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of Religion**

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# The Encyclopedia of Religion

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# The Encyclopedia of Religion



Mircea Eliade

EDITOR IN CHIEF

Volume 6

Archbishop Mitty High School  
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# Abbreviations and Symbols Used in This Work

- abbr.** abbreviated;  
 abbreviation  
**abr.** abridged; abridgment  
**AD** *anno Domini*, in the  
 year of the (our) Lord  
**Afrik.** Afrikaans  
**AH** *anno Hegirae*, in the  
 year of the Hijrah  
**Akk.** Akkadian  
**Ala.** Alabama  
**Alb.** Albanian  
**Am.** Amos  
**AM** *ante meridiem*, before  
 noon  
**amend.** amended;  
 amendment  
**annot.** annotated;  
 annotation  
**Ap.** *Apocalypse*  
**Apn.** *Apocryphon*  
**app.** appendix  
**Arab.** Arabic  
*'Arakh.* *'Arakhin*  
**Aram.** Aramaic  
**Ariz.** Arizona  
**Ark.** Arkansas  
**Arm.** Armenian  
**art.** article (pl., arts.)  
**AS** Anglo-Saxon  
**Asm. Mos.** *Assumption of*  
*Moses*  
**Assyr.** Assyrian  
**A.S.S.R.** Autonomous Soviet  
 Socialist Republic  
**Av.** Avestan  
*'A.Z.* *'Avodah zarah*  
**b.** born  
**Bab.** Babylonian  
**Ban.** Bantu  
**1 Bar.** *1 Baruch*  
**2 Bar.** *2 Baruch*  
**3 Bar.** *3 Baruch*  
**4 Bar.** *4 Baruch*  
**B.B.** *Bava' batra'*  
**BBC** British Broadcasting  
 Corporation  
**bc** before Christ  
**BCE** before the common era  
**B.D.** Bachelor of Divinity  
**Beits.** *Beitsah*  
**Bekh.** *Bekhorot*  
**Beng.** Bengali  
**Ber.** *Berakhot*  
**Berb.** Berber  
**Bik.** *Bikkurim*  
**bk.** book (pl., bks.)  
**B.M.** *Bava' metsi'a'*  
**BP** before the present  
**B.Q.** *Bava' qamma'*  
**Bräh.** *Brähmaṇa*  
**Bret.** Breton  
**B.T.** Babylonian Talmud  
**Bulg.** Bulgarian  
**Burm.** Burmese  
**c.** *circa*, about,  
 approximately  
**Calif.** California  
**Can.** Canaanite  
**Catal.** Catalan  
**CE** of the common era  
**Celt.** Celtic  
**cf.** *confer*, compare  
**Chald.** Chaldean  
**chap.** chapter (pl., chaps.)  
**Chin.** Chinese  
**C.H.M.** Community of the  
 Holy Myrrhbearers  
**1 Chr.** *1 Chronicles*  
**2 Chr.** *2 Chronicles*  
**Ch. Slav.** Church Slavic  
**cm** centimeters  
**col.** column (pl., cols.)  
**Col.** *Colossians*  
**Colo.** Colorado  
**comp.** compiler (pl.,  
 comps.)  
**Conn.** Connecticut  
**cont.** continued  
**Copt.** Coptic  
**1 Cor.** *1 Corinthians*  
**2 Cor.** *2 Corinthians*  
**corr.** corrected  
**C.S.P.** *Congregatio Sancti*  
*Pauli*, Congregation of  
 Saint Paul (Paulists)  
**d.** died  
**D** Deuteronomic (source of  
 the Pentateuch)  
**Dan.** Danish  
**D.B.** *Divinitatis*  
*Baccalaureus*, Bachelor of  
 Divinity  
**D.C.** District of Columbia  
**D.D.** *Divinitatis Doctor*,  
 Doctor of Divinity  
**Del.** Delaware  
**Dem.** *Dema'i*  
**dim.** diminutive  
**diss.** dissertation  
**Dn.** *Daniel*  
**D.Phil.** Doctor of  
 Philosophy  
**Dt.** *Deuteronomy*  
**Du.** Dutch  
**E** Elohist (source of the  
 Pentateuch)  
**Eccl.** *Ecclesiastes*  
**ed.** editor (pl., eds.); edition;  
 edited by  
*'Eduy.* *'Eduyyot*  
 e.g. *exempli gratia*, for  
 example  
**Egyp.** Egyptian  
**1 En.** *1 Enoch*  
**2 En.** *2 Enoch*  
**3 En.** *3 Enoch*  
**Eng.** English  
**enl.** enlarged  
**Eph.** *Ephesians*  
*'Eruv.* *'Eruvin*  
**1 Esd.** *1 Esdras*  
**2 Esd.** *2 Esdras*  
**3 Esd.** *3 Esdras*  
**4 Esd.** *4 Esdras*  
**esp.** especially  
**Est.** Estonian  
**Est.** *Esther*  
**et al.** *et alii*, and others  
**etc.** *et cetera*, and so forth  
**Eth.** Ethiopic  
**EV** English version  
**Ex.** *Exodus*  
**exp.** expanded  
**Ez.** *Ezekiel*  
**Ezr.** *Ezra*  
**2 Ezr.** *2 Ezra*  
**4 Ezr.** *4 Ezra*  
**f.** feminine; and following  
 (pl., ff.)  
**fasc.** fascicle (pl., fascs.)  
**fig.** figure (pl., figs.)  
**Finn.** Finnish  
**fl.** *floruit*, flourished  
**Fla.** Florida  
**Fr.** French  
**frag.** fragment  
**ft.** feet  
**Ga.** Georgia  
**Gal.** *Galatians*  
**Gaul.** Gaulish  
**Ger.** German  
**Git.** *Gitin*  
**Gn.** *Genesis*  
**Gr.** Greek  
**Hag.** *Hagigah*  
**Hal.** *Hallah*  
**Hau.** Hausa  
**Hb.** *Habakkuk*  
**Heb.** Hebrew  
**Heb.** Hebrews  
**Hg.** *Haggai*  
**Hitt.** Hittite  
**Hor.** *Horayot*  
**Hos.** *Hosea*  
**Hul.** *Hullin*  
**Hung.** Hungarian  
**ibid.** *ibidem*, in the same  
 place (as the one  
 immediately preceding)  
**Icel.** Icelandic  
**i.e.** *id est*, that is  
**IE** Indo-European  
**Ill.** Illinois  
**Ind.** Indiana  
**intro.** introduction  
**Ir. Gael.** Irish Gaelic  
**Iran.** Iranian  
**Is.** *Isaiah*  
**Ital.** Italian  
**J** Yahvist (source of the  
 Pentateuch)  
**Jas.** *James*  
**Jav.** Javanese  
**Jb.** *Job*  
**Jdt.** *Judith*  
**Jer.** *Jeremiah*  
**Jgs.** *Judges*  
**Jl.** *Joel*  
**Jn.** *John*  
**1 Jn.** *1 John*  
**2 Jn.** *2 John*  
**3 Jn.** *3 John*  
**Jon.** *Jonah*  
**Jos.** *Joshua*  
**Jpn.** Japanese  
**JPS** Jewish Publication  
 Society translation (1985)  
 of the Hebrew Bible  
**J.T.** Jerusalem Talmud  
**Jub.** *Jubilees*  
**Kans.** Kansas  
**Kel.** *Kelim*

- Ker.** *Keritot*  
**Ket.** *Ketubbot*  
**1 Kgs.** *1 Kings*  
**2 Kgs.** *2 Kings*  
**Khois.** Khoisan  
**Kil.** *Kil'ayim*  
**km** kilometers  
**Kor.** Korean  
**Ky.** Kentucky  
**l.** line (pl., ll.)  
**La.** Louisiana  
**Lam.** *Lamentations*  
**Lat.** Latin  
**Latv.** Latvian  
**L. en Th.** Licencié  
 en Théologie, Licentiate  
 in Theology  
**L. ès L.** Licencié ès Lettres,  
 Licentiate in Literature  
**Let. Jer.** *Letter of Jeremiah*  
**lit.** literally  
**Lith.** Lithuanian  
**Lk.** *Luke*  
**LL** Late Latin  
**LL.D.** Legum Doctor,  
 Doctor of Laws  
**Lv.** *Leviticus*  
**m** meters  
**m.** masculine  
**M.A.** Master of Arts  
**Ma'as.** *Ma'aserot*  
**Ma'as. Sh.** *Ma'aser sheni*  
**Mak.** *Makkot*  
**Makh.** *Makhshirin*  
**Mal.** *Malachi*  
**Mar.** Marathi  
**Mass.** Massachusetts  
**1 Mc.** *1 Maccabees*  
**2 Mc.** *2 Maccabees*  
**3 Mc.** *3 Maccabees*  
**4 Mc.** *4 Maccabees*  
**Md.** Maryland  
**M.D.** *Medicinae Doctor*,  
 Doctor of Medicine  
**ME** Middle English  
**Meg.** *Megillah*  
**Me'il.** *Me'ilah*  
**Men.** *Menahot*  
**MHG** Middle High German  
**mi.** miles  
**Mi.** *Micah*  
**Mich.** Michigan  
**Mid.** *Middot*  
**Minn.** Minnesota  
**Miq.** *Miqva'ot*  
**MIran.** Middle Iranian  
**Miss.** Mississippi  
**Mk.** *Mark*  
**Mo.** Missouri  
**Mo'ed Q.** *Mo'ed qatan*  
**Mont.** Montana  
**MPers.** Middle Persian  
**MS.** *manuscriptum*,  
 manuscript (pl., MSS)  
**Mt.** *Matthew*  
**MT** Masoretic text  
**n.** note  
**Na.** *Nahum*  
**Nah.** Nahuatl  
**Naz.** *Nazir*
- N.B.** *nota bene*, take careful  
 note  
**N.C.** North Carolina  
**n.d.** no date  
**N.Dak.** North Dakota  
**NEB** New English Bible  
**Nebr.** Nebraska  
**Ned.** *Nedarim*  
**Neg.** *Nega'im*  
**Neh.** *Nehemiah*  
**Nev.** Nevada  
**N.H.** New Hampshire  
**Nid.** *Niddah*  
**N.J.** New Jersey  
**Nm.** *Numbers*  
**N.Mex.** New Mexico  
**no.** number (pl., nos.)  
**Nor.** Norwegian  
**n.p.** no place  
**n.s.** new series  
**N.Y.** New York  
**Ob.** *Obadiah*  
**O.Cist.** *Ordo*  
*Cisterciencium*, Order of  
 Cîteaux (Cistercians)  
**OCS** Old Church Slavonic  
**OE** Old English  
**O.F.M.** *Ordo Fratrum*  
*Minorum*, Order of Friars  
 Minor (Franciscans)  
**OFr.** Old French  
**Ohal.** *Ohalot*  
**OHG** Old High German  
**OIr.** Old Irish  
**OIran.** Old Iranian  
**Okla.** Oklahoma  
**ON** Old Norse  
**O.P.** *Ordo Praedicatorum*,  
 Order of Preachers  
 (Dominicans)  
**OPers.** Old Persian  
**op. cit.** *opere citato*, in the  
 work cited  
**OPrus.** Old Prussian  
**Oreg.** Oregon  
**'Orl.** *'Orlah*  
**O.S.B.** *Ordo Sancti*  
*Benedicti*, Order of Saint  
 Benedict (Benedictines)  
**p.** page (pl., pp.)  
**P** Priestly (source of the  
 Pentateuch)  
**Pa.** Pennsylvania  
**Pahl.** Pahlavi  
**Par.** *Parah*  
**para.** paragraph (pl., paras.)  
**Pers.** Persian  
**Pes.** *Pesahim*  
**Ph.D.** *Philosophiae Doctor*,  
 Doctor of Philosophy  
**Phil.** *Philippians*  
**Phlm.** *Philemon*  
**Phoen.** Phoenician  
**pl.** plural; plate (pl., pls.)  
**PM** *post meridiem*, after  
 noon  
**Pol.** Polish  
**pop.** population  
**Port.** Portuguese  
**Prv.** *Proverbs*
- Ps.** *Psalms*  
**Ps. 151** *Psalms 151*  
**Ps. Sol.** *Psalms of Solomon*  
**pt.** part (pl., pts.)  
**1 Pt.** *1 Peter*  
**2 Pt.** *2 Peter*  
**Pth.** Parthian  
**Q** hypothetical source of the  
 synoptic Gospels  
**Qid.** *Qiddushin*  
**Qin.** *Qinnim*  
**r.** reigned; ruled  
**Rab.** *Rabbah*  
**rev.** revised  
**R. ha-Sh.** *Ro'sh ha-shanah*  
**R.I.** Rhode Island  
**Rom.** Romanian  
**Rom.** *Romans*  
**R.S.C.J.** *Societas*  
*Sacratissimi Cordis Jesu*,  
 Religious of the Sacred  
 Heart  
**RSV** Revised Standard  
 Version of the Bible  
**Ru.** *Ruth*  
**Rus.** Russian  
**Rv.** *Revelation*  
**Rv. Ezr.** *Revelation of Ezra*  
**San.** *Sanhedrin*  
**S.C.** South Carolina  
**Scot. Gael.** Scottish Gaelic  
**S.Dak.** South Dakota  
**sec.** section (pl., secs.)  
**Sem.** Semitic  
**ser.** series  
**sg.** singular  
**Sg.** *Song of Songs*  
**Sg. of 3** *Prayer of Azariah*  
*and the Song of the Three*  
*Young Men*  
**Shab.** *Shabbat*  
**Shav.** *Shavu'ot*  
**Sheq.** *Sheqalim*  
**Sib. Or.** *Sibylline Oracles*  
**Sind.** Sindhi  
**Sinh.** Sinhala  
**Sir.** *Ben Sira*  
**S.J.** *Societas Jesu*, Society  
 of Jesus (Jesuits)  
**Skt.** Sanskrit  
**1 Sm.** *1 Samuel*  
**2 Sm.** *2 Samuel*  
**Sogd.** Sogdian  
**Soṭ** *Soṭah*  
**sp.** species (pl., spp.)  
**Span.** Spanish  
**sq.** square  
**S.S.R.** Soviet Socialist  
 Republic  
**st.** stanza (pl., ss.)  
**S.T.M.** *Sacrae Theologiae*  
*Magister*, Master of Sacred  
 Theology  
**Suk.** *Sukkah*  
**Sum.** Sumerian  
**supp.** supplement;  
 supplementary  
**Sus.** *Susanna*  
**s.v.** *sub verbo*, under the  
 word (pl., s.v.v.)
- Swed.** Swedish  
**Syr.** Syriac  
**Syr. Men.** *Syriac Menander*  
**Ta'an.** *Ta'anit*  
**Tam.** Tamil  
**Tam.** *Tamid*  
**Tb.** *Tobit*  
**T.D.** *Taishō shinshū*  
*daizōkyō*, edited by  
 Takakusu Junjirō et al.  
 (Tokyo, 1922–1934)  
**Tem.** *Temurah*  
**Tenn.** Tennessee  
**Ter.** *Terumot*  
**Tev. Y.** *Tevul yom*  
**Tex.** Texas  
**Th.D.** *Theologicae Doctor*,  
 Doctor of Theology  
**1 Thes.** *1 Thessalonians*  
**2 Thes.** *2 Thessalonians*  
**Thrac.** Thracian  
**Ti.** *Titus*  
**Tib.** Tibetan  
**1 Tm.** *1 Timothy*  
**2 Tm.** *2 Timothy*  
**T. of 12** *Testaments of the*  
*Twelve Patriarchs*  
**Toh.** *Ṭohorot*  
**Tong.** Tongan  
**trans.** translator,  
 translators; translated by;  
 translation  
**Turk.** Turkish  
**Ukr.** Ukrainian  
**Upan.** *Upaniṣad*  
**U.S.** United States  
**U.S.S.R.** Union of Soviet  
 Socialist Republics  
**Uqts.** *Uqtsin*  
**v.** verse (pl., vv.)  
**Va.** Virginia  
**var.** variant; variation  
**Viet.** Vietnamese  
**viz.** *videlicet*, namely  
**vol.** volume (pl., vols.)  
**Vt.** Vermont  
**Wash.** Washington  
**Wel.** Welsh  
**Wis.** Wisconsin  
**Wis.** *Wisdom of Solomon*  
**W.Va.** West Virginia  
**Wyo.** Wyoming  
**Yad.** *Yadayim*  
**Yev.** *Yevamot*  
**Yi.** Yiddish  
**Yor.** Yoruba  
**Zav.** *Zavim*  
**Zec.** *Zechariah*  
**Zep.** *Zephaniah*  
**Zev.** *Zevahim*
- \* hypothetical  
 ? uncertain; possibly;  
 perhaps  
 ° degrees  
 + plus  
 – minus  
 = equals; is equivalent to  
 × by; multiplied by  
 → yields

# G

(CONTINUED)



**GOD.** [This entry consists of five articles that discuss ideas and images of God in monotheistic traditions:

- God in the Hebrew Scriptures
- God in the New Testament
- God in Postbiblical Judaism
- God in Postbiblical Christianity
- God in Islam

Directly related is the entry Attributes of God. For broad discussions in cross-cultural perspective, see Deity; Monotheism; Pantheism and Panentheism; Theism; and Transcendence and Immanence. For other views of deity, see Goddess Worship; Gods and Goddesses; and Polytheism.]

## God in the Hebrew Scriptures

The God of Israel is the major character in the Hebrew scriptures. Although he is not mentioned in the *Book of Esther* or in the *Song of Songs*, God appears in all the remaining twenty-two books of the Hebrew Bible. Within these books God is depicted as creator, provider, and lawgiver. Most of the writers assume that he is just, that he has a special relation with the people of Israel, and that he hearkens to prayer. But because the Bible is not a systematic theological treatise and because not all internal contradictions were removed by its editors, we find major disagreements among the writers about the crucial elements of Israelite faith, including concepts of God.

**Biblical Terminology of the Divine.** The proper name of the God whose exclusive worship is demanded by the biblical authors is written consonantly as *YHVH*. This tetragrammaton, attested more than 6,600 times in the Bible, also occurs on the Moabite Stone (ninth century BCE) and in several ancient Hebrew letters and inscriptions. Vocalized biblical texts do not preserve the actual pronunciation of *YHVH*. Instead, they direct the reader to pronounce the divine name as though it were the frequent epithet *adonai*, meaning "lord." (It was the mis-

understanding of this scribal convention that gave rise to the English form *Jehovah*.) The original pronunciation of *YHVH* is generally reconstructed as "Yahveh" or "Yahweh," on the basis of early Greek transcriptions. A shorter form, *YH*, generally considered secondary, is found 24 times in the Hebrew scriptures. In proper names, the theophoric element is never written as *-yhvh* but as *-yh* or *-yhv*.

The name *YHVH* occurs frequently in the compound *yhvh tsv't* (*yahveh tseva'ot*). Usually translated as "lord of hosts," its exact significance is uncertain. Most likely it means either "creator of the [heavenly] hosts" or "Yahveh is the [armed] host of Israel." *YHVH* is also sometimes combined with *elohim*, the most common generic word for "god," in the form *Yahveh Elohim*. The term *elohim* appears some 2,600 times in the Hebrew scriptures, and, although in form the word is plural, it is often construed with a singular verb. Most commonly, *Elohim* refers to the God of Israel and is thus synonymous with or interchangeable with *Yahveh*. Certain writers, in particular the author of the so-called Elohistic source of the Pentateuch and the composers of certain Psalms, preferred *Elohim* to *Yahveh* as the proper name of the God of Israel.

Even when *Elohim* refers to the God of Israel, it can be treated as a plural (*Gn.* 20:13). Most frequently, however, the plural references are to gods whose worship by Israelites is condemned by the biblical authors. These are referred to as *elohim aherim* ("other gods"; *Ex.* 20:3, *Dt.* 5:7) and *elohim hadashim* ("new gods"; *Jgs.* 5:8). Similar are expressions in which the plural construction is employed. Examples are *elohei ha-nekhar* ("foreign gods"; *Gn.* 35:2, *Jos.* 24:20) and *elohei nekhar ha-arets* ("foreign gods of the land"; *Dt.* 31:16). It must be noted that the Hebrew writers employ the singular sense of *elohim* even when illicit divinities such as Ashtarte, Milcom, and Chemosh are meant (*1 Kgs.* 11:5, 11:33).

Because *elohim* is antithetical to *anashim* ("people";

see *Jgs.* 9:13), it can include gradations between the two categories of divinity and humanity. Among these are ghosts (*1 Sm.* 28:13, *Is.* 8:19) and minor divinities (*Gn.* 32:29, 48:15–16). The term can also serve in adjectival expressions of might, power, and the like. Among such examples are *ruah elohim* (“mighty wind”; *Gn.* 1:2), *nesi' elohim* (“great prince”; *Gn.* 23:6), *naftulei elohim* (“violent struggles”; *Gn.* 30:8), *hittat elohim* (“terror”; *Gn.* 35:5), *herdat elohim* (“panic”; *1 Sm.* 14:15), *kis'akha elohim* (“your eternal throne”; *Ps.* 45:7), and *har elohim* (“majestic mountain”; *Ps.* 68:16). In addition, *elohim* can mean “happenstance,” as in *etsba' elohim* (*Ex.* 8:15), and, frequently, “nature” in the late book *Ecclesiastes*.

Related etymologically to *elohim* is the shorter form *eloah*, construed solely as a grammatical singular. Most of its occurrences are in the later books of the Hebrew scriptures, although it is found also in the archaic poem in *Deuteronomy* (32:15, 32:17). The word occurs almost exclusively in poetry and never with the definite article. With the exception of two passages in *Daniel* (11:38–39), *eloah*, in contrast to *elohim*, does not refer to foreign divinities but has the virtual status of a proper name for the God of Israel.

Another important scriptural designation of divinity is *el*, whose function corresponds generally to that of *elohim*. The word has numerous cognates in the classical Semitic languages and is attested some 230 times in the Hebrew scriptures in the singular as well as the plural, *elim*. Like *Elohim*, *El* can substitute for *Yahveh* as a proper name for the God of Israel, its most common use (*Nm.* 12:13, 23:8, 23:19; *Is.* 8:8, 8:10). The Hebrew word *el* can take the definite article and appear as *ha'el*, “the god” (*Gn.* 46:3, *Ps.* 85:9). It can also refer to pagan deities in such forms as *el zar* (“strange god”; *Ps.* 44:21, 81:10), *el aher* (“other god”; *Ex.* 34:14), and *el nekhar* (“foreign god”; *Mal.* 2:11, *Ps.* 81:10).

Unlike *elohim*, *el* has clear antecedents in older Semitic languages. Early documents from Ebla (modern-day Tel Mardik) in central Syria and from Mesopotamia show that the closely related *ilu* was used in Akkadian for “god” as well as for the proper name of a high god. Chronologically closer to first-millennium Israel are the texts from Ugarit in northern Syria, which employ *el* for “god” in general and also for the head of the Canaanite pantheon. *El* was known for wisdom and beneficence as well as for his exploits with sex and alcohol. He was a healer and creator god who was sometimes depicted as a bull. Some biblical passages that mention *el* refer to this god (*Is.* 14:13, *Ez.* 28:2, *Hos.* 12:6). [See article on *El*.]

Because the *Yahveh* cult appropriated the name of *El* to its own object of worship, we cannot always tell whether an *el* reference in a biblical text is to the Ca-

naanite *El*, to *Yahveh*, to a blend of both, or to another divinity entirely. Among the problematic occurrences is *el ro'i*, “the god who sees me” or “*El* who sees me” (*Gn.* 16:13). The name *El Bet-'El* (*Gn.* 31:13) is even more problematic, because a divinity named *Beth-'el*, doubtless the hypostasis of a shrine, was worshiped in Samaria in the eighth century (*Hos.* 10:15, 12:5), in Tyre in the seventh century, and at Elephantine in Egypt in the fifth century. Similar difficulties attend the proper understanding of *el shaddai* (*Gn.* 17:1, 28:3; *Ex.* 6:3), which occurs as well in the form *shaddai* (*Nm.* 24:4, 24:16; *Ez.* 1:24; *Jb.*, *passim*). Earlier attempts to connect *El Shaddai* with the Amorite *Bel Shade* (“lord of the mountains”) have been disproved. Recently published texts in Aramaic from Deir 'Alla in Jordan refer to *shaddayin*—divinities. Whether this discovery will shed some light on the biblical *el shaddai* remains to be seen. There has been a great deal of scholarly discussion of the name *El 'Elyon* (*Gn.* 14:18; *Ps.* 78:35). It is uncertain whether the name should be rendered “God most high” or “*El* most high” and whether the name itself is a blend of two originally distinct non-Israelite divinities. Finally, a divinity named *El Berit* had a temple at Shechem (modern-day Nablus). The name might be translated as “god of the covenant” or “*El* of the covenant”.

**Biblical View of the Origins of the Worship of YHVH.** The original meaning of the name *YHVH* is unknown to modern scholars. Only one biblical writer, the author of *Exodus* 3:14, attempted an explanation, by relating the name to the verb *hayah* (“be, exist”): “and *YHVH* said . . . say unto the children of Israel: ‘I am’ hath sent me unto you.”

The biblical writers differ among themselves as to when the worship of *Yahveh* originated. According to *Genesis* 4, Eve knew God by the name *Yahveh*, and her two sons, Cain and Abel, brought him sacrifices. Verse 26 of that same chapter tells us that in the days of Enosh (Hebrew for “person”), grandson of Adam, the name *Yahveh* began to be invoked. In other words, God was worshiped as soon as there was a human community. In contrast, the author of *Exodus* 6, commonly identified as the Priestly writer (of the P source) denies that Israel’s ancestors knew God by this name (*Ex.* 6:3). Instead, he asserts that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob knew their God as *El Shaddai* and that the name *Yahveh* was only first revealed to Moses. Though most scholars regard the P source as one of the latest documents, there is something to be said here for its reliability. It is unlikely that the writer would have originated the claim that the ancestors did not know the proper name of the ancestral god.

Extrabiblical data have not resolved the question of

the origin of Yahveh worship. Similarities in the cultures and languages of first-millennium Israel and third-millennium Ebla, as well as second-millennium Mari, have led some scholars to interpret elements of personal names in texts emanating from these areas as references to Yahveh. These interpretations have not won general acceptance. The same holds for the fragmentary mention of a god called Yv at late second-millennium Ugarit. Perhaps the most promising clue comes from a location named Yhv' in the Negev or the Sinai desert mentioned in Egyptian sources from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries BCE. These references lend some support to the Midianite or Kenite hypothesis that makes much of the biblical traditions that Yahveh revealed himself to Moses in Midianite territory (*Ex.* 3) and that the father-in-law of Moses was a Midianite priest (*Ex.* 2) who taught Moses how to administer divine law (*Ex.* 18).

**The Historical Problem of Israelite Monotheism.** Scholars are in agreement that Judaism was a monotheistic religion by the end of the Babylonian exile (c. 539 BCE). Most also agree that Jewish monotheism was greatly encouraged by the preachings of the preexilic prophets. The Hebrew scriptures in their present form are colored by the belief that Yahveh was the sole legitimate object of Israelite worship from earliest times. In consequence, the biblical depiction of Yahveh worship presents the unusual situation of a people who seem to have disregarded for centuries what is in retrospect said to have been their official religion. The German scholar Julius Wellhausen ([1885] 1957) argued that the official religion of Israel had been originally polytheistic and that Yahveh had been a national god to whom every Israelite owed allegiance. In this respect, Yahveh did not differ from the Moabite god Chemosh or the Assyrian Ashur. The Bible notes time and time again that Israelites worshiped other gods alongside Yahveh. According to Wellhausen, no one viewed this as problematic until the rise of classical prophecy, in the eighth century BCE. Yahveh, proclaimed the prophets, would punish unethical behavior on Israel's part by bringing foreigners against them. In order to make this threat credible, Yahveh had to grow in power at the expense of all other divinities.

Only with the fall of Judah (in 587/6 BCE), in Wellhausen's analysis, did the contrite Jewish masses begin to accept that the prophets had been right. The dispersion of Yahveh's people all over the world proved that Yahveh was a universal God and, finally, the sole God in existence. The exilic prophet "Second Isaiah" was the most articulate representative of this thoroughgoing monotheism. Under the influence of his and similar teachings, the bulk of the Pentateuch was composed,

and the early prophetic and historical writings were reshaped. In other words, what the Hebrew scriptures present is largely retrojection of monotheistic beliefs of the exilic and postexilic periods onto true early Israelite religion.

In contrast to Wellhausen, other scholars, such as William F. Albright (1957) and, especially, Yehezkel Kaufmann (1970), argued that monotheism was Mosaic in origin and was Israel's official religion. These scholars generally accept the Bible's judgment that much of Israelite attention to other gods was sinful. Kaufmann, however, departs from this consensus. He argues that the prophets, in condemning Israelite idolatry, were in fact polemicizing against vestigial fetishism. The fact that their opposition was more often directed against "idolatry," the worship of "wood and stone," rather than against real gods was for Kaufmann highly significant. According to his theory, the monotheistic revolution fomented by Moses had so thoroughly eradicated polytheism from Israel that most Israelites no longer understood the myth, ritual, and magic practiced by their pagan neighbors. Aside from some government-sponsored or -tolerated exceptions, the Israelites were never guilty of more than leftover superstition. To the zealous prophets, however, these venial sins warranted Yahveh's harshest punishments. The correctness of the prophetic position was demonstrated, at least to the prophets, by Israel's political defeats.

**Israelite monolatry.** We have seen that the biblical writers (as well as modern scholars) disagree about the period in which the explicit worship of the one God began. There is no disagreement, however, that the Bible requires that the people Israel serve God exclusively. Various early formulations of God's demand for exclusive worship connect it with the Exodus from Egypt, an event that, if exaggerated in magnitude, clearly has some historical basis (*Ex.* 20:2–3, *Hos.* 13:4, *Ps.* 81:10–11). According to the Pentateuch, a covenant (*berit*) between God and Israel was concluded through the mediation of Moses at the mountain variously called "Sinai," "Horeb," and "the mountain of God." This covenant bound Israel to Yahveh's exclusive service and carried with it the obligations that were understood as the Law. (*Ex.* 19–24, 34; *Dt.* 5). An additional covenant to the same effect was made in the plains of Moab (*Dt.* 29–30). *Joshua* 24 describes how Joshua caused his people to conclude a covenant for God's exclusive worship at Shechem (without reference to any Mosaic precedent). None of these covenant traditions insists that Yahveh is the sole god in existence, yet each maintains that Israel is bound to serve him alone.

Some of the early prophets, such as Amos and Isaiah, do not employ the covenant theme explicitly, but they

likewise insist on Yahveh's demand to be worshiped by Israel to the exclusion of all other gods. That demand is best described as *monolatry*, a form of worship in which only one god is served but the existence of others is not denied. Monolatrous worship is, in theory, compatible with polytheism. [For discussion of these terms, see Henotheism.]

Monolatry was not unknown in the ancient Near East. In the fourteenth century BCE, Akhenaten, King of Egypt, had inaugurated a solar monolatry in which the royal family worshiped the Aton, the sun disk, to the exclusion of Egypt's traditional gods. Mesopotamian mythology describes the temporary worship of a single god in an emergency. In addition, ancient Near Eastern prayer literature regularly employed monolatrous language. A worshiper would approach various gods in turn with the declaration that each one was the only proper object of worship. Sometimes the suppliant went as far as saying that the other gods were no more than attributes or bodily limbs of the god addressed. Undoubtedly at the moment of utterance, these pious statements were meant sincerely, although their intent was not to invalidate the worship of other gods.

Yet the fact that monolatry was found outside of Israel does not explain why it was deemed so important in Israel. The books of the Bible agree that Israel's tenure in its own land depended on the exclusive worship of Yahveh. In spite of Yahveh's reminders tendered by his servants the prophets, the people insisted on worshipping other gods (2 Kgs. 17:7–23, Jer. 25:3–11), with whom they were supposed to have no relation (Ex. 23:32; Jer. 7:9). The fall of Samaria in 722 BCE and the fall of Judah in 587/6 BCE were caused, according to the biblical writers, by failure to adhere to the covenant with Yahveh.

The covenant, it must be understood, was integral to the very identity of the Israelites as a political entity. It was the god Yahveh who was credited with bringing out from Egypt those descendants of Egyptian slaves and native dissidents who were to constitute the people Israel. Through Yahveh, this new group was to acquire its own land, independent of the Egypto-Canaanite political system. This granting of land by Yahveh to his people was also described by the metaphor of *berit*, or "covenant," and was modeled after the international treaty formulas of the second millennium BCE. In Israelite theory, all the land belonged to Yahveh, who assigned it to his people in terms similar to those found in Hittite suzerainty treaties, in which the "great king" demanded sole allegiance from his clients. In its religious adaptation, the covenant notion meant that Israel was to serve Yahveh alone. The Hittite kings demanded exclusive allegiance because they knew that their

clients might turn to other kings. Yahveh's representatives, who acknowledged the existence of other gods with whom one might be tempted to make a similar covenant (Ex. 23:32), demanded analogous exclusive allegiance. In addition, the covenant with Yahveh served as the theological expression of the mundane political union between the Canaanite natives and the outsiders who together made up Israel, a process described in *Joshua* 24. It may be noted that the setting of this chapter is Shechem, the scene of successful and unsuccessful coalitions with Canaanites (see *Gn.* 34 and *Jgs.* 8–9).

**God in covenant and history.** Because it had emerged in historical circumstances, the covenant metaphor imparted to the Israelite cult a far greater concern with "history" than was found in the other cults of the ancient Near East. The "triumphs of Yahveh" (*Jgs.* 5:11), as they are called in the ancient Song of Deborah, were more focused on human life than were Baal's victories over death and aridity. It is not that the gods of the other nations were not concerned with history nor that Yahveh was not concerned with nature. Rather, the degree of emphasis was markedly different in Israel in that Israelite writers were more likely to produce tales of Yahveh's political triumphs than to produce tales of his cosmic ones.

The relative space given in the Bible to God's "mythical" and "historical" deeds is very instructive. Several poetic passages refer to divine combat with a sea monster in which Yahveh vanquishes his foes in the manner of the Babylonian Marduk, the Canaanite Baal, and the Hittite Iluyankas (*Is.* 27:1, 30:7, 51:9–10; *Hb.* 3:8; *Ps.* 74:13–14, 89:10–11, 93:1–4; *Jb.* 26:10–14). The first eleven chapters of *Genesis* contain accounts of God's creation of the world by fiat in the manner of the Egyptian Ptah, the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden, the descent of the ancient heroes from the fallen divinities, and the great flood. Most of the biblical text, however, concentrates on God's relation to humanity and, especially, to Israel. The Bible is unique among the preserved literature of the ancient Near East in the extent to which a god is involved in human institutions. Thus although there are references to ritual instructions in Egyptian divine books and Mesopotamian accounts of the divine revelation of exorcisms and incantations, these are the exception. The well-known Code of Hammurabi of Babylon (1792–1750 BCE) contains numerous parallels to biblical law, but it is the king, and not the god of justice, who claims credit for its composition.

The Bible claims divine jurisdiction over all areas of life in a more thorough and consistent manner than do all other extant ancient Near Eastern sources. Although Babylonian legal collections such as Hammurabi's Code or the Laws of Eshnunna, for example, show close par-

allels to laws in the Pentateuch, the context is different. Thus, Hammurabi claims that the gods had called on him to establish justice and so he, the king, enacted the laws. In contrast, in the Hebrew Bible the claim is made that all laws governing all Israelite institutions and all personal relations were divinely revealed to Moses at Yahveh's sacred mountain. Every human action, even when wickedly intended, such as the sale of Joseph by his brothers, is part of the divine plan (*Gen.* 45:5, 50:19–20). Unlike the Akkadian speaker who could describe actions performed *lā libbi ilāni* ("without divine consent"), the Hebrew could refer only to divine disapproval.

The exclusive worship of Yahveh was the religious expression of the political and social factors that had brought Israel into existence. The demand to serve Yahveh alone came to the fore in the settlement of the land, in the formation of the monarchy under Saul (eleventh century BCE), in the purge of the house of Omri under Jehu (r. 842–815 BCE), in the anti-Assyrianism of Hezekiah (r. 715–686 BCE), and in the expansionism of Josiah (r. 640–609 BCE). It reached its logical conclusion, monotheism, in the exilic preachments of "Second Isaiah" and in the reconstitution of the postexilic community of the fifth century BCE.

**The persistence of polytheism.** At the same time, a number of factors undermined Yahvistic monolatry from the beginning. First, the people who made up Israel were themselves of diverse origin and could not easily forsake their ancestral gods (see *Jos.* 24). Second, monolatry does not deny the existence of the many divinities. As normalcy set in, the old gods whose existence had never been denied reasserted themselves; the international interests of the monarchy and of commerce also encouraged tolerance of other gods.

It should also be recalled that polytheism made sense in the ancient world. It was not until long after the Babylonian exile that such concepts as "nature" and "universe," which Greek thinkers formulated, began to make an impact in the Middle East. Israelite worship of gods and goddesses reflects the difficulty that the average person must have had in assuming an underlying unity in what appears to be a collection of diverse forces often opposed one to another.

Many Israelites must have resisted monotheism because of its difficulty in accounting for unwarranted suffering. To be sure, the problem of theodicy had been raised by Mesopotamian thinkers long before the rise of Israel, but because polytheists could always blame divine injustice on rivalry among the gods, the problem never became so pointed as in the late biblical writings *Job* and *Ecclesiastes*. These postexilic works were written by authors who took for granted that Yahveh was

the sole god in existence. If that sole God was all-powerful and just at the same time, how could injustice persist? The author of *Job* answered that God was not omnipotent. The writer of *Ecclesiastes* answered that injustice was built into the system that God had set in motion.

**Theocracy.** The blending of gods and their characteristics is the salvation of monolatry and surely of monotheism. As increasing numbers of Israelites began to become consistent monolaters and monotheists, a process that took centuries, the figure of Yahveh began to absorb many of the functions and attributes of the older gods. We have seen that Yahveh assumed El's name in addition to that god's reputation for beneficence and wisdom. Yahveh likewise acquired Baal's thunderous voice (*1 Sm.* 2:10), his fructifying abilities (*Hos.* 2:10), and his title of "cloud rider" (*Ps.* 68:5).

The biblical writers did not, however, tolerate Yahveh's absorption of the attributes of Near Eastern goddesses. Instead, they condemned the widespread royal and popular worship of female deities. The mother of the pious king Asa (c. 913–873) had constructed an image of Asherah, and another representation of this same Canaanite "creator of the gods" stood in Yahveh's Jerusalem Temple until Josiah's time (*2 Kgs.* 21:7). In ancient Israel, Astarte remained popular in her classical form as well as in her Aramaean-Mesopotamian incarnation as "queen of heaven" (*Jer.* 7:18, 44:17ff.). The biblical depiction of the popularity of female divinities is corroborated by external evidence. Recent archaeological discoveries at Kuntillet 'Ajrud and Khirbet al-Qum have brought to light Hebrew inscriptions referring to "Yahveh of Teman and his Asherah." It is possible that *asherah* in these inscriptions had become a common noun meaning "consort." Finally, the Jews at Elephantine in the fifth century BCE knew a divinity called Anatyahu, an apparent androgynous blend of Yahveh with the ancient Canaanite goddess Anat.

Despite the popularity of female divinity, or perhaps because of it, biblical monolatry excluded the female presence. That the biblical writers personify Yahveh with masculine traits is probably a reflection of the power structure in Israelite society. The northern kingdom of Israel never had a reigning queen. Athaliah, the only reigning queen of the southern kingdom of Judah (842–837 BCE), had come to power under highly irregular circumstances (*2 Kgs.* 11:1–3). There were some women prophets, among them Miriam, Deborah, and Huldah, but no female priests.

**The Rise of Monotheism.** The present state of the evidence suggests that monolatry arose early in Israel but that monotheism was a late development. Throughout the early first millennium BCE, only a minority of Isra-

elites were consistent in their exclusive worship of Yahveh. To this tenacious minority we are indebted for the henotheistic concept of Yahveh that informs the earlier biblical books. The narratives of *Joshua* 24 and *Genesis* 35 reflect what must have been the majority view: to engage in the cult of Yahveh while images of other gods were present was defiling. Jeremiah assailed his contemporaries for committing crimes and then proceeding to Yahveh's temple and declaring that "we have been saved" (*Jer.* 7:9–10). Baal worship is among the enumerated crimes. Presumably the priesthood required of all entrants to the sanctuary the declaration that they served Yahveh alone, which at the moment they did, fulfilling the Decalogue's demand that "you shall have no other gods in my presence" (*Ex.* 20:3). The Temple priesthood was generally consistently monolatrous, although royal toleration and active support of other cults would have applied pressure on Yahveh priests to be flexible at times (*2 Kgs.* 1–8).

Some biblical writers took the existence of other gods for granted, though all agreed that Yahveh was superior to the other gods (*Gn.* 1:26, 3:22, 6:2; *Ex.* 12:12, 15:11; *Ps.* 82:1–8). Other writers, such as the prophets Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, spoke of Yahveh as the only proper object of Israelite worship, as the only divinity in control of earthly and heavenly events. Among the prophets, Second Isaiah was the most consistent monotheist, insisting that Yahveh was the sole god in existence (*Is.* 43:10–12, 44:6–8, 45:5–7, 45:18–22, 46:9). In general, the biblical monolaters believed the worship of Yahveh alone to be both an Israelite obligation and privilege. Others might worship their own gods (*Dt.* 4:19; *Mi.* 4:5–6). The monotheists required all peoples to forsake their ancestral gods and to worship Yahveh alone (*2 Kgs.* 5:17–18; *Is.* 44:6–20, 45:22; *Jer.* 10:12–16; *Zep.* 3:9; *Zec.* 14:9).

**Biblical Imagery of God.** Although many verbal images of Yahveh are found in the texts, the Bible in God's name prohibits the physical depiction of all divine images (*Ex.* 20:4, 34:17; *Dt.* 4:15–17, 5:8), even for use in the cult. Clearly, this prohibition was not universally observed (*Jgs.* 17:35). Some verbal divine imagery echoed Israel's roots in the Canaanite past. Yahveh was spoken of as a bull (*Gn.* 49:24; *Is.* 1:24; *Ps.* 132:2, 132:5), a further legacy from the Canaanite El, and was represented sculpturally as a bull or calf (*Ex.* 32:4–5, *1 Kgs.* 12:28, *Hos.* 8:6, *Ps.* 106:20).

According to one theory, no one could see Yahveh and remain alive (*Ex.* 32:23), but there were exceptions (*Ex.* 24:10–11; *Nm.* 12:8; *Is.* 6:1, 6:5). God is often described as humanlike (*Gn.* 1:27, 18:2) and with a face (*Ex.* 33:20), a back (*Ex.* 33:23), arms (*Dt.* 32:40), and legs

(*Na.* 1:3, *Zec.* 14:4; in *Exodus* 4:25, *legs* is a euphemism for Yahveh's genitals). As a warrior (*Ex.* 15:3, *Ps.* 24:8), God carries a bow (*Gn.* 9:13), arrows (*1 Sm.* 22:15), and a sword (*Dt.* 32:42). Second Isaiah says that Yahveh is indescribable (*Is.* 40:18, 40:25, 46:5) but dresses him in armor and a helmet (*Is.* 59:17). According to *Daniel* 7:9, God is old and has white hair. Other depictions refer to fire and smoke emanating from Yahveh's mouth and nose (*1 Sm.* 22:15) and to his thunderous voice (*Ex.* 20:18–19, *Ps.* 29:3–9, *Jb.* 40:9), images borrowed from the figure of Baal, the thunder god.

**God's kingship.** In many passages of the Hebrew scriptures, God is spoken of as king. We may distinguish two basic usages, Yahveh as king of the gods and Yahveh as king of Israel. The first meaning is rare but is attested in the verse "For YHVH is a great god, a great king over all the gods" (*Ps.* 95:3). More common is the notion of Yahveh's kingship over Israel (*Jgs.* 8:23; *1 Sm.* 8:7; *Is.* 41:21, 45:6) and over the world (*Ps.* 47:3, 93:1, 97:1). The gods of Assyria and Mesopotamia such as Marduk and Ashur were regularly spoken of as kings in relation to their own peoples and to the rest of the world. Like these gods, Yahveh as king was the divine enforcer of justice and equity, guardian of the rights of the defenseless widow and orphan. Like them as well, he controlled the nations of the world and regulated their movements for the benefit of the people to whom he was closest.

**God's presence.** Though God was generally not visible, he might manifest himself publicly in the *kavod*, a word usually translated "glory" but best rendered "person," or "self." The *kavod* of Yahveh showed Israel that Yahveh was present among them. Often this presence could be invited by cultic procedures (*Lv.* 9:6, 9:23). Frequently the *kavod* of Yahveh is associated with the wilderness tabernacle (*Ex.* 16:7, 16:10, 29:43, 40:34–35) and with the Jerusalem Temple (*1 Kgs.* 8:11; *Ez.* 43:2). Among Yahveh's cultic titles were *melekh ha-kavod* ("the king himself"; *Ps.* 24:7, 24:10) and *el ha-kavod* ("the god himself"; *Ps.* 29:3). Like its Akkadian counterpart *me-lammu* ("sheen"), the *kavod* of Yahveh is of intense luminosity (*Is.* 60:1–2, *Ez.* 43:2) and is often shielded by a cloud (*Ex.* 24:16, 40:34; *Ez.* 1:27–28). The *kavod* is sometimes spoken of as filling the entire earth (*Nm.* 14:21, *Is.* 6:3, *Ps.* 72:19).

**God's transcendence.** Yahveh is often described as *qadosh*, a term used of divinities in Ugaritic and Phoenician. Usually translated "holy," the basic meaning of *qadosh* is "set apart." God is thus not bound by time, space, or form nor by moral or ethical categories (*2 Sm.* 6:5–8). Yet because God serves as the guarantor of justice (*Jer.* 11:20), his divine justice could be questioned



(*Gn.* 18:25, *Jer.* 12:1, and most of *Jb.*) and even denied (*Eccl.* 8:15).

Yahveh is frequently referred to as a jealous god (*Ex.* 20:5, 35:14; *Dt.* 4:24, 5:9, 6:15; *Jos.* 24:19; *Na.* 1:2). In these instances, the term employed is a derivative of the verb root *qn'*. In a Babylonian text, the goddess Sarpanitum is described by the identical term. What is unique to the description of Yahveh is the action that activates Yahveh's jealousy (*qinn'ah*) most often—the worship of other gods. Sometimes Yahveh's jealousy results in unbridled punishment (*Dt.* 4:24, 6:15). At other times, it results in strict retributive justice and would better be translated as "zeal" (*Na.* 1:2–3). At still other times, "passion" or "ardor" would be better choices (*Is.* 9:6; *Zec.* 1:14, 8:2).

**God's emotions.** At the same time, God is also spoken of as being slow to anger (*Ex.* 34:6, *Nm.* 14:18, *Jl.* 2:13, *Na.* 1:3), forgiving of sin (*Jon.* 4:1), and the receiver of the penitent (*Hos.* 14:2; *Jer.* 3:12, 35:3; *Jl.* 2:12; *Zec.* 1:3; *Mal.* 3:7). The different views of Yahveh reflect not only the temperaments of the individual writers but the vicissitudes of Israel's history as well. Because Yahveh was so embedded in Israel's political and social life and institutions, the changes in Israel's fortune provoked different aspects of the divine character. Paradoxically, Yahveh is at once the most transcendent god of the ancient Near East and the most human. This is expressed most sharply in the prophetic writings of Hosea and Jeremiah. God's love for Israel is like that of a husband for a wife (*Hos.* 3:11). Unlike God's love, which is constant, Israel's is fickle (*Hos.* 3:1, *Jer.* 2:25). Yet both Hosea and Jeremiah emphasize that God's love will be great enough to overcome Israel's inconstancy and that God's relation to his people is eternal (*Hos.* 2:21, *Jer.* 32:40).

[For further historical and literary discussion of the Hebrew scriptures, see *Biblical Literature, article on Hebrew Scriptures*. See also *Israelite Religion for an extensive discussion of the context in which God was understood in the biblical period*.]

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S. DAVID SPERLING

### God in the New Testament

The New Testament enunciates no new God and no new doctrine of God. It proclaims that the God and Father of Jesus Christ is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of earlier covenants. What the New Testament announces is that this God has acted anew in inaugurating God's final reign and covenant through the career and fate of Jesus of Nazareth. [*For discussion of Jesus' life and of Christology, see Jesus.*]

**The Pre-Easter Jesus.** Jesus inherited the Old Testament Jewish faith in Yahveh, which held that God was the creator of the world (*Mk.* 10:6 and parallel) and the one God who elected Israel as his people and gave them his law (*Mk.* 12:29 and parallels). Moreover, God promised the Israelites final salvation (*Is.* 35, 61). At the same time, the sense in the New Testament that God is now realizing ancient promises and is acting anew (cf. *Mt.* 11:4–5, an indubitably authentic saying of Jesus) gives Jesus' image of God a sense of immediacy. God was not merely creator some thousands (or billions) of years ago; he is creator now, feeding the birds and clothing the flowers (*Mt.* 6:26–30, *Lk.* 12:24, and Q, the purported common source of *Matthew* and *Luke*). Not only did God give the law through Moses, but God now demands radical obedience in each concrete situation (cf. the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount in *Mt.* 5:27–48). Above all, God is now offering in the proclamation and activity of Jesus a foretaste of final salvation. Jesus' announcement of the inbreaking of God's reign (*Mk.* 1:15, *Mt.* 10:7, *Lk.* 9:2, Q) is not an abstract concept detached from Jesus' own word and work. Jesus' word and work are the occasions through which God acts definitively and savingly. The same is true of Jesus' exorcisms: "If I by the Spirit [finger, *Lk.* 11:20] of God cast out demons, then the kingdom [i.e., reign] of God has come upon you" (*Mt.* 12:28, *Lk.* 11:20, Q).

Jesus issues a call, "Follow me" (*Mk.* 1:17, 2:14; cf. *Mt.* 8:22, *Lk.* 9:59, Q?), not because he advances any claim for himself as such, but only because in that call, as in his word and work in the world, God is issuing the call to end-time salvation. To confess Jesus (*Mt.* 10:32, *Lk.* 12:8, Q, *Mk.* 8:38) or to deny him before others is to determine one's ultimate fate on the last day—whether it be judgment or salvation. The verdict of the Son of man on that day will be determined by whether men

and women confess Jesus now. Thus, in Jesus' call God is proleptically active as judge and savior. The Fourth Gospel puts it more thematically: God's salvation and judgment are already meted out here and now in the word of Jesus and people's response to it (*Jn.* 3:18, 5:22–27).

**Jesus' conduct.** Jesus eats with outcasts, and he defends his conduct by telling the parables of the lost (*Lk.* 15). These parables interpret Jesus' action as God's action in seeking and saving the lost and celebrating with them here and now the joy of the reign of God. Ernst Fuchs points out in *Studies of the Historical Jesus* (Naperville, Ill., 1964) that "Jesus . . . dares to affirm the will of God as though he himself stood in God's place" (p. 21).

**God as Abba.** Jesus' word and work are God's word and work because Jesus has responded to God's call in complete faith and obedience. This is brought out in the baptism, temptation, transfiguration, and Gethsemane narratives of the synoptists (*Mk.* 1:9–11 and parallels, *Mt.* 4:1–11, *Lk.* 4:1–13, Q, *Mk.* 9:2–8 and parallels, *Mk.* 14:32–42 and parallels), and once again it is thematically treated in the discourses of the Fourth Gospel (e.g., *Jn.* 8:28–29). This relation of call and obedience is summarized in Jesus' intimate address to God as Abba ("father"). This is no new doctrine, for the Old Testament and Judaism knew God as Father (e.g., *Is.* 63:16), nor does it imply a claim to metaphysical identity with the being of God or with an aspect of that being, as in later New Testament traditions. Again, Jesus does not pass the Abba appellation on to others as a way of defining God. Rather, he invites those who have responded in faith to his message of God's salvation to call God "Abba" with him. "Abba" is a familial mode of address which presupposes a new relationship with God. Because Jesus first made the response and enables others to make the same response, they too may call God "Abba" (cf. the Lukan version of the Lord's Prayer, *Lk.* 11:2).

**Jesus' death.** The saving activity in word and deed which fills the whole career of Jesus culminates in his journey to Jerusalem in order to make the last offer of salvation or judgment to his people at the very center of their national life. As a prophet, Jesus is convinced that he will be rejected and put to death and that this death will be the culmination of Israel's constant rejection of God's word as known through the prophets: "It cannot be that a prophet should perish away from Jerusalem" (*Lk.* 13:33; cf. the parable of the vineyard, *Mk.* 12:1–9 and parallels). Since it is the culmination of his obedience, his death, like all his other activity, is seen by Jesus as the saving act of God. The most primitive form of the suffering-Son-of-man sayings, namely, "The

Son of man will be delivered into the hands of men" (cf. *Mk.* 9:31), if authentic, expresses this by using the divine passive: God will deliver the Son of man to death. It is God's prerogative to inaugurate covenants. Therefore, at the Last Supper, Jesus speaks of his impending death as a supreme act of service (*Lk.* 22:27; cf. the foot washing in *Jn.* 13:2–15), which inaugurates the final covenant and reign of God (*Lk.* 22:29; cf. *Mk.* 14:24, 25 and parallels). In the references to service, covenant, and kingdom (reign) at the Last Supper lies the historical basis for the post-Easter message of atonement. [See also Atonement, article on Christian Concepts, and Justification.]

**Easter.** The Easter experiences created in the disciples the faith that, despite the apparent debacle of the crucifixion, God had vindicated Jesus and taken him into his own eternal presence. The early community expressed this conviction chiefly through testimony about Jesus' resurrection: "God raised Jesus from the dead" (*Rom.* 4:24, 10:9; *1 Thes.* 1:10) or "Christ was raised" (*Rom.* 4:25, 6:9; *1 Cor.* 15:4—a divine passive). After Easter, for the believing community, God is preeminently the God who raised Jesus from the dead. Insofar as there is any specific New Testament definition of God, this is it (e.g., again, *Rom.* 10:9). This results in the ascription of titles of majesty to Jesus. At the resurrection, God made him Lord and Christ (Messiah) (*Acts* 2:36) and even Son of God, originally a royal title (*Rom.* 1:4). Jesus is exalted to a position as close as possible to God, to God's "right hand." That means God continues to act savingly, even after Easter, toward the community and toward the world through the proclamation of Jesus as the Christ. In saving activity, God and Christ become interchangeable subjects: what God does, Christ does at the same time. However, Christ does not replace God. All the titles of majesty declare that Christ is God's agent, not God's surrogate.

**The Message of the Post-Easter Church.** Like Jesus in his pre-Easter life, the early church did not approach Israel with a new doctrine of God. Its message was that God had decisively inaugurated the fulfillment of his promises in the career and fate of Jesus of Nazareth, and above all in his resurrection. This is the burden of the sermons in the early chapters of the *Acts of the Apostles*: "Jesus of Nazareth, a man attested to you by God with mighty works and signs which God did through him . . . this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God . . . God raised him" (*Acts* 2:22–24).

**The Hellenistic-Jewish mission.** Members of the Greek-speaking Jewish community, initially led by Stephen (*Acts* 6, 7), first found themselves preaching the Christian message to Greek-speaking non-Jews (*Acts*

11:20). In approaching them, it was found necessary to change tactics. Instead of launching straight in with the Christ event as God's act of salvation, they had to start further back, with belief in God. Because these non-Jewish Greeks came from a pagan and often polytheistic environment, it was necessary first to establish belief in the one God before speaking about what this God had done in Christ and was now doing salvifically. In other words, the Hellenistic-Jewish Christians needed an apologetic for monotheism, arguments for the existence of the one God, in their mission to non-Jews. They were able to draw upon the apologetic which had earlier been worked out by Greek-speaking Jews in their approach to the pagan world. [See also Apologetics.] One of the earliest references to such an apologetic for monotheism is attested to by Paul when he reminds the Thessalonians of his original preaching to them before their conversion to Christianity: "You turned from idols to serve a living and true God" (*1 Thes.* 1:9). Note how this precedes the second part of the message: "and to wait for this Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead" (*1 Thes.* 1:10). A further example of Pauline apologetic for monotheism, and a claim that creation contains a natural revelation of God and his moral demands, occurs in *Romans* 1:18–32 and 2:14–15. Humanity has, however, frequently rejected this revelation and disobeyed God's moral demands, and Paul seeks to recall pagans to such knowledge and obedience. He sees a close connection between idolatry and immorality: "They . . . exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles. . . . Therefore God gave them up in the lust of their hearts to impurity" (*Rom.* 1:23–24). Later examples of an apologetic for monotheism are to be found in *Acts* 14:15–17, addressed to an unsophisticated audience, and in *Acts* 17:24–29, addressed to a cultured one.

**Pauline theology.** Paul's theology is entirely occasional, that is, it was worked out in response to concrete problems in the Christian communities he knew. [See *the biography of Paul the Apostle*.] The focus of his theology is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and its saving consequences. He inherited from the liturgical tradition an understanding of Christ's death as a sacrifice. It was the blood that inaugurated the new covenant (*1 Cor.* 11:25). Christ was the paschal lamb (*1 Cor.* 5:7). But Paul did not develop these sacrificial images in his reflection on Christ's death, perhaps because such language tended to drive a wedge between Jesus and the Father, as though the sacrifice was offered in order to propitiate or appease an angry deity. The language of the (probably pre-Pauline) hymn in *Romans* 3:25–26, especially the word translated in the King James Ver-

sion as "propitiation" (Gr., *hilastērion*), might be taken in that way. But God is the initiator in the atoning death of Christ ("whom God set forth"), and the word is better translated "expiation," as in the Revised Standard Version. This means that the crucifixion was an act of God dealing with and removing sin, the barrier between God and humanity, rather than an act of Christ directed toward God. It is an act of God's reconciling love, directed toward sinful humanity (*Rom.* 5:8). Through it God justifies the ungodly (*Rom.* 4:5). *Reconciliation*, like *expiation*, is a word denoting God's activity toward us, rather than Christ's activity toward God. Christ does not reconcile the Father to humanity, as traditional theology has often asserted (see, e.g., article 2 of the 1563 Thirty-nine Articles), rather, "God in Christ was [or, was in Christ] reconciling the world to himself" (*2 Cor.* 5:19). Justification and reconciliation (two slightly different images for the same reality) are expressions of the righteousness of God, a central concept in Paul's thinking about God. Righteousness is both an attribute and an activity of God; it is God's action of judging and saving.

A writing on the fringe of the Pauline corpus, not by Paul himself, is the *Letter to the Hebrews*, which interprets the saving act of God in Christ in terms of Christ as the high priest. Once again, this author is careful not to drive a wedge between God and Christ. As high priest, Christ does not offer a sacrifice to God for the purpose of propitiation. Rather, the Son offers his life in perfect obedience to the Father (*Heb.* 10:5–10) in order to make purification for sin. As in Paul, the object of Christ's deed is not God, but sin.

**The Incarnation and the Being of Christ.** All levels of tradition in the New Testament examined thus far speak of Christ's relation to God in functional terms. He is commissioned, called, and sent as divine agent. God is present with and in him and active through him. These biblical traditions do not raise the question about Jesus' personal identity in relation to God. There is no discussion of Jesus' "divinity" or of his "divine nature" in the earliest sources; these are Greek rather than Hebrew concepts. But given the exalted status of Jesus, which the Christian community believed him to have received at Easter, it was inevitable that the question of Jesus' identity would eventually be raised, especially by the Greek-speaking world. Such reflection initially employed the concept of the divine wisdom to elucidate the revelatory work of Jesus. Historically, Jesus had appeared as a spokesman for the divine wisdom, using the speech forms of the wisdom tradition as these are seen, for example, in *Proverbs*. The content of Jesus' wisdom utterances contained an implicit claim that he was wisdom's last and definitive spokesman; this view is drawn

out explicitly in the Q material (*Mt.* 11:25–27 and Q parallel). Matthew himself even identifies Jesus with wisdom, although in a functional rather than ontological sense (*Mt.* 11:28–30; cf. *Sir.* 24:25, 51:23–24). [For discussion of notions of wisdom in broad religious perspective, see *Wisdom*. See also *Wisdom Literature*.]

In first-century Judaism, however, the concept of God's wisdom was advancing beyond the stage of poetical personification of an aspect of God's activity, toward a hypostatization (i.e., an attribution of distinct, concrete existence) of an aspect of the being of God. As such, the wisdom of God was an outflow of his being, through which he created the world, became self-revelatory to humanity, called Israel, gave the law, and came to dwell with Israel's notables, such as Abraham, Moses, and the prophets, but this wisdom was constantly rejected by most of the people. In certain hymns in the New Testament (*Phil.* 2:6–11, *1 Cor.* 8:6, *Col.* 1:15–20, *Heb.* 1:1–3) the career and fate of Jesus are linked to this earlier activity of wisdom (though the term *wisdom* itself is not used); a single, continuous subject covers the preincarnate activity of wisdom and the earthly career of Jesus. The result is that Jesus becomes personally identified with the hypostatized wisdom of God. The agent of creation, revelation, and saving activity finally becomes incarnate in Jesus. But this development occurs only in hymnic materials and at this stage is hardly the subject of theological reflection.

**Johannine incarnation Christology.** The final step toward an incarnation Christology is taken in the Johannine literature, especially in the Fourth Gospel. This gospel is prefaced by the Logos hymn (*Jn.* 1:1–18). *Logos* ("word") was used as a synonym for the divine wisdom in the later wisdom literature. In this hymn *logos* is equated with, yet distinguishable from, the being of God: "In the beginning was the word [*logos*] and the word was with God and the word was God" (*Jn.* 1:1), which we may paraphrase as "God is essentially a self-communicating God. This self-communication was a distinct aspect within God's being, related to him, and partaking in his divine being."

The hymn goes on to speak of the activity of the Logos as the agent of creation, revelation, and redemption and finally states that the Logos became flesh, that is, incarnate (*Jn.* 1:14). There could be no clearer statement of the identity of Jesus of Nazareth with an aspect of the very being of God. In the rest of this gospel, the evangelist sets forth the life of Jesus as the incarnation of the divine wisdom, or Logos. (After *John* 1:14 neither *wisdom* nor *logos* is used in the Fourth Gospel, but imagery from the wisdom/Logos tradition is appropriated, especially in the "I am" sayings.) Jesus speaks as one fully conscious of personal preincarnate existence

within the being of God. It is significant, however, that this new "high" christological language does not replace the "lower" Christology, which speaks in terms of call, commission, and the response of obedience. Apparently John understands his "higher" Christology to be an interpretation of the "lower," refraining from abandoning the terms in which the pre-Easter Jesus spoke and acted. Much of later traditional church Christology has ignored the presence of these two levels in *John* and has rewritten the earthly life of Jesus exclusively in terms of the "higher" Christology.

**Is Jesus God?** Only very cautiously and gradually does the New Testament use the predicate *God* for Jesus. First, there are possible examples in some Pauline doxologies (e.g., *Rom.* 9:5), although there are problems of text, punctuation, and grammar that make it difficult to decide whether in such passages Paul actually does equate Jesus with God. Then the *Letter to the Hebrews* transfers Old Testament passages which speak of Yahveh-Kurios (Lord) to Christos-Kurios (e.g., *Heb.* 1:10). Only the Johannine writings directly and unquestionably predicate the deity of Christ. First, he is the incarnation of the Logos which was God. Then, according to the now generally accepted reading, he is the "only-begotten God" during his incarnate life (*Jn.* 1:18). Finally, Thomas greets the risen Christ as "my Lord and my God" (*Jn.* 20:28). Then *1 John* sums it up by predicating God as the preexistent, incarnate, and exalted one in a summary formula: ". . . in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life" (*1 Jn.* 5:20). Thus the New Testament can occasionally speak of Jesus as God, but always in a carefully nuanced way: he is not God-as-God-is-in-himself, but the incarnation of that aspect of the being of God which is God-going-out-of-himself-in-self-communication. [For discussion of incarnation in various religious traditions, see *Incarnation*.]

**The Trinity.** There is a triadic structure in the Christian experience of God. Through the power of the Holy Spirit, believers know Jesus Christ as the revelation of God the Father. This experience becomes crystallized in triadic formulas (*2 Cor.* 13:14, *Mt.* 28:19) or in unreflected theological statements (*1 Cor.* 12:4–6). But there is no attempt to work out a doctrine of the Trinity, or to integrate the Old Testament Jewish faith in the oneness of God with the Christian threefold experience. Like the doctrine of the incarnation, this was left to the post-New Testament church. [For discussion of the development of Christian doctrines concerning God, see *Trinity and Theology*.]

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REGINALD H. FULLER

## God in Postbiblical Judaism

Postbiblical Jewish thought concerning God can be divided into four distinct periods: the rabbinic or Talmudic (from the first century BCE to the sixth century CE), the philosophical or theological (represented chiefly by the medieval thinkers), the qabbalistic or mystical, and the modern (from the eighteenth century down to the present). While each of these periods has developed independently of the others, there is still a considerable overlapping of ideas from one period to another. Both the rabbinic and the philosophical approaches have had an influence on the mystical, and all three have served in modern attempts at reconstruction of Jewish theology. These four periods will be discussed in turn.

**The Rabbinic Approach.** Rabbinic thought as contained in the Talmud and the Midrash is unsystematic in presentation. While there is an abundance of references in these sources to the nature of God and his re-

relationship to man and the world, the statements are general responses to particular stimuli, not precise, theological formulations. It is consequently imprecise to speak of the rabbinic doctrine of God, even though the expression is used by some scholars. The Talmud and Midrash are the record of the teachings of many hundreds of individuals, each with his own temperament and disposition, as these individuals reflected on God's dealings with the Jewish people. Even in their edited forms, the rabbinic sources constitute more an anthology of diverse views than an official consensus by an assembly of elected or inspired teachers. Nevertheless, on the basic ideas about God there is total agreement. All of the rabbis are committed to the propositions that God is One, creator of heaven and earth; that he wishes all men to pursue justice and righteousness; that he rewards those who obey his will and punishes those who disobey; and that he has chosen the Jewish people from all the nations to give them his most precious gift, the Torah. The debates, discussions, and contradictory statements in rabbinic literature are about the detailed meaning and application of these basic concepts.

From an early period, the tetragrammaton, *YHVH*, was never pronounced by Jews as it is written because it is God's own, special name, too holy to be uttered by human mouth. The name *Adonai* ("my lord") was substituted as a euphemism with regard to which a degree of familiarity was allowed. On the other hand, the rabbinic doctrine of the imitation of God suggests a close point of contact between God and man following the scriptural teaching that man is created in God's image. This doctrine is formulated as follows: "Just as he is merciful, be thou merciful. Just as he is compassionate, be thou compassionate. Just as he feeds the hungry, clothes the naked, and comforts the mourners, do thou these things" (*Sifrei Dt.* 11.22; B.T., *Shab.* 133b, *Sot.* 14a).

The two most frequently found names for God in the Talmud are *Ribbono shel 'olam* ("Lord of the universe"), used when addressing God in the second person, and *ha-Qadosh barukh hu'* ("the Holy One, blessed be he"), used when speaking of God in the third person (B.T., *Ber.* 4a, 7a, and very frequently). The implication of this change of person is that while God can be addressed directly in prayer, his true nature is beyond human comprehension. He is the wholly other, totally distinct from any of his creatures, and of him it is permitted to say only that he is the Holy One.

Nevertheless, there are numerous passages in the Talmud and the Midrash in which human terms are applied to God. The rabbis were as little bothered by the

problem of anthropomorphism as the biblical authors, though the more human metaphors, when used of God by the rabbis, are generally qualified implicitly, sometimes explicitly, by the expression *ki-ve-yakhol*, "if it were really possible [to say such a thing]." Occasionally the anthropomorphisms are startling, as when God is said to have requested Ishmael, the high priest, to bless him, or when it is said that God prays to himself, his prayer being "May it be my will that my quality of mercy prevail over my quality of judgment that I might behave with respect to my children beyond the letter of the law and pardon them" (B.T., *Ber.* 7a).

Other rabbinic names for God were intended to suggest either his distance from man or his nearness. The name *ha-Maqom* ("the place"), defined as "He is the place of the world but the world is not his place" (*Gn. Rab.* 68.9), suggests, if this is the original meaning of the term, God's nearness. The name *Shamayim* ("heaven," B.T., *Ber.* 31a, 33b, and frequently) suggests his remoteness. In the rabbinic expression "our father in heaven" (*Yoma'* 8.9, *Sot.* 9.15), both ideas are combined. The name *Shekhinah* (*San.* 6.5, and frequently), a feminine form from the root meaning "to dwell," denotes God's indwelling presence.

It is incorrect, however, to think of these names as implying the transcendence and immanence of God. Abstract terms of this nature are entirely foreign to rabbinic thinking. The description of God as king is ubiquitous in the rabbinic literature with antecedents in the Bible. This metaphor is also founded on the rabbis' experiences of earthly rulers. God is the divine king whose laws must be obeyed. When he is stern to punish evildoers, he is said to be seated on his throne of judgment. When he is gracious to pardon, he is said to be seated on his throne of mercy (B.T., 'A.Z. 3b). The rabbis urge man to stand in prayer as if he were in the awesome presence of a king (*Ber.* 5.1), first uttering the king's praises and then offering him supplications (B.T., *Ber.* 31a). Yet there are numerous instances in which the rabbis declare that God is different from a human king. God obeys his own laws, unlike a human king, who is beyond the law (J.T., *R. ha-Sh.* 3a-b, 57a). God commands man not to steal, and he himself refuses to accept the sacrifice of an animal that has been stolen. To steal food and offer God thanks for the food is to be guilty of blasphemy (B.T., *B.Q.* 94a).

Especially after the dispersal of many Jews from the Holy Land and the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, the idea, found only sporadically in the Bible, that God shares human suffering, grieving with the victims of oppression, was deepened by the rabbis. Whenever Israel is in exile, they taught, the Shekhinah is in exile

with them (B.T., *Meg.* 29a). The idea that God is affected by human degradation is applied even to a criminal executed for his crimes. The Shekhinah is said to be distressed at such a person's downfall (*San.* 6.5).

A severe problem for the rabbis was the apparent conflict between the favoritism shown to Israel by God and God's concern for the whole of mankind. In one Talmudic passage, the ministering angels are made to ask God why he shows special favor to Israel, God replying that it is right for him to do so, since Israel is extraordinarily diligent in worshiping him (B.T., *Ber.* 20b). The ministering angels are a device used by the rabbis to express the problem of theodicy that they themselves were compelled by their sense of integrity to face. When, in the rabbinic account, the second-century rabbi 'Aqiva' ben Yosef is tortured to death by the Romans for teaching the Torah, the ministering angels similarly protest: "Is this the reward for teaching the Torah?" (B.T., *Ber.* 61b). In the same vein, the second-century rabbi Yann'ai declared: "We are unable to understand why the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper" (*Avot* 4.15). Despite such awareness of the illusive nature of any solution to the problem of suffering, there are rabbinic suggestions that such suffering is the outcome of sin or the misdeeds of parents and ancestors. There is also to be found the idea of "sufferings of love," of God visiting sufferings on a man in order to demonstrate that man's faith and trust in him come what may.

Both idolatry and dualism were strongly condemned by the rabbis. The twice-daily reading of the Shema' ("Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One," *Dt.* 6:4), Israel's declaration of faith in God's unity, was introduced at least as early as the first century BCE, probably in order to constantly reject the dualistic ideas prevalent in the Near East. The third-century Palestinian teacher Abbahu, in a polemic evidently directed against both Christian beliefs and dualism, expounded the verse: "I am the first, and I am the last, and beside Me there is no God" (*Is.* 44:6). His interpretation is 'I am the first,' for I have no father; 'and I am the last,' for I have no son; 'and beside me there is no God,' for I have no brother" (*Ex. Rab.* 29.5).

In rabbinic Judaism there is little denial that the legitimate pleasures of the world are God's gift to man, who must give thanks to God when they are enjoyed. In one passage it is even said that a man will have to give an account to God for his rejection of what he is allowed to enjoy (J.T., *Qid.* 4.12, 66d). Yet the emphasis is on spiritual bliss in the hereafter, when man, as a reward for his efforts in this life, will enjoy the nearness of God forever. Although the first-century teacher Eli'ezer sought to limit to Jews the blissful state of the

world to come, his contemporary Yehoshu'a, whose view was later accepted, held that the righteous of all peoples have a share in the world to come (*Tosefta, San.* 13.2). That this bliss consists of the proximity of the righteous to God was given expression by the third-century Babylonian teacher Rav, who said: "In the world to come there is neither eating nor drinking, neither procreation nor business activity, neither hatred nor competition, but the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads and bask in the radiance of the Shekhinah" (B.T., *Ber.* 17a).

**The Philosophical Approach.** The medieval Jewish theologians, influenced by Greek philosophy in its Arabic garb, had as one of their main aims the refinement of the concept of God. Unlike the Talmudic rabbis, the medieval thinkers presented their ideas on God in a systematic way. Pascal's distinction between the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the God of the philosophers generally holds true for the distinction between the rabbinic mode of thinking and that of the medieval theologians. For these theologians, the doctrine that God is One means not only that there is no multiplicity of gods but that God is unique, utterly beyond all human comprehension, and totally different from his creatures, not only in degree but in kind. Moses Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204), the most distinguished of the medieval thinkers and the most influential in subsequent Jewish thought, adapts for his purpose the rabbinic saying (B.T., *Ber.* 33b) that to overpraise God is akin to praising a human king for possessing myriads of silver pieces when, in reality, he possesses myriads of gold pieces. Maimonides (*Guide of the Perplexed* 1.59) observes that, in the illustration, the king is not falsely praised for possessing thousands of gold pieces when in reality he has myriads. The distinction is between silver and gold. The very coinage of praise suitable for a human king is entirely inapplicable to God. Only the standard liturgical praises of God are permitted and these only because they are formal and so not a real attempt to describe the divine nature.

The medieval thinkers insisted that all of the anthropomorphic expressions used in the Bible about God must be understood in a nonliteral fashion. Maimonides codified thirteen principles of the Jewish faith, one of which is the belief that God is incorporeal. Anyone who believes that God can assume a corporeal form is a heretic to be read out of the community of believers, and he has no share in the world to come, according to Maimonides in his *Mishneh Torah* (Repentance 3.7). In his stricture to this passage in Maimonides, Avraham ben David of Posquières (d. 1198) vehemently refuses to read a believer in God's corporeality out of Judaism.

Such a person cannot be dubbed a heretic simply because he is not a philosopher and takes biblical and rabbinic anthropomorphisms literally.

For the medieval thinkers God was both omniscient and omnipotent. A major problem for them was how to reconcile God's foreknowledge, seemingly implied in the doctrine of his omniscience, with human freedom to choose. If God knows beforehand how a man will choose, how can he be free to choose? Unwilling to compromise man's freedom of choice, essential to Judaism, both Avraham Ibn Daud in his *Emunah ramah* (ed. S. Weil, Frankfurt, 1852, pp. 93–98) and Levi ben Gershon (Gersonides, 1288–1344) in his *Milhamot ha-Shem* (2.6) could see no solution to the problem and were led to qualify the doctrine of God's foreknowledge. God does know all the possible choices open to man, but he does not know beforehand the particular choice a man will make in a given situation. This qualification does not constitute a denial of God's omniscience. God knows all that can be known, whereas human choice, because it is free, is only possible, and the possible, the contingent, must be uncertain by definition. Such radical qualification failed utterly to convince other thinkers. Hasdai Crescas (1340–1410) felt obliged to conclude that since God does have complete foreknowledge this must, indeed, involve a denial that man is free to choose. For Crescas, man's freedom is an illusion (*Or ha-Shem* 2.4.5). Maimonides had earlier seized both horns of the dilemma: man is free, and yet God has complete foreknowledge (*Mishneh Torah*, Repentance 5.5). This is not an admission of defeat by Maimonides. His view is that for the solution of the problem it would be necessary for humans to grasp the nature of God's knowledge, and, since God's knowledge is not something outside of him but is God himself, such a grasp on the part of humans is quite impossible. In God the Knower, the Knowledge and the Knowing are one.

In addition to their discussions regarding God's nature, the medieval thinkers examined God's activity in the finite world, that is, his role as creator and the scope of his providence. That God is the creator of the universe is accepted as axiomatic by all the medieval thinkers, although Gersonides (*Milhamot ha-Shem* 6) is radical here, too, in accepting the Platonic view of a hylic substance, coeternal with God, upon which God imposes form but does not create. Maimonides (*Guide of the Perplexed* 2.13–15), while at first toying with the Aristotelian idea of the material universe as having the same relation to God as the shadow of a tree to the tree, eventually accepts the traditional Jewish view that God created the world out of nothing. Maimonides' motivation is not only to preserve tradition but to emphasize the otherness of God, whose existence is necessary,

whereas that of all created things is contingent. As Maimonides remarks in his *Mishneh Torah*:

The foundation of all foundations and the pillar of wisdom is to know that there is a First Being. He it is who brought all things into being, and all creatures in heaven and earth and in between only enjoy existence by virtue of his true Being. If it could be imagined that he does not exist, nothing else could have existed. But if it could be imagined that no other beings, apart from him, enjoyed existence, he alone would still exist and he could not cease because they have ceased. For all beings need him, but he, blessed be he, does not need them, any of them. Consequently, his true nature is different from the truth regarding the nature of any of them.  
(Fundamental Principles of the Torah 1.1–3)

Like the God of the biblical authors and the rabbis, the God of the medieval thinkers is a caring God whose providence extends over all of his creatures. Both Maimonides (*Guide of the Perplexed* 3.17–18) and Gersonides (*Milhamot ha-Shem* 4) limit, however, God's special providence to humans. For animals there is only a general providence that guarantees the continued existence of animal species, but whether, for instance, this spider catches that fly is not ordained by God but is by pure chance. Yehudah ha-Levi (1075–1141) in his *Kuzari* (3.11) refuses to allow chance to play any role in creation: God's special providence extends to animals as well as to humans.

Sa'adyah Gaon (882–942) anticipated Thomas Aquinas's statement that "nothing that implies a contradiction falls under the scope of God's omnipotence" (*Summa theologiae* 1.25.4). Sa'adyah (*Book of Beliefs and Opinions* 2.13) observes that the soul will not praise God for being able to cause five to be more than ten without adding anything to the former, nor for being able to bring back the day gone by to its original condition. Centuries after Sa'adyah, Yosef Albo (d. 1444) similarly distinguishes that which seems impossible but imaginable from that which is impossible because it cannot be imagined. The latter as a logical impossibility does not fall under the scope of the divine omnipotence (*Book of Principles* 1.22).

**The Qabbalistic Approach.** The mystical movement or tendency in Jewish thought known as Qabbalah arose in twelfth-century Provence, reaching its culmination, in Spain, in the *Zohar*, the greatest classical work of Jewish mystical speculation. The qabbalists accepted the arguments of the philosophers in favor of extreme negation of divine attributes. Yet they felt the need, as mystics, to have a relationship with the God of living religion, not with a cold abstraction. In the theological scheme worked out by the qabbalists, a distinction is drawn between God as he is in himself and God in manifestation. God as he is in himself is Ein Sof



("no end, i.e., the limitless"), the impersonal ground of being who emerges from concealment in order to become manifest in the universe. From Ein Sof there is an emanation of ten *sefirot* ("spheres"; sg., *sefirah*), the powers of potencies of the godhead in manifestation, conceived of as a dynamic organism. Of Ein Sof nothing whatsoever can be said. More extreme than the philosophers in this respect, the qabbalists refuse to allow even negative attributes to be used of Ein Sof, but God in his aspect of manifestation in the *sefirot* can be thought of in terms of positive attributes. The living God of the Bible and of religion is the godhead as manifested in the *sefirot*. Ein Sof, on the other hand, is only hinted at in the Bible since complete silence alone is permissible of this aspect of deity. A later qabbalist went further to hold that, strictly speaking, even to use such a negative term as Ein Sof is improper (see I. S. Ratner, *Le-or ha-Qabbalah*, Tel Aviv, 1961, p. 39, n. 40). When the *Zohar* does refer obliquely to Ein Sof the expression used is "No thought can grasp thee at all" (*Tiqqunei Zohar*, second introduction).

The *sefirot* represent various aspects in the life of the godhead, for instance, wisdom, justice, and mercy. These are combined in a very complex order, and through them the worlds beneath, including the finite, material universe, are controlled, the whole order conceived as a great chain of being from the highest to the lowest reaching back to Ein Sof. There is a male principle in the realm of *sefirot* and a female principle, a highly charged mythological concept that opponents of Qabbalah, medieval and modern, considered to be a foreign, verging on the idolatrous, importation into Judaism (see *responsa* of Yitshaq ben Sheshet Perfet, *Rivash*, edited by I. H. Daiches, New York, 1964, no. 157, and S. Rubin, *Heidenthum und Kabbala*, Vienna, 1893). The male principle is represented by the *sefirah* called Tif'eret ("beauty"), the female principle by the *sefirah* called Malkhut ("sovereignty"). The sacred marriage between these two means that there is complete harmony on high, and the divine grace can flow through all creation. But the flow of the divine grace depends upon the deeds of man, since he is marvelously fashioned in God's image. Thus in the qabbalistic scheme God has made his purposes depend for their fulfillment on human conduct; in this sense it is not only man who needs God but God who needs man.

The *sefirah* called Malkhut, the female element, is also known as the Shekhinah. A rabbinic term in origin (meaning the indwelling of God, from a root meaning "to dwell"), the *shekhinah* comes to denote for the qabbalists a person in the godhead. The rabbinic idea of the exile of the Shekhinah, originally meaning no more than that God is with Israel in its exile, means for the

qabbalists that until the advent of the Messiah there is incomplete balance, the female element exiled from the male, and part of God exiled, as it were, from God. The task of restoration, of redeeming the Shekhinah from her exile, is man's task on earth. [For further discussion, see Shekhinah.] Again, the rabbinic name "the Holy One, blessed be he" is now a name for Tif'eret, the male principle. The latter-day qabbalists introduced a mystical formula before the performance of every good deed and religious act in which the worshiper declares: "I do this for the sake of the unification of the Holy One, blessed be he, and his Shekhinah."

In qabbalistic literature produced in the school of Isaac Luria (1534–1572), the mythological elements become even more pronounced. In Lurianic Qabbalah, the process by means of which Ein Sof emerges from concealment is traced back beyond the emergence of the *sefirot*. The first act of Ein Sof (although the qabbalists stress that these divine processes take place beyond time) is one of *tsimtsum* ("withdrawal, contraction"). Ein Sof first "withdraws from himself into himself" in order to leave an "empty space" into which the *sefirot* can emerge in their separateness; the Infinite becomes self-limiting so as to become revealed as a multiplicity of powers. The whole process is conceived of in terms of a flow of the light of Ein Sof and then its recoil, as if the Infinite can only produce limitation and ultimately a finite world by God allowing himself gradually, one might say painfully, to produce that which is outside of himself. In one version, current in some Lurianic circles but suppressed in others, the purpose of *tsimtsum*, producing that which is not God, is for God to purge himself of the evil that is latent in his being (see I. Tishby, *Torat ha-ra' ve-ha-qelippah be-qabbalat ha-Ari*, Jerusalem, 1984). It is not surprising that such an astonishingly unconventional notion came to occupy a very peripheral role in the thinking of the qabbalists. [See also Qabbalah.]

The eighteenth-century mystical movement of Hasidism, particularly the more speculative branch of the movement known as Habad, tended toward a panentheistic understanding of the idea of *tsimtsum*. *Tsimtsum* does not really take place, since the Infinite is incapable of suffering limitation, but *tsimtsum* represents no more than a screening of the divine light so that finite creatures might appear to enjoy separate existence. The only true reality is God. There is a basic difference between this panentheistic ("all is in God") or acosmic view and that of pantheism ("all is God"). In the pantheistic thought of Barukh Spinoza (1632–1676), God is the name given to the totality of things. God is the universe and the universe is God. In Habad thought, without God there could be no universe, but without the uni-

verse God would still be the unchanging same; in fact, God is the unchanging same even after the creation of the universe, since from God's point of view there is no universe. The traditionalist rabbis and communal leaders, the *mitnaggedim* ("opponents"), saw the Hasidic view as rank heresy. For them the verse that states that the whole earth is filled with God's glory (*Is.* 6:3) means only that God's providence extends over all and that his glory can be discerned through its manifestation in the world. Speculative Hasidism understands the verse to mean that there is only God's glory as an ultimate.

In the classic work *Tanya'* (*Sha'ar ha-yihud ve-ha-emunah* 1) by the founder of the Habad school, Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady (1747–1813), God is described as a sun and a shield. The sun's rays are essential to life, but the sun must be screened from view to some extent if creatures on earth are to endure its splendor. In the sun itself, however, the rays are lost in its great light. Similarly, finite creatures can only enjoy existence because the divine light is screened. They are like the rays of the sun separated from the sun itself. Yet, in reality, the analogy is very inexact, says Shne'ur Zalman, since the divine light pervades all. From God's point of view, finite creatures are like the rays of the sun in the sun itself. They enjoy no separate existence at all. The verse "Know this day, and lay it to thy heart, that the Lord, he is God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath, there is none else" (*Dt.* 4:39) is taken by Shne'ur Zalman to mean not only that there are other gods but that there is no ultimate reality apart from God himself. The unity of God, understood by medieval thinkers in the sense of his uniqueness, is here interpreted to mean that there is no real multiplicity of beings but only one true being. [See also Hasidism, *article on Habad Hasidism.*]

**Modern Approaches.** Modern Jewish thinkers have been obliged to face the challenges to traditional theism provided by modern thought. From the Renaissance onward the emphasis in the West has shifted from a God-centered to a man-centered universe. The inerrancy of the Bible was questioned. The idea of revelation as conveying infallible information about God appeared less convincing. Kant and his followers questioned whether human reasoning is capable of proving the existence of God. The rise of modern science tended to favor mechanistic philosophies of existence and, in more recent years, both linguistic philosophy and existentialism, in their different ways, cast suspicion on all metaphysics. Although the Jew did not begin to participate fully in Western society and to assimilate Western patterns of thought until the end of the eighteenth century, modern Jewish thinkers have been influenced by all of these trends in Western thought, compelling them to rethink the traditional views concerning God. The result has

been an espousal of differing attitudes toward theism, from a reaffirmation of the traditional to a radical transformation in naturalistic terms. In any event, the vocabulary used since, by both the traditionalists and the nonconformists, is that of modern thought, even when it is used to interpret the tradition.

Among twentieth-century Jewish thinkers, Mordecai Kaplan (1881–1983) is the most determined of the naturalists. For Kaplan and his disciples God is not a supernatural, personal being but the power in the universe that makes for righteousness. Kaplan maintains that people really were referring to this power when they spoke of God, even though, in the prescientific age, they expressed their belief in terms of a supreme being, the creator of the world who exercises care over it. Faith in God does not involve belief in being outside the universe but is an affirmation that the universe itself is so constituted that the pursuit of righteousness will triumph. God is the power that guarantees salvation, in terms not of an otherworldly existence but of the enrichment of the human personality to its highest stage of evolution.

Martin Buber (1878–1965), the best-known of Jewish religious existentialists, stresses, on the contrary, the personal aspect of deity. In Buber's thought, when man has an I–Thou relationship to his fellows and to the world in general, he meets in dialogue the Thou of God. While the medieval thinkers devoted a significant part of their thought to reasoning about God's nature, Buber rejects such speculations as futile, cosmic talk, irrelevant to the life of faith. God cannot be spoken about, but he can be met as a person by persons. Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) has a similar existentialist approach. For Rosenzweig there are three elements in the universe: God, the world, and man. Religion, specifically Judaism, binds these three together through the processes of revelation, creation, and redemption.

Avraham Yitshaq Kook (1865–1935), the first chief rabbi of Palestine, is completely traditional in his concept of God but accepts the theory of evolution, which, as a qabbalist, he believed to be in full accord with the qabbalistic view. The whole of the universe is on the move, and man is rising to ever greater heights ultimately to meet God. Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907–1972), strongly influenced by Hasidism, stresses the sense of wonder as the way to God. Because the universe is shot through with wonder, it points to the wondrous glory of its maker, who, in the title of Heschel's book, is "God in search of man." Heschel's God shares in man's tribulations. He is the God of the Hebrew prophets, involved intimately in human affairs, not a cold abstraction without power to save.

More than any other event, the Holocaust, in which

six million Jews perished, compelled Jewish religious thinkers to examine again the doctrine that God is at work in human history. Efforts of medieval thinkers like Yehudah ha-Levi and Maimonides to account for evil in God's creation were, for many, totally inadequate to explain away the enormity of the catastrophe. Some contemporary thinkers invoke the idea found in the ancient sources that there are times when the face of God is hidden, when God surrenders his universe to chance if not to chaos and conceals himself because mankind has abandoned him. There is a reluctance, however, to explore such ideas, since they appear to condemn those who were destroyed, laying the blame, to some extent, at the door of the victims. The free-will defense has also been invoked by contemporary thinkers, both Jewish (e.g., Avraham Yitsḥaq Kook, Milton Steinberg) and non-Jewish (e.g., John Hick). For man to be free and exercise his choice in freedom to meet his God, the world must be a place in which naked evil is possible, even though the price might seem too high.

None of these theories has provided contemporary Jewry with an adequate response to the problem of evil. The widespread tendency among believers in God is to rely on faith rather than on reason; man finds it hard to believe in God but harder still to accept a mindless universe. The only Jewish thinker of note who has accepted, in part at least, the "death of God" theology is Richard Rubenstein. The others reaffirm, in their different ways, the traditional picture of God as existing and caring, even though, like Kaplan, their understanding of what this can mean departs from that picture. Orthodox thinkers accept the traditional idea in its totality, including the belief that the Torah, given by God, is the path to eternal life and that, even on earth, God will eventually intervene directly, bringing the Messiah to redeem the Jewish people and the whole of mankind. Thinkers belonging to the Reform movement also accept the idea that human history is moving toward its culmination in the acknowledgment of God with the establishment of God's kingdom; however, they speak not of a personal Messiah but of the dawning of a messianic age.

[For further discussion of God in modern Judaism, see Jewish Thought and Philosophy, *article on Modern Thought*, and Attributes of God, *article on Jewish Concepts*. For two Jewish efforts at redefining God, see Reform Judaism and Reconstructionist Judaism. See also Holocaust, The, *article on Jewish Theological Responses*.]

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and *Historically Considered* (1918) by Kaufmann Kohler, with new material by Joseph L. Blau (New York, 1968), is a pioneering work but now dated and heavily influenced by Protestant thought of the first decades of the twentieth century. *Jewish Theology: A Historical and Systematic Interpretation of Judaism and Its Foundations* by Samuel S. Cohon (Assen, 1971) and my *A Jewish Theology* (New York, 1973) are more adequate in that they consider more recent trends in theological thought.

On the rabbinic views, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God* by Arthur Marmorstein (1927; reprint, New York, 1968) is a detailed examination of the names of God in rabbinic literature by an expert in this literature. George Foot Moore's *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era, the Age of Tannaim*, 3 vols. in 2 (1927-1930; reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1970), contains much information, by a non-Jewish scholar, on early rabbinic discussions of God and his relationship to Israel. *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* by Solomon Schechter (New York, 1961) is a well-written and scholarly treatment of the subject. There is also a good deal of material in *A Rabbinic Anthology*, edited by C. G. Montefiore and Herbert Loewe (1938; reprint, Philadelphia, 1960), in which a Reform and an Orthodox Jew also debate their differing attitudes to the rabbinic formulations. Occasionally this discussion tends to shade off into apologetics and must be used with a degree of caution.

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For useful summaries of modern thinkers on God three works can be recommended. *Anatomy of Faith* by Milton Steinberg, edited by Arthur A. Cohen (New York, 1960), compares modern Jewish thought on God with Christian thought. *Modern Philosophies of Judaism* by Jacob B. Agus (New York, 1941) is an excellent examination of the thought of Buber, Rosenzweig, Kaplan, and other modern Jewish thinkers. *My Jewish Thought Today* (New York, 1970) is an annotated anthology with a section on God.

LOUIS JACOBS

### God in Postbiblical Christianity

Both New Testament writers and postbiblical Christians sharply opposed the God of their faith to the many gods of popular religion. In doing so they joined not only Jews but also most thoughtful pagans, who believed in one God beyond the many. Since the reality of the one God was not in doubt, arguments for God's existence in that era were unimportant.

There was, however, during the early centuries of the Christian era a great divide. On one side were those classical religious thinkers who continued to reflect on God in strictly philosophical ways, trusting their reason to suffice. This tradition reached its apex in Neoplatonism. On the other side were those who accepted the authority of Jewish (supplemented later by Christian or Islamic) scriptures, correlating the ideas found there with the fruits of reason. The great Alexandrian Jew Philo, a contemporary of the apostle Paul, gave classical expression to this second approach, which gradually won out in the Mediterranean world. [See Apologetics.]

Justin Martyr provides an early picture of how Christians understood the relation of their doctrine of God to the wider culture. He reports that he sought knowledge of God from philosophy with little success. A Christian then persuaded him that the human mind lacks the power to grasp the truth of God and that one must begin with what God has revealed. Accordingly, Justin turned to the Hebrew scriptures, read now through Christian eyes, and found there what he wanted. His success did not lead him to a total rejection of Greek philosophy, however; he continued to admire Plato, but to avoid attributing Plato's wisdom to human reason, he claimed that Plato had learned from Moses.

The authority of scripture ensured that for Christians as for Jews, the God who sometimes appears as an impersonal deity in the philosophical writings would be understood as personal. On the other hand, under the influence of existing philosophical concepts, biblical ideas came to be set in a new key. For example, God's changelessness, which in the Bible means God's faithfulness and dependability, was generally understood to be God's freedom from transiency and perishing. Subsequently this concept was transformed by some into metaphysical immutability. Likewise, God's everlastingness (beginningless and endless life) was sometimes transformed into a nontemporal eternity.

The matter primarily in dispute was the content of divine activity in relation to humankind, what God had done, was doing, and would do. To be a Christian was to affirm that the God of whom the Hebrew scriptures speak had acted in Jesus for the redemption of the world. This conviction expressed itself in the doctrine of incarnation, and it was this doctrine that most distinguished Christian thought from Jewish and philosophical ideas. Yet even incarnation could find various points of contact in the wider religious context, and these analogies were used by some commentators to understand and interpret it. On the one hand, God was known to have spoken through prophets and sibylline oracles; the theologians of Antioch taught that the Word of God was present to and in Jesus even more fully than in the

prophets and oracles. On the other hand, the idea that God sent heavenly messengers, or angels, was widespread; Arius taught that he who was sent to earth as Jesus was not just one angel among others but the one supreme creature through whom all other creatures, including the angels, were made. But the Christian conviction that in Jesus it was God who was incarnate opposed the latter theory, and the former still left God too separate from Jesus to be truly incarnational. Under the leadership of Athanasius the church determined at the Council of Nicaea (325) that what was incarnate in Jesus was truly God, and at the Council of Chalcedon (451) it maintained that while Jesus was fully God, his divinity left his humanity unimpaired. [For further discussion of conciliar debates about God, see Councils, article on Christian Councils, and Heresy, article on Christian Concepts. See also Incarnation and Trinity.]

While the church insisted that what was incarnate was truly God, it did not simply identify what was incarnate with the one whom Jesus called "Father." Instead, following the prologue in the *Gospel of John*, the Word (or Son) who was with God and who was God was the incarnated one. This required a distinction within the one God. Even so, the church lacked a conceptuality that could show how the Word could both be one with God and become incarnate in Jesus without diminution of Jesus' humanity; and so the assertion, unsupported by intelligible conceptuality, became a "mystery." Similarly, the doctrine of the Trinity, which grew out of these debates with the addition of the Holy Spirit, could not be conceptually clarified. Thus faith became assent to mysteries on the basis of the authority of the church.

Although the doctrines of incarnation and Trinity are inescapable and central to Christian theology, their character as mystery reduced their role in shaping early Christian thinking about God. For example, whereas one would expect thinking about God's attributes to be deeply influenced by the gospel accounts of Jesus, such an influence has in fact been uncommon. On the whole, God's attributes were understood much as they were affirmed in Jewish and philosophical thought of the time: God is incorruptible, unsusceptible of harm or decay; God is incorporeal and invisible, a purely spiritual being. An early Christian statement about God's attributes is to be found in the apocryphal *Preaching of Peter*, which describes God as

the invisible, who sees all things,  
 uncontained, who contains all things,  
 without needs, of whom all are in need and  
 because of whom they exist,  
 incomprehensible, eternal, imperishable,  
 unmade, who made all by the word of his power.

In the Middle Platonism of the second century there was a strong tendency to emphasize the radical difference of God from the world, and so the incomprehensibility of God, just mentioned in the *Preaching of Peter*, was accentuated. This note was strong among the Gnostics, but it became prominent also among Christian writers who were increasingly willing to draw consistent consequences from the idea that God was incomprehensible. For example, Clement of Alexandria wrote that God cannot properly be called "one or the good or the one itself or Father or God or Demiurge or Lord" (*Strōmateis* 5.82.1).

The patristic writer Origen made still more explicit the tension between the increasingly negative theology, which the church assimilated largely from the surrounding culture, and the positive language of scripture. Earlier, in arguing against anthropomorphic myths of the gods, Christians had denied that God feels fear or anger or sexual passion and had sometimes generalized this to speak of the divine *apatheia*; Origen systematized this doctrine and drew the conclusion that all passages describing divine emotions such as joy or grief must be read allegorically.

In a late homily on *Ezekiel*, Origen seems to have reversed his position on this point, explicitly denying that the Father is impassible. But the weight of his influence, along with the general logic of the idea of metaphysical immutability, carried the day. The idea that God the Father could have feelings such as pity was called "patripassianism," and it has been generally regarded as unacceptable at least until the late twentieth century, when Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Jürgen Moltmann, Kazoh Kitamori, and many others, including process theologians generally, began to emphasize God's suffering.

Although there was broad consensus that all things derive from God, there were alternative images of the relationship between God and the world. One image emphasized creation as an external act of will. The world is envisaged as coming into being by divine fiat out of nothing. Another image, which envisioned the world as the outworking of the dynamism of the divine life, found its clearest expression in Plotinus's doctrine of emanation. Insofar as this image implied that the world was made of divine substance, it was rejected by the church, but some of its language remained influential. A third image was that of participation, wherein God is seen as perfect being, and creatures are thought to exist as they participate in this being in a creaturely way. This image was supported especially by God's self-revelation to Moses. God is understood to have said: "I am who I am. . . . Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He Who Is, hath sent me to you." A fourth image was that of inclusion, according to which God is

the "uncontained, who contains all things" (*Preaching of Peter*). This follows from the words attributed to Paul in *Acts*: "In God we live and move and have our being" (17:28).

The Platonic influence on developing Christian beliefs encouraged a correlation between the human intellect and God. Thus gnosticism held that knowledge of God is superior to faith, and this idea was taken over also by some of the more orthodox Christians. A related concept held that the human soul or mind possessed a kinship with God that was lacking to the body. Such ideas encouraged intellectualistic mysticism and bodily asceticism. The Christian struggle to overcome this dualism can be traced from the fourth-century Cappadocians through the fourteenth-century Greek-speaking church. It required both the denial that God is of the order of thought or idea and the rejection of a further development in the thought of Plotinus, which located God as the One beyond thought who could be reached only through thought. At the same time it required the clarification of how human beings could have real communion with God by grace.

Basil of Caesarea made a distinction between the essence or substance of God, which is radically and eternally inaccessible, and the divine energies. These energies, he taught, are God's actual working in the world and are, therefore, fully God and wholly uncreated. Basil associated these energies especially with the Holy Spirit. "Through him the ascent of the emotions, the deification of the weak, the fulfillment of that which is in progress is accomplished. It is he who, shining brightly in those who are being purified of all uncleanness, makes them spiritual persons through communion with himself" (*On the Holy Spirit* 9.23).

The writings of Pseudo-Dionysius (Dionysius the Areopagite) shared much with the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. They served later in the West to encourage a Plotinian form of mysticism. But in the East, where their influence has been pervasive and their orthodoxy unquestioned, they have provided the basis for a Christian spirituality that overcomes a Platonic dualism.

These writings reaffirm the total inaccessibility of the divine essence while stressing the divine energies, powers, or processions. Created beings participate in the divine energy in the way proper to each. Thus the movement of God into the world of creatures enables the creatures to rise toward God. In this process both positive and negative theology are needed. Positive theology finds symbols for God everywhere in the created world. Negative theology points out that these are indeed symbols and that there is no name for God's essence. In neither process is there any priority of the intellectual over the physical.

In the eighth century, John of Damascus, the most authoritative theologian of the Eastern church, included these elements in his exposition *The Orthodox Faith*, thus ensuring their continued role. This role was most important in monastic practice, which sought to realize the presence of the Holy Spirit. Symeon, called the New Theologian, gave expression to this practice in the early part of the eleventh century. He wrote of the experience of the uncreated light that is neither sensory nor intellectual. This light illumines the human heart, judging, purifying, and forgiving. It is the foretaste of the Parousia.

This current of Eastern spirituality came to its fullest expression in Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century. He wrote: "Illumination or divine and deifying grace is not the essence but the energy of God" (*Theophanes*, in *Patrologia Graeca* 150.932d). Essence and energy are the two modes of the one divine existence.

This basic structure of Eastern thought of God was the context also for the defense of icons. The Iconoclasts held that the use of icons in worship was idolatrous since it assumed that the icons shared the substance of God. The victorious defenders thought of divine energies as imparted to the icons without any loss of their creatureliness, while the divine substance remained radically transcendent and unknowable. [See *Icons and Iconoclasm*.]

The impact of Platonic philosophy in Western thought of God took a different turn chiefly because of Augustine of Hippo. Augustine made fully explicit the theological issues raised for the Christian by dominant philosophical ideas. For example, the church taught the doctrine of creation of the world out of nothing. This seemed to imply that God first was alone and then, subsequently, created the world. But this notion of a temporal sequence of events in the divine life seemed in conflict with the perfection of God. If there was good reason to create a world, why would God delay? In any case, would this sequence not necessarily imply a change in God from precreating to creating? And would not the existence of the world introduce something new into the divine omniscience?

Augustine undertook to reconcile the doctrines of creation and immutability by radical reflection on time. Time, he held, is a function of the mutable, created order. It has, therefore, no reality for God. For us there is past, present, and future; but from the perspective of eternity, the contents of time exist timelessly. This became standard theological teaching, often ignored in the rhetoric of the church, but rarely directly denied before the twentieth century.

Unlike the author of the pseudo-Dionysian writings, Augustine understood the essence of God to be all that

which is common to the persons of the Trinity. God is truth itself, which is at once goodness itself. As the sun is the source of light by which our eyes see the visible world, so God is the source of illumination of the mind by which it sees eternal truths. And just as it is possible, though difficult, to see the sun itself, so also it is possible, though difficult, to contemplate God.

Truth, according to Augustine, draws the mind to itself, but the mind is distracted by the sinful will, which directs itself toward inferior things. What is known is not different, therefore, from natural knowledge, but because of sin natural knowledge is always distorted. Hence the mind cannot attain to truth apart from the healing of the will. This is the work of grace through Jesus Christ, in whom God accepted humiliation in order to overcome human pride.

This basic pattern, reflective of Plato's influence, dominated early medieval thought of God. It came into conflict with thinking affected by a new, firsthand encounter with the writings of Aristotle, which were mediated to Christian theologians in the West chiefly through Islamic Spain. The Aristotelian influence in theology was long viewed with suspicion, but eventually it gained a strong foothold in Western Christianity through the acceptance of Thomas Aquinas, who, as the most authoritative teacher of the Roman Catholic church, synthesized aspects of Aristotle with much of the Augustinian tradition.

Thomas found in Aristotle an achievement of natural reason that moved from sense experience to the demonstration of the existence of God. This he called natural theology. He recognized that reason based on sense experience cannot arrive at all the truths taught by the church; so he affirmed also that there are truths attainable only by revelation. In addition he saw that much that the philosopher can attain by reason is also revealed so that all may know.

The Augustinian tradition argues that knowledge of God's existence is already implicitly given in thought. Anselm's formulation of the ontological argument is the most thoroughgoing expression of this tendency. Thomas, on the other hand, seeks to lead the mind by inference from what is known through the senses to the affirmation of God as the supreme cause of the world. The emphasis in Thomas's idea of God shifts, accordingly, from that of the illuminator of the mind to the cause of the existence and motion of all creaturely things.

The Thomistic argument that has best stood the test of time is the argument that proceeds from the contingency of all creaturely things to a necessary existent. By itself, an infinite series of contingent causes cannot explain the actual existence of anything. This dependence

of contingent being on necessary being is closely related to Thomas's most original metaphysical work, his analysis of *esse*, or the act of being in its distinction from essence. The broad outlines of this argument already existed in the patristic consideration of God's self-revelation to Moses interpreted as "He Who Is." But whereas Augustine understood it to mean that God is he who never changes, Thomas taught that God is *ipsum esse*, being itself, that is, the act of being. This is pure act, free from all potency, apart from which there can be nothing at all. As pure act it is necessary existence, that on which all contingent existence wholly depends. French Neo-Thomists in the twentieth century, such as Étienne Gilson, highlighted these features of Thomas's thought, which had been partly obscured in the interim.

Being itself is radically different from any creaturely being, and since our ideas are formed in the creaturely world, we cannot speak of God univocally. Nevertheless, our language about God is not merely equivocal. We are justified in using analogies that move from creaturely effect to divine cause, attributing to the supreme cause the perfect form of the excellences found in the effects.

Thomas thought of God not simply as *ipsum esse* but as *ipsum esse subsistens*, that is, as the one who is being itself. The unity of the idea of being itself with the idea of the supreme being has been characteristic of the Thomistic tradition. However, Meister Eckhart, the great fourteenth-century mystic, distinguished God as supreme being from godhead as being itself, and he sought the latter in the depths of his own being. Through this distinction and his experiential realization of being, Eckhart provided a Western Christian analog for the thought and practice of Hindus and Buddhists, who had long distinguished the transpersonal ultimate from the personal God.

Thomas subordinated the divine will to the divine wisdom. That is, God wills what is good. In this doctrine, his thought followed that of the church fathers, including Augustine. God remains for Thomas, as for them, the One, the True, and the Good. But there were others for whom this Platonic way of thinking ceased to be convincing, for whom there were no truth and goodness existing in themselves and attracting the human mind and will; they asserted that God is much more the efficient cause of natural motion, that God is free agent, bound to nothing, and, in short, that God is almighty will, determining thereby what is true and good. This voluntaristic emphasis is associated with the rise of medieval nominalism, influenced especially by William of Ockham. Nominalism is the doctrine that universals are names given to certain things. These universals have no existence in themselves. Furthermore, since there is an

element of arbitrariness in how we name things, human choice and decision are accented instead of discernment of what is objectively there for the mind to discover. This doctrine entails the theory that God alone chooses what to require of human beings and what to do for them. What God has chosen cannot be learned by human reason; it can only be revealed by God. [See Nominalism.]

This voluntaristic theology prepared a context for the Protestant Reformation. With the reformers the emphasis was not on philosophical limitations to human knowledge of God but on the radical corruption of the human mind by sin. This impairment does not eradicate all knowledge of God, but it does lead to distortion of every human effort to say who God is. For knowledge of God we are totally dependent on God's gracious and redeeming act in Jesus Christ.

In Calvin's systematic formulation, for example, God's reality is fully manifest objectively in the order of nature; but because of sin those who have tried to interpret nature by reason have been led astray. The truth of God's objective manifestation in nature is properly grasped only through scripture. But, once again, although the truth about God is perfectly clear in scripture, the sinful mind distorts that as well. Hence scripture is properly understood only through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, bestowed by God as God pleases and not according to human merit.

The problem of theodicy is present wherever God is affirmed to be both omnipotent and good, since to deny sin and evil would contradict both scripture and experience. The problem is heightened when, as among Calvinists, God's election is emphasized to be independent of human desert. For the voluntaristic tradition, however, the answer is also given: what is good is finally determined by the divine will. The human mind has no independent access to criteria by which to judge the goodness of God.

Most theologians, however, have attempted to mitigate the starkness of this answer. Calvin himself attempted to demonstrate that the reprobate fully deserves damnation, and he attempted also to display the justice and mercy of what God has chosen to do as humanly intelligible. Others have argued more systematically that any alternative ordering of things would reduce the goodness of the world; usually the necessity or inevitability of evil in a world where there are free creatures has been emphasized. Although the phrase has not been popular, since it seems to minimize sin and evil, most theodicy has undertaken finally to show, in Leibniz's words, that this is "the best of all possible worlds." [See Theodicy.]

During the Renaissance a new wave of Platonic influ-

ence gave rise to the Hermetic tradition, which emphasized the mathematical character of the world, the power of movement immanent in things, and the interrelatedness of human thought with these things. The divine was perceived as indwelling power rather than as transcendent will. The voluntaristic tradition had earlier separated revelation from the support of reason and encouraged an authoritarian spirit; the Hermetic tradition, too, separated reason from revelation, but encouraged instead a critique of hierarchical structures in church and society. Together they paved the way for modern philosophy in the seventeenth century, whereupon there ended definitively the unity of theology and philosophy that had dominated Western thought for more than a thousand years. [See Hermetism.]

The early development of modern science was chiefly in the Hermetic context. But partly for theological reasons, René Descartes and Robert Boyle argued for a mechanical nature of passive objects to which the human mind is essentially alien. This left the sovereign will of God as the source of all order. Newton vacillated between these two worldviews, but eventually he gave his great prestige to the mechanical alternative, and this came to be known as the Newtonian worldview.

The church meanwhile kept alive older modes of thinking of God. Many of the theological debates, such as the Socinian, Arminian, Wesleyan, Universalist, and Unitarian objections to strict Calvinism, paid little attention to the issues raised by modern science. Their concern was to recover the emphasis on human freedom and to make more intelligible the idea of God's love for all people.

Nevertheless, the Newtonian, or mechanical, worldview came to be accepted as the only legitimate one in a scientific age. When the church expressed its faith in ways that were not consistent with this worldview, it became increasingly ghettoized in relation to the intellectual community. Among the intelligentsia thought of God accommodated itself rapidly to the new vision, and popular thought gradually followed. God was conceived, accordingly, as sovereign will, the omnipotent creator and lawgiver. As lawgiver God imposed laws on nature whose mathematical character physicists were disclosing. Parallel to physical laws were moral laws imposed upon human beings. Since human beings are free, these laws functioned more like those of the state, except for the omniscience and omnipotence of the lawgiver. Thus, it was held, people can disobey, but their disobedience is punished—in part in this life, but fully and appropriately in the next.

This developing idea of God was fully personal in the sense that God was conceived to be a supreme mind and will. But human relations to God were mediated

through impersonal laws. The term *deist* was applied to this position; originally synonymous with *theist*, it came later to imply the lack of any immediacy of inwardness of relationship. Deism pictured God as the maker of the machine, which then runs according to the principles built into it. [See Deism and Enlightenment, The.]

In the eighteenth century the chief issue was whether God, having established natural laws, ever acted contrary to them. All agreed that God was supernatural. The issue was whether God caused supernatural events in the created world, that is, whether miracles occurred. Orthodox Christians held that the biblical accounts of miracles were true, whereas the Deists held that natural law was perfect and that therefore God did not violate it.

The eighteenth century witnessed also the rise of religious skepticism. There had been skeptics all along, but their numbers and prestige were greatly increased during the Renaissance, as well as by the multiple divisions of Christianity and accompanying religious wars following the Reformation. Also, the increasing autonomy and success of natural science suggested that scientific explanation is sufficient by itself and does not require metaphysical and theological grounding. By the end of the eighteenth century belief in God had become radically problematic. The philosophy of David Hume brought the skeptical spirit to expression in ways that continue to influence contemporary thought. By insisting that causality must be an empirically observable relationship, Hume undercut every argument that begins with the world or with aspects of the world and reasons that there must be a cause that transcends the world. [See Skeptics and Skepticism; see also Naturalism.]

Reflection about God on the European continent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was shaped by the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Influenced by Hume, Kant saw that empirical evidence alone could not ultimately serve as a sufficient ground for the Newtonian worldview. This perception led him to ground that worldview in necessary structures of thought wherein Newtonian space and time, as well as causality, are ways in which the mind necessarily orders phenomena.

Kant's conclusion was by no means atheistic. Even in relation to the exercise of theoretical reason, the idea of God has a beneficial effect, though it must not be introduced as an explanatory principle. More important, Kant points out that in addition to the sphere of theoretical reason there is another sphere of practical reason, which deals with how people should act. In this sphere, too, the fundamental moral principle is independent of theology. People should act always accord-



ing to maxims that they can will to be universal principles. For example, if one cannot will that people in general lie, cheat, or steal whenever it is to their personal advantage to do so, then one ought not to lie, cheat, or steal for one's own advantage. This principle—the “categorical imperative”—holds whether or not God exists.

But Kant also affirmed that it would be fitting if the will that conforms to this imperative were happy. Indeed, the *summum bonum*, that whose realization we must all desire, is the union of virtue and happiness. Such a state is not attained in this life, but we have the right to posit that it is not an illusion, that is, that this life is not the whole, and that in the larger sphere the *summum bonum* may be realized. This argument assumes that God exists as the guarantor of ultimate fittingness.

Although few have followed the exact way in which Kant correlated God with ethics, many have agreed that belief in God belongs with ethics rather than with science. Later in the nineteenth century Albrecht Ritschl was to found a neo-Kantian school, which interpreted theology as statements about values rather than about facts. God is that which is supremely valuable, not a being about whose existence it is suitable to argue.

Kant's philosophy opened up a particular idea of God of which he did not approve. Kant had given an elaborate account of the *a priori* structures of experience and thought, specifying that these structures apply to thought or mind as such; they are not accounts of contingent features of particular minds, but rather “transcendentals,” and individual minds exist by participation in them. Mind as such—in German, *Geist*—has a reality of its own, transcending that of individuals. In developments subsequent to Kant much nineteenth-century German theology associated *Geist* with God.

The most influential thinker who made this association was Hegel, who believed that the structure of *Geist* was not static, as Kant thought, but dynamic. Hegel studied this dynamism in the process of thinking as such and also traced it through the great cultures of universal history. He saw it as directed toward a final completion or realization, which he called absolute *Geist*. This Hegelian effort to discern the working of *Geist* in the whole of human cultural and intellectual history has since been characteristic of such theologians as Ernst Troeltsch and Wolfhart Pannenberg.

Kant's philosophy can also be used to support the idea of a religious *a priori*. Theologians can argue that just as space, time, and causality are *a priori* structures of experience, so also is the sense of the divine. Friedrich Schleiermacher held that in all people there is to

be found a “feeling of absolute dependence,” and he built his theology around this feeling. Later, Nathan Söderblom and Rudolf Otto identified the feeling of the holy or the numinous as the essentially religious element in experience. Paul Tillich subsequently spoke of “ultimate concern.”

This approach to the divine leaves somewhat ambiguous the reality of God as such. Its normal rhetoric implies that there is One on whom we are absolutely dependent, that there is One who is numinous, or that our ultimate concern is correlated with that which in truth concerns us ultimately. In this way it crosses beyond the boundaries of strict Kantian thought. Even within the Kantian framework, it follows that since we cannot but experience the world in this way, the question of truth or falsity is irrelevant. In some such way as this there has been a widespread tendency in twentieth-century theology to avoid the need for arguments for the objective reality of God, without relapsing into subjectivism or giving up realistic language about God.

In the twentieth century an important segment of Roman Catholic Thomistic thought has followed Kant in still another way by taking the “transcendental turn.” Transcendental Thomists, such as Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, probe with Kant within the human mind for the conditions of all thought and knowledge. But unlike Kant they discover not the categorical requirements for the Newtonian worldview but the horizon of being as such, which is God.

In the English-speaking world, in spite of Hume's skepticism on the matter, William Paley's arguments from the order of nature to a transcendent creator were convincing to many, and for many, therefore, Charles Darwin's theory of evolution generated a major crisis of faith. If one thinks of the world as having come into being with something like its present order, it is indeed difficult not to posit a supremely intelligent and powerful creator. But if one supposes that the complex forms of life now to be observed were produced by chance and necessity out of much simpler forms, the role of such a creator declines, eventually to the vanishing point. Hence Darwinism appeared to be a profound threat to theism, and out of the controversy was born fundamentalism as a self-conscious movement, holding to the literal accuracy of biblical teaching against dominant scientific and historical study. Its teaching, of course, had roots in the whole of conservative Protestant history, especially Calvinist, but its defensive stance against science was new. [See *Fundamental and Evangelical Christianity and Modernism*, article on Christian Modernism.]

Those who wished to accept the evolutionary perspective while remaining theists were compelled to recon-

ceive the way God works in the world. Such thinkers, instead of conceiving of God deistically as one who produced the world, gave it its laws, and left it to run its course, found it possible to imagine God as working with creatures in the development of new patterns of order. To do so, however, required the introduction of the notion of purpose into evolution. Debate continues as to whether this modification is justifiable. Thus Teilhard de Chardin argued that the whole evolutionary process moves toward a final destiny, an Omega Point. Jacques Monod replied that science has now established that chance and necessity reign supreme. Yet Monod seems to attribute intelligent purpose to human beings and even to other animals. There is in fact considerable evidence that purposive behavior is an important factor in the evolutionary process, and defenders of theism can argue from it that God is the source of this purposiveness.

The most influential theologian of the twentieth century, Karl Barth, was shaped in much of his thought by Kant's critical philosophy, but he rejected all adaptations of the doctrine of God to philosophical requirements. He denied, more radically than the Protestant reformers, that God can be known by human reason. We are entirely dependent, Barth maintained, on God's self-revelation, who is Jesus Christ. This revelation is known only in the scriptural witness to him. Central to what is revealed of God is radical, sovereign, dynamic freedom. We can lay no claims on God and make no judgments about how God will act except as we lay hold on the divine promises and the divine self-disclosure. In Germany this radically Christocentric theology provided a rallying point against compromise with the quasi-religious claims of Nazism. [See Neoorthodoxy.]

Barth strove mightily to let his thought of God be shaped by scripture through and through. He wished to avoid dependence on the philosophical ideas that had been so influential throughout Christian history. He also wanted to avoid reaction against uncongenial or hostile modes of thought in contemporary society. His intellectual honesty and openness commanded the respect of many modernists, despite their discomfort with his conclusions; his radical faithfulness to scripture commanded the respect of many fundamentalists, despite his refusal to endorse their teachings about biblical inerrancy and despite his rejection of their quarrel with modern science and philosophy. In the English-speaking world, aided by the popularity of the supportive writings of Emil Brunner, Barth provided an alternative to modernism and fundamentalism, thus making possible an ecumenical center for theological discussion from the thirties into the sixties.

The dominance of a positivistically inclined linguistic

analysis in English-language philosophy raised problems for the English-speaking Barthian consensus, as illustrated by the work of a North American student of Barth, Paul Van Buren, who called for a nontheistic interpretation of Barth's theology. Meanwhile opposition to Christian teaching about God continued, inherited from nineteenth-century skeptics and also from those who had found belief in God oppressive: Ludwig Feuerbach, who complained that humanity treated its own goodness as something alien, and projected this as "God"; Friedrich Nietzsche, who thought that human beings could not assert their own freedom until they "killed" God. Barth's reassertion of God as free and sovereign will did little to respond to these challenges, and the work of Thomas Altizer renewed this challenge in the mid-sixties. The "death-of-God" theology contributed further to weakening Barth's influence.

The appearance soon after World War II of the writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer from a Nazi jail struck a responsive chord in those already uncomfortable with Barth's theology. The ideas sketched in these writings indicate a quite different way of thinking of God. "Only a powerless God," Bonhoeffer wrote, "can help." It is the Crucified One rather than the all-determining Lord who can speak to suffering humanity "come of age." Bonhoeffer thus helped gain a hearing for a current of thought that directly challenged God's impassibility and affirmed patipassianism. This position had been formulated philosophically in the United States by Alfred North Whitehead and was systematically developed by Charles Hartshorne; it was forcefully expressed theologically in Germany by Jürgen Moltmann.

Although few have followed Bonhoeffer's rhetoric of divine powerlessness, there has been considerable new reflection on the nature of God's power. Whitehead held that God's power is persuasive rather than coercive. That this was true with respect to human beings had long been taught—for example, by Augustine. But in Whitehead's view, to exist at all is to have some measure of self-determination. Hence God's relation to all creatures is persuasive. Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that God is to be thought of as the Power of the Future. God is not now extant as one being alongside others making up the given reality, but rather that which will be all in all. Pannenberg argues that all creative realization in the present comes into being from this divine future. Hence God remains all-determinative, but the mode of this determination is quite different from that against which people have protested for the sake of human freedom. Instead it is God's determination of the present that makes us free.

The association of God with the future, building on the eschatological language of the New Testament, has

had other supporters. Whereas for Pannenberg it has ontological meaning, for J.-B. Metz and Jürgen Moltmann it is associated with a "political theology," which locates salvation primarily in the public historical realm. It is also central to the "liberation theology" of Rubem Alves, Gustavo Gutierrez, Juan Segundo, and other Latin Americans. These German and Latin American theologians argue that God's will is not expressed in the present structures of society or in some romanticized past, but rather in the promise of something quite different. Hence, the overwhelming tendency of religion to justify and even sanctify existing patterns, or to encourage nostalgia for a lost paradise, is opposed by the prophetic challenge in view of the hoped-for future. [See *Political Theology*.]

Among these theologians, the image of God has been more important than the concept. Indeed, recognition of the difference between image and concept and of the great importance of image has played a large role in recent thought about God. Blacks in the United States, led by James H. Cone, have pointed out that God has been imaged as white. The fact that theological concepts about God make the notion of skin color absurd has not reduced the power of this image. Blacks then need to image God as black to claim their human and religious identity. They can go on to say that the biblical witness to God's self-identification with the poor and oppressed gives special justification to this image. Black theology has also provided stimulus for fuller indigenization of images of God in many non-Western cultures.

Similarly, although theologians have insisted that God is beyond gender, feminists have had no difficulty showing that the Christian image of God is overwhelmingly male: whereas God's whiteness is clearly not biblical and is rightly rejected in the name of the Bible, God's maleness is biblical. Hence the denial of maleness to God requires a radical approach to scripture. Furthermore, the characteristics attributed to God by even those theologians who have rejected anthropomorphism have usually been stereotypically masculine ideals: omnipotence, impassibility, self-sufficiency. Feminists challenge this whole theological tradition. They divide between those, such as Mary Daly, who believe that the Christian God is inherently and necessarily patriarchal, and hence incompatible with women's liberation, and those, such as Rosemary Ruether and Letty Russell, who believe that the Christian deity is a liberator who can free us also from patriarchalism. [See *Anthropomorphism; Androcentrism; and Gender Roles*.]

For a century now there has been a slow decline of the mechanistic worldview. Since the rise of that worldview had so marked an impact on Christian thinking about God, its decline would seem to be important as

well. However, the change in theology has not been dramatic. Because of Kant's influence, theology in central Europe has been largely separated from questions of worldview. The effect of Barth's theology has been to reinforce this separation. Ironically, the separation has led to the continued acceptance of the mechanistic worldview by some theologians despite its loss of prestige among physicists. Rudolf Bultmann, for example, accepted this worldview unquestioningly and argued from it with respect to what is credible to modern people.

Nevertheless, others, such as Karl Heim, worked to adapt Christian theology to new developments in science; this approach was especially common in the French- and English-language worlds. Scientific developments abounded. After the controversy over evolution, more fundamental challenges to mechanism came from physics with the rise of quantum theory. Newtonian laws gave way to statistical probabilities, and self-contained atoms were replaced by fields. Substances gave way to events. But the lack of a fully articulated, generally accepted new worldview, correlated with the whole range of the sciences, has reduced the impact on theology of the decay of the older worldview. Meanwhile there has emerged largely outside the churches a popular religious culture that correlates religious beliefs with what it takes to be the new science.

The most impressive effort to propose a conceptually rigorous worldview or cosmology appropriate to post-mechanistic science is that of Whitehead. Whitehead also spelled out what he saw as the implications of this new cosmology for belief in God. Since the new cosmology replaces atomism with a field of interrelated events, it calls for understanding God as also fully interrelated with the world. God is not a cosmic lawgiver but an intimate participant in every event. Similarly, every event enters forever into the inner life of God.

Whitehead's ideas have been systematically modified, developed, and defended by Charles Hartshorne. In light of the new ways of thinking of God Hartshorne reformulated classical arguments for God's existence, including the ontological argument, and he called his theism neoclassical. This neoclassical theism is a panentheism based on a doctrine of God as dipolar, absolute in essence but relational in actuality. Hartshorne's thought has played a central role in the emergence of "process theology."

Another context for Christian reflection on God in recent times is dialogue with representatives of other religious traditions. These dialogues intensify the question whether the Christian God is also worshiped in other traditions. In relation to Jews and Muslims, who share much scripture with Christians, there has rarely been serious doubt. It has also been usual missional

strategy in countries previously unacquainted with these scriptures to use terms already present in their languages to speak of the Christian God. It has been widely assumed that, whatever the misunderstanding or distortion, every people has some notion of the one true God who is revealed in the Bible.

Such dialogue also usually leads to greater appreciation of the faith of the dialogue partner and increases the sense that the one true God is known also by the partner. This perception results in an effort to distinguish God from Christian ideas and images of God, so that Christians may respect ideas and images quite different from those to which they have been accustomed. H. Richard Niebuhr has provided a confessional model for dialogue in which the partners tell their story to one another in ways that celebrate the understanding to which their own story has brought them, without disparaging or closing themselves off from what others have learned from their own very different histories.

Reflection on the deep differences between dialogue partners can also lead to the conclusion that the reality of which the partner speaks is different from the biblical God. Meister Eckhart's distinction of godhead from God, Paul Tillich's language about being itself as the God beyond the God of theism, and Whitehead's distinction of creativity from God offer bases for fresh reflection on the relation of the mystical ultimate in Indian and Chinese religions to the Christian God.

The diversity of interests that lead to reflection on God witnesses to the continuing importance of the topic. It also produces great confusion. It is not clear that different statements using the word *God* have, any longer, a common topic. In the Christian context, however, one can almost always understand that, despite all the diversity of concepts and imagery, *God* refers to what Christians worship and trust. Further—with a few exceptions, such as Edgar S. Brightman and William James—God is associated with perfection. Part of the confusion lies in the changing ideal. Whereas for many centuries it seemed self-evident to most Christians that the perfect must be all-determining, affected by nothing external to itself, timeless, and completely self-sufficient, that supposition is no longer so evident today. Much of the debate about God is a debate about what we most admire and most desire to emulate.

[See also Theology, article on Christian Theology. Discussion of Western philosophy's approach to ideas about God can be found under Philosophy. See also the biographies of theologians and philosophers mentioned herein.]

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JOHN B. COBB, JR.

### God in Islam

"There is no god other than God." This is the essence of the Muslim profession of faith (*shahādah*). Pronouncement of the Islamic creed, the *Shahādah*, is the supreme religious act. Its mere recitation suffices for entry into the "community of the believers." In addition to this affirmation of the existence of God and his unicity, its full form contains an immediate corollary on the mission of the Prophet ("and Muḥammad is the messenger of God"), for the Muslim profession of faith would not be valid without reference to the preaching of the Qur'ān. Is this preaching not, first of all—essentially and historically—the rejection of polytheism, the destruction of idols, in and by the witness given to the one and unique God, the lord and creator of all that exists?

This witnessing through which the Muslim faith defines itself is both a renewal and an explanation of the *mīthāq*, the pact made by God with the human race in preternity (surah 7:172), recalled by earlier prophets and validated and ratified by the pre-Islamic monotheistic believers acknowledged in the Qur'ān. Abraham, the "friend of God" (4:125), stands out in this context. He is described as being "just and a prophet" (19:41), "a true believer [*ḥanīf*], having surrendered himself [*muslim*] to God" without compromise with the *mushrikūn*, or polytheists, those who associate others with God (3:67).

However, it is only the Qur'anic teaching that has given this basic faith its perfect expression and full value. This is not only true because the Prophet performed the obligations of religion as a *ḥanīf*, giving to God the "eternal worship" set out by the Creator from the beginning of time but partially corrupted by the "peoples of the Book" (2:135); it is also true because Muḥammad received the mandate to preach "in the name of the Lord who created," in the name of the "very generous one who instructed man by the pen and taught him what he did not know" (surah 96, tradition-

ally accepted in Islam as the first that “came down” to the Prophet).

Even if monotheism cannot thus be considered the exclusive prerogative of Islam, the affirmation of the divine unicity in and by the Shahādah remains its characteristic heritage, the central fact structuring its religious universe. [See Shahādah.]

Before sketching out the traditional elaboration of this faith in the great schools of Muslim religious thought, and in order to understand their approach, it is necessary to look at what the Qur’ān itself says. This must be done with particular care since the Qur’ān does not present itself in its literary form as a doctrinal exposition on God, his nature, and his attributes. In addition, regardless of the scholarly disputes among different schools as to whether the Qur’ān itself was created or uncreated, it is considered in Muslim belief as the word of God revealed to humanity, where the “Unknowable” addresses himself to “those who believe in the Mystery” (2:3) to tell them about himself what he chooses.

All the Qur’anic affirmations relating to the existence of God, his transcendent perfections, or his ways of acting toward his creatures refer to *Allāh*, the word presented in Islam as the proper name of God. The wisdom and subtlety of Arab philologists has frequently been directed toward this word, which appears about twenty-seven hundred times in the text of the Qur’ān. Grammatically, *Allāh* is a contraction of the word *al-ilāh*, which appears in pre-Islamic Arabic poetry to convey a sense of the “divinity” of the person being evoked. In turn, the origin of *al-ilāh* is found in a root common to various ancient Semitic languages, *el*, from which are derived the names of divinities encountered in ancient Semitic cults. It appears likely that in the pantheon of the old Meccan religion, *Allāh* already designated, by figurative substitution, the supreme divinity associated with inferior ones of tribal origin. Certain tribes of the Hejaz also invoked him, as is shown at the end of surah 29. However, the same surah illustrates that *Allāh*, the God of Qur’anic preaching, has nothing in common with any similarly named divinity.

### God in Qur’anic Teaching

It has often been remarked that, in the early Qur’anic teaching, God is usually named in terms of attributes that are related to humans: All-Powerful Creator, Supreme Lord, King of the Present and Future Life, Judge of Judges, and so forth.

Orientalists have given varying interpretations to this feature. Some authors have seen it as a pedagogy designed to purify the religion of the Meccans (as in 5:3). The Meccan surahs as a whole, however, present the

mission of the Prophet as a continuation of that of the earlier prophets: to confirm and perfect it and to make it universal (33:40, “Muḥammad is the Seal of the Prophets”). Others, such as P. Casanova, more attentive to the importance placed on the Day of Judgment, prefer to make Muḥammad a *nabī* (“prophet”) of the last hour, with an essentially eschatological message, an “explicit warner for those who fear the hour” (38:70; see also 79:45 and its context). Like the Creation, however, the Judgment is only a manifestation of God’s omnipotence and of his absolute and limitless lordship.

**The Uniqueness of God.** In any case, the teaching of the Qur’ān, designed as it is to lead the heart “to the right path” (1:6), implies the positive affirmation of the true God whose prerogatives over mortals cannot be shared, and the affirmation of an intransigent monotheism would rapidly make itself explicit. Indeed, it is the very essence of the message to be transmitted: “Say, ‘I am only a mortal, like you. It has been revealed to me that your God is one God’” (41:6). Nor does the Qur’anic teaching cease to denounce the complete falsity of the beliefs it is combating, despite a hostility encouraged as much by the faithfulness of the Meccans to their own divinities as by the economic and political implications of their polytheistic religion. The unshared godship belongs to the true God. No other divinities are associated with God, and no divine intermediaries lie between him and man—this is the essence of many Qur’anic verses that would form a pendant to those denouncing the vanity of idols (“useless and harmful,” 25:55) and the perversion of the *mushrikūn*, the only unpardonable sin being that of those who “associate” (4:48).

The Qur’ān denounces with particular vehemence a triad of female divinities known throughout pre-Islamic Arabia: al-Lāt (the Goddess), al-‘Uzzā (the All-Powerful), and Manāt (the one who presides over destiny and death). These divinities are assimilated to the *banāt Allāh*, the “daughters of God,” ridiculed in the Qur’ān (16:57–59). How can God have daughters as men have sons (52:39)? Concerned with preserving the sanctuaries where these goddesses were venerated, the Meccans pressured the Prophet. It is in this context that the incident recorded by al-Ṭabarī occurred: Satan (Iblis) made Muḥammad’s speech falter. As a result he unwittingly accorded to these three divinities the power of intercession given to the angels “with the consent of God” (53:25). Tradition would speak of “satanic verses,” and the Qur’ān (22:52) would affirm the abrogation by God of any “impurity” that Satan had surreptitiously introduced into the prophetic message. In their own way, the difficulties of interpretation presented by

surah 53 illustrate again the strength of the monotheistic message brought by the Prophet.

**Unicity.** The Qur'anic teaching does not limit itself to the affirmation of a strict monotheism. It is also clearly stated that the unique (*waḥīd*) God is one (*aḥad*) in himself, one in his nature as deity.

Say, he is God, one,  
God, the impenetrable,  
Who has not begotten, and has not been begotten,  
And equal to him is not any one.

The well-known surah 112 dates probably from the Meccan period, perhaps from Medina. The names it would receive, departing from the rule that the title of a surah is taken *ad litteram* from its content, show the particular attention Muslims give it. It is known as *sūrat al-ikhhlās*, that is to say the surah of "pure worship" ("the action of offering a sincere worship," in Blachère's French translation), or *sūrat al-tawḥīd*, "the proclamation of divine unicity."

Juxtaposed with the striking initial profession of faith ("Allāhu aḥad") is the final correlative, "not any one," no one ("Lam yakun aḥad"). This affirmation-negation is the decisive confrontation between the creator and the created. It displays, like a diamond in its setting, the unfathomable and incommunicable mystery of the deity. The second verse, "Allāhu ṣamad," is awkward to translate. *Al-Ṣamad* is one of the "most beautiful names" of God, whose root has as its primary meaning "without hollow," or "without cleft." Al-Jurjānī, of the Ash'arī school (fourteenth to fifteenth century CE), would comment, "Without mixture of any sort, without any possibility of division into parts, because in God there is no 'hollow'" (*Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, Cairo, 1907, vol. 8, p. 216). Louis Massignon would translate it as "dense to the absolute degree." The word *impenetrable* in my translation is meant to evoke the density of this unity without cleft that belongs to God alone (and in turn, the meaning "unknowable"). By reinforcing the unicity of the One who is "sufficient to himself" (*ghanī*, as in surah 2:267), *ṣamad* appears as the repetition of the intrinsic unicity of God in himself. The third verse reaffirms this unicity by categorically rejecting any multiplicity within the deity of God. Without doubt it was originally directed against the "daughters of God" of the Meccan pantheon and all that the *mushrikūn* in their error "associated" with God. Later, and in connection with the Qur'anic verses that call upon the "people of the Book" (4:171, "Do not say three . . . God is one. . . . How could he have a son?"), this verse was directed at the Christians. The thrust of this thought appears to have been intended to place the first believers on guard against the "associationism" of the Christians, that is,

against the mystery of the divine persons seen as a multiplicity within the deity. This interpretation is confirmed by the ongoing controversies in which Islam reacted against the mystery of the Trinity (and that of the incarnation) as a betrayal of the divine unicity under cover of which, so it was perceived, a "cleft" in God would be introduced.

**Tawḥīd.** The two words used to describe the external and internal unicity of God meet in the *tawḥīd*: "Allāh waḥīd wa-aḥad." In its absolute transcendence, this pronouncement constitutes both the act of unification of the one God and the proclamation of his unicity. Although the word *tawḥīd* is non-Qur'anic, it appears in the *ḥadīth* and is inextricably integrated with the formulations of Muslim faith. When the religious sciences developed in Islam, the particular discipline of *'ilm al-kalām* ("the science of the word" of God, or about God) was also called *'ilm al-tawḥīd* ("the science of divine unicity"). Regardless of the school or current of thought, it would always include a fundamental treatise on *tawḥīd*.

*Tawḥīd* is the verbal noun of the second form of the root *wḥd*, which indicates the action of unifying, of conferring unity. Etymologically it designates the knowledge one has of the unity of a thing. Its application to the field of religion gave it the meaning of either the science that permits the solid establishment of beliefs, or the fact of worshiping the unique Venerable One while having faith in his unity and affirming that this unity applies to his essence, which is dissimilar to all other essences, and to his attributes and acts, although here the controversies between schools enter into the question. This technical sense, dominant and stressed in Muslim thought, has a declarative value: it signifies the reciting of the formula affirming the divine unity-unicity, and *shahādah* is the concrete witnessing to this unity-unicity, actualizing and creating in the heart of the believer the interior reality of *tawḥīd*. Hence, *shahādah* is the first religious duty, even taking precedence over ritual prayer (*ṣalāt*). This is stated in a *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Sa'īd, a companion of the Prophet: "God has given nothing better than the proclamation of divine unity and ritual prayer. If there had been anything better than *tawḥīd*, he would have imposed it on his angels." Is it not God who speaks the eternal and uncreated witness that he himself bears to himself? ("Verily I am God, there is no god but I," 20:14.) This witnessing joins with that of the believer to participate in it and be authenticated by it. (In the words of al-Ḥallāj, God alone can truly bear witness to his unicity in the heart of his disciples.) Similarly, the Qur'an (59:23) uses the phrase *Allāh al-mu'min*, an expression that has caused considerable difficulty to many trans-

lators. *Al-Mu'min*, one of the "most beautiful names" of God, signifies "the believer," that is to say, "he who witnesses to his own truthfulness," or who pronounces the witness of faith in himself in a kind of equivalent to the "knowledge" he has of himself since "he alone knows perfectly the mystery" (72:26).

**The Divine Perfections.** These are revealed by the Qur'anic teaching. More precisely, God informs humans of all they can and should know about him by the "names" he gives himself. To add any more would be to violate the mystery that he is; *al-Ghayb* (2:3), "the mystery," is again one of the "most beautiful names" of God. The term *Allāh* describes him in his inaccessible nature of a deity both unique and one (*tawḥīd*) whose essence remains unrevealed. The other Qur'anic names reveal the divine perfections (and/or God's actions in the world, especially in relation to man) with the same distancing. This applies particularly to the "most beautiful names [that] belong to him" (20:8), which determine the attitude the believers should take before him and which are objects of meditation and reverence for the believers' piety. The names he chose to reveal at the same time describe and hide him, since he is "the first and the last" and "the evident and the hidden," *al-ẓāhir wa-al-bāṭin* (57:3), and "it is not given to any mortal that God should speak to him, except by revelation, or from behind a veil" (42:51, cf. "the veil of the name," *ḥijāb al-ism*, in Islam). This is particularly true of the names that proclaim the absolute difference between God and his creatures, and that thus magnify his mystery. From the point of view of Islam these names are not affirmed in relation to God's creatures either by causality or by an analogy of dissimilarity. Nor is this done by way of apophysis; rather, they are affirmed by the very flash of certitude that bears witness to God, echoing the pact dating from preeternity, the *mīthāq*, which the Qur'anic text revives. Once the life, the omniscience, and the omnipotence of God are affirmed, then a certain life, knowledge, and power can be attributed to man, but fleetingly and with utmost fragility. Thus, the divine perfections revealed by the "names" (see in particular 59:22–24) underline and emphasize the transcendence of the Most High in relation to a world whose order and harmony are already "signs of God" (*āyāt Allāh*, as in surah 2:164), an irrefutable witness of the necessary existence of the Creator that man must acknowledge and adore.

The Qur'anic teaching does not enumerate the divine perfections in a systematic manner, as would be done in the science of *kalām* by the treatises on divine attributes (*ṣifāt Allāh*) and on the "acts of the Most High" (*af'āluhu ta'ālā*). Muslim piety later gathered them together, completing the list of Qur'anic names with those

mentioned in the *ḥadīth* in order to recall and venerate them by a practice similar to that of the Christian rosary.

Some authors try to give a systematic presentation of the Qur'anic teaching on the divine perfections by distinguishing the absolute divine names (for example, *al-Qayyūm*, the Subsistent) from the relative names (*al-Ghaffār*, the Absolver). However, the application of this principle is awkward because it violates both the letter and the spirit of the Qur'ān. Consequently, I shall restrict myself to citing the three perfections whose "names" are the object of the highest veneration in Islam.

**Al-Raḥmān.** Always preceded by the definite article in the Qur'ān, this term is considered a proper name of God because, as J. Jomier has expressed it, nothing is said of *al-Raḥmān* that is not also said of *Allāh*. *Allāh* focuses thought on the unfathomable unicity, while *al-Raḥmān* focuses it on the depths of divine mercy and benevolence. This is recalled by the invocation "Bismillāh al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm" ("In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate"), which "opens" almost all the surahs and sanctifies on an everyday basis every important act of the believer, every act in his or her life that is morally qualified or qualifiable by the "good." The invocation joins to the name strictly reserved for God the (substantive) adjective *raḥīm* ("compassionate, benevolent"). Both terms have the same root (*rahm*), which signifies in Semitic languages the entrails, the maternal womb, and which had already provided the name *al-Raḥmān* to the unique God worshiped in the center and south of the Arabian Peninsula before Islam. In the Qur'ān the names referring to God's mercy are much more frequent than those describing him as a fearful master. God is called *al-Qaḥḥār* (the Fearsome) four times and once (59:23) *al-Jabbār*, which can be translated as "the terrible, the awesome," for this is how he would appear to the impious and the hypocrites. In these cases we are almost always dealing with an admonition against sinners that is followed by the wish "maybe he will return [unto God]" since God is both "Lord of majesty and of generosity" (55:78). For those who serve him and are faithful he is the Most Indulgent One who never ceases to pardon, the continual Giver, the Dispenser of all that is good, the Generous, the Conserver, the Answerer, the Friend and Protector, the Pitying, the Guide and Leader, and the Most Patient who is slow to punish. All these are Qur'anic names that emphasize and clarify *al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm*, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

When the Qur'anic teaching is taken as a whole, as it should be, God's mercy becomes inseparable from the omnipotence of which it is a special expression. These

two perfections are the two poles of divine action, at the same time contrasted and complementary. Divine omnipotence is extolled by frequent reference to the unparalleled lordship of “the Lord [al-Rabb] and Creator [al-Khāliq] of all things” (6:164, 13:16). As the “absolute initiator” (al-Ḥādī, 6:101) he creates whom he wishes, how he wishes. “When he decrees a thing, he but says to it ‘Be!’ and it is” (2:117; the *kun*—“be”—of realization appears eight times in the Qur’ān in contexts relating to creation and resurrection). An infinite closeness is juxtaposed with this omnipotence. Since he is the “absolute initiator,” God knows all, sees all, and hears all (as in 6:59 and 34:50, “He is, in truth, the one who hears and who is near”). Man is thus strongly disposed to recognize God’s unbreakable presence in every action, in every thought, and in every act of the human heart: he “created you and what you make” (37:96). Also he knows perfectly “what is in your souls” (as in 2:235 and many other instances). Is he not “closer to man than his jugular vein” (50:16)? Has he not positioned himself “between man and his heart” (8:24)? The specific context, as well as the Qur’anic teaching taken as a whole, however, show that this presence is not one of immensity bound up with transcendence in its very immanence, but rather a presence of proximity linked to the omnipotence and one that leaves intact, by its lack of similarity with all that is created, the inaccessibility of the Most High.

**Allāh al-Ḥaqq.** This phrase appears frequently in the Qur’ān, where it is related to the sovereign power of the Most High (as in 22:6, “That is because God is the Truth, and he brings the dead to life, and he is powerful over everything”). Like *al-Raḥmān*, *al-Ḥaqq*, which signifies both “the real” and “the truth,” is considered a synonym of *Allāh*, and the Ṣūfīs, the mystics of Islam, would use *al-Ḥaqq* by preference when addressing God. The usual translation as “truth” conveys poorly in our European languages all the resonance of the Arabic term. The primary sense of the root conveys the idea of an indestructible law engraved in stone, hence an unchallengeable established fact. It is only by derivation that the concept of correspondence to fact arises. Only then, in the third instance, does the sense of right and legal obligation that results from it develop. “The real,” “the truth,” and “right” founded on justice are all suggested together by the term *al-ḥaqq*. Certainly the Qur’ān uses *al-ḥaqq* for every reality, every truth, and every recognized right. However, the source of each lies always in God, who alone can authenticate every reality and every truth since only the divine decree (*qadar*) really founds truth and right, a created fact, a word, or a requisite of the created thing. God alone is total truth, since he alone is the real in its totality. Truth and real-

ity correspond here since God alone is “subsistent in himself,” *al-Qayyūm* (3:1), he who exists in himself and by himself with no reason for being other than himself (see also 20:111, 2:255). It is this absolute subsistence that establishes him in reality and truth, necessary by essence and “without cleft.” He is for this reason perfectly truthful and makes truth manifest. Used thus in figurative substitution, *al-Ḥaqq* is related to the Qur’anic substantive names preferred by tradition, such as *al-‘Adl* (“justice”), *al-Nūr* (“light”; God is perfectly and manifestly evident in himself: “light upon light,” 24:35), and *al-Salām* (“peace”). The term *al-Ḥaqq* thus shows that in Islam God is not merely presented as the supreme reality, but rather as the only reality, the only one to truly deserve this name since reality without breach or hollow (*ṣamad*) is a concept that applies only to God.

**Al-Ḥayy.** The participial noun *al-ḥayy* (“the living”) is undoubtedly the “name” most frequently meditated upon and brought to mind by the Ṣūfīs. It connotes a perfection that, in a certain way, all the others make explicit. Indeed, the name *al-Ḥayy* reaches God’s mystery, but from the outside and on the outside, so to speak, without permitting the believer’s gaze to penetrate to it. “The gazes of men do not reach it,” while he “scrutinizes their gaze” (6:103). God the One, who alone is real in his incorruptible reality, is the perfect Living One (3:2; cf. 20:111), the “Living One who does not die” (25:58), and thus the “omniscient,” the “omnipotent,” and, in relation to man, “the merciful who never ceases to show mercy.” But the mystery of the divine life and the secret of his intimate life remain unrevealed and, we should add, for the Muslim faith, unrevealable. This is perhaps the most profound difference between Islam and Christianity.

**The mutashābih (“ambiguous”) verses of the Qur’ān.** The names that reveal the perfections and the actions of God cannot be attributed to him except according to their revealed literal meaning. Consequently, the few anthropomorphisms present in the Qur’anic teaching (the eyes of God, as in 11:37; his face, as in 55:27; and so forth) would be the object of exegetical and theological controversies in the schools of *kalām*. The same would be true, and to an even greater degree, for the diverse Qur’anic affirmations that call into question man’s liberty under the hand of God. These passages deal with the mystery of the relations between the all-powerful creator, just judge and remunerator, who bestows his favor on whom he wishes and leads astray whom he wishes (as in 5:14 and 14:4), and his free creature, man, who is responsible to him but nevertheless subject to his decree (as in 18:29–30, 3:131–136, and elsewhere). [See Qur’ān for further discussion.]



### God in Traditional Muslim Religious Thought

From a sociophenomenological viewpoint, in every revealed religion the message written down in the book (or books) held to be sacred has a normative value for the religious thought it generates. Faith, by answering man's religious aspirations, cannot avoid the demands for rationality inherent in the human spirit. Indeed, faith provokes and activates this demand and in so doing positions itself in relation to reason. But in this effort of reflection, the first generations of believers always hesitate, if not refuse, to free themselves from the explicit terms (notions and/or terminology) of the message accepted as revealed. Their work nevertheless retains a preferential and normative value for later generations of believers who would periodically attempt a "return to the source." In Islam these fundamental questions, concerned as they are with the conception one holds of faith, revelation, and the like, would receive original answers governed by the characteristics proper to the Qur'anic teaching, that is to say, by inaccessibility of the divine on the one hand and the literal revelation of the Qur'an on the other.

**Historical Outline of the Problem.** The God of the Qur'an is al-'Azīm, the Inaccessible (e.g., 2:255, 42:4), well beyond the bounds of human understanding, which cannot limit him in any way or compare him to anything. In his knowledge and by his knowledge alone man cannot reach him "whom one does not question" (21:23; see also 21:110). Consequently, it is not surprising that all the schools devoted long preliminary discussions to what human reason can know of God on its own or on the basis of Qur'anic texts. Indeed, the response given to the question of the relationship between faith and reason, linked as it is to the attitude of the heart and the spirit toward God, determines the type of interpretation and the major lines of explanation given to the Qur'an.

The Muslim tradition, always active among the community of believers (the *ummah*), has never ceased to confirm, even to protect, the inaccessibility of God, sometimes to the point of jealousy. Typical of this attitude are the controversies, sometimes violent, that were provoked in Damascus under the Umayyads and later in Baghdad under the Abbasids, by the development of the science of *kalām*. This new science grew into a religious discipline that Western scholars like to call the "theology of Islam." However, this translation is only approximate since the primary objective of *kalām*, its role in the defense of the dogma "against those who doubt and deny," is different from that of Christian theology, defined by Augustine as "knowledge of the faith." In any case, the doctors of *kalām* (*mutakallimūn*), or

Muslim "theologians," were always obliged to contend with the reticence shown by the "pious elders" or their successors, the traditionists, toward any attempt to justify dogma by purely rational means, and the tension was alternately a source of inspiration and controversy. This reticence, transmitted from one generation to the next within the *ummah*, would manifest itself with particular vigor in Ḥanbalī thought, developed by the great and rigid traditionist Ibn Ḥanbal (ninth century), whose profession of faith was "The Qur'an and the *sunnah* [Muslim tradition]: that is religion." This tendency would continue to oppose the rationalist or modernist trends that were never totally excluded from Islam any more than from Christianity. It would also categorically reject any rationalist currents of thought in which Qur'anic monotheism became mere deism, in the sense given to the term by the philosophers of the European Enlightenment.

Throughout the centuries many "reformers" arose to fight once again in the name of divine inaccessibility against any interpretation or explanation that risked putting the inscrutable mystery within reach of human reason and its discourse. Such was the meaning of the reaction of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (d. 935/6) against the Mu'tazilah. The Mu'tazilī schools of *kalām* were among the earliest constituted. Under the impact of Greek thought in the Abbasid period the Mu'tazilah gave greater credence to reason and held it able to justify by its own principles the contents of the religious law. In addition, they would maintain the double affirmation of divine transcendence and human liberty, the latter in the name of divine justice itself. [See Mu'tazilah.] Al-Ash'arī, a defector from the Mu'tazilah, attempted to place the rational dialectic at the service of traditional positions and to center the question of the relations between God and man on the divine omnipotence of God. His doctrine, along with that of his contemporary al-Māturidī, would become dominant in Sunnī Islam; only in the contemporary period would a revival of Mu'tazilī thought occur. [See Ash'ariyah.]

Al-Māturidī, the "Master of Samarkand," did not found a "school." His teachings, however, firmly rooted in the *sunnah*, stood in opposition to that of the Shī'ah and the *falāsifah*, the Muslim disciples of the Greek philosophers. These preoccupations were also the basis of the major objections made by the great al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) against the *falāsifah*. The influence of the *falāsifah*—particularly Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroës)—on Muslim thought, and indeed their contribution to universal culture, must not be minimized. However, despite their sincerity toward Islam, the intellectual attitude of the *falāsifah* was not sufficiently consistent with the traditional position toward faith for

their intellectual achievements to be integrated into the Muslim religious heritage. [See *Falsafah*.]

The fundamental reaction of the Muslim faith to the inaccessibility of God and the corresponding intellectual attitude is nonetheless not one of narrow-mindedness or intellectual laziness. On the contrary, it rejects a passive and meaningless acceptance of the revealed message and the facile recourse to *taqlid* (acquiescence to accepted opinions), even though the majority of the Ḥanābilah make *taqlid* the conscious imitation of the Prophet and his companions, who believed without looking for "proofs." It calls instead for a personal effort of enquiry, but one that is always based on the intangible letter of the Qur'ān and on the *sunnah*. The ultimate aim of this quest is always to better align the behavior of the believer to the "correct path" that God wishes him to take (e.g., 1:6–7, 37:118). A remarkable example of this attitude is found in the person of the famous Ḥanbalī Ibn Taymīyah (fourteenth century), whose successors the contemporary "orthodox reformers" claim to be.

The concept of divine inaccessibility, uncompromising and absolute as it may be, does not isolate God in an abstract heaven. It is the expression of a separate and separating transcendence in the sense that the intimate life of God remains a guarded mystery, unrevealed and, in official teaching, uncommunicated. (Islam has no concept comparable to the Christian notion of "theological life," that is to say, a shared divine life.) This does not mean, however, that God is distinct from and indifferent to humans. In studying the Qur'anic preaching on God, have we not seen that every affirmation concerning his existence, his perfections, or his means of action toward his creatures was merely a repetition of the unformulated mystery of divine unity-unicity presented in ever renewed expression through the style and rhythm of Qur'anic Arabic? At the same time, each affirmation communicated to man what he needed to know to glorify God on earth and to be worthy of paradise in the hereafter. Thus Muslim faith creates in the souls of true believers an attitude of total and confident surrender (*islām*) to God, whom they know, on his word, to be a reliable, omnipotent, and benevolent guide (as in surah 93). [See *Īmān* and *Islām*.]

This faith gave rise, before and then concurrently with *kalām*, to other "religious sciences," most notably *fiqh*, "the science of the law" in Ignác Goldziher's translation, far preferable to the more common formula, "Islamic jurisprudence." Is it not *fiqh*, a specifically Islamic discipline placed by history in constant conflict with the schools of *kalām*, that elaborates the "code of life" of the community of the faithful with its

major concern the devotional obligations and religious behavior of its members toward God?

In Islam the Qur'ān is presented and received as the Word revealed by a God who reveals nothing of himself. God imparts no confidence about his mystery. He "stood in majesty on the highest horizon" when the Prophet "approached him to within two bow-lengths"—woe to him who attempts to go further, to receive from on high the Qur'anic revelation in its literal form (see 53:1–10). The problems of exegesis (*tafsīr*) would consequently take on a singular importance for two basic reasons. On the one hand there was a lack of any doctrinal authority to give the guaranteed meaning of what had been supernaturally "dictated." On the other the problems of exegesis exist in their own right. How can one understand and interpret the revealed words to grasp the thought of "he who spoke"?

*Tafsīr* played a crucial role when the controversy over the *mutashābih* verses of the Qur'ān developed. However, the rationalizing character taken by these scholastic debates deeply disturbed the "pious elders" and served to provoke a vigorous Sunnī reaction in the middle of the third century AH. This took the form of a return to the tradition exemplified and taught by Muḥammad, the *sunnat al-nabī*. This term signifies simultaneously "the deeds and actions [of the Prophet], his words and silent approbation," as A. J. Wensinck has expressed it. Islam used the technical term *ḥadīth* to describe the content of the *sunnah*. The *ḥadīth* became the subject of a characteristic "religious science" born of the devotional attachment of the true believers to the "traces" of the Prophet and his companions. General opinion considers that the "*sunnah* of the Prophet" stands somewhat under a "revealed" light, in continuity with the Qur'ān, which it is able to explain and elucidate more surely than all of human exegeses and reasonings.

**The Existence of the Unique God.** According to Qur'anic teaching, man has no excuse for not knowing how to affirm the existence of God. On one hand he carries from birth the mark of the *mīthāq* like a seal affixed to his heart. This innate predisposition to Islam, traditionally called *fiṭrah*, appears as a kind of primordial natural religion that finds its fulfillment only in *shahādah*. On the other, "in creation . . . there are truly signs for those who have intelligence" (3:190–191). This does not mean that faith is merely the outcome of a process of metaphysical reasoning using the principle of causality and the analogousness of being to arrive at an Aristotelian "prime mover." Man must learn to recognize the "signs of God" in the "signs of the universe." Faith appears then as a flash of recognition, revitalizing the *mīthāq* in the heart of man attracted by the beauties

of creation and tempted to go no further in spite of the signs that God has given through them. Man sees the impermanence of the transient world both in and through this dazzling revelation. He also gives witness to the One who alone remains: "Everything perishes [is perishing] except his face" (28:88; see the exceedingly beautiful text celebrating Abraham's faith, 6:74–89). Muslim thought would always affirm that human reason can and must decipher the "signs of the universe." It would take Abraham's faith as a starting point for a "proof" of God's existence. This was a proof by allusion that, under the influence of Greek thought and logic, would become demonstrative through an argument combining the concept of a beginning in time and that of the contingency of the world (proof *a novitate contingencia mundi*).

Without going into further detail on this point, it is necessary to point out the differences between the schools, since they are particularly indicative of the questions mentioned above. The Mu'tazilī schools taught that, starting from creation, human intelligence can and must rise to the affirmation of God even without the help of a new explicit revelation (the Qur'anic preaching) to make this obligatory. This was to be done by inference, by a dialectic grasp of opposition—an intellectual process that parallels the gift of faith to Abraham but comes about by means of the two-stage reasoning so characteristic of Arab-Muslim thought. The responsibility, or the honor, of giving form to this demonstration of the existence of God *a contingencia mundi* and of giving it a more easily transmitted probative value would fall to the great *falāsifah* who had adopted Aristotelian formal logic, such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.

The Ash'arī school on the contrary, and al-Ghazālī after them, took the position that the (real) capacity of reason can be exercised only if revelation makes this an obligation without which man could not escape the trivialities of the world. For the followers of al-Māturīdī reason can in principle exercise this power, but in reality it also requires the authentic signs that the Qur'anic verses constitute: by divine benevolence these correspond to the "signs of the universe" (the same word, *āyāt*, designates both "signs"). We can see how such positions, each in its own way, maintain or restore the primacy of Qur'anic teaching over reason (in its approach and its arguments).

**The Divine Attributes (Ṣifāt Allāh).** The appellations and actions ascribed to God by the Qur'anic teaching incited the intelligence of believers to attribute perfections to him. The list of divine attributes was formed even before the birth of the schools of *kalām*. This list would remain effectively unchanged since the *ṣifāt* have,

and can have, only one source, the Qur'ān. No attribute can be affirmed that is not taught in the Qur'ān, either directly or by way of immediate consequence (*tafwīd*). Another consensus would emerge with the birth of the science of *kalām*. Except for certain particular points, the different currents of thought would consider the *il-āhiyāt* ("those [sciences] that have to do with God") as rational. Reason therefore becomes responsible for what it can deduce concerning the existence of God, once this existence is recognized. Certain elements, such as the Ash'arīyah, did not necessarily accept that reason left to its own devices would succeed in formulating all the divine attributes. However, they did not deny that this very reason can understand that they are of necessity linked to the affirmation of the unique God, absolute creator and just judge.

Scholastic disputes would begin with the efforts of the doctors of *kalām* to systematize to some degree the data provided by the Qur'ān. The development of the necessary explanations would come up against the lack of clarity of the Qur'anic vocabulary and concepts, especially as it is not simple in such a sensitive field to give precise definitions. These disputes first arose in connection with problems of the inaccessibility of the Qur'anic God and the literal revelation of the Qur'ān itself. These debates would center principally on the meaning of the attributes of God. At the same time they would deal with the reality of the *ṣifāt* and, by extension, the relationship of the latter to the divine essence and/or whether these *ṣifāt* were eternal or not. With time these debates would become increasingly technical and sterile (logic, philology, and so forth) and would lose their appeal even within the Islamic world; consequently I shall allude to them here only in very brief fashion.

The classification of the attributes into different categories would vary. However, the schema presented below achieved a certain consensus.

1. *Attribute of the essence.* Existence, the attribute con-substantial with the essence, was the positive term expressing the essence without adding any other significance. This was *dhāt Allāh*, the "self" of God bearing neither comparison with nor analogy to the essence of perishable things. This was his existence (*wujūd*).
2. *"Essential" attributes.* These were subdivided into two groups. First came the negative attributes (eternity, everlastingness, dissimilarity from the created, subsistence through himself) that underline divine transcendence and consequently manifest that God has neither equal nor opposite of any sort. Second were the *ma'ānī* attributes that "add a concept to the

essence." They are not identical to the essence but are not other than it (in a separated or separating way). Some are *'aqlīyāt*, "rational" (power, will, knowledge, life); the others are *sam'īyāt*, "traditional." These latter cannot be grasped by human reason and can only be known by the Qur'anic teaching. Among this group we can mention seeing, hearing, speech, visibility, and perception; their exact meaning has been keenly disputed by the Mu'tazilah and Ash'arīyah.

3. *Attributes of "qualification."* These are the divine names or the *ma'ānī* attributes in the verbal form (present participle), such as possessing power, willing, and so forth.
4. *Attributes of action.* These do not intrinsically qualify the essence, but designate what God can do or does not do (creation, command, predetermination, and so on). The schools differed in their view of the relationship of these attributes with knowledge and will; the Ash'arīyah were usually more "voluntarist," the Māturīdīyah more "intellectualist."

The central point in these debates is the question of the "reality" of the attributes and their relationship to the essence. The "pious elders" had already affirmed several attributes without providing any reasoning, just as they had affirmed the existence of God, both by punctiliously respecting the letter of the Qur'ān and by accepting that the divine names were synonyms. However, their fundamentalist attitude with regard to the text of the Qur'ān came into conflict with the ambiguities and anthropomorphisms of the *mutashābih* verses. This led them into contradiction, even to the point of being open to the accusation of comparing God to his creatures. Particularly aware of the purity of any affirmation concerning God, the Mu'tazilah, who saw themselves as "the people of justice and *tawhīd*," submitted the divine attributes to a severe critique. They rejected by the practice of *tanzīh* "distancing" all that evoked the created, supporting themselves by those passages in the Qur'ān that invite such an interpretation (e.g., 6:103, 42:9). Finally, this "stripping away" of the attributes (*ta'tīl*) by a rigorous *via remotionis* tends to weaken the notion of them and to compromise their reality in God. Purified in this way, the attributes exist in God but are identical with the essence. This double affirmation rests on a distinction that can hardly be anything but nominal.

Under these conditions, the position of the Mu'tazilah toward *sam'īyāt* attributes is not surprising. Sight, hearing, visibility, and the like are considered as mere metaphorical expressions of God's omniscience and omnipotence. Speech, God's manifestation in time and the

expression of his will in the religious laws laid down for people, must have "begun." Thus the Qur'ān is "created." The *tawhīd* accepts no change or even the shadow of variation. The school of Basra would even come to speak of a "contingent" divine knowledge and will regarding man's free acts. Thus we see how and why the Mu'tazilī concept of reason, "criterion of the religious law," led its followers to transform the *tawhīd*, which they had intended to serve and magnify, into a concept that was negatively expressed but still accessible on the discursive level. The content of monotheistic faith thus tends to become a notion of God justified before human reason. This attitude and its inevitable consequences could not but provoke opposition and, finally, rejection. This task would be taken up by the Ash'arīyah.

The Ash'arīyah wished to justify their global and monolithic understanding of the mystery, which was comparable to that of the "pious elders." Thus they would carefully apply *tanzīh* to the divine attributes, the reality of which they strongly supported. The Ash'arīyah adopted this attitude since they perceived the attributes according to their precise traditional definition (*tawqīf*), that is to say, in the manner in which God "set it down" in the Qur'ān and, secondarily, in the *sunnah*. The *sam'īyāt* attributes especially are taken in their literal sense, while still remaining sufficiently mysterious to prevent anthropomorphism. They are seen as having no analogy with the created world. Their reason for existing cannot be grasped since their means of existence is "without how or comparison" (*bi-lā kayf wa-lā tashbih*). Speech is seen as subsisting in God, whom it expresses; it is an "essential" speech, just as the Qur'ān is "uncreated," distinct from its created expression, the Qur'anic text and recitation. By applying to all the attributes the principle of "without how or comparison" the Ash'arīyah believed they could both remain faithful to the literal meaning of what the Qur'ān affirms and avoid the *ta'tīl* for which the Mu'tazilah were criticized. The attributes "are not God nor are they other than he." They subsist in the divine essence in a manner completely unknown. In the eleventh century, al-Juwaynī, the teacher of al-Ghazālī, tried to give the attributes an intermediate existence between being and nonbeing, but this approach was not taken up by others. (More philosophically aware, the *fa-lāsifāh* would advance the logical notion of distinction of reason.) The Māturīdīyah, for their part, would avoid any formulations that might insinuate, in whatever manner, a distinction between God and his attributes, especially those that might imply that the attributes are the "accidents" of the essence. They would go to considerable lengths to remain as close as possible to the let-

ter of the Qur'ān ("God the Speaking, the Willing," and so forth) and would say, for example, that "God is knowing and possesses a knowledge attributed to him from all eternity."

These scholastic disputes can appear tedious, and indeed, they sometimes are. I shall conclude by quoting Louis Massignon's remark at the end of his study on salvation in Islam: "God is not within the reach of man. Man should not be allowed to try to reach God. An abyss separates us from him. Thus emerge the strictness and intransigence of a monotheistic faith among a people to whom prophets have come to remind men that God is separate from them and inaccessible to them. Indeed faith, pure faith, is without doubt the only gift worthy of being offered to him." This is truly what is shown by those pious believers whose submission (*islām*) to the commands of the Law is the basis of a total surrender to God through an act of trust that does not question.

[For further discussion of Islamic theology, see Kalām. The divine "names" are discussed in detail in Attributes of God, article on Islamic Concepts. See also Creeds, article on Islamic Creeds; Free Will and Predestination, article on Islamic Concept; and the biographies of historical personalities mentioned herein.]

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LOUIS GARDET

Translated from French by Richard Scott

**GODDESS WORSHIP.** [This entry consists of five articles on the worship of goddesses:

An Overview

Goddess Worship in the Ancient Near East

Goddess Worship in the Hellenistic World

The Hindu Goddess

Theoretical Perspectives

*The first provides a cross-cultural and chronological survey of goddess worship, tracing the phenomenon from Paleolithic to modern times. The following three articles examine the rituals and myths associated with goddesses in various cultures. The final piece presents theoretical issues that arise in the study of goddesses and that reflect controversies involving more general interpretations of religious history.]*

#### An Overview

The scope and antiquity of goddess worship are remarkable. Female sacred images are associated with some of the oldest archaeological evidence for religious expression and they still have efficacy in the contemporary world. Goddess images are depicted in a wide range of forms, from aniconic representations, such as abstract organs of reproduction, to fully elaborated icons decorated with the finery of monarchy. They are linked to all major aspects of life, including birth, initiation, marriage, reproduction, and death. They display the elaborate variegation of religious experiences in different cultural contexts. [See *Feminine Sacrality*.] A historical survey reveals goddess worship to be a continuous phenomenon, despite periodic ebbs and tides during certain critical epochs.

**Goddess Worship in Upper Paleolithic Cultures.** Some of the earliest archaeological evidence for the human religious impulse consists of sculptured images and cave paintings of female figures excavated in hundreds of Upper Paleolithic sites throughout Europe and northern Asia, including France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, the Ukraine, and Siberia. These images, carved in bone, stone, antler and mammoth tusks, out-

number those of male figures ten to one. They have been identified sometimes as part of an elaborate and pervasive worship of goddesses; they are commonly known as "Venuses," after the Roman goddess of love and beauty. The interpretation of these artifacts remains controversial today. [See Prehistoric Religions.]

Some Venuses have been discovered in Aurignacian deposits as old as thirty to forty thousand years. However, they appear more frequently about 25,000 BP. Remarkably, these same goddess figurines have been unearthed from sites dated as late as the early Neolithic period. One of the earliest of these figurines, found in the Dordogne region of France, was estimated to be thirty-two thousand years old, roughly the age of the famous cave art of that period and situated one level above Neanderthal artifacts associated with what are believed to be ceremonial burials. This "pregnant" figure was carved from reindeer antler and is marked by a series of small notches that do not appear to be purely decorative. We cannot be sure how to interpret this figurine, though it might be part of an elaborate cult associated with later discoveries of the same type.

The Venuses have been widely interpreted as evidence of a single phenomenon, fertility symbolism. Some scholars have lumped these prehistoric figurines together with a later so-called Great Goddess complex and the emergence of agriculture. [See Agriculture.] Most archaeologists, however, hesitate to treat all these female images as fertility symbols, because they are the product of a wide variety of peoples with different economic systems, cultural traditions, and languages. Perhaps the Venuses had a great variety of meanings, both within the different cultural contexts in which they were found and depending on the time period. Each of these images must be read in the context of its archaeological provenience. Thus, theories that the Venuses represent an ancient, widespread cult of "fertility magic" are oversimplifications. Current research suggests that the Venuses may be associated with a wide range of phenomena involving women, such as maturation, menstruation, copulation, pregnancy, birth, and lactation. They are not to be treated separately or isolated in any way from other artifacts of the same period that represent some type of "storied event." [See Paleolithic Religion.]

The Neolithic goddess figurines take different forms. Some are thin and geometric, representing snake and bird goddesses. These water and air deities were likely cosmic symbols of the regeneration of life. Other figurines are faceless, unclothed, and corpulent. Still others appear to be conspicuously pregnant, with exaggerated breasts and large buttocks. The most famous of these figurines, the Venus of Willendorf (Austria), is often

taken to be typical of Upper Paleolithic mother-goddess figures. This image is four and three-eighths inches high, made of soft stone, faceless, fat, but not apparently pregnant; it appears to have been painted with red ochre. However, the diversity of female images is marked; not all are full iconic representations. There is a variety of images of female body parts such as sculptured breasts (from sites in Czechoslovakia) marked with curious notches that may have been either notational or decorative—some of these were worn as a string of beads, others as a single pendant. Abstracted images of vulvas have also been unearthed in France, Spain, and Italy. Some are forked images, others are shaped like disks, and all have clear, finely marked notches, which may be connected in some way with the menstrual cycle.

Other permutations include the various female images painted on cave walls that have some association with animals and a variety of different symbols and markings of probable notational significance. A number of abstracted images of female buttocks have been found in various sites, sometimes with breasts and torsos. In one Italian grave site, for instance, a decorated bone pendant in the shape of female buttocks was found. The image is well worn, and it seems to have been used for some purpose during the life of its wearer and then placed among various other ceremonial burial objects, including two other crudely carved goddess images made especially for the burial.

There is a great range of evidence for goddess worship in the Upper Paleolithic era. The character of this worship is largely uncertain, and no single interpretation is adequate. The figurines may have been associated with pregnancy, birth, burial, fertility, initiation, hunting, and the menstrual cycle; they may even have had some erotic function. Although they represent a prominent element in the religious life of this period, it is erroneous to isolate these female figurines from other important and associated imagery, such as animals, male images, and undeciphered markings. Nor can we make the further leap of suggesting that this rich collection of sacred female images constitutes proof of an early stage of matriarchy; the symbolism of these images tells us nothing clear about male or female roles in the social organization of Upper Paleolithic cultures.

**Neolithic Earth Goddesses and the Emergence of Agriculture.** The most noteworthy fact about Neolithic goddess worship is its strong continuity with earlier Upper Paleolithic configurations. Gradually Paleolithic goddess symbolism was transformed to fit into the complex of human needs generated by increasingly agricultural and urbanized forms of social organization. Most sources date the Neolithic era around 10,000 to 4,000

BP; it was marked by the appearance of ground stone tools and the domestication of plants and animals in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and throughout various parts of Asia. The female images found in Neolithic sites represent the continuity of traditions from earlier Mesolithic and Upper Paleolithic cultures. Chevrons, meanders, serpentine and spiral designs associated with Neolithic goddesses are all familiar motifs prefigured in Paleolithic female images. Also, it appears that the Neolithic goddesses who were linked to lunar mythology are derived from earlier roots. Many of the Neolithic goddess figurines are corpulent, like their Upper Paleolithic predecessors; they are connected also to the supply of wild animals, but by this time with the addition of domesticated animals such as the dog, bull, and male goat as well. Some of these Neolithic figurines are pregnant, seated on a throne, representing goddesses of vegetation. In general, they are composite images, sharing the traits of both preagricultural and agricultural societies. Also noteworthy is a complementarity between male and female images—one is not subordinate to the other. [See Neolithic Religion.]

The complex imagery of the Neolithic era was centered around females and animals, as illustrated by evidence from the famous Anatolian site of Çatal Hüyük, excavated by James Mellaart in 1961–1963. [See *Lady of the Animals*.] This Neolithic settlement located in southern Turkey is dated from the seventh to sixth millennium BCE. Its more than forty shrines, distributed through nine building levels, have yielded a wealth of information about Neolithic religion. The evidence displays a clear cultic continuity associated with a mother goddess and accompanying male deities. In some shrines at Çatal Hüyük the goddess is depicted as being supported by leopards or giving birth to a bull, which was a male deity. This association of goddesses with male deities is unusual at Neolithic sites; they usually appear without a male counterpart.

The statuettes at Çatal Hüyük suggest that goddesses were connected variously with pregnancy, birth, ritual marriage, and command over wild animals. Images of stylized female breasts similar to Upper Paleolithic figurines have also been found here. The principal deity of this Neolithic site is a goddess represented in three forms, as a young woman, a mother giving birth, and an old woman. There are also several images of twin goddesses, with one of the two portrayed in the process of giving birth.

In other Neolithic shrines, goddesses appear as bird and snake deities connected to rain and water. Further recent evidence of Neolithic goddess worship comes from a village site presently being excavated outside of Amman, Jordan. Here an international team of archae-

ologists has unearthed a series of plaster figurines three feet tall with startled expressions on their faces, along with fifty animal figurines, two adorned plaster skulls, and three Venuses. One of the statues is of a nude female standing and pushing up her breasts with her hand. This image may foreshadow the later cult of the goddess Astarte, who was widely worshiped in the area.

The question has to be raised as to whether these Neolithic goddesses were part of a single cult complex spread across Europe and the Middle East or whether they represent different traditions entirely. In some places they are associated with ancestor worship, death, and the afterlife; in others they are related to the emergence of agriculture and the fertility of crops. In still others, they represent developmental functions, as they had in the Upper Paleolithic era. Whatever the answer may be to this question, one thing is clear. Goddess worship is not, as some scholars have suggested, an innovation that appeared suddenly in the Neolithic period with the emergence of agriculture, which these scholars then see as a woman-controlled form of subsistence.

#### **Goddess Worship in the Development of Civilizations.**

Goddess worship has played a central role in the worldwide transition from small-scale social organization to the emergence of civilizations in India, the ancient Near East, Greece, Rome, China, and Japan. In these complex agricultural societies female deities have been variously linked to the fertility of crops, the sovereignty of kingship, the protection of urban ceremonial centers, and the waging of warfare against enemies.

**India.** No civilization in the world developed goddess worship so elaborately as did India. Terra-cotta figurines of mother goddesses have been found in the Indus Valley, dated at 2,500 to 1,500 BCE, along with abstract stone rings representing the yoni and lingam, prototypes for the later god Śiva and his female consort. Goddesses rarely functioned separately from male divinities in ancient India. Nor was goddess worship the central theme in the development of Indian civilization except during periodic episodes of florescence. Indeed, the goddess does not appear as a major focus in Indian literature until 600 BCE, in a legend recorded in the *Kena Upaniṣad*. Not until much later, probably the seventh century CE, did goddess worship emerge as a somewhat separate cult in Hinduism and eventually in Tibetan Buddhism. This Tantric expression of goddess worship was particularly strong in eastern India where it continues to flourish today, though somewhat less intensely than formerly.

At no point in the development of Indian civilization was goddess worship completely separate from devotion to male deities. The Hindu rajas wielded power through the manipulation of icons of major male deities

like Sūrya, Viṣṇu or Śiva. While these gods had female consorts who were worshiped alongside them, goddesses usually played a secondary though by no means unimportant role as images of cultural identity. No doubt at the village level there has been a long, relatively unbroken continuity of goddess worship extending back to Neolithic times. Local village goddesses were besought (as they continue to be today) to increase human fertility, to cause or cure diseases, to bring about good fortune, to enhance the productivity of crops, or to destroy demons. Yet, at the more exalted level of courts and kings, these female deities played a less prominent role. Up until the early part of this century many rajas incorporated tribal peoples into their spheres of influence by worshiping local goddesses, but this royal patronage of goddess worship was usually accompanied by an even stronger devotion on the part of the raja to the sect of a male deity. Thus, it would be erroneous to conceive of Indian goddess worship as a distinct component in the development of Indian civilization. The widely known Hindu goddesses like Sarasvatī, Lakṣmī, and Pārvatī rarely stand alone. Only Kālī and Caṇḍī, the more ferocious aspects of female divinity, become focal points for separate worship. Even in these cases the goddess rarely acts as a primary source for establishing the legitimacy of kingship.

**The ancient Near East.** In the ancient Near East the phenomenon of goddess worship displayed an even more elaborate and subtle set of nuances. Here we encounter several distinct civilizations, some having borrowed heavily from each other. A number of goddesses were prominent in ancient Egypt: Nut, goddess of the sky and consort of the earth god, Geb; the goddess Neith, patroness of victorious weapons and the art of weaving; Isis, goddess of wisdom; and Hathor, another sky goddess who assumed various forms. Some of these goddesses were deeply entwined in the development and continuity of divine kingship. The name *Isis*, for instance, is related linguistically to the term for "chair" or "throne." The throne or "holy seat" of the pharaoh was the "mother of the king." The pharaohs thought themselves to be sons of Isis. Later Isis became linked to the god Osiris. The heroic story depicts Isis's famous search for her murdered husband's corpse, her discovery of it, and his resurrection. Eventually Isis became universalized as a benevolent goddess of the harvest. Her cult spread from Egypt to Greece and throughout the Roman empire. By 300 BCE the cult of Isis had become a popular mystery religion, with secret initiation rites promising salvation and rebirth.

Another stream in the ancient Near Eastern tradition of goddess worship flows from the Mesopotamian civi-

lization located on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In that area the goddess Inanna was worshiped; she was the queen of heaven and earth and the goddess of love, and she was profoundly involved in the rise of Sumerian state-level social organization. Although she was one of many goddesses of ancient Sumer, Inanna outlasted and overshadowed them all. Also known as Ishtar and later worshiped by different Semitic peoples, Inanna had very ancient roots. She was part of an amalgamation of Sumerian and Akkadian religious and political beliefs, extending back to 3000 BCE or possibly farther, and she is connected to the fertility of crops, the emergence of increasing sedentary patterns of social organization, and the development of the first urban centers.

In the late nineteenth century the world's oldest texts on cuneiform clay tablets were unearthed after having been buried for at least four thousand years. Some of these texts tell the life story of Inanna from adolescence through womanhood and her eventual apotheosis. The texts are extremely rich; they reveal the sexual fears and desires of the goddess, an elaborate history of kinship among various deities in her family tree, her power as queen of Sumer, and her responsibilities for the redistribution of resources and fertility of the earth. Inanna's cult was centered at the ancient temple city of Uruk. Here archaeologists have provided evidence for the earliest known urban civilization, dated 3900–3500 BCE and characterized by monumental temple architecture and the first writing. The oldest shrine of Uruk was dedicated to Inanna, as were numerous later temples. She was the supreme patroness of the city. Though related to other deities, she retained a certain degree of independence. Inanna's shrine was the focus of considerable economic activity and the redistribution of resources characteristic of urban life.

Unlike the female divinities of India and Egypt, the goddess Inanna, who was most likely derived from Neolithic and possibly even earlier Paleolithic roots, played the principal role in the religious tradition of an urban society. She was considered to have equal status with the sky god, An, head of the Sumerian pantheon. In this urban context, Inanna became a focal point for the full emergence of life in city-states, and she assumed the regal responsibility for victory in war and the redistribution of resources among urban peoples. Often these functions have been allotted to male deities in other traditions, as in the case of the Hindu gods Śiva and Jagannātha.

Inanna is identified with the Semitic goddess Ishtar and the West Semitic goddess Astarte. These deities, along with the Canaanite goddesses Asherah and Anat (a wrathful warlike deity), were worshiped by the early



Hebrew people. We can be certain the early Israelites worshiped the Canaanite goddess Asherah; even Solomon praised the pillars representing this deity, and his son Rehoboam erected an image of her in the temple at Jerusalem. Probably the female deities of the early monarchic period did not disappear but were changed into different forms, despite repeated efforts to reestablish a strong monotheism in Judaism in the biblical period. Raphael Patai (1967) has argued that various disguises are assumed by the goddess in later Judaism: she appeared in the form of the cherubim (depicted as man and woman in an erotic embrace); in images of Yahveh's wife Astarte; as the one and only God having two aspects, male and female; and in the form of the Shekhinah (the personified presence of God on earth). In this latter form, the Shekhinah argues with God in defense of man; she is sometimes manifested as Wisdom and at other times as the Holy Spirit. The feminine element played an important role in qabbalistic thought, especially in the thirteenth-century *Zohar*, which stressed the Shekhinah as female divine entity; she was also referred to there as Matronit ("divine matron"). The Shekhinah was seen as an intermediary between God and the scattered peoples of Israel and was widely accepted in Jewish communities in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, when Qabbalah had widely felt influence. According to Patai, the complex concept in Qabbalah that the Shekhinah and God are one, filtered down to the Jewish masses, led to the simplified belief in her as a goddess. [See also Shekhinah.]

Although the early Israelites engaged in the worship of female deities, at some point goddess worship was removed from the religious tradition. Whether one places this purge of the goddess early in Judaism or posits a disguised form of goddess worship that was retained for centuries and then finally removed, the really important question is why the phenomenon was eliminated from the tradition at all. Some feminist scholars have argued that this purge of the feminine represents a repression of women. However, the phenomenon can be explained also by the purely theological argument that monotheism requires the loss of all "extraneous" deities, no matter what gender. This raises yet another question. Why has none of the monotheistic religions worshiped a feminine deity as its centerpiece? Could there be some truth to the often asserted position that monotheism represents a final ideological phase in the evolution of complex state-level civilizations? If this were true, how then does one explain Indian civilization, which is clearly a state-level form of social organization, but is neither monotheistic nor associated with an exclusively dominant male divinity? Perhaps

the gender of deities has little, if anything, to do with the social structure in which they are manifested. Such questions require further research from different theoretical perspectives.

**Greece.** In Greece, the rebirth theme is found in the Eleusinian mystery cult associated with the earth goddess, Demeter. However, instead of the rebirth of a male deity, a female deity is reborn: Demeter's daughter, Persephone, is resurrected after her abduction by Hades, lord of the underworld. The pre-Olympian goddesses of Greece were usually connected to vegetation rituals. A prime example was Gaia, earth mother and chthonic mother of the gods. This deity was associated with the oracle at Delphi before the oracle became exclusively Apollo's. Her rituals included animal sacrifices, offerings of grain and fruit, and ecstatic possession trance. Many of the later Greek goddesses emerged from pre-Hellenic earth goddesses like Gaia. The famous twelve deities of Olympus included the goddesses Hera, Athena, Aphrodite, Hestia, Artemis, and Demeter. These Olympian goddesses were each given distinct roles to play in accordance with their earlier spheres of influence. The original chthonic aspects of these goddesses were diminished as they became subordinated in the Olympian hierarchy ruled by Zeus. No longer was each goddess an organic link to the generative forces of life and death. Instead, she became highly compartmentalized in her new role in the male-dominated Olympian pantheon. This compartmentalization demarcates a transformation in the role of goddess worship in the development of Greek civilization.

**Rome.** There was a strong identification of Greek deities with Roman deities. Most Greek goddesses had their Roman counterparts. In 204 BCE Roman aristocrats officially adopted the foreign cult of the Anatolian goddess Cybele, later to be known as the Magna Mater (Great Mother). On 4 April of that year the image of the goddess was carried into the city by Roman matrons, a temple was erected, and she was installed as a national Roman deity. Only self-castrated foreign priests were allowed to serve in the temples dedicated to Cybele, because Roman citizens were forbidden to be priests until the reign of Emperor Claudius (41–54 CE). Driven by Cybele, his angry mother, Attis died of self-castration and then returned to life in response to his mother's intense mourning. This death and rebirth theme was celebrated during a series of holidays at the beginning of spring; the rituals included a procession carrying a pine tree (representing the dead Attis) into the temple of the Magna Mater, violent ritual mourning, a celebration of the rebirth of Attis, and the bathing of Cybele's statue.

*China and Japan.* The Vajrayāna tradition of Tantric Buddhism in Tibet and Mongolia is widely associated with goddess worship. Male and female manifestations of the divine power are depicted as opposite but complementary aspects of each other. This dynamic tension of male and female principles, derived from Tantric Hinduism, has resulted in a large number of goddesses who are intimately related to their male counterparts as consorts. Some goddesses, however, retain a certain degree of autonomy and represent independent deities. This is the case of the goddess Tārā, a female *bodhisattva* who became a universal protectress. In Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, Kuan-yin, goddess of mercy, is also considered to be a *bodhisattva*. She is a principal teacher, a savior who can give her devotees assurance of enlightenment and carry believers to the western paradise of O-mi-t'o-fo's Pure Land. This goddess continues to be worshiped throughout China and in Japanese Buddhism.

The tradition of goddess worship is well established in Japan, not only in Buddhism, but also in Japanese Shintō, where many male and female nature deities are propitiated. In Shintō the world was created by a divine creator couple, the god Izanagi and the goddess Izanami. They gave birth to the sun goddess Amaterasu and her brother Susano-o no Mikoto, god of storms, along with other nature deities. Amaterasu eventually became the cult deity of the Japanese royal family, retaining both her Shintō function as sun goddess and a new role as Shining Buddha of Heaven. Until this century the emperor of Japan was considered to be the descendant on earth of Amaterasu. He was charged to keep peace in the world and to support her major pilgrimage shrine, located at Ise.

This survey of archaic goddess worship points to the diversity of the roles goddess worship has played in the development of civilizations. In some parts of the world goddesses were central in the emergence of urbanism and kingship. Elsewhere they were secondary consorts of male divinities or vestiges of mystery cults associated with earlier shamanistic religion. Sometimes they represented a continuity with Neolithic and Paleolithic traditions or were transposed and reconceived as the bearers of complex social organization—waging warfare, presiding over the collection of taxes and controlling the redistribution of resources. The emergence of virtually every major civilization was associated in some way with goddess worship. While there may not be a single "Great Goddess" worshiped universally, the ubiquity of the phenomenon remains unbroken from Paleolithic times.

**Contemporary Patterns of Goddess Worship.** The worship of female sacred images is found in some form

or other throughout the world, except in those societies dominated by Islam or certain branches of Protestantism. Even in cultures heavily influenced by iconoclastic secular movements, like the Soviet Union, vestiges of goddess worship remain. For instance, Joanna Hubbs (in Preston, 1982, pp. 123–144) traces images of a divine feminine in contemporary Russian folk art, film, and literature, noting strong national themes that continue to thrive in the Soviet state.

Goddess worship is represented widely in the Hindu, Buddhist, and Shintō countries of Asia. Catholic Europe is replete with pilgrimage shrines devoted to the Virgin Mary; some of these are associated with earlier pagan goddesses, while others represent a postindustrial flourishing of Marianism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even in North America, where Protestantism predominates, sacred female imagery is venerated in Catholic enclaves, like the large pilgrimage shrine devoted to Saint Anne de Beaupré in Quebec, Canada. In the United States a quarter of a million pilgrims a year visit the Shrine of the North American Martyrs (in Auriesville, New York), a composite pilgrimage site devoted to the Jesuit martyrs along with the American Indian Kateri Tekakwitha, "Lily of the Mohawks," who is a candidate for canonization. Åke Hultkrantz (in Olson, 1983, p. 202) notes an extensive pattern of goddess worship among American Indians despite the widespread misconception that these religions are mostly oriented around male deities. Native American goddesses are often earth mothers linked to the cultivation of corn. Goddess worship played an important role in ancient Aztec, Maya, and Inca civilizations, traces of which continue to thrive in descendent Mesoamerican populations. The goddess Tonantsi remains today a vibrant focus of worship among the Nahuatl of Mexico (remnants of the great Toltec and Aztec civilizations). Here goddess worship expresses its typical syncretic pattern; images of Tonantsi are displayed on altars alongside Christian sacred images, like the statue of Joseph, who is considered by the Nahuatl to be a son of the goddess.

Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean a pattern of syncretism involving goddess worship is evident. Particularly widespread is the transformation of local Indian goddesses into Marian images. The best-known example of this syncretic expression is the famous Roman Catholic pilgrimage icon of the dark-skinned Virgin of Guadalupe, whose shrine was built on the site of a temple once dedicated to the Aztec goddess Tonantsi. Goddesses are prominent in some African tribal religions. Daniel F. McCall (in Preston, 1982, pp. 304–322) traces the diffusion of Neolithic goddesses from Southwest Asia to West Africa, where they became variously

syncretized with local deities and were absorbed into Akan, Yoruba, and Igbo religious traditions.

**Patterns and Themes of Contemporary Goddess Worship.** A comparative study of this vast array of types of goddess worship reveals certain common themes and distinct differences in the ways female deities are experienced. They are worshiped as nurturant or punishing mothers, protectors of community, images of national identity, sources for the resolution of human problems, symbols of virginity and purity, the origins of the fertility of crops and human beings, mediators between humans and male divinities, and sources for healing. None of these attributes is assigned to every goddess, although they frequently recapitulate one another and cluster together. The nurturing power, for instance, is associated often with the fertility of crops and conceived to be the source of community identity, but this pattern is not found everywhere. The following is a survey of common features identifiable with goddess worship throughout the world. While they are not universal characteristics of the phenomenon, these common features demonstrate how deeply rooted goddess worship is within human experience. They each deserve special attention.

**Virginity.** In some parts of the world female deities are associated with virginity, purity, and perfect piety. [See Virgin Goddess.] This tradition is strongly represented in several religions. In Hinduism, Kannagi, goddess of chastity, symbolizes the sacredness of motherhood, which is linked to pure Tamil ethnic identity, language, justice, and politics. The Tamil concept of chastity connotes not asexuality but sacred power. Another example of the Hindu virginity theme is found in Nepal and India where Kumār *pūjā*, the worship of a premenstrual girl as the embodiment of a goddess, has been a tradition of some frequency until recent years. The combination of two seemingly contradictory themes—virginity and motherhood—was evident among ancient Near Eastern goddesses like Inanna, Ishtar, and Anat. These goddesses were simultaneously chaste, promiscuous, nurturant, and warlike. While the Virgin Mary is never portrayed as being promiscuous, she sometimes embodies and exhibits a continuity with the attributes of these earlier goddesses; she is pious, intercedes, protects the community, bears children, is virginal, and enters from time to time into the world to do battle against the forces of evil. The apparent contradiction in the juxtaposition of virginity and motherhood dissolves if the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is taken to “reinforce the dogma that the Virgin’s child is the son of God” (Leach, 1966, p. 42). The divine mother is not a mere projection of human motherhood; female divinities give birth, but, unlike human mothers,

they are rarely considered to be polluted by the event because of their supernatural status.

**Motherhood.** Another dimension of goddess worship that enjoys widespread representation is the role of nurturant female divinities as god bearers and sources of both carnal and spiritual life. Deities of the ancient Greek and Roman world gave birth to gods, occasionally by having intercourse with humans. The earlier pagan role of god bearer finds continuity in Mary’s capacity as *theotokos*, mother of the incarnate divinity; here Mary becomes a human partner in the unfolding nature of God. Consequently she is the supreme intercessor with God on behalf of individuals who seek her assistance. The nurturing power of the divine feminine has very ancient manifestations, extending back to Neolithic goddesses, whose theriomorphic form was the cow. The nurturing goddess is often associated with mother’s milk, which gives life and has strong curative powers. A. J. Weeramunda (in Preston, 1982, pp. 251–262) describes the milk-overflowing ceremony in Sri Lanka, which is a ritual means for bringing health, both to individuals and the Sinhala community. Here the goddess, symbolized by milk, stands for matrilineal kinship, mother’s blood, bodily health, and integration of community. This ancient theme is recapitulated in Roman, Greek, and Coptic tales of miracles worked by the Virgin Mary that refer to the milk from her breasts and the power of her tears to cure diseases.

**Wifehood.** Goddesses are depicted frequently as wives and consorts. Sometimes as consort she is subservient to her partner. However, the goddess may be raised to the powerful position of queen and protectress. In India, each year Jagannātha is said to argue with his jealous wife Lakṣmī after he has returned from a visit to other deities in the neighborhood. Here Lakṣmī is portrayed as a nagging wife. However, the role of consort to a male deity may be only secondary for a goddess. Inanna, the supreme goddess of ancient Sumer, was queen of heaven and earth foremost; her role as wife to Dumuzi, the shepherd king, was less important. Inanna’s power was evident in the prolonged Sumerian New Year celebration that culminated in the sacred marriage rite of the goddess Inanna to the reigning monarch, a rite designed to ensure the fertility of soil and womb.

**Protection.** One of the most widespread and significant roles of female deities is the tripartite function of protectress, monarch, and emblematic symbol. This pattern contrasts with gentler, more nurturant motifs like fertility and healing. The Chinese Buddhist goddess Kuan-yin is a popular domestic deity who is considered also to be a *bodhisattva* and celestial bureaucrat. The Virgin of Gaudalupe provides a famous example of the

emblematic, integrative, and protective role of the sacred female image. During the fight for Mexican independence, loyalists carried the banner of the Virgin of Remedios while their opponents marched into battle with the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe; soldiers polarized between the two shot at the banner of the "enemy" virgin. In many parts of the world female sacred images assume highly specialized protective qualities; the Taoist goddess Ma-tsu is protectress of fishermen and sailors who face the dangerous storm-ridden Taiwanese Straits; in Spain Our Lady of Macarena is protectress of bullfighters; the goddess Amaterasu was the supreme national guardian deity of Japan. The Black Madonna of Częstochowa continues to be considered queen of Poland, her image is worn on badges by members of the Solidarity movement, and she is highly revered as a focus of pilgrimage by millions of Polish Catholics, including Pope John Paul II.

**Earth goddess.** Some scholars have attempted to link the gender of deities with natural phenomena, typically associating female deities with the earth and male deities with the sun. Although this pattern is widespread, there are several noteworthy exceptions. For instance, the ancient Egyptian goddess Nut was conceived to be a sky deity whose partner, Geb, was an earth god. According to C. Jouco Bleeker (in Olson, 1983, p. 31) Egyptian goddesses were not believed to be intrinsically earth mothers. The Japanese Shintō goddess Amaterasu, who is identified with the sun rather than earth, is another example. Thus, the general rule that goddesses are earth mothers is clearly not without exception. There is considerable evidence from ancient times that goddesses were associated with various natural phenomena, particularly the sea, the earth, and the phases of the moon. The many *pīṭhas* associated with goddesses in India are linked to the earth. Each of these pilgrimage sites devoted to goddesses is considered to be a fragment of Satī's body (the dead wife of Śiva) that fell to earth when her corpse was divided up by the gods to prevent Śiva from going mad with grief. In Orissa, in eastern India, women behave as though they are menstruating during the three days when the earth mother menstruates; nor is it uncommon in India for men to avoid tilling the fields when the goddess is menstruating.

**Fertility.** This leads to another widespread characteristic of goddesses; namely, their power over the fertility of soil, the fecundity of women, and a plentiful food supply. The ancient Neolithic city of Çatal Hüyük offers evidence for goddesses of the hunt and the abundance of crops. Alexander Marshack (1972, p. 355) speculates that the Neolithic goddess, as mistress of animals, is

prefigured in female images from the Upper Paleolithic era where goddesses are displayed holding animal horns that have been stained with red ocher. Goddesses remain associated with the abundance of food even today. The Inuit (Eskimo) goddess Sedna is an example; if angered by sins committed in the community she withholds the supply of sea animals. According to Hultkrantz, the American Indian conception of the mother goddess as mistress of animals was changed by the introduction of horticulture about 2000 BCE, when she began to be identified with the cultivation of maize, beans, squash, gourds, and other crops. In Europe corn-mother images have been placed in fields by peasants for hundreds of years. This concern with the fertility of the earth is repeated in the widespread association of goddess worship with human fertility. Barren women in Europe, India, Africa, and many other parts of the world turn to female divinities to ask for aid in pregnancy. Here goddesses become a source of life so that the human community may be sustained. The ability to bear a large number of children is often a sign of status in agricultural societies where abundant human labor enhances the wealth of a family unit. Thus, some form of goddess worship for the purpose of bearing children is often widespread in these societies.

**Healing.** If goddesses can give life they can also take it away. They are frequently supplicated for curing diseases. The Indian goddess Śitalā not only cures smallpox, she is considered to be its source and requires elaborate rituals to cool her anger, which causes the disease. Thus, Hindu people both fear and adore her. The healing of wounds, prayers for health, and the quest for wholeness are so universally associated with goddess worship that this aspect requires special scholarly attention.

Why are female deities more frequently invoked than male deities for purposes of healing? The obvious answer is that goddesses tend to be attributed more often with overall nurturant qualities. They are the primary and original sources of life, like human mothers, and they consequently represent a reprieve from the more painful realities of death, decay, and disease. Yet, as we have already observed, goddesses are linked also to the darker experiences in the human condition. There must be an even more subtle reason for the ubiquity of the healing function attributed to female deities. In traditions where the female is subordinate to the male (and this is quite widespread), the worship of female sacred imagery represents an embracing of the whole field of symbolic potentials and the bringing together of opposites. While male deities are approached during the course of everyday life for the favors required to sustain

a worldly existence, female divinities become the focus for ongoing sustenance of the individual or local family.

It is no accident that female deities are strongly represented in home rituals, in roadside shrines, and at local pilgrimage sites in many parts of the world. Surinder M. Bhardwaj (1973) has demonstrated this point for Hinduism, noting how pilgrimage shrines devoted to goddesses are visited by pilgrims more on a subregional basis for the purpose of curing diseases and asking for small favors, while pilgrimage to the shrines of male deities is almost always at the regional or national level and for the purpose of *darshan* (Skt., *darśana*; "sight of the deity") rather than a quest for cures. Not only is the mother more accessible and nurturant than the more distant father, she is the completion of a process by which the individual embraces the whole religious field, including both gods and goddesses who constitute not separate but complementary parts of a unified whole.

**Violence and anger.** The ambivalence associated with certain types of goddess worship is characteristic of another major theme in this survey. Since female divinities can take away life, they sometimes display a vengeful, angry, and terrifying aspect. Such goddesses are identified with dark occult powers, sacrifice, and death. Usually the darker aspects of goddesses are consonant with nurturing qualities. The Balinese Hindu goddess Rangda, the witch, is an exception to this rule. She is linked to the terrible and fearful powers of divine origin. Rangda, whose name means "widow," is associated with her husband's death. She is constantly doing battle with her archenemy Barong the dragon. Elaborate ritual battles between Rangda and Barong are acted out in the famous trance dances that have attracted so many tourists to Bali.

Rangda is associated with evil and death, unlike her Hindu counterpart, Kālī, who has a more nurturant side. Kālī grants boons to those who respect her, but she is easily angered and must not be crossed. Her major role is to battle demons, whose skulls she wears in a garland around her neck. Like Rangda, Kālī is linked to death by her association with widowhood and graveyards. In a brilliant essay on the goddess Kālī, C. Mackenzie Brown (in Olson, 1983, pp. 110–123) notes that her bloody intoxication with rage and violence is not an indication that she is evil. Kālī is "mother of us all"—she gives birth, dazzles us with her splendor, and consumes us in the game of life. Both beneficent and terrible qualities are combined in the image of Kālī. Just as Hindu disease goddesses become angry and cause epidemics because people have neglected to worship them, Kālī rises up from time to time, bringing about a reign of chaos in the realm of human order. Thus, she

evokes enormous fear and ambivalence among devotees. Such violent expressions of goddess worship are found in many of the world's religions. Artemis and Medusa evoked similar responses among the ancient Greeks. Also, the Middle Eastern goddesses Ishtar and Isis were considered to have a terrible aspect associated with the cosmic dark forces. The Aztec goddess Ilamatecutli was one of several deities associated with death.

The theme of ambivalence is further elaborated in the concept of *vagina dentata* ("vagina with teeth") where the womb of the earth goddess appears to have a devouring mouth. For example, when the goddess is angry, she who is the source of life can take it away as slayer of life. The vessel of procreation becomes a tomb. Death by absorption into the *vagina dentata* is not always a punishment for wrongdoing. Sometimes the devouring womb represents the necessary death of the old order to establish a new social and religious organization. In these cases, entry into the *vagina dentata* is a rite of initiation leading through a dangerous passage along a path toward new birth. The violent act of being swallowed by an earth deity is a tradition found in many American Indian religions, among the Australian Aborigines, in Hinduism, and in various parts of Africa and Polynesia.

One of the most interesting rites associated with goddess worship is the widespread but not universal practice of blood sacrifice, which is found in some form or other in most religious traditions. While sacrifice is not confined to the veneration of female deities, it is represented widely in goddess worship traditions. The sacrifice of blood, whether of human or animal origin, has been linked to goddess worship from ancient times. Sacrifice is widely celebrated in that brand of goddess worship where female deities are portrayed as angry, vengeful, or punishing. Kālī and Durgā in the Hindu pantheon are deities of this kind. In contemporary India large numbers of goats, buffalo, chickens, and other animals are offered to these deities to satisfy their thirst for blood and to display community allegiance. Even human sacrifice is reported to have been practiced as an expression of goddess worship. It is not difficult to understand why blood sacrifices should be associated with goddesses. Through sacrifice human beings create bonds between themselves and deities. Since people turn to goddesses to fulfill their needs, it is logical for sacrificial offerings to be made as expressions of thanksgiving. Despite the fact that blood sacrifice has been outlawed in many parts of the world, this custom continues to thrive, often underground. Sometimes various types of sacrificial substitutions are made in place of

blood offerings, like the sacrifice of cucumbers, pumpkins, or money.

The many patterns of goddess worship evident throughout the world extend deep into antiquity and continue to thrive in many of the world's religions even today. Goddesses played a prominent role in prehistoric cultures, throughout the development of agriculture, and in the emergence of urban life associated with the great traditional civilizations. They continue to be a fertile source of religious experience within our contemporary world. Goddesses are multivalent sacred images best understood within their separate historical and cultural contexts.

[See also the entries on specific goddesses.]

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JAMES J. PRESTON

### Goddess Worship in the Ancient Near East

The veneration of goddesses in the ancient Near East was a major component in these cultures that belong to the most ancient civilizations of history. From the artifacts and information gleaned primarily from archaeological excavations in the areas now known as Arabia, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Sinai, Syria, and Turkey, evidence of goddess worship ranges from small goddess statues of the eighth millennium BCE found in Jericho to the suppression and closing of goddess shrines in Arabia during the seventh century CE.

Artifacts of goddess reverence from preliterate periods, such as small statues, murals, relief plaques, and other ritual objects, as well as the remains of goddess temples, have been brought to light from many areas of the Near East. Goddess statues found at Jarmo in northern Iraq are dated to the late seventh millennium BCE. At Çatal Hüyük, southeast of Konya in Turkey, statues, murals, and remains of temples containing goddess images are dated to the mid-seventh millennium, while goddess statues found at Hacilar, northwest of Antalya in Turkey, are dated to the mid-sixth millennium. Goddess statues discovered in the area along the Tigris river near Mosul and Erbil in Iraq are dated to the Hassuna period of the mid-sixth millennium. Excavations of the Halaf period settlements that stretched across Syria and northern Iraq revealed goddess statues from the early sixth millennium. From levels of early settlement at Ur and Uruk (later Erech, now Warka), northwest of Basra near the mouth of the Euphrates in Iraq, goddess statues are dated to the early fifth millennium, a few centuries earlier than the goddess statues and artifacts found at Badarian sites of Egypt.

Although evidence of goddess worship in the preliterate periods mentioned above provides a great deal of knowledge, the most specific and clarifying information about goddess reverence in the Near East survives from the literate civilizations of the third millennium onward. This is the information that has been obtained from the discovery and deciphering of ancient writings that include inscriptions, temple documents, law codes, epic legends, prayers, and other written materials related to the worship of the goddess. These ancient writings were once pressed into tablets of damp clay, inked by reed pens on papyrus, carved into brick and stone, and

even inscribed on such objects as statues, vases, and doorposts. They reveal the beliefs of ancient goddess worshipers through the words of the actual devotees who wrote of them beginning with the third millennium.

From this wealth of information it is now clear that no single name, symbol, image, set of rituals and beliefs, or natural element such as the sun, moon, earth, or stars can be said to represent all goddess reverence in the Near East. The artifacts and written evidence reveal numerous customs, rituals, and legends, a wide variety of symbols and attributes, and a vast array of names, titles, and epithets associated with the goddess in these areas. To a great extent, this variety results from the existence of goddess worship in many quite separate geographic locations and for periods of thousands of years. Beliefs and imagery often varied even from one town or small settlement to another, each having developed its own local deities and beliefs. As ancient city-states or towns conquered or merged with others over the centuries, the deities and beliefs of the peoples also merged and were oftentimes synthesized into ever more complex theological systems. To add to this complexity, a great number of titles and epithets were applied to goddess figures, many of these used to refer directly to the goddess, such as the titles of the goddess Anat of Ugarit in northern Canaan (western Syria), Balatu Darkati (lit., "lady of dominion") and Balatu Samen Ramem ("lady of the high heavens"), or the title of the goddess Asherah of Ugarit, Elat, meaning simply "goddess." The goddess Au Set of Egypt, better known as Isis, was known as "mother of one thousand names."

The wealth of evidence now available refutes several earlier assumptions about ancient goddess worship in the Near East. One of these was that goddess reverence was most often symbolically associated with the earth or the moon. We now know that several goddess figures were associated with the sun, such as Wurusemu of Anatolia (Turkey), who was most often referred to as the sun goddess of Arinna, and the goddess Shapash (Shaps), known as the sun in the texts of Ugarit. Writings concerning the goddess Inanna, whose worship was widespread in many areas of Sumer (southern Iraq), reveal that she was linked symbolically with the planet Venus, as were the Akkadian (Babylonian) goddess Ish-tar, the goddess Eshtar of Ebla in northern Canaan, and the goddess Astarte of Canaan and Cyprus. The symbolism of the planet Venus in the worship of Astarte emerges in later texts about the goddess Aphrodite of Cyprus and Greece and in the worship of the goddess known as Venus in Rome.

The goddess Isis was associated with the star Sothis

(Sirius), whereas the Egyptian goddess Nut, cited as the mother of Isis, was depicted and described as the entire heavens, stars spread across her body as she was shown arching protectively over earth. The Sumerian goddess Nammu, who was described as the one who gave birth to heaven and earth and all other deities, was associated with the sea, as was Asherah, also known as the "mother of deities" in writings from Ugarit.

Although there were some Near Eastern goddess figures associated with the moon, such as Nikkal in Ugarit and Hekate in western Anatolia, and although the goddess Ninhursaga of Sumer may have been associated with the earth, the moon and earth were far from widespread symbolic elements linked to goddess reverence in the Near East, as is commonly stated. It is interesting to note that in Egypt the moon was represented by the male deity Khonsu, in Sumer by the male deity Nanna, and in Akkad by the male deity Sin; among the Hittites of Anatolia, who worshiped the sun goddess of Arinna, the moon was represented by the male deity Kushukh.

A second commonly held assumption is that all goddess worship of the ancient Near East can be categorized under the term "fertility cults." It is true that within the worship of certain Near Eastern goddess figures there were rituals and prayers for the greater abundance of crops and cattle. What is excluded by such a single-faceted term is a multitude of other aspects, attributes, and powers associated with ancient goddess figures.

Wurusemu, invoked as sovereign of heaven and earth, as well as Inanna, Ninlil, and Nanshe of Sumer, were each mentioned individually in the texts of various cities as the one who bestowed the divine right to rule and govern the land. Inanna was also said to hold the power of judgment and decision and the control of the law of heaven and earth. Ishtar was described in prayer as holding the fate of everything in her hand. Both Seshat (Sefchet) of Egypt and Nidaba (Nisaba) of Sumer were revered as the tutelary deities of writing and written language, whereas the goddess Sekhmet of Egypt, and Anat, Ishtar, and Astarte were each called upon for help in battle. In certain areas of Sumer, the goddess called Gula and Bau (Bawa) were invoked as divine physicians and the guardians of medicine and healing. The goddess Nanshe of the city of Lagash in Sumer was described as the judge of all humankind on New Year's Day. She was also known as the guardian of ethics and morals who was concerned about compassion for the widow and the orphan, the weak and the poor. The Egyptian goddess Maat represented righteousness and truth; the hearts of those who had died were thought to

be judged by being weighed on a scale against the weight of an ostrich feather that Maat wore in her head-dress, good deeds keeping the heart light enough to enter the final field of peace (the Sekhet Aaru). Both Seshat and Asherah were revered as tutelary deities of architecture and building.

The goddess Hathor of Egypt, whose worship was often brought into close alignment with Isis, gave life to people with the touch of her *ankh*, the ritual object that signified life. [See Cross.] Ishtar, and Nidaba, Ninsuna, and Nina of Sumer, as well as the goddess Buto (Ua Zit, Wadjet, Uatchit) of Egypt, were thought to prophesy the future through the oracular priestesses who tended their shrines. While the Sumerian goddess Nammu was credited with the creation of the universe and all other deities, her daughter Ninhursaga (Ninmah, Nintur) was described as the creator of people. The forming of humankind was attributed to the goddess as Aruru or Mama, known as "mother womb" and "creator of destiny" by the Akkadians. The goddess Cybele was invoked as "mother of deities," as was the Hurrian goddess Hapat and the Hittite Wurusemu; all three of these goddess figures are known from Anatolia. The goddess Nut, also called "mother of deities," and the goddess Ershkigal of Sumer were described as those who watched over the dead; the goddess Ninsikil was regarded as the guardian deity of the Sumerian paradise, Dilmun. It is perhaps Isis about whom there is the most comprehensive information, derived from ancient Egyptian writings as well as from the later classics of Greece and Rome. Isis was described as the one from whom all being arose, oldest of the old, the one who makes the universe spin, the roadmaker of the paths of stars, the one who first established justice, who first gave law to the people, who had the power to make the Nile rise and irrigate the land, the inventor of agriculture, flaxen textiles, and the first sail.

Our present knowledge of the powers attributed to ancient goddess figures of the Near East now makes it clear that the earlier label of "fertility cults" falls quite short of encompassing the complex and multifaceted nature of goddess worship as it was known in ancient times. It is also vital to bear in mind that our information comprises only what has so far been discovered. Cities described in ancient texts as major religious centers of goddess worship, such as Arinna, said to be one day's journey from Hattushash (Boğazköy) in Turkey, and Per Uto (Buto), believed to be near or beneath Des-suk on the delta of Egypt, have not yet been specifically located. The relatively recent find of the city-state of Ebla in northwestern Syria, which has brought many surprises to both archaeology and religious history, re-



vealed the name of the goddess worshiped there as Esh-tar, establishing links among Ishtar of the Akkadians and Astarte of Canaan.

Once aware of the many differences in ancient goddess reverence, we may also observe certain similarities and connections that emerge from the evidence. According to one legend about Isis, as related by Plutarch, her brother-husband Osiris had been murdered in a plot engineered by their brother Seth. The coffer containing his body then floated up the Nile and out into the Mediterranean Sea, finally washing ashore at the Canaanite city of Byblos (Geba). Through her continual efforts to find the body and give it a proper burial, the grief-stricken Isis traced the body to the royal palace at Byblos. The coffer had become embedded in a tamarisk tree that had then been used for a pillar in the palace. Isis brought the body back to Egypt and hid it in the marshes of Buto, but Seth discovered the hiding place and cut the body into fourteen pieces. Isis then set out in a papyrus skiff and as she found each piece she gave it a solemn burial in the place she had found it. This legend is obviously linked to the frequently mentioned Egyptian belief that specific parts of Osiris were buried in separate locations of Egypt. Since Byblos is known to have been a trading port and possibly even a colony of Egypt from early dynastic periods, this legend also reflects the connections between goddess worship in the two areas. Lucian wrote that the rituals at Byblos, which were celebrated for the goddess Baalat and the death of her young consort Adonis, were actually much the same rituals as those for Isis and Osiris in Egypt. Several stone reliefs discovered at Byblos depict Baalat with images that are identical to those of the Egyptian Isis.

Other connections between goddess worship in separate areas may be seen in an inscribed prayer of Queen Pudu Hepa of fourteenth-century-BCE Hattushash. In this inscription Pudu Hepa stated that she regarded the goddess Hapat, whom she had worshiped when she was a Hurrian princess, as much the same goddess she then knew as a Hittite queen, the sun goddess of Arinna. Legends of Sumer and Akkad show that the goddess Ishtar was thought of as much the same deity as the Sumerian Inanna. This connection is most apparent in the legends of the *Descent of Ishtar* and the *Descent of Inanna*, both accounts describing the descent of the goddess into the underworld of the dead. Links among Egypt, Sinai, and Canaan are evident in inscriptions to Baalat discovered at Egyptian malachite mines at Serabit el Khadim on the Sinai Peninsula, as well as in the multitude of small relief plaques of Astarte found in Canaan on which the image of the goddess also bears a very close resem-

blance to Egyptian images of Isis or Hathor. Showing the goddess standing upon a lion, holding serpents or flowers in her outstretched arms, these plaques were most often marked simply *qadesh* ("holy"). Judging from the number of them that have been discovered, they appear to have been owned by many people in the land of Canaan, even in Israelite areas and periods.

Another type of artifact that links goddess reverence in separate areas are certain stones, possibly meteorites, that were regarded as sacred to the goddess. [See *Megalithic Religion, article on Prehistoric Evidence.*] At the temple of Aphrodite at Paphos, Cyprus, a specific stone was anointed with oil each year on the feast day of the goddess, which was celebrated at about the time of the vernal equinox. A stone that was sacred to Baalat at Byblos was described by Sanchuniathon of Berytus (Beirut) as "containing the souls of all people." The Black Stone at Mecca is thought originally to have been sacred to the Arabian goddess al-'Uzzā, the "mighty one," whose shrine and worship existed at Mecca until the suppression of this worship upon the institution of Islam. Some of the most interesting events surround the black stone of Pessinus in Anatolia, sacred to the goddess Cybele. During the Roman battles with Carthage (Punic Wars) a sibylline oracle decreed that the Romans would win the war if the black stone of Cybele was brought to Rome. This was done in 204 BCE. The war ended shortly afterward and a temple for Cybele was built to house the stone in Rome. From that time, great processions and rituals were held for Cybele at the time of the vernal equinox. The Roman rituals included the commemoration of the death of Cybele's young lover Attis, an effigy of Attis hung upon a tree each year. It was said that three days after his death Attis rose from the dead, bringing salvation to the worshipers of Cybele.

In many areas of the ancient Near East, such as Sumer, Babylon, and Canaan, worshipers of the goddess, known as "sacred women" (*qadishtu* or *Ishtaritu*), performed sexual rituals within the temple complex. [See *Hierodouleia.*] These sexual rituals were included in a listing of cultural assets (the *mes*) that the goddess Inanna brought to Erech, as explained in the Sumerian legend, the *Transfer of the Arts of Civilization from Eridu to Erech*.

One of the similarities between goddess worship in different areas that has been of major interest to scholars is the relationship between the goddess and her less powerful young consort, sometimes described as her son. This relationship may be observed in legends and rituals concerning Inanna and Dumuzi, Ishtar and Tammuz, Astarte and Tammuz (or Eshmun or Adonis), and

Cybele and Attis. The relationship of Astarte and Adonis survived in the Greek legends of Aphrodite and Adonis, most probably through the channel of the island of Cyprus, where the worship of Astarte and Aphrodite as "queen of heaven" was brought into close alignment at Citium, Amathus, and Paphos.

These consorts of the goddess appear to be the origin of ideas about kingship in the ancient Near East. The position of king was closely aligned with the idea of loving and being loved by the goddess. In several Sumerian texts the king is referred to as "the beloved of Inanna, fit for her holy lap." Sargon of Akkad wrote of his love and devotion to the goddess Ishtar and how she in turn provided him with special protection and privileges. The concept of divine right to the throne through a special connection with the goddess of the land was at times ritualized in a *hieros gamos*, a sacred marriage between the man who was to be king and the priestess who represented the goddess. [See Hieros Gamos.] The texts of King Shulgi of Ur in Sumer may be a record of the words spoken by the priestess and the king in the sacred marriage, for in them we read, "When he has made love to me on the bed, then I in turn shall show my love for the lord, I shall make for him a good destiny; I shall make him shepherd of the land" and "Goddess, I will perform for you the rites that constitute my royalty." These customs concerning kingship help to explain inscriptions such as the one describing Ishtar as "she who holds the reins of kings" and the one concerning the sun goddess of Arinna as "she who controls kingship in heaven and on earth." Such attitudes and rituals probably reflect earlier periods of matrilineal descent in which the right to the throne, or to leadership of the clan or tribe, was inherited through the female line.

An extremely interesting aspect of goddess worship in the ancient Near East is its repeated appearance in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament). We read in *Judges* 2:13 and 3:7 and in *1 Samuel* 7:3-4 that the religion of the goddess as Asherah or Astarte continually rivaled the religion of the Hebrew Yahveh. Writers of the Hebrew scriptures referred to Astarte as "Ashtoreth," a name that implied shame. Throughout *1* and *2 Kings* there are references to the installation of and reverence for the *asherim* (pl., also *asherot*; sg., *asherah*), which were wooden poles or trees, possibly carved, associated with the worship of the goddess Asherah.

In Judah, the southern Hebrew kingdom whose capital was in Jerusalem, kings such as Rehoboam, Jehoram, and Ahaziah were described as having erected the *asherim* or revering them. Judah's King Asa, who demolished and removed many of the sacramental objects of the Canaanite worship, deprived his own grandmother (or mother, according to a Masoretic text) Maa-

cah of the position of queen mother because she had made an image of Asherah (*1 Kgs.* 15:13).

The kings of Israel, the northern Hebrew kingdom whose capital was in Samaria, were continually accused by the biblical writers of erecting and allowing *asherim* in the holy places of Israel. Kings Omri, Ahab, Joram, and even the sons of Jehu (the soldier king who massacred the entire house of Ahab in the name of Yahveh) were even more severely criticized for following the practices of the ancient Canaanite religion, which included the worship of Asherah. During the reign of King Ahab, his wife Jezebel kept a large number of clergy for Asherah in Samaria, cited as 400 in *1 Kings* 18:19. Queen Jezebel was the daughter of the Sidonian King Ethbaal and had apparently been raised within the religion of Asherah. It seems to have been customary for Hebrew kings to allow their foreign wives to practice their own religions, for even before Ahab's time King Solomon not only allowed his Sidonian wife to worship Astarte in Jerusalem but took part in this worship himself (*1 Kgs.* 11:5, 11:33).

These references to Asherah in the biblical periods of the tenth to sixth centuries BCE in Judah and Israel were more fully understood upon the discovery of ancient Ugarit. In the Ugarit tablets there are many references to Asherah as the "mother of the deities," and to her worship not only in Ugarit but also in Tyre and Sidon.

The religious historian who studies goddess worship in the ancient Near East may spend a lifetime examining the enormous number of artifacts and writings related to the subject, arriving at various analyses and theories. But the most obvious fact may be of greatest interest to people of today—that in the lands that brought forth Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, God was once worshiped in the form of woman.

[See also the entries on specific goddesses mentioned herein.]

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MERLIN STONE

## Goddess Worship in the Hellenistic World

The term *Hellenistic* indicates not so much a culture as an epoch. In fact, a single word cannot be used to cover such a complex historical development and, even less, include the religious experience of that time, because every religion, by its very nature, transcends a rigid framework. In truth, even before the Hellenistic age, the spread of ideas of a religious kind had started already in that widespread *koinē*, or substratum, that characterized civilization from the Indus River to the Iberian Peninsula; and it was precisely on the Mediterranean shores that this civilization enjoyed its greatest splendor. Thus, certain so-called foreign cults did not prove alien but were accepted indeed by a significant number of followers; one only need think of the widespread cults of Cybele and Isis. These facts also explain how it was possible that *Tyche*, a name dear to philosophical thought, originally denoted a goddess in the most distant pantheon of the Aegeans.

The myth of *Tyche* is succinct; we learn about it not so much in written passages but, rather, thanks to the name itself, which means "fate, destiny." In Hesiod (*Theogony* 346ff.), *Tyche* appears as the daughter of *Tethys* and *Okeanos*; she was thus one of the *Okeanids*, the extremely ancient daughters (*presbutatai kourai*) of that remote, divine couple. The first of these daughters had power over sea water, and the second ruled over river water. Pindar (*Olympian Odes* 12) enlightens us on the matter: *Sōteira Tyche* ("Tyche the redeemer"), who had been transformed by Pindar's time into Zeus's daughter, was called to defend the city of *Himera* on Sicily. It was she who looked after the fate of ships, battles, and citizens' meetings. Can one not almost glimpse *Athena Polias* depicted here? In reality, the evolution of the *polis*, which was fatally susceptible to prosperity just as much as to terrible decline, was believed to de-

pend on *Tyche*, the goddess of events; so she proved an efficient *polias* for the dwellers of *Himera*.

According to the poet as recalled by Pausanias (7.26.8), *Tyche* is not only one of the *Moirai* but also the most powerful of them; thereby, she was a *potnia* ("queen"); in other words, a great goddess. In Homer the *Moirai* were even more important than Zeus. Traces of her cult appear in the statues that are found in Greek sanctuaries; as described by Pausanias, sometimes the divinity is holding the so-called *Horn of Amaltheia* (4.30.6; 7.26.8), which is the horn of plenty, while on other occasions she is bearing the infant *Ploutos* in her arms, a guarantee of wealth. Pausanias observed (9.16.2) that "she almost seems to be his wet-nurse"; such images emanate favor, just as the epithet *agathē* ("good")—noted by Pausanias (5.15.6)—also signifies favor: it reveals the goddess as it is required of her and redeems her from the obscure ambiguity so obviously embodied in her name. At *Lebadea* in *Boeotia*, according to Pausanias (9.39.5), at the oracular seat (*manteion*) of *Trophonios*, there is a place dedicated to *Tyche Agathe* as well as to an undefined *daimon*, who might be interpreted as the masculine counterpart of destiny. He too is *Agathos*. They were apparently only an abstract couple since, in reality, they were extremely concrete beings connoted by positive magic that defended and protected from evil. Moreover, it is important to note that in that place anyone wanting to consult *Trophonios* was delayed in preparation. It is also significant that in *Thebes*, according to Pausanias (9.16.2), the sanctuary (*hieron*) dedicated to *Tyche* was next to that of *Tiresias*: once again the divinity of destiny was next to an oracle who announced events.

In Rome the goddess *Fortuna* was highly suitable to serve as a translation of the name *Tyche*; the former had been made Jupiter's daughter just as *Tyche* had been made to descend from Zeus. Moreover, *Fortuna* stood for those concise formal analogies that, in the course of time, would bring about religious syncretism. *Fortuna*, too, moved from an archaic mythic-ritual reality with its center originally in *Praeneste* (modern-day *Palestrina*), where she appeared as the maternal goddess (there are numerous terra-cotta statues of feminine figures with suckling babes) and, at the same time, as goddess of prophecy, her natural vocation. In *Praeneste* she was venerated by three ceremonies in the month of April, while in Rome on the calends of the same month, during the *Veneralia* celebrations, the women would worship *Fortuna Virilis*, who was later confused with *Venus Verticordia*. The epithet *Virilis*, moreover, is one of the many that Plutarch mentioned in his description of her (*Quaestiones Romanae* 74). [See *Fortuna*.]

*Tyche* and *Fortuna* were gradually impoverished in

myth and ritual, because their very names announced them as goddesses of events, thereby expressing their undeniable power over transient precariousness. It is not surprising, therefore, that philosophical thought appropriated the name of Tyche (as well as that of Fortuna), which was detached from its religious context in order to express only the inevitable phenomena of destiny that gravitates about mankind: had Oedipus Rex not already foreseen this when (1080 ff.) he called himself Tyche's son?

New religious tendencies arrived in Greece, where non-Greek divinities landed, but even they were not as alien as everyone at first thought. The Minoan thalassocracy had opened up the sea routes between Crete and Egypt as far back as remote prehistory, and Mycenaean Greeks had traveled along and improved these routes, which were also cultural inroads, and so created a true Mediterranean *koinē*, which is particularly well documented by both archaeological finds and by the deciphering of Linear B. This *koinē* was still fully active even in historical times: Herodotus (2.155–156) proved this more or less consciously by outlining that *interpretatio Graeca* of the gods in Egypt, according to which Horus corresponded to Apollo, Isis to Demeter, and Bubastis to Artemis. For Leto, the lady of the oracle at Buto on the Nile Delta, Herodotus failed to find—or rather, did not even seek—a correspondence, an unusual fact that Uberto Pestalozza, in a study devoted to that goddess and included in *Pagine di religione mediterranea* (Milan, 1942), explained as follows: Leto was the earliest divinity and the most important one, judging by the oracular power; “consequently both her name and cult were inherited intact from dynastic Egypt . . . and in Egypt Leto was always Leto, from the Mediterranean age to the Hellenistic and Roman ages.”

In the light of such religious experience, that other *koinē*, which was widespread during the Hellenistic era and was of great historical and cultural influence, cannot be totally new or unexpected, as it was common at first in Greece and later in both Greece and Rome. When analyzing its cultural significance, its passage from east to west has frequently been mentioned; perhaps, then, insufficient attention has been paid to the movement in the opposite direction, which brought the Greek language, and with it Greek culture as well, to Egypt and Persia and even touched slightly upon India.

One has to believe that a kind of interior unease, discernible in the Hellenistic age, contributed to the arrival and establishment of mysteries that were not completely Greek. The latter were based on the drama of death that was suffered and overcome by the divinity and, as such, encouraged believers to hope for something after death. The Greeks had already come into

close touch with the existential dramas of the two great divinities of Cretan origin: the drama of the *dea dualis*, namely, that of mother and daughter—Demeter and Kore—experienced in the event of marriage, which is to be understood as the death of the *korē* (“virgin”), who revives as a *numphē* (“wife”) there near Hades, and the drama of the god Dionysos, who as a child experienced danger in life equal to the danger in death. Moreover, lesser Cretan figures could also be found in Greek religion; for example, Krokos, the young boy who, as myth would have it, was accidentally killed by Hermes just as Hyacinthus was by Apollo and from whose blood were born bulbous plants that long before the cultivation of grain could conjure up the idea of an annual resurrection. Thus the Greeks had their own mythical tales that were steeped in blood and tears, so it is historically misleading to believe, according to Homer's expression about the Olympians, that religion is characterized by “happy and immortal” gods; Homer's depiction is not even true in his own work, however, as the first book of the *Iliad* indicates.

Holy stories such as those mentioned above had prepared mankind to accept distant cults, that sprang from divine events and were not without blood and tears. This was so for the myth of Isis and Osiris, which, having left its native land (Egypt), moved toward Asia Minor, reached Greece (the landing place was Corinth), and later came to Italy and, in the first century BCE, to Rome. The myth, which turned brother and sister into a married couple, did not trouble the religious sensitivity of the Greeks, who worshiped Zeus and Hera, both children of Kronos and Rhea, as the wedded couple *par excellence*, and yet in this society marriages between blood relations had long since been condemned. This was the reason for the tragedy in Aeschylus, the poet who, according to Mario Untersteiner, in *Le origini della tragedia e del tragico, dalla preistoria a Eschilo* (Turin, 1955), “discovers and sings about the contradictory nature of reality.” Probably the way in which Osiris faced death also did not disturb the Greeks' religious sensitivity; there is something prodigious, instead, in the god's skill in fertilizing his bride Isis, who lay prone on him. But of what were the gods incapable? Horus, who was born of this union, grew into his father's avenger. The image of Isis with the infant Horus in her arms makes the goddess seem immediately familiar, and the most recent iconography freed her of her native hieratic severity.

Like Tyche, Isis was bestowed with the horn of abundance. She was called Isityche, a reflection of her power in her native land, for instance, at Philae, where she promised to prolong the lives of her followers. In this respect, she was much more powerful than the Greek or

Latin gods, a fact that should not be forgotten when one considers the prestige she held in the world to which she immigrated. It was in this very world, moreover—except during the two important solemnities, the springtime Navigium Isidis, in which Isis was honored as the expert of navigation (does Athena not spring to mind?), and the autumn Inventio Osiridis, during which she was totally involved in the vicissitudes of the god Osiris—that the Egyptian cult embodied the novelty of the daily ritual, with priestly duty extending the course of the whole day from morning to sunset in a succession of gestures and litanies. This example is a unique one and is not even comparable to the assiduous task of the Vestals: the Greek and Roman religions were both distinguishable since they were based on periodic feast days and not on regular, daily actions.

In its turn, however, the cult of Isis itself offered something new, which was revealed in the rite of “osirisation,” according to which the dead person was assimilated to Osiris; in other words, he was “osirised.” This privilege was initially reserved for the pharaoh since he was of divine stock, but later it was extended to high personages and, in the end, to all followers of the god. In Greece, as well as in Rome, the ritual was performed on a living person, namely, the initiate for whom the god of the dead gave his guarantee of immortality. This represents an important innovation, as it shows how the ancient Egyptian god was led to satisfy the need for immortality that is peculiar to mankind. [See *Mystery Religions*.]

The so-called Greek initiatory religions offered just such satisfaction, a fact that might represent the most important step toward the syncretism (or ecumenism?) that characterized the Hellenistic epoch but was only gradually put into practice in different ages and in different ways. In the meantime, traders, sailors, soldiers, and slaves had spread the religion of Isis as far as the banks of the Rhone and the Danube. Moreover, Isis was worshiped as Aphrodite, Juno, Hekate, Bellona, or Ramnusia in a crescendo that made her all the goddesses in one. By that time syncretism had overcome all limits. The very needs of the faithful—when not the ambitions of the “learned”—restrict sacred matters, which are necessarily varied and full of nuances, to a rigid framework; one consequently runs the risk of losing the vital sap. Isis, however, did not run this risk: she was an “authentic religious creation,” as Mircea Eliade defined her in *A History of Religious Ideas*, vol. 2 (Chicago, 1982), and not unfamiliar to the well-known iconography of the madonna and child.

Cybele, the Phrygian Mater Deum, had arrived in Rome in 204 BCE, a long time before Atargatis, the Syrian goddess, whose very name reveals her origins, and

even before the Phoenician goddess Astarte, the consort of Adonis, who was later confused with Aphrodite. [See Cybele.] Both Astarte and Adonis were brought to the city by traders. In her manifest form (a meteorite) Cybele looked just like a rock, and during the troubles of the Punic Wars her obvious place was on the Palatine, even with all the caution that her myth and cult imposed, since hers was a cruel love story ending with the castration and death of Attis. Her cult, by that shower of a bull's blood on the person to be initiated (*taurobolium*), was a ritual of death and rebirth, and the genitals of the slaughtered animal represented the offering made by the initiated individual, who symbolically repeated Attis's frenziedly devoted gesture. Such matters were confined to the ceremony, because the priests' castration excluded the Romans from service to the goddess.

At the feast of Adonis, the life-death event was ritualized by lamentation and the sight of the so-called gardens, which featured rapidly growing grass. This feast remained, however, of less importance than that of Attis, which was a sacred spectacle performed between 15 and 27 March: the marshlike environment of the myth was recreated with reeds, and a pine, representing the figure of the god himself, was wrapped in bandages, decorated with violets, and carried in procession. Lamentation could be heard as far as the burial. The tree, like the rock, is a divine epiphany of universal significance; in this case, it was also an evergreen, like the ivy with which Dionysos appeared long before he turned himself into the donor of vines. During the entire sacred action, which drew to a close on 25 March with the rejoicing of the Hilaria in honor of Attis, who had revived, Cybele remained as if estranged; her grief was intermingled with a choral atmosphere of widespread mourning. Yet two days after the Hilaria the goddess became the protagonist once again when her statue, “in a particularly solemn procession,” as Pestalozza remarks in *Religione mediterranea* (Milan, 1952), was carried to the Almo, a tributary of the Tiber, for a bath. In this latter action Pestalozza discovers, on the basis of many examples including many outside the classical world, a postnuptial rite. So it was Cybele, as the *potnia* or great goddess, who put the seal on the entire feast of Attis, recalling, without revealing, her secret of mother and lover.

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MOMOLINA MARCONI

### The Hindu Goddess

Goddesses have been known and widely revered in India since ancient times. The thousands of female images found in Northwest India in the ruins of the Indus Valley civilization (c. 2500–1500 BCE) indicate that goddesses played an important role in the religion of this culture. Several goddesses are also known in the *R̥gveda* (c. 1100 BCE), the most ancient Vedic text of the Hindu tradition. Among these are Pṛthivī, associated with the earth; Uṣas, associated with the dawn; Vāc, associated with speech and wisdom; and Aditi, primarily known as the mother of a group of gods called the Ādityas. Although goddesses were known in the Vedic period (1100–600 BCE), the deities who dominate Vedic religion are all male. The relative lack of goddesses occupying central positions in Vedic texts and religion, however, may not be an accurate indication of the role goddesses played in popular village religion during this time. The literary tradition in Hinduism traditionally has been dominated by high-caste males who disdain or are suspicious of popular village religion, which usually includes goddess worship. The dominance of goddess worship in modern Hindu village religion suggests that goddesses may always have been important at the village level, even though male deities have dominated the textual tradition.

By the beginning of the epic period (400 BCE–400 CE) several goddesses who later become central to Hindu mythology and worship were known to, or were admitted into, the Hindu literary tradition. The most important of these goddesses are Sarasvatī, Lakṣmī, and Pārvatī. In Vedic literature, Sarasvatī is associated primarily with a river and represents a prototype of later Hindu goddesses, such as Gaṅgā, who are personifications of great Indian rivers. In the later Hindu tradition, however, Sarasvatī is associated with, or embodies, wisdom, learning, and cultural refinement. In modern India she is worshiped primarily by schoolchildren and those involved with education and the arts.

The goddess Lakṣmī is associated with the lotus in her early history and primarily seems to embody the miraculous vitality of vegetation. She is also associated

throughout her history with royal authority and kingly power. In addition she represents wealth, bounty, good luck, and material well-being. In her later history Lakṣmī becomes associated with the god Viṣṇu as his consort. He plays the role of heavenly king, while she represents the bounty, order, and fertility brought into being by his just cosmic rule. In contemporary Hinduism Lakṣmī is especially popular among businessmen and merchants, who believe that material prosperity cannot be found without Lakṣmī's presence and blessing.

Pārvatī is associated with the mountains, particularly the Himalayas, and is known primarily as the consort of the god Śiva. Śiva is an aloof, ascetic deity given to yogic trance. Pārvatī's principal role in Hindu mythology is to attract him into marriage. By luring Śiva into marriage, she brings the immense spiritual and sexual energy he has accumulated through his asceticism into the world for the world's benefit. The primary symbol of this accomplishment is the image central to most Śiva temples: the conjoined *liṅga* (phallus) and *yoni* (vulva).

By the early medieval period (600 CE) several fierce goddesses who are often active on the battlefield became widely known to the Hindu literary tradition. The most important of these goddesses are Durgā and Kālī. Durgā is the combined energies of the male deities, who create her in order to combat a demon who has been given the boon that he can be defeated only by a female. Durgā has many arms, each of which wields a weapon special to one of the powerful male deities; she rides a lion; and she is overwhelmingly beautiful and powerful. She is said in many texts to appear in the world whenever it is threatened by demons or whenever her devotees call upon her for assistance. Her primary role is to maintain and protect cosmic order by appearing periodically to battle demons who oppress the world.

Kālī is considerably more forbidding than Durgā. She also appears on the battlefield, but her character is much more uncontrolled than that of Durgā. Typically she gets drunk on the blood of her victims and in her frenzy threatens the stability of the world. She is described as black, naked, and adorned with parts of human bodies, and as having disheveled hair. She dwells in the cremation ground and is often pictured seated on a corpse. Kālī is particularly popular in Bengal. Wherever she is worshiped she receives blood offerings. She represents the other face of the divine feminine in Hinduism, namely, the insatiable hunger of the many fecund and life-giving goddesses, whose energies must be constantly replenished and reinvigorated by blood sacrifice.

Several Hindu goddesses are associated primarily

with Indian geography. The Indian subcontinent itself is regarded by Hindus as sacred and is often represented as a goddess called Bhārat Mā, Mother India. Of particular sacrality are the great rivers of India; the most sacred of all is the Ganges. The goddess Gaṅgā, an embodiment of this river, is regarded as immensely purifying and forgiving. To bathe in her waters is to be cleansed of sin and to achieve direct contact with the goddess herself, who is one and the same as the physical river.

The everyday worship of goddesses in Hinduism is visible primarily at the village level, where goddess worship is extremely prominent. Many of these goddesses are only regional or local in reputation, though they may be associated in the minds of some villagers with goddesses of the literary tradition. These village goddesses are preoccupied with the lives, concerns, and well-being of small communities and limited locales. They are associated especially with fertility, both of humans and of crops, and with diseases. They often receive blood offerings and are usually worshiped by all members of a village, regardless of caste affiliation. Their primary identity is with a specific village.

At a certain point in the Hindu literary tradition an important theological and philosophical tendency becomes apparent and dominates some texts that are partial to goddesses. This is the theological tendency to assume that there exists one Great Goddess who manifests herself in a variety of forms. The underlying assumption of this theology is that the many distinct goddesses of the Hindu tradition are all manifestations of a unifying cosmic principle that is characterized as active, powerful, fecund, and female. Although this great being is known by many names, she usually is called simply Devī (Goddess) or Mahādevī (Great Goddess). She is also often called Śakti, which means "power" and suggests her great, inexhaustible creative powers. This Great Goddess is primarily an active deity who is attentive to the stability of the world and to the needs of her devotees. Although she has a dark, destructive, blood-thirsty side, this aspect of the Great Goddess is seen as a natural part of an overarching orderliness that affirms the positive and necessary interaction of life and death, creation and destruction, vigor and rest, in the nature of the cosmos.

[For discussion of goddess worship in various Hindu systems, see Durgā Hinduism; Śaivism; Vaiṣṇavism; Tantrism; Hindu Tantric Literature; and Indian Religions, article on Rural Traditions. Goddess worship in particular regions is discussed in Bengali Religions; Hindi Religious Traditions; Marathi Religions; and Tamil Religions. See also Sarasvatī; Rādhā; and Ganges River.]

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DAVID KINSLEY

### Theoretical Perspectives

Theories about goddess worship have been advanced ever since the emergence of the social sciences disciplines in the nineteenth century. Religion specialists in the fields of anthropology, sociology, folklore, psychology, and comparative mythology have contributed numerous theories to explain the phenomenon of goddess worship. The topic has been revived in recent years, particularly by specialists in the area of women's studies. The following survey of theoretical issues in the study of goddess worship reflects controversies that have raged over broader issues concerning the more general interpretation of religion.

**Early Perspectives on Goddess Worship.** Nineteenth-century European social scientists and specialists in comparative religion were fascinated by what they conceived to be universal themes of human experience. Since they relied heavily on the accounts of missionaries, traders, and other travelers to different cultures rather than firsthand fieldwork, many of their speculative theories are discredited today. These writers were concerned with the origins of human institutions such as marriage, law, and religion. Contemporary scholars tend to be more cautious than these early writers about the origins of religion, believing that it is just as dangerous to speculate about the past as it is to develop theories about other cultures without firsthand field observation.

One of the most influential theories in the study of goddess worship was advanced by the nineteenth-century Swiss jurist and historian of Roman law J. J. Bachofen (1815–1887), who linked goddess worship with a more general theory of social development. He asserted that the first human societies were matriarchal and characterized by widespread promiscuity, which was

reflected in the worship of female deities. While this theory has been discredited by contemporary anthropologists, early social theorists like Lewis Henry Morgan, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels praised it. Sir James Frazer set himself the task of completing Bachofen's assemblage of evidence for matriarchy among world cultures. Even Sigmund Freud thought that goddess worship was linked to an earlier stage of matriarchy. For Bachofen and his followers, "mother right" marked a fixed and predetermined stage in the evolution of human cultures. This stage in human evolution, according to Bachofen, can be confirmed by myths about goddess worship, which are living expressions "of the stages in a people's development, and for the skillful observer, a faithful reflection of all the periods in the life of that people" (Bachofen, p. 75). The matriarchal period of human history was one of sublime grandeur, when women inspired chivalry, chastity, and poetry in men. Although men had superior strength, women strove for peace, justice, and religious consecration—guiding the men's "wild, lawless masculinity." This early phase of cultural evolution was displaced, in Bachofen's view, by a later period of conquest and patriarchy.

As early as 1851 proponents of the matriarchy theory were embroiled in a controversy set off by the famous jurist Sir Henry Maine, who insisted that the patriarchal family was the original social unit. This was the same year in which Bachofen was preparing his work *Das Mutterrecht*, asserting exactly the opposite thesis. Over thirty years later, anthropologist and folklorist J. F. McLennan (1886) reasserted the matriarchal theory, citing new anthropological evidence. Again in 1891 the matriarchy concept was discredited by Edward A. Westermarck, who was disturbed by Bachofen's idea that myths and legends preserve the "collective memory" of a people. Westermarck's argument attempted to reestablish Maine's patriarchal theory of human origins.

The issue flamed into controversy once again in 1927 with the publication of Robert Briffault's encyclopedic work *The Mothers*. Arguing against Maine and Westermarck, Briffault reasserted the existence of a primitive matriarchy that universally preceded patriarchy. However, unlike Bachofen, who defined matriarchy as a period of mother rule and inheritance through the female line, Briffault conceived matriarchy to be a period when women were socially rather than politically dominant. Briffault speculated that the "male instinct" created the original social herd and that the "female instinct" was responsible for the establishment of the family. Much of Briffault's evidence was derived from the study of religion; he thought that the widespread existence of

lunar deities among primitive peoples was proof of the early social dominance of women, since women were the first hierophants of lunar cults. Briffault's evolutionary theory was not the last of its kind. As recently as the 1930s Wilhelm Schmidt advanced a theory for the origin of religion employing a multilinear rather than unilinear model of cultural evolution. Schmidt assumed the existence of three types of "primary cultures"—matrilineal, patrilineal, and patriarchal. According to Schmidt, women were involved in the earliest cultivation of plants. Consequently their social importance increased, giving rise to widespread goddess worship.

Few psychologists have contributed theories about goddess worship. Freud thought devotion to female deities represented an infantile desire to be reunited with the mother. According to Freud, goddess worship represents universal unconscious fantasies characteristic of a stage in early psychic development in which the mother seems to be all-powerful to the child. C. G. Jung placed the religious impulse in a more central position than did Freud. He postulated a set of innate universal archetypes operative in the human psyche, one of which was the feminine principle. Jung utilized symbolism from primitive, archaic, and contemporary religions to shed light on the operation of these archetypes. [See Archetypes.]

The Jungian perspective has been most fully developed in a classic work by Erich Neumann entitled *The Great Mother* (1955). This massive volume explores the phenomenon of goddess worship from a number of psychological perspectives. Unlike social theorists who traced the development of goddess worship in social time and space, Neumann analyzes the phenomenon purely in terms of inner psychic images. Although he repudiates Bachofen's sociological analysis of matriarchy, he praises him for having made lasting discoveries about the elementary character of the feminine. In Neumann's words, "early mankind and the matriarchal stage are not archaeological or historical entities, but psychological realities whose fateful power is still alive in the psychic depths of present-day man." Neumann posits a matriarchal stage sequentially preceding patriarchy at the psychic level. This stage in the evolution of the human psyche is represented by belief in the Great Goddess. A strange contradiction permeates Neumann's work; on one hand he discounts Bachofen's sociological argument for matriarchy, but at the same time he praises Briffault for having "discovered the fact (which is still insufficiently recognized) that early culture is in very high degree the product of the female group" (p. 281). At the methodological level, Neumann admits to removing documents and images of goddess



worship from their cultural contexts. He rationalizes this methodology by asserting that psychohistory (a set of stages in the development of the human psyche) does not necessarily parallel historical events in a linear way. Despite such methodological curiosities, Neumann's work represents one of the most comprehensive treatments of goddess worship ever assembled by a Western scholar. Not only does he demonstrate the great variety of forms manifested in the phenomenon of goddess worship, he reveals the "transformative" nature of this religious impulse. He sketches out four manifestations of the Great Mother archetype: (1) the Good Mother (associated with childbearing, vegetation mysteries, and rebirth); (2) the Terrible Mother (linked to death, dismemberment, sickness, and extinction); (3) the Positive Transformative Goddess (related to wisdom, vision, ecstasy, and inspiration mysteries); and (4) the Negative Transformative Goddess (connected to rejection, deprivation, madness, and impotence). Any female deity can be classified as one of these four functions of the archetype; some goddesses can be placed in more than one of these categories.

There has been no major work on the topic by a single author since Neumann's classic treatment of goddess worship in the mid-1950s. There are several reasons for this. First, the works of Neumann and Briffault, who wrote in the twentieth century, reflect the nineteenth-century approach to comparative religions, which relished the fabrication of elaborate and ambitious theoretical frameworks for the study of complex phenomena. Also significant is the emergence of scientific anthropology, which, until recently, has stressed the analysis of single, manageable cultural entities through direct fieldwork. Armchair speculation went out of style with the emergence of the Boasian school in anthropology during the early twentieth century. Few psychologists, excepting Freud and the Jungians, have studied religious topics. Contemporary psychologists have focused on discrete measurable phenomena, such as the religious content of dreams and the relationship of psychedelic drugs to altered states of consciousness. Within the mainstream of American psychological thought virtually nothing has been written on the subject of goddess worship.

Other than anthropologists and psychologists, some religion scholars have approached goddess worship from a phenomenological perspective. Joseph Campbell for instance, in his monumental four-volume work *The Masks of God* takes a Jungian approach to goddess worship. While he sometimes uses caution in connecting goddess worship with a matriarchal stage in cultural evolution, at other times he perpetuates the nineteenth-century hypotheses of primitive matriarchy. E. O.

James (1959) vacillates between a purely historical description of different goddesses in their cultural contexts and generalizations that border on a universal psychic unity approach, much like Erich Neumann's.

**Contemporary Issues in the Study of Goddess Worship.** After nearly thirty years without a major work on goddess worship, there has been a revival of interest in the topic from three quarters—anthropology, religious studies, and feminist scholarship. Several new books have been published on goddess worship in the early 1980s. My edited work *Mother Worship: Theme and Variations* (1982) utilizes current data generated by anthropologists to address the topic. Another volume, *The Book of the Goddess: Past and Present* (1983), edited by Carl Olson, is a collection of articles by historians of religion and feminist scholars. Goddess worship is a central theme in the Autumn 1983 issue of *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, which is devoted to the study of women and religion. This recent revival of interest in goddess worship is due to three main factors: (1) a new interest in the old matriarchy controversy, (2) an active discussion among feminists about goddess symbolism, and (3) the emergence of a new comparative religions.

**The matriarchy controversy.** The issue of primitive matriarchy, which once plagued the study of goddess worship, has not disappeared. Some modern writers continue to assume there was an early historical phase when females dominated males. They cling to the notion that goddess worship is a remnant of that earlier period. The controversy continues to stir lively debate among popular writers, though many scholars think the issue is a dead one.

Most contemporary historians of religion accept the anthropological view that a stage of matriarchy never existed. However, a few scholars of eminent stature like Joseph Campbell (in Bachofen, 1967, p. lv) continue to support Bachofen's idea of an age of "mother right" that preceded patriarchy. They insist that this has been "confirmed irrefutably" by archaeological evidence. Although most feminist scholars today agree with the anthropological position, there remain a few articulate feminist authors who continue to perpetuate the idea of an original matriarchal stage. An example of this genre is Starhawk's *The Spiral Dance: A Rebirth of the Ancient Religion of the Great Goddess* (1979), in which the author discusses a rediscovery of the ancient "matrifocal civilizations" and the "falsehoods of patriarchal history." According to Sally R. Binford (1981, pp. 150–151) the belief in early matriarchies has taken a religious form for some feminists; mother-goddess worshipers in Los Angeles, for instance, have become organized into a church with a temple and priestesses. They believe that

the archaeological data that refute their position reflect a conspiracy against women among professional archaeologists. Binford calls this movement a "New Feminist Fundamentalism."

The only other scholars to take primitive matriarchy seriously today are Soviets, who continue to espouse Friedrich Engels's outdated nineteenth-century notions. Alexander Marshack (1972, pp. 338–339) cites Soviet archaeologists who interpret Upper Paleolithic mother-goddess figurines as confirmation of the existence of early matriarchal hunting societies organized around totemic clans controlled by women. According to Marshack, this view is simplistic, a distorted interpretation of complex data. He insists that the goddess images from the Upper Paleolithic era are evidence for symbolic processes "extremely variable in meaning and use and that they played a number of specialized and generalized roles across the complex, integrated, time-factored culture. . . . These facts do not confirm a matriarchy." Marshack adds one final but crucial note to his argument: the era was also marked by a separate, specialized masculine imagery and complex animal mythology, and the female figurines must be considered in this context. Thus, Upper Paleolithic society was neither matriarchal nor patriarchal, despite Marxist claims to the contrary.

There is no anthropologist today who would argue for a stage of matriarchy associated with goddess worship. It has been refuted on many occasions by anthropologists of all theoretical persuasions, including Marxists and feminists. In a brilliant argument against the matriarchy theory, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (1979, p. 343) notes three errors committed by scholars who insist on perpetuating this myth: they mistakenly assume that (1) the presence of female deities is evidence of matriarchy, (2) matrilineal societies are survivals of an era of matriarchy, and (3) the assumption that matrilineality and matriarchy are related to each other. According to Binford (1981, pp. 152–153) all these ideas are false and misleading. In fact the myth of matriarchy is damaging to the cause of feminists. Women are not freed by perpetuating the myth. The idea that the type of complex social organization required for matriarchy could be found among prehistoric societies is so patently ridiculous as to be a source of embarrassment for serious scholars pursuing the study of religion.

Even scholars who reject the existence of a historical stage of matriarchy sometimes insist that the symbolism of goddess worship can provide information about the history of female social roles. Some feminists argue, for instance, that the absence of female sacred imagery in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is due to the repression of women in Western societies. This attempt to

draw a parallel between the gender of sacred images and women's roles is misguided. Occasionally the two may parallel each other, but the social role of women may directly contradict or differ significantly from that suggested by a religion's sacred imagery. A study of Hindu goddess worship does not allow us, for instance, to predict with any certainty the relationship of women to men in Indian society. This same point is made by the historian and women's studies specialist Judith Ochsorn (in Olson, 1982, p. 18) in her 1982 study of the Middle Eastern goddess Ishtar. According to this scholar, the Near Eastern deities were heavily anthropomorphized. Sometimes they reflected the reality of social roles in the Middle East, but more often they represented a different concept of community—as exemplified by the frequent instances of incest among the deities, a totally foreign idea in the social reality of that period.

Today most scholars of comparative religions, including feminists, would agree that primitive matriarchy is a myth. This does not preclude continued research on male and female roles in prehistoric societies. Since fieldwork has not confirmed the existence of even a single matriarchal society, the matriarchy controversy is a quasi-religious issue that has no place in the serious study of goddess worship. Far more important is the contemporary scholarship of feminists who seek to deepen our understanding of the relationship of human nature to religion without invoking dubious nineteenth-century issues like primitive matriarchy. In much of this work women are searching for a new focus of identity in the modern world. Goddess worship has been intimately linked to this quest.

**The feminist revival of goddess worship.** One reason for the increasing popularity of goddess worship as a subject of inquiry is the expanding influence and scholarly development of women's studies. According to Carol Christ (in Olson, 1983, p. 235) feminist writings about the gender of deities reflect two distinct types of argumentation: (1) religions that stress the maleness of the supreme being deify the masculine principle and see it as the only source of legitimate authority; (2) the attribution of male qualities to deities reflects distorted concepts derived from alienated male experience in Western societies. Feminists who use the first argument stress the need to eliminate masculine pronouns and gender-specific titles from Jewish and Christian scriptures and liturgy to restore authority to women. Feminists who assert the second argument oppose this simple solution because in their eyes the distorted male image of divinity in Western religions cannot be removed by merely changing gender-specific language. They argue that the symbolism will remain biased be-

cause of the dualistic, conquest-oriented, patriarchal, and hierarchical infrastructure that underlies these male-oriented religions.

Carol Christ (in Olson, 1983, pp. 238–248) presents a schematic view of feminist solutions to the problem of gender in the worship of deities. According to this scholar, there are four approaches advanced by feminist theologians to resolve the problem of male symbolism of God: (1) male symbols of God can be reinterpreted in nonoppressive ways; (2) language used to refer to God can be made androgynous; (3) female symbolism for the Supreme Being must be introduced in order to create an imagery that reflects dual gender; (4) male symbolism must be deemphasized to provide an opportunity for the Great Goddess, whose existence has been obscured by this symbolism, to reclaim her ascendancy. Western feminists are experimenting with many different ways to introduce female sacred imagery into Judaism and Christianity.

Those feminists who believe sexism to be an integral part of Western religions want no part in saving them from what they see as built-in sexist biases; instead, they advocate a reemergent goddess worship as a focus of religiosity appropriate to complex modern life. These feminists are actively developing extensive experimental liturgies for raising consciousness about goddess worship, both as it existed in antiquity and in religions outside of Western civilization. Thus, goddess worship and imagery are considered to be the focus of a new power for women rooted in the women's liberation movement and grounded in a new symbol system. *The Spiral Dance* by Starhawk is a recipe for the rebirth of an "ancient religion of the Great Goddess." It reflects the conviction among some feminists that goddess worship is a source of strength and creativity for women, and also provides an antidote to the regrettable patriarchal "conquest of nature" theme that characterizes Western thought.

The debate among feminists about these social and theological issues has been a healthy source of revitalization not only in terms of the reawakening of the study of goddess worship but also in terms of scholarly inquiry into assumptions about human nature that lie at the heart of Western religions. The growing literature in this field promises to shed new light on the role of goddess worship in the contemporary world. Consequently, we can expect a steadily increasing growth in the amount of research on the veneration of female deities, deriving particularly from the work of those contemporary feminists who are intentionally constructing new myths to transform traditional patterns of goddess worship into forms that give women a stronger sense of their own identity, power, and meaning in the modern

world. Thus, the feminist movement is a major contributing factor in the revitalization of goddess worship as a topic of inquiry among popular writers and scholars in different disciplines.

**The new comparative religions.** A significant new direction is developing in the social sciences after the long siege of behaviorism in psychology and historical particularism in anthropology. The revolt against the errors of nineteenth-century armchair theoreticians has come to an end. This is reflected in a new comparative religions, which focuses once again on the main themes of human religious experience. Instead of working from a dubious, in fact erroneous, data base, the new comparative religionists are treating these universal themes with the benefit of over fifty years of extensive fieldwork conducted in various cultures by cautious social scientists. Since the mid-1970s social scientists and religion specialists have been working together more closely. The result is the publication of numerous volumes devoted to the main themes of religion, such as sacrifice, death, rebirth, rites of passage, the evil eye, pilgrimage, and goddess worship. These new works are neither too speculative nor overly cautious about exploring panhuman dimensions of religious experience.

One of the most widely publicized and heavily attended sessions at the American Anthropological Association meetings in San Francisco during 1975 was entitled "Anthropological Inquiries into Mother Worship." This session resulted eventually in an edited volume on the topic (Preston, 1982).

The mid-1970s marked a watershed in the anthropological study of religion. Since that time some anthropologists have been about the business of synthesizing a vast amount of data accumulated over the years on various dimensions of religion. Much of this new information was isolated previously in the contexts of specific ethnographies devoted to the elaboration of particular cultural descriptions. The large numbers of people who attended the session on goddess worship in San Francisco were not attracted by any "star quality" scholars making their usual erudite presentations, but rather the time was ripe for introducing once again a topic that had remained more or less dormant for several decades. An extensive amount of data had been gathered on goddess worship in many different cultural contexts, and no one knew what to do with it. Scholars were seeking a new frame of reference. Historians of religion had been synthesizing the work of anthropologists for years. It was now time for anthropologists to return to their original task of making sense of a topic like goddess worship by placing it in a comparative framework.

The new approach to goddess worship, though cau-

tious, strives to retain a delicate balance between cultural context and the broader panhuman issues that continue to be vital in the comparative study of religion. Despite the early years of ambitious speculation and the later period of overcautious skepticism, many questions about goddess worship remain unanswered. We need to know more about the relationship between male and female deities. Why in some religions are female sacred images almost totally absent? What about the role of goddess worship in the development of complex forms of social organization? Why do female sacred images continue to thrive, even in Communist countries where religion is not officially sanctioned? How do the personal religious experiences of devotees who turn to goddesses differ from those who turn to male gods for answers to their prayers? Why is goddess worship associated with such great antiquity? How does the worship of female deities fit into the postindustrial world? The new comparative religions, with its balanced perspective that incorporates questions of panhuman and culturally specific levels of analysis, has been another stimulus for the revitalization of major themes of religious significance shared by human beings the world over.

No single theory is adequate to explain the multifaceted phenomenon of goddess worship. What deeply felt impulse is there that continuously kindles the veneration of female sacred images for thousands of years among human populations? Are Victor Turner and Edith Turner (1978, p. 236) correct when they ask whether the resurgent interest in female sacred images during the modern era is an index of our discontent with male iconoclasm, technology, progress, and bureaucratization? Elsewhere I have written (Preston, 1982, pp. 340–341) that the loneliness of urban life, the contemporary emphasis on independence, the fast pace of technological society, and the radical severing of our relationship with the earth have left people in postindustrial societies with a deep sense of disenchantment that is perceived to have the potential to be healed by a return to sacred qualities, which are often considered to be best expressed through a divine mother image. Even if we do not agree with the Jungian idea of a feminine archetype, all humans understand the mother-infant bond and recognize the related universal symbol of the womb as mother of life. The worship of female sacred images is deeply entwined with our panhuman experience of this primary bond. While not every incidence of goddess worship is an expression of the attempt by humans to return to the primary bond of origin, there can be no doubt this theme underlies the strong continuity of goddess worship expressed in so many different

forms and in such great profusion throughout the world.

[See also Women's Studies.]

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JAMES J. PRESTON

**GODS AND GODDESSES.** In human religious experience, hierophanies (manifestations of sacred power) provide centers of meaning, order, worship, and ethics. Humans have always felt that real life is in close contact with sacred power as encountered in the form of divine beings. Ideas and experiences of these goddesses and gods thus are not so much intellectual reflections as existential concerns, revolving around the fundamental human question of how to live authentically in this world.

Gods and goddesses fit most aptly into what have been called polytheistic cultures, where the divine reality has not been unified into monistic or monotheistic systems. Monism still allows for goddesses and gods as

manifestations or emanations of one divine reality, whereas monotheism absorbs their functions as attributes of the one God or else downgrades them to helpers like angels or saints. In this article I shall describe the major types of gods and goddesses in the cultures in which the plurality of divine beings is taken for granted.

**History and Morphology of Divine Beings.** It is important to keep in mind both the history and the morphology of human involvement with the sacred. Historically, all the different forms that have developed need to be understood and related to the cultural areas in which they are at home. Each particular culture chooses certain types of sacred modalities as strong and efficacious, and these modalities define the goddesses and gods as they are experienced and described by the people of that culture. There is always an ongoing process of devaluation and revaluation of the gods and goddesses, even in archaic cultures that seem to change very little over long periods of time. The modalities of the sacred are dynamic, one form diminishing in importance or becoming absorbed into another form, while new experiences give strength to other forms of the sacred.

At the same time, it is important to look at the morphology of goddesses and gods across various cultures. The modalities by which the sacred is experienced are given in the structures of nature itself and in the structures of human life. Almost everything in human experience has been seen as the arena of a sacred manifestation: sky, earth, mountains, hunting and planting, sexuality, childbirth, eating, rulership, and so forth.

Humans experience these divine manifestations in concrete, compelling forms. The goddesses and gods thus revealed are felt to have efficacious power, will, and personality. Their power meets human existence precisely at the most vital and crucial areas of life, in connection with such matters as food, fertility, protection, birth, and death. The fact that the divine beings have personality and will means that human existence is not just aimless and haphazard but is related to the sacred pattern created or structured by the will of the gods and goddesses.

In looking at the history and morphology of divine beings, several considerations must be kept in mind. First of all, even though the goddesses and gods of a particular society necessarily reflect the values and traditions of that society, it is misleading to attempt to set up direct correspondences between the divine world and human society. Just because a society emphasizes a mother goddess does not mean that it was originally a matriarchy, for example. Myths about the gods and

goddesses cannot be taken as direct reflections of human historical experiences.

Second, there has been much discussion of the "original" function of certain goddesses and gods, in contrast to added or accumulated functions. Further, scholars sometimes attempt to make distinctions between "primordial" gods and deified humans, or between gods and a multitude of lesser spirits and semidivine heroes; while these distinctions are valuable in some cases, they can also be misleading. In general, the discussion in this article will be restricted to presenting the major divinities of the world as they are found in the actual religious traditions.

**Cultural dimensions.** The traditional cultural context determines the system of gods and goddesses, for deities are always envisioned in ways appropriate to a culture. While the ethnographic theories about *Kulturkreise* ("culture circles") have not reached scholarly consensus, we may very generally divide ancient and archaic peoples into hunters and gatherers, archaic planters, and pastoralists, with goddesses and gods appropriate to each category. Beyond these, cultures become more complex and syncretistic, developing the earlier pantheons in many directions.

Divine beings in hunting societies include ancestors, of course; sky and astral gods are important as well; representations of the mother goddess are also widespread. But most characteristic of hunting cultures are sacred beings associated with animals: culture heroes in animal form and, above all, masters and mistresses of animals. These are powerful gods and goddesses who represent the sacred as experienced in the people's sacred relationship to animals.

Planting cultures also know animal forms of gods, but here earth gods of fertility come to the fore. Mother Earth is creator and giver of life, appearing also in vegetarian goddess forms as, for example, Mother of Grain. Atmospheric gods—storm and sun—are also important in that they fertilize Mother Earth and bring fecundity. Dying and rising deities often symbolize the rhythm of fertility. Ancestors or culture heroes are important, especially among root-planting peoples, as the divine beings who originated cultivated plants.

Pastoral peoples are of many types and are often found mixed together with planters. Sky and atmospheric gods tend to be supreme among these peoples. But they also revere divine powers associated with herds of animals, because these are the principal means by which the people participate in sacred life-giving power.

Cultures that have moved beyond these archaic levels develop very complex pantheons of goddesses and gods.

For example, agricultural city-state societies like those of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, or Mexico (Aztec), typically have a hierarchal pantheon ruling over the city-state through a human ruler, the pantheon mirroring the various functions of the city-state. And the complex civilizations established throughout Europe and Asia by the Indo-Europeans retained some elements of the pastoralist gods of the early Indo-Europeans but greatly expanded and developed these pantheons in connection with the religious traditions of the peoples they conquered and absorbed.

**Pantheons.** In most cultures the plurality of divine powers is understood to operate as some sort of pantheon, a system of gods and goddesses functioning as a sacred community. Pantheons arise from the experience of the sacred in different arenas of nature and society. They change over time as some functions become more important and others less so or as cross-cultural contact introduces new gods who take over the roles of the older ones. The pantheon functions as a particular culture's way of understanding the various experiences of the sacred in a symbolic system, providing orientation and unity to human existence in a world made up of a plurality of divine wills.

We should not expect the structure of pantheons to be rational and logical; different gods can easily have the same function, or the same god may have two seemingly disparate functions. Often, a pantheon has some kind of hierarchal structure based on the different functions of its goddesses and gods. There may be a head of the pantheon, for example, a father of the gods (such as El for the ancient Canaanites) or a great goddess who ranks first before all in power and authority (such as Amaterasu in early Shintō). [See Supreme Beings.] Sometimes the head of the pantheon is envisioned as old or remote, and the vital functions are really performed by other powerful, immanent gods. [See Deus Otiosus.] The pantheon may sometimes, though not necessarily, be a reflection of human society. For example, one god rules, and the others perform the basic functions to maintain life and order; the gods marry and have offspring; the gods fight and make peace and carry on meaningful life.

These activities within the pantheon are of course mythological happenings on a cosmic rather than historical scale, though the actions of the gods have repercussions in the human realm. Myths about the gods and goddesses describe the time of beginnings and the sacred events that shaped human existence in its vital aspects; repeating the myths and performing the rituals reenact these divine events so that they will continue to be real and efficacious in human existence. [See Myth and Ritual.]

**Typologies of Goddesses and Gods.** Typologies of gods and goddesses must span both the historical-cultural data and the morphological possibilities of these divine beings. Since a typology puts forth ideal types, it will never be completely embodied in a particular cultural system. Some societies may have very few of the possible types, while other societies may have a very full representation of the various forms of divinities. It is useful to adopt two different perspectives on gods and goddesses: a cosmic typology and a social typology. The cosmic typology outlines the possible epiphanies of the sacred through the structures of the cosmos and the organization of these divine forms. The social typology defines sacred beings in relation to functions in vital areas of human society and culture.

**Cosmic goddesses and gods.** Many religious traditions expressly recognize a cosmic typology of gods and goddesses. The Greeks divided their gods into the Olympians and the chthonic gods, and early Shintō spoke of *kami* of heaven and *kami* of earth. Deities of the Indo-European peoples typically are related to the three realms (Skt., *lokas*) of sky, atmosphere, and earth.

**The sky gods and goddesses.** Among cosmic gods, the sky deities generally take precedence. Even the most primal, archaic cultures know of the god who is manifested in the vault of the sky. The characteristics of this god are drawn from the experience of the sky: this is the high god with authority over all, all-seeing and thus all-knowing, present everywhere and almighty. In some way the sky god is also the ultimate creator and sustainer of everything. At the same time this god is remote, a *deus otiosus*. Other goddesses and gods of the sky and atmosphere are often thought of as helpers of the supreme sky god. Tribes of southeastern Australia have a sky god called Baiame, or Daramulun, who is self-created, causes rain, and sees and hears all. The Yoruba sky god is Ọlọrun, an almighty, immortal, all-knowing creator. Anu of ancient Mesopotamia is the supreme authority in the sky, presiding over the assembly of the gods. Varuṇa of Vedic India is visible everywhere, with the wind as his breath; he gives rain and thunder and is all-knowing, thousand-eyed, the universal king and the guardian of cosmic order. Ahura Mazdā, the Iranian god corresponding to Varuṇa, and Zeus, who became the high god of the Greeks, retain this celestial character of sovereignty, as do the related sky gods Jupiter of the Romans and Óðinn (Odin) of the Scandinavians. All these sky gods, of course, also take on many other specialized functions. [See Sky.]

**Meteorological gods and goddesses.** Deities associated with meteorological and atmospheric phenomena often represent specialized functions of the sky god. Important among these are, first of all, the storm and wind

deities. Moving away from sovereignty and transcendence, they express fecundity, the sky god's aspect as creator, virile male power, spouse of the earth, giver of rain. Anu, the Mesopotamian sky god, in this aspect is called the "fecund breed-bull"; he is the husband of Ki (Earth) and manifests his powers in the spring sky with thunder and fertilizing rain. In this form, too, appear such great storm gods as Indra of India, Min of ancient Egypt, Baal and Hadad of the Northwest Semites, Marduk of Babylon, and Þórr (Thor) of Scandinavia. While the supreme sky god is quite remote and transcendent, these storm gods become more immanent: Varuṇa the sky god becomes old and feeble, and Indra takes over; El is sometimes pictured as old and impotent, and Baal moves to central stage as the fecundator. The storm gods overflow with strength and vitality, burst open the clouds for rain, send fertility to the fields, and keep the cosmic forces going. Wind and storm are destructive as well as fecundating, and the ravages of such storm gods and goddesses as Þórr, Enlil of Mesopotamia, Anat of the Canaanites, and Ẓango of the Yoruba are dreaded. [See Meteorological Beings.]

Sun divinities are meteorological sacred powers related to the sky, embodying and dispensing the power of life. [See Sun.] The sun god brings enlightenment and wisdom and is characterized by unchangeability, stability, and order. Fighting against darkness and chaos, the sun god daily creates light anew and is thus the prototype of the rising of the dead. In many cultures the sun god or goddess plays the role of the supreme god; Re-Atum in ancient Egypt, Huitzilopochtli in Mexico, the sun god among various North American Indians, and Amaterasu in Japan exemplify this. Another aspect of the sun god is his destroying power, especially in desert cultures; this god overpowers the living with heat and drought, devouring as well as generating life. The sun god also has connections with the underworld; like Re of ancient Egypt, he may lead dead souls through the underworld, or, like Utu of Mesopotamia, he may act as their judge during his nightly journey.

Goddesses and gods associated with the stars and planets frequently are experienced as the eyes and/or ears of the sky god, lending themselves to the all-seeing and all-knowing qualities of the high god. [See Stars.] The Maasai of Kenya believe the sky god Ngai has universal vision through his nighttime "eyes"; a falling star is one of the eyes of Ngai coming closer to earth in order to see better. The sky god Varuṇa is "thousand-eyed," and the Samoyed sky god Num employs the stars as his ears, through which he listens to the earth from the boundless regions of the sky. In addition, the complicated movements of the stars and planets led the ancient Babylonians to associate them with divine beings

who control events in nature and human life, an idea also taken over by the ancient Greeks.

The moon waxes and wanes, disappears and reappears, and thus its divine epiphany epitomizes mysterious power, change and transformation, death and rebirth, fertility and regeneration. [See Moon.] Frequently the moon manifests a goddess of fertility; this is true for Selene among the Greeks, Rabie among the Wemale of Ceram, and Pe among the Pygmies; furthermore, there are lunar elements associated with many of the great goddesses. The moon deity rules especially over the rhythms of life associated with the waters, rain, vegetation, and the fertility of Mother Earth and all women. At the same time, the moon goddess sometimes becomes the mistress of the dead, receiving those who die and regenerating them. Gods of the moon, such as Thoth of ancient Egypt, Nanna of ancient Mesopotamia, and Aningaak of the Inuit (Eskimo), measure time and regulate natural phenomena. And the fierce goddess Kālī in the Hindu tradition represents the lunar charting of time and destiny.

*Earth gods and goddesses.* Earth deities form an important and complex category of the cosmic typology. [See Earth.] Basic types include the various manifestations of the earth itself: waters, mountains, the great many hierophanies associated with animal forms and vegetal forms—all those divine aspects that seem "given" in the powerful epiphanies of Mother Earth.

The earth is the primary source and nurturer of all life, and it is also that sacred power that receives all life back again. All human cultures have perceived in Tellus Mater (Mother Earth) a particularly significant epiphany of the sacred. Hesiod states in his *Theogony* that Gaia (Earth) first gave birth to Ouranos (Heaven), and the hierogamy between Gaia and Ouranos initiated the whole process of life. The Earth Mother is endlessly creative but, as a goddess, passive and indistinct, the repository of a wealth of sacred forces. Manifest in the very soil of the place where humans live, she expresses herself first of all in motherhood (that is, inexhaustible fruitfulness) even before she develops into the Great Goddess of vegetation and harvesting. In the long saga of human history prior to the discovery of agriculture, the Mother Goddess played an important role in the way humans understood their existence; the multitude of female figurines found from Paleolithic cultures provides evidence of her importance. Children come from the Earth Mother; the sick are regenerated by being brought again into close contact with her; the dead are returned to her womb. For example, Ala, worshiped by the Igbo of Africa, is the source of fertility for the land and the family, the abode of the ancestors, and the guardian of laws; barren women pray to her for chil-

dren, and men ask her for success in trade or increase in livestock.

Indistinct and unformed like the earth, yet similarly powerful, the *fons et origo* of all life is the sacred power manifest in water. [See Water.] Water symbolizes the primal reality from which all forms come and to which all forms return. Nun in ancient Egyptian mythology, for example, is the primordial ocean in which are the germs of all things. Rich in seeds, the divine water is homologized to semen and fertilizes earth, animals, and women. Hapi, a male god of the Nile, is often depicted with breasts to show that he is a bringer of life. Water also purifies and regenerates, and so the Iranian water divinity Aradvī Sūrā Anāhitā is thought to purify humans and multiply flocks. A great many local cults are associated with springs and streams in various religions; among the Ashanti, the most powerful deities are those associated with rivers. But water deities are ambivalent: water both generates life and destroys it. So the goddesses and gods of the waters are capricious, randomly doing good or evil. Well known from Greek mythology is Poseidon, the untamed and faithless god of the ocean; from his palace at the bottom of the sea he swallows the world and renews it in rhythmic cycles. In Scandinavian mythology, Ran, the sea god Aegir's wife, draws people down with her net. Sedna, the sea goddess of the Inuit, is the mother of sea animals, but when humans violate taboos, she sends famine and destruction with icy dispassion. Water gods and goddesses of chaos take the form of dragons and snakes, both destroying the world and bringing rain and fertility; Tiamat in Babylon, Yamim in Canaan, and Vṛtra in India exemplify this duality.

Powerful epiphanies of earth deities are experienced through mountains, strong and distant pillars of heaven, stabilizing the earth and providing order and fertility. [See Mountains.] Most mountains in Japan, such as Mount Fuji, are felt to be the locale of *kami* presence; and T'ai-shan in China is a divine mountain that attracts extensive worship. Pele, goddess of volcanoes in Hawaii, demonstrates the destructive aspect of volcanic mountain epiphanies.

Reaching back to the dawn of human existence is the sense that the sacred is manifested in animal form. Epiphanies are associated with animals that are powerful and terrifying, those that exhibit wisdom or secret knowledge, those that are symbolically connected with the power of the earth, the moon, or the waters, and above all those that share sacred life-power with humans through their very flesh and blood. Animal symbols of goddesses and gods include the cow in ancient Egypt, a manifestation of the sky goddess Nun; the fox Inari in Japan; the coyote in North America; the bear



among the Ainu; the buffalo among North American Indians; serpents and dragons in a great variety of cultures, as well as caribou, elephants, dolphins, whales, eagles, and so on. Imaging the divinities in animal form expresses a sense of close relation to the sacred life that sustains animals and humans alike. [See Animals.]

With the agricultural revolution came also a revolution in cosmic epiphanies, transforming Mother Earth into various forms of the goddess of vegetation, as well as giving new emphasis to the fertilizing male earth gods. Plant life is an epiphany of sacred power. For example, in a bas-relief of Assur the upper part of a god's body is represented as coming out of a tree; and a seal from the Indus Valley civilization depicts a divine being within a tree faced by a group of worshipers. Among the Polynesians the growth of plants such as banana trees and taros actually comes from the sacred concentration of power in the ancestral *dema* deities of the time of the beginnings. Characteristic of plant life is the rhythmic cycle of death and birth, season after season, and so the divinities of vegetation reflect this pattern of death and rebirth; this is true, for example, of Baal of the Canaanites and Tammuz of Mesopotamia. Gods of phallic energy, such as the ancient Egyptian Min and the Indian Śiva, express another aspect of the divine source of generative power. [See Agriculture.]

*The gods and goddesses of the underworld.* Chthonic deities live in the dark recesses of the earth and are especially related to the underworld. [See Underworld.] In some cases, the gods of the underworld are raging, destructive monsters who bring down even the gods of life; such a figure is Mot in Canaanite mythology. The ruler of the place of the dead is grim and dreaded; this is true of Hades in ancient Greece, Ereshkigal in Mesopotamia, and Seth and Nephthys in Egypt. Sedna, sea goddess of the Inuit, and T'ai-shan, a mountain god of the Chinese, are cosmic divinities who receive the dead into their abodes. These goddesses and gods of the underworld are ambiguous in the extreme: dreaded and avoided, they still have sacred powers that can assist people in this most critical passage of life. Often the deities of the underworld are related to the deities of life-giving power; Satene among the Wemale of West Ceram is an example. After all, it is Mother Earth who finally receives back the dead. In illustration of this, figurines of pregnant mother goddesses have been found in prehistoric burial sites, providing images of life-giving power within the realm of death.

*Gods and goddesses of social functions.* Much research has been done on the social functions of goddesses and gods, especially on the triad of functions common to Indo-European divinities: (1) a sovereignty function with magical and juridical aspects; (2) a func-

tion of physical power and bravery, especially in war; and (3) a function of fertility and prosperity. Georges Dumézil in particular has shown how this triad of functions penetrates all the societies that stem from proto-Indo-European culture, although each culture went on to develop their divinities further. [See Indo-European Religions.] While this important system of categorization is incorporated to some extent in the social typology used here, it should be noted that this scheme does not apply to non-Indo-European cultures. For example, many deities of the ancient Near East and of Africa combine the sovereign and the warrior functions and other ancient societies do not so clearly separate the food-producing class and its attendant deities from the warrior class and its gods. Most of the great gods and goddesses of non-Indo-European peoples cannot be neatly pigeonholed into this triad of functional classes; thus the following categories are amplified somewhat.

*Creators and guardians of society and order.* Cosmic sky gods fall most easily into the first category set forth above: they are sovereign deities who are creators and preservers of society and order. [See Cosmogony.] Often the high god creates human society and originates and upholds cosmic and moral law. This god holds people responsible on the basis of his moral design, judges them, and punishes them, either directly or through other deities who perform this function. In Vedic thought, the sky god Varuṇa is the cosmocrator and also the upholder of *ṛta*, the cosmic and moral law to which all things are subject. Jupiter, the Roman high god, is the guardian of oaths, treaties, and moral duty. In theistic Hinduism, Vaiṣṇavas see Viṣṇu as the originator and preserver of society. Kṛṣṇa, *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, advises Arjuna to fulfill the duties of his warrior caste, for even Kṛṣṇa (Viṣṇu) performs his *dharma* (duty) so that the worlds continue to function (*Bhagavadgītā* 3.3–24). Yahveh of the Hebrews both originates human society and gives forth the law that governs all peoples. Shang-ti, worshiped by the Shang rulers in ancient China, is thought of as the head of the house of the ancestors, sending both weal and woe in governing the fortunes of the rulers. In Babylon, the assembly of the great gods, having created humans as servants of the gods, supervises human society and determines human destinies. Widespread among African peoples is the notion that the high god is the ultimate originator and authority governing human life.

Sometimes the high god creates the original humans, and these culture heroes then complete the creation and oversee its order. For example, the *dema* deities of the myths of the Marind-anim of New Guinea create the vital aspects of human culture and morality by their actions in the time of the beginnings. Ancestors take the

place of the high god as guardians of human morality, although the high god is recognized as the ultimate authority, the court of last resort. The high gods may have inspectors, like Eṣu of the Yoruba and Satan of the Hebrews (*Job* 1–2), to help in upholding the divine order.

*Goddesses and gods of protection and war.* Gods who display physical power often function as gods of protection and war. [See *War and Warriors*.] This role is ascribed especially to cosmic storm goddesses and gods, such as Indra in the Vedas and Thor in Scandinavian mythology. Ancient Near Eastern cultures have combined sovereign storm gods to function as divine warriors and protectors; Marduk of the Babylonians and Yahveh of the Hebrews are two such gods. Mars of the Romans is the classical god of war, protecting the state against its enemies but also preserving fields and herds against damage and disaster. Goddesses (e.g., Anat in Canaanite mythology and Sekhmet in ancient Egypt) are also presented as ferocious warriors.

Deified humans rise to become gods of war and protection, such as the famous Chinese general Kuan-ti, who was deified as the warrior protector *par excellence*. Gods can also appear in human form to destroy evil, as do the *avatāras* of Viṣṇu, whom this high god sends out from age to age to battle the rise of evil in the world. And a great variety of goddesses and gods function as divine protectors in every conceivable time of crisis: Castor and Pollux protect warriors for the Romans; in China the deified girl who became T'ien-shang Shengmu (Holy Mother in Heaven) is first of all the protector of sailors; Min of ancient Egypt is the protector of travelers, as is the *kami* of the road in Japan and Saint Christopher in popular Christianity; and gods and goddesses all over the world protect women in childbirth and children as they grow up.

*Goddesses and gods of fertility and prosperity.* Deities promoting fertility and prosperity fit into an extremely broad and diverse category; in fact, the majority of gods and goddesses take on some of these functions, and the remaining categories listed below could be included in a general way in this basic category.

All the goddesses and gods associated with hunting and agriculture belong in this group. It is perhaps in securing and producing food that humans experience most deeply the interpenetration of divine cosmic powers and the divine forces of society and culture. In hunting cultures special importance is given to the hierophanies related to the animal herd most essential to the survival of the people. Sacred power manifests itself in mythological form as the master (or mistress) of animals; this god or goddess is an archetype of the herd, protector and master of animal life, who also provides boons to humans, giving to them of the sacred life of

the animals. [See *Lady of the Animals and Lord of the Animals*.] The Caribou Man of the Naskapi Indians (of Labrador) and the Great Bull Buffalo of the Blackfeet Indians are examples of this type of divine being. Planting peoples learn the sacred work of planting and harvesting from the deities who originate and continue the powers of vegetal fertility. In West Ceram, myths tell how the body of the goddess Hainuwele was cut up and planted in the earth, where it changed into root plants that the people have continued to cultivate. Widely known is the Mother of Grain, exemplified by Demeter in ancient Greece; never confused with Gaia, the cosmic Earth Mother, she is the goddess of the cultivated soil.

A primary concern in the realm of fertility is human procreation, and most societies have deities of love, marriage, and procreation. In Greek mythology, Hera, wife of Zeus, is the goddess of marriage, and Aphrodite and Eros are instigators of love. Ishtar of Mesopotamia and Hathor of ancient Egypt are goddesses of love and procreation. Freyja in Scandinavian mythology is at the same time divine lover/mistress and wife/mother. Popular Mexican conceptions of the Virgin Mary portray her as the life-giving mother in addition to her function as the virgin. Aborigines of Australia have myths about the Great Rainbow Snake who is responsible for human fertility. An aspect of this divine function is the granting of prosperity and wealth; in Scandinavia this function is performed by the deities known as the Vanir: Freyr, for example, grants peace and fertility, and his father, Njǫrðr (Njord), dispenses prosperity to those who go to sea. In the Hindu pantheon, Lakṣmī, the divine wife of Viṣṇu, is the goddess of wealth and happiness. And Gaṇeśa, the popular elephant-headed god, is widely worshiped as the overcomer of obstacles and the bringer of good fortune.

*Domestic and community gods and goddesses.* The center of concern for fertility and prosperity is the home, and many goddesses and gods dwell and function within it, guarding the door, presiding over the hearth, sustaining marital ties, and granting children—everything that makes for happy home life. Hestia is the goddess of the hearth for the Greeks, as Vesta is for the Romans. Among the ancient Aryans, Agni, the god of fire, also presides over the family cult of the hearth. Neith in ancient Egypt is skilled in the domestic arts, as is Athena among the Greeks. For the Ainu of northern Japan, the fire goddess, Iresu-Huchi, presides over the home, giving peace and prosperity, receiving and keeping children who have died. Traditional Japanese homes have images of Daikoku and Ebisu as protectors of the household, and the Chinese have Tsao-kung, the god of the hearth, who watches over and brings prosperity to the family. For the Romans, the *penates* guard the store-

room, and the *lares* guard the family estate boundaries.

Beyond the home, local communities have gods of protection and prosperity. At the entrance to traditional Japanese villages stands a stone image of the *bodhisattva* Jizō, erected for the protection and welfare of the village. And the Chinese earth god T'u-ti-kung is worshiped in traditional villages; he is the god rooted in the locality who keeps track of village happenings and generally oversees the prosperity and welfare of the community.

*Gods and goddesses of healing, sickness, and death.*

A major concern in human life has always been sickness and death; appropriately many goddesses and gods operate in this critical area. Some bring sickness and death, others cure sickness and protect the dead, and still others perform both functions. Well known is the Greek god Asklepios, who presides over healing and medicine. In China, Pao-sheng Ta-ti was a human doctor who after death became the god of medicine and healing. Traditional Japanese keep images of the Buddha Yakushi, king of medicines, in their homes for health. Some gods and goddesses specialize in bringing about sickness: the Pakoro Kamui brings smallpox to the Ainu; Irra is the dreaded plague of ancient Mesopotamia; and Namtar, the herald of Ereshkigal, Mesopotamian goddess of the underworld, has sixty diseases that he can spread among humans.

The ambiguity of divine power is often expressed in the existence of one deity who is both the bringer of health and prosperity and the agent of destruction and death. Hermes, protector and guide of travelers, becomes the grim psychopomp who guides souls to Hades. In the Vedas, the god Rudra often brings sickness and destruction, although he is also revered as the healer. The Great Rainbow Snake of the Australians, Hina of the Hawaiians, and Kālī of Hinduism all promote fertility and birth but also cause destruction and death. Human hopes of merciful treatment in the passage of death are reflected in the existence of many goddesses and gods who guard, nourish, guide or otherwise help the deceased. Hathor of ancient Egypt nourishes the dead, and the *bodhisattva* Jizō in Japan is especially revered as the receiver and protector of infants who die. Yama of Hinduism, as the first mortal to die, guides the dead to the celestial world. Amida (Skt., Amitābha) is popularly worshiped in Japan as the merciful Buddha who, when a person dies, appears with his holy retinue to lead the soul to rebirth in the Pure Land paradise. Some cults link the worshiper to the story of the deity's death and resurrection. Prominent cults of this type are that of Osiris and Isis in Egypt, Tammuz in Mesopotamia, as well as several of the Hellenistic mystery religions.

*Gods and goddesses of culture, arts, and technology.* Though divinities related to cultural expressions are quite diverse, with roles corresponding to the needs and experience of a particular society, some general types can be mentioned. [See Culture Heroes.] Among divine culture heroes are figures like Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods for the benefit of humans; Blacksmith in Dogon tradition, who acquired seeds from heaven and brought them to earth for the first crops; Rāma, the carrier of culture, whose feats are recounted in the Hindu *Rāmāyaṇa*; Nyikang, the first king of the Shilluk of Africa; and Quetzalcoatl, the deified hero of the Aztec. Some culture heroes are thought of as the original humans who created the vital aspects of human existence in the mythic time of the beginnings; the *dema* of the Marind-anim and the ancestors in the Dreaming of Australian myths provide the prototypes for human cultural activities such as planting, sexuality, and festivals. The changing image of the trickster, such as Coyote among North American Indians, perhaps could fit here; though not necessarily worshiped as a god, the trickster typically wrests some cultural benefit for humans from the gods.

Gods and goddesses are patrons of the arts, representing the creative force and the secret knowledge of individual arts. Sarasvatī in Hinduism is the goddess of learning, art, and music, widely worshiped in school festivals. Thoth, the god of wisdom in ancient Egypt, is endowed with complete knowledge and is the inventor of all the arts and sciences: arithmetic, surveying, geometry, astronomy, soothsaying, magic, medicine, surgery, music, drawing, and—above all—hieroglyphic writing.

There are goddesses and gods for almost every conceivable occupation, craft, and technology. Njord of Scandinavia is patron of those who build ships and go to sea. In Greek mythology, Herakles and Hermes are associated especially with merchants, Athena is associated with women artisans, and Hephaistos, the god of fire, is the creative flame of the forge in metalwork. Among the Yoruba it is believed that Ogun (perhaps a deified ancestor) clears away obstacles and gives prosperity to all those who work with iron and steel—warriors, hunters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, barbers, butchers, and (in modern times) mechanics and taxi drivers. Hermes is the patron not only of merchants but also of thieves and rogues; and Inari of Japan is the god of rice growers as well as prostitutes and geisha.

*Gods and goddesses of esoteric knowledge and magic.* The mysterious character of divine power finds expression in deities associated with secret mysteries and magical powers that are available only to those who have special knowledge or have been initiated into the

worship of these goddesses and gods. The high god of the Indo-Europeans is, in one of his aspects, the source of esoteric knowledge and magic. Varuṇa of the Vedic period in India has the sun as his eye and controls *māyā* ("creative power," but later also "illusion"). Óðinn of the Scandinavians is one-eyed, having left his other eye in the well of the giant Mímir in return for the gift of wisdom. A famous poem describes how Óðinn hung on a tree for nine days and nights in order to acquire the esoteric knowledge of magical runes. Deities of esoteric knowledge inspire poets, shamans, and prophets, and they give up secret knowledge to diviners. The Scandinavian goddess Freyja, for example, is linked to the *völva*, a woman who goes into shamanistic trances and acts as a soothsayer. Yogic practices in religious Taoism attempt to tap into the power of the exterior and interior gods, and Tantric practices in Esoteric Buddhism involve invoking the cosmic Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* for esoteric knowledge and power.

[For theoretical views on the nature of God or the gods, see Deity; Polytheism; Monotheism; Henotheism; Theism; and Deism. For a discussion of the representation of the divine in human form, see Anthropomorphism, and for treatments of the historical worship of a god or goddess, see Goddess Worship and God, as well as numerous articles on specific deities from various religious traditions.]

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THEODORE M. LUDWIG

**GÖKALP, ZİYA** (1876–1924), Turkish sociologist influential in the modernization of religious thinking and in the development of Turkish nationalism. He was born Mehmed Ziya in the small town of Diyarbakır in southeastern Turkey. After a traditional Muslim primary education and a secular secondary education in Diyarbakır, he went to Constantinople to continue his studies in 1895. Five years later he was arrested and banished to his hometown for his involvement with the Young Turks, then a secret organization.

Following the successful Young Turk revolution of 1908, he went to Salonika as a delegate to the Society (later Party) of Union and Progress. There he contributed to a journal of philosophy (*Yeni felsefe mecmuası*) and a literary review (*Genç kalemler*) published by the Young Turks. It was at this point that he adopted the pen name Gökalp ("sky hero"), which he retained for the rest of his life.

With the outbreak of the Balkan War, he and his associates moved to the Ottoman capital, where their

Turkish nationalist ideas were sharply opposed by the politicians and writers known as Islamists, as well as by the traditional Ottomanists. In Constantinople Gökalg became acquainted with a group of Turkish-speaking émigré writers from Kazan, the Crimea, and Azerbaijan whose ideas had been influenced by those of the Russian Narodniks. Prominent among these writers was Yusuf Akçura of Kazan, the author of a lengthy essay entitled *Three Ways of Policy* (*Üç tarz-i siyaset*), in which he speculated on three possible directions for the Ottoman empire—a continuation of Ottomanism, a political unification of Muslims, or a national unification of the Turks (possibly including those of the Russian empire).

This formulation of the Turkish problem had a strong influence upon Gökalg, whose writings after 1911 were concerned with the resolution of Akçura's trilemma within the framework of the modern nation, although the modifications he proposed were unacceptable not only to the Ottomanists and Islamists but even to the Turkists themselves. In his major work, *Türkleşmek, islamlaşmak, muasırlaşmak* (Turkism, Islam, and Secularization, 1918), he presented the concept of secularization, already initiated by the Tanzimât reforms, as a means of reconciling the "three ways." Throughout his life Gökalg dealt with the political, religious, cultural, and educational ramifications of what he believed to be the reforms necessary to arrest the decline of Turkish national unity. Following the fall of the Ottoman empire he welcomed the birth of the nationalist, republican, and secular regime in 1921, and in the remaining three years of his life he strove to adapt his earlier writings to it.

Central to Gökalg's thought were two distinct yet interrelated concepts, "civilization" and "culture." The first of these he associates with traditions created by and belonging to different ethnic groups and capable of being transmitted from one group to another, while "culture" represents the specific and unique set of mores of a particular nation. For Gökalg "culture" is the more basic of the two because without cultural roots, any attempt to develop a dynamic civilization will be unsuccessful.

In applying this distinction to the concrete issue of Turkey's transition from a multiracial, formally Muslim empire to a democratic, Western-oriented, and secular nation-state, whose cultural basis would be Turkish and only secularly Muslim, he was dealing not with the problems of Western society or civilization, but with a nonsecular, non-Western society that had come under the influence of Western civilization. He was concerned mainly with the place the Turkish people would assume in the modern world, since they were seen as alien to the Christian cultural background of Western civiliza-

tion. He felt that the nations of the West, while remaining Christian in character, were destined to become secularized because of the dominant role assumed by science and rational thought. Non-Christian Turks, however, and others who were neither Christians nor Muslims, such as the Japanese, could be secularized only if and when they became "nations," for modern Western civilization had little to do with the language, religion, folkways, and mores of the people outside the world of Christianity.

After Gökalg's death, there was a decline of interest in his earlier writings, which preceded the readjustment of his thinking to the conditions of the nationalist, secular regime. His ideas, however, would exert considerable influence upon later Muslim thinkers, such as Muhammad Iqbal.

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NIYAZI BERKES

**GOLD AND SILVER** are among the most widespread symbols in the history of religions. Their exceptional physical qualities make them—like their celestial counterparts, the sun and the moon—unusually powerful symbols of spiritual realities. As a physical substance, gold is quite literally incorruptible: it is highly resistant to chemical reactions and is immune to the corrosion that affects baser metals. It is also intrinsically luminous, seeming to shine with a light of its own. Thus no speculative leap was required to make gold the universally acknowledged symbol of life and the spirit and of perfection and immortality. There is a certain obviousness to the symbolic value of gold that explains its universal appeal throughout history and in virtually every corner of the world.

Silver too is naturally suited to serve as a religious symbol. Its faultless whiteness has made it a symbol of purity and—in the appropriate historical contexts—of chastity. Purified in the refiner's fire, it becomes a symbol of purification and perfection. Associated with its silvery counterpart in the night sky, it is integrated into an entire complex of lunar symbolism that includes—not surprisingly—the great purifier, water.

**Religious Significance.** When John Ruskin spoke of gold's "imperishable splendour," he spoke metaphori-

cally of a universally recognized quality that people of earlier times took quite literally. For many in the history of religions, gold has not merely symbolized the imperishable but embodied it. In ancient India the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* identified gold with immortality. The ancient Chinese identified it with Heaven. Beliefs such as these lie behind the extremely widespread use of gold in connection with a whole variety of funerary practices. Indeed, most of the surviving examples of the ancient goldsmith's art have been found in graves. One of the most impressive collections of artistic gold articles was discovered in the tomb of Tutankhamen (Egypt, fourteenth century BCE), including the stunning gold burial mask that formed a part of the king's coffin. Gold funeral masks are quite common globally: they have been found from Champa (modern Vietnam) to Peru. The mummies of the kings of ancient Peru were completely wrapped in gold foil. In addition to masks, many other accessories and ornaments found in graves are also made of gold or silver. In the case of gold the meaning is clear: the immortality of the deceased is ensured by providing him with an immortal persona, the mask made of gold. Moreover, gold (like jade) was sometimes used to block up the natural openings of the corpse in the belief that this would prevent its decay. In some cases, notably in ancient China, such concern for immortality began while the person was still alive. Thus Chinese alchemy, as in some other alchemical traditions, it was believed that drinking an elixir made from gold would confer immortality.

As a symbol of spiritual realities, gold occurs frequently in the representations of key religious figures. The Buddha, the Enlightened One, is frequently portrayed in gold. One of the most impressive examples is the huge image of the Buddha found in the Wat Traimit in Bangkok, Thailand, an image made entirely of gold. One also thinks of the dazzling gold ornaments that adorn the *bodhisattvas* in the paintings discovered at Tun-huang. Equally striking are the golden aureoles that surround the heads of saints in Christian iconography. [See also Colors.]

Religious rituals have also made use of gold and silver. All manner of ritual implements and vessels have been fashioned from these precious metals. The medieval Christian church made extensive use of gold in the construction of crosses, chalices, patens, ornamental covers for the Bible, and reliquaries. One also finds silvered cases created to house Buddhist *sūtras*, and a variety of Buddhist ceremonial objects in gold.

Yet the symbolism of gold and silver in the history of religions has not always been completely positive. Particularly in the Western Semitic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), gold and silver have occasion-

ally taken on a negative value. One need only recall the story of the golden calf (*Ex.* 32) or the golden image set up by Nebuchadrezzar, which Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego refused to worship (*Dn.* 3). In the Hebrew scriptures gold is often the symbol of idolatry or of purely human glory. There is a similar distrust of gold and silver in Islam. According to one *ḥadīth*, or saying of the prophet Muḥammad, "He who drinks from gold and silver vessels drinks the fire of Hell." In the opinion of the thirteenth-century Persian cosmographer al-Qazwīnī, the use of gold and silver for ornament thwarts the divinely intended purpose of these metals, which should be used as coinage for trade.

**Association with Sacred Time and Space.** Gold and silver have also played an important part in the articulation of sacred time and space. Sacred time *par excellence* is often represented as a Golden Age, which is followed by an only slightly inferior Silver Age. The widespread schema of the four ages of the world finds its way into the *Book of Daniel* (2:31-45), in Nebuchadrezzar's dream of a colossus with a head of gold and with breast and arms of silver.

To the extent that sacred space has been organized around a temple, the presence of gold and silver ornament has contributed powerfully to the creation of a properly numinous ambience. Here one thinks not only of the wealth of Solomon's temple and of medieval Christian cathedrals, but also of the Temple of the Sun at Cuzco in ancient Peru, which was covered with enormous quantities of gold. In the Hindu tradition the world has passed through four periods of time; according to popular legend, all the accoutrements used by people were made from gold in the earliest period, which was regarded as the purest era.

**Association with Alchemy.** Nowhere, however, is the symbolic potential of gold and silver exploited more fully than in the various traditions of alchemy. According to alchemical doctrine, gold and silver develop in the earth under the influence of the sun and moon respectively. The ultimate goal of this development is the production of gold, which is consequently viewed as the perfect metal, and as a symbol of spiritual perfection. The alchemist's art is intended to hasten this natural process, both in external nature and within the alchemist's soul. Silver here becomes the symbol of the soul's purity and passivity before the activity of the spirit, symbolized by gold.

[See also Money and Alchemy.]

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DAVID CARPENTER

**GOLDEN AGE.** In its narrowest sense, the term *Golden Age* refers to a mode of utopian existence, described in a variety of Greek, Roman, and later Western Christian texts, that is freed from the vicissitudes of everyday life and is characterized by peace and plenty, with nature spontaneously producing food and man living in close relationship to the gods. Most usually, the Golden Age is located temporally in the far past or, more rarely, in the distant future. Spatially, it is located in vague or far-off regions of the earth; more rarely, it is a place accessible only after death, as described by Pindar (fifth century BCE) in his portrait of the Elysian Fields (*Olympian Ode* 2.68–76). In its broadest sense, the term has been extended by some scholars to include any mythical, paradisaical time of origins. As banalized in common discourse, *golden age* has been transformed into a quasi-historical label for any period of extraordinary wealth or human achievement.

**The Hesiodic Myth and Its Development.** The most particular reference to the Golden Age, although it does not use the term, is the account of the successive races of men given by the Greek author Hesiod (eighth century BCE) in his didactic poem *Works and Days* (106–201). Whether directly or indirectly, Hesiod is the sole source for the myth in later Western literature and the arts.

The account sits somewhat uneasily in its Hesiodic context, being introduced almost by way of a digression, and seems to be in tension with other anthropogenic motifs in the poem. Five races or kinds of men are described in temporal succession. Four are characterized by valuable metals: the golden race, the silver race, the bronze race, and, after an intervening race of heroes that is most likely not part of the original schema, the iron race. Although not fully developed, there appears to be a succession of moral and physical decay. With the exception of the intrusive race of heroes, each state appears to be inferior to its predecessor.

In its brief description of the golden race, the Hesiodic narrative combines six motifs: (1) the succession of races of men (in Hesiod's account, these are different species, separate creations of the gods, and are not to be seen as successive stages of mankind, the world, or his-

tory); (2) the correlation of the races with metals; (3) the identification of the golden race with the reign of an elder deity (in Hesiod, with the rule of Kronos); (4) the topos that, in the beginning, man lived in close company with the gods; (5) a set of paradisaical features including a carefree existence of feasting, wealth, and peace in a state of perpetual youth, terminated by a peaceful death; and (6) the spontaneous yield of crops from the earth, so that man was fed without toil. Each of these motifs has worldwide distribution. At times, they have served as elements that have been integrated into broader systems of religious, historical, and anthropological thought (for example, systems of apocalypticism, messianism, utopianism, or primitivism) as well as literary genres such as the pastoral. However, the combination of motifs in Hesiod is without parallel.

In later Greek poetic versions, especially the influential *Phaenomena* (96–136) by Aratus (third century BCE), additional details were added to Hesiod's brief account. The Golden Age was characterized, above all, by justice. Its utopian mode of life included vegetarianism. What was of greater importance, the metals now identified stages in the history of a single race, and the implicit theme of degeneration was more consistently applied. In Greek philosophical literature—most extensively by Plato (*Statesman* 269–274)—this latter element was fully developed and related to notions of historical periodicity, recurrence, and world cycles.

The later, expanded portrait of the Golden Age, with the additional motif of free sexuality, was carried over into Latin versions of the Hesiodic myth, above all in the first-century work of Ovid (esp. *Metamorphoses* 1.76–150). The Latin tradition is important in three respects. First, the persistent Greek terminology referring to the "golden race" (*chruseon genos*) was transformed into the more familiar phrase "the Golden Age" (*aurea saecula* or *aurea aetas*). Second, although some Roman texts maintain the four metals schema, the contrast was reduced to a duality: then and now, the Age of Kronos and the Age of Zeus, the Golden Age and the present times. Third, with the general loss of Greek literature in the Middle Ages, it was the Latin tradition, especially the Ovidian version, that was most influential on later Western literature.

Beyond its adaptations of the Hesiodic myth, Roman tradition contributed new spatial and temporal dimensions to the Western imagining of the Golden Age. Two innovations were of greatest significance; both may be associated with the towering figure of Vergil in the first century BCE. The development of the Alexandrian conventions of the pastoral, the literary topos of the idyllic place (*locus amoenus*), and the paradisaical imagery of the Golden Age came together in Vergil's portrait of Ar-

cadia in his *Eclogues*. In such poetry, the Golden Age came closer to the experience of contemporary man. Taken out of mythical time and reduced to the "good old days," to bucolic scenes of the rustic, simple life, the pastoral became "an image of what they call the Golden Age" as Alexander Pope observed in his *Discourse on Pastoral Poetry*. At the same time, an eschatological element was introduced. Often tied to imperial ideology, the notion was advanced that the Golden Age was recoverable, now or in the immediate future. While this became a commonplace of imperial rhetoric (see Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.791–794)—no fewer than sixteen Roman emperors claimed that their reigns had reestablished the Golden Age—the best-known example remains the fourth of Vergil's *Eclogues*. This mysterious poem, composed in 41–40 BCE, ties the end of the Iron Age and the initiation of a new Golden Age to the birth of a wondrous child. In Vergil's work, the myth of the Golden Age is no longer an expression of pessimism with respect to the present; rather it has become a prediction of future hope and regeneration.

Elements in the poetic tradition of the Golden Age lent themselves to christianization. In its Greek form, it could be harmonized with accounts of Eden and with notions of sin as accounting for man's fall from Paradise. The eschatological understanding of the Golden Age could be harmonized with predictions of the birth of the Messiah and the coming of Christ's kingdom. However, apart from contributing to theories of world periods, the myth of the Golden Age was not a major element in Christian literary imagination from the early sixth century (see Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* 2.5) until the Renaissance.

While late medieval epic traditions (for example, Dante and the *Roman de la rose*) continued antique conventions of the Golden Age, a variety of new historical factors contributed to a reawakening of interest in the motif of the Golden Age. Alongside of the rediscovery of classical texts and works of art was the self-consciousness of a "renaissance," of a new birth, a new age that was, at the same time, a recovery of lost, past glories. Thus, the motto of Lorenzo de' Medici, "the time returned" (*le tems revient*), the description by Vasari of the era of Lorenzo as "truly a golden age" (*Life of Botticelli*), the elaborate court and coronation pageants in which Saturn-Kronos and the four metallic ages were depicted by actors (Vasari, *Life of Pontormo*). Once again, the language of the Golden Age and imperial ideology were conjoined.

The development of Renaissance urbanism led to a new, nostalgic interest in the pastoral, a form rediscovered by Jacopo Sannazaro and Torquato Tasso and culminating in Edmund Spenser's dominant interest in the

Golden Age. The reformers found in the concept of the Golden Age an expression of their interest in a return to simplicity (see, for example, Erasmus's *In Praise of Folly*). Above all, it was contact with other cultures through exploration that allowed a sense of the palpable presence of the Golden Age. Joined to the topos of the Noble Savage, the new peoples and territories, especially those of the "New World," are unceasingly described in the Renaissance chronicles as living in the Golden Age. While shorn of much of its mythic content, the concept plays a role in the subsequent, somewhat turgid history of rival theories of the progress and degeneration of mankind.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these various contexts were much elaborated, especially in the context of the mythic understanding of immigrant America. It was a place of new birth and rebirth, a place of freedom, its bounty vast and unimaginable. From the seventeenth-century Puritan imagination (in Cotton Mather's words, "the first Age was the Golden Age; to return unto that will make a man a Protestant, and I may add, a Puritan") to the nineteenth-century romanticization of the American West (historian H. H. Bancroft, for example, described life as "a long happy holiday . . . such as the old-time golden age under Cronus or Saturn"), the imagery was self-conscious and persistent.

Finally, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the topos of the return of the Golden Age was joined to the industrial myth of progress, expressed on the one hand in the notion of science as providing a world without care, and on the other in theories of primitive communism that animated many radical social and political utopian experiments and political movements. Both of these ideologies are a major motif in the writings of Dostoevskii (most explicitly in *Notes from the Underground* and *The Dream of the Ridiculous Man*), perhaps the most creative literary use of the Golden Age since Vergil.

**The Golden Age in Cross-Cultural Comparison.** In considering the worldwide distribution of the myth of the Golden Age, much depends on decisions of definition and classification. Does one seek close parallels to the specific constellation of motifs found in the Hesiodic narrative, or does one note any instance of a sharp duality between a previous age of perfection and the present? Does one include such closely related topoi as post-mortem realms that are the reverse of present conditions, or terrestrial paradises? Does one insist on the notion of past possession of the Golden Age? Does one focus on those mythologies that report its permanent loss, or on those that promise its return? Does one include mythologies in which characteristics resem-



bling life in the Golden Age serve as narrative elements, expressing some contrast between a past and present state (as in the various mythologies of the origin of death), but do not function as the focal point of the myth? Does one include instances of isolated motifs (such as the widespread motif of self-harvesting plants or automatic implements) that occur in folkloristic contexts other than a Golden Age? Out of the number of possible comparisons, three systems of Golden Age mythology stand out, both for their persistence and for their differing functions: the Golden Age in relation to myths of origins, to millenarian activities, and to royal ideologies.

**Myths of origins.** Most myth posits a sharp duality between "then" and "now," a duality often overcome in the narrative through modes of transformation whereby the one becomes the other. This split and its attendant transformation is most clearly expressed in myths of origin, especially those that take the form of a mythology of rupture between a previous state and the present order. Evaluations of this previous state vary: it may be better, or worse, or simply different than the present.

Among early literary accounts, scholars of the ancient Near East have identified a genre of creation narrative that begins with the formula "When there was not" (the same negative formula recurs in medieval Christian descriptions of the other world). Some of these take on the form of a myth of a Golden Age. For example, "Enki's Spell," a part of the Sumerian epic *Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta*, tells of a time when there were no dangerous animals to threaten man, when there was nothing to fear, and when mankind spoke a common tongue, obeyed divine laws, and was ruled by the beneficent deity Enlil. This happy state was brought to an end through the jealousy of another deity (Enki). This same negative formula recurs in Scandinavian mythology to describe the original cosmos (*Völuspá* 3, 5). In this state, before the creation of man, the gods lived in peace, playing games and possessing much gold (*Völuspá* 8). This happy mode of existence will return. The golden feasting tables will once again be set out and the fields will bear crops without cultivation (*Völuspá* 61–2). This last motif is common to many Indo-European epic traditions; for example, *Mahābhārata* 3.11.234–235 tells how during the *ṛtayuga* there was no work and the necessities of life were obtained by being merely thought of). The motif occurs as well in many mythologies of the invention of agriculture, especially in the Indonesian and North American Indian culture complexes. For example, in a variation on this theme, which includes as well the mythologem of rupture, a characteristic etiological tale from the Boróro (of Mato Grosso, Brazil) tells how, in olden times, a woman went to pick maize,

which in those days was planted and cultivated by spirits. The woman accidentally hurt her hand and blamed the accident on Burekóibo, the chief of the spirits. In punishment, the spirits ceased their labors, and man had to toil for food, clearing the forest, planting the seed, and cultivating the crops. There was as well a diminution in the size of the ears of corn since the days when the spirits were responsible for agriculture.

**Millenarianism.** The explicit connection of the Greco-Roman myth of the Golden Age and Christian chiliasm is at least as old as the third century (Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* 5.5, 7.24) and was fully developed in the complex, medieval Christian sibylline traditions. Similar combinations are equally prominent in archaic mythologies and recent nativistic movements. While none of these are demonstrably free from possible Christian influence, they reflect, as well, indigenous tradition. [See also Millenarianism.] Perhaps the clearest set of examples is from the South American Indians of Gran Chaco and Amazonia. There are mythologies of a lost Golden Age such as that found among the Tembé. In earlier times, there was once a place where work was unknown. The fields planted and harvested themselves. When the inhabitants grew old, they did not die but were rejuvenated. The present-day Tembé no longer know the route to this "Happy Place."

Such a mythical place can also be used to describe an original peaceful unity, subsequently shattered, which explains the difference between the white colonialist and the native. Thus, the Mataco picture a time and place long ago when there were no Christians, when the ancestors of what would later become the Christians and the Mataco lived together harmoniously in a single house. Everything was provided without labor, from tools to domesticated animals and clothing. The Christian ancestors took away the best of these things, leaving the Mataco only clay pots and dogs. In other versions of this motif of the origin of inequality, the native utopia is superseded by a European one, as among the Boróro. After living peacefully together, quarrels broke out over the possession of magically produced objects. The white man's ancestors were sent away in boats to avoid bloodshed and have never returned because they found a more beautiful and even more wondrous uninhabited land.

A more complex expression of a recoverable Golden Age occurs among the various Tupi-Guaraní and Tupinamba groups who have set off on lengthy tribal wanderings from the interior to the Atlantic coast in order to reach a mythical "Land without Evil" or "Land of Immortality and Perpetual Rest." (The earliest record of such a journey is from a Spanish report in 1515; the most recent instance occurred in 1957.) This land, var-

iously described by the different groups, has neither sickness or death; it is a vast garden-island, filled with game and fruits, on which the inhabitants will spend their time feasting and dancing.

The same sort of Golden Age imagery recurs among Tupinamba nativistic resistance movements. The Santidades, as described by late sixteenth-century Jesuit missionaries, were common among groups displaced by force to work on the colonial plantations. Native religious leaders urged their followers to stop work and revive old rituals. If they did so, the fields would plant and harvest themselves, tools would work automatically, and old men would be rejuvenated and not know death.

The fundamental imagery of these groups stems from shamanistic visions of an otherworld. Many exhibit, as well, clear Christian borrowings. Such influence, however, was reciprocal. In 1539, a large group of Tupinamba crossed the South American landmass at its widest point in a nine-year journey ending in Peru. There their tales of the mythical "golden place" they were seeking so excited the Spaniards that an expedition was immediately launched to locate Eldorado (originally a golden man; later believed to be a city of gold).

**Kingship.** From the earliest Mesopotamian hymns of self-praise by Shulgi, ruler of the third dynasty of Ur (c. 2094–2047 BCE) to the encomia addressed to seventeenth-century European monarchs (such as Charles II, whom Abraham Cowley celebrates for having transformed an Age of Iron into an Age of Gold), royal ideology and the myth of the Golden Age have been intertwined. As noted above, historical kings from the emperors of Rome to the Medicis have claimed that their reigns reestablished the Golden Age. There is even greater elaboration of Golden Age motifs in the myths of primordial sacred kings. Kronos-Saturn in Greco-Roman tradition is one such example, already present in the Hesiodic account. Iranian mythology is more extended and explicit.

After the ninth century CE, in the late Pahlavi, New Persian, and Arabic writings as well as in the so-called secular epic tradition, the disparate Iranian royal genealogical and mythical traditions were organized into a systematic presentation that located the origins of kingship in the figure of Hōshang. Depicted in quite conventional terms as an ideal king and civilizing hero as well as the progenitor (with his sister Gūzak) of the Iranian people, Hōshang established justice, peace, and law. He invented iron-working, the arts of mining and navigation, and the building of canals for irrigation. He was the first to hunt with dogs, make clothing out of skins, and to fashion wooden doors for houses. During

his reign, according to the fifteenth-century universal history by Mīrkhwānd, the *Rawḡat al-ṣafā'* (Garden of Purity), the "world bloomed" and people "reposed in gardens of content."

Behind this stereotypical portrait of an ideal realm, lies an older, most likely pre-Zoroastrian, myth of a full-blown Golden Age, that associated with the reign of the Indo-Iranian figure of Yima. In the earlier traditions of the Avesta, Yima is like the sun. In his reign of a thousand years, man and beast do not die (indeed, there is no difference in appearance between a man and his son); waters and plants do not dry up from the heat; there is neither excessive warmth, nor cold, nor any form of disease; and there is an inexhaustible supply of food (*Yasna* 9.4–5; *Yashts* 9.10, 10.50, 17.30, 19.32–33).

During this Golden Age, Yima enlarged the world three times in order to make room for his citizens and bounty, but such a realm could not be extended indefinitely. Therefore, Ahura Mazdā warned Yima that a universal winter would come and that Yima was to carve out a subterranean kingdom with magical tools, into which he was to bring the most magnificent individuals among the men, animals, and plants in his realm as well as the most savory foods. This kingdom, *vara*, in many respects resembles Yama's realm of the dead in Indic tradition. There, in his underground golden kingdom, which will glow with its own self-generated light, Yima will rule and men will live "the most beautiful life" (*Vendidad* 2). In late traditions, Yima will emerge, at the end of the world's winter, to repopulate the earth (*Mēnōg ī Khrad* 27.27–31). Following the so-called Zoroastrian reform, this archaic myth was radically altered. The Golden Age of Yima's rule lasts only until he lies, when the glorious kingship will leave him (*Yashts* 19.33–38). Indeed, in some traditions, Yima is only the builder of the subterranean realm; Zarathushtra's third son will be its ruler (*Vendidad* 2.42–43).

[See also Paradise; Utopia; and Heaven and Hell.]

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JONATHAN Z. SMITH

**GOLDENWEISER, ALEXANDER A.** (1880-1940), American anthropologist and student of primitive religions. Born in Kiev, the son of a distinguished jurist and criminologist, Alexander Alexandrovich Goldenweiser was educated in his native Ukraine, and later, at the graduate level, in the United States. An important early influence was the intellectual companionship and guidance of his father, Alexander Solomonovich Goldenweiser, a social thinker influenced by Hegel and Spencer. Father and son shared a broad intellectual outlook and traveled together in Europe.

Goldenweiser immigrated as a young man to the United States and from 1900 to 1901 pursued graduate study in philosophy at Harvard. He later shifted his studies to Columbia, where he came into contact with Franz Boas and his students, and took his doctoral degree in 1910 under Boas's supervision. Goldenweiser taught as an instructor at Columbia from 1910 to 1919, served as a lecturer in the Rand School of Social Sciences from 1915 to 1929, and was professor of thought

and culture at the Portland Extension of the University of Oregon from 1930 until his death in 1940. He also taught at the New School for Social Research, the University of Wisconsin, and Reed College.

Although he carried out several months of anthropological fieldwork (on the social and political organization of the Northern Iroquois), Goldenweiser's primary interests were theoretical. He was known as the most philosophical of American anthropologists, and he remarked once that he would rather read bad theory than no theory at all. The formative influence on his mature work was clearly that of Boas and his students. Goldenweiser's most influential writings are sober and sharp-sighted critiques of the cultural evolutionism and diffusionism prevalent in the early twentieth century.

Goldenweiser's "Totemism: An Analytical Study" appeared in 1910, the same year as James Frazer's monumental *Totemism and Exogamy*, although, as Lévi-Strauss later noted, Goldenweiser's 110 pages were to have a more permanent theoretical influence than Frazer's four volumes. Frazer sought to establish the status of totemism as an evolutionary stage of religious development, a sort of universal primitive institution. Goldenweiser argued that what was called "totemism" was in fact merely the co-occurrence of three otherwise distinct traits—the differentiation of formally similar clans, the use of plant and animal symbols to distinguish them, and the recognition of a special relation between clan and totem.

Goldenweiser, often immersed in the themes and issues of his times, wrote widely on a number of topics relating to culture and history. It was, however, in such works as his analysis of totemism, or his essay (1913) on "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Cultures" (in which he argues, against the diffusionists, that limited possibilities make cultural similarities inevitable) that his remarkable, critical intellect was able to transcend the limitations of its era.

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ROY WAGNER

**GOLDZIHHER, IGNÁ CZ** (1850-1921), Hungarian Arabist and Islamicist. After elementary schooling and a Jewish religious education in his birthplace, Székesfe-

hervár, Goldziher moved to Budapest in 1865. By the time he completed the *Gymnasium* in 1868, he had already begun to study Islamic languages at the university under Arminius Vámbéry. From 1868 until 1870 he pursued his studies first in Berlin with Friedrich Dieterich and Emil Rödiger for Arabic and Hebrew, and with Abraham Geiger and Moritz Steinschneider for the historical relations between Judaism and Islam, and then in Leipzig, where he received his final training as an Arabist under Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer, obtaining his doctorate in 1870. The work of the Austrian scholar Alfred von Kremer opened up for Goldziher the perspective of an intellectual history (*Geistesgeschichte*) of Islam. Appointed privatdocent at the University of Budapest in 1871, he undertook several journeys, including a year's stay in Egypt (1873–1874), where he attended lectures at al-Azhar mosque. Goldziher became secretary of the Liberal Jewish Community in Budapest in 1876 and had to confine his research largely to the evenings; yet during these years he prepared his major publications. He became professor of the philosophy of Judaism at the Jewish Seminary in 1900 and was appointed to the chair of Semitic philology at the University of Budapest in 1905; from there he exerted great influence as the "patriarch" of Islamic studies until his death in 1921.

Goldziher may be said to have laid the foundation of Islamic studies as a scholarly discipline based on the literary and historical study of texts, most of which were at the time available only as manuscripts. It required great erudition and immense knowledge acquired through the reading of the original sources, and a creative use of the categories of the history of religions, to reconstruct the architecture of the history of Islamic religion as he did.

Goldziher's first contribution was to reveal and then study Islam's sources (such as the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* literature) as well as its religious disciplines: the techniques of Qur'ān exegesis (*tafsīr*), jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and philosophical theology (*kalām*). He also successfully undertook the study of texts pertaining to the further development of religious ideas, including those of mystical and "sectarian" developments.

Second, by trying to understand the problems treated in the religious texts within the framework of Muslim thought itself, Goldziher was able to show the inherent logic of the history of ideas in Islam. He could situate texts and ideas not only in the "outward" history of Islamic institutions and in political history but also as part of the inner development of Islam as a religion.

Third, Goldziher carried out a critical quest for historical truth and strived to show the historical situation, character, and limitations of ideas and practices

that were of a religious nature and that were consequently held to be of an eternal validity. As a historian, he revealed the historical character of the texts that, with their interpretations, form part of Islamic religion and culture. He also traced external historical influences that have played a role in the development of Islam.

Goldziher revealed Islam as a complete entity in itself—that is to say, a religious entity—and encouraged its study. His insights into Islamic scripture and tradition, law, and theology were certainly enhanced by his familiarity with similar problems in the study of Judaism. The respect he enjoyed among Arabs is noteworthy; his contacts with Muslim scholars were many, and several of his publications have been translated into Arabic. The diary he maintained—an unusual habit in the world of scholarship—was published in 1978.

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JACQUES WAARDENBURG

**GOLEM.** For discussion of the Jewish notion of the golem, see the biography of Yehudah Löw ben Betsal'el.

**GOOD, THE.** A distinction has to be made between two sets of questions related to the concept of the good. There are ethical problems about how to elaborate reasonable criteria of goodness, where goodness is conceived as a characteristic of human actions and of things or properties that are directly or indirectly relevant to human life. And there are questions concerning the goodness of God or of existence as such, apart from God's benevolence and love for the human race. I shall concentrate upon the latter question.

In archaic and polytheistic religions, gods are not necessarily good either in the sense of caring about human well-being or in the sense of providing us with a model of moral conduct; some are, some are not, and many combine good and evil characteristics in both respects. Yet in the myths of origin, the evil of gods has been connected, as a rule, with destruction and disorder, and goodness with creation and harmony, whether or not any one of the gods was invariably and systematically good or evil. In Iranian dualist mythology good and evil were attributed respectively to one and another mutually hostile divine beings. In all monotheistic religions God is totally good in an absolute and unqualified sense, and his goodness consists not only in that he loves his creatures: it is his intrinsic, nonrelative property; God would be good even if he had not created the universe. So conceived, goodness acquires a metaphysical meaning that probably cannot be further analyzed, cannot be reduced to other concepts, and has an axiomatic character.

Philosophical reflection on this kind of goodness is Plato's legacy; he discovered the idea of the good, which is, of course, desirable and therefore good for us, as well as the source of all goodness; but the good is not good because desirable, but desirable because intrinsically good. This topic was taken up and elaborated by later Platonists, including, in particular, Plotinus; to him the One is good both in terms of our human needs and happiness and good in itself, apart from this relationship. Other Platonists, however, denied that the characteristics of goodness could be meaningfully attributed to the first principle: Speusippus, Plato's successor in the Academy, made the point, and so did the last pagan philosopher, Damascius, to whom the first principle, being utterly ineffable, could not possibly have any properties, whether relative or even absolute; having no name (even the word *principle* is not appropriate) and no relationship with other realities or even with itself, it cannot be called good in any sense.

Christian philosophy, which assimilated many Platonic categories, has always stressed all the meanings of divine goodness: God is good in himself, he is the creator of all goodness, he is benevolent, and he is the source of criteria whereby our acts are called morally good or evil. Whatever else is good is such derivatively and by participation in the goodness of God. And, apart from a few dualistic sects, all creation was, in Christian thinking, attributed to God; since no existence is conceivable apart from God, whatever exists is good by definition. Evil has no positive ontological characteristics and is to be defined as pure negativity, *privatio*, lack of being: evil comes from the ill-will of human or diabolic creatures endowed with freedom of choice and abusing this freedom; yet even the devil, insofar as he exists, is good, even though his will is incurably and totally corrupt. This doctrine has been elaborated in detail by Augustine. In Thomas Aquinas's idiom it is summed up in saying that being and goodness are coextensive (*esse et bonum convertuntur*). Some Christian philosophers and theologians discussed the question (broached already by Plato): are the criteria of good and evil, given us by God, arbitrary or intrinsically valid? In other words, is the good good because God has decreed it to be good (as some nominalists and Descartes believed), or has God told us that it is good because it is good in itself (as Leibniz argued)? If the former, moral rules appear to us as arbitrary and contingent as, say, the rules of traffic; God could have decreed other norms of conduct and said, for instance, that adultery is good and loving one's neighbor wrong—a conclusion that sounds outrageous to common sense; yet, if God orders what is intrinsically good, apart from his decrees, he appears to be bound by laws that do not depend on him, which makes his omnipotence doubtful. The question can be invalidated, however, by saying—in conformity with Thomist metaphysics—that God is what he decrees and that there are no rules of goodness different from his essence, therefore he neither obeys a foreign law nor issues arbitrary decrees of which the content is contingent upon his essence.

If God is good in himself, and not only benevolent to his creatures, it is essential, in Christian terms, that we should love him not only as a benefactor and savior but because he is who he is. The point was strongly stressed by many Christian mystics and other "theocentrically" oriented writers. They argued that God is not only the highest good but the only good proper, therefore we are for God, rather than he for us; we should admire him utterly oblivious of all favors and graces we get from him; indeed our love should be the same even if we knew that he condemned us to hell, and we should be happy to accept his will unconditionally, whatever it

means to us; we ought only to want God to be God, whereas to love God in reciprocity for his benevolence is unworthy or perhaps sinful. The standard Christian teaching, while stressing the value of the disinterested love of God, never goes so far as to say that worshipping God in connection with his gifts and graces is a sin or to deny that our salvation is an intrinsic good and not only an instrument whereby God's glory is augmented; indeed, the last two statements sound heretical. The theory of "pure love" was hotly debated in the Catholic church in the seventeenth century.

The idea of divine goodness as a nonrelative property does not seem to be a product of pure philosophical speculation. It is rooted in, and makes explicit, the old tenet of many religions: creation as such is good, and therefore the creator is good as such.

The distinction between autotelic (or intrinsic) and instrumental goods has been almost universally admitted by philosophers since Plato and Aristotle, yet there has never been an agreement about how to draw the line between them and how to define what is good in itself; many philosophers have denied that a collection of properties can be found that would be common to all the things and experiences people have called good. In the conflict between utilitarians and Kantians, and between utilitarians and pragmatists, these problems are among the most often debated.

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LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI

**GOODENOUGH, ERWIN R.** (1893–1965), American historian of religions. After studying for the Methodist ministry at Drew Theological Seminary and Garrett Biblical Institute, Goodenough spent three years in New Testament and Jewish Studies at Harvard University, chiefly with George Foot Moore, before proceeding

to Oxford University and earning a D.Phil. in 1923. Little influence of Oxford is discernible in his work, except perhaps in the sketch of Middle Platonism provided in his dissertation on Justin Martyr. In the published version (Jena, 1923) he mentions none of his teachers. The book does, however, foreshadow his later studies of Philo Judaeus, for in it Goodenough discovered the influence of Philo to be pervasive in early Christian theology.

Goodenough began teaching at Yale University in 1923 and remained there until his retirement, steadily producing articles and books to demonstrate that many sectors of Judaism had been receptive to Greco-Roman influence, not only in the realm of philosophical ideas but also in those of mystical intuition and artistic representation. His *By Light Light*, subtitled *The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism* (1935), was not universally accepted by students either of the Hellenistic world or of Judaism, but like all his works it stimulated interest in his hero, Philo.

In 1953 began the publication of Goodenough's major work, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, which was posthumously completed in 1968 in thirteen volumes (including a volume of valuable indexes and maps). The genesis of this remarkable combination of fact and analysis was a visit Goodenough made to Rome during his time at Oxford. In Rome he saw catacomb frescoes and intuitively concluded that the depictions of Old Testament scenes must have had Jewish models. Excavations in the early 1930s at Dura-Europos (in which Yale participated) seemed to confirm his theory, for a third-century synagogue with bold and mysterious frescoes of biblical themes (now preserved at Damascus) was found.

Such paintings, prohibited by rabbinic teaching, required explanation, and Goodenough took two primary lines of approach. First, he went back to the Jewish catacombs at Rome and to many museums elsewhere, searching for the symbols present at Dura and working out their meanings for members of the Jewish communities. Then, influenced by psychoanalytic methods, he proceeded to explain their "basic" (usually Freudian) significance. Another principle he employed had to do with his division of the paintings into "left" and "right" on the basis of Pythagorean and gnostic notions, although the scenes themselves seem to be arranged "up" and "down."

The possibility or even likelihood that Goodenough was overinterpreting naturally occurred to him as well as to others, but he preferred to take this course rather than to retreat into agnosticism. As an "ex-Christian," as he called himself, he found mystical theories especially attractive. His tendency to say what he thought,

and to point out what he did not believe, aroused the ire of the youthful William F. Buckley, Jr., whose *God and Man at Yale* (1951) included an attack on Goodenough's lack of orthodoxy in teaching college students.

During a year at Brandeis University (1962–1963) Goodenough moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he contemplated writing a study of early Christianity based on his Hellenistic Jewish model. In a commemorative essay, Goodenough's friend and sometime student Samuel Sandmel raised questions about the possibility of such a work, in view of Goodenough's lack of knowledge of the history of scholarship, especially in the New Testament field, but he concluded that what Goodenough considered "prolegomena" to this proposed final work were probably more valuable than any book on Christian origins would have been.

Goodenough was active in learned societies, serving as editor of the *Journal of Biblical Literature* from 1934 to 1942 and as president of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences from 1947 to 1958. He took an active part in the American Council of Learned Societies from 1953 to 1965 and was a member of its Committee on the History of Religions. In this setting especially he was highly influential because of his learning, common sense, and personal charm.

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ROBERT M. GRANT

**GORAKHNĀTH**, also known by the Sanskrit form of his name, Gorakṣanātha; a teacher of *haṭhayoga* who lived sometime between 900 and 1225 CE. A leading Hindi scholar, Hazariprasad Dwivedi, has observed that "since the time of Śaṅkarācārya there has not been anyone in India as influential or as great" as Gorakṣanātha. There is still no consensus about either his dates or the compositions that may be correctly attributed to him.

Scholars who favor an early date for Gorakhnāth base their claim mainly on indications of an early date for his guru, Matsyendranāth. They focus especially on a reference made by Abhinavagupta (tenth century?), in which he identifies a Matsyendranāth as his own guru. Some sources call Gorakhnāth's guru Mīnanāth (both *mīna* and *matsya* signify "fish"). Most scholars take Mat-

syendranāth and Mīnanāth to be the same person. Svātmārāma's *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā*, however, lists Gorakhnāth as the fifth or sixth in spiritual descent from Matsyendra and the direct disciple of Mīna. This lineage would lead one to conclude that Matsyendra and Mīna are different and that Gorakhnāth lived over a hundred years after Matsyendra. A later date for Gorakhnāth is based on the genealogy of Jñāndev, the author of the Marathi classic *Jñāneśvarī*, which, according to some manuscripts, was written in the year 1290. Jñāndev claims to be the third in spiritual descent from Gorakhnāth. This would place Gorakhnāth in the early thirteenth century.

No reliable data on the life of Gorakhnāth exist. He is, however, the subject of many fascinating legends, legends that provide an archetypal portrait of a great yogin and wonder-worker. The majority of these legends originated with the Hindu sect known as the Kānpaṭṭa Yogīs—also called *nāths* and *nāth siddhas*—who have been the principal proponents of the doctrine and practice of *haṭhayoga*.

It is said that Gorakhnāth's doctrine was first propounded by the god Śiva. Śiva imparted the doctrine to his wife, Pārvatī, while they were seated in a boat, or castle, floating on the milk ocean. Matsyendranāth changed himself into a fish in order to listen surreptitiously to Śiva's teachings. When the god became aware of this ruse, he uttered a curse foretelling that Matsyendranāth would forget what he had learned. Eventually, Matsyendranāth became ensnared by the charms of the women of the mythical land of Kadalī and forgot the doctrine. His disciple Gorakhnāth disguised himself as one of the dancing girls of Kadalī and broke his guru's enchantment through the words of his songs. Matsyendranāth and his disciple then returned to their former practice of austere yogic asceticism.

Gorakhnāth and Matsyendranāth are included among the eighty-four *siddhas*, who belong as much to Buddhist Sahajiyā tradition as to the Śaiva tradition of the Kānpaṭṭas. The Kānpaṭṭas also include them among the so-called nine *nāths*. Although the names of some of these *nāths* vary from list to list, two of them—Jālandharīpā or Hāḍisiddha, an Untouchable brother-disciple of Matsyendranāth, and Kānhupā, Jālandharīpā's chief disciple—form the principal subjects of a related cycle of legends that recount their relations with King Gopīcānd and his mother, Queen Mayanāmatī. Kānhupā may be identical with Kṛṣṇapāda, the author of several of the Tantric Buddhist songs called *caryāpadas*.

The texts attributed to Gorakhnāth are all expositions of the practices and mystic doctrines of *haṭhayoga*. Some are written in Sanskrit and others in Hindi or other languages of North India. Most important are the

*Siddhasiddhānta-paddhati* and the *Gorakṣa-śataka* in Sanskrit and the *Śabadī* and *Gorakḥbodh* in old Hindi.

The *Gorakṣa-śataka* (Hundred Verses of Gorakṣa) is one of the basic texts of *haṭhayoga* and shares many verses with other such texts such as the *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā* and *Gheraṇḍa-saṅghitā*. The *Gorakṣa-śataka* describes the six (elsewhere eight) "limbs" of yoga—postures (*āsana*), breath control (*prāṇāyāma*), sense withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*), concentration (*dhāraṇā*), meditation (*dhyāna*), and illumination (*samādhi*)—and pays particular attention to certain yogic practices such as the *khecari mudrā*, the muscle contractions called *bandhas*, and meditations on the seven mystical centers (*cakras*).

The *Siddhasiddhānta-paddhati* is a more extended and theoretical work that gives a somewhat different map of the supraphysical anatomy of the subtle body. It describes nine *cakras*, together with sixteen mental supports (*ādharas*), three points of concentration (*lakṣyas*), and five firmaments (*vyomans*). These are all used as points of reference and aids to the attainment of supreme reality, here called the *anāman* ("nameless"). An elaborate cosmology postulates a series of correspondences between the microcosm of the individual body and the macrocosm of the physical universe. The goddess Śakti is called the support of the body. *Anāman* is closely related to, or identical with, the union of Śiva and Śakti. When the master yogin produces this union within his subtle body, the supernatural powers (*sid-dhis*) appear spontaneously. After twelve years of practice the yogin becomes the equal of Śiva himself.

[See also *Haṭhayoga and Cakras*.]

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DAVID N. LORENZEN

**GÖRRES, JOSEPH VON** (1776–1848), German publicist and Romantic mythologist. Johann Joseph von Görres was born in the Rhineland and educated in

Catholic schools. He remains best known for his fervent nationalist activities as editor and pamphleteer: successively a republican, monarchist, and, as Catholic polemicist, an ultramontanist—this last position also marked his tenure as professor of history at Munich in the final third of his life, during which he wrote *Die christliche Mystik* (4 vols., 1836–1842). His nationalism is reflected in his mythic interests. While lecturing at Heidelberg from 1806 to 1808, he was associated with Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano, who were then publishing their landmark German folklore collection *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (1806–1808). Görres published his own collection *Die teutschen Volksbücher* (1807) and *Altteutsche Volks und Meisterlieder* (1817). In 1820, after having studied Persian from about 1808, he presented a translation entitled *Das Heldenbuch von Iran* (part of the *Shāhnāmeh*). His major work on myth is *Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt* (1810).

This "history of the myths of the Asiatic world" seeks to demonstrate that a primal monotheism originated in India and spread from there through the world, though in confused or debased form. Görres carries his thesis into discussions of Indic, Persian, Chaldean, Egyptian, Greek, Chinese, and Germanic myth. Seen from this perspective, his book is a prime example of German Romantic descriptions of pagan myth as "plagiarized" versions of the one true monotheistic revelation—a doctrine borrowed from earlier Christian writers. But his book is not a history in any rigorous sense so much as a grand Romantic visionary system, rapturously elaborated. He openly relies on "higher" intuitive insight where scholarly evidence is lacking or recalcitrant. His thought (always difficult) is perhaps best understood as suggesting that the godhead is perpetually present. In the far-off mythic age, original mankind lived in the godhead, openly, spontaneously, and wholly. When this golden age dissolved, mankind entered "history" and came to believe in an external "nature." Still, the original truth survives in myth and can be at least partially recovered despite mankind's dispersal and self-division into many peoples and languages. There are echoes of Schelling in Görres's emphasis on nature and history as the self-revelation of the godhead. But he also seems at times to deny history or nature any real status whatever, and in this vein he may be close to certain views of William Blake.

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BURTON FELDMAN

**GOŚĀLA** (sixth or fifth century BCE?), more fully, Gośāla Maskariputra; one of the principal heterodox religious figures of early India. A contemporary of the Buddha and the Jina, Gośāla was the leader of the Ājīvika community and is said to have regarded himself as the twenty-fourth *tīrthaṅkara* of the current *avasarpīṇī* ("descending") age. His name is given in various forms depending on the source of the reference: Makkhali Gosāla in Pali; Maskarin Gośāla ("the ascetic with the bamboo rod") in Buddhist Sanskrit; Gośāla Maṅkhaliputta in the Jain Prakrits; and Maṅkali in Tamil.

Much of the information concerning Gośāla and the Ājīvikas derives from early Buddhist and Jain scriptures and the commentarial literature that developed around them. As a result, our picture of the Ājīvikas suffers from the inevitable distortions of sectarian prejudice. Some stray allusions to the Ājīvikas can also be found in Sanskrit literature. The Tamil epics, however, are comparatively well acquainted with the sect and the Ājīvikas are mentioned in South Indian epigraphs dating from the fifth to the fourteenth century CE.

A fairly reliable account of Gośāla's life and his relationship with Mahāvīra can be found in the fifteenth chapter of the fifth *aṅga* of the Jain canon. According to this account, Gośāla was born in the kingdom of Magadha (Bihar), probably the son of a *maṅkha* or professional mendicant. Impressed by the teachings and personality of Mahāvīra, Gośāla insisted on being admitted as his disciple and for at least six years accompanied him on his peregrinations. At last, feeling himself to be spiritually more advanced than his master, he undertook the practice of austerities, acquired magic powers, and challenged Mahāvīra. Surrounding himself with disciples, he is alleged to have established his headquarters in Śrāvastī (northwest of Magadha), forging close links with the potters' community there.

In the twenty-fourth year of his asceticism Gośāla was visited by six other ascetics, possibly disciples. It is surmised that at that meeting the teachings of Gośāla were codified to form the core of Ājīvika scripture. It was on this occasion that he enumerated the six inevitable factors of life: gain and loss, joy and sorrow, and life and death, along with the two "paths," song and dance. It is now believed that the original corpus of Ājī-

vika scripture was composed in an eastern Prakrit, perhaps akin to the Jain Prakrit Ardhamāgadhī. Quotations and adaptations of these scriptures appear to have been sporadically inserted in Buddhist and Jain accounts of the sect, but the Ājīvika scriptures themselves failed to survive.

Ājīvika doctrine apparently contained elaborate teachings on cosmology, reincarnation, and the elemental categories. However, the school is best remembered (and condemned in Buddhist and Jain sources) for its uncompromising determinism (*niyati*). In a Jain text an Ājīvika deity declares that there is in fact no real human effort, no deed, no strength, no courage, no action or prowess: all beings are instead "determined" (after Basham). This determinism thus denies free will, moral responsibility, or the maturation of *karman*. It was this tenet that elicited the strongest condemnation from the Buddha in his assessment of various "false views."

[See also Ājīvikas.]

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COLETTE CAILLAT

**GOSPEL.** As a word in the English language, *gospel* represents Middle English terminology derived from the Old English *gōdspel* (from *gōd*, "good," and *spel*, "story"). "Gospel" is the common translation of the Late Latin *evangelium*, which is a virtual transliteration of the Greek *euaggelion*. In classical Greek, *euaggelion* designated everything connected with the *euaggelos*, the bearer of good news (from *eu*, "well," and *aggelos*, "messenger, one who announces"). Initially *euaggelion* designated the reward given to the messenger who brought happy news (see Homer, *Odyssey* 14.152–153). In the plural the term *euaggelia* was used to designate the offerings to the gods made in thanksgiving upon the reception of good news (e.g., Xenophon, *Historia Graeca* 4.13.14). Later *euaggelion* came to be used for the con-

tent of the message, the good news itself, usually an announcement of a military victory.

*Euaggelion* occasionally entered into religious use, where its connotation was derived from oracular usage. Within this context, *euaggelion* signified a divine utterance, but the term was also used in the cult of the emperors. There it enjoyed a mythical quality. Anything having to do with the emperor could be qualified as *euaggelion*, particularly imperial birth announcements and news of the emperor's ascension to the throne, but even imperial decrees. A significant passage in this regard is a calendar inscription (9 BCE) from Priene in Asia Minor that comments upon the birth of the emperor Augustus. This passage is usually translated "For the whole world the birthday of the [emperor] god began the joyful news [*euaggeliōn*, a genitive plural] in his regard," but the passage is mutilated, and the Greek *euaggeliōn* may just as well refer to "joyful sacrifices" instead of "joyful news."

Hellenistic Jewish authors, such as Philo of Alexandria (d. 45–50 CE) and Josephus Flavius (37–c. 100 CE), used *euaggelion* with a secular connotation. The term was also employed by the translators of the Greek Bible (the Septuagint), who used *euaggelion* to render the Hebrew *bsr*. In the Hebrew scriptures *bsr* is used only in a secular sense. *Euaggelion* likewise has only a profane meaning in the Septuagint. There *euaggelion* is used of the reward given to a messenger in 2 Samuel 18:22 and of a joyous message in 2 Samuel 18:20 (likewise 2 Sm. 4:10, 18:25, 18:27; 2 Kgs. 7:9).

**The Septuagint.** In the Septuagint (a Greek translation of the Hebrew scriptures), the verb *euaggelizein*, cognate with *euaggelion*, is commonly used in the profane sense with the meaning "to announce." In "Second Isaiah" (Is. 40:9, 52:7, 60:6, 61:1), however, and in some texts dependent upon it (Na. 1:15; Ps. 68:11, 96:2), *euaggelizein* specifically connotes the announcement of the good news of salvation. The messenger of good news (*euaggelizomenos*) announces that the time of salvation is at hand, that Yahveh will reign as king, that a new age is about to dawn. Within this context the use of the verb acquires an eschatological connotation. The era of salvation is made present by the announcement of it. Neither "Second Isaiah" nor the dependent texts use the noun *euaggelion* in this eschatological, salvific sense.

The notion of the bearer of the good news of salvation persisted in both Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism (see the Targum on Isaiah 40:9 as well as 1QM 18:14 from among the Dead Sea Scrolls). The mid-first-century *Psalms of Solomon* (11:1–2) uses *euaggelizein* in the eschatological sense, while in postbiblical Judaism *bsr* and its cognate verb refer not only to concrete historical news but also to prophetic messages of weal and woe,

angelic messages, and divine announcements of consolation and blessing.

**New Testament.** Within the New Testament, *euaggelion* is used far more frequently by Paul than by any other author (forty-eight times in the indisputably Pauline writings). His writings are the first literary attestation to the Christian usage of the term. It is characteristic of Paul that he uses the term in an absolute sense and without any qualifying adjective. To some authors this suggests that Paul first gave a Christian connotation to the term *euaggelion*, while to others it implies that Paul had taken over an earlier Christian usage. In any event, there is little doubt that the term acquired its Christian significance in a Hellenistic environment. While some scholars maintain that the early Christian usage was derived from emperor worship, the more common opinion locates the roots of the Christian use of *euaggelion* in "Second Isaiah."

**Paul.** In the Pauline letters two passages confirm the thesis that Paul has taken over the absolute use of *euaggelion* from early Christian usage. The passages in question are 1 Corinthians 15:1–4 and Romans 1:1–4. In his first letter to the Corinthians, Paul uses classic language to describe the handing on of traditional teaching and employs *euaggelion* to identify the content of that teaching. Paul explicates the content of the *euaggelion* by citing a creedal formula, probably derived from Palestinian Christian circles, that focuses on the death and resurrection of Jesus. In the opening verses of the letter to the Romans, the content of the gospel is the disclosure of Jesus as the Son of God and our Lord by his resurrection from the dead. Thus, for Paul, the basic content of the gospel is the resurrection by means of which Jesus is constituted as Lord. This is understood as the fulfillment of the scriptural promise. Paul sometimes (e.g., 1 Cor. 9:12, 2 Cor. 2:12) calls it the gospel of Christ (*euaggelion tou Christou*) because the good news of salvation has Christ as its central object.

In the writings of Paul, *euaggelion* also defines the oral proclamation of the missionary (e.g., 2 Cor. 8:19, Phil. 4:15). In 1 Corinthians 9:14, Paul uses the word in two senses, that is, as his message and as the act of proclamation. The act of proclamation involves more than recitation of a creedal formula or recital of the traditional kerygma on Jesus' death and resurrection. Paul's whole person is involved (see 1 Thes. 1:5, 2:8). His proclamation is the work of an apostle "approved by God to be entrusted with the gospel" (1 Thes. 2:4). Paul writes succinctly of "my gospel" (Rom. 2:16) or "our gospel" (2 Cor. 4:3). Those who receive his message receive it "not as the word of men but as what it really is, the word of God, which is at work" (1 Thes. 1:13). For Paul, the gospel is the "gospel of God" (e.g., 1 Thes. 1:9,

2 Cor. 11:7) because it comes from God and is about God's work. Coming from God, the gospel is powerful. Its proclamation brings about the eschatological era of salvation; it implies the ending of one world order and the beginning of a new one.

**Mark.** Both in understanding of the term *euaggelion* and in frequency of its usage (seven times), Mark is similar to Paul. This does not imply a direct dependence of Mark on Paul, since both of them reflect earlier Christian missionary usage. Mark, however, uses only *euaggelion*, the noun, and not the related verb. For Mark, *euaggelion* is a technical expression used to denote the kerygmatic announcement of salvation. Jesus is the subject of the gospel insofar as he proclaimed the coming of the kingdom of God (*Mk.* 1:15). When proclamation occurs, that which is proclaimed becomes a reality. Accordingly, the activity of Jesus became the object of the gospel. Mark editorializes on the tradition he has incorporated into his work in order to affirm that the gospel relates to that which has been done in and through Jesus. Mark emphasizes this notion by opening his work with "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God" (*Mk.* 1:1). This striking statement brings into focus a point of view even if it does not, strictly speaking, function as a title for the entire work.

**Matthew and Luke.** Neither Matthew nor Luke employs *euaggelion* so frequently as does Mark, and the Johannine literature does not use the term at all. Matthew uses the term four times but never without further qualification. He writes of "the gospel of the kingdom" (*Mt.* 4:23, 9:35), of "this gospel" (*Mt.* 26:13), and of "this gospel of the kingdom" (*Mt.* 24:14). In all four instances Matthew uses *euaggelion* in relation to a speech complex. For him Jesus is no longer the content of the gospel; instead, he is the communicator of the gospel. The speeches of Jesus are "gospels." Matthew's emphasis is on Jesus' preaching and teaching as providing a paradigm for the Christian way of life.

Luke does not use *euaggelion* at all in the first part of his written work, but it appears twice in *Acts* (15:7, 20:24). Nonetheless, Luke employs the verb *euaggelizomai* ("I bring the good news") frequently both in his gospel (ten times) and in *Acts* (fifteen times). By doing so, Luke emphasizes the act of preaching, which is then explained by the direct object that accompanies the verb. He sharply distinguishes the preaching of the apostles from Jesus' own preaching. Willi Marxsen has suggested that Luke deliberately avoided using *euaggelion* in the first part of his work because instead of giving a record of the church's proclamation he was writing a type of "life of Jesus."

**The Written Gospel.** The general Pauline usage of *euaggelion* to mean the proclamation of salvation as con-

cretized in the death and resurrection of Jesus continued into the second century as the writings of Polycarp of Smyrna (*Letter to the Philippians* 9.2) and the *Didache* (12.3.1) attest. Aristides of Athens, the first of the Christian apologists, once mentions the "evangelical writing" (*euaggelikē graphē*), and Ignatius of Antioch intimates that the gospel was a written text when he wrote to the church of Smyrna that neither "the prophetic predictions nor the law of Moses nor the gospel" has convinced his opponents (*Letter to the Smyrneans* 5.1).

Even when *euaggelion* came to be applied to a written text, the word continued to be employed in the singular, and this use of the singular was still widespread in the third century. The usage bespeaks the conviction that the gospel was identical with the teaching of the Lord. This usage is reflected in the formulaic expression "the Lord says in the gospel" (e.g., *2 Clem.* 8:5), but it is also reflected in the titles of the Gospels. The earliest parchment codices of the New Testament, namely, the fourth-century Sinaiticus and Vaticanus codices, entitle the Gospels "according to Matthew," "according to Mark," and so on. This manner of providing each of the written gospels with a title suggests that *euaggelion* applied to the whole collection of the four canonical gospels. Nonetheless, three of the early New Testament papyri have made use of more complete titles: *Gospel According to Matthew* (P<sup>4</sup>) and *Gospel According to John* (P<sup>66</sup>, P<sup>75</sup>). Even this is a strange turn of phrase if the sole intention is to designate authorship. These titles seem to suggest that the single gospel was narrated according to the vision of a specific evangelist. There was only one message of final, eschatological salvation, namely, salvation accomplished through the death and resurrection of Jesus, but the message could be conveyed in different ways.

In the middle of the second century, Justin Martyr (c. 100–163/5), writing in Rome, was the first Christian author to write of the Gospels in the plural (*euaggelia*). In his *First Apology* (c. 155) and his *Dialogue with the Jew Trypho* he refers to the "memoirs of the Apostles" on some fifteen occasions. The first time he mentions the memoirs, he adds by way of explanation "which are called gospels" (*hatina kaleitai euaggelia*; *Apol.* 1.66.3). In two other places, however, he retains the singular use of *euaggelion* (*Dial.* 10.2, 100.1). At the time of Clement of Alexandria (150?–215?) the *euaggelion* was understood to be a book on the system of Christian morality. Subsequently the term was also applied to the so-called apocryphal gospels, the oldest of which come from the second century.

The transference of *euaggelion* from the designation of an oral proclamation to a written text—a usage that most probably derives from the first verse of Mark—at-

tests that these texts had the same content and purpose as the oral proclamation. Both the oral proclamation of the gospel and the written gospel speak of eschatological salvation accomplished in the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. Far from being biographies of Jesus, the four canonical gospels attest to his preaching and to his activity in the light of his death and resurrection. The historical traditions they contain are subordinated to their religious and kerygmatic purpose. They were written to evoke and/or confirm faith in Jesus as Christ and Lord (see *Jn.* 20:31). The central content of the gospel is one, even if it is attested in documents written by different authors.

**Later Usage of the Term.** At the time of the continental Reformation, Martin Luther (1483–1546) sharply distinguished between the law and the gospel. The law makes demands and provokes anxiety; the gospel bestows grace and brings consolation. From his study of *Romans* 1:16–17, where Paul writes of the gospel as “the power of God for salvation . . . for in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for faith,” Luther concluded that justification did not depend on outward obedience to the law. Although the content of the law is the unchangeable will of God, the law brings humans before the throne of judgment. The first use of the law deters people from sin by fear of punishment; a second use makes even believers conscious of their sin. In contrast, the gospel, appropriated through faith, reveals the saving love of God, assures believers of justifying grace, and offers a promise of the forgiveness of sins.

In modern times, preaching the gospel is characteristic of Christian missionary endeavors throughout the world. Gospel faith is popularly associated with evangelical preaching and the view that Jesus is one’s personal savior. The reading of a passage from one of the four canonical gospels (*Matthew, Mark, Luke, John*) is a key feature of worship services of the more liturgically oriented Christian churches. Frequently the excerpt that is read is simply referred to as “the gospel.”

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RAYMOND F. COLLINS

**GOZAN ZEN.** The Japanese term *gozan* (also pronounced *gosan*; Chin., *wu-shan*; “five mountains”) refers to a system of monastic organization and its associated culture that flourished in Sung-dynasty China and medieval Japan. Because many Buddhist monasteries in premodern China and Japan were located on mountains and conceived of as being secluded from the world, the word *mountain* came to connote a monastery. The “five mountains” were a designated group of Zen (Chin., Ch’an) monasteries. Gozan organization began to develop in China during the Sung dynasty (960–1279) and was transmitted to Japan during the Kamakura period (1185–1333). These monasteries developed a distinctive pattern of Zen monastic life, a common organizational hierarchy, and a characteristic cultural style. Thus the expression “five mountains” is also applied to the literature produced by monks from these monasteries (*gozan bungaku*), the wood-block books printed in these monasteries (*gozan-ban*), and the art and culture associated with them (*gozan bunka*). This article will outline the development of the Gozan administrative organization, define the Gozan style of Zen, and introduce Gozan literature and culture.

As with Zen itself, Gozan organization, learning, and culture had their origins in China, and throughout their history in Japan the Gozan monasteries remained major conduits for the dissemination not only of Zen but also of Chinese culture in the broadest sense. During the Sung dynasty some fifty large Ch’an monasteries in the Hang-chou and lower Yangtze regions of China were brought under the regulation of civilian officials and organized into a three-tier hierarchy headed by five great monasteries (*wu-shan*; Jpn., *gozan*.) These were among the most prestigious Ch’an training centers in China. They were visited by such Japanese monks as Eisai, Dōgen, and Enni, who went to China in search of Zen beginning in the late twelfth century. From the mid-thirteenth century on Chinese monks from these monasteries, fleeing the advancing Mongols and seeking a

new mission field for Ch'an, made their way to Japan, where they were patronized by shoguns, provincial warrior chieftains, and members of the imperial court.

Before the close of the thirteenth century a similar three-tier hierarchy of Zen monasteries was beginning to take shape in Japan under the patronage and regulation of the Hōjō regents who dominated the Kamakura *bakufu*. The early Kamakura Gozan included Kenchōji, Engakuji, and Jufukuji. Jōchiji and Jōmyōji were added later. With the overthrow of the Kamakura *bakufu* in 1333, the Kemmu Restoration of 1333 to 1336, and the establishment of the Muromachi *bakufu* after 1336, political power shifted back to Kyoto. A Kyoto Gozan hierarchy was quickly designated by the emperor Go-Daigo and the early Ashikaga shoguns.

The Gozan network assumed its final configuration, although by no means its full scale, under the third shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. By an edict of 1386 the five Kyoto Gozan, ranked in order of seniority, were Tenryūji, Shōkokuji, Kenninji, Tōfukuji, and Manjuji. Their counterparts in Kamakura were Kenchōji, Engakuji, Jufukuji, Jōchiji, and Jōmyōji. The great Kyoto monastery of Nanzenji was set at the apex of the Kyoto and Kamakura Gozan as a superior temple. Lesser Zen monasteries in Kyoto, Kamakura, and throughout the provinces were ranked beneath the Gozan as either *jissatsu* ("ten temples") or *shozan* ("many mountains"). Just as the Gozan category had been inflated from five to eleven monasteries, so too the *jissatsu* and *shozan* tiers grew rapidly in number. By the fifteenth century there were nearly fifty *jissatsu* and more than two hundred *shozan*.

This network was a fairly centralized system with uniform monastic regulations and organization and with close links maintained between the Gozan in Kyoto and Kamakura and their satellites in the provinces. Monks could move fairly freely among the monasteries, and a novice who began his religious career in a provincial *shozan* might continue his training in a larger regional *jissatsu* and, perhaps, go on to hold high office in a central Gozan. The whole network was supervised by a Zen monk official, known as the *sōroku*, from a subtemple within Shōkokuji. The *sōroku* served as the mediator between the *bakufu* and the Gozan. Not all Zen monasteries were included within the Gozan. The Gozan system was dominated by those branches of the Rinzai school, especially the lineage of Musō Soseki, who found favor with the *bakufu*. Very few Sōtō Zen monasteries were included, and the Rinzai monasteries of Daitokuji and Myōshinji were excluded. [See the biography of Musō Soseki.]

Zen monastic life within the Gozan was lived under the traditional Buddhist monastic precepts and characteristic Zen regulations known as *shingi* ("regulations

for the pure community"). Gozan Zen practice in Japan was based on the codes in force in Chinese Ch'an monasteries and shaped by such Chinese émigré monks as Lan-ch'i Tao-lung and Wu-hsüeh Tsu-yüan in the thirteenth century, and their successors Musō Soseki, Gidō Shūshin, and Zekkai Chūshin in the fourteenth century. The core of monastic life was communal meditation in the monks' hall, private and public interviews with a Zen master involving the resolution of *kōan*, lectures on the *sūtras* and Zen texts in the Dharma Hall, and prayers and *sūtra* chanting in the Buddha Hall. In the late Kamakura and early Muromachi periods the standards of Gozan monastic life were fairly strictly observed. By the fifteenth century, however, a slackening of discipline was becoming evident as monks took the privilege of the great monasteries for granted, neglected the rigorous practice of Zen, and devoted themselves to more worldly interests or to cultural activities. The monk Ikkyū Sōjun was so disappointed that he quit the Gozan in disgust and joined the Daitokuji community. He castigated Gozan monks, calling them idle rice bags who were concerned only with eating well and living comfortably. [See also the biography of Ikkyū Sōjun.]

Many Ch'an masters of the Sung dynasty had consorted with lay scholars and artists, whose cultural interests they shared. Ch'an monks became well known as calligraphers, painters in ink monochrome, poets, and students of Chinese philosophy. Some masters rejected these non-Buddhist avocations as distractions from the true quest for enlightenment through Ch'an. Other monks defended them as legitimate means of expressing, enhancing, or relaying the insights of the search for enlightenment. These cultural interests were too strong to contain and the acquisition of secular learning and cultural accomplishments became a part of life in the great Chinese monasteries. These tastes were quickly transmitted to the Japanese Gozan, where they served to draw the Zen monks and their warrior and court patrons more closely together. Calligraphy and the writing of Chinese poetry were the two most common avocations, but Gozan monks were also accomplished ink painters, designers of gardens and buildings, arbiters of taste in art objects, interior decoration, and the advocates of drinking tea, as well as teachers of Confucian and Taoist thought.

Under the patronage of the *bakufu*, the court, and the provincial warrior nobility, the Gozan system flourished economically. Gozan monasteries acquired estate holdings throughout Japan. The Kyoto Gozan, in particular, were active participants in trade with China, in commerce, and in money lending. The bursars of some monasteries acquired reputations as astute managers of resources and lands. Politically, Gozan monks were ac-

tive in defense of their monastic interests. They lent their managerial and diplomatic expertise to warriors, serving as advisers and go-betweens in domestic disputes and in the conduct of diplomacy and trade with China. By the fifteenth century, the Gozan was much more than a network of monasteries. It could be counted among the most influential and powerful religious, political, and economic institutions in medieval Japanese society.

The weakening of the Muromachi *bakufu* and the warfare of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries exposed the Gozan to depredation. Many monasteries were burned or lost their landholdings. Communities were scattered, morale was reduced to a low ebb, and spiritual concerns were neglected. Although some recovery took place under the patronage of Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa shoguns, the Gozan never recovered the influence it had had in the medieval period. Perhaps the last prominent Gozan monk was Ishin Suden of Nanzenji, who served both as *sōroku* of the Gozan and as an influential adviser to Tokugawa Ieyasu.

Many of the former Gozan monasteries survive today, some of them as Zen training centers. Among these are Nanzenji, Shōkokuji, and Tenryūji in Kyōto, and Engakuji in Kamakura. The Gozan system, however, as a monastic hierarchy and means of regulation and centralization faded out with the Meiji Restoration. Contemporary Zen monasteries are grouped by lineage around their major monasteries (*honzan*). Moreover, contemporary Rinzai Zen owes more to Hakuin Ekaku (1686–1769) and the Daitokuji and Myōshinji lineage than it does to the medieval Gozan.

[See also Zen.]

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MARTIN COLLCUTT

**GRACE.** The religious significance present in the Anglo-French word *grace* is both multifaceted and ambivalent. As a theological term, it may attempt to pinpoint the activity of God here and now, or it may disclose nothing less than the reality underlying all of religion and faith.

This almost transparent term points to the fundamental power and horizon of every revelation, to the ultimate religious question and statement in any religion,

for grace stands primarily not for human virtue but for God's presence. Grace is a divine activity in human history and in human lives. The reality signified by *hesed* ("lovingkindness") in the Hebrew scriptures and by *charis* ("grace") in the Greek scriptures can be found in the Tao, in the power of the Hindu triad, and in the radical absence contemplated by Buddhism. Occasionally we can find in these other traditions the same theological discussions about the mediation by grace of the divine in human freedom and suffering.

Christian theologians have filled volumes with definitions and classifications of grace. Since God remains mystery, the ineffable presence of the deity eludes precise definition, and therefore the ultimate meaning of the word remains mysterious. In theology, as distinct from the expression of religion in art (where grace is shown rather than defined), the word *grace* frequently denotes either too much or too little.

Moving back through the Latin *gratia* to the Greek *charis*, with its overtones of graciousness and liberality, the word *grace* assumed a Christian theological importance with Paul. But even for Paul, whose creative interpretation of Christianity began the turbulent odyssey of this term, the word has several meanings. *Charis* can mean a power coming from the spirit of Jesus active in a Christian (the charism of healing or preaching; *1 Cor.* 12), but it can also mean the power of God to help one follow Christ despite the evils and difficulties of human life. And with Paul there is also a more objective meaning of grace. The foundation of all grace and of all graces (charisms) is the generous saving activity of God manifested toward us in the history and destiny of Jesus. God's grace is the gift of persevering, loving, purposeful generosity that becomes visible in a climactic way in the life, teaching, death, and resurrection of Jesus.

*Charis* means the favor of God, but that favor made active in the advent of Jesus Christ, particularly so in his words and deeds. God's loving generosity in Christ bestows not only forgiveness of sin but a new, death-surviving mode of existence. Jesus Christ is grace objectified, and in and after him the worlds of creation, time, and human personality have been radically (if invisibly) altered. Paul applied Jesus' phrase "the kingdom of God" largely in a concrete manner to Jesus himself, particularly through the triumphant guarantee of newness assured by Jesus risen from the dead.

In a significant phrase, Paul proclaims that while sin inevitably leads to death, the *charisma* of God to us is "eternal life in Christ Jesus" (*Rom.* 6:23). The following chapters of that letter describe this *charisma*: new freedom, familial intimacy with God, the capability to follow the new "law" of love, the indwelling of the Holy

Spirit in men and women, and God's advocacy on behalf of needy individuals (*Rom.* 8). Personal entry into this life is begun by baptism conceived as rebirth in Christ's death, burial, and resurrection. The event of Easter has both personal and cosmic results.

A final realization of *charis* for Paul comes from this very baptismal life. The new life of grace is not only a divine favor and an adoption but also a commissioning for action. *Charismata*, charisms, are powers of the Holy Spirit active in mature Christians, empowering them to act on behalf of the reign of God and the life of the church. Christians are not passive. Each Christian has through the baptismal spirit some active gift to aid the church either inwardly or in its mission of service and evangelization. Drawing on his metaphor of the body, Paul faces the difficult challenges of diversity and unity in the young churches and of leadership amid a variety of services. Nonetheless, Paul will not abandon this final realization of the new presence of God where grace continues through time to be present in human life and ministries of service (*Rom.* 12, *1 Cor.* 12). [See *the biography of Paul.*]

**Historical Developments in the Theology of Grace.** Eastern Christian theology was heir to thought forms of human participation in the divine and subsequently emphasized less the evil and ruinous counterpart to grace than the almost mystical capacity of the human person to become, through grace, a participant in the life of the triune God. In the first two centuries of Christianity, the church was largely Greek-speaking. However, by the end of the second century, with the influence of Tertullian in the West and Clement of Alexandria in the East, Greek and Latin theology had begun to take distinct directions. In the more Hellenistic, Neoplatonist world of the Eastern Empire the seeds of the New Testament teaching about a new creation, a new man and woman, and a human being who is the temple of the spirit of God found fertile soil.

The school of Alexandria in the third century, the great bishop-theologians of the fourth century, and monasticism and mysticism in the fifth to eighth centuries solidified and concretized Eastern theology—a theology of trinitarian, divinizing grace renewed by Christ. In the East, Manichaean dualism and the Augustinian theology of a God redeeming a segment of the fallen world were overshadowed by a view owing much to Neoplatonism, which envisioned a single world in which the divine plan and presence was intertwined with creation and the Trinity continues that plan and presence through the effects of redemption.

After the sporadic but often intense persecution in the second and third centuries, the role of baptism as a commission for an eschatological life related less to the

fading idea of martyrdom than to the newer opportunity of communal eremitical monasticism. Some monastic figures stressed the ascetic side, others the contemplative. With schools and theologies influenced by orientations based in the thought of Origen and Dionysius the Areopagite, the monastic life became a school of contemplation fulfilling in a special way the Christian vocation. Far from being simply training for visions and miracles, monasticism viewed grace as the seed or enabler of a God-bestowed contemplative outlook which, as it intensified, fostered not visions but apophatic faith in touch with the darkness of the divine essence. Furthermore, in the Eastern Christian churches, the liturgy became the sacramental place where grace reaches the concrete; in the liturgy, the social and the historical meet contemplatively the timeless icon, hymn, and sacrament of worship.

In the West, Christianity came to emphasize salvation from sin. With Augustine grace took on characteristics of an intermediate power sent from God to heal the effects of evil in human beings. Augustine's life and conversion led him to emphasize sharply the human person's proneness to evil and corresponding need for some divine assistance so that men and women might turn to God in faith and hope and to their neighbors in mercy and love. With Augustine, grace appears in a triad along with freedom and evil. Human freedom can mean freedom to choose this or that, but more often it means the freedom to choose God as the personal ultimate in a life. Evil can mean the fallen human condition—characterized, for example, by prison camps—or it can mean the personal realization of evil in a sinful act.

Within Western Christianity the history of the controversies over grace illustrate the changing and perduring meanings of the word. In the first decades after Christ Paul asserted, against Jewish or Christian groups who based their hopes on external religious observances, the free and open salvation made widely accessible by God's recent entry into human history. Augustine upheld against the ascetic Pelagius (whose view of the positive capacity of human nature made a strict following of the Christian way more plausible) the pervasive infection of the primal Fall. Augustine considered human choice without grace to be enchained, bereft of the contact of a divine activity (namely, grace) by which one could please and live for God. In Augustine, conceptions of the Fall, the human sinful condition, and original sin describe the opposite of salvation, of true goodness and life. The view of the nature of grace as an intermediary, as a quasi entity of divine promise and power, began to appear.

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas, who was at work on his synthesis of nature and society with

Christian teaching, disagreed with his Augustinian colleagues over the need for grace. Thomas defended the natural potentialities of the human personality to do their work—to know the truth, to seek the good. He considered original sin to be a serious wounding of the personality from within the emotions and the ground of the will but not an irrevocable termination of the image of God. He brought back into Western thinking the spirit of the Alexandrian school, a synthesis of nature and grace where every aspect of creation and grace has the potential to find its place in a harmonious whole.

Martin Luther, propelled by his rediscovery of Augustine and Paul, protested against the localization of divine power in things (e.g., indulgences and noncommunal liturgy) and denied that the forms and laws of the church had a monopoly over grace. Luther's theology of justification by faith permitted him to disengage grace from human control and to return its meaning to God alone. Despite the extrinsic nature of grace for Luther and its initial separation from virtue and service, it would not be correct to view Luther as unconcerned with progress in the Christian life, that is, with sanctification. For Luther, the Christian life is different from the life of sin: the Christian life is lived as the product not of law and effort but of an initial constituting and saving (justifying) grace. Calvin selected other emphases for his Reformed theology of grace, particularly God's sovereignty manifested in the divine transcendent plan for the elect.

The Reformation began a long period filled with controversies over the nature of grace. Essentially these were arguments over how human freedom in need of redemption was affected by truly divine grace. If grace is God's act or the exercise of God's power, how do the finite and the created participate in it? How can predestination and human freedom be reconciled?

The great topic of Baroque Roman Catholic theology lasting for almost two centuries after the middle of the sixteenth century was grace conceived as a finite, God-given force that converts, sanctifies, inspires, and saves. Corresponding to the culture of the times, with its new empirical science and Cartesian philosophy, grace had the characteristics of the subjective, the mechanical, and the theatrical. Italian and Middle European art and architecture of the period were frequently statements of a cosmic and mystical theology of grace: in a sacral world of light and golden divine symbols, great saints were depicted in their triumphant lives.

For Protestant communities as well as for Catholic religious orders the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were times of meticulous theological analyses of grace. Strongly held views on God's action and human psycho-

logical response (both at the time of conversion and during the span of a Christian life), similar to those of the Jansenists, Jesuits, and Dominicans, brought into existence Arminians, Methodists, and Pietists who debated the triad of divine action, human freedom, and sin.

The spirituality of the Jesuits reflects the Baroque (and later nineteenth-century) Catholic devotional analysis of the interior life as activated by modes of "created grace," that is, God as the principle of human transformation rather than God as God ("uncreated grace"). In the seventeenth century, the Jesuits, providing leadership to the Counter-Reformation, found themselves embroiled in controversies over freedom and grace on three fronts. The origin of the Jesuits' positive view of human efforts cooperating with grace lay with the great Reformation theologies. Within Roman Catholicism, the Dominicans judged the Jesuits' theory of human freedom to be exaggerated and their theology of divine foreknowledge to be inadequate, while the followers of Michel de Bay (Baius) and Jansen asserted that the Jesuits neglected the seriousness of original sin.

As the eighteenth century progressed, such theological controversies seemed dated and were swept aside by the rationalism and naturalism leading to the Enlightenment. If human nature was good, wounded by the past structures of society, it needed not a divine jostle but its own education to pursue the good. Grace is transformed, even replaced, by the human mind and will, a nature awaiting cultivation, and even by human history, where religion should be viewed as a facet of reason.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy provides a different interpretation of the active presence of God in history and life. The movement from Schelling and Hegel to Marx saw no need to preserve any separation of grace from nature and sin. Consciousness, freedom, and development become aspects of one reality, the enactment of the life of the ultimate, and in that process of enactment there is no supernature above nature.

After World War I some theologians began to rethink Christianity precisely as a religion of grace, but from modern perspectives on the self and freedom. Grace was viewed as a horizon of consciousness and history, as the challenge made by the holy against the demonic in life. Grace is the presence rather than the mechanics of God. For Paul Tillich, all aspects of human life could be theonomous, that is, transparent to the divine, rather than authoritarian or superstitious. As symbols of God, nature, religion, and art inspire a new being in believers, one that struggles with the problems of meaning,



life, and morality. For Tillich's Roman Catholic counterpart, Karl Rahner, grace was no less than God as horizon and presence. God's activity in human life and history is universal and actively draws the world to a future that is the plan and future of God. Human life, open to and vivified by grace, is realized, preached, and exemplified particularly in Christ. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the Jesuit paleontologist, was convinced that the ultimate force driving the threads of evolution—spiritual as well as biological—on earth was not instinct but grace. What the *Gospel of John* calls *agapē*, love, is in Christ the source and the goal of the cosmos. For Teilhard, religious history, like evolutionary history, is acted out over a long time. From the great religions of the world a central line emerges—that of Christ as the incarnation of God's gracious purpose. In the contemplation and discipleship of grace, a higher, developmental phylum introduces to the human race individuality-in-community and freedom-in-charity. Rather than the end of the world being close, the human race, for Teilhard, is only a few steps out of the cave.

In the thought of these three popular twentieth-century theologians, Tillich, Rahner, and Teilhard, one sees the modern, post-Kantian, and post-Heideggerian shift to the historical subject. Grace is both a divine presence and a developmental horizon of all history; Christ and the church are grace manifest, but they are not its exclusive repositories. In short, grace is viewed no longer as the change of God's will (Luther) or as a supernatural divine power agitating within human minds and wills (Council of Trent, 1545–1563), but as the patient, luminous, inviting presence of a transcendent and mysterious God intimately active in the pain and glory of life.

**Prospects in Theology of Grace.** In the late twentieth century, reinterpretations of grace have reestablished grace as nothing less than the underlying reality of all religious enterprises, as the very presence of God. In this way it is the foundation for various schools of spirituality—Origenist, Greek and Russian, Benedictine, Franciscan, Dominican, Anabaptist, Carmelite—but it also confronts and stimulates Christian ethics to put greater emphasis on issues of peace and justice in the world. Grace is perceived as the axis along which the kingdom of God confronts institutionalized evil.

The ecumenical movement, which began as the mutual acceptance of Christian churches—Protestant, Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox—gradually discovered through scholarly investigations a remarkable lack of conflict between, for example, Luther's and Thomas Aquinas's interpretations of grace, and between Trent's and Karl Barth's. There are fewer doctrinal and theo-

logical differences than first assumed. Drawing on the tradition held by mainstream Christianity that God's active presence reaches an incarnation and a climax in Jesus Christ but is not monopolized by Christ, Christian theologians such as Karl Rahner and official Christian assemblies such as the Second Vatican Council have increasingly acknowledged the presence of grace in other world religions and in the struggles of individual lives in increasingly secular and agnostic contexts. For example, dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism is now not simply an exchange of similar words about ritual or theodicy but an exploration of different presentations and explorations of grace in speculative, monastic, and mystical traditions.

Realms as diverse as art, politics, and monasticism disclose different approaches to what Jesus called the kingdom of God and to what the history of Christian theology calls grace. In the realm of art is found the presentation in various media of the primal dialectic between sin and grace. Here grace emerges from the dramatic reiteration of an active unseen presence that reveals "the more" and its opposite, the violent exploitation of the holy, the beautiful, and the human. The structure of Gothic architecture, the oils of Fra Angelico and the engravings of Rembrandt, the formation of light by the Baroque, the planned abstractions of Kandinsky (which are there to make real "the realm of the spiritual") are struggles with the horizons of the holy, of the spiritual, of grace. Such novelists as Fedor Dostoevskii, Graham Greene, Georges Bernanos, François Mauriac, and Flannery O'Connor have often had evil and grace as their themes. In such works, grace challenges in the most surprising ways the conventions of religion and society, and evil is presented as the almost necessary counterpoint to grace. Life becomes a chiaroscuro of evil and grace.

The Christian theological term *grace*, then, can refer at the same time to the most abstract dimension of religious power or human transcendentality and to the blood and sweat of ordinary everyday life. The record of theological controversies over grace illustrates its prominence as a religious problem and its ultimate mystery. The core of that mystery is God as active in history and in every human life.

[For further discussion of grace in Christian theology, see Free Will and Predestination, *article on* Christian Concepts; History, *article on* Christian Views; Justification; Merit, *article on* Christian Concepts; and the *biographies of religious thinkers mentioned herein*. For discussion of religious ideas closely related to notions of grace in comprehensive religious perspective, see Evil; Free Will and Determinism; Kingdom of God; Redemp-

tion; Sin and Guilt; and Transcendence and Immanence.]

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THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.

**GRAEBNER, FRITZ** (1877–1934), German ethnologist. Fritz Graebner was born on 4 March 1877, the son of a schoolteacher in Berlin; Graebner himself attended school in Berlin from 1887 to 1895 and studied history, German philology, and geography, and other subjects (especially ethnology) at the universities of Berlin and Marburg (1895–1901). In 1901 he received his doctorate in philosophy at Berlin with a dissertation on medieval history. By this time he was already employed at the Berlin Museum of Ethnology as an auxiliary scientific assistant.

In 1906 he transferred to the museum of ethnology in Cologne (called the Rautenstrauch-Joest Museum after those who endowed it), became a full assistant there in 1907, and the museum's director in 1925. In 1911 he qualified as a privatdocent at the University of Bonn. His work was interrupted by his capture in Australia at the outbreak of World War I; because he was German, he was kept prisoner there until 1919. In 1921 he was appointed professor extraordinarius at Bonn and in 1926 became an honorary professor at the University of Cologne. However, he was unable by this time to lecture

any longer, since he was already suffering from a serious illness that soon made all scientific work impossible. He retired in 1928 and returned to his native city, Berlin, where he died on 13 July 1934.

Graebner's fields of specialization were the cultures of Oceania and Australia. He first became generally known in the field of ethnology through his 1904 lecture "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Ozeanien," which was delivered at a meeting of the Berlin Society for Anthropology, Ethnology, and Prehistory and published in *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 37 (1905). (Bernhard Ankermann, a colleague of Graebner, delivered the lecture "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Afrika" at the same meeting.) From then on, Graebner produced numerous detailed studies that dealt with, among other things, themes of social organization and spiritual culture (thus it is wrong to consider him merely a "museum ethnologist" who concentrated in a one-sided way on the material aspects of culture). In these studies he made broad comparisons that ranged throughout the world. Contesting the theories, prevalent at the time, of the more or less unilinear evolution of culture and the "elementary idea," Graebner (in his first book, *Methode der Ethnologie*, 1911) took up ideas first espoused by Friedrich Ratzel and Leo Frobenius and developed the culture-historical method. This method seeks to bring cultural-historical processes to light even where written sources are lacking or insufficient. To this end, Graebner's method begins with particular facts and seeks to establish "culture circles" (*Kulturkreise*), then to infer from the geographical locations of these complexes their "culture strata" (*Kulturschichten*), that is, the relative ages of cultures and their reciprocal influences, and, finally, to uncover the origins of individual cultures.

Since a culture circle must comprise all the necessary categories of cultural life, including religious ideas, Graebner also took up certain problems of the history of religions. He rejected speculations that traced all religious manifestations back to a single primordial phenomenon (e.g., animism or belief in magic); he subjected the theories of E. B. Tylor and James G. Frazer to detailed criticism and sought, unlike them, to bring to light the religious phenomena typical of individual culture circles or, as the case might be, larger cultural groups. Thus he regarded patrilinear and matrilinear cultures not as phases of a single standardized development but as independent cultural forms that coexisted with each other; he established, for example, that animism, worship of the dead, and lunar myths played a greater part in matrilinear cultures, whereas belief in magic and sun myths were more important in patrilinear cultures. He discussed this system (which was in

large measure taken over by Wilhelm Schmidt) in many essays on specific topics, in the relevant sections of his comprehensive presentation of ethnology ("Ethnologie," in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, edited by Paul Hinneberg, 1923) and in full detail in his final major work, *Das Weltbild der Primitiven* (1924). In this last book he represented the religious ideas of nonliterate peoples as the points of departure for the religions of the high cultures and for subsequent philosophical systems.

[See also the biography of Wilhelm Schmidt.]

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JOSEPH HENNINGER

Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

**GRAIL, THE.** Late in the twelfth century, a mystic theme appeared in Western literature that was fast taken up as the central feature of chivalric romances with a religious message and appeal. The key image of the theme is "the Grail," or, frequently, "the Holy Grail," which is still a metaphor for spiritual salvation and the goal of a quest by the elect. As a religious concept the Grail is of interest for having served, for about one century and in the context of contemporary civilization, as a symbol with, in social terms, a strongly aristocratic connotation. The two pivotal works of the Grail cycle, *Conte del Graal* (or *Perceval*) by Chrétien de Troyes and *Joseph d'Armathie* (or *Roman de l'estoire dou Graal*) by Robert de Borron, were dedicated, respectively, to Count Philip of Flanders and Count Gautier of Montfaucon, both feudal lords, both Crusaders who died in the Holy Land.

**The Forerunner: Chrétien's Grail Procession.** It is widely accepted that the earliest appearance of the Grail theme is in Chrétien's *Conte del Graal*, written in the late eighties of the twelfth century but left unfinished, probably because of the author's death. The relevant narrative is concentrated in two brief scenes, the one set in the "Grail Castle," the other in the "Hermitage." An innocent young knight, unaware of the realities of life and aimlessly wandering, is directed by a mysterious fisher to a mysterious castle. In the hall he meets the same fisher, the "Fisher King" and lord of the castle, an invalid bound to his couch. The youth then sees a strange procession passing by, full of symbols: a

squire with a white lance, from which a drop of blood falls on his hand; two squires bearing golden candelabra; a noble maiden carrying a *graal*, a receptacle set with precious gems and shedding a brilliant light; another maiden with a platter of silver. The young knight, who has not yet matured enough to fulfill his destiny and who overrates the chivalric virtue of silence, does not ask the question of charity expected of him, "Who is served with the *graal*?" He thus fails to meet the test that would have restored the ailing Fisher King and the wastelands surrounding him. When he awakens the next morning the spell has disappeared, the castle is empty, and he resumes his wanderings, now in search of the lost castle. After five years he is directed to a hermitage and begs help from a holy man, who consents to the repentant's desire for salvation. The Fisher King, he learns, is his uncle, whose father's life was sustained by a Host brought to him in the Grail.

**Christianization of Chrétien's Prototype.** Soon after Chrétien, in whose Grail fragment Christian doctrine is handled in rather ambiguous terms (as pointed out by Leonardo Olschki, 1966), the *topos* is again taken up and transformed into the central feature of a spiritual, and ever more Christian, body of literature. The following titles exemplify the genre.

Robert de Borron (late twelfth to early thirteenth century) is the author of *Joseph d'Armathie*, written in verse and, somewhat like a Christian legend, based on apocryphal gospels, the *Evangelium Nicodemi* and the *Vindicta Salvatoris* (Vengeance of the Lord). Joseph, thrown into prison, survives thanks to the *veissel* in which Christ, during the Last Supper, instituted the Eucharist and in which his blood was gathered during the Passion. The symbolization has taken a sharp turn: the Host, which was the content of the Grail in Chrétien's story, is here replaced by Christ's holy blood, and the vessel itself has changed into the chalice of the sacrament. Borron, furthermore, links the evangelization of Britain with the transfer of the Grail to the West.

A prose version of *Joseph d'Armathie*, named *Didot-Perceval* (after the manuscript collection in which it is preserved) and attributed to the same Robert de Borron, is patterned after Chrétien yet has a distinct religious reinterpretation of the happenings: the Grail of the procession, for example, becomes the receptacle of the Last Supper, and Perceval, if he passes the test, will become the guardian of Christ's blood.

*Perlesvaus*, a prose text (written between 1191 and 1212), blends a chivalric romance with a Christian allegory, strongly in the Cistercian spirit. Here the Knights of the Grail have become knightly monks.

A group of five romances in prose, attributed to Walter Map and called the Vulgate Cycle (1215-1230), was

the most popular of the Grail versions. Among them are the *Estoire del Saint Graal* and the *Queste del Graal*. In these stories the quest of illustrious knights for the Grail is told in terms of expiation and redemption, election and rejection. The christianization is emphasized by changing the carrier of the Grail, according to sacramental usage, from a woman to a man. The knights' worldly virtues have been replaced by chastity and charity. The Grail, now the goal of the quest, symbolizes the blending of the two worlds of contemporary civilization, knighthood and religion.

**The Elusive Grail.** The corpus of the Grail romances raises questions that, in general, are unanswerable. The Grail itself has remained a riddle: its shape varies from vase to cup to dish to stone; the use is that of a talisman or a reliquary; its symbolic meaning shifts with the context. By the middle of the twelfth century the term appears in the western French dialects, still marked by the indefinite article as a common noun ("a grail"). This is also the way Chrétien uses it. But already in his prologue, and from Borron on, it is commonly used as a proper name, "the Grail." The derivation of the word itself is still hypothetical. There is a consensus on a base form *gradalis*, but the consensus stops at the root morpheme of *gradalis*: it has been variously identified as *gradus* ("degree, step"), implying that food was placed in the vessel "step by step"; as *cratis* ("wickerwork") or *creta* ("fuller's earth"), both of which hint at the material used in making the receptacle; and as *cratus*, a shortened tenth-to-thirteenth-century Latin form of the Greco-Latin *crater*/*craterus* ("crater"), secondarily expanded by the suffix *-alis* in analogy to other words for vessels, such as *baucalis* and *garalis*.

The long history of exegesis, striving to bare the issue of the myth, has been moving in two directions. The one is synchronic: it relates a work to the events and currents of its time and thereby aims to discover the meaning (*sens*) a story may have had for its contemporary public. The other direction is diachronic: it centers on the subject matter (*matière*), which it locates in a tradition and which it derives, as far as possible, from specific models. Knowledge of the model highlights the "message" of the work.

**The Synchronic View.** The impact of the contemporary world on the Grail corpus and, above all, on Chrétien's *Conte del Graal* has been traced to religious diversity and policy, upper-class education and ethical perceptions, and to events of historical import. Various interpretations follow.

1. The objects carried in the ceremonious procession before the Fisher King, such as the Host in the Grail, the bleeding lance, and the candelabra, have been ex-

plained as echoes of the eucharistic procession practiced in the Byzantine Mass (Konrad Burdach, William A. Nitze).

2. The extensive christianization manifest in the *Queste del Saint Graal* has been interpreted as a reflection of Cistercian mysticism, specifically that of Bernard of Clairvaux (Albert Pauphilet, Étienne Gilson).

3. The spiritual structure of the *Conte* is related to ideas current at Chartres, the Western center of the twelfth-century Renaissance. Chrétien realizes in his work what Bernard Silvester, the humanist, requested of a true author: "Being a philosopher, he has to write about the nature of human life." And Chrétien has created in Perceval a character motivated by the two forces of theology and charity, from which the Fisher King and the wastelands expect their redemption (Leo Pollmann).

4. The legend implies a heretical attempt (Nitze speaks of its "heterodox tinge") to fight the supremacy of Rome and to replace Rome's propaganda of the doctrine by another authority (Giulio Bertoni).

5. The Grail myth is considered a militant allegory, inspired by the activity of Count Philip of Flanders, against the heresy of the Cathari and other dualistic sects; the father of the Fisher King is the Perfect Man of Catharism (Otto Rahn, Leonardo Olschki). To Olschki, the castle, representing the dualistic beliefs, is contrasted to the hermitage, which stands for Christian orthodoxy; and Perceval does not yield to the lure of the former but embraces the true faith of the latter.

6. Chrétien's *Conte del Graal* is an *Erziehungsroman*, a novel of education, describing the military, chivalric, spiritual, and religious formation of Perceval, the perfect knight and the perfect Christian (Martín de Riquer). Specifically, since Perceval displays traits of Prince Philip Augustus, the *Conte* seems to have been designed as a "mirror of princes," sponsored by Philip of Flanders to further the education of his royal godson and pupil, the future king (Rita Lejeune).

7. Perceval symbolizes the two virtues of prowess and charity (defined as "love of God"), and charity finally prevails over prowess (David C. Fowler).

8. The decadence and fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem function as a starting point. An analogy can be drawn between the concept of the Crusades and the religious theme of the Grail: the quest for and conquest of a Christian ideal is transferred to the elect in a castle of mystery. The construct of defeat and renewal represents an underlying exhortation to persevere in the Crusades (Helen Adolf).

9. The quest for the Grail is the conversion of the Jewish Temple, intended to offset further bloodshed of

the Jews by fanatic Crusaders. Chrétien was working against the hatred of the Jews (Urban T. Holmes, Jr., M. Amelia Klenke).

10. The Grail procession was inspired by representations in Christian art of the Crucifixion, with such figures as Longinus, the carrier of the lance, and a beautiful young woman who gathers the blood of Christ in a vase; she in turn becomes an allegory of the church who brings the Eucharist to the Old King (Riquer). Similarly, Klenke relates the objects of the procession to the cathedral art of contemporary France.

11. According to C. G. Jung's depth psychology, the vessel is not a historical reality but an idea, or primal image, and as such is of universal significance, found in untold numbers of myths and legends.

**The Diachronic View.** The supposed models of the Grail romances vary widely as to provenance and genre. They include specific paradigms such as the Indic Vedas, an Iranian national epic, the Alexander legend of late antiquity. But three great traditions of medieval culture are now recognized as the dominant influences: Christian legends, Celtic folklore, and ancient rituals.

**Christian legends.** The hypothesis of a Christian foundation of the Grail myth centers on the objects in the Grail procession. The apocryphal gospel *Vindicta Salvatoris* contributed a cardinal episode to Robert de Borron's version: that of the elect, Joseph of Arimathea, kept alive by a vessel—an image deeply noted in Christian tradition. Once in existence (as Willy Staerk points out), the Grail blended with the varying perceptions of the Last Supper in early Christianity. Staerk recognizes five connotations of the Grail: vessel with Christ's blood; receptacle of the Last Supper; calix of the first Eucharist; receptacle of the Host; calix in which the first Mass was celebrated. The image of the lance, too, was embedded in the Christian tradition: it is the lance with which Longinus, a pagan soldier and Christian martyr, opened the side of the crucified Christ (*Jn.* 19:34). Longinus turned into the hero of a legend (Burdach). The third object, the silver plate (*tailleur d'argent*), has been repeatedly identified as the paten on which the calix of the Last Supper was placed. Some analysts question the assumption of an underlying Christian model and see Chrétien's *Conte*, the first medieval form of the Grail story, as still "pré-Christianisé" (the term used by Pierre Gallais). They see in Robert de Borron's Christian version an *ex post facto* reconstruction of the myth's "early history," produced with the aid of pseudogospels.

**Celtic folklore.** Since the Arthurian world provides the milieu for the Grail romances, the repeated attempts to derive features of the myth from Celtic lore

are certainly justified. Irish sagas and Welsh tales, it is assumed, were taken up by Breton storytellers, who adapted their themes to the French environment. The Grail objects are among such themes: the magic horn of the gods, the wish platter, and the horn of plenty anticipate the Grail, and the spear of Lugh, either dripping blood or held before a caldron of blood, returns in Chrétien's bleeding lance. Above all, one character vital to the narrative, the Fisher King, has his Celtic counterpart: the maimed king, his wound, and his wastelands reflect the pagan belief, transferred into Celtic lore, that the reproductive forces of nature were related to the sexual potency of the ruler (R. S. Loomis, William A. Nitze, Emma Jung and Marie Louise von Franz).

**Ancient rituals.** The Grail myth in its sundry versions can be read as a saga of nature worship (Jessie L. Weston). The mythic prototype discernible behind it is the ancient cult of Adonis, the deity linked to vegetation and fertility and symbolizing the fading and rebirth of nature. He was the lover of both Persephone, goddess of death, and Aphrodite, goddess of love, and thus always on his way from death to life, and from life to death. Proceeding from there, Weston interprets the episodes and characters of the Grail story in terms of a nature ritual: the maimed Fisher King, deprived of his reproductive powers, is to be restored to life by the fulfillment of the quest, and thus is an analogue of the wastelands; cup and lance are the sexual symbols of female and male, just as blood stands for life; the Grail, by providing the sacramental meal, represents the source of life.

Following a similar line of thought, Nitze senses behind Perceval's story, with the decisive role of his mother and the nonrole of his father, echoes of a matriarchal system; and he sees in the suffering of the Fisher King and his land, to be ended by the initiate's (at first unasked) question, the key to the Grail procession: the restoration of life and vegetation. This leitmotif is prefigured (without, as Nitze emphasizes, an immediate connection) in ancient ceremonies such as the Eleusinian mysteries and the cults of Mithra and Isis.

**Count Philip's Book.** In his prologue to the *Conte*, Chrétien states that Count Philip of Flanders transmitted to him a book containing a very good story, the *Tale of the Grail*, with the suggestion "to turn it into rime." This cryptic statement by the author about his source has provoked numerous hypotheses, not least concerning its reliability. Since Chrétien is unlikely to have made a playful or insincere reference to the illustrious name of his patron, one must assume that the model for the *Conte* was a real one and that it was a story written in prose. Of the sources mentioned here, ancient rituals

anticipated, in several respects, the *sen* of Chrétien's Grail narrative, and Celtic lore prefigured various details of the objects and characters. But none of these analogues, nor their aggregate, amount to what Chrétien's prologue praised as "the best story every told at a royal court." Yet such a story, we suggest, did exist. The model was the *Isis Book*, the eleventh book—half fiction and half a personal memoir—of Apuleius's novel, the *Metamorphoses* (second century). In Chrétien's time the *Metamorphoses* existed in Florence in at least one manuscript but was not well known in France and had hardly been exploited for literary purposes. A comparison reveals both direct analogues between the works of Apuleius and Chrétien, and source material contained in the Apuleian text, which Chrétien may have associated with features of other traditions.

**Analogues.** The similarities cover subject matter, structure, textual homologies, and major and minor details. The *Isis Book* is, in the words of Arthur Darby Nock, "one of the great ancient documents of a conversion." Its theme, like that of the *Conte*, is the salvation and rebirth of a young man, Lucius, who is selfish and a sinner and yet a select, and who after his tribulations (narrated in the preceding ten books) is initiated into a mystery religion. The *Isis Book*, in the portions comparable to Chrétien's Grail story, describes the procession of Isis and the conversion of Lucius. The Isis procession, moving in ritual order, is dominated, just as Chrétien's procession is, by gold, light, beauty, and mystery. Lucius's conversion, like Perceval's, is staged as a dialogue between two characters, the initiate and the initiator. The phases of the ritual run parallel in both versions, with numerous textual concordances: selection; the initiate's readiness; his prayer for help; revelation; the hortatory sermon; the initiation.

Four *topoi* occurring in the *Conte*, three of them in the hermitage scene, are prefigured in a Hermetic dialogue which was traditionally ascribed to Apuleius and likewise narrates an initiation. From the ninth century on, an apocryphal treatise, the *Asclepius*, was included among the works of Apuleius. The *editio princeps* (1469) of the *Metamorphoses*, based on an unknown manuscript, contained the *Asclepius*. In short, it is not clear whether Count Philip's book contained the treatise together with the novel or not. The *Asclepius* was the Latin translation of a Greek dialogue that described the catechesis of Asklepios by the mystagogue Hermes Trismegistos. It was familiar to and often quoted by the prominent authors of the school of Chartres. The analogues to the *Conte* are a secluded sanctuary as the locus of the ritual, with four men present; the Hermetic term *malitia* for spiritual ignorance (*agnōsia*), rendered as *mal* by Chrétien; a vegetarian meal ending the con-

version; and the *topos* of the wastelands as an apocalyptic vision of Egypt, which in the *Conte* is tied to Perceval's (failed) test.

**Stimuli.** Chrétien's technique of syncretism seems to emerge from his use of the Isis procession, which provides motifs for the two central features of his Grail scene.

*The Fisher King.* The prelude of the Isis procession, the Anteludia, consists of a bizarre spectacle of persons and properties. Among the many unconnected items are (in this order) the following: a hunting spear; a hunter; a sword; a fowler; a fisherman with hooks; a sedan on which someone is carried; a golden cup; a feeble old man. These eight unrelated words (or phrases) return in Chrétien's word portrait of the Fisher King and his court: a *fisherman* fishing *with hooks* in a river (where Perceval meets him first) reappears as the lord of the castle, marked as such by having among his men a *hunter* and a *fowler*; maimed by a *spear*, he is confined to a *couch* on which he *is carried* around; he presents a *sword* to his guest and pours wine from a *cup of gold*, while he watches the procession that brings the life-sustaining wafer to the *feeble old man*, his father. By welding these incoherent bits into one figure and linking it to ancient fertility myths and Celtic lore, Chrétien created an impressive character of medieval literature.

*The Grail.* Two vessels carried in the main body of the Isis procession share the salient features of the Grail, above all, those of its external aspect: both are golden; in addition, the *cymbium* ("bowl") sheds an intense light and the *urnula* ("small urn") is ornamented and mysterious. The inherent powers of the Grail, on the other hand, are prefigured in other sources. Celtic tradition may have contributed the idea of the horn of plenty. As to the ancient rituals, the *Corpus Hermeticum* seems to have provided with its fourth treatise, entitled *The Krater*, a model of the Grail that contributed its mystic functions. The Greek text states that "the vessel is divine," repeated nearly verbatim in Chrétien's "Tant sainte chose est li graus" ("The Grail is so holy an object"). The content of the Hermetic vessel is *nous*, intellect, which makes man perfect; it is concretized as the wafer that the Grail contains. The Old King (the Fisher King's father), sustained in his retreat by such spiritual rather than material nourishment, evolves, in other words, into Perfect Man. The means by which the Hermetic materials were transmitted to Chrétien is not clear. The fourth treatise of the *Corpus Hermeticum* was known in Byzantium, to be sure, and Chrétien, quite knowledgeable about contemporary Byzantine affairs, as he demonstrated in his *Cligès*, could easily have heard about Hermetism and its mystical appeal. But Hermetic ideas were in vogue at the school of Chartres,

and if the Old King is a replica of the Hermetic Perfect Man, as he is portrayed in the death scene of Hermes in the contemporary *Liber Alcidi*, the scene at the Grail Castle turns into an example of twelfth-century theosophy and "literary paganism."

**Wolfram's Kyot.** With his Grail story Chrétien left a rich legacy to medieval letters; yet his followers divided the heritage. On the one hand, starting with Robert de Borron, the romances of the Grail cycle displayed an ever greater emphasis on the Christian aspect; on the other hand, there stands, by itself, a masterpiece of literature, Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Parzival* (c. 1200–1212). Its narrative, to be sure, is modeled after Chrétien's *Perceval*. The differences of content, frequently at the frontier of religion, appear to be related to a difference of sources. But on the question of sources the two authors are not very helpful. Chrétien's puzzling remark about Count Philip's book has its counterpart in Wolfram: he mentions an enigmatic informant, Kyot, as having provided an Arabic model for the *Parzival* and, in addition, as having expressed his misgivings about Chrétien's choice of the (unspecified) source for *Perceval*. Questions of Kyot's provenance and even his mere existence have provoked varying hypotheses. On the basis of Wolfram's scattered remarks, of the Catharist beliefs ascribed to the Grail community, and of the striking role that the science of geomancy plays in *Parzival*, we have identified Kyot as Guillot (i.e., William) of Tudela, in Navarre, the author of the first part of the *Chanson de la Croisade albigeoise*. He was, as the author of this work, familiar with Catharism, was an adept of geomancy, had settled around 1199 in southern France, wrote in a Provençal French *Mischsprache*, and in all probability knew Arabic.

The source that Kyot transmitted to Wolfram and that Wolfram fused with Chrétien's story was, again in our analysis, the *Corpus Hermeticum* ascribed to Hermes Trismegistos. The treatises of this body of works communicate the mystical beliefs of a loosely structured brotherhood in second- and third-century Egypt, and they were written in Greek, known in Byzantium, and transmitted to the West through Arabic. The treatise that topically comes closest to Chrétien's Grail fantasy is the one on the soteriological vessel of Hermetism, the Krater. Wolfram recreated the Grail in Hermetic terms as an astral myth. In *The Krater* it is stated that "God filled a great krater with intellect and sent it down to earth"; similarly, in Wolfram's version, the Grail is an astral vessel whose powers derive from a wafer brought down by a dove. The radiant maiden who carries the vessel in Wolfram's Grail procession also represents a Hermetic concept: she is called *Repanse de Schoye*, which translates the Greek for "knowl-

edge of joy," the second most important virtue (after knowledge of God) in the process of spiritual rebirth.

The great religious conversion scene at the hermitage in the *Conte* also seems to be recreated by Wolfram in accord with his Hermetic inspiration. In the treatises of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, Hermes Trismegistos appears as the dominant figure: he is a saint, an ascetic, a teacher, a sage; he is the symbol of learning and the founder of astrological science. Wolfram's mystagogue, Trevrizent, appears to be a portrait of Hermes Trismegistos. He is a holy man, has written about religious doctrine, and is a teacher of astrology. This typological derivation accords with the etymological root of this name. The epithet *trismegistos*, "the thrice-great," was rendered in Arabic as "the thrice-sage," which was translated into medieval Latin as *triplex scientia* ("threefold wisdom") and into Old French whose obvious (although not documented) equivalent *treble escient* was, finally, corrupted by Wolfram into *Trevrizent*. [See Hermetism.]

The works whose resemblances to the Grail myth have been outlined here, the *Isis Book* for Chrétien and the *Corpus Hermeticum* for Wolfram, fall within the broad class of sources often subsumed under the label of "ancient rituals." Yet the web of homologies involving subject matter, structure, characters, text, key terms, and the ambience of mystery appears sufficiently dense to consider these works, on the borderline between religion and literature, as the specific models of the two Grail romances.

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HENRY and RENÉE KAHANE

**GRANET, MARCEL** (1884–1940), eminent French Sinologist. Granet was associated with the Durkheimian sociological tradition, and he wrote extensively on ancient Chinese religious institutions in relation to the development of Chinese civilization. He was born at Luc-en-Diois and, after demonstrating his outstanding scholastic abilities at several *lycées*, enrolled at the elite École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he studied European history and came under the sway of Émile Durkheim, who was offering lectures there. The crystallization of Granet's intellectual interests, along with his turn toward China, came about during his graduate work from 1908 to 1911 at the Foundation Thiers. His commitment to sociological theory deepened, and in looking for comparative material to extend his study of the code of honor in European feudalism, he took up the study of Chinese language and history under the direction of the renowned Sinologue Édouard Chavannes. From this point on, Granet's academic focus was fixed on China. As forecast by his initial interest in feudalism, he was continually concerned with the problem of the development and significance of ancient Chinese "feudal" institutions as interrelated with kinship, morality, and religion.

Granet's baptism as a Chinese scholar came when he studied the Chinese classical texts and commentaries in Peking during the years 1911 to 1913, the traumatic period of the republican overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty. He was to return to China only once more, for a brief stay in 1918, at the end of his World War I military service. Returning to Paris, he married in 1919, took his doctorate in 1920, and resumed writing and teaching in his prewar position at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. At about this same time he accepted an additional teaching appointment at the Sorbonne, and in 1926 he was elected to a prestigious chair at the École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes and was installed as the first director of the Institute des Hautes Études Chinoises. Throughout this period Granet gained fame for his brilliantly synthetic style as an author and teacher and was actively engaged in Parisian intellectual circles that included such notable colleagues as Marcel Mauss, Henri Maspero, Marc Bloch, Édouard Mestres, and Louis Gernet. After the fall of France in

1940, Granet took over the fifth section of the École Pratique from Marcel Mauss, who, because he was a Jew, was forced by the Nazis to relinquish his post. Granet's distinguished career was tragically ended shortly thereafter, when he died suddenly at the age of fifty-six.

Granet's importance stems both from his specific analysis of ancient Chinese religion and from the methodological implications these specialized investigations have for the overall interpretive study of religion. With regard to his approach to early Chinese tradition, especially as set forth in *Fêtes et chansons anciennes de la Chine* (1919; translated into English as *Festivals and Songs of Ancient China*, 1932) and *Danses et légendes de la Chine ancienne* (1926), Granet violated the traditional Sinological mold of strict philological and historical exegesis by considering the whole corpus of ancient Chinese documents, both the classics and nonorthodox texts, as fragmentary specimens of a comprehensive system of thought. The point of textual analysis, therefore, is not just to distinguish between true historical facts and false mythological embellishments but to accept the fact that an entire ancient text, or set of texts, reveals a particular logic that is ideologically grounded in mythic and ritual themes. In fact, for Granet and his contemporary Henri Maspero, the actual historical facts are often only emblematic scraps manipulated in accordance with a mythic and ritual code that, in turn, categorically reflects back on the forms and transformations of ancient social life.

From this admittedly controversial perspective, Granet attempted to show that the ordinarily ignored aspects of primitive, peasant, or folk tradition are embedded even in orthodox classical works and that these archaic social and religious patterns are crucial for understanding the fundamental "collective representations" that regulate all subsequent Chinese thought. In *Fêtes et chansons*, for example, Granet uncovered in the classical Chinese *Book of Odes* an ancient spring and autumn festival cycle that, he implied, is the basic categorical imperative for the later Chinese cosmological system of complementary dualism. Although he typically eschewed the use of comparative ethnographic material, in *Danses et légendes* he extended his earlier analysis, much in the spirit of Marcel Mauss's "Essai sur le don" (1923–1924), by demonstrating how the mythic and ritual themes of totemism, initiatory masculine brotherhoods, and potlatch that are found in the whole ensemble of ancient texts help to expose a specific pattern of cultural development that leads from ancient peasant society through a clan system of alternating prestations (i.e., a comprehensive system of social reciprocity) to a developed patriarchal feudal system.



Aside from other important technical writings that also touch on the same key theoretical issues, the culminating expression of Granet's approach to China in particular and to methodology in general is *La pensée chinoise* (1934). The significance of this stylistically graceful and keenly insightful example of *haute vulgarisation* is that, besides presenting a brilliant portrait of the distinctive character of the Chinese mind, it implicitly goes beyond a simple application of a Durkheimian sociology of knowledge by suggesting that the categories of Chinese thought may be viewed as a total transformational system of linguistic representations not wholly determined by the historical flux of social forms. As with his last work on kinship, *Catégories matrimoniales et relations de proximité dans la Chine ancienne* (1939), which the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss acknowledged as a precursor to his own methodology (*Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*, 1949), *La pensée* unconsciously points toward the modern development of structural hermeneutics, as is seen, for example, in Lévi-Strauss and, appropriately enough, in the work of Granet's students, the Indo-Europeanist Georges Dumézil and the paleohistorian André Leroi-Gourhan.

Granet has often been condemned by Sinologists as too much of a poetic generalist and by sociologists as too much of a narrow specialist. And it is true that his special genius was to fall between the two camps by respecting both philological limits and interpretive breadth. Granet was an artisan of texts who sometimes "gambled" with his speculative conclusions, and there is no doubt that much of his work on Chinese religion and society must be discarded or at least drastically revised. At the same time, however, recent scholarship indicates that Granet's pioneering methodological spirit and some of his specific findings still have considerable relevance for the study of traditional Chinese religion and the general sociology of religion.

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**Works about Granet.** There is no full-scale biographical or critical examination of Granet, but see the appreciative discussion and full bibliography by Maurice Freedman, "Marcel Granet, 1884–1940: Sociologist," in his translation of *The Religion*

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N. J. GIRARDOT

**GREAT MOTHER.** See Goddess Worship.

**GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH** is a broad term used to describe several historical expressions of the life of the Christian church. The terms "Greek Christianity" and "Greek church" are often used as synonyms for it, but with different nuances. This article seeks to clarify the term "Greek Orthodox church" by describing Greek Orthodox Christianity through its historical development to its twentieth-century expressions.

**The Early Church and Greek Christianity.** In their broadest meaning, "Greek church" and "Greek Christianity" can refer to the earliest development of Christianity as it moved from its Jewish matrix into the Greek cultural world of the Roman empire. In this sense it is contrasted to Jewish Christianity. Cultural life at the time was imbued with the Greek heritage: language, philosophy, religion, literature, and political values. In the early Christian tradition, "Greek" often meant "pagan" or "gentile," but it referred, as well, to Christians who came to the faith from a polytheistic background as distinguished from Jews who accepted the messiahship of Jesus. Much of the New Testament and the earliest Christian patristic documents were written in the Greek language and addressed the Greek mind. Thus, insofar as early Christianity was a religion of conversion, it reflected its immersion in Greek language and thought.

**Greek Christianity and Latin Christianity.** Greek Christianity soon came to be distinguished from other cultural embodiments of the Christian experience, especially Latin Christianity. The early development of Latin Christianity has its roots in the Greek tradition as exemplified by Irenaeus of Lyons (c. 130–c. 200). The Greek approach to Christianity was strongly theological, seeking to come to as careful a comprehension as was possible of the mysteries of the Christian faith. It expressed itself, as well, in rich worship traditions and

iconography, on the one hand, while cultivating monastic, ascetic, and mystical Christian traditions on the other. But by the late third century the special characteristics of the Latin cultural milieu began to influence the church in the West and formed a more practical, legally oriented Christian expression. Nevertheless, Greek and Latin Christianity at this period were not contrasting forms of the faith but were complementary to each other.

**Byzantium's Greek Christianity.** The Christian church in the Byzantine (East Roman) empire (325–1453) retained and developed the ancient traditions of Greek Christianity. Organizationally, this fostered more of the early church's sense of local autonomy, in which the council remained central to church life. The early Christian tradition, as expressed in the Greek fathers, Eastern monastic spirituality, early canonical practice, and liturgical life became normative for Byzantine Christianity. Distinct Christian traditions, however, differentiated from the Greek tradition, producing other ecclesial identities. These were the Oriental Orthodox churches, the Nestorian church, and the Roman Catholic church.

The Oriental Orthodox churches (each with a national component and traditionally characterized as monophysite) and the Nestorians became ecclesially distinguished from Greek Christianity by the fifth century. Latin Christianity, following its own inner dynamic, and strongly influenced by the rise of Frankish and Germanic political and economic power in western Europe, developed into a distinct ecclesiastical reality. This distinction was formalized with the Great Schism between the two great halves of Christendom that occurred over a period from the ninth to the early thirteenth century. The schism between Greek East and Latin West was made permanent by the sacking of Constantinople in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade. [See Schism, *article on Christian Schism.*] It then became a linguistic convention to refer to the church in the West as "the Roman Catholic church" and the church in the East as "the Greek Orthodox church."

**Greek Orthodoxy and Slavic Orthodoxy.** With the rise of Slavic Christianity, a new ethos affected the identity of the Greek Orthodox church. This development was a direct result of Greek Orthodox missionary policy in the ninth through the twelfth century, which fostered indigenous cultures, liturgical languages, and clergy in each mission church. Originally, the church hierarchy was composed of Greeks. But each of the various Slavic and other peoples eventually obtained their own hierarchies. All of these new churches, however, received the Christian faith in its Greek form (in contradistinction to

the Latin/Roman form). But while there was a deep-rooted spiritual identity with the ancient Greek Orthodox tradition of Christianity, there came into being a new Slavic identity within these churches. [See Russian Orthodox Church.]

What intensified the mix of traditional Greek Orthodox Christianity and the Orthodox Christianity of local nonethnic Greeks was the *millet* system put in place by the Muslim conquerors of the Byzantine empire (1453). As a means of governing the Orthodox Christian peoples, as well as all other ethnic-religious groups, the Muslims understood them to be one people, or nation (the *millet*). The patriarch of Constantinople was recognized as the head of the Orthodox Christian "nation" with civil as well as religious duties. Greek metropolitans and bishops were appointed over the various Orthodox peoples to exercise this new administration, which included responsibilities for collecting taxes, assuring the observance of the law, and the loyalty of the Orthodox Christian populations to the central government. The combination of spiritual and secular responsibilities created many difficulties and occasioned abuses, but it also provided many opportunities for service to Orthodox unity. Thus, the ecumenical patriarchate served as a focal point in the defense of the Orthodox faith from incursions of Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries intent on proselytizing the Orthodox during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Numerous councils were held for this purpose. With only a few exceptions, all of the documents arising out of this movement were written originally in Greek.

At the same time, the ecumenical patriarchate, both as a representative of the Turkish authorities and as an agency of Greek ethnic influence upon the indigenous cultures of these Orthodox peoples, began to be perceived in some ways as an alien force. When, in the first half of the nineteenth century, various national wars of independence were initiated against the Muslim Ottoman empire, they were often concurrently actions of independence from the Greek cultural influence of the patriarchate of Constantinople as well as from its political influence. This led to the formation of independent (autocephalous) national churches. A partial exception was the Church of Greece. Its separation from the ecumenical patriarchate was forced by political considerations only.

Generally, the new order of things required a church organization and consciousness that would demarcate the newly organized autocephalous churches from the ethnic Greek traditional character of the ecumenical patriarchate, while concurrently acknowledging fully its historical "ecumenical" character as *primus inter pares*

("first among equals") of the Orthodox world. In this manner, the Orthodox churches of Russia (1448), Serbia (1879), Romania (1885), Bulgaria (1870), Czechoslovakia (1922), Finland (1923), Poland (1924), and Albania (1937) came into being. Thus, for example, today it is possible to differentiate Greek Orthodoxy from Slavic Orthodoxy and Romanian Orthodoxy as cultural realities within the canonically unified Eastern Orthodox church.

**Greek Orthodox Churches Today.** In the modern and ethnic sense, Greek Orthodoxy is understood to include those churches whose language, liturgy, and spirit keep Orthodoxy and the Greek ethnic cultural tradition united. These churches are the Church of Greece, the patriarchate of Constantinople (in part because it is also the international center of world Orthodoxy), the patriarchate of Alexandria, the patriarchate of Jerusalem, the Church of Cyprus, and the ethnic Greek diaspora jurisdictions throughout the world.

**The Church of Greece.** The most restricted meaning of "Greek Orthodox church" refers to the autocephalous Church of Greece. Prior to the Greek War of Independence, which began in 1821, Christianity in what is now known as Greece was, for most of its history, part of the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople. Even though the church was self-declared autocephalous in 1833, it understands itself to be in direct continuity with the founding of Christianity in Thessalonica, Philippi, Corinth, Athens, Nicopolis, and other Greek cities by the apostle Paul. Given the Orthodox tradition that ecclesial order often follows civil governmental patterns, over the centuries the church in Greece has come under various patterns of ecclesial jurisdiction. Following the early period, when metropolitan sees had been established in the major cities, Greece came under Constantinople, where it stayed—with a few interruptions—until the nineteenth century. Originally, the autocephalous Church of Greece included only the southern part of the modern nation of Greece, since only that area was liberated in 1830. Over the years, as the Greek nation expanded, the church also grew in territorial size and numbers. But this equation of the boundaries of the state and the jurisdiction of the Church of Greece is not absolute. Several areas of the nation of Greece are ecclesiastically under the control of the ecumenical patriarchate: the Dodecanese, Crete, and Mount Athos. The Orthodox church is the official church of Greece, while at the same time freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution. The vast majority of Greece's population of over nine million people are baptized Orthodox Christians. In addition to the archbishop of Athens, there are eighty-five bishops in

seventy-seven dioceses and almost seventy-five hundred parishes.

**The patriarchate of Constantinople.** With the establishment of the modern secular Turkish state in 1921, under Kemal Ataturk, the position of the patriarchate of Constantinople has suffered severe weakening. Following the destruction of the Greek military forces in the Greco-Turkish war of 1922, an erosion of the Greek population of Asia Minor has continued unabated. It began with the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey as mandated in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. Only the Greek population located in western Thrace and Constantinople (Istanbul) was exempted from the removal to Greece. The treaty also guaranteed the independence, freedom, and permanence of the patriarchate in its location in Constantinople, but it soon became a pawn in the political conflicts of Greece and Turkey. The conflict of Turkish and Greek interests in Cyprus has been the occasion for the patriarchate to become a "pressure point" against Greek interests.

In 1955, after years of general harassment, government-inspired riots wrought havoc on the Greek community of Istanbul, in which not only private homes and shops but churches, cemeteries, schools, and other institutions were vandalized and destroyed. Economic and administrative pressures forced a large part of the Greek Orthodox population to leave the last remaining enclave of Greek Orthodoxy in Turkey. Only a few thousand now remain, as the patriarchate clings to its legal rights to remain in its historic city.

The patriarchate's numerical strength resides in the numerous Greek Orthodox dioceses, or "eparchies," within its jurisdiction in the diaspora. In addition to four eparchies in Turkey, the Patriarchate of Constantinople exercises jurisdiction over the Archdiocese of Crete, with eight metropolitan sees; the four metropolitan sees of the Dodecanese; the historic monasteries of Patmos and Mount Athos; the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, with ten dioceses; the Archdiocese of Australia, with five archdiocesan districts; the Archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britain and the Exarchate for Western Europe, Ireland, and Malta, with eight bishops, in addition to the archbishop; the Metropolis of France and the Exarchate of Iberia, with three metropolitan regions; the Metropolis of Germany and the Exarchate of Central Europe, with three bishops and the archbishop; the Metropolis of Austria and the Exarchate for Italy and Hungary; the Metropolis of Belgium and the Exarchate for the Low Countries, with the archbishop and one bishop; the Metropolis of Sweden, Scandinavia, and the Northern Lands, with one bishop; the Metropolis of New Zealand

and the Exarchate for India, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, with the archbishop; the Metropolis of Switzerland and the Exarchate of Europe, with the metropolitan who also presides over the Orthodox Center at Chambesy, Switzerland. The Ecumenical Patriarchate maintains a permanent representative at the World Council of Churches in Geneva. Although there are some exceptions, nearly all of the people making up the congregations of these ecclesiastical jurisdictions are of Greek background.

**The patriarchate of Alexandria.** Egypt was one of the first areas to come under the influence of Islam in the eighth century. The larger portion of the Christian population that survived belonged to the Coptic church. Nevertheless, the Greek Orthodox patriarchate of Alexandria continued to exist in Egypt throughout the centuries. Its major constituency consisted of a well-organized Greek community that was strongly entrenched in leadership positions in commerce, finance, and education. Numerous educational and cultural institutions were supported by the Greek community. In addition the patriarchate of Alexandria had canonical control over all of Orthodoxy on the African continent. By and large these jurisdictions were composed of Greeks in the various African nations and some missionary churches. The numerical strength of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in Egypt was broken with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. The Greek population of Egypt lost much of its economic and social status and began to emigrate. Nevertheless, in the 1980s the patriarchate continued to serve about 350,000 Orthodox Christians whose members worship in the Greek, Arabic, and several native East African languages. There are thirteen metropolitan sees.

**The patriarchate of Jerusalem.** Though severely tried throughout the years of the Muslim conquests of the Holy Land, the patriarchate of Jerusalem was able to sustain itself until the Crusaders conquered the city of Jerusalem in 1099. The Greek Orthodox patriarch was expelled and replaced with a Latin patriarch. This situation lasted until 1177. In 1517 the area came under the control of the sultan in Constantinople while the church continued to struggle to maintain its rights to the holy places of Jerusalem. In the mid-nineteenth century, international agreements affirmed the rights of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate over the ancient churches of the Holy Sepulcher. Changing political circumstances in the area have required the negotiation of agreements regarding the status of the patriarchate with the British, Jordanians, and Israelis. At the beginning of the 1980s, the patriarchate counted eighty thou-

sand members with sixteen bishops and maintained under its jurisdiction the archdiocese of Sinai, in present-day Egypt.

**The Church of Cyprus.** The Church of Cyprus, consisting exclusively of Greek Cypriots, received its independence as an autocephalous church through the eighth canon of the Council of Ephesus (431), but its history goes back to New Testament times (*Acts* 11:19). Its bishops participated in the Council of Nicaea (325). Although the Orthodox church suffered severe repression during the period of Latin domination (1191–1571), it retained its Greek Orthodox character. Under the Turks (1571–1878) the Orthodox hierarchy was fully acknowledged. The Orthodox church is very close to the people of Cyprus, especially since the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island nation when almost half of its members were made refugees in their own land. In 1985, the Church of Cyprus counted more than 440,000 members with six dioceses, seven bishops, and twelve hundred priests.

**The Greek Orthodox diaspora.** The Greek Orthodox Christians found throughout the world today in traditionally non-Orthodox lands are primarily under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The various ecclesial jurisdictions are mentioned above. Those in English-speaking lands are the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, the Archdiocese of Australia, the Archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britain, and the Metropolis of New Zealand. Of these, the American jurisdiction is the largest.

The Archdiocese of North and South America was established in 1922. Sixty years later it consisted of the archdiocese and ten dioceses with 488 parishes, 569 churches, 530 priests, and 670,000 duly recorded members, although it serves a much larger number of persons who identify themselves as Greek Orthodox Christians. It supported 24 parochial schools and 412 afternoon Greek schools. The church also has two institutions of higher learning, Hellenic College and Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology. It maintains an orphanage and several old-age homes. In 1984 it supported 518 catechetical schools for children and 186 adult religious education programs. Nearly every parish has a "Philothonos [Friends of the Poor] Society" and one or more youth groups. It publishes a bimonthly newspaper, *The Orthodox Observer*, and a scholarly theological journal, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, through the Holy Cross School of Theology. This pattern of organization and functioning is the model for the other churches of the Greek Orthodox diaspora.

[For discussion of the distinctive beliefs and practices of Eastern Orthodoxy, see Eastern Christianity.]

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STANLEY SAMUEL HARAKAS

**GREEK RELIGION.** [*This entry focuses on Greek religion during the Archaic and Classical periods, from the eighth to the fourth century BCE. Other religious systems of the ancient Mediterranean region are treated in Aegean Religions, which discusses the earlier cultures of Cycladic, Minoan, and Mycenaean peoples, and in Hellenistic Religions, which surveys the later history of religions in the Greek-speaking world.*]

The Greek religion of the Archaic and Classical periods (eighth–fourth century BCE) presented several characteristic traits that should be borne in mind. Like other polytheistic cults, Greek religion was a stranger

to any form of revelation: it knew neither prophet nor messiah. It was deeply rooted in a tradition in which religion was intimately interwoven with all the other elements of Hellenic civilization, all that gave to the Greece of the city-states its distinctive character: from the language, the gestures, and the manner of living, feeling, and thinking to the system of values and the rules of communal life. This religious tradition was neither uniform nor strictly defined; its nature was not dogmatic in any way. It had no sacerdotal cast, no specialized clergy, no church, and no sacred book in which the truth was fixed once and for all. It had no creed that gave the faithful a coherent set of beliefs about the beyond.

**Mythology and Religion.** On what basis, then, did the deep-seated religious convictions of the Greeks lie, and how were they expressed? As their beliefs were not based on doctrine, they did not entail for the devout any obligation to adhere, for fear of impiety, on all points and to the letter to a body of defined truths. It sufficed for a person performing rites to give credence to a vast repertory of stories learned in childhood. Each of these stories existed in many versions, allowing a wide margin of interpretation. It was within the context of this narrative tradition that beliefs about the gods developed and that a consensus emerged as to their nature, their role, and their requirements. Rejecting this core of common beliefs would have been, for a Greek, like giving up the Greek language or the Greek way of life. However, for all that, the Greeks were fully aware that other languages and other religions existed. They could, without falling into disbelief, remain objective enough about their own religious system to engage in a free and critical reflection on it, and they did not hesitate to do so.

But how did they preserve and transmit this mass of traditional "knowledge" about the social reality of the otherworld—the families of the gods, their genealogies, their adventures, their conflicts or agreements, their powers, their spheres and modes of action, their prerogatives, and the honors that were due them? Where language was concerned, essentially in two ways. First, through a purely oral tradition maintained in each household, especially by women: nurses' tales or old grandmothers' fables, as Plato called them, were absorbed by children from the cradle. These stories, or *muthoi*—which were all the more familiar for having been heard by children at the age when they were learning to speak—helped shape the mental framework in which the Greeks imagined the divine, situated it, and conceived it.

As adults, the Greeks learned about the world of the

gods through the voices of the poets. Through the tales about the gods, the remoteness and strangeness of the otherworld took a familiar, intelligible form. Performed with a musical instrument, the poets' songs were not heard in private, intimate surroundings, as were the tales told to children, but at banquets, official festivities, and important competitions and games. The rise of a written narrative tradition modified and preserved the very ancient tradition of oral poetry and came to occupy a central place in the social and spiritual life of Greece. The poets' songs were not a luxury reserved for the learned elite, nor were they merely personal entertainment for an audience; they functioned as a real institution that kept alive the social memory, as an instrument for the preservation and communication of knowledge. As a verbal form that could be memorized easily, poetry expressed and fixed the fundamental traits that went beyond the particularities of each city and were the foundation of a common culture for all of Hellas—especially those traits reflected in religious representations of the gods proper, daemons, heroes, or the dead. Had it not been for all the works of the epic, lyrical, and dramatic poetry, we could speak of Greek cults in the plural instead of a unified Greek religion. In this respect, Homer and Hesiod played prominent roles: their narratives about the divine beings acquired an almost canonical value and functioned as sources of reference for the authors who came after them as well as for the public that listened to or read them.

Certainly, the poets that succeeded Homer and Hesiod were not as influential. As long as the city-state remained alive, however, poetic activity continued to act as a mirror, reflecting the image of the inhabitants and allowing them to perceive their dependence on the sacred and to define themselves with reference to the immortal. Poetic activity gave the community of mortals its cohesiveness, its continuity, and its permanence.

Consequently, a problem arises for the historian of religions. If poetry was the vehicle through which the attributes of divine creatures, their roles, and their relationships with mortal creatures were expressed, and if it fell to each poet to present, with occasional modifications, the divine and heroic legends that, taken together, constituted an encyclopedia of knowledge about the otherworld, should these poetic tales and dramatized narrations be considered as religious documents or be given a purely literary value? That is, do myths and mythology, in the forms given them by Greek civilization, belong to the field of religion or to that of literary history?

For the scholars of the Renaissance, as for the great majority of the scholars of the nineteenth century, the reply was self-evident. In their eyes, Greek religion was,

above all, an abundant treasure of legendary tales transmitted to us by the Greek authors (assisted by the Romans) in which the spirit of paganism remained alive long enough to offer the modern reader in a Christian world the surest path to a clear view of ancient polytheism.

Actually, in taking this standpoint, they simply walked in the footsteps of the ancients. In the sixth century BCE, Theagenes of Rhegium and Hekataios inaugurated a critical approach to the traditional myths, as recounted by Homer in particular. They subjected these stories to a reasoned examination or applied to them a method of allegorical exegesis. In the fifth century, work was begun that would be systematically pursued in essentially two directions. First, chroniclers undertook the collection and inventory of all the legendary oral traditions peculiar to a city or a sanctuary. Like the *atthidographs* of Athens, these scholars attempted to set down in writing the history of a city and its people from its earliest beginnings, going back to the fabulous time when the gods mingled with men, intervening directly in their affairs to found cities and to beget the first reigning dynasties. Thus was made possible, from the Hellenistic period onward, the enterprise of scholarly compilation that led to the drafting of veritable repositories of mythology: the *Bibliotheca* of "Apollodorus," the *Fabulae* and *Poetica Astronomica* of Hyginus, book 5 of the *Bibliotheca historica* of Diodorus Siculus, the *Metamorphoses* of Antoninus Liberalis, the three miscellaneous collections known as the *Mythographi Vaticani*.

Parallel to this effort, which aimed at a systematic summary of the legends common to all Greeks, there became apparent a certain hesitation and uneasiness—already perceptible among the poets—about how much credit should be accorded to the scandalous episodes that seemed incompatible with the eminent dignity of the divine. But it was with the development of history and philosophy that interrogation reached full scale; from then on criticism assailed myth in general. Subjected to the investigations of the historian and the reasonings of the philosopher, the fable, as fable, was deemed incompetent to speak of the divine in a valid and authentic fashion. Thus, at the same time that they applied themselves, with the greatest care, to setting down their legendary heritage, the Greeks were led to challenge the myths, sometimes in the most radical manner, and to raise the problem of the truth—or falsehood—of the myth. The solutions varied from rejection, or pure and simple negation, of the myths to the multiple forms of interpretation that permitted them to be "saved"; for example, a banal reading might be replaced with learned hermeneutics that brought to light a secret lesson underlying a narrative and analogous to

those fundamental truths—the privilege of the wise—which, when known, reveal the only real sure access to the divine. Yet, from one point of view, no matter if the ancients were carefully collecting myths, if they interpreted or criticized them or even rejected them in the name of another, truer kind of knowledge—it all came down to recognizing the role generally assigned to myths in the Greek city-state, namely, to function as instruments of information about the otherworld.

During the first half of the twentieth century, however, historians of Greek religion took a new direction. Many refused to consider the legendary traditions as strictly religious documents that could be useful as evidence of the real state of the beliefs and feelings of the faithful. For these scholars, religion lay in the organization of the cult, the calendar of sacred festivals, the liturgies celebrated for each god in his sanctuaries. Next to these ritual practices, which constitute the “real” religious compartments, the myth appears as a literary outgrowth, a mere fabulation. As a more or less gratuitous fantasy of the poets, myth could be only remotely related to the inner convictions of the believer, who was engaged in the concrete practice of cult ceremonies and in a series of daily acts that brought him into direct contact with the sacred and made him a pious man.

In the chapter on Greece in *Histoire générale des religions* (1944), A.-J. Festugière warned the reader in these terms:

No doubt poets and sculptors, obeying the requisites of their art, were inclined to represent a society of highly characterized gods; form, attributes, genealogy, history, everything is clearly defined, but the cult and popular feeling reveal other tendencies. Thus, from the beginning, the field of the religious is enclosed. In order to understand fully the true Greek religion, forgetting therefore the mythology of the poets and of art, let us turn to the cult—to the earliest cults.

What are the reasons for this exclusive bias in favor of the cult and for the importance attributed to its most archaic elements? There are two, very distinct reasons. The first is of a general nature and has to do with the personal philosophy of the scholar and with his idea of religion. The second is a response to more technical requirements: the progress of classical studies—in particular, the strides made in archaeology and epigraphy—opened new areas of investigation, besides the mythological field, to students of antiquity. These advances led scholars to call into question, and sometimes even modify profoundly, the image of Greek religion furnished by literary tradition alone.

Today, the rejection of mythology is based on an anti-intellectualist presumption in religious matters. Schol-

ars of this standpoint believe that behind the diversity of religions—just as beyond the plurality of the gods of polytheism—lies a common element that forms the primitive and universal core of all religious experience. This common element, of course, cannot be found in the always multiple and varying constructions that the mind elaborates in its attempt to picture the divine; it is placed, therefore, outside of intelligence, in the sacred terror that man feels each time he is compelled to recognize, in its irrecusable strangeness, the presence of the supernatural. The Greeks had a word for this effective, immediate, and irrational reaction in the presence of the sacred: *thambos* (“reverential awe”). Such awe would be the basis of the earliest cults, the diverse forms taken by the rites answering, from the same origin, to the multiplicity of circumstances and human needs.

Similarly, it is supposed that behind the variety of names, figures, and functions proper to each divinity, a ritual brought into play the same general experience of the divine, considered a suprahuman power (*kreitton*). This indeterminate divine being (Gr., *theion*, or *daimonion*), underlying the specific manifestations of particular gods, took diverse forms according to the desires and fears to which the cult had to respond. From this common fabric of the divine, the poets, in turn, cut singular characters; they brought them to life, imagining for each a series of dramatic adventures in what Festugière does not hesitate to call a “divine novel.” On the other hand, for every act of the cult, there is no other god but the one invoked. From the moment he is addressed, “in him is concentrated all divine force; he alone is considered. Most certainly, in theory he is not the only god since there are others and one knows it. But in practice, in the actual state of mind of the worshiper, the god invoked supplants at that moment all the others” (Festugière, 1944, p. 50).

Thus the refusal of some scholars to take myth into account becomes clear: it leads exactly to that which from the beginning was meant, more or less consciously, to be proved. By effacing the differences and the oppositions that distinguish the gods from one another, any true difference is effaced between polytheisms of the Greek type and Christian monotheism, which then becomes a model. This flattening out of religious realities to make them fit a single mold cannot satisfy the historian. Must not his first concern be, on the contrary, to define the specific traits that give each great religion a character of its own and that make it, in its unicity, an entirely original system? Apart from reverential awe and a diffused feeling of the divine, the Greek religion presents itself as a vast symbolic construction, complex and coherent, that allows room for

thought, as well as feeling, on all levels and in all aspects, including the cult. Myth played its part in this system in the same way as ritual practices and representations of the divine. Indeed, myth, rite, and figurative portrayals were the three modes of expression—verbal, gestural, and iconic—by which the Greeks manifested their religious experience. Each constituted a specific language that, even in its association with the two others, responded to particular needs and functioned autonomously.

The work of Georges Dumézil and Claude Lévi-Strauss on myth led to a totally different presentation of the problem of Greek mythology: How should the texts be read? What status did they assume in Greek religious life? The days when one could discuss myth as if it were a poet's individual fantasy, a free and gratuitous romantic invention, are gone. Even in the variations to which it lent itself, a myth obeyed the severe constraints of the community. During the Hellenistic period, when an author, such as Callimachus, wrote a new version of a legendary theme, he was not free to modify the elements or to recompose the scenario as he pleased. He belonged to a tradition; whether he conformed to it exactly or deviated on a certain point, he was restrained and supported by it and had to refer to it, at least implicitly, if he wanted the public to hear his tale. As Louis Gernet (1932) noted, even when a narrator seemed to have completely invented a tale, he was actually working according to the rules of a "legendary imagination" that had its own functioning, internal necessities, and coherence. Without even knowing it, the author was obliged to submit to the rules of the play of associations, oppositions, and homologies that had been established by a series of previous versions of the tale and that composed the conceptual framework common to the type of narrative. To have meaning, each variation of a myth had to be linked to, as well as compared with, the other variations. Together, they composed one semantic space, whose particular configuration appears as the characteristic mark of Greek legendary tradition. By analyzing a myth in all its versions, or a corpus of diverse myths centered around the same theme, we are able to explore this structured and organized mental space.

Interpretation of a myth, therefore, operates along lines different from those characterizing the study of literature and must meet other goals. It seeks to determine the conceptual architecture of the very composition of the fable, the important frameworks of classification that are involved, the choices made in the division and the coding of reality, and the network of relationships that the story, by its narrative procedures, establishes between the various elements of the plot. In

short, the mythologist seeks to reconstitute what Dumézil calls the "ideology," that is, the conceptualization and appreciation of the great forces that in their mutual relationships and their perfect equilibrium govern the natural and supernatural worlds, men, and society and makes them what they ought to be.

In this sense myth, which should not be confused with ritual or subordinated to it, does not conflict with ritual as much as has been supposed. In its verbal form, myth is more explicit than rite, more didactic, more apt to theorize. It thus contains the germ of that knowledge that—on another level of language and thought—is the concern of philosophy when it formulates its assertions using concepts and terms that are removed from any reference to the gods of the common religion. The cult is more engaged in considerations of a utilitarian nature. But it is no less symbolic: a ritual ceremony unfolds according to a scenario whose episodes are as strictly organized and as fraught with meaning as the sequences of a narrative. Every detail of this *mise-en-scène*, in which the worshiper in defined circumstances undertakes to act out his relationship with one god or another, has an intellectual dimension and goal: it implies a certain idea of the god, the conditions for his approach, and the results that the various participants, according to their role and status, have the right to expect from this means of entering into symbolic commerce with the divinity.

Figurative representation is of the same nature. Although it is true that during the Classical period the Greeks gave a privileged place in their temples to the great anthropomorphic statues of the gods, they were familiar with all the forms of divine manifestation: an-*iconic* symbols, either natural objects, such as a tree or a rough stone, or products shaped by the human hand (e.g., a post, a pillar, a scepter); diverse *iconic* figures, such as a small, rough-hewn idol whose form was completely hidden by clothes; monstrous figures mingling the bestial and the human; a simple mask whose hollow face and fascinating eyes evoked the divine; a fully human statue. These figures were not all equivalent, nor were they indiscriminately suited to all the gods or to all aspects of the same god. Each had its own way of translating certain aspects of the divine, of "making present" the beyond, of locating and inserting the sacred in the space of the here and now. Thus, a pillar or post driven into the ground had neither the same function nor the same symbolic value as an idol that was ritually moved from one place to another; as an image locked away in a secret repository, its legs bound to prevent its escape; or as a great cult statue whose permanent installation in a temple demonstrated the lasting presence of the god in his house. Each form of represen-



tation implied for the specific divinity a particular way of making himself known to man and of exercising, through his images, his supernatural powers.

If, following various modalities, myth, image, and ritual all operate on the same level of symbolic thought, it is understandable that they combine to make each religion a complete whole in which, to quote Dumézil in *L'héritage indo-européen à Rome* (Paris, 1949, p. 64), "concepts, images and actions fit together and by their relations form a kind of net in which, potentially, all the matter of human experience must be caught and distributed."

**The World of the Gods.** To find the lines of the net, to pick out the configurations shaped by its meshes: such must be the historian's task. In the case of Greek religion, this proves to be far more difficult than with the other Indo-European religions, in which the pattern of the three functions—sovereignty, war, and fertility—is maintained. Where it is clearly attested, this structure serves as the framework and keystone of the entire edifice and provides a unity that seems to be lacking in Greek religion.

Indeed, Greek religion presents an organization so complex that it excludes recourse to a single reading code for the entire system. To be sure, a Greek god is defined by the set of relationships that unite or put him in opposition to other divinities of the pantheon, but the theological structures thus brought to light are too numerous and, especially, too diverse to be integrated into the same pattern. According to the city, the sanctuary, or the moment, each god enters into a varied network of combinations with the others. Groups of gods do not conform to a single model that is more important than others; they are organized into a plurality of configurations that do not correspond exactly but compose a table with several entries and many axes, the reading of which varies according to the starting point and the perspective adopted.

Take the example of Zeus. His name clearly reveals his origin, based on the same Indo-European root (meaning "to shine") as Latin *dies/deus* and the Vedic *dyeus*. Like the Indian Dyaus Pitr̥ or the Roman Jupiter (Iovpater), Father Zeus (Zeus Pater) is the direct descendant of the great Indo-European sky god. However, the gap between the status of the Zeus of Greece and that of his corresponding manifestations in India and in Rome is so evident, so marked, that even when comparing the most assuredly similar gods one is compelled to recognize that the Indo-European tradition has completely disappeared from the Greek religious system.

Zeus does not appear in any trifunctional group comparable to the pre-Capitoline Jupiter-Mars-Quirinus, in which sovereignty (Jupiter) is contrasted with the ac-

tion of the warrior (Mars) and the functions of fertility and prosperity (Quirinus). Nor is he associated, as Mitra is with Varuṇa, with a sovereign power that expresses not only legal and juridical aspects but also the values of magic and violence. Ouranos, the dark night sky, who has sometimes been compared with Varuṇa, is paired in myth with Gaia, the earth, not with Zeus.

As sovereign, Zeus embodies greater strength than all the other gods. He is the supreme power: with Zeus on one side and all the assembled Olympians on the other, it is Zeus who prevails. Confronted by Kronos, whom he dethroned, and the Titan gods, whom he fought and imprisoned, Zeus represents justice, the fair distribution of honors and offices, respect for the privileges to which each person is entitled, concern for what is due even to the weakest. In him and by him, order and power, law and violence are reconciled and conjoined. "All kings come from Zeus," wrote Hesiod in the seventh century BCE, not to oppose monarch, warrior, and peasant, but to affirm that there is no true king among men who does not set himself the task of quietly making justice triumph. "From Zeus are the kings," echoes Callimachus four centuries later, but this kinship between kings and the royalty of Zeus does not fit into a trifunctional framework. It crowns a series of similar statements that link a particular category of men to the divinity who acts as its patron: blacksmiths to Hephaistos, soldiers to Ares, hunters to Artemis, and singers accompanied by the lyre to Phoibos (Apollo).

When Zeus enters into the composition of a triad, as he does with Poseidon and Hades, it is to delimit by their apportionment the cosmic levels, or domains: the heavens to Zeus, the sea to Poseidon, the subterranean world to Hades, the surface of the earth to all three. When he is paired with a goddess, the dyad thus formed brings out different aspects of the sovereign god, depending on the female divinity who is his counterpart. Joined with Gaia ("earth"), for example, Zeus is the celestial principle, male and generative, whose fertilizing rain reaches deep in the ground to animate young sprouts of vegetation. United with Hera in a lawful marriage that engenders a legitimate line, Zeus becomes the patron of the institution of matrimony, which, by civilizing the union of man and woman, serves as the foundation of every social organization; the couple formed by the king and queen is the exemplary model. Associated with Metis, his first wife (whom he swallowed and assimilated entirely), Zeus the king is identified with cunning intelligence and with the underhanded shrewdness needed to win power and to keep it. He is able to ensure the permanence of his reign and to protect his throne from traps, snares, and surprises, for he is always prompt to foresee the unexpected and to

ward off dangers. Taking Themis for his second wife, he fixes, once and for all, the order of the seasons, the balance of human groups in the city (order and balance represented by the Horai, daughters of Zeus and Themis), and the ineluctable course of the Fates (the Moirai). He becomes cosmic law, social harmony, and destiny.

Father of the gods and men, as he is designated already in the *Iliad*—not because he sired or created all beings but because he exercises over each of them an authority as absolute as that of the head of a family over his household—Zeus shares with Apollo the epithet *patrōios* (“the ancestral”). Together with Athena Apaturia, Zeus, as Phratrios, ensures the integration of individuals into the diverse groups that compose the civic community. In the cities of Ionia, he makes of all the citizens authentic brothers, celebrating in their respective phratries, as in one family, the festival of the Apaturia, that is, of those who acknowledge themselves children of the same father. In Athens, joined with Athena Polias, Zeus is Polieus, patron of the city. Master and guarantor of political life, Zeus forms a couple with the goddess, whose function as titular power of Athens is more precise and, one might say, more localized. Athena watches over her city as a particular city distinguished from the other Greek city-states. She favors Athens, according to the dual privileges of concord within the city and victory outside of it.

Celestial and judicious wielder of supreme power, founder of order, guarantor of justice, governor of marriage, father and ancestor, and patron of the city, the tableau of the sovereignty of Zeus includes still other dimensions. His authority is domestic as well as political. In close connivance with Hestia, Zeus has supreme control not only over each private hearth—that fixed center where the family has its roots—but also over the common household of the state in the heart of the city, the Hestia Koinē, where the ruling magistrates keep watch. Zeus Herkeios, the god of the courtyard and the household, circumscribes the domain within which the head of the house has the right to exercise his power; Zeus Klarios, the divider of estates, delineates and sets boundaries, leaving Apollo and Hermes in charge of protecting the gates and controlling the entries.

As Zeus Hikesios and Zeus Xenios, he receives the suppliant and the guest, introduces them into the unfamiliar house, and ensures their safety by welcoming them to the household altar, although he does not assimilate them entirely to the members of the family. Zeus Ktesios, the guardian of possession and wealth, watches over the property of the head of the house. As an Olympian and a celestial god, Zeus opposes Hades; yet as Ktesios, Zeus’s altar is deep in the cellar, and he

takes on the appearance of a serpent, the most chthonic of animals. The sovereign can thus incorporate that chthonic part of the universe normally controlled by the powers of the underworld but occasionally incarnated by Zeus himself in a kind of internal tension, polarity, or even a double image. The celestial Zeus, who sits at the summit of the shining ether, is mirrored by a Zeus Chthonios, Zeus Katachthonios, Zeus Meilichios, a Zeus of the dark underworld, who is present in the depths of the earth where he nurtures, in the proximity of the dead, the riches or retributions that are ready, if he is willing, to surge into the light led by the chthonic Hermes.

Zeus connects heaven and earth by means of the rain (Zeus Ombrios, Huetios, Ikmaios, “rainy,” “damp”), the winds (Zeus Ourios, Euanemos, “windy,” “of a good wind”), and the lightning (Zeus Astrapaios, Bronton, Keraunios, “wielder of thunderbolts,” “thunderer”). He ensures communication between high and low through signs and oracles, which transmit messages from the gods of heaven to mortals on the earth. According to the Greeks, their most ancient oracle was an oracle of Zeus at Dodona. There he established his sanctuary at the site of a great oak, which belonged to him and which rose straight as the tallest column toward heaven. The rustling of the leaves of the sacred oak above their heads provided the consultants with the answer to their questions to the sovereign of heaven. Moreover, when Apollo pronounces his oracles in the sanctuary of Delphi, he speaks not so much for himself as in the name of his father, with whom he remains associated and, in his oracular function, seems to obey. Apollo is a prophet, but he is the prophet of Zeus: he voices only the will and decrees of the Olympian so that here—at the navel of the world—the word of the king and father may resound in the ears of those who can hear.

The different epithets of Zeus, wide as their range may be, are not incompatible. They all belong to one field and emphasize its multiple dimensions. Taken together, they define the contours of divine sovereignty as conceived by the Greeks; they mark its boundaries and delimit its constituent domains; they indicate the various aspects that the power of the king-god may assume and exercise in more or less close alliance (according to circumstances) with the other divinities.

An entirely different matter is the Zeus of Crete, the Kretagenes, Diktaios, or Idaios, the youthful god whose infancy was associated with the Curetes, with their dances and orgiastic rites and the din of their clashing weapons. It was said of this Zeus that he was born in Crete and that he also died there; his tomb was shown on the island. But the Greek Zeus, in spite of his many facets, can have nothing in common with a dying god.

In the *Hymn to Zeus*, Callimachus firmly rejects the tradition of these stories as foreign to his god, "ever great, ever king." The real Zeus was not born in Crete, as those lying Cretans told it: "They have gone so far as to build you a tomb, O King; Nay, you never died; You are for eternity."

In the eyes of the Greeks, immortality, which sets a rigorous boundary between the gods and men, was such a fundamental trait of the divine that the ruler of Olympus could in no way be likened to one of the Oriental deities who die and are reborn. During the second millennium, the framework of the Indo-European religious system, whose influence is reflected in the name of Zeus, may well have collapsed among those people speaking a Greek dialect, who came in successive waves to settle Helladic soil and whose presence is attested as far as Knossos in Crete from the end of the fifteenth century BCE. Contacts, exchanges, and intermixing were numerous and continuous. There were borrowings from the Aegean and Minoan religions, just as there were from the Oriental and Thracio-Phrygian cults when the Greeks later expanded throughout the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, between the fourteenth and the twelfth centuries, most of the gods revered by the Achaeans—and whose names figure on the Linear B tablets from Knossos and Pylos—are the same ones encountered in the classical Greek pantheon: Zeus, Poseidon, Eneaios (Ares), Paean (Apollo), Dionysos, Hera, Athena, Artemis, and the Two Queens, that is, Demeter and Kore.

The religious world of the Indo-European invaders of Greece could well have been modified and opened to foreign influences, but while it assimilated some concepts, it kept its specificity and the distinctive features of its own gods. From the religion of the Mycenaeans to that of the age of Homer, during those obscure centuries that followed the fall or the decline of the Aegean kingdoms after the twelfth century, continuity was not only marked by the persistence of the names of the gods and cult places. The continuity of certain festivals celebrated by the Ionians on both shores of the Mediterranean proves that these festivals must already have been customary in the eleventh century at the outset of the first wave of colonization, whose point of departure may have been Athens, the only Mycenaean site to remain intact, and which established groups of emigrants on the coast of Asia Minor to found Greek cities.

This permanence of Greek religion must not be misleading, however. The religious world evoked by Homer is no more representative of the religion of an earlier period than the world of the Homeric poems is representative of the world of the Mycenaean kings, whose exploits the bard, after an interval of four centuries, undertook to evoke. During this time a whole series of

changes and innovations were introduced: behind apparent continuities was a veritable rupture (that the epic text effaces but whose extent can be measured through archaeological research and a reading of the tablets).

**The Civic Religion.** Between the eleventh and eighth centuries, technical, economic, and demographic changes led to what the English archaeologist Anthony Snodgrass called the "structural revolution," which gave rise to the city-state (*polis*). The Greek religious system was profoundly reorganized during this time in response to the new forms of social life introduced by the *polis*. Within the context of a religion that from then on was essentially civic, remodeled beliefs and rites satisfied a dual and complementary obligation. First of all, they fulfilled the specific needs of each group of people, who constituted a city bound to a specific territory. The city was placed under the patronage of its own special gods, who endowed it with a unique religious physiognomy. Every city had its own divinity or divinities, whose functions were to cement the body of citizens into a true community; to unite into one whole all the civic space, including the urban center and the *chora*, or rural area; and to look after the integrity of the state—the people and the land—in the presence of other cities. Second, the development of an epic literature cut off from any local roots, the construction of great common sanctuaries, and the institution of pan-Hellenic games and panegyrics established and reinforced, on a religious level, legendary traditions, cycles of festivals, and a pantheon that would be recognized equally throughout all of Hellas.

Without assessing all the religious innovations brought about during the Archaic period, the most important should be mentioned. The first was the emergence of the temple as a construction independent of the human habitat, whether houses or royal palaces. With its walls delimiting a sacred enclosure (*temenos*) and its exterior altar, the temple became an edifice separated from profane ground. The god came to reside there permanently through the intermediacy of his great anthropomorphic cult statue. Unlike domestic altars and private sanctuaries, this house of the god was the common property of all citizens.

To mark and confirm its legitimate authority over a territory, each city built a temple in a precise place: in the center of the city, the acropolis or agora, the gates of the walls surrounding the urban area, or in the zone of the *agros* and the *eschatiai*—the wilderness that separated each Greek city from its neighbors. The construction of a network of sanctuaries within, around, and outside the city not only punctuated the space with holy places but also marked the course of ritual processions,

from the center to the periphery and back. These processions, which mobilized all or a part of the population on fixed dates, aimed at shaping the surface of the land according to a religious order.

Through the mediation of its civic gods (installed in their temples), the community established a kind of symbiosis between the people and their land, as if the citizens were the children of an earth from which they had sprung forth in the beginning and which, by virtue of this relationship with those who inhabited it, was itself promoted to the rank of "earth of the city." This explains the bitterness of the conflicts, between the eighth and the sixth centuries, that pitted neighboring cities against each other in the appropriation of cult places on those borders that were held in common by more than one *polis*. The occupation of the sanctuary and its religious annexation to the urban center were equivalent to legitimate possession. When it founded its temples, the *polis* rooted them firmly in the world of the gods so that its territorial base would have an unshakable foundation.

Another innovation with partly comparable significance left its mark on the religious system. During the eighth century, it became customary to put into service Mycenaean buildings, usually funerary, that had been abandoned for centuries. Once they were fitted out, they served as cult places where funeral honors were rendered to legendary figures who, although they usually had no relationship to these edifices, were claimed as ancestors by their "progeny," noble families or groups of phratries. Like the epic heroes whose names they carried, these mythical ancestors belonged to a distant past, to a time different from the present, and constituted a category of supernatural powers distinct from both the *theoi*, or gods proper, and the ordinary dead. Even more than the cult of the gods (even the civic gods), the cult of heroes had both civic and territorial value. It was associated with a specific place, a tomb with the subterranean presence of the dead person, whose remains were often brought home from a distant land.

The tombs and cults of the hero, through the prestige of the figure honored, served as glorious symbols and talismans for the community. The location of the tombs was sometimes kept secret because the welfare of the state depended on their safety. Installed in the heart of the city in the middle of the agora, they gave substance to the memory of the legendary founder of the city (the tutelary hero or, in the case of a colony, the colonizing hero), or they patronized the various components of the civic body (tribes, phratries, and demes). Disseminated to various points of the territory, the cults consecrated the affinities that united the members of the rural areas

and villages (the *kōmai*). In all cases their function was to assemble a group around an exclusive cult that appears to have been strictly implanted in precise points of the land.

The spread of the cult of the hero did not just comply with the new social needs that arose with the city; the adoration of the heroes had a properly religious significance. Different from the divine cult, which was obligatory for everyone and permanent in character, and also from the funerary rites, which were limited in time as well as to a narrow circle of relatives, the heroic institution affected the general stability of the cult system.

For the Greeks, there was a radical opposition between the gods, who were the beneficiaries of the cult, and men, who were its servants. Strangers to the transience that defines the existence of men, the gods were the *athanatoi* ("the immortals"). Men, on the other hand, were the *brotoi* ("the mortals"), doomed to sickness, old age, and death. Consequently, the funeral honors paid to the dead were placed on a different level from the sacrifices and devotions demanded by the gods as their share of honor, their special privilege. The narrow strips of material decorating the tombs, the offerings of cakes for the dead person, the libations of water, milk, honey, or wine that had to be renewed on the third, ninth, and thirtieth day after the funeral and again each year on the festival of the Genesia appear to have been the temporary continuation of the funeral ceremony and mourning practices rather than acts of veneration toward the higher powers. [See Genesia.] The intent of opening the doors of Hades to the dead person was to make him disappear forever from this world, where he no longer had a place. At the same time, through the various procedures of commemoration, the funeral transformed his absence into a presence in the memory of the survivors—an ambiguous, paradoxical presence, as of one who is absent, relegated to the realm of shadows, reduced henceforth to the social status of a dead man by the funeral rites. Even this status, however, is destined to sink into oblivion as the cycle of generations is renewed.

The heroes were quite another matter. To be sure, they belonged to the race of men and thus knew suffering and death. But a whole series of traits distinguished them, even in death, from the throng of ordinary dead. The heroes had lived during the period that constituted the "old days" for the Greeks, a bygone era when men were taller, stronger, more beautiful. Thus the bones of a hero could be recognized by their gigantic size. It was this race of men, later extinct, whose exploits were sung in epic poetry. Celebrated by the bards, the names of the heroes—unlike the names of ordinary men, which

faded into the indistinct and forgotten mass of the nameless—remained alive forever, in radiant glory, in the memory of all the Greeks. The race of heroes formed the legendary past of the Greece of the city-states and the roots of the families, groups, and communities of the Hellenes.

Although they were men, these ancestors seemed in many ways nearer to the gods, less cut off from the divine, than the rest of humanity. In their day, the gods still mingled readily with mortals, inviting themselves to the homes of men, eating at their tables, and even slipping into their beds to unite with them and—by mixing the two races, the mortal and the immortal—to beget beautiful children. The heroic figures whose names survived and whose cults were celebrated at their tombs were very often presented as the fruit of these amorous encounters between the divinities and human beings of both sexes. They were, as Hesiod said, “the divine race of heroes called demigods.” If their birth sometimes endowed them with a semidivine origin, their death also placed them above the human condition. Instead of descending into the darkness of Hades, they were “abducted” or transported by means of divine favor—some during their lifetime but most of them after death—to a special, separate place on the Isles of the Blessed, where they continued to enjoy in permanent felicity a life comparable to that of the gods.

Although it did not bridge the immeasurable gulf that separates men from the gods, heroic status seemed to open the prospect of the promotion of a mortal to a rank that, if not divine, was at least close to divinity. However, during the entire Classical period, this possibility remained strictly confined to a narrow sector. It was thwarted, not to say repressed, by the religious system itself. Indeed, piety, like wisdom, enjoined man not to pretend to be the equal of a god; the precepts of Delphi—“know who you are, know thyself”—have no other meaning than that. Man must accept his limits. Therefore, apart from the great legendary figures, such as Achilles, Theseus, Orestes, and Herakles, the status of the hero was restricted to the first founders of the colonies or to persons, such as Lysander of Samos and Timoleon of Syracuse, who had acquired exemplary symbolic worth in the eyes of a city.

We know of few cases of men who were heroized during the Classical period. They never concerned a living person but always one who after his death appeared to bear a *numen* (or formidable sacral power) because of his extraordinary physical characteristics (size, strength, and beauty), the circumstances of his death (if he had been struck by lightning or had disappeared leaving no trace), or the misdeeds attributed to his ghost, which it seemed necessary to appease. For ex-

ample, in the middle of the fifth century, the boxer Cleomedes of Astypalaia, who was exceptionally strong, killed his adversary in combat. Denied a prize by the decision of the jury, he returned home mad with rage. He vented his fury on a pillar that held up the ceiling of a school, and the roof caved in on the children. Pursued by a crowd that wanted to stone him, Cleomedes hid in a chest in the sanctuary of Athena, locking the lid on himself. His pursuers succeeded in forcing it open, but the chest was empty: no Cleomedes, living or dead, was to be found. The Pythia, when consulted, advised the establishment of a hero cult in honor of the boxer, whose strength, fury, misdeeds, and death set him above ordinary mortals. Sacrifices were to be made to him as “no longer a mortal.” But the oracle manifested her reservations by also proclaiming that Cleomedes was the last of the heroes.

However much the heroes constituted, through the honors paid to them, a category of superior beings, their role, their power, and the domains in which they intervened did not interfere with those of the gods. They never played the role of intermediary between earth and heaven; they were not intercessors but indigenous powers, bound to the spot of ground where they had their subterranean homes. Their efficacy adhered to their tombs and to their bones; there were anonymous heroes designated only by the names of the places where their tombs were established, such as the hero of Marathon. This local quality was accompanied by a strict specialization. Many heroes had no other realities than the narrow function to which they were dedicated and which defined them entirely. For example, at Olympia, at the bend of the track, competitors offered sacrifices at the tomb of the hero Taraxippos, the Frightener of Horses. Similarly, there were doctor heroes, door-men, cook, fly-catcher heroes, a hero of meals, of the broad bean, of saffron, a hero to mix water and wine or to grind the grain.

If the city could group into the same category of cults the highly individualized figures of heroes of long ago, whose legendary biographies were fixed in their epics, of exceptional contemporaries, of anonymous dead of whom all that remained were funerary monuments, and of all sorts of functional daemons, it was because inside their tombs they manifested the same contacts with the subterranean powers, shared the same characteristic of territorial localization, and could be used as political symbols. Instituted by the emerging city, bound to the land that it protected and to the groups of citizens that it patronized, the cult of the hero did not, in the Hellenistic period, lead to the divinization of human figures, nor did it lead to the establishment of a cult of sovereigns: these phenomena were the product of a different

religious mentality. Inseparable from the *polis*, the hero cult declined with it.

The appearance of the hero cult, however, was not without consequences. By its newness it led to an effort to define and categorize more strictly the various supernatural powers. Plutarch noted that Hesiod was the first, in the seventh century, to make a clear distinction between the different classes of divine beings, which he divided into four groups: gods, daemons, heroes, and the dead. Taken up again by the Pythagoreans and by Plato, this nomenclature of the divinities to whom men owed veneration was common enough in the fourth century to appear in the requests that the consultants addressed to the oracle of Dodona. On one of the inscriptions that have been found, a certain Euandros and his wife question the oracle about which "of the gods, or heroes, or daemons" they must sacrifice to and address their prayers to.

**The Sacrificial Practices.** To find his bearings in the practice of the cult, the believer, therefore, had to take into account the hierarchical order that presided in the society of the beyond. At the top of the hierarchy were the *theoi*, both great and small, who made up the race of the blessed immortals. These were the Olympians, grouped under the authority of Zeus. As a rule they were celestial divinities, although some of them, such as Poseidon and Demeter, bore chthonic aspects. There was indeed a god of the underworld (Hades), but he was in fact the only one who had neither temple nor cult. The gods were made present in this world in the spaces that belonged to them: first of all, in the temples where they resided but also in the places and the objects that were consecrated to them and that, specified as *hiera* ("sacred"), could be subject to interdiction. These include the sacred groves, springs, and mountain peaks; an area surrounded by walls or boundary markers (*temenos*); crossroads, trees, stones, and obelisks. The temple, the building reserved as the dwelling of the god, did not serve as a place of worship. The faithful assembled to celebrate the rites at the exterior altar (*bōmos*), a square block of masonry. Around it and upon it was performed the central rite of the Greek religion, the burnt offering (*thusia*), the analysis of which is essential.

This was normally a blood sacrifice implying the eating of the victim: a domestic animal, crowned and decked with ribbons, was led in procession to the altar to the sound of flutes. It was showered with water and fistfuls of barley seeds, which were scattered on the ground and on the altar as well as on the participants, who also wore crowns. The head of the victim was then lifted up and its throat cut with a *machaira*, a large knife concealed under the seeds in the *kanoun*, or ritual

basket. The blood that gushed onto the altar was caught in a receptacle. The animal was cut open and its entrails, especially the liver, were drawn out and examined to see if the gods accepted the sacrifice. If accepted, the victim was immediately carved. The long bones, entirely stripped of flesh, were laid on the altar. Covered with fat, they were consumed with herbs and spices by the flames and, in the form of sweet-smelling smoke, rose toward heaven and the gods. Certain internal morsels (*splagchna*) were put on spits and roasted over the same fire that had sent to the divinity his share, thus establishing a link between the sacred powers for whom the sacrifice was intended and the performers of the rite for whom the roasted meat was reserved. The rest of the meat was boiled in caldrons, divided into equal parts, and eaten by the participants on the spot, taken home, or distributed outside to the community at large. The parts that were thought to confer honor, such as the tongue or the hide, went to the priest who presided at the ceremony, though his presence was not always indispensable.

As a rule, any citizen, if he was not impure, had full authority to perform sacrifices. The religious significance of this must be defined by bringing out its theological implications. From the start, however, several points are essential. Certain divinities and certain rituals, such as that of Apollo Genetor in Delphi and Zeus Hupatos in Attica, required, instead of a blood sacrifice, food oblations: fruit, palms, grain, porridge (*pelanos*), and cakes sprinkled with water, milk, honey, or oil; no blood or even wine was offered. There were cases in which this type of offering, usually consumed by fire but sometimes simply deposited on the altar without being burned (*apura*), was characterized by marked opposition to customary practice. Considered pure sacrifices, unlike those involving the killing of living creatures, they served as models for sectarian movements. Orphics and Pythagoreans referred to them in advocating a ritual behavior and an attitude toward the divine that, in rejecting the blood sacrifice as impious, diverged from the official cult and appeared foreign to the civic religion.

In addition, blood sacrifice itself took two different forms according to whether it addressed the heavenly and Olympian gods or the chthonic and infernal ones. The language already made a distinction between them: for the first, the Greeks employed the term *thuein*; for the second, *enagizein* or *sphattein*.

The *thusia*, as we have seen, was centered on an elevated altar, the *bōmos*. The chthonic sacrifice had only a low altar (the *eschara*) with a hole in it to let the blood pour out into the earth. Normally the celebration took place at night over a ritual pit (*bothros*) that opened the

way to the underworld. The animal was immolated with its head lowered toward the earth, which would be inundated with its blood. Once its throat was cut, the victim was no longer the object of ritual handling; because it was offered in holocaust, it was burned entirely without the celebrants having the right to touch it or to eat it. In this kind of rite, in which the offering is destroyed in order to be delivered in its entirety to the beyond, it was less a matter of establishing with the divinity a regular commerce of exchange in mutual confidence than of warding off the sinister forces, of placating a formidable power who would approach without harm only if defenses and precautions were taken. One might say that it was a ritual of aversion rather than one of reconciliation or contact. Understandably, its use was reserved for the cult of the chthonic and infernal deities, for expiatory rites, or for sacrifices offered to heroes and to the dead in their tombs.

In the Olympian sacrifice, the orientation toward the heavenly divinities was marked not only by the light of day, the presence of an altar, and the blood gushing upward when the throat of the victim was cut. A fundamental feature of the ritual was that it was inseparably an offering to the gods and a festive meal for the human participants. Although the climax of the event was undoubtedly the moment that, punctuated by the ritual cry (*ololugmos*), life abandoned the animal and passed into the world of the gods, all the parts of the animal, carefully gathered and treated, were meant for the people, who ate them together. The immolation itself took place in an atmosphere of sumptuous and joyful ceremony. The entire staging of the ritual—from the procession in which the untied animal was led freely and in great pomp to the concealment of the knife in the basket to the shudder by which the sprayed animal, sprinkled with an ablution, was supposed to give its assent to the immolation—was designed to efface any traces of violence and murder and to bring to the fore aspects of peaceful solemnity and happy festivity. Furthermore, in the economy of the *thusia*, the procedures for cutting up the victim, for roasting or boiling the pieces, for their orderly distribution in equal parts, and for their consumption, either on the spot or elsewhere, were no less important than the ritual killing. The alimentary function of the rite is expressed in a vocabulary that makes no distinction between sacrificer and butcher. The word *hiereion*, which designates an animal as sacrificial victim, at the same time qualifies it as an animal to be butchered, as one suitable for eating. Since the Greeks ate meat only on the occasion of sacrifices and in conformity with sacrificial rules, the *thusia* was simultaneously a religious ceremony in which a pious offering, often accompanied by prayer, was ad-

dressed to the gods; a ritualized cooking of food according to the norms that the gods required of humans; and an act of social communion that reinforced, through the consumption of the parts of one victim, the bonds that were to unite all citizens and make them equal.

As the central moment of the cult, the sacrifice was an indispensable part of communal life (whether family or state) and illustrated the tight interdependence of the religious and the social orders in the Greece of the city-states. The function of the sacrifice was not to wrest the sacrificer or the participants away from their families and civic groups or from their ordinary activities in the human world but, on the contrary, to install them in the requisite positions and patterns, to integrate them into the city and mundane existence in conformity with an order of the world presided over by the gods (i.e., “intra-world” religion, in the sense given by Max Weber, or “political” religion, in the Greek understanding of the term). The sacred and the profane did not constitute two radically opposite, mutually exclusive categories. Between the “sacred” in its entirely forbidden aspect and its fully accessible one a multiplicity of configurations and gradations existed. In addition to those realities dedicated to a god and reserved for his use, the sacred was also to be experienced by way of objects, living creatures, natural phenomena, and both the everyday events of private life—eating a meal, departing on a journey, welcoming a guest—and the more solemn occasions of public life. Without any special preparation, every head of a family was qualified to assume religious functions in his home. Each head of a household was pure as long as he had not committed any misdeed that defiled him. In this sense, purity did not have to be acquired or obtained; it constituted the normal state of the citizen.

As far as the city was concerned, there was no division between the priesthood and the magistracy. There were priesthoods that were devolved and practiced as magistracies, and every magistrate was endowed by virtue of his duties with a character of holiness. For any political power to be exercised, for any common decision to be valid, a sacrifice was required. In war as in peace, before giving battle as well as when convening an assembly or inaugurating a magistrate, the performance of a sacrifice was just as necessary as it was during the great religious festivals of the sacred calendar. As Marcel Detienne so accurately observes in *La cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec*: “Until a late period, a city such as Athens maintained the office of archon-king—one of whose major functions was to administer all of the sacrifices instituted by the ancestors, that is, all the ritual gestures that guaranteed the harmonious operation of society” (Detienne, 1980, p. 10).

If the *thusia* was indispensable for ensuring the validity of social undertakings, it was because the sacrificial fire, by causing the fragrant smoke of the burning fat and bones to rise toward heaven while at the same time cooking man's portion, opened the lines of communication between the gods and the participants in the rites. By immolating a victim, burning the bones, and eating the flesh according to ritual rules, the Greeks instituted and maintained with the divine a contact without which their entire existence, left to itself and emptied of meaning, would have collapsed. This contact was not a communion; even in a symbolic form, the Greeks did not eat the god in order to identify with him and to participate in his strength. They consumed a victim, a domestic animal, and ate a part different from that offered to the gods. The link established by the sacrifice emphasized and confirmed the extreme distance that separated mortals and immortals, even when they communicated.

Myths about the origin of the sacrifice are most precise in this respect. They bring to light the theological meanings of the ritual. It was the Titan Prometheus, son of Iapetus, who was said to have instituted the first sacrifice, thus establishing forever the model to which humans were to conform in honoring the gods. This took place during the time when gods and men were not yet separate but lived together, feasted at the same tables, and shared the same felicity far from all evils and afflictions. Men were still unacquainted with the necessity of work, sickness, old age, fatigue, death, and women. Zeus had been promoted king of heaven and had carried out an equitable distribution of honors and privileges. The time had come to define in precise terms the forms of life appropriate for men and for gods.

Prometheus was assigned the task. He brought before the assembled gods and men a great steer, killed it, and cut it up. The boundary that exists between gods and men follows, therefore, the line of division between the parts of the immolated beast that went to the gods and those that went to men. The sacrifice thus appears as the act that, as its first accomplishment, consecrated the distinction of divine and human status. But Prometheus, in rebellion against the king of the gods, tried to deceive him for the benefit of men. Each of the two parts prepared by the Titan was a ruse, a lure. The first, camouflaged in appetizing fat, contained only the bare bones; the second, concealed in the skin and stomach and disgusting in appearance, constituted all that was edible in the animal.

Honor to whom honor is due: it was for Zeus, in the name of the gods, to be the first to choose a portion of the sacrifice. He saw the trap but pretended to be tricked, the better to take his revenge. He chose, there-

fore, the outwardly enticing portion, the one that concealed the inedible bones under a thin covering of fat. For this reason, men burned the white bones of the victim for the gods, then divided the meat, the portion that Zeus did not choose, among themselves. Prometheus had imagined that in allotting the flesh to humans he was reserving the best part for them. But shrewd as he was, he failed to suspect that he was giving them a poisoned gift. By eating the meat, men sentenced themselves to death. Driven by their hunger, they behaved from then on like all the animals that inhabit the earth, the water, or the air. If they take pleasure in devouring the flesh of an animal that has lost its life, if they have an imperious need for food, it is because their hunger, never appeased but constantly renewed, is the mark of a creature whose strength fails gradually, who is doomed to weariness, old age, and death. By contenting themselves with the smoke from the bones and living off smells and fragrances, the gods bore witness that they belonged to a race whose nature was entirely different from that of men. They, the immortals, were everlasting and eternally young; their being contained nothing perishable and had no contact with the realm of the corruptible.

But the vengeance of the angry Zeus did not stop here. Even before he created out of the earth and water the first woman, Pandora, who introduced among men all the woes hitherto unknown to them—birth from procreation, fatigue, toil, sickness, age, and death—he decided, as retribution for the Titan's partiality toward mankind, to never again allow men access to the celestial fire. Deprived of fire, were men thus obliged to eat raw meat like beasts? Prometheus then stole a spark, a seed of fire, in the hollow of a stick, and brought it down to earth. Although they would no longer have the flash of the thunderbolt at their disposal, men were given a technical fire, more fragile and mortal, one that would have to be preserved by constant feeding. By cooking their food, this second fire—contingent and artificial, in comparison with the heavenly fire—differentiates men from animals and establishes them in a civilized life. Of all the animals, only men share the possession of fire with the gods. Thus it is fire that unites man to the divine by rising toward heaven from the lighted altars. [See Fire.] But this fire, celestial in origin and destination, is also, in its all-consuming ardor, as perishable as the living creatures subjected to the necessity of eating. The frontier between gods and men is both bridged by the sacrificial fire, which unites them, and accentuated by the contrast between the heavenly fire in the hands of Zeus and the fire that Prometheus's theft made available to mankind. Furthermore, the function of the sacrificial fire is to mark the



portion of the victim belonging to the gods (totally consumed in the flames) and that of men (cooked just enough not to be eaten raw).

The ambiguous relationship between men and gods in the sacrifice was coupled with an equally equivocal relationship between men and animals. In order to live, both must eat, whether their food be animal or vegetable, and so they are equally perishable. But it is only man who eats his food cooked according to rules and after having offered in honor to the gods the animal's life, dedicated to them with the bones. If the barley seeds showered on the head of the victim and on the altar were associated with the blood sacrifice, the reason was that cereals, as a specifically human food involving agricultural labor, represented in the Greek view the paradigm of cultivated plants symbolizing, in contrast to a savage existence, civilized life. Cooked three times (by an internal process that assists the cultivation, by the action of the sun, and by the human hand that turns it into bread), cereal was an analogue to the sacrificial victim, the domestic animal whose flesh had to be ritually roasted or boiled before it was eaten.

In the Promethean myth, sacrifice comes into being as the result of the Titan's rebellion against Zeus at a time when men and gods needed to separate and establish their respective destinies. The moral of the story states that one could not hope to dupe the sovereign god. Prometheus tried to deceive Zeus; man must pay the price of his failure. To perform a sacrifice was both to commemorate the adventure of the Titan, the founder of the rite, and to accept its lesson. It was to recognize that through the accomplishment of the sacrifice and all that it entailed—the Promethean fire, the necessity of work and of women and marriage in order to have children, the condition of suffering, old age, and death—Zeus situated man between animals and gods for all time. In the sacrifice, man submitted to the will of Zeus, who made of mortals and immortals two separate and distinct races. Communication with the divine was instituted in the course of a festive ceremonial, a meal recalling the fact that the commensality of former times was no more: gods and men no longer lived together, no longer ate at the same tables. Man could not sacrifice according to the model established by Prometheus and at the same time pretend in any way to equal the gods. The rite itself, the object of which was to join gods and men together, sanctioned the insurmountable barrier that separated them.

By means of its alimentary rules, sacrifice established man in his proper state, midway between the savagery of animals that devour one another's raw flesh and the perpetual bliss of the gods, who never know hunger,

weariness, or death because they find nourishment in sweet smells and ambrosia. This concern for precise delimitations, for exact apportionment, closely unites the sacrifice, both in ritual and in myth, to cereal agriculture and to marriage, both of which likewise define the particular position of civilized man. Just as, to survive, he must eat the cooked meat of a domestic animal sacrificed according to the rules, so man must feed on *sitos*, the cooked flour of regularly cultivated domestic plants. In order to survive as a race, man must father a son by union with a woman, whom marriage has drawn out of savagery and domesticated by setting her in the conjugal home. By reason of this same exigency of equilibrium in the Greek sacrifice, the sacrificer, the victim, and the god—although associated in the rite—were never confused.

The fact that this powerful theology should have its base on the level of alimentary procedures indicates that the dietary vagaries of the Orphics and Pythagoreans, as well as certain Dionysian practices, had a specifically theological significance and constituted profound divergences in religious orientation. Vegetarianism was a rejection of blood sacrifice, which was believed to be like the murder of a close relation; *omophagia* and *diasparagmos* of the Bacchantes—that is, the devouring of the raw flesh of a hunted animal that had been torn to pieces while still alive—inverted the normal values of sacrifice. [See *Omophagia*.] But whether sacrifice was circumvented, on the one hand, by feeding like the gods on entirely pure dishes and even on smells or, on the other, by destroying the barriers between men and animals maintained by sacrificial practice, so that a state of complete communion was realized—one that could be called either a return to the sweet familiarity of all creatures during the Golden Age or a fall into the chaotic confusion of savagery—in either case, it was a question of instituting, whether by individual asceticism or by collective frenzy, a type of relationship with the divine that the official religion excluded and forbade. Furthermore, although employing opposing means with opposite implications, the normal distinctions between sacrificer, victim, and divinity became blurred and disappeared. The analysis of sacrificial cuisine thus leads to an understanding of the more or less eccentric—sometimes integrated and sometimes marginal—positions occupied by various sects, religious movements, or philosophical attitudes, all of which were at odds both with the regular forms of the traditional cult and with the institutional framework of the city-state and all that it implied concerning the religious and social status of man.

**Greek Mysticism.** Blood sacrifice and public cult were not the only expressions of Greek piety. Various move-

ments and groups, more or less deviant and marginal, more or less closed and secret, expressed different religious aspirations. Some were entirely or partly integrated into the civic cult; others remained foreign to it. All of them contributed in various ways to paving the way toward a Greek "mysticism" marked by the search for a more direct, more intimate, and more personal contact with the gods. This mysticism was sometimes associated with the quest for immortality, which was either granted after death through the special favor of a divinity or obtained by the observance of the discipline of a pure life reserved for the initiated and giving them the privilege of liberating, even during their earthly existence, the particle of the divine present in each.

In this context, a clear distinction must be made between three kinds of religious phenomena during the Classical period. Certain terms, such as *teletē*, *orgia*, *mustai*, and *bakchoi*, are used in reference to all three, yet the phenomena they designate cannot in any way be considered identical. Despite some points of contact, they were not religious realities of the same order; nor did they have the same status or the same goals.

First, there were the mysteries. [See Mystery Religions.] Those of Eleusis, exemplary in their prestige and their widespread influence, constituted in Attica a well-defined group of cults. Officially recognized by the city, they were organized under its control and supervision. They remained, however, on the fringe of the state because of their initiatory and secret nature and their mode of recruiting (they were open to all Greeks and based not on social status but on the personal choice of the individual).

Next there was the Dionysian religion. The cults associated with Dionysos were an integral part of the civic religion, and the festivals in honor of the god had their place like any other in the sacred calendar. But as god of *mania*, or divine madness—because of his way of taking possession of his followers through the collective trance ritually practiced in the *thiasoi* and because of his sudden intrusion here below in epiphanic revelation—Dionysos introduced into the very heart of the religion of which he was a part an experience of the supernatural that was foreign and, in many ways, contrary to the spirit of the official cult. [See Dionysos].

Finally, there was what is called Orphism. Orphism involved neither a specific cult, nor devotion to an individual deity, nor a community of believers organized into a sect as in Pythagoreanism, whatever links might have existed between the two movements. Orphism was a nebulous phenomenon that included, on the one hand, a tradition of sacred books attributed to Orpheus and Musaios (comprising theogonies, cosmogonies, and heterodox anthropogonies) and, on the other, the appear-

ance of itinerant priests who advocated a style of existence that was contrary to the norm, a vegetarian diet, and who had at their disposal healing techniques and formulas for purification in this life and salvation in the next. In these circles, the central preoccupation and discussion focused on the destiny of the soul after death, a subject to which the Greeks were not accustomed.

What was the relationship of each of these three great religious phenomena to a cult system based on the respect of *nomoi*, the socially recognized rules of the city? Neither in beliefs nor in practices did the mysteries contradict the civic religion. Instead, they completed it by adding a new dimension suited to satisfying needs that the civic religion could not fulfill. The goddesses Demeter and Kore (Persephone), who together with several acolytes patronized the Eleusinian cycle, were great figures of the pantheon, and the narrative of the abduction of Kore by Hades, with all its consequences (including the founding of the *orgia*, the secret rites of Eleusis), is one of the basic legends of the Greeks. The candidate had to take a series of steps to attain the ultimate goal of initiation—from the preliminary stage of the Lesser Mysteries of Agrai to renewed participation in the Greater Mysteries at Eleusis, the *mustēs* having to wait until the following year to acquire the rank of *epoptēs*. The entire ceremony (at Athens itself, at Phaleron for the ritual bath in the sea, and on the road from Athens to Eleusis in a procession that followed the sacred objects and included the Eleusinian clergy, the magistrates of Athens, the *mustai*, foreign delegations, and throngs of spectators) took place in full daylight before the eyes of everyone. The archon-king, in the name of the state, was in charge of the public celebration of the Greater Mysteries, and even the traditional families of the Eumolpides and the Kerukes, who had a special relationship with the two goddesses, were responsible to the city, which had the authority to regulate by decree the details of the festivities.

Only when the *mustai* had entered the sanctuary was secrecy imposed and nothing allowed to escape to the outside world. The interdiction was sufficiently powerful to be respected for centuries. But although the mysteries have kept some of their secrets till this day, some points about them can be considered certain. There was no teaching, nothing resembling an esoteric doctrine, at Eleusis. Aristotle's testimony on this subject is decisive: "Those who are initiated have not to learn something but to feel emotions and to be in a certain frame of mind." Plutarch describes the mood of the initiates, which ranged from anxiety to rapture. Such inner emotional upheaval was brought about by the *drōmena*, things played and mimed; by the *legomena*, ritual formulas that were pronounced; and by the *deiknumena*,

things shown and exhibited. It is probable that they were related to the passion of Demeter, the descent of Kore into the underworld, and the fate of the dead in Hades. It is certain that after the final illumination at the end of initiation, the believer felt that he had been inwardly transformed. From then on, he was bound to the goddesses in a close personal relationship of intimate connivance and familiarity. He had become one of the elect, certain to have a fate different from the ordinary in this life and in the next. Blessed, asserts the *Hymn to Demeter*, is he who has had the full vision of these mysteries; the uninitiated, the profane, would not know such a destiny after they died and went to the realm of the shades. Although they neither presented a new conception of the soul nor broke with the traditional image of Hades, the mysteries opened the prospect of continuing a happier existence in the underworld. This privilege was available to believers who freely decided to submit to initiation and to follow a ritual course, each stage of which marked a new progress toward a state of religious purity.

On returning home to his family and to his professional and civic activities, nothing distinguished the initiate either from what he had been before or from those who had not undergone initiation—no external sign, no mark of recognition, not even a slight modification in his way of life. He returned to the city and settled down again to do what he had always done with no other change but his conviction that through this religious experience he would be among the elect after his death: for him, there would be light, joy, dancing, and song in the world of darkness. These hopes concerning the hereafter would later be nourished and developed among the sects, which would also borrow the symbolism of the mysteries, their secrecy, and their hierarchical system. But in the city that patronized them, the mysteries became part of the official religion.

At first glance, the status of Dionysism may seem comparable to that of the mysteries. This cult also consisted of *teletai* and *orgia*, initiations and secret rites open only to those who were invested as *bakchoi*. But the winter festivals of Dionysos at Athens—Oschoporia, rural Dionysia, Lenaea, Anthesteria, urban Dionysia—did not form a coherent and self-contained whole or a closed cycle as they did at Eleusis; they were instead a discontinuous series spread throughout the calendar along with the festivals of the other gods and revealing the same norms of celebration. All of them were official ceremonies, fully civic in character. Some of them carried an element of secrecy and required specialized religious personnel, for example, the annual marriage of the queen, the wife of the archon-king, to Dionysos, which was performed in the Boucoleion during the An-

thesteria. The Gerarai, a group of fourteen women, who assisted the queen in her role as wife of the god, performed secret rites in the sanctuary of Dionysos in the marshes, but they did this “in the name of the city” and “following its traditions.” The people themselves prescribed the procedures of the wedding and ensured their safety by having them engraved on a stele. Thus the queen’s secret marriage was equivalent to the official recognition by the city of the divinity of Dionysos. It consecrated the union of the civic community with the god and represented his integration into the religious order of the community.

The Thyiads, or Bacchantes, of Athens, women who participated in the orgiastic rites of Dionysos, met their counterparts from Delphi at Mount Parnassus every three years. They performed their secret rites in the name of the city. They were not a segregated group of initiates, a marginal sisterhood of the elect, or a sect of deviants: they formed an official female cult, entrusted by the city with the task of representing it before the Delphians. They operated according to the framework of the cult rendered to Dionysos in the sanctuary of Apollo. There is no evidence of private Dionysian associations that recruited adepts to celebrate secretly a specific cult under the protection of the god in Attica, or even in continental Greece, in the fifth century, as was the case several centuries later with the Iobakchoi. Toward the fifth century, when the city of Magnesia, on the Meander River, decided to organize a cult dedicated to Dionysos, it founded, after consulting Delphi, three *thiasoi* (three official female colleges placed under the direction of qualified priestesses who had come from Thebes especially for that purpose).

What then constituted, in comparison with the other gods, the originality of Dionysos and his cult? Dionysism, unlike the mysteries, did not exist as an extension of the civic religion. Instead, it expressed the city’s official recognition of a religion that in many ways eluded the city, contradicting it and going beyond its control. It established, in the midst of public life, a religious behavior that displayed aspects of eccentricity in an allusive, symbolic form or in an open manner.

Even in the world of the Olympian gods, to which he had been admitted, Dionysos personified, as expressed so well by Louis Gernet, the presence of the Other. He did not confirm and reinforce the human and social order by making it sacred. Dionysos called this order into question; indeed, he shattered it. In so doing he revealed another side of the sacred, one that was no longer regular, stable, and defined but strange, elusive, and disconcerting. As the only Greek god endowed with the power of *māyā* (“magic”), Dionysos transcends all forms and evades all definitions; he assumes all aspects

without confining himself to any one. Like a conjurer, he plays with appearances and blurs the boundaries between the fantastic and the real. Ubiquitous, he is never to be found where he is but always here, there, and nowhere at the same time. As soon as he appears, the distinct categories and clear oppositions that give the world its coherence and rationality fade, merge, and pass from one to the other. He is at once both male and female. By suddenly appearing among men, he introduces the supernatural in the midst of the natural and unites heaven and earth. Young and old, wild and civilized, near and far, beyond and here-below are joined in him and by him. Even more, he abolishes the distance that separates the gods from men and men from animals.

When the Maenads give themselves over to the frenzy of the trance, the god takes possession of them, subjugating and directing them as he pleases. In frenzy and enthusiasm, the human creature plays the god, and the god, who is within the believer, plays the human. The frontiers between them are suddenly blurred or obliterated in a proximity through which man is estranged from his daily existence or ordinary life, alienated from himself, and transported to a distant elsewhere. This contiguity with the divine, accomplished by the trance, is accompanied by a new familiarity with animal savagery. On the mountains and in the woods, far from their homes and from cities and cultivated lands, the Maenads play with serpents and suckle the young of animals as their own, but they also pursue, attack, and tear to pieces living animals (*diasparagmos*) and devour their raw flesh (*omophagia*). Through their eating behavior, they assimilate themselves to wild beasts that—unlike men, who eat bread and the cooked meat of ritually sacrificed domestic animals—eat one another and lap up each other's blood, knowing no rule or law but only the hunger that drives them.

Maenadism, which was limited to women, carried in its sudden outburst two opposing aspects. For the faithful, in happy communion with the god, it brought the supernatural joy of momentary escape to a kind of Golden Age where all living creatures meet again, mingled like brothers and sisters. However, for those women (and cities) who rejected the god and who had to be constrained by punishment, *mania* led to the horror and madness of the most atrocious of pollutions: a return to the chaos of a lawless world in which maddened women tear apart the bodies of their own children as if the children were animals and devour their flesh. A dual god, combining in his person two facets, Dionysos, as he proclaims in *The Bacchae* of Euripides, is both "the most terrible and the most gentle."

In order that he may show himself beneficent in his gentleness, Dionysos—whose strangeness, irrepressible exuberance, and intrusive dynamism seem to threaten the stability of the civic religion—must be welcomed into the city, acknowledged as belonging to it, and assured a place beside the other gods in the public cult. The entire community must solemnly celebrate the festivals of Dionysos: for its women, it must organize a form of controlled and ritualized trance within the framework of the official *thiasoi*, promoted public institutions; for its men, an estrangement from the normal course of things in the joyfulness of a revelry consisting of wine and drunkenness, games and festivities, masquerades and disguises; and, finally, it must found the theater on whose stage illusion acquires substance and comes to life and the imaginary is displayed as if it were reality. In each case, the integration of Dionysos into the city and its religion meant installing the Other, with all honors, in the heart of the social establishment.

Ecstasy, enthusiasm, and possession; the joy of wine and festival; the pleasures of love; the exaltation of life in its outpouring and unexpectedness; the gaiety of masks and disguises; the happiness of everyday life—Dionysos can bring all of these if men and cities are willing to recognize him. But never does he come to announce a better fate in the hereafter. He does not advocate flight from the world, nor does he teach renunciation or offer the soul access to immortality through an escetic way of life. He conjures up the many faces of the Other in this life and world, around us and within us. He opens before us, on this earth and even in the framework of the city, the way of escape toward a disconcerting strangeness. Dionysos teaches or forces us to become other than what we ordinarily are.

Undoubtedly, it was this need to escape, this nostalgia for a complete union with the divine, that—even more than his descent into the underworld in search of his mother, Semele—explains the fact that Dionysos could be associated, sometimes quite closely, with the mysteries of the two Eleusinian goddesses. When the wife of the archon-king went to celebrate her marriage with Dionysos, she was assisted by the sacred herald of Eleusis; and, at the Lenaea, perhaps the most ancient of the Attic festivals of Dionysos, it was the torchbearer of Eleusis who led the invocation taken up by the public: "Iacchos, son of Semele." The god was present at Eleusis as early as the fifth century and had a discreet presence and a minor role even in those places where he had neither temple nor priest. He intervened as the figure of Iacchos, to whom he was assimilated and whose function was to preside over the procession from Athens to Eleusis during the Greater Mysteries. Iacchos was the

personification of the joyful ritual cry given by the cortege of *mustai* in an atmosphere of hope and festivity. In the representations of a hereafter to which the faithful of the god of *mania* seemed quite indifferent (with the exception perhaps of those in southern Italy), Iacchos was imagined as leading the blessed chorus of initiates in the underworld while Dionysos led his *thiasoi* of Bacchantes on earth. [See Dionysos.]

The problems of Orphism are of another order. [See Orpheus.] This religious movement, in all of its diverse forms, belonged essentially to late Hellenism, in the course of which it took on increasing importance. But several discoveries during the twentieth century have confirmed that Orphism had a role in the religion of the Classical period. Let us begin with the first aspect of Orphism: a tradition of written texts and sacred books. The papyrus of Derveni, found in 1962 in a tomb near Salonika, proves that theogonies from the sixth century may have been known to pre-Socratic philosophers and to have partly inspired Empedocles. Thus Orphism's principal feature appears from its beginning: a doctrinal form that opposed it to the mysteries and to Dionysian religion, as well as to the official cult, while relating it to philosophy. These theogonies are known to us in many versions, but the basic orientation is the same: they take an opposite view from that of the Hesiodic tradition. For Hesiod, the divine world is organized in a linear progression leading from disorder to order, from an original state of indistinct confusion to a differentiated world organized into a hierarchy under the immutable authority of Zeus. For the followers of Orphism, the reverse was true: in the beginning the first principle, primordial Egg or Night, expresses perfect unity, the plenitude of a self-contained totality. But the nature of "being" deteriorates as its unity is divided and dislocated, producing distinct forms and separate individuals. To this cycle of dispersion there must succeed a cycle during which the parts are reintegrated into the unity of the whole. This is to take place during the sixth generation with the coming of the Orphic Dionysos, whose reign represents a restoration of the One, the recovery of the lost plenitude.

But Dionysos does not just play a part in a theogony that substitutes for the progressive emergence of a differentiated order a fall into division, followed (as if redeemed) by a reintegration into the whole. According to one tale, Dionysos, who had been dismembered and devoured by the Titans, was reconstituted from his heart, which had been preserved intact; the Titans were then struck down by Zeus's thunderbolt, and the human race was born from their ashes. This story, to which Pindar, Herodotus, and Plato seem to make allusions, is at-

tested in the Hellenistic period. In it, Dionysos himself assumes the double cycle of dispersion and reunification in the course of a "passion" that directly engages the life of man since it mythically founds the misfortune of the human condition and, at the same time, offers mortals the prospect of salvation. Born from the ashes of the Titans, the human race carries as a legacy the guilt of having dismembered the body of the god. But by purifying himself of the ancestral offense by performing rites and observing the Orphic way of life, by abstaining from all meat to avoid the impurity of the blood sacrifice—which the city sanctifies but which recalls for the Orphics the monstrous feast of the Titans—each man, having kept within himself a particle of Dionysos, can return to the lost unity, join the god, and find a Golden Age type of life in the hereafter.

The Orphic theogonies therefore led to an anthropology and a soteriology that gave them their true meaning. In the sacred literature of Orphism, the doctrinal aspect cannot be separated from the quest for salvation: the adoption of a pure life, the avoidance of any kind of pollution, and the choice of a vegetarian diet expressed the desire to escape the common fate of finitude and death and to be wholly united with the divine. The refusal of blood sacrifice was more than just a deviance from common practice, for vegetarianism contradicted precisely what sacrifice implied: the existence of an impassable gulf between men and gods, even in the ritual through which they communicate. The individual search for salvation was situated outside the civic religion. As a spiritual movement, Orphism was external and foreign to the city, to its rules and to its values.

Its influence was nonetheless exercised along several lines. From the fifth century on, certain Orphic writings seem to have concerned Eleusis, and whatever the differences, or rather the oppositions, between the Dionysos of the official cult and the one of the Orphic writings, assimilation between the two might have occurred quite early. In *Hippolytus*, Euripides suggests such an assimilation when he makes Theseus speak of the young man "playing the Bacchant under the direction of Orpheus," and Herodotus attributes the interdiction from being buried in woolen clothes to "the cults called orphic and bacchic." These convergences are not decisive, however, as the term *Bacchic* is not reserved exclusively for Dionysian rituals. The only evidence of a direct encounter between Dionysos and the Orphics, and at the same time of an eschatological dimension to Dionysos, is to be found on the fringes of Greece, on the edges of the Black Sea, in the Olbia of the fifth century. Here, the words *Dionusos Orphikoi*, followed by *bios thanatos bios* ("life death life"), were discovered on bone

plates. But, as has been observed, this puzzle remains more enigmatic than enlightening, and in the present state of documentation, its singular character attests to the peculiarities of religious life in the Scythian environment of the colony of Olbia.

In fact, Orphism had two major impacts on the religious mentality of the Greeks during the Classical period. On the level of popular piety, it nourished the anxieties and the practices of the superstitious, who were obsessed with the fear of impurity and disease. Theophrastus, in his *The Superstitious Man*, shows the protagonist going every month to renew his initiation and discovering, together with his wife and children, the Orpheotelestai. Plato, for his part, described the Orpheotelestai as beggar priests and itinerant holy men who took money for their alleged competence in performing purifications and initiations (*katharmoi* and *teletai*) for both the living and the dead. These marginal priests, who made their way from city to city and based their science of secret rites and incantations on the authority of the books of Musaios and Orpheus, were readily identified as a band of magicians and charlatans who exploited public credibility.

But on another, more intellectual level, the Orphic writings belonged, along with others, to the movement that, in modifying the framework of the religious experience, shifted the direction of Greek spiritual life. Orphism, like Pythagoreanism, belonged to a tradition of outstanding figures with exceptional prestige and powers. From the seventh century on, these "god-men" used their abilities to purify the cities; they have sometimes been defined as representing a Greek version of shamanism. [See Shamanism.] In the middle of the fifth century, Empedocles testified to the vitality of these maguses, who were capable of commanding the winds and of bringing the dead back from Hades and who presented themselves, not as mortals, but as gods. A striking characteristic of these singular figures—who included not only Epimenides and Empedocles but also a number of inspired and more or less legendary missionaries, such as Abaris, Aristeas, and Hermetimos—was that their disciplined lives, spiritual exercises in the control and concentration of their breathing, and techniques of asceticism and recollection of former lives placed them under the patronage, not of Dionysos, but of Apollo, a Hyperborean Apollo, the god of ecstatic inspiration and purifications.

In the collective trance of the Dionysian *thiasos*, the god came down to take possession of his group of worshipers, riding them and making them dance and jump about according to his will. Those who were possessed did not leave this world, but they were made different by the power that inhabited them. In contrast, among

the god-men, for all their diversity, it was the human individual who took the initiative, set the tone, and passed to the other side. Thanks to the exceptional powers that he had succeeded in acquiring, a god-man could leave his body, abandoned as if in a cataleptic sleep, and travel freely into the other world, then return with the memory of all that he had seen in the beyond.

This type of man, by the way of life that he had chosen and his techniques of ecstasy, demonstrated the presence of a supernatural element within him, an element foreign to earthly life, a being from another world, in exile, a soul (*psuchē*) who was no longer, as in Homer, a shadow without force or an insubstantial reflection but instead a *daimon*, or "spirit," a power related to the divine and longing to return to it.

To possess the control and mastery of this *psuchē*, to isolate it from the body, to focus it in itself, to purify it, to liberate it, and by means of it to return to the heavenly place for which the heart still yearns—such may have been the object and the end of the religious experience in this tradition of thought. However, as long as the city-state remained alive, no sect, religious practice, or organized group expressed the need to leave the body and to flee the world in order to achieve an intimate and personal union with the divine. The renouncer was unknown to the traditional Greek religion. It was philosophy that relayed this concept by interpreting in its own terms the themes of asceticism and of purification of the soul and its immortality.

For the oracle of Delphi, "know thyself" meant "know that you are not a god and do not commit the sin of pretending to become one." For Socrates and Plato, who adopted the maxim as their own, it meant: know the god who, in you, is yourself; try to become, as much as is possible, a likeness of the god.

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JEAN-PIERRE VERNANT

Translated from French by Anne Marzin

**GREGORY I** (c. 540–604), called the Great; bishop of Rome from 590 until his death, one of the most remarkable figures to occupy the Roman see. Gregory was born into a landowning, aristocratic Roman family; he was related to popes Agapetus I (r. 535–536) and Felix III (r. 483–492). We have no direct evidence about his early life and education, but his correspondence, our main historical source, suggests that he received sound legal training and acquired wide experience in the management of landed estates. We have Gregory's own testimony that he spent some years in a public career as prefect of the city of Rome. Although we must assume that his education brought him into contact with Latin classical authors, there are few echoes of their works in Gregory's writings; in this he was very different from Jerome and Augustine. What we do know about his origins suggests a pious family background in which Christian authors and values prevailed.

During his term as prefect he apparently felt called to become a more perfect Christian by embracing the monastic life. He speaks of having delayed his "conversion" for a long time. When the decision was finally made—



probably after his father's death—he established a monastery dedicated to Saint Andrew in his paternal home, where he gathered a community and appointed an abbot, and where he himself lived, by his own choice, as a monk. Despite the traditional view that Gregory was a Benedictine monk, it is by no means certain that the rule of Saint Benedict governed the life of this new monastic house.

Gregory's skills as administrator and negotiator were too widely known to be eclipsed by his entry into seclusion. Pelagius II was no sooner elected bishop of Rome (r. 579–590) than he summoned Gregory from his monastery, ordained him deacon, and sent him as papal representative (*apocrisiarius*) to Constantinople. Gregory apparently accepted this mission on the condition that he could take monks from Saint Andrew's with him and set up a quasi-monastic household in the imperial city. Gregory remained in the East until about 586, when he returned to Rome to resume his monastic life and to assist and advise Pelagius II, even drafting some of the pope's later letters.

Without much delay, and without waiting for the imperial consent, the Senate, clergy, and populace elected Gregory bishop of Rome after Pelagius's death in 590. Later tradition maintained that Gregory fled the city to avoid this burden but was captured after three days and brought back. Gregory always lamented the imposition of this heavy burden, which deprived him of his "beloved solitude," but he continued to view himself as a monk and aimed to set up his household, as at Constantinople, in the form of a small community made up of monks and clerics who would live together and share all things in common.

The fourteen years of Gregory's pontificate (590–604) are well documented, particularly on the strength of his correspondence. We have a picture of a man who showed a superb command of estate and personnel management and from whom emanated good sense, moderation, and tact, allied to shrewd, businesslike efficiency. He was fully conversant with the laws of the imperial code but could temper them with goodwill and humanity. He exhibited a firmness allied to fairness that was in the best Roman tradition. These qualities were constantly at play in Gregory's attempts to introduce greater order and efficiency into the administration of the patrimony of Peter (the possessions held by the church of Rome not only in Italy and Sicily but also in Gaul, Africa, and elsewhere), and in his handling of the affairs of dioceses and monasteries, and ecclesiastical disputes of all kinds. The correspondence also gives rise to the impression that in becoming bishop of Rome Gregory was in fact assuming again some of the duties

of the prefect of Rome, concerning himself with food and water supplies, appointing commanders and paying for troops, and taking a leading role in negotiating truces and treaties with the threatening Lombard invaders. Although there had been previous occasions when popes assumed leadership of the city of Rome, particularly in crisis, Gregory's pontificate is the first and best example of ecclesiastical authority replacing, throughout the machinery of government, the political power of a declining state.

Here and there in his letters a note of rigor and acerbity emerges perhaps native to the Roman patrician and professional administrator, but for the most part these elements were held in check by Gregory's reverence for the gospel teaching of humility and charity, in whose light he constantly examined and formed his own conduct. His preoccupation with saving souls and helping the poor is ever present. John the Deacon, Gregory's biographer, refers to a "very large papyrus volume" (the first of its kind to be drawn up by a bishop of Rome), in which Gregory, with his usual efficiency, caused all pensions, rent reductions, subsidies, and charitable outlays to be recorded so that none would be forgotten or overlooked in future years. Gregory's concern for the good of souls likewise appeared in missionary activities directed toward heretics or pagans, the most noteworthy being his sending, in 596 and 601, groups of monks from his own monastery, under the leadership of Augustine, to evangelize the Anglo-Saxons.

Despite the incessant preoccupations of his years as bishop of Rome, and despite a debilitating malady that seems to have afflicted him for years, Gregory consistently found time to pursue the activity that lay nearest his heart, namely, to study and interpret holy scripture for the group of close associates with whom he lived, in an effort to bring out its hidden meaning as a guide for moral life. Gregory had begun such a discourse, on the *Book of Job*, during his stay at Constantinople. In the period between his return to Rome from the East (586) and his election as bishop (590), he reorganized these spontaneous discourses into book form. The result was the vast *Magna moralia in Job*, a work in thirty-five books divided into six codices, which had a lasting influence on the whole Middle Ages. During the first years of his pontificate he discoursed in church and before the people not only on the gospel lessons of the day but also on the opening and final chapters of *Ezekiel*, chapters that seemed particularly relevant in those grim years when events seemed to presage the end of the world. However, he found talking to a large audience in church a trying experience that overtaxed his health. After his

first years as pope he gave up the practice, but continued to discourse to a smaller group of intimates. He himself listed the books on which he spoke: *Proverbs*, *Song of Songs*, the books of the prophets, *Kings*, and the *Heptateuch*. Only the commentary on *1 Kings* and two homilies on *Song of Songs* are extant.

In addition to his scriptural works and his letters, Gregory also wrote a book of dialogues (between himself and his deacon Peter), recounting the miracles performed through God's power in Italy in his own time. The aim of this work was to revive the religious faith of the Roman people, beset at that time by war, plague, and famine. The second book of the *Dialogues* is devoted entirely to one figure, Benedict, the founder of Monte Cassino and author of the Benedictine rule; it embodies the earliest traditions about Benedict, including stories gathered by Gregory from Benedict's own disciples.

His *Regula pastoralis* (Pastoral Rule), probably the best known and most used of Gregory's works in the Middle Ages, was the first work of his pontificate. No sooner had he been consecrated in 590 than he set about constructing a standard of conduct for the ideal shepherd of souls. In this one can perhaps perceive an attempt to redefine his own insights as a skilled administrator and negotiator on a level higher than that of practical affairs; that is, on a universal, spiritual plane. Gregory always maintained that if bishops lived up to their true ideal the church of Christ, spread throughout the world, would prosper. In writing the *Pastoral Rule* he sought to instruct himself as well as others.

As the years of his pontificate proceeded, Gregory continued to reflect on the implications of his position as bishop of Rome, a see that claimed preeminence in the church over all other sees, including those that were also patriarchal. Here he reached views that differ markedly from those that later formed the traditional papal attitude. Gregory sought to limit the Roman claim to what he considered its essential elements. He believed that a supreme authority was needed in the church, but only so that things might be put right if they went wrong; if simony were practiced in Gaul or in Alexandria, it was his duty to remonstrate, "but when fault does not intervene, we [bishops] are all equal by reason of humility." Gregory was tireless in underlining the danger of pride and the need for humility in those who govern the church. For this reason, he rejected the title of ecumenical patriarch, not only when applied to the patriarch of Constantinople but also for himself. Ecumenical means universal, and he who is universal has no rivals in rank; on that level, others have no standing. Therefore, he wrote to his friend Eulogius, patriarch of Alexandria, "you deny your own standing as bishop when you assert that I am universal as bishop and

pope." On the level of custom and usage, including liturgical usage, Gregory did not believe that the Roman see held any monopoly of good things. It is here that he contrasts most markedly with his predecessor Innocent I, who maintained that all the churches in the West needed to follow Roman usage. Gregory's legal training had familiarized him with customary law, and he had observed that good things might be found everywhere. "We should love places because of the good things they possess and not things because of the places from which they come," he wrote to Augustine of Canterbury in his so-called *Libellus responsionum*, urging him to borrow liturgical usages from Gaul as well as from his native Rome for the newly converted Anglo-Saxons. Such a statement fitted into Gregory's larger view that claims to monopoly were detrimental to charity, which was fostered by diversity and interchange. Diversity on the level of custom was allowable and even desirable, as long as unity was always maintained in Christian faith. The medieval papacy would have evolved very differently if Gregory's precepts in these matters had prevailed.

It is now recognized that Gregory the Great had relatively little to do with the sacramentary or with the chant that still bears his name. He unquestionably composed certain prayers and prefaces that eventually found their way into the Roman sacramentary, but these are limited in number, a total of 82 out of 927 formulas. The liturgical traditions associated with Gregory's name go back to Carolingian times and derive from Gregory II rather than Gregory the Great.

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PAUL MEYVAERT

**GREGORY VII** (Hildebrand, c. 1021–1085), pope of the Roman Catholic church (1073–1085). The facts of Hildebrand's youth and education are hazy. He was born in Tuscany, perhaps at Soana, but went to Rome early in his life. There he became a monk, probably at the Benedictine house of Santa Maria del Priorato. At Santa Maria Hildebrand was for a time a student of the learned exiled Bishop Laurentius of Amalfi and was active in the service of Gregory VI (1045–1046), with whom he had a familial connection. In January 1047, Hildebrand accompanied this pontiff into exile in Germany, after Gregory's deposition by Emperor Henry III and the Synod of Sutri (December 1046). That exile is the first precisely datable event in Hildebrand's life. Whether or not he ever formally became a monk at Cluny has been debated, but he probably resided there for a time prior to his return to the south. That return occurred in the company of Bishop Bruno of Toul, who in 1049 journeyed to Rome to become Pope Leo IX (1049–1054).

Leo's pontificate is commonly considered to be the beginning of the eleventh-century reform papacy. Leo brought to Rome a group of reformers from both Italy and the north. Hildebrand's career in the Roman church developed in conjunction with individuals such as Peter Damian and Humbert of Moyenmoutier. Hildebrand was designated by Leo as abbot and rector of the Benedictine house of San Paulo fuori le Mura, and his importance in the evolving administrative and reformative operations of the church is evidenced by his designation, several times in the 1050s, as a papal legate north of the Alps. During one such legation, in 1054 in France, Hildebrand presided over a synod at Tours that considered the question of the eucharistic views of Berengar of Tours, whose career would stretch into the 1070s and who would be called to Rome during Gregory's pontificate for an examination of his teachings. It would, however, be a mistake to view Hildebrand as the chief papal adviser at this point. But with his appointment as archdeacon under Nicholas II (1059–1061), and with the death of Humbert and the election of Alexander II, both occurring in 1061, Hildebrand's importance grew to the extent that Walter Ullmann has called him, with perhaps only slight exaggeration, the Roman church's "mentor and moving spirit" during Alexan-

der's long pontificate (*New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 6, p. 773).

Alexander II died on 21 April 1073. During the ceremony for the pope's burial, Hildebrand was acclaimed by the Roman populace as Alexander's successor. As has been often pointed out, that public display was at variance with the terms of the recently enacted papal election decree (1059), which Hildebrand himself would have approved, and which placed the selection of the pope firmly in the hands of the cardinals. In the course of events that took place during the spring of 1073, public acclamation preceded the election by the cardinals and other clergy, rather than vice versa as stipulated in the 1059 decree. Although the election was certainly valid, the irregularity opened Hildebrand to the charge that his rise to the papacy was illegitimate. Hildebrand chose the papal name Gregory, probably in honor both of Gregory I, one of the fathers of Latin Christianity and a venerable monastic pope, and of his relative and one-time patron, Gregory VI. Gregory's consecration as bishop of Rome was on 30 June 1073, a date that would have been chosen carefully, for it is the feast day of the two great saints of the Roman church, Peter and Paul.

The significance of Gregory's twelve-year reign as pope is impossible to assess outside of the framework of the reforming movements underway at the time throughout Latin Christendom. For decades sensitive churchmen had criticized perceived abuses in religious structure and administration. Chief among the abuses cited was simony, the gaining of an ecclesiastical office by means of payment rather than according to canonical norms. Various circles of ecclesiastical reform in the eleventh century were also adamant in condemning, in addition to simony, sexual incontinence among the higher orders of the clergy. Taken together, these offenses against simony and clerical marriage and concubinage marked an effort to purify the administrative structure and sacramental life of the Latin church, and the notion of *puritas ecclesiae* ("purity of the church") became a common reform theme.

From the pontificate of Leo IX, however, and especially from the reign of Nicholas II, the papacy emerged consistently in a position of leadership in this reform movement aimed at purifying the church. Repeatedly, in papal letters and conciliar decrees, and as a result of legatine missions, the Roman church fostered the reform of religious life, aiming particularly at eradicating the abuses mentioned above. It must be stressed, however, that these initiatives did not involve merely administrative adjustments in the church's structure. The theological and practical importance of the reform reached deep into the religious mentality of Latin Chris-

tendom, and had profound effects on areas such as eucharistic theology, the cult of saints, the attitude toward church property, and the role of laymen in designating appointees to church positions. Concomitant with this evolving reform activity, an ecclesiology developed centering on the Roman see. The roots of this doctrine reach far back into the history of Latin Christianity, but from the mid-eleventh century the potential and the prerogatives of the Roman church began to command increased attention as the reforms progressed.

The reform and the rise of the Roman church occurred side by side. This increase in Roman importance was not the invention of eleventh-century thinkers. The dossiers of claims and the incidents and traditions on which Roman leadership of Latin Christianity rested reach as far into the past as the New Testament and the so-called Petrine passages (*Mt.* 16:13-19). Popes such as Leo I, Gelasius I, and Gregory I were pivotal figures in late antiquity, advancing claims that contributed to the special status of the Roman church and its bishop; and in the ninth century Nicholas I was a vigorous proponent of those claims and that status. Yet from the reign of Leo IX the uniqueness and authority of Rome was stressed increasingly and with new vigor. As the reformers, now in control of the papal office, sought to advance their aims, the prestige and potential of the Roman church became a vehicle for this strategy. As the reform progressed there occurred a parallel and even intersecting development in which the theoretical authority believed for centuries to be vested in the Roman church became increasingly real, and attention was given in practice as well as theory to the rights and powers of Rome, its clergy, and its bishop.

Such was the general situation confronting Gregory VII at the beginning of his pontificate. Given Gregory's long association with papal reform, it was expected that the major initiatives for purity in the church would be continued. Yet these policies, along with Gregory's strong personality and intense devotion to the Roman church, were on a collision course with events growing out of the final years of the pontificate of Alexander II. The difficulty in great part would center on events occurring as a result of King Henry IV of Germany growing to manhood, determined to assert his power over areas within his sphere of influence. Among the issues involved were claims to authority in both secular and church matters in important cities in northern Italy, and especially in Milan. Thus in the early 1070s, Henry was found supporting one candidate for the bishopric of that city while the papacy supported another. The issue was twofold. Did Henry have a right to grant churches

according to his own judgment to whomever he chose; and could Henry ignore directives from the Roman church and its bishop?

Historians are fortunate to possess from Gregory VII a papal register—a unique survival from the eleventh-century papacy—in which the progress of events and ideas can often be followed in detail. In the register, under March 1075, there appears a series of twenty-seven epigrammatic statements that were drafted by Gregory and his advisers (the so-called *Dictatus papae*), perhaps as titles for a new canon law collection where texts would have been presented from the canonical tradition to support each proposition. The unusual form and special content of these texts has received much attention from historians, for contained therein is a series of strong statements asserting the superiority of ecclesiastical over secular authority, and the absolute authority of the Roman church and its bishop over all churches and bishops. Here are found, for example, in number 12, the statement that the pope may depose emperors and, in number 27, the claim that the pope may absolve subjects of unjust men from their fealty. Clearly, from the outset of his reign, Gregory VII was concerned not only to advance policies to bring about *puritas ecclesiae* but also, as part of a larger plan, to define and command obedience to the prerogatives of the Roman church.

The decade between 1075 and Gregory's death in 1085 saw the genesis and development of a church-state controversy that would outlive both Gregory and Henry. It would pose issues about the interaction of the ecclesiastical and secular spheres of society that would be debated for centuries. Gregory maintained a papal right to remove Henry from the kingship and to release his subjects from their oaths of loyalty. Henry, on the other hand, claimed the right to control the churches in his realm, and because of what he saw as the indefensible novelty of Gregory's positions, condemned him as a "false monk" and usurper of the papal throne. The battle extended beyond rhetoric and exchanges of letters. In 1076 Gregory excommunicated Henry and forbade him to exercise his royal duties. After a period of diplomatic maneuvering, however, in the early 1080s Henry invaded Italy, drove Gregory from Rome into Norman territory in the south, and installed in Gregory's place at Rome a so-called antipope, Clement III (Archbishop Wibert of Ravenna). The controversy offers historians such compelling vignettes as the famous scene in January 1077 that occurred at Canossa in northern Italy. At a crucial stage of the dispute, Henry, beleaguered in both Germany and Italy, presented himself to Gregory as a penitent, parading barefoot in the

snow to seek forgiveness from the pontiff. After watching this performance from within the castle for three days, Gregory forgave Henry, and lifted the sentence of excommunication (but probably did not intend to reinstate him as king). What political advantage was gained or lost on each side has been much debated, but Gregory's action in forgiving Henry was the response of a pastor of souls and not of a power-crazed fanatic.

The prohibitions that Gregory issued against laymen investing individuals with church benefices traditionally have been accorded a great amount of attention. In fact, the term "investiture conflict" has sometimes been applied, albeit incorrectly, to the heart of the entire eleventh-century papal reform movement, and the controversy about lay investiture, especially as it evolved in the German empire, has been wrongly seen as the cornerstone of Gregory's policy to promote reform. While Gregory did issue important decrees aimed at prohibiting lay investiture, recent research has demonstrated that the decrees were probably not issued until 1078, not in 1075 as has been assumed. These prohibitions and their transmission must also be examined in great detail to determine the extent to which they were applicable (and promulgated) at various points throughout Latin Christendom for the papacy under Gregory was not everywhere uniform in its emphasis on certain issues.

For an accurate understanding of Gregory's policies we must return to the history of the eleventh-century reform, and to the pope's fascination with and devotion to the Roman church and the papal office. Seen from this perspective, the various events and turmoil of his reign can be viewed as outcroppings of his desire to continue the work of his predecessors, and at the same time to promote intensively what he deemed the proper order of Christian society. Using the Bible as his chief source, and infused with religious fervor and a deep sense of Roman ecclesiastical possibilities, Gregory believed that the world ought to be subject to the leadership of the church, for churchmen were responsible for promoting the kingdom of God on earth and were held accountable for human souls. It was Peter, the founder of the Roman church, to whom Christ gave supreme authority over the terrestrial church, and thus Peter's vicar, the bishop of Rome, is to be obeyed as the supreme authority. Because of the church's leadership in medieval society, and given the amalgamation within that society of entities that later ages would distinguish as *church* and *state*, the bishop of Rome was to be obeyed in both ecclesiastical and secular spheres. Both the secular and the ecclesiastical realms—the *regnum* and the *sacerdotium*—should attend to their proper du-

ties by seeking to do God's will under the headship of the church.

No less than laymen, Gregory expected churchmen to be loyal devotees of Peter and his vicar. The papal office, furthermore, was an awesome responsibility. Gregory believed that it was his divinely enjoined duty to protect the church from the stain of abuses such as simony, and to free it from every distraction, including lay or clerical interference, that would impede the performance of God's work in the world. It often was necessary, consequently, to instruct and admonish all sectors of society about their duties in that society and about the proper reverence for Peter and his successors. Gregory prohibited lay investiture, promoted closer ties between Rome and outlying bishoprics and abbeys, granted detailed powers to papal legates, stressed the need for liturgical harmony with Roman usages, ordered special commissions to investigate the eucharistic teachings of Berengar of Tours, and even proposed to Henry IV a jointly led crusade to the East to beat back the infidel from the Holy Land. Gregory was neither a canon lawyer nor a theologian, although he was concerned with both areas, and he insisted that he was not an innovator. Perhaps he can be understood best if he is seen as an eleventh-century monk of intense Christian devotion and energy. He sought to realize what he considered a properly structured Christian society and used the expanded authority of the papal office in his efforts.

At the time of his death in 1085, Gregory was an exile from Rome, driven to southern Italy by Henry IV and an irate Roman populace. He had been deserted by many of his supporters, and even many reforming churchmen thought he had gone too far in his battle with Henry. By reason of that battle, however, and because of his powerful personality, Gregory's name has been attached to the entire reform movement of the age, and the term *Gregorian reform* is familiar to even the casual student of medieval Christianity. Although his importance is undeniable, whether or not the cause of church reform was aided or hindered by his pontificate is a complicated issue. Many twelfth-century writers remembered Urban II (1088–1099), not Gregory, as the great figure of the preceding age of reform. Even so, Urban forcefully acknowledged himself to be a disciple of Gregory, although the extent to which Urban is a true "Gregorian" can be debated. As decades passed, however, Gregory's name would be cited less and less frequently in the works of Roman pontiffs, but the issues that dominated his reign could not be ignored. Because of the claims that Gregory made, particularly those detailing the relation between secular and ecclesiastical

authority, medieval church-state relations had been fundamentally altered.

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ROBERT SOMERVILLE

**GREGORY OF CYPRUS** (1241–1290), known as Gregory II; patriarch of Constantinople. Born in Frankish-occupied Cyprus, Gregory traveled to Ephesus, Nicaea, and finally Constantinople, where he studied under Gregory Akropolites. His exceptional proclivity toward humanism gained for him a place in the select circle of academicians at the patriarchal school where he lectured on the Pauline letters. As one of the more

creative personalities of the late thirteenth century, he was the very embodiment of the Palaeologian renaissance that synthesized a renewal of ascetic spirituality and classical learning.

Upon his ascendancy to the patriarchate in 1283, Gregory inherited the political and religious problems that had been festering since the Fourth Crusade (1204) and the Council of Lyons (1274). Under the aggressive unionist attempts of Emperor Michael VIII and Patriarch John XI Beccus (1275–1282), these issues became entangled with the *filioque* controversy.

The Synod of Blachernae (spring 1285) proved to be a short-lived victory for Gregory in his efforts to reconcile the Arsenites (the hard-line conservatives) with the unionists. The importance of this synod, however, was, by way of its condemnation of Beccus, its reaction to and rejection of the 1274 Roman formulation. Gregory's role was pivotal because of his synodal paper (*Tome*), which, however, was not subsequently recognized for what it was—the definitive refutation of Beccus's theological innovation. Gregory's subsequent writings (among them the *Pittakion*, which was addressed to his benefactor and supporter, Andronicus II Palaeologus) constitute a defense of his stand against the *filioque*.

Gregory's theological contribution offered an insightful solution to the *filioque* debate. Rather than being one of provisional accommodation (Beccus) or of rigorous adherence to the formulations of Photios and Athanasius, his solution worked out the implications of the Cappadocians and of John of Damascus on the procession of the Holy Spirit. For Gregory, it was not enough to accept the authenticity of a particular scriptural or patristic reference; its correct interpretation was essential as well.

Gregory addressed Photios's thesis that the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father alone by raising the question of the relationship of the Spirit and the Son outside of time, as expressed in the formula "through the Son." His argument distinguishes between the essence and energies of God, or between God's unknowability and his perceivable manifestation in the world. By emphasizing the notion of energetic revelation in Greek patristic thought, Gregory remained, indeed, in the mainstream of Byzantine apophatism and also became the forerunner of fourteenth-century Palamite theology.

The impact of Gregory's insights on the Palamite synthesis as well as his solution to the *filioque* debate is increasingly recognized by scholars as being far more valuable and genuine than the theology of unionism. Unfortunately, Gregory's contemporaries, unlike his successors, did not share the same sentiments toward

their prelate. Even though they tacitly accepted his orthodoxy, they insisted that he resign and solemnly removed his name from the hierarchical list of the *sunodikon*. Was his self-imposed abdication from the patriarchate the most prudent action to take against a small yet influential band of opponents? That he did so proves not his weakness but his pastoral sensitivity to the importance of healing the political divisions that had torn the church during his lifetime.

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JOHN TRAVIS

**GREGORY OF DATEV** (1346–1410), or, in Armenian, Grigor Tatevatsi; Christian theologian, philosopher, and saint of the Armenian church. Gregory of Datev was born in T'mkaber, a city in the province of Vayots Dzor (northeastern modern Armenian S.S.R.). At the age of fifteen, he entered the Monastery of Aprakunik' to study under the famous philosopher and theologian Hovhannes of Orot'n (1315–1388), with whom he remained for twenty-eight years. With his teacher, Gregory traveled in 1373 to Jerusalem, where he was ordained a celibate priest. He received the degree of doctor of the church in Erzinka (present-day Erzincan, eastern Turkey) and in 1387 was elevated to the rank of supreme doctor of the church at the Monastery of Aprakunik'. At the death of Hovhannes and upon his express wish, Gregory became the dean of the theological school, which in 1390 moved to the Monastery of Datev.

In addition to classical Greek philosophy, biblical exegesis, and both Greek and Latin patristic thought, Gregory's students were also introduced to music, calligraphy, and the art of painting illuminated manuscripts. An erudite thinker, Gregory knew Greek, Latin, and Arabic. He died at the Monastery of Datev at the age of sixty-four and was buried there, where his tomb

lies to this day. Venerated by following generations as "Second Illuminator," "eternally shining sun," "heavenly champion," and "great teacher," Gregory of Datev dominated the thought and orientation of the Armenian church in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as monk, author, educator, theologian, philosopher, scientist, orator, apologist, painter, calligrapher, and polyglot.

Well versed in the scholastic manner of demonstration, Gregory used syllogistic argumentation throughout his works with the intention of eventually manifesting the orthodoxy of the Armenian church against the unitive attempts of Rome. His most important theological tracts are *Girk' Hartsnants* (Book of Questions; 1397) and *Oskep'orik* (Book of Golden Content; 1407). In these Gregory addresses himself to such topics as the Holy Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and Christ's birth, baptism, death, and resurrection. In *Book of Golden Content*, Gregory taught that rational examination can prove the existence of God without recourse to faith, because the existence of creatures implies the reality of the creator. In this work he also formulated a profession of the Orthodox faith based on the creeds of the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople and included the teachings of the Armenian church and its early fathers, especially Gregory the Illuminator (c. 239–c. 326). In continuous use, this credo is recited also during ordination ceremonies by the ordinand.

Criticizing Plato, Gregory taught in his *About the Structure of Man* that the spirit does not exist prior to the corporeal (body or matter) nor apart from it but issues concurrently and works through the mechanisms that the corporeal provides. There are different types of spirit—the vegetative, the animal, and the rational. Through the initiative of God, the corporeal, whether body or matter, contains "formative power" or spirit, which is immortal, and which has heat, motion, and action. According to Gregory, faith and science do not exclude each other but belong properly to two different realms. Science is bereft of the means to consider the supernatural realm and by faith alone we cannot understand nature. Knowledge of the natural world is acquired through reason, training, and experience (by way of the five senses). The rational spirit of mankind is like a clean parchment and receives whatever is impressed on it, whereas through God's grace we can understand theological truths.

An industrious writer, Gregory produced twenty-eight volumes on biblical, liturgical, pastoral, theological, and philosophical topics. Most of his works have not had a comprehensive critical evaluation. Such a task would enhance the proper understanding of the beliefs

of the Armenian church through the writings of one of its most loyal sons.

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AVAK ASADOURIAN

**GREGORY OF NAREK** (c. 945–c. 1010), or, in Armenian, Grigory Narekatsi; Christian mystic, poet, and saint of the Armenian church. Gregory was born in the village of Narek in the region of Vaspourakan (present-day Van, eastern Turkey). His father, Khosrov Antsevatsi, bishop of the nearby province of Antsevatsik', built a monastery, where Gregory obtained his elementary schooling. He continued his education in the Monastery of Narek, where after ordination he spent the remainder of his life.

The rulers of the kingdom of Vaspourakan favored ties with Byzantium. Consequently, the Monastery of Narek trained its novices in the trivium and quadrivium, having incorporated the syllabi used in the edu-



cational centers throughout the Eastern Christian empire. Thus Gregory was well versed in Greek philosophy, especially in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonic school, which by the tenth century had been clothed in Christian garb. Gregory was also well read in the Armenian church fathers of the fourth through seventh centuries and was familiar with the thought of Ignatius of Antioch, the Cappadocian fathers, and Chrysostom.

Gregory's major work, the *Book of Lamentation*, popularly known as *Narek*, is a prayer book still much venerated. In it the penitent is made aware of the total otherness of God and of humanity's utter dependence on God, who is the source of all reality. The *Book of Lamentation* is an analysis of Gregory's own spiritual progress, realized through a fundamental knowledge of Christ and a radical knowledge of himself as sinner. The work also exhibits detailed knowledge of the scriptures and familiarity with agriculture, architecture, mathematics, astronomy, nautical art, and medicine. Among his other literary achievements are twenty-one hymns, or odes; four panegyric orations, containing historical accounts of the era; and ten discourses, actually spiritual songs, consisting of invocations and supplications. Of special interest is the historical information these discourses contain concerning the stratification of society during the times of Gregory.

Gregory was and remains the mystic of the Armenian church. Central to his mysticism is the belief in a cathartic process that ultimately would lead humankind to a reacquisition of divine similitude, or the likeness of God. The mysticism espoused by Gregory is a uniquely human undertaking whereby man tries to encounter God. To meet the Almighty, man must rid himself of transgressions. In order to encounter God, who transcends all being and all knowledge, it becomes necessary to renounce all sense gathered through the workings of reason. This apophatic approach to knowledge of God takes the form of negating all meaning in order to emphasize the absolute unknowability of God. According to Gregory, God is incomprehensible, invisible, ineffable, beyond totality, unspeakable, unobservable, without beginning, and without time.

Gregory, however, also embraced the cataphatic approach to God by stressing God's actions in history, which manifest God's love and concern for humankind. In the *Commentary on the Song of Songs of Solomon*, Gregory emphasizes the parallelism between the union of Yahveh with Israel and the marriage of the incarnate Logos with the church. As the Lord of compassion and mercy, the Christian God is distinctly a God of action, that is, a living God. Gregory began all his prayers by

declaring, "from the depth of heart, a conversation with God."

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AVAK ASADOURIAN

**GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS** (c. 329–c. 391), one of the Cappadocian fathers, known to Christian tradition as "the Theologian" by virtue of his rhetorical erudition and the consummate skill with which he combated the perceived heresies of those who in any way detracted from or denied the validity of the established orthodoxy of his day. One of those "heretics" was his own father, Gregory the Elder, who in his youth had been a member of an obscure but apparently popular sect known as the Hypsistarii. But inasmuch as his father was later converted to orthodoxy and subsequently consecrated bishop, his son could say of him that he was one whose "character anticipates their faith" (Oration 18) and that he was "well grafted out of the wild olive tree into the good one" (Or. 7). It was by his mother, Nonna, however, that Gregory was to be most enduringly influenced, for it was she who, by her tears and by her prayers, persuaded him to embrace the ascetic life. Gregory said of her, "Who had a greater love of virginity, though patient herself of the marriage bond?" (Or. 18). Gregory was one of three children; Gorgonia, his older sister ("One red tint was dear to her, the blush of modesty," Or. 8), and a younger brother, Caesarius ("Neither by his fame [as a physician] nor by the luxury which surrounded him was his nobility of soul corrupted," Or. 7), both predeceased Gregory. The funeral orations Gregory preached for his sister and

brother remain classics of their genre, panegyrics of the most elaborate sort.

Gregory's education was undertaken at Cappadocian Caesarea, at Palestinian Caesarea, at Alexandria, and finally at Athens. Upon completion of these extensive studies, Gregory had hoped to retire to a life of contemplative solitude ("with no contact with human affairs except when necessary," Or. 2), but this desire was thwarted when his father, now a bishop, ordained him priest and set him on the stormy road of pastoral and ecclesiastical responsibilities. The "tyranny" he experienced at his father's hand was repeated when his close friend Basil of Caesarea consecrated him suffragan bishop of the "exceptionally abominable and narrow little village" (Or. 10) of Sasima. Upon his father's death, however, Gregory returned to Nazianzus to pursue what he hoped would be a quiet and undisturbed episcopate.

This was not to be so. During the "heretical" emperor Valens's reign, the Arian party had gained strength, so Gregory was (again reluctantly) persuaded to go to Constantinople, the capital city, and preach on behalf of the outnumbered "orthodox." Arius and his followers had called into question the eternal divinity of Christ (a dogma that the Council of Nicaea, in 325, had promulgated in direct opposition to Arius), while others had denied the full divinity of the Holy Spirit. Such views offended Gregory deeply, so he set out in a series of five long discourses, commonly known as his *Theological Orations* (Or. 27–31), to articulate, with both depth of learning and clarity of thought, what he believed to be the true doctrine of the Trinity. The core of his teaching consisted in his assertion that the salvation of humankind is possible only if the agents of that salvation (i.e., Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) share fully in the divinity of the one godhead. Defending the so-called Nicene faith against its Arian detractors, however, took its toll on Gregory, as did his other episcopal duties, including his unwilling participation in ecclesiastical politics. It is no surprise, then, that during the Council of Constantinople in 381 (where many of his views were adopted) he retired to the contemplative life that he had so fervently desired from the beginning.

But Gregory's retirement years, as his extant letters clearly indicate, were far from idle. Chief among his concerns during this period of his life was yet another "heresy," this time authored by Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea. In an attempt to solve the question of how the Son of God (or Word) could become incarnate in the human Jesus, Apollinaris suggested that the Word (Gr., *logos*) took the place of Jesus' mind (or rational faculty), thus ensuring the unity of the incarnate person and also implying that everything Jesus did or said could be attributed to divine authorship. Gregory, in three closely

argued dogmatic letters (101, 102, 202), called this a "mindless" Christology, insisting—again, out of a concern for the need for salvation and for humanity's ultimate goal of union with God—that "only that which is assumed [i.e., by the Logos] can be saved." It must be the whole person, the mind included, that was assumed by the Word at the time of the incarnation, if the whole person is to be saved. If the whole person is not assumed, then salvation itself is imperiled. Gregory's powerful and incisive arguments won the day, and Apollinaris's bold attempts to explain the incomprehensible were condemned.

If Gregory were to be remembered, within the relatively narrow confines of the history of doctrine, only as "the Theologian," and if he were understood solely as the defender of true faith against heretical encroachments, we would be doing him an injustice. As important as his christological and trinitarian concepts were to the debates of his day, his more enduring (and often overlooked) significance may lie elsewhere. Caught, as he was, between the desire for solitary retirement ("For me the greatest business is to be free of business," Epistle 49) and his vehement dislike of ecclesiastical and political machinations ("For my part . . . my inclination is to avoid all assemblies of bishops, because I have never seen a council come to a good end or turn out to be a solution for evils," Ep. 130), he nevertheless manifested in his own person a delicate balance between a genuine concern for his fellow Christians' spiritual well-being and an intuitive grasp of those divine mysteries that transcend logical or rational boundaries. This balance is seen less in his exclusively doctrinal discourses than in his poetry, for it is in the latter that one glimpses a sensitivity at once aesthetic and mystical.

While Gregory's orations address theological issues with precision and directness, his poems—many of them no less theological—are less rigid, more given to deep self-understanding and to a broad, inclusive generosity of spirit. Gregory may be one of the earliest Christian theologians to realize, instinctively, that poetry is a more appropriate medium for theological articulation than is prose, however well ordered, systematic, and architectonic that prose might be. He would have delighted, one dares suppose, in the claim of the nineteenth-century Scottish poet John Campbell Shairp that "whenever we come face to face with truth then poetry begins." It is as if Gregory's dogmatic discourses were true to his (albeit grudging) acceptance of the ecclesial responsibilities laid on him, whereas his poems gave voice to his capacity for a deep inner awareness of his relationship to God, a relationship of which both his constancy in ascetic discipline and his unending search after truth were genuine symbols. The balance, then,

between theological precision in the interests of orthodoxy and his poetic sensitivities was, for Gregory, perhaps more of a tension than a balance. Yet he had a vision of the future state in which the balance would be restored and the tension resolved. And this he could express both poetically and theologically:

No longer from afar will I behold the truth,  
As if in a mirror reflected on the water's surface.  
Rather, the truth itself will I see with eyes unveiled,  
The truth whose first and primary mark the Trinity is,  
God as One adored, a single light in tri-equal beams.

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DONALD F. WINSLOW

**GREGORY OF NYSSA** (c. 335–c. 395), also known as Gregory Nyssen; Christian theologian. With his elder brother, Basil of Caesarea (c. 329–379), and Basil's lifelong friend, Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329–c. 391), Gregory of Nyssa was a principal architect and interpreter both of the trinitarian settlement canonized by the ecumenical Council of Constantinople (381) and, in his later years, of the ascetic and mystical tradition of Eastern monasticism.

Little is known of the details of Gregory's life. The child of an aristocratic Christian family of Cappadocia, he had two bishops among his brothers, while his elder sister, Macrina, whose biography is numbered among his works, was a noted and saintly ascetic. Destined for an ecclesiastical career, Gregory was early made a lec-

tor in the church and was educated in the local schools at Caesarea, thus missing the opportunity to study, as Basil had, at one or more of the great cosmopolitan centers of learning. Nevertheless, Gregory decided in favor of marriage (with a woman named Theosebeia) and the career of a professional rhetorician, which he took up in earnest around 365.

Gregory's first known work was the treatise *On Virginity*, which he wrote in defense of the ascetic life, apparently at the behest of Basil. Shortly after its composition, Basil, now the metropolitan bishop of Caesarea, found himself badly in need of episcopal allies in his struggle with the Arian orthodoxy of the imperial court. Accordingly, he induced Gregory to be ordained bishop of Nyssa (371), a small town on the river Halys, some eighty miles northwest of Caesarea. The job fit neither Gregory's tastes nor his talents, but he carried on until a synod of Arian bishops, assembled at Nyssa in his absence, deposed him (376) on a charge of maladministration of funds.

The year 379, which saw both the death of Basil and the accession of an anti-Arian, pro-Nicene emperor in the person of Theodosius I, marked a turning point in Gregory's life. For one thing, it raised him to prominence in the life of the church: he was chosen (though by his own choice he did not long remain) the metropolitan bishop of Sebaste in Armenia I; he figured prominently at the Council of Constantinople in 381; and he functioned as a regular "special preacher" in Theodosius's capital.

More important still, Gregory, on the death of Basil, took up the cudgels against his brother's principal theological opponent, the radical Arian Eunomius. In all he composed four treatises entitled *Against Eunomius* during the years 380–383. His continuation of his brother's work in the debate with Arianism was paralleled by his completion of Basil's exegetical homilies on the creation story of *Genesis* 1. To this end Gregory wrote a lengthy treatise, *On the Making of Man*, many of whose themes and issues are echoed in his contemporary *Dialogue on the Soul and the Resurrection*, which he presents as a conversation between himself and his dying sister Macrina. In all of these works Gregory exhibits a remarkable knowledge not only of the Origenist tradition in Christian theology, which Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus had "rediscovered," but also of pagan philosophy in the Neoplatonic idiom; and his indebtedness to these traditions is not the less obvious because he is critically aware of the problems they created for Christian theology.

In his defense of the orthodoxy of the Nicene tradition (i.e., of the doctrine that Son and Spirit are "of one being" with God), Gregory insists, with Basil and Greg-

ory of Nazianzus, that the three hypostases of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share a single being or substance (*ousia*): each is all that the others are. Furthermore, every action or operation of God is one in which all three hypostases share: as there is one divine being, so there is one divine *energeia*. What differentiates the "persons" is solely the relations of causation or origination in which they stand to one another. God appears in Gregory's thought as a single being that is articulated through relations of strict self-reproduction.

In taking this stand, Gregory repudiated the Arian hierarchy of divine hypostases, which established the identity of the Son, or Word, and the Spirit by insisting that they were things of a different (and inferior) order in relation to God; mediating between God and world. The fundamental error in this Arian position, as Gregory saw it, lay in the belief that the being of God is definable and hence limited: that Son and Spirit can be distinguished from God because their definitions are different from God's. He insists, on the contrary, that no human words or ideas grasp the *ousia* of God, which is infinite and illimitable Good; and for this reason the distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit belongs not to the order of being but to that of cause or relation.

This doctrine of the divine infinity is closely related to a central anthropological theme that appears in Gregory's treatise *On the Making of Man* as well as in certain of his later ascetic works. As might be expected in one whose thought was so closely allied to Platonist and Christian-Platonist traditions, Gregory, like Origen before him, has difficulties about the bodily dimension of the human being. On this score he corrects Origen by insisting that soul and body come simultaneously into being and that embodiment is no product of a previous fall. Nevertheless he makes this critical move with a caution that reveals his sympathy with Origen's deprecation of the body. Where he corrects Origen most firmly is in the latter's treatment of human finitude and mutability. For Gregory, mutability, the capacity for unending change, is the characteristic of the human creature that corresponds to divine infinity and incomprehensibility. It is envisaged not primarily as the ever-present possibility of departure from God, but even more as the condition of eternal progress into the infinite Good—Gregory's definition of salvation.

These theological themes are developed in Gregory's later ascetic writings (especially in his *Life of Moses* and his fifteen *Homilies on the Song of Songs*) into the beginnings of a mystical doctrine that is closely integrated with his understanding of baptism and the life that it initiates. For him the processes of moral purification and spiritual illumination come to no final end precisely because there is no end to the Good that they

seek. They issue, as did Moses' pilgrimage, in an entrance into "the cloud" that symbolizes divine incomprehensibility and infinity. In Gregory's spiritual teaching, therefore, there is an anticipation of the path that apophatic mysticism was to take in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite.

[See also the biographies of Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus.]

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RICHARD A. NORRIS

**GREGORY OF SINAI** (d. 1347), ascetic and mystic, canonized by the Eastern Orthodox church. The Greek church commemorates his life on 11 February and the Slavic churches on 8 August. We know much of the life and writings of this great church father from the life composed by his disciple Kallistos I, patriarch of Constantinople.

Born in Asia Minor, Gregory took his monastic vows on Mount Sinai. After travels to Cyprus and Crete he came to Mount Athos. Disturbed to find the holy men of Athos in ignorance of true silence and contemplation, he undertook to instruct both monks and solitaries in the contemplative art. Further travels took him to Constantinople and to Thrace, where he founded monasteries and taught the techniques of mental prayer.

Gregory did not write extensively. Most of his works are concerned with mental prayer and hesychasm, the spiritual life of inner wakefulness. He taught that through obedience, mourning, tears, and the power of pure contemplation the mind is cleansed and led to a vision of the "uncreated light" of God. Spiritual perfection is finally achieved in deification (*theōsis*).

The contemplative art practiced and taught by Gregory is known as "prayer of the heart." In his *Instructions to Hesychasts* he describes a method whereby the mind is forced to descend from head to heart and is then held in repeated invocation of the name of Jesus Christ. Mental prayer is thus remembrance of God through a pure and imageless contemplation. He urged his disciples to keep their minds "colorless, formless, and imageless" and emphasized the use of such physical aids as rhythmic breathing for attainment of inner stillness. But, be-

cause human effort alone cannot accomplish meditative union, he urged that "no one can hold the mind by himself, if it be not held by the Spirit." As man works at prayer, the prayer works in him, and the mind rejoices with the presence of the Holy Spirit and is strengthened in its striving for perfection.

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GEORGE S. BEBIS

**GREGORY PALAMAS** (1296–1359), the most important Orthodox theologian of the fourteenth century and one of the greatest theologians in the history of the Orthodox church. Raised in the Byzantine imperial court, he later became a monk and wrote important theological works that refer primarily to the experience of communion with God. He was elected archbishop of Thessalonica and immediately following his death was recognized as a saint of the Orthodox church. Gregory's memory is celebrated twice a year: on 14 November, the day of his death, and on the second Sunday of Lent. This second celebration, which serves in effect as an extension of the Sunday of Orthodoxy, reveals the special importance the Orthodox church attaches to his person and teachings.

The works of Gregory Palamas summarize the entire earlier patristic tradition, offering it in a new synthesis that has as its central theme the *theōsis* (deification) of man. This *theōsis* is realized through the participation of man in the uncreated energies of God. For this reason, the rejection of the uncreated energies of God, which has as a consequence the rejection of the possibility for man to achieve *theōsis*, was not considered by Palamas to be merely another typical Christian heresy but rather the summarization of all heresies, and, ultimately, the negation of the God who is revealed in the scriptures and the church.

Gregory was born in 1296 in Constantinople. When he was seven years old he lost his father, Constantine, but he continued to reside in the imperial court in Constantinople under the protection of the emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus. He received a rich education there, particularly in philosophy. Even though the emperor had

destined him for high public office, the young Gregory had become increasingly occupied with ascetic practices and noetic prayer, and he eventually chose to enter the monastic life. At the age of twenty, he left with his two younger brothers for the monastic center of Mount Athos. He remained there first with a hesychast in the vicinity of Vatopediou Monastery, then as a member of the *koinobion* (brotherhood) of the great monastery of the Lavra, and finally in the hermitage of Glossia.

In 1325, Turkish incursions compelled him and other monks to leave the Holy Mountain. While on a visit to Thessalonica, he was ordained a priest; he left soon after for Beroea, where he lived for five years at a hermitage outside the city, under even more austere conditions of asceticism. In 1331, Serbian raids became a serious threat, and he was forced to abandon Beroea and return to Mount Athos. Resuming again the hesychast life, he resided for the most part at the hermitage of Saint Sabbas, near the great monastery of the Lavra, except for one year, during which he served as abbot of the monastery of Esphigmenou.

It was at Saint Sabbas that Gregory first was exposed to the anti-hesychast opinions of Barlaam of Calabria, a monk and philosopher of Greek ancestry from southern Italy. While representing the Orthodox church during preparatory discussions with papal legates on the question of church union during the years 1333–1334, Barlaam had refuted the *filioque* by invoking the unapproachability and unknowability of God. The agnostic character of Barlaam's theology disturbed many Orthodox theologians, including Gregory. He composed his *Apodictic Treatises concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit* (1335) without, however, ever referring to Barlaam by name. It was the attack of Barlaam against the ascetic method of the hesychasts that eventually provoked an open rift between him and Gregory. Relying on simplistic and incomplete information concerning the psychosomatic method of prayer used by the hesychasts, Barlaam assailed them in the most severe terms, characterizing them as *omphalopsuchoi* ("men with their souls in their navels") and as Massalians, a heretical group that claimed salvation is obtained only through the power of prayer and not through the sacraments of the church. The defense of the hesychasts was undertaken by Gregory. It was for this purpose that he wrote his famous work *Triads in Defense of the Holy Hesychasts* (c. 1338). The positions taken by Gregory were approved from the beginning by the church. They were sanctioned as well by various synodal decisions, which have a special importance for Orthodoxy.

The first official recognition of Gregory's teachings, with a parallel condemnation of the views of Barlaam, came about through the approval of the *Hagioretic*

*Tome*, which Gregory himself wrote in 1340 and which was signed by representatives of the monasteries of Mount Athos. In June 1341, a council was convened in Constantinople that condemned the positions taken by Barlaam, who confessed his error and finally was compelled to return to the West.

The definitive resolution of the debate was delayed, however, by the untimely death of the emperor, Andronicus III Palaeologus, which occurred immediately following the conclusion of the work of the council and before he had had a chance to sign its decisions. The situation was complicated by the political controversy that soon arose over the question of the imperial succession and that led to a civil war. Thus, a new period of struggle began for Gregory, a struggle that lasted until 1347. His new opponent was Gregory Akindynos. During this period, when the strong man in Constantinople was Patriarch John Calecas, Gregory was banished, imprisoned, and excommunicated from the church (1344), while his adversary Akindynos, who had already been condemned by the church for his views (August 1341), was gradually restored to prominence and even ordained a priest. Calecas's tactic, however, eventually undermined his position. Anne of Savoy, mother of the underaged emperor John V Palaeologus, had set Gregory free. A new council, convened at the beginning of 1347, condemned Patriarch Calecas at the same time that the victorious John VI Cantacuzenus was entering the city as coemperor. The patriarchal throne was assumed by the hesychast Isidore, and Gregory was elected archbishop of Thessalonica. However, the zealots, who were occupying Thessalonica and who refused to recognize the legitimacy of Cantacuzenus, prevented the new bishop from entering his see. Thus, Gregory only formally undertook his pastoral responsibilities at the beginning of 1350, after Cantacuzenus had captured that city as well.

Gregory's first act as archbishop of Thessalonica was to reestablish peace within his flock. In the meantime, he had to contend with a new attack against the hesychasts, this time from the Byzantine humanist Nikēphoros Grēgoras. A new council, called in Constantinople in 1351, decided once again in favor of Gregory and reconfirmed his teachings, especially those having to do with the distinction between essence and energy in God. In 1354, while traveling to Constantinople, Gregory was captured by the Turks and remained their prisoner for approximately one year in Turkish-occupied areas of Asia Minor. There he had the opportunity to come into contact with local Christian communities, as well as to converse with Muslim theologians. After the payment of a ransom, he was set free by the Turks. While passing through Constantinople, he held public debates with Ni-

kēphoros Grēgoras, against whom he also composed several new treatises. In 1355 he returned to Thessalonica, where he continued his pastoral work. He died on 14 November 1359.

Gregory left numerous writings, which are preserved in many manuscript codices. For the most part, these have been published. His dogmatic and apologetic writings include the *Apodictic Treatises*, in which Gregory propounds his compromise with the Latin teaching on the *filioque* by stating that the Holy Spirit, who proceeds eternally from the Father, is poured out on the faithful also from the Son. In his *Triads* he discusses the value of secular studies, various aspects of prayer (including the participation of the human body in prayer and the vision of the uncreated light), and the impossibility of participation in the imparticipable essence of God. Finally, the *Hagioretic Tome* presents God's unfolding revelation and the need for obedience to the saints who have had the experience of the mystical energies of the Holy Spirit.

Gregory's writings on the spiritual life include *The Life of Peter the Athonite* (1334); *One Hundred and Fifty Physical, Theological, Moral and Practical Chapters* (1347), in which basic dogmatic, anthropological, moral, and ascetic themes are presented; *To Xenī* (1345), which analyzes the anthropological and theological presuppositions of the spiritual life; and *Exposition of the Decalogue*, a synopsis of Christian morality. Most of the sixty-three homilies of Gregory that have survived were preached during his tenure as archbishop of Thessalonica. These sermons help to reveal the multifaceted personality of Gregory—his lively interest in the spiritual uplifting of his flock, as well as his concern for peace, social justice, and the everyday problems of the faithful. Some of these homilies, such as the sixteenth and the fifty-third, are complete theological treatises. Most of his letters have been preserved, as well as numerous other theological treatises.

The theology of Gregory has an empirical character. The prophets, the apostles, and the fathers of the church based their theology on the experience of the revelation of God within history. However, true theology is also organically combined with the vision of God; it is the fruit and expression of this vision.

The vision of God is possible because God, who is unapproachable and imparticipable according to his essence, becomes accessible to human beings through his uncreated grace or energy. To have the vision of God, man must cleanse his heart from the stain of sin. Before the incarnation of Christ, the uncreated grace of God illumined the just from without. After the incarnation, God is united to man through the sacrament of the Eucharist and is manifested as light within man's inner

being—provided that the person has tried, through prayerful contemplation, to collect his *Nous* (intellect), which is usually distracted by the things of this world, and to cleanse it from sin. This interpretation of the theory of the uncreated light can be found not only among the hesychast monks, but, more generally, in the teaching of the Orthodox church regarding the renewal and *theōsis* (deification) of man. By participating in the uncreated grace or energy of God, man becomes himself a god by grace. The experience of man's *theōsis* begins already in this life and is fulfilled in the kingdom of God. Christ, who is the Son of God become man and who came into the world as the brother of all human beings, is at the same time also the father of all in the faith, who leads them into the eternal and everlasting glory of the kingdom of God: "for in the glory of the Father, Christ is come, and in the glory of their Father Christ, the righteous shine as the sun and will become light and see light, the pleasing and all-holy vision which is only accessible to the purified heart" (Christou, ed., vol. 1, p. 599).

The influence of the theology of Gregory on Eastern Orthodoxy remains historically important. His tradition of theology served as the best source of counsel for the life of the Orthodox during the dark period of Turkish domination. His teaching, as well as the hesychast tradition, was propagated not only within the bounds of the Byzantine empire but also throughout the entire Orthodox world, giving new inspiration to ascetic and ecclesiastical life. The basic principles of Palamite theology, revived in the early twentieth century by the publication of more of his works as well as numerous studies, has become the starting point for the renewal of Orthodox theology and spiritual life, which, during recent centuries, has sustained intense influence from the West.

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GEORGIOS I. MANTZARIDIS

Translated from Greek by Christopher H. Bender

**GREGORY THE ILLUMINATOR**, chief bishop of Armenia from circa 314 to 325, one of the major saints of the Armenian church, and author of the conversion of the Armenian people to Christianity. Our information about him derives mainly from two fifth-century sources, Agathangelos's *History of the Armenians* and the Greek *Life of Gregory*.

According to Agathangelos's legendary account, Gregory was the son of the Parthian prince Anak who killed his kinsman King Khosrov of Armenia. The Armenians retaliated by killing Anak's family, Gregory being the sole survivor. He was taken to Caesarea Mazaca (modern Kayseri, Turkey), where he was raised a Christian. There he married a Christian woman with whom he had two sons. He entered the service of King Tiridates III of Armenia (298–330), accompanying him to Greater Armenia in 298 when the Romans restored the king to the throne of his ancestors. Gregory's refusal to offer sacrifice to the idol of the goddess Anāhitā provoked the king to torture him and condemn him to imprisonment in the Khor Virap ("deep pit") of Artashat. There Gregory miraculously survived for thirteen years until he was released to cure the king of a severe ailment. Succeeding in his mission, Gregory converted the king, the royal family, and the army, and set out to proselytize the Armenian nation. He destroyed six major shrines of the prevailing deities of ancient Armenia, erected crosses throughout the country, and built baldachins over the graves of the forty Christian virgins martyred by Tiridates III.

About 314 Gregory received episcopal ordination in Caesarea. Returning to Armenia, he destroyed the pagan shrine at Ashtishat and founded the first church in Armenia. Tradition reports that he baptized the entire Armenian nation in the waters of the Arsenias River, built several churches, founded monasteries, and ordained bishops. Finally, after handing over his episcopal duties to his younger son, Arīstakēs, he retired to a solitary life. The office of the chief bishop of Armenia became intermittently hereditary in his family until 439. The cult of Gregory and the veneration of his relics became popular in the second half of the fifth and especially in the sixth and seventh centuries.

The Armenian tradition ascribes to Gregory the au-

thorship of canons, a book of homilies (the *Yachakhatum*), and the liturgical books that are used in the Armenian church. Modern scholarship, however, has shown that none of these works could have been composed before the fifth century.

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KRIKOR H. MAKSOUDIAN

**GRIMM BROTHERS.** Jakob Ludwig Karl Grimm (1785-1863) and his brother Wilhelm Karl (1786-1859) were born in Hanau, Germany, where their father was town clerk and later *Amtmann* (local administrator). Their happy childhood ended with his death in 1796; thereafter they had a constant struggle against poverty, with several younger children to support. The brothers worked in close harmony all their lives, and their researches into early Germanic language, literature, antiquities, and religion formed the basis for future studies in these fields.

At the university in Marburg the brothers became interested in medieval literature. The family moved to Kassel, and Jakob worked as a clerk in the War Office and later as secretary to the legation in the war against Napoleon. Finally both brothers were employed in the library of the elector of Hanover. From about 1806 they were collecting popular tales and encouraging their friends to do so, believing that this material, never previously taken seriously by scholars, was essential for the study of Germanic mythology. The first volume of *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* (Household and Children's Tales) appeared in 1812. The brothers worked unceasingly, reading manuscripts, recording oral material, and continually exploring new fields. They published poems from the Icelandic Eddas, corresponded with Walter Scott (with whom they compared Scottish and Danish ballads), and worked on runic inscriptions and Slavic languages. In 1816 and 1818 they brought out *Deutsche Sagen* (German Legends) taken from printed and oral sources. Jakob concentrated on philology and early law, publishing *Deutsche Grammatik* (German

Grammar) in 1819 and *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer* (German Legal Antiquities) in 1828. Wilhelm worked mainly on medieval German literature and the heroic epics, and brought out *Die deutschen Heldensagen* (The German Heroic Sagas) in 1829.

At first they refused teaching posts, but unsympathetic treatment by the elector forced Jakob to become professor of philology at Göttingen in 1830; Wilhelm joined him there and proved a brilliant lecturer. Wilhelm married Dorothea Wild in 1825; it was a happy marriage, and Jakob continued to live with his brother and sister-in-law. In 1835 Jakob published *Deutsche Mythologie* (Germanic Mythology), which established the link between German and Scandinavian myth and led to a new interest in Germanic antiquity throughout Europe. Many English students came to Göttingen, among them the Anglo-Saxon scholar John Kemble. However, once more the brothers had to leave when the reactionary duke of Cumberland became king of Hanover.

They were invited to work in Saxony on a comprehensive dictionary of the German language, and when the liberal Friedrich Wilhelm became king of Prussia in 1840 he persuaded them to move to Berlin, to live in financial security and lecture at the university and the academy. This meant a great change in their lives, but a happy one, and both brothers worked indefatigably until the end, Jakob surviving Wilhelm by four years. By their lives of devoted scholarship they made a major contribution to the serious study of folk tales and comparative mythology, and showed how language could be studied scientifically as a means of exploring man's early religious beliefs.

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HILDA R. ELLIS DAVIDSON

**GROOT, J. J. M. DE** (1854-1921), Dutch Sinologist and ethnographer. Born in Schiedam, Holland, Johannes Jacobus Maria de Groot enrolled in the polytechnic school at Delft in 1872. He subsequently studied Chinese with Gustave Schlegel at the University of Leiden.

In 1876 de Groot went to Amoy (present-day Hsia-



men, China) to continue his study of Chinese, and his stay in Amoy led to the publication of his first book, *Les fêtes annuellement célébrées à Emoui (Amoy): Étude concernant la religion populaire des Chinois* (translated from Dutch into French by Édouard Chavannes and published in 1886). From 1878 to 1883 de Groot traveled through Java and Borneo working as a Chinese interpreter. De Groot returned to Holland in 1883, but was likely working for the government of the Dutch East Indian Colonies since 1878, and in their employ he returned to China and lived there from 1886 to 1890, collecting the data later published in six volumes as *The Religious System of China: Its Ancient Forms, Evolution, History and Present Aspect; Manners, Customs and Social Institutions Connected Therewith* (1892–1910).

De Groot was appointed professor of ethnography at the University of Leiden in 1891. In 1904 he succeeded his mentor Schlegel as professor of Chinese, and in 1912 he assumed the chair of professor of Chinese at the University of Berlin.

De Groot was made a corresponding member of the Netherlands Royal Academy of Sciences in 1887 and a full member in 1891. His election to membership in the Dutch Society of Literature came in 1893. In 1894 de Groot shared the prestigious Stanislas Julien Prize with Édouard Chavannes. He was named *correspondant de l'institut* by the French Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in 1908. In 1910–1911 de Groot came to the United States to deliver the American Lectures on the History of Religions, a traveling lecture series, and at that time was awarded an honorary doctorate by Princeton University. In 1918 the kaiser presented him with the Service Cross for his help during World War I.

De Groot's two most important works are *The Religious System of China* and *Religion in China: Universism, a Key to the Study of Taoism and Confucianism* (1912; a revised and enlarged edition appeared in German in 1918), which is the published form of the lectures delivered in the United States in 1910–1911. The former is a detailed description of the funeral customs of the Chinese and of their ideas concerning the soul. It remains an important source of information on funeral rites, ancestor worship, geomancy (*feng-shui*), exorcism, and possession. In *Religion in China: Universism*, de Groot argues that worship of the universe and its ways, its fluctuations between *yin* and *yang*, constitutes the root religion of the Chinese, from which Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism developed as three branches from a common stem. When Confucianism assumed the dominant position during the Han dynasty, it failed to develop as a religion and prevented religious growth of Taoism and Buddhism as well.

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ROBERT G. HENRICKS

**GROTIUS, HUGO** (1583–1645), or Huigh de Groot; Dutch lawyer, diplomat, historian, poet, philologist, and theologian. Grotius was born at Delft on 10 April 1583, into a socially and politically influential family. Following three years at the University at Leiden and a brief period accompanying a diplomatic embassy to Paris, he returned to Holland at the age of sixteen to become an advocate at the courts of The Hague. In 1607 Grotius was appointed to the office of Advocate-Fiscal (attorney general) of Holland. He married Maria van Reigersberch in 1608.

As a result of an association with the Dutch East India Company, Grotius wrote his first major legal treatise, *De jure praedae* (On the Law of Prize, 1604–1605), which presents a theory of natural law based on divine will. In 1625 he published his most important book, *De jure belli ac pacis* (On the Law of War and Peace), in which he again pursued the topic of natural law and its role in international relations. Here Grotius reveals his concern for the lack of restraint in waging war in the Christian world. He examines the theoretical justification for war and the rules that govern the actual waging of war. He then distinguishes natural law (identical with the law of God but knowable apart from divine revelation) from the voluntary laws of nations that exist between civil communities. Both these types of law he finds binding in relations between states. In the case of a conflict between natural and voluntary law, the law of nature should prevail, although the application of this principle is qualified. In addition to delineating the conditions of waging a just war, Grotius also advocates *temperamenta*, or mitigations, in the conduct of war. To avoid unnecessary suffering, he counsels communities to circumscribe their tactics in keeping with the perfect law of Christ, which, though itself not a basis of law, provides an ideal.

Grotius was also involved in the religious affairs of his day and strongly committed to the cause of Protes-

tant unity. In his 1612 correspondence with Isaac Casaubon at the court of James I of England, he advocated a synod of Protestant churches in order to establish a common confession of faith that would protect against the development of heresy in the individual churches, help them present a united front against any papal aggressions, and yet allow moderate Roman Catholics to see their integrity. Grotius's hopes for such a meeting were, however, disappointed, in part because he was already involved in a heated religious and political controversy. He represented the States of Holland in a conflict that began with the appointment of a professor of theology and escalated into a major battle between church and state and between the local and the central governments within the Republic of the United Netherlands.

After Prince Maurits came to power Grotius was sentenced to life imprisonment (18 May 1619). While in prison he wrote *Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland*, *Annotations of the Gospels*, and *On the Truth of the Christian Religion*, an apologetic work in which he attempts to prove the truth of the Christian faith based on reason and the testimony of works outside the Christian tradition. On 22 March 1621 his wife Maria contrived to smuggle Grotius out of prison in a chest used to transport books, and he fled to Paris. Grotius subsequently held various diplomatic and legal positions including the office of Swedish ambassador to France. In March of 1645, he was permitted to visit Rotterdam and Amsterdam on his way from Paris to Stockholm. On 28 August of that same year Grotius died while traveling from Stockholm to Lübeck.

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ANNE CLARKE

**GUÉNON, RENÉ** (1886–1951), French traditionalist, metaphysician, and scholar of religions. René Guénon was born in Blois, the son of an architect. He carried out his early studies in his place of birth and went to

Paris in 1904 where he pursued the field of mathematics and then philosophy, which he was later to teach. During his youth, Guénon was attracted to various occultist circles and to Freemasonry; he entered several of these orders, including the Hermetic Ordre Martiniste and the Église Gnostique. As a member of this "gnostic church" he adopted the name of Palingenius (under which he wrote several articles in the review *La gnose*) and encountered Léon Champrenaud (who had been initiated into Sufism under the name of Abdul-Haqq) and Albert de Pounourville (who had received Taoist initiation and was known as Matgioi).

Guénon left Parisian occultist circles as he became more and more aware of Eastern doctrines. In 1912 he embraced Islam, receiving through Abdul-Hadi, a Swedish initiate, the blessing of the Egyptian Şūfi master Shaykh 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Illaysh al-Kabīr. Guénon continued, however, to be deeply involved in the intellectual life of Paris, encountering such well-known figures as Jacques Maritain, René Grousset, and others; in 1921 he published his first book, *Introduction générale à l'étude des doctrines hindoues*, a work that marked a major turning point in the study of Eastern doctrines in the West.

In 1930 after the death of his French wife, Guénon set out for Egypt. He spent the rest of his days in Cairo living as a Muslim and was known as Shaykh 'Abd al-Wāḥid Yaḥyā. There he was to take an Egyptian wife, by whom he had two daughters and two sons. He associated closely with certain eminent Muslim authorities of Egypt, such as Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd, later to become shaykh of al-Azḥar. Guénon also carried out extensive correspondence with scholars and traditional authorities throughout the world, including Ananda Coomaraswamy, Marco Pallis, Leopold Ziegler, Giulio Evola, and Titus Burckhardt. He was also visited by many Westerners in search of traditional teachings and by some of those in the West who, like him, were seeking to revive tradition. Foremost among the latter group was Frithjof Schuon, who visited Guénon twice in Cairo and who corresponded with him until the end of Guénon's life. During the night of 7 January 1951, Guénon died after a period of illness and was buried according to Islamic rites in a cemetery outside of Cairo.

While in Cairo, Guénon continued the incredibly fruitful intellectual life that he had begun in France, and numerous books, articles, and reviews continued to flow from his pen. The articles appeared mostly in the journal *Le voile d'Isis*, which changed its name to *Les études traditionnelles*. The writings of Guénon include some twenty-nine books and some five hundred articles and reviews ranging over the domains of religion, meta-

physics, the traditional sciences, sacred art and symbolism, occultism and esotericism, and the criticism of the modern world.

The monumental corpus of the writings of Guénon can be classified into several categories, though because of the traditional nature of his thought there is an interrelation of his various books. The *Introduction générale à l'étude des doctrines hindoues* was not simply his first work to be published; it serves as a general introduction to all the major themes of his writings including his exposition of tradition, his criticism of the modern world, and his discussion of Eastern doctrines based upon the purely metaphysical aspects of their teachings.

A number of books by Guénon are devoted more specifically to the criticism of the modern world and to the discussion of the significance of Eastern traditions in the process of rediscovery of tradition in the West. They include *Orient et occident* (1924), *La crise du monde moderne* (1927), and *La regne de la quantité et les signes des temps* (1945). A group of his books turn to the study of initiation and esotericism as well as the criticism of occultism and "spiritualism" as distortions and caricatures of authentic esotericism. These include *Aperçus sur l'initiation* (1946), *Le théosophisme: Histoire d'une pseudo-religion* (1921), *L'erreure spirite* (1923), and *Initiation et réalisation spirituelle* (1952). The works of Guénon dealing with metaphysics and Eastern doctrines include *L'homme et son devenir selon le Védānta* (1925), *La métaphysique orientale* (1939), *Le symbolisme de la croix* (1931), *Les états multiple de l'Être* (1932), and posthumous collections of articles such as *Études sur l'hindouisme* (1968) and *Aperçus sur l'ésotérisme islamique et le taoïsme* (1973). Guénon also wrote a number of major works on the traditional and modern sciences from the traditional point of view, such as *La grande triade* (1946), *Les principes du calcul infinitésimal* (1946), and the posthumous collections of essays, *Symboles fondamentaux de la science sacré* (1962) and *Formes traditionnelles et cycles cosmiques* (1970). Furthermore, Guénon dealt with the social and political dimensions of tradition, devoting many essays as well as his books *Autorité spirituelle et pouvoir temporel* (1929) and *Le roi du monde* (1927) to this subject. The latter work, dealing with the supreme center of tradition in this world, has remained Guénon's most enigmatic and controversial book for later traditionalist thinkers.

In treating various traditions Guénon concentrated most of all upon the East, dealing especially with Hinduism, Taoism, and Islam (though hardly at all with Buddhism, whose traditional character he did not confirm until later in his life). But Guénon did also concern himself with the Christian tradition, devoting such works as *Aperçus sur l'ésotérisme chrétien* (1954), *L'ésotérisme de Dante* (1925), and *Saint Bernard* (1929) to specifically Christian themes.

Guénon, however, identified Christian esotericism mostly with the hermetic and other esoteric currents that became integrated into the Christian tradition rather than with the Christ-given initiation at the heart of Christian rites.

Guénon's influence continues to expand as the decades go by. His works are marked by emphasis upon tradition, universality, orthodoxy, and essentiality. Guénon suddenly appeared upon the intellectual stage of Europe and sought to sweep aside with an unprecedented intellectual rigor and an iconoclastic zeal all the "isms" prevalent in modern thought ranging from rationalism to existentialism. To present the truth of tradition, he believed, he had to clear away completely all those conceptual schemes that have cluttered the mind of Western man since the end of the Middle Ages and that have prevented him from understanding the perennial truths of tradition. Against the relativism of the day, Guénon understood these truths as principles of a divine and sacred nature from which have issued the great civilizations of East and West, including the Far Eastern, Hindu, Islamic, and traditional Christian civilizations. Tradition for Guénon does not refer to custom or habit but rather to truths rooted in ultimate reality and the spiritual world, and to the ramifications, applications, and historical unfolding of these truths, which are made available to people through the revelation that lies at the heart of all religions. Guénon distinguishes between the esoteric and exoteric dimensions of tradition and asserts the necessity of the existence of both dimensions. He also distinguishes between reason and intellect and insists upon the centrality of pure intellectuality, which for him was practically synonymous with spirituality.

Guénon, moreover, insists upon the universal nature of traditional truth, which lies at the heart of diverse religious forms. He refers repeatedly to the inner unity of truth and of traditional forms, standing united in opposition to the modern world, which is based upon the forgetting of the principles of tradition.

Guénon also emphasizes the importance of orthodoxy, which he does not limit to the exoteric realm. For him tradition and orthodoxy are inseparable. To understand tradition means to grasp the significance of orthodoxy and the necessity of remaining within its fold. Guénon's whole message is in fact based upon not only the theoretical grasp of tradition but the necessity of living within an orthodox, traditional way, without which no metaphysical truth can possess efficacy even if it is understood theoretically. There is for him no spiritual realization possible outside tradition and orthodoxy.

Guénon is also concerned with the essence of doctrines, ideas, forms, images, and symbols. His writings shed a penetrating light upon doctrines and symbols that have become opaque and meaningless in the West as a result of the loss of metaphysical knowledge. He bestowed once again upon traditional concepts and symbols their essential meaning lost for the most part in the West since the Renaissance. He also presented to the West for the first time the essential teachings of the Eastern traditions in an authentic manner, and his presentation was accepted by the living authorities of those traditions. Moreover, Guénon sought to revive tradition in the West in the light of essential, metaphysical truth and to provide the weapons necessary to combat the errors of the modern world.

Guénon must be considered as the first expositor in the West of the traditionalist school in its fullness, a school that is also identified with "perennial philosophy." He was followed in his task of reviving traditional teachings in the West by Coomaraswamy and Schuon, whose writings perfected the exposition of the *sophia perennis* and of traditional doctrines. The influence of Guénon has, furthermore, gone beyond the traditionalist school to touch numerous scholars of religion, theologians, and philosophers who often without acknowledgment have adopted some of his doctrines and teachings.

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SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR

**GUIDE, SPIRITUAL.** See Spiritual Guide.

**GUILT.** See Sin and Guilt.

**GUÑAS.** *Guṇa* is a Sanskrit word etymologically suggesting a "strand" or "thread," several of which when intertwined make up a rope. The term is defined and

applied in numerous ways, depending on the governing systematic assumptions and/or philosophical contexts. Four of the most common usages are described below.

The *guṇas* or "virtues" of an animate or inanimate object can be contrasted with its *doṣas*, or "faults." This sense of the word is found in medical parlance but is not confined to that context. It is also found in Mīmāṃsā exegesis of the merits of action, including mental and verbal activities.

Perhaps related to the foregoing, Sāṃkhya metaphysics postulates three *guṇas* as the constituents of *prakṛti*, or material nature. These three qualities are known as *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, terms that are somewhat difficult to translate into simple English. *Sattva* connotes the bright, light, buoyant, wise, good, transparent aspects of nature and all creations. *Tamas* connotes their opposites, hence what is dark, heavy, dull, bad, opaque. *Rajas* is viewed in Sāṃkhya as the catalytic or dynamic principle in things that accounts for all spiritual and material change and activity. According to Sāṃkhya, all substance, whether mental or physical, consists of a mixture of these three *guṇas* in certain proportions. During *pralaya*, the period when the material universe is reabsorbed into its unmanifest state, the three *guṇas* are in equilibrium. At the time of creation, that is, at the onset of another cycle of manifestation of the universe, an imbalance among the *guṇas* occurs, and thus differentiation takes place.

In the Vaiśeṣika system of classification, *guṇa* is the name of the second of seven categories of being. A *guṇa* in this system is a particular characteristic of an individual substance, for example, the specific patch of color that is displayed in a certain piece of cloth at a given instant. A *guṇa* for Vaiśeṣika is a fleeting quality related for only a few moments to its possessor, which must be a substance (*dravya*). Particular colors, tastes, sounds, smells, and textures are *guṇas*; so too are numbers, contacts and disjunctions, desires and aversions, effort and awareness, as well as karmic and memory traces.

In Jainism, *guṇa* is one of three inherent qualities of every material thing (*puṅgalā*). Each bit of matter is a substance (*dravya*) possessing certain kinds of features (*guṇas*) that are presented in various modes (*pariyāyas*). Thus a *guṇa* in Jainism is not substantial, as Sāṃkhya *guṇas* are, but neither is it adventitious or evanescent, as are Vaiśeṣika *guṇas*. A Jain *guṇa* is a generic feature of the kind of substance comprising an individual object—earthy, hot, and so forth. The quantitative and qualitative variations of these features are their modes.

[For further discussion of the *guṇas* in individual philosophical systems, see Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. See also Prakṛti.]

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KARL H. POTTER

**GURDJIEFF, G. I.** (1877?–1949), Georgii Ivanovich Gurdzhiev; Greek-Armenian spiritual teacher who remains an enigmatic figure and an increasingly influential force in the contemporary landscape of new religious and psychological teachings. Resembling more the figure of a Zen patriarch or a Socrates than the familiar image of a Christian mystic, Gurdjieff was considered by those who knew him simply as an incomparable “awakener” of men. He brought to the West a comprehensive model of esoteric knowledge and left behind him a school embodying a specific methodology for the development of consciousness.

By the term *consciousness* Gurdjieff understood something far more than mental awareness and functioning. According to him, the capacity for consciousness requires a harmonious blending of the distinctive energies of mind, feeling, and body, and it is this alone that can allow the action within man of those higher influences associated with such traditional notions as *nous*, *buddhi*, or *ātman*. From this perspective, man as we find him is actually an unfinished being unconsciously led by his automatic conditioning under the sway of external stimuli. The wide variety of Gurdjieff's methods may all be understood as instrumental toward realizing self-consciousness and the spiritual attributes of “real man”—that is, will, individuality, and objective knowledge. These methods and his teaching about the evolution of man are implicated in a vast network of cosmological ideas that are spelled out in his own writings and in P. D. Ouspensky's *In Search of the Miraculous* (New York, 1949).

During his lifetime, notwithstanding the sensationalistic press accounts written about him during the 1920s, Gurdjieff was almost unknown outside his circle of followers. From the 1950s onward, however, his ideas began to spread both through the publication of his own writings and through the testimonies of his pupils. His exceptional personal character, especially his genius for using every circumstance of life as a means for helping his pupils feel the whole truth about themselves, gave

rise to numerous misleading accounts that for many years overshadowed the integrity of his ideas. Today, however, the Gurdjieff teaching has emerged out of this background of rumor and innuendo to be recognized as one of the most penetrating spiritual teachings of modern times.

Gurdjieff was born in Alexandropol in the southern Transcaucasian part of Russia. His father was Greek and his mother Armenian. Exceptionally gifted, as a boy he was favored with tutors from the Orthodox church and was precociously schooled for both the priesthood and medicine. Convinced that the thread of perennial esoteric knowledge was somewhere still preserved, he left the academic path to engage himself in a quest for ultimate answers. For some twenty years (1894–1912) he pursued his search—mostly in Inner Asia and the Middle East—for the core of the ancient traditions. This chapter of his life remains a mystery, although the significant events are recounted in his autobiographical narrative *Meetings with Remarkable Men*.

In 1913 Gurdjieff appeared in Moscow with a fully developed teaching and began to organize around him groups of pupils drawn mainly from the intelligentsia. From then on the outline of his life can be more clearly traced. Both the Russian writer P. D. Ouspensky and the composer Thomas de Hartmann describe the continuity of his work throughout the hardships of the Bolshevik Revolution and the journey that brought him and his followers to the Caucasus (1917), then to Constantinople (1920), and finally to Fontainebleau, France, south of Paris, where in 1922 he was able to establish on a firmer basis his Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man at the Priore d'Avon.

The institute's doctrine and experimental methods soon attracted many leading artists and intellectuals from England and the United States, who came to meet Gurdjieff and eventually work with him. Most of them, like Maurice Nicoll, Jane Heap, and Katherine Mansfield, had been introduced to the teaching by A. R. Orage, the noted critic and editor of *The New Age*, and by P. D. Ouspensky.

In early 1924, Gurdjieff made his first visit to the United States, accompanied by a large group of pupils, where, mainly in New York, he gave a series of public performances of his work on sacred dances. His aim was to show the forgotten principles of an objective “science of movements” and to demonstrate its specific role in the work of spiritual development.

In the summer of 1924, after a nearly fatal automobile accident, Gurdjieff decided to reduce the activities of his institute and the circle of his followers, and to secure the legacy of his ideas in written form. By 1934, he had completed the first two series of his writings and

part of the third. In the meantime he maintained contact with his older pupils, returned twice to the United States (in 1929 and 1933), and settled definitely in Paris.

In 1935, Gurdjieff resumed his work with groups, assisted by Jeanne de Salzmann, his closest disciple, who was later responsible for the continuation of his work. Although extreme discretion was demanded of his followers, the groups in France expanded continuously, even throughout the war, and included outstanding figures in literature, art, and medicine, such as René Daumal, Kathryn Hulme, and P. L. Travers. After the war, Gurdjieff's international family of pupils again gathered around him. He made his last visit to America in December 1948 and in spite of illness continued his work intensively until his death, in Paris, on 29 October of the following year.

*Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson*, first published in English in 1950, is his masterpiece, an unprecedentedly vast and panoramic view of man's entire life on Earth as seen by beings from a distant world. Through a cosmic allegory and under the cloak of discursive anecdotes and provocative linguistic elaborations, it conveys the essentials of Gurdjieff's teaching. *Meetings with Remarkable Men*, published in 1963, tells the tale of Gurdjieff's youth and his unremitting search for knowledge. Gurdjieff originally intended to complete his trilogy with a final series entitled *Life Is Real Only Then, When "I Am"*; the manuscript, however, was never completed, and part of it was lost. The remaining part, raw and fragmentary, was published in 1981. *Views from the Real World*, published in 1973, is a collection of talks given by Gurdjieff and recorded by his pupils in the 1920s. Gurdjieff also left a considerable amount of music, composed in collaboration with Thomas de Hartmann. Some of this music was used to accompany the movements and sacred dances that constituted an essential part of Gurdjieff's teaching and that have been documented and preserved by his pupils.

The specific work and correlative research proposed by Gurdjieff have been carried on and expanded, under the guidance of his pupils, through foundations and societies in most major cities in the Western world. A number of other groups have also appeared, which, though not connected with his pupils, claim to follow Gurdjieff or to have some relation to his teaching.

[See also the biography of Ouspensky.]

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*Views from the Real World* (New York, 1973), a collection of Gurdjieff's "early talks . . . as recollected by his pupils"; it has a foreword by Jeanne de Salzmann. *Gurdjieff: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York, 1984) provides an overall view of the extensive literature relating to Gurdjieff.

MICHEL DE SALZMANN

**GURŪ GOBIND SINGH.** See Singh, Gobind.

**GURŪ GRANTH SĀHIB.** See Ādi Granth.

**GURŪ NĀNAK.** See Nānak.

**GYŌGI** (670–749), born Koshi no Obito; Buddhist monk who popularized Japanese Buddhism during the Nara period (710–784). According to the *Genkō shakusho*, a collection of biographies of priests, Koshi no Obito was born in the Kubiki district of Echigo (present-day Niigata Prefecture) to a family that claimed to be descended from Korean royalty. In his youth, because he was so often in the company of birds and cows, he was called Ushitori ("cowbird"), but he soon began to concern himself instead with the needs of his fellow men. His ministrations on behalf of common people attracted hundreds of followers. At the age of fifteen, he "left the world" (i.e., took mendicant orders) and entered Yakushiji, one of the seven great Nara temples. Under the guidance of the monks Eki, Dōshō, and Gien he became acquainted with the doctrines of the Hossō (Skt., Yogācāra) school of Buddhism.

In 694 Gyōgi was ordained a monk by Tokuei, who administered the 250 full monastic precepts (*gusokukai*; Skt., *upasampadā*). He later retired with his mother to Mount Ikona in order to practice austerities. In this action Gyōgi, whose religious name means "foundation of ascetics," followed the example of the mountain ascetic (*hijiri*) En no Gyōja, who had done the same a few decades earlier. [See the biography of En no Gyōja.]

Gyōgi did not persist in this life of retreat, however. Soon he started to travel extensively and to propagate Buddhism, not only in its religious, but also in its magical aspects. At the same time he undertook numerous projects that demanded strenuous physical labor: he constructed roads, built bridges and dikes, and planned and dug out irrigation canals. Gyōgi was a remarkable sculptor and artisan; he invented a new kind of earthenware and is credited with the introduction of the potter's wheel. Also active in welfare work, he built free clinics and lodging houses. In the province of Kii he built forty-nine Buddhist temples. In all these activities

he was convinced that his engagement in manual labor was an "expedient means" (*upāya*) to *nirvāṇa*. Hence his testimony: "That I have attained [understanding of] the *Lotus Sutra* was possible only through making firewood, gathering herbs, drawing water, and laboring thus." In his sermons he stressed that there was no antagonism between Shintō and Buddhism, and he tried to reconcile Shintō gods and Buddhas. It is not accurate, however, to trace to Gyōgi the origin of Ryōbu Shintō, or Shintō-Buddhist syncretism.

Gyōgi's activities and sermons earned the high esteem of Emperor Shōmu (r. 724–749). In 745 he appointed Gyōgi to the office of *daisōjō*, the highest office in the Buddhist hierarchy. At that time, Gyōgi was also sent by the emperor to the sun goddess Amaterasu's shrine at Ise, bearing a Buddhist relic as a present to the deity. By that gift he hoped to receive her approval for the construction of a huge statue of Buddha Vairocana (the Daibutsu) to be erected in the Tōdaiji in Nara, a large temple that had been completed a few years earlier. In a dream Shōmu received the answer of the sun goddess, who said: "This land is the country of the gods. [The people] should worship them. But the wheel of the sun [sun goddess] is Dainichi Nyorai [Skt., Mahāvairocana]." With these words Amaterasu identified herself with Buddha Vairocana. Thereupon, Gyōgi traveled about the country to collect money and gold for the construction of the Daibutsu. Although in his lifetime Gyōgi was already considered a *bodhisattva*, he was not granted this title by the emperor until the year of his death. He is considered to be the manifestation of Mañjuśrī, the *bodhisattva* of divine wisdom. Gyōgi died in Tōnanin Hall of Sugiwara Temple in 749.

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J. H. KAMSTRA

**GYŌNEN** (1240–1321) eminent Japanese Buddhist scholar-monk of the Kamakura period (1185–1333). Gyōnen was born in the village of Takahashi in Iyo Province (present day Ehime Prefecture, Shikoku). Precocious as a child, Gyōnen is reported to have been able to recite Buddhist scriptures from memory at the age of three. At eighteen Gyōnen entered the monastic life, receiving the precepts for novices from the Vinaya (mo-

nastic discipline) master Enshō at the Kaidan'in, located on the grounds of the Tōdaiji in Nara. At age twenty he took full monastic orders (*gusokukai*) from this same master. Following his ordination he studied a variety of teachings, including those of the Ritsu (Vinaya), Tendai (Chin., T'ien-t'ai), Mikkyō (Tantric), and Kegon (Chin., Hua-yen) traditions. He also became well versed in the literatures of the Yuishiki (Yogācāra) and Sanron (Mādhyamika) schools, and in Jōdo (Pure Land) and Zen doctrines. Gyōnen's interests extended to the continental literatures of Confucianism, Taoism, and the writings of a variety of other thinkers of the classical period of Chinese philosophy.

In 1276 Gyōnen became the permanent attendant to his ordination master Enshō, and in this position studied with him until approximately 1275, eventually standing in for Enshō in his lectures. In 1276 Gyōnen presented a lecture series of the *Kegongyō* (Skt., *Avatamsaka Sūtra*) in the Daibutsuden ("great Buddha hall") of the Tōdaiji, a series attended by the leading monks of the seven official monasteries of Nara as well as by many court nobles. In the following year Gyōnen succeeded his master as abbot of the Kaidan'in. In this capacity he devoted his time to administering the precepts to ordinands and to lecturing and writing on the Kegon and Vinaya traditions.

His talents soon came to the attention of Retired Emperor (and now monk) Go-Uda (r. 1274–1287), who paid a personal visit to the Kaidan'in and received the Mahāyāna precepts from Gyōnen, effectively making himself his disciple. In honor of the occasion the title *Kokushi* ("national master") was bestowed on Gyōnen and he was invited to lecture at the court on Fa-tsang's *Hua-yen wu-chiao chang*, one of the basic texts of the Kegon tradition. In 1291, Gyōnen gave a well attended series of lectures on the *Hokekyō* (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*) at the Kongōzanji in Yamato Province (present-day Nara Prefecture).

In 1300 Gyōnen succeeded Shinjō as abbot of Tōshōdaiji, the temple built by Ganjin (688–763) as the monastic center of the Vinaya tradition in Japan. While there, he administered the Hīnayāna Pratimokṣa precepts (*betsujikai*) to Zenni and Shinji, two monks who became his chief disciples. He then returned to the Kaidan'in, where he died several years later. Following his decease his ashes were divided: one half was interred at the Kaidan'in, the other half was buried next to his master Shūshō, from whom he received the Kegon teachings, on Mount Jūbi in Nara Prefecture. Gyōnen's biographies preserve the names of twelve of his major disciples, among whom Zenni is conspicuous for having transcribed the master's many lectures.

Gyōnen's literary output is prodigious by any stan-

dard. The product of a lifetime of scholarship in diverse religious and secular fields, his corpus runs to some hundred and sixty titles in over a thousand volumes. These include works on all the major Buddhist traditions as well as Japanese history, Shintō, and music history and theory. Gyōnen is also credited with the construction of ten monasteries for the exclusive practice and study of the Vinaya. As a central figure in the "revitalization" of the Nara schools during the Kamakura period, and as a superb redactor of the entire Japanese Buddhist tradition up to his time, Gyōnen is one of the most important monks of the medieval era.

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LEO M. PRUDEN



# H



**HABOUS.** *See* Waqf.

**HADAD.** *See* Adad.

**HADES.** Son of Rhea and Kronos, Hades was for the ancient Greeks the lord of the land of the dead, the realm that was granted him in the division of the world with his brothers Zeus and Poseidon following their victory over the Titans (*Iliad* 15.188). In later mythology the abode of departed spirits was itself referred to as Hades.

Situated at the limits of the earth, where night meets day, or in the subterranean regions (*Odyssey* 11 passim; Hesiod, *Theogony* 748ff., 766ff.), Hades has been conceived of as a musty world clad in darkness, a place odious to mortals and immortals alike. In this country without laughter or sunshine, where all are obliged to make their way sooner or later, the dead, their heads filled with darkness, wander forever among the silent fields of asphodels (daffodils) or atone for their sins in the depths of Erebus or Tartaros. To return to sweet daylight is impossible, for without memory the dead could not find the way back. Furthermore, as soon as the new arrivals cross the dismal threshold Hades locks the gates, and his agents, who never sleep, prevent any attempt at escape.

Relentless at heart, Hades leaves his abode only to protect the stability of his domain; it is Thanatos (Death) who obtains inhabitants for him. However, Hades became infatuated with Demeter's daughter, Persephone, and carried her off to share with him the hon-

ors of the infernal throne. Their union is at once sterile and prosperous: they have no child but enjoy the wealth of the soil, which they dispense to the living as they choose. [*See also* Demeter and Persephone.]

If love and abduction suggested the theme of death in ancient Greece, Persephone's return to her mother and the springtime that she brought with her impelled mortals to the Eleusinian mysteries, which opened the path to immortality.

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JEANNIE CARLIER and SÍLVIA MILANEZI

Translated from French by Alice Otis

**ḤADĪTH.** Muslims of the Sunnī majority employ the Arabic word *ḥadīth* (pl., *aḥādīth*)—and less often *khābar* ("news"; pl., *akhbār*) and *athar* ("vestige"; pl., *āthār*)—in referring to any "talk" or "account" of what the prophet Muḥammad or a member of the early Muslim community said or did. *Al-ḥadīth* means "the single report" and, in a collective sense, "the group of reports." It also serves as an abbreviation of the phrase *'ilm al-ḥadīth* ("the science of *ḥadīth*"). This religious science involves the study of the written collections of *ḥadīth* as well as the technical works that explain and uphold the critical

standards used both to authenticate and to preserve individual *ḥadīth*.

For Muslims, the term *ḥadīth* includes connotations of its immediate origins, that is, from an eyewitness, and reflects the common preference for predominantly oral transmission. Ever since the third century AH (ninth century CE), when all *ḥadīth* were gathered in written collections, Muslims have continued to prefer forms of transmission that entail some oral communication, if only a face-to-face encounter when written materials are handed over. Because of the association with transmission, *ḥadīth* is commonly translated as "tradition," but this term obscures the other element in the process, namely reporting.

The *ḥadīth* record what the Prophet said and did and sometimes what a companion or follower said or did. But the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet are most highly esteemed, and only these are transmitted exactly as they were received. The *ḥadīth* of a companion or follower might be shortened or related in different words according to its sense. In either case the material was separate from the Qur'ān, and as Muslim legal theory developed it was viewed as second in authority to the Qur'ān. These *ḥadīth* of the Prophet, the companions, and the followers must be distinguished from the *ḥadīth qudsī* ("sacred *ḥadīth*"), which record God's words but stand apart from the revelation sent down through Muḥammad.

A typical *ḥadīth* has two parts: an *isnād*, or chain of authorities, which vouches for the careful and accurate transmission of the *ḥadīth* from the first eyewitness to the present reporter; and a *matn* ("text"), which recounts what was said or done. In recording the authorities (*rijāl*) who transmit the *ḥadīth* one to another, the *isnād* also employs a variety of terms to describe the character and style of transmission at each stage. Transmission might occur through immediate audition (*samā'*) from the mouth of a master (*shaykh*); submission (*'ard*) of the *ḥadīth* to the master for a guarantee of his approbation; a license (*ijāzah*) to transmit *ḥadīth*; handing over (*munāwalah*) of the master's materials to a student; correspondence (*mukātabah*); bequest (*waṣīyah*); or accidental finding (*wijādah*) of a master's materials. Only from the third century of Islam was general agreement partly attained on these procedures and on the sense of terms in the *isnād*, such as *'an* ("on the authority of"), *ḥaddatha* ("he told"), *akhbara* ("he informed"), *sami'tu* ("I heard"), and *anba'a* ("he disclosed").

**Significance.** On the one hand, the significance of the *ḥadīth* is related to the status of the Prophet in Islam. The *ḥadīth* are a record of the *sunnah* of Muḥammad and the early community. These *sunnah* are the prac-

tices and patterns of behavior that brought such phenomenal success to Muḥammad and the Medinese community. The Prophet was the vehicle of the revelation, and his relation to it was the most intimate. Whatever he said or did was considered most informed, and Muslims quickly came to consider his *sunnah* exemplary and normative for themselves. From the beginning, Muḥammad was the best model of what the Qur'ān enjoined people to do. The Qur'ān itself declares: "You have a good example in the Messenger of God" (33:32). In the first generation of Muslims, some felt compelled to recall what he had said and done.

On the other hand, the significance of the *ḥadīth* is related to the position of the law in Islam. For a variety of reasons, Muslims developed a religion that strongly emphasizes orthodox practice. The divine law (*sharī'ah*) became the primary instrument for religious continuity. In the hands of the lawyers, the positive law (*fiqh*) translated the *sunnah* of the Prophet into rules of conduct. The *ḥadīth* were the most valuable and reliable corroborants of the *sunnah*. Emphasis therefore fell on the careful transmission of *ḥadīth* (*taḥammul al-'ilm*) that might support the *sunnah*. Attached in this way to the law as a source of directives and precedents for virtuous activity, the *ḥadīth* were paradigmatic rather than historical. This suited perfectly the intent of legal scholars to establish *sunnah* that were authoritative for the law. So the *ḥadīth*, while helping the scholars formulate a rule of conduct for Muslims, came to edify, teach moral lessons, deal with legalities and religious obligations, propose dogma, and even touch on etiquette and good manners.

In short, the *ḥadīth* perpetuate Muḥammad's mission so that he remains a living example for each generation of Muslims. Likewise, they link Muḥammad as model with the law as a guide for the conduct of daily life. The *ḥadīth* therefore share in the symbolic character of Muḥammad as leader of the community and in the prescriptive function of the law to apply the Qur'ān and *sunnah* normatively to human behavior.

**History.** The reasons for the rise of the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet may be surmised. The Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula always had a special fondness for recalling the glory of their tribes and their past history with poetry and song. The pre-Islamic Arabs revered the *sunnah* of their ancestors. For the first Muslims, to honor and follow the *sunnah* of the Prophet was simply an extension of this familiar pattern. Muḥammad had been an unusually successful leader of his community and had assembled one of the largest confederations of tribesmen in the history of the peninsula. His words and deeds had a dramatic effect on the Arabs in his lifetime.

But the *ḥadīth* did not acquire their later style and official character at once. In the first years of Islam, some people were harshly critical of efforts to record what the Prophet had said and done. 'Umar, the second caliph of Islam, objected to *ḥadīth* generally, lest they rival the Qur'ān. A few companions, such as 'Abd Allāh ibn Mas'ūd (d. 653), Zayd ibn Thābit (d. 666), and Abū Sa'id al-Khudrī (d. 693), opposed a written record of the *sunnah* of the Prophet but themselves transmitted such materials orally. The alarm of these four indirectly testifies to the early desire both to recount and to record what the Prophet had said and done.

Despite such misgivings and criticism, Muslims of the first generation determinedly recorded *ḥadīth*, and most of these early Muslims advocated the use of writing. They carefully handed over their records to family or trusted associates, so that by the end of the first century of Islam a fundamental body of written *ḥadīth* was preserved. The oral methods of transmission persisted and even predominated but ultimately proved less reliable. When steps were initiated to gather written *ḥadīth* in large collections, the "family" materials clearly enjoyed the higher reputation. In terms of volume of materials preserved, the foremost "families" were those of Anas ibn Mālik (d. 710), 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Amr ibn al-Āṣ (d. 684), Zayd ibn Thābit, Ibn 'Umar (d. 692), Ibn 'Abbās (d. 687), and 'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr (d. 713).

At the close of the first century of Islam, 'Umar II (d. 719), the Umayyad caliph famous for his piety, sought to make his administrative policy uniform on such economic matters as taxes, blood money, and inheritance. He chose to rely on the *sunnah* of the Prophet and so sought out the *ḥadīth* pertaining to these economic issues. He turned to leading individuals in his empire who could gain access to the "family" collections and asked them to gather the pertinent *ḥadīth*. The eminent scholar Muḥammad ibn Muslim ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 742) was called on to write down the *ḥadīth* that 'Umar had gathered.

Although these materials were never officially employed because of the early death of 'Umar II, they were transmitted through al-Zuhrī, who also established certain practices in dealing with *ḥadīth*. He chose to record *ḥadīth* of the companions and followers as well as those of the Prophet, and he insisted on a full *isnād* for the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet. Al-Zuhrī also promoted writing and so through his numerous students ensured a lesser role for the oral method thereafter. These students included 'Uqayl ibn Khālid (d. 761), Mālik ibn Anas (d. 796), Yūnus ibn Yazīd al-Aylī (d. 775), Muḥammad ibn al-Walīd al-Zubaydī (d. 765), Shu'ayb ibn Dinār (d. 779), Ma'mar ibn Rāshid (d. 770), 'Abd al-Razzāq ibn

Hammām (d. 827), Sufyān ibn 'Uyaynah (d. 811), Ibrāhīm ibn Sa'd (d. 798), and Ibn Jurayj (d. 767)—all individuals prominent in the history of *ḥadīth* in the second century of Islam.

The work of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820) was to dominate the second century; he firmly linked the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet with the developing legal thought (*fiqh*) of Islam. The prophet Muḥammad had led his community in life, and so, after his death in 632, when Muslims sought guidance for their practice, they naturally appealed to his *sunnah*. As the development of a code of behavior became a serious pursuit in the second century, so reliance on the true *sunnah* was demanded. Al-Shāfi'ī was responsible for the recognition that legal scholars gave *ḥadīth* as the best corroborators of the *sunnah*. In his *Jimā' al-'ilm* and his *Risālah* he set down a strict method of reasoning for the use of the *ḥadīth* by the lawyers. With such efforts, al-Zuhrī and al-Shāfi'ī helped to give rise to the *aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth* (supporters of *ḥadīth*), who in their devotion to the *sunnah* of the Prophet promoted the law and the practice that it required to a central place in Islam.

The second and third centuries also saw a rapid growth in the number of *ḥadīth*. Forgeries and fabrications were numerous, springing out of the sectarian atmosphere of the time. Non-Islamic materials, often of Christian origin, were also appropriated. To a certain extent the core of *ḥadīth* specialists identified and marked this material, particularly when its chain of authorities proved inadequate. Where an acceptable *isnād* was provided, the material was often accepted, especially if it reflected the *sunnah* of the Prophet. But the proliferation of *ḥadīth*—al-Bukhārī was said to have sifted through hundreds of thousands in the third century to gather fewer than ten thousand acceptable *ḥadīth*—was mainly due to the multiplication of the lines of transmission (*ṭuruq*) for each *ḥadīth*. The popularity of traveling to learn *ḥadīth* (*riḥlah fī ṭalab al-'ilm*) promoted this increase. So did the growing practice of transmitting the *matn*, not only in its literal or original form (*ḥarfī*) but also in various edited forms bearing the same meaning (*ma'nawī*). Each new line of transmission as well as each version counted as yet another *ḥadīth*.

**Collection.** It was the collectors who put an end to the geometric increase in the number of *ḥadīth* in circulation by the third century of Islam. With their scholarship they fixed the corpus of acceptable and sound *ḥadīth*. The written recording had already passed through two phases. In the earliest days of Islam, when oral transmission was more prevalent, the "family" document (*ṣaḥīfah* or *juz'*) handed down to relatives or

trusted associates marked the first phase in which accounts of the Prophet were written down (*kitābat al-ḥadīth*). In less than a century the scattered *ḥadīth* were being actively sought out to be recorded and listed (*tadwīn al-ḥadīth*). Travel "in search of knowledge" increased the dissemination and gathering of *ḥadīth*. In origin a practice of the *ḥunafā'* (unaffiliated monotheists) of pre-Islamic times and then established in the Qur'ān (9:22), the *riḥlah* became the most important avenue of scholarly communication in Islam. The ever increasing importance of *ḥadīth* to the law also promoted collection.

The systematic organization of *ḥadīth* (*taṣnīf al-ḥadīth*) quickly followed. The earliest ordered form was the *musnad* ("supported") collection. It gathered *ḥadīth* under the name of the companion who had been their originator and first supporter. This order resembled exactly the "family" collections of the first Muslims and so was an obvious first choice of order for collections. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) gathered the most famous and largest *musnad*. It contained about 30,000 *ḥadīth* from the companions. Abū Dā'ūd Sulaymān al-Ṭayālīsī (d. 818) also collected a *musnad* work, one of the first, containing 2,767 *ḥadīth* from more than six hundred authorities. In a later century the scholar Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Ismā'īl al-Būsīrī (d. 1436) would speak of ten *musnads*, which included Ibn Ḥanbal's and nine others.

But this form of collection lacked any index of the materials under legal subjects and so was difficult to use for legal thinkers who were developing a systematic methodology and who considered *ḥadīth* a major source to verify the *sunnah*. Moreover, the *musnad* had not always been restricted to the most authentic materials necessary for the law. The older organization by source (*'alā al-rijāl*) gave way to one better suited to subjects considered in the law. The *muṣannaf* ("arranged") collection offered organization by topics (*'alā al-abwāb*). There are six *muṣannaf* collections to which Muslims give special acclaim and respect.

The first to win undisputed authority, but only in the second half of the fourth century of Islam, were the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* (collections of authentic *ḥadīth*) of al-Bukhārī (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875). Both collections treat legal topics along with exegetical questions and biographical issues concerning the Prophet. Al-Bukhārī's work, *Al-jāmi' al-ṣaḥīḥ* (The Authentic Collection) contains 7,397 *ḥadīth* arranged in 3,450 chapters. After repetitions are accounted for, the actual number of *ḥadīth* is 2,762.

Besides having a new form of arrangement, these collections were also restricted to only acceptable and sound *ḥadīth*. The *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim is nearly equal in repute to that of al-Bukhārī but is somewhat shorter.

Next to receive general approbation from Muslims

were the two *Kitāb al-sunans* of Abū Dā'ūd al-Sijistānī (d. 888) and al-Nasā'ī (d. 915). Both works were judged authoritative by the time of the *ḥadīth* specialist Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 1245). As the title implies, their *ḥadīth* were restricted to matters of practice (*sunan*) that the law treated. The canon of the classical *muṣannaf* collections totaled six by the fourth century AH, after the acceptance of the *Sunans* of Abū 'Īsā Muḥammad al-Tirmidhī (d. 915) and Ibn Mājah (d. 886). These six collections, of which al-Bukhārī's and Muslim's were foremost, were held to be sound. Other works, such as the *Sunans* of al-Dāraquṭnī (d. 995), 'Abd Allāh al-Dārimī (d. 868), and al-Bayhaqī (d. 1066), were also important, but not to the same degree as the first six.

New collections of *ḥadīth* appeared after the third century of Islam, but they were generally compilations from well-known *musnad* and *muṣannaf* works. One such collection that retains its popularity is the *Maṣābiḥ al-sunnah* (The Lamps of the *Sunnah*) by Abū Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Baghawī (d. 1116). It was subsequently revised by the preacher Walī al-Dīn al-Tibrīzī in 1337 under the title *Mishkāt al-maṣābiḥ* (The Niches of the Lamps).

Another popular form of collection was the *Arba'ūn* (Forty [*Ḥadīth*]). The number forty alludes to the age at which Muḥammad was called as a prophet and to his saying that every Muslim should learn forty *ḥadīth* by heart. These works were certainly a product of Muslim piety. The earliest *Arba'ūn* was compiled by 'Abd Allāh al-Marwazī (d. 912). Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nawawī (d. 1277) wrote one of the most famous. In it he took forty-two (pious excess!) *ḥadīth* from al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dā'ūd, al-Nasā'ī, Ibn Mājah, Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Dārimī, and Mālik ibn Anas.

**Authenticity.** The foregoing description of the history and collection of *ḥadīth* agrees generally with the traditional Muslim version. The question of authenticity—whether a particular *ḥadīth* was in fact a true account of the Prophet and the early community—assumed major importance for the *aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth* in the second and third centuries of Islam, when al-Shāfi'ī presented the decisive argument for using only authentic *ḥadīth* of the Prophet in order to establish the *sunnah*. But *ḥadīth* specialists understood their concerns for authenticity in the light of the Prophet's authority. The value of *ḥadīth* lay in their role as witnesses of the Prophet's behavior. Therefore, authenticity was a matter of testimony. Scholars assessed the authenticity of a *ḥadīth* by seeking a complete *isnād*, which would prove that the *ḥadīth* had originated in earliest times and that a chain of living witnesses had attested this to one another. The literature of *ḥadīth* criticism identified each *rajul* (authority cited in the *isnād*). The places he visited and im-

portant events, such as his first audition (*samā'*) of a *ḥadīth* and his death, were recorded. His character, affiliations, and mental capacity (memory and accuracy) were rated. This information was the basis of assessment of the *rijāl* and the *isnād*. In theory, this critique expunged *ḥadīth* that recorded local customs or foreign materials or were forgeries arising from partisan politics and sectarian disputes. But the *isnād* as an authenticating device first appeared, and then only in a rudimentary form, in the last third of the first century of Islam, and it became general practice only by the end of the second century. Though the best scholars exercised remarkable caution and honesty, their approach appears one-sided in comparison with modern methods. They did not inquire whether the *matn* contained credible material concerning the Prophet or the early community. Moreover, editorial practices such as transmission according to sense (*bi-al-ma'nā* or *ma'nawī*) permitted wide variations from the original. *Ḥadīth* specialists did recognize problems of this sort. Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 1071) discussed the effects of *ma'nawī* transmissions in one of his manuals of criticism, *Al-kifāyah fī ma'rifat uṣūl 'ilm al-riwāyah* (Sufficient Knowledge of the Basic Principles of the Science of Transmission). Particular attention was paid to any possible subtraction (*nuqṣān*) from or addition (*ziyādah*) to the exact, original meaning, especially for the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet.

Western scholarship on *ḥadīth* is also preoccupied with the question of authenticity. It has generally rejected the validity of the Muslim critique and been eager to discover ways to identify historically credible material in *ḥadīth*. Four scholars have published provocative ideas on the problem of authenticity in the last hundred years: Ignác Goldziher with volume 2 of *Muhammedanische Studien* (Halle, 1890); Joseph Schacht with *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1950); Nabia Abbott with *Qur'anic Commentary and Tradition* (Chicago, 1967); and G. H. A. Juynboll with *Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chronology, Provenance and Authorship of Early Hadith* (Cambridge, 1983).

The first comprehensive and systematic Western study of *ḥadīth* was prepared by Ignác Goldziher. He conceded that the words and deeds of the Prophet may have been carefully recorded in the beginning. But he also concluded that the political and sectarian factionalism of the Umayyad period had permanently damaging effects on the growth and authenticity of *ḥadīth*. Effective criticism from Muslims came too late, since it began only in the late second and third centuries. Forgeries, fabrications, and foreign borrowings had altered and obscured the original, small stock of authentic ma-

terials. Goldziher's findings viewed *ḥadīth* as a valuable source for the history of various trends in early Islam rather than as an authentic source of information about the Prophet and his times.

Joseph Schacht took Goldziher's observations a step further. He concluded that the *ḥadīth* and the Qur'ān were not the original basis of the law, but that local custom, misleadingly labeled *sunnah*, served as the original basis. Under pressure from scholars such as al-Shāfi'ī, lawyers had come to insist on authentic *ḥadīth* in order to validate the *sunnah* as being truly from the Prophet. This resulted in the fabrication of full *isnāds* and the creation of parallel *isnāds* to supply the needed *ḥadīth*. Schacht's conclusion is far-ranging: ". . . that every legal tradition from the Prophet, until the contrary is proved, must be taken not as an authentic or essentially authentic . . . statement . . . , but as the fictitious expression of a legal doctrine formulated at a later date" (Schacht, 1950, p. 149).

Almost two decades later Nabia Abbott tried to balance Schacht's conclusion with a more optimistic study of *ḥadīth*. On the basis of a group of papyri dealing with *ḥadīth*, she argued that the "family" documents of the first century did exist, had relied on writing to record *ḥadīth*, and so provided a core of several thousand authentic *ḥadīth*. Her study also emphasizes the attentiveness and caution of such important *ḥadīth* scholars as al-Zuhri and others after him. Their effort was responsible for the "family" *ḥadīth* safely reaching the standard collections in the third century. In response to Goldziher and Schacht, she argued that historical and legal works are not reliable points of departure for an assessment of *ḥadīth* in the second century. However, her conclusions are based on papyri that do not predate the mid-second century.

Most recently, G. H. A. Juynboll, after a review of the early *ḥadīth* literature and tools of criticism, has concluded that the standardization of the *ḥadīth* did not begin earlier than the start of the first century AH. He accepts, as had Goldziher and Schacht, that the historicity of the *ḥadīth*, save perhaps in a few cases, will not be proven and therefore outlines a specific methodology that may approximate a place of origin, a time, and an author for many *ḥadīth*. His book details individual cases which he judges prove shortcomings in the *mutawātir* report (on reliable transmitters), in the status of the transmitter who is a common link among *isnāds*, and in the way Muslims assessed the transmitters in the *isnād*. Juynboll declares that "it is mostly impossible to prove with uncontrovertible certainty that *isnāds* are not invented in their entirety" (Juynboll, 1969, p. 214).

Although these four authors have investigated the general character of *ḥadīth*, their work does not deny

the historical framework of *ḥadīth* outlined above. Instead, more detailed research on individual *ḥadīth* is now called for, such as that seen in the articles of M. J. Kister. Moreover, the question of authenticity, especially as posed by the four authors discussed above, may demand too much historically of *ḥadīth*. By nature, *ḥadīth* are exemplary. They were judged authentic by virtue of their acceptability as carriers of what the transmitters believed about the Prophet and the early community. Western scholars have asked one question in their quest for authenticity: Is the *ḥadīth* historically reliable? Muslim scholars have meant something else by authenticity: has the testimony to the example of the Prophet's words and deeds been reliable?

**Criticism.** A critical attitude toward *ḥadīth* arose from the start. Its intent was to preserve the authentic *ḥadīth* of the Prophet. Evidence of the attitude is apparent in the existence of the "family" documents, in the early arguments over written versus oral transmission, and in the methodical selection of *ḥadīth* for early *musnad* and *muṣannaf* collections. Undoubtedly, the linking of *ḥadīth* to the law effected an even more determined *ḥadīth* criticism (*'ilm al-ḥadīth*).

Some collectors, such as al-Bukhārī and Muslim, took up the issue of criticism in a special chapter in which they discussed forms of transmission, the qualities of an acceptable *isnād*, and the like. Before the fourth century, numerous monographic works on particular issues having to do with the problems of authenticity and preservation circulated among Muslims. The majority of these works dealt with the identity of the transmitters and their pertinent biographical data. All of this was needed to make a critical assessment of these transmitters in the *isnād*: whether to reject or admit them (*al-jarḥ wa-al-ta'dīl*). Specialists also suggested various grades for *ḥadīth* and *isnāds*. *Ḥadīth* were divided into the grades of sound (*ṣaḥīḥ*), good (*ḥasan*), and weak (*ḍa'īf*), depending on the quality of their *isnāds*. The *isnād* also fell under a wide variety of technical descriptors, so that the particular criticism of the *rijāl* or the transmission (*riwāyah*) was fully apparent. For example, the *ḥadīth* was *mutawātir* ("recurrent") if it possessed so many transmitters of reliable character that there could be no collusion. An *isnād* was *muttaṣil* ("connected") if it was unbroken, and *mawqūf* ("interrupted") if it reached back only to a companion.

In the third century, the classical *ḥadīth* collections fixed the corpus. And *ḥadīth* criticism, especially when it concerned the *rijāl* and the *isnād*, achieved a high level of sophistication as specialists strove to select the authentic *ḥadīth*. Because Muslims assessed authenticity from the perspective of the *isnād*, no parallel criticism of the *matn* developed.

After the *ḥadīth* were collected, critical manuals on technical points (*'ulūm*) concerning *ḥadīth* began to appear. These manuals summarized and organized the scientific assessment of *ḥadīth* that had preceded. Abū Muḥammad al-Rāmāhurmuzī (d. 975?) wrote the first manual, *Al-muḥaddith al-fāṣil bayn al-rāwī wa-al-wā'ī* (The *Ḥadīth* Reporter Who Is Both Transmitter and Attentive Listener), in which he discussed the complementary skills of *dirāyah* (technical expertise) and *riwāyah* (transmission). Ibn al-Bayyī' al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī (d. 1014) improved on this manual with his *Ma'rifat anwā' 'ulūm al-ḥadīth* (Knowledge of the Classes of the Science of *Ḥadīth*). Each of its fifty-two chapters treats a key technical term of *ḥadīth* criticism.

Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, however, was the most important contributor to *ḥadīth* criticism in the classical era. Relying on all previous effort, he brought the discipline to a new level. His *Ta'rikh Baghdād* (Chronicle of Baghdad) was the beginning of an enormous, though never completed, effort to produce a comprehensive reference source on the *rijāl*. He also wrote two major critical manuals: *Jāmi' li-akhlāq al-rāwī wa-ādāb al-sāmi'* (Summary of the Characteristics of the Transmitter and the Manners of the Listener), which takes up the theme treated by al-Rāmāhurmuzī, and the *Kifāyah*, which describes *ḥadīth* criticism. These three works, along with many others, made him the authority on *ḥadīth* criticism.

Two manuals bridge the gap between the important contribution of al-Khaṭīb and the classical manual of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ. The North African judge 'Iyāḍ al-Yaḥṣībī (d. 1149) published *Al-ilmā' ilā ma'rifat uṣūl al-riwāyah wa-taqyīd al-samā'* (Indication of the Knowledge of the Basic Principles on Transmission and on Recording What Is Heard). A second North African judge, al-Mayyānishī (d. 1185), wrote his manual, entitled *Mā lā yasa'u al-muḥaddith jahluhu* (What the *Ḥadīth* Reporter Cannot Afford to Be Ignorant Of), in 1183 while in Mecca.

In the seventh century of Islam, Taqī al-Dīn ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Shahrazūrī wrote his *Madkhal ilā 'ulūm al-ḥadīth* (Introduction to the Sciences of *Ḥadīth*), usually called the *Muqaddimat Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ*. Considered the classical manual of the *'ulūm*, it has sixty-five chapters, each summarizing a technical subject related to *ḥadīth*. The manual quotes most previous works and achieved such authority for its conciseness and good order that it became a primary text, displacing all previous manuals.

The *Muqaddimah* spawned numerous abridgments and summaries. Al-Nawawī wrote *Al-irshād* (Guidance) as a summary of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ's work and then *Al-taqrīb* (What Reveals More) as a summary of his summary.

Badr al-Dīn al-Kīnānī (d. 1332) wrote *Manhal al-rāwī* (The Transmitter's Watering Hole), which served the same purpose. And al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭayyibī (d. 1342) abridged the works of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, al-Nawawī, and Badr al-Dīn in *Al-khulāṣah fī uṣūl al-ḥadīth* (Summary of the Basic Principles of Ḥadīth).

Other summarizers include Abū al-Fidā' ibn Kathīr (d. 1372), with his work *Al-bā'ith al-ḥathīth* (The Motivating Cause); Badr al-Dīn al-Zarakshī (d. 1392), who wrote *Al-nukat 'alā Muqaddimat Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ* (Quick Remarks on the Introduction of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ); Zayn al-Dīn al-'Irāqī (d. 1404), author of *Al-taqyīd wa-al-īdāḥ* (Recording and Clarifying) and the poem *Alfīyat al-ḥadīth* (One Thousand Verses on Ḥadīth); and al-Jurjānī (d. 1413) with his *Risalah* (Epistle).

The height of the medieval effort came with the works of Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī (d. 1449)—especially *Nukhbat al-fīkr fī iṣṭilāḥ al-ḥadīth* (Choice Thought on the Conventions of Ḥadīth)—and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505) and his *Tadrib al-rāwī* (Schooling of the Transmitter). They again summarized previous works, but in both cases expanded anew on some topics and even created new divisions.

The manuals summarized all the individual disciplines that ḥadīth criticism employed. There were works on each of the disciplines that provided more detail. The largest body of literature of this sort concerned the *rijāl*. Of early prominence was the work by Abū Muḥammad ibn Abī Ḥātim (d. 938), *Kitāb al-jarḥ wa-al-ta'dīl* (Book of Rejecting and Admitting), a discussion of weak transmitters. The literature reached a climax with the *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz* (Mention of the Preservers) and the *Mizān al-i'tidāl* (Scale of Balance) of al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), and the *Lisān al-mizān* (Tongue of the Scale) and *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb* (Revision of the Revision) of Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī. These works were generally organized alphabetically. Each entry provided as full a name for the subject as possible, pertinent dates, his teachers and his students, where he traveled and lived, any known weaknesses, previous assessments, and perhaps an example of material he transmitted.

Studies on the language used in ḥadīth also became popular. Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 838), who wrote the oldest extant study, *Kitāb al-amwāl* (Book of Riches), had noted that "the supporters of ḥadīth have one language and the Arabs another." Special studies were needed to define the *gharīb* (rare or unusual terms) in ḥadīth in a systematic fashion. 'Abd Allāh ibn Muslim ibn Qutaybah (d. 889) commented on and added to Abū 'Ubayd's work in his *Kitāb gharīb al-ḥadīth* (Book of the Unusual in Ḥadīth). Later al-Mubārak ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī (d. 1210) compiled the classic study *Nihāyah fī gharīb al-ḥadīth* (The Final Word on the Unusual in

Ḥadīth), which included all previous research in the area.

The enormous bulk of ḥadīth collections promoted another kind of critical literature, the concordance, which listed ḥadīth alphabetically and included short extracts or titles (*aṭrāf*) from the ḥadīth. Though the first concordance appeared in the late fourth century of Islam, the earliest standard concordance was the *Ashrāf 'alā ma'rīfat al-aṭrāf* (The Celebrated Ones according to the Knowledge of Short Extracts) by 'Alī ibn 'Asākir (d. 1176), listing ḥadīth from six collections. Two centuries later Yūsuf ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mizzī (d. 1341) expanded the *Ashrāf* to list other collections in his *Tuḥfah* (The Gem). Finally, Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī wrote his classic *aṭrāf* work, the *Ithāf al-maharah bi-aṭrāf al-'asharah* (The Experts' Gem on the Short Extracts from the Ten), on the six canonical *muṣannaf* collections and the four *musnads*. Today the standard work is the *Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane*, in seven volumes, by A. J. Wensinck.

Much more literature exists than is mentioned here, from extraordinarily detailed studies on the names of the *rijāl* to massive commentaries on well-known ḥadīth collections. Such effort evidences the centrality of ḥadīth to Islam and the Muslim desire to preserve the ḥadīth in a condition as near as possible to their original recording.

**Modern Attitudes.** The traditional interest in ḥadīth continues to the present time. Works on the 'ulūm al-ḥadīth still appear, in large numbers, in Arabic and even in English. The collections of ḥadīth have also been newly edited and published. Interest in ḥadīth in fact has been greatly enhanced by the circumstances of modernity. As Muslims in the nineteenth century saw a threat to Islam in the West and in modernization, individual thinkers took to examining the state of Islam, either adopting a fundamentalist and defensive point of view or seeking reforms, or even rejecting Islam outright. Since the ḥadīth had a fundamental place in the structure of Islam and were the major source of authority for the law, any reassessment of Islam immediately affected the ḥadīth. In the past century the question of the authenticity of ḥadīth has been a major issue of religious discussion in Muslim centers.

The issue first arose in the area of modern-day India and Pakistan after the debacle of 1857–1858 suffered by the traditional Muslim community. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) launched the Aligarh movement and introduced rational modernist thought to his fellow Muslims. Like Goldziher later, followers of Sayyid Ahmad Khan such as Chiragh Ali (1844–1895) rejected the authenticity and authority of the ḥadīth of the collections, considering them instead to be a record of the

opinions and ideas of the early generations of Muslims. Judging *ḥadīth* on the *matn*, they took for authentic only those in harmony with the Qur'ān and did not employ the *isnād* as a criterion.

In response, a traditionalist revival was spawned, encouraging the founding of a conservative religious school at Deoband in 1867 and the start of the Ahl-i Ḥadīth (Supporters of Ḥadīth). The Ahl-i Ḥadīth accepted all the Prophet's *ḥadīth* as genuine without any modern criticism and bound themselves to the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet as collected centuries before.

The contemporary defense against the modern opponents of *ḥadīth* (*munkirīn-i ḥadīth*) is waged along revivalistic lines by many in India and Pakistan. The most famous is Abū al-'Alā Mawdūdī (d. 1979). But his own position is not entirely palatable to the Ahl-i Ḥadīth. He admits that the authenticity of most *ḥadīth* is only probable, but the utter necessity of *ḥadīth* for the religion demands their use. So he has devised means other than reliance on the *rijāl* (about whom he admits reservation), namely, the testing of the *ḥadīth* by one who has developed a special sense for the true spirit of Islam and can affirm that the *ḥadīth* records what the Prophet would have said or done.

In Egypt, modern interest in the *ḥadīth* began only in this century. Muḥammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), whose ideas and activity motivated so many others, wrote little about *ḥadīth* other than to urge Muslims to free themselves from too slavish an adherence to the authority of past scholars and *ḥadīth* specialists. His disciple Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) continued his call for a renewed employment of *ijtihād* (independent judgment), touching also on the case of the *ḥadīth*. But he rejected any attempt to do away with all of the *ḥadīth*.

A major attack on *ḥadīth* occurred in 1958 with a book by Maḥmūd Abū Rayyah, who concludes that most *ḥadīth* from the major collections are not authentic records of what the Prophet said or did, but forgeries. His writing points out problems with the traditional *isnād* criticism, the unquestioned acceptance of the righteousness (*'adālah*) of the companions, the lateness of the written record, the fabrication of *ḥadīth*, and the transmission of *ḥadīth* according to the sense (*rivāyah bi-al-ma'nā*). Yet Abū Rayyah does not deny the need for the *ḥadīth* and so generates an extensive argument for the broad use of *ijtihād*. Abū Rayyah's book prompted numerous refutations from the scholars at Cairo's al-Azhar University and elsewhere, so that in effect his ideas were countered.

A modern Muslim attitude toward *ḥadīth* is not yet well defined. Present attitudes are often excessive, ei-

ther supporting the *ḥadīth* blindly or rejecting them wholesale. Moderate views share two convictions: that Muslims must retain the *ḥadīth* in order to define Islam and its code of behavior adequately and that some renewed style of *ijtihād* must be permitted to promote a modern employment of the *ḥadīth*.

**Shī'i Ḥadīth.** The Shī'ah, here specifically the Twelvers (Ithnā 'Ashariyah), also rely on *ḥadīth* as a major source of authority. And because of the special role of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and the imams who descended from him, lines of transmission from the imams are preferred. The Shī'ah share many *ḥadīth* with the Sunnī Muslims, yet among the former, the authority of a *ḥadīth* is much more certain when it depends on the word of the imams rather than the *isnād* and the *rijāl* criticism of Sunnī Muslims. Many Shī'i *ḥadīth* are not shared by the Sunnīs and represent the teachings of the imams, most often on dogmatic issues or esoteric teachings peculiar to the Shī'ah. Again the rank of the imams renders these immediately authoritative. A fourfold classification of *ḥadīth*, established by Jamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī (d. 1247), became popular: (1) the *ṣaḥīḥ*, or sound *ḥadīth*, with an *isnād* that connects without break to one of the imams; (2) the *muwaththaq*, or authenticated *ḥadīth*, with an *isnād* in which a companion of the imam (one of the *aṣḥāb al-ijmā'*) unequivocally declares it acceptable despite an apparent incorrectness in its doctrine; (3) the *ḥasan*, or good *ḥadīth*, with an *isnād* that includes a transmitter from the imam whose uprightness (*'adālah*) is not unequivocally declared; (4) the *ḍa'if*, or weak *ḥadīth*, which does not fall within the first three classes.

The Shī'ah collected their *ḥadīth* only in the fourth and fifth centuries of Islam in large part because the last living imam went into "occultation" in 873 and because the Buyid rulers, who proved friendly to the Shī'ah and their scholars, only came to power in 945. The first and most famous collection was *Al-kāfi fī 'ilm al-dīn* (What Is Sufficient for Knowledge of Religion) by Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Kulīnī (or al-Kulaynī, d. 941). Its 326 chapters contain over fifteen thousand *ḥadīth* of the Prophet and of the imams. The *Kāfi* is in three parts: the first, the *Uṣūl al-kāfi* (Roots of the *Kāfi*), is theological in tone, while the remaining two, the *Furū' al-kāfi* (Branches of the *Kāfi*), touch on individual legal topics.

The second canonical collection, *Man lā yaḥḍuruḥu al-faqīh* (Who Has It Is a Scholar), gathered by al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq ibn Bābūyah al-Qummī (or Ibn Bābawayhī, d. 991), records over nine thousand *ḥadīth*. The last two recognized collections are both the work of Shaykh al-Ṭā'ifah Abū Ja'far Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067): *Tah-*



*dhīb al-aḥkām* (Correcting Judgments) and *Al-istibṣār fī mā ukhtulifa min al-akḥbār* (Examination of What Is in Dispute among the Reports). The former has over three thousand ḥadīth in 393 chapters; the latter, over five thousand in 920 chapters.

The works of Ibn Bābūyah and al-Ṭūsī differ from the *Kāfī* since they lack the chapters on *uṣūl* (jurisprudence), excepting one chapter on the competency and authority (*ḥujjah*) of the imams. All four collections rely on *isnāds* reaching back only a few generations to the imams. Unlike their Sunnī counterparts, the Shī'ah were not busied with the search for sound *isnāds* reaching back to the Prophet, since the infallibility (*'iṣmah*) of the imams precluded the need.

*Ḥadīth* criticism (*dirāyat al-ḥadīth*), though traced back by the Shī'ah to Ibn al-Bayyī' al-Naysābūrī, really began with the previously mentioned Jamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Mūsā al-Ḥusaynī. Al-Shahīd al-Thānī Zayn al-Dīn ibn 'Alī ibn Aḥmad al-'Āmilī (d. 1559) set the style for this genre in his *Bidāyat al-dirāyah* (The Start of *Ḥadīth* Criticism) and *Ghunyat al-qāṣidīn fī ma'rifat iṣṭilāḥāt al-muḥaddithīn* (What Those Aspiring to Know the Conventional Usage of the *Ḥadīth* Reporter Must Have). The scholars of the Shī'ah also composed commentaries on the four collections such as the famous *Sharḥ uṣūl al-kāfī* by Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, d. 1640). Others gathered the ḥadīth of the four collections into new compilations or, as in the case of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī (d. 1699) in his *Bihār al-anwār* (Rivers of Lights), even added materials not previously found in the four canonical works. Though the *rijāl* were never as central a concern for the Shī'ah as they were for other Muslims, three works gained recognition: the *Rijāl* of Muḥammad ibn 'Umar al-Kashshī (d. 951); the *Kitāb al-rijāl* of Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Najāshī (d. 1058); and the *Kitāb al-rijāl* of al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf al-Ḥillī (d. 1325). To this now is added the monumental work *A'yān al-Shī'ah* (The Leading Personalities of the Shī'ah) by Muḥsin al-Amīn al-'Āmilī (d. 1952).

[See also Islamic Law, article on Shari'ah; Sunnah; Tafsīr; and the biographies of the various figures mentioned herein.]

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Wansbrough, whose characterization of the action in ḥadīth as "exclusively symbolic, isolated, stylized, and ritualistic" makes his the most significant contribution to the discussion of the nature of ḥadīth in modern times. Examples of ḥadīth and ḥadīth criticism, together with a history of ḥadīth, can be found in Alfred Guillaume's classic work *The Traditions of Islam* (Oxford, 1924; reprint, Beirut, 1966). James Robson has more examples of ḥadīth in his translation of al-Baghawī's *Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ*, 4 vols. (Lahore, 1963–1965), and he includes a helpful introduction on ḥadīth and ḥadīth literature. Robson has also written an outstanding entry on ḥadīth in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. (Leiden, 1960–), and has to his credit a long list of articles essential to any study of ḥadīth literature and the history of ḥadīth (see J. D. Pearson, *Index Islamicus 1906–1955*, plus supplements (Cambridge, 1959–)).

The best available examples of ḥadīth criticism literature are the translations by William Marçais, *Le Taqrīb de en-Nawawi* (Paris, 1902)—its footnotes are especially enlightening on the variety of technical terms—and *An Introduction to the Science of Tradition*, edited and translated by James Robson (London, 1953), from a work of al-Naysābūrī. On ḥadīth *qudsī*, the excellent book of William A. Graham, *Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam* (Paris, 1977), includes a valuable introduction and ninety sacred ḥadīth. The article by Josef Horowitz, "Alter und Ursprung des Isnad," *Der Islam* 8 (1918): 39–47, is the classic work on the earliest use of the *isnād*. On Shī'ī ḥadīth, information is limited, but reference should be made to Dwight M. Donaldson's book *The Shi'ite Religion* (London, 1933), chapters 27 and 28, and to Ḥasan al-Amin's *Islamic Shi'ite Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1 (Beirut, 1968), pp. 94–107. The article by Gérard Lecomte, "Aspects de la littérature du ḥadīth chez les imamites," in *Le Shī'isme imāmīte*, edited by Toufic Fahd et al. (Paris, 1970), discusses the nature of Shī'ī ḥadīth.

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L. T. LIBRANDE

**HAFETS HAYYIM.** See Kagan, Yisra'el Me'ir.

**HĀFĪZ SHĪRĀZĪ** (AH c. 726–792/c. 1326–1390 CE), in fuller form Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ-i Shīrāzī; Persian lyric poet and panegyrist, supreme master of the *ghazal*. He was born in Shiraz, spent the greater part of his life in the area, and died there as well; his tomb is now a showplace. Much of his career was in the service or the ambiance of a minor dynasty, the Muzaffarids, whose overall reign was approximately coeval with his own lifespan. As usual with Persian literary figures, Ḥāfiẓ's exact dates and the details of his life are much disputed: the traditional biography leans heavily on anecdotal pieties, casual references in a variety of sources, and possible allusions in his own corpus, the text of which is still far from being in a definitive form.

He is said to have had an impoverished childhood, part of it as an orphan, and to have worked at various menial tasks, but in the culture of the time these circumstances were no obstacle to his acquiring a sound education in the traditional disciplines. His pen name, Ḥāfiẓ, ostensibly signifies that he had memorized the Qur'ān, and his poetry itself displays a confident acquaintance with Arabic, the so-called Islamic sciences, various branches of secular knowledge, and Persian literature to his own day. By the age of thirty he appears to have gained some acceptance as a panegyrist to princes and influential ministers of state, and he continued thus—with various vicissitudes of fortune—for most of his life. At no time, however, does he seem to have enjoyed a regular appointment or any considerable wealth. Indeed, since some of his patrons were rigidly orthodox Sunnis, his generally libertine and *laissez-faire* attitudes—whether actual or merely professed—often landed him in a measure of disgrace, if not in outright persecution.

It has sometimes been suggested, and as often denied, that Ḥāfiẓ was even of Shī'ī allegiance, and certainly various passages in the poems can be read in this sense. Nor, in the light of modern scholarship, would his celebrated Ṣūfī leanings necessarily conflict with such loyalties. The precise truth can hardly be discovered at this date, especially since ambiguity is in the nature of the case for any poet beholden to an establishment: in this case, Ḥāfiẓ would have had to be extremely ambiguous in his poetry in order to avoid offending various religious, political, or social interests. What seems clear, however, is that he generally carried, and made frequent reference to, a reputation for aggressive nonconformity.

Ḥāfiẓ's unique literary position rests on his *Divān*,

the collection of his poems, practically all in the *ghazal* form (a sort of ode, ranging from a few monorhyming couplets to twelve, fifteen, or more). Unfortunately, no more than a few brief excerpts in translation can be cited here, but perhaps these opening lines from three separate *ghazals* will give the reader a sense of Ḥāfiẓ's work:

If that Shirazi Turk will take my heart into his hand  
I'll give up, for his Indian beauty spot, all Samarkand and  
Bukhara.

The green fields of heaven I saw and the new moon's sickle  
And I was minded of what I'd sown and the reaping day to  
come.

I'll hold not my hand from wanting till my desire is realized;  
Either my body attains my heart's beloved, or my heart will  
leave my body.

Ḥāfiẓ is said to have produced his own definitive recension some twenty years before his death, but no manuscript of this has ever come to light (and given the constant wear and tear on this particular poet's work over the centuries, it seems unlikely that any ever will). All known versions are believed to depend on an edition allegedly produced at some point after his death by a disciple. Whatever Ḥāfiẓ's own intentions may have been (at an earlier date or at various later times), the actual textual situation, quite apart from variant readings, is extraordinarily chaotic. In the thousands of extant manuscripts from all periods and places, and consequently in the more than a hundred printed editions, the number of poems ranges from about five hundred to almost one thousand, although the lower figures are commonly taken to be the more reliable. Moreover, in these recensions the order and number of lines in any particular poem can vary greatly, with virtually only the first (the internally rhymed quote-line) and the last (containing the poet's name) remaining stable. This is not at all abnormal in classical Persian poetry, where each line is designed to have a degree of self-containment and "finish" unfamiliar in Western literatures. What is unusual in the present case is the extent of variability, and this feature has given rise to a whole critical literature in its own right. Other factors of confusion are the idiosyncratic cultural tendencies for lesser poets to father their works onto famous names, or for all writers to borrow freely from each other where a line or two may seem particularly apt. Nor, in a culture where memory and oral tradition also play an important part, can the standard methods of scholarship (the oldest manuscript is normally the best, the simplest solution is likely to be wrong, and so forth) be applied with full

confidence. In short, the text as it stands is neither authoritative in itself nor reliable in its possible relationship to the poet's life, and it may never become so.

Once this is said, and the rich (but often falsely romantic) accretions draped around the figure of Ḥāfīz in Western renderings have been stripped away as far as possible, one is still left with a body of poetic utterance that is regarded by Persian-speakers as sublime to the point of near-sacredness. Ḥāfīz's *Divān* is read or memorized, and quoted, at all levels of society, but it is also used—by those who call it a “Qur'ān in Persian”—in all solemnity to take random auguries at such important moments in life as a projected marriage, a business or medical decision, the start of a lengthy journey, and so on. Persian-speakers may or may not fully appreciate the linguistic and literary mastery Ḥāfīz constantly displays; they may not always relish his ambiguities and the alternating and interpenetrating themes—mystical, melancholy, pessimistic, hedonistic, or panegyric—but they all believe they hear in him a voice of infinite wisdom and transcendence. Nor does this apply only to those whose usual language or mother tongue is Persian, for Ḥāfīz was for centuries as revered in regions where Turkish (the Ottoman empire) and Urdu (various princely states of India) were the local languages. Indeed, many of the best earlier studies, translations, and commentaries have emanated from those centers, since Iranian scholarship as such in Hafiziana is largely a twentieth-century development and is in some degree indebted to these as well as to the West.

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G. M. WICKENS

**H'AI GAON** (939–1038), Babylonian halakhist. H'ai succeeded his father, Sherira', as head of the academy

at Pumbedita and occupied the post for forty years, during which time he penned hundreds of *responsa*, composed significant halakhic monographs, and trained Jewish students from all over the world. The geonic period reached its apogee with H'ai, who as its crowning figure also witnessed its irreversible decline.

The quantity of H'ai's *responsa*—about one-third of all preserved geonic *responsa* are attributed to him—indicates that he was considered the leading legal authority of his time, a status underscored by the far-flung provenance of his correspondence and the fact that he was appealed to by scholars of the first rank. In eleventh- and twelfth-century rabbinic writing, “the gaon” invariably means H'ai. He saw the Talmud as the decisive factor in all Jewish law (the characteristic posture of all geonim), after which ranked the decisions and enactments of his geonic predecessors, and the force of custom. In addition to *responsa*, H'ai also wrote major halakhic monographs in both civil and religious law; here he ordered the welter of Talmudic discussion into topically organized units and brought this geonic literary form to a height surpassed only by Maimonides.

H'ai's attitude toward Talmudic legend and his theological comments combine a moderate rationalism with mystical interests. Continuing the philosophical tradition of Sa'adyah, H'ai reinterpreted legends with anthropomorphic features, argued for a nonliteralistic approach to *aggadot*, and in general denied the authoritative status of these rabbinic materials. At the same time, he recoiled from the suggestion of Shemu'el ben Ḥofni (his father-in-law) that the Witch of Endor had simply tricked Saul into thinking she had raised the ghost of Samuel (*I Sm.* 28). H'ai also wrote a short treatise on the nature of the messianic redemption and discussed the esoteric teachings of *merkavah* mysticism.

[For discussion of the geonim, see Halakhah; see also Judaism, article on Judaism in the Middle East and North Africa to 1492.]

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GERALD J. BLIDSTEIN

**HAIR.** Words are related to the things they denote only by the conventions of language, but symbols, unlike words, are inherently appropriate to what they signify. Thus, since most animals are much hairier than human beings, some cultures may use this difference to express the distinction between the realms of nature and culture, as in myths that describe the first men as very hairy, and also as ignorant of fire and of the rules of correct behavior toward their kin. But symbolic meanings are not simple reflections of natural phenomena. So, in other societies, the symbolic opposition between "hairy" and "hairless" may be related not to the distinction between nature and culture but rather to the categories of youth and age; in this case "hairy" will symbolize the health and vitality of young people, whereas "hairless" will signify the baldness and infirmity of old age. Again, we may find that long hair is considered appropriate to the female sex because it appears soft and rounded, while close-cropped hair is associated with males because it allows the shape of the skull to appear, giving an appropriately hard and angular appearance. Or again, short hair may express puritan values, and long hair their opposite. So, opposition between the hairy and the hairless may symbolize such diverse categorical relations as animal and human, youth and age, male and female, and puritan and worldly. It is also quite possible for one and the same symbolic use of hair to have several different meanings simultaneously.

All symbolism accommodates to the natural properties and associations of objects, but it also assimilates these properties and associations into cultural systems of meaning in a selective, creative, and coherent way. Because symbols are derived from man's interaction with the physical world, we must also be alert to the possibility that an apparently symbolic custom is really nothing more than a practical expedient. In some African societies, for example, the shaving of children's heads has no symbolic meaning and is merely undertaken to prevent lice. On the other hand, we must not assume too readily that practical explanations such as hygiene will normally be adequate to explain the symbolic uses of hair.

In attempting to explain the different symbolic uses of hair, then, we must keep in mind its basic properties and associations, especially its associations with animals, with growth and vitality, and with youth and puberty as opposed to old age. That it has great potential for manipulation, can be cut painlessly, and is closely associated with two socially significant areas of the body—the head and the genitals—is also of great importance. Because of this variety of properties and associations, no single theory can account for all symbolic

uses of hair. But there are, nevertheless, a limited number of themes in hair symbolism that are found all over the world.

**Hair Symbolism in Freudian Theory.** Freudian theory maintains that the head is a phallic symbol, that the hair symbolizes semen, and that haircutting is a symbolic castration. In some instances, the head and its hair do clearly have explicit sexual associations. In ancient Greek and Roman belief, the head was the source of semen in the form of cerebrospinal fluid, and hair was an indication of sexual vigor. The same belief is held by the Punjabis of India, who suppose that true ascetics are able to store up their semen and concentrate it in the form of spiritual power at the top of their heads. Quite apart from these physiological beliefs, the head resembles the genitoanal region because these are the only two areas of the body with orifices, and each embraces radically opposed functions: social relations on the one hand, and physical functions on the other. Because the realm of nature confronts that of the social and the intellectual so blatantly in these two regions, it is not surprising that they can be substituted for one another in humor, in magical and religious contexts, and in popular and prescientific sexual lore. Thus the nose and tongue become analogues of the penis; the eyes represent the testicles; the mouth and ear correspond to the vagina or anus; and head hair corresponds to pubic hair. It may be for this reason that among the Chickrí of central Brazil a woman may wear her hair long only after the birth of her first child and that in traditional Dobuan society of the western Pacific an adulterer would publicly cut the hair of a woman he had seduced if he wished to defy her husband. In that society care of the hair is a reciprocal service between spouses and is associated with sexual intercourse.

Sexual potency, however, is only one aspect of vitality, physical strength, and animality in general. Samson's strength lay in his hair, but we have no warrant for attributing any narrowly sexual significance to the association, nor for regarding the cutting of his hair as castration. There are, in addition, numerous symbolic acts of haircutting that are even less plausibly interpreted as castration, such as cutting women's hair at marriage and the shaving of infant boys, slaves, military recruits, pilgrims, and returning travelers. Further, we find certain categories of persons, such as religious ascetics, who do not cut their hair but who conventionally abstain from all sexual relations, while the stereotype of the long-haired intellectual in our own culture is entirely free of any erotic association. The Freudian hypothesis cannot therefore be supported by the facts, except in a few instances.

**Hair as a Symbol of Animality, Strength, and the Supernatural.** As already noted, hair is a prominent feature of animals, and the persistent growth of hair, most noticeably on the head, is analogous to the growth of vegetation. Not surprisingly, therefore, hair is a common symbol of vitality, physical strength, nature, and supernatural beings or forces closely associated with nature. The culture hero Dribidu of the Lugbara tribe of Uganda is a good example of this association. The culture heroes were not members of clans, like modern Lugbara, but lived in isolation in a world without clans. *Dribidu* means "the hairy one," for this culture hero had long hair over most of his body. He was also known as Banyale ("eater of men"), since he ate his own children. In a myth of the Kukukuku of Papua, men at first had long hair all over their bodies and were ignorant of fire, cooking their food over women's genitals. When they were shown how to make fire and to cook their food over it in the ordinary way, the long hair fell off their bodies and they became fully human.

In Stith Thompson's *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* (Copenhagen, 1955), there are twenty instances of hairiness associated with supernatural or half-human beings such as fairies, dwarfs, giants, water and wood spirits, devils, and mermaids; seven associations with animal-human relationships; three with vegetable-human relationships; three with witches; seven with the soul or vitality; and six with asceticism. The ascetic, particularly the solitary anchorite of fourth-century Egypt and Syria or the Hindu *saṃnyāsin*, abandons ordinary society and even the company of fellow ascetics to lead a completely solitary life, frequently naked and unkempt. In *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–1788), the historian Edward Gibbon wrote of the anchorites of the Egyptian desert:

All superfluous incumbrance of dress they contemptuously cast away, and some savage saints of both sexes have been admired, whose naked bodies were only covered with their long hair. They aspired to reduce themselves to the rude and miserable state in which the human brute is scarcely distinguished above his kindred animals. . . . They often usurped the den of some wild beast whom they affected to resemble. (chap. 37)

Hair, particularly of the head and beard, is often believed to be the seat of physical strength and supernatural power, the two of which may not be clearly differentiated. The early Frankish kings, who were essentially warriors, were celebrated for their long hair, which was a distinctive mark of their royal status, so that cutting the hair disqualified a member of the royal family from succession to the throne. Maori chiefs were also forbid-

den to cut their hair, as were the priests of a number of societies, such as the Aztec and the two moieties of the Borana Galla of Ethiopia. Divine beings may likewise be represented as long-haired. The Aryans so depicted the sun, whom they also described as having flaming or golden hair. The Egyptians referred to the sun god Re as adorned with golden locks. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the persecution of witches was at its height in Europe, it was believed that the power to bewitch lay especially in the hair. Accordingly, it was standard practice not only to shave witches' heads but to depilate their entire bodies in order to render them harmless before execution. For centuries it was also customary to shave the heads and bodies of the insane.

**Haircutting, Social Control, and Initiation.** Insofar as the hair is an expression of life, strength, and magical and religious power or is associated with animality or the condition of being in some way outside society, cutting or shaving the hair is an appropriate symbol for the imposition of some form of social discipline or restraint and is also a means of signifying a person's transition from one social status to another. In this context haircutting, like the cooking of food, is a fitting metaphor for the imposition of social control on nature, and also for transition and rites of passage in general.

Orlando Patterson, in his *Slavery and Social Death* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), notes the ubiquity of the shorn head as the mark of the slave:

In Africa we find the shorn head associated with slaves among peoples as varied as the Ila and the Somali. In China, in highland Burma, among the primitive Germanic peoples, the nineteenth century Russians, the Indians of the northwest coast, and several of the South American and Caribbean tribes, the heads of slaves were shorn (in the ancient Near East so was the pubic hair of female slaves). In India and pharaonic Egypt slaves wore their hair shorn except for a pigtail dangling from the crown. (p. 60)

In the Americas, however, slaves were not shorn, because the characteristic hair type of the African was a more effective indicator of servile status. The shaving of the head has also been prominently associated with the punishment of criminals, as in the pillory, and as a mark of convict status. In modern times it has been closely associated with military discipline, especially as an initiation rite for recruits, and in tribal societies boys often have their hair cut as part of their initiation into adult status.

Haircutting may also be an initiation into society. When a son is born to him, a Muslim has seven obligations, according to Julian Morgenstern: to give the new-

born a name; to cut his hair; to give as alms the weight of the hair in silver or gold; to sacrifice an animal; to smear the baby's head with saffron; to circumcise him; and to distribute to the neighbors portions of the animal sacrificed (Morgenstern, 1966, p. 41). The convert to Islam from an unsanctified religion, in addition to being washed or anointed with water, might also have his hair cut off. Muslim travelers returning from long and dangerous journeys, as well as pilgrims, cut off their hair. Participation in sacred events may have been regarded in some societies as taking place outside society; thus it was forbidden to cut one's hair until the end of the Passover and Sukkot festivals, and a traditional English superstition held that it was unlucky to cut one's hair on a Sunday.

The Bible provides a number of instances of hair symbolism in which hairiness is associated with the life of the hunter, wild beasts, physical strength, rebellion, or special sanctity, while cutting or shaving the head is associated with rejoining society, with submission to some specific authority within society, or with a rite of passage. Esau, the hunter of wild beasts, was a hairy man, while his brother Jacob, a herdsman dwelling in tents, was a smooth man (*Gn.* 25:23–27). In *Leviticus*, it is prescribed that when a leper, by definition an outcast, is cured and ready to be reincorporated into society, he shall have all his hair shaved off (*Lv.* 14:8–9). The Nazarenes, who consecrated themselves unto the Lord by a vow, allowed their hair to grow until the end of the period of their vow, when it was formally shaved off at the Tabernacle (*Nm.* 6:1–18). Female prisoners of war, if made wives, were required to pare their nails and shave their heads (*Dt.* 21:10–14). Samson's strength lay in his hair; when it was cut off, he was as weak as any other man (*Jgs.* 16:17–19). Absalom, who rebelled against David, his father and sovereign, was remarkable for his long hair (2 *Sm.* 14:26). When Nebuchadrezzar was overthrown and made an outcast, "he was driven from men, and did eat grass as oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, till his hairs were grown like eagles' feathers, and his nails like birds' claws" (*Dn.* 4:33). For women, uncovered hair was symbolic of maidenhood, while the covering of the hair was symbolic of marriage and the acceptance of the husband's authority; it was also an ancient Jewish custom to cut off a woman's hair at marriage.

The imposition of authority is not necessarily symbolized by the cutting of hair, however. On the Pacific island of Tikopia, commoners loosen their hair to express submission to a chief, because in so doing, they signify their openness to control and influence. (On the same island, women cut their hair short, and men wear theirs long.)

**The Use of Hair in Magic, Sacrifice, and Mourning.** Magical and sacrificial uses of hair seem to form a somewhat separate category from those considered so far, since they involve the nature of something detached from the body. One of the commonest uses of hair is in hostile magic, when the hair clippings of an intended victim are obtained and ensorcelled, together with, or as an alternative to, nail parings, blood, saliva, semen, or other bodily secretions. In primitive thought, we frequently find that the human person is believed to have "extensions" that may include not only hair and the other bodily secretions but also personal names and belongings such as garments, shadows, and even footprints, all of which may be used to cast spells on a victim. In some societies, a sorcerer may cast a spell by including one of his own hairs in something given to the intended victim. Thus, in Papua a man may put one of his pubic hairs in a cigarette and give it to a woman who, it is believed, will then form a passionate attachment to him.

In many societies, fear of sorcery leads to the burning, burying, or hiding of hair. The Konso of Ethiopia take great care to hide these clippings: they cannot burn them since, according to their belief, doing so will cause their own sickness or death. As an alternative, in some cultures the cutting of hair or nails is forbidden for infants or others thought to be specially vulnerable to magical dangers.

Hair may also be used to transfer disease to another person, animal, or thing. In the Hebrides, it was the custom to cure epilepsy by burying a black cock with some clippings of hair and nails from the patient. In Devon and Yorkshire, the hair of a child with whooping cough was placed between two slices of bread and given to a dog; when the dog coughed, it was a sign that the disease had been successfully transferred. Conversely, the hair of a sick person might be put into a hole or hung in the branches of a healthy tree, so that the patient might derive health from the tree.

A related use of hair is in sacrifice. This was once very common, particularly among the ancient Greeks and Romans, who established relations with various gods by placing locks of hair on their altars. On reaching manhood, youths offered their first beard to Apollo, one of whose functions was to promote the fertility of crops, or gave their hair to the local river god. Nero offered his first beard to Jupiter, and Phoenician women sacrificed their hair to Adonis at the annual spring festival. Greek women offered their hair to deities before marriage, while Hygieia, goddess of health, was given offerings of women's hair before or after childbirth.

Hair is also used in a number of cultures to maintain a relationship with the dead; it may be placed with the

corpse or on the tomb. In Islamic society, boys who had been dedicated to a saint at birth had their heads shaved sometime between eight and twelve years of age, and their hair was placed on the saint's tomb. Conversely, among the Iroquois, a lock of hair from the dead was given to the nearest relative of the deceased, while the Zuni believed that to burn the hair of a deceased friend and inhale the smoke would produce good health. Among the Arabs, the hair or beard is regarded as the seat of vitality and thus is specially suited to serve as the substitute for a life. As part of a reconciliation ceremony, a murderer has some of his hair or beard shaved off, as a token of the life that might have been demanded.

The cutting or tearing out of hair in mourning is one of the most commonly reported uses of hair. Since it is almost invariably associated with other forms of bodily mutilation, such as the gashing of the skin or even the severing of finger joints, it is most simply interpreted as self-directed aggression produced by grief. Mourning may also be signified by disheveling the hair or by covering it with dirt, ashes, mud, and so on. In all such cases the hair is also a convenient symbol indicating that the mourners temporarily hold a special status.

In hair symbolism, then, a relatively small number of basic themes constantly recur in the mythology, ritual, and social relations of peoples all over the world. But these themes are only a general guide; each case must be analyzed within the context of the particular culture in which it occurs.

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CHRISTOPHER R. HALLPIKE

**HĀJJ.** See Pilgrimage, article on Muslim Pilgrimage.

**HAKUIN** (1686–1769), more fully Hakuin Ekaku; mid-Tokugawa period (1603–1868) reviver of Rinzai Zen. Hakuin was born to a commoner family in Hara, present-day Shizuoka Prefecture. Entering Buddhism at an early age, he studied widely both Buddhist canonical works and Zen literature. He was also well versed in the secular literature of China and Japan, and in popular Japanese poetry and song. At age twenty-two he set out on his studies, visiting a succession of Zen masters and practicing meditation at various temples. At twenty-four he visited the Zen master Shōju Rōjin (Dōkyō Etan, 1643–1721), and after an arduous eight-month stay, was granted his teacher's sanction. For the next eight years Hakuin traveled to various temples, perfecting his understanding of Zen, eventually returning to his temple, the Shōinji in Hara, in 1718. Here he concentrated on teaching a considerable number of disciples. Hakuin also devoted much time to itinerant preaching and lecturing and to the instruction of laymen. He passed away in 1769.

Shortly after its inception the Tokugawa shogunate established strict control over all Buddhist sects, estab-

lishing a system of main and branch temples and in many ways restricting the activities of the Buddhist clergy. Buddhism in the Tokugawa period is generally described as effete and corrupt, yet in many respects it flourished greatly. Their activities severely restricted, some Buddhist priests turned to scholarship and study; others sought to reform and revitalize their teachings. This trend was especially evident in Zen: the Sōtō sect underwent reforms at the hands of a group of scholar-priests; Rinzaï was revitalized by Hakuin and his heirs.

In Hakuin's time, Zen study and practice had degenerated into a sterile and formalized *kōan* study or had moved toward a popular Zen that rejected the *kōan*, minimized meditation practice, and frequently admitted elements of Pure Land Buddhism. Hakuin revolted against these tendencies. Turning back to the Zen that had been introduced to Japan from Sung China in the early Kamakura period (1185–1333), Hakuin taught a strict form of *kōan* Zen based on the teachings of Nampo Jōmyō (Daiō Kokushi, 1235–1309), Shūhō Myōchō (Daitō Kokushi, 1283–1338), and Kanzan Egen (Musō Daishi, 1277–1360) and the school centered at the Daitokuji and Myōshinji temples in Kyoto (known after its founders as the Ō-Tō-Kan school). The exact details of the *kōan* system Hakuin used are not clear; his descendants in the second generation Inzan Ien (1751–1814) and Takuju Kōsen (1760–1833) established a formalized system of *kōan* study that persists to this day. Under this system, students were required to meditate on and respond to a specific series of *kōans*. Often, as the monk progressed he would reinvestigate *kōans* previously studied, until those few who survived the rigorous, lengthy training were themselves sanctioned as teachers. Before taking up teaching duties it was customary for the priest to spend several years in isolation, perfecting his own understanding.

In his teaching Hakuin emphasized disciplined meditation under a teacher's guidance, "see into one's own true nature" (*kenshō*). He emphasized meditation in the midst of activity, or meditation at all times and in all places, in contrast to quiet sitting in secluded areas, a practice that he vehemently condemned. Hakuin was opposed to all methods of Zen other than his own and inveighed against popular forms that simplified his teaching.

Hakuin was a prolific writer, adept in a variety of genres. For the practicing monk he wrote several major works, highly technical in nature, designed as aids to their studies. A large body of his writing consists of letters to feudal lords and to other priests and nuns in which he champions the virtues of Zen and calls strongly for humane government and adequate consideration for farmers. Some of his works are simple

preachings on Buddhism in general, directed toward his lay followers; other works imitate popular songs or recitations of the day. Of great popularity were several pieces, including *Yasen kanna* (Talks on a Boat in the Evening) and parts of *Orategama* (Embossed Teakettle), that deal with Hakuin's theories for nurturing health and prolonging life.

Hakuin is noted for his painting and calligraphy, of which many specimens remain. His work is bold and amusing and includes caricatures of his parishioners, brushstroke drawings of Zen figures, poems, Zen sayings, and single characters, all boldly drawn in his untrained yet original hand.

Hakuin is the dominant figure in the history of Rinzaï Zen in Japan. By turning back to the Sung-era Zen that had been introduced in the Kamakura period he organized a strict and austere course of *kōan* study and provided for a revival of Rinzaï Zen that had hitherto been in extreme disarray. All Rinzaï masters practicing today trace their lineage to Hakuin.

[See also Zen.]

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PHILIP YAMPOLSKY

**HALAKHAH.** [This entry consists of two articles: a history of the continuity and changes in Jewish law from the geonic period to the present and a companion piece on the structure of Jewish law.]

#### History of Halakhah

Jewish law (*halakhah*) was the major integrative factor in Jewish life from early geonic times (eighth century) until the onset of the modern era. With Jewry's ever-increasing geographic dispersion and political incapacity, Jewish identity was shaped increasingly by Jewish law. It defined the broad sphere of religious observance and significantly influenced the norms and practice of communal governance, and its study was a central spiritual and intellectual experience. Jewish law was created in rabbinic academies and courts by indi-



vidual scholars and by communal custom and enactment. Until the modern period, Jewish law responded to the major challenges in Jewish life, and the historical-geographic grid of legal creativity paralleled the development of the major centers of Jewish life.

**Chronological Periods, Geographic Centers, and Authorities.** The geonic period most likely begins with the Islamic conquest of Babylon in about 650; indeed it seems that the establishment of this more centralized Muslim administration was paralleled in the Jewish institutional structure. The gaonate (sg., *ga'on*, "splendor," derived from the formal name of the academy in Sura, Splendor of Ya'aqov) shared the governance of Babylonian Jewish society with the exilarch and claimed halakhic and spiritual authority over world Jewry. The central academies of Sura and Pumbedita (both in the general vicinity of Baghdad and eventually located in that city) were each headed by a gaon; all other scholars have remained anonymous in the literature. The major contribution of the geonic period to the development of Jewish law lies in the stabilization and standardization it brought to the relatively fluid situation in Talmudic times.

The gaonate successfully asserted the supremacy of the Babylonian over the Palestinian Talmud (a reflection of the historical ascendancy of Babylonian Jewry) and brought much indecisive Talmudic discussion to a binding conclusion. The liturgy, in particular, reached a high degree of regulation with the publication of prayer-texts and rules in the *siddurim* of 'Amram (fl. 856) and Sa'adyah (fl. 928). Geonic pressures toward standardization in this and other ritualistic areas were especially stimulated by the need to combat the competing Karaite movement and other sectarian groups. The growing urbanization of Jewish society and its commercial involvement also required, and received, legal guidance through the elaboration of Talmudic materials and explicit enactment, such as that enabling debtors to collect from the movable properties of orphans. Leading geonic figures include Yehud'ai, Naṭron'ai, 'Amram, Sa'adyah, and Shemu'el ben Ḥofni, all of Sura; Palṭoi, Sherira', and H'ai, all of Pumbedita. An auxiliary center of legal study during this period developed in North Africa; its central figure was Ḥanan'el, who was heavily influenced by H'ai.

Though geonic activity continued after the eleventh century (the twelfth-century Maimonides engaged in correspondence with the Baghdad gaonate), the weight of legal development passed to western Europe as the period of the *ri'shonim* ("first ones, early ones") began. The death of the Babylonian H'ai in 1038 and the birth of Rashi (Shelomoh ben Yitshaq) in France in 1040 conveniently symbolize the shift. Perhaps paralleling the

political decentralization of Christian Europe, rabbinic authority in Ashkenazic Europe was not centralized or even institutionalized—a striking contrast to the geonic structure. Scholars reached eminence by popular acknowledgement of their authority, not by appointment or election; law derived largely from learning, not from institutionalized structure. Men like Gershom ben Yehudah, Rashi, his grandson Ya'aqov ben Me'ir Tam, Eli'ezer ben Natan, Yesha'yah di Trani, Me'ir ben Barukh of Rothenburg, and his student Asher ben Yehi'el were the leading teachers of their time, but neither they nor their schools had any official status; at the most, some might have been judges in communal courts.

The *ri'shonim* generally continued the explication and development of Talmudic law, though certain topics—mercantile law, Jewish-gentile relations, and communal governance—did demand more original treatment. The desire to base communal governance on Jewish law and its principles forced legists to hammer out basic political issues, such as the rights of majority and minority, equity in tax law, and election procedures, with little in the way of Talmudic precedent to guide them. Halakhic development in Provence and Spain may be characterized in a similar fashion, though the Sefardic rabbinate of the Iberian Peninsula during the Christian reconquest, reflecting the general political situation, was more centralized than its Ashkenazic counterpart and also more influenced by geonic legal patterns. Men like Avraham ben Yitshaq and Avraham ben David of Posquières; Yitshaq ben Ya'aqov Alfasi in North Africa; Moses Maimonides in Egypt; and Me'ir Abulafia, Moses Nahmanides, Shelomoh ibn Adret, and Nissim Gerondi in Spain were teachers and judges whose commentaries and *responsa* carried their decisions and opinions around the world.

The work of the geonim and *ri'shonim* was brought to authoritative and influential summation by Ya'aqov ben Asher (d. 1343) in his *Arba'ah turim* (*Tur*). The period from its appearance till the publication (in 1550–1571) of the *Shulḥan 'arukh* of Yosef Karo and Mosheh Isserles is one of transition to the period of the *aḥaronim* ("later ones") and also marks the migration of Jewry and its legal centers eastward: Ashkenazic Jewry to eastern Europe and Sefardic Jewry, after the 1492 expulsion from Spain, to Greece, Turkey, and the Land of Israel. The halakhic achievement of the *aḥaronim*, especially in the ranks of Ashkenazic legists, tends to the derivative. (This was despite the influence of Yisra'el Isserlein of Austria and the originality of Yosef Qolon of Italy in the fourteenth century; the achievement and influence of Ya'aqov Weill, Ya'aqov Landau and Yisra'el Bruna, all in the fifteenth century, were in the area of religious custom rather than in creative legal thought.)

It is possible that continual political harassment, capped by pogroms and expulsions in the wake of the Black Death, sapped the intellectual energies of Ashkenazic Jewry. Furthermore, influential masters such as Ya'aqov Pollack and Shalom Shakhna preferred not to publish at all, arguing for a return to the more pristine concept of oral law, but their impact was to be felt in the revival of the sixteenth century. Sefardic halakhists, however, met new problems raised by commercial advance in the eastern Mediterranean region and the difficulties that emerged after the expulsion from Spain and Portugal such as the reabsorption of converts, fixing of personal status, and the forging of common patterns of governance and practice from the disparate communal traditions of the sixteenth century.

After 1492 the Sefardic settlements in Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and the Land of Israel constituted a single sphere of intellectual discourse and enjoyed an impressive level of halakhic activity. Foremost among the scholars of this era were David ibn Zimra', Levi ben Hāviv, and Yosef Karo, all born in Spain before the expulsion; Mosheh di Trani, Yosef ben Lev, and Shemu'el de Medina. By the mid-sixteenth century, Ashkenazic Jewry had achieved a large degree of stability in Poland and Lithuania, and its halakhic focus was found in cities like Cracow and Lublin, where authorities such as Shelomoh Luria (c. 1510–1574), Mosheh Isserles, and Mordekhai Jaffe taught and wrote.

The publication of the *Shulḥan 'arukh* by Karo and its annotation by Isserles marks the most significant watershed in the codification of *halakhah* until modern times. The bulk of the work was published by Karo (a member of the Safad community of mystics and halakhists) as a self-contained entity in 1565–1566; he had already collated the Talmudic and medieval sources in his massive commentary to the *Ṭur, Beit Yosef* (House of Joseph), which also frequently indicates the direction in which he would move as an authority in rabbinic law. Isserles, rabbi in Cracow, published glosses (the *mappah*, "tablecloth," to the *Shulḥan 'arukh* [Set Table]) in 1571 that registered the Ashkenazic variants to the Sefardic traditions of Karo and gave greater weight to the force of communal custom than Karo's work alone had done. Isserles's glosses also constituted an approval of Karo's work, which overcame in a fairly short period its antagonists—legists of stature, such as Yosef ben Lev and Yehudah Löw ben Betsal'el, who opposed the reduction of rich tradition to the bare paragraphs of an authoritative code—and its competitors. The times were ripe for a new summation, as was evidenced by the existence of other, if more prolix, attempts: the *Levushim* (Garments) of Jaffe, and the *Yam shel Shelomoh* (Sea of Solomon) of Luria. Rabbinic scholarship now

set about producing commentaries and supercommentaries on the *Shulḥan 'arukh* in a process that both legitimated the code and made it a central document in the study and practice of Jewish law.

Despite the overall decline in the physical conditions of Jewish life by the late eighteenth century and its religious and ideological fissures, the period of the *aḥaronim* produced an extensive halakhic literature. Three characteristics deserve mention. (1) With the rise of the nation-state and the concomitant elimination of self-governing estates and religious communities, halakhists have addressed themselves less and less (except for textual or theoretical discussions) to issues of civil or criminal law. (2) With the rise of the Reform movement, Ashkenazic halakhists of the modern period have become more defensive and hence more conservative than their predecessors. (3) Communication and interaction between Ashkenazic and Sefardic halakhists have declined. It is too early to judge whether the existence of Israel as a Jewish state will have any effect on these tendencies.

Since the publication of the *Shulḥan 'arukh*, the two major avenues of practical halakhic development in modern times have been the commentatorial activity centered on the *Shulḥan 'arukh* and the *responsa* literature. Major commentaries were written on different sections of the code by Yehoshu'a Falk, David ha-Levi, Shabbetai Kohen, Yitshaq Lima, Shemu'el Feibish, and Hīzqiyyah di Silow, among others. These works explicate the code but also deal with issues growing out of its rulings and occasionally prefer their own opinions based on alternative sources. This tendency may also be noted in the work of Eliyyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman of Vilna, which is devoted especially to tracing critically the Talmudic sources of the code. Subsequently, a more popular literature developed, which presented the results of these discussions in digest form, focusing especially on ritual law: *Ḥayyei adam* (Man's Life) and *Ḥokhmat adam* (Man's Wisdom) by Avraham Danzig and *Qitstsur Shulḥan 'arukh* (Short *Shulḥan 'arukh*) by Shelomoh Ganzfried of Hungary, for example. A more expansive format is found in the works of Yisra'el Me'ir Kagan, (for example, in *Mishnah berurah*), and Ya'aqov Sofer (in *Kaf ha-ḥayyim*), which have molded the consensus of Ashkenazic and Sefardic Jewries, respectively, in the area of ritual law.

Halakhic authorities, many of whom were communal rabbis or judges on the communal religious court, continued to influence the course of *halakhah* in their *responsa*. Representative figures from the seventeenth century are Ḥayyim Ya'ir Bachrach of Germany, Yosef ben Mosheh di Trani of Turkey, and Shemu'el Aboab of Italy; from the eighteenth century, Ya'aqov Emden of

Germany and Yehezqel Landau of Poland, Moshe Hagiz and Yom-Tov Algazi of the Land of Israel, and Yehudah Ayash of North Africa; from the nineteenth century, 'Aqiva' Eiger of Germany, Moshe Sofer of Hungary, Yitshaq Elhanan Spektor of Russia, and Yosef Hayyim al-Hakham of Iraq. Sofer (known as Hatam Sofer) was a crucial figure in the nineteenth-century Orthodox response to Reform, coining the motto that in matters of law "novelty is forbidden by the Torah."

Halakhic activity in the modern period reflects the historic fortunes of the people: Ashkenazic Jewry witnessed a flowering in eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Galicia, Hungary) and a relative decline in western Europe; Sefardic Jewry continued its development in the Balkans, North Africa, and Iraq. Since the destruction of Jewries in World War II and the exodus from Arab lands after 1948, Israel and the United States have become the centers of halakhic creativity, buttressed by the revival of learning and observance in the latter half of the twentieth century. Much current halakhic activity simply elaborates medieval doctrine, but the rise of modern technologies has stimulated halakhic thinking in the areas of Sabbath law and medical ethics. The most major change in modern Jewish existence, namely the secularization of the mass of Jewish people, has not yet significantly affected the halakhic system.

**Literary Genres and Intellectual Currents.** With the onset of the geonic period, halakhic literature developed in genres that have remained fairly constant until modern times: (1) monograph-code, (2) commentary, and (3) *responsa*. The antecedents of the first two genres are essentially Talmudic: the Talmud frequently undertakes to comment on and explicate the Mishnah, while the Mishnah, especially as it detached itself from scripture and Midrash, was formed as a monograph-code. A fourth genre—communal enactments—is more representative of the interaction of lay and rabbinical leadership. These different genres reflect different intellectual postures and tasks. Different geographic centers also devote themselves with varying intensity to one genre or another, yet no center or historical period abandoned any one of the genres, so that the materials found in each were in a state of constant interaction, and a substantial body of substance and method was shared by all.

**Monograph-codes.** The monograph-code of the geonic period had a functional goal: it was meant to provide for the crystallization of normative, standard practice and make this practice accessible to students, judges, and religious leaders. The geonim developed rules by which Talmudic literature was sifted and compiled the results of this process. From a substantive point of view, the major achievement of the geonic monograph-code

lies in its reduction of Talmudic discussion to geonic decision. From a structural point of view, the basic challenge lay in the reorganization of the material contained in the Talmudic debate into topical units; this process demanded not only the paring down of Talmudic pericopes but, in the more advanced monograph-code, the development of new topics.

A classic and early monograph-code is the ninth-century *Halakhot gedolot* (Major *Halakhot*), variously assigned to Shim'on Qayyara and Yehud'ai Gaon. The extensive Talmudic discussion is considerably reduced and canalized into a conclusive decision. The basic outline is Talmudic, but new topical units are occasionally introduced to unite scattered Talmudic materials into a new framework. Virtually all inoperative law, such as laws of sacrifices, purities, and impurities, is eliminated. Despite its new features, *Halakhot gedolot* is, in essence, an abridgment of the Talmud, a form that reaches its apogee in the eleventh-century *Halakhot* of Alfasi. Other geonic monographs are radical departures from the Talmudic model. The *Sefer ha-miqqah ve-hamimkar* (Book of Purchase and Sale) of H'ai, for example, a work on oaths, and the monograph on benedictions by Shemu'el ben Hofni both reorganize Talmudic law, which is presented in coherent form as a rule-structured system. The author elicits the rule underlying the concrete Talmudic discussion and strives for maximal generalization. At the same time, he usually retains the legitimating Talmudic source.

The geonic monograph-code reached fullest expression in Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah* (Second Torah; 1187), which is probably the single most prominent work in all post-Talmudic halakhic literature. In addition to bringing this traditional form to perfection through an architectonic vision of the entirety of Jewish law, Maimonides' code also served as an innovating document: the codified law is completely detached from Talmudic authorities and citations; Mishnaic Hebrew is revived to serve as the language of a new code; matters of belief, ideology, and metaphysics are integrated as normative aspects of Jewish law; and new topics are fashioned (for example, "Laws of Repentance," "Laws of Kings and Their Wars").

While Maimonides' immediate purpose in compiling his code was to provide a practical summary of law for the use of both layman and judge in what he considered a period of intellectual decline, *Mishneh Torah* is also a statement of the content and nature of Judaism as he saw it. Maimonides' code has become a central document in halakhic discussion, but it has not brought an end to the process of further development outside it. Prominent halakhists have always claimed that codes freeze the open-ended Talmudic process and are a stul-

tifying concession to mediocrity, and Maimonides' elimination of the Talmudic bases for his decisions raised the hackles of his contemporaries (such as Avraham ben David of Posquières) even more. Subsequent codes, such as the *Arba'ah turim* of Ya'aqov ben Asher and Karo and Isserles's *Shulḥan 'arukh*, lowered their sights considerably: the sense of an ordering structure declines considerably, purity of line is lost, and Temple-oriented topics as well as metaphysics and beliefs are eliminated. No new codes have been produced since the sixteenth century, though the *Shulḥan 'arukh* has been rewritten twice in attempts to integrate new materials or to combine the code with its earlier sources: see the *Shulḥan 'arukh* of Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady (1745–1813) and the *'Arukh ha-shulḥan* of Yeḥi'el M. Epstein (1829–1908).

**Commentary.** In geonic times commentary was, of course, commentary on the Talmud. So as to facilitate study of this protean and involuted document, geonim produced lexicographical aids that explained difficult terms and wrote explanatory material to clarify difficult Talmudic pericopes and chapters. Thus we possess H'ai's lexicographical commentary to *Ṭohorot* as well as parts of his running commentary to tractate *Berakhot*. The classic running commentary to the entire Talmud was written in France by Rashi. Based on oral traditions, Rashi's explication made the Talmud accessible to all students.

Rashi's grandchildren (the most prominent of whom was Ya'aqov ben Me'ir Tam) inaugurated the tosafist ("additions") school. Now commentary no longer addressed itself to the words and sentences of one specific text and context but undertook a synthetic analysis of all related Talmudic passages. This seminal work was based on a thorough mastery of the entire Talmud, an acute analytical sensibility, and the intellectual boldness necessary to produce novel concepts. In a sense, the tosafists continued the Talmudic process itself, producing new legal doctrines in the course of harmonizing disparate Talmudic opinions. Their techniques and results quickly spread to Spain and Italy: men like Nahmanides (and his students) in the thirteenth century and Yesha'yah di Trani absorbed the new mode. By the fourteenth century, analysis of Rashi was no longer a springboard for tosafist revision alone but became a subject in its own right in the work of Yom Ṭov Ashbilli. [See *Tosafot*.]

Maimonides' code received the first of many sustained commentaries in Vidal di Tortosa's *Maggid mishneh* (The Second Speaker), a work that struggles with the code's relationship to Talmudic sources. Maimonidean commentary grew to the dimensions of a subdis-

cipline, an ironic outcome for a code perhaps designed to be a final statement of Jewish law.

New trends also asserted themselves: Isaac Campanon of Castile (late fifteenth century) pioneered a return to close reading of specific Talmudic texts utilizing categories of medieval logic; German and Polish Talmudists of the sixteenth century extended tosafist dialectic to a *pilpul* (lit., "pepper," in the sense of casuistry) based on subtle and frequently artificial comparisons and contrasts. Two modes of halakhic scholarship have become prominent in modern times: the analytic school that is identified with Ḥayyim Soloveichik of Brest-Litovsk but that had its inspiration in the *Qetsot ha-ḥoshen* (Ends of the Breastplate) of Aryeh Leib ha-Kohen and, ultimately, in aspects of tosafist thought, and the text-critical and historical studies that derive in part from similar models of Western scholarship. This latter mode, however, has made little impact on devotees of halakhic study.

**Responsa.** In contrast to commentary, *responsa*—along with the codes and their related literature—are attempts to mold halakhic practice by responding to specific problems as they arise. This genre developed massively in the geonic period. While both commentary and code are basically explications or restatements of Talmudic law, the *responsum* applies that law to a new, concrete situation as the respondent functions at the intersection of law and practical reality. The *responsum* was the major instrument of direct geonic authority, and thousands of geonic responses to their far-flung questioners have been preserved. The *responsa* are the case law of the halakhic system, and the centrality of halakhic figures can often be gauged by their position in the *responsa* network. The decision rendered in a concrete situation is considered by many experts to be more authoritative than the codified generalization.

Two overall tendencies of this genre ought to be noted. (1) Inasmuch as a respondent was questioned in matters of conflict or situations reflecting new conditions, the bulk of *responsa* till the modern period focused on civil law, matters of personal status, and the application of halakhic categories to new economic conditions. Ritual law became a dominant subject of this literature only in relatively modern times, as Jews began to turn to the civil authorities for melioration of many of the problems listed above. (2) From the fifteenth century on (probably beginning with the *Terumat ha-deshen* [The Collected Ashes] of Yisra'el Isserlein), the *responsum* also became an artificial literary form in which a scholar elaborated on any problem of interest to him rather than communicating to an actual questioner. Thus the *responsa* literature includes central

works of halakhic theory, such as the *Responsa sha'agat Aryeh* (Lion's Roar) of Aryeh Leib of Mez. (A similar phenomenon is present in Maimonidean commentary, which has been used as a literary framework for discussion of general problems of Talmudic law.) This development notwithstanding, *responsa* remain the major forum in which modern halakhists consider the varied problems raised by contemporary civilization, as is seen in the multivolume works of Moshe Feinstein (1895–1986) of the United States and 'Ovadyah Yosef (b. 1920) of Israel. The *responsa* is well suited to *halakhah*: it allows a focus on the specific and the concrete; and inasmuch as the respondent is approached by virtue of his scholarship and reputation, *responsa* function in the absence of a formal hierarchical structure.

**Enactments.** Works classified as enactments (*taqqanot*) could be communal, rabbinical, or, frequently, authorized by both lay and rabbinical leadership. Enactments included in the Talmud are assumed to have universal application, and some medieval enactments have also achieved very wide observance (thus the ban [*herem*] on polygyny). But the vast majority of *taqqanot* were local in scope and origin. They were often communal or rabbinical responses to acute problems and carried communal sanctions. More than any other aspect of the halakhic system, *taqqanot* (called *haskamot*, "agreements," in the Sefardic sphere) represent *vox populi*; they would often be signed by the lay leadership (with the rabbinate concurring) and were frequently adopted by communal oath in the synagogue. *Taqqanot* are often preserved as independent documents or in communal registers and so constitute a literary genre of their own.

**Modern Scholarship.** Modern scholarly treatment of the history of medieval and modern *halakhah* has passed through a number of phases. Nineteenth-century historians, who often placed Jewish literary culture at the center of their interest, also focused on the careers of the great halakhists. But this focus often spent itself on biographical and literary issues; the history of law and legal theory was barely touched. With the rise of twentieth-century historiography, the major focus moved to the social, economic, and geopolitical aspects of Jewish life; now halakhic materials were combed as sources of historical data. A considerable amount of work was also devoted to the impact of general historic conditions of halakhic rulings and was often designed to show how flexible earlier halakhists had been. In recent decades, scholarship has looked for the complex interactions of legal theory and practice with historical reality as well as the internal dynamic of the halakhic system.

Twentieth-century scholarship has been able to utilize manuscript materials to gain a fuller picture of the past. Although no scientific editions of any medieval or modern halakhic text exist as yet, many new sources have been published or are consulted by scholars. The rich *genizah* ("storehouse") of Cairo, in particular, has yielded much material emanating from the Babylonian and, even more important, from the obscure Palestinian gaonate. For example, by studying the legal documents found in the *genizah*, Mordecai A. Friedman has been able to reconstruct Palestinian marriage law, which went further in equalizing the rights of husband and wife than did Babylonian law (*Jewish Marriage in Palestine*, 2 vols., Tel Aviv, 1980).

The sociological investigation of Jewish law has been pioneered principally by Jacob Katz. Katz utilizes halakhic sources to shed light on social processes, but in his work on law governing Jewish-gentile relations (*Exclusiveness and Tolerance*, London, 1961) and in a number of papers on Jewish ritual law, he has also shown how social realities have affected the halakhic process. Recently, though, Haym Soloveitchik has indicated that the halakhic response has not always accommodated the social or economic need (see, for example, his paper "Can Halakhic Texts Talk History?" in *AJS Review* 3, 1978, pp. 152–196) but has developed through the interpretation of its textual traditions as well. Since Jewish legists generally functioned in close proximity to their Christian and Muslim contemporaries, the question of mutual influence arises. It appears that Jewish legists absorbed terminology and occasionally legal theory from their surroundings. A more substantive claim for the impact of Christian marriage law has been made by Ze'ev W. Falk in *Jewish Matrimonial Law in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1966), and that for Muslim law of prayer has been made by Naftali Wieder in *Islamic Influences on the Jewish Worship* (Oxford, 1947; in Hebrew). This area of research is in its infancy.

The issue of halakhic openness arises in other contexts as well, for example, regarding the impact of Jewish pietistic movements on Jewish law and the degree to which legists integrate their other intellectual commitments into their legal views. The researches into Maimonidean *halakhah* by Jacob Levinger (*Darkhei ha-maḥshavah ha-hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam*, Jerusalem, 1965) and Isadore Twersky (*Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, New Haven, 1980) indicate that Maimonides' halakhic corpus is conditioned by his philosophic attitudes. Katz's work on the relationship of Qabbalah to *halakhah* reveals, as well, the influence of spiritualism on certain aspects of Jewish law (see, for example, his Hebrew papers in *Tarbiz* 50, 1980–1981, pp. 405–

422; 51, 1982, pp. 59–106; and in *Da'at* 7, 1981, pp. 37–68). Nonetheless, the halakhic system has retained a great measure of integrity as a self-contained system.

The most rounded analysis of the history of *halakhah*, treating both systemic-conceptual development and the place of law in society and history, is that associated with the school of *mishpaṭ 'ivri* ("Hebrew law") in Israel. Although its scholarly and ideological assumptions have been subjected to sharp disagreement (see the debate between Izhak Engelard and Menachem Elon in *The Jewish Law Annual, Supplement 1*, 1980), this school surveys topics of Jewish law in fuller scope than do other methods. Significant work produced by its historians includes Aaron Freimann's study of conditional marriage, M. Elon on the freedom of the debtor's person, and Shmuel Shiloh on Jewish reception of non-Jewish law. A fine English-language exemplar of this method is David Feldman's *Birth Control in Jewish Law* (New York, 1968), which surveys Jewish law on birth control and abortion from biblical times until the present.

[See also the biographies of the principal halakhists mentioned herein.]

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

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There are a number of outstanding treatments of individual figures or specific movements: E. E. Urbach's *Ba'alei ha-tosafot*, 4th ed. (Jerusalem, 1980), details the milieu and contribution of the seminal tosafist movement; Isadore Twersky's *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides* (New Haven, 1980) is a magisterial analysis of various literary aspects of the code and the relationship of Maimonides' *halakhah* and his philosophical views. Louis Finkelstein provides translation and discussion of the major European *taqqanot* until the fifteenth century in his

*Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages* (1924; reprint, Westport, Conn., 1972), and Solomon B. Freehof's *The Responsa Literature* (Philadelphia, 1955) is an informative introduction to this genre.

Although research in Jewish law is published in various journals, a number of publications are devoted exclusively to this topic: *Shenaton ha-mishpaṭ ha-'ivri* (1974–), *Dinei Yisrael* (1970–), and the *Jewish Law Annual* (1978–).

GERALD J. BLIDSTEIN

### Structure of Halakhah

*Halakhah*, in the general sense of the word, is the entire body of Jewish law, from scripture to the latest rabbinical rulings. It is a complete system of law governing every aspect of human life. It has been traditionally viewed as wholly rooted in God's revealed will (B.T., *Hag.* 3b) but subject to the ongoing interpretation of the Jewish jurists (B.T., *B.M.* 59b).

In its more specific sense *halakhah* (pl., *halakhot*) refers to those laws that were traditionally observed by the Jewish people as if they were scriptural commandments (*mitsvot*) even though they were nowhere explicitly found in scripture. The term itself, according to Saul Lieberman in *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine* (New York, 1962), seems to refer to the statement of a juristic norm as opposed to actual case law. The task of much rabbinic exegesis, especially during the tannaitic period (c. 70–200 CE), was to show that through the use of proper hermeneutics the *halakhot* could be derived from the text of scripture, especially the Pentateuch. When this could not be done, the specific *halakhah* was termed "a law of Moses from Sinai."

**Origins.** Concerning the origins of *halakhah* there are three main theories.

The first, the traditional, rabbinic approach, is founded on the literal meaning of "a law of Moses from Sinai," namely, that Moses received two sets of teachings at Mount Sinai, one written (the Pentateuch) and the other oral (*torah she-be'al peh*), and that the oral Torah is the authoritative explanation of the written Torah (B.T., *Ber.* 5a). Thus all subsequent interpretation is in effect recollection of what had already been revealed at Sinai (J.T., *Meg.* 4.1,74d). This theory explains that the constant rabbinical disputes over virtually every point of *halakhah* are due not to any inherent ambiguity in the tradition itself but, rather, to insufficient mastery of the tradition by the rabbis (Tosefta, *Soṭ.* 14.10).

The second theory is that of Moses Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204). Although he too reiterated the literal meaning of the totally Mosaic ori-

gin of *halakhah*, in his specific treatment of the constitution of halakhic authority he states that *halakhah* is based on scripture and, equally, on the rulings of the Great Court in Jerusalem (*Mishneh Torah*, Rebels 1.1ff.). This is Mosaic law in that the members of the Great Court are Moses' authoritative successors. Maimonides explains the fact of constant rabbinical disputes in *halakhah* as due to the loss of political sovereignty, which led to the demise of the Great Court's jurisdiction. By this theory Maimonides places both rabbinical legislation and traditional *halakhah* on the same level.

The third theory is that of Zacharias Frankel (1801–1875). Expanding certain medieval comments into a more general theory, Frankel, in *Darkhei ha-Mishnah* (Leipzig, 1859), saw the term “a law of Moses from Sinai” as primarily referring to ancient laws that had become widespread in Jewish practice and whose origins were obscure. They were regarded as if they had come from the actual time of Moses. Frankel's theory, which received severe criticism from more orthodox scholars, reflected the growing historical consciousness of nineteenth-century Jewish scholarship and, also, stimulated research into the different historical origins of various *halakhot*. Frankel, then, along with other scholars of his time, laid the foundation for the historical understanding of *halakhah* as a developmental phenomenon.

**Scriptural Exegesis.** Because of the Pharisaic and rabbinic emphasis on the essential unity of the written Torah and the *halakhah*, in contradistinction to the Sadducean, which accepted only the former as authoritative (B.T., *Hor.* 4a), an elaborate hermeneutical system was worked out to derive as many of the *halakhot* as possible from the words of scripture, which was considered normatively unintelligible without the process of specifically relating it to the *halakhah* (B.T., *Shab.* 31a). This entire process was called *midrash*, literally meaning “inquiry” into scripture. The most important statement of this rabbinic hermeneutic is the “Thirteen Methods of Rabbi Yishma'e'l” (*Sifra*, intro.). The most widely used of these methods and the most typical was the *gezerah shavah*; namely, the process by which a word in one scriptural context was interpreted according to its meaning in another context. Since this type of interpretation was only for buttressing already normative *halakhot*, what it accomplished was a much wider latitude for tradition to determine the meaning of scripture (J.T., *Pes.* 6.1, 33a). However, not only did such hermeneutical methods support already normative *halakhot*, but they also led to the formulation of new norms. The most prominent proponent of this construc-

tive exegesis was the second-century sage 'Aqiva' ben Yosef, although his oftentimes daring interpretations elicited the criticism of his more conservative teachers and colleagues (B.T., *Men.* 89a).

In tannaitic texts a distinction is made between direct scriptural exegesis (*derashah*) and indirect exegesis. In a purely normative sense, however, it is difficult to see any authoritative difference between laws buttressed by the latter as opposed to the former. Both sets of laws were regarded as traditional *halakhot*; the only difference is that the former were more satisfactorily based on scripture.

**Rabbinic Law.** In the amoraic period (c. 220–c. 500) there emerged a more clear-cut distinction between laws considered scriptural (*de-oraita'*) and laws considered rabbinic (*de-rabbanan*). The difference between scriptural law and rabbinic law by this time was that the latter was considered to be evidently rational. As for scriptural law, despite attempts to discover “reasons for the commandments” (*ta'amei ha-mitsvot*), God's will was considered sufficient reason for it. “I have made a statute; I have decreed a decree; you are not permitted to violate my decrees” (*Nm. Rab.* 19.1). This phrase was used to refute any suggestion that only those laws whose reasons were evident were authoritative. In fact, certain scriptural laws were admitted to be rationally incomprehensible, but their authority was nevertheless emphasized as being because “my father in heaven has decreed such for me” (*Sifra*, Shemini, ed. Weiss, 93b).

Rabbinic law, although occasionally justified by indirect scriptural exegesis (*asmakhta'*), was then usually justified as being for the fulfillment of some religious or social need (B.T., *Ber.* 23b). This developed to such an extent that it was claimed that there were only three rabbinic laws for which no reason could be immediately discerned (B.T., *Git.* 14a). Furthermore, the lines between direct and indirect exegesis were considerably blurred (B.T., *Pes.* 39b). Finally, Rava', a fourth-century Babylonian sage who became the most prominent advocate of rational jurisprudence, indicated that the rabbis actually had more legislative power than even scripture (B.T., *Mak.* 22b). Nevertheless, although in theory the punishment for the violation of rabbinic law could be even more severe than that for the violation of scriptural law (*San.* 11.3), in reality it was almost always more lenient (*Naz.* 4.3). In case of doubt, in matters concerning scriptural law the benefit of the doubt favored the law, but in rabbinic law it favored the accused (B.T., *Beits.* 3b).

The question of the extent of scriptural law versus rabbinic law was deeply debated among the medieval Jewish jurists. Maimonides, following the Talmudic

opinion that scriptural law is limited to 613 Pentateuchal commandments (B.T., *Mak.* 23b), considered any other laws, whether traditional or formulated through exegesis or rabbinical legislation, as having the status of rabbinic laws (*Sefer ha-mitsvot*, intro., sec. 2). Moses Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Nahman, c. 1194–1270), on the other hand, was of the opinion that anything designated by the rabbis as scriptural law, especially those laws derived hermeneutically in rabbinic literature, has the status of scriptural law. Only those laws specifically designated by the rabbis as rabbinic are to be considered as such. This difference of opinion concerning the very character of *halakhah* is philosophical. Maimonides' prime concern seems to have been with the process of legislation, that is, with the ability of the duly constituted authorities to make new laws and repeal old ones. Nahmanides' prime concern seems to have been with a revival of the whole process of rabbinical exegesis. This distinction can be seen in the fact that Maimonides' chief halakhic contribution was that of a highly innovative codifier, whereas Nahmanides' was that of an exegete. This difference of approach can be seen in the Talmud and throughout the history of the *halakhah*, namely, the apodictic approach (B.T., *Nid.* 73a) as contrasted with the expository approach (B.T., *B.M.* 33a).

Rabbinical legislation was considered the original prerogative of the Great Court in Jerusalem (*Sifrei*, Shoftim, ed. Finkelstein, no. 144). With the diminution of its powers even before the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and its full demise at that time, how much of its power could be transferred to subsequent courts became the subject of considerable discussion.

Sometimes Jewish juridical power was limited because of the lack of political sovereignty; however, internal Jewish political considerations played an even more important role in determining the extent of juridical authority in certain times and places. Despite the destruction of the Second Temple and the demise of the Great Court, there was a strong attempt to retain prime rabbinical authority in the Land of Israel. Thus unqualified rabbinical ordination (*semikhah*), which was seen as an institution originating with Moses himself, was limited to those rabbis who functioned in the Land of Israel. When in the third century Rav (Abba' bar Ayyvu) left Israel for Babylonia, where he led the revival of the Jewish community, he was granted a qualified ordination, with authorization to adjudicate only in certain questions of law (B.T., *San.* 5a). Nevertheless, with the exception of adjudicating in the area of scripturally fixed fines (*qenasot*, B.T., *B.Q.* 84b), as the Babylonian community grew and developed its own institutions, its rabbis began to claim virtually all of the halakhic pre-

rogatives of the rabbinate of the Land of Israel (B.T., *Git.* 88b). Generally, this set the pattern for subsequent rabbinical authority, namely, that the rabbis in every time and place exercised as much halakhic authority as political and religious conditions both allowed and required (Tosefta, *R. ha-Sh.* 1.18). Moreover, it was recognized that in emergency situations the rabbis had the right to override existing laws temporarily (*hora'at sha'ah*), even scriptural ones (B.T., *Yev.* 90b). Finally, it was recognized that the rabbis even had the power to abrogate certain aspects of scriptural laws, although this power was considerably qualified (*ibid.*, 89b).

**Types of rabbinical legislation.** Rabbinical legislation can generally be divided into two classes: decrees (*gezerot*) and enactments (*taqqanot*).

Decrees were justified by the principle traced back to the period of Ezra (sixth century BCE) that "a fence is to be made around the Torah" (*Avot* 1.1). This "fence" consists of prohibitions designed to protect scriptural law from probable transgression. Thus, for example, numerous additional restrictions (*shevut*) were enacted to protect the thirty-nine scriptural prohibitions of Sabbath labor from being carelessly violated, to enhance the overall sanctity of the day, and to guard against behavior that the rabbis saw as inconsistent with the spirit of the law (*Beits.* 5.2). However, to distinguish rabbinical legislation from scriptural law and to prevent an infinite multiplication of strictures, the rabbis emphasized that laws were not to be enacted to protect their laws (B.T., *Beits.* 3a).

Rabbinical enactments were justified by the scriptural prescription that "you not deviate from what the judges will tell you" (*Dt.* 17:11). Although this probably refers to the simple necessity of applying scriptural law, the rabbis saw it as mandating their power to add to it if circumstances warranted doing so. These enactments were of three kinds.

1. Enactments were made to commemorate postbiblical Jewish events. Thus, for example, the recitation of the liturgical formula "Blessed are you, Lord . . . who has commanded us" was justified for the ritual of kindling Hanukkah lights on the grounds that the rabbinical legislation that mandated it is itself prescribed by scripture (B.T., *Shab.* 23a). As the rabbis often put it, "It is a commandment to listen to the words of the sages" (B.T., *Yev.* 20a).

2. Enactments were made to alleviate hardships arising from the widening gap between scriptural law and social and economic realities. Thus, for example, the scriptural law prescribing the cancellation of debts every seventh year (*Dt.* 15:1ff.) proved to be a deterrent to lending money to those who needed it most in a commercial economy, where long-term loans were becom-



ing more and more common. To alleviate this situation, in accordance with the overall purpose of the Torah, that is, to promote social justice and well-being, Hillel the Elder (first century CE) enacted the institution of *prozbul*, whereby a creditor handed over his note to a court. Since the court collected the debt, the lender avoided the prohibition of personally collecting the debt after the Sabbatical year (*Git.* 4.3).

3. Enactments were made to curtail individual rights, the exercise of which was seen as contrary to the common good. Thus, for example, the third-century Babylonian sage 'Ula' ruled that although scripture permitted repayment of a debt with merchandise of any quality (*Dt.* 24:11), the debtor must repay a debt with at least medium-grade merchandise so as not to discourage lending (B.T., *Git.* 50a). This same type of curb on what was perceived to be the antisocial exercise of individual privileges was the basis of the numerous laws enacted in medieval communities (*taqqanot ha-qehillot*). The most famous of these was the ban on polygyny issued for Ashkenazic (northern European) Jewry by Gershom ben Yehudah of Mainz (c. 965–1028) even though both the Bible and the Talmud permit the practice.

**Rabbinic legal procedures.** Rabbinical legislation was conducted according to a number of procedural rules. Although the reason for a specific rabbinical enactment did not have to be immediately publicized (B.T., 'A.Z. 35a), there certainly had to be a clear and compelling religious or social need for it to be enacted. Rabbinical legislation was considered general in scope and was not to be formulated as case law (B.T., 'Eruv. 63b).

The question of how long a rabbinical enactment was considered binding and what power of repeal subsequent rabbis have is a complicated one and is debated by scholars. Thus an important passage in the Mishnah states that "one court may not repeal [*mevaṭel*] the decrees of a fellow court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in numbers" (*Eduy.* 1.5). Some scholars have interpreted this as applying to a contemporary court only. Others have interpreted it as applying to a subsequent court. "Greater in numbers" has been interpreted to mean a greater number of disciples. However, it was highly unusual for a subsequent court to regard itself as wiser than an earlier one. The rabbis generally were too reverent of tradition to attempt to repeal it overtly. The Talmudic statement "If earlier generations were angels, we are but men" (B.T., *Shab.* 112b) reflects this typical attitude. Therefore, repeal usually took the form of more subtle reinterpretation of earlier enactments. However, even when the reason for an enactment was no longer extant, it was still considered binding unless there was a strong reason for reinterpretation.

The question of rejection of a rabbinical enactment by the people was debated in the Middle Ages. The Talmud states that "a decree is not to be made unless the majority of the community are able to abide by it" (B.T., 'A.Z. 36a), and this was interpreted to mean that it had to have been accepted as normative by the majority of the community. (There does not seem to have been, however, any procedure for an actual plebiscite.) Rashi (Rabbi Shelomoh ben Yitṣṣḥaq, 1040–1105) restricts this right to the generation of the enactment itself; that is, if they accept it the enactment is binding irrespective of the possible rejection by subsequent generations. Maimonides, on the other hand, extends the right of rejection even to subsequent generations; that is, if an earlier rabbinical enactment had fallen into disuse, then a subsequent court may regard it as no longer binding (*Mishneh Torah*, Rebels 2.7). Following the same logic, in another ruling Maimonides opts for the ancient Babylonian practice of publicly reading the Torah in the synagogue in an annual cycle over the ancient Palestinian practice of reading it in a triennial cycle, simply because the former practice had acquired universal Jewish acceptance.

**Custom.** *Minhag* ("custom") is the third constituent element in *halakhah*, after scriptural exegesis and rabbinic law. It basically has three functions.

1. Custom is invoked when the law itself is ambiguous. If there are two reputable opinions as to what a law is, then there are two ways of deciding what is to be done. Either the majority view of the sages is followed (B.T., *Hul.* 11a), or the popular practice of the people is consulted and followed (J.T., *Pe'ah* 8.2, 20c). In the latter situation custom does not establish law but distinguishes between which law is considered normative (*halakhah le-ma'aseh*) and which law is considered only theoretical (*ein morin ken*, J.T., *Yev.* 12.1, 12c). Popular acceptance of one practice over another is considered a valid criterion of juridical choice because "if the people of Israel are not prophets, they are the children of prophets" (J.T., *Pes.* 6.1, 33a). In other words, popular practice is indicative of an unbroken chain of tradition.

2. Custom is considered a valid form of law, supplementing scriptural commandments and formal rabbinical legislation. Certain customs are considered universally Jewish. For example, the Orthodox objection to the modern practice of men and women sitting together in non-Orthodox synagogues, although some have attempted to find formal halakhic objections to it, is actually based on the fact that theretofore separation of the sexes in the synagogue was undoubtedly universal Jewish custom. Earlier in the nineteenth century the same invocation of the authority of custom was used to

object to the introduction of the organ into synagogues in western Europe, with the additional point that such a practice constituted "walking in the ways of the gentiles."

Other customs are considered local and binding only on members of a particular locality. Generally, the rule is that if one is in a different locality from one's own, one should do nothing there to cause any scandal or controversy (*Pes.* 4.1). The force of the authority of local custom can be seen, especially, in the diversity of liturgical rites among Jews even to this day. These differences of custom to a large extent reflect differences of local environment and the social, political, and economic conditions within the respective Jewish communities. In new localities, where there are Jews from varying backgrounds, the general approach is to attempt to devise a unified rite so that there not be numerous groups (B.T., *Yev.* 13b). More frequently than not the rites of the more dominant group in the new locality prevail over everyone.

3. Custom sometimes takes precedence over established Jewish practice even when it has no foundation in *halakhah*. Usually this power of custom was used to rescind privileges the *halakhah* had earlier granted (Elon, 1978, pp. 732ff.). However, sometimes custom even had the power to abrogate, *de facto*, scriptural law. For example, the law that certain portions of slaughtered animals be given to descendants of Aaronic priests irrespective of time and place was not considered binding because of customary neglect.

**Extrahalakhic Factors.** The role extrahalakhic factors have played in the development of the *halakhah* is one of considerable debate among scholars. Aside from the question of the influence of history and general philosophy, which could be seen as extraneous modes of thought, there is the question of the influence of the nonlegal body of rabbinic thought, largely theological, known as *aggadah*. Generally it was held that one could not decide the law based on *aggadah* alone. Nevertheless, it can be shown that aggadic factors were influential in formulating halakhic opinions. This becomes evident when the views of the various rabbis, who were both halakhists and aggadists, are examined.

Thus, for example, 'Aqiva', in a discussion of capital punishment, states that had he been a member of the Sanhedrin when capital punishment was practiced, no one would have ever been executed (*Mak.* 1.10). The Talmud attempts to find a legal basis for this opinion inasmuch as capital punishment is prescribed by scripture for a number of crimes. The halakhic conclusion (written long after the time of 'Aqiva') is that he would have interpreted the laws of evidence so strictly as to make conviction for a crime punishable by death a

practical impossibility (B.T., *Mak.* 7a). However, one can find an aggadic statement, recorded in the name of 'Aqiva' himself, that "whoever sheds human blood diminishes the divine image" (Tosefta, *Yev.* 8.7). Since even a convicted criminal has not forfeited that divine image (Tosefta, *San.* 9.7), one can see that 'Aqiva' had theological objections against any sort of bloodshed. It would seem that his theology was the authentic influence on his halakhic opinion, although subsequent legalists had to find a halakhic reason for it lest the authority of the law be reduced to theological opinion, something that was generally avoided (J.T., *Hor.* 3.9, 48c).

One can see further evidence of this in the relation between *halakhah* and Qabbalah (Jewish mystical literature), especially if Qabbalah is taken to be a subsequent development of *aggadah*. On the one hand, despite the growing popularity in the Middle Ages of the *Zohar* (the most important qabbalistic text), there were halakhists who regarded it as nonauthoritative, whether or not they approved of its theology. On the other hand, there were legalists who regarded it as divine revelation and *ipso facto* authoritative. A compromise was reached between these two opinions by David ibn Avi Zimra' (1479–1573), who ruled that when the Talmud was inconclusively divided on a certain law, the *Zohar* could be invoked to decide in favor of one of the Talmudic opinions. However, the *Zohar* could not be so invoked when the Talmud was conclusive.

**Subdivisions of Halakhah.** For descriptive purposes it is helpful to see *halakhah* as divided into the following areas: (1) ritual law, (2) law of familial and personal status, (3) civil law, (4) criminal law, and (5) law pertaining to non-Jews.

**Ritual law.** Although including inoperative laws pertaining to the Temple cult and most matters of ritual purity, ritual law can be seen today as confined to matters of worship, the Sabbath and festivals, diet, clothing, and sex. In the four-part *Shulḥan 'arukh* of Yosef Karo (1488–1575), which has become the most authoritative halakhic code, ritual law is the subject of all of the first part, *Oraḥ ḥayyim*, and most of the second part, *Yoreh de'ah*.

One of the most important principles to emerge in the development of ritual *halakhah* is that in cases where the observance of the law poses a distinct danger to human life, the law is not to be observed. The origins of this seminal principle can be seen as early as the Maccabean revolt against the Seleucid rulers of the Land of Israel (166–164 BCE). In that revolt the pietists refused to fight on the Sabbath. This led to their being frequently massacred on the Sabbath by their enemies, who quickly became aware of this restriction. It was ar-

gued (*I Mc.* 2.39–42) that this insistence on unqualified Sabbath observance would lead to the total extermination of the Jewish people. In the early second century, under similarly oppressive circumstances, the rabbis meeting secretly at Lod ruled that one was to transgress the law rather than die a martyr's death. The only exceptions were if one were ordered on pain of death to practice idolatry overtly, commit murder, or initiate an act of adultery, homosexuality, or bestiality (B.T., *San.* 74a). All of this was based on the scriptural command "You shall live through them" (*Lv.* 18:5), which was interpreted to mean "You shall live through them but not die because of them" (*Sifra*, *Aḥarei-mot*, 86b). This principle, in one form or another, was invoked on numerous occasions and led to such corollaries as "Danger to life takes precedence over a ritual infraction" (B.T., *Hul.* 10a).

**Law of familial and personal status.** The law of familial and personal status is the subject of *Even ha'ezer*, the third part of the *Shulḥan 'arukh*, and of some sections of *Yoreh de'ah*, the second part. In this area of *halakhah* the question that has become the subject of widest discussion and deepest controversy since 1948 is that of who is a Jew.

**Jewish identity.** According to scriptural law it would seem that Jewish identity is patrilineal, as suggested by such statements as "The whole community were registered by the clans of their ancestral houses [*le-veit avotam*; lit., "the houses of their fathers"]" (*Nm.* 1:18; J.T., *Qid.* 64d). Furthermore, when Ruth the Moabite married the Israelite leader Boaz, without specific mention of any formal conversion, her descendants were automatically considered as following her husband's patrimony (*Ru.* 4:21–22). Nevertheless, according to the Talmud Jewish identity is considered matrilineal (B.T., *Qid.* 68b). The origins of this approach can perhaps be seen in the beginnings of the postexilic period (c. 516 BCE), when at the urging of Ezra the people banished not only their non-Jewish wives but also "those born of them" (*Ezr.* 10:3).

Once one is born of a Jewish mother, or he or she has properly converted to Judaism, that status is considered irrevocable (B.T., *San.* 44a, *Yev.* 47b). However, the community can revoke various privileges of Jewish status from apostates and other persons as well who have removed themselves from basic Jewish identification and observance.

**Marriage and divorce.** The subject of the most extensive halakhic structure is marriage and divorce. Marriage originally consisted of two parts. The first part, *erusin* ("betrothal"), was initiated when the man, with the consent of the woman, designated her as his wife before at least two bona fide witnesses, usually by giv-

ing her an article of stipulated value (*Qid.* 1.1). The woman, however, continued to live with her parents; her father now had joint responsibility for her, along with her husband. After a period of time, usually one year, the bride left her parental home and went to live with the groom (*nissu'in*), and the couple consummated the marriage. The status of the woman was greatly enhanced by the marriage contract (*ketubbah*), which provided a considerable payment in the event of her being divorced or widowed (Epstein, 1927).

Divorce required that the husband present his wife with a formal bill of divorce (*get*), drawn up at his instigation by a rabbinical court. Although the school of Shammai made adultery the only grounds for divorce, the *halakhah* followed the more lenient view of the school of Hillel, which made virtually any incompatibility sufficient for divorce to be effected (*Git.* 9.10). Although the woman herself could not instigate divorce proceedings, she could, nevertheless, when there was clearly sufficient incompatibility, request that a rabbinical court force her husband to grant her a divorce (*Ket.* 7.10). Indeed, nonfulfillment of the basic husbandly duties of support and regular sexual intercourse obligated a man to do so (*Ket.* 5.6).

**Civil law.** Jewish civil law regulates all areas of life involving property. It is the subject of the greatest discussion in *Hoshen mishpat*, the fourth part of the *Shulḥan 'arukh*.

Of all the areas of *halakhah*, civil law has been the most flexible. The underlying basis of this flexibility is perhaps best expressed in the rabbinic dictum "The Torah cares about property of Israel" (*Neg.* 12.5). In other words, although there was a consistent commitment to general principles of justice, it was understood that the law, especially in the unstable and diversified area of economics, must be responsive to the needs of the times. This characteristic, it might be added, was limited to the area of civil law, and for this reason one could not apply most of the principles developed there to the more conservative area of ritual law (B.T., *Ber.* 19b).

Although the *halakhah* developed its own standards for various commercial activities, the operative principle is "Everything is according to the practice [*minhag*] of the locality" (*B.M.* 7.1). Thus, even conditions contrary to the law of the Torah, which under all other circumstances are null and void, in monetary matters are considered valid if freely agreed upon by both parties to a contract (B.T., *Qid.* 19b), except where the prohibition of one Jew taking interest from another Jew is involved. However, even here the *halakhah* eventually evolved a procedure (*hetter 'isqa'*) whereby interest could be charged for commercial loans using the legal fiction of

designating the creditor as a partner of the debtor in a joint venture (Elon, 1975, pp. 504–505). Furthermore, flexibility in this area of *halakhah* is evidenced by the fact that in monetary disputes informal arbitration was encouraged in lieu of formal adjudication.

Private property was not considered an absolute right by the *halakhah*. Although there is an elaborate system of adjudicating claims and counterclaims between private parties in such areas as torts and contracts, the court had the power to declare private property ownerless (*hefker*) if this was in the interest of the common good (B.T., *Yev.* 89b). It must be added, however, that this principle was used sparingly, and it seems as though for the *halakhah* a limited free-enterprise system is considered both the norm and the desideratum.

**Criminal law.** Jewish criminal law, also dealt with in *Hoshen mishpat*, is concerned with capital and corporal punishment. Capital punishment is mandated for such interpersonal acts as murder and adultery as well as for such ritual acts as public violation of the Sabbath. Corporal punishment (lashing) is mandated for various ritual infractions (*Mak.* 3.1ff.). Most personal injury, however, was treated as a civil tort rather than as a criminal act per se. Thus the scriptural *lex talionis* ("an eye for an eye," *Ex.* 21:24) was interpreted by the rabbis as prescribing monetary compensation for the victim rather than the actual mutilation of the perpetrator.

Even after the Roman rulers of the Land of Israel had removed the power of the Jewish courts to administer capital punishment, sometime before 70 CE, the rabbis were sharply divided about its desirability. Although the institution itself, because it was scripturally prescribed, could not be explicitly abrogated, a number of rabbis were obviously opposed to it in practice if not in principle (B.T., *San.* 71a). This tendency to oppose capital punishment is also seen in the rabbinic institution of *hatra'ah*, according to which one could not be convicted of a capital crime unless he or she had been explicitly forewarned by the same two witnesses who actually saw the crime and the criminal had explicitly indicated that he or she was aware of both the criminal status of the act to be done and the exact type of capital punishment it entailed (B.T., *San.* 40b–41a). Such an institution would seem to limit sharply the number of legal executions. Whether *hatra'ah* was actually practiced when the Jewish courts had the power of capital punishment is questioned by some modern scholars. Nevertheless, it does reflect a definite tendency in rabbinic theory if not in actual practice.

On the other hand, a number of prominent and influential halakhists expressed the view of the second-century sage Shim'on ben Gamli'el II that capital punish-

ment is necessary to maintain social order (*Mak.* 1.10). Indeed, the Talmud is followed by many subsequent authorities in advocating capital punishment even for crimes not specified as capital crimes in the legal sources if the court believed that "the hour required such" in cases of gross public provocation. In the thirteenth century the important halakhist Shelomoh ben Avraham Adret stated that were all the traditional qualifications of capital punishment in the *halakhah* to be followed, "society would be destroyed." His statement, furthermore, was probably not just theoretical in that it is known that Spanish Jewish communities at that time did have the power to execute criminals (Elon, 1978, p. 9).

The actual practice of Jewish criminal law, and to a large extent Jewish civil law as well, has frequently required the type of political sovereignty that Jews did not have. Thus in the third century the Babylonian authority Shemu'el of Nehardea formulated the seminal juridical principle that "the law of the kingdom is the law" (B.T., *B.B.* 54b). This principle was justified in several ways; the most cogent is that the Jewish court has the power to transfer its authority in civil and criminal matters. Historically this relegated all Jewish criminal law and much Jewish civil law to the realm of the theoretical. Thus some medieval authorities seem to have thought that this principle was too radical in that it gave away too much Jewish legal sovereignty. It is still too early for the most part to see if and how Jewish criminal and civil law can be revived in the state of Israel, which, at the present time at least, is constituted as a secular state not subject to the authority of the *halakhah* except in limited areas (see below).

**Law regarding non-Jews.** The area of Jewish law pertaining to non-Jews has been called "the seven commandments of the sons of Noah" (Tosefta, 'A.Z. 8.4). These commandments are (1) the obligation to adjudicate cases according to defined statutes and the prohibitions of (2) blasphemy, (3) idolatry, (4) homicide, (5) adultery, homosexuality, and bestiality, (6) robbery, and (7) eating a limb torn from a living animal. A number of commentators saw these seven commandments as seven general legal categories rather than seven specific norms.

One of the most important historical questions about this area of *halakhah* is whether or not it was actually enforced among non-Jews. Some scholars consider this highly unlikely inasmuch as no actual case is reported in the rabbinic sources, where these laws were the basis of adjudication, and there do not seem to have been free gentiles living under Jewish legal jurisdiction in the rabbinic period. Indeed, only in Maimonides' *Mishneh*

*Torah* (Code of Law), which deals with every area of *halakhah*, even those no longer (if ever) operative, are the Noahic laws systematically presented and discussed (Kings and Wars 8.10ff.). It is, moreover, important to note that non-Jewish slaves, who were certainly owned by Jews at that time, were subject to a body of law containing many more distinctly Jewish practices and prohibitions than the Noahic laws (B.T., *Hag.* 4a).

Nevertheless, the concept of a law governing non-Jews, which was considered to have been normative for Jews as well before the Sinaitic revelation of the 613 commandments of the Mosaic Torah, had a profound effect on the development of Judaism. In terms of *halakhah* the Noahic laws were considered to be the minimal normative standards upon which the Mosaic Torah was based. Thus the Talmud in more than one place states that "there is nothing prohibited to non-Jews that is permitted to Jews" (B.T., *San.* 59a). In another place it states that Jewish law must be stricter lest it appear as "a lower form of sanctity" (B.T., *Yev.* 22a).

In terms of Jewish-gentile relations the Noahic prohibition of idolatry became the basis of determining which non-Jewish societies were actually idolatrous and which were merely following "ancestral custom" (B.T., *Hul.* 13b). This distinction had great practical importance in that Jewish dealings with confirmed gentile idolators were proscribed in many areas, including in various business transactions ('A.Z. 1.1). In the Middle Ages the Noahic prohibition of idolatry became the standard for determining the Jewish view, both theoretical and practical, of Christianity and Islam. Islamic monotheism was, of course, much easier to justify on Jewish grounds than were Christian incarnationism and trinitarianism. Indeed, a number of medieval halakhists, usually themselves living under Muslim regimes, considered Christianity a form of idolatry entailing all the Talmudic proscriptions pertaining to idolatry and idolators. However, other legalists, usually living under Christian regimes, drew upon earlier Talmudic distinctions between stricter criteria for Jews than for gentiles, especially in areas of religious conviction, and so considered Christianity a mediated monotheism.

In those democratic countries where Jews are full participants, there has been renewed interest in this area of *halakhah* as a source for determining "the Jewish point of view" on various issues of public concern as widely divergent as abortion, capital punishment, and prayer in American public schools. How pertinent, however, many of these sources are to the areas of public concern to which they have been related, without thorough critical historical and philosophical examination and reinterpretation, is itself a source of

great difference of opinion among contemporary Jewish thinkers.

**Current Role of Halakhah.** Although *halakhah* is a system of law governing every aspect of personal and communal life, there is no Jewish community in the world today where *halakhah* is the sole basis of governance. This inherent paradox—namely, a total system of law forced by historical reality to share legal authority with another system of law, if not to be actually subordinate to it—has led to a number of tensions both in the state of Israel and in the Diaspora.

**Halakhah in the state of Israel.** In the state of Israel, *halakhah*, as adjudicated by the rabbinical courts, is recognized as the law governing all aspects of public Jewish religious ritual and all areas of marriage and divorce. (The same privilege is extended to the respective systems of law of the various non-Jewish religious communities there.) This political arrangement has led to a number of areas of tension. Thus many secularist Israeli Jews object to having to submit in questions of personal and familial status to the authority of religious courts, whose very religious justification they do not accept. This conflict has manifested itself in the demand by many secularist Israelis for civil marriage and divorce in the state of Israel, something that *halakhah* rejects as unacceptable for Jews. Even more profound is the fact that there is a conflict between *halakhah* and Israeli law on the most basic question of Jewish identity, that is, who is a Jew. According to *halakhah*, anyone born of a Jewish mother or himself or herself converted to Judaism is considered a Jew. According to the Israeli Law of Return (*Hoq ha-Shevut*), any Jew (with the exception of one convicted of a crime in another country) has the right of Israeli domicile and Israeli citizenship. However, in 1962 in a famous decision the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that Oswald Rufeisen, a Jewish convert to Christianity and a Roman Catholic monk, was not entitled to Israeli citizenship as a Jew because in the popular sense of the term he was not a Jew even though he was one in the technical, halakhic sense. On the other hand, in 1968, in another famous decision, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the wife and children of an Israeli Jew, Binyamin Shalit, were not to be considered Jews for purposes of Israeli citizenship because they had not been converted to Judaism, even though they identified themselves as Israeli Jews in the secular sense of the term. In this case, unlike the earlier one, the court accepted a halakhic definition of who is a Jew.

At the present time, furthermore, there is considerable debate in the state of Israel and the Diaspora about what actually constitutes valid conversion to Judaism. All Orthodox and most Conservative halakhists have re-

jected the conversions performed under Reform auspices because in the great majority of such cases the objective halakhic criteria of conversion—circumcision for males and immersion in a ritual bath (*miqveh*) for both males and females (B.T., *Yev.* 47b)—have not been fulfilled. Even the conversions performed under Conservative auspices, although fulfilling these objective criteria, are also rejected by many Orthodox legalists, who claim that Conservative rabbis lack the requisite commitment to *halakhah* to function as acceptable rabbinical judges. All of this is evidence of the widening division among the branches of contemporary Judaism.

**Halakhah in the Diaspora.** In the Diaspora, where adherence to *halakhah* is a matter of individual choice in practically every country that Judaism may be freely practiced, there is little ability to enforce the communal authority inherent in the halakhic system itself. This has led to a number of vexing problems. For example, the Talmud empowers a rabbinical court to force a man to divorce his wife for a variety of objective reasons that make normal married life impossible. When Jewish communities enjoyed relative internal autonomy, such enforcement could be carried out regularly. However, today, because of the loss of such communal autonomy, such enforcement is impossible, and many Jewish women, although already civilly divorced and no longer living with their former husbands, are still considered married according to *halakhah* and are unable to remarry because of the refusal of their former husbands to comply with the order of a rabbinical court.

This growing problem in societies where mobility and anonymity are facts of life has led to basically three different approaches. Many in the Orthodox community have attempted to resort to legal measures in the civil courts to force compliance with *halakhah*. In addition to a lack of success heretofore, this has raised, especially in the United States, the constitutional issue of governmental interference in private religious matters. On the other hand, the Conservative movement since 1968 has revived the ancient rabbinical privilege of retroactive annulment (B.T., *Git.* 33a) in cases where it is impossible to obtain a Jewish divorce from the husband. The Reform movement, not being bound by the authority of *halakhah*, accepts a civil divorce as sufficient termination of a Jewish marriage. These three widely divergent approaches to a major halakhic problem are further evidence of the growing divisiveness in the Jewish religious community in both the state of Israel and the Diaspora.

**Reconstitution of the Sanhedrin.** The only chance for effecting any halakhic unanimity among the Jewish people would be the reconstitution of the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem as the universal Jewish legislature and su-

preme court. This proposal was actually made by the first minister of religious affairs in the state of Israel, Judah Leib Maimon (1875–1962). However, considering the fact that this reconstitution itself presupposes much of the very unanimity it is to effect, it would seem that it is rather utopian, something the Talmud euphemistically called “messianic *halakhah*” (B.T., *Zev.* 45a).

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The most comprehensive treatment of halakhic institutions in English is *The Principles of Jewish Law*, edited by Menachem Elon (Jerusalem, 1975), although more detailed questions are dealt with in Elon's Hebrew work, *Ha-mishpat ha-'ivri*, 2d ed. (Jerusalem, 1978). Another helpful work, especially regarding Jewish civil law, is Isaac H. Herzog's *The Main Institutions of Jewish Law*, 2 vols., 2d ed. (New York, 1965). Still the best treatment of the history of *halakhah* is Louis Ginzberg's “Law, Codification of” in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York, 1905). Ginzberg's “The Significance of the Halachah for Jewish History,” translated by Arthur Hertzberg in *On Jewish Law and Lore* (Philadelphia, 1955), is a fascinating but controversial treatment of early *halakhah* from a socioeconomic point of view. Another important general treatment is the article “Halakhah” by Louis Jacobs and Bert De Vries in *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Jerusalem, 1971).

The number of good monographs on halakhic topics in English is steadily growing. One can read and consult with profit the following finely researched and written works: Boaz Cohen's *Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study*, 2 vols. (New York, 1966); Louis M. Epstein's *The Jewish Marriage Contract* (1927; reprint, New York, 1973); David M. Feldman's *Birth Control in Jewish Law* (New York, 1968); Solomon B. Freehof's *The Responsa Literature* (Philadelphia, 1955); Aaron Kirschenbaum's *Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law* (New York, 1970); Isaac Klein's *A Guide to Jewish Religious Practice* (New York, 1979); Leo Landman's *Jewish Law in the Diaspora* (Philadelphia, 1968); Samuel Mendelsohn's *The Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews* (Baltimore, 1891); and my own *The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism* (New York, 1983).

The articles in *The Jewish Law Annual*, vols. 1–4, edited by Bernard S. Jackson (Leiden, 1978–1981), generally represent

some of the best critical scholarship on halakhic topics in English today. A good sampling of the current theological debate over the authority and scope of *halakhah* can be found in a symposium in *Judaism* 29 (Winter 1980).

DAVID NOVAK

**HALEVY, JUDAH.** See Yehudah ha-Levi.

**HALL, G. STANLEY** (1844–1924), American psychologist and educator. Granville Stanley Hall was born in western Massachusetts, in a conservative Protestant environment. He was educated at Williams College, at Union Theological Seminary (New York), at several institutions in Germany, and finally at Harvard, where he studied under William James. Hall was a significant figure in the early period of American psychology. He is remembered primarily as an organizer, teacher, and editor, and as the president of Clark University. He founded North America's first formally accepted university psychology laboratory, the continent's first psychology journal, and its first professional organization for psychologists.

Early in his career, Hall was influential in promoting experimental over "philosophical" methods in psychology. He was a key figure in the "child study" movement, which was influential in introducing questionnaire techniques and the direct observation of children into psychology, and which also spurred the development of "progressive" educational methods. With his two-volume work *Adolescence* (1904), Hall gave the psychological concept of adolescence its first formal articulation. He was instrumental in bringing psychoanalysis to American attention by inviting Freud for his only visit to the New World.

Through his own work and, more importantly, through the work of his students E. D. Starbuck and James Leuba, Hall was influential in creating psychology of religion as an empirical discipline. He pioneered the empirical study of individual religious experience by assembling data on the religious experiences of children, and in 1904 he founded *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*. Hall's most important substantive contribution to the psychology of religion was his observation that most conversions occur in adolescence. This observation developed into a characteristic theme in Hall's work: the linking of adolescence, conversion, and the life of Jesus. Hall argued that to complete adolescence successfully, a person must undergo a transformation in which "the older, lower selfish self is molted and a new and higher life of love and service emerges." Religious conversion is the most ef-

fective and "natural" vehicle of this transformation and "the Gospel story is the most adequate and classic, dramatic representation of . . . [this] most critical revolution of life" (*Adolescence*, vol. 2, p. 337).

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JOHN W. NEWMAN

**HALLĀJ, AL-** ("the cotton carder"), al-Ḥusayn ibn Maṣṣūr (AH 244–309/857–922 CE), known among Muslims as "the martyr of mystical love." Although he has been maligned in some circles for his "heretical" teachings and his alleged claim to divinity, his place in the world of Islamic poetry is undisputed: there, the name al-Ḥusayn ibn Maṣṣūr, or simply Maṣṣūr, stands as one of the major symbols of mystical union and of suffering in love.

Born in southern Iran, he spent some of his youth with Sahl al-Tustarī, the mystic to whom Sufism owes the first systematic theory of *nūr Muḥammad* ("the light of Muḥammad"), which forms an important aspect of al-Ḥallāj's later thought. From Basra, al-Ḥallāj proceeded to Baghdad, the center of mystical learning during the late ninth century, and frequented such Ṣūfī masters as al-Junayd. This mystic, a representative of the so-called sober trend in Sufism, had developed the art of speaking in *ishārāt* ("hints"), lest the orthodox take offense at the teachings of mystical *tawḥīd* (unification with God). Al-Ḥallāj married a Ṣūfī's daughter but fell out with other mystics in Basra. Setting out for Mecca on his first pilgrimage, he performed extraordinary ascetic feats, but according to legend, the decisive incident of his life occurred after his return. When he knocked at al-Junayd's door, he was asked who was there; he answered, "Anā al-ḥaqq" ("I am the Creative Truth"). The accuracy of this legend cannot be ascertained, but the phrase "Anā al-ḥaqq" appears in an important context in his *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn*, which he composed toward the end of his life.

After the clash with al-Junayd, or for other reasons, al-Ḥallāj discarded the Ṣūfī gown and wandered through Iran and Khorasan before making his second pilgrimage, along with four hundred disciples. He next set out for India, "to learn magic," according to his ad-

versaries, "to call the people to God," by his own account. From Gujarat he wandered through Sind and the Punjab and reached Turfan, probably via Kashmir. When he returned to Baghdad, he was met with even greater hostility from both the orthodox and the Ṣūfis, and he undertook a third pilgrimage. Apprehended on the road to Sūs, he was exposed on a pillory and finally imprisoned in Baghdad in 913. The protection of the chamberlain Naṣr al-Qashūrī and the friendship of the mother of the infant caliph al-Muqtadir made his life in prison tolerable, and quite a few miracles are recounted for this period. Of his visitors in prison, the last was Ibn Khafif, a young ascetic from Shiraz who noted down some of his sayings and who can therefore be considered the first link in the spiritual chain that leads to Rūzbihān-i Baqlī of Shiraz (d. 1209), the commentator on the *shāḥīyāt* ("theopathic locutions") of al-Ḥallāj and other Ṣūfis.

In March 922, the government succeeded in drawing up a death sentence for al-Ḥallāj and declaring it "lawful to shed his blood." The Persian writer 'Aṭṭār (d. 1221) sums up al-Ḥallāj's end in his *Tadhkirat al-awliyā'* (Biographies of the Saints): "A dervish asked him, 'What is love?' He answered, 'You will see it today and tomorrow and day after tomorrow.' That day they killed him, the next day they burned him, and the third day they gave his ashes to the wind." Al-Ḥallāj went dancing in his chains to the gallows, and his last words were "All that matters for the ecstatic is that the Unique should reduce him to Unity." He died on 26 March 922 (24 Dhū al-Qa'dah 309), and many decades later people in Baghdad were still seen waiting for his return at the banks of the Tigris, on whose waves his ashes had formed the words *anā al-ḥaqq*.

The explanations for al-Ḥallāj's execution are manifold. The Sūfī tradition claims that his death was a punishment for *ifshā' al-sirr* ("divulging the secret"), for it is not permissible that a mortal should speak up and say "I am the Creative Truth, or," as *ḥaqq* was usually translated, "I am God." That is against the law of love, where secrecy is a most important ingredient. One may doubt, however, whether the famous statement "Anā al-ḥaqq" was really the reason for the government's decision; political and practical problems certainly played an important role. The French scholar Louis Massignon has shown how confused the political situation in Baghdad was during those decades; the caliphs were powerless and the viziers, in whose hands the true power lay, changed frequently. Sunnī and Shī'ī allegiances were played out against each other, and fear of the Qarāmiṭah, who threatened the Abbasid empire from their stronghold in Bahrein, made unusual religious claims appear particularly dangerous.

Was it not possible, so the authorities asked, that al-Ḥallāj had been in touch with the Qarāmiṭah, who had just founded a principality in Multan and who ruled northern Sind? Besides, the letters that al-Ḥallāj received from various parts of the Islamic world addressed him with strange-sounding titles, and some of them were beautifully decorated and written in mysterious characters, similar to the Manichaean books from Inner Asia. There is also no doubt that al-Ḥallāj, like his friend the chamberlain Naṣr, was in favor of more equitable taxation; even worse, he had spoken publicly of the *isqāṭ al-farā'id*, the possibility of making substitutions for the personal obligations of fasting or even the pilgrimage. Such ideas were anathema to orthodox Muslims.

It was also told that al-Ḥallāj, preaching in the mosques of Baghdad, would call people to God, to a deeper personal realization of the mysteries of faith, and that he would then implore them to kill him, for thus, he said, he would be rescued from this life and they would receive recompense for killing a heretic. Such eccentric behavior, coupled with extreme asceticism and the punctual performance of religious duties, was difficult for ordinary believers to accept. Furthermore, al-Ḥallāj's burning love of God, which he expressed in short, tender verses, aroused the anger of the Zāhiriyyah, who denied the possibility of real love between humans and God. Thus, almost all factions in the religious circles of Baghdad were against al-Ḥallāj for various reasons, and many regarded him as a crafty man who practiced magic and tried to seduce people, nay, even went so far as to lay claim to divinity.

In later centuries, especially in the folk and high poetry of Persianate countries, al-Ḥallāj was considered the foremost representative of *waḥdat al-wujūd* ("unity of being"), someone who, as Friedrich A. G. Tholuck (1821) said, "with incredible audacity tore away the curtain from pantheism." Massignon, however, has proved that al-Ḥallāj was anything but a pantheist; rather, he represents the *waḥdat al-shuhūd* ("unity of witness"). To understand his attitude it suffices to read his long, touching prayers in which he tries to circumscribe the primordial and eternal God who is forever separated by his *qidam*, his pre-eternal being, from human being, which is created in time.

How can one describe him who is too high to be reached by human eyes and yet is evident everywhere? Al-Ḥallāj's prayer-poems oscillate between the burning longing for the transcendent God who is separated from him by the little human "I" and the consoling experience of this God's presence in the human heart, "flowing between the heart and its sheath as tears flow from the



eyelids." In rare moments of ecstasy, the uncreated divine spirit can enwrap the created human spirit and speak through the human tongue, as God once spoke through a burning bush. Then the mystic feels that "my spirit has mingled with thine like water and wine" or "like amber and musk" (for such claims, al-Ḥallāj was accused of believing in *ḥulūl*, "incarnation"). The painful feeling of duality is wiped out, and God attests his unity through the tongue of the lover, for, as Abū Bakr al-Kharrāz (d. 890/9) had stated, "No one has the right to say 'I' but God." In such moments the saint becomes the living witness of God (*huwa huwa*, "he is He"), and he can exclaim "Anā al-ḥaqq" as the true witness of God's unity because God has taken away from him everything, including his "I."

Al-Ḥallāj tried to awaken the sense of personal relationship between the believer and God, and his whole life was devoted to the realization of the deepest truth of *islām*, complete surrender to the one God. The numerous anecdotes collected in the *Akḥbār al-Ḥallāj* reveal this feeling (with some embarrassing details), and his poetry, though sometimes using mystical letter symbolism, is pure and completely devoid of sensuality. Some of his verses, such as his *qaṣīdah* "Uqtulūnī,"

Kill me, O my trustworthy friends,  
for in my being killed is my life . . .

have been quoted by later authors time and again (by Rūmī, for example). Only a few fragments of al-Ḥallāj's interpretation of the Qur'ān are preserved, among them the statement that seems to sum up the secret of his life: "Happiness comes from God, but affliction is he himself." There are also his *riwāyāt*, the *ḥadīth* whose contents are perfectly orthodox but whose chains of transmission go not through human transmitters but through mythical and heavenly creatures.

The only book by al-Ḥallāj that has been preserved in full is his *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn* (alluding to *ṭā* and *sīn*, the mysterious letters at the beginning of surah 27 of the Qur'ān). In this small treatise, probably written while he was in prison, al-Ḥallāj introduces into Sufism the parable of the moth and candle: the moth that sees the light, feels the heat, and finally immolates itself in the flame, never to return to its peers, is the model for the lover who has found "the reality of Reality." This image was to become a favorite with Persianate poets and reached Europe through translations around 1800; Goethe used it in his famous poem "Selige Sehnsucht" in *West-östlicher Divan* (1819) to express the mystery of "dying before one dies."

The *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn* also contains one of the finest early descriptions of the Prophet, who is celebrated in exquisite rhyming prose as light from the divine light

and source of the lights of the prophets. But there is also the embarrassing chapter in which al-Ḥallāj confronts himself with Pharaoh and Iblīs and claims that he will not recant from his "Anā al-ḥaqq" any more than Pharaoh will recant from his statement "I am your highest Lord" (surah 79:24) or Satan from his remark vis-à-vis Adam that "I am better than he" (surah 7:11). Small wonder that such sentences shocked the Muslims of Baghdad and that more than once it was asked what, then, was the difference between the "I" of al-Ḥallāj and that of Pharaoh. Rūmī answered in his *Mathnavī* that "Pharaoh saw only himself while al-Ḥallāj saw only God—hence his claim was a sign of grace while Pharaoh's claim turned into a curse."

Al-Ḥallāj's Satanology has deeply impressed one trend in later Sufism (including Aḥmad al-Ghazālī, Sarmad, and Shāh 'Abd al-Laṭīf, among others). He sees Iblīs caught between the divine order to fall down before the newly created Adam and the divine will that nothing besides God himself should be worshiped. Iblīs prefers to obey the divine will and to prove himself as the true monotheist who looks only at God, as a faithful lover who happily wears the garment of curse that is given him as a result of his obstinacy, although he avers, according to al-Ḥallāj, "Juḥūdī laka taqdis" ("My rebellion means to declare thee holy").

It has been said that al-Ḥallāj tried to live in accordance with the Qur'anic description of Jesus, and his use of such Christian theological terms as *nāsūt* ("humanity") and *lāhūt* ("divinity") in speaking of God has led several scholars in East and West to believe that he was a crypto-Christian. His death on the gallows, as on the cross, would fit well into this picture.

Ṣūfīs of the following generations often quoted the sayings of al-Ḥallāj without identifying him, but, on a larger scale, his true revival began in the twelfth century. Rūzbihān-i Baqlī continued the tradition that must have been alive in Shiraz thanks to Ibn Khafīf, and in northeastern Iran, 'Aṭṭār was initiated into Sufism by the spirit of al-Ḥallāj. 'Aṭṭār devoted the most moving chapter of his *Tadhkirat al-awliyā'* to the martyr-mystic and succeeded in conveying to his readers al-Ḥallāj's daring love and willingness to suffer. This chapter became the source for virtually all later descriptions of al-Ḥallāj's life and death in the Persianate world, be it in Persian verse, Sindhi drama, or Turkish poetry. The great mystical poets quoted him, although Rūmī held that his master, Shams al-Dīn, was much superior to al-Ḥallāj, who, he said, was only a lover, not a beloved. The sober Ṣūfī orders likewise remained critical of him; they accused him of not having reached true annihilation, for "the water makes noise only so long as it does not yet boil," and they pointed out that the ves-

sel of his spirit was too shallow to keep the contents of love as it behooves.

But wherever the dangerous power of love is described, the name *Manṣūr* appears. Interestingly, it is most prominent in the folk poetry of Sind and the areas through which al-Ḥallāj wandered shortly after 900 (even in the *Ismā'īlī* verses called *gināns*). There, the bards sing how "the gallows became his bridal bed" and praise him as the one who drank and dispensed intoxicating spiritual wine, the wine of unity. In the Turkish tradition, his name is particularly connected with the Bektashī order of Ṣūfīs, whose initiation takes place at the *dār-i Manṣūr* ("Manṣūr's gallows"), for the novice has to die within himself before being revived in the order. Popular Arabic tradition invokes *Manṣūr's* name less frequently than does Persianate mystical poetry, but everywhere he was used as a model of "pantheistic" Sufism—hence the aversion of the orthodox (headed by Ibn Taymiyah) to him.

It was thanks to Massignon's lifelong studies that a new approach to al-Ḥallāj's personality developed in the Islamic countries as well as in the West. The Indian thinker Muhammad Iqbal, the first to rediscover al-Ḥallāj's "dynamic" teachings, praised him in his *Jāvid-nāmah* (1932) as a kind of forerunner of himself, "who brought resurrection to the spiritually dead." After World War II, al-Ḥallāj became more prominent among the Arabs. Classified as an "Islamic Kierkegaard" by 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, he figures in the works of progressive Arab writers as an important symbol of freedom and struggle against the establishment. In a drama devoted to him, *Ma'sāt al-Ḥallāj* (1964) by Ṣalāḥ 'Abd al-Ṣabūr, his social engagement is emphasized, and in the verse of Adonīs and al-Bayātī he appears in surrealistic, paradoxical forms. In the Indian subcontinent, his name and numerous allusions to gallows and rope have been used to point to those who fought for freedom from colonial powers or against unjust governments. In Iran, the name Ḥusayn ibn *Manṣūr* is uttered along with that of Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, the Prophet's grandson, in Shī'ī Muḥarram processions.

Thus, al-Ḥallāj, "who left the pulpit and spoke out his heart's secret on the gallows," is still very much alive. Even though much of his subtle theology is not properly understood by the general populace, his joy in suffering for love of God has made him a favorite symbol for those who believe in personal piety rather than dry legalism and for those who are willing to suffer for their ideals, be they political or religious.

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ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL

**HALLOWEEN**, or Allhallows Eve, is a festival celebrated on 31 October, the evening prior to the Christian Feast of All Saints (All Saints' Day). Halloween is the name for the eve of Samhain, a celebration marking the beginning of winter as well as the first day of the New Year within the ancient Celtic culture of the British Isles. The time of Samhain consisted of the eve of the feast and the day itself (31 October and 1 November). This event was a crucial seam in the social and religious fabric of the Celtic year, and the eve of Samhain set the tone for the annual celebration as a threatening, fantastic, mysterious rite of passage to a new year.

The religious beliefs of the Celts emphasized pastoral deities, and Celtic festivals stressed seasonal transitions. Beltene, the beginning of summer, was celebrated at the end of April and the beginning of May. Samhain signaled the commencement of winter and, together with Beltene, divided the year into cold and hot seasons. Samhain marked the end of preparations for winter, when flocks and herds had been secured and harvested crops had been stored.

The eve of this festival brought with it another kind of harvest. On this occasion, it was believed that a gathering of supernatural forces occurred as during no other period of the year. The eve and day of Samhain were characterized as a time when the barriers between the

human and supernatural worlds were broken. Otherworldly entities, such as the souls of the dead, were able to visit earthly inhabitants, and humans could take the opportunity to penetrate the domains of the gods and supernatural creatures. Fiery tributes and sacrifices of animals, crops, and possibly human beings were made to appease supernatural powers who controlled the fertility of the land. Not a festival honoring any particular Celtic deity, Samhain acknowledged the entire spectrum of nonhuman forces that roamed the earth during that period.

Given the upheaval of normal human activities and expectations on the eve and day of Samhain, it was also thought to be an especially propitious time for ascertaining information about the future course of one's life. Various methods of divination were used by individuals attempting to discover their fortunes, good or ill, and to foretell events such as marriage, sickness, or death.

Samhain remained a popular festival among the Celtic people throughout the christianization of Great Britain. The British church attempted to divert this interest in pagan customs by adding a Christian celebration to the calendar on the same date as Samhain. The Christian festival, the Feast of All Saints, commemorates the known and unknown saints of the Christian religion just as Samhain had acknowledged and paid tribute to the Celtic deities. The eve of the Celtic festival was also christianized, becoming the Vigil of All Saints or Allhallows Eve (with special offices existing in both the Anglican and Roman churches). The medieval British commemoration of All Saints' Day may have prompted the universal celebration of this feast throughout the Christian church.

The customs of Samhain survived independently of the Christian holy day. Gradually, the eve of Allhallows (Halloween) lost much of its Celtic religious significance for the masses, and it became a secular observance, although many traditionally Celtic ideas continued to be associated with the evening. Divination activities remained a popular practice. Adults, dressed in fantastic disguises and masks, imitated supernatural beings and visited homes where occupants would offer tributes of food and drink to them. A fear of nocturnal creatures, such as bats and owls, persisted, since these animals were believed to communicate with the spirits of the dead.

Halloween was celebrated only in the Celtic areas of Great Britain: Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and northern rural England. In non-Celtic England, many of the customs of Halloween were assimilated into a commemorative festival that arose in the seventeenth century as the celebration of Guy Fawkes Day (5 November). Eng-

lish Protestant settlers in the New World did not bring the custom of Halloween with them. Irish and Scottish immigrants introduced scattered Allhallows Eve observances to America, but it was only in the years after the massive immigration of the Irish to the United States during the potato famine (1845–1846) that Halloween became a national event.

Modern Halloween activities have centered on mischief making and masquerading in costumes, often resembling otherworldly characters. Folk customs, now treated as games (such as bobbing for apples), have continued from the various divination practices of the ancient celebrants of this occasion. Supernatural figures (such as the ghost, the witch, the vampire, the devil) play a key role in supplying an aura of the mysterious to the evening, whether or not they originally had an association with the festival. Children are particularly susceptible to the imagery of Halloween, as can be seen in their fascination with the demonic likeness of a carved and illuminated pumpkin, known as the jack-o'-lantern. In recent times, children have taken up the practice of dressing in Halloween costumes and visiting homes in search of edible and monetary treats, lightly threatening to play a trick on the owner if a treat is not produced. There also has been renewed interest in Halloween as a time when adults can also cross cultural boundaries and shed their identities by indulging in an uninhibited evening of frivolity. Thus, the basic Celtic quality of the festival as an evening of annual escape from normal realities and expectations has remained into the twentieth century.

[See also Celtic Religion.]

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LEONARD NORMAN PRIMIANO

**HALLUCINOGENS.** See Psychedelic Drugs.

**HALO.** See Nimbus.

**ḤANĀBILAH** (sg., Ḥanbalī) is the name used to denote the followers of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, just as the names Shāfi'iyah, Mālikīyah, and Ḥanafīyah are used to denote the followers of al-Shāfi'ī, Mālik, and Abū Ḥanīfah, respectively. Of these four groups, the Ḥanābilah has been considered anomalous, and rightly so, although not for the reasons usually given. Western writers have reiterated that this group was the smallest of the four; that it fought against the theology of *kalām*, which is quite true; that it fought against Sufism, which is definitely false. It is clear that the Ḥanābilah fought against philosophical theology (*kalām*) and philosophical Sufism (monism, incarnationism), but certainly not against theology in its juridical form, nor against Sufism in its traditionalist, ascetic form. Some writers have described the Ḥanābilah as conservative; others, echoing the biased sources they use, have resorted to a wide range of pejorative epithets: fanatical, inflexible, anthropomorphic, obstructionist, intolerant, insignificant, and the like.

#### Emergence of the Madhhab

The Ḥanābilah, like the Ḥanafīyah, Mālikīyah, and Shāfi'iyah, maintained schools in which it taught law as the principal subject. Nonetheless, the group called Ḥanābilah cannot be understood in its historical genesis and development as merely a "school of law," as it has been characterized heretofore. In modern Arabic, the term for "school of law" would be expressed by a literal equivalent of the English, something like *madrasat al-fiqh*. The classical Arabic term is *madhhab*, which means "a way of going," "direction," and, technically, "thesis" or "opinion." Each *madhhab* of law had institutions of learning—colleges of law—exclusively for its own members. This institution was at first the noncongregational mosque, or *masjid*, and later the *madrasah*, a term that in modern Arabic means "school." The *madhhab* itself was not a school; it was a guild in whose name schools were maintained.

"**Personal Schools.**" The emergence of these guilds of jurisconsults dates from around the middle of the ninth century. Before that time, the jurisconsults were grouped geographically, as, for instance, the Iraqis, the Medinese, the Kufans, the Basrans, and the Syrians. The groups that came to be identified by the names of persons after the mid-ninth century have been referred to as "personal schools," to distinguish them from the earlier "geographical schools." The natural tendency has been to associate their chronological emergence with the dates of their eponyms: Abū Ḥanīfah (699–767),

Mālik (707–795), al-Shāfi'ī (767–820), and Ibn Ḥanbal (780–855).

The historical reality was somewhat different; in fact, it may well have followed the exact reverse of this order. The "personal schools," according to Joseph Schacht, were so designated "soon after the time of Shāfi'ī," beginning with the Shāfi'ī *madhhab*. Henri Laoust placed the constitution of the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* "during the period from the Sunni reactionary movement of [Caliph] al-Mutawakkil (232–47/847–61) to the advent of the Buyids in 334/945." There is, of course, no way to determine the precise date of the emergence of a *madhhab* of law, or that of its extinction: the *madhhab*, though a guild, was neither founded nor dissolved by a formal act; its colleges of law were founded by such a formal act, the *waqf*, as charitable trusts, but not the *madhhab*. Its disappearance could, however, be determined through the disappearance of its representatives in a given locality—when the biographer of a jurisconsult of a given *madhhab* declares that the biographee was the last member of that *madhhab* in his locality—but the date of death would indicate the date of the *madhhab's* extinction in that locality, not the date of the loss of its effectiveness, which no doubt had already taken place.

A *madhhab* came into existence because its members had interests to protect and to advance. What could these common interests have been for the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*? It was, like the three other surviving Sunnī *madhhabs*, a *madhhab* of law; as such it simply served the purpose of bringing together its member-jurisconsults. Consensus, *ijmā'*, was constituted on the basis of the legal opinions of the jurisconsults. But a legal opinion was issued by an individual jurisconsult, not by a "school" of jurisconsults, or even by a committee. Similarly, the practice of *ijtihād*—consulting the sources of the law to arrive at a solution for a legal question—was carried out by a single jurisconsult acting as an independent free agent.

**Religious Issues: Traditionalism vs. Rationalism.** The *madhhabs* were guilds of law, but their genesis was due to reasons of religious philosophy. They issued from, and represented, the traditionalist movement, in opposition to the movement of rationalism in Islam. Were it not for this antagonism, the *madhhabs* of law might not have emerged as they did. Their traditionalism is indicated by their emulation of the Prophet. The founding members of the *madhhab* chose a great imam as their eponym and referred to themselves as his companions, in emulation of the greatest imam, the Prophet, and his companions.

The supreme struggle between traditionalists and rationalists came about in the Inquisition (*miḥnah*) of the

ninth century. It hinged on the question of whether the Qur'ān was the created or uncreated word of God. The inquisitors belonged to the rationalist theological movement of the Mu'tazilah. The Mu'tazilī thesis was that the Qur'ān is the created word of God; to say that it is his uncreated word would make it coeternal with God, a violation of God's unicity (*tawḥīd*) and hence of the very monotheistic character of Islam itself. The traditionalist thesis was that God's word is eternal. His *fiat* ("kun!") could not itself be created, since it is by this, his word, that God creates; a created thing could not bring other things into existence. [See Mu'tazilah.]

When the end of the Inquisition in 848 brought an end to the Mu'tazilah as a political force, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, flogged severely and imprisoned for refusing to adopt the Mu'tazilī thesis, emerged as the charismatic hero of Islam. The struggle that Ibn Ḥanbal undertook and carried to its termination had already been started by al-Shāfi'ī, a longtime foe of the Mu'tazilah whose life's work was dedicated chiefly to supporting the traditionalist movement. Al-Shāfi'ī did not live to see the end of the Mu'tazilī menace. The period following his death was witness to the apex of the Mu'tazilah's political power. But by the time of Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855), who followed in his traditionalist footsteps, the formidable foe met its decisive downfall.

The Inquisition cleared the way for the rise of the *madhhabs*, which began to flourish, organizing the traditionalist movement. Many such guilds of law were founded; many disappeared from the scene, their membership absorbed by other guilds. In the eleventh century their number crystallized into the four *madhhabs* surviving today.

In a period of two centuries (mid-ninth to mid-eleventh), the mainstream of Muslim history moved relentlessly in the direction of traditionalism, engulfing all obstructions set up against it. The landmarks of this mainstream are unmistakable.

1. *Al-Shāfi'ī's Risālah* (before 813/4). From elements for the most part already at hand, al-Shāfi'ī forged a new science, a juridical theology, namely a study of God's law, with which he meant to replace *kalām*, a study of God himself. Juridical theology studies God's commands and prohibitions, not whether God is, or what he is. It deals with the fundamentals of obedience to God (religion), not just idle words (*kalām*) about God himself, which may well lead to perdition.

2. *The Inquisition* (833–848). The Inquisition ended with the decisive political demise of its masters and the victory of its victims.

3. *The Professions of Faith* ('*aqā'id*; sg., '*aqīdah*). The period following the Inquisition brought in a rich harvest of creeds by members of the traditionalist move-

ment, headed by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, six of whose creeds have survived. He apparently took his lead from al-Shāfi'ī, one of whose creeds has come down to us. Among subsequent creeds, two are of particular significance, belonging as they do to the fundamental teachings of traditionalism: one by the great mystic al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), the other by al-Ash'arī (d. 936?).

4. *The Retraction of Ibn Shannabūdh* (935). Ibn Shannabūdh abjured his Qur'anic variant readings as aberrant and unlawful. His retraction emphasized the sacred character of the Qur'ān in the Vulgate of the caliph 'Uthmān, and pointed to the success of the traditionalist thesis vindicated by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal during the Inquisition.

5. *The Defection of al-Ash'arī*. Forsaking the teachings of Mu'tazilī rationalism, al-Ash'arī rallied to the doctrines of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and placed himself squarely under the Ḥanbalī banner.

6. *The Qādirī Creed* (first third of the eleventh century). Proclamations of the caliph al-Qādir in 1017, 1018, and 1029 culminated in a profession of faith bearing the name of the caliph, Al-i'tiqād al-Qādirī, read by order of the caliph in 1040/1. Its contents, steeped in traditionalism, are directed chiefly against the Mu'tazilah, the Ash'ariyah, and the Shī'ah. In contrast with Ma'mūn's inauguration of the Inquisition, the Qādirī creed, formulated two centuries later, dramatizes the distance traveled by traditionalism and proclaims its triumph in very clear terms.

7. *The Organization of Knowledge*. The success of traditionalism is clearly manifested in the development of the institutions of learning following the failure of the Inquisition. By the middle of the eleventh century, the rationalist institutions (*dār al-'ilm* and others), essentially libraries where books on the "foreign sciences," such as Greek philosophy, were available for reading and discussion, had disappeared from the scene. Libraries became annexed to the *madrasahs*, where books on the "foreign sciences" could be read privately but never formed part of the regular curriculum.

All "personal schools" of law emerged from the traditionalist movement of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* (literally, "people of the *ḥadīth*," traditionalists). The transition from "geographical" to "personal" *madhhabs* came in response to the threat of the philosophical theologians, who had succeeded in gaining the support of the central power. The task of the traditionalists was not merely to counterbalance the force of their opponents but to tilt the scales in their own favor.

**Economic Issues: The Waqf.** To this religious weapon the traditionalists added an economic one: the charitable trust (*waqf*). As lawyers they were both the interpreters and the guardians of its law. A basic principle

of its law was that nothing could be based on *waqf* that would be inimical to the tenets of Islam. Through their legal opinions they determined what was, and what was not, inimical. Furthermore, *waqfs* were founded by Muslim individuals, with individually owned private property. When caliphs, sultans, emirs, viziers, or any other official or functionary instituted *waqfs*, they did so as private Muslim individuals. There was no provision in the law for "official" *waqfs*. The object of *waqf* was charitable, immediately or eventually, and the founder's chief motive was *qurbah*, to draw near to God, through good works endowed in perpetuity. [See *Waqf*.]

All institutionalized learning in Islam was funded through such religious foundations. The lawyers designated as inimical to Islamic beliefs Greek philosophy, the foreign sciences, and *kalām*-theology, which, they felt, was tainted with philosophy. The *kalām*-theologians were thus excluded as such from the curriculum of the *madrāsah* and cognate institutions; eventually, the *dār al-ilm* and its cognates, libraries that were meeting places of the rationalists, ceased to exist.

The exclusionary rule of *waqf* left out the philosophers and philosophical theologians. No longer in a position to beat the traditionalists, they joined them by infiltrating the juridical *madhhabs* as jurisconsults. The Mu'tazilī theologians found a home in the Ḥanafī *madhhab*, and later the Ash'ariyah found theirs in the Shāfi'ī *madhhab* (there were some rare instances where a Mu'tazilī theologian was a Shāfi'ī jurisconsult and an Ash'arī theologian, a Ḥanafī jurisconsult). One's Sunnī orthodox identity was determined by his membership in one of the Sunnī *madhhabs*. The *madhhabs* accepted one another; transfers from one to any other was unrestricted at any point in a member's lifetime.

**Misconceptions concerning the Ḥanābilah.** One particular misconception concerning the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* was its relatively reduced representation in the Islamic world when compared with the other *madhhabs*. This fact kept cropping up in the early studies on the Ḥanābilah, and its repeated mention is indicative of the scholars' perplexity when they were confronted with what appears to be the disproportionate attention this *madhhab* received from the annalistic sources in descriptions of riots. The explanation lies in its makeup in comparison with the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī *madhhabs*. (The Mālikī *madhhab* had a sparse membership in tenth-century Baghdad, and its last representative there left for points west in the eleventh century.) The Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī *madhhabs*, as already mentioned, were infiltrated by the Mu'tazilah and Ash'ariyah, respectively. This situation gave each of these two *madhhabs* an internal structure made up of two antagonistic groups,

fundamentally opposed to each other on the theological level: one group belonging to the *ahl al-ḥadīth* (traditionalists) from which it issued, and the other belonging to the *ahl al-kalām* (rationalists). In Baghdad, there remained only one Sunnī *madhhab* representative of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* alone, free of infiltration by either group of *ahl al-kalām*: the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*.

Another factor to be considered is the reluctance of the religious intellectual to attack a fellow intellectual belonging to the same *madhhab*. This inhibition, from which a Ḥanafī or Shāfi'ī jurisconsult might suffer vis-à-vis a fellow jurisconsult of the same *madhhab* who happened to be also a philosophical theologian, did not afflict the Ḥanbalī jurisconsult. He felt free to fight not only any signs of rationalistic tendencies within his own *madhhab*, but also any and all groups hostile to the *ahl al-ḥadīth*. The Ḥanābilah fought as members of the *ahl al-ḥadīth*. Though their numbers were relatively small as members of the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*, they represented the overwhelming majority of Sunnī Islam as members of the traditionalist movement. Many a Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī traditionalist passed undetected in the ranks of the *ahl al-ḥadīth*. A perusal of the biographical dictionaries of Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī jurisconsults would show the preponderance of traditionalist jurisconsults in their ranks, as compared with philosophical theologians.

The annalists, referring to struggles between antagonistic socioreligious groups, are apt to throw the historian off track by the way they identify the groups. The terms used may well hide their true identity. *Ḥanafī* may be used for *Mu'tazilī*, and *Shāfi'ī* for *Ash'arī*, while *Ḥanbalī* remains a constant. This is why the Ḥanābilah must be seen in the light of their membership in the traditionalist movement, which encompassed all four *madhhabs*. In this movement, the Ḥanābilah played the role of spearhead. Because of the uniform structure of their *madhhab*, they were the group most frequently mentioned in the annals. It was easy to arrive at the conclusion that of all the groups they were the most contentious, considering the relatively small size of their *madhhab*. In reality they were but a fraction of the traditionalist movement, the mere tip of the iceberg.

Other misconceptions regarding the Ḥanbalī school that have developed in Islamic studies over the years arise from the uncritical use of sources hostile to the Ḥanābilah and from the neglect of sources that could have been used to provide some control and a more balanced account. The following misconceptions are perhaps those that die the hardest.

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal is often represented as a disciple of al-Shāfi'ī, a notion that can be construed to give two opposing views of their relationship. One—which would

be true—is that there was a kinship of spirit between the two great imams. The other—which would be false—is that Aḥmad must have had a falling-out with al-Shāfi‘ī and that he must have rejected the Shāfi‘ī school in order to found one of his own. Both imams belonged to the traditionalist *ahl al-ḥadīth* movement from which all the *madhhabs* emerged. Aḥmad and al-Shāfi‘ī were the “patron saints” of two traditionalist *madhhab* guilds whose chief concern was not only to raise the prophetic traditions to the level of sacred scripture—in this, al-Shāfi‘ī led the way, and Aḥmad followed in his footsteps—but also to fight for the primacy of faith and thus put a stop to the spread of rationalism.

The Ḥanbalī outlook is often regarded as basically legalistic and therefore incompatible with the interior life of Ṣūfī mysticism. The hostile attitude of Ibn Ḥanbal and his followers, particularly Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymīyah, seemingly gives credence to such a view. But such hostility, when it existed, was directed toward certain Ṣūfis and certain Ṣūfī practices. At no time has the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*, or the followers just mentioned, condemned Sufism as such, or all adepts of Sufism. The reason for this is clear and rather simple. Sufism, like the Ḥanābilah, issued from the *ahl al-ḥadīth* movement, and the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* boasted of many Ṣūfis. Close to a third of the notices in Ibn Rajab’s biographical work on the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* are devoted to Ṣūfis. Among the great Ḥanbalī Ṣūfis are Ibn Sam‘ūn (d. 997), al-Ḥarawī al-Anṣārī (d. 1088), and ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 1166), head of the first Ṣūfī order in Islam that has come down to our day, which included among its members Ibn Taymīyah, a so-called enemy of Sufism. What the Ḥanābilah did indeed condemn in Sufism were Ṣūfis steeped in pantheism (*ittiḥādīyah*) or incarnationism (*ḥulūlīyah*).

Members of the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* have been criticized as rigidly opposed to reason, as partisans of a literalist interpretation of the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth*, professing the most rigidly dogmatic doctrines in comparison with the other *madhhabs*, as steeped in obscurantism and crass anthropomorphism, as fanatical and intolerant. These judgments by Western Orientalists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are in great measure attributable to the paucity of printed sources available at the time and to the one-sidedness of these sources, hostile to the Ḥanābilah and utilized without testing the authors’ bias.

### Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, like al-Shāfi‘ī before him, was of pure Arab stock, and like al-Shāfi‘ī, whom he greatly admired, he gave a preponderant place to the *sunnah* of

the Prophet as sacred scripture alongside the book of God, the Qur’ān. His teachings form the doctrinal basis of the *madhhab* that bears his name.

**Life.** Born in Baghdad in December 780, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal died there in July 855. A biographer says of him: “He left Merv in his mother’s womb, was born in Baghdad, grew up there, and died there.” He was known as “the imam of Baghdad.” Profoundly interested in the study of *ḥadīth*, he began to devote himself to it at the age of fifteen and made his way throughout the lands of the eastern caliphate in search of its authoritative transmitters. He traveled in Iraq (Kufa, and especially Basra), the Hejaz, Yemen, and Syria, the regions of the so-called geographical schools of law. Between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-four he made the pilgrimage to Mecca five times, along with two pious retreats in Medina.

Though a great admirer of al-Shāfi‘ī, and one who was ready to lay down his life for the same religious ideals, Ibn Ḥanbal cannot be considered simply as the disciple of the great imam. He studied under a great number of *ḥadīth* experts of this day, and many transmitted *ḥadīths* on his authority, among them the authors of the “six books” of *ḥadīth*: al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and Abū Dāwūd directly; al-Tirmidhī, al-Nasā‘ī, and Ibn Mājah indirectly, through his disciples. Al-Shāfi‘ī himself is said to have transmitted on Ibn Ḥanbal’s authority. Ibn al-Jawzī, in his biography of Ibn Ḥanbal, gives the names of his teachers of law: Hushaym ibn Bashīr (d. 799), a disciple of Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī, and after Hushaym’s death, Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynah (d. 814). Among Ibn Ḥanbal’s other important teachers was ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Mahdī (d. 814), in answer to whose request al-Shāfi‘ī had written his famous *Epistle*.

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal’s persistent passive resistance to the Inquisition earned him the undying respect and admiration of the following generations down to this day. His funeral, the scene of genuine popular emotion, was followed by a procession that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. His tomb became one of the most visited places of pilgrimage. Poets hailed him as the hero (*fatā*) of Islam. The scars he carried to his grave were the badges of his bravery.

**Works.** Among Aḥmad’s works are the *Radd ‘alā al-jahmīyah wa-al-zanādiqah*, *Kitāb al-sunnah*, and *Kitāb al-masā’il*, which present answers to questions addressed to him on dogmatics, law, and ethics, and the *Kitāb al-ṣalāt*, on ritual prayer and its performance. The *Kitāb al-wara’*, on asceticism, is quoted extensively by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī in his *Qūt al-qulūb* (Sustenance of the Souls), and again by al-Ghazālī, whose *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn* (Revivification of the Religious Sciences) is based on al-Makkī’s work.

By far the most celebrated work of Ibn Ḥanbal is his *Musnad*, a title that designates a collection of *ḥadīths* resting on the authority of the persons by whom they have been transmitted, traced back to the Prophet himself and arranged under the names of the first guarantor of the *ḥadīths*. This arrangement is distinguished from the one followed by the generation after that of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and referred to as the *Ṣaḥīḥs*, or collections of "sound" *ḥadīths*. It has often been said that these books constitute a codification of *ḥadīths* in Islam, and since the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal is not included among the "six books," the implication is that its contents were not reliable. In contrast, the two *ṣaḥīḥs* of al-Bukhārī and Muslim were seen as the most important works on *ḥadīth* and the most "sound." This interpretation is misleading.

In fact, legal studies were in the process of development in the newly founded colleges of law that were flourishing at the time. Because of the recent achievements of al-Shāfi'ī and Ibn Ḥanbal, institutionalized education had taken on a strong traditionalist orientation, and law, based heavily on the study of *ḥadīth*, had become the queen of the Islamic sciences. To make the collections of *ḥadīths* more easily studied for their legal content, the order was changed to accommodate students of law. Instead of arranging *ḥadīths* according to their chains of transmitters (*isnād*, whence the term *musnad*), they were chosen for their legal content and arranged according to the chapters of books on law. The new collections were referred to as "sound" (*ṣaḥīḥ*), not in the sense that former collections were less so, but rather to emphasize that the new collections were also sound, in spite of their innovative arrangement according to subject, rather than according to their authoritative transmitters.

Great *musnad* collections date after as well as before the so-called Six Books, and they specialize in one or more transmitters or groups of transmitters. Aḥmad's *Musnad* is a collection of several *musnads* including those of the first four "Rightly Guided" (Rāshidūn) caliphs, the principal companions of the Prophet, the Anṣār, the Meccans, the Medinese, the Kufans, the Basrans, and the Syrians.

**Followers of Ibn Ḥanbal.** Aḥmad left two sons, who were half brothers: Ṣāliḥ (818–880), *qāḍī* ("judge") of Isfahan and a transmitter of his father's legal opinions; and 'Abd Allāh (828–903), a transmitter of most of his father's works. In addition to the sons, a number of disciples carried on the transmission of Aḥmad's legal thought contained in his *masā'il*, including: (1) al-Kawsaj, a native of Merv who settled in Nishapur and died there in 865; he was a source for al-Bukhārī, al-Tirmidhī, and Ishāq ibn Rāhawayh; (2) al-Athram (d. 874 or

875), who arranged what he collected of the *masā'il* according to the chapters of law books; (3) Ḥanbal ibn Ishāq (d. 886), Aḥmad's first cousin; (4) al-Maymūnī (d. 887), of Raqqah, a disciple of Aḥmad from 820 to 842 (al-Mardāwī, in his *Inṣāf*, attributes to al-Maymūnī one sixteen-volume work and two other large volumes, containing Aḥmad's *masā'il*); (5) al-Marwazī (d. 888), one of Aḥmad's favorite disciples and the transmitter of his *Kitāb al-wara'*; (6) Abū Dā'ūd al-Sijistānī (d. 888), author of *Kitāb al-sunan*, one of the "six books," so highly regarded that he was often compared with his professor Aḥmad in learning and piety; (7) Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 890), author of a characteristically Ḥanbalī traditionalist profession of faith (*'aqīdah*) against the legitimacy of philosophical theology (*kalām*); (8) Ḥarb al-Kirmānī (d. 893), a Ṣūfī, who transmitted *masā'il* of Aḥmad and of Ibn Rāhawayh; (9) Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī (d. 898), a philologist and *ḥadīth* expert who was Aḥmad's disciple for twenty years and was often compared with him in learning and piety.

**Tenth century.** The tenth century ushered in the rise of Ḥanbalī literature. The name that dominates the early part of this period is that of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 923). He was a student of al-Marwazī, had a teaching post in the mosque of al-Mahdī, and knew Aḥmad's son 'Abd Allāh personally. It is to his scholarship that the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* owes its first *corpus juris* and the first biographical history of the *madhhab*, *Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābilah*, of which some folios have survived and are preserved in the Zāhirīyah, the National Library of Damascus.

Two other names dominate the first half of this period: al-Barbahārī and al-Khiraqī. Al-Barbahārī (d. 941), a disciple of al-Marwazī and the Ṣūfī Sahl al-Tustarī, was an activist who struggled against the Shi'ah and the Mu'tazilah and fought for the reform of the Sunnī caliphate, now under the influence of the Buyids. A true traditionalist, al-Barbahārī was hostile to *kalām* and opposed al-Ash'arī, his contemporary. It is said that al-Ash'arī wrote his *Ibānah* after a discussion with al-Barbahārī, which, if true, would explain partly al-Ash'arī's rallying to the banner of Ibn Ḥanbal. Al-Barbahārī is a key figure in the social and political history of this period.

Al-Khiraqī (d. 946) gave the Ḥanābilah one of its most important works, *Al-mukhtaṣar fī al-fiqh* (The Epitome on Law), on which the fifteenth-century Ḥanbalī Yūsuf ibn 'Abd al-Hādī reports that three hundred commentaries were written over the centuries. Al-Khiraqī is said to have written many other works which did not enjoy wide diffusion. The reason given is that he had left Baghdad, and his books, apparently lacking the diffusion they would have received had he remained there,



were eventually destroyed when his house burned. Among his disciples were three members of the Ḥanābilah famous in their day: Ibn Baṭṭah, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī, and Ibn Sam'un.

Other Ḥanbalī followers of repute belonging to this period include: Abū Bakr al-Sijistānī (d. 928), Abū Muḥammad al-Rāzī (d. 939), and Abū Bakr al-Najjād (d. 959), a Ṣūfī and *ḥadīth* expert. This period also witnessed some of the most fervently Sunnī professions of faith (*'aqīdahs*), a constant in Ḥanbalī history.

The names that stand out in the second half of this century are those of Ibn Sam'un, Ibn Baṭṭah, and Ibn Ḥāmid. Ibn Sam'un was a famous Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī who had studied under the direction of a number of Ṣūfīs, among them Abū Bakr al-Shiblī and al-Ḥuṣrī (d. 981). Ibn Sam'un studied *ḥadīth* under Ibn Abī Dāwūd, and held a number of sessions in which he dictated *ḥadīths*. Highly regarded in his own *madhhab*, he had a reputation—and disciples—far beyond it. He is mentioned in the twenty-first of the *Maqāmāt* (Assemblies) of al-Ḥarīrī, "Al-Rāzīyah." The two Ash'arī scholars, al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013) and al-Isfarā'inī (d. 1027), as a mark of high respect when greeting him, used to kiss his hand. Ibn Baṭṭah is known especially for his two works *Al-ibānah al-kubrā* and *Al-ibānah al-ṣuḡhrā*, the second of which was translated and studied by the eminent Islamicist Henri Laoust. Other important Ḥanbalī personalities of this period include Abū Bakr al-Ājurrī (d. 971) and al-Ṭabarānī (d. 971). Al-Ājurrī, a Ṣūfī and *ḥadīth* expert, is claimed by both the Ḥanbalī and Shāfī'ī *madhhabs*, a phenomenon of rather frequent occurrence, since both *madhhabs* are profoundly traditionalist and may well have come into existence as "personal *madhhabs*" at approximately the same time. Al-Ājurrī authored a *Kitāb al-sharī'ah* on Islamic law. Al-Ṭabarānī wrote three famous *mu'jams*, a *Kitāb al-sunnah*, and a *musnad* of the Syrian *ḥadīth* experts.

**Eleventh century.** The eleventh century ushered in the final phase of the period that brought about the restoration of Sunnī traditionalism following the collapse of the rationalist-inspired Inquisition. It was a century that witnessed the emergence of the Ḥanābilah at the head of a movement that was the mainstay of the caliphate. A Ḥanbalī of this century, Ibn Baqqāl (d. 1048), expressed the matter in this statement made in the caliphal court in the presence of the vizier Ḥājib al-Nu'mān: "The caliphate is a tent, and the Ḥanābilah are its tent ropes; should the tent ropes fall down, the tent would topple over." The implication was clear. The caliphate must give its support to traditionalism, whose adherents are the guardians of the source of its legitimacy.

The name that leads the first half of this century is

that of Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 1012), the greatest Ḥanbalī master and jurisconsult of his time. His *Kitāb al-jāmi'*, in four hundred volumes, treated the divergences in legal opinions among the jurisconsults. He wrote extensively on theology and on law and its theory and methodology, but none of his works is extant.

Al-Sharīf Abū 'Alī al-Hāshimī (d. 1037), a disciple of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī, wrote many works, among them *Kitāb al-irshād* on law, and a commentary on al-Khiraqī's epitome on law. He had a study circle in the mosque of Manṣūr for legal opinions and notarial work. His *'aqīdah* has been preserved in his biographical notices.

Abū 'Alī al-'Ukbarī, known as Ibn Shihāb (d. 1037), a disciple of Ibn Baṭṭah, was a Ḥanbalī of broad culture, expert in the fields of law, belles lettres, Qur'anic science, *ḥadīth*, and poetry, and was known for his legal opinions. He was also a copyist, a profession which did not simply furnish him with his livelihood but actually made him rich. In his will he left one-third of his property for the benefit of Ḥanbalī students of law, but they received none of it: the sultan is said to have confiscated the estate. Al-'Ukbarī, in an autobiographical note, said that he earned 25,000 dirhams from copying manuscripts, a good part of this coming from his specialty of copying the *Dīwān* (Collected Works) of the poet al-Mutanabbī in three nights, on paper that cost him 5 dirhams, which he would then sell for a sum between 150 and 200 dirhams.

The second half of this century is led by Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā (d. 1066), whose name is cited extensively in the works of his successors. He was a favorite disciple of Ibn Ḥāmid, who chose him from among his students to teach the others during the master's absence on the pilgrimage to Mecca. With Abū Ya'lā we come into the period of Ḥanbalī history better served by the sources. More of its literature has been preserved in the libraries of the Islamic and Western worlds. Abū Ya'lā was a successful master jurisconsult under whose direction some of the great Ḥanbalī intellectuals studied and became master jurisconsults in turn. It is in this period that *madrasahs* began to flourish in Baghdad. This is also the period in which rationalist influences succeeded in getting a hearing among some of the leading lights of the Ḥanābilah. Abū Ya'lā is one, and Ibn 'Aqīl, who belongs to this period and the next, is another. The parents of both intellectuals were of the Ḥanafī *madhhab*, where the ideas of the Mu'tazilah may well have been familiar to members of the family circles. That Abū Ya'lā was influenced by *kalām*-theology may be clearly seen in his *Mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn* (The Reliable Book on the Fundamentals of Religion), where the influence of Ash'arī doctrines is palpable, although the author avoids the

term *kalām* in the title and uses the more traditionalist term *uṣūl al-dīn* for "theology."

Among Abū Ya'lā's many works, *Al-mu'tamad* survives only in his abridged version; other important writings include *Al-aḥkām al-sultānīyah*, a treatise on government and public administration with the same title and, for the most part, the same text as the work of al-Māwardī (d. 1058); *Al-'umdaḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, on legal theory and methodology, still in manuscript (Cairo); and *Kitāb al-riwāyatayn*, on positive law and also unpublished (Istanbul). Abū Ya'lā's standing in the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* is such that he came to be referred to simply as "the judge" (*al-qāḍī*), the organizer of his *madhhab* and one of its great teachers.

Two of Abū Ya'lā's students especially helped to spread the *madhhab* beyond the confines of Baghdad. Qāḍī Ḥarrān (d. 1083), whom Abū Ya'lā appointed as his judicial representative in Ḥarrān, was the author of works on law, legal theory and methodology, and theology, none of which has survived. Abū al-Faraj al-Shīrāzī (d. 1094), who is credited with carrying the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* to Jerusalem and Damascus, wrote on law and legal theory and methodology, as well as on traditionalist theology, which involved him in recurrent altercations with Syrian rationalists of the Ash'arī movement. Al-Shīrāzī stands at the head of a long line of Ḥanbalī descendants known collectively as "the family of Ibn al-Ḥanbalī."

One of Abū Ya'lā's students who deserves special mention is the *sharīf* Abū Ja'far (d. 1077), an activist of the stamp of al-Barbahārī who was in constant struggle against what he considered to be the heretical innovations of his period. His fight against corrupt practices—prostitution and illicit alcoholic beverages—brought him into conflict with officials of the Seljuk sultan, as well as with those of the caliph, who was his first cousin. He was intransigent in his attitude against the two rationalist movements, the Mu'tazilah and the Ash'ariyah, in their attempt to strengthen their footholds in the capital. Among his writings, the best known is his *Ru'ūs al-masā'il*, a work on positive law in which he argues in favor of the legal opinions of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, a manuscript of which is in the Zāhirīyah in Damascus. Ibn 'Aqīl, in his *Kitāb al-funūn*, has preserved a legal opinion of Sharīf Abū Ja'far that throws some light on the Seljuk forces who invaded Baghdad in mid-century, long hailed as the saviors of Sunnism against the Buyid Shī'ah. The Seljuks pillaging the inhabitants of Baghdad in 1055, said the *sharīf*, should be brought to justice as highway robbers, since the inhabitants had no defense against them. Abū Ja'far led a turbulent life, which often put him under house arrest

or in prison. His biographers seem to think that he did not die a natural death. At his funeral, the popular masses, his powerful arm against enemies, cried out during the procession: "Invoke God's mercy upon the *sharīf*—martyred, assassinated, poisoned."

The other students of Abū Ya'lā finished their careers in the first half of the twelfth century. Some who had begun their legal studies with him completed them after his death with one or another of his older disciples. Among the Ḥanābilah of this period are Abū al-Faṭḥ al-Ḥulwānī, al-Mukharrimī, and Ibn Abī Ya'lā. Al-Ḥulwānī (d. 1112), like Abū Ja'far, was a jurisconsult and ascetic. He studied law first with Abū Ya'lā, then with the *sharīf* and Ya'qūb al-Barzabīnī. He is the author of the *Kitāb al-mubtadī fī al-fiqh*, a textbook on law for beginners. Ibn Abī Ya'lā ("son of Abū Ya'lā," d. 1131) was the second of Abū Ya'lā's three sons, and his name attests to the great renown of the father as well as to that of this particular son. Ibn Abī Ya'lā is known especially for his biobibliographical history of the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* from its beginnings down to his day.

A great Ḥanbalī mystic of this period is the celebrated 'Abd Allāh al-Anṣārī al-Ḥarawī (d. 1088), of Herat (Persia) as indicated by his name. He studied in his hometown and also in Nishapur, Ṭūs, Biṣṭām, and Rayy. The origins of his membership in the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* are not known, but there is no doubt that he was a Ḥanbalī, and a pugnacious one to boot. He made this clear in his declarations, as well as in his writings, which include *Dhamm al-kalām*, a condemnation of *kalām*-theology; *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad*, a biographical work extolling the excellence of Ibn-Ḥanbal's virtues; and *Manāzil al-sā'irīn*, the most important Ḥanbalī treatise on mysticism. The last-named work attracted many commentators, including one by the Ḥanbalī jurisconsult and mystic Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, the disciple of Ibn Taymiyah, himself a jurisconsult and theologian, and a member of the Qādirīyah Ṣūfī order. Al-Anṣārī also wrote a *Qaṣīdah dāliyah* (Ode Rhyming in Dāl [the eighth letter of the alphabet]), a profession of faith in defense of Ḥanbalī beliefs; the title was later taken up by al-Kalwadhānī for the same purpose. The biographer Ibn Rajab cites some of al-Anṣārī's other verses in which he declares that "My *madhhab* is the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*," and again, "I am a Ḥanbalī and shall be one as long as I live, and, on my death bed, my last will and testament to my fellow Muslims will be that they follow the principles of Ibn Ḥanbal." What al-Anṣārī meant was that they should become traditionalists in opposition to the rationalism of the Ash'arī movement that he opposed: "Our God shall be seen sitting on his throne [i.e., beatific vision]; his word is eternal [i.e., the Qur'ān

is not created]; his prophet is Arab. Anyone who says other than this is an Ash'arī!"

Ya'qūb al-Barzabīnī (d. 1093) was a classmate of Sharīf Abū Ja'far. They completed their legal studies together, were both received as notaries by the chief *qāḍī* Dāmaghānī, and then began to teach law during the lifetime of their master, Abū Ya'lā. Al-Barzabīnī wrote a *ta'līqah (summa)* that was the abridgment of that of his teacher Abū Ya'lā; extracts from it appear in the *Dhayl* of Ibn Rajab. Ṭalḥah al-Āqūlī (d. 1118), who began his legal studies under Abū Ya'lā, was one of al-Barzabīnī's first students. Like both his teachers, he too became a *qāḍī* and professor of law; he taught two works of Abū Ya'lā on the latter's formal authorization and had a post in the mosque of Manṣūr, where he held sessions of legal disputation. Ibn Qudāmah cites him in the *Mughnī* and his *Kāfī*.

Abū Sa'd al-Mukharrimī (d. 1119), jurisconsult and Ṣūfī, headed the first Ḥanbalī *madrasah* in Baghdad; heretofore the *madhhab's* institutions of learning had been mainly mosque-colleges (*masjids*). His legal studies took place with the *qāḍī* Abū Ya'lā, then with the *sharīf* Abū Ja'far, and finally with the *qāḍī* Ya'qūb al-Barzabīnī. He too was a *qāḍī* in the Bāb al-Azaj quarter on Baghdad's east side, where he built his *madrasah* sometime between 1102 and 1117. This was the *madrasah* that later became known as that of the Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, Al-Jīlānī enlarged it and made it into a *madrasah* and *ribāṭ* (monastery) for jurisconsults and Ṣūfīs. Ibn Rajab emphasizes that Abū Sa'd al-Mukharrimī stood at the head of a long line of Ṣūfīs, ascetics, and *ḥadīth* masters. His name occurs in the Ṣūfī pedigrees of later Ḥanbalī scholars.

Abū Khāzim ibn Abī Ya'lā (d. 1133), born one year before the death of his famous father, was the last of Abū Ya'lā's three sons and bore the name of his paternal uncle, Abū Khāzim. He studied law, the disputed questions, and legal theory and methodology with al-Barzabīnī. He wrote on the disputed questions and issued a commentary on al-Khiraqī's *Epitome*.

Abū al-Khaṭṭāb al-Kalwadhānī (d. 1116) was one of the great disciples of Abū Ya'lā. Essentially a jurisconsult, al-Kalwadhānī excelled in law and its disputed questions. His reputation in law was so great that the celebrated Shāfi'ī jurisconsult and ambassador of the sultan Burkiyārūq to the caliph would exclaim at the approach of al-Kalwadhānī: "Here comes Law." His writings include the unpublished *Al-tamhīd* on legal theory and methodology (Zahiriyyah) and *Al-tahdhīb fī al-farā'id*, on decedents' estates, also unpublished (Munich), which was criticized by the Ḥanbalī vizier Ibn Yūnus (d. 1197) in his *Awhām Abī al-Khaṭṭāb*. Among his

other works are the "Ode Rhyming in Dāl" (Damascus, 1908), the profession of faith that is his only known work treating of theology, and numerous treatments of positive law.

The most brilliant and successful student of al-Kalwadhānī was Abū Bakr al-Dīnawarī (d. 1138), who was in turn the professor of law of the well-known polymath Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1200), as well as of Ibn al-Munā (d. 1187) and the Ḥanbalī vizier Ibn Hubayrah (d. 1165). The caliph al-Mustaẓhir appointed al-Dīnawarī to the chair vacated by the death of his professor al-Kalwadhānī in the mosque of Manṣūr, and the event is reported by Ibn 'Aqīl along with the disputations on law which usually took place in honor of the inauguration of the new professor of law.

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Zāghūnī (d. 1132), a contemporary of Ibn 'Aqīl, was the Ḥanbalī master jurisconsult who came closest to Ibn 'Aqīl in breadth of knowledge. The extensive list of his books given by Ibn Rajab includes works on positive law, disputed questions of law, decedents' estates, theology, and legal theory and methodology, a collection of his academic sermons, a history, collections of legal opinions (*fatāwā*), and *ḥadīth*, none of which has survived. He had a chair for legal disputations and academic sermons in the mosque of Manṣūr. Two great Ḥanbalī scholars were his students: Ṣadaqaḥ ibn al-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Jawzī.

Among the original minds of the century stood the towering figure of Ibn 'Aqīl (d. 1119). His family background was Ḥanafī-Mu'tazilī. At the age of sixteen he began his legal studies in the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*. During his graduate years he studied Mu'tazilī *kalām*-theology privately and in secret. After the death of his rich and powerful Ḥanbalī patron, Abū Manṣūr ibn Yūsuf, in 1067, he was pursued by a faction of his Ḥanbalī *madhhab* and was forced to go into hiding for a period of five years. Finally in 1072, in order to regain his freedom, he signed a retraction in which he abjured the Mu'tazilah and the veneration he had shown for the great mystic al-Ḥallāj in a treatise. Reflecting on this retraction in later life, Ibn 'Aqīl said that his companions had misunderstood his intention in studying under the direction of Mu'tazilī masters: "My Ḥanbalī companions demanded that I cease my relations with a certain group of intellectuals, and this prevented me from acquiring useful knowledge." As for his treatise in veneration of al-Ḥallāj, it appears to have remained in circulation among Ṣūfīs of the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*.

With Ibn 'Aqīl traditionalist thought reached new heights of achievement. His writings give evidence of a genuine attempt to achieve harmony between faith and reason. His two outstanding works are *Kitāb al-funūn*,

of which only one of two hundred volumes has come down to us, and *Al-wāḍiḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, a *summa* on legal theory and methodology written according to the scholastic method later to be used in the Christian West.

Besides the schools of Harran, Damascus, and Herat, the Ḥanābilah, by this time, had also spread to Isfahan, where 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Mandah (d. 1077) was as much an activist as the Ṣūfī al-Ḥarawī al-Anṣārī was in Herat. Among Ibn Mandah's works is a refutation of the Jahmīyah.

**Twelfth century.** The Ḥanbalī names that dominate the twelfth century are those of Ibn Hubayrah, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, and Ibn al-Jawzī. Less famous, but no less interesting because of his membership in the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*, is the unusual figure of Ṣadaqah ibn al-Ḥusayn.

Ibn Hubayrah received his Ḥanbalī education under Abū al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Farrā' (d. 1132), Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and Abū Bakr al-Dīnawarī and studied the literary arts under al-Jawālīqī, the Ḥanbalī grammarian who succeeded his master al-Tibrīzī to the post of grammarian in the Madrasah Niẓāmīyah. Ibn Hubayrah became vizier of Caliph al-Muqtafī in 1149 and remained in that post under al-Mustanjid for a total of sixteen years, until his death in 1165. He founded a *madrasah*, endowed it, and established his own library in it as a *waqf* in perpetuity. He wrote a work on grammar, *Al-muqtaṣid*, an epitome of Ibn al-Sikkīt's *Iṣlāḥ al-mantiq*, and a work on the five pillars of Islamic worship, *Al-'ibādāt al-khams*. But his most important work is his *Kitāb al-ifṣāḥ* (Aleppo, 1928), a commentary on the *ḥadīth* collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, within which a whole independent work on law was written as commentary on a single one of its *ḥadīths*. In preparation for the writing of *Kitāb al-ifṣāḥ*, the vizier spent 113,000 dinars to invite scholars from all parts for discussions on law. The work contains those doctrines on which there was unanimity among the four eponymous imams of the Sunnī *madhhabs* as well as questions that remained in dispute. The *Kitāb al-ifṣāḥ* was copied and used far and wide.

'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī is the famous Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī whose Ṣūfī brotherhood is still prosperous in our day. He studied law under al-Mukharrimī, al-Kalwadhānī, Ibn 'Aqīl, and Abū al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Farrā'. In a recently published Ṣūfī *silsilah* ("chain") of initiation for Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mukharrimī, previously known only as a jurisconsult, appears for the first time as the Ṣūfī who passed on the Ṣūfī cloak (*khirqah*) of initiation to 'Abd al-Qādir. It was also the *madrasah* of al-Mukharrimī to which 'Abd al-Qādir succeeded as administrator, professor of law, and Ṣūfī master; under his direction the in-

stitution was enlarged, and it has been maintained on Baghdad's east side down to this day. He studied Sufism under the Ṣūfī shaykh Ḥammād al-Dabbās (d. 1131), who was severely criticized by Ibn 'Aqīl. 'Abd al-Qādir wrote two well-known works: *Al-ghunyah li-ṭalībī ṭarīq al-ḥaqq* (The Seeker's Sufficiency in Search of the Truth), in which, basing his teachings on the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*, he included an *'aqīdah* of profoundly orthodox inspiration that is a succinct presentation of Ḥanbalī traditionalist beliefs. He was severely criticized by his Ḥanbalī contemporary Ibn al-Jawzī, no doubt because of scholarly rivalry, but was ably defended by 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Maqdisī, Ibn Qudāmah, and Ibn Taymīyah. The last two are known to have belonged to the Ṣūfī order of 'Abd al-Qādir, and perhaps also 'Abd al-Ghanī, who, with his cousin Ibn Qudāmah, had studied with 'Abd al-Qādir for the period of forty days that preceded the Ṣūfī master's death.

Ibn al-Jawzī, whose life spanned all but thirteen years of this twelfth century, was a jurisconsult, *ḥadīth* expert, historian, preacher, and polemist. A prolific author, he wrote his first work—a "bibliography of works pertaining to the Qur'ān and its sciences," according to an autobiographical note—at the age of thirteen. A famous preacher and sermon writer whose talents were highly praised by the Spanish Muslim traveler Ibn Jubayr, Ibn al-Jawzī said he preached his first sermon at the age of seventeen. Into the works of this polymath passed a great amount of the writings of Ibn 'Aqīl, Ibn Hubayrah, and others otherwise lost to us. He first studied law under the direction of Ibn al-Zāghūnī, whom he was later to criticize; after Ibn al-Zāghūnī's death he studied with al-Dīnawarī, Abū Ya'lā the Minor, grandson of Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā, and al-Nahrawānī, under whom he worked as repetitor (*mu'id*), and whom he succeeded as professor of law in his two *madrasahs*. By the year 1179, he held five professorships of law in *madrasahs* of which he was also the administrator. That date also coincides with the date his history of Baghdad, *Al-muntaẓam*, is terminated. With Ibn al-Jawzī, the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* reached the apex of its influence in the Abbasid capital, owing in large measure to his own weight with the caliph. Under the vizierate of the Ḥanbalī Ibn Yūnus (d. 1197), Ibn al-Jawzī was once again active in public life, but he lived the life of an exile in Wāsiṭ from 1194 to 1199, when he was allowed, through the intervention of the caliph's mother, to return to Baghdad. He died two years later.

Ṣadaqah ibn al-Ḥusayn was the most atypical Ḥanbalī intellectual, a veritable maverick of his *madhhab*. He was a jurisconsult, belletrist, poet, philosophical theologian, and historian. Unfortunately, none of his works are extant. He studied dialectic, *kalām*, dece-

dents' estates, and, in secret, logic and philosophy. Unlike his contemporary Ibn al-Jawzī, he lived a secluded life teaching in his mosque-college in the Badriyah quarter (Bāb Badr) on Baghdad's east side, where he led the people in prayer, issued legal opinions to those who solicited them from him, and taught various subjects to students who frequented his mosque. One of his works, on theology, is entitled *Ḍaw' al-sāri fī ma'rifat al-Bārī* (A Torch in the Night to Light the Way toward God); his history is a continuation of that of his teacher Ibn al-Zāghūnī covering the period from the latter's death in 1132 to a period close to his own death. Like the *Muntaẓam* of Ibn al-Jawzī, it was an annalistic and biographical work.

**Later period.** From this point to the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenth century, the Ḥanābilah no longer boast of names comparable in reputation to those just treated. Nevertheless, there are some figures worthy of a place in the history of Ḥanbalī thought. Ibn al-Ghazzāl (d. 1218), known as a sermon writer, wrote a treatise on the mystic al-Ḥallāj in which he made use of Ibn 'Aqīl's earlier work on this mystic. Ibn Nuqṭah (d. 1232) was a *ḥadīth* expert and historian whose history, not extant, is often cited as a source. Al-Qaṭī'ī (d. 1237), a disciple of Ibn al-Jawzī, wrote a continuation of al-Sam'ānī's (d. 1168) continuation of the *History of Baghdad* of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 1071). Al-'Ulthī (d. 1237) was a pious ascetic who criticized the policies of Caliph al-Nāṣir, the Ṣūfī practices of a disciple of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, and Ibn al-Jawzī's allegorical interpretation of the divine attributes. Muḥyī al-Dīn Yūsuf (d. 1258), son of Ibn al-Jawzī, was a Ṣūfī and held the post of *muḥtasib* (market superintendent) of Baghdad under Caliph al-Nāṣir. He was considered more expert than his father in jurisprudence and dialectic. He wrote several works, including *Al-īdāh fī al-jadal* (Dialectic Made Clear), which is still in manuscript. While on an official visit in Damascus in 1254, he founded a *madrasah* called al-Jawzīyah. Returning to Baghdad, he was killed, with his three sons, during the Mongol invasion four years later.

With the fall of Baghdad, Damascus became the center of learning for the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*, whose masters had perfected their studies in Baghdad. Important Ḥanbalī intellectual dynasties developed in Damascus over the years: the descendants of the eleventh-century al-Shīrāzī who became known as the family of "Ibn al-Ḥanbalī," the Munajjā family founded by Wajih al-Dīn As'ad ibn Munajjā (d. 1209), and the Qudāmah family, also referred to as the Maqādisah (sg., Maqdisī), meaning those who came to Damascus from Palestine (Jammā'īl, a place near Jerusalem, Bayt al-Maqdis). The most well-known member of the third family is Mu-

waffaq al-Dīn ibn Qudāmah (d. 1223). Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Maqdisī (d. 1245), who had gone to Baghdad to perfect his studies, brought back to Damascus works with which he later endowed the *madrasah* he founded in Baghdad called the *Ḍiyā'iyah*. Many of the works of this *madrasah* are now in the Zahirīyah in Damascus.

Another exodus from Harran brought to Damascus the Taymīyah family, the most illustrious member of which was Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328). Two other members of the family were Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Taymīyah (d. 1226), a disciple of Ibn al-Jawzī and professor of law in the *madrasah* founded by Nūr al-Dīn in Harran; and Majd al-Dīn ibn Taymīyah (d. 1254), nephew of Fakhr al-Dīn and grandfather of the famous Ibn Taymīyah. [See the biography of Ibn Taymīyah.] The son, 'Abd al-Ḥalīm (d. 1283), *qāḍī* of Harran, was the one who fled from the Mongols and took the family to Damascus. The famous son, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah, the father, and the grandfather collaborated, each after the other, on a work in the field of legal theory and methodology called *Al-musawwadah* (The Draft), of which Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah's disciple, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ḥarrānī al-Dimashqī (d. 1344), made a fair copy, distinguishing between the contributions of the three authors (Damascus, 1964).

Among Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah's disciples, by far the most famous was Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, a Ṣūfī like Ibn Taymīyah. Just as Ibn Taymīyah wrote a commentary on the Ṣūfī work of 'Abd al-Qādir, *Futūḥ al-ghayb*, Ibn Qayyim commented on the *Manāzil al-sā'irīn* of al-Anṣārī al-Harawī. He also wrote *I'lām al-muwaqqi'in*, on legal theory and methodology, and a profession of faith in verse (rhyming in the letter *nūn*), *Al-nūnīyah*. Ibn Rajab, a disciple of Ibn Qayyim, wrote the well-known history of the Ḥanābilah from 1068 as a continuation of Ibn Abī Ya'lā. His *Qawā'id* (Cairo, 1933) is an important work on jurisprudence.

Of the Muflīḥ family, Shams al-Dīn ibn Muflīḥ (d. 1361), a student of Ibn Taymīyah, is the author of *Al-ādāb al-shar'īyah* (3 vols., Cairo, 1929–1930), and the chief *qāḍī* Burhān al-Dīn ibn Muflīḥ (d. 1480) authored a history of the Ḥanābilah, not extant. A member of the 'Abd al-Hādī family also deserves mention: Yūsuf ibn 'Abd al-Hādī (d. 1503), a prolific author, many of whose works are preserved in the Zahirīyah. He was a voracious reader, and his signature is found on the margins of a great many manuscripts in that library and elsewhere. One of his students in *ḥadīth*, the Ḥanafī historian Ibn Ṭūlūn (d. 1546), wrote his biography. Among the other Ḥanbalī scholars worthy of mention, the following may be cited: al-Mardāwī (d. 1481), author of *Kitāb al-inṣāf*, a twelve-volume work on law, and *Kitāb al-taḥrīr*, on legal theory and methodology; al-Ḥujāwī

(d. 1561), whose *Iqnā'* is a basic manual on Ḥanbalī law; al-Bahūtī (d. 1641), the well-known Ḥanbalī author who taught at al-Azhar; Ibn al-'Imād (d. 1679), author of a history, mainly biographical, from the year AH 1 to the year AH 1000 (622–1592 CE); 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ba'li (d. 1778), Ṣūfī disciple of 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī who introduced him to the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabī and Ibn al-Fāriḍ.

The Ḥanābilah, through Ibn Taymiyah, influenced two modern movements, the Wahhābiyah and the Sa-lafīyah. It is through these two movements, in Arabia and Egypt respectively, that works of the Ḥanābilah and their teachings, especially those of Ibn Taymiyah, were made known. And it is in connection with the Wahhābī movement, which was misrepresented and opposed by the Ottomans, that misconceptions developed among modern scholars regarding the Ḥanābilah.

[For further discussion of the "schools" of law, see Madhhab. Issues related to the debate between the traditionalists and the rationalists are discussed in Ash'ariyah; Fādhīth; Kalām; Mu'tazilah; and the biography of al-Shāfi'ī. For later developments in the Ḥanbalī madhhab, see Wahhābiyah and the biographies of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb and Ibn Taymiyah.]

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GEORGE MAKDISI

**HANDS** are a key factor in what it means to be human, because they interact with the intelligence in probing, manipulating, and transforming matter for cultural ends. The hands are also the most expressive and versatile members of the body for symbolic and ritual gestures and tasks, whether social, religious, or magical. Hands give and receive, grasp and relinquish; they strike, protect, punish, and caress. Hands beckon, greet, and wave goodbye; they warn, admonish, and direct; they also pull apart and dismantle, heal and repair, assemble, divide and gather.

**As Symbols of Deity.** The Qur'ān speaks of God's hand bestowing bounty and blessing as well as exercising power over all things (67:1). The hand is mentioned often in the Bible as a symbol of God's power and guidance. In Hindu iconography, some representations of deity—preeminently Śiva Nāṭarāja, lord of the dance—have multiple hands and arms, symbolizing omnicompetence; this meaning is further enriched by the precise symbolism in Hindu thought of fingers, palms, and other parts of the hand.

In religious iconography overall, hands occur in a wide variety of gestures. For example, Christ as cosmic ruler is depicted with raised right hand, palm facing outward in a gesture of benediction and peace. Images and pictures of the Buddha feature various *mudrās*, that is, signs or gestures made by the hands—such as the "fear not" position, which resembles the blessing of Christ. Other *mudrās* include extending the hand toward the ground to call the earth to witness and "preaching the Dharma," both hands raised in front of the chest. Even in aniconic Islam, the talisman known sometimes as the 'Hand of Fāṭimah' is a prominent anthropomorphic symbol of divine protection. Depending on whether one is Sunnī or Shi'ī, the fingers represent either the Five Pillars of Islam (*shahādah*, "testifying" to the unity of God and the apostlehood of Muḥammad; *ṣalāt*, "ritual prayer"; *zakāt*, "almsgiving"; *ṣawm*, "fasting"; *ḥajj*, "pilgrimage") or the five holy personages (Muḥammad, Fāṭimah, 'Alī, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn).

The frequent attribution of hands to deity in religions both ancient and contemporary bears witness to a peculiar anthropomorphic persistence. In the Hindu reli-

gion, the arms and hands of Śiva seem furthermore to challenge the preeminence of the primordial and creative word, which is also at the core of creation in the Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Similarly, although God is depicted as creating by means of speech in both the Bible and the Qur'ān, in both he is also represented as having created humankind, alone among creatures, with his hands. "When thy Lord said to the angels, 'See, I am creating a mortal of a clay. When I have shaped him, and breathed my spirit in him, fall you down, bowing before him!' Then the angels bowed themselves all together, save Iblīs; he waxed proud, and was one of the unbelievers. Said he, 'Iblīs, what prevented thee to bow thyself before that I created with my own hands?'" (Qur'ān 38:72–76). Regardless of whether this passage is interpreted literally or symbolically, it testifies to a special link between God and humankind in which spirit, clay, and molding hands figure centrally.

**Worship, Prayer, and Meditation.** The most general use of hands ritually is in prayer. In the Christian tradition, many Protestants hold the hands palm to palm with fingers interlocked, as did ancient Romans and Sumerians. Roman Catholics have often preferred to place the palms together with fingers pointing upward, a position found also in Hindu and Buddhist piety. Romans and Greeks prayed to the deities of the underworld with hands pointing downward. Many peoples touch altars and shrines with their hands while praying for blessings. Ancient Christians in the catacombs are known to have prayed with arms and hands stretched out to the sides in imitation of crucifixion. In Muslim petitionary prayer (*du'ā'*), the hands are held out in front of the body with palms open upward; after the words have been uttered, the palms are rubbed across the face. The clapping of hands in praise was known among the ancient Hebrews and Egyptians, and it is still practiced in certain ritual contexts by Africans, Chinese, and Japanese. The Sioux were known to raise their arms with the palms of the hands turned toward a sacred presence, after which they would lower the hands toward the earth. Raising the hands has sometimes been a gesture of adoration of deity, for example, when the priest raises the Host and the chalice during the celebration of the Christian Eucharist. Ancient Egyptians raised both hands with palms facing the shrine.

The Hindu and Buddhist ritual hand gestures known as *mudrās* are the most highly elaborated in religious history. *Mudrā* as a sacred hand language is widely employed in the ritual, dance, drama, and iconography of South and Southeast Asia. The great Vajrayāna stupa of Borobudur, in Central Java, contains hundreds of sculptures and reliefs portraying Buddhas whose hands form

*mudrās* symbolizing the whole range of Buddhist teachings. [See *Mudrā*.]

**Blessings, Oaths, and Consecrations.** The use of the hand in blessing is widely known. In the Bible, the hand is raised over or toward those to be blessed (*Lv.* 9) and sometimes placed on the head of a person (*Gn.* 48:14). A central Christian blessing is the sign of the cross made with the hands, a gesture performed slightly differently by Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox: the former move the hand from the forehead to the breast and then from the left to the right shoulder, whereas the latter perform the final motion from right to left shoulder. The hand is also used in Christianity to sprinkle holy water, to baptize either by sprinkling or pouring, and to anoint.

The laying on of hands in ordinations and other forms of consecration is known from the Bible and other sources. A similar gesture was performed in ancient Egypt, where the gods were believed to lay their hands on the head of the new pharaoh. In some Christian groups, for example, among Baptists, a "right hand of fellowship" is extended by the members of the congregation to newly baptized communicants.

A very prominent and widespread category of hand gestures has existed in connection with oath taking; among these are raising the hand, touching a sacred object (e.g., Bible, altar, scepter, weapon), clasping hands, pointing at a holy thing, and touching one's own breast. In medieval Islam, new caliphs were acknowledged and legitimized by the *bay'ah*, a survival of an ancient Arabian oath of allegiance symbolized by raising the right hand and then clasping the hand of the ruler or his designated representative, with God as witness.

**Apotropaic and Magical Uses.** The sign of the cross has been made for a great variety of reasons, not the least of which has been to ward off demons and other evils. Another potent hand gesture has been the sign of the "horns," a fist with the index and little finger extended, thought to be efficacious against harmful spells and persons. Alternatively, a person who felt threatened by an occult danger might extend all the fingers of a hand toward the antagonist (real or imagined) and say, "Five in the eye!" This archaic apotropaic gesture of the Mediterranean Basin is often expressed in North Africa and Egypt by means of a talisman in the shape of a hand or by grains of wheat.

Positive and negative imprints of human hands, for example, in red ochre, appear frequently in prehistoric cave art as well as in many contexts since. Such imprints are often thought to protect against the evil eye and other misfortunes.

Magical healing often features hand gestures and touches. Christ is reported to have healed by his touch

(see, e.g., *Mt.* 9:20). Royal personages have also been known to heal with their hands, as for example the British monarch Charles II's famous cures of scrofula. Even the hands of dead persons have been used in healing as well as in other magical operations. [See Touching.]

Decoration of the hands, such as by tattooing, is known widely. Men of the Mentawai Islands, near Sumatra, tattoo their hands in order to wipe out the evil influences of blood spilled in their village. Coptic Christians in Egypt have traditionally worn on the back of the hand or on the wrist a tattooed cross, employed for identification as a Christian in case of death among strangers in that predominantly Muslim country. At festive times, such as Arabian tribal weddings, women sometimes color their hands with henna. In many parts of India as well, women decorate their hands with henna on festive occasions. Hands are also frequently adorned with rings, intended for protection as well as for fashion. In Java, men wear rings set with various stones believed to act as powerful amulets against harmful spirits and spells as well as against more tangible dangers such as poisonous snakebite. Javanese men commonly allow their thumbnails to grow very long in imitation of a mythical hero, Warkudara, who persisted steadfastly in all endeavors and could not be cheated. He is depicted in shadow puppetry (*wayang kulit*) with bladelike thumbnails, symbols of his valor and fighting skills.

**Ritual Avoidances and Mutilations.** Washing the hands has been a widespread symbol of cleansing the self of sin and guilt, and a symbol of ritual purity generally. Veiling the hands has also been practiced, usually because their uncleanness in the presence of sacred things threatens the efficacy of ritual. Sometimes covering the hands has symbolized a person's inferior social or ritual status.

The left hand is widely considered to be unclean, and performing a task or keeping something in place with this hand is generally considered inappropriate. The reasons are probably not so simple as that the left hand is reserved for humble tasks, such as the toilet; perhaps such use is recommended because the left hand and the left side of the body generally are thought to be inherently inferior to the right. The predominance of the right hand among all peoples is well known, and even when a child's natural preference may be for the left hand, he or she is often trained to use the right hand instead. The auspicious character of the right hand is maintained in the English word *dexterous* (Lat., *dextra*, "right"); the word *sinister* (Lat., *sinistra*, "left"), too, speaks for itself. [See Left and Right.]

In predominantly Muslim regions such as Malaysia

and Indonesia, as well as in other Islamic countries, the right hand is used for greeting, gesturing, handing over or receiving objects, and touching others. It is considered extremely rude as well as inauspicious to use the left hand for any of those functions. In the Qur'ān, God is said to give, on Resurrection Day, each person's book of deeds either into the right hand, symbolizing salvation, or into the left, indicating damnation (69:19). When eating, especially from a common dish, Muslims use only the right hand. According to the Islamic *shari'ah*, or law, the strict punishment for the habitual thief is amputation of the right hand, which precipitates a shameful condition that persists for life and in certain social groups condemns the guilty person to eating alone.

Prehistoric imprints of human hands sometimes show loss of fingers or joints, evidence perhaps of ritual deformation of the hand, either undergone voluntarily or performed as a punishment on captured enemies; both forms are known in ethnography. The severed hands or fingers both of dead persons, such as those killed in battle or by execution or assassination, and of children who died in the womb or at birth have been thought to possess extraordinary powers and therefore have been used in a variety of magical rituals by witches, medicine men, conjurers, and others. American Indians used to wear the hands or fingers of vanquished enemies as powerful medicine. In West Africa, the hand or finger of a deceased relative was often kept as a potent ingredient in magical charms and spells. There are many other magical and superstitious ideas and practices that involve the hands and that have only remote relevance, if any, to religious belief and symbolism, but closer connections with the hands' quite remarkable profane qualities and abilities: one example is chiromancy, the practice of "reading" the hand and especially the palm for purposes of divining the future fate of an individual—a tradition based upon the belief that the hand is the person in miniature.

[See also Human Body, article on The Human Figure as a Religious Sign.]

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FREDERICK MATHEWSON DENNY

**HANDSOME LAKE** (1735–1815), Seneca shaman, prophet, and sachem of the Six Nations of the Iroquois; known in Iroquois as Ganio' Daí Io'. He was born on the Genesee River opposite modern-day Avon, Livingston County, New York. Handsome Lake's life mirrors the history of the Iroquois people. Born at the zenith of Iroquois power and influence, he participated in major battles against Indian and American opponents and witnessed his people's loss of land and pride following the Revolutionary War. He later suffered a debilitating illness, exacerbated by bouts of drunkenness, but was revived by a series of dream-vision experiences and led the way to a national revitalization of Indian values.

Early in 1799 Handsome Lake was confined to bed with a serious illness and seemed near death. During a series of dream-vision experiences in June and August 1799 he received many messages from the Creator through four intermediaries whom the prophet referred to as the Four Messengers or the Four Angels. They instructed him about his mission, guided him on a sky journey to the land of the damned and the blessed, and promised him shamanic powers. Handsome Lake recovered, and his sense of physical and spiritual rebirth intensified as he preached and worked for reform.

The earliest messages the prophet received condemned alcohol, witchcraft, abortion, and charms. The Creator was also displeased with wife beating and desertion by husbands, as well as by adultery, undisclosed multimarriages, interference in marriages by mothers-in-law, and the neglect and abuse of children and the elderly. Such activities reflected a serious breakdown in the traditional Iroquois way of life. Handsome Lake now called for a breakup of the longhouse dwelling and instituted the building of single-family houses following the Quaker model. More radically, he preached that men must give up their rapidly declining occupations of hunting and waging war and instead take up farming, the traditional domain of women. At the same time, he warned against the private ownership of property as destructive of traditional Iroquois values, and he encouraged cooperative farming and other communal activities. He also condemned the cruelty to farm animals evident among many whites. Fearful of the corrosive effects of white education on Iroquois traditions, he said

that only a few Iroquois children should be educated, and those for the express purpose of enabling the Iroquois to deal with the whites in legal and political matters.

His reforms of ritual life emphasized the communal ceremonies of thanksgiving centered on the agricultural cycle. Thus he tended to downplay and even denounce the role of the medicine societies. Eventually they regained their prominence, albeit within the context of an Iroquois life reformed by Handsome Lake and his half brother, Cornplanter.

As a prophet, Handsome Lake differed from the Native American cultic and nativistic prophets. The cultic prophets claimed that renewal would occur only when the people returned to the sacrifices and rituals they had neglected. The divine would then send forth its power and restore them. The nativistic prophets proclaimed that the whites would be destroyed if the people rejected all white influences and returned to the old ways. In contrast, Handsome Lake was an ethical-eschatological prophet. He spoke in the name of a transcendent moral being who was seriously displeased with the sins of his people and would either reward them or punish them after death depending on whether they reformed themselves. The Creator did not promise that the whites would be destroyed or driven away but rather said that personal and social reforms would enable the Iroquois to be strong enough to maintain their own independence and to survive in a world increasingly controlled by whites. Rejecting both the assimilationism of the Mohawk Joseph Grant and the nativism of the Seneca Red Jacket, Handsome Lake presented the Iroquois with the will of the Creator: they must either accept the *gaiwiio* ("good word"), that is, the revelations and injunctions received by Handsome Lake, by repenting their deeds and embracing personal and social reform, or be lost in both a personal-eschatological and a sociohistorical sense.

Unlike the biblical prophets, Handsome Lake's concern with ethical behavior and eschatology was not accompanied by a desacralization of nature. Although he rejected any cultic prescription for the ills of his people, Handsome Lake affirmed as integral to the Iroquois tradition the necessity of maintaining correct relationships with the spirit forces through ceremonial life. Only by enacting the moral and socioeconomic reforms enjoined by the *gaiwiio* could the Indian tradition be fully effective.

Corresponding to Handsome Lake's integration of eschatological and cosmic elements was his idea of the holy as both a transcendent moral being and an immanent presence and power. The present-day Longhouse religion, or Handsome Lake religion, while basing itself on the prophet's teachings, incorporates them into a re-

ligious structure that includes shamanic institutions and practices, agricultural and gathering ceremonies, and organizational meetings such as the Six Nations Conference.

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DONALD P. ST. JOHN

**HAN FEI-TZU** (d. 233 BCE), Chinese philosopher of the Legalist school. His name was Han Fei; *tzu* is a suffix meaning "Master." He was probably born around 280 BCE. According to his brief biography in chapter 63 of the *Shih chi* (Records of the Historian), a work written some hundred years after his death, Han Fei was a prince of the royal family of Han, a small state south of the Chou capital at Lo-yang. He studied under the Confucian philosopher Hsün-tzu, where he was a fellow student of Li Ssu (d. 208), who was destined to become chief aide to King Cheng of Ch'in, later First Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty. Han Fei, distressed at the danger posed to his state by predatory neighbors, repeatedly

remonstrated with its ruler, offering his advice in written form because he suffered from a stutter. When his counsel went unheeded, he wrote a book setting forth his ideas on government. Like Machiavelli's treatise, to which it has often been compared, it is a handbook for the prince, with a few chapters added for the guidance of his ministers.

Later, when the state of Ch'in to the west threatened to overthrow Han, Han Fei was sent as envoy to the Ch'in court. King Cheng, an admirer of his writings, received him with favor, but Li Ssu, now the king's chief adviser, poisoned the king's mind against Han Fei, and he was thrown into prison, where he committed suicide.

*Han Fei-tzu*, the book that bears his name, comprises fifty-five sections, although some of these may be later additions. Most of the sections are short, concise essays on some aspect of Legalist thought. Legalism began to take shape in the late years of the Eastern Chou dynasty (771-256 BCE), when the Chou rulers had ceased to exercise any real authority and China was divided into a number of feudal states that constantly contended for power and territory. The aim of the Legalist thinkers, who confined their attention almost exclusively to governmental affairs, was to advise the rulers of the time how they might increase the wealth and power of their states. In particular, they stressed the need to encourage agriculture and aggressive warfare. Han Fei's work, while drawing on earlier Legalist writings, represents the final and most comprehensive statement of the Legalist philosophy.

The Chinese name for Legalism is Fa-chia (School of Law), and law plays a vital role in Han Fei's thought. He advises the ruler to promulgate a detailed code of laws so that his subordinates and the populace at large will know exactly what is expected of them and what penalties await transgressors. Equally important in his vocabulary is the term *shu*, by which he designates the methods or arts employed by the ruler in selecting and manipulating his officials. From the Logicians he borrows the term *hsing-ming* ("forms and names"), and he counsels the ruler to keep constant check on both the "name" of a man's office—his roster of duties, the things he proposes to accomplish—and the "form," that is, the man's actual performance in office. If the two tally, the man is to be rewarded and promoted; if not, he is to be summarily punished. Han Fei labels rewards and punishments the "two handles" of government and insists that if the ruler deals them out in proper measure, he can invariably control his subordinates and bend them to his will.

Although Han Fei cites anecdotes from history to il-

lustrate his arguments, he refers neither to the golden age of antiquity, as do so many other early Chinese philosophers, nor to any religious or ethical principles. Conventional religious and moral concepts may be useful in shepherding the masses, but the ruler is to regard himself as above them, as he is above the rule of law. He should be guided solely by self-interest, concealing his true motives and desires and trusting no one, not even his closest friends or kin. Borrowing the language of Taoist quietism, Han Fei pictures the ideal ruler as delegating the actual conduct of affairs to his ministers while he himself passively appraises the results. He is to hold himself aloof from human contact, surrounding himself with an air of awe and mystery and inspiring in his subjects a state of constant fear.

The king of Ch'in, who continued to admire Han Fei's doctrines even after the philosopher's imprisonment and death, in time succeeded in conquering all the other states and unifying China, and in 221 BCE he assumed the title of Shih-huang-ti, or First Emperor of a new dynasty, the Ch'in. Abolishing the last remnants of feudalism, he set about creating the kind of vast bureaucracy Han Fei had envisioned, controlling the population with strict laws, standardizing weights and measures, and suppressing other philosophies, such as Confucianism, that clashed with Legalist thinking. But the dynasty scarcely survived the death of its founder in the year 210, falling victim the following year to military uprisings. Though the reasons for its downfall were numerous and complex, Chinese thinkers have traditionally blamed its rapid demise on the harsh and cynical policies of Legalism. As a school of philosophy, Legalism was discredited. Later rulers at times drew on its teachings, but they were usually careful to disguise their borrowings behind a Confucian facade. Han Fei's cogent, witty, and eloquently argued essays continued to attract readers through the centuries, but almost all expressed repulsion at his rejection of moral values and his call for government by fear. For all his incisive insight into the nature and workings of political power, his view of human nature proved to be harsher than most of his compatriots could accept.

[See also Legalism.]

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BURTON WATSON

**ḤANUKKAH** ("dedication") is the Jewish winter festival that falls on the twenty-fifth of the month of Kislev and lasts for eight days. It celebrates the victory of the Maccabees over the forces of Antiochus after a three-year battle in the second century BCE. The major sources on the festival's origin are two apocryphal books, *1 Maccabees* and *2 Maccabees*. It is stated there (*2 Mc.* 10:6-8) that the altar was rededicated and the festival of eight days introduced because during the war the Jews were unable to celebrate the eight-day festival of Sukkot. Thus in the earliest period there is no reference to Ḥanukkah as a feast of lights. That it became such is due to the Talmudic legend (B.T., *Shab.* 21b) that the Maccabees found only one small jar of oil for the kindling of the *menorah* ("candelabrum") in the Temple. This was sealed with the seal of the high priest but contained only sufficient oil to burn for a single night. By a miracle the oil lasted for eight nights. It was consequently ordained that lights be kindled on the eight nights of Ḥanukkah. However, it is stated in the Talmud (B.T., *Shab.* 21b) that the Shammaites and Hillelites, at the beginning of the present era, debated whether the lights were to be kindled in descending order (eight the first night, seven the second, etc.) or in ascending order (one the first night, two the second, etc.). If this statement is historically correct, it demonstrates either that the legend of the oil was already known at that time or that, at least, there was an association of Ḥanukkah and light even at this early period. According to some historians, the origin of the festival is to be found in pagan festivals of light in midwinter. The prayers for Ḥanukkah refer only to the victory, but in practice the kindling of the lights is the main feature of the festival.

It has long been the custom for each member of the household to kindle the Ḥanukkah lights in an eight-branched candelabrum frequently called a *menorah* (though the *menorah* in the Temple had only seven branches) but nowadays also known as a *ḥanukkiyyah*. The lights are kindled in the synagogue as well as in the home. The older practice was to use only olive oil, and this is still customary among the more pious, but the majority of Jews use candles for the Ḥanukkah lights. Rabbinical authorities have discussed whether electric lights may be used for this purpose, the consensus being to permit them. One light is kindled on the first night, two on the second night, three on the third night, and

so on until all eight are lit. In order to avoid lighting the candles one from the other, an additional candle known as the *shammash* ("retainer") is used to light the others. A declaration is recited:

We kindle these lights on account of the miracles, the deliverances, and the wonders which thou didst work for our ancestors, by means of thy holy priests. During all the eight days of Ḥanukkah these lights are sacred, neither is it permitted to make any profane use of them; but we are only to look at them, in order that we may give thanks unto thy name for thy miracles, deliverances, and wonders.

A popular Ḥanukkah hymn is *Ma'oz tsur* (O Fortress Rock), sung to a familiar melody said to have been originally that of a German drinking song.

Medieval Jewish thinkers understood the Ḥanukkah lights as representing spiritual illumination. The festival is a time for intensive study of the Torah as well as for almsgiving. Ḥanukkah is consequently treated as a more "spiritual" festival than the boisterous Purim, so that although fasting is forbidden on Ḥanukkah, there is no special festive meal. The Torah is read on each day of the festival; the passages chosen are from the account of the gifts brought by the princes at the dedication of the Tabernacle (*Nm.* 7) and the command to kindle the light of the *menorah* (*Nm.* 8:1-7). The Prophetic reading on the Sabbath of Ḥanukkah is from the vision of the *menorah* seen by Zechariah (*Zec.* 2). An addition to each of the daily prayers thanks God for delivering the strong into the hands of the weak, the many into the hands of the few, the impure into the hands of the pure, and the wicked into the hands of the righteous.

It is nowadays customary for Ḥanukkah presents to be given to children. This practice is found in none of the early sources and seems certain to have been introduced to offset the giving of Christmas presents at this season of the year.

Children and some adults play a game with a spinning top (*dreidel*) on each side of which is a different letter representing a move in the game. These letters are the initial letters of the Hebrew words making up the sentence "A great miracle happened there." To the consternation of the more conventional rabbis, card-playing is often indulged in on Ḥanukkah.

The Talmudic rabbis stress the need for proclaiming the miracle by kindling the Ḥanukkah lights outside the door of the home, but eventually this practice was discouraged because it could be misinterpreted by non-Jews as a desire to demonstrate Jewish reluctance to live among their gentile neighbors. The less obtrusive practice of kindling the lights near the door but inside the home became the norm. In modern Israel it is far

from unusual to see huge Ḥanukkah candelabra on top of public buildings and synagogues.

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LOUIS JACOBS

**HANUMĀN** is the name of a Hindu monkey god widely venerated throughout India. One of the principal characters of the Hindu epic *Rāmāyaṇa*, Hanumān is also called *Sundara* ("beautiful"), and the fifth book of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, in which Hanumān plays a central role, is called *Sundara Kāṇḍa* (Book of the Beautiful One). Here Hanumān, a minister for the monkey king Sugrīva, first comes to know of Rāma, who is searching for his wife, Sītā, who has been kidnapped. Hanumān negotiates friendship between Rāma and Sugrīva and later flies across the ocean to Lanka in order to locate Sītā. Finding her under an *aśoka* tree, he presents Rāma's signet ring as a token of recognition, conveys Rāma's message of consolation, and assures her that Rāma will come to rescue her. He then destroys a large part of Lanka, but is captured and brought before the demon king Rāvaṇa. When Hanumān coils his long tail and sits on it at a level higher than that of Rāvaṇa, the king orders that an oil-soaked cloth be wrapped around Hanumān's tail and then ignited. Hanumān flies about with his fiery tail and burns large parts of the city. He returns to Rāma to bring the message from Sītā. During the ensuing battle, Hanumān is sent to the mountains to bring *sanjīvini* ("reviving") herbs for Rāma's brother Lakṣmaṇa, who is wounded. Unable to identify the herbs, Hanumān brings the entire mountain.

There are several stories of Hanumān's miraculous and divine birth. His mother was the *apsaras* Anjanā, who was married to Kesari, but who conceived Hanumān when Vāyu, the wind god, overcome by her beauty, made love to her. Another story tells of Vāyu entering into Anjanā's body through her ear, thus causing Hanumān's conception.

When Hanumān was born he was so hungry that his mother's milk could not satisfy him. He therefore flew into the sky to eat the sun, which he thought was a fruit. The god Indra threw his thunderbolt to stop him, injuring the boy's chin. Angered by this act, the wind god took Hanumān into a cave to shelter him. But when Vāyu disappeared the people in the world were no

longer able to breathe. At the request of the gods, Brahmā entered the cave and healed Hanumān's wounds. The other gods also blessed Hanumān and conferred on him various boons, including eloquence of expression. Because of his injury, which left his jaw swollen, the child was known as Hanumān, "having a large jaw."

In folk traditions Hanumān is worshiped as a deity with magical powers and the ability to conquer evil spirits. As an unmarried god who never spilled his seed he is especially popular with body builders, because it is believed that one must be celibate in order to have a strong body. In the Jain Rāmāyaṇas, Hanumān is not a bachelor, but is married to the daughters of Khara and Sugrīva. Whereas in the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmiki Hanumān plays the role of the minister, the messenger, and the trusted servant of Rāma, in the later *bhakti* Rāmāyaṇas Hanumān is described as the supreme devotee of Rāma, and is therefore considered the model of devotion. It is believed that Hanumān first wrote the story of Rāma, but that he threw it into the ocean to give an opportunity for Vālmiki's Rāmāyaṇa to gain prominence.

[See also Rāmāyaṇa.]

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VELCHERU NARAYANA RAO

**HAOMA.** Both a "being worthy of worship" (*yazata*), or deified personification, and a substance ingested during Zoroastrian ritual sacrifices, *haoma* has an exact parallel in the *soma* of ancient India: \**sauma*, from the verb *sav* ("to press, to crush"), is the reconstructed Indo-Iranian form. [See Soma.] What the substance was originally—a plant or its sap, or a hallucinogenic mushroom such as *Amanita muscaria* (Wasson, 1968)—is not certain. What is certain, however, is that the Indo-Iranian form serves as evidence of a common ritual background in Iran and India. We also know that in both countries the original substance has been substituted with another; for centuries Zoroastrians have continued to use a species of *Ephedra* in their ritual sacrifices. This plant grows in many regions of Central Asia and Iran and yields a juice with hallucinogenic properties. *Haoma* must have been both a hallucinogen and a stimulant: it was reported in the ancient texts to give

strength, victory, health, and wisdom and to induce an ecstatic state.

The cult of *haoma*, later to become an essential part of Zoroastrian rites, was originally denounced by Zarathustra, who refers to it in the *Gāthās* in negative terms: *haoma* is the "urine" of an intoxicating drug (*Yasna* 48.10). Several scholars have opposed such an interpretation, maintaining that neither animal sacrifice nor *haoma* was ever denounced by the prophet (R. C. Zaehner, Marijan Molé, and Mary Boyce), but their arguments are not convincing. The complex of rites, myths, and legends connected with *haoma* belongs to the pre-Zoroastrian Indo-Iranian tradition and is at the center of a scenario dominated by the warlike god Indra, who, in Zoroastrianism, was relegated to the rank of demon. It is most likely, then, that the acceptance and use of the drug was a reintegration that occurred in the religion after the time of the prophet. In the later texts of the Avesta, *Haoma*, like other beings readmitted to the cult, is a *yazata* to whom a hymn, the Hōm Yasht (*Yasna* 9–11), is dedicated. The hymn is recited during one of the most important parts of the complex ceremony of the Yasna. At the end of the recitation, the officiating priest drinks *haoma* that has already been prepared and consecrated ritually according to meticulous rules of purification, presumably in order to induce an ecstatic state.

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GHERARDO GNOLI

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**HAQĪQAT MUḤAMMADĪYAH.** See Nur Muḥammad.

**ḤARAM AND ḤAWṬAH.** Arabian society may be described as a conglomeration of individual tribal units normally in a state of war, truce, or alliance with other tribal units, whether these tribes are settled in villages and towns or are migratory herders. Unarmed traders, artisans, and peasants are subject to the noble (*sharīf*) tribes, who consider them weak (*ḍa'īf*) and ignoble. Occasions inevitably arise when tribes, even if at war, must meet on neutral ground in physical security: to attend markets, to make political arrangements such as a truce, and for purposes of religion. Since tribal lords find it hard to accept the authority of their peers, when it becomes necessary for someone to preside over tribal arbitrations, to provide a secure forum for their meetings and even to impose certain sanctions upon them, they require an authority with supernatural backing to preside in territory not subject to tribal law. Consequently, they turn to a family regarded as having holy attributes, deriving supreme authority from a divine source, and so exercising the functions committed to it through a prophet or saint.

The institution known in ancient Arabia as *ḥaram* (and probably also *maḥram*), and in parts of contemporary south Arabia as *ḥawṭah*, is closely associated with such holy houses. It is a sacred enclave containing a shrine, administered in Shāfi'ī territory by a lord called a *manṣab* (or sometimes *manṣūb*), subject to divine law and independent of the surrounding tribal territory (*aḥ-bāṭ*). The inviolability of the sacred enclave is guaranteed by its tribal supporters (*anṣār*) as in the case of Medina and, for example, Anṣār Mawlā al-Dawīlah in Wādī Ḥaḍramawt. *Ḥaram* and *ḥawṭah*, the terms for the inviolable sacred enclave, appear to be related semantically to *maḥjar* and *ḥimā*, terms for interdicted pastures: the root of each of these commences with the root letter *ḥā'*. In addition, the *ḥimā* of al-Ṭā'if appears to have had religious associations.

The *hijrah* of northern Zaydī Yemen, while distinct from *ḥaram* and *ḥawṭah*, is an institution of related pattern. Although it is not attested in the first Islamic centuries, it seems to be foreshadowed in certain pre-Islamic inscriptions. For example, in the expression "wb'sh'b dhhmdn whgrhmw w'rbhmw" ("the tribes of Hamdan and their protected persons [*hijar*] and their tribal [bedouin] Arabs"), the term *hijar* (sg., *hijrah*) means both the protected persons and the place where they reside.

The sacred enclave in its most primitive form is prob-

ably exemplified by the *ḥawṭah* of Mughshin (northeast of Zafār, on the edge of the Arabian sands), where to cut bush or to kill hares brings misfortune. As in the simple desert *ḥawṭah*, bush may not be cut nor may birds or animals be slain in the Meccan *ḥaram*, a highly developed institution.

*Ḥrm* and *mḥrm*, translated as "sanctuary," are attested in the *Sabaic Dictionary* (Louvain, 1982). Maḥram Bilqīs, the name the Arabs give to the ruins of the pre-Islamic temple of Ilumquh at Mārib, is well known. The sanctuary of the god Dhū Samāwī at al-Ḥazm of the Yemenite Jawf was set in a sacred enclave: the inscription identifying it refers to a *maḥram* and *mnṣbt*. *Mnṣbt* means a place of *anṣāb* or boundary stones which, as is known, marked the Meccan *ḥaram*, and when Muḥammad founded the *ḥaram* at Yathrib (the pre-Islamic name of Medina) he had its bounds marked out in the same way. Oaths were taken by the Anṣāb al-Ka'bah and sacrifices made to them. The *ḥawṭah* is also marked out with boundary cairns, and on entering it one dismounts out of respect for it.

**Inviolability of the Enclaves.** The tribes recognized the inviolability of the *ḥaram* or *ḥawṭah* to such an extent that in ancient times the Quraysh would raid outside Mecca but find safety by returning to its *ḥaram*, a pattern also followed by the tribes of Musaylimah's *ḥaram*. It cannot, however, be assumed that they thereby escaped scot-free, for, to judge from procedure at the *ḥawṭah* in our times, a case would still be brought by the injured party against those tribes; this may indeed almost be deduced from episodes connected with Musaylimah's *ḥaram*.

The deed of Muḥammad's foundation of the Yathrib *ḥaram*, which subsequently became Madīnat al-Nabī, "the prophet's town," is conveyed in documents F and H of the "Eight Documents" (the so-called Constitution of Medina). The regulations they contain, along with those quoted by the historian Wāqidi and the geographer Yāqūt, can also reasonably be considered to represent the law of the pre-Islamic era. Document F states that "this writing does not intervene between a wrongdoer and one committing a criminal act." In his geographical dictionary the *Mu'jam*, Yāqūt says, "Who-soever enters it [the Meccan *ḥaram*] is secure, and he who commits an aggression in any other territory, and then takes refuge in it, is safe when he enters it and when he leaves it the punishments are applied to him." Similarly, the *manṣab* will take a murderer who has sought refuge in the *ḥawṭah* under his protection and conduct the man back to his tribe; the two tribes affected will then have the case brought to the *manṣab* for arbitration.

Murder in the *ḥaram* or *ḥawṭah* is a heinous crime:

the murder of the caliph 'Uthmān in the Medinese *ḥaram* was pointed to as a major offense by his relative Mu'āwiyah. In such a case the *manṣab* of the *ḥawṭah* writes to the chief of the offending clan and the chiefs of all of the other tribes, making them responsible for dealing with the crime. The guilty clan hastily sends the *manṣab* a propitiatory gift, *suqtān* (corresponding to *ṣarf wa-'adl* in the "Eight Documents"). All the *ḥawṭah* tribes then assemble at the *manṣab's* house, and the headman of the guilty clan, or even the *manṣab* himself, will take the murderer's dagger and slash his brow with it until it bleeds, to demonstrate that the man's honor (*wijh*) has been besmirched. This symbolic action is referred to in a Minean inscription and also in the biography (*sīrah*) of the prophet Muḥammad, where it is called *tajbih* and is accompanied by blackening the face. To expiate the offense the guilty tribe must execute one of its own members, not necessarily the murderer, or else all of the other tribes will unite to attack it until atonement is exacted by slayings adequate to the seriousness of the crime of violation.

As any offense against the *manṣab* or persons under his protection is regarded as infringing on respect to him, an astute *manṣab* can attain great power by playing off one tribe against another. He may even succeed in forming a small theocratic state. Given the tribes' need for a supreme authority deriving power from a divine source, the theocratic state seems a natural development in Arabia, and it is thought that the pre-Islamic *mukarribs* ruled over theocracies. Leaving aside questions of revelation, there are obvious political parallels between this pattern and the process whereby Muḥammad established himself in Yathrib.

**Hijrah.** At this point the *hijrah* must be reconsidered in terms of its Yemeni usage and as Muḥammad's Hijrah, nowadays usually translated as his "migration" from Mecca to Medina. "Muḥammad's *hijrah* chiefly involves the concept of seeking protection with powerful armed tribes, even if *hijrah* does [also] mean one's physical transference from one place to another" (Serjeant and Lewcock, 1983, p. 40b). He left the protection of his own tribe, Quraysh, for that of the arms-bearing tribes of Yathrib. In the Yemen sayyids or others (e.g. the Ma-shāyikh Bayt al-Aḥmar, who are the *hijrah* of the Ḥāshid confederation) may seek tribal protection. The tribes assemble and decide to grant *hijrah* on the basis of the applicant's sanctity, learning, and other qualities. A person thus protected does not fight or contribute to blood-wit or any levy (*ghurm*) the tribe imposes on itself for war, blood-wit, or entertainment. The *hijrah*, if a man of religion, is considered an ultimate arbiter (*marja'*) and an example to be imitated (*qudwah*), judging in quarrels, marriage, and divorce, and writing

amulets for people and cattle. So *hijrahs* often become centers of religious learning. Sanaa city is *muhajjar*, that is, protected by seven large tribal groups in its vicinity. A tribesman slaying there must restore the city's respect (*tahjīr*) by paying a fine and slaughtering an 'aqīrah ("sacrificial animal") at the gate of the city. The prophet Muḥammad became the ultimate arbiter (*marja'*) at Yathrib, exercising functions not dissimilar to those of the *hijrah* sayyids and *manṣabs* of *ḥawṭahs*, although he did not write amulets.

The pre-Islamic *ḥaram* would be protected by the god whose shrine it contained. In Mecca this was the Ka'bah, which the *ḥadīth* suggests was a tent, probably a symbolic form of the square black tent known in the south as *karbah*. It was the sanctuary of Allāh of Quraysh, known as Quraysh Allāh. With the growth of Quraysh power in Arabia a pantheon seems to have accrued to the original cult. Infringement of the *ḥaram* laws brought divine punishment because the *ḥaram* was regarded as able to defend itself by supernatural means, as Yathrib did at the Battle of the Trench, following which the Prophet established his *ḥaram* there.

The annual pilgrimage to the Meccan *ḥaram* was the major event of the year; entertainment was provided through a tax levied for the purpose and through private contributions. The pilgrims came in chanting the *talbiyah*, verses addressing the god, as today they would call out "Ya Hūd!" and chant the *tahwid* to the prophet Hūd at his annual pilgrimage. The Meccan pilgrimage was of a pattern common to the Arabian Peninsula to judge by an inscription which details regulations for the pilgrimage to Almaqah at Mārib. There the god Ta'lab is to receive tithes from which he will provide a banquet. Animals under Ta'lab's protection are not to be hunted.

Islam abolished the gods of paganism and left no partner to Allāh, but the sacred enclaves have remained, the *ḥawṭahs* with their pilgrimages. Those pilgrimages are either annual events or are made out of season for special private requests of the saints whose tombs are usually found in the *ḥawṭahs*: the pilgrims circumambulate the tombs, grasping the four corner-posts as they pass. To this day also the *manṣab* must provide from his revenues for a feast at pilgrimage time and entertain visitors throughout the year.

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R. B. SERJEANT

**HARAPPA.** See Indus Valley Religion.

**HARNACK, ADOLF VON** (1851–1930), German Protestant church historian and theologian. Carl Gustav Adolf von Harnack was born in Dorpat (now Tartu), in the Russian province of Livonia, where his father, Theodosius Harnack (1817–1889), was a professor of theology at the German-dominated university. He was educated at the universities of Dorpat and Leipzig, received the Ph.D. in 1873, and began lecturing on church history at Leipzig in 1874. In 1879 he went, as full professor, to Giessen, in 1886 to Marburg, and in 1888 to the University of Berlin, where he taught until his retirement in 1921, thereafter lecturing as emeritus professor until the spring of 1929.

Harnack was the premier historian in modern times of early Christianity and, with Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923), the foremost spokesman of a liberal Protestantism that sought to "overcome dogma by history." He insisted that the rise and development of Christianity could be understood solely by the use of the historical-critical method, that is, by impartial study of the extant Christian literature, to the exclusion of all metahistorical sources and standards of judgment such as authoritative church dogma or belief in an infallible teaching office or an inerrant Bible.

History, for Harnack, meant above all documentary history. Building on the seminal studies of early Christianity by F. C. Baur (1792–1860) and Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), he established early church history on secure textual foundations. Many of his more than sixteen hundred publications were critical editions of patristic texts, and he supervised the publication of hundreds of others, chiefly in the series "Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur" (1882–), of which he was a founder. He summarized the results of this textual scholarship in his *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius* (1893–1904).

Harnack wrote penetrating studies of monasticism and of church polity in Christianity's first two centuries. He also wrote what is still the foundational history of

the early Christian missionary enterprise, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (1902; translated as *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, 1908). His true métier, however, was not institutional history but the history of doctrine—research that culminated in his monumental *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (1885–1890; translated as *History of Dogma*, 1894–1899). Dogma, in Harnack's narrow definition, referred exclusively to the trinitarian and christological dogmas formulated by general church councils in the fourth and fifth centuries. Whereas Ritschl had stressed the gradual de-judaization of Christianity as the central factor in the development of early Christian doctrine, Harnack emphasized the progressive hellenization of Christianity, holding that Christian dogma was "a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the gospel." This did not mean that the gospel (the original teaching of Jesus) had entirely disappeared into dogma, or that the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation were sheer speculation, but that Greek philosophy of religion and its attendant intellectualism had shaped Christian dogmatic thought from its inception. Thus Christian faith came to be dependent on metaphysics and, most shocking of all to Harnack, a "fancied Christ" had been put in the place of the real, historical one.

In Harnack's judgment, moreover, the mainline Protestant reformers had failed to break decisively with "dogmatic Christianity," though their root religious principles actually undermined the authority of all dogma. Martin Luther, for example, had delivered the Christian faith from moralism, ritualism, hierarchicalism, and philosophical speculation, yet he continued to adhere to the old dogmas, even grounding his piety on them, and thus gave them a new vitality and authority within the Evangelical church. The result of this "unfinished Reformation" was a Protestantism beset by ordinance, doctrine, and ceremony. What was urgently required, therefore, was a "critical reduction of dogma," to be carried out in fidelity to the animating concerns of Reformation religion and to be achieved by a rigorous historical criticism that would distinguish between the timeless "kernel" of Christianity and its timebound "husks." Harnack took up this task in his most popular book, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1900; translated as *What Is Christianity?*, 1903), based on lectures to students of all faculties at Berlin in 1899–1900.

The "essence of Christianity"—its element of permanent validity as distinguished from its transient historical forms—is the gospel, above all as Jesus proclaimed it but also as it has repeatedly found expression in the course of Christian history. Appropriating the leading



theological themes of his mentor, Ritschl, Harnack contended that the gospel is a simple and self-authenticating phenomenon, centering on the rule of the holy God in the trusting heart, on the experience of God as loving father and thus the assurance of the infinite value of the human soul, and on an ethical life marked by an abiding disposition to the good, under God's grace, and by neighborly love and mercy. Hence the gospel is essentially timeless, and it addresses a human nature that, religiously viewed, is also unchanging—ever yearning for “the presence of the Eternal in time” and so for a vindication of the ultimate worth of the human spirit over against an indifferent natural order. This gospel, accordingly, requires no metaphysical foundations, no articulation in binding dogmas, no elaborate ritual, and no institutional guarantees. The religion of the Christian gospel, Harnack concluded, is not only “undogmatic” and “perennial,” but also shows itself to be a “cultural” religion in the proper sense, namely, one uniquely responsive to modern man's insistent quest for the meaning of life.

Controversy surrounded Harnack throughout his career. The most bitter conflict broke out in 1892, when he proposed that the Apostles' Creed be replaced in liturgical worship by a shorter confession of faith based on Reformation principles and on the results of modern historical scholarship. Though denied all official recognition by the Evangelical church, he was the most widely honored theologian of his time. In 1890 he was elected to the Prussian Academy of Sciences and in 1900, on the occasion of its two-hundredth anniversary, he wrote the academy's official history. He was a founder and the first president (1903–1911) of the Evangelical-Social Congress. From 1905 to 1921 he was director general of the Royal Library in Berlin. He served as the first president (1911–1930) of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft for the Advancement of the Sciences (now called the Max Planck Gesellschaft). In 1914 he was raised to the dignity of hereditary nobility by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Harnack's theology went into eclipse soon after his death, largely owing to its repudiation by Karl Barth (1886–1968) and other leaders of the regnant Protestant neoorthodoxy. Church historians and theologians otherwise sympathetic to Harnack's program have criticized his narrow definition of dogma, his thesis of hellenization, and his cardinal notion of a “timeless gospel” for a “timeless humanity.” Nevertheless, his reputation as the greatest modern student of the ancient church is secure, and his insistence that Christianity must be interpreted by the historical method has been upheld.

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Harnack's thought has been discussed most fully by Karl H. Neufeld, S.J., in two works: *Adolf von Harnack: Theologie als Suche nach der Kirche* (Paderborn, 1977) and *Adolf von Harnacks Konflikt mit der Kirche* (Innsbruck, 1979). The best treatment to date in English is by G. Wayne Glick, *The Reality of Christianity: A Study of Adolf von Harnack as Historian and Theologian* (New York, 1967), to be supplemented by Wilhelm Pauck's *Harnack and Troeltsch: Two Historical Theologians* (Oxford, 1968), a masterly essay by a former student of Harnack at Berlin. Harnack's interpretation of Luther and of Reformation thought is considered by Jaroslav Pelikan in his essay “Adolf von Harnack on Luther,” in *Interpreters of Luther: Essays in Honor of Wilhelm Pauck*, edited by Pelikan (Philadelphia, 1968), pp. 253–274. Harnack's indebtedness to Albrecht Ritschl and his controversy with Karl Barth are discussed, respectively, by E. P. Meijering in *Theologische Urteile über die Dogmengeschichte: Ritschls Einfluss auf von Harnack* (Leiden, 1978) and by H. Martin Rumscheidt in *Revelation and Theology: An Analysis of the Barth-Harnack Correspondence of 1923* (Cambridge, 1972).

DAVID W. LOTZ

**HARRIS, WILLIAM WADE** (c. 1865–1928), leader of a mass movement to Christianity in Africa that inspired creation of an African Christian church. The prophet Harris created the largest mass movement to Christianity in the history of the African continent and revolutionized the religious life of the southern Ivory Coast. He paved the way for the growth of the Catholic church and the establishment of the Protestant church and for the creation of several indigenous religious institutions. Most significant among these is the Harrist Church of the Ivory Coast, which institutionalized his teachings. His impact was unique among the movements to Christianity led by African prophets in that it reflected totally indigenous initiative in a population not previously christianized by missionaries. [See also African Religions, *article on Modern Movements.*]

A Grebo from southeastern Liberia, Harris was familiar with Western customs and literate in both English and Grebo as a result of mission schooling. He became an Episcopalian lay preacher, taught in a mission school, directed a boarding school, and worked as a government interpreter.

When antagonism between the Grebo and the Liberian government broke out, Harris led several acts of rebellion against the government. In 1909 he was imprisoned for treason for leading an alleged coup d'état attempt. During his imprisonment he had a vision of the angel Gabriel that convinced him he was God's last prophet, charged with the divine mission of bringing Christianity to all those people not yet converted. In 1913, after his release from prison, Harris went to the Ivory Coast, where his message was well received. The Ivoirians, who found their traditional spiritual guardians ineffective in warding off the colonial onslaught, welcomed Harris's message of a stronger spiritual force.

Harris told them to destroy the altars, masks, and other material representations associated with their indigenous religion and to worship the Christian god as he taught them. In little more than one year, he had baptized what colonial officials estimated at from 100,000 to 120,000 people; Catholic missionaries, who had been summoned by the colonial government to inculcate loyalty to France among its new subjects, had succeeded in baptizing only 400 people in the previous two decades.

To complete the christianization of those he baptized, Harris sent them to the Catholic missions and to his Protestant disciples from Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) who were working in the Ivory Coast. In areas where there were neither missions nor disciples, Harris delegated village leaders to teach their fellow villagers what they had learned from him.

The Catholic missions were inundated with Harris's converts, and his African Protestant disciples continued to convert and teach multitudes in the prophet's name. When a Protestant missionary from Europe arrived in the Ivory Coast in 1924, expecting to find no Ivoirian Protestants because there had been no European Protestant missionaries there, he encountered tens of thousands of Ivoirians worshiping autonomously, calling themselves Harrist Protestants and exhorting him to send the "teachers with Bibles" Harris had said would come to teach them the word of God.

Although some of the Ivoirians who had been worshiping autonomously were initially drawn to the Protestant missionaries, they became disaffected when the Protestants attacked fundamental social institutions such as polygamy and sought to undermine the power of Harris's disciples. In 1926 a Protestant delegation returned from a visit to Harris in Liberia with a message telling his converts to join the Protestant church, but in 1928 an Ivoirian delegation went to tell the prophet of their grievances against the missionaries. This group returned from Liberia with a "last will and testament" from Harris that supported their desire to worship in-

dependently. John Ahui, the young member of the delegation whom Harris chose to continue his mission, perpetuated the prophet's teachings and founded the Harrist Church of the Ivory Coast, of which he remains the patriarch.

Harris's message to the Ivoirians was both spiritual and secular. He urged them to stop worshiping the nature spirits that had failed to protect them from conquest by the French and instead to worship the omnipotent creator god who would bring them prosperity, a return to their state of sovereignty, and access to the knowledge and technology of their conquerors. He offered them his own example as an African who, as a result of his schooling and resultant professional positions, could function in the world of the Europeans and Americans as well as in an African milieu. Thus the unprecedented movement of religious conversion that missionaries characterized as a "tidal wave" or "avalanche" to Christianity also had a secular influence; Harris's movement inspired Ivoirians to learn the pragmatic tactics necessary to regain their sovereignty and to create new institutions within which to do so.

Because he inspired Ivoirians to such manifestations of collective indigenous initiative, which the colonial administration perceived as a direct threat to its control over its subjects, Harris was expelled from the Ivory Coast in 1914. Those who persevered in worshiping as Harris had taught them were persecuted by the colonial officials, often with the assistance of the Catholic missionaries.

The Harrist church appealed to Ivoirians because it represented a form of Christianity based on indigenous organizational, conceptual, and ritual structures. Harris had such appeal to the Ivoirians not only because he considered the conceptual structures and preoccupations of the traditional religion but also because he offered desirable solutions to the immediate problems engendered by the colonial situation. Additionally, Harris's style of presentation corresponded to the indigenous mold pioneered by priests of the traditional nature spirits.

That the prophet Harris was a native Liberian is significant because of Liberia's special meaning in Africa. Created by Afro-Americans seeking freedom from the oppression of American racism, Liberia was a symbol of the possibility of the redemption of Africa from European exploitation by and for Africans and their descendants abroad.

Influential Afro-American leaders in Liberia, such as Edward Wilmot Blyden, believed that Afro-Americans could share with the Africans the benefits of Western knowledge and experience, to be synthesized with the Africans' own wisdom and techniques for the creation

of a new sovereignty. It is therefore particularly appropriate that William Wade Harris, a symbol of African potential for the Ivoirians, should have brought his message from Liberia, a symbol of African potential and freedom from oppression.

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SHEILA S. WALKER

**HARRISON, JANE E.** (1850–1928), English authority on ancient Greek religion. Harrison, one of the first female students of the University of Cambridge, taught classics throughout her career at Newnham College, Cambridge. Her reputation rests primarily on three works: *Prolegomena to the History of Greek Religion* (1903), *Themis* (1912), and *Epilegomena* (1921).

*Prolegomena*, published when its author was fifty-three years old, testifies to her recognition of the importance of the still comparatively new disciplines of archaeology and anthropology at a time when most teachers of the Greek and Latin classics were convinced not only that the objects of their study contained nothing of the "primitive" but also that the behavior of "primitive" societies could teach them nothing relevant to their studies. For Harrison, the living essence of Greek religion was not the Olympians, so prominent in the literature and in the major temples of Greece, but the ancient rituals, performed long after their original significance was forgotten. In the spirit of the anthropology of her day, she was both evolutionist and comparatist, but for her, evolution did not necessarily result in progress. In the introduction to *Themis* she characterized the gods of Homer, the sculptors, and the mythographers as "like a bouquet of cut flowers, whose bloom is brief, because

they have been severed from their roots." The goal of *Prolegomena* was to discover those roots.

Harrison was always open to new influences: in the introduction to *Themis* Bergson and Durkheim appear, joined in the preface to the second edition (1927) by Freud, who, together with Gilbert Murray, had convinced her that "the full-blown god, the Olympian, has a biological function which could never be adequately filled by the [eniautos-] daimon [that is, the "year-spirit"] who lies behind each and every primitive god." The analysis of the year-spirit, together with his ritual, is the goal of *Themis*. Harrison did not abandon belief in the *eniautos-daimon*, of whose importance field anthropologists were by this time supplying evidence, but she now acknowledged that the Olympians were not merely the products of art and literature and that they served a religious function. The balance had already been corrected in *Epilegomena*, whose publication preceded the second edition of *Themis*. In *Epilegomena* the influence of Freud and Jung is everywhere apparent, together with that of "the greatest of Russian philosophers," Vladimir Solov'ev.

For a variety of reasons *Themis* was not well received. It presented so many new ideas, and drew on so many disciplines, that even workers in the field who sympathized with Harrison's approach to her subject confessed themselves puzzled by some of the work. The introduction to *Themis* claims to give a simple account of the book's contents, but the account merely highlights the complexity. Harrison had an insatiable appetite for new material, for fresh light on the world and its ways. When she wrote *Themis* her ideas, stimulated by the new material, were still in ferment. The book's plan and argument are less clear than its author supposed at the time of publication. In addition, some readers found the book threatening. *Prolegomena* concerns ancient Greece, and indeed a period long antedating the Greek classics. *Themis* may be concerned with explaining certain Greek cults and rituals, but its thesis of the development of deities from the collective representations of group rituals evidently had a wider relevance. Harrison, an agnostic and a lifelong member of the Rationalist Association, had come to value the religious impulse as an attempt to "apprehend life as one, as indivisible, yet as perennial movement and change." But all dogmas and creeds and the gods associated with them were in her eyes "the *eidola* of man's market-place . . . dead men, hollow ghosts."

*Epilegomena* exhibits a change. Its preface states the book's goal as not merely to summarize the results of many years' work on the origins of Greek religion but to indicate the bearing of these results on religious questions of today. Its third chapter, "The Religion of

Today," presents an ascetic view of life which commands her approval. *Epilegomena* most clearly charts Harrison's intellectual development; read before *Prolegomena* and *Themis*, it clarifies the views expressed in her earlier books.

Breadth of vision, empathy, and enthusiasm characterize Harrison's work. Its fate is inevitably linked with that of the anthropologists, psychologists, and philosophers whose thought stimulated and molded her own. Some of her conclusions, inevitably, are now of merely historic interest, but the subsequent development of the study of Greek religion has been profoundly influenced by her work.

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A. W. H. ADKINS

**HARTLAND, E. SIDNEY** (1848–1927), English folklorist and armchair anthropologist. Hartland is a good example of the polymaths produced by the Victorian era, contributing prolifically to a wide range of topics but practically forgotten today. Although he wrote books on primitive law, primitive society, and the priority of matrilineal kinship, Hartland's favorite subject was religion, and his opinions obtained attention not only in his native Britain but from such leading figures of the day as the French comparatist Marcel Mauss and the Austrian theorist and historian of religion Wilhelm Schmidt.

Among Hartland's contributions to the study of religion may be mentioned his theory of magic and religion. He considered that early man's awe and wonder were aroused by his sense of a power behind appearances. Through personification early man shaped gods or spirits with humanlike dispositions, making it natural for him to attempt to placate or control them ritually. Thus, although magic and religion can be distinguished—the one using coercive ritual procedures, the other propitiatory—they spring from the same psychological root and are interwoven in human practice.

A like reductionism appears in Hartland's study of Celtic and Teutonic fairy tales. Assuming the unity of the human imagination, he held that questions concerning the nature and distribution of these tales lead into the domain of psychology. But it is a psychology that must be reconstructed from the simplest and most ar-

chaic phenomena that anthropological research can discover. The pursuit of this method led Hartland from Celts and Teutons to other European peoples and, beyond them, to Pacific islanders and American Indians, among others. The result was that stories familiar to some of Hartland's Western contemporaries were traced to a more primitive state of society and a more archaic plane of thought.

In criticizing such writers as Hartland, Mauss pointed out that they explained the form of religious institutions by appealing to individual mental processes to the neglect of social needs and interrelationships among institutions. This premise fell into disfavor late in Hartland's life with the rise of a socially and culturally oriented anthropology. Similarly the emphasis on intensive local fieldwork made the comparative method applied by Hartland seem antiquated.

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*The Science of Fairy Tales* (London, 1891) offers a most readable entry to Hartland's thinking about traditional oral literature and to his application of the comparative method, while the three volumes of *The Legend of Perseus* (London, 1894–1896) show his sustained and detailed attempt to trace the appearances of a single story and to relate them to "custom" and "superstition." Both these early works invite comparison with later ventures toward a science of mythology. Hartland's opinions on a range of religious topics are conveniently collected in *Ritual and Belief: Studies in the History of Religion* (London, 1914).

KENNETH MADDOCK

**ḤASAN AL-BAṢRĪ** (AH 21–110/642–728 CE), famous Muslim ascetic of the generation following the prophet Muḥammad. The son of a freed slave, he was born in Medina and brought up in nearby Wādī al-Qurā. During the First Civil War, which resulted in the rise of the Umayyad caliphate, Ḥasan moved to Basra, where he settled permanently after a brief career as holy warrior in what is now Afghanistan and as secretary to the governor of Khorasan.

To a simple religious spirit such as Ḥasan, the social and economic changes accompanying the schisms and *coups d'état* within Islam amounted to an excess of worldliness. Thus he reacted much more sharply to this disease in the hearts and behavior of the people than he did to the tyranny of the Umayyad government, then personified in al-Ḥajjāj, the governor of Iraq. Though openly critical of the Umayyads, Ḥasan refused to "bid them good and forbid them evil" (because, he said, their swords were faster than our tongues) or to participate in uprisings against them. Likewise, he advised others not to oppose by the sword a punishment or test from

God, such as the tyrant al-Ḥajjāj, but to face it with patience and repentance: God, said Ḥasan, brings change and relief through these means rather than through hasty resort to violence. Thus, a Khārijī who tries to right a wrong (through violence) commits a greater wrong.

Although he was an acknowledged expert in the Islamic religious sciences of *tafsīr* (Qur'anic exegesis), *fiqh* (jurisprudence), and *ḥadīth* (traditions of the Prophet), and he was also said to have lectured and written books on these subjects, Ḥasan's fame rests on his pietistic and dogmatic concerns. Here his interest lay not in theological doctrine but in the quality of faith and action, in the inner, genuinely sincere, pious life of the heart translated into an outer, morally upright, ascetic mode of living. Equipped with extensive knowledge and a living memory of the practice of the Prophet's companions, an attractive personality, an eloquent tongue, and most of all, a fearful heart and an upright character, Ḥasan engaged in preaching against worldliness and its resulting hypocrisy. His sermons and letters are grim reminders of the transience of worldly life, the permanent value of the life in the hereafter, and the inevitability of death and divine retribution, as well as moving exhortations to fear God and foster sincere faith and upright conduct. The *munāfiqūn*, those worldlings with skin-deep faith and readiness to sin, were morally aberrant believers in acute danger of hellfire and hence urgently in need of help.

Ḥasan's doctrine of *qadar* (free will) was also morally inspired, directed as it was against the sinners' deterministic rationalizations. Challenged by Caliph 'Abd al-Malik to defend and define his position, he indicated that humans have power (*qudrah*) to choose freely; that good and guidance come from God, who has foreknowledge of both good and evil (the latter coming from humans or the devil); that God's predestination is not coercive nor his foreknowledge prohibitive for human free choice. The reports that Ḥasan recanted his belief in free will were probably later attempts by the orthodox Sunnīs to clear his reputation of what had come to be regarded as heresy, although the possibility remains that he did partially modify his position.

The fact that both the Ṣūfīs and the Mu'tazilah regarded Ḥasan as one of their forerunners is a mark of his importance and influence as an ascetic and a theologian. It is even more remarkable that the Sunnīs take pains to count him among their own predecessors despite his novel attitudes in matters of piety and dogma. And it is a measure of his immediate impact that on the day Ḥasan died, evening prayers could not be held in the mosques because the whole city of Basra was busy attending his funeral.

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Besides numerous fragments of sermons (*mawā'iz*) and a few bits and pieces of his Qur'anic exegesis, some of Ḥasan's letters (*rasā'il*) have survived, including those addressed to caliphs 'Abd al-Malik and 'Umar II. In addition, Ḥasan has been frequently quoted as an authority in *tafsīr*, *ḥadīth*, and *fiqh* literature, as well as *ādāb* (belles lettres) and *akhlāq* (ethics, particularly exhortative).

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HASAN QASIM MURAD

**HASIDISM.** [This entry consists of three articles concerning Jews identified as *Ḥasidim* (Pietists):

An Overview

Habad Hasidism

Satmar Hasidism

*The introductory article disusses the origins, principal personages, and main features of eastern European Hasidism in the eighteenth through twentieth centuries; the companion articles focus on the two main Hasidic dynastic movements. For discussion of the pietistic movement of Jews in medieval Germany (ḥasidut Ashkenaz), see Ashkenazic Hasidism.]*

## An Overview

Hasidism is the common appellation of a Jewish pietistic movement that developed in eastern Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century, became, before the end of that century, a major force in modern Judaism, and has remained as such into the twentieth century. Previous Hasidic movements in Jewish history—mainly the Ashkenazic Hasidism of medieval Germany (twelfth–thirteenth centuries) and the early *ḥasidim* of the tannaitic period (first–second centuries CE)—will not be discussed here. Rather, the movement at hand is that called, in the writings of the opponents of Hasidism and some historians, "Beshtian Hasidism," a

sobriquet that refers to the movement's founder, Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer, known as the Besht (an acronym for Ba'al Shem Tov, "Master of the Good Name").

**Roots of the Movement.** Hasidism did not emerge, as most other Jewish religious movements did, from the schools of the higher social strata and leading intellectuals. Its first teachers belonged to a social group of popular preachers who used to wander from one community to the other, usually among the smaller and poorer Jewish communities in Podolia and the neighboring areas. Many of these preachers were suspected of Shabbatean tendencies, and they found their audience among the small merchants and the poor in peripheral areas. This fact influenced the later development of the Hasidic movement. Even after Hasidism grew dominant in larger communities, it remained faithful to the social groups that supported it in its early beginnings, and an awareness of the religious needs of the uneducated and the poor became one of the traits of the movement.

Attempts to describe Hasidism as a movement of social rebellion of the poor against the rich, the downtrodden masses against the leaders, have failed. There is no evidence that the Hasidic teachers intended to change the social structure of Jewish communities. But Hasidism did emphasize the ability of the lower social groups to actively participate and achieve a high position in Jewish religious practice.

The religious background for the appearance of the Hasidic movement is the Shabbatean crisis. While various historians differ in their descriptions of the main reasons for the emergence of Hasidism and in their evaluation of the social and cultural reasons for its success, there is little doubt that the movement served as an answer to the most profound religious crisis that affected Judaism from the late seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries. Gershom Scholem described Hasidism as the neutralization of the messianic element in Judaism after the Shabbatean crisis, and while some scholars insisted that there are messianic elements in Hasidism, none disputed the direct relationship between Hasidic theology and the Shabbatean sects that flourished in eastern Europe in the eighteenth century.

Jewish theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many of whom persisted in believing in the messianism of Shabbetai Tsevi, had to develop a theology that would explain the paradox of a messiah committing the worst possible transgression against orthodox Judaism—Shabbetai Tsevi's conversion to Islam in 1666. Various theologies were developed, some of which called upon the believers to follow the messiah and convert to Islam, thereby creating a "coalition" between Judaism and Islam against Christianity; others main-

tained that belief in Shabbetai Tsevi could be continued within Judaism provided the believer express his attachment to the new messianic, redemptive period that began with the appearance of Shabbetai Tsevi. These expressions eventually covered a whole range of possibilities, from the most anarchistic, antinomian ones of the Frankist movement in Poland in the middle of the eighteenth century to the mild celebrations of Tish'ah be-Av (the ninth day of the month of Av, the day of the destruction of the Temple and a day of fasting, which the Shabbateans turned into a celebration of Shabbetai Tsevi's birthday).

Among the various expressions of the continued belief in Shabbetai Tsevi as the Messiah, two are of interest in understanding the beginnings of Hasidism: the most radical one and the most orthodox one. The radical Frankist movement, which proclaimed that in the new messianic world the way to preserve the Torah was to destroy it, was regarded as a sign of a deep crisis in Jewish religion and education. The Frankists, before converting to Christianity, participated in a religious dispute (in Kamenets in 1757 and in Lvov in 1759) during which they were reported to have directed a blood libel (accusation of a murder for ritual purposes) against their Jewish coreligionists. This aberrational movement, which included some very tempting ideas that captured the hearts of many, signified the need for a reformulation of Jewish organized religious life as well as for the formulation of new answers to basic theological questions, especially the interpretation of qabbalistic symbols from the thirteenth century *Zohar* and from the teachings of Isaac Luria of Safad (1534–1572) that were used extensively by the Shabbateans.

The other side of the Shabbatean response to the conversion was a retreat to ultra-orthodoxy or cryptoorthodoxy, often with some pietistic ("Hasidic") elements. Explaining that the crisis of the Shabbatean endeavor was caused by the insufficient spiritual support the messiah received from his followers, these Shabbateans adopted a way of life that emphasized continued practice of repentance, self-negation, and insistence on strict adherence to every detail of Jewish religious law. Groups of such *hasidim* appeared in several Jewish communities in eastern Europe that were the centers for spiritual seeking. Not all of their members were Shabbateans, and the Shabbateans themselves were divided in many ways. But when the new Hasidic movement emerged, it did so against the background of several groups or sects of *hasidim* that had already become a common phenomenon in the major centers of Jewish culture in eastern Europe.

The relationship of Hasidism to Shabbateanism and the Frankist movement is complicated. On the one

hand, an early Hasidic legend tells how in the Besht's participation in the Lvov disputation of 1759, he defended Judaism from the accusations of the Frankists. On the other hand, another Hasidic tradition quotes the Besht as lamenting the conversion of the Frankists following that disputation, claiming that as long as a limb is connected to the divine body of the Shekhinah it can be cured, but once severed it is lost forever. In a similar vein, we find motifs of understanding and closeness to the Shabbatean experience coupled with fierce negation and rejection of the Shabbatean message. The Besht is described as trying to save the soul of Shabbetai Tsevi from Hell, where he saw him stretched out on a table with Jesus Christ; Shabbetai Tsevi then tried to pull the Besht down, and only by a great effort did the Besht succeed in extricating himself. It seems that though the condemnation of Shabbateanism by the Hasidim was absolute, the idea that the Shabbateans could and should be saved also persisted in Hasidic circles. Members of the Bratslav sect of Hasidism believed that their leader, Naḥman of Bratslav, was destined to correct the religious damage done by the Shabbatean movement.

**History.** The history of the early Hasidic movement can be divided into four main periods, each a major step in its development.

1. *The circle of the Besht (c. 1740–1760).* The Besht seems to have been in contact with a group of wandering preachers, like himself, who in their homiletics preached a new kind of worship and presented a new conception of the role of the elect in Jewish religion. They were qabbalists, following the main mystical symbols of the Lurianic school but emphasizing the achievements of the individual and his ability to assist his brethren in religious matters. *Devequt* (communion with God) was one of the main subjects they preached, stressing man's ability to attain constant communion with God. It is possible that parallel to the Besht's circle of adherents there were other pietistic groups in some of the major centers of Jewish culture in eastern Europe. Some of these circles were influenced by various Shabbatean ideas; all were aware of the Shabbatean crisis.

2. *The first Hasidic center in Mezhirich (1760–1772).* After the Besht's death, the leadership of the Hasidic movement was assumed by his disciple, Dov Ber of Mezhirich (now Międzyrzec, Poland). He held "court" in his home, where many young Jewish intellectuals as well as common people gathered to listen to his sermons. These were transcribed by his disciples and later published in several versions. The court of Dov Ber (called the *maggid*, i.e., "preacher") was described, among others, in the autobiography of Salomon Maimon, who had visited it in his youth. In this period be-

gins the history of Hasidism as an organized movement, led by an accepted authority.

3. *The disciples of Dov Ber (1773–1812).* This is the most important period, in which Hasidism became a major force within Judaism. Several of Dov Ber's disciples created "courts" like that of their teacher, and led *'edot* ("communities"), around which thousands, and then tens of thousands, of adherents gathered, accepting the leadership of that disciple and making their community an alternative social and religious organization of Jews, distinct from the hegemony of the traditional rabbinate. Elimelekh of Lizhensk (now Leżajsk, Poland), Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady (Belorussia), Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk, and, to some extent, Naḥman of Bratslav belong to this category. In this period of Hasidic theory of the *tsaddiq* was developed and began to shape both Hasidic thought and social organization. At this same time the Hasidim became a distinct group, not only because of the internal development of Hasidism, but also because of the growing opposition to it from the school of Eliyyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman, the "Gaon of Vilna," which published several pamphlets against Hasidic ideology and practice, denouncing them as heretics and excommunicating them, even trying to enlist the help of the Russian government against their leaders (especially Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady, founder of the Habad sect). This fierce opposition was motivated both by fears that the Hasidim were going to undermine the traditional Jewish social structure, which was based on the prestige of the scholars and Talmudists, and by the fear of another Shabbatean movement. There is no doubt that the growing opposition to Hasidism contributed significantly to the internal cohesion of the Hasidic communities and created clear lines of demarcation between areas in which the Hasidim became dominant and areas governed by their opponents.

It was in this period that Hasidic literature was initially published. The first works were those of Ya'aqov Yosef of Polonnoye, the Besht's greatest disciple, whose voluminous collections of sermons include most of the material we have concerning the teachings of the Besht (the first Hasidic work published was Ya'aqov Yosef's *Toledot Ya'aqov Yosef*, Korets, 1780). These were followed by the sermons of Dov Ber, published by his disciples, and then many other collections of sermons by his followers. The only work published in this period in the form of an ethical work and not the usual collection of sermons was Shne'ur Zalman's *Tanya'* (see below). By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Hasidic movement had an organized leadership, prolific literature, well-defined communities and areas of influence, and an established standing in the general framework of Jewish life.

4. *The development of Hasidic "houses" or "lines of succession" (shoshalot).* To a very large extent this process has continued to the present. Many of Dov Ber's disciples served as founders of several Hasidic communities when their disciples scattered and each established his own "house" and community. The custom of passing Hasidic leadership from father to son or, in some cases, son-in-law, became more and more frequent, until it was universally accepted that the new leader had to be from the family of the previous leader. These "houses" usually bore the names of the towns in which they were established, even after the center was moved to another country—Poland, for instance, where many centers were located in Warsaw before the Second World War—or to another continent such as to the United States or Israel, where many of the centers are today. The history of Hasidism has since fragmented into the separate histories of various houses or schools. Only two of the communities have preserved their specific ideological and organizational profile, remaining distinct from all others, throughout this period—Habad Hasidism, founded by Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady, and Bratslav Hasidism, the followers of Nahman of Bratslav, the Besht's great-grandson. The rift between Hasidim and their opponents has obtained until this day; most Jews of east European descent belong to family lines of either Hasidim or *mitnaggedim* ("opponents").

**Spread of the Movement.** The spread of Hasidism after the death of Dov Ber in 1772 occurred at the same time that the opposition to the emerging Hasidic movement was growing. After that year, for a period of nearly fifty years, their opponents orchestrated repeated declarations excommunicating the Hasidic leaders and several times enlisted the help of the Russian government in their efforts, claiming that the Hasidim, as heretics, were undermining the foundations of the state. The documents concerning this organized opposition have been collected by Mordecai Wilensky and analyzed in a detailed, two-volume study.

The persecution by their opponents did not halt the spread of the movement, which gathered momentum and gained new communities and adherents in the end of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. The disciples of Dov Ber and their disciples established the great Hasidic houses. Levi Yitshaq established an important Hasidic community in Berdichev, while Menaḥem Naḥum built the house of Chernobyl, which was continued by his son, Mordechai Twersky, and went on for many generations. Yisra'el of Rizhyn (now Ruzhin, Ukrainian S.S.R.), a descendant of Dov Ber, built the Rizhyn-Sadigora house; his four sons who followed him made it into one of the most impor-

tant and eminent Hasidic communities in Russia. Mosheh Ḥayyim Efrayim of Sedlikov (now Sudykwo, Poland), a grandson of the Besht, did not lead a community, but his book, *Degel maḥaneh Efrayim*, a work of Hasidic sermons that often relies on direct traditions of the Besht, was influential. In Poland and Lithuania Hasidism became a major force through the work of Shelomoh ben Me'ir of Karlin and Ḥayyim Ḥaiqel of Amdur (Indura). Hasidic communities in the Land of Israel were established in Safad and Tiberias by Menaḥem Mendel of Vitebsk and Avraham ben Aleksander Kats of Kalisz who migrated to the Land of Israel in 1777. In the beginning of the nineteenth century a group of great leaders gave renewed impetus to the spread of Hasidism, among them Ya'aqov Yitshaq ("the Seer of Lublin"), Ya'aqov Yitshaq ben Asher of Pshischa (now Przysucha, Poland), and Avraham Yehoshu'a Heschel of Apt in Moldavia (now Opatow, Poland). Menaḥem Morgenstern established the great house of Pshischa-Kozk, and Shalom Rokeaḥ the Belz Ḥasidim. Mosheh Teitelbaum, a disciple of Ya'aqov Yitshaq of Lublin, created the powerful and influential Satmar Hasidism in Hungary. By the middle of the nineteenth century Hasidism was the dominant force in most Jewish communities in eastern Europe, and most Hasidic houses continued their existence and development until the Holocaust. [For location of the major Hasidic courts, see the map accompanying Judaism, article on Judaism in Northern and Eastern Europe to 1500.]

**Theology and Ethics.** It is nearly impossible to describe Hasidic theology and ethics as being distinct from previous Jewish ideologies because Hasidic teachers preached their ideas in the form of sermons, which included all layers of earlier Jewish thought. Almost all the main ideas and trends found in early-eighteenth-century Hebrew homiletical literature also appear in Hasidic thought, and attempts to define specifically Hasidic ideas, or even emphases, usually fail because similar examples can easily be produced from earlier homiletical literature. A second difficulty is that every Hasidic teacher developed his own theology and ethics and his own list of priorities which may distinguish him or his group but never characterize all the hundreds of teachers and writers who created Hasidic literature. It is unfeasible to generalize from one or a group of Hasidic teachers to the movement as a whole. Every definition is therefore a necessarily subjective one. Thus only a few general outlines, qualified by the preceding statements, can be presented concerning Hasidic theology.

**Relationship to Lurianic Qabbalah.** Hasidism relies on qabbalistic terminology and is largely based on Lu-



rianic Qabbalah. In many specific formulations, however, the Ḥasidim seem to have preferred the simpler symbolism of the *Zohar* (the main qabbalistic work written in northern Spain in the late thirteenth century) to that of Ḥayyim Vital (1543–1620), the disciple of Luria who wrote the main body of Lurianic teachings.

Hasidic theology, like other qabbalistic schools of the eighteenth century, downplayed the most dramatic mythical symbols of Lurianic mysticism, especially that of *shevirat ha-kelim* (“the breaking of the divine vessels”), the description of the catastrophe within the divine world which is the origin of evil, according to Luria. The idea of *tsimtsum* (divine self-contraction) was elaborated by the Ḥasidim (especially by Dov Ber), but in a completely different manner than in Luria’s original thought. According to Luria, this was the drastic process of divine contraction away from the world, which vacated the space in which the cosmos was going to be created from the divine light of the godhead, the first exile of God. According to Hasidism, however, this was a necessary process, for the world could not absorb the full power of the undiluted divine light. The act of *tsimtsum*, the contraction of that light, was intended to facilitate the acceptance of divine light, in a less concentrated form, by the righteous in the created world. Instead of the original Lurianic idea of a mythological catastrophe, the Ḥasidim presented a theology in which this process was the result of divine benevolence toward the faithful.

The Ḥasidim also deemphasized the Lurianic concept of *tiqqun* (restoration), the process by which messianic redemption is enhanced by the collective efforts of the Jewish people as a whole; they preferred instead the concept of *devequt* (communion with God), a process of individual redemption by which a person uplifts his own soul into contact with the divine powers. The description of the ten qabbalistic *sefirot*, the ten divine hypostases, is closer in Hasidic works to the thirteenth-century system of the *Zohar* than to the much more complicated system of Luria.

**Extent of messianism in Hasidism.** There is an emphasis in Hasidic literature on personal religious achievement rather than on the general, national, and cosmic impact of religious life. The redemptive element, while still strong in Hasidism, often emphasizes the redemption of the individual’s soul rather than that of the nation or of the cosmos as a whole. This is a slight departure from Lurianic Qabbalah, but not all Hasidic teachers shared this view, and some non-Hasidic writers, who either predated Hasidism or belonged to the opponents of Hasidism, also often stressed the emphasis on the individual in qabbalistic symbolism.

The place of the messianic element in Hasidic thought has been a subject of controversy among contemporary scholars. In a detailed study in 1955, Ben Zion Dinur tried to prove that the Ḥasidim, following the Besht himself, developed an esoteric messianic system that was hidden in most of their works but served as the main purpose and drive behind Hasidic preaching and the expansion of its influence. This approach was severely criticized by Gershom Scholem, who saw in Hasidism the neutralization of the Lurianic and Shabbatean acute messianism and a new emphasis on individual redemption through the process of communion with God. Isaiah Tishby recently analyzed early Hasidic texts and found that many of them include more messianic elements than Scholem suggested. There is no doubt that, on the whole, early Hasidism rejected the more extreme messianic tendencies; the works of Dov Ber can be characterized as neutralizing the messianic drive. But Hasidic teachers in their various works reveal differing attitudes, and some of them may have had stronger messianic inclinations than the Maggid and even the Besht.

In the early nineteenth century there was a renewed messianic enthusiasm with Hasidism. Naḥman of Bratslav developed a messianic system (see below), and under the impact of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 we find several Hasidic leaders engaged in messianic activity. In contemporary Hasidism the Habad sect seems to be deeply motivated by an acute belief in an imminent messianic redemption, concentrating its activities on enhancing this process by strict adherence to religious commandments.

**Hasidic approach to God.** In early Hasidic literature there is an emphasis on direct, emotional worship of God and a deemphasis on contact with God through constant study of the Torah and Talmud and diligent observance of the particulars concerning the performance of the *mitsvot*. This does not mean that the Ḥasidim did not study the Torah or that they disregarded the *mitsvot*, as their opponents often claimed; rather, the Ḥasidim stressed the importance of mystical contact with God through *devequt*, usually attained while praying but also achieved when a person is working for his livelihood or engaged in any other physical activity.

There are many precedents for this attitude in pre-Hasidic Jewish thought, and there are many exceptions to it among Hasidic teachers. Still, it seems that on the whole, Ḥasidim perceived a wider range of modes of worship as acceptable and commendable than did their detractors, and that the mystical aspect of everyday religious life is more prominent among the Ḥasidim. This attitude led to the prevailing conception of Hasidism as

oriented toward the needs of the simple believers, the uneducated, and even the ignorant—a conception based primarily on very late (end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) collections of stories and one that is considerably exaggerated.

**Good and evil.** Hasidic teachers, more than non-Hasidim, contributed to the development of a conception of the way to fight evil within one's soul that is different from the prevailing Lurianic one. On the one hand, Lurianic theology described a common source for good and evil, claiming that both emanate from the godhead; but, according to Luria, evil cannot exist unless it is in close contact with the good and derives sustenance from it. In order to overcome evil, the righteous must separate good from evil, thus making the latter's existence impossible. Shabbatean thinkers, on the other hand, emphasized that evil can be overcome from within by correcting it. Dov Ber of Mezhirich and other Hasidic teachers insisted that evil can and should be overcome by absorbing it, uplifting and making it again a part of goodness, believing that the spiritual stature of the "corrected" or "repentant" evil is higher than that of the elements that were always good. In early Hasidic works this theory is presented as teachings accessible to everybody and offered to all righteous Jews; later it was merged with the doctrine of the *tsaddiq*.

**Hasidism as revival of traditional spirituality.** The spiritual side of religious life holds a central place in Hasidic teachings, following the traditions of medieval Hebrew ethical and homiletical literature. Great emphasis is placed on the correct qabbalistic intentions in prayers (*kavvanot*), on spiritual repentance, on the love and fear of God, and on social justice and love for fellow men. While very few new ideas on these subjects are to be found in the vast Hasidic literature, the movement undoubtedly represents a revival of these spiritual values within the framework of everyday religious life. In this respect, then, there is no basis to the frequent descriptions of Hasidism as an original phenomenon that changed the face of traditional Judaism; but it can be claimed that the Hasidim collected many spiritualistic ideas and practices from previous Jewish sources and brought them to the foreground of their teachings and Jewish worship in a more central way than before. In this sense their endeavor can be described as "revivalistic."

**The Doctrine of the Tsaddiq.** While these ideas characterize Hasidism, they do not distinguish the Hasidic movement from previous Jewish religious movements or from the other religious movements of that time, even that of the *mitnaggedim*. Many of these ideas are found, and emphasized, in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century non-Hasidic Jewish works of

ethics and homiletics. Hasidism, however, can be defined as a separate movement, different from all others preceding or contemporary to it, because of its doctrine of the *tsaddiq* ("righteous man"), which sets clear boundaries, in theory and in practice, between Hasidim and non-Hasidim.

The theory of the *tsaddiq* presented Judaism with a new concept of religious leadership that was both charismatic and mystically motivated. According to this theory, in every generation there are some righteous persons who can and should, by their outstanding mystical worship, correct the sins and transgressions of lesser-endowed people. The Hasid (follower) has only limited ability to approach the godhead and to carry out difficult religious tasks, especially the correction of evil, including that in his own thoughts and deeds. The leader, the righteous *tsaddiq*, whose soul emanated from a very high place in the divine realm, is the one to carry out these tasks for his generation and especially for his followers, the members of the Hasidic community that he leads. Thus the *tsaddiq* is an intermediary between the Hasid and God, bringing before the heavenly powers (the qabbalistic *sefirot*) the prayers and religious achievements of his community. He receives forgiveness for the sins of his followers and effects the elevation of the evil within them, transmuting it into good at the common source of both in the divine realm.

The *tsaddiq* himself does not contain any evil; the sins he uplifts and corrects are those of his community. One description of this transaction—found in the works of the great formulator of this theory, Elimelekh of Lizhensk, a disciple of Dov Ber—is that the sins of the community appear to the *tsaddiq* as evil thoughts which he then uplifts and rehabilitates into good thoughts. This theory demands that the *tsaddiq* be in constant movement between good and evil, heaven and earth (*ratso' va-shov*, "ran and returned," after *Ezekiel* 1:14). He has to be close to the evil that he is to correct, subjecting himself to the process of a "fall" (*yeridah*) or "smallness" (*qatnut*, a term used in Lurianic theology only to refer to the divine powers when they descend from their high dominion). When he uplifts evil and turns it into goodness, he is united with the divine powers in a state of "greatness" (*gadlut*). This dynamism is the most characteristic aspect of the *tsaddiq* concept, and there is no difficulty in ascertaining the source from which the Hasidim, probably unwittingly, derived it.

Even before Shabbetai Tsevi's conversion to Islam, his "prophet," Natan of Gaza, described his messianic role as an intermediary between the godhead and evil on earth. The changing moods of Shabbetai Tsevi, probably caused by a manic-depressive state, were explained as resulting from his constant movement be-

tween his source and origin among the *sefirot* and the realm of the devil on earth. After his conversion, Shabbatean theologians explained that in order to overcome evil the Messiah had to merge with it and destroy or correct it from within. There are close parallels between the Shabbatean concept of the Messiah and the Hasidic concept of the *tsaddiq*, and there can be little doubt that the Ḥasidim created their system on the heels of Shabbatean theology.

Nevertheless, the Hasidic concept of the *tsaddiq* is not messianic in the same sense as its Shabbatean precursor. The *tsaddiq* is undoubtedly a quasi-messianic figure, but his influence is limited in time and place—he “redeems” only his own community in his own lifetime. The redemption that the *tsaddiq* accomplishes is not the general, national, and cosmic redemption of Shabbateanism. Rather, he effects individual redemption of the souls in his community—those of his followers—only while he is alive; after his death his successor (his son or relative) will continue in this task, while at the same time dozens of other *tsaddiqim* are performing the same task for other communities in other places. It may be stated that Hasidism broke down the Shabbatean concept of the messiah into small fragments, each of which is the *tsaddiq* for his own time and place. Instead of one messianic figure who inaugurates the historical redemption, Hasidism provides a process of constant redemption of the souls of the believers, a process carried out by every *tsaddiq* within the boundaries of his time and place. When viewed in terms of a messianic movement, Hasidism destroyed the basis for any large, messianic upsurge, replacing it with the small, everyday process of individual redemption. It is possible that the vehement opposition of the Hasidic movement as a whole, with very few exceptions, to modern Jewish nationalism and Zionism should be understood in this light. If individual redemption is assured by faithfulness to the *tsaddiq*, the importance of national redemption is diminished.

The theory of the *tsaddiq* was the focal point of Hasidic theology, shaping to a very large extent Hasidic social organizations and ways of worship as well. According to this theory, the *tsaddiq* not only provides the Ḥasidim with spiritual redemption for their souls but also promises them the basic earthly needs—their livelihood, delivery from illness, and assurances that they will have children (*banei*, *ḥayyei*, *mezonei*; literally, “my sons, my life, my food”). The Ḥasidim, for their part, have to give the *tsaddiq* spiritual support; their belief in his superhuman role enables him to achieve his spiritual tasks. They are also obligated to supply the *tsaddiq*’s everyday needs so that he may support himself and his family.

The *tsaddiq* became the center of the Hasidic community. His court was their meeting place several times each year; his room became the place where they brought their complaints and requests; his blessing was believed to ensure both earthly and heavenly success. The Ḥasidim congregated to listen to the *tsaddiq*’s prayers and sermons, worshiped with him with great qabbalistic “intentions” (*kavvanot*), and practiced the religious commandments, often with joy and happiness. The task of uplifting evil was thus taken from the shoulders of the individual Jew and consigned to the *tsaddiq* as the representative of the community and the intermediary power between heaven and earth.

Not all the *tsaddiqim* accepted this role. There were several leaders who were uncomfortable with this mode of worship; they left their communities and secluded themselves. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the basic Hasidic attitudes to social organization and everyday worship were developed according to the lines drawn by the doctrine of the *tsaddiq*.

The most important variant to this doctrine grew out of Bratslav Hasidism, founded by Naḥman of Bratslav (1772–1810), the grandson of the Besht’s daughter. Naḥman’s life passed in conflict with other *tsaddiqim*; he refused to accept their authority even over their own communities. When he died his followers chose not to nominate another *tsaddiq* but continue, to this very day, to believe that Naḥman was the “true *tsaddiq*” (*tsaddiq ha-emet*) and that the Messiah, who will redeem Israel, will be his reincarnation. In the Bratslav doctrine of the *tsaddiq* there is, to a very large extent, a return to the Shabbatean concept of one redeemer for all; the redemption therefore assumes historical dimensions.

Another important variant is that of the Habad Hasidism, founded by Shne’ur Zalman of Lyady (1754–1813), a disciple of Dov Ber. From this school we have the most detailed information concerning the organization of a *tsaddiq*’s court. At the same time, Habad Hasidic works seem to minimize the redemptive role of the *tsaddiq*, especially as outlined in the works offered to the public as a whole, such as Shne’ur Zalman’s *Tanya*. Habad developed a highly centralized global organization headed by the *tsaddiq*, with an emphasis on the teaching of Jewish ethics and practice of the *mitsvot* and basic qabbalistic theology, relegating the more developed messianic and redemptive elements in their theology to esoteric groups among the Habad adherents. Habad is reputed to insist on a more intellectual version of Hasidism, but many other communities share this same trend.

The doctrine of the *tsaddiq* also contributed to the emergence of a special kind of hagiographic literature, for the *tsaddiq* could easily serve as a religious hero to

stories of this kind. A body of legends in which the Besht was a central hero was collected early in the nineteenth century under the title *Shivhei ha-Besht* (In Praise of the Besht), following the earlier example of *Shivhei ha-Ari*, which was about Isaac Luria. The tales told by Naḥman of Bratslav in his last years were published as *Sippurei ha-ma'asiot le-rabbi Naḥman*, stories describing in a veiled manner the spiritual conflicts and messianic drives of Naḥman. Many stories were told by the Ḥasidim about their leaders, but these began to be published only in the last third of the nineteenth century, mostly by non-Hasidic authors, editors, and publishers, and later by some Hasidic publishers. Many of these stories are nothing but adaptations of ancient Jewish folktales in which the specific *tsaddiqim* are inserted as heroes. Hasidism throughout its history, including contemporary Hasidism, chose the sermon to be its basic literary genre and mode of expression. This vast body of homiletical literature is the basic and often the only source for Hasidic theology and practice. Some *tsaddiqim* prepared, or their disciples collected, brief anthologies of the sayings of the leaders, and a few *tsaddiqim* wrote ethical works, such as *Tanya'*, but the dominance of homiletical literature in authentic Hasidic literature is uncontested.

**Misconceptions about Hasidism.** In popular works about Hasidism that focus on material derived from late Hasidic hagiography and collections of sayings of Hasidic teachers culled from their homiletical works and sermons, Hasidism is often described as a popular movement concentrated around charismatic leaders who impress their believers by various miracles and exemplary ethical behavior, without any theological or mystical basis. In some accounts even the strict adherence of Ḥasidim to the commandments of Judaism is missing, and Hasidism appears as a kind of "ethical Judaism" based on enthusiastic celebration of festivals and social ethics.

This erroneous image of Hasidism is the product of the literature written by Jewish writers in Hebrew and Yiddish in the early twentieth century, such as Shalom Asch, Yitshaq Loeb Perez, and Yehudah Steinberg, who portrayed Hasidism in nostalgic terms after having left traditional Judaism and embraced Western ways of life. Some scholars and writers, from Martin Buber to Elie Wiesel, followed them to an extent, perpetuating the image of Hasidism as pure, spiritual Judaism which expresses love of Israel, love of God, and love toward every human being. In their descriptions, modern writers have tended to emphasize public behavior in the Hasidic courts and to neglect the mystical, quabbalistic theology and the theoretical basis of the worship of the *tsaddiq* in Hasidism.

The studies of scholars such as Gershom Scholem, Joseph G. Weiss, Isaiah Tishby, Mendel Pierkaz, and others in the last generation restored the serious study of Hasidism and based it on philological, historical, and ideological scrutiny of the Hasidic texts themselves. Hasidism is the latest chapter in the history of Jewish mysticism, in which quabbalistic symbols became central to a wide, popular movement that produced a new type of religious leadership and introduced religious-mystical values to modern Orthodox Judaism.

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JOSEPH DAN

## Habad Hasidism

Habad is a distinctive Hasidic school founded by Shne'ur Zalman of Lyady and led by a dynasty of his descendants, the Schneersohn family. Because his son Dov Ber (1773–1827) settled in the Belorussian town of Lubavitch and established a Hasidic center there, the Habad movement is also widely known as Lubavitcher Hasidism. The present head of the movement is Menahem Mendel Schneerson (b. 1902), seventh in the line of succession. From its New York headquarters the movement directs a vast array of religious, educational, and publicistic ventures throughout the world.

As a theological system, Habad represents the apex of acosmic mysticism within Judaism. Only God has real existence; all else, including the existence of the person as a separate being, is illusory. The purpose of the spir-

itual life, assiduously and systematically cultivated in Habad, is to bring the devotee to the realization of this truth in heart and conduct as well as in mind. Habad believes, however, that the true conversion is first and foremost an intellectual one; while other Hasidic leaders emphasized the moral life and the virtues of simplicity, Shne'ur Zalman and his followers taught a highly abstract mystical theology and praised the virtues of contemplation and detachment. The name *Habad* (HaBaD), which is an acronym for *hokhmah*, *binah*, and *da'at* (three aspects of the mental function), is indicative of this.

Habad thought teaches that divinity is equally present throughout the universe, and that the existence of the universe itself is but an effulgence of light that comes from the eternal and unchanged One. This radiance, also identified with the creative speech of God, takes on the form of creation, and through it the One dons the garb of multiplicity. It does so in order that the presence of divinity be confirmed even in the seemingly "lowliest" places, a gradation that would have no meaning if not for the existence of the corporeal world. The spreading forth of divine energy into the furthest corners of being is a constant process, without which the universe would lose even its semblance of reality.

The religious life is both a participation in this constant spreading forth of divinity, through the bodily fulfillment of the divine commandments, and a reversal of the process, in which all things are "uplifted" and returned to their source in God through inward devotion and contemplative prayer. Habad is in part a reaction to the extreme Hasidic emphasis on prayer and inwardness alone as religious values and insists that the physical enactment of the commandments, even without understanding, has cosmic implications. There is also a great emphasis on Torah study in Habad circles, including the study of Habad theological works, again in contrast to the conduct of some other Hasidic groups. Study and deed are taken as the activist side of the religious life, ever to be balanced with inwardness and contemplation.

Beginning in the early twentieth century, Habad took a leading role in the preservation of traditional piety, whose hold over Jewry was weakening, and in providing an avenue of return to tradition for Jews reared outside it. The previous Lubavitcher *rebe*, Yosef Yitshaq Schneersohn (1880–1950), was the leading rabbinic figure in Russia after sovietization and fought valiantly for the survival of religious Jewry there. After his exile in 1927 and a period of residence in Latvia and Poland, the Lubavitch community settled in Brooklyn in 1941. Particularly since the mid-1960s, large numbers of previ-

ously unaffiliated American Jews have joined to swell the ranks of this movement, making it the most prominent Hasidic group on the American scene. In that same period, an openness to the uses of technology, the integration of modern techniques of education and public relations, and a vague modernization of style, though carefully circumscribed within the bounds of Jewish law, have raised questions about Habad in some more traditionalist Hasidic circles.

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ARTHUR GREEN

### Satmar Hasidism

The school of Hasidic practice known as Satmar Hasidism arose in Satu-Mare (Satmar), Transylvania, in the decades immediately preceding the Holocaust and rose to prominence primarily in the postwar years. It is identified chiefly with the personality of Yo'el Teitelbaum (1888–1982), who was rabbi in Satmar and, after his rescue from Hungary in 1944, in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York.

In a larger sense, Satmar may be said to represent the distinctive Hasidic style that developed in northern Hungary and Transylvania in the nineteenth century. Lying outside the original heartland of Hasidism, Hungarian Jewry was dominated by a learned and pious rabbinate that saw itself locked in a life-and-death struggle with the forces of assimilation and religious reform, forces that were far stronger in Western-looking Hungary than they were in Poland and the Ukraine. Here Hasidism served as a goad to the revitalization of Orthodoxy, resulting in a bitter and sometimes fanatical tone that was absent from Hasidism in other areas.

After the Holocaust, the Satmar rabbinical court in Brooklyn became a center for the many thousands of pious Hungarian Jews who had escaped the war only by the coincidence of living in the last country to come under the dominance of the "final solution" and its executors. In Brooklyn, the Jewish life of prewar Hungary was reestablished almost unchanged, and the Satmar

rabbi was especially known for his generous aid in the resettling of this Jewry. He was also known for his unswerving and increasingly bitter opposition to Zionism, the state of Israel, and all forms of Judaism that differed from his own ultraorthodox way of life. His writings, while reflecting great rabbinic erudition, are polemical in character, including the often repeated charge that the Holocaust was divine punishment for the evil deeds of Zionist and assimilationist Jews. In this sense Satmar represents a "last stand" of certain traditional Jewish attitudes, but he is looked upon with hostility by most other Jewish groups, including other Hasidim, as being overly self-righteous and unrealistically antagonistic to the modern world.

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ARTHUR GREEN

**HASIDUT ASHKENAZ.** See Ashkenazic Hasidism.

**HASKALAH.** See Jewish Thought and Philosophy, article on Modern Thought.

**HASTINGS, JAMES** (1852–1922), Scottish Presbyterian minister and compiler and editor of voluminous works dealing with Christian texts and the subject matter of religions. Born in Aberdeen, Scotland, Hastings attended the University of Aberdeen and was ordained a Presbyterian minister in 1884; he later held pastorates in Free Church parishes in Kincardineshire and Dundee. Founder of the *Expository Times*, he is best known for his indefatigable zeal as an editor of numerous works, which may be grouped into four types.

First are those comprising articles dealing with the texts of early Christianity (e.g., *A Dictionary of the Bible*, 1898–1904; *A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, 1906–1908; and the *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, 1915–1918). Exegetical and expository in character and intended to provide students of biblical literature with the most recent findings of scholarship, the articles in these volumes were written by established (largely theologically conservative) scholars in command of the most recent methods of historical and textual criticism and philological analysis and exegesis, and their work represented a distinct advance in this field. Second are the works that are primarily homiletical in character

(e.g., *Great Texts of the Bible*, 1914, and *Greater Men and Women of the Bible*, 1914). Third is a series of works on Christian doctrines, including the *Christian Doctrine of Prayer* (1915), *The Christian Doctrine of Faith* (1919), and *The Christian Doctrine of Peace* (1922).

Fourth is the renowned *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (13 vols., 1908–1926). This work, grand in vision and impressive in accomplishment, represents a scholarly achievement of the first importance. Intended to provide an account of the various aspects of religion (beliefs, rituals, philosophies, theologies, ethics) among peoples the world over and in all ages, the encyclopedia became a reference work with no compeer for more than half a century. Exemplary of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century interest in producing encyclopedic collections of knowledge in various fields, the encyclopedia became both a resource for reviewing the results of scholarship concerning the study of religion and an impetus for the extension of knowledge of peoples and cultures the world over, thus transcending the prior provincialism of much of Western scholarship.

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*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.* 13 vols. Edinburgh and New York, 1908–1926.

*Dictionary of the Apostolic Church.* 2 vols. Edinburgh and New York, 1915–1918. This contains articles by one hundred different scholars treating the texts and history of the Christian community to the end of the first century.

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F. STANLEY LUSBY

**HAṬAM SOFER.** See Sofer, Mosheh.

**HAṬHAYOGA** is historically the most influential, and today the best known, of the several schools of yoga derived from the classical Yoga of Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra*. *Haṭhayoga* differs from classical Yoga, and from its sister schools, principally in the special emphasis that it gives to certain aspects of yoga doctrine and practices. Classical Yoga depends heavily on Sāṃkhya metaphysics and tries to strike a balance between physical exercises and meditation. *Haṭhayoga* tends to prefer esoteric mysticism to systematic metaphysics and emphasizes physical exercises over meditation. It also pays partic-

ular attention to the acquisition of supernatural powers and the conquest of disease and death. The set of mystical, supraphysical concepts contained in *haṭhayoga* texts make it one of the principal constituents and markers of the current of Hinduism known as Tantrism.

Many of the aspects of yoga that are especially associated with *haṭhayoga* appear to be quite ancient. As early as the *R̥gveda* (10.136) we find a description of *munis* (ascetics) who possess the power of flying on the wind. [See Flight.] Yogic practices and concepts such as those elaborated in *haṭhayoga* texts already are mentioned prominently in the early Upaniṣads. The supra-physical "veins" (*nāḍīs*) of the human body, which become a central feature of the mystical anatomy of *haṭhayoga*, appear in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.6.6). Included among these is a central vein leading to the crown of the head. Breath control is referred to, somewhat elliptically, in the *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.5.23). The later *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (2.8–15) describes the practices of yoga, including breath control, in some detail and notes that "he who has attained a body made of the fire of yoga will not be subject to sickness, old age or death" (2.12).

Most of the elements of *haṭhayoga* appear in a more developed form in the descriptions of Tantric ascetics found in the *Mālatī-mādhava* of Bhavabhūti (c. 725) and in the *Harṣacarita* of Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa (c. 650). The majority of the extant texts of *haṭhayoga*, however, are associated with the somewhat later sect of the Kānpaṭa Yogīs, sometimes called Nāths or Nāth Siddhas. In the South the so-called Tamil Siddhas of about the tenth to fifteenth century wrote poems grounded in the concepts and vocabulary of *haṭhayoga*. These same concepts and vocabulary also pervade the works of Tantric Buddhism and even infiltrate the yoga literature of the austere Jains. Because of the great religious and linguistic diversity of the literature, often coupled with an intentionally hermetic style, scholarly understanding of its overall structure and history remains incomplete.

The idea of a supraphysical subtle body with its own anatomy forms the conceptual heart of *haṭhayoga*. Although different texts describe this mystical anatomy somewhat differently, most mention seven *cakras*, or "centers," located in the trunk and head, connected by a network of *nāḍīs*, or "veins." Each of these *cakras* takes the form of a lotus and is associated with a particular *yantra*, or mystical diagram; *mantra*, or mystical invocation; and god or pair of gods.

The first *cakra*, called the *mūlādhāra*, or "root," is a lotus of four petals located in the perineal area between the anus and the sexual organs. Its *yantra* is an inverted triangle with a *liṅga* of Śiva in its center together with the *mantra* "oṃ" and the elephant-headed god Gaṇeśa.

Coiled around the *liṅga* is a sleeping snake called Kuṇḍalinī, who blocks the top of the *liṅga* with her mouth. This Kuṇḍalinī represents the energy (*śakti*) of Śiva. The yogin attempts to awaken her and make her ascend through the central *nāḍī*, called the *su-ṣumnā*, passing through each of the remaining *cakras* until she reaches the highest, called the *sahasrāra* ("lotus of a thousand petals") or *brahmarandhra* ("opening of *brahman*"), located on the top of the head. There Kuṇḍalinī unites with Śiva, an act that produces the supernatural powers and immortality that the yogin seeks. Ultimately this union is identical with the experience of enlightenment itself. [See also *Cakras and Kuṇḍalinī*.]

The various physical and meditative techniques employed by the adepts of *haṭhayoga* to achieve this experience involve the parallel immobilization of breath, semen, and mental activity. The term *haṭha*, in fact, means "forceful suppression." Thus, *haṭhayoga* is that meditative technique that involves the forceful suppression of one's senses and control of one's bodily processes. These techniques are described in such texts as the *Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā* of Svātmārāma, the *Gheraṇḍa Saṃhitā*, the *Gorakṣa Śataka*, and the *Siddhasiddhānta Paddhati*. One of the most important of these techniques is the *kṛhecārī* ("she who moves in the sky"). The yogin inserts his tongue in his throat, thus blocking both respiration and the descent of saliva. On the plane of the subtle body, it is said that this practice blocks the descent of the nectar of immortality produced by the moon located beneath the *sahasrāra cakra*. Normally this nectar falls into the fire of the sun located in the lower body. The practice of the *kṛhecārī* enables the yogin, according to the *Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā*, to "drink" this nectar and thus "live many years, free of disease and with a body as soft as the stem of a lotus."

[For discussion of the various yogic schools, see *Yoga*. See also the biographies of *Goraknāth* and *Patañjali*.]

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DAVID N. LORENZEN

**HATHOR** was an ancient Egyptian mother-goddess figure whose cult center was at Dendera in Upper Egypt. Represented as partially or totally bovine, Hathor the Great was probably an assimilation of several goddesses with similar attributes.

In the Old Kingdom Pyramid Texts (c. 2475 BCE for the earliest copy) Hathor, whose name means "house of Horus," personified the entire Heliopolitan ennead, or family of gods, which provided the principal genealogy of the Horus-king of Egypt. These nine gods began with Atum and proceeded through three more generations to Osiris and Isis, the parents of Horus. With Hathor personifying this whole group of gods, Horus became her son and the son of her spouse, Re, the sun god, who had come to the fore by the fifth dynasty.

Hathor also figured prominently in the royal imagery, particularly in the New Kingdom, when she was frequently depicted as the cow suckling a young pharaoh, and often had shrines or chapels dedicated to her. Her great temple at Dendera, erected in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, is unique in several respects, including its many subterranean passages and the so-called zodiacal ceiling of its roof's kiosk.

Another small cult temple of Hathor was founded by Ptolemy IV at Deir al-Madīnah, where many earlier tombs show the "lady of the west," a cow coming from the Theban mountain known as the Qurn. Thus as early as the New Kingdom she was associated with the necropolis of that area. "Hathor of the sycamore" is a frequent epithet, and a temple is known as far away as Sinai. There are several references in literary and medico-magical texts to the assistance rendered at birth by the seven Hathors and also to the fates they ordain for the newborn. Hathor "the golden one" was known in love poetry as goddess of love and patroness of lovers.

The sistrum is a musical instrument commonly associated with the worship of Hathor, and her son Ihy was a musician deity. Priestesses of Hathor are known from all periods, although in the later periods there was a tendency to assimilate Hathor and Isis.

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LEONARD H. LESKO

**HAWAIIAN RELIGION.** The traditional religion of the Hawaiians was based on that of their Polynesian



ancestors, who were Neolithic fishermen and horticulturalists. These were the first to settle, perhaps around 500 CE, the fertile and geographically isolated Hawaiian Islands. Although inhabitants of the islands from Hawaii to Kauai had altered some of the ancestral beliefs and practices, the similarities between Hawaiian and other Polynesian religions impressed Captain James Cook, who in 1778 was the first European to visit the islands.

Believing that supernatural forces filled sea, sky, and earth, the Hawaiians personified them in countless named and individualized deities, who controlled nature and mankind through their *mana*, or supernatural power. The people retained cosmogonic gods from the homeland, such as Kāne, Kanaloa, Kū, Lono, and Wākea, and goddesses like Hina, Papa, and Haumea, but they added aspects to these gods and included the deified dead, beings like the volcano goddess Pele, and touchy local spirits in their pantheon of supernatural beings. This pantheon provided the inherited or acquired guardian gods, or *amakua*s, of each individual, family, occupation, and profession. A god communicated its will through dreams, an image, something in nature such as a shark or thunder, or a human prophet.

**Priesthoods and Worship Places.** The priests, or *kahunas*, who mediated between gods and people, were professional specialists trained, commonly by older kin, in the material techniques and rituals essential for success in their calling. Of the several organized priest-hoods, the higher-ranking and stricter order for priests in service to the Kū gods of war and sorcery and the lower and milder order for priests in service to the Lono gods of peace and abundance were given support by the Hawaiian king Kamehameha I (called Kamehameha the Great, 1758?–1819), who was a very religious man. The principal god of each order was a national god upon whose favor the expansion and prosperity of the kingdom depended. Each order's high priest, the *kahuna-nui*, was considered to be its founder's direct descendant and an expert in every branch of religion. The high priest wielded political power by advising the ruler on how to win divine support. Failure was attributed to errors in worship, to countermagic, or to hidden infractions of taboos. A system of religiously sanctioned permanent and temporary taboos controlled every phase of society and everyone's life regardless of rank. The system began, tradition states, when Wākea ("atmosphere") got away from his wife Papa ("earth")—giving Wākea the opportunity to seduce their daughter—by having a *kahuna* declare that the gods had tabooed two nights during which husband and wife were required to separate.

Public worship took place at *heiaus*, or open-air reli-

gious centers. The form, size, equipment, and location of a *heiau* depended on a chief's power to command labor and on the *kahuna*-architect's traditionalism or creativity. A simple un-walled rectangular *heiau* had an altar, images, and a raised platform. A complex type excluded the populace with stone or palisaded walls that enclosed several terraces, an altar, consecrated images, refuse pits, burial grounds, a tapa-covered oracle tower (an architectural feature unique to these islands, as Captain Cook observed), and houses for a drum, other sacred objects, an earth oven, and—during taboo periods—for the ruler and important priests. Outside the walls was a structure called the "house of Papa," where the highest-ranking female chiefs, who were themselves considered to be earthly goddesses, worshiped the prolific and ever-reborn Haumea (often identified with Papa) and the water-spirit form of a deified female chief from Maui (who was called Kihawahine), as well as other divine beings.

The walled, exclusive type of *heiau* was introduced, tradition states, by the high priest Pā'ao, a Tahitian who arrived in about the twelfth century. He also introduced human sacrifice, a strict priestly order and ritual for Kū, and his personal god Kā'ili, who as Kū-kā'ilimoku ("Kū the island-snatcher") became Kamehameha the Great's inherited *aumakua* and war god. Pā'ao widened the existing gap between chiefs and commoners by introducing new sacred royal symbols like the red-feather girdle, taboo standards (tapa-covered balls on sticks that were carried before chiefs as insignia of taboo), and compulsory prostration (*kapu moe*) before those male and female chiefs who were believed to be directly descended from the gods.

Only a king or paramount chief could build the most sacred type of *heiau*, where burned human sacrifices were offered to the highest Kū gods. This functional type of *heiau*, called a *luakini* ("many refuse pits") or *po'okanaka* ("men's heads"), was used at times to pray for royal health and national prosperity; but essentially it was a war temple (so that if a subordinate chief built one it was a sign of rebellion). The general term *waihau* referred to "comfortable" *heiaus* where easier ritual, without human sacrifice, was practiced. Most *heiaus* had economic functions relating to farming, fishing, healing, rain, tapa making (which was women's work), and so on. A chief had a religious duty to build these *heiaus* in which to pray for divine aid for his chieftom or to give thanks. Each deity had specific requirements as to size, amount, and color of offerings. Dissatisfied gods sent drought and disease, and commoners would then abandon the chief to seek one who was more religious. But if all went well, people built smaller *heiaus* on their allotted land to further enliven the earth.

**Major Deities and Associated Rites.** Dominating the pantheon for chief and commoner alike were Kanaloa, Kāne, Lono, and Kū. Each, in particular but overlapping ways, fostered health, abundance, rain, and fertility. Only Kū had also a destructive side. To each name, except that of Kanaloa, Hawaiians attached dozens of descriptive phrases to signify the god's varied aspects or his subordinate gods.

**Kanaloa.** Called Tangaroa or one of many other cognate names (e.g., Tangaloa, Ta'aroa) elsewhere in Polynesia, Kanaloa was Kāne's younger brother. For Hawaiians he was the god of squid and, because of a play on words, also a god of healing (the Hawaiian word *he'e* means both "squid" and "to put to flight"). Kanaloa rarely had his own shrine or *heiau*, but in prayers he was often named along with Kāne, Lono, and Kū, and like them he was assigned a period in the lunar month during which he was due special homage. By identifying him with Lucifer and the three other gods (Kāne, Kū, and Lono) with the Christian Trinity, the scholarly nineteenth-century Hawaiian Christian converts Samuel M. Kamakau and Kepelino Keauokalani helped to obscure the roles Kanaloa had played in traditional religion. [See Tangaroa.]

**Kāne.** Called Tane in southeastern Polynesia, Kāne, whose name means "male" or "man," was the most approachable, forgiving, and revered of the four major gods. One worshiper in his prayer would chant, "You and I warm to each other, Kāne," and other worshipers would often say, "Life is sacred to Kāne." According to more than one myth, Kāne, while dwelling on earth with Kanaloa, had plunged his digging stick into the ground to release springs of fresh water to mix with his and Kanaloa's *kava* (a narcotic drink made from the pounded root of the shrub *Piper methysticum*). The release of fresh water by Kāne-of-the-water-of-life, as he was frequently called, was a symbolic sexual act, for the gesture served to fructify the earth. Before ritually consuming their offering of pork and *kava*, men prayed for forgiveness of broken taboos or for revenge for sorcery at their family's phallic "stone of Kāne," a single, high, conical stone situated near a stream. Sweet-potato farmers prayed to their Kāne *aumakuas*-of-the-rain-filled-clouds; and grateful fishermen left fish for Kāne and sometimes for Kanaloa at a shrine, which was usually only a rock or a pile of rocks. And after prescribed rituals that took place during an earth-shaking storm, the dead of a ruling family of the island of Maui, who considered themselves descendants of Kāne-hekili ("Kāne-thunder"), were transfigured by their ancestors and *aumakuas* into thunder and lightning.

Early in the twentieth century, Robert Luahiwa, an elderly Hawaiian from the island of Kauai, described a

ceremony that called on Kāne to bring rain and life to the land, and he recited the prayers used by the high priest. The congregation sat silent and motionless on a *heiau* terrace until Kāne's high priest (on a higher terrace) had, after five long prayers, lifted the taboo. The priest had invoked some seventy forms of Kāne—in clouds, rain, and forest growth—as well as the other three great gods and the goddesses of hula and of the forest greenery that decorated the *heiau* (Laka, Hi'iaka, the latter's sister Kapo, and their oldest sister Pele, who became violent if ignored). The priest's last prayer, heard only by the chief at his side, was delivered on the third, highest, and most sacred stage of the oracle tower, where the god revealed his will.

**Lono.** The god of two related sources of abundance—peace and seasonal winter storms—Lono (called Rongo or Ro'o in southeastern Polynesia) was also a god of healing. He had numerous *heiaus*, called "houses of Lono," devoted to rainmaking and medical purposes. The Makahiki, the longest ceremonial period, involved everyone in celebrating Lono's annual (*makahiki*) return for four months of the rainy season to preside over rituals for health and ample rain, and over the ritualized collection of taxes, recreation, and release from work. When Captain Cook arrived in 1778, he was greeted as Lono-i-ka-makahiki because he arrived during this period and anchored at the bay called Kealakekua ("the path of the god," i.e., Lono) and because his masted sails resembled the Lono symbol that led the procession of tax collectors and Lono priests on their coastal circuit of the island.

The Lono symbol was a long staff topped with a carved human image across whose neck a crosspiece supported a rectangular white tapa flag and other sacred objects. A shorter staff led a procession in the opposite direction. The principal procession stopped at each district boundary to collect taxes placed near a stone altar that held another Lono symbol, a carved wooden head of a pig, representing fertility. If the collectors were satisfied with the amount of pigs, dogs, vegetables, *kava*, and the like, the Lono priest blessed the district, and the party moved on. At the ruler's compound the party was given a feast. Rites included the ruler putting a valuable whale-tooth necklace on the Lono figure and his wife draping it with fine white tapa. Later the ruler redistributed the taxes to his subordinate chiefs who supported him in battle and who held land as a reward for their service.

While the ruler, the Lono priests, and their attendants were busy with numerous rituals for the general welfare, the populace engaged in hula, sports, and games, each activity having its guardian gods. Wrestling and boxing matches recalled that when Lono learned, after

killing his human wife, that she had not been unfaithful, he had become for a time insane and had fought violent matches. Finally he had left the islands in his canoe, promising to return. To signal that the Makahiki was over, that people should return to work, and that chiefs could go to war again, the priests dismantled the Lono staffs and set adrift a canoe full of gifts to ensure Lono's return the next year.

Each morning and evening the head of a family took down the net-covered "gourd of Lono" encircling the neck of the image on the altar in the men's eating house. He prayed for his family, the commoners, and the chiefs, and he ritually ate from the gourd, the bowl of which represented the earth and its bounty, the cover the heavens, and the handle the rainbow. To lift the taboo on eating a new crop, he or a *kahuna* performed first-fruits rites, then put the gourd of Lono in the midst of the male guests invited to feast. He invited them again when, after weaning, his son entered the men's house, never again to eat with women. Placing a roasted pig's head on the altar and a pig's ear in the gourd of Lono (so Lono would listen), the *kahuna* prayed that the boy would thrive and bear fruit like the gourd-vine. Later the boy would be subincised and ceremonially initiated into eating pork, which was men's food and taboo to women.

**Kū and Hina.** There were many gods in the class called Kū (Tu was the southern Polynesian cognate of the name). Hawaiians regarded the Kū gods either as independent gods or as aspects of a single Kū. Usually an epithet attached to the name suggested the special function or distinctive trait of each particular Kū god. The same principle applies to the class of goddesses called Hina (cognates of the name elsewhere in Polynesia are Hine, Sina, and 'Ina). Some Hinas had more than one name. Hina-of-the-moon is also known as Maimed Lono because, according to myth, her husband tore off her leg as she fled to the moon. Pele's sacred name is Hina-of-the-fire, and Lea's other name is Hina-of-the-ohia-growth. (The ohia is a kind of tree.) Kū and Hina, as well as their varied aspects, function as man and wife in daily rites performed by the populace. With his sister-wife Hina (whose name means "prostrate"), Kū ("upright") united the people into a single stock, for Kū and Hina represented the male and female reproductive principles. Kū also symbolized the east, sunrise, and the right hand; Hina the west, sunset, and the left. Such antithesis was common. The couple was invoked in pregnancy and child care; their subordinate gods or aspects presided over many activities on land and sea. Kū'ula-kai ("red Kū of the sea") was the fishermen's chief god, and fishing *heiaus* were named *kū'ula* for him. His wife was Hina-the-sea-fossicker. Their siblings lived

on upland farms and forests. The chief forest god was Kū-moku-hāli'i ("Kū the island spreader"), the husband of Lea, who warned woodsmen of decayed trees by taking the form of an *elepaio* (a flycatcher) and pecking at trees to look for insects. Kū-moku-hāli'i was also the chief god of canoe makers, whose *kahunas* conducted rites at the foot of a chosen tree, usually a koa (*Acacia koa*). Farmers venerated Kū-of-the-digging-stick. Each occupation had numerous Kū gods.

The highest class of Kū gods was invoked during national crises—war, famine, disease—after the king had first built or rebuilt a *luakini* where harsh and complex rituals called upon the Kū gods for aid. Kū-nui-ākea ("the supreme Kū") manifested himself in the ceremonies as the Kū gods of war, sorcery, and the binding of conquered chiefdoms into a kingdom. A ten-day, four-part *luakini* service required numerous men and pigs as sacrifices, and additional pigs to feed the highborn worshipers and priests. If taboo-breakers, war captives, or slaves were unavailable to be used as burned sacrifices, some large *ulua* fish (*Carangidae*) were substituted.

The first set of rites, held in the presence of chiefs and workmen in the refurbished *luakini*, centered on a stylized parade led by a *kahuna* with a taboo-standard (followed by a naked man who impersonated the god Kahoali'i) and by feather-covered wicker images of gods (a Hawaiian innovation) carried by their keepers. The workers then went home. The second set of rites took the king, the "feather gods" (as the wicker images were called), and the *kahunas* to a forest, where they ritually cut ohia trees for new images. A taboo-breaker was sacrificed in rites that accompanied the cutting of the first tree, and from this tree came a block of wood that would represent Kū on the altar. Marching back to the *heiau* with their logs, the members of the procession shouted loudly and seized human victims along their route. After the images had been carved, dressed in red *malos* (loincloths), and consecrated, the *kahunas*, in the ceremony's third phase, chanted all night long while worshipers listened. In the fourth part of the rite, a *kahuna* prayed for an hour while the motionless worshipers, arranged in rows behind the images, sat with bowed heads and sometimes with upraised arms. The concluding rites were held in the "house of Papa," where a *kahuna* and the highest female chiefs freed the worshipers from taboo before they returned to secular life.

**Gender Taboos, Illness, and Death.** Considered inferior and polluting, women were excluded from all men's *heiaus* and shrines. Three female chiefs who were regarded as goddesses are reported, however, as exceptions. One was Keakea-lani-wahine ("Keakea royal woman"), who, upon succeeding her mother as ruler of

Hawaii, had charge of all its *heiaus* and in each *luakini* made human and pig sacrifices and other offerings. Nevertheless, she took the ritual meals apart from the men and ate no pork, bananas, coconuts, or other foods taboo to women. The taboo system required all men and women to take meals separately and to eat food proper to their sex. All cooking was performed by men, who used separate ovens for men's and women's food. Taboo-breakers were slain or mutilated. (Persons threatened with death for any reason were spared, however, if they reached certain *heiaus* or sites designated as places of refuge.)

Medical *kahunas* were specialists in treating particular diseases, each of which had its guardian gods. They believed that an illness that proved resistant to ordinary treatment, such as by herbs, was due to an *aumakua's* anger at broken taboos and therefore required prayers and offerings. Most *kahunas*, however, specialized in problems related to infertility and pregnancy and in the treatment of children's diseases.

In death a person's soul was prevented from falling into Milu, a realm of eternal darkness, by its *aumakua*, who ushered it to its ancestors' part of a happy realm in Pō, the underworld. A soul without an *aumakua* wandered homeless on earth, ate spiders and moths, and became a malevolent ghost. A soul with a god from the Pele family might be transfigured into a volcanic flame if a priest, having prayed and made offerings, cast the corpse or part of it into the crater. Other souls might be transfigured into embodiments of their gods—a shark, thunder, a water spirit, a bird, or something else. Transfigured male and female chiefs became their descendants' gods.

Dead commoners were buried wherever convenient. The cleaned bones of some royalty were hidden in caves to prevent enemies using them for fishhooks; the bones of other royalty were encased in plaited sennit caskets of humanoid shape and deposited in the mausoleum Hale-o-Keawe on the island of Hawaii. Sorcery was always suspected when a highborn person died. A *kahuna* trained to identify sorcerers held a *kuni* ("burn") ceremony in which he burned part of the victim's corpse. When the *kahuna's* god had revealed the sorcerer's name, the accused—even if a chief—was killed and burned.

**The State Religion and Its Demise.** At his death in 1819, Kamehameha the Great, who believed his many gods had made him head of a unified feudal kingdom, left a state religion based on the taboo system that protected the *mana* and authority of the gods and their chiefly descendants from spiritual contamination and consequent weakness. That same year, however, Kamehameha's son Liholiho (1797–1824) took power, adopted

the title Kamehameha II, and abolished the official religion without replacing it with another. This decision, which was only reluctantly accepted by Liholiho, had principally been made by the most politically powerful of his father's wives, by his mother who was herself a very sacred chief, and by the highest priest of the Kū order. Liholiho signaled the overthrow of the taboo system by publicly sharing a meal (consisting of food cooked in one oven) with his father's wife and his mother. The Kū priests began destroying *heiaus* and images, and the excited populace followed suit. Some hid their images and worshiped in secret. Not all customs and beliefs vanished: even today, faith in the *aumakuas*, for example, lingers on. The only military resistance to the abolition of the religion came from Liholiho's cousin, who had inherited the *aumakua* Kū-kā'ili-moku, but the resistance ended when the cousin lost his life in battle.

The reasons, still debated, for the overthrow of the religion included weariness of the burden of taboos on chiefs and commoners and on men and women and, of course, the changes that had been wrought by Europeans. Particularly instrumental had been the introduction of a market economy, which was hampered by the chiefs' religious, social, and economic obligations to their people—a system of obligations that was based on the ancient and successful subsistence economy. A few months after Liholiho's act, the first band of Protestant missionaries arrived from Boston; they had been unaware of Liholiho's abolition of the traditional religion until their ship was off Hawaii's shore.

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traditions, tales, poems, prayers, and descriptions of religion; Thomas G. Thrum's notes shed light on obscure references. E. S. Craighill Handy's *Polynesian Religion* brilliantly discusses the interrelationships of indigenous Polynesian religions, including the Hawaiian, and illustrates the major concepts they share.

June Gutmanis has published a major collection of ancient Hawaiian prayers selected from previously published and unpublished sources. Hawaiian texts are accompanied by English translations (and retranslations) and by commentaries.

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KATHARINE LUOMALA

**HAWKS.** See Eagles and Hawks.

**ḤAWṬAH.** See Ḥaram and Ḥawṭah.

**HAYASHI RAZAN** (1583–1657), also commonly referred to as Hayashi Dōshun; Japanese Confucian

thinker of the early Tokugawa period. Hayashi Razan was born and raised in Kyoto as the scion of a family of samurai turned urban merchants. He was sent as a child to study at Kenninji, a Zen temple, but he resisted suggestions that he become a priest. Instead, from his mid-teens he committed himself to the study of Confucianism and Chinese secular learning. He began his career as a Confucian in 1603 at the age of twenty-one by conducting public lectures on the *Analects* of Confucius as explicated by the Chinese Sung Neo-Confucian philosopher Chu Hsi. In this manner Razan sought to establish Chu Hsi Neo-Confucianism as a public teaching independent of both the hermetic traditions of medieval scholarship and the Zen-accented Confucianism that flourished in the major Zen temples of the Muromachi period. Toward the same end, affiliating himself with Fujiwara Seika, Razan adopted the latter's hallmark of a scholar's garb patterned after that of the scholar-official class of China.

However, Razan's career as an independent scholar was relatively short. In 1605 he came to the attention of Tokugawa Ieyasu, founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, and in 1607 he entered the service of the shogun. Earlier military rulers had employed monks to draft legislation and handle other government matters requiring erudition or writing skills beyond the ordinary. In accordance with that tradition, one of the conditions for Razan's employment was that he shave his head and assume priestly garb and the priestlike name of Dōshun. These conditions remained in effect for the duration of his employment, which continued until his death fifty years later.

Razan's employment by the shogunate is often taken as a symbol of Ieyasu's intent to establish Chu Hsi Neo-Confucianism as the official ideology. But as the conditions of his employment suggest, Razan was taken into service because of his general erudition rather than because of any particular expertise in Neo-Confucianism, and his official duties had little to do with the spread of Confucian teachings. Together with the Buddhist priests in shogunal employ, he oversaw the shogunal library, drafted diplomatic correspondence between the Tokugawa and the rulers of other countries, and participated in the drafting of laws and the compilation of the genealogical records of shogunal vassals. He also embarked on the writing of a major history of Japan, eventually completed after his death by his son Gahō, who inherited Razan's position with the shogunate.

Of more relevance to his background as a Confucian scholar, Razan established a private school and shrine to Confucius that eventually received shogunal support, although not on the scale of shogunal patronage of various Buddhist institutions. He wrote works elucidating

various points of Chu Hsi's teachings and polemics against Christianity and Buddhism, which, in the Confucian vein, he attacked as socially disruptive and therefore immoral religions, alike in their practiced deception of a credulous, ignorant populace. At the same time, arguing that the Confucian way of government and Shintō were the same in essence, he asserted that to establish Confucianism in Tokugawa life was to restore Shintō to its true place in Japanese society.

However, by and large Razan was more noted for his wide-ranging knowledge than for the originality or compelling nature of his interpretation of Confucianism. He did not found a distinctive school comparable to that of Yamazaki Ansai or the later Ogyū Sorai. In the area of Shintō studies, his influence was also relatively slight. Perhaps out of rivalry with the Buddhist monks associated with the shogunate, who had succeeded in gaining the latter's support for their own more traditional fusion of Buddhism and Shintō (this support was reflected most graphically in the shogunate's sponsoring of the posthumous apotheosis of Tokugawa Ieyasu as a Buddhist-Shintō deity), Razan sought to establish his particular fusion of Confucianism and Shintō as the special hermetic tradition of his house. But his successors did not continue his efforts.

Thus Razan's main contribution to the establishment of Confucianism in Tokugawa life lay in his carving out a position for the professional scholar as a government adviser. At the same time, however, he was condemned by many other Tokugawa Confucians for his readiness to compromise his principles in the process of winning a place for himself. Both Yamazaki Ansai and Nakae Tōju began their careers as Confucians by denouncing Razan's acceptance of treatment as a priest despite his recognition of the evils of Buddhism. Others objected to the precedent he established for the treatment of the Confucian as a professional scholar differentiated from and subordinate to those responsible for the actual business of government. In the eyes of many Tokugawa Confucians, the career pattern for the Confucian scholar pioneered by Razan contravened the traditional ideal of the Confucian playing a central role in society and thereby bringing his education and moral rectitude to bear on the transformation of society.

[See also Confucianism in Japan.]

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KATE WILDMAN NAKAI

**HAYDON, A. EUSTACE** (1880–1975), Canadian historian of religions and a founder of the modern humanist movement in North America. Born in Brampton, Ontario, Albert Eustace Haydon attended McMaster University, where he received his B.A., Th.B., B.D., and M.A. degrees; the University of Saskatchewan, where he received another master's degree; and the University of Chicago, where he received his Ph.D. After serving as a Baptist pastor in Canada (1903–1913), a YMCA general secretary (1913–1916), and a Unitarian minister (1918–1924), Haydon joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in 1919; he became chairman of the department of comparative religion there in 1921 and a full professor in 1929, and he stayed at Chicago until his retirement in 1945.

Haydon was critical of theories of religion that understood it to be grounded in "religious consciousness" or in a response to a trans-human religious object or power, and of prior appropriations of the comparative method in the study of religion, which he saw to be apologetic in character; he in turn articulated a theory of religion that was influenced by the social sciences. Rejecting efforts to discover a unilinear evolutionary theory of religion as misdirected quests for origins, he considered religion to be basically social in character. In a manner consistent with his functionalist approach to religion, Haydon saw the religious sensibility as characterized by a shared social quest for the good (that is, the completely satisfying) life. The study of the history of religions became for him the continuing effort to describe the various manifestations of the persistent human quest to realize idealized values of the good life in diverse cultural contexts.

There were, he suggested, three components of religion: a socially envisioned set of ideal values, a program for the realization of these values, and a worldview in which the quest for these values is related to the natural and human environments. In his scholarly publications, Haydon implemented his understanding of the task of the historian of religions by describing the ways in which this human quest has been manifested in the particular religions that appear, in concrete forms, in diverse and endlessly varied cultural and conditioning environments. He was a founder of the modern humanist movement in North America and understood humanism to have an essentially religious dimension. Haydon was one of the authors of both the Humanist Manifesto of 1933 and of the revised Humanist Manifesto of 1973.

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F. STANLEY LUSBY

**ḤAYYIM VITAL.** See Vital, Ḥayyim.

**HEAD.** [This entry consists of two articles. The first treats the symbolism and ritual use of the head in various religious traditions. It is followed by a discussion of the head cult in the Celtic tradition, where it was especially prominent.]

## Symbolism and Ritual Use

The symbolic and religious value of the head is attested by various myths that stress the theme of many-headedness (thus calling attention to assorted aspects of divine power) as well as by numerous rituals, dating to prehistoric times, in which the human head is hunted, offered as a sacrifice, preserved, and venerated. What-

ever exact meaning these myths and rites ascribe to the head, they all rest on a common, and certainly very ancient, valorization that must not be overintellectualized. In the most archaic psychology the forces of courage as well as the impulses of anger and violence have their base in the head. The Greeks of the Homeric age considered it the location of a *psuchē* difficult to control and opposed to reason and judgment, which were located in the chest and heart. In agreement with Alcmaeon of Croton, the Pythagoreans localized sperm in the head. From that localization of life force came the belief that the vital and spiritual element of a victim could be assimilated by eating his brain.

As a source of power, the skull naturally became an object of worship: its magical value came from the fact that it was supposed to be the center of life. Among the Celts, for example, the head was the container of a sacred force, whereas in other ancient and traditional cultures, the head is conceived of as the seat of vital energy, the active principle of the whole individual. From such beliefs come headhunting rituals, the offering of skulls in sacrifice, and veneration for ancestors' skulls, as well as the apotropaic talismanic value attributed to the head.

**Multiple Heads.** Indo-European mythologies represented the diverse fields of application of the divine power by endowing the gods with three heads. Hinduism recognizes the *trimūrti*, a figure with three faces on the same head, representing Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva; in other words, the creating, preserving, and destroying power of the divine One.

Śiva is often shown with three or five faces and many arms, a sign of his omnipotence. Agni (Fire), accomplishing the will of Indra in the world, is endowed with three heads. Indra, "the leader of all the gods and lord of light," will struggle against Trīśiras, the son of Traṣṭr the demiurge, a young ascetic brahman also possessing three heads: with one he reads the Vedas, with the second he eats, and thanks to the third, he surveys the whole universe. He was endowed with a threefold knowledge and a threefold will and thus risked upsetting the divine equilibrium. Indra therefore struck Trīśiras with his thunderbolt and had a woodcutter chop off his three heads. In the Greek world, Hekate, the lunar goddess of night and of crossroads, has three heads: a horse's or cow's head and a dog's head that together frame the head of a young girl. She possesses an abundance of magical charms. In the same nocturnal register there corresponds the dog Kerberos, with three heads and tails of a serpent. Kerberos is the guardian of Hell, and his monstrous voracity, born of the imagination, is the incarnation of the greed of devouring death.

The Hindu god Aditi has two faces, for it is he who

begins and ends each liturgical act (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 3.2.4.16). Like him, the Bifrons Janus of the Romans has a double face, for he is the god of passage in time as well as space. His face is double, as his functions as overseer and protector of time are ambivalent. Among the Celts, the three-headed god, often identified by the Gallo-Romans with Mercury, had many representations in Aedui country and in the northeast of Gaul. Certain Celtic myths feature animal gods with three heads or three horns. This repetition signifies, as in Hinduism, the desire to represent, and thereby augment, the divine power. It is the same for the Thracian Rider, often endowed with three heads. In the nineteenth century, thousands of representations of anthropomorphic divinities with three or seven heads were destroyed during the evangelization of the Samoyeds. This many-headedness recalls the faculty of seeing and knowing everything that the Finno-Ugrians assigned to the sun, which was the principal manifestation of the god Num.

**Beheading.** Numerous discoveries in mountain caves have revealed the existence during the last interglacial period (150,000 years ago) of rites in which the skulls of bears were placed with long bones and preserved as if they were an offering to a divinity in charge of dispensing the spoils of the hunt. This rite seems analogous to one practiced not so long ago by the Inuit (Eskimo) of King William Island and to another rite practiced by the Samoyeds, in which a reindeer's head and long bones were exposed on some branches as an offering to Num, their supreme god. The discovery in Silesia of the skull of a young bear whose incisors and canines had been sawed and filed has been compared to a rite practiced by the Gilyak of Sakhalin Island and by the Ainu of Yezo, present-day Hokkaidō. This offering of an animal's skull and long bones appears very characteristic of hunting peoples. [See also Bones.] However, if the fact of their belief in a supreme being who is lord of the animals can be contested because of the lack of unambiguous documents, the religious character of this offering seems certain from the time of the late Paleolithic age.

It is difficult to ascertain whether it is a question here of a sacrifice of firstlings in which the brain and the marrow are offered to the god (the thesis of Alexander Gahs, 1928) or of a belief that the killed animal will not be reincarnated into another similar animal unless its bones remain intact (according to Karl Meuli's hypothesis in *Griechische Opferbräuche*, Basel, 1945). It is possible to state, however, that the idea of a ritual intended to assure the quantitative renewal of game rests upon an identical belief observed in a large zone extending

from the Caucasus to Tibet, and in the entire Arctic European and North American zone. Similar indications have been found in Mesopotamia, in ancient Ugarit at the time of the Aqhat epic, as well as in the Egyptian *Book of Going Forth by Day*. Applied to the hunted animal (bear or reindeer) the belief is that life resides in the "soul of the bones," and that in offering the skull it is the whole animal, in its most vital part, that is thus consecrated to the god.

One finds the same belief, but now applied to man, in founding rituals that mention certain myths: the first decapitation is the sacrifice that founds the order of the created world. According to the Chaldean priest Berossus (third century BCE), the god Marduk ordered the head of the first (primordial) man cut off. From a mixture of the spurting blood and the earth, Marduk then fashioned all humans and animals. The construction of a city or a temple is also found to be linked to a sacrificial decapitation in certain myths about the Kotoko of Chad.

Pliny reports (*Natural History* 23.4) that when the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was constructed at Rome, a gigantic human skull was found during the laying of the foundations. This was interpreted as a favorable portent that Rome would be the head of the world and the capitol the seat of its power. We should also recall the Christian legend of Adam's skull, found at the very place where the cross of Christ was raised at Golgotha, "the place of the skull," as if to mark the foundation by the new Adam of the new Jerusalem of redeemed men. A completely different meaning, closer to that of hunting peoples, appears in the Aztec ritual of beheading during the sacrifice to Chicomecoatl-Xilonen, the goddess of young corn, and to Teteoinnan (Toci), the mother goddess of fertility and vegetal plenty. It should be noted that the same word, *quechcotona*, designates both sacrificial decapitation and the gathering of ears of corn.

The headhunt, a rather common practice, is the necessary condition for being recognized as an adult and being deemed suitable for marriage. This practice is more like a ritualized war expedition than a sacrifice to the gods. It is well documented among Indo-European peoples such as the Scythians, who suspended the heads of enemies they had killed around the necks of their horses (Herodotus, 4.6.4). In ancient Greece the head hunt was an obligatory rite for initiation into the brotherhood of animal-men: Dolon the Trojan dressed himself in a wolf skin and tried one night to bring back the heads of Odysseus and Agamemnon; when he was discovered, his own head was cut off by Odysseus and Diomedes (*Iliad* 208ff.). The skull hunt was commonly



practiced by the Celts. The Gauls hung the trophy skulls in their homes or nailed them to the main door after having rubbed them with cedar oil (Strabo, 4.4.5; Diodorus Siculus, 5.29.4–5). Sometimes these skulls, glazed with a thin layer of gold, served as sacred vessels for human blood libations to Teutates, and as cups strictly reserved for use by the druids and the chiefs (Livy, 23.24.12). This custom was to be maintained in Celtic Ireland and in the country of the Gauls. Gallic coins from Armorica pictured chopped-off heads as a victory symbol evoking the hero Cú Chulainn, the son of the god Lugh who brandished decapitated enemy heads in battle in order to frighten the enemy. He himself died in single combat with Lugard, who cleaved his head, since in the Celtic world death took effect only if the membranes of the brain, the adversary's seat of life and force, were reached.

In certain Semitic cultures, or cultures influenced by Semitic peoples, the head hunt is associated with the hunt for genital parts. Whether practiced in ancient Israel (1 Sm. 18.25–27, 2 Sm. 3.14) or by ethnic groups in northern East Africa, the trophy brought back is, along with the head, the foreskin or male member. Among the American Plains Indians, scalps have always been war trophies that the Cheyenne or Blackfeet hung at the tip of a pole around which they danced in honor of the forces of nature. Joseph François Lafitau (*Mœurs des sauvages américains*, vol. 2, *De la guerre*, 1724) says that the Iroquois exposed the severed head of an enemy caught apart before the battle in order to frighten their opponents, but that afterward they only scalped those who were dead or left for dead. This scalp was prepared like the skin of an animal taken in the hunt and exhibited at the end of a pole. Lafitau compares this practice to that of the Scythians and the Gauls.

In the whole Malay archipelago, the head hunt and human sacrifice have been so closely linked that among the Niassans, the same word, *binu*, designates both. [See also Human Sacrifice, *overview article*.] Among the Dayak in central Borneo, the ideal booty consists of the head because it contains "the substance of the soul." The victims of this hunt are excluded from the kingdom of the dead, as are the hanged, those struck by lightning, and those who died in an accident. On the other hand, victorious hunters and heroes who fall in the course of a head hunt are noble, and their souls will live at the summit of high mountains in the company of the Kamangs, their ancestors. A similar practice was more recently extended to the mountainous populations of Indochina, to the Nagas studied by J. P. Mills (1926–1937), as well as to the Jivaroan people of Latin America and the Mundurum of Brazil, who carefully pre-

served the heads of decapitated enemies, sometimes by shrinking. Head hunts are conducted on the occasions of rites of passage and initiation, or during the foundation rites for a common house, the chief's house, or the village temple.

The close connection between the skull hunt and human sacrifice has also been noted in Assam and Burma. Under the influence of Śaiva Tantrism, the ritualistic and symbolic role of the skull in Tibetan Buddhism has often been superimposed on a very ancient stratum of local beliefs, culminating in a revalorization of prehistoric practices in a type of Tantric yoga. Such was the case with the Aghorins, Śaiva ascetics who ate from human skulls and meditated while seated on cadavers, and who also practiced ritual cannibalism up to the end of the nineteenth century. They were the successors of the Kāpālikas, or "carriers of skulls," who had certain orgiastic practices and were worshipers of Śiva the great destroyer (*Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* 6.8). Forgetting the yogic significance of the corpse and the skeleton, these Aghori naturally rediscovered the most ancient practice of the cannibalistic headhunters (Mircea Eliade, *Yoga*, New York, 1958, pp. 296–298).

The Aztec decapitation ritual took place after the human sacrifice. The head, separated from the body from which the heart and the lungs had already been removed, was impaled and publicly displayed on the *tzompantli*. The skulls, perforated transversally at the level of the temples, remained there a long time. This ritual was ordinarily practiced at the time of the sacrifices to the warrior gods, the hunting gods, or the agrarian gods, but we have not been able to uncover the deepest reason for such a practice. In a single Mexican village, Fray Bernardino de Sahagún saw seven *tzompantli* (*Florentine Codex*, appendix 2) and the conquistadors counted between 80,000 and 136,000 human heads exposed in this way, among which Cortés recognized those of fifty-three of his companions next to four heads of the first horses put to death. It is not certain that these "skull walls," which inspired respect mixed with fear, were the result of the worship of the god of death. But it is certain that the head was a sacrificial trophy that was displayed as the personal property of the Aztec collectivity, since the handling of these heads seems always to have been reserved for the priests and dignitaries of the Aztec people (*Florentine Codex* 3.53).

Certain African ethnic groups link the skull to initiation rituals; thus, in the blood-pact rite in Benin, the skull of a traitor or one who died by accident serves as the receptacle for a beverage made of the cointiates' blood. Those who betray their oath will experience the same ignominious death as the skull's owner. In the rite

of initiation into Haitian Voodoo, the concepts of *pot-tête*, *mait-tête*, and *lav'tête* have quasi-magic importance, as the place where the initiate, whose head hair, body hair, and nails have been gathered, unites with the *lwa*, or spirit, received at the time of initiation.

**The Honored Head.** Discoveries from the Middle and Upper Paleolithic ages, in Europe as well as in the Middle East, or in Australia, show the importance of the cult of the skulls of the ancestors. Their heads were prepared with great care and preserved. These skulls have undergone an enlargement of the occipital orifice, have been colored with red ocher, a substitute for blood as the symbol of life, and have been preserved according to a precise ritual orientation exactly like that practiced not long ago in Sulawesi. Likewise, the Aborigines of Australia preserve their relatives' skulls with great care, in order to venerate them and carry them along with them on their pilgrimages. The same care in decorating and preserving the ancestors' skulls is also found among the Andamanese of the Bay of Bengal, the Papuans of New Guinea, and the Indians of Bolivia. All of them believe that the "soul of the dead" resides in his skull and that it protects them.

In the same way, the Celts preserved the skulls of their next of kin on "encephalic" pillars with hollowed-out niches, such as those of Roquepertuse, Entremont, and Glanum. This custom was maintained for a long time in the Danube Basin where the ancestors' skulls, separated from their skeletons, were preserved under the main altar in churches. Every year, during the rites of passage, the young men took them out and wore them around their necks. Certain African ethnic groups, like the Bamileke, bring the skull of the deceased back into the home and deposit it near the family altar, where it is invoked in prayers of benediction and protection. This is because the skull, as a vessel for sacred power of divine origin, protects its possessor against all kinds of peril and gives him health, wealth, and victory.

Belief in the oracular powers of the head follows from this worship of the ancestors' skulls. Because the head is the seat of life, it is believed that one can easily enter into a relationship with the dead by means of the skull. Those of ancestors permit one to question the spirits, a common practice in Melanesia and Polynesia. Among certain Indian ethnic groups of Latin America, the Jivaroan people in particular, the spirits manifest themselves in the shape of skulls, formidable if they belong to ancient shamans. The Inuit of Iglulik believe in the existence of tattooed flying heads, the manifestation of spirits who have taught language to the Inuit. In ancient Israel, the *terafim* show the relation between the worship of skulls and divination: small anthropo-

morphic domestic idols become the instrument of divination (*Gn.* 31:19; *I Sm.*, 15:23, 19:13, etc.). Commenting on these texts, medieval rabbis affirmed that the *terafim* were made from the decapitated head of a first-born son from which the hair had been removed. The head, sprinkled with salt and castor oil, was preserved and questioned about the future according to a ritual analogous to the one reported in the tenth century among the natives of Hauran. The Greeks likewise were acquainted with the existence of oracular heads: that of Orpheus at Lesbos (Philostratus, *Heroicus* 5.704) and that of Archonides preserved by Cleomenes of Sparta (Aelianus, 12.8).

But it is especially in Celtic literature that the theme of the oracular head comes to its fullest expression. Separated from the body, heads continue to act and speak as if they preserved the vital breath they once contained, like Brân's head in the *Mabinogi*, or those of the Roman Arthurians who take up the old theme of *Fledh Bhricrenn*, in which the hero Cú Chulainn is the prototype of the knight Gawain. The Celtic theme of the severed head, still living and speaking, is the foundation of Christian legends of cephalophoric saints, the most famous of which is Saint Denis, the bishop of Paris. All these legends originated in northern Gaul, in Celtic country, and do not illustrate, as was long believed, the affirmation of Chrysostom concerning the martyrs who could present themselves with confidence at God's tribunal "carrying their cut-off heads as a testimony of their martyrdom." It is always the same sacred power, vital and of divine origin, that is expressed by the severed head testifying to its religious faith.

[See also *Crown and Nimbus*.]

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MICHEL MESLIN

Translated from French by Kristine Anderson

## The Celtic Head Cult

Headhunting as a proof of prowess and the veneration of the head as the seat of the soul and the source of spiritual potency are both far older than the dawn of the historical period. In Europe there is fairly clear evidence for them as far back as Mesolithic times. They were therefore part of the European heritage long before the Celts emerged as a distinct cultural entity. But here, as in so many other instances, what the Celts borrowed or inherited from others they soon made peculiarly their own. The veneration of the head became a central element of their ideology, a deep-set preoccupation which lasted from the birth of the Celtic peoples to their final conquest, one which left its imprint ubiquitously on their art and on their mythology.

The archaeological and artistic evidence for the head cult among the Celts is too extensive to catalog briefly. For example, at the Celto-Ligurian sanctuary of Entremont in southern Gaul (Provence), fifteen male skulls were found, several of them still bearing the marks of the spikes with which they had been fixed for display, and at Bredon Hill in Gloucestershire, England, a row of skulls uncovered near the entrance seem to have fallen from above the gate of the fort. At Entremont there are many examples of severed heads sculpted on blocks of stone, while Roquepertuse, also in Provence, has its famous decorated portico with niches in which human skulls were placed. There is also a wealth of heads sculpted in stone or carved in metal which, while not explicitly identified as severed heads, reflect clearly and sometimes very dramatically the importance accorded the head as a symbol of extraordinary power and divinity: for example, those from Heidelberg or from Mšecké-Žehrovice in Bohemia, or the pear-shaped heads on the Pfalzfeld Pillar, or the three-faced head from Corleck, County Cavan, Ireland.

Classical authors confirm the archaeological testimony. According to Posidonius, as reported by Diodorus Siculus (5.29.4–5) and Strabo (4.4.5), the Celts returned from battle with the heads of their defeated enemies hanging from the necks of their horses. The heads of their most distinguished opponents they embalmed in cedar oil and stored carefully in a chest to be displayed proudly to their visitors, and in some instances they used the skull of a distinguished enemy as a vessel for

sacred libations. These and other similar references are supported by the insular Celtic literatures, where the return of the hero carrying the heads of his foes as trophies is commonplace. Cormac's *Glossary*, which dates from around 900 CE, defines the term *mesradh Machae*, "the nut harvest of Macha (the war goddess)," as "the heads of men after they have been cut down."

But the cult of the head went far beyond the pursuit of martial glory. The head was not only a prized heroic trophy but also a profoundly religious symbol, sometimes evidently representative of a deity and generally suggestive of supernatural wisdom and power. It was a source of prosperity, fertility, and healing as well as an apotropaic agent to ward off evil from the individual and from the community as a whole. Severed heads are often associated with sacred wells—themselves instruments of healing—in the archaeological record, in the early insular literature, and in modern oral tradition, and this association was carried over into the legends of the Christian saints. There are many instances in the literature of heads continuing to live—speaking, directing, entertaining—long after they have been separated from the body. Perhaps the most striking example is that of Bendigeidvran (Brân the Blessed), whose head has presided over the otherworld and protected the island of Britain since its burial at the White Mount in London. Indeed so widespread and so persistent is the image of the head in its various aspects that Anne Ross has seen fit to describe it as "the most typical Celtic religious symbol."

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PROINSIAS MAC CANA

**HEALING** occupies a singular and prominent place in religious experience throughout the world. Often the most important figure or symbol in any given religious tradition is the source of healing.

Śākyamuni Buddha is portrayed as a great healer in the Pali canon. He healed through his teachings on impermanence and through prescribing meditative exercises as therapies for illnesses which, from the Buddhist point of view, are bound up with psychic states that have gone awry. In cases where the Buddha healed directly, the episode of sickness and cure offered all concerned a new insight into the nature of things and, in some instances, the opportunity for complete liberation (Birnbaum, 1979, p. 12).

According to the revelations made known through Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), humankind was to use the techniques of divine cure to overcome evil in the form of sickness and to restore the world to its original perfection. The goal of the entire process of creation, fall, and salvation is *frashōkereti*, which means both healing and renovation. Perfect healing would bring about the end of time and of death and would offer humankind a new existence in a timeless future body in Paradise.

In the biblical tradition of the Hebrews, God himself announces "I am the Lord, your physician" (*Ex.* 15:26; see also *Ps.* 103:3). The rabbinic tradition of Judaism sought to justify human participation in the essentially divine activity of healing. Discussions centered around the interpretations of biblical verses dealing with the restoration of property (*Ex.* 21:19-20, *Dt.* 22:2) and the commandment to love one's neighbor (*Lv.* 19:18) and to till and tend the vineyard of God's creation, taking the human body as the parallel of the paradisiacal Garden of Eden.

In the Christian tradition, the miraculous cures of Jesus are the distinctive sign that the Messiah has come and that the new age of the kingdom of God has dawned (*Mt.* 4:23-25, 10:1, 10:7-8, 11:4-5). As the divine physician, Jesus instructs his disciples how to cure all kinds of diseases, especially by casting out unclean spirits.

In Islam, the concern for healing expressed in the Qur'ān and in the *ḥadīth* becomes an important part of revelation. In general, healing activity is attributed to God. Healing is so central a part of the revelation made known to the prophet Muḥammad that the Qur'ān refers to itself as a "cure" for the mind or heart, the locus of mental, intellectual, moral, and emotional life (10:57, 12:82, 41:44). From the tenth to the fourteenth century CE, Islamic theologies of cure developed whole traditions based on vast sources: the prophetic medicine of Sunnī Islam and the imams' medicine in Shī'ī Islam.

To the extent that they make healing a central tenet of their belief system and practical life, adherents of these religious outlooks join the ranks of human beings across the globe and throughout history. Communities in Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas have long made cure of the body an expression of their beliefs and attitudes toward the most profound powers in the universe.

The following discussion deals with religious healing from a comparative perspective. The outline roughly follows the hypothetical contours of an incident of sickness and cure, moving from the origins of the disease and techniques of cure through the discovery of symptoms, their diagnosis, choice of therapy, the actions of cure, and the aftereffects of healing.

**The Origins of Disease.** The meaning and value of ideas and experiences associated with healing become most clear in the specific religious contexts in which they arise. Thus, for example, the passion of physical suffering has different meanings in the self-sacrifice of the Buddhist *bodhisattva* Kṣemadatta, who burned his own hand in order to become a living lamp, in the crucifixion of Christ to gain everlasting life for those who believe in him, and in the death of al-Ḥallāj, the Muslim mystical poet who saw the human condition, in both its love and painful separation of absence and death, as a mirror of the divine nature and its attributes. If we recognize that each religious and medical system allows for unique statements of meaning and value, we can also point out the way in which the imagery of origins reflects some common pattern. The myths and theories of origins of disease not only provide rational and cognitive grounds for analyzing sickness and health, but they locate the experience of illness as a reality in the cosmos. Sickness is real. From the very beginning, it has intimate ties with personal, so-

cial, and material creation. [See Diseases and Cures.]

It is important to know how the origins of disease are perceived in each religious tradition. The images and symbols of the origins of disease help justify and rationalize sickness and exculpate the victim of illness. They also help the community to think about the condition of sickness. However, the primary importance of myths of the origins of disease is neither social nor cognitive. Rather, they help locate sickness as an ontological condition, a mode of being. The search for the origins of disease reveals that the sick human being is confronting a reality, and it uncovers the nature of this reality.

The supreme being itself may send afflictions. In keeping with their absolute and total character, celestial supreme beings dispatch people with summary diseases and capital punishments. The Semang of Kedah (Malaysia), for example, believe that the supreme being, Kari, who created most of the universe, is omniscient and sees every offense from his dwelling place on high. He punishes wrongdoers by dropping on them a flower from a mysterious plant. Wherever the flower falls, fatal lightning strikes. Often, congenital diseases are attributed to the creator. The Mondari of southern Sudan attribute the origin of certain nervous disorders and mental sickness to Ngun Ki, the Spirit-of-the-Above. Symptoms of such diseases include sudden onset, an indication that the power from above has fallen hard and swiftly. Alternately, mental incapacity that appears to be congenital is also attributed to the authorship of the creator, for the afflicted are considered bad creations that were broken or spoiled in the making (Buxton, 1973, pp. 35–36).

Supreme beings and creators not only set in motion fatal and incurable diseases, they can indirectly unleash a flood of pathogenic substances on the world. This is especially the case when creators destroy their own creations through universal flood, fire, petrification, darkness, or earthquake. These catastrophes generally leave toxic residues. Left over and only partially destroyed, such fragments of the primordial world cause disease in those who come into contact with them (if these fragments should be inert substances like poisons, ashes, or brackish primordial waters) or who are attacked by them, as in the case of leftover primordial monsters continuing to devour victims in today's world.

At times, a co-creator, one who competes or thwarts the efforts of the divine creative partner, introduces disease into the world. According to the Mazdean theology of the Iranian *Dēnkard* (9.37.5), the world was once perfect, immortal, and immaterial (*mēnōg*). Even the material creation (*gētīg*) made by Ōhrmazd, the good creator, was perfect. Only when Ahriman creates finite space does he corrupt the world with evil and sickness,

a state of confusion (*gumēzishn*) that will endure until the end of time. Ahriman's demonic creations inhabit human bodies, where they lodge themselves as diseases.

Often a more ambiguous divine figure introduces disease. Divine culture heroes or mythical tricksters collaborate in creation with the supreme being. However, they are rarely equal in power or status with the high god. They are usually deputies commissioned to carry out the will of the creator. In the course of discharging their duties, however, they bungle the job or meet with misadventure that lets loose disease. Bauro, the hero of Tucano-speakers of southern Colombia, for example, was entrusted with the gourd of night. This gourd would allow people to dream and to perform ceremonies if it was opened with due care. Unfortunately, the hero was unable to prevent meddlers from opening the container prematurely. Its contents flooded the earth with penetrating darkness, accompanied by the diseases of noxious vermin, stinging insects, and venomous reptiles.

Supernatural tricksters are in the business of introducing change, passage from one condition of being to a contrary state of existence. Frequently, tricksters accomplish this feat through the imagery of the human body. When they introduce the body to the experience of transition, disease is often the result.

In some cases, the divine or supernatural body itself gives rise to disease. This is especially true among mythic figures whose slain cadavers are dismembered to bring into being various species of plants or animals. Consumptive realities, that is, substances to be consumed, appear not only in the forms of food but in the guise of diseases.

Ancient Taoist texts (*Huai-nan-tzu*, chaps. 2, 4; *Chuang-tzu*, chap. 9; and *Shan-hai ching*, chap. 13) describe the origins of madness (*ch'ang-k'uang*). Ancient gods of the time of paradise drummed their bellies and created a rumble-guts of thunder and lightning, shattering the world with a primordial deluge. The belly is the location of the Yellow Court (*huang-t'ing*), the center of meditative techniques and mystical experiences that transmute the body, rid it of impurities, and reconceive the individual as a holy and immortal embryo. The individual who suffers madness in this way is said to know with his or her belly the ancestral gods who drummed at the time of creation (Girardot, 1983, p. 268).

Many diseases result from the incomplete condition of creation. According to a myth reporting the emergence of the Navajo peoples at the beginning of time, colors were kept separate from one another in different world levels and in the baskets located at each of the cardinal directions. In the center of the universe was

placed a covered basket containing whooping cough, smallpox, nervous disorders, and all manner of sickness. The basket also contained the first human being and his companions. When the mythical people emerged through the various layers of the primordial world and ascended into this one, they gradually accumulated a riot of confused colors collected from all the various world layers they had passed through. They also brought along the basket of ills.

Creation, increasingly complicated over time, maintains its order only with difficulty. In the Navajo case, the failure to intercalate the myriad orders of sounds, colors, directions, supernatural beings, plants, stones, and qualities of light accumulated during the ascent through multiple worlds, brings on disorder reflected in the body as sickness.

Finally, disease can enter the world through the disobedience of a creature. Instructed by the supreme being, creator, or culture hero to keep silent, maintain vigil, stand motionless, or observe dietary restrictions, the first people disobeyed. [See Fall, The.]

These mythic scenarios do not exhaust the kinds of episodes portraying the origins of disease. The point is that a religious healer rarely, if ever, confronts a merely biological disorder located exclusively in the body of the patient. The religious healer encounters a primordial reality: battles with supernatural forces that have existed from the beginnings of time. Healing must be an act of re-creation, corrective creation, or cosmic battle waged to triumph over or annihilate miscreant primordial powers. The healer must be cognizant of the origins and nature of the realities he or she confronts through the experience of the patient. Disease forces the religious healer to reckon with the creation of the world.

**Myths of the Origins of Cure.** The time of creation also proves to be important for the origins of techniques of cure. These myths of origin are not of merely speculative interest to local religious doctors. They play a directly therapeutic role in episodes of sickness and healing. Thus, for example, in healing a newborn infant, a specialist among the Manus fisher folk of the Admiralty Islands intones the origin myths of the ginger and aromatic herbs that he passes around from one person to another during the ceremony. The myths of origin of these herbs is rather lengthy. It is sung several times, tracing the history of the curative substances from the beginning of time to the more recent period when it was acquired by the medical specialist who does the singing.

Cultures around the world express similar sorts of views. The Na-khi, a people of southwestern China, hold that one cannot speak about medicine or healing without first recounting in a ceremonial way the origins of the medicine. Na-khi medicines begin at a time when

heaven, the stars, and the planets first appeared. The myth recounts the origin of affliction, the history of its descent from one generation to the next, and the history of the heroic and historical struggle between the forces of illness and the powers of cure. Myths concerning the origins of cure often recount the long quests for a remedy carried out by the first supernatural healers.

Myths of the origins of cure are often recited in the presence of the ailing patient, for only then can the therapy be effective. The rite of cure clarifies the mythic origins of the medicine that is always embedded in a cosmogonic myth. A formulaic chant-remedy for toothache in ancient Assyria begins with the time when Anu, the creator, made the heavens. In their turn, the heavens created the earth, the earth the rivers, the rivers the canals, and the canals made smaller pools. Eventually, the pools gave birth to the Worm of Sickness. Weeping with hunger, this pathogenic Worm went to ask the supernatural beings Shamash and Ea for something to consume. No fruits of the earth would do; the Worm would satisfy itself only with human teeth. Even while the worm is given license to devour human teeth and cause decay, it is cursed and destroyed by the god Ea. In times of need, the myth was recited in a ritual fashion in order to reenact the origins of the world and the origins of toothache and its cure. As sure as the world and dental decay exist, so too does the power, made present through the performance of the myth, to overcome the pain and its corrosive cause (Thompson, 1923, p. 59).

The important issue is that at some time in the mythic past a supernatural power of cure has vanquished the power of affliction in question. Not only does this sacred act set a precedent for healing the disease; through recitation of the myth of cure, the healer makes present once again the ancient supernatural powers and events that conquered the disorder at the beginning of time. That is why the healer's words and deeds are effective. [See Incantation.]

**Diagnosis.** When people fall ill and suspect that their affliction has a supernatural cause, they seek expert advice. In many social settings there is an informal but ordered network of people who help the sick person choose the best course of action. Such a therapy management group often consists of relatives, friends, neighbors, and local authorities. The group helps decide how serious the crisis is and how to face it. Should the illness endure, interrupting the productive relations of the individual and the community, special assistance is sought from someone familiar with the meaning of the symptoms.

The individual who diagnoses sickness may serve as a referral center to medical practitioners specializing in

one disease or another. Alternately, the diagnostician may both discern the disease and cure it. The diagnostician reads the signs of the disease manifest as symptoms and reconstructs both the mythic and social history of the sickness. For example, the immediate causes of the disease may be due to the castigating action of ancestors or the hidden malevolence of neighbors or relatives (Turner, 1964). Another frequent proximate cause of illness is the poor performance of ritual acts. Paul, for example, pointed out to the Christians of Corinth this cause of their illnesses: "For any one who eats and drinks without discerning the body eats and drinks judgment upon himself. That is why so many of you are weak and ill and others of you have died" (1 Cor. 11:29-30).

The competence of the diagnostician may stem from his or her personal experiences of sickness from similar diseases, from innate gifts or talents (e.g., clairvoyance), acquired techniques (e.g., special objects of power, ability to interpret dreams), or familiarity with spirits. Among the Balahis of central India the medical specialist known as the *janka* speaks with the afflicting spirit while trying to diagnose the illness. He cracks the patient's knuckles and figures out the supernatural cause of the disease by counting the number of cracks he hears. Other *jankas* use stalks of grass, winnowed grain, or the flickering of an oil lamp to figure out the source of sickness (Fuchs, 1964).

Diviners sometimes master elaborate symbolic schemes accounting for the elemental substances, forces, and processes at work throughout the cosmos. Such systems of correspondence reduce the infinitely complex circumstances of mythic, cosmic, social, and personal history to a relatively few combinations of symbolic items. Some African systems of correspondence have given evidence of astounding complexity. Reputedly revealed by divinities at the beginning of time, Yoruba divinatory techniques reveal the correspondences that exist between patterns of nuts or shells cast on the ground and hundreds of lengthy, enigmatic verses memorized by the diviner. The diviner must know the nuances of meaning in the poems and be expert in applying them to new situations. The verses allude to mythic personages and events that shaped the world. The current condition of the patient is brought into line with some primordial condition of creation revealed in the poem. The sickness, its origin, and the conditions of its cure are revealed when the diviner recognizes the suitable pattern of shells, the proper verse, and its fitting interpretation. Versions of this elaborate system of correspondence have spread throughout West Africa and the Americas. Not only do diviners have keen memories and sharp intuitions; they are shrewd social

analysts whose probing questions unveil the patient's medical history and uncover sources of tension and anxiety in the community.

Through the images appearing in the religious imagination, diviners rearrange the conditions of time. They seek out the moment when cosmic and supernatural forces combined in the same configurations as those symptoms of disease manifest in the patient. Chinese medicine, for example, aims at discovering the "logical link between two effective positions existing at the same time in different places in space" (Porkert, 1974, p. 1). Conditions that are simultaneous in time may be said to induce rather than provoke one another's existence as in a chain of causal connections. The Chinese diagnostic system uses subtle and rich elaborations of the polar combination of *yin* and *yang* as well as the cycle of the *wu-hsing*, the Five (Evolutive) Phases. The Five (Evolutive) Phases are stretches of time or, more precisely, temporal segments of exactly defined qualities that follow one another in cyclical fashion at precise positions defined in space. They are often described in terms of five elements with corresponding annual seasons and cardinal directions: wood (spring, east), fire (summer, south), metal (autumn, west), water (winter, north), and earth (center).

Other systems of correspondence use the symbolism of colors, sounds, movements, the disposition of sacrificed body parts such as lungs, liver, or bones; or dreams and other experiences of the diviner or patient to connect the hidden conditions of the sick person to the more legible outward signs of the manifest world. The point is that all creation is isomorphic; each part bears the same arrangement of forces, qualities, and substances. If the diviner can clarify the working order or disorder of any one part of creation, he or she can see more clearly the same conditions obtaining in other areas of existence—the affected space of the patient's body.

In the Peruvian Andes, diviners use *mesas* to diagnose sickness. *Mesas* are ground cloths, tables, or boards whose divisions reflect the principle structures of the universe, namely, the three levels of the world (the heavenly realm, the inner earth, and the central world inhabited by humans) as well as the elemental structures of time (the seasons, years, night, day, and hours). On the *mesa*, the diviner locates objects representing and embodying supernatural forces with which he is familiar. During a nightlong ceremony in which he asks the patient a series of questions concerning the sick person's physical and social condition, the diviner arrives at a judgment concerning the nature of the sickness and the course of therapy. By successfully locating the patient in space and time, he defines the key supernatural

relations that condition the patient's existence, including the current illness.

**Healers.** The types of religious healers are many in number and diverse in style. Some are specialists in simple instrumental cure such as bonesetting, herbal remedies, and dietary prescriptions. They master a finite canon of pharmacopoeia or therapeutic protocols. Their training is often scholastic and routinized. Of greater interest are the healers specialized in confronting disease through symbolic dramas, especially rituals of cure. Such healers are called to their vocations through a number of different means. Sickness is often a sign of election by a supernatural agent of cure. The isolation of serious illness, the sufferings that the candidates endure, and the deliriums they undergo can all be interpreted as an initiation to the office of healer (Eliade, 1964, pp. 33–65).

In their dreams and visions, for example, shamans of the Tunguz, Buriats, and other Siberian peoples see their own bodies tortured, pierced, cut into pieces with knives, boiled down to their bones, and then reconstituted. This mystical experience of death and resurrection qualifies them as future healers. [See Shamanism.] In a concrete way, their own body has overcome death and disease. Traveling to other worlds in their ecstasies, these healers bring back medical materials (crystals, herbs, rattles, pieces of bones) as signs of their powerful relationship with sacred beings. One Siberian shaman, for example, fashioned a drum from three boughs he took from the mythical tree growing at the center of the world. That cosmic tree transects every spatial and temporal layer of the universe. During treatment, the sound of the drum transports the patient's soul through space and time to the moment and place where creation began.

Exorcists also have previous acquaintance with spirits afflicting their patients. [See Exorcism.] Although they may not have contracted the disease, they have encountered the supernatural beings who possess the sick. In their initial confrontation, exorcists learn to recognize the voice of the pathogenic spirit. That first meeting of the exorcist and the spirit of affliction amounts to a time of trial in which he or she exercises the techniques needed to expel the possessing spirit. Very frequently exorcists establish a dialogue with the disease-bearing being. In the course of the conversation and interrogation, the possessor reveals its identity either through its voice or by announcing its name. During the dialogue, the spirit also reveals to the exorcist the manner in which it may be expelled. Often the sounds of exorcism that the healer recites are the very sonic structures of the afflicting spirit. The names, songs, babbling

sounds, or poems are the outward manifestations of invisible forces.

For example, the *mau tham* ("experts in reciting words") are exorcists in the Buddhist communities of northeast Thailand. They specialize in magic uses of sacred sound. During apprenticeship, they fall into trance, trembling and losing consciousness, while sacred Buddhist words are recited. While entranced, their teacher interrogates them and learns which sacred verses the disciples need to know to expel spirits. The spirits (*phi*) become identified with the totally incomprehensible sounds, which represent verses from Buddhist texts. The *mau tham* lives a life of strict observance and restriction. Should he eat forbidden foods, the knowledge inside him, in the form of sonic images of words, would turn into the afflicting enemies that he battles and exorcises in his patients. Exorcism has a slight twist to it since the *phi*, the possessing spirit, actually inhabits the body of a neighbor in the village. From the body of its host, it attacks the patient of the exorcist. During the ceremony, the exorcist forces the patient to pronounce the name of the person in whom the afflicting spirit resides. Then the *mau tham*, recognizing the spirit in question, forces it to leave by reciting its sounds.

In the *Gospel of Mark*, the exorcism of the Gerasene demoniac follows much the same course. The possessing spirit, recognizing Jesus and shouting at the top of his voice, enters into a dialogue of questions. Jesus asks the spirit its name. It reveals its name as well as the manner in which it should be expelled: "Send us to the pigs, let us go into them." As is often the case, the spirit is expelled from the patient and is made to enter some object or being such as an animal familiar (*Mk.* 5:1–20).

**Clinical specialists.** Any given culture may recognize a range of religious healing specialists. Among the !Kung people of the Kalahari Desert, for example, all healers begin their vocation with the experience of "dying *kia*," an intense mystical state during which healers come to possess *num*, a healing energy originally given to the !Kung by the gods. *Num* causes *kia* when *num* boils fiercely within the healer. All !Kung healers undergo this painful and feared process. All possess *num* in the pit of their stomach and the base of their spine and heat up the *num* through energetic dance until it pours as sweat and rising vapor from their skin. Although all !Kung healers cause the heat to rise up through their spine to the base of their skull and provoke *kia*, the patterns of their careers and practices vary widely. Precise circumstances contribute to the diversity of types of healers in the community: location, gender, spiritual acquaintances, training as a healer, so-



cial circumstances, experiences of illness, age, quality of trances, proven abilities to heal, as well as social factors such as the number of healers in the community, the degree of professionalization, and one's knowledge of diseases of unknown or foreign origin (Katz, 1982).

The Aztec at the time of the Spanish conquest distinguished among several medical specialties. A number of sixteenth-century texts document these specialties and their procedures. The *tetonalmacani*, *tetonaltiqui*, or *tetonallaliqui* cared for those patients, especially young children, who had lost their *tonalli*, a species of soul. The *teapatiani* ("healer of the crown of the head") applied pressure to the palate of infants, massaging it in such a way as to close the fontanel in a propitious manner. Another practitioner designed figures on the body of the patient before bleeding the victim suffering dysentery. Some healers sucked out sickness and transformed the intruding pathogen into a piece of parchment, flint, pebble, or some other object. Other Aztec clinicians included bonesetters and curers of scorpion bites, gynecological disorders, and sicknesses suffered during the rites of passage through the life cycle. Aztec mystical healers were called to their vocation when struck by lightning. Midwives demonstrated their power by dancing publicly during the great religious feasts. Deep massagers cured by warming their feet directly in fire and then walking on the affected muscles of the patient. The most esteemed specialist in the Aztec tradition was the herbalist, and the most despised was the *tetlaxiliqui*, the abortionist.

Complexity of this sort is not only a function of social and political life but of diverse historical circumstances including the spread of disease and the experiences of sick individuals over time. Above all, however, the diversity of religious healers is an outgrowth of the intricate and varied sets of relationships with supernatural beings who are subtly different from one another.

**Group therapy.** Entire groups may serve as vehicles of healing, especially when the instrument of cure is communal music or dance. Among the Toraja people of Sulawesi, for example, men and women sing their children to sleep with lullabies (*ma'bugi*) which each sex sings separately. When the entire community, men and women together, sing the *ma'bugi*, however, a power is made present that affects the whole world, including the fertility of fields and animals and the health of people.

In the Mediterranean area, in western Europe, and in the Balkans of eastern Europe, medicinal dances performed by the entire community heal the sick. The whole group becomes a manifestation of the sacred displayed at their public ceremony. In quite different ways, Şūfī brotherhoods of Morocco, the Macedonian

Rusalija, Serbian Kraljice-Rusalje, Romanian Căluş, and peasants of southern Italy from the classical period of Magna Graecia to the present day, cure through the power of group dances that battle with supernatural causes of disease and death. At times, the sick patient is forced to arise and dance and, in that way, to manifest the healing power in his or her own body. Curative dancing practices are ancient among these cultures. Similar group therapies exist throughout the world. Musicians, especially drummers and percussionists, play a key role. Using their ability to discern the movements of spirits, accompanists guide the community through the episodes of the cure, carefully judging the endurance of the dancers, the emotional state of the ensemble, the mood of the spectators, the nature of the supernatural powers present, and the reactions of the ailing patient.

**The Operating Theater.** Sessions of cure take various symbolic forms. The actions themselves are efficacious and revealing of the religious situation in which the patient, healer, and onlookers find themselves.

**Extractive Protocols.** Some medical routines are unremarkable. Japanese custom, for example, builds in a number of purification rites aimed at separating *hitogomi* ("people dirt") from the body and all other habitable spaces. Hands are kept clean by constant washing. The lower parts of the body, especially the feet, can carry contagion from one category of space to another (from outside of the body to the inside, from outside the house to the inside). Consequently, when making the transition from spaces generating disorders (e.g., the crowded street) to areas of order, one changes one's shoes. Also, when making the temporal transition from day to night and night to day, Japanese custom routinizes ritual bathing that not only cleanses the physical body but functions as a purification of symbolic space and time. Special care is taken on New Year's Day to purify the inside of houses, temples, shrines, buses, schools, and cars as well as all other areas that have had dangerous exposure to "the outside." [See Purification.]

Confession of sins represents a similar religious strategy in maintaining health or expelling disease. [See Confession of Sins.] Confession is one of the most widespread practices in the world, represented on every continent in every known period of history. Its direct connection to health is undeniable. The weight of sins can accumulate to fill or overload the physical body and the soul, making it impossible for the individual to remain mobile and robust and for the postmortem spirit to ascend to its celestial destination.

Faults confessed are physical in origin, for they are

often breaches of behavior, of restrictions on diet, or of prescribed ritual performance. For that reason, breaches of ritual procedure may have been inadvertent. Notwithstanding the lack of deliberate intention, disordered behavior or disobedience (literally, lack of proper listening) takes its toll on the physical and spiritual health of the community. The symbolism of sound allows the penitent to expel evil from his body in the form of words or whispered mumbles. The Inca of the South American Andes possessed a category of healer who presided over confession. A confessor would encourage his patients to whisper their offenses onto tufts of *ichuri*, a species of grass. Then he would pitch the grass into the river, where he also purified the patient.

Sucking is a widespread technique of cure. The healer may use some technical device such as a goat's horn for cupping or a leech for drawing out blood. More often, the healer sucks out the intruding pathogen with his own mouth. In such cases, the healer's mouth is a medical instrument, a womb of transformation that changes the sickening substance into something harmless or even helpful. Sucking can be a stunning spectacle. Several investigators have commented on the violence, noise, and aggressive suction that draws blood from different places on the patient's body. The healer's mouth, throat, and stomach possess special powers. The Tapi-rape healer of Brazil, for example, intoxicates himself with great gulps of tobacco smoke from his pipe. He deliberately makes himself sick so that he begins to vomit, but he sucks his own vomitus and accumulated saliva into his mouth. Throughout this noisy performance, he stops intermittently to suck on the body of his patient. Finally he vomits up the entire mess and searches for the intrusive object that has provoked sickness. Sometimes several healers carry on cures of this sort in joint practice and at the same time. On these occasions the sound of violent vomiting reverberates throughout the village (Wagley, 1977, p. 191).

Purification through washing, healing through confession of sins, and withdrawal of the disease through sucking are examples of extractive healing techniques. The most dramatic of these scenarios that drive out affliction are exorcisms that cast out the agent of disease. As we have already pointed out, such exorcisms are highly dramatic episodes. Sound is crucial, especially the enunciation of a command through the pronunciation of a name, the incantation of a song or poem. The exorcist has the uncanny ability to recognize the afflicting being as it hovers in the darkness and invisibility of the body. The goal of the exorcist is to cast the spirit hiding in the residue of primordial darkness contained in the body out into the light or into the darkness of

another container (for example, another animal, a tree, a gourd, or a medicine bundle).

**Inspiration.** Another category of healing techniques are those that are inspirational. These place some power or spirit inside the body of the patient in order to cure. Massage can transmit healing power from the specialist to the patient. A related exercise of the healing touch is the laying on of hands, especially the hands of powerful figures such as divine kings, prophets, possessed mediums, the insane, or others marked by the presence of supernaturals. [See Touching.]

At times, the power of cure is applied to the body of the patient through the ministration of herbs or the anointing with oil, covering with mud, plastering with cereal gruel or some other symbol of the regenerative life of earth or plants. The power that causes the earth to be fertile and ever fresh with new life, and the supernatural force that fills the plant world (and medicinal plants in particular) imbues the body of the patient with the power of creation.

Blowing also infuses some power of heat, light, or sound into the sick person. Among Tucano-speakers of southern Colombia, healers can cure by blowing because that is the way Yepa Huake made human beings at the beginning of time. He breathed life into them. Through cure, the healer re-creates the sick body. In evangelical Christianity, the healer lays hands on patients to inspire them with the creative spirit who hovered over the waters of chaos at the beginning of creation.

The ultimate form of healing through inspiration is the retrieval of the lost soul of the sick person. This dangerous task requires that the healer's soul exit his or her body and travel to the margins of the universe, to the heights of heaven, or to the depths of the underworld. Ecstatic healers are frequently clairvoyants. Their vision penetrates the opaque matter of the patient's body and of the material world during their quest for the lost soul. Perilous ordeals that jeopardize the soul of the healer fill the journey to fetch back the soul. Often, the battles that take place in the outer regions of the cosmos are acted out in the center of the healing arena or, if the healer has fallen "dead" while his soul journeys on high, the epic adventure is recounted in exciting detail later (Eliade, 1964).

With all of these techniques, the practice of religious medicine becomes public theater. The fallen condition of the physical body serves the cause of high religious drama. Upon the tragic or comic outcome hangs the fate of individuals and communities. Furthermore, the symbolic actions of cure—the episodic structure of the healing séance marked by shifts in music, style, color

symbolism, body postures, and changes in symptoms—reveal the meaning of the sacred as it impinges on concrete existence. For this reason, religious medicine is a well-attended event, a great spectacle from which flows important symbolic languages used to understand and order the world.

In almost all of these healing scenarios, the effective demonstration of cure is essential. The healer holds up some pathogenic object drawn out from the body of the patient: a crystal, pebble, thorn, splinter, bug or snake, a thread, a piece of fat, or a wad of cotton. No matter what the subsequent condition of the patient, the cure is deemed a success once the afflicting spirit has been vanquished. If the patient dies, it proves that the disease agent was more powerful a spiritual entity than the helper spirits of the healer. But the operation itself, for the time being, is a success. The demonstration of cure reincorporates the sick individual back into the normal network of relations and activities. Normalization may amount to a declaration that the new, invalid condition of the patient is normal. Once the patient is either returned to a regular routine or is exculpated by identifying the source of sickness, life can go on.

**The Complete Cure.** The aims of religious healing are consonant with the overall goals of religious life in a culture. Healing may be directed toward reestablishing ritual order, life in abundance, the expulsion of disorder and evil, redemption from condemnation, salvation from guilt and sin, liberation from existence, or extinction of existence itself. [See Soteriology.] Sickness reminds religious beings to assume their peculiar role in the world, one cognizant of sacred realities and coordinated with the cosmos. Rituals of healing redress the fragmented social, personal, temporal, physical, and metaphysical tissues constituting the whole of the universe. By confronting powers that appeared at the time of origins when the world or society came into being, healers transcend, absorb, incorporate, ingest, or are ingested by cosmic modes of being other than the self. All this is possible because the human body and its experiences comprise a knowable world of physical, spiritual, mental, cognitive, and emotional forces that reveal supernatural structures of creation. Religious healing clarifies the ways in which the individual human body lies at the center of sacred meaning.

[See also *Medicine and, for a more particular discussion, Psychology, article on Psychotherapy and Religion.*]

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LAWRENCE E. SULLIVAN

**HEALTH.** See Diseases and Cures; Healing; and Medicine.

**HEART.** Analysis of the symbolic values attached to the heart shows an unquestionable distance between the heart as a source of biological life and its diverse meanings for the emotional, moral, and religious life. The word *heart* may be specific, but the symbol is as multifarious as the polysemy of the term is rich. The range of meanings of *heart* is, indeed, at once based on a physiological reality (which entails a certain animistic conception of the individual) and on spiritual and mystical meditations—two sources that are intimately linked in most cultures.

It seems certain that the vitalistic conception of the heart as the seat of courage, strength, and life is represented by the presence in a great number of ancient societies of the custom of eating the heart of one's enemy to acquire his strength. Likewise, the notion of the heart as the source of life is the basis of the sacrifice usually practiced by the Aztec and earlier by the Maya. In the Inca empire, for instance, the heart was torn out, still beating, resulting in a copious hemorrhage. The flowing blood was nourishment for the Sun (symbolized by the eagle) and an invigorating drink for Tlaltecuctli, the lord of the earth. The heart was considered the most precious part of the person; therefore it was the offering of life itself, a gift from the gods, that was achieved in the removal of a living heart and by the shedding of human blood.

The great symbolic themes relating to the heart were posed by the ancient Egyptians. It is the principal organ of physical life, and is well described in the medical papyri. It is also the center of emotional life, courage, and spiritual life. Thought, will, and wisdom reside there.

The heart thus becomes the very locus of personality, capable of prayer to and love for the gods. But the heart is also man's memory, the witness to the deeds he accomplishes during his life. This is why, after death, hearts are weighed with Maat, the goddess of truth and justice, as a counterweight. The heart has a major role in the judgment of the dead, in which man's fidelity to moral prescriptions and social rules is examined. It is the dwelling place of Sia, the god of understanding, knowledge of the past, and creative imagination. If the dead person is "justified by his heart," if the judgment is in his favor, he then experiences union with the god: "Your heart is Re's heart," says the *Book of Respiration* (2.10), for in man's heart abides "the god who lives" in him, a kind of personal genius who determines the existence and the behavior of each individual. The heart is simultaneously soul, life, thought, witness of man's deeds, and the place where the god resides in order to guide man on this earth and to give an account in the afterlife of his actions. In the human heart, as necessary for life on earth as for survival after death, man may meet the divine.

According to the Egyptians, the gods also have a heart. The stela of King Shabaka, recapitulating an old theology of Memphis, shows that Ptah's heart is the seat of creative activity and the center of his imagination. All that was created by Ptah (the cosmic demiurge) was thought in his heart and came to life through the intermediary of his creating word.

The heart occupies an important place in the sacred texts of Hinduism, as well as in its techniques of spiritual meditation. The natural symbolism of the heart as the center of life and the psychological faculties appears in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (3.20–25). The heart is there described as the place where everything that exists takes shape: faith, suprainTELlectual knowledge, ontological truth, speech, and biological life (for "the sperm rests on the heart"). Even though the heart is hardly mentioned in the Vedas, which stress sacrificial ritual and praise of the divine, the outline of a "liturgy of the heart" can be seen in the oldest Upaniṣads. There it is conceived of as central in the activity of the *ṛṣis*, those seers who intuitively perceive the divine and express it in hymns. The heart is the secret place of their inspiration, where hymns are prepared to offer the gods, but it is also the critical authority that monitors the hymns' value. The heart thus becomes the place of divine vision, which is only given by grace to those who practice self-renunciation. It is understood that the heart's knowledge is *satya*, real and true, since it alone can enable one to pass from the unreal and the illusory to the real. Such knowledge is transformative, for it dis-

covers, by means of the heart, the divine immanence within man. In *bhakti*, the heart is the seat of an aspiration to join the god and the center of a desire that "binds man at the level of his heart." Man should also reject the desire of natural and illusory realities in favor of the enjoyment of bliss and union with *brahman*. It is necessary to clear this heart by way of renunciation in order to become "a polished mirror" in which the god can be reflected. "When all the desires he carries in his heart have been cast away, then the mortal becomes immortal and from that time onward he delights in *brahman*," says the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.7).

The heart is thus the symbol of divine inhabitation in man. Four terms most often define this heart, citadel of the divine, of *brahman*: the grotto (*Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 201, 469), the bird's nest (*Haṃsa Upaniṣad* 13), the ritual hearth, and especially the lotus, an ancient cosmogonic symbol on which the moralizing values of the pure and the impure, the emotional and the intellectual, are grafted (*Dhyanabindu Upaniṣad* 33–35 and 93). But what lives in this place? An impersonal, transcendent principle, the *ātman* (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.3.3), which exists and senses; the authority that perceives through the senses and that is the interior light in every human being; or else the image itself of the power of a personal god such as Śiva, Hari, Indra, the Everlasting, the Supreme (*Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 269). The heart can thus become, by divine grace, the place for the vision of the god: "The man who is free from desire, all pain having vanished by grace of the creator, sees the Lord and his majesty" (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.20). Thus the heart is the place of passage from duality to unity, from formlessness to form, from the unreal to the real (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.2–3; 8.3.1–2). The path of the heart, simultaneously one of meditation and renunciation, of the reversal of passions and desire for union, is thus the route from the carnal to the subtle, from the mortal to the immortal (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 4.16.20).

The ancient Greek world had a rather undifferentiated psychological knowledge of the heart. In the writings of Homer, Hesiod, and the tragedians, *kardia* designates the place of the soul's life, the affects, the emotions, and the feelings. It is the place of secret thoughts and tactical intelligence. By a process of metonymy, the word *stēthos* (chest) is used in the sense of heart; *thumos* (the breath contained in the chest) designates the ardor that animates the feelings that lie in the heart and the thoughts that are formed there. It is this term, *thumos*, less concrete and more subtle, that predominates in the Classical age, but the philosophers introduced an important distinction. In agreement with

doctors and certain philosophers like Empedocles (fifth century BCE), who defined the heart as the seat of thought, the Epicureans and then the Stoics located intelligence there. Chrysippus asserted that the heart is the seat of *dianoia*, the source of language (*Stoicorum vererum fragmenta* 837, 838, 879). In response, Plato developed the theory of a tripartite soul: above the diaphragm is the mortal soul, the *thumos* that inspires good deeds; below are the passions, and the immortal principle of the soul is in the head. Therefore, only the ardor of generous deeds is found in the zone of the heart (*Republic*, book 4). Aristotle, however, situated sensations, sensory knowledge, memory, and imagination in the heart, but not the *nous*, or intelligence. Impossible to locate, the *nous* is not attached to any physical organ (*Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a). With Plotinus, all the metaphorical uses of *kardia* and *thumos* disappear in a distinct shift toward intellectualization, which will counterbalance any Judeo-Christian influence.

In the Bible, the world *lev* (heart) occurs 1,024 times, a frequency that testifies to the multivalence of a term common to the Hebrews and the ancient Semites, for whom the heart was an organ indispensable to life, the place for concentration of all the vital forces. If it beat more or less rapidly with respect to emotions felt, it was because, as the center of knowledge, it was an organ both receptive and active. The heart is the locus not only of the whole psychological and intellectual life but also of the moral life. It is man's interior, or *qerev*: "I shall put my law within them and write it on their hearts," says Yahveh (*Jer.* 31:33). This heart that permits understanding of divine things is, at first, recollection and remembrance of Yahveh's goodness. The expression "ascends to the heart" designates the necessary recollection: "From afar remember Yahveh and that Jerusalem ascends to your heart" (*Jer.* 51:50). The heart is therefore an active center where the ideas and impressions received are transformed into deeds; the heart thinks out man's projects and is the seat of the individual's creative power in the form of consciousness. Not only is the heart the center of moral life, but finally the center of religious life as well. It is the heart that experiences the fear of God and keeps faith to the alliance with Yahveh: the faithful heart belongs entirely to God, in whom it is fixed (*1 Chr.* 29:18).

During the Hellenistic age, when the Bible proliferated in the Greek translation, the word *kardia*, used to translate *lev*, was weighted with all the Semitic values of the heart and took on a new meaning to the extent that the association between heart, thought, and memory became commonplace. In the New Testament writings, a synthesis between Greek and biblical values of

*heart* is achieved. The famous formula defining the ideal community of the first Christians "which has but one heart and one soul" (*Acts* 4:32) associates the new heart promised by Yahveh (*Ez.* 11:19) with a Greek proverb cited by Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* 9.8.2) and used again by Cicero in order to define friendship (*De amicitia* 21.81). *Heart* is thus taken in its metaphorical sense in order to designate man's inner self, the place where his spiritual life is born and develops. But the third-century hellenization of an expression from the Christian faith makes more specific the use of *heart*, which loses its meaning of "understanding." Commenting on the beatitude of pure hearts (*Mt.* 5:8), Origen explains that to see God with the heart means to understand him with the spirit (*De principiis* 1.1.9). For Origen, the heart equals understanding; when the scripture says "heart," this is only a metaphor for emphasizing the "passage from the visible order to the invisible order." A similar Platonism will be developed later, more clearly, in the fourth century by Gregory of Nyssa, who explains the famous passage of the *Song of Songs*—"I sleep but my heart waketh" (5.2)—by bringing up the *psuchē* and the *dianoia* of the soul and of the intelligence in order to explain the word *heart*.

In the West, the term *cor* keeps the sense of the Hebrew *lev*, but Augustine enriches it with his psychological analyses in the *Confessions*. For him, the heart is the place of interiority and religious experience, which defines individuality: "My heart is where I am, such as I am" (*Confessions* 10.3.4). Little by little, however, in the Christian West the word *heart* becomes a simple metaphor for the whole emotional life, while in the East it keeps the meaning of spirit liberated from the passions and the affections and of the place for the understanding of divine things and the love of God.

A fundamental vein of Christian mysticism is that in which the divine heart and the human heart unite in an exchange of love. This mystical view of the heart, which appears in the West around the beginning of the eleventh century, is linked to a spirituality centered on the suffering humanity of Jesus Christ, as if devotion to the divine heart could not exist without an emotional reference to Jesus' heart of flesh and the shedding of his blood, which constitutes tangible proof of the love of a suffering and crucified God. In this heart of flesh, bared by the wound inflicted on the cross, the Christian mystics contemplated the same mystery of God's love, trying to specify its meaning in this heart, which had been pierced although it had already stopped beating. (*Jn.* 19:34). It was undoubtedly Anselm (1033–1109) who, meditating on the passion of Christ, was the first to glimpse this pierced heart as a revelation of God's love (*Patrologia Latina* 158.761–762).

The same idea is found in the writings of the Cistercian William of Saint-Thierry and of Bernard of Clairvaux (*Patrologia Latina* 183.1072). The emotionally pious individual ponders the wound in the divine heart and, confronted with its proof of God's love, wishes to penetrate it and lose himself in it. Such a desire for union, a desire to respond to God's love, has given rise to numerous mystical experiences: that of Lutgard of Aywières at the beginning of the thirteenth century, who was a "sympathetic" participant in the sufferings of the Passion and who "struck at the very heart of Jesus a tenderness so strong that she was forever strengthened"; or those mystical experiences of the cloistered nuns of Hefta in Saxony. Mechthild of Magdeburg (1207–1282) describes in detail how God put her own heart into his divine one burning with love, the two making but a single heart "as the water loses itself in the wine." God's heart is thus the place of sharing and joy while the mystic, like the apostle John, rests on the very breast of Jesus (*Das fliessende Licht der Gottheit* 2.38).

From this monastery in Hefta, where other nuns shared the devotion to Jesus' heart shown by Saint Gertrude (1256–1334), the custom passed to the Franciscans. The memory of their founder's stigmata and their popular emotional preaching developed a piety founded on the contemplation of the afflictions of the crucified one and his wounded heart. In his *Vitis mystica*, Bonaventure (1221–1274) praises "the good Jesus' heart" and stresses the love, revealed by Christ in his incarnation, that is sensitive to human nature. This wounded heart is the vital and tangible expression of God's blessings. But it is also the place into which the human soul must penetrate "as if into a promised land where he will find sweetness, purity, and even God's love," says Ubertino da Casale (*Arbor vitae crucifixae Jesu*, c. 1320). This desire for union with Jesus' heart is so great that, through many repetitions in the course of these unifying experiences, an exchange of hearts between Christ and the mystic is effected, as in the cases of Lutgard, Catherine of Siena, Dorothy of Montau, and, later, Marguerite-Marie Alacoque. It is a symbolic exchange, of course, in which God's will is voluntarily substituted by a human being for his or her own and which is the sign of a transforming union born of that "new spirit and that new heart" prophesied by Ezekiel (36:26–27). This symbol of Christ's heart replacing that of the mystic represents "the union of the uncreated spirit and the created spirit that is realized by the preeminence of grace," explains Thomas of Cantimpré in the *Life* of Lutgard (*Acta sanctorum*, June, vol. 4, p. 193). The heart is the whole human being, who always wishes to unite more fully with the person of the word incarnate

himself perceived in a heart, which is the sign of his love and the center "where all the virtue of divinity is enclosed."

In the Christian East, the "prayer of the heart," from the time of the Desert Fathers to our own time, has combined an ancient technique of breath control with the invocation of Jesus' name, in order to "make the spirit descend into the heart." By concentrating his gaze on the interior of his heart, one discovers it as the locus of emotional life, desires, and love. Then one must melt one's perceptual and intellectual thoughts there, as if in a brazier, and let them heat up and burn until a cry breaks out in one's heart, a call to Jesus, the unique source of that love. The heart is thus the space where the body and soul penetrate each other and coexist, just as the inhaled air mixes with the very breath of life. The discovery of the heart therefore reestablishes human nature in its original state, before the Fall, in rediscovering the energy of the Holy Spirit given by baptism, and in becoming the temple of God once again. The expression "prayer of the heart" is therefore metonymical, although the method of prayer described appears to link it to a specific respiratory technique. Hesychast spirituality insists on the necessity of asceticism to purify the heart of man, who may then come back to the reason why he was created and discover truth. Man then receives illumination from the sun of justice, whose light shines in his heart, which thus becomes the place where God reveals himself and the place of God's desire, where the created being lets the Lord live, and finally knows *hēsuchia*: the eternal joy of being united with him forever (*Mt.* 17:4).

Exactly this conception of the heart as the place of God's desire and the organ of prayer and knowledge of divine things is found again in Pascal in seventeenth-century France, where the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus proliferated, with such devotees as Marie des Vallées, Jean Eudes, and Marguerite-Marie Alacoque. Indeed, the Pascalian heart is the center of neither the emotions nor the faculties of the soul; it is the place of resolution and adherence. It is will, and through it the individual is defined and expressed. But it is, in addition, the organ that knows an order superior to that of reason: "It is the heart that feels God and not reason: this is what faith is, God susceptible to the heart and not to reason" (*Pensées* 278). Pascal meant that reason is not useless, but that it remains insufficient, for it belongs to the natural order, whereas "the heart has reasons that reason knows not" (*ibid.*, 277). The knowledge of God is not an abstract thought; it emerges from the very existence of man, and it resides in the desire for abundance: "My whole heart reaches out to know where the true good is in order to follow it." For, as Pascal

wrote in 1658 in his *Art of Persuasion*, "man discovers the truth of which he speaks inside himself." Thus, in diverse cultures and religious traditions, the heart has the profound value of symbolizing and structuring all of human life, the spiritual as much as the physical.

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MICHEL MESLIN

Translated from French by Kristine Anderson

**HEAVEN AND HELL.** As symbolic expressions found in various religious traditions, heaven and hell suggest polar components of a religious vision: a state of bliss and/or an abode of deity or sacred reality on the one hand, and a state of spiritual impoverishment and/or an abode of evil or demonic spirits on the other. As a spatial referent, Heaven is generally considered to be "above," informed by the human experience of the sky as the expansive space or dome encompassing the earth and also including the sun, moon, and stars. Just as Heaven is "above" the earth, so then is deity "higher" than the human or earthly plane for those traditions in which Heaven is viewed as the abode of deity. On the contrary, Hell is generally regarded as a realm "below," a meaning reflected in the derivation of the English *hell* from the Old English, *helan*, with a root meaning of "hide," "cover," or "conceal." Thus, Heaven is often symbolized by light or brightness as a realm of bliss, whereas Hell is characterized as dark or shadowy, a realm of anguish and suffering.

**Judaism.** The worldview of the ancient Hebrews, as reflected in the Hebrew scriptures, distinguished between the world above, the "heavens" (*shamayin*), as the dwelling place of Yahveh, and the earth, the two comprising the universe of God's creation. The creation narrative of *Genesis* 1–3 portrays the heavens and the earth as the whole of God's creation. Under the earth was She'ol; the ambiguous term *she'ol* was used at times to refer to the grave or tomb itself and at other times to indicate an obscure land of shadows, the realm of the dead. Existence there was understood in largely negative terms, since in She'ol the "spirit" or "breath of life" (*ruah*) through which human beings were endowed by God with life was thought to have departed. Prior to

the Babylonian exile of 597 BCE, the dead were not thought of as having an existence in which individual identity was preserved beyond life on earth but rather were conceived as a faceless collective existing in a joyless realm.

With the rise of Judaism in the period following the fifth century BCE, the Jewish understanding of heaven as an ideal relationship of the righteous with God was informed both by intercultural influences and by continuing efforts to unfold the meaning and import of the covenant relationship between the community and God. For example, life after death had been clearly and definitively envisioned by the Zoroastrians of Persia as involving a judgment of individuals at death: the righteous were destined to enjoy forever the presence of God in a realm of unending light, while the unrighteous were condemned to a torturous hell. The Greeks, both in religions such as the Orphic cults and in the thought of major philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, stressed the immortality of the soul. By the second century BCE, both the resurrection of the dead and an event of final judgment were affirmed in some circles of Jewish thought. [See *Resurrection and Judgment of the Dead*.] Heaven came to be regarded as the destiny of the righteous, those in vital covenant relationship with God. Multiple heavens (seven or ten) are mentioned in Jewish apocryphal literature and in teachings preserved in the rabbinical tradition. Paradise, a state of spiritual fulfillment in which the covenantal righteous enjoy an ideal relationship with God, is variously referred to as the third of seven or the seventh of ten heavens. Messianic expectations, which developed in the centuries immediately before and following the dawning of the common era, were often associated with affirmations of the resurrection of the dead and a final judgment, with the righteous destined for a heavenly paradise. In association with these developments, a place of punishment, Gehenna, was thought to await the unrighteous after death, though the period of punishment was limited in accordance with the degree of seriousness of one's transgressions.

Traditional Judaism views the final destiny of humans in terms of the three doctrines of recompense, immortality, and resurrection. Informed by the demand of conscience that virtue be rewarded and wickedness punished, the tradition holds that even if one does not encounter equity during the earthly life, it will nonetheless be met with afterward. The interpretation of the actual form of immortality, however, is permitted wide latitude in the tradition, with deathlessness envisaged as preserving individual identity and awareness (with the attending literal images of Paradise and Gehenna) or, alternatively, as a state that is impersonal and with-

out consciousness. Similarly, resurrection has been understood as a climactic event physically reanimating the dead and including the final judgment of bliss or damnation and also as an eternal event through which the corporeality of the resurrected is transfigured into a pure spirituality.

**Christianity.** The cardinal import of heaven and hell as components of the Christian religious vision is clearly evident in the New Testament portrayal of the completion of God's redemptive activity consummated in the manifestation of a new heaven and a new earth (*Rv.* 21). Not only is heaven envisioned in early Christianity as the fulfilling state of bliss and reconciled relationship with God of which the followers of Jesus are assured, but it is also the abode of the divine, where Jesus dwelled before his earthly life and to which he proceeded following his death and resurrection. Essential to the Christian confidence in a heavenly life after death in which the total uniqueness of human personality is preserved is the concomitant affirmation that God will make possible the resurrection of the dead. This belief is to be distinguished from the Greek notion (especially of Plato and Aristotle) of the immortality of the soul understood as rationality. The reality of hell as the arena presided over by Satan and his angels and as the destiny of the "cursed" was assumed by early Christians and frequently appears in the New Testament writings (e.g., *Mt.* 25:1-46). This teaching has been taken literally by many Christian thinkers through the centuries, though alternative views have occasionally been expressed. Origen (third century BCE), for example, understood hell to involve not the eternal punishment of the cursed, but punishment of such duration as was necessary to provide for the restoration of all to the presence of God.

In Roman Catholic Christianity hell is deemed to be a state of unending punishment for the unrepentant who die without the grace of God as transmitted through the sacraments. This state is characterized both by absence from God's presence (*poena damni*) and by the suffering of fire and other tortures (*poena sensus*). The Roman Catholic concept of purgatory, defined by the councils of Florence (1439) and Trent (1545-1563), envisions an intermediate state after death during which there is opportunity for the expiation of venial sins and compensatory punishment for mortal sins, thus providing for the ultimate restoration of fellowship with God. This teaching, likely informed by the Jewish notion of Gehenna and the Greek notion of the realm of Hades, is correlative with rituals for the dead (prayers, oblations) intended to assure their full expiation. Salvation is understood in the Roman Catholic tradition to be a process, begun in earthly life and continuing in life



beyond death, through which there will ultimately be a realization of the "beatific vision," a heavenly state of full and unqualified awareness of the presence of God, a state of spiritual perfection that cannot be attained during the earthly pilgrimage. The significance and import of the Christian teaching about heaven and hell has nowhere been given more powerful aesthetic and imaginative expression than in Dante's masterful poem the *Commedia* (completed 1321). Eastern Orthodox Christianity, in sharing the teaching that hell is a destiny of eternal fire and punishment awaiting the cursed and unredeemed following the Last Judgment and that heaven is the ultimate destiny of the redeemed, has placed focal emphasis on the resurrection of Jesus as assuring the resurrection of the faithful.

Protestant Christianity, though generally lacking the teaching on purgatory or intermediate states, has retained the traditional Christian teachings respecting heaven and hell, while reinterpreting theological understandings of grace and faith as they are pertinent to salvation. With the dominance of the scientific worldview in the modern era and the theories proffered by the psychological and social sciences, literal and spatial interpretations of heaven and hell have been found untenable by some Protestant thinkers. In terms of theological argument, it is contended that it is contradictory to posit hell as eternal punishment while affirming God as one who is loving and merciful and wills all to be saved and forever seeks the lost. Karl Barth (1886–1968), for example, rejected the entire notion of eternal damnation, and instead maintained that the central message of the church is the election of all of humanity in Jesus Christ. Heaven and hell have been reinterpreted by such thinkers as indicative of qualities of life that are conducive to or detract from the realization of the full potential of persons or, alternatively, as symbols that underscore the fundamental character of the decision of faith, in which the whole of the individual is at stake, and the freedom of that decision, through which one may choose to reject God's presence or seek a full union extending beyond the confines of the earthly life.

**Islam.** In the Qur'an and the traditions of Islam are manifold descriptions of Heaven and Hell that are expressive of the centrality of judgment as an aspect of Muslim religious anthropology. Perfect justice, one of the attributes of God, will be disclosed at the Last Judgment following resurrection. God's judgment will be pronounced on the basis of an expansive record of each person's deeds. Overriding the demerits of every believer's evil deeds will be the support provided by the Muslim confession subscribed to from the heart ("There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is his prophet.") That judgment in turn will be followed by the entrance of the

believers into Heaven and the relegation of the infidels to Hell. In a manner reminiscent of the Zoroastrian Chinvat Bridge, each person will proceed across the bridge of al-Aaraf following the judgment. This will be a felicitous crossing for the true Muslim but a travesty for the infidel, whose fall from the bridge into the pits of Hell is assured. In accordance with the will of God, Muḥammad will, however, recover some who fall. The portrayals of Paradise in the Qur'an and the traditions are graphically idyllic, in no way lacking the enjoyment of sensuous pleasures and bountiful surroundings:

This is a Remembrance; and for the godfearing is a fair resort,  
Gardens of Eden, whereof the gates are open to them,  
wherein they recline, and wherein  
they call for fruits abundant, and sweet potions,  
and with them maidens restraining their glances of equal age.  
"This is what you were promised for the Day of Reckoning;  
this is Our provision, unto which there is no end."

(surah 38:50–54)

Interpreters of the Muslim tradition such as al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) have called attention to the accompanying spiritual components of heavenly existence, viewing all other of the manifold pleasures of Paradise to be overshadowed by the ecstatic awareness of being with God. Equally graphic are the Qur'anic descriptions of punishment and torture in Gehenna, as indicated in the following passage:

All this; but for the insolent awaits an ill resort,  
Gehenna, wherein they are roasted—an evil  
cradling!  
All this; so let them taste it—boiling water and pus,  
and other torments of the like kind coupled  
together.

(surah 38:55–58)

Traditional Islam adheres to a conviction that the sufferings in Hell will be unending, though there are suggestions of a purgatorial realm from which, after a time, Muslims in need of purificatory restitution to the *ummah* (the Muslim community) will be recovered. Both Heaven and Hell are subdivided into seven regions in Muslim teaching, with an eighth region added to the heavenly realm of the blessed.

**Hinduism.** The religious symbolisms of heaven and hell as given expression in the religious traditions of India have a distinctive role and significance when contrasted with their multiple meanings within the contexts of the religions of West Asia and Western civilizations. The ancient Vedic literature (1500–1200 BCE), especially the *R̥gveda* (a collection of hymns associated with funereal rituals), portrays a heaven regarded as the realm of the fathers, who proceed there after death in order to be with the gods. As the practice of the funeral rite of cremation gained prominence,

Agni, god of fire, was called upon to provide for the purification of the deceased. Yama, who was the first human to die and who was also the god of the dead, oversees the heavenly realm. This realm was associated with the sky and the dead were associated with the stars. Among the gods in the heavenly realm is Varuṇa, god of the high-arched sky and a source of the order in the earthly realm. The welfare of those who have passed beyond death to heaven was associated with their participation in rituals, sacrifices, and offerings to the gods while on earth.

In heaven, the distinctiveness of personal identity is preserved, and, in close communion with the gods, those who have entered heaven enjoy the pleasures and goods they have known on earth, but in full measure. Priests and warriors were portrayed among those who enter the heavenly realm, though there was no comprehensive and systematic indexing of those who do and those who do not enjoy the goods of heaven. Though there is much ambiguity regarding human destiny in the literature of the earliest Vedas, there are suggestions that the fate of those who did not achieve a heavenly state (presumably because of a neglect of proper ritual participation, since no moral tests for entrance into heaven were suggested) is either extinction or relegation to a realm of darkness under the earth (hence, hell). In later elaborate ceremonial works, specifically the Brāhmaṇas composed primarily for the ritual performances of the priests, there was presented a more definitive characterization of heaven as an abode in which were experienced the joys and goodness of earthly existence, but greatly enhanced and without the limitations known before death. The quality of heavenly life was viewed as correlative with efficacious ritual performance on earth since association with the gods of sacramental ritual communion (Agni, Varuṇa, Indra, et al.) was assured. Hell was likewise presented as a realm of retribution for ritual deficiencies.

By the era of the rise of Hinduism proper (third century BCE), a quite different worldview had come to dominate the Indian scene, shaped fundamentally by the philosophical and religious ideas of the Upaniṣads (sixth to first centuries BCE). A cyclical worldview had been given sophisticated expression. The notions of transmigration and reincarnation informed a pervasive understanding of human existence as involving, in cyclic continuity, a series of lives, deaths, and rebirths and had come to dominate a comprehensive interpretation of human existence.

Heaven and hell came to be viewed not as a vision of ultimate fulfillment or destiny, but as intermediate states intermittent with a series of earthly existences in a cycle of births and deaths (*saṃsāra*). One's *karman*

(Pali, *kamma*), the reservoir of the consequences of thoughts, words, and deeds cumulative over the entire series of one's existences, determines the nature of the soul's passage from one earthly existence to another through one of the several levels of heaven or hell, which are thus intermediate states of varying degrees of suffering or relative bliss. In traditional Hindu cosmology, three realms (*lokas*)—heaven, the earth, and a netherworld (sky)—are supplemented by a vision of fourteen additional realms, seven of which rise above the earth ("heavens") and seven of which (or, in some instances, multiples of seven, such as twenty-one) are below the earth.

The goal of the continuing human pilgrimage was liberation and release (*mokṣa*) from the suffering associated with attachment to the samsaric cycle to the unqualified enjoyment and ultimate fulfillment of the bliss of *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa*, which is held to be resistant to definition but is accessible to experience, has been variously envisioned as the union of the soul (*ātman*) with the ultimate divine reality, *brahman* (Śaṅkara, eighth to ninth century CE, and the school of Advaita Vedānta), or as an unqualified communion of the soul with God (Rāmānuja, eleventh to twelfth century CE, and the school of Viṣiṣṭadvaita). Such fulfillment was to be achieved by the spiritual discipline of one of the pathways (*mārgas*, *yogas*), or some combination thereof, of traditional Hinduism: *jñānayoga* (liberating wisdom), *karmayoga* (actions), *rājāyoga* (contemplative discipline), or *bhakti* (loving devotion, adoration of God, *pūjā*).

The twice-born castes (*brāhmaṇas*, *kṣatriyas*, *vaiśyas*) had fullest access to these pathways of spiritual practice, especially the first three pathways mentioned. The *bhakti* movements in Hinduism stressed a mode of religious life that involved devotional and ritual practices in which adoration was centered on one of the gods of Hinduism, primarily Śiva or Viṣṇu, or one of their *avatāras* (incarnations) or consorts. The rich corpus of Hindu religious literature provided an abundant resource for the edification and inspiration of *bhakti* devotees. The *Bhagavadgītā* (Song of the Blessed Lord; c. first century CE), a portion of the expansive epic *Māhābhārata*, portrays Kṛṣṇa (an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, the "preserver") as worthy of a devotee's total devotion, while stressing the ideal of responsible yet disinterested action in the world. Some scholars hold that the importance of the *Bhagavadgītā* lies in part in its recognition of the legitimacy of *bhakti* as a pathway to liberation alongside of *jñāna*-, *karma*-, and *rājāyoga*. The other great Indian epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa* (c. fourth century BCE, with the first and last of seven chapters presumed to be later additions), portrays Rāma as another *avatāra* of Viṣṇu worthy of devotional adoration, the accomplished

practice of which results in intermediate stays in one of the heavens until the perfection of the practice leads to the perfect bliss of unqualified and unendingly blissful adoration of and communion with God (*nirvāṇa*).

**Buddhism.** With the Hindu tradition Buddhism shares a cyclical view of history and of individual existence. [See Cosmology.] The world of time and space and history, the realm of samsaric cycles, is transitory and constantly in flux. Heaven and hell are seen as parts of that transitory world, as intermediate and temporary states between one earthly existence and another. Death is thus but a transition from one earthly existence through an intermediate level of one of the heavens or hells to rebirth in yet another earthly existence. The attachment of beings to the samsaric cycle, often referred to as the "wheel of existence" and characterized by *duḥkha* (suffering, unsatisfactoriness), is caused by *tṛṣṇā* (clinging, grasping, desiring) conditioned by ignorance (*avidyā*) of the Dharma, or the truth of the Middle Path as taught by the Buddha. Though *tṛṣṇā*, in the early Buddhism of India and the later Therāvada of Southeast Asia, is the ultimate cause of rebirth, one's *karman* determines the type and level of rebirth. In this tradition, only the enlightened ones, the *arhats*, are free from the cycle of rebirths to enjoy the equanimity and the bliss of *nirvāṇa*.

The temporary aggregation of the components of ordinary experience (the *skandhas*: form, sensation, perception, dispositions and volitions, and consciousness, including self-consciousness) that prompt the presumption of separate person or self is dissipated at death following the experience of liberation (*mokṣa*). Short of enlightenment, there is no surcease of the continuous round of rebirths. The having-been-ness of one life, with its repository of *karman*, leads to the coming-into-being of another life in another realm, though it is denied that any *ātman*, soul or self, as a separate entity transmigrates (known as the Buddhist teaching of *anātman*). Rebirth may occur in any one of the various heavens or hells, and one may be reborn as an animal, again as a human being, or in the *preta* realm, the realm of ghosts.

There is no one completely systematic account of the various hells in the Pali canon, the corpus of Therāvada texts known as the Tipiṭaka. Generally, the realm of *kāmaloka*, of the lower universe of sensuality, includes the various hells and the six lower heavens. The Pali Abhidhamma Piṭaka reports eight "hot" hells below the earth, each involving differing forms of suffering by which the consequences of bad *kamma* are consumed. In addition, there are sixteen minor hells attached to each of these hells. The duration of a passage through any one of these hells is not definitively established, each being correlative with the measure of the evil

*kamma* to be consumed. Other Hinayāna canons preserve more systematic and detailed cosmologies.

The structure of the heavenly realms in Buddhism draws upon non-Buddhist and Hindu sources, though they are reinterpreted within the Buddhist context. The six heavens of the sensual realm of *kāmaloka* are inhabited by the kings and gods who manifest their power through various forms of sensual experience. Included in this group is the Tuṣita Heaven, from which Gautama is said to have come upon entering his last earthly existence in which he experienced enlightenment, as well as the *bodhisattvas* of exemplary compassion and saving power.

The Buddhist heavens of the other two realms, *rūpaloka* (the world of form) and *arūpaloka* (the formless world, often referred to as the world of mind or consciousness), are accessible only by those accomplished in the practice of the discipline of meditation and spiritual endeavors. The heavens of *rūpaloka* are material and are inhabited by the gods who are free from sensual yearnings. They are variously numbered in different lists, in some texts enumerated as thirteen while in other texts listed as being from sixteen to eighteen, distributed in four different groups correlative with four *dhyānas* (modes of meditation). The heavens of *arūpaloka* are likewise structured in four groups, each characterized by stages or levels of meditative attainment. For Buddhism, life in the heavenly realms is not free from involvement in the conditioned existence of samsaric cycles. The ultimate goal of enlightenment and fulfillment transcends even the highest of the heavens.

The *bodhisattva* motif of Mahāyāna Buddhism qualifies the ideas of both heavens and hells in the Buddhism of the "large vehicle." The *bodhisattvas*, moved by compassion for all beings involved in suffering (*duḥkha*), are beings who have taken a vow not to enter *nirvāṇa* until all sentient beings can do so. They are able to manifest themselves through diverse forms and beings and in any of the realms in which there are suffering beings, even into the depths of the lowest hell, to share their merit with all who are in need of liberation and enlightenment.

In no movement of the Buddhist traditions is this emphasis on the saving power of *bodhisattvas* and Buddha figures more vividly expressed than in the Pure Land schools of China, Korea, and Japan. Central to this popular Buddhist movement is the figure of Amitābha (Chin., O-mi-t'o-fo; Jpn., Amida), a Buddha who has gained inexhaustible merit through countless ages of Buddhist practice and who, as a consequence, possesses infinite saving power dedicated to the salvation of all. This Lord of the Western Paradise responds beneficently to all who invoke his name, assuring them of

both protection in earthly life and passage at death to the Land of the Western Paradise, whence their full enlightenment and entry into *nirvāṇa* is assured.

The quest for immortality had developed in Chinese religious Taoism; and with its associated belief in heavens, it made for fruitful interaction with Chinese Buddhism of the Pure Land. A notable figure who did much to extend the influence of Pure Land Buddhism in China was T'an-luan (476–542), who had turned to this form of Buddhism after an extended Taoist search for the elixir of immortality. All mortals, he held, could be assured of salvation by faith in Amitābha, given expression through the recitation of his name, thus relying on his saving power.

The dominant Pure Land schools of Japan, the Jōdo-shū, founded by Hōnen (d. 1212), and the Shinshū, formed by followers of a disciple of Hōnen, Shinran (d. 1262), attest to the wide appeal of this form of Buddhism, with its inviting vision of the Western Paradise. Pure Land texts, especially *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (Jpn., *Hokekyō*) and the *Sukhāvativyūha*, contain graphic and imaginative descriptions of the Western Paradise: a bountiful land without pain or suffering; abounding in pleasure and beautiful natural surroundings, with flowing rivers and lotus-filled lakes, permeated by pleasant music, adorned by exquisite gems, and where neither a notion of nor a word for hell is to be found.

**Chinese Traditions.** The aspiration to achieve harmony in society that has characterized all of Chinese religion and philosophy has given to Chinese understandings of heaven a unique aspect. Rooted in the most ancient traditions of China, the worship of Heaven as well as the ruler of Heaven, Shang-ti, is evident as early as the Shang dynasty (1532–1027 BCE). During the period of the Chou dynasty (1027–256 BCE) the worship of Heaven, T'ien, was regarded as essential for the maintenance of harmony between Heaven and earth. It is in the Confucian tradition, which formatively shaped the essential character of Chinese civilization through many centuries of relative stability, that a sophisticated articulation is found of the nature and place of Heaven.

Although Confucius's teachings and the Confucian tradition advocated the quest for harmony in human affairs, especially through the five relationships (ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, and friend-friend), as the way to perfect harmony in the cosmos, there is no doubt that basic presumptions regarding Heaven provided an ontological ground for the moral teachings to be manifest in the perfection of the *chün-tzu* (sage, ideal gentleman). The focus was placed on human affairs; human beings should begin by seeking harmony in the relationships that immediately address them. Yet the underlying con-

viction was that if harmony is achieved in human affairs, harmony with Heaven will be assured. Thus, the full practice of *li* (tradition, propriety) informed by *jen* (human beings in relationship with each other) in the spirit of *shu* (reciprocity) along with the honoring of *hsiao* (filial piety) will manifest the kind of *te* (perfect moral virtue and power) that is the ideal of the *chün-tzu*. This is, for Confucianism, the way (*tao*) of Heaven in human affairs, and the very nature and structure of the cosmos as determined by Heaven is such that all will be well if ruler and subject both revere and follow (i.e., practice) this way. Thus, though it appears that the thought of Confucianism can most accurately be characterized as primarily a social ethic, there are nonetheless cosmic and ontological dimensions grounded in its notion of Heaven. The will of heaven (*t'ien-chih*) is the primary reality and the ultimate basis of Confucian thought. Whatever happens that is not the direct responsibility of human beings is attributed to the will of Heaven.

Unrestrained speculation about the nature of Heaven was not characteristic of Confucian thought, as evidenced in the texts of the Four Books, that is, the *Lun-yü* (Analects), the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning), the *Chung-yung* (Doctrine of the Mean), and the *Meng-tzu* (Book of Mencius). In certain passages it does seem to be presumed that Heaven is an impersonal force underlying the cosmos, the ultimate source of order and morality. Yet in other passages Heaven is presumed to have the capacity to understand the plight and situation of human beings, indicating a seemingly personal dimension to heaven.

Though Confucian thought was not inclined to speculate about Heaven as a destiny awaiting human beings beyond death, its emphasis on the centrality of the family afforded a natural sympathy with ritual practices of ancestral reverence. [See Ancestors.] Propriety in honoring the ancestors, whose spirits survived death and whose welfare was reciprocally related to that of living persons, became an essential component of *li*. As indicated earlier, both Buddhists who presided over masses for the dead and religious Taoists in China subscribed to a cosmology that included levels of heavens above and hells below the earth.

**Japanese Traditions.** There are, in indigenous traditions of Japan, concepts analogous to those of heaven and hell in other religions. The oldest traditions recorded in the *Nihongi* and the *Kojiki* contained only nascent suggestions concerning the possibility of life beyond death, though this itself was associated with the grave. Following the sixth century, Chinese and Buddhist influences contributed to further development of religion in Japan. References are made to a realm be-

neath, one term for which was Yomi (literally, "darkness"). Though characterized as an undesirable realm from which beings threaten the welfare of the living, it is not clear that it is a repository of the dead. Gods dwell there, but they represent negative powers of death and disease. Later Yomi came to be conceived as a realm of punishment. More definite in later Japanese texts are the notions about a realm analogous to heaven, Ame. This is the dwelling place of the gods, and notable persons are thought to proceed there after death. Ame is a bounteous realm above the earth, made attractive by the presence of trees, flowers, and streams; its beauty is beyond anything known on earth. The importance Ame came to have is underscored by the tradition that Amaterasu, the sun goddess, visited there as well as Izanagi after his failure to recover his wife, Izanami. Japanese Buddhism shared as well the normative Mahāyāna visions of various levels of heaven and hell as intermediate states.

[See also *Paradise and Underworld*.]

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LINDA M. TOBER and F. STANLEY LUSBY

**HEBREW SCRIPTURES.** See under *Biblical Literature*.

**HECATE.** See *Hekate*.

**HEDGEHOGS.** In the myths and legends of Inner Asia and eastern Europe, the hedgehog enjoys considerable respect because of its amazing wisdom. It is often described as being superior in wisdom even to the apparently omniscient God. Moreover, the hedgehog is sometimes a culture hero, instructing people in the various arts of life such as fire making, agriculture, and marriage customs.

In several cultures, the hedgehog has been thought wise enough to have assisted God in his work of creation. As a Romanian cosmogonic myth tells it, during creation the earth had spread out so far that there was no more room for the waters. God did not know what to do, so he sent the bee to the hedgehog, the wisest of all animals, to ask advice. It refused, however, to help, giving the excuse that God was all-knowing. The bee,

knowing that the hedgehog is in the habit of talking to itself, stole back up to it and heard it murmuring, "God does not know that he must create valleys and mountains in order to make room for the waters." The bee hurried back to God with this advice, enabling him to complete his creation. Bulgarians have similar stories. In a Lettish version, God himself tells the hedgehog of his cosmogonic dilemma and obtains advice from it. To reward the hedgehog, God gives it a coat made of needles.

The Buriats have preserved a story about how the Lord of the Earth once visited Khormusta Tengri, one of the gods of heaven. On leaving, the Lord of the Earth begged for the sun and the moon as presents. Hospitality did not allow Khormusta Tengri to refuse, so the Lord of the Earth took the lights of the sky with him and shut them up in a box. The whole universe became dark. Distressed, Khormusta Tengri turned to the hedgehog. Using its profound wisdom, the hedgehog was able to return the sun and the moon to their heavenly orbits. In another Buriat version, the two divine beings are Kān-Čurmasan and Lusat, god of the ocean, with the hedgehog playing the same role.

According to the Buriats, fire making originated with the hedgehog. In the beginning, neither gods nor men could make fire; only Hedgehog, who was then a human being, could. One day, a crowd gathered around Hedgehog to hear the secret of making fire. But the young girls, seeing his strange shape, began to laugh, and this angered him so much that he decided to tell his secret only to his wife, and even then only under a promise of silence. But the hawk overheard him explaining the secret and told it to the gods. From the gods men in turn learned the art of making fire. Later, the descendants of Hedgehog were transformed into hedgehogs. Similar stories are known among some eastern European peoples: according to the Udmurts and the Mari, it is the hedgehog that showed men and animals how to make fire using stone, steel, and tinder. They also say that the hedgehog instructed people in using the iron plow to till the soil.

The idea that the hedgehog is a clever animal is still alive, too, in the folklore of western Europe. A German folktale tells of a race between the hedgehog and the hare from which the hedgehog, by a trick, emerges victorious.

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MANABU WAIDA

**HEGEL, G. W. F.** (1770–1831), German philosopher, culminating figure in the philosophical movement known as German Idealism. Born in Stuttgart, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was given a thorough grounding in the humanities, with strong emphasis on literature and history. From his earliest years he was keenly aware of the cultural disintegration of western Europe—moral and religious, sociopolitical, and intellectual. He felt strongly that he was called to be a scholar and educator who would contribute to the reintegration of German culture, initially through emphasis on religious renewal. Thus, in 1788 he was enrolled in the Lutheran seminary at Tübingen, where, from 1788 to 1790, he studied philosophy and, from 1790 to 1793, theology. From this he turned to political thinking, seeking to analyze the moral prerequisites of an authentic political society. Finally he became convinced that only as a philosopher could he secure the intellectual underpinnings necessary for religious and sociopolitical renewal. From 1793 to 1796 he served as private tutor in Bern, Switzerland, and from 1797 to 1801 he filled the same position in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. In 1801 he moved to Jena, where he defended his dissertation (*De orbitis planetarum*) and began his professional career at the university.

In 1807 Hegel's first major work, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, was published, and he began a short-lived career as a newspaper editor in Bamberg. From 1808 to 1816 he held the post of director of a *Gymnasium* (secondary school) in Nuremberg, where he published his second major work, *Science of Logic*. In 1816 he was named professor of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, where, in 1817, he published his third major work, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (2d and 3d eds., Berlin, 1827 and 1830). In 1818 he was appointed professor in Berlin, where he remained until his death in 1831. The last work by Hegel to be published during his lifetime was *Philosophy of Right*, which appeared in 1821. The bulk of his writings—on art, religion, history of philosophy, and philosophy of history—were published posthumously, based on a combination of his lecture notes and notes taken by his students.

**Understanding Hegel.** It can safely be said that no major figure in the whole of Western philosophy has been more difficult to understand than Hegel; indeed, to understand him is the task of a lifetime. The reasons for the difficulty are many, but they can be summed up,

generally, as five: his encyclopedic vision, his enormous erudition, his language, his dialectical method, and his extraordinarily systematic thinking.

1. *Encyclopedic vision.* In a certain sense Hegel's intellectual quest is a continuous act of faith in reason. He seeks to articulate this faith in such a way that reason itself validates its claim that no truth is recalcitrant to it—not in the sense that human reason can, as merely finite activity, discover all truth, but in the sense that given truth, reason can comprehend the rationality of it, that is, the rational necessity underlying even existential contingency. As Hegel sees it, reason is truly reason only if it is ultimately absolute and infinite, that is, if it is absolute Spirit. This absolute Spirit, conceived as concretely real and not as some vague abstraction, will be seen to be God. Human reason is, it is true, finite, but it is reason at all only insofar as it is a sharing in infinite, divine Spirit, whose object is the infinite totality of reality.

2. *Enormous erudition.* Hegel's was a lifetime of intense and insatiable intellectual curiosity; he was not only an omnivorous student but also one who thoroughly enjoyed every intellectual challenge he met, one who did not, however, indulge in intellectual games. What he sought was a knowledge that is not only true but that truly makes a difference in life—not truth simply for its own sake but for the sake of life. He was not a mere technician in the handling of concepts but a thinker who sought rational grounds for a way of life, not merely an intellectual life but a life that is moral, religious, social, and political—in short, authentically human.

3. *Language.* Hegel uses a language that is both allusive and elusive; he uses language to say what only pure thought can think, and in so doing he stretches language, perhaps beyond its limits, refusing to let grammar be a straitjacket. One must be careful not to read Hegel in such a way as to take his meaning to be what the reader would mean if he or she said the same.

4. *Dialectical method.* Hegel claims that he has not arbitrarily chosen to think and speak dialectically, but that the dynamic character of reality itself demands just this method of dynamic thinking. At the very beginning of his *Science of Logic*, he tells us that to think at all is to think being, but that to think being necessarily entails thinking its opposite, nonbeing, and that to think the relationship between being and nonbeing entails thinking becoming. If we add to this the basic Hegelian contention that what truly rational thought cannot but think to be true cannot but be true, we come to the conclusion that reality is necessarily dynamic and can be thought truly only in a thinking that is dynamic. Incidentally, the oft-repeated description of the Hege-

lian dialectic in terms of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is not Hegel's own description, and in fact is not part of Hegel's mature vocabulary at all.

5. *Extraordinarily systematic thinking.* The comprehensive grasp of any truth implies, for Hegel, the whole of truth; similarly, an adequate grasp of anything Hegel says demands a comprehensive grasp of all he says, which makes for enormous difficulty of comprehension. Strictly speaking, no work by Hegel can be comprehended simply by itself. To understand *Phenomenology of Spirit*, one must see it as an application of the dynamic methodology elaborated in *Science of Logic*, and the latter must be read in light of the progressive development of rational thinking traced in the former. When he writes of morality, of law, of social-political structures, of art, religion, or philosophy, all must be situated in the framework of the systematic structure articulated in *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Whatever is to be understood must be understood in the dynamic matrix of historical development.

**Hegel and Religion.** With the difficulty acknowledged of coming to grips with the complexities of Hegel's highly intricate thought patterns, it remains true that no modern thinker has had more influence than Hegel—and that influence is on the increase—on moral, legal, social-political, aesthetic, religious, and philosophical thought. We confine ourselves here, however, to Hegel's influence on subsequent religious and theological thinking—both Catholic and Protestant. It is important to note in this connection that, for Hegel, religious consciousness, a uniquely human phenomenon, has characterized human society as far back as any records will take us, and that it has borne eloquent testimony to the progressive sophistication of human consciousness of the divine, known in Hegel's writings as the Absolute.

Historically speaking, that consciousness has manifested itself, initially in its most primitive form, in the deification of the cosmic forces of nature, with mounting refinement through efforts on the part of man to portray the divine in plastic, mythic, and poetic form, culminating in what he sees as "absolute religion," or "religion of revelation," in which God, the absolute Spirit, reveals himself to the human spirit by taking on human form. Clearly Hegel has in mind here the Christian religion, which he calls, in fact, in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, "absolute religion." It should be noted, however, that, for Hegel, in every form of religion, even the most primitive, religious consciousness is more than a projection on the part of man of human ideals; in every form it is a self-manifestation—a self-revelation—of the Absolute, which is spirit and only spirit.

For Hegel, then, religion and revelation are insepara-

ble, but revelation can take progressively more adequate forms—remembering, of course, that in all its forms it is revelation to man as thinking spirit. Thus God reveals himself to man in nature, but only if man thinks of nature in such a way as to receive the revelation. By the same token God reveals himself not only to but also in finite spirit, provided that man sees in finite spirit the necessity of infinite Spirit. God, moreover, speaks to man in the words of scripture, not so much, however, in the words themselves as in the story the words tell.

Thus, when Hegel speaks, as he does in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, of a “spiritual interpretation” of Christian teachings—an interpretation sometimes confused with “demythologization”—he is saying that if what revelation tells us of God is true, grasped as true through the mediation of the inner light of the Spirit, then what it tells us to be true is necessarily true, and this truth can be articulated in reason. Then God speaks to man not only in words but in person, in the person who is the Word. Finally, God speaks to man in the person of the Spirit who dwells in man—in the community of believers and in the individual believer. To find where Hegel says all this we must turn chiefly to his *Phenomenology*, chapter 7, “Religion”; to his *Encyclopedia*, part 3, section 3, “Philosophy of Absolute Spirit” (with “additions”); to his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*; to his *Lectures on Aesthetics*; and to his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*.

Here it is important to come to grips with the Hegelian concept of the “objectively rational.” When the human spirit affirms what God has revealed, it affirms what is not only true but also necessarily true, even though the affirmation has not been arrived at as the result of a strictly rational (or logical) process of thinking. Thus, what is affirmed is objectively rational. Hegel’s further contention is, however—and this is where he meets the greatest opposition—that given the truth of what is revealed, human reason can see the rational necessity of it. Whatever is true of God is necessarily true, and thus there can be no contradiction between what reason sees and what religion believes, even though it may well be that reason will not see it until faith presents it. Thus, God’s being and God’s activity are identical, the latter as necessary as the former, without prejudice to God’s freedom, that is, his absolute self-determination.

It can be seen from what has been said thus far that Hegel is far more interested in the object of religious affirmation than he is in the subjective character of the affirmation. Nor is he concerned with the affirmation simply as an intellectual act: much more his concern is

with the response of the whole human person to God, who is truth. Nevertheless, he contends that the response is adequately human only if it proceeds from what is most characteristically human in man, that is, reason, but not reason conceived in narrowly “rationalistic” terms. Here it is that Hegel has frequently been accused of making the religious relationship far too rational, of being panlogistic, if not pantheistic, of allowing religion to be swallowed up in philosophy. It is true, of course, that he does say that art presents the Absolute in the form of the sensibly perceptible, that religion represents the Absolute in the form of imaginative thinking, and that philosophy renders the Absolute present in its most proper form, that of pure thought, but it remains to be seen whether this, in fact, either dilutes the religious response or renders it no longer religious.

Whether or not Hegel succeeded in what he set out to do is a question that has elicited a variety of answers—depending for the most part on the predispositions of those who seek to answer the question. It scarcely seems open to question, however, that what Hegel intended was not to cancel out either the revelation in which absolute truth is presented, or the faith in which it is received, or the religious life that is consequent on both. When “speculative philosophy” thinks out the content of religious consciousness, philosophy does not supplant religion; it completes religion by thinking its content in the form most proper both to its exalted object and to the human subject, who is essentially rational. As Hegel sees it, it is absolute Spirit that bears witness in the human spirit to absolute truth, whether that be the truth of religion, of morality, of law, or of philosophy. Not only need not every believer become a philosopher, but the philosopher need not—must not—abrogate the faith that is at once the necessary precondition to and the constant underpinning of philosophical reflection.

Although it is true that in the final chapter of his *Phenomenology* Hegel sees “absolute knowing” as the culmination of human spiritual development, this affirmation must be seen against the backdrop of his contention that all human knowledge of truth is the work of absolute Spirit bearing witness in finite form to infinite truth. What philosophy can do, then, is to recognize that the presence of truth—even particular, finite truth—bespeaks the witness of absolute Spirit in human thinking. Both religion and philosophy are finite human activities, but they are more than that; because these finite activities ascend (are elevated) to the infinite object who is God, they are infinitized in the communion of the human and the divine.

Here it is important to emphasize the moral dimen-



sions of Hegel's thought. Whether the ascent of the human spirit to God be religious or philosophical or both, neither mere intellectual interest nor fascination with the wonders of nature, nor awe before the extraordinary capacity of the human mind to think, will trigger that ascent; the orientation of the human spirit to God, the Absolute, will be effectively realized only if that orientation coincides with the striving toward moral goodness, in which alone the self-realization of the human spirit can be accomplished. For Hegel thought is not thought in the fullest sense if it is not oriented to the good, not merely in the sense of good thinking but, more importantly, in the sense of good living: it is, he contends, irrational to be immoral. God, then, is the ultimate goal of moral striving, not, it is true, as some vague, indeterminate "moral order" of the universe, but as the concrete, personal foundation for all moral order. Thus, there will be no religion in any significant sense where there is no longing for moral goodness that leads to religious consciousness of God as fulfillment of that longing. This, in turn, ultimately demands that the orientation be not merely emotional, even though knowing God is inseparable from an emotional response to the God who is known, the one God of both religion and philosophy.

**Hegel and "Hegelianism."** It would be misleading here not to acknowledge that there has been and continues to be considerable dispute among scholars as to whether Hegel quite literally intended that absolute Spirit, which he sees as the concrete unified source of all thought and of all spiritual activity, and absolute Idea, the unified concrete object of all thought, should be identified with the God of religion. In addition, there has been and continues to be dispute as to whether, no matter what Hegel intended, the God of whom he speaks can legitimately be identified with the God of Christianity. All disputes aside, however, if we are to take Hegel at his word, he quite clearly says that since there is only one God, then the God of philosophy and the God of (Christian) religion are one and the same—if not, then the God of philosophy would be but an abstract God, that is, no God at all.

As late as 1830 (shortly before his death), in the preface to the third edition of his *Encyclopedia*, he indulges in one of his few emotional outbursts against those who take it upon themselves to say that he is not Christian. He also says quite clearly in more than one place that if philosophy is to be true to its vocation, it cannot fail to be theology. Thus, for Hegel, there is no area of philosophical thought that does not have as the goal of its striving the Absolute, or God—not so much, however, as simply an object of contemplation but, more signifi-

cantly, as an ideal for will, where the ideal is conceived as concrete, personal Spirit. Thus, since philosophical thinking is the activity of the human spirit, the subject matter of philosophy is not, properly speaking, God as transcendent object; rather it is the human spirit in its intimate relation to divine Spirit, without which the former cannot realize in itself all that it is to be human.

It thus becomes impossible to speak in any precise way of the concept of "Hegelianism." There is a Hegelian content, call it "absolute idealism" (an idealism oriented to and rooted in the Absolute); and there is a Hegelian method, call it "systematic dialectic." Those who came after Hegel and were influenced by him can be classified in three groups: Hegelians of the right, of the left, and of the center. To be "Hegelian" at all was to employ to a greater or lesser extent Hegel's method. The divisions concern the content of Hegel's thinking and focus primarily on the interpretation of his religious thinking: the "left," rejecting all that he has to say about God and, above all, about the person of Jesus, makes do with the method, more or less loosely employed; the "right" employs the method to articulate Christian belief; the "center" does the same as the "right" but interprets Hegel's language in more or less metaphorical ways. The lasting (and growing) influence of Hegel, however, cannot be encapsulated in facile catchphrases.

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contained in Jean Hyppolite's *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Evanston, Ill., 1974).

QUENTIN LAUER, S.J.

**HEIDEGGER, MARTIN** (1889–1976), German philosopher. Young Heidegger's concern with the meaning of holy scripture was matched by his interest in the question of the meaning of being. Raised as a strict Roman Catholic, he studied for the priesthood for two years before deciding to pursue philosophy at the University of Freiburg. After receiving his Ph.D. in 1915, he stayed on at the university to work with Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. During the years 1916 to 1919, Heidegger came to find Catholic dogma too rigid and moved toward liberal Protestantism. In the 1920s he appears to have abandoned his faith altogether, yet throughout his life he remained deeply involved with religious and spiritual issues. From 1923 to 1928, he taught at the University of Marburg, where he was a colleague of Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, and Rudolf Otto. Then he returned to Freiburg to replace the aging Husserl as professor of philosophy. In 1933–1934, while rector of the university, he openly supported National Socialism, but he soon changed his position and began challenging Nazi views in his classes. As a result, he was eventually declared expendable and was sent to work on the Rhine dikes. After World War II, he returned to Freiburg, where he spent the rest of his life teaching and writing as a professor of philosophy. Heidegger's thought can be divided into an early and a late phase. The late phase, the so-called turn, began in the late 1930s. This "turn" was not a radical shift in his thinking but rather the mature expression of insights he had voiced earlier.

**Heidegger's Early Thought.** In his major work, *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger claims that human existence, or *Dasein*, constitutes the temporal-historical clearing in which beings can manifest themselves, or "be." For Heidegger, *being* does not mean the metaphysical ground of reality, a role traditionally assigned to God, but instead the finite presencing or manifesting of entities as entities, as things that *are*. Our ability to use the word *is* shows that we understand the difference between being (presencing) and entities (things that present or reveal themselves). Because we are constantly understanding and interpreting what it means for ourselves and other beings "to be," Heidegger concludes that human existence is essentially hermeneutical. Although we often understand ourselves as things, such as egos or thinking subjects, Heidegger argues that we are not things at all. Instead, we are the finite openness in which things, such as subjects and objects, can first

manifest themselves, or "be." Each of us must decide how to be this openness, whether inauthentically or authentically. As inauthentic, human *Dasein* conceals the fact that it is mortal openness and interprets itself as an enduring thing, like an ego or a soul. Yet, the mood of anxiety can at any time reveal that *Dasein* is not a thinglike substance, but instead finite openness for the being of beings. This revelation invites *Dasein* to halt its flight into distractions and roles that conceal who *Dasein* really is. In the moment of authenticity, *Dasein* resolves to undergo a radical change in its temporal openness. As a result of this change, *Dasein* no longer understands itself as an ego bent on avoiding death, but instead as a finite individual called on to take responsibility for its own limited possibilities and to act in concert with others to promote the community's heritage. Authenticity, then, is not merely a personal matter, but an event that aligns one with the destiny of one's people. For Heidegger, authenticity is a prerequisite for genuine philosophical understanding of being. Influenced by Augustine, Pascal, Luther, Kierkegaard, Dostoevskii, and Nietzsche, he maintains that theoretical knowledge must be rooted in the personal experience of authentic human existence. Only such experience promotes the fulfillment of Western philosophy: to understand the being of beings.

**Heidegger's Later Thinking and Its Impact on Theology.** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger approaches being by analyzing the being (human *Dasein*) who understands being; in his later works, however, he approached being in other ways. For example, he meditated on the role played by language in the self-revealing, or being, of beings. Moreover, he no longer spoke of authenticity in voluntaristic terms, such as "resoluteness," but instead described it as "releasement" (*Gelassenheit*) from will, ego, and subjectivism. This turn in his thinking, which took on a mystical element influenced by Meister Eckhart, revealed new possibilities for a dialogue between philosophy and theology. The idea of releasement, for instance, has clear affinities with the Christian doctrine of grace. Heinrich Ott, a student of both Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth, was one of the first to point out the theological implications of Heidegger's later thought. Although the analysis in *Being and Time* of human *Dasein* had been inspired in part by Barth's work on the apostle Paul, Barth rejected Heidegger's philosophy because it overemphasized human understanding and did not properly address the being of God. Bultmann's theology supposedly suffered from a similar problem. But Ott argues that the later Heidegger corrected his early overemphasis on the human and spoke instead of humanity's need to be "appropriated" (*ereignet*) by and for the "event" (*Ereignis*) that "gives" being

to us. Preparing for such appropriation requires a thinking that is more fundamental than science, that is, thinking that lets being reveal itself. True thinking discloses that language is not a tool we possess to dominate entities; instead, we are "owned" by language. Language is the "house of being," the gathering and sheltering that lets entities reveal themselves in their own terms, not merely as objects for human use. In Ott's view, Heidegger's talk of responding to the presencing of entities through language may be analogous to Barth's claim that faith demands a response to the Word of God: philosophy is to being as theology is to the self-manifesting Word of God.

Heidegger himself always warned of the dangers of misusing his thought for theological purposes. In 1928, he distinguished sharply between philosophy and theology. Much later, he claimed that if he were taken by faith, he would have to give up philosophy. He maintained that Christian faith cannot be fully understood in ontological terms; it must be rooted, instead, in the historical events of Christ's death and resurrection. Hence, he had doubts about the implications for faith of Bultmann's demythologizing. Although indebted to motifs drawn from the Judeo-Christian tradition, Heidegger did not intend to revive it. His call for a return of the gods shows his abiding concern for the sacred, but he denied that being can be identified with God. God is a kind of being, but being, as such, refers to the historically different ways in which entities reveal or manifest themselves. He hoped that, in our dark time, the "destiny of being" would bring forth a new world in which the gods would reappear. It is not clear how he could have such hope in being, however, because it lacks a personal dimension. Still, his impact on modern theology has been great. Heidegger's early concern with hermeneutics was transmitted to theology by his student Hans-Georg Gadamer as well as by Bultmann. Furthermore, by offering an alternative to the dualistic understanding of human existence, by calling for a non-objectifying way of speaking of the holy, and by urging us to remain open for a return of the sacred, Heidegger provided much insight not only for such Protestant theologians as Bultmann, Tillich, Gogarten, Fuchs, Ebeling, and Macquarrie, but also for such Catholic theologians as Karl Rahner.

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MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN

**HEILER, FRIEDRICH** (1892–1967), German theologian and historian of religions. Born into a pious Roman Catholic family in Munich, Heiler studied theology, philosophy, Asian languages, and psychology at the University of Munich and received his doctorate in 1917 with a study of prayer that is still a classic, *Das Gebet*. One year later he published *Die buddhistische Versenkung* (Munich, 1918), a study of Buddhist contemplation. His work attracted the interest of the Swedish archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who invited him to Sweden. There he became active in the Lutheran

church. In 1920 he accepted a professorship in comparative religion at the University of Marburg, where he remained until his retirement. During the Nazi era he was transferred from the Faculty of Theology into the Faculty of Arts and became its first dean after 1945.

Heiler's book on prayer shows his talent for explaining a central religious phenomenon in a purely inductive way, free of any philosophical presuppositions. Without losing sight of historical relationships, the book provides a phenomenological exposition not only of non-Christian religions but also of the Christian churches and their leaders, whose personalities Heiler interprets within the framework of the general history and phenomenology of religion. This achievement prevails in all of his writings down to his last major work, an introduction to the phenomenology of religion, *Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion* (Stuttgart, 1961).

Heiler's double allegiance to the Catholic church and his new, Lutheran affiliation was never completely resolved, as his correspondence with Söderblom shows. In order to bridge the gap, he founded a high church movement, and he was later consecrated as a bishop in the Gallican succession. As much as he was critical of the historical development of the Roman church, the celebration of the Mass according to the ancient Christian rite remained central to Heiler's spiritual life. This orientation is evident from *Der Katholizismus* (1923; new ed., Munich, 1970), which provoked much controversy, and from two of his later studies, *Urkirche und Ostkirche* (Munich, 1937), on the development of the Eastern rites from earliest times, and *Altkirchliche Autonomie und päpstlicher Zentralismus* (Munich, 1941), on the Roman rite and its centralizing tendencies. His early interest in the modernist movement, which influenced him considerably, prompted him to write a biography of one of its leaders: *Alfred Loisy, 1857–1940, der Vater des katholischen Modernismus* (Munich, 1947).

Heiler had both a liberal attitude and a strong mystical bent. Opposed as much to Bultmann's demythologization as to Barth's radical theology, he saw in Christianity a microcosm of the world of religions in general, and he believed in the presence of the ever-working Logos Spermatikos. His personal piety was shaped by the ideals of Franciscan devotion as he experienced it in relations with his Italian Franciscan friends. Like the medieval Franciscans, he hoped for the *Papa angelicus* who would usher in the age of the Holy Spirit and the one holy church. Toward this end, he worked all his life, devoting numerous articles, many lectures, and his editorship of a journal, *Eine heilige Kirche* (Munich, 1919–1941), to bringing it about.

The ideal of the one church Heiler extended to non-Christian religions as well, for he saw in them manifestations of the same basic religious truths he found in Christianity. He was particularly inclined toward Buddhism, especially the figure of the compassionate Buddha, and toward mystical Hinduism, which is demonstrated in *Die Mystik in den Upanishaden* (Munich, 1925). Eventually he was to defend Sadhu Sundar Singh in a long literary feud with the critics of this convert from Sikhism to Christianity. In both his writing and his teaching, Heiler always emphasized the role of women in religion. His numerous sermons combine wide knowledge of religious history with his very personal faith in the God who manifests himself as love.

Although Heiler was misunderstood in various quarters during his lifetime, many of his ideas were realized after his death. His major books, which demonstrate his philological erudition and which provide an immense wealth of bibliographic sources, will remain standard works in the history of religions and in the study of early Christianity. Taking up and enlarging the promise evident in his first masterwork on prayer, Heiler's later works reflect his ideal of an "evangelical catholicity" and his hope for a synthesis (rather than syncretism) of the world's religions and their highest ideals.

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There is no biography of Heiler in any language. For a better understanding of the man and his work, two books are recommended: *Die grössere Ökumene: Gespräche um Friedrich Heiler*, edited by Emmanuel Jungclaussen (Regensburg, 1970), and *Friedrich von Hügel, Nathan Söderblom, Friedrich Heiler: Briefwechsel 1909–1931*, edited, with an introduction and commentary, by Paul Misner (Paderborn, 1981). The latter presents the revealing correspondence of Heiler, Söderblom, and Baron Hügel.

ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL

**HEIMDALLR** is a Germanic deity of uncertain attributes. Little information is given about Heimdallr in the Eddic literature. *Grímnismál* (st. 13) indicates that he lives in Himinbjörg, the "celestial shelter" from which he guards the abode of the gods, happily drinking

mead while performing his task; but Loki claims (*Lokasenna* 48) that he was fated to an awful life in days of yore and that he will forever stand watch for the gods with a clammy back (*aurgu baki*) because of his exposure day and night to foul weather. (The adjective *aurgu* is derived from the Old Norse *aurr*, which in the *Vǫluspá*, stanza 19, designates the nutritious moisture that drips from Yggdrasill.) On the other hand, Heimdallr is described as the "whitest of the gods" and like the other Vanir is able to predict the future, according to the *Þrymskviða* (st. 15). All men are called "Heimdallr's children" in the *Vǫluspá* (st. 1), and it is stated that he will blow his horn—allegedly retrieved from under the holy cosmic tree—at the end of time (st. 46).

The *Vǫluspá hin skamma* (Short Prophecy of the Seeress), which constitutes stanzas 30–45 of the *Hyndluljóð*, ascribes his birth to nine mothers, all giant maidens who bore and breast-fed him at the edge of the world, a tradition confirmed by the poem *Heimdallargaldr* (Magic Song of Heimdallr). In the second stanza of the *Húsdrápa*, the tenth-century Icelandic poet Úlfr Uggason describes Loki fighting with the "son of nine mothers" for the possession of a beautiful *hafnýra* (lit., "sea kidney"); Snorri Sturluson states more specifically in the *Skáldskaparmál* (chap. 16) that Loki's adversary was Heimdallr and that they fought in the shape of seals for this "sea kidney," which Snorri identifies with the Brising Necklace. Furthermore, in referring to the *Heimdallargaldr*, Snorri explains the use of the kenning *Heimdallar höfuð* ("Heimdallr's head") for "sword": it is ascribable to the fact that a head was "Heimdallr's fate"; that is, he was struck to death with a man's head. This is also confirmed by the kenning *hjórr Heimdallar* ("Heimdallr's sword") for "head" in two twelfth-century poems. The reference to Heimdallr's "nine mothers" indicates that he was endowed with nine lives. However, apart from the report that he was killed with a man's head, there is only one other episode involving his death, namely his fight to the finish with his archfoe Loki at Ragnarök.

In the *Gylfaginning* (chap. 27) Snorri provides some additional details: Heimdallr is also known as *Halinskiði*—a term also designating the ram—and *GulLintanni* ("gold tooth"), "because he had teeth of gold." His horse is called *Gulltoppr* ("gold tuft"), and his home is located next to the quaking path of the rainbow, *Bifröst*, the bridge at the edge of heaven that he guards against invasion by the cliff giants. Heimdallr is the ideal watchman: needing less sleep than a bird, he is able to see for a distance of one hundred leagues by day or by night and to hear the grass growing on the earth, or the wool on the sheep, or any other noise.

Linguistic analysis of the name of the god hardly helps to elucidate his basic character. The Old Norse *Heimdallr* is a compound consisting of two elements: the first is usually identified with *heimr* ("homeland, world"), a cognate of the English word *home*; the second is a masculine noun, *dallr* (of which the feminine equivalent, *dǫll*, appears as the second component of one of Freyja's names, *Mardǫll*). It has been connected with the Old English word *deall* ("brilliant, bright, proud") and thus may refer to Heimdallr's shining "whiteness." This interpretation is supported by another etymology that connects his name with the Old Frisian term *hēmtiacht* ("brilliantly luminous"). However, de Vries (1961, p. 219) is presumably right in considering the Old Norse *dallr/dǫll* as reflexes of the Germanic *\*dalþu-* ("blooming, flourishing"?), with a root appearing also in the Greek word *thallō* ("bloom, be luxuriant") and the Gothic *dulþs* ("festival"), originally connected with the renewal of nature. The Late Icelandic term *dallur* is glossed *arbor prolifera* ("prolific tree") by Björn Halldórsson (Turville-Petre, 1964, p. 153). This would point to a special relationship between Heimdallr and the cosmic tree, Yggdrasill, and would corroborate the etymology that suggests that *Heimdallr* means "god of the world" and *Mardǫll* "goddess of the sea" (ON, *marr*), a type of affinity that can hardly be directly documented in the case of Freyja.

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EDGAR C. POLOMÉ

**HEKATE** was a Greek underworld and fertility goddess. Though not mentioned in Homer, in Hesiod's *Theogony* Hekate is a Titan whom Zeus, after his overthrow of the Titans, continues to revere above all others. Hesiod represents her as a threefold goddess with a share in earth, sea, and starry heavens, and as a great mother goddess associated with fair judgment and with victory in battle and game. She was worshiped as a

principal goddess in Asia Minor and Boeotia; in Greece proper during the Classical period, she was primarily invoked by women. Her name, which probably means "the distant one," suggests her affinity to that other goddess of women, her cousin Artemis. (Hekate's mother, Asteria, a star goddess, is sister to Leto, the mother of Artemis and Apollo.) Hekate's connection to the sea is expressed primarily by her love affairs with various sea gods, especially Triton and Phorkys (to whom she bore the sea monster Scylla). As a goddess of fertility, she is closely associated in ritual with Demeter and occasionally is called her daughter.

Like Demeter's beloved daughter Persephone, the goddess of spring, Hekate is goddess not only of the crops that sprout from the earth but also of the dead in the underworld. She is particularly identified with the passage between earth and the underworld (and perhaps was once identical with three-headed Kerebos, who guards the entrance to Hades). Hekate roams the earth on moonless nights in the company of baying dogs and the hungry spirits of those dead who were not ready to die, those who were murdered or not given appropriate burial rites. Indeed, Hekate is goddess of all dangerous and precarious transitions, including childbirth as well as death; her three-faced image stood at every crossroads, before every threshold. As a fertility goddess who shows herself at night, Hekate is inevitably sometimes spoken of as a moon goddess, although this is not part of the original conception. Later writers increasingly emphasize Hekate's dark and frightful aspects. She is associated with witchcraft and is identified as the patroness of sorceresses like Medea, who kills her own young sons in her anger at being rejected as woman, wife, and mother. For the Greeks, all that is most uncanny and fearsome about femininity found form in Hekate.

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CHRISTINE DOWNING

**HELL.** See Heaven and Hell; see also Underworld.

**HELLENISTIC RELIGIONS.** Whereas religion is never a mere reflex of political, economic, and social

conditions, there are periods in history when these factors exert a palpably strong influence on religious thinking. The Hellenistic age was certainly such a period. Its early phase, which began with the conquests of Alexander the Great in 334 BCE and continued with the rule of his successors, brought military and political upheaval to many peoples. When Roman imperialism later became the dominating power, there was greater apparent political stability, and the consciousness of a unified world, which Alexander's victories had furthered, was enhanced. The thought of one world does not necessarily lead to the idea of one God, but it does raise questions about a possible spiritual unity behind the manifold manifestations of religious experience.

Culturally this was a world that gave primacy to the Greek language, and Alexander himself, although a Macedonian, was a fervent disseminator of Greek culture. Within his empire other languages continued to flourish, including Aramaic, Hebrew, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Latin, but it was Greek that bore the official stamp of the ruling powers. Alexandria largely replaced Athens as the world's cultural capital, with Pergamum in northwestern Asia Minor as a splendid rival. Alexandria gave a Greek form to its glittering artistic and intellectual achievement, although it harbored several other cultural and religious groups, not the least of which were the Alexandrian Jews. In philosophy, however, Athens retained some of its pristine vigor since it was there that the new schools of Epicureanism and Stoicism first found a footing. In different ways both Epicurus and Zeno, the founders of these schools, were reacting to the broadened horizons created by Alexander's achievements. Even before this the Greek world was no narrow enclave, for Greek colonies had long since spread to Asia Minor and the Black Sea area, to Egypt and North Africa, and to southern Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Gaul. What was new in the Greek dimension of Alexander's conquests was the thrust in an easterly direction to Syria and Palestine, to Persia and Babylon, and through Central Asia to parts of northern India. In the wake of the military thrust, Greek settlements and cities were established in many non-Greek areas. Eventually the force of the population impact weakened, although Alexander's successors continued to hold sway for several centuries. An encounter with very diverse cultures ensued, and the traditional division between Greeks and barbarians underwent radical revision. In terms of religion the resulting counterthrust of Eastern traditions meant that the Greeks received more than they gave.

It was not the brute power of military aggression that brought about the change in outlook. In his *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1948), Sir William Tarn argues

that Alexander himself had a dream of the unity and reconciliation of all peoples, but the sources are more faithfully interpreted as recording a prayer by him for the cooperation of Greeks and Persians as ruling imperial partners. Yet the aftermath of his victories brought a realization of the unity of East and West.

**New Trends in State-supported Religion.** In spite of the great change in worldview thus effected, the old order was not swept away quickly. In Greece itself the city-states continued to function after the Macedonian conquests, and this meant that the official religious cults espoused by these states were still maintained. Politically, however, the citizens were aware that they were carrying on under the shadow of Macedonian imperialism and that the substance of their political power, particularly in foreign policy, had much diminished. This sense of insignificance must have demeaned the quality of their religious worship. The Athenians continued to honor their patron goddess Athena, especially as Athena Promachos ("defender"), but they knew very well that they were subject now to whatever Macedonian dynast was in power in the area. Such a situation threw the citizens back on their own spiritual resources so that their concerns as individuals counted correspondingly more. In later ages the emphasis on the individual might often seem to be at the very heart of religion, as in A. N. Whitehead's well-known definition of it: "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness." The ancient world, in contrast, viewed religion as something essentially communal that was realized, above all, in public activities arranged by the state. In the Hellenistic age these activities continued to some extent, but in other ways there was a marked focus on the concerns of the individual.

Not that the social urges suffered atrophy: a popular feature of the religious life of this age was the great vitality of the associations or clubs formed by adherents of the various cults, with or without the sanction of the state. While these associations were often allowed the use of sacred premises, their main activities were usually convivial and charitable. They provided good cheer in the way of wine, beer, and banquets and also a good deal of help to needy members. Naturally the religious element was not ignored, and the name of the patron deity normally appears in records of their proceedings. The evidence concerning them derives from a great part of the Greek world. Prominent in this evidence are towns that were centers of trade and therefore rather cosmopolitan in character, such as Rhodes, Delos, and Piraeus (the harbor town of Athens). Abundant testimony has also been forthcoming from centers of the native cults in Egypt, and at that time these cults, especially those connected with Isis, were spreading to other

countries. Thus at the end of the first century CE there was a club of this kind attached to a temple of Isis in London.

Emphasis on the importance of the individual came from a quarter that at first sight might seem surprising: the belief in astrology, which was then so fashionable. [See Astrology.] Its origins were in Babylon, where astronomy had also been pioneered. The Babylonians had shown that the heavenly bodies moved in a fixed order that could be scientifically forecast. Then their astrologers, who were also astronomers (the two fields had not yet diverged), introduced the belief that events in the world were somehow linked to events among the stars. It followed that worldly events could also be prophesied since they too had been ordained beforehand. Under the Roman emperors astrologers were several times banned and expelled; yet many of the emperors themselves had recourse to them. When applied to the individual, astrology meant that everything depended on the personal horoscope, which was based on the exact date and hour of birth and on the planet then in the ascendant and on its relation to the zodiac. The effect of the prognosis could be depressing, even terrifying. In a Greek magical papyrus (found in the corpus of Preisendanz, 13.708ff), the astrologer thus advises his anxious client:

You must enquire, "Lord, what is fated for me?" And he will tell you of your star and the nature of your Daemon [guiding spirit] and your horoscope and where you shall live and where you shall die. But if you hear something bad, do not break into screams and tears. Ask him, rather, to cancel it himself or to change its course. For this god has power to do everything.

Here the astrologer is invoking the aid of religion with his allusion to a god who can change the prognosis. But a fatalistic acceptance is more often indicated. What is clear, in any case, is that the personal horoscope is the basis of the procedure. The fate of the individual is the center of attention.

A new development that imparted fresh vitality, albeit of dubious sincerity, to the official state worship was the gradual establishment of the cult of the ruler, whether king or emperor. The first clear instance of it in this period was the worship of Alexander the Great as a divine person. In his case it was conspicuously an upshot of religious practices long prevalent in the Eastern countries that he had conquered. In the nations of Mesopotamia the king had regularly been associated with the gods. He had not been defined theologically as a god, but there was an aura of divinity about him. [See Kingship.] A victory stela of Naram-Sin of Akkad shows him towering above his followers, with a clear suggestion of his superhuman standing. In Egypt, on the other

hand, the pharaoh was given an official status of divinity. When alive he was equated with the god Horus, and in death he became the god Osiris, father of Horus. He was also called "the son of Re" (the sun god). The distinctions are well delineated by Henri Frankfort in his *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago, 1948).

It is significant that the initial divinization of Alexander was associated with Egypt. According to ancient historians he visited the oracle of Amun at Siwa in the Libyan desert some four hundred miles southwest of what was later Alexandria. There, in 331 BCE, an Egyptian priest accosted him as the "son of Amun" in a way that corresponded to traditional Egyptian practice. To be regarded as the son of a god must have appealed to Alexander, and from that moment on he seems to have pressed the idea purposively, demanding obeisance and worship in many countries. Greeks and Macedonians did not take easily to the idea, yet there was a strand within the Greek tradition that allowed the divinization of dead heroes and eventually of living rulers. This contributed to the cult of the dead Alexander in Egypt and, in the time of his successors there, led to the worship of the living king and his queen, a practice started by Ptolemy II and his wife Arsinoë, who assumed the title *theoi adelphoi*, "the brother-sister gods." (The Ptolemaic kings regularly married their sisters.) Less thoroughgoing modes of the ruler cult prevailed in the other regions of Alexander's empire. By gradual steps the Seleucids of Syria and the Attalids of Pergamum eventually followed the practice, although the Attalids were accorded full divinity only after death. The Macedonians were slower still in coming to it, perhaps because of skeptical resistance.

To assess the depth or sincerity of the worship produced by the ruler cult is difficult since it soon came to be a test of political loyalty. In 307 BCE the Athenians paid divine honors to Demetrius Poliorcetes, the ambitious Macedonian soldier-king. Their hymn of praise to him couples him with the goddess Demeter and describes him as the son of Poseidon, god of the sea, and of Aphrodite, goddess of love. Then it contrasts his nearness with the distance of the traditional gods: "Other gods are far removed or do not listen; or they do not really exist or do not heed us at all. But thou art here with us; we can behold thee, not shaped in wood or stone, but here in person. And thus we pray to thee." In spite of some military successes, Demetrius was a rake and a scoundrel. We can therefore safely assume that the fulsome language of the hymn disguised a degree of disgust.

When the Romans took up the ruler cult, Egypt was again influential in the early stages, and there was a measure of continued tradition; yet in Rome itself there

had been antecedents in relation to "the divine Julius" (Julius Caesar.) [See Emperor's Cult.] The full-scale cult was at first enacted in the provinces only, but eventually it was insisted on as a test of loyalty. To adherents of the many polytheistic religions there was no problem in this claim, since it merely meant that the divinized emperor was to be added to the variegated pantheon already in existence. Even followers of the mystery religions were not embarrassed by the claim, for the demands of these religions were by no means exclusive. Those in serious trouble were the adherents of Judaism and Christianity, two religions of uncompromising monotheism. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" may not imply strict monotheism, since the commandment does not necessarily deny the existence of other gods, but rather demands the exclusive worship of Yahveh. By the Hellenistic era, however, Judaism had become unequivocally monotheistic, and Christianity inherited its unbending stance. To upholders of the polytheistic tradition it seemed a form of fanatical intolerance, and it sometimes provoked very harsh reactions.

An aspect of the ruler cult that affected the minds of men more seriously than the superficial matter of expressing political allegiance was the whole question of divine incarnation. Was it possible to conceive of the divine taking human form? [See Incarnation.] In early Greek thought it is sometimes suggested that the gulf between man and god is not wide and that an affinity exists between them. In the early fifth century BCE Pindar expresses it thus: "Of one stock are men and gods, and from one mother do we draw our breath" (*Nemean Odes* 6.1). Some of the heroes of Greek mythology were deemed to be offspring of mixed unions, the father being divine and the mother mortal. Herakles is in this category, for his father was said to be Zeus and his mother the mortal Alkmene, daughter of a king of Mycenae. Zeus was not able to achieve union with her until he disguised himself as a victorious warrior.

Rather different is the process by which historical heroes came to be worshiped after death. Their historicity cannot always be demonstrated, but the likely evolution followed from a lively memory of their deeds. One might rephrase Shakespeare to explain the distinctions enacted: "Some men are born divine, some achieve divinity, and some have divinity thrust upon them." The hero worship that developed among the Greeks outside mythology is akin to the second category; it involved outstanding individuals who by their own merit and fame came to be especially honored after death. [See Heroes.] The triumphant commander who "liberated" or "saved" a city naturally qualified for special honors akin to those paid to divinity. An early and successful



candidate was the Spartan commander Lysander, whose deeds secured for him this type of apotheosis even during his lifetime. [See Apotheosis.] But Alexander decisively outshone heroes of such caliber since his deeds encompassed not only the Greek world but much else as well. Quite apart, therefore, from his experience at Siwa, which gave him an Egyptian passport to divinity, he qualified splendidly according to the criterion of Greek hero worship. When his cult was established in Egypt, followed by that of the Ptolemies, several of the new royal divinities were inevitably ill qualified to attract real worship. They might be said to have had divinity thrust upon them automatically.

Behind the developments in Egypt stood the long-standing dogma of the god-man, and its influence in the Hellenistic world went beyond the particular instances of divine dynasty. This dogma became prominent in the New Kingdom (1551–1070 BCE) when the claim was made that the pharaoh had a mortal mother but a divine father. His procreation was explicitly, albeit tastefully, described as a visit by the god Amun to the queen. In so doing the god was said to take on the guise of the living pharaoh, so that what was ostensibly a natural process was given a supernatural interpretation.

A story told about Nectanebo, the last pharaonic king of Egypt, gives prominence to this doctrine. The Greek work called the *Alexander Romance* relates how Nectanebo, in spite of his vaunted magical power, was defeated by the Persians and fled to Pella in Macedonia after suitably changing his appearance. A prophecy from Memphis announced that he would return to Egypt as a young man who would overthrow his enemies and conquer the world (a reference, of course, to Alexander). Furthermore Alexander's mother, Queen Olympias, is said to have welcomed Nectanebo in Macedonia because of his fame as a magician, and he at once fell in love with her. When the queen informed him that her husband, Philip, being then away at war, was said to be beguiled by another woman, Nectanebo confirmed the rumor and told her that a god would visit her in a dream and have intercourse with her and that from this union would come a son who would avenge her on Philip. The god was to be the Libyan Amun, with golden hair and ram's horns. Olympias duly experienced the divine visit in a dream but then declared that she wanted not merely a dream but the real thing, whereupon Nectanebo impersonated the god and had intercourse with her himself. The son who was born of the union was naturally deemed to be Alexander, thus marked out as of divine origin. Although Alexander was said to have caused the death of Nectanebo, he was also said to have recognized him as his father and to have buried him with honor. The Greek writer of this story

has told it with a sense of skeptical irony, yet it points to the fact that the people of the age were engrossed with the idea of the god-man and with the possibility that the divine could break into the sphere of human life through incarnation.

**Magic, Myth, and Miracle.** According to the Pauline saying, it was the Jews who demanded signs (that is, wonders or miracles) while the Greeks sought wisdom. In fact, it was not only the Jews who demanded miracles; the majority of the Greeks did also, and so did the majority of other peoples. From time immemorial religion had been mingled with magic, and the power to produce miraculous events was regarded as the mark of godhead acting either in a direct intervention or through chosen intermediaries.

In considering ancient magic, one must avoid any notion of conjuring tricks made possible by sleight of hand or by various illusionary processes. Some charlatans did resort to such stratagems, but the true medium of divine power did not approach his task thus. In the oldest myths of many nations, the creation of the world itself is the result of miraculous divine actions, and the teasing thought of what lay beyond the beginning of things often produced the image of one creator god, who was unbegotten and who had to initiate a process of creation without the help of a spouse. The early Greeks who followed the Orphic teaching believed that a cosmic egg was the source of everything. This idea might appear to derive from a natural symbol, but probably it came to the Greeks from Egypt, although the Egyptians had several other theories of creation. By the Hellenistic age some Greeks had become familiar with a similar doctrine that had spread from Iran.

Strangely enough, the Greeks did not regard their supreme god, Zeus, as a creator god. Yet their myths about him are replete with miracles, especially when his many dealings with mortal women are portrayed. For instance, having fallen in love with Io, a priestess at Argos, Zeus changed her into a heifer in order to hide her from his wife Hera. Metamorphosis became a frequent medium of miraculous intervention by gods. [See Shape Shifting.] Early in the first century CE, the Roman poet Ovid devoted a whole cycle of poems to this theme, and in the next century it was the central motif of the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius, an entertaining and often ribald novel that nevertheless conveys a deeply religious vision.

It tells the story of Lucius of Corinth, a Greek who was changed into a donkey through a mistake made in the employment of magic. After many strange adventures in asinine form, he is restored to human form by the goddess Isis at Cenchreae, the harbor of Corinth, during the spring ritual of the Ship of Isis. The last part

of the novel movingly portrays his devotion to this new religion.

Unlike the immortal gods, however, heroes are not usually invested with miraculous powers, in spite of their divine associations. Herakles achieves his great deeds with might and main, and Prometheus, while he sometimes deploys a kind of low cunning, is a culture hero intent on benefiting mankind.

Removed from the category of gods and heroes was the human purveyor of magic and miracle. At his best he had to be a knowledgeable person. Astrology was often within his professed prowess, and the secrets of astrology were not available to any ignoramus. His attitude to the gods seems to have varied. Respect and devout loyalty characterized him in the role of their chosen instrument. Yet sometimes the magician was expected to compel the gods to act in a certain way, and a number of magical spells are extant in which the gods are fiercely threatened unless they comply. But it was important to use the correct formula and to know the functions and mythology of the deity concerned. In the Hellenistic era magic was especially used for treating disease.

Here the doctrine of demons was often basic. Regarded as intermediate between man and god, demons (spirits) were divided into good and evil categories, with the possibility that good demons could be promoted to the rank of gods. Under the influence of Iran this system was sometimes developed into a thoroughgoing dualism connoting a hierarchy of both angels and devils but with devils headed by a supreme figure of evil. This view regarded all disease as the creation of evil demons. To conquer the disease therefore demanded the defeat and expulsion of the baleful spirit that had taken possession of the victim. A person's good demon, on the other hand, acted as his guardian angel. Yet the good demon was not normally regarded as potent enough to deal with an evil demon who had entered a person. A spiritual power from outside was needed, and the first task was one of diagnosis, which meant the correct identification of the occupying demon. The magician was expected to announce the name of the hostile power and to order its expulsion in the name of a superior and beneficent power; there are familiar examples in the New Testament. Treatment of disease in both the Jewish and the pagan world was often colored by these concepts.

This was not, however, the only technique practiced by magicians and priests. Instead of a frontal attack on the demon, a mollifying approach was sometimes adopted, as when insanity was treated by the playing of soft music. A multitude of medical charms have come down to us, and they combine popular medicine with

magical rites. Central to these, very often, is the power of the spoken word of the magician himself, whose incantations are recorded, for purposes of reading and imitation, in Greek and Egyptian magical papyri. Moreover, the direct interventions of the gods of healing, particularly of Asklepios, Isis, and Sarapis, are often lauded.

In origin Asklepios was perhaps a hero; later he was raised to the rank of a divinity and became the foremost god of healing in the Hellenistic world, with temples at Epidaurus in the Peloponnese and at Athens, Rome, and Pergamum; the most celebrated of his temples was on the island of Kos, northwest of Rhodes, the home of a famous Greek medical school. Numerous inscriptions set up in the temples of Asklepios record the gratitude of worshippers for the cures obtained, which were frequently regarded as completely miraculous. Yet some of the techniques used partook of current orthodox medical practice, for example, prescribed dietetic rules, hot and cold baths, and various types of exercise. Special use was also made of incubation, whereby the worshiper slept in the temple of the god in order to experience a visitation from him through a dream or vision; such a visitation could bring both a cure for the disease (or advice as to how a cure might be obtained) and a revelation of a spiritual nature. The grateful records do not refer often to medical prescriptions or details of diet, so one may infer that psychological processes were involved: autosuggestion, experiences of spiritual illumination, and a sense of serenity deriving from a loving relationship. The term *faith healing* could well be applied to such felicitous procedures. What is particularly impressive, as well as eminently consonant with the temper of the Hellenistic age, is the fervent personal relationship with the god that ensued and the worshiper's sense of trust and devotion. We are fortunate to possess one intimate record of these experiences in the *Hieroi Logoi* (Sacred Stories) of Publius Aelius Aristides, a rhetorician of the second century CE.

Magic is customarily divided into the categories of "black" and "white," a division that can certainly be applied to the practice of it by the Greeks. In early prototypes, such as Circe and Medea, the two aspects appear. The Homeric Circe, semidivine in origin, is a powerful magician who uses potions and salves and also teaches Odysseus to summon the spirits of the dead. Medea was the outstanding enchantress of the myths used in Greek tragedy. She enabled the Argonauts to get the golden fleece by putting the dragon of Colchis to sleep; moreover, she possessed the evil eye and could make warriors invulnerable. Orpheus was another master of magic. Son of the muse Calliope, he rendered wild beasts spellbound with his music.

The two words most often used for "miracle" were *thauma* ("wonder") and *sēmeion* ("sign"). Obviously the two aspects could be embraced by either word. A miraculous event that astonishes people can be pleasing or punishing in intent and can be a sign, or omen, from the gods as an expression of their power but with a similar possible duality of purpose. Religion in ancient times had a bias toward beneficent magic, its prayers normally being expressions of devotion and appeals for help. But the appeal might concern the destruction of an enemy, which could involve harsh miraculous intervention by the gods. At the same time divine intervention could inflict moral retribution on individuals. Even the kindly Isis, whose magic was mainly beneficent, sometimes inflicted blindness on sinners.

When a beneficent miracle was enacted in public, it was regularly followed by an expression of blessing or felicitation, the *macarism*. Thus when Isis restores Lucius from asinine to human form in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius (also called *The Golden Ass* and written about 170 CE), the people who see the event declare:

This is the man who has been today restored to human shape through the splendid divinity of the all-powerful goddess. Happy is he, by heaven, and thrice blessed, to have clearly deserved, by the purity of his former life and his pious loyalty, such a wondrous favor from heaven that he is, as it were, born again and has at once pledged himself to service in the sacred rites. (11.16)

Although the priests of Isis have taken part in the miracle, as for instance in providing the garland of roses to be eaten by the ass-man, it is the goddess herself who naturally receives the acclaim.

Sometimes, nevertheless, the human agents were not averse to claiming a measure of glory. Among the rhetorical practitioners of the second sophistic movement, which flourished in the first and second centuries CE, especially at Athens, Smyrna, and Ephesus, were a few literati who combined their philosophical and oratorical gifts, which they displayed as peripatetic lecturers, with a keen interest in magic. One was Apuleius, whose interest in magic is evident in much of his work, especially the *Metamorphoses*. Early in his career, however, he was accused of using magic to gain the hand of a rich widow in marriage. Although acquitted, thereafter he was reluctant to practice any form of the art.

In the context of magic and miracle the most remarkable person in the second sophistic movement was undoubtedly Apollonius of Tyana, who lived in the first century CE and came from Cappadocia in Asia Minor. An account of his life, written about 217 CE by another Sophist, Philostratus, presents him as a wandering scholar whose travels embraced Babylon, India, Egypt,

and Ethiopia. In spite of his fame, his life was ascetic and disciplined and modeled on Pythagorean ideals. In addition, however, he frequently performed miracles that included acts of healing, magical disappearances, and even raising the dead, deeds that recall the claims made for Jesus of Nazareth.

The trustworthiness of Philostratus, however, has been much impugned. He cast his life of Apollonius in the form of a Greek travel romance, which suggests a fictitious element. Further, he wrote the book at the request of Julia Domna, the second wife of the emperor Septimius Severus, so that the possibility of anti-Christian animus and parody cannot be excluded. It is likely, then, that some more modest deeds by Apollonius provided a basis for the heightened account presented. The simple asceticism of his mode of life must also have impressed people, although Philostratus exaggerates even here, as when he says that Apollonius was "a more inspired student of wisdom than Pythagoras" (1.2).

One of the faculties ascribed to Apollonius was clairvoyance. At Ephesus in 96 CE, he is said to have had a miraculous vision of the emperor Domitian being murdered in distant Rome, a vision whose validity was afterward confirmed. The event is related by both Philostratus and the historian Dio Cassius, so that its truth need not be questioned. Even the less sophisticated type of magician was expected to indulge in processes of divination that would let him foretell the future. This did not usually imply powers of prophecy in a general sense but, rather, the ability to judge and foretell the outcome of a particular problem or issue. Methods of divination included dreams, incubation (sleeping in a temple), auguries based on observation of birds, extispicy (especially the inspection of the entrails of animals killed specifically for this purpose), and the interpretation of weather signs, not to mention the whole area of astrology. Several of these methods had been developed originally in Babylon and Egypt. [See Divination.]

Another important divinatory method was by oracle. [See Oracles.] In the Greek tradition the personal mouthpiece of the god of the oracle was the *prophētēs*, who might be a man or a woman. He or she was thought to be possessed by a divine power, a process that Plato compared to poetic inspiration. The medium became *entheos* ("full of the god") and was in a state of *ekstasis* ("standing out of oneself"). In the oracles the power of prophecy was linked to special sites and to particular gods. Here a paradox emerges: the Greeks are famed for their rationalism and are regarded as the pioneers of intellectual enquiry and scientific thinking, yet their belief in oracles belies this approach. To some extent, the inconsistency can be explained through social division: the credulous majority trusted oracles

while the educated elite evinced skepticism, the latter trend becoming more pronounced in the Hellenistic era, as Plutarch showed in the first and second centuries CE.

The paradox reveals itself to some degree in the figure of Apollo himself. He is the god of light and reason, yet he is the dominant god at Delphi, seat of the most celebrated oracle. In his *Birth of Tragedy*, the philosopher Nietzsche contrasts Apollo and Dionysos, the one representing the cool temper of rationalism, the other the passionate surrender to ecstasy. Certainly this antithesis is at the heart of Greek thinking.

One noted feature of Greek oracles was the ambiguity of their response. Statements that could be interpreted in more than one way were often forthcoming. Among the problems posed on behalf of states were political issues, and this meant that some oracles, particularly the one at Delphi, exerted considerable influence on the states' policies. But the Hellenistic age saw the decline of Delphi and the rising prestige of other oracles, such as those of Asklepios at Epidaurus and Rome and that of Trophonios in central Greece.

Oracles in other countries were also much frequented, such as that of Zeus Amun in Libyan Siwa, where Alexander had a significant personal experience. Sometimes the questions raised were those of individuals, reflecting the private problems of simple people: a man is anxious to know whether his wife will give him a child, a woman wants to be cured of a disease, someone asks a commercial question about the best use of property, or a man wonders whether the child his wife is carrying is his own.

In his work *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*, Plutarch (c. 46–125 CE) discusses why so many oracles in Greece have ceased to function. Various answers are supplied in a discussion presented in the form of a dialogue. The population had decreased, says Plutarch, and there is some atrophy of belief. There is also the theory, seemingly endorsed by Plutarch himself, that in the oracles it is not the gods but beneficent demons who are at work.

Another writer who provides a revealing picture of what goes on at an oracle is Pausanias, who flourished about 150 CE. In his *Description of Greece* (9.39) he gives many details of the procedures at the oracle of Trophonios in Lebadea (modern Levadhia) in Boeotia. Regarded as relating to the hero cult, Trophonios may have been in origin a fertility god with chthonic associations; his sanctuary was built over an alleged entrance to the underworld. The person who wished to consult the oracle had to first wait quietly in the house of Agathos Daimon ("gracious divine being"), where various rites of purification and dietetic regimen were observed. Then came whippings, various offerings and

sacrifices, an anointing with oil, bathing in a river, a special drink, and a prayer, after which the inquirer was dressed in a linen tunic and pulled through a narrow hole into a subterranean cave where he was terrified by snakes but able to calm them with honey cakes. Only then did he see or hear Trophonios and become enlightened concerning his future, after which priests explained his experiences. It was said that the inquirer always came out of the cave of Trophonios dejected and pale. Psychologically the treatment was rigorous and searching; modern parallels might be sought in regimes using drugs such as methedrine with stringent concomitants. In ancient times the initiations in the mystery religions provide the nearest parallel.

**Universalism and Syncretism.** Although Alexander the Great did not establish a world state in the world as then known, his empire transcended the national states and induced a sense of cohesion and interdependence. It was in this era that the word *kosmopolitēs* ("citizen of the world") came into vogue. The idea had occasionally appeared before this. Democritus of Abdera had said in the fifth century BCE, "To the wise every land is open; the good soul looks on the whole world as his country." More pointed and forceful expression was given to the idea by Diogenes the Cynic (c. 400–325 BCE), founder of the Cynic sect. He came from Sinope on the southern shore of the Black Sea but spent much of his life in Athens. He was given the nickname of "the Dog," while his followers were similarly called "Dog Philosophers" or Cynics, from the snarling way in which they and their master condemned accepted conventions and defied civilized life, embracing instead a style of extreme poverty, simplicity, and hardship. Among the conventions that Diogenes rejected was attachment to the polis, or city-state. His rejection was practical in that he wandered from one country to another without accredited citizenship or a settled home (in Athens he lived in a tub). In principle he was a kind of anarchist. He called himself a "citizen of the world," but this did not imply any politically defined belief. It was in effect a negative claim denying the value of the city-state.

It was the Stoics, however, who succeeded in giving to this approach a more positive and meaningful basis. Initially they were intellectually indebted to the Cynics, but Zeno of Citium in Cyprus (335–263 BCE) went far beyond them and included a religious interpretation in his cosmopolitanism. According to Zeno the whole universe is governed by divine reason, and men should therefore live in conformity with it and with the order of nature established by it. A saying of Zeno that Plutarch has recorded presents the view that men should not live in a state of division according to separate

cities and peoples and differing rules of justice; rather, all men should be viewed as belonging to one state and community and sharing one life and order. Plutarch wryly adds that in writing thus in his much-admired book *The State*, Zeno was presenting a dream or ideal of a well-ordered philosophical world.

It was indeed an age when several "utopias" were written. Plato had set an example with his *Republic*, but later writers in this genre deployed a good deal more fantasy, as when Iambulus in the early second century BCE wrote of his voyage to the southern seas, where he stayed for seven years in the seven "Islands of the Sun." He painted an idyllic picture of the islands: their climate is perfect and their land ever fruitful; the inhabitants are all supermen and there is no distinction between slave and free; property is shared and women and children are held in common; there is no strife of any kind, and their deities are the powers of nature—the sun, the heavenly bodies, and the sky.

There were a few practical ventures, too, in utopianism. Alexarchus, brother of King Cassander of Macedonia, after being given some land on the Athos peninsula, built a big city that he called Ouranopolis ("city of heaven"), where the citizens were called Ouranidai ("children of heaven"), and the coinage was adorned with figures of the sun, moon, and stars. Rather similar was the concept implemented briefly by Aristonicus of Pergamum (in 133–130 BCE), who led a popular rising against Rome. He planned a state called Heliopolis ("city of the sun"), whose inhabitants he called Heliopolitai ("citizens of the sun"); but after some initial successes he was captured and killed by the Romans. The Greek satirist Lucian, who wrote in the second century CE, provided a witty parody of literary utopias in *A True Story*, a travel romance full of irony and burlesque, of which Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* is a modern descendant.

In the context of Stoic philosophy the doctrine of world citizenship was elaborated somewhat by Chrysippus (c. 280–207 BCE), who noted that the word *polis* was given two senses: the city in which one lived; the citizens and the state machinery. Similarly, he argued, the universe is a *polis* that embraces gods and men, the former wielding sovereignty while the latter obey; yet gods and men, for all their difference in status, have a means of contact and converse since they both use reason, which is "law by nature." In the last phrase he is overturning a contrast present in previous political thought. A later Stoic, Panaetius (c. 185–109 BCE), was more pragmatic in his approach. A world state seemed no longer within practical reach, but he continued to believe in the general unity of all mankind. At the same time he restored to the city-state a certain secondary role, admitting its usefulness in a realistic sense while

denying its claim to decide in any final sense, matters of right and wrong; such decisions were to remain in the domain of reason and nature.

It thus appears that the idea of being a citizen of the world, vague and ill defined as it often was, came to include, under Stoic inspiration, the religious concept of a ruling divine reason. Although the reality of a world state was missing, the idea of mankind as one community had a powerful spiritual effect. Whereas we cannot assume that everyone, or even the majority, embraced the idea fully and fervently, there are many signs that thinking people accepted it. A sharp division had existed previously in attitudes toward other nations: pride and prejudice were clearly present in the categories of Greeks versus barbarians or Jews versus gentiles. Certain nations enjoyed more power than others since, in the empire bequeathed by Alexander, Macedonians, Greeks, and Persians were in the ascendancy until Rome took control. In religious matters, nonetheless, the great variety of national traditions was often regarded as a common heritage of humanity. This is the attitude taken by Plutarch when he argues, doubtless under the influence of Stoicism, that the gods of Egypt should be preserved as "our common heritage" and not made the peculiar property of the Egyptians. In chapter 67 of his treatise *Isis and Osiris* he states his belief that the gods of the various nations, in spite of their differing names, are essentially the same and that behind the divergent forms there is a universal reason and providence:

Nor do we regard the gods as different among different peoples nor as barbarian and Greek and as southern and northern. But just as the sun, moon, heaven, earth and sea are common to all, though they are given various names by the varying peoples, so it is with the one reason [*logos*] which orders these things and the one providence which has charge of them, and the assistant powers which are assigned to everything: they are given different honours and modes of address among different peoples according to custom, and they use hallowed symbols, some of which are obscure and others clearer, directing the thought towards the divine, though not without danger. For some, erring completely, have slipped into supersition, and others, shunning it like a marsh, have unwittingly fallen in turn over the precipice of atheism.

At the same time, Plutarch is occasionally ready, within the same work, to accept the Iranian doctrine about the happy end of the world, when Areimanius (Angra Mainyu), the god of evil, will be utterly obliterated by the gods who follow Horomazes (Ahura Mazdā), lord of light and good. The happy final state will reflect the blessed unity of mankind: "The earth shall be flat and level, and one way of life and one government shall

arise of all men, who shall be happy and speak the same language" (chap. 47). Here the universalism envisaged is somewhat colorless and depressing; it accords with Iranian sources, one of which (*Bundahishn* 30.33) declares that when the universe is renewed, "this earth becomes an iceless, shapeless plain." According to this teaching, mountains were created by the Spirit of Evil and will disappear with his overthrow; *Isaiah* 40:4 reflects the same viewpoint when the prophet announces, as part of a serene vision, that "every mountain and hill shall be made low" and "every valley shall be exalted," thus achieving the uniform flatness of Plutarch's Iranian dictum.

The union and solidarity of the human race are also a part of the Iranian teaching, for the *Dēnkard* (9–18), a Pahlavi book of the ninth or tenth century CE that probably preserves earlier ideas, prophesies a final outcome in these terms: "At the final Rehabilitation the whole of mankind will be firmly and unchangeably linked in mutual love, and this will mean that the demons will utterly despair of ever being able to harm man again. . . . Then there will be a universal joy for the whole of creation for all eternity; and fear will be no more" (trans. R. C. Zaehner, in *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, London, 1961, pp. 280f.)

Stoicism may well have influenced the idea of "one government of men," but Stoic sources apparently do not mention the use of one language as a requirement of the cosmopolis. The inherited traditions vary on the question of languages. In chapter 11 of *Genesis* the story of the tower of Babel points to an original state of bliss when all men spoke one common language, and a Babylonian legend sees the multiplication of tongues as a cause of discord. Egyptian tradition, on the other hand, praised Thoth as the creator of languages and viewed his act as contributing to the rich variety of creation in general, with its many races and kinds of living beings. The Christian tradition, as in *Revelation* 7:9 with its allusion to "a great multitude of all tribes and peoples and tongues," certainly envisages a universalism in which diversity is present in unity and humanity is a "community of communities."

Whatever the variety of the traditions so freely transmitted in the Hellenistic age, in religious matters there was usually a readiness to acknowledge and respect diverging ways of belief, worship, and ritual. A process that went even beyond this was that of syncretism, a term often hailed as the hallmark of the age. In origin a Greek word, it was not used by the Greeks with the exact meaning assigned to it today. [See Syncretism.] It derives from the verb *sugkrētizō*, which itself derives from *Krēs*, "a Cretan"; it was used politically of two

parties combining against a common enemy, while the noun *sugkrētismos* was used of a federation or union of Cretan communities.

In English and other modern languages the noun denotes the attempted union or reconciliation of diverse or opposite tenets or practices, especially in the philosophy of religion. The usage is also often extended to include the equation or identification of diverse deities and the combination or fusion of their cults, the latter practice being a specifically Hellenistic development. Earlier experience was indeed fully conversant with the equation of deities.

In ancient religions the most thorough process of syncretism in this sense is found in the developed phase of Roman religion, when Roman deities were identified with Greek counterparts—Jupiter with Zeus, Juno with Hera, Venus with Aphrodite, Ceres with Demeter, Mars with Ares, and so on. In some cases this conscious process found no easy counterpart: Janus, the god of the door, was a distinctively Roman concept. In other cases a Greek deity was adopted without any attempted assimilation. Thus the Greek god Apollo was worshiped in Italy by the Etruscans and was afterward much revered by the Romans, becoming a favorite god of the emperor Augustus. A simple act of comparison could lead to syncretism of this kind: one community compares its own gods with those of another; when similar powers or functions are recognized, the comparison may lead to identification. Of course, this process is valid only with polytheistic communities since monotheism rejects comparisons. Nor does the process arise when there is no contact between communities and therefore no need to make comparisons, except in instances where a plurality of deities within communities of the same culture invites an equation of functions. This may lead to assimilation and the use of one divine name instead of several. Thus it appears that among the Greek communities there were several forms of the corn mother, but eventually the name of Demeter, best known, was applied to most of them. Even so, local varieties persisted in several of the cults. The "Black" Demeter of Phigalia, a town of Arcadia, for instance, was very different from the Demeter of Eleusis. In Phigalia the Black Demeter was said to be the consort of a horse-shaped Poseidon.

In the fifth century BCE the Greek historian Herodotus indulged freely in the kind of syncretism that meant identifying the gods of different nations. In his second book, which deals with Egypt, he consistently identifies the Egyptian Osiris with the Greek Dionysos and the Egyptian Isis with the Greek Demeter. Probably this was prompted only by recognition of their similar functions, although he does refer to festivals. Later, how-

ever, in Hellenistic times, the cults of these deities influenced one another. Isis, for example, was often depicted with ears of wheat on her headdress in a manner traditionally associated with Demeter, while ivy, the plant of Dionysos, figured in the rites of Osiris. Again, the phallus was sometimes carried now in processions of Osiris in Egypt, as it had been regularly in the rites of Dionysos among the Greeks; the Egyptian tradition had previously known nothing of this. Another good instance of active syncretism was the god Sarapis, worshiped in Egypt and elsewhere under the Ptolemies. He derived from the Egyptian god Osir-Api (Osiris-Apis) but was now represented in Greek style in a form rather like that of Zeus (but with the *modius*, a measuring vessel, on his head). He was identified with Zeus and with Helios. He was not, however, a new creation; his emergence points to amalgamation and adaptation.

Increasingly in Hellenistic times, the cults of Oriental deities were introduced to the cities of the Greek world and Italy. Such a procedure had been very difficult, and indeed dangerous, in previous ages, for the orgiastic nature of some of these cults was much feared, and all public cults were rigidly controlled by the state. But a radical change of attitude came in Hellenistic times. State control remained, but often it now actively supported foreign cults, as for instance the cult of Dionysos in Ptolemaic Egypt. When Stratonice, the wife of Seleucus Nicator in Syria, resettled the city of Bambyce as Hierapolis in about 300 BCE, one feature of the worship sanctioned there was the fusion of the great Syrian goddess Atargatis with the Hellenic goddesses Artemis, Hera, and Aphrodite. In Egypt this type of cult syncretism was furthered by the system of the *sunnaoi theoi* ("temple-sharing gods"). This was used principally to advance the claims of the Ptolemaic kings and queens as divine beings in temples throughout Egypt in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus and afterward; the names of the royal divinities were added as gods who shared the temple with the main deity worshiped there. The reigning Ptolemies and their wives were thus promoted to an honored position on a par with that of the traditionally accepted deities.

Usually the Greeks raised a temple in honor of one particular deity, as Athena was honored in the Parthenon at Athens, Zeus in the great temple at Olympia, and Apollo in his temples at Delphi and Delos. Yet it was very natural that associated deities, especially those connected in myth, legend, and cult, should be represented and worshiped in the same temple. Thus Artemis was honored with Apollo as his twin sister, just as Hadad was honored with the Syrian goddess Atargatis as her consort.

Hellenistic practice went a good deal further than this in the mingling of gods, which the Greeks termed *theokrasia*. One is at first surprised to read in Apuleius's *Metamorphoses*, when he describes the preparations for the initiation of Lucius into the cult of Isis, that the high priest in charge of the rites is called Mithra and that he is linked to the initiand "by a certain divine association of constellations." A close and friendly attitude toward Mithraism is clearly indicated, and astrological lore is also openly deployed. Furthermore, when the temple of Mithra was discovered in the Walbrook area of London by W. F. Grimes in 1954, the finest work of statuary to come to light was of the Egyptian god Sarapis. Nor does the evidence of inscriptions and literature suggest anything other than an attitude of sympathetic cooperation between these and other religions.

There was, of course, no claim of exclusiveness to prevent such an attitude, as was the case with Judaism and Christianity. Well-known instances indicate that even priesthoods of different religions could be held by the same person. Plutarch's friend Clea, to whom he dedicated his study of the Egyptian cults, was a priestess of Dionysos and also of Isis and Osiris. Similarly, in the fourth century CE one Vettius Agorius Praetextatus was initiated into the Dionysian, Eleusinian, and Mithraic mysteries.

Popular religious practice and belief are undoubtedly best reflected in inscriptions, whether in temples, on tombstones, or on amulets, and in magical incantations. Often the gods of different countries are named together in dedications and formulaic expressions of thanksgiving. This is also true of inscriptions that are official and public in character. Thus, in an inscription dated between 50 and 35 BCE, Antiochus I of Commagene, a small kingdom north of Syria, presents an exposition of his religion. He begins by calling himself "the God, the righteous God" and "friend of Romans and Greeks," and then declares that he has made his kingdom "the common dwelling place of all the gods." He alludes to the ancient doctrine of Persians and Greeks and refers with reverence to Zeus-Oromasdes, to Apollo-Mithra-Helios-Hermes, and to Artagnes-Herakles-Ares. This showpiece of syncretism contains an element of political expediency: the king is eager to pander to both Romans and Greeks (the Seleucid rulers); his religion is basically Iranian but with Greek embellishments.

In contrast, the easy and fluid permutations of popular magical texts indicate a general readiness to mix varying religious traditions very freely. Two frequent names are the Greek *Zeus* and the Jewish *Iao* (*Yahveh*). In the case of *Zeus* one cannot always be sure whether the name conceals a Mesopotamian or Egyptian deity

since these brief formulas rarely reveal the double personality expressed in Antiochus's *Zeus-Oromasdes*, where the second element is obviously more important than the first. Sometimes the Jewish Iao is identified with Zeus or Dionysos.

Nor does the resulting fusion always refrain from a conflation of myths. Thus a magical papyrus now in Oslo (Papyrus Oslo 1.105–109) addresses the god Seth-Typhon, whose name combines Egyptian and Greek deities. The papyrus goes on to say that the god's mother is a white sow, an allusion to an Egyptian myth about Seth and the goddess Nut. It then hails the god as "thou who dost hold in Heliopolis an iron staff with which thou didst barricade the sea and enable them to pass through." Heliopolis here is the city of the sun god in Egypt, but the "iron staff" is apparently that of *Psalms* 2:9, "Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron," while the words that follow allude to the passage of the Hebrews through the Red Sea. The god addressed is therefore a fusion of the deities of three nations, including the Jewish Yahveh, and it is Yahveh who dominates the last part of the invocation.

One of the results of syncretism in religion was a sense of tolerance and sympathy. People who are ready to borrow from other religions are clearly not about to condemn them. Judaism and Christianity are again the exceptions, and their fervid intolerance was a source of strength in the struggle for survival. Only very rarely does a sense of conflict and hostility appear among the adherents of the pagan religions. Plutarch sometimes inveighs against the primitive cruelties unveiled in facets of mythology; his method is fairly radical in that he is prepared to reject such elements as unworthy of the gods.

In his novel about the ass-man rescued by Isis, Apuleius is appreciative and respectful in his allusions to most other religions. Here there was almost a logical imperative operating since Isis, as he often stresses, combined the attributes of all other goddesses. Yet there are two glaring exceptions to his tolerant attitude. One is the portrait of the baker's wife (9.14), who is described as a retailer of all the vices and as one who "scorned and spurned divine beings and instead of accepting a definite faith . . . falsely and blasphemously professed belief in a god whom she regarded as the one and only god." The description might apply to the Jewish or Christian faith, but the list of vices corresponds rather closely to those named in *1 Corinthians* 5:11, so that a Christian allusion is a little more likely. Even more hostile is Apuleius's withering depiction (8.24ff., 9.3ff.) of the priests of the Syrian goddess Atargatis. They are said to be addicted to homosexual practices, to crude begging, to flagrant pilfering (they steal even

the golden cup from the temple of the mother of the gods), and to unscrupulous manipulation of an oracle. Doubtless the praise of Isis was heightened by this attack, and for once the age seems to be characterized by competing and conflicting religions.

In general, syncretism tended to induce a belief in pantheism. The free mingling of many varying divinities suggested to some minds that the world was full of God in some form or another. Aratus of Soli (c. 315–240 BCE), in his astronomical poem *Phaenomena*, said that "all the ways are full of God, and all the meeting-places of men, the sea and the harbors; and at every turn we all need God, for we are related to him" (the Greek has *Zeus* for *God*). The last clause was quoted by Paul in his address at Athens (*Acts* 17:28): "As some of your own poets have said, 'We are also his offspring.'" At the same time syncretism furthered the quest for the unity of the divine. Earlier Greek philosophers had been concerned with the idea that there was one god behind the many names and forms. Now that the deities of divergent national traditions were being actively equated and fused, the idea of one divine reality was becoming still more widespread.

**The Rejection of Religion.** It may seem a paradox that, in spite of the religious tendencies delineated, the direct or indirect rejection of religion was also a feature of Hellenistic thinking. Direct rejection was restricted to a small minority of philosophers, but its intellectual vitality is manifest, although it was not a completely new development. Several of the Sophists of the fifth century BCE had propagated a doctrine that questioned accepted religious beliefs. Before the Sophists, Anaxagoras had done the same. While he may not have plainly denied the existence of God or the gods, his belief that mechanistic laws were behind the workings of the universe excluded a divine causation or operation, even in Mind (*Nous*) was seen by him as the initiator of cosmic motion.

Among the Sophists, Protagoras was broadly in the same category. He once said concerning the gods: "I am unable to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors obstructing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life." The relativism of Protagoras also tended in this direction, for it was he who said, "The measure of all things is man." If Protagoras may thus be rightly classified as an agnostic, Diagoras of Melos, also of the fifth century BCE, was definitely an atheist; indeed, he was called *ho Atheos*. Like Protagoras, he was condemned for impiety, but trials and convictions for this are not always clear indications of a denial of the gods. Diagoras wrote a book in which he attacked the Eleusinian mysteries, and with these re-



marks he doubtless caused great offense. The main thesis of his book went a good deal further, declaring that the gods did not exist at all. What he saw as the obvious absence of divine punishment in human life was the ground for his denial. He is the first uncompromising atheist in the history of European thought.

In the Hellenistic age Euhemerus of Messene, who for a time (311–298 BCE) served Cassander, king of Macedonia, can also be listed as an atheist, although his attacks on traditional religion were more of a rationalizing reductionism than a frontal assault. In his travel romance *Sacred History*, which idealized life on the island of Panchaea in the Indian Ocean, he tells of an inscribed record of the deeds of the gods Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus. According to the record, these mighty deities had originally been human kings whom their appreciative subjects elevated to the rank of divinity. Clearly this approach could be interpreted as a defense of contemporary ruler cults, but when generalized in relation to gods everywhere, it meant that real divinity disappeared in the postulated human origins. The Greek hero cults also fitted the theory. It is easy to understand why “euhemerism” is still an influential force in the study of religions.

It is not surprising that the Cynics, who tended to oppose all established values, sometimes included religion in their abuse. Diogenes of Sinope expressed contempt for the Eleusinian mysteries. A man who could defend stealing from temples, cannibalism, and incest obviously took pleasure in destructive challenge. Yet his teacher Antisthenes, who attacked all religious conventions and the belief in a multitude of gods, maintained that there existed one God beyond all visible phenomena. The Hellenistic Cynics developed the popular and hard-hitting speech form called the *diatribē*, which combined comic effects with satire that was often abusive. Yet in spite of the Cynics, continued attacks on religious conventions, it is doubtful whether a full-fledged atheism should be ascribed to them.

Features of the Cynic tradition can be recognized in the works of Lucian (120–180 CE), who ridiculed both religion and philosophy; under the latter heading he especially attacked the Cynics, indebted though he was to them. His attacks on religion are well exemplified in his comic picture of Zeus struggling at a celestial reception desk to cope with the countless prayers of humanity. Nor does Christianity escape his lash. He says of Christians that “the poor beggars have persuaded themselves that they will be absolutely immortal and live everlastingly, and for this reason they scorn death and willingly surrender when arrested” (*Peregrinus* 13); they are “simple-minded people,” he adds, who can be easily imposed upon by any charlatan or trickster.

A certain criticism of religion emerges also in the works of the philosophers called Skeptics. Their main emphasis was on the reservation or suspension of judgment, but this was applied in a general sense to the validity of sense perceptions and thus to the uncertain claim that knowledge of things can be attained. Specific problems concerning religion were discussed by Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–210 CE), who noted the vast amount of disagreement on the subject that prevailed. The very existence of the gods or of God, the propriety or otherwise of animal sacrifices and dietetic rules, the problem of how the dead should be treated, the right attitude toward death itself—all these matters produced debate and radically differing views. He argues that relativism is inherent in these areas: “All are matters of custom.” Therefore, he concludes, judgment on questions of religious belief and practice must also be suspended. [*See Skeptics and Skepticism.*]

**Philosophy and Religion.** The two most popular and influential philosophical schools of Hellenistic times were those of the Epicureans and the Stoics, both of which originated in the period immediately following Alexander’s conquests. Both were also much affected, albeit in very different ways, by the radical political changes of the age as well as by the new international horizons. To some extent, both took up attitudes that were critical of traditional religious beliefs. Indeed, some would describe them, particularly the Epicureans, as rejecting religion, but this would be misleading.

Epicurus (341–270 BCE) was born in Samos but spent much of his life in Athens, where he bought a house with a garden (his school was eventually called “the Garden”). For him, the aim of philosophy is to secure a happy life; “pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily.” Pleasure of the soul is valued above bodily pleasure, and the ideal is *ataraxia*, “freedom from disturbance.”

Epicureans were often accused of profligacy, but they lived a modest and simple life of seclusion. Women and slaves were allowed into the Garden, and among the women were several courtesans (*hetairai*), who obviously became a pretext for some of the accusations made against the Epicureans of gross sexual immorality and of overindulgence in wine and food. Such charges came mainly from adherents who later abandoned the school.

In his moral doctrine and spiritual temper Epicurus paid great attention to the idea of friendship (*philia*, for which Lucretius, the Roman Epicurean, used the word *amicitia*); and there is every reason to believe that he strove to follow his noble ideal. He says of friendship: “Of all things which wisdom supplies to make life entirely happy, by far the greatest is the possession of

friendship." Again: "Friendship must always be sought for its own sake, although it has its origins in the need for help." And yet again: "That is also very beautiful, the sight of those near and dear to us, when to the bonds of kinship is joined a union of hearts." In his book *The Faith of Epicurus* (London, 1967), Benjamin Farrington aptly compares the saying of William Blake, "The bird a nest, the spider a web, man friendship" (p. 23), and even more appositely since its context is not far removed in time, cites the dictum of Aristotle: "Moreover friendship [*philia*] seems to hold states together and lawgivers are more concerned about friendship than about justice. For concord seems to be akin to friendship . . . , and when men are friends there is no need of justice" (p. 29; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a). Friendship is seen, then, not only as a personal tie between individuals but also as the motivating force of a healthy society.

If these ideas indicate the quality of Epicurus's spirituality, his precise attitude to religion must be examined. This is well expressed in his *Letter of Menoeceus*, a letter to a disciple of his to whom he wished to explain the basic principles of his creed. First of all, one must believe that "God is a being immortal and blessed"; then, a little later, he says that "gods certainly exist, since our perception of them is clear." The apparent contradiction here between "God" and "gods" is familiar in previous Greek writing, especially in the works of Plato, who combines a suggestion of monotheism with the traditional polytheism.

Epicurus goes on to say that many false ideas are current about the gods, in particular the popular concept of reward and punishment whereby the injuries suffered by the wicked and the blessings enjoyed by the good are directly conferred by the gods. He then passes on to discuss death, a subject he often broaches in connection with religion. He tells Menoeceus that it is important to realize that death means nothing to us since it deprives us of all sensation. To realize this makes mortal life more enjoyable in that the desire for immortality is removed. The fear of death and of what may follow it is groundless; the wise man will think reverently of the gods and will be entirely fearless of death. Indeed, he will preserve his peace of mind and "live like a god among men." The life of the gods, as other Epicurean writings make clear, is regarded as one of calm beatitude. They enjoy a blissful existence far away from the turmoil of the human world, free of pain and peril. They take no interest in human affairs and are content with the immortality and supreme blessedness that is theirs.

Perhaps it is Lucretius (94–55 BCE), the Roman exponent of Epicureanism, who has given the most attractive expression to these ideas, both in his depiction of

the bliss enjoyed by the gods in their remote paradise and in his searing attacks on popular notions of punishments after death, which were associated with the divine control of Hades. Some of the attacks made by Lucretius on these popular misconceptions sound very much like a condemnation of religion *in toto*. After a breathlessly pathetic picture of Agamemnon sacrificing his own daughter Iphigenia to satisfy the claims of religion, the poet declares, "So many evils was religion able to instigate" (*De rerum natura* 101).

Epicurus himself, on the other hand, is careful to point out that he regularly follows traditional religious observances: "Let it be enough to state now that the divine is in need of no mark of honor, but that it is natural for us to honor it, especially by having pious conceptions of it and secondly, by presenting to all the gods in turn the traditional sacrifices" (Philodemus, *De musica* 4.6, quoting Epicurus). At first sight a palpable contradiction occurs here. If the gods are not concerned with human life, why should human beings bother to honor them with prayer and sacrifice? Do not these religious acts imply a constant concern on both sides? To resolve this dilemma, it seems, one should ascribe to Epicurus the highest form of worship, the utterly disinterested adoration of the divine which expects nothing in return but has the joy of sharing in the divine happiness. Prayer and sacrifice enable such a worshiper to take part in the blessedness of the gods. It was said of Epicurus, "He appeals to the Completely Happy so as to strengthen his own blessedness." It could be argued that he is, therefore, receiving something from the gods, even though the gift is purely spiritual in character, and that the gods are ready to bestow it, thus belying the concept that they are a remote community of beings who have no care or concern for humanity.

Epicurus also recommended prayer because it enabled one to participate in the religious life of one's own country; he viewed it as natural and proper. This contrasts sharply with his constant advice to withdraw completely from political and public activity. But if there is a measure of inconsistency in his sanction of traditional religious rites, his condemnation of the astral religion propagated by Plato in his later years is perfectly consonant with the lofty view of the divine that Epicurus always tried to maintain. His creed is well summed up in the saying of Diogenes of Oenoanda in Asia Minor, who lived in the second century CE: "Nothing to fear in God. Nothing to feel in death."

In one respect the Stoics differed firmly from the Epicureans: they urged active participation in public life, not a retreat from it. While favoring the idea of a world state, they did not shrink from service to their own. Their basic teachings also differed. For them it was vir-

tue, not pleasure, that was the supreme value in life; knowledge was important in the quest for virtue, but the essential thing was to live in agreement with nature since nature leads to virtue. In modern parlance, to follow nature may often imply an uninhibited pursuit of the natural instincts and their pleasures, but the Stoics' interpretation is quite different. For them the formative and guiding principle in nature is reason (*logos*), which is identified with God himself and is said to manifest itself as fate or necessity and as providence. Another special manifestation is human reason, whose guidance it is our duty to obey. For rational beings such as man virtue alone is the vital possession, and from virtue alone comes happiness. Pleasure, on the other hand, is regarded as only a by-product of virtuous living and not as a proper end in itself. Like the Epicureans, the Stoics valued "freedom from disturbance" (*ataraxia*) as a desirable state, as well as "freedom from emotion" (*apatheia*) and "inward independence" (*autarkeia*). The founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium (335–263 BCE), was highly regarded for his integrity, and it was said of him that "he made his life a pattern to all, for he followed his own teaching." He was succeeded as leader of the school by Cleanthes (331–232 BCE), who was followed in turn by Chrysippus (280–207 BCE). These philosophers showed varied emphases in their teachings, much more so than did the followers of Epicurus, who adhered closely to the precepts of their founding father and gave him almost divine status.

Among the Stoics, Cleanthes was the most concerned with religion. He is renowned for his beautiful *Hymn to Zeus*, where the god is addressed as the creator of the world and the universe and as a ruling spirit who continues to dwell in the whole of his creation. When we compare this hymn with previous Greek praises of the god, we are struck by the absence of any specific allusions to the mythology or cult of Zeus, and we recall that some of the mythology was quite scandalous. Instead, Zeus has become to Cleanthes an abstract figure standing for divine creativity, reason, law, and providence. He does refer to the thunderbolt of Zeus, but he links it to the Stoic doctrine of the conflagration that will end the world: "Nature's own stroke brings all things to their end." He also gives it a moral force, urging Zeus to use it to dispel darkness from the souls of men.

Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus assembled arguments to prove the existence of God, giving prominence to the argument from design: the order and regularity of the heavenly bodies could not be produced by man, it is urged; they must have been produced by something better than man. "And what name other than God would one give to this?" (Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods*

2.16, quoting Chrysippus). As we have seen, in its whole view of nature and man early Stoicism assigns a built-in importance to religion. A moral earnestness is also evident in the writings of Stoics in the Roman imperial era, especially those of Seneca (5 BCE–65 CE) and Epictetus (55–135 CE), whose idea of God is practically monotheistic. In their attitude to the gods of tradition, the Stoics were often charged with a pallid reductionism. They tended to equate the gods with the functions associated with them. Plutarch, a middle Platonist not unfriendly to Stoicism, complains in the early second century CE of the facile way in which gods were labeled according to their physical associations; Osiris was thus related to natural fertility while Dionysos was explained as wine and Demeter as grain. Another kind of reductionism was employed by the Stoics to explain myths whose primitive crudities offended them, namely, a wholesale use of allegory. Plutarch himself was prepared to use this method liberally. The Platonist school that he favored continued to flourish, but it had abandoned orthodoxy in its espousal of an open eclecticism.

The philosophical creeds with their variety of religious ingredients appealed, of course, only to an educated elite. Their quiet colonnades were far removed from the rough-and-tumble of the marketplace, as was the Epicurean Garden. Many confusing cries accosted the common man in the marketplace, and he often found it most satisfying, as far as religion was concerned, to follow the emotional uplift and the offer of salvation presented by the mystery religions and by Christianity.

[For further discussion of Hellenistic religions, see Gnosticism; Hermetism; Manichaeism; Mystery Religions; Neoplatonism; and Roman Religions, article on The Imperial Period. For discussion of other religious movements of this period, see Rabbinic Judaism in Late Antiquity; Jesus; Paul; and Apostles.]

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J. GWYN GRIFFITHS

**HENOTHEISM**, a term coined from the Greek *henos* ("one") and *theos* ("god"), was for some time used by F. Max Müller interchangeably with *kathenotheism*, derived from the Greek *kath'hena* ("one by one"). It was Friedrich Schelling (1175–1854) who first used the word *henotheism* in his study of mythology to indicate "relative, rudimentary monotheism," which he supposed was the idea of God in prehistoric consciousness (*Philosophie der Mythologie und der Offenbarung*, 1842). F. Max Müller (1823–1900), in his attempt at "tracing the origin and first growth of human thought," employed the word as a technical term of *Religionswissenschaft* to designate a peculiar form of polytheism that in his view was characteristic of the description of the gods in the *R̥gveda*. He observed that in the Vedas—the oldest Indian religious literature—deities are invoked by a variety of names, such as *Agni* ("fire"), *Sūrya* ("the

sun"), *Uṣas* ("dawn"), *Maruts* ("the storms"), *Pr̥thvī* ("the earth"), *Āp* ("the waters"), *Nadī* ("the rivers"), that are closely connected with nature by more proper names, such as *Varuṇa*, *Mitra*, *Indra*, and *Aditi*. However, "to the mind of the supplicant" each god is "at the time a real divinity, supreme and absolute," not limited by the powers of any other gods. Müller called this "belief in single gods" *henotheism* or *kathenotheism*, "a worship of one god after another" (Müller, 1881, pp. 136–137). In his lectures of 1882 he reflected that "this shorter name of *henotheism* has found more general acceptance, as conveying more definitely the opposition between *monotheism*, the worship of only one God, and *henotheism*, the worship of single gods" (Müller, 1896, pp. 146–147).

Müller distinguished this Vedic plurality of gods from the idea of polytheism, which, as he pointed out, derived chiefly from Greek and Roman antiquity and designated "a certain more or less organized system of gods, different in power and rank, and all subordinate to a supreme God, a Zeus or Jupiter" (Müller, 1896, pp. 145–146).

Partly in opposition to the thesis of Ernest Renan (1823–1892) that monotheism was a unique tendency of the Semitic race, Müller suggested that a "henotheistic phase" was "a peculiar phase of religion" that was found probably everywhere preceding either polytheism or monotheism (Müller, 1873, p. 142; cf. Müller, 1881, p. 414). He asserted that such a phase existed not only in India but in Greece, Italy, Germany, and elsewhere (Müller, 1879, p. 275; cf. Müller, 1896, p. 163). Müller maintained that this henotheistic phase "tended to become a belief in *one* God, presiding over the other, no longer supreme gods—*polytheism*; or a belief in one god, excluding the very possibility of other gods—*monotheism*" (Müller, 1879, p. 362; cf. Müller, 1896, p. 163).

In comparing monotheism and henotheism, Müller drew the following distinction: "There is one kind of oneness which does not exclude the idea of plurality [i.e., henotheism]; there is another which does [i.e., monotheism]" (Müller, 1881, p. 415). The association of henotheism with the idea of "rudimentary monotheism," however, never completely disappeared from the minds of some scholars of religion. Thus, henotheism was sometimes confused with "monolatry," a term best applied to the religion of ancient Israel before it attained monotheism, at a time, that is, when the existence of gods other than Yahveh was admitted but their worship was strictly forbidden (see *Ex.* 22:20). It has been pointed out by Friedrich Heiler (1961, p. 323) and others that monolatry—the exclusive worship of a god by a certain social group—clearly differs from the henotheism expounded by Müller.

Müller's idea of henotheism has a speculative dimension that deals with how a divine reality reveals itself to human beings. He saw in the Vedas a "breaking forth" of the awareness "that all the deities are but different names of one and the same godhead" and that "the primitive intuition of the godhead"—"the main-spring of all later religion"—"is neither monotheistic nor polytheistic. . . . God is God" (Müller, 1881, pp. 136–137 and 414–415). Thus, he asserted that "the unity of the Divine" was at the basis of the henotheistic mode of expression (Müller, 1896, p. 144). From his study of the Vedas Müller concluded that "we learn a lesson—the lesson *how gods were made and unmade*—how the Beyond or the Infinite was named by different names in order to bring it near to the mind of man, to make it for a time comprehensible, until, when name after name had proved of no avail, a nameless God was felt to answer best the restless cravings of the human heart" (Müller, 1896, p. 163). However, if one disregards these metaphysical assertions, Müller's idea of henotheism appears to be yet another term that designates a certain plurality of gods, entailing a possible confusion with such terms as monotheism, polytheism, and monolatry.

The idea of henotheism propounded by Müller is two-fold: it designates a certain developmental stage within a religion preceding polytheism or monotheism and a unique, qualitative "kairological moment," or aspect, of man's religious awareness itself (Panikkar, 1979, p. 266). Heiler, for one, employs the word *henotheism* for its psychological significance, equating it with "subjective theism," which in his view paves a way to objective monotheism (Heiler, 1961, p. 460). The primordial religious intuition that attracted Müller's attention may be compared with one of the two modes of thinking Heidegger identifies, namely with the *besinnliches Denken*, or meditative thinking, as opposed to *rechnendes Denken*, or calculative, analytical thinking.

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MICHIKO YUSA

**HERA**, the Greek goddess of marriage and childbirth, was the wife of the chief Olympian god, Zeus. According to Hesiod, Hera, like the other children of Kronos and Rhea, was swallowed as an infant by Kronos and later vomited up when the youngest son, Zeus, came to his siblings' rescue. After a series of liaisons with six other goddesses, Zeus courted this sister and then married her. Homer's version is less colorful, but here, too, Hera and Zeus are siblings, with Zeus (as befits a patriarchal husband) the older brother. Most of the myths associated with Hera present her as Zeus's unhappy, jealous, and vindictive spouse. She actively persecutes the various women whom Zeus seduces (most notably Leto, Io, Callisto, Semele, and Alkmene), and often their offspring as well (especially Dionysos and Herakles). Her own children consist of two rather colorless daughters (Eilytheia, goddess of childbirth, and Hebe, goddess of youth), and two sons: Ares, the mindlessly aggressive god of war, and Hephaistos, the crippled divine artisan (whom some traditions represent as a parthenogenetic child whom Hera conceived in anger after Zeus gave birth to Athena).

As goddess of childbirth, Hera was willing to assist only at the delivery of legitimate offspring. Literary tradition represents her commitment to and disappointment in monogamous marriage as equally intense. Yet cultic traditions suggest that Hera, whose original home was probably Argos, is a far more ancient divinity than Zeus, and that the Hera worshiped by women was quite different from the Hera of literature. Because she was seen as relevant to all the stages of female life, she was revered as maiden, wife, and "separated one" (a term suggesting the postconnubial existence of a widow or divorced woman). As wife she was known as Hera Teleia ("Hera fulfilled"), the goddess who found fulfill-

ment, not misfortune, in marriage. (Weddings were part of Hera's cult, not Zeus's.) From this perspective, female existence is directed not toward dominating lover-victims (as modeled by the ancient mother goddesses) or toward self-sufficient solitude, but rather toward being matched and mated with a genuinely equal partner. As a maiden, Hera anticipates marriage; after marriage she still honors marriage as her authentic destiny, even when disappointed by its reality.

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CHRISTINE DOWNING

**HERDER, JOHANN GOTTFRIED** (1744–1803), German pastor and theologian, literary critic, and philosopher of history. The unity underlying Herder's many and varied academic endeavors, which resulted in a seemingly unending flow of publications, stemmed from his consistently historical approach to the topics he studied. Historical awareness sets him apart most noticeably from the prevalent thought patterns of the ahistorical Enlightenment authors of his time and makes him a pivotal figure in eighteenth-century German intellectual life.

Herder was a contemporary of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788). Like them he grew up in the province of East Prussia and studied in Königsberg (present-day Kaliningrad) where Kant was his teacher at the university and where Hamann became his friend and private tutor, introducing the young student to English language and literature, especially Milton and Shakespeare. Following a brief period of formal university studies (1762–1764) Herder assumed a teaching position at the German secondary school in Riga, Latvia, before he was installed in 1767 into the ministry. For the rest of his life he remained in the pastorate. He served three Lutheran churches, first in Riga (1767–1769), then in Bückeberg (1770–1776), and finally in Weimar (1776–1803), interrupted only by a study tour through the Netherlands and France in 1769–1770. Those two years of travel included a memorable voyage of five weeks on the North Sea, which he described in a catalog of new ideas and study plans published posthumously under the title *Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769* (1846), and a period of extremely vigorous and intense discourse with a group of young German poets, the *Sturm und Drang* cir-

cle around Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in Strasbourg. Goethe, immediately upon his own move to Weimar in 1775, used his influence with the court there to secure for Herder a high ecclesiastical position in that small German principality. Herder's fame as a preacher never waned. He was able to fuse religiosity with his philosophy of humanism in ways that made his sermons easily understood and commonly admired.

Herder's first major publication, *Über die neuere deutsche Literatur, Fragmente* (On the New German Literature, Fragments; 1766–1767), contains his important views on language and expresses his love for idiomatic expressions and inverted word order, which were qualities that he deemed to be essential to poetry. Shakespeare became his model. Shakespeare's use of Nordic mythology impressed Herder and led him to demand that one must seek to understand the cultural and intellectual environment in which a poet lived before attempting to interpret a given work of literature. The psychological-historical approach became a hallmark of Herder's criticism, whether he dealt with the poetry of the Hebrew scriptures or with Latvian folk songs. In *Kritische Wälder* (Critical Forests; 1769), Herder disputes G. E. Lessing's attempt to establish objective criteria for artistic production. Whereas Lessing sees Homer as the world's greatest poet, Herder considers him merely to be the greatest among the Greeks, claiming instead that individual circumstances, such as national language and ethnic peculiarities, determine appropriate criteria for judgment of works of art. With *Über den Ursprung der Sprache* (On the Origin of Language; 1771) Herder joined the debate as to whether language was divinely given or a human invention, attempting to show that there cannot be a satisfactory answer to that question because language and human existence are synonymous. Herder wrote this essay for a contest sponsored by the Berlin Academy and won the prize. In 1774, Herder was awarded another academy prize with his entry "Auch eine Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit" (Another Philosophy of History). Instead of delineating the development of the human race from primitive beginnings to a sophisticated and mature present stage (a practice common among Enlightenment authors), Herder denies such absolute progress and looks upon history as a window through which we can observe humanity's progression toward the goal that God has established for it. He sees no justification for his contemporaries to consider earlier epochs to be morally, aesthetically, or intellectually inferior. In fact, he has praise for the "darkness" of the Middle Ages, during which virtue, honor, and love were of the utmost importance, and he chastises his own age for lacking in those human qualities. Herder believed that history is

the revelation of God's plan for mankind; he eventually would define his own understanding of this plan more and more clearly as the number of his historical investigations grew. His works *Wie die deutschen Bischöfe Landstände wurden* (How the German Bishops Became an Estate of the Realm; 1774) and *Ursachen des gesunckenen Geschmacks bei den verschiedenen Völkern da er gebühret* (Causes of the Decay of Taste in the Various Nations Where It Once Flourished; 1775) are merely two examples of his many historical writings.

Herder's love for biblical hermeneutics is directed mainly at the Old Testament, in which the sense of history and the beauty of poetry which Herder found attractive are especially in evidence. His book *Alteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts* (The Oldest Document of the Human Race; 1774–1776) offers an interpretation of the first few chapters of the Bible. Herder, the knowledgeable literary critic, builds a convincing case for an allegorical interpretation of *Genesis* 3, only to declare that such a reading is insufficient and leads merely to superficial moral teachings. Instead, he reads the account of the Fall as history and maintains, unlike many eighteenth-century theologians, the truth of original sin as an anthropological fact. His major contribution to the philosophy of history, the famous *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind; 1784–1791), seeks to establish the purpose of the human race from a Christian metaphysical point of view and to define that purpose as the practical application of humanitarian ideals.

While Herder continued to write about many aspects of the arts and letters and devoted himself (frequently in cooperation with Goethe) to careful study of the natural sciences, he published with increasing frequency during his Weimar years works specifically on religion. His book *Maran Atha, das Buch von der Zukunft des Herrn* (Maran Atha: The Book of the Coming of the Lord; 1779) represents Herder's poetic explanation of *Revelation*, one of the books in the Bible that rationalistic theologians found quite unacceptable. The work *Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend* (Letters Concerning the Study of Theology; 1780–1781) was written to serve as a handbook to students of theology, offering exegetical insights into the Old and New Testaments. Herder had become much more orthodox during his Bückeburg years, although questions of dogma never occupied a place of great importance in his scheme of thought. The study *Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie* (On the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry; 1782–1783) views the Old Testament as the greatest poetry given to mankind and therefore as a revelation of the ultimate truth. Pietistic influences are in part responsible for this view. Such influences were strong in Herder's youth and

were renewed through his conversations and correspondence with the Countess Maria Eleanora of Schaumburg-Lippe in Bückeburg and the Swiss pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741–1801), both Pietists. Although Herder in *Gott, einige Gespräche* (God: Some Conversations; 1787) appears to embrace the ideas of Barukh Spinoza (1632–1677), there is widespread agreement that he was not a Spinozist because of his decisive disagreement with the Deists. Rather, it is agreed that he used Spinoza's thoughts to clarify his understanding of God. Herder saw God as existing in the world yet refused to limit God's existence to this world. That was Herder's method in most of his writings. He reacted critically to what others had written and offered his own insights, yet he rarely presented his ideas in a systematic fashion. His was the role of a fruitful critic more than that of a builder of a complete worldview. The fact that others have seized upon his ideas and developed them constitutes his contribution and his significance.

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FRIEDHELM RADANDT

**HERESY.** [This entry consists of two articles: An Overview and Christian Concepts. The first examines the concept of heresy in the history of religions; the second focuses on Christian definitions. For a directly related discussion, see Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy.]

#### An Overview

The term *heresy* derives from the Greek *hairesis*. In classical Greek this word has a variety of meanings, all

based on the verb *haireō*: "seizure" (of a city), "choice," "election," and "decision or purposive effort." This last meaning is the starting point for the Hellenistic and Christian use of the term to mean "doctrine," "school," or "received opinion," emphasizing the idea of a free decision or free choice of a doctrine or doctrinal authority. The word thus becomes a technical term for a philosophical school, a party, or a religious doctrinal system and its adherents. The term is applied to Stoics, Pythagoreans, Sadducees, Essenes, Pharisees, and Christians (see *Acts* 5:17, 24:5, 24:14, 26:5, 28:22). Neither in Greek nor in Hellenistic Jewish usage does the word have a negative, derogatory sense; it is an entirely value-free designation.

This situation changes with dramatic suddenness, however, with the rise of Christian literature. The New Testament already uses *haireō* in a negative sense (see *1 Cor.* 11:19, *Gal.* 5:20, *2 Pt.* 2:1); the word therefore conveys suspicion, according to Heinrich Schlier. The semantic development in the direction of "sect, division, erroneous teaching" that is thus initiated continues in the early church; *haireō* becomes a technical term for "heresy" and is applied primarily to the gnostics but also to Greek and Jewish "sects." (The older meaning of "doctrinal opinion, received view" is inflected, not completely but in large measure, in the direction of "erroneous teaching, false belief.") As Schlier says, "Hence the concept does not owe its meaning to the development of an orthodoxy. The basis of the Christian concept of *haireō* is to be found in the new situation created by the introduction of the Christian *ekklesia*. *Ekklesia* and *haireō* are material opposites" (Schlier, 1964, vol. 1, pp. 182–183).

Despite this, the concept of heresy acquired sharp definition only gradually from the second century on; its distinction from the concept of schism took even longer. Furthermore, the process here described was not entirely comparable to the development in Judaism, although there was a strict temporal parallelism: from the end of the first century *haireō* and the corresponding Hebrew word *min* were used in the derogatory sense of "heresy" and were applied to Christians and gnostics, among others. One presupposition of this development was the emergence of rabbinical orthodoxy after Jamnia (c. 100).

This brief history of the term, the details of which are fascinating but cannot be presented here, shows in archetypal fashion the characteristic elements in the Christian understanding of heresy. This understanding was already present in the New Testament and did not have to wait for the coming of the later orthodox great church, although because of the "apostolic" authority

the church had acquired in regard to doctrine, scripture, and episcopal office, the distinction between heresy and orthodoxy came to be more clearly drawn as the church developed, thus allowing the opposition to emerge with full clarity.

**Scholarly Theories about Heresy.** The science of religions borrowed the term *heresy* from Christian usage as fixed in canon law and, as a result, has been very much influenced by the history of the Christian church. The traditional view of "orthodoxy" and "heresy" as equivalent to "true" and "false" was first challenged by Martin Luther in his disputation with Johannes Eck at Leipzig (1517), where he let himself be drawn into saying that even councils (of the church) can err, as they did in the case of Jan Hus. Luther and his disciples, though themselves branded as heretics by Rome, did not further develop this aspect of their critical revision of church history. As a result, the opposition of orthodoxy and heresy reappeared within Protestantism itself (the terminology used by the early church in dealing with heretics served as justification). Only after the appalling experience of the seventeenth-century religious wars were minds ready for another view of the matter.

In his *Unparteiische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie von Anfang des Neuen Testaments bis 1688* (Impartial History of the Church and Heresy from the Beginning of the New Testament to 1688, published in 1699), Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714), a German Pietist theologian, attempted to show that Christian truth is to be found among heretics, schismatics, and sectarians (mystics), and not in the great church itself or in orthodoxy. Although Arnold simply offered a kind of inverted church history in which heresy, especially the views of the mystics, and not orthodoxy was given the seal of approval (by "impartial" Arnold meant "nonconfessional"), his book exercised an important and mellowing influence and blazed a trail for the ensuing period. Among his successors were J. L. von Mosheim (*Ketzergeschichte*, 1746–1748), C. W. F. Walch (*Historie der Ketzerereien*, 1762–1785), F. C. Baur (*Die christliche Gnosis*, 1835; *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, 1847, 1858; *Das Christentum und die christliche Kirche der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, 1853, 1963), Adolf von Harnack (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 1886, 1909), and Adolf Hilgenfeld (*Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums*, 1884).

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the work of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule paved the way for a still more penetrating historical view of heresy and orthodoxy, not only because early Christianity came to be understood and interpreted in the context of its environment, but also because the barrier raised by the



canon (considered to be the New Testament) was dismantled, and the New Testament was increasingly recognized as presenting only some of the many theological concepts and ideas of early Christianity. It became increasingly difficult to make a distinction between heresy and orthodoxy. The multiplicity of competing statements of faith regarding the "saving event" in Jesus Christ and its theological explanation showed ever more clearly that at the beginning of the church's history neither heresy nor orthodoxy was sharply defined or patent; both were concepts developed later.

This view of the matter has been presented most notably by Walter Bauer in his well-known book *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* (1934; *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, Eng. trans. of 2d ed., 1971). A critical study of the early sources for the history of Christianity in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Greece shows that in these ancient Christian centers the gnosticism later judged to be heresy was evidently regarded as Christianity. An orthodoxy came into being as the result of a lengthy historical and theological process. From a confrontation with other doctrines and practices something emerged that was to be regarded as the orthodox doctrine and practice: a canon, an episcopal office that drew its legitimacy from succession to the apostles (who were subsequently promoted to be the founders of the principal episcopal sees), baptism, imposition of hands, and eucharist.

**A Morphology of Heresy.** This understanding of the origin of heresy and orthodoxy derived from the history of the Christian church is to a great extent valid for the history of religions. Bauer's thesis is therefore important also for the general study of religions. To that extent the unreflective, traditional concept of heresy is no longer applicable today; it must yield its place to the historical insight that *heresy* and *orthodoxy* are relative terms for religio-historical processes of quite different kinds. In any case the history of religions has no room for a theological and dogmatic judgment of these processes. It uses the concepts as purely historical categories or, better, as umbrella terms that make it possible to manage, in some degree, the multiplicity of contents presented by the history of religions. The history of religions cannot indeed bring about a revision of historical writing that would discard concepts that bear the mark of history. It can, however, exert a very healthy influence on the discussion of this subject by giving a critical presentation of historical events and causes that have led to oppositions between heresy and orthodoxy, which, in turn, have so often had tragic consequences. From the standpoint of comparative religion, an under-

standing of the applicability of the concept of heresy can shed light on the concept itself.

**Religions in which heresy does not appear.** Strictly speaking, it is possible to speak of "heresy," "schism," or "sect" only in connection with a certain type of religion, namely, religions founded by an individual or, as I prefer to call them, "confessional religions." For in all the ancient popular religions that were not explicitly traced back to a founder or that did not have their own canonical document containing a revelation (as, for example, do Zoroastrianism and Judaism) there was no such thing as a "schism" or a "heresy" in a strict and specifically religious sense. This is to be accounted for by the fact that in these religions the particular religion or cult of the gods was coextensive with the people as a whole, that is, religion and national community were inseparable. An "apostasy" from the official cult binding on all meant a withdrawal from the nation; in other words, apostasy brought exclusion from the civic community (for the Germanic community this meant "outlawry"). Furthermore, the idea of a binding confession in the sense of a kind of rule or norm of faith was wholly alien to such a national or popular religion. As a result, divergent views on, for example, the nature of the gods or similar subjects did not immediately lead to a break with tradition and thus to divisions. Popular religions were therefore essentially tolerant and as long as there was no attack on the central cultic life showed themselves liberal toward the cults of other gods.

For illustration of this spirit we need only recall the *interpretatio* of foreign gods, a tested means of adapting and of establishing equivalences. [See Syncretism.] Communities or associations were of course to be found within popular religions, but they were for the most part simply specific manifestations of religio-social life, as, for example, the mysteries based on the ancient cults of the gods. There was no place for "orthodoxy" and "heresy" in the mysteries; indeed, a person could become an initiate in several mysteries. Nor do the groups and associations found in the religions of illiterate tribes form an exception to this rule. When there are no fixed norms set down in the doctrine of an exclusive community there is no room for "heresy."

In this world of national and tribal religions there was, however, an area that served as a very sensitive touchstone of orthodoxy in a broad sense of the term. I refer to the area of cult or worship. Here there was indeed the basis for a parting of the ways. It can be said that in a national or popular religion heresies and schisms in the narrow sense did not arise, since the necessary presupposition was lacking, but that on the other hand an individual could bring about a reordering, re-

structuring, or reformation, which then led to the founding of an entirely new religion or to a new cult. The occasion for such an innovation was almost always a radical critique of the traditional cult and of the sacred tradition closely connected with it. Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), the Buddha, and Muḥammad are the outstanding examples of this phenomenon. In the case of the Buddha, it is true, his community was initially only one philosophico-ascetical group among others. Also to be mentioned here is the pharaoh Akhenaton (Amunhotep IV), who failed in his attempt to introduce monolatry into Egypt.

There was still another area in national or popular religions in which divisions and formations of schools could arise: the area of philosophy, in Greece or ancient India, for example. The formation of new philosophical schools represented an "apostasy," or deviation from a doctrine; in fact, the Greco-Christian concepts of "heresy," "schism," and "sect" were derived precisely from this area of ancient cultural life. [See Apostasy.] The concepts belong primarily to the philosophical and not the religious tradition. It is remarkable how ingenious Hinduism has been in reincorporating the "heresies" that spring from attitudes toward the Vedas. Hinduism is a popular religion (it may be said to be the only Indo-European one still in existence) that has a religious authority, namely the Vedas, as its guiding principle. As a result, a distinction is made between "orthodox" heretics and radical negators such as the Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs. It is clear from this that the formation of heresies or schisms is connected with an authoritative revelation, whether this takes the form of a canonical document or a person.

**Religions that give rise to heresy.** If we turn to religions that have a founder, we find a radically different situation. (These "confessional religions" are not, it should be noted, identical with "world religions," and it is better to avoid the unfortunate term *revealed religions*, because it has too many theological associations.) All of the religions in question—Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam—lay claim in one way or other to a normative doctrine. This does not from the outset always take the form of a fixed confession of faith, but there is at least a definite conception of faith and doctrine or, better, a central nucleus of doctrine that is used to separate "true" from "false" and that has taken written form in a sacred canon (thus "religions of the Book"). Such doctrines are, for example, monotheism or Yahvistic henotheism in Israel; the ethical dualism of Zarathushtra; the Buddha's knowledge and practice that lead to deliverance; faith in Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ; the ontological and anticomic dualism of Mani; the confes-

sion of Allāh and of Muḥammad as his messenger.

The historian of the "confessional religions" mentioned above is familiar also with their slow maturation from preliminary stages and their development of a central doctrinal core that then became a distinguishing orthodoxy or orthopraxis. Orthodoxy is not present from the beginning as a fixed quantity (Islam is no exception here, though it might seem such at first glance). It is always a secondary development, establishing itself in the confrontation of divergent interpretations of the founder's "original teaching." Walter Bauer's thesis regarding the slow development of Christian orthodoxy from a number of divergent but, in the beginning, equally acceptable trends in early Christianity is to a large extent valid for the history of religions in general. Orthodoxy is in every case an interpretation of the doctrine or message that the founder has left behind and that frequently shows a lack of internal harmony, to say nothing of the fact that it is usually transmitted only in oral form. On the one hand, it is this state of the founder's teaching that leads to a struggle among the groups that subsequently form within the religious community. Local and social differences also play a part. On the other hand, while the preaching of a founder is indeed open to numerous interpretations in matters of detail, the fact is that once the tradition originating with him has been fixed in writing, his teachings as a whole take on a particular shape and form. The result is a certain uniformity among all his followers in regard to the basic norms of doctrine, belief, and behavior.

**How heresy develops.** In those religions that give rise to the development of heresy, a number of stages mark the process. Even in the lifetime of a founder there may already be disagreements on matters of doctrine or behavior (e.g., between the Buddha and Devadatta on questions of asceticism). The many-sidedness and occasional lack of clarity in the founder's teachings lead, especially after his death, to the formation of groups in the original community (groups that initially had more or less equal standing). In the struggle among these groups, one group emerges—often as the result of a compromise—that interprets and transmits the founder's heritage in an "orthodox" way. As a result, a point is reached at which there can be heresies or the formation of sects in the strict sense of these terms. (We have seen in the case of the Christian concept of heresy that the existence of a "church" plays a normative role even before the rise of an "orthodoxy.")

It is difficult at times to determine how one particular movement is able to establish itself as orthodox. In most cases this movement or school preserves the heritage of the founder in a balanced and fully satisfactory way. In some cases only a rough determination of ortho-

doxy is reached; the result is the continued existence of groups with equal standing (as in early Indian Buddhism and the later Buddhism of East Asia; also in earlier Zoroastrianism as opposed to the official Zoroastrianism of the Sasanids). Islam too may be mentioned in this context because there is no "church" with an attendant hierarchy. The consensus of scholars who act as representatives of the community of believers becomes a regulating agency (the same holds for Judaism). Ideally, however, it is for the caliph as head of the community (*ummah*) to suppress heretics (*kāfirs*) and innovators (*mubtadi'*).

A tense opposition between "orthodoxy" and "heresy," "church" and "sect," marks the entire history of the founded religions and is also one of their fruitful major themes. Using the history of the Christian church as an example, Ernst Troeltsch has very impressively described this process as one of conflict between the institutional principle and the principle of voluntarism, both of which are contained in the gospel.

**Causes of the rise of heresy.** In parallel fashion it is possible to distinguish the following causes that lead to some typical forms of heresy:

1. *Dogmatico-theological questions* understood as problems of doctrinal tradition and their interpretation (personal factors may at times play a role here, e.g., the apostasy of disciples). This cause is admittedly seldom found in a pure form (as Troeltsch established in connection with Christianity), but it is a main factor in almost all confessional religions (think of Jewish Christianity or Marcionism). Doctrinal questions supply the ideological backbone of almost all heresies and sects (e.g., Mazdaism or the Islamic Shī'ī sects); every "heresy" seeks doctrinal justification as an expression of its immediate self-consciousness.

2. *Questions of lifestyle* or, if you will, of ethics and morality (in any case, problems of practice). Frequently these are directly connected with the questions mentioned above or else are consequences of divergent doctrines. In most instances sects follow a "radical" line and thus tend to extremism (e.g., in questions of asceticism or discipline in religious orders, as in Buddhism and also in Christianity).

3. *Questions of ritual and cultic observance.* Once again, these are usually connected with doctrinal problems but rarely in "book religions" as distinguished from "cultic religions." Even Christianity, a book religion, has known such cases: the controversy over the date of Easter in the second century, for example.

4. *Social problems*, which are closely connected with moral and ethical problems. Socio-revolutionary movements come under this heading. Marxist analysis and more recent sociological analyses have shed a great deal

of light on this area, showing that a good many heresies have been the expression of critical situations in society (e.g., medieval heretical movements in Christianity and Islam, or the recent "religions of imminent salvation" in nonliterate cultures). Following Troeltsch, English sociologist of religion Bryan R. Wilson has interpreted modern sectary movements within Christianity, especially in the Anglo-American world, as expressions specifically of social protest and has once again shown that periods of social unrest are privileged times for the rise of sects. Social tensions and pressures in a society that is sustained and given its impress by an "established church" lead to movements of religious protest directed against state and church as a single undivided power. In the Middle Ages such movements appeared as "critical" manifestations within feudalism and asserted themselves most clearly in "heretical" movements (Bogomils, Albigensians, Waldensians, and so on). The important part played by this sort of background should not, however, lead us to interpret every religious sect or heresy as a crypto-revolutionary movement. There is good reason to reject the old ahistorical underestimation of such causes, but we should not replace it with a one-sided overestimation of them.

5. *Political causes.* These are often closely connected with the social causes described above, because the politico-religious ambitions of a stratum or class usually also involve social interests that can lead to divisions within an established religion of the type we are discussing. In Islam, for example, the vast majority of Shī'ī and other sects or heresies are religio-political movements that have been sparked by concrete disputes concerning, for instance, the position of the community leader. Or, they are simply a consequence of the overall structure of Islam.

6. *Cultural, anthropological (racial), and ethnic factors* that are evident in Islam, in the history of the Eastern Christian church, and, to some extent, in Buddhism, for example, are factors that do not, of course, operate in isolation. Also to be mentioned under this heading is the continued influence of past forms of religion, the various forms of "paganism," for instance, which either give the impulse to emerging heresies and divisions or at least supply them with ideological material. Striking examples are gnosticism (see below), Manichaeism in the Iranian world, and the rise of the Nuṣayriyah and the Druze in the Islamic world.

7. *The figure of a charismatic leader* often plays a role that should not be underestimated in the separate or combined operation of these various factors. He has an important part in shaping a heresy and its further course. He can develop from the founder of a sect into the founder of a new religion.

**A Historical Example: Gnosticism.** One of the most striking examples of a heresy that had its own original worldview but on encountering another religion (Christianity) became part of its history, is gnosticism, or gnosis. In it we are confronted with a cosmopolitan or ecumenical form of religion that is largely parasitical in character. By way of lay intellectuals it made its way into the Christian community as early as the time of Paul or, to put it differently, it attached itself to certain Christian ideas. The result was a development that turned a pre-Christian religious movement into a Christian heresy or, more exactly, a distinct movement or sect in the church. There can be no doubt of this in view of the different roles played in gnostic systems by the spiritual man who founds a gnostic sect and by Jesus Christ as authoritative bringer of revelation, and in view, too, of gnosticism's very different soteriology. But before the point was reached at which gnosticism became a heresy or sect, it was in many places the church itself, with its own scriptural tradition and exegesis. We know from numerous gnostic writings that the gnostics regarded themselves as the real Christians and intended to be the true church. To Celsus, of course, the gnostics were Christians. There were groups of gnostics who formed tightly knit churches, as the letters of Paul, the *Gospel of John*, and the Nag Hammadi writings show in their different ways; even Irenaeus, a father of the church, admits this. Gnosticism was therefore not natively an anti-Christian or anti-ecclesial movement. Its entire exegesis of scripture disproves this interpretation. It was turned into such by the heresiologists, who, like Paul before them, initiated a process of elimination to which gnosticism finally fell victim.

The reaction of Irenaeus provides a good mirror in which to study this development. He equates gnosis with paganism; in fact, he attacks the gnostics as worse than the pagans, a view fully justified from a historical standpoint. He sees them as imitators of the pagans and yet not as genuine *pagani* but rather heretics of the Christian age who disagree with the church on the real origin of things and on true Christian doctrine. Unlike Hegesippus and Hippolytus, Irenaeus knows nothing of an earlier prehistory of gnosticism and is familiar only with Simon Magus as founder and first heretic. To a great extent, Irenaeus's view of the matter determined the course followed by subsequent heresiologists: they knew gnosticism only as a Christian heresy (a conception that only slowly yielded its place to another during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).

It was in the confrontation with gnosticism (including Marcionism) that ecclesial orthodoxy took form. Scholars have always realized that this process of distinction

and separation was of radical importance, but they have not always understood what the process meant for both sides. It is more than a simple coincidence that to a great extent both the church and the gnostic "heretics" used the same arguments in their disputes, especially the arguments from tradition and from the unbroken line of witnesses. Both sides made use of the same proofs, as a study of Irenaeus and the texts of the Christian gnostics shows; these proofs were those of apostolic authority, scriptural exegesis, and tradition. Tradition provided the gnostics with an impregnable fortress: the secret tradition that is for practical purposes identical with liberating knowledge and that has been entrusted solely to spiritual men or initiates, and is completely kept from the ignorant (see, for instance, the *Gospel of Thomas*). [See Esotericism.] Recent studies have shown that on certain points of his terminology for the church, Irenaeus was dependent on the gnostics; for example, *diadochē* and *paradosis*, used in connection with the principle of succession, were already current terms among the gnostics. This is why Irenaeus was unable to get the better of the gnostics with arguments of this kind, even though he repeatedly attempted to do so.

Irenaeus's principal weapon, however, was the concept of gnosis itself: "Irenaeus uses the concept of gnosis to distinguish between Church and heretics by focusing the entire dispute on the fundamental and always presupposed attitude of the human person to revelation and God" (Norbert Brox, *Offenbarung, Gnosis und gnostischer Mythos bei Irenaeus von Lyon*, Salzburg, 1966, p. 170). Another and quite different way of attaining true gnosis, a way essentially different from that of the gnostics, is available to human beings: the way of humble knowledge of the order of salvation that is attested in scripture, handed on by the apostles, and described in the church's teaching and preaching and that is explained, of course, by Irenaeus himself. True (ecclesiastical) gnosis thus becomes a standard by which heretical gnosis is shown to be an erroneous figment of the imagination. This example makes clear the complicated way in which the distinction between heresy and orthodoxy was achieved and how the two could not become distinct without having first fertilized one another.

Similar processes are to be seen at work in other sectors of the history of religions. Islamic orthodoxy took over to a large extent the philosophical terminology, though classified as heretical, of the Mu'tazilah who had assimilated the Hellenistic heritage. Both Shī'is and Sunnis developed their own *sunnah* or religio-legal tradition and claimed justification for it in Muḥammad (in the case of the Shī'is, by way of 'Alī, Fāṭimah, and their sons as the Prophet's spokesmen). In Zoroastrian-

ism the problems of monotheism and dualism, which had their basis in the theology of Zarathushtra, led alternately to orthodoxy and heresy, a process in which the civil authorities played a part. Thus the religion of the god of time (Zurwān) was dominant in the later Arsacid and early Sasanid periods as the accepted interpretation of the Zoroastrian tradition. [See Zurvanism.] Later on, however, especially once the Zoroastrian religion had been outlawed, this form became a heresy to be bitterly opposed, and modern Parsis even reject as non-Zoroastrian a dualist interpretation of the message of Zarathushtra. Thus it is made repeatedly clear that the relation between heresy and orthodoxy is one of interplay that does not permit historians of religion to pass any clear value judgment on the matter; rather they see in this situation clear evidence of the dynamism and vitality of religion.

[See also Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy; Schism; and Sect.]

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KURT RUDOLPH

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### Christian Concepts

The apostle Paul referred to *haireseis* ("opinions") in the primitive Christian community, acknowledging that they were inevitable. So long as the community was disorganized and disunited, as it clearly was in the first and second centuries, a wide variety of opinions could legitimately exist. When, largely in response to the gnostic question, the community organized and developed centers of authority, certain opinions were rejected as contrary to the views of the united community. Such rejected opinions were called "heresies" in the pejorative sense as early as the second century. Thenceforth a "heretic" was a Christian holding rejected views on any theological matter, including morality and ecclesiology as well as matters relating more closely to the nature of God. A heretic had to be a Christian; Jews, pagans, atheists, Muslims, or other non-Christians were held to be guilty of "infidelity" rather than heresy.

The definition of heresy was always spongy, especially so in the first three centuries, when the borders of the community were not firmly drawn. Heresy was opposed to "orthodoxy," "correct teaching," and to "catholic," "universal," teaching. Thus, historically, heresy and orthodoxy developed as two sides of the same coin. A gradual process occurred in which certain opinions were gradually incorporated into a growing core of accepted doctrine, while other opinions were extruded from the body of acceptable belief and were designated as heresies. In periods of intense debate, when definitions of an issue were in the process of being forged, the term's relativity was clear, since both sides of the debate, as for example the Arians and Athanasians, accused one another of heresy. At the end of such debates, when the issue was finally resolved, the winning party found its teachings ensconced as orthodox and the losing party saw its teachings rejected as heresy:

Heresy never prospers. Why? I daresay  
If heresy prosper, none dare call it heresy.

[See Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy; Tradition; Theology, *article on Christian Theology; Dogma; and Excommunication.*]

Thus the definition of heresy is relative. It is relative through time. What is permissible opinion in one period becomes objectionable heresy in another period. Many of the early Fathers, for example, were subordinationists without fear of heresy, but once the Council of Nicaea had decided against Arianism, subordinationists were heretics. It is thus intellectually impossible (as well as morally undesirable) to judge a person's ortho-

doxy or heresy by the standards of another period, although tendencies to do so have marred both Catholic and Protestant historical writing for centuries. That Anselm did not have a Lutheran view of redemption and that Wesley did not share Thomas Aquinas's view of transubstantiation are facts that may provoke useful theological reflection but that have nothing to do with judging anyone orthodox or heretical.

In some periods the definitions of heresy and orthodoxy developed in rather a straightforward fashion. During the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, for example, when papal canon law and scholastic theology advanced fairly coherently from one point to another, the definition of heresy moved logically forward with that advance. At any given moment, some people would be moving along with the advance and would be considered orthodox; others would resist the advance and be considered reactionary heretics; still others would be impatient with the advance, demanding quicker and more radical change—these would be considered reformist heretics. Accordingly, heresy is also relative in place, because current theological movements always affect some areas and segments of the community more rapidly than others. At Cambrai in 1077 a man named Ramihrd was burned as a reformist heretic for holding precisely the views that were being put forward by Gregory VII in Rome, but had not yet found their way into the provinces.

Inherently a relative notion, heresy takes on a more solid, definable form whenever a fixed authority is generally accepted by the community, an authority the community trusts to judge between orthodoxy and heresy. The bishops, believed to have the apostolic succession, were entrusted with such authority as early as the second century, but as the bishops often disagreed among themselves, the community tended to seek a firmer authority. They found this first in the ecumenical councils, which, as assemblies of all the bishops, were believed to represent the universal church. [See Councils, *article on Christian Councils.*] In addition to the councils, the opinions of the most respected church fathers were considered weighty. In the fifth century Vincent of Lérins could define Catholic orthodoxy in terms of a putative consensus: it was that held always, everywhere, and by everyone, which Vincent understood to mean all the authorities—the Fathers and the councils. The emperor or king occasionally exercised semiecclesiastical authority, but the clearest definition of heresy in Christian history was possible in the period from 1050 to 1300, when Christian society was dominated and defined by the papacy. Papal ecclesiology and canon law defined a Catholic Christian as one who sub-

mitted to the authority of the pope; those who steadfastly refused to do so were defined as infidels, schismatics, or heretics.

The definition of heresy in western Europe in the high Middle Ages was simple: it was a doctrine held in defiance of papally defined orthodoxy. Even this simplicity is deceiving, however, because there were many points that the papacy failed to define, and often antipapal groups and movements emerged (sometimes with their own pope) that defined things differently. The Eastern Christian community never accepted such definitions either before or after the Great Schism, and heresy has always been much more loosely defined in the East than in the West, for the Eastern church had a less-defined structure and canon law. In the West, conciliarism challenged the papal structure, and the Reformation shattered whatever consensus there may have been, revealing heresy again as a relative, not a universal term. [See Canon Law; Papacy; Reformation; and Schism.]

*Heresy* is not a well-defined term, and in fact there can be no such thing as a history of heresy. Heresy is not a subject, for it is not a coherent concept. It has no core, and no borders, only a set of vaguely overlapping phenomena. Between Montanism and Catharism, Origen and Hus, Waldensianism and witchcraft, the connections are vague and superficial at best. Moreover, what was considered heresy in the third century is little like that considered heresy in the twelfth or the twentieth. Heresy, therefore, must always be studied *pari passu* with orthodoxy in terms of the general intellectual, social, and cultural movements of the time. Thus Waldensianism can be much better understood in the context of contemporary movements of poverty, including the orthodox mendicants, than in relation to ancient Donatists or modern Methodists. Heresy cannot be studied as a phenomenon in itself, but many aspects of heresy are coherent subjects. One may study the development of an individual heresy; or the controversy between two groups that ended in one group's being designated heretical; or the connection of heresy with other contemporary movements; or the development of attitudes toward religious dissent; or the sociological and ecclesiological patterns of authority, resistance, sect, and church.

The type of heresy that emerges at any point thus naturally reflects the concerns of the Christian community at that point. In the first three centuries, when questions centered on the nature of the scriptures, the basic meaning of revelation, and the proper stance of the Christian toward this world, and toward pagan persecution in particular, the heresies of the Ebionites, Gnostics, Montanists, and Donatists occurred. In the fourth

and fifth centuries, when the church was struggling with trinitarian and christological definitions, it produced solutions that were defined as orthodox, extruding the Arians, Nestorians, and Monophysites from the community. A transition period followed, in which the old concerns continued to be reflected in heresies such as monothelitism, and new concerns arose producing iconoclasm and the *filioque* controversy. [See Iconoclasm.] In the East, gnostic dualism revived during the tenth through twelfth centuries, producing Bogomilism and Messalianism, and exporting these ideas from the 1140s into the West in the form of Catharism. In the West, the early Middle Ages, socially and culturally unsophisticated, produced crude and ignorant heresies, such as those of Aldebert, Eudo, and Tanchelm.

The revival of learning and scholasticism produced a new round of controversies, but because most of the central theological points had been aired in earlier centuries, few medieval intellectual heresies were pronounced; occasionally a scholar, such as Abelard, Amalric of Bena, or John Wyclif allowed their speculations to press beyond the boundaries of what was considered permissible at the time. Most medieval heresies reflected the moral and ecclesiological concerns of the period. As the rulers of the church pressed moral reform through close ecclesiastical organization and discipline, a number of reformers believed that the establishment was not moving quickly or thoroughly enough; moreover, these reformers noted that the accumulation of power by the papacy and episcopate was generating new corruptions, and they contrasted the power of the clergy with the simple life of poverty they believed characterized the apostolic church. Henry of Lausanne, Valdès, Hus, all carried their apostolic criticism to the point of denying the need for the clergy at all in favor of a democratic view in which all Christians come to God through a simple life of poverty, prayer, and reading of the scriptures. The papal establishment found itself in the middle, condemning reactionaries who defended lay investiture, simony, and clerical marriage on the one hand, and condemning the Fraticelli, who advocated an apostolic life of poverty, on the other.

The papal determination to achieve a Christian society by enforcing discipline and obedience led to crusades against the heretics and, from the 1230s, the papal inquisition. [See Crusades and Inquisition, The.] The scholastics and inquisitors extended the definition of heresy considerably. For example, sorcery, which had been a relatively minor crime in the early Middle Ages, was in the fourteenth and subsequent centuries transformed into the heresy of witchcraft and defined as devil-worship so as to fall under the jurisdiction of the

Inquisition. [See Witchcraft, *article on* Concepts of Witchcraft.]

The sharp lines drawn by the papacy were blurred by the conciliarists and virtually erased by the Protestant Reformation. Luther and Calvin, clearly heretics by the standards of medieval papalism, attained independence of that judgment by virtue of the success of their views. Their shattering of the medieval consensus created a new kind of heresy; for where orthodoxy is fragmented, so is heresy. Each of the reformers quickly set up his own standards of orthodoxy, by which Zwingli, the Anabaptists, and Servetus, for example, were defined as heretics. The selective usage of terms by the Protestants illustrates a sociological element in the definition of heresy. The reformers condemned the Catholics as ignorant, obscurantist, even as antichrists in league with Satan, but they did not often call them heretics, whereas *heretic* was precisely the term most favored by the Catholics in attacking the reformers. The term *heresy* implies a rebellion against established belief systems, so that rebels seldom accuse the establishment of heresy. Calvin saw the Anabaptists as heretical, the Catholics as evil and benighted, but not as heretics. Heresy thus has the denotation of "religious error," but also the connotation of rebellion against an established view. The evolution of heretical groups into sects and then into established churches with their own definitions of heresy is well known. The heresies of the Reformation period (both the Protestants defined as heretics, and the new heresies defined by the Protestants) reflected the concerns of the time in their focus upon ecclesiology, the nature of the Christian community. Just under the surface of ecclesiology was the question of the foundation of Christian truth. How do we know, how do we determine, where Christian truth lies, what kind of a community God wants his people to build? These questions are fundamental; it is natural that they should in a sense return the lines of heresy and orthodoxy to the muddle they were in during the first two centuries of the church.

Modern Christian views of heresy are more diverse as a result of the Reformation, and that diversity has increased with the variety of theological trends that have developed in both Catholicism and Protestantism in the twentieth century. Eastern Orthodox views of heresy remain ill defined, because of the lack of central authority and canon law in a church whose organization is divided between several patriarchates and national churches. For Roman Catholicism, heresy was quite sharply defined between the time of the Council of Trent and the Second Vatican Council, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when papalism, Thomism, and a generally defensive attitude to-

ward other religious bodies prevailed. Since Vatican II, the Catholic church has been marked by increased toleration, both of Protestants, who are now regarded as "separated brethren" rather than as heretics, and of dissent within the Catholic church itself.

Protestantism's views are rather sharply divided between the older, traditional churches such as the Anglican, Lutheran, and traditional Reformed churches on the one side, and the growing evangelical movement on the other. The older churches, more deeply rooted in tradition, earlier in their history took a strong stand against theological dissent, but the fragmentation of Protestant bodies and the growth of widely heterodox opinions within Protestantism have resulted in a tolerance of opinions so extreme that charges of heresy have become rare. On the other hand, the evangelicals, although breaking explicitly with ecclesiastical tradition, tend to regard scripture as a sole and infallible authority; this provides them with a basis for condemning those who differ from their own allegedly noninterpretational view as heretics, or, as the current vocabulary prefers, not "real Christians." Implicitly aware of their own historical and sociological status as heretics, perhaps, the evangelicals usually refrain from using the term.

Diverse as heresies and their definitions have been, some common characteristics and problems raise perennially important questions for the Christian community. Essentially, the question of heresy is the question whether any limits exist on what can be considered Christian. One extreme view sets no limit: anyone calling himself a Christian is to be considered one. Such a view saps the very meaning of the term by extending its boundaries to infinity and runs the risk of rendering it linguistically meaningless. The other extreme is a rigidly confessional, dogmatic view, defining out of Christianity whatever does not fit comfortably into a given system. Between such views is an objective, historical account that observes the overall development of Christianity, including its efforts to set boundaries and standards. The historian has insuperable difficulties in attempting to define Christianity apart from the scripture and tradition that bind it together and set it apart from other religions and movements. A person claiming to be Christian but standing far outside the boundaries set by scripture and tradition cannot be, in any meaningful sense, a Christian. His position might be "true" (in which case Christianity would be wrong), but it would not be Christian. Objectively, some ideas are beyond the boundaries of Christianity. Technically, such views would be apostasies or infidelities rather than heresies, for a heresy is an unacceptable view of Christian theology held by a Christian. The point at which a heresy



transmutes into an apostasy varies, but such a transmutation is linguistically sensible. [See Apostasy.]

Whatever role apostasy may play in Christianity, the role of heresy is varied and ambiguous. A tension between the spirit of order and the spirit of prophecy has informed Christianity from the earliest times to the present. Without a principle of order, Christianity would become, as the gnostics did, hopelessly divided and atomized. Without a spirit of prophecy, it would become a dried husk, devoid of life. Order relies upon the authority of revelation as presented by scripture and interpreted by tradition, the whole process tended by the Holy Spirit. Prophecy relies upon the authority of the Holy Spirit in breaking into any time or place with its fire of love and enlightenment. The heretic, who by definition holds to a truth rejected by the religious establishment, departs from the tradition. He claims that he has access to a truth higher than that of tradition. That truth might be a new revelation in itself. Few heretics have taken such a radical view; to do so, in fact, would be in effect to launch, as the prophet Muhammad did, a whole new religion. Heretics tend instead to argue that they have illumination or inspiration from the Holy Spirit that enables them to interpret scripture and tradition in a fuller and truer sense than the establishment. The problem with such a position is validation. The heretic asks his hearers to trust him rather than the bishops (or other traditional authorities). His success in making this demand depends partly upon how discredited the authorities appear at the moment and partly upon his own charismatic gifts and powers.

Heresy has had several functions in Christianity: it has raised important issues and advanced theological understanding and definition; it has acted as a challenge to petrified authority and brought life and spirit into the church again and again. It has also produced disruptions, rancor, hostility, and violence. In its extreme forms it has pressed beyond the very boundaries of Christianity. Although heresy is so diverse and ill defined that no judgment can be made of it as a phenomenon in itself, individual heresies may be judged according to the great commandment of Christ: to love. Heresies and responses to heresy that are informed with charity enrich the Christian experience; heresies and responses to heresy that lack charity only discredit and undermine the Christian community.

[For further discussion of particular religious movements and groups viewed as heretical from the perspective of orthodox Christianity, see Arianism; Cathari; Doce-tism; Donatism; Ebionites; Gnosticism; Manichaeism; Marcionism; Monophysitism; Montanism; Nestorianism; Pelagianism; and Waldensians.]

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JEFFREY BURTON RUSSELL

**HERMENEUTICS.** The term *hermeneutics* is derived from the Greek verb *hermēneuein* ("to interpret") and refers to the intellectual discipline concerned with the nature and presuppositions of the interpretation of human expressions.

## Introduction

The Greek term has etymological associations with the name of the Greek god Hermes, the messenger of the gods and the deity of boundaries. Some have seen this association as reflecting the inherently triadic structure of the act of interpretation: (1) a sign, message, or text from some source requires (2) a mediator or interpreter (Hermes) to (3) convey it to some audience. So considered, this deceptively simple triadic structure implicitly contains the major conceptual issues with which hermeneutics deals: (1) the nature of a text; (2) what it means to understand a text; and (3) how understanding and interpretation are determined by the presupposi-

tions and beliefs (the horizon) of the audience to which the text is being interpreted. Serious reflection on any of these three issues reveals why interpretation is itself a philosophical issue and a subject of interpretation.

Since interpretation is fundamental to all the intellectual disciplines—to the natural sciences as well as the humanities—one might have expected hermeneutics to have arisen earlier in Western culture than it did. Although there were many controversies within Judaism and Christianity concerning the interpretation of the Bible—just as pre-Reformation humanists were concerned with the exegesis of the texts of antiquity—it was not until the middle of the last century that modern hermeneutics was born. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) is generally acknowledged to be the founder of modern hermeneutics, but it was Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) who first dreamed of developing a foundational discipline for the cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) that would render their conclusions as objective and as valid as those of the natural sciences.

Dilthey's dream was overtaken by the rapid emergence and proliferation of the many specialized disciplines that are now recognized and preserved by the organizational structure of the modern university—art history, anthropology, economics, history, the various literatures, political science, psychology, philosophy, and so on. Each of these disciplines rapidly developed its own intellectual interests and normative procedures for the presentation and adjudication of arguments within them. Methodologies rather than hermeneutics dominated intellectual life.

In recent years, however, powerful intellectual currents have brought hermeneutics once again to the fore, so that interest in it has burgeoned among literary critics, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, theologians, philosophers, and students of religion. These currents include (1) new theories of human behavior in the psychological and social sciences in which human cultural expressions are regarded as manifestations of unconscious and instinctual drives or as reflections of class interests; (2) developments in epistemology and the philosophy of language that have led to claims that what counts as reality for a given culture is a function of the linguistic structures superimposed on experience; and (3) the arguments advanced by philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger that all human experience is basically interpretative, and that all judgments take place within a context of interpretation mediated by culture and language behind which it is impossible to go. Underlying all these currents is the assumption that human consciousness is situated in history and cannot transcend it—an assumption that raises important questions concerning the role of cultural conditioning in any understanding.

It would be an error, however, to conclude from this new interest in hermeneutics that Dilthey's dream of a universal foundational discipline for the cultural sciences is about to be realized. Even a superficial glance at the contemporary intellectual scene reveals little agreement concerning how hermeneutics is conceived or how the discipline should proceed. The intellectual disciplines constituting the modern university have themselves been fractured into parties, each of which has its own method and mode of interpretation. In psychology, for example, there are behaviorists, cognitive psychologists, Freudians, Jungians, and Gestaltists, just as in the social sciences there are functionalists, structuralists, ethnomethodologists, and Marxists.

Paradoxically, it is just this proliferation of parties that partially accounts for the resurgence of interest in hermeneutics in our own time. Diversity and conflict of interpretations historically have provided the stimulus and the urgency for acquiring understanding and agreement. Dilthey pointed out, for example, how the rise of modern hermeneutics was itself closely connected with the post-Reformation debates among Protestants and Catholics over the interpretation of scripture, just as Schleiermacher's own attempt to establish a universal hermeneutics was admittedly prompted by the attempt to overcome misunderstanding. The incommensurate perspectives that disciplines may adopt concerning the same object (such as a text, language, or human nature) raise profound questions about the nature of human conceptualization, objectivity, understanding, explanation, and translation. Hence it is not surprising that, for many intellectuals, hermeneutics is increasingly coming to occupy the role that epistemology did a few decades ago.

The problems of hermeneutics are more unavoidable in the scholarly study of religion than in many other academic disciplines, for reasons both conceptual and historical. Conceptually, religions themselves may be regarded as communities of interpretation, so that the scholarly study of them takes the form of an interpretation of an interpretation. Since the scholarly interpretation of religion most often rests on different assumptions than the religious interpretation, the religious participant frequently regards the scholar's interpretation as reductionistic and alien. Hence a perennial debate among scholars of religion regarding the degree to which the scholarly interpretation of religion must do justice to the believer's own point of view.

Historically, the scholarly study of religion—as well as the rise of modern hermeneutics—is closely associated with the religious tradition of liberal Protestantism. Indeed, liberal Protestantism might be said to have emerged through a series of bitter hermeneutical debates concerning the application of historical-critical

methods to the Christian Bible. These debates illustrate the phenomena discussed at the beginning of this paragraph, since orthodox Christians regarded the application of these methods to the Bible as an alien mode of interpretation. Liberal Protestantism resolved the issue by defining the essence of religious faith as experience rather than doctrine or historical belief.

Schleiermacher, the founder of hermeneutics as well as of liberal Protestantism, was particularly influential in articulating the outlines of this compromise. He regarded the various religions as culturally conditioned forms of an underlying and universal religious sensibility. Thus he not only moved the locus of faith from belief to experience, but also laid the foundations for a descriptive science of religion to which Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), Joachim Wach (1898–1955), and others were to contribute. This close connection between liberal Protestantism and the scholarly study of religion partially accounts for the fact that liberal theologians have been particularly sensitive to theories of interpretation.

Many scholars would insist that, to answer the many questions arising from the activity of interpretation, it is important to have a hermeneutical theory. Others, however, would insist that the great mistake distorting all modern hermeneutics is precisely the lust for some such theory. Rather than prejudice the issue from the outside by describing alternative hermeneutical theories, I shall roughly delineate four ways in which modern hermeneutics may be conceived, each of which is dominated by a distinctive question:

1. What is it to understand a text and what are the conditions of its possibility?
2. How are the cultural sciences distinct in method and form from the natural sciences?
3. What are the conditions that make any sort of human understanding possible?
4. How can we resolve certain conceptual puzzles associated with concepts like *understanding* and *meaning*, and how might such a resolution help us to understand the task of interpretation?

Each of these questions, and the conception of hermeneutics it yields, often overlaps with the others, and a theorist of one type may also deal with issues characteristic of another. Nevertheless, these four ways are sufficiently distinctive to be a useful heuristic device for organizing what follows.

### Hermeneutics as Inquiry into the Interpretation of Texts

Modern hermeneutics had its origins in attempts to solve problems and conflicts concerning the interpreta-

tion of texts; Schleiermacher is usually regarded as the originating figure. Although there were debates before his time concerning the difference between sacred and profane interpretation, it was Schleiermacher whom Dilthey properly called the “Kant of hermeneutics,” because Schleiermacher argued that scripture required no special type of interpretative procedure, and grasped that the fundamental issue was to develop the basic grammatical and psychological conditions necessary for the understanding of any text whatsoever. It was Schleiermacher again who saw that the nature of language was the crucial theoretical issue confronting hermeneutical theory, because one could gain access to another person’s meaning only through the medium of language.

**Authorial Intention.** Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical theory is organized around two foci: (1) the grammatical understanding of any characteristic modes of expression and the linguistic forms of the culture in which a given author lived and which conditioned that author’s thinking and (2) the technical or psychological understanding of the unique subjectivity or creative genius of that author. Both these foci reflect Schleiermacher’s own indebtedness to Romantic thinkers who had argued that any individual’s mode of expression, however unique, necessarily reflects a wider cultural sensibility or spirit (*Geist*). A correct interpretation requires not only an understanding of the cultural and historical context of an author, but a grasp of the latter’s unique subjectivity. This can be accomplished only by an “act of divination”—an intuitive leap by which the interpreter “relives” the consciousness of the author. By seeing this consciousness in the larger cultural context, the interpreter comes to understand the author better than the author understands himself or herself.

Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics have not had a great influence on secular literary criticism in either England or the United States, although most literary criticism until the 1920s generally assumed that the aim of interpretation was to discover the intention of the author. In the last several decades, however, most literary criticism has been built on the assumption—classically enunciated by T. S. Eliot in his essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919), but argued on other grounds by Freudians, Marxists, New Critics, structuralists, and deconstructionists—that a literary text has its own afterlife independent of the author, and that to understand it has little or no relationship to understanding the author’s intentions when writing it. In recent years, however, some critics have rediscovered Schleiermacher and reaffirmed his view that some form of authorial intent must be the foundation of a theory of objective meaning. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., for example, has argued in *Validity in Interpretation* (1967) that, if inter-

pretation is to avoid pure subjectivity and arbitrariness, there must be some criteria for determining the correct meaning of a text. This in turn, says Hirsch, requires some theory of determinate meaning. Anyone concerned with objectivity will be driven logically to some discriminating norm, and "the only compelling normative principle that has ever been brought forward is the old-fashioned ideal of rightly understanding what the author meant" (p. 26). This has led Hirsch and others to deal with the many problems this position raises. However, while this view represents the common sense of most laypersons, it is not now widely shared by most literary critics, who have developed hermeneutical theories rejecting authorial intent as the norm of meaning.

#### **Schleiermacher and the Interpretation of Religion.**

So far as the interpretation of religion is concerned, Schleiermacher's influence is to be found less in his hermeneutical theory, which is dominated by the problem of recovering the author's meaning, than in his views that (1) religiosity is an essential and *a priori* aspect of human nature and (2) language is the medium of all understanding. The first assumption has elicited many attempts to develop what Paul Ricoeur has called a "regional hermeneutics": rules governing the interpretation of religious expressions as a unique and autonomous type. One of the earliest and most influential of these attempts was Rudolf Otto's analysis of the "numinous" in his famous book *Das Heilige* (1917; Eng. trans., *The Idea of the Holy*).

Less explicitly indebted to Schleiermacher, but based on the same assumption of the universality of human religiosity, is the very influential work of Mircea Eliade. He argues that the basic structure of religiosity can be seen most clearly in archaic religions in which human life is regarded as part of a living cosmos. Profound connections are said to exist between the rhythms of human and cosmic life. Myths and religious symbols are systems of micro-macrocosmic correspondences and analogies. Human fecundity, for example, is seen as recapitulating the pattern of divine fecundity. All human activities are thus sanctified and made meaningful. This assumption has led Eliade to explore the many variants of certain recurring symbols in the world's religions, as for instance the sacred tree, stones, snakes, fish, and water.

#### **Hermeneutics as Foundation for the Cultural Sciences**

A second way of thinking about hermeneutics is to regard it as providing a foundational discipline for the cultural in contrast to the natural sciences. This discipline would presumably establish the boundary lines

separating the various generic types of interpretation—literary, artistic, philosophical, legal, religious, and so forth—and would establish the methods and normative canons of objectivity and validity for each type. It would, in short, be a universal hermeneutics. Wilhelm Dilthey is generally regarded as the most important exponent of this view of hermeneutics, and the Italian historian of law Emilio Betti is perhaps its best-known contemporary advocate. Although profoundly influenced by Schleiermacher—at an early age he wrote a prize essay on Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, and later a monumental biography of him—Dilthey rejected Schleiermacher's assumption that every work of an author is an outgrowth of an implicit principle contained in the author's mind. Dilthey considered this assumption to be profoundly antihistorical, because it does not sufficiently take account of the external influences at work or the author's development. Moreover, Dilthey thought that a universal hermeneutics required the elaboration of epistemological principles that would serve the cultural sciences in the way that Kant's principles accounted for Newtonian physics. If Kant developed a "critique of pure reason," then Dilthey devoted his life to a "critique of historical reason."

**Cultural versus Natural Sciences.** Dilthey's hermeneutics quite obviously rests on a sharp distinction between the methods of the cultural and those of the natural sciences. The distinctive method of the cultural sciences is understanding (*Verstehen*), whereas that of the natural sciences is explanation (*Erklärung*). The natural scientist explains events by employing universal laws, whereas the historian neither discovers nor employs such laws but, rather, seeks to understand the actions of agents by discovering their intentions, purposes, wishes, and character traits. Such action is intelligible because human actions, in contrast to natural events, have an "inside" that we can understand because we too are persons. Understanding, then, is the discovery of the "I" in the "Thou," and it is possible because of a shared universal human nature.

Insofar as Dilthey's hermeneutics rests on understanding as a distinctive act that requires an imaginative identification with past persons, one can discern the influence of Schleiermacher. But Dilthey developed an elaborate and complex theory of experience (*Erlebnis*) and its relationship to various forms of expression that constitutes nothing less than the philosophical anthropology and epistemology he thought necessary to establish hermeneutics as a foundational discipline of the cultural sciences. Dilthey was never able to complete this enterprise in a way satisfactory to himself or others, and its complexities defy any brief exposition here. Suffice it to say that it contained a sophisticated

analysis of the temporality of experience and the way in which human experience is bound together by units of meaning that are subconscious and prereflective. These meanings become objectified in human expressions. He held that our knowledge of our own experience as well as of the experience of others is available only through these objectified expressions. Consequently, we come to know human nature through historical knowledge, that is, through understanding the varieties of objectified forms in which humanity has expressed its own experience of life. Ultimately, history is the variety of ways in which human life has expressed itself over time. Indeed, we can grasp our own possibilities only through historical reconstruction and understanding. Through understanding (*Verstehen*) of the life-expressions (*Lebensäußerungen* and *Erlebnisausdrücke*) of past persons, we come to understand the humanity of which we are a part.

**Weber and Wach.** Like Dilthey, the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) was preoccupied with establishing the objectivity of the results of the cultural sciences, but he was even more interested in the status of generalizations in political economy and sociology. His work therefore stands at the juncture between the humanities and the social sciences. He was interested in the logical relationships between understanding and explanation. Though sympathetic to Dilthey's attempts to establish the autonomy of understanding, he was also interested in generalizations about human collective actions—generalizations he hoped could be made as objective and scientific as those in the natural sciences. His analysis and classification of types of social actions, and his delineation of ideal types, are attempts to solve these conceptual problems. Unlike Dilthey, he was especially interested in the interpretation of religion. His *Sociology of Religion* (1904–1905) is one of the great works in the comparative study of religion, and his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1922), although now dated in important respects, is one of the influential books in modern sociology.

The significance of Dilthey and Weber for hermeneutics lies primarily in (1) their minimalization of the concern for recovering the author of the text, and their extension of hermeneutics to cover all forms of cultural expression and actions; (2) their efforts to work out the logic of understanding as an activity unique to the cultural sciences; and (3) their attempts to ground the possibility of understanding in some theory of the structure of human nature and its expressions (Dilthey) or of types of social action (Weber).

The hermeneutical theories of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Weber deeply influenced the work of Joachim Wach, a German sociologist of religion who immigrated

to the United States in 1935. Wach wanted to establish the interpretation of religion as an objective descriptive discipline free of the normative claims of Christian theology. For him as for Dilthey, the proper starting point for such a discipline was the establishment of the necessary conditions for understanding (*Verstehen*). Wach, like Schleiermacher, believed that *Verstehen* generally requires a type of empathy, but that in religion it specifically presupposes a basic "sense for religion" that Wach then explicated in terms of Schleiermacher's notion of an inherent religious propensity in human nature. Wach argued that religions are the expressions of this sense for religion. The challenge of religious studies, then, is to develop a logic of the forms of religious expression, a theory of religious symbolism and language. Wach himself concentrated on arranging and classifying the forms of religious expressions—for example, the theoretical, practical, and sociological, which he then further subdivided and explored.

The attempt to construct a universal hermeneutics for the cultural sciences inevitably leads the theorist to propound some theory of human nature and its expressions. Having uncovered the radically different forms of consciousness and belief exemplified in history, for example, Dilthey then thought it important to develop a psychology that would account for this diversity of worldviews while affirming the "unity of human nature" that made it possible for an interpreter in one culture to understand a person in a strange and different culture. But, it may be asked, how can the appeal to some abstract principle such as the "unity of human nature" aid an interpreter who is actually confronted with cultural expressions so different and strange that a sympathetic act of understanding seems impossible? Dilthey never solved this problem.

**Psychological Theories.** The degree to which one's hermeneutics is a function of one's view of human nature is most dramatically illustrated by modern psychological theories such as those of Freud and Jung. Here human expression and behavior are explained and understood in terms of unconscious psychical forces. As Paul Ricoeur has shown, Freud's theory of the unconscious led him not only to broaden the theory of human expressions so as to include dreams and slips of the tongue as "texts" but also to propose a hermeneutics in which art and religion were also seen as containing unconscious meaning. According to Freud, for example, religion is best understood as the expression of unconscious wishes rooted in infantile helplessness and molded by the "family romance" in which Oedipal sexual wishes play an important role. Consequently, religion is regarded as a collective neurosis and evaluated negatively. Thus not only does Freud's hermeneutics re-

ject "authorial intent" as a superficial category, but it proposes a different meaning for the classical hermeneutical dictum that the interpreter can better understand an author than the author understands himself. For Schleiermacher and Dilthey, this dictum meant that the interpreter better understands the cultural and linguistic context that conditions the author, and of which the author is unaware. For Freud, this dictum means that the interpreter has the theoretical key to unlock the unconscious meanings of which no past author could possibly be aware. The interpreter understands more scientifically the unconscious drives, instincts, and mechanisms of repression that determine a given form of expression. Texts are semiotic codes for which the scientific interpreter alone holds the key.

### Hermeneutics as Reflection on the Conditions of All Understanding

Given the way in which reflection on understanding necessarily drives one to consider basic epistemological and anthropological issues, it should not be surprising that the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) has been so influential in our own time. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger, although profoundly influenced by Dilthey, argues that Dilthey was finally unable to overcome the subjectivistic tendencies of Western thought since Descartes—tendencies that have led to a peculiar dilemma in epistemology, and to a seductive preoccupation with the cognitive ideals of the natural sciences and technology. Crucial to Heidegger's analysis is the argument that human beings already find themselves in a world made intelligible to them by virtue of what he called "the forestructure" of understanding, that is, the assumptions, expectations, and categories that we pre-reflectively project on experience and that constitute the "horizon" of any particular act of understanding. An analysis of our "everydayness" reveals that what we regard as problematic as well as intelligible becomes so only against the backdrop of the tacit, prereflective understanding we already possess. In all explanation one discovers, as it were, an understanding that one cannot understand; which is to say, every interpretation is already shaped by a set of assumptions and presuppositions about the whole of experience. Heidegger calls this the hermeneutical situation. He means that human existence itself has a hermeneutical structure that underlies all our regional interpretations, even those in the natural sciences. Our prereflective understandings are modified and corrected as they become more self-conscious in the encounter with texts, objects, and other interpretations.

Heidegger's thought has been influential in several directions, two of which are important for religious stud-

ies: the interpretation of religion and the conception of hermeneutics generally. Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), a German New Testament scholar and theologian, saw in Heidegger's analysis of human existence the conceptual basis for an exegesis of the New Testament whereby its basic religious insights could be extracted from the mythical thought-forms of the first century, in which it was originally expressed. To the complaint that this exegesis employed modern presuppositions, Bultmann replied that all exegesis is determined by certain philosophical presuppositions; the only question is whether these are correct. He believed Heidegger to be correct because Heidegger had discovered the inherent historicity of human existence, that is, how it is essentially constituted by acts of decision rooted in a self-understanding oriented toward the future. Moreover, Heidegger had shown that genuine historical understanding requires the encounter with past expressions of human self-understanding that can modify our own. In this sense, the act of historical understanding has an element that resembles the act of appropriation of a religious message. Although Bultmann was primarily interested in the implication of Heidegger's work for the interpretation of the New Testament understanding of faith, the same hermeneutical procedure could be employed on other religious phenomena, as Hans Jonas has done in his well-known work *The Gnostic Religion* (1958).

It is Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900), however, who in a major work, *Truth and Method* (1960), has done more than any other recent thinker to reconceive hermeneutics along Heideggerian lines. His theory also involves a criticism of previous conceptions of hermeneutics such as those of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. The difficulty with Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, apart from its limitation to the interpretation of texts, is that Schleiermacher (and Dilthey too) assumed that the historical and cultural distance of the interpreter from the phenomena being interpreted necessarily occasions misunderstanding. Gadamer argues, following Heidegger, that interpretation also assumes a context of intelligibility, and that the presuppositions and assumptions—one might say prejudices—of the interpreter are precisely what enable understanding as well as misunderstanding. Consequently, our own assumptions and beliefs are not necessarily barriers to understanding but preconditions of it. The quest for a presuppositionless understanding is futile. Every text or object is interpreted from some standpoint in a tradition that constitutes the horizon within which anything becomes intelligible. This horizon is continually modified as it encounters objects, but there is no final and objective interpretation.

Gadamer has been criticized by Emilio Betti for destroying any possibility of distinguishing between a subjective and a universally valid interpretation. Betti argues that texts and cultural expressions have meanings independent of the interpreter's opinions, and that the interpreter can provide no canon for distinguishing right from wrong interpretations. Gadamer replies that the task is not to provide norms and rules for interpretation but to analyze the inherent structure of understanding itself—an analysis that reveals interpretation to be as Gadamer describes it.

### Hermeneutics as an Analytic and Mediating Practice

There is a fourth way of thinking about hermeneutics that is less easily characterized than the others, because it involves no theory of hermeneutics. Those who think in this fashion are not interested in establishing rules for the interpretation of texts nor in providing foundations for the cultural sciences. Their aims appear to be more piecemeal: to analyze, to clarify, and if possible to resolve conceptual issues surrounding *explanation* and *interpretation* in the various contexts in which they are employed; to establish the logical connections between *meaning*, *truth*, and *validity*; to discover the various normative uses of language; to ascertain what is meant by *rationality* and *irrationality*, especially as it bears on the possibility of translation and the problem of relativism. No one of the various thinkers who think and work in this way may necessarily discuss all these problems systematically, yet the various proposed solutions often bear directly on those problems normally associated with classical hermeneutical theory. For example, some thinkers concerned with the philosophy of science, such as Mary Hesse, have argued that no sharp distinction can legitimately be drawn between explanation and interpretation, since explanations in the natural sciences are as interpretative as those in the cultural sciences. Or again, some philosophers have argued that, since there is no realm of the given to which theories can correspond, the attempt by philosophers since Kant to formulate epistemological theories is a mistake. There is no one right or wrong way to interpret anything, including texts, hence the quest for agreement is not a desideratum.

Generally, this type of thinking about hermeneutics owes much to the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), whose later works deal extensively with issues such as “What does it mean to understand?” and “How do we know that another person is in pain?” It was characteristic of Wittgenstein's approach that no simple summary of his views can be given, since he argued that the function of a philosopher is to analyze

carefully the concrete uses in specific contexts of words like *understanding*. He believed that it was a mistake to attempt to provide a general theory of understanding. The mind easily becomes bewitched by such general theories, and this bewitchment is itself the source of most philosophical difficulties and illusions. Instead, we should look at how such words are actually employed and embedded in concrete practices. A few students of religion have argued that this approach has important implications for the interpretation of religion. For example, it has been asserted that the hermeneutical theory of Joachim Wach has excessively constricted interpretation by superimposing a single model upon it.

Although Wittgenstein's philosophy is often said to be alien to Heidegger's, there are affinities at surprising points, not the least of which is the notion that explanation and interpretation make sense only within a horizon of presuppositions, practices, and assumptions that our culture mediates to us—our tradition, so to speak. Wittgenstein, like Heidegger, also saw the human situation itself to be hermeneutical. But unlike Heidegger, he did not think this fact justified the construction of an ontology. Rather, he felt it should be the occasion for the painstaking exploration of the concrete forms of discourse—“language games”—in which human beings engage. There can be only regional explorations of the grammar governing specific forms of expression. Presumably, then, the interpretation of religion ought to devote itself to carefully mapping and exploring those characteristics of the distinctively human form of life one calls religious: its structure, presuppositions, and forms of expression.

[For discussion of traditional disciplines of interpretation of particular sacred literatures, see Biblical Exegesis; Buddhist Literature, *article on Exegesis and Hermeneutics*; and Tafsir. For related discussions, see Anthropology, Ethnology, and Religion; Literature, *article on Literature and Religion*; Phenomenology of Religion; Structuralism; Study of Religion; and Women's Studies. See also the biographies of the various scholars and thinkers mentioned herein.]

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VAN A. HARVEY

**HERMES.** Offspring of the furtive passion of Zeus and the nymph Maia, the ingenious Hermes was born on Mount Cyllene in Arcadia. From the tenderest age he proved to be a skilled thief, a lookout, a nocturnal prowler, and a bringer of dreams (Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 13–15).

Born in the morning of the fourth day of the month, by noon he was playing the lyre—his first invention—and that evening he stole Apollo's herd of sacred cows. Once his theft and his tricks were discovered, he bowed to the will of Zeus and accompanied his brother to Pylos, where he had hidden the booty. There he imprisoned Apollo and the flock with branches from a tree that sprouted from the ground at his command and became strong bonds. Amused, he then produced impressive strains on his lyre. Apollo, charmed by his brother's songs and forgetting the nasty tricks he had suffered, proposed a trade: he would keep the lyre and Hermes the cows. Another time Hermes created the syrinx, and Apollo was not long in wanting that shrill instrument, too. Thus through a new exchange, Hermes obtained the caduceus, a magnificent and opulent wand that wards off misfortune and carries out divine intentions. In addition, Apollo granted Hermes a kind of prophetic power known to the Fates.

Hermes' thieving reveals the god's precocity and at the same time explains the change in the character of Apollo, who, having been a shepherd, was thus established as a god of prophecy and of music. In light of this, the theft becomes providential.

In fact, it was thanks to Hermes' thefts and tricks that gods and heroes came out of battle victorious. Helped by Hermes, Perseus killed the Gorgon, Herakles was victorious in Hades, and Zeus, by destroying the Titans, became master of the world. This may be why Hermes became Zeus's appointed herald. With the help of the caduceus, he carried out divine decrees and thus established justice and harmony throughout Zeus's kingdom.

Hermes' world is one of peace and frivolous delight. He likes neither deadly conflict nor the honors it procures. He values palaestra contests and matches in eloquence. As a shepherd, he loves high mountains and spacious pastures. From his breath arise fertility and fecundity of flocks. Hermes provides favorable opportu-

nities for commerce, for exchange, and for pillage. A night god, Hermes guides and protects travelers. It is he who silently pours sleep into the eyes of mortals. The lord of roads, Hermes leads souls to the land of the dead. He alone can accomplish this task because, like Hades, he is trickery and darkness.

Herald by day, herald by night, Hermes knows no frontiers. Like the lyre he created, his steps bring men gaiety, love, and gentle sleep.

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JEANNIE CARLIER and SÍLVIA MILANEZI

Translated from French by Alice Otis

**HERMES TRISMEGISTOS.** Identified with Hermes in the *Histories* of Herodotus (fifth century BCE), the Egyptian god Thoth was sometimes called *aa aa ur* (or *paa paa paa*). In the Egypt of the Ptolemies at the beginning of the second century BCE, this epithet was rendered approximately as *megistos kai megistos theos, megas Hermēs* ("greatest and greatest god, great Hermes") or, more succinctly, as *Hermes Trismegistos* ("thrice greatest Hermes"; Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 1, p. 1; vol. 2, p. 469).

Because this meaning soon became obscured, the title was reinterpreted in various ways. According to the eighth-century historian George Syncellus, who in part is confirmed by Augustine (354–430 CE), Manethon (third century BCE) supposedly taught that *trismegistos* is the surname of the second Hermes, son of Agathodemon (the hellenized name of the god Khnum or Kneph) and the father of Tat (another version of Thoth), who is said to have transcribed the teachings of Thoth, the first Hermes, and stored them in Egyptian sanctuaries (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 3, p. 163). These teachings, which had been engraved on tablets by the first

Hermes, his grandfather, before the Flood, were supposedly discovered and made available in Greek by Ptolemy II Philadelphus (308–246 BCE). Later, a tradition preserved especially by Hermias of Alexandria (fifth century CE) justifies the title *trismegistos* on the basis that Hermes, after three successive reincarnations in Egypt, had “remembered himself” and “recognized himself” (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 474–475), a factor that had to be connected to the Hermetic doctrine of rebirth (i.e., *palingenesia*; cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* 13 and Nag Hammadi codex 6.57–59). It must be noted that the title *trismegistos* is bestowed also by Osiris upon Agathodemon (*Fragmenta Hermetica* 32B).

Thus, that literature in Greek, translated supposedly from the Egyptian (*Corpus Hermeticum* 16.2), that claims to be the teachings of Thoth, the first Hermes, and of his disciples or descendants is called Hermetic. In addition to the names already cited, Hermes Trismegistos converses also with his master Poimandres-Nous (“intellect”; cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.11) and with his disciples Ammon and Asclepius (*Asclepius* 1), grandson of Asclepius-Imhouthes (*Asclepius* 37), himself the son of Ptah-Hephaistos (*Stobaei Hermetica* 23.6). In addition, Isis discusses with her son Horus a revelation from the first Hermes that was given to her by her grandfather Kamephis (*ibid.*, 23.33), probably distinct from Kneph-Agathodemon (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 3, p. 164).

**Inventory and Chronology of Hermetic Literature.** To Thoth, the inventor of writing, the ancient Egyptians attributed all sorts of books, especially magical writings, secret techniques employed in temple workshops (e.g., the gilding of statues or the dyeing of fabrics), and theological writings recopied or composed by the priests in the “house of life” (*pransh*; Nag Hammadi codex 6.61.20). Thus the Greek Hermetica that have come down to us can be divided into two categories: works of occult sciences and philosophical works.

1. Among the works of occult sciences, A.-J. Festugière (1942–1953, vol. 1, pp. 77, 240, 283) distinguishes three kinds: (1) astrology, beginning in the third or second century BCE, (2) alchemy, beginning in the second or first century BCE, and (3) magic, recorded in papyri of the fourth to seventh centuries CE that reproduce sources obviously much more ancient. The interested reader may turn to Festugière (*ibid.*) for a thorough exposition of this occult literature in all its abundance and great complexity.

2. The philosophical works were originally grouped as collections of the discourses of Hermes with his various disciples or of them among themselves. Of this undoubtedly very abundant literature, still preserved are only some fragments and the texts of a few discourses

that have come to us through subsequent intermediaries. These may be grouped into chronological order as follows:

1. *Fragmenta Hermetica* 1–36 (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 4): various fragments quoted in Greek, Latin, or Syriac by several authors, from Tertullian (second–third century CE) to Bar Hebraeus (1226–1286). To these fragments should be added the Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae 29456r and 29828r (Oellacher, 1951; Mahé, 1984), as well as an Armenian fragment (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, p. 346; parallel with John Malalas, in Scott, 1924–1936, vol. 4, p. 233) and several Syriac fragments (Brock, 1983, 1984, with some Greek parallels).
2. *Asclepius* 1–41 (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 2): a Latin adaptation of *Logos Teleios*, finished probably after 320 and before 410.
3. Nag Hammadi codex 6 (Mahé, 1978–1982): codex 6 of the Nag Hammadi collection (c. 340–370 CE), containing Coptic translations of three treatises:
  - (a) Nag Hammadi codex 6.6, preserved without title and currently called *The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth*;
  - (b) Nag Hammadi codex 6.7, *The Prayer That They Spoke*, parallel to *Asclepius* 41 and to the Papyrus Mimaut (Greek) of Paris;
  - (c) Nag Hammadi codex 6.8, without title, a fragment of *Logos Teleios* parallel to *Asclepius* 21–29 and to three Greek quotations cited by Lactantius around 320, Cyril of Alexandria around 435, and Joannes Stobaios around 500. The allusions of John Lydus (sixth century CE) to this same text can hardly be regarded as mere quotations.
4. *Stobaei Hermetica* 1–29 (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vols. 3–4): fragments or treatises quoted in Greek by Joannes Stobaios in his *Florilegium*, which he compiled around 500 for the education of his son.
5. *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius* (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2), translated from Greek into Armenian, probably in the second half of the sixth century CE. *Definitions* 10.7 repeats *Stobaei Hermetica* 19.1; *Definitions* 11 is an interpolation drawn from Nemesius (c. 390 CE).
6. *Corpus Hermeticum* 1–14 and 16–18 (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vols. 1–2): a compilation of Hermetic treatises done after Stobaios and before Michael Constantine Psellus (eleventh century CE). The connection of *Corpus Hermeticum* 18 to Hermetism is debated.

The Arabic Hermetic writings described by Louis Massignon (in Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 1, pp. 384–

400) are mostly original compositions without any direct ties to the Greek Hermetica.

Outside of *Asclepius*, the Middle Ages knew nothing of the philosophical works of Hermes except for some fragments mentioned by a very few Hellenists: *Corpus Hermeticum* 1–14 was translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino in 1463; *Corpus Hermeticum* 16–18 and a part of the *Stobaei Hermetica* were published shortly thereafter in the sixteenth century; Nag Hammadi codex 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 were discovered in 1945 but were not made available to scholars until 1970; *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius* was published for the first time in 1956 in Yerevan, U.S.S.R.

As for dating the composition of the various treatises, the *Logos Teleios* (*Asclepius*, Nag Hammadi codex 6.7, 6.8) is scarcely older than the third century CE. Most of the Greek texts seem to have been written in the second century BCE, yet they rest upon even older sources. Indeed, it is sometimes a case of works or compilations that we no longer possess such as the *Sayings of Agathodemon* (*Corpus Hermeticum* 10.25, 12.1, 12.8), the *General Discourses* (*Corpus Hermeticum* 10.1, 10.7, 13.1; *Stobaei Hermetica* 4a.1; *Stobaei Hermetica* 6.1; Nag Hammadi codex 6.63.2; *Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae* 29456r and 29828r), the *Diexodica* (*Fragmenta Hermetica* 30; *Asclepius* 1 corr.; Nag Hammadi codex 6.63.3 corr.). In addition, the cited *Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae*, copied at the end of the second century CE, inform us that at that time a collection of the *logoi* of Hermes to Tat, comprising at least ten treatises, had already been made. Going further, Strabo, on a visit to Egypt in 24–20 BCE, mentions some Hermetic literature that was not only astrological but also philosophical (Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 1, p. 78). Finally, since *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.31 contains precise allusions to Jewish liturgy, it probably precedes the expulsion of Jews from Egypt after the revolt of 115–117. Yet since *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius* 9.4 is the source of *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.18, it dates at the latest from the first century CE and could well go back even further (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, p. 278).

**Origins and Orientations of the Philosophica of Hermes.** Although the distinction between the Hermetic writings on the occult sciences and the philosophical works is easily supported by their differences in tone and content, the break is not total between the two genres. The prayer of *Asclepius* 41 (Nag Hammadi codex 6.7) also appears at the end of a magical formula for union with the sun (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 1, p. 141), and the magical papyri often contain invocations or myths comparable to those included in the philosophical writings (Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 1, pp. 296–308; compare with the prayers of *Corpus Hermeticum* 5, 13,

and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6, and with the myths of *Corpus Hermeticum* 1, *Asclepius*, and *Stobaei Hermetica* 23). Furthermore, the alchemical writings contain sentences also found in the philosophical writings (Mahé, 1978–1981, vol. 2, pp. 309–310). Finally, certain philosophical treatises contain magical words and symbols (Nag Hammadi codex 6.56.17f., 6.61.10f., 6.62.10f.), while *Stobaei Hermetica* 6 (to Tat, on the decans) is hardly distinguished from an astrological text except by its parenetic epilogue.

Composed in different periods by different authors, the Hermetic philosophical works do not present a consistent teaching. They can be divided according to two tendencies: the one, which is the greater part, is optimistic; the other inclines toward a rather pessimistic and gnostic dualism (such as *Corpus Hermeticum* 1, 4, 13; or some passages of *Asclepius*). Furthermore, the origin of this literature poses a complex problem. It cannot be conceded that the Greek texts are translations of ancient Egyptian writings. Indeed, nothing that is directly comparable has been preserved either in hieroglyphic or in demotic Egyptian. The documents that Eve A. E. Reymond calls “ancient Egyptian Hermetic writings” (Reymond, 1977) are simply secret writings that show no verbal parallels or perhaps even no lexical affinities with the Greek Hermetica (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, p. 478–481).

Moreover, the content of the Greek writings betrays a composite origin in which Egyptian inspiration combines with Hellenic and Jewish influences. Festugière has shown how the decline of Greek rationalism led to disguising traditional philosophical teachings as divine revelations attributed to sages of Egypt or the Orient. Thus, the philosophy of Trismegistos reflects the fundamental themes of Alexandrian Hellenism concerning anthropogony, the origin and final ends of the soul (Festugière, 1942–1953, vol. 3), and the opposition between the cosmic god (*ibid.*, vol. 2) and the unknown god of gnosis (*ibid.*, vol. 4). In addition, many specific arguments are borrowed from Greek philosophy. Thus, *Stobaei Hermetica* 1 illustrates a maxim of Protagoras (fifth century BCE), repeated by Plato (*Timaeus* 28c), that it is impossible to say anything about the divine essence. *Stobaei Hermetica* 2A interprets, with the help of the doctrine of the four elements, the Platonic dogma that nothing exists by itself on earth. *Stobaei Hermetica* 3.1 cites *Phaedrus* 245c and elaborates, along with *Stobaei Hermetica* 4–5, a physical theory of forces and movement, of a very Hellenic inspiration.

The influence of Judaism is equally certain. This is revealed by the use of a vocabulary that is characteristic of the Greek Bible. Thus, God is termed *kurios kai patēr* (“lord and father”) in *Corpus Hermeticum* 5.2 and

13.21, *Asclepius* 26, Nag Hammadi codex 6.73.24, and *Fragments Hermetica* 23. However, these Judaic influences are unequally distributed: they are very strong in some treatises, sporadic elsewhere, and nonexistent in some. Thus *Corpus Hermeticum* 1 (*Poimandres*) contains not only a cosmogony inspired by the *Book of Genesis* (likewise *Corpus Hermeticum* 3) but also an apocalyptic scheme comparable to that of the Slavonic *Apocalypse of Enoch* (2 *Enoch*). It also contains allusions to the Eighteen Blessings in the Jewish liturgy as well as to the recitation of the Shema' (*Dt.* 6:4–9). *Corpus Hermeticum* 13 and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6 are close to the same traditions. Comparison has also been made of the myth of the fall of souls in *Stobaei Hermetica* 23 (*Korē Kosmou*) to that of the fall of the angels in the Ethiopic *Apocalypse of Enoch* (1 *Enoch*), which may also have influenced *Asclepius* 25 (Nag Hammadi codex 6.73.1f.). All these indications point to the influence of the canonical books of the Bible as well as of the apocryphal writings that were current among certain heterodox Jewish circles; some of these may have had gnostic tendencies, judging from *Corpus Hermeticum* 1; others, perhaps Esene, if indeed a tie can be seen between *Stobaei Hermetica* 23 and 1 *Enoch*. In addition, the Papyri Vindobonenses Graecae, cited earlier, bear on the front the discourse of Hermes with Tat and, on the back, the *Book of Jannes and Jambres*, an apocryphal text or pseudepigraphon of the Old Testament.

The analogies between the teachings of Hermes and those of the Jewish exegete Philo Judaeus (d. 45–50 CE) could be explained by Alexandrian scholarly traditions rather than by reciprocal influence. Indeed, the orientations of the two authors are distinct. Philo could not endorse pantheism, immoderate esteem for astrology, theurgy, or the praise of statues and idolatry, all of which are often expressed in Hermetic writings (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 318–320). Apart from some allusions to divine mercy in *Corpus Hermeticum* 13.3, 13.8, 13.10 (cf. *Ad Titum* 3.5), a treatise highly influenced by Judaism, the God of Hermetism—"innocent" like that of Plato—sometimes sees to it that the guilty are punished, but, unlike the biblical God, hardly ever thinks to pardon them.

Underlining the importance of Hellenic and Jewish influences in the *Hermetica* does not amount to denying Egyptian inspiration. Contrary to the statement by Festugière (1942–1953, vol. 2, pp. 30f.), it is not Platonic dialogue that lies at the origin of the Hermetic *logos* but rather the collection of ancient Egyptian wisdom (*sbayt*) sayings (*mtrw*) that were formulated as the teachings of a "father" to his "son," since scribal and other intellectual functions were hereditary at that time. In the same way, the oldest Hermetic writings are some gnomolo-

gies such as *Stobaei Hermetica* 6 or *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius*. Subsequently, the sentences (which might be either connected to one another simply by conjunctions, or provided with commentaries, or illustrated by myths, or inserted into prayers) give rise to the Hermetic *logoi*. In these the disciple, generally called "my son," sometimes timidly interrupts the master whom he calls "my father." *The Wisdom of Any* (thirteenth century BCE) contained already the start of such a dialogue.

As in many Egyptian hymns, the Hermetic God is at once "One and All"; he (or some derivative entity) is also "his own father" and "his own mother." He artistically designs the body of man (*Corpus Hermeticum* 5.6–7) with the same care as that of Khnum in the texts of Esna (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 291–294). In *Stobaei Hermetica* 23.32 Isis receives from the primordial god Kamephis the gift of the "perfect black," (*to teleion melan*), namely Egypt (*Kah nkēmē*, "black earth"); in *Stobaei Hermetica* 23.42, the lions are termed "sleepless," an ancient Egyptian tradition (Nock and Festugière, 1945–1954, vol. 3, p. ccvi).

**New Writings Discovered at Nag Hammadi.** Along with Greek and Jewish influences, several passages of the writings discovered at Nag Hammadi bear the stamp of authentic Egyptian inspiration. Nag Hammadi codex 6.8 (parallel to *Asclepius* 21–29) opens with an evocation of the carnal union of man and woman presented, in accordance with Egyptian paganism, as a proper image of divinity. The refusal, expressed next by Trismegistos, to call "statues" the truly living gods fashioned by men calls to mind the belief in *ba*, the soul of idols. Then comes a prediction by Hermes to Asklepios: someday, under the pressure of foreign invaders, the Egyptians will cease to adore their gods, who will depart from them. Formerly the image of piety, the country, full of barbarians and emptied of its ancient inhabitants, will become the image of impiety. The soil of Egypt and the waters of the Nile will be impotent in the face of these misfortunes. Since Egypt is "the image of heaven" and "the temple of the universe," these human disorders will lead to a cosmic catastrophe: men will cease to adore the world and to respect the soul and will invert their values and ally themselves with the bad angels. Therefore the balance of elements will be upset, and evil will triumph until the Demiurge punishes the guilty and creates the world anew, as it was "the first time." Then returning from the desert of Libya, the gods of Egypt will enter the great "city by the sea," which lies at the head of Egypt on the side of the sunset.

Without excluding the specific influence of foreign, Jewish, and perhaps Iranian apocalypses, one might see

a similarity between this prediction and ancient Egyptian oracles: *Iouper* (twenty-second to eighteenth century BCE), Neferty (c. 2000 BCE), Demotic Chronicle (third century BCE) and, during the Hellenistic age, the Greek *Oracle of the Lamb* (under Ptolemy III, c. 246–221 BCE) and the *Oracle of the Potter* (c. 130 BCE). Contrary to Jewish traditions, Hermes here is not an ecstatic visionary. He speaks calmly under the influence of wisdom alone: His vibrant praise of Egypt calls to mind *Stobaei Hermetica* 24.11–15, where Egypt, “our most holy country,” is located at the heart of the earth; it is represented, after the image of the god Geb, as a man lying on his back facing the sky. References can be made as well to Nag Hammadi codex 2.122, where Egypt is referred to as an image of paradise. This Egyptian patriotism is countered by the defiance of Philo and other Jews, for whom Egypt is a symbol of idolatry, ignorance, or concupiscence of the flesh (Mahé, 1978–1982, vol. 2, pp. 85–88). The end of Nag Hammadi codex 6.8 is a description of Hades that was not included in *Asclepius*, meaning that the former was entirely unknown before the discovery of the codex. It is essentially an adaptation of Platonic myths in *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and the *Republic* about the journey and judgment of the soul, giving Hades an aerial location. This has some similarities to Jewish apocalyptic, while the Egyptian element is practically nonexistent. After being examined by the Great Demon seated between heaven and earth, the righteous soul goes to its proper resting place, while the evil soul is handed over to be tormented by strangler demons, who scourge it and cast it in the celestial sea where fire and ice mass together. Yet God is innocent of these torments.

In contrast with Nag Hammadi 6.8, Nag Hammadi 6.6 is a gnostic treatise very similar to *Corpus Hermeticum* 13, but with a more Egyptian setting. An anonymous disciple reminds Hermes of his promise to carry out his initiation by bearing his thought to the Ogdoad and then to the Ennead, that is, to the eighth and the ninth heavens (as in *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.24–26). In the course of a conversation on spiritual regeneration, the disciple learns to recognize his “brothers” and to pray to the “Father of the All.” Then the two conversants invoke “the invisible god whom one addresses in silence.” Chanting the seven vowels that correspond to the heavenly spheres, they reach the seventh, a symbol of piety according to the divine Law, and exchange a kiss. The power of light then descends upon them, and the first vision of the Ogdoad takes place, if not only for Hermes, at least in an incomplete manner for his disciple. The latter then directs a hymn to his father, during which takes place a second vision, more complete than the first, since the disciple sees the Ogdoad, the Ennead and

the One who creates in spirit. He salutes his father with the title *trismegistos*. Then he promises to maintain secrecy and utters a thanksgiving to God, the end of the All, who has allowed him to know Him and to see himself. Next he chants the seven vowels over again and concludes his prayer. Trismegistos orders him to write everything in hieroglyphics on a stela that is to be placed in the open court of the temple of Hermes in Diospolis beneath a specific constellation. The stela will be surrounded by eight guards—the males having the faces of frogs (like the self-generating divinities of the Ogdoad at Hermopolis) and the females having the faces of cats (a solar symbol)—as well as by the “nine of the sun.”

In the imprecatory formula of the conclusion, a celestial hierarchy emerges to guard over the writing: the Unbegotten, the Self-begetting, the Begotten, and the Seven Ousiarchs (i.e., the planetary gods penetrated by the demiurgic spirit). This hierarchy also appears in the report of Hippolytus (second to third century CE) on the Perates, in the *Mysteries of Egypt* by Iamblichus (c. 250–300), and in other writings from Nag Hammadi such as the *Gospel of the Egyptians* (Nag Hammadi codex 3.54). A comparison with the exegesis of *Genesis* 1–8 in *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.1–18 reveals a complex syncretism in which the Unbegotten, the Self-begotten, the Begotten, and the Seven Ousiarchs are identified, respectively, with the Creator, Adam, Seth, and the seven generations from Seth to Noah (cf. *Genesis* 5.1–29) on the one hand and with the heavenly spheres on the other hand. Thus, reaching the Ogdoad means not only escaping planetary Heimarmene and subjection to the Law but also recovering the likeness and the glorious condition of Seth, the first man who was begotten in the form and image of the Self-begotten (i.e., Adam), who in turn was made in the image of the Unbegotten Creator. Just as God beholds himself in the Self-begotten, according to *Eugnostos the Blessed* (Nag Hammadi codex 3.74–76), the disciple of Hermes is regenerated by the vision of himself, which makes him similar to the primordial man. This Jewish background of the Hermetic *palingenesia* strongly contrasts with the Egyptian setting of the dialogue.

*The Prayer That They Spoke* (Nag Hammadi codex 6.7), represented in codex 6 as the part following Nag Hammadi codex 6.6 yet preserved in other contexts in *Asclepius* 41 and in the *Papyrus Mimaut*, concludes with the formula “Once this prayer was said, they kissed one another and went to eat their food that was pure and without any blood.” One can question at this point whether any Hermetic brotherhoods existed, and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6 and 6.7 leave little doubt about it: indeed there were gnostics influenced by Judaism who invoked

Hermes Trismegistos. They formed communities like the one described in *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.27–31, in which fraternal meals were held, the kiss of peace was exchanged, and initiations were conducted into the mystery of regeneration as described in *Corpus Hermeticum* 13 and Nag Hammadi codex 6.6.

However, it should not be overlooked that philosophical Hermetism originated in scholarly traditions before the gnostics ever thought of laying claim to it, and that it continued to develop independently of these same gnostics. Thus, *Definitions of Hermes Trismegistos for Asclepius*, a collection of philosophical definitions, served as a source before 115 CE for *Corpus Hermeticum* 1, a gnostic treatise, and, in the third century, for the *Logos Teleios* with a very different orientation.

As a place of confrontation for the religious beliefs of ancient Egypt, for Greek philosophy, for Judaism, and for gnosis, the philosophical writings of Hermes do not stand for a single doctrine, and they are not the "bible" of any religion. Instead, they reflect the varied spiritual currents in Alexandria during the first three centuries of the common era. Their relative unity is due mainly to their literary genre, in which the ancient gnomic sources always remain recognizable even when the same sentence is commented upon differently in one treatise as compared to another. The poignant fervor and brilliant stylistic success make certain passages, especially prayers, outstanding testimonials to the spiritual concerns of late paganism.

[For further discussion, see Hermetism.]

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JEAN-PIERRE MAHÉ

Translated from French by Paul C. Duggan

**HERMETISM.** It is appropriate, especially as a consequence of the distinctions in vocabulary suggested by Frances A. Yates, to restrict use of the word *Hermetism* to designate in a precise manner the Alexandrian corpus—that is, the body of writings attributed to Hermes Trismegistos—and the various adaptations and commentaries that it has given rise to in modern times. The

word *hermeticism* would then serve to designate a much broader ensemble of doctrine, beliefs, and practices, not necessarily dependent on the Alexandrian or neo-Alexandrian Hermetic tradition, but including Christian interpretations of Qabbalah and, in a general way, most of the forms that cloak modern esotericism. Unfortunately, this distinction in vocabulary, while perfectly legitimate and very useful, is not translatable into every language; it is in German (*Hermetismus*, *Hermetizismus*) but not in French. This is why I have suggested the use of the word *hermésisme* in the sense of *hermeticism*, with the corresponding adjective *hermésien* to describe this attitude of mind in French.

The Hermetic tradition owes its existence to a collection of Greek texts written in Alexandria between the first and third centuries of our era and attributed to the mysterious figure known as Hermes Trismegistos, "Thrice-Greatest Hermes." [See Hermes Trismegistos.] These writings, named after their supposed author and known collectively as the Hermetica, had a strange destiny. In the Middle Ages only a few rare extracts were known, and yet their author, clouded by an aura of mystery, was the subject of great interest. Not until the dawn of the Renaissance did the texts themselves come to light. Their discovery gave rise to a prodigious amount of interest, which was to last until the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, they are mainly the object of erudite research.

The body of writings known as the Hermetica is not large. It consists primarily of the *Asclepius*, a text falsely attributed to Apuleius of Madaura and of which we have only a Latin version, and the *Corpus Hermeticum*, a collection of fifteen or seventeen Hermetic dialogues, the first of which, the *Poimandres*, is the most famous. *Poimandres* deals with the creation of the world, whereas other treatises of the series describe the soul's ascension through the celestial spheres and its divine sojourns, a process that brings about its regeneration.

Alexandrian Hermetism is one of the most important resources of modern esotericism. Both are characterized by an eclectic mentality, a philosophical attitude that favors the concrete and eschews ontological dualism, and by their common use of the scenario of fall and reintegration.

The eclectic state of mind accepts the possibility of quenching one's thirst in diverse streams—hence it tends sometimes to merge with the notion of a *philosophia perennis*—and consequently displays a great tolerance on the religious plane. Hermeticism promotes the most irenic tendencies among Roman Catholics and Protestants and embraces the ideal of universal concord, of a solidarity between man and the world. Her-

metic optimism extends to the affirmation of the possibility of union with the divine, through the inscription of the universe within the human soul or intelligence. This optimism is tempered, however, by the recognition of the negative consequences of the Fall for the present state of both man and nature.

Philosophically, the Hermetica reject absolute ontological dualism and stress the positive, symbolic value of the universe. This can be seen in the treatise in which Nous ("mind") addresses Hermes. Here Nous teaches Hermes how to reflect the universe in his own spirit, seizing the divine essence of nature and impressing it on the interior of his soul. This process is made possible by the fact that man possesses a divine intellect. Here we meet the theme of the world as mirror of the divine and object of contemplation. The idea that the universe is a text to be read or deciphered is the great common denominator of esotericism. One knows God through the contemplation of the world. And since the universe is a forest of symbols, it is natural to become interested in all that it contains. Hence the taste of the Hermetica for the particular, the *mirabilia*, to the detriment of the abstract and the general. Hermetic science is anything but disinterested. It reaches the general only by means of an enriching detour through the concrete and the particular. Here we find Paracelsus and German Romantic *Naturphilosophie* in embryo: a taste for the concrete, a philosophy of incarnation, and hence an obvious affinity with Christianity. According to one Hermetic axiom, "nothing is invisible, even among the incorporeal," since the reproduction of bodies is an "eternal operation" and embodiment is "a force in action." Thus, in these passages of the *Corpus*, the *Geistlichkeit*, or "spiritual corporality," of Boehme's and Oetinger's theosophy is prefigured. [See Theosophy.]

A third point of convergence between esotericism and Hermetism is the reference to a myth of fall and reintegration. The theme of the fall of man through the attraction of the sensual, a theme so common in Western theosophy, is found already in *Poimandres*, where it is apparent that the imprisonment of Adam in the sensual realm was due to eros. This mythic theme should not be read as antic cosmic. Rather it is an invitation to undertake the work of regeneration through reascent. This reascent is accomplished either by means of the intellect, which makes a connection with intermediary spiritual intelligences (such as angels), using them as a spiritual ladder, or by theurgical means, or by both at once. [See Theurgy.] The Hermetica thus permit us to better understand the theurgy of John Dee in the sixteenth century and Martínez Pasqualis in the eighteenth. The divine essence locked within man must be regenerated along specific paths, including initiations of various

kinds. Thus, implicit in Alexandrian Hermetism is a belief in an astrological cosmos, which is the scene of an initiatory journey. By contrast, the astrology of modern times, especially since the seventeenth century, tends more and more to separate itself from initiatory processes and to become exclusively a form of divination.

Finally, in Alexandrian Hermetism we find the idea that, thanks to man, the earth itself is capable of improvement, of recovering its former glorious state and becoming truly "active." It is the idea of a prodigious fecundity that had already been promoted by a text of Paul (*Rom.* 8:19–22): man led nature to its fall; consequently man can help regenerate nature, if he will but regenerate himself. Here we have a possible basis for a metaphysically founded ecology!

**Early Antiquity and the Middle Ages.** The oldest references to the work of Hermes Trismegistos in the Christian tradition are found in the writings of two fathers of the church, Lactantius and Augustine. Lactantius (d. 340?) devoted several laudatory lines to him and considered him to be more ancient than Plato and Pythagoras. In two of the texts that he knew, the *Asclepius* and *Poimandres*, he detected a herald of Christ's coming. Augustine, in the *City of God* (8.13–26), condemned "Hermes the Egyptian, called Trismegistos" because of a passage in the *Asclepius*—which he cites at length—that discusses magical processes intended to animate the statues of gods by making spirits descend into them. In another passage (18.29), he confirms Lactantius's idea of the antiquity of Hermes Trismegistos, who, Augustine tells us, lived "a long time before the wise men and philosophers of Greece." Clement of Alexandria also mentions his name, attributing a great number of works to him (*Strōmateis* 6.4.35–38).

It seems that the *Asclepius* was the only one of the Hermetic texts known in the Middle Ages, though we do not have even a *testimonium* about it for the period from Augustine to the twelfth century. On the other hand, other alchemical and especially astrological texts in the same vein appeared, attributed to "the Thrice-Greatest" or simply to Hermes. One example is the *Liber Hermetis Trismegisti*, an anthology of astrological magic discovered and published by Gundel in 1936. It was not written before the fifth century, but the elements that compose it are drawn from earlier works. Several other pseudo-Hermetic texts in the genre of the *Liber Hermetis Trismegisti* existed during the Middle Ages. A good number of them are translations from the Arabic into Latin, for Hermetism returned to the West through the Arabs, who were strongly influenced by Hermetic and gnostic literature, especially at Harran. The famous *Picatrix* is one such text. Undoubtedly written in the twelfth century, it was cited during the Re-



naissance by authors interested in the Hermetica. It contains, in particular, a famous passage in which Hermes is said to have been the first to make use of magical images and is presented as the founder of Adocentyn, a marvelous city in Egypt. Hermes Mercurius Triplex is presented here in his triple role as Egyptian priest, philosopher-magician, and king or legislator.

Another famous text is the fragment entitled *Tabula smaragdina*, or *The Emerald Tablet*, attributed to Hermes but certainly later than the Alexandrian Hermetica. It too was translated into Latin from the Arabic, for the first time, it seems, by Hugo Sanctelliensis, bishop of Tarazona (Spain), along with the *Liber de secretis naturae et occultis rerum causis quem transtulit Apollonius ex libris Hermes Trismegisti*. The text of *The Emerald Tablet*, the most famous and most popular piece of Hermetic literature, is still known today. This is the text that begins with the well-known words "All that is above is like all that is below, all that is below is like all that is above, in order that the miracle of unity should be fulfilled." Soon after it was translated, a certain Hortulanus provided it with a commentary, which was to be frequently republished.

Among the Hermetic texts that appear in the twelfth century, we may also cite the *Liber de causis*, which contains a passage devoted to the "secrets of creation," attributed to Apollonius of Tyana. This passage, which deals with the creation of man, is presented as a revelation of Hermes. As the *Liber* describes it, the revelation comes "from the moon," where Apollonius appears as the spokesman of Hermes. Also noteworthy are the *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, a short text in which the image of God as a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere appears for the first time, and the *Liber compositione alchemiae quem edidit Morienus Romanus*, long considered to have been translated from Arabic into Latin by Robert of Chester in 1144, but probably of a later period. The latter book, which is the first text of medieval alchemy known to us, presents Hermes as the inventor of the arts and the sciences. From this time on, the name of Hermes will be associated with alchemy as well as with Hermetism proper. Finally, the twelfth-century pseudo-Hermetic *Liber Hermetis Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum principiis* belongs in the same context. Hugh of Saint-Victor was influenced both by it and by the *Asclepius*.

The reputation of Trismegistos extends in fact beyond the limits of the esoteric tradition, which in the Middle Ages was still often difficult to distinguish from theological thought. During this period we find assorted references to Hermes and to Hermetic texts. Several authors refer to the *Asclepius*. Theodoric of Chartres and Alber-

tus Magnus cite it, as does Bernardus Silvestris in his *De mundi universitate*. Alain de Lille gives extracts from it in his *Contra haereticos*. Vincent of Beauvais speaks of it on two occasions, and it is mentioned by William of Auvergne. In the fourteenth century, Thomas Bradwardine mentioned it in his *De causa Dei* and Roger Bacon referred to Hermes Mercurius as the "father of philosophers." On the eve of the Renaissance, it is still hard to distinguish between the Hermes of alchemy and the Hermes of the Hermetica, which is not surprising since they represent almost identical attitudes of mind. In the fifteenth century, the alchemist Bernard of Trévisé identified Hermes as the restorer of alchemy in his *Liber de secretissimo philosophorum opere chemico*. These references must be understood against the background of a belief in a *prisca philosophia* or *prisca magia*, a primordial philosophy or magic that was already widespread during the Middle Ages. It was thought that Plato and his predecessors Orpheus and Pythagoras had visited Egypt in order to learn the oral and written philosophy of Moses and to study the secrets of an Egyptian wisdom that predated even Moses. Zarathushtra (Zoroaster) was believed to represent the Chaldean aspect of this primordial tradition, while Hermes represented the properly Egyptian aspect. Both were believed to precede Plato. Such a belief in a *prisca philosophia* or *prisca theologia* indicates a desire to avoid a hiatus in tradition and to preserve the continuity of history. At the beginning of the Renaissance, this belief in an ancient religion common to humanity seemed to be confirmed by Marsilio Ficino's translation of the *Corpus Hermeticum* into Latin. It was a belief favorable to the irenic tendencies typical of Renaissance thought, since it presupposed a fundamental divinity in man that went beyond exterior religious forms.

**The Rediscovery of Hermes Trismegistos in the Renaissance.** Around 1460 an event occurred that assured the sudden, unprecedented influence of the Hermetica. A monk, Leonardo da Pistoria, brought to Florence a Greek manuscript containing the fifteen treatises that constituted what would later be called the *Corpus Hermeticum*. These treatises had undoubtedly already been brought together in the eleventh century, since it was in this form that Psellus knew them. Leonardo, who had found the document in Macedonia, thereupon presented it to Cosimo de' Medici, the ruler of Florence and a great patron of letters. At the end of 1462 or the beginning of 1463, Cosimo gave the manuscript to Marsilio Ficino to be translated into Latin. At this time Ficino was about thirty years old and had a successful career as a philosopher behind him. Although he had already agreed to translate the collected works of Plato, who was considered a religious author throughout the Re-

naissance, Cosimo asked him to begin with Trismegistos. By April 1463 the translation was complete. It appeared in 1471 and went through no fewer than sixteen editions before the end of the sixteenth century, not counting partial editions. That these texts were translated prior to those of Plato in the projected program of translations is a testimony to the interest they aroused and to the importance attributed to them even before they could be read. Their prestige was due, no doubt, to the veneration and admiration paid to their supposed author, Trismegistos, who was thought to have lived long before Plato.

Pico della Mirandola, younger than Ficino, more or less his disciple, and living in the same Florentine milieu, added to the *magia naturalis* of the Renaissance a "practical" or theurgical Qabbalah. Most important, having discovered Alexandrian Hermetism through Ficino, he was the first to join Hermetism to the Qabbalah, uniting both around the common theme of the knowledge of creation through the Word. This marriage of the Qabbalah and Hermetism had consequences that would be important for the evolution of Western esotericism. Pico thus initiated what Frances A. Yates has called the hermetico-qabbalistic tradition, a tradition that was to have a double character. On the one hand, it was theosophical, that is to say, speculative and Pythagorean; on the other hand, it included magical elements and was thus more theurgical than the works of Ficino. Pico presented his views in his famous nine hundred theses, or *Conclusiones*, defended at Rome in 1486, and in his *Defense* or *Apology* published in 1487, at the same time as his *Discourse on the Dignity of Man*. The *Discourse*, which expresses the spirit of the Renaissance, is the period's fundamental theoretical text on magic, a text of both a spiritual and practical gnosis introduced by Ficino and finished by Pico.

Pico's influence, to be sure, was not solely philosophical. Were not the true operative magi of the Renaissance the artists, as Yates suggests? Were they not Donatello and Michelangelo, who knew how to breathe divine life into their statues, after the manner of the *Asclepius*, by means of their art? Magic as Pico conceived it was, in the final analysis, that taught by the *Asclepius*, a text to which he explicitly refers. It was a knowledgeable or erudite magic, different from the often crude magic of the Middle Ages, as exemplified by the *Clavis Salomonis*. Pico's magic emphasized instead the philosophical aspects of a text like the *Picatrix* and indirectly prepared the way for the great Germanic theosophy that blossomed at the end of the Renaissance. In it, man is no longer merely the privileged spectator of the universe; he is not only a microcosm that reflects the entire macrocosm in himself; he is, as

the *Asclepius* had already suggested, divine, or in any case he is in a position to exercise a demiurgic creative power. Man's dignity, his greatness, is now strongly emphasized. Did one not speak of the "divine" Raphael, the "divine" Leonardo, the "divine" Michelangelo? To this theme of the divinity in man, Pico, and with him all later Western esotericists, added the ancient injunction "Know thyself," which was now given a new, gnostic significance in the wake of the rediscovery of the *Corpus Hermeticum*.

The age of the Renaissance witnessed also the emergence of an explicitly Hermetic art. It can be seen in Botticelli's *Primavera*, which, painted in 1478, only seven years after the publication of the *Corpus Hermeticum* in Latin, is a veritable magical talisman, a "figure of the world." In 1488, an unknown artist inlaid a beautiful work in the floor tiles of the cathedral of Siena, a representation still visible today. It depicts Hermes Trismegistos as a bearded old man attired in a robe and cape and wearing a padded miter. He is surrounded by various other personages, and the whole is accompanied by a very typical inscription: "Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus Contemporeanus Moysii." A little later, Pope Alexander VI, Pico's patron, commissioned a large fresco abounding with Hermetic symbols and zodiacal signs to be painted by Pinturicchio in the Borgia apartment in the Vatican; there we see Hermes Trismegistos in the company of Isis and Moses.

Several other authors contemporary with Ficino and Pico referred to the newly rediscovered *Corpus Hermeticum*, and the *Asclepius* continued to draw the attention of some, such as Antonio Agli, the bishop of Fiesole, in his *De immortalitate animae* (1475). But soon new editions with enthusiastic and erudite commentaries appeared. The earliest was the work of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, who, in 1494, published the first fifteen dialogues under the title of *Poimandres*, using Ficino's text and following it with a brief personal commentary. In 1505, he published the text again, this time commenting on it chapter by chapter and including the *Asclepius*, which, he claimed, had condemned operative magic. In addition, Lefèvre added a previously unpublished text entitled *Crater Hermetis* (The Basin of Hermes).

The author of the *Crater Hermetis* was a certain Ludovico Lazarelli, who exhibited an extreme fondness for Trismegistos. His book shows the influence of book 4 of the *Corpus*, which discusses the manner in which the master transmits regenerative experience to his disciple. In Lazarelli, as in Pico, variations on the maxim "Know thyself" appeared. Hermetism was to make a major contribution to the development of this theme of Christian Socratism, especially in the seventeenth cen-

ture. In 1507, Lazarelli translated the newly discovered book 16 of the *Corpus*, which had been unknown to Ficino. Lazarelli also seems to have been the author of the *Epistola Enoch*, a text focused on the picturesque figure of Mercurio da Correggio, a sort of "Hermes' fool" who brought the Thrice-Greatest to the public eye. On Palm Sunday of 1484 he appeared in Rome in bizarre dress and in like company. On the banks of the Manara he put on winged shoes and a crown of thorns topped with a crescent moon bearing the inscription: "This is my son Poimandres, whom I have chosen." He mounted a white ass and made a speech in which he called himself the "angel of Wisdom, Poimandres, in the most sublime manifestation of the Lord Jesus Christ" and claimed to have descended from heaven. Then, making his way to the Vatican, he deposited diverse objects on the throne of Saint Peter. In 1496 he turned up again in Florence and then in Lyons, exhibiting himself always in the same way. Eventually he converted Lazarelli to Hermetism. Mercurio is of interest to the historian since, being illiterate, he provides evidence for the vogue of Hermetism among the common people. Interestingly, his exploits took place prior to the inscription on the tiles of the cathedral of Siena.

Also at this time, Symphorien Champier, an admirer of Ficino and disciple of Lefèvre d'Étaples, published his own collection of texts at Lyons (1507), reproducing most of the commentaries of his master and adding his own to them. He also added the Latin translation of book 16 just completed by Lazarelli and did not hesitate to derive all of Greek philosophy from Hermes. He considered the famous passage from the *Asclepius* on magic and animated statues to be an interpolation by Apuleius, and thus not to be attributed to Hermes. This tendency to downplay the magical aspects of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, and of the *Asclepius* in particular, in favor of a more noble, essentially philosophical interpretation, is typical of French Hermetism. It can be seen in Pontus de Tyard, bishop of Chalons (*Deux discours*, 1578), among others.

In England, the beginning of the sixteenth century witnessed the adaptation of Catholic theology and philosophy to Neoplatonism and the *prisca theologia*, notably in the work of John Colet, Thomas More, and their intellectual circle. Colet was a disciple of Ficino and had also been influenced by Dionysius the Areopagite. More's *Utopia* (1516) shows the influence of Hermetism, if only in the irenicism that is so central to it. Before the crises arising from confessional conflicts, More was able to propose religious Hermetism as a possible palliative for the century.

Let us follow the thread of chronology. The *De harmonia mundi* (1525) of Francisco Giorgi Venetus, one of

the most beautiful books of Christian esotericism of the Renaissance, bears the stamp of Hermetism and strives to reconcile the *Corpus Hermeticum* with the teachings of Christianity. The most famous book of occult philosophy of the age, the *De occulta philosophia* (1533) of Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, cites Hermes Trismegistos many times, and the same author, in his speech given at Pavia (*Oratio habita Papiæ*), took for his subject "the dialogues on the wisdom and the divine power of Hermes." Like Lazarelli in his *Epistola Enoch*, Agrippa identified Hermes as a grandson of Abraham and attributed all kinds of inventions to him. Valentine Weigel, the father of Germanic theosophy, of which Jakob Boehme is the greatest exponent, cites the name of Hermes Trismegistos more than that of any other author before the sixteenth century, and thus more than that of Dionysius the Areopagite, Plato, or Augustine. Like Agrippa, however, Weigel invoked this prestigious name more often than he utilized the Hermetic texts themselves. Traces of Hermetic influence can also be seen in Copernicus, for he cites Hermes in reference to the sun considered as the visible God.

Between 1553 and 1556 the *Fragments of Stobaeus* appeared and were subsequently incorporated into the *Corpus Hermeticum*. They were partially edited by Trincavelli at Venice but were completed only in 1575, by Canter. Lazarelli's *Crater Hermetis* was published in French in 1549 and dedicated to the duke of Lorraine; this text reproduced the *argumentum* of Ficino and the commentaries of Lefèvre d'Étaples, though without mentioning their names. Finally, in 1553, Michael Servetus, a Catholic and disciple of Champier, who had undoubtedly introduced him to the works of Plato and the *prisca theologia*, wrote his *Christianismi restitutio*. Servetus claimed the ancients as his authorities, especially Hermes and the Platonic fathers. He believed that Plato owed his conception of the world of ideas and archetypes to Hermes. In Servetus there is a curious materialistic interpretation of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, a sort of inverse Platonic emanationism, since for him matter and the body are the source of all being.

**The Golden Age of Religious Hermeticism.** The succeeding years saw the publication of important new editions of the *Corpus*, with more or less plentiful commentaries. In 1554, through the efforts of Turnebus, the first edition of the Greek text of the *Corpus* appeared in Paris, based on the manuscript used by Ficino and accompanied by the latter's Latin translation, as well as by Lazarelli's translation of the additional treatise. A preface by Vergerius emphasized the resemblances of Hermetism to Christianity. Three years later, Lefèvre d'Étaples's collection was translated into French by Gabriel du Preau, accompanied by the *Crater Hermetis* of

Lazarelli. Even more important than Turnebus's work was the new Greco-Latin edition of the *Corpus* (1574) by the bishop François de Foix de Candale, which was followed by a French edition in 1579, to which his own commentary had been added. Foix de Candale professed a kind of ecstatic religious Hermetism and seems to have put the *Corpus Hermeticum* on the same plane as the canonical writings of Christianity. His long commentary in French continues the apologetic tradition of Ficino, Lazarelli, and Lefèvre d'Étaples. This was also the age of the vague yet recognizable Hermetism that one finds in the *De aetatibus mundi imagines* (1545–1573) and *Da pintura antigua* (1548) of the Portuguese writer Francisco de Holanda. The intellectual context of these works is that of the Escorial, marked in the study of art and philosophy by a Hermetism nourished by speculations on the proportions and numbers thought to be hidden in the marvels of mythic and sacred architecture.

The end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth were the golden age of religious Hermetism (Dagens, 1961, pp. 5–15). In addition to the editors and commentators, many others came under the influence of Trismegistos. Jacques Gohory (d. 1576), also known as Leo Suavius, directed a kind of medico-magical academy at Paris. Between 1570 and 1580 the De la Boderie brothers published their translations of Ficino, Pico, and Giorgi. It was also at this time that Ficino's *Opera omnia* appeared (1576), followed six years later at Anvers by Philippe Duplessis-Mornay's famous book *De la vérité de la religion chrétienne*, written at a time when William of Orange was trying to establish religious tolerance at Anvers. Duplessis-Mornay, a Protestant, employed Hermetism in fashioning a religious position that stood above all religious conflicts, a position close to that of Erasmus but with an added esoteric dimension. He compared the *Corpus Hermeticum* with the *Zohar* and made mention of Orpheus, Zarathushtra, and the sibyls, but especially of Hermes, "the source of them all." As is common among the French, his Hermetism is mystical and theological. His book, translated into English by Sidney and Arthur Golding in 1587, is perhaps the most complete exposition of Hermetism in the tradition of Ficino. The work of another Frenchman, Du Bartas, is comparable to that of Duplessis-Mornay in this regard, although the Hermetism of the former is more sober.

The end of the sixteenth century also saw the appearance of the works of Hannibal Rossel and Francesco Patrizi, in addition to diverse writings by Giordano Bruno. *Pymander Mercurii Trismegisti*, written by the Italian Franciscan Rossel, appeared at Cracow in six volumes between 1585 and 1590 and was reissued in

Cologne in 1630. It contained the text of Foix de Candale, as well as commentaries borrowed from Dionysius the Areopagite. Rossel's work consists of an enormous commentary on the *Poimandres* that makes an irenic use of Hermetism—hardly surprising in a time when active religious tolerance was being practiced in Poland. Patrizi's *Nova de universis philosophia* (1591) was dedicated to Gregory XIV. It consisted of the text of the *Corpus*, as established by Turnebus and Foix de Candale, and a new Latin translation. Patrizi portrayed the true magus as one who is devoted to God, and true *prisca magia* as the true religion. He claimed that a single treatise from the *Corpus* contained more philosophy than all of Aristotle and advocated the study of Plotinus, Proclus, and the early fathers, while discouraging the study of the Scholastics, whom he judged too Aristotelian. In the spirit of the Counter-Reformation, he took up the question of a new catechism and recommended the study of the *Corpus* to the Jesuits. He even went so far as to suggest to the pope that Hermetic Platonism be assigned in all Christian schools as an aid to converting the Lutherans. In 1592, Clement VIII, won over to some of his ideas, called him to Rome to teach Platonic philosophy at the university, but once there he incurred the displeasure of the Inquisition.

Giordano Bruno also recommended a "new" philosophy founded on Hermetism. Bruno's Hermetism, in contrast to that of Ficino and the French, represented a kind of aggressive return to Hermetic magic. It was scarcely Christian; he did not identify the *intellectus* and *Filius Dei* of the Hermetica with the second person of the Trinity. In 1591 he tried to win over Clement VIII in Rome, but as we know, his radical interpretations, unlike those of Patrizi, led him to the stake in 1600.

Religious Hermetism is above all gnostic and irenic. But in the 1590s, the Puritanism then flourishing in England brought about a weakening of the theological syncretism that had favored those tendencies. With Edward VI, the English Protestants had already begun to break with the past, going so far as to destroy books and libraries; under the reign of Mary a Hispano-Catholic intolerance further damaged the tradition. Puritan Anglicanism under Elizabeth had lost all trace of Erasmusian tolerance, and Hermetism suffered accordingly, at least in the official milieu of the church and the university. It continued to develop within private circles, however, such as those that formed around Sir Philip Sidney and Queen Elizabeth's astrologer, John Dee. In addition to Sidney and Dee, who were primarily enthusiasts of esotericism, we may also mention Richard Hooker, who often cited the *Corpus* in his work *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, which began to appear in 1593. Despite these references, however, Hooker does

not seem to have identified himself with the Hermetic tradition as such.

**Casaubon's "Revelation" and Seventeenth-Century Hermetism.** At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Hermetism and the *prisca theologia* suffered a terrible blow, one that served to separate the Renaissance from the modern world. In 1614, the Genevan Isaac Casaubon, seeking to refute the arguments of a spokesman for the Counter-Reformation who had cited Lactantius's passages on Trismegistos, discovered and demonstrated in a definitive manner that the texts of the *Corpus Hermeticum* did not predate the first centuries of our era. That this discovery should have come so late is surprising, since in the sixteenth century there was no lack of good humanists capable of making it. The fact that it was so long in coming is an additional testimony to the vogue of the *Corpus* and of Hermes Trismegistos during that period. At first certain authors deliberately ignored the discovery; others, at least for a few years afterward, simply did not know about it. Nevertheless, Alexandrian Hermetism, now known to be much less ancient than previously believed, began to find ever fewer followers.

Sir Walter Raleigh devoted a whole section of his *History of the World* to Hermes, but he was writing while imprisoned in the Tower of London when Casaubon's book appeared. Tommaso Campanella's ignorance was also involuntary. On the other hand, it is surprising that Marin Mersenne, who, with Johannes Kepler, founded modern science and who was never slow to recognize a new argument against the followers of the *philosophia occulta*, still did not know Casaubon when he wrote his *Quaestiones in Genesim* in 1623—the more so since this was a huge work directed against the hermeticists and the qabbalists. Nevertheless, he made use of this argument a little later. Mersenne pointed his finger in particular at Robert Fludd, the most important theosophist of England, whose major work, *Utriusque cosmi historia*, had appeared six years earlier. Fludd responded with his *Sophiae cum Moria certamen* (1626) and *Summum bonum* (1629). Gaffarel supported him while Pierre Gassendi took Mersenne's part. Fludd was also involved in a controversy with Kepler, who nevertheless had cited the *Corpus* at length in his *De harmonice mundi* (1619).

Fludd himself did not seem to know about Casaubon's discovery, or at least pretended not to know about it. He gave as much weight to the *Corpus* as to *Genesis* or the *Gospel of John*. On almost every page of his works one can find a citation from Ficino's Latin translation. He evidently associated Hermetism with the Qabbala, in an original synthesis similar to Pico's, presented as an updated version of the occult philosophy of the Ren-

aissance. If Bruno and Campanella spoke little about the Qabbala, if their Hermetic cult remained more or less naturalistic, Fludd himself returned to origins—in other words, to Ficino and Pico—and reinterpreted them. After all, he was more trinitarian than Bruno, and unlike the latter, his Christianity was genuine. On the other hand, his interest in Rosicrucianism, which appeared in Germany at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is well known. It is undoubtedly possible to see the latter as a prolongation of the Hermetic spirit of the Renaissance, to which a new tendency toward secrecy had been added, rendering it subterranean and restricting to minority groups what had still, in the preceding century, been the domain of the dominant philosophers. [See Rosicrucians.]

It is not surprising to find allusions to the *Corpus* and to its supposed author in the Neoplatonists of Cambridge. They generally accepted Ficino's idea of an uninterrupted transmission of ancient wisdom from Moses to Hermes, passing through Zarathushtra, Pythagoras, Plato, and Orpheus. Ralph Cudworth's position on this point is interesting, for it anticipates what an esotericist of today might think of that tradition; indeed, Cudworth believed that the *Hermetica*, no matter how weak in details, could well have preserved certain authentic Egyptian teachings. Other English authors contemporary with Cudworth readily cite Trismegistos, although they can hardly be thought of as his followers. One detects here the influence of Casaubon. Robert Burton, in his *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), mentioned Hermes no fewer than thirty times, along with Ficino, Pico, Paracelsus, and Campanella. One has the impression, however, that all these names are merely a show of erudition in the context of an enlarged humanism. The same reserved attitude is found in Sir Thomas Browne, a skeptical scholar as well as contemplator of the infinite. He often evoked the famous Hermetic image of the sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere, but he has obviously borrowed it from the *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum* and not from the *Corpus Hermeticum*. Browne himself was not convinced that the ancient wisdom was superior to the modern. It was merely in his capacity as a collector of information and propagandist that he cited Trismegistos, as likely to find what he needed there as elsewhere: "The severe schools shall never laugh me out of the Philosophy of Hermes, that this visible world is but a Picture of the invisible" (*Works*, ed. Keynes, 1928–1931, vol. 1, p. 17). Indeed, "where I cannot satisfy my reason, I love to humour my fancy." One finds similar references in the works of William Gilbert (*De magnete*, 1600), Henry Reynolds (*Mythomystes*, 1632), and Milton, who cites Hermes Trismegistos three times (in *Il Penseroso*, lines

87ff.; *Ad Joannem Rousum*, line 77; and *De idea Platonica*, lines 33ff.). An English version of the *Corpus* was provided by John Everard in 1650 and 1657, many times reedited afterward.

In France, Ficino's doctrines, still alive at the Palace Academy and in Queen Margot's circle, provided the occasion for several references to the Hermetic tradition, but these became less frequent after the scandal of Casaubon. "Hermes" and "Hermetism" developed into a notion that came more and more to refer to alchemy or theosophy—and eventually became hermeticism, or esotericism, in the modern sense of the term. This is the case in d'Espagnet's *La philosophie naturelle rétablie en sa pureté, avec le traité de l'ouvrage secret d'Hermès* (1651). But in 1659 Jean Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin could still devote four hundred pages of his lovely folio volume *Les délices de l'esprit* to the *Book of Revelation* and *Genesis* under the sign of Pico, through whom Hermes is evoked. Finally, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet himself did not neglect the Hermetic themes that he found in the church fathers (in particular, Gregory of Nyssa and Lactantius). In his *Sermon on Death* (1662), for instance, he utilized Cicero's *De natura deorum*, a text of Stoic origins that had been incorporated into Hermetic literature and that had influenced the *Corpus Hermeticum*. Here again the references to Hermetism served to guarantee or reinforce confidence in human powers.

The Jesuit Athanasius Kircher gave Hermes Trismegistos and the *Corpus* almost as much importance as had Fludd in his own writings. Kircher's *Oedipus Aegyptiacus* (1652)—one of the works first to stir the Egyptomania that swept Europe over the next three centuries—is full of citations borrowed from Ficino's text of the *Corpus*, and particularly from the *Asclepius*. Kircher readily associated Qabbalah and Hermetism, and, like Ficino, saw Hermes as the inventor of the hieroglyphs; following the example of Renaissance Hermetism, he interpreted these as truths about God and the world, inscribed on stone monuments, and especially on obelisks. This is basically the inverse and complementary process to that of interpreting the *Hermetica* as a collection of *icones symbolicae*, since Hermes was also supposed originally to have written in hieroglyphs. Most of the hieroglyphs that Kircher referred to were demystified when Jacques-Joseph Champollion deciphered them in 1824. This was the second blow, after Casaubon, delivered to the "Egyptian" myth.

**Aspects of Hermetism in Germany.** Translations of the *Corpus* into Dutch had been published in 1607 and 1643. The first translation into German seems to be the publication of extracts in *Occulta Philosophia* (1613). In

Germany, the anonymous *Hermes Trismegisti Vere Aureus* (1610) carried a vibrant dedication to Trismegistos and was presented as a dialogue between Hermes and a disciple—a little like the *Corpus*, although the Alexandrian reference served more as a pretext than as a motif. In general, the Germans had little part in the golden age of European Hermetism, which lasted from Ficino to Kircher. Agrippa had written before the Reformation, and Kircher had composed his main works in Rome. During this period humanism made only slight progress in Germanic lands, hampered by the barrier that Lutheranism had erected against it. Alexandrian Hermetism, by its very nature and as a legacy of ancient Greek literature and thought, remained a subject of study for the humanists, even after it had been translated into Latin by an Italian. As a consequence, the authors of almost all the great commentaries on the *Corpus* were also French and Italian: Ficino, Lefèvre d'Étaples, Foix de Candale, Patrizi, Rossel. The Christian Qabbala, which was almost contemporary with Hermetism and was sometimes confused with it, was also poorly represented in Germany, although better than the latter.

What is most remarkable is that Germanic esotericism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was essentially "barbaric," in the sense that it did not owe much to the ancient legacy and developed in a more or less autonomous fashion. We have seen that Hermes Trismegistos was the object of a particular veneration in Weigel and Agrippa, although they made little use of the *Hermetica*. Paracelsus, Boehme, J. G. Gichtel, and most of the representatives of early *Naturphilosophie*—in other words, the whole theosophical current that had chosen Germany as its protector—owed practically nothing to Hermetism. This remained so, despite many similarities of thought, publications of *Hermetica* (such as the *Poimandres* of Rossel in Cologne), and the occasional references of theosophists like Abraham von Frankenberg and Josephus Stellatus (also known as Joseph Hirsch) to Hermetic materials. These references remained rather general and alchemical. One may well wonder if the disappearance of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and its author after the discovery of Casaubon did not result, either as a consequence, reaction, or compensation, in the reinforcement of the belief in a tradition, all the more secret or primordial because one could no longer date it. The Rosicrucian vogue, which appeared at exactly the same time as Casaubon's revelation, can perhaps be partially explained by such a reaction, as the historian R. C. Zimmermann has suggested.

In the Germanic countries, Hermetism at the end of the seventeenth century and at the beginning of the

eighteenth appears to have been a manifestation of humanism, which appeared only with the beginning of the Enlightenment. One interesting presentation of Hermetism was a book by a certain Christian Kriegsmann, published in 1684 at Tübingen, *Conjectaneorum de germanicae gentis origine, ac Conditore, Herme Trismegiste, qui S. Moysi est Chanaan . . . Liber Unus*. In it the author endeavored to demonstrate by philosophical arguments that Hermes was the founder of the Germanic peoples. Ten years later, Johann Ludwig Hannemann cited Kriegsmann in his *Ovum hermetico-paracelsico-trismegistum*, a work devoted primarily to medical and occult chemical recipes, but which also contained a lively homage to Hermes, who is presented as having lived well before Christ—obviously Casaubon was not cited! A large place is also given to Hermes Trismegistos in the works of Johann Heinrich Ursinus (*De Zoastroe bactriano, Hermete Trismegisto* 1661) and Olaus Borrichius (*Hermetis Aegyptiorum*, 1674).

In 1706 the first complete German translation of the *Poimandres* appears in Hamburg, with commentaries by Aletophilus (W. von Metternich?), under the title *Erkenntnüss der Natur und des sich darin offenbarenden Gottes*. In the same period, the title of Ehregott Daniel Colberg's work *Das platonische hermetische Christentum* (1690–1692) was a vague reference to both spiritualists and theosophists, against whom the author took up arms, reserving only four pages of his book for Hermes himself. A little later, Gottfried Arnold made almost no mention of Hermetism in his voluminous history of sects and heresies, and Johann Heinrich Zedler's great dictionary, which appeared around 1730, gave only a very vague definition of it. Nevertheless, 1706 saw the publication of the first complete German translation of the *Corpus* at Hamburg, while Johann Albrecht Fabricius began to publish his monumental *Bibliotheca Graeca* (1705–1728), one of the first great surveys of Hellenism in Germany, in which Hermes was much discussed. Hermes also appeared in the *Theo-Philosophia theoretico-practica* (1711) by Samuel Richter (called Sincerus Renatus), one of the fundamental works of eighteenth-century German theosophy. Finally, Johann Jacob Brucker devoted an entire volume of his popular *Historia critica philosophiae* (vol. 14, 1743) to hermetism, in both its broad and narrow senses.

**New Perspectives.** During the remainder of the eighteenth century and all of the nineteenth, the Hermetism of Hermes Trismegistos was confused with Egyptomania, Orphism, and Pythagoreanism. The rather muddled imagery that resulted nevertheless proved favorable to literary and artistic inspiration. Quintus Aucler and Pierre Jacques Devismes were a part of the neopa-

gan current. Their work displays a taste for the cosmic harmonies that had so interested Giorgi Venetus and Fludd. In *Hermes Trismegisti Poemander* (Berlin, 1781), Dietrich Tiedemann had provided one of the very first scholarly editions, and under the same title, Gustav Parthey provided another version (Berlin, 1857), with commentary.

Nineteenth-century occultism made little use of Alexandrian Hermetism, but it helped to stimulate scholarly research into the subject of esotericism in the broad sense. As a result, the beginning of the twentieth century saw a proliferation of detailed works on Qabalah, alchemy, and Freemasonry. On the other hand, neo-Rosicrucianism and the Theosophical Society of H. P. Blavatsky were concerned with Hermetism: in 1871, Beverly Randolph's *Hermes . . . The Divine Pymander* appeared in Boston; in 1882, John David Chamber's *The Theological and Philosophical Works of Hermes Trismegistos, Christian Neoplatonist*; and in 1885, Anna Kingsford and E. Maitland's *The Hermetic Works: The Virgin of the World*, as well as new editions of Everard's translation. Louis-Nicolas Ménard had presented the *Corpus* in 1867, trying to be simultaneously academic and esoteric. A similar endeavor can be found in G. R. S. Mead's *Thrice Great Hermes: Studies in Hellenistic Theosophy and Gnosis* (1906).

But the genuine academic work began only with the appearance of Richard Reitzenstein's *Poimandres* (1904). Most important on this academic level are the four volumes edited by Walter Scott and John Ferguson at Oxford (*Hermetica*, 1924–1936). Shortly after, a remarkable translation of the *Corpus*, with notes and commentaries, was published by Arthur Darby Nock and A.-J. Festugière, followed by Festugière's enormous and learned survey *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*. Finally, numerous works have brought us up to date on the reception of Hermetism in the Renaissance and the seventeenth century, especially those of Brian P. Copenhaver, Eugenio Garin, Paul O. Kristeller, Wayne Shuhmaker, E. L. Tuveson, D. P. Walker, and Frances A. Yates, to cite only a few of the best.

Two streams thus go on running in parallel directions: the esoterically inspired and the objective, scholarly, and academic. Representative of the former in our century are the edition by the "Shrine of Wisdom" of *The Divine Pymander* (1923) as well as Duncan Greenless's *Gospel of Hermes* (1949) or Gerard Van Moorsel's *Mysteries of Hermes Trismegistus* (1955). But the academic works seem to be the most numerous. Thus having been an object of veneration, indeed, of particular devotion and then having been relegated to darkness, the Thrice-Greatest and his *Hermetica* have become, in

our own day, the subject of studies for linguists as well as historians of literature and philosophy.

[See also Esotericism.]

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ANTOINE FAIVRE

Translated from French by Kristine Anderson

**HERMITS.** See Erematism.

**HEROES.** A hero may be defined as a person who possesses powers superior to those of ordinary men and who displays them courageously, at the risk of his own life but to the advantage and benefit of others. His essential characteristic is best expressed by the Latin term *virtus*, which embraces both valor and nobility. He is the opposite of an ogre.

In ancient times, the hero was believed to perform his extraordinary deeds by virtue of the fact that one of his parents has been a god or goddess, or that he had been infused in infancy with a special divine grace. He occupied a position intermediate between gods and mortals. [See Virgin Birth.]

Thus, the mother of the Babylonian hero Gilgamesh was the goddess Ninsuna; Herakles sprang from the union of Zeus and the maiden Alkmene; Perseus from that of Zeus and Danaë; Aeneas from the mating of Venus and Anchises; Romulus and Remus from the rape by Mars of Rhea Silvia; and, in the Indic epic the *Mahābhārata*, the hero Karna is the offspring of the Sun and a mortal bride.

In Greek myth, Demophon had grace "poured" on him at birth by the goddess Demeter; Achilles by his immortal mother Thetis; and Odysseus's son Telemachos by Athena. Aeneas was similarly annealed by Venus.

Ancient heroes were generally ancestral and often primeval. Recognized as such and celebrated not only in traditional legend but also in religious ceremonies were the "founding fathers" of families, clans, cities, and states, whose protective genii they were deemed to be. These heroes might be genuine historical persons or purely fictitious figures who epitomized (rather like the American Uncle Sam) the corporate identity of a people or group, and were named for it. Such eponymous heroes include Arkos, putative founder of the city of Argos; Doros, prime ancestor of the Dorians; and the biblical Edom (i.e., Esau, twin brother of Jacob/Israel), ancestor of the Edomites.

Heroes filled several roles in the cultural and religious life of an ancient community or family. They provided a symbolic focus, like national saints in Christian countries, for communal cohesion. They fought for and protected the community in battle. Appeal could be made to them in ritual ceremonies to promote fertility and increase. They served as models of conduct.

Ancient gods who have been superseded and are no longer worshiped sometimes survive in popular lore as human heroes, or, in Christian legend, as saints. Helios, the Greek sun god, was transformed into Saint Elias, and a pair of Celtic "Dioscuri" (heavenly twins) into the warrior saints Amicus and Amelius. Conversely, human heroes whose historical identity has faded from memory are sometimes transmogrified into gods. In heroic epics, such as the Icelandic *Völsungasaga* or the Finnish *Kalevala*, it is, indeed, often a difficult matter to determine whether such central characters as Sigurd, Väinämöinen, or Ilmarinen are genuine historical persons or demoted gods, while Beowulf is thought by many scholars to be a fusion of both.

Not to be confused with this, however, is the process of apotheosis, whereby, in several cultures (e.g., among the Sumerians, Egyptians, and Hittites), certain royal heroes were said to have been elevated posthumously to the rank of gods. [See Apotheosis.] What is implied in such cases is not (as all too commonly supposed) that the deceased monarch then acquires divinity, but rather



that, being intrinsically divine in part, he at death relinquishes his mortality.

The popular biographies of heroes conform almost everywhere to a more or less standard pattern. F. R. S. Raglan (1936) has drawn up a list of traits and exploits common, in greater or lesser number, to such divine heroes as Moses, Alexander the Great, Arthur of Britain, El Cid, Charlemagne, and others. It is as follows.

1. Heroes are abandoned and exposed at birth. Some notable examples are the Assyrian monarch Sargon of Akkad, Moses, Oedipus, Perseus, Romulus and Remus, the Japanese Hiruko, and T'u-chüeh, the legendary father of the branch of Turkic peoples known to the Chinese as the T'u-chüeh. The exposed child is eventually retrieved from a river or hilltop by a kindly fisherman, shepherd, or peasant, or even nurtured by an animal. Alternatively, the hero's mother is a water nymph. In Indonesia, for instance, the heroic kings of San-for-t'i are known as "spawn of the naiad." This has been explained as reflecting a custom of testing the legitimacy of male children by throwing them into a stream, but it is also possible that it was intended to symbolize that the hero was imbued at birth with the qualities and potencies of the primordial substance, water.

2. The hero vanquishes a dragon or monster. Herakles subdues the Nemean lion and the Lernaean hydra; Theseus overcomes the Minotaur, Bellerophon, the Chimera; Beowulf slays Grendel; Tristram of Lyonesse and Saint George conquer dragons; David slays Goliath. Where the defeated adversary is a dragon, this probably reflects the widespread practice of staging an annual combat in which the personified power of swollen streams or (in coastal cities) of the intruding ocean is brought under control or in which, conversely, impounded waters are released to irrigate parched soil at the end of summer. [See Dragons.] Not infrequently—as in the case of Perseus and Saint George—a concomitant motif is the rescue of a princess threatened by the monster. The triumphant hero is then rewarded by her hand in marriage and becomes heir to the throne.

3. The hero acquires his status by passing certain tests. Sometimes these are feats of strength, as when Theseus retrieves the sandals and sword of Aegeus by lifting a massive rock, or when Sigmund recovers a sword embedded in a tree, or when Samson brings a banquet hall crashing down upon the Philistines. But the test may also consist in the performance of seemingly impossible tasks, such as fetching snow in summer. [See Quests.] These tasks (often imposed as the price of winning the princess) are accomplished in many cases through possession of magical aids. Perseus, for instance, has winged sandals, a magic wallet, and a "cap of invisibility"; Beowulf, the sword of the giants;

Sigmund, the sword of Óðinn (Odin); and Arthur, a scabbard that renders him invincible.

4. Heroes are sometimes distinguished by physical features. They are, like gods, abnormally tall and handsome. Saul, the heroic king of Israel, was taller than any of his subjects (see *1 Samuel* 10:23–24), and the same is said of Xerxes. Athenaeus, the Greek antiquarian, asserts that among the Ethiopians the most handsome man was appointed king, and in Egyptian bas-reliefs the pharaoh is often portrayed as larger than anyone else. The notion is represented also in myth: the Babylonian god Marduk was distinguished by his height, and the Canaanite god Attar, genius of artificial irrigation, could not succeed to the throne of Baal, god of rainfall, because he was too small. In a more ribald vein, folk tales sometimes equip popular heroes with prodigiously long penises that enable them to have sexual intercourse at a remote distance.

The hero's physical development is often depicted as having been extraordinary. For example, legend asserts that both Moses and Bacchus could speak as soon as they were born. It is also said of Moses, Herakles, and of several North American Indian heroes that they attained full stature within a few days. Moreover, the bodies of heroes often bear special marks. Both Kṛṣṇa and the Buddha are thus distinguished, while, in one of the Dead Sea Scrolls, it is said that the Messiah will be "full of freckles." Equally remarkable is the hero's mental ability: popular lore relates that even in childhood Solomon and Jesus surpassed venerable sages in wisdom. The Dead Sea Scrolls assert that this will also be true of the Messiah.

5. Heroes go to a special heaven when they die. Greek heroes went to Elysium, valiant Norsemen who fell in battle to Valhøll. King Arthur was transported in a barge to Avalon.

6. Great heroes do not die a natural death, but are transported alive to Heaven. Familiar examples are the prophet Elijah in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), Herakles in Greek legend, and Romulus in Roman lore, while of the patriarch Enoch we are told that he "walked with God and was not" (*Genesis* 5:24). Sometimes, as in the case of Moses, the hero ascends a mountain and disappears—a notion that can probably be traced to the belief attested in many cultures (e.g., in Tahiti, Java, Madagascar, New Guinea, and Borneo) that all the dead go up an actual or mythical mountain at death.

7. The deceased hero will return in the hour of his people's need. In sundry passages of the Old Testament (e.g., *Jer.* 30:9, *Ez.* 34:23–24), it is said of David that he will come back to rule over his people at their eventual restoration. The British say the same thing about Ar-

thur, the Scots about Bruce, the Prussians about Frederick Barbarossa, the Finns about Väinämöinen, the Samaritans about Moses, the Danes about Holger, and certain North American Indian tribes about Glooscap (Kuloscap). Such an idea appears in Indian, Iranian, Armenian, and Korean folk tales.

Some of the experiences and exploits attributed to heroes are thought by several modern scholars—notably Mircea Eliade (1958)—to be based on earlier cultic usages. Thus, the Greek legend that Achilles was reared by semi-equine, semi-human centaurs would have originated in the custom, widespread elsewhere, of having boys prepared in the bush for initiation by masters disguised as animals, while the tradition that he lived for some time among girls, dressed in female raiment, would reflect a not uncommon practice of so attiring male votaries and initiates. In some Babylonian texts, for instance, we read of a sacred order of “men-women”; on the island of Kos, the priests of Herakles wore women’s clothes, and such sacred transvestites (berdaches) are attested also among North American Indians. A further reflection of this usage is the tale that Dionysos was given female raiment by the goddess Rhea. Similarly, Theseus’s passage through the labyrinth and that of the Babylonian Gilgamesh through the nether tunnel would be mythic counterparts of a well-attested rite of initiation, and the idea that heroes ascend a mountain when they die would derive from a procedure observed by many “primitive” peoples whereby initiands and shamans climb a pole or tree to symbolize their elevation from the world of the mundane to that of the ideal.

While popular legend and lore concentrate mainly on the “divine” traits of the hero (his valor and virtue), they do not altogether ignore his human limitations and frailties. An outstanding instance of this is found in the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, whose subtle irony has been all too often overlooked. Gilgamesh, the most renowned of Babylonian heroes, who was also celebrated in earlier Sumerian poems, is here presented as essentially a hero *manqué*. He violates the prohibition against felling sacred cedars and thereby loses his boon companion, Enkidu. He is offered the chance of spending the rest of his life in a paradisaical garden, but rejects it in favor of a futile search for immortality. He sails across lethal waters, but his poles give out in midcourse. He reaches the ancient hero Utanapishtum but learns that the latter has acquired immortality by special privilege and can give him no recipe for it. He seeks eternal life, but cannot keep awake for seven days on end. He finds the magical plant “Graybeard grow young again,” but a sea serpent devours it. Finally he returns, defeated, to the

place from which he started out. In the same vein, Moses is denied entry to the Promised Land because he rashly struck a rock for water instead of merely speaking to it, as God had commanded. David cannot build the Temple, because he has sinned in his lust for Bathsheba. Jason ends up with his boat, the *Argo*, collapsing upon him.

Heroes are celebrated not only in legend and literature, but also in religious cults. Their tombs (often situated in the middle of cities or in sacred buildings) are often shrines, and memorial exercises are often held there on the anniversaries of their births or deaths. At such ceremonies they are often invoked by name to come and rejoin their living kinsmen at a communal meal. A Canaanite text from ancient Ugarit presents the order of service for an occasion when ancient kings and heroes (*rpum*—the *refa'im*, or “shades,” of the Old Testament) were thus invoked. At major festivals they returned, along with all the dead (“our founders are with us in spirit”).

It has been suggested, in fact, that one of the sources of ancient Greek tragedy was the recital of commemorative eulogies on such occasions. In Greece, the offerings presented to the deceased followed the pattern of those made to deities of the netherworld and to chthonic spirits: the sacrificial animals were black and they were slaughtered with their heads pointed downward. They had to be burned completely; no one could eat of them. The rite was performed at night, not in broad daylight, as was otherwise the case. Sometimes, too, it is said that the gods themselves regaled the heroes at these seasonal ceremonies, as indeed they did all the time, on the mythical level, in the Isles of the Blessed.

The characterization of the hero varies in accordance with the different human values and ideals in any particular epoch. In medieval times, for instance, as exemplified in the poems of the French *trouvères*, the hero’s principal traits are courtesy and chivalry—he is the “parfait, gentle knight” of Chaucer—and at the hands of Christian redactors (e.g., of the Arthurian legends), he is a paragon of Christian virtues.

In modern times, the hero has become desacralized. Belief in his divine parentage or in his annealment by a goddess has disappeared. No longer an object of cult worship, he is simply a historical man of mettle, such as George Washington, Horatio Nelson, George Armstrong Custer, Simon Bolívar, Ho Chi Minh, and the like. In recent decades, heroes have become popular celebrities drawn from such spheres of public life as politics, the armed forces, stage, screen, and sports. Nevertheless, most of the notions and usages associated with

their ancient predecessors still survive in attenuated form. They are interred in sacred buildings like Westminster Abbey or Saint Paul's Cathedral or (like Napoleon, Ulysses S. Grant, and Lenin) in grandiose mausoleums. Their homes are now shrines for tourists as they once were for pilgrims. The anniversaries of their births or deaths are marked by commemorative exercises or pageants (e.g., Washington's Birthday, Martin Luther King Day). Publicity agents take the place of the old-time bards in spreading their renown and relating their exploits, and "fan clubs" have replaced the ancient cultic bands of devotees (e.g., the Maenads). Such modern heroes lend their names to social enterprises, and their charisma is enlisted not, as formerly, to promote fertility or advance the communal weal, but to "endorse" and advertise commercial products, such as garments or cosmetics. In wartime, they inspire and rally citizen support by recruiting volunteers or selling government bonds. They are frequently known, as were Odysseus ("the man of many wiles") and Aeneas ("pious") by nicknames describing their qualities: Wellington is "the Iron Duke"; General George Patton is "Old Blood and Guts"; Joseph Vissarionovitch is Stalin ("the man of steel"); a popular boxer (Joe Louis) is "the Brown Bomber"; and a film beauty (Jean Harlow) is "the Blonde Bombshell." Heroes of stage and screen are termed "stars" (a survival of ancient astralization) or "idols." Even persons who are involved in some spectacular event, such as a rescue operation or a shoot-out, come to be regarded as heroes, though their status—unlike that of their ancient predecessors—is ephemeral and does not outlast their brief moment.

There are even nonhistorical, fictional heroes, like Batman or Superman in American comic strips and cartoons. Just as were their forerunners in bygone times, these too are equipped with magical props, such as wings that enable them to fly in from outer space or wonderworking potions and elixirs. Though the media differ, the essential message is the same; as a mythic figure, the hero is perennial.

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THEODOR H. GASTER

**HESCHEL, ABRAHAM JOSHUA** (1907–1972), Jewish scholar and philosopher of religion. Heschel was born and raised in Warsaw, received his training in the methods of modern scientific research in Berlin, and wrote most of his mature works in the United States. Born into an intensely traditional Hasidic milieu, he was descended on his father's side from Dov Ber of Mezhirich, successor of the Besht (acronym of the Ba'al Shem Tov, Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer), founder of the Hasidic movement that flourished among eastern European Jews in the eighteenth century; Avraham Yehoshu'a Heschel, known as "the Apter *rebe*"; and Yisra'el of Rizhyn. On his mother's side, he was descended from Levi Yitshaq of Berdichev and Pinhas of Korets.

As a youth, Heschel received traditional training in Talmud and rabbinic lore, in which he excelled, and immersed himself in the world of Jewish mysticism, the literature of Qabbalah. Having decided to acquire a modern Western education, he enrolled in a secular Yiddish *Realgymnasium* in Vilna (now Vilnius), and in 1927 he moved to Berlin, where he attended the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums and the University of Berlin. His doctoral dissertation (1933), dealing with the phenomenon of prophetic consciousness, was published in 1936 (*Die Prophetie*). After teaching Talmud at the Hochschule, he was appointed Martin Buber's successor at the Central Organization for Jewish Adult Education in Germany and the Jüdische Lehrhaus in Frankfurt in 1937. After his deportation in October 1938 with the rest of the Polish Jews then resident in Germany, Heschel taught for eight months at the Institute for Jewish Studies in Warsaw. He was enabled to leave Poland before the Nazi invasion only by a call to join the faculty of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Heschel reached the United States, via England, in 1940, and after five years on the faculty of the Hebrew Union College, he taught at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York as professor of ethics and mysticism, until his death. In the last decade of his life, he became actively involved in a number of public issues. He participated in negotiations with Cardinal Bea concerning the formulation of a declaration on the Jews, which emerged from Vatican Council II, and he also took part in the civil rights movement, opposition

to the Vietnam War, and the campaign to enable Russian Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

Heschel's philosophy of religion developed under the influences of his traditional Jewish upbringing and the challenges of modern secular philosophy, science, and psychology. He was impressed by the works of the Neo-Kantian philosophers, such as his teacher Heinrich Maier (*Philosophie der Wirklichkeit*, Tübingen, 1926), and by the phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler. But against the Neo-Kantians he defended the claim of traditional Judaism that God is more than a postulate of reason. From the phenomenologists he learned to analyze the constitutive traits and structures of experienced reality, without reducing them to alien categories that can distort their unique character. Already in his early work on prophecy, later expanded into his English book *The Prophets* (1962), he asserted that the phenomena of biblical prophecy should not be forced into the categories of Aristotelian metaphysics. The "divine concern" of the living God of the Bible, who takes a passionate interest in his creatures, is the key to Heschel's philosophy of religion.

Heschel rejected the construction of a "religion of reason" in the spirit of the Neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen, because such would substitute philosophy for religion; he rejected the analysis of "religious experience," as in Schleiermacher and Rudolf Otto, because it would replace religion with the psychology of religion; and he criticized the "reconstruction" of traditional Judaism to conform to modern naturalism in the manner of Mordecai M. Kaplan, because it would transform religion into the sociology of religion. If religion is *sui generis*, it must be studied on its own terms, and the interpreter must focus on the preconceptual, ineffable reality of lived religion and on the dynamic relationship between God and man disclosed in the classical documents of Judaism and the lives and experiences of pious men.

Heschel consciously adopted a dual approach in his work both as a scholar who pursued historical research in the sources of classical Jewish thought and as an original and imaginative contemporary philosopher and theologian. This approach enabled him to formulate his own thought as an authentic interpretation of his Judaic heritage in all its richness. Heschel's scholarly studies, in addition to his seminal work on prophecy, included a biography of Moses Maimonides, published in 1935; various articles on medieval philosophy, Qabbalah, and Hasidism; and a work written in Hebrew on the doctrines of revelation in Talmudic thought, of which two volumes were published in 1962–1965 and a third still awaits publication. A two-volume work on the life and thought of Menahem Mendel of Kotzk, the

"Kotzker rebe," and an English volume about Mendel and Kierkegaard (*A Passion for Truth*) appeared posthumously.

The second strand of Heschel's work, in which he tried to offer his contemporaries a theology based on the application of the insights of traditional sources to the problems of modernity, is chiefly developed in *Man Is Not Alone* (1951) and its successor volume, *God in Search of Man* (1955). Here religion is defined as an answer to man's ultimate questions. Since modern man is often estranged from the reality that informs genuine faith, Heschel thought it was futile to present merely traditional answers to these questions. Hence, he tried first and foremost to recover the significant existential questions to which Judaism offers answers, confronting his readers with the living God of the Bible. To the religiously sensitive person, God is an "ontological presupposition," the ultimate reality, which is later crystallized by discursive thought into the concept of a power, a principle, a cause, or a structure.

Heschel described three ways in which man can reach an awareness of God. The experience of wonder leads beyond mere facts to an awareness of the grandeur and mystery of reality. Wonder as curiosity becomes the starting point of science that looks beyond given facts (*data*) to the laws they exemplify. Wonder as "radical amazement" points to the ground and power that stand behind all facts and perceptions of facts. This "evocative" approach to reality results in a pantheistic outlook: through created things we become aware of the God who is within, but who is also beyond all finite existence.

A second approach to awareness of God is reached by delving into the recesses of one's own being, realizing that the self is not a discrete, independent, and self-sufficient entity, but part of something greater and more comprehensive than the individual. This approach tends toward a quasi-mystical view, but it stops short of mystical absorption in the godhead, by emphasizing God as the subject of reality and man as the object whose dignity and worth are derived from his awareness that he is the goal of divine concern and expectation.

In a third way to God, man becomes aware of the voice and word of God. The "holy dimension," discovered by reacting responsively and responsibly to this address, characterizes the biblical view of revelation. By observing the commandments of the transcendent God, Israel entered this holy dimension of challenge and guidance, and by obediently responding to the divine imperative, man experiences himself as the object of divine address and concern. The ability to respond to the divine challenge is the root of human freedom; the

failures and successes of Israel in responding to God's call constitute the drama of Jewish history as interpreted by faith. Thus the Bible is not so much man's theology as God's anthropology.

Because of Heschel's stress on faith as a response to God's demands, he opposed both the scholastic attempts to identify the biblical God with the Greek notion of "being," and the modern process philosophies that describe the deity as the power that makes for goodness, the *nisus* of the universe, or the moral dimension of reality. His own concept of "divine pathos" makes the idea of concern, or directed attention, the central category of biblical thought. Aristotle's Unmoved Mover must give way to the biblical idea of the Most Moved Mover. Man responds to divine pathos with sympathy, and by this act of identifying with divine aims, he overcomes his egocentric predicament without having to suppress his own needs. Religious man, by acts of empathy with divine goals, converts divine goals and ends into consciously acquired and deeply felt personal needs. Man, who shares "transitive," outgoing concern with God, not only must have needs but must also be needed, in order to attain true fulfillment.

Heschel's philosophy is shot through with polarities; the pair he calls "pattern and spontaneity" (*qeva'*, *kavvanah*) are basic to life and liturgy and produce a creative tension between, on the one hand, the prescribed and regulated observance of the commandments (*mitsvot*) and, on the other, the novel and individual way in which a Jew ought to respond to the unique experiences of existence. Time and space stand in a similar dialectical relation where things are frozen processes; life is a unity frozen in the process of gathering the past into itself in memory and faithfulness and of reaching into the future in hope, expectation, and anticipatory celebration. The Sabbath, whose celebration is a weekly commemoration of creation, the renewal of the divine-human covenant, and a foretaste of future redemption, is an edifice in time.

Heschel's latest work on the Kotzker *rebe* mirrors his awareness of the tension between mystery and meaning, between natural and crisis theology, between sacramentalism and utopianism—or, in the language of Qabbalah, between the world of unification (*'alma' de-yihuda'*) and the world of separation (*'alma' de-feruda'*). Perhaps Heschel's most important theme is that God is in need of man and that man's deepest fulfillment can be found by participating in the divine concern.

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FRITZ A. ROTHSCHILD

**HESIOD** (Gr., Hēsiodos; fl. c. 730–700 BCE), one of the earliest recorded Greek poets. The earlier of his two surviving poems, *Theogony*, is of interest to students of Greek religion as an attempt to catalog the gods in the form of a genealogy, starting with the beginning of the world and describing the power struggles that led to Zeus's kingship among the gods. The cosmogony begins with Chaos ("yawning space"), Earth, and Eros (the principle of sexual love—a precondition of genealogical development). The first ruler of the world is Ouranos ("heaven"). His persistent intercourse with Earth hin-

ders the birth of his children, the Titans, until Kronos, the youngest, castrates him. Kronos later tries to suppress his own children by swallowing them, but Zeus, the youngest, is saved and makes Kronos regurgitate the others. The younger gods defeat the Titans after a ten-year war and consign them to Tartaros, below the earth, so that they no longer play a part in the world's affairs.

This saga of successive rulers is evidently related to mythical accounts known from older Hittite and Babylonian sources. Hesiod's genealogy names some three hundred gods. Besides cosmic entities (Night, Sea, Rivers, etc.) and gods of myth and cult, it includes personified abstractions such as Strife, Deceit, Victory, and Death. Several alternative theogonies came into existence in the three centuries after Hesiod, but his remained the most widely read.

Hesiod's other poem, *Works and Days*, is a compendium of moral and practical advice. Here Zeus is prominent as the all-seeing god of righteousness who rewards honesty and industry and punishes injustice.

Also attributed to Hesiod was a poem that actually dated only from the sixth century BCE, the *Catalog of Women*, which dealt with heroic genealogies issuing from unions between gods and mortal women. It enjoyed a status similar to that of the *Theogony*, but it survives only in fragments.

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M. L. WEST

**HESTIA**, the Greek goddess of the domestic and communal hearth, is closely allied to the Roman goddess Vesta. Hestia, the eldest child of Kronos and Rhea, was swallowed by her father at birth, and was the last to emerge from the patriarchal "womb" when Zeus liberated his siblings. The motif of first and last recurs frequently in the traditions associated with her. She receives the first and last libation offered at every feast, no matter what divinity is being honored. Although she was an original member of the Olympian Twelve, there is a tradition that at some point she yielded her place

to Dionysos—a tradition but, typically, no story. Indeed, there are almost no stories about this least anthropomorphic of the major Greek divinities.

Hestia's name also served as a common noun designating the hearth and its fire; most essentially, she was the fire at the center of Olympus, of the city-state, the family home, and the soul. She was worshiped not at specially designated temples but at the family hearth; in the Classical period altars originally dedicated to her were rededicated to Zeus Ephestios ("Zeus of the hearth"). Her tranquillity and apparent passivity were understood to be inherent to her character and not externally imposed; her virginity was deliberately chosen. Hestia is represented as shunning all adventure or entanglement. Though she had no children of her own, she bestowed her dispassionate and nondiscriminating motherly love on all alike, but especially on motherless orphans. Though Vesta in Rome was attended by virgins chosen before they were six, the Greek goddess's attendants were most typically elderly women who had once been married. Hestia represented the stability and continuity of communal and familial existence; a new colony was established by bringing a log from the mother city's hearth, a new home by lighting a log brought from the daughter's family hearth.

Hestia was often paired with Hermes: she always selfsame, he a shapeshifter; she homebound, he a wayfarer; she ultimately trustworthy, he a trickster. That she was replaced on Olympus by Dionysos suggests the significance of their complementation: life in his realm had meaning at the extreme, whereas life in hers had meaning at the center. Hestia embodied the Greek recognition of the sanctity to be found in the most ordinary and familiar things, those too easily ignored, too readily devalued.

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CHRISTINE DOWNING

**HESYCHASM.** See Eastern Christianity; Monasticism, *article on* Christian Monasticism; and Silence.

**HETERODOXY.** See Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy.

**HIERODOULEIA.** Contemporary scholarship uses the expression *sacred prostitution* to refer to a sexual rite practiced in the ancient Near East. In the temples of Ishtar, Astarte, Mâ, Anāhitā, and Aphrodite, for example, women, often virgins, offered themselves sexually to strangers. Sometimes the temples were staffed by such "sacred prostitutes." Their actions were ritual components of the cult of the goddess in question. In ancient Greece, the word for sacred prostitute was *hierodoulē*, or "sacred servant." The term used here, *hierodouleia* ("sacred service"), refers to the ritual itself.

This survey will exclude practices associated with such terms as *bacchanalia*, *saturnalia*, and *orgy*, which refer to the temporary loosening of sexual restraints that occurs frequently in many societies all over the world during certain festivals, rites of passage, and other types of religious observances. In the current state of scholarship on the topic of cultic sexual activity, it would be premature to try to establish any correlations between such practices and the more institutionalized forms of cultic sexual activity. [See also Sexuality.]

The present discussion is limited to religious or sacred prostitution, as distinct from profane or exclusively commercial prostitution. The distinction between the two imposes itself on the basis of both historical and ethnographic evidence. One of the first legal written documents we possess for the ancient Near East is the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which specifies a severe punishment for a female temple prostitute who goes to a tavern (the word *tavern* is considered by scholars to be synonymous with the word *brothel*). More than three thousand years later, the female servants-cum-courtesans (*devadāsīs*) of the temple of Jagannātha in Puri, Orissa (India), are forbidden still even to walk in the streets frequented by common prostitutes.

The Babylonian evidence indicates that a distinction between cultic and profane sexuality is both ancient and persistent. It is very possible that the distinction became blurred or perhaps even totally obliterated in the minds of most Westerners because in the Hebrew scriptures the term used for the cultic sexual activity of both male and female temple servants—*znh*, "to prostitute oneself"—is also used to refer to apostasy (*Hos.* 2:7, 4:15; *Jer.* 2:20, 3:6, 3:8; *Ez.* 16:15, 23:3, 23:19; *Is.* 57:3). Sexual cultic activity became for the monotheist Yahvists synonymous with abandoning the worship of Yahveh and turning to false gods. Apostasy in the Bible is considered to be the worst of sins, hence terms referring to cultic sexual activity—*prostitution*, *harlotry*, and *whoredom*—took on extremely negative connotations.

This attitude toward cultic sexual activity seems not, however, to have always existed or to have been estab-

lished easily. Authors of the Hebrew scriptures mention the existence and activity of sacred prostitutes, both male (*qodesh*) and female (*qedushah*), even in the Temple at Jerusalem. Scholarly research has detailed the efforts of the prophets throughout the history of the ancient Israelites to oust such a custom from their midst. It seems to have been finally eradicated only after the fall of Jerusalem (586 BCE) and the Babylonian exile. The eventual triumph of a monotheist Yahvistic religion took place in a polytheistic cultural environment radically different in its religious orientation. According to the Old Testament scholar Walter Kornfeld, the disappearance of this institution was of primary importance to the establishment of the Yahvistic religion. Cultic sexual activity was an essential aspect of religions that venerated a mysterious life-power manifesting itself in a cyclic manner, following the rhythms of nature, which was most often conceived of as feminine. This configuration contrasts markedly with religions that revere a single masculine god who reveals himself at specific moments in history.

Some form of cultic sexual activity was practiced by temple servants of both sexes in most of the cultural areas of ancient West Asia. In Mesopotamia the earliest evidence (mostly textual) comes from Sumer, where the cult of the goddess Inanna (Ishtar) was prominent and was associated with such activity. In a hymn written about 2300 BCE by the high priestess of the moon god at Ur and called the *Exaltation of Inanna*, that goddess is referred to as "the hierodule of An" (An was the highest god of Sumer). Other Sumerian texts show that temples to Inanna had at their service many temple prostitutes. The goddess Inanna transformed herself into the Semitic Ishtar with the Akkadian conquest of Sumer during the third millennium BCE, and the women who carried out the sexual aspect of that goddess's cult were called *ishtaritu*. Given the characterization of Inanna as a hierodule, it is likely that the women temple servants were considered to be living embodiments of the goddess. Such a conjecture is reinforced by ethnographic evidence on the *devadāsīs* (female servants of a deity) of India.

In Puri, the *devadāsīs* of the temple of Jagannātha are considered to be the living embodiments of Jagannātha's wife Lakṣmī. Lakṣmī is a goddess of prosperity, abundance, and well-being, and the *devadāsīs* who, laden with precious ornaments, dance and sing twice daily in the temple are the visible signs of the goddess's wealth. Their sexual activity as courtesans links them to well-being, since erotic pleasure is considered one of the foremost expressions of that state. They represent the auspiciousness of the married state and embody the active sexuality of the non-widowed wife.

The textual evidence from Mesopotamia seems to point toward a similar identification between the hierodule and the married woman. Both wore a veil in imitation of Ishtar, who is always represented wearing a veil. In India also, both *devadāsīs* and married women cover their heads with the end of their sari, a gesture often described as wearing a veil. In paragraph 127 of the Code of Hammurabi, hierodules are said to be protected from molestation in the same way as a married woman. Another parallel between the institution in Mesopotamia and in India is that in both, the consecrated women live in their own houses. Even though the *devadāsīs* are concubines of the king and the priests, they cannot be said to be part of a male establishment. They invite whom they please to their own houses. The *devadāsīs*, like the *ishtaritu*, are not supposed to procreate; they adopt girls to succeed them. In paragraph 178 and subsequently, the Code of Hammurabi speaks only of the adopted children of the temple servants. Similarly, the prosperity and abundance for which the *devadāsīs* stand are the general prosperity of the land and the well-being of the realm: they are specifically not meant to be fertile. The *devadāsīs* are well versed in the *ars erotica* as well as in music, dance, and literature: a wealth of textual evidence in India depicts them as often extremely well educated not only in the arts but in philosophy as well. In Indian epic literature (c. third century BCE–third century CE), the courtesans embody the wealth, refinement, and culture of the prosperous and well-ruled city.

A similar role is played by a harlot in the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, one of the oldest and most widely diffused works from ancient Mesopotamia (some of its versions date from the beginning of the second millennium BCE). Gilgamesh, the ruler of the city of Uruk, abuses his people; a goddess named Aruru creates a half-man, half-animal creature named Enkidu to subdue Gilgamesh. Enkidu lives in innocence with the animals in the forest. A harlot is sent to humanize him; she makes love to him and teaches him how to behave as a human being. He is brought into the city of Uruk and eventually tames Gilgamesh, who ceases to mistreat his people. Thus the active sexuality of the prostitute results in well-being for the inhabitants of Uruk.

This story has a close parallel in the myth of Ṛṣyśṛṅga, in Indian literature. This sage, who had a horn on his forehead, was born of a female doe who drank the seed a sage had spilled in a pond. Ṛṣyśṛṅga grows up in his father's forest hermitage, eating berries and roots and never seeing other human beings. In a neighboring kingdom, a terrible drought plagues the realm because of the misconduct of the king. The king is advised that the only way to save the inhabitants

from starvation is to bring Ṛṣyśṛṅga into the city. Only the city courtesans are able to do this. One of them cleverly seduces the horned forest dweller, introducing him not only to erotic pleasure but to cooked food, clothes, and other refinements of city life. When she and Ṛṣyśṛṅga enter the city, rain pours from the sky, to the great joy of the people. The active sexuality of the courtesan is—as in the Mesopotamian example—the instrument that safeguards the well-being of the king and the community.

In both stories, the courtesan represents human culture and is able to transform a semi-wild creature into a civilized human being. The similarity between the two stories may be a result of the archaeologically well established fact of extensive contacts between ancient Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley civilization of Northwest India (c. fourth to second millennium BCE). Even though more than a millennium separates the end of the Indus Valley civilization from the earlier portions of the epics, scholars have traced many features of later Hindu civilization to the earlier, pre-Aryan, agrarian Indus Valley civilization. The hypothesis that temple prostitution may be one such historical continuity from the earlier period must be entertained, especially in view of the striking similarities between the ancient Mesopotamian practices and the Indian institution.

Another complex of ideas embodied in cultic sexual activity is that of the transference to the king of the fertile power of the goddess. The king, both in ancient Mesopotamia and in Hindu India, was regarded as the guarantor of the fertility of the land and its people, and in general of the prosperity and well-being of the realm. In order to carry out this function, the king had to receive this power from a woman. In ancient Mesopotamia the power was transferred through the sacred marriage (*hieros gamos*) ritual, one of the most widely documented rituals for a period of over two thousand years. The earliest accounts come from Sumer in the early third millennium BCE. Essentially, the rite consisted of ceremonial and public sexual intercourse between the king, representing the goddess's consort Dumuzi (the Akkadian Tammuz), and a representative of Inanna, most likely a high priestess, head of the temple hierodules. The point of the intercourse is not procreation but the assurance of abundant crops and the goddess's endorsement of the king's ability to rule. [See *Hieros Gamos*]

In Puri, the king, who before the Muslim and British conquests ruled a large empire (until the second half of the sixteenth century), through the coronation ritual is symbolically infused with female generative powers. More literally, the *devadāsīs*, who are the living embodiments of Lakṣmī, infuse the king with the fertile pow-



ers of the goddess. This is accomplished in the sexual act when the woman's sexual fluids, containing her power of life (*śakti*), enter the man's body via his sexual organ. In the Hindu case, the sacred marriage rite is carried out not literally but symbolically during the king's coronation and every year afterward.

Besides cultic sexual activity carried out by females, ancient Mesopotamian texts speak of male hierodules who represented the goddess's consort Dumuzi. These men were eunuchs who dressed in women's clothes and engaged in cultic homosexual activity. Dumuzi and his transformations into the Phoenician/Canaanite Baal, the Syrian/Greek Adonis, the Phrygian and Lydian Attis, and the Egyptian Osiris were consorts/sons of the goddess. The Mesopotamian Inanna similarly transformed herself into the corresponding figures of Asherah, Astarte/Aphrodite, Cybele, and Isis.

Common to the mythology of these deities is the theme of the self-castration of the male god and his subsequent death and stay in the underworld, from which the goddess rescues him, bringing him back to life. The death of the god often corresponds in the myth to the barrenness of nature, whose fertility is restored by the goddess's reunion with her consort. An early Babylonian hymn likens Tammuz to plants that quickly fade. This theme is carried down through the millennia and finds expression in the Greek ritual celebrating the death of Adonis, called the Adonia, during which female courtesans sowed certain seeds in baskets that they placed on the rooftops. There the plants quickly germinated and grew in the summer heat but just as quickly faded, since their roots had no time to grow strong. These "gardens of Adonis" metaphorically represent the young god's sterility, since the plants wilt before they can bear fruit, thus echoing in concrete ritual action the mythical theme of the god's self-castration. Certain Roman authors (Servius, Ovid) report that in the Phrygian and Lydian (Asia Minor) cult of Cybele and Attis, male devotees castrated themselves during certain festivals while in a state of trance brought about by dance and music. They then became temple servants of the goddess, wore women's clothes, and engaged in cultic homosexual activity. [See Homosexuality.]

The cult of Cybele was brought to Rome in 204 BCE by official decree. Following military difficulties with their enemy Hannibal, the Romans consulted the sibylline oracles, who admonished them to bring the image of the West Asian goddess (a black stone) to Rome. This was done with great ceremony, and the goddess was installed on the Palatine hill. Her eunuch priests, called Galli by the Romans, followed the customs of their cult of origin in Asia Minor. The cult of Cybele in Rome survived until the fifth century CE.

The interdiction against transvestism in the Hebrew scriptures (*Dt.* 22:5) is understood by most scholars as being part of the larger movement against fertility cults. The fact that sterile transvestite eunuchs are symbolically linked to the seasonal renewal of the earth's fertility is attested in several of the myths concerning Ishtar and Tammuz. It is also confirmed ethnographically by a similar phenomenon in India, that of the male transvestites generally known as *hijras*. For these transvestites, found all over North and South India, self-castration is a caste duty (*dharma*). It is carried out in a ritual context: the neophyte is seated in front of a picture of the goddess Bahuchara Mātā and repeats her name while the operation is being performed. This constitutes the traditional initiation into the *hijra* community. In the myth about this goddess, she cuts off one of her breasts, offering it in place of her body to bandits who would ravish her. By castrating themselves and dressing as women, her devotees achieve a special identification with her. [See Gender Roles.]

Most *hijras* are homosexual prostitutes; their most important religio-cultural function is to sing and dance in houses where a male child has been born. The *hijras* confer fertility, prosperity, and health on the child and its family. The *hijras'* connection to the fertility of the land—and not only to that of the people—is preserved in one of the stories they tell, a story strikingly similar to that of the seduction of the ascetic Ṛṣyśṛṅga by a courtesan. Drought was plaguing a kingdom, and only the personal visit by the king to two *hijras* visiting his city was able to bring about the rains. The parallelism between the institution of the *hijras* and the sacred eunuchs of the ancient eastern Mediterranean is remarkable. As in the case of the parallelism with female cultic sexual activity, the existence at some period in history of contact between the two areas cannot be excluded.

The institution of the transvestite *hijras* and that of the female temple courtesans exhibit the seemingly paradoxical link between sterility and general fertility. The *devadāsīs* and, according to the available evidence, the ancient West Asian female hierodules are not supposed to procreate; they adopt children but do not give birth to them. The eunuchs have sacrificed to the goddess their reproductive capacity. Their sexual activity is sterile. A study of the rituals and myths of the courtesans of the temple of Jagannātha in Puri leaves no doubt that it is their sexual activity that ensures general well-being and prosperity. The evidence concerning the *hijras* and the ancient West Asian sacred eunuchs points to a similar conclusion. The sacrifice of one's reproductive capacity is symbolically akin to death; the link is particularly clear in the myths of the self-castration of Tammuz, Adonis, and Attis, which is soon fol-

lowed by death. The paradox of general fertility brought about by the sexual activity of persons who have sacrificed their own fecundity may have to be understood as one symbolic expression of the widespread sacrificial theme of renewed life through death.

The ancient eastern Mediterranean/West Asian region and the Indian subcontinent are not the only areas of the world where sexual cultic activity is practiced. Unfortunately, the reports by ethnographers on the subject are rather spotty, and not enough information is available to attain a satisfactory understanding of these practices. Some form of sacred prostitution has been reported for various groups in West Africa. A. B. Ellis, in *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa* (London, 1890), reports that in Dahomey the female priestesses who have been dedicated to a deity are considered to be his wives; they do not marry, and they engage in prostitution. They are known as *kosi*, a term derived from *kono*, meaning "unfruitful," since a person so dedicated and any child born to her are lost to their natal lineage and belong to the deity. These women wear a special type of dress and cover their breasts, unlike other women, a peculiarity they share with ancient Indian courtesans, the only women with covered breasts in the painted frescoes of the Ajanta caves (c. seventh and eighth centuries CE). The priestesses of the python god Dangbi are distinguished from those of other deities by having their own organization. Through a trance possession by the python god, any female can join this organization. Her person then becomes sacred and inviolate. These women live together in separate houses and are accorded great personal freedom.

Farther to the east, among the Ibo in what is today Nigeria, the earth goddess had an important shrine in the town of Nguru. Amaury Talbot noted (in *Some Nigerian Fertility Cults*, Oxford, 1927) that about three hundred women had been given to the shrine as virgins. They practiced cultic sexual activity, mostly with sterile men who came to the shrine to pray for increased virility. These women were not supposed to procreate; any child born to them was exposed.

Farther to the west, Ellis reports (in *The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa*, London, 1887) the existence of a form of sacred prostitution among the coastal tribes of what is today Ghana. The gods are served by both priests and priestesses. The priests marry, but the priestesses do not, since they are, as in India, considered to be married to the deity. These women dance, enter into trance, and prophesy. They have sexual relations with men of their own choice, who are reported to live with the priestesses for the duration

of the relationship. The ethnographic record is spotty on the subject, and these African examples are probably not the only instances of institutionalized cultic sexual activity on that continent.

The presence of both transvestite males engaging in homosexual activity and of women who were sexually free has been reported for pre-Conquest Mesoamerica and for Borneo. In the capital of Teocolhuacán, on the Gulf of California in northwestern Mexico, founded by descendants of the Toltec, temples had attached to them male transvestites and women who engaged in some form of cultic sexual activity. In Borneo, several groups have initiated priests and priestesses into some form of prostitution. Among the Posso-Todjo Toraja, the Olo Nyadju, the Olo Dusun, and the Kayan, most of the initiated priesthood are women. The members of the priesthood receive their ritual knowledge from spirits of the sky world. Both priests and priestesses have specialized knowledge of garden magic and of healing. Priestesses conduct the ghosts of the dead, especially those of chiefs, to the land of the dead. They also perform ceremonies concerned with house building. The priests dress as women and act as homosexual prostitutes, and the priestesses act as public prostitutes.

In addition to forms of cultic sexual activity that are practiced regularly by certain men and women, there are cases in which sexual activity is engaged in only during a certain period. The North African Awlad Nā'il tribe descends from a famous sixteenth-century saint. The women of the tribe are priestesses of saints' shrines. At puberty they go into towns and practice prostitution until they have accumulated a satisfactory dowry. They then return to their villages and marry; no opprobrium whatsoever is attached to their method of accumulating wealth. Edmond Doutté reports (in *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, Algiers, 1908) that when the French colonial administration tried to interfere with such practices, the whole population protested vigorously, insisting that to eradicate or curtail the custom would be detrimental to the production of abundant harvests. This example could represent a historical continuity, since Augustine (*City of God* 2.4) reports that the Semitic mother goddess was worshiped in North Africa under the names of Astarte and Tanit. During their festival days, female devotees engaged in sacred prostitution. Similarly, Herodotus notes (1.199) that in Paphos (on Cyprus) women used to prostitute themselves in the service of Adonis/Tammuz before marrying, and Justin writes that they did this to accumulate money for a dowry.

The North African premarital exchange of sexual services for wealth is similar to a custom observed in the

Palauan archipelago in the western Pacific (part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands). After attaining puberty, young girls are sent by their mothers to serve as concubines in the men's clubhouse of another village for three months to a year. In payment for their services, the men send money to the girls' families. This system of temporary prostitution generates an important network of economic exchanges between villages. The institution is also viewed as a form of magical protection for the village in which the women take up temporary residence. This is conveyed by placing on the gable of the men's house a statue of a nude female prominently displaying her genitalia. The myth explaining the origin of such a figure states that the woman was a concubine in the men's house and therefore from another village. The men from her natal village are classified as her brothers, and for them to gaze on her nakedness would be a grave sin. The men's clubhouse on which such an image is displayed is therefore protected from raids by the men from the villages of its resident female visitors.

A comparative study of institutions involving cultic sexual activity by males and females, on either a permanent or semipermanent basis, has not been undertaken. The subject is not free from a negative bias, in all likelihood rooted in the ancient association between apostasy and cultic sexual activity.

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FRÉDÉRIQUE APFFEL MARGLIN

**HIEROPHANY** (from Greek *hierō-*, "sacred," and *phainein*, "to show") is a term designating the manifestation of the sacred. The term involves no further specification. Herein lies its advantage: it refers to any manifestation of the sacred in whatever object throughout history. Whether the sacred appear in a stone, a tree, or an incarnate human being, a hierophany denotes the same act: a reality of an entirely different order than those of this world becomes manifest in an object that is part of the natural or profane sphere.

The sacred manifests itself as a power or force that is quite different from the forces of nature. A sacred tree, for instance, is not worshiped for being a tree. Neither is a sacred stone adored, in and of itself, for its natural properties as a stone. These objects become the focus of religious veneration because they are hierophanies, revealing something that is no longer botanical or geological, but "wholly other."

**Forms of Hierophany.** The forms of hierophanies vary from one culture to another. The matter is complicated for, throughout the course of history, cultures have recognized hierophanies everywhere in psychological, economic, spiritual, and social life. There is hardly any object, action, psychological function, species of being, or even entertainment that has not become a hierophany at some time. Whatever humans come in contact with can be transformed into a hierophany. Musical instruments, architectural forms, beasts of burden, and vehicles of transportation have all been sacred objects. In the right circumstances, any material object whatever can become a hierophany.

The appearance of the sacred in a hierophany, however, does not eliminate its profane existence. In every religious context some objects in the class of things that convey the sacred (e.g., stone, trees, human beings) always remain profane. No single culture contains within its history all the possible hierophanies. In other words, a hierophany always implies a singling-out. Not all stones are held to be sacred in a culture; only some are venerated, or one, because their properties make them fitting vehicles of the sacred. A hierophany separates the thing that manifests the sacred from everything else around it, from all that remains profane.

The sacred appears in cosmic form as well as in the imaginative life of human beings. Cosmic hierophanies

cover the spectrum of cosmic structures. Supreme gods of the sky, such as Num, the sky divinity of the Sumerians, or Anu, the Babylonian *shar shame* ("sky king"), reflect or share the sacredness attributed to the sky. So do the sovereign gods of the sky who display their power through storm, thunder, and lightning, such as the Greek god Zeus, his Roman counterpart Jupiter, and Yahveh, the Hebrew supreme being.

The sacredness of the earth is an important source of hierophany. Worship of Pachamama, mother goddess of the earth, is an ancient and widespread phenomenon in the South American Andes. Local soil is a sacred presence in countless cultures around the globe. The earth is often an important character in myths about the earliest times of creation. Such is the role of Papa ("earth") in Maori creation accounts and of Gaia in the Greek myths presented by Hesiod. Frequently the earth, as a hierophany of sacred being, appears as the creative partner of a heavenly being. Such a divine couple, deified sky and earth, figured prominently in the mythologies of Oceania, Micronesia, Africa, and the Americas.

The sun became a powerful manifestation of the sacred in central Mexico (among the Mixtec), in the Peruvian Andes (among the Inca), in ancient Egypt, and elsewhere. Furthermore, important cultural heroes who figure largely in the mythic history of various societies (e.g., among the Maasai of Africa, the Turco-Mongols, and Indo-Europeans) often have essential ties to the sun's powers.

In many cultures, the fertility of animals and plants is presided over by the sacredness of the moon. Above all others, the hierophanies of the moon convey the sacredness of life's rhythms: rainy seasons, ocean tides, sowing times, the menstrual cycle. Among Pygmy groups of central Africa, for instance, the moon, called Pe, is the fecund source of new life. Women celebrate her sacredness with drinking and dancing feasts held at the time of the new moon. Through the metamorphosis it undergoes each month, the moon displays its powers of immortality and its ability to regenerate a form of life that even includes the experience of death. Women and snakes become epiphanies of the moon's sacred power through their periodic loss of life in the form of blood and skin. Menstruation sometimes is perceived not only as a shedding of blood but as a shedding of the "skin" that lines the uterus each month or of the "skin" that envelops the body of a new child if conception occurs that month. Snakes are sometimes thought to shed not only skin but also "blood": snake venom is viewed as a species of blood that is "shed" (that is, transmitted from fang to victim) when a snake bites its prey or when venom is consumed in festival brew.

Human physiology itself can become a manifestation

of the sacred. Divine kings and the mystical bodies of shamans, transformed by their contact with sacred realities, can themselves become transparent vehicles of sacred powers. Even the breath, soul, blood, pulse, semen, and body warmth of ordinary human beings can be seen as signs of the presence of supernatural forces. In certain yogic traditions, for example, a woman embodies *prakṛti*, the eternal source and limitless creative power of nature. The ritual nakedness of this *yoginī* makes possible the revelation of a cosmic mystery.

Ordinary items such as roots, herbs, and foods may also manifest the sacred in one tradition or another, as may manufactured items, such as swords, ropes, and puppets. Techniques and skills themselves, the processes of manufacture, reveal sacred powers. Ironworking, spinning, and weaving are frequently sacred activities, carried on by consecrated persons in holy places and periods.

The cosmogonic myths of tribal peoples, the Brahmanic tradition of South Asia, the mystical writings of Nichiren and Teresa of Ávila, the enthronement ceremonies of the king in ancient Babylon, the agricultural festivals of Japan, the ritual costumes of dancing shamans in Siberia, the symbolic fixtures of the Borobudur stupa, and initiation rites in various traditions are all hierophanies. They express some modality of the sacred and some moment in its history. Each one of these hierophanies reveals an aspect of the sacred as well as a historical attitude that humans have taken toward the sacred.

**Structure and Dialectic of the Sacred.** At the most general level of analysis, there exists a structure common to all hierophanies. Whenever the sacred is manifest, it limits itself. Its appearance forms part of a dialectic that occults other possibilities. By appearing in the concrete form of a rock, plant, or incarnate being, the sacred ceases to be absolute, for the object in which it appears remains a part of the worldly environment. In some respect, each hierophany expresses an incomprehensible paradox arising from the great mystery upon which every hierophany is centered: the very fact that the sacred is made manifest at all.

This characteristic structure of manifestation and limitation is common to all hierophanies. The dialectic of appearance and occultation of the sacred becomes a key to understanding religious experience. Once all hierophanies are understood as equivalent in this fundamental respect, two helpful starting points can be found for the study of religious experience. In the first place, all appearances of the sacred, whether sublime or simple, can be seen in terms of the same dialectic of the sacred. In the second place, the entire religious life of humankind is placed on a common footing. Rich and

diverse as it is, the religious history of human life evidences no essential discontinuity. The same paradox underlies every hierophany: in making itself manifest, the sacred limits itself.

**Theophany and Kratophany.** Although *hierophany* is an inclusive term, one can distinguish different types of hierophany. They depend on the form in which the sacred appears, and the meaning with which the sacred imbues the form. In some instances, a hierophany reveals the presence of a divinity. That is, the hierophany is a theophany, the appearance of a god. Theophanies differ widely from one another in form and meaning, depending upon the nature of the divine form appearing in them. A glance at the gods in the pantheon of South Asian mythology or in Aztec mythology shows that divinities can differ markedly in revealing various divine forms of the sacred, even within the same culture. Needless to say, theophanies from different cultures (e.g., Baal, the storm god of the ancient Semites; Viracocha, the creator god of the Inca; and Amaterasu, the Japanese deity of the sun and ancestress of the imperial line) manifest quite different modalities of the sacred. In the form of divine persons, theophanies reveal the distinct religious values of organic life, cosmic order, or the elementary forces of blood and fertility, as well as of purer and more sublime aspects.

A second type of hierophany may be termed a kratophany, a manifestation of power. Kratophanies preserve the sacred in all its ambivalence, both attracting and repelling with its brute power. The unusual, the new, and the strange frequently function as kratophanies. These things, persons, or places can be dangerous and defiling as well as sacred. Corpses, criminals, and the sick often function as kratophanies. Human beings in powerful or ambivalent circumstances (such as women in menses, soldiers, hunters, kings with absolute power, or executioners) are hedged around with taboos and restrictions. People approach sacred foods with etiquette and manners designed to ward off defilement, sickness, and pollution. The precautions that surround saints, sacrificers, and healers stem from fear of confronting the sacred. Kratophanies emphasize the extent to which the manifestation of the sacred intrudes on the order of things. Kratophanies also bring out the contradictory attitude displayed by human beings in regard to all that is sacred. On the one hand, contact with hierophanies secures, renews, and strengthens one's own reality. On the other hand, total immersion in the sacred (or an improper encounter with it) annihilates one's profane existence, an essential dimension of life.

In any case, a hierophany (whether in the form of a theophany or kratophany) reveals the power, the force, and the holiness of the sacred. Even the forces of nature

are revered for their power to sanctify life; that is, to make fertility holy. The forces of nature that appear in divine forms or in certain objects make reproductive life partake of the unbounded power and plenty of the sacred.

**Impact on Space and Time.** Hierophanies directly affect the situation of human existence, the condition by which humans understand their own nature and grasp their destiny. For example, hierophanies alter the fundamental structures of space and time. Every hierophany transforms the place in which it appears, so that a profane place becomes a sacred precinct. For Aboriginal peoples of Australia, for example, the landscape of their native lands is alive. Its smallest details are charged with the meanings revealed in myth. Because the sacred first appeared in those places (to guarantee a food supply and to teach humans how to feed themselves), they become an inexhaustible source of power and sacrality. Humans can return to these places in each generation, to commune with the power that has revealed itself there. In fact, the Aboriginal peoples express a religious need to remain in direct contact with those sites that are hierophanic. One may say that the hierophany, connected with the transformed place of its appearance, is capable of repeating itself. The conviction is widespread that hierophanies recur in a place where the sacred has once appeared. This explains why human habitations and cities are constructed near sanctuaries. Ceremonies of consecration, ground-breaking, or foundation-laying for temples, shrines, sacred cities, capitals, and even bridges and houses, frequently repeat or echo acts of fundamental hierophanies, such as the creation of the world. At times they even provoke a sign indicating the location of a hierophany (e.g., the release of an animal and the sacrifice of it on the spot where it is later found; or geomancy). These rituals of foundation and construction ensure that the site will perpetuate the presence of a hierophany that first appeared within the bounds of a similarly structured location and event. The precincts for festival and ceremony are frequently consecrated for the occasion in this way. Thus, for example, the Yuin, the Wiradjuri, and the Kamilaroi, Aboriginal groups of Australia, prepare a sacred ground for their initiation ceremonies. The ground represents the camp of Baiame, the supreme being.

Hierophanies also transform time. A hierophany marks a breakthrough from profane to magico-religious time. Just as spaces sacralized by a hierophany may be reconstructed through acts of consecration, so the acts of hierophany are repeated in the sacred calendar of each year. Rituals that repeat the moment of a hierophany re-create the conditions of the world in which the sacred originally appeared, and at that moment

when the sacred manifests itself again in the same way, extraordinary power overwhelms the profane succession of time. New Year ceremonies are among the most striking examples of the periodic re-creation of the world in a state as fresh, powerful, and promising as it was in the beginning. Any fragment of time (e.g., the phases of the moon, the transitions of the human life cycle, the solstices, the rainy seasons, the breeding cycles of animals, the growth cycles of plants) may at any moment become hierophanic. If it witnesses the occurrence of a kratophany or theophany, the moment itself becomes transfigured or consecrated. It will be remembered and repeated. The rhythms of nature are evaluated for their power as hierophanies; that is, for signs of the power to renew and recommence cosmic life. Furthermore, hierophanic moments of time are not limited to cosmic rhythms of nature or biology. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, human history is transfigured into a theophany. The manifestation of God in time guarantees the religious value of Christian images and symbols such as the cross, the holy mountain of Calvary, and the cosmic tree.

**Implications for the Study of Symbolic Life.** The transfiguration of so many objects into symbols of something else, some sacred reality, has repercussions for understanding the nature of symbols. [See Symbolism.] The study of hierophanies penetrates the meaning of the symbolic life and uncovers the function of symbolism in general. Humans have an innate sense of the symbolic, and all their activities imply symbolism. In particular, religious acts have a symbolic character. From the instant it becomes religious, every act or object is imbued with a significance that is symbolic, referring to supernatural values and realities.

Symbols relate to the sacred in several ways. Sometimes symbolic forms become sacred because they embody directly the spirit or power of transcendent beings (e.g., stones that are the souls of the dead, or represent a god). In these cases the hierophany is effected by a symbolism directly associated with the actual form (i.e., a form apprehended by religious experience, rather than empirical or rational experience) of stone, water, plant, or sky.

At other times the meaning of a religious form may derive from symbolism that is less clear. Religious objects become hierophanies in a less direct way, through the medium of symbolic existence itself. They acquire a religious quality because of the symbolism that imbues them with religious meaning. That is, they become sacred because of their location within a symbolic system. Their sacrality depends upon a consciousness able to make theoretical connections between symbolic expres-

sions. In such cases, the hierophany is effected by the transformation of concrete forms into a nexus of cosmological principles and powers.

For example, the symbolism that has surrounded the pearl throughout history works to transform it into a "cosmological center" that draws together key religious meanings associated with the moon, women, fertility, and birth. [See Pearl.] The symbolism of the pearl is quite ancient. Pearls appear in prehistoric graves and have a long history of use in magic and medicine. Careful inspection of myths of pearls in many cultures reveals that water imbues pearls with its germinative force. Pearls were included in ritual offerings to river gods. Some pearls have magical power because they were born of the moon. The pearl is like a fetus, and for this reason women wear pearls to come in contact with the fertile powers of hidden creative processes within shells, in amniotic waters, and in the moon. Pearls have also been used in the cure of illnesses associated with the moon. Placed in tombs, pearls renewed the life of the dead by putting them in contact with the powerful regenerative rhythms of the moon, water, and femininity. Covered in pearls, the dead are plunged once more into the cycle of birth, life, death, and rebirth—the career of living forms intimately bound to the moon. In sum, the pearl becomes a hierophany when humans become aware of the cosmological pattern of water, moon, women, and change.

This kind of sacred symbolism has its origins in theory; specifically, a theory of symbols. What gives the sacred object in question (e.g., a pearl) its rich and full religious meaning is the framework of symbolism surrounding it. This is triggered by an awareness of the wider symbolic universe. This conclusion has importance for understanding the role of human reflection in the origin of certain hierophanies. An object becomes sacred, becomes the locus of a hierophany, when humankind becomes aware of the cosmological pattern of principles (e.g., water, moon, change, the cycle of death and birth) centered in it. The theoretical links make possible the experience of the full range of sacrality. The form draws its full meaning from the symbolism that surrounds it and of which it is a part. In fact, symbols extend the range of hierophanies. Objects not directly the locus of a hierophany may become sacred because of their envelopment in a web or pattern of symbolism.

Two related statements should now be made separately. The first consideration is that hierophanies can become symbols. In this respect, symbols are important because they can sustain or even substitute for hierophanies. However, symbols play an even more star-

ting and creative role in religious life: they carry on the process of hierophanization. In fact, the symbol itself is sometimes a hierophany; that is, it reveals a sacred reality which no other manifestation can uncover. A hierophany in its own right, symbolism affords an unbroken solidarity between humankind (*homo symbolicus*) and the sacred. Extending the dialectic of hierophanies, symbolism transforms objects into something other than what they appear to be in the natural sphere. Through symbolism any worldly item may become a sign of transcendent reality and an embodiment of the sacredness of an entire symbolic system. Indeed, we may say that symbolism itself reflects the human need to extend infinitely the process of hierophanization. Looking upon the remarkable number of forms that have manifested the sacred throughout the broad history of religions, one concludes that symbolic life tends to identify the universe as a whole with hierophany and thereby opens human existence to a significant world.

[See also the entries Revelation and Sacred and the Profane, The.]

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MIRCEA ELIADE and LAWRENCE E. SULLIVAN

**HIEROS GAMOS**, Greek for "sacred marriage," "sacred wedding feast," or "sacred sexual intercourse," is the technical term of a mythical or ritual union between a god and a goddess, more generally a divine and a human being, and most especially a king and a goddess. The term has had its widest use in the study of kingship in the city cultures of the ancient Near East. [See Kingship, *article on* Kingship in the Ancient Mediterranean World.] The fundamental symbolism however is that of the union of man and woman, a set of opposites as general and as readily available as the opposites east and west, north and south, sky and earth. The latter, sky and earth, are often presented as endowed with sexual characteristics and are therefore inseparable from our subject.

It is useful to state in this introductory orientation that a lingering Victorian prudishness in twentieth-century scholarship, embarrassed and at the same time fascinated by sexual symbolism, has occasionally singled out *hieros gamos* configurations for undue attention. It has done so with euphemisms, adumbrations, and unwarranted explanations, oblivious to the fact that in most civilizations other than those of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe and America, sexual references are not matters for this sort of secretiveness. (Typically, in learned translations textual passages with descriptions of pudenda, intercourse, harlots, courtesans, and so on, were translated into Latin until at least the middle of the twentieth century.) It is essential nevertheless to understand sacred marriage symbolism in advanced cultures in the first place as a variation on much older, very general symbolic expressions. The rather mechanistic and blanket explanation of sacred marriage rites as a stimulus or magic for bringing about fertility in people, animals, and fields, in the wake of scholarship by Wilhelm Mannhardt (1831–1880) and James G. Frazer (1854–1941), cannot do full justice to the poetry, profundity, dramatic quality, and complexity of our documents.

**Ancient Roots.** The French prehistorian André Leroi-Gourhan (b. 1911) was led to the conclusion that certain signs and figures in the art of Paleolithic hunter cultures that stretched from Spain and France into Siberia form a coherent whole in their expressions, in both signs and representations. Among these expressions is the polarity of female and male symbols, for instance, the bison (female) and the horse (male). The American prehistorian Marija Gimbutas has collected a large number of art objects discovered in eastern Europe, dated from c. 7000 to 3500 BCE, hence before the rise of the earliest civilizations in the Near East, and in that large collection the vast majority of objects is conspicuously re-

lated to female forms, conjunctions of male and female, and parturition. Details of interpretation are difficult to assess, but we are aided by the wide distribution of identical or comparable symbolizations in later cultures, of which the meaning is clearer; they allow us to see general patterns. These very ancient signs and images presuppose articulate languages and mythologies. Moreover, with respect to our subject, we may safely infer that "sexual" and "marital" topics were focal points in religious expression.

Mention must also be made of the fact that next to a sexual union between heaven and earth, of the type of Ouranos and Gaia in Hesiod's *Theogony* and Dyaus and Pṛthivī in the Vedic texts, we have documentation of supreme beings that are often called "bisexual." Such a being is both one and two, male and female at the same time. Being two in one, divinities of this type are more properly called "androgynous" than "bisexual." [See Androgynes.] The ancient Mexican supreme being is Ometecuhtli-Omecihuatl ("father-mother"). The figure of Apna-Apha ("our-mother-our-father") occurs in a place on Kisar, an island in the Moluccas. The Konyak Nagas of Assam know a supreme being Ga-Wang ("earth-sky"). It is noteworthy that in several of these cases the female or earth element is mentioned first and seems to be the more important aspect, and also that in a number of myths earth and sky are said to have been one in the beginning, and the act of creation consisted in separating the two.

All these imageries from prehistory and from a variety of tribal cultures are essential for our understanding of the *hieros gamos* symbolism as a particularly fertile imagery in several cultures, each with its own historical impulses and developments that, like the earlier symbolisms, have their focus in the fullness of existence. What sets the later *hieros gamos* apart from its earlier forms is a more highly developed dramatic expression and a tangible association with (political and economic) power.

**Agriculture and Sexual Symbolism.** The invention of agriculture, the novelty of a community's life henceforward depending on grain or rice, represents a tremendous change. Scholars have become reluctant to exaggerate the significance of this change because of the recent work on prehistory; they are now inclined to see more than mere "hunting magic" in prehistoric art forms and to detect in them much more articulateness and subtlety. Hence the sudden emergence of agriculture may appear less as a break with the past and more as a radical transformation. Tilling the soil is an act performed on the (female) earth. Archaic digging sticks are commonly depicted as phalli. Quite literally, the work of the farmer is a sexual ritual. The process of gen-

eration, though certainly not unknown before, now becomes a process in which all forms of existence and the preserving and safeguarding of life itself are at stake. The seasons take on a new significance, and the great goddess is the one who rules over the calendar, that is, over time, as well as over the material world. [See Agriculture.]

In the protohistorical civilization of the Indus Valley such a goddess played a role, and the artifacts make clear that she and others elsewhere were associated or identified with the physical expression of vegetational power. The goddess's power is not necessarily linked with a male partner, and even when she is so linked (as is Devī, the great goddess of Hinduism, with Śiva), her uniqueness, or her transcendental character, is not diminished. She is the one inexhaustible source of all that is. [See Goddess Worship.] Agricultural production has obviously made its marks on religious expression, yet it would be unwarranted speculation to see even in her a figure completely different from the prehistoric female forms of thousands of years earlier, such as the so-called Venus of Willendorf or the Venus of Lespugue, or to deny all continuity with the past.

The goddess's power is expressed in her ability to generate all by herself; her characteristic function is that of *generatrix* (Przyluski, 1950), and the participation of a male is secondary or irrelevant. Comparison to "ordinary" motherhood is misleading. We are dealing with a religious symbol, and her giving birth by herself points to what in abstract language would be her essential transcendent reality. Typically, a Vedic text (*R̥gveda* 10.125) refers to the goddess Vāc (Speech) as the queen of the land and bringer of treasures, but also as the first to partake of the sacrifice (i.e., before the other deities) and as the one who really moves when any of the principal gods move. In other words, she is the ultimate ruler even over the divine world.

How can such absolute transcendence be grasped? Here the "classical" marital symbolism of the Neolithic and agricultural world, with its own prehistoric roots, makes its force felt. The farmer's work is the outer circle of a series of concentric circles. In the symbolic expressions sexual and marital imagery forms the center.

The economic change brought about by agriculture is the one aspect most immediately visible to a modern spectator. No doubt it is significant that for the first time staple food could be stored. (One understands at once that, from an economic standpoint, this is the birth of a true notion of capital, for without some degree of permanence, "capital" remains a hazy concept.) The ability to store grain creates the conditions necessary for larger communities. These facts are all of significance for the historian, yet they are abstract infer-



ences from situations of which archaeological finds, ancient art objects, icons, temples, and myths speak directly and concretely. For example, in the culture of ancient Greece, grain was stored in vessels that were half buried in the earth, and such vessels were the place where divinities of the earth (chthonic deities) appeared.

The acts of a great goddess, the divine character of the earth, the significance of women, the ritual nature of work on the land and its bond with sexual involvement all amount to a new, total experience of the everyday world and its ultimate foundation. How novel this entire symbolism was we can see from the frequency and the ferocity with which outsiders have tried to destroy it. The expansion of Indo-European tribes (c. 3000 to 1500 BCE) religiously pastoral rather than agricultural in orientation, set civilization back considerably (Gimbutas, 1982). Various nomadic raids in North-west India and also much later conquests by Muslim invaders, who, like the Indo-Europeans, were basically pastoral in their religious orientation, made havoc of temples; the invaders were particularly provoked by sensual imagery (which for Muslims included the unveiled faces of goddesses and nymphs sculptured in sanctuaries).

In its turn, agricultural life itself became established and traditional; sexual rituals persisted. These latter have rightly drawn the attention of well-known scholars (such as Mannhardt, Frazer, J. J. Meyer, and many others) not only to rites in ancient societies but also in continuing folk customs. The power of naked women to increase the harvest is attested by a number of cultic ceremonies. Images of prehistoric, protohistoric, and traditional goddesses show the ancient significance of nudity, as do those of fully dressed goddesses alternating with trees with dense foliage (Przyluski, 1950). Prosperity and abundance are symbolically integrated in the dynamic of ritual life. Mannhardt and Frazer have recorded many instances where the sex act itself was believed to be an effective magic. [See also Sexuality.] The explanation of "magic" makes sense if only we bear in mind that it owes its existence to a coherent vision of this world and its divine complement.

Perhaps many older, prehistoric images of goddesses or perhaps many prehistoric artistic designs interweaving male and female characteristics anticipated comparable ideas and hopes. Whatever the likelihood of this suggestion, there is no doubt that full-fledged agricultural societies, even at a very early date, were in a special position to focus on certain aspects of the symbolism.

**Early City-States and Hierodouloi.** The *hieros gamos* as a royal ritual is the creation of early city-states built

on the wealth provided by agriculture. Far from putting an end to the "primitive" village cults, they expanded and stylized them with forms that were derived from, and were variations of, earlier symbolism. One of these is the sexual union of the king and a "priestess" as an episode in the lengthy ancient Babylonian Akitu (New Year) festival. The model for this rite is already given in Sumerian myths and temple customs. It is true that our knowledge of religious practices among the common people of the ancient Mesopotamian world is inadequate, but we do know that in this world the main ritual procedures for the entire populace were carried out through the mediation of rulers and religious specialists of various kinds. [See *New Year Festivals and, especially, Akitu.*]

Around 2100 BCE King Gudea had a temple built for the god Ningirsu, who had appeared to him in a dream. Among the rites performed in the new temple was the sacred wedding ceremony of the god and his consort Baba, lasting seven days. Apparently such a marriage was an expected part in the liturgy for each one of the important deities already present in Sumerian culture, as it was later in Babylonian cults, and still later throughout Assyrian and also West Semitic cults.

The *hieros gamos* rite, attached to the New Year festival and celebrated in various cultic centers, symbolized the union of the king of the city and the city's goddess, represented sometimes by the king's consort, more often by a *hierodoulē*, a female servant of the sanctuary, a "priestess." (It may be misleadingly derogatory to translate the Sumerian or Akkadian terms as "sacred prostitute.") [See *Hierodouleia.*] Many bloody sacrifices were offered, functioning, as has been suggested, as wedding gifts, but certainly losing none of their proper sacrificial value, involving man in activities brimming with the risks of encountering the divine world and venturing his existence in the time to come on this encounter. The entire wedding in the ritual is a replica, a visible counterpart, of the celestial union. Not only was the *hierodoulē* the personification of a goddess, but also the king might be said to represent a god, if only some qualifications are made.

An early prototype of the ritual is the Sumerian story of the goddess Inanna and her relation to Dumuzi. The latter is depicted as a shepherd boy with whom the supreme, all-powerful goddess fell in love. In the drama the goddess descends into the netherworld for reasons that are not altogether clear but are certainly related to her ambition to perfect her rule by extending it even over the realm of the dead. She is defeated in her attempt, and her "elder sister," Ereshkigal (the queen of the great below) makes no exception in her case; she fixes "the look of death" on Inanna. Inanna cannot es-

cape unless a substitute is found. She vows to find one. In her absence, Dumuzi, her love, spends his time with all the paraphernalia of wealth and power, occupying the throne. Although Inanna had no intention of consigning him to the netherworld in her place, she now fixes "the look of death" on him and orders the demons to take him away and torture him. The story ends in a compromise, whereby Dumuzi will be on earth for half the year, and the other half in the realm of death.

It is this type of mythological configuration that served as a model for the Sumero-Akkadian kings, and it is this type of mythology with its many themes, sub-themes, and variations that formed the pattern of kingship and religion in the entire world of the ancient Near East. *Ezekiel* 8:14 is one of the texts in the tradition of Israel strongly opposed to most of the religious customs connected with the *hieros gamos*; it tells us of women who (ritually) bewailed the fate of Tammuz (Dumuzi) at the gates of the temple. A considerable number of details make it not at all unlikely that also the gospel story of Jesus Christ owes some of its features to the myth of the dying shepherd-god (Kramer, 1969). Dumuzi (Tammuz) is not really presented as a god, and originally he was no god but rather a (human) king whose marriage to the great goddess (Inanna-Ishtar) was required to confer a sacred certainty, a future, and wealth on his land.

It is clear that kingship demanded a sacred foundation that could be provided only through the omnipotence of the great goddess. However, the complexity of the story of Inanna and Dumuzi, even in summary, allows us to see more than a utilitarian purpose, or a mere generalization on an ideology of kingship. The sacred marriage, far from being a mere cerebrally thought-out, politically effective ceremony, is a manner of coming to terms with the extreme agonies of human existence: defeat vis-à-vis death, the ultimate frustration of any attempt to amass power or wealth, in spite of the necessity to do so. Both the certainty of death and the uncertainty of power and wealth are not only facts of life; they are experiences in the ultimate drama, to be relived each year. The king's place, and through his mediation, man's place in the relationship to the goddess and her partner, allow for an initiation into the mystery of existence. Obviously, this is much more than a clarification concerning a destiny after death or an explanation or stimulus for the sowing and reaping of grain, or a comment on the life and death cycle of cereals.

In Babylonian religion, the rule of the supreme god Marduk, just like that of his divine partner Ishtar (the Akkadian name of Inanna), is not limited to one area. Although the goddess's myth shows her as not alto-

gether successful in her journey to the netherworld, she does return and her rule is emphatically presented as universal. In contrast, in the earliest myths, Dumuzi remains associated with pastoral life, and the impression is given that rule on earth has its limits; this same impression is also given in later times. Such rule, however, must have its basis in the *hieros gamos*.

That the certainty of rule over the land and its well-being is of the utmost concern is borne out by the king's determination of destiny. Just as the god Marduk's rule was established when he received the "tablets of fate" (in the *Enuma elish*, the most famous creation myth), the king shows himself as king in fixing the rules and regulations that keep the universe functioning properly. The ritual by which he does so is complex, but it is related to the Akitu festival, and the sacred marriage itself is to be regarded as a "third form for the determination of destiny" (Pallis, 1926). Clearly, the union with the goddess is of paramount importance for rule on earth.

**The Power and Love of the Goddess.** We have seen that the one most striking theme in the mythology and rituals of the sacred marriage is the power of the goddess. It is associated with war and destructive anger but also with irresistible life and with love. This mythology is the root of much love poetry, even in traditions that, with Israel, rejected its symbols and rituals. The words of the *Song of Songs* 8:6, "love is strong as death," derive their force and meaning from the same revolutionary reorientation in the history of mankind that created the *hieros gamos* symbolism. [See also Love.]

Although the Mesopotamian imagery of the sacred marriage is the earliest on record, comparable symbolisms have arisen in other religions (e.g., Mexico and India)—always in an agricultural context and in a tropical or temperate region more or less close to the equator. Contrary to ideas that dominated scholarship for a long time, supreme goddesses are not primarily mothers but lovers. When supreme male deities come to the fore, such as Marduk in Babylon or Viṣṇu and Śiva in Hinduism, the devotee turns generally not to the male but to the female partner of the couple, from whom flows grace and who in her loving relation provides the perfect bridge. In the devotional experience of Vaiṣṇavism (the religion of the distinctly royal, masculine, yet compassionate god Viṣṇu), the devotee calls instinctively on Lakṣmī (Śrī), Viṣṇu's consort, who is depicted in Hindu literature as accessible, even more accessible than Viṣṇu himself. Through many waves of cultural history and religious change the very early experience of the great goddess's love is still tangible.

Perhaps most noteworthy, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, most especially in Tibet, the goddess Tārā has pre-

served her popularity, in spite of the traditional prominence of the male element in Buddhism, in which according to an almost general consensus only a final birth as a man can open the way to *nirvāṇa*. Tārā however is ranked on the same level as the *bodhisattvas*, those who are prepared to enter *nirvāṇa* but decide not to do so and decide instead to assist the as yet unsaved world. Again, through the female, bliss is most accessible.

[See also Marriage.]

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KEES W. BOLLE

#### HIGH GODS. See Supreme Beings.

**HIJIRI** are Japanese lay ascetics and influential antagonists of priests and monks. The role of the *hijiri* in Japanese folk religion is far more important than that of the ministers of the official religions (priests and monks in Shintō and Buddhism, respectively). The *hijiri* is in many ways the spokesman of the common man. *Hijiri* are the forerunners of the lay leaders of modern Japanese sects, who are considered to embody the spirit of that traditional role. The concept of *hijiri* dates back to the earliest known period of Japanese history, when the *hijiri* (lit., "he who knows the sun") determined and appointed the years, months, and days, and must have been connected with an unofficial and spontaneous cult of the sun goddess Amaterasu. The *hijiri* gradually came to be considered a sage, the one who, like the sun, let the light of his knowledge shine on others. He must have been a charismatic leader, endowed, like a shaman, with supernatural powers and natural skills.

The transmission of Taoism and Confucianism to Japan expanded the meaning of *hijiri* to include the Chinese ideas of the *hsien*, the mountain ascetic and hermit, the *sheng-hsien*, the virtuous hermit, and the *sheng-jen*, the holy one or "ultimate man." As the one who is believed to reconcile in himself the opposites of *mu* and *wu*, of nonbeing and being, life and death, male and female, the *hijiri* was considered to live in happiness in the hereafter.

The introduction of Buddhism into Japan in 538 added still other meanings to the notion of *hijiri*. In Buddhism a *hijiri* became in the eyes of the laity the sacred and highly respected antagonist of its official ministers, the monks in their hierarchical ranks. He was believed to be the ideal *ubasoku* (Skt., *upāsaka*, "layman"). In the *Nihonshoki*, one of the oldest Japanese chronicles, two prominent Buddhist lay leaders, the Korean king Song (sixth century) and the Japanese prince regent Shōtoku Taishi (574–622), are depicted as *hijiri*. After Shōtoku Taishi's death the monk Eji cried, "He was verily a great *hijiri*" (Kamstra, 1967, p. 424). As *hijiri*, these leaders combined the old Japanese idea of the wise man and the Chinese ideas of the virtuous, ascetic, and ultimate man with that of the holy *upāsaka*.

A few decades later, people who showed special skill also came to be called *hijiri*. We find *go no hijiri*, experts in *go*; *waka no hijiri*, experts in *waka* (Japanese poems); and *sake no hijiri*, experts in producing *sake* (rice wine). From the eighth century on, the *hijiri* gradually became protectors of the common people against the *goryōshin*, the angry spirits of those who did not die like decent people. In doing so, they followed patterns of life different from those of monks and priests: they did not settle down, but wandered in the mountains and from village to village and city to city. They followed one of three kinds of religious and magical practices: *nembutsu* (invocation of the name of the Buddha Amida), Shugendō (mountain asceticism based on Tantrism and Shintō shamanism), and *yin-yang* magic. The most prominent of these three groups were without any doubt the *nembutsu-hijiri*. They served not only to protect against the threat of angry spirits but also performed memorial rites to the spirits of the dead consisting of the recitation of the most powerful *sūtras*. Sometimes they chanted these texts while dancing the *nembutsu* dance. *Hijiri* who gave up their wandering life and settled down lost claim to the title. Some fell to the lowest classes and became producers of bamboo wares, stage actors, or puppet performers. From the fourteenth century onward, the name *hijiri* was also applied to laymen who performed special tasks in Buddhist temples or monasteries. Some of these lay *hijiri* (*zoku hijiri*)

served as bell ringers, gardeners, Buddha hall keepers, pagoda keepers, and grave keepers.

[See also Nien-fo; Shugendō; and Onmyōdō.]

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J. H. KAMSTRA

**HILDEBRAND.** See Gregory VII.

**HILDESHEIMER, ESRIEL** (1820–1899), German rabbi and founder of the Orthodox Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin. Hildesheimer was born in Halberstadt, Germany, and was educated in the first Orthodox school in Germany to include secular subjects in its curriculum. He continued his studies with Jacob Ettlinger and Isaac Bernays, rabbis who combined their traditional observance with a receptivity to contemporary thought. Both men encouraged Hildesheimer's interest in secular learning, and under their influence he went on to the universities of Berlin and Halle; from the latter he received in 1846 a Ph.D. for a study of the Septuagint. Hildesheimer emerged from his early years as a staunch opponent of Reform Judaism and a major proponent of the modern Orthodox philosophy of *torah 'im derekh erets*, Samson Raphael Hirsch's slogan that affirmed the worth of modern Western culture and traditional Jewish study and belief.

Hildesheimer's first opportunity to realize his ambitions for the creation of a "cultured Orthodoxy" came in 1851, when he became rabbi of the Jewish community in Eisenstadt, Hungary (now in Austria). There he established the first *yeshivah* in the modern world to have a secular component in its regular course of study. This innovation earned Hildesheimer the wrath of many Orthodox traditionalists in Hungary, and as a result he returned to Germany in 1869. In Berlin he became rabbi of the separatist Orthodox congregation Adass Jisroel. In 1873, with the opening of the Orthodox Rabbinical Seminary, Hildesheimer realized his dream

of a school that would train rabbis committed to both Jewish Orthodoxy and *Wissenschaft des Judentums* (the modern scholarly study of Judaism). This institution gained Hildesheimer a position of leadership among Orthodox Jews, and his institutional accomplishments mark him as a major architect of modern Jewish Orthodoxy.

Hildesheimer himself produced a number of scholarly works; the most prominent is a critical edition (1890) of *Halakhot gedolot*, an important geonic work. In addition, he founded in 1870 a German-language newspaper, *Die jüdische Presse*, for the dissemination of his views. His opinions on contemporary issues are also reflected in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (1923), a collection of his major polemical/apologetic essays. His Jewish legal rulings, *Teshuvot Rabbi 'Esri'el* (1969–1976), have appeared in two volumes.

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DAVID ELLENSON

**HILLEL** (c. 50 BCE–early first century CE), Jewish sage and teacher. Although several modern scholars claim that Hillel, known as "the Elder," had Alexandrian roots, there is no reason to doubt the Talmudic tradition that he was a native of Babylonia. Hillel was a disciple of Shema'yah and Avtalyon, who preceded Hillel and his colleague Shammai as the two leading teachers, or "pairs" (*zugot*), in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem (Palestinian) Talmud reports (*Pes.* 6.1, 33a, where Hillel is

called "the Babylonian") that Hillel was designated *nasi'* (patriarch, i.e., head of the court) in recognition for having been able to resolve a difficult question of Jewish law on the basis of a tradition he heard from Shema'yah and Avtalyon. The later patriarchs were regarded as descendants of Hillel, who in turn was said to have been a scion of the house of David (J. T., *Ta'an.* 4.2, 68a). Most scholars do not take the latter claim seriously, as Davidic ancestry is also assigned to the Hasmonaeans, Herodians, Jesus, Yehudah ha-Nasi', and the Babylonian exilarchs. It is possible that Hillel is to be identified with Pollio (Pollion), the Pharisee who appears in the *Jewish Antiquities* (15.3, 15.370) of Josephus Flavius (37/8–c.100), but this may be a reference to Avtalyon.

Talmudic tradition portrays Hillel as a great spiritual leader who embodied the qualities of humility, patience, peace, love of Torah, and social concern. Many of the well-known sayings attributed to Hillel in *Mishnah Avot* (chaps. 1 and 2) emphasize these ideals. For example: "Be of the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving people and bringing them near to the Torah." "A name made great is a name destroyed." "If I am not for myself who is for me? And when I am for myself, what am I? And if not now when?" "Do not separate yourself from the community." "Do not judge your fellow until you are in his position." A popular tradition (B.T., Shab. 31a) illustrates Hillel's forbearance and contrasts it with the impatience of Shammai, who often appears as his foil. Shammai is said to have rebuffed a heathen who demanded of him: "Make me a proselyte on condition that you teach me the entire Torah while I stand on one foot." When approached by the same heathen Hillel responded, "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow man. That is the whole Torah, the rest is commentary. Go and learn it." This negative formulation of what eventually circulated as the Golden Rule, like many of Hillel's sayings, has parallels in ancient literature (e.g., *Tb.* 4:15), so the intention is not simply to relate the uniqueness or essence of Judaism. Here Hillel appears as the teacher *par excellence*; in one utterance he conveys that the central ideals of Judaism are easily delineated, but the path to their fulfillment can be discerned only through further study and commitment.

Several social *taqqanot* ("enactments") are associated with Hillel. The most important of these is the *prozbul*, a legal instrument that enabled creditors to claim their debts after the sabbatical year though biblical law (*Dt.* 15.2) prohibited it (*Shevi'it* 10.3). The biblical law was intended to protect the poor in an agricultural society. In later times, when the economy depended upon the

free flow of credit, people would refrain from lending as the sabbatical year drew near because they feared the money owed them would not be collectible. By means of the *prozbul*, creditors transferred their bonds to the court, thereby retaining the right to collect after the sabbatical year.

Hillel's interest in the intention of the biblical text and its practical application to daily life may be the reason he is credited (Tosefta *San.* 7.11) with the promulgation of seven exegetical principles (*middot*), several of which were known to have existed earlier. These principles were expanded to thirteen by the second century tanna Yishma'e'l ben Elisha' (*Sifra*, intro.). While there are very few instances where Hillel (or for that matter, Beit Hillel, the school of thought named after him) is reported to have employed these principles (see B.T., *Pes.* 66a; J.T., *Pes.* 6.1, 33a), their importance increased in the later tannaitic and amoraic periods.

Hillel's significance has been assessed in various ways, all of which acknowledge that he was a pivotal figure in Judaism during the late first century BCE and the early first century CE. Joseph Klausner, Alexander Guttmann, and Judah Goldin have regarded the sage as responsible for establishing the importance of intellect and interpretation along with tradition. David Daube has suggested that Hillel created the basis for the development of Jewish law, narrowing the differences between the Pharisees and Sadducees by showing how the oral law is inherent in the written. Jacob Neusner has credited Hillel with the transformation of the Pharisees from a political party to a society of "pious sectarians" committed to "table-fellowship," that is, to the meticulous observance of tithing laws and the eating of everyday meals in a state of ritual purity.

[See also Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.]

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STUART S. MILLER

**HILLĪ, AL-** (AH 648–726/1250–1326 CE), more fully Jamāl al-Dīn Abū Manṣūr al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn 'Alī ibn al-Muṭahhar, known as 'Allāmah ("great scholar" or "sage") al-Ḥillī after Hillah, a great center of Shī'ī learning in southern Iraq; hence, a number of famous scholars are known as al-Ḥillī.

Al-Ḥillī studied first with his father and then with his famous maternal uncle, Najm al-Dīn Abū al-Qāsim Ja'far ibn Sa'īd al-Ḥillī, known as "the Foremost Scholar" (al-Muḥaqqiq al-Awwal), as well as with a number of other Shī'ī and Sunnī scholars. His mentor in philosophy and theology was the controversial astrologer, theologian, and philosopher Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274).

Al-Ḥillī wrote in all the religious and rational sciences, as well as in biography, Arabic grammar, and rhetoric. He was the first to apply the scientific study (*'ilm*) of the *ḥadīth* ("traditions") to Shī'ī tradition, and his methodology remains normative in Shī'ī *ḥadīth* scholarship. The method, however, earned him the hostility of the Akhbārī scholars, who accepted all the traditions in the four Shī'ī *ḥadīth* collections as sound.

The majority of al-Ḥillī's works, numbering over one hundred, or according to some accounts five hundred, have been lost. Among his ten published works, all of them standard textbooks in jurisprudence and theology, is *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-i'tiqād*, a commentary on *Tajrīd al-i'tiqād* (Divesting the Creed [of All Details]), a Shī'ī creed by Ṭūsī. This commentary has superseded all other works on Shī'ī dogmatics. Al-Ḥillī's treatise *Al-bāb al-ḥādī 'ashar* (The Eleventh Chapter) is an important creed and has been translated into English. It was appended to another of his important works, *Minhāj al-ṣalāḥ fī ikhtisār al-Miṣbāḥ* (The Proper Way to Abridge *The Lamp*), an abridgement of Abū Ja'far Ṭūsī's *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* (The Lamp of the Vigilant [in the Night Prayers]).

Around 1305 al-Ḥillī traveled to Persia, where he engaged in many debates with leading Sunnī scholars. Under his influence the eighth Il-khanid sultan of Persia, Öljeitü Khudā-Banda, who had been first a Christian, later a Buddhist, and then a Ḥanafī Sunnī Muslim, was converted to Twelver Shiism. Under Öljeitü the names of the twelve Shī'ī imams were inscribed on

mosques, and coins were struck in their names. Thus for the first time, however briefly, Twelver Shiism was officially recognized as the state religion of Iran.

'Allāmah al-Ḥillī, a contemporary of Ibn Taymīyah and other noted Sunnī scholars, was both admired for his great learning and attacked and vilified as a leading and influential Shī'ī scholar. He was honored by being buried at Najaf in the shrine of 'Alī, the first Shī'ī imam (and not, as William M. Miller, Dwight M. Donaldson, and S. Husain Jafri mistakenly assert, in Mashhad, Iran: "al-Mashhad al-Ghurawī" is an honorific title for the shrine of 'Alī in Najaf). Al-Ḥillī's tomb in Najaf is well known and often visited by pilgrims.

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MAHMOUD M. AYOUB

**HIMALAYAN RELIGIONS.** Along the Himalayan mountain chain runs one of the major cultural, linguistic, and racial divides of the Asian continent. In the highlands of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Arunachal Pradesh archaic tribal religions dovetail and overlap with Buddhism and Hinduism; speakers of Indo-Aryan languages live side by side with peoples of Tibeto-Burman tongues, and such cultural contrasts are paralleled by a racial complexity resulting from the mingling of Mongoloid and Caucasoid elements. Over this kaleidoscopic scene composed of a multitude of heterogeneous ethnic groups religious phenomena are scattered unevenly.

**Nepal.** In the highlands of Nepal advanced civilizations rich in scriptural traditions have long coexisted with preliterate tribal cultures, and the Kathmandu Valley, the homeland of the ancient Newar people, has seen a succession of sophisticated ideologies and art styles with strong religious overtones.

The earliest documents relating to religious practices in the Kathmandu Valley go back to the period of the Licchavi kings (300–870 CE). In the tolerant ideological climate of that time several faiths flourished side by side. The dominant religions were Hinduism and Buddhism, both of which had absorbed elements of various local cults. Indigenous mother goddesses rivaled in importance such Brahmanic deities as Śiva and Viṣṇu,

and the Buddhist pantheon was infiltrated by innumerable demigods and demons.

In the fifth century CE two great Buddhist monuments, the stupas of Svayambhunath and Bodhnath, rose on the outskirts of Kathmandu; today these sanctuaries continue to attract thousands of pilgrims, some coming from as far as Ladakh or Sikkim. Communities of Theravāda as well as Mahāyāna monks lived in dozens of monasteries supported by royal grants. The Licchavi kings showered their generosity equally on Buddhist monks and brahmins; the mutual tolerance that still characterizes the practice of religion in Nepal may well have its roots in the centuries of Licchavi rule.

When in the twelfth century Muslim conquerors destroyed the Buddhist centers of northern India, Nepal offered a haven to refugee Buddhist monks. This process was paralleled in the twentieth century when Tibetan lamas fleeing the oppression of Chinese Communists found a new home in the Kathmandu Valley and made it their own by constructing several large monasteries.

In the thirteenth century, kings of the Malla dynasty established themselves in Nepal; under their rule Hinduism became the dominant religion. At that time both Hindus and Buddhists came under the influence of Tantrism, a religious system that introduced various innovations in devotional practices, including sexual rituals, without, however, developing novel philosophical principles of its own.

Like earlier monarchs, the Malla kings commissioned the construction of temples and monasteries, employed in their courts Buddhist priests and brahmins, and endowed costly sacrificial rites and elaborate festivals. Nepalese catholicity of worship finds expression in the active participation of adherents of different sects in most of the festivals, irrespective of the nature of the deities receiving homage.

In no other part of the Himalayan region are Buddhism and Hinduism as closely entwined as in the Kathmandu Valley. The zone of high altitude along the Tibetan border is almost exclusively inhabited by Tibetan-speaking Buddhist populations, while the southern lowlands are a preserve of Indo-European-speaking Hindus only minimally interspersed with some clusters of tribal people. The large hilly region extending between these two contrasting environmental zones is inhabited by a mixture of Tibeto-Burman-speaking indigenous tribes and some groups of Hindu castes with close cultural affinities to the people of northern India.

An example of the peaceful coexistence of two religious systems within a single population is the situation in the valley of the Kali Gandaki, the river flanked by the Annapurna range and Mount Dhaulagiri. This valley, known as Thak Khola, is the homeland of the Tha-

kali, a tribe exhibiting Mongoloid racial features and speaking a Tibeto-Burman dialect related to the language of the Tamang. Originally the Thakali worshiped local deities with offerings of goats and sheep; they had also developed a complicated cult of clan gods, which culminated in blood sacrifices and served to cement the cohesion of patrilineal kin groups. But from the seventeenth century onward Tibetan lamas (Tib., *bla mas*), following the Kali Gandaki trade route, settled among the Thakali and established Buddhist temples (*gompa*) and nunneries in several villages. From then on many Thakali went to study in Tibetan monasteries, and some of their communal ceremonies and festivals assumed a purely Buddhist character. Yet tribal priests continued the worship of local and family gods, sacrificing various animals at small, crudely built shrines put up in fields and forests. While Thakali have a clear idea of the merit gained by the performance of Buddhist rites, they do not consider the propitiation of locality and clan deities in any way meritorious; they regard it simply as a means to attain good health, ample crops, and success in trading ventures. Thus each of the two religions practiced by the Thakali is rooted in a distinct value system.

The absence of the concepts of merit and sin in their systems of supernatural values is characteristic of most tribal religions of Nepal and other Himalayan countries, a feature that distinguishes these religions fundamentally from Buddhism. Thus the Magar, a tribe widespread over the highlands to the south and southwest of Thak Khola, believe in the existence of a multitude of gods, goddesses, and spirits, and they assume that these invisible beings control health, reproduction, and the fertility of livestock and crops. Although they regard the worship of these beings as conducive to good fortune, the Magar lack the idea that their cult might be instrumental in the acquisition of religious merit. The gods are thought of in anthropomorphic terms and are given offerings of food and drink, including the blood of sacrificial animals, because they are believed to enjoy sensual pleasures such as eating and drinking.

Shamanism is central to the religious practices of the Magar. The shamans play a vital role as mediators between men and supernatural beings, who are believed to dwell in a sphere overlapping with the world of humans. Both men and women can act as shamans and place themselves at will into ecstatic trance. Initiation into the secrets of their profession is an elaborate procedure lasting several days. The curing of illness and the prevention of misfortune are foremost among the tasks of shamans, but they also act as guardians of tribal traditions and preserve by oral transmission the rich mythology of the Magar tribe.

Spread over the middle ranges of Nepal are several other Tibeto-Burman tribes, the most numerous of whom are the Gurung and the Tamang. In the Annapurna region Gurung dovetail with Bhotia and have absorbed many of the latter's Buddhist beliefs and practices.

The Tamang adhere overtly to Buddhism, and in some of their villages there are temples similar to the *gompa* of Tibetans and Sherpas; in these temples lamas learned in Tibetan sacred scriptures officiate at Buddhist rituals. Simultaneously, Tamang priests and shamans rooted in traditional tribal religion perform seasonal agricultural rites, propitiate local deities and spirits with prayers and offerings, and conduct the cult of their clan ancestors. In some settlements there is a sacred grove surrounding one or two stone platforms where the village priest worships the earth mother with sacrifices of sheep and fowl. While the functions of lamas and shamans are mutually exclusive, the laity is hardly conscious of the contradictions between the cult of the old Tamang gods and the rites of lamaistic Buddhism.

Among the Sherpa, a population of Tibetan origin settled in a region of high altitude southwest of Mount Everest, the cult of local deities and Buddhist ideas have been harmonized, and lamas conduct rites in honor of mountain gods and clan deities. Sherpas are devout adherents of the Rñin-ma-pa sect of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and several monasteries organized on the model of Tibetan institutions serve as focal points of religious activities.

The Rai and Limbu tribes, which occupy a large territory in the eastern hill regions, have been less influenced by Buddhism and Hinduism than the tribal societies of western Nepal. Their worldview is based on the firm belief that human life is inextricably linked with a multitude of supernatural beings approachable only by shamans, who communicate with them in controlled conditions of ecstasy and possession. According to Limbu mythology, the first shaman descended from the sky, sent to earth by the creator god. He appeared in the rays of the sun and landed in a great expanse of water. He swam ashore, and as he wandered about the earth he learned of the origins of men and animals and acquired the power of diagnosing disease and curing the sick with the help of gods and spirits.

The paraphernalia of Limbu shamans resemble many of those connected with Central Asian shamanism, such as a ladder by which the shaman's soul is believed to ascend to the sphere of the gods. Shamans maintain that in trance a part of their personality travels to other worlds, and that during funeral rites the shaman ac-



companies the soul of the deceased to the land of the dead.

**Sikkim.** Like Nepal, Sikkim has a heterogeneous population composed of several ethnic groups that settled in the country at different periods of time. The autochthonous inhabitants of the state are represented by the Lepcha, a tribe of Mongoloid race speaking a Tibeto-Burman language. The original religion of the Lepcha is based on the worship of local deities and a variety of nature spirits, whose cult is in the hands of shamans. From the seventeenth century onward, Bhotia populations from Tibet filtered into Sikkim and established themselves as a ruling class dominating the indigenous Lepcha. With them, Mahāyāna Buddhism entered Sikkim and developed as the state religion. By the middle of the twentieth century there were thirty-five monasteries in Sikkim, and Buddhism had spread also among the Lepcha, who gradually adopted the Bhotia language and merged with the Bhotia into a single religious entity.

Today many Lepcha practice two mutually contradictory religions, that is, the old Lepcha religion, which is based on shamanistic beliefs, and the Buddhism imported from Tibet. In the old Lepcha religion the ability to act as priest depends on possession by a spirit attached to a lineage of priestly character. The chief function of a priest is to ward off the misfortunes and afflictions caused by malevolent spirits; this can be achieved by animal sacrifices as well as by direct communication with supernatural powers. On certain occasions, priests become possessed by their tutelary spirit, to whom they owe the gift of prophecy. At funerary ceremonies the priest summons the soul of the deceased to speak his last words through the priest's mouth, and then conducts it into the sphere of the gods.

In Buddhism, priesthood and sanctity are acquired by learning, whereas Lepcha priesthood is based on qualities inherited in families. Lamaist ethics are founded on a belief in individual destiny and a balance of merit and sin, while Lepcha ideology lacks the concept of sin.

The interpenetration of Buddhist ritual and local religious practice found expression in the seasonal dance festivals held in the royal temple of Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim. Some of these performances are comparable to the ritual dances enacted by Bon priests in the southeastern Tibetan borderlands. The masked priests represent fierce Bon deities and their attendants, and the dances are staged "for the suppression of evil." Similar dances form an important part of the annual worship of the mountain god personifying Kanchenjunga, whose peak dominates the landscape of Sikkim. On some occasions of great ritual importance a Lepcha shaman,

who may be male or female, becomes possessed by the spirit of a semilegendary Lepcha chieftain believed to have ruled the Lepcha country when the first Tibetan settlers arrived in Sikkim. [See Bon.]

**Bhutan.** In Bhutan, the easternmost of the Himalayan kingdoms, Tibetan Buddhism has virtually displaced the older indigenous religions, which contained a number of elements of the Bon cult. Today, large monasteries with hundreds of monks flourish under the patronage of the king's government. Most of them adhere to the Bka'-brgyud-pa sect and have close links with monastic communities of the same sect in Nepal. In the late seventeenth century a hierarchy of monastic dignitaries was established as part of the political system. An official known as *je kempo* has full religious authority over all Buddhist institutions irrespective of their sectarian allegiance, and this official still functions as the administrative head of the Central Monk Body at Thimphu and Punakha. Lamas belonging to this central body may be delegated to act as heads of regional monk bodies in other parts of the country. At present the Central Monk Body is maintained at a strength of one thousand members, and the number of monks distributed throughout Bhutan is estimated as approximately five thousand, a figure considered the minimum required for the maintenance of the existing monasteries and shrines.

**Arunachal Pradesh.** Where the Indian Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh borders on Tibet and northeastern Bhutan, tribal populations have come under the influence of Mahāyāna Buddhism in its lamaistic form. Until recently one of the main caravan routes ran through this region across the Himalayas, and along this track Buddhist monks and nuns infiltrated into the borderland and established themselves among the local Monpa tribesmen. Though remnants of the old Bon religion persist, Buddhist monasteries and nunneries are now the main centers of religious life. The great monastery of Tawang, founded by Tibetan lamas, represents one of the most prominent institutions of the Dge-lugs-pa sect south of the Himalayan main range.

Side by side with Buddhism in its Tibetan form there exists among the Monpa a cult of local deities. The rites connected with their worship are referred to as *bon*, and the priests of that cult have no connection with lamas and Buddhist institutions. They propitiate their gods with animal sacrifices and offerings of eggs, meat, fish, and beer.

The great majority of the population of Arunachal Pradesh is made up of numerous different tribes, all of whom speak Tibeto-Burman languages and are of Mongoloid race. Many of them are virtually unknown to the

outside world, but there are some anthropological accounts of such tribes as Apa Tani, Nishi, Miri, and Adi. None of these groups has been influenced by either Buddhism or Hinduism, but all share a belief in the dependence of human beings on supernatural powers imagined in anthropomorphic shape. While some of their deities and spirits figure in myths and stories, there is no body of religious traditions among them that reflects a consistent image of a pantheon, nor do any of the tribes think of the immortals as occupying ranked positions in a hierarchy. None of the tribes of the region acknowledges a supreme deity standing above all other supernatural beings, although some tribes believe in two or three deities of outstanding power and importance. Thus the Nishi of the Subansiri region worship the two deities Potor and Met, the one of whom is described as female and the other as male. These deities are thought to have come into existence long before sky and earth originated, and to dwell—invisible to men—on the surface of this earth feeding on the meat of sacrificial animals. Different from such earth bound deities is the divine couple Doni-Sü, worshiped by several tribes. Doni is equated with the sun and Sü with the earth, and together they are supposed to see everything men do. However, they pay no attention to the moral aspects of human actions.

Apart from the major deities there also exist in the imagination of all tribes minor supernatural beings associated with specific localities or activities. There are deities influencing the growth of the crops and others believed to live in people's houses and to look after pigs and fowls. Certain spirits dwelling in the forest are thought to be highly dangerous to man; even more deadly is a category of spirits whose help is sought by practitioners of black magic.

Priests act as mediators between men and gods, and it is to them that people turn when illness strikes, bad weather ruins the crops, or other emergencies occur. An Apa Tani priest has to be much more than a go-between. He is the repository of the tribe's sacred lore, and must be able to recite and chant for hours invoking multitudes of gods and recalling mythological events relevant to the nature of the ritual he is performing. Only a few priests are shamans and act as oracles through whom gods and spirits make their wishes known.

While most tribes of Arunachal Pradesh have only hazy ideas about the nature of the deities they worship, their beliefs regarding the fate of man in the world beyond are far more precise. Not only priests and shamans but also laymen can give an account of the land of the dead and the life the departed lead there. They believe that there are two or more regions to which the

departed go and that the manner of their death determines their ultimate destination. Those who died a natural death go to an underworld that the Apa Tani call Neli and the Nishi, Nilitu. It is thought to resemble the land of the living, with villages and houses similar to those on the surface of the earth. The life the departed lead in that place is a reflection of their earthly life: rich men will be rich again, and the poor will be poor. Those who died unmarried can find spouses in Neli and even beget children. But ultimately they die in Neli and go to another land of the dead situated below Neli. Men and women who died an accidental death or were killed in battle go to a sphere in the sky, which is a pleasant abode where life is similar to life on earth.

There are various ideas regarding the path by which the land of the dead is to be reached. Common to these is the belief in a guardian of the underworld, whom the departed have to pass, and who questions them about their achievements in their earthly life. He praises martial successes and the acquisition of wealth but ignores deeds of charity. Indeed, the idea of transcendental rewards for meritorious acts has no place in tribal thinking: the belief in the more or less automatic repetition of earthly life in the land of the dead does not provide any motivation for conduct aiming at anything other than gratification of one's immediate self-interest. There is no common ground between the tribal populations' this-worldly morality and the otherworldly ethic of Buddhist societies. Tribal deities do not appear in the role of lawgivers and guardians of human morality. In the view of the tribesmen of Arunachal Pradesh religion does not have the function of controlling social behavior, but is seen as a system of practices concerned solely with the regulation of relations between humans and supernatural powers.

[See also Tibetan Religions, *overview article*.]

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CHRISTOPH VON FÜRER-HAIMENDORF

**HIMIKO**, an early Japanese shamanic ruler. The *San-kuo chih*, a Chinese dynastic history compiled about 280 CE, states:

The Land of Japan formerly had a man as ruler. For some 70 to 80 years after that there were disturbances and warfare. Thereupon the people agreed upon a woman for their ruler, and called her Himiko. She occupied herself with magic and sorcery, bewitching people. Though mature in age, she remained unmarried. She had a younger brother who assisted her in ruling the kingdom. After she became the ruler, there were few who saw her. She had 1,000 women as attendants, but only one man. He served her food and drink and acted as a medium of communication.

(quoted in Goodrich, 1951, p. 13)

According to other sources, the "disturbances and warfare" occurred sometime between 178 and 183, after which Himiko ruled Japan for more than half a century until her death in about 247.

*Himiko* is often mistaken for the personal name of this ruler, but in fact her real name is not known, and *himiko* was simply a title commonly given to rulers. Himiko herself had a rival, a male ruler of the kingdom of Kuna, who also used *himiko* as part of his title. The word literally means "the successor of the spirit woman." As a means of legitimation, the early Japanese rulers claimed to be the successors of a shamanistic ancestor called Himi. So *himiko* came to mean "the ruler." However, because this particular woman ruled

Japan for such a long time and also because we have little information about other early rulers, the name *Himiko* is usually reserved for this figure.

In her kingdom, Himiko's so-called younger brother was assigned a rather significant political role, since she withdrew once she had become the ruler. She communicated regularly only with him, and he became the medium who conveyed her messages to the people. Through him, her pronouncements were converted into secular policy. After 239, Himiko occasionally sent tributes to the Chinese emperor. The last mission sent by Himiko, in 247, informed the Chinese that she was at odds with Himiko-koso, the king of Kuna. Thereafter she died, probably in the struggle with Kuna, and a great burial mound more than 145 meters in diameter was erected. Over a hundred attendants followed her to the grave. A king was subsequently placed on the throne, but he lacked popular support, and soon the country was again at war. Finally, Toyo, a thirteen-year-old girl of Himiko's clan, was named queen, and peace was restored.

The early Japanese chronicles do not mention a female ruler called Himiko. The only one who appears is the empress Jingū, who lived about a century after Himiko. It is known, however, that the deity Himiko worshiped was called Himi ("spirit woman"), and this name is almost identical in meaning to *Hirume*, the original name of Amaterasu, the supreme goddess in Japanese mythology. Thus, the early Chinese and Japanese sources reinforce one another and confirm that worship of the "spirit woman" was the essential part of early Japanese religious practice.

[See also Japanese Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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KAKUBAYASHI FUMIO

**HĪNAYĀNA BUDDHISM**. See under Buddhism, Schools of.

**HINCMAR** (c. 805-882), archbishop of Reims. Hincmar was born in northern France and sent as a boy to be educated at the Abbey of Saint-Denis near Paris un-

der its famous abbot, Hilduin. He entered the monastic community at Saint-Denis and together with Hilduin spent some long periods at the court of Louis I (r. 814–840). In 845 he was chosen—no doubt with the approval of Charles II (840–877), the son of Louis I—to fill the archepiscopal see of Reims, which had been vacant since the deposition of Ebbo (835). Claiming to have been unjustly deposed, Ebbo had reoccupied his see for a time and had performed ordinations during this period; he and his supporters introduced struggles and complications into Hincmar's career that persisted even after Ebbo's death (851), particularly with respect to the clerics Ebbo had ordained.

A man with a forceful personality and unbounded energy, Hincmar seemed to thrive on controversy; we find him enmeshed in all the important struggles of his time. The intemperate nature of his language and actions gained him more enemies than friends. On the political level he sided with Louis I and Charles II against the emperor Lothair I (r. 840–855) and his son Lothair II, king of Lorraine (r. 855–869). The emperor, part of whose territory came under Reims's jurisdiction, supported Ebbo and attempted to depose Hincmar. With regard to Lothair II, Hincmar strongly opposed the king's repudiation of his wife Theutberga in order to marry his concubine, and he wrote the well-known treatise *De devortio Lotharii et Teutbergae* to clarify all the doctrinal and canonical issues involved.

As archbishop, Hincmar attempted to reorganize his diocese, to recover ecclesiastical possessions that had been alienated, and in particular to bring all his diocesan bishops into obedient submission to his jurisdiction. This last effort led to a bitter and implacable conflict with his own nephew, also named Hincmar, bishop of Laon, against whom he wrote a treatise called the *Opusculum LV capitulorum*. The archbishop likewise interjected himself into the theological controversies of his day, taking the monk Gottschalk to task on the question of predestination in his treatise *Ad reclusos et simplices* and challenging the monk Ratramnus on the formula *trina deitas* in the treatise *De una et non trina deitate*. On the question of predestination, Hincmar sought an ally in John Scottus Eriugena (fl. 847–877), who also wrote on this matter. But the replies of several other contemporary theologians, Lupus (of Ferrières), Prudentius (of Troyes), and Florus (of Lyons), show that Hincmar's theological speculations were not viewed as altogether sound.

Hincmar's vast literary output reflects all aspects of his activities. That he was a man of great learning is reflected in the splendid library he accumulated at Reims—many of whose books still survive—and in the scriptural, patristic, and other sources quoted in his

treatises. His knowledge of civil and canon law is noteworthy; it is evident especially in his treatises on the divorce question and against his nephew, Hincmar of Laon. Only a fraction (about eighty letters) of his vast correspondence has come down to us, and several of his treatises are also lost, in particular two treatises on the question of images. Even in his own day he was accused of producing forgeries to support the causes he sponsored. His most recent biographer, Jean Devisse, has not succeeded in eliminating the doubts of scholars on this score. Hincmar is one of the first writers to quote the pseudo-Isidorian decretals, forgeries also dating from his time but almost certainly produced in the camp of his opponents, especially Ebbo and his supporters.

The section of the *Annales Bertiniani* from 861 to 882, which Hincmar composed, has earned the admiration of modern historians. In these pages, Hincmar demonstrates his penetrating mind and his ability to comment shrewdly on contemporary personages and events.

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PAUL MEYVAERT

**HINDI RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS.** Approximately 150 million people living in north-central India speak Hindi as their first language; at least as many, in bordering regions from Rajasthan to the eastern extremities of Bihar, speak it as a second language. Urdu, Hindi's sister tongue, is spoken by tens of millions more, and is distinguished from Hindi chiefly by its preference for expressions derived from Persian and Ar-

abic. Urdu is a tongue with Muslim associations, while Hindi has a Hindu flavor that is intensified by vocabulary adopted directly from Sanskrit. The membrane between the two languages is by no means impermeable, however, and the religious situation is similar: many of the practices surrounding Muslim holy men (*pīrs*), for example, closely resemble those associated with their Hindu counterparts (*gurus, sants, etc.*).

Hindi speakers, who see themselves as occupying the geographic center of Hindu culture—what in earlier times was called the Middle Country (Madhyadeśa), where Aryan culture in India flourished—often suppose that regional distinctiveness is something characterizing other areas of the subcontinent more than their own. Local and regional identities are indeed strong in India, even within the Hindi-speaking area; nonetheless, there is a core of religious literature and tradition that sets the Hindi region apart from other areas of India and makes it possible for people whose personal religious emphases vary widely to communicate as members of a single, if large and complex, family.

**The Bhakti Core.** This core is defined by a corpus of devotional (*bhakti*) poetry generated from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries and associated with such names as Kabīr, Mirā Bāī, Sūrdās, Tulsīdās, and Nānak. In the compositions of these singer-saints and others contemporary with them, various dialects of Hindi came into their own as media suitable for religious expression. Doubtless, earlier poetry also served as the focus for popular piety, but it seems to have remained largely oral; what survives in writing from the fourteenth and earlier centuries is largely in the nature of epic and romance, touching only obliquely on matters of faith. With but a few exceptions, religious texts apparently remained the province of those versed in Sanskrit and the Jain Prakrits: if there were vernacular texts, they have now been lost. [See also the biographies of Kabīr, Mirā Bāī, Sūrdās, Tulsīdās, and Nānak.]

A written tradition of religious literature in the vernacular began to build in the fifteenth century with adaptations of the great Sanskrit epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The earliest were composed by Viṣṇudās at the court of Gwalior in 1435(?) and 1442. A century and a half later writers began giving vernacular form to the Sanskrit *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. The most prestigious medium of literary expression in the western Hindi regions was Braj Bhāṣā, the language spoken from Gwalior northwards throughout the Braj region, where the god Kṛṣṇa is said to have spent his youth. To the east, an alternate tradition held sway: Avadhī, the dialect spoken in Avadh, the natal region of the divine king Rāma. Avadhī too played host to vernacular adaptations of Sanskrit works, by far the most influential

among them being the *Rāmcaritmānas* (Spiritual Lake of the Deeds of Rāma) of Tulsīdās, composed toward the end of the sixteenth century. A third major linguistic strand in the religious literature of medieval north India is less regional in character and less associated with myth and legend than either Braj Bhāṣā or Avadhī. Because it apparently had its home in a marketplace environment that made it accessible to Hindi speakers of various classes and regions, it typically contains a great mixture of dialectal forms and varies according to where it was spoken. Such language, which sometimes comes tolerably close to the *kharī bolī* that is the basis of modern standard Hindi, is difficult to describe, but insofar as it was productive of a religious literature it is often simply called *sādhukkarī bhāṣā*, "what holy men speak." In *sādhukkarī bhāṣā* the events of daily life and personal experience play an important role.

Anthologies of vernacular religious poetry, extant examples of which date back to the end of the sixteenth century, can be found in each of these three dialects; often an anthology contains more than one. Collections as different as the massive *Ādi Granth* of Gurū Arjun (1604) and the much smaller anthologies prepared for individual merchants or princes suggest by their linguistically diverse contents that songs composed as far west as the Punjab and as far east as Bihar could be considered part of a single network. [See also *Ādi Granth*.]

Within this overarching tradition, a more or less distinct thematic milieu is associated with each of the three major dialects. Much of the religious poetry in Braj Bhāṣā is devoted to Kṛṣṇa; Rāma is often addressed and described in Avadhī; and in *sādhukkarī bhāṣā* one finds a mixed agenda appropriate to the multiformity of the language: important traces of devotion to Śiva and Śakti, for example, sometimes lurk behind a predominantly Vaiṣṇava facade. Sūrdās, Nanddās, and a host of other poets native to the Braj region composed their Kṛṣṇa lyrics naturally enough in Braj Bhāṣā, as did Tulsīdās when he wrote his *Śrīkṛṣṇagītāvalī* (A Series of Songs to Kṛṣṇa); Mirā Bāī, traditionally understood to have been a princess of Rajasthan, seems often to have done the same. Braj Bhāṣā was also deemed appropriate as a medium for the praise of Rāma, but when Tulsīdās began crafting his epical *Rāmcaritmānas*, Avadhī presented itself as a ready tool. Avadhī had already established itself as a fit vehicle for epic or elegiac themes such as those that fill the story of Rāma, and in a similar way Braj Bhāṣā, through its identification with the amorous Kṛṣṇa, came to be seen as the most graceful medium for love poetry in Hindi. *Sādhukkarī bhāṣā*, associated especially with such figures as Gorakhnāth, Kabīr, Ravidās, and Dādū, ex-

pressed its eclectic character in anthologies of poetry associated with the *sant* tradition, those "good folk" who preached allegiance to no particular form of God other than that transmitted through the charisma of one's *guru*. [See also the biography of Gorakhnāth.] In the language of *sants* such as Kabīr, the designation *Rāma* had less to do with the *avatāra* of Viṣṇu who was an exemplary king bearing that name than with the totality of the divine presence.

Historians of Hindi literature have usually accepted a tripartite linguistic and theological division in categorizing medieval devotional poetry. They typically present the first two as divergent expressions of *saguṇa bhakti*—the Kriṣṇaite and the Rāmaite—and the last as *nirguṇa bhakti*. According to the *saguṇa* ("with qualities") persuasion, God can appropriately be worshiped through divine attributes and forms that make themselves felt in the phenomenal world, hence through myth and image. According to the *nirguṇa* ("without qualities") persuasion, the purpose of the religious life is to discard such earthbound symbols and attain a purer apprehension of the divine; this teaching is at the heart of the message of poets such as Kabīr and Nānak.

To overemphasize this tripartite taxonomy, however, is to ignore what binds together this whole array of poet-saints and all who venerate their names. Tradition has recognized these ties by affirming a series of connections—imagined or otherwise—between individual saints. To an extent these links reaffirm the individual dialects and religious traditions to which we have referred, but they also create confluences between them that have a tendency to draw the group into a single stream. In *sant* poetry, some of these ties are claimed in verses attributed to the saints themselves: Ravidās makes mention of Nāmdev and Kabīr; Dādū adds Ravidās's name to the list; and Eknāth and Tukārām, the Maharashtrian poet-saints, in turn acknowledge Dādū. Other connections emerge in hagiologies as old as the *Bhaktamāl* of Nābhādās (c. 1625) and the *Caurāsī vaiṣṇavan kī vārtā* (c. 1650) attributed in its final form to Gokulnāth. The former depicts Kabīr, Ravidās, and Pipā as pupils of a common *guru*, Rāmānand, and the latter draws the catholic Sūrdās into a chain of sectarian poets such as Paramānanddās and Nanddās, who were pupils of Vallabha. [See also the biography of Vallabha.] Other relationships seem to have been postulated later on, such as the tradition that Nānak met Kabīr, that Tulsīdās encountered Sūrdās, or that Mirā Bāi embraced Ravidās as her *guru*. And repeated patterns in the biographies of poet-saints on both sides of the *nirguṇa-saguṇa* line—a miraculous and undesired access to wealth, for example—draw these figures into even closer proximity.

Such associations at the level of hagiography echo others that figure in the poetry itself. For all their differences of perspective, the *bhakti* poets seem united in their conviction that one must cultivate personal experience as a way to approach God; hence they downplay and often ridicule the preoccupations of ritual religion. Furthermore, all the *bhakti* poets, with the occasional exception of Tulsīdās, seem to consider both sexes and all strata of society as potentially worthy devotees. Finally, they share a common mode of discourse. Poets as different as Sūrdās, with his tender affection for Kṛṣṇa as a child, and Kabīr, with his predilection for trenchant social criticism, unite in dedicating a significant proportion of their creative efforts to poems in the *vinaya* ("humble petition") genre. These songs of petition and complaint are occasioned primarily by the experience of being separated from God (*viraha*), and although the desire to see God (to have *darśan*, "sight") may seem natural from a *saguṇa* perspective such as Sūr's or Tulsī's, one also encounters it in poems attributed to Kabīr and Nānak. Indeed, these twin themes of *viraha* and *darśan* are persistent in *bhakti* poetry throughout the subcontinent. [See also *Bhakti*.]

**The Preservation of the Tradition.** It is a measure of the extent to which the *bhakti* poets of the Hindi area define a regional sensibility that their works have become important elements in curricula used today in the public schools of north India. But the religious impact of the poets is felt even more keenly outside the classroom.

**Performance.** Every autumn, in the period surrounding the festival of Daśahrā or Vijayamadaśamī, when Rāma's victory over the demon Rāvaṇa is celebrated, Tulsīdās's *Rāmcaritmānas* becomes the basis for dramas (*rāma līlās*) depicting salient events in the life of Rāma. The most famous of these *rāma līlās* is performed on the grounds of the palace of the maharaja of Banaras and extends over a period of thirty-one days, drawing pilgrims from far and wide; equally well-attended *rāma līlās* are celebrated in cities and towns wherever Hindi is spoken. In a similar way, the weeks leading up to Kṛṣṇa's birthday Kṛṣṇa Janmāṣṭamī, which comes in August or September in the monsoon season) witness the performance of verses by Sūrdās and other Braj Bhāṣā poets in musical dramas depicting the life of Kṛṣṇa, particularly his childhood and youth. These *rāsa līlās* emanate from the Braj region, which is a great center of pilgrimage, especially during the rainy months of Śrāvaṇ and Bhādrapad. [See also *Līlā*.]

Though the *Rāmcaritmānas* typically becomes the basis for large public performances only in autumn, it serves as the focus of private devotions all year round: often individuals and religious associations engage

brahmans to chant it uninterruptedly from start to finish, or do so themselves. Likewise, one can sing the songs of Kṛṣṇa in devotional groups at any time. Indeed, such *bhajan* ("singing") groups provide much of the informal religious life with which Indian villages and cities pulse. The Indian film industry—whose primary medium is Hindi—has adopted many traditional *bhajans* into its films, making them familiar not just in Hindi-speaking areas but throughout the country and beyond. It is difficult to say whether the public consciousness of religious literature in Hindi is now shaped more by schoolbooks and cheap religious pamphlets, by performers and itinerant preachers, or by the many films depicting religious themes. [See also Drama, article on Indian Dance and Dance Drama.]

**Communities and orders.** Much of the religious life of north India over the past half millennium has been defined by the religious communities, both householder and ascetic, that were established to channel the religious fervor of the medieval period. These provide access to the *bhakti* tradition in both its *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* modes, with the Gauḍīya, Vallabha, Nimbārka, Haridāsī, and Rādhāvallabha *sampradāyas* ("sectarian traditions") devoted primarily to Kṛṣṇa; the Rāmānandī order devoted especially to Rāma; and the Kabīr, Ravidāsī, Dādū, and Sikh Panths spreading the message of the *sants*.

Among the Kṛṣṇaite groups, the most influential have probably been the Gauḍīya and Vallabha *sampradāyas*. The former looks to the ecstatic saint Caitanya (1486–1533) as its founder—a Bengali who established temple and monastic lineages not only in his native region but in Braj and Orissa as well. The Caitanyaite influence on Braj has undoubtedly had much to do with elevating the worship of Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa's favorite among his milkmaid loves (*gopīs*), to a status almost on a par with his own: she is his consort, consubstantial with him. Other lineages that have their centers in Braj (the Rādhāvallabha, Haridāsī, and Nimbārka *sampradāyas*) share in this adulation of Rādhā, which finds expression in the poetry of such saints as Hit Harivaṁś, Haridās, and Vṛindāvandās. [See also Kṛṣṇaism and the biography of Caitanya.]

The Vallabha *Sampradāya*, which traces its history to the sixteenth-century theologian Vallabhācārya, appears to have attained institutional definition somewhat later than the Gauḍīya *Sampradāya*, but was very successful in doing so. Though patronized early in its history by Mughal rulers, it was forced to flee the Braj area during the period when Aurangzeb occupied the throne; it transferred its center to Nāthdvārā in western Rajasthan. Partially in consequence of the proximity of Nāthdvārā to the west, Gujaratis have become among the

most influential devotees in the Vallabhite fold, and their mercantile connections make them an important force across North India. Vallabha, in sympathy with the general sensibilities of the *bhakti* movement, questioned the propriety of clerical and monastic institutions, feeling that true faith admitted of no boundaries between religious specialists and ordinary people. Vallabha's progeny, however, developed a ritual style sufficiently elaborate, and a following sufficiently prosperous, to transform their homes into grand temples possessing some of the most detailed ceremonial traditions in all of Hinduism. One of the salient aspects of this style is its careful attention to hymnody: through *dhrupad* (a style of classical music) the *Sampradāya* has preserved a tradition of performing *bhakti* poetry that is otherwise obsolete in modern India.

Membership in both the Gauḍīya and the Vallabha *sampradāyas* involves initiation at the hands of one of their spiritual leaders. Such initiation is open on an ascriptive basis to anyone who seeks it, though family traditions usually determine the teaching heritage with which a person becomes allied. Another restriction pertains to social status. Normally, membership in these communities is confined to members of caste society; untouchables, despite the thrust of some *bhakti* teachings, are usually not welcomed and do not seek to belong.

Membership patterns are significantly different among communities whose allegiance is to the *nirguṇa* side of the *bhakti* tradition. The theological emphasis on turning away from particular characteristics and forms attributed to God appears to go hand in hand with questioning the legitimacy of similar distinctions in society. Among *nirguṇa* poets, Kabīr and Ravidās made especially sharp comments about caste, owing in part, no doubt, to their own humble origins; the communities that have formed in their names continue to appeal to a largely lower-caste clientele. With Ravidās this is overwhelmingly true: over the past century—particularly in the Punjab but now elsewhere as well—his name has served as a rallying point for communal pride among the *camār* (leatherworking) caste to which he belonged. Ravidās temples, educational institutions, and community centers have been established, and poetry ascribed to him serves as an essential component of Ravidāsī teaching. The institutional heritage of Kabīr, the Kabīr Panth, is more complex and wide-ranging, embracing both monastic institutions and lay groups. It extends from a center in Kabīr's own city, Banaras, eastward into Bihar, and as far west as Gujarat. Although the Kabīr Panth has a predominantly lower-caste membership, merchant castes also play an important role, particularly in the Dharmadāsī branch.

Mercantile castes have exercised an even greater influence over the development of the Sikh Panth, the community that traces its origins to Nānak, since each of its ten *gurūs*, including Nānak himself, belonged to merchant (*khatri*) families. The Sikh community is by no means restricted to *khatri*s, however, and its leadership has been shared at least equally by the Punjabi farming and landowning caste called *jāt*. Whereas Kabīr and Ravidās groups typically revere their *gurus* in image form, ensconcing them at the center of their ritual lives, the Sikh community has, at least since the time of the tenth *gurū*, eschewed any such practice. In Sikh worship, the functions that otherwise would cluster around an image or *gurū* are diverted to a book—the *bhakti* anthology (*Ādi Granth*) compiled by Gurū Arjun—and for that reason the scripture is referred to as a *gurū* in its own right, the *Gurū granth sahib*. Through it, Sikhs come in daily contact with the words of the *nirguṇa bhakti* saints who stand at the fountainhead of their tradition. [See also Sikhism.]

Each of the communities mentioned so far, with the possible exception of the Ravidāsīs, can trace its origins directly to the medieval *bhakti* period, sometimes claiming an individual poet as its founder. But the *bhakti* heritage extends as well to groups whose institutional associations with the medieval saints are harder to establish. Prominent among these is the Radhasoami Satsang, a *nirguṇa* tradition that came into focus in the mid-nineteenth century and has since splintered into a number of *guru*-centered communities, some with a sizable international constituency. Radhasoami is quite influential in North Indian life: many government bureaucrats count themselves members; its publications are numerous; and when large convocations are held at its center in Beas, Punjab, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims attend. Radhasoami's history features the establishment of several visionary communities, such as the one at Beas, part of whose impetus was to leave behind the encumbrances of caste as members gathered to lead a common life in the presence of a living *guru*. Curiously, this seemingly plain-spoken egalitarian message from the *bhakti* tradition went hand in hand with an esoteric interpretation of other *bhakti* themes: the traditional importance of listening to the truth within, for example, was transmuted into a doctrine of the *guru* as the incarnation of an eternal sound-current. When one seeks the roots of this kind of thinking, one is drawn back, through the Dharmadāsī branch of the Kabīr Panth, to the apotheosis of Kabīr himself as a primordial, supernatural force. Here, as in other aspects of the *nirguṇa bhakti* tradition, the demythologizing fervor that was expressed in the fifteenth and

sixteenth centuries seems to have created a vacuum that was filled by remythologizing later on.

**Hindi Traditions in a Larger Perspective.** To sketch the religious traditions that have Hindi as their linguistic medium is scarcely to portray the full dimensions of the religious life of Hindus resident in North India. We have said little about rituals pertaining to days, weeks, months, years, or the life cycle; about the panoply of religious specialists from brahmans to curers to ascetics; about the pantheon revered in various areas; about temple architecture and practice; or about how one's experience of religion is conditioned by one's sex, age, or position in the caste hierarchy, one's urban or rural locale, or one's proximity to a major religious center. Often, one or another of these factors affects patterns of individual piety more profoundly than the specifically "Hindi" traditions discussed here, and often what matters most does not hold constant across the whole Hindi region or the entire social spectrum. In the Hindi area as elsewhere, Hinduism resists easy generalizations. One can, however, point to certain motifs that seem particularly significant in North Indian religion, as contrasted with other areas of the subcontinent.

In the realm of ritual, for example, one might observe that it is somewhat more acceptable in North India than elsewhere for a young man to take on the sacred thread just prior to his marriage; elsewhere, there is greater insistence on keeping these two major rites of the life cycle separate and distinct. As for festivals, Holī, the spring first-fruits celebration that falls in March or April, assumes a bacchanalian intensity one might more easily associate with Gaṇeśa Caturthī in Maharashtra or Durgā Pūjā in Bengal. [See also Holī.] Among religious specialists, one might mention the historically formative role played by the iconoclastic Nāth order, with its mixed ascetic and householder membership. The Nāth Sampradāya, which regards Gorakhnāth (c. ninth–eleventh century?) as its most important preceptor, was particularly influential in laying the basis for the *sant* tradition as it spread across North India in the early medieval centuries. It is associated with a particular form of *yoga* that assumed the potential immortality of all and questioned the efficacy of traditional forms of temple and Brahminic ritual.

We have already touched on several points relating to the pantheon, but it might be stressed in addition that while all of India has tended in recent centuries to shorten the distance between the great and local gods by focusing increased attention on intermediary figures such as the elephant divinity Gaṇeśa, North India has led the way in expanding the significance of his monkey cousin, Hanumān. In Hanumān, servant of Rāma, super-



human strength and superhuman devotion unite, making this god the very personification of efficacious *bhakti*; at the same time, he remains peculiarly accessible and unthreatening because he belongs to a subhuman species. The *Hanumān cālīsā* (nineteenth century?), dedicated to him, is one of the most frequently recited texts in North India, and many Hindi speakers turn first to the monkey god in times of peril and stress.

Like all of India's major regions, North India has its own set of pilgrimage places: Puṣkar and Nāthdvārā in Rajasthan; Badrināth and Gaṅgotrī in the Himalayas; Mathurā and Vṛndāvana in Braj; Ayodhyā in Avadh; and Hardvar, Prayāga, Banaras, and Gayā stretching along the Ganges from west to east. What is striking about several of these places, however—certainly Vṛndāvana, Prayāga, Ayodhyā, and Banaras—is that they attract pilgrims not merely from the Hindi-speaking regions but from all over India. [See also Vṛndāvana and Banaras.] Three among these—Vṛndāvana, Ayodhyā, and Banaras—gain their national reputation because they are perceived as the homes, the primary residences, of three great gods in the pantheon: Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, and Śiva. Banaras benefits additionally from its special association with the Ganges, holiest of India's waters; the Jumna (Yamunā), sister to the Ganges and for Hindus a goddess like her, contributes to the status of Vṛndāvana. Prayāga owes its special sanctity to the fact that it marks the confluence of these two rivers; every twelve years it plays host to the most populous of all Hindu festivals, the Kumbha Melā. Participants in the Kumbha Melā come from all corners of the subcontinent to bathe in the confluence of the Ganges, the Jumna, and the invisible Sarasvatī at the auspicious moment when the sun passes into the house of Aquarius; all caste groups, all major religious organizations, and all ascetic orders are represented. [See also Kumbha Melā and Pilgrimage, article on Hindu Pilgrimage.]

The Kumbha Melā suggests what is perhaps the most distinctive feature of regional religion in the Hindi-speaking area: in some of its most important respects it is pan-Indian as well. One can find at Madurai "the Mathurā of the south" or in the Godavari a Ganges transposed to central India, but never the reverse; the songs of Mīrā Bāī are known all over India in a way that the Tamil lyrics of her south Indian counterpart Āṅṅāl can never be. The fact that Hindi rivals English as a lingua franca for modern India is not the only cause of the tendency among Hindi speakers to feel that the religion they practice somehow sets the Hindu paradigm; it is that history and mythology have made them before all others host to the gods. Kṛṣṇa and Rāma lived where they live, and when Śiva descended from the Himalayas

to the plain, his feet first touched a place where Hindi is spoken. Successive invasions and movements of population have complicated and transformed the religious landscape of North India more than most areas of the subcontinent, but nothing can alter the Hindi region's special claim that the gods were there first.

[Many of the sects mentioned herein are discussed in Vaiṣṇavism, especially in the articles on Bhāgavatas and Pāñcarātras; see also Śrī Vaiṣṇavas. For further treatment of the worship of Kṛṣṇa, see Kṛṣṇaism. The medieval poet-saints are discussed in Poetry, article on Indian Religious Poetry, and in Marathi Religions. See also Kṛṣṇa; Rāma; Rādhā; and Śiva.]

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JOHN STRATTON HAWLEY

**HINDUISM.** [*This entry deals exclusively with the Hindu tradition. For a more general survey of the religions of India and their interaction with each other, see Indian Religions.*]

Hinduism is the religion followed by about 70 percent of the roughly seven hundred million people of India. Elsewhere, with the exception of the Indonesian island of Bali, Hindus represent only minority populations. The geographical boundaries of today's India are not, however, adequate to contour a full account of this religion. Over different periods in the last four or five millennia, Hinduism and its antecedents have predominated in the adjacent areas of Pakistan and Bangladesh and have been influential in such other regions as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia. But in these areas Hindu influences have been superseded or overshadowed by the influences of other religions, principally Buddhism and Islam. This account will treat only of Hinduism as it has taken shape historically in the "greater India" of the Indian subcontinent. [*For discussion of Hinduism outside the Indian subcontinent, see Southeast Asian Religions.*]

**Indus Valley Religion.** There are good reasons to suspect that a largely unknown quantity, the religion of the peoples of the Indus Valley, is an important source for determining the roots of Hinduism.

The Indus Valley civilization arose from Neolithic and Chalcolithic village foundations at about the middle of the third millennium BCE as a late contemporary of Egyptian and Mesopotamian riverine civilizations. It engaged in trade with both, though mostly with Mesopotamia. Reaching its apogee around 2000 BCE, it then suffered a long period of intermittent and multifaceted decline culminating in its eclipse around 1600 BCE, apparently *before* the coming of the Aryan peoples and their introduction of the Vedic religious current. At its peak, the Indus Valley civilization extended over most of present-day Pakistan, into India as far eastward as near Delhi, and southward as far as the estuaries of the Narmada River. It was apparently dominated by the two cities of Mohenjo-Daro, on the Indus River in Sind, and Harappa, about 350 miles to the northwest on a

former course of the Ravi River, one of the tributaries to the Indus. Despite their distance from each other, the two cities show remarkable uniformity in material and design, and it has been supposed that they formed a pair of religious and administrative centers.

The determination of the nature of Indus Valley religion and of its residual impact upon Hinduism are, however, most problematic. Although archaeological sites have yielded many suggestive material remains, the interpretation of such finds is conjectural and has been thwarted especially by the continued resistance of the Indus Valley script, found on numerous steatite seals, to convincing decipherment. Until it is deciphered, little can be said with assurance. The content of the inscriptions may prove to be minimal, but if the language (most likely Dravidian) can be identified, much can be resolved.

At both Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, the cities were dominated on the western side by an artificially elevated mound that housed a citadel-type complex of buildings. Though no temples or shrines can be identified, the complex probably served both sacred and administrative functions. A "great bath" within the Mohenjo-Daro citadel, plus elaborate bathing and drainage facilities in residences throughout the cities, suggests a strong concern for personal cleanliness, cultic bathing, and ritual purity such as resurface in later Hinduism. Indeed, the "great bath," a bitumen-lined tank with steps leading into and out of it from either end, suggests not only the temple tanks of later Hinduism but the notion of "crossing" associated with them through their Sanskrit name, *tīrtha* ("crossing place, ford").

A granary attached to the citadel may also have involved high officials in ceremonial supervision of harvests and other agricultural rituals. Terra-cotta female figurines with pedestal waists, found especially at village sites, reveal at least a popular cultic interest in fertility. They are probably linked with worship of a goddess under various aspects, for while some portray the figure in benign nurturing poses, others present pinched and grim features that have been likened to grinning skulls: these are likely foreshadowings of the Hindu Goddess in her benign and destructive aspects.

But most controversial are the depictions on the seals, whose inscriptions remain undeciphered. Most prominently figured are powerful male animals. They are often shown in cultic scenes, as before a sort of "sacred manger," or being led by a priestly ministrant before a figure (probably a deity and possibly a goddess) in a peepul tree, one of the most venerated trees in Hinduism. Male animals also frequently figure in combination with human males in composite animal-human forms. With female figures seemingly linked to the God-

ness and males associated with animal power, it has been suggested that the two represent complementary aspects of a fertility cult with attendant sacrificial scenarios such as are found in the animal sacrifice to the Goddess in post-Vedic Hinduism. In such sacrifices the Goddess requires male offerings, and the animal represents the human male sacrificer. Most interesting and controversial in this connection is a figure in a yogic posture who is depicted on three seals and a faience sealing. Though features differ in the four portrayals, the most fully defined one shows him seated on a dais with an erect phallus. He has buffalo horns that enclose a treelike miter headdress, possibly a caricatured buffalo face, wears bangles and necklaces or torques, and is surrounded by four wild animals. Some of these associations (yoga, ithyphallicism, lordship of animals) have suggested an identification with the later Hindu god Śiva. Other traits (the buffalo-man composite form, association with wild animals, possible intimations of sacrifice) have suggested a foreshadowing of the buffalo demon Mahiṣāsura, mythic antagonist and sacrificial victim of the later Hindu goddess Durgā. Possibly the image crystallizes traits that are later associated with both of these figures.

The notion that features of Indus Valley religion form a stream with later non-Aryan religious currents that percolate into Hinduism has somewhat dismissively been called the substratum theory by opponents who argue in favor of treating the development of Hinduism as derivable from within its own sacred literature. Though this "substratum" cannot be known except in the ways that it has been structured within Hinduism (and no doubt also within Jainism and Buddhism), it is clear that a two-way process was initiated as early as the Vedic period and has continued to the present. [*For further discussion, see Indus Valley Religion.*]

**Vedism.** The early sacred literature of Hinduism has the retrospective title of Veda ("knowledge") and is also known as *śruti* ("that which is heard"). Altogether it is a prodigious body of literature, originally oral in character (thus "heard"), that evolved into its present form over nine or ten centuries between about 1400 and 400 BCE. In all, four types of texts fall under the Veda-*śruti* heading: Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads. At the fount of all later elaborations are the four Saṃhitās ("collections"): the *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā* (Veda of Chants, the oldest), the *Sāmaveda* and *Yajurveda Saṃhitās* (Vedas of Melodies and Sacrificial Formulas, together known as the "liturgical" Saṃhitās), and the *Atharvaveda Saṃhitā* (the youngest, named after the sage Atharvan). These constitute the four Vedas, with some early sources referring to the "three Vedas" exclusive of the last. [*See Vedas.*] The material of the four

was probably complete by 1000 BCE, with younger parts of the older works overlapping older parts of the younger ones chronologically. The Saṃhitās, or portions of them, were preserved by different priestly schools or "branches" (*sākhās*) through elaborate means of memorization. Many of these schools died out and their branches became lost, but others survived to preserve material for literary compilation and redaction. The subsequent works in the categories of Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka, and Upaniṣad are all linked with one or another of the Vedic schools, and thus with a particular Vedic Saṃhitā, so that they represent the further literary output of the Vedic schools and also the interests of the four types of priests who came to be associated differentially with the ritual uses of the four Saṃhitās. It is from the *Ṛgveda* that Vedic religion in its earliest sense must be reconstructed.

Although the urban civilization of the Indus Valley had run its course by the time of the arrival of the Aryans in about 1500 BCE, the newcomers met heirs of this civilization in settled agricultural communities. The contrast between cultures was striking to the Aryans, who described the indigenous population as having darker skin, defending themselves from forts, having no gods or religious rituals but nonetheless worshiping the phallus. As small stone phallic objects have been found at Indus Valley sites, this is probably an accurate description of a cult continued from pre-Vedic Indus Valley religion that prefigures the later veneration of the *liṅga* (phallus) in the worship of Śiva. In contrast to this predominantly agricultural population, the invading Aryans were a mobile, warlike people, unattached to cities or specific locations, entering Northwest India in tribal waves probably over a period of several centuries. Moreover, their society inherited an organizing principle from its Indo-European past that was to have great impact on later Indian civilization in the formation of the caste system. The ideal arrangement, which myths and ritual formulas propounded and society was to reflect, called for three social "functions": the priests, the warriors, and the agriculturalist-stockbreeders. Early Vedic hymns already speak of three such interacting social groups, plus a fourth—the indigenous population of *dāsa*, or *dasyu* (literally, "slaves," first mythologized as demon foes of the Aryans and their gods). By the time of the late *Ṛgveda*, these peoples were recognized as a fourth "class" or "caste" in the total society and were known as *sūdras*.

Most crucial to the inspiration of the early Vedic religion, however, was the interaction between the first two groups: the priesthood, organized around sacerdotal schools maintained through family and clan lines, and a warrior component, originally led by chieftains of

the mobile tribal communities but from the beginning concerned with an ideal of kingship that soon took on more local forms. Whereas the priests served as repositories of sacred lore, poetry, ritual technique, and mystical speculation, the warriors served as patrons of the rites and ceremonies of the priests and as sponsors of their poetry. These two groups, ideally complementary but often having rival interests, crystallized by late Vedic and Brahmanic times into distinct "classes": the *brāhmaṇas* (priests) and the *kṣatriyas* (warriors).

Although the *Ṛgveda* alludes to numerous details of ritual that soon came to be systematized in the religion of the *Brāhmaṇas*, it brings ritual into relief only secondarily. The primary focus of the 1,028 hymns of the *Ṛgveda* is on praising the gods and the cosmic order (*ṛta*), which they protect. But insofar as the hymns invoke the gods to attend the sacrifice, there is abundant interest in two deities of essentially ritual character: Agni and Soma. Agni (Fire) is more specifically the god of the sacrificial fire who receives offerings to the gods and conveys them heavenward through the smoke. And Soma is the divinized plant of "nondeath" (*amṛta*), or immortality, whose juices are ritually extracted in the *soma* sacrifice, a central feature of many Vedic and Brahmanic rituals. These two gods, significantly close to mankind, are mediators between men and other gods. But they are especially praised for their capacity to inspire in the poets the special "vision" (*dhi*) that stimulates the composition of the Vedic hymns. Agni, who as a god of fire and light is present in the three Vedic worlds (as fire on earth, lightning in the atmosphere, and the sun in heaven), bestows vision through "illumination" into the analogical connections and equivalences that compose the *ṛta* (which is itself said to have a luminous nature). *Soma*, the extracted and purified juice of the "plant of immortality," possibly the hallucinogenic fly agaric mushroom, yields a "purified" vision that is described as "enthused" or "intoxicated," tremulous or vibrant, again stimulating the inspiration for poetry. The Vedic poet (*kavi*, *ṛṣi*, or *vipra*) was thus a "see-er," or seer, who translated his vision into speech, thus producing the sacred *mantras*, or verse-prayers, that comprise the Vedic hymns. Vedic utterance, itself hypostatized as the goddess *Vāc* (Speech), is thus the crystallization of this vision.

Vedic religion is decidedly polytheistic, there being far more than the so-called thirty-three gods, the number to which they are sometimes reduced. Though the point is controversial, for the sake of simplification we can say that at the core or "axis" of the pantheon there are certain deities with clear Indo-European or at least Indo-Iranian backgrounds: the liturgical gods Agni and Soma (cf. the Avestan deity *Haoma*) and the deities who

oversee the three "functions" on the cosmic scale: the cosmic sovereign gods *Varuṇa* and *Mitra*, the warrior god *Indra*, and the *Aśvins*, twin horsemen concerned with pastoralism, among other things. Intersecting this structure is an opposition of Indo-Iranian background between *devas* and *asuras*. In the *Ṛgveda* both terms may refer to ranks among the gods, with *asura* being higher and more primal. But *asura* also has the Vedic meaning of "demon," which it retains in later Hinduism, so that the *deva-asura* opposition also takes on dualistic overtones. *Varuṇa* is the *asura par excellence*, whereas *Indra* is the leader of the *devas*. These two deities are thus sometimes in opposition and sometimes in complementary roles: *Varuṇa* being the remote overseer of the cosmic order (*ṛta*) and punisher of individual human sins that violate it; *Indra* being the dynamic creator and upholder of that order, leader of the perennial fight against the collective demonic forces, both human and divine, that oppose it. It is particularly his conquest of the *asura* *Vṛtra* ("encloser")—whose name suggests ambiguous etymological connections with *Varuṇa*—that creates order or being (*sat*, analogous to *ṛta*) out of chaos or nonbeing (*asat*) and opens cosmic and earthly space for "freedom of movement" (*varivas*) by gods and men. Considerable attention is also devoted to three solar deities whose freedom of movement, thus secured, is a manifestation of the *ṛta*, a prominent analogy for which is the solar wheel: *Sūrya* and *Savitṛ* (the Sun under different aspects) and *Uṣas* (charming goddess of the dawn). Other highly significant deities are *Yama*, god of the dead, and *Vāyu*, god of wind and breath. It is often pointed out that the gods who become most important in later Hinduism—*Viṣṇu*, *Śiva* (Vedic *Rudra*), and the Goddess—are statistically rather insignificant in the *Veda*, for few hymns are devoted to them. But the content rather than the quantity of the references hints at their significance. *Viṣṇu*'s centrality and cosmological ultimacy, *Rudra*'s destructive power and outsiderhood, and the this-worldly dynamic aspects of several goddesses are traits that assume great proportions in later characterizations of these deities.

Although it is thus possible to outline certain structural and historical features that go into the makeup of the Vedic pantheon, it is important to recognize that these are obscured by certain features of the hymns that arise from the type of religious "vision" that inspired them, and that provide the basis for speculative and philosophical trends that emerge in the late *Veda* and continue into the early Brahmanic tradition. The hymns glorify the god they address in terms generally applicable to other gods (brilliance, power, beneficence, wisdom) and often endow him or her with mythical traits and actions particular to other gods (supporting

heaven, preparing the sun's path, slaying Vṛtra, and so on). Thus, while homologies and "connections" between the gods are envisioned, essential distinctions between them are implicitly denied. Speculation on what is essential—not only as concerns the gods, but the ritual and the *mantras* that invoke them—is thus initiated in the poetic process of the early hymns and gains in urgency and refinement in late portions of the *Ṛgveda* and the subsequent "Vedic" speculative-philosophical literature that culminates in the Upaniṣads. Most important of these speculations historically were those concerning the cosmogonic sacrifices of Puruṣa in *Ṛgveda* 10.90 (the *Puruṣasūkta*, accounting for, among other things, the origin of the four castes) and of Prajāpati in the Brāhmaṇas. Each must be discussed further. In addition, speculations on *brahman* as the power inherent in holy speech and on the *ātman* ("self") as the irreducible element of personal experience are both traceable to Vedic writings (the latter to the *Atharvaveda* only). We shall observe the convergence of all these lines of speculation in the Upaniṣads and classical Hinduism.

**Religion of the Brāhmaṇas.** The elaboration of Vedic religion into the sacrificial religion of the Brāhmaṇas is largely a result of systematization. The first indication of this trend is the compilation of the liturgical *Samhitās* and the development of the distinctive priestly schools and interests that produced these compendiums. Thus, while the *Ṛgveda* became the province of the *hotṛ* priest, the pourer of oblations and invoker of gods through the *mantras* (the term *hotṛ*, "pourer," figures often in the *Ṛgveda* and has Indo-Iranian origins), the newer collections developed around the concerns of specialist priests barely alluded to in the *Ṛgveda* and serving originally in subordinate ritual roles. The *Sāmaveda* was a collection of verses taken mostly from the *Ṛgveda*, set to various melodies (*sāmans*) for use mainly in the *soma* sacrifice, and sung primarily by the *udgātṛ* priest, who thus came to surpass the *hotṛ* as a specialist in the sound and articulation of the *mantras*. And the *Yajurveda* was a collection of *yajus*, selected sacrificial *mantras*, again mostly from the *Ṛgveda*, plus certain complete sentences, to be murmured by the *adhvaryu* priest, who concerned himself not so much with their sound as with their appropriateness in the ritual, in which he became effectively the master of ceremonies, responsible for carrying out all the basic manual operations, even replacing the *hotṛ* priest as pourer of oblations. A fourth group of priests, the *brāhmaṇas*, then claimed affiliation with the *Atharvaveda* and assumed the responsibility for overseeing the entire ritual performance of the other priests and counteracting any of their mistakes (they were supposed to know the other three Vedas as well as their own) by silent recitation of

*mantras* from the *Atharvaveda*. As specialization increased, each priest of these four main classes took on three main assistants.

The Brāhmaṇas—expositions of *brahman*, the sacred power inherent in *mantra* and more specifically now in the ritual—are the outgrowth of the concerns of these distinctive priestly schools and the first articulation of their religion. Each class of priests developed its own Brāhmaṇas, the most important and comprehensive being the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* of one of the *Yajurveda* schools. The ritual system was also further refined in additional manuals: the *Śrautasūtras*, concerned with "solemn" rites, first described in the Brāhmaṇas and thus called *śrauta* because of their provenance in these *śruti* texts, and the *Gṛhyasūtras*, concerned with domestic rites (from *gṛha*, "home"), justified by "tradition" (*smṛti*) but still having much of Vedic origins. The *Śrautasūtras* were compiled over the period, roughly, from the Brāhmaṇas to the Upaniṣads, and the *Gṛhyasūtras* were probably compiled during Upaniṣadic times.

The domestic rites take place at a single offering fire and usually involve offerings of only grain or ghee (clarified butter). Along with the maintenance of the household fire and the performance of the so-called Five Great Sacrifices—to *brahman* (in the form of Vedic recitation), to ancestors, to gods, to other "beings," and to humans (hospitality rites)—the most prominent *gṛhya* ceremonies are the sacraments or life-cycle rites (*saṃskāras*). Of these, the most important are the rites of conception and birth of a male child; the Upanayana, or "introduction," of boys to a *brāhmaṇa* preceptor or *guru* for initiation; marriage; and death by cremation (*Antyeṣṭi*, "final offering"). The Upanayana, involving the investiture of boys of the upper three social classes (*varṇas*) with a sacred thread, conferred on them the status of "twice-born" (*dvija*, a term first used in the *Atharvaveda*), and their "second birth" permitted them to hear the Veda and thereby participate in the *śrauta* rites that, according to the emerging Brahmanic orthodoxy, would make it possible to obtain immortality.

The *śrauta* rites are more elaborate and are representative of the sacrificial system in its full complexity, involving ceremonies that lasted up to two years and enlisted as many as seventeen priests. Through the continued performance of daily, bimonthly, and seasonal *śrauta* rites one gains the year, which is itself identified with the sacrificial life-death-regeneration round and its divine personification, Prajāpati. In surpassing the year by the Agnicayana, the "piling of the fire altar," one gains immortality and needs no more nourishment in the otherworld (see *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.1.5.4).

*Śrauta* rites required a sacrificial terrain near the home of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), with three sacred fires (representing, among other things, the three worlds) and an upraised altar, or *vedī*. Nonanimal sacrifices of the first varieties mentioned involved offerings of milk and vegetable substances or even of *mantras*. Animal sacrifices (*paśubandhu*)—which required a more elaborate sacrificial area with a supplemental altar and a sacrificial stake (*yūpā*)—entailed primarily the sacrifice of a goat. Five male animals—man, horse, bull, ram, and goat—are declared suitable for sacrifice. It is likely, however, that human sacrifice existed only on the “ideal” plane, where it was personified in the cosmic sacrifices of Puruṣa and Prajāpati. The animal (*paśu*) was to be immolated by strangulation, and its omentum, rich in fat, offered into the fire. *Soma* sacrifices, which would normally incorporate animal sacrifices within them plus a vast number of other subrites, involved the pressing and offering of *soma*. The most basic of these was the annual Agniṣṭoma, “in praise of Agni,” a four-day rite culminating in morning, afternoon, and evening *soma* pressings on the final day and including two goat sacrifices. Three of the most ambitious *soma* sacrifices were royal rites: the Aśvamedha, the horse sacrifice; the Rājasūya, royal consecration; and the Vājapeya, a *soma* sacrifice of the “drink of strength.” But the most complex of all was the aforementioned Agnicayana.

A thread that runs through most *śrauta* rituals, however, is that they must begin with the “faith” or “confidence” (*śraddhā*) of the sacrificer in the efficacy of the rite and the capacity of the officiating priests to perform it correctly. This prepares the sacrificer for the consecration (*dīkṣā*) in which, through acts of asceticism (*tapas*), he takes on the aspect of an embryo to be reborn through the rite. As *dīkṣita* (one undergoing the *dīkṣā*), he makes an offering of himself (his *ātman*). This then prepares him to make the sacrificial offering proper (the *yajña*, “sacrifice”) as a means to redeem or ransom this self by the substance (animal or otherwise) offered. Then, reversing the concentration of power that he has amassed in the *dīkṣā*, he disperses wealth in the form of *dakṣinās* (honoraria) to the priests. Finally, the rite is disassembled (the ritual analogue to the repeated death of Prajāpati before his reconstitution in another rite), and the sacrificer and his wife bathe to disengage themselves from the sacrifice and reenter the profane world.

In the elaboration of such ceremonies and the speculative explanation of them in the Brāhmaṇas, the earlier Vedic religion seems to have been much altered. In the religion of the Brāhmaṇas, the priests, as “those who know thus” (*evamvids*), view themselves as more powerful than the gods. Meanwhile, the gods and the

demons (*asuras*) are reduced to representing in their endless conflicts the recurrent interplay between agonistic forces in the sacrifice. It is their father, Prajāpati, who crystallizes the concerns of Brahmanic thought by representing the sacrifice in all its aspects and processes. Most notable of these is the notion of the assembly or fabrication of an immortal self (*ātman*) through ritual action (*karman*), a self constructed for the sacrificer by which he identifies with the immortal essence of Prajāpati as the sacrifice personified. And by the same token, the recurrent death (*punararmṛtyu*, “redeath”) of Prajāpati’s transitory nature (the elements of the sacrifice that are assembled and disassembled) figures in the Brāhmaṇas as the object to be avoided for the sacrificer by the correct ritual performance. This Brahmanic concept of Prajāpati’s redeath, along with speculation on the ancestral *gṛhya* rites (*śrāddhas*) focused on feeding deceased relatives to sustain them in the afterlife, must have been factors in the thinking that gave rise to the Upaniṣadic concept of reincarnation (*punarjanman*, “rebirth”). The emphasis on the morbid and transitory aspects of Prajāpati and the sacrifice, and the insistence that asceticism within the sacrifice is the main means to overcome them, are most vigorously propounded in connection with the Agnicayana.

In the Brāhmaṇas’ recasting of the primal once-and-for-all sacrifice of Puruṣa into the recurrent life-death-regeneration mythology of Prajāpati, a different theology was introduced. Though sometimes Puruṣa was identified with Prajāpati, the latter, bound to the round of creation and destruction, became the prototype for the classical god Brahmā, personification of the Absolute (*brahman*) as it is oriented toward the world. The concept of a transcendent Puruṣa, however, was not forgotten in the Brāhmaṇas. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 13.6 mentions Puruṣa-Nārāyaṇa, a being who seeks to surpass all others through sacrifice and thereby become the universe. In classical Hinduism, *Nārāyaṇa* and *Puruṣa* are both names for Viṣṇu as the supreme divinity. This Brāhmaṇa passage neither authorizes nor disallows an identification with Viṣṇu, but other Brāhmaṇa passages leave no doubt that sacrificial formulations have given Viṣṇu and Rudra-Śiva a new status. Whereas the Brāhmaṇas repeatedly assert that “Viṣṇu is the sacrifice”—principally in terms of the organization of sacrificial space that is brought about through Viṣṇu’s three steps through the cosmos, and his promotion of the order and prosperity that thus accrue—they portray Rudra as the essential outsider to this sacrificial order, the one who neutralizes the impure forces that threaten it from outside as well as the violence that is inherent within. Biardeau (1976) has been able to show that the later elevation of Viṣṇu and Śiva through yoga and *bhakti* is

rooted in oppositional complementarities first formulated in the context of the Brahmanic sacrifice. [For further discussion, see Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas; see also Vedism and Brahmanism.]

**The Upaniṣads.** Several trends contributed to the emergence of the Upaniṣadic outlook. Earlier speculations on the irreducible essence of the cosmos, the sacrifice, and individual experience have been mentioned. Pre-Upaniṣadic texts also refer to various forms of asceticism as performed by types of people who in one way or another rejected or inverted conventional social norms: the Vedic *muni*, *vrātya*, and *brahmacārin*, to each of whom is ascribed ecstatic capacities, and, at the very heart of the Brahmanic sacrifice, the *dīkṣita* (the sacrificer who performs *tapas* while undergoing the *dīkṣā*, or consecration). These speculative and ascetic trends all make contributions to a class of texts generally regarded as intermediary between the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads: the Āraṇyakas, or "Forest Books." The Āraṇyakas do not differ markedly from the works that precede and succeed them (the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is both an Āraṇyaka and an Upaniṣad), but their transitional character is marked by a shift in the sacrificial setting from domestic surroundings to the forest and a focus not so much on the details of ritual as on its interiorization and universalization. Sacrifice, for instance, is likened to the alternation that takes place between breathing and speaking. Thus correspondences are established between aspects of sacrifice and the life continuum of the meditator.

An *upaniṣad* is literally a mystical—often "secret"—"connection," interpreted as the teaching of mystical homologies. Or, in a more conventional etymology, it is the "sitting down" of a disciple "near to" (*upa*, "near"; *ni*, "down"; *sad*, "sit") his spiritual master, or *guru*. Each Upaniṣad reflects the Vedic orientation of its priestly school. There are also regional orientations, for Upaniṣadic geography registers the further eastern settlement of the Vedic tradition into areas of the Ganges Basin. But the Upaniṣads do share certain fundamental points of outlook that are more basic than their differences. Vedic polytheism is demythologized, for all gods are reducible to one. Brahmanic ritualism is reassessed and its understanding of ritual action (*karman*) thoroughly reinterpreted. *Karman* can no longer be regarded as a positive means to the constitution of a permanent self. Rather, it is ultimately negative: "the world that is won by work (*karman*)" and "the world that is won by merit (*puṇya*)" only perish (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.6). The "law of karma" (*karman*) or "law of causality" represents a strict and universal cause-effect continuum that affects any action that is motivated by desire (*kāma*), whether it be desire for good or for

ill. Thus even meritorious actions that lead to the Vedic heaven "perish," leaving a momentum that carries the individual to additional births or reincarnations. The result is perpetual bondage to the universal flow-continuum of all *karman*, or *saṃsāra* (from *saṃ*, "together" and *sr*, "flow"), a term that the Upaniṣads introduce into the Vedic tradition but that is shared with Jainism and Buddhism. As with these religions, the Upaniṣads and Hinduism henceforth conceive their soteriological goal as liberation from this cycle of *saṃsāra*: that is, *mokṣa* or *mukti* ("release").

*Mokṣa* cannot be achieved by action alone, since action only leads to further action. Thus, though ritual action is not generally rejected and is often still encouraged in the Upaniṣads, it can only be subordinated to pursuit of the higher *mokṣa* ideal. Rather, the new emphasis is on knowledge (*vidyā*, *jñāna*) and the overcoming of ignorance (*avidyā*). The knowledge sought, however, is not that of ritual technique or even of ritual-based homologies, but a graspable, revelatory, and experiential knowledge of the self as one with ultimate reality. In the early Upaniṣads this experience is formulated as the realization of the ultimate "connection," the oneness of *ātman-brahman*, a connection knowable only in the context of communication from *guru* to disciple. (Herein can be seen the basis of the parable context and vivid, immediate imagery of many Upaniṣadic teachings.) The experience thus achieved is variously described as one of unified consciousness, fearlessness, bliss, and tranquillity.

Beyond these common themes, however, and despite the fact that Upaniṣadic thought is resistant to systematization, certain different strains can be identified. Of the thirteen Upaniṣads usually counted as *śruti*, the earliest (c. 700–500 BCE) are those in prose, headed by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*. Generally, it may be said that these Upaniṣads introduce the formulations that later Hinduism will develop into the *saṃnyāsa* ideal of renunciation (not yet defined in the Upaniṣads as a fourth stage of life) and the knowledge-path outlook of nondualistic (*advaita*) Vedānta. Even within these early Upaniṣads, two approaches to realization can be distinguished. One refers to an all-excluding Absolute; the self that is identified with *brahman*, characterized as *neti neti* ("not this, not this"), is reached through a paring away of the psychomental continuum and its links with *karman*. Such an approach dominates the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. *Avidyā* here results from regarding the name and form of things as real and forming attachment to them. The other approach involves an all-comprehensive Absolute, *brahman-ātman*, which penetrates the world so that all forms are modifications of the one; ignorance results from the failure

to experience this immediacy. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* this second approach is epitomized in the persistent formula "Tat tvam asi" ("That thou art").

The later Vedic Upaniṣads (c. 600–400 BCE) register the first impact of theistic devotional formulations, and of early Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Most important of these historically are two "yogic" Upaniṣads, the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Kaṭha*, the first focused on Rudra-Śiva and the second on Viṣṇu. Each incorporates into its terminology for the absolute deity the earlier term *puruṣa*. As Biardeau has shown in *L'hindouisme* (1981), they thus draw on an alternate term for the Absolute from that made current in the *brahman-ātman* equation. The *Puruṣa* of *Ṛgveda* 10.90 (the *Puruṣasūkta*) is sacrificed to create the ordered and integrated sociocosmic world of Vedic man. But only one quarter of this *Puruṣa* is "all beings"; three quarters are "the immortal in heaven" (*RV* 10.90.3). This transcendent aspect of *Puruṣa*, and also a certain "personal" dimension, are traits that were retained in the characterization of *Puruṣa-Nārāyaṇa* in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and reinforced in the yogic characterizations of Rudra-Śiva and Viṣṇu in the previously mentioned Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic texts do not restrict the usage of the term *puruṣa* to mean "soul," as classical Sāṃkhya later does; rather, it is used to refer to both the soul and the supreme divinity. The relation between the soul and the Absolute is thus doubly defined: on the one hand as *ātman-brahman*, on the other as *puruṣa-Puruṣa*. In the latter case, the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* describes a spiritual itinerary of the soul's ascent through yogic states to the supreme *Puruṣa*, Viṣṇu. This synthesis of yoga and *bhakti* will be carried forward into the devotional formulations of the epics and the *Purāṇas*. But one must note that the two vocabularies are used concurrently and interrelatedly in the Upaniṣads, as they will be in the later *bhakti* formulations. [For further discussion, see Upaniṣads.]

**The Consolidation of Classical Hinduism.** A period of consolidation, sometimes identified as one of "Hindu synthesis," "Brahmanic synthesis," or "orthodox synthesis," takes place between the time of the late Vedic Upaniṣads (c. 500 BCE) and the period of Gupta imperial ascendancy (c. 320–467 CE). Discussion of this consolidation, however, is initially complicated by a lack of historiographical categories adequate to the task of integrating the diverse textual, inscriptional, and archaeological data of this long formative period. The attempt to cover as much of this span as possible with the name "epic period," because it coincides with the dates that are usually assigned to the formation and completion of the Hindu epics (particularly the *Mahābhārata*), is misleading, since so much of what transpires can hardly be labeled "epic." On the other hand, attempts to define

the period in terms of heterogeneous forces operating upon Hinduism from within (assimilation of local deities and cults, geographical spread) and without (heterodox and foreign challenges) either have failed to register or have misrepresented the implications of the apparent fact that the epics were "works in progress" during the whole period. The view one takes of the epics is, in fact, crucial for the interpretation of Hinduism during this period. Here, assuming that the epics already incorporated a *bhakti* cosmology and theology from an early point in this formative period, I shall try to place them in relation to other works and formulations that contributed to the consolidation of classical Hinduism.

The overall history can be broken down into four periods characterized by an oscillation from disunity (rival regional kingdoms and tribal confederacies on the Ganges Plain) to unity (Mauryan ascendancy, c. 324–184 BCE, including the imperial patronage of Buddhism by Aśoka) to disunity (rival foreign kingdoms in Northwest India and regional kingdoms elsewhere) back to unity (Gupta ascendancy, c. 320–467 CE). The emerging self-definitions of Hinduism were forged in the context of continued interaction with heterodox religions (Buddhists, Jains, Ājīvikas) throughout this whole period, and with foreign peoples (Yavanas, or Greeks; Śakas, or Scythians; Pahlavas, or Parthians; and Kūṣāṇas, or Kushans) from the third phase on. In this climate the *ideal* of centralized Hindu rule attained no practical realization until the rise of the Guptas. That this ideal preceded its realization is evident in the rituals of royal paramountcy (Aśvamedha and Rājasūya) that were set out in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Śrautasūtras*, and actually performed by post-Mauryan regional Hindu kings.

When we look to the component facets of the overall consolidation, these four periods must be kept in mind, but with the proviso that datings continue to be problematic: not only datings of texts, but especially of religious movements and processes reflected in them, and in surviving inscriptions. Most scholars ordinarily assume that when a process is referred to in a text or other document, it has gone on for some time.

**Śruti and smṛti.** Fundamental to the self-definition of Hinduism during this period of its consolidation is the distinction it makes between two classes of its literature: *śruti* and *smṛti*. *Śruti* is "what is heard," and refers to the whole corpus of Vedic literature (also called *Veda*) from the four Vedas to the Upaniṣads. *Smṛti*, "what is remembered" or "tradition," includes all that falls outside this literature. Exactly when this distinction was made is not certain, but it is noteworthy that the six *Vedāṅgas* or "limbs of the *Veda*" (writings on



phonetics, metrics, grammar, etymology, astronomy, and ritual) are *smṛti* texts that were composed at least in part during the latter half of the Vedic or *śruti* period. [See Vedāṅgas.] The ritual texts (Kalpasūtras) are subdivided into three categories: Śrautasūtras, Gṛhyasūtras, and Dharmasūtras. Whereas the first two (discussed above under Brahmanic ritual) pertain to concerns developed in the Vedic period, the Dharmasūtras focus on issues of law (*dharma*) that become characteristic of the period now under discussion. [See *Dharma, article on Hindu Dharma*.] Dates given for the composition of these texts run from 600 to 300 BCE for the earliest (*Gautama Dharmasūtra*) to 400 CE for the more recent works. Both Gṛhyasūtras and Dharmasūtras were sometimes called Smārtasūtras (i.e., *sūtras* based on *smṛti*), so it seems that their authors regarded them as representative of the prolongation of Vedic orthodoxy (and orthopraxy) that the *smṛti* category was designed to achieve. As the term *smṛti* was extended in its use, however, it also came to cover numerous other texts composed in the post-Upaniṣadic period. [See *Sūtra Literature*.]

This *śruti/smṛti* distinction thus marks off the earlier literature as a unique corpus that, once the distinction was made, was retrospectively sanctified. By the time of the *Mānava Dharmasāstra*, or *Laws of Manu* (c. 200 BCE–100 CE; see *Manu* 1.23), and probably before this, *śruti* had come to be regarded as “eternal.” Its components were thus not works of history. The Vedic ṛṣis had “heard” truths that are eternal, and not only in content—the words of the Vedas are stated to have eternal connection with their meanings—but also in form. The works thus bear no stamp of the ṛṣis’ individuality. Such thinking crystallized in the further doctrine that the Vedas (i.e., *śruti*) are *apauruṣeya*, not of personal authorship (literally, “not by a *puruṣa*”). They thus have no human imperfection. Further, it was argued that they are even beyond the authorship of a divine “person” (*Puruṣa*). Though myths of the period assert that the Vedas spring from Brahmā at the beginning of each creation (as the three Vedas spring from *Puruṣa* in the *Puruṣasūkta*), the deity is not their author. Merely re-born with him, they are a self-revelation of the impersonal *brahman*. In contrast to *śruti*, *smṛti* texts were seen as historical or “traditional,” passed on by “memory” (*smṛti*), and as works of individual authors (*pauruṣeya*), even though mythical authors—both human and divine—often had to be invented for them.

*Smṛti* texts of this period thus proclaim the authority of the Veda in many ways, and nonrejection of the Veda comes to be one of the most important touchstones for defining Hinduism over and against the heterodoxies, which rejected the Veda. In fact, it is quite likely that

the doctrines of the eternity and impersonality of the Veda were in part designed to assert the superiority of the Veda over the “authored” and “historical” works of the heterodoxies, whose teachings would thus be on a par with *smṛti* rather than *śruti*. But it is also likely that the *apauruṣeya* doctrine is designed to relativize the “personal” god of *bhakti*. In any case, these doctrines served to place a considerable ideological distance between *śruti* and *smṛti*, and to allow *smṛti* authors great latitude in interpreting *śruti* and extending Hindu teachings into new areas. *Smṛti* thus supposedly functioned to clarify the obscurities of the Veda. But the claim that *smṛti* texts need only not contradict the Veda left their authors great freedom in pursuing new formulations.

**Varṇāśramadharmā (“caste and life-stage law”).** The most representative corpus of *smṛti* literature, and the most closely tied to the continued unfolding orthodox interests of the Vedic priestly schools, is that concerned with *dharma* (“law” or “duty”). As a literary corpus, it consists of two kinds of texts: the Dharmasūtras (600/300 BCE–400 CE), already mentioned in connection with the *śruti/smṛti* distinction, and the Dharmasāstras. The most important and earliest of the latter are the *Mānava Dharmasāstra*, or *Laws of Manu* (c. 200 BCE–100 CE), and the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* (c. 100–300 CE). But other Dharmasāstras were composed late into the first millennium, to be followed by important commentaries on all such texts. The main focus of these two classes of texts is fundamentally identical: the articulation of norms for all forms of social interaction, thus including but going far beyond the earlier Sūtras’ concern for ritual. Four differences, however, are noteworthy. (1) Whereas the Dharmasūtras are in prose, the Dharmasāstras are in the same poetic meter as the epics, *Manu* in particular having much material in common with the *Mahābhārata*. (2) Whereas the Sūtras are still linked with the Vedic schools, the Sāstras are not, showing that study and teaching of *dharma* had come to be an independent discipline of its own. (3) The Sāstra legislation is more extended and comprehensive. (4) The Sāstras are more integrated into a mythic and cosmological vision akin to that in *bhakti* texts, but usually ignoring *bhakti* as such, with references to duties appropriate to different *yugas* (ages), and the identification of north central India as the “middle region” (*madhyadeśa*) where the *dharma* is (and is to be kept) the purest. [See *Śāstra Literature*.]

The theory of *varṇāśramadharmā*, the law of castes and life stages, was worked out in these texts as a model for the whole of Hindu society. There is little doubt that it was stimulated by the alternate lay/monastic social models of the heterodoxies, and no doubt that it was

spurred on by the incursions of barbarian peoples—frequently named in these texts as *mlecchas* (those who “jabber”)—into the Northwest. The model involves the working out of the correlations between two ideals: first, that society conform to four hierarchical castes, and second, that a person should pass through four life stages (*āśramas*): student (*brahmacārin*), householder (*gṛhasthin*), forest dweller (*vānaprasthin*), and renunciant (*saṃnyāsīn*). The first ideal is rooted in the *Puruṣasūkta*. The second presupposes the *śruti* corpus, since the four life stages are correlated with the four classes of *śruti* texts. Thus the student learns one of the Vedas, the householder performs domestic and optimally also *śrauta* rituals of the Brāhmaṇas, the forest dweller follows the teachings of the Āraṇyakas, and the *saṃnyāsīn* follows a path of renunciation toward the Upaniṣadic goal of *mokṣa*. But although all the life stages are either mentioned (as are the first two) or implied in the *śruti* corpus, the theory that they should govern the ideal course of individual life is new to the Dharmasūtras. Together, the *varṇa* and *āśrama* ideals take on tremendous complexity, since a person’s duties vary according to caste and stage of life, not to mention other factors like sex, family, region, and the quality of the times. Also, whereas a person’s development through one life ideally is regulated by the *āśrama* ideal, the passage through many reincarnations would involve birth into different castes, the caste of one’s birth being the result of previous *karman*. A further implication is that the life stages can be properly pursued only by male members of the three twice-born *varṇas*, as they alone can undergo the Upanayana ritual that begins the student stage and allows the performance of the rites pertinent to succeeding stages.

Each of these formulations has persisted more on the ideal plane than the real. In the case of the four *āśramas*, most people never went beyond the householder stage, which the Sūtras and Śāstras actually exalt as the most important of the four, since it is the support of the other three and, in more general terms, the mainstay of the society. The forest-dweller stage may soon have become more legendary than real: in epic stories it was projected onto the Vedic *ṛṣis*. The main tension, however, that persists in orthodox Hinduism is that between the householder and the renunciant, the challenge being for anyone to integrate into one lifetime these two ideals, which the heterodoxies set out for separate lay and monastic communities.

As to the four *varṇas*, the ideal represents society as working to the reciprocal advantage of all the castes, each one having duties necessary to the proper functioning of the whole and the perpetuation of the hierarchical principle that defines the whole. Thus *brāh-*

*maṇas* are at the top, distinguished by three duties that they share with no other caste: teaching the Veda, assisting in sacrifice, and accepting gifts. They are said to have no king but Soma, god of the sacrifice. In actual fact the traditional *śrauta* sacrifice counted for less and less in the *brāhmaṇa* householder life, and increasing attention was given to the maintenance of *brāhmaṇa* purity for the purpose of domestic and eventually temple rituals which, in effect, universalized sacrifice as the *brāhmaṇa*’s *dharma*, but a sacrifice that required only the minimum of impure violence. This quest for purity was reinforced by *brāhmaṇas*’ adoption into their householder life of aspects of the *saṃnyāsa* ideal of renunciation. This was focused especially on increasing espousal of the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* (nonviolence, or, more literally, “not desiring to kill”) and was applied practically to vegetarianism, which becomes during this period the *brāhmaṇa* norm. *Brāhmaṇas* thus retain higher rank than *kṣatriyas*, even though the latter wield temporal power (*kṣatra*) and have the specific and potentially impure duties of bearing weapons and protecting and punishing with the royal staff (*daṇḍa*). The subordination of king to *brāhmaṇa* involves a subordination of power to hierarchy that is duplicated in contemporary rural and regional terms in the practice of ranking *brāhmaṇas* above locally dominant castes whose power lies in their landed wealth and numbers. *Vaiśyas* have the duties of stock breeding, agriculture, and commerce (including money lending). Certain duties then distinguished the three twice-born castes as a group from the *sūdras*. All three upper *varṇas* thus study the Veda, perform sacrifices, and make gifts, whereas *sūdras* are permitted only lesser sacrifices (*pākayajñas*) and simplified domestic rituals that do not require Vedic recitation.

Actual conditions, however, were (and still are) much more complex. The four-*varṇa* model provided the authors of the *dharma* texts with Vedic “categories” within which to assign a basically unlimited variety of heterogeneous social entities including indigenous tribes, barbarian invaders, artisan communities and guilds (*śreṇis*), and specialists in various services. Susceptible to further refinement in ranking and regional nomenclature, all such groups were called *jātis*, a term meaning “birth” and in functional terms the proper word to be translated “caste.” Thus, although they are frequently called subcastes, the *jātis* are the castes proper that the law books classified into the “categories” of *varṇa*.

To account for this proliferation of *jātis*, the authors asserted that they arose from cross-breeding of the *varṇas*. Two possibilities were thus presented: *anuloma* (“with the grain”) unions, in which the husband’s *varṇa*

was the same as his wife's or higher (in anthropological terms, hypergamous, in which women are "married up"), and *pratiloma* ("against the grain") unions, in which the wife's *varṇa* would be higher than the husband's (hypogamous, in which women are "married down"). Endogamous marriage (marriage within one's own *varṇa*) set the highest standard and was according to some authorities the only true marriage. But of the other two, whereas *anuloma* marriages were permitted, *pratiloma* unions brought disgrace. Thus the *jātis* supposedly born from *anuloma* unions were less disgraced than those born from *pratiloma* unions. Significantly, two of the most problematic *jātis* were said to have been born from the most debased *pratiloma* connections: the Yavanas (Greeks) from *śūdra* males and *kṣatriya* females (similar origins were ascribed to other "barbarians") and the *caṇḍālas* (lowest of the low, mentioned already in the Upaniṣads, and early Buddhist literature, as a "fifth caste" of untouchables) from the polluting contact of *śūdra* males and *brāhmaṇa* females. It should be noted that a major implication of the prohibition of *pratiloma* marriage is the limitation for *brāhmaṇa* women to marriages with only *brāhmaṇa* men. This established at the highest rank an association of caste purity with caste endogamy (and the purity of a caste's women) and thus initiated an endogamous standard that was adopted by all castes—not just *varṇas* but *jātis*—by the end of the first millennium.

This accounting of the emergence of *jātis* was integrated with further explanations of how society had departed from its ideal. One is that "mixing of caste"—the great abomination of the *dharma* texts and also of the *Bhagavadgītā*—increases with the decline of *dharma* from *yuga* to *yuga*, and is especially pernicious in this Kali age. Another is the doctrine of *āpad dharma*, "duties for times of distress" such as permit inversion of caste roles when life is threatened. A third doctrine developed in the *Dharmaśāstras* identifies certain duties (*kalivarjyas*) as once allowed but now prohibited in the *kaliyuga* because people are no longer capable of performing them purely. Through all this, however, the ideal persists as one that embraces a whole society despite variations over time and space. [For a more detailed treatment of the system of *varṇāśramadharmā*, see Rites of Passage, article on Hindu Rites; see also *Varṇa* and *Jāti*.]

**The four *puruṣārthas* (goals of man).** The theory that the integrated life involves the pursuit of four goals (*arthas*) is first presented in the *Dharmaśāstras* and the epics, in the latter cases through repeated narrative illustrations. The development of distinctive technical interpretations of each *artha*, or facets thereof, can also be followed during the period in separate manuals: the

*Arthaśāstra*, a manual on statecraft attributed to Candragupta Maurya's minister Kauṭilya but probably dating from several centuries later, on *artha* (in the sense now of "material pursuits"); the *Kāmasūtras*, most notably that of Vātsyāyana (c. 400 CE), on *kāma* ("love, desire"); the already discussed *Dharmaśāstras* on *dharma*; and the *Sūtras* of the "philosophical schools" (*darśanas*) insofar as they are concerned with the fourth goal, *mokṣa*. Early sources often refer to the first three goals as the *trivarga*, the "three categories," but this need not imply that the fourth goal is added later. The *Dharmaśāstra* and epic texts that mention the *trivarga* are focused on the concerns of the householder—and, in the epics, particularly of the royal householder—these being the context for the pursuit of the *trivarga*. The fourth goal, *mokṣa*, is to be pursued throughout life—indeed, throughout all lives—but is especially the goal of those who have entered the fourth life stage of the *saṃnyāsīn*. The *trivarga-mokṣa* opposition thus replicates the householder-renunciant opposition. But the overall purpose of the *puruṣārtha* formulation is integrative and complementary to the *varṇāśramadharmā* theory. From the angle of the householder, it is *dharma* that integrates the *trivarga* as a basis for *mokṣa*. But from the angle of the *saṃnyāsīn*, it is *kāma* that lies at the root of the *trivarga*, representing attachment in all forms, even to *dharma*. Paths to liberation will thus focus on detachment from desire, or its transformation into love of God.

**Philosophical "viewpoints" (*darśanas*) and paths to salvation.** As an expression of Hinduism's increasing concern to systematize its teachings, the fourth goal of life (*mokṣa*) was made the subject of efforts to develop distinctly Hindu philosophical "viewpoints" (*darśanas*, from the root *dr̥ś*, "see") on the nature of reality and to recommend paths to its apprehension and the release from bondage to *karman*. Six Hindu *darśanas* were defined, and during the period in question each produced fundamental texts—in most cases *sūtras*—that served as the bases for later commentaries.

In terms of mainstream developments within Hinduism, only two schools have ongoing continuity into the present: the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta*. And of these, only the latter has unfolded in important ways in the postsynthesis period. Nonetheless, all six have made important contributions to later Hinduism. It must thus suffice to discuss them all briefly at this point in terms of their basic features and major impact, and reserve fuller discussion of the *Vedānta* alone for the period of its later unfolding.

Of the six schools, two—*Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*—are rooted primarily in the Vedic *śruti* tradition and are thus sometimes called *smārta* schools in the sense that

they develop *smārta* orthodox currents of thought that are based, like *smṛti*, directly on *śruti*. The other four—Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga—claim loyalty to the Veda, yet are quite independent of it, their focus instead being on rational or causal explanation. They are thus sometimes called *haituka* schools (from *hetu*, “cause, reason”).

Of the *smārta* schools, the Mīmāṃsā is most concerned with ritual traditions rooted in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, whereas the Vedānta is focused on the Upaniṣads. It is notable that both sustain Vedic orientations that reject (Mīmāṃsā) or subordinate (Vedānta) *bhakti* until the Vedānta is devotionalized in its post-Śaṅkara forms. Beginning with Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (c. 300–100 BCE), Mīmāṃsā (“reflection, interpretation”) provides exegesis of Vedic injunctive speech, in particular as it concerns the relationship between intentions and rewards of sacrifice. Great refinement is brought to bear on issues relating to the authority and eternalness of the Veda and the relationship between its sounds, words, and meanings. Vedic injunctions are taken literally, the many Vedic gods are seen as real although superfluous to salvation (there is an anti-*bhakti* stance here), and it is maintained that the proper use of injunctions is alone enough to secure the attainment of heaven (not a higher release, or *mokṣa*, as propounded by all the other systems, including *bhakti*). Mīmāṃsā persists in two subschools, but only in small numbers among brahman ritualists.

As to the Vedānta (“end of the Veda,” a term also used for the Upaniṣads), the foundational work is Bādarāyaṇa’s *Vedānta Sūtra*, or *Brahma Sūtra* (c. 300–100 BCE), an exegesis of various Upaniṣadic passages in aphoristic style easily susceptible to divergent interpretations. These it received in the hands of later Vedantic thinkers.

The *haituka* schools are notable for their development, for the first time within Hinduism, of what may be called maps and paths: that is, maps of the constituent features of the cosmos, and paths to deliverance from bondage. Emerging within Hinduism at this period, and particularly in the schools least affiliated with the Vedic tradition, such concerns no doubt represent an effort to counter the proliferation of maps and paths set forth by the heterodoxies (not only Buddhism and Jainism, but the Ājīvikas). They allow for a somewhat more open recognition of the deity of *bhakti* (Sāṃkhya excepted) than do the *smārta* schools, though none of the *haituka* schools makes it truly central.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, systems first propounded in Gautama’s *Nyāya Sūtra* (c. 200 BCE–150 CE) and Kaṇāda’s *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (c. 200 BCE–100 CE), were quickly recognized as a hyphenated pair: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Nyāya (“rule, logic, analysis”), emphasizing logic and methods of argumentation as means to liberation, was viewed as complementary to Vaiśeṣika (“school of distinct characteristics”), which advanced a theory of atomism and posited seven categories to explain such things as atomic aggregation and dualistic distinction between soul and matter. At least by about the fifth century, when the two schools had conjoined, Nyāya logic and Vaiśeṣika cosmology served to provide influential arguments from design for the existence of God as the efficient cause of the creation and destruction of the universe and liberator of the soul from *karman*.

Far more influential, however, were the pair Sāṃkhya (“enumeration”) and Yoga. The foundational texts of these schools may be later than those of the others, but they are clearly distillations of long-continuing traditions, datable at least to the middle Upaniṣads, that had already undergone considerable systematization. Thus Patañjali’s *Yoga Sūtra* is from either about 200 BCE or 300–500 CE, depending on whether or not one identifies the author with the grammarian who lived at the earlier date. And Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhyakārikās* probably date from the fourth century CE. Even though Sāṃkhya’s “atheism” and its soteriology of the isolation (*kaivalya*) of the soul (*puruṣa*) from matter (*prakṛti*) have been modified or rejected in other forms of Hinduism (both doctrines may link Sāṃkhya with Jainism), Sāṃkhya’s cosmology and basic terminology have become definitive for Hinduism at many levels: not only in the Vedānta, but in *bhakti* and Tantric formulations as well. In fact, given the preclassical forms of theistic Sāṃkhya founded in the Upaniṣads and the *Mahābhārata* and their use in *bhakti* cosmologies, it may well be that the atheism of the classical Sāṃkhya results from a rejection of *bhakti* elements from a fundamentally theistic system. Sāṃkhya thus posits *puruṣa* without a transcendent, divine *Puruṣa*, and its *prakṛti* is also abstract and impersonal.

In any case, a number of Sāṃkhya concepts became basic to the Hindu vocabulary, only to be integrated and reinterpreted from different theological and soteriological perspectives by other schools. These include the concepts of the evolution and devolution of *prakṛti*, the sexual polarity of *puruṣa* as male and *prakṛti* as female, the enumeration of twenty-three substances that evolve from and devolve back into the *prakṛti* “matrix,” the concept of matter as a continuum from subtle psychomental “substances” to gross physical ones (in particular the five elements), and the notion of the three “strands” or “qualities” called *guṇas* (*sattva*, goodness, lucidity; *rajas*, dynamism; *tamas*, entropy), which are “braided” together through all matter from the subtle to the gross.

Meanwhile, whereas Sāṃkhya provides the map to be “known,” Yoga defines the path by which *puruṣa* can extricate itself from *prakṛti*. The “eight limbs” of Yoga (an answer to the Eightfold Path of Buddhism?) represent the most important Hindu formulation of a step-by-step (though also cumulative) path to liberation. The first two “limbs” involve forms of restraint (*yama*) and observance (*niyama*). The next three involve integration of the body and senses: posture (*āsana*), breath control (*prāṇāyāma*), and withdrawal of the senses from the dominance of sense objects (*pratyāhāra*). The last three achieve the integration of the mind or the “cessation of the mental turmoil” that is rooted in the effects of *karman*: “holding” (*dhāraṇā*) to a meditative support, meditative fluency (*dhyāna*), and integrative concentration (*samādhi*) through which the freedom of *puruṣa* can be experienced.

The classical Yoga of Patañjali, known as *rājayoga* (“royal yoga”), diverges from the Sāṃkhya in acknowledging the existence of God (Īśvara). But Īśvara is a focus of meditation, not an agent in the process of liberation. The use of the term *rājayoga*, however, suggests that by Patañjali’s time the term *yoga* had already been used to describe other disciplines or paths, resulting in a situation where the terms *yoga* (“yoke”) and *mārga* (“path”) had become interchangeable. One will thus find *rājayoga* mentioned later along with the more generalized “yogas”, or “paths,” that become definitive for Hinduism through their exposition in the *Bhagavadgītā* (c. 200 BCE): the paths (or yogas) of *karman* (“action”), *jñāna* (“knowledge”), and *bhakti* (“devotion”). [Each of the six Hindu darśanas is the subject of an independent entry. See also Indian Philosophies.]

**Classical bhakti Hinduism.** The consolidation of Hinduism takes place under the sign of *bhakti*. And though Mīmāṃsā ritualism and Vedantic and other “knowledge” trends continue to affiliate with an “orthodox” strain that resists this synthesis, or attempts to improve upon it, classical *bhakti* emerges as constitutive henceforth of mainstream Hinduism, including forms of devotional sectarianism. [See *Bhakti*.]

Intimations of *bhakti* developments are registered as early as the late Vedic Upaniṣads, and in inscriptions and other records of syncretistic worship of Hindu deities (Viṣṇu and Śiva) alongside foreign and heterodox figures in the early centuries of the common era. However, the heterogeneity and scattered nature of the non-textual information available on the emergence of *bhakti* during this period have allowed for conflicting interpretations of the salient features of the process. But rather than reweave a fragile developmental web from supposedly separate sectarian and popular strands, it is better to look at the texts themselves to see what they

attempted and achieved. We should note, however, that to the best of our knowledge it was achieved relatively early in the period of consolidation, for the *Bhagavadgītā*—the text that seals the achievement—seems to be from no later than the first or second century BCE (it is cited by Bādarāyaṇa in the *Vedānta Sūtra*), and possibly earlier. Of course, continued unfolding occurred after that.

The achievement itself is a universal Hinduism that, following Biardeau’s discussion of *bhakti* in “Études de mythologie hindoue” (1976), we may designate as *smārta*. [For discussion of the *smārta* tradition, see Vedism and Brāhmaṇism.] It inherits from the Brahmanic sacrificial tradition a conception wherein Viṣṇu and Śiva are recognized as complementary in their functions but ontologically identical. The fundamental texts of this devotional *smārta* vision are the two epics—the *Mahābhārata* (c. 500 BCE–400 CE) and the *Rāmāyaṇa* (c. 400–200 BCE)—and the *Harivaṃśa* (c. 300–400 CE?). These works integrate much Puranic mythic and cosmological material, which later is spun out at greater length in the classical Purāṇas (“ancient lore”), of which there are said to be eighteen major and eighteen minor texts. The epics and Purāṇas are thus necessarily discussed together. But it should be recognized that whereas the *smārta* vision of the epics and the *Harivaṃśa* is fundamentally integrative and universal in intent, the Purāṇas are frequently dominated by regional and particularistic interests, including in some cases the strong advocacy of the worship of one deity (Śiva, Viṣṇu, or the Goddess) over all others. It is thus tempting to think of the period of Purāṇa composition (c. 400–1200 CE?) as one that extends the integrative vision of the fundamental texts but develops it in varied directions. Still, as it is not clear that instances of Puranic theological favoritism are motivated by distinct sects, it is misleading to speak of “sectarian” Purāṇas. [See Purāṇas.]

Taken together, then, the *Harivaṃśa* and the *Mahābhārata* (which includes the *Bhagavadgītā*) present the full biography of Kṛṣṇa, and the *Rāmāyaṇa* that of Rāma. The *Harivaṃśa* (Genealogy of Hari—i.e., Kṛṣṇa), the more recent of the texts concerning Kṛṣṇa, presents the stories of his birth and youth, in which he and his brother Balarāma take on the “disguise” (*veśa*) of cowherds. Thus they engage in divine “sport” (*līlā*) with the cowherd women (*gopīs*), until finally they are drawn away to avenge themselves against their demonic uncle Kāṃsa, who had caused their exile [See *Līlā*]. The *Mahābhārata* (Story of the Great Bhārata Dynasty) focuses on Kṛṣṇa’s assistance to the five Pāṇḍava brothers in their conflicts with their cousins, the hundred Kauravas, over the “central kingdom” of the lunar dynasty (the Bhārata dynasty) at Hāstinapura and Indraprastha

near modern Delhi. Both texts incorporate telling allusions to the other “cycle,” and since both stories must have circulated orally together before reaching their present literary forms, any notions of their separate origins are purely conjectural. The *Rāmāyaṇa* (Exploits of Rāma) tells the story of Rāma, scion of the solar dynasty and embodiment of *dharma*, who must rescue his wife Sītā from the demon (*rākṣasa*) Rāvaṇa. Though each of these texts has its special flavor and distinctive background, they become in their completed forms effectively a complementary triad. Indeed, in the “conservative” South, popular performances of Hindu mythology in dramas and temple recitations are still dominated by three corresponding specializations: *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the latter (c. 800–900 CE?) enriching the devotional themes of the *Harivaṃśa* in its tenth and eleventh books and in effect replacing it as representing the early life of Kṛṣṇa. [See *Mahābhārata*; *Bhāgavadgītā*; and *Rāmāyaṇa*.]

The *smārta* universe in these texts is structured around Viṣṇu, and more particularly around his two heroic incarnations, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. Thus other deities are frequently represented as subordinated to or subsumed by these figures. But there is also recognition of Viṣṇu’s complementarity with Śiva: some passages that stress mutual acknowledgment of their ontological unity, others that work out the interplay between them through stories about heroic characters who incarnate them, and scenes in which Viṣṇu’s incarnations do homage to Śiva. It should be clear that efforts to find “tendencies toward monotheism” in such texts involve the reduction of a very complex theology to distinctly Western terms. The same applies to those *Purāṇas* that are structured around Śiva or the Goddess rather than Viṣṇu but are still framed within the same cosmology and the same principles of theological complementarity and subordination.

This *smārta* vision is not, however, limited to one theological conundrum, for it extends to encompass Śiva and Viṣṇu’s interaction with other major figures: the god Brahmā, masculine form of the impersonal Absolute (*brahman*), now subordinated to the higher “personal” deities; the Goddess in her many forms; Indra and other *devas* (now “demigods”); their still perennial foes, the demons (*asuras*); and of course humans, animals, and so on. It also presents an overarching *bhakti* cosmology in which the yogic supreme divinity (Śiva or Viṣṇu) encompasses the religious values of *saṃnyāsa*, *tapas*, knowledge, and sacrifice, and introduces the view that taken by themselves, without *bhakti*, these values may be incomplete or even extreme “paths.” Further, it incorporates the *smārta* social theory of the

Dharmasūtras and the Dharmasāstras, and works out its implications within the cosmology. The details of this *smārta* vision are best discussed, however, in relation to the Hindu chronometric theory that is presumed and first articulated in these texts and then further developed in the *Purāṇas*. [See also *Cosmology*, article on Indian Cosmologies.]

Time is structured according to three main rhythms, hierarchically defined, the longer encompassing the lesser. Most down-to-earth is the series of four *yugas* named after four dice throws, which define a theory of the “decline of the *dharma*”: first a *ṛtayuga* (“perfect age”), then a *tretāyuga* and a *dvāparayuga*, and finally a degenerate *kaliyuga* (“age of discord”). A *ṛtayuga* lasts 4,000 years, a *tretāyuga* 3,000, a *dvāparayuga* 2,000, and a *kaliyuga* 1,000, each supplemented by a dawn and twilight of one-tenth its total. A full four-*yuga* cycle thus lasts 12,000 years and is called a *mahāyuga* (“great *yuga*”). These are not human years, however, but divine years, which are 360 times as long as human years. Thus a *mahāyuga* equals 360 times 12,000, or 4,320,000 human years, and a *kaliyuga* is one-tenth of that total. A thousand *mahāyugas* (4,320 million human years) is a *kalpa*, the second major time unit, which is also called a “day of Brahmā.” Brahmā’s days are followed by nights of equal duration. Brahmā lives a hundred years of 360 such days and nights, or 311,040 billion human years, all of which are sometimes said to pass in a wink of the eye of Viṣṇu. The period of a life of Brahmā, called a *mahākalpa*, is the third major temporal rhythm.

Working backward now, we may observe the *modus operandi* of Viṣṇu and Śiva (and of course others) as it is envisioned in the *smārta* Hinduism of our texts.

First, at the highest level, Viṣṇu and Śiva are great yogins, interacting with the rhythms of the universe in terms of their own oscillations between activity and yogic concentration (*saṃādhi*). At the *mahāpralaya* (“great dissolution”), the deity (usually Viṣṇu in these early texts, but just as often Śiva or the Goddess in later Puranic ones) oversees the dissolution of the universe into the primal *prakṛti* in accord with the cosmological theory of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. This ends the life of Brahmā, but it is also to be noted that it marks the restoration to its primordial unity of *prakṛti*, which—as feminine—is regarded mythologically as the ultimate form of the Goddess. From a Śaiva standpoint, the male (the deity as Puruṣa) and the female (the Goddess as Prakṛti) are reunited at the great dissolution of the universe, a theme that is depicted in representations of the deity as Ardhanārīśvara, “the Lord who is half female.” Their union is nonprocreative and represents the unitive experience of the bliss of *brahman*. Creation then occurs

when the deity (whether Śiva or Viṣṇu) emerges from this *samādhi* and instigates the renewed active unfolding of *prakṛti*.

The coincidence of the death of Brahmā with not only the dissolution of the universe but the reintegration of the Goddess and her reunion with Śiva is highly significant. The Goddess is an eternal being, worthy of worship because—like Viṣṇu and Śiva—she outlasts the universe and can bestow *mokṣa*. Brahmā, ultimately mortal and bound to temporality, is worshiped not for *mokṣa* but rather—and mostly by demons—for earthly power and lordship. Stories that portray Śiva's severing of Brahmā's fifth head and refer to the "head of Brahmā" (*brahmaśiras*) as the weapon of doomsday, are perhaps mythic echoes of this ultimate cosmological situation wherein the coming together of Puruṣa and Prakṛti coincide with his death.

The primary creation has as its result the constitution of a "cosmic egg," the *brahmāṇḍa* ("egg of Brahmā"). Further creation, and periodic re-creations, will be carried out by Brahmā, the personalized form of the Absolute (*brahman*). Insofar as the *brahman* is personalized and oriented toward the world, it is thus subordinated to the yogin Puruṣa, the ultimate as defined through *bhakti*. Moreover, the activity of Brahmā—heir in his cosmogenic role of the earlier Prajāpati—is conceived in terms of sacrificial themes that are further encompassed by *bhakti*.

It is at this level that the three male gods cooperate as the *trimūrti*, the "three forms" of the Absolute: Brahmā the creator, Śiva the destroyer, and Viṣṇu the preserver. Within the *brahmāṇḍa*, Brahmā thus creates the Vedic triple world of earth, atmosphere, and heaven (or alternatively heaven, earth, and underworld). These three samsaric worlds are surrounded by four ulterior worlds, still within the *brahmāṇḍa*, for beings who achieve release from *samsāra* but still must await their ultimate liberation. These ulterior worlds are not henceforth created or destroyed in the occasional creations or destructions. As to the triple world, Brahmā creates it by becoming the sacrificial boar (*yajñavarāha*) who retrieves the Vedas and the earth from the cosmic ocean. The destruction of the triple world is achieved by Śiva. As the "fire of the end of time," he reduces it to ashes, thus effecting a cosmic funerary sacrifice. And Viṣṇu, the god whom the Brāhmaṇas identify as "the sacrifice," maintains the triple world while it is sustained by sacrifices, and also preserves what is left of it after the dissolution when he lies on the serpent Śeṣa ("remainder") whose name indicates that he is formed of the remnant of the previous cosmos, or more exactly of the "remainder" of the cosmic sacrifice. This form of Viṣṇu, sleeping on Śeṣa, is called Nārāyaṇa, a name

that the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* already connects with the Vedic Puruṣa, the "male" source of all beings. When Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa awakens, Brahmā—who in some fashion awakens with him—re-creates the universe. Through all these myths the earth is a form of the Goddess, indeed the most concretized form she takes as a result of the evolution of *prakṛti* (earth being the last of the evolutes emitted and the first to dissolve).

Thus the greater universe whose rhythms are integrated within the divine yoga of Viṣṇu and Śiva encompasses an egg of Brahmā, which encloses a triple world whose rhythms form a round sustained by the divine sacrificial acts of the *trimūrti*. This pattern is transposed onto the third temporal rhythm, that of the *yugas*. Thus the characteristic religious virtues of the *yugas* are as follows: *dhyāna* ("meditation") or *tapas* ("asceticism") in the *kṛtayuga*; *jñāna* ("knowledge") in the *tretāyuga*; *yajña* ("sacrifice") in the *dvāparayuga*; and *dāna* ("the gift") in the *kaliyuga*. Thus the two *śruti*-based ideals of knowledge and sacrifice are enclosed within a framework that begins with yogic meditation as a divine *kṛta-yuga* activity and ends in the *kaliyuga* with the devotional gift. *Bhakti* thus encompasses knowledge and sacrifice.

The distinctive feature of the rhythm of the *yuga* cycle is that it is calibrated by the rise and fall of *dharma* in the triple world. Beings who have achieved release from the triple world oscillate between the four higher worlds, enduring periodic destructions of the triple world and awaiting the great dissolution of the universe that will dissolve the egg of Brahmā (coincident with his death) and result in a vast collective ultimate liberation of reabsorption into the supreme Puruṣa. Needless to say, this is to occur only after an almost incalculable wait. But beings who have attained these ulterior worlds are no more affected by *dharma* than the yogic deity beyond them. The maintenance of *dharma* within the triple world thus engages the deities in their third level of activity, that of "descent." In classical terms this is the theory of the *avatāra*. Though the term is not used in the epics or the *Harivaṃśa* in its later, specialized sense, these texts are suffused by the concept and its *bhakti* implications, which include narrative situations wherein the divinity looks to all concerned, and sometimes even to himself, as a mere human. The programmatic statement of the *avatāra* concept (without mention of the term itself) is thus stated by Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*: "For whenever the Law [*dharma*] languishes, Bhārata, and lawlessness flourishes I create myself. I take on existence from eon to eon [*yuga* to *yuga*], for the rescue of the good and the destruction of evil, in order to establish the Law" (4.7–8; van Buitenen, trans.).

The classical theory of the ten *avatāras*—most of whom are mentioned in the epics and the *Harivaṃśa*, but not in a single list—is worked out in relation to Viṣṇu. One thus has the following “descents” of Viṣṇu in order of appearance: Fish (Matsya), Tortoise (Kūrma), Boar (Varāha), Man-Lion (Narasimha), Dwarf (Vāmana), Rāma with the Ax (Paraśurāma), Rāma of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Kṛṣṇa, the Buddha, and the future *avatāra* Kalki, who will rid the earth of barbarian kings and reestablish the *dharma* at the end of the *kaliyuga*. There are various attempts to correlate appearances of the *avatāras* with distinct *yugas* and even *kalpas*, but the one feature that is consistently mentioned in these formative texts is that Kṛṣṇa appeared at the interval between the last *dvāparayuga* and *kaliyuga*, and thus at the beginning of our present age. It is likely that the theory was first formulated around Kṛṣṇa and Rāma along with the Dwarf (the only form to be associated with Viṣṇu in the *śruti* literature) and the apocalyptic Kalki. But in actuality, the *avatāra* theory is more complex. In the epics and in living Hinduism, Viṣṇu does not descend alone. In the literature, his incarnations take place alongside those of other deities, including most centrally Vāyu, Indra, Sūrya, the Goddess, and—at least in the *Mahābhārata*—Śiva. And in localized temple mythologies throughout India, one hears of *avatāras* of Śiva and the Goddess as well as of Viṣṇu. In devotional terms, the *avatāra* is thus a form taken on earth (or, better, in the three worlds) by any one of the three deities we find at the ultimate level of cosmic absorption, where all that remains beside the liberated beings who join them are the eternal yogic deities Viṣṇu and Śiva and the primal Goddess. [See *Avatāra*.]

The classical concept of the *avatāra*, structured around Viṣṇu, remains, however, the chief Hindu use of the term. Its formulation in the epics and the *Harivaṃśa* is thus constitutive for succeeding eras of Hinduism, in which it will only be enriched but not essentially changed by later *bhakti* theologies. Looking at these texts comprehensively, then, with the *Gītā* as our main guide, we can outline its main contours. Against the background of the vast, all-embracing *bhakti* cosmology, the involvement of the yogic divinity on earth takes place completely freely, as “sport” or “play” (*līlā*). Still, the god takes birth to uphold the *dharma* and to keep the earth from being unseasonably inundated in the waters of dissolution under the weight of adharmic kings. The *avatāra* thus intercedes to uphold the system of *varṇāśramadharmā* and to promote the proper pursuit of the four *puruṣārthas*. Since he appears in times of crisis, a central concern in the texts is with the resolution of the conflicts between ideals: renunciation versus householdership, *brāhmaṇa* versus *kṣatriya*, killing

versus “not desiring to kill” (*ahiṃsā*), *dharma* versus *mokṣa*, *dharma* versus *kāma* and *artha*, and conflicts between different *dharmas* (duties) such as royal duty and filial duty. But though the texts focus primarily on the two upper castes, the full society is represented by singular depictions of figures who evoke the lowest castes and tribal groups. It is also filled in with figures of real and reputed mixed caste.

Confusion of caste is a particularly prominent issue in the *Mahābhārata*, where it is raised by Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā* as the worst of ills. Most significantly, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Harivaṃśa* identify a particularly pernicious form of caste confusion among the barbarian (*mleccha*) peoples of the Northwest (the Punjab), mentioning Yavanas, Śakas, and Pahlavas among others as enemies of the *dharma* and causes for such “mixing.” The fact that events of the period from 300 BCE to 300 CE are projected into the distant past indicates that part of the *bhakti* synthesis was the articulation of a mythical theory of historical events. One may thus look at these *smṛti* texts as posing a model for the revival of Hinduism in accord with “eternal” Vedic models, with the descent of the *avatāra*—and indeed of much of the Vedic pantheon along with him—guaranteeing the periodic adjustment of the sociocosmic world to these eternal norms. Furthermore, the tracing of all Hindu dynastic lines back to the defunct if not mythical “lunar” and “solar” dynasties provided the model for the spatial extension of this ideal beyond the central lands of Āryavarta where the *dharma*, according to both *Manu* and the *Mahābhārata*, was the purest.

But the focus of the *avatāra* is not solely on the renovation of the *dharma*. He also brings to the triple world the divine grace that makes possible the presence, imagery, and teachings that confer *mokṣa*. The epics and the *Harivaṃśa* are full of *bhakti* tableaux: moments that crystallize the realization by one character or another of the liberating vision (*darśana*) of the divine. Most central, however, is the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is both a *darśana* and a teaching.

The *Bhagavadgītā* (Song of the Lord) takes place as a dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna just before the outbreak of the *Mahābhārata* war. Although he is the third oldest of the five Pāṇḍavas, Arjuna is their greatest warrior, and Kṛṣṇa’s task in the *Gītā* is to persuade him to overcome his reluctance to fight in the battle. Fundamental to the argument is Arjuna’s requirement to fulfill his *dharma* as a *kṣatriya* rather than adopt the ideal—unsuitable for him in his present life stage—of the renouncer. Thus the *Gītā* champions the theory of *varṇāśramadharmā* as upholding the sociocosmic order.

Kṛṣṇa presents his teaching to Arjuna by revealing a sequence of “royal” and “divine” mysteries that culmi-



nate in his granting a vision of his "All-Form" (*Viśva-rūpa-darśana*) as God, creator and destroyer of the universe. In this grand cosmic perspective, Arjuna is told that he will be but the "mere instrument" of the deaths of his foes, their destruction having now come to ripeness through Viṣṇu's own agency in his form as cosmic time, or *kāla* (*Bhagavadgītā* 11.32–33). Arjuna thus recognizes this omniform deity as Viṣṇu in this climactic scene.

On the way to this revelation, however, Kṛṣṇa acknowledges the three paths (*yogas*) to salvation: action, knowledge, and devotion. These are presented as instructions by which Arjuna can gain the resolute clarity of insight (*buddhi*) and yogic discipline by which to recognize the distinctions between soul and body, action and inaction, and thus perform actions—including killing—that are unaffected by desire. Ritual action and knowledge are set forth as legitimate and mutually reinforcing paths, but incomplete unless integrated within and subordinated to *bhakti*. Kṛṣṇa thus presents himself as the ultimate *karmayogin*, acting to benefit the worlds out of no personal desire. He thus bids his devotees (*bhaktas*) to surrender all actions to him as in a sacrifice, but a sacrifice (*karman*) no longer defined in Vedic-Mīmāṃsā terms as a means to fulfill some personal desire. Kṛṣṇa also presents himself as the object of all religious knowledge, the highest *puruṣa* (*uttama-puruṣa*) and supreme self (*paramātman*), beyond the perishable and the imperishable, yet pervading and supporting all worlds (15.16–17).

One other facet of the *bhakti* synthesis to which the *Gītā* alludes is the transition from traditional Vedic sacrifice (*yajña*) to new forms of offering to the deity (*pūjā*, literally, "honoring"). [See *Pūjā*, *article on Hindu Pūjā*.] This corresponds to the theory that the "gift" is the particularly appropriate religious practice for the *kaliyuga*. Thus Kṛṣṇa says: "If one disciplined soul proffers to me with love [*bhakti*] a leaf, a flower, fruit, or water, I accept this offering of love from him. Whatever you do, or eat, or offer, or give, or mortify, make it an offering to me, and I shall undo the bonds of *karman*" (9.26–27; van Buitenen, trans.). The passage probably refers to domestic worship of the "deity of one's choice" (*iṣṭadevatā*). But it is also likely to allude to temple worship, for it is known from inscriptions and literary sources from the third to first century BCE that sanctuaries existed for Vāsudeva and Keśava (presumably as names for Kṛṣṇa and Viṣṇu), as well as for other deities. By the beginning of the Gupta period, around 320 CE, temple building was in full swing, with inscriptions showing construction of temples for Viṣṇu, Śiva, and the Goddess. Temples were built at sites within cities, as well as at remote holy places, and sanctuaries at both such

locations became objectives along pilgrimage routes that are first mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. From very early if not from the beginning of such temple worship, the deities were represented by symbols and/or iconic images.

Certain aspects of temple construction and worship draw inspiration from the Vedic sacrifice. The plan of the edifice is designed on the ground as the Vāstupuruṣamaṇḍala, a geometric figure of the "Puruṣa of the Site" (*vāstu*), from whom the universe takes form. The donor, ideally a king, is the *yajamāna*. The *sanctum sanctorum*, called the *garbhagrha* ("womb house"), continues the symbolism of the Vedic *dikṣā* hut: here again the *yajamāna* becomes an embryo so as to achieve a new birth, now taking into his own being the higher self of the deity that he installs there in the form of an image. The temple as a whole is thus a Vedic altar comprising the triple world, but also an expanded image of the cosmos through which the deity manifests himself from within, radiating energy to the outer walls where his (or her) activities and interactions with the world are represented. [See *Temple*, *article on Hindu Temples*.]

But the use of the temple for ordinary daily worship involves radically non-Vedic objectives. The Vedic sacrifice is a means for gods and men—basically equals—to fulfill reciprocal desires. *Pūjā* rites are means for God and man to interact on a level beyond desire: for man to give without expectation of reward, or, more exactly, to get back nothing tangible other than what he has offered but with the paradoxical conviction that the deity "shares" (from the root meaning of *bhakti*) what is given and returns it as an embodiment of his or her grace (*prasāda*). God is thus fully superior, served as a royal guest with rites of hospitality. Basically four moments are involved: offerings, taking sight (*darśana*) of the deity, receiving this *prasāda*, and leave-taking by circumambulation of the *garbhagrha* and the image within. The offerings are the *pūjā* proper and comprise a great variety of devotional acts designed to please the deity, some of which may be worked into a daily round by the temple priests, who offer on behalf of others.

Finally, one last element of the consolidation of Hinduism achieved by early Gupta times is the emergence of the Goddess as a figure whose worship is recognized alongside that of Viṣṇu and Śiva and is performed with the same basic rites. Indeed, it is possible that aspects of *pūjā* ceremonialism are derived from non-Vedic *sūdra* and village rites in which female deities no doubt figured highly, as they do in such cults today. The two epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, reflect themes associated with the Goddess in the portrayals of their chief heroines, Draupadī and Sītā, but the *Harivaṃśa* is

probably the first text to acknowledge the Goddess as such. There she takes birth as Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma's "sister" (actually she and Kṛṣṇa exchange mothers). Some of her future demon enemies are mentioned, and there is also reference to her having numerous places of worship and a cult that apparently included animal sacrifice. Thus the Goddess is integrated even within the texts of the early *smārta* Hinduism that are centered on Viṣṇu. But the text that registers her full emergence is the *Devīmāhātmyam* (Glorification of the Goddess). Probably from about 400–600 CE, it was included in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*. Here the Goddess is recognized under all her major aspects, as primal matter embodied in the universe yet beyond it, incarnate in many forms, cause of the joys and miseries of this world and of liberation from it, the power (*śakti*) enabling the roles of the *trimūrti*, yet higher than the gods and their last resort in the face of certain demons, most notably the buffalo demon Maḥiṣāsura, her most dedicated and persistent foe through cults and myths both ancient and current. This emergence of the Goddess is registered more fully in the development of Tantric Hinduism. [See Goddess Worship, *article on The Hindu Goddess*.]

**Tantric Hinduism.** *Tantra* is literally "what extends." In its Hindu form it may be taken, according to its name, as a movement that sought to extend the Veda (whose pedigree it loosely claimed) and more particularly to extend the universalistic implications of *bhakti* Hinduism. However, although it was quick to integrate *bhakti* elements and to influence *bhakti* in nearly all its forms (late Puranic, popular, and sectarian), its earliest and most enduring forms "extend" Hinduism in ways that were directly opposed to the epic-Puranic *bhakti* synthesis. Nonetheless, it is still formulated within the same cosmology.

Early Tantrism developed most vigorously, from the fourth to sixth centuries CE, in areas where Brahmanic penetration had been weakest: in the Northwest, in Bengal and Assam in the East, and in the Andhra area of the South. These are areas where one must assume non-Aryan influences in general, and more particularly probably also tribal and folk practices involving shamanism, witchcraft, and sorcery, and, at least in the East and South, a cult of the Goddess. As Tantrism gained currency in succeeding centuries throughout India, the shamanistic and magical features were assimilated to yogic disciplines, while the elevation of the Goddess gave full projection on a pan-Indian scale to roles and images of the Goddess that had been incorporated, but allowed only minimal scope, in the early orthodox *bhakti* and even earlier Vedic sacrificial traditions. The earliest extant Tantric texts are Buddhist, from about the fourth to sixth centuries. [See Buddhism,

Schools of, *article on Esoteric Buddhism*.] Hindu Tantric texts include Vaiṣṇava Saṃhitās, Śaivāgamas from a slightly later period, and Śākta Tantras (exalting the Goddess as Śakti, or Power) from perhaps the eleventh century on. But from its start Tantrism represented a style and outlook that placed the Goddess at the center of its "extensions" and to a certain extent cut across sectarian and religious distinctions, whether Hindu, Buddhist, or even Jain.

Though Hindu Tantra thus asserts its Vedic legitimacy, its stance is intentionally anti-Brahmanic. It was especially critical of Brahmanic concepts of hierarchy, purity, and sexual status, all of which had been reinforced by the orthodox *bhakti* synthesis and which were in particular bound up with a theology that viewed the supreme divinity as a male (a Puruṣa, whether Śiva or Viṣṇu) whose ultimate form was accessible only beyond the rhythms of the cosmos and its hierarchy of impure and pure, gross and subtle worlds. For Tantrics, dualities were artificial and their experience was the result of delusion. On the analogy of the union between Śiva and Śakti, which in Puranic devotional terms is conceivable only at the end of the *mahāpralaya*, or great dissolution of the universe, Tantric practice (*sādhana*) addresses itself to experiencing the unity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (*puruṣa* being both "soul" and deity, *prakṛti* being both "matter" and Goddess), male and female, pure and impure, knowledge and action, and so on. Most important, all this takes place here and now, not only in this world, where *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* on the macrocosmic scale are one, but in the human body, where their microcosmic embodiments can be experienced. The body thus becomes the ultimate vehicle for liberation, the dissolution of opposites taking place within the psychophysical continuum of the experience of the living adept, who realizes beyond duality the oneness of *brahman*.

In terms of practice, Tantra's rejection of Hindu orthopraxy is even more decisive. And practice is clearly exalted above theological or philosophical formulation. Two types of Tantra are mentioned: "left-hand" and "right-hand." The Tantric rejection and indeed inversion of orthopraxy is most pronounced in the former, as the right-hand Tantra interprets the most anti-Brahmanic practices of the left metaphorically, and also includes under its heading a wide variety of ceremonial rituals assimilated into *bhakti* Hinduism that are simply non-Vedic. These include the use of non-Vedic *mantras* as well as *yantras* and *maṇḍalas*, aniconic and non-Vedic geometric devices used for visualization and integration of divine-cosmic forces. Adepts come from all castes, but low-caste and even tribal practitioners and teachers are especially revered. The goal of liberation

within the body takes the specific form of seeking magical powers (*siddhis*), which in orthodox forms of Hinduism are regarded as hindrances to spiritual achievement. Under the tutelage of a guru, who embodies the fulfillment sought and its transmission and who is thus all-important, the *siddhis* are sought through yoga disciplines that show the impact of Tantra through their anatomical analysis of the "subtle body" (*liṅga śarīra*). First practiced is *hathayoga*, the "yoga of exertion or violence," that is, rigorous physical discipline geared to coordinating the body's "ducts" or "channels" (*nāḍīs*) and "energy centers" (*cakras*). This is followed by *kuṇḍalinīyoga*, which awakens the dormant *śakti*, conceived as a coiled-up "serpent power" in the lowest *cakra* between the genitals and the anus, so that it (or she) can pierce and transform all the *cakras* (usually six) and unite with Śiva in the "thousand-petaled *cakra*" in the region of the brain.

Beyond these practices, "left-handed" Tantrics pursue in literal fashion the ceremonial of the "five *m*'s" (*pañcamakārapūjā*). That is, they incorporate into their cultic practice five "sacraments" beginning with the syllable *ma*: fish (*matsya*), meat (*māṃsa*), parched grain (*mudrā*, regarded as an aphrodisiac), wine (*madya*), and finally sexual intercourse (*maithuna*). It is likely that most if not all of these practices involve the incorporation of elements of the cult and mythology of the Goddess, who already in the *Devīmāhātmyam* delights in meat and wine and is approached by lustful demons for sexual intercourse. Tantric texts stress that these practices are to be carried out within a circle of adepts and supervised by a male and female pair of "lords of the circle" who insist on strict ritual conventions that guard against an orgiastic interpretation. Classically, the male is to retain his semen at the point of orgasm, this being a sign not only of profound dispassion but an actualization of the nonprocreative union of Śiva and Śakti at the dissolution of the universe of dualities.

It is interesting to note that, although their historical validity is debated by scholars, there are strong Indian traditions suggesting that Śaṅkara's philosophical nondualism had practical Tantric repercussions. [See also *Tantrism and Hindu Tantric Literature*.]

**Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta and Smārta Orthodoxy.** The Advaita (nondualist) interpretation of the Vedānta can be traced back at least to Gauḍapāda (c. 600 CE), but it is Śaṅkara (c. 788–820) who established this viewpoint as the touchstone of a revived *smārta* orthodoxy. Born in a small Kerala village, Śaṅkara spent his alleged thirty-two years as a vigorous champion of the unity of Hinduism over and against intra-Hindu divisions and the inroads of Buddhism and Jainism. He toured India, setting up monasteries (*maṭhas*) near fa-

mous temples or holy places at each of the four compass directions, and appointed a disciple at each center to begin a line of renunciant "pontiffs." And he wrote works of great subtlety and persuasiveness, including commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the *Bhagavadgītā* that inspired contemporaries, disciples, and authors of later generations to write additional important works from the perspective that he developed. [See *the biography of Śaṅkara*.]

An essential feature of Śaṅkara's argumentation is that lower views of reality must be rejected as they are contradicted or "sublated" by higher experiences of the real. Finally, all dichotomous formulations must be abandoned upon the nondual experience of the self (*ātman*) as *brahman*. The world of appearance is sustained by ignorance (*avidyā*), which "superimposes" limitations on reality. *Māyā* ("illusion" or "fabrication"), itself neither real nor unreal, is indescribable in terms of being or nonbeing. It appears real only so long as *brahman* is not experienced. But it is empirically real relative to things that can be shown false from the standpoint of empirical observation. *Māyā* is thus said to be more mysterious and unknowable than *brahman*, which is experienced as being, consciousness, and bliss (*sat-cit-ānanda*).

As philosophy, Advaita is thus a guide to *mokṣa*, which is experienced when the ignorance that results from superimposing *māyā* on *brahman* is overcome. Liberation arises with knowledge (*jñāna*), but from a perspective that recognizes relative truth in the paths of both action and *bhakti*. Practically, Śaṅkara fostered a rapprochement between Advaita and *smārta* orthodoxy, which by his time had not only continued to defend the *varṇāśramadharmā* theory as defining the path of *karman*, but had developed the practice of *pañcāyatana-pūjā* ("five-shrine worship") as a solution to varied and conflicting devotional practices. Thus one could worship any one of five deities (Viṣṇu, Śiva, Durgā, Sūrya, Gaṇeśa) as one's *iṣṭadevatā* ("deity of choice"). As far as *varṇāśramadharmā* was concerned, Śaṅkara left household issues largely aside and focused instead on founding ten orders of *saṃnyāsis* (the *daśanāmi*, "ten names"), each affiliated with one of the four principle *maṭhas* he founded. But traditional orthodox views of caste were maintained. According to Śaṅkara, as *sūdras* are not entitled to hear the Veda, they cannot pursue knowledge of *brahman* as *saṃnyāsis*; rather they may seek *mokṣa* through hearing the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*. Four of the ten *saṃnyāsi* orders were thus restricted to *brāhmaṇas*, and it does not seem that any accepted *sūdras* until long after Śaṅkara's death. *Bhakti* sectarian reformers were generally more liberal on this point. As to the god (or gods) of *bhakti*, Śaṅkara views

the deity (Īśvara) as essentially identical with *brahman* and real relative to empirical experience. But by being identified "with qualities" (*saguṇa*), God can be no more than an approach to the experience of *brahman* "without qualities" (*nirguṇa*). Viewed from the experience of the self as *nirguṇa brahman*, which "sublates" all other experiences, the deity is but the highest form of *māyā*. Clearly, *bhakti* traditions could not rest with this solution. But it should be noted that in opposing Śaṅkara and abandoning the universalist vision of the epic-Puranic devotional synthesis, the sects turned their backs on the main impulses that had attempted to sustain the unity of Hinduism.

**Sectarian Hinduism.** The elaboration of *bhakti* Hinduism continued to unfold in the later Purāṇas, linking up with the temple and pilgrimage cultus and with local and regional forms of worship. It thus established itself until the time of Śaṅkara as the main expression of Brahmanic orthodoxy and the main shaping force of popular Hinduism. But though it proclaimed a universal Hinduism, it gave little weight to the problem of the immediate accessibility of salvation. While caste hierarchy was to remain in effect on earth to assure, among other things, the pure temple worship of the gods by the *brāhmaṇas*, the ultimate release that the Purāṇas promised was almost infinitely postponed. It is possible that their postponement of a collective liberation was a kind of purification process for liberated souls and thus a prolongation of the concern for *brāhmaṇa* purity on earth. In any case, the remoteness of salvation and the defense of caste purity and hierarchy in the Puranic devotionism of Brahmanic orthodoxy were probably incentives for the development of alternate forms of *bhakti*. These emerged in sectarian traditions, in movements led by saint-singers who inspired vernacular forms of *bhakti* revivalism, and more generally in local and regional forms of Hinduism. [For further discussion of sectarian movements, see Vaiṣṇavism; Kṛṣṇaism; and Śaivism.]

**Sectarian traditions.** Sectarianism and *bhakti* revivalism are movements of separate origins that converge for the first time in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the Tamil-speaking area of South India. There the fusion was accomplished in the traditions of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaiva Siddhānta, sects whose names indicate their distinctive theological preferences for Viṣṇu and Śiva. Henceforth, sectarianism and *bhakti* revivalism continued to interact and produce hybrid forms as they spread over all of India.

Generally speaking, sects followed a reformist impulse, and in most of them one can identify the emergence of the *guru* as a new type of figure: not the transmitter of an "impersonal" Vedic teaching, but one who

takes inspiration from the personal deity of the sect, with whom he may even be identified. Traditional hierarchy was generally respected, but with the proviso that within the sect divine grace was not limited by caste boundaries. Nonetheless, as groups formed around masters and their teachings, they took on many of the characteristics and functions of castes (endogamy, interior ranking), and certain sects formulated their stands with particularly positive attitudes (the northern school of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas) or negative attitudes (Liṅgāyats and Vīraśaivas) toward *brāhmaṇas*. Sects distinguish themselves over and against each other by many means, and often quite passionately: by bodily markings, forms of yoga discipline, worship, theology, and in particular by their choice of supreme deity, whether Śiva, Viṣṇu, Śakti, or, in the North, Kṛṣṇa or Rāma. Nonetheless, they generally participate in wider Hindu activities such as pilgrimage, festival, and temple worship (the Liṅgāyats are an exception) and draw upon fundamental Hindu belief structures. Thus most sects acknowledge other deities as subordinate to the supreme deity of the sect. In particular, most have worked out ways of encompassing the relation of the God and the Goddess at some fundamental theological level. Persistently the supreme deity is identified both as the ultimate *brahman* and also as in some way personal. The sects also frequently define various stages of divine descent or interaction with the world, various stages of the soul's ascent, and various types of relation between the soul and God. Thus the sects elaborate upon the epic-Puranic cosmology while modifying and refining the theological and soteriological terms. It is only against this background that their formulations are intelligible.

From the historical vantage point, one may note that the consolidation of the separate strands of sectarianism and *bhakti* revivalism occurs after, and is no doubt in part a response to, the growing success of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta. Prior to Śaṅkara, sectarian groups had centered primarily around distinctive ritual traditions that were increasingly influenced by Tantrism: not only in forms of worship and theological formulation, but also, in some Śaiva sects, in actual practice. Thus the Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātras and Vaikhānasas and the Śaiva Pāśupatas (all mentioned first in the late *Mahābhārata*) between the fifth and tenth centuries produced their Saṃhitās and Āgamas to regularize the construction of temples, iconography, and *pūjā* ceremonialism. Some Pāśupatas and Kāpālikas (a Tantric Śaiva sect) also incorporated forms of abrupt anticonventional behavior modeled on Śiva's character as the great yogin ascetic. With the exception of the Pāñcarātras, who elaborated an influential doctrine of the emanations (*vyūhas*) of Viṣṇu that paralleled the cosmogonic theory

of evolution in the Sāṃkhya system, the theological formulations of these movements were apparently among their secondary concerns.

**Saint-singer tradition.** Whereas the early sectarian movements were able to spread their impact from north to south using Sanskrit as their medium, the *bhakti* revivalist movement began in the South, drawing on Tamil. Like the sectarian movements, the saint-singers developed their traditions along Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva lines. The sixty-three Nāyaṇmār (or Nāyaṇārs) promoted the worship of Śiva, while the twelve Ālvārs similarly honored Viṣṇu. Part of the revivalist motivation was provided by the earlier spread of Buddhism and Jainism in the South, both of which lost considerable following as a result of the efforts of the Nāyaṇmār and Ālvārs, as well as those of their contemporary Śaṅkara.

Some of the most renowned among these two companies of saint-singers have left songs that they composed at the temples of Viṣṇu and Śiva, praising the form and presence of the deity therein, the place itself as his manifestation, and the communal attitude of worship generated there through pilgrimage and festival. Though they honor the deities in terms familiar from Puranic myths, the stories are set in the local terrain. The emotional side of *bhakti* thus draws from deep Tamil traditions, including a revival of classical Tamil poetic conventions involving the correlations between different types of landscape, different divinities, and different types of male-female love. In the hands of the saint-singers, erotic love in particular was drawn on as a metaphor for devotional feelings that stressed the feminine character of the soul in relation to the deity and idealized a softening of the mind or heart that could take the forms of "melting" into the divine, ecstatic rapture, divine madness, and possession.

Following the advent of Śaṅkara, most of the sectarian and revivalist movements found common cause in their devotionalist stance against Advaita nondualism and continued to develop for the most part interdependently. Thus, most formatively, the songs of the Ālvārs were collected in the ninth century for eventual use by the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas. And the poems of the Nāyaṇmār—supplemented by the songs of Māṇikkavācakar, who apparently lived just after the list of sixty-three Nāyaṇmār had been set (ninth century)—were collected to form parts of the canon of the Śaiva Siddhānta. However, the revivalist and sectarian strains could also at times follow somewhat independent courses. The saint-singer tradition continued to take Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava forms among the Liṅgāyats and the Haridāsas of Karnataka, and also to be associated there with sects (the Liṅgāyats themselves and the Brāhma Saṃpradāya or Dvaita Vedānta tradition of Madhva,

respectively). But its spread through Maharashtra, the Hindi-speaking areas of North India, and through Bengal was most focused on Viṣṇu, or more accurately on his forms as Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, who in turn, in the Hindi and Bengali areas, became the deities of different sects. In the case of Kṛṣṇa, erotic devotional poetry opened new dimensions on the theme of Kṛṣṇa's love-play with his "new" consort, Rādhā (her name does not appear before the twelfth-century Sanskrit *Gītāgovinda* by the Bengali court poet Jayadeva). In Hindi and Bengali poems, not only are the emotions of motherly love for the baby Kṛṣṇa and erotic love for the youthful Kṛṣṇa explored, but they are tied in with a classical theory of aesthetic appreciation (*rasa*).

As to the sects, the impact of Śaṅkara's Advaita is evident at many points. Although Śaiva monasticism may predate Śaṅkara by about a century, his establishment of *maṭhas* around India was highly influential. Certain post-Śaṅkara sects thus adopted institutionalized forms of "monastic" renunciation, either like Śaṅkara setting their *maṭhas* alongside the temples (Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Dvaita Vedāntins, Śaiva Siddhāntins) or in opposition to the whole temple cultus (Liṅgāyats). Vaiṣṇava sects also assume henceforth the mantle of new "Vedāntas" in order to seek Vedic authority for their advocacy of *bhakti* theologies over and against Śaṅkara's nondualism and in their efforts to subordinate the path of knowledge to that of *bhakti*.

Most distinctive and most important theologically among the Vaiṣṇava schools are those of Rāmānuja (c. 1017–1137) and Madhva (1238–1317), both of whom attempted to refute Śaṅkara's interpretations of the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the *Bhagavadgītā* with their own commentaries on those texts. The more prolific Madhva also wrote commentaries on the *Ṛgveda* and the epics. Rāmānuja, drawing on the ceremonialism and theological formulations of the Pāñcarātra sect as well as on the revivalist poetry of the Ālvārs, developed for the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas the first *bhakti* sectarian repudiation of the Advaita. In his "qualified nondualistic Vedānta" (*viśiṣṭādvaita vedānta*), he argued that Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa is the ultimate *brahman*, his relation to the world and souls being "qualified" as substance to attribute. World and souls are thus real, as of course is God—all in opposition to Śaṅkara's view that there is no reality other than *brahman*. For Rāmānuja the three paths not only culminate in *bhakti* but are crowned by *prapatti*, "surrender" to God or "falling forward" at his feet. Criticizing both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Madhva's "dualistic Vedānta" (*dvaita vedānta*) stressed the absolute sovereignty of God and the fivefold set of absolute distinctions between God and souls, God and the world, souls and souls, souls and the world, and matter in its

different aspects—all of which are real and not illusory.

On the Śaiva side, the most distinctive sect is the Kashmir Śaiva, or Trika, school, established in the ninth century, with possibly earlier roots. It is nondualist, but from the standpoint that all is essentially Śiva. As pure being and consciousness, Śiva is aware of himself through reflection in the universe, which he pervades as the *ātman* and in which he is manifest through his *śakti* (power, or female energy, personified as the Goddess). The universe is thus an expression of Śiva's aesthetic experience of his creative awareness as self and his delight in unity with his Śakti. "Recognition" of Śiva as the *ātman*, and experience of the self through *spanda* ("vibration")—an attunement to the blissful throbbing waves of divine consciousness in the heart—are among the means to liberation. One of the foremost systematizers of this school was Abhinavagupta (c. 1000 CE), who developed the view that states of aesthetic appreciation (*rasas*, "tastes") are modes of experiencing the divine Self. Though favoring *śāntarasa* (the *rasa* of peacefulness), Abhinavagupta's theories influenced the North Indian medieval devotional poetry that explored *bhakti* itself as a state of *rasa*, with such powerfully evocative modes as love of Kṛṣṇa in the relationships of servant-master, parent-child, and lover-beloved. This type of devotional intensity reached its peak in the person of the Bengali saint Caitanya (1486–1533), founder of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava sect, whose ecstatic dancing and singing enabled him to experience the love of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. Popular tradition regards him as an *avatāra* of Kṛṣṇa, a form assumed by Kṛṣṇa to experience in one body his union with his Śakti.

**Popular Hinduism.** The main current of living Hinduism is popular Hinduism. It has been affected by every change the tradition has gone through and may fairly be assumed to have ancient roots, in some aspects traceable to Indus Valley religion, in others to *śūdra*, village, and tribal forms of religion that were never more than alluded to—and then negatively—in the ancient and classical sources. *Bhakti* and Tantra are two movements within Hinduism that draw inspiration from this broad current, and popular Hinduism today remains dominated by *bhakti* and Tantric expressions. [See also Indian Religions, *article on Rural Traditions.*]

It is, however, perilous to look at popular Hinduism from the perspective of what it might have once been: that is, to attempt to isolate or reconstruct its Dravidian, pre-Aryan, or non-Brahmanic components. Although hypotheses about pre-Aryan and non-Aryan forms of popular Hinduism are certainly worth pursuing, they must be informed and restrained by a sound understanding of the comprehensive structures through

which both popular and Brahmanic forms of Hinduism are integrated at the popular level. Aspects of popular religion that might look non-Aryan turn out on closer examination to involve Vedic prolongations. Nor are recent constructs like sanskritization, brahmanization, or kṣatriyazation—all useful up to a point, but stressing only the adoption by low-caste groups of high-caste models—adequate to account for the multivector process that must have occurred for a long time as it continues to occur today.

Amid the bewildering variety of popular Hindu rites, customs, and beliefs, two broad structures can be identified that clarify this overall integration. One involves the working out of the implications of *bhakti* in relation to temple worship; the other involves the working out of the implications of the caste system in relation to local forms of worship more generally. As they function, the two structures are intimately related.

Generally speaking, whether one defines a locality in large terms (a region, a former kingdom) or small terms (a city, town, or village), one will find two types of divinities: pure and impure. The pure divinities are forms taken locally—*avatāras*—of the great gods Viṣṇu and Śiva. Sometimes the Goddess is also purified to this rank, often with a myth explaining her change from violent to peaceful habits (as with the alleged conversion of the goddess Kāmākṣī at Kanchipuram, Tamil Nadu, by Śaṅkara). And in certain regions Śiva's sons Murukan/Skanda (in Tamil Nadu) and Gaṇeśa (in Maharashtra) also assume this role. In their temples, these gods are offered pure vegetarian food by brahmins. Today, all castes can worship in such temples, thanks to temple entry legislation by the postindependence government; formerly, low castes were excluded. These castes still maintain their own temples where impure gods are served with nonvegetarian offerings, that is, sacrifices of male animals, usually cocks and goats but occasionally water buffalo. Legislation prohibiting buffalo sacrifices has so far had mixed results.

Whereas worship of pure gods—especially at remote pilgrimage sites—is focused ultimately on renunciation and liberation, that of impure gods is dominated by down-to-earth concerns. One thus finds among the general category of impure gods lineage deities (*kuladevatās*), caste deities, and village deities (*grāmadevatas*). The first are usually but not always male, and some are deities for brahman as well as low-caste lineages. Caste deities and village deities are usually female, and the category may overlap where the deity of a locally dominant caste becomes also the village deity. Where the village deity (usually a goddess) is the deity of a vegetarian caste or has had her cult purified to bring it into

accord with high-caste standards, she frequently has one or more male assistants—impure demons converted to her cause and frequently lineage gods themselves—who handle the animal sacrifice (real or symbolic) for her, often out of her line of sight.

Nonetheless, though opposing principles are each given their play, it is their overlap and interrelation that is most striking. Low castes worship the pure gods in their temples. And high castes acknowledge the power of the impure deities, not only as *kuladevatās*, but through selective (pure) means of participation in festivals sponsored by lower castes. Through the universalization of *bhakti*, the impure gods are sometimes also the prototypes for the demons whose deaths at the hands of the pure deities transform them into their devotees. These local myths have their roots in Puranic mythologies, and the sacrificial practices they evoke involve at least in part prolongations and reinterpretations of the Vedic animal sacrifice.

The second issue—working out of the implications of the caste system in relation to local forms of worship—has thus already been touched upon, but with the focus of issues of purity and impurity as defined by brahman and low-caste involvements. There remains the issue of the role of the *kṣatriya*, or more particularly the king, as the ruler of the land. The caste system has traditionally functioned in locally defined territories, “little kingdoms,” where the local ruler had certain roles to perform. No matter what his actual caste, whether high or low, pure or impure, he had to function as a *kṣatriya*. In his ceremonial status, he performed the role of *rajmān*, engaging him at the core of a system of prestations and counterprestations with other castes as a sort of patron for those who perform services for him. Most significantly, this title derives from the Vedic *yajamāna*, “sacrificer,” and prolongs not only the *yajamāna*’s function as patron of other castes (particularly brahmans, who offer sacrifices for him), but that of “sacrificer” itself. The model of the king as *rajmān* on the regional territorial level has its counterpart in the village in the person(s) of the leader(s) of the locally dominant caste, who assumes the role of *yajamāna* at village festivals. When, as was until recently widely the case, the village festival involves the sacrifice of a buffalo, it thus occurs within a continuum that includes the royal buffalo sacrifice traditionally performed in connection with the pan-Hindu festival of Dussera, and the mythology of the goddess Durgā and the buffalo demon Mahiṣāsura that is traceable to the *Devīmāhātmyam* in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*. There are many local and regional transformations of this pattern, but a basic theme is that the Goddess, who personifies victory, acts for the *yajamāna* and

the kingdom or village in her conquest over demonic forces (impure barbarians, drought, diseases) that threaten the welfare of the local terrain over which she, as goddess, presides.

**Hindu Responses to Islam and Westernization.** Self-conscious Hindu responses to influences from the West were first worked out in the classical period in the epics, the Dharmaśāstras, and the Purāṇas. It seems that military dominance by “barbarian” peoples in that period provided one of the incentives for the articulation of Hindu orthodoxy. Islamic rule and Western rule in India have provided similar incentives, but this often goes unmentioned as historians place their emphasis on what is supposedly new. A full accounting of the impact of almost ten centuries of Islam and five centuries of Western presence in India would have to deal not only with their distinctive new influences but also with the ways in which traditional Hindu models have been revived and applied in new and adaptive ways, often on the folk and popular level. That, however, can only be alluded to here.

Islamic influence on Hinduism has many dimensions, all difficult to assess. From the time of the raids of Mahmud of Ghazni into Northwest India (977–1030) into the period of Mughal dominance, Hindus had to deal periodically with outbreaks of violence and iconoclastic zeal. Regional defense of Hindu traditions against Islam—first by the Rajputs in Rajasthan, then by the Vijayanagar rulers and their successors in South India (1333–eighteenth century), and finally by the Marathas in Maharashtra and the South (late sixteenth century–1761)—clearly fostered the Hindu ideal of the territorial kingdom, big or “little,” as a model for the protection of ongoing Hindu values. Under the Muslim rulers, in fact, many Hindu chiefs and petty rajas were left in control of their local realms so long as they paid tribute and supplied military support. In these circumstances, conservative and puritanical tendencies seem to have gained momentum in orthodox Hinduism, particularly in regard to caste and the purity of women. Nonetheless, one finds numerous cases where Muslim themes and figures have been integrated into popular Hindu myth and ritual, but usually in ways that indicate Muslim subordination to a local or regional Hindu deity.

While orthodox, popular, and domestic forms of Hinduism thus drew in on themselves, however, Hindu sectarian traditions multiplied, particularly in the period of the breakup of the Delhi sultanate (1206–1526). Notable at this time were Caitanya in Bengal, and two exemplars of the North Indian *sant* (holy man) tradition: Kabir (c. 1440–1518, from Banaras) and Nānak (1469–1539, from the Punjab). These two latter figures both

preached a path of loving devotion to one God that combined aspects of Islamic Sufism and Hindu *bhakti*. They thus formulated probably for the first time in terms partly Hindu an exclusivist monotheism like that found in the Abrahamic traditions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Over and against the direct experience of this one God, all else was mediate and external, whether the practice were Muslim or Hindu. Thus not only caste but idol worship was rejected by these teachers. But though their syncretistic poetry remained highly popular, it did little to change the Hindu practices it criticized. Nānak's work in particular provided the foundation for the Sikh tradition, an increasingly non-Hindu and non-Muslim movement on its own. Nor did the syncretistic interests of the great Mughal emperor Akbar (ruled 1555–1605) do much to encourage theological synthesis, despite the popularity of his, for the most part, religiously tolerant rule. Akbar's successors on the Mughal throne abandoned his policies and pursued expansionist goals that aroused resistance from the heirs of the Vijayanagar and the Rajput kingdoms, and especially from the Sikhs and the new power of the Marathas. The seeds of a nationalist vision of Hinduism may be traced through these movements and back to the imperial ideal of the epics.

Under the British, certain reform tendencies initiated under Muslim rule were carried forward, freshly influenced by Christian missionary activity and Western education. Most notable were the reform movements of the nineteenth century. The Brāhmo Samāj was founded in 1828 by Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833, from Calcutta). In an early treatise Roy wrote an attack on idolatry that showed Muslim influence, but by the time he founded the Samāj he had been more affected by Christianity, and particularly by the Unitarians. Roy thus introduced a kind of deistic monotheism and a form of congregational worship to go along with a rejection of idolatry, caste, sacrifice, transmigration, and *karman*. The Ārya Samāj, founded in 1875 by Swami Dayananda Sarasvati (1824–1883, from Kathiawar), denied authenticity to Puranic Hinduism and attempted a return to the Vedas. Showing that the Vedas lent no support to image worship and various social practices, he went further to assert that they were monotheistic. As regards caste, he championed the *varṇa* theory as an ancient social institution but denied that it was religious. Both movements split into rival camps. [See Brāhmō Samāj and Ārya Samāj.]

The Ramakrishna Mission, established on the death of its founder Ramakrishna (1834–1886) and carried forward by his disciples, most notably Vivekananda (1863–1902), is more representative of traditional Hindu values. Strong *bhakti* and Tantric strains con-

verged in the mystical experiences of Ramakrishna and were held in conjunction with an initiation into Advaita Vedānta and experiences of the oneness of all religions through visions not only of Hindu deities but of Jesus and Allāh. For many followers, this humble priest of Kālī has thus come to be regarded as an *avatāra*, in the tradition of Caitanya. Vivekananda, Western-educated and keenly intellectual, attended the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, lectured widely, and established the Vedānta Society of New York. When he returned to India as a recognized champion of Hindu self-pride, he helped to organize the disciples of Ramakrishna into the pan-Indian Ramakrishna Mission. The first such teacher to gain prominence in India by popularity gained abroad, he thus inadvertently set up a pattern that has been followed by many prominent gurus and swamis in the twentieth century. Notable among them are Swami A. C. Bhaktivedanta (1896–1977), founder of the Hare Krishna movement (ISKCON) as an outgrowth of the Bengal Caitanya tradition [see International Society for Krishna Consciousness], and Swami Muktananda (1908–1982), exponent of *siddhayoga* teachings that draw on Kashmir Śaivism.

An earlier figure, one who attracted a large Western following without ever leaving India, was Śrī Aurobindo (1872–1950), whose career spanned nationalist political activism in Bengal (up to 1908), followed by the establishment of an ashram (hermitage) in Pondicherry for the teaching of a type of integral yoga that stressed the "evolutionary" progress of the soul toward the divine. One must also mention Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948), whose reputation upon returning to India in 1915 after twenty-one years in England and Africa was not that of a guru but a champion of Indian causes against social and economic discrimination. As he took on more and more ascetic and saintly aspirations, however, Gandhi sought to combine an ideal of dispassioned and nonviolent service to humanity, modeled on the *Bhagavadgītā*'s doctrine of *karmayoga*, with work for Indian *svarāj* ("self-rule").

Although sometimes referred to as a Hindu renaissance, the effect of the various reformers since the nineteenth century has been to a certain extent more ideological than religious. Where they founded religious movements, these attracted only small followings. But their religious views—that Hinduism is essentially monotheistic, that caste is not essentially Hindu, that Hindu tolerance does not deny the truths of other religions, that Hinduism is in accord with modern science, and so on—have had major influence on a Western-educated, largely urban elite that, at least for now, controls the media and the educational processes of contemporary India. It remains to be seen how this new



vision of unity will square with the traditionally diverse Hinduism of the vast population of the countryside.

[For surveys of regional religious traditions in India, see Bengali Religions; Hindi Religious Traditions; Marathi Religions; and Tamil Religions. For Hindu cultic life, see under Worship and Cultic Life; see also Domestic Observances, article on Hindu Practices; Hindu Religious Year; and Priesthood, article on Hindu Priesthood. The religious dimension of Indian artistic expression is treated in Drama, article on Indian Dance and Dance Drama; Music, article on Music and Religion in India; Iconography, article on Hindu Iconography; and Poetry, article on Indian Religious Poetry. Many of the technical terms and many of the personalities, both mythic and historical, mentioned herein are the subject of independent entries.]

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ALF HILTEBEITEL

**HINDU PHILOSOPHY.** See Indian Philosophies.

**HINDU RELIGIOUS YEAR.** The religious celebrations of the Hindu year appear to be countless, and thus the main difficulty in presenting them here is selecting a pattern that is sufficiently comprehensive to take into account their intricacy. The difficulty is met at two levels. First, diversification occurs not only across broad regional areas, but throughout subregions as well. Second, villagers of a particular locality will share only a part of the series of annual festive observances, most of which vary according to caste, family custom, and sectarian bias. Moreover, even for a festival acknowledged to be pan-Indian, local variations occur concerning the date and the particulars of ritual and mythological background.

Very often, in order to highlight sociological factors, anthropological studies give mere chronological listings of localized festivals. From that perspective, however, the meaning of rituals and of their dating is left open to question. One must be content either with the functionalist explanation of a fictitious solidarity supposedly reinforced by festivals, or with the obvious general purpose of every ritual, prosperity.

More sophisticated views have been elaborated to account for the multiplicity of local traditions in relation to the Sanskrit-Brahmanic "great tradition" (Srinivas, 1952; pp. 213–228) as well as for the "processes of universalization and parochialization" that McKim Marriott has found to be "generally operative in Indian civilization" (1955, p. 218). Although these theories were initially expressed with careful qualifications, later scholars have sometimes cited them in an almost mechanical manner: the relationship between the "great" and "little" traditions has been reduced to the nineteenth-century pseudohistorical understanding of an irreconcilable dichotomy between Brahmanic religion and the so-called autochthonous tribal, Dravidian (or even pre-Vedic) ones.

With the structural studies of myths and rituals, a renewed interest has grown for the study of Hindu symbolism and, as an outcome, for the study of the Indian calendrical system. When we observe the popular use of intricate almanacs (*pañcāṅga*), we cannot but ascertain the all-inclusive character of the Hindu conception of

time in relation to efficient activity and hence to religious celebrations.

**The Hindu Conception of Time.** The year is the main unit of time in so far as it is equivalent to a day of the gods. From this unit, time computation expands in two ways. The small units, that is, from the year downward, depend on astronomical considerations and directly concern men in this world. The great units given by the Puranic cosmogonies are on the scale of the gods and have nothing to do with astronomy. However, the eschatological speculation of the cosmogony not only teaches that time is basically cyclical in the very periodical succession of creation-degradation-resorption, but it also institutes a homology among the cosmic periods, the levels of ultimate values, and the divine manifestation for this world (Biardeau, 1981, p. 173). In other words, man is at the very center of the cosmos. Since he is the only being able to act with a goal in mind, by his ritual activity at the level of what is at issue on the earth, he alone is capable of sustaining the whole sociocosmic structure with its two poles, that is, liberation from transmigration and ultimate resorption into the Absolute, as well as the very continuation of this world. [See also *Cosmology, article on Hindu and Jain Cosmologies.*]

Thus to refer to this world Hindu thought uses the term *karmabhūmi* "earth of (ritual) activity (or of transmigration)"; such activity cannot be but efficacious if the proper actions are observed at the right time and the right place. The principle of appropriateness, which is especially emphasized in the Hindu medical texts, remains at work insofar as every important undertaking of daily Hindu life is related to an astronomical conjunction. It is not a mere question of choosing a good date but of selecting a conjunction of time in which two or more specified astronomical phenomena meet and combine their effects; thus, we are reminded that time is not only cyclical but that it also introduces a rupture in its apparent continuity.

**The Hindu Calendrical System.** The Hindu calendar combines the solar year with a lunar year, both systems being synchronized by adding or deleting lunar time units. A solar month begins with the *saṃkrānti* ("entry") of the sun from one *rāśi* (zodiacal sign) to another (the twelve *rāśis* have almost the same names as the zodiacal signs of the Western system). Since this system disregards the precession of the equinoxes, the vernal equinox, which is supposed to occur when the sun enters Meṣa, or Aries, takes place around the thirteenth day of April. In the same way, the great *saṃkrānti* of mid-January marks the Indian winter solstice and thus the beginning of the solar year, when the sun's course is northward (*uttarāyana*); from mid-July its course is

southward (*dakṣiṇāyana*). The distinction between the two halves of the year is one of the important structural oppositions of the Hindu conception of time.

For the lunar months, the waxing and waning of the moon provides the major opposition between a bright and a dark fortnight. The very name of the full moon, *pūrṇimā*, conveys an idea of fulfillment; moonlight gives people strength, and the time of the full moon is thus auspicious for offering sacrifices to the gods. On the contrary, the dark half of the lunar month and the new moon, *amāvāsya*, "when the sun and moon 'dwell together,'" are more ambiguous and are often devoted to ancestor worship. Each lunar day (*tithi*) of a fortnight is named in order by a numeral. Some of them are consecrated to a specific god: for example, the fourteenth of each dark fortnight in a year is consecrated to Śiva, but among them, that of February–March is the most important and has been sometimes mythically associated with a *nakṣatra*, or lunar constellation. For in conjunction with the synodical revolution of the moon, the zodiacal belt, already divided into twelve *rāśis*, is also divided into twenty-seven segments, each taking the name of a *nakṣatra* and each deemed to be ruled by a specific (Vedic) deity with a specific influence. Each lunar month is named for the *nakṣatra* that appears (though sometimes with a slight astronomical variation) to be in regular conjunction with the full moon. When the months are solar months, they have been given either the names of the lunar months, as in Tamil Nadu or Bengal, or those of the *rāśi*, as in Kerala. Whichever the case, both solar and lunar cycles with their related elements are taken into consideration. However, there is a great diversity of regional calendrical systems; sometimes a particular holiday is celebrated on different dates in different regions. The variations derive from several factors: not only do lunar and solar months coincide, but, depending upon the region, the lunar month is known either as "ending with the full moon" (*pūrṇimānta*) or as "ending with the new moon" (*amānta*). Furthermore, each region has several almanacs based on different textual traditions. As in the Western system, the seven planets (including the sun and the moon) are correlated with the days of the week; to the seven are added two mythical bodies, Rāhu and Ketu, which are said to cause eclipses. In addition, planets interfere at sporadic intervals throughout the year.

For any given celebration, not only is a date fixed corresponding to an astral conjunction, but smaller units of time are also assigned with separate values of their own. The determination of the specific moment (*muhūrta*) for the performance of an auspicious act involves highly sophisticated calculations that must account for

the fact that the different sidereal components of the date have varying durations. Additionally, there are seemingly endless values to these many combinations that induce auspicious as well as inauspicious periods when no serious enterprises—especially religious ones—can be undertaken.

It would appear, then, that in the Hindu calendrical system each segment of time derives value from its relation first to the astronomical moment and by implication to the cosmical time. Theoretically speaking, the significance of a religious event comes partly from its occurrence in conjunction with different sidereal cycles and partly from the symbolic meaning attached to each astral phenomenon. From a practical viewpoint, however, this is not so easy to ascertain. But, considering that symbolic meaning always carries several possible interpretations, the conception of time mainly provides for a series of distinctive oppositions—such as bright and dark, pure and impure, and so forth—as a mental framework for (religious) activity.

Furthermore, the notion of a proper or auspicious time would not be so significant if it did not correspond to the notion of a proper place. If crowds gather every twelve years at Prayāga (Allahabad) in northern India or at Kumbakonam in the South for ritual bathing (and with the intent of future salvation), it is because at that very place waters of different sacred rivers are said to mix together at the very time of a special astral conjunction. [See also Kumbha Melā.] In a similar way, worship throughout the course of the year takes place not at random but in a delimited space, either in the home or at the temple or at any temporary place that has been set aside according to rule for that purpose. Hinduism emphasizes the relationship of (sacred) time to (sacred) space; that is, the site of the temple or of any home inscribes in its space the same values that are represented in the conceptual square diagram of the earth. [See also Temple, article on The Hindu Temple.] The dimensions of space and the positions of the gods are coordinated with the symbolic projections on earth of the solar and lunar cycles and of other astronomical phenomena. The definition of space thus includes a definition of time according to the specific values assigned to each orientation. Consequently, by delimiting a space—or only by facing a specific direction—for worshipping a deity at a prescribed conjunction of time, the worshiper reenacts a cosmos appropriate for his sacrificial relationship with the divine.

**Structure of the Religious Year.** Among the diverse kinds of religious celebrations, there is but a thin line demarcating *vrata* (religious obligation usually involving a fast, a purificatory bath, and special worship) from *utsava* (festival). They share many elements, and

from a list of almost 1,500 *vratas* and *utsavas* that Kane (1975) has compiled, twenty-two are still celebrated in various Hindu regions.

At least one-fourth of these are observed by all Hindus throughout India and Nepal. There is also some difficulty in distinguishing private from domestic observances, and popular festivals, celebrated at every level of society, are possibly associated with the temple festivals. Some of the largest temples may include in their festive calendar all the sacred days of the Hindu year and other ones as well, according to the personality of the main deity and to the myths of the place. A temple celebration may provide some Hindus for a reason to undergo a *vrata*, sometimes in connection with a pilgrimage. In small, localized temples of goddesses or subordinate male gods the date of the festival, and eventually of the *vrata*, may appear only minimally connected with the general calendrical system. Such events do conform to their proper seasons and to long-lived tradition, and therefore must be understood in relation to the specific regional pattern.

Most religious celebrations are held during the bright half of the lunar months. The full moon is sacred and is observed, if not everywhere on each month, at least in one region or another. The relatively few celebrations that fall during the dark half of the lunar month assume special significance. The three main such festivals are dedicated to Śiva, to Kṛṣṇa, and to the Festival of Lights, Dīvālī. The significance of these sacred *tithis* of the opposed bright and dark halves of the lunar months is correlated to the structure of the solar year. [See also Dīvālī.]

In many parts of India the New Year begins with mid-April, at the vernal equinox. In Andhra Pradesh the vernal equinox is called Yugādi ("beginning of a cosmic cycle") and it is often held that this is the time when Brahmā begins the creation. The time of Dīvālī, however, which comes after the autumnal equinox, is also perceived as a beginning. The New Year tends to be celebrated at the balanced time of the equinoxes, whereas both solstices mark an intersection between opposing periods. If we remember the equivalence of the year to a day of the gods, the solstices are then the metaphorical sunrise and sunset, sensitive transitions that must be manipulated carefully, particularly in the case of the sunset, which is perceived as *pradoṣa* ("break in time," or "fault").

Makara (Capricorn) Saṃkrānti ("transiting") of mid-January, or the winter solstice, is a sacred date almost everywhere in India. It is especially celebrated in regions that observe solar months, such as in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, where the festival of Poṅkal combines worship of the sun, of the ancestors, and of cattle,

with a ritual cooking of the new rice and prescribed gift-giving. However, even in areas that observe lunar months, the period of the summer solstice, though not marked by a special day, is the beginning of a period of intense religious activity. At this point seasons must be taken into account insofar as the summer solstice corresponds with the monsoon time of the tropical year. Even in areas with regional climatic variations (in Tamil Nadu the rains do not come from the east until October), everywhere in India the agricultural year begins with the monsoon approximately when the sun begins its apparent course southward. The very accumulation of natural events strengthens the symbolic cosmic drama at issue. Ekādaśī (the "eleventh day" of the bright fortnight) in July–August is recognized as the time when Viṣṇu, the king and sustainer of the world, goes to sleep for four months; that celebration is thus called the Cāturmāsya ("four months"). The celebration of Viṣṇu lying on the cobra Ananta (celebrated on the fourteenth day of the bright fortnight of September–October), is reminiscent of a *pralaya*, or a destruction of the world submerged by waters, just before a re-creation. This particular fortnight belongs to the *pitṛs* ("fathers"), and ancestors are especially worshiped at the new moon of August–September and during the dark half of September–October in a ceremony called Piṭṛpakṣa, just before Navarātri. During these four months, the *asuras* (demons) threaten to take the place of the gods and the earth is left to the power of the underworld beings. Thus the *nāgas*, or mythic cobras associated with water and fecundity, are propitiated on Nāga Pañcamī, the fifth day of the bright fortnight of August–September.

Because it is felt that men must protect themselves from inauspicious forces, during the full moon of August–September the twice-born of the upper social orders (*brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, and *vaiśya*) reaffirm the close relationship to the divine that is theirs by virtue of the investiture of the sacred thread, the symbol of their second birth. In a custom observed mainly in northern India, a "thread of protection" (*rakṣābandhana*) is tied by the domestic priest to the hand of his clients, or, more commonly, by a sister to that of her brothers. During this period no marriage is allowed, for it is felt that women are the best mediators for helping to pass through this crisis time, which is crucial to the fecundity of the earth and the continuation of the socio-cosmic order. Women thus propitiate different forms of the Goddess (from July to September) and undergo *vratas* for the sake of their husbands on Haritālikā, or Tīj, the third day of the bright fortnight of September–October. Śiva's son Gaṇeśa is worshiped in the fourth of the same fortnight (with a renewed interest, since 1893,

in Maharashtra), and the *ṛṣis*, the archetypal Vedic seers, on the fifth.

However, the birth of Kṛṣṇa on the eighth of the dark fortnight in August–September, and that of Vāmana, the dwarf incarnation of Viṣṇu, on the twelfth day of the bright half of September–October (the Oṇam festival in Kerala), foretell the final restoration of the socio-cosmic order. But the main battle is left again to a feminine power, the goddess Durgā, who, after “nine nights” (Navarātri), from the first to the ninth of the bright fortnight in October–November, killed the buffalo demon. [See also Navarātri.] The final “victory of the tenth” (Vijayadaśamī) emphasizes the revival of dharmic kingly rule on earth. On the fourteenth of the dark fortnight in October–November light comes again with Dīvālī, which celebrates Lakṣmī, the goddess of prosperity, with lamps, festivities, and the retelling of stories about Yama, the god of death, and about the inevitable victory of the gods over the forces of evil. At last, Viṣṇu awakes from his sleep on the eleventh of the bright fortnight of November–December.

In South India, the myth of the sleeping Viṣṇu is not well known. Instead, the celebration of Śiva’s son Skanda, a favorite god in Tamil Nadu, reflects a popular myth in which Skanda is the slayer of the *asura*: on the sixth of the bright half of November–December the *mūrtis* (images) of Skanda and of the *asura* are taken out in procession, and the priest (or another participant) holds the spear and symbolically kills the demon. The next full moon, called Karttikaidīpa, duplicates the lightings of Dīvālī. Despite regional variations, the second half of the solar year seems to be perceived everywhere in India as inauspicious and dangerous; it is a period in which the gods must assent to the underground, the demonic, and the feminine powers for the very sake of the fecundity and continuation of the earth.

The first part of the year is auspicious and bright, but, as a corollary, it is unfruitful. Early in the season, during Śivarātri (on the fourteenth of the dark fortnight in February–March), Śiva bestows salvation on his devotees, even if they include hunters, who kill animals. As told by a popular tale, a hunter who spent the night of Śivarātri in a forest, pouring water and throwing leaves of the *bilva* tree (which is associated with Śiva) on a buried *liṅga*, thus worshiped Śiva without knowing it and obtained salvation when he died. The narrative recalls that salvation through devotion to Śiva is possible for all people, even for those of the lowest social order who have no access to sacred knowledge. It is reminiscent also of the fact that Śiva himself takes the form of a hunter in some myths. As regards the Śivarātri celebration, Śiva is believed to have originally appeared as an unending column of fire, affirming his supremacy

over Brahmā and Viṣṇu, thus recalling his relation to the fire of a cosmic destruction before the universal flood.

The fifth of the bright fortnight of February–March is dedicated to the beginning of spring, personified as Vasanta, the “brilliant” companion of Kāma, the god of love. The celebration of Vasanta seems to be to the season of love what the worship of the *nāgas* (six months previous, during August–September) is to fecundity.

The beginning of spring also marks the beginning of the preparations for Holī, at the full moon of March–April. Holī is a very popular festival in northern India. Often defined as the festival of the *śūdra* (members of the fourth and lowest order of Hindu society), Holī is an occasion in which normal, socially restrained behavior is momentarily forgotten; everyone engages in playful dousing with colored powder and water and shares in the bonfire that symbolically destroys all of the world’s evil. In Bengal, Holī is associated with the worship of Kṛṣṇa. Holī is not known in South India, but there the full moon of March–April is variously celebrated, either with the burning in effigy of Kāma, whom Śiva burnt with his third eye, with the marriage of particular gods, or with the worship of Skanda or other deities. The fires of Holī and Kāma are counterpart to the waters on which Viṣṇu sleeps lying upon the cobra Ananta, which occurs six months later, on the day before the full moon of September–October. [See also Holī.]

Spring merrymaking ends with the turning of the vernal equinox. Again with the bright half of April–May, a Navarātri festival of nine days is held. This festival is the counterpart of the autumnal Navarātri but is less elaborate—often only two or three days are consecrated to the Goddess. However, the birth of Rāma (an incarnation of Viṣṇu) on the ninth echoes the royal restoration of the great Navarātri for the sociocosmic order. With the two next full moons, Yama (or, in Tamil Nadu, Yama’s attendant Citragupta, who records the good and evil deeds of human beings) and the *pitṛs* (in Gujarat) are remembered. The full moon of May–June is dedicated to terrible or warrior forms of the deity (Narasimha or Skanda). Formerly, on the third of the bright half, a fast was held in some northern areas for Akṣayya (“the inexhaustible”); whatever was given on that day was said to become inexhaustible and undecaying. The *vrata* anticipated the then threatening scarcity of food and water. On that date was also celebrated Viṣṇu’s *avatāra* as Paraśurāma (“Rāma with the axe”), who became incarnate in order to kill all *kṣatriyas*, because one of them had stolen his brahman father’s cow, the inexhaustible wealth without which no brahman can sacrifice. This mythical event indicates that something has begun to go wrong in the sociocosmic order.

During the oppressive heat of the last month before the summer solstice, people can do almost nothing but wait for the rains. The Ganges River (Gaṅgā) is believed to have come down to earth on the tenth of the bright fortnight of June–July for the salvation of human beings. On that day a bath in the Ganges or in a sacred river is prescribed for destroying sins. This is considered a time of cosmic crisis, for the sun is moving southward (an inauspicious direction), and monsoon floods follow the burning sun of May–June, recalling the image of a cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*) in which destruction by fire is followed by deluge. The month of June–July is called Jyeṣṭha (“eldest”); the feminine form of this name is Jyeṣṭhā, indicating Lakṣmī’s “eldest” sister, Alakṣmī, the goddess of nonprosperity or misfortune. On the full moon of Jyeṣṭha women renew their series of *vratas* by worshiping the goddess Sāvitrī and the ever-growing banyan tree for a never-dying husband.

There are comparatively many more ascetic observances during the second half of the solar year than during the first, for during the first, bright half of the year the emphasis is rather on the direct relationship of human beings to deities, and most of the festivals for family gods (*kuladeva*) and locality gods (*grāmadeva*) seem to be held during that period. These particular festivities have not been taken into account here because they vary so much from region to region. Instead, I have emphasized the structure of the Hindu religious year with its complementarily opposed halves. I have also chosen to rely mainly upon the mythological background for these observances, which emphasizes their sociocosmic significance; on the village level, however, this meaning is not always recognized, and the rituals serve mainly pragmatic interests having to do with food, disease, fate, and so forth. From our point of view, there is a correspondence between the different significant levels. Moreover, one must not forget the importance of *bhakti*, pure devotion, which has a particular influence on worship at every level of society.

Finally, the religious calendar taken as a whole does not convey a sense of rigid sectarian bias. Emphasis on one deity or another appears to be primarily a regional matter. Vaiṣṇava devotees, of course, will give more emphasis to celebrations of Viṣṇu, and Śaiva devotees, to those of Śiva. A few exclusive sects may have their own specific festive dates more or less grafted onto the general calendrical system. But in general, the very complementarity of Viṣṇu, Śiva, and the Goddess contributes to the balance of activities throughout the religious year.

[Many of the religious observances mentioned in this entry are further discussed in *Worship and Cultic Life, ar-*

*ticle on Hindu Cultic Life, and in Indian Religions, article on Rural Traditions. See also Viṣṇu; Kṛṣṇa; Śiva; and Goddess Worship, article on The Hindu Goddess. For festivities that concern specific traditions, see Śaivism; Vaiṣṇavism; Durgā Hinduism; Kṛṣṇaism; and Gāṇapatya Hinduism. For local traditions, see also Bengali Religions; Hindi Religious Traditions; Marathi Religions; and Tamil Religions.]*

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MARIE-LOUISE REINICHE

**HINDU TANTRIC LITERATURE** is vast and varied in form, if not always in content. It is written mostly in Sanskrit, but also in all the other languages of India. It has a long tradition, is still flourishing today, and indeed has become an essential part of Hinduism, which in the course of time became largely Tantric or tantricized. The main body of Hindu Tantric literature in Sanskrit consists of what is called *āgama*. This word, meaning "tradition," is opposed here to *nigama*, the established doctrine, which is the Veda and its orthodox sequel; the distinction is similar to that made in religion between the terms *Tantric* and *Vedic*. Usually the *āgamas* of the Śaivas are called *Āgama*, those of the Śāktas are called *Tantra*, and those of the Vaiṣṇavas are known as *Samhitā*. This terminology is, however, not strictly respected.

The Śaivāgamas are the basic scriptures of Śaivism—both Southern and Kashmir Śaivism as well as Viraśaivism—embodying as they do most of its doctrine and theology and its ritual and technical prescriptions. As the "tradition," they are considered to be divinely inspired, emanating from Śiva.

None of them is dated. Some are believed to be very ancient, although there is no proof of their having existed before the sixth or seventh century CE. More recent Śaivāgamas date back to the thirteenth or fourteenth century. But whatever their date, they have certainly been modified in the course of time. Their place of origin is unknown; several features point to South India, where they still form the basis of Śaiva practices and beliefs, but they were also considered authoritative in Kashmir.

The *Āgamas* are usually in verse, and vary in length. In theory they consist of four parts (*pādas*): on knowledge or doctrine (*vidyāpāda*), on ritual (*kriyāpāda*), on conduct (*caryāpāda*), and on yoga (*yogapāda*); but few *Āgamas* have reached us in their complete form, if indeed they ever had one. The *vidyāpāda* in particular is often missing. *Āgamas* do not focus on philosophy or doctrine, but on how devotees should conduct their lives and practice religion.

The doctrine in all *Āgamas* is not homogeneous; some are dualist, others nondualist. Their cosmogony (notably the lists of *tattvas*) also differs, as do their views on

initiation. Yet all maintain that the Agamic path must be followed in order to gain liberation or supernatural joys, which the Veda, although useful in everyday life, cannot help one to attain. Most *Āgamas* contain instructions not only on cult and ritual, but also on images and temples. The *Ajita*, *Kāmika*, and *Karaṇa* *Āgamas* are especially rich in this respect. Thus they are a fundamental source concerning architecture and iconography and a number of practical aspects of Hinduism.

Tradition has it that there are twenty-eight Śaivāgamas. Ten of these are called *śaiva*, that is, "revealed by the Śivas": *Kāmika*, *Yogaja*, *Cintya*, *Kāraṇa*, *Ajita*, *Dīpta*, *Sūkṣma*, *Sahasra*, *Aṃśumat*, *Suprabheda*. The eighteen others are *raudra*, "revealed by the Rudras": *Vijaya*, *Niśvāsa*, *Svāyambhuva*, *Anala*, *Vīra*, *Raurava*, *Makuta*, *Vimala*, *Candrajñāna*, *Bimba*, *Prodgīta*, *Lalita*, *Siddha*, *Santāna*, *Sarvokta*, *Pārameśvara*, *Kiraṇa*, *Vātula*.

The twenty-eight *Āgamas* are also divided into five groups corresponding to the five mouths or faces of Śiva from which they have issued. However, undue importance should not be attached to such classifications. There are, in addition, about two hundred secondary *Āgamas* (*Upāgamas*), some of which are important. In manuscript colophons and in the text itself, *Āgamas* are often called *Tantras*.

The domain of *Tantras* is more difficult to define. First, there are few purely Śākta texts. Although Śakti is extolled, Śiva often remains the highest, even if a somewhat abstract, form of the divinity. Śaiva *Tantras* also exist. Second, this vast literature is still little known: many texts are known only by name or through quotations; few have been published and even fewer critically edited. Catalogues remain the main source of information, but inventories are far from complete, despite recent progress.

*Tantras* are supposedly divine revelations transmitted to mankind by a succession of spiritual masters. They are traditionally said to number 64 (8 × 8) or 192 (3 × 64), or 500. But lists and classifications differ and seem artificial. Texts available are often said to be a shortened version of some original work of immense size; if any such original text ever existed, it has not survived.

It is not known when the earliest works were composed, perhaps in the sixth or seventh century CE. The most recent *Tantras* are almost contemporary. They are usually in verse and in poor Sanskrit. Precautions taken to ensure that their teachings remain secret, such as the use of conventional or cryptic language, or allusions to esoteric doctrines and practices, all make them difficult to understand. The themes found here are more mystical and esoteric than those of the *Āgamas*; Tantric

themes include the nature of the deity, cosmogony, description and worship of deities, *mantras* and *yantras*, Tantric yoga, magic, and so on.

Some Tantras are distinguished by a better Sanskrit and more complex and elaborate ideas, for instance the *Netra*, *Svacchanda*, *Mālinīvijaya*, or *Vijñānabhairava*, all connected with Kashmir. The best-known one in the West, the *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*, is an eighteenth-century fabrication.

The *Samhitās* (the word means "collection" or "compendium"), sometimes called *Vaiṣṇavāgama*, are the basic texts of the *Pāñcarātra* school. According to tradition there are 108 *Samhitās*. In fact, they number more than 200 of varying length, with an estimated total of over a million stanzas. They are supposed to have been revealed by the godhead with the object of teaching how to serve and worship God.

A *Samhitā* is divided theoretically into four parts, like the *Tantras*: *jñāna*, on knowledge and doctrine, *yoga*, on spiritual exercises, *kriyā*, on images, temples, and the like, and *caryā*, on ritual. These texts introduced into *Vaiṣṇavism* the doctrine of *śakti* and expounded the concept of the *vyūhas*: the hypostases of Viṣṇu through which he expands so as to manifest the cosmos. The doctrines of the main founders of *Vaiṣṇava* sects—*Yāmuna*, *Rāmānuja*, and *Madhva*—depend expressly or implicitly on the *Samhitās*.

The chronology of the *Samhitās* is uncertain. The oldest may date back to the sixth century CE. Some are quoted by eleventh-century authors, others by fourteenth-century authors. The most ancient seems to be the *Jayākhyā*. The best known is the *Ahīrbudhnyā*. The *Sattvata* and *Pauṣkara* are also important. The *Pāñcarātra* seems to have originated in northern India and then spread southward. At least some of the *Samhitās* have come from Kashmir or central India; others are probably from the South, where their tradition is still very alive today. Certain texts called *Samhitās* are not part of the *Pāñcarātra*. On the other hand, *Lakṣmī Tantra* and *Padma Tantra* are two important *Pāñcarātrāgamas*.

There are also a great many other Tantric works. The *Purāṇas*, the basic texts on Hindu legends, rites, and customs, contain Tantric elements; the more recent the *Purāṇa*, the more evident the Tantric influence. Many of the *Upaniṣads* are Tantric: the so-called *Śākta* and *Yoga Upaniṣads* and some of those usually classified as *Śaiva* and *Vaiṣṇava*. There are thousands of hymns of praise (*stotra*), collections of hundred stanzas (*śataka*), "thousand names" (*sahasranāma*), songs (*gītā*) and other poems in praise of Tantric deities, glorifications (*mahātmya*) of divinities (such as the *Devīmāhātmya*, also called *Caṇḍī-* or *Durgā-māhātmya*), and glorifications of places, as well as other types of devotional literature.

Works on Tantric yoga, on *kuṇḍalinī*, on the science of *mantra* (*mantraśāstra*) should also be mentioned; these constitute an especially important group that includes such well-known texts as *Prapañcasāra*, *Śāradātilaka*, and *Mantramahodadhi*. There are also literary or ritual compositions (*nibandha*), manuals of ritual (*paddhati*), and innumerable compilations and digests.

Finally, there are metaphysical and philosophical works that have not been ascribed to divine authorship. Some are quite remarkable, for instance the works of *Abhinavagupta*, *Utpaladeva*, or *Kṣemarāja*, all *Śaivas* from Kashmir, or the works of *Sadyojyoti*, a *Śaiva* dualist (tenth century), or those of *Bhāskararāya* (eighteenth century). Such texts represent a most important and often brilliant contribution to Tantric literature.

Texts in Sanskrit form not only the majority of Tantric literature, but also its essential part, for whatever role so-called popular elements may have played in its evolution, Tantrism belongs fundamentally to the learned Sanskrit tradition of India. Even at its popular level, Hinduism always remains closely knitted to this tradition. That is why even Tantric works in vernacular languages have close links with Sanskrit literature, which provides them with their themes, terminology, and conceptual framework.

Tantric works in Indian languages other than Sanskrit are numerous and diverse. In South Indian languages, Tantric *Śaiva* and *Śākta* literature is abundant, concerning, for instance, the cult of *Kālī* or the *Siddhas* or the ritual and devotional themes. There are also many poems, songs, and works on *mantraśāstra*, *yoga*, and other topics. Among the Indo-Aryan tongues, Bengali takes the foremost place. The best-known texts are the *Maṅgalas* (or the Hymns of *Rāmaprasad*) to the Goddess, *Sahajiyā* works, and the songs of the *Baūls*. But there are many others. Poems, songs, and devotional or philosophical works have also been written in other languages, and they still continue to appear today.

[For a discussion of the Hindu Tantric tradition, see Tantrism.]

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ANDRÉ PADOUX

**HIPPOCRATES** (460?–380? BCE), celebrated Greek physician, called the “father of medicine.” In spite of his reputation as the founder of scientific medicine, the embodiment of medical wisdom, and the exemplar of the ideal physician, little is known with certainty about Hippocrates' life. There are only a few contemporary or near-contemporary references to him. He is mentioned by Plato (*Protagoras* 311b–c, *Phaedrus* 270c), Aristotle (*Politics* 1326a14), and Aristotle's pupil Menon (in *Anonymous Londinensis* 5–6). He is said to have been a native of the island of Kos, off the southwestern coast of Asia Minor, and to have been an Asclepiad (the term may refer to a family or a guild of physicians that traced their origin to Asklepios, the god of healing, or may simply mean “physician”). He was, according to these sources, a teacher of medicine whose fame Plato compared to that of the sculptors Polyclitus and Phidias. He taught that one cannot understand the body without taking into account the whole, and he explained disease as the result of air that forms in the body during the process of digestion.

A biographical tradition that began long after his lifetime incorporated additional details, many of them anecdotal and legendary. Four short biographies are extant. The earliest is attributed to Soranus, a medical writer of the second century CE, while the others were recorded in the *Suda*, a tenth-century encyclopedia; by the twelfth-century Byzantine poet and scholar Tzetzes; and by an unknown late Latin writer. It is uncertain how much of the information they contain is trustworthy. They relate that Hippocrates learned medicine from his father Heraclides, who was a physician; that he studied under the atomist Democritus and the Sophist Gorgias; that he traveled extensively in Greece, visiting Athens, northern Greece, and the Propontis (the present-day Sea of Marmara); that he taught medical students on Kos; and that he died at an advanced age at Larissa in Thessaly, where he was buried. Additional biographical material contained in a collection of spurious epistles attributed to Hippocrates is almost certainly fictitious.

There has come down to us, under the name of Hippocrates, a large and heterogeneous collection of medical books, the so-called Hippocratic treatises, which consist of some sixty different works, all written in the Ionic dialect. Most of them date from the late fifth or fourth centuries BCE, but some are much later. The collection may have originated as the library of a medical school (perhaps that of Kos) that was brought to Alexandria in the third century BCE where it came to be attributed to Hippocrates. All the works are anonymous and exhibit differences of style and approach. It is widely held today that none can be attributed with certainty to Hippocrates. It is possible that he wrote some of them, but there is no agreement on which, if any, are authentic. The Hippocratic treatises are the work of many hands and represent a variety of points of view, both lay and professional. They include clinical, theoretical, and ethical writings.

The best known of the Hippocratic writings is the so-called Hippocratic Oath. Exactly when it was written is uncertain. Although the earliest mention of it is in the first century CE, it may date from as early as the fourth century BCE. There is no evidence of its use in the pre-Christian era. Those who took the oath swore by Apollo, Asklepios, and other gods and goddesses of healing to guard their life and art “in purity and holiness.” Its religious tenor and some of its injunctions (e.g., prohibition of abortions, euthanasia, and perhaps surgery) suggest that it originated among a restricted group of physicians (perhaps the Pythagoreans, a philosophical sect that emphasized moral purity, asceticism, and piety) who lay outside the mainstream of Greek medicine. The oath was later adopted by Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and (with necessary changes) it gained wide use.

According to popular Greek opinion, disease and death were sent by gods or demons. The Hippocratic writers, influenced by the pre-Socratic philosophers, for the most part rejected this supernatural etiology of disease. Hippocratic medicine was both empirical and rational. It was empirical in being based on meticulous clinical observation (its case histories remained unparalleled until the sixteenth century), and rational in rejecting magic and superstition and viewing disease as the result of natural causes. The Hippocratic treatise *On the Sacred Disease* exhibits this rational approach to medicine. The writer does not accept the traditional view that epilepsy is caused by divine possession. It is, he believes, no more sacred than any other disease, and has a natural cause. In rejecting a magico-religious etiology for a natural one, Hippocratic writers did not display an antipathy to religion. Instead, they regarded all things (including disease) as both natural and di-

vine. Medicine itself was a divine art, in which the physician sought the assistance of the gods. "Prayer indeed is good, but while calling on the gods a man should himself lend a hand" (*Regimen* 87). The Hippocratic physicians recognized the healing force of nature (*vis medicatrix naturae*) and attempted to assist the body to heal itself.

There existed alongside Hippocratic medicine a tradition of religious healing centered in the cults of various gods, demigods, and heroes. The most notable was the cult of Asklepios, who by the fourth century BCE came to be the chief healing god of Greece, eclipsing all others as his cult spread throughout Greece. Sanctuaries of Asklepios were later established throughout the Mediterranean world and attracted the sick, who sought miraculous healing from the god. Hippocratic medicine and temple-healing coexisted apparently without antagonism. Temple-healing by Asklepios was regarded as complementing secular medicine, particularly in chronic cases for which medicine could do little. Both secular and religious healing came from the same god, who assisted physicians as well as the sick. Asklepios was the patron of physicians. Galen called himself a servant of Asklepios, and in Athens physicians offered sacrifices to the god for themselves and their patients.

The deontological treatises of the Hippocratic collection are the earliest writings on medical etiquette. They seek to create a distinct identity for the physician and to lay down guidelines for professional conduct. In establishing a standard of behavior by defining the obligations of the physician, they created both a tradition of medical ethics and an ideal of dedicated and compassionate practice, which were subsequently adopted in late antiquity and the Middle Ages by Christian, Jewish, and Muslim physicians. They have continued to influence the Western medical tradition down to the present day and they remain the greatest legacy of Hippocratic medicine.

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GARY B. FERNGREN

**HIRATA ATSUTANE** (1776–1843), prominent Japanese thinker and ardent nationalist who vigorously argued for the superiority of Shintō and native Japanese institutions over all imported traditions. Atsutane was the fourth son of Ōwada Tsugutane, a member of the warrior class. As an adolescent he was trained in the reading of Chinese texts and in practical medicine. At twenty years of age he left his home province and came to live in Edo, the capital of the Tokugawa government. There, he encountered great difficulty making a living, and was finally forced to do manual labor until he was adopted by Hirata Tōbei, also a member of the warrior class. Thereafter, he went by the name Hirata Atsutane.

In spite of his difficult financial situation Atsutane continued his studies. His first book, entitled *Kamōsho* (*Scoldings to a Fool*), was a criticism of *Bendōsho* (*A Discourse on the Way*), a work by the famous Confucianist Dazai Jun. In it, Atsutane accused Dazai of misunderstanding the ancient "way" of Japan. Taking along a handwritten draft of this book, he made a trip to see Motoori Norinaga at his home in Matsuzaka in the hope of being accepted as a disciple. However, it was only in 1803, two years after Norinaga's death, that his discipleship was formally acknowledged by the son of Norinaga. [See the biography of Motoori.] The next year he opened a small private academy in Edo and began to devote himself to writing. He produced two important works during this early period: *Shinkishinron* (*A New Discourse on Kami*), a criticism of the Chinese understanding of the fate of the soul and an outline of his own conviction that the soul continues to exist after death, and *Honkyōgaihen* (*Additional Teachings of the Central Tradition*), a description of ideas regarding the imperial *kami* and life after death, which reveals the influence of Christian texts Atsutane had read in Chinese translation. These works embody the basic attitudes and principles that guided his life thereafter: that truth is one, that Japan is the country in which the original *kami* was born, and that therefore all religions should

be interpreted in accordance with Japanese mythology. Hirata also believed that the world of *kami* is the primary, eternal one that controls this world and for which we must prepare during this lifetime.

In 1808 he was certified by the Shirakawa family to teach Shintō priests. This gave him a source of income and made it possible for him to concentrate on teaching and writing. His writings consist of lectures on ancient Shintō, popular Shintō, Confucianism, Buddhism, *waka* poetry, and so forth. Some of his most important works were written in the period beginning in 1811. Typically, Atsutane would append several commentaries to his text in order to avoid mistakes of interpretation. For example, to *Koshi* (Ancient History) are appended two works, *Koshicho* (References to Ancient History) and *Koshiden* (Commentaries on Ancient History). In 1812, the year his first wife died, he wrote another important work entitled *Tama no mahashira* (The Real Pillar of the Spirit), in which he interpreted the Japanese myth of the creation of the universe in accordance with the principles of astronomy. This methodology had first been attempted by Hattori Nakatsune in *Sandaikō* (A Study of the Three Planets), a discussion of the relationship between mythological deities and the sun, the earth, and the moon, based on knowledge drawn from books imported from Holland. Atsutane's work was influenced by the same line of thought, a major reason why many of his followers lost influence among intellectuals in the early Meiji period.

In the early 1820s, having established an academic reputation in a somewhat narrow sense, Atsutane became interested in ancient Japanese letters and the field of demonology. His work on the latter subject is regarded today as the model that inspired contemporary studies of folk beliefs. In the late 1820s his studies turned to India and China in an attempt to identify Japan as the ideal country mentioned in the ancient texts of those countries. During this period he also tried to make himself known to certain daimyo in order to secure official patronage. In 1830 he was granted a small stipend from the Owari domain of one of the three collateral Tokugawa families.

Toward the end of his life Atsutane explored the fields of divination and metrology. He published *Kōkoku doseikō* (Japanese Metrology) in 1834, much to the consternation of the government, which wanted to maintain strict control over such matters. As a result, his stipend from the daimyo of Owari was cancelled. In spite of this, Atsutane began to publish a study of the calendar in 1837, and in 1840 was again questioned by government officials. On the first day of the following year he was ordered to stop writing. He returned to his home province shortly thereafter, all efforts he had

made for the freedom to move and to write having come to naught. In the years of social change that followed his death, however, his disciples increased and contributed to the establishment of the new government in the Meiji restoration a quarter century later.

[See also Kokugaku.]

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UEDA KENJI

**HIRSCH, SAMSON RAPHAEL** (1808–1888), German rabbi and foremost ideologue of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy in the Western world. Hirsch was born in Hamburg and educated in an "enlightened-pious" family of Orthodox Jews who rejected the notion that secular culture is incompatible with traditional Jewish faith. Thus he continued his studies with Jacob Ettlinger and Isaac Bernays, rabbis who were receptive to modern culture. He studied at the University of Bonn in 1829 and, in 1830, became *Landrabbiner* of Oldenburg. In 1836 Hirsch wrote his *Neunzehn Briefe über Judentum* (The Nineteen Letters on Judaism), which has become a classic expression of Jewish Neo-Orthodox philosophy. A year later, in 1837, he wrote *Choreb, oder Versuche über Jissroels Pflichten in der Zerstreung* (Horeb: Essays on Israel's "Duties" in the Diaspora), his major work on the nature of Jewish revelation and law. These works earned Hirsch a reputation as a champion of Orthodoxy and a steadfast opponent of Reform.

In 1841 Hirsch became rabbi of Aurich and Osna-brück in Hannover (now Lower Saxony), and in 1846 he was appointed *Landesrabbiner* of Moravia. Hirsch's affirmation of Jewish political emancipation, his wearing of a clerical gown during services, and his emphasis upon the study of the Bible (rather than exclusive concentration on the Talmud) appear to have alienated him from more traditional Orthodox elements in the Moravian community. In any event, he moved to Frankfurt, where he served as rabbi of the Orthodox Israelitische Religionsgesellschaft from 1851 until his death. Here Hirsch formulated his policy of Orthodox separatism from the rest of the Jewish community and implemented his conception of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy through the educational and communal institutions he created.

Hirsch soon became the leading Orthodox proponent

of the notion that traditional Jewish belief in the divinity and the immutability of the written and oral laws could be combined with an affirmation of Western culture. He did oppose *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, however, because he feared that it undermined traditional Jewish notions of revelation. Hirsch detested Reform for its rejection of the oral law and charged that it reformulated Judaism in accordance with the demands of the age; against Reform he argued that the contemporary era had to be viewed in light of Judaism.

Like the Reformers, Hirsch proscribed neither secular culture nor secular education. He saw Torah as increasing humanity's knowledge of the true nature of man, while he understood secular education as increasing humanity's understanding of God's will as it unfolds itself in both nature and history. In speaking about the relationship between religious and secular knowledge, Hirsch wrote that "both should be put on the same footing" (*Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 450). Hirsch popularized this educational philosophy through the saying found in *Pirquei avot* (Chapters of the Fathers) 2.2, "Yafeh talmud torah 'im derekh erets" ("An excellent thing is the study of Torah combined with worldly occupation"). While *derekh erets* literally means "worldly occupation," Hirsch interpreted it as signifying modern culture; this saying became the rallying cry of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy in the Western world.

In addition, Hirsch enthusiastically embraced the Jewish emancipation. He saw it as a positive development because it afforded Jews increased opportunities to fulfill their divinely ordained mission. He regarded the duty of patriotism as an obligation of love, and he charged that the Land of Israel "had seduced the people Israel from its allegiance to God" (*The Nineteen Letters on Judaism*, translated by Bernard Drachman, New York, 1960, Ninth Letter, p. 62). Israel's union, for Hirsch no less than the Reformers, was a religious one. "Land and soil," he wrote, "were never Israel's bond of union. That function was always fulfilled solely by the common task set by Torah" (*ibid.*, Sixteenth Letter, p. 107). Jewish separatism was justified because of the universal spiritual mission Israel was mandated by God to fulfill "until . . . humanity as a whole might turn to God and acknowledge Him as the sole Creator and Ruler" (*ibid.*, Seventh Letter, p. 55).

A prolific author, Hirsch articulated these ideals in many other essays, articles, and books. Among the most famous are his commentaries on the siddur and the Pentateuch. In these works, Hirsch argued that the purpose of prayer and devotion is, in terms reminiscent of Kant, an educational one—that is, to prepare the individual philosophically and psychologically for the uni-

versal ethical-religious tasks of this world. Furthermore, Hirsch employed Hegelian legal categories in these works and explicated the particular laws and statutes of the Jewish religion in a way that allowed him to identify them with universal concepts and principles of rational thought.

These intellectual characteristics, the pure German literary style evidenced in his writings, his affirmation of emancipation, his embracing of contemporary German standards of aesthetics, and his positive attitudes toward secular education and culture all combined to gain him a great degree of prominence and to mark the emergence of a new type of Orthodox Jewish religious leader. He remains the most important exponent of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy.

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DAVID ELLENSON

**HISTORICAL METHOD.** See Study of Religion.

**HISTORIOGRAPHY.** [*This entry consists of two articles. The overview article provides a cross-cultural survey of ideas of history and their effect upon the development of Eastern and Western religious traditions. The companion article, Western Studies, focuses on the formative Greco-Roman historiographical tradition and its influence on the further history of religion in the West. For detailed treatment of conceptions of history within the Jewish and Christian traditions, see History.*]

## An Overview

The English word *history*, as well as the French *histoire* and the Italian *storia*, stems from the Greek *historia*, which was used first to refer to a general inquiry into things and only later to refer to history as it is now understood. Germans speak of *Geschichte* (from *geschehen*, "to happen"); Chinese choose *shih* (meaning both "fact" and "history"); Hindus use terms such as *iti-hāsa* (tradition; lit., "verily thus it happened") and *purāṇa* (ancient lore); and Arabs alternate *tar'ikh* (derived from the word for dating events), *khabar* ("report"), and *'ibar* (derived from the verb meaning "to pass on, through, over, or beyond"). Because the meanings of these terms are bound to cultures and periods, etymological analysis does not provide a ready explanation for the universality of the writing of history.

An investigation of time as the basic dimension of human existence yields more profound insights. It demonstrates the relentless change from past to present to future and how that change leads human beings to search for elements of continuity so as to reconcile their memories of the past with their experiences of the present and their expectations for the future. History is the endeavor that reconciles change and continuity by constructing such a unity of past, present, and future. That purpose links history to religion, itself the affirmation of a continuity transcending the world and time. Indeed, the history of historiography is marked decisively by the fate of that link between religion and historiography. In the mythological stage, sacred concepts alone defined the unity in time, telling of the emergence first of the cosmos and then of human society. In the subsequent stage of traditional historiography the ever more multitudinous and complex human phenomena of the ongoing present and the expected future were linked to the sacred past (be it the mythological core or the works of Confucius, the Buddha, Jesus, or Muḥammad) and thereby given meaning. In the later phases of traditional historiography, that creative process of establishing continuity through reference to the sacred past became more complicated as human history revealed more and more of its scope and some self-regulating patterns. The less frequent direct linkage between the present and a sacred past resulted in a greater prominence of human phenomena in the world's traditional historiographies, a prominence in many cases supported by a nascent rationalist undercurrent. Finally, in modern Western civilization, that linkage snapped completely and a historiographical revolution began that challenged the very link between religion and historiography. The repercussions became worldwide.

For centuries, the mythical accounts of how the cosmos and human society were created shaped both the substance and the tenor of historical works. Therefore, it mattered whether the world was perceived as going through endlessly recurrent cycles (ancient Indian accounts) from which human beings strove to escape into a state of timelessness; or as the onetime creation by an all-powerful creator (the three monotheistic religions), which demanded of human beings lives of decision with reference to a Last Judgment at the end of time; or as depending on the mythological age mainly for the substance and legitimacy of its moral and political order (Chinese and Japanese accounts). [See *Cosmic Law; Cosmogony; and Cosmology.*]

Of even greater import to traditional historiography were accounts of the foundation of human society, most often formulated in terms of a loss of perfection. Ancient Indian texts spoke of a decline from the Golden Age, first to one marked by a need to eat and engage in sex, shortening the human life span, and then, crucially, to one of agriculture and private property that necessitated restraints on power and violence through law and government. The process had four stages (*yugas*): the ideal stage, the *kr̥tayuga*; the beginning of degeneration in the *tretāyuga*; the *dvāparayuga*; and the present, destructive stage of *kaliyuga*. In the Jewish and Christian traditions human society resulted from an act of disobedience—Adam and Eve trying to partake of God's full knowledge. Expulsion from the Garden of Eden brought the new human world of toil and suffering but also the possibility of joy and prosperity contingent on the proper relationship between God and human beings. Chinese, Greeks, and Romans spoke of a decline in more general terms: Confucian scholars saw decay as an ever-present threat (if the proper precepts were not obeyed); Greeks knew of the five consecutive ages (or races) of declining quality suggested by Hesiod; and Greek and Roman writers repeated tales of a lost Golden Age. Each of these fundamental views left its imprint on traditional historiography.

### Traditional Historiographies

Historiographies in the traditional manner prevailed in the West until the eighteenth century and outside of the West for two more centuries. Traditional historiography established for all events their continuity with the sacred past by authorizing what constitutes proper memory, by interpreting the why and how of events, and by using a methodology that stresses the consensus of continuing texts rather than verification measured according to human reason. In all of this, the "authority of the past" is dominant.

**Indian Traditional Historiography.** Indian historiography, which has its mythological anchor in the Vedic literature, particularly the fourth Veda—the Upaniṣads—with its exhortation to focus human life on a union with the all-encompassing and changeless Absolute, gives little encouragement to record the world's changing phenomena. Indeed, it has been argued (too sweepingly) that because of this focus Indian culture lacks a historical consciousness. While no large body of ancient historical works exists, there is a body of historical material in the Vedas, the Itihāsa. Among its historical genres, the Purāṇas contained genealogies and stories of kings. The royal genealogies were kept by a special court official, the *sūta* and later the *māghada*; the genealogies traced the king and his family back to the mythological period. Other lists showed the proper priestly succession. These were important because the link to sacred antiquity gave legitimacy to priests and kings. The Itihāsa-Purāṇa tradition also contained stories with clear lessons on conduct. Narrative historiography, as epic history, found an outstanding example in the *Mahābhārata* (uncertain date; some parts extant in the seventh century) and the popular genre of *ākhyāna*. By 300 CE ancient Indian historiography had found its enduring form. From then on, largely undisturbed by the Muslim and European hegemonies, it offered chronicles of the various feudal states and biographies of outstanding persons in the form of the *carita*. All of these manifest the basic characteristics of Indian historiography: a lack of interest in precise dating; a lack of desire to distinguish clearly between legend, fantasy, and fact; a love of poetry; a preference for the idealized over the realistic; and the absence of a method for establishing the congruence of text and preceding text or of text and observable world. All of these characteristics are consistent with the emphasis on achieving union with the Absolute and reflect the resulting relative inattention to the story of human phenomena for their own sake. Thus, history was seen as the outward manifestation of an inner drama, whose logic was not to be found in mechanical cause-and-effect relationships but in *karman*, a structure by which punishments follow wrong deeds and rewards follow good ones.

Into this historiography was fitted, with some considerable modifications of the ancient tradition, both the Buddhist and Jain histories. In their basic tenor these traditions too placed strong emphasis on individuals escaping from the transient world, although they offer somewhat more encouragement for an involvement in that world. Their radically new feature was the reanchoring of history in the teachings and examples of persons who had actually lived in history. Buddhist historiography anchored in the Tripiṭaka, with its account of

episodes in the Buddha's life (566–486 BCE), the formulation of his teachings, and the founding of the *saṃgha* ("community"). Thus, Mahānāma's famous *Mahāvamsa* (Chronicle of Ceylon) was written in the traditional Indian manner, but, while acknowledging the Vedic core, it stressed the Buddha's life and teachings and the teacher Mahinda's work in Ceylon; none of this was intended to reconstruct accurately the past but to edify readers and listeners. Jain historiography varied Hindu tradition by introducing a succession of twenty-four *jinas* (saints), the last one being Vardhamāna Mahāvīra (d. 476?), and by deemphasizing some supernatural explanations in favor of rational ones.

**Chinese Traditional Historiography.** Given to the concrete and the particular rather than the supernatural and abstract, Chinese historiography had as its narrow mythological base the mandate of Heaven (*t'ien-ming*), which required the emperor to organize and maintain a social order according to moral precepts. The mandate deified the emperor without making him a god, but also sanctioned his overthrow if the order was either not maintained or failed to conform to the moral code. Heaven provided for the authority of the ruling dynasty but also for revolution and the subsequent establishment of a new dynasty. That view accorded well with the fifth-century *Ch'un-ch'iu* (Spring and Autumn Annals) of the state of Lu. This work, comprising typical annals of military campaigns, events at court, and unusual occurrences, became in the edition attributed to Confucius an instrument of moral and social teaching. Thereafter, the dependence of the fortunes of individuals and dynasties on conformance to the moral code and its correlate political wisdom remained a theme in Chinese historiography. The close connection between the mythical mandate, history writing, the state, and the moral structure of life was maintained when, after 221 BCE, a strong imperial government emerged. Even the destruction by imperial decree (213 BCE) of all previous historical materials emphasized that link: these records fostered the survival of memories dangerous to the new order. History writing was affirmed with the establishment of a commission to collect ancient texts (136 BCE) and a "grand college" (124 BCE), and above all through the sponsorship of the Cheng-shih (Standard Histories). The pioneering work, the *Shih chi* (Records of the Historian) by Ssu-ma T'an (d. 110 BCE?) and his son Ssu-ma Ch'ien (c. 145–85 BCE), contained composite annals (mostly court accounts), genealogical tables of the imperial family, lists of ministers of state, and a biographical section devoted to famous statesmen and scholars. Later, such histories were created by the official history office (*shih kuan*). In accordance with the principle of orderly succession—the

manifestation of the triumph of peace and harmony over chaos—it became the duty of each dynasty to compose the history of the preceding one, always mindful of linking authority to ancient times and of offering proper lessons from the past. Thus a stable historical record, sustaining and reflecting traditional China, spans the period to the end of the monarchy in 1911. Even Chinese Buddhism with its sense of universal equality and compassion for all human beings, its longing for release from this life, and sense of decline in human history, was adjusted in its historiography to Chinese traditionalism and—partially because of intermittent coercion by the state—never developed a true alternative to the official view of the past.

**Japanese Traditional Historiography.** Beginning with the early *Nihonshoki* or *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan; 720 CE) and its cruder predecessor the *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters, 712 CE), Japanese historiography carried the imprint of the well-developed Chinese historiography. But while the Confucian linkage of virtue and fortune was present in them, the stronger feature was the Shintō assertion of an unbroken sequence of emperors originally descendant from the sun goddess. This sacred imperial line made superfluous the Chinese concept of the mandate of Heaven and its rationale for dynastic change. Yet, from the eleventh to the seventeenth century there were no imperial histories, because that historiography did not fit a society in which the power was held by noble families. The Japanese prose writings, the *Rekishū monogatari* (Historical Tales) and the *Gunki monogatari* (Military Tales), recorded the powerful lords' deeds and their relationship with the imperial family. The dominance of noble families, ruling for and through the emperor, raised the issue of legitimate authority. Works by imperial partisans, such as the fourteenth-century *Jinnō shōtōki* (Records of the True Descent of the Divine Emperors) by Kitabatake Chikafusa, extolled the divine/human position of the emperor as the descendant of the sun goddess, a mode of thinking characteristic for the whole "loyalty to the emperor" school, which centuries later (in 1868) was instrumental in the restoration of imperial power.

Historians sympathetic to the feudal overlords found—in the Confucian manner—the dominance by feudal families legitimate if the law and thus harmony was effectively maintained and—in the Shintō manner—if a genealogical link with the imperial line could be established. In either case the traditionally sanctioned authority of the emperor remained above the rise and fall of political power. The Buddhist priest Jien's *Gukanshō* (1219) illustrates well the complexity of interpretation in Japanese traditional historiography. Although written with an ostensibly political purpose it called upon

the Shintō concept of the direct divine descent of emperors, the Confucian linkage of virtue, order, and harmony, and a profusion of Buddhist organizing concepts: *kalpas* (cycles with a first half of decadence and a second one of recuperation); the tripartite scheme of True, Imitation, and Final Law (the last being the worst, when even Buddhist teachings were corrupted); and finally, interwoven into all of these, the Principles (impersonal shaping forces, one for each age). In the end all of these schemes were subject to the Buddhist doctrine of continuous universal decline despite temporary respites, a message that fit the pessimism of a difficult period. With the reemergence of a strong central (although not imperial) government under the Tokugawa shoguns (1603–1867), the Chinese historiographical model emphasizing centralized power became once more attractive and shaped the late seventeenth-century *Honchō tsugan* (Comprehensive Mirror of Japan). It stressed the political lessons of history interpreted according to the now strongly encouraged Confucianism.

**Greek and Roman Historiographies.** Greek and Roman historiographies were in their entirety traditional, as they were never decisively shaped by the rationalism and skepticism of their own cultures and, of course, never by that of modernity. The Homeric epics were the mythological core of Greek historiography, and their heroic history befitted the ideals of the Greece before the city state (*polis*) and organized record keeping. The Greece of the *polis* preferred an "unheroic" history, although the lessons of honor and noble passions derived from the narratives of the struggles and tragic fates of heroes were never forgotten. The prose histories with a human dimension, often structured by crude chronologies (generation counts, lists of officeholders, priests, and priestesses), offered grand inquiries into cultures (Herodotus, c. 484–c. 425 BCE) or wished to serve the citizens of the *polis* (Thucydides, c. 460–c. 400 BCE). The Homeric gods who had so frequently and directly interfered in battles and individual lives receded soon into a lesser role, punishing those immoderately in love with money or power (Herodotus) or yielding all influence to the human drive for power (Thucydides). The exact role of the often-mentioned Tyche (fate or fortune) was never clear. Yet many traditionalist historians, despite their admiration for human deeds, still gave proper credit to the gods. The uncertain role of gods and mythology continued in Greek historiography after the latter had lost its city-state focus, in the Macedonian monarchy and subsequently in the monarchical Hellenistic states. Universal history, attempted in the fourth century BCE by Ephorus of Cyme, proved impossible in a tradition that lacked any ingredient conducive to the linking of non-Greek and Greek records into a universal history. Tra-

ditional historiography, most often local in nature, received support from the antiquarians, who composed critical histories of ancient religious legends and rituals, hoping to use the increasingly rationalist ideal of accuracy for the support of tradition.

Early Roman historiography was really Greco-Roman. One of Rome's mythological roots reached back to Aeneas, the Trojan refugee who came to Italy and was linked genealogically to the seven legendary Roman kings. The first of these, Romulus, the founder of Rome, was also part of another mythological tradition, that of a Vestal Virgin's two sons, of Romulus and Remus, set out to die and nursed by a she-wolf. Elaborated at great length, these mythological traditions constituted Rome's ancient heritage. A nonmythological ritual tradition had a more direct impact on Roman historiography: the *Annales Maximi* kept for each year by the high priest (*pontifex maximus*) fixed the days when sacred law permitted business and court transactions (the *dies fasti*), and thus began a strong annalistic genre that recorded much of the public Roman life. But until the second century BCE the influence of late Greek historiography, speculative in nature and detached from Roman tradition, was overpowering. Histories in Greek predominated, reaching their peak in the *Histories* of Polybius (c. 200–118 BCE), with its cyclical philosophy of history in which each ideal government form first decays into corruption and then is replaced by another ideal form: monarchy moves to tyranny; aristocracy to oligarchy; then democracy to mob rule, whereupon, it is implied, the cycle begins anew with monarchy. For Polybius this was a cycle only Rome could escape, because only Rome had mixed the three ideal forms in one composite constitution. Decadence also concerned Polybius's contemporary Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, who condemned the Greek influence as destructive of traditional "Old Rome." This theme persisted, the idea that the "Old Rome" of tradition, where people practiced ancient religious rituals and civic virtues and rendered public service willingly, was being corrupted. But as much as the great Roman historians between 86 BCE and 120 CE (Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus) spoke of decadence, none of them suggested a truly cyclical view of history, because the gods had pronounced Rome eternal.

The Roman state and historiography alike remained linked to the traditional core, and Roman historians never speculated in an abstract manner about general forces and patterns shaping events, as some Greeks had done (e.g., Thucydides, Polybius, and the Stoic Posidonius of Apameia). In the main, Greek and Roman histories focused on individual events and deeds, which they judged according to moral precepts and public benefits.

For Romans, decadence stemmed from the failure to affirm the ancient virtues; hence the importance of the Roman antiquarians, particularly Marcus Terentius Varro (116–127 BCE). Such history in support of tradition conformed to Aristotle's dictum that history dealt only with individual phenomena and not with universals (as did poetry and philosophy); hence the firm link of history to rhetoric (as the art of persuasion) rather than to philosophy (as the endeavor to explain).

**Jewish Historiography.** Jewish historiography expressed a unique sense of history—history as sacred memory, telling of God's great acts throughout time and the Jews' reactions to them, most importantly God's choice of the Jews as the instrument for the fulfillment of his purpose. In the covenant that affirmed God's choice of the Jews as the instrument for the fulfillment of his purpose, God promised Abraham to make the Jews numerous and give them land in return for their obedience and faithfulness. Joined to this was the Deuteronomist account of the pre-covenant period. God's creation of the world; Adam and Eve's loss of paradisiacal existence, leading to human life in its present form; and another overreaching deed, the building of the Tower of Babel toward heaven, with the subsequent sudden appearance of many languages and nations. In the world of the covenant, the Jews attempted to fulfill their demanding mission. Thus, in the kingdom period (David and Solomon), they had to translate that mission into actions that satisfied both God's will and the needs of state policies. When as a people possessing free will they often failed, prophets recalled them intermittently to their great purpose. Then, in the time of the Babylonian exile, with no Jewish state left, the eschatological aspect of the Jewish faith (the concern with the last things) was stressed, leading to the apocalyptic views of late Jewish history (the prophet Daniel).

It was important for the fate of the Jews that an authoritative version of this whole sacred history was conveyed by the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), a compilation of many sources that had undergone redactions by skilled compilers (such as the Deuteronomist, Yahvist, and Chronicler) until it was put into canonical form in 100 CE. After the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE, Jewish historical writing became insubstantial except for Josephus's *The Jewish War* (75–79 CE) and *Jewish Antiquities* (93? CE). Jewish thought in the Diaspora (the state of being scattered) became ahistorical. The Jewish state, whose fate had offered the possibility of tracing God's will and acts in time, had disappeared. Now Jewish jurisprudence, philosophy, and Qabbalah were perceived as surer guides to pious wisdom than history. But the unique Jewish sense of history, with its totally sacral concept of time, became



decisive for Western civilization in its Christian interpretation.

**Christian Traditional Historiography.** Christian historiography also had as its basis a historical record, the biblical account (in the Old and New Testaments) of the entrance of God himself into history. Such a rupture in continuous human time at first retarded the formation of a Christian historiography, as some Christians (the chiliasts), expecting the imminent second coming of Christ, denied a historical future, while other Christians (the Marcionites), emphasizing the newness and uniqueness of Christ's first coming, rejected the Old Testament and thereby denied a meaningful past. As time went on, however, Christians accepted history as the process of universal redemption through the gradual education of mankind. Time was the space in which God worked his purpose, and the end would come when "time was fulfilled." Into that process fitted Paul's reinterpretation of Jewish Christianity in the direction of a universal Christianity and the formulation of a positive view of the Roman empire. Rejection of the empire had come easily because of Rome's pagan mythology and religion and her persecution of Christians. The positive view of Rome pointed to a divine purpose in the Augustan empire, as its peace, order, and communications network facilitated Christian missionary work. When in 313 Christianity became tolerated and then later the favored faith, its linkage to the empire (and subsequently to other secular states) brought about a flourishing traditional historiography, one that sacralized history, wished to encompass all nations and times, and shared certain forms.

The unity of all nations and times found its grand expression in chronology. In his chronological tables Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263–339) compiled lists of rulers and events from many ancient cultures and synchronized them with the dominant Judeo-Christian line. While his chronology prevailed in the medieval period, discrepancies in the figuring of world eras—the counting of all dates from creation, Adam, or Abraham on—arose early because scholars used different versions of the Old Testament, a work devoid of dates (years elapsed from Adam to Christ ranged from 3952 to 5500). By the late sixteenth century at least fifty different world eras were known, a fact that prepared the way for linking faith and chronology through the presently used scheme of reckoning history from the incarnation, which preserves the sacred nature of time without insisting on the substantial unity of the past.

In early Christian historiography the world's duration was often given as six thousand years (six days of creation times one thousand, since "one day is with the Lord as a thousand years," 2 Pt. 3:8). Each millennium

formed a world age (*aetas mundi*), demarcated by prominent biblical figures or events, such as Adam, Noah, Moses, Abraham, David, the building of the Temple, the restoration of the Temple, and, always, Christ. The scheme of world ages, used by Origen, Augustine, Isidore of Seville, Bede—with or without the one-thousand-year spans—became a favored periodization scheme for world chronicles. It found a rival in the Christian adaptation of a Jewish apocalyptic vision: Nebuchadrezzar's dream about a statue and its eventual destruction by a boulder, interpreted by the prophet Daniel (2:32–41) as the successive appearance in history of four empires, followed by God's kingdom. Such a transfer of power from empire to empire (*translatio imperii*), known to ancient writers, was used by Paulus Orosius (fl. 414–417) in his *Histories against the Pagans*. He stipulated a sequence of Babylonian, Macedonian, Carthaginian, and Roman empires; the latter, blessed by Christ's life and work and being the instrument of the universal mission, would endure to the Last Judgment. Augustine (354–430) mentioned various age schemes but suggested a detachment of Christian views of history from all such rigid and earth-bound schemes in favor of a dynamic perspective: history is seen as the battlefield of the forces fueled by the love of God (City of God) and those propelled by the love of self and the world (City of the Earth). No entities or persons in this world belonged wholly to one or the other of the two communities; all of them were of a mixed state, with the separation and the victory of the good only occurring at the Judgment. Augustine's dynamic view found few adherents in medieval historiography with its usually close attachment to secular institutions. When, after 1100, cultural change accelerated in the West, some new periodization schemes followed the trinitarian pattern: the old one of "prior to the law," "under the law," and "under God's glory" or the new one after the Trinity proper—periods of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In each case the most recent period was seen as the one most "advanced" and also closest to the end (Adam reborn). Joachim of Fiore (c. 1130–1202) spoke of the age of the Holy Spirit as the final one of universal brotherhood, with monks as the spiritual leaders, while Hugh of Saint-Victor (d. 1141) perceived a gradual development from natural law to written law to the time of grace, a development marked by progress from a primitive understanding of ritual and sacraments to an ever fuller sacramental union with God through Christ.

In traditional Christian historiography divine providence worked through portents, miracles, the never-ending cycle of sin and punishment, and the divinely instituted church. Histories of the church began with Eusebius's *Church History*, which with its continua-

tions was compiled into the widely used *Historia Tripartita* (sixth century). But as long as the church was integrated into the total life, ecclesiastical histories reached far beyond the confines of the institution proper. In the histories of the integration of new peoples into Latin Christendom (Germans, Slavs, Danes, Normans), and of Byzantium's mission to the Slavs and the peoples of the Near East, the church appeared clearly as God's means of accomplishing the universal mission. The church also was central in the histories of the Crusades, those attempts to regain the Holy Land for the Christian world, although the later Crusades already reflect the ascendancy of political and economic motives over the zeal for sacred endeavors.

The Christian view of the past was put forth in a number of often ill-defined genres. The biographies of emperors and kings, as well as the *gesta* ("deeds"), which dealt with a whole series of officeholders (abbots and bishops), gave much praise to individuals. That offense to Christian humility was justified by the inspiration the works offered for proper Christian behavior. The most prevalent genres, however, were the annals and chronicles, often difficult to distinguish from each other. Both fit well the Christian image of time rushing toward its fulfillment (the word chronicle derives from *chronikos*, "belonging to time"). Particularly the world chronicle, reaching from creation to the contemporary period and divided according to world ages, represented traditional Christian thinking about history at its best. It therefore was a sign of trouble when, from 1100 on, more and more world chronicles dropped the sacred story (at least up to the incarnation) and could no longer master the ever-increasing data by the usual schemes of world ages and four empires. By the fourteenth century the traditional world chronicle also was losing its nourishing base with the decline of monasticism. When its once clearly perceived structure of the human story collapsed, the world chronicle became encyclopedic and, while it was still a source of inspiration (particularly for Franciscan preachers), it conveyed more in the way of information than of a sense of the grand sacred development—a signal for severe problems to come.

**Islamic Traditional Historiography.** Islamic historiography had its firm anchor in the life and teachings of Muḥammad (570–624 CE). The earlier tribal society left its historiographical traces through the epic *Battle Days of the Arabs* (reports on events and persons) and the genealogical records. But Islamic historiography used also the Old Testament narrative to account for the period before Muḥammad, seen as a time of numerous corruptions of faith reversed at certain points by

prophets, each of whom pronounced a new *shari'ah* (law) and founded a new community of the faithful: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and the final one, Muḥammad, who had to establish true Islam against the most recent falsifications of faith by the followers of Moses and Jesus.

Muḥammad's bringing of the Qur'ān constituted the center of human history, when God had communicated his will to the human race for all time. Thus, the full meaning of history was ascertainable from the *sīrah*, a biography of the Prophet. Of historical material it included the Old Testament account to Ishmael (strong on genealogies), the events in Arabia before Muḥammad (legends and genealogy of Muḥammad), and the life's work of Muḥammad (with many *maghāzī*, that is, histories of the expeditions, their leaders, purposes, and major participants). Traces of pre-Islamic elements, such as a fondness for the inclusion of poetry and narrative reports and a love for biography, appear in the sacred literature of Islam. The reliability of accounts was ascertained by *isnād*, a critical method parallel to that used in Islamic theology and law for inclusion of records into the *ḥadīth* (tradition in the specific sense of verified tradition). It concentrates on establishing an unbroken series of trustworthy transmitters and not on the verification of content. Thus, Islamic traditional historiography could not corrode the sacred core as it was linked to it in method and content.

The task of traditional historians was facilitated by the unity of the Islamic community in the caliphal state with its combined secular and religious authority. With the empire as its given scope, the time flow as its organizing principle, its chronology firmly anchored in the Hijrah (Muḥammad's emigration from Mecca to Medina, 622 CE), and with room for narrative, the annalistic chronicle became the prevalent genre of traditional historiography, reaching its highpoint in al-Ṭabarī's chronicle, the first comprehensive account of Islamic history, reaching to about 915.

While in al-Ṭabarī's history the united empire served as an integrating factor, it was that empire, with its diverse peoples and cultures (of particular impact were Iraq, Syria, and Persia), that gradually made Islamic historiography broader but less homogeneous. The continuing contacts with the outside world and the internal political disintegration also strengthened the centrifugal influences in Islamic historiography. Universal histories slowly became less the conquering story of Islam, starting from the sacred core, and more the story of various cultures, such as in the *Murūj al-dhahab* (Meadows of Gold) by al-Ṭabarī's contemporary al-Mas'ūdī (d. 956?). In these histories, although they retained many

elements of traditional historiography, the central principle of unity was often a philosophical idea, unconnected with the religious tradition and the unified Islamic state. The spreading doubt and uncertainty provoked a conscious traditionalism that caused a reemphasis of traditional ways in historiography but also a deemphasis of history in favor of theology and religious law, which were perceived as more stabilizing. Historians, for their part, tried to gain a broader theoretical basis for Islamic historiography. After 1000 CE, as traditional Islamic historiography was being challenged by the increasing rationalism and skepticism emanating from the study of Greek philosophy and science, histories quite often began with introductory remarks on the theory of history that went well beyond the range of questioning permitted by *isnād*.

**The Resilient Non-Western Traditional Historiographies.** In comparison with biblically based historiographies, particularly the Christian one, other historiographies were considerably more stable. They did not reject their mythological and religious heritage, largely because their historiographical truth-finding process never assigned a truly corrective or interpretive critical role to reason. Indian historical writing did not draw a sharp line between fact and legend. Chinese (and with it Japanese) methodology expected from reason a careful refinement of the records of the past but not a reinterpretation of the past. Chinese scholars considered a record true if the sources agreed or a documented contradiction was absent (not, as in the West, if multiple independent confirmation were obtained), a standard that assured a high degree of accuracy with a minimal corrosion of tradition. This standard served historians well who strove for the consensus of an ongoing tradition and saw history as the succession of separate, identifiable, and observed events subject to no abstract concept of wholeness and with no structure of a philosophical nature. In Greek and Roman historiographies any radical challenge to tradition was checked by history's divorce from philosophy, its tie to rhetoric, and its role as public servant. Challenges to Islamic traditional historiography were more serious. After 1000, under the influence of ancient Greek philosophy and science, attempts were made to reformulate history's purpose and to construct histories of interconnected phenomena at a distance from sacred tradition. The highpoint of these attempts came with the *Kitāb al-'ibar* (History) by Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), which relies on human reflection, not traditional authority, searches universal history for timeless patterns in human conduct as the core to a theory of culture, and aims not at constructing a theoretical image of reality but at assist-

ing in the realization of an ideal society in given circumstances. The *Kitāb al-'ibar* stood between traditionalism and rationalism, as would much of Islamic historiography from then on.

### The Age of Anthropocentric Historiography

Between the 1300s and the 1700s Christian traditional historiography disintegrated slowly but relentlessly and to a degree unprecedented in other cultures. In their quest for authentic texts, Renaissance humanists developed a sophisticated text criticism that stripped layers of later "deposits" from the original texts, beginning the diminution of the aura of ancientness that so far had given weight to tradition and preparing for the view that texts are not the manifestation of universal wisdom but merely the reflection of thought in a particular culture at a given point. Eventually, and with radical consequences, even the Bible would become the object of such critical analysis. Humanist histories also shifted their focus to the world of states and secular individuals, where the religious dimension was secondary.

In the Reformation, Protestants obliterated parts of traditional history when they rejected centuries of ecclesiastical development as periods of religious corruption. In the bitter struggle over the true tradition, Protestants affirmed a new historical continuity by linking the present directly with the (ideal) apostolic church, while Catholics defended the continuous tradition. The geographical discoveries created a global world whose great variety of people had to be integrated into traditional universal history. At stake were the unitary origin of mankind in Adam and the central position of Jewish history in the course of world history. Thus, according to the Jesuit José de Acosta (late sixteenth century), the American Indians were linked to biblical origins by a migration across the Bering Sea. More audaciously, the seventeenth-century pre-Adamite theory of Isaac de la Peyrere separated the general (pre-Adamite) creation of all people from the subsequent story of the Jewish people beginning with Adam, a view unacceptable to Christians because it left most people without a link to Adam and biblical history.

These challenges further eroded the already weakened traditional universal history. Although that history was much cultivated at the new Protestant universities, its specifically Christian features receded gradually into ecclesiastical history. From the late sixteenth century, schemes appeared that separated human history from sacred history. The latter increasingly became ecclesiastical history and lost ground steadily to the human history that concentrated on the world's

immanent concerns. In turn, human history soon experienced difficulties in structuring its accounts similar to those difficulties Christian historians had encountered when dealing with the period after Christ, a period (the sixth world age) that lacked easily identifiable biblical "markers." The new world historians, having abandoned the sacred structures although still accepting the biblical story for the early period, experimented with various structures that gave order and unity to their accounts. Finally, in the 1690s, Christopher Cellarius suggested the still popular division into ancient, medieval, and modern periods, which in effect expelled the Christian story from its central place. The sturdily traditional Roman Catholic historiography never experienced these problems because it yielded the place of honor to systematic theology and its less mutable categories and lessons.

Finally, traditional historiography was drawn into the seventeenth-century battles over epistemological questions. Francis Bacon's empiricism appreciated history as the memory of data for observation. But advocates of the new sciences, along with René Descartes (1596–1650), downgraded historiography for not being able to deliver uncontested general truths. They found history trivial because it did not deduce its insights from a few *a priori* principles. In response, the erudite historians avoided interpretations and restricted their work to establishing an unassailable record of the past through a rigorous criticism of ancient texts and documents. Churchmen, particularly the Jesuit Bollandists and Benedictine Maurists, did pioneering in order to ward off a wholesale rejection of traditional history; indeed, the Maurist Jean Mabillon wrote the *De re diplomatica* (1681), which remained the handbook for historical studies for two centuries.

**Adaptation and Change of Traditional Christian Historiography.** From the 1400s to the late 1800s, Western historiography saw attempts to reconcile the traditional Christian view of history with developments that favored a secular vision of history. They included the cyclical interpretation of history, the appreciation of ages and cultures on their own merit (historicism), a simple updating of tradition, stipulations of a unitary process including God and the world, and, finally, development of a historical science that still left room for the Christian interpretation of history.

**God and the organic pattern.** The cyclical model of organic life, particularly its decadence phase, had been part of the classical tradition and recently had been revived as an interpretive view to replace the traditional Christian interpretation of history. Then, in the early 1700s, Giambattista Vico, who accepted biblical history up to the Flood, put forth a systematic cyclical view of

history for the time afterward, when human society was formed through the rituals of burial and worship, and the regulation of sex. Divine providence prescribed for history a pattern of *corso* and *recorso* ("cycle" and "re-current cycle"). Each cycle had three successive stages—the eras of gods, heroes, and men—and was characterized by its own type of life, thought, language, and arts. The last stage, although most advanced, was not superior to the others, because in a paradoxical development the more humane a society became the more subject it became to decay, making the high point of humaneness the beginning of a new barbarism as well. Also using the organic model, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) stressed God's special care for the *Volk*, an organic unity of people with its own language, arts, thought, and literature. History told the stories of *Völker*, none superior to the other because all were equidistant from God, although Herder eventually dropped the mere sequence of nations for a hazy developmental theme—the increase of *Humanität* (a refined civility). Herder stood at the beginning of historicism when he endowed each historical phenomenon with its own value, thus refusing to measure the value of historical ages on the scale of progress. The affirmation of the Christian tradition, including divine providence, saved early historicism from the radical relativism inherent in the assertion that each historical phenomenon must be appreciated on its own terms. In the nineteenth century, that historicism pervaded the historical science of the Lutheran Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). But after 1850, all religious affirmations were removed from historicism, laying bare its inherent relativism and skepticism toward all schemes of meaning beyond the affirmation of the uniqueness of each phenomenon; this in turn initiated in the 1880s a fervent search for historical truth and meaning.

**Progress, a radical challenge.** The eighteenth century brought a revolution in the interpretation of universal history as the theme of historical progress triumphed over the traditional scheme of Christian universal history. In the previous century, the latter had found its last prominent advocates in Sir Walter Raleigh (1554–1618) and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704). Now, as interpreted by a philosophy (as opposed to a theology) of history, world history became the story of mankind's emancipation through the progressive ascendancy of reason. At first suppressed by ignorance and superstition, rationality increased under the pressure of human unhappiness until by the eighteenth century it reached maturity in some Western nations, a pattern that was expected to be repeated universally. Christian faith and its views on history were seen as manifestations of an earlier, less developed stage and was valued

only for the church's preservation of learning. The meaning of history was entirely immanent, anthropocentric, and entirely determined by the imagined perfect future, a total reversal of the Christian view of the meaning of history as transcendent, God-centered, and dependent on the sacred past. History was no longer the working out of God's will leading to the transcendent kingdom of God but the demonstration of progress, with all ages being stepping stones toward the perfect future age—a secular kingdom of God (although some proponents of the progress view, such as Voltaire, were skeptical of the idea of universal perfection). [See Enlightenment, The.]

This radical challenge to the traditional Christian view of world history called forth Christian responses along the lines of either rejection or adaptation; the challenge was felt most intensely in the German-speaking world, where, in the early nineteenth century, the historical approach in the search for truth became supreme. There, romantic and idealist adaptations to the progress view were based on a fundamental reinterpretation of God's relationship with the world. In the eighteenth century, under the influence of rationalism, God, still perceived as a person, was seen to govern a human history in which human beings could, through the education of their reason (one akin to God's reason), improve the world materially as they simultaneously enhanced themselves spiritually. History was God's education of mankind to an ever fuller comprehension of God (a progress entailing even the overcoming of some biblical concepts that could be considered outdated) until the spiritual, rational, and historical worlds would be identical. In the nineteenth-century idealist and romantic concepts of history, God no longer governed the world from "outside" but rather was immanent in it as *Urgrund* (primal, eternal cause) or as a dynamic spiritual principle. God and the world formed a dynamic whole. The kingdom of God referred simply to the spiritual perfection in and of this world, making all of history *Heilsgeschichte* ("history of salvation"). Thus, in the philosophy of history of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), the complex relationship of creator and creation in time was transformed into the self-realization of the all-encompassing Idea (pure thought), a process reflected in the increasing identity between the universal and the particular and the potential and the actual. The process was driven by the dialectical struggle of the existing against its inherent negation and directed toward the creation of the new. In a grand unitary process, the cosmos including God was in motion toward its goal—not happiness or rationality but the fully realized Idea (complete actualization and freedom).

Idealist adaptations of the Christian theology of history reduced the meaning of many traditional elements: the biblical story became relevant for its own time only; the transcendent kingdom of God was transformed to the end stage of the immanent world process; the Christian faith was now only one (although superior) explication of the universal religious truth, with Jesus being one (although special) explicator. History changed from a dramatic struggle between the forces of light and darkness into a dialectically evolving sequence of stages of ever-greater spirituality. In a few cases this mode of thought even affected Roman Catholicism. In the 1830s, Johann Adam Möhler stipulated the reconcilability of tradition with progress as Christians helped the seeds of faith mature by constantly overcoming the time-bound manners of understanding faith and tradition.

**Tradition and historical science.** The drive toward a historiography, not based on traditional authority but on rigorous documentation through critically verified sources begun by erudite historiography, owing a great debt to classical philology, and enhanced by the eighteenth-century Göttingen professors of historical, legal, and political studies, finally produced nineteenth-century German historical science. However, its leading figure, Leopold von Ranke, still considered history God's work, accomplished through the "ideas" as guiding forces and intelligible to historians through an intuitive process (*Ahnen*). But the Rankean compromise collapsed, because the new methodology demanded the abandonment of all transcendent elements and because historicism could see in the Christian tradition no more than one of many traditions. Christian scholars who eventually applied text criticism to the Bible in the hope of securing faith through a text properly verified and congenial to modern minds in effect brought about a rapid diminution of the biblical core of traditional historiography. Typical was the attempt to reestablish the authority of the Christian faith in a modern manner through a critically verified biography of Jesus that would reveal what Jesus actually said, did, and taught (see the nineteenth-century "natural" histories of the "prophet" Jesus or Ernest Renan's popular biography of Jesus). Yet, this endeavor failed, because in only a few instances could the Christ of dogmas, miracles, and prophecies be penetrated and make visible the historical Jesus—a problem of great consequence for subsequent attempts to reconcile history and faith.

**Religion and a Radically Anthropocentric Historiography.** Beginning in the 1880s two developments marked the history writing on various continents. Historical science in its secular and tradition-eroding form exerted its impact on the remaining traditional historiographies of the world, while in the West a not-yet-

concluded internal struggle began to gain a firm critically verified basis for historical truth, including a new secular interpretation of history. For their part, Christians continued to reconstruct the traditional Christian view of history.

**Impact on traditional historiographies.** Strains appeared in traditional historiographies even before the impact of the Western critical theory of history. It proved increasingly difficult to integrate the many and varied phenomena of the changing world into a tradition developed from a sacred core. The strains showed first in methodology, the endeavor charged with devising ways to find and affirm truth. Prior to 1900, some Chinese scholars had attempted to make historical methodology (mainly text analysis) more accessible to rational arguments without weakening the tradition so essential for social stability, continuity, and dynastic legitimacy. Then, when Western intrusions ended the isolation of China and the revolution of 1911 overthrew the monarchy, Chinese historiography's continuity and stability were shattered, too. Chinese historians began their search for a new sense of continuity by stressing those genres of traditional historiography most akin to the modern spirit (histories of scholarship, institutions, statecraft); by adapting the old methodology to the Western model, which meant going beyond text criticism and partially accepting the modern Western worldview; by dethroning the classical tradition, such as turning Confucius from a sage for all ages into a "forward"-looking reformer for his own period only; by fusing Western liberalism and its view of progress to the traditional sequence of Chaos, Peace, and Harmony, identifying the last with democracy; and, finally, by adopting a version of Marxist historical materialism, totally hostile to traditional views of the past.

Japanese traditional historiography knew no rationalist undercurrent, although a critical attitude toward past records was not absent as the work of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) showed. Yet he analyzed the language and the ideas of ancient Japanese texts not in the interest of a rationalist ideal but in accord with the Shintō restoration of the Tokugawa period that attempted to cleanse these texts of all Chinese and Buddhist accretions. After the opening toward the West in 1868, the Japanese were first convinced that minor adjustments in their traditional views on history would suffice. At the College of Historiography a record collection began in 1877 as a basis for the ongoing *Dainippon hennenshi* (Chronological History of Japan), a work written after the Chinese pattern. But during the following decades Japanese historians came to know German historical theory and English historical monographs; this led to the founding in 1889 of the Historical Society

of Japan, which was dedicated to the Western historiographical model. Yet both the Chinese and the Western historiographical models soon found resistance in a new Japanese traditionalism—nationalism. In 1895 *Dainippon hennenshi* was abandoned because of its Chinese character, and while many Japanese works in the Western manner appeared, pro-imperial traditionalist historiography received increasing support.

Islamic historiography has experienced the coexistence of traditional and Western critical historiography, so common to many modern societies. Attempts to fuse Western historiography with the traditional concepts of Islam coexist with calls from fundamentalists for a return to a strictly traditional historiography. Relative to Islam, however, only Indian historiography has preserved more of its traditional historiography. Traditional chronicles were written in the state of Maratha well into the twentieth century. The absence of a true methodological tradition aiming at the "certain fact" denied Western influence a logical point of entry. Western historical science had to create a separate body of historiographical works.

**Christian historiography and the triumph and crisis of historical science.** By the 1880s, history perceived as a science had triumphed in Western historiography. Modest success had come to the "natural science" school of historiography that had started in the 1830s with Auguste Comte's three-stage interpretation of history as first theological, then metaphysical, and finally positive. This last, the fulfillment of all of history, recognized no absolutes and essences, only laws governing relationships between phenomena. But no such positive historical laws have been found. German historical science, the attempt to unite history and science without destroying history's autonomy, had become prevalent. It was just as destructive of traditional historiography, because by rejecting the traditional views and interpretations of history it converted pre-nineteenth-century works into mere pools of source materials. In turn, from the 1880s on, the triumphant scientific history was forced to embark on a search for a new logic of historical inquiry, safely distant from religion or metaphysics, but able to forestall the anarchy of opinions that in the absence of a body of traditional truth threatened the very endeavor of history. Since the 1930s that search has accelerated: neo-idealists advocated the process of mental reconstruction of the past (R. G. Collingwood); admirers of the creativeness of life saw historical truth as everchanging with life (Benedetto Croce); neo-positivists looked for laws covering large numbers of phenomena (Carl Hempel); analytical philosophers found the structure of history in the language structure of historical works; and finally there have been scholars who

saw in a consistent, densely reasoned, and well-documented narrative the proper basis for historiography.

With much of the Christian historiographical tradition rejected and historical science more certain of its ability to reconstruct the factual past than of its ability to interpret that past, grand ideologies filled the void: liberalism with its faith in inevitable progress; Marxism with its interpretation of history as the story of the dialectical overcoming of all exploitative societies in favor of the socialist/communist society; and fascism with a militantly nationalist interpretation of the past, linked to a romantic notion of the concentration of the "national soul" in a leader. They all in their own ways neutralized religion and other elements of traditional historiography. Those concerned with Christian historiography found the competition fierce and to many of them accommodation to modernity seemed more promising than its rejection.

Enamored by the spirit of progress through the sciences and the Enlightenment, the Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) formulated a Christian view of history full of hope closely akin to the modern "religion of the earth." As a biologist he spoke of salvation as the evolution of consciousness to higher and higher levels approaching Christ's perfect consciousness. A modern social reformist spirit shaped the American turn-of-the-century Social Gospel movement, and, since the 1960s, Hegel's and Marx's visions of an immanent kingdom of God on earth have reverberated in liberation theology, with its call to Christians to make common cause with the poor and oppressed of the developing nations. Here the end of time is not only defined as the ultimate union of human beings with God but also as the communion of human beings with each other. It is not clear whether the process is an ongoing one (ever-new identifications with ever-new poor and oppressed) or a state of perfection following a onetime liberation.

Rejecting all easy adaptations to secular philosophies of history, Reinhold Niebuhr's *Faith and History* (1949) put forth a Christian view of history that took into account the achievements and the horrors of the twentieth century, a period whose widespread ignorance of biblical tradition contrasted with the affirmation of the "goodness" of human nature and a belief in progress. Niebuhr demonstrated the irony in history of the best human intentions turning to ill effects and pointed to the greater realism of the Christian historical interpretation, which praises human genius but also is aware of evil, the limitations of the rational mastery of the world, and the futility of a life of immanence. History, in which the sacred and profane could never be fully united, is creative but not redemptive.

In this period of fundamental changes, Christian

scholars continued to try to reestablish the authority of the Christian tradition by making its core impervious to modern criticism. For many Protestant scholars this meant reducing the biblical component to a small historically, scientifically, or existentially validated core. Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich held the intrusion of eternity (God) into time (human history) to a minimum. For Bultmann the only historical event of sacred character was the Easter event; all other biblical stories were myths (human images of otherworldly phenomena). The kerygma, the challenge to faith in Christ, emanated from an understanding of the Easter event and led to timelessly recurring decisions to faith. There was neither a base nor a need for a Christian interpretation of history. Tillich, who doubted that any religious statement could be more than symbolic (that is, could directly depict divine reality), acknowledged the role of the historical Jesus as demonstrating human existence without worldly distortions and calling all people to a "new being." But since much of human activity reflected to various degrees an "ultimate concern" with the "ground of being," he considered all cultural history to be sacred or religious history.

Other scholars found the price of such a harmonizing with the modern spirit—the abandonment of much of the biblical story as the basis of historiography—too high to pay. Among these scholars were the Protestant fundamentalists, who restored biblically based prophetic history to the center of Christian historical accounts. In the Augustinian and Kierkegaardian vein, Karl Barth (1886–1968) sharply separated time and eternity, insisting that only in biblical times did God reveal himself and not in the course of history, progress, or culture. Christian faith and wisdom rise from the decision individuals make when confronted, in the biblical record, with the story of Christ, and not from the study of the history of cultures and societies. For Barth, history, even ecclesiastical history, is therefore no more than an auxiliary tool of theology.

Large-scale attempts to write the history of cultures from a Roman Catholic viewpoint have been made (Christopher H. Dawson, Martin C. d'Arcy). But since the 1960s such attempts have focused on Roman Catholic church history, one of the last bastions of traditional Christian historiography. While Protestant historiographical arguments have focused on how much of the Bible could be used in a scientific age as a foundation for interpreting history, Roman Catholic arguments now concentrated on the unique sacred role of the Catholic church in history. In the 1950s, the traditional view still prevailed that the church, like Christ, represented a unique presence of eternity in time (Jean Daniélou, Henri-Irénée Marrou, Hubert Jedin). At its

core, all interpretation of history was explication of doctrine. Then, Vatican II deemphasized the conception of the church as the *corpus mysticum* (mystical body of Christ) in favor of the church conceived as the people of God through time. Some Catholic scholars took this change to mean that the dependence of historical interpretation on theology could now be broken. They attempted to turn church history into a sociological study of an institution or an analysis of the changing behavior of believers in time. With the abandonment of all claims for a special status of the church in history, its history would become one special history among many.

**Outlook.** The near future should see the beginnings of a solution to the dilemma in historical interpretation, now global in scope. For centuries the ancient myths and then the great religions had created and supported the schemes for explaining and organizing history and, with it, meaning. Also, traditional historical interpretations were part and parcel of the traditional social and political order; thus their diminution in strength meant more than just the fading of some opinions. Their challenger, modern Western historical science, too, is an integral part of a larger whole—the scientific-technological Western culture the achievements of which have radically increased the human potential for good and evil and which for the first time has linked all human societies into an interdependent network. As part of the new “religion of the earth,” historical science rejects all sense of mystery and demands that interpretations of history use forces, patterns, and aims immanent to this world. Thus there is the suspension of moral judgment in historical methodology, an endeavor of great sophistication that has not only expunged superficial or false interpretations but also the ascertaining of meaning in history. None of the new models or narratives, brilliant as they are, has as yet been able to match the public role of traditional history. On the other hand, various attempts to continue the traditional historiographies in a manner acceptable to scientific historiography have had only temporary success. In this crisis the age-old link between religion and history writing is at stake. Religion is threatened with becoming irrelevant to interpreting history, doomed to an ahistorical, recurrent reliving of the sacred past by individuals, while the writing of history, supported by a sophisticated methodology, remains a technical endeavor given to the reconstruction of aspects of the past. In such a situation neither religion nor history is able to master the reconciliation of the past, present, and future that in centuries past has enabled them, in conjunction with each other, to serve a public purpose and give meaning to the flow of life.

[Numerous entries deal with the different ways in which

*the experience of time has received order in various traditions: Sacred Time; Chronology; Ages of the World; Evolutionism; and Tradition. For a discussion of the relationship between mythical and historical thinking, see Myth, article on Myth and History.]*

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There is a great deal of literature on the interpretations of history within the West; less material is available for other cultures. The most comprehensive and up-to-date account of Western historical interpretations is my *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern* (Chicago, 1983). It includes a most useful thirty-five-page bibliography. More information on specific periods can be found in Harvey H. Guthrie's *God and History in the Old Testament* (Greenwich, Conn., 1960); L. G. Patterson's *God and History in Early Christian Thought* (New York, 1967); Beryl Smalley's reliable *Historians in the Middle Ages* (London, 1974); Alan Richardson's *History: Sacred and Profane* (Philadelphia, 1964), a fine treatment, although occasionally difficult for the general reader; and *God, History, and Historians: An Anthology of Modern Christian Views of History*, edited by C. T. McIntire (New York, 1977).

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ERNST BREISACH

## Western Studies

Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, the origin of philosophical and historical examinations of religion lies in the works of the ancient Greeks. This is equivalent to saying that the point of departure for these traditions' philosophical and historical self-examination is Greek thought. Other attitudes toward the development of religion are undoubtedly to be found in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China before Greek thought intervened, but these attitudes will remain outside my present consideration. I shall here be concerned basically with the examination of religion within the Hellenic tradition.

**Historical and Philosophical Dichotomy.** A significant distinction was imposed by the very nature of the Greek perspective: philosophical examination and historical examination of religion became two distinct branches of knowledge. Indeed, it is characteristic of Greek thought to distinguish in general (at least from the fifth century BCE onward) between philosophy and history. No doubt philosophical criticism operates inside a historical or antiquarian examination of religion, and, reciprocally, the empirical knowledge of cults and myths collected by historians or antiquarians assists philosophical criticism of religion. But the two subjects—philosophical and historical evaluations of religion—are seldom fused or, at least, seldom confused.

To indicate the depth of this dichotomy in Western thought, it is enough to mention David Hume, who was one of the most radical eighteenth-century thinkers about religion—perhaps one of the most radical thinkers about religion of modern times. Hume approached religion from both the historical and the philosophical points of view. In his *Natural History of Religion* (1757) in which he treats religion in historical terms, he states, "As far as writing of history reaches, mankind, in ancient times, appear universally to have been polytheists." Findings about modern tribes only confirm for him the facts adduced by the ancients about the original polytheism of mankind. In the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, which appeared three years after his death in 1779, Hume discusses religion from a philosophical point of view. His concern is not the evolution of religion but the validity of religion. He contends that

the argument from design for the existence of God is of doubtful value. It is generally recognized that Hume took Cicero's *On the Nature of the Gods* as a formal model for his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. There is no obvious ancient model for his *Natural History of Religion*, but he must have carefully considered Diodorus Siculus's *Historical Library*, book 1 (of the first century BCE) and was familiar with the work of Herodotus and Lucian.

**The Ancient Greeks.** After Herodotus (fifth century BCE), history in Greece tended to be confined to what we would call political and constitutional history, although doctors like Galen use the word *historia* to mean a compilation of medical reports in literature. Other aspects of the past such as religious ceremonies, festivals, or sacrifices, were more frequently examined in monographs that were sometimes generically designated *archaiologia* (in Latin, *antiquitates*). Biography was a separate literary genre: if the subject of a biography was a religious personality (a religious reformer, a priest, a holy man, or even a superstitious politician), biography was a contribution to the history of religion. Within Christianity such biographies were written to recount the lives of saints.

**Poetry.** Two well-known features of Greek Archaic poetry had consequences for the study of religion. The poetry of Hesiod, especially his *Theogony*, shows a marked tendency to treat the world of the gods as a historical world. In Hesiod's poetry there is a succession of generations of gods in which older gods, without necessarily dying, lose their power in confrontations with younger gods. The society of gods is perceived as a society to which new members are added and in which members gain or lose power. There is not only a change of human attitudes toward gods, but there is also a change in the attitudes of the gods themselves. In Hesiod, myth already incorporates the notion of a succession of leading gods: myths are presented as a sort of history of religion. Another important feature of Greek Archaic poetry is its frequent criticism of the gods. Such criticism often radically repudiated commonly held views about the gods. For example, Xenophanes (fl. 500 BCE) remarked that just as the Ethiopians imagine their gods to be similar to themselves, so horses, if they could paint, would paint their gods as horses.

**Philosophy.** The critical opinions about the gods in Greek Archaic poetry encouraged and inspired philosophical critiques of religion and historical research on the diversity of religions among the nations. Philosophers tended to separate God from man to the point of making God almost unintelligible except as the first mover or as a celestial body. The Stoics used allegorical interpretation (which had been current in explaining

away embarrassing episodes of the *Iliad*) to turn mythology into a confirmation of their pantheistic materialism. In the handbook *Theologiae graecae compendium* by Cornutus (c. 50 CE), one finds a systematic summary of Stoic allegory with some interesting statements about the religious attitudes of primitive man. Only Epicurus (341–270 BCE) insisted on believing in the existence of the traditional gods; his position did not allow the gods to exercise any influence on men, and he found in their happiness a model for the happiness of philosophically minded men. It is surprising how few references are made to the gods in the extant works of Aristotle; passages about them are almost marginal remarks (*On the Heavens* 2.1.284a; *Metaphysics* 1.2.982b, 11.8.1074b). Hence, in later Greek thought, especially among Neoplatonists, mystical practices were introduced to supplement the scanty information about gods in the discussions of the philosophic masters.

**Historical research.** Supported by visits to sanctuaries and by travels to foreign countries and remote localities, historical research provided both the raw material and the guiding principles for alternative historical interpretation. As a keen traveler and as one adept in the comparative method (which contemporary doctors used to explain climatic differences), Herodotus provided a model for research on religion. He explained similarities between Greek and Egyptian gods by claiming that the Greeks had derived their gods from Egypt. His account of the Scythians shows his awareness of the difference between reporting and believing. Even more telling of this awareness is his conclusion of the story of Salmoxis: "Whether there was a man called Salmoxis, or this be a name among the Getae for a god of their country, I have done with him" (4.95–96). Herodotus influenced Greek, and later, Roman writers who explored the customs of foreign countries and who also, as natives, explained to Greeks and Romans the characteristic features of their own countries. Accounts by non-Greeks became particularly frequent after Alexander the Great. These non-Greeks, who had adopted the Greek language, include Manetho (fl. third century BCE), Berossus (fl. 290 BCE), and later Josephus Flavius (c. 37–100 CE). Incidentally, Josephus's writings on the Jews comprise the only complete ancient account of a "barbarian" religion by a native to be preserved—although they were preserved through Christian, not through Jewish, tradition. Posidonius (c. 135–51 BCE) of Apamea in Syria deserves special note insofar as he was both a Stoic philosopher of somewhat mystical inclinations and a universal historian who purported to be a continuator of Polybius; he was, however, more anthropologically oriented than his predecessor.

Greek and Roman historians tended to ignore reli-

gion, especially when they dealt with Greek and Roman history. Consequently, most of what we know about Greek and Roman cults is derived from specific monographs on religious subjects (e.g., Plutarch on the Delphic oracle and Lucian on the Syrian goddess), accounts by travelers and geographers (e.g., Strabo and Pausanias), or, finally, works by Christian polemicists (e.g., Lactantius and Augustine).

Books on religion during the Hellenistic and Roman period reflect contemporary perspectives and interests. In the third century BCE, the ruler cults were developed by Alexander and his immediate successors. Ruler cults had, of course, existed before in and outside of Greece; but this new expansion was far more powerful and, at least for Greek speakers, involved delicate balances of power between men and gods. Persaeus, the pupil of Zeno the Stoic, and others reminded their contemporaries that past benefactors and kings had been divinized (cf. Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.15.38). Hecataeus of Abdera (c. 300 BCE) distinguished two categories of gods: the celestial and the terrestrial. The second category was comprised of benefactors. (Diodorus Siculus in his *Bibliotheca historica* 1.12 probably reflects his teaching.) In his *Sacred History*, Euhemerus (fl. 300 BCE) claimed to have discovered on the island of Panchaia an inscription revealing that Zeus had been a mortal king who had received divine honors for his contribution to civilization; Zeus was born and died in Crete. Whether Euhemerus thought that all the gods had been men like Zeus is uncertain. Though Euhemerus shocked many with his ideas and his forgeries (the latter being the object of a virulent attack by Eratosthenes), his ideas had success: his book was translated into Latin by Ennius in the second century BCE, and was summarized by Diodorus in the first century BCE. Antoine Banier's *La mythologie et les fables expliquées par l'histoire* (3d ed., 1738–1740) shows that scholarship continued to be euhemeristic even in the eighteenth century.

In the second and first centuries BCE, many erudite Greek works tried to preserve the memory of ceremonies that were becoming obsolete. Most of these works were lost, except for what may have passed into later lexicons, such as the so-called *Suda*. A conspicuous model, known to the Latins, of this erudition was the work about Athens by Polemon of Ilium (fl. 200 BCE). In Italy Alexander Polyhistor (d. late first century BCE) gained a reputation for systematic compilations of this kind of information about foreign countries.

**Roman Thought.** The Latins of the first century BCE had a state with a vigorous religious tradition of its own; this tradition was considered to be the foundation of and the justification for Rome's enormous power. Roman religion had become a constitutive aspect of Ro-

man prestige among her subjects. On the other hand, Greek philosophy had penetrated Roman thought: antiquarian devotion to the religious past was in conflict with rationalistic and irreverent tendencies. In this context a distinction among the theologies of poets, philosophers, and statesmen, probably borrowed from Greek philosophers, became popular in Rome. This distinction was formulated by the Roman lawyer and pontiff Q. Mucius Scaevola and was accepted by Marcus Terentius Varro and (by implication) by Cicero. Mucius Scaevola preferred the theology of statesmen, finding even the theology of the philosophers dangerous. The hesitation is conspicuous in Cicero who, however, is chiefly the protagonist of the introduction of systematic philosophical criticism into the interpretation of Roman religion. Others were oriented toward a guarded defense, or reconstruction, of Roman religion, though they were aware of philosophical argument. Even in Rome Varro was something of an exception when he produced and dedicated to Julius Caesar his *Divine Antiquities*, a systematic description of Roman religion. Varro had reservations about the traditional religion of Rome, but he was mainly interested in saving what was in danger of being forgotten and in propounding it to the ruling class: unknowingly, he was preparing the ground for the restoration accomplished by Augustus. His work (which, much later, Augustine made the foundation of his criticism of Roman paganism) immediately became more authoritative than that of his contemporary Nigidius Figulus, who was strongly committed to religion. There was a great deal of antiquarian doctrine on Etruscan, Persian, and Egyptian religions—not to mention Greek cults—in Figulus's books (e.g., *On the Gods*). If Varro wanted a reasonable preservation of the Roman past, Nigidius Figulus seems to have been more aggressively in favor of a personal synthesis. He emphasized the power that religious practices give to the individual, not to the state. Varro and Nigidius could hardly ignore their Epicurean contemporaries, such as Lucretius, who preached an almost religious escape from religion.

Traditional Roman religion could never be simply taken for granted after the Caesarian age. Though Augustus put an accent on conservation of the past, the writers of the imperial age, even under Augustus, were explicitly or implicitly conditioned by new religious currents. Some writers remained within the frame of paganism ("Oriental cults"); others preached a god who was incompatible with other gods (Judaism and Christianity). The most difficult pagan writers to assess are those who composed their books when Judaism and Christianity were well known, and yet ignored or gave only perfunctory attention to these religions. There is

perhaps no great antiquarian lore behind such writers, but they wrote primarily as historians, rather than as philosophers. It is not very clear why Plutarch (c. 46–after 119) writes what he writes about Isis and Osiris and other religious subjects. The same can be said about Pausanias's *Description of Greece* (second century CE) with its great attention to the history of cults in various parts of Greece. It is also difficult to separate autobiography from antiquarian lore in some of the religious speeches by Aelius Aristides in the same century. With Lucian (c. 120–after 180) we are indeed on the threshold of direct polemics with Christianity ("The Passing of Peregrinus"), though his main contributions to the history of religion are his study of his contemporary Alexander of Abonuteichos, the false prophet, and his description of the cult of Dea Syria in Hierapolis, which was composed in an archaizing style inspired by Herodotus.

**Christian-Pagan Polemics.** Though polemics between Christians and pagans became common in the second century, Judaic circles (as judged from preserved works) were no longer inclined to discuss religious differences either philosophically or historically. A possible exception is the recently published letter by "Anna" to Seneca, which may be a piece of Jewish propaganda on monotheism that was written not later than the fourth century (see Bernhard Bischoff, *Anecdota novissima*, Stuttgart, 1984). The Christians had to explain to the pagans why paganism, that is, polytheism, existed and was deplorable. This involved an element of historical explanation. The pagans, on the other hand, did not have to explain their own existence: it was sufficient for them to defend the rationality of their beliefs, as Celsus did, for instance, by explaining the function of polytheism in a plurinational world. Thus, in this exchange, there was more historical interest on the Christian side, a point worth remembering, as the Christian view prevailed. Whether the Christian view attributed polytheism to demonic influences or to the adulation by human beings of human beings, as the pagan Euhemerus had suggested, there was an element of historical conjecture in the Christian point of view. Indeed, Christian writers used pagan erudition to support their argument. It is enough to point to the use made of Varro by Augustine in the *City of God*; before Augustine, Varro's work was used by the Christian writers Arnobius and Lactantius. Furthermore, Augustine (and he was not alone in this) applied to the evolution of Jewish religion the biological scheme of the transition from infancy to maturity that he had met in pagan historians (*City of God* 10).

**Second to Fourth Centuries.** It would be idle to pretend that the polemics between pagans and Christians in the second to fourth centuries represented more than

a secondary contribution to the historical study of religion. Actual historical work is rather to be found in two other types of writing. One is biography of holy men, both pagan and Christian, which was common in this period of conflict between paganism and Christianity. For example, the biography of Apollonius of Tyana by Philostratus (c. 170–c. 245) precedes the biography of Antony of Egypt by Athanasius (c. 293–373). Biographical exploration now becomes an essential way of describing and understanding religion. Next to it, and hardly less important, is a new form of ecclesiastical history with its peculiar techniques for following up the growth of the church or churches. There is a question about the relation between Eusebius's *Church History*, the prototype of the genre, and the Gospels and *Acts of the Apostles*. It is enough here to underline the fact that, within the tradition of Greco-Roman historiography, first the Gospels and then the *Church History* introduce new and revolutionary types of historiography; of religion. *Acts* is, within this literary genre, less original. There is, furthermore, the wider question of whether what we now call pseudepigrapha intended to provide historical information about past situations. This question can be put to such different texts as *4 Maccabees*, the *Martyrdom and Ascension of Isaiah*, and the *History of the Rechabites*; it can even be put to what to us is a novel, the story of *Joseph and Asenath*.

**The Middle Ages.** Insofar as lives of saints and ecclesiastical histories remained extremely fertile genres of historiography in the Middle Ages, there was no shortage of recordings of religious events between the sixth and the fifteenth centuries. Furthermore, the ordinary chronicle was adapted to register events inside religious institutions (e.g., monasteries or cathedral churches), and it may be difficult to distinguish this chronicle from a local ecclesiastical history. Histories of wars had to take into account wars that had overwhelmingly religious meanings, such as the Crusades. Conversely, Ordericus Vitalis (1075–1142?) was not the only chronicler to worry about the encroachments of secular history on that ecclesiastical history that he had meant to write in the early twelfth century.

However mixed in character the single events reported, a definition of new religious experiences emerged everywhere. It is obvious in the "spirit of the Crusades," though one must remember that there were also crusades against heretics. These crusades had their historians (though not many, unfortunately, on the side of the heretics). Our notion of monastic life would be poorer without the autobiography by Abelard and the answer that Héloïse gave to it. The appearance of anchorites among the debris of rural Anglo-Saxon society after the Norman conquest is made vivid by the auto-

biography of Christina of Markyate, the recluse of the twelfth century. And, of course, there is the assiduous utilization of prophecies by historians of every kind, even by such a hard-boiled historian of the late twelfth century as Giraldus Cambrensis (Gerald de Barri).

These chronicles and biographies, however, seldom analyzed the religious phenomena they described. In the Middle Ages, understanding of religious diversity, if it was even attempted, is in sermons or philosophical treatises rather than in histories. This is true also of what Jews and Muslims wrote about religion: the former, in any case, had little historiography. Jews, Muslims, and Christians shared monotheistic presuppositions. The differences between the three faiths were debated theoretically rather than investigated historically. There was even less urgency among Jewish, Muslim, and Christian thinkers to understand polytheistic religions. Even Thomas Aquinas tended to follow the most unhistorical aspects of patristic thought in explaining the existence of polytheism. This tendency is also apparent in Jewish thought. Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1075–1141) portrays the king of the Khazars discussing his own conversion with a rabbi without any serious reference to data derived from ordinary historical or ethnographical sources. Even Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204), who claimed that he had read all he could in Arabic sources about the heathens and who had a keen sense of the social conditions of religious life, confined himself to philosophical or theological arguments. Some Muslim, Jewish, and Christian thinkers explained changes in religion by reference to astral influences (Abū Ma'shar, Avraham Ibn 'Ezra', William of Auvergne, etc.) The Bible was of course the enormous exception; it was quoted by both Jews and Christians as a source of historical information. Though it would be wrong to underrate the medieval (especially Jewish) contribution to biblical criticism, the Bible as a sacred text was kept isolated from profane historiography.

The first beginnings of a different, more historical approach to religion, and especially to polytheism, is to be found in Islamic, Christian, and Jewish works of the eleventh to twelfth centuries that report on the religious situation in countries visited either by the authors or by their informants. Examples of this new approach are found in the writings of al-Bīrūnī on India, Adam of Bremen on northern Europe (as seen from the diocese of Bremen-Hamburg), and Benjamin of Tudela on the Jews of various parts of the world. This approach was developed further by Christian writers in the middle of the thirteenth century and coincides with the remarkable attempt of Christianity to come to terms with the Mongolian empire as a potential ally against Islam.

Giovanni del Pian dei Carpini (John of Plano Carpini) and William of Rubrouck belong to this current, to which one can add Marco Polo. (An English translation of the reports by del Pian dei Carpini and W. Rubrouck is found in *Mission to Asia*, trans. Christopher Dawson, Toronto, 1980). Knowledge gained through exploration and diplomacy restored paganism as a relevant part of the contemporary world and supplemented classical accounts of polytheism. At least one writer, the Icelandic historian Snorri Sturluson (1179–1241) in the thirteenth century collected the pagan myths of his own country. The accumulation of the new information on pagan countries must have modified Christians' awareness of their own pagan past in Christian countries. More research is needed if we are to fully understand the effect of this accumulation of new data on polytheism in the late Middle Ages.

**The Renaissance.** Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century humanism and the Renaissance would have been inconceivable without this double awareness of external and internal paganism. Ancient mythology, ancient religion, and ancient historiography acquired a new relevance in countries like Italy because the pagan past seemed to require reinterpretation. In Italian humanism (one may start with Giovanni Boccaccio's *Genealogia deorum gentilium*, 1351–1360), the task of describing the pagans is inseparable from the task of explaining the existence of paganism. Even writers whose goal was the conversion of the infidel (and who used public theological controversy increasingly in efforts to convert Jews) sought more information about paganism. Arabic and Hebrew were studied by Christians in order to dispute with and convert Muslims and Jews. Foreign sacred texts, including the Talmud, were perused. An interest in Indian languages was born, though it did not fully emerge until the discovery and serious study of the sacred texts of India in the eighteenth century. The discovery of America opened up the exploration of a new pagan world in which Hebrew survivals were suspected.

The old interpretative models remained valid: euhemerism, demonic tricks, allegory, and the theory of successive revelations. But the new information acquired a value and created alternatives to the old models. First, the aim of informing readers about the religions of the world was in itself a novelty. One finds, for example, Johann Boemus's *Omnium gentium mores, leges et ritus*, which appeared in 1520 and had successive editions, partly with additions by other authors, during the sixteenth century. His work was followed, for instance, by Lilio Giraldi's *De deis gentium varia et multiplex historia* (1548) and by Alessandro Sardi's *De moribus ac ritibus gentium* (1557). Second, new speculations about languages and nations began to undermine the

traditional picture of the early history of mankind. When, for instance, Jean Becan von Gorp made public his discovery that Dutch had been the primitive language of mankind and that Cimbri had taught wisdom to the Greeks (*Origines antwerpianae*, 1569)—one of the many discoveries about the primitive language of mankind—the oddity of the claim was in itself an indication of change.

The new intellectual nationalists of the divided Europe of the sixteenth century could almost simultaneously sympathize with their pagan ancestors and accuse their enemies (most frequently Roman Catholics) of preserving pagan rituals. Such controversial literature is reported in J. A. Fabricius's *Bibliotheca antiquaria* (2d ed., 1716); a prototype, with a physiognomy of its own, is *Apologie pour Hérodote* (1566) by Henri Estienne. The relation between paganism and Christianity then became a question of historical continuity or discontinuity between specific aspects of paganism and Christianity. Conversely, elements in paganism that were judged to be true were ascribed to the survival within paganism of early revealed truths.

An important feature in all these works, notwithstanding the concern with immediate doctrinal issues, is an examination and analysis of the evidence with an attention to detail and with a philological skill that had been unknown to earlier authors. Though ecclesiastic history by Matthias Flacius Illyricus and his collaborators (the so-called *Centuriae Magdeburgenses*, 1559–1579), represents the Protestant point of view, and Cesare Baronio's refutation, the *Annales ecclesiastici* (1588–1607), represents a Catholic version, Flacius and Baronio have more or less the same critical method. The new style of collecting and sifting evidence became more conspicuous as religious polemics became less sharp in the seventeenth century and tended to peter out (or rather to be affected by Deism or by skepticism) in the eighteenth century. This is already manifest in the *Vitae sanctorum* (Lives of the Saints) of the Bollandists, in the many works dedicated to the history of Christian institutions in given countries (for instance, Fernando Ughelli's *Italia sacra*, 1642, and William Dugdale's *Monasticon Anglicanum*, 1655). The Benedictine erudition in France and Italy of the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century is the crown of this method.

**Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.** In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pagan antiquities were studied in an effort to understand how the pagans preserved elements of the revelation to the Jews: the Phoenicians were assumed to be the transmitters. This is the subject of Samuel Bochart's *Geographia sacra seu Phales et Chanaan* (1646), G. J. Vos's *De theologia gentili*

(1647), Theodore Gale's *The Court of the Gentiles* (1669–1677), and Pierre-Daniel Huet's *Demonstratio evangelica* (1690). At the end of the seventeenth century, the notions that Homer mirrored the age of the patriarchs (Gerard Croese, *Homeros Hebraios*, 1704) and that the religion of Delphi preserved traditions of the age of the Judges (Edmund Dickinson, *Delphi phoenicizantes*, 1655) were not unusual. This type of research went on for the whole of the eighteenth century. (See, for instance, Jacob Bryant, *A New System*, 1744–1746). In fact one of the most telling titles appeared as late as 1786: Guérin du Rocher's *Hérodote historien du peuple hébreu sans le savoir* (1786). At the same time, it was argued at great length and with great erudition that God had thought it wise to give the Hebrews pagan rites made venerable by antiquity (for example, in John Spencer's *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus eorumque rationibus*, 1685). Others, especially Spaniards such as Fray Bernardino de Sahagún in his *Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*, wanted to insert the new American experience into the context of the old pagan world. But Sahagún's attempt, conducted between 1569 and 1582, was obviously premature: his book remained unpublished until 1820. Joseph-François Lafitau returned with greater maturity to the same subject in 1724. His *Mœurs des sauvages américains comparés aux mœurs des premiers temps* was not only published but found an immediate audience. Yet its importance as a pioneer work in anthropological research was not recognized until the twentieth century.

The gradual apprehension of the religions of India and China with their sacred texts remains one of the great achievements of Western scholarship between the end of the sixteenth and the end of the eighteenth century. For research on China, Juan González de Mendoza's *Historia de las cosas mas notables . . . del gran Reyno de la China* (1585) is considered epoch making. For scholarship in the next century, I shall mention only Athanasius Kircher's *China illustrata* (1663) because the author, a Jesuit, was also the author of *Oedipus Aegyptiacus* (1652–1654), a pioneering attempt to decipher the Egyptian hieroglyphs and to reconstruct Egyptian religion. Kircher's work typifies the dual interest in ancient and modern pagan civilizations. Kircher was already in possession of a Sanskrit grammar, but it was not until the late eighteenth century that the first successful interpretation of basic Iranian and Indian texts was achieved. The translation of the Zand Avesta by A.-H. Anquetil-Duperron appeared in 1771 (later Anquetil-Duperron turned to the Upaniṣads), while Charles Wilkins's translation of the *Bhagavadgītā* appeared in 1785. William Jones gave the first clear formulation of the relations between Indian religion and

Greek and Roman paganism (1784; see Jones's *Works*, vol. 1, 1799, pp. 229–280). It is well to remember, however, that the distribution in Europe in the 1760s of the translation of a text called *Ezur Vedam* (True Veda) delayed the understanding of early Indian religion and misled Voltaire; the text was a concoction by Christian missionaries with native help. Chinese wisdom had the greater appeal for the rationalists and theists of the eighteenth century. It was left for the Romantic movement, especially in Germany and France, to appreciate the religions of India. But there are other works that confirm the eighteenth-century contribution to collecting the evidence about the religious history of distant countries and sects, such as Thomas Hyde's *Historia religionis Veterum Persarum* (1700) and Isaac de Beausobre's *Histoire critique de Manichée et du manichéisme* (1734).

**The Rise of Modern Historiography.** The factual, empirical, almost antiquarian attitude of the historians of religion in the late Renaissance and in the Baroque age was transmitted to the historians of the Enlightenment and of the Romantic period. No doubt, as Hume and Voltaire show, erudition was often conspicuously avoided for the sake of philosophic generalization. But erudition was always kept within reach even by the most dedicated philosopher. If there was a shift it occurred not in erudition itself, but rather in the purpose of erudition, which was increasingly used to support Deism (Edward Herbert of Cherbury), tolerance (Pierre Bayle), and religious emotions when contemplating nature, in preference to dogmas.

A new approach to religion emerged that can be described as typical of the Enlightenment: the attempt to determine and describe the various stages of the development of religion in mankind at large. In this approach new stages were identified, such as fetishism, that is, the adoration of objects, which was defined, after several predecessors, by Charles de Brosses in 1760, and animism, which was first tentatively postulated in various memoirs by Nicolas Fréret, while Banier resurrected the old euhemerism. It is here that Hume's insistence on the priority of polytheism over monotheism belongs. Hume's *Natural History of Religion* (1755) owed much even in its title to the *Natural History of Superstition* (1709) by John Trenchard. The intention behind these systems was not necessarily anti-Christian, though there were writers who were inclined to straight materialism, such as C. F. Dupuis during the French Revolution. One of the most radical and isolated thinkers, Giovanni Battista Vico, was a devout Catholic who tried to save the ancient Jews from the suspicion of myth making that he saw as essential to ancient paganism. The overall result of this philosophical historical

movement was to present schemes of human progress that theologians had to face. For the first time, philosophers and historians joined forces in presenting religion as something that had a history. It was an uneasy collaboration between philosophers and historians, but it was a new and significant one. It was even capable of transforming cultural events into religious experiences, as in Antoine Court de Gébelin's *Le monde primitif* (1773–1784).

**Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.** But what is this religious experience? What is religion? It is here that pre-Romantic and Romantic thought came out decisively, even against the Enlightenment, to restate the autonomy of religion as an emotion and as a need within the human experience. From G. E. Lessing and J. G. Herder to Friedrich Schleiermacher and F. L. J. von Schelling, the main effort was to rediscover religion as an emotional experience rather than as a culturally conditioned social manifestation. The philosophers parted company again with the historians, for whom the search for the social roots of religion remained a permanent bequest from the eighteenth century. Research in the field of religion during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reveals an interaction between these two main approaches: the exploration of religious experience as such and the quest for a historical typology of religious attitudes and practices. The two currents seldom run parallel to each other; more often they cross each other, but never achieve confluence. This interaction can be seen in the continuity from Schleiermacher and Benjamin Constant de Rebeque to, say, Gerardus van der Leeuw and the Chicago school of Joachim Wach (with its German roots) in the effort to create a hermeneutic of religious experience. Though this effort must not be confused with that of the various psychological schools that have studied religious phenomena, such as William James's pragmatism and the psychoanalytic doctrines of Freud and Jung, it shares with the psychological schools a search for the roots of the religious experience as such. The relevance of such psychology or philosophy to theology is direct.

On the other side, the historical exploration of specific religions displayed unprecedented sophistication of methods and techniques. The deciphering of hieroglyphics and cuneiform conditioned the modern research on Egyptian and Mesopotamian religions, and even the partial interpretation of Etruscan texts added a new dimension to the knowledge of ancient Italian religions and helped to disentangle Roman from Greek religion. Knowledge of Buddhism, especially outside India, changed dramatically, and new information about so-called primitive tribes affected our knowledge of (and indeed the terminology we apply to) so-called ad-

vanced religions (consider, for example, the scholarly fortunes of the Melanesian term *mana*). The discovery of new texts such as the Dead Sea Scrolls modified the physiognomy of familiar religions.

To these changes, one has to add radical new methods and points of view regarding the examination of traditional texts. The succession (or rather superimposition) of source criticism, comparative studies (especially within Semitic studies), form criticism, redaction criticism, canon criticism, deconstruction, and so on, transformed our understanding of the Bible.

The problem that arose and that dominated the study of religion since the early nineteenth century, was how to establish a real connection between theories on the nature of religion (with their hermeneutics of religious experience) and the new "factual" acquisitions about individual religions. Solutions have differed according to intellectual climate and individual preferences. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, G. F. Creuzer tried to create a systematic, symbolic interpretation of ancient mythology (1810–1812). During the middle of the century, F. Max Müller began to develop what he called a "science of religion" on a model offered by the new Indo-European linguists such as Franz Bopp, and English anthropologists, such as E. B. Tylor, tried to improve on their eighteenth-century predecessors by using Darwinian concepts of evolution. The writings of Marx and Engels about the dependence of religion on the economic foundations of society should be mentioned here as well. At the turn of the twentieth century, Wilhelm Wundt developed his "psychology of the nations." Émile Durkheim, followed by his nephew Marcel Mauss, presented religion as the internal transfiguration of society that keeps society going, and Max Weber, followed by Ernst Troeltsch, proposed a sociology of religion with an inherent typology of religious experience as an answer to the never rigorously developed Marxist interpretation of religion.

Two aspects of this process of connecting history of religion with philosophy of religion deserve special notice. One aspect can be presented with the mere name of Ernest Renan. Though he was a radical critic of the Christian tradition, he communicated genuine religious sentiments in his books and exercised a decisive influence in the formation of modernist currents within Catholicism. (He was, incidentally, also a pioneer in the study of Semitic epigraphy, which renewed our knowledge of Semitic religions.)

The other aspect is the increased scholarship of Jews in a field that had previously been dominated by scholars in the Christian tradition. In the late sixteenth century, the original scholar 'Azaryah dei Rossi, the author of *Me'or eiyneyim* (Light of the Eyes), remained almost

unknown to non-Jews and little known to Jews themselves. He was recognized as a pioneer in the study of Judaism by Jews of the generation of Moses Mendelssohn in the late eighteenth century, and his work opened up the path to the so-called science of Judaism (*Wissenschaft des Judentums*) of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Leopold Zunz, Solomon Munk, Heinrich Graetz, Ismar Elbogen, etc.). Other Jews contributed significantly to the understanding of other religions (James Darmesteter on Persian religion, Ignác Goldziher on Islam) and to the comparative study of religion (Salomon Reinach). It should also be remembered that Durkheim brought a rabbinic education to his sociology.

At present there seems to be a definite preference for sociological interpretations of circumscribed aspects of religion: something less ambitious, say, than the phenomenology of van der Leeuw and Wach, and also less theoretically sophisticated than the sociology of Weber. This preference is due to the realization that many subjects (e.g., the position of women in religion, the function of holy men in different societies, the behavior of sectarians within the "greater societies," and even apocalyptic and messianic movements) have been studied without sufficient consideration of their social context. This preference for the social aspects of religion may well be a transitory fashion. The tension between the discovery of facts about individual religions and the need adequately to define religion itself is bound to continue. History and philosophy of religion are likely to go on disturbing each other, and theology will go on facing both. The triangle of history, philosophy, and theology is still with us.

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ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO

**HISTORY.** [This entry comprises two articles about religious conceptions of history: Jewish Views and Christian Views. For discussion in broader religious perspective of the writing of history, see Historiography.]

#### Jewish Views

This article describes the conception of history in the Hebrew scriptures and in rabbinic and medieval Judaism and controversies concerning historical continuity and change in modern Judaism.

**Biblical Views.** The unusual importance of history in Israelite religion probably predated the articulation of a full-fledged monotheism that explicitly denies the potency of all gods except Yahveh, the God of Israel. The core of the biblical narrative deals with the relationship between Israel and Yahveh, a relationship created and actualized in history. Yahveh is presented as having anticipated, in the calling out of the patriarchs, the formation of the house of Israel (*Gn.* 18:17) and as having liberated the descendants of the patriarchs from Egyptian bondage in order to enter into a covenantal treaty



with them at Mount Sinai (*Ex.* 19:3–8, *Dt.* 26:5–9). In the biblical narrative the subsequent history of Israel, a duration of eight centuries, is winnowed and assembled accordingly.

**History and time.** Whenever it was that monolatry (the sacred obligation to worship only Yahveh and not “other gods,” as in *Exodus* 19:5–6, 20:2–3) became monotheism (the explicit negation of the ontic reality of other gods, as in *Isaiah* 45:5–7), the transformation eschewed some of the most widespread ancient mythological themes. Rather than describing the birth of the various generations of gods, the struggles between them to define their respective sovereignties, and the gods’ liaisons with other gods and humans, the dramatic foreground of the Hebrew scriptures is occupied by human responses to Yahveh’s acts of revelation and salvation, chastisement and consolation. More than embracing narratives of a series of specific moments, however, biblical history moved toward a new sense of historical time.

The contrast is made between mythological time, where ritual and recitation aim at reexperiencing paradigmatic moments, and historic time as a continuum of unrepeatable occasions each possessing independent value. In this regard, the Hebrew Bible is sometimes described as holding to a linear, rather than a cyclical, notion of time, but this concept oversimplifies the biblical meaning of history. *Genesis* 1–11, often called “the primeval history,” makes use of ancient Near Eastern mythological materials as reinterpreted by Israelite monotheism. And the biblical notion of history does focus on repetitive patterns (the cycle of sin, punishment, contrition, atonement). The mythological residue and the cyclical patterns are presented in the context of a chain of events reaching back to the absolute beginning of the world and human civilization and forward to a future open in a crucial sense. The cyclical-linear sense of time is also a feature of the prophetic books. Implied in the classical prophets is that past events are guideposts to actions taken in a historical present that is infused by a unique, pregnant tension. The prophet addresses the people and its rulers out of the immediacy of the divine imperative; in order to avert an impending catastrophe, he demands a change of direction (turning, repentance). The prophetic oracles do not embody revelations of predetermined fate but warnings of inevitable acts of divine justice if Israel’s behavior continues in the path that the prophet has denounced. The prophet speaks out of the conviction that despite sins committed in the past, the future can assume a different character because God forgives those who reform their habitual ways. The prophet hopes to change rather than

predict history and to break through the old cycle of failure to advance the divine demand.

**Stages of history.** In its final redaction the Hebrew Bible locates the Israelite-God covenant in a world historical context, creating a conception of universal history that shaped the consciousness of European civilization for many centuries. The primeval history in *Genesis* 1–11 in effect narrates the coming-into-being of the human condition, including humanity’s division into many nations and tongues. The remaining chapters of *Genesis* trace the precarious continuity of God’s blessing of the direct ancestors of Israel during their sojourns in Canaan until the settlement in Egypt. The objective of the Exodus from Egypt is the actual formation of the people at Mount Sinai and during their wilderness wanderings, until the twelve Israelite tribes enter Canaan to occupy their patrimonies (through the *Book of Joshua*). A second historical cycle, *Judges* through *2 Kings*, deals with the history of the people in the promised land: the tribes eventually coalesce into an Israelite kingdom that in less than a century is rent in two. The narrative follows the subsequent history of the two kingdoms (extracted, we are told, from royal chronicles, e.g., *1 Kgs.* 14:29, 16:5, 16:14, 16:20, 16:27) together with stories of the prophets who issued judgments on the kings, until the Assyrian destruction of the northern kingdom of Israel in 722 BCE and the Babylonian conquest of the southern kingdom of Judah in 587/6 BCE. The fall of the Israelite kingdoms is attributed, above all, to God’s punishment for idolatry condoned by the rulers (e.g., *2 Kgs.* 17:7–18, 21:10–16, 24:3–4). In contrast to the preceding, the Babylonian exile, the return to Zion, and the second commonwealth are recounted episodically in tales of religious fidelity in Babylon (*Dn.* 1–6), accounts of the rebuilding of the Temple and the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah (mainly in the books named for these two men), and the story of the near destruction and last-minute salvation of the Jews of the Persian empire in the *Book of Esther*. A second interpretation of Israelite history up to the Babylonian exile is contained in *1* and *2 Chronicles*.

These accounts of the past are completed by a vision of the future, a conception of the ultimate destiny of humanity. Biblical eschatology is ignored in the historical books but present in the prophetic oracles of the “latter time” concerning the prince of justice who will rule the land (*Is.* 9:2–7, 11:1–10), a utopian age of worldwide peace (*Is.* 2:1–5, *Mi.* 4:1–4), universal worship of Yahveh (*Is.* 56:6–8, *Zec.* 8:20–23), thorough internalization of the covenant and outpouring of prophecy (*Jer.* 31:31–34, *Jl.* 2:28–29), the pacification of nature (*Is.* 65:17–25, *Zec.* 14:1–14), and cataclysmic judgments vindicating

God's holiness among the nations (*Ez.* 38–39; *Is.* 24–27, 63:1–6). Some of these and other prophetic visions already show an evolution from the eschatology of classical prophecy to apocalypticism.

Unlike the classical prophet, who is usually located in the text according to the rulers of his own time and the historic situation that he directly addresses, the apocalyptic hides behind the name of an earlier personage who presents a synoptic vision of history through many centuries. For the apocalyptic, history and eschatology are fused in a preordained sequence from the time of the visionary to the final days. In the most developed apocalyptic material of the Hebrew Bible (*Dn.* 7–12), the subject is the future rise and fall of monstrous pagan empires. Eventually “the saints of the Most High” will triumph, God's dominion will be firmly established in the earth, “and many of the dead will awaken, some to eternal life and some to everlasting contempt” (*Dn.* 12:2). The extracanonical Jewish apocalyptic literature that took shape between the second century BCE and the second century CE sought to sustain the people's faith that despite appearances to the contrary, the divine plan would culminate in the destruction of evil and the establishment of God's direct rule over creation. The growth of apocalypticism is but one symptom of a large shift of emphasis, in a period marked by a turning away from concrete history to other themes and interests in Judaism of late antiquity. [See *Apocalypse*, *article on Jewish Apocalypticism to the Rabbinic Period.*]

**Hellenistic and Pharisaic-Rabbinic Views.** While this transformation was occurring, however, a final burst of ancient Jewish historiography adumbrated several historical concerns of considerable importance of Judaism later. The books of the Maccabees, which memorialize the struggle against the Seleucid king Antiochus IV (r. 175–164 BCE) to repress Judaism in Judaea, contain the prototype of the literature of martyrology (*2 Mc.* 6–7) developed by medieval Christian and Jewish writers. Josephus Flavius (37/8–c. 100), who recorded the Jewish war against Rome between 66 and 70 CE that eventuated in the destruction of Jerusalem and its Temple, narrated an occurrence of immense practical and symbolic importance for Judaism. Although Josephus's works were not preserved by the Jews in the original, a medieval Hebrew rendition of these events, *sefer yosippon*, probably composed in the tenth century in southern Italy, supplemented Talmudic legends concerning this catastrophic event. The bulk of traditional Jewish knowledge about postbiblical history (the Hasmonean and Herodian kingdoms, the religious movements of the late Second Temple period, the revolts against the Romans in the first and second centuries CE, the personalities and actions of the Pharisaic sages and influential

rabbis of late antiquity) were preserved in anecdotal, often legendary, form in the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds and in the Midrash.

Biblical history served as a matrix of lessons and models reinforced by repeated allusion to the personages and experiences of ancient Israel. In the liturgy of holy days, Jews annually relived the turning points of history as distilled from the Bible: creation of the universe (Ro'sh ha-Shanah); Exodus from Egypt (Pesah); revelation of the Torah at Sinai (Shavu'ot); divine protection during the wilderness wanderings under the leadership of Moses (Sukkot); the constant availability of divine forgiveness and the holy splendor of the priests, who were the channel for atonement of sin while the Temple stood (Yom Kippur); salvation from threatened extermination in the Diaspora (Purim); the miracle of “those days” in Maccabean Jerusalem (Hanukkah); the destruction of Zion and the Temple (Tish'ah be-Av). An indication of the closure and formalization of the rabbinic conception of history is the emergence in late antiquity of a system of dating from the beginning of the world (*anno mundi*, the era of creation), which came to serve as a Jewish alternative to the Christian chronology based on the birth of Christ and, later, the Muslim system dating from the Hijrah.

The most prominent essentially historic element of Pharisaic-rabbinic Judaism is the notion of a continuous chain of religious authority from the revelation at Sinai to the (moving) present. In the rabbinic worldview Torah is a transcendent, premundane blueprint for creation containing God's purposes for creating humankind and the people of Israel, and Torah is present in history in two guises: the text of the Pentateuch (the written Torah) and the unfolding body of tradition (the oral Torah) anchored in Moses at Mount Sinai and growing with the teachings of every generation of sages. Torah was passed down by word of mouth from the elders to the prophets to the sages (*Avot* 1.1), given a written form in the Mishnah at the end of the second century CE, and continuously supplemented by the discussions and reasoning of the rabbis in the Talmudic *yeshivot* and thereafter. [See *Torah.*] Tracing the chain of reliable authority became a major interest of medieval Jewish historiography.

**Medieval and Early Modern Views.** The continuity of the rabbinic tradition became a polemic issue in the eighth and ninth centuries with the rise of the Karaites, who denied the authority of the Talmud. The tenth-century Karaite historiographer Ya'qub al-Qirqisani viewed as forerunners of the Karaite movement the Sadducees of the Second Temple period, who had rejected the Pharisaic “traditions of the fathers” (an early stage of the notion of the oral Torah). In the tenth cen-

ture Sherira' Gaon, head of the Pumbedita *yeshivah*, composed an epistle defending rabbinic authority by explaining how the corpus of Talmudic literature came into being, in the course of which he transmitted considerable historical data. The unbroken continuity of the "order of generations" was one of the principal motives of Avraham ibn Daud's *Sefer ha-qabbalah* (Book of Tradition), a schematic account of Jewish history written in the twelfth century which contained undertones of messianic expectation.

As indicated, in the Middle Ages another impetus to the recording of events in Jewish history was the commemoration of Jewish martyrs. The massacres of the Jews of the Rhineland at the inception of the First Crusade was the subject of an Ashkenazic chronicle literature that was augmented as a result of later crises, such as the massacres of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1648–1649. However, most of the medieval Jewish philosophers had little interest in history as such. Moses Maimonides (1135/8–1204) considered the reading of books of history at best a diversion for one's leisure hours (*The Guide of the Perplexed* 1.2) and a waste of time for serious scholars who should occupy themselves with jurisprudence, the natural sciences, and metaphysics. Maimonides does employ history incidentally to explain some of the biblical commandments as means to wean Israel from pagan practices of the ancient world. Of the medieval Jewish philosophers, it was Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1075–1141), a severe critic of Jewish Aristotelianism, who grounded Jewish faith in the experience of a specific people qualified by their innate aptitude, when in a proper moral condition in the Holy Land, to receive the Torah. Ha-Levi's contrast of the abstract, rational God of the Aristotelian philosophers with the puissant God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob represents a definite, if limited, turning from metaphysical to historical arguments for the truth value of Jewish faith.

Not until the sixteenth century was there a rebirth of Jewish historiography akin to that of the Hellenistic era. Most of the works of this period, by exiles from the Iberian Peninsula, are, in form, medieval chronicles in which there are sometimes found Renaissance elements (the *Shevet Yehudah* by Shelomoh ibn Verga offers a political and social analysis of the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492). A truly pioneering figure in sixteenth-century Jewish historiography was 'Azaryah dei Rossi, whose *Me'or 'enayim* shows the influence of Renaissance humanism in its recovery of Hellenistic Jewish texts and critical treatment of Talmudic anecdotes.

In contrast to this limited interest in historical research for its own sake was the qabbalistic interest in history, which was meant to establish the authenticity of its esoteric exegesis of the Torah. The most influential

text of the Spanish Qabbalah, the *Zohar*, was presented by its thirteenth-century author as the work of a circle of second-century Galilean rabbis, giving the *Zohar* a pedigree as old as the Mishnah and antedating by many centuries the spread of rationalistic philosophy among Jews. Metahistorical elements in qabbalistic literature reached an apogee in the teachings of the sixteenth-century mystic Isaac Luria. Lurianic Qabbalah developed a theology of cosmic redemption based on the principle that carrying out the divine commandments with the correct mystic intention (*kavvanah*) liberates divine sparks that had been scattered abroad and trapped in husks of evil during the processes of cosmic creation. [See Qabbalah.] The Lurianic version of the Qabbalah, inasmuch as it conceived of human action as necessary to bring the Messiah, lent an intrinsic dignity to the temporal process that history had not had in Jewish thought since biblical times. However, these human acts produced their effects in a spiritual realm invisible to mundane eyes. An attempt to apply this theory on the concrete stage of history, expressing the buildup of messianic tension in early modern Jewry, erupted in the short-lived movement around the mystical messiah Shabbetai Tsevi in the 1660s. The revolutionary enthusiasm was quickly extinguished among most Jews.

**Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Views.** A modern awareness of history entered Judaism in the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* that emerged in Germany in the 1820s. The proponents of the scientific study of the Jewish past argued that an objective knowledge of Jewish history would increase respect for Judaism's contributions to civilization and, at the same time, enable Jews to grasp the essence of their tradition. However, the critical methodology of modern scholarship also posed new issues for Judaism (and other revealed traditions) by calling into question the historicity of formative events and persons, challenging the unity of scripture, and drawing attention to data that contradicted the presumed continuity of the received tradition. [See Jewish Studies, *article on Jewish Studies* from 1818 to 1919.]

The religious trends that crystallized in nineteenth-century European and American Jewry represent contrasting strategies of response. The Reform movement perceived Judaism as a progressive revelation that is based on the original inspiration of Moses and the prophets and has attained its most adequate formulation in modern times; for the Reformers, historical knowledge provided the basis for distinguishing between the authentic kernel of Judaism and the protective husk of law and custom once necessary but no longer relevant in postmedieval circumstances. The Positive-Historical approach (which in America became

the basis for Conservative Judaism) conceived of revelation as in part molded by the gradually developing consensus of the historic Jewish community, which thereby assured continuity of sacred practice and doctrine. For the Orthodox, Torah was a timeless, immutable divine instruction for the ideal human life; intervention in the process of explicating Torah as undertaken by the Reformers and, more moderately, by the Conservatives in order to bring Judaism in line with the spirit of the times was considered by and large destructive. At present, both Conservative and Orthodox Judaism (and some Reform figures) emphasize the continuity of the *halakhah* (religious law) as a normative feature of Judaism but disagree as to what extent present-day rabbis have the right to diverge from earlier sages and the stricter contemporary authorities.

As the nineteenth-century progressed, modern Jewish historiography amassed considerable knowledge of the social and political history of the Jews as well as of the religious and literary history of Judaism. Erudite nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars (preeminently, Heinrich Graetz) published works that educated their readers in the complex and variegated Jewish past, enabling Jews to relate positively to their tradition apart from any commitment to theology or religious praxis. Especially in eastern Europe secular views of Jewish historical identity accompanied the formulation of Jewish nationalist and socialist ideologies (e.g., Simon Dubnow's conception of the centrality of Jewish institutions of self-government in the Diaspora in relation to his ideology of Jewish Diaspora nationalism, and Jewish socialists and Marxists who took economic themes and even the class struggle as central). Most important has been the rethinking of the meaning of Jewish history from the Zionist perspective, emphasizing the age-old longing for redemption from exile and the centrality of the land of Israel as the ancestral homeland to which the Jews were to return to build a new commonwealth, but, in various ways, also seen as a progressive, even revolutionary, advance in history, a kind of active return to history. [See Zionism.]

Since World War II a theme that has gained prominence in Jewish consciousness is the history of Jewish responses to catastrophe. The Holocaust drew attention to repeated cycles of Judeophobia since ancient times and the ways Jewry has understood itself in relation to the nations of the world. And the Holocaust has raised issues concerning God's relation to history (the traditional problem of theodicy), with reverberations in recent Jewish historical and theological writing. [On this final point, see Holocaust, The, article on Jewish Theological Responses.]

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ROBERT M. SELTZER

## Christian Views

Christians interpret history from the perspective of the life of Jesus of Nazareth (c. 4 BC—AD 30), whom they call the Christ. Christians believe that in Christ God became incarnate in human history and thereby signified divine recognition of the validity of history. The salient events in the history of Christ's life in ancient Roman Palestine—notably his birth, his ministry, his death by crucifixion, and his resurrection to life—form the basis of the Christian religion. At the same time, these events provide the ultimate orientation for Christian views of universal history and historical process.

Christians believe that history began with the creation of the world and will culminate with the return of Christ. Their vision of history includes all peoples as well as all nonhuman creation. They give a special role within history to the Jews before Christ's time, to his immediate disciples (called the apostles), and to the church and the kingdom of God for the remainder of history after Christ. This ongoing temporal course of worldly existence proceeds in cycles of worship and forgiveness and renewal as, under the providence of God, Christians seek to do the will of God and to overcome sin and evil with good.

Thus, to be Christian unavoidably entails bonding with an interpretation of history, giving some account of the complexity and particularity of history as viewed in the light of Christ. Christian views of history contrast with alternatives that have different ultimate orientations, whether liberal capitalist, Marxist, Hindu, Buddhist, or something else. With the secularization of thought and society in Western civilization in recent times, Christian views have tended to shrink to an emphasis on church history, but many Christians have enlarged their views again in order to approach the whole of history and historical study with the help of Christian understandings of humanity and the course of the ages.

**Elements of Christian Views of History.** The first people who gathered around Jesus created the Gospels, which disclosed what mattered for the Christian religion. This they did not by instruction in ritual or law, not by theological discourse or logical argument, but by telling the history of Jesus and celebrating his divine incarnation as a person like all other people in history. The Gospels are the earliest form of Christian historical writing. Jesus' message reveals that the meaning of history—past, present, and future—is found in the coming of the kingdom of God. History is the repeated overcoming of the kingdom of darkness by God's kingdom of light. In the words of the Lord's Prayer, "Our father in heaven, holy be your name, your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven." [See *Apostles; Gospel; Jesus; and Lord's Prayer.*]

The experience of the crucifixion and the resurrection of Jesus totally transformed the apostles' understanding of history. They created the first Christian views of history by reworking their inherited Jewish interpretations of history. They regarded Jesus as the one whose coming the ancient Hebrew prophets had often promised. John calls Jesus the Messiah, the Christ, the one anointed by God to be the savior of Israel. The very use of that title constituted an interpretation of the role of Jesus in world history. Matthew and Luke constructed genealogies showing that Jesus was the direct descendant of the two greatest names in Jewish history, Abraham and David, and, according to Luke, the direct lineal offspring of Adam, the first human being created by God.

The Gospels and the *Acts of the Apostles* also tell how Jesus projected a new horizon for the future. After leaving his followers for a time he would return again to be among them. They caught suggestions of the end of the age, the *eschaton*, some time in the near or distant future, and they could anticipate a final resurrection of the dead.

The apostle Paul, in *Romans*, later created an interpretation of history that explains both the continuity of Jesus with Israel and Adam and the radical innovation that following Jesus would mean for the future. Paul views Jesus as both the descendant of Adam and the New Adam. History thus divides into two ages. Before Christ there was the creation, the old covenant, the old self, the way of the law, whereas after Christ there would be the new creation, the new covenant, the new self, the way of grace. Paul thinks that the Hebrew scriptures (the Old Testament) contained many anticipations or types of Christ and that the children of David and Abraham were to be completed by a new Israel called the *ekklesia*, children of Abraham by adoption. [For further discussion of concepts of the church, see under Church, especially the article on Church Membership.]

It is important to understand that the early Christians formed their views of history as an integral expression of their worship, their liturgy, their preaching, their art, and their common experiences and confessions of Christ within the new community of the *ekklesia*, later called the church. Over the centuries, it was largely through such tangible and close-to-home means that Christians taught, maintained, elaborated, revised, and unfolded their Christian views of history into the wide variety of forms known in the history of Christianity. The writings on history by the great thinkers—like Paul, Eusebius (d. c. 339), Augustine (d. 430), Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Luther (d. 1546), Calvin (d. 1564), and Bossuet (d. 1704)—depended upon and emerged from within the experience of the worshiping community. The great creeds of the church—from the simple confession of Peter ("You are the Christ, the son of the living God") to the important Nicene Creed (325), the famous and popular Apostles' Creed (eighth century), and the many creeds of the Reformation era—were affirmations of the faith that entailed the recital of the history of Jesus and a sacred version of world history. [See *Creeds, article on Christian Creeds.*]

What emerges is an interpretation of universal history that depicts a sequence of creation, fall, redemption, and culmination. History begins with the creation of the world and Adam by God and continues with a decline into sin and suffering. God then offers the possibility of restoration, first through the line of Abraham and Israel, then through Jesus Christ and the *ekklesia*. Finally come the last days, the *eschaton*, when all things culminate in the return of Jesus Christ, followed by the Last Judgment, the appearance of the new heaven and the new earth, the resurrection of the dead, and the experience of eternal life. It is a comprehensive vision that

gathers up the past, opens up the future, and explains the meaning of the present.

Seen in this way, the history of the world has a beginning and will have an ending. History is ongoing. Christian writers, like the author of *Hebrews* and Augustine, use the figure of a journey or pilgrimage, and others following the Gospels use the image of the way or the path to catch the ongoing movement of things. They grasp the meaning of the course of history in part by identifying various ages or periods through which the world has passed. For example, Paul's two ages, the old and the new, could also be regarded as one, the present age, surrounded by eternity before creation and eternity after the end of time. Matthew's and Luke's genealogies calculate four or five ages. The *Letter of Barnabas* (early second century) turns these into six ages as an analogy of the six days of creation. And since a day in the eyes of God is like a thousand years (2 Pt. 3:8), this means that God would bring the world to an end after six thousand years. Augustine adopted the six-age scheme and noted in the final pages of his monumental *City of God* that the world was then in the sixth and final age. Later writers, notably during the Reformation of the sixteenth century, divided the six thousand years into four monarchies—Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome—based on the Old Testament *Book of Daniel*. In the seventeenth century the threefold scheme of ancient, medieval, and modern came into vogue, appearing first in relation to Christian history. Even then, many Christian writers thought that if the world was like human life they were living during the old age of the world. History was moving toward culmination by way of beneficent decline.

With all this emphasis on ongoing movement and periods, many people have asserted that Christian views of history are by definition linear and for that reason distinct from views depicting history as cyclical. However, Christian views are also cyclical and offer several ways of understanding the recurrent rhythms of history. The earliest instance was the introduction of Sunday as the day of worship symbolic of the resurrection of Jesus. The common meal, later called the Eucharist or the Lord's Supper, became a way for Christians repeatedly to remember (*anamnesis*) the death of Jesus. [See Eucharist.] Paul emphasized the rhythm of creation and re-creation and has taught Christians over the ages recurrently to experience and strive for the overcoming of evil with good. In other guises they know this as the patterns of repentance and forgiveness, forgiveness and restoration, by which God repeatedly shows mercy to sinners and brings new things out of old. The symbol of the resurrection itself is an affirmation of the recurrence of blessing and healing in spite of the persistence of hu-

man evil. Augustine, following the example of Jesus and Paul, envisions world history as a recurrent spiritual conflict between the kingdom or city of God and the city of this world. In these and other ways, Christian views of history posit the reality of recurrence in the world within the drama of the ongoing course of events from the origins to the *eschaton*.

Christian views of history also have a personal side. They permit the people of God as a community (the church) and as individual members to orient themselves within the overall course of history. Over the years Christians, as the church, have created practices called sacraments, ordinances, or services that mark both the linear course of life in the world and the cyclic experience of the world: baptism initiates each person, usually at infancy, into the *ekklesia*; confirmation or acceptance into church membership marks religious coming of age; marriage establishes the procreative relationship and companionship on the journey; the Eucharist, or Lord's Supper, recurrently remembers Christ's death; penance or prayers for forgiveness register the cycle of sin and restoration; and holy unction, last rites, or the Christian funeral complete the earthly pilgrimage.

Christians gradually came to express their views of history in the form of a calendar that liturgically recalls the events of the life of Christ in an annual cycle. The first entry to the calendar became known as Easter and celebrates the resurrection of Jesus. Christians have remembered the birth of Jesus as Christmas from at least the early fourth century. Christmas, or the advent to Christmas, came to mark the start of the Christian new year. Later, Christians added the events of Epiphany, Holy Week, Pentecost, and the Ascension. Christians also mark the ongoing sequence of years with reference to the birth of Jesus, counting the years from "Our Lord's Incarnation" (AD, *anno Domini*). This scheme, which formalized a popular Christian usage, was devised by Dionysius Exiguus (early sixth century) as part of his calculation of the liturgical date of Easter. Much later and more slowly, Christians began to count the years backward from the incarnation, calling them "Before Christ" (BC). By using these important symbols they claim, in effect, that the whole course of history centers on Jesus Christ and that the annual cycle of Christian experience recalls Jesus' life. [See Worship, *article on Christian Worship*; *Christian Liturgical Year*; *Christmas*; *Easter*; and *Epiphany*.]

A solid tradition of what may be called historical writing reflects the emphasis Christians put on recording the actual course of events. It began with the gospel histories and the *Acts of the Apostles*. Then early in the third century Julius Africanus produced a five-volume

*Chronology* that had the dual purpose of establishing that the antiquity of Moses was greater than that of the Greeks and of tracing the continuity of Christianity with Jesus Christ. Eusebius of Caesarea (early fourth century) established the lasting tradition of Christian historiography with his *Chronology* and his *Church History*. Augustine's *City of God* became the most magisterial and influential Christian interpretation of world history. Following the patterns of explanation found in the Old Testament, he showed how the activities of God, humans, angels, and devils conjoined to produce human history as a struggle between the city of God and the city of this world. Augustine's student Paulus Orosius elaborated upon this. From these sources an immense number of medieval chronicles, annals, and histories took their cue. Between the seventh and the fifteenth centuries writers produced histories of the church, the various peoples of Christendom, the rulers and governments, the cities, the Crusades, the saints, the monasteries, and the whole world known to them. Protestants, Anglicans, and Catholics from the sixteenth-century Reformation onward continued the fecund tradition of Christian historiography in the form of polemics against each other. [See *Historiography*.]

Running through most Christian interpretations of history is the understanding that God, whose realm is the timeless present of eternity, also acts in history. Joined to this is the equally pervasive conviction that humans are responsible for the course of the events of history. How to reconcile the relations of these two chief actors in history—God and humans—has been a point of perennial disagreement among Christians. The doctrines of divine predestination and human free will have operated as a paradox or polarity in much Christian thinking about history. The Old Testament provides the model for interpreting God's work in history. Just as God governed Israel by leading the Israelites out of Egypt, establishing David on the throne, and confounding their enemies, so God governed the church through the ages. And just as God also ruled over Assyria, Egypt, and Babylon, so God ruled over all things in the world in all times according to God's will. Christians call this the providence of God. [See *Free Will and Predestination*, *article on Christian Concepts*.]

In a similar way, on the model of the Lord's Prayer, Christians attribute to God's action everything from their daily food to the rise and fall of kingdoms. Yet all the while they know, according to their roles in life, that they are responsible for tending their fields as farmers or governing the commonwealth as rulers. God's central act in history was the incarnation in Jesus Christ, and Christ continues to rule as Lord of history. Christians began to talk very early in the church's his-

tory of God's eternal plan of salvation and God's plan for the world. Historians from Eusebius to Merle d'Aubigné (1794–1872) have explained the course of events as the result of the intermingling of God's action and human action. When human actions fulfill the will of God, God bestows blessings; when they do not, God sends judgment instead. The prospect of the Last Judgment came before the people, especially during the medieval and early modern periods, by means of sermons and art. The providence of God has given Christians confidence in history, while the Last Judgment has often given them cause to tremble.

**Types of Views.** From the time of the apostles to the present, Christian interpretations of history have proliferated into at least four dominant types. All types have in common the elements already summarized—orientation by the life of Christ, an embrace of universal and personal history, some account of the ongoing and the recurrent matters of history, and so on. They differ, however, in the way they interpret these elements and in the priorities and emphases they assign to them. All appeal to Christ, the Bible, and the experience of the history of Christianity for justification.

The four types may be called the millenarian, the ecclesiastical, the reform/revivalist, and the mystical. The millenarian type of interpretation of history appeared quite soon among the early Christians and has re-emerged periodically throughout Christian history to the present day. The millenarians, or "chiliasts," emphasize the future of history and eschatology. They are deeply aware of the troubles of the present world. They look forward to the return of Jesus Christ as the means of salvation, and they expect salvific change to be abrupt and total. Their name comes from the anticipated thousand-year rule by Christ at the end of history, the seventh eschatological day after the six days of world history. Their scriptural sources are the *Book of Daniel*, chapter 24 of the *Gospel of Matthew*, and the *Book of Revelation*. The earliest millenarians (see the *First Letter to the Thessalonians*) expected the return of Jesus to occur in their lifetime. Millenarian movements over the years have included the prophets of the end around the year 1000, some elements in the Crusades, Joachim of Fiore (d. 1202), the Fifth Monarchy Men (seventeenth century), and the followers of John Darby (1800–1882). In the twentieth century most fundamentalists and evangelicals have been millenarians. They have called themselves "premillenarians" because they emphasize the return of Jesus before the advent of the thousand-year reign of purity, and "dispensationalists" because they emphasize the various ways God has changed the divine mode of working with the world over the ages.

The ecclesiastical type of interpretation of history began as the early Christians created the institutional forms of the church community and has carried on to the present by means of the dominant churchly traditions. The ecclesiastics emphasize the continuity of history expressed by means of a specific sequential connection with Jesus and the apostles (e.g., apostolic succession). They contrast the church and the world, while nonetheless struggling for and often achieving some alliance with the political rulers and some penetration of the general culture with Christian ecclesiastical mores. They believe that salvation comes primarily by means of God's work through the church, notably in the sacraments and in preaching. They value institution-building, maintenance, and stability and seek to control change. Their biblical sources are the letters of Paul, especially *Romans*. The ecclesiastical interpretation emerged with the appearance of bishops and ecclesiastical organization as recounted by Eusebius. The papacy, the church councils, and the Jesuits are among those who perpetuate this interpretation. In the twentieth century, mainstream Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Orthodox, and Lutherans exemplify this type.

The reform/revivalist type of interpretation of history has ridden in tandem with the ecclesiastical type throughout the history of Christianity. The emphasis in this third type has been on renewal and recurrence, together with either a return to some normative past or a renovation to some better future. Its proponents are concerned with overcoming spiritual or moral decline and often stand in judgment against the dominant structures. They see God's salvific work especially in institutional reform or personal spiritual revival. They expect the need for change to be periodic, or as the motto of one Calvinist part of the Protestant Reformation expressed it, they aim to be "always reforming." Reformers have readily converted to the ecclesiastical type (in a conservative form) once their reforms have become established. They take their scriptural inspiration especially from Paul's theme of new creation in *Romans* and *Colossians*. Some of the many movements that have viewed history in this way have been the early Benedictines, the early Franciscans, the Cluny monks, the early Calvinists and Lutherans, the early Methodists, and in recent times, the evangelical revivalists. The Pentecostal movement of the twentieth century has been a major revivalist movement stressing the outpouring of the Holy Spirit and the restoration of the pristine spirit of Christ. Liberation theologians in Latin America are another example.

The mystic type of interpretation of history also appeared early and has reemerged periodically throughout Christian history. Mystics seek to transcend the

course of mundane history, suspending themselves, as it were, above the process of past-present-future. They have tended to condemn and belittle the history of the world and to seek salvation by union with another realm. Their hope has been to overcome change, yet through all that, they have also consciously intended to exercise an influence upon the affairs of the world. The vision of John in *Revelation* inspired them biblically. Notable examples of the mystic type are the pillar saints (stylites) of Syria, the contemplative orders, the Neoplatonic tradition, Meister Eckhart (d. 1327?), Teresa of Ávila (d. 1582), Jakob Boehme (d. 1624), and the early Quakers. Many Christians in the twentieth century have welcomed the influence of Buddhist and Hindu mystics on the Christian practice of meditation and prayer.

**Secularization and Christian Perspectives.** By the late eighteenth century, as part of the early phases of the secularization of Western thought and society, many began to call Christian views of history into question. In particular, capitalist industrialization, the new powers of science and technology, and the thought of philosophers as different from each other as David Hume, Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau combined to evoke new faith in humanity and in human powers of control, creativity, and reason. These gave support to new convictions that this world (the *saeculum*) was ultimate and that history was progress toward human improvement.

The practical effect of the secularizing tendency upon Christian views of history has been the accentuation of two sets of distinctions. First, Christians focused more narrowly on the history of the church and tended to regard the history of the rest of life as a secular concern properly handled by scholars acting as secular historians and not as Christian historians. This contributed to the creation of specialized kinds of histories, like histories of politics, art, economic affairs, as well as the church. Second, Christians began to formulate a theology of history—as distinct from a philosophy of history. In the hands of philosophers like Voltaire, J. G. Herder, G. W. F. Hegel, and a host of more recent thinkers like those of the British analytic school, reflection on the world's history could appear to be an exercise quite remote from what theologians did when they thought about the biblical sources, Christ, and Christian experience.

In this manner a distinction between sacred and profane history became more pronounced. Church historians and theologians came to see themselves, and to be seen, as sociologically set apart from other historians and other scholars of religion. They commonly found themselves in seminaries, Christian colleges, and distinct professional societies separate from the universi-



ties and general scholarly associations. From the perspective of the general culture, people commonly came to regard the church as merely one institution next to others, with the result that the relevance of Christian views of history to life as a whole no longer could be assumed. Liturgy and preaching continued in their cyclic rhythm as the primary vehicles for the transmission of Christian views of history, but with a built-in separation of Christian history from the history of life as a whole, now called secular history. Historians, including those who were themselves Christians, found they could readily explain the temporal course of human affairs solely in terms of human actions in the milieu of the natural environment. This they did quite apart from any believed activity of God and any sacred vision of universal history. The theories and findings of geology, biology, astronomy, and "prehistory" make a convincing case that the world's history has already taken perhaps billions of years in spite of previously honored calculations of the creation of the world based on *Genesis*. The difficulty, if not impossibility, of genuine prediction beyond the most proximate future made Christian visions of the future *eschaton* seem at best irrelevant to the course of history.

In the twentieth century, however, many historians, philosophers, theologians, writers, and biblical scholars have led a notable renewal of Christian views of history. They have come from a wide range of Christian traditions, including the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Reformed, Orthodox, Baptist, and others. Prominent names since the 1930s include Reinhold Niebuhr, Herbert Butterfield, Arnold Toynbee, T. S. Eliot, C. S. Lewis, Christopher Dawson, and Georges Florovsky. After World War II, the renewal formed part of the general ecumenical and church renewal movements associated with the World Council of Churches (after 1948), the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), and the resurgence of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism.

Several trends concerning Christian views of history became noteworthy in the 1970s and 1980s, even as the four major types of views continued. First, many Christians stressed the need to reintegrate Christian visions with an understanding of the history of life and the world as a whole. Second, many historians who were Christians explored how Christian insights about human beings and worldly existence might suggest approaches to the historical study of all facets of human history, including, in addition to churches, the history of politics, economic affairs, art, technology, families, and so on. Third, the ongoing encounter with other religions of the world, notably Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and the primal religions, has led Christians to reevaluate the meaning of the claims about

Christianity being a religion of history. Fourth, the experience of the secular religions of capitalism and Marxism has stimulated revisions of Christian views of history as a means of helping to overcome economic and political oppression.

[For discussion of related perspectives on history from a comparative point of view, see *Eschatology, overview article*; *Millenarianism, overview article*; *Mysticism*; *Revival and Renewal*; and *Secularization*. See also the *biographies of the thinkers mentioned herein*.]

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C. T. McINTIRE

**HISTORY OF RELIGIONS.** This article presents an overview of the history of religions as a scientific discipline. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive survey of the specific data that lie within the province of the historian of religions, nor does it attempt to survey the broader history of the discipline. The purpose

here is rather to provide a brief description of the nature of the history of religions and to discuss its methods of research. The first part presents a theoretical examination of the dialectical method proper to the discipline. In the second part, attention will be given to the actual field of comparative research through the presentation of a brief historical typology.

### Theoretical Overview

The discipline of the history of religions is characterized by the dialectical relationship that exists between its object of study and its methods of research. It is, of course, the concept of religion that best defines the discipline's object. This concept, however, though a necessary precondition for research, is never allowed to function as an *a priori* category, which would predetermine the direction of the historian's inquiries. Instead, it is held in dialectical tension with the ongoing progress of research. The methods employed in this research are in turn adapted to the deeply historical nature of their subject matter. Such methods are essentially inductive, intended to grasp religion in its concreteness, in its historical creativity, and in its meaningfulness for the cultural, social, and individual lives with which it is interwoven. The dialectic that emerges from this interaction of the concept of religion with specific, ongoing historical investigations may be taken as a distinctive feature of the discipline.

The nature of this dialectical foundation of the history of religions may be clarified by contrasting it with several alternative approaches to religion. First of all, it must be distinguished from the hermeneutical approach, which fixes upon a single interpretative key to unlock the mysteries of the phenomenon under investigation. Hans Jonas's intelligent application of modern existentialist categories, such as the feeling of *Geworfenheit* ("thrownness") in his study of gnosticism, or Rudolf Otto's use of the category of the holy, may be taken as examples of such an approach. In either case, the task of accurate historical description and the construction of a complete and articulate typology of the phenomenon under study are in danger of being neglected. As a result the interpretative key is insufficiently tested against the facts. In addition, the crucial problems of continuity and change, which are unavoidable in the comparative study of religions, tend to be overlooked.

The dialectical character of the history of religions discipline may also be contrasted with the so-called phenomenological method. This method tends to focus only on the synchronic elements of religion, describing and classifying religious forms without reference to particular historical contexts. It aims at capturing the meaning of religious phenomena without committing

itself to an analysis of the historical, cultural, social, and psychological settings of those phenomena. It thereby neglects the study of the diachronic, formative processes that give a religious phenomenon its depth and endow it with the colors of real life. In the end, the special sensitivity of the individual phenomenologist is called upon to fill this gap. No doubt there is something valuable in the phenomenologist's capacity for empathy, or *Einfühlung*. But the historian of religions must attend first and foremost to the fact that the object of his study is a historical object. The dialectical processes of creation and change, development, and even revolution escape the phenomenologist's ahistorical gaze.

It would be a mistake to conclude from the inadequacies of the phenomenologist's method that the proper alternative lies in historicism. On the contrary, historicism, whether in its idealistic or materialistic form, must also be distinguished from the approach of a historian of religions. While religion is a decidedly historical phenomenon, it must not be reduced to history. Historicism makes religion a mere moment in a dialectic that essentially transcends it. This is as true for Hegel as it is for Marx. In addition to these historical forms of reductionism, there are sociological and psychological approaches to religion that are reductive as well. Whatever the particular form, however, all forms of reductionism have in common an appeal to a univocal conception of religion located within a preconceived frame of reference.

It is no solution to counter historical reductionism with an appeal to the irreducible character of religion as perceived by the subjective, experiential sensitivity of the phenomenologist. In both cases, that of the phenomenologist as well as that of the historicist, there is an illegitimate appeal to an *a priori*, preconceived conception of religion. It is this *a priori* character of their respective conceptions of religion that is incompatible with the positive, inductive, comparative-historical approach proper to the historian of religions and to the dialectic that the historian must preserve between his tentative interpretative categories and the ongoing progress of his research.

Theory is equally illegitimate in the history of religions when it is applied in an *a priori*, undialectical manner. Nevertheless, it is not to be rejected out of hand. On the contrary, theory is indispensable when it functions as hypothesis open to verification, revision, or rejection on the basis of empirical research. The distinguished anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard, for example, goes too far in his distrust of theory. He would limit the study of religion to the description of the social and cultural functions of specific religions in order to escape the distortions of general theories of religion.

This is overly cautious. In fact, even though theoretical biases are unavoidable, arbitrarily reductive positions can be tested on the basis of positive research and their shortcomings exposed. An excellent example of this is Andrew Lang's criticism of the theory of animism. Using concrete evidence, Lang showed that this theory was reductive in its claim to represent the most archaic form of religion. In fact, the theory was unable to account for the widespread belief in a high god among primitive peoples. This use of empirical, historical evidence to test proposed theories or hypotheses provides ample insurance against the dangers of overextended or reductive generalizations.

So far I have argued that preconceived or *a priori* theories of religion that are not held accountable to the findings of historical research remain outside the dialectic that governs the work of the historian of religions. At most, such theories can function as hypotheses awaiting verification. It may be helpful now to examine the dialectic itself more closely by focusing on the particular problem of the definition of religion. How, if at all, are we to arrive at a clear concept of religion? And how does this concept function in actual research? In raising these questions one is immediately confronted with what at first appears to be a methodological impasse. On the one hand, if such a concept is to escape the problems of an *a priori* characterization of religion, it must itself arise out of actual comparative historical study. On the other hand, it is hard to see how such comparative study is to proceed until this concept is in hand.

**The Concept of Religion.** The appearance of an impasse is created by the way in which the problem is posed. If we assume that a concept of religion is at the same time a prerequisite for and a result of comparison, then we are indeed faced with an insurmountable paradox. But this is not the case if we resort to a dialectic that unites the notion with its employment in such a way as to make them mutually dependent. In this case the concept of religion is inductive in origin, and its clarification goes hand in hand with progress in empirical research.

At this point it is clear that an adequate notion of religion is not to be formed through a mere *a priori* selection of data to which research should be extended. The primary problem is not to extend a conception of religion over the widest possible range of material but rather to discover a conception that is adequate to specific historical contexts. The search for a universally adequate definition of religion can lead quickly to a minimal notion of religion, a kind of lowest common denominator with no practical usefulness. Such a univocal definition, which would seek to rank the different

religions as so many species under a single genus, is clearly inadequate for a fundamentally empirical discipline. Such a discipline requires conceptual categories that are continuously being created and are always open to further revision in the light of the development of comparative studies. Far from being a univocal concept, the notion of religion that emerges from the continued comparison of new and varied historical materials is an analogical notion.

Things are described analogically when they correspond to each other in certain important respects but differ from one another in other, equally important respects. Analogical notions thus contrast sharply with univocal notions. When we apply the term *vertebrate*, for instance, to a man, a dog, and a crocodile, we are applying it univocally, since the notion of vertebrate is integrally and equally realized in each of these cases. The same cannot be said of analogical notions. When we describe both a feather pillow and our summer's reading as "light," we are speaking analogically, since the quality of lightness applies very differently in each case. To say, then, that the historian of religions must employ the term *religion* analogically rather than univocally means that it cannot be assumed that all the phenomena studied under the rubric of *religion* are all "religious" in the same respect. This is especially true when studies extend beyond the context of closely related cultural milieus.

Now, it is exactly the analogical value of the notion of religion that relieves it of the impossible task of achieving universal extension while remaining responsive to the specifics of history. If the notion of religion is analogical, the aim of research will not be the progressive extension of a univocal concept but the documentation of sets of partial affinities between different systems of belief and practice, which are the segments of the polychromatic network that constitutes the variegated world of religion. It is clear that this procedure is much more in keeping with the comparative-historical aims proper to the history of religions than any merely phenomenological approach. The approach I am describing is meant to remain constantly in touch with the concreteness of its object; facts and sets of facts (historical contexts and processes) are compared directly, without being submitted to an intermediate process of abstract categorization.

If the historian of religions cannot rely on a univocal concept of religion or its deductive use, it follows that he will not be dependent upon philosophy or some metascience for his categories. On the contrary, it is to be expected that comparative-historical research will seek its categories precisely in the historical continuities and discontinuities it studies. The historian of reli-

gions is not concerned with facts isolated from their historical contexts and processes but rather with these contexts and processes themselves. The historian of religions aims at discovering the degree and quality of the affinity that exists between religions and that warrants characterizing them as such.

Given the empirical nature of the history of religions and its interpretative categories, and in particular its analogical conception of religion, it becomes apparent that its findings can be neither verified nor falsified through appeals to either *a priori* reasoning or personal convictions. The sole criterion of adequacy becomes empirical. What must be shown is the adequacy of a particular account to the facts it claims to describe, both the facts of a given historical situation and the relationship between one such situation and others. Ultimately, in the comparative context proper to the discipline, this will lead to a principle of holism as the final criterion of adequacy. Accounts will be more adequate as they encompass broader ranges of concrete data.

At this point it may be asked why the concept of religion should be retained at all, even in an analogical sense. Strictly speaking, one could simply refer to various sets of continuities by the use of arbitrary symbols (*x*, *y*, *z*, and so forth). But this analytical procedure would not fit the historical character of the discipline, which is rooted in a cultural milieu and motivated by a specific intellectual interest. It is not by chance that the problem I am analyzing is termed *religion* and not *way*, *law*, or *ethos*, although the latter terms would be equally legitimate labels for comparative study. It is for historical reasons that this particular field is called comparative religion. This does not mean that the validity of the enterprise is merely relative or Eurocentric. It means only that in positing this notion one is conscious that the comparative study of religions began in a particular historical and cultural milieu. It was in this milieu that the term *religion* came to be used in analyzing the problem of continuity and change within systems of belief and ritual behavior. It was in this setting that "true" religion began to be contrasted with the "other" religions. Out of this context arose the history of religions, which rejected the pretense of evaluating different religions normatively (a task, on the other hand, legitimate and unavoidable for philosophy and theology) and instead studied them phenomenologically. On this level it could speak both of the universality of religion, since systems of belief and ritual practice more or less comparable with those in the West can be found everywhere, and of religions in the plural, given the clear differences that distinguish these systems.

These considerations lead us back to the dialectic that is the basis of the comparative-historical methodology

proper to the history of religions. The emergence of the notion of religion among Western students of religion was the result of just such a dialectic. This notion was not constructed *a priori* but was already a part of an elaborate cultural and historical milieu that had a Jewish and Christian background. Increased contact with non-Western forms of religious belief and practice initiated the dialectical development just described. This dialectical study continues today as research is progressively extended to new materials, in harmony with the progressively broadened experience of the historian of religions.

This open, dialectical character of comparative historical study will be best served if the actual modalities of this research reflect a consciousness of the analogical character of its categories, especially the category or notion of religion. In this way the distortive effects of the forced employment of univocal terms will be avoided. Dialectical, historical comparison will be free to investigate a wide variety of continuities between different systems of belief and practice without aiming at the reduction of these to a single, comprehensive, univocal referent. The result will be a complex, multidimensional map of religion, a map readable in all directions, on which a given feature or set of features will appear now central, now peripheral. Buddhism, for instance, may appear peripheral when the map is read "theistically" and yet occupy a central place when viewed in terms of its monastic institutions. Similarly, it may appear central when viewed in terms of the widely held belief in transmigration, but more peripheral in its denial of the reality of the transmigrating soul.

**Holistic Approach.** In addition to restricting itself to an analogical use of its interpretative categories in creating such a map of the religious universe, the history of religions must also attempt to be holistic in its approach to its materials. It must study religious beliefs and practices within the specific contexts that give them their full meaning. Within these contexts, functional interpretations will often be of positive value. This is particularly true in the case of simple societies where the functions of religion are relatively undifferentiated from the rest of social life. But the fundamentally analogical character of religion prevents the use of such functional models to explain religion as a whole. As a whole, it remains a concrete whole, and the holisms characteristic of the history of religions must be realized not at the level of univocal theory but at the level of contextualized historical description. This description will aim at the construction of an exhaustive historical typology, a multidimensional map of the actual religious terrain.

The achievement of such an historical typology of religions will result from modalities of historical comparison that must be further specified. In the first place, comparative-historical research in the history of religions must be distinguished from what we may call "idiographic" research, namely, research concentrated on religion in a particular cultural context. Such specific, noncomparative studies are necessary but not sufficient. Nor can the comparative-historical research envisioned here be identified with a systematic, purely formal typology, nor with a phenomenology that neglects issues of origin, growth, and change. The goal is rather the establishment of specific sets of synchronic and diachronic continuities and discontinuities that apply to more than one religion and perhaps to an entire cultural area. In any given case these patterns may be explained either on the basis of cultural diffusion or as the result of independent but parallel developments. In the latter case, parallelism need not signal a unilinear evolution in the history of religions but may rather point to analogies between specific historical and cultural circumstances.

It will often be difficult to decide whether a given pattern is to be explained on the basis of diffusion or parallelism. What is important is to avoid an *a priori* theoretical option in favor of either. This was the mistake of those who, in reaction to the theories of unilinear evolution typical of the nineteenth century, adopted an equally monolithic hypothesis of universal diffusionism. The fact is that one of the major gains in the field of comparative-historical research has been the discovery of partly similar cultural achievements in the field of religion and culture that are not due to phenomena of diffusion, not even stimulus diffusion. A typical example is the birth and diffusion of polytheism. The connection of polytheistic cults and their typical features (such as theogony, theomachy, specialized sanctuaries and priesthoods, anthropomorphic and hypermorphic gods, etc.) with what are known as archaic high cultures is too evident to be overlooked. It is impossible at the present day to explain all such connections solely on the basis of diffusion, even though a diffusionist hypothesis remains obligatory in some well-defined cases (as, for instance, in the case of the widespread cultural and religious diffusion of cuneiform literature).

### Historical Typology of Religion

Having dwelt on some methodological issues concerning the history of religions as a comparative-historical discipline, I shall turn now to a brief overview of the subject matter of this discipline, that is, to the presentation of a concise and inevitably selective historical typology of religion. But first a few preliminary remarks

on earlier attempts to map the most general features of the religions may be in order.

In such earlier attempts we meet with notions that owe much to the different cultural epochs in which they were conceived and to the different theories of the origin and development of religion current at the time. Many of these notions are a legacy of philosophical and theological discussion. The best example here is the concept of monotheism, especially as contrasted with polytheism, deism, and pantheism. Many more concepts, including animism, preanimism, animatism, manism, and—more ancient than these—fetishism, owe their origin to the positivistic evolutionary theories typical of the nineteenth century. All of these notions were conceived as expressing primitive or archaic stages of religious thought. As such they presupposed a view of religion as primarily concerned with the mental representation of reality. The cultic and ethical aspects of religion were underestimated, as well as the structural and historical complexities of so-called primitive forms of religion (and it was particularly on primitive religions that the new history of religions discipline focused). This rather exclusive emphasis on the conceptual aspect of religion was typical of nineteenth-century anthropology and should be distinguished from what we may call its rational aspect, which had been emphasized both by Scholastic theology and by the Deism of the eighteenth century. These one-sided excesses of the past should serve as a *caveat* for today's historian of religions. This does not mean, however, that attention to the conceptual dimensions of religion should be lessened or arbitrarily reduced in turn.

A very different but equally problematical approach to the study of religion, one mentioned above, was the descriptive and interpretative tendency associated with the familiar concepts of "the holy" and "the numinous," a tendency already in existence before Rudolf Otto's famous book *The Idea of the Holy* (1917, first German edition) gave it a permanent place in religious studies. This new tendency was the opposite of the analytical and conceptual approach just mentioned, and this difference was clearly expressed by Otto's refusal to conceptualize the experience of the holy or to trace it to a specific source, such as God, the gods, spirits, or anything else. Otto's analysis of the essence of religion as the experience of the holy was focused on terms such as *immortality*, *freedom*, or *the absolute*. According to him, man is made intuitively aware of the transcendent reality to which these terms refer through his experience of their opposites on earth. Apart from the similarities of this kind of argument with the ontological argument for the existence of God found in some medieval and modern philosophical systems, the historian of religions

must question whether such negative characterizations of the holy are as universal as Otto believed. In fact, they appear to be intertwined, from the point of view of both history and metaphysics, with peculiar notions concerning God, the divine, and religious values, both on the individual level and, as Walter Baetke aptly pointed out, on the social level.

A historical typology of religion should avoid the danger of employing a merely analytical and classificatory conceptualization, particularly if this is intended to reduce the issue of religious ideas and experiences to an issue of mental representations, or to the so-called *imaginaire*. It should also avoid reliance on selective intuitions in the guise of a scientific phenomenology of religion. Both attitudes ultimately prove to be reductive and ethnocentric. As was made clear in the previous section, a historical typology of religion will serve to map specific sets of analogically related affinities that are neither merely conceptual nor phenomenological but in the best sense historical.

Viewed historically, then, religions can be divided into two broad groups, and this division will provide the general framework for a genuinely historical typology. This initial division is between those religions that are described as ethnic and those that are founded.

**Ethnic Religions.** Ethnic religions are a part of the culture of a people and do not owe their origin to a historical founder. No single individual has endowed these religious traditions with the unmistakable impress of his personality. Rather, ethnic religions are historical formations that are originally indistinguishable from the formation processes of the cultures and populations to which they belong. Ethnic religions are not restricted to tribal or nonliterate cultures. They may also be found in highly developed literate cultures. Their exact character, which may thus range from unitary to syncretistic, depends upon specific cultural and historical circumstances.

The historical character of ethnic religions, including those of nonliterate cultures, requires that they be studied holistically. Their actual contents and functions in the epochs and contexts for which there is documentary evidence must be closely examined. This must be done without losing sight of the changes and adaptations that these traditions undergo in the course of time, due to internal, developmental tendencies or to influences and stimuli coming from outside.

The fact that even nonliterate ethnic religions are parts of a larger world means that the purely descriptive or "idiographic" study of these traditions cannot do without a comparative outlook. Comparison becomes inevitable when the scholar's attention is drawn to the cross-cultural affinities or "family resemblances" that

link the cultural and religious expressions of different countries and areas.

**Approaches to Comparison.** Two main approaches to comparison may be distinguished in the history of religions. The first developed in the nineteenth century, and the other took shape at the end of that century and at the beginning of the twentieth. Each of these warrants a brief discussion before I continue.

The first approach, practiced in the nineteenth century, was inseparably linked to evolutionary thought and to the elaboration of general theories concerning the origins and the growth of religion on a world scale. It was on this basis that notions such as animism and animatism were introduced into what was understood to be scientific research (hence the German name of this field, still with us, of *Religionswissenschaft*). These notions were intended to apply cross-culturally, indeed universally. There is no need to repeat what I have already said about the negative reductive tendencies implicit in such an approach. It was of course highly reductive and arbitrary, insofar as its unilinear evolutionist presuppositions were effective. But it also had some positive effects, inasmuch as it made possible the identification of conceptual, ritual, behavioral, and ethical affinities or continuities that transcended such older categories as idolatry, paganism, and superstition, which were no longer suitable for a descriptive approach.

The rise of a descriptive phenomenology of religion contributed to a further refinement of these new patterns. Take, for instance, the case of the notion of shamanism. Once shamanism was differentiated from the generic notion of animism and considered not only as a peculiar element of religious behavior but also as an element of a structure implying a cosmology and a worldview, it could contribute to the transition from an evolutionistic outlook too fond of concepts and representations to a cultural-historical study based on the discovery of cultural wholes and cultural areas. In other words, the elaboration of a more rigorous, multidimensional, and descriptive phenomenology of religion allowed the history of religions (*Religionswissenschaft*) to survive the inevitable crisis of evolutionism and its universal and unilinear stages and to enter a more rewarding phase characterized by a new form of comparison, namely cultural-historical comparison.

This new form of comparison proved effective when, at the beginning of the twentieth century, cultural-historical research was able to concentrate on area studies, as in the pioneering works of Bernhard Ankermann and Leo Frobenius (on Africa), Fritz Graebner (on Oceania), and Franz Boas (on the North Pacific). On this basis it was possible to connect phenomenological and histori-

cal research in the study of a particular group of ethnic religions belonging to nonliterate cultures. In this way the originally negative term *nonliterate* acquired positive content. Nonliterate ethnic traditions became definable on the basis of undeniable categorical continuities (e.g., shamanism) that were at the same time specific to particular areas. As a result, the so-called primitive religions ceased to be studied in terms of a procrustean bed of an alleged, indiscriminate primitivism. Such attributions now had to be demonstrated on the basis of cultural-historical inquiry. In this way the study of nonliterate religions entered with full rights into the field of religio-historical research proper. At the same time, the historian of religions was not obliged to renounce his fundamental interest in comparison and (where appropriate) study of historical development, two aspects that had been neglected by the heirs of the older anthropological methods and the practitioners of an exclusively functional social anthropological research.

**High Cultures.** I have already noted that ethnic religions are found among literate as well as nonliterate cultures. In particular, the high cultures of antiquity produced ethnic religious traditions that make special demands on the historian. Study of them requires a philological competence that clearly excludes any simplistic or superficially phenomenological approach. It remains true, however, that even the historian of religions lacking such specialized knowledge can still contribute to a fuller understanding of these religions on the basis of his typological-historical experience. Take, as an example, the discovery of some of the classical characteristics of the demiurgic trickster in such diverse figures as the Greek Prometheus, the ancient Egyptian Seth, and Yurugu, also named Ogo, of the Dogon of West Africa. This discovery and the accompanying insight into the dualistic cosmology that provides the backdrop for such figures would have been impossible for the classicist or Egyptologist working only within his own speciality. It resulted rather from the comparative method of the historian of religions. This comparative approach can be particularly successful in the comparison of the mythologies of cultures that belong to the same subcontinent but have had different histories. It could, for instance, be expected to shed much light on the difficult question of the relationships between ancient Egyptian culture and other African cultures, both in the sense of an African substratum of Egyptian culture and of an Egyptian influence on sub-Saharan Africa.

Another fascinating problem for comparative research concerns the continuities and discontinuities between the nonliterate cultures and religions on the one

hand and the high cultures and their religious systems on the other. Given the differences that exist between them as well as the differences that exist within the respective traditions themselves, the question of their mutual interrelationships becomes quite complex. Particularly important is the question of the partial continuities that exist between the high gods of some nonliterate cultures and the heavenly deities who head the pantheons of some of the typical polytheistic formations in the high cultures of antiquity. This kind of partial continuity, which sometimes extends to founded and universalistic religions as well (as in the case of the God of heaven among the Israelites and the high divinity of pre-Islamic Arabia), is one of the most interesting phenomena in the history of religions.

**Monotheism and Polytheism.** Closely connected to the question of continuities between cultures is the question of the exact nature of monotheism. This question has been the subject of a long debate within the history of religions. Some have claimed to find monotheism in the religions of nonliterate cultures, particularly among hunters and gatherers. Others, in contrast, have viewed it as a late phenomenon in the process of evolution, or even, as Raffaele Pettazzoni put it, as a revolutionary stance against a preceding form of polytheism. Actually these alternatives cannot be formulated so rigidly. The explicit and polemical formulations of monotheism that we find in the Bible and the Qur'an have little in common with the high gods of contemporaneous nonliterate cultures. Although the latter are not necessarily *dei otiosi*, severed from the cult and from the world of men, they are nevertheless far from the intense dynamism of the God of the Bible and the Qur'an. It must be admitted that not all religious complexes extraneous to polytheism are *ipso facto* monotheistic. The most developed polytheistic systems did not "evolve" in the direction of monotheism, nor did they express a revolutionary movement in that direction. Rather, they tended to become progressively monistic, elaborating the notion of a deity who is "polyonymous" (as is Isis in the aretologies of the Hellenistic period) or is *pan-theos*, a god containing all the gods. In its most mature form, such a deity was conceived as "theopantistic," that is, as identical with the cosmos and at the same time transcending it. Such is the picture of Zeus presented in an Orphic poem: "Zeus is the beginning (or head), Zeus is the middle, from Zeus all things came into existence," or in a fragment of Aeschylus: "Zeus is all these things, and what is beyond them." This assessment of Zeus bears comparison with the theopantistic speculation concerning the figure of Puruṣa in Vedic India.

It is important to realize that polytheism, as a his-

torical type of religion, is much more specific than a merely formal notion of a plurality of gods. In fact, polytheism is not found in all types of culture, but is specifically linked to the high cultures of antiquity (and also to some in modern times, particularly in East and South Asia). These cultures characteristically possess an advanced form of cereal agriculture and show a degree of social stratification, with an attendant differentiation of classes, professions (including scribes), a priesthood and nobility, established sanctuaries, and the like. The cosmos itself is represented as having a departmental organization. Such cultures are found in the ancient Mediterranean area, and in West, South, and East Asia. Further instances can be found in the Nordic countries of Europe, in Central America and Peru, in the medieval kingdoms of the Sudan (owing to Mediterranean influences), and to an extent in Polynesia. The social and historical specificity of polytheism as a religious type would seem to require that opposition between it and monotheism become acute only in particular historical and religious situations. Such situations include the historical emergence of the Hebrew people and their religion in the Near East, the vogue of the cult of Ahura Mazdā in Iran, the rise and diffusion of Christianity in the Mediterranean world, and the preaching of Muḥammad against the religion of the pre-Islamic Arabs. Clearly, the problem of polytheism and its relation to monotheism is not to be solved on the basis of a general phenomenological "stratigraphy" of religion and its main forms, any more than it was solved by a unilinear evolutionism. It is not a question of relative anteriority between polytheism and monotheism, homogeneous in themselves, but of specific, noninterchangeable historical formations that can interact with different types of religious and cultural organization. Monotheistic formations may present themselves either as immemorial tradition, as a novelty, or as the message of the one God and his triumph over false deities. Other formations could have evolved into pantheons that inspired and also reflected the complex organization of the high cultures of antiquity. Roman religion, for instance, is the product of many different cultural influences, having been almost completely reshaped in the course of time on the basis of long-lasting Greek influence (particularly in its pantheon). Nevertheless, it never lost its continuity with its most primitive expressions. Among these was the notion of a heavenly god, Jupiter, who had an Indo-European heritage. This god was to dominate Roman religion under the name of Optimus Maximus, yet this did not prevent him from being assimilated to the supreme god of the Greek pantheon, Zeus, and to all types of religious, ethical, philosophical, and symbolic notions.

I have already had occasion to note that the general type that I have identified as ethnic religions and contrasted with founded religions admits of a certain amount of internal diversity. Thus ethnic religions need not be those of nonliterate tribal societies but may also be found in more complex literate societies. I shall now introduce two further subtypes of ethnic religions, those that are scriptural and those that are national.

**Scriptural and National Religions.** Some ethnic religions are in fact characterized by the existence of sacred scriptures, organized on the basis of a "canon." Acceptance of these is considered an essential aspect of religious affiliation. The outstanding example is the function of the Vedas in Hinduism. Ethnic religions possessing scriptures exist in a situation midway between the nonscriptural religions of tribal societies, where religious affiliation is indistinguishable from the simple fact of social life, and at the other extreme, the universal religions, where the individual as such becomes a convert to the "good news" of a prophetic message written down in a book.

Another important subtype among ethnic religions is that of the national religions, those cults that promote a national and political consciousness. This is the case with state Shintō as practiced in some periods of Japanese history, with some forms of Hinduism, with Zoroastrianism in the Sasanid empire, and with the official cults in ancient Rome, such as the cult of Capitoline Jupiter and the cult of the emperor. It must be added that some of the founded religions may initially embrace a national outlook. Islam, for instance, may have been conceived originally as a prophetic message addressed to the Arab nation, although, to be sure, it is considered to be the final form of the historical revelation of God. The situation is similar in Judaism, whose universalism was mediated through the entire course of Hebrew history. There were also particular occasions when Christianity, though possessed of a universalist message, became bound up with specific national, cultural, and political interests, as, for instance, those of the Byzantine empire.

**Founded Religions.** I shall now look more closely at the founded religions, which include, in addition to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the religions of Zarathushtra (Zoroaster) and the Buddha, the religion of the Sikhs, and, with certain qualifications, the plethora of prophetic-nativistic cults and the "new religions." These traditions, which all trace their origin to a specific historical founder, raise fundamental historical questions. When a religion is founded, this obviously takes place in a cultural milieu already characterized by specific religious notions and institutions. The relation of the prophet or founder and his original followers



to this milieu may vary considerably, depending on whether the preceding religious environment had been predominantly of the ethnic type or had already known prophets and forerunners. In general there is a vivid sense of novelty in the foundation of these religions, sometimes even a revolutionary novelty. The founder nevertheless often conceives his mission as in part a restoration of primordial values long since lost. In some cases this question of partial continuity is decisive and helps illuminate the religious quality of the founder's message. This can be seen in the case of Buddhism. Many of the notions fundamental to Buddhist doctrine, such as *dharmā*, *karman*, *saṃsāra*, and *mokṣa*, already played an important religious role in India at the time of the Buddha. An understanding of the Buddha's appropriation and modification of these terms is thus of great importance for a typological assessment of his message as a "religious" message, bound up with the religious traditions that preceded him.

Among the founded religions the universal religions stand out as a definite subtype. These religions are based on a universal message of salvation, not limited to any particular group, ethnic or otherwise. They are characterized both by eschatological and otherworldly perspectives and by strong this-worldly ethical and social commitments. Their message is addressed to the individual and demands conversion and adherence to a religious community that, in sociological terms, may be described as a church. This community typically undergoes a rapid initial expansion, sometimes suffers persecution, and actively engages in missionary activities aimed at making new converts. These characteristics clearly distinguish the universal religions from the ethnic and national religions, even though, as noted above, universal religions may occasionally become closely associated with specific cultures.

The emphasis on a universal message and personal conversion in response to it, an emphasis that transcends all racial and social barriers, differentiates the universalistic religions from the cults of antiquity that were sometimes their rivals. These cults, such as the mystery religions, would be better described as cosmopolitan rather than universal. Unlike commitment to any of the universal religions, participation in such cults could coexist with whatever other religious commitments an individual might have had, such as to the gods of the tribe, city, or state; the universal religions, however, demanded the individual's total allegiance.

This contrast becomes less clear in the case of the syncretistic tendencies found at the popular levels of the universal religions. Christianity and Islam, for instance, have been influenced, in some of their popular or ethnic manifestations in South America and Africa

respectively, by local traditions of animism or "spiritism." The same lack of a clear differentiation between the universal and the local is found in the prophetic-nativistic cults that reinterpret the message of the great universal religions in strictly local terms, although not infrequently these same cults are inimical to preexisting forms of local magic and sorcery.

The case of Buddhism is somewhat unique. Although it displays many of the features that were attributed above to the universal religions, it nevertheless resembles the mystery cults of antiquity in its ability to coexist, in the belief system of a single individual and in a single cultural milieu, with other forms of locally preexistent religious belief and practice. This is especially evident in contemporary Japan, where a single individual may have a double allegiance to Buddhism and Shintō, according to the circumstances. The rather peculiar status of the universalism of Buddhism is linked to the equally peculiar status of Buddhism as a "religion."

Finally, another historical type of religion is comprised of those mysteriosophic (i.e., Orphic) and gnostic movements of antiquity and the Middle Ages that drew heavily on the universal religions of Christianity, Islam, and Zoroastrianism, borrowing many of their basic terms but totally reshaping them to suit their own needs. This procedure is found as well in the scientific theosophy of some contemporary gnostics, whose reinterpretations of the basic tenets of different religions are for the most part superficial.

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UGO BIANCHI

**HITTITE RELIGION.** The exact origin of the Hittites, an Indo-European people, is not known. Invading Asia Minor from the east, by the middle of the second millennium BCE they had established an empire covering the greater part of that region. Their empire declined after 1200 BCE, owing to Indo-European invasions and the growing power of Assyria.

**Names of Gods.** Knowledge about Hittite society, culture, and religion has increased since the deciphering of their cuneiform writing, on clay tablets found early in the twentieth century AD at Bogazköy (in Turkey). Hittite society was ethnically and linguistically diverse, with Hattian, Hurrian, and even some Semitic elements, and this diversity is evident in the divine names.

The earliest identifiable stratum is the Hattian. The Hattians were resident in central Anatolia before the Indo-European Hittites arrived. They had a long tradition of settled urban life. It is understandable that a people open to influences from its neighbors, as the Hittites were, would early adopt the worship of Hattian de-

ities. Because the Hattic language is still very poorly understood, we can only partially understand the meanings of the divine names. Some are common nouns for elements of nature: *Eshtan* ("sun, day") *Izzishtanu* ("favorable day"), *Kashku* ("moon"), *Kait* ("grain"). Others denote status: *Kattahha* ("queen"), *Wurunkatte* ("king of the land"), *Shulinkatte* ("king of the *suli*"), *Kattishhabi* ("king god"), *Teteshhawi* ("great god").

The Hurrian language is better understood than Hattic. Still, because the number of Hurrian words that we can translate is not large, it is not possible to interpret many Hurrian divine names. [See Hurrian Religion.] The influence of Sumerian and Akkadian religious vocabulary and divine epithets is obvious. Aya, Ishhara, Ellil (Enlil), Anu, and Alalu were originally Mesopotamian deities.

**Nature of Deity.** In Hittite art the gods were depicted either by their animal totems or anthropomorphically. The texts concur in depicting them in human terms. Gods needed to eat, drink, sleep, and exercise. They needed companionship, ego-building, and love (including sexual intercourse). They made mistakes through lack of knowledge. They could be deceived. They needed to be informed by others. Each possessed a specialized skill that put him in demand by both mortals and other gods. In myths gods were born and died (i.e., were killed). But very little, if anything, indicates that they aged or became senile. That what they did was not always just or fair is clear from the prayers, in which the human petitioner chides them for mistakes and pleads for fair treatment. Although no god was omniscient, some possessed very wide knowledge and every god was superior to humans in knowledge. In instructions to priests and temple officials, mortals who thought to conceal their offenses from a god were warned of the futility of the attempt. Although every god was more powerful than any mortal, none was omnipotent, and degrees of power were quite diverse among them.

**Functions of a Deity.** As each mortal had his rank and function in human society, so each deity had his position and role, not only among his fellow deities but in concourse with humanity and the cosmos.

**General functions.** While it is not possible to completely reconstruct the hierarchy of Hittite deities, it is clear that in convocations of gods certain figures naturally assumed leadership. In the Old Hittite vanishing-god myths (see below) it is the storm god who presides. But although he presides, he is not always able to enforce his will on the other gods. He must ask advice, plead his case, and seek volunteers for missions. Occasionally he is able to command another figure.

Hierarchical organization is also seen in the New Hittite pantheon. There is a fixed sequence in the god-lists

in the state treaties, and there is an order of both gods and goddesses in the processional reliefs at Yazılıkaya, near Bogazköy. In the myths *Kingship in Heaven* and *The Kingship of the God Lamma* we see how rival factions fight over the position of king of the gods. The god Lamma boasts that his exalted position allows him to control the other gods. In the prayers of Hattusilis III and of his queen, Puduhepa, lower-ranked gods are requested to present the mortals' prayers favorably to their superiors in the pantheon. To be sure, the question is not entirely one of rank. The intercessor god is usually a favorite child or grandchild of the senior god. Indeed, the hierarchy which we describe is that of a large, extended family in which the patriarch and matriarch possess considerable power to direct their descendants and the descendants of their brothers and sisters.

In their prayers the Hittites reminded the gods that they required worshipers who would bring regular food-offerings; thus it was in their own interest that they protect and bless the community of faithful worshipers. But aside from this maintenance of the cult, mortal assistance was rarely needed by the gods. In a mythological context we see examples in the two versions of the Illuyanka myth. The disabled storm god must be helped to vanquish his adversary, the great serpent Illuyanka. On the divine level he is assisted by the goddess Inara. She in turn, for no obvious reason, needs the help of the mortal Hupashiya, which she bargains for by consenting to have sexual intercourse with him. But though she subsequently lives with him as a sex partner, she dominates him completely and apparently punishes his unfaithfulness to her with death. Outside of the mythological texts, when a god needed the service of a mortal he revealed himself through omen, oracle, or dream. His request was always viewed as a command, which could not be ignored.

Gods "served" mortals by ensuring material prosperity, protecting them from enemies and natural catastrophes, hearing their prayers, making known to them their sins, and forgiving them (sometimes after a punishment). Although the Hittites apparently believed in an afterlife, at least for their kings and queens, there is no evidence that they prayed or made sacrifices in order to obtain life after death or a better quality of existence in that afterlife.

**Specialized functions.** Just as there were storm gods who sent rain and winds to fertilize the crops and make them prosper, so there were deities of grain and vineyards, deities of the rivers who gave water for irrigation, deities of springs, deities of the forest, and deities of wildlife who gave success in hunting. Under the influence of Mesopotamian concepts, the sun god Ishtanu was the all-seeing dispenser of justice to humans and

even to animals. There were war gods (the Zababa type) who gave victory to the Hittite armies. There was a god who could confer invisibility on the Hittite troops and enable them to attack the enemy by surprise. There were deities who sent and withdrew plagues, both upon the Hittites and their enemies. There were deities of human sexual potency. And although one might ask one's personal god for any of these boons, there were divine specialists for many tasks.

**Pantheon.** The Hittites called the aggregate of gods and goddesses "the thousand gods," and there may indeed have been that many. The total number of divine names known from the tablets and inscriptions is slightly more than six hundred, a total arrived at by culling the entire written corpus. The number of deities worshiped in any one Hittite city or town would be much smaller. Lists of divine names are found in state treaties, where the gods of both contracting parties are invoked to ensure that the oaths taken will be kept. Divine names are sometimes listed together with offerings to be made to them either at a particular festival or during the course of a year. In the famous imperial sanctuary at Yazılıkaya, we see carved in low relief on the walls of the sanctuary a dual procession of gods and goddesses, the males proceeding from left to right and the females from right to left, with the chief male and female deities meeting at the architectural focus point. The total number of divine figures in the preserved parts of the two processions is seventy-one. This assemblage represents the official imperial pantheon of the last half century of the Hittite kingdom. It is a completely Hurrianized pantheon, with deities of the Hattian and Hittite-Luwian strata syncretized, where possible, with Hurrian deities. This process of syncretism made possible a considerable reduction in the total number of deities, since several could be included under one (in this case, Hurrian) name. Other divine names in the inscriptions may represent either gods without a cult (e.g. purely literary figures) or gods from cult sites away from the capital who were never admitted into the official state cult.

**Mythology.** Mythological texts in the Hittite language may be subdivided into two groups: those of Anatolian origin and those of foreign origin. Myths deriving from Old Hittite originals are all Anatolian. The deities who figure in the Old Hittite Telepinu and Illuyanka myths and the other disappearing-god myths are a mix of what Emmanuel Laroche calls Hattian and Asianic. The myth of the moon falling from heaven occurs in both a Hattian and a Hittite version. There is very little about the Hittite version that linguistically recalls Old Hittite, yet it is surely possible that a long tradition of recopying has removed almost all traces of its original Old

Hittite language. Although Kamrushepa is a Hittite replacement for the original Hattic name of this goddess of magic, there is no reason to doubt that the myths in which she figures also belong to this Hattian group. All of the Anatolian myths are associated with incantations or rituals. The myths of non-Anatolian origin are all post-Old Hittite. They are generally independent of any incantation or ritual. One exception is the Ashertu myth, part of which describes a ritual to exorcize and purify Baal.

**Vanishing-god myths.** These myths, the best known of which is about the god Telepinu, are paradigms for dealing with natural catastrophes such as drought, blight, and diseases affecting livestock. The god who disappears must be located, appeased, and brought back. On the mythological level this is accomplished by nonhuman agents. The bee searches for, finds, and stings awake the sleeping god. The goddess Kamrushepa carries out a ritual to appease him. When transferred to the real world of those who are suffering from such a catastrophe, the search for the missing god entails a determination by oracle of which god is angry. Texts recording such oracular inquiry are extremely common in the New Hittite period, but have now been identified in the Old Hittite script, showing that his procedure was probably as common in the earlier period as in the later one. The pacification and return of the god is accomplished by a magic ritual of the type called *mugawar* in Hittite. Directions for such *mugawars* accompany the vanishing-god myths; other *mugawars* are described in ritual texts. It is a characteristic ritual form among the Hittites.

**Illuyanka myths.** Two stories on the same tablet are about the conflict between the storm god and his antagonist, the great serpent Illuyanka. *Illuyanka* is in fact not a name but a common noun, meaning "serpent" or "snake." But this particular reptile is clearly large and strong enough to have once defeated and disabled the storm god. In both stories the initially defeated storm god secures the help of a mortal who utilizes a trick to help the storm god triumph in his return match with the reptile. In the first version the goddess Inara and her mortal partner, Hupashiya, make Illuyanka and his brood drunk so that they cannot go back down into their hole in the ground. While they are helplessly drunk, Hupashiya ties them up, and when the storm god comes he is able to kill them. In the second version the storm god's own son by a mortal woman marries the daughter of Illuyanka and apparently uses his right as a son-in-law to ask a gift from Illuyanka. He receives his father's eyes and heart, which he passes on to the storm god. Renewed in his powers, the storm god defeats Illuyanka.

Like the vanishing-god myths, these two stories express natural catastrophes in the mythological terms of a disabled storm god. The disabled god is incapable of restoring himself and needs mortal cooperation, which is but a mythological counterpart of the actual mortal activity in the realm of magic rituals. The breakdown in nature is expressed mythologically as a giant serpent that must be subdued and killed. Reptiles are not a common symbol of evil in Hittite, but it is a fact that in the New Hittite myth of Hedammu a giant reptile is opposed by the goddess Ishtar. Unlike other Hittite myths, the first version of the Illuyanka story is localized, through the mention of the land of Tarukka, in north-central Anatolia. The second version takes place near an unnamed sea.

**Kumarbi cycle.** The theme of this group of stories is kingship among the gods. In *Kingship in Heaven* kingship is first held by Alalu, one of a previous generation of gods, who at the time of the Hittite storyteller are envisaged as dwelling in the netherworld and who bear the name "former gods." After a mere nine years of reign Alalu is driven from his throne by his erstwhile cupbearer, Anu, and he takes refuge in the netherworld. Alalu's own son, Kumarbi, becomes Anu's cupbearer for nine years. Then Anu and Kumarbi do battle, and Kumarbi drives his father's usurper from the throne. Since Anu (Sum., An) was the god of the sky, he tries to escape to the sky. But Kumarbi catches him, drags him down, and emasculates him by biting off and swallowing his genitals. Anu curses Kumarbi and prophesies the birth, from the swallowed genitals, of the god who will ultimately displace Kumarbi. Since Kumarbi is Alalu's son, he hopes to prevent his own removal by Anu's issue. This is the motivation for the emasculation. But fate cannot be denied. The genitals produce in Kumarbi several gods who are "born" from him, one of whom is Teshub, the storm god, who eventually deposes Kumarbi. In the *Song of Ullikummi* the deposed Kumarbi produces issue of his own, a great stone monster conceived by his intercourse with a huge rock, to depose and destroy Teshub. Another myth in this cycle, the *Kingship of Lamma*, also treats the theme of kingship among the gods. Thus the entire cycle of Kumarbi myths deals with struggle among the gods for supremacy.

**Tales of Appu, the Cow and the Fisherman, and the Hunter Keshshi.** These stories, of which unfortunately only a portion is preserved, were edited almost forty years ago as Hurrian tales in Hittite translation. But it is now known that only the Keshshi story has a Hurrian background. No names in the Appu story, either of gods or humans, are Hurrian, although the geographical setting appears to be somewhere to the east of Mesopotamia. Nor is there any indication of Hurrian elements in

the *Cow and the Fisherman*. The fisherman's city is Urma, which is unlocalized. Keshshi marries a woman with the Hurrian name Shintalimēni, whose brother is Udubsharri. The theme of the Appu story is twofold: (1) One cannot escape the fate which marks us at birth; and (2) although evil appears to prevail for a time, the justice of the gods will ultimately triumph. Appu has two sons, to whom the names Unjust and Just are given, and they grow up to fulfill their names. Unjust takes advantage of Just until their case comes to the attention of the gods. And although the end of the story is on a part of the tablet that has broken away, the short proemium introducing the story predicts the end: the gods always vindicate the just men and destroy the unjust.

Not enough is preserved of the *Cow and Fisherman* to discern a theme. Very little is preserved also of the *Keshshi* story, but it appears that Keshshi has angered the gods by neglecting their cult and doting on his new wife, and that he will suffer for this.

**Baal, Elkunirsha, and Ashertu.** This West Semitic myth about three deities, familiar to us from the Ugaritic myths and the Old Testament, was somewhat inaccurately translated into Hittite. Clues to the wording of the West Semitic original can be found in those places where *parallelismus membrorum* in the original was distorted in translation. The story itself resembles the incident of the patriarch Joseph and Potiphar's wife. Ashertu propositions Baal, and when he refuses, she threatens to get even. He reports the incident to her husband, Elkunirsha, who gives him permission to humble her. He does so, telling her that he has killed her sons. Thereupon Ashertu laments their death and eventually becomes reconciled to Elkunirsha, even turning him against Baal. Ishtar (Astarte), Baal's sister, overhears them plotting against her brother and flies "like a bird" to meet him in the desert, where she warns him. There the tablet breaks off, leaving the narrative unfinished. An attached ritual describes the purification of Baal, which probably followed some injury to him connected with this plot.

**The Hittite Temple.** Six Hittite temples have been excavated at Bogazköy. In addition to the cella, where the cult image of the deity was found, each contained a number of rooms that were used to house the permanent personnel and to store temple revenues. Each temple had a central courtyard. Worshipers crossing the courtyard from the temple entrance passed through a portico into the cella, which apparently could accommodate only priests and a small number of worshipers. Some larger temples, such as the principal temple in the lower city at Bogazköy (Temple I), may have contained two or more cellae and therefore housed the cult images of more than one god. In the terminology of the

texts, therefore, going from the "house" of god A to the "house" of god B might have been possible without leaving the confines of a single multiroomed structure.

As in other cultures, the Hittite temple—through its craftsmen personnel, its real estate farmed by sharecroppers, and its shares of booty taken by the king in battle—generated a large amount of revenue. Because we lack private economic documents, we cannot tell whether in Hatti, as in Babylonia, the temple served as a lending agency, similar to a modern bank. It is not, however, improbable that it did so.

**Cult images.** Although, thanks to rock reliefs depicting Hittite gods and goddesses, we have some idea of the appearance of their cult images, these latter (being made of precious metals, which would have been carried off by the destroyers of Bogazköy) have not survived. Small images in gold or silver have indeed survived, but the full-size cult images that stood in the temple cella have not. About these we are informed in the inventory texts called statue descriptions, which give a fairly good idea of the appearance of the statues. I quote an example.

The Storm God of Invocation: a gold statue of a standing man with wings coming out of his shoulders. In his right hand he holds a gold ax. In his left hand a gold symbol of good. He stands on an *awiti*-animal, its teeth plated with silver, its chest plated with gold. To the left and right of the wings stand [the attendant goddesses] Ninatta and Kulitta.

The Storm God of the Sky: a gold-plated statue of a seated man. In his right hand he holds a *hattalla*-club. In his left hand he holds a gold symbol of good. On top of two mountain gods, portrayed as standing men, silver-plated. Underneath is a silver base. Two silver rhytons. . . .

The Storm God of the House: a silver model of a bull's head and neck, facing forward. . . .

The Warrior God (Zababa): a silver statue of a standing man. In his right hand he holds a *tukul*-mace. In his left hand he holds a shield. Underneath stands a lion. Under the lion is a silver-plated base . . . one silver *ashshuzeri*-vessel. He has no attendant.

Sun God of the Sky: a silver statue of a seated man. On his head are silver fishes. Beneath him is a wooden base.

From reports of oracle inquiries we learn that the god was thought to be angered when the platings of gold and silver on his statue became worn. When an oracle indicated this, the king had to instruct goldsmiths or silversmiths to replat the image.

**Temple personnel.** Periodically, the king commissioned a census of the temples of the realm. Each city, town, or village was listed with its deities and temple(s). For each deity the census listed two types of male clergy and one type of female clergy. If for any reason a sanctuary lost any of its quota of clergy, it was re-

staffed. A small staff of two or three clergy was necessary even for a small sanctuary; in the main temple at Bogazköy there were many more. No term corresponding to *high priest* is known in Hittite, but a presiding official for the large, urban temples must have existed.

The larger temples also maintained a staff of craftsmen. A list of the craftsmen employed in the main temple at Bogazköy enumerates goldsmiths and silver-smiths, potters, leatherworkers, stoncutters, engravers, weavers, kitchen personnel, and various kinds of musicians. They lived and worked in a precinct just south of the main temple complex. Surviving texts describe the elaborate measures taken to ensure the ritual purity of these temple workers and their counterparts who served the needs of the king. Temple watchmen patrolled the precincts night and day to guard against fire and the intrusion of unwanted "unclean" animals. Visitors had to be escorted by temple guards from the main entrance to their appointments inside the temple and back to the exit once their business was done. Unauthorized persons were not allowed access to the holy precincts. In general, foreigners were not allowed in the Hittite temple; only privileged foreigners, perhaps ambassadors at the court, were allowed admittance under special circumstances.

**Cultus.** As stated above, the gods were treated like rich and powerful men. The description of the transporting of the images uses verbs inappropriate to the transporting of living persons, indicating that the Hittites were well aware that the image was not in fact the god but merely symbolized his presence. Still, the image was treated with the same deference that would be paid to any important personage. It was put to bed at night in the god's bedroom. In the morning it was aroused, washed and groomed, presented with food, and brought out to its cult platform for the day's round of receiving visitors (priests, dignitaries, and so on). On festival days it was put on a litter and carried through the streets to a pleasant meadow outside the city, where ceremonies, prayers, offerings, and even music, acrobatics, and games were performed to entertain the deity. The invisible divine beings symbolized by these statues were also viewed as leading a busy and active life. Ritual prayers invoking their presence in times of great need recognized that the god in question might have gone on a journey to the mountains or even to some foreign land.

No extant tablet contains the entire cultic calendar for the temples of Bogazköy. Texts describing festivals, however, make it evident that the busiest seasons of the year for festivals were fall and spring. The summer was occupied with harvesting and with the king's annual military campaigns. In the winter it was too cold for the

outside activity often required at festivals, although we do know that the Festival of the Year took place toward the end of the winter. We possess elaborate descriptions of some of the major festivals and lists naming many other festivals about which we know relatively little. The personal participation of the king (and sometimes also the queen) was very important. At times of military crisis a king might even have to leave command of the armies to a subordinate in order to return to Bogazköy to celebrate a religious festival. Not to do so constituted an unforgivable affront to the gods that could prove disastrous.

The activities of worship were prayer (addressing the god either to invoke, praise, or petition him), sacrifice (presenting to the god gifts of food and drink), and entertainment (music, games, reciting myths). The musical instruments were drums, stringed and reed instruments, and horns. Singing was done in any of various languages, depending upon the deity's ethnolinguistic background: Hattic, Luwian, Hittite, Palaic, Hurrian, or Babylonian. In the cult of the Hattian gods a lead singer and a chorus sang antiphonally. Hattian deities were addressed in worship under two names: the name used among mortals and that among the gods.

The premise underlying all Hittite prayer is that gods thought like mortals and could be influenced by pleasant words and gifts. The paradigm for the divine-human relationship was a master-slave one. A human could expect from his divine lord or lady just what a slave could from his master.

More than one Hittite noun was used to designate what we call "prayer." *Mugawar* (*mugesshar*) referred to the invocation of the god's presence through words and ritual acts. Praise, adulation, and adoration were called *walliyatar*; petition was *wekuwar*. Reply to accusations of sin (i.e., self-justification or protestation of innocence) was *arkuwar*. A single Hittite prayer often contained several of these types of expression.

Sacrifices were made of domestic animals, principally bulls, cows, sheep, and goats. For certain Hurrian rituals, birds were sacrificed. The cult never prescribed the sacrifice of a wild animal. The animal was killed and its meat prepared to serve as the god's food; no expiatory use was ever made of the blood of the sacrifice.

Animals given to the god were to be healthy specimens. Persons who knowingly substituted scrawny or unhealthy animals for healthy ones were guilty of a serious offense. In some rituals alternate, less expensive victims were accepted from poor worshipers. All sacrifices were to be presented promptly at the prescribed time, and delayed sacrifices or rituals were not accepted. Priests were warned in instructive texts not to tolerate excuses from worshipers who wished to post-

pone required rites of sacrifice. Especially appropriate at the time of their first harvesting were vegetable and grain offerings; they too had to be brought promptly.

**Revelation.** The gods communicated their will to mortals in several ways. A surviving oracle text in Old Hittite script proves that oracular inquiry already existed at that time. In the Old Hittite *Telepinu Proclamation*, warnings from the gods about serious offenses came through the words of the "men of the gods," who a number of scholars have taken to be prophets of some type. A third method—dreams—is not attested earlier than the New Kingdom. Communication of a god's will to a king, queen, or prince is first mentioned in the prayers of Mursilis II and first attested in the childhood of Hattusilis III, the son of Mursilis II. At a certain point in a ritual for a man suffering from sexual impotence, the sufferer is instructed to sleep in a holy place and report his dreams.

**Sin, Death, and the Afterlife.** Several Hittite words are translated as "sin," "offense," or "crime." Those occurring in prayers are *washtai-*, *washtul*, and *shallakardatar*. The first two refer to a deed with evil or unpleasant consequences and in most cases they must be translated as "sin." But either "sin" or "offense" can be expressed by the word *haratar*. A particularly serious offense of a special sexual nature is *hurkel*, which in most instances coincides with what we would call incest. *Shallakardatar* is a deliberate and highhanded offense against a deity.

From the Hittite point of view, sins against the gods could be deliberate or accidental. In either case they had to be identified, confessed, and (in most cases) corrected. Identification of sins committed unwittingly was possible only through consulting the god by oracle. The process was an involved one. By posing questions requiring only a "yes" or "no" answer one gradually narrowed the field of possibilities until a specific offense was determined. Then the question was posed: "Is the god angry for this reason only, and not for any additional reason?" If the answer to this was "yes," the inquiry was terminated. If "no," the inquiry continued until the final cause was identified.

Confession necessitated a promise to make amends. If the offense was the neglect of some religious duty such as a sacrifice, the offender promised to make up the sacrifice, sometimes with a greater outlay of offerings. Two Hittite words denoted gifts to make amends for these sins of neglect: *sharnikzel* and *mashkan*. The former also referred to compensation for injury or breach of contract in civil law, while the latter in profane usage meant a gift or bribe. If the gods punished a person for committing a sin, this did not absolve him from the obligations of confession and compensation. Animal sac-

rifices were not used to expiate sin, nor did the compensatory gifts mentioned above constitute an expiation. Rather, a man's offense against a god was viewed as completely analogous to his offense against another man, and the terminology (e.g., *sharnikzel*) was identical.

Relatively little is said in the surviving Hittite texts about the fate of man after death. The Old Hittite Kantuzili prayer rather philosophically observes that if one were to go on living under the present circumstances eternally, that might turn out to be a nightmare, for the ills of this life would become eternal. This would turn out to be a grievance (*kattawatar*), that is, a ground for complaint against the gods. In the description of the lengthy ritual for cremation and interring of the ashes of a dead king we learn that certain farming implements were burned in order to accompany the deceased king to the next life, so that he might cultivate the soil there. In the Hittite laws, a clause dealing with a wife's predeceasing her husband decrees that before her dowry can be released to her widowed husband, he must burn certain of her personal possessions. This burning doubtless served the same purpose as the burning of the farming implements for the dead king. In many cultures, items of personal value to the deceased are placed in the grave with the dead body, a practice strongly suggesting use of the articles in an afterlife. In the case of the Hittite king our texts explicitly confirm this interpretation. Descendants of the dead man continued to make offerings to his spirit. This practice is also attested in Hittite texts. In one instance, King Muwatallis, when he moved the royal residence from Bogazköy to Tarhuntassa, transferred to the new residence the statues of the gods and the "dead [ancestors]."

A Hittite religious belief maintained that the spirit of a dead person with a grievance against a living person might continue to haunt the latter until the grievance was resolved. The precise nature of the grievance was determined in the same way as sins against a god: by oracular investigation. When the grievance had been resolved and the spirit had been pacified, he was "set on the road," that is, he was sent on his way to the abode of the dead.

Hittite texts never reveal where that abode was. The Hittite cosmology allowed for a heaven above, where most of the gods dwelled, and the netherworld beneath, where the remainder lived. But we do not know if the dead resided in either of these places. In a ritual intended to remove certain evils and safely dispose of them forever where they could not harm mankind, the dead were magically put into large copper vessels and covered with lids of lead. According to one version of the incantation, these vessels were at the bottom of the sea; according to the other version, in the nether-

world. This, of course, does not prove that the spirits of the dead were confined in the netherworld. It only suggests that unwelcome things were kept there.

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HARRY A. HOFFNER, JR.

**HMONG RELIGION.** See Southeast Asian Religions, *article on Mainland Cultures*.

**HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST** (1873–1966), American philosopher of religion and metaphysician who also wrote on the philosophies of law, education, selfhood, and civilization. His *magnum opus*, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (1912; 14th ed., 1962), combined Josiah Royce's idealist concern for meaning

and the Absolute with William James's pragmatist commitment to science and experience. Hocking's original contribution was his solution to the problem of solipsism. We share the mind of another, he argued, through the common perception of, and mutual concern for, a particular object. Mind is its content. One cannot simply think (*pace* Descartes); one must think something. This particular object of common concern is the content of our common mind.

The experience is articulated dialectically. Natural realism regards the world as objectively "outside" ourselves. Subjective idealism responds that we know only our own individual reality "within" the mind. A dialectical synthesis discovers a world made objectively real by common perception. Hence science assumes public verifiability, and hypothesis becomes fact only when various individual experimenters acknowledge a common perception.

Empirical minds come and go, however, and yet we experience particular objects as real even when we are alone. How so? We intuit the presence of a nonempirical mind that is constantly co-observer with us. We are never absolutely alone. Objective reality is thus grounded in the attention of an Absolute Mind. As personal reality, this caring presence of the Absolute is the meaning of God in human experience.

Hocking relates this natural theology both to Christianity and to the problem of world religious pluralism in three later books: *Re-Thinking Missions* (1932), *Living Religions and a World Faith* (1940), and *The Coming World Civilization* (1956). There is a natural religion of humankind, shared by ordinary believers the world around. The substance of this religion is compatible with Christian faith. A life lived out of this natural perception will be different from one lived in the light of Christianity's supernatural revelation, but the relation is a natural one. So, in *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (1918), Hocking argues that the natural human will to power finds fulfillment in the evangelism of the Christian world mission, since, ideally, mission seeks to confer power on others, rather than gain power over them.

Nevertheless, the Christian missionary movement has historically been insensitive to non-Western cultures; and Christian theology has been exclusivistic in relation to other world religions. The integrity of the Christian message can be maintained without violence to other religious traditions through a relational model that is neither the indiscriminate amalgamation of synthesis, nor the exclusivism of radical displacement. Encounter causes each religion to rethink basic positions. The world's living religions will not die, nor will the emerging world faith necessarily be called Christian. This way of reconception will, however, lead to a future in which



the natural religion of humankind and the substance of historic Christianity will be conjoined, providing the binding ingredient for cultural and religious pluralism in the coming world civilization.

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Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven, 1912) was the first of his twenty books. Other major writings on religion include *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (New Haven, 1918); *Living Religions and a World Faith* (New York, 1940); *The Coming World Civilization* (New York, 1956); and *The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience* (New York, 1957), originally published as *Thoughts on Death and Life* (New York, 1937). For evaluations of Hocking's work see my festschrift for Hocking, *Philosophy, Religion and the Coming World Civilization* (The Hague, 1966), and my *Within Human Experience: The Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

LEROY S. ROUNER

**HOFFMANN, DAVID** (1843–1921), German rabbi, Jewish legal authority, Orthodox communal leader, and biblical and rabbinic scholar. David Tsevi Hoffmann was born in Hungary and studied in the *yeshivot* of Moses Schick and Esriel Hildesheimer. Hildesheimer, who affirmed the worth of secular culture and traditional rabbinic scholarship, had a profound influence on Hoffmann. This influence led Hoffmann to Pressburg (now Bratislava, Czechoslovakia), where he studied in both the famed Sofer Yeshiva and the Evangelical Gymnasium. Hoffmann began his university studies in 1865 in Vienna and immigrated in 1866 to Germany, where he completed his university education at Berlin and Tübingen; he received his doctorate in 1870 for his *Mar Samuel, Rektor der Jüdischen Akademie zu Nehardea in Babylonien* (Mar Samuel, Rector of the Jewish Academy at Nehardea in Babylonia). This work was severely criticized by Samson Raphael Hirsch for its application of critical methods to the study of Talmud, although Hoffmann himself felt that his own application of this method did not negate the divine authority of the oral law. In 1873 Hoffmann joined the faculty of the Orthodox Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin; in 1899 he became rector of the seminary. He served, simultaneously, as rabbi of the Berlin separatist Orthodox congregation, Adass Jisroel.

Hoffmann insisted that a defense of traditional Jewish religious belief could be combined with an affirmation of contemporary secular culture and scholarship, and he displayed this commitment through hundreds of essays and numerous books of both scholarly and apologetic natures. His defense of the unitary authorship of the Bible is contained in his commentaries on *Leviticus*

and *Deuteronomy* and in his famed *Die wichtigsten Instanzen gegen die Graf-Wellhausensche Hypothese* (The Most Important Arguments against the Graf-Wellhausen Hypothesis, 1904). Hoffmann also defended German Jews against the attacks of German anti-Semites in *Der Schulchan-Aruch und die Rabbinen über das Verhältnis der Juden zu Aderglaubigen* (The *Shulḥan 'arukh* and the Rabbis on the Relationship between Jews and Gentiles, 1885). Hoffmann's studies in Midrash and Talmud were seminal in the development of modern Jewish scholarship in these areas, and his collection of Jewish legal decisions, *Melammed le-ho'il* (1926–1932), evidences a remarkable sensitivity to the German environment and an absolute determination to preserve Orthodoxy against the encroachments of Reform Judaism. His modern approach to Jewish Orthodoxy provided an important model for Jews in Germany and throughout the West, and, because of this, Hoffmann remains a critical figure to the understanding of the development of Jewish Orthodoxy in the modern world.

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DAVID ELLENSON

**ḤOKHMAH.** The Hebrew feminine noun *ḥokhmah* (var. *ḥokhmot*, *Prv.* 1:20, 9:1, 14:1) reflects a common Semitic root, attested to in Akkadian, Ugaritic, Phoenician, Aramaic, and Arabic. While *ḥokhmah* is conventionally rendered as "wisdom," actual biblical usage indicates a considerably broader semantic range than that suggested by the English term. Along with intellectual prowess and sagacity, *ḥokhmah* denotes the mastery of any number of crafts ranging from such concrete skills as spinning cloth (*Ex.* 35:25), working in metal, wood, and stone (*Ex.* 31:3–6), and navigation (*Ps.* 107:27) to the more subtle arts of dream interpretation (*Gn.* 41:8), ritual wailing (*Jer.* 9:16), sorcery (*Is.* 3:3), epigrammatic speech (*1 Kgs.* 5:9–14), private diplomacy

(2 Sm. 20:16–22, cf. Eccl. 9:13–18), court politics (1 Kgs. 2:6, 2:9), and the exercise of kingship (1 Kgs. 5:26; cf. the ironic use in Is. 10:13 and Ez. 28:4–5, 28:12).

In and of itself, *ḥokhmah* is thus an ethically and religiously neutral term, and only context dictates whether to render it “wisdom,” “expertise,” “shrewdness,” or “craftiness.” Nevertheless, *ḥokhmah*, on its highest level, comes to be interpreted as and identified with piety (lit. “fear of the Lord”) in the so-called wisdom literature of the Hebrew Bible (e.g., Prv. 15:33, Jb. 28:28) and elsewhere (e.g., Is. 33:6). It is particularly difficult to define *ḥokhmah* on the basis of the specific prescriptions of a wisdom book, such as *Proverbs*, for here the range of accomplishments that characterize the attainment of wisdom run the gamut from conscientious farming and animal husbandry (Prv. 27:23–27) to polished table etiquette at the palace of a king (Prv. 23:1–3). In terms of its general values, however, *ḥokhmah* in *Proverbs* is reflected in industry, discreet and circumspect behavior, and all pragmatic measures that make for successful living. Not the least of the latter is avoidance of the divine wrath attendant upon acts of impiety and transgression. Thus the formulation that “the beginning of *ḥokhmah* is the fear of the Lord” (Ps. 111:10, Prv. 9:10) reflects utilitarian self-interest no less than it reflects sublime theological speculation (cf., e.g., Prv. 14:26–27, 16:6, 19:23), but it is piety all the same.

The qualities of *ḥokhmah* are attributed to the deity, especially with reference to the technical skill and prowess with which the creation of the world was effected (Jer. 10:12, 51:15; Prv. 3:19–20; Ps. 104:24). Indeed, any extraordinary display of wisdom on the part of a mortal is spoken of hyperbolically as divineline *ḥokhmah* (1 Kgs. 3:28, Ezr. 7:25; cf. 2 Sm. 14:20, “like the wisdom of a divine angel”). Not surprisingly, therefore, exceptional human *ḥokhmah* may be spoken of as having been bestowed upon an individual by a specific act of God (Ex. 28:3, 1 Kgs. 5:9, 5:26; 2 Chr. 1:10–12). Something of the specifically divine origin of *ḥokhmah* is perhaps also suggested when the text speaks of the imparting of the “spirit” of *ḥokhmah* to an individual, as in the case of God’s anointed king (Is. 11:1–3) or Joshua, as charismatic successor to Moses (Dt. 34:9, contrast Nm. 27:20). However, more typical of biblical speculation concerning wisdom is the notion that it is the result and reward of human efforts and initiative toward its acquisition (e.g., Prv. 3:13, 4:5, 4:7, 23:23, 29:15, but cf. 2:6).

By far the most striking and intriguing usage of the term *ḥokhmah* in the Hebrew Bible is to be found in Prv. 1, 8, and 9, where the texts speak, often quite elabo-

ately, of Wisdom as a personified being. In each of these biblical chapters Ḥokhmah, here best rendered as “Lady Wisdom,” makes a personal appearance, holding forth her unequivocal promise of life to those who adhere to her ways (Prv. 1:32–33, 8:35–36, 9:6, 9:11). While this message, as well as the actual medium of the personified figure of Lady Wisdom, clearly unite the three chapters, individual differences in the depiction and characterization of Ḥokhmah are to be noted. In the first chapter of *Proverbs* Ḥokhmah calls out her message from the most prominent public places of the town, her rhetoric being much like the angry diatribe of a scolding prophet. Lady Wisdom threatens to turn a deaf ear to all those who are content to reject her in good times, but who will inevitably seek her counsel in the times of calamity to come. She will not only ignore their pleas but will laugh scornfully at their downfall (Prv. 1:20–33).

In *Proverbs* 8, the harangue of Lady Wisdom against the shortcomings of others gives way to the calmly reasoned exposition of her own merits. The setting is, once again, a public one, this time including the outlying highways and byways, no less than the city streets (8:1–3). Wisdom is to be sought after not in fear of retribution but rather in enlightened self-interest: she embraces the timeless virtues of truth and justice; her worth exceeds that of precious metals and costly jewels; she is the infallible guide of kings and statesmen (8:4–21). But the climax of her argument (8:22–31) appeals to nothing less than a quasi-divine pedigree extending back beyond cosmic memory, she being the first to have been created. Not only is Ḥokhmah the sole witness to God’s creation of the world, but she even claims to have been a party to it as well, the Lord having created the world “with Wisdom” (that is, wisely, skillfully).

Finally, in *Proverbs* 9, a third face of Ḥokhmah emerges, and with it yet another rhetorical posture. Here Lady Wisdom is the accomplished architect of her own seven-pillared edifice, the latter most probably representing the repository of what would seem to be wisdom’s seven constituent arts or disciplines, although other quite diverse interpretations (architectural, cosmic, astrological, mythological, etc.) have been proposed for this structure. As if in public celebration of her architectural feat, Ḥokhmah graciously tenders a lavish banquet. What Ḥokhmah now offers her eagerly sought guests is in effect her self and substance, the food and drink of wisdom. The latter is to be ingested, imbibed, and so, in the larger sense, internalized. One need not overly mythologize the language in this particular scene, for in biblical parlance to “eat” and “drink” of a quality is, figuratively, to partake of and share in that quality (cf., e.g., Prv. 4:17, 31:27; Jb. 34:7).

Alongside the richly variegated personification of *ḥokhmah* in *Proverbs* 1, 8, and 9 is the more restrained treatment it receives in *Job* 28. This elegant poem has as its theme the rarity and elusiveness of true wisdom, whose home and haunts are known only to God. The only consolation that the poem holds forth for mankind is God's assurance (almost as an afterthought) that piety—holding God in awe and shunning all evil—constitutes that which is attainable of this strangely remote wisdom. If the easy accessibility of *ḥokhmah* in *Proverbs* 1, 8, and 9 represents the immanence of wisdom in everyday life, in *Job* 28 it is the divineline transcendent of wisdom that finds expression.

Taken together, these four biblical instances of the personification of wisdom have long been the subject of scholarly scrutiny and speculation, especially with regard to their conceptual and literary origins. On the simplest level, the personification of *ḥokhmah* may be compared to such verses as Psalm 85:11–14 in which the personified attributes Faithfulness (*ḥesed*), Truth (*emet*), Well-being (*shalom*), and Right (*tsedeq*) alternately encounter one another, embrace, peer down from the heavens, and walk before the deity as might a dutiful royal servant (cf. 89:15). That is, the specific personification of wisdom in our four passages may be viewed as an extension and an elaboration of an attested biblical literary practice. A further biblical parallel to personified *ḥokhmah* is suggested by the variously attested phrase "spirit of wisdom" (e.g., *Ex.* 28:3, *Dt.* 34:9, *Is.* 11:2). In *1 Kings* 22 we read of a vision in which the deity is holding court, surrounded by the hosts of heaven, and the "spirit" of Falsehood, yet another personified abstraction, steps forward, volunteering to do the divine bidding. Quite a number of biblical scholars, however, maintain that the representation of *ḥokhmah* is not merely metaphorical, but reflects a more fully developed theological doctrine of wisdom as a "hypostasis," an independently existing manifestation of divine wisdom, or of the order inherent in the divine creation.

Going beyond biblical usage, any number of parallels to the personification of *ḥokhmah* have been sought in ancient Near Eastern literature—for example, the Egyptian goddess Maat ("truth, order") and the Babylonian-Canaanite divinities Kittu ("Truth") and Misharu ("Justice")—the closest analogues of which are afforded by the Babylonian and (later) Hurrian divinization of Ḥasīsu ("understanding, intelligence"), and the figure of the divine Siduri, who bears the epithet "goddess of wisdom," and who is depicted in the *Epic of Gilgamesh* (tablet 10) as offering wise counsel to the hero in her role as "barmaid." Clearly, the closest counterpart to the biblical *ḥokhmah* is to be found in the Aramaic *Book*

of *Aḥiqar* (fifth century BCE), where *ḥokhmata* is spoken of as "of the gods," "precious to the gods," and whom "the lord of holy ones has exalted."

In the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha many of the biblical conceptions of personified *ḥokhmah* reappear, sometimes with striking elaboration and innovation. In *Ben Sira* 24:1–21, Wisdom again speaks on her own behalf but now refers specifically to the people and land of Israel as her particular earthly focus, and her words are followed (v. 22) by the narrator's explicit identification of Ḥokhmah (Gr., Sophia) with the law of the covenant (i.e., the Pentateuch or Torah). Earlier, Jeremiah also couples the *torah* ("teaching") of God with *ḥokhmah* (*Jer.* 8:8–9; cf. *Dt.* 4:6). So, too, a hymn to Wisdom in *Baruch* (3:9–4:4) declares Wisdom to be God's special revelation to Israel, being "the book of God's laws."

In *Ben Sira* 51:13–30 a highly personal celebration of the acquisition of Wisdom makes novel reference to her "beauty" and the desires aroused by this beauty. A Hebrew version of this very passage was discovered among the Dead Sea Scrolls ("Psalms Scroll," 11QPs<sup>a</sup> cols. xxi–xxii), which speaks through bolder, more suggestively erotic double entendre. In the *Wisdom of Solomon* (8:2), the wise king recalls how he sought to take Wisdom (Sophia) as his "bride."

The notion of Ḥokhmah as an independent being, seemingly radiated out from the deity, is developed in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, where Wisdom is spoken of as an auralike emanation of God's glory and light (7:25–26), and as one in attendance at the divine throne. Further, fragments of a myth of Ḥokhmah are preserved in *1 Enoch* 42, which recounts how Wisdom, having sought and not found any suitable dwelling place among mankind, returned to her original place among the angels.

In the Talmud and early *midrashim* little attention is devoted to speculations on personified Ḥokhmah, since the latter is there identified with and, in effect, replaced by personified Torah (see, e.g., the elaborate scriptural "proofs" in *Genesis Rabbah*, section 1). The later personifications of Shekhinah (God's presence) and Sabbath in Jewish literature also took on motifs similar to those associated with personified Ḥokhmah in biblical and apocryphal literature. It may be that the rabbinic reticence with regard to the personification of *ḥokhmah* was partially conditioned by its running polemic with gnostic sectarians. The latter not only prominently featured Wisdom (Sophia) in their cosmology, but actually incorporated the Hebrew term into their system in the form of *Achamoth*, said to be a daughter or lesser form of Sophia. In Jewish mystical literature, Qabbalah, *ḥokhmah* is given preeminence among the *sefirot*, or di-

vine emanations, hearkening back to its important role in earlier Jewish and gnostic speculation.

[See also *Wisdom; Wisdom Literature, articles on Biblical Books and Theoretical Perspectives; and Sophia.*]

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MURRAY H. LICHTENSTEIN

**HOLDHEIM, SAMUEL** (1806-1860), rabbi and spokesman for the more radical Reform Jews in Germany. Born in Kempen, Posen, Holdheim mastered the traditional study of rabbinic texts as a youngster. He was also attracted to secular culture, however, and as a young man gained fluency in German and attended the universities of Prague and Berlin. He became rabbi in Frankfurt an der Oder in 1836 and in 1840 succeeded to the post of chief rabbi of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. He became well known in these positions as a champion of Reform and emerged from the Reform rabbinical conferences of 1844-1846 as the leader of its extremist elements. In 1846 he was elected rabbi of the Reform congregation in Berlin, a post Abraham Geiger refused because of the congregation's separation from the general Jewish community. Holdheim served there until his death.

Holdheim articulated his philosophy of Reform Jewish belief and practice in numerous articles, sermons, pamphlets, and books, including *Ueber die Autonomie der Rabbinen und das Prinzip der jüdischen Ehe* (The Autonomy of the Rabbis and the Principle of Jewish Marriage Laws; 1843), in which he advanced the thesis that

the laws of the state and not rabbinic legislation should regulate matters of marriage and inheritance for Jews. In his philosophy of Reform Judaism, he distinguished between religious-ethical and national components in Judaism. The latter, he claimed, constituted the "perishable shell" of Jewish teachings and were no longer binding in the modern era. The religious-ethical elements, in contradistinction, comprised the "everlasting kernel" of Jewish faith and remained valid in the contemporary period. Thus, he was able to write, "The Talmud speaks with the ideology of its own time, and for that time it was right. I speak from the higher ideology of my time, and for this age I am right" (quoted in W. Gunther Plaut, *The Rise of Reform Judaism*, New York, 1963, p. 123). While Holdheim was not alone among the Reformers in expressing these views, his prominence among the leadership of the movement made him a significant exponent of these sentiments.

Holdheim's thought found practical expression in his enthusiastic support of Jewish political emancipation as justifying the radical transformation of Judaism, in his sanctioning of mixed marriages, and in his advocating that the Jewish Sabbath be transferred from Saturday to Sunday, "a civil day of rest." Holdheim also supported the almost complete removal of Hebrew from, and the adoption of the vernacular in, Jewish prayer services (although he advocated the reading of Torah in Hebrew) and, in his Berlin congregation, introduced radical reforms into the prayer book and ritual. His approach to Reform found expression in America through the efforts of David Einhorn of Baltimore and later Philadelphia; Holdheim can thus be identified as an architect of the "classical Reform" position in the United States.

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DAVID ELLENSON

**HOLĪ** is a popular North Indian festival noted for its Saturnalia-like excitement celebrated each year at the full moon in the lunar month of March-April. The cer-

emony is not found in South India, but a similar festival in honor of the god of love, Kāma, takes place there at the same time. While there does not seem to be a direct link between the two rites, literary sources suggest that both occasions are examples of an age-old tradition of celebrating the arrival of spring.

People in northern India usually celebrate Holī during the few days after the full moon. However, in many places the festival starts before the full moon, sometimes as early as Vasanta ("spring"), the fifth day of the waxing moon in the lunar month of February-March, when the Holī fire is first prepared for lighting. At this time, people begin to collect and contribute wood and cowdung to pile up around a central pole; in addition, a pot is sometimes filled with seeds and buried beneath this pile. The main Holī ritual centers around a bonfire ceremoniously kindled at the time of the rising moon. Both men and women circumambulate the fire, into which they often throw coconuts or on which they roast new barley. Divinations of the coming harvest are cast by interpreting the direction of the flames (when the fire is burning) or by the state of the seeds in the buried pot (when the fire has gone out). People sometimes take embers from the fire to their homes in order to rekindle their own domestic fires; they also collect the ashes from the Holī fire for use as protection against disease.

The Holī fire is also regarded as a funeral pyre (Marriott, 1966, pp. 201, 204), for it is understood to destroy a female demon commonly known as Holikā. Certain through a boon she was granted that she was never to die by fire, Holikā climbs the pyre taking in her lap Prahlāda, a faithful devotee of Viṣṇu who is either her brother or the son of her brother Hiraṇyakaśipu (Viṣṇu's enemy). Prahlāda, who is sometimes identified with the central pole that rises out of the fire, survives the ordeal through his fervent devotion to Viṣṇu; Holikā, the evil one, perishes in the flames.

This exemplary narrative does not really explain the erotic and occasionally violent mood of "playing Holī." People—usually members of the lower social strata—drench each other as well as powerful and prestigious members of the upper classes with water stained with various powders, cattle urine, and mud. Those victims of the various tricks and pranks played on them, including those men who during the festival have been beaten with sticks by women, must simply go along with their reversed status for the time being. The Holī celebration is marked by the selection of the King of Holī, the hearty enjoyment of lewd singing and shouting, the drinking of *bhang*, a drink of hashish mixed with milk and yogurt, and the fondling of phallus-shaped effigies. Anthropologists have been intrigued by these rites.

McKim Marriott, for example, notes that "the dramatic balancing of Holī—the world destruction and world renewal, the pollution followed by world purification—occurs not only on the abstract level of structural principles, but also in the person of each participant" (Marriott, 1966, p. 212). The negation of social status is, however, a limited one, and Holī does not involve the complete reversal of everyday norms (Babb, 1975, p. 174). According to Hindus of northern and central India, the frenzy and licentiousness of the festival is merely a reenactment of the *līlās* of Kṛṣṇa, the amorous and frolicsome "plays" that the god enjoys with cowherd boys and girls. Indeed, Holī is the "feast of love" (Marriott, 1966), and its excesses are clothed in the emotional feelings and motives of Kṛṣṇa *bhakti* movements (Biardeau, 1981, pp. 156–161).

In a Bengali variant of the festival, the burning of a human effigy is associated with the Kṛṣṇaite swing festival (Bose, 1953). In India, the swing carries erotic connotations and may be an element of a generalized marriage ritual. Although Kṛṣṇa does not appear in all variations of the celebrations, the burning of a human or animal effigy is ubiquitous and has gone on for years (*ibid.*, p. 83).

In Andhra Pradesh, the festival to Kāma mentioned earlier retains some of the frenzy of the North Indian Holī (Christian, 1982, p. 255). Such ritual delirium does not appear to any significant extent in Tamil Nadu. Although a festival to Kāma may take place here and there in orthodox Śiva temples, Tamil celebrations usually involve only small local groups instead of entire villages. The Kāma festival begins after Śivarātri and runs until the full moon. An effigy of Kāma is constructed while people recount his story. Assisted by the effects of alcohol, the participants dance wildly, some of them dressed like tribal women (which evokes a good deal of erotic behavior). The effigy of Kāma is burnt in the fire in a ritual reenactment of a well-known tale in which Kāma sends an arrow to Śiva in order to distract him from his meditation long enough to allow the god to father a son. Enraged, Śiva destroys Kāma with a bolt of lightning from his third eye, reducing the Lord of Desire to ashes. However, the terrible yogin (Śiva) himself becomes "Desire" for a short time and enjoys the pleasures of sexual union with Pārvatī. For that moment Śiva becomes, in effect, Kāma. The theological reversal echoes the ritual reversal.

The element of *bhakti* does not appear in the South Indian festival, but here the ritual is more explicit. First, in conformity with the Hindu sacrificial context, the Kāma rite focuses on the element of desire—its fulfillment and destruction. Although *kāma* (the fulfillment of desire) may be the lowest of the four traditional goals

of life (the others being *artha*, or "prosperity"; *dharma*, or "religious duty"; and *mokṣa*, or "salvation") it is just as essential as the others, for no aspect of the other three goals can be met without desire (Biardeau, 1981, pp. 49–54, 78). The ascetic Śiva is also Kāma, and thus sires Skanda, for the heroic son must eventually save the world by destroying the demons who are forever threatening the power of the gods. In addition, *kāma*—desire without knowledge—is the goal attributed particularly to the *śūdra*, the noninitiated, lowest order of Hindu society. In the springtime, the time of cosmic renewal, everyone ritually becomes a *śūdra* in order to recreate the world. This temporary inversion of the social hierarchy and of the four goals of Hindu life is marked in the ritual when Kāma, or Holī, is crowned king.

[See also Śiva and Hindu Religious Year.]

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MARIE-LOUISE REINICHE

**HOLOCAUST, THE.** [This entry consists of two articles. The first, History, provides the background for the second, Jewish Theological Responses.]

#### History

From the French Revolution to the 1860s, the Jews of western and central Europe experienced political emancipation. Unencumbered by ties to an agrarian way of life, many Jews also experienced economic prosperity and social mobility during the following decades of industrialization and urbanization, as they seized the opportunities that a period of rapid change offered. However, late nineteenth-century Europe also witnessed the emergence of radical protest movements by those who bore the cost of modernization. Such movements were usually anti-Semitic, as the Jew was an easy symbol of

all that these people perceived to be the ills of modern society: urbanization; democratization; disruptive social mobility; and a large-scale, impersonal market economy undermining the livelihoods of tradesmen, artisans, and peasants. The adoption of the Jew as such a symbol was facilitated by a ready-made and widespread negative Jewish stereotype fostered by centuries of religious anti-Semitism. A racist brand of Social Darwinism that emerged at this time was quickly utilized to provide a veneer of pseudoscientific respectability suited to a more secular age. In this later view the Jew had such a baneful influence because he was by nature a rootless and subversive cosmopolite who could never become a true member of a national community shaped by "blood and soil."

In Germany and Austria this antimodernist protest was known as the *völkisch* movement, and it received added impetus after World War I from the humiliating defeat, revolutionary turmoil, and disintegrative inflation that afflicted central Europe. The most successful mobilizer of this discontent was the National Socialist German Workers' Party of Adolf Hitler, and the antimodernist, anti-Semitic *völkisch* tradition was the ideological force behind most of its early activists. For Hitler himself, however, the Jew was an even deeper psychological obsession. He saw the Jew not only as the cause of present ills, manifested above all in the rising Bolshevik threat, but also as the very metaphysical source of evil itself spanning the centuries. Thus, in addition to a war of expansion in the east assuring Germany of the territorial base (*Lebensraum*) necessary for its status as a major power, Hitler also advocated the "removal" of the Jews from Germany. But Hitler did not come to power because of his promises for war and racial persecution. A much broader, often contradictory appeal for a "renewal" of German life underlay the Nazis' electoral breakthrough in the early 1930s. The hopes for the restoration of effective government to deal with the communist threat and the economic depression, the reconciliation of a highly factionalized German society into a unified racial entity with a common purpose, and a new meritocracy opening up careers to the professionally disadvantaged of Germany's tradition-bound society won votes from all sectors of the population but above all from the middle and lower-middle classes. With the votes of more than one-third of the German population behind Hitler, the old elites gambled that they could use him for their own purposes (many of which partially overlapped with Hitler's own goals). He was appointed chancellor in January 1933.

While Hitler consolidated his dictatorship in short order, an equally rapid solution to the Nazis' self-imposed Jewish problem was not forthcoming. Hitler's obsessive

anti-Semitism provided sanction for various kinds of attacks upon the Jews but neither assured coordination of such attempts nor clarified the ultimate goal. Furthermore, Hitler and the Nazis had to take into account various inhibitive factors, such as the fragile state of the economy, foreign reaction, and the sensibilities of their conservative allies and the German public. What emerged was a cyclical pattern of intensifying persecution, as periodic pressure from party radicals for violent attacks upon the Jews was mollified with legislative discrimination more conducive to economic stability and less disturbing to the majority of the German public. In 1933 the Jews were deprived of civic equality and barred from various professions. In 1935 the Nuremberg Laws completed the social ostracism of Jews by forbidding marriage or sexual intercourse between Jews and "Aryans." In 1938 another wave of legislation impoverished the Jews by systematically stripping them of their property.

The party radicals made one last attempt to take control of Nazi Jewish policy when Joseph Goebbels incited the *Kristallnacht* riots of 9–10 November 1938. The arson of synagogues and vandalism of Jewish businesses throughout Germany caused dismay among many Germans who did not want to be confronted with a choice between their loyalty to and illusions about the regime on the one hand and their innate respect for property and order on the other. Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Göring joined forces and, with Hitler's approval, centralized control of Jewish policy, effectively excluding Goebbels. Henceforth the persecution of the Jews would be carried out through the orderly administration of the German bureaucracy, not through the violent pogroms of local party activists. Unobtrusive but relentless, this bureaucratic persecution proved far more conducive to the indifference of the German public and far more dangerous to the Jews.

With the growing role of Himmler's SS (a complex and expanding conglomeration of elite party organizations, police forces, and eventually even military formations) in shaping Nazi Jewish policy, one clear vision gradually emerged—a Germany free of Jews through emigration. But it was a vision unrealized. Faced with mounting immigration barriers in a world gripped by economic depression and thus decidedly unsympathetic to impoverished refugees, German Jews were reluctant to abandon career, property, and a country to which they were deeply attached. Emigration proceeded slowly, and the addition of Austrian and Czech Jews in 1938–1939 brought more Jews into the Reich than had emigrated over the past six years. The *Kristallnacht* had removed any remaining illusions of waiting out the Nazi regime, and almost all German Jews were now

desperate to leave. The SS conducted experiments in coerced emigration organized by Adolf Eichmann to get rid of the Austrian and Czech Jews as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, time ran out. The outbreak of war in September 1939 closed most borders, and the acquisition first of two million Polish Jews and then another half million Jews in western Europe by June 1940 shattered any expectation of a solution to the Jewish question through emigration.

The Nazis now sought a solution to their Jewish "problem" through increasingly ambitious expulsion schemes. First the Jews of Germany, especially the additional 550,000 of the newly annexed Polish territories, were to be expelled to a "Jewish reservation" in the Lublin region of Poland. Then, with the defeat of France the Nazis conceived a scheme for expelling all the Jews of Europe to the French island colony of Madagascar. Neither plan proved feasible, but in the meantime the Polish Jews were herded into the major cities of Poland and gradually ghettoized. With economic ties severed and most of their property confiscated, the Jews of these frightfully overcrowded ghettos seemed destined to extinction through starvation and disease. One-half million Jews died in the ghettos between 1939 and 1941. The rest survived while Jewish leaders, forced into Jewish councils on German orders, tenaciously struggled to restore minimal communal life and above all a viable ghetto economy that would keep the Jews alive by giving the Germans a stake in the productive potential of Jewish labor.

Germany's decision to invade the Soviet Union posed once again the dilemma engendered by military success, which inevitably would bring more Jews into the expanding German empire. Hitler decided to break this vicious circle. Mobile SS firing squads (*Einsatzgruppen*) were formed to carry out the mass murder of the Russian Jews and Communist party cadres that fell into German hands. The war for *Lebensraum* and the destruction of the Jewish-Bolshevik enemy would be one. The previous policies of expulsion and ghettoization had at least implied a decimation of the Jewish population, but now the quantum leap to systematic mass murder had been taken.

In the first month following the 22 June 1941 invasion of Russia, the Germans experienced spectacular success. In late July, intoxicated by victory and the prospect of a whole continent at his feet, Hitler now authorized Himmler's deputy, Reinhard Heydrich, to devise plans for a "final solution" to be applied also to the European Jews. The firing-squad method of the *Einsatzgruppen* was proving inadequate even in Russia because of the lack of secrecy of the mass executions, the psychological burden on the killers, and the staggering

number of victims to be murdered. The technocrats of the Nazi regime solved these problems, however, by inventing the death camp. Secrecy, efficiency, and psychological detachment were to be achieved by deporting the victims to "factories of death" where a small staff would apply assembly-line methods to rob, gas, and cremate thousands of arriving Jews within a few hours. Construction of the two earliest death camps, Chelmno and Belzec, was underway by November 1941. Four additional death camps followed: the Birkenau section of Auschwitz, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Majdanek. When Reinhard Heydrich met with representatives from the various German ministries at the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942 to coordinate the deportation of all European Jews "to the east," the "final solution" to the Nazis' self-imposed Jewish problem was at hand.

In Poland the Germans descended upon the ghettos in savage "ghetto-clearing" operations, taking off the non-working population first. Everywhere Jewish leaders faced the same excruciating dilemma. Resistance in the ghetto invited instant and overwhelming German retaliation against the entire community. Escape of the young fighters to the forests involved the abandonment of families. Compliance meant the incremental destruction of the community but at least initially held out hope that a remnant of workers would survive. This course was thus generally followed by Jewish leaders as the least intolerable evil, until family members had been lost, along with the illusion that the Germans were sufficiently utilitarian to preserve skilled labor. Only then did armed resistance seem rational. The Warsaw ghetto uprising, for instance, broke out in April 1943 when only seventy thousand of its nearly one-half million Jews were still alive.

Outside Poland and Russia the number of prospective victims was much less but the political obstacles to deportation to the death camps were much more complicated. Within the Third Reich both the police and a wide variety of local authorities handled the uprooting process. In the areas of German military administration and among Germany's allies and satellites, help from local collaborators was essential to identify and round up the Jews. Throughout all these regions the complex deportation program was coordinated by Heydrich's specialist, Adolf Eichmann. Deportations began from the Third Reich in the fall of 1941, and from Slovakia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway in 1942. In 1943 the deportation effort spread to Greece, Bulgaria, Denmark, and Italy, though it faltered in Bulgaria and was thwarted almost entirely in Denmark through local obstruction. In Romania and Yugoslavia most of the Jews perished locally without resort to de-

portations. Finally, in May and June of 1944, nearly one-half million Hungarian Jews were the victims of the largest single deportation of the war.

As the Holocaust ran its course within the German empire, the outside world gradually learned of but never truly comprehended the magnitude and significance of the disaster. The first reports of a German plan to murder the entire Jewish population of Europe reached the West in the summer of 1942 through contacts in Switzerland. By November the reports had been fully confirmed, and an Allied declaration followed that condemned the Nazi actions and threatened punishment after the war. But little more was done. Old bureaucratic attitudes and patterns of behavior, shaped in an era when policy had been to turn back the tide of refugees from Nazism, did not change quickly. Rescue through military victory provided an easy excuse for inaction, and Allied leaders did not insist upon a fundamental change in priorities necessary to alter this situation. The vast majority of Hitler's victims were beyond any rescue effort, but inability to stop the murder of millions was only made more horrifying by the pervasive passivity of the Allies concerning the possible rescue of additional thousands of threatened Jews.

When the Nazi regime finally collapsed in defeat, between five and six million Jews (approximately one-third of world Jewry) had perished in the Holocaust. A nearly equal number of non-Jews were also murdered by the Nazis: over three million Russian prisoners of war, the mentally ill, the Gypsies, the Polish intelligentsia, political opponents and resisters, homosexuals and others defined as "asocials," numerous slave laborers kept in unlivable conditions, and countless victims—especially Russians, Poles, and Yugoslavs—of mass reprisals and indiscriminate terror aimed at subduing the civilian populations of occupied territories. The Nazi regime showed itself capable of mass murder against virtually any group of people. But no other group of victims occupied the role in Hitler's mind of metaphysical evil incarnate as did the Jews. No other victims were threatened so totally and pursued so relentlessly. And no other victims died so helpless and abandoned.

[*The human capacity to create an enemy is discussed in War and Warriors, overview article; see also Anti-Semitism and Persecution, article on Jewish Experience. For discussion of the effect of the Holocaust on the movement to create a Jewish homeland, see Zionism.*]

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CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING

### Jewish Theological Responses

The Holocaust (Heb., *sho'ah*), the willed destruction of European Jewry and the intended complete eradication of world Jewry by the Nazi regime, casts its shadow over all Jewish realities in the post-Holocaust era. The nature of this event, and the particularity and peculiarity of its assault against Jewish life and Jewish dignity, force a fundamental reexamination of all inherited Jewish norms, not the least of which are Judaism's traditional theological foundations. This is not to assert that these classical assumptions will necessarily change or prove inadequate to the test, but only that they must again be asked to answer age-old questions of theodicy.

To grasp the challenge of the Holocaust one must understand the unique racial/Manichaeic *Weltanschauung* of Nazism and the role of the Jew in it. For Hitler and his Reich, anti-Semitism and the struggle against world Jewry were not only subjective sentiments of personal

will but also actualizations in history of metahistorical antitheses, and as such, necessary and inevitable. Killing Jews, or more precisely eliminating "the Jews," or Judaism itself, was in this modern gnostic myth a sacred obligation. "The Jew," the collective singular, was the generic, supranatural enemy. The *Endlösung*, the "final solution," was not primarily understood by its cruel initiator as a political or socioeconomic force. It was not an expression of class struggle or nationalism in any recognizable sense. It was intended as, and received its enormous power from, the fact that it aimed at nothing less than restructuring the cosmos. "Those who see in National Socialism nothing more than a political movement," Hitler unflinchingly observed, "know scarcely anything of it. It is more even than a religion: it is the will to create mankind anew" (Hermann Rauschning, *Gespräche mit Hitler*, Zurich, 1940, pp. 231f.). Thus, as if it were the conclusion of an immutable tautology, Hitler felt that the Jewish people must be annihilated.

In responding to the catastrophic consequences of this racial fantasy, which claimed six million Jewish lives, Jewish thinkers have explored many theological avenues—some old, some new. As to the old, Jewish history is no stranger to national tragedy and, as a consequence, there is an abundance of traditional explanatory models that could be and have been adapted and reapplied to the Holocaust. From these, six have regularly been looked to by modern thinkers as providing maps for understanding the theological complexities raised by the Holocaust.

**The 'Aqedah.** The 'Aqedah, or "binding," of Isaac, the biblical narrative recounted in *Genesis* 22:2ff., is often appealed to as a possible paradigm for approaching the Holocaust. (See, for example, Berkovits, 1973, pp. 124–125, and Neher, 1981.) Such a move is rooted in Jewish tradition, especially that of the medieval martyrologies of the Crusader and post-Crusader periods, in which the biblical event became the prism through which the horrific medieval experience became refracted and intelligible. Like Isaac of old, the Jewish children of Europe, and more generally all of slaughtered Israel, are seen as martyrs to God who willingly sacrifice themselves and their loved ones in order to prove beyond all doubt their faithfulness to the Almighty (see Shalom Spiegel, *The Last Trial*, New York, 1967, and the medieval religious poems collected in A. M. Habermann's *Sefer gezerot Ashkenaz ve-Tsarfat*, Jerusalem, 1945).

The appeal of this interpretation lies in its conferring heroic status on the dead because of their sanctity and obedience to the God of Israel. Their death is not due to sin, to any imperfection on their part, or to any violation of the covenant; rather, it is the climactic evidence

of their unwavering devotion to the faith of their fathers—not its abandonment. As a consequence, the traditional (and present-day) reproach, that what befell Israel is “because of our sins,” is wholly inappropriate. Not sin but piety is the key factor. God makes unique demands upon those who love him and whom he loves, and, as did Abraham, so too do the Jewish people respond with a fidelity of unmatched purity and selflessness. As such, the dreadful events become a test, the occasion for the maximal religious service, the absolute existential moment of the religious life, whose benefits are enjoyed both by the martyrs in the world to come and by the world as a whole, inasmuch as it benefits from such dedication.

In evaluating the appositeness of this reading of the Holocaust one appreciates its positive elements: it does not assign sin to the victims and denies sin as the cause of the horrific events that unfolded; it praises Israel's heroism and faithfulness. Yet the analogy between biblical and modern events breaks down before other elemental features of the 'Aqedah paradigm. First, in *Genesis* it is God who commands the test. Are we likewise to impute Auschwitz to a command of God? Second, in the original it is Abraham, God's especially faithful servant, who is tested because of his special religious status: “Take now thy son, thy only son, whom thou lovest” (*Gn.* 22:2). We cannot transfer, as the analogy requires, Hitler and his S.S. into the pivotal role of the Abraham who would sacrifice his “beloved.” Finally, in the biblical circumstance the angel of the Lord brings the matter to a conclusion with no blood being shed: “Lay not thy hand upon the lad, neither do thou anything to him” (*Gn.* 22:12).

**Job.** The biblical *Book of Job*, the best-known treatment of theodicy in the Hebrew Bible, naturally presents itself as a second possible model for understanding the Holocaust. (See, for example, Maybaum, 1965, p. 70, and Greenberg, 1981.) According to such a rendering—which is not unlike that offered by the 'Aqedah—*Job* provides an inviting paradigm because again Job's suffering is not caused by his sinfulness but rather by his righteousness, which is perceived by Satan as a cause for jealousy. Moreover, the tale ends on a “happy” note, as Job is rewarded for his faithfulness with God's double blessing. On a deeper level, the resolution of Job's doubts is never really clear; God's reply through the whirlwind is, in important ways, no answer to Job's questions; and Job's first wife and family are still dead through no fault of their own.

*Job* presents details that lead away from rather than toward an analogy with the Holocaust, and hence disallow the use of Job's faithfulness as an appropriate response to Hitler's demonic assault. First, the reader of

*Job* knows, by way of the prologue, that the pact between God and Satan over the conditions of Job's trial explicitly stipulates that Job not be killed. This, above all, renders the situation of Job and that of Auschwitz altogether different. Second, except for the few who survived them, all our theological ruminations are the work of those who were not in the death camps, and hence our situation is not that of Job but, as Eliezer Berkovits has said, of Job's brother. Third, the haunting matter of those who died in order to make the test possible finds no resolution in *Job*. God's capriciousness appears all too manifest. Finally, the climax of *Job* occurs when God reveals himself. He may not provide an answer to the specific bill of complaints raised by Job, but at least Job knows there is a God and hence, at a minimum, some reason to “trust in the Lord,” even if he does not understand his ways. Job receives some sort of “answer,” as Martin Buber among others has emphasized, through this manifestation of God's presence: “I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye sees thee; wherefore I abhor my words and repent” (*Jb.* 42:5–6; see Martin Buber, *At the Turning*, New York, 1952, pp. 61ff.). By contrast, those who went to their death in the death camps received no such comforting revelation of the divine.

**The Suffering Servant.** One of the richest theological doctrines of biblical theodicy is that of the Suffering Servant. Given its classic presentation in the *Book of Isaiah* (especially chapter 53), the Suffering Servant doctrine is that of vicarious suffering and atonement in which the righteous suffer for the wicked and hence alay, in some mysterious way, God's wrath and judgment, thus making the continuation of humankind possible. According to Jewish tradition, the Suffering Servant is Israel, the people of the covenant, who suffer with and for God in the midst of the evil of creation. By suffering for others, the Jewish people make it possible for creation to endure. In this act of faithfulness the guiltless establish a unique bond with the Almighty. As they suffer for and with him, he shares their suffering and agony and comes to love them in a special way for loving him with such fortitude and depth. (For the rabbinic use of this concept see, in the Babylonian Talmud, *Sanhedrin* 98b, *Berakhot* 5a, and *Sotah* 14a.)

In Jewish theological writings emanating from the Holocaust era itself and continuing down to our own day, this theme has been enunciated. One finds it in the writings of Hasidic *rebeyim* (see, for example, Kalman Kalonymus Spiro, *Esh qodesh* [Holy Fire], Jerusalem, 1960, and the material presented in *Eleh ezkerah* [These Will I Remember], edited by Isaac Lewin, 6 vols., New York, 1956–1965). It is also evinced in the work of Conservative thinkers such as Abraham Joshua Heschel

(1954 and 1955) and in that of Orthodox thinkers such as Eliezer Berkovits (1973) and Irving Greenberg (1981). "God's servant," writes Berkovits, "carries upon his shoulders God's dilemma with man through history. God's people share in all the fortunes of God's dilemma as man is bungling his way through toward Messianic realization" (p. 127).

One theologian, Ignaz Maybaum, a German Reform rabbi who survived the war in London, takes the paradigm outside the traditional Jewish framework and uses it to construct a more systematic, theological deconstruction of the Holocaust. First in the "servant of God" in *Isaiah*, then in the Jew Jesus, and now at Treblinka and Auschwitz, God uses the Jewish people to address the world and save it: "They died though innocently so that others might live" (Maybaum, 1965, p. 67). According to this reading of the Holocaust the perennial dialectic of history is God's desire that the gentile nations come close to him while they resist this call. To foster and facilitate this relationship is the special task, the "mission," of Israel. It is they who must make God's message accessible in terms the gentile nations will understand and respond to. But what language, what symbols, will speak to the nations? Modern Israel repeats collectively the single crucifixion of one Jew two millennia ago and by so doing reveals to mankind its weaknesses as well as the need for its turning to Heaven. In a daring parallelism Maybaum writes: "The Golgotha of modern mankind is Auschwitz. The cross, the Roman gallows, was replaced by the gas chamber. The gentiles, it seems, must first be terrified by the blood of the sacrificed scapegoat to have the mercy of God revealed to them and become converted, become baptized gentiles, become Christians" (ibid., p. 36). For Maybaum, through the Holocaust the world moves again forward and upward, from the final vestiges of medieval obscurantism and intolerance, of which the Sho'ah is a product, to a new era of spiritual maturity, human morality, and encounter between the human and the divine.

Applied to the Holocaust, the doctrine of the Servant seems worse than the problem: it means that God can act cruelly, demand terrible sacrifices, and regulate creation by "unacceptable" means. Surely the omnipotent, omniscient creator could have found a more satisfactory principle for directing and sustaining his creation. Recourse to mystery, to saying "God's ways are not our ways," is not an explanation; rather, it is a capitulation before the immensity of the Sho'ah and a cry of faith.

The more specific, elaborate, form given the doctrine by Maybaum empties Jewish life of all meaning other than that intelligible to and directed toward the gentile nations. Only the Christocentric pattern now applied to

the people of Israel gives this people's history and spirituality meaning. In addition, this view is predicated on a false analogy between the Holocaust and Good Friday. Christians are able to declare that "Christ died for the sins of mankind" for (at least) two cardinal reasons. The first and most weighty is that Christ is believed to be God Incarnate, the second person of the Trinity: the crucifixion is God taking the sins of mankind on himself. He is the vicarious atonement for mankind. There is thus no terrible cruelty or unspeakable "crime" but only divine love, the presence of unlimited divine grace. Second, the human yet divine Christ, the hypostatic union of man and God, mounts the cross voluntarily. He willingly "dies so that others might live." How very different was the Sho'ah. How very dissimilar its victims (not martyrs) and their fate. The murdered were not divine, they were all-too-human creatures crushed in the most unspeakable brutality. If God was the cause of their suffering, how at odds from the traditional Christian picture this is. For here God purchases life for some by sacrificing others, not himself. Furthermore, the Jews were singled out "unwillingly"; they were not martyrs in the classical sense—though we may wish to transform their fate for our needs by seeing them as such.

The disanalogy of the Holocaust and Good Friday would yet reveal something more. According to Maybaum, the symbol of the crucifixion is one of vicarious atonement. But given the circumstances of the vicarious sacrifice of the Sho'ah, is it not the case that the nature of the atonement is far more criminal and infinitely more depraved than the sins for which it atones? What sort of *kohanim* ("priests") were the Nazis, and what sort of sacrifice could they bring about? Can one truly envision God, the God of Israel, making such a vicarious expiation?

**Hester Panim.** In wrestling with human suffering, the Hebrew Bible appeals, especially in the Psalms, to the notion of *hester panim*, "the hiding of the face" of God. This concept has two meanings. The first, as in *Deuteronomy* 31:17–18 and later in *Micah* 3:4, is the causal one that links God's absence to human sin. God turns away from the sinner. The second sense, found particularly in certain psalms (e.g., *Ps.* 44, 69, 88 and variants in, e.g., *Ps.* 9, 10, 13; see also *Jb.* 13:24), suggests protest, despair, and confusion over the absence of God for no clear reason, and not as a consequence of sin. Here mankind stands "abandoned" for reasons that appear unknown and unfathomable. Thus the repetitive theme of lament in the Psalms as the psalmists implore God "why" or "how long" he will be absent.

In the rabbinic sources the term *hester panim* is further developed in a variety of contexts, most notably in

response to the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. Its employment is an indication (1) that the traditional, more widely used explanation for that event—that it was brought on by sin—is either not compelling or is being rejected; and (2) that the sages were profoundly perplexed by this and related events and yet could not or would not account for it through appeal to either human sinfulness or divine capriciousness. Their faith in divine providence required that they not abandon trust in God, but just how his will and presence was to be deciphered seemed increasingly uncertain; hence the appeal to *hester panim*.

In applying the doctrine of *hester panim* to the Holocaust, modern theologians are attempting to vindicate Israel, to remove God as the direct cause of the evil by suggesting that evil is something men do to other men, and to affirm the reality and even the saving nature of the divine despite empirical evidence to the contrary. *hester panim* is not merely or only the absence of God; rather, it entails a more complex exegesis of divine providence stemming from an analysis of the ontological nature of the divine. God's absence, *hester panim*, is a necessary, active, condition of his saving mercy; that is, his "hiddenness" is the obverse of his "long-suffering" patience with sinners. In other words, being patient with sinners means allowing sin. "One may call it the divine dilemma that God's *Erekh Apayim*, his patiently waiting countenance to some is, of necessity, identical with his *hester panim*, his hiding of the countenance, to others" (Berkovits, 1973, p. 107). *Hester panim* also is dialectically related to the fundamental character of human freedom without which man would not be man. It should also be recognized that this notion is an affirmation of faith. The lament addressed to God is a sign that God exists and that his manifest presence is still possible. Even more, it proclaims that God in his absence is still, paradoxically, present. It is a sign that one believes that ultimately evil will not triumph, for God will not always "hide his face." For some contemporary Jewish theologians, like Emil L. Fackenheim, Eliezer Berkovits, Irving Greenberg, and Martin Buber, the state of Israel is proof of the vindication of the forces of good over evil, light over darkness.

Martin Buber, in his contemporary idiom, modernized the biblical phrase and spoke of our era, during and after the Holocaust, as a time of "the eclipse of God" (as he titled his book, 1952). This felicitous description represents Buber's wish to continue to affirm the existence of God despite the counterevidence of Auschwitz. Yet this again is an appeal to faith and mystery despite strong evidence to the contrary. Also, this gambit still fails to answer the pressing question: Where was God in the death camps? Given the moral

attributes, the qualities of love and concern, that are integral to God's nature, how can we rest in the assertion of his self-willed absence, that is, in passivity, in the face of the murder of a million Jewish children. The solution only produces a larger conundrum.

**Mippenei Ḥaṭa'einu.** In biblical and later Jewish sources the principal though not unique "explanation" for human suffering was sin, as we have seen. There was a balance in the universal order that was inescapable: good brought forth blessing and sin retribution. Both on the individual and collective level the law of cause and effect, of sin and grief, operated. In our time it is not surprising that some theologians—particularly traditional ones—and certain rabbinical sages have responded to the tragedy of European Jewry with this classical "answer." Harsh as it is, the argument advanced is that Israel sinned grievously and God, after much patience and hope of return, finally "cut off" the generation of the wicked. The reasoning is expressed in the phrase *mippenei ḥaṭa'einu* ("because of our sins" are we punished). Though the majority of those who have wrestled with the theological implications of the Sho'ah have rejected this line of analysis, an important, if small, segment of the religious community have consistently advanced it.

Two questions immediately arise in pursuing the application of the age-old doctrine to the contemporary tragedy of the Holocaust. The first is: "What kind of God would exact such retribution?" Christian thinkers who "explain" Auschwitz as one of many punishments of a rebellious Israel for the crime of deicide, and Jewish thinkers who pronounce Israel's sinfulness are both obligated to reflect, to be self-conscious, about the implications of their idea of God. Could a God of love, the God of Israel, use a Hitler to annihilate the Jewish people?

Second, what sin could Israel be guilty of to warrant such retribution? Here the explanations vary depending on one's perspective. For some, such as the Satmar *rebe* Yo'el Teitelbaum (1888–1982) and his small circle of Hasidic and extreme right-wing, anti-Zionist followers, the sin that precipitated the Holocaust was Zionism. For in Zionism the Jewish people broke their covenant with God, which demanded that they not try to end their exile and thereby hasten the coming of the Messiah through their own means. In return "we have witnessed the immense manifestation of God's anger [the Holocaust]" (*Sefer va-Yo'el Mosheh*, Brooklyn, New York, 5721/1961, p. 5). For others on the right of the religious spectrum the primary crime was not Zionism but Reform Judaism. In this equation the centrality of Germany as the land that gave birth simultaneously to Reform Judaism and Nazism is undeniable proof of

their causal connection. (See, for the presentation of this position, Elhanan Wasserman, *Iqvata de-meshiḥa* [In the Footsteps of the Messiah], Tel Aviv, 5702/1942, p. 6; Ḥayyim 'Ozer Qanyevski, *Ḥayyei 'Olam* [Eternal Life], Rishon Le-Zion, 5733/1972.) In a similar, if broader vein, others of this theological predisposition identified Jewish assimilation as the root issue. Again the key role played by Germany is "proof" of the mechanism of cause and effect. Alternatively, in these same very traditional Orthodox circles, Issachar Teichthal saw the negative catalyst not in the Jewish people's Zionist activity but just the reverse, in their passionate commitment to life in exile and their failure to support willingly and freely the sanctified activity of Zionist upbuilding and thereby bring the exile to a close. In his book *Em ha-banim semehah* (The Mother of Children Is Happy), written in Hungary in 1943, Teichthal, writing in the belief that the twin events of the Holocaust and the growth of the Zionist movement marked the beginning of the messianic era, declaimed: "And these [anti-Zionist leaders] have caused even more lamentation; [and because of their opposition] we have arrived at the situation we are in today . . . this abomination in the house of Israel—endless trouble and sorrow upon sorrow—all because we despised our precious land" (*Em ha-banim semehah*, Budapest, 5703/1943, p. 17).

**The Free Will Defense.** Among philosophical reflections concerning theodicy, none has an older or more distinguished lineage than that known as the free will defense. According to this argument human evil is the necessary and ever-present possibility entailed by the reality of human freedom. If human beings are to be capable of acts of authentic morality they must be capable of acts of authentic immorality. Applying this consideration to the events of the Nazi epoch, the Sho'ah becomes a case of the extreme misuse of human freedom. At the same time such a position in no way forces a reconsideration of the cosmological structure in which the anthropological drama unfolds, nor does it call into question God's goodness and solicitude, for it is man and not God who perpetrates genocide. God observes these events with his unique divine pathos, but refrains from intercession in order to allow human morality to be substantively real. At the same time that he is long-suffering with evil elements of humanity, his patience results in the suffering of others.

This situation, however, is not ultimate or final in the Jewish context, for there is also the deeply held contention that God must absent himself for man to be but must also be present in order that meaninglessness does not ultimately gain final victory. Thus God's presence in history must be sensed as hiddenness, and his anonymity must be understood as the sign of his presence.

God reveals his power in history by curbing his might so that man too might be powerful. In Israel's experience, as Berkovits declares in making this case, one sees both attributes of God. The continued existence of the Jewish people despite its long record of suffering is the strongest single proof that God does exist despite his concealment. Israel is the witness to God's presence in space and time. Nazism understood this fact, and its slaughter of Jews was an attempt to slaughter the God of history. The Nazis were aware, even as Israel sometimes fails to be, that God's manifest reality in the world is necessarily linked to the fate of the Jewish people.

This defense has been—not surprisingly, given its historical tenacity and intellectual power—widely advocated by post-Holocaust thinkers of all shades of theological opinion. The two most notable developments of the theme in the general theological literature are in Berkovits's *Faith after the Holocaust* and Arthur A. Cohen's *The Tremendum*.

In trying to estimate the power of the free will argument in the face of Auschwitz, two counterarguments are salient. First, could not God, possessed of omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute goodness, have created a world in which there was human freedom but less evil—or even none at all? The sheer gratuitous evil manifest during the Holocaust goes beyond anything that appears logically or metaphysically necessary for the existence of freedom and beyond the bounds of toleration for a just, all-powerful God. Secondly, it might be argued that it would be morally preferable to have a world in which evil did not exist, at least not in the magnitude witnessed during the Sho'ah, even if this meant doing without certain heroic moral attributes or accomplishments. That is to say, for example, though feeding and caring for the sick or hungry is a great virtue it would be far better if there were no sickness or hunger and hence no need for such care. Here it is important to recognize that free will is not, despite a widespread tendency so to understand it, all of one piece. Free will can be limited to apply only in certain, specific circumstances, just as action can be constrained in certain ways. Consider, too, that God could have created a humankind that, while possessing free will, nonetheless also had a proportionately stronger inclination for the good and a correspondingly weaker inclination to evil.

**A New Revelation.** To this point the first six positions analyzed have all been predicated upon classical Jewish responses to national tragedy. In the last two decades, however, a number of innovative, more radical, responses have been evoked from contemporary post-Holocaust thinkers. The remainder of this article will con-

centrate on the most important of these explorations, beginning with the contention argued by Emil L. Fackenheim, that the Holocaust represents a new revelation. Rejecting any account that analyzes Auschwitz as a *mippenei ha'ata'einu* event, or, in fact, any notion of an "explanation" for the Holocaust, Fackenheim, employing a Buberian model of dialogical revelation, revelation as the personal encounter of an I with the eternal Thou (God), urges Israel to continue to believe despite the moral outrage of the Sho'ah. God, in this view, is always present in Jewish history, even at Auschwitz. We do not, and cannot, understand what he was doing at Auschwitz, or why he allowed it, but we must insist that he was there. Still more, from the death camps as from Sinai, God commands Israel. The nature of this commanding voice, what Fackenheim has called the "614th Commandment" (there are 613 commandments in traditional Judaism) is: "Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories" (1970, p. 84); that is, Jews are under a sacred obligation to survive; after the death camps Jewish existence itself is a holy act; Jews are under a sacred obligation to remember the martyrs; Jews are, as Jews, forbidden to despair of redemption or to become cynical about the world and man, for to submit to cynicism is to abdicate responsibility for the world and to deliver the world into the hands of Nazism and similar potentially evil forces. And above all, Jews are "forbidden to despair of the God of Israel, lest Judaism perish" (*ibid.*). The voice that speaks from Auschwitz above all demands that Hitler win no posthumous victories, that no Jew do what Hitler could not do. Fackenheim invests the Jewish will for survival with transcendental significance. Precisely because others would eradicate Jews from the earth, Jews are commanded to resist annihilation. Paradoxically, Hitler makes Judaism after Auschwitz a necessity.

This interesting, highly influential response to the Sho'ah requires detailed analysis. How do historical events become "revelatory"? And what exactly does Fackenheim mean by the term *commandment*? In the older, traditional theological vocabulary of Judaism, it meant something God actually "spoke" to the people of Israel. Fackenheim, however, would reject this literal meaning in line with his dialogical premises. It would seem that for him the word has only analogical or metaphorical sense in this case; if so, what urgency and compelling power does it retain? Secondly, should Hitler gain such prominence in Jewish theology, to the extent that Judaism survives primarily in order to spite his dark memory? In raising these two issues we only begin to do justice to the richness and ingenuity of Fackenheim's position.

**The Covenant Broken: A New Age.** A second modern thinker who has urged continued belief in the God of Israel, though on new terms, is Irving Greenberg. For Greenberg all the old truths and certainties have been destroyed by the Holocaust. Any simple faith is now impossible. Greenberg explicates this radical notion in this way. There are three major periods in the covenantal history of Israel. The first is the biblical era. What characterizes this first covenantal stage is the asymmetry of the relationship between God and Israel. The biblical encounter may be a covenant, but it is clearly a covenant in which "God is the initiator, the senior partner, who punishes, rewards and enforces the punishment if the Jews slacken" (Greenberg, 1981, p. 6). This type of relationship culminated in the crisis engendered by the destruction of the First Temple in 587/6 BCE. To this tragedy Israel, through the prophets, in keeping with the logic of this position, responded primarily through the doctrine of self-chastisement: the destruction was divine punishment rather than rejection or proof of God's nonexistence.

The second, rabbinic phase in the transformation of the covenant idea is marked by the destruction of the Second Temple. The reaction of the rabbis was to argue that now Jews must take a more equal role in the covenant, becoming true partners with the Almighty. "The manifest divine presence and activity was being reduced but the covenant was actually being renewed (*ibid.*, p. 7). For the destruction signaled the initiation of an age in which God would be less manifest though still present.

Greenberg believes that a "third great cycle in Jewish history" has come about as a consequence of the Holocaust. The Sho'ah marks a new era in which the Sinaitic covenantal relationship was shattered and thus an unprecedented form of covenantal relationship, if there is to be any covenantal relationship at all, must come into being to take its place. "In retrospect, it is now clear that the divine assignment to the Jews was untenable. After the Holocaust, it is obvious that this role opened the Jews to a total murderous fury from which there was no escape. . . . Morally speaking, then, God can have no claims on the Jews by dint of the Covenant." What this means, Greenberg argues, is that the covenant

can no longer be commanded and subject to a serious external enforcement. It cannot be commanded because morally speaking—covenantally speaking—one cannot order another to step forward to die. One can give an order like this to an enemy, but in a moral relationship, I cannot demand giving up one's life. I can ask for it or plead for it—but I cannot order it. (*ibid.*, p. 23)

Out of this complex of considerations, Greenberg pronounces the fateful judgment: the Jewish covenant with God is now voluntary. Jews have, quite miraculously, chosen to continue to retain their Jewish identity and to build a collective Jewish state, the ultimate symbol of Jewish continuity. But these acts are, after Auschwitz, the result of the free choice of the Jewish people. The consequence of this voluntary action transforms the existing covenantal order. First Israel was a junior partner, then an equal partner, and finally, after Auschwitz, it becomes the senior partner, "so in love with the dream of redemption that it volunteered to carry on with its mission" (ibid., p. 25).

In turn, Israel's voluntary acceptance of the covenant and its continued will to survive suggest three corollaries. First, these factors point, if obliquely, to the continued existence of the God of Israel. By creating the state of Israel, by raising Jewish children, Israel shows that "covenantal hope is not in vain" (ibid., pp. 37–38). Second, in an age of voluntarism rather than coercion, living as a Jew under the covenant can no longer be interpreted monolithically, that is, only in strict halakhic (traditional rabbinic) fashion. Third, any aspects of religious behavior that demean the image of the divine or of humanity, such as racial prejudice, sexism, and oppression of all sorts, must be purged.

Interpretation of Greenberg's view must turn on the following issues: the correctness of his theological reading of Jewish history, an open and difficult question; the theological meaning and status of key categories such as "covenant," "revelation," "commandment," and the like—that is, on the one hand, whether Greenberg has done justice to the classical meaning of these terms, and, on the other, whether his revised rendering is justifiable and functional; and whether we should allow Hitler and the Holocaust such decisive power in determining the inner, authentic nature of Jewish theology.

**A Redefinition of God.** An important school in modern theological circles known as "process theology," inspired by the work of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, has argued that the classical understanding of God has to be quite dramatically revised, especially in terms of our conception of God's power and direct, causal involvement in human affairs. According to those who advance this thesis God certainly exists, but the old and the more recent difficulties of theodicy and related metaphysical problems emanating from classical theism arise precisely because of an inadequate description of the Divine, a description that incorrectly ascribes to God attributes of omnipotence and omniscience.

Arthur A. Cohen, in his *The Tremendum: A Theological*

*Interpretation of the Holocaust* (1981), made a related proposal. Although he draws on the writing of F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) and on Qabbalah (Jewish mysticism) as his sources, he is no doubt also familiar with the work of the process theologians. After arguing for the enormity of the Holocaust, its uniqueness, and its transcendence of any meaning, Cohen suggested that the way out of the dilemma posed by classical thought is to rethink whether "national catastrophes are compatible with our traditional notions of a beneficent and providential God" (p. 50). For Cohen the answer is no, at least to the extent that the activity and nature of the providential God must be reconceptualized. Against the traditional view that asks, given its understanding of God's action in history, how it could be that God witnessed the Holocaust and remained silent, Cohen would pose the contrary "dipolar" thesis that "what is taken as God's speech is really always man's hearing, that God is not the strategist of our particularities or of our historical condition, but rather the mystery of our futurity, always our *posse*, never our acts" (p. 97). That is, "if we begin to see God less as an interferer whose insertion is welcome (when it accords with our needs) and more as the immensity whose reality is our refiguration . . . we shall have won a sense of God whom we may love and honor, but whom we no longer fear and from whom we no longer demand" (ibid.).

This redescription of God, coupled with a form of the free will defense, made all the more plausible because God is now not a direct causal agent in human affairs, resolves much of the tension created by the *tremendum*.

This deconstruction of classical theism and its substitution by theological dipolarity fails to deal adequately with the problem of God's attributes. Is God still God if no longer the providential agency in history? Is God still God who lacks the power to enter history vertically to perform the miraculous? Is such a "dipolar" God still the God to whom one prays, the God of salvation? Put the other way round, it certainly does not appear to be the God of the covenant, nor the God of Exodus and Sinai, nor yet the God of the prophets and the *ḥurban bayit ri'shon* ("destruction of the First Temple") and the *ḥurban bayit sheni* ("destruction of the Second Temple"). These counterevidences suggest that Cohen's God is not the God of the Bible and rabbinic tradition. Hence it is legitimate to ask whether, if Cohen is right—indeed, particularly if Cohen is right—there is any meaning left in Judaism, in the idea of God in Jewish tradition, or any covenantal role or meaning left to the Jewish people? Cohen's revisionism in this particular area is so radical that it sweeps away the biblical

ground of Jewish faith and tradition and allows the biblical evidence to count not at all against his own speculative metaphysical hypotheses.

Secondly, is the dipolar, noninterfering God "whom we no longer fear and from whom we no longer demand" yet worthy of our "love and honor?" This God seems closer, say, to Plato's Demiurge or perhaps better still to the God of the deists. What difference in our lives is there between this God and no God at all? What sense is there, given his noninterference, in calling him a God of love and salvation?

Nevertheless, *The Tremendum* is an important work of Jewish theology that forces us to engage in theology as few recent books by Jewish authors have and that is saturated with an intense concern with the people of Israel; it is the product of a deep and broadly educated mind.

**God Is Dead.** It is natural that many should have responded to the horror of the Holocaust with unbelief. Such skepticism usually takes a nonsystematic, almost intuitive, form: "I can no longer believe." However, one contemporary Jewish theologian, Richard L. Rubenstein, has provided a formally structured "death of God" theology as a response to the Sho'ah.

In Rubenstein's view the only honest response to the death camps is the rejection of God, the statement "God is dead," and the open recognition of the meaninglessness of existence. Our life is neither planned nor purposeful, there is no divine will, and the world does not reflect divine concern. Mankind must now reject its illusions and recognize the existential truth that life is not intrinsically valuable, that the human condition reflects no transcendental purpose, and that history reveals no providence. All theological "rationalizations" of Auschwitz pall before its enormity and, for Rubenstein, the only worthy reaction is the rejection of the entire Jewish theological framework: there is no God and no covenant with Israel. Drawing heavily upon the atheistic existentialists such as Camus, Sartre, and earlier Nietzsche, Rubenstein interprets this to mean that in the face of history's meaninglessness human beings must create and project meaning.

What makes Rubenstein's theology a Jewish theology are the implications he draws from his radical negation with respect to the people of Israel. Rubenstein inverts our ordinary perception and argues that with the death of God, the existence of the *community* of Israel is all the more important. Now that there is nowhere else to turn for meaning, Jews need each other all the more to create meaning: "It is precisely because human existence is tragic, ultimately hopeless, and without meaning that we treasure our religious community" (1966, p. 68). Though Judaism has to be "demythologized," that

is, it has to renounce all normative claims to a unique "chosen" status, at the same time it paradoxically gains heightened importance in the process.

Coupled to this psychoanalytic revisionism in Rubenstein's ontology is a mystical paganism in which the Jew is urged to forgo history and return to the cosmic rhythms of natural existence. The modern Jew is exhorted to recognize the priorities of nature. So, for example, he must come to understand that the real meaning of messianism is "the proclamation of the end of history and return to nature and nature's cyclical repetitiveness" (*ibid.*, p. 135). The future and final redemption is not to be the conquest of nature by history, as traditionally conceived in the Jewish tradition, but rather the conquest of history by nature and the return of all things to their primal origins. Man has to rediscover the sanctity of his bodily life and reject forever the delusion of overcoming it; he must submit to and enjoy his physicality—not try to transform or transcend it. Rubenstein sees the renewal of Zion and the rebuilding of the land with its return to the soil as a harbinger of this return to nature on the part of the Jew who has been removed from the earth (symbolically, from nature) by theology and necessity for almost two thousand years. The return to the land points toward the final escape of the Jew from the negativity of history to the vitality and promise of self-liberation through nature.

Rubenstein's challenging position raises two especially difficult issues. The first has to do with how one evaluates Jewish history as "evidence" for and against the existence of God. It may well be that the radical theologian sees Jewish history too narrowly. He takes *the* decisive event of Jewish history to be the death camps. Logic and conceptual adequacy require that if we give negative theological weight to Auschwitz we must give positive theological weight to the re-creation of the Jewish state, an event of equal or greater import in Jewish history. Another issue raised by the question of "evidence" is the adoption by Rubenstein of an empiricist theory of meaning as the measure by which to judge the status of God's existence. History, in its totality, provides evidence both for and against the nonexistence of God on empirical or verificationist grounds—that is, there is both good and bad in history.

**Mystery and Silence.** In the face of the Holocaust, recourse to the God of mystery and human silence are not unworthy options. However, there are two kinds of silence, two kinds of employment of the idea of a God of mystery. The first is closer to the attitude of the agnostic: "I cannot know." Hence all profound existential and intellectual wrestling with the enormous problems raised by the Sho'ah and with God after the Sho'ah are avoided. The second is the silence and mystery that Job



and many of the prophets manifest, to which the Bible points in its recognition of God's elemental otherness. This is the silence that comes after struggling with and reproaching God, after feeling his closeness or his painful absence. This silence, this mystery, is the silence and mystery of seriousness, of that authenticity that will not diminish the tragedy with a too quick answer, yet that, having forced reason to its limits, recognizes the limits of reason. Had Abraham accepted God's judgment at Sodom too quickly, or Job his suffering in a too easy silence, they would have betrayed the majesty and morality of the God in whom they trusted. In the literary responses to Auschwitz by survivors one finds this attitude more commonly than in works of overt theology. It is preeminent, for example, in the novels of Elie Wiesel, André Schwarz-Bart, and Primo Levi and in the poetry of Nelly Sachs. Assuredly, there is great difficulty in ascertaining when thought has reached its limit and silence and mystery become proper, but, at the same time, there is the need to know when to speak in silence.

[See also *Jewish Thought and Philosophy, article on Modern Thought.*]

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STEVEN T. KATZ

**HOLY, IDEA OF THE.** [This entry attempts an assessment of the role of the German theologian Rudolf Otto and his book *The Idea of the Holy* in setting forth a distinctively phenomenological interpretation of the nature of religion.]

Rudolf Otto's work during the first half of his career culminated with his publication, at the age of forty-eight, of *Das Heilige* (1917), translated as *The Idea of the Holy* (1923). Published in an age of high hopes for science, it has as a central concern the assertion of the autonomy of religion. Otto's position is diametrically opposed to what has come to be called reductionism, that is, the explanation of religion as a creation of human culture, a response to psychological or social needs that is in some sense the product of those needs. Otto, by contrast, asserts the autonomy of religion in the sphere of its own activity and its status as a response to a power transcending the human.

A landmark among theories of religion, Otto's book appeared only five years after the major work by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. To situate Otto in European intellectual history, it will be useful to discuss Durkheim briefly. This is not because of any direct response by Otto to Durkheim; as far as can be told, they never met in person, nor did the German theologian and the French sociologist discuss each other's

works. Rather, the contrast between these two influential books demonstrates the presence of an issue that has persisted in the interpretation of religion. Durkheim, who analyzes the sacred as originating in a symbolic projection of the clan or tribal group identity, stands as a polar opposite to Otto, who portrays the holy as a power far greater than, and lying far beyond, the human realm.

Although Otto does not seem to have reacted directly to Durkheim, he did write an article in 1910 that was sharply critical of a figure Durkheim found attractive: the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, whose *Völkerpsychologie* (Leipzig, 1900–1909) offered an evolutionary theory of religion as a social phenomenon, the product of group fantasy. Otto flatly denied the possibility of a social account of customs and myths in the absence of a capacity for religious feeling in the individual, and he asserted the uniqueness of such a feeling as a distinctively human spiritual capacity.

The significance of Rudolf Otto's work is that it takes account of the cumulative critical and scientific tradition of modern Europe and claims a place of respect for religious experience and religious thought in a modern age. That critical heritage, too vast to be set forth in detail here, included the institutional challenges to church authority of the Renaissance, Reformation, and French Revolution. It included the rationalist critique of revealed knowledge made by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. It included nineteenth-century scientific discovery, comprehending a view of the evolution of human biology that many saw as paradigmatic for culture as well. And it included comparative linguistic, historical, and cultural studies fueled by an expanding fund of information from Europe's contact with the rest of the world; this new knowledge tended to remove the element of uniqueness from various aspects of the Christian heritage. Otto, then, was a product of modern European culture, seeking an up-to-date but sympathetic expression of religion in terms of what that culture had at its disposal.

**Religious Feeling.** By and large, the use of the expression *the holy* as a noun has spread since the appearance of Rudolf Otto's book, and as a direct result of it. Otto was not the first to employ *the holy* as a noun; that distinction may belong to the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915), who did so in an essay in 1903. In any event, the pattern of making noun concepts out of adjectival qualities was not new; for instance, we find the term *das Göttliche* ("the divine") in the writings of the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831).

In the academic study of religion in the English-speaking world, reference to *the holy* has implied an ap-

preciation of divine potency as a reality. The usefulness of the term has been generic: it has been possible to take references to the source or object of religious veneration as examples of human religiosity generally, without committing oneself to the affirmations or practices of a particular community and tradition.

The subtitle of Otto's *The Idea of the Holy* declares his agenda: *An Inquiry into the Nonrational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational*. Otto was not seeking to deny an important role to rationality. Far from it. Otto, in the tradition of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), insisted that reason could operate *a priori* to establish mathematics, rules of inference, and the like, and could operate *a posteriori* to distill impressive amounts of information from sense data. In particular, Otto sought to extend and refine the application of the Kantian critique of reason promoted by Kant's disciple Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843). We today who read *Das Heilige* in isolation should note Otto's priorities in his foreword to the 1923 English translation: "I feel that no one ought to concern himself with the 'Numen ineffabile' who has not already devoted assiduous and serious study to the 'Ratio aeterna.'" Religious orthodoxy in general, and Christian doctrine in particular, have a tendency toward rationalization, Otto asserts. But while highly developed rational, conceptual systems have their place, Christian theology has tended to overlook the nonrational element in religious experience. It is this element that Otto seeks to characterize and illustrate in *Das Heilige* as "something remarkably specific and unique" (p. 4).

The principal and abiding interest of Rudolf Otto's philosophy of religion during the twentieth century has centered on his description of religious experience. In *Das Heilige* Otto presented as characteristic of religion a particular awareness of the presence of divinity for which he coined the word *numinous*. He derived the word from *numen*, the Latin term for a divine spirit or localized power that the ancient Romans perceived in nature. The numinous, for Otto, is a feeling that one has as a creature in the presence of a superior power. Otto gives it a three-factor explication: it is the awareness of a mystery (something wholly other than ourselves), which is *tremendum* (awe-inspiring, overpowering, possessed of its own emotionlike initiative) yet at the same time fascinating (such that we are drawn to seek communication with it). Having set this forth in forty pages, Otto seeks in the balance of the book to describe ways in which the sense of the numinous is expressed in religious art, in biblical literature, and in the writings of the Christian mystics. Writing as a Lutheran, Otto is particularly interested in mystical elements in the faith of Martin Luther.

Although *Das Heilige* seems to start out as a treatment of a philosophical problem, namely the role of the rational and the nonrational as sources of religious knowledge, the bulk of the book is not so much an argument as a collection of illustrations. Herein perhaps lie both the book's weakness and its strength. The reader is drawn into material from the history of religious life rather than the history of doctrine, drawn into territory which is more psychological or symbolic than conceptual. Bit by bit, we are shown that a religiously satisfying response to the Kantian problem of knowledge of the transcendent is likely to be a deeply personal rather than a rationally analytical one. Otto is by no means the first religious philosopher to have made such a point; the limits of reason had been discussed by early Christian theologians, and the twelfth-century Muslim thinker Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī proposed a particularly appealing synthesis of the roles of reason and experience. But Otto's innovation appears to have been to provide a structure for the description of feeling and in so doing to commend feeling itself to people of a rational bent.

Otto's term *numinous* has subsequently become part of the general vocabulary of the study of religion, often in two senses. In one of these senses, the quality inheres in the experience; one has a numinous experience or feeling, numinosity or numinousness is an aspect of that experience or feeling, and the reality that is held to exist is an event in the consciousness of the religious individual. In the other of these senses, *numinous* refers to the quality of that presumed reality beyond the individual; it produces, or is the object of, that experience or feeling, and it is held by religious participants and religiously committed observers to be a reality far transcending the experience of any one individual.

Essentially, in the rhetoric of Otto's presentation, both of these connotations of the term *numinous* are implied; Otto wants the term to function in both senses. On page 7 of *The Idea of the Holy* he says, "I shall speak, then, of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied." The overall thrust of Otto's presentation involves the conviction that there exist not only a state of mind and a realm of value as two distinct realities, but that the first of these is intimately linked to the second and constitutes a form of evidence for it.

For centuries a recurring problem of religious philosophy has been whether anything in the realm of the transcendent or divine can be demonstrated to the uncommitted or skeptical inquirer to be an existing reality. On the whole, the post-Kantian consensus has been that there is no "objective" knowledge of the transcen-

dent possible through the operation of reason on the data received from the senses. Experience of the transcendent, however compelling to the person who has it, is not necessarily compellingly transferable to the person who does not have it.

Although the bulk of Otto's book amounts to a descriptive inventory of various people's intense experiences of divine power, which seeks to elicit an appreciation of intensely felt religion (particularly of mysticism) from the reader, the inescapable fact that Otto himself realizes is that there is no demonstration by argument that can substitute for religious experience itself. Perhaps the best-known phrases in *The Idea of the Holy* appear on page 8:

The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, or, say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious feelings.

This fundamental element of religion, the sense of the numinous, is held to be a primary datum of human experience. The explicit contention appears to be that, as in the case of physical sensations, emotions, or aesthetic feelings, if one has not had the experience, one cannot understand the subject; and it is at least loosely implied that if one has had the experience, one can.

Otto appears to expect people to have had religious experience. But his memorable injunction "to read no farther" takes on significance because it is evident that religious experience is not universal—that is, it is something that some people have and others do not. Even if most people have it and only a few lack it, there are still some persons who must be treated as rational, as perceptive, yet not as religious. Thus religiousness, however characteristic it may be of humans in general, and however "normal" it may be, is not universal. This normality or normativeness of religion, not the universality of religion, can be seen as both a strength and a weakness of Otto's position: a strength, in that many have been tempted to take the objects of religion as experientially evident without exhaustive rational proof; but a weakness, in that for those who seek such a proof there is nothing conclusive forthcoming.

**Semantics of "Holy" in English.** One of the more interesting aspects of the use of Otto's discussion of the holy in the two generations since his book appeared is the widespread equation between the terms *the holy* and *the sacred* in writings sympathetic to religion in general. [See also *Sacred and the Profane, The.*]

Speakers of English are not surprised to find in their language two common and near-synonymous terms for the same phenomenon. In instance after instance, a word of Germanic (Anglo-Saxon) background such as *get* or *gut* will be matched by a word of Romanic (Latin or French) origin such as *obtain* or *intestine*. Frequently the Germanic word is felt to be more direct or down-to-earth. But while the word of Romanic origin may connote greater sophistication, its denoted meaning may often be the same as the Germanic. The result is that speakers of English can display a tendency to expect synonyms, to assume for practical purposes an equivalence in terminology, without seriously testing the matter.

An instance of this disposition is that in the English-speaking world, writers on the nature of religion in general have referred sometimes to *the holy* and sometimes to *the sacred* as though the phenomena were identical and the terminology a rather incidental matter of personal taste. This has been true not merely when the subject has been mentioned in passing apropos of another argument; it has also been the case in critical works on this very topic, such as Mircea Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane*, or in discussions of Eliade such as Thomas J. J. Altizer's *Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred* (Philadelphia, 1963, p. 24). Eliade's generation has invested *the sacred* with the same connotations that Otto's generation found in *the holy*, a point to which we shall return shortly. Otto's English translator, John W. Harvey, assumes *the sacred* and *the holy* to mean the same thing in a sentence he adds to the text of *The Idea of the Holy* at a prominent juncture at the end of the first chapter. And in his own appendix to the English translation, "The Expression of the Numinous in English" (*The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 216-220), he finds *holy* "a distinctly more numinous word than *sacred*" but does not specify a difference in denotation. Indeed, for Harvey the two terms are part of "the English wealth of synonyms" that "has presented the translator with an embarrassment at the very outset" (p. 216).

On equivalency of vocabulary, it should be noted that while English is one of the world's more self-consciously cosmopolitan languages, it is by no means the only one. The Norman conquest of England in the eleventh century, which superimposed a Latin vocabulary on a Germanic one, is suggestively parallel to the Islamic conquest of Iran in the seventh century, which gave Persian a massive inventory of Arabic loanwords as synonyms for the vocabulary of pre-Islamic Iran.

What does the English word *holy* mean? For the range of its usage, with dated examples of the first appearance of various senses, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1933) provides three copious pages of material. For our pur-

poses, the usage divides into three categories: first, the attributes of God (who is definitively holy) or the divine; second, the attributes of things that derive their holiness from association with God; and third, the attributes of people and actions conforming to what is held to be God's expectation. On God as holy, one has such phrases as "Holy art thou," "the Holy One of Israel," and the like. Examples of holy things are the Holy Bible and the Holy Grail. For people and actions, consider the phrases "holy man," "to lead a holy life," etc. Inevitably, there are borderline cases: "holy matrimony" falls under the second heading if one regards it as an institution (and therefore a "thing"), but under the third if it is seen as an activity.

*Sacred* may today be a near equivalent of *holy*, but it differs in two important respects. First, it is more recent as a word in English. Whereas *holy*, a term of Germanic origin, occurred in Old and Middle English, *sacred*, coming from Latin by way of French, made its appearance only gradually in the centuries after the Norman conquest. Second, *sacred* took over some, but by no means all, of the semantic range of *holy*: specifically, it referred to respected or venerated objects but not to the divine itself and not to persons as individuals. The God of the Bible did not become the "sacred one of Israel," nor did a "holy man" become a "sacred man."

What was at stake in the extension of the word *sacred* in English usage appears to have been an effort to describe the veneration accorded by human beings rather than to assert that the thing in question had been hallowed by God. *Sacred*, a past participle of a now-archaic verb *sacren*, meaning "to consecrate," implicitly commits the speaker or writer merely to a description of human veneration, whereas *holy* may more likely imply that the user of the term holds that the object in question has indeed been hallowed by God. *Sacred*, though frequently used by religiously committed persons, had also the potential of being a descriptive term used by an outsider to a religious community, while *holy* was much more exclusively a participant's term. Thus, we say "the holy Bible" in a context where the book is treated with reverence, but in referring to others' scriptures we are comfortable with expressions such as "the sacred books of the East."

A telling illustration of this difference appears in English translations of the Bible. In the King James Version of 1611, the Hebrew *qadosh* is regularly rendered as *holy*, whereas in the Revised Standard Version of 1946-1952, it is sometimes *holy* but in other cases *sacred*; the instances in which the twentieth-century translators departed from the usage of their seventeenth-century predecessors have primarily to do with the cultic utensils of the Hebrew temple, a ritual expression of religion

from which mid-twentieth-century Protestant biblical scholarship appears to have sought to keep a distance, feeling presumably that God's real intent for people was located elsewhere than in the Hebrew sacrifices.

Conduct is an area in which *sacred* has never taken over the territory of *holy*. A person, to be holy, must conform to the divine standards of conduct: either ritual, or moral, or both. Thus holiness, through the centuries, has been the pattern of obedience put forward as the ideal for the pious devotee which, when most supremely achieved, renders one a holy person—a "saint." Holiness, in this sense of religious practice, was a prime goal for a religiously motivated person, and was self-consciously reflected on. Indeed, the content of articles on holiness in theological dictionaries and encyclopedias prior to the twentieth century was regularly a discussion of the ideals of the religious life and not a generic discussion of the holy as we have come to treat it.

The second decade of the twentieth century saw a shift from such devotional discussions of holiness to a more comparative treatment. A pioneer in this development was the Swedish historian of religions (and subsequently archbishop) Nathan Söderblom (1866–1931), who contributed a substantial article on holiness to the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (vol. 6, 1913). As Otto would do four years later, Söderblom sought not to discuss so much the practice of holiness in the sense of an attribute of human conduct as the awareness of it in the sense of an attribute of divinity. To accomplish this discussion cross-culturally, Söderblom recapitulated various terms suggestive of supernatural power, such as the positive holiness of *mana* and the negative holiness of *taboo*, from the languages of tribal societies—terms that had come to be used by late nineteenth-century European and American theorists of religion to indicate the most pervasive, the simplest, the most fundamental, and presumably the original feature of religion throughout human culture. Cross-cultural discussions of the nature of religion had been common since the work of F. Max Müller on comparative mythology in the mid-nineteenth century. It appears, however, to have been Söderblom who first applied the term *holiness* to such a topic.

**Translation Equivalents.** The semantic differentiation between *sacred* and *holy* that I have sketched is limited to English and is not necessarily found in other languages. Elsewhere we might expect to find (a) two (or more) terms, possibly with a different distinction than that between *sacred* and *holy* in English; (b) one term, covering both senses; or (c) no readily identifiable vocabulary equivalent.

Latin and the languages descended from it are an example of the first possibility; German and Russian, of

the second; and the languages of certain tribal cultures appear to furnish examples of the last category.

Latin has two words that have been frequently translated as "holy": *sanctum* and *sacrum*. Unlike the situation in English, where two words have etymological sources in different languages, the two Latin terms go back to the same Indo-European root, *sak-*, with an *-n*-infix occurring in the case of *sanctum*. The spheres of use of the two Latin terms, however, appear roughly parallel to English. On the whole, *sanctum*, like *holy*, generally commits the speaker to an endorsement of the holiness in question as a reality, and it applies to the divine power (God is *sanctus*) and to the conduct of individuals (*saint* being derived from *sanctus*). *Sacrum*, on the other hand, denotes human veneration.

Latin's "daughter languages," which emerged from vernacular Latin in the Middle Ages, preserve this vocabulary distinction. From *sanctum* come *santo* in Italian and Spanish, *saint* in French; while from *sacrum* come Italian *sacro*, Spanish *sagrado*, and French *sacré*. Yet in the usage of these various languages, it is not always the case that the same adjective is applied to a particular object. If for *holy* we would expect *sanctum* and its derivatives rather than *sacrum*, then French usage will meet our expectations with *la sainte Bible*, but Latin, Italian, and Spanish will surprise us with *Biblia sacra* (or, in Spanish, *sagrada*). Could it be that Catholic Europe did not hold the Bible in as high regard as did the Protestants, who turned to it as a source of authority over against that of the church? Such a view might fit in with the Italian and Spanish usage, but hardly explains the expression *la sainte Bible* in French. This illustration, then, may be sufficient to convince us that the semantic distinction between *holy* and *sacred* can serve as an indicator of a potential confusion but not necessarily as a precise tool with which to resolve it.

German has not classically had two terms to use. To be sure, there is a word *sakral*, meaning "cultic," but only in recent years has it seen much use as in noun form for an organizing concept, and even then it is primarily used to translate *the sacred* from works in other languages. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, *heilig* covered what we have reviewed as the participant's semantic field of English *holy* as well as the observer's connotation of English *sacred*. As long as Western discourse regarding religion dealt almost exclusively with the received Judeo-Christian tradition, and as long as the disposition of most speakers was to accept at least a major subset of the tenets of that tradition, pressure for precision tended not to arise. Indeed, it can be argued that Rudolf Otto tapped the predispositions of a largely willing audience when he published *Das Heilige*.

Writing in a language in which *the holy* and *the sacred* are one and the same, he was able to combine a participant's appreciation of religious experience with an observer's range of comparative detail. To a very considerable extent, the excitement that he generated revolved around his call for a participant's appreciation of religion, but this was focused on his discussion of experience; neither he nor his readers directed attention to the "insider" connotation built into the German term *heilig*. To the extent that readers thought about the word, it appears they gave Otto credit for having given it a more comparative or cross-cultural denotation.

The capacity of the German word *heilig* to leave open the possibility of God-given holiness, while also referring to human respect, has had more than minor consequences. A German scholar, Albert Mirgeler (1901–) mentions the semantics of holiness as a contributing factor to the medieval investiture controversy, a major political struggle involving northern versus southern Europe over the role of the Roman church in the designation of rulers (*Mutations of Western Christianity*, London and New York, 1964, pp. 96–97). What may have been only a claim for human respect in the Latin name *sacrum imperium Romanum* came to be understood as a more sweeping claim in its German translation, *heiliges römisches Reich* ("Holy Roman Empire"). One must be cautious in pressing this point, for, after all, a divine sanction for the power of the state *was* claimed; and, moreover, many examples could be adduced to show that where words are ambiguous people do have ways of identifying the ambiguity and deciding which sense of a word applies. Still, the possibility of confusion was clearly present.

Russian is another language with only one common word for *holy* and *sacred*: *sviaty*. Rudolf Otto expressed fascination with the chanting of this term, which he had heard from the lips of Russian priests. Again in the Russian case, there are theopolitical overtones. For centuries prior to the victory of Marxist atheism in our own land, Russians referred to their land (both its territory and its tradition as a state) as *sviaty Rus*, "holy Russia." Russia is not the only territory that has been called holy; specific temple precincts frequently are, and the land of the Bible is called "the Holy Land" ("Terra Sancta," etc.) in the various languages of Christendom. But the holiness claimed for Russia is probably best understood at the level of Latin *sacrum*, not *santum*, at a level, in short, not like the spiritual holiness associated with the Holy Land but like the institutional sacredness of the Holy Roman Empire.

Researchers in comparative and cross-cultural studies have generally been ready to suppose that there exists in tribal societies on all continents, as well as in all

the great classic traditions of the Eurasian land mass, a universal human pattern of setting apart certain moments in time or precincts in space and of finding in them hints of a transcendent power or value. It seems to be granted that the *phenomenon* of a sense of the sacred or holy is virtually universal. It is, however, far less clear that appropriate *vocabulary* is equally widespread. There appear to be languages without an equivalent covering the same range of meaning as the word *holy*. This is a problem encountered frequently by Bible translators, whose attempts to render *Holy Spirit* have sometimes yielded expressions like "clean ancestor" in the target language.

Indeed, much of the principal ritual expression of holiness is bound up with the notion of purity. For persons most familiar with the religious tradition of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, this may be not immediately evident, since many interpreters in recent centuries have concentrated on an ethical conception of holiness, crediting the Hebrew prophets or Jesus with a repudiation of ritual. The intimate relationship between holiness and purity can also be overlooked because a separate vocabulary for purity exists in both Hebrew and Greek. But the notion that the holy itself, as well as human beings who seek to draw near to it, should be kept apart from the profane, finds symbolic as well as practical expression in the avoidance of various sorts of contaminating or polluting substances and actions. Jewish avoidance of pork, Muslim traditions regarding fasting, Christian practice of celibacy, Zoroastrian precautions to safeguard the holy fire, traditional Hindu dietary and social taboos, Shintō ablutions at shrines—all these and many more are instances of the maintenance of some sense of purity worthy of holiness in the "great" religions. It should be no surprise that when investigators of tribal traditions have looked at behavior expressing a sense of, or response to, the sacred, the maintenance of standards of purity has been a salient finding. Where an explicit theoretical conceptualization of holiness has seemed to be lacking, emphasis on ritual purity has offered an obvious approximation in the custom and the languages of tribal societies.

**Otto's Legacy.** One of the principal options in the study of religion in the mid-twentieth century has been termed the "phenomenology" of religion. Definitions of this term have varied from strict to loose. Understood strictly, the phenomenology of religion is supposed to be a precise application to religion of insights from the European philosophical movement known as phenomenology, launched by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), in which the self's awareness of what presents itself to consciousness is explored. Phenomenology in that sense has little to do with Rudolf Otto, since he antedated

many of the philosophical phenomenologists and did not employ their terminology; to the extent that philosophical phenomenology has influenced the phenomenology of religion, that influence has occurred through certain comparativists writing since Otto's time, particularly in Holland.

In a looser sense of the term, however, Otto was a phenomenologist of religion, indeed one of the pioneers of the enterprise. If by *phenomenology* one means the type of sympathetic treatment of material from a variety of religious traditions, seeing recurring features of religion as a response to a divine stimulus, in the pattern of the Dutch comparativists of the 1930s through the 1960s, then this name for the approach can be applied retroactively to Rudolf Otto. After Otto's time, this sympathetic treatment of religion in general, stressing similarities (which refrained from arguing the superiority of one tradition over another, stressing differences), would become a major methodological option in the academic study of religion. Many of its practitioners would look back to Rudolf Otto's work of 1917 as a charter document for phenomenology's attitude of sympathy for religion (Mircea Eliade does this in *The Sacred and the Profane*, for example), just as they would look back to P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* (Manual of the Science of Religion; 1887–1889) as a prototype of phenomenology of religion's taxonomic treatment of data from various religions.

One does not need to be a comparativist to appreciate, and to be influenced by, Rudolf Otto's presentation of the holy in *Das Heilige*. In fact, what made Otto's book a theological best-seller was only marginally the existence in the first quarter of the twentieth century of a cross-cultural cosmopolitanism with respect to religion. Such an interest would account far more for the sales of James G. Frazer's *Golden Bough* (1897; 3d ed., 1907–1911), whose net effect was to explain away various religious practices as benighted and to suggest that modern men and women had outgrown traditional religion. Much more important was a widespread desire to hold that traditional religion could be felt, if not proved, to be authentic even in a modern age. Most people who read Otto were looking for intellectual and psychological respectability for their own religious faith, not for an elaboration of the faith of others. And it has become commonplace to suggest that the events of World War I, by shattering many easy assumptions of the inevitability of human progress, turned many people to a renewed quest for religious values. This development is often cited as a factor in assessing the impact of Karl Barth in *Der Römerbrief* (1919), a book differing sharply in its religious assumptions from *Das*

*Heilige* but sharing with it the status of theological best-seller in the aftermath of the war.

However much Rudolf Otto was aware of the diversity of religions, he made his principal mark by contributing to the faith-and-reason agenda of Western philosophy of religion and Christian theology. Immanuel Kant, in demonstrating convincingly the limits of rational proof, had "made room for faith" as not only unprovable but undisprovable. After him, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) was to characterize religion as rooted in a *feeling* of absolute dependence. Otto's presentation of the "sense of the numinous" likewise takes feeling or experience as what must be dealt with rather than questioned. In the decades since Otto, probably the most illustrious bearer of this intellectual lineage has been the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich (1886–1965), who (in contrast with Karl Barth's emphasis on revelation) argues from human concern as the starting point for discourse about God.

The type of position that largely since Otto's day has come to be known as religious existentialism, arguing from experience and commitment as a primary datum, remains, despite the obvious problems of objective proof, a major twentieth-century option in the philosophy of religion. To call Otto an existentialist philosopher of religion would be a retroactive designation of the same kind as my calling him a phenomenologist of religion.

In the end Otto's *Das Heilige* remains a classic in the field probably not because his attempts at a solution have great enduring value but because he has put some of the basic questions in an arresting fashion. Many who pick up the book today feel that they have the measure of it by the fortieth page. Just as a standard newspaper article must face the "cut off test," it seems to make its main point at the beginning, following that up with optional detail. But the challenge of page 8, "whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther," is as compelling today as when Otto wrote it. Page 8 of *The Idea of the Holy* will be with us for a long time to come.

[For discussion of the place of *The Idea of the Holy* within the corpus of Otto's work, see the biography of Otto.]

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WILLARD G. OXTOBY

**HOLY PLACES.** See Geography; Pilgrimage; and Sacred Space.

**HOLY SPIRIT.** For discussion of the Holy Spirit in Christianity, see Trinity and articles under God.

**HOLY WAR.** See Crusades and Jihād.

**HOME** is a universal concept of central importance to religious thought. Like such other general symbols as sun and earth, it recurs from prehistoric times across cultures, in contrast to more culture-specific analogues such as the cross and the Ka'bah. Besides its symbolic importance, home is also a significant locus of ritual in many traditions.

As with most sacred symbols, home is simultaneously

an abstraction and a concrete object (as when it is embodied in a dwelling). The development of home as dwelling place can be traced from animal to human habitats; from the dens, windbreaks, and caves of nature to the tents, huts, and houses of culture. To automatically equate house and home, however, is to oversimplify, for home transcends all physical dwellings. Nonetheless, this distinction must be applied cautiously, for it assumes a secular separation of symbol and referent alien to preliterate thought.

The qualities that make home a sacred symbol include the way it traditionally functions as an ordering symbol. As such, it is a kind of mandala, or symbol of wholeness, containing within itself all opposites. Among the Tiv of Nigeria these opposites are primarily social. Spatially, home (the compound of huts and granaries) represents kin and domestic group. Genealogy typically governs both hut and compound location. Consequently, a death in the family necessitates readjustment of hut positions to reflect the resultant social order. When a father dies, his son assumes the father's reception hut and allows the houses of the father's wives to decay. He then builds new huts for the widows among those of the heirs, usually brothers, of the deceased, who now become the women's new husbands through a practice known as leviatic. Meanwhile, new huts are built for the son's wives adjacent to his reception hut. With the death of a compound head, fission of a compound often occurs so that sets of brothers and their families leave the compound with a new leader.

Commonly the home symbolizes a cosmic order, as exemplified by the tents of the prerevolutionary Mongol Buriats. The Buriats divided their dwellings into four sections: the south portion from the door to the hearth was the low-status half; that from the hearth back, the high-status half. Each half was then again divided, the west side being male and ritually pure, the east, female and ritually impure. Therefore male visitors would stay in the southwest quadrant, female in the southeast. The seat of honor for the host and high-status guest always rested in the northwest sector. Even objects were categorized in this way; valuables and hunting equipment, for example, were male, household utensils female.

Most Native American cultures saw similar cosmic correlations, leading them to characterize their dwellings as both temple and house. For the Plains Indians, the floor of the tipi represented the earth, the walls the sky, and the poles the paths linking earth and humanity to the sky and Wakantanka ("the great mystery"). A small altar of bare earth behind the fireplace, often with sod and roots removed and the earth pulverized and swept clean, represented Mother Earth. Sweet grass, cedar, or sage were burned here as incense to the spirits.



In Africa, the layout of Dogon villages and houses also correlates cosmos, village, house and individual in a series of scales. Both village and house approximate the figure of a man, some of whose "body parts" are female. The outer door of the house is a phallus, its kitchen door a vagina, and the entire ground floor a woman on her back, ready for sex. The ceiling is her male partner. Such cosmic correlations of home and universe are common to the folklore of many archaic cultures.

**Homelessness.** When connections linking self, ancestors, society, and cosmos dissolve, homelessness ensues. Dread of such a state is universally expressed in conceptions of the "unhoused" dead. In ancient Greek and Roman thought, for example, the unburied were doomed to wander forever as phantoms incapable of stopping for the offerings necessary to rescue them. The connection to home is also threatened by enslavement, which severs all bonds to family, tribe, and village, and by banishment, a punishment frequently imposed in preindustrialized cultures. [See Exile.]

**Consecration and Domestic Rituals.** Consecration initiates the process whereby dwelling becomes home. Worldwide, various kinds of foundation rites effect this transformation. [See Foundation Rites.] Typically they begin by employing divination (such as the elaborate system of *feng-shui* in China) or astrology (as in India) to select the appropriate site. [See Geomancy.] Exorcism follows, and then the foundation is laid according to the directions of a priest or sorcerer. Archaeological evidence indicates the universality of foundational "charms" from at least as early as the Shang period in China (c. 1751–1028 BCE), when humans were customarily sacrificed at each house post; similar customs were observed into the twentieth century by groups such as the Maori. Thought to underlie such blood-related offerings is the belief that victims of violent death become demons who make powerful house spirits. Animal substitutes have long been used in foundation rites, as among the Arabs of ancient Moab (present-day Jordan), who sacrifice a sheep to pacify the *jinn* before laying a tent. Other surrogate victims have included statues (Rome), images of the house god (India), and animal parts, pottery, and vegetable remains (Europe).

In the Korean shamanistic tradition known as *mudang*, this essential process of consecration (*sŏngjo baji*) is repeatedly reenacted even today to symbolize cosmic renewal. Typically, pine branches are hung on the gate and white papers on the roof beams of the central hall room to protect and renew the home. Additional rituals of renewal, the Ttökkosa and Sulkosa, are held at every full moon to correlate cosmic change to the building ground of the new home: as the moon appears the ground is renewed. In this tradition the house replaces

the more common archaic symbols of mountains or cosmic trees as symbols of the *axis mundi*.

In Judaism, *hanukat-habayit*, "dedication of the home," is based on *Deuteronomy* 20:5 ("What man is there that has built a new house and has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home, lest he die in the battle and another man dedicate it"). No established form exists for this ceremony beyond the uttering of appropriate blessings and the affixing of a *mezuzah*, a parchment believed to protect the occupants from committing sin, inscribed: "And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates" (*Dt.* 6:9, 11:20).

In some traditions, domestic rituals augment or replace practices otherwise performed in sacred places specifically set aside for religious purposes. Daily prayers are common to many religions, but more elaborate home-based rituals occur in the post-Vedic Hindu *pūjā* rites, in which images of deities must be attended daily. In the morning the deity is awakened, bathed, dressed, perfumed, garlanded, and fed. Food is again proffered at noon and at night, with an evening song closing the day. Domestic rituals also significantly characterize Orthodox Judaism, Korean *mudang*, Haitian Voodoo, and the resurgent practice of witchcraft, or Wicca.

**Pollution.** In contrast to consecration, which is designed to vitalize and protect a dwelling by installing a strong protective spirit, prophylactic processes are enacted to exorcise malevolent spirits or evil substances, the most malevolent of which involve blood as in giving birth, fatally wounding an occupant, or natural death. Death especially pollutes a dwelling, so that its occupants must be ritually purified before freely resuming their lives. Among the Yoruba, for example, if purification rites fail and a dwelling is believed to be ghost-infested, it will be abandoned.

Pollution almost universally attends the onset of menstruation as well, and a young woman is frequently required to leave her home until ritual purification renders her fit again for home life. This ritual is enacted by various tribal cultures, such as that of the Bolivian Yuracare who require her to live in a specially constructed leaf hut for four days. Similarly, an almost universal pattern of purification rites attends childbirth in preindustrial cultures. Houses that fail in these various struggles against pollution are often considered demonic, as *Leviticus* 14:43–44 describes: "If the disease has spread in the house, it is a malignant leprosy in the house; it is unclean." The motifs in folklore of people-eating and haunted houses are additional manifestations of this phenomenon.

On a daily basis, too, pollution of the home must be guarded against, as Judaism well illustrates. In a tradi-

tionally observant Jewish home, all food must be kosher, meaning that it must conform to Jewish dietary laws developed from *Leviticus* 11:1–43 and must be prepared properly, using one set of dishes and cooking utensils for meat, another for dairy products. If mixing accidentally occurs, the polluted object becomes impure and must be rendered ritually and legally fit again, or discarded.

**Death and Dwelling Places.** “Home” means belonging, dwelling in one’s proper habitat. In this sense, the term applies equally to the living and the dead, the grave being as much a home for the dead as a house is for the living. The nearly universal custom of bestowing grave goods on the dead underscores this connection, as does the custom of constructing tiny dwellings specifically for the soul, a practice common in the Yang-shao period of China and in ancient Egypt. The present-day Sakai of the Malay Peninsula similarly fill huts with doll-sized furniture and implements for use of the dead, and images of ancestors are kept in miniature “soul houses” in parts of Papua and Melanesia.

Such intimate connection between home and deceased family members is dramatically expressed in the dwellings of the Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast of North America. For them, the house itself lives as a kind of double of its owner, becoming “empty” or “broken” when he dies. When the family regroups around its new head, a new house is built. Characteristics of the “life” of the house are its “speaker’s posts,” open-mouthed figures through which ceremonial words of welcome emerge as if from the ancestor himself, and the gigantic mouth of the frontal pole that “swallows” those who enter.

**Household Shrines.** From Neolithic times, the practice of setting aside a corner or room of a dwelling as a shrine has been common to many traditions. In ancient Egypt this domestic shrine, usually recessed in the wall of the central hall and adorned with religious scenes, contained a figure of a household god made of pottery or precious metal. Among the Banyankole in Africa each hut contains a special grass-covered, hard-beaten mound of earth, about a foot high, to hold sacred objects. Among the Gold Coast tribes, an honored place is set aside in one corner of the home for special offerings to the domestic spirit known as the *suhman*. The Yoruba place a humanized image of the house god Olarosa at the door and make a recess in the wall for their personal fetish as well. Among the Udmurts, the *vorsud* or clan god customarily resided on a shelf in the outhouse. Household altars also prominently characterize domestic observances in China, Japan, and Tibet.

**House Spirits, Domestic Deities, and Family.** Almost universally, home, as opposed to mere dwelling, is vivified by a spirit of some sort, usually an ancestor. Evi-

dence in the form of cave burials, skull cults, and sacrifices to the dead dates from the Paleolithic era, suggesting a sacred connection linking ancestors with dwelling places. In pre-Christian Europe, the house god was commonly represented as a snake, which was believed to be a vehicle for the souls of the dead. Among the Lithuanians, for example, the paterfamilias typically maintained his serpent (*givojitos*, “the living ones”; *givoitos*, “immortal ancestor”) in a corner of the house where he offered it food and sacrificed to it.

An elaborate system of household deities existed among the ancient Romans: the *manes* were the benign gods, an undifferentiated collective of ancestors; the *penates* were gods of the store closet; and the *lar familiaris* was the primitive concept of home personified, to which offerings were made on all family anniversaries. Among the Teutons, the household spirit often assumed manikin form. The *cofgodar* (“house gods”) of the Anglo-Saxons have their counterparts today in the *Kobolde* and *Butzen* of the Germans; Puck of the English; the brownies of the Scots; and the *gardsvor*, *tomte*, and *nisse* of the Scandinavians, all still frequently believed to be spirits of ancestors.

Among the Slavs every house has a *domovoi*, the spirit of the founder of the family. At festivals commemorating ancestors, this little old grayhaired man in old-fashioned dress is honored, too. Before the family moves, its members pray, offering bread and salt to entice the house spirit to accompany them. Before Lent, the head of the house invites the *domovoi* to supper by going into the yard and bowing to the four cardinal points. In Russia the spirit is named according to location: in the cattle shed he is the *chlevnik*; in the yard, *dvorovoi*; in the drying kiln *ovinnik*; and in the bathroom, *bannik*.

Among the shamanistic Samoyed of the Arctic coast of Russia, the domestic spirits (*haha*), usually one male and one female, are represented by oddly shaped roots and stones or anthropomorphic figures kept on a special *haha* sledge. Whenever the family moves, special *haha* reindeer carry it. No woman, even a shaman, may uncover the *haha* or care for the domestic gods. The *haha* sledge ordinarily stands behind the *chum* (“tent”) on the outer side of the *si*, the place of honor, occupied only by the eldest family male.

In most West African tribes, the family fetish and a class of ancestral spirits known as the “well-disposed ones” protect their particular village and family. Among the Kenyahs, a rude image of the minor deity Bali Atap, who protects the house against sickness and attack, stands beside the gangway connecting house and riverbank. A different god, Bali Utong, brings prosperity.

Among the Ainu of Japan a family spirit, *inaw*, is in-

vested with life, dwelling in a special corner of the hut behind the heirlooms. In times of trouble he is stuck in the hearth and offered prayers. The incorporeal *eing-saung nat* of the Burmese scares off burglars; it lives in the southern post of the house, which is devotionally adorned with leaves. The Burmese also pray to images of respected relatives as house guardians. [See Demons]

**The Sacred Hearth Fire.** The sacred quality of household spirits and deities has frequently been associated with one of the most common attributes of home, the sacred hearth fire. [See Fire.] In Brahmanism, the householder rekindled the sacred fire whenever religious rites were performed. For all domestic ceremonies (*smārta-karman*) the fire of a clay hearth (*grhyāgni*) was sufficient. Every morning the family assembled around the fire in prayer before "feeding" it with bits of consecrated wood (*samidh*) from the *palāśa* tree. If the smoldering embers were inadvertently extinguished, the household would be plunged into chaos; only for an expiatory ceremony (*prāyaścitta*) was the fire intentionally rekindled. The fire god, Agni, functioned as both the god of the household and of the clan, protecting both from evil, much as Hestia did in Greece and Vesta in Rome.

Among Native Americans of the Northern Hemisphere the sacred fire burned by day in the hearth at the center of the dwelling. Fire, a gift of the gods, symbolized the sun, much as the surrounding home symbolized the universe. The door or tent flap was positioned facing the east to catch the morning's first rays.

Since ancient times the sacredness of the hearth fire has been symbolized in China by the stove god, Tsao-wang, and in Japan by the kitchen gods Okitsuhiko and Okitsuhime and the god of the stove, *kama no kami*. Bronze Age Chinese dwellings all had a central opening for smoke called "the center of the house." The spot beneath it was sacred to the tutelary god of the ground on which the house stood. Here food was prepared and eaten, family council held, and the god worshiped. Originally, the god represented the mystery of fire, guardianship of the house ground, and the family's ideals and traditions.

**Secularization.** In traditional cultures, "home" is a sacred symbol capable of transforming chaos into cosmos and engendering personal wholeness. But for many industrial and postindustrial cultures, home has become a purely secular institution, particularly in those societies that accept Plato's denigration of the private sphere associated with home in favor of the public one associated with politics. Accordingly, two strongly opposed orders are thought to govern existence. One, to which all humans belong, is the natural order of things determined by biology, in which woman bears children and man maintains the life of the family. The center of

this existence, which is ruled by necessity (*anagkē*), is the hierarchically arranged household (*oikia*) dominated by the eldest male. Contrasting with and transcending this order, however, is the city-state, the *polis*, in which every member is equal. In this "higher" realm of the *polis*, members are most truly alive, as they engage in the two "highest" forms of human activity, action (*praxis*) and speech (*lexis*). But only citizens can be members—women, children, slaves, and foreigners are automatically excluded.

Both implicitly and explicitly, this praise of the public and denigration of the private elevates males to a place of existence from which women, by virtue of their anatomy, are barred. Historically, the public sphere of men is extolled while the domestic sphere of women, the home, is both trivialized and despised (except briefly in Victorian times in the West when it was sentimentalized). Thus, much as Freud in *Totem and Taboo* openly derides the concept of God as a believer's internalized image of his or her father, many contemporary Western feminists, Marxists, and utopian thinkers now ignore or dispise the institution of home. For them home has become an ugly image of privatism instead of a symbol of cosmic order and personal wholeness.

[For a discussion of the religious valorization of the family and each of its members, see Family; for discussions of ritual life that centers in the home, see Domestic Observances.]

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KATHRYN ALLEN RABUZZI

**HOMER** (Gr., Homēros; eighth or seventh century BCE), Greek epic poet. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are attributed to Homer as were also in antiquity some other epics no longer extant, together with a collection of thirty-three hymns. The latter, however, are certainly by various poets, and most scholars agree that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are works by different authors. The gods play a conspicuous part in both epics, initiating and influencing action on the heroic stage. This probably reflects poetic convention (the effect being to adorn and heighten the narrative) rather than pious belief. There is more to interest the historian of religion in Homer's descriptions of sacrificial and other ritual.

The principal gods are represented as having houses in a clear, weatherless region at the top of Olympus (the highest mountain in Greece, its summit usually hidden by cloud), and as feasting and conversing together in the hall of Zeus, their chief. The arrangement may owe something to early Greek feudal society and also, indirectly, to Near Eastern poetry, where similar divine assemblies occur. The gods also have their individual places of worship and resort on earth, and may sometimes be found there. Besides the Olympian gods, there are others more closely bound to the earth: river gods, mountain and fountain nymphs, sea nymphs, the Old Man of the Sea, and Hades and Persephone in the lower world.

The gods are portrayed as having entirely human emotions and motives. In the Trojan War some favor the Greeks, others the Trojans. Often they have a special concern for some individual: Apollo aids his priest Chryses; Aphrodite aids Aeneas because he is her son and Paris because he chose her in preference to other goddesses; Athena aids several of the principal Greek heroes. Aid may be given in response to prayer and usu-

ally involves the god's personal presence at the scene. Their descent from Olympus sometimes takes the perceived form of a natural phenomenon such as a bird or meteor descending, but on earth, when they choose to be visible, they take human form.

As the gods each have their private motives, they are often at conflict among themselves—a reflection of the conflicts inherent in human affairs. Only Zeus has an overall plan, corresponding to the way the story has to turn out in the end. Even this plan may be temporarily disrupted by the short-sighted maneuvers of other gods, as in the amusing episode (*Iliad* 14.153–360) where Zeus is seduced by his wife and after making love falls asleep.

This is not the only passage where Homer's gods suffer indignities, and from as early as the sixth century BCE some Greeks found them shocking, lacking in proper divine dignity and wisdom. A common response was to interpret the stories of the gods as allegories symbolizing, for example, the conflict of physical elements in the cosmos. This approach was taken up by the Stoics in the third century BCE and persisted by way of Neoplatonism into the Middle Ages.

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M. L. WEST

**HOMILETICS.** See Preaching.

**HOMO RELIGIOSUS.** When the Swedish botanist Linnaeus developed his system of biological classification in the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment's ideal of rationality strongly governed views of humanity. As a result, Linnaeus designated the human species *Homo sapiens*. Soon, however, the Romantic movement and the incipient human sciences accentuated other dimensions of humanity than the rational. In time, new

terms were coined on the Linnaean model to designate humanity in various distinctive aspects: *homo ludens* (G. F. Creuzer and, later, Johan Huizinga), *homo faber* (Henri Bergson), *homo viator* (Gabriel-Honoré Marcel), and others. Perhaps the nineteenth century's growing awareness of the universality of religion, especially in the realm of the "primitives" (as they were then known), made it inevitable that a phrase would emerge to express that aspect of humanity that the Enlightenment's ideal had so opposed: *homo religiosus*, "the religious human." In some circles the expression has gained wide currency, but its sense has not remained constant. Three general meanings of *homo religiosus* are most important to students of religion.

**Homo Religiosus as Religious Leader.** In one meaning, *homo religiosus* refers to a particularly religious person within a given (religious) community, that is, to a religious leader. The roots of this usage are much older than the Enlightenment and Linnaeus's *Systema naturae*. In antiquity *religiosus* denoted persons who were scrupulously but not excessively attentive to observances due to gods and men (Festus, pp. 278 and 289 M; Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.72). In this sense, Cicero could speak of *homines religiosi* (*Epistulae ad familiares* 1.7.4). Christianization brought overtones of distinctiveness—*religiosi* became persons of special ecclesiastical standing—and this usage was transferred to the vernaculars, as in the English noun *religious* and expressions such as "religious folk" (*Romance of the Rose* 6149).

Later, in reaction to the Reformation's universalization of the religious life, Pietist and Puritan movements emphasized a religious distinctiveness whose center was subjective and individual rather than objective and institutional (a personal *Nachfolge Christi*). Friedrich Schleiermacher thought of religion as neither knowing nor doing but as an experiential awareness of one's absolute dependence upon God. He conceived Christ as the unique person in whom this consciousness received ultimate expression, the person whose fully immediate and perfectly open relationship with the Father qualified him to be the mediator of the divine.

In the twentieth century *homo religiosus* as religious leader has inherited both the medieval meaning of *religiosus* and the liberal Protestant tradition initiated by Schleiermacher. According to Max Scheler, who developed a full version of this view, *homo religiosus* is a particular type of human personality: "the man who has God in his heart and God in his actions, who in his own *spiritual figure* is a transformer of souls and is able in new ways to infuse the word of God into hearts that have softened and yield" (Scheler, 1960, p. 127).

Scheler distinguished the *homo religiosus* from four other exemplars of value: the artist, the leading spirit

of a civilization, the hero, and the genius. These other figures are each exemplary in some aspect or other: the hero in deeds, for example; the genius in works. *Homo religiosus*, however, is exemplary in his entire being, which in its totality calls for unquestioning imitation (*Nachfolge*). Moreover, Scheler distinguished several types of *homo religiosus*. Of these, the most significant is the original *homo religiosus*, for historical religious traditions, the founder. Unique in his own community, the founder is the medium for a positive revelation of the holy. The various derived *homines religiosi*—followers, martyrs, reformers, priests, theologians, and others—are lesser in stature and reflect the absolute claim advanced by the existence and nature of the perfect *homo religiosus*.

Among modern historians of religions, Joachim Wach spoke of *homo religiosus* in this sense. Unlike Scheler, however, Wach was heavily indebted to Max Weber. He saw the distinctive character of the *homo religiosus* not in an intrinsic quality or activity of the personality but in the historical and sociological effect of his personal or official charisma.

**Religious Humanity.** Today, two other senses of *homo religiosus* have eclipsed the definition of *homo religiosus* as religious leader, at least in Anglo-American scholarly parlance. In both cases the term is employed not in a particularistic sense—the *homo religiosus* or *homines religiosi*—but in a generic sense, *homo* referring not to an individual but, as with Linnaeus, to humanity. In one usage, the term is a general designation for all human beings, referring specifically to religion as one constitutive aspect of humanity distinct from others. This usage assumes a fundamental unity of all humankind that is much more than biological, and its proponents speak more of the human condition than they do of concrete religious phenomena.

The Dutch historian of religions Gerardus van der Leeuw openly set this sort of *homo religiosus* in opposition to Scheler's. For van der Leeuw, the human as such emerges in the existential tension between two poles: on the one hand, a fully united collective identity in which the individual is submerged (that is, a primitive mentality, the realm of mysticism); on the other, a duality of subject and object in which a human being strives to render everything a technical object, in the end even itself. With humanity there emerges at the same time both *conscientia* (conscience and consciousness) and, from existential anxiety, a sense of sin—hence God and religion. While van der Leeuw is not unaware of the existence of atheists and agnostics, in his formulation such persons can never escape their own selves, their own *conscientiae*.

More recently, Wilhelm Dupré has seen religion as

both a "universal pattern of human self-realization" and a "constitutive presence . . . in the emergence of man" (Dupré, 1975, p. 310). Dupré exposit his conception of humanity by using three expressions, *homo existens*, *homo symbolicus*, and *homo religiosus*, each of which necessitates the next. The symbol, not the existential situation of the subject in the world, is the pivot upon which Dupré's conceptions turn. Because religion is for him both the quality that gives intensity to any process of symbolization and the dimension in which symbolization originates, Dupré sees humanity as inevitably religious.

**Homo Religiosus and Homo Modernus.** In a third meaning, as in the second, *homo religiosus* is a generic term, but here it does not extend to the entire species. Instead, it characterizes the mode of human existence prior to the advent of a modern, secular consciousness. Thus, this usage differs from the second in the seriousness with which it takes secularization as an abandonment of religion and in the weight it assigns religious elements within the modern, secularized world. Its adherents are able to conceive religion in terms of concrete phenomena normally considered religious (such as myths and rites), without recourse to subtle redefinitions governed by their views of humanity in general. At the same time, they may still appreciate religion's secular manifestations. Because this view appears above all in the influential writings of Mircea Eliade, it is perhaps the most widely known modern use of *homo religiosus*.

Eliade is struck by the difference between the nature and use of symbols in the ancient classical religions and especially among archaic cultures as opposed to the modern Western intelligentsia. He contrasts two distinct modes of existing in and experiencing the world. His *homo religiosus* is driven by a desire for being; modern man lives under the dominion of becoming. *Homo religiosus* thirsts for being in the guise of the sacred. He attempts to live at the center of the world, close to the gods and in the eternal present of the paradigmatic mythic event that makes profane duration possible. His experience of time and space is characterized by a discontinuity between the sacred and the profane. Modern man, however, experiences no such discontinuity. For him, neither time nor space is capable of distinctive valorization. He is determined indiscriminately by all the events of history and by the concomitant threat of nothingness, which produces his profound anxiety.

The break between the two, however, cannot be complete. Determined by history, modern man is thereby determined by his unrenounceable precursor, *homo religiosus*. For support, Eliade points to religious struc-

tures in the modern world, such as mythic images suppressed in the modern unconscious and the religious symbols and functions of modern entertainment. Nonetheless, there is a profound difference between archaic reality and modern relic. For *homo religiosus*, recognized structures determine a whole world and a whole person. For modern man, these unrecognized structures are particular and private, repressed or relegated to peripheral activities.

The influence of Eliade's notion of *homo religiosus* can be gauged by the amount of discussion it has provoked among scholars. Some, especially anthropologists, question Eliade's data and methods and have come to the radical conclusion that Eliade's *homo religiosus* is never encountered in the field (see Saliba, 1976).

Others point out hidden biases that have skewed what they see as otherwise careful work. Those concerned with women's issues, for example, may find Eliade's view of the genuine human life basically androcentric: Eliade's *homo religiosus* is actually *vir religiosus* (see Saiving, 1976).

A third tack grants Eliade's universal structures but challenges the inferences that he draws. Some wonder, for example, whether archaic structures and their modern survivals might not simply arise from "the organic and psychological constitution of *Homo sapiens*" (Brown, 1981, p. 447). Given human biological unity, they question whether Eliade's differentiation of modern man from *homo religiosus* is relevant.

A final critique questions not Eliade's notion of *homo religiosus* but what it sees as his program of revitalizing religious humanity. For example, Kenneth G. Hamilton, a proponent of the death-of-God theology, finds Eliade's preferences opposed to historical faith (see Hamilton, 1965). Religious humanity surrenders questioning and particularity for openness and universality, and as a result abandons history and morality.

**Homo Religiosus in the Study of Religion.** Clearly, scholars give the term *homo religiosus* a variety of distinctive meanings. In addition, they use it with great variation in specificity and frequency. The expositions given here rely on careful and exact discussions, but many scholars also use the expression casually, and the precise meanings they intend are often difficult to determine. Again, some in the field assign *homo religiosus* a prominent place in their thought, but others do quite well without mentioning the term at all.

The formulation of an adequate concept of *homo religiosus* as such is only rarely a primary scholarly goal. As the varied and often incompatible meanings of the term show, scholars are generally driven by deeper and more substantive questions about religion, and they for-

mulate different views on religious matters in which a phrase like *homo religiosus*—a Latin expression that attracts the reader's attention—can perform a range of services. Nonetheless, so long as the study of religion is conceived of as a human study, some students will find *homo religiosus* a convenient and useful expression.

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Gerardus van der Leeuw develops his views on *homo religiosus* in the context of a discussion of primitive mentality; see his *L'homme primitif et la religion: Étude anthropologique* (Paris, 1940). Similarly, Wilhelm Dupré comes to reflect on the universality of religion when he examines primitive peoples in his *Religion in Primitive Cultures: A Study in Ethnophilosophy* (Paris, 1975).

Indispensable for Eliade's view of *homo religiosus* is his *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York, 1959), which discusses the experience of *homo religiosus* with reference to space, time, nature, and life. The volume contains dispersed contrasts of *homo religiosus* and modern man. For these contrasts, see also, among other writings, Eliade's *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries: The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities* (New York, 1960) and his *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York, 1954). A recent article by Eliade discusses technology and mythology in the archaic and modern worlds: "Homo Faber and Homo Religiosus," in *The History of Religions: Retrospect and Prospect*, edited by Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York, 1985).

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GREGORY D. ALLES

**HOMOSEXUALITY.** Sexual activity between persons of the same sex is known from many places far and near throughout history. Because the word *homosexuality* derives from the Greek *homos*, meaning "same," and not from the Latin *homo*, meaning "man," the term refers both to sex between males and sex between females, though in practice *lesbianism* is used to refer to sexual relations between females. The image of homosexuality has a special history in the social, medical, and religious discourse of Western culture. This image equates the sexual behavior, personal identity, and sociosexual orientation of a person, often under a negative rubric. Other cultures, however, do not make this equation. Thus to say that someone engages in homosexual activity is different from saying he or she is "homosexual." Moreover, since about the eleventh century CE homosexuality has been seen as antithetical to Western ideas of church, family, and state; this attitude generally reflects a traditional Judeo-Christian cosmology. Homosexual relations in religious contexts outside the Western tradition have a wider meaning.

It has been argued both that homosexuality is universal and, to the contrary, that it is culture-bound to certain societies or historical periods. Part of this controversy depends upon how homosexuality is defined. Victorian scholars such as Krafft-Ebing suggested that homosexuality as an essence indicated nervous degeneracy that produced an inversion of innate instincts. Others, such as Havelock Ellis, saw it differently; and Freud believed that it was "remarkably widespread" in simple societies, because "all human beings are capable of making a homosexual object-choice" based upon bisexual potential and social experience (*Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, New York, 1962, pp. 5–11). The ancient Greeks were an especially puzzling case, as Jeremy Bentham noted, to Victorian scholars, who admired their beautiful art and their accomplishments in literature and philosophy but who detested their customary homosexuality.

Modern research has confirmed Freud's view that homosexual activity occurs in many simple societies. In a classic comparative study of sexual behavior patterns, Ford and Beach (1951) found that homosexual activity was considered socially acceptable and normative for certain people in 64 percent of the seventy-six societies studied. Moreover, institutionalized homosexuality is

known among peoples from parts of Africa and Asia, among North and South American Indian tribes, among peoples on the islands of the Pacific, including New Guinea, and among the Australian Aborigines; it occurs as a religious theme in the ancient world among the Greeks (especially the Dorians and the Spartans), the Celts, and the Romans, in ancient Arabia and Islamic fringe areas, in feudal Japan, in ancient China and Indochina, and in selected Indo-European traditions. Here, religious—or, to be more precise, ritual—homosexuality occurs in relation to phallic cults and fertility symbolism, mythology, and ideas about spirit, seed, and soul, particularly as they concern the creation of the cosmos and maleness in humankind. In some societies, however, same-sex relationships are disliked or defined as taboo; certainly ritual homosexuality is not universal. An analysis of cross-cultural sexual variations does show that in the cultural traditions listed above homosexuality plays a role in respect to the experience of the sacred.

It has been demonstrated that there are three forms of the cultural structuring of homosexual activities and organization the world over: (1) age-structured homosexuality, in which people of the same sex but of different ages are sexually involved; (2) gender-reversed homosexuality, wherein a person adopts the dress, mannerisms, and sexual activities of the opposite sex; and (3) role-specialized homosexuality, in which a person, by virtue of his or her social or religious role, is entitled to engage in homosexual activity. In simple societies these forms usually do not occur together but are mutually exclusive. As described below, most cross-cultural examples of these forms concern only male homosexuality; institutionalized female homosexuality is rare. Contrary to popular Western thought, the first type—age-structured homosexual behavior—seems the most frequent. These social types can be studied in different ways, each of which provides a somewhat different interpretation. A focus on overt homosexual behavior, for instance, may tell us little about the experience or identities of the persons involved. But it is clear that such ritual homosexual forms do not create the lifelong, habitualized identity we in the West label “the homosexual.” Nor do non-Western homosexual customs necessarily indicate the sexual orientation of the persons involved, since participants in the age-structured type later marry, have children, and may or may not engage in extramarital homosexual relations. The exact causes of these homosexual forms are still unknown. Moreover, to ask what causes these types of homosexuality is very different from understanding how they function or affect individuals and societies. I shall here examine the latter dimension, on which reliable information exists.

**Age-structured Homosexuality.** The most common form of ritual homosexuality is organized through customary sexual relationships between older and younger males. In some cultures the practice is obligatory and universal for all males, usually early in the life cycle and, for the junior partner, before marriage. Age-organized homosexuality is associated with militarized societies as well. Ritual and ceremonial practices frequently provide a social basis for it, thus linking sexuality and religion, though this association is by no means true of all the relevant examples.

Of all age-structured systems, that of the ancient Greeks, our cultural ancestors, is the most famous. In the Hellenic world homosexuality is known among the militaristic Dorians at least as early as 800 BCE. Senior and junior males engaged in homosexual relationships as a part of masculine development. Among the Dorians on Crete, Ephoros describes the experience as an initiation that begins with a ritual capture (*harpagē*) of a boy by his lover; the community acknowledged this by gift giving and feasting, recalling the myths of the pederastic captures of Chrysippus by Laius and of Ganymede by Zeus (see Bremmer, 1980, p. 285). Early Greek homosexuality was fundamentally related to the concept of *aretē*, which in Homer's time meant “warlike prowess.” *Aretē* implied masculine valor, beauty, and nobility, symbolized, on the earthly plane, by the heroic strength of warrior and athlete, by the spirit and speed of horses, and, on the spiritual plane, by the power of the gods (Jaeger, 1945). Male lovers were known as *erōmenos* (“boy, beloved”) and *erastēs* (“senior, lover”). The ideal was for the senior to transmit the noble qualities of *aretē* to his junior through teaching, love, and sex, the senior receiving sexual pleasure. [See also Agōgē.]

The military aspect of Hellenic homosexuality is widely noted. Some scholars feel it has been exaggerated (Hoffman, 1980); certainly it changed over time. The Thebans and Spartans were said to have taken boy lovers with them as comrades and bedmates. The youths in turn learned warrior values and the military arts. The Theban military corps known as the Sacred Band was said to derive its strength from the homoerotic unity of male warrior couples. Many ancient texts tell celebrated stories of how male lovers overthrew tyrants and defeated invaders. And Plutarch says that “an army consisting of lovers and their beloved ones, fighting at each other's side, although a mere handful, would overcome the whole world” (Westermarck, 1917, vol. 2, p. 479). In Classical Attic culture, however, the educational and social dimensions of homosexual love were stressed over the military aspect (Dover, 1978).

What did male love mean to the ancient Greeks? The subject has long been a source of controversy, for the



ancients have only their texts and art to speak for them. While homosexuality was not directly supported by Greek religion, the polymorphous sexuality of the Greek gods—Zeus himself, for instance, engaged in homosexual love capture, and Aphrodite served as patroness of both heterosexual and homosexual love—is noteworthy. Perhaps polytheism in Greece and in non-Western cultures contributed to the acceptance of homosexuality.

Certainly there is no question that the widely known figures of Greek philosophy, the teacher Socrates and his students Plato and Xenophon, among others, engaged in homosexual relationships as a part of the educational process. The teacher transmitted the noble qualities of *aretē*, knowledge, and virtue in the context of homoerotic love with his students (Dover, 1978). In the Hellenic world, an act could be described as homosexual or heterosexual, but not a person—a view markedly in contrast with the modern one. This was no doubt complemented by the sexual segregation and the taboo on adultery among the Greeks. Still, homosexuality was frowned upon between peers (except with slaves, as among the Romans), and the *erōmenos* went on to marry, father children, and play the role of *erastēs*, which strove toward honor and beauty, “the very heart of the Greek view of life” (Jaeger, 1945, p. 13).

Plutarch reports that in Sparta, at least, noblewomen loved girls as well. There, female initiation involved age-structured lesbian relationships like those of males. The writings of Sappho suggest a similar ritual background.

Age-asymmetric homosexuality was also known in ancient Rome, though the Roman attitude toward it was more ambivalent. The Romans drew upon and emulated Greek culture in many ways, and Livy reports male homosexual intercourse as a part of Bacchic rites in the early Roman republic. Homosexuality among nobles seems to have elicited a mixed reaction among Romans. Most Romans focused upon the negative character of effeminacy, seduction, and prostitution among those who engaged in homosexual activity, consistent with their patriarchal culture and imperialistic worldview. Nonetheless, there was probably no law against homosexuality until late in the Roman empire. The masculine senior role in homosexual relationships was widely regarded and honorable; one need only recall the emperor Hadrian’s unending devotion to his dead male lover, the Greek youth Antinous, as a renowned expression of erotic fidelity. The complexity of the Roman response to homosexuality may have to do with many and diverse influences, which, through Roman conquests, trade, and the advent of Christianity, introduced heterogeneous standards into Roman culture and cosmology.

Age-structured homosexuality appears as a more general theme in various Indo-European traditions from which historical evidence has survived. Most sources suggest that the Celts practiced ritual pederasty, whereas the Irish and Welsh probably did not (see Bremmer, 1980, p. 288). Obligatory homosexuality existed in ancient Germany and Albania and was no doubt linked to their warrior traditions. Here again, age-structured homoeroticism belonged to a transitional period before adulthood, young men engaging in anal intercourse with boys. Because these peoples strongly condemned passive homosexuality in adults (as did the Greeks and Romans), it is reasonable to conclude that whereas for boys the passive role was required, honorable, and masculine, for adults it was dishonorable and despised.

The evidence indicates that homosexuality was broadly accepted and known from the Near East and Mediterranean in biblical times. Homosexual prostitution was known in ritual cults of Mesopotamia and Canaan. Mesopotamian law codes do not mention homosexuality. The Hittite code prohibits only father-son incest, and the Middle Assyrian code forbids only homosexual rape. In the Hebrew scriptures only *Leviticus* 18:22 and 20:13 generally prohibit male homosexuality. It has been argued that negative attitudes toward homosexuality, however, did not take hold until late antiquity. Both Hebrew and Christian dualistic oppositions between good and evil, spirit and flesh, male and female promulgated an ascetic ethos, which repudiated pleasure of all kinds as detrimental to salvation and spirituality. Early Christianity assimilated a view that opposed all sexual pleasure and was generally antagonistic to homosexuality (Greenberg and Bystry, 1982). Following this, church doctrine was ambiguous regarding homosexuality until about the eleventh century CE; thereafter, ecclesiastical law and centralization of the church in the context of European state formation increasingly restricted and criminalized homosexual contact.

Islamic societies held a different and more tolerant, informal attitude toward homosexuality. Indeed, *Ṣūfīs* saw homosexual relations as an expression of the spiritual link between man and God. Some authorities suggest that Islamic ideas influenced the biblical practice of oath taking on the father’s penis. They point to *Genesis* 47:29–31, wherein Jacob, on his deathbed, makes his son Joseph swear he will remove him from Egypt, pledging loyalty by touching Jacob’s penis. This practice may have been a symbolic survival of noble homosexuality in ancient Arabia that involved a primitive rite of transference of male force, from a powerful adult warrior to a younger recruit homoerotically attached to

him in order to acquire military and civic education. The same authorities compare the practice to Dorian homosexuality. Modern examples of male homosexuality are known from North Africa and Morocco, and female homosexuality is reported in harems of certain Muslim societies around the world. Age-structured homosexuality of the ancient Arabian form has been reported in modern times in the Oasis of Siwa.

Love between men in ancient China was seen as an alternate erotic expression not antagonistic to the family or to heterosexual marriage. In some respects the dualistic cosmology of the ancient Chinese, with the principles of *yin* and *yang*, was neutralized in the homosexual act. Homosexual love appears to have reached a popular high point in the Han dynasty, when the emperor Ai-ti cut off the sleeve of his robe when called to court audience rather than awaken his male lover; after this, in Chinese literature, homosexuality was known as "the love of the cut sleeve." Many similar stories are found in feudal Japanese literature.

Age-structured homosexuality was prevalent and esteemed in the militarized feudal order of Japan up to the beginning of the Meiji era (1868). Some of the great shoguns and samurai kept male lovers to provide emotional and sexual support. The youth in this role was esteemed and was given a secure position in the feudal hierarchy. In the seventeenth-century Japanese novelist Saikaku Ihara's book *Comrade Loves of the Samurai* (Tokyo, 1972), we find romantic tales of how samurai sons were urged by their families to form homoerotic alliances with warriors that matured into lifelong companionships, alongside their marriages. The Japanese attitude toward women was similar to that of the ancient Greeks: women were to be married and produce heirs, whereas boys were for pleasure and companionship. "Samurai warriors would select a particular youth as a favorite and like the Homeric Greeks, a *samurai* would keep a particular lover by his side during battle" (George DeVos, *Socialization for Achievement*, Berkeley, 1973, p. 269). Because of this homoerotic interest, both male and female houses of prostitution were known in feudal Japan, though the male inmates were probably not boys of noble or samurai birth. The *kabuki* theater of Japan is said to have originated from a shogun's preference for male performers.

The Azande of Africa also practiced an age-structured kind of "military homosexuality." The king's household contained hundreds of wives and some boys, all of whom were "married" to him. Young warriors married boys, and a commander could have more than one "boy-wife." When they married, the boy was given spears by his lover; warrior and boy addressed each other as "my love" and "my lover." They traveled together, and the

boy kept the senior's household in order. When he matured, the warrior gave him bridewealth so he could marry in turn and take boy lovers of his own. The example of the Azande suggests that asymmetric homosexuality flourished in a situation in which few females were available for marriage because of polygyny, complexity of marriage arrangements, and warrior segregation (themes also present in Pacific island societies).

The most recent and detailed studies of age-structured homosexuality come from Melanesia, a culture area in which the ancient influence of phallic cults and initiation rites provides striking parallels with the warrior homosexual ethos noted elsewhere. It has been demonstrated that between 10 and 20 percent of all Melanesian societies, ranging from Fiji and New Caledonia to Malekula Island in Vanuatu and other off-lying islands and lowland areas of New Guinea, practiced ritualized male homosexuality; in the Papuan Gulf region of New Guinea it was universal. Moreover, various Australian Aboriginal tribes, especially those of the Kimberleys and central desert area, had similar customs. The current evidence indicates that these traditions resulted from an ancient migration of peoples into the area around Melanesia some thousands of years ago.

In these societies ritual initiation customs placed homosexuality in a highly structured socioreligious context. The adjective *ritualized* applies best to the Melanesian situation because (1) homosexual practices were implemented through male initiation rites (2) that had sacred significance for society and the individual, (3) the cultural rules and social roles of which were supported by the wider moral-jural force of society or of a secret men's society, (4) which prescribed sexual intercourse between senior and junior males based upon social and kinship taboos. Typically, Melanesian homosexual contact made older adolescent or married men the dominant partners and prepubescent or adolescent boys the passive partners. In most groups age-asymmetric homosexuality was obligatory for all males. It was by nature a transitional sociosexual form that masculinized boys, making them into mature men who eventually married. However, in certain societies, such as the Malekula, the Marind-anim of southwest New Guinea, and the Ingiet secret society (of New Britain), older men were expected to be dominant inseminators of boys, even though they were married and could be grandfathers. In such societies, then, it is appropriate to speak of a pervasive bisexual orientation in the male life cycle.

The military character of Melanesian homosexuality was elaborate and should be underlined. Virtually all of the relevant cultures were caught in a web of intensive and constant Stone Age warfare. Their phallic cults and

secret societies not only promoted fertility but constituted the warriorhoods that defended the community and raided neighboring tribes. Initiation into the men's club thus meant entry into military life. Women and children were excluded from secret cult activities, as would be expected in the extreme form of patrilineal culture found there. Phallic worship was omnipresent. John Layard in *Stone Men of Malekula* (London, 1942, p. 489) states that in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) the penis is held in "high esteem" and the glans penis is accorded "extreme reverence"; elsewhere he refers to these groups as "male admiring societies."

Melanesian homosexual rites involved the transmission of male power by physical means, anal or oral insemination strengthening a boy's penis, body, and masculine character. Little wonder that Arnold van Gennep, in his classic *Les rites de passage* (Chicago, 1960, pp. 169-171), refers to coitus as a rite of great efficacy, and to homosexual insemination as a final ceremony of incorporation into these male cultures. Such rites should be seen in the broader context of customs that effect boys' submission to the sacred authority of gods and elders. For the Marind-anim, ritual homosexuality was bound up with daring headhunting raids into distant enemy groups; for the Keraki of Papua and the Sambia of the Papuan fringe, the attainment of manhood required participation in war raids, followed by serving as dominant homosexual partners for initiated boys. Homosexuality thus went hand in hand with military training and socialization into the masculine role.

Sexual antagonism is a prominent theme in these Melanesian tribes; some sexual segregation of men and women occurred in all of them. Institutionalized secrecy was supported by ritual sound-producing instruments, such as sacred flutes and bull-roarers, that both protected the cult and symbolized its power over others, thus serving as symbols of male religious orthodoxy. The secret significance of these instruments has been shown to stem from heterosexual hostility and segregation and from men's envious imitation of women's procreative powers. In this context the Dutch authority Jan van Baal goes so far as to refer to Marind-anim homosexuality as the "dark secret" of a phallic religion. Women often were perceived by men as fertile, polluting, and depleting of male life force. Strict taboos on adultery, menstruation, childbirth, and virginity were common. Marriage practices were political arrangements without much freedom of choice. Sister-exchange and bride-wealth marriage customs created alliances between clan groups or villages and enemy groups. It has been found that senior men were expected or allowed to inseminate their wives' younger brothers (i.e., their brothers-in-law) in tandem with impregnating

their wives. Polygyny and a shortage of women, too, made institutionalized homosexuality a pragmatic sexual outlet for unmarried mature males. Among the Big Nambas tribe of Vanuatu, it reached an extreme form, in which chiefs were said to exercise a monopoly over females as wives and over boys as lovers, some chiefs becoming so attached to boys that they preferred them to their wives. It is notable that Vanuatu is the only Melanesian area in which institutionalized lesbianism is known.

In the Melanesian world, ritual in general and homosexual rites in particular drew a special boundary between the sacred and profane arenas of culture. The belief system underlying the differences between male and female development must be noted. Females were widely perceived to be "naturally" fast-growing, fertile, and reproductively competent, males slow to grow and not "naturally" fertile or reproductively competent. Here semen and menstrual blood were antithetical; groups such as the Sambia believed they must eradicate "female blood" from boys and then inseminate them through homosexual intercourse in order for them to attain manhood. Thus, women naturally procreated, and men used ceremonies to create spiritually and symbolically "reborn" boys. Insemination thus placed boys in the sacred realm, and initiation created a years-long liminal phase of development ultimately leading to the profane and sexually dangerous adult experience of heterosexual marriage.

This dichotomy sheds light on a puzzling bifurcated pattern of homosexuality in Melanesia. Are homosexual relations "real" or "mythical," in Layard's terms? In the vast majority of these societies it has been found that actual homosexual activity occurs for years, as noted. In a small number of societies, however, actual homosexual intercourse may or may not occur, may occur only once, as among the Ingiet cult, or may occur only as a theme in social consciousness or mythology. In most groups, homosexual penetration and submission stress a stronger relationship to the sacred; those cultures that deemphasize it place homosexuality closer to the profane arena. An intermediate example is the Kaluli of New Guinea, for whom homosexuality was voluntary rather than obligatory, and who stressed symbolic marriage to female spirits as a transition into actual heterosexual relations later (Schiefflin, in Herdt, 1982). Thus the Kaluli saw homosexuality as a profane counterpart to heterosexuality, which was, for them, socially and spiritually higher.

Many scholars have noted the similarities between age-structured homosexual organizations the world over. The comparison of the ancient Greeks and Melanesians is widely cited and seems appropriate, in spite of

the cultural differences between their worlds. The Melanesian systems are more closely like those of lowland Amazon tribes, wherein ritualized homosexuality, warfare, and sexual antagonism are also prominent. Yet, Jane Harrison's idea (in *Themis*, New York, 1961) that among the Greeks and primitive peoples, initiations transform boys from a "woman thing" into a "man thing" seems to be borne out. The trend of age-structured homosexuality everywhere was to promote and accomplish the masculinization of boys.

**Gender-reversed Homosexuality.** A different social form is based on the adoption of the gender role, dress, and mannerisms of the opposite sex, leading to a different type of homosexual contact. Sometimes this is referred to as institutionalized transvestism, or cross-dressing. It has been found to occur in selected indigenous societies of North and South America, island Polynesia, and Southeast Asia, and among preliterate and peasant groups in mainland Asia and Africa. Gender-reversed homosexuality is associated, although not exclusively, with shamanism as a religious institution. Though the phenomenon is reported in both sexes, male examples are more frequent in the literature. Usually this form exists in societies where it is believed that a small number of individuals in each generation aspire to the gender role of the opposite sex. Gender reversal usually begins in childhood, has recognized customs associated with it, and is acknowledged by the society. [See Gender Roles.]

Gender-reversed homosexuality is inextricably linked with symbols of sexual ambiguity in many cultures. Role and erotic inversion here make this symbolic association understandable. If blurring of the genders is present in the cosmology of a society, gender reversal can be expected in socioreligious practice. In the Greek pantheon, for instance, Athena and Dionysos were born of Zeus, blurring on the cosmic plane the boundary between male and female reproduction. In India, Śiva reproduced by spilling his sperm, and Sāmba, the divine son of Kṛṣṇa, not only engaged in homosexuality but also dressed as a woman to seduce the wives of other gods. Likewise, the *hijāda* role provides a contemporary example of actual gender reversal in Northwest India. Males in this role wear women's clothes, beg alms, and perform as women in ceremonies, though it is unclear whether they engage in homosexual activity. Other examples from ancient and modern times reveal the same link between cosmic sexual ambiguity and actual gender reversal (Carrier, 1980; Hoffman, 1984).

The institution of the berdache (from the Arabic word *bardaj*, meaning a boy slave kept for erotic purposes) is perhaps the best known anthropological example of gender-reversed homosexuality. Some 115 North Amer-

ican Indian tribes had this traditional role. Most of these groups were hunters and gatherers, some of which permitted a surprising degree of sexual equality. Among the Plains Indians, warfare was also common. Though the male-to-female form of gender reversal is most famous, some 35 of these cultures also recognized female berdaches, who as girls acted and dressed as boys. Three signs indicated that a person could become berdache: preference for occupations of the opposite sex, the adoption of dress and mannerisms indicative of the other sex, and the choice of same-sexed persons as sexual partners. Some berdaches became ritual experts and shamans, and cases are reported of female berdaches who were skilled hunters and great warriors. Few berdaches were biologically abnormal or hermaphroditic. These societies both recognized and legitimized the berdache "calling," which occurred usually in childhood or by vision-quest experiences in adolescence. Berdaches could marry, adopt children, acquire property, and generally participate in most aspects of tribal life. Hostility to the institution of berdache by white settlers and missionaries resulted in the abandonment of the role by the late nineteenth century, though a recent report suggests the survival of acculturated berdaches in some places.

The ranked societies of Polynesia, Tahiti in particular, are associated with gender-reversed homosexual organization. The role of the *mahu* in Tahiti has been reported in depth, and the cross-dressing and feminization of *mahu* males appear very similar to those of the *berdache*. Female *mahu* are also historically reported. In modern times community response to the *mahu* has varied, with approval of gender-role reversal but disapproval of homosexual behavior. Religious activity seems unrelated to the role.

The obvious sociosexual trend of gender-reversed homosexuality for males is feminization; this is in marked contrast to the age-structured form. Moreover, these traditional gender-reversed roles suggest a lifelong pattern of exclusive homosexual activity, a pattern also at variance with those developed where the age-structured type is practiced. It should be noted that among Melanesian societies, cross-gender and transvestite behavior are very rare (Herdt, 1984), as was true for the ancient Greeks and others. Hermann Baumann (1955) was perhaps the first scholar to recognize that the age-structured masculinizing form of homosexuality is fundamentally different from the feminizing gender-reversed type found elsewhere. Moreover, he demonstrated that the masculinizing role should not be equated with the androgyne figure in myth or ritual.

**Role-specialized Homosexuality.** The third form of homosexual organization is based solely on the entitlements of a status or role not widely held in a culture.

Thus, for example, the person who became a shaman among the Chukchi tribe of Siberia was entitled by supernatural intervention to reverse gender roles and to engage in homosexual behavior, though this was disapproved for others in the society. Here we must consider the element of what Mircea Eliade calls "divine bisexuality," the idea that a special role—usually religious—"is fraught with sacredness" (*Birth and Rebirth*, New York, 1958, p. 25). In simple societies this is different from the obligatory involvement in age-structured homosexuality for all males and from individual expression of gender reversal for selected people noted above. However, examples also show that role-specialized homosexuality in complex societies diverges from a purely religious basis to encompass wider meanings. Because some complex examples do not involve gender reversal, moreover, it is important to avoid confusing the categories of gender-reversed and role-specialized homosexuality.

In ancient societies numerous examples of role-specialized homosexuality drew their support from the religiosity of divine bisexuality. Male and female temple prostitutes who engaged in homosexual activity under the protection of religious cults in Mesopotamia and Canaan are relevant. [See Hierodouleia.] In the Roman world Semitic cults that utilized gender reversal and homosexuality were role-specialized, the most famous priest in this context being Elagabalus. In these social settings religious morality legitimized homosexual conduct. We should not forget, however, the negative and chaotic consequences of "good" versus "bad" moral choices that could flow from homosexual customs in certain ancient traditions like that of the Greeks. Here a combination of divine royal power and aberrant homosexual choice, as in the Greek myth of Oedipus, arises repeatedly and hangs over the mythology of Western sexuality. It will be recalled that Laius, the father of Oedipus, abducted the boy Chrysippus out of homosexual desire. In rage the goddess Hera, guardian of marriage, sent the Sphinx to destroy Thebes. Eventually, by trickery, Jocasta produced a son from Laius: Oedipus, whom Laius tried to kill. The rest of story is well known; it ends in incest, patricide, Oedipus's self-inflicted blindness (symbolic self-castration), and madness, themes reflected in Shakespeare's great tragedy, *Hamlet*. These mytho-symbolic images of "bad" moral choice foreshadow the ambiguous status of role-specialized homosexuality in the modern Western era.

Role-specialized homosexuality in tribal societies is strongly identified with shamanism. The divine or celestial origins of shamanic curative and medicinal powers is widely attested. What is more, transvestite shamans having important supernatural powers are known on

both sides of the Pacific and into Indochina as well. The Chukchi shaman is particularly well known in this respect, and it has been demonstrated that Chukchi shamans cross-dress and engage in homosexual relations, some even taking husbands. Among those who remain heterosexual, their spirit guides still oblige them to dress as women.

An intermediate case of role-specialized homosexuality, which began in a shamanic tradition but changed into a secular form, is provided by the so-called flower boys (*hwarang*) of Silla, known from the Yi dynasty in Korea. Here the concept of *midong* ("good-looking boys," with pederastic overtones) is noteworthy. These boys dressed as girls and accompanied wandering musicians and players. They were sometimes married to the latter, and served as entertainers; they would thus seem to suggest attributes of both age-structured and gender-reversed homosexuality. Yet, they were historically associated with popular shamanic performances and were referred to in terms of the literary and theatrical homosexual traditions of China and the chivalrous homosexual code of medieval Japan.

A more recent and secularized role-specialization example—this one concerning lesbianism—is known from the nineteenth-century Canton Delta in China. Certain villages in this patriarchal class society established girls' houses, wherein girls formed strong affectional and economic bonds with each other. It was notorious throughout China that many of these girls formed lesbian relationships. Non-Buddhist religious sects influenced the young women by stressing sexual equality and purity through nonmarriage. The introduction of the silk industry in this area in the 1860s supported the practice of lesbianism, since families encouraged their daughters to take vows of "popular spinsterhood," rather than lose their income. These spinsterhood bonds were not deviant but were accepted at the time; no other institutional form of lesbian contact occurred in these communities or was acceptable. Remnants of this lesbian sisterhood are still to be found in Hong Kong and Taiwan today. In other words, this role-specialized social form involved homosexual relations but was not gender-reversed or age-structured.

How is homosexual behavior in modern Western society to be interpreted, particularly in light of the trichotomy described here? A partial answer to this question was provided in the historical perspective on homosexuality, noted above, following the fall of the Roman empire. Role-specialized homosexuality is the most complex category of the three, for it implies elements of social support and ambivalence, normative and gender-reversed behavior, and specialization of socioeconomic and cultural interests. Over the past cen-

ture homosexuality has undergone a dramatic transformation, from the turn-of-the-century "disease of effeminacy" to the modern gay rights movement. We must be clear, however, that the modern social category and erotic identity signified by the term *gay* is not the same as homosexual organizations or roles found in ancient times and in other cultures (cf. Boswell, 1980); it is in several respects a unique development in human society. This suggests a change from a predominantly gender-reversed feminization to a more frequent masculinization of overt homosexuality in popular culture. In Latin American cultures, such a symbolic transformation is problematic, for as Joseph Carrier notes, gender roles are still defined with respect to the hypermasculine ideal model known as *machismo*. Western culture, more broadly, has seen a gradual change from the specific identification of gender-reversed homosexuality with specialized roles in the theater and art world. Was it not Freud (*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 1960, p. 94) who said, "In the great artificial groups, the church and the army, there is no room for woman as a sexual object"? In this sense, contemporary age-asymmetric masculine homoerotic bonding in complex societies was until recently restricted to male clubs, military boarding schools, and the armed services. The gay rights movement and related social changes are altering this view, as homosexuality is increasingly decriminalized and removed from the medical category of psychopathology in Western countries.

Recent Western attitudes toward homosexuality are strongly linked to religious history and theology, but broader socioeconomic trends since the late Middle Ages have played an equally powerful role. Historical research has challenged the widely held view that hostility toward homosexuality was merely the result of the Judeo-Christian tradition (Greenberg and Bystry, 1982). It has been demonstrated that polytheistic societies are generally more tolerant of homosexuality than are monotheistic ones (Hoffman, 1984), though exceptions to this generalization are plentiful. Perhaps the institutionalization of religiously supported sexual morality, as much as anything, fosters disapproval of sexual behavior deviating from heterosexuality. Other factors, such as trends to urbanization and the establishment of capitalistic industrial apparatus, have undoubtedly contributed to changes in Western attitudes toward homosexuality (Boswell, 1980; Foucault, 1976), yet these trends too cannot account for certain historical examples (Greenberg and Bystry, 1984). The development of complex state and church bureaucracies, with associated unconscious responses to all deviance, including homosexuality, may eventually provide more adequate institutional and psychosocial explanations of the spe-

cial image homosexuality occupies in Western discourse.

[See also *Masculine Sacrality; Phallus; and Androgynes*.]

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GILBERT HERDT

**HÖNEN** (1133–1212), more fully Hōnen Shōnin Genkū; Japanese Buddhist priest and reformer, founder of the Jōdoshū sect of Japanese Buddhism. Hōnen's life reflects the changing times in which he lived as well as his role in those changes. He was born in the fourth month of 1133 in Mimasaka Province (modern Okayama Prefecture) into a provincial military family. The military clans of Japan were then embroiled in a struggle with the nobility for control of agricultural lands, and in 1141 Hōnen's father, Uruma Tokikuni, was killed in a skirmish over possession of a local manor. The young Hōnen was sent to a nearby Tendai Buddhist temple, the Bodaiji, probably for protection from his family's enemies. Hōnen seemed a promising candidate for a clerical career and was therefore sent in 1145 to continue his novitiate at the Tendai main temple of Enryakuji on Mount Hiei near Kyoto. His training went well, and in 1147, at the age of fourteen, he was formally ordained into the Tendai priesthood.

Hōnen was a serious and dedicated monk. His early biographies tell us that in the years following his ordination he read the entire Buddhist canon three times and mastered not only the Tendai doctrines but those of the other contemporary schools as well. Conditions then, however, were every bit as unsettled on Mount Hiei as elsewhere in Japan and hardly conducive to a life of study and contemplation. The great national struggle between the nobility and the provincial military clans (the same struggle that had claimed the life of Hōnen's father) was rapidly increasing in intensity, and the monastic establishments of the day, including the Tendai order, had become deeply involved in this struggle. Not only was political intrigue rife on Mount

Hiei, but numbers of monks had been organized into small armies that engaged in constant brawls with the monastic armies of other temples and with the troops of the Taira military clan, which had by then occupied Kyoto, the capital.

In 1150 Hōnen sought refuge at the small Tendai retreat of the saintly master Eikū (d. 1174) located at Kurodani on the flanks of Mount Hiei. Eikū's small community was a center of Pure Land Buddhist devotion. Hōnen spent twenty-five years there studying the Pure Land scriptures and cultivating *nembutsu zammai*, a meditational trance (*samādhi*) in which the devotee concentrates upon Amida Buddha (Skt., Amitābha or Amitāyus), the Buddha of the Western Pure Land.

The worship of Amida Buddha had been growing in Japan since the late tenth century, when the Tendai monk Genshin (942–1017) published his compendium on Pure Land thought and practice, the *Ōjōyōshū* (Essentials of Pure Land Rebirth). This Buddhism, which had enjoyed wide popularity in China from the sixth century CE, teaches the existence of a purified Buddha field, a "pure land" presided over by Amida Buddha and situated far to the west of our world. Those who wholeheartedly devote themselves to this Buddha can be saved by rebirth in this Pure Land after death. Those reborn there will receive the status of a *bodhisattva* and achieve their own enlightenment and Buddhahood in but one final lifetime.

The appeal of this kind of Buddhism was growing in Hōnen's time because of a deepening conviction at all levels of society that Japan and all the world had entered the age of the decadent *dharma* (Jap., *mappō*)—a desperate time predicted in the scriptures when the Buddhist establishment, teachings, and even the spiritual capacities of mankind would plummet and the world would be plunged into strife and natural calamity. This conviction was based not only upon an assessment of the decadent monastic institutions and bloody civil conflicts of the age in Japan but also upon consideration of the appalling conflagrations and famines that ravaged the capital district in those times. Since none could achieve emancipation through his own efforts in the traditional ways of discipline, works, and wisdom, the only recourse was rebirth in the Western Pure Land through devotion to Amida Buddha. The swelling tide of Pure Land faith in Hōnen's time was further augmented by its appeal to a new clientele that had until then been largely disenfranchised from participation in the Buddhist quest—common people and especially the rural folk.

Hōnen also found spiritual solace in Pure Land faith. While at Kurodani he absorbed himself in the Pure Land scriptures and in cultivation of the *samādhi* of

meditation upon Amida. This practice was a legacy of Genshin's *Essentials of Pure Land Rebirth*, which teaches a fervent contemplation (meditative envisualization) upon Amida's resplendent body while invoking his name with the formula "Namu Amida Butsu" ("Homage to the Buddha of Limitless Light"), and repeatedly circumambulating his image. The primary goal of this practice was an ecstatic realization of the nondual Buddha mind—that is, a profound enlightenment experience. A secondary goal was to assure one's rebirth into the Pure Land by achieving a perfect vision of Amida as he would appear in welcoming descent at the moment of one's death.

Hōnen did not, however, find spiritual satisfaction in these exercises even after many years at Kurodani. From his later writings, we know he was convinced that he himself dwelt in an age of decadent *dharmā*. He considered the achievement of enlightenment by himself or his contemporaries to be all but impossible, and even the attainment of a perfect vision of Amida to be impractical. In this conviction, Hōnen had recourse to an alternative Pure Land teaching.

In addition to the extremely arduous *nembutsu zammai*, Genshin had also prescribed a practice of simply calling upon the name of Amida Buddha (invocational *nembutsu*), constantly and with deep devotion, but especially at the moment of death, in the hope of thereby eliciting Amida's compassion and being brought by him for rebirth into the Pure Land. Within orthodox Tendai circles, this was considered a practice inferior to *nembutsu zammai* and suitable only as a last resort for sinners and others incapable of the correct practice. Hōnen became convinced that this last resort was the only resort for him and his contemporaries. This conviction was based not only on his own experiences but also on the teachings of the great Chinese Pure Land master Shan-tao (613–681), whom Hōnen discovered in Genshin's *Essentials of Pure Land Rebirth*. Shan-tao emphatically taught, and Hōnen came to agree, that calling upon Amida Buddha's name was not an inferior practice at all, but the practice especially designed by Amida for the salvation of otherwise hopelessly damned mankind during the age of the decadent *dharmā*.

In the spring of 1175, at the age of forty-two, Hōnen acted upon his new conviction. He left Eikū's Tendai retreat, took up residence in the suburbs of the capital, and began to teach and practice the exclusive cultivation of invocational *nembutsu*. This marked a definitive departure of the Japanese Pure Land movement from its traditional Tendai home. Hereafter it would pursue an independent course both doctrinally and as a community. The Jōdoshū sect of Japanese Pure Land Bud-

dhism, which became the first independent Pure Land Buddhist community in East Asian history, dates its founding from this time.

During the next quarter century, Hōnen taught widely and wrote voluminously on the way of the Pure Land. He gathered around himself a small community of disciples and lay followers. He also became one of the most respected clerics of his age, preaching and ministering to nobility, lecturing at the national temple, Tōdaiji, and becoming the personal chaplain to the regent to the throne, Kujō Kanezane.

Hōnen's most important composition during this period was the *Senchaku hongan nembutsu shū* (Treatise on the Selected *Nembutsu* of the Original Vow). Composed in 1198 at the request of the regent Kanezane, this work establishes the principles of an independent Pure Land movement with regard to both theory and practice. It divides Buddhism into two paths, the difficult path to enlightenment, impractical in an age of decadent *dharmā*, and the easy path for all, that of rebirth in the Pure Land. Moreover, Hōnen's work maintains the legitimacy of a Pure Land school (Jōdoshū) and designates this school's patriarchal lineage and scriptural canon. It also demonstrates that, among all possible means to Pure Land rebirth, the *nembutsu* of calling on Amida's name is the practice especially selected and guaranteed by Amida Buddha because it is the easiest practice, available to all. Further, the *Senchakushū* repeatedly urges its readers to keep the *Nembutsu* constantly on their lips so as to avail themselves of rebirth into Amida's Pure Land and emancipation from the sufferings of both this life and countless future transmigrations.

Hōnen's following and influence had by now become so great as to be seen as a challenge by the established monastic orders. His Pure Land teachings rejected the fundamentals of their faith and his claim of legitimacy for the Pure Land school flew in the face of one of their most cherished presumptions: that only the emperor could establish a legitimate Buddhist institution. These resentments took a serious turn in 1204 when the monks of the Tendai order petitioned their abbot to suppress Hōnen's movement. Hōnen responded by imposing on his disciples a seven-article pledge (the Shichikajō Seikai) to abstain from such excesses as criticizing other schools of Buddhism, encouraging violation of the Buddhist precepts (on the pretext that those who rely on the *Nembutsu* need have no fear of committing evil), and spreading heretical doctrines while falsely claiming them to be those of their master Hōnen.

This mollified the Tendai establishment for a time, but in the following year (1205) the powerful Kōfukuji order of Nara presented a formal petition to the Clois-



tered Emperor Go-Toba, accusing Hōnen's movement of nine specific heresies and infractions and demanding its suppression. This Kōfukuji petition (*Kōfukuji sōjō*) accused Hōnen and his followers of (1) presuming to establish a new Buddhist school or sect, (2) making new and unauthorized icons, (3) neglecting Śākyamuni Buddha, (4) condemning practices other than *nembutsu*, (5) rejecting the Shintō gods, (6) distorting the Pure Land teachings by rejecting practices other than *nembutsu* as means to rebirth, (7) misrepresenting *nembutsu* by rejecting the superior meditative and contemplative *nembutsu* in favor of the inferior invocational *nembutsu*, (8) rejecting the Buddha's monastic community and discipline, and (9) instigating disorder and rebellion in the nation.

No immediate action was taken by the emperor, and Hōnen might well have weathered this storm, for he was highly regarded in court circles. But late in 1206 two of his disciples engaged in an indiscretion that had serious repercussions. During the absence of Go-Toba, the priests Anraku and Jūren led the emperor's ladies in a Pure Land devotional service that continued throughout the night. The jealous emperor was furious and acceded to the demands of the Kōfukuji monks. Early in 1207, Jūren and Anraku were executed, the cultivation of exclusive *nembutsu* was prohibited, and Hōnen and several of his disciples were exiled to distant provinces. Hōnen was not allowed to return to the capital until late in 1211, and he died shortly thereafter in the first month of 1212. Two days before his death, he dictated to his disciple Genchi (1182–1238) his final testament (*Ichimai kishōmon*). It begins thus: "My teaching is neither the contemplative *nembutsu* taught by the wise of both China and Japan, nor is it enlightenment by means of learned meditative *nembutsu*. It is nothing other than to utter 'Namu Amida Butsu' for the purpose of rebirth in the Pure Land without a single doubt of achieving that rebirth." He died with the *Nembutsu* on his lips and, according to his disciples, amid auspicious signs of Pure Land rebirth. He was seventy-nine.

These events were grievous impediments to the Pure Land movement, but they did not stem what was to become a great tide of Pure Land faith. Several of Hōnen's chief disciples, notably Benchō (1162–1238) and Shinran (1173–1262), carried his message to the provinces and organized Pure Land communities. These later became established as the influential Jishū and enormously popular Jōdoshū (Pure Land) and Jōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land) sects.

Though Hōnen initiated sweeping changes in the religious life of Japan, he was not a revolutionary. He was a highly respected cleric in his day, admired for his scholarship and revered for his piety by clerics and laity

alike. In some ways, he was deeply conservative. Although he urged on his followers the exclusive cultivation of invocational *nembutsu*, he himself never abandoned his monastic vows of chastity and poverty, and to the end of his life he cultivated contemplative *nembutsu*. Yet he definitively broke with the monastic, elitist Buddhism of his times. He provided both the intellectual foundations and the inspired personal leadership for the first independent Pure Land Buddhist movement.

[See also Jōdoshū; Mappō; and Nien-fo.]

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ALLAN A. ANDREWS

**HONJISUIJAKU** is a technical term in Japanese Buddhism that originally designated a theory of emanation pertaining to Shintō and Buddhist divinities. Later, it came to be applied to the interpretative framework of the associations among them (*shimbutsu-shūgō*). The term is a compound: *honji*, usually translated as "original nature," designates the limitless potentiality of the Buddha to manifest himself in as many forms as he wishes in order to lure living beings toward awakening; *suijaku*, usually translated as "manifestation" or "hypostasis," designates those forms. The original use of the term is to be found in the various Chinese commentaries of the *Lotus Sutra* (Skt., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*; Chin., *Miao-fa lien-hua ching*; Jpn., *Myō-*

*hōrengyō*). These commentaries propose a twofold division of the scripture in which the first fourteen chapters are called (in Japanese) *jakumon* ("teaching by manifestation") and the second fourteen chapters, *hommon* ("fundamental teaching"). The *jakumon* part is the collection of the doctrines propounded before the *Lotus Sutra*, whereas the *hommon* part is the Lotus doctrine according to which the historical Buddha (Śākyamuni) was the mere manifestation of a transcendent principle.

This theoretical scheme was generally applied to the various members of the Buddhist pantheon, so that even *bodhisattvas* could manifest themselves under variegated guises, using the doctrine of salvific means, or clever devices (Skt., *upāya*; Chin., *fang-pien*; Jpn., *hōben*), in order to guide living beings of different psychological inclinations or intellectual abilities toward the realization of Buddhahood. [See *Upāya*.] As Buddhism came into contact with other religious systems in Asia the *honjisuijaku* theory was then applied to interpret the divinities of these religions as lower manifestations of the members of the Buddhist pantheon. This interpretation had surfaced in China at varied levels of religious life, but it played a central role in Japan from the Nara period (710–773 CE) on.

Buddhism was officially recognized in the records of the Japanese state by the middle of the sixth century CE. Relationships between the Buddhist sects and the evolving systems of religious cults loosely referred to as Shintō began soon thereafter: the legends describing the arrival of Buddhism in Japan in the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters, 712) show evidence of the fact that mythological and ritual structures of autochthonous creeds were used to interpret the phenomenon, and there is little doubt that Buddhism was treated as an advanced form of Shintō. Various Buddhist scriptures and rites were used in the traditional context of protection of the state and in agrarian rituals; other rites were used to reinforce the legitimacy of the rulers. Shintō shrines were built to symbolize sociopolitical and economic structures; Buddhist temples came to be built along similar lines, often next to Shintō shrines. As a consequence, Buddhist monks came to officiate next to Shintō priests, to the point that they joined them in rites surrounding the funerals of emperors.

From the early Heian period (794–1185) on some monks were ordained specifically in connection with major Shintō shrines and received as such the name of *shimbundōsha* (monks ordained for Shintō divinities). As time passed, the Buddhist ecclesiasts came to administer the economic, political, and ritual affairs of the shrines they were associated with, and associations between Shintō and Buddhism began to occur at the lev-

els of thought, ritual, literature, and art. Japan thus evolved syncretic systems that were locally grounded in shrine-temple complexes, in which the different particular divinities of the Shintō shrines were associated with the different Buddhist divinities of the adjacent temples. It is there that the *honjisuijaku* theory played fully: Shintō divinities were seen as manifestations of Buddhas or *bodhisattvas*, and their virtues were explained accordingly.

Because these systems of association were occurring in shrine-temple complexes, the *honjisuijaku* theory permeated many local cults during the classical and medieval periods of Japanese history; but during the Kamakura period (1185–1333) the major cultic centers housing the headquarters of the important sects of Buddhism developed integrative philosophical and ritual systems in which the *honjisuijaku* theory was central. Mount Hiei (Hieizan), center of the Tendai school of Buddhism, developed the syncretic sect Sannō Ichijitsu Shintō, and Mount Kōya (Kōyasan), center of the Shingon school of Buddhism, developed the syncretic sect Ryōbu Shintō.

By the middle of the medieval period, almost all Shintō divinities of Japan were essentially linked to Buddhist divinities at all levels of religious life and experience. Virtually all medieval records of shrines show the name of the Shintō divinity, and immediately thereafter indicate the following: "a *suijaku* of" such and such a Buddhist divinity. The result of these systematic associations was the creation of a composite culture in which one easily recognizes the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese ingredients. It should be noted, however, that historically the *honjisuijaku* theory had an implicit vertical power relationship, aptly suited to Buddhism's superiority in political, economic, and ritual areas. But most of the associations between the divinities were not perceived, originally, to be couched in the context of power, but rather in the context of association and metaphor. These associations were expressed or interpreted according to word games in which initiated people could read subtle meanings and thereby decode the original and fundamental unity of the divinities of both religions.

However, during the Muromachi period (1336–1573) some priests of Shintō shrines, jealous of Buddhist institutional power and motivated by nationalistic reasons, created other syncretic systems in which the *honjisuijaku* theory was reversed to their advantage: instead of seeing Shintō divinities as hypostases of Buddhist divinities, they claimed that the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* were in fact manifestations of Shintō *kami* (divinities). [See *Kami*.] First and foremost in this re-

spect was Yoshida Kanetomo (1435–1511), a priest of the Yoshida shrine in Kyoto, who authored apocryphal scriptures, designed rituals, and formed a “Shintō-sided” sect of syncretism known as Yūitsu Shintō. This sect was of some importance in Japanese religious and cultural history, for it was granted, in the seventeenth century, the authority to license Shintō priests. From that time on Buddhism faced mounting criticism, it lost much of its economic and political support, and the nature of its relationships with Shintō changed accordingly. In 1868 the Meiji government decreed the official separation of Shintō from Buddhist divinities. Shintō was then changed in order to become the state religion: this marks the historical end to the meaningful existence of the *honjisuijaku* theories and practices in Japan.

In the light of these historical processes, the interpretation of the *honjisuijaku* theory becomes quite complex, for if on the one hand one wants to propose a strictly sectarian interpretation of the term, on the other hand one must keep in mind the various interpretations given to it in the course of history, and there is some discrepancy between the two. The Japanese have, in time of crisis, interpreted the theory as a model of power relationships, whereas in time of peace they have interpreted it as a model of peaceful coexistence. It may be said that many associations remain in the minds of some Japanese religious practitioners, and that composite culture is still a major aspect of Japanese religiosity and culture; but in any case, the *honjisuijaku* theory is no longer applicable as a structural device for communication processes between religious systems.

[See also *Shintō and Syncretism*.]

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*The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation: The Historical Development of the Honji-Suijaku Theory* (Tokyo and Rutland, Vt., 1969), but this work needs to be revised to a considerable extent.

ALLAN G. GRAPARD

**HOOKER, RICHARD** (1554–1600), an apologist and theologian of the Church of England, famous for his work *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (hereafter cited as *Laws*). Born at Heavitree near Exeter, Hooker received his basic education in the Exeter Grammar School. His parents could not afford more advanced schooling for him, but his uncle took the boy to see Bishop John Jewel of Salisbury (1560–1571), who agreed to be his patron and arranged for his admission as a clerk at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1568. His tutor was Dr. John Rainolds (1549–1604), a leader of the moderate Puritans at the university.

Hooker received his B.A. in 1574 and his M.A. in 1577. He was made a fellow of the college and a lecturer in Hebrew, and in 1581 he was ordained. His wide learning, gentle disposition, and genuine piety were admired at Oxford. Among his pupils two became lifelong friends and advisers in the writing of the *Laws*: Edwin Sandys, son of Bishop Edwin Sandys of London (1570–1576; archbishop of York, 1576–1588), and George Cranmer, grandnephew of Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury (1533–1556).

In December 1584, Hooker received the living of Drayton Beauchamp, Buckinghamshire, but a few months later he was appointed master of the Temple in London. He was soon involved in bitter controversy with Walter Travers, the afternoon lecturer at the Temple, who was a noted Puritan of presbyterian views and ordination. Instead of living in the master's house, which was in disrepair and partly occupied by Travers, Hooker took lodging in the nearby home of John Churchman, a prosperous member of the Merchant Taylors' Company and a friend of Sandys. In February 1588, Hooker married Churchman's daughter Joan, who bore him two sons (both of whom died in infancy) and four daughters.

Hooker resigned from the Temple in 1591 and was given the living of Boscombe, near Salisbury. It is doubtful if he was ever resident there, for he was already writing the *Laws* in the Churchmans' home, where he lived with his growing family. There also Sandys, who had entered Parliament, and Cranmer could easily confer with him about the work. In 1595, Hooker moved with his family to a living in Bishopsbourne, near Canterbury. He remained there, except for

frequent visits to London, until his death on 2 November 1600.

In the preface to the *Laws*, Hooker outlined the themes of his eight projected books and made clear the purpose of the work. It was a defense, based on scripture, the tradition of the church, and reason, of Queen Elizabeth's settlement of the Church of England against the radical Puritans. The latter sought to overthrow the settlement by abolishing the royal supremacy, episcopacy, and *The Book of Common Prayer* and to substitute a presbyterian system of church government and discipline modeled on Calvin's church at Geneva.

Because Hooker had difficulty finding a publisher, Sandys contracted with a printer, John Windet, Hooker's cousin, to produce the work. Sandys agreed to bear the entire cost. Archbishop John Whitgift of Canterbury gave his license, and the preface and first four books were issued in early March 1593. The publication, as Sandys had hoped and planned, came just before the opening of Parliament to consider (and pass) the Act to Retain the Queen's Subjects in Obedience, a stringent ruling against all who refused to attend the Church of England's services or who were "present at any unlawful assemblies, conventicles, or meetings, under colour or pretence of any exercise of religion."

Book 5, much longer than the others, appeared in 1597. Hooker completed drafts of the last three books before his death. They were not published for many years—books 6 and 8 in 1648 and the complete work, with book 7, in 1662. Their authenticity, often questioned, is now generally accepted. A large portion of the beginning of book 6 has been lost, although notes on it by Sandys and Cranmer are extant, and Hooker's manuscript pages of book 8 were left in some disorder.

Books 1–4 deal with laws in general: the divine law of God himself; the immutable natural law implanted by God in creation; and the positive law of human societies. Yet human reason, impaired by the Fall but assisted by divine revelation and grace, can understand the natural law and be guided in positive law according to times, circumstances, and experience. No positive law is perfect, but it is always reformable.

Against the radical Puritans, Hooker argued that the scriptures were not self-authenticating. Their authority had been determined by the church. Nor did the scriptures contain a detailed ordering of the governance and worship of the church, but only its basic principles. These principles were different from the unchanging and essential revelation for faith and salvation. On the basis of scriptural principle, Hooker defended in book 5 the rites and customs of *The Book of Common Prayer* and in book 6 its mode of penitential discipline.

In book 7 he based episcopacy not on any divine in-

stitution but on the universal practice of the church since apostolic times. Book 8 on the royal supremacy is cautiously ambivalent. Hooker defended on scriptural grounds the necessity of obedience to constituted civil authority by the consent of the people. In his England, as in ancient Israel, civil and ecclesiastical societies were coextensive. He was aware, however, that the Crown had used its prerogatives to limit the church's freedom in ordering its own internal life.

Hooker's extensive and erudite documentation of his arguments, the richly textured eloquence of his style, and his openness to reforms in the Church of England have made his work a constant resource in the later development of Anglican theology. His political philosophy has been judged as both a conservative apology for the status quo and a liberal critique of the Elizabethan church. He has been acclaimed as the first major prose writer in modern English literature. Yet his lasting legacy has been his appeal to reason in the interpretation of scripture, the church's government, and worship.

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MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

**HOOKER, THOMAS** (1586–1647), English and American Puritan minister. Born in Leicestershire,

Hooker took his B.A. and M.A. at Cambridge, where he was variously Dixie fellow, catechist, and lecturer in Emmanuel College. As a minister he became active in the unofficial meetings of Puritan ministers then taking place. When William Laud moved to restrict nonconforming ministers in the late 1620s, Hooker fled, first to the Netherlands, thence to New England in 1633. He and Samuel Stone organized the first church in Newtown (now Cambridge), Massachusetts. Partly because of religious and political disputes in the Bay Colony, partly because of his parishioners' dissatisfaction with their land allotments, Hooker led in 1636 a removal to Connecticut, where he and his group founded Hartford. When the General Court of Connecticut first met in May 1638 to draw up its Fundamental Orders, Hooker's sermon on the occasion described the proper relationship between the people and their magistrates. Although an important political statement of early New England, the sermon is no longer commonly accepted, as it once was, as evidence of Hooker's democratic attitudes. Hooker maintained his influence in Boston, returning in 1637 to serve as a moderator of the synod called to deal with Anne Hutchinson and the antinomian threat, then later in 1645 to participate in the meeting called to consider responses to the Westminster Assembly. The first of these meetings marked the triumph of Hooker's preparationist theology as a nearly official view of the process of salvation for the New England churches. At the later meeting Hooker presented his *Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline* (London, 1648), which became one of the definitive statements of the congregational church order in New England. He died at Hartford on 7 July 1647.

More than thirty volumes appeared over Hooker's name or were legitimately credited to him; the most important, in addition to the *Survey*, are collections of sermons that examine the spiritual stages the soul passes through on the way to conversion. Under the influence of Richard Sibbes and other English preparationist theologians who held that the individual soul could not earn grace but could prepare itself for its reception, Hooker preached extensively on the subject and made his final survey of the soul's progress during his pastorate at Hartford. These sermons were published posthumously in the two volumes entitled *The Application of Redemption* (London, 1656-1659). Hooker was well known in his own time for his direction of troubled spirits in the process of discovering saving grace in themselves, and this concern is evident in his various sermonic works on the theology and psychology of conversion. He was also interested in the role meditation could play in the spiritual life of a soul under the workings of grace, and he has been recognized in this

century as one of the significant Puritan exponents of the meditative process.

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FRANK SHUFFELTON

**HOPE.** If we define religion as the systematic expression of the interplay between traditional faith and transforming hope, then hope is of the essence of religion. It is the impetus of religious renewal, as fear is often behind hardening tradition. Priestly conceptions of religion may accentuate the equation of religion with tradition and the past. Prophetic calls for renewal also may emphasize a return to pristine purity. But each major tradition posits a future leader who focuses the hope arising from past faith. Jewish traditions speak of a messiah, Islam of a hidden imam. Christians look for the second coming of Christ. Buddhists speak of Maitreya (Jpn., Miroku) as the Buddha to come, and Hindus of Vaiṣṇava orientation look for another avatar of Viṣṇu. The hope is for a final realization of what is now only anticipated, in continuity with the patterns of devotion fostered by the central figure or founder of the present community.

Until modern times, the emphasis tended to be on reform rather than renewal. Myths of ending were shaped by myths of beginnings. The biblical motif of a return to paradise lost is a case in point. The conception of the new as better comes in European thought with the inversion of the chain of being, the change from classical, hierarchical conceptions of emanation (typically beginning with the spiritual and settling into the material) to contemporary, developmental conceptions of evolution and revolution (beginning with the inorganic and culminating in consciousness). Whether retrospective or prospective, religious thought, to be religious, must be characterized by the hope that present vicissitudes will be overcome, that faith will be vindicated, and that the

group, if not the individual, will realize a joy or bliss of which we now experience only passing intimations. Even those who conceive of eternity as timeless and ever present acknowledge that this realization of bliss remains, for most, a future possibility on the horizon of daily living. However conceptualized, the fact of such hope for the future often makes devotees ready to become martyrs to their cause.

Religious hope is necessarily transforming because of the focus in religion on ways of liberation or salvation, often expressed in terms of a movement from death to full life, error to right knowledge, disease to perfect health, despair to assurance of ultimate satisfaction. Patterns of transformation, or ways to realization of a religious end, were classically conceived in terms of refinement, renunciation, reintegration or resurrection and, more recently, in terms of revolution and reconstruction. Each pattern is generated by different concepts of self and of ultimate reality, although different traditions embody features of more than one means of transformation; as, for instance, in monastic Christian ideas of paradise, where Hebrew visions of restoration or resurrection melded with Hellenistic versions of renunciation.

Refinement is typically of the cultured or cultivated self in repudiation of barbaric, chaotic elements presently disrupting society. The ideal is of the sage, as exemplified in China by Confucius and taken up in the Enlightenment strand of modern Western thought by such thinkers as Voltaire and John Dewey. Renunciation is of material things for spiritual value, or of the demands of the body for the sake of the soul, as in the case of Socrates or the story of Gautama the Buddha. Reintegration is of the whole self as microcosm with the harmonies of earth and heaven as macrocosm, as articulated in the Taoist literature of China and the psychology of C. G. Jung. Restoration may be of the faithful people, as in Israel under King David. But restoration in its Christian pattern, resurrection, is of the individual and corporate self, both body and spirit, recreated by God within a whole new order of being, identified in medieval times with heaven but biblically imaged, especially in the *Book of Revelation*, as both a new heaven and a new earth. Modern transformations may be described as reconstruction, when the emphasis is on the mechanistic thrust of science and technology, notably through medicine, where it is the material order which is renewed. Or we may speak of revolution, partly technological (as in the industrial revolution or the contemporary movement for women's liberation, insofar as this relates to childbearing and housework) but primarily political and economic, as in the call for collective renewal by Marx and Mao.

As already noted, the different ways of transformation may be blended with each other. The story of Socrates includes motifs of refinement and renunciation. Christian ascetics link renunciation with resurrection, while modern theologies of liberation link resurrection with revolution. Relevant for our topic is the fact that the grounds for hope vary according to the way in question. Resurrection presupposes the reality of transcendent divine power, which can create out of nothing. Revolution comes through human action, whether in solidarity with a wholly human collective or in communion with God. Reintegration affirms the forces of nature in all of us. Thus, religious hope hinges on different conceptions of ultimate transformation—theistic, humanistic, and/or naturalistic—and is not necessarily tied to a particular belief in the existence of a supernatural agent or god. Where classical myths portray gods and goddesses as immortals, modern stories revolve around heroes and anti-heroes. What gives each story religious significance is the hope of ultimate transformation, not the reference to god as such.

The subject of transformation is the self; but by self may be meant just a part or principle of life as we first experience it. As mentioned, ways of renunciation deny the physical body but affirm the continuity of a spiritual self. In the extreme case of Buddhism, both mind and matter are identified with the present cycle of miserable existences (*saṃsāra*), and what is affirmed is a principle (the Buddha nature, which has realized *nirvāṇa*). Reintegration is of the whole self, body and mind, with the present cosmos. By contrast, resurrection entails the gift of a new body and an individuating spirit in a new world (whereas immortality implies a true spiritual self, or soul, now trapped in the body and only really at home in a supernatural realm). Both resurrection in the religion of Israel and revolution in modern times emphasize the community, of which a remnant is restored or gains the ideal condition aspired to by all. In tribal this-worldly traditions, hope for the future is focused on the children and succeeding generations as they return to the ways of their ancestors (a variant on refinement, especially in the ancestral cult called Confucianism by Western scholars). Thus, who and what is hoped for varies, according to conceptions of selfhood and the nature of ultimate reality.

Again, while a common religious hope may be for life after death, this is not necessarily the case. If the sense of self is of an individual or of a pattern of characteristics transmigrating through a possible infinite series of bodies, then the expectation of life after death may instill fear, not inspire hope. The Buddhist doctrine of no self (Sanskrit, *anātman*; Pali, *anatta*) was developed in just such a context. Even when life is thought to be sin-

gular, not cyclical, the expectation of an afterlife may be fearful if the prospect is of a ghostly loss of place or of torment in hell. Traditional notions of purgatory arose to meet this fear and to give grounds for hope to those who despaired of immediate entry to heaven.

The scope of renewal may be temporary or permanent, partial, individual, communal or cosmic. Renunciation is for the sake of permanent renewal of the spiritual self or permanent realization of *nirvāṇa*. Reintegration presupposes a permanent process on the cosmic scale, but individual integration within this process may be temporary and partial. Resurrection, in classical Christian and Muslim eschatologies, is of the whole individual with the whole people of God, involving permanent enjoyment of God's enlivening presence for the faithful and perpetual punishment for the faithless. The vision of a new heaven and a new earth includes the whole created order within the compass of the promised renewal. The emphasis falls on faith because it is what God does for humankind, and not unaided human effort, that carries the promise of salvation. By comparison, refinement and revolution are primarily humanistic ways that include the rest of nature only as the setting for human fulfillment.

Reconstruction presupposes the permanence of nature and, through applied science, makes this increasingly available to human beings: for instance, through computerized memory banks, artificial limbs and hearts, and artificial insemination (where hope is concentrated on survival through one's children). In principle, such hope is available to all, but in practice, access is limited to the affluent. Science fiction often illustrates how the current limitations on reconstruction may be overcome, at least in our imagination. In general, it seems fair to say that the dominant global cultures, including their religious systems, are increasingly universal in scope and are expanding the range of human expectations from tribal lands to the whole earth, from the earth to the universe, and from the known universe to all possible galaxies and states beyond the terrestrial.

Symbols of hope reflect the blending of traditions and motifs of transformation. In Buddhism, the tree reflects the rootedness of perfect enlightenment conquering ignorance. The tree of life in images of paradise reflects the garden setting for creation in Mesopotamian cultures. Taoist Chinese images include bowls of life-enhancing fruit. By contrast, the cross of Jesus provides a reverse image for Christians, linking the tree of life to the historical paradigm of suffering and atonement. The evergreen tree in northern climes, combined with images of mother and child, is a Christian example of conflated symbols, whose meaning varies according to the

story told. The Buddhist wheel, by contrast, can suggest both abhorrence of the cycles of existence and the teaching that reverses the patterns of alienation. The lotus is a reminder that beauty arises even out of the mud.

Symbols are especially important in expressions of hope because hope is always for what is possible but not yet fully realized. As already noted, the sense of ultimate reality shapes the horizon of hope. Symbols of journeys and arrival at the far shore suggest both present separation and eventual satisfaction. Where this world is all there is, hope through children or through lasting achievements dominates, and hope is linked to memory. Where all possibilities seem closed off, despair sets in. We owe to Søren Kierkegaard the definitive contrast, expressed in modern literature, between despair of ever realizing the authentic self and despair caused by realizing what the self has become. Since Plato, Western religious thought has emphasized being as the ideal end of becoming. Asian thought, by comparison, has often posited an ultimate emptiness of individuating features, such that despair more typically has been despair at continuing to be as one is.

Hope, as the obverse of despair, may be hope for oneself as individual or group, hope for one's world, or hope for the ultimate nature of things. As such, classical thought counted hope a virtue. In Chinese traditions, a world in disarray was evidence of the lack of virtue among earthly and heavenly rulers. The concept of the mandate of heaven for the virtuous gave reformers hope that order might be restored. On the Indian subcontinent, despair over the lack of virtue throughout the hierarchy of being led to expectations of periodic, cosmic cataclysms, followed by renewal. Echoes of this idea appear in biblical stories of Noah and the flood followed by the rainbow. In Christian thought, hope is a theological virtue, along with faith and love. According to Thomas Aquinas (*Summa theologiae* 2.1.25.3), hope is always for some future good that is difficult but possible to attain. There is no hope for the damned, while the blessed no longer need hope since they enjoy the direct vision of God. It is theological, since the gift of the possibility comes from God, and a virtue, since the gift may be refused.

With regard to hope for oneself, increasing differentiation in the evolution of modern culture has put more and more emphasis on the individual. To live for the reflected glory of an earthly or heavenly lord no longer appeals to those who would be rulers of their own destiny. In *The Myth of Sisyphus* Albert Camus carries this line of thought to its final point. In existential psychology, the importance of hope was most insisted on by Viktor Frankl. Drawing on his experience in the concen-

tration camps of the 1930s and 1940s, he realized both that while there's life there's hope and that to go on living we must have hope.

[See also Redemption; Enlightenment; Mokṣa; Healing; and Atonement.]

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PETER SLATER

**HORNS.** The physical power and reproductive potency of horned animals, which were so important in the economy of ancient hunting and agricultural societies, made them ideal symbols of strength and fertility. The primitive use of horns as plows and the symbolic view of plowing as the impregnation of Mother Earth led to the belief that horns were charged with sexual power. The association of horns with fertility was further encouraged by their phallic shape and symbolic identification with both the rays of the sun and the crescent moon.

The association of horns with power and fertility accounts for the proliferation of horned gods and goddesses in both the East and the West. The Sumerian gods Anu, Enlil, and Marduk wear horned headdresses, as do the Egyptian deities Hathor, Isis, Nut, Seth, and Amun. The Hindu god Śiva and the Greek god Poseidon share the same emblem, a trident, a symbolic representation of horns. In Greek mythology, Dionysos, Pan, the satyrs, the river gods, Hera, Io, and Aphrodite all have horns as attributes. The Cretan ceremony of bull vaulting involved grasping the horns, the source of fertility and power; and the Cretan symbol of the double ax is probably a pair of stylized horns.

The Canaanite gods Baal and El were horned bull gods as was, originally, Yahveh, which is why horns decorate the altar described in *Exodus* 27. Moses, too, has been associated with horns. In *Exodus* 34:29–35, the Hebrew verb *qaran*, which means either “to send forth beams” or “to be horned,” occurs three times in the phrase *qaran 'or panav*, describing the beaming face of Moses upon his descent from Mount Sinai. In the Vulgate, however, this phrase is translated as *facies cornuta*

(“horned face”), and the symbolism of this mistranslation has persisted over the centuries. The horns on the head of Michelangelo's *Moses*, sculpted about 1515, are one well-known example.

In Christian iconography, the foremost association of horns is with devils and demons, although the Virgin Mary is sometimes depicted with the “horns” of the moon. The Vedic and Buddhist divinity Yama is horned. In ancient China, Shen Nung, one of three legendary divine emperors, is traditionally pictured with two horns on his head, as a symbol of his connection with nutrition and animal life. Celtic gods and goddesses are often horned.

The horned headgear of the gods was appropriated by humans to indicate their divine mandate and power. Babylonian and Assyrian kings wore rounded caps with horns. Alexander the Great identified himself with the horned god Amun and appears on coins with ram's horns. Etruscans, Celts, Vikings, and Anglo-Saxons wore horned headdresses, as did American Indian chiefs and shamans. Medieval crowns, and even the miters worn by Christian bishops, owe their shape to earlier horned headdresses.

The association of horns with fertility accounts for the metaphoric use of *horn* for “phallus” (*Ps.* 132:17, *Jer.* 48:25), as well as for the worldwide consumption of powdered horn as an aphrodisiac. The image of cornucopias, or horns of plenty, is a well-known symbol of abundance. Horn amulets have been found on every continent. One of their most important uses was in detecting poison, since horned animals, particularly unicorns, were thought to be the natural enemies of venomous serpents. The Chinese still use ivory for this purpose, reserving carved rhinoceros horns for the decorative function of symbolizing prosperity and strength. The prophylactic properties of horn extends to the sounds made by horned instruments, which have been valued throughout the world for their ability to ward off evil spirits, ghosts, demons, and devils.

Not all associations with horns are positive. Horned animals are dangerous. From the Stone Age on, horns were used as weapons. (The curved shape of swords and daggers reflects this primitive usage.) Potions made from powdered horns may be poisonous. The association of horns with fertility made them the ideal symbol of cuckoldry. The symbolism connecting horns with the moon has negative, as well as positive, implications. While the waxing of the moon is a sign of rebirth, the waning moon symbolizes death, darkness, and the underworld. Horns are, therefore, ideal attributes for evil and libidinous demons, devils, and monsters. Aside from the Devil of Christian folklore, sometimes known as “Old Hornie,” the Babylonian demon Pazzuzu was



horned, as were the libidinous satyrs of ancient Greece. Japanese *oni* are evil spirits depicted as humans with bull horns. Most monsters have horns or horny scales.

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ALLISON COUDERT

**HORSES** have played an essential role in the life, and therefore in the religion, of all the peoples who have had direct contact with them, particularly the Indo-Europeans, the ancient Mesopotamians and Egyptians, the Arabs, the Chinese, and the North American Indians. It is, I think, fair to say that horses have always captured the mythic imagination through their ability to symbolize a number of related phenomena: power, wealth, divinity, sexuality, flying, and the tension between taming and freedom.

Among the earliest evidence of the importance of the horse to human culture are the magnificent wall paintings in the caves of Lascaux, in southern France, dating from around 30,000 BCE. There the grouping of horses with other wild animals such as stags and bison suggests that they were probably animals that were hunted rather than harnessed or ridden. Even so, it has been proposed that certain structures depicted on the walls at Lascaux represent corrals, implying that some sort of taming may already have begun. André Leroi-Gourhan has argued that the horse is part of the male half of a general sexual bipartition in the animal symbolism at Lascaux. If this is so, we have very early evidence indeed of the horse in association with both taming and sexuality, perhaps even with the combined concept of the taming of sexuality, which is a dominant theme in the Indo-European religious symbolism of the horse.

But the true history of the horse in man's religious conceptualization must begin with the first certain evidence of its domestication: the use of the chariot, which, for several centuries before horses were ridden, was employed as a means of transport, of farming, and as an instrument of war. Starting before 2000 BCE from a location somewhere in the area of the Caspian and Mediterranean seas, the use of the horse to pull a chariot spread eastward through Persia to India, then south through Syria to Egypt, then west through Anatolia to Greece, and then northwest into eastern Europe. Among

the Hittites, a Mittannian named Kikkulis, who was employed as Master of the Horse by the Hittite king Sepululiumas, composed the earliest book we know that deals with nothing but horses, about 1360 BCE. And the earliest known Egyptian figure of a horse appears on a bronze axhead of the eighteenth dynasty (c. 1450 BCE), which shows a horse led in hand in a manner assumed to be that of a charioteer rather than that of a rider. Horse chariots were also found in the tomb of Tutankhamen and are depicted on a wall painting from Thebes dated about 1400 BCE.

A particularly vivid description of the Egyptian chariots, and one that places horse and horseman in a religious narrative context, is the fifteenth chapter of *Exodus* in the Hebrew scriptures, a chapter that some scholars have dated as early as the twelfth century BCE. The passage that celebrates the parting of the Red Sea and the subsequent drowning of Pharaoh's men, horses, and chariots begins "I will sing unto the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously; the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea." The term *rider* may not necessarily refer to a mounted horseman; it is a generic term that could apply as well to a charioteer. But it is worth noting that the horse is here associated with several themes that occur often in the mythology of the horse: armies, evil, death, and, most striking, the bottom of the ocean.

**Ancient Indo-European Horse Sacrifices.** With the Greeks and the Vedic Indians, and later with the Romans, the horse truly came into its own as a religious symbol, one that pervades both myth and ritual. Rituals involving horses, more particularly rituals that involve the killing of a white stallion, are attested throughout the Indo-European world. Among the ancient Norse, a white horse symbolizing the sun and accompanied by women was killed in a ritual that included obscene references to the phallus of the horse, ritual castration, and an intoxicating drink. In the Roman festival of the October Equus, a horse dedicated to Mars was killed in the course of a ritual, and a chariot race took place; in the Roman Parilia, a horse was mutilated (perhaps castrated). Among the Greeks, white horses were sacrificed to Poseidon and to the sun; a white mare was sacrificed at the grave of a maiden who had been raped and had committed suicide; black horses were inauspicious. Both Roman and Greek sources indicate a fertility cult associated with the horse, one that often agrees in striking detail with the Vedic cult of the horse. The Persians tell of a battle between an evil black horse and a good white horse, whose victory released the fertilizing rains; and the Iranians regarded white horses as symbolic of the sun (Pausanias, 3.4.20; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 8.3.11).

Among the Indo-Europeans in general, it appears, the white horse was sacred.

We shall examine the Indian and Irish models of these rituals in greater detail, but in this introductory survey it is useful to note a linguistic link between these far-flung Indo-European cults of the horse. The Gallic proper name *Epomeduos* may be cognate with the Sanskrit *aśvamedha*; both royal names are possessive compounds designating kings who have (performed) horse sacrifices. The first element of the compound simply means "horse"; the second element is more difficult to pin down, but it has the connotations of a ritual drink (like mead) or an intoxicating drink. Thus the term as a whole may mean "intoxication with the horse"; Jaan Puhvel, who has noted these linguistic implications, remarks that "the early Indo-Europeans were undoubtedly 'crazy about horses,' and so were the Gauls" (Puhvel, 1955). It may, however, mean "one who has performed a ritual involving a horse and a sacred drink" or even—as is supported by the evidence provided by the Indian and Irish horse sacrifices—a ritual in which the horse itself supplied the substance or the sacrificial food and drink for the king, a ceremony in which a horse was ritually eaten. Whether eaten or not, horses were sacrificed by the Greeks (Herodotus, 7.113; Ovid, *Fasti* 1.385), by the Armenians and Massagetes (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.5; Herodotus, 1.216), and by the Scythians, of whose spectacular royal burials Herodotus gives us a hair-raising description (4.71–72).

Still, it is the Vedic, Roman, and Irish horse sacrifices that provide the triangle on which the Indo-European evidence rests, however shakily. The facts of congruence in existing sources are impressive, although the weight and substance of documentation are grotesquely dissimilar. The Vedic ceremony is by far the best documented, both in terms of the contemporaneous nature of the ritual and the text describing it (both dating from 900 BCE but referring to the hymns to the horse in the *R̥gveda*, perhaps as much as three hundred years earlier) and in terms of the volume of data: hundreds and hundreds of pages of Sanskrit texts. The Roman ritual is a poor second, cursorily described by Polybius (12.4b), Plutarch (*Quaestiones Romanae* 97), and Festus (ed. Lindsay, pp. 178.5ff.) with distressing discrepancies and lacunae. The Irish ritual is even more problematic, having been described only in the twelfth century CE by a Christian monk who could scarcely believe his eyes, so appalled was he by the obscenity of the rite (Giraldus Cambrensis, *Topographia Hibernica*, ed. Brewer, p. 169).

Yet the parallels are truly striking. In India, a ritually consecrated stallion was killed after a chariot race; the chief queen then pantomimed copulation with the stal-

lion, to the accompaniment of verses (spoken by priests) regarded as obscene even by the contemporaneous texts (which prescribe a "perfumed" verse to be recited at the end, to wash out the mouths of the participants). In Rome, after a race the right-hand horse of the winning chariot was sacrificed to Mars; its tail was carried to the Regia, where its blood was sprinkled on the altar (Plutarch) or the hearthstone (Festus). Men from the Sacra Via and the Suburra did battle for the head, the latter (if they won it) carrying it to the Turrus Mamilia, the former to the wall of the Regia. In Ireland, the king pantomimed (or performed) copulation with a live mare who was afterward dismembered and cooked; the king bathed in her broth and drank it, and the broth was then distributed to the people.

The common thread in all three rituals is the killing of an equine. In two of the rituals (India and Rome) the horse is a stallion; in two of the rituals (India and Ireland) there is a sexual union as well as a death. It could be argued, from the writings of Georges Dumézil and others, that the ritual emphasizes a different one of the three Indo-European functions in each of the three cultures in which it appears: the Roman primarily martial, the Indian royal and sacred, the Irish fertile and nourishing. But all three rituals can and do incorporate all three levels of symbolism. A ceremony that is about royalty and the power of the king not only can but, in a sense, must also be about sexuality and nourishment: for the ancient Indo-European stallion symbolized at once the powers of the warrior, of the king, and of the virile male.

**Ancient Indo-European Horse Myths.** Given the primacy of the stallion in the aggressively virile cultures of the Indo-Europeans, how are we to explain ritual focus on the Irish mare? One could argue that the Irish variant is properly Gallic, rather than Indo-European, and make the case (as Robert Graves did in *The White Goddess*, 1948) for an ancient Gallic horse goddess whose cult was superseded by that of an Indo-European horse god. In support of this contention is the Gallic cult of the goddess Epona, almost the only goddess worshiped in the same guise by both continental and insular Celts. Intimately connected with the Welsh Rhianon and the Irish Macha, whom we shall soon encounter, and thematically connected with the horse-headed Greek Demeter, Epona is often depicted as a woman riding on a mare, or as a mare, or with a mare's head; she is also associated with a male horse god, Rudiobus. Epona, whose name comes from the Proto-Indo-European \**ékwo-s*, "horse" (Lat., *equus*; Skt., *aśva*), is particularly concerned with pregnant mares and with foals. Pseudo-Plutarch (parallel 29; cited by Le Roux, 1963, p. 133) gives what may be the only ancient record

of a Celtic hierogamy like the one that is described, as a ritual, by Giraldus Cambrensis so many years later: "A certain Phoulouios Stellos, who hated women, had intercourse with a mare. In time, she brought forth a beautiful maiden whom she named Epona, a goddess of horses." [See also Epona.]

Celtic mythology offers rich support for the concept of an ancient horse goddess. The Irish *Táin Bó Cuailnge* narrates the myth of Macha, a tri-functional equine goddess who, forced to run in a chariot race while she is pregnant, dies bringing forth twins or who, in another avatar, brings forth a son at the very moment when a mare in the stable gives birth to twin foals (Kinsella, 1970; Gricourt, 1954). And the Welsh *Mabinogi* tells the story of Rhiannon, who appears to King Pwyll riding on a white horse, marries him, and bears him a child while a mare has a foal at the same moment; accused (falsely) of killing the child, Rhiannon is condemned to carry guests from the mounting block to the court on her back.

The myth of the mare goddess has a broader Indo-European distribution as well. In India, the myth begins with references in the *R̥gveda* to the wife and false-wife of the sun, a myth that is told in greater detail in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Purāṇas*: Vivasvant, the sun, married Saranyū, who fled from him and substituted for herself another female, Chāyā ("dark shadow") upon whom Vivasvant begat a son, Manu, the ancestor of the human race. Meanwhile, Saranyū took the form of a mare and fled from Vivasvant, but he took the form of a stallion, followed her, and covered her; upon giving birth to the twin horse-gods, the *Aśvins*, she abandoned them. The parallels with Celtic myths are striking: a goddess in the form of a white mare takes human form and mates with an aging sun king; impregnated by him, she gives birth to hippomorphic twins, the ancestors of the human race, whom she injures or abandons, and she leaves the king to return to her heavenly home. The inversions and reversals that take place over the wide Indo-European area and through the centuries are complex, but clearly we are dealing with some sort of protean mythic core.

Greek mythology supplies further evidence in support of this corpus. Demeter, who is often depicted with a mare's head, mated with Poseidon (the god of the sea, to whom horses were sacrificed, and who was himself called Hippios, "equine"; Apollodorus, 3.6.8; Pausanias, 8.25 and 8.42); in Arcadia, Demeter is portrayed as Black Demeter, with the head and mane of a horse on the body of a woman (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 6.406b). Poseidon is also involved in several myths in which a woman is raped by a god in the form of a stallion and gives birth to foals that she attempts to destroy; he is

more distantly involved in a Greek cycle of myths about overprotective fathers of equine goddesses who destroy their suitors (the myths of Hippodameia, Hippomenes, and Alcippe). Glaucus and Diomedes of Thrace are said to have had savage mares, made more savage by their enforced chastity, who devoured men, and Hippolytus (well known from Euripides' tragedy), who worshiped Artemis and denied Aphrodite, was dragged to death by chariot horses that were frightened by a monster sent by Poseidon from the sea.

**European Myths of Evil Mares.** The pattern of myths of evil mares is almost exclusively Indo-European, which is hardly surprising, given the special place of the horse in Indo-European culture. The negative symbolism of the Indo-European mare is epitomized by the myth, widely documented in India, in which a demonic female full of anger and destructive lust is tricked into taking the form of a mare with flames shooting out of her mouth. While she dwells at the bottom of the ocean, the flames in her mouth keep the ocean from overflowing its bounds and the ocean keeps her flames from destroying the world. On doomsday she will emerge from the ocean; her flames will destroy the universe with fire; and the uncontrolled waters of the ocean will flood the world. The underwater mare is thus a symbol of the tension between uncontrolled powers and the dangers that arise from the brutal suppression of those powers; it is a symbol of the paradox of the wild and the tame, in all three Indo-European spheres: the sacred, the martial, and the sexual.

The underwater mare appears, in various transformations, throughout later European mythology. Celtic mythology describes aquatic monsters known as Goborchinn ("horseheads") as well as horse eels and water horses, the forerunners of sea serpents and dragons like the Loch Ness monster, whose heads are often surprisingly equine. And, closer to home, we can see this symbolism at the heart of the climactic scene in Richard Wagner's opera *Götterdämmerung* (The Twilight [or Doomsday] of the Gods). Brünnhilde is one of the Valkyries, the female warrior spirits who ride their winged horses through the skies to bring fallen warriors to Valhalla; at the end of the opera, Brünnhilde mounts her white horse and rides through a wall of fire to her death, whereupon the waters of the Rhine rise and flood the world.

In folklore, the more anthropomorphic aspects of the myth, particularly the implications of the relationships between the mare and her children, are stressed. The Antti Aarne-Stith Thompson index of tale types and motifs gives many examples of myths in which a queen is falsely accused of the murder of her children and condemned to death, myths in which horses usually play a

part. The accused woman sets out on a mare, and the wicked fairy who calumniates her is torn to pieces by a horse (TT 451); the unfaithful wife is transformed into a mare, like adulteresses in the *Arabian Nights* as well as in Finnish, Russian, and Italian tales (TT 449). Witches are closely associated with mares: a witch may be accompanied by a horse, she may appear as a horse, she may transform a man into a horse and ride him, or she may become a man-eating mare. The equine witch appears consistently as the villain in Indo-European folklore: she is the female fiend who eats children and rides her victims (an image with psychological overtones of fear and sexuality); she is the black maiden from hell, riding on her white horse; or she is the leader of the wild chase of witches on their phallic broomsticks, the horses of death. The image of the erotic woman on the white horse is not necessarily negative—there is always Lady Godiva, not to mention naked women on horseback in contemporary soft-core pornography—but her very eroticism is a negative value in the ancient Indo-European conceptual system, in which women should be not erotic but chaste.

The term *nightmare*, even though it is etymologically unrelated to the word for the female horse, comes to assume explicit equine overtones from an early period in European mythology, in part through the attraction of assonance and in part through the influence of an already developed mythology. The true etymology is from the Old English *mare* ("hag"), and a nightmare, according to the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, is a "female monster . . . supposed to settle upon people and animals in their sleep, producing a feeling of suffocation." The prototype of the nightmare who presses down on the sleeper or has intercourse with him while lying on top of him is the mare who rides perversely astride her husband or victim. In modern reinterpretations of the image of the nightmare, in literature and art (the horse in Fuseli's haunting painting entitled *The Nightmare*, or in Blake's *Death on a Pale Horse*, or the tortured horses in Picasso's *Guernica*), the cluster of meanings related to the several homonyms often merge: mother (Fr., *mère*), female horse (Eng., *mare*), ocean (Lat., *mare*; Fr., *mer*), death (IE, *\*mer*, *\*mor*), and the underlying Old English etymological meaning, "hag."

We can postulate chronological levels in the history of the degradation of the symbolism of the mare. At first there may have been one mare goddess, an awesome, dangerous, sacred creature (sacred in Rudolf Otto's sense of the word: *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*), who was sought by the king, captured, and wooed. She is a source of power, who invigorates the aging king by her annual ritual copulation with him; she dies in a sacrifice of her immortality to his mortality. At this period,

the mare is simultaneously maternal, sororal, and erotic. In Semitic and Babylonian myths, she is manifest in the figures of Inanna and Ishtar, both of whom were said to copulate with horses. But in later European mythology, the mare goddess was split into two parts, the good mother and the evil whore, and the benevolent white mare is given a malevolent, black alter ego.

This transition is even more sharply marked in the closely related mythology of the swan-maiden. Mares in many Indo-European myths about evil women are closely associated with birds: they assume the form of birds or appear as winged horses. In the swan-maiden variants of the theme, a woman from the other world assumes the more delicate and feminine form of a white bird, instead of a white horse; she lives with a prince for a while and then leaves him when he violates the condition that she had set for their cohabitation (not to ask her name, or not to see her naked). This may be a very old Indo-European motif indeed, judging from archaeological evidence from Europe before 3500 BCE depicting the bird goddess. Her mythology begins with the Vedic myth of Purūravas and Urvaśī and extends to the ballet figures of *The Firebird* (the firebird is the Russian version of the magic sunbird) and *Swan Lake*, in which Odette, the good, chaste White Swan, is opposed by Odile, the evil, seductive Black Swan. Then, too, when the Valkyries are not riding horses they become swans.

But the demotion from mare to swan was not the last step in the degradation of the symbol. The swan became male. In Greek myth, Zeus assumes the form of a white swan in order to seduce Leda as she is bathing in a river (Leda's two sons, Castor and Pollux, became known as the Dioscuri, or equine twins, the Greek parallel to the Vedic Aśvins). And in the legend of Lohengrin, it is he, not she, who rides in the swan boat. In Lohengrin's story the more ancient myth of the immortal woman who visits the mortal man or king came to be replaced by the myth of the immortal man who rescues the mortal woman. In a skiff drawn by a white swan (here a male), Lohengrin rides, as on a white horse, to the rescue of Elsa; the helpless female awaits the great horse/swan god who deigns to visit her and who will make her promise never to ask him his name or his lineage. Now Leda awaits Zeus, awaits the moment when she may, in Yeats's words, "put on his knowledge with his power / before the indifferent beak could let her drop."

**The Rider on the White Horse.** Thus the white stallion came to supplant the white mare in Indo-European mythology at a very early period. His mythology, like hers, was a mythology of ambivalence, of the coincidence of opposites, but the powers in question were different. The stallion came to symbolize not only death

(as had the mare) but also rebirth, not only the taming of the wild (as had she) but also complete freedom from all social bonds.

Plato likened the human soul to a charioteer who had harnessed two horses to his chariot, one pulling him toward brutish sensuality, the other to a higher spiritualism; and, before Plato, the Indian Upaniṣads had likened the senses to horses that must be controlled if they are not to remain vicious and wild. The locus of this taming is the mouth of the horse, whence we derive such metaphors as "to bridle," "to curb," "to take the bit between the teeth," and so forth. The horse's mouth was therefore seen as the point of dangerous interaction. This notion is a misconception (for, as every horseman knows, although horses can indeed bite, it is the other end of the horse that poses the real danger, and horses are in any case strict vegetarians); nevertheless, it is the source of the many myths in which horses devour people, myths in which doomsday flames come out of the horse's mouth (or nostrils). That the mouth of the mare is believed to be dangerous is an instance of the projection of aggression, assuming that she will injure you with the organ where you have injured her (through the bit).

In Christian mythology, doomsday appears as the four horsemen of the apocalypse, or the rider on the white horse; in India, death becomes incarnate as the centaur or white horse named Kalki, an avatar of Viṣṇu who will usher in the final Kali Age and the end of the world. This is the image captured in Peter Schaffer's play *Equus*, in which an adolescent boy confuses together in his fantasies the tortured mouth of the horse-god that he rides naked in sexual ecstasy and the tortured head of Christ bridled in his crown of thorns. And it is the image that begins James Joyce's famous poem:

I hear an army charging upon the land  
 And the thunder of horses plunging, foam about their knees.  
 Arrogant, in black armour, behind them stand,  
 Disdaining the reins, with fluttering whips, the charioteers.  
 (from *Chamber Music*, 1907)

But the other, positive aspect of the horse never lost its symbolic power. Centuries before the Roman invasions, someone carved into the chalky hillsides of the English Downs several colossal images of a white horse. The horse by itself, unharnessed, unbridled, unriden, was always at home in the mountains, close to its divine home and far away from the ropes of men. The horse thus remained always a symbol of freedom. In the ancient Indian horse sacrifice, the stallion wandered freely for a year before the ceremony, attended by his herds and followed by the king's men, to claim for the king whatever grazing land he cared to wander

through. This image of freedom was somehow preserved rather than canceled by the later composite image of the white horse and its noble rider, who were thought of as a single creature, ideally a kind of centaur. The horse transferred its freedom and nobility to its rider, even as the ancient Indian stallion transferred these qualities to the king during the sacrifice. Thus Saint George, always mounted on a white horse, kills the very dragon that is, as we have seen, a variant of the demonic underwater mare, the shadow side of the white stallion itself; and medieval equestrian imagery placed not only knights and kings but princes of the church on horseback, to symbolize all that was not only noble but divine.

The horse carried man from earth to heaven. In India and Greece, as well as in medieval Europe, we read of princes who are lured by white stags (or white swans, or white horses, or unicorns) from the safe territory of the royal parks to the thick of the forest, to the Other World, where they may meet their princess or encounter their dragon (or both, or both in one). The many tales of winged horses, as well as the conflation of horse and bird, often transform this horizontal voyage into a vertical flight. Not until the advent of photography late in the nineteenth century did people come to realize that a galloping horse did not literally fly, with forelegs stretched forward and hindlegs backward, and even then galloping continued to *feel* like flying. In many of the shamanistic myths of Inner Asia, China, and India, the initiate mounts a white horse and is suddenly carried off, out of control, into the world of the gods, where his initiation takes place. Thus the horse leads man from the world of the tame to the world of the wild, the magic, supernatural world of the gods.

This symbolism found its expression in the mythology of the American West, where the magnificent white mustang who can never be caught stands on the mountains with the wind lifting his mane, symbolizing all that is wild and free. Yet the stallion *is* caught, to become the alter ego (in India one would say the vehicle, or *vahana*) of the cowboy, who comes himself to represent the last bastion of male freedom—freedom from sexuality (the cowboy rides alone, like Lancelot, whose chastity was his power), from the law (for even the lawmen tend to be mavericks, and the outlaws are good outlaws), but most of all from being tamed or "fenced in."

Man can never entirely succeed in taming the horse. This is the charm and the challenge of any intimate association with a wild animal, that it retains some measure of its wildness. But the horse untames man, transferring to him—or, one might say, sacrificing for him—some of its own wildness and freedom.

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WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY

**HORUS.** In ancient Egypt there were originally several gods known by the name Horus, but the best known and most important from the beginning of the historic period was the son of Osiris and Isis who was identified with the king of Egypt. According to myth, Osiris, who assumed the rulership of the earth shortly after its creation, was slain by his jealous brother, Seth. The sister-wife of Osiris, Isis, who collected the pieces of her dismembered husband and revived him, also conceived his son and avenger, Horus. Horus fought with Seth, and, despite the loss of one eye in the contest, was successful in avenging the death of his father and in becoming his legitimate successor. Osiris then became king of the dead and Horus king of the living, this transfer being renewed at every change of earthly rule. The myth of divine kingship probably elevated the position of the god as much as it did that of the king. In the fourth dynasty, the king, the living god, may have been one of the greatest gods as well, but by the fifth dynasty the supremacy of the cult of Re, the sun god, was accepted even by the kings. The Horus-king was now also "son of Re." This was made possible mythologically by person-

ifying the entire older genealogy of Horus (the Heliopolitan ennead) as the goddess Hathor, "house of Horus," who was also the spouse of Re and mother of Horus.

Horus was usually represented as a falcon, and one view of him was as a great sky god whose outstretched wings filled the heavens; his sound eye was the sun and his injured eye the moon. Another portrayal of him particularly popular in the Late Period, was as a human child suckling at the breast of his mother, Isis. The two principal cult centers for the worship of Horus were at Bekhdet in the north, where very little survives, and at Idfu in the south, which has a very large and well-preserved temple dating from the Ptolemaic period. The earlier myths involving Horus, as well as the ritual performed there, are recorded at Idfu.

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LEONARD H. LESKO

**HOSEA**, or, in Hebrew, Hoshe'a (mid-eighth century BCE); Hebrew prophet whose words are recorded in the biblical *Book of Hosea*. Hosea prophesied during the reign of Jeroboam II of the northern kingdom of Israel (787/6-747/6 BCE), which was a period of economic prosperity and political stability. There are, however, a number of allusions in the book to either war (5:8ff.) or political anarchy (7:1ff., 10:3, 13:10–11), which may suggest that Hosea continued to prophesy until the fall of Samaria in 722. This fits well with the superscription's list of the Judahite kings (Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah) during whose reigns Hosea prophesied. Hosea's prophetic emphasis is mainly on domestic affairs, especially the cultic situation.

**Hosea's Marriage and His Prophetic Message.** The information on Hosea's background is minimal. We are informed, however, about a unique personal experience in his life, a peculiar marital episode. God had commanded Hosea to marry a harlot, one Gomer, daughter of Diblaim (1:3), who bore him two sons and one daughter. This marriage and its consequences, interpreted in religio-theological terms, form the major theme of chapters 1–3. The story of the marriage is told twice. The first account (chap. 1) is in the third person, while the second (chap. 3) is reported directly by Hosea. The significance of Hosea's marriage to a harlot and the text's repetition of the story of this marriage have been major issues in research on *Hosea*. Should God's order

to "go, take to yourself a wife of harlotry and have children of harlotry" (1:2) be read literally or only as a metaphor for the nation's religious attitude, with Hosea the faithful husband representing God, and Gomer the unfaithful wife representing Israel? Is a "harlot" defined as a professional prostitute or as a sacred prostitute (cf. *Amos* 2:7)? There are no clear answers to these questions. We should not ignore, however, the prophets' tendency to dramatize events literally (e.g., *Is.* 20:2, *Jer.* 28:10, *Am.* 8:1–3) and therefore the possibility that Hosea married a harlot (professional or sacred) to symbolize the content of his message. The root *znh* ("harlotry") appears no fewer than nineteen times in his prophecy, always in key passages. Hosea's personal experience is thus the paradigm of his prophetic message that Israel has betrayed God. The relationship between God and Israel is like that between man and woman, husband and wife, where Israel is the unfaithful wife and God the loving and forgiving husband, who calls to his wife to repent and come back to him (see 2:14ff. [Masoretic text 2:16ff]). The names of Hosea's three children, dictated to him by God, further express his prophetic message. The elder son is called Jezreel because "I will punish the House of Jehu for the blood of Jezreel" (see *1 Kgs.* 19:15–17; *2 Kgs.* 9–10) and "I will put an end to the kingdom of the house of Israel" (*Hos.* 1:4). His daughter is named *Lo'-ruḥamah* ("not pitied"), "for I will no more have pity on the house of Israel" (1:6), and the younger son is called *Lo'-'ammi* ("not my people"), "for you are not my people and I am not your God" (1:8).

No other prophet has portrayed the relationship between God and the people of Israel in such rich images of harlotry and vivid descriptions of the unfaithful wife. Indeed, the key words of Hosea's message are words which connote "fidelity" (*ḥesed*; 4:4, 6:4, 6:6), an emotional relationship with God (*da'at Elohim*; 4:1, 6:6) and repentance (*shuvah*; 6:1, 6:11, 7:10, 12:7).

Hosea's protestations against the unfaithful marriage also raise questions as to the nature of the Israelite religion of this time, since the Hebrew word for "husband," *ba'al*, also connotes the chief Canaanite god. Thus, a renewed relationship of fidelity between God and Israel will be expressed in new terms for marital relationships: "And in that day, says the Lord, you will call me "my man" [*'ishi*], and no longer will you call me "my husband" [*ba'ali*]" (2:16 [MT 2:18]). Scholars call attention to the possibility of religious syncretism that may have taken place in Israel. Archaeological findings in Kuntillet 'Ajrud in Sinai may indicate that a cult of Yahveh, with Baal as either an alternative name or a co-god, existed toward the end of the ninth century BCE. Hosea may thus have been protesting against a cult of fertility that involved sacred harlots and was prac-

ticed in his own agricultural society. Hosea also called to renew the *berit* between Israel and God. Many scholars translate *berit* as "covenant" and reject the existence of the concept of formal covenant between God and Israel prior to the later appearance of the Deuteronomistic school. Nevertheless, *berit* occurs in *Hosea* at least five times (see especially 6:7 and 8:1) and may be understood in terms of faithful marriage, as the context of Hosea's prophecy suggests.

**Hosea and Earlier Tradition.** Hosea is opposed to fundamental institutions of his society. He criticizes the priests (4:4–10) as well as the political leaders and even the monarchs of his kingdom.

Where now is your king, to save you;  
where are all your princes, to defend you—  
those of whom you said, "Give me a king  
and princes"?

I have given you kings in my anger,  
and I have taken them away in my wrath.  
(13:10–11, RSV)

He is the only prophet to anchor his reservations about kings in ancient antimonarchical traditions (see *1 Sm.* 8:5ff.). Hosea's disappointment in the kings of Israel may also mirror the political situation that followed the death of Jeroboam II. Jeroboam's son Zechariah ruled for six months and was assassinated by Shallum, who governed for just one month and was killed by Menahem (*2 Kgs.* 15:8ff.). Two other Israelite kings were also assassinated before the fall of the kingdom, for a total of four out of six kings murdered within approximately twenty-five years.

Hosea does not see himself as an innovator. He speaks for and identifies himself with the long prophetic tradition that started with Moses (12:13 [MT 12:14]; see also 6:5, 9:7, 12:10 [MT 12:11]). He has no illusions about the effect of his address, as he points out in 9:7: "The prophet is a fool, the man of the spirit is mad." But he does not withdraw, regarding himself as "the watchman of Ephraim" (9:8), following prophetic tradition (cf. 3:17ff.). (In *Hosea* this tribe's name is often used for the entire northern kingdom.) He is familiar with traditions about the patriarch Jacob—his birth (*Hos.* 12:3 [MT 12:4]), his struggle with the angel (12:4 [12:5]), his devotion to his beloved wife Rachel, and his flight from the land of Aram (12:12 [12:13]). He refers to the period of the Exodus (2:15 [2:17], 11:1, 13:4); to Moses, the prophet who brought Israel up from Egypt (12:13 [12:14]); and to Israel's unfaithful behavior in the desert at Ba'al-pe'or (9:10; see *Nm.* 25:1–18), when God punished the people by means of a plague for committing cultic-sexual sins. Hosea even refers to a certain version of the Decalogue (4:2; cf. *Jer.* 7:9). But he also empha-

sizes God's care of the Israelite people in the desert (13:5). Thus he shows that Israel's relationship with God has a long history, yet the people have ignored the ancient traditions that demonstrate God's devotion and commitment. For him, fulfillment of the moral commandments is the ultimate condition for the survival of the land and its people (4:3), for this constitutes faithfulness to this relationship with God.

**Language, Structure, and Authorship.** Hosea's identification with the prophetic tradition as well as certain linguistic affinities with *Deuteronomy* suggest that his ideas and language influenced the Deuteronomistic ideology and terminology. It may be that after the fall of Samaria, either Hosea himself or his disciples moved to Jerusalem, where his speeches were collected and preserved. Hosea's portrayal of God and Israel as husband and wife is also reflected in the prophecy of Jeremiah (cf. *Jer.* 2:17ff., 3:1ff.), who was very familiar with the style of the Deuteronomist.

Hosea was a great poet, a master of language; his verses in 11:8–9 are among the most moving lines in the prophetic literature. His language is a mixture of prose and poetry. His verses are longer than is typical and often break the symmetrical pattern of parallelism, enabling the isolation and emphasis of a specific idea through the device of climax.

What shall I do with you, O Ephraim?  
 What shall I do with you, O Judah?  
 Your love is like a morning cloud, like  
 the dew that goes early away.  
 Therefore I have hewn them by the prophets,  
 I have slain them by the words of my mouth,  
 and my judgment goes forth as the light.  
 For I desire steadfast love and not sacrifice,  
 the knowledge of God, rather than burnt offerings.  
 (6:4-6, RSV)

No other prophet employs so many figures of speech, especially simile, as Hosea. He may use a series of similes to create a single long poetic image, as in developing the figure of the oven in 7:4ff. He refers to God as a lion (5:14), a leopard (13:7), and a bear (13:8), images that illustrate his effort to attract his audience's attention in an unconventional way and to deliver his message as effectively as possible.

*Hosea's* language is complicated, however, and every study of the book struggles with the difficulties of the text. The language, especially beginning with chapter 4, is very often puzzling. Perhaps the text has been poorly transmitted, or, as some scholars suggest, perhaps Hosea speaks in a northern dialect, which may sound odd to the modern reader of the Hebrew Bible, who is used to the Judahite style.

The *Book of Hosea* is divided into two major parts: chapters 1–3 and 4–14. The first part includes three literary genres: biography (chap. 1), autobiography (chap. 3), and prophetic speech (chap. 2). There have been discussions concerning the chronological order of these chapters, with some scholars suggesting that chapter 3 precedes chapter 1, so that the biography (chap. 1), which develops the theme of the marriage, elaborates Hosea's personal account. Others, who attempt to preserve the present order, point to the words "Go again, love a woman" (3:1), which may indicate that chapter 3 refers to a second marriage and not to Gomer.

Chapters 4–14 are a compilation of poetic orations, and determining each prophetic speech unit is sometimes difficult. In light of the stylistic differences and the personal approach of chapters 1–3, it has been suggested that two different books composed by two prophets were combined. However, the intense imagery of harlotry, the motif of repentance, and the return of the wife to her husband dominate the second part of the book as well and thus suggest that the entire book is Hosea's composition.

In contrast to many other prophetic books, most of the material in *Hosea* has been assigned by scholars to Hosea himself or to his close disciples, except verses such as 1:7 and 3:5, which may reflect a redaction in terms of a Judahite salvation eschatology. The various historical allusions (which are not always readily obvious), such as the Syro-Ephraimite war (5:8ff.), and 13:9–16, which may refer to a military occupation toward the end of the existence of the northern kingdom, may suggest that the book was edited into chronological order.

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YEHOSHUA GITAY

**HOSPITALITY.** The word *hospitality* is a translation of the Latin noun *hospitium* (or the adjective *hospitalis*), which in turn derives from *hospes*, meaning both "guest" and "host." Behind this double connotation is the Greek concept of the *xenos*, the stranger who receives a welcome or, less frequently, acts as a welcomer of others. A great many cultures attach religious and ethical value to the establishment of friendly exchanges



between those who view one another as different—in rank, race, or tribe—and, therefore, potentially dangerous. In order to provide a focus for interpreting the diverse traditions that relate to this subject, the present study concentrates upon the prescribed behaviors for guests and hosts, particularly at meals; and the reasons, stated or implied, for these mores.

Pictures of hospitality abound in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Indeed, the practice of hospitality can be perceived as a cardinal virtue among the Homeric characters. Odysseus, the great wanderer, is himself praised for his exemplary hosting (Homer, *Odyssey* 1.176). In both epics hospitality represents that aspect of fearing the gods that creates a readiness for reciprocal relationships with strangers. Those who do not attain such openness are deemed barbarians (*Odyssey* 6.120f.). Conversely, a single act of welcoming on the part of one family group toward another, usually by means of a meal, can result in a bond of friendship that lasts generations (*Iliad* 6.215ff.). Thus, hospitality is an eminently practical virtue; through gift exchanges and the sharing of food or shelter, peace and harmony are achieved in what would otherwise be a chaotic world.

In Greek epic tradition, the gods themselves sometimes put on human disguises and assume the role of guests. On those occasions when they are welcomed, they respond with good news (*Odyssey* 1.180ff.) or extraordinary gifts (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 8.678ff.). In this reciprocation there exists a link with the ancient bedouin tradition concerning Abraham's gracious reception of three strangers by the Oaks of Mamre (*Genesis* 18:1ff.). These three strangers are variously understood to be human messengers, angels, or, in later Christian thought, the Trinity. Thus, icons of the orthodox churches depict Abraham's philoxeny, or love of strangers, as the believer's enjoyment of communion with the divine. In the biblical story, Abraham's guests respond to the lavish banquet that he and Sarah have prepared for them with the miraculous news that Sarah, who like her husband is advanced in years, will soon bear a son, Isaac. It is not surprising that in rabbinic Judaism, early Christianity, and Islam, Abraham becomes a kind of patron saint of hosts. The thought behind this tradition seems to be that hospitality merits a reward from God and must therefore be encouraged. A variation of this theme occurs in *Matthew* 25:33ff., where Jesus appears as the judge of all nations and announces that hospitable acts performed for the least of his brothers have actually been done for him and that, moreover, the end result of such acts is the opening of God's kingdom to those who have served him incognito. The special vocation of Christian monastics to care for strangers and

the needy, in part through the founding of hospitals, is based largely on this passage.

Rabbinic Judaism sometimes employs hospitality as a metaphor for the teaching and learning of Torah ("Let thy house be a place of meeting for the wise, and dust thyself with the dust of their feet and drink their words with thirst"; *Avot* 1.4). Hospitality is thought to be blessed by the bestowal of God's presence ("Three who have eaten at one table and have said over it words of Torah are as if they had eaten from the table of God"; *Avot* 3.4). Similar thoughts occur in New Testament stories where Jesus and Paul receive material hospitality but demonstrate by their words and actions that they are actually hosts to their welcomers on behalf of God's kingdom (*Mt.* 9:10–13; *Lk.* 7:36–50, 24:28–35; *Acts* 20:6–12).

In Islam, the fundamental notion underlying the theory and practice of hospitality is protection. This is expressed in the Arabic term *djiwar*, which denotes neighborliness or the granting of refuge to wayfaring strangers and resident visitors who are not members of one's own tribe. Such practices could have their origin in the bedouin conviction that guest and host alike (the Arabic word *dayf*, like *xenos*, means both) stand at the mercy of a hostile environment and must adhere to firm rules for the sharing of necessities to insure their common survival. Foremost among these rules is a custom according to which travelers may count on receiving food and lodging from a given host for three days. At the end of this period, they are expected to continue their journey unless unusual circumstances intervene (see also the early Christian *Didachē* 11–12). From this fundamental rule, refinements of hospitality evolve. Virtuous hosts prevail upon their guests to stay longer, and they emerge from their tents to welcome passing strangers. Some hosts provide gifts for their guests, usually in return for news brought by the travelers.

Religious articulations of hospitality also occur. For example, proximity to a sacred place is thought to confer protection; and it is said that when one becomes a Muslim, one is henceforth God's *djar* ("protected neighbor"). Perhaps it is this trust in God's care that stimulates Islamic practitioners of hospitality to extend such largess to their guests. H. R. P. Dickson reported that in the 1920s he was greeted by a number of Saudi Arabian hosts with this couplet: "O Guest of ours, though you have come, though you have visited us, and though you have honored our dwellings / we verily are the real guests, and you are the Lord of this house" (Dickson, 1951, p. 118).

In Hinduism of the classical period and, to a lesser extent, Hinduism today, practices of hospitality are shaped primarily by the caste system and the fourfold

stages of life through which an individual (i.e., student, householder, hermit, or homeless wanderer) passes. According to some of Hinduism's oldest sacred texts, members of one caste may not interdine with those of another. Under this constraint the basic foundation for mutuality between strangers, utilized by most cultures, is eliminated. Nevertheless, Hinduism recognizes an alternate code of hospitality whereby the brahman (Skt., *brāhmaṇa*), or member of the priestly caste, accepts food from members of other castes (under carefully prescribed conditions) in return for spiritual services, especially the reciting of the Vedas. Moreover, brahmans are enjoined to be generous hosts to members of other castes, albeit at separate tables and after their fellow brahmans have been provided for (*Laws of Manu* 3–4). The lowest caste, the śūdra, is understood to be servant to the other three, although the higher castes must see to the basic material needs of the lowest (*Mahabharata* 12). In general, brahmans are to assume the task of hosting the gods on behalf of other castes by offering sacrifices of food.

With regard to the fourfold stages of life, householders and hermits are the chief host figures, while students and homeless wanderers typically act the role of guests. In every encounter exchanges of spiritual and material gifts are expected, although not necessarily at common meals. All gifts are reproductive to the donor; that is, they bring an increase during one's present life and/or in subsequent reincarnations. Gifts of food in particular exercise special influence over an individual's *karman*. Indeed, "one is reborn in the other world with the nature of those whose food one accepts, or of those whose food is in one's stomach, or with the nature of the food itself" (Mauss, 1954, p. 126). Today some of Hinduism's ancient societal barriers no longer prevail, and a number of castes that had traditionally maintained strict separation from one another practice interdining where it is perceived to be in their common social and economic interests.

Tradition has it that as the Buddha lay dying at the home of Cunda the smith, who had served him poisonous mushrooms by mistake, he ordered his disciples to tell the grieving host that he must not feel guilty about the demise of his guest. On the contrary, said Gautama, Cunda's meal had granted him final passage to *nirvāṇa* and therefore ought to be praised. In addition to portraying Gautama's extraordinary compassion, this story illustrates a constant theme in Buddhist depictions of hospitality: whenever hosts share food with guests, especially when the guests are monks or revered teachers, merit accumulates for all parties.

In Theravāda Buddhism, no ritual acts as such are

prescribed. In the canonical texts, however, two public occasions of a religious nature are presupposed: the feeding of monks and preaching. In Sri Lanka, these are often combined in an event called the *pinkama* ("act of merit"), during the course of which a *dānē* ("gift-meal") is provided, usually by laypeople, and *baṇa* ("preaching") or *pirit* ("recitation of sacred texts") is contributed by the monks. These events may be large festal gatherings at temples, private visits by monks to the households of laypeople, or funeral meals attended by families and friends. The common feature of all of them, however, is the transferring of merit, which is accomplished when a host expresses his wish that the benefits of the food and drink being served might accrue to others who are not visibly present. Normally, gods, dead relatives, or *pretas* (homeless, hungry spirits) are named, but in the popular understanding merit transferred at a *pinkama* also contributes toward the enlightenment of its ordinary human guests. Indeed, according to the "perfection of donation" tradition in Mahāyāna Buddhism, a *bodhisattva* may reassign the merit produced by his giving so that it benefits every living creature. The merit itself is then conceived of as food, for the *bodhisattva* vows: "I turn over into full enlightenment the meritorious work founded on jubilation. May it feed the full enlightenment (of myself and of all beings)" (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā* 6.138; trans. Conze, 1954). In effect, the *bodhisattva* becomes a host to the entire universe.

Present in this vow as well is a reference to the joy associated with feeding events, a joy that itself produces merit beyond that earned by the host. Thus, Richard F. Gombrich reports that a priest in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), who had spent 5,000 rupees on a *pinkama*, told him how any villager responding to this meritorious act with sympathetic joy could accumulate more merit than the priest—and without spending any money (Gombrich, 1971, p. 226)! One may conclude then that in Buddhism, hospitality, in the form of the guest-meal, functions to extend compassion; through the meal an endless process toward universal enlightenment is initiated.

In Confucian thought and practice, represented by documents dating from the Chou dynasty, gatherings for the sharing of food and drink are occasions that honor the natural distinctions between individuals or groups and at the same time provide opportunities for a decent, orderly communion among all the participants. When those involved follow the prescribed rites, harmony is achieved, and this harmony has cosmic as well as societal implications. According to Marcel Granet's reconstruction of the ancient Pa Cha agricultural

festival, all those present were divided into two groups, one acting as hosts, the other as guests. These two groups embodied all the opposing forces of the universe (e.g., *yin* and *yang*), which produce great blessings when they meet under the proper conditions. Similar types of ritual meetings for the sake of harmony are the community drinking ceremony, as pictured in Hsün-tzu's description; the elaborate protocols for state visits and feasts transmitted by the authors of the *I li* (Book of Etiquette and Ceremonial) and the family ancestor festivals, during which the living and the dead are united through offerings of food. By means of such offerings, the dead are aided in their journey to the Western Heaven of Happiness, and the living are enabled to appropriate their merit. Thus, everyone benefits from the common feast.

The potlatch assemblies of the American Indians of the Northwest Coast appear to be altogether different from Confucian ceremonies in character and purpose, for their chief visible feature is an almost orgiastic competition in gift giving, which obligates guests to hosts and virtually enforces role reversals or loss of face in the future. Tribal and individual status are determined by the ability to give everything away in ritual acts of consumption or destruction. Nevertheless, as Marcel Mauss has shown in his classic work on gift exchanges among archaic peoples, even the radical potlatch (the literal meaning of which is both "nourish" and "consume") becomes a form of acting out natural laws, according to which a reciprocal flow of giving and receiving between those of different ranks must occur in order to preserve society. Guests and hosts are seen to be deeply linked with each other in a cosmic order that requires them to change their roles periodically to ensure proper redistributions of wealth and value (Mauss, 1967, pp. 31-45). However much the potlatch differs from its Chinese counterparts in matters of decorum, it resembles them in embodying a basic harmony. For potlatch societies, however, that harmony is one of great flux. [See also Potlatch.]

By way of summary, it may be noted that in all the cultures and traditions examined above hospitality, especially in the form of the guest-meal, is marked by exchanges of spiritual and/or material goods. These exchanges frequently have the effect of multiplying blessings or merit for the participants beyond the sum total of resources brought by the guests and hosts. Sometimes gods, dead relatives, or forces of nature are thought to be present at the meal. In every case their influence is felt, typically as a communion or productive alliance with the deeper forces of the universe.

[See also Gift Giving.]

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JOHN KOENIG

**HOTTENTOTS.** See Khoi and San Religion.

**HOWITT, A. W.** (1830-1908), English-born explorer, geologist, and amateur anthropologist who made first-hand studies of Aboriginal life in southeastern Australia. To the many aspects of indigenous culture that he described (social and political organization, as well as religion), Alfred William Howitt brought a comprehensive and systematic approach. He did have blind spots, however. He doubted, for example, whether Aboriginal beliefs in the supernatural were religious, apparently because of their remoteness from an ideally conceived Christianity. One of his notable achievements was to show that prolonged and highly organized ceremonies could be celebrated by people with a simple economy and material culture.

Howitt's descriptions of man-making ceremonies (initiation rites) in Southeast Australia, such as the Kurin-gal and Jeraeil ceremonies, stand comparison with the renowned studies of such rites in other parts of Australia made by Walter Baldwin Spencer and Francis James Gillen. His studies are especially valuable, how-

ever, because Aboriginal beliefs and ceremonies have become moribund in the Southeast, whereas much traditional culture survives in the central and northern parts of the continent. Howitt made it clear that ceremonies are ordered sequences of action, and he brought out the complex articulation of art, myth, choreography, and social organization that characterizes them. In documenting these vital aspects of sequence and articulation, Howitt displayed an intuitive grasp of the structural considerations stressed around the turn of the century by the French comparatists—by Arnold van Gennep in analyzing rites of passage and by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss in analyzing sacrificial rites. Another of Howitt's services was to show how widespread in the Southeast, and how essential to the intelligibility of the ceremonies, was belief in the powerful sky spirit he named the All-Father.

In addition to his obvious importance as recorder of a now-vanished way of life, Howitt is noteworthy for his urge, at that early date in the history of Australian anthropology, to typify and generalize. It was no mean feat to see in the Kuringal, Jeraeil, and many other ceremonies particular examples of a general type, to classify all Aboriginal initiations as belonging to either an eastern or a western type, or to perceive the All-Father in such diverse mythic personages as Baiame, Bunjil, Daramulun, Kohin, and Mungan-ngaua.

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KENNETH MADDOCK

**HSIAO**, filial piety, is a concept at the foundation of traditional Chinese social order and of Confucian religious consciousness. Represented by an ideogram combining the meanings "old age" and "son," the word appears in the most ancient Chinese texts—the inscriptions on oracle bones from the Shang dynasty and the dedicatory inscriptions on bronze vessels from the Shang and Chou dynasties—and it has remained essentially unchanged in meaning down to the present time.

*Hsiao* is defined by the *Hsiao ching* (Classic of Filial Piety) as "the duty owed to a parent by a child," that is,

respect, obedience, and the endeavor to please. Although it is not listed among the Confucian "five virtues" (humaneness, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness), it is considered the foundation and sum of them all. It is implied in Confucius's answer when, asked how the world might become harmonious, Confucius replied, "Let fathers be fathers and sons be sons" (*Analects* 12:11). Extended by analogy, filial piety underlies all hierarchical relationships in society: that of minister to ruler, of wife to husband, of younger brother to elder brother, and the like. The honor traditionally accorded to chaste widows derives in part from a sense that a hierarchy of duty and obligation exists in the wife toward the husband. Training in the precepts of filial piety was central to Confucian education. The standard elementary curriculum included books of illustrated anecdotes about paragons of filial piety, for example, a scholar who, in middle age, played with toys to make his aged parents feel young again.

Filial piety implies reciprocity: the son reveres and obeys the father and the father nurtures, guides, and corrects the son. However, the child's duties are constant: parental misconduct does not release the child from filial obligations. The duties are also extensive in time: filial piety is owed not only to living parents and grandparents but to all ancestors back to the founder of the clan. Thus continuation of the family line through the birth of male heirs is a sacred obligation, lest the ancestral shrine and family graves be neglected and the ancestral spirits be left devoid of sacrificial sustenance.

It is in ancestor worship that the religious content of filial piety is seen. Religious duties associated with filial piety include upkeep of the family graves and the maintenance of a household family shrine, at which sacrifices and obeisance are performed at annual festivals and on certain other occasions (for example, the formal announcement to the ancestors of the birth of a child, of a marriage, or of a death in the family). The paramount filial duty, however, is mourning. Confucian ritual canons such as *Li chi*, *I li*, and *Chou li* contain precise regulations for the ceremonies, regalia, and duration of mourning, which vary according to the degree of kinship involved. To the end of China's imperial period, officials were required to retire from office for "three years" of mourning (in fact twenty-five months) upon the death of a parent. The centrality of this duty is reflected in language: "filial garments" are mourning garments and a "filial chamber" is a mourning hut built next to the grave of a parent. Despite some official disapproval, elaborate and ruinously expensive funerals were a common manifestation of filial piety.

[See also Chinese Religion, *overview article*.]

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JOHN S. MAJOR

**HSIAO PAO-CHEN** (d. 1166 CE), Taoist master of the Chin period and founder of the T'ai-i sect of Taoism. A native of Chi Prefecture (present-day Honan Province), he was also called Yüan Sheng. Neither his occupation before becoming a Taoist master nor the training he undertook to that end is known. During the T'ien-chüan period (1138–1140) of Emperor Hsi-tsung's reign, Hsiao established the T'ai-i sect in Chi Prefecture. Of the three new Taoist sects established in the northern reaches of the Chin kingdom (Ch'üan-chen, Chen-ta, and T'ai-i), T'ai-i was the most similar in character to existing Taoist teachings. Its practices centered on the talisman called T'ai-i San-yüan that had allegedly been transmitted to Hsiao from an immortal. Although the contents of the talisman are not known, it is clear that the sect placed great importance on talismans and incantations. Because of Hsiao's ability to relieve people's suffering, disperse evil spirits, and cure illnesses, he gradually attracted many disciples and succeeded in establishing the T'ai-i sect. As Hsiao's teachings became a source of salvation for people wracked by the social unrest of the time, his sect's power grew apace. Hearing of his growing reputation, Emperor Hsi-tsung invited him to the court during the eighth year of his reign (1148). While at court, Hsiao demonstrated his spiritual prowess by curing a sick person. Deeply impressed, the emperor presented Hsiao with a name plaque inscribed “T'ai-i wan-shou kung,” the name he bestowed on Hsiao's Taoist temple in Chi Prefecture, thereby indicating official recognition and patronage of Hsiao's sect. Hsi-tsung is also said to have been converted to T'ai-i Taoism by Hsiao.

Although part of Hsiao's teachings centered on the use of talismans, he did not adopt elixirs of immortality

or other elements of the immortality cult. Instead, he upheld the “middle way,” forbidding the drinking of intoxicants and the consumption of the five pungent substances. He also forbade priests to marry. It is clear that the rules of conduct that he taught were strict and aimed at transforming Taoist speculative theories into a disciplined monastic practice. He also required that successive head priests of his school take his own name. Unfortunately, many elements of his life remain unclear.

[See also Taoism, overview article and article on The Taoist Religious Community.]

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KUBO NORITADA

Translated from Japanese by James C. Dobbins

**HSIEN** is ordinarily translated as “immortal,” “saint,” or “genie” and, in the history of Chinese religions, refers to the ideal of human perfection found in the Taoist tradition. A *hsien* is a human being (a man, woman, or child of any social rank) who—by assiduously following various spiritual (i.e., meditation, concentration, inner vision, mystical union) and physical (i.e., liturgical mime and dance, dietary, breathing, gymnastic, sexual, and alchemical) practices, or sometimes by fortuitous happenstance—has attained a unique mode of holy existence that is permanently in harmony with the ultimate life rhythm of the Tao. Because of this integration with universal life, the *hsien* continues to live for cycles of cosmic time equivalent to hundreds and thousands of normal human years, roaming about in the peripheral areas of the world, especially on mountains and in deep grottos (etymologically the term *hsien* alludes to the image of a man on, or in, a mountain), or in the starry mansions of the heavens. Possessing a refined or etherealized body that links the physical and spiritual dimensions of his personal being, the *hsien* achieves “material immortality” (the indigenous Chinese concept of immortality always involved both spirit and body) and embodies in his eccentric form and playful action the most important Taoist values of spontaneous freedom, effortless efficacy, and nondiscriminating concern for others.

The tradition of the *hsien* is specifically related to sectarian Taoist movements of revealed scripture and communal liturgy that arose after the breakup of the later

Han dynasty (second century CE), but the ideal of the *hsien* is to some degree rooted in earlier, mythically colored portraits of the holy man or Taoist adept, called the *tao-jen* ("man of *tao*"), *chen-jen* ("true man"), *shen-jen* ("spirit man"), and so on. Such portraits are seen in the ancient texts of the *Lao-tzu* (*Tao-te ching*) and the *Chuang-tzu* (c. fourth to second centuries BCE), in which the healing reunion of body and spirit and the concomitant preservation and prolongation of human life (if not the "material immortality" in the later extreme sense) are associated with the mystical arts of returning to the Tao.

Another contributing factor, one suggested by the mystical theme of spiritual wandering or flight that appears in the earliest Taoist texts, is the tradition of shamanic healing and divination by means of communication with the ancestors and spirits. This connection is indicated by an ancient variant graph for *hsien* that means to "rise up" or "soar like a bird" and that clearly suggests shamanic lore involving a hopping, birdlike dance, the magical use of herbs and minerals (some probably hallucinogenic in nature), and an ecstatic identification with a divine bird.

These strains of belief and practice establish the context for the emergence of an ill-defined cult of *hsien* immortality after the fourth century BCE, but it was not until the early Han period (second and first centuries BCE) that explicit textual and iconographical references to the *hsien* are found. Early Han depictions of *hsien* as winged angel-like beings who possess the secrets of deathlessness—sipping on jade and dwelling in the clouds, on paradise isles in the eastern seas, or on Kunlun Shan, the sacred mountains to the west—show the existence of popular, and not exclusively Taoist, salvational longings for immortality. Such representations directly anticipate much of the imagery to be found in the first collected biographies of Taoist immortals, such as the *Lieh hsien chuan* (Lives of Famous Immortals) attributed to Liu Hsiang of the early Han period but dating to the formation of religious Taoism after the second century CE.

The hagiographical accounts of legendary and semi-historical *hsien* that start to appear in abundance during the efflorescence of religious Taoism in the Six Dynasties period (second to sixth centuries CE) disclose no wholly consistent doctrinal structure and moreover variously draw upon Confucian familial ethical notions, traits related to the Buddhist idea of the *bodhisattva*, and sentiments associated with the folk religious tradition of the villages. It is nevertheless possible to specify some basic characteristics of these capricious beings.

1. *Hsien* were ordinarily imagined as superhuman, possessing incredible powers (flight, ubiquity, change-

able shape, invulnerability, invisibility, clairvoyance) and a fantastic appearance (hermaphroditic characteristics, youthful complexion, luminous body, jadelike bones, square pupils, pendant ears, elongated head). The manifestation of these occult powers and bodily characteristics was most often kept hidden in favor of a public identity that was wholly mundane. A *hsien* was not usually recognized as an extraordinary individual and, as the common Taoist saying goes, "remained hidden among the people."

2. There were usually three types of *hsien*: the "heavenly *hsien*" who primarily lived amid the stars and participated in the celestial bureaucracy; the "terrestrial *hsien*" who wandered the mountains and secret caverns of the world; and the *shih-chieh hsien* or "corpse-free *hsien*." The last, unlike the others, who simply disappeared in broad daylight to become *hsien*, achieved the refinement of a deathless subtle body only after a normal death. The heavenly *hsien* is theoretically the highest, but Taoist texts and popular sentiment often give preference to more worldly *hsien* who, because of their waggish misbehavior or boredom with the celestial order, were banished from heaven.

3. *Hsien* may be distinguished from the gods (*shen*) and ancestors of the Taoist and popular pantheons by virtue of their utter freedom from attachment to a specific location, temple, or gravesite. Unlike the gods and ancestors, the *hsien* cannot be coerced by sacrificial ritual and were not associated with a cult of miraculous relics.

In the most general sense *hsien* were beings always betwixt and between the divine and human worlds who functioned as voluntary mediators between the two realms. As the sacred edgemen of the Taoist religion and the models of ultimate human achievement, they whimsically intervened in the fortunes of the common people by granting scriptural revelations, talismans, alchemical elixirs, or other signs of freely bestowed grace. Finally it must be noted that the popularity of the *hsien* ideal extended beyond Taoist circles, and in various forms (e.g., the legends and iconography of the "Eight Immortals") broadly influenced folkloric, literary, and artistic expression throughout traditional Chinese history.

[See also Taoism, *overview article*.]

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N. J. GIRARDOT

**HSIN.** The graphs *hsin* and *hsin*, fourth and first tones, respectively, represent two distinct concepts in Chinese philosophy. In their ancient pronunciations, the first *hsin* ended in an *n* consonant sound while the second ended in an *m* consonant sound. Although written the same in English romanization, the two terms are unrelated and will be discussed separately in this article.

**Hsin as Trust.** The graph for this *hsin* (fourth tone) contains the elements for "man" and "word" and means "trust" and related senses. As the name of a virtue, it means both "trustworthiness" and "honesty" and is frequently linked with the word *chung* ("loyalty"), as in the phrase *chung-hsin* (loyalty and good faith). Later, *hsin* was added to the list of four virtues (humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) given in *Meng-tzu* (2A.6; 6A.6) to make a classical list of five. Both Confucius and Meng-tzu, however, condemn a mere fetishistic concern with *hsin* that loses sight of what is really right (*Meng-tzu* 4B.11; *Lun-yü* 13.20). The use of this same word, *hsin*, as a verb means, "to regard as having *hsin*," and so, "to trust, to have faith in." The word thus comes to mean "belief" in a doctrine or "faith" in a deity. It had gained this sense prior to the introduction of Christianity, as in the title of the Buddhist sacred text *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (Treatise for Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna). Something like a concept of religious faith did exist in ancient China, in the form at least of trust in the oracles. This attitude commended in the chapter entitled "Ta kao" ("Great Announcement," arguably an eleventh-century BCE text) in the *Shang shu* (Book of Documents): the Duke of Chou, speaking for the second Chou king, Ch'eng Wang, claims this attitude as the king's own and ascribes it also to his forebears. In this case, however, the word *hsin* is not used.

In the *Tso chuan* (Chuang 10.1), *hsin* is used to describe the relationship between a worshiper and a spirit; the meaning there is not "faith," however, but

appears to refer to the "trustworthiness" of the worshiper, who does not try to bribe the spirit with many offerings but keeps his commitments, thereby inspiring the spirit to have "confidence" in, and to bestow blessings upon, the worshiper. There is no suggestion anywhere in ancient Chinese writings of the personal faith of the devotee in a deity. The ancient Chinese, except for the questionings of certain philosophers like Hsün-tzu, usually took the reality of spirits for granted; there was no existential problem of faith.

The philosopher Mo-tzu (fifth and fourth centuries BCE) did show a concern with belief of a sort. The school of thought based on his ideas, which disappeared by the second century BCE, was anomalous in other ways: it insisted on orthodox statements of doctrine, split into sects on this basis, and argued against disbelief in Heaven and the spirits. But what the *Mo-tzu* actually says is that people should all *hsin* ("believe, be confident") that the spirits really are able to reward good acts and punish wickedness. Thus, Mo-tzu is arguing for the social utility of belief, and not for a transformation of the self (*Mo-tzu*, chap. 31, "Being Clear about Spirits"). The Ming dynasty Confucian moralist Wang Yang-ming, on the other hand, for whom the heart-mind is virtually a "God within," says that we must trust (*hsin*) our moral intuition (*liang-chih*). For Wang, our coming to do so does perhaps have the character of an "act of faith."

**Hsin as Heart.** The graph for this *hsin* (first tone) is a drawing of the physical organ of the heart. Since the early Chinese assumed that we both think and feel emotion with this organ, the word therefore came to mean "mind," and also "disposition." In Chinese religious thought, this "heart-mind" is the focus of the effort to cultivate and perfect the self. In some of the Chou dynasty bronze inscription texts, *te* (virtue) and *hsin* seem to be used almost interchangeably, and in some literary texts as well as in inscriptions a king's *te* is something in himself that he has a religious duty to "uphold" (*kung*) or to "revere" (*ching*). [See Tao and Te.] The *hsin* is the object of religious cultivation directed toward moral perfection, omniscience, or sagehood in two ways. According to the Confucian tradition based on Meng-tzu's thought, the *hsin* is the seat of incipient moral "tastes" or "sprouts" (*tuan*), which must be encouraged to grow. In the *Meng-tzu* (2A.6; 6A.6) the four incipient dispositions are those toward benevolence (*jen*), dutifulness (*i*), propriety (*li*), and knowledge (*chih*, explained here as the disposition to distinguish right from wrong). Meng-tzu also uses the word *hsing* ("human nature") identifying the *hsing* as the locus of man's innate goodness; this leads to the dispute as to the relationship between *hsin* and *hsing* in later devel-

opments of Mencian moral philosophy. In much of the Taoist tradition founded on Chuang-tzu's thought, one must "fast" the *hsin* (Chuang-tzu, Chap. 4) to rid it of preconceptions that would block direct insight into the Tao and make it, ideally, a "mirror" (Chuang-tzu, chap. 7).

In Mencian ethics the fundamental, positive characteristics of the *hsin* are what make all men basically alike. In the Taoist conception, which is similar to the early thought of Hsün-tzu and merges with Buddhist and later Neo-Confucian ideas, the individuating aspects of the *hsin* are just those traces of prejudice or, in Neo-Confucian terms, "selfish thought," that disturb the mind's mirror-like capacity to reflect reality exactly as it is, and that must be eliminated if the *hsin* is not to be "obscured" (*pi*). Without these taints, the *hsin* becomes the "Buddha mind" (or "Buddha nature"). Alternately, one can say, as did the Sung dynasty Neo-Confucian Lu Chiu-yüan (1139–1193), that "my mind is the universe," or as did Wang Yang-ming, that "this mind" (*tz'u hsin*) is the "intelligence" of the universe and enables me to "form one body with all things." Wang's idea seems to be that *hsin* is one (he sometimes says "the mind is Heaven"), even though it is individuated in the mind of each person.

Traditional scholarship identifies Wang's type of Confucianism as the school of Mind (*hsin-hsüeh*), in contrast to Chu Hsi's school of Principle (*li-hsüeh*). For Wang, the unclouded *hsin* as a natural perfect "mirror" both reveals, and disposes us to, what is morally right in every situation. He thus combines the Taoist and Ch'an Buddhist concept of the *hsin* as a "mirror" with the Mencian concept of morality. The late Neo-Confucian focus on the *hsin* as an object of self-cultivation took the form of a personal commitment to a life of constant self-scrutiny and self-discipline (*kung-fu*) aimed at practicing the steps of self-development outlined in the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning). The primary task in "cultivating the person" (*hsiu shen*, undertaken in order to "make one's virtue [*te*] shine") is to "make one's *hsin* correct" (*cheng hsin*). Moralists in the Sung, Yüan, and Ming dynasties put this "*hsin* learning" forward as the primary duty of the ruler and offered it as an easily grasped route to moral "sagehood" for even the relatively uneducated.

Two important problems surface in Neo-Confucian discussions of *hsin* (and these have earlier counterparts in Buddhist analyses of types of consciousness and modes of religious cultivation). The first is the relation of the *hsin* to the passions and to human evil. Ch'eng I (1033–1107) identifies the *hsin* ("mind") with the *hsing* ("nature"), as the locus in the human being of *li* (moral "principle"). [See Li.] Chu Hsi (1130–1200) takes the

*hsin* to be the seat of the passions and assigns it to the physical component of man's being, which (for both Ch'eng and Chu) accounts for man's tendency toward evil. The dilemma is resolved in the thought of many moralists by distinguishing the "Way-mind" (*tao hsin*) and the "human mind" (*jen hsin*), using a third-century text in the spurious "Ta Yü mou" chapter of the *Shang shu*.

The other problem pertains to the correct way to grasp the *hsin* in self-cultivation as a source of higher "knowledge." Should one still the emotions through meditation or "quiet sitting," or "polish the mirror" so as to isolate the mind's substance (*t'i*) "before the feelings are aroused" (*Chung-yung* 1)? Or is the mind's substance identical with, or revealed only in, its functioning (*yung*), the activity of emotion and thought here and now, when one remains detached from the ongoing flow of activity? These two methods may be ascribed to the proponents of "gradual attainment" and "sudden enlightenment" respectively. These two methods came to distinguish the Northern and Southern schools of Ch'an Buddhism beginning in the T'ang dynasty, and also the "right" and "left" schools of post-Wang Yang-ming Confucianism in the sixteenth century.

[See also Chinese Philosophy and the biography of Meng-tzu.]

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DAVID S. NIVISON

**HSIN-HSING** (540–594), Chinese Buddhist monk and founder of the San-chieh Chiao, or Three Stages sect. A native of Honan Province, Hsin-hsing entered the religious life at an early age and eventually took full monastic orders (*upasampadā*) at the Fa-tsang Ssu near the city of Yeh, the capital of the Northern Ch'i dynasty and a thriving center of Buddhist learning. With the eclipse of the Northern Ch'i by the Northern Chou dynasty and the initiation, in the year 574, of a vigorous proscription of Buddhism by the new government, Hsin-hsing renounced his vows and lived as a common laborer. It was during this period that he formulated the religious doctrines that would form the basis for the San-chieh Chiao.

The foundation of Hsin-hsing's thought was the conviction, common to many segments of the Buddhist



community during the latter half of the sixth century, that the Buddha's teachings had recently entered a period of degeneration and decline foretold in several Buddhist scriptures. This period, known as *mo-fa*, or the Latter Days of the Law, was believed to be one in which the spiritual capacities of sentient beings would be so far diminished as to render them incapable of observing the Vinaya or of distinguishing good from evil and truth from falsehood. Because it was an age far removed from that of Śākyamuni (fifteen hundred years from the date of his *parinirvāṇa* by the reckoning of many of Hsin-hsing's contemporaries), sentient beings were deemed no longer subject to his guidance and unable even to practice Buddhism as it had traditionally been taught, let alone to attain enlightenment. Adherents of this doctrine believed that *mo-fa* would last for ten thousand years, at the end of which time the teachings of Śākyamuni would disappear from this world.

Against this starkly eschatological background, Hsin-hsing argued for a reappraisal of contemporary Buddhist practice, one that would bring it into conformity with the greatly altered historical conditions prevailing during the *mo-fa*. He believed that it was only when religious practices matched the capacities of sentient beings and the historical conditions under which they lived that genuine enlightenment was possible. Unlike thinkers of the Pure Land tradition, who saw in the onset of *mo-fa* the need to replace the traditional range of Buddhist practices with a single, "easy," discipline, the worship of the Buddha Amitābha, Hsin-hsing claimed that the practice most appropriate to the *mo-fa* age was a radical recognition of the Buddhahood inherent in all sentient beings. Calling his teaching that of the Universal Dharma (*p'u-fa*), Hsin-hsing advocated rigorous moral training to combat the degeneracy of the age and a catholic embracement of "all Buddhas and all *dharma*s," predicated upon the underlying Buddha nature in all things. Members of his school were thus conspicuous for the public obeisance they made to others as a recognition of their potential Buddhahood, and for their strong emphasis on charitable activities. The sect came to receive lavish donations and eventually instituted *wu-chin tsang-yüan* ("inexhaustible treasures") as a means of dispensing its charities to the needy and to the *saṃgha*.

With the reunification of the empire under the Sui (589), Hsin-hsing was summoned to Ch'ang-an by the emperor Wen-ti (581–604). At the suggestion of one of his ministers, five temples were built in the capital for followers of the sect, thus providing an institutional base around which the sect flourished for the next decade. During this brief period of official favor and patronage Hsin-hsing produced many of his most im-

portant works, including the *San-chieh fo-fa* and the *Tui-ken ch'i-hsin fa*. In all, his works are believed to comprise at least forty fascicles, some of which were only recovered in this century among the documents unearthed at Tun-huang.

In the year 600, the Three Stages sect suffered the first in a series of proscriptions. The enormous wealth of the sect, its essentially negative assessment of the moral condition of society, and its contention that human institutions, particularly governments, were incapable of conferring any lasting spiritual benefits, made it a conspicuous target for the civil authorities. Throughout the T'ang dynasty the sect suffered numerous attempts to seize its wealth and outlaw its writings, until it finally succumbed under the general suppression of Buddhism in the year 845.

[See also Mappō.]

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For the traditional account of Hsin-hsing's life, see his biography in Tao-hsüan's *Hsü kao-seng chuan* (T.D. 50. 559c–560b). Among modern studies of Hsin-hsing and his sect, none surpasses Yabuki Keiki's *Sangaikyō no kenkyū* (1927; reprint, Tokyo, 1973). This monumental study includes some four hundred pages of original texts found at Tun-huang.

MIYAKAWA HISAYUKI

**HSI WANG MU**, whose name is usually rendered as "queen mother of the west," appeared in the earliest stages of Chinese mythology and was a focus of intense religious devotion during the first few centuries of the present era. It is possible that she is mentioned in the oracle bone inscriptions of about 1500 BCE, but she appears with more certainty in the *Chuang-tzu* (fourth century BCE) and later writings. Hsi Wang Mu is described as one who had "attained the Tao," but nothing is known of her beginning or her end; she was said to dwell in the never-never land of the far west. In some sources she is described as a being of hybrid form. Usually her realm is pictured at the summit of a mountain called K'un-lun, but there are also references to a cave residence. She is said to possess certain magical powers and to live in material splendor, surrounded by rare jewels. She may be accompanied by spirits, also of hybrid form, and K'un-lun is sometimes described as a being protected by encircling waters, or as beyond human reach.

The queen was also credited with various cosmic powers. She may have controlled certain constellations, and she may have been able to maintain or to disrupt the rhythms that kept the universe in operation. She is also believed to have held the secret of the elixir of im-

mortality, which she made available to suppliants in the form of a potion.

These characteristics feature in several versions of a Chinese myth relating a meeting between partners. According to one version, in order to keep the cosmic rhythms in motion it was necessary for two stars (who were otherwise separated by the Milky Way) to meet annually at a crucial point during the summer. The same theme is seen in accounts of meetings held during the summer between the Queen Mother of the West and various earthly monarchs. Sometimes the queen is described as receiving a king in her own abode; sometimes she travels to earth in all her glory to meet a king or emperor in his realm. The purpose of these ceremonial meetings was to enable the human partner to obtain the drug of immortality. In another version the queen is partnered by a mythical consort known as the King Father of the East.

According to several accounts, a soteriological movement that centered on the invocation of the queen swept through wide areas of northern China in 3 BCE. Descriptions of this movement refer to such practices as the exchange of tokens or talismans, the performance of religious services, and singing or dancing, as well as a certain amount of permissive or unrestrained behavior. The purpose of these gatherings was to prepare for the arrival of the queen and to convey or to acquire the promise of deathlessness. But it was not until the middle of the first century CE that the queen began increasingly to be associated with immortality.

Early Chinese notions of an afterlife had envisaged a "paradise of the east" situated in islands such as P'eng-lai. In addition to the attempts made by talismanic means to guide the souls of the deceased to paradise by way of those islands, considerable effort was stimulated by a completely different notion, one that sprang from intellectual rather than religious motives. It was hoped that the provision of symbolic objects of a different sort, notably a particular type of bronze mirror, would set a deceased person within the most favorable cosmic circumstances. By this means a correspondence would be forged between the individual's personal circumstances of life and death and the eternal cyclical movements of heaven and earth. But from perhaps the middle of the second century BCE emphasis was being directed to the acquisition of immortality through the agency of the Queen Mother of the West, in one of two ways. Either she might be induced to provide the elixir that would ensure continuity of life on earth, or the soul might journey to the land where the queen presided, a realm populated by mythical beings who took part in a super-human existence.

The custom of burying talismans to ensure the happiness of the deceased was established in China long before the first century CE, but from this time on the Queen Mother of the West appears repeatedly in funerary iconography. Her attributes, as shown on stone reliefs, frescoes (rarely), and bronze mirrors, include a characteristic headdress or crown and sometimes a throne, composed of part dragon and part tiger, on which she is seated in majesty. She is accompanied by one or more hares who are engaged in compounding the elixir, a three-legged bird (sometimes three separate birds), and a nine-tailed fox, all of whom have special duties and properties. She may be attended by an armed guardian. Sometimes suppliants are shown beside the queen, praying for the drug or drinking a dose in a cup. In a few instances she is portrayed at the top of a pillar that is virtually inaccessible to man; rarely, her partner is shown beside her, similarly enthroned.

In time the symbolic power of this type of iconography weakened, so that the details that originally possessed talismanic significance were reduced to decorative motifs and reproduced inaccurately. At the same time it is likely that the queen's religious significance and her popularity began to decline as Buddhist influence began to grow in China, beginning perhaps in the third century CE. Traces of Buddhist characteristics can be seen in versions of the myth of the queen that appeared from the third century CE. This shift in emphasis culminates in the well-known account of a banquet given by the queen during which Monkey steals the peaches of immortality from her table. Monkey's subsequent punishment and adventures are all placed within a Buddhist context.

[See also *Afterlife*, article on Chinese Concepts, and *Chinese Religion*, article on Mythic Themes.]

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MICHAEL LOEWE

**HSÜAN-TSANG** (596?–664), religious name of the Chinese pilgrim-monk who became a leading cleric of the early T'ang dynasty after returning from an eighteen-year journey to the homeland of Buddhism in India. Famous in his own day as a Buddhist scholar and adviser to the emperor, Hsüan-tsang eventually came to be best known as the historical prototype for the legendary Tripiṭaka, Master of the Three Collections of the Buddhist Dharma, whose mythical adventures with his

companion, the supernatural monkey king Sun Wu-k'ung, are elaborated in the great sixteenth-century Chinese folk epic, the *Hsi-yu chi* (Journey to the West).

Born into a family of relatively important government officials and court scholars under the Sui dynasty (581–618), Hsüan-tsang grew up during a period of great turmoil and transition, a time that saw the reunification of the Chinese empire after almost three centuries of division. With the encouragement perhaps of his father, he decided early to follow the example of an elder brother in pursuing a monastic career. The young monk is depicted as a precocious, even impetuous student, one who diligently sought out the best scholars of the realm, only to decide while still in his twenties that he had already exhausted the resources available to him in China. To truly master the Buddhist teaching, he felt, he would have to travel to the source of the tradition, to the Ganges River valley, thousands of miles away across some of the most inhospitable terrain in Asia.

In 627 Hsüan-tsang set out on his pilgrimage, surreptitiously crossing the western frontier of China after failing to secure the official bureaucratic approval he had sought. After an arduous journey across mountain and desert with several long sojourns at the oases of Central Asia, he finally reached India two years later, there slowly to make his way to the various sites associated with the career of the Buddha and also to spend a number of years studying with Buddhist teachers, including the aged Yogācāra master Śīlabhadra at the great university-monastery of Nālandā. We are told that the gifted Chinese monk mastered the intricacies of Buddhist philosophy, both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, while also pursuing studies in the standard curriculum of the day: Vedic literature, logic, grammar, medicine, and mathematics. Excelling at philosophical debate, an important spectator sport in the prosperous urban centers, Hsüan-tsang's fame increased steadily. He was chosen to represent Nālandā in important contests, and in 642, fourteen years after leaving China, he was summoned to the court of King Harṣa, a patron of the arts and ruler of most of northern India. With the generous patronage of Harṣa, which ensured his victory at a royal debate held in Kanauj later that year, Hsüan-tsang reached the apogee of his career in India and began to make plans for a return to China.

After traveling for more than a year, Hsüan-tsang arrived back in China in 645 bringing an extensive collection of Buddhist texts and artifacts. The new T'ang dynasty was a powerful and recently consolidated regime ready to initiate an expansionist policy in the west, a campaign that would eventually extend China's frontier across much of the very terrain that Hsüan-tsang had

come to know so well. The emperor T'ai-tsung was quick to recognize the strategic military value of his extensive knowledge of the geography, customs, and politics of the many kingdoms to the west, but Hsüan-tsang politely declined to return to lay life in order to serve as a court official. The monk did agree, however, to record his knowledge in a long and detailed travelogue, the *Ta-T'ang hsi-yü chi* (Record of Western Realms), a document that remains one of the best historical sources for Central and South Asia during this period. In recognition of his unique knowledge, Hsüan-tsang was received as a national hero and eventually installed as the director of a lavishly funded translation project that greatly expanded the Chinese Buddhist canon.

T'ai-tsung's imperial patronage gave Hsüan-tsang a position of great prestige and power within the Chinese Buddhist establishment of Ch'ang-an. As a Buddhist philosopher and scholar, he is probably best characterized as a radical conservative. The radical aspect of his character was evident already in the restlessness of his youth, in the dissatisfaction with the state of Chinese Buddhism that inspired his long pilgrimage to India. His primary concern was to preserve faithfully the roots of the tradition, and he had little interest in the new, more indigenous Chinese Buddhist thought that was being formulated in the late sixth century. It was surely no accident that once in India he allied himself with the most conservative faction of Mahāyāna thought then current, the scholastic Yogācāra doctrine represented by Śīlabhadra, a school that was vigorously resisting the innovations of *tathāgata-garbha* thought and Tantric practice. The Yogācāra thought he followed sought to revitalize the old Abhidharma program of systematic soteriology, undertaken anew in light of the Mahāyāna concept of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). His respect for older Buddhist traditions is demonstrated further by his devotion to the Maitreya cult and by the conspicuous absence of any reference to the increasingly popular Amītabha cult in his travelogue and his biographies.

In spite of his prestige, Hsüan-tsang's best efforts to restore a more Indian style of scholastic Buddhism in China were swept away by the new schools of Chinese Buddhism, schools that better addressed the Chinese philosophical problematic. Court patronage proved fickle, the influence of his disciples waned quickly, and in the end his teaching survived as a distinct lineage only in Japan, where it was known as the Hossō school. Modern scholars have gained an invaluable picture of early India through Hsüan-tsang's prodigious efforts. Yet it is not as scholar or philosopher that he is most venerated within the tradition. For East Asian Buddhists, Hsüan-tsang came to epitomize the sincerely devout and pious

pilgrim, the itinerant seeker ever in arduous pursuit of ultimate enlightenment.

[See also *Yogācāra and the biographies of Śīlabhadra and K'uei-chi.*]

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In addition to his many translations, Hsüan-tsang wrote a record of his journey and several philosophical treatises, including most notably an essay reconciling Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. Only the travelogue has survived, however, and of it there are several translations, all now rather dated and in need of revision. The best is Samuel Beal's *Si-yu-ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World*, 2 vols. (1884; reprint, Oxford, 1906). There is no complete translation of the main biographical document, that written by Hsüan-tsang's contemporaries Hui-li and Yen-tsung. Beal published a partial translation of this work also, *The Life of Hsüan-Tsang* (London, 1911). Preferable, though difficult to obtain, is the more complete and more accurate version published by the Chinese Buddhist Association of the People's Republic of China in commemoration of Hsüan-tsang's anniversary: *The Life of Hsüan-tsang*, translated by Li Yung-hsi (Peking, 1959).

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duction to Anthony C. Yu's four-volume translation, *The Journey to the West* (Chicago, 1977–1983).

ALAN SPONBERG

**HSÜN-TZU** (306–212? BCE), one of the foremost Confucian thinkers of the classical period of Chinese culture. His surname is sometimes also given in the earliest records as Sun and his personal name as K'uang or, elsewhere, Ch'ing. To show respect for this eminent teacher, he is usually referred to as Hsün-tzu ("Master Hsün").

Though a native of the state of Chao, Hsün-tzu spent most of his life in Ch'i and Ch'u, other prominent states of the era. In Ch'i he was affiliated with the famous Chhsia group, a kind of royal academy of scholarly counsellors, and eventually rose to become its leader. Later, Hsün-tzu fled Ch'i for Ch'u, where the prince in power appointed him magistrate of Lan-ling. When his patron was killed, Hsün-tzu resigned from his post but remained in Lan-ling, devoting himself to writing and the instruction of students. Hsün-tzu's dates are largely a matter of conjecture, but it is safe to say that he lived long enough to witness the elimination of the rival states and the unification of the empire by the state of Ch'in. His dismay at the authoritarian policies of the new empire and the role two of his former students, Li Ssu and Han Fei, played in their formulation may be inferred from one record, which notes, "When Hsün-tzu heard that Li Ssu had accepted the premiership of Ch'in he went into a fast."

Hsün-tzu's career falls near the end of the so-called age of the hundred philosophers, a period of considerable intellectual and social ferment in ancient China. Hsün-tzu was thus able to profit from the insights of a variety of thinkers, Confucians, Taoists, Moists, Legalists, Logicians, and others. Although he claimed to be a follower of Confucius, the Confucian tradition, particularly since the Sung period, has tended to regard him as a heterodox thinker. In part, this judgment reflects the discredit that the actions of his pupils had brought upon him through their activities at the Ch'in court. The ruthless Legalist policies of the new empire, which included the suppression of rival schools of thought and the infamous events of 212 BCE, in which 460 Confucian scholars are alleged to have been buried alive on the advice of Li Ssu, could not help but cast suspicion on Hsün-tzu as well. More to the point, however, is Hsün-tzu's conspicuous departure from the normative Mencian position on the innate goodness of human nature. Hsün-tzu instead speaks principally of the reformability of man's inherently evil nature. For Hsün-tzu, goodness

is acquired. His paradigm for moral education is thus the activity of the craftsman, which brings to essentially imperfect materials a sense of order, proportion, and fitness to function. Hsün-tzu evinced a similar independence from the Confucian tradition in his view of the moral relationship between man and the world, the microcosm and the macrocosm: "Heaven pursues a constant course," he said, "it is affected neither by a virtuous ruler nor by a wicked ruler."

The teachings of Hsün-tzu have come down to us in a volume of thirty-two chapters known simply as the *Hsün-tzu*. In contrast to the aphoristic style of earlier philosophical texts, such as the *Analects* and the *Tao-te ching*, the chapters in the *Hsün-tzu* are, for the most part, well formed and consistently reasoned essays on clearly stated topics. The text, comparatively free from corruption and forgery, covers a wide range of subjects—ethics and politics, to be sure, but also education, psychology, linguistics, logic, and aesthetics. The writing is refreshing in style as well as penetrating in insight.

A distinctive and enduring contribution to Chinese thought and culture is Hsün-tzu's emphasis on *li*, rites or ceremonial. *Li* is a broadly comprehensive notion, connoting both the inner feelings of decorum and propriety and the outer observance of ritual and convention. Already prominent in the teaching of Confucius, *li* was considered by Hsün-tzu as the basic force in the education of the individual as well as the stability of society. *Li* performs the function of discipline and control, so much needed in a time of complete chaos, but performs it without the harshness of law and punishment. In fact, *li* adds an aesthetic and spiritual dimension to the life of the individual and society. *Li* adorns and commemorates important occasions and promotes a feeling of participation and loyalty in the community.

In the end, Hsün-tzu is in complete agreement with Confucius and Meng-tzu in considering a well-ordered society comprised of well-educated individuals to be the final state of human bliss. In spite of all that the politics of Hsün-tzu's era revealed, his basic faith in the supreme potential of man was never shaken. "Men in the street all have the potential to become like the sage-king Yü," said Hsün-tzu.

[See also Confucian Thought, *article on Foundations of the Tradition*.]

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Y. P. MEI

**HUANG-LAO CHÜN**, or Lord Huang-lao, a Taoist divinity dating from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), is closely related to the deified form of the Taoist sage Lao-tzu. The origins of Lord Huang-lao are obscure, but we know that by the end of the second century CE there was a prevalent belief among both royalty and commoners that by sacrificing to this god one could attain long life and prosperity.

In 165 CE, the emperor Huan sanctioned a sacrifice to the god Lao-tzu in a temple at the latter's reputed birthplace. Several months later he made Huang-lao the object of the annual *chiao* sacrifice in the capital. Since Chou times, the performance of the *chiao*, which ensured good fortune for the world in the coming year, had been one of the most solemn responsibilities of the emperor. Originally directed toward T'ien (Heaven), the axial deity of the Chou people, the sacrifice came to be made to a new god, T'ai-i (Great Unity), during the second century BCE. The subsequent installation of Huang-lao at the *chiao* was clearly a sign of his growing importance. There is also evidence that seven years after Emperor Huan's actions a certain Prince Min of Ch'en sacrificed to Lord Huang-lao in order to ensure longevity and good fortune.

On the popular level, there are also signs of such a cult. Although the evidence is scanty, there might very well have been cults of both Huang-ti (the Yellow Emperor) and Lao-tzu as much as four centuries earlier. Such cults must have still been in existence at the time of the *chiao* of 166. Certainly a cult of Lao-tzu was central to the Celestial Masters sect, one of the two original organizations of the Taoist religion, founded in the mid-second century CE by Chang Tao-ling. The other Taoist millenarian leader, Chang Chüeh, who at about the same time founded the Way of Great Peace movement (known to history as the movement of the Yellow Turbans), was said to "follow the Tao of Huang-lao." This some scholars have interpreted to mean that he was a devotee of Lord Huang-lao.

Both the imperial and popular cults are the manifestations of a fundamental pattern in the religiosity of the Chinese people that stretches back to the beginnings of recorded history. This pattern is based on the belief that good fortune and longevity can be obtained by sacrifices to the spiritual powers of the world. Though the objects of these sacrifices have changed over time and have included a wide variety of spirits, deities, and immortals,

this basic pattern has remained the same down to the present day.

The specific symbolism of the god Huang-lao Chün derives from the mythology that surrounds each of the elements that form the combined name, Huang-ti and Lao-tzu. Originally claimed as the ancestor of the royal family of the state of Ch'i (home of the School of Immortalists), the Yellow Emperor appears in early Taoist and Naturalist writings as the first emperor of China. In ancient rituals, he was depicted as living in the center of the sky, a position associated with the color yellow. By the Former Han dynasty he had become the patron of the *fang-shih* and had become associated with the various techniques they practiced and with their ultimate goal, immortality. He himself is said to have been an immortal.

The symbolism of Lao-tzu began as that of a wise and venerable teacher. In the early Han he was regarded as an authority on the Taoist methods of self-cultivation and government. At about this time, both he and the Yellow Emperor became the legendary patrons of the Huang-lao Taoist school, which advocated government by rulers enlightened about the Tao. Later in the Han, Lao-tzu also came to be regarded as an immortal, and he was responsible for instructing people in the ways to attain immortality that were sometimes called the techniques of Huang-lao. By the middle of the second century CE, Lao-tzu in these cults was transformed into a god, the personification of the Tao itself and central to the functioning of the universe. The Lord Huang-lao who emerged at this time combines the qualities of the Yellow Emperor and Lao-tzu, including the symbolism carried over from the political philosophy of the earlier Huang-lao school. Its image of an enlightened ruler can be seen in the backgrounds of both late Han millenarian movements, the Celestial Masters and the Yellow Turbans, who strove to make this ideal government a reality.

Lord Huang-lao seems to have continued as an important deity well into the next two centuries, although he was gradually overshadowed by other deities, principally from the emerging Ling-pao tradition. He was still highly regarded, however, in the Shang-ch'ing tradition of Taoism, whose practices included a type of meditation that involved visualizing a great number of deities who lived within the body as microcosmic manifestations of universal gods. Among these deities Lord Huang-lao resided in the center of the head and was particularly esteemed since the ability to visualize him was a sign of progress in the adept. To the Taoists who continued to practice this kind of "inner alchemy" (*nei-tan*) in subsequent centuries, Lord Huang-lao remained the divine teacher who revealed the methods of immor-

ality through sacred texts. But the political connotations associated with him faded away after the failure of the Taoist millenarian movements of the Latter Han.

[See also Taoism, overview article; Huang-ti; and Lao-tzu.]

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HAROLD D. ROTH

**HUANG-TI**, the Yellow Emperor, is a pan-Chinese culture hero and the mythic first emperor of history. In order to avoid the very narrow connotations of the term *emperor*, the word *ti* is often rendered *lord*, *monarch*, *thearch*, *ancestor*, or *god*. The complex mythology of Huang-ti is roughly composed of three traditions that evolved during the first millennium BCE and that appear together in the first universal history of China, the *Shih-chi* (Records of the Historian), in the second century BCE: Huang-ti as celestial deity, as perfect sovereign, and as patron of the esoteric arts.

As the personification of the central part of heaven, surrounded by the four "emperors" of the four orient, Huang-ti received a cult from feudal lords in the Chou kingdom. After the unification of the empire by the Ch'in (221 BCE), the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) affirmed its heaven-ordained rule by unifying the cults to the five emperors and their celestial regions (corresponding to the Han dominion of "all under heaven"). Besides being the color associated with the center of the four directions, *huang* ("yellow") also means "radiant"; there are traces of a sun god myth of Huang-ti. More important is the fact that the graph *huang* ("yellow") is often used for another *huang* ("august, sovereign"), thus blurring the distinction between the Yellow Emperor and the "August Emperor," that is, the supreme celestial deity Shang-ti of the feudal religion. This might explain why, by the second century BCE, the majority of

feudal clans claimed Huang-ti as their ancestor. From the same period dates Huang-ti's place in Chinese astronomy. Under his personal name, Hsien-yüan, and in the form of a yellow dragon (the imperial emblem) he is an asterism in the southern section of the sky (*Chin-shu* 11A).

Huang-ti's reign at the dawn of history was a "golden age of perfect peace," or *t'ai-p'ing* (*Shih-chi* 1). Although the Taoists saw in this first ruler the initiator of humanity's decline into artificial and superficial civilization (*Chuang-tzu*), Huang-ti became for them the paragon of emperors who heed the advice of their counselors. The Taoist traditions of Han times propagated the "teachings of Huang (-ti) and Lao (-tzu)," hence their name: Huang-Lao Tao. The association of Huang-ti with the paragon sage Lao-tzu signifies the double relationship between the ruler-disciple and his adviser-master. Although the adviser is socially inferior to the ruler, the latter's charisma is but a manifestation of the sage's wisdom. Like a puppet moved by invisible hands, the emperor is the tool of the sage; their interplay symbolizes the invisible Tao and its manifest efficacy (*te*). Inspired by these teachings, the millenarian T'ai-p'ing rebels of 184 CE aimed at the re-creation of Huang-ti's golden age and wore yellow head scarves (hence the name Yellow Turban Rebellion) as a sign of the imminent rule under the aegis of the "yellow agent" (earth) of Huang-ti. In the many sacred scriptures attributed to him, Huang-ti is always the disciple being instructed by a sage or divine master. These scriptures concern not only philosophy and the art of government but also longevity techniques and the martial arts.

The earliest alchemists taught the Han emperor Wu (140–87 BCE) the art of making gold and becoming immortal "like Huang-ti," who had cast a sacred crucible and ascended to heaven on a dragon (*Shih-chi* 28). Taoist lore contains traces of Huang-ti's role in archaic confraternities of metalworkers and in medical, pharmaceutical, and yogic traditions that all contributed to the formation of Taoist immortality techniques. The oldest book on medicine, *Huang-ti nei-ching su-wen* (The Pure Questions of Huang-ti, Esoteric Canon of Medicine), is a dialogue between Chi Po, a Celestial Master, and his disciple Huang-ti. Other texts present him as being instructed by two female deities in the related arts of sexual and military techniques. Hsüan-nü ("the dark woman") taught him a magic dance to overcome the rebel Ch'ih Yu and, according to later legend, revealed to him a Taoist manual of military strategy, the *Yin-fu ching* (Classic of the Yin Talisman; c. eighth century CE). Hsüan-nü or Su-nü ("the clear woman") taught the emperor the immortality-conferring "arts of the bedchamber." A *Su-nü ching* (Classic of the Clear

Woman), now lost, was popular in the Middle Ages; it probably contained Su-nü's sexual instructions to the emperor. Furthermore, Hsüan-nü is his teacher in one of the earliest Taoist treatises on alchemy, the *Huang-ti chiu-ting shen-tan ching* (Yellow Emperor's Canon of the Nine Vessel Magical Elixir).

In the official traditions throughout history Huang-ti's image has been pale but distinct. His prestige as ancestor of the Chinese people and founder of their culture has recently been reasserted in a syncretist movement, the Hsien-yüan Chiao. Under the shock of defeat and flight to Taiwan in 1949, its founder, Wang Han-sheng, had a vision of Huang-ti and his sacred crucible (which is also a symbol of dynastic legitimation). Established in Taipei in 1957 and claiming one hundred thousand followers in 1981, the Hsien-yüan Chiao teaches a mixture of Taoist, Confucian, and Moist ideas and labors for a renaissance of Chinese culture and for the reunification of the empire.

[See also Kingship, *article on Kingship in East Asia*; Chinese Religion, *article on Mythic Themes*; and Huang-lao Chün.]

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ANNA SEIDEL

**HUA-YEN.** A major tradition of Buddhist doctrine and practice that emerged in seventh-century China, Hua-yen (Jpn., Kegon; Kor., Hwaōm) was soon transmitted to Korea and Japan, and has continued even into modern times to exert great influence on many aspects of religion, thought, and culture throughout East Asia. A product initially of the fruitful encounter between Mahāyāna Buddhism and elements of the native Chinese religious worldview, Hua-yen is especially noted for its liberating vision of the radical interrelatedness or interpenetration of all events and experiences, a unity amidst diversity wherein each and every particular phenomenon is seen both to incorporate and be absorbed by all other phenomena, without ever losing its own unique identity. It has often been characterized as a syncretism and, although more original than that description might suggest, it does in fact combine classi-

cal Mahāyāna themes like "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*), "representation only" (*viññaptimātratā*), and the embryonic Buddhahood of all beings (*tathāgatagarbha*) with such native Chinese motifs as cosmic harmony, the essential rightness of the natural world, and the intrinsic goodness of human nature.

Although not at all lacking in practical relevance to such forms of actual religious life as meditation and morality, Hua-yen has traditionally been regarded, along with T'ien-t'ai, as one of the more theoretical or philosophical of Buddhist traditions, and as such has commonly been contrasted to supposedly more practical traditions like Ch'an (Zen) or Pure Land. That this contrast is an invidious oversimplification is seen in the actual history of the tradition, which abounds in examples of the amalgamation of practice with theory. This was the rule during the several centuries in which Hua-yen maintained its identity as a separate teaching lineage and it was even more apparent later when, having waned as a distinct "school," it continued to flourish either as a basic ingredient in other Buddhist traditions like Zen and Tantrism or as an influence upon non-Buddhist traditions like Neo-Confucianism.

**Scriptural Foundation.** The scripture on which Hua-yen was based, and from which it took its name, is the *Ta fang-kuang fo-hua-yen ching* (Sanskrit, following the Tibetan, *Mahāvaiṣṭya Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra*), known most commonly by the abbreviated title *Hua-yen ching* (*Avataṃsaka Sūtra*) and usually referred to in English as the *Flower Garland* or *Flower Ornament Scripture*. This is a very long text composed of a number of originally independent scriptures of diverse provenance, all of which were combined, probably in Central Asia, sometime during the late third or the fourth century CE. It is a Mahāyāna scripture, mythopoeic and visionary in character like most of its genre and replete with grand descriptions of the Buddha, his extraordinary powers, his retinue of *bodhisattvas* and other heavenly beings, their qualities, and the myriad world-systems of Buddhist cosmology. Its occasion is the primal event itself, for the matters related by the text, insofar as they may be deemed temporal at all, are thought to have occurred during the period immediately following the Buddha's own experience of enlightenment, while he was still absorbed in the ineffable meditative experience (*samādhi*) of all things as they really are.

Of special importance among the text's various themes is that of the *bodhisattva* path, with its many stages and wondrous spiritual attainments. All of this is conveyed in vivid imagery dominated by the motif of light and translucency. Pervasive radiance, the most salient feature of the scripture's world, is understood to represent the boundless scope and unimpeded force of

the Buddha's insight, which reaches everywhere and before which nothing remains opaque. The text culminates in a final chapter, by far the longest and most cohesive, known in China as the *Ju fa-chieh p'in* (Chapter on Entering the Realm of Truth) but elsewhere better known as the originally independent *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra*. This is the story of the youth Sudhana (Shan-ts'ai), who represents all sentient beings aspiring to enlightenment, and of his long pilgrimage, during which he takes instruction from a number of spiritual advisers (fifty-two to fifty-four, depending on how one counts) and in effect accomplishes the *bodhisattva* path charted throughout the rest of the scripture. It is especially rich in the symbolism of fusion, interpenetration, and unity within multiplicity that would later inspire Hua-yen doctrine.

The earliest surviving version of the full text of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* is the Chinese translation done by Buddhahadra between 418 and 420 CE (T.D. no. 278). That version comprises sixty fascicles (scrolls) and thirty-four chapters and is divided into eight "assemblies" (*hui*) or scenes held at seven different locations. This was the version used by the earliest Hua-yen thinkers in their creation of the tradition. Another complete translation was done between 695 and 699 CE by Śikṣānanda (T.D. no. 279). This is in eighty fascicles and thirty-nine chapters, and it is usually divided into nine assemblies held at seven places. Shortly after its completion, this later version effectively supplanted Buddhahadra's as the canonical foundation of the Hua-yen tradition.

**Historical Outline.** Study of the *Hua-yen ching* began almost immediately after Buddhahadra's translation. The chronicles of fifth- and sixth-century Chinese Buddhism reveal not only that it was then a popular focus of scholarly scrutiny but also that it figured prominently in the devotional lives of many practitioners as a text to be chanted, copied, celebrated in maigre feasts, meditated upon, revered for its magical powers, and employed by artists as a repertory of themes. However, it was not until the early seventh century that anything even remotely like a distinctive Hua-yen "school" or lineage (*tsung*) can be said to have emerged. Scholars now trace such an origin to the Sui dynasty (589–618) and the opening decades of the T'ang dynasty (618–906). Special attention has recently been given to a trio of monks associated in those years with the Chih-hsiang monastery, located in the Chung-nan mountains just south of the capital of Ch'ang-an (Sian). The eldest was Tu-shun, also known as Fa-shun (557–640), a meditation master and thaumaturge who was especially inspired by the *Hua-yen ching* and whose use of it in the performance of miracles earned him considerable prominence in local traditions of popular piety. He is also credited



(but perhaps erroneously so) with the authorship of certain early Hua-yen treatises, the most important of which was the *Fa-chieh kuan-men* (Contemplations of the Realm of Truth), the *locus classicus* of the most famous of all Hua-yen doctrines, namely, the teaching of principle (*li*), phenomena (*shih*), and the various modes of their interpenetration. Tu was anointed by the later tradition as its "first patriarch," but it should be borne in mind that the conception of Hua-yen as a master-disciple succession in the manner of the Ch'an lineages is an anachronistic fiction.

Tu's contemporary Chih-cheng (559–639) was a scholar-monk, heir to several of the scholastic traditions of sixth-century Chinese Buddhism and noted especially for his exegesis of the *Hua-yen ching*. These two men shared an outstanding student in the person of the monk Chih-yen (602–668), traditionally held to be Hua-yen's second "patriarch." Chih-yen combined in his career both the emphasis on practice learned from Tu-shun and the breadth of scholarship fostered by Chih-cheng and other of his teachers. He was expert particularly in the learning of two early Chinese traditions of Yogācāra Buddhism that incorporated important elements of Tathāgatagarbha thought, the Ti-lun school, based on Vasubandhu's *Daśabhūmividyākhyāna* (Exposition of the Ten Stages Scripture) and the She-lun school, based on Pāramārtha's sixth-century translation of Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Compendium of Mahāyāna). He went on to apply his knowledge of these traditions in the study of the *Hua-yen ching* and composed several fundamental texts that are among the earliest pieces of distinctively Hua-yen literature. In the composition of these works Chih-yen created many of the doctrines that came to be characteristic of Hua-yen, not the least of these being the classical fivefold doctrinal classification (*p'an-chiao*) system, the rudiments of the sophisticated Hua-yen view of causation and dependent origination (*yüan-ch'i*), the teaching of "nature origination" (*hsing-ch'i*), and the doctrine of the instantaneous achievement of Buddhahood (*i-nien ch'eng-fo*). [See the biographies of Tu-shun and Chih-yen.]

Among Chih-yen's disciples, two were of special note. Ūisang (625–702) was a Korean monk who studied with Chih-yen in Ch'ang-an in the mid-660s. He then returned to his homeland to establish Hua-yen as one of Korea's most important Buddhist traditions, beginning the process whereby Hua-yen came to enjoy proportionately greater and more enduring eminence in Korea than in either China or Japan. Ūisang's fellow student Fa-tsang (643–712), later judged to be the tradition's third "patriarch," was a man of enormous erudition and a prolific author especially skilled in the eloquent and methodical exposition of doctrine. He was Hua-yen's

great systematizer and its first publicist. Much of his career was spent in codifying and elaborating the doctrines first formulated by his teacher and in adding to them teachings of his own devising, notably those born of his study of the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna). [See the biographies of Ūisang and Fa-tsang.]

The development of Hua-yen during the several decades following Fa-tsang's death is complex. One of his disciples, the Korean monk Shimsang (Jpn., Shinjō; d. 742), was instrumental in transmitting Hua-yen to Japan, where it shortly became one of the dominant scholastic and ecclesiastical traditions of the Nara period (710–794). Shimsang's lectures on the *Hua-yen ching* helped motivate Emperor Shōmu (r. 724–749) to construct the great Tōdai Temple and to install there the monumental Great Buddha, which ever since has stood as one of the foremost examples of Hua-yen influence on the arts. Another of Fa-tsang's disciples, Hui-yüan (c. 673–743), departed from his master on several key doctrinal issues and was unfortunately dismissed by the later tradition as a kind of heretic. Familiar with Fa-tsang's works, although never his student, was the layman Li T'ung-hsüan (635?–730?), whose several writings—including what was perhaps the first complete exposition of the eighty-fascicle translation of the *Hua-yen ching*—are marked throughout by very original interpretations of Hua-yen themes.

The next phase in the history of Hua-yen is signaled by the contributions of its reputed fourth "patriarch," Ch'eng-kuan (738–839?). Born twenty-six years after Fa-tsang's death and thus not his direct descendant, Ch'eng-kuan nevertheless mastered the Hua-yen system, which he studied with a student of Fa-tsang's student Hui-yüan. He resided for many years in northern Shansi, in the complex of monasteries located on the Wu-t'ai Mountains, long a center of Hua-yen devotion and study. His many treatises and exegetical works earned special distinction, particularly his immense commentary on the eighty-fascicle version of the *Hua-yen ching*, which would later vie with Li T'ung-hsüan's work for pride of place among all commentaries on the scripture. Perhaps his most notable accomplishment was to have laid a foundation on which Hua-yen could consort with other kinds of Buddhism, not only the Monastic Discipline (Vinaya) tradition, T'ien-t'ai, and San-lun (all of which he had studied) but also, and most significantly, Ch'an. Ch'eng-kuan was a student of Ch'an during a crucial period in its history, just as it was in the process of taking the forms that would come to be regarded as classical. The Ch'an lineage with which he was most closely associated was the Ox-head (Niu-t'ou) tradition and this, in turn, had direct links with the

classical Ch'an lineage *par excellence*, the Hung-chou school. Since Ch'an was then on the verge of becoming paramount among all Chinese Buddhist traditions, Ch'eng-kuan's efforts to bring Ch'an and Hua-yen together were especially important; they helped assure a future for Hua-yen during the subsequent centuries of Ch'an dominance.

The last of the five great "patriarchs" of Hua-yen was the literatus-monk Tsung-mi (780–841). An accomplished prose stylist and a scholar as well versed in China's "secular" traditions as in Buddhism, Tsung-mi combined a devout religious life with a successful clerical career and was cultivated by some of the foremost court scholars of his day. Like those of Ch'eng-kuan, his Buddhist studies were by no means confined to Hua-yen. He too was a Ch'an monk, especially faithful to the Ho-tse or "Southern Lineage" deriving from Shen-hui (670–762). He was especially noted for his advocacy of a text associated with none of the established traditions, the *Yüan-chüeh ching* (Scripture of Complete Enlightenment), a Chinese composition devoted to themes of a Tathāgatagarbha sort. Against the background of mature Hua-yen doctrine, Tsung-mi classified all the varieties of Buddhism, including all forms of Ch'an, into a comprehensive and hierarchical overview of Buddhist doctrine and practice. He then extended that classification to include both Confucianism and Taoism by composing the famous *Yüan-chen lun* (Enquiry into the Origins of Man), a reply to the critique of Buddhism found in essays of similar title by Han Yü (768–824), the great precursor of Neo-Confucianism. Of special importance for the future of Hua-yen was his advocacy of a unification of Ch'an and the more doctrinal (*chiao*) forms of Buddhism, Hua-yen being in his view the foremost of the latter. He is also sometimes identified as a bridge between Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. [See also the *biography of Tsung-mi.*]

After Tsung-mi, Hua-yen's history becomes rather diffuse. Traditional accounts continue to speak of a Hua-yen lineage extending through the end of the T'ang into the Sung dynasty, and such lineages did persist in Korea and Japan, but after the late ninth century the truly significant developments in Hua-yen were those occurring in other traditions that made use of Hua-yen themes. Hua-yen thought was particularly important in several lineages of Five Dynasties and Sung dynasty Ch'an, the Lin-chi master Ta-hui (1089–1163), for example, being only one of a great many prominent Sung Ch'an figures indebted to Hua-yen. It was also absorbed just as deeply into Korean Ch'an (Sŏn), as may be seen in the thought of Chinul (1158–1210), Korea's greatest Ch'an teacher. And in Japan, where Esoteric Buddhism (Mikkyō) developed further than anywhere else in East

Asia, Mikkyō practitioners like Myōe Shōnin (Kōben; 1173–1232) made unique use of Hua-yen motifs in their Esoteric contemplations and writings. [See the *biographies of Chinul and Kōben.*]

**The Teachings.** Underlying the often bewildering array of technical doctrines that comprise Hua-yen is the single, unitary vision of a world in which all things—both the particular phenomenal things (*shih*, "phenomena") that comprise conventional worldly experience and the general noumenal truths or principles (*li*) that govern phenomenal reality—are seen "to be without mutual obstruction" (*wu-ai*), that is, to enter, include, penetrate, absorb, and fuse with each other, but to do so without losing their respective identities. In traditional Buddhist terms, this is simply a novel and ingenious reiteration of the cardinal doctrine of dependent origination (Skt., *pratītya-samutpāda*; Chin., *yüan-ch'i*), whereby things are said neither to exist in themselves (the error of eternalism) nor not to exist (the error of annihilationism). [See *Pratītya-samutpāda.*] However, whereas it is more typical of earlier Buddhism to employ negative, "neither/nor" phrasing to express this teaching and its corollaries, Hua-yen favored more affirmative locutions, even if they required figurative rather than literal language.

Perhaps the best known and most effective example of this is the metaphor of the "net of Indra." This inspired trope pictures a universe in which each constituent of reality is like a multifaceted jewel placed at one of the knots of a vast net. There is such a jewel at each knot, and each jewel reflects not only the rest of the jeweled net in its entirety but also each and every other jewel in its individuality. Thus, each particular reflects the totality, the totality so reflected is both a unity and a multiplicity, and the reflecting particular maintains its distinctive but not discrete reality. All things and beings, Hua-yen teaches, are like these jewels. When this "metaphysical" insight is made to yield its soteriological or gnoseological implications it is seen to entail, among other things, the essential Buddhahood of each sentient being, the potential enlightenment at the core of all ignorance, the fundamental purity of all defilements, the eternity of each instant, the presence of the Buddha mind in all objects, and the final attainment implicit in even the most elementary stage of the path.

According to Hua-yen's five-part scheme of doctrinal classification, all other forms of Buddhism saw only a part of this comprehensive truth. Hīnayāna Buddhism saw the emptiness of beings, their selflessness, but not the emptiness of all events (*dharmā*). Elementary Mahāyāna—the emptiness teaching and the version of the Representation Only teaching that held the mind to be essentially corrupt—saw the insubstantiality of all

things and beings, and the inveterate ignorance and impurity of the mind which infected and distorted the world, but it did not see the countervailing actuality of those things and beings or the deeper purity of their underlying wisdom. Mature Mahāyāna—the Tathāgata-garbha tradition and the version of the Representation Only teaching that affirmed the essential purity of the mind—saw the immanence of transcendental reality, for example, the Buddhahood in each sentient being, but ran the risk of a kind of docetism in which particular mundane things were subordinated to the universal supramundane truths they harbored and were not valued in themselves. The so-called “sudden teaching” (*tun-chiao*)—associated initially with the theme of silence in texts like the *Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa* (The Discourse of Vimalakīrti) but later with the translinguistic character of Ch’an practice—saw the limits and snares of language and conceptualization and emphasized the all-at-once nature of liberation, to which words and ideas can make no gradual approach, but it ran the risk of underestimating the need for effortful practice and the importance of language and imagination in practice. It was only Hua-yen itself—the “complete” or “perfect” (*yüan*, literally “round”) teaching—that comprehended the whole truth without succumbing to partiality or extremes. In this respect Hua-yen saw itself as the “one vehicle,” identical (*t’ung*) with all other vehicles combined insofar as it included them all, but also separate (*pieh*) from them in that it surpassed them all.

There was something about the Hua-yen worldview that East Asian cultures, shaped as they were by the values of classical Chinese civilization, found quite congenial. Perhaps it was the deft way in which Hua-yen thinkers combined Chinese values and notions, like the affirmation of “this world” or the conception of reality as a concrete order governed by principles of harmony and complementarity, with basic Buddhist concepts like insubstantiality, interdependence, and the essentially mind-made character of all things. No doubt the abstruse character of Hua-yen discourse needed the leaven of an emphasis on practice and experience, a leaven of the sort it was to find in its collaboration with Ch’an and Mikkyō, but with that it rose to be a major ingredient in the intellectual and religious life of the whole East Asian world, and it stands even today as a paramount example of the East Asian transformation of Buddhism.

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Kiyotaka, and Yoshizu Yoshihide, to name only a few. Sustained Western-language study of the tradition got off to an inauspicious start with the publication of Garma C. C. Chang’s unreliable and tendentious *The Buddhist Teaching of Totality* (University Park, Pa., 1971). The situation was improved considerably, however, by the appearance of Francis D. Cook’s *Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra* (University Park, Pa., 1977), which, though clearly as much concerned to advocate Hua-yen as to present it to the academic community, is sound and informative. It deals especially with the thought of Fa-tsang. Two other works of lesser value have recently appeared that put Hua-yen into the service of idiosyncratic Western philosophical programs. They are Alfonso Verdú’s *Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought* (Lawrence, Kans., 1974), which treats especially of uses of Hua-yen thought in Ts’ao-tung Ch’an from a Hegelian perspective, and Steve Odin’s very odd miscellany, *Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism* (Albany, 1982), which deals haplessly with the thought of Üisang and attempts to draw comparisons between Hua-yen and the work of Western thinkers like Whitehead, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others.

Three different translations of the *Hua-yen ching* are now under way. Thomas Cleary’s *The Flower Ornament Scripture*, of which the first volume has already appeared (Boulder, 1984), is an excellent rendering of the eighty-fascicle version of the Chinese text. The same version is being translated by members of The International Institute for the Translation of Buddhist Texts in Talmage, California. Theirs is a resolutely literal translation with interspersed commentary by the contemporary Chinese monk Hsüan-hua; more than ten volumes have so far appeared. I am translating the earlier sixty-fascicle Chinese version on behalf of the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai’s Tripiṭika translation project; the first volume will appear in 1986. Apart from a few standard pieces like Fa-tsang’s *Golden Lion Treatise* or Tsung-mi’s *Enquiry into the Origins of Man*, which appear in indifferent translations in certain popular anthologies, not much of the enormous corpus of Hua-yen literature composed in China, Korea, and Japan has yet been translated into Western languages, but Thomas Cleary has recently published a collection of fine though sparsely annotated translations of several shorter works by Tu-shun, Chih-yen, Fa-tsang, and Ch’eng-kuan. The collection is entitled *Entry into the Inconceivable* (Honolulu, 1983). Also worth consulting are a number of articles, published in several different journals and collections, by Peter N. Gregory, Liu-ming Wood, and myself.

ROBERT M. GIMELLO

**HUBERT, HENRI** (1872–1927), French sociologist and ethnologist. Hubert was one of the galaxy of brilliant young minds that Émile Durkheim brought together in the founding of his notable journal, *L’année sociologique*, in 1897. Twelve volumes of the journal appeared between its founding and 1913 when, on the eve of World War I, it was obliged to suspend publication. Hubert was one of the contributing editors of the

journal and managed to publish work of his own in each of the twelve volumes. As was customary for *L'année sociologique*—indeed, it was an essential part of Durkheim's design for the journal—nearly all of the articles published were done in collaboration; Hubert's most frequent scholarly companion was Marcel Mauss, who became his closest friend. Both men were primarily interested in religion in terms of its rites, symbols, and cults, as was their master, Durkheim, and the results, both in *L'année sociologique* and other publications, were notable both as demonstrations of Durkheimian method and in their own right as independent ventures in research.

Probably the best known and surely one of the most important of Hubert and Mauss's joint works in comparative religion is "An Essay on the Nature and Function of Sacrifice" (1897–1898), published in the second volume of *L'année sociologique*. Durkheim drew on this essay in his classic *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912) when he came to the sections on ritual sacrifice. Hubert and Mauss argued that the essence of sacrifice, wherever it is found, whether in primitive or advanced religion, is communal, not simply a form of homage by individuals to a deity or departed member of the cult. Working from W. Robertson Smith's pioneering study, *The Religion of the Semites* (1889), and Smith's earlier article on sacrifice, published in the ninth edition of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1886), Hubert and Mauss emphasized that sacrifice is essentially a repast and that the worshipers who proffer it take part in the sacrificial meal as a cult or community along with the sacred being whom the ritual celebrates. Mauss and Hubert treated at length the long series of activities, invocations, lustrations, and prayers by which the animal eaten is transformed into something sacred. But all of these necessary steps notwithstanding, the sacrificial occasion is, Mauss and Hubert argued, "primarily an alimentary communion," a joining into mystic community of all the participants, each of whom carries with him as the essential part of his being a tiny portion of the sacred substance that is the core of the totemic clan. In keeping with the Durkheimian principle of the functional interdependence of all things social, Mauss and Hubert demonstrated that the animal sacrificed and eaten is given its sacredness by the clan that has made it the totem, but it in turn regenerates the sacredness of the clan community.

Hubert and Mauss made another lasting contribution to religious and magical study in a joint article in the seventh volume of *L'année sociologique*, published in 1902–1903, entitled "Outline of a General Theory of Magic." The pivot of the monograph is the principle

that anything touching an object or person also touches everything and everyone in any respect connected with that object or person. Closely related is a second principle declaring that like quite literally produces like; effects achieved upon the image of the actual being are duly transmitted to the latter. These two principles of magic may also be seen as corollaries, at bottom, of the communal-sacred character of all society.

There are other notable works done by Hubert, alone or in collaboration, in ethnology, archaeology, and ancient history. The frequency of Durkheim's references to Hubert from about 1900 on testifies to the very high regard he had for his young follower's work. Thus the famous section in Durkheim's *Elementary Forms* on the communal origins of abstract categories of mind—time, mass, force, and so on—has deep roots in a book published by Hubert seven years earlier on the representation of time in religion and magic.

Hubert's primary academic affiliation was with the *École des Hautes Études*, where he was professor of religious studies, but he had connections also for long periods with the *Musée des Antiquités Nationales* and with the *École du Louvre*. Virtually his entire life was spent in Paris.

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ROBERT NISBET

**HÜGEL, FRIEDRICH VON** (1852–1925), Roman Catholic layman who at the turn of the twentieth century became involved in the modernist crisis and who later became recognized as an outstanding authority on mysticism and religious philosophy. Born in Austria, von Hügel moved with his family to England in 1867. Mainly self-educated, von Hügel became a friend of the French exegete Alfred Loisy (1857–1941) and of the English Jesuit George Tyrrell (1861–1909). He immersed himself in the new scriptural criticism and championed

Loisy's right to publish when the latter faced church condemnation. He also generally supported Tyrrell, who was expelled from the Society of Jesus in 1906. The official church saw in the ideas of a number of writers at the time, including Loisy and Tyrrell, a denial of the transcendence of God and of church authority. It labeled their ideas "modernism" and condemned them in the encyclical *Pascendi* in 1907. Von Hügel and others believed that the church's very broad condemnation was unfair and to a degree a misunderstanding. But he gradually cooled to some of Loisy's ideas, although he continued to support the cause of the freedom of the exegete. He showed external respect in every way he could for the church's decrees, but he never essentially changed his position.

Toward the end of the modernist crisis von Hügel published his great work, *The Mystical Element of Religion as Studied in St. Catherine of Genoa and Her Friends* (1909). Around the biographical core of the book he developed his ideas on religion and mysticism. The chief forces of Western civilization he saw as Hellenism, Christianity, and science. He worked out three elements in all religion: the institutional, the intellectual, and the mystical. The thirst for religion and mysticism is at bottom metaphysical, arising from a keen sense of imprisonment in the contingent. "If man did not somehow have a real experience of objective reality and truth, he could never suffer so much from the very suspicion of a complete imprisonment within purely human apprehensions and values."

In 1912 von Hügel published *Eternal Life*, a study of the eternal and the absolute in religion. Time, he insisted, is a composite phenomenon containing two elements: clock time, or succession, and duration. In duration, the human being stands open to the infinite and experiences a quasi eternity. In 1921 he published *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, in which he underlined the transcendent element in religion and also included a probing essay on the apocalyptic element in Jesus' teaching. Some of his work was published posthumously. *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion, Second Series* (1926) contains discussions on institutional religion, church authority, and suffering in God. Von Hügel's unfinished work on the Gifford Lectures was published as *The Reality of God and Religion and Agnosticism* (1931).

Von Hügel became an outstanding spiritual director. He was a major influence on Evelyn Underhill, who was later to publish her remarkable works on mysticism. His deep spiritual life is seen in *Letters from Baron von Hügel to a Niece* (1928) and *The Life of Prayer* (1929). He received an honorary doctor of law degree from the Uni-

versity of Saint Andrews in Scotland in 1914, and in 1920 he became the first Roman Catholic since the Reformation to be honored with an honorary doctor of divinity degree from Oxford University.

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JOHN J. HEANEY

**HUGH OF SAINT-VICTOR** (d. 1142), regular canon of the Abbey of Saint-Victor, Paris, and influential thinker with lasting and decisive contributions to biblical exegesis, theology, and spirituality. The date and place of Hugh's birth are unknown. Both Saxony and the Low Countries have been plausibly suggested as the place of his birth. By 1125 he was at Saint-Victor teaching in the abbey school, where he founded the vigorous and creative Victorine intellectual tradition. At the same time, the first abbot, Gilduin, was winning royal favor and rich endowments for the young community, which had been founded in 1108 by William of Champeaux upon his retirement from teaching in the Parisian schools.

Hugh's learning was broad and deep. He united in a special way a religious vocation, keen intellectual curiosity, a strong historical sense, theological creativity, and dedication to the contemplative life. The breadth of Hugh's knowledge is illustrated by his *Didascalicon*, a guide to the study of philosophy and biblical exegesis. Philosophy, embracing all knowledge, was divided into four parts (theoretical; practical, including ethics; mechanical, including weaving, farming, et al.; and logical) that were to remedy the ignorance, vice, and bodily weakness resulting from the Fall.

In biblical studies Hugh introduced the idea that history, allegory, and tropology, the traditional three levels of meaning in the biblical text, should be seen as three areas of study to be pursued in succession. This idea had the important effect of making the systematic

study of the historical, literal meaning of the text the foundation for all further biblical study. Moreover, Hugh consulted Jewish rabbis about the literal meaning of the Hebrew text and incorporated their comments into his exegesis. In the Victorine program of studies theology was studied systematically to prepare for allegorical exegesis, while tropology was the context of examining not only ethics but also the discipline of body and mind leading to contemplative experience.

For each area of study—historical, theological, and mystical—Hugh wrote important books. His *Chronicon* contained a treatise on the art of memory and numerous tables for biblical chronology and the history of the Christian church, European rulers, and the papacy. *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* (On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith), Hugh's handbook to prepare for allegorical exegesis, was the first systematic *summa* of Christian theology and thus initiated a major form of medieval theological literature. Hugh's theology incorporated a unique sense of historical development and distinguished between the divine works of foundation in six days and the divine works of restoration that extend through all history from beginning to end. His doctrine of the sacraments was important for his definition of a sacrament and his recognition of valid sacraments in all historical periods.

Hugh introduced ideas from the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite into the mainstream of theological and mystical discussion. The major sources for Hugh's mystical teachings are two treatises on Noah's ark (*De arca Noe morali* and *De arca Noe mystica*) and a set of sermons on *Ecclesiastes*. In the ark treatises Hugh describes a complex, mandala-like drawing that represents with a subtle iconography the cosmos, salvation history, and the mystic's inward journey to union with the divine as these are related to Christ the creative, sustaining, incarnate, judging, and contemplative Word. This powerful symbolic representation of the spiritual quest is a major document in the development of medieval Christian mysticism.

Hugh's successors at Saint-Victor tended to emphasize single aspects of his thought. Andrew of Saint-Victor (d. 1175) devoted himself to the literal sense of scripture, advancing even further the historical understanding of the biblical text and drawing, like Hugh, on Jewish exegesis. Richard of Saint-Victor (d. 1173), one of the greatest medieval mystical writers, advanced Hugh's analysis of contemplation and his use of Dionysius in treatises combining subtle symbolic interpretation of scripture, psychological insight, and deep contemplative experience. Through Richard and Hugh, the Victorine tradition influenced the theological and con-

templative writings of the great Franciscan writer Bonaventure.

In poems of complex symbolism and theological depth, Adam of Saint-Victor brought the liturgical sequence to a high point in its development. The sermons of Abbot Achard of Saint-Victor (d. 1171) embodied the combination of contemplative and preaching traditions so characteristic of the abbey. The Victorine theological tradition was continued by Godfrey of Saint-Victor (d. after 1194) in *Fons philosophiae* and *Microcosmus*, while a narrow, antidialectical spirit at odds with other Victorines emerged in the writings of Walter of Saint-Victor (d. 1180). Thomas Gallus (d. 1246), a Victorine who became abbot of Vercelli, continued Hugh's interest in the works of Dionysius and wrote a commentary on them. All told, Hugh began an influential intellectual tradition at the abbey, a tradition that exercised a widespread influence on medieval thought and life in many areas.

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GROVER A. ZINN, JR.

**HUICHOL RELIGION.** The ten to twelve thousand Huichol-speakers of the Sierra Madre Occidental are the only sizeable indigenous population in Mexico whose aboriginal religion survives with only minor Spanish additions, and almost none of the syncretistic adaptations to Christianity typical of the rest of Mesoamerican Indian cultures. The first missions in Huichol country were established in 1722. More than two and a half centuries later Spanish Roman Catholicism is evident only in the addition of the Virgin of Guadalupe, "Jesucristo," and some saints to the extensive native pantheon of male and female nature deities. The Huichol have also added nominal baptism practices; feast day celebrations of the respective patron saints of the five independent, self-governing *comunidades* that make up the mountainous Huichol homeland; and observance of portions of the Christian ritual calendar to their ritual life. The celebration of these holy days is accompanied by recitations and dramatic enactments of a Christian myth cycle so drastically altered to conform to the native worldview that it resembles the New Testament only in broad outlines.

**Deities.** In contrast, in the native ceremonial round and in prayers, the Huichol deities have retained their ancient names, personalities, and associations, rather than having become identified with Christian supernatural beings. Some Huichols believe that the Virgin of Guadalupe is really Our Mother Young Eagle Girl, a female sky deity who usually takes the form of a bicephalic eagle; on the other hand, few Huichols have followed the neighboring Cora, and other Indian peoples, in identifying "Jesucristo" with the indigenous solar deity. The supernaturals are addressed in kinship terms, prefaced by the pronoun *ta* ("our"): for example, the fire god Tatewarí ("our grandfather"); the sun god Tayaupá ("our father"); the whitehaired old earth and creator goddess Tatutsi Nakawé ("our grandmother Nakawé"); Tamátsi Kauyumarie ("elder brother Káuyumarie"), the trickster / culture hero who manifests himself as deer; another deer deity, Tamátsi Maxa Kwaxí ("elder brother deer tail"); the corn goddess, who also personifies the earth made fertile by rain, Tatéi Utuánaka ("our mother"; lit., "our aunt"); and so forth. Female deities personify rain, water holes, lakes, ponds, maize, and squash. Agricultural, human, and animal fertility and fecundity are also personified by female deities, who are often depicted as snakes in ceremonial art. Many of the male deities are associated with the dry season, the hunt, and game. Some male and female deities function as owners of animal or plant species. The divine cactus, peyote, is personified as Sacred Deer, Master of the Deer, in a system of interdependent and interchange-

able symbols that, since the shift from hunting and gathering to slash-and-burn agriculture, has also come to include maize. As a group the deities, or divine ancestors, are variously called *kákaima* or *kakayátxi* (apparently archaic expressions that convey the sense of "gods" or "greater spirits"). Female deities are collectively known as *tatéima* ("our mothers"). Tatewarí is the most prominent deity in the western part of the Huichol territory, and in the eastern part he is known as Father Sun. The fire deity is also the first shaman, who, with grandmother Nakawé, put the world in order in the "first times," and is often addressed simply as *mara'akáme* (*mara'akáme* is the Huichol term for shaman or singer). Charismatic shamans may be identified with Tatewarí, as is the leader of the peyote pilgrimage. Probably as many as one-third to one-half of the adult Huichols, particularly the men but also some women, are sufficiently schooled in the sacred traditions to function as low-level shamans who are able to divine, conduct curing rites, and communicate with ancestral deities through chants, prayer arrows, symbolic designs of wool yarn and/or beads and beeswax, decorated gourd bowls, and food and drink offerings. To practice the higher level of shamanic and priestly activity, a person must gain community consensus and prestige and trust sufficient for him or her to have assumed successful leadership of at least five peyote pilgrimages.

**Sacred Spaces.** Beyond the local *rancho*, ritual centers on the large circular sacred house or temple, *tuki* or *tukípa* in Huichol, with the meaning of Big House. Several of these *tuki* or *tukípa* are found scattered through each of the five *comunidades*. They contain a doorway that faces east, a fireplace that represents Tatewarí, an altar, a hole in the center of the floor and another below the roof (from which subterranean gods, divine ancestors, and celestial spirits may emerge), sacred paraphernalia, prayer offerings, a low bench along the interior wall, and sometimes a squared, hollowed-out log that serves as a foot drum, whose sound is intended to alert subterranean ancestors and supernatural beings and to invite them to participate in the ritual.

Individual ranches have a sanctuary, called *xiriki*, that is constructed like the dwellings of the Huichol; the sanctuary houses carved stone and wood images of supernaturals, personal ceremonial paraphernalia, bows, arrows and deerskin quivers that are used on the peyote pilgrimage, an upright log drum with deerskin head, snares for ceremonial deer hunting, a supply of peyote, clay pots for the ritual maize beer (*nawá*) and so on. The most important occupant of the sanctuary is the *urukáme*, which is a small rock crystal tied in a sacred

bundle to the shaft of a hunting-arrow-like prayer arrow and that represents a deceased ancestor, usually a shaman. This miniature medicine bundle functions as supernatural guardian of the ranch community, who gives spiritual and practical counsel to the ranch elder or family shaman.

Numerous shrines associated with one or more deities are located in and around the Huichol territory, most prominent among them the great cave of Teakáta, home of the old earth goddess, in the *comunidad* of Santa Catarina. Other shrines as far away as the Pacific coast and Lake Pátzcuaro, south of Guadalajara, also draw Huichol pilgrims with offerings to such local deities as Tatéi Haramára, divine personification of the Pacific Ocean. A whole series of shrines lies along the three hundred mile pilgrimage route to Wirikúta, the Huichol name for the sacred homeland of the divine peyote cactus, *Lophophora williamsii*, *híkuri* in Huichol, just north of the Tropic of Cancer in the high desert of the state of San Luis Potosí.

Peyote was prominent in Aztec religion and divinatory curing, and is still important to several Indian populations of northwestern Mexico. But nowhere does it play so central a role in religious ideology and ritual as among the Huichol. The mythic charter of the Huichol peyote "cult" has a historic ring: in ancient times a group of divine male ancestors, who later become the principal deities, calls on the great *mará'akáme* Tatewari to cure them of a variety of physical and spiritual afflictions. He diagnoses their ills as having been caused by their separation from Wirikúta, home of the sacred Deer Peyote in the distant north-central high desert, and by their failure to follow the ancestors in hunting and consuming the divine cactus that lives there in the form of deer. He orders them to abstain from sex, salt, food, and drink and leads them on a pilgrimage so lengthy and arduous that some fall by the wayside. Along the way, within sight of the distant sacred mountains of Wirikúta, they are saved from death by thirst by female deities, who meet them with lifegiving offerings of water at a place of desert springs called Tateimatiniéri ("where our mothers dwell"). From there the male and female supernaturals proceed to Wirikúta, where, under the leadership of the great shaman, they track and slay the sacred deer. Peyote sprouts from the deer's antlers and his body transforms into peyote. They grind the antlers with sacred water from the desert springs, and when they drink the mixture they experience visions that restore their health and help them "find their life."

Huichol are enculturated as infants into the sacred geography and meaning of the peyote pilgrimage during an annual first fruits ceremony, in which the family

shaman "transforms" the infants into hummingbirds and, to the beat of the deerskin drum and the chanting of the peyote tradition, leads them on a magical flight to Wirikúta and back. The myth becomes reality during the dry season when small groups of Huichol set out for Wirikúta under the leadership either of an experienced *mará'akáme* or one still in training. The pilgrims assume the identities of the ancestral deities who made the first vision quest, their leader becoming Tatewari, Grandfather Fire. The three hundred mile pilgrimage is a journey back in time and space to the Huichol's sacred origins, where ordinary language and time are reversed, sand becomes water, night day, and the oldest man *nunútsi* ("a baby"). For novices, who are blindfolded until they reach the sacred female springs, the pilgrimage serves as symbolic birth and initiation rite into the mysteries of the peyote medicine. Along the way, the pilgrims acknowledge the stopping places of the divine ancestors, and the most solemn and emotion-charged of the rites is reserved for Wirikúta and the first peyote to come into view. As in the myth, peyote is deer; thus, the plant is literally shot with arrows. Each party of pilgrims forms at least a temporary society of *hikuritámete*, that is, a community of veterans of the peyote hunt that disbands at the conclusion of the ritual. In former times the *hikuritámete* may have functioned as a shamanistic medicine society similar to those of North American Indians. Following a solemn communion-like meal of the first peyote, the pilgrims scatter to collect *híkuri* for their own individual vision quests, and large quantities are harvested for future use.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on peyote as *the* divine psychoactive substance, there survive among the Huichol remnants of a former use and veneration of datura (and possibly the closely related genus *Solandra*). Personified as the supernatural sorcerer Kieri, datura has its own myth cycle with historical overtones and prayer offerings similar to those given to peyote. So far as is known, however, no actual use of the solonaceous datura survives among the Huichol, as it does, for example, among the Italian populations of the Southwest.

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PETER T. FURST

**HUI-NENG** (638–713), the Sixth Patriarch and the first major Chinese figure of Chinese Ch'an (Jpn., Zen) Buddhism. Traditionally, Ch'an traces its lineage from Śākyamuni, the historical Buddha, through twenty-eight Indian patriarchs culminating in Bodhidharma (c. 480–520, recognized also as the first Chinese patriarch), and from him through five Chinese patriarchs to Hui-neng.

The biography of Hui-neng (posthumous title Ta-chien Ch'an-shih, conferred in 815) contains many hagiographical features and, typically, has expanded as his importance in Ch'an Buddhism has grown. Other than his birth and death dates, almost all elements in the accounts of Hui-neng's life have variant versions. He was born to the impoverished Lu family in Hsin-chou (present-day Kwangtung Province) but later moved to Ts'ao-chi. At the age of thirty he heard a nun reciting the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* (Chin., *Ta-pan nieh-p'an ching*) and was at once able to explain its meaning despite his inability to read. In another version, Hui-neng heard a recitation of the *Vajracchedikā Sūtra* (Diamond Sutra; Chin., *Chin-kang ching*) and was immediately awakened to its profound meaning. In 674 Hui-neng went to study with Hung-jen (602–675), the fifth Ch'an patriarch, at the East Mountain in present-day Hupei. When Hung-jen expressed his doubt that a barbarian from the south could become a Buddha, Hui-neng countered, "Although people from the south and people from the north differ, there is no north and south in Buddha nature." Hung-jen accepted the understanding of this illiterate layman and eight months later secretly transmitted the teaching to him. At the age of thirty-nine, after several years in hiding in the south, Hui-neng became a priest. He devoted the rest of his life to teaching at various temples in Ts'ao-chi, including the Ta-fan temple, where his recorded sayings were delivered. He died in 713, leaving a number of disciples.

**Shen-hui and Northern and Southern Ch'an.** Despite the availability of numerous biographical accounts, little more can be said with certainty about Hui-neng. His fame and the development of his legend are almost solely the product of the activities of a long-forgotten priest, Shen-hui (670–762), whose works were among the documents discovered at Tun-huang in Central Asia.

In 732, at a temple in Hua-t'ai, north of the capital at Loyang, Shen-hui launched an attack on what came to be known as the Northern Ch'an school, which was derived from the school of Shen-hsiu (606?–706). Shen-hsiu, also an heir to the teachings of the Fifth Patriarch, was one of the most distinguished priests of his time, honored by the court, the priesthood, and laity. Shen-hui's attack centered on his vehement denial of the assumption that Shen-hsiu was the legitimate heir of the Fifth Patriarch. He asserted that his teacher, Hui-neng, was the true Sixth Patriarch, having received Hung-jen's teaching together with Bodhidharma's robe—a symbol of legitimate transmission handed down through five generations. Shen-hui further accused P'u-chi (651–739), an heir of Shen-hsiu, of falsely claiming to be the Seventh Patriarch and of sending an emissary to deface Hui-neng's stela and sever the head from his mummified body. In addition, he attacked the teachings of Northern Ch'an for advocating a gradual approach to enlightenment, in contrast to the sudden method taught by the Southern Ch'an school.

While Shen-hui's own school did not persist and he was virtually forgotten, his legacy lay in establishing Hui-neng as the Sixth Patriarch and assuring the historical presence of this once little-known priest. By the end of the eighth century Hui-neng was accepted as the Sixth Patriarch by all schools of Ch'an, and all present-day Ch'an derives ultimately from two of his putative heirs, Nan-yüeh Huai-jan (677–744) and Ch'ing-yüan Hsing-ssu (d. 740). Their association with Hui-neng is tenuous—both are listed as heirs in later biographies but are not mentioned in early works—yet so successful was Shen-hui's campaign that it was virtually obligatory that descent from the Sixth Patriarch be claimed.

**The Platform Sutra.** The *Liu-tsu t'an-ching* (Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch) is the principal work associated with Hui-neng. The earliest extant version of the text, found at Tun-huang, probably dates between 830 and 860 and was based on a text dating around 780. The Tun-huang manuscript is highly defective and is either copied from an imperfect version or recorded from an oral rendering. We may assume that an earlier version by an unknown compiler existed. The compiler of the original text is given as Fa-hai, an unknown monk who was presumably the keeper of Hui-neng's pagoda. Recent scholarship has suggested that Fa-hai was of the Ox-head (Chin., Niu-t'ou) school of Ch'an and that the *Platform Sutra* was associated with this school. The title carries the word *ching* (i.e., *sūtra*), an unprecedented use of the term, whose use is confined to works attributed to a Buddha. Such usage indicates a conscious shift of emphasis in Chinese Buddhism, particularly in

later Ch'an, from an abstract *nirvāṇa* to the enlightened status of an individual patriarch.

The *Platform Sutra* has enjoyed immense popularity in China, as witnessed by the large number of editions and great expansion of the text. Later editions have sought to correct the errors of the Tun-huang text. We have reference to a revision of 967 dividing the text into two chapters and eleven sections. This work, no longer extant, served as the basis for two Sung dynasty (960–1279) printed editions. These versions are also lost, but printed copies based on them exist in Japan. Yet another version, in three volumes, by the noted Sung dynasty monk Ch'i-sung (1007–1072) is presumed to be the precursor of two Yüan dynasty (1279–1368) editions that appeared in 1290 and 1291. These greatly expanded works were reprinted during the Ming (1368–1644) and Ch'ing (1644–1912) dynasties and had a tremendous popularity in Chinese Buddhist circles. Although most Chinese Ch'an texts made their way to Japan soon after their composition, the Yüan dynasty versions were not published in Japan until 1634 and seem never to have had a significant impact there.

**Hui-neng's Teachings.** An attempt to reconstruct Hui-neng's teachings is almost as difficult as the attempt to compile a reliable biography. The Tun-huang text of the *Platform Sutra* has little material that can with any assurance be ascribed to Hui-neng. Frequently there are passages identical with passages in Shen-hui's writings. The sermons in the text deal with terms and concepts drawn from various canonical sources, thereby contradicting the contention that Hui-neng was illiterate. The identity of wisdom and meditation, so strongly stressed by Hui-neng, is traceable to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*; the practice of the "*samādhi* [Chin., *ting*] of oneness" is found in the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (The Awakening of Faith); and the practice of "direct mind" is based on the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* (Chin., *Wei-mo-chieh so-shuo ching*). Sudden awakening, as opposed to the gradual awakening ascribed to Northern Ch'an, is stressed, yet we are never provided with a description of how this is to be obtained. Nor does the *Platform Sutra* indicate how Ch'an was practiced at this early time. We know little more than that the master preached to assemblies of laymen and monks and that he answered individual questions and engaged in brief conversations with his followers. Hui-neng advocated meditation, but we see little of what was later typical of Ch'an study: *kung-an* (Jpn., *kōan*) practice, individual interviews with the master, communal work and living, and so forth. Many of the sermons deal with the characteristic concerns of T'ang dynasty (618–907) Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Hui-neng is accorded a position of respect and rever-

ence in Ch'an history that is in many respects similar to that given Bodhidharma. He is a popular subject for stories and paintings in both China and Japan. Hui-neng's biography and teachings are integral chapters in the development of the Ch'an legend that was in the process of formation during the eighth and early ninth centuries. Eventually, this Ch'an develops into the highly organized and historically documented Ch'an of the Five Dynasties (907–960) and Sung periods.

[See also Ch'an.]

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PHILIP YAMPOLSKY

**HUITZILOPOCHTLI** ("hummingbird of the south") was the most powerful god in Aztec religion. The tribal god of the wandering Méxica, he became the patron deity of the Aztec ceremonial capital, Tenochtitlán (1325–1521). Primary sources depict the dual nature of the god, including a human aspect as left-handed warrior hero and a divine aspect as the solar god who kills the powers of the night. Both aspects express a single fact about Huitzilopochtli: he was a terrible, overwhelming warrior who completely dominated his enemies.

At the time of the Spanish conquest in 1521, Huitzilopochtli's shrine was situated, along with that of the rain god Tlaloc, on top of the largest pyramid in the Aztec empire, the Templo Mayor (Great Temple) of Tenochtitlán. His spectacular religious development from a tribal god to the principal god of the imperial capital is reflected in two mythical episodes that were ritually celebrated by the Aztec. The first, telling of the founding of the city, appears in the *Historia de la nación mexicana* and in the Codex Boturini, which recount how Huitzilopochtli led the Méxica from Chicomoztoc ("place of the seven caves") into the Valley of Mexico. In a second episode, Huitzilopochtli appears in the form of a giant eagle landing on a blooming cactus growing from a rock in the center of Lake Tezcoco in 1325 CE, the date of the

founding of the Aztec capital. This event, pictured in the Codex Mendoza, is marked by the construction of a shrine to Huitzilopochtli and the division of the community into five parts.

This shrine (which became the Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlán) and much of the ritual activity associated with it were modeled after the myth of Huitzilopochtli's birth recorded in book 3 of Fray Bernardino de Sahagún's *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España* (1569–1582; also known as the Florentine Codex). The *teotihuacatl* ("divine song") of the god's birth depicts a society of the gods preparing for war at the cosmic mountain, Coatepec ("serpent mountain"), where the mother of the gods, Coatlicue, has been mysteriously impregnated by a ball of feathers. Her four hundred children, enraged at her pregnancy, launch an attack. At the critical moment, Coatlicue gives birth to Huitzilopochtli, fully grown and dressed for war. He takes his *xiuhcoatl* ("serpent of lightning") and slaughters the attacking siblings. This episode has been variously interpreted by scholars as depicting a historical event or an astral encounter of the sun conquering the moon and stars.

Huitzilopochtli's supreme power was lavishly celebrated at the festival of Panquetzalitzli ("raising of banners"), which involved special human sacrifices following an opening ritual called *Ipainá Huitzilopochtli* ("the swiftness of Huitzilopochtli"). In the latter ritual, according to Fray Diego Durán in *Los dioses y ritos* and *El calendario* (c. 1581), a swift runner carried a dough image of the god through the streets of the capital, pursued by a multitude of "travelers" who never managed to catch him. This signified that Huitzilopochtli was never captured in war, but was always triumphant over his enemies.

Historically, following the formation of the Aztec state with the successful revolution against the empire of Azcapotzalco in 1428, the cult of Huitzilopochtli came to include massive human sacrifices of captured warriors, women, and children, which, the Aztec believed, contributed to the integration of the Aztec state, cosmic order, and Huitzilopochtli's dominance.

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DAVÍD CARRASCO

**HUI-YÜAN** (334–416), more fully Shih Hui-yüan or Lü-shan Hui-yüan, Chinese Buddhist monk. Born to a literati family named Chia in Yen-men (Shansi Province), Hui-yüan went to Honan at the age of thirteen to study both the Confucian classics and the *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu*. When he was twenty he met the eminent Buddhist monk Tao-an (312–385), whose personality and explanation of the philosophy of the "perfection of wisdom" (Skt., *prajñāpāramitā*) impressed him so much that he embraced Buddhism and became his disciple. He remained with Tao-an for twenty-four years, residing mostly at Hsiang-yang. In 378 the invading Ch'in army forced master and disciple to separate. Hui-yüan went south and eventually settled on Mount Lü in Kiangsi, where one of his colleagues from his days in Hsiang-yang, Hui-yung, interceded on his behalf to have the Tung-lin Monastery built for him around 384. He remained there until his death thirty years later.

The Tung-lin Monastery soon became the most famous center of Buddhism in southern China and continued to be so for several centuries after Hui-yüan's death. Much of this prestige derived from the high esteem in which Hui-yüan was held by the courts of the Eastern Chin dynasty in the South and the Yao Ch'in dynasty in the North, and by local rulers, who regarded him as the bulwark and paragon of Buddhist virtue. Hui-yüan was active as a scholar and proponent of Buddhism, improving its status in China by increasing the number of texts available in translation and by defending the religion against its opponents. He sent certain of his disciples west to gather scriptures, of which over two hundred were eventually translated. He was also involved in the activities of many translators, three of whom represented three important tendencies in Buddhism: Saṃghadeva (Abhidharma texts), Buddhabhadra (*dhyāna* texts), and Kumārajīva (*Mādhyamika* texts). In 404, in response to the anti-Buddhist policies of Huan Hsüan, the usurper of the Eastern Chin, Hui-yüan elaborated his position on church-state relations in his influential *The Śramaṇa Does Not Pay Homage to the Ruler*. Here he argued that of the two groups in Buddhism, the laity and the clergy, the former is subject to temporal authority but not the latter, since its members had abandoned society for nonworldly ends.

Hui-yüan also enjoyed enormous popularity among the gentry of South China, for it was to this group that he primarily directed his literary efforts. Some thirty of

his works, in the form of letters, essays, prefaces, eulogies, or inscriptions, are extant. Unlike Tao-an, who primarily wrote commentaries for the Buddhist clergy, Hui-yüan addressed issues that most concerned the gentry: rebirth, the immortality of the soul, the doctrine of *karman*, and the nature of the *dharmakāya*. His previous classical training made him successful in explaining these concepts in terms of the philosophical outlook of the Chinese elite, which at the time was dominated by *hsüan-hsüeh* ("dark learning") speculations into the underlying source (*pen*) of phenomena. That he never once quoted a Buddhist *sūtra* by name but made numerous allusions to the Confucian classics attests to his fervent desire to bring Buddhism into the mainstream of Chinese spiritual and intellectual life. Modern scholars have identified certain areas in which Hui-yüan's understanding of important Buddhist concepts deviates from that of the Indian texts. They have attributed this both to his concern to present Buddhist notions in a form comprehensible to the Chinese, as in his postulation of a cosmic soul (*shen*) as a means of explaining the process of rebirth, or to his frank inability in some instances to master the subtleties of Buddhist doctrine. This is particularly evident in his treatment of the Mādhyamika concepts introduced into China by Kumārajīva. Hui-yüan's correspondence with this, perhaps the greatest of all Buddhist translators, is one of our richest sources of information on the development of Buddhist thought in fifth-century China.

Among Hui-yüan's many accomplishments, his devotional group probably had the most enduring influence on Chinese Buddhism. In 402 Hui-yüan and 123 lay and clerical disciples gathered before an image of the Buddha Amitābha and made a collective vow to be reborn together in his Pure Land. Hui-yüan's devotional group served as a model for the lay-based Buddhist societies of the mid-T'ang and Sung periods, the most well known of which is the White Lotus Society of the early twelfth century. This group claimed to take its name from that of Hui-yüan's confraternity; modern scholarship, however, has shown the name to be of later origin. The deliberate evocation of Hui-yüan's legacy some eight hundred years after his death, however, attests vividly to his enduring prestige in the Chinese Buddhist community. His influence continues to be acknowledged by the Pure Land traditions of both China and Japan, which have traditionally regarded Hui-yüan as their founder and first patriarch.

[See also Ching-t'u and the biographies of Tao-an and Kumārajīva. For a discussion of the White Lotus Society, see Millenarianism, article on Chinese Millenarian Movements.]

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KENNETH TANAKA

**HUIWĪRĪ, AL-** (d. AH 469?/1076? CE), more fully 'Alī ibn 'Uthmān ibn 'Alī al-Jullābī al-Ghaznawī al-Hujwīrī; the author of *Kashf al-mahjūb* (The Unveiling of the Secrets), a very early textbook of Sufism in the Persian language. Almost all the facts of al-Hujwīrī's life that can be trusted come from what he says about himself and his contemporaries in the *Kashf al-mahjūb*. His name tells us that he was a native of Ghaznīn; Jullāb and Hujwīr were apparently quarters of that town. From the descriptions of his contemporaries, it is clear that he was born around the beginning of the eleventh century. He studied Sufism with Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad Khuṭṭalī and read some other sciences with Abū al-'Abbās al-Ashqānī. Al-Hujwīrī traveled widely through Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Syria as a dervish, staying in Ṣūfī hospices (*khānqāhs*) and apparently subsisting on alms. For the first eleven years that he was a mystic, he says, he had been preserved from marriage; but then either a marriage or a love affair (for the words are not clear) created a dangerous diversion, although he was able to escape after one year. By the time he wrote the *Kashf al-mahjūb* he had already composed as many as nine works, all of which, except for a collection of verses (*dī-wān*), were devoted to mysticism and ethics. Of these none has survived.

Contrary to later tradition, al-Hujwīrī does not seem to have had a single spiritual guide (*pir*), and certainly

his visit to Lahore, to judge from his own words, was not at this unnamed pir's orders. He says that he was separated from his books in Ghaznīn and forced to be (*giriftār*) among strangers (*nājinsān*) in Lahore. The use of the past tense suggests that he was no longer in Lahore when he was writing the *Kashf al-mahjūb*, and from a passage on contemporary saints it would seem that he was then in Ghaznīn. His tomb in Lahore is, therefore, not likely to be genuine. The traditional year of his death (AH 465) inscribed on this tomb is probably not far wrong, however, though Nicholson believes that he might have died within the next four years.

Al-Hujwīri's *Kashf al-mahjūb* became a classic text for later Persian and Indian Sufism, partly because of its comprehensive nature, partly because of its moderation, and partly because of its eclecticism. Al-Hujwīri wrote when many of the later elements of Sufism—the erotic concept of relationship with God, the total submission to the pir (leading to the "chain" of teachers, or *silsilah*), and the doctrine of pantheism—were either subdued or held only in secret. These are, therefore, not prominent in the text, though, as in the section on Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj, al-Hujwīri shows himself capable of both rejecting and tolerating pantheism; elsewhere he attempts a distinction between *maḥabbah* and *'ishq* to grapple with the tendency toward eroticism. The separate Ṣūfī discipline, of which the pir was later to become the kingpin, is boldly elaborated: the life of poverty, acceptance of alms, the patched garment, the practice of verse recitation (*samā'*), even the trend toward celibacy, are all expounded, though always with a willingness to state or even tolerate contrary opinions. In his treatment of the *hajj*, he expresses the same curious reserve toward the actual performance of that ritual as is found in subsequent Ṣūfī tradition.

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M. ATHAR ALI

**HUMAN BODY.** [This entry consists of two articles dealing with the symbolic significance of the human body. Myths and Symbolism presents a cross-cultural overview of myths about the origin and nature of the human body.

This is followed by The Human Figure as a Religious Sign, which discusses artistic representations of the human body as vehicles of religious meaning.]

### Myths and Symbolism

One of the great intellectual and spiritual problems throughout human history has been posed by the fact that certain material substances, which we now term "organic," possess life, while other matter does not. The observation that some things eat, drink, grow, and reproduce for a finite period of time, then cease to do so, prompts fundamental inquiries into the nature of life and death, time and change, meaning and meaninglessness, and also gives rise to speculation about the nature of living substances—specifically as to what it is that sets them apart from those that are dead and inert. Such speculations, until the very recent past, were hardly confined to technical issues of biochemistry and biophysics. Rather, physiology entailed the study of life, humanity, and the universe; as such, it had always a profoundly religious dimension.

Although there have been countless different systems of religio-physiological speculation that enjoyed currency at one time and place or another, two general patterns are particularly well attested and noteworthy for the pointed way in which they frame the problematic of organic matter. These are the dualism of body and soul (which radically differentiates the life principle from all else) and the homologization of microcosm and macrocosm (which systematically correlates the body with the world outside).

With regard to the first, dualistic physiology posits a radical distinction between base matter and some non-material life principle which inheres only within certain material aggregates for a period of finite duration. The entry of this life principle—be it defined as soul, spirit, breath, warmth, or the like—vivifies and energizes the matter in which it resides; when it departs, death is the result. [See Soul.] Such a dualism is implicit in the familiar account of the creation of the first human being in *Genesis 2:7*, where the body is carefully differentiated from the life principle, with only the latter deriving directly from Yahveh himself: "Then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being."

Such a dualism inevitably connotes a devaluation of the body in relation to the life principle. To a certain extent, the two are contrasted to one another so that soul is to body as sacred is to profane. The logic of this analogy, however, demands a mythology, cosmology,

and metaphysics that attempt to resolve the questions of how and why a divine, immaterial life principle can reside within a profane material body, and what the ultimate fate of this life principle may be. We have seen that *Genesis* posits an earthly origin for the body of the first man (whose very name, *Adam*, "clay," underscores this fact) and a divine origin for his life principle, breathed into him by a benevolent creator. The analysis of death in Hebrew scripture follows as a corollary to this, for the body is returned to the dust from which it came, while the life force is breathed back to God with the final (literal) expiration (*Eccl.* 12:7, *Ps.* 104:29).

A more emphatically dualistic understanding of the human condition, supported by a much more elaborate mythology and cosmology, is to be found in the Manichaean system. Although the details differ somewhat from one textual source to another, the basic outlines of Mani's views are reasonably consistent throughout. Within Mani's universe, two realms initially stood separate from one another, these being characterized sometimes as the realms of light and darkness, good and evil, God and matter, or the truth and the lie. From the realm of light, it is told there ventured forth a being, a son of God, known as Primeval Man, Ohrmazd, and by other names. This figure took with him his own five sons, who were the beneficent elements of air, wind, light, water, and fire (but note the absence of earth!), and he attached these elements to his body in order that they might serve as armor to protect him. His expedition, however, ended in defeat, and as a result particles of light came to be intermixed with dark, gross, earthly matter. As one Manichaean hymn describes it:

Angry became Āz ["Desire"],  
that evil mother of all demons,  
and she made a heavy disturbance  
for the sake of helping herself.  
And of the dirt of the demons  
and of the filth of the she-demons  
she made this body,  
and she herself entered it.  
Then from the five Elements of Light,  
the armor of Lord Ohrmazd,  
she formed the good soul  
and fettered it into the body.  
She made it like one blind and deaf,  
unconscious and deceived,  
that he at first might not know  
his true origin and family.  
She created the body and prison,  
and fettered the grieved soul.

(trans. Jes P. Asmussen)

The problem that then faced Manichaeans was how to regain knowledge of the origin and true nature of the

light within them, how to separate it from the disgusting bodily matter with which it was now commingled, and how to return it—along with as many other light particles as possible—to the celestial realm of light. In pursuit of salvation, the Manichaean elect were called upon to purify themselves through meditation, sexual abstinence, withdrawal from normal labor, and a fascinating set of dietary practices. Above all, their prescribed diet emphasized items that were extremely light in color, such as melons and cucumbers, for these were considered to have within them many particles of light. Proper ingestion was thus understood to be the absorption of light, while defecation was the voiding of dark matter. Over time the elect was expected to modify the mixture of darkness and light within his body in favor of the latter, in preparation for the ascent of this concentrated light to its primordial, heavenly home. Bodily processes thus, ironically, became the mechanism for salvation from the bodily prison.

Turning to the second general pattern of religio-physiological speculation, one may take as an example of the homologization of microcosm and macrocosm the general Indo-European system of creation mythology. This system rests upon two elegantly symmetrical myths: a cosmogony, in which is described the creation of the universe from the body of the first man; and an anthropogony, describing the creation of the first man out of parts of the universe. Germanic sources offer excellent examples of both. Consider, for instance, this cosmogonic account:

From Ymir's flesh the earth was made  
and from his sweat, the sea;  
Mountains from his bones, trees from his hair,  
and heaven from his skull.  
From his brows built the gentle gods  
Midgard for the sons of men;  
And from his brain shaped they all the clouds,  
Which were hard in mood.

(*Grímnismál* 40–41)

Although the following anthropogonic account exhibits a superficial christianization, having been written in the fifteenth century CE, the bulk of its contents derive from the pre-Christian tradition, as is seen from the way it preserves the same pattern as the pagan cosmogony cited above:

God made the first man—that was Adam—from eight transformations: his bone from stone, his flesh from earth, his blood from water, his heart from wind, his thoughts from clouds, his sweat from dew, the locks of his hair from grass, and his eyes from the sun.

(*Code of Emsig*)

What is established in texts such as these—Indic, Iranian, Baltic, Slavic, Greek, Roman, and Celtic parallels

could also be adduced—is the fundamental consubstantiality of the human body and the universe. The intent of these myths is to demonstrate in convincing detail that the cosmos is composed of the very same matter as is the body, and vice versa, the only difference between the two being one of scale. Flesh, for instance, is only the small-scale version of soil, and stone the large-scale version of bones, the two latter being the dense hard matter located within earth and flesh, respectively. A less obvious homology is that between brain and clouds, which seems to rest upon three perceived similarities: location in the upper regions of the body or world, crenellated shape, and quasi insubstantiality (although this last is more appropriate to thoughts than to the brain itself).

Like flesh and earth or bones and stones, brain and clouds were understood to be alloforms—alternative incarnations—of one another. In all, nine sets of alloformic homologies, beyond the general one of body/universe, may be confidently reconstructed for the Indo-European system: flesh/earth, bone/stone, hair/grass, blood/water, eyes/sun, mind/moon, brain/cloud, skull/rim of heaven, and breath/wind. These detailed homologies gave concrete expression to a sweeping religious vision in which the unity of humanity and the cosmos, of matter and spirit were resoundingly affirmed; they also provided the basic building blocks for a variety of ritual actions.

Among these rituals, one of the most important was sacrifice. This was no mere gift exchange but a ceremony in which the very cosmos was sustained as matter drawn from the bodily parts of the victim was transformed into its macrocosmic alloform, replenishing and renewing thereby the universe, in repetition of the cosmogony: bones became stones, flesh became earth, and so on. Healing rituals were also based upon knowledge of the homologic relation between body and cosmos. Broken bones might thus be knit by the introduction of matter drawn from stones, flesh injuries healed by application of earth, and loss of hair reversed by rubbing plants into the scalp—as is attested in an Indic charm, in which the priest addresses first the plant to be used and then the patient:

You are a goddess, born upon the divine earth, O Plant!  
 We dig you now, you who stretch downward, in order to  
 make the hairs firm.  
 Make the old ones firm; cause to be born those which are  
 still unborn, and make those which have been born  
 grow longer.  
 That hair of yours which falls out, and that which is  
 cut off with its roots still attached—  
 This now I sprinkle with the all-healing herb!

(*Atharvaveda* 6.136)

The posited efficacy of this cure rests on the alloformic relation of hair and plants. Plants were taken to be nothing other than an alternative form for the same matter also present in hair, and the knowledgeable priest could ritually transform this matter back into hair when the need arose. Traces of this ideology and ritual persist today in the enduring popularity of herbal shampoos, conditioners, and hair tonics.

The same physiological views that gave rise to such cures for baldness inform more serious questions of life and death, for at death, bodily matter was taken to be transformed into its macrocosmic counterparts, again in repetition of cosmogonic events. Witness this Middle Persian text:

There are five collectors, receptacles of the corporeal substance of those who have died. One is the earth, which is the keeper of flesh and bone and sinew. The second is water, which is the keeper of blood. The third is the plants, preservers of bodily hair and the hair of the head. The fourth is light, the recipient of fire. Last is the wind, which is the life-breath of creatures at the time of the Renovation.

(*Zādspram* 34.3–7)

The Renovation (*Frashōkereti*) referred to in the last line of this passage is the eschaton, the moment of world renewal and final purification. The reference is a pointed one, for among the culminating events of this end time is the resurrection (*Pahl.*, *ristāxēz*) of the dead, a process that reverses that of death, taking matter from its macrocosmic incarnation and restoring it to bodily existence; this is spelled out in another Middle Persian source, which states that in order to accomplish the resurrection “*Ōhrmazd [the Wise Lord] summons bone from the earth, blood from the water, hair from the plants, and life-breath from the wind*” (*Pahlavi Rivāyat accompanying Dādistān i dīnīg* 48.55).

If death repeats the cosmogony of this system, it is also apparent that resurrection repeats the anthropogony. Bodily incarnation is but one phase of an eternal existence, in which the same material substance moves from body to cosmos to body to cosmos *ad infinitum*, death and (re)birth being but moments of transition. Knowledge of the body thus amounts to knowledge of the universe, from which it is inseparable and of which it is the counterpart. Moreover, reverence for one amounts to reverence for the other.

In presenting these two systems—body-soul dualism and homology of microcosm and macrocosm—we have focused on attitudes toward and analyses of the origin, nature, and destiny of the body: on the material body as a topic for speculation. But we must also consider the body as a metaphor and a means of communication, for in addition to its being a topic for thought, the body

is also a medium for expression. Highly visible to others, the body is something social as well as material, something that does not simply exist but acts and speaks as well. Displayed, viewed, commented upon, criticized, and interpreted, bodies provide powerful vehicles for the discussion of cultural norms and values.

Among the Navajo of the American Southwest, for example, central cultural values are elegantly summarized within the multiple usages of the term *hózhó*, the semantic range of which spans social norms and etiquette, health and healing, ethics, religion, and aesthetics. Usually translated "beauty," *hózhó* denotes something considerably broader than its English equivalent, referring specifically to a state of order, harmony, dynamic balance, and well-being—in short, all that is desirable and makes life pleasant, stable, interesting, and worthwhile. Yet the translation "beauty" is more a condensation than an oversimplification, for it is possession of these qualities that, according to the Navajo, makes and marks anything as beautiful.

Given such a view, physical beauty is quite naturally highly valued, for it is understood to be the visible form produced by an inner state, specifically by that inner state which makes a person cooperative, dependable, productive, and beneficial to others. Moreover, such beauty is contagious, and can be transmitted from one person to another. That is to say, one who is at peace with himself/herself, possessing a balanced, well-ordered (*hózhó*) mental and emotional state, communicates this to others, leading them to relax and enjoy the same well-being, which they may then transmit to still others. That physical beauty may also be transmitted follows as a natural corollary of this line of thought, and a regular feature of a Navajo woman's initiation ritual is the "molding" of the initiand by an older woman who is recognized as beautiful in the fullest sense of the word. By the pressure of her body—applied in strenuous massages—and by the force of her personality, this woman is expected to shape the body and life of the young woman so that she too will enjoy and exhibit *hózhó*.

Costume and adornment may also carry *hózhó* and transmit it, as is most clearly stated regarding silver jewelry. These objects will be beautiful only if they have been made by artisans who are in a state of *hózhó*, the visible beauty of the objects being the result and expression of their makers' inner beauty. Worn proudly, they communicate balance, rhythm, energy, order, and stability to those who wear them and to any who behold them, transforming their lives and making them more beautiful in the process.

Body decoration is also an important means for communicating cultural values and transforming life expe-

rience throughout New Guinea, as is evident, for instance, in the Mount Hagen area, where such practices have been intensively studied by Andrew and Marilyn Strathern (1971). For all important public occasions, Mount Hageners decorate their faces with brilliant painted patterns, and their bodies with oils, shells, plumes, furs, wigs, and fancy aprons. Most of these items are obtained through trade or loan, and involve the wearer in a complex system of socioeconomic bonds, the successful maintenance of which is indispensable in putting together an impressive costume. Moreover, the wearing of such a costume is a public display of one's success in establishing and maintaining the friendship, kinship, marital, and trading relations necessary for costuming and for life. Nor is body decoration merely the proud display of past success in these relations; it is also a means to ensure future success, especially in marriage and trade, for an effective costume is understood to be one that is attractive—that literally attracts future wives and trading partners to the wearer.

It should be stressed that among Mount Hageners, body decoration is not an individualistic display born of personal ambition or vanity. Rather, it is something undertaken by a corporate group, most often a clan, who paint their faces and arrange their ornaments for a given occasion in accordance with a prearranged pattern set by a "Big Man." Within the clan, members compete to produce the finest costume while adhering to the common pattern, but they also compete as a group against other clans for the prestige of having the finest decorations. Success in such competition can come only when the clan has the support of its ancestral spirits, and such support is ensured by two methods. First, sacrifices to the ancestors are offered prior to any occasion of public display, thereby cementing good relations between the living and the dead. Second, good relations among clansmen must also be maintained, for the ancestors are outraged by moral failings and friction within the clan group, and will withhold their support should these be present.

In the Mount Hagen area, then, not only is it true that body decoration is a means for announcing and commenting upon social values, but the set of rituals and beliefs associated with body decoration serves as a buttress for those values. As the Stratherns cogently argue:

The two central values are clan solidarity and prestige, and individual wealth and well-being. This suggests why it is so appropriate that Hageners decorate *themselves* for it is men and women as persons who remain the points of reference of these values. This is not to deny that the value of group solidarity could be expressed in many other ways, for example



by cult buildings or statues. But decorations and dancing provide an excellent mechanism for demonstrating both of the two values together. Moreover, the values are to some extent complementary rather than opposed. . . . Hageners hold, in fact, that in this context the prestige of the clan coincides with that of its members. It is themselves that they decorate, for it is through men's personal achievements that renown is brought to them and their clan alike.

(Strathern and Strathern, 1971, pp. 172–173)

The Navajo and Mount Hagen examples and others like them are particularly important for showing the rich and varied ways in which the body may be used to articulate and activate complex systems of thought and values. At a more general—and thus, of necessity, more superficial—level, certain recurrent patterns of symbolic discourse centered on the body have been identified and analyzed. Raymond Firth, for instance, has singled out four general styles of body symbolism, which we may term the gestural, the membral, the reliquary, and the corporate, although Firth himself does not make use of these (or any other) specific identifying terms.

Gestural symbolism, for its part, involves the use of an individual actor's body in a deliberately chosen stance or motion to express an attitude or idea, as, for instance, when one kneels in prayer or submission as a means of acknowledging the superior power and stature of some other being, while simultaneously showing one's humility in the face of that being. [See *Posture and Gesture*.] In contrast, membral symbolism is utilized more in speech acts than in bodily action, for it employs reference to a specific bodily part in order to make statements about abstract personal qualities, as in the common metaphors "big-hearted" (generous) or "silver-tongued" (eloquent). Reliquary symbolism is related to both gestural and membral symbolism in certain ways. Like the latter, it makes use of bodily parts rather than bodily wholes, but like the former, it employs a real body rather than an imagined or metaphorical one. In specific, in reliquary symbolism a piece of the body of some revered figure—a saint, prophet, ancestor, or lover, to cite a few possibilities—becomes the focal object for one's emotional attachment, as with a lock of hair worn around the neck or a saint's enshrined remains. [See *Relics*.]

Most interesting and important, however, is the corporate pattern, in which the entire human body is presented as a model or replica of the social "body," with detailed resemblances between the constituent units of society and the bodily members. Political leaders or others in positions of primacy may thus be described as the "head," "heart," or "backbone" of society, as a means to describe the ways in which they direct, vivify,

or support the social grouping. More unusual is the way in which a Roman legend, the so-called Apologue of Menenius Agrippa, employs corporate imagery. The story, as told by Livy and others, is that at a certain moment in Roman history, the lower classes of society (the *plebes*) withdrew from the city of Rome, outraged at their exploitation by the ruling Patrician class. Unwilling to confront them militarily—for victory or defeat would be equally disastrous—the Patricians sent an ambassador, one Menenius Agrippa, who recounted the following parable to the rebellious orders:

There was a time when man's bodily parts did not agree in unity, as they do now, but individual limbs had their own opinions and their own powers of speech. Then, the other parts were outraged at having to work for the belly, while the belly rested idly, savoring their delicious gifts. So they plotted that the hands would not take food to the mouth, the mouth wouldn't swallow, and the teeth wouldn't chew. As a result, they starved the belly and all of them wasted away together. It thereby became apparent that the belly is no idler, but just as others feed it, it feeds the rest of the body.

(Livy, 2.32.9–11)

Debate here centers on whether the upper classes are parasitic or not, an issue discussed through body symbolism; the parable asks how the belly shall be understood, but it is evident from the frame-story that the real issue is how society will be ordered.

Often, corporate symbolism is used to charter and legitimate social stratification, as in the celebrated Vedic creation hymn, *R̥gveda* 10.90 (see especially verses 11–12), in which priests are said to have been created from the first man's mouth, warriors and kings from his arms, the class of food producers and merchants from his thighs, and the servant class from his feet. Similar systems are found in Slavic and Greek texts (the *Poem on the Dove King* and Plato's *Timaeus* 69d–70a and *Republic* 431a–d), although certain details differ. In all cases, however, the position of the dominant social class—numerically smallest but greatest in power and prestige—is justified by comparison to a bodily part (usually the head, sometimes an organ within the head, like the mouth or brain) that is smaller than other bodily parts, representing other social classes, but is placed vertically above them and enjoys some measure of executive control over them. Through this use of corporate imagery, the social order is represented as if it were a natural, thus inviolable, order.

On the horizontal plane, as on the vertical, corporate imagery is also regularly used to represent and reinforce social hierarchies. The polarity of right and left (dextrous and sinister) is here a dominant symbol, by use of which subordination of women to men or of rad-

icals to reactionaries, to cite but two examples, may conveniently be coded. The power of such imagery derives in large measure from the numerous polarities to which right and left are consistently associated, among them light/dark, even/odd, hand used in eating/hand used after defecation, culture/nature, purity/pollution, and sacred/profane.

The distinction between what is inside the body and what is outside is also crucial for countless systems of corporate symbolism that stress the difference between what is self and what is alien, what is contained and what is not, what ordered and what chaotic. Reflections on bodily images of inside and outside, moreover, give rise to the extremely thorny problematic of mediation, for there are certain places—the bodily orifices—where inside and outside meet, and certain substances—food and bodily products of all sorts (urine, feces, tears, sexual fluids, saliva, mucus, pus)—which pass from outside to inside or vice versa. Attitudes toward, and proscribed behaviors (taboos) regarding, these interstitial places and products may thus serve as a means for expressing and working out attitudes toward other borders—social, political, ethnic, taxonomic, or broadly cognitive—as has been forcefully argued by Mary Douglas (1966).

It would be a relatively simple matter to multiply examples almost endlessly for these and other patterns of body symbolism and speculation upon the nature of the body, so widespread have they been. Any thorough study of the religious significance of the body ought to include discussions of systems of physical discipline and the overcoming of fleshly existence, as found in Yoga, among the Jains, and within branches of Christian monasticism; attempts at the winning of bodily immortality as in Taoist and Western alchemy; and systems of bodily ornamentation and expression such as tattooing, scarification, dance, and masquerade. It is important to bear in mind that rich examples may as easily be drawn from our own culture as from exotic realms, a point delightfully made in Horace Miner's classic essay "Body Ritual among the Nacirema" (1956), in which he describes the cultic significance of such Nacirema (*American* spelled backward) customs as the brushing of teeth and the use of deodorants. Nor is Miner's point mere satire; the rituals and ideology of European and American bodybuilders, dancers, dieters, joggers, health care professionals, and fashion designers might well stand comparison to those of the Manichaeans, Navajo, or Mount Hageners.

[See also Bodily Marks; Nudity; and Clothing. For the religious significance and symbolism of the various parts of the body, see Head; Heart; Eyes; Hair; Hands; Knees; Feet; Phallus; and Yoni.]

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BRUCE LINCOLN

### The Human Figure as a Religious Sign

Just as the religious traditions of the world have attempted to shape man morally and to open him to a greater reality, they have shaped his image in art so that even the walls and furnishings of temple and home call to him to deepen his religious understanding. The human figure in religious art is an intimate mirror both of what man is and of what he may become: the sacred figures, the unruly demons, the suppliants, martyrs, priests, and indifferent crowds, the ravishing brides, the quizzical monks, those who inflict harm and those who bear it—all are mirrors of the spectator's own composite nature. Such figures are often encountered and pondered today in college courses, books, museums, or travels that offer exposure to a single tradition. A comparative approach that attempts to map the varieties of the human figure in religious art, and to derive a sense of the sum of these many parts, is rarely undertaken. In general, this lack is not to be regretted, because an encyclopedic approach can easily substitute schematic knowledge for the experiential encounter that high religious art requires if it is to exercise its influence as intended. On the other hand, a comparative survey and some degree of intellectual ordering can help us to know better what we are looking at and to experience its content more fully.

**Realms of Knowledge.** We look to religious art as we look to religious texts—for knowledge. "The work of art is a reminder," writes Ananda K. Coomaraswamy; "the summons of its beauty is to a thesis, as to something to be understood, rather than merely enjoyed" (Coomaraswamy, 1977, p. 241). In much of the world's religious art, four great realms of knowledge are preserved and transmitted through the extraordinary diversity of representations of the human figure. First among these is knowledge of the sacred figures: the gods and goddesses, primal teachers, and prophets. From those great beings, entire traditions flow; around their persons,

words, and illuminated acts, traditions circulate; toward the truth so revealed, traditions show a way of return from the separateness and "lostness" of earthly life conducted in ignorance. Religious art is charged with preserving the visibility of these sacred figures and their closest companions. Just as textual commentaries over the centuries elucidate new aspects of the being and truth of sacred figures, so religious art functions as another kind of commentary, emphasizing one or another aspect in keeping with the tenor and needs of an era. In each tradition that has accepted figurative art as a means, the depiction of sacred figures and their companions embodies more compactly and powerfully than other images both the central meaning of the tradition and the qualities of attitude and experience valued by its followers.

Second among the kinds of knowledge for which the human figure serves as vehicle are sacred history, myth, and, on a more modest scale, instructive tales. Be it the childhood of Kṛṣṇa, the prior incarnations of the Buddha, the passion of Christ, or the repose of Viṣṇu between creations, sacred history is the model of action in the world and embodies the realities of change and struggle. The sacred figures and their gifts of meaning rarely enter the world unhindered; thus, sacred history is the realm of time and opposition, of ordeal and triumph. Taking the visual form of narrative and carefully composed symbolic scenes, it too transmits qualities of attitude and experience as well as insight into the inevitable pattern of religious striving in the world; it raises the potentially chaotic experience of the followers of a tradition to a higher level where they can see and feel that opposition and struggle are lawful—not ephemeral inconveniences from which a more fortunate era would be free but parts of the design for humanity's ultimate welfare.

A third realm of knowledge traditionally associated with the human image is cosmology and psychology, the latter understood as a science of spiritual development which includes but is not limited to liberation from the innumerable petty ills that strip ordinary living of its dignity. Present in many of the world's religious traditions, the concept of the human being as a microcosm or "little world" identical in nature to the macrocosm or "great world" of the universe has logically led to images in which the outward order of the cosmos and the inner order of man's being are inscribed on the human figure. We find in the Jain tradition, for example, a schematic human figure subdivided into a grid of many worlds. Related to such cosmological images are images that reveal the subtle structure of the human being, exemplified by now-familiar depictions in

Indian tradition of the *cakras*, or localizations of energy within the body, and by less familiar European images based on astrological speculation.

The fourth realm of knowledge traditionally linked with the human figure in religious art is the realm of the followers—the priests and shamans, monks and devotees, rulers and peasants who may have but one trait in common: their discipleship. Such figures populate the pictorial universes of many religious traditions, where they are not merely records of events and persons *in illo tempore* and of psychocosmic reality but also of the traditions as they have persisted and developed. Preeminent among the followers are the renewers and perpetuators of the teachings. One such figure in the history of Buddhism, for example, is Bodhidharma, the founder of the Ch'an-Zen school, whose image is common in Far Eastern art. In Christianity, the image of Francis of Assisi has comparable significance; he too contributed uniquely to the restoration and flowering of the tradition. But the images of followers are not restricted to great, identifiable figures; they encompass a virtually unlimited variety of men and women, depicted in narrative and symbolic images from which other followers may gain knowledge and encouragement. Even when the image is quite abstract, as in Chinese paintings where a tiny traveler or boatsman is depicted in an overwhelming landscape, a "reminder" is transmitted in the sense that the viewer is helped to recall Lao-tzu's dictum: "The sky is everlasting / And the earth is very old. . . . When you know / What eternally is so, / you have stature . . ." (*Tao-te ching* 7, 16).

**The Doctrinal Basis.** I have thus far approached the human figure in religious art somewhat externally, without dwelling on the inner dimension of doctrine. Much of the genius and inherent drama of religious art lie in the fact that it must use physical means to evoke both physical and metaphysical meanings; one of its tasks is to represent persons and things in such a way that the viewer can sense within them an order of reality that surpasses the physical. Religious art makes the metaphysical more obvious than it is or generally can be in daily life. As we shall see, very nearly all human attitudes, postures, and physiognomies have been borrowed or transformed by religious art: ugliness no less than ideal beauty, sexual vigor no less than sturdy abstinence, impassivity and collectedness no less than exuberance. Underlying all of the varieties, which often fall into complementary pairs, is an enduring conviction that in the human being coincide physical and metaphysical realities.

Very nearly all traditions speak of the mortal body and of an undying or potentially undying presence

within it. The link between the two natures is described either as a way of external life that is moral, prayerful, and ritually correct or as a way of inner striving and contemplation—or as both joined in a single way of life. In few if any traditions is it assumed that human beings bear no responsibility for bridging the two sides of their nature or for passing from one side to the other. A brief selection of Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist texts will suffice to communicate the well-nigh universal doctrinal background against which the human figure in religious art must be perceived.

In Christianity the Gospels and the letters of the apostle Paul offer powerful expressions of the teaching that the body is a sacred vehicle to the degree that it participates in something beyond itself, beyond flesh and blood. "The lamp of the body is the eye. It follows that if your eye is sound, your whole body will be filled with light" (*Mt.* 6:22). Referring to spiritual sight and blindness through their physical counterparts, Jesus evoked a quality of being that illuminates body no less than mind and gives them a more than ordinary dignity and grace. In *1 Corinthians* Paul writes of two bodies, the first natural and earthly, the other spiritual: "There are celestial bodies and there are terrestrial bodies. . . . If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body. . . . Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven. . . . Therefore, my beloved brethren, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord" (15:40ff.). Perhaps more comprehensively than any other early Christian text, this passage implies the enduring program of Christian art with respect to the human figure: viewers should expect images of the body spiritual, as well as symbols and narratives that depict the passage from the earthly to the heavenly by means of steadfast work.

Hindu texts offer no less eloquent witness to the idea of two human natures, mortal and immortal:

Verily, this body is mortal. It has been appropriated by Death. But it is the standing-ground of that deathless, bodiless Self. . . . Now, he who knows 'Let me utter this'—that is the Self; the voice is the instrument for utterance. Now, he who knows 'Let me hear this'—that is the Self; the ear is the instrument for hearing. Now, he who knows 'Let me think this'—that is the Self; the mind is his divine eye.

(*Chândogya Upaniṣad* 8.12.1–5)

The body as such is "ill-smelling, insubstantial" (*Maitri Upaniṣad* 1.3), but it is the chosen vehicle of the "everlasting, unperishing, incomprehensible body-dweller" (*Bhagavadgītā* 2.18), capable of beauty and radiance insofar as the Self breathes within and shines forth from it.

Mahāyāna Buddhism proposes a complex doctrine of three bodies, of which the lowest is the physical and earthly manifestation; the intermediate is a subtle body perhaps analogous to the apostle Paul's "celestial" body; the highest corresponds to the ultimate state of enlightenment. The breadth of this doctrine, hardly suggested here, makes evident that we can expect in Buddhist art a rendering of the human figure in terms of the cohabitation of greater and lesser, the undying and the dying. Buddhist art proved particularly capable of transmitting the bodily and psychic attitude of *dhyāna* (meditation), the primary means of distinguishing between greater and lesser. "Whether a Bodhisattva walks or stands, sits or lies down, talks or remains silent, his concentration does not leave him. . . . Calm is his body, calm is his voice, calm is his mind . . ." (*Śikshāsamuccaya*, 202–203, in Conze, 1954, p. 138).

**The Complementary Pairs.** The profusion of human types in religious art and the varied styles of different times and places create the need for an organizing principle. Well suited to this purpose is the ancient recognition that opposites coincide or complement one another at a higher level of reference. The principle was vividly stated by Heraclitus at the dawn of Western philosophy: "God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and want. But he undergoes transformations, just as [oil] when it is mixed with a fragrance, is named according to that particular savor" (*Heraclitus*, ed. and trans. Philip Wheelwright, New York, 1971, fragment 102, p. 102). Similarly, art has transmitted religious meanings through radically different human types and artistic styles, but when apparent opposites are viewed in the larger context of universal religious values, they can be understood to complement rather than cancel each other.

In the following sections, three complementary pairs are examined at some length: the ideal and the grotesque, the realistic and the conceptual, the fluent and the geometric. Other pairs are cited briefly, as working material for the reader's own approach to the order underlying the diversity of types and styles.

**The ideal and the grotesque.** Ideal images are familiar in religious art and generally well understood, but their complement in grotesque or intentionally "ugly" images remains more enigmatic. For Western-educated minds, the ideal is associated primarily with classical antiquity and the Renaissance. Such ancient works as the famous mid-fifth-century bronze figure of Poseidon (possibly Zeus) hurling a projectile, or any of several figures of Athena from the Temple of Zeus at Olympia (see figure 1), embody the complex cultural achievement of their era: physical strength and poise harmonize with values of another order—emotional sobriety,



FIGURE 1. *Poseidon (Zeus?) of Artemision*. Bronze sculpture; Greece, c. 460 BCE. Classical antique image of human wholeness as a complex of strength and sobriety.

intellectual lucidity—to create images of man and woman in their wholeness.

Ideal images also have played a central role in Asian art; there too they may be viewed as norms, actively teaching and passively preserving the fundamental values of a culture. Under the Gupta rulers of India (fourth–seventh centuries CE), Buddhist and Hindu artists evolved extraordinarily pure images of the human figure that, like the Classical art of Greece, provided prototypes for the arts of distant times and places. Their ideal was also one of balance and harmony, but it was differently structured from Greek art in important respects.

The physique of a Buddha image of this type (see figure 2) is not conceived as a complex harmony of muscle and bone responding to keen intention but as a uniform field or envelope filled with quiet energy. The tissues are soft and relaxed, while the deliberately erect posture and frontal pose convey a sense of rigor. The patterned drapery of certain Gupta figures strengthens the impression of the body as a uniform field traversed by harmonious vital energy. Like the bodily type, the facial type of this ideal figure is informed with the contemplative values of Buddhism: the regularity and deep composure of the features complete a prototypical image of the Way and its goal. The best examples of this type both instruct and encourage the viewer and transmit over centuries a reminder of the precise physical and psychic attitude of "these wise ones, meditative, persevering, always putting forth strenuous effort to attain *nirvāṇa*, the highest freedom and happiness" (*Dhammapada* 2.3).



FIGURE 2. *Standing Buddha*. Sandstone sculpture, Mathurā style; India, c. fifth century CE. The human figure, in rigor and composure, as a uniform field of energy.

Given the inherent strength and geographic pervasiveness of the ideal image of the Buddha, it is surprising that its complement—the grotesque—should also figure in Buddhist art. The immediate followers of the Buddha, enlightened *arhats* or (in Chinese) *lo-hans*, came to be represented in one widespread version as gnarled, boney, eccentric figures, marked and even marred physically by their long struggle for enlightenment. They are religious veterans, victors in the war with oneself. Bodhidharma, founder of the Ch'an-Zen school from which such images stem, was himself characteristically represented in a manner that emphasized the existential challenge of the Way. The patriarch's intense eyes and theatrically expressive face (see figure 3) manifest not only the dry humor of Zen but also the truths meant to stir and nourish the viewer's understanding: the truth of personal struggle, the awesome power of spiritual vision, the unpredictable nature of the religious adept, who cannot be counted on for gentleness.

The ideal and the grotesque thus complement each other, the former embodying a timeless state of being, the latter recording the struggle to be. Neither is a "realistic" image, a quasi-photographic impression of a given individual; both indicate meanings that the mind and heart can grasp as parts of a whole.

**The realistic and the conceptual.** Realism or naturalism is often associated with predominantly secular periods of culture—with the cosmopolitan Hellenistic empire, for example, or with bourgeois Europe. At various epochs in the history of religious art, however, meticulous realism had established itself as a vehicle of undeniable spiritual power. Among the most notable examples are memorial portrait sculptures of priests and other religious figures and imagined portraits from the Kamakura period in Japan (1185–1333 CE). Generally life-size or near life-size wood carvings with innumerable realistic details of stance, dress, and physiognomy (including vividly observant rock-crystal eyes), such figures often project qualities of contained vitality and presence by which the viewer may feel his or her own life to be measured. Pursuing the memorial function with an intensity and effect beyond the ordinary, these works allow the personal authority of a departed individual to be experienced with uncanny immediacy.

In European art, a comparable although not identical



FIGURE 3. *Bodhidharma*. Detail from an ink painting by Fūgai; Japan, c. 1600 CE. The physical consequences of the struggle for enlightenment shown to be grotesque.



FIGURE 4. *Sumerian Deity (or Worshiper?)*. Gypsum figurine; Tell Asmar (in modern Iraq), mid-third century BCE. Unnatural and distorted appearance can convey religious themes; here, for example, the prominent appearance of the eyes of this temple figure suggests the witnessing of an epiphany.

quality is found in some of Rembrandt's portraits, in which one meets not a sage by whom one feels weighed and uplifted but, rather, a deeply sensitive companion in life's turmoil. The viewer is returned by such images to his or her own humanity in all its complexity and confused promise rather than turned toward the severe and life-giving practice of a religious teaching. An earlier phase of European art, the so-called Magic Realism of Jan van Eyck and other Flemish artists of the fifteenth century, must also be recalled in this context: their meticulous renderings of humanity, indeed of all natural things, create a pictorial world governed by the faculty of attention. Each shape and surface within that world had been probed with fresh eyes, each detail painted as if it were necessary to the whole.

The complement to realism has been called conceptualism, but the latter term requires subdivision to indicate the many different kinds of departure from natural appearance that occur in religious art, for meticulous realism is the exception rather than the norm. One useful subdivision of the term is expressionism, referring not only to the familiar twentieth-century

expressionist schools but more widely throughout history to art that has emphasized single traits of the human figure or distorted the figure in order to stress a paramount theme. For example, a group of worshipping figures from a third-millennium BCE Sumerian temple (see figure 4) possess overwhelmingly prominent eyes, presumably witnessing a sacred epiphany within the temple enclosure. Another class of conceptual religious art may be termed sacred fantasy; it is exemplified by the composite images of pharaonic Egyptian religion and of Hinduism, in which zoomorphic features and multiple limbs or heads are combined with elements of the human figure to embody religious concepts that cannot be expressed through natural appearances alone.

Religious art generally draws together both realistic and conceptual elements to make its statement, however much one or the other predominates. Our psyches are such that we can recognize even the simplest or most primitive outline of the human figure as "man" and feel drawn into the narrative or symbolic work where such a figure appears (see figure 5). That we are now able to respond to both religious arts that developed elaborate transformations of the human figure and those that chose to represent it through a primary sign is largely a result of the catholicity of early modern art, which accustomed modern eyes to forms adapted from Asian and African cultures that had never given emphasis to realism.

*The fluent and the geometric.* This pair of complementary terms can be glossed on a more abstract level as "energy" and "structure." Certain phases of religious art stress the animating flow of energy within the hu-



FIGURE 5. *Human-Figure and Scorpion Pattern*. Maricopa pottery bowl; North American Southwest, c. 1850. Even the simplest representation of the human figure can generate narrative involvement on the part of the observer.

man figure, while other phases stress the order and structural complexities of human being by means of geometric form. Extreme examples may prove instructive. The seventh-century Christian *Book of Durrow*, transcribed and illuminated by Irish and perhaps Saxon monks, includes a portrait of the evangelist Matthew in the guise of a typical monk of the era (see figure 6). The figure's torso is identical with his cloak, which in turn is rigidified into a bell-shaped form enclosing a colorful grid that recalls the enamel-work tradition from which this book/art sprang; the spine is rendered as a decorative axis around which falls the cruciform pattern of the grid. A curious and marvelous work that defies definitive interpretation, it seems to use geometric form to reflect the inner orderliness and voluntary restriction of monastic life.

Such a radically geometrized rendering of the human figure contrasts with the flamelike undulation and suppleness characteristic of later Thai Buddha images, in which the pliant figure is drawn upward and forward by the energy suffusing it. In seventeenth-century Western art, an analogous emphasis on energy and fluent form may be found in numerous religious and secular works—for example, in Gian Lorenzo Bernini's *Ecstasy of Saint Theresa* in which flows of animated drapery serve as a visible sign of the saint's inner experience.




FIGURE 6. *Symbol of Saint Matthew*. Manuscript illumination, from the *Book of Durrow*; Ireland, seventh century CE. The monastic context in which this work originated is reflected in the geometric order and discipline of the figure.



FIGURE 7. *Śiva Nāṭarāja*. Bronze sculpture; India, c. 1000 CE. Energy and structure blend to convey a rule of ordered movement in this characteristic image of Śiva dancing.

In certain masterworks, both Asian and Western, energy and structure are blended into a whole. The characteristic Hindu image of Śiva dancing, for example (see figure 7), at its best combines the poise and fluency of dance with a strict, quasi-architectural sense of the figure's structure and pose. Much the same may also be said of the figurative art of Piero della Francesca, Leonardo da Vinci, and Albrecht Dürer, to mention only three artists of the European Renaissance who based their figure designs on studies of the hidden geometry of the human figure. The underlying geometry in their work endows figures with a stateliness and composure that illuminates their actions. Wherever it appears in art, geometry lends to the human figure a quality of special order, either by mapping within the figure itself the structure of human being or by lending to the figure's contours and posture an air of solemn simplicity.

**Further complementary pairs.** In addition to the three pairs just discussed, a number of others reward study: the erotic and the ascetic, the devotional and the hieratic, the narrative and the symbolic, the opulent and the austere, portrait and type, masculinization and feminization—and, no doubt, others that each reader may uncover in the course of time. Each of these complements has characterized the human figure in high religious art at one or another time and place.

The devotional, exemplified in later Hindu painting by images of Rādhā or the *gopīs* awaiting or avidly serv-



ing Kṛṣṇa, has no greater or lesser place in world religious art than hieratic images such as the saints in the Russian icon tradition, who stand motionless and concentrated, beings outside of time. The erotic is exemplified not only by overt images of coitus and sexual play in the Asian religious traditions but also by covert emphasis in much Christian art on the womanly beauty of the Blessed Virgin and the manly beauty of Christ. But the ascetic is no less important in art as a sign of the rigors of the Way. The characteristic physical type of an entire major epoch of Christian art—the Romanesque period of eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe—can be justly described as somewhat ascetic: the figured capitals and doorways of Romanesque churches are populated with a gaunt but richly expressive tribe of Christians, exemplified by the figure of Christ in the Last Judgment tympanum at the Church of Saint-Lazare in Autun. The drapery of this powerful figure further illustrates the expression of energy in religious art, while the oval head with its simple, still features draws upon the power of regular geometric form to express containment and dignity.

**The Mirror of Humanity.** Like a mirror, the human figure in religious art draws the viewer out by presenting an object of interest, but it also returns the viewer to himself or herself. In the outward movement of attention, we are attracted by various aspects of the figure: its physical presence or beauty, its psychic attitude, the meaning that it conveys, its setting and companions, the history and cultural milieu of the work of art as a whole. In the inward return of attention, we remember, often in highly condensed form, our own experiences that relate to the figure: we measure the stance and attitude of the figure against our own stance and attitude; we are encouraged, moved, amused, or alerted no less than we would be had we encountered the figure as a character in literature.

In Islamic art, for example, the love story of Laylā and Majnūn has frequently been illustrated. Deprived of his beloved, Majnūn (literally “the madman”) seeks her everywhere. In various illustrations, a painfully thin Majnūn, dressed only in a loincloth, sits astride a woe-fully emaciated horse. Together they go in search of Laylā. The image is an anecdote, a brilliant illustration of an entertaining tale; it is often a *tour de force* of the art of drawing and deserves appreciation on aesthetic grounds alone, but it is something more. In the Ṣūfī interpretation of this tale, Majnūn’s longing for Laylā and his search for her against great odds is an image of man’s search for God, whom Ṣūfis name the Friend and the Beloved. Majnūn, almost comically distraught and yet steadfast in his quest, is thus one of the innumerable mirrors of the religious life found in art.

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ROGER LIPSEY

**HUMANISM.** The Christian humanism of the Renaissance and Reformation period was a complex intellectual movement, primarily literary and philological in nature, but with important historical, philosophical, and religious implications. Humanism was rooted in the love of classical antiquity and the desire for its rebirth, both in terms of form (primarily a search for new aesthetic standards) and of norm (a desire for more enlightened ethical and religious values). The return to original sources is reflected in a parallel way in the reformers’ emphasis upon the scripture as norm and New Testament Christianity as the ideal form of church life. Humanism developed in Italy during the fourteenth century and persisted through the Reformation well into the age of the Enlightenment.

The word *humanism* came from the phrase *studia humanitatis* or *humaniora*, the liberal arts or humane studies, a concept derived largely from Cicero. The liberal arts curriculum emphasized grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy. While the course of studies owed something to the traditional education of the medieval cathedral schools, it was less concerned with dialectic or logic, natural science, and Scholastic metaphysics. The term *humanist* was originally applied

to professional public or private teachers of classical literature who continued the medieval vocation of the *dicatores*, who taught the skills of letter-writing and proper style in speech and writing. But the word gradually came to assume a more comprehensive meaning, referring to all devotees of classical learning. Humanism came to be cultivated not merely by professional educators but by many men of letters, historians, moral philosophers, statesmen, and churchmen, including regular as well as secular clergy. They set the *aurea sapientia*, or golden wisdom, of the ancients against the arid dialectic of the Scholastic doctors. Christian humanism tended toward religious syncretism, moralism, and ethical Paulinism, and also toward a Christocentrism that emphasized Christ as an example of good living, rather than a Christology that focused on Christ's sacrifice on the cross as sin-bearer, substitute, and savior. [See Scholasticism.]

**Italian Renaissance Humanism.** It was natural that humanism should emerge most strongly in Italy, given the Roman inheritance and the artistic and architectural reminders of ancient glories. Toward the end of the thirteenth century, a form of protohumanism developed in the north of Italy, in Padua, Verona, and Vicenza, and in Arezzo and Florence in Tuscany. But the "father of humanism" was Francesco Petrarch (1304–1374), who gave to Italian literary humanism its basic character. He is perhaps best remembered for his vernacular lyrics, chiefly love poems to Laura; he was crowned poet laureate on the Capitoline Hill in Rome in 1341. Petrarch stressed the purity of the classical Latin style, revived enthusiasm for ancient Rome, and helped develop a sense of distance from the past and a revulsion toward the medieval "dark ages." He raised important personal and religious questions in such writings as *On the Solitary Life*, the *Secretum*, *Ascent of Mount Ventoux*, and *On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others*, in which he wrote as an apologist for the Christian view of man and the humanists' appreciation of the worth of the individual against certain neo-Aristotelians whose natural philosophy subverted those values.

Petrarch's friend Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–1375) gained renown for his *Decameron*, a collection of a hundred short stories, for books on famous men and women, and for an encyclopedic *Genealogy of the Gods*, an important handbook of mythology. Petrarchan humanism spread through Italy, largely as a lay, upper-class, and elitist movement. In the search for classical manuscripts, humanists such as Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459), Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), Cyriacus of Ancona (c. 1391–1457), and Giovanni Aurispa (1374–1450) excelled, rediscovering key works of Cicero, Quin-

tilian, Vitruvius, Plautus, Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, Thucydides, Euripides, Sophocles, and other ancient authors.

Humanism gained new momentum and direction with the Greek revival. In the final decades of the fourteenth century the Byzantine emperor, threatened by the Ottoman Turks, who were encircling Constantinople, made two expeditions to the West, in 1374 and 1399, to seek help. His efforts were futile, but some Greek scholars, such as Manuel Chrysoloras (c. 1355–1415), John Bessarion (1403–1472), and Gemistus Plethon (c. 1355–1450), remained in the West and introduced Greek literature, patristics, and philosophy. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, other scholars fled to the West, notably John Argyropoulos, Demetrius Calcondylas, and John and Constantine Lascaris, adding new momentum to the Greek revival and broadening the dimensions of philosophical discussion.

Certain humanists placed their rhetorical gifts in the service of the Florentine republic against the threatening tyrants of Milan and Naples. These civic humanists, such as chancellor Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406) and Leonardo Bruni (c. 1370–1444), stirred up the patriotic impulses of the citizenry for the defense of the state. In a broader sense civic humanism was more than an ideology of embattled republicanism, for it stood for a life of action spent for the common good. Giannozzo Manetti (1396–1459), who wrote *On the Dignity and Excellence of Man*, once described the whole duty of man as being to understand and to act. Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472), a truly universal man, the architect of Renaissance churches, palaces, and fountains, wrote treatises that for many decades dominated theory on architecture, painting, and the family.

In order to convey humanist ideals to youth, humanist educators not only wrote influential treatises on education but also established schools to put their theories into practice. Generally optimistic about the educability at least of the upper classes, the humanists cultivated the liberal arts to develop leaders with sound character and lofty vision. Pietro Paolo Vergerio (1370–1444) wrote a treatise on the morals befitting a free man, drawing extensively on Plato, Plutarch, and Cicero. Vittorino Rambaldoni da Feltre (1378–1446) and Guarino da Verona (1370–1460) set up model schools with a humanist curriculum and introduced such innovations as physical education and coeducation.

Among the disciplines emphasized was history, for the humanists valued both ancient and contemporary history. What the humanists learned from classical historians was reflected in their own histories, from the *History of Florence* of Leonardo Bruni to the *History of Florence* of Niccolò Machiavelli and the *History of Italy*

in *His Own Times* by Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540). Flavio Biondo (1389–1463), the founder of modern archaeology, produced massive topographical-historical works on Rome and all of Italy. Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) anticipated many of the questions raised later by Luther, such as free will and predestination, errors in the Vulgate, and the value of lay piety in contrast to monasticism. In a treatise titled *On the Donation of Constantine*, he proved with philological and historical critical arguments that the *Donation of Constantine* was a forgery purporting to prove that when Constantine moved the capital of the Roman empire to the East, he had given the Lateran Palace and outlying provinces to Pope Sylvester I and his successors, as well as conferring immense privileges upon them.

During the second half of the fifteenth century classical scholarship was more closely integrated with literary composition in the vernacular, printing spread rapidly following the establishment of the first printing press in Italy in 1465, and a new metaphysical emphasis superseded the relatively uncomplicated moral philosophy of the literary and civic humanists with the development of Neoplatonic, neo-Pythagorean, neo-Aristotelian, Hermetic, and qabbalistic philosophies and theodicies. Neoplatonism became the most prominent and characteristic form of Renaissance philosophy. [See Neoplatonism.] The renewal of interest in patristic writings, aided by scholars such as Ambrogio Traversari (1386–1439), and especially in the Greek fathers, added impetus to the Greek revival. Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) was concerned with the search for unity between the infinite One and the infinite multitude of finite things, the *coincidentia oppositorum*, a pantheism that raised the specter of pantheism. Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), the most eminent Renaissance philosopher, presided over the “Platonic Academy” endowed by Cosimo de’ Medici, the de facto ruler of Florence. Ficino did editions of Plato’s works and edited the *Enneads* of Plotinus and works of Greek pagan Neoplatonists such as Proclus and Porphyry, as well as of Dionysius the Areopagite, whose christianized Neoplatonism was so influential throughout the medieval period. Among his own influential works were the *Theologia Platonica* and the *De religione Christiana*, in which he used Neoplatonism apologetically as a support for the Christian faith. His understudy, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), sought to find the religious truth common to Christianity, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Hermeticism, Islam, and Qabbalah. He published for public disputation nine hundred theses, the *Conclusiones*, in which he sought to summarize all learning. In his oration *On the Dignity of Man*, sometimes described as the most characteristic Renaissance docu-

ment, he places man at the center of the “great chain of being,” the object of special creation, able to rise upward toward God or to sink downward to the sensate animalistic level, as he chooses. Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), combining Nicholas of Cusa’s Neoplatonism and Hermetic ideas with the physical implications of Copernican astronomy, synthesized a philosophy that verged on pantheism. Aristotelianism persisted in the universities, and Neo-Aristotelianism found advocates such as Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), who wrote on the nature of immortality, fate, free will, predestination, and providence. [See the biographies of Bruno, Ficino, Nicholas of Cusa, and Pico.]

**Northern Humanism.** Thanks to close political, commercial, ecclesiastical, and university ties with Italy, the new humanist culture came earlier to Germany than to other countries of northern Europe. The pioneers included wandering poets such as Peter Luder, schoolmaster humanists such as Johannes Murmellius and Rudolf von Langen, half-Scholastic humanists such as Conrad Summenhart and Paul Scriptoris, and moralistic critics of church and society such as Heinrich Bebel, Jacob Wimpfeling, Sebastian Brant, and the preacher Johann Geiler von Kaisersberg. But the man credited with being the father of German humanism was Roelof Huysman (Rodolphus Agricola, 1444–1485), known as the “German Petrarch.” After a decade in Italy he returned to “the frozen Northland” and presided over a group of young humanists in Heidelberg, to whom he expounded his theories of rhetoric. One of his disciples, Conrad Pickel (Conradus Celtis, 1459–1508), the “German arch-humanist,” organized young humanists into the Rhenish and Danubian sodalities to promote humanism and to do a topographical-historical work entitled *Germania illustrata*, never completed.

At the universities humanists struggled with Scholastics for positions, and by 1520 humanism had spread to urban centers and to both ecclesiastical and princely courts. The lawyer Conrad Peutinger, the historian Johannes Turmair (Aventinus), the city councilor Willibald Pirckheimer, a friend of Conrad Pickel, and the Nuremberg artist Albrecht Dürer were patrons and advocates of humanism. The clash of humanists and Scholastics came to a head in the celebrated Reuchlin controversy. Johannes Reuchlin (1455–1522) did a Hebrew vocabulary and grammar and wrote two major works, *On the Wonder-Working Word* and *On the Qabbalistic Art*, in which he used the Jewish mystical Qabbalah in support of Christianity. Reuchlin defended some Hebrew books from a vicious book-burner, Johannes Pfefferkorn, a converted Jew, and was in turn attacked by certain Scholastic doctors at Cologne. An Erfurt humanist, Johann Jäger (Crotus Rubianus, c.

1480–1545), and the young knight Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523) wrote a biting satire, *The Letters of Obscure Men*, ridiculing the Scholastics and defending Reuchlin. In Gotha the canon Mutianus Rufus (1471–1526) gathered a circle of young humanists from the University of Erfurt to promote classical learning.

Although there were early ties with Italy during the Avignon papacy and some promise of a flowering early in the fifteenth century, for example in the circle gathered around chancellor Jean de Montreuil (1354–1418), the Hundred Years' War and the struggle between France and Burgundy delayed the full development of humanism in France. The great flowering of humanism came from 1515 to 1547, during the reign of Francis I, a great patron of art and literature. Guillaume Budé (1468–1540) did a commentary on the *Pandects* (a digest of Justinian's law), a work on numismatics, a commentary on the Greek language, and a major work on Hellenism. Lefèvre d'Étaples (1455–1536) worked on biblical texts, doing a critical edition of *Psalms* and commentaries on Paul's letters and on the four Gospels; this work was important to Luther and the French reformers. Margaret of Angoulême, Francis I's sister, was not only an author but also a patroness of humanists and young reformers, along with Bishop Guillaume Briçonnet. François Rabelais (c. 1495–1553), author of the witty, gross, and satirical *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, offered criticism through the story of a giant and his son. Although sometimes called a skeptic, Rabelais is now seen more as an Erasmian Christian humanist interested in reform. The famous essayist Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) was the greatest French literary figure of the age.

In Spain, Erasmianism, Lutheranism, and mysticism found followers, but nonconformity was effectively suppressed. Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros (1436–1517) instituted rigorous clerical reforms, founded the University of Alcalá with a trilingual college, and endowed the publication of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible. Antonio de Nebrija (1441–1522), at Salamanca, was an outstanding classicist. The greatest literary figure of Spanish humanism was Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616), author of *Don Quixote*.

English humanism developed during the fifteenth century from political and ecclesiastical contacts with Italy. Classical studies were cultivated seriously at Oxford by Thomas Linacre (c. 1460–1524), William Grocyn (c. 1466–1519), and William Latimer (c. 1460–1543). John Colet (1467–1519), dean of Saint Paul's and founder of Saint Paul's School, modeled somewhat after the humanist schools of Italy, corresponded with Ficino and was intrigued by Neoplatonism. But he had a serious theological bent, and in his lectures on *Romans* he em-

phasized man's sinfulness and need for God's forgiveness. Thomas More (1478–1535) wrote the most famous work of English humanism, *Utopia*.

The prince of the northern humanists was Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (1469?–1536), who articulated the loftiest ideals of Christian humanism. A great classicist and patristics scholar, he expressed social and ecclesiastical criticism in *The Praise of Folly* and the *Colloquies*, expounded his "philosophy of Christ" in the *Enchiridion* and in *Paraclesis*, and did editions, with long introductions, of Latin and Greek classical authors and church fathers. His fame was eclipsed by the advent of the Reformation, and he reluctantly attacked Luther on the question of the freedom of the will. Erasmus inclined toward moralism and spiritualism rather than consequential soteriology, emphasizing Christ the teacher and example rather than the Savior who died on the Cross for the salvation of mankind. [See the biography of Erasmus.]

**Humanism and the Reformation.** The Reformation owed much to humanism for its success; contributing to an atmosphere favorable to the Reformation were humanism's emphasis on knowledge of the biblical languages and a return to the sources; its criticism of ecclesiastical and social abuses; its negative attitude toward Scholasticism; a concomitant romantic cultural nationalism; the use of the printing press; and the activities of the cadres of young humanists who carried Luther's message to all parts of the Holy Roman Empire in the early years. Luther referred to the Renaissance as akin to John the Baptist heralding the coming of the gospel. The so-called magisterial reformers, Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Melancthon, Bucer, Beza, and others, were all university men with some background in classical studies and humanist learning. Led by Luther, they reformed the university curricula in favor of humanist disciplines, reformed old and founded new universities, and established secondary schools, *Gymnasiums* and *lycées*, to promote the liberal arts. They insisted upon compulsory education for boys and girls, thus expanding education beyond the elitist upper-class concerns of the Italian humanists. They stressed teaching as a divine vocation. While Luther loved the classics, rejected Scholasticism, and favored humanism, his colleague Philipp Melancthon (1497–1560) was the major influence in promoting classicism. In line with Italian humanism, the reformers deemphasized dialectic and stressed the value of rhetoric, poetry, moral philosophy, and history. Along with their concern for pure theology, the proper distinction between law and gospel, and the centrality of sin and grace, the reformers viewed higher culture as a sphere of faith's works and became strong advocates of humanist learning. Learned

Protestants such as the polymath Joachim Camerarius (1500–1574), the educator Johannes Sturm (1507–1589), the historian Johannes Philippi (Sleidanus, 1506–1556), the irenic theologian Georg Calixtus (1586–1656), and a host of neo-Latin poets, playwrights, and philosophers carried humanism into the seventeenth century and the beginnings of the Enlightenment. Catholic reformers, too, especially the Jesuits, saw the value of the *humaniora*, or humane studies, and introduced them into their academies, colleges, and universities. The Reformation owed much to humanism and repaid the debt richly by broadening the popular base of education and carrying humanist learning into modern times. [See Reformation and Enlightenment, The.]

The Reformation brought to an end the role of Renaissance humanism as an independent cultural force, for thereafter it became associated closely with the various Christian confessions. Lutheran, Calvinist, Catholic, and radical humanist learning was cultivated in secondary schools and universities. Where humanism was transmitted in this academic way, it was preserved much longer than where it remained a matter of a few individuals or groups; but humanism took on a more pedantic and less spontaneous character in the universities.

Humanist impulses were not only widespread horizontally on a European scale but reached down vertically through the centuries. Where humanist influence was strong, it nourished tendencies toward universalism, or at least toward latitudinarianism, especially in England and the Netherlands, and fostered an irenic spirit. The humanist way of thinking has remained in evidence into the twentieth century.

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LEWIS W. SPITZ

**HUMAN SACRIFICE.** [This entry consists of two articles: the first is an overview that presents both reports of and theories about human sacrifice in various traditions; it is followed by a discussion of human sacrifice in the Aztec empire, where this practice was especially prominent.]

#### An Overview

Human sacrifice, defined as the killing of humans or the use of the flesh, blood, or bones of the human body for ritual purposes, has been a widespread and complex phenomenon throughout history. Most contemporary scholars try to explain human sacrifice in terms of ear-

lier theories of sacrifice in general. Though the explanations given for the purposes of sacrifice have been almost as varied as the phenomena themselves, they may be reduced to nine common themes drawn from four of the classic works on sacrifice. These themes may be illustrated with descriptions of human sacrificial practices in differing cultural contexts.

E. B. Tylor (1832–1917) theorized that the origin of religion lay in the primitive tendency to “animate” the entire world with “soul-ghosts.” Human sacrifice released these soul-ghosts so that they might join their ancestors and function as a gift to gain particular ends, as homage to a deity, or as a form of renunciation.

**Theoretical Perspectives.** According to W. Robertson Smith (1846–1894), sacrifice originated in totemism. Sacrifice was a communal meal shared between the people and their god, who was simultaneously their totemic animal and their kinsman. Smith postulated two types of sacrifice. The first, the honorific, was a gift either on a friendly basis of exchange or as a part of homage to a powerful deity. The communion meal became a cannibal feast when a tribe, such as the wolf tribe, offered to the god the appropriate food—the members of the sheep tribe, for example. The second, the piacular or expiatory sacrifice, took on a mystical, sacramental flavor when a tribe’s own totemic animal was offered as a redemption for a misdeed. The animal, who as a kinsman was also a representative of the people themselves, was killed and then shared in a communion in which people achieved atonement by physically assimilating into their own bodies the totemic form of themselves. The sacrificed animal was reborn by being assimilated into the living bodies of the people who ate it, and since those people were identified with the totemic animal, they too were reborn through this ritual.

James G. Frazer (1854–1941) developed a theory of regeneration of fertility according to which the sacrificial offering possessed tremendous potency. Sacred kings and human vegetative gods were killed to pass on their power to a younger successor, to incorporate their potency into the living who consumed their bodies, and to prevent their decay in old age since decay would endanger the fertility of earthly existence. Frazer also suggested that animals and plants were eventually substituted for the original human sacrificial offering because of the fear inherent in killing humans.

In their essay on Vedic and Hebrew sacrifice (1898), Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss considered sacrifice to be a religious act which, through the consecration of an offering, modified or transformed the condition of the person who accomplished that act by joining the divine and mortal via the sacrifice. Moreover, the self-sacrifice

of a god in human form was the ideal abnegation, for it was an offering of one’s own life.

Nine basic purposes of human sacrifice have been commonly cited from these early theorists: (1) humans are sacrificed in order to release souls for the service of the dead ancestors; (2) human sacrifice is a gift that binds deities to people in an exchange or that serves to propitiate the gods either as homage or as renunciation; (3) human sacrifice is a communion meal in which the power of life is assimilated and thus regenerated; (4) the offering of human sacrifice serves as an expiation of past transgressions and has a redemptive character; (5) it brings about atonement, (6) the regeneration of earthly fertility, or (7) immortality; (8) it transforms human conditions; and (9) it unifies the divine and mortal. Although some new approaches have been added taking into consideration factors such as the role that cosmology plays or the ordering capacities of human sacrifice, contemporary interpreters of human sacrifice still find these themes fruitful in a variety of cultural settings.

**Historical Corroboration.** The burials at Chan Chan (fourteenth–fifteenth centuries) in Peru are illustrative of the theme of soul-release and kinship with the dead. In this capital of the Chimu empire, many adolescent females were sacrificed and buried with their king. It is known that later, during Inca domination (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries), the king was considered alive after death and was treated as a participant in the affairs of his surviving kin. A kinship was established between the dead and the living in the Shang period (c. 1500–1000 BCE) in China as well. According to David N. Keightley (1978), in the Shang political system the dead and the living formed a bureaucracy together. The dead received “salaries” in the form of human sacrifices for their jobs as intercessors between the king and the high god Ti. Without this, earthly prosperity could not continue. At An-yang (c. 1500–1400 BCE), the entombment of an entire company of soldiers, four charioteers, their companions, the horses, and the chariots has been unearthed. [See *Afterlife, article on Chinese Concepts.*]

The themes of expiation, redemption, and communion were central in the sacrificial tradition of the early Christian church. The early martyrs believed that their sufferings were evidence that the millennium was close at hand. By recapitulating Christ’s death, they shared in his resurrection and were instantly transported into his presence. Ignatius of Antioch (Antakya, Turkey) echoed the themes of redemptive communion when he joyously declared that he looked forward to being crushed by the teeth of beasts so that he might become wheat for God’s bread.

Themes of redemption and abnegation can also be

found in the self-sacrifices of the samurai in Japan. Drawing on a warrior tradition dating back to the eleventh century that stressed kinship and extreme loyalty in the face of failure, the Bushidō cult arose in the peaceful Tokugawa period (1600–1867). Since there were few wars for the samurai to fight, Confucian ideals were joined with the earlier warrior ethic to create a martial cult in which the warrior was to give complete loyalty to his lord by rendering service in office rather than in war. If *seppuku* (ritual suicide) was demanded, the samurai were to comply without question. The reasons for *seppuku* might include atonement for transgressions, the avoidance of capture in war, the death of one's lord, or a final protest to a lord who failed to follow the samurai's good advice—an act of selflessness intended to bring the foolish lord back to his senses. *Seppuku* became a refined art in which the samurai, with tremendous self-control, slashed his own belly. Often an assistant then decapitated him in such a way that the head was left hanging by a bit of flesh. In one incident forty-seven samurai chose this ritual to avenge the disgraceful death of their lord. The kamikaze pilots of World War II also followed this ancient warrior tradition. [See also Bushidō.]

In the Hawaiian Islands, sacrifice stands for transformation, communion, and the capacity to reorder what has been disordered. In Hawaiian theology, gods, humans, and nature are one human species. Gods are no more than differentiated manifestations of the undifferentiated cosmic Pō (of which people and nature are extensions) so that the entire world is related by kinship. The sacrificial ritual begins with some perceived lack, which is understood as a kind of disorder. The offering is consecrated to the god, who eats a part of the sacrifice, thus assimilating into himself its *mana* (effective potency). The sacrifice then passes back to the participants, who assimilate it. In this communal sharing, life is reordered and thus regenerated via the mutual assimilation of the sacrifice—an assimilation made possible by the shared kinship of gods and humans. A transformative reordering is made.

The evidence for human sacrifice in Vedic India (c. 1500–600 BCE) is still largely contested. However, by drawing on both textual and archaeological sources, Asko Parpola has suggested that rituals that were precursors of the Agnicayana (Vedic fire sacrifice) included the killing of humans. These earlier rites were part of a yearly cycle of two seasons devoted to war and agriculture, the two divisions marked by sacrifices in which the *Aśvamedha* (horse sacrifice) was equated with the *puruṣamedha* (human sacrifice). Death and regeneration were central concepts in these two sacrifices as they

were in the Agnicayana. Even today, the Agnicayana symbolically involves human sacrifice: the mythic sacrificial dismemberment of Puruṣa (Cosmic Man) is recalled as the fire altar is constructed brick by brick, an act that reorders both Puruṣa and the cosmos. Five heads originally were buried under the altar—those of a man, a horse, an ox, a sheep, and a goat. Today a live tortoise is buried because of its cosmic and regenerative symbolism. The first layer of bricks represents Puruṣa's thousand eyes, and the finished altar is shaped like the firebird who will carry the sacrifice to heaven. J. C. Heesterman has suggested that human sacrifice was eliminated in the Brāhmanas (c. 900–700 BCE), which substituted animals and rice cakes, in an attempt to control the fear of disorder inherent in the ritual killing of humans. [See *Vedism and Brahmanism and Puruṣa*.]

The themes of order and disorder also play a role in Aztec sacrifice as does the theme of sacrificial exchange. A central myth of the Aztec tells of the birth and destruction of four ages prior to the Fifth Sun, the age of the Aztec. Each previous age is named for the way in which the sun was totally destroyed. The Fifth Sun, called the “age of movement,” was also doomed to destruction by earthquakes and famine. The sun of this age was born by the willing self-sacrifice of the gods, and so shall people sacrifice themselves for the gods in return. In a cosmic exchange, gods are the maize of people's existence while people are tortillas for the gods to eat. But just as all people are born, eat food, grow old, and die, so too will the Fifth Sun meet its demise, no matter how much it is fed. The Aztec universe was thus unstable—wobbling between periods of order and disorder. Only human sacrifice could stay the end, and that only temporarily. In this eschatological setting, massive sacrificial rites were performed that may have offered people a chance to take some control of their inevitable destruction, a chance to control the uncontrollable.

Human sacrifice may seem remote to civilized sensibilities. Nevertheless, as a human act it must be at least partly intelligible to other humans. On 18 November 1978, in Jonestown, Guyana, 914 members of the People's Temple took their own lives by means of a cyanide-laced fruit drink. Most of them did so willingly. The complex reasons for this massive sacrifice of human lives are both disturbing and challenging to one's capacity to understand. Yet some familiar themes may be recognized. The people of Jonestown, like the Christian martyrs, believed in a utopian world on “the other side.” Like the samurai, they chose death as a “revolutionary act” to protest against the racism that they had failed to overcome, and like the Aztecs, they preferred

to choose the time and place of their own deaths. As Jim Jones said during that "white night": "I haven't seen anybody yet didn't die. And I like to choose my own kind of death for a change."

[See also Suicide.]

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An extraordinarily rich source of information on the Aztecs was compiled by a sixteenth-century Franciscan father, Bernardino de Sahagún, in his *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España*, translated by Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble as *Florentine Codex: A General History of the*

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KAY A. READ

#### Aztec Rites

One of the most vivid examples of the Aztec ritual of sacrificing human beings (*tlamictiliztli*) appears in Bernal Díaz del Castillo's book *The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico* (1632; Eng. ed., New York, 1953). Díaz del Castillo, a sergeant in Hernán Cortés's army, describes seeing his comrades, who had been captured in a recent battle, being dragged by force up the steps of the temple of Coatepec by Aztec warriors and priests. As the "dismal drum" of the war god, Huitzilopochtli, mixed with the ominous sounds of shell and horn trumpets, the Aztecs decorated their captives with Aztec costumes and "with fans in their hands they forced them to dance before Huichilobos [Huitzilopochtli]." After this ceremonial preparation, we are told that the Aztecs placed the Spaniards "on their backs on some rather narrow stones which had been prepared as places for sacrifice, and with some knives they sawed open their chests and drew out their palpitating hearts and offered them to the idols that were there." Following this offering to the gods at the temple, the victims were rolled back down to the bottom of the steps where ritual experts "cut off their arms and feet and flayed the skin off the faces, and prepared it afterwards like glove leather with the beards on, and kept those for the festivals when they celebrated drunken orgies and the flesh they ate in chili-mole."

This description of an apparent mass murder represents what the distinguished Aztec scholar Burr C. Brundage in his book *The Fifth Sun* (1979) calls "the central fact of Aztec life . . . the nuclear cult of war, sacrifice and cannibalism." In this selection we can identify major ritual elements of Aztec human sacrifice that help us understand Aztec religion. Among the outstanding elements in the text are the centrality of the sacred temple of Tenochtitlán, the ascent and descent of the temple stairs, ritual dressing, dancing and music, the heart sacrifice of enemy warriors, the dismemberment and flaying of the victim, cannibalism, and an atmosphere of political and military crisis. It is significant that even in the report of an enemy soldier like Díaz del Castillo the central, indigenous aspects of Aztec ritual killing are communicated.

As a means of understanding these elements within a comprehensive setting, this essay will focus on the following: (1) the social world of the Aztec empire, char-



acterized as a pulsating polity marked by ferocious rivalries between the capital city of Tenochtitlán (the center) and the allied and enemy territories of the state (the periphery); (2) the cosmological setting of Aztec religion and human sacrifice; and (3) the practice and paraphernalia of human sacrifice. This approach will show Aztec ritual sacrifice as both text and context, ritual order and ritual horror. The Aztec warrior and worshiper powerfully experienced the gods not only in the poetry, art, and architecture of the ceremonial centers of the empire but also in the deadly thrust of the sacrificial knife, the eruption of blood on the temple, and the transformation of human flesh into ritual food.

**The Social World of Center and Periphery.** The social world in which Aztec ritual sacrifice developed was a rapidly expanding empire, organized around the capital city of Tenochtitlán between 1426 and 1521. This state organization was created and maintained, in part, by military force and a religious cosmology pervaded by themes of warfare and the ritual killing of gods and men. In the ninety-plus years of the rise of Aztec power, the elites of Tenochtitlán—who conceived of their world as *cemanahuac*, a “land surrounded by water” that was divided by the gods into four quadrants emanating from the capital—constructed the largest and most powerful political state in Mesoamerican history. This achievement of centralization was accomplished through the military conquest of scores of communities that lay in all directions from the capital. This center-oriented cosmological and social world was hampered by a pulsating political process marked by constant rebellions, secessions, and realignments by allies. One of the major political and religious instruments in stabilizing peripheral territories, and in the acquisition of massive tribute payments such as maize, beans, cloth, war service, and labor, was the large-scale sacrifice of enemy warriors at the major temples of Tenochtitlán. These sacrifices constituted massive theatrical ritual displays of the ideology, wealth, and symbolism of the exemplary center for the purpose of establishing and expanding Aztec authority within and beyond the Valley of Mexico.

This pattern of conquest, tributary control, and human sacrifice was already a traditional practice in Mesoamerica when the Aztec ancestors, the Chichimec (“sons of the dogs”), migrated into the valley in the early fourteenth century. At that time, the Valley of Mexico was politically fragmented into a myriad of small, warring city-states (each with a population of between ten and fifty thousand) in constant competition and conflict for political, ritual, and economic control. While human sacrifice as an instrument of political in-

timidation and religious devotion was widely practiced, the Aztec expanded its uses to incredible proportions during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

The most powerful city-state encountered by the Aztec during their rise to dominance was the Tepenac empire, which consolidated some areas of the central valley in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Around 1424, the Aztec of Tenochtitlán and the city-states of Texcoco and Tlacopan successfully rebelled against the Tepenac and formed a state organization called the Triple Alliance, which took over the Tepenac patterns of conquest, territorial control, and tribute payments. However, during the next ninety years, Aztec *tlatoanis* (“kings”) directed aggressive military campaigns to the north, south, east, and west of the city and central valley in order to expand their territorial and tributary empire. In some cases, large-scale military campaigns were carried out at great distances from the capital. These expansions into peripheral territories resulted in both new acquisitions of land and tribute and terrible defeats at the hands of the Tlaxcala-Puebla Valley kingdom in the east and the Tarascan state in the west.

One of the most important ritual and political institutions of the Aztec empire was the Xochiyaoyotl (Flowery Wars), which lasted from 1450 to 1519 and consisted of a series of scheduled battlefield confrontations between warriors of the Triple Alliance and warriors of the Tlaxcala-Puebla Valley kingdoms. In recent years a controversy has arisen over the causes and significance of the Flowery Wars. According to indigenous accounts that reflect the ideology of Aztec elites, the “wars” were staged primarily to provide sacrificial victims for ritual festivals and to keep the warriors in training. One argument is that the devastating famines of 1450–1454, during the reign of Motecuhzoma Ilhuicamina (Moctezuma I) were interpreted by the priestly elites as a sign of angry gods who needed a greater supply of warrior sacrifices. A sixteenth-century chronicler, Fray Diego Durán, states that the Flowery Wars were instituted for the specific purpose of supplying victims for the Templo Mayor (Great Temple) of Tenochtitlán, where the shrines of Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc stood. While the actual social causes were almost certainly more complex, the argument put forth by Tlacaellé, the chief adviser of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin (Moctezuma II) represents the Aztec vision well. He compared a warrior going to the Flowery Wars with a merchant going to distant markets to purchase luxuries. The god and his army went to the battlefield to purchase blood and hearts, the luxuries of the temples.

Recent research has expanded our understanding of

the Flowery Wars by revealing that these military confrontations resulted not just in the capture of warriors for temple sacrifice but in large-scale battlefield killing that left the competing armies depleted and in disarray. In these cases, the Flowery Wars reflect true warfare conditions between states, not simply the acquisition of warriors for sacrifice in the capital. Further, it is certain that during periods of truce between these ritually warring kingdoms, rulers of enemy territories were invited to witness the theatrical sacrifice of warriors in the ceremonial center of Tenochtitlán. Hidden behind special canopies, these visiting lords witnessed the ritual devastation of allied and enemy warriors. According to Johanna Broda, the Aztec rulers organized the ceremonies so that their enemies could see "the greatness of Mexico" and in order to "bewilder them, fill them with fear, . . . in order to show that the Aztecs were the masters of all the riches of the earth" (Broda, "Tlacaxipeualiztli: A Reconstruction of an Aztec Calendar Festival from a Sixteenth-Century Source," *Revista española de antropología americana*, 1970, p. 234). In this case, the rulers from the peripheries of the Aztec state were brought to the center to witness the ceremonial authority of the capital, Tenochtitlán, which assisted the Aztec in their purpose of achieving political superiority.

While the Aztec were able by the middle of the reign of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin (1502–1520) to consolidate scores of city-states into their empire and to intimidate many others into uneasy alliances, their world was repeatedly shocked by rebellions and defeats at the peripheries of their empire. These tensions kept the Aztec state in an atmosphere of crisis and regeneration and likely contributed to the escalation of ritual human sacrifices in the ceremonial center of the capital.

**Cosmology of Human Sacrifice.** In the various creation myths and sacred histories found in such representative works as the *Historia de los Mexicanos por sus pinturas*, the *Leyenda de los soles*, and Fray Bernardino de Sahagún's *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España* (1569–1582), the Aztec cosmos is shown to have several distinctive qualities, including a dynamic, unstable, and destructive cosmic setting that is marked by sharp alternations between order and disorder, cosmic life and cosmic death.

At least three major cosmogonic episodes contain paradigms for the Aztec practices of warfare and human sacrifice. A review of these episodes reveals two important patterns: first, a widening of the pattern of sacrifice from sacrifice to a single deity to sacrifice to masses of deities, and, second, the conquest and sacrifice of gods from the periphery of the cosmos by the gods and warriors at the center of the world.

A major cosmogonic episode related to human sacrifice is reported in Sahagún's *Historia* as occurring after the universe has passed through the first four cosmogonic ages. We are told that "when no sun had shown and no dawn had broken," the gods gathered around a divine fire at Teotihuacán ("abode of the gods") to answer the question: "Who will carry the burden? Who will take it upon himself to be the sun, to bring the dawn?" Following four days of penance and ritual, the god Nanahuatzin ("the pimply one"), dressed in ceremonial garb, hurled himself into the fire, followed by a second deity, Tecuciztecatl ("lord of snails"). Immediately, an eagle and a jaguar rose from the flames. "From this event it is said, they took the custom whereby one was called valiant, a warrior." Then the dawn appeared in all directions. Uncertain as to where the sun would rise, the gods fell upon their knees. Quetzalcoatl looked eastward and "when the sun came to rise, when he burst forth, he appeared to be red, he kept swaying from side to side." The gods were faced with an unstable, threatening cosmic orb born out of the self-sacrifice of two of their number. Because of the motionless sun, the gods decide to sacrifice themselves, saying, "Let this be, that through us the sun may be revived. Let all of us die." The wind god, Ecatl (Ehécatl), "deals death" to the mass of deities, but the sun still fails to "follow his path." In desperation, Ecatl "exerted himself fiercely, and violently as he blew" and the sun "went on his way." Thus began the fifth and present age—the Aztec age—created when one courageous warrior god sacrificed himself, followed by the sacrifice of almost all of the gods. The significance of this cosmogonic event is that the massive sacrifices at Tenochtitlán drew part of their justification from this cosmic escalation.

The cosmic pattern of mass sacrifice to energize the sun is repeated in a subsequent episode in which terrestrial warfare and human sacrifice are created by the gods to provide for their nourishment. In one version, the god Mixcoatl ("cloud serpent") creates five human beings and four hundred Chichimec warriors to stir up discord and warfare. While the warriors pass their time hunting and drinking, the god sends the five human beings to slay them. In this account, war is created specifically to provide sacrificial victims for the gods.

However, the specific paradigm for massive sacrifices of enemy warriors at Tenochtitlán appears in the *teotuitcal* ("divine song") of the birth of Huitzilopochtli, the Aztec war god. This narrative illustrates the pattern of the conquest and ritual killing of warriors from the periphery of the state at the major temple in the heart of the capital. The story begins when the mother of the gods, Coatlicue ("serpent skirt"), becomes pregnant

while sweeping out the temple at Coatepec ("serpent mountain"). When her daughter Coyolxauhqui hears of the pregnancy, she incites her 399 siblings to dress for war. The text in book 3 of Sahagún's *Historia* reads, "They were very angry, they were very agitated, as if the hearts had gone out of them. Coyolxauhqui incited them, she inflamed the anger of her brothers, so that they should kill her mother." Next, Coyolxauhqui directs them to dress for war: "They distributed among themselves their paper garb, the *anecuyotl*, the nettles, the streamers of colored paper, . . . their arrows had barbed points, . . . then they began to move." Following a journey through many towns, the army, led by Coyolxauhqui, charges up Serpent Mountain to kill Coatllicue. As they reach the top, Huitzilopochtli is born fully dressed and attired for war. Attacking Coyolxauhqui, he cuts off her head and dismembers her. The text notes, "The body of Coyolxauhqui rolled down the slope; it fell apart in pieces; her hands, her legs, her torso fell in different places." Next, Huitzilopochtli attacks the other warriors: "He pursued them, he chased them like rabbits, all round the mountain . . . four times, . . . with nothing could they defend themselves. He chased them, he drove them away, he humbled them, he destroyed them, he annihilated them." Following the killing of the enemy warriors at the mountain, he takes off their costumes and "introduces them into his destiny."

As the significant excavations (1978–1983) of the Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlán have revealed, this mythic episode was replicated in the architecture and ritual action of the temple, which was dedicated to Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc. We have learned that the temple was called "Coatepec" by the Aztec. Its arrangement of parts, with Huitzilopochtli's shrine at the top of one of the great stairways and the eleven-foot-diameter round stone depicting the dismembered Coyolxauhqui located at the bottom, is an architectural repetition of this mythic episode. Ethnographic research has shown that the largest number of ceremonial sacrifices of enemy warriors from surrounding communities took place at this temple. As the divine song of Huitzilopochtli's birth states at the end,

The Méxica venerated him,  
made sacrifices to him,  
honored and served him.  
And Huitzilopochtli paid back  
those who behaved that way.

And his cult was taken from there,  
from Coatepec, the Mountain of the Serpent,  
as it was practiced  
in ancient times.

**Practice and Paraphernalia of Human Sacrifice.** It must be understood that human sacrifice was carried out within a larger, more complex ceremonial system in which a tremendous amount of energy, wealth, and time was spent in a variety of ritual festivals dedicated to a crowded and hungry pantheon. This dedication is reflected in the many metaphors and symbols related to war and sacrifice. Blood was called *chalchiuh-atl*, meaning "precious water." Human hearts were likened to fine burnished turquoise, and war was *teotlatchinollli*, meaning "divine liquid" and "burnt things." War was the place "where the jaguars roar," where "feathered war bonnets heave about like foam in the waves." And death on the battlefield was called *xochimiquiztli*, meaning "the flowery death."

The crowded ceremonial schedule was acted out in the many ceremonial centers of the city and empire. The greatest single ceremonial precinct, that surrounding the Templo Mayor, formed the axis of Tenochtitlán and measured 440 meters on each of its four sides. It contained, according to some accounts, more than eighty ritual temples, skull racks, schools, and other ceremonial structures. Book 2 of Sahagún's *Historia* contains a valuable list with descriptions of most of these buildings, including "the Temple of Uitzilopochtli [Huitzilopochtli] . . . of Tlaloc . . . in the middle of the square; . . . it was higher; it was taller; . . . [it] faced toward the setting of the sun." Sahagún's work also contains descriptions of the kinds of sacrifices performed at various sacred places. At Teccizcalli, the Florentine Codex reports, "Moctezuma did penances; . . . there was dying there; captives died there." At Mexico Calmecac "dwelt the penitents who offered incense at the summit of the Temple of Tlaloc, quite daily." At Teccalco "there was casting of men into the fire." At the Great Skull Rack "there also . . . used to be slaying." At the Temple of Cinteotl, "the impersonator of Chicomecoatl died, at night only. And when she died, then they flayed her . . . the fire priest put on the skin." At Coaapan "the fire priest of Coatlan bathed himself." At Tilocan, amaranth-seed dough was "cooked . . . [for] the image of Uitzilopochtli." And, finally, at Acatl Yiacapan Uey Calpulli, "they gathered together the sacrificial victims called Tlalocs . . . when they had slain them, they cut them to pieces there and cooked them. They put squash blossoms with their flesh . . . then the noblemen ate them, all the high judges: but not the common folk—only the rulers." (All quotations in the preceding passage are from Sahagún, *Historia*, trans. Anderson and Dibble, vol. 2, pp. 179–193.)

Though important variations of ritual activity were carried out at these temples, schools, skull racks, and

bathhouses, the general pattern of human sacrifice was as follows. Most Aztec ritual began with a preparatory period of priestly fasting (*nezahualiztli*) that lasted four (or a multiple of four) days. An important exception was the year-long fast by a group of priests and priestesses known as the *teocuaque* ("god eaters") and the greatly feared in *iachhuan Huitzilopochtli in mocexiuhzauhque* ("the elder brothers of Huitzilopochtli who fasted for a year"). This preparatory period also involved nocturnal vigils (*tozohualiztli*) and offerings of flowers, food, cloth, rubber, paper, and poles with streamers, as well as incensing (*copaltemaliztli*), the pouring of libations, and the embowering of temples, statues, and ritual participants. Dramatic processions of elaborately costumed participants moving to sacred songs played by musical ensembles passed through the ceremonial precinct before arriving at the specific temple of sacrifice. The major ritual participants were called in *ixiptla in teteo* ("deity impersonators"). All important rituals involved a death sacrifice of either animals or human beings.

The most common sacrifice was the beheading of animals, such as quail. But the most dramatic and valued sacrifices were the human sacrifices of captured warriors and slaves. These victims were ritually bathed, carefully costumed, taught to dance special dances, and either fattened or slimmed down during the preparation period. They were elaborately dressed to impersonate the specific deities to whom they were sacrificed.

The different primary sources reveal a wide range of sacrificial techniques, including decapitation (usually for women), shooting with darts or arrows, drowning, burning, hurling from heights, strangulation, entombment and starvation, and gladiatorial combat. Usually, the ceremony peaked when splendidly attired captors and captives sang and danced in procession to the temple, where they were escorted (sometimes unwillingly) up the stairways to the sacrificial stone. The victim was quickly thrust on the sacrificial stone (*techcatl*), and the temple priest cut through the chest wall with the ritual flint knife (*techpatl*). The priest grasped the still-beating heart, called "precious eagle cactus fruit," tore it from the chest, offered it to the Sun for vitality and nourishment, and placed it in a carved circular vessel called the *cuauhxicalli* ("eagle vessel"). In many cases, the body, now called "eagle man," was rolled down the temple steps to the bottom, where it was dismembered. The head was cut off and the brains taken out. After skinning, it was placed on the *tzompantli*, a skull rack consisting of long poles laid horizontally and loaded with skulls. In many cases, the captor was decorated (for instance with chalk and bird down) and given gifts. Then, together with his relatives, he consumed a ritual meal consisting of "a bowl of stew of dried maize called

*tlacatlaolli*." To each celebrant went a piece of the flesh of the captive.

While this pattern of ritual preparation, ascent and descent of the temple, heart sacrifice of enemy warriors, dismemberment and flaying of the victim, and cannibalism was usually followed, it is important to emphasize the diversity of sacrificial festivals, which involved variations and combinations of these elements. For instance, during the feast of Tlacaxipeualiztli ("the feast of the flaying of men"), a prisoner of war "who came here from lands about us" was taken by a priest called the "bear man" and tied to a huge, round sacrificial stone, called the *temalacatl*, that was placed flat on the ground. The captive was provided with a pine club and a feathered staff to protect himself against the attacks of four warriors armed with clubs of wood and obsidian blades. When he was defeated he was taken off the stone, his heart was taken out, and he was flayed.

Another distinctive festival, called Toxcatl, was dedicated to the ferocious god Tezcatlipoca. Elaborate efforts were made to find the perfect deity-impersonator for this festival. The captive warrior had to have a flawless body and musical and rhetorical skills. For a full year prior to his sacrifice, he lived a privileged existence in the capital. He had eight servants to ensure that he was splendidly arrayed and bejeweled. Four wives were given to him during the last twenty days of his life. We are told that, just before the end of the sacrificial festival, he arrived at a small temple called Tlacoachalco. "He ascended by himself, he went up of his own free will, to where he was to die. As he was taken up a step, as he passed one step, there he broke, he shattered his flute, his whistle." He was then swiftly sacrificed (see Sahagún, *Historia*, trans. Anderson and Dibble, vol. 2, p. 71).

Still another remarkable ceremony was the New Fire Ceremony, also called the Binding of the Years, held only once every fifty-two years on the summit of the Hill of the Star outside Tenochtitlán. At midnight, when the star cluster called Tianquiztli ("marketplace"; the Pleiades) passed through the zenith, marking the end of the fifty-two-year calendrical cycle, a captive warrior was sacrificed. In his chest cavity, a new fire was started, marking the regeneration of the cosmos. The fire was then taken to the Templo Mayor and thence to all the cities and towns in the empire.

A remarkable festival, celebrated on the first day of the month of Atlcuaualo, involved the paying of debts to Tlaloc, the rain god. On this day, children (called "human paper streamers") with two cowlicks in their hair and favorable day signs were dressed in costumes—some set with pearls—of dark green, black striped with chili red, and light blue and were sacrificed

in seven different locations. The flowing and falling of tears of the children insured the coming of rain.

Besides these theatrical ritual killings, everyone in the Aztec world participated in some form of autosacrifice (bloodletting). Bloodletting was either an offering or a penitential rite involving the pricking of earlobes with maguey thorns or, in more severe cases, the drawing of strings through holes cut in the tongue, ears, genitals, or other fleshy parts of the body. Often blood was placed on slips of paper and offered to the gods.

With all this cosmology, social history, and ritual practice in mind, we can see that Bernal Díaz del Castillo witnessed more than a mass murder. He recorded an elaborate ritual tradition struggling to maintain the dominance of the Aztec city and its temple against threats from enemy warriors, who, like the siblings of Huitzilopochtli, had come to conquer and kill.

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DAVÍD CARRASCO

**HUME, DAVID** (1711–1776), Scottish philosopher and historian. Hume was born in Edinburgh on 26 April 1711, to Joseph and Katherine Home. Most of his childhood was spent on the family estate at Ninewells, in

Berwickshire, forty miles south of Edinburgh near the border of England. At age eleven Hume entered the University of Edinburgh, and upon leaving the university three years later, began to prepare for a career in law. Hume's interest in law was soon eclipsed by his passion for literature, history, and philosophy; over the following decade most of his time was spent studying what he called "polite authors" such as Shaftesbury, Butler, Locke, and Cicero. In 1734, at age twenty-three, Hume left Scotland to take a position as clerk with a Bristol merchant. It was here that he changed the spelling of his surname from *Home* to *Hume*, because in Scotland *Home* is pronounced as *Hume* is in England; Hume preferred that his name be pronounced correctly, even if it meant changing the spelling. After four months in Bristol, Hume left for the south of France, determined to pursue a life of letters.

In 1737 Hume returned from France with the two volumes of *A Treatise of Human Nature* in manuscript form. Being sure that the work would bring him instant fame and fortune, he was eager to publish without delay. In his own words, however, the *Treatise* "fell dead-born from the press." This is not to say that it was not widely read both in Britain and on the continent. Hume undoubtedly meant that the ideas put forth in the *Treatise* fell dead-born on the minds of those who read it. Reviews of the *Treatise* were universally negative.

Hume's disappointment was profound. During the six-year period from 1739 to 1745 he lived in virtual seclusion at Ninewells, writing the third volume of the *Treatise* (published in 1740) and experimenting with the essay form as a medium of expression. Hume's first efforts as an essayist resulted in a two-volume work published in 1742 under the title *Essays Moral and Political*. This was Hume's first successful publication. Only a small selection of the twenty-seven essays therein contained can be counted as serious philosophical pieces, and these were not the ones that accounted for the popularity of the collection as a whole.

Short of money, in 1745 Hume took a position as tutor to the marquis of Annandale, and in the same year applied for the chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Hume judged that a regular academic appointment would provide both the income and leisure necessary to pursue a full-time life of study. However, his application was opposed by the principal of the university, who accused him of atheism, heresy, and skepticism. His failure to secure this appointment was the second great disappointment of his life.

Hume's next two years were spent traveling in France as secretary to James St. Claire, a general in the British army. The army was of interest to Hume for financial

reasons only: he stayed just long enough to accumulate the money needed for another retreat to his study. Between 1747 and 1751 he composed and published his two great treatises: *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (originally entitled *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*), and *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. These were the first of Hume's serious philosophical works to achieve acclaim.

In 1752 Hume secured an appointment as librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh. This was the first time Hume had had steady access to a major library. He took the opportunity to pursue a project of long-standing interest—the detailed study of English history. Between 1754 and 1761 Hume published, in installments, his masterful six-volume *History of England*. Regarded as a classic in Hume's own time, this text remained the standard in its field until the end of the nineteenth century.

In 1763 Hume became secretary to the British embassy in Paris, spending the next three years writing and conversing with the luminaries of the Parisian intellectual set. By this time he was generally regarded as Britain's foremost man of letters. Hume returned to England in 1766 as under secretary of state, but he resigned from the diplomatic service three years later, retiring to Ninewells. In 1775 Hume was stricken with an internal disorder that claimed his life on 25 August 1776.

David Hume was a man of gentle bearing—humane, tolerant, charitable, and generous in his opinions of others. In his autobiographical essay *My Own Life*, Hume characterized himself as being of "cheerful nature." From all reports, his wit was sparkling; he was a favorite both in the polite salons of Paris and the rude pubs of Edinburgh. To his French intimates he was known as "le bon David," while his many friends in Scotland referred to him as "Saint David." Although Hume never married, he was not unpopular with the ladies; his charm and good humor more than compensated for his obese physical appearance.

Directly following its poor reception in 1739, Hume made two attempts to stimulate interest in *A Treatise of Human Nature*. In 1740 he published an essay entitled *An Abstract of a Treatise on Human Nature*, which identified the nub of the work's method and summarized some of the conclusions of the text. At the same time, Hume was busy at Ninewells preparing a corrected edition of the first two volumes, which he hoped would remove the misunderstandings that his first efforts had generated. But the corrected edition never appeared. The only changes made during this period that survived in printed form were included in an appendix to the

*Treatise* published together with the third volume in 1741. Neither the publication of the *Abstract* nor the materials appended to the *Treatise* had the desired effect. It was not until Hume cast the basic theses of the *Treatise* into essay form and released them in the *Enquiries* that the ideas first delivered in the *Treatise* received the sort of attention Hume thought they deserved. In later years, Hume in effect abandoned the *Treatise* in favor of his *Enquiries*. In the "Author's Advertisement" printed in volume 2 of the 1777 edition of Hume's works, Hume described the *Treatise* as a "juvenile work," stating that he had made an "error in going to press too early," and announcing that the *Enquiries* rather than the *Treatise* should be taken as expressing his considered views on the topics therein discussed. Still, succeeding generations of scholars have, as it were, rediscovered the *Treatise*. Most students of the history of philosophy now regard it as Hume's foremost contribution to philosophical literature.

Regarding the impact of the philosophical views first expressed in the *Treatise* and restated in the enquiries, two comments are in order. First, book 1 ("Of the Understanding") and its companion, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, are generally thought to contain definitive statements of the epistemological theses associated with classical British empiricism and generative of the empiricist trends in Western philosophy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant acknowledges Hume as the one who inspired his own probing into the foundations of human knowledge. The empiricist elements in the philosophies of Mill, Russell, Carnap, and Wittgenstein are in no small measure traceable to the direct or indirect influence of Hume.

Second, it should also be noted that, in book 3 of the *Treatise* and in *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume sets the stage for much of what follows in nineteenth- and twentieth-century moral philosophy. Here Hume works out a hedonistic, rule-based, and utilitarian theory of ethics very much like the one suggested more than a hundred years later by John Stuart Mill in chapter 5 of *Utilitarianism*. This theory has served as one of the major foci of moral-theoretical reflection in twentieth-century philosophical literature. It might be added that at least some commentators (e.g., A. J. Ayer, 1980) claim to find in Hume's ethical writings rudiments of the so-called emotive analysis of ethical language—a theory not brought to maturity until the mid-twentieth century, but very influential in British-American moral philosophy since that time. Whether or not this last claim can be sustained, it is clear that Hume stands as a major figure in the history

of ethics. Putting it all together, it is hard to imagine how the last two hundred years of Western philosophy would have gone, had the ideas expressed in the *Treatise* really fallen dead-born from the press.

The corpus of Hume's writings includes seven texts that specifically treat religious topics. In order of their appearance in published form, they are: (1) "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," published in 1742 as one of the *Essays Moral and Political*; (2) "Of Miracles" and (3) "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State," which appeared in 1748 as parts 10 and 11 respectively of *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*; (4) "The Natural History of Religion," one of *Four Dissertations* published in 1757; (5) "Of Suicide" and (6) "On the Immortality of the Soul," brought out together in 1777 under the title *Two Essays*; and (7) the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, which occupied Hume's attention periodically during the last twenty-five years of his life and was finally published in 1779.

All these texts are critical of religion—of religious institutions, religious practices, theological doctrines, and/or theological arguments. Correlatively, all were greeted in orthodox circles with suspicion and, in some cases, with hostility. Most were in one way or another suppressed either by Hume or by his publishers for fear of reprimand from the religious community. Thus, "Of Miracles," written prior to 1739 and originally intended for inclusion in the *Treatise*, was deleted from the text prior to publication, because Hume judged that it might be found scandalous and thus detract from the reception of his work. Similarly, "Of Suicide," "Of the Immortality of the Soul," and an early version of *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* were all scheduled for publication in 1756, but they were suppressed by Hume's publisher for prudential reasons. All three were published only after Hume's death and even then without the author's or publisher's name attached. It should be recalled that in 1745 Hume's appointment at the University of Edinburgh had been opposed because his writings were judged wanting on religious grounds. Eighteenth-century Britain could be hard on religious dissenters; neither Hume nor his publishers sought to cause offense.

Although Hume is best known for his views in epistemology and moral philosophy, the essay "Of Miracles" and the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* are generally regarded by contemporary philosophers as classics in the philosophy of religion. "Of Miracles" is centered on the question of whether evidence supporting the claim that a given miracle occurred could ever be strong enough to warrant belief, given the facts that (1) a miracle is by definition an event whose occurrence vi-

olates natural law, and (2) the evidence supporting the claim is derived entirely from human testimony. Hume's negative verdict is based on a general historiographical principle that is applicable not only in the study of religion, but in any area of inquiry that relies on human testimony as a major source of evidence: namely, that the credibility of any given piece of testimony is in part a function of the plausibility of what is affirmed within it.

*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* is focused on a very special version of the argument from design used by a number of eighteenth-century devotees of Isaac Newton's theological writings. In the course of the discussion, Hume not only delivers what many believe to be the definitive refutation of the argument from design (even anticipating the nineteenth-century Darwinian account of adaptation in nature), but he also presents a series of sharply penetrating critical studies on a wide variety of other important theological topics such as divine attribution, the cosmological argument for the existence of God, and, especially, the problem of evil. It should be added that, apart from its stunning philosophical merits, Hume's *Dialogues* can also be credited with what is perhaps the most beautifully executed employment of the dialogue form in Western philosophical literature.

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NELSON PIKE

**HUMOR AND SATIRE.** Traditionally, religions have employed humor and satire to bring people together and dissolve their differences. Clownish antics of the medieval church were not intended to desecrate the sacred but to dispel some of the rigidity and pomposity of the church-goers. The laughter of fools was praise to a God who disdained pride among his people. Today, some forms of religion have become too serious to allow laughter in the vestibules of their sacred halls. Each has developed rules of propriety, carefully maintained to avoid occasions for laughter.

The absence of humor and satire in Christianity began after the Protestant Reformation, which emphasized sobriety, thrift, industry, and ambition at the expense of laughter, excess, play, and burlesque. The church of the Middle Ages tolerated a substantial amount of buffoonery in association with the liturgy, and in a series of religious plays developed between the tenth and thirteenth centuries, horseplay was common and spectators were expected to laugh at the comic effect of certain scenes. One interesting instance is the Twelfth Night celebration in Renaissance England, at which a Lord of Misrule presided and roles were inverted. This was condemned by the Puritans. Another example of lampoonery is the Feast of Fools, which flourished in parts of Europe during the Middle Ages (Cox, 1969). Bishops, priests, and lay people dressed in outlandish costumes, sang bawdy verses, and mocked the rules and rituals of the church. They elected a Boy Bishop, usually the worst brat in town, to preside over the chaos and to celebrate a mock Mass. The Feast of Fools, celebrated in early January, was condemned by the Council of Basel in 1431 but survived until the age

of Reformation. Leaders of the Reformation, especially Calvin, emphasized reason and law. This led to extreme forms of seriousness such as Puritan Protestantism and Jansenist Catholicism.

During the Middle Ages the "holy fools" of the Eastern Orthodox church in Russia also represented a mixing of humor and religion. G. P. Fedotov discusses these in his classic study *The Russian Religious Mind* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946). The holy fools were canonized saints between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were four in the fourteenth century, eleven in the fifteenth, fourteen in the sixteenth, and seven in the seventeenth. At this point the church authorities discontinued the canonization of holy fools and even forbade this kind of life, because it was considered blasphemous. One holy fool was Saint Simeon, who feigned madness and immorality. He committed all sorts of indecent acts: caused scandals in church, publicly ate sausage on Good Friday, destroyed merchandise in the market, danced with prostitutes, and spent nights in their houses. Of course, all these acts masked a beneficent purpose—the conversion of sinners—but their external form was utterly scandalous, and this effect is precisely what was aimed at by the holy fools. The life of a holy fool was a perpetual oscillation between the moral act of saving others and the immoral act of abusing them. The holy fools exhibited reversal in their mockery of the world: the world did not abuse the blessed one, but the blessed ones abused the world.

Holy fools are similar to the mythical tricksters found in many religious traditions throughout the world. Both contradict the laws of society to remind people of distinctions between the sacred and profane. They cross ordinary boundaries in order to define them. One famous trickster was the god Hermes of classical Greek mythology. Others are Saynday of the Kiowa, Wakdjunkaga of the Winnebago, and Legba of the Fon.

Robert Pelton (1980) describes Legba, a trickster god of the Fon in West Africa. Within the Fon pantheon, Mawu-Lisa is the high god with seven children, to each of whom is assigned a specific domain (e.g., earth, sky, sea, and animals). But Mawu tells Legba that she will not give his brothers authority over him, because he is her youngest child and has never known punishment. Rather, she appoints him to visit his brothers' kingdoms periodically and report back to her. Legba moves from divine center to human periphery and back to enable each to find its full manifestation in the other.

It is said that at first Legba did good deeds for everyone, but the recipients of his favors always thanked Mawu, not Legba, who then began to scheme. Legba told Mawu that thieves were planning to steal yams



from her garden, and so she warned the people that whoever stole from the garden would be killed. Then Legba himself stole her sandals one rainy night, entered the garden, and took the yams, leaving sandal prints in the earth. In the morning, Legba called the people to find out whose feet matched the prints. When no match was found, Legba suggested that perhaps Mawu herself had come to the garden and had then forgotten what she had done. Mawu was annoyed at this suggestion, but when she compared her foot with the sandal print, the two matched. Humiliated, Mawu told everyone that Legba had played a trick on her. As a result, she swore to leave the earth for the sky. Since the sky in those days was only about six or seven feet above the earth, Mawu received a report each night about Legba, and whenever he committed a fault, she saw and scolded him. Irritated at this surveillance, Legba encouraged an old woman to throw her dirty wash water over Mawu's resting place. In anger Mawu moved farther away, leaving Legba behind on earth.

In this story Legba acts as a mediator between God and earth by double-dealing, that is, by means of a lie that is really a truth, a deception that is, in fact, a revelation, and a conspiracy that should have been no secret. His apparent fakery simply reveals what Mawu has consistently claimed: that his acts are hers, so that his footsteps are, in fact, *vestigia dei*. This trickster, like other tricksters and holy fools, brings into play—by trickery or buffoonery—the two halves of the “divine essence” (transcendental and experiential polarities).

In a slightly different manner, Christ has been represented as a “divine fool” and mediator between terrestrial and celestial realities. Early Christian martyrs depicted him on catacomb walls as a crucified man with the head of an ass. This crucifix thus represented a combination of animal, human, and divine qualities, and symbolized as well the paradoxical position of early Christians, who became fools for Christ, but with faith that this foolishness was wiser than the wisdom of men. Like Legba of the Fon, Christ contradicted the contradictors and made the divine presence known. More recently, Christ was represented as a clown in *The Parable*, a movie produced by the Protestant churches for the New York World's Fair in 1966. For many disillusioned people, Christ has come to symbolize a comic hope of dealing with the violence of starvation, poverty, and warfare.

To many there is a difference between what they believe to be real and what the world claims is real. This discrepancy is often the target of humor and satire. For example, Hindus consider the world as *māyā*, a form of illusion, and the discrepancy between *māyā* and the real

world is a source of humor. Jewish humor is rooted in the belief that Jews were divinely designated as “chosen people” yet were treated as rejects (Cohen, 1978). They have wryly deprecated their persecutors and bitterly mocked themselves to fill the gap between glorious expectation and miserable reality. They have depicted their adversaries as dimwitted and besotted, while they called themselves *shlemiels*, *shnorers*, and *luftmentshen* (bunglers, beggars, and luckless dreamers). Humor and satire are aimed at the comic victor/victim, at once the image of dignity and the epitome of hopeless frailty. For the believer, humor and satire are expressions of faith that the grossly human and grandly sublime are magnificently and dialectically mixed.

It is not surprising, then, that the clown appears in the religions of many cultures. One study of 136 cultures showed that 56 had a specific comedic ceremony (Pollio, 1980). The Koyemci clown of the Zuni Indians is an example of a role that combines comic and priestly elements. Koyemci clowns are members of the priestly clan, and Zuni tribesmen look upon them as important leaders of the Zuni nation. They excel in licentiousness and buffoonery. In one ceremony, two clowns crawl up to an old lady with their breechcloths down, exposing false penises made from gourds. The lady opens her thighs to reveal a false vulva, making everyone laugh. The clowns clumsily mount her while she is seated on a sacred shrine. As they pretend to copulate, they notice her son spying on them, so they shoo him off to fetch some water. He returns just after they have supposedly climaxed, beats them, and drives them off; then he thrashes his immoral mother. The ceremony ends in a brawl among the actors and a round of applause from the audience.

This burlesque serves a religious function for the Zuni. Priests and clowns both dealt with Zuni morals but in different ways: one by sanctifying its rules of restraint, the other by mocking those rules. The priest represents the need to submit to sacred rules, while the clown disobeys them to demonstrate the absurdity of a transgression. Behind the mask of the clown is a moralist who recognizes the severity of the socioreligious order and the licentiousness of human nature.

The association of sexual imagery with sacred symbols is often the basis for humor and satire in religion. There is a close analogy between the sexual and the divine in that both are subject to cultural controls and taboos. Sexuality and sacredness are potentially creative or destructive forces within any society; consequently, they are used interchangeably as metaphors for each other. [See Sexuality.] Michael Herzfeld (1979) presented the example of how Greek peasants associate

the *epitaphios*, solemn icon of Christ entombed, with the penis of an exhibitionist. According to folklore, many decades ago an inhabitant of Rhodes became notorious for exhibiting his penis at festive gatherings. Years later, his grandson was teased in a song:

How your grandfather deserves  
to be sung about, Constantine!  
He used to love his *epitaphios*  
bedecked with flowers!  
People knew your grandfather, Constantine,  
and talk about  
how he had his *epitaphios* out and  
paraded it around.

The apparent blasphemy implied in the song fades, however, in the light of an understanding of Greek culture. The key to the analogy between the solemn icon of Christ entombed and the grandfather's penis lies in the importance of patrilineal descent in Greek society: Christ and penis are similar in that they are the sources of sacred and human lineage ties. Moreover, the *epitaphios* is guarded in the inner sanctum of the church, where women are not allowed except on Good Friday, a day of reversal and revelation. Then women bedeck the *epitaphios* with flowers and parade it through the streets. In this way, the village church symbolically exposes part of its innermost paraphernalia to the secular streets, just as Constantine's grandfather displayed his manhood to the festive crowds. Hence the rite of the *epitaphios* is associated with fertility. It is a syncretic adaptation of Magna Mater ceremonies dedicated to the earth. Finally, far from exhibiting a blasphemous attitude, the singer of the Greek verse expresses his sense of the incongruity of blatantly parading something so very private and "interior," for nudity is frowned upon in rural Greece. Indeed, the sense of comic shock created by the incongruity of associating the *epitaphios* with a penis serves to underscore the importance of modesty and sacredness in regard to sexual organs, lineage, and icons.

The examples of tricksters, clowns, and *epitaphios* illustrate the use of elements of analogy, reversal, and incongruity in a religious context to entertain and teach. Usually, the occasions for such satire are the days between the beginning and the end of the calendar, such as January first for the Feast of Fools and Saturnalia and Good Friday for the parade of *epitaphios*. It is at such times that reversal can be enacted, because ordinary linear time is then suspended and actors are permitted to assume contradictory roles. Victor Turner (1969) refers to this time as liminality, that "betwixt and between" the confines of time and space. During

periods of liminality, roles are reversed, so that a brat becomes a bishop, a priest a clown, and a beggar a king. This reversal of roles levels the mighty and raises the lowly so that there is equality, comradeship, and homogeneity. Humor, not reverence, is the religious response. Laughter brings people together and dissolves differences—and hatreds. Such liminal occasions are important to religion because they create a commonality (*communitas*) among the participants, and the creation of community is a basic function of many religions.

Modern religions have dismissed humor and satire as blasphemous and irreverent in the context of ritual. Many religious leaders, leaning toward formality, sacredness, reverence, rationality, and authority, have helped to develop religious structures that are hierarchical, heavily structured, overly serious, dogmatic, or impersonal. On the other hand, many religions, such as that of the Zuni and the Greek and Russian Orthodox churches, retain elements of humor and satire in their rituals. Analysis shows that these elements contribute to religiosity by establishing the incongruity of faith and worldliness, by reversing the roles of the powerful and the lowly, and by creating a community of laughter.

[For discussion of related topics, see Clowns; Tricksters; and Carnival.]

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*The Feast of Fools* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), by theologian Harvey Cox, helps us to understand the demise of humor and satire in religion. Cox claims that *Feast* is the whimsical balance to his more serious study *The Secular City* (New York, 1965). He writes that festivity, fantasy, play, and dance are important to ritual. He attributes the demise of humor and satire within Western religions to the Protestant Reformation and points out that in the Middle Ages, humor and satire were integral parts of Catholicism.

An excellent source for plays from the Middle Ages is the two-volume study *The Drama of the Medieval Church* (1933; reprint, London, 1967) by Karl Young. These volumes contain plays for the Feast of Fools, Easter Day, the Nativity, and many more; texts are in Latin with English explanations. Young presents examples of buffoonery in association with the liturgy.

An insightful explanation for the demise of humor and satire in modern society is an article by David I. Grossvogel, "The Depths of Laughter: The Subsoil of a Culture," *Yale French Studies* 23 (Summer 1959): 63–70. When the taut cord of normal expectation suddenly snaps, the consequent nodes and loops are called laughter. Many modern people are unable to laugh authentically, because they are too self-conscious. They laugh as critics, according to prescription. Laughter of this kind scarcely merits the name.

*The Comic in Theory and Practice* (New York, 1960), edited by John J. Enck and others, is a collection of articles by famous

scholars on the theory and practice of satire and humor, including Henri Bergson on laughter, Sigmund Freud on wit and the unconscious, Northrop Frye on criticism, Samuel Johnson on the definition of comedy, and Charles Darwin on emotions. Unfortunately, the editors do not criticize or synthesize the plenitude of ideas.

For a description of a mock Catholic rite, see chapter 10 of my book *Mountain of the Condor* (Saint Paul, Minn., 1978). In an elaborate parody of the Catholic rituals of baptism, Mass, and Communion, the Qollahuaya Andeans of Bolivia baptize, and serve as Eucharist, loaves of bread in the form of babies. This folk tradition arose as an effort to counterbalance the enforced official Catholic rites, which were imposed on Qollahuayas by Catholic missionaries.

In *The Ritual Process* (1969; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), Victor Turner provides a theoretical framework for understanding incongruity, reversal, and sexual analogies within the ritual process. Turner explains the function of these elements by the concepts of liminality and *communitas*. *Communitas* is a return to the center and a communion with the deeper energy of being. Clowns, tricksters, and reversal rituals are associated with *communitas* and periods of liminality: they promote comradeship, equality, sexuality, and humanity, in opposition to structure, law, hierarchy, and reason. Structure and liminality are reciprocal processes within religion. Modern believers tend to neglect liminality and *communitas*.

A student of Turner and Eliade, Robert D. Pelton describes in *The Trickster in West Africa* (Berkeley, 1980) how tricksters such as Legba embody the symbolic process of liminality. The trickster symbolizes liminality in that he contains the sacred and the profane, not in separation, but in a continual imaginative process between rigidity and creativity, order and disorder. He is a juggler of heaven and hell, playing in the realm of mythic irony.

Humor can often be understood only within a specific cultural context. Rigorous theologians may criticize humor as being blasphemous, yet when this humor is seen in a particular context, it foments sacredness. Michael Herzfeld illustrates this in "Exploring a Metaphor of Exposure," *Journal of American Folklore* (July–September 1979): 285–301. Herzfeld shows that the penis-*epitaphios* metaphor is not blasphemous for members of a Greek village. Humor in religion is best appreciated in the more parochial setting in which it is conceived. Because religion is an intense cultural expression, it provides an ample semiotic field for humor and satire. In turn, outsiders have difficulty understanding this humor, which presupposes a measure of acquaintance with the encompassing cultural environment. Anthropologists can assist theologians in discerning the appropriateness of humor and satire.

Edmund Leach discusses a blasphemous libel suit in "Profanity in Context," in *Not Work Alone*, edited by Jeremy Chermas and Roger Lewin (New York, 1980). As Leach indicates, one reason for the demise of humor and satire in Western forms of religion is that people do not want to be considered blasphemous.

In "What's So Funny?"—another article included in Chermas

and Lewin's anthology—Howard Pollio points out that laughter is both a complicated psychophysical reaction and a social phenomenon. Pollio discusses the Koyemci clowns, whose joint status as clowns and priests serves to dispel one of the major misconceptions about humor: that it deals with unimportant, frivolous, and demaning behavior. One advocate of this view is Anthony M. Ludovici, whose book *The Secret of Laughter* (London, 1932) presents the argument that there is little in humor that is worthy of the human spirit. Ludovici claims that comic behavior hinders progress by dissipating people's creative energy through laughter. Behind Ludovici's belief is the Platonic dichotomy of spirituality and materiality within the person. Walter Kerr develops the same notion in *Tragedy and Comedy* (New York, 1967). Kerr sees in the comic experience an encounter with materiality. If religion is to be "ethereal," that is, "spiritual," then it must be contaminated with the materiality of comedy.

On the other hand, Konrad Lorenz writes in *On Aggression* (New York, 1966), pp. 275–299, that humor and satire are not trivial elements of culture. Citing examples from nature and Chesterton in equal measure, Lorenz shows how humor and satire are vehicles whereby seemingly rational and sober schemes of control and domination can be exploded by a pinprick of comedy. The comedian and the clown are often moralists ready to restore balance to what is upset, repressed, or distorted in religion and society. One poignant example is that of the holy fool Basil, who summoned Ivan the Terrible to his cave under the Volkhov Bridge, where he offered him fresh blood and raw meat. The tsar refused the offer, but he did later order that his executions be stopped. Another example is found in Sarah B. Cohen's article "The Jewish Literary Comedienne," in *Comic Relief*, edited by Sarah B. Cohen (Urbana, Ill., 1978), which demonstrates how Jewish humor emerges from the disparity between the prophetic role of the Jews as the chosen people and the harsh realities of immigrant life. As Ionesco wrote, "The comic alone is able to give us the strength to bear the tragedy of existence."

JOSEPH W. BASTIEN

**HUNA'** (c. 216–c. 297), a leading second-generation Babylonian amora, based in the city of Sura. Along with his colleague Yehudah bar Yehezqel, Huna' expanded the work of the first amoraim who employed the Mishnah to spread rabbinic Judaism. [See Amoraim.] He focused directly on the Mishnah, clarifying it and citing alternative or disputing tannaitic sources. He played a key role in presenting the traditions of Rav, his main teacher (B.T., *Shab.* 128a), and, in explaining Rav's and, occasionally, Shemu'el's dicta, he treated unclear legal points and new cases and developed independent teachings (Epstein, 1964). He instructed students and other rabbis in such diverse areas as ritual laws, ethics, and practical behavior (e.g., B.T., *Ber.* 6b, *Shab.* 23b, *Pes.* 105a). Stories, possibly reflecting educational develop-

ments, attribute outstanding features to his study sessions (B.T., *Ket.* 106a) and prominently associate him with the *kallah*, a periodic academic convention that lasted several days and was open to masters and disciples (Goodblatt, 1975, pp. 156–157, 168).

In receiving exilarchic authorization to judge civil and property matters, Huna' applied rabbinic principles in the marketplace and in such areas as divorce and inheritance (e.g., B.T., *San.* 7b; Neusner, 1968). Stories describe his pious acts for the poor and the sick (B.T., *Ta'an.* 20b–21a), and a dictum claiming that "whoever only studies Torah resembles a person without God" (B.T., 'A.Z. 17b) stresses the importance of good deeds. The Talmudic tradition, on the other hand, elevates his Torah study, in that its merit is what protected Huna' from natural calamities and enabled him effectively to hurl curses (B.T., *Mo'ed Q.* 27b, *Ta'an.* 20b).

He also emphasized the human inability wholly to know God's nature and ways (*Gn. Rab.* 12.1) and, like his contemporaries, saw both divine justice and mercy as well as reward and punishment at work (e.g., B.T., *Ber.* 7b, *R. ha-Sh.* 17b; Neusner, 1968, pp. 149–158). The accounts of miraculous events attending his burial underscore the esteem Babylonian and Palestinian Jews held for Huna' even after his death (B.T., *Mo'ed Q.* 25a; cf. Neusner, 1968, pp. 51–53). His exilarchic backing, however, laid the foundations on which he was able to build his influential career of piety and teaching.

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A comprehensive treatment and bibliography of Huna' and his teachings can be found in Jacob Neusner's *A History of the Jews in Babylonia*, 5 vols. (Leiden, 1966–1970), esp. vol. 3. Jacob N. Epstein's *Mavo' le-nusah ha-Mishnah*, 2 vols. (1948; reprint, Jerusalem, 1964), pp. 311–318, discusses the attitude of Huna' to tannaitic traditions and the Mishnah. See also David M. Goodblatt's *Rabbinic Instruction in Sasanian Babylonia* (Leiden, 1975) and my *Samuel's Commentary on the Mishnah* (Leiden, 1975), p. 217.

BARUCH M. BOKSER

**HUNGARIAN RELIGION.** The Magyars, a Finno-Ugric people, conquered most of the area of what is now Hungary and Transylvania in the late ninth century of the common era. They arrived in the Carpathian Basin around 896, but according to some scholars earlier groups of Magyars already lived there during the Avar period (seventh to ninth century). The Magyar language belongs to the Ugric branch of the Finno-Ugric subdivision of the Uralic language family, but by the late tenth century it had been strongly influenced by Turkic ele-

ments, which also brought Iranian and other loan words. "Hungarians" is the name given to the Magyars by the Europeans.

The religion of the conquering Magyar tribes first received scholarly attention in 1693 in Ferenc Otrókoci-Foris's *Origines Hungaricae*. In the absence of primary sources, scholars seeking to reconstruct the Magyar religious system have made use of the following: (1) descriptions of contemporary foreign authors; (2) medieval chronicles, based on oral tradition; (3) archaeological finds; (4) comparative linguistics; and (5) presumed survivals in recent folk religion. The Hungarians certainly were familiar with the three monotheistic religions and must have had an advanced religious system of their own, because when they were converted by the Roman Catholic church in the eleventh century, they retained their own designations for several important religious concepts. *Isten* ("God"), *Ördög* ("the Devil"), *böjtöl* ("to fast"), and *áldoz* ("to sacrifice") are Hungarian words of unknown etymology.

The main feature of Hungarian religion was probably shamanism. Hungarian scholars are more or less in agreement that shamans had an important role in the beliefs and cult of the Hungarians, and some survivals of shamanism can be detected even today. One term denoting "shaman" was *táltos*, a word still in use. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, *táltos* were living persons considered to have the supernatural power, acquired during a trance, to drive away hail and storm; in earlier times, they were healers as well. The modern *táltos* are usually male, but earlier, female *táltos* were also mentioned by name. In recent belief, the *táltos* are thought to be born with a surplus bone, to be visited by other *táltos* during infancy, and to have a duel in the air while transformed into bulls, horses, or fiery wheels. (In Hungarian folk tales, the word *táltos* generally refers to horses.) Other shamanic traits can be discerned in the activity of present-day seers (conjurers of the dead), who also enter a state of trance during their séances.

Little is known about the mythology and cult of the pagan Magyars. Some accounts mention horse sacrifice, with white horses preferred. The Magyars believed in some form of afterlife, as is evidenced in their pre-Christian burial practices; a horse's hide, leg bones, and skull have often been found in graves, along with other grave objects. Occasionally there is a mask on the deceased person's skull. Little is known about the Magyar pantheon; the phrase "God of the Magyars," however, occurs often in proverbs. The Magyars did not, it seems, produce images of their deities, and the "pagan idols" mentioned by foreign authors were mainly grave posts. Written sources seem to indicate the existence of ances-

tor worship and some kind of totemism, even totem ancestors in animal form and totem exogamy. Some birds of prey (for example, the *turul*, a mythical eagle or falcon), were held in high esteem and depicted on metal objects. Foreign contemporaries mention fire worship among the Magyars. Archaic cosmogonic concepts have survived in folk tradition, as in the notion that there are several worlds positioned one above the other and linked by a tree. Other archaic elements may be found in folk art: in the so-called *regős* songs, performed at Christmas, a miraculous stag is mentioned as the symbol of the winter sky. Medieval chronicles seem to point to the institution among pagan Magyars of dual kingship (i.e., there was a king who actually ruled and a second, sacred king) and the ritual sacrifice of the divine chief. This latter might be a practice taken over from the Khazars, among whom the Magyars lived for some time before settling in the Carpathian Basin.

The Hungarians adopted the Roman Catholic religion during the reign of Stephen I (r. 997–1038). Contemporary observations testify to the religious tolerance of the Magyars, who were willing to convert to Catholicism out of political necessity; the last pagan chief, Géza, is said to have considered himself rich enough to satisfy two gods simultaneously. After the conversion, conspicuous pagan rites, such as horse sacrifice and pagan burials, were prohibited, but some shamanistic practices were carried on by the common folk. The church replaced the ancestor cult with the cult of the canonized members of the Árpád dynasty.

Although a few figures from pagan mythology survive in folk beliefs, magical practices have merged into the general European pattern (fear of being bewitched, the casting of spells, magic binding, belief in the power of the evil eye, etc.). Outstanding survivals in later folk mythology are the *lidérc* and the *szépasszonyok* ("fair ladies"). The latter are evil female demons, their name being expressly taboo. (Evil demonic beings are generally referred to in the plural, "the evil ones.") The *lidérc* is a curious combination of helping spirit, demon lover, and *ignis fatuus*. In later witch trials the *lidérc* sometimes was mentioned as the helping spirit of a witch. The *lidérc* is thought to be able to appear in human form, as a chicken, as fire, and so forth.

Hungarian religion has been studied by scholars in several disciplines, including archaeology, folklore, linguistics, and prehistory. Recent trends in research are aimed at elucidating the role of shamans at the time of the Magyar conquests, their influence and status in society, and the scope of their activities. Missionaries visiting pagan Magyars from both the West and Byzantium were clearly at a loss when describing the structure of Magyar religion, and they gave no details

of the activity of the "magicians," as they called them.

The question of whether parallels closer to Hungarian shamanism are to be found among peoples speaking Uralic languages or those speaking Turkic languages is still unresolved, and present research therefore embraces the study of shamanism in both Siberia and Mongolia. Some outstanding scholars who have dealt with these topics are Daniel Cornides (1732–1787), Arnold Ipolyi (1823–1886), Ferenc Kállay (1790–1861), Kabos Kandra (1843–1905), Henrik Wlislöcki (1856–1907), Géza Róheim (1891–1953), and Vilmos Diószegi (1923–1972). Archaeologists, ethnologists, folklorists, and others working at present include István Dienes, Gyula László, György Györffy, János Kodolányi, Éva Pócs, Mihály Hoppál, Vilmos Voigt, myself, and several other scholars, both in Hungary and elsewhere (such as Mihály Ferdinandy). The subjects of research include shamanism and the European influence on Magyar folk religion.

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TEKLA DÖMÖTÖR

**HUN RELIGION.** Over the centuries, the name *Hun* has been widely and indiscriminately applied to a multiplicity of Inner Asian nomad peoples. In this article only the "genuine" Huns will be considered, those who in the second half of the fourth century CE took possession of the North Pontic steppes (the steppes to the north of the Black Sea) and for about eighty years—particularly under the rule of Attila (433?–453)—played a

major role in the history of Europe. I shall also take into account those Huns who, following the disintegration of Attila's empire, established and maintained in the northern Caucasus a kingdom that lasted to the end of the seventh century.

By the standards of Inner Asian historiography, the history of the Huns is reasonably well documented, mainly by written sources, among which the (alas!) fragmentary text of Priscus's eyewitness account of daily life in Attila's entourage is particularly valuable. Archaeology contributes next to nothing to the picture; so far it has not been possible to isolate more than a few finds incontestably Hun. Among these, some typical bronze caldrons have, on occasion, been considered sacral vessels, but there is no evidence in support of such an opinion.

The statement by the fourth-century historian Ammianus Marcellinus (31.2.11) that the Huns were not "bound by any reverence for religion or superstition" is contradicted by other, contemporary sources. These do give some clues about Hun religious beliefs, although, with one exception, none attempts to give a systematic description thereof. This exception is to be found in the Armenian chronicle attributed to Moses Daskhuranci, who does give some interesting, trustworthy data on the Caucasian Huns of the second half of the seventh century. He speaks of their "satanically deluded tree-worshipping errors" and mentions that they use horses as burnt offerings in the worship of "some gigantic savage monster whom they invoke as the god T'angri Khan, called Aspandiat by the Persians." In the first of these names it is easy to recognize the Turco-Mongol deity Tengri ("sky" or "heaven"), whose cult is first attested among the Hsiung-nu in Mongolia in the centuries just before and after the beginning of the common era. The Huns also "made sacrifices to fire and water and to certain gods of the roads, and to the moon and to all creatures considered in their eyes to be in some way remarkable." [See Tengri.]

Moses pays special attention to the funeral rites of the Huns who, "possessing completely anarchical minds," so he says, "stumble into every sort of error, beating drums and whistling over corpses, inflicting bloody saber and dagger cuts on the cheek and limbs, and engaging naked in sword fights—O hellish sight—at the graves, man against man and troop against troop. . . ." Although, to my knowledge, sword fights between groups are not noted elsewhere in such a context, the self-inflicted wounds and the laceration of the mourners' faces were a widespread custom among medieval Turkic peoples, described in classical as well as in Chinese sources, and also represented on wall paintings

preserved in Chinese Turkistan. Fragment 23 of Priscus tells us that at the death of Attila, the Huns, "as is the custom of that race, cut off part of their hair and disfigured their faces horribly with deep wounds so that the distinguished warrior might be bewailed, not with feminine lamentations and tears, but with manly blood." Before burying their dead the Huns were wont to lay out the body and, at least in cases in which the deceased had been a man of importance, the mourners would ride around the bier at full gallop "as in the circus games." The body was put in a coffin and a funeral feast preceded the burial. Priscus gives the Hun word for this repast, *strava*, a term for which no acceptable etymology has been proposed. If not due to a scribal error, the initial consonant cluster excludes the possibility that the word is Turkic or Mongol.

It was customary to place valuable objects in the tombs. Attila was interred by night, in great secrecy, and those who buried him were slaughtered so that—in Priscus's opinion—they should not be able to divulge the location of the tomb. It could be that a human sacrifice was performed. Analogies to this case can be found among the early (sixth-century) Türk. Captives were said to have been sacrificed "to victory" by the Huns upon their arrival on the Pontic steppes, but Jordanes' sixth-century account of this period contains many fictional elements.

There is evidence to show that the services of diviners were appreciated. According to Jordanes, Attila "sought counsel of omens in all warfare." He reports that the method used by the soothsayers consisted in the examination of the entrails of cattle and of "certain streaks in bones that had been scraped." The remark refers probably to scapulimancy, widely practiced in Inner Asia. The sources provide no evidence of the very likely use of shamans.

The practice of worshiping a sacred sword, often referred to in the secondary literature, cannot be established. At best, such references can be traced to a remark by Attila who, so it would appear, once declared that a sword that had been accidentally unearthed by a shepherd and brought to him would ensure his supremacy over the whole world.

In the Caucasus, in the Asian or European provinces of Byzantium, in Italy, and in their campaigns through Germanic lands, the Huns were in constant touch, friendly or inimical, with Christians. It can be taken for granted that many of the Huns were converted, a fact that allowed Jerome to write to Laeta in 403 that "the Huns are learning the psalter, the frosts of Scythia are warmed by the fire of faith" (107.2). Perhaps Jerome's, as it turned out unjustified, optimism was motivated by

the news of the missionary efforts of John Chrysostom and others. Success came only to the Albanian bishop Israel who in 681 and 682 stayed with the Huns of the Caucasus, converted their leaders, destroyed their idols, and burned their sacred trees. The Hun prince Alp Ilteber promised, in the words of Moses Daskhuranci, to "burn the sorcerers and wizards who will not adopt the faith, and [to] put to the sword any person who acts like a pagan." Thus, Western civilization arrived among the Huns of the epigone kingdom, putting an end to the religious tolerance so typical of Inner Asian states, including that of the Huns, those "unreasoning beasts" (to quote Ammianus Marcellinus), "utterly ignorant of the difference between right and wrong."

[See also Inner Asian Religions.]

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DENIS SINOR

**HURGRONJE, CHRISTIAAN SNOUCK.** See Snouck Hurgronje, Christiaan.

**HURRIAN RELIGION.** A Near Eastern phenomenon dating mainly from the second millennium before the common era, the Hurrian religion is known more from contemporary and later Hittite documents than from native Hurrian sources. The Hurrians were an apparently Armenoid people who moved into northern Syria and northwestern Mesopotamia by at least 2300 BCE. The cities of Nuzi, in the eastern Tigris region, and Alalakh, in northern Syria, were major centers of Hurrian culture by circa 1500 BCE.

The term *Hurrian* is an ethnic designation, and *Subartu* (roughly equivalent to the Hurrian *Aranzakh*) is

the Sumero-Akkadian name of the Hurrian-dominated area north and northeast of the Tigris. Mitanni was a Hurrian kingdom of the mid-second millennium in northern Syria and Iraq that had an Indo-Aryan aristocracy, and Urartu (whence Ararat) was a successor kingdom that flourished in southern Armenia circa 800 BCE. The Hurrian language, written in Sumero-Akkadian cuneiform (and, later, in Ugaritic alphabetic cuneiform), remains largely undeciphered. It is neither Semitic nor Indo-European in origin.

Some prominent European scholars would deny that the Horites of the Old Testament are Hurrians (in *Genesis* 14 the Horites are enemies of Abraham; in *Deuteronomy* 2 they are dispossessed by the Edomites; in *1 Chronicles* 1 they are the ancestors of Esau), but most American authors favor the identification. (Similar efforts to identify the Old Testament Hivites with the Hurrians are less convincing.) While admitting the presence of biblical anachronisms, the American scholars cite the extensive evidence that the Hurrians had moved down into the coastal areas and probably into Palestine at least by the Amarna age (mid-first millennium BCE). By the final quarter of the second millennium BCE there was, for example, a large and flourishing Hurrian population farther north at Ugarit, on the Syrian coast. Also notable are the remarkable parallelisms of legal and social customs between Nuzi documents of the fifteenth century BCE and the *Genesis* patriarchal narratives.

Because of the limited natively Hurrian resources, it is difficult to distinguish specifically Hurrian religious and cultic elements from those of their neighbors. The Hurrians borrowed heavily from Mesopotamian religion either by assimilating Assyro-Babylonian divinities into their own pantheon outright or by identifying these divinities with indigenous Hurrian gods. In turn, some of the Hurrian gods and religious practices were adopted by the Hittites. The Hittites also absorbed into their religion pre-Hittite elements and elements from other Anatolian peoples such as the Luwians. Since it is mostly from Hittite mythic and religious texts that scholars have access to the Hurrians, the situation is complicated indeed; many authors have resorted to referring simply to an "Anatolian religion" and have made no substantial effort to separate its strands. The major Hittite sources for Hurrian religion are the archives from Bogazköy (Hattushash), the ancient Hittite capital, and the stone carvings from the shrines at Yazılıkaya, about two miles east of Bogazköy.

Hurrian culture is equally notable as a vehicle of exchange of religious concepts and practices, especially from east to west, and as a source of original contribu-

tions. The flow of such ideas over almost three millennia was generally from the Mesopotamians to the Hurrians, from the latter to the Hittites and northwestern Semites (Amorites, Canaanites, and Phoenicians), and thence ultimately to Greece and Rome. Recent scholarship suggests that the Hurrians played a far larger role in this process than had previously been detected. Because of the Indic element among their aristocracy, it is also likely that the Hurrians were purveyors of some Indo-Aryan religious motifs to the west.

At the head of the native Hurrian pantheon was the weather god Teshub, the "king of heaven," the later Urartean Tesheba. His genealogy varies somewhat, depending on the way in which the relevant Babylonian material was assimilated. In Hittite texts stemming from the Hurrian myth cycle of Kumarbi (the father of the gods) and in some other texts, there is the following typical sequence of progenitors and offspring: Alalu, (Mesopotamian) Anu, Kumarbi, and Teshub. Early Anatolian iconography uses the symbol of a bull or of lightning bolts in connection with Teshub and other weather gods. The place-name *Tishbe*, designating Elijah's home in Gilead (*1 Kgs.* 17:1), may preserve the name of Teshub, and the same may be true of the name of the Greek city of Thisbe, in Boeotia.

Teshub's consort was Hebat or Hapat, the queen of heaven. Although she is not prominent in the extant mythological texts, worship of her was very widespread, and she was syncretized with other Near Eastern goddesses in later times. In Hittite iconography she is apparently identified with the sun goddess of Arinna, whose name is not known. Hebat has a rather matronly appearance in Anatolian art, and she is frequently depicted standing on the back of a lion.

The son of Teshub and Hebat was Sharruma, whom the Hittites associated with the weather gods of Nerik and Zippalanda. At Yazılıkaya the god who is represented by a pair of human legs immediately behind Hebat is doubtless Sharruma. Shaushka (sometimes Shaushga), who in Hittite myths about Kumarbi is called Teshub's sister, is prominent in the extant texts and in works of art, where she is often shown as a winged goddess standing (like Hebat) on the back of a lion. Shaushka's nature is very elusive. The Hittites identified her with the Mesopotamian Inanna-Ishtar, herself a goddess of extraordinarily complex origins and characteristics. Shaushka was said to have had two ladies-in-waiting, Ninatta and Kulitta.

Other Hurrian gods are Sheri ("day") and Hurri, or Khurri ("night") who pull Teshub's wagon and are portrayed as bulls; the moon god Kushukh (the same as the proto-Hittic Kashku) and his consort, the Mesopotamian Ningal; a sun god, Shimigi (the Urartean Shi-

wini); Shuwaliyatti and his consort, Nabarbi; and Teshub's vizier, Tasmisu. The later Urartean pantheon included Tesheba, Shiwini, and the national god, Haldi (Khaldi). An inscription found at Sargon II names the goddess Bagbarti as Haldi's consort.

Hurrian mythic narratives are known almost exclusively through their Hittite versions, in which the material is considerably intermixed with other Anatolian elements. The most significant myth cycle is that of the god Kumarbi. The two major texts, both in Hittite, are *Kingship in Heaven*, a tale of the struggle for divine kingship strikingly similar to Hesiod's *Theogony*, and the *Song of Ullikummi*, an epic preserved only in disconnected fragments.

In *Kingship in Heaven* Alalu is king of heaven for nine years, and Anu (the Sumerian sky god), "first among the gods," worships at his feet. Anu, however, battles with Alalu and defeats him, reigning in turn for nine years, with Kumarbi now worshipping him. Anu and Kumarbi engage in combat and Anu flees up to the sky. Kumarbi seizes him, drags him down, and bites off his genitals, laughing with glee. Anu cautions: "Do not laugh, for you have a heavy burden: I have impregnated you with the storm god [Teshub], the river Aranzakh [the Tigris], and Tasmisu [subsequently a servant to Teshub]." What ensues is not clear, but apparently Teshub captures the kingship from Kumarbi.

In the *Song of Ullikummi*, Kumarbi plots against his upstart son, Teshub. Kumarbi mates with a woman in the form of a stone (or perhaps she is a mountain) and she bears him another son, Ullikummi, made of diorite. Various helper gods place Ullikummi on the shoulders of Ubelluri, an Atlas figure who stands in the midst of the sea, and the young Ullikummi grows rapidly. The sun god notices the mighty figure of Ullikummi rising from the sea and warns Teshub, who weeps bitterly. Teshub appeals to the god Ea, who eventually takes in hand the blade that had originally severed the earth from the heavens and cuts Ullikummi off at the ankles. Presumably—here the story breaks off—Kumarbi and his powerless monster-son are defeated and Teshub's rule is assured.

Other Hurrian myths with religious motifs include the folk tale of Appu of Lulluwa and his wife, prosperous folk who go to bed fully clothed and wonder why they cannot conceive! The gods set them right and they bear two sons, Good and Evil. The myth of Heldammu is a story about a snake demon of the same name whose voracious appetite leads him to devour cities and towns. He is apparently infatuated with Ishtar, who suggests he desist from such dining. The myth of Kessi (or Keshi) is the very fragmentarily preserved story of a stalwart hunter.



Little is known of the actual cultic practices and worship of the Hurrians. From syncretic Hittite texts, mostly from Bogazköy, there is evidence for sympathetic magic, bird sacrifices (also attested in texts from Ugarit), and various forms of divination. As with the Hurrian pantheon, there was clearly much Babylonian influence on the Hurrian cult, and in turn, the Hurrian cult apparently was partially assimilated into that of the Hittites.

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WILLIAM J. FULCO, S.J.

**HUS, JAN** (1372/3–1415), also known as John Huss; Czech reformer of the Christian church. Hus was called John of Husinec after the village in southern Bohemia in which he was born of peasant parents. During his university years, he shortened his name to Hus. After earning a master's degree, in 1398 Hus became a member of the faculty of liberal arts at the University of Prague. He was ordained a priest in 1400, served as dean of the faculty from 1401 to 1402, and matriculated in the faculty of theology to work toward the degree of doctor of theology. Because of his subsequent activities and the controversies that developed around him, Hus never completed the degree.

In 1402 Hus was appointed preacher at Bethlehem Chapel in Prague, where sermons were delivered in Czech rather than Latin. He became a leader in the national Czech reform movement, which emphasized moral reform and preaching in the vernacular. Through his teachers Hus had been introduced to the thought of Milíč of Kroměříž (c. 1325–1374) and Matthew of Janov (c. 1355–1393), early leaders of the reform movement.

Hus, along with other reformers, also became inter-

ested in the thought of John Wyclif. Prior to 1402, Hus appears to have known only Wyclif's philosophical writings. But after Hus's friend Jerome of Prague brought a number of Wyclif's theological and reformist works to Prague in 1401, and again in 1406, Hus began to use some of Wyclif's less radical ideas for reform in his own sermons at Bethlehem Chapel. He also translated Wyclif's *Trialogus* into Czech. In 1403, the conflict between the nominalism of the German members of the faculty at the university and the philosophical realism of Wyclif and the Czech faculty members contributed to an academic (not an ecclesiastical) condemnation of the heretical sense of forty-five articles drawn from Wyclif's writings. [See the biography of Wyclif.]

The archbishop of Prague, Zbyněk Zajíc, who was primarily a soldier, not a theologian, at first supported both the clerical reform party and Hus. In 1405, he appointed Hus preacher to the Prague synod. However, by attacking clerical vices and abuses in his sermons, Hus aroused increasing clerical opposition to the reform party. Innocent VII and Gregory XII both exhorted Zbyněk to check the growing interest in Wyclif's views. Hus's friends Stanislav of Znojmo and Stephen Pálež later became his bitter enemies after they were forced to defend themselves against charges of heresy by renouncing Wyclif's views (particularly the doctrine of remanence, i.e., that bread and wine remain unchanged after the words of consecration in the sacrament).

Hus lost the archbishop's support when he and other Czech faculty members sided with Wenceslas, king of Bohemia, in his recognition of Alexander V, who in 1409 had been elected pope by the Council of Pisa in an attempt to end the schism that was dividing Western Christendom into three factions. The council had deposed and excommunicated Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, who both, however, refused to abdicate in Alexander's favor. When Zbyněk and the German members of the faculty supported Gregory XII, Wenceslas changed the constitution of the university in a manner that the Germans could not accept, with the result that they left Prague. (Some of them founded the University of Leipzig.) Zbyněk then obtained support from the antireformist clergy and acknowledged Alexander V as legitimate pope in order to secure papal approval of his proposed actions. To silence Hus, the archbishop forbade preaching in private chapels, but Hus continued to preach. Zbyněk retaliated by ordering the burning of Wyclif's books and sending charges of heresy against Hus to the Curia Romana.

When John XXIII, successor of Alexander V, issued indulgences for sale to raise funds for his crusade against Gregory XII and Gregory's supporter Ladislav of Naples, Hus opposed the methods used to sell the indul-

gences, but not the doctrine of indulgence itself. He thus lost the support of King Wenceslas, who was profiting from the sale of the indulgences. Hus was placed under a stricter ecclesiastical ban, and since his presence threatened Prague with an interdict, he left the city in 1412. He sought refuge in the castles of friends in southern Bohemia, where he completed important works in Czech and Latin, including his famous *De ecclesia* (1413).

Wenceslas's brother Sigismund, king of Hungary and king of the Romans, seeking to crush heresy and to end the papal schism, brought pressure to convoke in 1414 the Council of Constance. Threatened by an interdict for tolerating heresy in Bohemia, Wenceslas was forced to agree to Sigismund's plan to send Hus to the council. Hus arrived in Constance in 1414 with Sigismund's assurance of safe-conduct, but there he was questioned, imprisoned, and tried for heresy. He was found guilty and was burned at the stake at Constance on 6 July 1415.

Hus's religious views have been interpreted as being derived from the writings of Wyclif, and thus as both heretical and devoid of originality. They have also been interpreted as the culmination of the national Czech reform movement, modified by some of Wyclif's less radical ideas. In this interpretation, Hus is seen as essentially orthodox in his scholastic views, unlike his colleagues, some of whom advocated radical Wyclifite heresies. Some recent Czech writers have seen Hus and his followers as representatives of the lower classes in their revolt against a feudal society.

Hus had what is now called an ecumenical view of the church. He thought of the Roman church as but one among several branches of the church militant and defined the true church as the totality of the predestinated. Thus his judges at the Council of Constance interpreted his views correctly when they accused Hus of denying that the Roman church is the only true church but were wrong in their interpretation that he refuted the valid existence of the church militant. Denying the supreme authority of popes and councils, Hus accorded supreme authority for faith and practice to Christ's teachings and life, as chronicled in scripture; however, he granted a subordinate authority to the traditions of the church, and as a scholastic theologian did not exclude appeals to these traditions. Hus was not, strictly speaking, a pre-Lutheran advocate of *sola scriptura*. Neither was he an advocate of *sola fide*, justification by faith alone. He emphasized (with rare exceptions) the necessity of good works for salvation in the sense of *fide caritate formata*, faith formed by love. He believed in transubstantiation rather than in the doctrine of remanence. Toward the end of his life, in a letter from the

Council of Constance to his substitute at Bethlehem Chapel, Hus approved the distribution of both bread and wine, not bread alone, to the laity, a practice that his followers continued.

Hus's influence was especially pronounced among the moderate Hussites who were known as Utraquists (from *utraque*, "each of two," referring to the two Communion elements), and also as Calixtines (from *calix*, "goblet, drinking vessel"). His teachings strongly influenced the members of the *Unitas Fratrum* (Unity of Czech Brethren), who separated from the other Hussites in 1467. The Czechoslovak Hussite Church (or Czechoslovak National Church), founded in 1920, continues the Hussite tradition.

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JOHN C. GODBEY

**ḤUSAYN IBN 'ALĪ** (d. AH 61/680 CE), grandson of the prophet Muḥammad and third imam of the Twelver Shi'ah. He and his elder brother, al-Ḥasan, were Mu-

ḥammad's only grandsons, and stories abound of the Prophet's love and care for them both. There are even accounts that the Prophet foretold Ḥusayn's eventual martyrdom at Karbala. Ḥusayn himself grew up as a distinguished Muslim, showing great loyalty to his father and then to his brother.

The Shī'ah believe that after the death of Muḥammad in 632, leadership of the community (*imāmah*, the imamate) belonged to 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Ḥusayn's father, who was the Prophet's cousin. However, 'Alī was repeatedly passed over by the community until the third caliph, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān, was murdered by a group of rebels in 656. When 'Alī was proclaimed caliph in Medina without any council (*shūrā*)—a *shūrā* had been introduced for this purpose by the second caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb—some people disputed his right to it and demanded vengeance for the murder of 'Uthmān. As a result 'Alī faced two major rebellions, the second of which was led by Mu'āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, the governor of Syria and a relative of 'Uthmān. After an inconclusive battle at Ṣiffin, on the borders of Syria and Iraq, 'Alī reluctantly accepted a form of arbitration to settle the dispute. However, some of his supporters declared that he had committed unbelief in accepting arbitration and revolted against him. These rebels were called the Khārijīs. 'Alī annihilated them at the Battle of Nahrawān but was himself murdered in 661 by a survivor amid the breakup of his authority over the Islamic world.

Ḥasan succeeded his father but, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, came to an agreement with Mu'āwiyah whereby he would resign the caliphate on a number of conditions: that 'Alī should no longer be publicly cursed, that his family and their supporters should have security of life and property, that he should receive a large sum of money, and that upon Mu'āwiyah's death succession should be decided by a *shūrā*. According to Shī'ī sources, it was also agreed that Ḥasan should succeed Mu'āwiyah. It is reported that Ḥusayn opposed this agreement and refused to pledge allegiance to Mu'āwiyah. Ḥasan died in 671, and the Shī'ah believe that he was poisoned at the behest of Mu'āwiyah.

**Political Activity.** Ḥusayn now became leader of the supporters (*shī'ah*) of 'Alī and his family; this group was later to become known as the Shī'ah. Refusing their pleas to lead a revolution, he declared that he would keep his brother's agreement with Mu'āwiyah while the latter was alive. Mu'āwiyah, for his part, made all the provinces of his empire pledge allegiance to his son Yazīd (described as a drunken reprobate) as his successor. Ḥusayn was one of a small group who refused to make such a pledge.

When Mu'āwiyah died in 680, Yazīd immediately ordered the governor of Medina to take the pledge of allegiance from Ḥusayn or kill him. Ḥusayn put the governor off by persuading him that his pledge should be made publicly, before the rest of the people. He then escaped to Mecca, which, as the sanctuary (*ḥaram*) of God, provided him with some protection from Yazīd.

When the Shī'ah of Kufa, in Iraq, heard of this, they wrote to him urging that he come to Iraq and lead a revolution against Yazīd. Ḥusayn sent his cousin Muslim ibn 'Aqīl to Kufa to investigate the situation. Muslim reported that support for Ḥusayn was very strong and urged him to come. However, Yazīd's supporters in Kufa had warned the caliph of Muslim ibn 'Aqīl's activities and advised him that the governor of Kufa was weak. Yazīd responded by appointing his governor in Basra, 'Ubayd Allāh ibn Ziyād, to authority in both places and ordering him to go immediately to Kufa.

'Ubayd Allāh quickly gained control of Kufa by a mixture of threats and bribery. Muslim ibn 'Aqīl took refuge with a Shī'ī, Hānī' ibn 'Urwah, but 'Ubayd Allāh discovered his whereabouts through a spy and had him arrested for refusing to hand over Muslim. Hānī's arrest forced Muslim to come out in a premature revolt, and not all those who had promised support answered his call; in fact, by evening Muslim's supporters had dwindled to a handful. He was apprehended, and 'Ubayd Allāh had him and Hānī' publicly executed. The governor then put Kufa under military control and sent out forces to intercept Ḥusayn.

Meanwhile Ḥusayn, unaware of events in Kufa, had set out from Mecca with most of the members of his family and was joined on the journey by groups of tribesmen. When news of the death of Muslim and Hānī' reached him, he consulted with his family. There was general agreement among them to go on, to death if necessary; however, many of those who had joined the expedition expecting victory now deserted. The remaining small group was intercepted by Yazīd's son al-Ḥurr with a party of horsemen sent by 'Ubayd Allāh. They all stopped at Karbala on the banks of the Euphrates. 'Ubayd Allāh then sent an army under the reluctant command of 'Umar ibn Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ; on their arrival, Ḥusayn urged his family and supporters to leave him, but they refused. 'Umar ibn Sa'd was reluctant to fight and started to negotiate with Ḥusayn. 'Ubayd Allāh, annoyed at 'Umar ibn Sa'd's procrastination, ordered that water be cut off from Ḥusayn's camp and preparations made for battle.

The unequal battle began on the tenth day of Muḥarram, the day of 'Āshūrā'. Al-Ḥurr ibn Yazīd was so appalled that he joined Ḥusayn and died fighting for him. Ḥusayn's followers went into battle one by one; then

came the turn of the members of his family. All were killed, even a child Ḥusayn was cradling on his knee. Last to die, after a brave fight, was Ḥusayn: his head was cut off and his body trampled by horses. The camp was plundered, although Ḥusayn's only surviving son, who had been too sick to fight, was spared. He and the women were taken under escort to Kufa together with the decapitated heads of Ḥusayn and his followers. The head of Ḥusayn was paraded through the streets of Kufa. Later the captives were taken to Yazīd in Damascus, and he then sent them back to Medina. There was much grief and lamentation along the route of their journey.

**Historical Legacy.** Four years later a group of Kufans, known as the Penitents, marched out to atone for their desertion of Ḥusayn and to seek vengeance for his death. They visited Ḥusayn's grave at Karbala and spent the night in prayer and lamentation. Then they went on to a battle in which most of them were killed. The slogan "Vengeance for Ḥusayn" became a symbol for all future revolts of the Shī'ah against the Umayyads. It was under this slogan that the Abbasids eventually came to power in 750.

The expression of grief for Ḥusayn became an institutionalized form of religious expression for the Shī'ah from a fairly early period. At first these rites of remembrance were performed in secret but on occasion they took place in public. They were particularly associated with the first ten days of the Muslim month of Muḥarram. Then, as now, sermons were preached and poems recited which commemorated the events that led up to Karbala, culminating in Ḥusayn's death on the day of 'Āshūrā'. During these celebrations, known as *ta'ziyahs*, much grief is shown and some subject their bodies to self-flagellation. In Iran a kind of passion play developed around the story of Ḥusayn.

From the earliest times, his tomb at Karbala has been a place of pilgrimage (*ziyārah*) for the Shī'ah. On occasion the authorities became so concerned that they tried to destroy the tomb and stop pilgrimages to it; however, this pilgrimage has become one of the principal religious rituals that the individual Shī'ī wishes to undertake. It is second only to the pilgrimages to Mecca (*ḥajj* and *'umrah*), and among some of the less educated it is considered most important of all. Visitation to the tomb of Ḥusayn came to be regarded as a means of gaining miraculous cures and answers to prayers, and the idea of Ḥusayn as a kind of redeemer and mediator began to emerge.

The martyrdom of Ḥusayn occupies a particularly important place in the religious life of the Twelver Shī'ah, for whom it represents the supreme sacrifice on behalf of the people. They share in the way he was deserted in

his hour of need, grieve for his suffering, and are anxious to atone for it and avenge it. Throughout history, the cry of "Vengeance for Ḥusayn!" has acted as a compelling revolutionary call among adherents of Twelver Shiism. Its most recent manifestation has been the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979, where the Pahlavi shah was denounced as Yazīd.

Nor was the impact of Ḥusayn's martyrdom limited to Twelver Shiism. In Fatimid Egypt, for example, rites of remembrance were held regularly, although the Ismā'īliyah subsequently gave this event much less emphasis in their religious lives. For most Sunnī Muslims, the death of Ḥusayn was a very tragic event, but it became so identified with Shiism that diminishing attention was paid to it, and at one time rival celebrations were set up.

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I. K. A. HOWARD

**HUSSERL, EDMUND** (1859–1938), German philosopher, founder and central figure in the twentieth-century philosophical movement or approach known as phenomenology. Born in Prossnitz (Prostějov), Moravia, Husserl studied at the universities of Leipzig and Berlin and received his Ph.D. from the University of Vienna in 1882. After becoming an assistant to the mathematician Karl Weierstrass in Berlin, he moved to Vienna where, largely under the influence of the philosopher Franz Brentano, he changed his field from mathematics to philosophy.

Husserl's three teaching positions roughly correlate with three periods in the development of his phenome-

nological philosophy. His stay at the University of Halle (1887–1901) coincided with a prephenomenological period, during which he attempted to provide a psychological basis for mathematics and logic; it culminated in the influential *Logical Investigations* (2 vols., 1900–1901), which laid the foundation for his descriptive phenomenology. During his tenure at the University of Göttingen (1901–1916), Husserl established his role as founder of the “phenomenological movement.” He developed the phenomenological project that he had introduced in the second volume of his *Logical Investigations* and, in his *Ideas* (1913), he turned to a “pure” or “transcendental” phenomenology—a philosophical turn that was rejected by many of his followers. His work at the University of Freiburg (1916–1929) brought a radicalization of this phenomenological idealism, in which phenomenology was conceived as a renewal of life, a realization of our ethical autonomy, and an overcoming of the crisis of European science. The years 1929–1939, during which Husserl lived in Freiburg after his retirement from the university, may be designated as a fourth period. This period comprises the works of the “late Husserl.” Though isolated by social and political pressures as a man with Jewish parentage in Nazi Germany and, finally, by illness, Husserl developed, during this period, his existential notion of “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*) with which he explored the intersubjective and historical dimensions of experience.

Since Husserl was continually rethinking his phenomenological project, his works never formed a closed philosophical system. There are, however, several themes that can be found throughout his writings. Phenomenology, for example, was to be a descriptive, “rigorous science,” free from unexamined presuppositions, and each step was to have a sense of self-evident necessity. Husserl continually searched for radical “new beginnings,” that is, for an absolute foundation on which to ground his phenomenology and to grasp the constitution of meaning.

Husserl conceived phenomenology to be a radically descriptive approach, free from our normal, unexamined preconceptions; it was to utilize a phenomenological method that would allow it to describe the phenomena which appear in immediate experience and to gain direct intuition into their essential structures and meanings.

Husserl’s attitude toward religion is open to several interpretations. Though the majority of Husserl scholars have assumed that he had little or no interest in religion, several scholars, largely on the basis of unpublished manuscripts, correspondence, and conversations, have submitted that religion and “the problem of God” were serious concerns for Husserl.

Born to Jewish parents, Husserl became an Evangelical Lutheran in 1887. A few individuals have claimed that he had a religious conversion on his deathbed, but this report has been widely challenged. In general, Husserl’s phenomenological suspension of all judgments about what is real produced a tolerance toward all “genuine” religious phenomena. In addition, many scholars have commented that Husserl often conceived his phenomenological approach in terms of a “conversion,” and that he regarded his philosophical mission with a kind of religious fervor. It does seem, however, that Husserl had little interest in a personal God or in any other aspect of traditional religion; he rejected the externals of religion and all theological dogma. On the other hand, scattered references to God appear in *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*; passages with religious reference or implication are found also in later works such as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936) and in Dorion Cairns’s *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (1976); and a greater number of religious references appear in Husserl’s diaries and in later unpublished manuscripts and correspondence.

Although these passages tend to be vague, underdeveloped, and open to conflicting interpretations, it is apparent that, according to Husserl, God is neither a personal deity nor a cause of the world, but an “idea” within the context of universal teleology. God as idea is the *telos*, that is, the universal and ideal end and the transcendent motivating force and final principle in the evolution of reason. Furthermore, Husserl cryptically comments that only with an understanding of the “transcendental consciousness” of phenomenology can we “understand the transcendence of God,” and that “ethical-religious questions are the last questions of phenomenological constitution” (Cairns, *Conversations*, 1976, p. 47).

Husserl’s major contribution to the study of religion is found in later attempts by scholars to apply a modified Husserlian analysis to religion. Husserl’s influence can be seen in the phenomenological works of Max Scheler, Gerardus van der Leeuw, Paul Ricoeur, and many others. Phenomenology of religion has characterized itself as radically descriptive and antireductionistic. It has often adopted Husserlian terms, such as *epochē* and “eidetic vision,” and has sometimes utilized aspects of Husserl’s phenomenological method.

To a lesser extent, Husserl’s phenomenology has influenced philosophy of religion and theology. In the appendix to his *Ecclesial Man* (1975), Edward Farley surveys the impact of phenomenology on numerous Catholic and Protestant philosophers and theologians, submitting that Max Scheler was the dominant figure in the

field during the period between 1921–1934, and that the philosopher and theologian Henri Duméry, who applies an Husserlian method to the study of religion, has dominated the period from the 1950s to the present.

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Although there have been thousands of titles devoted to Husserl (Lapointe lists 3,879 publications), relatively few are concerned with religion. Perhaps the best source on this subject is *The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology*, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, volume 9 of "Analecta Husserliana" (Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1979). This volume includes several articles on Husserl, religious experience, and theology, of which Stephan Strasser's "History, Teleology, and God in the Philosophy of Husserl" is especially noteworthy. Edward Farley's *Ecclesial Man* (Philadelphia, 1975) utilizes Husserl's phenomenology in formulating a phenomenological theology and surveys the impact of Husserl's phenomenology on Catholic and Protestant philosophy of religion and theology.

DOUGLAS ALLEN

**HUTCHINSON, ANNE** (1591–1643), central figure in the antinomian controversy in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636–1637. A native of Alford, Lincolnshire, Anne Marbury married William Hutchinson, an affluent merchant of that town, and mothered a large family. Around 1630 she came under the religious influence of John Cotton, vicar of Saint Botolph's in nearby Boston, and four years later she and her family followed him to the newly settled town of Boston in New England.

The Puritans of the English Congregational churches had sought to leaven John Calvin's harsh predestination decree by incorporating a concrete assurance of election that would be contingent on the moral responsibility of the elect. They asserted that the hopeful believer could prepare his soul for the reception of God's saving grace through a life of purity that might offer evidence of salvation. John Cotton, however, warned that this innova-

tion imperiled the basic Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone. The believer must receive "witness of the Spirit itself," he wrote, before he could advance his moral condition as evidence of a state of grace.

Anne Hutchinson incautiously distorted Cotton's doctrine by asserting that the gift of grace implied the actual indwelling of the spirit of the Lord, mystically uniting the elect to himself, thus rendering superfluous all other evidence of salvation. This conclusion verged perilously on the antinomian heresy, which held that Christians are freed from the moral law of the Old Testament by the new dispensation of grace proffered in the gospel.

Hutchinson communicated her beliefs in the guise of an informal exegesis of Cotton's weekly sermons. Large numbers of people attended these doctrinal discussions at her home in Boston, and a majority of the local congregation, including most of the town's political and mercantile leaders, became enthusiastic disciples. When, at last, she accused all the Massachusetts clergy except Cotton of preaching a covenant of works, she precipitated a factional division that aroused the colony. Soon the religious breach assumed political dimensions and threatened the public safety.

The orthodox leaders, seeing the future of the colony at stake, regained political ascendancy by enlisting the support of outlying agricultural communities. A clerical synod declared Hutchinson guilty of holding numerous erroneous opinions, most of them inferential extensions of her central doctrine. Arraigned before the General Court in November 1637, Hutchinson unguardedly boasted that she had received revelations from the Holy Spirit, a heretical claim that horrified all orthodox Puritans. Repudiated by Cotton, excommunicated from the Boston church, and banished from the colony, she fled with family and friends to neighboring Rhode Island. Further dissension prompted her removal to New Netherland where, in 1643, she and her younger children were massacred by Indians.

Hutchinson left behind neither a religious organization nor a fixed system of belief. Although a remarkably intelligent and courageous woman, she seems to have been intolerant of religious doctrines other than her own. But the struggle of such sectarians who sought freedom of conscience for themselves prompted a diversity of beliefs that paved the way to a general freedom of religion for later generations.

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EMERY J. BATTIS

**HUTNER, YITSHAQ** (1907–1980), Jewish ultra-orthodox religious thinker and teacher. Born in Warsaw into a family prominently identified with Kotzk Hasidism (a highly intellectualized, re-rabbinized, and idiosyncratic form of Hasidism), Hutner was early recognized as so promising a student that he was literally snatched away to the rabbinical academy in Slobodka, famous for its combination of traditional Talmudic studies with pietistic Musar movement ideas and scientific analysis of sacred texts. Here he became a protégé of its head, Natan Tsevi Finkel. In 1926 Hutner went to study in Hebron, where in turn he became a protégé not only of Avraham Yitshaq Kook, the first Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Palestine and a supporter of Zionism, but also of the non-Zionist Joseph Hayyim Sonnenfeld. Both endorsed Hutner's first book, *Torat ha-Nazir* (Kovno, 1932), on Maimonides' *Laws of Nazirites*. After the riots of 1929 uprooted the Jewish community of Hebron, Hutner returned to Warsaw and then studied at the University of Berlin. In 1932 he returned to Palestine, and in 1935 he came to New York. Here he founded and headed the rabbinical academy and seminary Yeshivah Rabbi Chaim Berlin/Bet Midrash Gur Aryeh; eventually he also headed its sister institution in Jerusalem. For the rest of his life he commuted between the two schools, at one time finding himself on a hijacked plane in Jordan. He died in Jerusalem.

On the practical side Hutner was a member of the Council of Torah Sages in Israel. This council, which is part of the Agudat Yisra'el organization, is regarded as the religious authority by ultraorthodox institutions and individuals, and it plays a critical role in determining their attitudes toward such issues as Zionism, the

legitimacy of the state of Israel, and secular education. Its academies produce large numbers of rabbis, rabbinic scholars, and especially teachers for Jewish schools. Hutner presided over Torah u-Mesorah, the Orthodox educational agency. He published a considerable body of writing, especially *Paḥad Yitshaq*, 8 vols. (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1963–1981), which comprises his lectures at the academies on special occasions; *Haggahot 'al perush R. Hillel 'al Sifre* (Jerusalem, 1961); and a volume of letters and writings.

Hutner's theological and religious posture can be seen as informed by his checkered life story. He combined traditional rabbinism with Qabbalah and Hasidism, plus modernistic Jewish cultural and even non-Jewish philosophical and historical concepts (the latter usually by implication). Their synthesis in a striking and both substantively and literarily felicitous body of teachings accounts for Hutner's widespread impact.

The theoretical writings are altogether too subtle, rich, and profound to lend themselves to encapsulation. They belong in the historic Jewish literary genre of *midrash halakhah*—the highly spiritualized and ethicized, in this instance also esoteric, exploration of Jewish law. Methodologically, Hutner's thought is informed by a pronounced qabbalistic (i.e., quasi-Neoplatonic) dialecticism.

In broadest terms, Hutner offers the following worldview. The "hidden God" reveals himself in the universe, specifically through the Torah and the people of Israel. The universe is thus dialectically both a product of God and essentially alienated from God, and esoterically the Unity looms beyond phenomenal multiplicity. Every Jew is potentially a fragment of the metaphysical truth within historic reality. History itself is defined by the evils of its distance from God and the manifold nature of this evil, which encompasses sin, death, enmity to Israel and its Torah, and so on. Two forces impel history toward the restoration of the primordial unity: the Jewish enactment of Torah and the inner dialectic of the historic evils themselves. Indeed, the denouement is imminent. Then the unity of Israel and of mankind in the Jewish truth will presage the restoration of the primordial unity of the hidden God himself.

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STEVEN S. SCHWARZSCHILD

**HUTTERIAN BRETHREN.** The Hutterian Brethren are a branch of Anabaptist Christians originally organized by Jacob Hutter (d. 1536). [See Anabaptism.] Hutter's followers, known still as Hutterites, accept the year 1528 as the date of their founding because it was then that the founders decided to pool their resources and—unlike their Anabaptist counterparts the Amish and the Mennonites—to hold “all things common.” [See also Mennonites.] Although they have no objection to the name Hutterites, they prefer to be known as Hutterian Brethren or simply Brethren.

Jacob Hutter, a hat maker whose surname means “hatter,” was a Swiss Anabaptist minister who promulgated the practice of adult baptism, rejection of oaths, pacifism, and nonassimilation. He apparently had some education, since he spoke well and had a knowledge of geography and basic mathematics. He was also a firm disciplinarian and a brilliant organizer. Journeying in 1529 from the Tyrol to Moravia, he found disarray and dissension among various congregations of Anabaptists. With an unwavering hand, he was able to overcome the schisms and impart a sense of mission.

Hutter was a man of indomitable will and exceptional courage. During a trip to the Tyrol in 1536, he was abducted and imprisoned by his enemies. Despite torture, he refused to give up his beliefs in the separation of church and state, and he refused to take oaths, to bear arms, or to abandon his economic communalism. In February of that year he was burned at the stake. After only three years as leader, he had become a martyr.

Following the death of Jacob Hutter, Hans Amon became head of the church. After Amon's death in 1542, Peter Rideman, one of Hutter's former assistants, assumed leadership. Like Hutter, Rideman was a man of total conviction. His beliefs, heretical to prevailing ones, prompted his imprisonment for nine years. Following his death in 1556, the Brethren continued to grow. By 1600 they numbered some 25,000 members.

The so-called golden years ended abruptly, however, and during the 1600s and 1700s persecution became relentless. Hutterite numbers dwindled, and those who remained faithful were forced eastward, to Moravia, Transylvania, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. Under a promise of religious freedom, the Brethren were able to survive in Russia from 1770 to 1870, at which time the promise was withdrawn. Between 1874 and 1877 the entire Hutterite population, more than one thousand members, emigrated to the United States. The communal members, approximately four hundred, settled in South Dakota in three separate colonies known as Bruderhofs. These proved to be successful and growth

was rapid. By the time of World War I, some seventeen hundred Brethren lived in seventeen Bruderhofs.

Because of their refusal to bear arms, the war brought great difficulties to the Hutterites. Hostility caused all but one Bruderhof to relocate to Canada, but after the war many returned to the United States. During World War II, the Brethren were granted conscientious-objector status.

By the 1980s the Hutterites had grown to 250 Bruderhofs with a population of thirty thousand members scattered throughout the Midwest and Canada. Each Bruderhof is a self-supporting agricultural community employing modern farm machinery. All property is owned communally by approximately 150 members. If a group grows beyond this number, branches are set up. The Bruderhof is administered by five or six men elected for a lifetime. Women do not serve on the council, nor are they permitted to vote. The minister of each Bruderhof is both the spiritual and the secular head.

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WILLIAM M. KEPHART

**HYPOSTASIS** is a Greek noun that became an important term in philosophical and theological speculation. The use of the term in Greek philosophy, especially in Platonism, contributed directly to its use as a technical term in Christian theology and in gnosticism. The term is also used in modern scholarship in the history of religions. This article will stress the use of the term *hypostasis* in early Christianity and gnosticism.

**General Usage.** As a verbal substantive the Greek word *hypostasis* depends for its meaning on the verb *huphistēmi* (lit., “stand under”); it can mean the act of “standing under” or the result of that action. A wide range of meanings flow from these possibilities, including such abstract meanings as “origin,” “substance,” “real nature,” and so on.



**Greek Philosophy.** The fifth-century Christian historian Socrates, in the context of his discussion of the Synod of Alexandria (362), tells us that the founders of Greek philosophy never used the term *hupostasis*, though they often used another term, *ousia* ("being," "substance," etc.). While the ancient philosophers ignored the term *hupostasis*, the more recent ones (in Socrates' terms) have used the term as an equivalent of *ousia*. This statement and its context imply (correctly) that the use of the term *hupostasis* in Christian theology is largely dependent upon its usage by the Greek philosophers.

**Stoicism.** It is among the Stoics that *hupostasis* was first used as a philosophical (ontological) term. In Stoicism *hupostasis* comes to be used to refer to being that has "attained reality," that is, objective or concrete reality. It is Posidonius (first century BCE) who gives the noun *hupostasis* this particular sense. Posidonius also uses the term in an antithesis: objects in nature such as rain and hail "have *hupostasis*" (i.e., reality), in contrast to the rainbow, which exists "according to semblance" (*kat' emphasin*). Another Stoic, Cornutus (first century CE) applies the term to theology: Zeus is "father of gods and men" in that he is the cause of their hypostasis, that is, their objective reality. The Roman Stoic Seneca (first century CE) uses the Latin term *substantia* in an analogous sense, referring to centaurs, giants, and so on, which are fanciful beings not having *substantia* ("reality").

**Platonism.** Plato did not use the term *hupostasis*. Later Platonists adopted the term from the Stoics, probably by way of Posidonius. Middle Platonists of the second century deny that sense-perceptible objects have their own hypostasis. That is, the term *hupostasis* cannot be used to refer to matter, for the truly real is immaterial. In the Platonic context one can regard *hupostasis* ("reality") as virtually identical with *ousia* ("being, substance"). When they are distinguished in Neoplatonic usage, *hupostasis* has the sense of a more particular reality that has been brought into actuality by a higher cause.

Plotinus (third century) is the originator of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the hypostases, or "first principles," though in fact his use of the term *hupostasis* is still rather fluid. He developed the doctrine of three "first principles" (*archai*): the One (*to hen*), Intellect or Mind (*nous*), and Soul (*psuchē*). The *locus classicus* of this doctrine is *Enneads* 5.1, to which Porphyry gave the title *Concerning the Three Primal Hypostases*.

Plotinus's hierarchy of being, involving the doctrine of the hypostases, can be summarized as follows. (1) Being flows from being. (2) The realization of the lower

hypostasis occurs as a result of the next higher one's "activity" (*energeia*). (3) Yet the higher level is not thereby diminished. (4) Each perfect hypostasis is dependent upon the preceding one, as multiplicity is to unity. (5) The One is ground of all being. (See Dörrie, 1955, p. 72.) Plotinus also says of the "first hypostasis," that is, the One, that it is "prior to *hupostasis*" and "beyond being." (See Witt, 1933, pp. 337–342.) That the One transcends hypostasis is the standard view of the later Neoplatonists. The usage of Proclus (fifth century), for example, involves the tendency, generally observable in Neoplatonism from Iamblichus (fourth century) on, to multiply hypostases and levels within them. Proclus sees in each hypostasis a triadic movement of remaining, procession, and reversion. One can then define the term *hupostasis* as distinct from two other important ontological terms, *huparxis* ("existence") and *ousia* ("being"). While *ousia* is sometimes used as a synonym of *hupostasis* and sometimes as a synonym of *huparxis*, the latter connotes unity, whereas *hupostasis* connotes triplicity. *Ousia* is thus a more flexible term in Neoplatonism. (See Gersh, 1973, pp. 31–37.)

**The Septuagint and Philo.** Christian usage of the term *hupostasis* presupposes not only some of the philosophical background already discussed but also the use of the term in the Greek Bible (the Septuagint) and in Hellenistic (Greek-speaking) Judaism, such as is represented by Philo of Alexandria.

**The Septuagint.** *Hupostasis* occurs in the Septuagint some twenty times, corresponding to twelve different words in the Hebrew scriptures (in some cases *hupostasis* is hardly a correct translation). The meaning of the word in the Septuagint is very fluid, corresponding to general usage, though the notion of "reality" is present in a number of cases. For example, *Ruth* 1:12, where *hupostasis* means "reality" as a guarantee, renders the Hebrew word for "hope." The most important meaning of the word in the Septuagint is "underlying reality behind something" (Koester, 1972, pp. 581–582).

**Philo.** Philo's use of *hupostasis* reflects both Stoic and Middle Platonic influences. Philo says, for example, that a ray of light "does not have its own *hupostasis*," that is, it does not have its own "substantial existence" (*On the Eternity of the World* 88), reflecting a Stoic use of *hupostasis*. The Middle Platonic example is found in a passage where Philo refers to the immaterial "intelligible world" (*kosmos noētēs*) as "the world of intelligible *hupostasis*," that is, of reality, to which is contrasted the material world of sense perception (*On Dreams* 1.188). But Philo would finally attribute ultimate reality only to God, the ground of all being. Using a form of the verb *huphistēmi*, Philo says, "God alone subsists in

being," basing his statement on *Exodus 3:14* (*The Worse Attacks the Better* 160).

**Early Christianity.** A wide variety of meanings of the word *hypostasis* can be found in early Christian literature, but from the fourth century on the term comes to be used in special senses in dogmatic formulations on the Trinity and the doctrine of Christ (Christology). Greek philosophical influence becomes more and more evident in these contexts.

**The New Testament and early patristic literature.** *Hypostasis* occurs five times in the New Testament, twice in *Paul* and thrice in *Hebrews*. The two Pauline instances are *2 Corinthians* 9:4 and 11:17, where in both verses the term means something like "situation" (not "confidence"). In *Hebrews* 1:3 Christ, as Son of God, is called the "reflection of [God's] glory and the stamp (*charaktēr*) of his *hypostasis*," that is, of God's transcendent reality. *Hebrews* 11:1 contains a famous definition of faith (*pistis*) as "the *hypostasis* of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen," wherein the word *hypostasis* means "realization" (rather than "assurance," as in the usual psychologizing interpretation; see Mathis, 1922, p. 87). *Hebrews* 3:14 should be interpreted accordingly: in this verse *hypostasis* refers to the "realization" (by faith) of Christ, already commenced in the life of the Christian community. (See Koester, 1972, p. 587.)

Beginning with Tatian in the second century, the term *hypostasis* comes to be used more often and takes on a distinct philosophical and theological cast. Tatian refers to God as the *hypostasis*, or "absolute reality," of the universe, inasmuch as he has brought all things into being. Tatian can also refer to the *hypostasis*, or "real nature," of the demons as "reflections of evil." The author of the *Epistle to Diognetus* (2.1) challenges the heathen to reflect on what sort of *hypostasis* ("real nature") or form their so-called gods have. In one of the recently discovered Coptic texts from Nag Hammadi, *The Teachings of Silvanus*, a Christian document whose Greek original probably dates from the second century, it is said that "Christ has a single *hypostasis*" (99.13) and that he is "incomprehensible with respect to his *hypostasis*" (102.3). Here the term means "real nature." This text represents a transitional stage in the development of a trinitarian and Christological use of the term *hypostasis*.

**Trinitarian theology.** The main issue confronting early Christian theologians was how to reconcile a belief in the deity of Christ (and the Holy Spirit) with the belief in only one God, a fundamental inheritance from Judaism. In the development of Christian trinitarian dogma such basic philosophical terms as *ousia* and *hypostasis* come to play a decisive role. But it was not im-

mediately evident how these terms should be defined in relation to each other. The same fluidity of usage can be seen among Christian theologians as has already been observed in the discussion of Greek philosophy.

Socrates stated that the terms *hypostasis* and *ousia* were being used as equivalents by Greek philosophers. We have seen, however, that the terms come to achieve greater specificity in later Neoplatonism. The same thing happens in Christian theology. Origen (third century), while sometimes using the terms as virtual equivalents, does speak of the one God as monad, but also as a *trias* ("trinity") containing three *hypostaseis*, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Origen is also probably the first to speak of Christ as *homoousios* ("of the same substance") with the Father. (The gnostics had already used this word, but in another context; see Stead, 1977, pp. 190–202.) Thus Origen posits for the Deity a unity of *ousia*, or "substance," as genus, but a triad of *hypostaseis*, in the sense of three distinct species (Wolfson, 1970, p. 322). It is this language that becomes standard in Greek trinitarian theology.

It is possible that the second-century gnostic Valentinus "was the first to think of three *hypostaseis* and three persons [*prosōpa*; lit., "faces"], Father, Son and Holy Spirit" (fragment 9), but this statement may reflect a later terminology. (The fragment is found in Pseudo-Anthimus, who is perhaps identifiable as Marcellus of Ancyra, of the fourth century.)

Tertullian (second to third century) used the Latin term *substantia* as equivalent to the Greek *ousia* (though its exact Greek etymological counterpart is *hypostasis*), and expressed the unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as *una substantia*. He used the term *persona* (probably derived from juridical language) to refer to each of the three members of the Trinity. This is the language that became standard in Latin trinitarian theology.

It was not until the fifth century that orthodox trinitarian terminology became standardized. The Council of Nicaea (325), in rejecting the Arian heresy and adopting the *homoousios* formula to express the relationship between Father and Son, nevertheless used the words *ousia* and *hypostasis* as synonyms. At the Synod of Alexandria in 362, under the influence of Athanasius, the designation *treis hypostaseis* ("three hypostases") was officially adopted, though even there *mia hypostasis* was conceded to express the unity of the divine being as well as *mia ousia*. The Cappadocian fathers of the fourth century, especially Basil of Caesarea, were influential in the eventual differentiation of *ousia*, as the more common term, from *hypostasis*, the more particular. Hence the Council of Chalcedon (451) could define the unity of God as a unity of *ousia* and characterize the individual

members of the Trinity as three perfect hypostaseis or three perfect *prosōpa* (Lat., *personae*).

It should be noted that Christian theological development of the term *hypostasis* runs parallel to that of the Neoplatonist philosophers. But, in the final analysis, in orthodox Christian trinitarian language the three hypostases are coordinated, whereas in Neoplatonism lower hypostases are subordinated to the higher in a chain of being, and all hypostases are ultimately subordinated to the One.

**Christology.** As the distinction between *hypostasis* and *ousia* was gradually being defined a new problem was arising: the relation between *hypostasis* and *phusis* ("nature") in the context of Christology, that is, in descriptions of Christ as both God and man. [See Jesus.] Apollinarius of Laodicea (fourth century) virtually equated the two terms, maintaining that Christ, even after the incarnation, is "one nature, one *hypostasis*." Apollinarius was widely denounced as a heretic. In the early fifth century a very different Christology was propounded by Nestorius: Christ has two natures (*phuseis*), divinity and humanity, and each *phusis* has its own *hypostasis* ("substantial reality"). Cyril of Alexandria, the archenemy of Nestorius, developed the notion of a "hypostatic union": Christ has two natures, but they are united *kath' hypostasin* (lit., "according to hypostasis," i.e., in reality). Pope Leo I, in his famous *Tome*, defined the relationship between Christ's divinity and humanity as a duality in nature but a unity in person or *hypostasis*, and it is this formula that became standardized at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 ("two natures . . . one *prosōpon* and one *hypostasis*"). However, the distinction between *hypostasis* and *phusis* thus achieved was never accepted by the so-called monophysite churches, which continue to reject the Chalcedonian formulation.

**Gnosticism.** The word *hypostasis* was used by certain second-century gnostics, as attested both in Greek patristic testimonies and in the recently available Coptic texts from Nag Hammadi.

**Greek testimonies.** We have already noted that Valentinus may have been the first to think of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three *hypostaseis*. Other Valentinian gnostic uses of the term are more reliably attested. In the system of Ptolemy, as reported by Irenaeus, a primal divine Ogdoad is posited as the "root and *hypostasis* of all things" (*Against Heresies* 1.1.1). Here the term has the connotation of "origin" as well as "underlying reality." Later in the same system three "underlying" (*hupokeimenoi*) entities are posited: "matter" (*hulē*), "the psychic" (*to psuchikon*), and "the spiritual" (*to pneumatikon*). These entities are subsequently referred to with the terms *ousia* and *hypostasis*, used in-

terchangeably. These entities exist also in man, and the *pneumatikē hypostasis* is the "spiritual reality" of the gnostic, incapable of being sullied by anything in the world (1.6.2.). The Valentinians can even refer to the "spiritual *hypostasis*" of evil, quoting *Ephesians* 6:12 in this connection (1.5.4). Here the term means "reality" or "real nature," as in other second-century Christian literature (e.g., Tatian).

Marcus, a Valentinian gnostic teacher, developed a speculative system based on the letters of the alphabet. Irenaeus, in describing this system, says that Marcus constructs the *ousia* and *hypostasis* (i.e., "real nature") of the incorporeal and insubstantial Father out of many letters of the alphabet, but the technical terminology here may be that of Irenaeus himself. Monoemus the Arab, a gnostic known to us only from the testimony of Hippolytus, applied numerology in his interpretation of the Bible. The composition of numbers as "corporeal *hypostaseis*" (i.e., "realities") out of the primal monad is for him an analogy to the generation of the Son of man from the unknown Perfect Man (*Refutation of All Heresies* 8.13).

Plotinus accuses the gnostics known to him of introducing "other *hypostaseis*," such as "exiles" (*paroikēseis*), "impressions" (*antitupoi*) and "repentances" (*metanoiai*) (*Enneads* 2.9.6), referring doubtless to a gnostic mythological-metaphysical system in which those entities occur, presumably as "levels of reality." (These terms actually occur in some of the Coptic texts known to us—*Zostrianos*, for example—though the term *hypostasis* is not found in that connection.)

**Coptic texts.** The fourth tractate in Nag Hammadi Codex II is given the title *The Hypostasis of the Archons* and has as its main subject matter the "reality" of the cosmic "rulers." The meaning of the term in that text, which opens with a quotation from *Ephesians* 6:12, is akin to that of the Valentinian usage noted above ("hypostasis of evil"), but it also bears the connotation of "origin," as the content of the text attests (*hypostasis* is so used at 93.35).

In the *Apocryphon of John*, the term *hypostasis* is used of the "being" created by the Demiurge according to the image of God (15.9); of the seven psychic "substances" out of which Adam's psychic body is created (15.25); and of the "reality" of the flesh borne by the gnostic before his final redemption (25.34).

In the *Gospel of the Egyptians*, it is said that the Demiurge "trusted in his *hypostasis*," that is, his "nature" (59.1). In the *Sophia of Jesus Christ*, the term *hypostasis* is used twice of the "real nature" of the universe (91.3, 92.4).

In *A Valentinian Exposition*, the Son is said to be the "hypostasis of the Father," that is, the Father's "real na-

ture" (24.23). Later he is called "the *hupostasis* of the All" (25.33), that is, the "underlying reality," or perhaps "origin," of the All.

The term *hupostasis* is also used in two non-Christian gnostic texts of the late second or early third century, both of them heavily influenced by Platonic philosophy: *Allogenes*, a text known to Plotinus and his school, and *Marsanes*. In *Allogenes* a divine being called the Triple Power or Autogenes is said to be a "*hupostasis* of the primacy of the One who truly exists." Here the term means "real nature" but also has the connotation of "first principle" or "hypostasis" in the Neoplatonist sense. In *Marsanes* the term also means "real nature": of the Three-Powered One (9.17); of the Dyad (32.18); and of the redeemed gnostic (40.1).

In gnosticism the term *hupostasis* was used in a variety of ways under the influence of popular (mainly Platonist) philosophy, but it never achieved a consistent philosophical or theological definition, even if gnostic usage contributed, positively or negatively, to the formulations of Neoplatonist philosophy and Christian theology.

**History of Religions Scholarship.** The English term *hypostasis* is used in modern scholarship in the study of religion to refer to various "hypostatizations" (or "hypostasizations"), that is, mythic objectifications or personifications of divine qualities, gifts, or attributes or of abstract concepts or aspects of human existence, whereby such entities assume an identity of their own. Such "hypostases" are very widespread in ancient religions. Examples are Dike ("justice") in ancient Greece, Maat ("truth") in ancient Egypt, and Ḥokhmah ("wisdom") in ancient Israel. Such hypostases proliferate in the religious syncretism of the Greco-Roman world, and some of them (e.g., Tyche, "fortune") even acquire their own cultus. Wisdom is an especially important hypostasis in biblical religion (*Prov.* 8:22–31; *Ben Sira* 24:1–22), and her manifestation as Sophia in Greek-speaking Judaism (*Wisdom of Solomon*; the works of Philo Judaeus) is of great importance for the development of early Christian Christology as well as early gnostic mythology.

It should be stressed that the use of the term *hypostasis* for such entities is a modern development of the Greek term, though ultimately derived from the ancient

philosophical usage. (See Ringgren, 1947, 1959.) An ancient intimation of such usage can be found in Plotinus (*Enneads* 3.5.2): the heavenly Aphrodite, as child of Kronos ("mind") is "the most divine kind of Soul" and "a separate *hupostasis*." (See Koester, 1972, p. 577.)

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BIRGER A. PEARSON

# I



I. See Jen and I.

**IBERIAN RELIGION** is the product of a long period of development built upon the religious traditions of the Tartessians (who inhabited southern Spain from the ninth to sixth century BCE) and the Turdetans (a later branch of the Tartessians), themselves dependent in part on borrowings from the cultures of the ancient Mediterranean lands and the Near East. In order to understand Iberian religion, therefore, we must begin with the Tartessians and Turdetans.

**Religion of the Tartessians.** The only known Iberian myth refers to the Tartessian era and has been passed down by the third-century Roman historian Justin, who summarizes Pompeius Trogus's *Historiae Philippicae* (44.4.1). This myth concerns the culture hero Habis, who dictated the first laws. He divided his people into seven cities; taught them how to cultivate the land and improve their food supply; and forbade the nobles to work. Like culture heroes in the Greco-Roman world, such as Romulus, Theseus, and Triptolemus, Habis was a king. Other myths of the Tartessian era are Eastern in origin and were brought by the Phoenicians. They include the myth of Gilgamesh, depicted on a belt from La Aliseda (Cáceres), a western Phoenician work of 600 BCE, and on a stone relief from Pozo Moro (Albacete) dating from the fifth century BCE.

The Phoenicians also introduced their gods to the Tartessians, who accepted them. One such goddess is Astarte, whose cult images have been found in El Carambolo (Seville), Castulo (Jaén), Galera (Granada), Berrueco (Salamanca), and Pozo Moro. All of these are

modeled on Oriental images of the goddess. The Phoenicians also brought with them the cult of Reshef, of whom various images have been found in Huelva, Medina de las Torres (Badajoz), Carmona (Seville), and Cádiz. It is also likely that the Phoenicians spread the cult of Adonis among the Tartessians because there are traces of great archaism in the Adonia festivals. These were celebrated in Hispalis (Seville) at the beginning of the Tetrarchy, the period (286–266 BCE) that marks the rule of the emperors Diocleciano, Maximiano, Constancio Cloro, and Galerio. In addition, the cult of Bes was practiced in the south of the Iberian Peninsula, as evidenced by his images on a neckpiece from El Cortijo de Evosa. The Tartessians also accepted various Phoenician amulets, which appear on neckpieces from La Aliseda and in Iberian bronze and stone votive offerings.

Although the Tartessians, and later the Iberians, usually copied the Semitic type of sanctuary, there was a sanctuary, dedicated to Astarte, typical of Archaic Greece on the hillside of El Carambolo. Here cattle were sacrificed and offerings made in clay vessels that probably contained liquid. In Castulo, from the end of the seventh century BCE and going into the sixth, a sanctuary of the type of the Semites of Cyprus and Israel was used. The offerings were clay vessels, which were broken on the ground, placed in ditches, and covered with sand. These vessels also probably contained a liquid. Similar sanctuaries have been found in Carmona, dating to the seventh century BCE, and in the south of Portugal, from the fourth and third centuries BCE. In the Castulo sanctuary there is a terra-cotta bull on the altar, as there is in the sanctuaries of Cyprus; the bull was probably a cult object. A kitchen for cooking the meats

that were eaten in the sanctuary has yielded the two oldest mosaics of the Iberian Peninsula.

Other sanctuaries, which first appeared during the Tartessian era and continued through the Turdetan and Iberian epochs, have been unearthed in Despeñaperros, Sierra Morena (Jaén). These sanctuaries, known as Collado de los Jardines and Castellar de Santisteban, were located next to caves and fountains in rugged terrain. They have yielded about six thousand small bronze votive offerings. The oldest of these follow Phoenician models, while the others imitate Greek and indigenous models. The sanctuaries also contain animal figures and parts of the human body. The attitudes depicted on these offerings, primarily of a person making the offering and another one praying, are typical of the East. Libations, animal sacrifices, and sacred dances seem to have been offered. The most common offering, however, was the votive itself. There was probably no organized priesthood but, rather, a few holy men responsible for placing the votive offerings in the ditches.

These sanctuaries, which were first built in the seventh century BCE, were the prototypes of other sanctuaries found in the Iberian zone, such as that of Nuestra Señora de la Luz (Murcia). They were probably all sacred to numinous beings who watched over life and fecundity in their most diverse aspects, and they probably never developed any further religious function. The devout asked for tangible favors.

The Phoenicians introduced the Tartessian peoples to the funeral rites of the East. The most famous necropolises of this time (the seventh and sixth centuries BCE) are those of La Joya (Huelva), Setefilla (Seville), Medellín (Cáceres), Castulo, and the grave of La Aliseda. All of these were built by highly semiticized indigenous peoples who followed the Phoenician rituals. Thus, in La Joya, metal platters used for libations or burning incense appear with Astarte heads, and the tombs contain funeral banquet plates and chariots, just as in Cyprus. In Setefilla and Castulo there are nomads resembling those in the north of Syria.

The funeral rite itself was the same in the necropolises of Setefilla, Carmona, and Medellín: it consisted of the incineration of the corpses. Offerings associated with fire, possibly ritual in nature, were made near the burial. The bones of the corpse were pulverized, placed in urns, and covered with a plate. The grave was then filled with ashes or cinders. Finger cymbals found in Medellín attest to funeral dances, which are also depicted on certain stelae, such as the Stela of Ategua (Cordova). A tomb at La Aliseda, which probably belonged to a woman of the nobility, contained all manner of Phoenician jewels.

**Religion of the Turdetans.** From the late sixth century BCE to the arrival of the Romans at the end of the third century BCE, the Turdetan culture—one contemporary to that of the Iberians—flourished in the south of the Iberian Peninsula. The Turdetans continued the Phoenician cult to such goddesses as Astarte (depicted on jewels from Santiago de la Espada, Jaén) and to the Lady of Baza (Granada). A mother goddess, probably corresponding to Tanit, has also been attested. She appears in the Valley of Abdalajis (Málaga) and four times in the sanctuary of Castellar de Santisteban (Jaén). The goddess Athena was worshiped in areas now in the modern-day provinces of Cordova and Jaén. Artemis, associated with the stag, was venerated in Obulco (Jaén). Livy, writing of the events of the Second Punic War, which took place in Astapa (Seville), mentions the gods of heaven and hell (28.22).

Roman coins from the south of the Iberian Peninsula, dating from the Hellenistic era, indicate that the Romans were familiar with pre-Roman cults, themselves superimposed upon even earlier cults and creating a mixture of indigenous and Greco-Punic traditions. According to Diodorus Siculus (*Historical Library* 4.12.2), cows were held sacred. They were believed to be the descendants of the cows that Herakles had given to a petty Iberian king. Bulls, as evidenced by an image from Obulco (fourth century BCE), also appear to have been cult objects. The veneration of fantastic animals such as the sphinx and the griffin probably belongs to a later time.

The sanctuaries of the Tartessian era continued to be used by the Turdetans and were active until the time of Constantine. In addition, several places were believed to be sacred to Baal Hammon: Palos (Avienius, *Maritime Shores* 452); Segres (ibid., 215–216); and San Vicente (Strabo, *Geography* 138), an island (Avienius, *Maritime Shores* 164–165) with a sacred area where water libations were made and a rite involving the manipulation of sacred stones was performed.

The funeral rites of the Turdetans continued to be the same as those of the Tartessian period, but certain novelties were introduced, such as setting up images of lions or bulls to protect the tombs. These begin to appear in the fourth century BCE. Important persons buried in Heroon, like those at Pozo Moro, Obulco, and Carmona, were immortalized as heroes and gods. Battle scenes with warriors bearing the arms of the central plateau are depicted at Obulco. They are the work of Phocaeen artists of the second half of the fifth century BCE. Both the Carmona and the Obulco tombs portray funeral rites, battles, offerings of libations, and musicians. The former dates to the early third century BCE.

A sarcophagus from El Cortijo de Maquí (Jaén) testifies that the wolf was apparently associated with funerals. A Perotito saucer found at Cordova, decorated with funeral scenes from the Greek world, provides evidence of the assimilation of a Greek funeral symbolism by the indigenous peoples at the start of the Hellenistic period.

**Religion of the Iberians.** Iberian religion included a variety of myths and deities, many of which reflect foreign influence. For instance, an Iberian vessel from Los Villares de Caudete de las Fuentes (Valencia, second century BCE) shows that the Iberians had a myth of the battle of the giants that might have been of Greek origin. Similarly, the Phoenician symbolism that had been adopted by the Tartessians and the Turdetans was also employed by the Iberians. More important, however, were the mother goddesses who have been documented among the Iberians (at Serreta de Alcoy, Valencia, and Albufereta, Alicante). The Serreta image is of particular importance because it proves that the cult of the goddess included religious dances accompanied by music. The enthroned noblewomen of Llano de la Consolación and of Cabecico del Tesoro (Murcia) are images of Mother Earth.

The bust of the Lady of Elche (Alicante), a masterpiece of Iberian art dating from the fifth or fourth century BCE, is probably an image of the cult of the Carthaginian goddess Tanit, who was worshiped by the Iberians with all her Cyprian and Oriental symbolism. She is also depicted among horses in the Hellenistic Elche pottery. A coin from Elche, dated to the time of Caesar, indicates that Tanit was that city's principal goddess. Most probably she was assimilated to the Ephesian Artemis, whose cult was introduced among the Iberians by the Phocaeans (Strabo, 179) and who was celebrated with the same rite as in the metropolis. A painting on an Elche vessel shows that religious dances were also associated with her cult. Unfortunately our knowledge is limited by the fact that in the late fifth century and again in the fourth and third centuries BCE, the Mediterranean shores of Spain, and the south generally, witnessed a great destruction of cult images and stone votive offerings. The reasons for the destruction are unknown.

There was a temple in Sagunto dedicated to Artemis, from which a large linen cloth has been preserved. The foundations of another temple have been preserved in Ullastret (Gerona). Other sanctuaries from Mediterranean Spain, similar to those of the Tartessian epoch, are found in El Cigarralejo (Murcia, fourth century BCE), where horses might have been offered to Astarte, the Lady of the Horses, and in Cerro de los Santos (Albacete), where stone votive offerings from the same pe-

riod, depicting noblewomen carrying libational vessels, have been found. The sanctuary of Alcoy (Valencia), from the Hellenistic period, has also yielded some terracotta votive offerings.

Mediterranean Spain also had cave sanctuaries, which survived to Roman times and contained small ritual vessel offerings of animal sacrifices and possibly ritual meals. A terra-cotta from La Albufereta (Alicante) shows one such cave sanctuary with tree trunks, probably meant to represent the biblical *asherot*.

The Iberians held the bull to be sacred. It is likely that the bull images of Rojales (Alicante) came from a sanctuary associated with a cult of bulls. From a temple dedicated to this animal came the famous bovine heads of Costig (Balearic Islands), from the Hellenistic period. In the Azaila acropolis (Teruel), a *hērōion* (first century BCE) depicted a bull with astral signs, appearing next to an altar, probably as an object of worship. In the Balearic Islands, the bull was associated with funerals, and images of him have been found in many tombs.

**Religion of the Indo-Europeans in the Iberian Peninsula.** Our knowledge of the religion of the Indo-European peoples of the Iberian Peninsula is sketchy. Few Greek or Latin authors mention it. No priests are mentioned. Only Strabo (154) cites the seers of the Lusitanians, who were identical in form to the Welsh seers. They seem to have used captives taken in battle for a type of divination. A prisoner was covered with a sack and his stomach was pierced with a sword; divination was based upon the position in which he fell. Strabo (155) also mentions the peoples of the north, who worshiped a warlike god identified with Ares and sacrificed male goats, horses, and prisoners to him. This god is frequently cited in the inscriptions from the northeast. It appears that the sanctuary of Cancho Roano (Badajoz) was dedicated to him; it was probably a blood altar, like those of Greece and central Europe.

The moon was one of the principal deities of the Celtiberians and their neighbors (Strabo, 164). On nights of the full moon, religious dances were offered to this deity in front of the doors of houses. These dances have survived to our own day. The Lusitanians also revered a feminine deity related to the Greek Artemis and associated with the stag. The episode of Sertorius's hind alludes to her (Aulus Gellius, 5.22; Plutarch, *Life of Sertorius* 11).

Among the Vetones in the west and the Celtiberians in the center of the peninsula—both cattle-raising peoples—the bull and pig played an important role in religion. Religion was linked to astral cults, as evidenced by the Numantia pottery (Soria). The bull and pig sculptures found among these peoples were probably

related to such a cult. These sculptures, funereal in nature, continued to be produced until the late Roman period. Pre-Roman bronzes depicting bulls, such as the Chariot of Guimarães (Portugal), were probably related to the sacrifice of he-goats. A votive dagger in the Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan in Madrid, with *suove-aurilia* on a bullskin, and a dagger of Castello de Moreira (Galicia) are similar to others from the central plateau. All of them are from the pre-Roman era. These peoples probably had no bull god. Bovines had a magical quality, and their cult was linked with fecundity. Bullfights might have originated in rites associated with the sacredness of the bull, which were then secularized and turned into games.

Few likenesses of gods have been found. Strabo (164) states that the Galicians were atheists, which must be interpreted to mean either that they had no images of their gods or that the gods' names were taboo. On the Numantia pottery there is an image of Cernunnos, the great Welsh god. A sculpture from Candelario (Salamanca) and two reliefs from Riotinto (Huelva) depict a Celtic horned god. In addition, four bronze images of the Welsh god Sucellus have been preserved. One was found in Puebla de Alcocer (Badajoz), another in Villaricos (Almería), and two are of unknown origin.

In Louristán (Pontevedra) a relief of a god with bull horns on his head has been discovered. In the Pyrenees, an image was found of an indigenous god, analogous to Mars, with bull horns on his helmet and a bull on his breastplate.

Twenty-four goddesses are known, all of whose names begin with the radical *band-*. Their cult extended between the rivers Guadiana and Miño. They were associated with Tutela and were depicted with the attributes of Tyche, the goddess of fortune, as can be seen on a saucer from Cosmado in Lusitania. In addition, on a monument at Braga (Portugal) an indigenous water god is portrayed under the figure of a Greco-Roman water god.

Most of the names of the approximately three hundred and thirty indigenous gods appear only once. These old Indo-European names are found in Latin writings and refer to their respective geographic locations and the name of a tribe or people. One god who seems to have been widely worshiped was Endovellico: there are about eighty inscriptions referring to him. His sanctuary was in San Miguel de Mota (Portugal), and several sculpted heads of him, based on Greek models, have been preserved. He was a god of medicine and cured through sleep; at the same time he had a diabolical nature. Wild boars and *erôtes* appeared as symbols on his altars.

Another diabolical deity was the goddess Ataecina, re-

lated to Proserpina, who was worshiped in the area between the Tagus and Guadiana rivers. Yet another god adopted by the indigenous peoples was Lug (Lugh), well attested in Ireland and Wales. His name is found on three inscriptions from the province of Lugo; in one from Osma (Soria); and twice in a rupestrian inscription at Peñalba de Villastar (Teruel), where he is associated with the crow. The Welsh goddess Epona was worshiped on the central plateau; her name appears in three inscriptions. Between the Tagus and Douro rivers, aquatic nymphs, whose cult was related to health, enjoyed particular veneration.

In the north of Lusitania and in Galicia, the *lares* were highly venerated. Seventeen of their testimonials have been preserved, with such varied names as *Lares Anedici*, *Ceceaigi*, *Cerenaeci*, *Cusicilenses*, and so on. The *matres*, or *matronae* ("mothers"), are also mentioned in inscriptions, principally in the heart of the Iberian Peninsula, where we find several different names: *Matres Aufaniae* (Seville), *Brigaecae* (Burgos), *Galaicae* (Burgos), *Monitucinae* (Burgos), and so on. The goddess Nabia, addressed with various geographic epithets based on the names of peoples or tribes, was also particularly venerated. Her cult reached from the Tagus to the Cantabro. A god equated with Mars, astral in nature, was worshiped both in Lusitania (Conimbriga and Trujillo) and among the Accitans (Granada). He is cited by the Latin writer Macrobius (*Saturnalia* 1.19.5). The great Indo-European god of the heavens, identified with the Roman Jupiter, was worshiped by the peoples of the north under several names: *Anderón* (Galicia), *Assaecus* (Lisbon), *Candamus* (Asturias-León), and so on. He was a god of mountains and storms. Such syncretism between indigenous and Roman gods is well documented from the second century onward. Even though the devotees of these gods were usually indigenous people, the Romans and completely romanized indigenous peoples also worshiped them. The Hispanic pantheon itself greatly resembles that of Gaul, as described by Caesar (*Gallic Wars* 6.17) and Lucan (*Pharsalia* 1.444–446). Different names were probably given to the same deity. Almost all the indigenous names appear in little-romanized areas.

Three levels can be discerned in Hispanic religion: on the first level, the sacralization of tribal space is related to personifications of kinship groups; on the second, the original deity is catalyzed into different numinous entities associated with the trifunctional Indo-European sphere; and on the third level, the belief in gods is materialized by the Roman presence in the religion.

**Sacrifices.** Human sacrifice among the peoples of the north and the Lusitanians has already been mentioned. The Lusitanians sacrificed men and horses (Livy, *Peri-*



*ochae* 49) upon signing peace treaties. Two inscriptions refer to sacrifices to different indigenous gods. One, which appears in Cabezo das Fraguas (Portugal) and mentions a *suovetaurilia*, reads: "A ewe for Trebaruna and a father bull for Reve." The second comes from Marcicos (Portugal) and reads: "To the excellent virgin and to the nymph of the *danigos* [people] Nabia Corona, a cow, an ox. To Nabia, a lamb. To Jupiter, a lamb and a calf. To Urgos, a lamb; to Lida, an animal."

Several sanctuaries are known. The two most complete are those at Panoias (Portugal) and Ulaca (Ávila). There are different receptacles for blood and for victims' flesh on the rocks of these sanctuaries.

**Belief in the Afterlife.** In the Indo-European region of Spain, gravestones were engraved with astral signs, the sun, the moon, and the planets, indicating an astral concept of life beyond the grave. This same belief underlies the statement by Elianus (*De natura animalium* 10.22) that the Celtiberians left the bodies of warriors outdoors, to be worn to pieces by vultures. During the funerals of important Lusitanians, such as the leader Viriatus, many victims were sacrificed (Appian, *Iberia* 72). There were also combats and warrior processions (ibid., 71). Cremation was the accepted practice throughout the entire Iberian Peninsula.

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JOSÉ M. BLÁZQUEZ

Translated from Spanish by Erica Meltzer

**IBN 'ABD AL-WAHHĀB, MUḤAMMAD** (AH 1115–1206/1703–1792 CE), Islamic fundamentalist teacher who established the Wahhābī movement. He was born in Najd, a central region in Arabia. His father was the judge in the town of al-'Uyaynah and also taught jurisprudence according to the strict Ḥanbalī legal school and traditions. MuḤammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb began his study of the Qur'ān and basic Ḥanbalī texts under his father but set out on travels "in search of knowledge" when he was about twenty years old. He went first to Mecca and Medina, where he studied mainly with 'Abd Allāh ibn Sayf and MuḤammad Ḥayāt al-Sindī. 'Abd Allāh was a Ḥanbalī scholar from Najd who had settled in Medina. Through him, Ibn 'Abd al-

Wahhāb became tied to the traditions of Syrian Ḥanbalī scholarship. Ibn Sayf transmitted the course of studies of the seventeenth-century Syrian teacher 'Abd al-Bāqī al-Ḥanbalī and instructed him in the works of the great Ḥanbalī jurist and theologian Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328). Al-Sindī was not a Ḥanbalī scholar but a scholar of traditions who came from India; in Medina, he was part of a group of teachers who inspired a spirit of socio-moral revival in students from many areas. It was this basic education, with his father and after, that prepared Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb for his life's mission: the purification and renewal of Islamic society.

He went next to the city of Basra and the region of al-Ḥasā in eastern Arabia. Although he continued his studies, he also began his mission of purification. In Basra in particular, he opposed popular religious customs as well as the beliefs of the large Shī'ī Muslim population. Some sources suggest that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb also went to Persia, Syria, and even Egypt; this is, however, highly unlikely, for the sources closest to his lifetime make no mention of these broader travels.

Sometime between 1731 and 1737, he returned to Najd and lived in Ḥuraymilā, where his father was at the time. Following his father's death in 1740, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb returned to al-'Uyaynah and received the support of the local ruler for his purification efforts. Soon forced to leave by local opposition, however, he moved to al-Dar'iyah; there the local leader, MuḤammad ibn Sa'ūd, swore in 1744 to protect Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb and to support his mission. This alliance created a new state based on the fundamentals of Islam.

People from many areas were persuaded by the teachings and writings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. In addition, as conflicts arose, the military power of the new state brought victory and further expansion. Following Ibn Sa'ūd's death in 1765, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb remained a major counselor to his successor, 'Abd al-Azīz, and continued to preach and write until his death in 1792.

MuḤammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb left many works. Although he addressed varied subjects, his writings on *tawḥīd*, or the oneness of God, are the most prominent; the major text in this group is *Kitāb al-tawḥīd*. For him, *tawḥīd* was more than a monotheistic affirmation: it was a rejection of "saint worship" and veneration of anything other than God. A summary of his teachings is presented in *Al-uṣūl al-thalāthah wa-adillatuha* (The Three Roots and Their Proofs). Some of his sermons have been published in *Khuṭab al-shaykh* (Sermons of the Shaykh), while some legal decisions are presented in the history written by Ibn Ghannām.

MuḤammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb created a movement of renewal at a time of ferment within the Islamic world. During the eighteenth century there were many

Muslim groups working for socio-moral reconstruction on the basis of a strict interpretation of Islamic fundamentals. Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb was not unique, but he was the most rigorous of the major leaders in rejecting medieval "innovations" and the most intractable in opposing compromises with popular religion.

The immediate result of his work was the creation of a state community in Arabia dedicated to the implementation of his mission. This state was militarily defeated in the nineteenth century but experienced a revival in the twentieth, when it became the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's influence, however, goes beyond this political aspect. Islamic renewal in its Wahhābī form inspired later Muslim thinkers and activists in a variety of areas. For much of the nineteenth century, "Wahhabism" played a role in the Islamic world similar to that of "Khomeinism" in the last part of the twentieth. In intellectual terms, what Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb wrote and taught about themes such as *tawḥīd* became part of the fundamentalist mood in modern Islam. His work was respected by a wide spectrum of thinkers ranging from the relatively fundamentalist Rashīd Riḍā in Egypt to the South Asian modernist scholar Muhammad Iqbal.

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JOHN O. VOLL

**IBN ADRET, SOLOMON.** See Adret, Shelomoh ben Avraham.

**IBN AL-'ARABĪ** (AH 560–638/1165–1240 CE), one of the greatest mystic philosophers of Islam. He was born in Murcia in southeastern Spain and died in Damascus,

Syria. These simple geographical facts concerning the beginning and end of his external life are emblematic of the rich and complicated process of spiritual formation and development which the inner life of this extraordinary man underwent between Andalusia and the eastern domain of the Islamic world.

As clearly indicated by his full name, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-'Arabī (usually reduced to Ibn 'Arabī) al-Ḥātimi al-Ṭā'ī, he was, as a member of the tribe of Ṭayy, a man of the purest Arab blood. He started with the Sunnī orthodoxy of the Arabs, but his inborn mystical inclination and spiritual discipline brought him ever closer to the Eastern, specifically Iranian, type of spirituality, Shiism. He never converted formally to Shiism, but the philosophical view that he elaborated in his intellectual-mystical maturity, a view proceeding from his extraordinary visionary experiences in the *'alam al-mithāl* (a term apparently of gnostic origin, translated by Henry Corbin as *mundus imaginis*, that is, "world of archetypal images"), was remarkably congenial to the spirit of Iranian and Shi'ī Islam. Ibn 'Arabī has, in fact, found the greatest number of disciples and successors in Shi'ī Iran. Even today the metaphysics of Ibn 'Arabī together with—or mingled with—that of Suhrawardī, the Master of Illumination (Shaykh al-Ish-rāq), form the basis of the philosophic-gnostic worldview of Iranian Muslim intellectuals. In fact, one of his surnames, *Muḥyi al-Dīn*, meaning literally "revivifier of religion," manifests its living force when it is seen in terms of the role his thought has played in the historical formation of Iranian Islam. Another of his celebrated surnames, *al-Shaykh al-Akbar*, "Doctor Maximus," presents Ibn 'Arabī as the greatest of all spiritual leaders, which is also fully true with regard to his role in the world of Iranian spirituality.

Ibn 'Arabī, with his unusual profundity of mystical experience characterized by a profusion of archetypal images, his exceedingly abstruse mode of thinking, and obscure language, is one of those thinkers who defy any attempt at an easy presentation. The usual scholarly approach by way of systematic exposition (life, works, thought) here loses its validity, for each fact of Ibn 'Arabī's external life is endowed with a symbolic value that points to some particular aspect of mystical or visionary experience, while every aspect of his mystical experience is itself pregnant with philosophical ideas. All elements are thus closely integrated into an organic whole. What follows here is therefore an admittedly artificial articulation of Ibn 'Arabī's external-internal life into three major phases: (1) the master's intellectual and spiritual formation in Andalusia, (2) his love experience around the Ka'bah, and (3) his mystical-metaphysical maturity.

**Early Days in Andalusia.** Ibn 'Arabī received his earliest Muslim education in the great intellectual center of Seville, where he came at the age of eight and lived for about thirty years. There, under some of the leading scholars of the city, he devoted himself to a study of the traditional branches of Islamic science, the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, law, theology, and scholastic philosophy. Seville was also an important center of Sufism, with a number of outstanding Ṣūfī masters in residence. Quite naturally Ibn 'Arabī was attracted by their mode of living and teachings, and by the time he reached the age of twenty he had become fully aware of his spiritual mission, and thus entered decidedly upon the Ṣūfī path.

Particularly remarkable in this respect was his encounter with a woman saint, the celebrated Fāṭimah of Cordova, who appeared to him surrounded by a kind of heavenly aura. Fāṭimah of Cordova was then already a very old woman, but, as Ibn 'Arabī himself recalls, an unusual atmosphere of enchanting beauty seemed to be constantly radiating from her person, and she gave the impression of being a girl in her teens. Whenever he was in her presence, the young Ibn 'Arabī is said to have been unable not to blush. "I am your divine mother," Fāṭimah said to him, which is to say, she recognized in Ibn 'Arabī her spiritual son. Thus, as one of her favorite disciples, he was initiated into the mystic path. It is highly significant that his initiation into Sufism came about through such an experience of spiritual love, for this first love experience prefigures or foreshadows the metaphysics of love that Ibn 'Arabī would later develop in Mecca around the sacred temple of the Ka'bah.

As a "beardless youth" of twenty, Ibn 'Arabī began to travel widely in Spain and North Africa—Cordova, Almería, Tunis, Fez, Marrakesh—where he met eminent Ṣūfī masters and scholars. Particularly notable is his visit to Cordova, where he had a dramatic encounter with Ibn Rushd (Averroës), the great Peripatetic who represented the scholastic current of Aristotelianism in Islamic philosophy. The interview, which took place on the initiative of Ibn Rushd, was of decisive importance for both the young Ṣūfī and the aged Aristotelian in that it brought to light the basic discrepancy and opposition between the path of logical reason and the path of gnostic imagination which was subsequently to bifurcate Islamic thought in its entirety. Moreover, the fact that the young mystic in this episode gained the upper hand of the Peripatetic philosopher, leaving the latter dumbfounded in the end, allows us to put our finger accurately upon the nodal point of Ibn 'Arabī's philosophical thinking and mystical experience, showing how mysticism and philosophy were related to one another in his metaphysical consciousness. It was not simply a matter of mysticism overcoming philoso-

phy. His mystical-visionary experiences were most intimately connected with, and backed by, rigorous philosophical thinking. Ibn 'Arabī was a mystic who was at the same time a real master of Peripatetic philosophy, so that he could—or rather, he had to—philosophize his inner spiritual experience into a grand-scale metaphysical worldview, as we shall see below in connection with the structure of his metaphysics of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, the "unity of existence."

**Around the Ka'bah.** As he approached his mid-thirties, Ibn 'Arabī made up his mind to leave his homeland forever. This decision was taken partly because of the disquieting religio-political situation in the Muslim West (Spain and North Africa), where the bigotry and intolerance of orthodox theologians and jurists left no hope for the development of any new thought, but mainly because of a vision he had in 1198, while in Murcia, in which a bird flying around the divine throne sustained by pillars of light told him to set out immediately for the eastern regions of the Islamic world. Thus began the second phase of his external-internal life, extending from 1200 to 1223, twenty-three years of wandering in the Near East until he finally settled down in Damascus.

It was in the year 1201, when he was thirty-six years of age, that Ibn 'Arabī visited Mecca for the first time. There, in the holy city of Islam, he was hospitably received by an illustrious Iranian family from Isfahan. The head of the family was himself a Ṣūfī master who had migrated from Iran to the Hejaz and occupied a high position in Mecca.

According to Ibn 'Arabī's own account, this Iranian shaykh had a daughter, Niẓām by name, a young girl of dazzling beauty, the highest intellectual caliber, and profound spiritual experience. The magic of her gaze, the soft melody of her speech, and the graceful modesty of her bearing, he says, were such that her presence enchanted all those around her, and immediately he fell in love with her. His enamored soul expressed itself in a long love poem, the celebrated *Tarjumān al-ashwāq* (The Interpreter of Ardent Longings).

Outwardly, that is to say, if superficially read, *Tarjumān al-ashwāq* appears to be an ordinary love poem replete with mundane amatory imagery. And in fact it was understood as such by the majority of the learned and austere moralists of orthodox Islam, a situation that provided those who had always been suspicious of Ibn 'Arabī's ideas with good grounds for accusing him of moral corruption. By taking such an attitude toward the poem, however, they simply disclosed their ignorance of the fact that, transplanted from the world of physical reality to that of the visionary or "imaginal" dimension of consciousness, the beautiful Iranian girl

Nizām is transformed into an archetypal embodiment of the "eternal feminine." She becomes a theophanic figure of the divine *sophia aeterna* ("eternal wisdom"; Arab., *ḥikmah*), somewhat like Beatrice in Dante's *Commedia*. The whole poem is in this sense the lyrical self-expression of a man who has just been initiated into what Corbin calls the "sophianic religion of love."

In order to clarify the issue, Ibn 'Arabī himself later wrote a long commentary on the poem. This tract is of great philosophical importance in that it brings to light one of the most basic determinant principles of Ibn 'Arabī's thought: the *ta'wīl*, "internal hermeneutics." Meaning literally "bringing something back to its ultimate point," *ta'wīl* technically designates a particular way of interpreting whatever is visible on the surface, be it an entire text, a passage, a sentence, or even a single word, by reference to its invisible meaning hidden beneath the surface.

It must be understood that the use of internal hermeneutics was by no means restricted to the interpretation of a love poem. Quite the contrary: the principle, once firmly established, provided an interpretative method of wide, flexible applicability for all those who were at all interested in discovering esoteric meanings in the spiritual depths of a given text. The method proved preeminently suitable for application to the sacred texts of Islam, the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*. As a matter of fact, the entire philosophy that Ibn 'Arabī developed in the latter half of his life may be considered a product of the principle of internal hermeneutics actually applied to the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, whose "inner" meanings he excavated in the light of his own visionary experiences.

The principle of internal hermeneutics was inherited and further developed by a number of the outstanding Ṣūfis and Muslim gnostics in subsequent ages. In Shiism in particular it was elaborated into the prime method of philosophical thinking, so much so that it has come to be regarded as typical and characteristic of Shī'ī thought in its entirety.

It should be noted, however, that in the case of Ibn 'Arabī the *ta'wīl*, far from being a simple matter of verbal interpretation, also has an important ontological significance. For in his view, whatever exists in the empirical world conceals in its ontological depths an inner reality, which means for Ibn 'Arabī that everything existing in the world is a particular theophany. Everything, in other words, is a phenomenal form in which the absolutely invisible reality manifests itself. The world of external being is in truth nothing but a metaphysical process of cosmic scale by which the ultimate Internal makes itself manifest moment by moment through infinitely various forms of self-determination.

**Philosophical Maturity.** Ibn 'Arabī is said to have written an astounding number of works, at least more than two hundred, ranging from short treatises and epistles of a few pages to a colossal book of thousands of pages. Among his writings, two in particular stand out as truly monumental works representing his thought in its most mature form: *Al-futūḥāt al-makkīyah* (The Meccan Revelations) and *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (The Bezels of Wisdom).

The *Futūḥāt* was conceived and undertaken on the occasion of his first visit to Mecca in 1201 and was finished in Damascus more than thirty years later, in 1237. Often called the "Bible of esoteric Islam," it is a veritable encyclopedia of Sufism, treating, albeit in haphazard order, metaphysical theories, mystical experiences, and various esoteric sciences, visions, and speculations.

But by far his most important work is by common consent the *Fuṣūṣ*, which he composed in 1229, about ten years before his death. A book of some two hundred printed pages, it is comparatively small in size but incomparably vast in content and philosophical significance. In it is contained Ibn 'Arabī's prophethood: every Qur'anic prophet, beginning with Adam, is qualified in his relations to certain divine names and attributes and appears in his "spiritual" state. The last in line is the prophet of Islam, whose personality is interpreted in the light of the *ḥadīth* stating, "God has made dear to me perfume and women, and the consolation is in prayer." The long line of commentaries on the *Fuṣūṣ* (more than one hundred, according to Osman Yahia) written by his disciples and followers constitute a whole history of Islamic philosophy in themselves. The following brief exposition of his philosophy is based principally on this book.

**Ta'wīl: internal hermeneutics.** In the history of Islamic philosophy Ibn 'Arabī's position is technically known as *waḥdat al-wujūd* ("unity of existence"). *Waḥdat al-wujūd* is a peculiar type of mystical philosophy, the outcome of an ontological application of the principle of internal hermeneutics (*ta'wīl*). The *ta'wīl*, as we have observed, begins as a method of verbal interpretation that consists in going from the surface level (the "exterior," *zāhir*) of a given linguistic expression down to the depth level (the "interior," *bāṭin*) of its meaning. Ontologically applied, it turns out to be a characteristic method of metaphysical cognition, proceeding from the "exterior" of phenomenal things down into the "interior" of their prephenomenal reality. The ontological *ta'wīl* of the surface depth structure of being is accomplished by the mystic's progression through a series of stages of ecstatic experience, with each stage characterized by a peculiar vision of being.

The starting point of the whole process is the empiri-

cal world as seen through the eyes of an ordinary person, who sees everywhere ontological multiplicity, nothing but multiplicity. This is the only form in which he knows the empirical world. Infinitely divergent things are there, himself being one of them, each being self-subsistent and essentially different from the rest. Except in abstract thought he cannot see a fundamental unity underlying them all. The world of being is for him just a single plane of various forms and colors, with nothing behind or beyond. Even the word *phenomenon* does not make real sense, for he does not know of anything prephenomenal of which the so-called empirical things would be "phenomena."

Through the exercise of the ontological *ta'wīl*, however, an Ibn 'Arabī is expected to go beyond the ontological horizon of the ordinary person, beyond the "exterior," the surface of reality. Ibn 'Arabī is convinced that reality has another ontological dimension, the "interior," which is precisely what must be sought. However, in order to accomplish this task one has to go through a specific spiritual discipline; otherwise the depth dimension of consciousness congruous with the sought-for "interior" of reality can never be opened up.

**Fanā': self-nullification.** The ordinary person, in the view of Ibn 'Arabī, cannot see reality except in its variously articulated forms because of the primordial subject-object bifurcation of his consciousness. The subject standing opposed to the object, that is, the "ego," is by nature so made that it recognizes in the empirical world only a conglomeration of divergent things as so many cognitive objects. Thus, in order to go beyond the plane of ontological multiplicity one has first of all to bring to naught one's own ego-consciousness. The arduous process of spiritual discipline undertaken for this purpose leads one finally to experience what is designated by the technical term *fanā'*. Literally, *fanā'* means "disappearance," and technically, the disappearance of the ego or total self-nullification. The disappearance of ego-consciousness naturally implies the disappearance of the entire world of being, for where there is no cognitive subject there can be no object to be cognized. And the absolute space which thus actualizes itself beyond the subject-object bifurcation of human consciousness is realized to be prephenomenal reality in its metaphysical undetermination. Ibn 'Arabī calls it *Aḥad*, the "absolute One."

The "absolute One" is a total, unconditional negation of all things without a single exception. It is the absolute unmanifest before it manifests itself in a particular form, the undetermined before all determinations, the unarticulated before it is articulated into different entities. Even Allāh, God, proves here to be but one of its determined forms.

The mystic who has attained to the state of *fanā'* is thus aware only of absolute unity. He sees everywhere unity, nothing else. In his metaphysical awareness the whole world has turned into the One without even the faintest trace of articulation and determination. But, Ibn 'Arabī argues, the mystic should not stop at this stage of mystical experience. He who sees only the One, he who sees the whole world of being reduced to a metaphysical state of total undifferentiation, still remains imperfect. The true *Ṣūfī* must go a step further and grow into a "possessor of two eyes" (*dhū al-'aynayn*), a person who is able to see the world of being correctly as the *coincidentia oppositorum* of the One and the Many. Such a view of reality is experientially actualized at the stage of *baqā'* ("survival") lying beyond the stage of *fanā'*.

It will be obvious that "the Many" in this context refers to the phenomenal dimension of being, the world of variously determined phenomenal things. It will also be obvious, however, that the Many as realized in the *baqā'* experience is not the Many standing opposed to the One. Rather, one and the same reality is at once One and Many. The *coincidentia oppositorum* here in question may be brought somewhat closer to common understanding by saying that the "possessor of two eyes" in theological terminology is one who is able to see God in the creature and the creature in God. Or, using Ibn 'Arabī's favorite metaphor, we might say that the "possessor of two eyes" is able to see both the mirror and the images reflected therein, God and the creature playing alternately the role of the mirror and the role of the reflected images. The sight of the colorful multiplicity of phenomenal things does not act, as it does for ordinary people, as an ontological veil obstructing the view of the pure unity of reality in a state of ultimate non-articulation. Nor does the sight of the prephenomenal One stand in the way of the appearance of the phenomenal Many. On the contrary, the two complement each other in disclosing the integral structure of reality. For they are the two essential aspects of reality, the unity representing the aspect of its metaphysical "contraction" (*ijmāl*) and the multiplicity the aspect of its "expansion" (*tafṣīl*). Unless we grasp in this way the unity and multiplicity in a single act of metaphysical-ontological cognition we remain deprived of an integral view of reality as it really is.

**Tajallī: self-manifestation.** What has just been sketched of the relation between the prephenomenal and the phenomenal as a fact of the gnostic experience of reality fundamentally determines the whole structure of Ibn 'Arabī's philosophy of the *waḥdat al-wujūd*. It is a particular philosophy based on a metaphysical vision actually experienced by him as the interplay between

one and many. The key word here is *tajallī* (pl., *tajalliyāt*), "self-manifestation" (of the unmanifest), also called *ta'ayyun*, "self-determination" (of the absolutely undetermined).

In exact correspondence with the transformation of consciousness from the state of *fanā'* to that of *baqā'*, the absolute One goes on gradually transforming itself into the phenomenal Many through its own self-manifesting and self-determining activity. There is, in other words, inherent in the One a primordial ontological drive, a kind of creative energy that is symbolized by the divine word of creation, *kun* ("Be!"), and which Ibn 'Arabī calls "love" or "mercy." The whole world of being thus comes to be regarded as a product of the "breath of the Merciful" (*naḥās Raḥmānī*).

Important to note in this connection is the fact that the very first appearance of the creative energy of the One occurs within the One itself. That is to say, the One itself is structurally two-dimensional, and bears accordingly two different names: Aḥad and Wāḥid. These two words deriving from one and the same root are in ordinary Arabic used synonymously. But in Ibn 'Arabī's technical terminology, the Aḥad is the pure and absolute One—the reality of existence in a state of absolute undetermination, the prephenomenal in its ultimate and unconditional prephenomenality—whereas the Wāḥid is the same reality of existence at a stage where it begins to turn toward phenomenality.

The Aḥad is thus the One standing beyond all determinations. It carries no internal articulations, let alone external ones. And being utterly undetermined and unarticulated, it lies beyond the grasp of cognition, whether human or even divine. In theological language the situation may properly be described by saying that even God at this stage does not know himself. The self-consciousness of God makes its appearance only at the stage of the Wāḥid. The Aḥad is, in this capacity, an eternal mystery (*ghayb*), the "mystery of all mysteries" (*ghayb al-ghayūb*).

The Wāḥid, on the contrary, is the One with internal articulations. And these articulations contained within the One actualize themselves as so many ontological archetypes, called the *a'yān thābitah* (permanent archetypal realities). These archetypes predetermine the forms in which the creative energy of the absolute reality of existence continuously produces the things of the phenomenal world at the next stage of divine self-manifestation.

Such in broad outlines is the process of the *tajallī* ("self-manifestation") of the Absolute as conceived by Ibn 'Arabī, starting from the "mystery of all mysteries" and going down to the world of phenomenal things. The most important point to note about all this is that it is

by virtue of its own inner drive that the One produces—or more exactly, transforms itself into—the Many through the graduated process of self-manifestation. The One must necessarily and inevitably manifest itself in phenomenal forms. God, otherwise expressed, cannot but create the world. The Absolute *qua* Absolute cannot do without the phenomenal world, just as the phenomenal world cannot subsist except by the self-manifesting activity of the Absolute.

Ibn 'Arabī's work was and still is highly controversial. For centuries, many orthodox Muslims, beginning with Ibn Taymīyah, have considered the Doctor Maximus to be a heretic; modern thinkers still accuse him of "para-sexual symbolism" (Fazlur Rahman) and claim that his system obliterates the distinction between good and evil. *Al-futūḥāt al-makkīyah* was prohibited once more in Egypt in 1979. Despite this constant criticism, his ideas and formulations have permeated later Sufism, and even those Ṣūfis who did not agree with him could not help applying his handy definitions to their work. It is his influence that gives post-thirteenth-century mystical literature, especially the poetry composed in dervish circles, a uniformity of thought and expression.

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TOSHIHIKO IZUTSU

**IBN AL-FĀRIḌ** (AH 576–632/1181–1235 CE), more fully Abū Ḥafṣ or Abū al-Qāsim 'Umar ibn Abī al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn al-Murshid ibn 'Alī; often called the greatest mystical poet in the history of Arabic literature. His father, known as al-FāriḌ because his profession was the allocation of shares (*furūd*) in cases of inheritance, migrated from his native Hama in Syria to Cairo, where Ibn al-FāriḌ was born and where he lived and died.

Though little is known about his life, there is evidence that he married and had at least two sons and a daughter. He studied *ḥadīth* and Shāfi'i law in his youth, but his spiritual bent was such that he preferred solitary devotion in the desert or on Mount al-Muqaṭṭam, east of Cairo, and he finally became a Ṣūfī. After a long sojourn in Mecca, he returned to Cairo and was venerated by the populace as a saint.

He is said to have been handsome, righteous, and awe-inspiring yet pleasant and sociable. Later generations ascribed supernatural powers to him, following the example of his own grandson, 'Alī, who wrote an introduction to Ibn al-FāriḌ's *Dīwān* (Collected Works) and filled it with several fantastic tales. This may have been a defensive effort to exonerate the poet from accusations of heresy such as those made by Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328) and others regarding the practices and pantheistic tendencies of certain Ṣūfis.

The *Dīwān* of Ibn al-FāriḌ is slim, and the poems in it are of varying lengths. Dominated by the theme of love, they are couched in a beautiful style of great tenderness and sensitivity in which the sounds, patterns, and rhetorical conceits of the language are natural elements of the moods and ideas they convey. Capable of being read as love lyrics, they are intended to be expressions of mystical yearning for God. This is true even of the only wine poem in the *Dīwān*, in which intoxication with wine is but a symbol of union with the divine beloved.

Almost half of the *Dīwān* is occupied by a single poem of 761 verses entitled *Naẓm al-sulūk* (Poem of the Way), often referred to as "The Greater Ode Rhyming in T" to distinguish it from a shorter poem of 103 verses also

rhyming in the letter *t*. Considered Ibn al-FāriḌ's masterpiece, this ode is unique in its description of the mystic's experience of God and of the harmony achieved through realizing the union of phenomenal existence and pure Being. It has so intrigued subsequent generations of Ṣūfis by its exquisite beauty and mystical truths that many have written large volumes commenting on it, including al-Farḡhānī (d. 1300), al-Qāshānī (d. 1334), al-Qaysarī (d. 1350), Jāmī (d. 1492), al-Būrīnī (d. 1615), and al-Nābulusī (d. 1730). The commentaries of the last two were combined by Rushayd ibn Ghālib al-Daḥdāḥ (d. 1889). Commentaries have also been written on the *Khamrīyah* (Wine Poem) illuminating its mystical symbolism and explaining its religious and literary allusions.

A Ṣūfī order named al-Fāriḍīyah was known to exist in Egypt during the sixteenth century and claimed to originate from Ibn al-FāriḌ, but it does not seem to be in existence today. The poet's tomb, however, still stands in a well-known shrine at the foot of Mount al-Muqaṭṭam in Cairo.

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ISSA J. BOULLATA

**IBN 'AṬĀ' ALLĀH** (AH c. 650–709, c. 1252–1309 CE), more fully Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh al-Iskandarī; Arab Ṣūfī saint and sage of Egypt. He was the third great master of the Shādhilī order of Sufism founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (d. 1258) and the first shaykh of the order to reduce its teachings and practices to writing. Born in Alexandria into an illustrious dynasty of Mālikī religious scholars, he early evinced mastery in all of the religious disciplines and became an authority on Islamic law while professing antagonism toward Sufism. But a chance encounter with his future Ṣūfī shaykh, Abū al-'Abbās al-Mursī (d. 1287), dramatically transformed him into an ardent contemplative, and he became an authority in

both the law and the spiritual path in a relatively short time. Most of his life was spent in Cairo as a Ṣūfī shaykh and as a teacher of the exoteric religious disciplines.

He wrote many works on Sufism and religious topics, a half dozen of which have been particularly popular in Ṣūfī circles over the centuries and have gone through a number of reprints in recent times. The best known of these is his *Kitāb al-ḥikam* (Book of Aphorisms), a series of maxims of great beauty on Ṣūfī spirituality that has produced many commentaries by Ṣūfīs and become a classic in the field because its comprehensive and poetical formulations may easily be memorized. He defended Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) and other Ṣūfīs against the Ḥanbalī fundamentalist theologian Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328), who objected to their monistic speculations.

In the course of time, some of the works of Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh have become practically canonical among the Shādhiliyah; later masters constantly cite him. At his death his funeral procession was immense. He was buried in the Qarāfah cemetery of Cairo where his tomb, recently totally renovated with a new mosque and minaret, has for long centuries been visited by the pious. Lately he has become the object of a number of studies by scholars because of his preeminence in Sufism and the fact that the Shādhilī order has shown a continuing vitality down to our times.

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VICTOR DANNER

**IBN BĀBĀWAYHI** or Ibn Bābūyah (AH 306?–381/918?–991 CE), Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, known as al-Ṣadūq ("the veracious"); Twelver Shī'ī jurist and traditionist. Very little is known of his life. According to popular belief, he was born after his father, a leading figure in the Twelver community of Qom, had asked the Hidden Imam to pray that he be granted a son. The fa-

ther had a decisive influence on Ibn Bābawayhi's early upbringing and education. Following the custom of his day, Ibn Bābawayhi traveled widely in search of knowledge. He came to Baghdad in 963 CE and, after a stay of over a year, proceeded to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage before returning to Baghdad via Kufa in 966.

Ibn Bābawayhi was a frequent visitor to Nishapur and other Khorasani cities and was regarded by many as the leading light of Khorasani Twelver Shiism. His travels took him as far as Transoxiana, which he visited in 979. At some point in his career he established contacts with the western Iranian city of Rayy. These contacts were reinforced around 983, when Rukn al-Dawlah, the Buyid ruler of Rayy, asked him to take up residence at the court. Rukn al-Dawlah became Ibn Bābawayhi's patron, and in return Ibn Bābawayhi provided answers to questions which his benefactor put to him on matters of doctrine. Ibn Bābawayhi was highly esteemed in Rayy, although his influence seems to have waned somewhat toward the end of his life. He died and was buried in Rayy, where a domed shrine was erected over his tomb.

Ibn Bābawayhi was a prolific writer, although fewer than twenty of some three hundred works ascribed to him have survived. Even so, the surviving works are greater in number than those of any other older or contemporary Twelver author, and their impact on subsequent generations has been considerable. *Man lā yaḥḍuruḥu al-faqīh* (Every Man His Own Lawyer) is Ibn Bābawayhi's best-known work. As the title suggests, the need for such a work arose after the disappearance of the twelfth imam—the so-called greater occultation (*ghaybah*), which began in 941—who was no longer available to answer questions on religious practice. This work was completed in 979 and became one of the four standard legal textbooks of Twelver Shiism. Shorter legal compilations are *Al-hidāyah* (Guidance) and *Al-muqni' fī al-fiqh* (Sufficiency in Jurisprudence).

Ibn Bābawayhi's mastery of Twelver traditions also comes to the fore in works such as the *Thawāb al-a'māl* and *'Iqāb al-a'māl*, which include traditions on the reward and punishment, respectively, for praiseworthy or evil actions; the *'Ilal al-sharā'i'*, in which many traditions are adduced in explication of the reasons underlying various religious obligations; and the *Kitāb al-khiṣāl*, where traditions describing myriad qualities and actions are grouped in order of increasing numbers, from one to one million. Ibn Bābawayhi's *'Uyūn akhbār al-Riḍā* is an invaluable mine of information on the life and times of the eighth imam, 'Alī al-Riḍā (d. 818), while *Ikmāl al-dīn wa-itmām al-ni'mah* (The Perfection of Religion and Completion of Blessing), a title harking



back to surah 5:3 of the Qur'ān) is one of the earliest and most exhaustive expositions of the doctrine of the twelfth imam, his occultation, and his future reappearance as the Mahdi (Messiah).

Ibn Bābawayhi's interest in questions of dogma led him to compose the *Risālat al-i'tiqādāt*, the earliest extant Twelver creed. The views which he upholds there are in general agreement with those of earlier Twelver thinkers, yet they are at times less deterministic and anthropomorphic. He thus holds that the will of God encompasses everything, including evil deeds, but then defines this will as foreknowledge. In contrast to some Twelver traditionists, he denies the possibility that God may be seen in the hereafter. Because of his declared opposition to theological disputation (*kalām*), Ibn Bābawayhi, in the creed and elsewhere, relies almost totally on traditions of the imams, to the exclusion of reasoning. For this he was criticized by his renowned pupil Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022) in the latter's *Taṣḥīh al-i'tiqād* (Correction of the Creed). Al-Mufid also attacked Ibn Bābawayhi's position on some specific matters, such as his contention that the immunity (*iṣmah*) of prophets and imams from sin and error did not preclude the possibility of inadvertent mistakes, which God might induce in them to show that they were merely human. In his later years Ibn Bābawayhi was obliged to modify his anti-*kalām* views in the face of attacks by the Mu'tazilah, whose rationalist theology came increasingly to dominate Twelver thinking. This change is particularly evident in his *Kitāb al-tawḥīd* (The Book of the Unity of God).

As the example of al-Mufid shows, Ibn Bābawayhi was not without his critics, whose main complaint was that he relied on traditions of dubious authenticity. It is perhaps to counter such complaints that the honorary appellation al-Ṣadūq was conferred on him. Later generations of Twelver scholars are virtually unanimous in viewing Ibn Bābawayhi as one of the pillars of Twelver Shiism. His work may in fact be regarded as adumbrating the full-fledged Twelver literature of the eleventh century.

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ETAN KOHLBERG

**IBN BĀJJAH** (d. AH 533/1139 CE), known in Arabic as Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn al-Ṣā'igh and in Latin as Avempace; founder of Islamic metaphysics in Andalusia. Ibn Bājjah was also a poet and musician, an astronomer who dismissed the Ptolemaic epicycles, a politician, and a man of affairs. Born in Saragossa, reportedly of Jewish ancestry, he became a vizier when Saragossa fell to the Almoravids in 1110, but he was subsequently imprisoned while on an embassy to the former ruler. After his release, he avoided the Christian conquest of Saragossa by withdrawing to Valencia, only to be imprisoned for heresy at Játiva. This time Ibn Rushd's father or grandfather secured his release. He served twenty years as vizier to Yaḥyā ibn Yūsuf ibn Tāshufīn, lived in Seville and Granada, circulated to Oran, and died in Fez, reportedly poisoned.

Some thirty brief works preserve Ibn Bājjah's philosophy. Despite the distractions that, according to Ibn Ṭufayl, prevented him from fully clearing the storehouses of his wisdom (Goodman, 1983, p. 99), Ibn Bājjah contributed three distinctive, closely related ideas to the philosophical progression from al-Fārābī to Ibn Rushd.

1. His theory of the soul's "conjunction" (*ittiṣāl*) with the divine (namely, the Active Intellect) explains the common goal of mysticism, philosophy, ethical self-perfection, and metaphysical quest Platonically, as the consummation of an intellectual progress by which man is purified of material attachments and regains his true spiritual identity. By speaking of "contact" rather than simply union, and by interposing the Active Intellect between man and God, Ibn Bājjah attains a balance that eluded the more "inebriated" mystics (whom he criticized for their sensuality) and avoids their twin paradoxes—that man's identity is lost when it is finally fulfilled and that man becomes God just when he has annihilated the self. For pantheistic oneness Ibn Bājjah substitutes at-oneness, by reading "union" cognitively, as communion. Thus the intellectuality of Ibn Bājjah's vision preserves a quasi identity for the beatified soul.

2. The beatified souls, which ceaselessly sanctify God, are united to the Active Intellect by their contact with it; lacking matter as a principle of individuation, they cannot be differentiated from one another. This artful application of the Neoplatonic insight that the notions of ordinary arithmetic do not apply to disembodied

substances is later taken up in Ibn Rushd's monopsychism; it is further clarified by Ibn Ṭufayl's deployment of the Plotinian argument that the notions of identity and difference proper to the arithmetic of bodies are inapplicable to spiritual substances. Maimonides, who proudly stated that he studied under a disciple of Ibn Bājjah, treated Ibn Bājjah's approach (when properly qualified by the realization that disembodied things can still be differentiated as cause and effect) as the solution to the problem of the arithmetic of souls.

3. Much as Plotinus had recoiled from "this blood-drenched life," Ibn Bājjah looked to fulfillment for the individual despite rather than through the social community and its cultural traditions. In a synthesis of prophetic and ascetic withdrawal, he suggests, like al-Fārābī, that the spiritual adept find a true home beyond the very categories of this life. The gesture is completed again in Ibn Ṭufayl's vivid contrast of the cultural confinement and symbolic opacity of legalism and ritualism with the free and individualistically responsible insight of the spirit of the "solitary."

Ibn Bājjah's philosophy contrasts sharply with his worldly life, but Ibn Ṭufayl, the disciple who never met him, clearly paints in the lines of force that mark the powerful movement of the philosopher from revulsion with pettinesses, shams, and hypocrisies to the higher, purer realm that achieves fuller definition by the contrast.

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L. E. GOODMAN

**IBN DAUD, AVRAHAM** (1110-1180), known in rabbinic texts by the acronym RABaD I (Rabbi Avraham ben David), to distinguish him from Rabad II, Avraham ben Yitṣḥaq of Narbonne, and Rabad III,

Avraham ben David of Posquières; Spanish astronomer, historian, and philosopher. Avraham ibn Daud ha-Levi is best known for his history of the Jewish people, *Sefer ha-qabbalah* (The Book of Tradition; 1161), and his comprehensive Jewish philosophy, *Al-'aqidah al-rafiyah* (The Exalted Faith; 1168). He also published a work on astronomy (1180) that has not survived.

*The Book of Tradition* consists of a history of (1) the biblical period, (2) the Second Commonwealth, (3) the tannaim, (4) the amoraim, (5) the savoraim, (6) the geonim, and (7) the rabbis after the geonic period. On the surface, this work is a history of the Jewish people from its origins to the time of Avraham ibn Daud. But in reality, as the work's prologue and epilogue make clear, it is a detailed theological polemic that uses history. Against the Karaites, Muslims, and Christians who claimed that rabbinic tradition does not correctly record the revelation given to the children of Israel at Sinai, Avraham argues that rabbinic tradition is authentic. It is an unbroken chain of transmission of testimony to the true meaning of the divine revelation at Sinai by witnesses whose integrity is beyond question. In other words, the goal of *The Book of Tradition* is not to write the history of a people; rather, it is to show that the rabbinical account of the revelation at Sinai is true. The rabbis' testimony is to be accepted because all of the leaders of the rabbinic communities involved in the chain of tradition from Moses through Ezra to the rabbis of Andalusia in the twelfth century were individuals of intelligence and good character who therefore could be trusted to understand what they were told and to communicate the information they received honestly, without prejudice or distortion. Therefore, all accusations by Israel's enemies to the effect that rabbinic Judaism is a perversion of the theophany at Sinai are without foundation.

Whatever will be the ultimate judgment of historians on the accuracy of Avraham's history, *The Book of Tradition* has served as a prime source of information about Jewish history for Jewish and Christian historians from Avraham's own day to the twentieth century. The seventh part of the book is considered authoritative for the history of Andalusian Jewry, since it in effect amounts to an eyewitness report. But the earlier sections of the history also continue to have great authority for modern Jewish history; for example, they remain the basis for the list of the generations of tannaim and amoraim in the studies of classical Judaism by scholars such as Isaac Weiss, Hermann Strack, and G. F. Moore.

*The Exalted Faith* is the first work of Jewish philosophy to apply the diverse elements in the thought of Aristotle to a religious philosophy of Judaism. Avraham's arguments and statements are not so developed as those

of later Jewish Aristotelians such as Levi ben Gershom, (Gersonides, 1288–1344), but his work is the most comprehensive of all the Jewish Aristotelians. Avraham does not cite his contemporary sources, but he was clearly influenced by Ibn Sīnā (980–1037), Sa'adyah Gaon (892–942), and Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1075–1141).

*The Exalted Faith* is divided into three books. Book 1 deals with those presuppositions in Aristotelian natural science that are needed to explain what Avraham considers to be the basic principles of Judaism. Book 2 uses the claims in book 1 to explain what Avraham judges to be the basic principles of Jewish faith, namely, God's existence, oneness, and attributes (Principles 1–3); the existence and function of angels (Principle 4); the authenticity of the written Torah and rabbinic tradition (Principle 5); and divine providence (Principle 6). Book 3, "On Spiritual Healing," reads as an addendum to the treatise, the proper conclusion of which is the final principle of book 2.

Avraham asserts that the whole of *The Exalted Faith* was written to solve the problem of necessity and human choice. In the past the rabbis knew a great deal about science and religious law, but in his own time that is not the case. Those who know science know little about Jewish law, and those who know Jewish law know almost no science. This deplorable state of affairs leads many religious Jews to think that the study of science is in itself harmful to Jewish religious commitment. But the price they pay for ignoring science is that they lack the appropriate training that would enable them to grasp the fundamental principles of religious law. Hence, they are not equipped to provide a viable solution to fundamental questions of Jewish faith. The treatise is intended for Jews who have mature minds but insufficient knowledge and, in consequence of both conditions, are religiously confused. In other words, *The Exalted Faith* is intended to be a guide for the perplexed Jews of Avraham's time.

*The Guide of the Perplexed* (1190) of Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204) overshadowed *The Exalted Faith* in subsequent Jewish philosophy. Maimonides' writings clearly exhibit Avraham's influence, but that is not to say that the two Jewish philosophers have the same philosophy. Clearly they do not. For example, Maimonides rejects Avraham's claims that being Jewish in some way is relevant to the qualifications for prophecy, and that to some extent God's relations with the world enable human beings to have positive knowledge of God. Also, Avraham's accounts of all of the sciences are vastly more detailed than the mere hints of information contained in *The Guide*. In fact, no other work in Jewish philosophy is so comprehensive as Avraham's. Book 1 in itself is an excellent introduction to

medieval Aristotelian philosophy and science for modern students. It includes a reasonably detailed explanation of philosophical concepts such as substance and accident, as well as all of Aristotelian physics, psychology, and astronomy. (Only Levi ben Gershom presented a more detailed astronomy.) Similarly, book 2 provides an excellent introduction to classical Jewish philosophy and theology for modern students. In addition to its topical breadth, Avraham's work combines the atomistic and Neoplatonic teachings of the earlier generations of Jewish philosophers such as Sa'adyah Gaon and Yehudah ha-Levi (whose works he transcends but does not abandon) with new Aristotelian themes that subsequent Jewish philosophers such as Levi ben Gershom and Ḥasdai Crescas would develop in the fourteenth century. Students of Jewish history and Avraham's *Book of Tradition* will be especially interested in the fifth principle of part 2, in which Avraham spells out in detail the philosophical grounds and the theological purposes of his earlier history of the Jews.

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NORBERT M. SAMUELSON

**IBN 'EZRA', AVRAHAM** (c. 1089–c. 1164), Jewish biblical commentator and poet. Born in Christian Spain, Ibn 'Ezra' was educated both in traditional Jewish literature and in secular subjects. He was a friend of the theologian and poet Yehudah ha-Levi and recorded his answer to Yehudah's question about God in his commentary on *Exodus* 20:2. After leaving Spain in 1140, Ibn 'Ezra' spent the rest of his life traveling through Italy, France, and England. Most of his works were written during this period.

In his travels, Ibn 'Ezra' carried with him the intellectual achievements of Judeo-Muslim culture in Spain. One of the first to write on secular subjects in Hebrew (rather than Arabic), he exposed Jews outside the Iber-

ian Peninsula to the sophisticated study of Hebrew grammar and to other new areas of scientific investigation. Some traditionalists viewed him as a dangerous proponent of possibly heretical teachings.

Ibn 'Ezra' composed commentaries on all the books of the Hebrew Bible, although some have been lost. The introduction to his commentary on the Torah provides a critical review of contemporary biblical exegesis. Four types of commentators are censured: (1) those who frequently incorporate scientific treatises into comments on biblical phrases; (2) the Karaites, who reject rabbinic tradition; (3) those who make the Torah into a cryptic expression of esoteric doctrine (in one recension of the introduction, this is identified as "the method of the Christian scholars"); and (4) those who fill their commentaries with homiletical interpretations from the rabbis. Ibn 'Ezra' then outlines his own method, heavily dependent upon grammar and semantics. His plan was first to explain each problematic word and then to explicate the simple meaning of the passage as a whole.

The poetry of Ibn 'Ezra' broke away from classical Andalusian Hebrew poetics to a more popular mode. *Ḥai ben Meqits*, modeled after Ibn Sīnā's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, is perhaps the first attempt at sustained allegory in medieval Hebrew literature. At the same time, Ibn 'Ezra' was one of the last of the Spanish liturgical poets. His commentary on *Ecclesiastes* 5:1 contains an apologia for the newer, Spanish style, celebrating clarity of expression and purity of biblical diction, and an incisive critique of the older form, represented by the great liturgical poet El'azar Qalir, for its intermixing of biblical and rabbinic Hebrew, grammatical errors, and intentional obscurity. Poetry used in prayer, he argued, must be intelligible to the masses.

*Yesod mora'* treats many standard problems of medieval Jewish religious and ethical thought. The *Iggeret ha-Shabbat* was written to defend the traditional Jewish view that the Sabbath begins at sundown on Friday evening.

The biblical commentaries remained the most enduringly influential part of his oeuvre, engendering more than a dozen supercommentaries, many of which attempted to elucidate the "secrets" to which Ibn 'Ezra' occasionally referred. Some of his interpretations were scathingly rebutted by Moses Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Naḥman), who referred to his "open rebuke and hidden love" for Ibn 'Ezra'. Barukh Spinoza cited the comments of Ibn 'Ezra' on *Genesis* 12:6 and *Deuteronomy* 1:1 as evidence that the medieval commentator had anticipated his own position in questioning the Mosaic authorship of the entire Pentateuch (*Tractatus theologico-politico*, chap. 8).

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MARC SAPERSTEIN

**IBN GABIROL, SHELOMOH** (c. 1021–1058), known in Latin texts as Avicbron, Avencebrol, and Avicembron; Jewish poet and the first Jewish philosopher in Spain. Ibn Gabirol was born in Malaga, was raised in Saragossa, and died in Valencia. He is best known in the Jewish community as the author of secular, ethical, and liturgical poetry that reflects Jewish faith under the influence of both Neoplatonism and Ṣūfī poetry. His poems include *Ha-'anaq*, a 400-verse Hebrew grammar that he composed when he was twenty years old; *Azharot*, a rhymed enumeration of the 613 commandments of the Torah; and *Keter malkhut* (The Royal Crown), his most famous liturgical poem, which is a part of the liturgy for the Day of Atonement.

*The Royal Crown* contains four sections. The first two deal with names of God, the third presents Ibn Gabirol's cosmology, and the fourth is a confessional prayer. The overall theme of the poem is the great distance between God and man. Ibn Gabirol's account of the heavens in section three is part of his description of this vast separation. The order of the universe presented in the course of this section is in five parts: (1) the sublunar world, (2) the supralunar world (the heavens), (3) the sphere of Intelligence, (4) the "Throne of Glory," and (5) the Will of God, or God's Wisdom.

In 1045 Ibn Gabirol composed an ethical study in Arabic, *Iṣlāḥ al-akhlāq* (On the Improvement of the Moral Qualities), which was translated into Hebrew by Yehu-

dah ibn Tibbon in 1167 under the title *Tiqqun middot ha-nefesh*. Man's soul, Ibn Gabirol says, comes from the realm of Intelligence and enters Nature, but it remains between these two realms throughout its embodied life. Its goal during this life is to return to the level of Intelligence by means of knowledge and practice. Perhaps the most original part of this book is the correlation that Ibn Gabirol draws between virtues and vices, the external human senses, the humors, and the four elements of the sublunar world (air, water, earth, and fire). All human beings are composites of these elements and corresponding humors. A proper balance of these components produces human virtues, whereas an imbalance produces vices.

Ibn Gabirol's major philosophic work is *Yanbū' al-ḥayāt* (The Fountain of Life), of which no copies of the original Arabic have survived. It was translated into Latin in 1150, under the title *Fons vitae*, by Dominicus Gundissalinus, archbishop of Segovia, with the assistance of a Jewish convert. In the thirteenth century Shem Ṭov ibn Falaquera translated excerpts from the original into Hebrew under the title *Liqqūṭim mi-sefer meqor ḥayyim*; Jewish scholars apparently felt no need to prepare a Hebrew translation of the entire work since the Aristotelian Avraham ibn Daud had judged it to be excessively verbose, philosophically shallow, and religiously questionable. Ibn Daud's critique of *The Fountain of Life* in his work *The Exalted Faith* (1168) is a major reason why Ibn Gabirol's philosophic masterpiece was ignored by subsequent generations of Jewish philosophers. [See the biography of Ibn Daud.]

A philosophic study of matter and form, *The Fountain of Life* is devoid of any direct reference to biblical or rabbinic texts or doctrines, which in itself explains why subsequent Christian scholars could mistake this book's author for a Muslim or a Christian. In fact it was only in 1845 that Solomon Munk identified Avicbron, the author of *Fons vitae*, as Ibn Gabirol, the author of *Meqor ḥayyim*.

*The Fountain of Life* is divided into five treatises. The first is a general introduction of the topic of matter and form and their relation to physical substances. The second deals with the substance or matter that underlies the corporeality of the sublunar world. The third is a proof of the existence of simple substances, which function in Ibn Gabirol's ontology as intermediaries between God and the physical world. The fourth is a proof that these simple or spiritual substances are composed of form and matter, and the fifth treatise is an account of the universal form and universal matter that underlie everything in the universe except God.

The main thesis of the work is that everything in

God's universe has matter as well as form, a doctrine severely criticized by Ibn Daud and ignored by all subsequent Jewish philosophers until Spinoza. While *The Fountain of Life* had little influence on Jewish thought, it was a major influence on thirteenth-century Christian philosophy. The main thesis was adopted by Duns Scotus and the Neoplatonic Franciscans, while it was opposed by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the Aristotelian Dominicans. Among the Christian thinkers who explicitly referred to Avicbron were Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Alexander of Halès, Bonaventure, William of La Mar, and Giordano Bruno.

[For further discussion, see Jewish Thought and Philosophy, article on Premodern Philosophy.]

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NORBERT M. SAMUELSON

**IBN ḤANBAL.** See Ḥanābilah.

**IBN ḤAZM** (AH 384–456/994–1064 CE), more fully Abū Muḥammad 'Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Sa'īd ibn Ḥazm; Muslim theologian and man of letters. Born in Cordova to a rich and influential family, Ibn Ḥazm received a distinguished education in religious sciences, literature, and poetry. Nonetheless, he grew up in a period of disruptive ethnic and clan rivalries that saw the decline of the Umayyad caliphate at Cordova and the formation of tiny kingdoms fighting among themselves. His own childhood was marred by the disgrace of his father after the fall of Caliph Hishām II and by the destruction of the family home at Balāṭ Mughith in the course of bloody battles between Arabs and Berbers.

As a result of his political activities on behalf of the legitimist (Umayyad) party, Ibn Ḥazm met with imprisonment, banishment, and flight but was appointed to high positions as well, serving as vizier at least twice, under 'Abd al-Raḥmān III al-Murtadā and 'Abd al-Raḥmān V al-Mustaẓhir, and possibly a third time under the last caliph, Hishām al-Mu'tadd. Profoundly disappointed by his political experience and offended by the conduct of his contemporaries, Ibn Ḥazm subsequently left public life and devoted his last thirty years to literary activities.

His writings are quite personal, shaped by the intensity of his own reactions and rigorous in their condemnation of what is, in fact, only human nature. *Ṭawq al-ḥamāmah* (The Dove's Neck-Ring), a youthful work that was clearly revised later, is interesting in several respects. As a collection of prose passages and poetic illustrations on the subject of love and lovers, it offers a fairly standard treatment of a popular theme in Arabic literature. What sets it apart, however, is Ibn Ḥazm's penetrating observation of human psychology, a trait found in his later study of characters and conduct, *Kitāb al-akhlāq wa-al-siyar*, as well. Underlying the delicate charm of the prose and poetry in *The Dove's Neck-Ring* is an uneasy sensibility. Questioning, for example, the sincerity of exchanges between women and their lovers,

Ibn Ḥazm finds a gap between what is said and what is thought and concludes that language often serves to mask thought. This otherwise commonplace discovery of dishonesty provides him in turn with a basis for profound reflection on language and its wider uses, and it is here that he introduces the notion of *ẓāhir*, the "apparent" or literal meaning of words.

This line of thought is further developed when Ibn Ḥazm examines the word of God. In opposition to the Mālikīyah, he argues that people are bound to obey only the law of God, in its *ẓāhir* or literal sense, without restrictions, additions, or modifications. Although he was originally a Shāfi'ī jurist, Ibn Ḥazm joined the Zāhirī school and brought to it a systematic structure of logic. For the interpretation of sacred texts, he put together a Zāhirī grammar in which he specifically eliminates the ambiguities that grammarians were using to explain certain syntactical forms. He takes the position that language itself provides all that is necessary for the understanding of its content and that, therefore, God, who revealed the Qur'ān in clear (*mubīn*) Arabic, has used the language to say precisely what he means. Each verse should be understood grammatically and lexically in its immediate and general sense: when God wants a verse to have a specific meaning, he provides an indication (*dalīl*), in the same verse or elsewhere, which allows the meaning to be restricted.

The significance of a Qur'anic text can also be determined by a *ḥadīth* recognized as authentic after careful critical examination; a verb in the imperative, for example, can be taken as a command, but also as a suggestion: the meaning can be determined only from the literal sense of the context. From this position, it follows that Ibn Ḥazm strongly criticizes the use of reasoning by analogy (*qiyās*) and the principles of personal evaluation: the pursuit of what is considered good (*is-tiḥsān*), the pursuit of values for the common good (*is-tiṣlāḥ*), and most of all, the recourse to personal opinion (*ra'y*) by which the jurists sought to extend divine law to cases not mentioned in the texts (*nuṣūṣ*). In the same spirit, he limits the basis of consensus (*ijmā'*) to the companions of the Prophet; the agreement of the community of scholars on a legal question does not authorize the derivation of a law.

In *Al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām* (Judgment on the Principles of *Aḥkām*), Ibn Ḥazm develops his method for classifying human acts within the five established juridical categories (*aḥkām*) of obligatory, recommended, disapproved, forbidden, and lawful: for an action to fall into one of the first four categories, there must be a text (Qur'ān or authentic *ḥadīth*) that establishes its particular status; otherwise, the act is lawful. This method is

further applied in his voluminous treatise on Zāhirī law, *Kitāb al-muḥallā* (The Book of Ornaments).

Ibn Ḥazm is also famous for his great work, the *Fiṣal* (Detailed Critical Examination), in which he offers a critical survey of different systems of philosophical thought in relation to religious beliefs among the skeptics, Peripatetics, brahmans, Zoroastrians and other dualists, Jews, and Christians. Using the examination of these religions to establish the preeminence of Islam, he also attacks all the Muslim theologians, the Mu'tazilah and the Ash'ariyah in particular, along with the philosophers and mystics. His main objection is that each of them raises questions about the revealed text only to resolve them by purely human means. Ibn Ḥazm does not deny recourse to reason, since the Qur'an itself invites reflection, but this reflection must be limited to two givens, revelation and sense data, since the so-called principles of reason are in fact derived entirely from immediate sense experience. Thus reason is not a faculty for independent research, much less for discovery.

By submitting humans exclusively to the word of God, Ibn Ḥazm's literalism frees them from any choice of their own. His drive for synthesis leads him to demonstrate the harmony of all the Qur'anic and prophetic texts through the application of Zāhirī principles. As a result, his work constitutes one of the most original and important monuments of Muslim thought.

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ROGER ARNALDEZ

Translated from French by Miriam Rosen

**IBN KHALDŪN** (AH 732–808/1332–1406 CE), Muslim historian, famous as the first systematic theoretician of the social, economic, psychological, and religious forces that determine human history and society. Born in Tunis into an aristocratic and scholarly family that had left Seville for Northwest Africa almost a century earlier, he received the thorough education customary among the Muslim middle and upper classes. Entering government service shortly after he lost his parents and many of his teachers to the Black Death, he soon left Tunis and in 1354 arrived in Fez, where he was well received by the Marinid ruler but also had to suffer the customary tribulations of political involvement.

The Northwest African period of his life included a sojourn of a little over two years in Andalusian Granada (December 1362–February 1365), during which he undertook a diplomatic mission to Christian Seville, and over three years of quiet retirement from active politics (1375–1378) in rural Qal'at Ibn Salāmah (province of Oran). There he started work on his great history of the world (*Kitāb al-'Ibar*) and completed its "introduction," the *Muqaddimah*, in 1377. Returning to his native Tunis in order to complete the history, he reentered government service but soon felt that his position at court was shaky. Under the pretext of going on the pilgrimage to Mecca, he left Tunis in October 1382 for Egypt. There he spent the rest of his life as a college professor and administrator and achieved the zenith of his career with an appointment to the prestigious and influential Mālikī judgeship. His religious experience was enlarged by a pilgrimage to Mecca (1387–1388) and, in particular, a visit to the holy cities of Palestine (1400). A meeting with the Mongol ruler Timur in Damascus early in 1401 was another noteworthy event of his Egyptian period. He died unexpectedly in Cairo on 17 March 1406.

Ibn Khaldūn's approach to religion was conditioned by the fact that he lived in a Muslim society and was a prominent member of its religio-judicial establishment. Both as an enormously complex institution and as a powerful religious force in society, Islam is always present in his work and his thought. The encyclopedic outline of Muslim civilization in the *Muqaddimah* contains brief and factual sketches of the religious sciences and institutions; these sketches are admirably persuasive and have proved useful, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, as a first introduction to the subject. The historical development of the sciences connected with the Qur'an, the prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*), and jurisprudence is analyzed in a deceptively simple manner, and the great political-theological problems agitating Muslim society, such as the character of the caliphate

and the ever present messianic expectations, are discussed astutely.

A matter of vital concern in Ibn Khaldūn's life and time was the religious and social meaning of the relationship of Islam, in its dominant traditional manifestation as a sum of fundamentalist theology and law, to the individual and group emotionality of internalized religion represented by Sufism (*taṣawwuf*, "mysticism"). He is credited with a legal responsum (*fatwā*) and historical description and discussion of theories on mysticism, that expands on the chapter devoted to Sufism in the *Muqaddimah*. He supports traditional Sufism and rejects its ecstatic, seemingly antinomian forms, while being fully aware of their great impact on society. Other supernatural sciences, that were taken very seriously throughout medieval Islam, such as sorcery, astrology, and "scientific" attempts at divining the future, are discussed as to their compatibility with the traditional religious outlook. In general, Ibn Khaldūn applies a sense of realism to his basic concern with the forces governing human society. His approach to the religious/political institutions and religious sciences of Islam is predicated upon the assumption that human rationality, different though it is from revealed religion, affects them as it does all other cultural activity. Even where psychological or supernatural factors appear to be involved, man's task is to rely on reason, seconded by observation and experience, for understanding and explaining his world.

This approach raises the question of how Ibn Khaldūn reconciled his views on the normal course of human affairs with the dominant religious traditions and beliefs. The importance of his work results from his remarkable attempt to explain the historical processes in human terms, assumed by him to possess universal validity. Culture, equated with human life, is seen as dependent upon population density, a natural assumption in premodern times possibly confirmed for people in the fourteenth century by the devastation of the Black Death. Man's innate psychological need to belong and give political support to a group dominated by one or more leading personalities, for which Ibn Khaldūn chose the code word *'aṣabīyah*, translated approximately as "group feeling," is instrumental in producing the circular ebb and flow of concentrations of political power necessary for all civilization; religious convictions are beneficial, at times even indispensable, for an *'aṣabīyah* to achieve its potential. Economic factors—to a large extent controllable by proper human management, provided that the wisdom and will for it are present—complete the picture of human society, or societies, as based upon reason, numbers, and psychology.

What role, then, belongs to the principal religious te-

nets of Islam, such as God, prophecy, and the other world? Ibn Khaldūn could not disregard this question. He takes for granted the undeniable reality of the vast metaphysical structure set up by traditional Islam. Although he argues that prophecy cannot be proved by logical means, and he explains prophecy, on the human side, as depending on an extraordinary power of the soul, he accepts as a matter of course the existence of a succession of chosen human beings who are transmitters of the divine message, culminating in the prophet Muḥammad. Metaphysical forces are seen to have exercised a large, and often lasting, influence in certain ages, particularly at the origin of Islam. The potential for divine interference in human affairs at any given time continues to exist. Such interference, however, as in the form of miracles whose occasional occurrence cannot be denied, constitutes an interruption of the ordinary and need not be reckoned with in studying human society and the rules governing it. The widespread speculation about the end of the world concerned him only inasmuch as it was a belief that tended to conflict with political realities. There was practically no need for him to discuss life after death, which he accepted as a powerful belief.

It is tempting to ascribe to Ibn Khaldūn a kind of secularism and even claim for him a tendency to separate religion from politics and sociology. This view is anachronistic and disregards Muslim reality. Ibn Khaldūn was not an original religious thinker, but he showed a deep and no doubt genuine appreciation of the importance of Islam and religion in general. As befitted his position in life, he was sincere in his reverence for traditional Islam and the dogmas and practices it had produced. His individual religious views were not such as to cause much of a stir among his contemporaries, and there was little reason for later generations to pay attention to them. It was his way of looking at history that deeply impressed succeeding historians, especially among the Ottoman Turks. The full significance of his achievement began to find worldwide appreciation in the nineteenth century.

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specifically religious aspects of his work; among them is Ignacio Saadé's *El pensamiento religioso de Ibn Jaldūn* (Madrid, 1973).

FRANZ ROSENTHAL

**IBN RUSHD** (AH 520–595/1126–1198 CE), more fully Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rushd, known in Latin as Averroës; Spanish-Arabic philosopher, jurist, and medical writer. His father and grandfather were distinguished lawyers in Cordova, the leading center of intellectual culture in western Islam, which came under the rule of two successive Moroccan dynasties, the Almoravids (to 1146) and the Almohads (1146–1269). He received an excellent education in the Islamic sciences and Arabic literature, then in the physical sciences, medicine, and philosophy. At a young age he composed several summaries of Aristotle's works, which were all, except for the *Politics*, available in reliable Arabic translations.

These early books drew the attention of Ibn Ṭufayl, the senior physician to the Almohad emir in Marrakesh, who was interested in Greek philosophy but thought some explanation of Aristotle's texts was needed. After an interview at the palace (c. 1167) Ibn Rushd received a royal commission to continue his summaries and was nominated as a judge in Seville and subsequently as chief justice in Cordova. He held these posts for most of the rest of his life and devoted his free time to writing works of varying lengths on Aristotle's books, known as "summaries," "middle commentaries," and "long commentaries." It was through these works, translated into Latin and Hebrew, that he became known in the new universities of western Europe. He aroused much controversy in Christian circles over doctrines such as the everlasting time span of the physical substance of the universe, unavoidable to a strict Aristotelian, and the single Active Intellect into which all individual human intellects are absorbed after death. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) was especially opposed to the latter doctrine, with enormous consequences for the vigor of individualism in Western thought. Averroës was received more favorably by other Latin philosophers and scientists of the thirteenth century, such as Siger of Brabant, Roger Bacon, and a school of "Averroists" at the University of Padua, where his Aristotelian scholarship stimulated the growth of inductive, empirical sciences.

Ibn Rushd's impact on Islamic philosophy and theology was quite different. While interest in philosophy was growing in the European and British universities in his time, it was declining in the Arab countries and taking mystical forms in Iran. Only a few philosophers, such as Ibn Khaldūn, studied the Aristotelian commen-

taries of Ibn Rushd. But Ibn Rushd also wrote three important works of systematic philosophy that for a while injected new life into the study of Islamic theology.

The first of these was published about 1177 under the title *Faṣl al-magāl* (The Decisive Treatise). It is a short work on the legitimacy of philosophy from the standpoint of Islamic law (the *sharī'ah*). Citing the authority of the Qur'ān to encourage the study of nature in search for signs of divine providence and benevolence, Ibn Rushd pleads that such study must be built on all previous learning in logic and the sciences, especially that of the ancient Greeks, even though they had been pagans.

Some problems then are raised. What if the conclusions of science differ from those of revealed scripture? Since both are sources of truth, a reconciliation must be found, for "truth does not oppose truth, but accords with it and bears witness to it." This stance provides a straightforward denial of the theory of "double truth" wrongly attributed to Ibn Rushd by some European Averroists and long surviving in popular myth. Another persistent misconception has been that Ibn Rushd was concerned with conflicts between philosophy and theology. But theology (*kalām*) in Islam is merely the thought of fallible theologians, with no stamp of official approval by councils or popes. Hence Ibn Rushd felt free to attack it as the work of half-educated philosophers who merely confused people. His concern was to find harmony between philosophy and scripture itself.

These attitudes are fully confirmed by the detailed solutions he offers for three specific problems: (1) the "creation" of the universe means its continuous transformation; (2) God knows the particular facts of the world (denied by Ibn Sīnā) not as given objects but by his act of creating them; (3) our physical bodies are dissolved at death, but we may receive new celestial ones in a resurrection, and these would hold our reconstituted individual souls. Such conclusions were unlikely to satisfy the powerful conservative clergy. Ibn Rushd hedges his arguments by insisting that they should be taught only to those few who are qualified by their philosophic education to understand them; most people should be left alone with simpler ideas, for fear of undermining their belief in Islam altogether.

Following the *Decisive Treatise*, Ibn Rushd published a longer book with the abbreviated title *Kitāb al-kashf* (Programs of Proofs), in which he outlined a system of doctrines for reasonable Muslims who are not philosophers and refuted many erroneous teachings of the theologians. This is an important work that has not yet been sufficiently studied.

In 1184 he brought out his major work of systematic philosophy, in answer to al-Ghazālī's attack on the phi-

losophers, *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), written ninety years earlier but still influential among Muslims. Ibn Rushd's reply, which he entitled *Tahāfut Al-tahāfut* (The Incoherence of *The Incoherence*), takes the form of lengthy quotations from al-Ghazālī's book, followed by point-by-point refutations of his arguments. These wide-ranging dialogues discuss the creation of the world, the attributes of God, including his will and his knowledge, the nature of causation, and the fate of the soul, among many other topics. Al-Ghazālī's aim had been a negative one, to show that the philosophers al-Fārābī (873–950) and Ibn Sīnā (980–1037) had failed to prove twenty theses about God and the world that were irreligious or at least heretical from the viewpoint of Islam. These penetrating criticisms had remained unanswered. Ibn Rushd came to the defense of the original, pure philosophy of Aristotle and often repudiated in the process the arguments of the two Muslim philosophers.

As a result of his open teaching of Aristotelian philosophy and science and, no doubt, his attacks on the traditional theologians, he and a small group of fellow scientists in Cordova were indicted in 1195 on charges of irreligion. He was convicted and sentenced to exile for a few years, until he was taken by the reigning prince to Marrakech, where he died.

In spite of his Aristotelian writings and the trial in Cordova, Ibn Rushd has generally been regarded as a sincere Muslim, as witnessed by his long career as an Islamic judge (*qāḍī*), a book he wrote on jurisprudence, and his own conviction about himself. Although he had few disciples or even readers in Muslim countries over the following centuries, he continued to be honored as a learned scholar on Aristotle who had made a heroic but vain effort to reconcile that philosopher with Islam. Only in the last century has interest in him revived in the Muslim world, owing largely to fresh studies by Western scholars and a revival of interest in rationalistic philosophers among an educated Muslim public.

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GEORGE F. HOURANI

**IBN SĪNĀ** (AH 370–428/980–1037 CE), more fully Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā, known in Latin as Avicenna; Muslim philosopher and physician. Ibn Sīnā was born in Afshana, a village near Bukhara. Today a city in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, Bukhara was at that time the capital of the Samanid rulers, for whom Ibn Sīnā's father worked.

**Education.** Ibn Sīnā grew up in a bilingual environment; his native language was Farsi (Persian), but the language of his education was Arabic. The heritage of these two cultures was to lead to the two very different lines of his influence on later thinkers.

The education provided for Ibn Sīnā by his father was very wide-ranging, encompassing both Muslim religious studies and secular subjects from the Arabic, Greek, and Indian traditions. He began by memorizing the Qur'ān and much of the didactic literature known as *adab*, then went on to study Muslim jurisprudence (*fiqh*). His father and brother were followers of the Ismā'īlī branch of Shī'ī Islam, which encouraged the study of hermetic philosophy, Neoplatonism, and mathematics. Ibn Sīnā did not become an Ismā'īlī but did study these subjects, as well as "Indian calculation," probably meaning the use of the Hindi (Arabic) numerical system. When he reached ten years of age, his father hired a tutor to teach him Greek philosophy and science. For the next several years he studied Aristotle's logic, Euclid's geometry, and Ptolemy's astronomy and quickly surpassed his tutor in his knowledge of these subjects.

From age fourteen or fifteen Ibn Sīnā continued his studies on his own, reading the texts and commentaries in the natural sciences, metaphysics, and medicine. He excelled in this last subject, to the point that he was practicing and teaching it by the time he was sixteen. He completed his education in the following year and a half, reviewing and mastering all the branches of philosophy: logic, mathematics, natural science (or physics), and metaphysics. He was helped in his understanding of metaphysics by the commentary of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950 CE), whose commentaries on Greek philosophy and original writings had a great influence on Ibn Sīnā. In his attack on both Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, the great theologian al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) was to consider their views virtually identical.

**Public Life.** Ibn Sīnā's entry into public life began during this period of study, when he was summoned to treat the Samanid emir in Bukhara and then became part of his court. He was to spend the rest of his life—the next forty years—as a courtier, with all of the vicissitudes of fortune which that position usually entails. He held both medical and political positions in a number of courts in areas that are today part of Iran and

Soviet Central Asia, usually being forced to leave a given territory by "necessity," as he laconically calls it. At several courts he was an important minister, but the jealousy of rivals and an undoubtedly arrogant attitude toward his intellectual inferiors (virtually everyone he met) brought about his downfall and imprisonment or hasty escape from most of these courts.

During the time of this active political involvement, Ibn Sīnā was also engaged in writing a large and influential corpus of works on medicine and all branches of philosophy. Many of these works have been lost, and many that exist today are unedited, so we cannot speak with certainty about his philosophical development. Most of his major writings have survived, however, with the exception of *Al-inṣāf* (The Judgment), in which he compared the Eastern and Western views of Aristotle's philosophy. This work was lost during his lifetime; it might have answered some of the questions about his philosophy which exist even today. The two most influential of his works, *Al-qānūn fī al-ṭibb* (The Canon of Medicine) and *Al-shifā'* (The Healing [of the Soul]), were written over a period of years and were intended to be compendia of their subjects, medicine and philosophy. Most of his other major writings that can be dated were composed during the last thirteen years of his life, which he spent in Isfahan or on campaign with its ruler, as his official physician and courtier. During this period he composed some works in Farsi, such as the *Dānish-nāmah-i 'Alā'ī* ('Alā'ī Philosophy), and oversaw the translation of some of his earlier Arabic treatises into Farsi. In all, more than 130 works by Ibn Sīnā have survived to this day, many of them found only in manuscript form in Middle Eastern libraries.

Ibn Sīnā was interested in all branches of knowledge, religious and secular. Once, in order to avenge a slighting remark about his knowledge of Arabic philology, he spent three years studying the subject, then wrote several letters imitating exactly the greatest prose stylists in the language, and concluded his study by writing a book on the subject. Most of his surviving writings are of this sort: accounts of one aspect or another of the learning of his time, often in response to questions posed by his contemporaries. His philosophy is presented more systematically in his major works: the *Shifā'*; the *Najāt* (Salvation [from Error]), a selection of the most important parts of the *Shifā'*; *Ishārāt wa-al-tanbihāt* (Instructions and Remarks), the last of his major writings; and the *Dānish-nāmah-i 'Alā'ī*. The *Shifā'*, for example, is divided into four parts, treating logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; the first three parts are further subdivided, thus covering virtually all of the subjects of philosophy.

**Thought.** As can be seen from his major writings, Ibn Sīnā wished not merely to study all knowledge but to synthesize it as well. Aristotle's philosophy, Neoplatonism, Islamic religious teachings, and quite possibly Zoroastrian concepts were all present in his intellectual background, and traces of all of these traditions can be found in his thought. In his cosmology, for example, he adopts the Neoplatonic theory of emanation from a Necessary Existent through a series of Intelligences to the Active Intelligence, from which emanate the vegetative, animal, and rational souls and the material basis of the sublunary world. This emanation is necessary, since it is implicit in the nature of the Necessary Existent, as is its absolute goodness.

The Necessary Existent is the only exception to Ibn Sīnā's absolute distinction between essence and existence. For the Necessary Existent, essence and existence are identical; for all other existents they are separate. Even though the Necessary Existent is the Prime Cause of the created universe, the latter is independent of the Necessary Existent, which has no control over the good and (necessary) evil resulting from the process of emanation. Thus he employs Neoplatonic ideas in his attempt to harmonize the theory of Aristotle, which regards matter as coeternal with the Prime Mover, and the belief in creation by God *ex nihilo* held by Muslims. He was later criticized by Ibn Rushd (Averroës; d. 1198) for not following Aristotle more closely and was accused of heresy by al-Ghazālī for not accepting creation *ex nihilo*.

In his exposition of the relationship between human beings and the Necessary Existent, Ibn Sīnā likewise advocates a position that draws upon Neoplatonism to synthesize the various positions current in his time. Each human being, he states, is composed of body, soul, and intelligence. The highest aspect of the human being, the intelligence, desires to reach its perfection, to return to the source from which it has emanated. Passing back through the various stages of emanation, which Ibn Sīnā compares to passing through the stages of the mystical path, the individual intelligence ultimately achieves union with the Necessary Existent. There are similarities between this view and Aristotle's position that the greatest human happiness is found in the godlike activity of contemplation. However, in no sense could a part of the human soul become identified with the Prime Mover in Aristotle's system. Ibn Sīnā is closer to an Islamic position in his discussion of the relationship of humans to the Necessary Existent. But it is not the orthodox theological doctrine, which stresses the absolute separateness of human beings and God, that he approaches in his account. Rather, it is the Ṣūfī,

or mystical, view of the divine-human relationship. His mysticism differs from that of most Ṣūfis, however, in his argument that the *'ārif* ("knower," or, perhaps, "gnostic") can attain the *ma'rifat Allāh* ("knowledge of God") by his own will; he does not need God's grace to achieve this state of illumination.

In recent years, students of Ibn Sīnā's religious thought have found traces of Zoroastrian influence, in addition to the influences of Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and Islamic ideas. His theory of the role of the Intelligences in the universe bears a resemblance to the angelology of Zoroastrianism, and much less to the traditional Islamic view of angels as God's vicegerents and messengers. The individual must awaken to the knowledge that his intellect is a part of the world of the angels; at that point the mystical journey begins. Ibn Sīnā's view of the material universe as eternal, evil (mixed with good), and completely determined is related not only to the tenets of gnosticism and Manichaeism that still survived in the Iran of his time, but also to the late Zoroastrian doctrine of Zurvanism, which held even God to be bound by fate. In his development of a philosophical vocabulary in Farsi, he shows a knowledge of Zoroastrian terminology and adapts it to his own system.

**Influence on the West.** In canto 4 of his *Inferno* Dante includes Ibn Sīnā with the great pagan writers of antiquity in Limbo, the highest circle of Hell. Muslims were generally seen as schismatics—Dante in fact puts Muḥammad and 'Alī among the schismatics in canto 28—so it is surprising to encounter Ibn Sīnā alongside Homer, Plato, and Aristotle. Dante placed him in this high position quite likely because of the great influence his writings had exerted on Christian thought over the previous century and a half. His influence on Dante's ideas was especially strong.

Ibn Sīnā's influence in the West began almost as soon as his works began to be translated in twelfth-century Spain. Most of the *Shifā'* was translated into Latin before 1150, and it presented Christian thinkers with their first exposure to a completely coherent cosmology and system of metaphysics. It had a seductive attraction because of its comprehensiveness and was in some respects easier to accept than Aristotle's philosophy. Because Aristotle's works were being translated at the same time as those of Ibn Sīnā, and because some Neoplatonic works were attributed to Aristotle (e.g., the *Liber de causis*, a collection of extracts from Proclus's *Elements of Theology*), it was not always easy to distinguish the ideas of the two philosophers. During the thirteenth century, however, students of their works and commentators on them were able to separate the two men and identify the spurious works attributed to them.

At this point it was discovered by Christian theologians, as al-Ghazālī had alleged over a century earlier, that Ibn Sīnā's cosmology and metaphysics posed a danger to orthodox monotheism, whether Christian or Muslim.

Ibn Sīnā's philosophical system was too well constructed to refute completely and too widespread to ignore. Virtually all of the scholastic theologians accepted some of his ideas, although none went so far as to become "Latin Avicennists." The Christian writer who came closest to adopting his philosophy completely was his twelfth-century translator, Dominicus Gundissalinus, who wrote a number of works which borrowed heavily from the psychology and metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā, which Gundissalinus had translated into Latin. Gundissalinus's works, as well as those of Ibn Sīnā, were viewed critically by William of Auvergne (or William of Paris, c. 1180–1249). He accepted Ibn Sīnā's distinction between essence and existence but strongly rejected his emanationist creation theory, including the hierarchy of Intelligences existing between humans and God. In this rejection he was followed by Albertus Magnus (1206–1280) and Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274).

The two most important Christian thinkers strongly influenced by Ibn Sīnā were the British Franciscans Roger Bacon (c. 1214–after 1292) and John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308). Bacon did not compose a systematic theology but, rather, wrote a scientific encyclopedia resembling in many ways Ibn Sīnā's *Shifā'*. Neither Ibn Sīnā nor Roger Bacon wished to compare each point with the views of the ancient philosophers; as Ibn Sīnā told his chief disciple, Jūzjānī, "If you would be satisfied with my composing a work in which I would set forth what, to me, is sound in these sciences, without debating with those who disagree or devoting myself to their refutation, I would do that" (Gohlman, 1974, p. 55). Bacon also believed that Ibn Sīnā was, after Aristotle, the prince of philosophy. Even so, Bacon could not follow Ibn Sīnā completely: he substitutes God for Ibn Sīnā's creating Active Intelligence, for example. Duns Scotus adopted Ibn Sīnā's definition of metaphysics as the study of being *qua* being, and his discussion of universals was largely based on that of Ibn Sīnā as well.

**Influence in the Muslim World.** Ibn Sīnā had a number of disciples who continued studying and teaching his philosophical system. The orthodox Islamic revival of the eleventh century CE, however, crowned by al-Ghazālī's attack on the philosophers, limited the spread of his ideas to those areas not under the control of the Seljuk dynasty. The fact that he did not found a school like the Academy of Lyceum also restricted his influence to the occasional scholar or group of scholars. It is ironic that his philosophical writings became a part of the curriculum of European universities but not of the

*madrāsahs* (colleges) established in the Muslim world.

Ibn Sīnā's influence on Muslim writers, especially in the Farsi-speaking area of the Muslim world, was, nevertheless, important. The most significant impact of his thought was on Sufism, more specifically on the Ishrāqī (Illuminationist) school of Sufism founded by Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (1153–1191). The source of this influence was not his great encyclopedia of philosophy, the *Shifā'*, but rather several short treatises, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, *The Bird*, *On Love*, and *Salmān and Absāl*, as well as the last sections of his *Ishārāt*. There is a dispute among contemporary scholars concerning the extent to which Ibn Sīnā intended these works to be interpreted esoterically as mystical treatises. The Ishrāqī Ṣūfis, however, read them in this way and combine them with the obviously mystical theosophy of Muḥyi al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī (1165–1240) and the ideas of his contemporary Suhrawardī to form the most influential school of mystical philosophy in the Farsi-speaking Islamic world.

The aspect of Ibn Sīnā's writings that attracted Suhrawardī and his followers was his Eastern (*mashriqīyah*) philosophy. The Arabic words for "Eastern" and "Illuminationist" (*mushriqīyah*) are written identically; according to Suhrawardī they mean the same thing in Ibn Sīnā's works. Unfortunately, the most important of his writings on Eastern philosophy, *Judgment*, was lost, but his references to the East in *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and *The Bird* convinced Suhrawardī that Ibn Sīnā was on the right track. Suhrawardī translated the latter into Farsi and wrote a companion work to *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, which he called *Western Exile*. In his basic treatise *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* (Illumination Wisdom), Suhrawardī points out that the sources of wisdom that Ibn Sīnā lacked were precisely those writings of Zoroastrianism, Pythagoreanism, and Hermetism which were both Eastern and Illuminationist. He rejects Ibn Sīnā's distinction between essence and existence, saying that existence has no reality outside the intelligence that abstracts its essence. Ibn Sīnā's view of form and matter, similar to that of Aristotle, is transformed by Suhrawardī into light and darkness; the human soul is composed of light. He interprets Ibn Sīnā's treatises to be symbolic accounts of the return of the soul/light to the Supreme Light, and wrote several treatises that describe this journey of the soul to God.

The Ishrāqī tradition was most influential in Iran after the establishment of the Safavid regime (1499–1722) and its adoption of Shī'ī Islam as the official state religion. In Isfahan, the Safavid capital after 1598, the two greatest exponents of the Ishrāqī school were Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631) and his pupil Mullā Ṣadrā (1571/2–1640). Mīr Dāmād wrote a commentary on the metaphysics of the *Shifā'* in which he combined the teachings of Ibn

Sīnā and Suhrawardī, particularly in the area of angelology. Mullā Ṣadrā, the greatest of the Ishrāqī theosophers, founded a school that continues to the present day. His synthesis of philosophy, revelation, and illumination follows Ibn Sīnā's principle of the primacy of existence and its division into necessary, possible, and impossible existents. He departs from Ibn Sīnā's views and relies more on Ibn al-'Arabī, the Neoplatonists, and Islamic revelation in holding that the sciences of the "otherworld," learned by illumination and revelation, are true knowledge and far superior to the sciences of this world. Just as the Europeans had accepted only one aspect of Ibn Sīnā's thought, the philosophical/scientific, the Ishrāqīyah selected only the other aspect, the mystical, for inclusion in their system of belief.

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WILLIAM E. GOHLMAN

**IBN TAYMĪYAH** (AH 661–728/1263–1328 CE), more fully Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Ḥalīm ibn 'Abd al-Salām al-Ḥarrānī al-Dimashqī; jurisconsult, theologian, and Ṣūfī. He was born in Harran, and at the age of six he fled with his father and brothers to Damascus during the Mongol invasions. Ibn Taymīyah devoted himself from early youth to various Islamic sciences (Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and legal studies), and he was a voracious reader of books on sciences that were not taught in the regular institutions of learning, including logic, philosophy, and *kalām*.

**Early Career.** Ibn Taymīyah studied law under the direction of his father and Shams al-Dīn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Maqdisī (d. 1283). Under several teachers of *ḥadīth* he studied a number of works, in particular the *Musnad* of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, (a *ḥadīth* collection that he read several times), the "six books" of *ḥadīth*, and the biobibliographical *Mu'jam* of al-Ṭabarānī. He studied Arabic grammar and lexicography for a brief period under Sulaymān ibn 'Abd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī (d. 1316); then, on his own, he mastered Sibawayh's text on grammar. He became qualified to issue legal opinions before the age of twenty; at twenty-one, upon the death of his father in 1283, he succeeded him as professor of *ḥadīth* and law at Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Sukkarīyah, a Ṣūfī monastery and college of *ḥadīth* founded around the middle of the thirteenth century in Damascus. Ibn Taymīyah was a prolific writer, described as "fast to learn and slow to forget": it was said of him that once he learned something, he never forgot it.

Ibn Taymīyah also succeeded his father at the Umayyad Mosque, where he gave lectures on Qur'anic exegesis. His biographers record that, lecturing without notes, he would give materials for two or more fascicles. On one of these Fridays of Qur'anic exegesis in the Umayyad Mosque in 1291, Ibn Taymīyah lectured briefly on the divine attributes. This was his first known public venture into controversial dogmatics. The reaction was quick among his opponents, who tried to prevent him from lecturing further in the mosque but failed in their attempt. Ibn Taymīyah's treatment of the divine attributes was given as part of his profession of faith, the *'aqīdah*. The Shāfi'ī chief *qāḍī* Shihāb al-Dīn al-Khuwayyī declared: "I am in agreement with the creed of Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn [ibn Taymīyah]." When he was reproved, he continued: "because he has sound intelligence, speaks from extensive knowledge, and says only what he knows to be sound."

In 1292 Ibn Taymīyah went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he gathered materials for his work *Manāsik al-ḥajj* (Rituals of the Pilgrimage), denouncing a number of practices in the rituals of the pilgrimage as condemnable innovations.

The Shāfi'ī historian Ibn Kathīr, in the events of the year 1293/4, treats of the affair of 'Assāf al-Naṣrānī ("the Christian"), who was reported by witnesses to have cursed the Prophet. Ibn Taymīyah and a companion, al-Fāriqī, apparently implicated in the affair for encouraging the assault and battery to which 'Assāf and his bedouin protector were victims, were flogged and put under house arrest. This was the episode behind Ibn Taymīyah's work *Kitāb al-ṣārim al-maslūl 'alā shātīm al-rasūl* (The Sharp Sword Drawn against the Reviler of the Messenger [of God]).

In 1296, at the death of his professor Zayn al-Dīn ibn Munajjā, Ibn Taymīyah succeeded to the chair of law thus vacated in the Madrasah Ḥanbalīyah. His biographer Ibn Rajab said that he read an autobiographical note in Ibn Taymīyah's own hand to the effect that Ibn Taymīyah was offered, before the year 1291 (thus before the age of thirty), the post of *shaykh al-shuyūkh*, or head of the Ṣūfis, and the post of chief *qāḍī*, but he refused them both. Refusals to assume such posts usually meant that the scholar wished to stay aloof from the central power, out of desire for a private scholarly life, or in order to pursue the ascetic life, or to remain free to criticize practices he deemed not in keeping with the tenets of Islam. When Ibn Taymīyah's subsequent life is taken into consideration, his refusal clearly appears to have been based on the last of these reasons.

**Opposition to the Ash'ariyah.** Ibn Taymīyah lived in a period between those of two notable propagandists of the rationalist Ash'arī movement in theology: Ibn 'Asākir (d. 1176) and Subkī (d. 1370). The attempt of the Ash'arī movement to obtain legitimacy by infiltrating the Shāfi'ī *madhhab* (school) of law—an attempt that surfaced in the eleventh century—was still developing and had to face two implacable forces blocking its goal. The traditionalist movement was represented particularly by two *madhhabs* of law: the Ḥanbalī and the Shāfi'ī. The former was the obvious obstructive force, while the latter included the Ash'arī faction, which was hard at work to gain the adherence of fellow Shāfi'īs to Ash'arī thought, an effort destined to fail in the face of the alliance between the traditionalists of the two *madhhabs*.

Already in the days of Ibn 'Asākir the traditionalists had introduced an institution that was conceived to correct, among other things, the detrimental consequences of the exclusory principle in the *madrasah*, according to which only those students who chose to belong to the *madhhab* represented by the *madrasah* were admitted. This policy tended to be divisive, separating members of the traditionalist movement who belonged to all the Sunnī *madhhabs*, while allowing the Ash'ariyah to stay within one *madhhab*, the Shāfi'ī. The new institution that helped to correct the situation was the Dār al-Ḥadīth, wherein the principal subject of instruction was *ḥadīth* rather than law, and students of any of the four *madhhabs* could attend. Thus a Ḥanbalī professor, such as Ibn Taymīyah, could have students belonging to the Shāfi'ī *madhhab*, such as al-Birzālī, Mizzī, and al-Dhabī. The first Dār al-Ḥadīth was founded in Damascus by the Zengid ruler Nūr al-Dīn (d. 1173).

To the philosophical theology of the Ash'ariyah, Ibn Taymīyah opposed his famous professions of faith (*'aqīdah*; pl., *'aqā'id*). His first full-length *'aqīdah*, writ-

ten at the request of the people of Hama in the year 1299 and therefore known as *Al-'aqidah al-ḥamawīyah*, was very hostile to the Ash'ariyah and their *kalām*-theology. According to Ibn Rajab, Ibn Taymīyah wrote this *'aqidah* in one sitting. His other important profession of faith is the *'Aqidah wāsiṭīyah*, written for a group of religious intellectuals in Wāsiṭ (Iraq) before the arrival of the Mongols in Damascus. Both professions of faith were attacked by his enemies, and he was taxed with anthropomorphism. In a meeting in the house of the Shāfi'ī *qāḍī* Imam al-Dīn 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qazwīnī (d. 1299) the *'Aqidah ḥamawīyah* was studied; Ibn Taymīyah was questioned regarding various points, and it was deemed to be satisfactory. Regarding the *Wāsiṭīyah*, even the Ash'arī-Shāfi'ī Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Hindī (d. 1315) found it to be in conformity with the Qur'ān and *sunnah*. Nevertheless, his enemies tried hard to keep him in prison, even to have him executed, but failed on both counts.

Ibn Taymīyah's polemic activity extended to the philosophers, especially the logicians, against whom he wrote a refutation, *Al-radd 'alā al-manṭiqīyīn*. He wrote extensively against the monistic (*ittiḥādīyah*) and incarnationist (*ḥulūliyah*) Ṣūfīs and condemned as heretical innovations many of the Ṣūfī practices of his day. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymīyah was praised by the Ṣūfī Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Qawwām, who said: "Our Sufism became sound only at the hands of Ibn Taymīyah," implying that Ibn Taymīyah was not an outsider to Sufism. Recently discovered evidence shows that Ibn Taymīyah belonged to the Ṣūfī order of the Qādirīyah, named after the Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, whom he praised and preferred to the other Ḥanbalī Ṣūfī, al-Anṣārī al-Harawī.

On the theological question of the divine attributes, Ibn Taymīyah held that God should be described "as he has described himself in his book and as the Prophet has described him in his *sunnah*." This classical traditionalist doctrine goes back to al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820) and to Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855), the two great leaders of the movement, in whose works Ibn Taymīyah was thoroughly versed. Ibn Taymīyah and his famous disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 1350) drew much of their inspiration from the works of al-Shāfi'ī and Ibn Ḥanbal. From the genesis of the traditionalist movement the principal message has always been that the basic sources for belief and practice are the book of God and the practice (*sunnah*) of the Prophet.

Ibn Taymīyah, in the title of one of his numerous works, emphasized the place of the Prophet in relation to the two fundamental sources: *The Steps Leading to the Knowledge That the Messenger of God Has Already Made a Clear Exposition of the Roots and Branches of Religion*.

For the Prophet, as messenger, brought the book of God and was himself a living example of what should be followed. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah quotes from the introduction to al-Shāfi'ī's *Risālah*: "Praise be to God . . . who is as he has described himself, and who is exalted above all the attributes given to him by those among his creatures who have described him." And again: "No event shall befall an adherent of God's religion but that there is a guide in the book of God showing the right way to be followed." These two statements were quoted against the Ash'ariyah, the rationalist movement of the period of Ibn Taymīyah and Ibn Qayyim, as al-Shāfi'ī had said them some five centuries before in condemnation of the Mu'tazilah, the rationalist movement of his day.

**Under Attack.** Ibn Taymīyah's troubles came chiefly from his opposition to Ash'arī thought working from within the Shāfi'ī *madhhab*, and also from his criticism of extremist Ṣūfī thought and practices. His troubles (*miḥan*; sg., *miḥnah*) were treated extensively by his Shāfi'ī disciples al-Birzālī, al-Dhababī, and Ibn Kathīr, and by the Ḥanbalī biobibliographer Ibn Rajab.

Ibn Taymīyah's enemies finally succeeded in removing him from the scene. The opportunity was presented by one of his legal opinions (*fatwās*) entitled "Travel to the Tombs of the Prophets and Saints," in which Ibn Taymīyah prohibited such travel. His opponents pounced on this *fatwā* and charged him with demeaning the prophets and with unbelief (*kufr*). Eighteen jurisconsults, led by the Mālikī *qāḍī* al-Ikhnā'ī, wrote *fatwās* condemning him. The four chief *qāḍīs* of Cairo issued their decision that he be imprisoned in the citadel of Damascus. Other jurisconsults, including the two sons of the leading Mālikī jurisconsult Abū al-Walīd, had issued *fatwās* condemning that decision. They stated that it had no valid basis against Ibn Taymīyah since he had simply cited the divergent opinions of the jurisconsults on the subject of the visiting of tombs (*ziyārat al-qubūr*) and had given preponderance to one side of the question, a choice that was legitimate to make. But the decision stood without appeal. Ibn Taymīyah was never to leave the citadel alive; he died there some two years later. Three months before his death, his enemy al-Ikhnā'ī, against whom he had written a refutation, complained to the sultan, who ordered that Ibn Taymīyah be deprived of the opportunity to write; his ink, pen, and paper were taken away from him. But to the very last, his enemies could not quite get the better of him.

The biographers cite a number of statements made by Ibn Taymīyah during his imprisonment that show the man's stature and state of mind. "A prisoner is one who has shut out God from his heart." "A prisoner is one whose passions have made him captive." "In this world

there is a paradise to be entered; he who does not enter it will not enter the paradise of the world to come." "What can my enemies possibly do to me? My paradise is in my breast; wherever I go it goes with me, inseparable from me. For me, prison is a place of retreat; execution is my opportunity for martyrdom; and exile from my town is but a chance to travel." In reference to his enemies who strove to have him imprisoned: "If I were to give all the gold it takes to fill the space of this citadel, I could not possibly reward them for the good they have done me." And he often repeated the following prayer: "O God! Help me to move my tongue incessantly in your praise, to express my gratitude, and to serve you in perfect worship."

On 20 Dhū al-Qa'dah 728 (26 September 1328), Ibn Taymīyah died in the citadel at the age of sixty-five. The populace turned out in the hundreds of thousands for the funeral procession, which was compared to that of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. He was buried next to his brother, Sharaf al-Dīn 'Abd Allāh, in the Ṣūfī cemetery where other Ṣūfī members of his family were buried.

Ibn Taymīyah's influence has reached modern times. His teachings, first followed by Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), became the basis of the Wahhābī movement in the nineteenth century and the guiding principles of the Wahhābī state of Saudi Arabia. Again, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through Muḥammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā, they influenced the modernist Salafīyah movement.

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GEORGE MAKDISI

**ICELANDIC RELIGION.** See Germanic Religion.

**I-CHING** (635–713), Chinese Buddhist translator and traveler to India. Born Chang Wen-ming, a native of Ch'i-chou (modern Shantung Province), I-ching left his family at the age of seven and lived in a Buddhist monastery, where he studied under the guidance of two monks, Shan-yü (d. 646) and Hui-chih. The former was a learned scholar with a broad range of religious and secular knowledge; the latter was an expert on monastic discipline (Vinaya). I-ching was ordained at the age of fourteen and was urged by Hui-chih to follow the Vinaya strictly. He studied the monastic rules for another five years and became well versed in its regulations as well as in the interpretations given by Fa-li (d. 635) and Tao-hsüan (d. 667), the two leading and influential masters of monastic discipline. He was then allowed to lecture on the subject at the monastery. With the encouragement of his teacher, I-ching left the monastery for Ch'ang-an, the capital of T'ang-dynasty China. It was a time when Hsüan-tsang's (d. 664) famed journey to India and his translation of Buddhist texts into Chinese were still held in highest esteem, especially in the capital. Hsüan-tsang's legacy inspired I-ching to make his own mission to India. He first returned to his monastery at Ch'i-chou, then proceeded to Kuang-fu (Canton) with the blessings of his teacher. Although other monks had planned to join I-ching, all but one dropped out at the last moment.

In 671 the two monks boarded a Persian merchant ship and arrived at the kingdom of Śrīvijaya (South Sumatra), where I-ching's companion died. I-ching stayed on for six months and then embarked alone for Tāmra-līptī in eastern India via the kingdoms of Malayu, Kacha, and one of the Nicobar islands. At Tāmra-līptī he studied Sanskrit for a year. He then traveled to Nālandā with another Chinese monk, Ta-ch'eng-teng (d. 675). They went on pilgrimages to Gṛdhrakūṭa at Rājagṛha and to Mahābodhi at Bodh Gayā. Thereafter, they traveled to Vaiśālī, Amarāba, and Kāśī (Banaras), visited Jetavana Monastery at Śrāvastī and the "heavenly stairs" (said to have been built by the god Śakra for the Buddha to use in descending from Heaven) at Sāmkāśya, and journeyed to Sārnāth and Kukkuṭapāda.



At the end of his journey, I-ching settled at Nālandā, where for a period of nine years he studied the five prevailing Buddhist curricula. These were Buddhist logic, the *Abhidharmakośa*, monastic discipline (Vinaya), and the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra philosophies. I-ching pointed out that each of these disciplines is for a specific purpose, but that none is absolute by itself.

With the manuscripts he had collected at Nālandā, I-ching left central India for Tāmraliptī in 685. He embarked on a ship from the same port in 686, and after short stops at Kacha and Malayu, arrived at Śrīvijaya in 687. When he had been there a little over two years, however, I-ching found himself short of supplies for copying Sanskrit manuscripts. He went to the port to send word to China for supplies, but the ship that was to carry his message unexpectedly set sail while he was still on board. This accident brought I-ching back to Kuang-fu on 10 August 689, leaving behind his collection of Sanskrit manuscripts, amounting to half a million words. He recruited four assistants and returned to Śrīvijaya on 18 December 689. I-ching remained in the country, copied scripture, and studied under the distinguished teacher Śākyakīrti. He also wrote an account of Buddhist practices and a report regarding a group of Chinese monks who had traveled to India in search of Buddhism. I-ching sent these reports, together with his translations of Buddhist texts, to China through one of his assistants in 692.

Accompanied by two assistants, I-ching himself returned to Kuang-fu in 694. Five months later he traveled to Lo-yang, the eastern capital, where in 695 he was personally received with great honor by the empress Wu Tse-t'ien (r. 684–704). He was accommodated at Fo-shou-chi Monastery and worked as an assistant translator in the bureau of translations headed by Śikṣānanda. From 700 until his death, I-ching headed his own bureau of translation of Buddhist canons at Lo-yang and Ch'ang-an. Altogether he translated fifty-six works in 230 fascicles, among them scriptures, commentaries, and Vinaya texts. The empress and her successors patronized his work and even provided forewords to I-ching's translations. Various honors and rewards were bestowed upon the monk, and he was awarded the title "Master of the Tripiṭaka."

The works translated by I-ching include a broad range of Buddhist texts, including the Āgamas, the Avadānas, and Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras. Also translated were eleven Buddhist tantras and eighteen works on monastic discipline, as well as exegetic works that are important not only for Chinese Buddhism but also for

the religion as a whole. His version of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-uttamarāja Sūtra* (Golden Light Sutra) is widely acknowledged by scholars as the best Chinese translation of that scripture and one that has influenced all East Asia. His translation of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya texts has systematically preserved one of the most influential monastic traditions in India. His translations of the Yogācāra texts and of Buddhist logic are quite significant. I-ching's own writings are also valuable. His two records, of Buddhist practices in South Asia and of Chinese monks who traveled to India in the seventh century, are extremely important sources for historians of religion. His glossary, the *Fan-yü ch'ien-tzu-wen* (A Thousand Sanskrit Words), is the earliest extant Sanskrit-Chinese dictionary. Although I-ching's translations have been overshadowed by those of his predecessor, Hsüan-tsang, a sample examination of both renderings of the *Vimśatikā* (Liebenthal, 1934) concluded that I-ching was a better translator than Hsüan-tsang.

I-ching died on 16 February 713, at the age of 79. He was buried with grand honors, and was posthumously honored with the title Director of Foreign Office (*hung-lu ch'ing*). A memorial inscription was composed by Lu Ts'an at imperial request. A temple called Chin-kuang-ming ("gold light") was raised at his burial site in 758.

[See also Pilgrimage, article on Buddhist Pilgrimage in South and Southeast Asia.]

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JAN YÜN-HUA

Archbishop Mitty High School  
Media Center  
5000 Mitty Way  
San Jose, CA 95129
































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