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The Encyclopedia of Religion

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The Encyclopedia of Religion



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EDITOR IN CHIEF

Volume 15

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Abbreviations and Symbols Used in This Work

- abbr.** abbreviated; abbreviation
abr. abridged; abridgment
AD *anno Domini*, in the year of the (our) Lord
Afrik. Afrikaans
AH *anno Hegirae*, in the year of the Hijrah
Akk. Akkadian
Ala. Alabama
Alb. Albanian
Am. Amos
AM *ante meridiem*, before noon
amend. amended; amendment
annot. annotated; annotation
Ap. *Apocalypse*
App. *Apocryphon*
app. appendix
Arab. Arabic
'Arakh. 'Arakhin
Aram. Aramaic
Ariz. Arizona
Ark. Arkansas
Arm. Armenian
art. article (pl., arts.)
AS Anglo-Saxon
Asm. Mos. *Assumption of Moses*
Assyr. Assyrian
A.S.S.R. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
Av. Avestan
'A.Z. 'Avodah zarah
b. born
Bab. Babylonian
Ban. Bantu
1 Bar. *1 Baruch*
2 Bar. *2 Baruch*
3 Bar. *3 Baruch*
4 Bar. *4 Baruch*
B.B. *Bava' batra'*
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BC before Christ
BCE before the common era
B.D. Bachelor of Divinity
Beits. *Beitsah*
Bekh. *Bekhorot*
Beng. Bengali
Ber. *Berakhot*
- Berb.** Berber
Bik. *Bikkurim*
bk. book (pl., bks.)
B.M. *Bava' metsi'a'*
BP before the present
B.Q. *Bava' qamma'*
Bräh. *Brähmana*
Bret. Breton
B.T. Babylonian Talmud
Bulg. Bulgarian
Burm. Burmese
c. *circa*, about, approximately
Calif. California
Can. Canaanite
Catal. Catalan
CE of the common era
Celt. Celtic
cf. *confer*, compare
Chald. Chaldean
chap. chapter (pl., chaps.)
Chin. Chinese
C.H.M. Community of the Holy Myrrhbearers
1 Chr. *1 Chronicles*
2 Chr. *2 Chronicles*
Ch. Slav. Church Slavonic
cm centimeters
col. column (pl., cols.)
Col. *Colossians*
Colo. Colorado
comp. compiler (pl., comps.)
Conn. Connecticut
cont. continued
Copt. Coptic
1 Cor. *1 Corinthians*
2 Cor. *2 Corinthians*
corr. corrected
C.S.P. Congregatio Sancti Pauli, Congregation of Saint Paul (Paulists)
d. died
D Deuteronomic (source of the Pentateuch)
Dan. Danish
D.B. Divinitatis Baccalaureus, Bachelor of Divinity
D.C. District of Columbia
D.D. Divinitatis Doctor, Doctor of Divinity
Del. Delaware
- Dem.** *Dema'i*
dim. diminutive
diss. dissertation
Dn. *Daniel*
D.Phil. Doctor of Philosophy
Dt. *Deuteronomy*
Du. Dutch
E Elohist (source of the Pentateuch)
Eccl. *Ecclesiastes*
ed. editor (pl., eds.); edition; edited by
'Eduy. 'Eduyyot
e.g. *exempli gratia*, for example
Egyp. Egyptian
1 En. *1 Enoch*
2 En. *2 Enoch*
3 En. *3 Enoch*
Eng. English
enl. enlarged
Eph. *Ephesians*
'Eruv. 'Eruvin
1 Esd. *1 Esdras*
2 Esd. *2 Esdras*
3 Esd. *3 Esdras*
4 Esd. *4 Esdras*
esp. especially
Est. Estonian
Est. *Esther*
et al. *et alii*, and others
etc. *et cetera*, and so forth
Eth. Ethiopic
EV English version
Ex. *Exodus*
exp. expanded
Ez. *Ezekiel*
Ezr. *Ezra*
2 Ezr. *2 Ezra*
4 Ezr. *4 Ezra*
f. feminine; and following (pl., ff.)
fasc. fascicle (pl., fascs.)
fig. figure (pl., figs.)
Finn. Finnish
fl. *floruit*, flourished
Fla. Florida
Fr. French
frag. fragment
ft. feet
Ga. Georgia
Gal. *Galatians*
- Gaul.** Gaulish
Ger. German
Git. *Gittin*
Gn. *Genesis*
Gr. Greek
Hag. *Hagigah*
Hal. *Hallah*
Hau. Hausa
Hb. *Habakkuk*
Heb. Hebrew
Heb. *Hebrews*
Hg. *Haggai*
Hitt. Hittite
Hor. *Horayot*
Hos. *Hosea*
Hul. *Hullin*
Hung. Hungarian
ibid. *ibidem*, in the same place (as the one immediately preceding)
Icel. Icelandic
i.e. *id est*, that is
IE Indo-European
Ill. Illinois
Ind. Indiana
intro. introduction
Ir. Gael. Irish Gaelic
Iran. Iranian
Is. *Isaiah*
Ital. Italian
J Yahvist (source of the Pentateuch)
Jas. *James*
Jav. Javanese
Jb. *Job*
Jdt. *Judith*
Jer. *Jeremiah*
Jgs. *Judges*
Jl. *Joel*
Jn. *John*
1 Jn. *1 John*
2 Jn. *2 John*
3 Jn. *3 John*
Jon. *Jonah*
Jos. *Joshua*
Jpn. Japanese
JPS Jewish Publication Society translation (1985) of the Hebrew Bible
J.T. Jerusalem Talmud
Jub. *Jubilees*
Kans. Kansas
Kel. *Kelim*

- Ker.** *Keritot*
Ket. *Ketubbot*
1 Kgs. *1 Kings*
2 Kgs. *2 Kings*
Khois. Khoisan
Kil. *Kil'ayim*
km kilometers
Kor. Korean
Ky. Kentucky
l. line (pl., ll.)
La. Louisiana
Lam. *Lamentations*
Lat. Latin
Latv. Latvian
L. en Th. Licencié
 en Théologie, Licentiate in Theology
L. ès L. Licencié ès Lettres,
 Licentiate in Literature
Let. Jer. *Letter of Jeremiah*
lit. literally
Lith. Lithuanian
Lk. *Luke*
LL Late Latin
LL.D. Legum Doctor,
 Doctor of Laws
Lv. *Leviticus*
m meters
m. masculine
M.A. Master of Arts
Ma'as. *Ma'aserot*
Ma'as. Sh. *Ma'aser sheni*
Mak. *Makkot*
Makh. *Makhshirin*
Mal. *Malachi*
Mar. Marathi
Mass. Massachusetts
1 Mc. *1 Maccabees*
2 Mc. *2 Maccabees*
3 Mc. *3 Maccabees*
4 Mc. *4 Maccabees*
Md. Maryland
M.D. *Medicinae Doctor*,
 Doctor of Medicine
ME Middle English
Meg. *Megillah*
Me'il. *Me'ilah*
Men. *Menahot*
MHG Middle High German
mi. miles
Mi. *Micah*
Mich. Michigan
Mid. *Middot*
Minn. Minnesota
Miq. *Miqva'ot*
MIran. Middle Iranian
Miss. Mississippi
Mk. *Mark*
Mo. Missouri
Mo'ed Q. *Mo'ed qatan*
Mont. Montana
MPers. Middle Persian
MS. *manuscriptum*,
 manuscript (pl., MSS)
Mt. *Matthew*
MT Masoretic text
n. note
Na. *Nahum*
Nah. Nahuatl
Naz. *Nazir*
- N.B.** *nota bene*, take careful
 note
N.C. North Carolina
n.d. no date
N.Dak. North Dakota
NEB New English Bible
Nebr. Nebraska
Ned. *Nedarim*
Neg. *Nega'im*
Neh. *Nehemiah*
Nev. Nevada
N.H. New Hampshire
Nid. *Niddah*
N.J. New Jersey
Nm. *Numbers*
N.Mex. New Mexico
no. number (pl., nos.)
Nor. Norwegian
n.p. no place
n.s. new series
N.Y. New York
Ob. *Obadiah*
O.Cist. *Ordo*
Cisterciencium, Order of
 Citeaux (Cistercians)
OCS Old Church Slavonic
OE Old English
O.F.M. *Ordo Fratrum*
 Minorum, Order of Friars
 Minor (Franciscans)
OFr. Old French
Ohal. *Ohalot*
OHG Old High German
OIr. Old Irish
OIran. Old Iranian
Okla. Oklahoma
ON Old Norse
O.P. *Ordo Praedicatorum*,
 Order of Preachers
 (Dominicans)
OPers. Old Persian
op. cit. *opere citato*, in the
 work cited
OPrus. Old Prussian
Oreg. Oregon
'Orl. *'Orlah*
O.S.B. *Ordo Sancti*
 Benedicti, Order of Saint
 Benedict (Benedictines)
p. page (pl., pp.)
P Priestly (source of the
 Pentateuch)
Pa. Pennsylvania
Pahl. Pahlavi
Par. *Parah*
para. paragraph (pl., paras.)
Pers. Persian
Pes. *Pesahim*
Ph.D. *Philosophiae Doctor*,
 Doctor of Philosophy
Phil. *Philippians*
Phlm. *Philemon*
Phoen. Phoenician
pl. plural; plate (pl., pls.)
PM *post meridiem*, after
 noon
Pol. Polish
pop. population
Port. Portuguese
Prv. *Proverbs*
- Ps.** *Psalms*
Ps. 151 *Psalms 151*
Ps. Sol. *Psalms of Solomon*
pt. part (pl., pts.)
1 Pt. *1 Peter*
2 Pt. *2 Peter*
Pth. Parthian
Q hypothetical source of the
 synoptic Gospels
Qid. *Qiddushin*
Qin. *Qinnim*
r. reigned; ruled
Rab. *Rabbah*
rev. revised
R. ha-Sh. *Ro'sh ha-shanah*
R.I. Rhode Island
Rom. Romanian
Rom. *Romans*
R.S.C.J. *Societas*
Sacratissimi Cordis Jesu,
 Religious of the Sacred
 Heart
RSV Revised Standard
 Version of the Bible
Ru. *Ruth*
Rus. Russian
Rv. *Revelation*
Rv. Ezzr. *Revelation of Ezra*
San. *Sanhedrin*
S.C. South Carolina
Scot. Gael. Scottish Gaelic
S.Dak. South Dakota
sec. section (pl., secs.)
Sem. Semitic
ser. series
sg. singular
Sg. *Song of Songs*
Sg. of 3 *Prayer of Azariah*
and the Song of the Three
Young Men
Shab. *Shabbat*
Shav. *Shavu'ot*
Sheq. *Sheqalim*
Sib. Or. *Sibylline Oracles*
Sind. Sindhi
Sinh. Sinhala
Sir. *Ben Sira*
S.J. *Societas Jesu*, Society
 of Jesus (Jesuits)
Skt. Sanskrit
1 Sm. *1 Samuel*
2 Sm. *2 Samuel*
Sogd. Sogdian
Soṭ. *Soṭah*
sp. species (pl., spp.)
Span. Spanish
sq. square
S.S.R. Soviet Socialist
 Republic
st. stanza (pl., ss.)
S.T.M. *Sacrae Theologiae*
Magister, Master of Sacred
 Theology
Suk. *Sukkah*
Sum. Sumerian
supp. supplement;
 supplementary
Sus. *Susanna*
s.v. *sub verbo*, under the
 word (pl., s.v.v.)
- Swed.** Swedish
Syr. Syriac
Syr. Men. *Syriac Menander*
Ta'an. *Ta'anit*
Tam. Tamil
Tam. *Tamit*
Tb. *Tobit*
T.D. *Taishō shinshū*
daizōkyō, edited by
 Takakusu Junjirō et al.
 (Tokyo, 1922–1934)
Tem. *Temurah*
Tenn. Tennessee
Ter. *Terumot*
Ṭev. Y. *Ṭevul yom*
Tex. Texas
Th.D. *Theologicae Doctor*,
 Doctor of Theology
1 Thes. *1 Thessalonians*
2 Thes. *2 Thessalonians*
Thrac. Thracian
Ti. *Titus*
Tib. Tibetan
1 Tm. *1 Timothy*
2 Tm. *2 Timothy*
T. of 12 *Testaments of the*
Twelve Patriarchs
Toh. *Tohorot*
Tong. Tongan
trans. translator,
 translators; translated by;
 translation
Turk. Turkish
Ukr. Ukrainian
Upān. *Upāniṣad*
U.S. United States
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet
 Socialist Republics
Uqts. *Uqtsin*
v. verse (pl., vv.)
Va. Virginia
var. variant; variation
Viet. Vietnamese
viz. *videlicet*, namely
vol. volume (pl., vols.)
Vt. Vermont
Wash. Washington
Wel. Welsh
Wis. Wisconsin
Wis. *Wisdom of Solomon*
W.Va. West Virginia
Wyo. Wyoming
Yad. *Yadayim*
Yev. *Yevamot*
Yi. Yiddish
Yor. Yoruba
Zav. *Zavim*
Zec. *Zechariah*
Zep. *Zephaniah*
Zev. *Zevahim*
- * hypothetical
 ? uncertain; possibly;
 perhaps
 ° degrees
 + plus
 – minus
 = equals; is equivalent to
 × by; multiplied by
 → yields

T

(CONTINUED)



TRADITION. The word *tradition* comes from the Latin noun *traditio* (“handing over”), which derives from the verb *tradere* (“hand over, deliver”). *Traditio* corresponds closely to the Greek *paradosis*, which also comes from a verb (*paradidōmi*) meaning “hand over.” *Traditio* and *paradosis* can be used literally or figuratively, in the latter case often to mean “teaching” or “instruction.” *Traditio* and *paradosis* were commonly used in this sense by Latin and Greek Christian theologians to denote the body of teachings preserved and handed down by the church as “the catholic faith.” In the modern study of religion, however, a broader and more differentiated concept of tradition must be employed.

The Concept of Tradition. Culture depends on teaching and learning, and teaching and learning presuppose a tradition. The concept of tradition thus applies to virtually all fields of culture, including science, arts and letters, education, law, politics, and religion.

A belief or practice in any field of culture may be said to be a tradition to the extent that it is received from the hands, lips, or examples of others rather than being discovered or invented; received on the assumption that the authors and transmitters are reliable and therefore the tradition valid; and received with the express command and conscious intention of further transmission without substantial change. Hence, as a source of knowledge, tradition is to be distinguished from rumor and fashion. Rumor and fashion, although received from others, are not necessarily assumed to be reliable or to merit transmission without alteration; on the contrary, they invite speculation and elaboration. Tradition, however, purports to embody a fixed truth from an authoritative source.

Traditions in the field of culture command respect because of their relative antiquity and the presumed trustworthiness of their authors and transmitters. Sacred traditions provide a link between the origin and destiny of things. The ancient Greek poet and prophet Hesiod in his *Theogony* tells us that the Muses, the daughters of

Zeus, “inspired me with a divine voice to tell of the things that are to come and the things that were before” (lines 31–32). Similarly, the sacred traditions of all religions offer access to beginnings and insight into endings that personal experience and unaided reason cannot supply.

Sometimes sacred traditions tell of a golden age in the past. They preserve glimmers of the glorious age and establish beliefs, practices, and institutions to help people cope with the iron age of the present. At other times traditions anticipate the attainment of a glorious future age, which they portray in prophecies. Often sacred traditions address past and future together. In all three cases a view of time as something that can be recapitulated or at least held in synoptic vision long enough to add perspective to the present underlies the concept of sacred tradition. The work of seizing time through myth or prophecy explains the critical importance of memory in religious traditions. Memory defies time and change. “Remember!” is the first commandment of tradition.

The concept of tradition in religion may be applied to the means by which norms of belief and practice are handed down (e.g., by bards, books, chains of teachers, or institutions) or to the norms themselves. This article is concerned with the norms, while the word *transmission* refers to the means by which traditional norms are handed down. The distinction between tradition and transmission is not absolute, however. Religions typically resist it, especially if it is used to justify attempts to abstract the supposed essence of a religion from its historic vehicles and forms of expression. Because tradition is by definition an indirect source of knowledge, the forms in which traditional knowledge is transmitted cannot be cast away without risking loss of the contents, since the latter are not accessible or verifiable from contemporary sources. (To the extent that they are, they cease to be traditional in the strict sense.)

A sense of tradition as normative is a basic element

in all religious systems, whether or not formal concepts of tradition exist. When formal concepts appear, they may be broad or specialized depending on their function in the system and the degree of differentiation among the sources of religious belief and practice. Often the sense of tradition as normative is expressed by a broad collective reference to authoritative teachers or compendia: "the fathers," "the elders," "the sages," "the poets." An evolution from broad to specialized concepts can sometimes be discerned. In early catholic Christianity, for example, the concept of tradition embraced virtually all the formal sources of belief and practice handed down by the church, including the holy scriptures. Only much later did "tradition" come to signify the extrabiblical (ecclesiastical) sources in particular, at which point the "problem of scripture and tradition" could arise. In Sunnī Islam, by contrast, the formal concept of tradition, the *sunnah* ("custom, example") of the Prophet, became more specialized as a result of the formation of a closed collection of traditions—the six books of genuine *ḥadīths*, or stories of the Prophet, compiled in the third and fourth centuries AH (ninth and tenth centuries CE) and eventually accepted as authoritative throughout Sunnī Islam. [See *Sunnah and Ḥadīth*.]

Even more specialized cases are presented by two words meaning "tradition" in Judaism—*masorah* and *qabbalah*, which come from verbs meaning "hand down" and "receive," respectively. The verbs are used at the beginning of the early rabbinic *Ethics of the Fathers* (*Avot* 1.1) with reference to the handing down of the Torah from God to Moses, Moses to Joshua, Joshua to the elders, and so on. However, the nouns *masorah* and *qabbalah* eventually came to be used not for tradition in the comprehensive sense but for very specialized traditions: *masorah* for the exegetical traditions governing the transmission of the Hebrew text of the holy scriptures (hence "Masoretic text" for the canonical version of the Hebrew scriptures), *qabbalah* for the mystical and esoteric traditions of rabbinic Judaism. The function of specialized concepts is to sharpen the definition of tradition in selected areas and not to diminish the scope of tradition as a comprehensive norm. In religions with highly specialized concepts of tradition much that is traditional simply falls outside the formal concepts without being any less traditional for that reason.

In addition to being used in the practice of religion the concept of tradition is used in the modern study of religion; however, it is used descriptively rather than normatively, and often rather loosely. Sometimes the concept amounts to little more than a way of naming the religions, as when "Islamic tradition" (or "Jewish

tradition," etc.) is used to mean simply "Islam" (or "Judaism," etc.). This way of speaking may be questioned to the extent that it appears to single out traditionality as the most basic characteristic of a religion.

More problematic in relation to normative concepts of tradition is the pluralism reflected in some uses of the descriptive concept, as when "Chinese tradition" (or "Indian tradition," etc.) is used to refer collectively to the several religious systems of China (or India, etc.), or "Christian tradition" (or "Buddhist tradition," etc.) is used to group together conflicting normative versions of Christianity (or Buddhism, etc.). A type of historical relativism even more at odds with normative concepts is also encountered. When, for example, Confucian religion is treated as part of "Chinese tradition," there is a tendency to subordinate the religion to its historical context and religious values to the groups that bear them. Such a tendency may or may not reflect the best modern critical thinking about the relationship of values to history, but it must be carefully distinguished from the view of the religions themselves.

One important aim of the modern descriptive concept of tradition is to foster research into what might be called "deep tradition"—cultural patterns and values so basic to a civilization that they are not formally stated in classical tradition and may not even be clearly recognized by the bearers of the tradition. The concern of some modern scholars of India with the problem of defining the "Indianness" of India—the deposit of culture underlying the many different normative traditions of India—is a case in point. In this case, concepts such as "Indianness" and "Indian tradition" are used not to host pluralism but to advance the hypothesis of a unity that remains to be found and described. Such unities are difficult to define; nevertheless, the presentiment of continuity in the world's great civilizations is powerful enough to stimulate continuing research on "deep tradition."

Types of Traditions. Traditions may be verbal or nonverbal. Nonverbal traditions include traditional artifacts (e.g., icons, monuments, symbolic objects), sites, designs, gestures, postures, customs, and institutions. Nonverbal traditions cannot exist in isolation from verbal traditions, for the latter are needed to interpret them. However, nonverbal traditions possess a measure of autonomy in relation to verbal traditions because verbal interpretations can never completely penetrate the "thickness" of traditional objects or, in the case of religious objects, their presumed sacrality. Far from being dependent on specific verbal interpretations, nonverbal traditions typically host multiple or successive interpretations without losing their identity or traditional status. The persistence of nonverbal traditions in

relative autonomy over against the interpretations attached to them is a good example of traditionality: the ascription of value to something by virtue of the fact that it has been handed down from early times on good authority.

Oral and written tradition. Verbal traditions may be oral or written. Although the distinction pertains first of all to the means of transmission rather than to tradition, the substance of traditions is affected by the differences between oral and written transmission.

First, the forms of expression used in traditions are dictated in part by the means available. Some forms, such as hymns, proverbs, riddles, and folk tales, are essentially oral. [See Oral Tradition.] They may be written down, but writing does not open the way to a fuller realization of the form. Other forms, such as chronicles, law codes, and commentaries, depend on writing or are fully realized only in writing. Some of the most important forms of expression used in traditions, such as mythology and epic poetry, may reach a high level of development in either mode.

Second, oral tradition is a much older phenomenon than written tradition and typically precedes it in the formative period of traditions even after the invention of writing. This fact suggests that written traditions themselves are shaped in part by oral traditions. In many literate religious traditions, for example, scriptural and pedagogical titles recall and even purport to re-create an oral system of communication. Thus, *Qur'ān* means "recitation." The title of the first book of rabbinic law, *Mishnah*, comes from a verb meaning "repeat" and refers to pedagogy based on oral recitation. Similarly, *Upaniṣad*, a name for books of philosophical and esoteric teaching in Vedic tradition, comes from Sanskrit words meaning "sit down before [a teacher]." An accomplished monk in early Buddhism was called a *bahusuta*, "one who has heard much." The Greek word *euangelion*, "gospel" or "good news," means "news" in the literal sense of something proclaimed aloud in the hearing of the general public.

Third, oral tradition exists mainly in performance, while written tradition exists also in objective form apart from its applications. The relative independence of written texts stimulates the development of subtler intellectuality and greatly increases the possibilities of dissemination in fixed form. At the same time, writing involves significant dangers for a tradition. When a tradition is put into writing, its inconsistencies become more evident. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the quickened intellectuality that accompanies written traditions arises first of all from the need to address the inconsistencies that the writing down of a tradition exposes. Also, the independence of written texts opens the

way to the use of traditional materials in ways not intended by traditional authorities and ways cut off from the "living word" actualized in pedagogy and cult. To be sure, a written tradition is not further removed from the living word than an oral tradition insofar as the latter is understood as tradition in the strict sense. Tradition, oral or written, is the word handed down by others—the vehicle of the living word but not the living word itself. Nevertheless, the organic connection of oral tradition with performance guarantees the close proximity of tradition to the living word, whereas in the case of written tradition the connection is not as direct, and greater pains must be taken to regulate the use of traditions. Many traditional authorities have felt anxiety about writing, among them Plato: in his dialogue *Phaedrus*, Socrates tells a story about a wise Egyptian king who, in reply to the god who offered the Egyptians the gift of writing as "a drug to produce memory and wisdom," observed that the invention was more likely to produce just the opposite, namely forgetfulness, since those who came to depend on it would tend to seek wisdom in an external source rather than having to look within their own souls, and so they would "seem wise without being wise" (*Phaedrus* 274c–275). [See Memorization.]

Fourth, oral and written traditions coexist and influence each other even after many authoritative sources of tradition have been committed to writing. Oral tradition is not a stage that is outgrown with the arrival of written tradition. Even after it has been replaced by writing as the chief means of transmission, oral tradition continues to thrive in the form of customs, folklore, popular preaching, storytelling, esoteric speculation, practical applications of religion to everyday life, and other manifestations of traditional mentality. The text of the *Book of Exodus* was well established by 'Aqiva' ben Yosef's day, but that did not prevent the inquisitive rabbi and his colleagues from arguing about the number and size of the frogs sent against Egypt in the famous plague (B.T., *San.* 67b). People love to talk, and talk preserves and extends itself by means of oral tradition. Sometimes oral tradition even generates new bodies of written tradition, as in the case of the oral Torah canonized in the rabbinic law codes, the *Mishnah* and the *Talmud*.

The importance of oral tradition in the history of traditions has been widely recognized in the modern study of religion. In particular the concept of oral tradition has been used by scholars trying to reconstruct the origins and early history of religious traditions, since most traditions began orally and acquired written form only later. Unfortunately, the methodological problems of applying the concept of oral tradition are quite severe.

Except for the data supplied by modern anthropologists and ethnographers from direct observation, the evidence for oral tradition must be extracted from written sources. Scholarly opinion thus divides along a spectrum running from skepticism about the possibility of ever isolating the original oral layer of a written tradition to more confident approaches based on literary and rhetorical analysis and the selective application of archaeological evidence. In general it is fair to say that the concept of oral tradition and its applications in the modern study of religion stand in need of greater refinement.

Scripture and tradition. Many classical religious systems make a formal distinction between scripture and tradition among the sources of religious authority. *Scripture* refers to divinely revealed texts; *tradition* refers to revelation mediated by human teachers. The distinction tends to be clear enough in practice. Thus catholic Christians have no trouble distinguishing between the New Testament writings and the creeds and canons of the church councils; Muslims do not confuse the *sun-nah* of the Prophet with the Qur'an delivered by him. Yet the distinction between scripture and tradition is a difficult one to make in theory. It does not turn on the difference between divine revelation and human teaching, for in most religions authoritative tradition is esteemed almost as much as scripture as a vehicle of revelation. Furthermore, the theoretical priority of scripture over tradition rarely translates into a higher degree of binding force in practice. [See also Scripture.]

To some extent the distinction between scripture and tradition reflects the history of canonization in a religion. [See Canon.] When a canon of revealed scripture is definitively closed, authoritative teaching accruing thereafter is "tradition." Even so, the relationship must not be construed as a mere serial progression, least of all as a purely exegetical relationship, as if tradition were in essence commentary on a body of scripture antedating it. Materials preserved as tradition often reflect a significant degree of independence from scripture for a variety of reasons: the relative antiquity of traditions preserved from a time before the canonization of scripture and hence not conditioned by it; the diversity of sources embodied in tradition as opposed to the more restricted sources constituting a closed canon; and the reference of tradition to basic religious functions not adequately treated by scripture, such as liturgy or law.

Beyond providing a source of religious authority in addition to scripture, tradition plays an indispensable role in the appropriation of the scriptural source. Scripture cannot be used if it cannot be interpreted, and every use (liturgical, legal, theological, etc.) implies an interpretation. Interpretation, however, requires a gen-

eral framework and accepted rules of discourse that scripture by itself cannot supply. They are supplied by tradition. Thus there arises a practical dependence of scripture on tradition. Dependence need not imply diminished regard for the authority of scripture. While the critical historian might view a hermeneutical tradition as a device for overcoming the piecemeal character or obscurity of scripture, the pious mind will regard it as the only conceivable means by which to gain access to the vast and awesome contents of divine revelation—the means established by divinely ordained tradition as opposed to human invention. In the eyes of piety there is no contradiction between an appreciation of the grandeur and sufficiency of scripture and a recognition of the crucial role of interpretation. The aim of interpretation is not to threaten but to preserve and protect scriptural revelation: "Tradition [*masorah*] is a fence to the Torah" (*Avot* 3.14).

Nevertheless, conflicts between scripture and tradition are bound to arise because of differences in provenance, time of origin, and ideological tendency. In every religion with a body of scripture there will be traditions lacking scriptural warrant or contradicting the plain sense of scripture, and there will be beliefs and practices enjoined by scripture with no living function in tradition. While exegetical ingenuity can go part of the way toward resolving these conflicts, the problem of scripture and tradition cannot be settled by exegesis alone. From the outset a conciliatory assumption of harmony between scripture and tradition must be made to support the work of exegesis and interpretation. Otherwise the situation of the interpreter would be impossible, for scripture and tradition always diverge enough to make reconciliation impossible without a previous assumption of an ultimate harmony. This assumption is itself a *traditum*, a thing handed down and explicitly confessed by religious traditions with respect to their scriptures. The determination to affirm the harmony of scripture and tradition suggests that scripture has a significance that goes beyond its substantive contents, namely as an object of traditional loyalty, a badge of affiliation, and a symbol of continuity.

The role of the Vedic scriptures in Hinduism affords a good example. The Vedas were for a long time not scripture in the strict sense of the word because they were transmitted orally, but they acquired canonical form and played a quasi-scriptural role before being committed to writing. In scriptural form they enjoy theoretical priority over the books of tradition (*smṛti*; lit., "remembered") which were produced later. Thus, although the distinction between holy book and sacred tradition is not as sharp in Hinduism as it is in some other religions (the books of *smṛti* are also venerated as

holy scriptures), the relationship between Veda and *smṛti* still exemplifies the problem of scripture and tradition in a general way. A wide gulf separates the religion of the Vedas from that of later Hindu tradition. The Vedas present a religion of animal sacrifice and meat-eating, intoxicant-drinking priests; a worldview that knows nothing of the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*) and little of the theory of action (*karman*); a cult without temple worship; and a pantheon in which many of the gods and heroes of later Hinduism play little or no role. As for the classics of *smṛti*, their relationship to the Vedas is often so attenuated and artificial that one leading scholar has gone so far as to speak of the "de-vedization of the *dharma*" (i.e., of religion) in *smṛti*. Nevertheless, the books of *smṛti* consistently avow loyalty to the Vedas, and conciliatory explanations of departures from Vedic ways are offered. As Louis Renou put it, "The Veda is precisely the sign, perhaps the only one, of Indian 'orthodoxy' (*Le destin du Véda dans l'Inde*, vol. 6, pp. 2f., Paris, 1960). The "orthodoxy" is anything but doctrinal or ecclesiastical. Even so, the looseness of Vedic orthodoxy does not abolish the important line of division running through Indian religious history and separating the continuators of Vedic tradition from those groups, such as the Jains and Buddhists, who broke with the tradition in a radical way. Among the continuators a community of tradition existed despite many differences of doctrine and practice. Between the continuators and the others there was not a recognized community of tradition despite many historical and cultural affinities.

Tradition and Religious Originators. For a number of reasons the consciousness of standing in a sacred tradition is a typical feature of the outlook of originating figures in the history of religion. First, bearers of a new prophecy, revised values, or new loyalties must address their audience in terms that the latter find significant. The terms have to be drawn from a common tradition. A classic example can be seen in the *Book of Exodus* in the link that the prophet Moses must establish between the identity of the divine liberator whose name, Yahveh, he is commanded to reveal to the Israelite slaves in Egypt and "the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," namely the God or gods of ancient tradition (*Ex.* 3:13–15; cf. 6:2–3).

Second, religious originators must be able to reflect upon their own experience. Affording a means to achieve distance from the immediate present, tradition provides a framework for interrogation, interlocution, interpretation, and evaluation, without which reflection would be impossible. For example, early in his prophetic ministry Muḥammad experienced visions that he

later came to regard as encounters with the archangel Gabriel, the figure thereafter identified by Muslims as the agent of Qur'anic revelation. Scholars have pointed out, however, that the only reference to Gabriel as a revealer in the Qur'an occurs in a late Medinan surah (2:97–98) and that the descriptions of visions in earlier surahs (53:1–18, 81:15–25) are vague about the identity of the being encountered. In other words, it appears that an angelological tradition, not invented by Muḥammad but accepted by him at some point, served the Prophet (and later Islam) as a way to understand his early experiences.

Third, the consciousness of standing in a sacred tradition supports religious originators who break with the sacred traditions of contemporaries and coreligionists. The originator's personal sense of tradition makes the break bearable and keeps it from being episodic or nihilistic. So, for example, the apostle Paul, preaching a break with the Jewish law on the basis of faith in the gospel of Jesus Christ, was greatly aided by his conviction that he represented a tradition of faith authenticated by the law itself in its testimonies concerning Abraham (*Rom.* 3–4, *Gal.* 3–4).

The complexity of the relationship of religious originators to tradition can be seen in Jesus' confrontation with Jewish tradition as presented in the synoptic Gospels. That presentation has decisively shaped the way in which the problem of tradition and innovation has been understood in the history of Christianity and also in modern Western scholarship. The German sociologist Max Weber, in his famous discussion of charismatic leadership in *Economy and Society* (2 vols., Berkeley, 1978), had the rhetorical dichotomies of Jesus in the gospel according to Matthew in mind when he wrote, "From a substantive point of view, every charismatic authority would have to subscribe to the proposition, 'It is written . . . but I say unto you'"; and again when he wrote, "Hence, in a revolutionary and sovereign manner, charismatic domination transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms: 'It has been written . . . but I say unto you . . .'" (vol. 1, p. 243; vol. 2, p. 1115; cf. *Mt.* 5:21–48). Actually, in *Matthew* 5 Jesus does not say "It is written" but "You have heard that it was said to the men of old"; yet he then proceeds to quote from the Torah. Thus the confrontation is indeed between a written law and a living master. Master of the written law, Jesus is also shown in the synoptics to be sovereign over the sacred oral tradition claimed by the Pharisees when he directed to them the reproach "You leave the commandment of God, and hold fast the tradition of men" (*Mk.* 7:8; cf. *Mt.* 15:1–9).

Nevertheless, Jesus' relation to Jewish tradition is not adequately appreciated if one assumes that at bottom it

was dichotomous. Throughout the Gospels, including the passages cited above, there is much evidence for continuity. "Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them but to fulfill them" (*Mt.* 5:17). The theme of continuity has often been muted by the anti-Judaic tendencies of much historical Christianity and Christian theology, including nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberal theology, which differentiated sharply between the "legalistic" religion of the Jew and the "spiritual" religion of Jesus. Weber's discussion of charisma, too, tends to emphasize the break with tradition in the work of Jesus and of other prophets, military heroes, and messianic figures. Weber's emphasis was justifiable given his aims, namely the definition of terms and the clarification of pure types. Abstractly considered, a charismatic leader always stands over against tradition. He offers his followers something "new" and lays claim to a highly personal kind of authority, whereas "authority will be called traditional if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers" (Weber, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 226). In historical reality, however, charismatic leaders always possess notions of tradition that play a crucial role in their own thinking and in their relationships with followers and the general public. Thus Jesus, in the superficially anti-Mosaic teachings of *Matthew* 5 (e.g., vv. 21–22: "You have heard that it was said to the men of old, 'You shall not kill; and whoever kills shall be liable to judgment.' But I say to you that every one who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment"), probably would have said he was not invalidating the law of Moses but asking for something completely consonant with it. Jesus also frequently cited traditional authorities in his confrontation with the Pharisees, as when he cited the prophet Isaiah to support his condemnation of "your tradition" (hand washing before meals) in *Mark* 7:6–7 (cf. *Mt.* 15:7–9, *Is.* 29:13). The condemnation of a certain understanding of tradition is thus supported by an appeal to tradition, in this case by the analogy between Jesus' conflict with the traditionists of his day and the conflicts of the prophets of Israel with their opponents in the religious establishment of an earlier time. Even conflicts with tradition are molded by tradition.

Charismatic prophets who attack the sacred traditions of their contemporaries are not the only type of originators in the history of religion. Sociable teachers of virtue who accept commonly received forms of tradition but reinterpret their contents are also conspicuous. Originators of this type often make a conscious effort to deny the novelty of their message. Confucius is a good example. A powerful originator who decisively reoriented Chinese tradition, Confucius achieved a re-

markable humanization of the observance of the ritual forms of religion and a powerful condensation of its substance in his doctrine of "humanity" (*jen*). Yet he vigorously denied that there was anything new about his work. "I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say and devoted to antiquity" (*Analects* 7.1). Confucius's words and deeds were designed to authenticate this claim. He was scrupulous in his observance of the rites, devoted himself to traditional poetry and music, took as his models the ancient worthies of the Chou and Shang dynasties, and was careful to display reverence toward the spirit world and Heaven.

The approach of Socrates to tradition, at least in Plato's quasi-canonical version of it, runs parallel to that of Confucius in an important way, though with an equally important difference. The difference lies in the method, dialectic, which allows for the critical interrogation of received tradition to a degree and in a spirit quite foreign to Confucius's approach. The parallel lies in Socrates' insistence that he had neither new truths to tell people nor access to a special or secret source of truth but rather sought to clarify the true meaning of those traditional values—justice, goodness, piety—that most people accept on faith but cannot define or defend if asked to do so. Thus throughout Plato's portrait of Socrates there is a tension between a critique and an affirmation of Greek tradition. Socrates is depicted as a man who respects and participates in the common forms of tradition even as he questions them and demolishes the arguments of such pretentious and incompetent defenders as Euthyphro, Ion, and Agathon. The *Republic*, for example, although it contains perhaps the sharpest attack on Greek tradition in Plato's dialogues, namely the critique of Homer and Hesiod for "misrepresenting the nature of gods and heroes" (377e), opens with Socrates telling how he went down to Piraeus to pray to a goddess during a religious festival and ends with him telling a myth of gods and heroes (the myth of Er).

The Formation of Traditions. A general theory of the formation of religious traditions remains an elusive goal in the study of religion despite the large body of specialized scholarship on the formative periods of many world religions. The difficulty of constructing such a theory is related to the conflict between the modern critical view of tradition as a historical process and the concept of tradition as the preservation of inviolate sacred canons beyond time and change. The application of historical and philological analysis to sacred traditions never fails to locate them in a historical process. Yet the critical historical analysis of sacred traditions, if carried to the point of construing tradition as a purely historical process, fails to account for the most distinc-

tive fact of all: the continuity of sacred traditions with the capacity, however limited, to preserve themselves in a world of time and change.

All religious traditions construct pictures of their own formative periods. The pictures are built up over time by the retrospective projection of religious ideals onto the historical materials of the tradition. The pictures in turn contribute to the fixing of the canonical norms of tradition by fleshing out the ideals to be served by canonization. Such pictures must not be accepted as literal descriptions of the formation of a tradition. Their function is to stress the unity and continuity of tradition, whereas the critical history of any tradition in the formative period never fails to reveal breaks, conflicts, and a diversity of views and practices.

An example of an idealized picture of the formative period of a tradition is the picture of the early Christian church in the *Acts of the Apostles*, a New Testament work composed in the last third of the first century. The picture of the church in *Acts* was shaped in part by the proto-catholic ideal of a single apostolic church, and it contributed to the spread of this ideal in the following decades. *Acts* depicts a worldwide church directed from Jerusalem by twelve apostles governing alongside elders not identified as apostles, notably Jesus' brother James. Much attention is devoted to the missionary work of Paul, also not identified as an apostle (except in *Acts* 14). Stress is placed on Paul's cooperation with the Jerusalem church and on the harmony of his views with those of Peter, the only apostle to receive a substantial amount of attention in *Acts*. Matters that would tend to qualify the general impression of a unified church leadership, such as the nature of the relationship between the twelve apostles, Paul, and James, are not clarified. The picture is also at variance with some of the evidence preserved in Paul's letters. Paul does not hesitate to call himself an apostle, does not deal with a group of twelve apostles in Jerusalem, records a sharp conflict with Peter (*Gal.* 2:11-14), and in general gives the impression of a more independent relationship to the Jerusalem church than the one ascribed to him by *Acts*. To be sure, *Acts* is still far removed from the classical catholic concept of a church founded upon the apostolic succession of bishops. The first unambiguous representative of the episcopal type of church polity was Ignatius of Antioch, who was martyred in about 110 CE. The notion that bishops are the direct successors of the apostles and the unique guardians of apostolic tradition appeared in the late second century in the polemical writings of catholic bishops such as Irenaeus of Lyons, who used it to counter the claims of gnostic Christians that they possessed a secret tradition of faith from Jesus and the apostles.

The idealization of early tradition by later canonizers stands in tension not only with protean historical experience but also with the living traditions issuing from the precanonical stages in the formative period of a tradition. No religious tradition springs onto the scene already in possession of the canonical structures that will define it and hold it together in the long run. Nevertheless, nascent tradition must be defined and held together in some way in the circles where it is received. In these circles the legacy of charismatic leaders who can claim a direct link to the originating source of sacred tradition plays an important role, as do beliefs and practices deriving authority from custom and oral tradition. Local centers of living tradition developing independently and without much central coordination are the original hearths of tradition. Examples are the regional schools of law in early Islam (e.g., Medinese, Iraqi, Syrian), the metropolitan churches of different apostolic foundation in early Christianity (e.g., Antioch, Alexandria, Rome), and the various monastic disciplines elaborated by the Buddha's successors around a common core but admitting significant differences of practice and, eventually, belief. The fixing of canons in the later formative period of a tradition necessarily breeds conflict among the original local centers of living tradition. Conflict would be inevitable even if the work of later canonizers were free of ideological or regional bias, which is rarely the case. The function of canonization is to generalize and standardize; that of living tradition, to affirm and transmit inherited beliefs and practices.

Yet it must not be thought that canonization represents the regimentation of tradition by a central power that succeeds in working its will on its neighbors. Canonization is a process that presupposes a significant measure of consensus among the centers of living tradition to begin with. Without it the large-scale canonization of a tradition could not be successful, and the attempt to achieve it would result only in division. An example is the division of the order of monks at the second Buddhist council, said to have been held at Vaiśālī about a century after the Buddha's death. To be sure, this division need not be interpreted as a negative development in the history of Buddhism. Catholic Christianity and Sunnī Islam, on the other hand, are examples of extremely successful efforts of large-scale canonization accomplished in each case during the first three to four centuries of the religion's existence. The consolidation of broad segments of Judaism in late antiquity on the basis of the Talmud is another example of large-scale canonization carried out in a religious milieu that recent scholarship has shown to be far more diverse than formerly supposed.

If, however, canons are by definition clear, communicable, and relatively easy to identify once the process of canonization has run its course, the consensus presupposed by canonization is more difficult to locate and define. The general concept of consensus is further complicated by the fact that some religious traditions possess their own particular concepts of consensus, such as the concept of the consensus (*ijmā'*) of the law schools in early Islam. While concepts of consensus in religious systems function primarily as ideals, the ideals also preserve evidence of the fact that the formation of most broad traditions was not the work of a single religious center dictating canons to the periphery but resulted from the simultaneous emergence of distinct living traditions whose informal agreement on fundamentals was the *sine qua non* of the formal consolidation of tradition at a later time.

The bearers of consensus in the early formative period of a tradition are sometimes difficult to define, too. A good example of the difficulty is seen in the evolution of the *sunnah*, or tradition, in early Islam. In the third and fourth centuries AH (ninth and tenth centuries CE) the *sunnah* of the Prophet received its classical form and content in the six canonical books of *ḥadīths*, or stories of the Prophet, eventually accepted by Sunnī Muslims. How these books were produced is not a mystery. They were the leading works to emerge from decades of travel, research, and discussion by learned seekers of *ḥadīths* who undertook to discriminate between sound and spurious reports and whose methodology—the testing of the chain of transmission (*isnād*) of each report—was rigorous, even though modern critical historians would question some of the criteria applied. However, to suppose that one has explained the formation of the *sunnah* upon rendering an account of the work of the seekers of *ḥadīths* is to fail to address more basic and difficult questions: what was the connection between the *ḥadīth* material on which the seekers worked and the living traditions of Islam before their time, and what factors of consensus operative in earlier times paved the way for their work?

Much modern Western scholarship on *ḥadīth* and the closely related subject of early Islamic law stresses the breaks between the work of the canonizers and earlier Islam. It is pointed out that the transmission of *ḥadīths* with a certifying *isnād* was a late phenomenon and that there is reason to doubt that *ḥadīths* were formally transmitted at all in the first century of Islam. It is sometimes questioned whether the Prophet left any *sunnahs*, or traditions, apart from the Qur'ān. Above all it is pointed out that the schools of law, whose roots went back to early times, looked upon the later *ḥadīth* movement as a disruptive force that threatened their own un-

derstanding of the *sunnah* as the tradition of the law schools (rather than of the Prophet himself) and undermined the ideal of consensus. Some modern scholars, however, notably Fazlur Rahman in *Islam* (Chicago, 1966), have pointed out the ultimate irrationality of a critical historiography that bars the assumption of continuity in early Islam, since the consolidation of the *sunnah* and the integration of the traditional law schools into Sunnī tradition cannot be imagined without assuming significant elements of continuity and consensus at work from early times. Thus Rahman holds that the concept of *sunnah* from the beginning of Islam cannot have meant the *sunnah* of the law schools alone but must have been focused on the Prophet at least in intention, even though “it was not so much like a path as like a riverbed which continuously assimilates new elements” and its transmission accordingly would have taken the form of a “‘silent’ or ‘living’ tradition” rather than a formal discipline (Rahman, op. cit., pp. 54–55). The later *ḥadīth* movement formalized and, so to speak, professionalized the *sunnah*. But the movement was successful in Rahman’s opinion because the concept of “the *sunnah* of the Prophet” had always been the implied ideal of Muslim practice and, too, because a fixed corpus of *ḥadīths* provided a more solid basis on which to build a pan-traditional (“Sunnī”) consensus than did the ideal of the consensus of the law schools.

Beyond their role in the formative period of traditions, groups oriented toward a traditional consensus often play a significant role in the regulation or reforming of traditions. Brahman castes in many parts of Hindu India may be cited as an example of tradition-minded regulators. An important group of brahmins even goes by the name of Smārtas (from *smṛti*, “tradition”), or “traditionists.”

For an example of tradition-minded reformers one may point to the Pharisees in Judaism in late antiquity. Scholarly debate continues over how best to classify the Pharisees as a religious group and how to define their role in the reorganization of Judaism in late antiquity culminating in the canonization of the Mishnah and Talmud. Earlier in the twentieth century George Foot Moore, Louis Finkelstein, and other scholars propounded a view of the Pharisees as representatives of a “normative Judaism,” which served as the foundation for later rabbinic tradition. More recent scholarship has richly documented the religious diversity of Judaism in late antiquity, the influence of Hellenistic culture on the Pharisees themselves, and the role of parties other than the Pharisees in the making of rabbinic Judaism. The result has been to give rise to a revisionist view of the Pharisees almost diametrically opposed to the earlier one. Far from being seen as the bearers of “normative

Judaism," the Pharisees are presented as simply one sect among many in the religiously complicated world of Judaism around the beginning of the common era. That the name *Pharisee* may have originally meant "sectarian" lends support to the revisionist view.

Yet the more recent view also has its problems, conceptual and historical. The conceptual problem that is pertinent here is how to distinguish between sectarians and traditionists. After all, if all the religious activists in a given setting are "sectarians," then none of them is. To put it another way, the term *sect* in the history of religion has meaning only in contrast to *church* or similar terms denoting broad-based traditional structures emphasizing consensus and continuity. To be sure, the distinction between sectarians and traditionists is a relative one, but without it one is not able to speak about some basic differences between religious groups. For example, the difference between the Pharisees and the early Christians or the community at Qumran (where the "Dead Sea Scrolls" were discovered) was a difference of kind, not only degree. The latter groups were sects: small bands of devotees living apart from the ordinary world in a closely knit commune (Qumran) or preaching a radical new prophecy and claiming access to a special mystery realized in a new cult (Christians). Furthermore, Christians and Qumranians, along with other apocalyptic sects, lived in expectation of a cosmic cataclysm that would put an end to the public, historical Judaism of their day. Long before the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE these groups had broken with Jerusalem and its Temple and had reinterpreted received Jewish tradition in terms of their own expectation and sources of illumination. The Pharisees, too, were innovators, but they had a completely different orientation to tradition. True, they practiced stricter than average piety and possessed a rigorous methodology for realizing the goal of a pious life, but these characteristics alone do not make a sectarian. They are typical of all serious religious groups. In the realm of theory, what set the Pharisees apart from Christians and Qumranians was their assumption of continuity with the received institutions of historical Judaism, including the Temple; in the realm of practice, their stress, was upon realizing the goals of piety in the ordinary world of home and workplace, without new prophecies and without a new cult.

The Multiformity of Classical Traditions. Classical traditions are multiform in structure. Multiformity results from the adaptation of traditions to the variegated quality of human experience, including religious experience. Nestor, the voice of tradition in the Homeric poems, describes the problem exactly: "The gods do not give people all things at the same time" (*Iliad* 4.320).

Talents, tastes, values, social and political roles, age, sex, and station in life vary among individuals and groups. Tradition is called upon to unite what experience divides, so that the old can communicate with the young, the intellectual with the illiterate, the urbanite with the rustic, the priest with his flock, the prince with the pauper. Unity is sought not through regimentation but through multiform elaboration of tradition. Multiformity in turn makes it possible for tradition to play a number of mediating roles in a civilization: to apply religious values selectively and flexibly, to mediate conflicts between different sets of values, to host creative interaction between different theoretical viewpoints, and so on. The multiformity of classical traditions stops short of a thoroughgoing pluralism, however. In the end every tradition recognizes a hierarchy of values.

Several kinds of multiformity can be seen in the history of classical traditions. One kind results from the sociocultural differentiation of a tradition. Using terms that subsequently found wide application in the study of religion, the anthropologist Robert Redfield, in his *Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago, 1956), called the two basic forms of tradition resulting from this type of differentiation "the great tradition" and "the little tradition." The great tradition is literate, reflective, cultivated by specialists working in cities, schools, temples, monasteries, and the like. The little tradition is typically illiterate, customary, embodied in the common beliefs and practices of the mass of ordinary villagers. To be sure, scholars and cultivated practitioners of religion have always recognized that classical and popular religion diverge, yet this recognition seldom led to advances in understanding religious traditions because of the tendency to regard popular religion merely as raw material to be molded by classical tradition or even as an obstacle to right religion. The contribution of modern anthropological studies of religion in peasant societies has been to show, first, that popular religion is just as much a tradition as classical religion, a tradition that can achieve high levels of organization, complexity, and "rural cosmopolitanism"; second, that the interaction between great and little forms of tradition is a dynamic one in which the little tradition not only receives from the great but also contributes to it. Great and little traditions are, as Redfield put it, "two currents of thought and action, distinguishable, yet ever flowing into and out of each other" (Redfield, *op. cit.*, p. 72). [See *Folk Religion and Popular Religion*.]

Russian Orthodoxy, which combines the great tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the little tradition of the Russian village, may serve as an example of the interdependence of the two forms of tradition. The organizing principles of each tradition originated

independently but were interwoven to produce the concrete value synthesis of Russian Orthodoxy. Through Orthodoxy the Russian peasant acquired a consciousness of the world beyond the village, a consciousness reinforced by economic ties to towns and cities and by cultural and political linkages such as pilgrimages and military service. Orthodoxy, on the other hand, by combining with the little tradition of the village, achieved a presence in Russian society far more pervasive than its classical ecclesiastical institutions alone could have secured for it. The synthesis of great and little traditions can be seen, for example, in the Russian peasant cottage. Based on a design fixed by tradition and thus virtually invariable, the cottage was laid out rectangularly around an axis linking the icon corner, used for praying and receiving guests, and the stove corner, used for cooking, washing, and sleeping. The stove corner was oriented to the great tradition and yet it accommodated that most remarkable invention of the prehistoric Russian little tradition, the multipurpose clay stove.

A second kind of multiformity in classical traditions develops from the recognition of a multiplicity of paths to religious fulfillment. Classical Hinduism, for example, distinguishes at least three valid paths to the goal of liberation (*mokṣa*): the path of knowledge (*jñānamārga*), the path of devotion to a personal God (*bhaktimārga*), and the path of ritual and dutiful action in the world (*karmamārga*). It is fairly clear that the paths originated at different times and in different circles and that they evolved in relative independence of each other. Furthermore, there has never been a consensus in Hinduism about the relative merits of the paths. Monist philosophers unanimously proclaim the superiority of the path of knowledge, and their control of much of the higher philosophical literature of Hinduism has led some observers to assume that this appraisal is shared by all Hindus. Yet in the fervor of communion with God the devotionalist does not doubt the superiority of the path of devotion, nor in all probability has the vast majority of Indians ever doubted the practical superiority of ritual and dutiful action in the world. Thus the idea that the paths are expressions of a common aspiration cannot be explained as the natural outcome of the pursuit of the paths themselves but must be seen as a *traditum* in its own right—a tradition of handing down distinct paths in association with each other on the assumption of their mutual coherence. The assumption is an act of traditional faith, since a systematic doctrine reconciling the different paths has never been accepted by all Hindus.

The Hebrew scriptures constitute another *traditum* embodying a multiplicity of ways to religious insight. In Judaism and Christianity this multiplicity, while rec-

ognized, has not been emphasized in ways that would threaten strict monotheism or ecclesiastical unity. Nevertheless, the religious multiformity of the Bible has always been exploited by Jewish and Christian traditionalists. Certainly the Bible would be a far less usable book if it admitted only the normative religion of priests and legists, or only the charismatic religion of the prophets, or only the *logos* of the wise men, or only the devotionism of the psalmist; or if it lacked the rage of Job, the skepticism of *Ecclesiastes*, the eroticism of the *Song of Songs*. Nothing is more characteristic of the Hebrew scriptures as a *traditum* than the transmission of many ways of theological insight together in a single canon of law, prophets, and writings. Historically the various forms of religion represented in the Bible originated in relative independence and were cultivated selectively by different groups. One must not project back into the ancient period a general fraternization of priests, legists, prophets, wise men, cult singers, and skeptics united in the praise of the Lord of Israel. The joining together of all of them in common witness to and celebration of the One, the "Bible" as distinguished from its component parts, was precisely the contribution of tradition.

Other kinds of multiformity result from the adaptation of a tradition to stages of life and degrees of religious virtuosity. An example is the classical Hindu doctrine of the four *āśramas*, or stages of life (celibate student, householder, forest hermit, wandering ascetic). In classical doctrine the four *āśramas* are seen as successive stages through which a pious male of the twice-born castes will pass in the course of his life. It appears, however, that the distinction between the *āśramas* antedates the notion that they represent "stages" in a coherent succession. In any case, only a minority of Hindu householders have ever passed beyond the second stage, and many hermits and ascetics throughout the history of Indian religion were never householders. The doctrine of the *āśramas* appears to be an attempt on the level of ideals to reconcile the world-affirming, dutiful religion of the Indian family and state system with the renunciationist religiosity of ascetic and mystical virtuosi. The contribution of tradition is precisely the assumption that the four *āśramas* are coherently related to each other, and thus that respect and communication are possible among their representatives. The embrace of Hindu tradition is thereby significantly widened. Furthermore, although the *āśramas* may not exist in reality in the same way as they do in doctrine, doctrine nevertheless leaves its mark on everyday reality. For example, responsible householders all over the world hold many of the same values, but the Hindu householder's attitude toward householdership will be affected by the

view that householdership is not the end of worldly existence but a stage qualified by the existence of a higher and better way of life. A clear difference in orientation results. It is the difference between a Luther, justified by faith, rejecting any notion of a higher righteousness and thriving on the warmth of his family circle, and a Tolstoi, also an accomplished householder and the author of some of the greatest celebrations of family happiness in world literature, who was convinced of the superiority of breaking with family and society to realize the higher righteousness of a hermit or wanderer. The difference is not just one of personality; it is also one of tradition.

A special kind of adaptation of tradition to stages of life is represented by forms of religion connected with dying and the treatment of the dead. In all societies these matters are regulated chiefly by tradition, since neither reason nor experience can offer much guidance. By establishing a role in death a tradition indirectly secures a place for itself in life, since people's lives will be affected by the way they expect to die. In Japan, for example, Buddhism has traditionally been the religion of funerals, and only at the grave does it come close to being the universal religion of the Japanese people. Still, its special authority over death is one of the ways in which Buddhism gains visibility and prestige in Japanese tradition as a whole.

In some religions the distinction between the religion of virtuosi and that of ordinary people is built into the fundamental structure of the tradition. Theravāda Buddhism is a case in point. Early Buddhism was a religion for monks which, although moderate in comparison with many of the forms of asceticism in its day, proposed a way of life incompatible with living in the everyday world. Yet the Theravāda, "the doctrine of the elders," managed to establish itself as the leading religious tradition in several Southeast Asian societies. It achieved hegemony not by abandoning its traditional monastic discipline but by developing a mode of lay religious participation distinct from the monastic one yet in harmony with it: laypeople earn merit and thus improve their prospects in the next birth by supporting monks. Describing Burmese Buddhism in *Buddhism and Society* (New York, 1970), the anthropologist Melford E. Spiro has called the lay form of Buddhism "kammatic" (from Pāli *kamma*, Skt. *karman*, the principle of determination by action) as distinct from the "nibbanic" (from Pāli *nibbāna*, Skt. *nirvāṇa*, "enlightenment, extinction") system followed by monks. He also distinguished a third form, "apotropaic" Buddhism, concerned less with salvation than with profit and loss, health, fertility, fortune, protection from demons, and other worldly values. Apotropaic Buddhism owes much

to Burmese little tradition. By means of such elaboration Theravāda Buddhism was able to embrace all of Burmese society, not just the monastic community. The three forms of Burmese Buddhism remain part of an essentially unified tradition, however. "To say that there are three systems of Buddhism in Burma (or in Thailand or Ceylon) does not mean that there are three kinds of Buddhists in these societies; rather, all three systems are found in varying degrees in all Buddhists" (Spiro, op. cit., p. 13). The point is quite important for understanding the multiformity of classical traditions in general. Precisely because the forms of a classical tradition exist in proximity to each other and intersect at many points, the tradition serves as a unifying and mediating presence in the culture and society in which it exists. Differentiation to the point of creating separate traditions is resisted except in times of crisis and breakdown.

Mysticism, Esotericism, and Tradition. Mysticism and esotericism are forms of religious expression that present special problems for classical traditions. Mysticism is the cultivation of closeness to or union with the divine or ultimate, however conceived. It may or may not involve special doctrines; it always involves special techniques. Esotericism is the study and application of "secret" teachings of a speculative (e.g., theosophical, cosmological, eschatological) or practical (e.g., magical, occult) sort. Mysticism and esotericism need not overlap, although they commonly do. The genius of classical religious traditions is nowhere better seen than in their capacity to host mysticism and esotericism, if not always as honored traditions within tradition, at least as a traditionally tolerated religious "night life."

Experience is the goal of mysticism regardless of the means employed, which range from strict asceticism through sociable middle ways to antinomian abandon. In essence, then, mysticism is not a matter of tradition, since experience cannot be received from or handed on to others. Mysticism is a matter of insight or perception, not texts, doctrines, or rules. However, because mysticism is interesting to most religious communities and because human beings need to communicate about the things that interest them, mysticism tends to generate formal mystical traditions, which may grow to imposing size and complexity even against the wishes of a saintly originator (e.g., Francis of Assisi). Formal mystical traditions are canons applied specifically to adepts or aspirants, such as myths of foundation, sacred histories, chains of authoritative transmitters, initiatory rites and words, techniques of devotion and ecstasy, rules regulating physical functions, sayings, and texts. As a general rule, once a mystical tradition is formed, little vagueness or laxity in its application is tolerated

even though the goal of mystical aspiration remains personal experience. In fact, the canons of mystical traditions tend to be even more precisely defined and more rigorously applied than those of mainstream traditions. This is partly because of the elite character of mystical traditions, since rules can be more strictly enforced when applied to a few, and partly because of the central role of the spiritual master in many mystical traditions, a role commanding a high degree of obedience from aspirants and apprentices; also, perhaps, because of the need to contain the explosive forces of unstructured mysticism. In madness and in method the traditional mystic is not unlike a classical *Šūfī* poet who, God-intoxicated, is still mindful of his meters.

The interaction between mysticism and host traditions is extremely complex, although the history of religion supports the generalization that the two need each other. Mysticism needs a host tradition as a source of vocabulary and symbols. Even though the meaning of these may be revised by the mystics who use them, without them the mystics would not be understood by anyone. Also, the resistance commonly offered to mystics by the authorities of a host tradition, beyond safeguarding the presumed interests of the latter, is generally healthy for mystics because it helps them clarify their goals and refine their methods. As a general rule the nemesis of mystics is not too much structure, but too little.

As for the host traditions, they need mysticism to refresh traditional religion. Cadmus and Teiresias, personages representing the Greek political and religious establishment in Euripides' play *The Bacchae*, gave good advice to every established tradition when they advised the young ruler of Thebes, Pentheus, to admit the revels of the god Dionysos into the city, maintaining that incorporation of the cult would fortify tradition and enhance the prestige of the ruling house. If Pentheus disregarded his elders' advice with disastrous consequences to himself and his city, most established traditions in the history of religion have heeded it and thereby renewed themselves. Also, through mysticism traditions strengthen their links with popular culture. In spite of the elitism involved in any formal mystical discipline, many mystics have been rather sociable individuals, and mystics have almost always found favor with the popular strata. Among other things this has made mystics and ascetics effective agents of mission in religions with missionary ambitions.

Conflicts between mysticism and host traditions are common and may be severe. In the sixth century certain Palestinian monks, seekers of union with Christ through mental prayer, apparently claimed that they would achieve "equality with Christ" in the restoration of all

things at the end of time (for which reason they were called "Isochrists" or "Equal-to-Christers"). They were expelled from their monastery, and the doctrines supporting their position were condemned by the Council of Constantinople (553). The great Muslim mystic al-Ḥallāj was executed in Baghdad in 922 CE for claiming "I am the Truth" (i.e., God). In both cases, however, the conflict was precipitated more by the doctrinal implications of verbalized claims than by the practices or experiences that prompted the claims. The suppression of the Isochrists did not stop the spread of the mysticism of mental prayer in Eastern Orthodox monasticism; it simply showed that certain claims could not be expressed in public and probably should not be entertained in private even if prompted by mystical experiences. Similarly, many a *Šūfī* after al-Ḥallāj has thought "I am the Truth" but has not said it or has said it in figurative language, or with an appropriate gloss, or in the secrecy of his heart.

As a general rule mystics and traditionalists tend to recognize their mutual interest in avoiding direct conflicts or at least in finding ways to routinize them. Furthermore, the way is always open for creative individuals to propose new ways of uniting mysticism and tradition. Individuals who succeed enjoy great popularity in their traditions. One may point to al-Ghazālī, who achieved fame in eleventh-century Islam as a doctor of law and a *Šūfī* adept; to Gregory Palamas, the fourteenth-century bishop of Thessalonica who employed the refined intellectual traditions of Greek Orthodox theology to defend the radical experiential claims of rustic monks; or to the Indian philosopher Rāmānuja (eleventh to twelfth century), who, using the texts and methods of Vedānta, attempted to reconcile the monistic system with the experientially based claims of the devotionalists in a "qualified nondualism." In most cases the theoretical differences between mysticism and the doctrines of the host tradition are large enough to make it questionable to speak of a synthesis. But tradition does not require synthesis. Mediation is enough.

Esotericism is concerned with teachings rather than experience, although mystical and esoteric currents mingle in the history of religion. The basis of esotericism in religion is the claim to possess secret or otherwise special traditions from an authoritative source—traditions that support speculation, occult practices including magic, or both. The possession of secret traditions may provide the basis for independence from other religious groups or for the existence of an elite group within a larger host tradition. Among the reasons given to justify secrecy are that most people are too simple or too perverse to understand true teachings or

that the withholding of secrets is part of a providential plan to be revealed in the future. Also at work is the natural desire to avoid enraging the guardians of normative tradition by undercutting their authority in public. The threat of conflicts is real because esotericists always claim access to authoritative sources beyond those of normative tradition. Thus, for example, certain masters of Jewish Qabbalah claimed access through secret tradition to a primordial revelation from Adam or to texts composed by patriarchs and other ancient worthies. Such claims compromised the singularity of the Torah received from Moses and hence also the authority of the orthodox rabbis. Similarly, the teaching authority of catholic Christian bishops was potentially threatened by the belief of gnostics and early Christian allegorists that the allegorical interpretation of scripture was a tradition handed down by the apostles to intellectual Christians, not to the church as a whole.

Like mystics, however, esotericists generally steer away from direct conflicts with traditional authorities and aim at adaptation. Rarely a religion in its own right, esotericism needs exoteric tradition in order to define itself, and the common tradition is enriched by the resultant multiformity. One of the most important contributions of modern research on Qabbalah, for example, has been to show that many forms of esotericism were deeply embedded in the soil of Palestinian Judaism from early times and developed in the framework of the Talmudic tradition. This is not to deny that influences from other religions and from popular culture helped to shape Qabbalah. But influences have significant consequences in the history of religion because they meet the internal needs and combine with the fundamental themes of established traditions. Esotericists for the most part are less interested in reshaping traditional piety than in heightening its intensity by focusing on specific values and goals within it. The "paradoxical emphasis on the congruence of intuition and tradition" that Gershom Scholem observed in Qabbalah (*Kabbalah*, 1978, p. 3) is typical of the approach of most esotericists to their host traditions.

Tradition and Change. Religious traditions are not hostile to change provided that the new can be integrated with the old through the reform or renewal of tradition. In practice, however, such integration is difficult to accomplish, and religious traditions for the most part do not make the effort except when compelled to do so by a crisis of thought, practice, or belief. In critical situations, however, when the outward authority or inner coherence of tradition is at stake, religious traditions can demonstrate a vitality that contrasts sharply with their apparent inertia at other times. There is no paradox here. One of the primary

functions of religious traditions is to provide direction in times of change or crisis in the lives of individuals and groups. A sense of tradition, allowing for the old to be appreciated as ever new and the new to be received as clarifying or fulfilling the old, provides direction for individuals and groups at such times. All religions are not equally equipped to deal with all changes, and traditions may be overwhelmed by a crisis and cease to exist as organized entities (e.g., the demise of the formal traditions of the Mesoamerican peoples as a result of the Spanish Conquest). Even in these instances, however, features of the defunct traditions typically continue to exist under the auspices of the successor traditions and in the form of ongoing little tradition on the popular level.

While religious traditions are not necessarily opposed to reform or renewal, revolutionary change is a different matter. By definition a tradition is opposed to any change that abrogates the link with the past preserved in its fundamental *tradita*. The completely new is intolerable in a traditional religion. Even prophetic religions promising new and wondrous things to come do so in a way that reflects the mind of tradition. Indeed, prophetic religions depend on traditions of expectation—traditions of seeking and announcing the new over and over again. Furthermore, prophetic religions rely on traditional paradigms as the means of imagining and interpreting new events. The prophet Isaiah heralded the fall of Babylon and the liberation of the Judean exiles in his day as "new things . . . created now, not long ago" (*Is.* 48:6–7). But the rhetoric of novelty did not keep him from understanding the liberation as a new Exodus and the liberator as the same Lord who stood for Israel from of old, in whose hands the Persian conqueror Cyrus was merely a tool.

Before modern times the greatest challenges to the continuity of religious traditions came not from antireligious or areligious value systems but from other religious traditions: religions were displaced by other religions. The coexistence of different religious traditions in the same societies for long periods of time was also a source of change in religion, although the interaction of religious traditions before modern times has not been studied in great detail, the methodological problems involved being quite different. In modern times self-conscious dialogues between representatives of different religious traditions have arisen in many parts of the world. However, most of these dialogues are not the result of the age-old coexistence of traditions but rather are a reflection of the dynamics of modern times: negatively in the sense that the dialogues represent the joint efforts of traditionists to meet the threats posed to all religions by the antireligious and areligious value sys-

tems current in modern times; positively in the sense that the dialogues are made possible by modern social and political achievements (e.g., pluralism, democracy, nationalism) and scientific advances (including the modern study of religion), which provide a relatively neutral context for dialogue and new means of communication. It may be that the dialogues will grow in depth and scope, gently challenging each religious tradition to reconceive its own best self by coming to appreciate what is best in other traditions and thus helping the traditions to achieve "growth in sameness." However, the phenomenon of interreligious dialogue under modern conditions is quite recent. More experience is necessary before it will be possible to distinguish clearly between the ephemeral and enduring aspects of the dialogues.

Considerably more experience can be brought to bear on the study of the adjustment of individual religious traditions to the economic, social, political, and intellectual changes summed up in the word *modernization*. The problem of tradition and modernization concerns the fate of traditional value systems, including religious traditions, in a world shaped by modern science, market capitalism, and ideologies and technologies resulting from them, such as liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and biological and social engineering. Despite numerous studies of the problem of tradition and modernization in particular societies, there is little consensus among scholars about the lasting effects of modernization on religious traditions. When the problem first began to be studied by social scientists in the nineteenth century, "progressive" ideologies, liberal and socialist, shaped the discussion. Most researchers assumed that the world of tradition was fated to give way before modernity either at a stroke or in a series of stages. This view received support from the spectacle of antitraditional modernizing revolutions coming to power in many societies. In recent years, however, more attention has been given to the obvious persistence of traditions, including religious traditions, in societies that were supposed to have cast them off. Evidence has also been adduced to show that in many of these societies modernization actually reinforces and even reinvigorates certain aspects of tradition, as for example when the dissemination of modern technologies of communication makes it possible for religious groups to promote their message with unprecedented militancy, or when economic and political revolutions result in power, prominence, and upward mobility for individuals and groups whose outlooks remain deeply traditional. Furthermore, in many parts of the world the modernizing ideologies inspiring revolutionary change appear to require alliances with tradition, including re-

ligious traditions, in order to promote their goals. The central role of nationalism in the contemporary world, even in Marxist states such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, is a good example of this kind of linkage. Nationalism owes its power to the fact that, while it draws primarily on modernizing ideologies for its theory and practice, it also provides a channel for the expression of traditional ideals and solidarities.

Thus the issue of tradition and modernization is clouded today. Some scholars of religion, especially those with apologetic aims, go so far as to dismiss the entire issue as ill framed. In their view religious traditions will not only persist but will persist in much the same way as in the past. The challenges of modernization are deemed real enough but not qualitatively different from those surmounted by great traditions in the past. Other scholars hold the view that modernization presents challenges to tradition that are qualitatively different from those of the past. It is pointed out that only in modern times have antireligious and areligious value systems been embraced by large numbers of people including the popular strata as distinct from tiny groups of intellectuals. It is also pointed out that the alliance with tradition for modernizing purposes, while it complicates the problem of tradition and modernization in ways not expected by the early theorists, does not necessarily establish the continuity of tradition. The effects of such alliances on the structure, function, and mentality of traditions must be examined in detail to determine whether the mind of tradition is nurtured by them or disrupted even further. The example of nationalism again is pertinent. In spite of its dynamism as a vehicle for reasserting traditional identities, including religious affiliation, in countries as different as the United States, the Soviet Union, and India, nationalism poses a number of threats to the integrity of religious traditions. Its inherent particularism threatens to diminish the more universalistic aspirations of religious traditions. Its activism, seeking to simplify the structure of traditions in order to mobilize them for modern tasks, threatens to undo the age-old multiformity of traditions and thus to diminish their mediating capacity. Finally, the secularity of nationalist goals threatens to divert attention from disciplined spiritual cultivation. Whether and to what extent nationalism is the ally or the subverter of religious traditions in the modern world is an issue which remains open.

For the time being the best approach is probably to recognize that the problem of tradition and modernization is a fundamental part of the religious situation of modern times and is not likely to be settled or even

greatly altered in the near future. The naive progressivism of the early theorists has been abandoned by most scholars. The persistence of traditions is widely recognized. Yet the general problem remains. The harmonization of tradition and modernization would appear to be a noble aspiration but a difficult one in practice. Tradition reveres continuity; modernization demands new beginnings. Given the inexorability of modernizing forces in the modern world, the continuators of tradition may be expected to go on experiencing stress and many threats to their identity, including some that arise from within their own traditions as modernizing tendencies are insinuating themselves even there. Yet the work of the modernizers is also full of tensions, and these are likely to intensify as idealistic enthusiasm for modern visions gives way to the awesome difficulties of putting the visions into practice. The modernizers risk losing the way to the future for lack of an orientation received from the past and risk proving themselves incapable of imagining the new because they disallow analogies with the old. A steady orientation requires traditions: traditions inherited from premodern times, new traditions of modernity's own making, or new cultural syntheses combining elements of both.

[For the relationship between tradition and change, see *Revival and Renewal and Reform*.]

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religion. The book presents the results of Lord's and Milman Parry's research on oral poetry in the Balkans and contains chapters on other epic traditions, especially Homer. On oral tradition in the Hebrew Bible, see Eduard Nielsen's *Oral Tradition: A Modern Problem in Old Testament Introduction*, with a foreword by Harold H. Rowley (Chicago, 1954).

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PAUL VALLIERE

TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE. According to *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language*, second edition, unabridged, to *transcend* is to "ascend beyond, excel." The term is used of the "relation of God to the universe of physical things and finite spirits, as being . . . in essential nature, prior to it, exalted above it, and having real being apart from it." *Immanence*, defined as "presence in the world . . . in pantheism is thought of as uniform, God . . . equally present in the personal and the impersonal, in the evil and the good. According to theism, immanence occurs in various degrees, more in the personal than the impersonal, in the good than in the evil."

It is clear that *transcendence* is a value term expressing the unique excellence of God, because of which worship—utmost devotion or love—is the appropriate attitude toward the being so described. It is less obvious that *immanence* is a value term, but *ubiquity*, "being everywhere," comes closer to expressing a unique property. If God is everywhere in the world and also in some sense beyond the world, then God certainly surpasses all ordinary objects of respect or love.

"Prior to the universe" seems to suggest a time when God was alone, with no cosmos of creatures to relate to—first a creator not actually creating, then one creating. But it also might mean that there was a different universe before our own. Origen thought God had created an infinity of universes in succession and never lacked relation to some actual creatures. We see a partial return to that position in Alfred North Whitehead's hypothesis of "cosmic epochs," each with its own natural laws. Whitehead held that having a universe, some universe or other, is, in principle, inherent in God's nature and not subject to divine choice. What may be subject to such choice are the particular laws that will govern a cosmic epoch about to arise. God's "real being apart from the universe" means, in such a view, a vantage apart from our current universe, not apart from all universes. Not every theologian agrees with those who think to compliment God by affirming divine freedom to have simply no creatures. The objection to this once-popular view is that since any creatures are better than none (that being as such is primarily good and only sec-

ondarily bad is a classical doctrine), God would be making the worst possible choice by not creating at all. Freedom to do this seems nonsensical when affirmed of God.

In what sense is God *in* the universe? The suggestion in *Webster's*, attributed to "idealists," is that the divine presence is "like that of a conscious self in the world of that self." Or, attributed to "realists," it is like "that of a self in its organism and its behavior." The latter suggestion makes Plato a realist, for it was he who in the West first thought of God as the World Soul, whose body is the entire cosmos of nondivine things and persons. This proposal (in the *Timaeus*) was, however, seldom followed until recent times, and was rejected by Whitehead. In this I take Whitehead to have been mistaken. The relation of mind to body in human (and other) animals is the relation of mind to physical reality, to "matter," that we most directly and surely know. If our thoughts do not influence our behavior, then we know nothing of any influence of mind or spirit on the physical world. David Hume pointed this out in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* through the character Cleanthes.

Realistic Idealism. The idealist view referred to above is less obviously intelligible. Does our mere contemplation of the world make us immanent in that world? When we remember past experiences, does that put our present consciousness back into those experiences? If I think of someone in Hong Kong, does that put me in Hong Kong? The form of idealism referred to by Webster's definition is no longer widely held. It is the data of an awareness that are in the awareness, not vice versa. If this realistic principle—accepted by the theistic metaphysicians Charles S. Peirce and Whitehead, who in some respects are properly called idealists—is sound, then it is the creatures' awareness of God, not God's awareness of them, that constitutes the divine presence in the universe. And if God is universally present, then the creatures universally are, however inadequately, aware of God, who is the universal object as well as the universal subject. This implies, as Peirce and Whitehead held, as did Henri Bergson and some other recent theists, that every creature has some form of awareness, even if it be nothing more than some mode of feeling. For those of this persuasion, dualism and materialism are both inconsistent with a well-thought-out theism.

Unfortunately, the term *idealism* is still often applied to the now antiquated doctrine presupposed by the editors of *Webster's*. Few changes of opinion are more definite or important than the shift, in this century, in the way the relations of mind or experience to its data are conceived. Indeed, the alternative to idealism is no longer realism but the choice between dualism and ma-

terialism. A "realistic idealism" makes perfectly good sense. And Plato was both realist and idealist, except insofar as, like all ancient Greeks, he was unable to escape entirely dualism and materialism. No one in the West knew how to conceive mind, or awareness, as a universal property of creatures until Leibniz, the true founder of realistic idealism, made his distinction between dynamic singulars and aggregates or groups of singulars. (The singulars he called monads, but this term tends to connote some further doctrines peculiar to Leibniz that are no longer accepted, even by those strongly influenced by Leibniz, so far as the problem of mind and matter is concerned.) In Asia, where Leibniz has not as yet had much influence, there seems to be no comparably well-articulated doctrine of realistic idealism that can be called theistic.

The distinction between dynamic singulars—all of which are sentient—and their groups or aggregates depends, for Leibniz, on the primitive form of the atomic theory then entertained by physicists and also upon the discovery by Leeuwenhoek of the realm of microscopic animals. With a stroke of genius, Leibniz generalized this and held that larger animals consist of smaller animals (in a generalized sense), thus anticipating the cell theory established much later. Leibniz may well have realized the philosophical meaning of Leeuwenhoek's discoveries better than some philosophers do now. He made a realistic idealism at last possible and thereby freed theism from one of its greatest difficulties, enabling it to give a positive explanation of the divine ubiquity. [See also *Idealism and Materialism*.]

God's Dually Transcendent Love. Whitehead's theory of prehension (or "feeling of feeling"), applied to God and all creatures, makes God the universally prehending and universally prehended subject, feeling all and felt by all. Hence God is in all and all is in God. Since creaturely prehensions are those of subjects in principle inferior to God, they feel God inadequately, whereas God, in principle superior to all, feels the creatures and their mostly unintellectual feelings with ideal adequacy. Although each creature contains God and God contains each creature, the divine containing is unqualified, but the creaturely containing is more or less drastically qualified. Thus, for theism, God is present "in various degrees" in the parts of the universe, but the creatures are wholly present to God. As Berdiaev urges, the most pertinent question is not "Is God in the world?" but rather "Is the world in God?" The Pauline saying, that in God "we live and move and have our being," can be taken literally without necessarily implying pantheism.

To say that God feels the feelings of all creatures is to contradict the doctrine of classical theism that God is

impassible, wholly unaffected by others. Anselm said that God was not compassionate, although the effects of the divine being were *as if* God were compassionate. What this amounts to, for some of us, is that the New Testament saying "God is love" is untrue, yet the effects of God's nature upon us are what they would be if God loved us. We here confront a deep divergence between that theism pervasive in Scholasticism (with Bonaventure producing the most thoroughgoing attempt to interpret divine love), and found also in medieval Islamic and Jewish writings, and the theism that I call neoclassical, which has been set forth by some recent philosophers and theologians (e.g., Nikolai Berdiaev, Alfred North Whitehead, Rudolf Otto, Otto Pfleiderer, John Oman, Alfred Ernest Garvie, and Edgar S. Brightman). Whitehead's assertion that "to attribute mere happiness to God is a profanation" hints at this rejection of Anselm's doctrine, and his further statement that "God is the fellow sufferer who understands" makes the contrast quite clear. Berdiaev is no less plain on this point.

The denial that love, however generalized, can characterize deity is implied by Plato, who, in his *Symposium*, interprets love as the longing for absolute beauty and hence a confession of imperfection. The nearest Plato comes to attributing love to God is to say that there is no envy in the divine nature, and hence God is willing to have creatures sharing existence with him. Plato does definitely attribute to God knowledge of the creatures, whereas Aristotle denies this. All his deity thinks is the generic nature of thinking itself, totally free from the contingency and particularity that go with individuals in the world.

In India, the Advaita Vedāntins, often regarded as the orthodox Hindus, thought of the highest and only genuine reality as beyond anything that could be called love. The latter is a social relation, presupposing a plurality of subjects in space and time, whereas *brahman* is without temporal or spatial plurality. In India, however, there are also various proponents of pluralism. Rāmānuja and Madhva are the most obvious examples, but there are others whose views show striking analogies to the Western "process" view, the greatest single representative of which is Whitehead. To appreciate adequately the strength of the worldwide effort to find something greater and better, or more real, than love at its best, we need to relate the issue to the problem of anthropomorphism. We human animals are social, and it has with some justice been said that an absolutely nonsocial animal does not exist. God, however, is in principle superior to any animal. God is uniquely excellent, without possible rival or equal.

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is an attempt to have it both ways. In some sense, the Son and Holy

Spirit are equal to God the Father; in some sense God is supreme. The three divine persons could love each other, even were there no creatures. This doctrine is too paradoxical to be defended apart from revelation. Apart from some such doctrine, either God does not love anyone or the being in principle superior to all conceivable others loves these lesser beings. Even with the trinitarian doctrine, the question remains relevant: must not God, conceived by analogy to what we know of ordinary beings (and how else can we conceive anything?), cherish the creatures? If we can sympathize with children and other kinds of animals, must God view them and us with mere indifference? If so, was not Aristotle right in saying that God does not know particular, contingent individuals because they are "not worth knowing"?

Extremist and Middle-Ground Strategies. History shows two ways of approaching philosophical disagreement. One way, in practice taken by some of the wisest philosophers, is to suspect extreme views and look for a "middle way" between opposite extremes. Some of the ancient Buddhists did this explicitly. With regard to transcendence and immanence, one extreme is gross anthropomorphism, taking God to be, as Matthew Arnold put it, "a magnified, nonnatural man." The opposite extreme is to say, as Karl Barth once did (he later partly rescinded the statement), that God is "wholly other" than ourselves. The middle way is to look for a difference in principle between God and all else and yet also, consistent with this, a resemblance in principle between God and all other beings. Many philosophers and theologians have more or less consciously proceeded in this fashion, and two of these, Plato and Whitehead, have been especially successful (at least according to some scholars strongly influenced by Whitehead). However, conditions in the ancient world were unfavorable to this side of Plato; and for many centuries a quite different way was taken in the West (beginning with Aristotle and the theologian Philo Judaeus).

In India, also, it was not a middle way that was the mainstream of thought. Instead, an extremist strategy was followed, though with some inconsistency. It was taken for granted that truth is an extreme with error its opposite. The maxim, without ever being so stated, perhaps, was "Let us find the view that is most hopelessly wrong and affirm the opposite." That the God of all the worlds is like a localized and mortal animal, dependent for its very existence on an environment, is clearly wrong, the absurd error of anthropomorphism. So, let us deny of God, or the supreme reality, all traits that animals and still lesser beings have in common, and, by achieving the opposite of anthropomorphism in characterizing God, we will come as close to the truth as is in our power. All animals and lesser beings are finite,

changeable, subject to influence by others, complex, and have feelings as well as thoughts (if they have the latter). Let us say, therefore, that God is infinite, unchangeable in every way, wholly impassible, immune to influence by others, wholly simple, incapable of feeling, but with purely intellectual knowledge (whatever that may be). It was David Hume who first indicated the possible fallacy in all this. What is to guarantee that, when we have denied all that constitutes reality as we experience it, anything is left to distinguish God from mere nonentity? The famous negative way, the *via negativa*, must, after all, be supplemented by something positive, or we may end up worshiping a mere nothing or a mere verbal formula.

As a matter of fact, the premise of the negative way—its characterization of beings in the world—is seriously inaccurate. What is common to ordinary individuals is only inadequately or ambiguously described as finite, changeable, subject to influence by others, and complex. Furthermore, the distinction between awareness as feeling and awareness as pure thought or knowledge is problematic. What thought or knowledge would be without feeling is not something that our experience makes transparently obvious. Finally, we animals are not simply finite; each of us is a mere *fragment* of the finite. The entire cosmos may be spatially finite; and even a beginningless past would be in a sense finite compared to the infinity of all that is conceivable. It is very well arguable that no knowledge of finite things could, without contradiction, be considered absolutely infinite. Hence an all-knowing God must be in some sense or respect finite.

Similarly, knowledge of the contingent must be contingent. What we are and what God cannot be is fragmentary. The divine finitude must encompass at least the world's finitude and also its infinity in whatever sense the world is infinite. Yes, we are affected by others, but it is just as true that we affect others. We are cause and effect; the question is, does it even make sense to view God as the cause of all and the effect of nothing? As Aristotle said, knowledge of contingent things is conditioned by the reality of the things known. The all-knowing cannot be simply and in every sense uncaused, unconditioned.

The alternative to the negative way is the doctrine of dual transcendence, according to which God in principle excels over others both in the sense that the divine nature is uniquely absolute and infinite and in the sense that it is uniquely relative and finite. If we could not be absolute (independent) or infinite in the divine sense, neither could we be relative or finite in the divine sense. Nor need it be contradictory to attribute both of these contrasting properties to God. Contradiction occurs

only if a subject is said to have a property and a contrary property in the same respect; otherwise contradiction does not obtain. And if it be said that since God is simple, God cannot contain a duality, the reply is ready: the divine simplicity is itself only one side of the duality of transcendence. In Whitehead's view, God's "primordial nature" is simple (I would say even simpler than Whitehead makes it) but God's "consequent nature" is the most complex reality there is. The complex can include the simple.

It was said above that "changeable" is an inadequate or ambiguous characterization of things other than God. There are changes for the better, for the worse, and neutral changes. Animals are open to good changes—growth, enrichment of experience—but also to bad ones—decay, impoverishment. To demand that God be, in every respect, immutable is to imply that there is no form of the capacity to change without which a being would be defective, or even a mere abstraction, not a concrete, actual being. The divine excellence requires immunity to negative change, to loss or degeneration; but does it require an incapacity for any and every kind of good change, every kind of increase in value? Plato (not the scriptures) proposed the argument "God must be perfect, hence any change would have to be either for the worse or without value, meaningless." This argument presupposes for its force that we have a positive idea of a maximum of value such that no additional value would be possible. Plato's phrase for such an unincreasable, unsurpassable value was "absolute beauty." What this is neither Plato nor anyone else has told us. An analysis of aesthetic principles strongly suggests that given any conceivable beauty there could be a greater beauty. If this be so, Plato's argument proves nothing.

Another ambiguity or problematic concept in the negative way was the idea that dependence was necessarily a defect distinguishing ordinary things from God. This excludes knowledge from God, if indeed Aristotle, or anyone else, can tell us what "to know" means. In addition there are two kinds of dependence, only one of which is obviously a weakness, this being dependence for very existence and essential properties. Denying this radical dependence of God for very existence leaves quite open the possibility of a dependence for qualities not necessary to the divine existence. If there is any genuine freedom in the creatures, they will do things they might not have done. God will know what they have done, but (as the Socinians saw long ago) this knowledge cannot be essential to God's very existence. Rather, had a creature done something other than what it did, God would have had correspondingly different knowledge other than the knowledge he does have. If

the word *knowledge* is given an honest meaning, one can consistently assert the compatibility of creaturely freedom with divine knowledge only if one admits divine knowledge without which God could and would—had the world been otherwise—have existed as God, incapable of error and ignorance. Total independence of others entails not knowing these others. Plato did not know us and was independent of us; we know Plato and *therefore* are not wholly independent of Plato.

Step by step, the reasoning of simple or nondual transcendence has been examined by this and other writers. It seems lacking in cogency. To understand the steady loss of support by philosophers (beginning with Hume and Kant) for classical theism (which denies dual transcendence), this lack of cogency is important. Belief in the divine uniqueness can survive the admission that it is not change but certain kinds of change, not dependence but certain kinds of dependence, that are excluded by the divine excellence. That the issue is worldwide and intercultural is remarkably well illustrated by the following coincidences.

In a year—I think the very month or week—in which I was thinking and writing about how God in some senses is changing, yet also in other senses unchanging, a man from India delivered a sermon in the chapel of the University of Chicago, with which I was connected for twenty-seven years. He was Radhakamal Mukerji, a leading sociologist of India, but also a writer on mysticism. He said in his sermon that God is unchanging in "ethical" goodness but increases in "aesthetic" value, which I took to mean in the richness or beauty of the divine experience of the world as new creatures come into being. This distinction between ethical value as capable of an absolute maximum and aesthetic value as an open infinity with no upper maximum was exactly the conclusion I had come to before hearing or knowing Mukerji. Also before this, I had had a somewhat similar intercultural experience, which was confirmed again long after Mukerji's visit. It involved two monks of the modern Bengali sect of Hinduism whose views harmonized with the idea of a deity both unchanging and yet in some respects changing. One of these monks, Makanam Brata Brahmachari, who did his doctoral dissertation under me, quoted a representative of his sect who wrote of God: "Lo, the cup is eternally full, yet it grows without ceasing." When this man began talking to me about "love" as a theological term I asked him what he meant by the word. "I mean," he said, "the consciousness of consciousness, the thinking of thinking, the . . . of. . . ." I am not sure, but he may have said, "the feeling of feeling." If he did, the analogy with Whitehead was close. In his dissertation he writes: "God is more than the absolute." Of course; for a mere negative like

nonrelative by itself constitutes no sufficient account of any actuality. Plato is not relative to us, but that is Plato's total ignorance of us; we constitute nothing of Plato's being, whereas, by his knowledge of and hence relativity to them, Parmenides and many others whom he did know contributed much to his wonderfully comprehensive awareness.

The Reality of Divine Love. Finally, I want to focus on the proposition "God is love." Mortimer Adler has recently explained why, although he is convinced that an intelligent divine being exists as creator of all, he does not think it can be demonstrated that this being is benevolent or loving. One may, however, question the distinction drawn here between divine intelligence and divine love. If God is to know us, God must know our feelings. How can feelings be known except by feelings? Can mere intellect (whatever that is—perhaps a computer) know feelings while having none of its own? And if God has feelings, what kind of feelings? Envy, malice, conceit, hatred, inferiority complexes? What have these to do with all-encompassing intelligence? For me, this is a wholly absurd combination of ideas. By embracing in knowledge all the qualities of reality, God possesses all that anyone possesses by way of value, so what could envy mean? Hatred would be baseless, since by willing the suffering of creatures God would be willing divine sharing in these sufferings. Whitehead's wonderfully simple formula of "feeling of feeling" as a basic element in knowledge excludes any ground for Adler's dilemma. To know others without intuiting their feelings is scarcely knowledge at all, and such an ability would hardly seem likely as an essential quality of an indestructible cosmic subject upon which all others radically depend. Simple atheism would be more reasonable than affirming such a God, so far as I can see. To give intelligence cosmic and everlasting scope, but to deny such scope to love, seems a discordant mixture of notions. Or is Advaita Vedānta and the doctrine of *māyā* the alternative to love? We think we exist as individuals, but really only *brahman* exists, spaceless and timeless. We are appearances of *brahman*, although *brahman* is unaware of us. Or does *brahman* constitute us by dreaming us? I have a different theory of dreams, and so had Bergson. Perhaps we can leave the doctrine of *māyā* to the Indians, who are by no means in agreement on the subject.

It is fair to add that there is no agreement in the West on the reality of divine love. [See Love.] Can a fragment of reality comprehend the encompassing? I feel entirely confident that if love cannot encompass all, including creaturely hatred as a degenerate case of love (the total lack of which is mere indifference), then nothing positively conceivable by such as we are can do so either.

If no form of theism escapes difficulties, puzzles it cannot solve, questions to which it finds no convincing answer, this is perhaps to be expected. A god easily understood is not God but a fetish, an idol. Dual transcendence removes some of the traditional paradoxes, especially if we include a clear doctrine of freedom as well as of more or less humble forms of sentience and feeling for all dynamic singulars in nature. Peirce had already done this before Whitehead took creativity as the ultimate category, applicable in the uniquely, divinely excellent form to God and in humbler forms to all creatures. But still there are puzzles. Change in God seems to imply, and Berdiaev hints at this, a divine kind of time. But how to relate this timelike aspect of God to worldly time is a problem that overwhelms me with a sense of incompetence. Physicists have their own difficulties with time, and without a mathematical competence beyond that of most of us one can scarcely begin to understand these difficulties, let alone overcome them.

By attributing freedom as well as minimal sentience to even the least single creatures (particles, atoms), the classical atheistic argument from evil loses its cogency. The details of nature are decided not by God but by the creatures concerned, by atoms, molecules, bacteria, single-celled animals, and many-celled animals, including human beings. And if it be said that God, in deciding to have free creatures instead of unfree creatures, is indirectly responsible for evil, the reply is that for the new type of idealism "unfree creature" is an ill-formed formula. As God is supreme freedom, ordinary singular beings are instances of less than supreme freedom, not of total lack of freedom. To be is to create, to decide what is otherwise undecided. Decision making, freedom, cannot be monopolized. Supreme freedom would have nothing to do were there not also less exalted forms of freedom. Genuine power is not power over the powerless. No single agent ever decides exactly what happens. The new physics (and even classical physics as interpreted by Clerk Maxwell, Reichenbach, Peirce, Whitehead, Sudarshan, and others) seems to harmonize better with this doctrine than did classical physics as it was usually interpreted by philosophers.

The present climate of opinion suggests the need for reconsidering many an old controversy and for questioning not only certain assumptions of classical theologians but also some of those of classical atheists or agnostics, including Hume, Kant, Marx, Comte, Russell, and Nietzsche. Not all contemporary forms of theism can be refuted by antiquated forms of skeptical argument.

Religion is a two-story affair, to adapt a phrase from James Feibleman. It is in part an empirical and histor-

ical matter, concerned with contingent fact about human nature and traditions. The idea of God, however, is nonempirical and metaphysical. Dealing as they do with what is eternal and necessary, including the eternal and necessary aspects of God, metaphysical statements are true if they make coherent sense and false otherwise. To admit that one has no idea of the answers is to imply that one has no idea of the question; for they are either self-answering or else confused. It is humanly difficult to admit this confusion. If one could clearly see that and how one is confused, would one still be confused? I feel confident there will be other writers in this collective enterprise whose confusions will contrast with mine. And there is something to be said for making one's partialities explicit.

[For further discussion of this topic, see Theism; Pantheism and Panentheism; and Sky. See also Supreme Beings; Attributes of God; and Anthropomorphism.]

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My article "Pantheism and Panentheism" in this encyclopedia deals with closely related topics; its bibliography is relevant here. My *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* (Albany, N.Y., 1984) is a somewhat popular, nontechnical presentation of my own version of the idea of God as supreme love exalted above ordinary love by dual transcendence. My article "Transcendence" appears in *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, edited by Vergilius Ferm (New York, 1945), pp. 791–792; see also in the same work my articles "Hume, David," "Omnipotence," "Omnipresence," and "Perfect, Perfection," as well as Herman Hausheer's "Fechner, Gustav Theodor."

For a distinguished Jewish theologian's idea of God, see John C. Merkle's *The Genesis of Faith: The Depth Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel* (New York, 1985); see also Heschel's *God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism* (New York, 1955). Heschel's view is remarkably close to the neoclassical view, although both doctrines were worked out independently. Edgar S. Brightman's *The Problem of God* (Nashville, 1930) is an approximation to the dual transcendence view; see also Brightman's *A Philosophy of Religion* (1940; Westport, Conn., 1969), especially chapters 7, 10, and 11, for a fine historical sketch of the idea that God must have finite as well as infinite aspects. Brightman's conceptualization is in line with the trend to turn away from the extremist strategy that prevailed from Aristotle to early modern times toward a middle-ground strategy, in which God is neither exclusively infinite nor exclusively finite but is, in suitable divine ways, both.

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TRANSMIGRATION denotes the process by which, after death, either a spiritual or an ethereal, subtle, and thinly material part of the personality, having left the body that it previously inhabited, "migrates" and enters (i.e., is reborn in) another body (human or animal) or

another form of being (plant or even inanimate object). Other terms often used in this context are *rebirth* (especially in connection with Indian religions), *palinogenesis* (from Greek *palin*, "again," and *genesis*), and *metempsychosis* (from Greek *meta*, "again," and *psuchē*, "soul"), although *metensomatosis* (from Greek *sōma*, "body"; cf. Latin *reincarnatio*) would be a more correct expression for the passage of the soul into another body. Manichaean texts in Syriac use the expression *tašpikha* or *tašpikha denafshatha*, corresponding to Greek *metaggismos* (from *metaggizesthai*; cf. Latin *transfundī*) and conveying the underlying notion of a transfusion or change of vessel whereby the soul is "poured" from one body into another. The Latin church father Augustine in his anti-Manichaean writings also uses the noun *revolutiones* and the verb *revolvi*, which happen to be identical with the later qabbalistic technical term *gilgul*: the soul "revolves" (i.e., rotates) through successive bodies. Earlier qabbalistic terms were *sod-ha-'ibbur* ("the mystery of transition") and *ha'taqah* ("displacing, changing place"), the latter equivalent to the Arabic *tanāsukh*.

All forms of belief in transmigration (with the exception of Buddhism, which I shall discuss below) presuppose some form of animism. Without implying commitment to all the theories of E. B. Tylor, it is obvious that the notion of a nonphysical entity (soul, or *anima*) existing separately from the physical body is assumed by all beliefs that posit an afterlife. The detailed elaboration of any one culture's views of afterlife and transmigration depends on the anthropology and psychology (i.e., the doctrines and beliefs concerning the nature of man) that culture holds, explicitly or implicitly. Thus the word *soul* may mean the whole man minus the body or a special substance or collection of substances nonphysical in nature. In the former case it is the whole albeit disincarnate man that survives (and goes on, for example, to the underworld, the land of the dead); in the latter case it is a specific soul-substance that persists and returns to its ancestral or heavenly home or haunts the living or is reborn. Many belief systems, especially among primitive societies, know of multiple souls (Tylor himself quoted many examples), but the idea is also not uncommon in more developed civilizations; examples include the *ba* and *ka* of the ancient Egyptians, the gnostic *psuchē* and *pneuma*, and the fivefold division current among Jewish qabbalists (*nefesh*, *ruah*, *neshamah*, *ḥayyah*, *yehidah*).

Origin of Concept. The doctrine of transmigration has diverse origins, explanations, and functions. The concept may have arisen in connection with the primitive view of the repetitive, cyclical nature of existence or the view that the ancestors continue to live in their descen-

dants. It may have arisen from the assumption that discarnate ("naked") souls seek to clothe themselves with, and unite themselves to, a physical body, a notion that relates back to the subject of animism and the attribution of souls to inanimate objects. One important function of the doctrine of transmigration is to explain the character traits (e.g., cruelty or avarice) of a particular individual by considering him as the reincarnation of a deceased person who had similar traits. There is also an inverted characterology. When transmigration is considered not merely as punishment but as another chance to accumulate more merits, atone for past sins, and fulfill one's destiny, then character traits can be interpreted as reparation for shortcomings in a previous existence. A pious man, conspicuous for his compassion, charity, and generosity, is obviously a soul that returned to this earth to make amends for his cruelty and avarice in a previous existence. Moreover, belief in transmigration provides a theodicy, an explanation of apparent injustice in the order of things. Why is one man rich and blessed, another poor and pursued by misfortune? Why is one man born a brahman or prince, another a low-caste or an outcaste? The explanation is that every man reaps the fruits of his actions in previous existences. This may be the doing and judgment of a personal god, or (as in the Hindu tradition) the automatic result of karmic causality. In fact, the doctrine of *karman* is, in Max Weber's words, the "most consistent theodicy ever produced by history."

Historical Cross-Cultural Overview. The acceptance of the belief in some form of transmigration or return of the dead person to terrestrial life is a fairly general concept that is evident in many cultures. Monotheistic faith systems, however, have generally rejected this concept.

Primitive religions. There is little evidence of belief in transmigration in most nonliterate societies to the extent that they have been reliably and systematically studied by ethnologists. In many cases the evidence is conflicting; material on the Australian Aranda (Arunta) by Baldwin Spencer and F. J. Gillen, for example, has been subsequently challenged by Carl Strehlow. George Grey, to give another example, reported (*Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in North-Western and Western Australia*, London, 1841) how he was welcomed in the bush by an Aborigine family as their son, adding that "this belief, that white people are the souls of departed blacks is by no means an uncommon superstition among them." Yet definitive evidence for such beliefs is lacking, and the interpretation of available evidence (e.g., regarding burial customs) is uncertain. If in some Australian tribes a woman who wants to bear children visits or worships at a site inhabited by (or

otherwise associated with) the ancestors, this is not proof of primitive ignorance regarding the process of procreation (as was thought at one time by adherents of the theory of primitive or prelogical mentality). Rather, it is indicative of a certain worldview regarding the relationship of new generations to the ancestors. Although theories put forth about prehistoric religions are purely speculative and should, in any case, never confuse that category with primitive religions, it may be mentioned here that archaeological evidence of burial sites (especially those in which bodies are found in "contracted burial," the knees of the skeleton touching the chin in an embryolike position) does not warrant any conclusions regarding belief in transmigration or rebirth.

Germanic and Celtic religions. The pre-Christian beliefs of these religions provide little solid evidence of a general acceptance of the notion of transmigration. The indications are too vague and scattered to permit definite assertions about Germanic religions. Julius Caesar's statement (*Gallic Wars* 6.14) that the druids possessed teachings concerning transmigration (see also Diodorus Siculus, 5.28) is very definite, but the subject remains doubtful in the absence of supporting evidence. The same also applies to the vague, inconclusive hints contained in Irish and Welsh epics and romances.

Egyptian religion. The ancient Greeks considered Egypt to be the source of the belief in transmigration, but there is general agreement that the account of Herodotus (2.123) is mistaken. The Egyptian *Book of Going Forth by Day* seems to assume that certain privileged souls could transform themselves into animals (e.g., phoenix, heron, or crocodile), but this is a far cry from a general doctrine of transmigration.

Greek religion. As the account of Herodotus suggests, the idea of transmigration was not unknown in ancient Greece. However, in ancient Greece, transmigration was but one doctrine among many, and a rather insignificant one at that. As a rule the souls of the departed were thought to descend into the underworld (Hades), though mythology and legend told of exceptional figures who were translated to the sky (e.g., as stars) or to the Elysian Fields, or otherwise transformed. The origin of the belief in transmigration in Greece is obscure. It may have evolved from certain ancient layers of primitive Greek religion. Sometimes the belief appears to be connected with the god Dionysos and thence with Orphism.

It is to the Orphic tradition that Plato and others appeal when expounding certain ideas concerning the fate and destiny of the soul, including the assertion that the physical body is the "prison of the soul" and that the latter can achieve liberation and salvation by an ascetic way of life. Here we seem to be on safer ground, pro-

vided we mean by "Orphic" not a definite body of doctrine but "a floating mass of popular belief" (William K. Guthrie), to be gleaned from, for example, Empedocles, certain passages in Pindar, and above all Plato. Once the soul is considered a distinct spiritual entity, temporarily imprisoned in a body, transmigration becomes an obvious possibility. One "Orphic" tablet reports the soul saying "I have flown out of the sorrowful weary wheel" (cited in Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to Greek Religion*, 1976, p. 669)—a sentence that could equally well have been uttered by a Hindu soul that had escaped the wheel of *saṃsāra* and attained *mokṣa*. (On the "sorrowful cycle," see also William K. Guthrie, *The Greeks and Their Gods*, 1955, p. 323).

Greek tradition is unanimous in ascribing the doctrine of transmigration to Pythagoras (sixth century BCE), who, however, is mythologically related to Apollo rather than to Dionysos. Pythagoras (whose authority was also invoked by the medieval Jewish qabbalists, on the basis of their acquaintance with Neoplatonic texts) was even credited with remembering previous incarnations (his own and those of others)—a feat that Buddhism reserves for the possessors of the highest supernatural attainments. His contemporary Xenophanes pokes fun at him by telling a story according to which Pythagoras once cried out to someone, "Stop beating that dog—I recognize him by his voice as a friend of mine." The sources of Pythagoras may have been purely Greek; there is no convincing evidence of Indian influence, though the latter cannot be excluded.

Xenophanes' story about Pythagoras has been told here with a purpose, for it illustrates how belief in the transmigration into animals can also lead to an ascetic discipline that requires vegetarianism. Indeed, many Neoplatonic and gnostic sects (e.g., the Manichaeans and their successors) enjoined vegetarianism not only as an ascetic practice but because of the belief that animal bodies might be inhabited by human souls. The more extreme view that the same might also be true of fruits and vegetables caused some Manichaean saints not to cut up vegetables themselves but to have this service performed by lower-ranking believers. (The qabbalists had it the other way round: a soul "exiled" into an animal body could be redeemed and liberated if the animal was ritually slaughtered and eaten, piously and with the appropriate mystical intentions, by the qabbalist saints.) The Orphic tradition concerning transmigration became "canonical" after it passed into the writings of Plato (cf. *Phaedrus* 248f. and *Cratylus* 400c, where it is explicitly attributed to the Orphics; also *Meno*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*, and especially the great myth at the end of the *Republic*). From Plato this tradition passed into Neoplatonic and gnostic systems, and from

there into medieval literature. The notion of transmigration does not seem to have played any role in Rome, though it is mentioned by Vergil (*Aeneid* 6.748).

Connected to the Greek notion of transmigration are the theories of preexistence, asceticism, and liberation. The Orphic-Platonic-Neoplatonic system implies several presuppositions. The one is the preexistence of the soul that enters a body (at birth or at conception) and leaves it (at death), much as a body might put on a coat and then shed it again. Another is the notion that the pure, spiritual soul is imprisoned in gross bodily matter in this lower world from which it has to be liberated: "The body is a prison" (or "a tomb"), as the popular Orphic proverb put it. The way to liberation from the weary round of rebirths is the purification of the soul of base lusts, desires, pollution, vice, sin, and so forth. Hence also the ascetic emphasis (which, of course, can also assert itself without the doctrine of transmigration, wherever the soul is supposed to aspire to immortal bliss or to a higher spiritual sphere).

When the soul is considered not to be timeless but to have a natural beginning (e.g., Aristotle) or to have been created by God (e.g., at the moment of conception, as in traditional Christian belief), then it should logically also have a natural end. The eternity and immortality of a soul that has a beginning in time is therefore a problem for philosophy as well as theology, but neither the solutions proposed for this particular problem nor the cosmological details relating to the doctrine of transmigration (is the soul reincarnated at once? where does it bide its time between one earthly life and the next?) are within the scope of this article. Suffice it to indicate here that belief in a resurrection of the body as the ultimate eschatological goal constitutes not only a rejection of the Orphic-Neoplatonic conception of man but also (theoretically, though not *de facto* in all religious systems) a denial of the doctrine of transmigration, since it views the human being as a body-soul unity and the person as an individual (in the literal sense, from "indivisible").

Western monotheistic religions. In the monotheistic religions originating in the western part of the ancient world, the concept of transmigration is generally absent. It is a doctrine unknown in classical (biblical and rabbinic) Judaism. The first reference to Jewish sectarians holding such views is found in the writings of the philosopher-theologian Sa'adyah Gaon (Babylonia, tenth century), but these probably percolated into Oriental Jewry from sectarian Muslim sources. The doctrine reappeared with the rise and development of Qabbalah in twelfth-century Provence, precisely at the time and place where the same belief also flourished among the so-called Christian heretics. In the latter case the

belief is almost certainly derived from traditions that were ultimately Manichaeic. Since the thirteenth century the notion of *gilgul* has been a central qabbalistic tenet. There were differences of opinion as to the number of possible reincarnations (a maximum of three, or more) and whether transmigration was into human bodies only or also into animals, plants, or even inanimate objects.

Orthodox Christianity in all its forms rejects the notion of transmigration as incompatible with Christian anthropology (i.e., the interpretation of the nature of man), with belief in hell (and/or purgatory) and paradise, and above all with the doctrine of redeeming grace as made available to man by Christ's sacrifice. The soul is not preexistent but created by God (as noted in the papal encyclical *Humani generis*, 1950), and man consists of two substances, soul and body ("Homo constat ex duabus substantiis, animae scilicet et corporis"), which are joined together once only before the general resurrection.

Nevertheless, at certain periods and in certain circles interest in the doctrine of transmigration was evident, especially during the Renaissance (as a result of the ascendant Neoplatonic influence). Post-Enlightenment thinkers as well as Romantics (Kant, Lessing, Lichtenberg, Lavater, Herder, Goethe, Schopenhauer) were not impervious to the attractions of this notion, though in the nineteenth century Indian influence demonstrably played a major role. Modern spiritualism, though its beginnings were in America, drew on Indian philosophy and on what was held to be the occult "wisdom of the East" in its subsequent theoretical elaboration in Europe (by, for example, Allan Kardec) as also in its Theosophical development and the latter's Anthroposophical offspring.

Like normative Judaism and Christianity, normative Sunni Islam rejects the idea of transmigration. However, certain gnosticizing and mystical circles acceded to the notion of transmigration and rebirth. The notion of reincarnation as a valid philosophy is evident in "heretical" sects with esoteric, gnostic teachings, for instance the Nuṣayriyah and the Druze.

Far East. Neither Japanese Shintō nor indigenous, pre-Buddhist Chinese traditions knew of metempsychosis, though spirit possessions (and their exorcism) were not unknown.

Manichaeism. In the Manichaeic belief system, the prevalent notion of transmigration is generally considered to have been influenced by the corresponding concept in the Indian religious system. Whereas the Indian connections of Pythagorean doctrines are doubtful, there seems to be better evidence of Indian influence on

the Manichaeic system, since there is little reason to doubt the information given by such witnesses as the tenth-century Arab scholar and traveler al-Bīrūnī (see E. S. Sachau's *Alberuni's India*, 1910, vol. 1, p. 54). According to the Manichaeans, those who lived in a worldly state or married had to be reborn in the body. (Again, for the qabbalists everything was the other way around: to have remained childless was sufficient reason for the soul to be sent back into this world in order to make amends where it had failed in its duty toward God and the cosmos.) The best future that could befall such souls was to be incarnated as food ("in cucumbers and melons," as Augustine puts it with somewhat savage humor) and to be eaten by the Manichaeic saints—a process that would translate them to their final goal of bliss.

India. The notion of transmigration and reincarnation is a pivotal aspect of the general socioreligious belief system in India. In the Hindu religious tradition, the concept of transmigration is a vital aspect of the cultural milieu and has played a dominant role in shaping the actions, ethics, and ideologies of the people. Thus, the Indian subcontinent and the cultures influenced by it are dominated by the notion of *samsāra*, "what turns around forever," the wheel of birth and death. Whereas in the West the idea of transmigration was always felt to be something exotic, strange, and at any rate requiring special justification, in India it came to be an accepted presupposition of life, illustrating if anything Clifford Geertz's description (in "Religion as a Cultural System," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, London, 1975, p. 90) of "conceptions of a general order of existence . . . clothed with such an aura of factuality that the modes and motivations seem uniquely realistic."

The history and development of this notion are not yet quite clear, and scholars are at variance regarding the role of possible influences of the more popular levels of the religion of the Aryan invaders and those of the native, pre-Aryan religions. There is consensus that the weary round of *samsāra* is not yet part of Vedic religion. The notion seems to have evolved in the post-Vedic Āraṇyaka literature (i.e., books written by forest recluses) and developed more fully in the Upaniṣads, where it is presented as new (e.g., by Yājñavalkya in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*). There it is part of the growing interest in the question of the essential and real "self" of man, the *ātman*. The fact that the notion was taken for granted, and made the basis of their respective doctrines of salvation, by Jainism and Buddhism suggests that by the sixth century BCE it was already widespread in India. Among the presuppositions of this doctrine is the notion that space and time are endless. The identity

of the self depends on (moral) karmic determinants. Life is an unending, eternal, weary round of suffering, governed by an automatic causality of reward and punishment (*karman*) that takes the soul from one existence to another through all six spheres of being, from that of the gods to that of "hungry spirits" and demons.

In Indian religious sensibility the emphasis is not so much on the duality "life and death" as on "birth and dying." The problem about rebirth is that of necessity it also implies "re-dying," that is, death recurring *ad infinitum*, unless man succeeds in escaping from the vicious circle of *saṃsāra* (also depicted iconically as the monstrous wheel of unending existences, the *bhava-cakra*, and described very graphically in the Buddhist Avadāna and Nidāna literature) into ultimate liberation (Hindu *mokṣa*, Buddhist *nirvāṇa*). It should be emphasized that the ultimate goal (*artha*) is release and escape; the heavens (*svarga*) are still part of the samsaric world. Doctrinal differences of opinion relate to the method of liberation (yoga, mortifications, the "middle path") as well as to the precise definition of the liberated state.

The descriptions in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.12.15f. (cf. also *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* and *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*) still exhibit a somewhat mythological character. Those who have achieved perfection and have realized their true self go, after death, the "way of the sun," namely, the path of the gods (*devayāna*): they enter the abode of *brahman* (*brahmaloka*) never to return again. Those who have not achieved ultimate self-realization but have lived a life of sinless piety and devotion (through sacrifices, penance, and charity) go along the path of the ancestors (*pitryāna*) to the world of the moon where they become rain and subsequently food: "Gods feed on them, and when that passes away from them, they start on their return journey to be reborn as human beings. . . . Thus do they rotate." Evildoers are reborn as insects and vermin. According to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.10.7 they are reborn as dogs and pigs. As has been noted above, heaven too is part of the samsaric cycle, and hence gods too are reborn, even as human beings can be reborn as *devas*, to be subsequently reborn once again.

What or who exactly is it that is reborn? Unorthodox śramanic teachings as well as Upaniṣadic speculation provide a varied technical vocabulary (*ātman*, *jīva*, *puruṣa*) to deal with the questions of empirical ego, real self, and so forth. Some systems of thought conceive also of spiritual entities in terms of a subtle, ethereal matter; one such example in Western history would be the Stoics.

Jainism. In the Jain system, the living entity is called

jīva ("soul" or "life"), and it is doomed to unending rebirths as long as it is covered and encumbered (as if by a thinner or thicker film) by *karman*, which is conceived as a kind of fine matter. The generation of new *karman* must be stopped, and the accumulated *karman* already present must be removed if liberation is to be achieved. That such liberation can be achieved is demonstrated by the line of *jinās* (lit., "conquerors").

Buddhism. The Buddha is sometimes called the "world conqueror," precisely because he is a "world renouncer." The very special and fascinating problem of Buddhist doctrine concerning karmic rebirth arises from the fact that Buddhism denies the existence of an *ātman*—that is, self, or ego-substance beyond the empirical ego, which is a transitory combination of "heaps" of "elements" (*skandhas*). Regardless of whether the anti-Brahmanic doctrine of *anātman* ("no-self") was already explicitly taught by the Buddha himself or was developed later, it is clearly a central concept of historical Buddhism.

If one denies the presence of an individual self, or *ātman*, yet shares the general Indian belief in rebirth, the question inevitably arises as to what it is exactly that survives to be reincarnated, that suffers rebirth, and that seeks release in *nirvāṇa* from the wheel of *saṃsāra*. The ways in which the various Buddhist schools deal with this problem need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that it is assumed that even after the dissolution of the combination of changing elements that constitute the empirical human organism and consciousness, some kind of substratum remains to become the point of crystallization for a new set of mental states (i.e., a new existence). Strictly speaking, therefore, the terms *transmigration* and *reincarnation* are not very good renderings of the Buddhist (as distinct from the Hindu or Jain) notion of *saṃsāra*; G. R. Welbon's phrase "birth-and-death-in-sequence" would be a more adequate rendering. The last thoughts before death determine the nature of rebirth: at death the "fundamental thought" is transformed into "emigrating thought," which, in turn, determines the "rebirth thought," the nucleus of a new existence.

Tibet. The application of the doctrine of rebirth in Tibet, a culture decisively shaped by one particular form of Buddhism, deserves special mention because of its relevance to the social system and its political institutions. Transfer of authority is a problem in every social system, and various techniques and mechanisms are devised to regulate it (elections, rules of hereditary succession, etc.). When the highest bearers of spiritual and/or temporal authority are bound to celibacy, hereditary succession from father to son is obviously impossible.

The Tibetan system of harnessing the belief in transmigration to the mechanism of succession is unique. Competent sages identify incarnations of a high order (*tulkus*) by determining into which newborn baby a recently deceased personage has passed. The succession of Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas (the former representing successive incarnations of Avalokiteśvara, the latter those of Amitābha) is assured by this method.

[See also *Reincarnation and Soul*.]

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R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

TRANSSEXUALITY. See *Gender Roles*.

TREES are a form of nature that represent life and the sacred continuity of the spiritual, cosmic, and physical worlds. A tree is often used to symbolize a deity or other sacred being, or it may stand for what is sacred in general. The religious beliefs that surround a tree may include as sacred any one or all of the physical parts of the tree: its trunk, branches, leaves, blossoms, sap, or roots. Sacred objects constructed from the wood of special trees are also used for religious purposes.

The physical properties of trees are combined with supernatural or sacred ideas, the beliefs that surround a tree's connection with what constitutes religion in different cultures. Trees are not only sacred in the major religions of the East and West, but also in other traditions where belief in the sacred is combined with beliefs in the power of ancestors, in the creation of life in birth, about death and the afterworld, and about health and illness. Trees represent certain deities or ancestors, serve as mediators or links to the religious realm, and are associated with cultural beliefs in heaven or the afterlife. Trees may be valued as spiritual and physical contributors of life because they furnish liquids valued as sacred beverages used in ritual or as medicines for curing a variety of illnesses.

Through association with a particular religious or historical event, an individual tree or species of tree acquires the symbolic significance of the event as part of its meaning. The oak, date palm, and willow were used in the building of Solomon's temple and in constructing booths at Sukkot (*Lv.* 23:40). Deodar wood is used in the construction of Hindu temples. The oak is commonly taken to be the tree under which Joshua set up a pillar at Shechem to commemorate the nation's covenant with God (*Jos.* 24:26). The Jewish captives in Babylon in 597 BCE hung harps on weeping willows along the banks of the Euphrates (*Ps.* 137). The religious significance of this act established the willow as a symbol of mourning, death, and rebirth. The branches of the palm tree stand for Christ's triumphal entry into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday as well as for his rebirth. These associations are still prevalent in Christian tradition.

A society's religious beliefs about what kinds of trees are sacred generally depends on the nature and number of trees found in its territory. If trees are plentiful, the forest as a whole will also be an important part of the religion's spiritual beliefs and rituals. The Kwakiutl Indians of Pacific North America, like many other societies living in a tree-filled environment, believe that their heavily forested inland region is the home of supernatural beings.

The Innate Power of Trees

Religious or spiritual power may be inherent in a tree or in the elements that make up the tree. For example, in Taoist thought, trees and all forms of nature contain *yin* and *yang* energies, that is, the opposing forces of the universe. Each tree has spiritual power as it contains and balances these inequalities: the light and dark colors of the leaves and bark, and the opposition between light and shadow. In southwest China *feng-shui* stands for the interaction of *yin* and *yang* and represents a power that affects the world and everything in it. *Feng-shui* may be found especially in strange and awe-inspiring trees and stones. The contemplation of these powers or the active cultivation of trees to enhance their spiritual force, as in the Japanese art of *bonsai*, builds gentleness of character, religious spirit, and respect for mankind.

The Andaman Islanders use the intrinsic qualities of hibiscus trees to aid them in their struggles to catch large turtles and fish. It is through the spiritual qualities of these trees that the Islanders are able to succeed in overcoming their prey and to protect themselves from harm. The particular qualities of the tree represent essential elements of physical and spiritual life and ward off dangers associated with turtles and the sea.

The Haida Indians of North America used a power inherent in hemlock branches to scrub themselves in ritual baths. The tree had the power to purify and protect the Indians and to enable them to attain the degree of cleanliness required during their rituals and thus remain on good terms with their supernatural beings.

Power to Avert Illness and Evil. Trees offer protection from both physical and spiritual illness through their associations with the divine. For the Ainu of Japan, *ramat* (literally "heart," translated as "spirit" or "soul") is a power that resides in all things in varying degrees. Wood is especially rich in *ramat*, which is provided by the spirit of Shiramba Kamuy, the upholder of the world and male god of vegetation. The Ainu believe that nothing is more effective for protection against evil and spiritual problems than *inaw* (carved wood offerings). The wood of over fifteen kinds of trees including oak, willow, lilac, dogwood, and magnolia may be used in the carving of *inaw*, which are then offered to good *kamuy* (spirits). Similarly three trees—the thorn, elder, and alder—are predominantly used to carve *inaw* for bad *kamuy*. *Inaw* are also hung in houses to provide general protection for the home and its occupants.

In the Konkan district of western India it is believed that barrenness can be cured by planting a tree for the uneasy spirits that wander about and inhabit women, preventing conception. Under favorable circumstances

the evil spirit will leave a woman suffering from barrenness to take up residence in the newly planted tree, allowing the woman to conceive. The Indian mimosa tree is believed to provide spiritual protection against wicked spells and the evil eye. The illness caused by *Sītalā-Māyā*, the Indian goddess of smallpox, may be averted by setting up a branch of the neem tree just as Buddhists invoke certain sacred trees for health.

Trees may represent a spiritual healing for and protection from evil. The oil of the olive was traditionally used to soothe the pain and so the olive tree or a sprig of the tree has become a symbol of the grace of Jesus Christ through which the sorrowful sinner finds eternal peace.

The Cosmic Tree. In many religions the universe is portrayed as multilayered, the layers kept distinct and in place by a world tree running through the exact center of the cosmos. [See *Axis Mundi*.] Salishan Indians of North America hold that their deity made three worlds, one above the other: the sky world, the earth, and the underworld. All are connected by a single tree that passes through the middle of each. The Babylonians believed that their cosmic tree, *Kiskanu*, was the home of the god of fertility and *Ea's* mother, *Bau*, the goddess of plenty. Heaven, or the home of *Bai Ülgen*, is believed by the Altai people to be on the top of a giant fir tree that grows at the earth's navel. The Vasyugan Ostiak (Khanty) believed that the cosmic tree's branches touched the sky and its roots extended to the underworld. A copy of the celestial tree of the Siberian Tatars stands before the palace of *Erlik Khan*, the lord of the dead.

Similarly, in Scandinavian mythology the cosmos is connected by a sacred ash, *Yggdrasill*. Its roots reach to *Niflheimr*, the lowest region of *Hel*; its trunk, entwined by the snake of the ocean, is in *Miðgarðr*, the realm of humans; and its branches reach to *Ásgarðr*, the home of the gods. Other versions of the myth depict the great ash with three roots: *Niflheimr* or *Hel* under one, *Utgardr*, the realm of giants and demons, under the second, and *Miðgarðr* under the third. On top of *Yggdrasill* sits the eagle of *Óðinn* (Odin), chief of the gods; nearby is the Spring of *Urðr* ("fate"), where the gods dispense justice and determine the fate of the world. At *Ragnarøk*, the doomsday of the gods, *Yggdrasill* will shake its roots, freeing the monsters of the lower regions.

Indian tradition offers many variations of the cosmic tree. In the *Upaniṣads* the tree is inverted with its roots in the sky while its branches cover the earth. The eternal *āsvattha* ("fig tree"; *Ficus religiosa*) is a manifestation of *Brahmā* in the universe. This forest tree is also described as rising from the navel of *Varuṇa* or of *Nārāyaṇa* as he floats in the waters of the universe.

The ancient Egyptians believed that the sky was a huge tree that overarched the earth. The stars were fruits or leaves on the tree and the gods perched on its boughs. This tree separated the ocean from the sky, the upper from the lower worlds. Osiris, lord of the dead, was identified with this celestial tree. The sun was born from the tree every day while the celestial tree disappeared each morning, thus marking the periods of night and day. The year was also symbolized by 365 trees representing the days of their calendar year.

Cosmic space is also defined horizontally by trees. In addition to the center of the earth and the sacred tree, with its roots deep in the underworld and its trunks and branches defining the world of man and the gods, many American Indian religions add sacred trees, and their associated colors, birds or other animals, and gods, to each of the four cardinal directions. The Maya, the Aztec, and the Indian cultures that later took part in their cultural heritage believed that five sacred trees (the four corners of the world and the center) were responsible for the organization of the universe; they allotted particular times of the year, or entire years in some cases, to serve under the dominion of each direction.

The Tree of Life. Many religions believe that the cosmic tree stands for the sacrality of the world, its creation, continuation, and fertility. Thus in many cases the world tree is also a tree of life and immortality as well. The patronesses of the cosmic tree for the Warao of South America are the Grandmothers, deities who are also associated with seasonal change and the winter solstice. The trees of the cardinal points and the Warao deities take on an especially interesting form. The southeast represents the soul of the Mother of the Forest, a deity of the world of light, while the southwest is the body of the Mother of the Forest. For the Warao, deities of the northeast and northwest represent the Tree of Life, the moriche palm, and so symbolize sustenance and fertility. Hebraic teaching and Islamic tradition describe the Tree of Life with its roots in heaven and its branches overarched the earth. Zoroastrianism teaches that the Tree of All Seeds, or the Tree of All Healing, which grows in the cosmic sea, Vourukasha, is responsible for life on earth.

In ancient Egypt, the celestial tree was also a tree of life. Its fruit kept the gods and the souls of the dead in eternal youth and wisdom. Out of this tree of life emerge divine arms some of which bear gifts while others pour out the water of life from an urn. In the Vedas, Varuna lifted up the celestial tree of life and by squeezing its fruit between two stones obtained *soma*, or *amṛta*, the drink of immortality. Ancient Egyptian religion also associated this tree with fate. Sekhait, the

goddess of writings or fate, sits at the foot of the cosmic tree where she records on the tree itself, or in its leaves, all future events as well as the important events of the present for the benefit of future generations.

The Tree of Knowledge. For Buddhists, the Bodhi Tree, or Bo Tree, is both the source of life for all beings and the tree of enlightenment. Śākyamuni Buddha made a special resolution at the foot of this tree of wisdom to remain under its branches until he attained supreme enlightenment. It was under this tree that he attained enlightenment after he was tempted and threatened by Māra and his three daughters Tanhā, Rati, and Rāga, who were like swaying branches of a young leafy tree singing songs of the season of spring.

The Babylonians believed that two trees guarded the eastern entry to heaven: the tree of truth and the tree of life. Similarly, in the Garden of Eden described in *Genesis* stood the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. After Adam ate of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil offered by Eve, God said, "Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever" (*Gn.* 3:22). Adam and Eve were driven from the garden, marking the beginning of mankind's troubles on earth.

Trees as Food. In many religions trees are believed to be responsible for spiritual nurturance and sacred food. The Polynesians of Futuna believe that in Polotu, the abode of the gods, grows a sacred tree, the Puka-tala. The leaves of this tree will change into a wide variety of foods when they are cooked and so may supply all needs. For the tribes of South America's Gran Chaco, the god Cotaa created a wondrous tree that would provide food and drink for hungry people.

The bark of the alder tree is credited by the Karok Indians on the Klamath River in northwestern North America with providing salmon, an important food source. The creator of the world, Kareya, built a dam at the entrance of the Klamath River that prevented salmon from coming upstream to the Karok. The bark of the alder tree looks like salmon when it is broken off the tree and wetted. A Karok myth relates how this bark was used by Coyote to trick the women who guarded the dam into allowing the salmon to come up from the ocean, forever supplying food for the Karok. Salmon play both a life-sustaining and a religious role among these Indians, as does the wood of the alder tree.

Creation of Mankind. In many religions the myth of a people's origin relates how a cosmic tree played an important role in either the actual creation of people or the emergence of mankind in this world from some other world. These beliefs are intimately tied to what is

believed to be sacred. For example, among the Ainu the human backbone is regarded as the seat of life, and was originally made from a willow branch. But more frequently the cosmic tree or tree of life is responsible for the creation of the people of a society. Kiowa religion features a girl child, Pekeahaidei, carried by a growing tree into the sky where she marries and has a boy child. Carrying her child with her, she falls through a hole in her world. The child survives the fall to this world and is raised by Spider Old Woman, a very sacred being. Later the child creates Kiowa culture.

The Uyurucares of Bolivia believe that their god Tiri split a tree and from the opening came all the people of the earth. The Zuni, in their story of creation, are brought up from the lowest world level, where all is darkness, with the aid of the two sons of the sun. Branches from the pine tree to the north, the spruce to the west, the silver spruce to the south, and the aspen tree to the east had to be gathered before they could leave the Darkness World. The Zuni climbed the long prayer stick made from the pine of the north to the third world; scaled the crook from the spruce of the west to the second world; used the prayer stick from the spruce of the south to rise to the world below this one, and finally emerged into the Daylight World (this world) by climbing the prayer stick made from the aspen tree. This emergence story blends the cosmic tree, the trees of the four corners, and the tree of life as sacred elements that bring the Zuni to their present world and that serve as important parts of their religious beliefs.

The Seneca Indians of northeastern North America also give an account of the discovery of the world originating with the sacred people of the sky. In the middle of their village stood a tree covered with white blossoms, which gave light to the people when the tree was in bloom. When the blossoms fell, there was darkness. A woman of the Seneca dreamed three times that the tree must be pulled up by the roots. After the third dream, her people uprooted the tree. Upon discovering their actions, the chief became angry and ordered the woman who had had the dream to be pushed into the hole where the tree had been. The falling woman then discovered this world, an event that marks the beginning of the Seneca culture.

Trees as Ancestors. A common extension of the notion of the cosmic tree as the source of all life is the belief in a tree as an ancestor and creator. This belief can take many forms. The Warramunga of northern Australia, for example, believe that the new life present in the womb of a mother receives its spirit or soul from certain trees, entering the womb through the navel. The

Lakota on the upper Missouri River say that the first man and woman were two trees and that a snake chewed their roots off in order to allow the couple to walk away.

The Sauras of India honor the banyan tree, for they believe that "it is our mother." The banyan tree suckered two fatherless children whose mother had abandoned them under its branches. The children would have perished but for the milk of the banyan that dripped into their mouths and fed them.

For the Ndembu, the "milk tree" (*mudyi*) is a dominant symbol of their culture and religious beliefs. The white latex sap of the tree is believed to represent breast milk and semen, suggesting the creation and nurturance of life. This tree stands for what is good in Ndembu society and is used in rituals to counter evil forces. The tree also stands for the spirits of the ancestors of the matriline, the important lineage of descent, and so represents social custom and structure.

In another vein, trees can be associated with a shrine dedicated to a deceased relative, who, in time, becomes an ancestor. Among the Nuer a *colwic* is the spirit of those people struck by lightning. These people are believed to have been chosen to enter into close kinship with the god Kwoth. A person killed by lightning is said to become a Child of Kwoth, a spirit of the air. The blood relatives of the deceased, his patriline, erect a *riek* or shrine over his funeral mound and plant a sapling of the nyuot tree at its side. The nyuot tree is associated with the *colwic* spirit and with the rain and the sky to which the soul of the dead person has been taken. When this sapling is planted during the rains (when most lightning occurs), the tree takes root. If it were to die another would be planted in its place. This tree becomes a shrine for the deceased's lineage. It is through this shrine that the deceased's spirit may become active in the everyday affairs of his relatives.

This idea of a sacred tree representing the lineage or clan is an old one. For many cultures, the ancestors are the deities and are responsible for life, death, and spiritual happiness. The wooden totem-pole used particularly by cultures of the Pacific Northwest coast of North America is not merely a name or emblem of different family groupings. The totem is a collective label, but it also has a religious character: the totem's origins related to the special relationship to the ancestors and the sacred world. The *inaw* of the Ainu, mentioned above, were originally the receptacles of ancestral *ramat*; later, the winged *inaw* (*shutu inaw*) came to represent ancestors. Some of these winged *inaw* became minor *kamuy* owing to their concentrated *ramat*, and were effective in warding off injurious magic.

Trees and Divine Powers

Trees may be viewed as having souls or spirits themselves or they may be a part of some divine being. Thus trees may symbolize a deity either by serving as the visible embodiment of a sacred presence or by marking a sacred spot that a deity frequents. Sacred trees may be the abode of deities or may be the divine beings themselves. For instance, the sacred heath worshiped in the time of Plutarch grew around the sarcophagus of Osiris and was known as the "soul of Osiris."

Trees with Souls or Spirits. Many religions include beliefs that trees have souls or are sentient sacred beings. The Australian Aborigines believe that the spirit of men resides in the land and that a tree, a bush, or a rock is the present incarnation of this spirit and has great religious value. A group of relatives thus includes humans and the spirits of these natural features of the landscape. If an Aboriginal leaves the area, he would leave a vital part of himself behind.

The pre-Islamic *jinn* are associated with certain kinds of trees. These trees are conceived as animate and rational, for a supernatural life and power resides in the trees. In Greece the dryads were oak nymphs, and the *tengu* of Japan are forest spirits.

The Trobriand Islanders of the western Pacific depend both spiritually and physically on the spirit of their canoe and the tree from which it is made. Once a tree is selected, the owner, builder, and helpers must perform a short ceremony before the tree can be cut down. A small cut is made in the trunk, and a bit of food is placed in the incision. This is an offering to the tree's *tokway*, or wood sprite, to induce the spirit to leave the tree so that the workers may begin the process of converting the tree into a canoe.

The Japanese have a story about the spirit of a very large and old willow tree that grows near a temple. The village decides to build a bridge and use the willow's wood for part of its construction. A young man, who like his ancestors before him loves and respects the old tree, saves it by offering to substitute wood from his own land in place of the willow tree. The village accepts and the tree is saved. Returning from work one day the young man meets a beautiful young woman under the willow. They marry with the understanding that the young man never ask his wife where she came from or who her parents were. He agrees. The emperor declares that a temple is to be built nearby. The village is eager to have the willow included in the building materials for the good fortune it will bring. One morning when the willow is being cut down the wife wakes up and tells her husband that she is the spirit of the willow,

that she married him to make him happy in return for saving her (and the willow) so many years ago, but that now she must return to the willow to die with it because she is a part of it.

The spirit of a Buddhist nun of the eighth century CE is believed to be embodied in a giant ginkgo tree in Japan. This tree is called the Nurse Goddess Tree of Miyagi Field because of hanging formations that resemble human breasts, from which moisture drips in wet weather. This tree's "moisture" is believed to have the power of restoring milk to a woman who is unable to nurse. The tree itself is worshiped as a sacred mortal who has become a god and is filled with divine power.

Deities as Trees. Trees may give birth to deities, or sacred beings may be made from trees. Among the Ainu of Japan, A-e-oina Kamuy, a sky god, is born to the elm tree spirit as is Kamuy Fuchi, supreme ancestress and ruler of all departed spirits. She was born from the elm tree impregnated by Kando-oro Kamuy, the possessor of the heavens. Her spirit is manifested in the sacred fire of the hearth and in vegetation.

In Asia Minor the almond tree and the river Sangarius were believed to have given birth to the god Attis, and consequently maturing almond trees became his symbol. The Tupari of the Mato Grosso region of Brazil believe that two of their male gods were born from a large rock. Since they had no wives, they cut down two trees, and each carved himself a woman and so populated the world.

Trees may also represent the essence of the deity. For example, the Buddha's fig tree, *āsvattha*, is the chosen symbol of his essence, synonymous with all existence and all life. Among the Mandan Indians along the Missouri River in North Dakota, the world had two creators: First Creator and Lone Man. Lone Man leaves the cedar with the Mandan as a protection from all harm. The cedar is the body of Lone Man and contains his essence. Among the Arikara the cedar trees grown in front of their lodges are the body and spirit of Mother Corn, an important deity.

Deities Symbolized by Trees. Wreaths and crowns of foliage, usually laurel, olive, myrtle, ivy, or oak were sacred to Apollo and so symbolized some particular personification of him. The myrtle was also a symbol of both Venus and Neptune, the male and female deities of the productive and fertile powers of the waters. Several species of oak were symbols of Zeus.

Frequently a tree is held to be sacred because a deity resides in its branches. The *āsvattha* is said by some to be the abode of Brahmā as well as embodying his essence and serving as the tree of wisdom and life. Other sources say that in this sacred tree abide Brahmā,

Viṣṇu, and Śiva, as well as Viṣṇu in his incarnation as Kṛṣṇa. Among the ancient Semites, the goddess Al-Ozza had her abode in a sacred acacia at Nakhla.

Some trees are taken as symbols of a sacred person because of particular religious qualities the tree possesses. The myrtle is believed to be the symbol of pure maidenhood in Christianity and so is ascribed to the Virgin because of her pure life and sacred character. The palm, cypress, and olive are also symbols of the Virgin during her annunciation. They denote peace, heaven, and hope.

Greek beliefs frequently describe the actions of the gods in transforming human or divine beings into trees. The virginal Daphne, fleeing Apollo's embrace, is turned into a laurel tree by her mother, Gaia, the earth. Apollo breaks off a branch and crowns himself with it. In another myth, Aphrodite takes pity on Smyrna, mother of the slain Adonis, and transforms her into a myrrh tree.

Trees as Vehicles of Communication with Deities

Trees serve as a means of communicating with the divine in three ways: through their use in shrines, the meeting place on earth of a sacred being and mankind; through the relationship between sacred trees and shamans, the religious mediators of the divine; and through the use of sacred drinks or drugs made from trees that allow a mystical contact with the sacred.

Trees and Religious Shrines. Sacred trees may be found along with bushes, shrubs, rocks, or even with a temple to make a shrine. In ancient Egypt, by order of Pepi II, a new center of worship was officially recognized by planting a Syrian fir in the town. Among the Pare of Africa, religious shrines were sacred groves of trees and depended in size upon the size of the community who would worship in them. Many Shintō shrines are built under the branches of an ancient tree as an alternate abode for the deity of the tree. The usual sacred tree of Shintō is the evergreen sakaki. It is usually on the grounds of the shrine, protected by sacred ropes. One of the most powerful shrines in Java lies in the center of Modjokerto, where at the foot of a huge banyan tree lies a small stone statue of Gaṇeśa, the Hindu elephant god of wisdom, surrounded by a white fence.

A shrine in the town of Kagami in Japan is dedicated to Musubi no Kami, the god of love, and built in honor of a cherry tree, Kanzakura. A myth tells of the spirit of a sacred cherry tree. A young girl falls in love with a handsome young man and will not accept the marriage arranged for her by her father. When the girl discovers she has fallen in love with the spirit of the cherry tree,

she chooses to become a caretaker of the shrine devoted to the tree. There she stayed for the remainder of her life, representing religious perfection and dedication.

Sacred trees pass on communications from deities by speaking directly to men, or indirectly through their whispering leaves whose sounds must then be interpreted by priests. At Dodona in Epirus, the talking Oak of Zeus delivered divine messages to men through priests. Wood from this oak was also used to build the *Argo* and spoke to the heroes with a human voice. At Delphi, the laurel tree served as the voice of Apollo. The famous sacred tree near Shechem called the "tree of the revealer" in *Genesis* 12:6, was originally a Canaanite tree oracle.

Trees and Shamans. Shamans or priests are frequently associated with sacred trees as oracles or interpreters of divine will. The shaman may be spiritually connected to the cosmic tree. Most frequently the shaman uses the cosmic tree as a vehicle to ascend to the sky or to the deities of the universe to gain sacred information.

In addition to the ability to transverse the universe and communicate with the deities by means of the sacred tree, shamans can communicate with the spiritual realm through divination, frequently using parts of sacred trees for ritual communication. According to the religion of the Sisal, an ethnic group in the Tumu district of northern Ghana, the first diviner or shaman descended from God shortly after man descended to earth using the baobab tree. Shamans also frequently have spirit helpers to aid them in their ceremonials. Among the Coast Salish of North America, one of the most powerful spirit helpers is known as Biggest Tree and aids the shaman in acquiring gifts made from cedar. These gifts are "alive" for those who possess the power to perceive and use them.

Religious objects made of wood may also act as messengers. The wooden *inaw* of the Ainu are messengers (*shongokoro guru*) or intermediaries between the Ainu and the *kamuy* or between the *kamuy* themselves.

Trees and Divine Intoxicants. Many religions include the use of a divine potion, made from sacred plants, as necessary vehicles to the divine. Shamans frequently incorporate the use of such potions into their practices. Varuṇa obtains *soma*, or *amṛta*, the fruit of immortality, by squeezing the fruit of the celestial tree of life between two stones. The palmyra palm is a symbol of Śiva, yielding an intoxicating and powerful juice. In Chan Kom, descendants of the Maya use a favorite Mayan intoxicant and purge that has strong religious associations. They make a ceremonial mead of fermented honey and add the bark of the balche tree dur-

ing the process for its narcotic effect. This drink, *balche*, enables communication with the deities and is necessary for all religious rituals, especially those for fertility, abundance of crops, rain, health, and family. [See Beverages.]

The Ritual Use of Trees

Sacred trees have a ritual significance. The trees and their meanings may be incorporated into rituals of curing, initiation, marriage, and death. Trees used in any of these contexts stand for the divine and represent the sacred beliefs being honored through the ritual.

Trees appear in rituals in various forms as symbols for the divine. Sacred beverages are made from tree bark. Incense made from the sap and bark of sacred trees calls deities down to this world and then "feeds" them while they are here. [See Incense.] *Copal*, an incense made from a tree sap and used by many cultures in Latin America, not only aids communication with the deities but protects the ritual participants from harm by driving away evil and purifying the area. Most frequently, wood is used to construct powerful religious paraphernalia, such as the sacred poles erected to symbolize the presence of the ancestral spirits or the cosmic tree during the ritual. The symbol of the cross is used in different religions to symbolize specific divine beings or the sacred in general.

The Zinacantecos, descendants of the Maya in Chiapas, erect cross shrines for every kind of ceremony. Three small pine trees are fastened to crosses and pine needles are strewn on the ground around the crosses to set off the area as sacred and ritually pure. There must be three crosses for a ceremony, and one is generally a permanent wooden construction, supplemented by two crosses made entirely from fresh pine boughs. The triadic symbol displays the Catholic religious use of three crosses as well as the traditional Native American beliefs. Crosses are "doorways" to the houses of the ancestral deities. They mark the boundaries between the sacred and the profane realms.

In Christian belief, the cross may be referred to as a symbol of the Tree of Life that stands in the Garden of Eden. The wood from the True Cross was believed to have the power to restore the dead to life. A variety of different trees are credited with being the wood chosen for Christ's cross: cedar of Lebanon, dogwood, mesquite, ash, and oak.

Trees in Rituals of Initiation and Marriage. Many African cultures mark the transition from youth to adulthood through rituals of initiation, and some of the most powerful symbolism of this change is represented through the use of trees. [See Rites of Passage.] Among the Ndembu, the milk tree, the *mudyi*, a symbol of life

and the ancestors, is used in both male and female initiation ceremonies to transform boys and girls into fertile, productive adults. Traditionally, a girl's initiation ceremony and the use of the milk tree served as her marriage ceremony as well.

Every young girl among the Newari of Nepal is married to a small tree (*bel*) from early childhood. In India, the "marriage of trees" may be performed when a woman has been married for many years and has not yet borne children. One tree representing her husband and one tree symbolizing her fertility are planted side by side so that their combined growth may symbolically and spiritually increase her fertility and the growth of life within her womb.

The "marriage tree" is common in South India as a representation of a male or female ancestor. This tree is necessary for all weddings and is adorned as a part of the ceremony. In Java large "plants" are assembled from banana stems and scalloped tree leaves of various types, and wrapped with green coconut branches. These "flowers" made from trees are essential ritual elements for the wedding ceremony, representing the virginity of the bride and the groom.

Trees Associated with Death and Rebirth. A variety of trees are specifically associated with religious beliefs about the fate of the dead and the rebirth or passage of their souls to the afterlife. Christian death symbolism involves the use of willows and cedar trees. These trees symbolically stand for the death of the body as well as heralding a rebirth of the soul. These trees are almost always present in cemeteries in America and may be accompanied by conifers or other kinds of evergreens: a promise of everlasting life. Wood is the most common material from which coffins are made for burial in Christian practice in the United States. The leaves of the baine palm used by the Coorgs of South India are associated with death and are used in funeral rituals.

Many religions practice tree burial as the appropriate spiritual resting place for the deceased. The Khasiyas of eastern India leave the deceased in the hollow trunk of a tree. Many North American Indian groups placed their dead in trees or on wooden structures grouped together to form a sacred burial ground. The Nootka and Southern Kwakiutl used another form of tree burial. They folded the body up and put it in a large box, which was then placed high in a tree. A wooden mortuary column was erected to display the family crest of the deceased.

In many religions, without proper religious burial the soul of the departed would be in danger and could harm the deceased's living friends and relatives. For the funeral pyre, the Coorgs of South India cut down a mango

or pavili tree that grows in the burial ground. The entire tree must be used for cremating the corpse; improper use of the tree's parts may result in another death in the community in the near future.

[See also Vegetation.]

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PAMELA R. FRESE and S. J. M. GRAY

TRENT, COUNCIL OF. Also known as the nineteenth general council of the Roman Catholic church, this council opened on 13 December 1545 and closed on 4 December 1563, after twenty-five formal sessions. The road to Trent, long and tortuous, passed through Constance, Basel, and Pisa. The cry for a sweeping reform of the church from top to bottom—"reformatio capituli et membrorum"—had been raised one hundred years before Luther posted his theses. It continued to ring out through the fifteenth century, accompanied more often than not by the insistence that serious reform could be achieved only within the framework of a general council. Basic to this coupling of reform and council was the widespread conviction that the papacy was incapable of or unwilling to put right the tangle of abuses that threatened to smother the ecclesiastical life of Christendom. Indeed, it was argued by many that the popes' chronic misuse of their dispensing powers, particularly with regard to the appointment to benefices, was the root cause of those abuses.

The demand for a council became the standard rhetoric not only of churchmen but also of princes and statesmen. Conciliar preeminence assumed doctrinal status in many of the best universities in Europe and found its way into a thousand pamphlets, treatises, and broadsides. Preachers thundered the message from their pulpits, and echoes were heard in busy chancelleries no less than in silent Carthusian charterhouses. No pope could be elected until he had assured the cardinals in conclave that he would summon a council within a year or two of his coronation.

Such were the shock waves loosed at the Council of Constance (1414–1418). The questions addressed there were at once constitutional, procedural, and moral. With whom or what lies ultimate authority within the church? The monarchical concept of the papal primacy had taken its classical form in the days of Gregory VII (d. 1085), had pressed its brief even further under the great lawyer popes of the thirteenth century (e.g., Innocent III, d. 1216, and Clement IV, d. 1268) and, scarcely checked by the extravagances of Boniface VIII (d. 1303), had reached a kind of practical hegemony, at least in fiscal affairs, at Avignon (1305–1376). But the protracted scandal of the Western Schism (1378–1417), when two and then three rival "popes" competed for the allegiance of Christendom, brought the notion of papal monarchy into severe disrepute, just as the solution of the crisis by a general council convened at Constance under the aegis of the German emperor enhanced the idea of conciliar superiority. The council's deposition of the three squabbling claimants, its election of a successor (Martin V, 1417–1431), and its solemn decree, *Sacrosancta*, all combined to stake out a constitutional po-

sition: a general council, representative of the emperor and other Christian princes, the learned elite of the universities, the experts in canon law, and the college of bishops, acted for the whole church, of which the pope was a functionary, albeit an exalted functionary. [See *Papacy and the biographies of Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII.*]

The decree *Frequens*, which called for such a council to be held every ten years, concerned itself with the procedural problem. *Frequens* presumed the doctrine of *Sacrosancta*. Since final and decisive authority belonged to the council, the pope's position was that of chief executive or prime minister responsible to the council, which therefore had to meet frequently. The conciliar movement of the fifteenth century based itself on these grounds. Due partly to the temper of the time, that movement did not succeed. The secular counterparts of the aristocratic ecclesiastical assemblage the conciliarists had in mind were in retreat everywhere in Europe and, in most places, on the eve of dissolution. Ambitious dynasts were in the process of bringing the powers to tax, to maintain military establishments, and to appoint government personnel under their own bureaucratic control, and thus reducing and even eliminating the prerogatives of the great medieval parliaments. It was unlikely that the church, the first Western institution to adopt this centralizing model, would have reversed direction in favor of a polity that was demonstrably anachronistic.

But there were other, more proximate causes for the collapse of the movement, not least the tendency of the conciliarists to quarrel among themselves. The popes, for their part, ignored the doctrine of *Sacrosancta* and evaded the provisions of *Frequens*. A council was indeed convoked at Basel in 1431, but it soon fell out with the pope, who withdrew from it and convened a more tame assembly under his own presidency at Florence. The rump council continued to meet at Basel until 1449, when it broke up into bitterly contending factions. After that, conciliar rhetoric sounded increasingly hollow, especially when engaged in by secular rulers who routinely invoked the threat of a council as a device to influence papal policy in Italy. So the conciliar movement died a lingering death, its last gasp coming at Pisa in 1511, when the king of France, in league with a dissident minority of the college of cardinals, summoned a council whose declared purpose was to strip the pope, the king's bitterest political enemy, of his office. This *conciliabulum* did not survive the French military reverses of the following year.

The effective end of the movement, however, did not put a quietus to the theory. The teaching of *Sacrosancta* continued to flourish in university circles, notably at

the Sorbonne. Nor did those who rejected *Sacrosancta* necessarily repudiate *Frequens* as well. The two decrees had doubtlessly been wedded in the minds of the fathers of Constance, but as the century wore on a distinction between them was often drawn by those who, while not prepared to admit the constitutional superiority of the council, nevertheless believed that only a council could bring about meaningful reform.

The moral issue raised at Constance went unresolved for a hundred years. There had occurred a kind of spontaneous reform of the members in some places—the *Devotio Moderna* in the Netherlands, a florescence of mysticism in England and Germany, an evangelical revival in northern Italy, a dedication among the educated classes everywhere to the scholarly endeavors of Christian humanism. But these were hardly more than specks upon a dark sea of clerical illiteracy, popular superstition, jobbery, and pastoral neglect. The belief was almost universal that such abuses perdured because the Curia Romana, the pope's own administration, permitted and even encouraged them. Curial fees, taxes, and charges proliferated, most of them designed to allow what traditional law and common sense declared to be perilous to the life of the church. The members would never be properly reformed, it was said, unless the head were reformed too.

The Renaissance popes, whose lifestyles and political ambitions were hardly calculated to inspire confidence, stubbornly refused to put their houses in order or to permit any other organ of the church to do so. They tried to keep to the high ground of constitutional theory. The papal primacy, they argued, was a datum of divine revelation that they were pledged to defend as they had received it. They also declined to have any outside agency oversee and most likely interfere with the workings of their own court, the central bureaucracy of the church. Reform of the Curia, they proclaimed, was the business solely of the supreme pontiff.

Whatever the theoretical value of this argument, the trouble with it was that the supreme pontiffs, themselves products of the curial system, were clearly not prepared to go beyond platitudes and gestures in correcting the colossal financial chicanery that corrupted the various papal departments and that reached a stunning climax in the election and pontificate of Alexander VI (r. 1492–1503). Since Constance, the conviction that everything was for sale in Rome—offices, judgments, indulgences, dispensations from the law—had grown, not lessened, and the poison of simony seeped down through the whole body of the church. Julius II did indeed summon a council in 1512, largely as a counter to the French-sponsored gathering at Pisa, but the meanderings of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) pro-

duced reform decrees that were no better than scraps of paper and that served merely to confirm the cynical mistrust of the papacy's moral resolution.

The popes' highest card in this game of stalemate was the reluctance of even fervent conciliarists—aside from a handful of academics—to challenge the doctrine of the Petrine office. But the year that saw the conclusion of the futile Fifth Lateran Council was also the year of the Ninety-five Theses. By 1520, Luther declared himself ready to jettison the papacy if that institution obstructed the full flowering of the gospel as he understood it. And Luther soon proved he was no effete intellectual but the leader of a potentially vast popular movement. Over the next decade the character of the debate about a council was drastically altered. As early as 1523, the German estates, gathered in the Diet of Nuremberg, called for "a free Christian council in German lands." Here was conciliarism with a new twist. Now, besides the old clamor for a council to reform ecclesiastical abuses, there came the demand from a growing constituency in northern Europe for a reform of dogma as well. [See *Reformation and the biography of Luther.*]

The Council of Paul III. The pope who had to contend with this new situation, Clement VII (r. 1523–1534), avoided it as best he could, and though he paid lip service to the conciliar idea, he was as obstructive as his predecessors had been. His successor was cut from a different cloth. Alessandro Farnese, who upon his election assumed the name Paul III (r. 1534–1549), had long been a champion within the Curia of a reform council, and he had carefully distanced himself from Clement VII's duplicitous policy in this regard. Not that Farnese had the credentials of a reformer. His youthful career—Alexander VI had made him a cardinal when he was twenty-six—had revealed many of the more seamy features of the Renaissance papal court. In his middle years he had undergone something of a religious conversion, which, though it did not eradicate all the bad habits of his past, led him at least to a greater earnestness and gravity of purpose. Never a moral zealot himself, he signaled his good intentions by promoting men of genuine probity and even holiness to high ranks and, most of all, by immediately moving to fulfill his pledge to summon a general council.

From the beginning of Paul III's initiative, everything seemed to work at cross-purposes. For a council to succeed, both great Catholic sovereigns—the German emperor and the king of France—had to support it, but they were bitterly at odds with each other. The emperor, Charles V, pressed for a council of reconciliation to bring peace to Germany, which meant a council to correct abuses, to satisfy the *gravamina* of the German estates against the Curia, with as little attention as pos-

sible paid to divisive doctrinal issues. Francis I wanted no council at all, because religious unrest in Germany, which discomfited his Habsburg rival, was much to his liking. Had Paul III had his way, he would have preferred a council over which he could keep careful watch, a kind of "Sixth Lateran," which would emphasize doctrine and, with a preponderance of bishops from the Papal States in attendance, protect the prerogatives of the Curia. But he knew he had no chance for that, and so he proposed what appeared to be the next best scenario. Mantua was a petty Italian city-state whose duke was vassal to the emperor; on 2 June 1536 the pope, ignoring the unanimous advice of his cardinals, summoned a general council to convene at Mantua the following May and ordered all the bishops, abbots, and other prelates of the whole world to appear there.

Immediately obstacles sprang up all around him. The duke of Mantua demanded a large papal army to garrison the town. The Protestants promptly declined to attend because of the presence of this hostile force, and then, when security arrangements were altered to meet their objections, they refused anyway. The king of France also refused to participate or to allow any French prelates to do so. The emperor, pointing out how Francis I had connived with the Lutheran princes and even with the Turks, urged Paul III to join him in an assault upon the French and thus guarantee a successful council. The war duly broke out in 1536, but without the pope, who shrank from a step that might have provoked Francis into following the schismatic example of Henry VIII and that at the same time might have contributed to eliminating the only check upon Habsburg power, which he feared as much as the French king did. Instead, the pope postponed the Mantuan council twice, then translated it to Vicenza, postponed it again, and finally, in 1539, suspended it altogether.

The failure was more than a disappointment. It tended to sustain the view—not only among Protestants—that this pope was no more serious about reform than his predecessors had been. Paul III did not help his cause much by the simultaneous campaign he was carrying on—in the best Renaissance style of his first mentor, Alexander VI—to make a ruling dynasty of his children and grandchildren. The Farnese did indeed become dukes of Parma, but only at the cost of diminishing further the pope's limited fund of goodwill. Even so, whatever Paul III's flaws of character, lack of persistence was not one of them. The intricate diplomacy involved in the conciliar enterprise never really ceased, even when the distrustful emperor turned to another tack and urged a conference of leading theologians, Protestant and Catholic, who could discuss all the religious discontents and find solutions to them. The pope

cooperated in this venture, but the distinguished participants in the Colloquy of Ratisbon, which occupied most of the summer of 1541, failed to reach a meeting of minds. Any hope of religious reunion was fast slipping away.

The pope responded by returning to his conciliar project. With the assent of the somewhat chastened emperor, he formally announced the opening of a general council for 1 November 1542. The site this time was Trent, a small Italianized town northwest of Venice that was nevertheless an imperial free city and thus juridically "in German lands." But the earlier pattern of delay, postponement, and obstructiveness by Francis I and outright rejection by the Protestants, quarrels between pope and emperor, and intermittent warfare between France and the empire was bitterly repeated. Not until 13 December 1545 did Paul III's council finally begin in the Cathedral of Saint Vigilius in Trent. The process had consumed eleven years and had produced only thirty-four voting participants. It was no wonder the mood was somber throughout the Mass of the Holy Ghost and the formal reading of the bull of convocation, which reminded the fathers that their solemn task was to heal the confessional split, to reform those abuses that sullied Christ's body, and to promote amity among Christian princes.

Those princes, though their influence over the council was enormous, did not participate directly in its decision making, nor did anyone else outside the higher clergy. In its procedure Trent was more akin to the papal councils of the high Middle Ages than to Constance or Basel. Franchise belonged only to the "fathers" of the council, that is, to the bishops present—not their procurators—and to the generals of the mendicant orders. The presiding officers were the legates appointed by the pope. They were empowered to set the agenda, although each bishop was free to request inclusion of any proposal he pleased. This arrangement met with few serious difficulties once the basic compromise between the pope's and the emperor's positions was accepted: that matters of dogma and matters of reform would be treated simultaneously.

The work schedule followed a consistent pattern. It began with a "particular congregation," at which theologians and canonists would discuss the draft of a particular decree. The fathers formed the audience for these technical expositions. Then, meeting alone in a "general congregation," they debated the matter themselves until they reached agreement upon a final text. A "session" was a public meeting at which that text was read out, formally voted upon, and promulgated at the council's decree. Since it was thought to have a liturgical as well as a juridical significance, a session was al-

ways convened in the cathedral or some other church. Between 1545 and 1563 the Council of Trent held twenty-five sessions, of which seventeen were substantive in the sense that they were occasions for the proclamation of doctrinal definitions and reform legislation, while the rest were ceremonial affairs.

The first particular congregation met on 20 February 1546 to examine Luther's assertion of *sola scriptura*. On 8 April, at the fourth session, the council declared that apostolic traditions, "which have come from the mouth of Christ or by the direction of the Holy Spirit and have been passed down to our own times," deserve to be accepted by believers "with as much reverence [*pari pietatis ac reverentia*]" as scripture itself. The fifth session, on 17 June, renewed earlier conciliar legislation setting up structures for the theological training of the parochial clergy and placed upon bishops and pastors a stern obligation to preach to their flocks every Sunday and holy day. On the dogmatic side this session issued six "canons," terse condemnatory statements on the Pelagian as well as the Lutheran view of original sin.

Then began the most protracted debate of the council, devoted to the central Lutheran doctrine of justification. The first draft of a decree on this controversial subject was submitted to the fathers on 28 July and promptly rejected. For the next seven months the arguments raged through forty-four particular and sixty-one general congregations, until finally an acceptable text was hammered out and promulgated at the sixth session, on 13 January 1547. There was nearly unanimous assent to the sixteen chapters of the decree and the thirty-three canons, which repudiated Luther's view of justification by faith alone. But there was no such unanimity when the next great issue of reform was introduced. The fathers and their theologians wrangled through the succeeding months over the requirement that bishops reside in their dioceses. When the proposed decree was presented the first time, only twenty-eight fathers out of a total grown by early 1547 to sixty indicated their agreement by voting *placet*. The divisions over the matter were so deep that it had to be set aside for later consideration. The seventh session, on 3 March 1547, therefore contented itself with asserting a bishop's right to supervise parishes in his diocese administered by members of religious orders. The dogmatic decrees of the same session defined the nature of the sacraments, fixed their number at seven, and asserted their effective spiritual power (*ex opere operato*). The doctrine of baptism and confirmation was also treated in detail.

Meanwhile, in the midst of all this intellectual labor, various discontents revealed themselves. Trent was a small town with limited accommodations. Its location made it a difficult place to supply with provisions, and

its climate was harsher than the southerners in attendance were accustomed to. Many of the fathers complained of the discomfort in which they were forced to live. During the summer of 1546, fighting between the emperor and the Smalcald League surged close enough to the city that dissolution of the council was seriously contemplated. This danger passed away, only to be replaced by a typhus epidemic that broke out in the vicinity early in 1547 and that caused the council to translate its deliberations to Bologna (eighth session, 11 March 1547). The emperor was furious at what he considered the pope's maneuver to bring the council under his direct control by removing it to a city in the Papal States. Fourteen imperialist bishops remained in Trent, but the majority of the fathers went dutifully off to Bologna, where they labored through intense debate in both particular and general congregations on the rest of the sacraments, the sacrificial character of the Mass, purgatory, veneration of the saints, and monastic vows—all doctrinal issues raised by the Protestant reformers. But Paul III allowed no formal sessions or decrees, lest he push the angry emperor too far. The significance of the Bologna phase of the council, until its suspension on 16 February 1548, proved to be the use to which its work was put when the council assembled again at Trent three years later.

The Council of Julius III. Giovanni Maria del Monte, who had been senior legate during the first phase of the council, was elected pope in February 1550 and took the name Julius III. Immediately he came under pressure from the emperor to reconvene the council and, specifically, to get on with the business of reform. The new pope faced many of the same political problems as his predecessor, and it was in the teeth of strong resistance from the German Protestant princes and the new king of France, Henry II, that the council reopened at Trent on 1 May 1551. The fifty or so fathers did little serious work before the end of the summer, but thanks to the deliberations at Bologna they were ready at the thirteenth session, on 11 October, to issue a decree on the Eucharist that in eight expository chapters and eleven canons reasserted the traditional dogma of the real presence as well as the mechanism of transubstantiation. Six weeks later, at the fourteenth session, the sacraments of penance and extreme unction received doctrinal definition. The landmark character of these dogmatic decisions, however, was not matched by the reform legislation passed in the thirteenth and fourteenth sessions. Directives about rights and duties of bishops with regard to their clergy, and regulations governing procedures in ecclesiastical courts, did not, as the council's critics were quick to point out, strike at the roots of the accumulated abuses.

At the beginning of 1552 a faint flicker of hope for reunion flared up and then quickly died out. On 15 January, ambassadors and theologians from several Protestant states, having come to Trent under a safe-conduct, appeared at the council's fifteenth session. But their brief presence only served to demonstrate that the confessional divisions could no longer be healed or that at any rate a council managed by the pope and already committed to *traditio* no less than to *scriptura* as a font of revelation could never be an instrument of reconciliation.

So the fathers returned wearily to their own debates, now treating of the sacrament of orders and the sacrifice of the Mass. The congregations dragged on inconclusively into the spring, as the emperor went to war yet again with the German princes allied with France. This time he was badly defeated, and when he fled to nearby Innsbruck the fathers at Trent decided it was too risky to remain there. They used the sixteenth session, 28 April 1552, to adjourn the council *sine die*. Julius III, at heart an indolent and self-indulgent man, made no effort through the rest of his pontificate to revive it. His successor, Paul IV (1555–1559), was fiercely determined to effect reform, but he had no patience for conciliar ways and preferred instead to impose doctrinal and moral purity by liberal use of the inquisition, of which he had once been head. This policy was an utter failure, as indeed was Paul IV's whole reign, and when the cardinals entered the conclave of 1559 the scandal of an unfinished council cast a long shadow over it.

The Council of Pius IV. The conclave of 1559 lasted more than three months, and the pope who emerged from it, Pius IV (Giovanni Angelo de' Medici), was committed to bringing the Council of Trent to a satisfactory conclusion. The obstacles he encountered in persuading the Catholic powers to take up the conciliar enterprise once again were different but hardly less daunting than those Paul III and Julius III had had to face. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559) had indeed removed for the time being the threat of war that had so plagued the earlier stages of the council. But the Catholic monarchs—three of them, now that Charles V had departed the scene and had divided the Habsburg territories between his brother, Ferdinand I, and his son, Philip II of Spain—were deeply at odds over the crucial problem of whether the council Pius IV formally convoked (29 November 1560) was to be a continuation of the former one or an entirely new undertaking. France, now troubled as Germany had been for a generation by a growing and aggressive Protestant faction, joined the imperialists in demanding a new council unencumbered by any decisions arrived at earlier. The king of Spain conversely insisted that the

work begun before be allowed to run its course. The pope agreed with this view, though he dared not say so publicly. Instead he adopted a policy of studied ambiguity, confident that once an assembly had been lured back to its original site the problem would solve itself. After months of the most convoluted diplomacy, this tactic succeeded. On 18 January 1562, some 113 fathers gathered at Trent—their number would ultimately swell to 277—and implicitly accepted continuation by deciding to resume deliberations at the point at which they had been suspended ten years before.

By March the council had returned to the discussion of episcopal residence and found itself mired once again in argument. Everyone agreed that bishops should reside in their dioceses and that their widespread failure to do so was a fundamental cause of corruption in the church. But was the requirement one of divine law or ecclesiastical law? This seemingly abstract question had vast implications, because if residence were an obligation *jure divino*, it could mean that bishops exercised their office independently of the pope. A vote on 20 April revealed that the fathers were divided almost evenly on the subject. Tempers ran so high that the legates managed to calm the situation only by postponing discussion of the question until a later date. Dogmatic deliberations meanwhile continued, and at the twenty-first session (16 July 1562) the council defined the sacrificial character of the Mass and the whole presence of Christ in each of the eucharistic species of bread and wine. The disciplinary decision as to whether the laity should be allowed to share the chalice—something taken seriously by the emperor and by Germans generally—was referred to the pope for implementation after the council.

Next on the agenda came discussion of the sacrament of orders, which involved once more the thorny issue of episcopal residence. By autumn the council had reached an impasse. No formulation, however ingenious, could budge the determination of either side. The winter of 1563 arrived, and then the spring, and still no resolution was in sight. The conciliar machinery ground to a halt, and after ten months of wrangling, the breakup of the council appeared imminent. Then, in early March, the senior legate suddenly died, and Pius IV replaced him with Giovanni Cardinal Morone. This proved to be the decisive intervention.

Morone, the ablest papal diplomat of the century, recognized that behind the arguments advanced by the proponents of *jus divinum* lurked the conviction that the papacy intended no real reform. He moved swiftly to defuse this radical mistrust, especially in the minds of the emperor and the king of Spain, by guaranteeing that a sweeping reform schema, blessed in advance by the pope, would be proposed to the council in short or-

der. Employing a variety of formal and informal commissions, and playing skillfully upon the vanity of the heretofore unpredictable French delegation, Morone put the council back to work again. When the emperor expressed misgivings, Morone went off to Innsbruck to reassure him; when the pope hesitated to support his program, Morone threatened to resign. At the twenty-third session, on 15 July 1563, the council approved his first package of reform legislation. Perhaps its most important provision was the directive to establish a system of seminaries to provide intellectual and moral training for the parochial clergy. As for the conciliar crisis at hand, Morone evaded the insoluble problem by ignoring it. "It is a divine precept that the pastor know his flock," the decree began, but, though strictly obliging bishops to reside, it did not try to define the basis of that obligation. Moreover, cardinals were explicitly included in the requirement, and thus was struck down one of the worst and most resented of the abuses, the accumulation of benefices by officers of the Curia.

The logjam broken, there followed a hectic summer and autumn of congregations dealing with a flood of reform ideas. The whole clerical estate was refashioned during these months. Morone moved easily through all the factions, the pope's man indeed but the council's man too, always urging accommodation, compromise, the practical attainment of the goal of restoring spiritual primacy to the workings of the church. Special emphasis was placed upon eliminating the chaos in ecclesiastical administration which had opened the door to so many abuses. Morone spared little time for theoretical discussion; the question of indulgences, for example, which had occasioned the Lutheran reformation, was settled not in a dogmatic decree but in a reform decree. This also was the case with the veneration of the saints and relics. The council indeed defined the sacramentality and the indissolubility of matrimony, but it was even more intent on suppression of clandestine marriages. Statistically the achievement was prodigious: three times as much reform legislation was passed by the council during Morone's brief legateship than in all the sessions before him combined.

By the twenty-fourth session, on 11 November 1563, the end was finally in sight. The last session, at which all the conciliar decrees since 1545 were to be formally promulgated, was scheduled for 9 December. However, news from Rome that Pius IV was severely ill led Morone to move the date forward. Therefore, the twenty-fifth session was held on 3 and 4 December 1563, when each of the 229 fathers gave his *placet* to all the work the council had done over its eighteen years of life. A *Te Deum* was sung, and tearful fathers embraced one another, in many cases embracing those with whom they had often violently disagreed.

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TRIADS, groups or sets of three persons, things, or attributes, are found in many concepts of the divine. Because triads involve an uneven number they have been considered to be perfect expressions of unity and por-

tion, corresponding to a threefold division in nature or to images of the nuclear family. [See Numbers.]

In Indian mythology, the *R̥gveda* suggests a threefold classification of its many divinities into gods of heaven, air, and earth. In its prayers three chief gods represent the powers of these natural elements: "May Sūrya [sun] protect us from the sky, Vāta [wind] from the air, Agni [fire] from the earthly regions" (10.158.1). Agni, god of fire and messenger to the gods during fire sacrifice, took three forms, as the sun in the sky, lightning in the aerial waters, and fire on earth. Commentators on the Vedas considered that the number of gods could be reduced to three, Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya being considered as sons of the lord of creatures, Prajāpati.

A famous dialogue in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads asks how many gods there are. In reply, a traditional invocatory formula in a hymn to all the gods is quoted as indicating three hundred and three and three thousand and three. Further questioning reduces these figures to thirty-three, six, three, two, one and a half, and finally one, and that one is *brahman* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.9).

In the same Upaniṣad, Prajāpati is said to have had three kinds of offspring—gods, men, and demons—who lived with their father as students of sacred knowledge. Each class of beings asked for a divine word, and to all Prajāpati gave the same reply: *dā*. This word was like the rolling thunder, *dā, dā, dā*. Each interpreted it according to his own needs, and three definitions resulted: self-restraint, giving, and compassion (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 5.2). This concept was used by T. S. Eliot in the closing lines of *The Waste Land*: "then spoke the thunder. . . ." Eliot ended with another threefold borrowing from the Upaniṣads: "Shantih Shantih Shantih" ("Peace, peace, peace").

The Upaniṣads refer to three *guṇas*, strands or qualities which characterize all existing beings. These qualities are goodness or purity (*sattva*), passion or force (*rajas*), and darkness or dullness (*tamas*). The *Maitri Upaniṣad* affirms that in the beginning the three qualities were differentiated within the supreme self: "That One become threefold." This supreme self (*brahman*) is indicated by the sacred syllable *om̐*, with which every recitation of the Veda begins. The sacred syllable divides itself threefold, for *om̐* consists of three units: /a/, /u/, and /m/. *Aum* is the sound form of this being, and "one should worship it with *aum* continually" (*Maitri Upaniṣad* 6.3–4). A later description of *Brahman* was *sacit-ānanda*, or *saccidānanda*: being, intelligence or consciousness, and bliss.

In the *Bhagavadgītā*, goodness, passion, and darkness are declared to be the strands or qualities that spring from nature, binding the embodied self although it is changeless. But the world was deluded by these three

strands and did not recognize that they come from God alone, that they are in him but he is not in them. God is higher and eternal. Since nature is the uncanny power of God, all elements must ultimately derive from him (*Bhagavadgītā* 7.12–13).

Trimūrti. In Hindu mythology and popular theology many gods appeared, though Viṣṇu and Śiva (Rudra) became dominant. Early in the common era a *trimūrti* (“having three forms”) was proposed that created a triad of these two and a creator, Brahmā. These three were regarded as forms of the neuter absolute *brahman*, or corresponding to the three *guṇas* of the Absolute. The epic *Mahābhārata* tells of these gods separately and not as a unity, and when the Trimūrti concept appeared its exposition varied according to the preferences of the writers for one or another deity.

A story in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* says that there was once a dispute among the gods as to which member of the triad was greatest. The sage Bhṛgu went to each of them in turn to decide the matter by tests. First he saw Brahmā but omitted to bow to him, whereupon the god blazed out in anger. Next he visited Śiva and did not return the god’s salutation, so that Śiva raised his trident (*trisūla*) to destroy him; the sage was spared only by the intercession of Śiva’s wife. Lastly Bhṛgu called on Viṣṇu, found him asleep, and woke him with a kick on the chest. Instead of becoming angry, Viṣṇu begged the sage’s pardon for not having greeted him and said that he was highly honored by the kick, which had left an indelible mark on his breast, and that he hoped the sage’s foot had not been hurt. Bhṛgu decided that Viṣṇu was the mightiest god because he overcame his enemies with weapons of gentleness and generosity. This Vaiṣṇava story indicates the diversity and rivalry of different sects and the problems of a triad.

It was debated whether the three gods were equal or had interchangeable functions. Each in turn might be the Supreme Lord, Parameśvara, and take the place of the others. The poet Kālidāsa, in his *Kumārāsambhava* (2.4ff.), expressed his adoration for the Trimūrti unified before creation but afterward divided in three qualities, proclaiming its threefold glory as “knower and known, priest and oblation, worshiper and prayer.” These verses inspired Emerson’s poem *Brahma* and its line “I am the doubter and the doubt, I am the song the Brahmin sings.” But rather than teaching the equality of three persons in one God, Kālidāsa seems to have been addressing the personal Brahmā as the supreme god, despite his use of the term *Trimūrti*.

For the Vaiṣṇava believer Brahmā was an emanation of Viṣṇu, a demiurge or secondary creator; he is described in the vision of the *Bhagavadgītā* (11.15) as sitting on a lotus throne emerging from the body of Viṣṇu,

the god of gods, a scene illustrated in many paintings. Whatever his former status, Brahmā has long since declined in popular esteem. His temple at Pushkar in Rajasthan is said to be one of only two in India, though this is difficult to verify in such a vast land with innumerable shrines. At Pushkar the temple of Brahmā has four black faces, supposedly directed at the four cardinal points though three of them face the worshiper. A *lingam* of Śiva nearby also has four human faces carved on it, no doubt to show affinity with Brahmā. But in popular religion in most of India today Brahmā has virtually disappeared, while Viṣṇu and Śiva have vast followings. (The two groups are considered almost as distinct religions.) The third most popular cult today follows the great goddess Mahādevī, the all-pervading power *śakti*, known under many names and notably today as Kālī.

A famous sculpture of the Trimūrti dating from the fifth to eighth centuries CE is in the Great Cave on Elephanta Island near Bombay. It is a massive stone bust nineteen feet high, with three faces each four or five feet long. This figure represents Śiva, who is the dominant deity among the sculptures in these caves. The eastern face is Rudra the destroyer, the front is Brahmā the creator, and the western face is Viṣṇu the preserver. All three are regarded as aspects of the character of Śiva, and all show the impressive serenity that marks representations of divine activity.

Early students of Hinduism in the West often considered that parallels exist between the Trimūrti and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and attempts were made to apportion common functions to the three persons in one God. There are still writers who call Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva “the Trinity,” but the parallel with Christianity is not close, and the Trimūrti concept never became popular or embodied an orthodox and catholic creed. Hindu writers and artists tended to favor one god of the three, and Viṣṇu and Śiva came to dominate in their own schools.

Trikāya. In Indian Buddhism there were triadic concepts from an early date, and some which developed in Mahāyāna Buddhism and outside India showed parallels to Chinese triads. The Three Refuges (*triśaraṇa*), or Three Jewels (*triratna*), appeared in Buddhism at an early date. In the Tripiṭaka, or “Three Baskets” of scripture, the invocation of these refuges is attributed to the first lay believer in the Buddha. Recited every day in Theravāda Buddhism by the laity as well as by monks, the Triple Refuge is a simple affirmation of trust in the central objects of religion: the Buddha, the Dhamma or doctrine, and the Sangha or monastic order. The formula reads thus: “I go to the Buddha for refuge, I go to the Dhamma for refuge, I go to the Sangha for refuge.”

The Buddha is credited with saying that whoever trusts firmly in the virtues of the Three Jewels has "entered the stream," has set out on the way to enlightenment.

In the development of Buddhism the term *yāna* ("vehicle, means of progress") was used to indicate a way of attaining enlightenment. The Mahāyāna claimed to be the "one vehicle" (*ekayāna*), and its followers called their opponents Hinayāna, followers of a "lesser vehicle." But, occasionally, more tolerant texts spoke of the major ways as *triyāna*, "threefold means."

Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy wrestled with the problems of the absolute and the relative and of one or many Buddhas. A solution was found for philosophy in the doctrine of the *trikāya* ("three bodies"). This was expressed in essence in the *Lañkāvatāra Sūtra* and developed by the Yogācāra school. According to this theory the body of the Buddha is threefold. The *dharmakāya* ("doctrine body or essential body") is self-existent and absolute, the same for all Buddhas. It supports the other two bodies, for ultimately only it exists. The *sambhogakāya* ("bliss body or communal body") is the channel through which the Buddhas communicate with *bodhisattvas* in the heavens. This notion was used to interpret texts that describe many Buddhas preaching to assemblies of *bodhisattvas* and gods in all the universes, while at the same time they had passed away to *nirvāṇa*. The *nirmāṇakāya* ("transformation body") is that by which the Buddha works for the good of all creatures, including the historical Buddha, who appeared on earth, and in other existences, and then passed away into *nirvāṇa*.

The *trikāya* doctrine sought to reconcile different expressions of the nature of the Buddha. In early texts the *dharmakāya* was simply the body of doctrine; once the Buddha had died, he existed thereafter in the doctrine. In popular beliefs the Buddhas were many, and they continued to exist in a state of bliss to hear the prayers of worshipers. Buddhist art from Gandhara to Japan often grouped three Buddhas or *bodhisattvas* together, the individual personages differing according to the environment. Parallels that have been drawn between the *trikāya* doctrine and the Christian teaching of the Trinity are strained and unproved. The Chinese triads appear to have been separate developments, although in popular religion triads of gods may be confused with several Buddhas.

Three Pure Ones. Chinese speculations on a divine Triad and its representation in worship may have developed from Taoist philosophical notions of an original unity which produced diversity. In the *Tao-te ching* 42 (fourth to third century BCE?) it is declared that "Tao produced the one, the one produced the two, the two produced the three, and the three produced the ten thousand things." This is not unlike an idea in the

Chāndogya Upaniṣad (6.2) of one neuter being which entered into three divinities to produce the many. However, Arthur Waley in his translation of this verse rendered it thus: "Tao gave birth to the One, the One gave birth successively to two things, three things, up to ten thousand" (Waley, 1934, p. 195).

The concept of an inseparable triad of Heaven, earth, and man became popular in Chinese thought. Philosophers aimed at formulating systems that would deal with all questions concerning the divine, natural, and human worlds, so that all human activity might be in harmony with divine and natural orders. Such a system of knowledge and behavior was set out in the *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu* (Spring and Autumn Annals of Mr. Lü), a work by various hands early in the common era. The book is in three sections, representing the triad of Heaven, earth, and man. The first section is in twelve chapters, the number associated with Heaven. The second is in eight chapters, the number associated with earth. The third is in six chapters, the number associated with man. Each chapter indicates actions appropriate for each season, stating that if men fail to perform them properly they will cause disturbances in nature and bring calamity from Heaven.

Perhaps early in the common era, popular Taoist religion developed the worship of a triad, the Three Ones, San-i. It has been suggested that the concept of three celestial persons derived from Christian influence, although it is rather early for that to have happened unless some Christian ideas had filtered through via gnostic speculations. It is more likely that the idea of a religious triad developed from philosophical notions of diversity arising from unity, or that philosophical and religious concepts developed independently and were merged by priests who claimed authority for three deities worshiped as one.

An ancient Taoist divinity was T'ai-i, the Grand Unity, introduced into official worship during the Han dynasty as the greatest of all gods, above the five legendary emperors. The Grand Unity became the personification of the Tao. As the Tao emanated itself into creation, a triad developed that controlled the whole universe. To the Grand Unity were added T'ien-i, the Heavenly Unity, and Ti-i, the Earthly Unity. It is strange that T'ai-i, the original all-embracing unity, was regarded as one of three. It seems more natural for T'ai-i to have been conceived as three in one, but there was great complexity in the multiplication of Taoist deities. From the second century of the common era Taoist liturgies spoke of the Great Mysterious Three in One, T'ai-hsüan San-i, which comprised the Sagely Father, the Lord and Master of the Human Spirit, and the Pivot of All Transformations. The Taoist imagination

peopled the universe with a great variety of gods, natural forces, and deified heroes, forming a heavenly hierarchy under the presiding supreme triad which controlled the universe like a state bureaucracy.

In the Taoist triad the three gods were said severally to control time past, present, and to come. By the Sung dynasty the triad of Three Pure Ones had become associated with chronological functions. The Precious Heavenly Lord, the First Original Heavenly Venerable One, controlled time past; some have compared him to the Father in the Christian Trinity. The Precious Spiritual Lord, the Great Jade Imperial Heavenly Venerable One, controlled time present; scholars have compared him to the Son. The Precious Divine Lord, the Pure Dawn Heavenly Venerable One appearing from the Golden Palace, controlled time to come; scholars have compared him to the Holy Spirit. Joseph Needham wrote that "there can be little doubt that the Taoists had intimate contact with Nestorian Christians at the capital during the T'ang dynasty. The really interesting question is where their trinity came from eight centuries previously" (*Science and Civilisation in China*, Cambridge, 1956, vol. 2, pp. 158-160).

Whether there was a Christian influence or not (Nestorian missions did not arrive in China until the seventh century at the earliest), there was abundant contact between Taoism and Buddhism, which from the first century established itself as one of the three great ways of Chinese religion. Buddhist triadic concepts could be found in the *trikāya* doctrine, or in the concept of the Dhyāni Buddhas, which were regarded as personifications of creative aspects or manifestations of a primordial Ādi-Buddha. In popular Buddhist religion there were triads of Buddhas, such as Śākyamuni (Gautama), Amitābha of the Pure Land, and Maitreya, the Buddha to come. Another triad comprised the mythical Avalokiteśvara, Mñjuśrī, and Samantabhadra, who have been worshiped in temples and pagodas in China and neighboring lands down to modern times, often alongside Taoist gods.

Lao-tzu, the great saint of Taoism and the supposed author of the *Tao-te ching*, was often assimilated to the Three Pure Ones. Influenced by Buddhist teachings on multiple Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* and the various incarnations of the Buddha, the Taoists came to espouse similar beliefs. Lao-tzu was said to have been born before heaven and earth appeared and to have experienced numerous later births. Like the Buddha, he became an object of worship.

In Japanese Shintō the first verse of the *Kojiki* names three gods who all came into existence at the time of the beginning of heaven and earth. Later gods of storm,

sea, and fire were grouped in threes, notably the storm god Susano-o no Mikoto, who was considered under three aspects ("three-treasure-rough-god"). The supreme sun goddess, Amaterasu, when asked for permission to erect a great Buddhist statue at Nara, is said to have identified herself with Vairocana, a member of a Buddhist triad, the personification of truth and purity.

The Shintō *kami* were regarded either as *avatāras* of the Buddhas (from the Buddhist point of view) or as their originals (from the Shintō point of view). Chinese triadic influences appeared in Japanese symbolism, as in paintings with three parallel curves and three or more flamelike signs, which were taken as symbols of the soul. A characteristic Shintō symbol is the *tomoe*, which is chiefly found in groups of three in the crest of many shrines. The *tomoe*, three pear-shaped sections of a circle, is often associated with the Chinese *yin* and *yang*, the two pear-shaped halves of a circle indicating complementary opposites, such as heaven and earth, male and female. The threefold *tomoe* is found even in the great Shintō shrine center at Ise, though this site is said to have been kept free from foreign influences.

Hypostases and Families. Triadic concepts can be traced in the ancient Mediterranean world, though not as clearly (with the exception of Egypt) as in India and China. Plato in the *Republic* (book 4) distinguished two elements in human nature, the rational and the irrational or lustful, not unlike the Indian *sattva* and *tamas*. But he found himself obliged to distinguish a third element, the spirited or passionate, similar to the Indian *rajas*. When there is a division between rational and irrational, the spirited should array itself on the side of the rational. The three elements in man, according to Plato, correspond to the social classes of guardians, auxiliaries, and producers. These were not unlike the Indian classes of priests, warriors, and merchant farmers, although Plato's classes served different functions. Individuals and societies are wise when the rational element prevails, as when *sattva* prevails in Indian thought. They are courageous because of the spirited element, and they are temperate when the rational element governs with the consent of the other two, producing balance and harmony.

The Greeks wrestled with the problems of the divine nature and action in ways different from those of the Indians or Egyptians. In the *Timaeus*, Plato proposed an account of the universe. The world came into being as a living creature endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God; the world is an image of what is eternal and true, a reflection of the changeless; the ultimate truth is God the creator. This was a unitary view, though Christian theologians later found a fore-

shadowing of the Trinity in the *Timaeus*, even from its first verse, which simply said, "One, two, three, but where is the fourth of my guests?"

There was more triadism in Neoplatonic teachings of three primal hypostases, a favorite theme of Christian theologians. Plotinus claimed that earlier Greek philosophers had established three degrees of reality, the primary realities or hypostases. These were represented triadically as the Good or the One, the Intelligence or the One-Many, and the World Soul. These three are in the very nature of things, and they are also in human nature, so that our individual soul is something divine, possessing intelligence, and perfect.

In popular Greek religion various gods were grouped together, as, for example, Demeter, Kore, and Dionysos. Demeter, the corn goddess (Lat., Ceres), had an early double, Kore, who in time was regarded as her daughter, Kore or Persephone (Lat., Proserpina). Demeter's search for Persephone in the underworld was a vegetation myth represented in the Eleusinian mysteries under the symbol of the growing seed that assures a happy future life. Dionysos was also a fertility god; his mystery flourished in the Hellenistic age when Christianity was expanding.

The Etruscans had a triad of gods—Tinia, Uni, and Menerva—who presided over the destinies of towns and were identified by the Romans with their Capitoline triad of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. In Rome the flamen (priests or sacrificers) were led by three major and twelve minor priests. The three major priests were the *flamen Dialis* (of Jupiter), the *flamen Martialis* (of Mars), and the *flamen Quirinalis* (of Quirinus). These gods of the triad were invoked in formulas of devotion recited before battle, on receiving spoils, and when sanctifying treaties. Jupiter represented the sky-universe, like the celestial gods of Greece and India, and his priest was preeminent. Mars was the god of war, and months and festivals were named after him. Quirinus was a god of Sabine origin, but little is known of him except that his functions resembled those of Mars and his flamen formed the third of the threesome with those of Jupiter and Mars. The triad of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus was later overshadowed by the triad of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. A great new temple was dedicated to the latter three on the Capitoline hill in Rome in 509 BCE, the first year of the republic; inside was a statue of Jupiter.

Among the many gods of the ancient Western world, the clear examples of triads are found in Egypt and Mesopotamia. One reason for the concept of triads in Egypt, and no doubt in other lands, was the fusion of the cults of different places. When a victorious ruler

brought several towns under his dominion, they would be subject to both political and religious control. New gods encountered local deities whose worship could hardly be suppressed. A simple solution for the conqueror and his priests was to admit the gods of the vanquished into general worship, without giving them too much independence. Neighboring gods joined the principal deity, the patron of the city. Thus at Heliopolis the local god Atum was joined with the lion pair Shu and Tefnut from the nearby town of Leontopolis. At Memphis there was a triad of Ptah, Sekhmet, and Nefertum. At Elephantine was a triad of Khnum, Sati, and Anukis.

However different the gods might have been originally, the ancients regarded them as members of a divine family, taking the roles of father, mother, and son. But the coincidence of different family relationships in the mythologies of the merging cults could cause confusion, as when the father became the son of his wife, or the mother the wife of her son.

The most famous triadic divine family of ancient Egypt was that of Osiris, Isis, and their son Horus. Osiris was a very popular god, whose cult flourished throughout Egypt from prehistoric times. In the texts Osiris was said to have been killed by his brother Seth, though according to one tradition he was drowned. The body of Osiris was divided into several parts and was sought and embalmed by his wife Isis, who became pregnant by the dead god. Isis gave birth to Horus, who avenged his father by killing Seth and reigning as successor to Osiris. This complicated mythology was recorded most clearly by Plutarch in the beginning century of the common era. Fundamental to the myths of this divine triad were the death and resurrection of Osiris, his place as a nature god, and his role as a model for earthly rulers. These myths provided links with both gnostic and Christian teachings.

Egyptian priests refined their ideas of the divine triads from early anthropomorphic myths to more abstract conceptions. Thus the god Ptah had two of his faculties, heart and tongue (spirit and word), personified under the visible forms of the gods Horus and Thoth. Or the family associations became the union of three spiritual aspects of the same god: his supreme intelligence, active spirit, and creative word. Or God was conceived of as three persons animated by the same will, like the founders of the towns of Thebes, Heliopolis, and Memphis. Re was the thinking head of this triad, Ptah its body, and Amun its invisible intelligence. This was not far from the Neoplatonic doctrines of a God who comprised intelligence, mind, and reason.

In Mesopotamia there were triads of deities organized according to the elements of heaven and earth. The high

god Anu ruled in the sky, Enlil inspired the wind or storm and was god of the land, and Enki or Ea ruled the waters or abyss on which the world rested. The positioning of the deities varied over time. For instance, Enlil was once regarded as the first of the triad, though from the beginning of the second millennium BCE he was regarded as second. Another triad of Babylonian deities was composed of the moon god Sin, the sun god Shamash, and the storm god Adad. The popular goddess Ishtar was associated with both this and the previous triads, ousting colorless figures with whom they had earlier been associated. She was connected also with the ancient Sumerian god Tammuz, a vegetation deity like Osiris who descended into the underworld where Ishtar went to seek him. The return of Osiris and Ishtar in the spring brought joy and fertility.

Of the surviving religions of Semitic origin, Judaism and Islam rejected triadic notions of the godhead, while Christianity developed them. The Hebrew Bible was strongly monotheistic, although traces of female elements in the deity can be discovered, as when Jeremiah revealed that incense had been offered to the queen of heaven in Jerusalem and the cities of Judah (*Jer.* 44:17). Scholars have noted that there was goddess worship among Hebrew emigrants at Elephantine in Egypt. In a more abstract way *Proverbs* 8 and 9 referred to wisdom personified as the female companion of God before and during creation, a notion akin to the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel. In the Qabbalah sexual imagery was used to describe the love of God for the Shekinah, a sacred union of king and queen. But in general, Jewish teaching was alien to dualities or triads.

Islam was even more adamant, attacking the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, or what it considered that to be. Thus the Qur'ān exhorts, "Do not say, Three. Refrain, it will be better for you. God is only one God" (4:169). And again, "Surely they have disbelieved who say: 'God is one of three.' There is no god but one God" (5:77). Orthodox Christian doctrine did not say God was one of three, though no doubt the doctrine could be perverted in that way in popular use. Any suggestion of a divine family, of God begetting or procreating, or having a partner associated with him, was repugnant to Islam. Thus in the Qur'ān Jesus was credited with denying that he said, "Take me and my mother as two gods apart from God" (5:116). This was quite proper, and belief in the unity and absoluteness of God was fundamental to Islam. Some writers have pointed out that Islamic theology alludes to diversity in the divine nature through "the most beautiful names of God" (*al-asmā' al-ḥusnā*); these many attributes and titles are recited on prayer beads in popular devotion. And theologians have

discussed the eternity of the Qur'ān, which was held to be uncreated, almost like a divine hypostasis. In Islamic art the name of God, *Allāh*, may be seen written three times in the prayer niche in mosques, but the main current of Islam has been against both triad and trinity.

Christian doctrine developed, against an Old Testament background, from devotion to Christ, but as it developed it came into contact with triadic concepts of the divine from Egypt and the Near East. Belief in a divine family emerged, for the concepts of Father and Son were in Christianity from the beginning. The Holy Spirit was regarded as the third hypostasis in the Trinity, but it was often a vague or neglected notion. With the growth of the cult of the Virgin and Mother the female side of a triad seemed guaranteed. If Mary had been called God the Mother, like Isis, she would have completed a divine family. In popular religion that might have happened, but trinitarian theology was anchored in the Bible, and Christian teachings developed from those scriptures which gave a threefold baptismal formula and a triadic blessing. As with other religions, the threefold doctrine is best understood in its historical context, however attractive seeming cultural parallels may be. [See Trinity.]

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GEOFFREY PARRINDER

TRICKSTERS. [*This entry consists of four articles on the mythic archetype of the trickster:*

An Overview

African Tricksters

North American Tricksters

Mesoamerican and South

American Tricksters

The introductory article presents a morphology of the trickster; the companion articles focus on tricksters in the myths of Africa and the Americas, where the figure is delineated with particular clarity. For further discussion, see the articles on mythic themes under African Religions; North American Religions; Mesoamerican Religions; South American Religions; Polynesian Religions; Melanesian Religions; and Micronesian Religions.]

An Overview

Trickster is the name given to a type of mythic figure distinguished by his skill at trickery and deceit as well as by his prodigious biological drives and exaggerated bodily parts. The myths of many cultures portray such a comic and amoral character, who is sometimes human but is more often animal in shape, typically an animal noted for agility and cunning: the wily coyote, the sly fox, the elusive rabbit, or the crafty spider. Sometimes the trickster is the agent who introduces fire, agriculture, tools, or even death to the human world. As such, he plays the part of another mythic archetype, the transformer, or culture hero, who in a mythic age at the beginning of the world helps shape human culture into its familiar form. However, the trickster's distinction lies not so much in his particular feats as in the peculiar quality of his exploits—a combination of guile and stupidity—and in the ludicrous dimensions of his bodily parts and biological drives. In those cultures where he stands independent of other mythic figures, his adventures are recounted in a separate cycle of myths and lore.

The trickster represents a complicated combination of three modes of sacrality: the divine, the animal, and the human. Myth relates that the trickster existed in the early times when the world was still taking shape and was inhabited by supernatural beings. As one of these important supernaturals, the trickster possesses extraordinary powers more divine than human. He frequently thwarts the supreme being's creative intentions. In one North American Indian myth, for example, the Winnebago trickster Wakdjunkaga scatters all living creatures across the face of the earth with an enormous fart, which leaves them laughing, yelling, and barking. This is an ungracious parallel to the Winneba-

go's solemn account wherein Earthmaker creates a quiet and static world order in which each species remains in a separate lodge. The trickster may assume an even more active role on the mythic stage in the absence or weakness of a supreme being. However, there is no need to pair the trickster in a dualism with the supreme being in order to understand his unique character.

The trickster is remarkable for the carnality that he shares with humans and animals. In his case, however, bodily functions and features are extreme: voracious appetite, insatiable lust, stupendous excretions, cosmic flatulence. He reorders (or has reordered for him) his bodily parts: his head may be fastened to his bottom, or his penis to his back. The trickster is usually male, but he often assumes female form in order to conceive and give birth. His (or her) most conspicuous bodily parts are passages (mouth, nostrils, anus, ears, vagina) and members that bridge or penetrate those passages (e.g., head, penis, or, in the case of the spider figure, the filament with which he spins his web). The trickster's appetites cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of the biology of sex or the physiology of hunger. He craves modes of being other than his own: animal, plant, and so on.

On a grand scale, the trickster mimics human needs, drives, and foibles, especially the imperfections of an ambitious but flawed intelligence. He often fumbles his tricks, and his mishaps lead to a comic apotheosis of wit into wisdom. The nature of his deception is especially complicated: a pretended ignorance and a pretended cunning. The irony of his maladroit trickery is so pervasive that one cannot decide whether the trickster is really ignorant or whether he is so clever that he successfully exculpates himself by pretending to be stupid. Reflections on his nature call into question the deeper nature of reality in an imperfect and changing world of the senses. By his duplicity, the trickster would have one believe that he intends his elaborate schemes to fail so that benefits might arise from catastrophe.

Ironically, it is just in his animal-like biological constraints and imperfections of intelligence—the human frame of meaning—that the trickster affirms a sacrality different from that of divine immortals. This sensate sacrality of foibles stumbles into other sacred realms with penetrating burlesque. For these reasons, trickster stories have been called a mythology of incarnation, and he a symbol of the human condition. The religious dimension of comic figures in folk literatures and dramas is often illumined by comparison with the strictly mythic personality of the trickster found in sacred texts relating the beginnings of the world.

The trickster parodies all pretensions to perfection. He mocks the gods, institutional religious figures, the techniques of humans, and himself. By poking fun at anything that parades as permanent, important, or impermeable, he exposes a penetrable (i.e., accessible, comprehensible) reality. In the process of penetrating it, he reveals the sacrality both of passage and of mundane flaw. He images the process of the religious imagination itself, which sees to it that human beings experiment with the sacred and which sometimes leads not to the serenity of faith in a static, eternal paradise but to an exciting, unpredictable turmoil of the senses in sacred music, dance, and sexuality. The trickster represents not a mystical contemplation of the singular but a sensuous appreciation of multiplicities and contraries.

As the trickster flounders toward a sacred life rooted more in carnate being than in divine being, ambiguity, irony, change, and humor fill the emptiness caused by the *kenōsis* of immortality. The trickster unites things by passing them through the senses and the imperfect reflections of his intelligence. His bodily parts and "all too human" intelligence admit no firm distinction between corporeal and spiritual existence. His exorbitant and active penis offers him access to realms of reality in which he ought properly to have no business. His (or her) bodily passages become the loci where worlds meet, come together, and even pass through and interpenetrate one another. Wherever he appears, the trickster enacts the human comedy as a sacred drama, displaying the ironic condition of a limited mind served by limited senses but with an unlimited desire to relate to the realms of meaning around it.

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LAWRENCE E. SULLIVAN

African Tricksters

African tricksters speak and embody a vivid, subtle language of sacred transformation. Through it they strike up absurd conversations between laundresses and goddesses, sex and death, flatulence and spiritual power, breaking the univocal by the anomalous and so opening human life—bodily, daily, defined—to its sacramental immensity. Like their counterparts in Amerindian myth and folklore, African tricksters inject bawdiness, rebellion, and wild lying (one might aptly call it polymorphous perversity) into the mythic history and the common experience of divine-human relations wherever they appear. Unlike many tricksters elsewhere, however, these multiform world-shatterers and pathfinders in Africa are woven not only into the fabric of myth but also into the stuff of everyday life, playing a part in economics, rites of passage, and ordinary conversation. This observation may tell more about the history of Western colonialism and ethnography than it does about the tricksters of non-Westerners, but it does suggest that anyone who wants to know the trickster in Africa must study the particular ways and speech of many different African peoples.

Such study is only now passing into its second phase. Travelers, ethnographers, and, more recently, Africans themselves have studied hundreds of African societies. Tricksterlike myths and stories have emerged from many of their reports, but only a few collections of trickster tales have been gathered and examined within the context of their social and religious settings. Rarely do we have the tales in their original languages, or in more than a single version, together with the indigenous commentary that would make deep translation and comparison more reliable. Nevertheless, these barbest beginnings have already demonstrated that the transforming power of the trickster—what the Yoruba refer to when they say that "Eṣu turns feces into treasure"—works in the present as well as in the primordial past.

In the first place, Africans have delighted in using animal tricksters to shape their children's "moral imagination," as T. O. Beidelman (1980) has put it. He has analyzed the complex ways that the Kaguru use Hare,

Hyena, and other animals as metaphors, partly for the surface rules and patterns of their life, but much more for the deeper intuitions and meanings that make them, the Kaguru, who they are. The Kaguru, like the Ashanti in their *anansesem* ("spider stories") and the Azande in their tales of Tore, the spider, understand that the intricate lies and outrages of their tricksters reveal the social order as sacred in its supple particularity. Too bawdy to be taken as cautionary fables, too confident of the unity between specific and ultimate aims to be reduced to sets of binary opposition, too attuned to animals' lives to use them univocally, these stories provide an education in wit. They insist that the core of human existence, a meeting place of every sort of force, is displayed by—not prior to, withdrawn from, or obliterated by—the twists of disease, the denial of hospitality, the crazed lens of sexual rivalry. Ananse is "wonderful" because he makes all multiplicity a symbol of the Ashanti oneness that exists here and now. Telling the trickster's stories, then, is an anamnesis. In displaying his power to dismember everything, a people celebrates its capacity for remembering its own way of being.

African trickster figures are images of an ironic imagination that yokes together bodiliness and transcendence, society and individuality. Ananse of the Ashanti, Mantis of the San, Ogo-Yurugu of the Dogon, and others contend with animals and gods, spirits and humans; they exploit every liminal space to claim all speech for human language. Thus the differences among these figures are as significant as their similarities. Indeed, the trickster in Africa shows by his witty juggling with meaning and absurdity that he is more accurately understood as a spectrum of commentaries on mythic commentary than as a "category." This epistemological playfulness seems to represent a sophisticated African form of religious thought. It is perhaps a commonplace to insist that in every system the order of the center and the wildness of the periphery are linked. It is a bold piece of spiritual logic to make this insistence a joke—or even more, a joking relationship.

Legba, the trickster god of the Fon, personifies such logic clearly. The youngest of the seven children of the female-male high god, Mawu-Lisa, Legba is her linguist. All who approach her, even the other gods, must first address him. His trickery provoked Mawu into distancing herself from the newly formed earth, and his unpredictable mediation reminds both gods and humans that autonomy requires the perils of relationship. Legba's phallic image stands before all Fon dwellings as a symbol that every passage reshapes the world; like Ananse, he reveals that each transaction releases a sort of anti-entropic energy that turns muteness into conversation, randomness into meaning.

Legba is the master of the Fon dialectic. Fon mythology has kept alive the memory of their historical adaptiveness, which enabled them to borrow liberally from the institutions of their neighbors (especially from the Yoruba, whose Eṣu-Èṣṣe inspired Legba). By grasping their history in mythic terms as well as in secular terms, the Fon have insisted that their assimilation of others' creations is both revelation and ingenuity, and their traditional order has delighted in elaborating the movement from dark, female inside to bright, male outside—and back again. The patterns of kingship and clan, the stages of inner growth, the interweavings of gods and nature, and even the structures of juridical process became images of the dual being of the high god, the bipolar principle of all life. In the intercourse between visible and invisible universes, Legba is the living copula. The Fon say that Legba, or Aflakete (a name meaning "I have tricked you"), "dances everywhere like a man copulating." He infuses cosmic dialectic into social order as the laughter he provokes becomes the sacramental sign that the male-female processes of Fon life are both human and transcendent.

The link between divination and the trickster represents a still deeper level of meaning that West Africans especially have found in him. The Yoruba, like the Fon (who have adopted much of the Yoruba system of divination, known as Ifa) and the Dogon, see their trickster god as the chief possessor of divination's language. Eṣu is a disruptive mediator, "the anger of the gods," who stirs up trouble to increase sacrifice, yet his quickness of eye and hand symbolizes a metaphysical slipperiness that makes him both sociotherapist and iconographer. At moments of conflict the meetings that create a world become collisions. Lines of connection break down, intersections turn into dead ends, and, as the myths say, all becomes as fluid as water, as destructive as fire. Divination seeks to transform these dead ends into thresholds of larger meaning; Yoruba divination particularly knows that to give answers to knotted social and spiritual questions is, finally, to redraw an *imago mundi*, to restore the shattered icon of the Yoruba cosmos. Eṣu is not the source of most divinatory responses, but he enables divination to run its course. Some depiction of him is carved into every divining tray, and that portion of the tray is always turned to the east, from which both light and darkness come. Eṣu brings confusion so that order may encompass the unencompassable. In their art and cities the Yoruba image the world that the relationship between sky and earth, Ọlọrun and Onile, with all their attendants and rituals, has brought into being. Lord of exchange in the market beginning and ending each Yoruba week, Eṣu reveals that the meeting of these beings creates human

business, truly Yoruba ground. At every kind of crossroads Eṣu's mastery of interchange ensures that the design of this ground includes all movement—even explosion and decay.

The central figure of the vast spiral of correspondences that is Dogon life and myth is the tricksterlike Ogo-Yurugu. Created by Amma, the high god, to become one of the androgynous semidivine founders and overseers of life on earth, Ogo rebelled against his "father's" plan because he feared he would be deprived of his female twin. He seized part of his primordial matrix and sought to shape the world with its help. After a long struggle, Amma rendered him mute and put him to wander alone on the fringes of human society as Yurugu, the "pale fox," but his concupiscent itch, his desire to possess the source of fecundity, led his obedient male twin (Nommo) to offer himself to Amma as a sacrifice that brought the world as it is into being. The Dogon believe that Yurugu still speaks a revelatory, if twisted, word in divination and that his story is embedded in the human personality, especially in males. The navel bears witness to his premature separation from the divine womb; children resemble him in their play; the joking relationship between an adolescent boy and his maternal uncle's wife repeats the pattern of Ogo's quest for twinning; and funeral dances bear the traces of his mistaken celebration of victory over Amma. Ogo-Yurugu is a paradigm of Dogon irony, for his "going and coming" discloses that wholeness is an "achieved gift," one both won and bestowed: as man thrusts outward, he discovers the inner unity of personal individuation, social integration, and cosmic intelligibility.

The Dogon find Ogo-Yurugu within the soul and on the peripheries of life, in the present and in the farthest past, in solitary rebellion and in every relationship. Like Ananse, whose lies defeat Kyiriakyinnyee ("hate to be contradicted") and bring contradiction into Ashanti life, Ogo symbolizes the human imagination reaching everywhere to create worlds as filled with both order and meaning as language itself. The African trickster, then, teaches both dexterity and insight. His dance does not signify abandonment of either worship or intelligence; it signifies delight that the unsayable is quite precisely said in the never-final failures of this world's words. If, then, the realm of the sacred is shaped by human play as well as by divine work, so that the least fragment of life can become an icon of boundlessness, what could be more practical than learning how to imagine? And how could one better celebrate the meeting of transcendence and human wit than with sacred laughter?

[See also African Religions, *article on Mythic Themes.*]

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North American Tricksters

The most prominent and popular personage, generally speaking, in the varied oral traditions of the numerous Amerindian peoples living north of the Rio Grande is the figure known as the trickster. Although the trickster may be spoken of in the singular as a type, there are in fact many tricksters, of whom a great vari-

ety of stories is told across the North American continent. Some are purely tricksters, but the most significant and central mythic figure in many tribes is a trickster who is also the tribe's culture hero and the creator (usually by transformation) of the present world order. Sometimes he is the maker of the earth and its beings, or alternately the co-creator, often antagonistic to the principal creator.

With rare exceptions, North American tricksters are beings of the mythic age only; they are not believed to be living gods or spirits, and they have no cult (other than the semiritualistic narration of their stories). Their relationship to shamanism, the definitive religious form in most of the region, is debated. Tricksters' activities in myths often resemble shamans' journeys to the spirit world, but tricksters ordinarily employ no "helpers," and shamans do not seek help from "trickster spirits." Although a history of oral traditions can be only a matter of speculation, it appears that the trickster figure belongs to a very ancient stratum of Indian mythology, since certain universally disseminated motifs, such as the theft of fire and the origin of death, are regularly attributed to him.

The concept of the trickster as a type is based upon his most essential trait: his trickiness. Tricksters everywhere are deceitful, cunning, amoral, sexually hyperactive, taboo-breaking, voracious, thieving, adventurous, vainglorious—yet not truly evil or malicious—and always amusing and undaunted. Even though his activities are usually motivated by ungoverned desire, the trickster is capable of performing deeds that benefit others: releasing imprisoned game, the sun, the tides, and such; vanquishing and/or transforming evil monsters; and, like the shaman, journeying to the land of the spirits or the dead to rescue a lost loved one. The significant element in all these deeds is trickery. But the trickster's tricks are not considered evil: as a weak "animal-person" or mere human in a world of strange animals and spirit beings, the trickster must use strategy to survive. Moreover, as a being of insatiable appetites (for food and sex), he cannot afford the luxury of scruples. Thus he breaks incest taboos (rapes or marries in disguise his daughter or mother-in-law) and hoodwinks small animals into dancing with eyes closed so he can kill them. His overweening pride prevents him from asking for help, or from acknowledging it when he receives it, and leads him into countless misadventures. Often behaving like a fool and coming to grief, he reacts invariably with buoyant good humor, refusing to accept defeat. Nothing is sacred in his eyes: all holy institutions may be mocked or mimicked with impunity by the trickster. Shamanism, especially, seems parodied in

such continent-wide stories as those of a trickster's flight with geese or on the back of a buzzard, ending in his crashing to earth, often being fragmented, and his laughing it all off as a big joke.

In addition to humorous trickster folk tales, which are remarkably similar all over North America, each region has its own set of traditions about the mythic age, and in a majority of instances the leading personage of that time was a trickster.

Raven is the dominant mythic figure all along the Alaskan and Canadian Pacific coast. Some tribes attribute to him the creation of the land (e.g., by dropping pebbles on the water), probably following a world flood. The central myth of the Raven cycle is about his theft of the sun, which was being kept in a box by a "powerful chief." Making himself a tiny particle in the drinking water of the chief's daughter, Raven contrives to be reborn as a baby in the chief's house. He cries for the box and is given it, whereupon he resumes his raven form and flies away, bringing light to the world. (Theft of the sun is a mythic theme found over much of North America, attributed almost always to the principal trickster or to a group of animals headed by him.)

In the Plateau region of the northwestern United States, Coyote is usually regarded as the maker or procreator of the people, sometimes using the body of a river monster he kills, sometimes by cohabitation with trees after a flood. His principal cycle concerns his release of the salmon and his subsequent journey up the Columbia River, leading the salmon. He demands a "wife" at each village, and if his request is granted, he makes that place a good fishing spot. The cycle is prefaced with a tale of jealousy, lust, and deceit. Coyote, desiring his son's two wives, treacherously and magically causes his son to be taken into the sky world. Coyote pretends to be his son while the son in the sky is gaining supernatural powers, unbeknownst to Coyote. Later the son returns, reclaims his wives, and takes revenge by causing his father to fall into the river and be carried away. Thus Coyote arrives at the mouth of the river where the salmon are kept; by turning himself into a baby, he tricks the women who keep them and releases them to swim upstream.

In California and the Great Basin region, Coyote usually is involved in a dualistic relationship with a wise, benevolent creator (Eagle, Fox, Wolf, or an anthropomorphic figure). Set against the backdrop of a world flood (or fire), the earth is remade and repopulated by the two, with Coyote ordaining the "bad" things such as mountains, storms, and fruit growing out of reach. Coyote decrees death—and then his son is the first to die. So Coyote establishes mourning rites for people to "en-

joy." He also decrees conception by sex and painful childbirth. Here and in the Plateau, where "spirit helpers" were commonplace in everyday life, Coyote too has his "helpers": two chunks of excrement that he voids when in need of advice, but to which he always replies, "Just what I was going to do anyway!"

The Paiute and Shoshoni of the Great Basin consider Coyote the progenitor of the people (through intercourse with a mysterious woman following the flood). But among the Pueblo, whose mythology centers on an emergence from the underground, Coyote plays a rather minor role in most tribes. The Navajo assign him a larger part than the others: he causes the flood that necessitates the emergence; then he scatters the stars in the sky haphazardly, ordains death, and establishes sex. On the Great Plains, Coyote is known primarily as a trickster only. Some northern tribes credit him with the re-creation of the earth after the deluge, and the Kiowa consider themselves the people of Sendah, a Coyote-like figure, who led them out of a hollow log in the beginning. Inktomi ("spider") of the Lakota is very similar to Coyote, except in the unique esoteric traditions reported from the Oglala Lakota. Here he is a veritable "fallen angel," who caused the first human family to be banished from their subterranean paradise and who subsequently induced the whole human race to emerge onto the earth by making them think life here would be better. The Oglala are one of the few groups in North America who consider the trickster genuinely evil, and almost the only tribe that believes the trickster to be a living spirit.

Hare, the chief trickster in the poorly preserved traditions of the Indians of the Southeast, seems not to be implicated in the emergence-origin traditions of these tribes. Rather, he is a culture hero (stealing the sun, fire, and such; transforming monsters), and he is the bungling rival of the youthful "blood-clot boy," a pure hero type. Siouan-speaking peoples seem to have brought a tradition of Rabbit stories to the Great Plains when they migrated there from the Southeast. Their Rabbit or Hare is a precocious boy, living with his grandmother, who by his foolish and/or heroic deeds makes the world habitable, as it is today. He is not, however, credited with any demiurgic activities.

The Algonquins, inhabiting a large part of eastern and midwestern Canada, New England, and the area around the three western Great Lakes, have mythologies centered on anthropomorphic culture heroes who were also tricksters, though seldom foolish, plus several minor theriomorphic tricksters. The leading figures are Gluskabe in Maine, Tcikapis in northern Quebec, and Manabush and Wisakejak (various spellings) in the most westerly tribes. The few Tcikapis tales recorded

show him a monster-killing dwarf, whose greatest exploit was the snaring of the sun. Gluskabe, Manabush, and Wisakejak have much in common: they live with their grandmother and younger brother, Wolf—who is abducted and killed by water monsters and must be rescued and revived by the hero. (A remarkably similar tale is told of Coyote and Wolf far to the west, in the Great Basin.) The myth has been elaborated in the esoteric traditions of the Midewiwin, a secret curing society of the western Algonquins. Some investigators report a vague belief that the hero of this myth lives now somewhere in the north. The neighboring Iroquois make no place for their trickster, S'hodieonskon, in their dualistic creation myth.

In some tribes humorous trickster tales are relegated to a category apart from the more serious "myths," but because all these narratives are set in "myth times," they are never confused with quasi-historical legends or accounts of shamanic experiences. Thus, to some degree, a quality of sacredness adheres to the person of the trickster everywhere, despite the seemingly profane nature of many of the narratives.

The oral traditions of North America present a variety of combinations of trickster traits with others (culture hero, demiurge, etc.); but all are reducible to the idea of a being who lives by his wits and his wit, who represents a mythical perception of man making his cosmos and finding a place within it.

[See also North American Religions, *article on Mythic Themes.*]

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MAC LINSOTT RICKETTS

Mesoamerican and South American Tricksters

The peoples of Mesoamerica and South America maintain lively traditions concerning a cunning and deceitful mythic figure, the trickster. Although tricksters are ludicrous rather than solemn beings, they cannot be discounted as trivial because their activities and transformations touch on religious issues. For instance, they steal fire, which is deemed the center of social and physical life, and their clever bungling frequently introduces death. They stir up such a riot of the senses with their playful conduct, that sex, food, and song become sacred emblems of incarnate life. The trickster's scheming prefigures human intelligence, which is based, ironically, on the realm of the senses.

Tricksters are usually animals that have bodies riddled with passages, or they may have excessively large orifices, any of which may be cut open or penetrated. The contemporary Huichol, who live in the Sierra Madre Occidental, in north-central Mexico, consider Káuyumarie ("one who does not know himself" or "one who makes others crazy") one of their principal deities (Myerhoff, 1974). Káuyumarie is the animal sidekick of the supreme Huichol deity, Tatewarí ("our grandfather fire"). Irreverent, clever, and amusing, Káuyumarie brought about the first sexual intercourse between man and woman. He guides pilgrims to Wirikúta, where the Huichol believe the beginning of time and the center of space are located, and where, as the Sacred Deer, he was dismembered. Pilgrims learn at Wirikúta that all paradoxes and contradictions—even the distinctions between deer, maize, and peyote—arise from the division of Káuyumarie's body (Myerhoff, 1974). The four directions are colored by his body parts, and these colors can be seen in flowers or in the visions induced by eating his flesh—the sacred peyote plant. The horns on Káuyumarie's head enable humans to penetrate the contradictions that make up human experience (Furst, 1976).

Tricksters distort sight and sound purely to create il-

lusion and noise. The Aztec divinity, Tezcatlipoca ("smoking mirror"), uses an obsidian mirror to distort images. He was able to trick Quetzalcoatl, for example, into looking into the mirror in which Quetzalcoatl saw a repulsive and misshapen being. Tezcatlipoca in one of his assumed shapes is Huehuecoyotl ("drum coyote"), the puckish patron of song and dance, who was an ancient Chichimec divinity known for being a sly contriver (Brundage, 1979). [See also Tezcatlipoca.]

Extraordinary body designs or cross-sex dress, which the trickster sometimes manifests, is a way in which the contrary conditions of existence are mediated. In her study of Zinacantecan myth from the Chiapas Highlands of Mexico, Eva Hunt links contemporary female tricksters to the sixteenth-century goddess Cihuacoatl, a female deity with a tail, a fake baby, and a snake, which emerges from under her skirt and from between her legs. In the contemporary Cuicatec region and the Puebla-Nahuatl area of Mexico, she is embodied as Matlacihuatl, and she is also known as Mujer Enredadora ("entangling woman"). Her name derives from *maxtli*, a loincloth. Matlacihuatl is adulterous and promiscuous, and she specializes in seducing homosexual men. She is sexually anomalous, having a vagina at the back of her neck that opens like a mouth. If a man does seduce her, he will become pregnant and give birth to a child that looks like excrement (Hunt, 1977).

A female turtle is the trickster of the Desána people in southern Colombia. She constantly outsmarts primordial monkeys, jaguars (the dominant supernatural beings of the primordial age), foxes, deer, and tapir, using their body parts to her advantage; for example, she uses the leg bone of the jaguar as a flute.

Tricksters often opposed the dominant supernatural beings of their day and embarrassed or humiliated the divine patrons of priests, shamans, and other privileged religious specialists. For example, the Maquiritaré, Carib-speakers of Venezuela, tell of divine twins; Iureke revives his twin brother, Shikiemona, who has been fixed in the form of a fish by the Master of Iron. In an effort to save his brother, Iureke assumes the form of a kingfisher and covers his brother with excrement. When the Master of Iron washes Shikiemona clean, the water removes the excrement and revives the dying twin, and he swims away (Civrieux, 1980). Later, the twins destroy the supernatural jaguar by exploiting his will for power. "I want some wind. I need some power," the jaguar exclaims. So the twins trick him into swinging on a vine after eating a smelly agouti (a kind of rodent). The jaguar breaks wind, filling the air with a foul smell on a cosmic scale, and ultimately the jaguar is propelled to the end of the earth, where he lands with a bang and breaks all his bones.

In other myths tricksters steal various forms of life from the underworld. For example, the Sanumá (Yanoama) of the Venezuela-Brazil border region, tell of Häsimo, a mythic bird-man, who steals fire from a primordial alligator, which stores fire in its mouth, by shooting excrement into its face, forcing the alligator to laugh (Taylor, 1979).

Manipulation of flesh and of bodily openings and closings is a key strategem of tricksters. Among the Waiwai of Venezuela, an old man, who is a known liar and master of disguise, rescues his child from buzzards by making himself smell like putrid flesh (Fock, 1963). Yaperikuli, the transformer and trickster of the Baniwa of the upper Rio Negro region of northwestern Brazil, killed the chief of the Eenu-nai ("sky people") by opening his body and leaving it in a hammock like a "dummy." The trickster's role in general consists of his becoming enmeshed in a predicament and then rescuing himself through the use of his incarnate intelligence and the physical transformation of his body. Tricksters are sometimes wedged in the dangerous passages between two states of being, and through their efforts to rescue themselves—using perhaps a hole, or vine, as a passage—these states of being become altered forever.

The Yukúna people of the northwest Amazon region tell the story of two heroic brothers. The younger brother, Maotchi, is extracted from a hole in a tree by a female agouti with whom he has promised to have sex in exchange for being rescued. Once night falls, he fears making love with her, and so they sleep foot-to-foot. However, she begins to devour him through her anus, and by midnight she has "swallowed" him up to his anus, which then begins to swallow her. On another occasion, Maotchi tricks his elder brother, Kawarimi, into jumping with him into an enormous hole that leads to another world at the center of the earth. Maotchi saves himself by grabbing a vine as he falls, uprooting the vine in the process. As his brother falls into the hole, Maotchi shouts "Stone, stone!" to make his brother fall faster and, eventually, break all his bones (Jacopin, 1981).

Cross-dressing constitutes another tactic of the trickster. In eastern Ecuador, the Shipibo trickster is an ant-eater who manages to trade "clothes" with a jaguar. The result is the human world, in which appearances and body forms can be deceiving: that is, where an ant-eater is really a jaguar, a jaguar really an ant-eater, and so on (Roe, 1982). Because death is the ultimate transformation, tricksters have been linked with it; they also mock death and extract benefit from its appearances. For example, in Brazil, the Tapirapé culture hero, Petura, is able to steal fire from the primordial king vulture by pretending to be a cadaver: when the king vul-

ture comes to devour the maggots infesting the corpse, Petura steals his "red fire." He also gives the ant-eater its shape by thrusting a club up its anus and a wooden stick into its nostrils (Wagley, 1977).

In the Gran Chaco area of southern South America, the Mataco trickster Tokhwáh—also known as Tawkx-wax, Takwaj, Takjuaj, Tokhuah—is both good and bad, and, although he advances human capabilities, every step forward brings comic disaster (Simoneau and Wilbert, 1982). Tokhwáh acts bisexually, chasing women and often seduced by men. His exploits require an entire cycle of myths, and he is at once divine and earthly, creative and destructive. In order to retain nourishing foods, Tokhwáh uses mud to close up his anus, which had been torn open through intercourse with an iguana. In another episode, he is blinded with excrement that comes flying through the air when Tokhwáh strikes a pile of dung that has answered his questions by making inarticulate dropping noises, "pa pa pa pa." On another occasion, as punishment for eating a child, all of Tokhwáh's orifices are plugged with clay or wax. When a woodpecker reopens his orifices, various bird-beings are splattered with blood and waste, giving the various species their distinguishing marks (Simoneau and Wilbert, 1982).

The actions of Mesoamerican and South American tricksters reveal the contradictions at the heart of human experience: carnal and spiritual, living but mortal, ambitious but finite. With a blend of humor and tragedy, trickster myths describe the calamities that occur when contrary conditions of being collide and overlap in a single experience.

[See also Jaguars.]

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TRIGLAV, a three-headed deity of the heathen Slavs, was literally named: from *tri*, "three," and *glava*, "head." Worship of him in the temple at Szczecin (Stettin), Pomerania, is attested by Herbord, Ebbo, and Monachus Prieflingensis, the three biographers of Otto, a twelfth-century bishop of Bamberg. According to Herbord, the image of Triglav at Szczecin had three heads joined to one another. Ebbo states that the image was of gold; Monachus Prieflingensis asserts that all three heads were silver-plated. Another idol of Triglav stood in the town of Wolin. Both images were destroyed by Otto.

No detailed description of the image of Triglav exists. One of the interesting features of this god is that he was connected with the number three. His idol stood on the largest of the three hills of Szczecin, and the black horse consecrated to him and used in divination was led thrice across nine (thrice three) lances that were placed in front of the temple, about a yard apart.

In the words of the high priest of the temple at Szczecin, Triglav had three heads in order to make it known that he ruled over three realms: heaven, earth, and the underworld. Ebbo refers to him as the "summus deus" ("highest god"). Hence, Triglav may have been either a manifestation of three major gods or three aspects of one god. The black horse and the mention of the underworld suggest Triglav's ties with Veles-Volos, the god of death and the underworld, a deity standing in opposition to Sventovit, the god of heavenly light, who was

associated with a white horse. Triglav may also have been related to Chernoglav, the "black god," who had a silver mustache and who was worshiped at Rügen, as mentioned in the *Knytlingasaga* (1265).

Tricephalous sculptures, mostly undated, have been found in South and East Slavic areas (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Russia); in France, Gallo-Roman sculptures of three-headed gods date from the second to the fourth century CE. A tricephalous figure called the Thracian Rider was known in the ancient Balkan world, particularly in Bulgaria, and his image is preserved on hundreds of stelae of the second and third centuries CE. The name of Triglav has been retained in the toponymy of all Slavic areas, proving its common Slavic origin.

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TRINITY. Trinitarian doctrine touches on virtually every aspect of Christian faith, theology, and piety, including Christology and pneumatology, theological epistemology (faith, revelation, theological methodology), spirituality and mystical theology, and ecclesial life (sacraments, community, ethics). This article summarizes the main lines of trinitarian doctrine without presenting detailed explanations of important ideas, persons, or terms.

The doctrine of the Trinity is the summary of Christian faith in God, who out of love creates humanity for union with God, who through Jesus Christ redeems the world, and in the power of the Holy Spirit transforms and divinizes (2 Cor. 3:18). The heart of trinitarian theology is the conviction that the God revealed in Jesus Christ is involved faithfully and unalterably in covenanted relationship with the world. Christianity is not unique in believing God is "someone" rather than "something," but it is unique in its belief that Christ is the personal Word of God, and that through Christ's death and resurrection into new life, "God was in Christ reconciling all things to God" (2 Cor. 5:19). Christ is not looked upon as an intermediary between God and world but as an essential agent of salvation. The Spirit poured

out at Pentecost, by whom we live in Christ and are returned to God (Father), is also not a “lesser God” but one and the same God who creates and redeems us. The doctrine of the Trinity is the product of reflection on the events of redemptive history, especially the Incarnation and the sending of the Spirit.

Development of Trinitarian Doctrine. Exegetes and theologians today are in agreement that the Hebrew Bible does not contain a doctrine of the Trinity, even though it was customary in past dogmatic tracts on the Trinity to cite texts like *Genesis* 1:26, “Let us make humanity in our image, after our likeness” (see also *Gn.* 3:22, 11:7; *Is.* 6:2–3) as proof of plurality in God. Although the Hebrew Bible depicts God as the father of Israel and employs personifications of God such as Word (*davar*), Spirit (*ruah*), Wisdom (*hokhmah*), and Presence (*shekhinah*), it would go beyond the intention and spirit of the Old Testament to correlate these notions with later trinitarian doctrine.

Further, exegetes and theologians agree that the New Testament also does not contain an explicit doctrine of the Trinity. God the Father is source of all that is (Pantokrator) and also the father of Jesus Christ; “Father” is not a title for the first person of the Trinity but a synonym for God. Early liturgical and creedal formulas speak of God as “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ”; praise is to be rendered to God through Christ (see opening greetings in Paul and deuterio-Paul). There are other binitarian texts (e.g., *Rom.* 4:24, 8:11; *2 Cor.* 4:14; *Col.* 2:12; *1 Tm.* 2:5–6, 6:13; *2 Tm.* 4:1), and a few triadic texts (the strongest are *2 Cor.* 13:14 and *Mt.* 28:19; others are *1 Cor.* 6:11, 12:4–6; *2 Cor.* 1:21–22; *1 Thes.* 5:18–19; *Gal.* 3:11–14). Christ is sent by God and the Spirit is sent by Christ so that all may be returned to God.

The language of the Bible, of early Christian creeds, and of Greek and Latin theology prior to the fourth century is “economic” (*oikonomia*, divine management of earthly affairs). It is oriented to the concrete history of creation and redemption: God initiates a covenant with Israel, God speaks through the prophets, God takes on flesh in Christ, God dwells within as Spirit. In the New Testament there is no reflective consciousness of the metaphysical nature of God (“immanent trinity”), nor does the New Testament contain the technical language of later doctrine (*hypostasis*, *ousia*, *substantia*, *subsistentia*, *prosōpon*, *persona*). Some theologians have concluded that all postbiblical trinitarian doctrine is therefore arbitrary. While it is incontestable that the doctrine cannot be established on scriptural evidence alone, its origins may legitimately be sought in the Bible, not in the sense of “proof-texting” or of finding metaphysical principles, but because the Bible is the authoritative record of God’s redemptive relationship

with humanity. What the scriptures narrate as the activity of God among us, which is confessed in creeds and celebrated in liturgy, is the wellspring of later trinitarian doctrine.

Dogmatic development took place gradually, against the background of the emanationist philosophy of Stoicism and Neoplatonism (including the mystical theology of the latter), and within the context of strict Jewish monotheism. In the immediate post–New Testament period of the Apostolic Fathers no attempt was made to work out the God–Christ (Father–Son) relationship in ontological terms. By the end of the fourth century, and owing mainly to the challenge posed by various heresies, theologians went beyond the immediate testimony of the Bible and also beyond liturgical and creedal expressions of trinitarian faith to the ontological trinity of coequal persons “within” God. The shift is from function to ontology, from the “economic trinity” (Father, Son, and Spirit in relation to us) to the “immanent” or “essential Trinity” (Father, Son, and Spirit in relation to each other). It was prompted chiefly by belief in the divinity of Christ and later in the divinity of the Holy Spirit, but even earlier by the consistent worship of God in a trinitarian pattern and the practice of baptism into the threefold name of God. By the close of the fourth century the orthodox teaching was in place: God is one nature, three persons (*mia ousia, tres hypostaseis*).

Questions of Christology and soteriology (salvation) occupied theologians of the early patristic period. What was Christ’s relationship to God? What is Christ’s role in our salvation? The Logos Christology of the apologists identified the preexistent Christ of Johannine and Pauline theology with the Logos (“word”) of Greek philosophy. The Stoic distinction between the immanent word (*logos endiathetos*) and the expressed word (*logos prophorikos*) provided a way for Justin Martyr (d. 163/165) and others to explain how Christ had preexisted as the immanent word in the Father’s mind and then became incarnate in time. Third-century monarchianism arose as a backlash against Logos theology, which was feared to jeopardize the unity of God; the modalism of Sabellius admitted the distinctions in history but denied their reality in God’s being. Origen (died c. 254) contributed the idea of the eternal generation of the Son within the being of God; although other aspects of Origen’s theology later were judged to be subordinationist, his teaching that the Son is a distinct hypostasis brought about subtle changes in conceptions of divine paternity and trinity. In the West, Tertullian (d. 225?) formulated an economic trinitarian theology that presents the three persons as a plurality in God. Largely because of the theology of Arius, who about 320 denied that Christ was fully divine, the Council of Nicaea (325) taught that Christ is *homoousios* (of the same sub-

stance) with God. The primary concern of Athanasius (d. 373), the great defender of Nicene orthodoxy, was salvation through Christ; if Christ is not divine, he cannot save. Like the bishops at Nicaea, Athanasius had a limited trinitarian vocabulary; *hupostasis* (person) and *ousia* (substance) could still be used interchangeably.

The fourth-century Cappadocian theologians (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus) formulated orthodox trinitarian doctrine and made it possible for the Council of Constantinople (381) to affirm the divinity of the Holy Spirit. The speculatively gifted Cappadocians made a clear distinction between *hupostasis* and *ousia* (roughly equivalent to particular and universal), thereby establishing orthodox trinitarian vocabulary. At the close of the patristic period John of Damascus (d. 749) summarized Greek trinitarian doctrine with the doctrine of *perichōresis* (Lat., *circumincensio*), or the mutual indwelling of the divine persons.

Western trinitarian theology took a different course because of Augustine (d. 430). Instead of regarding the Father as source of divinity, Augustine's starting point was the one divine substance, which the three persons share. He sought the image of the Trinity within the rational soul and formulated psychological analogies (memory, intellect, will; lover, beloved, love) that conveyed unity more than plurality. The Augustinian approach served to effectively refute Arianism, but it also moved the doctrine of the Trinity to a transcendent realm, away from salvation history, from other areas of theology, and from liturgy. In the Latin West Boethius (died c. 525) formulated the classic definition of person, namely, "individual substance of a rational nature." Augustinian theology was given further elaboration in medieval theology, especially by Anselm (d. 1109) and in the Scholastic synthesis of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). Still Augustinian but focusing on person rather than nature, Richard of Saint-Victor (d. 1173) and Bonaventure (d. 1274) developed a psychology of love; charity is the essence of Trinity.

Although there are important exceptions to any typology, in general, Greek theology emphasizes the hypostases, the "trinity in unity," whereas Latin theology emphasizes the divine nature, or "unity in trinity." The Greek approach can be represented by a line: Godhood originates with the Father, emanates toward the Son, and passes into the Holy Spirit who is the bridge to the world. Greek theology (following the New Testament and early Christian creeds) retains the "monarchy" of the Father who as sole principle of divinity imparts Godhood to Son and Spirit. The Greek approach tends toward subordinationism (though hardly of an ontological kind) or, in some versions, to tritheism since in Greek theology each divine person fully possesses the divine substance. The Latin approach can be repre-

sented by a circle or triangle. Because the emphasis is placed on what the divine persons share, Latin theology tends toward modalism (which obscures the distinctiveness of each person). Also the Trinity is presented as self-enclosed and not intrinsically open to the world.

Principles of Trinitarian Doctrine. Trinitarian theology is *par excellence* the theology of relationship. Its fundamental principle is that God, who is self-communicating and self-giving love for us, is from all eternity love perfectly given and received. The traditional formula "God is three persons in one nature" compactly expresses that there are permanent features of God's eternal being (the three persons) that are the ontological precondition for the three distinct manners of God's tripersonal activity in the world (as Father, Son, Spirit).

Technical terms, theological theories, and official (conciliar) statements function together as a "set of controls" over the correct way to conceive both of God's self-relatedness as Father, Son, and Spirit, and God's relatedness to creation as Father, Son, and Spirit. Although one must guard against reducing the mystery of God to a set of formal statements, precise distinctions are useful insofar as they refine theological vocabulary or protect against distortions ("heresy"). Still, doctrinal statements are inherently limited; they address specific points of controversy, leaving other questions unsettled and sometimes creating new problems. Conciliar statements and theological principles guard against egregious errors (for example, "the Holy Spirit is a creature") and serve as boundaries within which trinitarian discourse may take place.

First, God is ineffable and Absolute Mystery, whose reality cannot adequately be comprehended or expressed by means of human concepts. Trinitarian doctrine necessarily falls short of expressing the full "breadth and length and height and depth" of God's glory and wisdom and love. Even though God who "dwells in light inaccessible" is impenetrable mystery, the doctrine of the Trinity is not itself a mystery, nor is the doctrine revealed by God, nor is the doctrine a substitute for the knowledge of God gained in the union of love that surpasses all concepts (see *Eph.* 3:18–19). Trinitarian doctrine is a partial and fragmentary exegesis of what has been revealed, namely, that God is self-communicating love. Further, because God is a partner in love and not an object to be scrutinized or controlled by the intellect, speculative theology must be firmly rooted in spirituality, doxology, and a concrete community of faith so that trinitarian doctrine does not become "heavenly metaphysics" unrelated to the practice of faith.

Second, the revelation and self-communication of the incomprehensible God, attested in the concrete images and symbols of the Bible and celebrated in Christian

liturgy, is the proper starting point of trinitarian theology. Theological thinking proceeds from "God with us" ("economic" Trinity) to the nature of God ("immanent" Trinity). The starting point "within" God led to an overly abstract doctrine in the West and to a virtual divorce of the "immanent" Trinity from the Trinity of history and experience. Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834) reacted against the cleavage between "God" and "God for us" by relegating the idea of the essential Trinity to an appendix to his summary of Christian theology. Karl Rahner's (d. 1984) widely accepted axiom is pertinent: "the 'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' Trinity and vice versa." God is who God reveals God to be. Concepts that describe the ontological intrarelatedness of God must be drawn from and are subject to control by the "facts" of redemptive history.

Third, because the three persons together and inseparably (though without mingling or confusion) bring about salvation and deification, and because the one God is worshiped as Father, Son, and Spirit, no divine person is inferior to any other person. Although undivided, God exists as the pure relationality of love given and received. The decree of the Council of Florence (1442) that "everything in God is one except where there is opposition of relation" was regarded as a final answer to tritheism (belief in three gods), Arian subordinationism (ontological hierarchy of persons), Sabellian modalism (no real distinctions "in" God), and Macedonianism (denial of the divinity of the Holy Spirit).

There are two divine processions: begetting and spiration ("breathing"). Each divine person exists by relation to the other two persons (Gr., "relation of origin"; Lat., "relation of oppositon"), and each fully possesses the divine substance. In Greek theology the three hypostases have the distinguishing characteristics (sg., *idiotēs*) of "being unbegotten" (*agennēsia*), "being begotten" (*gennēsia*), and "proceeding" (*ekporeusis*). The Father is the fountainhead of Godhood (*fons divinitatis*), who imparts divinity to Son and Spirit. According to Latin theology there are four relations (begetting, being begotten, spirating, being spirated) but only three "subsistent" relations: paternity, filiation, spiration. Latin theology (following Augustine) understands divine unity to reside in the divine nature that is held in common by Father, Son, and Spirit; Greek theology (following the Cappadocians) understands the unity to reside in the "perichoretic" relatedness of the three persons.

A corollary of the inseparability of the three coequal divine persons is the axiom that "all works of the triune God *ad extra* are indivisibly one" ("opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt"). According to Latin theology it is the three-personed substance of God that acts in his-

tory; according to Greek theology every action of God toward creation originates with the Father, passes through the Son, and is perfected in the Spirit (Gregory of Nyssa). In any case, the axiom must not be understood to obscure what is distinctive to each divine person.

Fourth, a false distinction must not be set up between what God is and what God does, between essence and existence, between unity and threefoldness, between nature and person (relation). There are no "accidents" in God; the statement of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) that each divine person is the divine substance countered the claim of some theologians (Joachim of Fiore) that God is a quaternity (three persons + essence = four persons).

Fifth, since the nature of God is to love, and love naturally seeks an object, it might appear that God "needs" the world as a partner in love. This would make the world coeternal with God. Many Scholastic theologians speculated on this question. Thomas Aquinas admitted that while he saw no philosophical reason to deny the eternity of the world, the testimony of the *Book of Genesis* and his Christian faith constrained him to do so. In 1329 Meister Eckhart was condemned for asserting the eternity of the world. With respect to trinitarian theology, even though Rahner's axiom (see above) suggests that God's relations to us, including creation, are constitutive of God and vice versa, theologians traditionally speak of a perfect and reciprocal exchange of love "within" God, that is, among Father, Son, and Spirit independent of their relationship to creation, in order to preserve the absolute character of God's freedom.

Current Directions and Remaining Problems. After centuries of disinterest in trinitarian doctrine in the West, the riches of this vast tradition are once again being explored. Three basic directions may be observed. First, some theologians have revised analogies of the "immanent" Trinity according to contemporary philosophy (for example, process metaphysics), linguistics, or interpersonal psychology. While this approach overcomes some of the aporia of classical expositions, it perpetuates the metaphysical starting point "within" God apart from salvation history. A second approach focuses on soteriology and Christology and is circumspect about the "immanent" Trinity, though without denying that historical distinctions are grounded ontologically in God. A third approach uses trinitarian symbolism to describe God's deeds in redemptive history but resists positing real distinctions in God. Despite basic differences in method, these three approaches all move in a more personalist (relational) direction and, in the case of the latter two, a more "economic" direction.

Theologians who specialize in trinitarian doctrine

suggest that several areas warrant further attention. First, most trinitarian doctrine is so abstract it is difficult to see its connection with praxis. The "summary of Christian faith" and the living out of that faith should be brought to bear more directly on each other. Creeds, doxologies, and liturgy are important loci of the trinitarian faith recapitulated in trinitarian doctrine.

Second, unlike the "mystical theology" of the Orthodox tradition, theology in the West has been separated from spirituality since the thirteenth century. Reintegrating theology and spirituality would help to overcome the rationalist tendencies of Western theology, to provide the field of spirituality with theological foundation, and also to strengthen the weakest component of Western theology, namely, pneumatology.

Third, the *filiouque* ("and from the Son") clause, inserted into the Western creed in the sixth century but denounced by the Orthodox church, remains a serious obstacle to reunion between East and West. Theologians should work assiduously for ecumenical agreement.

Fourth, to speak of God as "three persons" always has been problematic and remains the same today. In the modern framework "person" means "individual center of consciousness." To avoid the tritheistic implications of positing three "persons" in God, the relational, or "toward-the-other" character of "person" should be reemphasized.

Fifth, the exclusively masculine imagery of trinitarian doctrine hinders full recovery of the trinitarian insight into the essential relatedness of God. The fatherhood of God should be rethought in light of the critique of feminist theologies and also in view of the nonpatriarchal understanding of divine paternity to be found in some biblical and early theological writings.

Sixth, revising trinitarian theology along soteriological lines raises the question of its place in the dogmatic schema, that is, whether it ought to be treated as a separate "tract," as prolegomenous to theology, as its apex and summary, or as an undergird that is presupposed throughout but never alluded to explicitly.

Seventh, trinitarian theology must be pursued within the context of the "God question" of every age, whether this question takes the form of existentialist atheism, secular humanism, or some other.

Eighth, the Christian doctrine of God must be developed also within the wider purview of other world religions. Trinitarian doctrine cannot be christomonistic, excluding persons of other faiths from salvation, nor can it surrender its conviction that God is fully present in Christ.

For trinitarian doctrine to be recovered as a vital expression of God's nearness in Christ, theologians must

translate into a contemporary idiom the mystery of God's triune love in a way that does justice not only to the testimony of our predecessors but also to the ongoing and ever-new features of God's relationship with a people.

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CATHERINE MOWRY LACUGNA

TRIPITAKA. See Buddhist Literature, *article on Survey of Texts.*

TROELTSCH, ERNST (1865–1923), German Protestant theologian and cultural philosopher. Ernst Peter Wilhelm Troeltsch is considered “the most eminent sociologically oriented historian of Western Christianity” (Talcott Parsons, quoted by James Luther Adams, “Why the Troeltsch Revival? Reasons for the Renewed Interest in the Thought of the Great German Theologian Ernst Troeltsch,” in *The Unitarian Universalist Christian* 29, 1974, pp. 4–15). With regard to the impact of his work, Troeltsch was the most significant evangelical theologian since Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834). As the central figure in German Protestant theology in the early twentieth century, he was able to exercise an enduring influence on philosophy, religion, sociology, and the study of history.

Troeltsch was born in Haunstetten, a small town near the old southern German imperial city of Augsburg. He spent his childhood and youth in Augsburg. Through the efforts of his father, a well-to-do physician, Troeltsch became acquainted at an early age with the modern natural sciences, and the famous preparatory school at Sankt Anna gave him the sense of a cosmopolitan Christian humanism.

In 1883, Troeltsch began the study of philosophy for two semesters at the Roman Catholic preparatory school in Augsburg and then, in the fall of 1884, of Protestant theology in Erlangen. He was particularly interested in the reconciliation of faith with knowledge and, therefore, attended lectures in art history, political science, national economics, history, psychology, and philosophy. Since the theological faculty at Erlangen was dominated by a neoorthodox Lutheranism, Troeltsch transferred, in 1885, to Berlin for a year and, in the fall of 1886, finally to Göttingen. Here the systematic theologian Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), the most prominent contemporary representative of a liberal, Lutheran, cultural Protestantism, exercised a primary and profound influence upon him.

As early as 1891, however, Troeltsch formulated a sharp criticism of Ritschl’s ethicizing modernization of Luther’s theology. He emphasized the far-reaching cultural differences between the “Old Protestantism” of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the modern world, which had emerged only with the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Insofar as Luther had remained committed to the ideal of a religiously dominated, homogeneous culture and had represented a pacifist ethic that sanctioned submission to the status quo, he was, for Troeltsch, still part of the Middle Ages. Thus for Troeltsch’s own theological development, Enlightenment traditions were more important than the theology of the reformers. He believed that theology must be changed from the old dogmatic paradigm to a “histori-

cal method” and must be based upon a general, rational theory of religion.

Already in the *Disputationsthesen*, published on the occasion of his doctoral degree in 1891 (text in *Troeltsch-Studien I*, 2d. ed., Gütersloh, 1985, pp. 299–300), Troeltsch designated such a theology, which he believed compatible with modern consciousness, a “religious-historical discipline.” It is not yet clear to what extent this statement was influenced by the Göttingen religious historian and Septuagint scholar Paul Anton de Lagarde (1827–1891). Troeltsch was part of a very close and friendly exchange in Göttingen with the church historian Albert Eichhorn (1856–1926), as well as the exegetes Hermann Gunkel (1862–1932), Alfred Rahlfs (1865–1935), William Wrede (1859–1906), Heinrich Hackmann (1864–1935), and especially Wilhelm Bousset (1865–1920). These “young Göttingers” wanted to transform traditional biblical scholarship into an undogmatic, sociologically informed religious history of Judaism and early Christianity. They therefore attempted to understand the origins of Christianity from the perspective of the ancient religions, especially of late Judaism. Since they were not interested in historically secondary theological dogmatics, but rather in the original productivity of religious consciousness, they, along with Johannes Weiss (1863–1914), emphasized very strongly the eschatological character of Jesus’ preaching of the kingdom of God, and also the autonomy of religion within culture. Troeltsch was considered the “systematician” of this “little Göttingen faculty,” which as a so-called religious-historical school exercised a significant influence on the theology of the early twentieth century.

In a well-known essay, *Über historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie* (On Historical and Dogmatic Method in Theology; 1900, included in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, Tübingen, 1913, pp. 729–753), using the historiographic principles of critique, analogy, and correlation, Troeltsch drew the radical conclusion of definitively separating a supranaturalistic view of Christianity as the only true religion from the old dogmatic understanding of Jesus Christ as the extraordinary and exclusive revelation of God. The breaking down of the traditional isolation of Christianity from other religions should not, however, imply any skeptical relativism, but rather should serve as a foundation for the specific validity that Christianity claims. The program for a general theory of religion, which Troeltsch first outlined in 1895 in *Die Selbständigkeit der Religion* (The Independence of Religion), should, therefore, produce a metacritique of modern religious criticism. It should demonstrate, moreover, in dialogue with Ludwig Feuerbach’s “suspicion of illusion,” the real

meaning of religious consciousness, in order to prove thereby the special validity of the Christian tradition. Thus the connection of historical-empirical analyses of the history of Christianity with a variety of attempts at a systematic philosophy of religion is characteristic of Troeltsch's lifework. The difficulties of making such a connection, however, demanded extensive epistemological, historical, and philosophical analyses of the relationship between historical contingency and the absolute. This Troeltsch was not able to bring to completion. To that extent, his massive literary work is, for the most part, fragmentary.

After a short lectureship in Bonn, and at the age of only twenty-nine, Troeltsch was called to Heidelberg in 1894 as professor of systematic theology. After the turn of the century, he became known far beyond the narrow borders of academic theology. This was a result of his intensive engagement in ecclesiastical politics on behalf of different organizations in liberal Protestantism, and also his prominent position within the University of Heidelberg. From 1909 to 1914, Troeltsch represented the university in the lower chamber of the parliament of the grand duchy of Baden. He was especially known for his numerous publications. On the basis of religious-historical comparison in his famous lecture *Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte* (The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religion, Tübingen, 1902), he denied to Christianity its traditional claim of absoluteness and relative superiority as the religion of personality. In *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft* (Psychology and Epistemology in the Study of Religion, Tübingen, 1905), an essay presented to the International Congress of Arts and Sciences in Saint Louis in 1904, he connected William James's psychological pragmatism with the Neo-Kantian assumption of empirically independent structures of consciousness to form a theory of the "religious *a priori*." In accordance with this, the production of religious ideas is seen as a constitutive accomplishment of human subjectivity. In *Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft* (*Writings on Theology and Religion*, 1977, pp. 82–123), Troeltsch sought to explicate the independence of religion on four levels: First, empirically given religion should be analyzed according to a psychology of religion as an autonomous phenomenon of life that is constitutive for all culture. Second, in the epistemology of religion, the level of reality proper to religious consciousness must be rationally justified. Third, within a special historical philosophy of religions, the general concept of religion should be realized specifically and concretely in terms of the plurality of real existing religions for comparative religious-historical studies. Fourth, a metaphysics of religion

bases the religious understanding of worldly reality upon the self-revelation of God. In this way, the universal history of religion should be proven to be the progressive revelation of God, and the presence of the absolute would be demonstrated in finite consciousness.

Troeltsch was not, however, able to carry out this great program. The concept of the religious *a priori* remained especially unclear. For Troeltsch only partially appropriated Kant's understanding of *a priori* structures of consciousness. He could do justice to the statement that the pious subject knows itself—or all finite reality—to be grounded in a divine substance only insofar as he understood the *a priori* as a product not proper to the intellect. To presuppose objects of cognition as directly given, however, contradicted the Kantian point of departure of his argumentation. The more Troeltsch sought to explain, in numerous small monographs on the philosophy of religion, the relationship of the religious consciousness to reality, the less he could still do justice to Kant's criticism. Although in close personal contact with the leading German representatives of Neo-Kantianism, Troeltsch did not share their basic assumptions.

After the turn of the century, in addition to his studies in the philosophy of religion, Troeltsch published in relatively quick succession several cultural-historical investigations into the profound transformation of the Christian consciousness during the transition to the modern period. These include the large treatise, *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit* (Protestant Christianity and the Church in the Modern Age, in Paul Hinneberg, ed., *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, Part 1, Section 4.1, Berlin and Leipzig, 1906; 1922, 3d ed.), on the basis of which the University of Greifswald conferred on him an honorary doctorate in philosophy, and a famous lecture, *Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt* (Munich, 1906; 1911, 2d ed.; abridged English version, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*, London and New York, 1912). Both show the strong influence of Max Weber's investigations of 1904–1905 into the genetic connections between Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. And Weber, in turn, was strongly influenced by Troeltsch's understanding of Lutheranism as a politically as well as economically premodern, patriarchal religion. Moreover, indications of the significance of the ascetic work-ethic of Calvinism for the development of capitalism can already be found in Troeltsch's work before the appearance of his friend's famous essays on Protestantism. The very close, seventeen-year friendship meant a substantial scholarly enrichment for both Troeltsch and Weber.

It is true that Troeltsch had established a sociological foundation for his understanding of the church even before the meeting with Weber. However, it was only under the influence of his friend that he distinguished precisely between church and sect as different types of religious community-building. *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (The Social Doctrines of Christian Churches and Groups), which, already partially published in 1908–1910, appeared in 1912 as the first volume of Troeltsch's collected works, also shows, however, significant sociological differences between the friends. Troeltsch wanted to present the social and ethical consequences of the Christian conceptual world and its interaction with cultural phenomena. The eschatological ideal of the kingdom of God of the Gospels stands in a relationship of unresolvable tension to the facticities of culture. Nevertheless, in that the church institutionalizes the grace of redemption sacramentally, it can become the place of salvation for the masses and fit the Christian concepts to the political-social order and its needs for legitimation. In contrast to this, the sects, small groups on the margin of society with demands for high achievement on their members, radicalize the tensions of religion and society to the point of absolute opposition between the norms of culture and the *lex Christi*, the Sermon on the Mount.

From the types of church and sect, Troeltsch further distinguished mysticism as the third particular social form of Christianity. Here the opposites of religion and society are reconciled within the pious subject himself, to the extent that he knows himself to be a participant in the divine spirit and he glimpses the true reality of the kingdom of God in a purely spiritual and universal brotherhood of those gifted by God. Troeltsch especially ascribed to his third type significant historical effects for modern Christianity. Weber, however, did not consider mysticism to be a separate social form of religion. This difference is the expression of contradicting evaluations of the real meaning of religion for modern societies. Unlike Weber, Troeltsch was convinced that, even under the conditions of Western rationalism, religion was an extremely important factor in societal formation. He understood the Christian tradition primarily as a force for the strengthening of individual autonomy over against the depersonalizing developmental tendencies of modern capitalism. Moreover, the church's tradition had to be provided with a new cultural credibility; that is, "religious individualism," inspired by the mystical tradition, which had been forced out of the evangelical church, had to be again given a right to exist within a "flexible church of the people" (*Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, Tübingen, 1913, p. 105). In connection with Schleiermacher's program of a practically ori-

ented theology of consciousness, Troeltsch interpreted dogmatic statements as self-communications of the genuine Protestant consciousness, as is shown especially in *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben* (1911; translated as *The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith*, in *Writings on Theology and Religion*, 1967, pp. 182–207) and in his posthumously edited lectures on *Die Glaubenslehre* (Munich and Leipzig, 1925).

In the spring of 1915 Troeltsch was transferred to Berlin by the minister for cultural affairs. The chair he occupied there was renamed specifically for him, as a professorship in "religious, social, and historical philosophy and the history of Christian religion" and was transferred from the theological to the philosophical faculty.

With his moving to the capital of the empire, Troeltsch's intensive political activity quickly gained in public significance. Troeltsch interpreted World War I as an imperialistic power struggle, at the root of which lay not only economic antagonisms, but also deep-seated political and cultural contradictions between the German spirit and Western rationality. In spite of this connection with his earlier analyses of the social and ethical differences between Lutheranism and Calvinism, Troeltsch was not a theoretician of a separate political way for Germany. Since 1916 he had been fighting for a thorough democratization of the imperial constitution, the political integration of the parties of the workers' movement, and economic reforms aimed at breaking down class differences. This was reflected in manifold activities for the limitation of war and for peace negotiations. Troeltsch was a delegate of the leftist-liberal German Democratic party in the Prussian state assembly and undersecretary in the Prussian ministry for cultural affairs. After defeat and revolution, he was one of the leading representatives of that small minority in German Protestantism that interceded for the acceptance of the constitutional compromise of Weimar and for its concrete actualization as a social democracy.

In close connection with his political and practical activity, Troeltsch turned his attention in Berlin primarily to this question: to what extent could normative approaches to the solution of the present cultural crisis be found in the European cultural tradition? Because of his sudden death on 1 February 1923, Troeltsch was not able to realize concretely his program for a "European cultural synthesis." However, the basic theological structure of Troeltsch's philosophy of history can be recognized in the lectures *Christian Thought: Its History and Application* (London, 1923), edited by his friend Friedrich von Hügel (1852–1925), the so-called lay bishop of Roman Catholic modernism, and also the con-

cluding part of *Das logische Problem der Geschichtsphilosophie* (The Logical Problem of the Philosophy of History), the first book of *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (Historicism and its Problems), which appeared in 1922 as the third volume of the *Gesammelte Schriften*. Troeltsch now expressly restricted to the European-American cultural arena the old claim of Christianity to a position of relative superiority among the world religions. To pretend to understand foreign cultures was cultural imperialism. Against monistic worldviews, which presuppose that a universal history of humanity can be recognized, Troeltsch argued for a pluralistic understanding of reality. In that he was guided by the theological insight that an overview of history is possible only for God, but not for finite persons.

In the antiliberal, mostly antidemocratic, German Protestant theology of the 1920s, Troeltsch's cultural relativism encountered intensive criticism. Since the 1960s, however, one can see—on the international level as well as on an interdisciplinary level—a notable renaissance of interest in Troeltsch's thought. Indeed his theology of cultural modesty is important, in that it permits central problems of contemporary theological and philosophical discussion—for instance, the pluralism of religious traditions, the dependency of theology upon contexts, the relationship of Christianity to cultural modernity—to be grasped outside of all claims of dogmatic absolutism.

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Smart et al. (Cambridge and New York, 1985); and my and Hartmut Ruddies' "Ernst Troeltsch: Geschichtsphilosophie in praktischer Absicht," in *Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen*, vol. 8, edited by Joseph Speck (Göttingen, 1986). A critical biography of Troeltsch does not yet exist. However, there are detailed studies for a biography of the young Troeltsch in *Troeltsch-Studien*, vol. 1, *Untersuchungen zur Biographie und Werkgeschichte: Mit den unveröffentlichten Promotionsthesen der "Kleinen Göttinger Fakultät" 1888–1893*, edited by Horst Renz and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf (Gutersloh, 1982).

Jean Séguy's *Christianisme et société: Introduction à la sociologie de Ernst Troeltsch* (Paris, 1980) offers an instructive introduction to Troeltsch's sociology of religion. Intensive work has also been done on Troeltsch's dogmatics and theory of religion. See *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*, edited by John Powell Clayton (Cambridge, 1976); B. A. Gerrish's *The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage* (Edinburgh, 1982); Walter E. Wyman, Jr.'s *The Concept of Glaubenslehre: Ernst Troeltsch and the Theological Heritage of Schleiermacher* (Chico, Calif., 1983); Sarah Coakley's *Christ without Absolutes: A Study of the Christology of Ernst Troeltsch* (Oxford, 1986); and *Troeltsch-Studien*, vol. 3, *Protestantismus und Neuzeit*, edited by Horst Renz and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, (Gutersloh, 1984). In addition to studies in the reception of Troeltsch's thought in the Anglo-American world, in Italy, and in the Netherlands, this last volume contains detailed examinations of Troeltsch's political activity. Moreover, an instructive introduction is offered by Arrigo Rapp in *Il problema della Germania negli scritti politici di E. Troeltsch, 1914–1922* (Rome, 1978).

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Translated from German by Charlotte Prather

TRUBETSKOI, EVGENII (1863–1920), Russian Orthodox philosopher. Evgenii Nikolaevich Trubetskoi, a brother of Sergei, was professor of philosophy at the University of Moscow from 1905 to 1918. He developed his philosophical views within the same general context as did Vladimir Solov'ev and was the author of a major study on him, *Mirosozertsanie Solov'eva* (Solov'ev's Worldview, 2 vols., Moscow, 1913). A theoretical disagreement with Solov'ev, which did not stand in the way of their friendship, led Trubetskoi to study Western theocratic ideas. In his two-volume *Religiozno-obshchestvennyi ideal zapadnogo khristianstva* (The Religio-Social Ideal of Western Christianity, Moscow, 1892; Kiev, 1897), which focused on Augustine and the medieval papacy, he concluded that a religious institution's primary responsibilities were incompatible with that institution's exercise of political power.

In his philosophy, Trubetskoi blended philosophical idealism, traditional Orthodoxy, and a voluntaristic-exhortative creed that shaded off into political activism. His posthumously published *Smysl zhizni* (Meaning of

Life) was popular among the Russian émigrés whom it provided with the much-needed assertion that there was meaning in existence.

Trubetskoi was instrumental in stimulating increased interest in religious philosophy. He was active in the Moscow Psychological Society, in the Religio-Philosophical Society of Vladimir Solov'ev (named after the philosopher), and in the publishing house Put' (The Way). All three, on different levels, popularized metaphysics, religion, and, tangentially, liberalism. Trubetskoi worked for reform of the Russian Orthodox church and for a greater involvement of the laity in the church. He was appointed to the pre-Sobor meeting in 1906 that prepared for institutionalizing self-government in the church and was elected to the church council that pronounced the reestablishment of the patriarchate in 1917.

Evgenii Trubetskoi in his writing focused both on the individual, as the carrier of value, and on the state, which establishes conditions that can make moral value effective. He published a number of important works in law, and led between 1906 and 1910 a small moderate political party, the Party of Peaceful Regeneration. At the same time he edited the *Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik* (Moscow Weekly), a journal in which he expounded upon public issues. In 1910 he joined the Constitutional Democratic Party. During World War I his patriotic brochures, especially one containing an analysis of icons titled *Umozrenie v kraskakh* (Speculation in Colors), were quite popular.

Trubetskoi based his liberalism not on the will of the majority but on the rights inherent in each individual. He saw the state as a necessary buffer between the majority, which could, on occasion, be illiberal, and the individual. Equally outspoken about the dangers of violence from the left as from the right, he condemned the terrorist actions of radicals that the Russian progressives tended to condone.

Trubetskoi was an early and uncompromising foe of the Bolsheviks. In the last years of his life he placed great hopes on the innate religiosity and conservatism of the Russian peasants to overthrow the oppressive Bolshevik regime. He died in Novorossisk, fleeing the Bolsheviks and predicting their early demise.

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There is no comprehensive study of Evgenii Trubetskoi. His philosophical views are discussed in the standard works on Russian philosophy. I have written an introduction to a new edition of his memoirs, *Iz proshlago* (Newtonville, Mass., 1976), in which can also be found a bibliography of his major works.

MARTHA BOHACHEVSKY-CHOMIAK

TRUBETSKOI, SERGEI (1862–1905), scion of an old noble family in Russia, was professor of philosophy at the University of Moscow. Weeks before his death Sergei Nikolaevich Trubetskoi became the university's first elected rector. He was instrumental in popularizing philosophical idealism. His philosophical and religious convictions led him to take public stands on the major issues of the day, positions which brought him national prominence. At an audience with the tsar in June 1905 Prince Trubetskoi was the spokesman of the moderate liberals. A close confidant of Vladimir Solov'ev, Trubetskoi worked within the philosophical tradition of idealism that encompassed Plato, Kant, the Russian Slavophiles, especially Ivan Kireevskii, and the Western mystics, particularly Jakob Boehme. Trubetskoi's interest in the history of philosophy led him to the history of religion. He wrote an introduction to the Russian edition of Karl Barth's *Religions of India* and prepared a bibliography on the history of religion for the Russian edition of P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Illustrated History of Religions*.

Trubetskoi's work was based on philological as well as historical study and demonstrates an amalgamation of philosophical and religious concerns. He maintained that while no strictly philosophical system can solve all the problems raised by philosophy, Christianity does hold solutions to these problems. For Trubetskoi, *sophia* (wisdom) is an intermediary between the absolute and humanity. He argued that the Logos, which he traced not to the philosophy of the Greeks but to Jewish gnosticism, refers to the concrete person of Christ rather than to a rational concept that might be linked to *sophia*. He rejected the notion of God as the absolute actualizing itself in history since, in his view, the absolute, by its very nature, could not be in the process of becoming. Trubetskoi held that Christianity, with its absolute and autonomous system of morality, is the vehicle through which the potential for the kingdom of God can be realized.

The source of true knowledge, according to Trubetskoi, lay in reason, sensibility, innate ideas, mystical experience, and faith, all of which reflect what he refers to as the "concrete consciousness" of each individual. Knowledge is possible because the human being is conscious of an external reality and is also part of that reality. Consciousness is not solely the function of the individual but of the species collectively. Hence, Trubetskoi considered the consciousness of causality to be both innate and based upon external reality. In his statement, "Whenever I make any decision I hold within myself a conference about all with all," Trubetskoi encapsulated a theory he characterized as "metaphysical socialism."

Because human beings have the capacity to reason, Trubetskoi argued, it follows that humankind can rise above natural causes and act morally. Eventually, humanity or society can develop the capacity to become a real organism, an eternal person. Although Trubetskoi posited the collectivity of consciousness, he maintained that value lay with the individual, since it is the individual who can reason and know. He defended the immortality of the individual soul and the freedom of the individual from external constraints. His conscious attempts to popularize philosophy drew him into the public arena. The reactionary wing of the Russian Orthodox clergy, which resented lay interference and the intrusion of philosophy into religion, accused Trubetskoi of undermining religion, while in actuality he sought to make it meaningful to the educated.

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TRUTH. The concept of religious truth expresses various aspects of human experience: reality that is permanent, immeasurable, unconcealed, effective, powerful; personal character that is sincere, good, genuine, valuable; and knowledge that is certain, accurate, pure, clear, and convincing. Truth emerges out of the basic human experience of valuation (both as assessment and appreciation) as a necessity for human survival and well-being. Human life is characterized by the need to distinguish between what is real and unreal, powerful and powerless, genuine and deceptive, pure and contaminated, clear and confused, as well as relative degrees of one extreme or the other. In an attempt to understand the character and variation of the existential engagement with truth in different religious traditions, we can recognize three aspects of truth: (1) the charac-

ter of accurate knowing, (2) the nature of the reality known, and (3) the formation of value as the power to actualize this reality in authentic living. As a general concept, religious truth can be defined as the knowledge and expression of what-is for the purpose of achieving the greatest well-being possible (i.e., salvation, absolute freedom, or total harmony).

Inherent in religious truth is the recognition that a person who knows, manifests, or orients his or her life to ultimate reality is achieving ultimate transformation—for example, being saved or attaining complete liberation. In knowing the truth a person becomes authentic because he or she places his or her self-consciousness in a comprehensive context of what-is. The object of religious knowing is not simply information about another thing or person; it is recognition of the deepest reality or resource for fulfillment of life. Such an object, called God, the Dharma, the Tao, *tathatā* ("thusness"), or *nirvāṇa*, is not a conventional object in a subject-object relationship, but the original source, the nature, or quality of all conventional objects as they really are. This understanding of truth cannot be limited to a conception of truth as a relationship between words or between ideas and things (though words, ideas, and mental images may evoke the quality of truth whereby self-consciousness responds appropriately to what-is). Religious truth entails the continuing development of a valid relationship between self-consciousness and one's most extended and most profound environment (reality).

When people express religious truth, they are aware of different levels, kinds, or functions of truth. At the extremes are absolute and relative truth, or transcendent and conventional truth. The former expresses the deepest reality, the sacred, God, or "what-is"; the latter indicates accurate information about life the importance of which is limited to specific situations and short-term goals. The assumption of all religious truth is that personal estimations of what-is or decisions of momentary value must be affirmed only insofar as they are an aspect of the transcendent or absolute truth. Such absolute truth transcends and incorporates the concerns defined by information dependent on time-space conditions; it establishes an overarching value in relation to which the information has significance and meaning. This value is not external to the reality experienced, as an idea about something or a momentary feeling would be. Rather, it is experienced as a total orienting impetus providing coherence for the ideas and feelings that prompt a person to act in a certain way. Thus, truth is the valuation achieved by self-consciousness as it becomes a particular organizing center of self-

awareness, meaning, feeling, and action—an individual participating in, and responding to, reality.

To respond appropriately or accurately to what-is can be understood as a release of ultimate power enabling a person to avoid self-deception and dissipating entanglement with unimportant activities and destructive forces. Religious truth is a transforming orientation leading to superlative well-being, known in traditional religious terms as the conversion from sin to salvation, illusion to insight, bondage to freedom, and chaos to order. It expresses not only what is apparent or of relative worth but also what-is at the deepest level. From the standpoint of sin, bondage, or chaos, this ultimate reality is experienced as what *ought* to be. By affirming the highest truth, a person declares a strategy for both knowing the ultimate reality and actualizing it in his or her daily experience, because such truth is of highest value for achieving superlative well-being. It expresses a comprehensive purpose as part of a person's perception of reality.

In world religions, truth is advocated as a corrective to three general sorts of deception: (1) intentional deception between people, or lying; (2) error due to lack of information; and (3) an inclination toward self-deception. These are interrelated because, in the last analysis, the expression of truth between people and the correction of ignorance find their capacity in the awareness developed through a continuing effort to avoid self-deception about "the way things really are." People often lie to each other in the sense that they deceive themselves about their own deepest resource; they lack information about ultimate values and reality because they are too easily satisfied by short-term pleasures.

At the same time, there is a wide range of solutions to self-deception in the different world religions. This is due to the fact that there are different orientations having different structures of valuation for determining which way of being authentic is really the best and which is derivative or secondary. Since truth is a solution to a process of self-deception, the correcting process that communicates and actualizes what-is at the deepest level, and thus what ought to be, is a comprehensive transformation of one's life-orientation. To examine different expressions of truth in world religions, we must not only look at different ideas about truth as a conceptual formulation but describe the processes in which the truth as description or information about reality is also a reevaluation of what is significant in life. We will look at five different approaches or ways of knowing the truth so that it might actualize the deepest well-being possible, sometimes specified as the good, heaven, salvation, liberation, or total harmony. These

approaches to truth are (1) intimate experience of spiritual presence(s), (2) symbolic duplication of sacred reality through myth and ritual, (3) cultivation of appropriate relationships, (4) awakening transcendent consciousness, and (5) cognition of necessary and eternal realities. Then we will consider some of the problems of formulating and reformulating the deepest truth in relation to other, general claims to truth in changing historical and social contexts.

Intimate Experience of Spiritual Presence(s). One way of knowing the ultimate truth is the awareness of what-is through the extraordinary experience of spiritual presence(s). These are most often unseen but powerful, controlling forces in life. This type of truth does not appeal for its validity to universal ideas or the coherence and meaning of culturally accepted symbols, even though the social-mythic system communicates the reality of these powerful presences in symbolic and mythic language. For this type of truth the adequacy and meaning of reality is encountered by direct personal acquaintance with usually unseen spiritual presences as they provide healing, regenerative resources, wholeness, and joy. The validity of this truth depends on the intimate and direct experience of such a presence. I shall describe two kinds of intimate knowledge of sacred presence. The first is found in many archaic cultures in North and South America, Africa, Siberia, and the South Pacific islands; it is expressed in the ecstatic experiences of diviners and shamans. The second is found in the ecstatic devotion to, and often prophetic utterance for, God in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and the theistic forms of Hinduism.

An essential element of this religious knowledge is the rupture of conventional, everyday experience, a personal, heightened sensitivity to the usually hidden, but ultimately real, presence of power(s). While the wisdom of the shaman is often described as "supernatural," it is probably better to regard this—from the standpoint of the advocates—as a deeper or clearer knowledge of the natural forces that make all life possible. For example, the *kilumba* or *nganga* (one who possesses a healing vision) among the Bantu-speaking Luba in Africa is a man who is "seized" by a spirit or disembodied ancestor in order to reveal why some person or a society has inappropriately interfered with the powers of life and therefore has manifested disease, social disharmony, or natural catastrophe. Or, among the Huichol of north-central Mexico, the shaman (*mara'akáme*) is a person who is more deeply aware of the hidden forces contending with each other; he has transcended the apparent conditions of conventional existence and becomes the medium or mouthpiece of these forces in life. The un-

sual character of his knowledge is described as coming from the spirits (divine powers), who know and determine everyday happenings.

The shamanic communication requires crossing over from the biosphere to a hidden (spiritual) plane and then returning to the mundane world. The mundane sphere is a state of separation, pollution, and mortality, as evidenced by illness and social conflict. The hidden, but more powerful (spirit) realm is also one of contending forces who (which) can be benevolent or beneficent toward the members of the biosphere. The shaman needs to have the capacity and skill to maintain a balance between the contending forces; he engages the spirit forces as they "possess" him while deftly remaining balanced between two worlds. According to the Tucano of the Amazon forests, the soul of the shaman (*payé*) is said to be luminous, penetrating the darkness, and generative of life and health—like the sun. His skill and purity of soul allow him to ascend to the sky or descend into the netherworld, described as "death" or "dismemberment," and then return to the everyday world.

When the shaman becomes "possessed" by a spirit, his ecstatic experience is interpreted by the audience within a cosmology that affirms hidden vital forces, and his "seizure" is seen as a sign that they will soon hear the voices or sounds of these spirits that will aid them in dealing with vital problems. The truth of the shaman's utterances, then, is part of a total orientation to life in which the members of the community respond emotionally, socially, and physically to the perceived forces affecting them day in and day out. Shamanic utterances are distinguished in these societies from psychotic experiences among the people by their predictive force and concrete results in solving problems. At the same time, when the utterances of a recognized shaman are not effective by empirical examination, some extenuating circumstance, such as impurity or inadequate following of a prescription, can be given to account for the failure.

The second kind of religious truth that requires an intimate knowledge of a sacred presence is the overwhelming experience of a devotee to God. This, too, requires a sense of a usually hidden force that directs one's life as well as all existence. Direct personal experiences of God in Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism are described as awesome, uncanny; they can provoke fear and terror. At the same time, they can provide deep comfort, evoke a sense of wonder and joy of life, and transform one's self-consciousness from a feeling of weakness, corruption, and worthlessness to strength, purity of heart, and profound value. In the theistic tra-

ditions of all cultures are found examples of pious devotees whose personal experiences of God are described as spontaneous eruptions of a divine force that, on the one hand, compels them to lead a new kind of existence and, on the other, provides a serene strength to meet life's traumas of personal loss, illness, and death. The devotee who lives his or her life in the presence of divine love and judgment feels reconnected with the source of life, so that even when mundane life is seen as full of evil and impotency, there is confidence in the divine power's ability to overcome the apparent meaninglessness and self-destructiveness.

The validity of the truth known from personal experience depends directly on an evaluation of one's self-consciousness within the context of a transcendent presence of the powers of life or the Holy One. The awareness is perceived as an overwhelming disclosure that transcends other norms of validity, such as empirical verification or rational analysis. Such divine disclosure provides a direction for living and a principle for knowledge not available in other norms of validity. The response to this disclosure is faith or trust in the final control of a powerful, loving, and caring divine presence. In the last analysis, such a divine presence remains a mystery, one that cannot be controlled by personal wants or verified by the mundane experience of health or prosperity. The response of faith is one of service in (and servitude to) the divine will. The truth known in such response is validated by the devotee in the experience of being known by the Holy One.

Symbolic Duplication of Sacred Reality Through Myth and Ritual. Symbolic expressions of truth in the form of divine words, sacred myths, and sacramental rites and initiations are found throughout the world. They reflect the power of symbolic gestures and language to construct a realm of meaning. While often combined with the experience of powerful forces and the sense of social obligation and order, the communicative power of religious symbolic forms is found in their capacity to express several levels of meaning simultaneously, so that such activities as dancing, eating together, body marking, telling stories, and the use of special words or sounds can have more than a single signification. Verbal language, especially, has the mental-emotional force to construct multiple levels of meaning whereby self-consciousness attends to, and structures, experienced reality. The formation of ideas woven together by syntax (i.e., language) identifies and orders (often overlapping) conceptual units of consciousness into meaningful awareness. Thinking or imagining is more than a presentation of external sensations to the mind; the formation of ideas is a projec-

tion of self-consciousness toward, and into, the sensations of the experienced world. To speak about the world creates a relationship of symbolic meaning between self-consciousness and the world. The use of language demands a choice whereby a person separates one "thing" from another, classifies similar appearances into concepts, and makes evaluations between more or less significant features of one's experience.

The power of language to construct a symbolic realm of meaning relates self-consciousness to the world by creating a "center" in the individual and, at the same time, placing the individual in a universe "as it is"—that is, as it appears directly to self-consciousness. Thus, symbols that express truth are those consistent with the deepest (often presumed) valuation inherent in one's experience. Religious symbols are those mental-emotional lenses that provide images of oneself (a psychology) and the universe (a cosmology); they teach human beings not only what to see, but how to see. As scholars of mythology have pointed out, religious myths are those symbolic expressions that are recognized as true simply by being expressed.

A religious symbol, such as a divine name, sacred myth, ritual action, or visual image of a deity, is seen by religious advocates as the manifestation of a pure, original, mysterious, and powerful reality in a particular concrete form. The symbolic bodily gesture, sound, or physical image is a paradigm of reality—divine reality. Myths and rituals are repetitions of original life-creating actions by the gods, primal ancestors, and cultural heroes and, therefore, must be carefully preserved and meticulously duplicated. They disclose the divine resource that makes any life at all possible. It is the sacred that is eternal, genuine, whole, and pure—the opposite of the profane, corrupt, and fragmented mundane human experience—yet, paradoxically, it is expressed in and through the mundane form, where it usually remains hidden. The religious power of the symbols derives precisely from the fact that they claim to repeat the primal action of creation, the divine rescue of the world from devouring demons, or to describe the joys of paradise in the eternal realm. In providing the paradigmatic truth regarding reality, myth and ritual also provide a model for successful human living. The appeal to divine action is a basic principle of justification for social relations, morality, and, in many cases, all human activities.

Sacred words (divine names, sacred actions and laws, blessings, curses) and sounds (*mantras*, chants) are perceived by religious devotees to have a special capacity to release power. According to the perspective of Mīmāṃsā, a school of Hindu philosophical thought, the sacredness of *mantras* (sacred sounds, phrases, or

verses) derives from the eternity of the word. The use of the *mantra* in prayer, meditation, or worship reveals the deity or divine energy because the sound is intrinsically related to the divine energy; it is an eternal causal principle. The sound (*śabda*) of words is not arbitrary; it represents an eternal principle or force that is manifested in many forms of changing existence. The *mantras*, thus, express the essence of divine powers in their very repetition; the sacred utterance in the hymns of the *R̥gveda* is a direct testimony to the primal energies of the universe. This view is basic for several subsequent Hindu theistic schools that appealed to the validity of verbal testimony on the basis of the intrinsic power of sound (speech) to express the eternal principles so long as the revealer, the source of knowledge, is adequate.

In Zoroastrianism, a sacred utterance, the Ashem Vohu, is used in most devotions to concentrate a person's mind on *asha* ("truth"). *Asha* is the name of an abstract principle of truth or righteousness in the cosmos, but also the name of a divinity often invoked in the *Gāthās*, one of the Amesha Spentas ("bounteous immortals"). As one of the immanent powers who maintain the universe, Asha is also symbolically identified with fire, a focus of much Zoroastrian ritual. In this religious tradition, truth is symbolically expressed in a divine name, a concrete ritual image, and evoked through a sacred prayer. In Islam, "truth," as identical to reality (*al-ḥaqq*), is an attribute of God, the creator of the world and maintainer of righteousness. *Al-ḥaqq* is that which is steadfast and permanent; it is genuine and authentic. God, as the reality, is the source of truth for humanity, especially as found in the sacred recitation (Qur'ān) given to Muḥammad.

The validity for truth in religious symbolic expression, then, is found in the recognition that its source is eternal, of the realm of the sacred. The activity of God, of bounteous spiritual beings, or of primal ancestors is the real and significant activity. The duplication of the sacred realm in symbolic gestures, physical objects, names, stories, and sounds provides the paradigm for meaning, regeneration in life cycles, and the norm for righteousness. True human knowledge and behavior imitates that of the gods or God. In religious initiations, sacrifices, and sacraments, people release eternal power that purifies as it discloses the foundation for human well-being. The deepest problems in life arise from forgetting one's sacred source, neglecting to repeat the sacred action symbolically, or rejecting the sacred word (such as the Jewish Torah, Jesus Christ as the divine word made flesh, or the Muslim Qur'ān) as the basis for all well-being. When the effects expected from following the sacred rituals and words are not attained, the dev-

otee usually recognizes some failure in perfectly duplicating the sacred paradigm. When there are conflicting myths competing for the loyalty of believers, the sacred reality of one myth is often judged to be demonic power by those holding another myth (an exclusive position), or it is seen as a lesser but related aspect of the true sacred reality according to advocates of another myth (an inclusive position).

Cultivation of Appropriate Relationships. Another approach to truth that expresses self-consciousness of what-is is through practical moral wisdom characterized by honesty, trustworthiness, and sincerity. Here the emphasis is on moral action that is consistent with personal integrity. This approach holds that a person cannot truly know the nature of reality without demonstrating what it means to “be” in everyday activities. The means for attaining wisdom combines intuition with observation and learning drawn from ancient tradition. We will discuss first the expression of this truth from Chinese and Indian sources, which appeal to a natural cosmic order (law), and then briefly note several theistic expressions whose ultimate source is divine but that emphasize the moral character of truth.

In the classical Chinese expression of truth there is no sharp distinction between the knowledge of what-is and a person’s moral action. Authentic awareness of reality is expressed more in daily practice than formulated in arguments about the nature of the good. The law of life is known not through a personal experience of a divine presence, duplication of a sacred word, or rational reflection; rather it is known through living out a sensitivity to the inherent cosmic harmony within the self and the world. Moral wisdom is found typified in the ancient Sage Kings by the phrase “sageliness within and kingliness without.” The goal is to develop a moral attitude that is tested in social relationships, one that is based on the general notion that there is an intrinsic order in all things that must be actualized in concrete relationships with nature and society.

Truth in both verbal expression and behavior is defined as *ch’ang* (“constant”). A statement or behavior is “constant” when it promotes appropriate relationships within an organic order. Thus, truth is not an idea or abstraction but a human expression that shapes practical behavior. It has a practical function in communication that attempts to promote good behavior. In the Confucian classic *Chung yung* (Doctrine of the Mean) the insight into the way (*tao*) of life focuses on “sincerity” (*ch’eng*). Sincerity is the demonstration that one perceives the reality of all life; it is a manifestation of the ultimate coherence between self-consciousness and the objective world. The capacity to cultivate such sincerity or integrity is inherent in human beings, but its

actualization is not inevitable, so the potential must be fulfilled by constant personal effort.

In classical Hinduism, also, there is the recognition that truth about what-is is most profoundly expressed in everyday activity. From the beginning of the common era, when the Brahmanic tradition that grew out of Vedic rituals was synthesized with a concern for social order, down to the present a prominent notion has been that of *dharma* (“law, reality, truth”). The cosmic order that pervaded all things is expressed also in appropriate social relationships. The *dharma*, what people should do, is the correct arrangement of everything in life. Knowledge of oneself is found in following one’s *dharma*, one’s way of being in relation to the organic whole. Everything and everybody has a place in the universe. The moral duties of farmer and ruler, husband and wife, or child and parent were defined by their appropriateness to each person’s station. To act contrary to one’s obligations and responsibilities destroys one’s own character and creates chaos in society and nature.

According to the Brahmanic text *Manusmṛiti* (The Laws of Manu) the sources for knowing one’s *dharma* were first the Veda, then the tradition, then the virtuous conduct of the religious leaders and holy men, and, finally, self-satisfaction. Most of the society did not study the Vedas, so they learned appropriate conduct from the tradition as expressed in popular stories, festivals, and social rules as they were reinforced by interaction with others. The truth of one’s existence was defined by participation in the fabric of society, and the cultivation of personal character was found in the virtues of sincerity, self-restraint, and honesty.

In the theistic traditions of Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Islam there has also been a deep sense of expressing truth through moral behavior. Truth is expressed in the qualities of veracity, integrity, and trustworthiness. In Zoroastrianism, truth (*asha*) is the order that governs human conduct. Those who are honest, keep their oaths and covenants, and are loyal to Ahura Mazdā are the righteous ones (*ashavan*), those who uphold *asha*. They look for the final victory over the wicked (*drugvant*), those who follow falsehood. In Judaism, truth (*’emeth*) is expressed in righteousness, justice, and peace. In such actions Jews worship “the God of truth.” God keeps his word, and those who speak the truth come near him. Thus, those who avoid deceit and hypocrisy in all their dealings practice the truth. In Islam, the word *ṣadaqa* means integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness. It is the quality of expression when one tells the truth; it requires that a person be honest with himself or herself and with others, as well as recognize the actual situation with which one is dealing. To express the truth is

to follow the will of God, since he is the source of everything. A statement that corresponds to reality is an action that is trustworthy.

Awakening Transcendent Consciousness. A fourth religious way that truth is viewed as the accurate self-consciousness of what-is focuses on the quality of consciousness. Rather than centering the nature of truth on the intimate experience of a spiritual presence, on the symbolic structuring of a sacred realm of meaning, or on cultivating appropriate relationships within a cosmic network, the power by which one can attain comprehensive well-being is the liberating insight that purifies inner dispositions, attitudes, and the thinking-feeling processes—all aspects of consciousness.

The truth of oneself and the world is perhaps partially expressed in symbolic imagery, ideas, and behavior, but the key condition for attaining true (or transcendent) knowledge, say the practitioners of this way, is the avoidance of attachment to these conventional habits of knowing. Here the concern to transform the manner or mode of knowing from a self-limiting, fabricating, and distorting process to a freeing, direct-intuitive insight is crucial because it is assumed that there is an intrinsic and reciprocal relation between the knowing process and the reality known. It is also assumed that there are different qualities of knowing, each of which leads to one or another kind of "becoming real." For anything to exist, it has to come into existence, or "become something," within the context of some manner of perception, process of knowing, and mode of consciousness. The concept of realization includes the two elements of knowing and becoming, as when we say that someone realizes certain possibilities. To realize transcendent consciousness requires a shift away from the conventional habits of consciousness aimed at perceiving (understanding) what-is. In this shift to another process of knowing, a person also comes to exist, "becomes," in a new way.

The highest truth, then, in this approach requires insight into the nature of the process of becoming; it stresses how a person contributes positively or negatively to this process by the manner or quality of his or her awareness. This means that the expression of truth must "fit" the level or quality of the hearer. Truth is not a single idea or proposition that stands eternally and to which all particular forms partially correspond. Ideas and concepts are useful as pointers to truth, or catalysts for freeing a person from habitual mental-emotional entanglements, but a statement that would "fit" a lower spiritual condition, and thus be "true," might be denied as an appropriate expression for someone at a higher level of spirituality. Because thought, emotions, and inner dispositions are interrelated, say the teachers of this way, a true statement is not a universal abstraction, an

idea known by the intellect, but a catalyst for insight. Also, the hearer of truth must be prepared to receive it; for a religious idea to bear spiritual fruit, it must be received with a pure heart, or liberated mind. Such an apprehension requires more than intellectual skills or socially conditioned reflex responses; it is cultivated through serenity, courage, diligence, and love (compassion). To know the highest truth, then, is an illumination of "becoming" as an aspect of what-is, which is experienced as unconditional freedom.

The methods for attaining insight, which liberate one from self-imposed bondage according to several spiritual disciplines in India, include quieting the mind through meditation, separating oneself from conventional perceptual and emotional stimuli, sustained and detailed awareness of the factors in one's self-conscious "becoming," concentration (*samādhi*) on the unmoving or unifying center of consciousness, and various levels of mental absorption (*dhyāna*). These are techniques through which a person is reeducated to "see" himself or herself in relation to the world so that he or she is not constructing mental-emotional chains that cause suffering. For example, in Theravāda Buddhist practice, the meditation procedures are intended to help one to withdraw from external conditioning forces and to concentrate one's consciousness, so that one can avoid the habitual confusion of one's pure consciousness with the shifting appearances of things, people, ideas—all aspects of the "objective" world. Once a person is not attached to conventional perceptive and ideational imagery, he or she can expand consciousness through trance or mental absorption and eventually, in a freed state of mind, be intuitively aware of "the immeasurable" or "emptiness." In such a state of awareness, say the Buddhist *suttas*, the Buddha perceived the nature of "becoming" as dependent coarising and also understood the root cause of suffering and the possibility of its elimination. Similarly, classical Hindu Yoga advocated the use of certain body positions, controlled breathing, detachment of the senses from external objects, and concentrated mental states to quiet—that is, to avoid producing—conventional procedures of knowing, such as habitual perceptions, inference, memory, or authoritative (sacred) words. These conventional means of knowing are useful as practical vehicles for business, getting physical pleasure, or establishing social relationships, but they are not useful in knowing the deepest reality, pure consciousness (*puruṣa*). Yoga intends to free one from the small, limiting consciousness, or the image of one's ego, so that one may become directly aware of universal consciousness.

A common metaphor in both theistic and nontheistic religious traditions for the transcendent consciousness is the identity or union of the self with ultimate reality

(God). Well-known examples of this are found in Advaita Vedānta Hinduism, in Muslim Ṣūfī recollection of God, and in Christian mysticism. Śaṅkara (eighth century CE), as an exponent of “nondual highest knowledge” (*advaita vedānta*), asserted that a genuine and deep investigation into *dharma* led to the inquiry into *brahman*, the single undifferentiated reality that pervades all differentiated existence. The eternal *brahman* is pure being-consciousness-bliss (*sat-cit-ānanda*), and the most profound spiritual truth is to realize that self-consciousness (*ātman*) is identical to *brahman*. The Ṣūfī master Ibn al-‘Arabī expresses a comparable insight in his assertion that true submission to God is an all-pervading sense that the self vanishes in the only true reality, God. He says in his *Fuṣuṣ al-ḥikam*: “When you know yourself, your ‘I’-ness vanishes and you know that you and God are one and the same.”

The Spanish Christian mystic John of the Cross (1542–1591) makes a similar claim in his manual on spiritual discipline, *Ascent of Mount Carmel*, when he writes: “This union comes to pass when God grants the soul this supernatural favor, that all the things of God and the soul are one in participant transformation; and the soul seems to be God rather than a soul, and is indeed God by participation.” The soul, then, is like an unstained window that allows the divine rays to illuminate it and “transform it into its own light.” These examples indicate a common concern to know the highest truth through emptying the self of its conventional consciousness so that the ultimate reality itself is manifest; however, because mystics each use a distinctive method interwoven with their own psychological and cosmological concepts, their statements about the nature of consciousness and ultimate reality remain significantly different.

Cognition of Necessary and Eternal Realities. A fifth approach to the expression of truth is that found in classical Greek reflection on the nature of reality. While Greek philosophy is not a religious tradition in the conventional contemporary sense, Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle wrestled at a profound level with the relation between self-consciousness, the perceived world, and eternal reality (or realities). Their reflection had a significant influence on patristic and medieval Christian theology and on Islamic theology, as well as on the post-Renaissance European philosophical discussion of truth. Despite important differences in the understanding of truth found in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, they shared several assumptions in their approach that have been carried forward in the way Western philosophers, and some Christian and Muslim theologians, have addressed the issue of truth.

One of the basic assumptions is that reality (the being of things) is universal, necessary, and, consequently,

prior to any knowledge of it. Truth (Gr., *alētheia*, from *alētheuein*, “to disclose”) is a disclosure of what-is. Whether the eternal being is defined in terms of eternal ideas, as in Plato, or in terms of substances, as in Aristotle, the object of true knowledge is a necessary reality that is effective (even active) in the experienced world. The being of things is objective, presenting itself to the mind. Another important assumption is that whatever is real is intelligible; reality is that which can be known by the intellect. It has a signifying character, or a meaning of its own, which is known by cognition and, for Plato, intellectually contemplated by the mind. The “being” of things is the subject of any true judgment, which is basically a response to the disclosure of being. Whatever is real has a universal potential—it is potent and is a possibility—and is disclosed in particular forms and events. Plato asserted that being is itself a unity expressed by many particular forms, and such being is known by an integration of self-consistent judgments. By means of the intellect, human beings can know the universal potentials (reality), that is, can identify their meanings as they disclose themselves. By knowing the eternal ideas, especially the Good, human beings respond appropriately to life and achieve their own well-being.

In this context true knowledge is the mind’s inner appropriation of the universal potentials that are disclosed by cognitive judgments pertaining to the continually changing appearances of the outer world. The mind has both a passive and an active role in becoming aware of the meaning that is exposed in the changing appearances. The passive aspect receives the impressions through observation, while the active aspect constructs the meaning mentally, by thinking or judgment. In this act the self-consciousness appropriates to some degree the meaning inherent in the being of things. The truth cognized is the valuable quality of the meaning appropriated, and it is evident to the degree that the mind signifies to itself what is disclosed by what-is. In this approach to truth, then, the primary effort is to respond with the intellect to a meaning found in an impersonal but active reality outside the mind. Truth is universal and has an inherent signification that must be reflected by the intellectual grasp of that objective meaning. The basic conceptual signification of reality should be the same in the mental experience of all human beings, regardless of their particular languages or symbolic systems.

Unlike the approach to truth through myth and symbol (which establishes the true meaning in symbolic duplication of a sacred realm), the meaning in this approach is assumed to be in an external reality that is only reflected in corresponding concepts. When mental images or concepts that intend to signify the meaning

inherent in nonsymbolic facts conflict with each other, it is an indication that one or more of the symbolic significations do not correspond to the meaning, or self-signification, of reality. Such meanings are simply "beliefs," which may have emotional force but are not regarded by people taking this approach as signifying what-is. In the Western religious traditions, this approach has led to both dogmatism and scientific theorizing: the former identifies eternal, universal, and objective signification with divine revelation and its explication in theological dogmas; the latter identifies eternal, universal, and objective signification with scientific theories based on empirical verification and general inferences that are presumed to function alike in the experience of all people.

Interpretation, Communication, and Verification. All religious truth, as an existential expression of what-is, is tested and verified by ever-changing human experience. Regardless of the nature of ultimate reality and its relation to the process of its becoming actualized in self-consciousness, as discussed in the approaches to truth given above, the quality of one's awareness, symbolic expression, or social relationship is tested in the changing circumstances of personal maturation and cultural-historical development. There is a basic question arising in each religious and cultural tradition: how is knowledge of the transcendent reality related to a general human means of knowing, for example, perception and inference? Another question arises: how is the original, eternal truth—which itself became manifest in a specific historical-cultural-linguistic situation—to be known in changing and sometimes quite different cultures? We will look at various answers to these questions by first considering the issues of continuity, meaning, and interpretation of symbolic and moral truth. We shall then examine levels of meaning, practical techniques, and the use of language to communicate the special awareness found in the experience of spiritual presence(s) and transcendent consciousness.

In the claims of truth that are based on a sacred word (divine revelation) and/or found in a tradition of trained scholars (such as priests, lawyers, or Confucian literati) who conserve and interpret the eternal moral law, there is a profound concern to understand or make intelligible the meaning of the sacred word and the eternal moral law. Great effort is made to learn, preserve, and interpret the normative teaching so that it is relevant to a community of believers in a specific lived experience. The difficulty in exposing the genuine intention of the original symbolic expression in light of new situations and personal differences of interpretation has resulted in the development of various schools or denominations within all religious traditions. For example, the center

of Jewish life is the study and interpretation of the Torah. In this tradition there are different interpretations regarding the relation between the written Torah and the oral Torah. All faithful Jews try to live in the basic myth of the Exodus and according to God's commandments, but there are different interpretations of the purpose of God relative to the historical experience of the Jewish community, the nature of the promised salvation (in this life and the next), and the degree to which certain customs and ritual laws are to be observed in different cultural situations, as well as the centrality and character of study, prayer, moral action, and observance of sacred days. For the past two millennia the leadership of the Jewish community has centered on the rabbi, who not only was trained to interpret the Torah in a creative fashion but also served in many communities as judge and administrator of the law. Especially since medieval times, the rabbis and philosophically inclined thinkers have had to relate the expressions of the Torah to reason and, in the last two centuries, to scientific analysis of the human condition. Such questions as the nature of free will, divine providence, and the psychological conditions for faith are important considerations for contemporary efforts to worship God in truth and to fulfill divine moral obligations of justice and love.

Similarly, Christian faith is based on the divine revelation in Jesus Christ, and study of the Bible, especially of the New Testament, has been central to the life of the Christian community. Already in the first centuries of the Christian church, as the New Testament canon was taking shape and the creeds (the "symbols" of the church) were formulated to define the normative understanding of faith, the impact of the Classical Greek philosophical language helped to shape the doctrines of the Trinity, the person of Christ, and the nature of humanity. A continuing issue in the proper interpretation of scripture, devotional life, and worship was the authority of one or another bishop to declare the official understanding of Christian faith, which was settled by the convening of councils in the fourth and fifth centuries.

The concern to formulate statements of belief that would gain intellectual assent by believers has pervaded the history of the Christian church. During the thirteenth century a watershed formulation was made by Thomas Aquinas that eventually was recognized as authoritative and has remained the supreme theological statement for the Roman Catholic Christian community. In his *Summa theologiae* and *De veritates* he synthesized an understanding of Christian faith with Greek philosophical thought, especially from Aristotle, affirming that truth is a transcendental property of being that,

in turn, is dependent on God, the ultimate intellectual cause. According to him, faith is human understanding, but the truth of faith rests on the truth of God, and belief—which includes church dogma—is a result of divine grace. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, Christian reformers, such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, rejected the medieval understanding of a single ministerial (papal) office and, thus, many Roman Catholic dogmas; they emphasized the need to base Christian faith on the primal sacred word, the Bible. During the past three centuries, Christians in western Europe and America have engaged in theological reflection in a cultural context dominated by rationalism, scientific analysis, and industrial socioeconomic structures. These intellectual influences condition the formulation of Christian faith on issues such as the nature of human life, the meaning of revelation, and the role of men and women in the political and social order.

Some basic problems encountered by advocates of truth derived from an intimate experience of spiritual presence(s) and from transcendent awareness are (1) communicating an inconceivable reality through the use of words or appeals to conventional human experience, (2) relating unusual inner experience to general criteria of verification in common-knowledge perception or inference, (3) justifying the claims for a superior inner spiritual quality within the person who claims unusual and authoritative states of consciousness, and (4) avoiding the apparent circularity entailed in the claim that those who do not affirm the validity of supra-conscious truth are not qualified to understand or judge the validity of this truth. The manifestation of the ultimate source of truth in an experience of spiritual presence(s) or an unconditional transcendent awareness is seen by its advocates to be a source of knowledge beyond logic, symbolic imagery, and conventional perception.

Nevertheless, advocates use words, symbols, and inference to argue by analogy or by logical analysis. For example, the vision of Lord Viṣṇu in the Hindu classic *Bhagavadgītā* (Song to the Lord) includes such imagery as “many mouths and eyes,” and “the light of a thousand suns springing forth simultaneously in the sky” to portray the Lord. The Muslim devotional mystic Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273) describes the true devotee as a person with “a burning heart.” With regard to the use of inference to communicate transcendent awareness, a prime example is the second-century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher-monk Nāgārjuna, who used a rigorous logical dialectic to reject the claim of unchanging essences as the reality of existence. Or, in the Zen Buddhist tradition, logical riddles (*kōan*) are used to break the habits of language and conceptual imagery that

cause attachment to things or ideas. Logic and symbolic imagery, then, are never wholly descriptive of the transcendent reality—only suggestive, or preparatory to moving to a new level of awareness.

Critics, on the other hand, argue that since the religious reality that its advocates claim to know is so different from any communicable description of it, religious experiences indicate more about the simply subjective (perhaps only psychological) conditions of the knower than about any universal reality. Or, since the nature of religious truth requires a change in the quality of apprehension through special techniques or through transcendent power (e.g., God’s grace), any special appeal to unusual states of consciousness cannot provide the norm of validity for a general theory of truth that also relies on conventional inference or perception.

Truth in world religions, then, is a concept that not only has different meanings and uses in religious language but also indicates different approaches to the religious concern for the becoming self-conscious of what is that makes possible the attainment of the highest well-being. Each of the approaches described here provides an evaluative process that structures the conditions, goals, and nature of truth. The different approaches each have their own development, principles of validation, and impact on people’s lives. While different religious and cultural traditions emphasize one or two approaches to truth, the major world religions and civilizations have included several of them as sometimes permissible options.

In the contemporary world, where people of different, and sometimes conflicting, religions and ideologies are in a network of political, economic, and ecological relationships, there is a heightened sense of urgency to develop strategies for at least existing safely within a plurality of ultimate commitments, if not for integrating or discovering the principle of unity in that truth that declares the source of well-being for all humanity. One of the most difficult issues in attempting to integrate the various approaches is that each holds that a distinction must be made between lesser, conventional truth and the highest, or divine, truth. Each approach is itself a system of evaluations about the nature of ignorance, the ultimate reality, and the mechanism of knowing the truth that rejects alternate systems of evaluation.

Especially in those communities that identify their survival and highest fulfillment with a single *form* of truth, through orthodoxy (normative or prescribed teaching) or orthopraxis (normative or prescribed behavior), the tolerance of alternative approaches to truth is difficult to maintain. Paradoxically, a society often

holds rigidly to a form of truth when there is change in, or confusion about, the underlying system(s) of evaluation (as, for example, the conflict between the epistemological assumptions of the scientific method and those of the symbolic self-consciousness attained in myth and sacrament), and often an openness to explore alternative forms (contents) of truth emerges when there is stability in the basic system of evaluation.

The contemporary world is characterized by rapid changes in technology and the development of a worldwide communication network. This situation requires new concepts of the self and the universe and an exchange of cultural and religious approaches to truth. The challenge for contemporary people is how to live within some system of comprehensive evaluation (as found in a religion or ideology) and how to respond in a mutually life-enhancing way with people committed to another system of evaluation. The survival and well-being of people in all cultures necessitates a creative reexamination and critical assessment of varied truth claims that implicitly give weight to different ways of valuation.

[For philosophical perspectives on truth and discerning the truth, see *Philosophy and Epistemology*, respectively. For related entries on the nature of religious truths, see *Religious Experience and Knowledge and Ignorance*.]

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TSEVI, SHABBETAI. See Shabbetai Tsevi.

TSON-KHA-PA (1357–1419), Tibetan Buddhist monk, scholar, mystic, and reformer. Not only did Tsoñ-kah-pa bring Tibetan Buddhist thought to its full maturity, but the institutions he founded became the basis of the Tibetan religious establishment for 550 years, from 1409 until the Chinese invasion in 1959 caused the exile and diaspora of Tibetan Buddhists. Tsoñ-kah-pa Blo-bzañ-grags-pa was born at the time of Byañ-chub-rgyal-mtshan's reassertion of Tibet's independence during the breakup of the Mongol empire, completed in 1368. His lifetime was thus a time of self-definition for Tibetan civilization; his personal achievement, his intellectual synthesis, and his public deeds were crucial to that national identity.

Almost from birth, Tsoñ-kha-pa was recognized as a prodigy. A learned master of the Bka'-dgams-pa order, Don-grub-rin-chen, traveled all the way to northeast Tibet to take the boy under his tutelage. Tsoñ-kha-pa left home at the age of three and began his studies immediately. By the time he was six or seven his intellectual promise was clearly emerging; he was thus ordained as a novice and initiated into contemplative *mañḍalas*. The beginnings of his mystic life were marked by visions of great ancestors in his tradition, particularly Atīṣa (982–

1054), the founder of the Bka'-gdams-pa order. [See the *biography of Atīśa*.] He studied both the teachings of Maitreyañātha (from the era of Asaṅga, c. 350–430) on the *bodhisattva* ethic and the contemplative teachings of the Bka'-gdams-pa. He memorized many other important textbooks from the Indian Buddhist monastic curriculum, according to the educational regime of the Bka'-gdams-pa and Sa-skyapa orders.

In 1372 he was sent by his tutor to central Tibet, where he soon distinguished himself in the great monastic universities of Dbus and Gtsaṅ in studies of logic, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, psychology, and cosmology, as well as in the practice of contemplation. In his early twenties he went into a trance in a great assembly at Skyor-mo-luñ, remaining bolt upright but oblivious in concentration on selflessness, or voidness, for sixteen hours. Soon afterward he began to compose his first major book, the *Golden Rosary of True Eloquence*, elucidating the Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom) teaching and practice. The book was hailed as a work of genius, gaining Tsoñ-kah-pa national fame before he was thirty. Although his major teacher was a Sa-skyapa by the name of Red-mdā'-ba Gžon-nu-blo-gras (1349–1412), Tsoñ-kha-pa studied with all the major scholars and hierarchs of the day, regardless of the order to which they belonged.

In his early thirties, becoming dissatisfied with his own understanding of the deeper points of the Centrist (Mādhyamika) teaching of voidness (*sūnyatā*), Tsoñ-kha-pa set about to study the vast literature of the Tantras more widely. He was frustrated that his scholastic teachers discouraged him in this interest, urging him to continue his philosophical study and teaching. Tradition relates that at this point the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī intervened in his spiritual development—first through an intermediary, the monk Dbu-ma-pa (at whose instigation Tsoñ-kha-pa left the monastery), and eventually by directly instructing the young mystic. [See Mañjuśrī.] Mañjuśrī was his main teacher from that time forward, although he sought instruction from a variety of human teachers as well. Mañjuśrī allegedly commanded Tsoñ-kha-pa to remain in retreat for five years, from 1393 to 1398, taking eight of his closest disciples with him. In this period, Tsoñ-kha-pa performed great feats of asceticism.

It is reported that finally, in an autumn predawn stillness in the year 1398, Tsoñ-kha-pa achieved perfect enlightenment at O-de-guñ-rgyal in Ol-kha. He awoke, joyous and invigorated, from a prophetic dream in which he had received blessings from the great Indian masters Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita. He then studied the critique of the self in the eighteenth chapter of Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. Characteristically,

his enlightenment came at a moment when his finger pointed to the passage commenting on the words "The self is not the aggregates [of body and mind]; nor is it other than the aggregates." From this time forth, Tsoñ-kha-pa was very outspoken about his views, engaging in no false humility about his understanding. His writings are critical and scholarly, as well as incisive and authoritative. His collected works, on every important subject in the Buddhist arts and sciences, run to more than seventeen volumes; another fourteen volumes were written by his two main disciples, Rgyal-tshab Dar-mar-chen (1364–1432) and Mkhas-grub Dge-legs-dpal-bzañ-po (1385–1438), most of whose writings refer to Tsoñ-kha-pa's teaching as their source.

Biographies refer to a standard set of "four major deeds" that reveal the nature of Tsoñ-kha-pa's contribution to the Tibetan nation. In the first deed, Tsoñ-kha-pa asserted himself against the growing Buddhist perception of the world as sinking in an age of darkness. He refurbished and reconsecrated the Maitreya image and temple in Rdziñ-phyi in 1399 and 1401. Because the *bodhisattva* Maitreya is believed to be the next Buddha in this world, such an effort indicates a strong millennial orientation in Tsoñ-kha-pa's thought. [See Maitreya.]

The second deed was an assembly, in 1403, of a three-month council on monastic discipline (Vinaya) attended by masters and monks from the major orders: Sa-skyapa, Bka'-brgyud-pa, and Bka'-gdams-pa. This led to a renewal of the code of the Tibetan monastic community (*samgha*) by returning to the letter and spirit of the original Vinaya, using as a primary source the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya as interpreted and refined by the great ethicist Guṇaprabhā (fl. fifth century CE at Nālandā). In spite of Tsoñ-kha-pa's own attainment of insight according to the "Universal Vehicle" (Mahāyāna) Centrist teaching and his great reverence for the Tantric contemplative technology, he asserted the primacy of the "Individual Vehicle" (Hīnayāna) monastic order. He believed that as long as the "Individual Liberation Discipline" (the Prātimokṣavinaya) is kept pure in the world, the *buddhadharma* will not disappear.

The third deed represents the expansion of Tsoñ-kha-pa's millennialism into the center of Tibetan society. He founded the Great Prayer Festival (Smon-lam-chen-mo) by institutionalizing a yearly New Year's celebration in Lhasa. The two-week festival celebrated Śākyamuni's two weeks of miracles performed at Śrāvastī—itsself an apocalyptic event. The secular authorities gave the keys of the nation's capital to the religious leaders, all orders joined together, and people came from all over Tibet for a yearly celebration of transcendence, of fusing the sacred and the secular. In offering Beatific Body orna-

ments to the icon, Tsoñ-kha-pa symbolically proclaimed the fusion of heavenly and earthly realms at the heart of the Tibetan civilization.

Finally, in the fourth deed, Tsoñ-kha-pa allowed his devotees to build him a monastery (which he called Dga-'ldan, after the Tuṣita Heaven where Maitreya awaits birth in this world), so that within its precincts he could build the architectural *maṇḍalas* of his favorite divine forms of Buddhahood (i.e., the Guhyasamāja, Cakrasamvara, and Vajrabhairava Tantric forms of the Buddha). In sum, his last three major deeds show, respectively, his dedication to the Individual Vehicle, the Universal Vehicle, and the Diamond Vehicle, aptly illustrating his teaching synthesis, which was known as the "integration of the Three Vehicles" (*theg pa gsum zuñ 'brel*).

Through the energetic missionization of the Mongols by the Dalai Lamas and the Dge-lugs pa order in subsequent centuries, Tsoñ-kha-pa became greatly revered outside of Tibet by Mongols and Manchus. Otherwise his impact on the larger Buddhist world has been slight. Only now is the importance of his work beginning to be recognized in Japan and the West.

[See also Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Tibetan Buddhism, and Worship and Cultic Life, article on Buddhist Cultic Life in Tibet.*]

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TSOU YEN (fourth century BCE), traditionally regarded as the founder of the school of Naturalists or Yin-yang Five Phases school (Yin-yang Wu-hsing-chia) of classical Chinese philosophy. A native of the state of Ch'i, known for its tradition of scholarly interest in cosmology and related fields, Tsou Yen almost certainly did not invent the terms and concepts that characterized the school of Naturalists. None of Tsou Yen's writings have survived, except in fragmentary form as quotations in other works. Therefore his contribution to the development of the school of Naturalists must be inferred, or accepted according to conventional accounts. He might well have played a significant role in synthesizing such earlier concepts as *tao*, *ch'i*, *yin-yang*, and *wu-hsing* into a comprehensive framework of explana-

tion for the natural processes and phenomena of the universe.

For the ancient Chinese, the universe was organic rather than mechanical; every phenomenon could affect every other. According to the Naturalists, phenomena that could be grouped in categories of classification—*yin* or *yang*, for example, or one of the Five Phases—interacted within that category more strongly than the phenomena in other categories. Relationships, or "resonance," among phenomena could be described and predicted with reference to the interactive medium known as *ch'i*.

Tsou Yen's name is linked with this school of thought as a whole, and particularly with the "nine continents" theory of cosmography, wherein the entire universe consists of nine continents, separated by oceans. Each continent was divided into nine subcontinents, each further divided into nine provinces. China, with its nine provinces of classical tradition, was thus regarded as the southeastern subcontinent of one of the nine great continents of the universe. This theory clearly was derived from the *Yü kung* (Tribute of Yü) chapter of the *Shu ching* (Book of Documents), but unlike the nine provinces of that work, Tsou Yen's map of the universe was purely schematic, unrelated to terrestrial geography. The 3 × 3 grid figure of the nine continents was also characteristic of other speculations of the school of Naturalists, such as the magic square of three and similar numerological manipulations of the Five Phases.

For Tsou Yen and the Naturalists, natural philosophy could be regarded as a set of scientific issues that were relatively independent of human political and ethical concerns. Natural philosophy became more human-centered with the integration of Yin-yang Wu-hsing theories into the Huang-lao school of early Han dynasty philosophy, and thence into the syncretic Confucian philosophy of Tung Chung-shu (179–104 BCE) and the worldview of post-Han religious Taoism. The ideas associated with Tsou Yen thus contributed strongly to the development of early Chinese philosophy as a whole, but those ideas also changed in the course of their integration into the mainstream.

[See also Yin-yang Wu-hsing and the biography of *Tung Chung-shu*.]

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TSUNG-MI (780–841), more fully, Kuei-feng Tsung-mi; Chinese Buddhist Ch'an and Hua-yen scholar, traditionally reckoned as the fifth "patriarch" both in the Ho-tse line of Southern Ch'an and in the Hua-yen tradition. Tsung-mi was born in Hsi-ch'ung County, Kuo Prefecture, in Szechwan Province. His family, the Ho, was one of local prominence, and as a youth he received a traditional education in the Confucian classics. He became interested in Buddhism as an adolescent, but he continued his Confucian studies at a local academy in preparation for the imperial examinations that would open the door to an official career. In 804, however, he met the Ch'an priest Tao-yüan and was so impressed that he abandoned his worldly ambitions and became his disciple. Later, while still a novice monk, he experienced his first awakening after reading only two or three pages of the *Yüan-chüeh ching* (The Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment) at the home of a lay patron. Tsung-mi continued his Ch'an study under Tao-yüan, receiving full ordination from him in 808. Two years later he was introduced to the commentary and subcommentary to the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* written by the famous Hua-yen scholar Ch'eng-kuan (738–839). This work so impressed him that in 812 he became a disciple of Ch'eng-kuan and studied intensely with him for two years. In 816 he withdrew to Mount Chung-nan outside the eastern capital of Lo-yang to read the Buddhist canon. He now began a productive career as a scholar, writing numerous commentaries on a wide range of Buddhist texts. His greatest exegetical energies, however, were devoted to the *Yüan-chüeh ching*, which he regarded as better suited to the age than the *Avatamsaka*. His scholarly activity came to an abrupt stop in 835, when he became implicated in an abortive attempt to oust the eunuchs from power at court. Afterward he withdrew from public life, and nothing further is known about him until his death in 841.

Tsung-mi's Ch'an training played a key role in the new thrust that he gave to Hua-yen metaphysics. His emphasis on the ultimate ground from which phenomena arise over their unimpeded interpenetration—an idea characteristic of the classical Hua-yen thought of Fa-tsang (643–712)—reveals his interest in clarifying the ontological basis for religious practice. He also found in Hua-yen hermeneutics a framework in which to harmonize the conflicting tendencies evident in the Buddhist world of his day. His *Ch'an-yüan chu-ch'üan-chi tu-hsü* (Preface to the Collected Writings on the Source of Ch'an), for instance, in addition to affording valuable historical insight into the Ch'an of the late eighth and early ninth centuries, seeks to reconcile the split that had developed between Ch'an practitioners and textual scholars, as well as between the various

Ch'an lineages. His efforts to articulate a comprehensive framework in which apparently opposing positions could be sublated also extended to non-Buddhist traditions, as can best be seen in his *Yüan-jen lun* (Inquiry into the Origin of Man). Tsung-mi's writings represent an important stage in the complex unfolding of the dialogue among the "Three Religions" (Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism) in Chinese history.

[See also Hua-yen.]

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TSWANA RELIGION. Traditional religion among the Tswana of the high veld of southern Africa centered upon the supreme being, Modimo, and ancestor spirits known as *badimo*. The fact that *badimo* is the plural form of *modimo*, an honorific term used to express awe and reverence toward elders as well as toward the supreme being, indicates that the difference between Modimo, the ancestors, and human beings is one of degree rather than kind. While they occupy different positions in a complex hierarchy of spiritual power, all beings—whether spiritual or human—are intimately connected with each other. As the Tswana Christian theologian Gabriel Setiloane indicates, it is a basic premise of Tswana thought that a representative is identical with the person being represented or that a symbol is that which it symbolizes. Hence, the Tswana say, "Motho ke modimo" ("Man is *modimo*"), something that implies a far greater degree of interaction than the English "There is something of the divine in every man" (Setiloane, 1976, p. 21).

Modimo is believed to be the source and root of all existence. Intangible and all-pervasive, irreparably part of human experience but not directly sensed, he is a source of appeal in times of affliction and the guardian of the moral order. The complexity of the Tswana concept of the supreme being is best indicated by the wide

range of praise names that are used to characterize him. Modimo is *mme* ("mother") and *lesedi* ("light"), but he is also known as *selo* ("monster") insofar as he possesses dangerous powers that go far beyond those of normal humanity.

Because a person cannot come into direct contact with Modimo and remain unchanged, the Tswana have recourse to the *badimo*, ancestors who act as intermediaries between humanity and the supreme being. Closely involved in everyday life, the *badimo* function to preserve harmony in social relations and to ensure the fertility of humans, animals, and crops. Their attitude toward humans is basically parental—looking to the welfare of the community as a whole, they seek to correct faults and protect their descendants from harm. In return, they expect *tirelo* ("service"). The essence of *tirelo* is the sharing of benefits with others. The *badimo* are said to love company and are especially gladdened by feasts. Whenever food or beer is prepared, a portion is set aside or poured on the ground for the *badimo*. This is done to maintain their good favor, for without it, life cannot be kept in proper balance and lived to the full. When an individual has neglected to honor the *badimo*, the Tswana say that he suffers from *bolwetse*, a term that covers both physical illness and a range of other maladies. Principally, it indicates that an individual is in disharmony with the spiritual forces (including Modimo) that engender and sustain his existence.

The concern for the community as a whole that is a central part of Tswana religion is expressed in the Tswana theory of human personality, or *seriti* (pl., *diriti*). Each person is born with a "heavy" or "light" *seriti* that can act for evil or for good. If a child is born with a light *seriti*, it must be strengthened and imbued with good intentions. Healthy *seriti* brings dignity, respect, and prosperity; bad *seriti* causes ill will and discord in the social realm. A father of a household or a chief with good *seriti* strengthens the *diriti* of those who live in the house or chieftdom and vice versa. Because a man's *seriti* pervades much of his world, if he does wrong, his children, crops, or animals may suffer. Also, insofar as *seriti* originates from the *badimo* and is upheld by them, it functions as a spiritual force that knits together social and spiritual relations.

In times of suffering, people have access to religious specialists, or "doctors," known as *dingaka* (sg., *ngaka*). Both men and women can become doctors. There are six kinds of doctors in Tswana society, each classified according to the various divinatory and medicinal skills that he or she possesses. The best known, however, are the "horned" and the "hornless" doctors. The horned doctors divine by interpreting the pattern created by the throwing of four tablets, which represent an older and younger male and an older and younger female, or

of pairs of astragalus bones, which represent the male and female of every common animal species. The hornless doctors divine by examining the patient. There are few doctors today and their practices, though still common, are officially illegal.

Human suffering is largely caused by incurring the displeasure of the *badimo* or by the actions of sorcerers. The complex Tswana term *boloi*, often translated as "sorcery" or as "magic," refers to both of these occurrences. There are two kinds of *boloi* that are socially constructive: *boloi* of the heart and of the mouth. Both involve offenses against a senior member of the kin group. If the senior member is slighted in some way, it is believed that he "puts the *badimo*" on the offender. The senior member need not be conscious of ill will toward the offender. In response to the offense, the *badimo* withdraw their support from the offender's *seriti* in order to call attention to his fault, and he is then susceptible to disease and other malign influences. Because of the encompassing nature of his *seriti*, much of his world is similarly threatened. In order to restore proper relations within the community (which includes the *badimo*), the offender provides an animal for slaughter; after it has been killed, the senior member uses a mixture of chyme and aloe to "wash" the offender and strengthen his *seriti*.

Two other types of *boloi* exist that are unquestionably evil. *Boloi ba bosigo* ("night sorcery"), which seems to be a form of witchcraft rather than sorcery, refers to the belief that certain witches (usually elderly women working in covens) cavort at night and cause mischief. Essentially tricksters, such witches gather naked, enter houses through closed doors and windows, upset pots, suck milk from nursing mothers or cows so that their yield is insufficient, exhume new corpses, and use owls as sentinels and hyenas as steeds. Day sorcery (*boloi ba motshegare*) is much more serious. It involves the purposeful manipulation of material substances for evil ends—usually to inflict disease or death upon a particular individual. Sorcerer and victim are often close relatives, such as husband and wife, parent and child, or brother and brother, who are overcome by feelings of greed, envy, or vengeance. *Bongaka*, therapy performed by the various *dingaka*, is essential to the prevention of sorcery.

Contemporary Tswana religion can only be explained in light of the tragic history of the people since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The impact of Western civilization coincided with the beginning of the nineteenth century, and chaos reigned in Tswanaaland from 1810 until 1840. The first Christian mission was established in 1816 and four others were set up in the next thirty years; by 1870, missions had spread throughout Tswanaaland. The dispersal of Tswana

groups—both by the onslaught of marauding refugees resulting from the Zulu expansion known as the Mfecane and by the Boers, who took Tswana lands and subjected the people to forced labor—greatly weakened orthodox religious practices. The Boers drove the Tswana into reserve pockets of land in the Transvaal, the northern Cape of Good Hope, the Orange Free State, and the territory that became the Botswana state. Here, the remnants of once cohesive groups recombined into artificial units.

The Tswana have therefore been subjected to a great deal of pressure and turmoil inimical and destructive to their own religion. The official religion of most Tswana groups in the late twentieth century is Christianity. Although the public rituals of the indigenous religion are seldom encountered, the more private and individualized practices of witchcraft, sorcery, and traditional healing persist strongly, even among Christians. The relationship between old and new beliefs is complex; much more of the former may remain than meets the eye. As Setiloane points out, many zealous and long-standing Christians have never given up the old worldview but have instead fitted Christianity into it. A number of traditional religious skills and rituals, including *pha badimo*, a thanksgiving ritual that is performed to show gratitude to the *badimo*, continue to play an important role in Tswana Christianity. The new social, political, and economic order brought about by the colonial system had more impact in christianizing the Tswana than the missionaries' religious teaching, which was too blatantly contradicted by the harsh oppression and racism of southern Africa to carry conviction.

The fundamental belief in the supreme being and the *badimo* continues to inform convictions about the earth and home as sacred and holy as well as attitudes toward cattle, which still have strong emotional, religious, and practical value, for they form the basis of important transactions between Tswana. Such exchanges continue to provide a binding conception of marriage, paternity, kinship, and family bonds that Christianity cannot replace. Initiation ceremonies, with their acutely emotional and religious accompaniments, also retain central and unassailable roles, as they induct the young into the profound continuities and solidarities of community life, earth, kin, and cattle. These values can still give a fundamental sense of psychological security, personal adequacy, and proper place in the cosmic scheme of things, and they function as an anchor in the stormy upheavals that afflict the Tswana in southern Africa today.

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TUATHA DÉ DANANN. According to the pseudo-historical annals of the *Book of Invasions*, five races successively occupied Ireland. Fourth, after the Fir Bholg and before the Goidels, came the Tuatha Dé Danann, and it is around their name that the mythic and divine organization of Ireland crystalized. In fact, the Tuatha Dé Danann must be seen as the gods of pre-Christian Ireland. The "people of the goddess Danu," they came from the north, according to a very old Hyperborean tradition known to (and misunderstood by) the Greeks. Their principal adventures are recounted in the *Book of Invasions* and in narratives of the two battles of Magh Tuiredh. The *Death of the Children of Tureann* complements these accounts. Finally, the cycle of Édaín relates their adventures in detail, but in absolutely nonchronological, indeed mythic, fashion. Other narratives or texts frequently refer to them. The Tuatha Dé Danann correspond to the Welsh *tylwyth teg* and the Breton *korrigans*.

It is the Tuatha Dé Danann that take Ireland from the Fir Bholg, defend it against the demonic Fomhoire, and organize the country, finally dividing the land with the Goidels in an equitable settlement: the Goidels on the surface of the earth and the Tuatha Dé Danann within the hills and beneath the lakes (in the *sidh*), symbolic and concrete representations of the otherworld. [See Fomhoire.]

The organization of the Tuatha Dé Danann is described with a fair amount of precision in the *Second Battle of Magh Tuiredh*. It is typically tripartite and Indo-European, following the ideological, class, and functional norms defined by the works of Georges Dumézil.

Classless and transcending all functions is Lugh ("the shining one"), an omniscient god called also Samildánach ("skilled in many arts"). At the time of his entry into Tara, the royal court of the Tuatha Dé Danann, he enumerates all his abilities to the doorkeeper druid and is allowed to enter precisely because he possesses together all the capabilities of the other gods: he

is magician (druid), leech, poet, warrior (or hero), and craftsman (carpenter and smith).

The other deities are divided into a priestly, a warrior, and an artisan class. The representative divinity of the priestly class is Daghdha ("the good god"). Daghdha is a druid god; master of the elements, of climate, and of time; sage and scholar; and also a formidable warrior. The representative divinities of the warrior class (embodying combative skills and physical strength, as well as magic and trickery) are Nuadha and Oghma. Nuadha ("distributor"), king of the Tuatha Dé Danann, is called Airgedlámh ("of the silver arm"). His white color makes him, after promotion to royalty, the equal of a druid in authority and dignity. Without him, there is no victory. He is a generous provider of wealth and, as guarantor of social order, a fair and impartial judge. Oghma ("champion") makes use not only of physical strength and violence but also of trickery and magic. In this last respect he is also the god of eloquence and writing. The representative divinities of the craftsman class (embodying manual labor and technological skill) are Goibhniu and Luchta. Goibhniu ("smith") manufactures all the arms of the Tuatha Dé Danann. Luchta ("carpenter") makes all the lance shafts for the battles of Magh Tuiredh. There is no special god of agriculture: material prosperity is the purview of the king, and the craftsmen make all tools necessary to social life as well as arms and farming implements.

The god of youth, Mac ind Óg, or Oenghus, is the son of Daghdha. The divine leech Dian Cécht, father of Lugh, also defies classification because his medical abilities divide into three functional levels: priestly (incantatory medicine), warrior (leech medicine or surgery), and cultivator (herbal medicine).

The sole feminine divinity appears under multiple names as mother, daughter, sister, and wife of the various gods. Brighid, daughter of Daghdha, is mother of all the gods and patroness of poets, smiths, and doctors. Boann is the wife of Elcmhaire (Oghma) and the sister of Daghdha, to whom she bears a son, Mac ind Óg. Édain is sovereign of Ireland and wife of Midhir, god of the otherworld. Morríghan, goddess of war, is wife of Daghdha, the druid god.

The classification and functions of the Irish Tuatha Dé Danann thus closely match Caesar's description in the *Gallic Wars* (6.17), which lists the principal Gaulish theological functions by their Roman theonyms:

- Mercury: inventor of all the arts (Lugh)
- Jupiter: rules the heavens (Daghdha)
- Mars: directs wars (Nuadha, Oghma)
- Apollo: drives away illness (Dian Cécht, Mac ind Óg)
- Minerva: teaches the rudiments of civilization (Brighid)

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FRANÇOISE LE ROUX and CHRISTIAN-J. GUYONVARC'H
Translated from French by Erica Meltzer

TUCCI, GIUSEPPE (1894–1984), Italian scholar of Asian religions. Giuseppe Tucci was born in Macerata in the Marche region of Italy on 5 June 1894 and died on 5 April 1984 in his house in San Polo dei Cavalieri, near Tivoli, in the province of Rome. Tucci fought during World War I, and after the war he graduated from the University of Rome (1919). From 1925 to 1930 he resided in India, teaching Chinese and Italian at the universities of Santiniketan and Calcutta. In 1929 Tucci was elected to the Accademia d'Italia, and in 1930 he accepted the chair of the department of Chinese language and literature at the Istituto Universitario Orientale of Naples. He then accepted the chair of the department of religion and philosophy of India and the Far East at the University of Rome (1932), where he remained until his retirement in 1969.

In 1933 he was instrumental in the founding of the Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (IsMEO), the first president of which was Tucci's colleague and friend Giovanni Gentile. Tucci himself was president of the institute from 1947 to 1978; from 1979 he was its honorary president.

He was the editor of several periodicals, including *Alle fonti delle religioni* from 1921 to 1924, *Bollettino dell'IsMEO* (which became *Asiatica* in 1935) from 1933 to 1943, *Le scienze del mistero e il mistero delle scienze* in 1946, and *East and West* from 1950 to 1984. He founded many series of scholarly publications of the Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, such as the "Serie Orientale Roma" (the first fifty-two volumes of which he edited) in 1950, "Reports and Memoirs" (documenting research) in 1962, and "Restoration" in 1969. From 1950 to 1973 he directed the series "Il nuovo Ramusio," published by the Libreria dello Stato. He edited many other works meant to diffuse and popularize knowledge about Asian civilizations.

Tucci's scholarly research was complemented by his

field explorations—he was, perhaps, the last of the great explorers—as well as by his impassioned interest in the contemporary Asian world. The six years he spent in India were fundamental in his life, as were his eight expeditions to Tibet (1929–1948), his six expeditions to Nepal (1950–1954), and his missions of exploration to Pakistan (starting in 1955), Afghanistan (1957), and Iran (from 1959); Tucci continued to conduct archaeological research on field explorations such as these until 1976.

The highest honors of the countries of Afghanistan, Japan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand were conferred upon Tucci. He received honorary doctorates from many European and Asian universities, including those of Delhi, Kathmandu, and Teheran; he was given various academic and scientific titles in Italy (from the Accademia d'Italia, the Accademia delle Scienze of Turin, the Accademia of San Luca, and the Società Geografica Italiana), in Austria (from the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften), in France (from the Société Asiatique), in Germany (from the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut), in Japan (from the Imperial Academy and the Tōyō Bunko), in India (from the Asiatic Society of Calcutta and Vishvabharati University of Santiniketan), and in England (from the British Academy and the Royal Asiatic Society).

Tucci received many international prizes, including the gold medal of the Calcutta Art Society (1965), the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal (1971), the medal for archaeology of the Academy of Architecture of Paris (1972), the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding (1976), and the Balzan Prize for History (1979). The Jawaharlal Nehru Award was always especially dear to Tucci because of his friendship with Nehru and his ties with great figures of modern India such as Rabindranath Tagore, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and Mohandas K. Gandhi.

The entire Indian subcontinent and Tibet were the main areas of Tucci's interest as a scholar and explorer. A complete bibliography of his works contains 360 titles, including many dozens of books, about two hundred articles, numerous encyclopedia entries, reviews, and so on. His research actively touched on many fields other than Indian and Tibetan studies, however, and he focused especially on the study of religious and philosophical thought and on historical investigation. His interest in the latter field led him to study the archaeology of Hindukush and Iran; this study was also inspired by his perennial interest in the various points of encounter of the great Asian civilizations of the Himalayan regions, Northwest India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

He undertook his studies of China primarily during the first stage of his scholarly activity in works such as *Scritto di Mencio* (1921), *Storia della filosofia cinese an-*

tica (1922), and *Saggezza cinese* (1926). At any rate, the most important object of his studies was Buddhism in the various forms it had taken as it expanded from India toward Tibet, Central Asia, China, and the Far East. Tucci interpreted Buddhism as the highest form of Asian humanism. Always in search of universal values in a humanistic perspective, Tucci felt that the history of Asia was closely interconnected with that of Europe, and he thus always considered Eurasia to be a single continent in cultural as well as geographical terms.

His most important scholarly works are *Linee di una storia del materialismo indiano*, 2 vols. (1923–1929); *Indo-Tibetica*, 6 vols. (1932–1941); *Teoria e pratica del Mandala* (1949); *The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings* (1950); *Minor Buddhist Texts*, 2 vols. (1956–1958); *The Religions of Tibet* (1970); *The Ancient Civilization of Transhimalaya* (1973); and *On Swāt: The Dards and Connected Problems* (1977).

Endowed with vast humanistic knowledge and intensely interested in religious and philosophical thought, Tucci possessed great erudition, extraordinary knowledge of languages, and philological skill. He knew Sanskrit and Tibetan in depth, and also had significant knowledge of Chinese and Pali (and other Indian languages). Nevertheless, he did not disdain the public at large, to whom he addressed many works, among which are *Santi e briganti nel Tibet ignoto* (1937), *Forme dello spirito asiatico* (1940), *Asia religiosa* (1946), *Tra giungle e pagode* (1953), *To Lhasa and Beyond* (1956), *The Discovery of the Mallas* (1962), *La via dello Swat* (1963), *Il trono di diamante* (1967), *Tibet, Land of Snows* (1967), and *Rati-Lilā* (1969).

Many of Tucci's minor writings are collected (partially revised by him) in his *Opera Minora* (1971) published by the Oriental School of the University of Rome. The Istituto Universitario Orientale of Naples dedicated two volumes of Asian studies to him entitled *Gururājamañjarikā: Studi in onore di Giuseppe Tucci* (1974), and the Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente published an international collection of Asian studies in three volumes dedicated to Tucci's memory, entitled *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memoriae Dicata* (1986).

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On 7 May 1984, the Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente solemnly commemorated its founder with the publication of my *Giuseppe Tucci* (Rome, 1984); an English version of this work, accompanied by an updated bibliography of Tucci's writings, appeared under the title "Giuseppe Tucci" in *East and West*, n.s. 3 (1984): 11–12 and 23–42. A year after Tucci's death, the institute published *Ricordo di Giuseppe Tucci* (Rome, 1985) by Raniero Gnoli with contributions from Luciano Petech, F. Scialpi, and G. Gallupi Vallauri; this work includes a biographical note, a discussion of Tucci's *cursus honorum* and his scholarly concerns, and a bibliography.

Short commemorative notices have been published in various scientific reviews, including S. Cleziou's in *Universalis 1984* (the annual supplement of the *Encyclopaedia Universalis*), pp. 614–615; P. Corradini's in *Mondo cinese* 45 (1984): 101–105; Mircea Eliade's in *History of Religions* 24 (1984): 157–159; K. Enoki's in *Tōhōgaku* 68 (1984): 127–154; Luciano Petech's in the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 7 (1984): 137–142; B. J. Staviskij's in *Narody Azii i Afriki* 1 (1985): 213–214; M. Taddei's in *AIUON* 44 (1984): 699–704; and R. Tamburello's in *Il Giappone* 24 (1984): 211–213.

A special commemorative issue (no. 2) of *India Past and Present: A Biannual Journal of Historical Research* (Bombay, 1985), is dedicated to Tucci and contains (pp. 3–11) an editorial on his life and work. Corrado Pensa's study "L'occidente e le religioni orientali nella prospettiva di Giuseppe Tucci," in *Paramita: Quaderni di Buddismo* 16 (1985): 19–25, deals with the West in relation to Eastern religions following the perspective of Giuseppe Tucci.

GHERARDO GNOLI

Translated from Italian by
Rodica Blumenfeld-Diaconescu

TU KUANG-T'ING (850–933), Taoist scholar of the T'ang dynasty (618–907) and the author of numerous works on Taoist liturgy, biography, history, and geography. Born in the waning decades of the once powerful T'ang dynasty, Tu's career spanned the chaotic years that saw China fragmented into contending regional states after three hundred years of unity. Buddhism had just begun its recovery from the repressive actions taken by Emperor Wu-tsung in 845, when thousands of temples were closed, property was confiscated, and tens of thousands of clergy returned to lay life and thus to eligibility for taxation and conscription. Taoism had fared better, since the T'ang emperors, who were surnamed Li, considered themselves descendants of Lao-tzu. When Tu failed to place in the special court-service examinations, he chose Taoist rather than Buddhist orders as an alternative path to a scholarly career and entered the monastery on Mount T'ien-t'ai in his native province of Chekiang.

Impressed by his literary skill, Emperor Hsi-tsung (873–888) appointed Tu to the court at the capital, Ch'ang-an. Not long after, in 880, the emperor was forced to flee the rebellion of Huang Ch'ao, and he sought refuge in the southwest, in Szechwan. Tu followed the court there and remained in Szechwan through the subsequent fall of the T'ang and the period of disunity known as the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. When in 907 Wang Chien established the southern kingdom of Shu (modern Szechwan), he enlisted in his service many displaced T'ang officials, artists, and poets, among them Tu.

Tu received several prestigious appointments and ti-

ties from the Shu court, including the one by which he is most often referred to, Master of Vast Realization (Kuang-ch'eng Hsien-sheng). After nearly forty-five years of court service, Tu retired to a mountain retreat, where he died at the age of eighty-five. Traditional accounts say that his practice of immortality-conferring techniques enabled him at death to be delivered from his body and ascend to heaven, as had so many devotees of the Tao before him.

Tu was one of the most prolific of Taoist scholars. His works include several hagiographical collections of Taoists who became immortals. Most notable of these is a work devoted to accounts of Taoist women, *Records of the Immortals of Yung-ch'eng, City of the Queen Mother of the West*. He also compiled an extensive work on Taoist religious geography, *Records of the Cavern-Heavens, Beneficent Peaks, Rivers, and Famous Mountains*. This work describes the five sacred summits, the five governing mountains, and the ten great "cavern-heavens" lying under them, and includes as well a full catalog of other places. In this work, the cosmology, practice, and lore of Taoism is systematically integrated with the physical as well as the fantastic features of the traditional Chinese world. The bulk of Tu's writings, however, deal with various aspects of Taoist liturgy, especially the *chai* ("fast"), a rite of atonement and merit, and the *chiao* ("communal offerings"), a rite of communion and spiritual renewal among all the visible and invisible realms of Heaven and Earth. It was said that Tu was summoned to perform a "great *chiao* of the entire Heavens" (*chou-t'ien ta-chiao*) shortly after Wang Yen, the second king of Shu, assumed his throne.

In his writings Tu developed the work of earlier Taoist masters such as Lu Hsiu-ching (406–477), T'ao Hung-ching (456–536), and Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen (647–735). He worked to preserve the continuity and what he saw as the purity of a scholarly and scriptural tradition that dated from the Way of the Celestial Masters (T'ien-shih Tao) more than seven centuries earlier. Tu also sought to elaborate Taoist teachings in a more unified or systematic way. Such work was of great value to rulers seeking cosmological legitimation of their claims to power. In *Records of Reverence for the Tao through the Ages*, which recorded the recognition and favors bestowed on Taoism by a succession of imperial patrons, Tu assembled explicit testimony to the fundamental unity of Taoist and imperial interests, but the perception of this unity clearly pervades his entire corpus.

[See also Taoism, overview article.]

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study of the medieval rite of "tossing dragon tablets," "Le jet des dragons," in *Mémoires concernant l'Asie orientale*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1919), briefly discusses Tu and translates part of his *Records of the Cavern-Heavens* and another of his liturgical texts. For an excellent discussion of the succession of Taoist scholars and masters in which context Tu and his work are best understood, see Michel Strickmann's "Le taoïsme du Mao-Chan: Chronique d'une révélation," in *Mémoires de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises*, vol. 17 (Paris, 1981). A detailed study of the historical period, with some attention to Taoism and Buddhism, is found in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 3, *Sui and T'ang China, 589–906*, part 1, edited by Denis C. Twitchett (Cambridge, 1979). Part 2, containing additional materials on religion, is forthcoming.

CATHERINE BELL

TULSĪDĀS, late medieval Indian poet whose plays and other works have had great influence on Hindu devotionism, especially in communities that make Rāma the focus of worship. Despite his great popularity, or perhaps because of it, very little accurate information is available about the life of Tulsīdās. There is abundant material about him in the form of hagiographies and oral legends, but these legitimize his saintly life and the holy nature of his literary works rather than record the actual events of the biography.

While there is disagreement as to the date of Tulsī's birth, his death is generally agreed to have occurred in 1623. The traditionally accepted date of his birth is 1503, which would mean that he lived for 120 years. This is logical from the point of view of his hagiographers, because the full life span of a sinless human being is believed to be 120 years. Modern scholars consider that he was born probably in 1532 to a brahman family in an eastern Hindi-speaking area. In his *Kavitāvali*, Tulsī writes that he was born to a very poor family and that his father and mother did not welcome his birth. It is believed that he was born under an unfortunate conjunction of planets, which meant that for astrological reasons his parents had to abandon him.

Tulsī says that in his childhood his mind was always on Rāma, but that he later fell into the ways of the world. Sometime during his life Tulsī went to Banaras, where he lived until his death.

In 1574 Tulsī began the composition of his most renowned work, the *Rāmcaritmānas*, or *The Holy Lake of the Deeds of Rāma*. Tulsī became famous through this work, and he himself remarks in his *Kavitāvali* that "the world even likens me to the great sage Vālmiki." In addition to the *Rāmcaritmānas* and the *Kavitāvali*, at least ten other works can be ascribed to Tulsī with certainty. Chief among them are *Vinay-patrika*, *Dohāvali*, and *Gītāvali*.

As a poet, Tulsīdās combines the grandeur and the

majesty of Sanskrit with the lyrical grace and power of Vraj (or Braj) Bhāṣā, a dialect of Hindi. A master of alliteration and rhythm, Tulsī also shows great restraint in his use of words, blending the epic and the lyric styles. His choice of dialect and style was not in conformity with the scholarly standards of his time. Tulsī describes himself as *prākṛit kavi* ("uncultivated poet"), and from a scholarly viewpoint his language was *grāmya*—of the village, uncultured. Yet because of its poetic excellence, *Rāmcaritmānas* was the most revered of all Hindi texts both by scholars and by ordinary people.

The greatest achievement of Tulsī lies in making the popular devotional style acceptable to the orthodox Hindu community and the philosophical interpretations of the high culture accessible to ordinary people. His reinterpretation of the *Rāmayaṇa*, based on the Sanskrit *Adhyātma-rāmayaṇa* and *Bhūsuṇḍi-rāmayaṇa*, revolutionized the nature of the epic and transformed it into a popular devotional poem.

[See also Hindi Religious Traditions; Bhakti; Rāmāyaṇa; and Poetry, article on Indian Religious Poetry.]

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VELCHERU NARAYANA RAO

TUNG CHUNG-SHU (c. 179–104 BCE), leading Confucian philosopher of the Han dynasty (202 BCE–9 CE) and author of the influential *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu* (Luxuriant Dew from the *Spring and Autumn Annals*). Tung is best known for the theory of mutual response between Heaven and man set forth in that work. A native of Kuang-ch'uan (in modern Hopei), Tung rose to national prominence in the early years of Emperor Wu (r. 140–87 BCE) through three famous memorials on the relationship between Heaven and man that he presented to the throne. This occurred probably in 124 BCE, in reply to the emperor's queries. Although he never held a position of political importance and remained most of his life a private scholar and writer, Tung nevertheless exerted a shaping influence on the mind of Han China and more than anyone else was responsible for the establishment of the Confucian classics as the official learning of the state.

Tung's philosophical system has been generally regarded as an amalgamation of the Yin-yang and Confucianist (Ju-chia) schools. But this is a misleading view for several reasons. In the first place, the Yin-yang cos-

mological view, together with the idea of the cyclical movement of the Five Elements, had become so widespread by the Han dynasty that it was more a common underlying assumption of Chinese thought than a separate philosophical school. Tung's contribution is more properly seen as a reformulation of Confucianism on the basis of an assumption held in common with philosophers of other schools. Second, Tung incorporated elements from the thought of schools other than the Yin-yang school into his system. These include Legalist, Taoist, and Moist ideas. For example, his identification of "legal punishment" with the principle of *yin* as a supplementary function of government is an adaptation from Legalism; his term "will of Heaven" (*t'ien-chih*) is a borrowing from Moism; and his view of the Tao, the Way, shows the influence of Taoism. The Taoist-Legalist text on silk called *Ching-fa*, excavated in the 1970s from an early Han tomb, also throws some new light on the formation of Tung's philosophy. His famous saying "The great source of Tao derives from Heaven, Heaven does not change, nor does the Tao" is clearly derived from that text.

In modern times Tung has been generally condemned for elevating Confucianism to the position of state ideology at the expense of the other philosophical schools. While there is some validity in this view, a word of clarification as to what was elevated to state ideology is also needed. In Han China a clear distinction was made between the Five Classics as the common sacred tradition on the one hand and the various philosophical schools as private teachings on the other. Under this distinction, the personal philosophical views of Confucius were not made orthodoxy; rather it was the tradition of which he was custodian that was thus elevated. Of the Five Classics, four are of pre-Confucian origins (the *Book of Changes*, the *Book of History*, the *Book of Poetry*, and the *Book of Rites*). Only the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Ch'un-ch'iu*) is attributed to Confucius. But, according to tradition since Meng-tzu, the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, a history of the state of Lu, was compiled in order to continue the sacred tradition of the *Book of Poetry* and the *Book of History*. Confucius did not compile the *Annals* for the purpose of expressing his personal philosophical views. In his memorial to the throne, Tung proposed that an imperial academy be established in which the curriculum included only studies of the classical texts of the sacred tradition as transmitted by Confucius, but not the private teachings of all the philosophical schools. Undeniably, Tung's proposal gave the Confucians a considerable edge over the other schools. Nevertheless, there is a subtle distinction in the fact that Confucianists were honored only as custodians of the sacred tradition, not as members of the Confu-

cianist school. It is important to keep in mind that, like the *Lao-tzu* and the *Mo-tzu*, neither Confucius's *Analecets* nor the *Meng-tzu* formed part of the official learning.

At the center of Tung's philosophy is the idea that all things in the universe are interrelated. The universe has ten basic constituents: Heaven, earth, man, *ying*, *yang*, and the Five Elements (or Five Powers) of wood, fire, soil, metal, and water. The first three are the most important because they are "the origins of all things"; Heaven produces things, earth nourishes them, and man brings them to completion. Here Tung obviously follows Hsün-tzu's idea that man forms a triad with Heaven and earth and actively participates in the creative process of the cosmos. A complementary idea is Tung's view that nature (i.e., Heaven and earth) is the macrocosm and man the microcosm.

In Tung's writings, two different meanings of the term *t'ien* ("heaven") may be discerned: the physical universe and the divinity that presides over the universe. In his theory of mutual response between Heaven and man, Tung means by Heaven the latter. He believes that Heaven has a will and creates everything (including man) for a purpose. His cosmology is therefore a thoroughly teleological one. Heaven has created man for the purpose of developing and maintaining an order, a cultural, political, and economic order. To achieve order, the mandate of Heaven (*t'ien-ming*) is conferred on the Son of Heaven, that is, on the emperor, who in turn must always justify his mandate by his moral virtue. He is held responsible by Heaven for the orderliness of the human world. Heaven is sensitive to human errors and responds to misgovernment with anger, expressed by the issuance of calamities and prodigies. Serious offences against Heaven's will by the emperor may lead to the loss of the mandate, that is, to the end of his dynasty. Thus the theory of mutual response between Heaven and man, with the mandate of Heaven as a corollary, is actually a double-edged sword: it justifies as well as undermines the legitimacy of a reigning dynasty.

According to Tung's theory, no dynasty can last forever. His theory of succession, however, modifies the earlier theory, according to which the succession of dynasties follows the order of movement of the Five Elements. Instead, Tung believes that dynastic change follows the sequence of the "reigns," namely, the black, white, and red reigns. Each dynasty represents one reign with its own system of government. With the end of one reign, the existing dynasty must give way to a new one.

Tung also developed the notion of *yin* and *yang* in a somewhat new direction. While agreeing that *yin* and

yang are the two basic forces of the universe and should always be kept in harmony, he nevertheless places *yang* above *yin*. Moreover, he applies the principle of *yin* and *yang* to human relationships. In his view, the ruler is *yang*, the subject *yin*; the father is *yang*, the son *yin*; the husband is *yang*, the wife *yin*. This is the famous theory of the so-called Three Bonds. Although the theory is Legalist in origin, Tung provided it with a *yin-yang* justification. This theory dominated the Chinese social thought until the end of the nineteenth century.

As a Confucian scholar, Tung specialized in the study of the *Kung-yang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*. As a result, he wrote a series of short essays that constitute the *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu*. This work, although not entirely free from later interpolations, has survived to this day.

[See also Yin-yang Wu-hsing and Confucianism, article on Foundations of the Tradition.]

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YÜ YING-SHIH

TUNGUZ RELIGION. The peoples of Siberia speaking Tunguz languages numbered 56,000 persons, according to the 1979 census of the U.S.S.R. The most numerous of them are the Evenki (27,300) and Eveny (12,500), who are collectively called Tunguz in the older literature. Sometimes the ethnonym Lamut ("sea person") is employed, applying only to certain groups of Eveny. The close racial and cultural relationship of these two peoples makes it possible to examine their beliefs in the framework of a single system, which may be designated "Tunguz religion." Other peoples speaking Tunguz languages are the Nanay (Goldi; 10,500), Ulchi (2,500), Udege (1,500), Oroki and Orochi (1,200), and Negidal'tsy (500). They represent a special cultural area, extending as far as the basin of the lower Amur River and Sakhalin Island, that includes the ancient cultural legacies of the Ainu and Nivkhi (Giliaks) and

the inhabitants of northeastern China. A common religion has long been the primary factor uniting the atomized society of Tunguz hunters who, in small groups, mastered the vast space of taiga and tundra between the Yenisei River on the west and the Sea of Okhotsk on the east and between the Arctic Ocean on the north and Lake Baikal on the south. [See map accompanying Southern Siberian Religions.]

The periodic religious ceremonies of the Tunguz are closely tied to their mythology, and in several instances they directly reproduce myths of creation and of the heroic deeds of their first ancestors, beginning with the words *tarnimngākāndu bičen* ("this was in *nimngākān*"). The term *nimngākān* means "myth, tale, legend; warm fairyland; bear ritual; shamanic séance." Each group of Tunguz has a myth on the creation of *bugha*—its own inhabited territory. *Bugha* has a variety of meanings: "locality, world, native land; cosmos, sky, earth; spirit master of the upper world/lower world/hunt, God, devil; paradise, hell; icon." The Tunguz also use this term to designate the entrance into a bear den or a small hut made of young larches with small figures of beasts and birds placed therein in preparation for shamanic performances. The basic meanings of the term *bugha* embrace, in this way, notions of the creator, creation of the world, and of a model of the world. For designating the deity of the upper world the Tunguz also use the names Mayin, Ekseri, Seweki, and Amaka. The first of these names is tied to the concept of "success" or "hunting luck," whereas the last is a kinship term referring to representatives of the older age groups: "grandfather, father, uncle," and, in general, "ancestor." The word *amaka* also has other meanings: "bear; God; sky."

According to the perceptions of the Tunguz, the upper world (*ughu bugha*) is connected to the middle world (*dulu bugha*) through the North Star, termed *bugha sangarin*, "sky hole." In turn the middle world is also connected to the lower world (*hergu bugha*) through an opening within it. In the *nimngākān* the first ancestors were able to move between all three levels of the world. Thereafter this became the privilege of the shamans, who use for this purpose Tuuruu, the Tunguz variant of the World Tree, or its equivalent, Engžekit, the mythical river called "the place that no one sees." It flows from the place termed Timānitki ("toward morning; east"), transects the middle world, and enters into the place called Dolbonitki ("toward night; north"), beyond which stretches the realm of the dead, Bunikit or Buni. Into Engžekit flow the many branch rivers of individual shamans. Somewhere at the confluence of these tributaries with the mythical river are the Ōmīruk, territories inhabited by souls (*ōmti*); these lands comprise the sacred wealth of each clan.

One of the myths associated with Engžekit tells of the origin of the first people, of reindeer, and of cultural objects from the various parts of the mythic bear's body. He voluntarily sacrificed himself to the heavenly maiden, who was carried off on an ice floe in the current between the upper and middle worlds. In other myths the bear, representing the ancestor of one or another Tunguz tribe, is similarly depicted as a culture hero, the creator of reindeer breeding, bequeathing after his inevitable death the ritual of the Bear Festival. This festival, which is essentially the same among all the Tunguz, is associated with the seasonal hunt of the animal in its den, which takes place in early spring or late autumn. The most important detail of the Tunguz bear ceremony, which has an explanation in their religion-mythological perception of the world, is the way in which they handle the bear's eyes. Hunters, having cut off the head of the slain beast, take out its eyes with great care, seeking to touch them neither with a knife nor with their fingernails. Then they wrap the eyes in grass or birch bark and carry them away into the forest, where they place them high in a tree. The Udege did this in the hope that the bear's eyes might be illuminated by the first rays of the rising sun. In the tabooed language of Tunguz hunters the bear's eyes are called *ōsikta* ("stars"). The connection of the bear with heavenly luminaries is well illustrated in a Tunguz myth in which the bear, named Mangi, follows the reindeer or moose who had stolen the sun. Having caught up with his prey, the bear returns the sun to its place. Both protagonists in this myth form the constellation of Ursa Major, the Big Dipper, in Tunguz cosmology (Chichlo, 1981, pp. 39–44).

This myth of the heavenly (or cosmic) hunt was reenacted by the Tunguz during the greatest festival of the year, Ikenipke (a name derived from the word *ike*, "to sing"), which took place in a specially constructed cone-shaped dwelling (*žumī*), whose name designates not only "house, household, or family" but also "bear den" and *uterus animalis*. In the center of this dwelling is placed a pole called Tuuruu, along which Ekseri, the spirit of the upper world, and Hargi, the spirit of the lower world, travel in order to hold conversations with the shaman. The festival, which may be called the Tunguz New Year, consists of eight days of dancing, singing, and pantomime. The people, led by the shaman, would move inside the *žumī* in a circle in the direction of the sun's movement as they traveled up the river Engžekit behind an imaginary reindeer. In his song, the shaman would describe all the details of the travel, which lasted a year—all the animals, spirits, and obstacles encountered. At the end of the festival the men would shoot from a shamanic bow at wooden reindeer

figures, shattering them into pieces that each man kept until the next festival.

Other important shamanistic rituals of the Tunguz took place in specially constructed dwellings in the taiga. With complex auxiliary structures, these represented a model of the supernatural world. The first, *nimngāndek*, signifies "the place where *nimngākān* is fulfilled." The second, *sevenčedek*, is "the place where a ceremony with *seven* is performed." Among all Tunguz peoples, *seven* means "shaman's spirit helper," but this word is connected to one of the names of the high God, Sevek or Seveki, and to the taboo reindeer of light coloring, *sevek*, which is also called *bughadi oron*, "heavenly reindeer." The ritual of dedicating the chosen reindeer as *sevek* is either independent or part of the ritual cycle in the Ikenipke festival. From the moment of this dedication, the *sevek* serves only for the transport of sacred objects. After its death, this reindeer is laid out on a platform set up in a tree.

The word *seven* also signifies the ritual dish at the Bear Festival, which is prepared from rendered bear fat mixed with finely chopped bear meat. Scooping the *seven* with a spoon, the hunter must swallow it without its touching his teeth. This method of partaking of the body of the beast deity is identical to the rules of handling bear eyes. The boldest hunters may swallow them but only without touching them with their teeth; otherwise the hunter will become blind. The meaning of these rules becomes more understandable in light of the strong prohibitions associated with the domestic hearth. The firewood and coals must not be stirred with a sharp object, nor may broken needles be thrown into the fire. Even to place a knife with its point toward the fire may put out the eyes of the spirit of the fire. This spirit, according to an Orochi myth, is a pair of bear cubs born from the mating of a bear and a woman. According to the Evenki, the bear is a culture hero who gave people fire. Reconstructing the Tunguz spirit of the domestic fire discloses his bisexual nature, corresponding to an androgynous deity like the bear. It is therefore understandable why hunters do not risk swallowing *ōsikta* ("bear's eyes"), preferring to return them to the taiga. The luster of these "stars" on top of the World Tree assured hunting success, and the projections of the luster are the light and warmth of domestic hearths.

When considered as a system, the myths, concepts, rituals, and customs of the Tunguz show what a large, if not central, role the bear occupies. The most powerful shamans have him as a guardian spirit. At the time of the séance they don his skin, thus receiving power over all zoomorphic spirits, which they gather in the darkness of the sacred dwelling that represents, in essence, the cosmic bear den. The moose as well plays a signifi-

cant role in the religious life of hunters and shamans, but its significance cannot be explained, as it is by most scholars, by economic functions alone. It must be noted that, according to myth, the moose emerges from the bear's fur and is, in consequence, part of him. And if Ursa Major is termed Heglen ("moose") by the Tunguz, this denotes a shift of stress in the direction of one member of a binary opposition composing the structure of the myth (and constellation), in which prey and hunter can change places. In their ritual practice Tunguz shamans preferred to place this stress on the figure of the hunter, inasmuch as they considered Mangi, who tracked the cosmic moose, to be their forefather.

Traces of the myth of the cosmic hunt in the religious life of Tunguz peoples still remain, as attested by ancient wooden disks of the Nanay that represent the sun (*siū*). On the upper part of one of them is a drawing of a bear, and on the lower is the representation of a moose turned upside down. The Nanay hung such disks on the door of a dwelling or on a child's cradle; to the shamans they were an indispensable accessory of their costume. Possessing healing and protective functions, these disks are concise and expressive signs of the fundamental myth of the beginnings of human history. In the Nanay culture area, the myth of the bear Mangi, who freed the sun from captivity, and the myth of the hunter Khado, who killed the excess suns, which were burning all living things, came into contact with each other. Both myths are similar insofar as the Orochi, neighbors of the Nanay, consider Khado the father of the shamanistic spirit Mangi, the representation of which is on the shamans' staffs.

The Tunguz, whose livelihood depends upon success in hunting, conducted simple ceremonies that gave the hunter confidence in his own powers and in the benevolence of fate. He could do without a shaman, having enlisted the support of the master spirit of a locality and having gained a personal spirit helper. One of these rites is Singkelevun, "obtaining *singken* (success)." This ritual appears to be the simplest imitation of the concluding ceremony of the Ikenipke rite: the hunter makes an image of a reindeer or a moose, takes it with him into the taiga, and then shoots at it with a small bow. If the image is hit immediately, it becomes a *singken*. The dried parts of previously killed animals (hearts, jaws, noses), which the hunter saves, are also guarantors of success. Certain groups of Tunguz began to call the spirit master of the taiga Singken. The Evenki and Orochi conducted a Singkelevun ceremony in October, before the beginning of the winter hunting season. It was performed among them as a complex shamanistic ceremony consisting of several cycles.

For the preservation of human life, the Tunguz pre-

pared special repositories of souls, which were "earthly" miniature copies of *ōmīruk* found in the basin of the Engžekīt River in the upper world. The domestic *ōmīruk* are small boxes with little figurines placed in them. Each figurine holds the soul of a person placed there by a shaman. Certain shamans placed tufts of hair from persons needing protection in the *ōmīruk*. Such little boxes were strapped to the saddle of the heavenly reindeer. The *ōmī* was evidently a reincarnated substance circulating within the limits of a determined social group. Among the Nanay, for example, the *ōmī* lived in the form of small birds on the clan tree, from which they descended into women's bodies. Depictions of these trees are still found on the robes of Nanay women today.

In the case of frequent deaths of children, the shaman had to set out for the upper world, where he snared one of the soul birds and swiftly descended to earth. Evidence of his successful trip was a fistful of wool strands pressed together, which he threw into a white handkerchief held up for him by an assistant during the séance.

The traditional method of disposing of the dead among the Tunguz was aerial: the body, washed in the blood of a sacrificial reindeer and clothed and wrapped in a hide, tent cover, or birch bark, was laid on a scaffold set up in the branches of a tree. Coffins, when used, were made of hollowed-out tree trunks and set upon tree trunks or on posts dug into the ground. The belongings of the deceased were left with him, and his reindeer was strangled and left at the place of burial. After christianization in the eighteenth century, the Tunguz began to practice underground burial. However, the traditional ritual persists in the Siberian taiga even today.

The Tunguz considered the cause of death to be the departure or theft by evil spirits of the *beye* soul, the name of which translates as "body." In conducting the mourning ceremony for the dead a year later, the Tunguz sometimes prepared a temporary "body" from a section of a tree trunk, which they clothed in part with the deceased person's clothing, provided with food, and bade farewell to forever. The shaman, completing the conveyance of the deceased into Buni, asked him not to return again nor to disturb the living. Among the Nanay, the initial conveyance of the deceased, termed Nimngan, took place on the seventh day. Here, the deceased was represented by a bundle of his clothing, in which the shaman placed the *han'an*, the "shadow" soul of the deceased, which he had caught. This bundle of clothes was treated like the living for a period of three years, until the final farewell with him at the large *kasa* memorial festival, lasting several days. But even here, under the unquestionable influence of Manchurian

Chinese customs, the Nanay and other Tunguz peoples of the lower Amur region observed traditional division between the living and the dead. An ancestor cult did not unfold here nor, more forcibly, was it characteristic of the Evenki and Eveny, the nomads of the Siberian taiga.

Shamanism and the traditional religion of the Tunguz have not totally disappeared, as is commonly believed, notwithstanding atheist propaganda and prohibitions. As recently as 1958, four nomadic Even communities, living in isolation for more than thirty years in the mountainous forest-tundra of Magadan oblast, were headed by eight authoritative shamans, one of whom was called by the honorific Amanža (Amaka). In 1978, Evenki believers on the Sym River (a branch of the Yenisei in central Siberia) used the services of three shamans. The cult of the domestic hearth continues to exist in various forms among all nomadic Tunguz, including sovkhos (state farm) workers. In certain Tunguz settlements, one may see on the main street a post with a bear's skull fastened to it, evidence that the power of the Master of the Taiga is still recognized by his offspring.

[See also *Bears and Shamanism*, article on Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanism.]

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Translated from Russian by Demitri B. Shimkim

TUONELA is the place of sojourn for the dead among the Finns and Karelians. The name means "the home of Tuoni," the ruler of the world of the dead. Apparently, Tuonela originally denoted the filled grave as the resting place of an individual dead person, but later was extended to mean the whole graveyard as the common dwelling place of the deceased.

In Karelian and Ingrian cemeteries small log huts were erected above the graves, with a window at the end or on one side to let in light and to enable the dead to look out. Similar huts were found in the cemeteries of other Finno-Ugric peoples (e.g., the Mordvins) in Russia. The custom of erecting huts in cemeteries was obviously borrowed from the Russians, who had similar house-shaped structures with pitched roofs on their graves. (These structures were later forbidden by the tsarist government.) In pre-Christian times, the dead were buried in small groves (*hiisi*) near the village. The groves were considered holy; no trees could be cut or twigs broken there.

Since the dead were believed to have the same needs as the living, it was the duty of the living to provide them with the necessities of life—clothing, food, and tools for work. Special attention was attached to footwear, for which the dead had particular use. Unmarried women were given the kerchiefs that married women wore so that they could marry. Care for the dead continued beyond the funeral, in order to let them have their share of the family proceeds. On commemoration days, food was taken to the graves; it was believed that the dead, assuming the form of birds, came to eat there.

Another group of beliefs about the topography of Tuonela also exists. Based on foreign models, they have been adapted to Finnish-Karelian cosmography and are elaborated in funeral laments. According to these beliefs, the realm of the dead was situated at the northern end of the world, separated from it by a deep precipice. At the base of the precipice flowed the black river of Tuonela, unilluminated by the sun or moon. The river

contained a whirling, wild cataract and a fire stream, in which spears, swords, and needles stood upright and the dead could be seen swimming in bloody clothes. The crossing of the river was associated with great danger. The dead could wade through it, the water reaching as high as their birthmarks, or they could cross a bridge made of thin thread. More frequently, the dead were transported across the river in a boat steered by the daughter of Tuoni. Singing in one's ears indicated that relatives in Tuonela were calling for the boat.

Fingernails are especially significant in the Karelian beliefs about Tuonela. The nails of the deceased were clipped on Saturday night, cut in two, and slipped into the neck-hole of the deceased person's shirt. They helped the dead ascend Tuonela mountain, which was smooth as an eggshell. If the nails were not cut in pieces, the Evil One would make a boat from them and take the person to Hell after his death. The picturesque nature of these beliefs about Tuonela stems partly from Baltic-Slavic, Byzantine, and Old Egyptian traditions, and partly from medieval Christian vision literature and hagiography.

[See also Finnic Religions.]

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FELIX J. OINAS

TURKIC RELIGIONS. Throughout the course of their long history, the Turkic peoples have simultaneously or successively practiced all the universal religions (Christianity, especially Nestorian Christianity; Judaism; Manichaeism; Buddhism; and Mazdaism) before the majority of them were won over to Islam. However, before yielding to these religions, they held their own system of beliefs, their own personal representations. These are generally identified as "animism" or "shamanism," even though the last term cannot even begin to cover the whole of the religious phenomena.

Their "national" religion, largely shared by the Mongols and certainly the Tunguz, is still practiced today. It has been kept alive among certain Siberian and Altaic groups and, to a much greater extent than is realized, within the very institution of Islam, to which it has more or less adapted without abandoning or altering many of its original characteristics.

This is not to say that the indigenous Turkic religion is free of every foreign element. It developed in contact with other ideas, notably those from China and Iran. It has continually evolved and grown richer over the course of centuries, either through internal development or the influence of great civilizations. It is, in fact, quite flexible and is based on tolerance and religious coexistence. Certainly, it is essentially a mystic religion. Its beliefs have never been solidly unified, and, as we are beginning to better understand, they are like two diverging branches of a common trunk: the popular one is centered on shamanism, totemism, and a vigorous polytheism; the imperial one is antishamanist, antitotemist, and has monotheistic tendencies in its advocacy of the supremacy of Tengri, the sky god.

Although they are separate, these two branches have not escaped interpenetration. One branch developed under the tribal regime, the other during the formation of the great empires of the steppes, such as those of the Hsiung-nu, the T'u-chüeh or Türk (sixth to eighth century), the Uighurs (eighth to ninth century), or the Mongols (thirteenth to fourteenth century). It must be remembered that the Turkic peoples played a major role in the Mongol empire. This is reflected in the use of the name Tartar (Turkic, Tatar), which was used to refer to the armies of Chinggis Khan and is none other than the name of a very ancient vassalized Turkic tribe. This expressive name also evoked an infernal river of antiquity, the Tartarus, and had the connotation of "barbarian" as well.

Whether tribal or imperial, however, the prevailing political and social regime allowed a memory of the former to remain, and when the prevailing order was temporarily abolished, along with it was abolished a part of what it had imposed. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the beliefs common to both the popular religion and the imperial religion apart from the beliefs that pertain more particularly to one or the other.

Until recently, it had been considered impossible to understand the religion of the Turkic people in its ancient form. Studies, especially ethnographic ones, have been written on groups of people who continued to practice the religion in modern times (nineteenth to twentieth century). Only recently has it been observed that the inscribed Turkic stelae of the sixth to the tenth century, certain manuscripts (including the dictionary

of Maḥmūd al-Kashghārī, tenth century), and foreign sources (especially Chinese but also Byzantine, Arabic, Latin, Armenian, and Syrian) present a considerable wealth of information. This information takes on full meaning when compared with ethnographic notes, medieval Mongolian sources, and pre-Islamic remnants in Turkic-Muslim plastic and literary works. Thus we begin to have, if not a complete knowledge of the ancient Turkic religion, at least a satisfactory view of the overall picture.

Of course, we have acquired more information on some periods and peoples than on others. We have a fair understanding of the religious situation under the empires but know little of the religious situation of the tribes, at least before the modern era. We know something of certain ethnic groups but nothing at all of others. In general, we have sufficient documentation on the period between the foundation of the Türk empire (sixth century) and the conversion of the Oghuz to Islam (eleventh to thirteenth century), as well as on the present era.

The Common Heritage. With a few small exceptions, the Turkic religion has offered structures to all peoples of all social classes in all regions of the Turkic world throughout history. Admittedly, there was a less influential period during which the religion was developing, but it appears to have been firmly established as early as the first century CE. It would be incorrect to believe, for example, that at the beginning of the Türk empire, the western Türk borrowed a cult of fire that was unknown to the eastern Türk from Iran (where it is known to have flourished), for the cult was already pan-Turkic. Because Sogdian, the language of an Iranian people, was used as a written language as far north as Mongolia in the early sixth century, the fact that literary evidence for the fire cult exists in an Iranian language cannot be used to prove that the cult was of Iranian origin. Far less important practices seem to be known in the east but not in the west, such as the wearing of plumes, which did not spread to the west until the Mongolian invasions.

Although the religion was fairly well established early on, certain innovations appeared over the course of time. Without doubt, the dualism already apparent in the Turkic religion has been accentuated through the influence of Manichaeism. From Buddhism has come a conception of hell as a cosmic zone situated under the earth in symmetry with the sky (a deity), as well as the transformation of one of the great mythological characters, Erlik or Erklik ("the virile one, the valiant one") from a warrior who killed the stars at daybreak to the god of the underworld, a king of innumerable demons

who not only live on the earth but haunt the entire universe. Equivalent to the Indo-Iranian Yama, he is attested to in Turkic sources as early as the 1200s. [See Erlik.] The idea of paradise seems to have taken shape in a similar way; the Sogdian word for it, *utchmaq*, has been confused with the Old Turkic infinitive *utchmaq*, which means "to fly away" and which was traditionally used, at least in speaking of great individuals, to signify "to die." An innovation that seems to be more important was observed by the Chinese in about 628: "In the past, the Türk had the custom of burning the dead; now they bury them." However, one must consider that the Turkic peoples have always fluctuated between incinerating and burying the dead. Of the pre-Slavic Bulgarians and, in a general way, of the western Türk, it is said, "One phratry burns its dead, the other buries them." The Kirghiz continued to use incineration until they came into contact with Islam.

Ideas that have remained unchanged are those relative to death, the afterlife, and funerary rites (apart from the issue of burial versus incineration). Death, which one hopes will be violent and unnatural (in spite of the respect that is occasionally shown the elderly) is considered the Necessity, Kergek (perhaps a deity). However, it is deeply dreaded and has given rise to bitter regrets, supposedly issued from the mouths of the deceased. Death is eminently contagious and requires a sober approach toward the dying one (generally abandoned) or the deceased. The type of afterlife to be attained depends primarily on the treatment accorded the skeleton. It must be cleaned perfectly: the flesh must be scraped off and the cadaver set on a platform in a tree and exposed. When the bones are clean, they are either buried in the ground (if the deceased is to retain his earthly ties) or burned (if he is to lose them and gain access to the kingdom of the dead). The funerary ceremonies have also survived the centuries without having been changed: they include lamentations and ritual mutilations, declamations (*agit*) of the virtues of the deceased, a sacrifice, and a communal meal. The meal has been especially important, so much so that the word *yog*, originally designating the funeral as a whole, would eventually connote only the meal.

The varying forms of the obsequies clearly demonstrate the margin of liberty or of uncertainty that remained within a well-defined context. This latitude occurs again and again primarily in the view of the world. The universe is generally represented as composed of two parallel plains, the sky and the earth (ultimately extended to three with the addition of the underworld). At the same time, it is also seen as a square plateau (earth), covered by a circumscribed dome (sky), with

the four corners of the earth being allowed to exist outside the shelter of the sky. The cosmic axis that links the sky, the earth, and the underworld can be a mountain or a tree with seven branches, each branch representing a level of the sky. The levels of the sky are in turn derived from the seven planets still known to have been popularly believed in during modern times but also attested to by prehistoric engravings and by every construction with symbolic value, for example, the pillar of the tent, the ensemble formed by the central hearth of the yurt, and its upper opening, through which the smoke escapes. This axis is at once the support for the sky and the path that permits access to it. Among the numerous microcosms consonant with this view, the yurt, a circular tent in the form of a bell, is the most characteristic. It is protected from exterior influences by the powerful deity of the threshold, which one must kiss upon entering. Although circular in shape, the yurt was oriented first toward the rising sun and then toward the south.

It is possible that the sky and the earth originally may have been placed side by side, but there is more speculation than truth to this. The Orkhon inscriptions (eighth century) speak about origins in two lines: "When the sky above was blue and the earth below was dark, the son of man appeared between them." The Turkic peoples were little interested in the cosmogonical problem or in eschatology. Of the more recent cosmogonies (after the tenth century), the well-known one reported by Wilhelm Radloff (1884, vol. 2, p. 3) and all allusions to the creative power of the sky god were influenced by foreign religions.

The observation of stars is an important occupation. The phases of the moon are considered lucky or unlucky. No projects are to be undertaken when the moon is in its last quarter, although a good time to launch a military campaign is when the moon is waxing or is full. The last days of the lunar month are favorable for obsequies because they mark an end and announce a rebirth. Similarly, human life closely parallels plant life. Trees are born each spring and die each autumn; thus the cadaver is saved for the biannual obsequies, which take place either when the leaves begin to fall or as they grow green again, a fact that explains the aforementioned techniques used to preserve the skeleton. When great personages are taken to their place of final rest, an attempt is made to be in harmony with the vegetative season, the phases of the moon, and the beneficial moments of the solstices and the equinoxes.

The four classic elements make up the universe. Water and fire are of exceptional value. Moreover, they are antagonists and complementary components: fire

comes from wood, which is born from water. The last has a fertilizing capacity but above all is pure. It is forbidden to dirty water, even though water does not purify. A "mass of water" is a symbol of knowledge and intelligence, qualities of the sovereign. Fire, which eventually would become a god, is an alter ego of the shaman because of its hypnotic, elevating, and healing powers. It is the great purifier. All defiled objects or those suspected of being defiled, notably anything that enters the camp, must pass between two fires, jump over the fire, or go around it. However, this ancient belief became obsolete in the nineteenth century, while fumigation, also a purifier, remained popular. The hearth, considered the reflection of the family, is protected by numerous taboos. To extinguish it and disperse the ashes would amount to destroying the race. Since ancient times, the great priest of this fire has been the "prince of fire," the *ottchigin* (derived from *ot tegin*), the youngest son to inherit the paternal residence—the heart of the empire—after the older sons had been provided for or endowed with a distant appanage. Today, this office is held by various members of the family, occasionally women. Like thunder, lightning—fire from the sky—arouses terror and is seen as a divine punishment against the one it strikes.

Every existing thing is inhabited by a force of varying intensity that we could call, although not quite accurately, "spirit," "soul," or "master-possessor." Each force can be broken down into a multitude of forces or can be combined with others to constitute a more vast, collective force. The tree is powerful, but the grove or forest is more powerful. The "eternal" stone is fully effective only when combined with others to form cairns (*obo*), piles generally located in dangerous passages or passages recognized as such by a sacred mystery. Anything complex like man, has several souls; human souls reside particularly in the blood (the shedding of which is forbidden), breath, hair, skull, sexual organs, and elsewhere. Thus nothing is simple or stable; everything has variable dimensions, a sort of ubiquity. But everything makes reference to the animal, zoomorphism being the form *par excellence*—the form of all spirits and of human spirits before their birth, during their life, and after their death. Consequently, everything that exists can appear as it is or in animal form.

In one way or another, all animals have had a numinous role, but certain animals are different from others: the bird of prey, the eagle or falcon, is a divine messenger that flies near Tengri and sits enthroned on the summit of the cosmic tree; the stag is often considered a saint, but is hunted nevertheless; the hare's position is as ambiguous as that of the camel, which is totemized

or tabooed as impure; the bear is the quintessential lunar animal, whose hibernation stirs the imagination; geese or swans, which appear in the widespread legend of the swan maiden, may symbolize the celestial virgin; all birds are souls; and the horse, a member of the clan, is the epitome of the sacrificial animal and also often a solar or aquatic symbol.

With the exception of the act of killing another man, combat between an animal and an adolescent, or another animal designated to represent him, constitutes the principal rite of passage. This rite allows a youth to become part of adult society and gives him rights to women or, rather, constitutes marriage in itself. In effect, the match is an enactment of the sexual act: to conquer the animal is to become both its spouse and its son. It renews and reenacts the primordial ancestral struggle: murder, copulation, and birth. This rite is an ancient legacy clearly attested by the animal art plaques of the steppes, medieval manuscripts, and modern commentary.

Despite a strong family structure, accounts of adoption by animals or humans are numerous, and fraternity is not dependent upon birth alone. Fraternity can be pledged between two strangers through the exchange of significant gifts (osselets, arrows, horses) and particularly through the mixing of blood. The rite that establishes fraternity consists of the two postulants' joining their slashed wrists or drinking mixed drops of their blood from a cup that is often made from the dried skull top of a murdered enemy chief. This giving of one's blood to another man is actually only one variant of the oath. The other form is the giving of blood to the earth, realized through the pouring of one's blood or the blood of a sacrificed animal; this act is performed before the sky, which deeply involves those making the pledge.

The Popular Religion. Despite the pretensions of certain shamans to positions of tribal leadership, shamanism is essentially a religious phenomenon, a dominant one in the religious life of contemporary non-Muslim Turkic peoples and one that is at the heart of the popular religion. It speaks to the people of things that interest them most—the preservation of their life (magical healings), their future (divination), and their relations with the familiar gods and spirits (the shaman's sacerdotal role, his cosmic voyage). The institution of shamanism is surely quite ancient. Although poorly discernible in antiquity, it was in full bloom by the time of the Middle Ages, despite the total silence of the Türk inscriptions on the subject. This silence does not prove the nonexistence of shamanism but, rather, reflects the care taken to exclude it from imperial records. The oldest descriptions of shamanic séances date back almost

to the era when the Old Turkic word for shaman, *qam*, clearly appears, and when magical healings and divinations were attested to among the Oghuz. Descriptions of such rites among the nomadic Turkic tribes come to us from Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), while similar accounts regarding the Kirghiz come from Marvazī.

Shortly after this period, numerous traces of shamanism appeared among the tribes converted to Islam who became part of the Seljuk hordes. From then on, the information continues to increase and become more precise. In the thirteenth century, van Ruusbroec provided a remarkable description of the séance. From all this medieval information, it appears that the shaman had the ear of the people, communicated with the sky god, was visited by demons, and went into trances to accomplish his cosmic voyages, during which he met many spirits and their auxiliary, or adversary, spirits. His objectives were to cure the sick by expelling the spirits that had entered them or by finding the spirits that had left their bodies, to predict the future, and to exercise certain sacerdotal and political powers. In other respects, the shaman seems to have been a sort of blacksmith, a manipulator of two numinous objects, fire and metal. In any case, he already had rivals: for healing, the first official doctors; for divination, the astrologers (seers who were closer to the princes than to the people) and all kinds of sorcerers, diviners, and prophesiers who waved their wands or arrows and used osselets and dice, who used haruspicy, scapulimancy, and, especially, oneiromancy, and who interpreted divinatory texts. One type of sorcerer who became the shaman's most threatening rival was the "rainmaker," the *yadadji*, who, with the help of a bezoar, produced thunderstorms on demand. These sorcerers, like the astrologers, worked more freely under the imperial religion than did the shamans, because the sorcerers had no pretensions to power or claims of intimacy with the sky.

The totemic system, which can exist only in tribal societies that employ it to determine basic structures (families, clans), plays a role in the popular religion that is almost as important as that of shamanism. For a long time, totemism was unknown among the Altaic peoples in general; however, in the mid-twentieth century pioneering research by P. J. Strahlenberg, Chodzidlo, A. Billings, N. Shchukin, and others revealed a totemic system among both contemporary and extinct Turkic societies, such as the Bashkirs, the Oghuz, and the western Türk. Since the eighth century, the Arabs (as confirmed by certain medieval Turkic texts) have observed a tie between clans of certain tribes and certain animals. The study of these observations reveals, beyond all possible doubt, a totemism, naturally misunderstood in the Arab and medieval Turkic accounts.

It is clear that the people, organized under the tribal system, worshiped numerous gods of human dimension and that they cared little about great deities, notably the Sky. We have seen that they were surrounded by innumerable forces that they had to use or protect: natural forces and even fabricated objects (the "master" of the weapon, its "soul," could render the weapon ineffective). The "masters" of the herd, of game, fish, hunting and fishing territories, and doubtless others all had to be conciliated. The masters that the Old Turkic texts call *idug yer sub*, "sacred lands and waters," concerned them most. These also could be the ensemble of indivisible lands inhabited by the tribe, or better, their "master-possessors" (those of other tribes and of foreigners such as the Chinese were recognized). It could also refer to certain privileged parts of this ensemble, often cited by name. The latter lands were "left free," as conveyed by the word *idug*. In these areas it was forbidden to carry out any secular activity: hunting, fishing, or felling trees. The idea that the parts of a whole should always be respected was extended to everything. There were also *idug* animals within the herd that could not be milked, sheared, or mounted. It was important for the hunters to allow some animals to escape from the game they encircled. At least the first fruits of the harvests had to be set aside unused. At each milking and at each meal, it was customary to set apart a portion of milk or meat to be offered to the gods.

Out of a desire to maintain control over the earth's products, the people made "soul supports"; these represented the spirit protectors of animals and harvests. They were among the numerous idols placed in the yurts and were also transported in carts, which became veritable traveling altars. Constructed of felt, wood, and metal, these zoomorphic or anthropomorphic idols could also represent and contain the soul of ancestors and of all imaginable powers. One took care of them, fed them, and painted them with blood. Ethnographers eventually began to call these idols by the Mongol word *ongon* (Turkic equivalents: *töz, tyn, kürmes*), although *ongon* actually refers to totems. Some of the highest deities were affected by this idolization, either through a spontaneous irruption of the practice as applied to the lower spirit protectors or through absorption of elements from the imperial religion. In a general way, the cave, the waters, the trees, and the stars were venerated. Every elevation of ground became a place of cult worship: it established the image of an ascent toward the sky, a distant and vague god [See *Ongon*.]

Whereas the tribal and familial deities of ancient periods are poorly understood, it is almost impossible to define the possible ties of the people to the great gods as revealed to us by the imperial texts alone, at least for

the period during which the people were not under the empire.

The Imperial Religion. It is difficult to comprehend the significance and the success of the imperial religion without taking into account the tribal organization of society, with its attendant instability, internecine wars, anarchy, and misery. Divided, the inhabitants of the steppes were powerless. United, they became invincible. Therefore, their strength assured free commerce and made possible raids and conquests of the rich lands of sedentary peoples. Despite the tribes' pronounced taste for independence and their attachment to tradition, the empire presented certain advantages that the tribes were prepared to accept, even if it meant losing part of their patrimony along with their autonomy. Certainly the sovereign, promoted through his own genius or through circumstances, was descended from the tribal regime and practiced the popular religion. This fact, together with his need to secure mass support, inclined him to tolerate the tribal religion; but he reorientated it, promoting elements that had been secondary, diluting or eliminating elements that were in essence anti-monarchist. The two great victims were shamanism and totemism.

From the imperial viewpoint, shamanism had no alternative but to adapt. During the long medieval periods, shamans had not only attained positions of tribal leadership (without necessarily having the gifts or the means for leadership) but had also pretended to maintain privileged relationships with the invisible, to climb to the sky. As tribal chiefs, they had to accept a superior authority, something that was more difficult for them than for others. As religious leaders, they had to acknowledge that the kaghan, the emperor, had relationships with the invisible world and the sky, relationships much closer than their own. Thus, there was an inevitable conflict between the shaman and the sovereign. However, the contest being unequal, it often ended abruptly or resulted in the inevitable elimination of the shaman. Chinggis Khan's suppression of the influence of the great shaman at his court can be seen as an epitome of this conflict. Even though we have no information, we can assume that the process was the same in other political structures with pan-Turkic tendencies. It is characteristic that the Old Turkic texts do not contain a single word about shamanism: we have already seen why. Nevertheless, it took real courage on the part of the sovereign to disregard the fear inspired in the Turkic peoples by all those who held religious or magical powers, including priests of the religions with which they came in contact.

Totemism was an equally formidable obstacle erected by the tribal regime against the empire. Classificatory

and divisive by definition, it was diametrically opposed to the imperial ideal. The duty to which the sovereign was thus called to devote himself consisted of renouncing the various totems of the clan cults and insistently promoting the totem or totems of the ruling dynasty. The ruling dynasty, like every family, like every tribe, was descended either from two united animals or from an animal that had had sexual relations with a human. The sex of the animal or human was not as important in this matter as was the complementarity of the different species. The latter was indicated more clearly and can be seen in the animal art of the steppes: a wildcat and a herbivore, a bird of prey and a rodent, an animal and a human. The myth of origin that was the most widely believed (because it simultaneously served the Türk, the Mongols, and other, smaller, groups) first presented a she-wolf who fed a young boy, married him, and gave him children, thus becoming his mother and wife at the same time. Later this was changed: a wolf was believed to have united with a doe. The content of this myth is particularly rich, especially among the Türk, because it involves the intervention of fertilizing water (the marsh where the she-wolf finds the child), the cave (where she gives birth), and even the bird of prey, which flies above the couple.

However, widespread as it is, this myth is only one among many. One could say that there are as many myths as there are Turkic peoples. Hence, the ancestor of the Kirghiz was a bull or a dog married to forty virgins; the ancestors of the Karakhanids, a lion and a camel. The Oghuz have demonstrated how a theme was able to change owing to unknown influences. Oghuz Kaghan, the eponymic ancestor of the confederation (whose name was etymologically *ogush*, "tribe") was first named "colostrum" (*agiz*), then "young bull" (*oghuz*) after his ancestor, while the wolf remained his guide and protector. Later, the Oghuz had six birds of prey as "totems" when they were divided into six clans and twenty-two or twenty-four when the number of their tribes increased. The exaltation of one's ancestors was emphasized in the Türk empire. Each year the sovereign either went in person or sent a high dignitary to the birthplace (cave) of his family. Türk flagpoles were topped with golden wolves' heads; thus the wolf continued to lead his descendants into battle and also to march ahead of them in migrations.

The imperial ancestor was clearly a divine animal who came from the sky. He was "blue" like the sky and, as described in a relatively recent (post-Chinggisid) text, he could be associated with luminous rays that emanated from the sun and moon. Thus, two different traditions concerning the origins of great men seem to have existed—one involving the sexual union of ani-

mals, one involving light that came and impregnated a woman or that, itself a radiant daughter, seduced heroes like Oghuz Kaghan. Some attempt was made to combine the two traditions, but never with much success, not even in the case of the Mongols, whose *Secret History* reveals the efforts made in this respect, or in the Turkic *Oghuz name*, which owes much to the former.

The popular gods suffered less from the imperial religion. Any major force that contributed to the power of the empire was welcomed, and the Turkic peoples, with their fundamental beliefs in the diffused divine, opposed the disappearance of these gods. (Popular sentiment also had to be respected.) Nevertheless, their fate was not always the same. Some were more or less forgotten, while others were promoted. Still others were obviously approached from a new perspective. The various *idug yer sub*, the "forbidden places," the "master-possessors of the earth and waters," were apparently reduced to those originally belonging to the imperial family. The mountains saw their strength become concentrated in two or three summits, such as the Ötükän, where the prince was seated. On the other hand, everything that appeared to be universal, common to all man, grew disproportionately. The earth goddess was often associated with the sky god and partook of his indivisibility. The sky himself, principally Tengri, became the sky god and was "blue," "elevated," and "endowed with strength"; he clearly became, at least eventually, "eternal," the supreme god above all others because he was the god of the emperor and was as exceptional as the latter was. The sovereign was "born from the sky," "resembled the sky," and was sometimes the sky's son, acting in his name as if he were his great priest; but he was also more, something like the sky's projection, his "shadow," as the Muslims would say. He directed the sky's cult, the collective prayers and ceremonial sacrifices in which he had all his people participate. From then on, Tengri concerned all people, all animals, all vegetables. He gave them life, made them grow, and protected them through two specific gifts, *kut*, a viaticum and celestial "soul," and *ülüg*, "luck."

The national god of the Turkic peoples, Tengri, was also the god of all men and demanded that all recognize him, that is, that they submit to the Turkic kaghan—a demand that caused him to take on the characteristics of a god of war. The worst transgression was to revolt against the prince, that is, against Tengri, and the god knew no other punishment for this than death. Before sending death, Tengri "applied pressure," sent messengers, and intervened in a purely psychological manner. In serious cases, he intervened simultaneously with the more popular gods. In medieval times, at least, there

does not seem to have been any notion of retribution or postmortem punishment. [See Tengri.]

If the popular religion has been passed over in silence by imperial Turkic texts, and often by others, there are nonetheless numerous deities that appear around the sky god without our knowing their connections to him: the earth goddess, the *iduq yer sub* and other master-possessors, the sacred springs and rivers, the trees, fire, and the mountain. Whether this last represented the "god of the earth," as with Boz Tengri, or whether it constituted the earth's axis, the center of the empire, like the famous Ötükän (in the Greater Khingan Range), its role eventually became so great and imposing that it was generally designated in Central Asia, as the god of the earth. (For example, the sacred mountain of the Mongolians is the Burkhan Qaldun.) The most powerful and stable of these deities that appear around the sky god is Umai (often still called this today but also known by other names, for example, Aiyysyt among the Siberian Yakuts), a placental goddess of whom al-Kashghārī says, "If one worships her, a child will be born." She protects newborns and mares and safeguards against puerperal fever. Certain attempts seem to have been made to bring her closer to Tengri; she has been called "close to the khatun," that is, to the empress. [See Umai.]

Finally, in addition to grandiose ceremonies (in terms of the empire), the imperial religion apparently promoted cults and new rites. The banner cult supported a particular soul, either of an ancestral animal (often evoked through a statuette or horse or yak tails atop a pole) or of one of the sovereign's ancestors. This gave rise to the feast of the unfurling of standards and to solemn sacrifices. The imperial family adopted the ancient practice of bloodless animal slaughter: they were strangled, suffocated, or stoned. Funerary temples, erected structures that are the only Turkic temples outside of natural sanctuaries (caves, groves, springs, mountains) or domestic sanctuaries (tents, carts carrying idols), have unfortunately come down to us in a deplorable condition. What remains of them, the *balbal* and the *baba*, may also be an imperial innovation. The *balbal* are shapeless stones (eventually wood was used, for instance among the Cumans and Kipchaks) erected to represent enemies slain in combat or immolated during obsequies. The slain enemies represented by the *balbal* are supposedly at the service of their murderers. For great personages, these monoliths number in the hundreds.

The *baba* are the funerary statues of deceased princes and, occasionally, princesses. They were not viewed as images of the departed but as images of the living, who, after their death, remained among the people. Not of

great aesthetic value, these huge, crude statues, of which a good number of specimens are known, represent the individual standing or seated, always holding a cup in the right hand, which is drawn back over the stomach. These works were the original image of the "prince in majesty" of classical Islam.

It is impossible to know whether belief in an afterlife in the sky was of imperial or popular origin, although there is no lack of presumptions that favor imperial origins: having come from the sky and belonging to it, the prince can only return there. In so asserting, one says that he "flies away," later that he "becomes a gyrfalcon" or that he "climbs up to the sky" where he is "as among the living." But there are also attestations of a celestial beyond for those who did not attain sovereignty—a place for those close to the prince, his servants, horses, concubines, and all those who could serve him or be useful to him. However, even if the sky was easily accessible to all—something we do not know—there was nothing to prevent the various souls of the same man, even those of a kaghan, from finding other places to inhabit (the tomb, the banner, the *balbal*, the *baba*), from being reincarnated in a new body, or from roaming the universe as an unsatisfied phantom.

[See also Chuvash Religion and Islam, article on Islam in Central Asia.]

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JEAN-PAUL ROUX

Translated from French by Sherri L. Granka

TURNER, VICTOR (1920-1983), Scottish-born American anthropologist and comparative religionist. On the basis of fieldwork in central Africa, Victor Witter Turner produced the richest ethnographic achievement of the period after World War II, and he explained the nature of religious ritual and symbolism in an African society in more detail than anyone had before.

Turner was born in Glasgow, Scotland. In 1943, in the midst of his five years of military service, he married Edith Davis, who was to collaborate with him in field research and writing throughout his career. He received his B.A. degree with honors in anthropology in 1949 from the University of London, where he studied with some of the leading figures of structural-functionalism: A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Meyer Fortes, Raymond Firth, and Edmund Leach. He went on to graduate study at the University of Manchester under Max Gluckman and was introduced to conflict theory and political anthropology. During 1950-1954 he was a research officer at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Lusaka, Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia), where he undertook, with his wife, a two-and-a-half-year study of the Ndembu people. In 1954 he returned to the University of Manchester and was appointed to the positions of lecturer and senior lecturer in social anthropology. From 1963 to 1968 he was professor of anthropology at Cornell University, and from 1968 to 1977 he was professor of anthropology and social thought at the University of Chicago. From 1977 until his death he was the William R. Kenan Professor of Anthropology at the University of Virginia. He held numerous fellowships, visiting appointments, and distinguished lectureships at universities in the United States and around the world. He or-

ganized major international conferences and was editor of the important series "Symbol, Myth and Ritual" published by Cornell University Press.

Like other leading anthropologists, Turner's ideas were shaped by his field experience. In the course of fieldwork he decided to abandon the social structural emphasis of his teachers and their bias against religion and to pursue a microsociological investigation of the actual processes of Ndembu village life that, he found, were articulated and resolved in ritual performances. Since Ndembu society is prone to conflict because of its inherent inconsistencies, he also rejected the static and mechanistic models of functionalism together with its goal of constructing universal social laws. Instead, he treated Ndembu society as a dynamic social process whose events were analyzable as "social dramas," consisting of phases of breach, crisis, redressive action, and reintegration (or schism), in which ritual played a central role. He also set aside the analytical perspective and alien categories of the outside observer and oriented his studies around the experiential context and cultural criteria of the Ndembu world, an approach that he later called the "anthropology of experience."

Although his initial study, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society* (1957), was labeled "difficult" and "experimental," Turner continued to refine his ideas about social drama and ritual process. He wrote one of the most detailed and perceptive studies of African divination, *Ndembu Divination: Its Symbolism and Techniques* (1961), viewing the subject in the context of social process and analyzing its use of social and ethical symbolism. He also wrote a short but brilliant clarification of methodological issues in African witchcraft studies, "Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy versus Dynamics" (1964), in which he treats a subject that had become bogged down in functionalist theorizing and confused definitions. He argues that witchcraft has to be viewed as a complex matter involving social process, cosmology, ecology, and biological factors. In addition he wrote a pioneering study of an Ndembu cult of affliction, *Chihamba, the White Spirit* (1962). In this work he attempted to go beyond the examination of social process and symbolic action and to formulate the implicit content of Ndembu thought by means of Thomistic concepts, long before the subjects of ethnophilosophy and ethnotheology had gained currency in anthropology. It was a venturesome effort and did not receive an entirely positive response. In subsequent and more detailed studies he examined Ndembu ethnomedical and ethno-biological concepts in the context of cults of affliction. One of these studies, *The Drums of Affliction* (1968), became the *locus classicus* of later scholarship in the field of African medical anthropology.

In the course of these ritual studies, Turner began to develop a theory of religious symbols. He noted in the field that certain symbols were dominant in ritual contexts and that they exhibited properties of condensation, unification of disparate significata, and polarization of meaning. Because of such semantic complexity, contextual variation, and attachment to ritual sequence, Turner rejected as overly simplistic the structuralist method of interpreting symbols in terms of synchronic, binary relationships. Instead, he proposed a threefold hermeneutic, based upon "exegetical," "operational," and "positional" levels of meaning. Moreover, he suggested that in the context of intense ritual experience, the ideological, or "normative," and the sensory, or "orectic," poles of meaning came together and reinforced one another in such a way as to produce powerful emotional effects and real transformations of character and social relationships. Herein, Turner felt, lay the power and efficacy of ritual.

Although he wrote two detailed accounts of Ndembu boys' and girls' initiation rites (the first appearing in *The Forest of Symbols*, 1967, the second in *The Drums of Affliction*, 1968), it was in the context of a brief comparative study of rites of passage, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in *Rites de Passage*" (1964), that he began to focus upon the work of the Belgian anthropologist Arnold van Gennep. He found van Gennep's analysis of rites of passage into the phases of separation, threshold or *limin*, and reaggregation to be not only a useful cross-cultural model but also the source of a fundamental insight: the regenerative and transformational possibilities of ritual liminality. Whereas van Gennep emphasizes only the outward change of social status accomplished by these rites, Turner emphasizes the inward, moral, and cognitive changes that occurred, and where van Gennep examines only the social aspects of the liminal state, Turner examines its deconstructive and reconstructive processes. Thus Turner concentrated upon the heretofore neglected, strange, and amorphous properties of symbols and actions of the liminal phase. He regarded such symbols and actions both as channels for communicating basic social and cultural values and as channels for discovering new moral and metaphysical insights that tend to subvert as well as support established religious and social orders.

Turner developed his theory of liminality further in the seminal work *The Ritual Process* (1969). Here he defines the social form of liminality as *communitas*, the direct, egalitarian encounter and fellowship between people as people, which characterized both temporary ritual states and certain more enduring social groups. In this context he defined three forms of *communitas*, the "spontaneous," the "ideological," and the "norma-

tive," and he elaborated a host of contrasting liminal and status system forms. In addition to illuminating past religious and political movements as well as popular currents in American society of the 1960s, Turner brought his theory of liminality to bear upon the phenomenon of religious pilgrimage, a generally ignored subject in the history of religions. His contribution, presented in another important essay, "The Center Out There: Pilgrims' Goal" (1973), was to see pilgrimage as a rite of passage whose goals include both the experience of *communitas* and the liminal encounter with the sacred at the pilgrimage center. There followed a series of lectures and articles on this theme, and they inspired other scholars to take up the subject. Together with Edith Turner, he explored the subject further in relation to Mexican, Spanish, and Irish pilgrimage sites in a fieldwork study, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* (1978). His subsequent search for liminality in the modern secular world led to his use of the word *liminoid* to represent the nonreligious genres of art, sport, and performance.

Although Turner often emphasized his departure from social functionalism, his vision of religion and society remained partly indebted to it. Like Émile Durkheim, he saw social order to be dependent upon ritual and ceremonial performances, and like Max Gluckman, he emphasized the cathartic effects of ritual reversal that helped to restore and legitimate established social structures. But he went beyond both Durkheim and Gluckman by examining the processes of social change and the ways in which ritual helped to create new social realities. His work, along with that of anthropologists Claude Lévi-Strauss, Clifford Geertz, and Mary Douglas, also helped to revive comparative studies in religious anthropology, which had been abandoned by British and American functionalists. But, although he agreed with Douglas and Geertz on the cognitive importance of ritual symbols, he refused to tie them closely to social structure as in Douglas's theory or to construe them as "texts" according to Geertz's formulation.

Following the American anthropologist Edward Sapir, Turner held that culture is not a completely or consistently articulated system, a set of dogmas or logically arrayed or Lévi-Straussian symbolic codes, but rather a changing entity, influenced by "root paradigms," that is, by axiomatic frames, or deep myths, that propel and transform people and groups at critical moments. In this respect Turner came to see that the Ndembu are not exceptional but typical, and thus that social order is fundamentally "processual" in form and "dramatic" in character.

Turner called his analytical method "dramatistic," because, like Freud, he believed that examination of dis-

turbances of the normal and the regular often gives greater insight into the normal than does direct study. Because of the episodic character of social systems, Turner preferred the sociologist Kurt Lewin's image of society as "social fields." He also saw affinities with the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz and his followers, who regarded culture as a constantly negotiated set of meanings, and he found useful Wilhelm Dilthey's theory that the meanings and values of life are to be found in the "structures of experience" and not in the formal categories of thought. This approach led him to welcome a shift in anthropology away from such concepts as structure, equilibrium, function, and system to such concepts as process, indeterminacy, and reflexivity, and he envisioned a new anthropology based upon a synthesis of disciplines instead of the usual disciplinary specialization. Turner himself was not, however, given to sustained theoretical exposition, and he often let unclarities remain in his writings, for which he was sometimes taken to task by his colleagues. He preferred to forge his concepts as he went along. His approach was regarded as highly original, and he put forward his ideas with a strong personal conviction that gave his analyses great force.

His final studies led him into the field of performance theory. In theater, especially experimental theater in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Turner saw the same kind of liminal reflexivity, the public cognizance of social situations, that he encountered in rituals associated with the redressive phase of Ndembu social dramas. Together with the drama theorist and director Richard Schechner, Turner understood theater to be an important means of communicating a society's self-reflections and a means of cross-cultural understanding. Thus he encouraged anthropologists to study theatrical performances as well as ordinary social life. In the course of his teaching he also guided students in the performance of ethnographic rituals as a means of learning about ritual and about the societies from which the students came.

At this juncture, he became interested in the subject of the neurobiology of ritual. It appeared that the contrasting functions of the cerebral hemispheres, the right and left brain, might correspond to the two aspects of society Turner had been looking at, structure and liminality. In a major essay, "Body, Brain and Culture" (1983), Turner speculated that the right hemisphere might also be the source of universal symbolic patterns, such as C. G. Jung's archetypes or his own root paradigms and deep myths, which seemed to exist at the subliminal level until activated and brought into the articulate realm of the left brain. The existence of differ-

ent brain levels, especially the neocortex and the mid-brain, also seemed to resemble the ideological and orrectic poles of dominant symbols. Perhaps at the height of ritual, Turner speculated, it was the interaction between these two levels with the right and left hemispheres of the brain that produced the transformational effect that was essential to successful ritual performance. Although these were but speculations about the possible biological mechanisms of the ritual process, they were consistent with Turner's fundamental conviction that it was in the dynamics and dramatics of social, ritual, and theatrical events that one came to understand the lives of others and oneself.

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TURTLES AND TORTOISES. There is a widespread belief that the earth rests on the back of a turtle or tortoise. This archaic idea is found not only among

North American Indians but also in South Asia and Inner Asia. The turtle now appears even as a symbol of the entire universe (e.g., in China). Moreover, according to creation myths involving an earth diver, the turtle, sometimes as an incarnation of the divine being, plays a prominent part in the cosmogony of various cultures.

According to the Maidu in California, a turtle dived to the bottom of the primeval ocean and procured a little soil under its nails. When it surfaced, God scraped its nails carefully and made a ball like a small pebble. The ball of soil then grew miraculously until it became as large as the universe itself. The Yokut narrate how at the time of beginning the eagle and the coyote sent a turtle into the waters. The motif of the turtle's successful dive is known also among the Algonquin. According to the Onondaga and the Mohawk (i.e., the Iroquois), it was a turtle that directed several different animals into the ocean; a beaver tried in vain, an otter also failed, but a muskrat returned successfully with soil in his claws and mouth. This soil was placed on the back of the turtle, and then the miraculous growth of earth began.

Inner Asia has preserved similar stories. According to the Buriats, in the beginning there was nothing but water, and a turtle. God turned the turtle on its back and built the world on its stomach. In other versions, Mandishire (the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī) transforms himself into a great turtle and supports the earth he has made on the surface of the waters.

The great tortoise is often represented in India as the sustainer of the four elephants upon whose backs the world rests. In the *Mahābhārata* the tortoise, as an avatar of Viṣṇu, supports the earth when the gods and demons churn the primeval ocean to obtain ambrosia.

In China, the turtle symbolizes the universe; its dome-shaped back represents the sky, while its belly, square in shape, stands for the earth. It also appears as the god of the waters, presiding over the north, one of the four cardinal points of the universe. Black in color, it is symbolically associated with winter and other aspects of the *yin*, or female principle; as in ancient Egypt and Greece, the tortoise in China is a symbol of erotic power and fecundity. Moreover, the great age to which the tortoise supposedly lives has made it a symbol of longevity and immortality; in the mythico-iconographical tradition the tortoise often forms a complex together with immortality, the moon, and paradise. There are "stone" turtles in South Korea and southern Japan (Kyushu), at its seashore facing the Korean Peninsula. Dating from prehistoric times, these monuments indicate that people believed in the turtle bestowing new life or immortality on the dead and escorting them

to the otherworld far across the sea or to paradise under the waters.

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MANABU WAIDA

TU-SHUN (557-640), also known as Fa-shun; first patriarch of the Hua-yen school in China. Tu-shun was born in the town of Wan-nien in Yung-chou Province, the birthplace of many important Buddhists. At the age of eighteen he was ordained by Sen-chen of the Yin-sheng Ssu, and studied Buddhist meditation under him. Some years later he went to Ch'ing-chou Province and there recommended that people hold a Buddhist vegetarian feast. According to legend, he is said to have satisfied the hunger of a thousand people with food adequate for only five hundred. According to this same legend, he acquired such great supernatural power through meditation that he was able to effect miraculous cures. Indeed, it is principally for such charismatic powers, and not for his doctrinal contributions, that he is known to later church historians.

As a result of his growing reputation, Tu-shun was asked to preach at the court of T'ang T'ai-tsung (627-645). It is said that the emperor bestowed upon him the honorary name *Ti-hsing* (Imperial Heart) in the year 632. In the years after his death at the I-shan Ssu temple in Nan-chiao, popular legend declared Tu-shun to have been an incarnation of the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī.

Little precise information is known about Tu-shun's religious practice. It is said that he urged Fan Hsüan-chih, one of his disciples, to chant the *Hua-yen ching* (*Mahāvaiṣṇava-buddhagaṇḍavyūha Sūtra*) and to learn from it the practice of the *bodhisattva* Samantabhadra. We can infer from this that his own religious exercises were intimately related to such practices. Tu-shun had at least four disciples: the above-mentioned Fan Hsüan-chih, Chih-yen, who was to become the Hua-yen school's second patriarch, a monk known simply as Ta, and a child of a Li family. The latter two persons are otherwise unknown.

Tradition has long ascribed to Tu-shun authorship of the seminal *Fa-chieh kuan-men* (On the Meditation of

the *Dharmadhātu*), a work that sets forth the basic doctrinal and practical stance of Hua-yen Buddhism. Some modern scholars, however, doubt that this book was either edited or written by him. The *Hsü kao-seng chuan* (Further Biographies of Eminent Monks), which contains the most reliable account of Tu-shun's life, makes no reference whatsoever to the *Fa-chieh kuan-men*. Nor is there any positive relation between the thought expressed in this work and the thought of Tu-shun's disciple and patriarchal successor Chih-yen. Finally, the *Fa-p'u-t'i-hsin chang*, written by Fa-tsang, the Hua-yen school's third patriarch, has the same content as this work. Given these arguments, and considering the long tradition of pseudepigraphy in the Buddhist tradition, the association of Tu-shun with the *Fa-chieh kuan-men* appears doubtful.

[See also Hua-yen.]

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KIMURA KIYOTAKA

TŪSĪ, NĀṢĪR AL-DĪN (AH 597–672/1201–1274 CE), more fully Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan; Persian Shī'ī philosopher, theologian, mathematician, astronomer, and statesman. As usual for the culture and the period, the real facts of his life are scanty; they are also clouded by politico-religious considerations. He was born at Tūs (in northeastern Iran; he is almost the only one of many famous natives called by the bare relative adjective *tūsī*), and he was of an undoubtedly Shī'ī, possibly Īsmā'īlī, family. An early aptitude for all the disciplines of the time was followed by specialization in mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy, in the last of which he became a devoted student of the works of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). For an unspecified period, but probably from his early twenties to his late fifties, he was in the service of the Īsmā'īliyah at various places in Iran, notably with a cultured governor of Quhistān, and finally at the great fortress of Alamūt. When the latter was overrun by the Mongol invasion of Hūlāgū (c. 1257), he went over to the new order as one of the many Shī'ī Muslims (and members of other disaffected groups) who

helped guide the Mongols to the extinction of the Sunnī caliphate and the control of Islamic lands and culture. For the last eight years of his life he returned to scholarship and was supported by the Mongols in a splendid observatory at Maragha, in the northwest Persian province of Azerbaijan. Here he prepared the *Zij-i Īl-Khānī* ("Il-Khanid tables": *Īl-Khān* was a title of the first Mongol rulers in Islam), an authoritative set of astronomical/astrological calculations. In his last days he is also thought to have turned to Sufism. He died in Baghdad, in present-day Iraq, still at that time an important cultural metropolis.

Over one hundred works of varying size, mostly in the learned Islamic lingua franca of Arabic, are commonly attributed to Tūsī, but less than twenty of these are believed to survive more or less intact (Islamic bibliography is still very inexact, particularly in Iran, where the best manuscripts have tended to remain uncatalogued in private hands). His writings cover the whole range of his interests as described above.

Tūsī's importance in religion lies partly in his being one of the subtlest and most learned of the Shī'ī theologians, partly in his application of ultimately non-Islamic philosophical ideas and methods to Islamic contexts and problems, but above all in his active involvement in the politico-religious crises of his time. Of his many famous contemporaries, some (e.g., Sa'dī) sought refuge in travel, quiet retirement, and literary pursuits, while others (e.g., Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī) immersed themselves totally in the mystical life. Tūsī can more easily be compared to a sensitive, religiously inclined German or Russian intellectual who somehow kept afloat through the storms of the post-1920 decades without any serious awareness of having lost most moral bearings. His later words of *apologia* for earlier compromises may or may not be sincere, but modern readers will empathize with him more readily than could their predecessors.

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Tūsī's two works as edited, referred to above, are both Persian, both primarily philosophical, and both equipped with good reference material of all kinds. One is *The Nasirean Ethics*, which I have translated with an introduction (London,

1964). Its title belies its far-reaching concerns in philosophy, psychology, sociology, economics, and politics—all brought within an Islamic frame of reference and often given a strongly personal coloring. It also contains a famous example of its *apologia*. This version was later used as a basis for the first scholarly Persian edition, *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* (Tehran, 1977–1981) by the late Muḡtabā Mīnovī and collaborators. The second work is *Taṣawwūrāt*, edited and translated by Vladimir A. Ivanov as *Rawḡatu't-Taslīm, Commonly Called Taṣawwūrāt* (Leiden, 1950).

G. M. WICKENS

TWELVERS. See Shiism, article on Ithnā' 'Ashariyah.

TWINS. The notion of duality, which must be distinguished from dualism, is common to every human culture. It finds a particular expression in the concept of the couple, an idea understood as a generating agency not only in the field of animal physiology but also in numerical and metaphysical symbology (as, for example, in Pythagorean speculation). According to this, the One and the Two, as generating principles, are perceived as masculine and feminine. The kind of duality expressed by the generating couple need not be viewed as dualistic in itself, but the shift from duality to dualism is obvious when the constituent elements (the One and the Two, male and female) are understood as principles that are, in effect, principal: that is, when their mutual relationship is responsible for the first origins of the world and of human beings and, at the same time, is one characterized by a strong disparity of value (or even a total opposition) between them. [See Dualism.]

Another privileged expression of duality, in both physiology and symbology, is the notion of twinship. The concept of twinship is not reducible to the projection of a physiological experience on a symbological plane. In fact, physiology requires the possibility of more than two twins, a possibility that is normally excluded in the symbological use of the notion. Thus, the duality of twins, an essential constituent of the notion in symbology, is given a peculiar function in the field of ontology, different from that of the couple. First, the couple is understood as a generating agency from the dynamic perspective of a sonship, which, on the symbological plane, can be unitary (as in the triadic pattern of father, mother, and son) or indefinitely plural. The notion of twins, however, is oriented toward stasis, whether there is a perfect symmetry between the two constituent elements, or, inversely, disparity between them. In fact, twinship is founded on the physiological experience of the diachrony of twins' conception in or emergence from the maternal womb. (This diachrony is

the motivation behind seniorship, the notion that the twin born second was conceived first.)

Historical Examples. Diachrony is a decisive element in a famous mythical story about twins, the myth of the birth of Ōhrmazd and Ahriman, the God and the Anti-god of Zoroastrian religion; this narrative is not explicitly accounted for in Zoroastrian literature but only in Christian and Islamic sources arguing against Zoroastrianism. It was not intended to resolve the radical dualism of Zoroastrianism but to provide an explanation of the origins of evil. Zurwān, the personification of time, performed a sacrifice in order to generate Ōhrmazd, the potential creator of all good things. But Zurwān doubted the efficacy of his sacrifice, and as a result he gave birth to twin sons, Ōhrmazd and Ahriman. The former was a result of his sacrifice, and the latter the consequence of his doubt. Since Zurwān had pledged to concede the royal privilege to the first son who appeared before him, the perverse Ahriman broke out of the maternal womb prematurely and demanded the fulfillment of his father's promise. Zurwān did not acknowledge him as a true son but was obliged to honor his promise; he declared that Ahriman would be king for nine thousand years, but that Ōhrmazd would be king forever.

Despite Zurwān's probable existence in the mythology of older times (in the cuneiform tablets of Nuzi and, according to some scholars, in a silver relief coming from Luristan), a similar myth of twinship appears in later religious contexts. More significant and much older is a text belonging to the very old *Gāthās* in the Zoroastrian Avesta (*Yashis* 30.3). This poem mentions two spirits (Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu) who "were seen in sleep as twins"; they are respectively good and bad in thought, word, and action and the foundations of life and its opposite. According to a recent translation of this text by Helmut Humbach, their aspects as the foundations of life and its opposite are not to be interpreted specifically in a chronological sense (that is, in the sense of a cosmogony); but we may still consider the two spirits as opposite principles that exist prior to any manifestation of their existence in this world and hold them accountable for the existence of good and bad, life and death. Thus, they express a radical formulation of dualism, not only moral but ontological.

It is not clear, however, whether the two spirits are literally twins. According to most scholars, they are sons of one and the same father, Ahura Mazdā (the former spelling of the name *Ōhrmazd*), because other texts in the *Gāthās* state that Ahura Mazdā is the father of the beneficent Spenta Mainyu. Moreover, the same scholars, noting that the text quoted above mentions a

“choice” made by the two twins (a good choice by the first and a bad choice by the second), think that these choices were made freely, in keeping with the then-current Zoroastrian notion of the free choice between good and bad that can be made by any human being in this world. This interpretation appears highly improbable. Good and bad seem natural choices for the first and second spirit respectively (otherwise, why should there be precisely two?), in the sense that the spirits prefigure the radical character of the choice. Or, rather, they embody it, but as principles and preformate referents of the choice itself and its consequences for people and *daēvas*, that is, life and its opposite. This is the only interpretation that can account for the pregnancy and the profound intermixture of ontology and ethics (as well as cosmogony and moral struggle) that is characteristic of Zoroastrianism in every period of its history. Moreover, it would be impossible to conceive the great god Ahura Mazda as the father of the evil spirit, for the simple reason that their respective essences have nothing in common. In conclusion, the term *twins*, as applied to the two spirits, should be understood in that Gathic text not as designating brothers, sons of one and the same father, but as a strong expression of their symmetrical and perfectly contrary essences. In order to compare this notion of the twin spirits with the myth of Zurwān and his two sons (who are also good and bad already in their respective natures and not as a consequence of a contrary choice made by them), we must take into account the precisely different natures of Ahura Mazda and Zurwān. The former is a supreme being completely endowed with personality and ethics; the latter—as time or destiny personified—is not so endowed; he is an entity apt to have materially with himself and to generate from himself such contrary personal agents as the twin characters, God and Antigod, that is, Ōhrmazd (the old Ahura Mazda) and Ahriman (the old Destructive Spirit) and their mutually opposing activities.

These two examples show the mythical theme of twinship in the context of the dualistic conceptions of Zoroastrian religion. As we have seen, the opposition between the two twins in the *Gāthās* and in the myth of Zurwān is, in a sense, horizontal. A different use of the theme of twins is present in Manichaeism. Mani was said to have a counterpart in the celestial realm, a twin, (Syr., *at-Taum*) a pneumatic-divine entity who was both his protecting agency and his alter ego. In the Manichaean Codex of Cologne, a Greek biographical text, the term *suzugos* (“he who is bound in marriage”) is substituted for *twin*. This is reminiscent of the fact that in Valentinian gnosticism the soul of the gnostic was conceived of as feminine, destined to marry her divine

counterpart, her angel. In Mani’s case, the terms *twin* and *husband* both point to a relationship that implies the gnostic notion of the perfect consubstantiality of the celestial element and its counterpart active in the terrestrial realm. The terrestrial element waits to be reunited with the celestial element, the pneumatic self. At the same time, the heavenly twin and the angelic husband are an expression of transcendence in relation to whatever lives in the terrestrial realm: “The mysteries and [vi]sions and the excellence of my Father, and concerning me, who I am, and my *suzugos* . . . who he is” (*Manichaean Codex of Cologne* 23.1–5). It is clear that this ambivalence concerning the perfect consubstantiality (or even identification) between Mani and his twin and at the same time the difference between them (i.e., their respective, actual identities) before the final return of Mani’s soul to its original abode implies a vertical structure, well adapted to the general gnostic notion of a devolution of some pneumatic essence or of its mission in this mixed world. This notion is antithetical to the radical, horizontal opposition of essences expressed in Zoroastrianism in the notion of twin spirits.

Among the nonliterate cultures in which dualistic and (needless to say) dual myths and conceptions exist, explicit radical dualisms are rare. The notion of two symmetrically opposed twins is found in the Iroquois myth of Iouskeha (“sprout”) and Tawiskaron (“flint”). More primitive tribes that profess a dualistic mythology do not share the idea of a symmetry between two opposed, superhuman beings (as, for example in the myth of Coyote, who has nothing in common—as far as his origin and ontological meaning are concerned—with the creator). The Iroquois are agriculturalists with matriarchal institutions. This may imply that the dualistic structure expressed in their myth, both in terms of the symmetry of opposing twins and their common origin from a maternal entity, derives from a lunar mythology. On the other hand, this symmetry must be distinguished from that found in Zoroastrianism between the opposed “twin” spirits, or between Ahriman and Ōhrmazd. The Zoroastrian notion of the ontological opposition between the two spirits or between God and Antigod is radicalized to such an extreme that it denies any dialectical or complementary function for Ahriman (with the exception of some brief, very heterodox tales in which he is given some positive capacities that render him rather akin to the figure of a trickster: for example, it is he who knows what Ōhrmazd must do in order to create the great luminaries). [See Tricksters.] However, some comparisons may be drawn between the Iroquois myth and the myth of the birth of Ōhrmazd and Ahriman from Zurwān. Some of the characteristics of the bad Tawiskaron may remind us of the deeds of Ahriman.

The bad Iroquois twin breaks out of the maternal womb, emerging from his mother's side. Iouskeha's demiurgical activity, like that of Öhrmazd, calls the good creatures of the world into existence; the creations of his twin are monstrous and maleficent. Tawiskaron calls into existence a gigantic frog who absorbs all the water in the world, causing aridity—a mythical motif that also exists in the Zurwān mythology. All in all, differences predominate. Even though Iouskeha (or Oterongtongnia) triumphs, he does not transcend his identity as a twin and grandson—not even the privileged one—of the female, primordial character, Ataentsic. Therefore, he has very little in common with the high god of Zoroastrianism, who does transcend his earthly role.

There are numerous problems connected with the myths of twins found among American Indians because of certain sociological elements common to many tribes; the tendency toward a dual organization, for instance, is shared by many populations of North and South America. It appears that the two moieties of a tribe are frequently connected with two mythical twins. According to Werner Müller (1956), this prevents us from interpreting the opposition between such twins as a crude opposition between good and evil. According to Mircea Eliade, the Iroquois myth "is a dualist myth, the only North American myth susceptible to comparison with the Iranian dualism of zurvanite type. . . . Nevertheless, as we shall presently see, such an irreducible antagonism does not reach the Iranian paroxysm, and this for the simple reason that the Iroquois refuse to identify in the 'bad' twin the essence of 'evil,' the *ontological evil* that obsessed Iranian religious thought" (Eliade, 1969, p. 147f.). Moreover, the ontological basis of the Iroquois dual and (because connected with cosmogony) dualistic mythology is intertwined with sociological and cultural motivations; it implies a question not only of essence but also of function. Tawiskaron's activity, though essentially negative in its value, is considered to have an effect on Iroquois institutions (their cult and calendar) and way of life. As Eliade observes (on the basis of Werner Müller's argumentation), it was a prophet of the Seneca tribe, Handsome Lake, who, at the beginning of the nineteenth century "substituted for the couple of the mythical Twins that of the Great God, Haweniyo (the 'Great Voice') and the Devil, Haninseono ('Who Dwells in the Earth')" (ibid., p. 148). This substitution could be a result of the prophet's monotheistic tendency, but as Müller and Eliade point out, it could also be a response to the accusation made by the Europeans that the Iroquois "adored the Devil." This accusation has been leveled several times in response to dualistic theologies and mythologies; it implies that

there is a cult around the second element of the couple. This element may be a demiurge-trickster, a culture hero, or a twin, in no way an exclusively bad character because it is also connected with an important, complementary aspect of reality. Such a notion reminds us of the Egyptian myth (as expounded by Plutarch) that Seth, the opposing and destroying agency complementary to Osiris, was defeated but not annihilated in order that the equilibrium of the universe remain unchanged.

According to Åke Hultkrantz, the theme of twins in American Indian culture is connected with the figure of the culture hero. [See Culture Heroes.] This hero may be the father of the twins; in some instances, at least one of the twins has some of the hero's characteristics. One even gets the impression that the twins incorporate respectively the two essences or tendencies present in the culture hero: "the vocation to produce and the vocation to destroy" (Hultkrantz, 1968, p. 41). Hultkrantz maintains that there is also a kind of parallelism between the relationship linking the supreme being and the culture hero on the one hand and the relationship between the two twins on the other. "It seems verisimilar that the myth of the twins be a variation of the mythological theme expressed in the relationship between the Supreme Being and the cultural hero, and that it influenced the latter only secondarily, possibly emphasizing dualism present in this" (ibid., p. 41f.).

In other cases, the twins have nothing in common with the culture hero, but they may accomplish—individually or together—some of the deeds traditionally attributed to him. According to Paul Radin (1949), three types are to be distinguished at the core of American Indian myths of twinship. First, the mother of the twins dies as a result of outside aggression or the unnatural birth of the bad twin (as among the Iroquois). In both myths, the second twin is negative and violent, but the first—at least in the first type of myth—is scarcely more commendable in his *modus operandi*. Second, the twins are children of the Sun. They are different in character, but they cooperate. The third type of myth is a combination of the first two. The first type seems to be common among the northern regions of North America; the second is concentrated in the southwestern regions of the same continent; the third belongs exclusively to South America.

Particularly interesting is the respective quality of the achievements of the twins in the context of their demiurgical activity, an issue that adds new particulars to the generic statement that the second twin, as Eliade points out, "does not incarnate the idea of 'evil' but only the negative, dark aspect of the world" (Eliade, 1969, p. 149). Thus, among the Tuscarora, an Iroquois tribe, the bad twin, "animated by a bad spirit," came violently to

light, so killing his mother. The good twin tried to create plants and animals, but the other, trying to imitate him, succeeded only in bringing desert lands and reptiles into existence. The bad twin also created the bodies of human beings; his brother gave them souls. In the end, the bad twin was vanquished but not annihilated; he became the king of the dead (Hultkrantz, 1963). We cannot but concur with Eliade that the twins in these mythologies form a complementary couple ruling "the two modes or two 'times,' which together constitute the living and fertile universe" (*ibid.*, p. 149).

Another character from these Iroquois myths, the Grande Bosse, a double of Tawiskaron, who fought against the creator and introduced sickness and other evils, was finally defeated but was given the task of curing and helping people. This double lives on the cliffs at the borders of the world, in the land where diseases are born, accompanied by the False Faces, the abortive creations of Tawiskaron, who had tried in vain to imitate the human beings created by his brother. But, as Müller points out, as known from ritual, these creatures "in spring and autumn, drive away the maladies from the villages" (Müller, 1946, p. 272). This is a notion widespread both in North America and in Australia, namely, that bad entities or spirits that are guilty of homicide are endowed with the capacity to heal: they know the "medicine." In the Menomini cult of Manabozo, for example, the evil spirits responsible for the death of the brother of the hero are obliged to impart the medicine to those initiated in the cult, that is, to act against their previous homicidal activity. The same applies to the dreadful character of Crow in some Australian myths and also to the Egyptian myth already mentioned, in which the evil Seth is defeated but not annihilated. A providential decision by Isis allows him to continue his struggle against Apophis, the serpent, who day after day attacks the cosmic boat of the sun crossing the heaven. Eliade's discussion applies to the Egyptian situation as well as to the Indian:

In other words, though the adversary has been defeated by the Great God, his works, the "evil," persist in the world. The Creator does not seek to, or perhaps he cannot, annihilate the "evil," but neither does he permit it to corrupt his creation. He accepts it as an inevitable negative aspect of life, but at the same time he compels his adversary to combat the results of his own work. (1969, p. 149)

Eliade points out, too, that the Iroquois worldview displays a clearly dualistic view of evil. Considered a "disastrous innovation" brought about by some bad superhuman personage, evil is nonetheless

accepted as a henceforth inevitable modality of life and of human existence. . . . The universe is imagined to have a

central portion, i.e., the village and the cultivated fields, inhabited by men; this central portion is surrounded by an exterior desert full of stones, swamps, and "False faces."

(*ibid.*, pp. 149–150)

The same situation is found in old Egypt, where the Nile and the land that is periodically flooded by it belong to Osiris; the desert and the barren sea (with the foreign, Asiatic) countries belong to the "red" Seth (red being the color of the desert), who is characterized by loneliness, infertility, and aggressiveness. A similar notion is found among the Dogon of West Africa. Nommo, the god of water (that of the Niger), may resemble the high god of numerous mythologies in his creative activity. The infelicitous attempts of his evil brother, Yurugu, or Ogo (who is not properly a twin), at creation result in misshapen, monstrous creatures. Compelled by his experience of failure, he introduces pain into the existence of the good creatures. In doing so, Yurugu joins the ranks of the demiurge-tricksters at least in terms of his inability to imitate the efficacy of the creator. But a difference remains. The demiurge-trickster is more interested in particular occurrences in purportedly worsening the quality of life than is the bad twin or brother; he introduces painful conditions of life, creates cliffs and mountains that are difficult to cross, and causes people to become mortal (as does Coyote among some Californian tribes and the bad demiurge of some Asiatic mythologies). But he also justifies his actions by claiming that he challenges human cultural creativity by providing obstacles to survival.

Another important feature of American Indian mythologies of twins is that in South America and in the southwestern regions of North America twins are conceived as sons of the sun. Their birth is characterized by the violent death of their mother. The twins are not necessarily portrayed as rivals. The difference between them is sometimes attested to by the difference of their respective destinies; one of them experiences death but is resurrected by the other (a motif found in the classical myth of the Dioscuri). These twins represent universal duality at the cosmological and sociological levels, which fact, however, does not prevent us from considering them as disparate in terms of their ontological consistency and their axiological evaluation. Similar interpretations apply when the mythical referents of the twins are respectively Sun and Moon, such as among the Apinagé (or Apinayé; see Nimuendajú, 1939). Among the Caribbean population of the Kallinã, the first twin, Tanusi, is a kind of high god and ancestor, the creator of all good things, living in the "land without evening." Yolokantamulu, his twin brother, is connected with obscurity and the pains of humanity and

lives in the "land without morning." By the standard tendency implicit in this kind of duality, the inborn disparity of the twins is not to be explained only as an expression of mere opposition between good and evil but also (or even preeminently) as an expression of ontological and cosmological (and sometimes sociological and psychological) complementarity (but see also the discussion by Josef Haekel, 1958, concerning Tanusi's feature as high god). At the same time, a notion of the disparity of value between the twins in the American Indian mythologies and religions can find a counterpart, as Eliade (1969, pp. 137f.) has observed, in the conception of the two souls in man, one of heavenly origin and the other of "animal" nature (as among the Apapocúva of Brazil). As for the Caribbean Kaliñas, they characteristically claim that things existing on earth have their spiritual counterpart in heaven. On the sociological plane, the twins may sometimes represent respectively the two moieties of a tribe, as among the already quoted Apinagé.

The principle of twinship is fundamental to the ideology of the Dogon of Mali. For them, twinship means perfection. One of the main characters of their cosmology and cosmogony is Nommo. He is perfect and beneficent. His personality is equivalent to a pair of twins, masculine and feminine, who represent the ideal couple. This couple is not to be imitated on this earth because the marriage between twins is prohibited as a result of the troubles caused by Yurugu, or Ogo, the first son of Amma and the Earth. Nommo as a spiritual entity is a married couple, which is, because married, completely perfect. Yurugu alone is single, imperfect, and unhappy. He personifies deficiency, ontological and ethical. Not directly linked to a twin (Nommo is his younger brother), Yurugu is only understandable as Nommo's misshapen opposite. But it is exactly this opposition (and not the twinship inherent in the entity that is Nommo) that introduces a crucial dialectic between completeness and deficiency in the Dogon ideology. In this ideology, there is a kind of articulated totality in which deficiency—as represented by Yurugu—is an indispensable component. All in all, we can conclude that in the Dogon ideology, twinship attains a higher status than in American Indian mythologies, because in those mythologies the principle of twinship is directly engaged in a dialectic of completeness and incompleteness as an element constituting a totality (so that even the "dark" element of a pair of twins is considered positive from a functional point of view).

According to the Dogon conception, twinship as such transcends evil but is pledged to coexist with it (i.e., with the single Yurugu). This kind of triadic ontology is very similar to that expressed in the Egyptian myth of

Osiris and Seth told by Plutarch. The good Osiris and the bad Seth are not twins but brothers. Osiris' counterpart is his wife, Isis; Seth is infecund and alone—which does not prevent him from being an element of a universal totality. Yurugu's status as the older son of Amma is a feature not uncommon in dualistic conceptions. For instance, the birth of Ahriman precedes (though as a consequence of a trick and a violent act) that of Öhrmazd in the Zurvanite myth, and while Satan is the younger brother of Christ in the dualistic and sectarian doctrine of the Bogomils. The violence that characterizes the birth or coming to light of a bad twin or brother is typical of such twinship mythologies; this feature probably expresses a kind of recrimination against the bad twin, which is intended to diminish but not to abolish his "legitimacy."

Finally, as far as the "incompleteness" of Yurugu is concerned (i.e., his deprivation of the benefits of both twinship and marriage, or of the marriage implied in twinship), we can conclude that for the first entities of some cosmogonies the duality of twinship and the duality of the married couple are the same. (An example can be found in the Zoroastrian myth of the first human couple, Mashya and Mashyane, who were twins due to the fact that they were brought into existence as the result of a split within a rhubarb plant.) On the contrary, this identification between the two main forms of duality on the anthropological level—between marriage and twinship—is prohibited in the actual life of the Dogon as a lasting consequence of the rupture of harmony caused by the "previous guilt" committed by Yurugu, a guilt that is both a cause and a consequence of his deficiency. According to a version recorded by Montserrat Palau Marti (1957), Yurugu's deficiency was due to the fact that he was born irregularly to Amma and the Earth, a couple whose feminine component had not yet been excised and was therefore not yet ready for marriage and generation. [See Clitoridectomy.]

Another version ascribes the guilt to Yurugu himself, who could not believe that Amma would give him a wife for his twin. This ambivalence concerning the ontological level to which the first origin of deficiency is attributed reminds us of the sin of Sophia according to Valentinus and his followers. Sophia failed to obey the law that regulated the order and fecundity of the aeons, those spiritual couples (or syzygies) that exist in the divine Pleroma ("fullness"). Yurugu did not find his "twin soul" (literally, the feminine part of his soul) because of his lack of belief or, alternatively, because of his inborn deficiency, and therefore he cohabited incestuously with his mother, the Earth; this resulted in the birth of certain malevolent entities who live in the woods, outside of the culturalized and purified (i.e., ritually cultivated)

land. On the other hand, the impurity and sterility of Yurugu does not prevent him from being an important element in the cosmological process; he is an essential part of the ordinary life of the Dogon. His "words" are essential to the development of life. Nommo, that is to say, one of the twins that compose his double personality, was sacrificed, and some cosmic entities were derived from him; he was later resurrected. Once the world is put in motion, the androgynous condition of existence (which was also peculiar to Nommo, whose two souls, masculine and feminine, were twins) is abolished, and sexual differentiation obtains—a differentiation, of course, that is different from the loneliness and incompleteness of Yurugu, the inhabitant of the woods. All in all, Yurugu remains a representation of limitation, but, for the same reason, also a referent of the growing cosmos of culture and agriculture. This corresponds to the will of Amma, that all be found and all be functional in nature, the perfect and the imperfect. Dogon dualism has its roots higher in the vertical series of the ontological levels; it affects the divine to some degree particularly if the first origin of deficiency is seen as deriving from the irregular maternity of Earth, whose feminine part was not yet excised.

We can conclude that the motif of twins in the ideologies of nonliterate cultures takes two main expressions: (1) symmetry, which being partial and not specular as in the Zoroastrian (Gathic) notion of the two spirits, is an adequate expression of the complementarity of twins; and (2) disparity in value, which also includes in itself a dynamism motivating some peculiarities related in the myth (e.g., when the second twin undergoes a crisis and is rehabilitated by the first). This complementarity, which is capable of integrating within itself the "bad" aspect, or simply the inferior quality, of the second twin, is not unqualified and static but articulated and dynamic; a distant equivalent is to be found in Platonic, Middle Platonic, and Neoplatonic speculation, where the existence of the lower, imperfect world, made after the image of the ideal one, is a requisite for the completeness of the All.

It is clear that this notion of an imperfection, which is a necessary component of a perfect totality, is extraneous to biblical creationism. It is dualistic in itself (when the two members of the couple are seen as disparate "principles" in the context of a cosmogony), and it in turn expresses a dialectical form of dualism. It must be distinguished from two other forms of dualism, where the "harmony" of the dialectical position is broken. The first is the Zoroastrian conception of the twins, one beneficent and the other maleficent; their relationship is one of radical opposition and mutual exclusion (a condition also present in the myth of Zurwān, despite

the fact that the idea of Time as father of both Ōhrmazd and Ahriman is not to be confused with the Zoroastrian conception of the twin spirits, who cannot have God as their common father). The second form is found in gnostic speculation, particularly Manichaeism, where matter, the substance of this visible world, is condemned, and Mani, the inspired founder, has a spiritual twin who is a heavenly counterpart of himself (i.e., his true self), to which he is to be "reduced" after his corporeal death.

Indo-European Cultures. We come finally to some myths of twins in the Indo-European cultures. In India, Yama, whose name means "twin," is accompanied by a female counterpart, Yamī, the feminine form of his name. But he underwent some essential modifications and became the king of the dead, a function well suited to his original quality as first man. In Iran, Yima (the equivalent of Yama), with his female twin, Yimak, remained a prototype of humanity. (Other prototypes were Gaya-maretan, a total figure with no female counterpart or twin, and Mashya and Mashyane, the primordial twins and human progenitors.) Yima later became the inhabitant of Var, a subterranean world in which different categories of living beings wait for the final rehabilitation. Yima's connection with the principle of twinship is an important confirmation of the principle of duality in the field of cosmogony, no less important than another principle in the same field, androgyny.

The mention of a pair of Indian twin deities, the Nāsatyas (or Aśvins), connected with the realm of health and fecundity (the third function of Indo-European tripartite ideology according to Georges Dumézil) introduces us to Castor and Pollux, the Dioscuri of Greek mythology. These can be seen as a privileged expression of ontological disparity, which is not necessarily ethical, contained within a set of twins. According to the characteristic and prevailing (but not necessarily older) formulation of the myth (first mentioned in the old epic poem *Kypria*, fragment 5k), Pollux was immortal, the son of Zeus—the supreme god—and of Leda; Castor was mortal, son of Tyndareus, the human husband of Leda. A very particular mythical element mediated their relationship so that they were neither wholly disparate nor wholly equal: the immortal Pollux renounced half of his immortality in favor of his mortal brother when the latter was fatally wounded by some common enemies. As a consequence of this, Castor and Pollux live alternatively in the heavens and in the netherworld (or they sojourn in their tomb in Laconia, at Therapnae near Sparta). This particular aspect of the myth represents a very peculiar expression of the twinship motif. The twins' symmetrical affinity is emphasized by their common attribute of the *pilos*, a piece of headgear later

interpreted as representing half of Leda's egg; on the other hand, their radical, original disparity is emphasized by the opposite natures of their respective fathers (Zeus and a human hero). However, this dialectical situation—of partial affinity and radical disparity—is transcended by the attribution to the mortal twin of one-half of the immortality of the other; this leads to the situation of an artificially produced, balanced equality. In this sense, twinship is both an ontological presupposition and a final acquisition for them: a pattern different from, or opposed to, that of other myths concerning twins or brothers who, on the basis of an ontological or merely ethical or behavioral disparity, come to represent opposing elements (sun or moon, life or death, etc.).

Unfortunately, there are versions of the myth of the Dioscuri that modify this basic pattern. In some texts, Castor and Pollux are sons of the same father, Tyndareus, whose name can also designate Zeus ("he who strikes"). According to other sources, they are sons of Zeus (hence the name *hoi Dioskouroi*, "the young sons of Zeus"). Moreover, there are different interpretations concerning the modalities of their alternating destinies apart from the fact that in old sources (Homer) they live as typical heroes in their tomb at Therapnae. The more widespread interpretation (Lucian) is that one lives in heaven and the other in his tomb or in the netherworld, and vice versa. There are also good reasons for understanding that they experience life and death together in alternation. In a famous song of victory (*Nemean Odes* 10), Pindar immortalizes this episode, making brotherly love the motivation behind the generous deed of Pollux, who renounces one-half of his (still to be experienced) immortality to show that life (even immortal life) is hard without friends. This throws a different light on the whole myth, more in accordance with the old Homeric statement that the two are together in their Laconian tomb, or *hērōion*.

Thus, we can distinguish the myth of the Dioscuri from such myths as that of the Sumerian Dumuzi, who alternates his stay in the netherworld with that of Gesh-tinanna, his sister. In other words, the Dioscuri do not belong fundamentally to the typology of the dying god (even a dying god split into two figures who take turns dwelling in the netherworld); they represent instead a special (duplicate) version of the hero, who lives in his tomb, from which emanates his protecting influence on the town and the territory. More precisely, the Dioscuri (*theoi hērōes*, "divine heroes") belong to a typology in between that of the chthonic hero and the heavenly god. Their shared immortality, based on their geminate personality, allows them to act together as heavenly gods; as such, they manifest themselves on the summit of a

ship's mast during a tempest, or they appear at the decisive moment during a battle. Their stay in a tomb links them to the classical heroes. All in all, this is a polytheistic interpretation of the motif of twins, different from those that are familiar to us in nonliterate cultures.

The most famous set of twins in myth and legend is Romulus and Remus, the founders of the Eternal City. Although the Dioscuri were worshiped in old Latium, as demonstrated by an archaic Latin inscription from Lavinium (fifth century BCE) dedicated to them, these twins were unrelated to the Roman twins. In contrast to the Dioscuri, who tended to be equated in their destiny and function (although Castor has special relations with the cavalry, and the temple on the forum was originally dedicated to—or at least named after—him, and only later after the Castores, the Roman name of the Dioscuri), Romulus and Remus tended to be differentiated, to the extent that the former kills the latter immediately after the marking of the sacred pomerium, which was intended to separate the domestic soil of the city from all external territory. The killing of the offender, Remus, because he had violated the pomerium, may be interpreted as prototypical of the drastic measures associated with this boundary for the protection of the city.

The legendary killing of Remus, however, did not prevent the Romans from continuing a ritual celebration, the Lupercalia, at which time two groups of Luperci, those allegedly instituted by Romulus (the Fabiani) and those said to be instituted by Remus (the Quinctiales), acted as rivals running around the old city acting out a rite intended to promote health and fertility and to reaffirm the ominous destiny of Rome. The rite was modified in 44 BCE, when a third group of Luperci was instituted (the Julii), the tradition behind the festivity being somewhat misunderstood. The owner of the third flock of Luperci, Caesar, who in those months was striving after kingship, could automatically be compared to the first founders of Rome as a candidate for kingship. All in all, the celebration of the Lupercalia—strictly ritualized and thus made inoffensive—could perpetuate in Rome's historical memory a significant notion, that of an endogenous source of rivalry and destruction, a duality threatening to become a dualism and, as such, dangerous; for this reason it was allowed to survive only within a strictly controlled ritual.

Twins and the Myths of Origins. We must note some considerations concerning the cultural-historical setting in life of at least some of these traditions of twinship within the context of myths of origins. Such traditions are dualistic in character, whether they emphasize a horizontal or a frontal, mutually exclusive opposition

between the twins (as in the case of Zoroastrianism), or, alternatively, a dialectical relationship between them. It would seem that this dialectic, as it is manifested among the American Indians, has something in common with an ideology of agriculturists, based on matriarchal and lunar aspects (e.g., the Kalifña situated the twins respectively on the bright and on the dark side of the moon). We can interpret in the same way the extreme specialization and absoluteness of the dualism of the Iroquois twins, deriving probably from a lunar, female entity, as well as the type of culture present in the South American and Caribbean tribes. This means, as Hultkrantz (1963) has observed, that dualism in America (at least this kind of dualism) is a southern phenomenon (as opposed to that of the Arctic hunters). To be sure, we cannot forget, as Müller (1956) points out, that some mythologies of hunters, both in Canada and in California, are also dualistic. But this dualism (e.g., the well-known myth concerning the demiurge-trickster, Coyote, who opposes the high being in his creating activity and thus introduces death and the "heavy" physiology of human beings) is structurally very different from the dialectical symmetry of twins. The high being and the demiurge-trickster are of very different extraction; they cannot be reduced to a symmetrical, bipartite form of totality. On the other hand, dialecticism is not absent in the Californian myths of the supreme being and Coyote. The supreme being is a giver of life, but death is introduced by Coyote on the basis of an argument that tends to emphasize the cultural utility rather than the negative aspect of death.

Another issue concerning the twins motif in mythology concerns the direct impact of the physiological experience of twinship on the psychology of the relevant populations. According to Hultkrantz (1963, p. 45) the "superstitious" attention paid to the phenomenon of twinship could have been inspired by its appearance in the symbological language of myth. On the other hand, what is exceptional on earth could also be seen as primordial, so that the inauguration of the terrestrial (imperfect) status of humanity would have meant also the transition from (perfect) twinship to (imperfect) singleness. Twinship, as it is experienced in this world, comes to mean something extraordinary. In addition, the rather extraordinary phenomenon of twinship has been differently evaluated in different cultures. In Africa, for instance, we move from a feeling of dread before twins (in some cases, one or both of them may be killed) among the San and Damara in southern Africa to a feeling of happiness and expectation of good fortune in their presence, as in Sudan. One could also venture that the typical ambivalence found in the disparities between twins (the second twin as bad, or simply as ter-

restrial, or, as a part of a totality, destined for a sacrifice from which he is ultimately rescued, as among the Dogon) is not unrelated to the problematical nature of physiological twinship, in which the different values of duality (completeness, but also distinction or even disparity) can put in motion a plurality of interpretations, both at the mythological and the ritual-sociological level. The reverse possibility, namely that the motif of twinship, which originally developed on the mythological level, could have motivated with its different expressions the contradictory nature of twinship on the ritual-sociological level, is perhaps too farfetched.

[See also Androgynes.]

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UGO BIANCHI

TYLOR, E. B. (1832–1917), English anthropologist, often called "the father of British anthropology." Edward Burnett Tylor was born in London on 2 October 1832, the son of a brass-founder. Both his parents were members of the Society of Friends, and it was within the Quaker community that Tylor grew up. He entered his father's brass foundry at the age of sixteen, but a breakdown in health followed, and in 1855 he was sent to America in search of a cure. In Cuba in 1856 he met the noted archaeologist Henry Christy, who was also a Quaker, and they traveled together for some time. Out of this visit came Tylor's first book, *Anahuac, or Mexico and the Mexicans, Ancient and Modern* (1861), written and published before he was thirty. He had no university education of any kind, but he was a gifted writer and a tireless researcher in the emergent anthropological field. The two books for which he is chiefly remembered were written in his thirties: *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* (1865) and the even better known work *Primitive Culture* (2 vols., 1871). Although he wrote many more articles and reviews, he was to publish only one more book, the popular handbook *Anthropology* (1881). Gradually he gained academic recognition. He received an honorary doctorate from the University of Oxford in 1875. In 1883 he became keeper of the Oxford University Museum, and in 1884 reader in anthropology. From 1896 to his retirement in 1909 he was professor of anthropology, the first in Britain. He was knighted in 1912 and died on 2 January 1917.

During the years of Tylor's greatest activity, the question of the origin and evolution of religion was high on the agenda of social scientists, the dominant theorists being F. Max Müller on one level and Herbert Spencer

on the other; Müller worked exclusively with language, while Spencer proceeded by way of vast generalizations learned in large measure from Auguste Comte. Tylor was no less interested than Müller in language, but he began at an earlier point in its evolution, far beyond "Aryan" roots and their meanings. To reach this point it was necessary for Tylor to formulate a comprehensive theory to bridge the gap between the present and the remote past. This was the theory of "survivals"—elements of culture or society that evolution has left behind. Gesture probably preceded language, though Tylor was too cautious to claim gesture to have been a separate stage in human communication. In matters concerning religion, he believed himself to be on firmer ground.

It was in 1866, in an article in the *Fortnightly Review* entitled "The Religion of Savages," that he first introduced his idea of "animism," "the belief in Spiritual Beings," as the earliest form of religion known to us—and of course accessible only through the study of survivals and by placing a particular interpretation on the difficult matter of "savage" mental processes. His theory was given a definitive statement in *Primitive Culture*, and the word *animism* is still widely used today, though more in a descriptive than in an evolutionary sense. [See Animism and Animatism.]

Otherwise, Tylor's approach to early forms of human religion has often been criticized as being too intellectual and too moral. According to one of his disciples, R. R. Marett, he was "a little blind to the spontaneity of the process whereby Man becomes at once religious and moral, without taking conscious thought to it, until he is fairly involved in an incoherent striving that is neither because it is both together" (Marett, 1936, p. 168). Looking into the past for a certain type of moralized religion, and failing to find it beyond a certain point, Tylor missed much of importance. He had no feeling for the ecstatic side of religion, perhaps partly because of his intense dislike of nineteenth-century spiritualism. Also he cannot be exonerated from having overlooked or deliberately ignored all the evidence later produced by Andrew Lang in support of "high gods of low races," gods who were neither ghosts nor spirits. "Spirit" was perhaps the only category open to a pioneer such as Tylor, but when linked with "belief" (as it was in his celebrated "minimum definition" of religion), it had the effect of relegating much else to a subordinate place in the structure of religion and culture.

In the running debate between evolutionism and diffusionism it is generally supposed that Tylor was wholeheartedly on the side of the unilinear evolutionists. But he was prepared to consider diffusionism on its merits, and to stop only when the evidence would carry

his argument no further. In his early years he was indeed something of a diffusionist, even to the extent of speculating that the Aztec god Quetzalcoatl was not only a man but may even have been an Irishman! Later his habitual caution prevented any further such flights of fancy, and on the whole he sided with the evolutionists, while stopping short of absolute dogmatism.

It was characteristic of Tylor's immediate disciples that sooner or later they were forced to part company with his findings in the form in which he stated them. The ubiquitous and enigmatic Andrew Lang broke away on the issue of "high gods," the urbane R. R. Marett on the matter of "preanimism" and later on questions concerning performative ritual. But these scholars and others retained a deep affection for their mentor. Marett wrote that throughout his career Tylor appears as "the most ingenuous of men, open-minded because he is simple-minded, the friend of all mankind because he would be incapable of feeling otherwise; and withal hard-headed, of business antecedents, not easily fooled, pedestrian enough to prefer solid ground under his feet" (ibid., p. 214). In short, though often unacknowledged, he laid foundations on which the study of primal religion has built for more than a century.

[For discussion of the controversy between Tylor and Herbert Spencer over Spencer's ghost theory of the origin of religion, see Manism.]

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ERIC J. SHARPE

TÝR is a Scandinavian deity associated with law and war. Although his name reflects the common root of the name of the Indo-European sky god (**dyēws/deywos*), Týr no longer represents the transcendence and majestic glory of the luminous sky. He is neither a supreme being and creator of the world nor a heavenly father like Zeus Pater, but he still assumes an honorable position beside the leading Æsir. The only myth in which he plays a significant role is the story of the fettering of the young Fenrisúlfr (Fenriswolf) related by Snorri Sturluson in the *Gylfaginning* (chap. 34).

The gods had been warned by a prophecy that Loki's ominous brood would be most baleful for them. Therefore, Alfaðir had cast Hel into Niflheimr and dispatched

the Miðgarðsormr, the World Serpent, to the rim of the cosmic ocean, but the young Fenrisúlfr was still in the custody of the Æsir. As the whelp grew up, nobody but Týr dared to feed him, and the gods thought it was time to secure him with powerful fetters. They tried two types of bonds, but each time the wolf easily broke loose. Then the Æsir sent Skírnir, Freyr's trusted servant, to the dark elves to ask them to manufacture an unbreakable fetter. From the rustle of a moving cat, the beard of a woman, the roots of a cliff, the breath of a fish, the sinews of a bear, and the spittle of a bird, the elves made a long band as soft as a silk ribbon yet able to withstand any test of strength. The gods then took the wolf to a lake on a remote island, where they challenged the dangerous monster to try to break his new bonds. Although the Fenrisúlfr had prided himself on making the other bonds snap, he did not deem this apparently weak band worth the test. As the gods insisted, he became rather suspicious about it and only consented to letting the Æsir bind him with the new ribbon if one of them placed a hand in his mouth as a pledge of good faith. All of the gods were reluctant to do so except Týr, who lost his hand when the wolf found out that he could not free himself from the tight bond. The gods then chained the Fenrisúlfr to a huge boulder and gagged him with a sword; thus he will remain fettered until Ragnarök.

The action of Týr is an example of heroic abnegation, although it involves deliberate perjury: the gods had indeed promised to the Fenrisúlfr that if he could not break the band they would release him. The tricking of the Fenrisúlfr into accepting the magic noose was accordingly "done with cunning and deceit" (ON, "gørt með list ok veél"). It is made ethically acceptable as a means to neutralize an uncontrollable danger threatening the community of the Æsir. Týr is willing to sacrifice his hand to inspire confidence in their statement; without this pledge, the wolf would not trust the gods—his enemies—and be subdued. Georges Dumézil has eloquently illustrated the parallel between Týr's thrusting his hand between the wolf's jaws and Mucius Scaevola's sacrifice of his right hand in a heroic act of perjury. Scaevola thereby convinced Lars Porsena, the Etruscan leader threatening Rome, that he and another three hundred young men were ready to give up their lives to kill the Etruscan king, and his sacrifice induced Porsena to sign a peace treaty that saved Rome from destruction ("'Le Borgne' and 'Le Manchot,'" in *Myth in Indo-European Antiquity*, ed. Gerald James Larson, Berkeley, 1974, pp. 18–20; *L'oubli de l'homme et l'honneur des dieux*, Paris, 1985, pp. 268–274). Perjury is justified when a higher loyalty to one's own group commands it, when the very existence of that group is at

stake: Týr breaks the pledge and loses his hand, but the Æsir are safe.

There has been considerable discussion about the symbolic significance of Týr. It has been pointed out that in Germanic myth several of the prominent gods, such as Óðinn, sacrifice an important body part in order to be able to perform a vital function in society. Týr's sacrifice has been correlated with his function as god of law (Dumézil, 1973, p. 45); Jan de Vries (1957, pp. 13–14, 22–24) had already emphasized this point, mainly on the basis of Týr's association with the Germanic *Þing* (the popular assembly, composed of the warriors-in-arms), where his priests kept the peace, and of the Germanic concept of war as a *vápnadómr* ("judgment by arms"), as the decision between two fighting groups is to be obtained according to set rules. This enabled de Vries to correlate the *interpretatio Romana* of the Germanic name **Tīwaz* (which becomes the Old Norse Týr) as Mars with the Dumézilian view of Týr as the Germanic representative of the juridical aspect of sovereignty (Dumézil, *Les dieux souverains des Indo-Européens*, Paris, 1977, pp. 196–200; Dumézil, *L'oubli de l'homme et l'honneur der dieux*, Paris, 1985, pp. 265–272; Polomé, 1984, pp. 402–405).

Snorri Sturluson describes Týr in the *Gylfaginning* (chap. 25) as the boldest and most courageous of the gods and states that he is invoked by warriors in battle because he can grant victory. He is also credited with extensive knowledge, whence the Old Norse expression *týspakr* ("Týr-wise"). Nevertheless, he plays a very limited role in Scandinavian mythology, and evidence for his worship is scanty outside of Denmark, where place-names attest to a rather widespread veneration of the god. He is also associated with the *t* rune, the "victory rune" that warriors engraved on their sword hilts and guards, thereby calling twice upon Týr.

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EDGAR C. POLOMÉ

TYRRELL, GEORGE (1861–1909), leading Roman Catholic theologian of the so-called modernist movement. Adversity and agitation marked Tyrrell's life from the beginning. Born in Dublin on 6 February 1861, two months after his father had died, Tyrrell was raised in penury and vagabondage by his devoted mother and schooled in gospel kindness by Charles W. Benson of Rathmines School, but was swayed oppositely by the acerbity and agnosticism of his elder brother William.

William's untimely death sent Tyrrell on a search for stable footing in the externals of religion. Experimentation with Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism led to friendship with Robert Dolling, the later famous "Father Dolling," who served briefly as Tyrrell's mentor and spiritual director, first securing his matriculation at Trinity College (1878), then inviting him to London to see sane Anglo-Catholicism at work, hoping thereby to prevent his anticipated conversion to Roman Catholicism. Dolling's strategy failed. On 18 May 1879 Tyrrell was received into the Catholic church and a year later into the Jesuit order as well.

Although Tyrrell felt confirmed in those momentous decisions, he was unprepared to conform to the rigid ultramontanist and rationalist neoscholasticism of the post-Vatican I church and to the mechanistic spirituality of the "restored" Society of Jesus. Two of Tyrrell's seminary professors suggested more congenial paths. Thomas Rigby encouraged him to bypass the scholastics and to read Thomas Aquinas for himself, while Joseph Rickaby was no doubt the one who gave him John Henry Newman's *Grammar of Assent* in 1885 and thus occasioned "a profound revolution in my way of thinking." From Thomas, Tyrrell learned the principle of modernization, or *aggiornamento*; from Newman, he derived an experience-based psychology of religion and an inductive, historical method, as opposed to the *a priori*, deductive method of scholasticism.

In 1894 Tyrrell was appointed to the chair of ethics at the Jesuit school of philosophy at Stonyhurst, but two years later, no longer tolerable to the established faculty, he was removed to London and the staff of the Jesuit religious periodical, the *Month*. Thus began a writing career that would propel him into ever-widening circles of liberals, modernists, and modernist sympathizers (among them Wilfrid Ward, Friedrich von Hügel, Maude Petre, and Henri Bremond) and lead him to the thought of a host of nonscholastic scholars (Bergson, Blondel, Dilthey, Harnack, Loisy, Sabatier, Schweitzer, Troeltsch, and Weiss).

Tyrrell's work anticipated Vatican II's effort to bring church polity and doctrine into constructive dialogue with the best and most enduring elements of post-Enlightenment thought. Initially Tyrrell allied himself

with Ward's mediating tactic of palliating ascendant policies with liberal doses of Newmanism, but as he encountered historical and biblical criticism, he concluded that Newmanism could not be made to answer questions it had never asked. In *Christianity at the Cross-Roads* (1909) Tyrrell sought to establish Newman's assumed identity between the "idea" of Christ and Christianity and the "idea" of Roman Catholicism by showing that the categories of apocalyptic and eschatology had carried the "idea" of Christianity unadulterated from epoch to epoch. He also went beyond Newman in criticizing not only the doctrinal expression of faith but the act of faith itself.

On 19 February 1906 Tyrrell was dismissed from the Society of Jesus for refusing to retract a published excerpt from his *Letter to a University Professor* (1903). The following year, on 22 October 1907, he was excommunicated for publicly criticizing Pius X's encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis*, which condemned modernism. Tyrrell died on 15 July 1909, a victim of Bright's dis-

ease, and was buried in the Anglican churchyard in Storrington, Sussex.

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DAVID G. SCHULTENOVER, S.J.

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UCHIMURA KANZŌ (1861–1930), Japanese essayist, scholar of the Bible, and Christian leader. Uchimura's unique place in modern Japanese thought results from his insistence on human independence before the biblical Christian God. Four prophetic acts by Uchimura dramatize and represent themes in his writing. In two of these acts Uchimura questioned the growing authoritarianism of the government. His scrupulous hesitation in 1891 to bow before the signature of the emperor and his outspoken avowal of pacifism in 1903, immediately before the onset of the Russo-Japanese War, raised the issue of Christian loyalty to the state. He also proclaimed the imminent return of Christ in 1918 and appeared to renounce in a posthumously published document the Christian movement associated with his name.

These acts resulted from a heightened sense of individual worth and responsibility apparent in Uchimura's personal history. His father, a capable samurai civil servant, lost his status, position, and self-respect with the political changes that followed the revolution of 1867–1868. He turned the leadership of the family over to his sixteen-year-old son after the boy received a government scholarship large enough to support the whole family. Uchimura studied at a government agricultural college, where, under the influence of evangelical American Calvinist teachers, he became a Christian.

After graduation in 1881, dissatisfaction with government service as a fisheries scientist and a disastrous marriage drove him to the United States. There he found sympathetic mentors at Amherst College and obtained a second bachelor's degree in 1887. Back in Japan, Uchimura administered a school manned largely

by American missionaries. Disagreement over evangelical methods—he wanted to cite Japanese examples of the upright life before he taught Christianity—led Uchimura to resign and forsake cooperation with missionaries. His hesitation before the imperial signature while a teacher in a government school cost him the possibility of further official employment. As a result, he determined to live by writing. After several lean years, he became the editor of a newspaper that he was to make into Japan's largest daily, but his declaration of pacifism cost him that position. He had already started in 1900 a monthly called *Seisho no kenkyū* (Biblical Studies). This publication fulfilled a long-standing ambition to write popular Bible commentaries and provided him with a livelihood until his death. Through his magazine, numerous individuals came to look upon Uchimura as their spiritual mentor. His many large lecture meetings after he joined the Second-Coming Movement in 1917 returned him to the center of national attention. The meetings developed into two-hour commentaries on the Bible for weekly audiences of five to seven hundred. He continued his magazine and lectures until death stilled his voice.

All of Uchimura's writings reflect a concern for a Japan suddenly introduced into the modern world. At the time, "the modern world" signified the European and North American nations, whose people believed in a hierarchy of states with those of the Christian culture ranked highest. Uchimura, through his English-language works, interpreted Japanese concerns to Westerners, emphasizing the rectitude of traditional Japanese virtues. His early Japanese-language works commented on contemporary Japanese society. His later writings

introduced the Bible and the fruits of Christian culture to Japan. These essays were frequently based upon the notes he had written for his weekly lectures. The commentaries on the Bible form a major part of these writings and constitute the largest corpus of biblical studies by one author in the Japanese language.

The concept associated with Uchimura's name is *mukyōkai* or *mukyōkai shugi*, usually translated as "no church," "nonchurch," or, in Uchimura's translation, "Christianity of no-church principle." It proclaims a faith linking humans to God through prayerful use of the Bible alone. The church as it existed in the Christian nations seemed to Uchimura so burdened with the associations of Western history and tradition as to lack meaning for Japanese. On the other hand, Japanese, through faithful reading of the Bible, could develop a Christianity true to their needs and consistent with their traditions. Uchimura's denial in an article published after his death of "what is today commonly called *mukyōkai*" did not reflect any change in his belief. Instead, it expressed his dismay at the incipient development among his followers of a church based on their interpretation of *mukyōkai shugi*.

Uchimura's followers, most concerned that they must not start a church, continue in small Bible-study groups known collectively as *mukyōkai*. They have no other organizational ties than their respect for the Bible and the works of Uchimura. Adherents include a number of figures important in the shaping of Japanese institutions after 1945: Tanaka Kōtarō, Yanaihara Tadao, Nambara Shigeru, Takagi Yasaka, and Matsumoto Shigeharu.

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JOHN F. HOWES

UGARITIC RELIGION. See Canaanite Religion.

UGRIC RELIGIONS. See Finno-Ugric Religions; Khanty and Mansi Religion; and Hungarian Religion.

ŬICH'ŎN (1055–1101), also known as National Master Taegak; Buddhist cataloger and founder of the Ch'ōnt'ae (Chin., T'ien-t'ai) school of Korean Buddhism. Ŭich'ōn was the fourth son of the Koryō king Munjong (r. 1046–1083), and one of the premier scholiasts of the Koryō (937–1392) Buddhist church. Early in his life, he is said to have mastered all of the main currents of Buddhist philosophy as well as much of Chinese classical literature. Korean Buddhism during his time was bifurcated between two increasingly hostile traditions: the scholastic schools (*kyo*; Chin., *chiao*), dominated by Hwaōm (Chin., Hua-yen) philosophy, and the Nine Mountains schools of Sōn (Chin., Ch'an), which were chiefly concerned with meditative practices. Ŭich'ōn deplored the sectarianism that had infected the order and criticized adepts of both the Sōn and scholastic schools for their intransigence.

To resolve this conflict, Ŭich'ōn proposed an approach to Buddhist religious training that placed equal stress on both scriptural study and meditation practice. Ŭich'ōn developed a curriculum based on such seminal texts as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi Śāstra*, *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun*, and *Avatamsaka Sūtra*, in order to engender a comprehensive understanding of the Buddhist teachings in his students. While acknowledging the value of scriptural study in conceptualizing the goal of practice and the course to be followed in reaching that goal, Ŭich'ōn recognized its limitations. Formal meditative training was also essential if the adept were to achieve any personal experience of what was learned in Buddhist doctrinal writings. Hence, a viable Buddhist vocation would maintain a careful balance between both learning and meditation.

Ŭich'ōn seems to have anticipated drawing upon his royal prerogative as a means of reconciling the rift between the Sōn and *kyo* schools. In order to effect his vision of a unified Buddhist tradition in which equal stress was placed upon both study and practice, Ŭich'ōn travelled surreptitiously to China in 1085, where he received transmission in the T'ien-t'ai lineage, one of the more ecumenical of the Chinese Buddhist schools. After returning to Korea the following year Ŭich'ōn then attempted to merge the Sōn and *kyo* branches of the Korean church into a new Ch'ōnt'ae school, which he felt provided a banner under which both branches could unite. While Ch'ōnt'ae was known in Korea before his time, it was Ŭich'ōn who was first able to establish the school as a fully viable, autonomous sect; it is for this reason that he is regarded as the founder of the Korean Ch'ōnt'ae school. Whatever his chances for success might have been, Ŭich'ōn's death at the young age of forty-seven brought his efforts to a premature end, and

Korean Buddhism remained divided until the similar endeavors of Chinul (1158–1210), some three generations later.

Along with his efforts to unify the Korean church, Ŭich'ŏn was also an avid bibliophile and one of the first Buddhist catalogers to recognize the importance to the tradition of native East Asian treatises and commentarial writings. In 1073 Ŭich'ŏn made a vow to compile a complete and permanent collection of such indigenous Buddhist literature, and dispatched agents to all areas of East Asia to obtain copies of texts not then available in Korea. Many of these books were obtained by exchange, as, for example, in the Khitan Liao region of northern China, where Wŏnhyo's works were traded for twenty-nine books by Liao authors. On his own trip to Southern Sung-dynasty China, Ŭich'ŏn reintroduced a number of seminal works by noted Chinese exegetes that were no longer extant in China, including treatises by the Hua-yen patriarchs Chih-yen (602–668), Fa-tsang (643–712), and Ch'eng-kuan (738–840); these were exchanged for over three thousand fascicles (*kwŏn*) of Chinese materials. Finally, in 1090 he published his renowned catalog of this collection, the *Sinp'yŏn chejong kyojang ch'ongnok* (New Compilation of a Comprehensive Catalog of the Repository of the Teachings of All the Schools; T. D. no. 2184), with listings of 1,010 titles in a total of 4,740 *kwŏn*. Xylographs were carved for each of these texts, forming what was termed *Sokchang-gyŏng* (Supplement to the Canon). Unfortunately, the woodblocks of the *Supplement* were burned by the Mongols during their invasion of the Korean Peninsula in 1232, and many of the texts so painstakingly collected by Ŭich'ŏn were lost to history. Nevertheless, his catalog does survive, and remains one of the most valuable sources of information on the scholastic literature of medieval East Asian Buddhism.

[See also Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Korea; T'ien-t'ai; and the biography of Chinul.]

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ROBERT EVANS BUSWELL, JR.

UIGHUR RELIGION. See Inner Asian Religions.

ŬISANG (625–702), also known as the National Master Taesŏng Wŏn'gyo; founder of the Hwaŏm (Chin., Hua-yen) school of Korean Buddhism. Ŭisang, one of the most important scholiasts of the Unified Silla period (688–935), helped to forge the doctrinal perspectives that would become characteristic of the mature Korean Buddhist tradition.

Ordained as a monk at the age of twenty-nine at Hwangbok monastery in the Silla capital of Kyŏngju, he soon afterward decided to travel to T'ang China together with his friend Wŏnhyo (617–686) to study under Chinese masters. As Ŭisang's biography relates, on their first trip in 650 (during the unification wars that were then raging between the three kingdoms of early Korea) the two pilgrims were arrested for espionage in the Liao-tung area by Koguryŏ border guards and were only repatriated after several weeks of incarceration. In 661 they tried again, this time traveling to a seaport in the Paekche region of southwestern Korea, which had been conquered by Silla the preceding year, where they hoped to board a ship bound for T'ang China. Prior to their embarkation, however, Wŏnhyo is said to have gained enlightenment and returned home to Silla, leaving Ŭisang to continue alone.

Arriving in Yang-chou on the lower Yangtze River, Ŭisang made his way to Chih-hsiang monastery on Mount Chung-nan, where he studied under Chih-yen (602–668), the putative second patriarch of the Chinese Hua-yen school. Ŭisang's arrival at Chih-hsiang monastery is said to have been anticipated by Chih-yen, and he quickly became one of his chief disciples along with Fa-tsang (643–712), who would eventually be recognized as the third patriarch of the school.

After Chih-yen's death in 668, Ŭisang became one of the leaders of the developing Chinese Hua-yen tradition. In 670, Ŭisang learned from two Korean envoys detained in the T'ang capital that a Chinese invasion of Silla was imminent. Ŭisang returned to Korea to warn King Munmu (r. 661–680), and, thanks to his monition, Silla was able to forestall the attack. Partially out of gratitude, the king sponsored the construction of Pusŏk monastery on Mount T'aebaek and installed Ŭisang as its abbot. This monastery became the center of the Hwaŏm school, from where the new teachings that he had brought from China were propagated throughout the peninsula. His fame was so widespread in Korea that more than three thousand students are said to have congregated there to hear his lectures. Due in large part to Ŭisang's efforts, Hwaŏm philosophy came to dominate Korean Buddhist scholasticism.

Ūisang's Hwaōm thought is epitomized in his *Hwaōm ilsŭng pōpkyedo* (Diagram of the Avatamsaka One-Vehicle Realm-of-Reality), a short poem of 210 logographs in a total of 30 stanzas written in 668 while he was still a member of Chih-yen's congregation. The poem is arranged in a wavelike form, the "ocean seal diagram" (Sagaramudrā Maṇḍala), which symbolizes the Hwaōm teaching of the "six marks" (*yuksang*)—that is, of universality and particularity, identity and difference, and integration and disintegration. The entire structure of the diagram represents the marks of universality, identity, and integration, while its curves designate the particularity, difference, and disintegration marks. The chart is woven into one continuous line to show that all phenomena are interconnected and unified in the *dharma* nature; the fact that this line ends at the same place where it began illustrates the cardinal Hwaōm doctrine of interpenetration. The diagram is divided into four equal blocks, indicating that the *dharma* nature is perfected through such salutary practices as the four means of conversion (*catuḥsamgrahavastu*): giving, kind words, helpfulness, and cooperation. Finally, the fifty-four corners found along the meanderings of the line of verse indicate the fifty-four teachers visited by the pilgrim Sudhana in his quest for knowledge as narrated in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* chapter of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*. Hence, the diagram serves as a comprehensive summary of all the teachings found in the sixty-fascicle recension of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*. Besides Ūisang's autocommentary to this poem, his only other extant work is the short *Paekhwa toryang parwōn mun* (Vow Made at the White Lotus Enlightenment Site), which combines Avalokiteśvara piety with Hwaōm philosophy.

Although Ūisang may not have been a prolific writer, his mastery of Hua-yen thought was highly regarded throughout East Asia. Fa-tsang, for example, continued to correspond with Ūisang even after the latter's return to Korea and, in one of his letters to Ūisang in 692, he asks for corrections and suggestions on one of his manuscripts. Indeed, an examination of Fa-tsang's writings reveals that the Korean exegetes Ūisang and Wōnhyo exerted strong influence on the development of his own thought, and, by extension, on the evolution of Chinese Hua-yen philosophy.

[See also Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Korea; Hua-yen; and the biographies of Fa-tsang and Wōnhyo.]

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UKKO. Finnish incantations dating from the Middle Ages call upon Ukko, the supreme god or the god in heaven. Typical is the following such invocation: "O Ukko, god supreme, old man in heaven, god of the skies." His name, which means "old man," and other of his epithets, Isä ("father") or Vaari ("old man, grandfather"), reveal the dominant character of this deity. On the other hand, *ukko* and its diminutive form, *ukkonen*, also mean "thunder." Ukko is in fact most often connected with thunder; like Jupiter, he was thought to drive a chariot that caused the sound of thunder during storms. Above all, Ukko is described in incantations as ruler of the weather and giver of rain. His protection was also sought in healing and at births, on behalf of cattle or humans against evil spirits, and in hunting. It seems that Ukko, originally the god of thunder and rain, gradually emerged under the influence of the Christian concept of God to become the supreme god, helping man in all his worldly needs.

Ukko's attributes are widely known symbols of lightning: a golden club, hammer, ax, sword, and arrow. "Ukko's wedges," ax-shaped stones found in the ground, have often been ascribed to the god of thunder as the implements with which he smote a tree or carved off shavings. Stones thought to belong to Ukko were used to protect their owners from fire or from evil spirits. Ukko's characteristics are reminiscent of the Scandinavian god of thunder, Þórr (Thor); Viking pendants depicting Þórr have also been found in Finland. In eastern and northern Finland thunderstones are called "Ukko's claws," suggesting that in the oldest Finnish beliefs thunder was represented as a giant bird with stone claws, as in northern Asia and America.

The list of Finnish deities given by the Finnish prelate Michael Agricola in the preface to his psalter (1551) notes that a toast was drunk to Ukko when seeds were sown in spring. Various later sources also describe village beer festivals, Ukon Vakati, held in Ukko's honor in spring or summer whenever there was threat of drought. In Karelia these rites merged with the worship of Saint Ilja, or Elias. The rites in question were performed to bring rain and to ensure a successful crop. Agricola mentions that women drank during the festi-

val, following which "many shameful deeds took place." Ukon Vakati has in fact been connected with the rites reenacting the holy alliance of the god of fertility and his wife, the god of the earth, known, for example, to the farming cultures of eastern Europe. Agricola further mentions Rauni as Ukko's wife. The Saami (Lapps) also knew of Ukko's wife Ravdna, a childless deity to whom rowan berries are dedicated. The names *Rauni* and *Ravdna* are derived from the Scandinavian word meaning "rowan" (Swedish, *rönn*; Old Icelandic, *reynir*). The rowan is mentioned in Scandinavian mythology as being Þórr's "castle," his savior in times of danger. No mention is made of Ukko's wife in later descriptions of rites, but the Earth Mother is sometimes mentioned alongside Ukko in eastern Finnish incantations in which he appears as the Sky Father.

According to accounts written between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the beer for the festivals held in honor of Ukko was sometimes made from malt germinated on the roof in a birchbark container. Food was also served. The site of the festival was often the organizer's farm, a lake shore, or, in inland areas, on "Ukko's hill" (*Ukon vuori*), a hill to which Ukko's share of the beer and sacrifices was brought. A ritual poem performed at festivals in Ukko's honor and asking him to increase the crop has been preserved in Ingria and Karelia.

[See also Finnic Religions.]

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Translated from Finnish by Susan Sinisalo

'**ULAMĀ'** ("the learned"), the religious scholars of Islam, are the guardians, transmitters, and interpreters of its sciences, doctrines, and laws and the chief guarantors of continuity in the spiritual and intellectual history of the Islamic community. The term is a generic one and embraces all who have cultivated the religious disciplines or fulfilled certain practical functions such as judgship. [See figure 1 for individual titles given to 'ulamā'.]

It is an axiom that the scholars are the heirs of the prophets; the emergence of the 'ulamā' as a distinct group had, therefore, to await the passing of the prophet Muḥammad and the completion of revelation.

However, the Qur'ān itself indicates the necessity and excellence of a learned class, quite apart from extolling, in numerous verses, the virtue of knowledge ('ilm). The word 'ulamā' appears in surah 35:28, although obviously not in the precise sense later usage conferred on it, and the expressions "those well rooted in knowledge" (3:7), "the people of remembrance" (16:43), and "those who have been given knowledge" (58:11) have also been interpreted as referring to the 'ulamā'. Numerous utterances attributed to the Prophet define the purpose and status of the 'ulamā': in addition to being "the heirs of the prophets," they are described as "the best of my community," "the trustees of the prophets" (in the sense of being repositories of the laws promulgated by the prophets), "the trustees of God over his creation," "the lamps of the earth" (in that through their knowledge they dissipate the darkness of ignorance), and "equivalent to the prophets of the children of Israel" (in stature and authority). The authenticity of some of these utterances has been questioned, but their content has shaped the self-image of the 'ulamā' and their role in Muslim society.

The antecedents of the learned class of Islam may perhaps be sought in the *ahl al-suffah* ("the people of the bench"), a group that customarily gathered outside the mosque in Medina for the cultivation of religious knowledge and from whom lines of transmission went forth to the great early authorities in Qur'anic exegesis, prophetic tradition, and law. Antecedents may be found also in certain individuals who excelled in a particular branch of learning (such as Ibn 'Abbās, described by the Prophet as "the foremost of the exegetes"). It was not until the ninth century that a distinct class of learned men crystallized, bearing the title of 'ulamā'. This development went together with the elaboration and differentiation of the various branches of religious knowledge, with the vast expansion of the Islamic realm beyond the Arabian Peninsula, and with the accelerating conversion of non-Arab peoples to Islam (the high proportion of Iranians among the 'ulamā' of what has been called the formative period of Islamic thought cannot be overlooked). But the most important single impetus to the emergence of the 'ulamā' class was the desire of the Islamic community to codify the provisions of Islamic law, for the 'ulamā' were primarily concerned with law, of which other subjects were the virtual adjunct. Jurisprudence has remained the core of the 'ulamā' curriculum down to the present.

Various explanations have been offered for the emergence of the *madrāsah*, the institution for the training and formation of the 'ulamā', but once the *madrāsah* appeared and spread throughout the Islamic world, it remained remarkably stable, and its resistance to

change became one of the most important elements in the ability of the 'ulamā' to function as guarantors of continuity. The *madrasah* had a hierarchy of posts ranging from the *muḥtadī*, or beginning student, to the *mudarris*, or fully qualified professor of law; intermediate stages were the *mutawassīṭ* ("intermediate"), the *munṭahī* ("terminal"), the *mufīd* ("docent"), the *mu'īd* ("repetitor"), and the *nā'ib mudarris* ("deputy professor").

Two elements lay at the heart of the *madrasah* education: the study of texts and the personal relationship between student and teacher. Particularly from the eleventh century onward, when all major developments in the field of jurisprudence had been completed, it was texts rather than the subjects they treated that defined the *madrasah* syllabus. The text was made the object of assimilation, discussion, elaboration, commentary, and criticism, so that an important part of 'ulamā' writing came to consist of glosses and commentaries on curricular texts.

The relationship between teacher and student consisted of far more than the transmission of a fixed body of knowledge. An entire worldview and distinct method of thought, as well as a sense of corporate identity, were also passed on. Accordingly, dealings between teachers and students were regulated by ethical and behavioral norms that were codified in a number of handbooks. These twin elements, the text and the teacher, were recorded in a document known variously as the *sanad* and the *ijāzah*, in which the competence of the student to teach various books was attested and the entire chain of authorities, to which his name was added as the most recent link, was enumerated.

Although the 'ulamā' were defined as a social unit by their cultivation and transmission of religious learning (together with the application of that learning in their own lives: *ilm* had always to be complemented by *'amal*, "practice"), they also exercised a variety of practical functions that made them indispensable to traditional society. Apart from preaching and leading congregational prayers in the mosque (a task that, outside the largest and most prestigious mosques, was often delegated to junior members of the class), they acted as judges, notarized and witnessed all important civil and commercial transactions, served as trustees for the estates of minors, and arbitrated popular disputes. All of these activities created a closeness between them and the rest of society (particularly the mercantile and artisan classes of the cities) that was singularly lacking in the relations of the state with its subjects.

Early 'ulamā' (like early Ṣūfīs) appear not to have drawn salaries or charged fees for the functions they fulfilled, and down to the present some 'ulamā', partic-

ularly in the countryside, have continued to earn their livelihood from the practice of a trade. But despite initial misgivings, it soon became normal for the 'ulamā' to charge fees for exercising notarial functions and issuing legal opinions (*fatwās*) and to accept stipends from the endowments that were settled on the learned institutions. Because the stipends were not always generous, it was often necessary to supplement them with income from other sources; 'ulamā' biographies are replete with stories of material hardship. But certain 'ulamā' are recorded to have accumulated great wealth, particularly when religious learning and prestige became hereditary in some families.

Islamic political theory, especially as elaborated by the Sunnī segment of the community, quickly came to an accommodation with the dynasties (often of military origin) that seized rule over the Islamic lands from the tenth century on; rebellion was generally equated with irreligion. Despite this, the 'ulamā' sometimes acted as the spokesmen for popular grievances. In addition, there was the lasting conviction that the 'ulamā' should shun close association with the state and its officers in order to maintain the superior degree of piety that was meant to undergird their learning. A frequently quoted tradition made the successorship of the 'ulamā' to the prophets conditional on their "not associating with the sultan." Those who did associate were designated by the celebrated al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) as "scholars with worldly motivation" ('ulamā' *al-dunyā*) or "scholars of evil" ('ulamā' *al-sū'*) by contrast with "scholars of otherworldly motivation" ('ulamā' *al-ākhirah*), that is, those who shunned such association. Tangential association with the state was, however, inevitable in the case of posts—above all, judgeships—that were at its disposal, and in Ottoman times the entire corps of 'ulamā' became in effect part of the state bureaucracy and thus lost its autonomy.

It is often supposed that a fundamental and consistent opposition existed between the 'ulamā' and the Ṣūfīs, the other great class of religious specialists in Muslim society, and certainly cases of mutual hostility are to be encountered. The overall historical record suggests, however, that a symbiotic relationship existed between the 'ulamā' and the Ṣūfīs: while the 'ulamā' cultivated *'ilm*, formal knowledge acquired through mental exertion, the Ṣūfīs pursued *ma'rifah*, inward knowledge resulting from the purification of the heart. The 'ulamā' were designated as "scholars of the exoteric" ('ulamā' *al-ẓāhir*) and the Ṣūfīs as "scholars of the esoteric" ('ulamā' *al-bāṭin*); the purview of religion was seen to include harmoniously the concerns of both groups. Theoretical Sufism was often taught in the *madrasahs*, and the Ṣūfīs recognized the authority of the

'ulamā' in matters of law. From the fifteenth century onward, it was even common for many of the 'ulamā', especially in India and the Ottoman empire, to be affiliated with one of the Şūfī orders, often the Naqsh-bandīyah. One who combined formal scholarship with Sufism in this way would be designated as "the possessor of two wings" (*dhū al-janāḥayn*).

In modern times, the authority of the 'ulamā' in Muslim society has generally declined. The increasing secularization of law and education has deprived them of many of their most important functions, so that in some

FIGURE 1. *Glossary of Titles Given to 'Ulamā'*

- Ākhūnd*: Originally a title given to scholars of unusual merit, primarily in Iran, it was subsequently devalued and became a pejorative term for the lowest stratum of 'ulamā'. From it is derived the Chinese *ahung*, meaning any Muslim religious functionary.
- Āyatullāh* (anglicized Ayatollah; "sign of God"): A title of recent origin given to the highest ranking Shī'ī scholars in Iran.
- Faqīh*: Originally one who had a broad and complete understanding of religion as a whole; it occurs in this sense in several of the traditions of the Prophet that delineate the general rank of the 'ulamā'. It later came to designate a specialist in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*).
- Ḥujjat al-Islām* ("proof of Islam"): Originally a title reserved for scholars of quite exceptional status, it is now applied in Iran to scholars beneath the rank of *mujtahid*.
- Imām Jum'ah*: Leader of the congregational prayers performed at midday on Friday.
- Khaṭīb*: The scholar who delivers the Friday sermon (*khuṭbah*).
- Marja'-i taqlīd* ("source of imitation"): A *mujtahid* whom the ordinary Shī'ī believer is obliged to follow in the details of religious law.
- Mawlānā* ("our master"): A title of respect for a senior scholar.
- Mawlawī*: A variant form of the preceding, used in South Asia and Afghanistan to designate any religious functionary.
- Mufīṭ*: A jurisconsult; one who delivers binding opinions on a matter of religious law.
- Mujtahid*: One who exercises *ijtihād*, that is, the search for a correct opinion in deducing the specific provisions of the law from its principles.
- Mullā* (anglicized Mullah): In origin probably a corrupt form of the Arabic *mawlā* ("master"), it has had the same semantic history as *ākhūnd*.
- Qāḍī*: Judge of the religious law.
- Shaykh* ("elder"): A title of respect used particularly in the Arabic-speaking lands and not implying the exercise of any particular function.
- Shaykh al-Islām*: The main religious dignitary of a Muslim city in Iran and Central Asia; in Ottoman usage, the head of the entire scholarly hierarchy.
- Wā'iz*: Preacher.

cases they have become little more than state-supported dignitaries with purely cultic and ceremonial responsibilities; vigorous and ambitious minds have found little stimulus to join the ranks of the 'ulamā'. In addition, the emergence of Islamic movements that bypass the 'ulamā' and even criticize them for alleged failings, such as intellectual stagnation and political passivity, has undercut their standing with the believing masses. In some cases, however, the 'ulamā' have collaborated with these movements, as in late twentieth-century Syria, where prominent 'ulamā' were involved in the Muslim Brotherhood. Independent 'ulamā' ventures in politics with parties such as the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia and the Jamī'at al-'Ulamā' in Pakistan have not been notably successful. The case of Iran, where the 'ulamā' not only defied the secularizing bent of the state but led a revolution to victory and founded an Islamic republic, is an exception to the prevailing trend of diminishing influence, owing to a number of special factors such as the organizational autonomy of the Iranian 'ulamā' in the prerevolutionary period and the charismatic appeal of Imam Khomeini. It is nonetheless possible that the present current of Islamic renewal may ultimately enhance the prestige and position of the 'ulamā' in other countries.

[See also *Ijtihād*; *Madrasah*; *Mosque*, *article on History and Tradition*; *Qāḍī*; and *Shaykh al-Islām*.]

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ÜLGEN, sometimes called Bai Ülgen ("rich Ülgen"), is a deity venerated by the Turkic peoples living in the Altai and Sayan mountains in southern Siberia. Ülgen is also known to the east, among the Mongol Buriats.

In Altai-Sayan Turkic mythology Ülgen figures as the highest deity. He created earth and heaven and all living beings. He is the master of the good spirits, the lord of the upper world, the realm of light; he is the protector of mankind. After him stands Erlik Khan, the lord of the lower world, the realm of darkness; Erlik is the master of the evil spirits. Both Ülgen and Erlik Khan determine the fate of human beings, who live in the middle world.

In the Buriat pantheon Ülgen plays a secondary but revealing role: the deity is regarded as female, a goddess of earth. The Buriats call her Ülgen Ekhe ("mother Ülgen") and consider her the female counterpart of Ünder Tengeri ("high heaven"). Ülgen becomes directly equated with earth in the expression *ülgen delkhei*, which connotes both "wide earth" and "mother earth."

The Buriat Ülgen seems to be a relic of an ancient Turco-Mongol cult dedicated to Ülgen as a terrestrial deity. Her character, however, has undergone an essential transformation in the religion of the Altai-Sayan Turkic people. Ülgen has gradually usurped functions of the male deity Tengere Kaira Khan ("heaven, the gracious khan"), the highest god of heaven, thus changing herself into a male deity. But Ülgen has not been able to supplant Tengere Kaira Khan completely. Thus Ülgen sometimes figures as the first of Tengere Kaira Khan's sons, not residing, as he does, on the seventeenth level of heaven, but on the sixteenth.

Nevertheless, in some of the myths, as well as in popular belief, Ülgen has succeeded in attaining the rank of highest deity. His name has been placed beside those of other deities used by Turkic and Mongol peoples to designate their highest being: Tengri ("heaven"; Türk); Köke Mönge Tengri ("blue eternal heaven"; Mongols, Buriats); Esege ("father") and Malan Tengeri (Buriats); Khormusta (Mongols, Buriats, Tuvin, and Altaic Turkic peoples); Iuriung Aïyy Toïon ("white good lord"; Yakuts); Burkhan Bagši ("teacher Buddha"; Tuvin); and Kudai ("god"; Altaic Turkic peoples). [See also Tengri.]

The various sources do not give a uniform description of Ülgen's character. Several indigenous conceptions of different historical and regional origin became mixed with foreign ideas, owing to Russian Orthodox missionary work and contact with Buddhist neighbors. Nevertheless, Ülgen's form and functions are sufficiently clear, in spite of discrepancies and contradictions in detail.

Hovering over the primeval ocean, Ülgen and the first

man, in the form of two ducks, create the earth from mud taken from the bottom of the sea. In other traditions Ülgen uses mud to create the first man. Both motifs are indigenous conceptions. Christian influence may be evident in two other motifs: Ülgen makes the first woman from two ribs of one of the first seven men, who then becomes her husband; the woman, seduced by a snake, eats forbidden food from the first tree and then gives it to her husband.

Having attempted to become like Ülgen, the first man is expelled to the lower world by the deity, who names him Erlik—a figure also well known in Buddhist mythology. The second man, Mangdyshirä, the Buddhist *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī, directs the three fish that support the earth, using a leash that is fastened to heaven. Thereby he controls heaven and earth. Having created the first parents of mankind, Ülgen retreats into his castle on the top of the cosmic mountain. He entrusts the supervision of mankind to the third man, Maitärä, the Buddha Maitreya.

Ülgen is described as an old man with a long beard. Thus he becomes identical with White Old Man, a fertility god who is also known among other peoples. Ülgen also preserves distinct characteristics of a tribal deity. He has a wife, sons, daughters, and servants; many of his sons are spirits of Altaic clans.

The fact that Maitärä, the third man, is Ülgen's representative on earth does not exclude people from direct contact with Ülgen and does not prohibit them from asking him, for instance, for abundant cattle, for good crops, or for protection against all kinds of evil. The means that can be used for this purpose are prayer and sacrifice, which are also offered to other good gods and spirits, including Erlik Khan. The animals used for sacrifice seem primarily to be horses and sheep. Sacrifices can (but need not) be made with the help of a shaman, as in the famous horse offering described by Wilhelm Radloff. The shaman kills a horse and, accompanying its soul, penetrates through all the layers of heaven until he reaches Ülgen. The deity informs the shaman whether or not the offering has been accepted favorably, and the shaman learns of impending dangers, such as bad harvests. It is uncertain if the cult of Ülgen has survived to the present day.

[See also Erlik and Buriat Religion.]

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from Wilhelm Radloff's *Proben der Volksliteratur der türkischen Stämme*, vol. 1 (Saint Petersburg, 1866), and *Aus Sibirien* (Leipzig, 1893), and from A. N. Anokhin's *Materialy po shamanstvu u altaitsev* (Leningrad, 1924). Ülgen and the horse sacrifice dedicated to him have also been dealt with by Mircea Eliade in his *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, rev. & enl. ed. (New York, 1964). Brief but valuable elucidations of Ülgen's role in Turkic and Buriat religions have been given in recent Soviet publications by such authors as V. P. D'iakonova, T. M. Mikhailov, and S. Iu. Nekliudov.

KLAUS SAGASTER

ULTRAMONTANISM is the tendency of Roman Catholicism that emphasizes the authority of the papacy in the government and teaching of the church. Originally articulated in opposition to Gallicanism, ultramontanism stressed the unity of the church centralized in Rome ("over the mountains") and its independence from nations and states. Ultramontane principles can be traced to the struggles of popes and councils in the fifteenth century. The papalist position received a full exposition by the Jesuit Roberto Bellarmino at the end of the sixteenth century. However, ultramontanism acquired its definitive meaning in the conflict over the Gallicanism of Louis XIV in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The term *ultramontanism* seems to date from the 1730s, although *ultramontane* was used with various meanings in the Middle Ages. During the eighteenth century, exponents of ultramontanism waged a generally losing struggle against Gallicanism and similar statist movements in other countries, such as Febronianism and Josephism. [See also Gallicanism.]

The French Revolution dealt a fatal blow to Gallicanism by destroying the monarchy on which it had rested. In the ensuing age of uncertainty, the attractiveness of the papacy as the only stable source of authority stimulated a Roman Catholic revival, of which ultramontanism was the essence. Count Joseph de Maistre forcefully expressed this position in *Du pape* (1819), proposing absolutism in state and church under the ultimate supremacy of the pope. The traditionalism of Viscount Louis de Bonald disparaged individual reason, for which Félicité de Lamennais (*Essay on Indifference*, 1817) substituted the "universal consent" of humanity, as embodied in the pope, as the ultimate test of truth. But Lamennais, developing the democratic implications of "universal consent," appealed not only to the pope but also to the people, seeking the freedom of the church in the freedom of society. Thus he commenced the liberal Catholic movement in the context of ultramontanism. The appeal made to Pope Gregory XVI by

Lamennais and his associates on the journal *Avenir* was rejected (*Mirari vos*, 1832) by a papacy still seeking safety in alliance with authoritarian monarchies. Lamennais left the church. Nonetheless, his more moderate colleagues, notably Count Charles de Montalembert and Henri Lacordaire, were able to build a party, at once ultramontane and liberal, that supplanted Gallianism as the political expression of French Catholicism. This party seemed to triumph during the revolution of 1848, securing its chief goal, freedom of Catholic education, with the passage of the Falloux law in 1850.

The Falloux law brought to the surface a latent division in the Catholic party, many of whose members had followed Montalembert's quest for liberty only as a means toward the end of the ultimate dominance of the church in French life. Louis Veuillot, editor of *L'univers*, led an intransigent group that rejected the compromises inherent in the Falloux law and advanced the most extreme claims on behalf of the church and, within it, of the authority of the pope. This new ultramontanism thus rejected liberal Catholicism, a product of the older ultramontanism, and set itself against all forms of liberalism in church, state, and intellectual life.

The attitude of the papacy was decisive. Although Pope Pius IX (1846–1878) had flirted mildly with liberalism early in his reign, he reacted sharply after the revolution of 1848, which had driven him out of his temporal dominions. After 1850, the church under his leadership regarded itself as besieged and embattled, hostile to all liberalism in political and intellectual life, and concentrating in the pope himself both the devotion of the faithful and the plenitude of authority. This was the final meaning of ultramontanism. Having already overcome Gallicanism, it now fought and defeated liberal Catholicism. Veuillot in France, the Jesuits associated with the periodical *Civiltà Cattolica* in Italy, William George Ward and Henry Edward Manning in England, Paul Cullen in Ireland, and, more moderately, the Mainz school led by Wilhelm von Ketteler in Germany were the leading exponents of a movement that rapidly triumphed among committed Catholics. The *Syllabus of Errors* (1864), a set of theses condemned by Pius IX, marked the height of ultramontane militancy. The definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican Council in 1870 set the seal on its victory. However qualified the wording of this definition, it was manifest that the ultramontane program of a centralized and authoritarian church under an irresistible pope had been achieved.

From the First to the Second Vatican Council, ultramontanism was effectively synonymous with orthodox

Roman Catholicism. The movement in its final form had won so complete a triumph that the term itself fell out of use.

[See also Papacy; Vatican Councils; *the biography of Pius IX*; and Modernism, *article on Christian Modernism*.]

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UMAI. The name *Umai* (*Umay*) first appears in the Old Turkic inscriptions of Mongolia (mid-eighth century CE), where it is borne by a feminine deity of unspecified but benevolent functions. There is a gap of more than a thousand years in the relevant documentation, but belief in *Umai* has remained alive among some of the Turkic peoples of the Altai region, and also among the Tunguz of northeastern Siberia. Here *Umai* may be male or female, or even androgynous. In one set of beliefs, where *Umai* is personified, the role of the spirit resembles that of a guardian angel of small children. Illness may signal *Umai*'s abandonment of her ward, and a shaman's intervention may be sought to effect her return. Often *Umai* is thought of as the keeper of the soul of unborn children.

Among the Turkic Sagays, Shors, and Beltirs, *umai* is the term applied to the soul of a child from the moment of his birth until about the time when he walks freely and speaks with some fluency. On occasion, the help of a shaman may be requested for the sinister purpose of transferring the *umai* of a healthy infant either into the body of one seriously ill, or into the womb of a woman thought to be sterile. As a result of such an abduction, referred to as *Umay* (or *Imay*) *tutargha*, the donor will die. The term *umai* is applied also to the umbilical cord, which, after being cut, is placed in a small leather pouch and attached to the child's cradle.

The inconsistencies and contradictions shown by nineteenth- and twentieth-century beliefs and practices suggest that these are but surviving fragments of an ancient cult no longer definable. Since *umai* is the stan-

dard Mongol word for "womb" or "placenta," it can safely be assumed that, although the name *Umai* first appears in a Turkic text and the cult of *Umai* is strongest among Turkic peoples, originally the deity was part of a Mongol religious system.

[See also Turkic Religions.]

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DENIS SINOR

UMĀPATI ŚIVĀCĀRYA (fourteenth century CE), Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta teacher, author, and theologian. Umāpati Śivācārya, who flourished in the South Indian temple city of Chidambaram during the early fourteenth century, was the last of the four *santāna ācāryas* ("hereditary teachers," a term here referring to four theologians in teacher-disciple succession) of the Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta school of philosophy-theology. (The other three *ācāryas* were Meykaṅṭar, Aruṅanti, and Maṛaiṅṅa Campantar, all of whom lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.) According to tradition, Umāpati was a Vaiṣṇava brahman from Korraṅkuṭi, near Chidambaram. One day, coming from the temple, he encountered the Śaiva *ācārya* Maṛaiṅṅa Campantar. This meeting resulted in Umāpati's conversion to Śaivism. Under the tutelage of Maṛaiṅṅa Campantar, who became Umāpati's guru, Umāpati studied Śaiva religious texts and himself became a prolific contributor to the Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta literature.

Fourteen theological texts are considered canonical in the Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta school and are collectively referred to as the Meykaṅṭasāstra. Umāpati wrote eight of these treatises, the most important of which is the *Civapirakācam* (The Light of Śiva). The *Civapirakācam* is a hundred-stanza "supplementary treatise" (*cārpunūl*) related both to Meykaṅṭar's "root treatise" (*mutaṅṅūl*) the

Civañānapōtam, the basic *sūtra* of the Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta, and to Aruṇanti's secondary treatise-commentary (*vaḷinūl*) on the *Civañānapōtam*, the *Civañānacittiyār*. This clearly situates Umāpati's work and thought within a typical medieval Hindu sectarian lineage, scholastic in style and substance. Umāpati shares with the other Tamil Siddhāntins a threefold ontology—*pati* ("the lord," i.e., Śiva), *pacu* ("the creature," i.e., souls), and *pācam/malam* ("bondage"/"dirt," i.e., phenomenal reality and consciousness). In the *Civapirakācam* he displays considerable psychological acumen in delineating the various levels of knowledge-experience that the soul passes through on its journey from an original benighted state of intimate connection with *malam* to an ultimate illumination with the light of Śiva.

Other works by Umāpati in the *Meykaṇṭa Sāstra* are briefly described as follows. The *Tiruvaruṭṭpayāṅ* contains ten sets of ten couplets in the style of the renowned Tamil ethical work known as the *Tirukkuṛaḷ*. Since the *Tirukkuṛaḷ*'s maxims treat only right conduct (*dharma*), wealth and power (*artha*), and eros (*kāma*), Umāpati offers the *Tiruvaruṭṭpayāṅ* to supply a section on *mokṣa*, the fourth Hindu "aim of life" (*puruṣārtha*). The thirteen-quatrain *Viñāvenpa* records a dialogue between the author and his guru concerning details of Siddhānta ontology and epistemology. The *Pōrriṭṭakroṭai*, a ninety-five-stanza composition in the form of a hymn of praise, describes the soul's transformation thanks to Śiva's grace. The *Koṭikkavi*, a mere four quatrains, plays upon an analogy between the ascent of the soul to Śiva and the raising of a flag at a temple festival. The 125-stanza *Neñcuvitūtūtu* casts the author's heart as a messenger to her beloved (Śiva), who is described as a king, and expounds the soul's transformation by him. The *Uṇmaineriviḷakkam* contains six quatrains treating the soul's development and enlightenment. The *Caṅkarpanirākaraṇam* consists of twenty stanzas refuting other sectarian views, especially those of Advaita Vedānta.

Besides the works in the *Meykaṇṭa Sāstra*, Umāpati is also the traditionally ascribed author of a number of Tamil Puranic works: a condensation of Cēkkiḷār's great hagiography on the lives of the Tamil Śaiva devotional saints; a sacred biography of Cēkkiḷār himself; the *sihalapurāṇa* ("sacred history of a place") of Chidambaram; and a *purāṇa* on the origins of the Tamil Śaiva collection of sacred hymns the *Tirumurai*. Umāpati also wrote a Sanskrit commentary on the *Pauṣkarāgama* and compiled an anthology of the Śaiva Āgamas, the *Śataratna-saṅgraha*.

[See also Śaivism, article on Śaiva Siddhānta; Tamil Religions; and the biography of *Meykaṇṭār*.]

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'UMAR IBN AL-KHAṬṬĀB (assassinated AH 23/644 CE), second caliph and founder of the Muslim Arab empire. Born in pagan Mecca, he accepted the mission of Muḥammad as God's prophet before the emigration (*hijrah*) of that city's nascent Muslim community to Medina. Muḥammad later married his daughter Ḥafṣah, whose name is linked with the collation of the Qur'ān. 'Umar's fame as caliph (634–644) justly rests on his energetic leadership and shrewd counsel during the expansion of the Medinan commonwealth, which was ultimately transformed into an imperial structure displacing both Byzantine and Persian power in the Middle East.

While traditional accounts attribute a great number of "firsts" to 'Umar, modern scholars have not always been able to distinguish 'Umar's achievements from those of a later period. His adoption of the title Amīr al-Mu'minīn ("counselor of the believers") rather than Khalīfat Rasūl Allāh ("successor of the Messenger of God"), as his predecessor Abū Bakr was called, indicates at least the emergence of a self-conscious, permanent community, if not that of a well-defined political office. It seems clear that he set the precedent for religious endowments (*awqāf*, plural of *waqf*), first on his own land and then on the conquered land of the Sawād in Iraq, the revenue from which was to be used for the benefit of future generations of Muslims. He probably also instituted the prayers (*al-tarāwīḥ*) during the fasting month of Ramaḍān, the obligatory pilgrimage (*ḥajj*), and the Hijrah as the commencement of the Muslim era (622 CE). Of more doubtful origin are the specific punishments for drunkenness, adultery, and lampooning, and most controversial of all is the so-called Covenant of 'Umar, promulgating fiscal, religious, and civil regulations with regard to the non-Muslim population.

The document is almost certainly a conflation, with only the fiscal and religious provisions properly belonging to 'Umar's time.

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'UMAR TĀL (1794/7–1864), known in Fūta as al-Ḥājī 'Umar ibn Sa'īd ibn 'Uthmān of Gede; intellectual and military leader in the central and western Sudanic region. Born in Fūta Tōro, a Fulbe state in the middle valley of the Senegal River, 'Umar first achieved prominence during the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, which he completed three times in the years 1828–1830. At the same time he obtained an appointment as the chief representative (*khalīfah*) in West Africa for the Islamic order called the Tijānīyah, which had been founded in North Africa in the eighteenth century. With these credentials 'Umar returned to West Africa, visited the capitals of the principal Islamic states, attracted a following of disciples, wives, and slaves, and established a reputation as a brilliant scholar, miracle worker, and military strategist. Much of his reputation emerged during a stay of seven years in Sokoto, the capital of the Islamic confederation of northern Nigeria. In 1839 'Umar traveled through the inland delta of the Niger River, where another Fulbe-dominated Islamic state called the caliphate of Hamdullāhi held sway. In 1840 he settled in Fūta Jalon, yet another Fulbe polity in the mountains of Guinea. In the small town of Jegunko he taught, formed his growing community, and completed his major work, *Rimāḥ*, which serves an important guide for Tijānīyah clerics today.

Beginning in 1846 'Umar moved in the direction of a military *jihād*, or war against unbelievers. He recruited in his original homeland of Fūta Tōro. He moved his rapidly expanding community to Dingiray, a settlement east of Fūta Jalon under the control of the Mandinka king of Tamba. In Dingiray the Umarian forces collected arms, built fortifications, and created the conditions of conflict with the Mandinka. Their victories over Tamba in 1852–1853 launched the *jihād*, established

'Umar's reputation as a military leader, and attracted thousands of new recruits.

'Umar subsequently directed his forces to the north, to the upper valley of the Senegal River. With an army of about 15,000 he defeated the Bambara kingdom of Kārta, which had dominated the upper valley for decades. In 1857 'Umar laid siege to Medine, a new post established by the expanding French, but he suffered heavy casualties when Governor Louis Faidherbe arrived with new troops from the coast. 'Umar then led his survivors to the east to regroup, then back to the west in 1858–1859 in a bold recruiting campaign along the river valley. With his predominantly new army he defeated the renowned Bambara kingdom of the Middle Niger, Segu, and made the city of the same name the capital of his far-flung but poorly organized state.

In 1862 'Umar led most of his troops against the caliphate of Hamdullāhi in retaliation for Hamdullāhi's assistance to Segu against the *jihād*. He achieved an initial victory, but the Hamdullāhi Fulbe, aided by the Kunta clerics of Timbuktu, revolted in 1863, destroyed the Umarian forces, and killed 'Umar in 1864. The Umarian *jihād* ended at this point, but the fragile polity it created endured until the French conquest some thirty years later. The principal leader of the state was 'Umar's oldest son, Aḥmad, commonly called Amadu Sheku, and its principal capital was Segu.

The basic structure of the Umarian *jihād* consisted of recruitment of men and weapons in the west, in the regions of Senegal and Fūta Jalon, to wage war in the east, against the Mandinka and Bambara. 'Umar relied particularly on the Muslims of the west who, like himself, were dissatisfied citizens of the Fulbe states of Fūta Jalon, Bundu, and Fūta Tōro. He fought against people who could be generally classified as non-Muslims and who blocked the emergence of Islam in the western Sudan. The Segu Bambara were regarded as particularly notorious "pagans." The campaign against Hamdullāhi was not part of the original design of the *jihād*. When 'Umar decided to undertake it he wrote a long apologia to justify his actions, and the dissension produced by the conflict of Muslim against Muslim, and Fulbe against Fulbe, helped produce the revolt of 1863–1864.

The basic structure of the Umarian *jihād* contrasts with the experience of earlier Fulbe-led *jihāds* and the states (Sokoto, Hamdullāhi, and the two Fūtas) that resulted from them. The earlier pattern consisted of internal revolutions against "pagan" or nominal Muslim ruling classes, followed by expansion to the exterior. This pattern was codified in the writings of the Sokoto leadership and adopted by 'Umar himself in his own writings. 'Umar could not, however, lead a second internal revolution in his native land, and he decided to recruit

in the west and fight to the east. He was highly successful militarily, but he laid little basis for an Islamic administration or for the incorporation or conversion of his new subjects. His twelve years of war have left decidedly different impressions in today's Senegal and Mali: in the first he is the crusading Islamic hero; in the second he is the invader who used Islam as a pretext.

'Umar left one lasting precedent to Muslims of all persuasions in West Africa: the example of emigration (*hijrah* in Arabic, *fergo* in Fulfulde) away from European expansion. In his desperate recruiting drive of 1858–1859, he called on Senegalese Muslims to leave a land that had become "polluted" by French expansion. His son Amadu followed his example in the 1890s at the time of French conquest of the interior, and other Muslim leaders, such as the caliph of Sokoto in 1903, did the same thing. They journeyed to the east, along the old pilgrimage routes, in search of places where the faithful could preserve Islamic state and society.

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UMBANDA. See Afro-Brazilian Cults.

UMMAH, an Arabic term for "group" or "people," is used in the Qur'an in the sense of "religious community." The ideal of an *ummah muslimah*, a unified, just, and pious "community submissive to God," is central to the Islamic religious vision. Abraham prayed that his posterity would be such a community (surah 2:127–129), and Muḥammad shared Abraham's vision in establishing his *ummah*. The foundations, boundaries, and character of this *ummah* as a religious and political entity were fixed in the first few centuries of Islamic history, with the *ummah* from the time of the Prophet and the first four caliphs as the normative embodiment of the *ummah* ideal. Contemporary debates among Muslims on a just political order have centered

on how best to realize this ideal and on its relation to the idea of nationalism.

Qur'anic Usage. Although perhaps connected with either the Arabic root for *umm*, "mother," or *imām*, "leader," *ummah* is generally considered a foreign term from either Hebrew or Aramaic. Although rare, Hebrew usage suggests that *ummah* may have entered Arabic as the designation of a tribal confederation in Arabia. The adjectival form *ummī* is used six times in the Qur'an, twice referring to Muḥammad (7:157, 158). Muslims take the term to mean "illiterate" to underline that the Qur'an has no human author, but the adjective probably meant "unscriptured, gentile," namely the unscriptured Arabs. In its rare occurrences in pre-Islamic Arabic poetry, *ummah* already means "religious community."

Ummah appears sixty-four times in sixty-two Qur'anic verses revealed in the middle and late Meccan and Medinese periods. By the end of the Medinese period, the term refers exclusively to the *ummah* of the Muslims, but earlier connotations from Qur'anic salvation history were never lost. That history held that if God had wished, he would have made humankind one *ummah* (16:93, 42:8), but he in fact created a number of *ummahs* with their own characteristic religious rituals (22:34, 67). The life span of each *ummah* is fixed by God (7:34), and many have passed away (2:134, 141). Human history is a repetitive cycle of divine revelation to successive *ummahs*, each of which was sent a messenger (16:36), witness (4:41), or warner (35:23, 24), against whom it conspired (29:18, 40:5). They opposed their messenger because of adherence to their *ummah*, the religious practices of the ancestors (43:22, 23). A portion of Jews and Christians remained an upstanding *ummah* (3:113), although many of them opposed their revelations. Muḥammad's mission was the end of this cycle. While at first it followed the same sad pattern, the *ummah* of Muḥammad emerged as singular (3:104), central (2:143), and supreme (3:110).

In the "Constitution of Medina," an agreement made by the Prophet with the population in Medina after his arrival in 622, both the Medinese and Meccan Muslims constituted a single *ummah*, with their earlier kinship loyalties severely curtailed. It is unclear whether Jewish supporters of Muḥammad were considered part of this *ummah*, but in a later clause the Jews are declared a separate *ummah*, with a separate religion (*dīn*).

By the time of Muḥammad's death a decade later, the term *ummah* referred to the exclusive religious community of the Muslims. Most striking was the conscious break with earlier kinship ties in order to found a community upon religious identity. Although Mecca and Medina had an honored place, the community was not

tied to a specific geographical area and was potentially all-inclusive. At its heart lay an insistent egalitarianism and a compelling call for a just communal order for all humanity.

Muḥammad's Community. While the term *ummah muḥammadiyah* ("Muhammadan community") is not Qur'anic, it became standard with the crystallization of the sense of the *ummah* as a separate body established by Muḥammad. Three issues central to the concept of Muḥammad's *ummah* were of utmost consequence to the subsequent intellectual and political history of Islam.

1. *Membership.* The boundaries of the *ummah* were potentially all-inclusive. By the second century AH (eighth century CE) it was agreed that every Muslim, whether Arab or not, was equal to every other Muslim, a stance that affirmed both the egalitarian and the expansive character of the community. Despite movements to narrow the *ummah*, the community came to agree that it was wrong for anyone to question the genuineness of another Muslim's membership. It is interesting in this regard that no ritual marking of entry into the *ummah* ever arose in Islam: one becomes a member either by birth or by the sincere confession of faith.

2. *Responsibilities.* The *ummah* has in several respects a legal personality. It guarantees the correct interpretation of the divine law under the authority of the Prophet's statement that "my community will never agree on an error." Certain duties, such as defense of the *ummah*, fall upon the community as a whole, rather than upon individual Muslims. If some members of the community defend the *ummah*, then that duty is discharged. On the Day of Judgment, souls will be gathered in their *ummahs*, and communal judgment will precede individual judgment.

3. *Leadership.* After the religious and political synthesis of the *ummah* of the first generation of Muslims collapsed, the ideal of the *ummah muḥammadiyah* survived as a strong source of communal identity for Muslims, although not as a political reality. Within the Sunnī context, leadership of the community came to be divided between the rulers and the class of religious scholars ('*ulamā*') who claimed to be the conscience of the *ummah* but generally kept separate from the political realm. The Shi'ah, while holding strongly to the possibility of reestablishing the connection of the political and the religious in a united *ummah* under their imam, in fact did not usually differ from the Sunnī compromise of a *de facto* bifurcation of leadership.

The Nineteenth Century. On 2 July 1798, the eve of his invasion of Egypt, Napoleon issued a proclamation telling the religious leaders of Egypt to pray for the progress of *al-ummah al-miṣrīyah*, "the Egyptian na-

tion." This use of *ummah* to refer to a territorially circumscribed, socially integrated national community was in marked contradiction to the traditional meaning of the term. Two questions arose: "What was the relation between national and religious identity to be for Muslim nations with significant religious minorities, such as the Copts of Egypt? What place did national communities have within the older ideal of a universal Muslim *ummah*? Attempts at resolving these two questions formed the agenda of Muslim political thought in response to European colonialism.

One option was the wholesale embrace of the idea of European nationalism. Rifā'ah Rāfi' al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (1801–1873), the Egyptian writer and educator, celebrated the notion of *waṭanīyah*, "patriotism." Imbued with a great sense of pride in Egypt's past, al-Ṭaḥṭāwī called for a national community of Egyptians, both Muslims and Copts. Foreign domination and despotism had caused Egypt to fall into a backward state and made this new vision of an Egyptian *ummah* necessary. A rediscovery of pride in one's *waṭan*, "homeland," would mean restoring Egypt to its former greatness and establishing a government truly concerned with the welfare of its people.

Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–1897), the Iranian-born Muslim activist, represented the pan-Islamic solution. Cosmopolitan in orientation and clear on the imperialist designs of Europe, al-Afghānī saw Islam as the basis of solidarity for all Muslim peoples. United under a just ruler, the *ummah* could become great again. With the aid of an '*ulamā*, returning to the truths of Islam, the just ruler would eventually unite the whole Islamic world and provide the most potent defense against the threat of the West.

Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), the Egyptian religious leader and educator, broke with the political program of his sometime collaborator al-Afghānī. 'Abduh thought the *ummah* needed spiritual leadership, most appropriately lodged with the Arabs. Through education this leadership would purify the *ummah* morally and intellectually. This was the necessary precondition for revitalization of the Islamic world. 'Abduh was deeply molded by the ideal of the earliest community and its potential universality but also felt that there was a significant role to be played by individual nations within the Islamic *ummah*. In the Egyptian context in which he sought to lay the groundwork for Muslim revitalization his legacy has legitimately been claimed by liberal secularists, Arab nationalists, and Muslim fundamentalists.

Resurgent Islam. The contradictions between the traditional Muslim notion of *ummah* and its modern reading as "nation" were exacerbated in the twentieth

century. Secular nationalisms gained strength as legitimizing ideologies and galvanized national struggles for independence, but since 1967 there has been a significant resurgence in Islamic consciousness among Muslim peoples, motivated in large part by the perception that imported ideologies such as liberalism, nationalism, and socialism all have failed. Further, tyranny within Muslim countries has been seen as the most pressing challenge facing Muslim peoples, and only a society regenerated by a religious revolution is capable of overthrowing tyranny and establishing a just society. It is misleading to suggest that this resurgence is monolithic. Nevertheless, insofar as its main thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Abū al-A'lā Mawdūdī (1903–1979), founder of the Pakistani Jamā'at-i Islāmī, and 'Alī Shari'atī (1933–1977), leading ideologue of the Iranian revolution, influenced one another, it is appropriate to consider this resurgence as, in some ways, a unified phenomenon. The concept of *ummah* is central to their thought. Three features are especially relevant.

1. *New jāhiliyah*. The Islamic world is threatened by the forces of *jāhiliyah*, "pagan ignorance," represented by the idols of nationalism, materialism, and despotism. The Muslim community stands at the same place that the Arabs occupied on the eve of the coming of the Prophet. No new revelation is required, but the reconstitution of an *ummah* according to the pattern followed by the Prophet is needed. This process involves the establishment of a small and dedicated group, then its withdrawal and struggle with the forces of *jāhiliyah* until final victory is won.

2. *Social dynamism*. The dynamic social organism of a purified *ummah* is the engine of Islamic revolution. The *ummah* guided by leaders who know what God expects will become a true embodiment of the principles of justice and solidarity. Leadership is not vested in the traditional 'ulamā', who are often mired in obscurantism and tied to the forces of despotism; rather, the blueprint of the just Islamic society can be discerned by anyone who carefully studies the texts of Islam.

3. *Islamic state*. The sign of victory is the establishment of an Islamic state, a government fully under the sovereignty of God. All Muslims will participate fully in the governance of this state through consultation. God's sovereignty and the will of the *ummah* will curb the powers of the rulers of such states. The idea of an Islamic state collapses the bifurcation of leadership of the *ummah* that is the legacy of Islamic history and returns to the ideal of the early *ummah*. It also addresses the conflict between the universal claim of the *ummah* and the call of nationalisms, since there will be a plurality of Islamic states, but an Islamic state is not sullied by

nationalism. This conception is what lies behind the Iranian revolutionary claim that "Iran is not my country [*waṭan*], Islam is." Since waiting for the establishment of a single universal Islamic state only dissipates revolutionary energy, the strategy now is to establish an Islamic state in each Muslim country.

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WILLIAM R. DARROW

UNCTION. See Anointing and Sacrament, article on Christian Sacraments.

UNDERHILL, EVELYN (1875–1941) English poet, novelist, and writer on mysticism. Born in Wolverhampton, England, the daughter of barrister Arthur Underhill, Evelyn Underhill supplemented her secondary education by studies at King's College, London, and by travel abroad. Underhill's early letters show some precocity for self-study and her personal and literary ca-

reer may be regarded in light of this capacity. Her marriage in 1907 allowed Underhill the kind of financial support and unencumbered way of life necessary for her both to seek personal guidance essential to her spiritual growth and to undertake the voluminous research that her work would demand.

Underhill was both beneficiary and catalyst in the revival of the metaphysical discussion current in the early years of her career. She was influenced by Arthur Waite, a figure of manifold interests in the occult, magic, and religion, associating herself for some time with the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn. Later, and in another vein, Underhill shared in the enthusiasm aroused by the ideas of contemporaries Henri Bergson and Rudolf Eucken and fell briefly under the influence of Hindu poet Rabindranath Tagore. More significant influences, however, were William Ralph Inge, the eminent dean of Saint Paul's Cathedral in London, and the Roman Catholic scholar Friedrich von Hügel, whose erudition and sensitivity had the most profound and lasting effect on her.

Underhill's work reveals her deep personal commitment to spiritual development. It reflects, for the most part, her conviction that Christianity provides an exceptionally vital medium for mystical communion. Although the focus of her work does not exclude the pagan experience, her insights are developed primarily within the Christian tradition.

Underhill's book *Mysticism* (1911) is her most important work. It is a decidedly nonacademic study of mystical experience. In part historical and primarily comparative, its lasting significance lies, however, in the psychological insight of Underhill's commentary. The experiences of mystics from a wide range of disciplines and cultures are presented. Underhill, emphasizing their similarity of expression, asserted the essential kinship of mystical experience wherever it is found. Early editions of *Mysticism* depict Christianity as exceptional only in its greater facility for fostering this experience. The appearance in 1930 of the revised twelfth edition revealed a significantly greater awareness of the differences between the Christian and non-Christian experience. The clarity and depth of understanding with which *Mysticism* was written have given it an unsurpassed value and accessibility as a guide to the mystical tradition.

Subsequent work was taken up in the midst of a growing preoccupation with the contemplative life. Prayer, public service, and guidance from devout and intelligent people such as von Hügel served to deepen Underhill's already substantial appreciation for the uniqueness of the Christian way. This is borne out in her revision of *Mysticism*. In general such changes in Underhill's perspective tended to move her work to-

ward the center of the Anglican faith to which she had returned. This tendency is manifest in her last major work, *Worship* (1936). This book deals with more orthodox forms of Christian practice. It stresses the practical virtues of prayer and the great importance and centrality of the Eucharist in Christian life.

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GREGORY F. PORTER

UNDERWORLD. The term *underworld* refers to the subterranean region inhabited by the dead. It is often the place of punishment of the wicked, the unrighteous, the unredeemed, the unbelieving, or the lost. The concept of an underworld is an ingredient in most belief systems in the history of religions, but there is no definite evidence indicating that the idea was present in the earliest stages of human culture. In the oldest strata of Egyptian and pre-Vedic Indian cultures, however, there exists a rich store of archaeological material suggesting that the aristocratic segments of society, at least, believed in some kind of an afterlife. But even in these early records of postmortem existence, there does not seem to have been a distinction between heaven, the realm of the blessed, and hell, the realm of the damned.

Later, when the two realms came to be differentiated, each religion appealed to its own set of criteria when determining the fate of an individual after death, whether blessed or damned. [See Heaven and Hell.] These criteria could be defined by birth, by ritual initiation into the community, by the performance of prescribed sacramental rites, by belief in a deity or in a set of teachings, and so on. Such standards were commensurate with the way the religion defined the proper relationship to the sacred.

Primitive and Archaic Religions. Tales of heroic journeys to the underworld, often undertaken on behalf of the entire community, are extremely widespread among tribal peoples throughout the world. Particularly nota-

ble for such lore are the Maori of New Zealand; the Algonquin, the Ojibwa, and various Plains tribes of North America; the Zulu, the Ashanti, and the Dogon of Africa; and numerous other societies in North Asia (especially Siberia and Mongolia), Central America, and South America.

If one disregards for the moment the detailed differences among the various accounts of the postmortem journey to the underworld, one can observe a common theme among many such stories. A heroic figure undertakes a descent into the belly of a chthonic or marine monster, a creature often identified as Mother Earth, the Mother of Death, or the Queen of the Night. He pursues a strenuous journey through her body, during which he encounters numerous obstacles and dangers. He finally reemerges into the world of the living, either through a natural orifice in the monster's body or through an opening that he himself creates. As numerous scholars have convincingly demonstrated, the ordeal of being ingested by a theriomorphic creature and of passing through the various channels of its body is symbolic of an initiatory ordeal whereby the hero conquers death or the fear of death and, in some cases, wins the prize of immortality.

The hero is submitted to a test or an ordeal in which he must either prove himself capable of overcoming the obstacles that lie in his path or prove himself capable of defeating the enemy that blocks his passage. The descent into the underworld is also a quest for special, esoteric knowledge or wisdom that is denied all other living beings who have not undertaken such a journey. As the possessor of this secret knowledge, the hero often serves as a mediator between the living and the dead or as a psychopomp who personally conducts the souls of the deceased to the underworld.

The typical shamanistic story of the descent into the underworld is exemplified in a tale of the Goldi peoples of Siberia. A shaman traps the soul of the deceased in a sacred pillow by beating his sacred drum. After mounting a notched tree in order to get a preview of the journey to follow, he summons two tutelary spirits to assist along the way and then, with the deceased and his ghostly companions, sets off on a specially prepared dogsled, furnished with a basket of food for nourishment. After encountering numerous obstacles along the way, the travelers arrive in the underworld. Using a fictitious name to protect his identity, the shaman deposits the deceased with his relatives in the underworld. He then returns immediately, armed with warm greetings and small gifts for the living from their subterranean kinsmen.

A prototypical example of the story in which the descent into the underworld is symbolically identified

with the return to the mother's womb is found in the religious lore of the Maori of New Zealand. Māui, the heroic representative of the Maori, returned at the end of his life to the hut of his ancestress, Hine-mi-te-po, the Great Mistress (of the Night). He leapt into her body as she slept, made his way without difficulty through the various channels within her body, and had just emerged halfway from her open mouth when the birds that had accompanied him burst into laughter. Aroused by the screech of the birds' laughter, the ancestress abruptly clamped her mouth shut and cut the hero in two with her sharp teeth. Because of this misfortune, humans ever since have been mortal; had Māui successfully escaped his ancestress's body, they would have become immortal.

Many tribal peoples situate the land of the dead in the west, on the western side of the world, or simply at some distance west of the village. Many scholars (most notably E. B. Tylor and F. Max Müller) have argued that this practice is confirmation that most myths and rituals pertaining to the journey to the underworld are elaborations of a core solar myth.

While there no doubt is a kernel of truth in this view, there are other equally significant layers of meaning invested in these stories and practices. One important theme concerns the descent of a hero into the belly of a ferocious marine creature and his reemergence through the mouth or anus of the beast in an effort to conquer death and gain immortality. A second theme is of an arduous journey through wild and monster-infested areas in search of a precious object (magical ring, sacred fruit, golden vessel, elixir of immortality, etc.) that will benefit the hero or his people. In a third theme, a tribesman submits himself to a deadly ordeal in order to pass from a lower to a higher stage of existence and thereby achieves a superhuman or heroic state of being. In yet another theme, a hero shoulders the onerous task of traveling to the subterranean regions where the Mother of Death or the Queen of the Night reigns supreme, thereby gaining knowledge of the route to the shadowy realm and of the fate of those who reside there.

Ancient Egypt. The afterlife of the Egyptian nobility is described in the Pyramid Texts. Royalty were believed to ascend at death to the Blessed Lands, or Fields of the Blessed, in the heavens. According to the Pyramid Texts, members of the aristocracy traveled to the celestial spheres to dwell there like gods, often traveling on the ship belonging to Re, the sun god. Highly elaborate and expensive mortuary rites, charms, and incantations were offered for the nobility to guarantee that the soul of the deceased would enjoy a blissful existence in the world beyond. The life in that world is largely similar

to this one but is free of the difficulties and misfortunes that plague the lives of even the powerful and wealthy. The afterlife of the common people is outlined in the Coffin Texts. Commoners were believed either to remain near the tomb after death or to travel to the netherworld.

The dead traveled to many different realms, some to the east but most to the west. It is now believed that the dead went in different directions because the disembodied spirits were thought to move about with the sun and the stars. The west was the primary destination of the souls (*ka*) of the dead. Darkness and night were identified symbolically with death and postmortem existence. The realm of the dead was located sometimes in the sky and sometimes beneath the earth. This region was ruled by Osiris, the king of the dead. While still a mortal, Osiris was murdered by his brother Seth and then resurrected by his sister-wife Isis. He subsequently became the chief ruler of the nether realm.

Assyria and Babylonia. In the views of the ancient Akadians and Babylonians, the underworld is a dreadful place. To get there one has to pass through seven gates and remove a piece of clothing at each. The realm is organized on the order of a political state under the tyrannical rule of a king and a queen, Nergal and Ereshkigal. In the text entitled "Descent of Ishtar to the Nether World" (Pritchard, 1969, p. 107), this realm of the dead is described as

the Land of no Return . . . the dark house . . . which none leave who have entered it . . . the road from which there is no way back, the house wherein the entrants are bereft of light, where dust is their fare and clay their food. Where they see no light, residing in darkness, where they are clothed like birds, with wings for garments, and where over the door and bolt is spread dust.

Once in the underworld, the fate of the deceased is improved or worsened depending on whether the body is buried according to the prescribed funeral rites and is provided by the living with food, clothing, and other accoutrements required for the journey to the other realm.

One name for the netherworld is Kigal ("the great subterranean realm"). *Kigal* is an element in the name of Ereshkigal, the "queen of the underworld" and sister of Ishtar. This domain was also known as Kutu, the sacred city of Nergal, a chthonic deity who was lord of the netherworld. The gateway through which each soul is required to pass is situated in the west, where the Babylonians watched the descent of the sun. All graves provide entrance to this shadowy realm. Having entered the main gate, the dead are then ferried across the river Hubur by a four-handed, fierce-faced ferryman to "the Great City." This city is a gigantic metropolis, en-

circled by seven walls, each wall surmounted by a gate and each gate guarded by a demon. At the very center of the complex is the lapis lazuli of Ereshkigal. Befitting her position as queen of the realm, she is surrounded by numerous attendants: a plague god who executes her orders, a scribe who announces the names of the new arrivals, and seven fierce, iron-willed judges called the Anunnaki. There are a host of demons who spread pestilence and suffering throughout humanity and keep the queen plentifully supplied with new residents.

Greece and Rome. In ancient Greece the belief in the postmortem survival of the soul stretches back to earliest times, as is suggested by evidence of food, drink, clothing, and entertainment provided in the grave. Already in Homer a clear distinction between the corpse and the ghost was made. The *Iliad* (3.278–279, 19.259) contains the belief that the gods punished or rewarded souls at death. It was thought that the souls of the living are supplied from the stock of souls in Hades.

Despite the rich stock of ideas native to the Greek islands regarding the dead and the underworld, from the time of Homer Greek writers showed no hesitation in drawing freely from other religious traditions and in synthesizing these foreign elements with indigenous material. Most of the borrowed elements were derived from Egypt (particularly the Osiris cult and the *Book of Going Forth by Day*) and from Mycenae. From Crete they adopted the idea of *elusion* ("paradise") and the figure of Rhadamanthys (one of the three infernal judges). From Mycenae they received the idea of weighing the soul in the balance.

The earliest Greek accounts of the postmortem journey of the soul to the underworld are to be found in the *Iliad* (1.595, 3.279, 5.395–396, 15.187–188) and in the *Odyssey* (11). At the moment of death, the soul (*psuchē*) is separated from the body, transformed into a ghostly double of the person (*eidōlon*), and transported down to Hades, an enormous cavern below the surface of the earth (*Odyssey* 11.204–222). Here the souls of the dead are capable only of "flitting around as shadows while exuding shrill chirping sounds." This dismal domain is the very antithesis of the realm of the "blazing sun"; it is a place where one sees only "the cold dead" and is an altogether "joyless region." The shades of the dead are unconscious and incommunicative until they have imbibed a quantity of blood, the essence of life. So morally neutral is the life of the dead that all distinctions pertaining to social station, political position, and religious latitude are obliterated, thus rendering even a mean and destitute existence in the world highly preferable (*Odyssey* 11.487–491) to the office of rulership over Hades.

In ancient Greek cosmology, Hades lies within the

ocean, perpetually shrouded in clouds and mist. Here there is no sunlight, only eternal darkness. The shades are depicted as being weak and extremely melancholy, always in search of escape from their sufferings and finding none. Especially painful are the sufferings of those who were either not properly buried on earth or not suitably nourished with sacrificial food offerings. The dire nature of the torments suffered by the inmates is graphically depicted in the story of Tantalos. Standing in water up to his chin, he found to his chagrin that the water mysteriously evaporated each time he sought to quench his thirst; surrounded by flowering fruit trees, he found that the wind blew the fruit away as he reached out to grasp it (*Odyssey* 11.582–592). Hades is separated from the realm of the living by a treacherous body of water, made up of five rivers (Lethe, Styx, Phlegethon, Acheron, and Cocytus). The entrance is guarded by Kerberos, a ferocious dog with three (earlier poets said fifty or one hundred) heads whose necks are encircled by venomous serpents. Here Minos judges the deeds of the deceased and provides the laws that govern them in the underworld. But the evidence seems to indicate that none of the laws meted out justice in the form of rewards for the righteous and punishment for the wicked.

According to Vergil, Rhadamanthys presides over a court of justice in which a variety of corporeal, mental, and spiritual retributions are distributed according to the nature of sins committed in the upper world. Nowhere in all of world literature is the drastic distinction between the two destinies after death presented in more painfully dramatic terms than in his *Aeneid*:

This is the place where the road divides and leads in two directions: one way is to the right and extends under the ramparts of Dis [i.e., Pluto] to Elysium [i.e., Paradise], but the left path leads to the evil realms of Tartarus, where the penalties for sin are exacted. To his left Aeneas spots a deep cave enclosed by a triple fortification around which flows Phlegethon, seething with flames and tossing rocks about in its tumultuous torrents. (6.540–579)

Aeneas encounters a gargantuan door that even the gods are powerless to penetrate, guarded by the ever-wakeful Tisiphone (one of the Furies). From inside, he hears horrifying groans and wailings from victims being lashed with whips and chains. Within this dismal kingdom of darkness and death reside a host of personifications of abstract entities: Grief and Cares, Diseases, Senility, Fear, Hunger, Toil, War, Discord, and countless other forces that afflict the life of every creature with misfortune and distress.

Not until the time of Plato do we encounter the notion that the righteous will be feted with sumptuous ban-

quets “with garlands on their heads,” or that the wicked will be plunged into a pit filled with mud, “where they will be forced to carry water in a sieve” (*Republic* 2.373c–d). Plato may have believed that the earthly experience of the fear of Hades is equivalent to being there already and that the suffering inflicted by a guilty conscience is sufficient punishment for the wicked act committed. This view coincides with the theory that Plato adopted many primitive beliefs about the fate of the soul and gave moral and psychological interpretations to allegorical tales (see *Gorgias* 493a–c). Similarly, for the poet and philosopher Empedocles the *psuchē* (“soul”) is the bearer of guilt, and the world of the senses is the Hades where the individual suffers for that guilt (frags. 118, 121). Also, Plato, who perhaps more than any other ancient thinker shows a genuine concern for the immortality of the soul and the judgment it undergoes after death, presents divine rewards and punishments in terms of reincarnation into a better or worse earthly life, rather than in terms of heaven and hell. In the *Laws* (904d) he suggests that Hades is not a place but a state of mind and adds that popular beliefs regarding Hades should be invested with symbolic value only. [See Hades.]

Judaism. References to the underworld in the Hebrew scriptures are vague and derive largely from beliefs common throughout the ancient Near East (especially Egypt and Babylonia). Numerous terms are used to designate this shadowy realm, the two most popular names being *She’ol* (a word that seems peculiar to Hebrew) and *Gei’ Hinnom* (Gr., *Geenna*; Eng., *Gehenna*). Some euphemistic substitutes for the latter are *erets* (“earth” or “underworld,” *1 Sm.* 28:13, *Jb.* 10:21–22), *qever* (“grave,” *Ps.* 88:12), *’afar* (“dust,” *Is.* 26:5), *bor* (“pit,” *Is.* 14:15), and *shahat* (“pit,” *Ps.* 7:16; “the land of darkness,” *Jb.* 10:21).

The historical Gehenna, or Gei’ Hinnom—“Valley of ben Hinnom,” or “Valley [of the son(s) of] Hinnom”—was located near the city of Jerusalem at the site of a cult in which children were sacrificed (*2 Kgs.* 23:10, *Jer.* 7:31); it was known popularly as the “Valley of Slaughter” (*Jer.* 19:5–6). Even before this time, the valley was used as a site for human sacrifices to the god Moloch (*2 Chr.* 33:8), and afterward, as a place where the city’s rubbish was burned. In mythology, Gehenna was located beneath the earth or at the base of a mountain range (*Jon.* 2:7) or beneath the waters of the cosmic ocean (*Jb.* 26:5). This realm is sometimes pictured as a horrifying monster with mouth agape (*Is.* 5:14), a realm where persons of all classes are treated as equals (*Ez.* 32:18–32).

She’ol is another term used to designate the realm of the dead or the subterranean spirit world, where the

destinies of the righteous and the wicked are the same. Heaven and She'ol are thought to be the two farthest extremities of the universe (*Am.* 9:2). She'ol is positioned at the nadir of a dark pit at the very base of the universe, into which the blasphemer who aspires to be equal with God will fall. But the term also refers simply to the state of death or to the grave (see *Prv.* 23:13–14, *Ps.* 89:49). The viability of this interpretation of the term is further confirmed by the fact that the Septuagint frequently translates *she'ol* as *thanatos* (“death”).

The Hebrew scriptures place the domain of the dead at the center of the earth, below the floor of the sea (*Is.* 14:13–15, *Jb.* 26:5). Some passages locate the gates that mark the boundary of She'ol in the west. This realm has been depicted as a place pervaded by dust and darkness (*Jb.* 10:21–22), as it was in Mesopotamian thought. In contrast to the Babylonian netherworld, which boasted a large company of demonic creatures, both the Hebraic underworld and heaven are ruled over by one and the same God whose sovereignty extends throughout the universe (*Ps.* 139:7–8, *Prv.* 15:11, *Am.* 9:2). There is a strong suggestion in Psalm 73 that God will manifest his grace to the righteous by taking them to heaven, where they will exist eternally with him. The people of God will, therefore, be saved from She'ol to live with God forever, but the unrighteous will face a deprived existence in the chambers of the subterranean regions (*Ps.* 49).

According to the Ethiopic *Apocalypse of Enoch* (22:9–13), She'ol is not an abode of all the dead, where the souls merely exist as vague shadowy figures devoid of individual characteristics, but is a spacious realm with three subdivisions: one realm is allotted to the righteous who have been vindicated in life, one to sinners who were not submitted to divine judgment before death, and one to those whose deeds were judged during life and found wanting. In time, She'ol came to be identified with Gehenna, the pit of torment, an idea that, in turn, informed the Christian concept of Hell (*Hb.* 2:5).

In the postbiblical Jewish apocalyptic tradition, among the seven heavens that extend above the earth, sinners are confined to the second heaven to await final judgment. North of Eden lies Gehenna, where dark fires perpetually smolder and a river of flames flows through a land of biting cold and ice. Here the wicked suffer numerous tortures (2 *En.* 3–9).

Elsewhere within the same book, the Angel of Death inquires of Jehoshua whether there are any gentiles (or “descendants of Esau”) in Paradise or any Children of Israel in Hell. Included in the reply is the observation that those descendants of Esau who performed righteous deeds on earth are rewarded here but sent to Hell

after death; Israelites on the other hand receive punishment while living and inherit the joys of Paradise after death. According to Josephus Flavius (37–100 CE), historian of the Jewish War of 66–70, the Essenes of the Dead Sea area believed that the righteous retire to the western region, where their lives are undisturbed by rain, cold, or heat and where they enjoy cooling breezes continuously. The wicked, however, are condemned to a dark, chilly hell where they suffer eternal torments.

Christianity. New Testament writers drew upon the postexilic Hebraic picture of Gehenna in formulating their understanding of the destination of the damned. Gehenna was imagined to be an enormous, deep pit that perpetually ejects clouds of putrid-smelling smoke from burning garbage, a pit where bodies of criminals and lepers are disposed of. Two significant alterations in the Hebraic concept of hell deserve mention: (1) there is a much sharper distinction between the realm of the blessed and the realm of the damned, and (2) the standard applied at the Last Judgment is defined by a person's attitude toward the person of Jesus and his teachings. In the Gospels the prevailing concept of the underworld is epitomized in the story of the rich man and Lazarus (*Lk.* 16:19–31). It would appear that the rich man is sent to Hell merely on account of his great wealth in this realm, whereas Lazarus is transported to “the bosom of Abraham” (Heaven, Paradise) in recompense for his sufferings and poverty. Hell is imagined as an invisible world, situated beneath the realm of the living, a blazing inferno of such intensity that even a drop of water applied to the tip of the tongue could bring welcome relief. It is also a distant land beyond a great gulf across which no movement is possible in either direction.

Whereas Hades remains at a great remove from the realm of the living, Paradise is situated in the immediate presence of God. The wicked in Hades and the righteous dead “at home with the Lord” await the final resurrection.

According to the eschatology of the *Book of Revelation*, a millennial reign is followed by the resurrection of the saints, and then by a period of universal conflict at the end of which Satan will be cast into a lake of fire and brimstone, preparatory to the resurrection of the remaining dead and the Last Judgment. Both Death and Hades are hypostatized as subterranean vaults that surrender the dead to be judged, after which Death and Hades themselves are thrown into the lake of fire, thus actualizing “the second death,” that is, condemnation to the eternal fires of Hell (*Rv.* 20:11–15, 21:8). The remarkable feature of this account of “final events” is that Hell is homologized with the lake of fire to which the wicked are condemned, and it is itself punished by

being cast into the same lake of torment. Supposedly the cosmic cataclysm that signals the termination of the current world order, the final defeat of Death and Satan and the Last Judgment, is a preview of the fate of the wicked in Hell. The nature of Hades can be inferred from the depiction of the realm of the blessed as a perpetually sunlit land in which the righteous are never discomfited by the blazing sun. There they are faithfully fed by the divine shepherd, refreshed by ever-flowing fountains, and relieved of their tears of grief.

Augustine (354–430 CE), the father of early medieval theology, perpetuated the concept of Hell as a bottomless pit containing a lake of fire and brimstone where both the bodies and the souls of men and the ethereal bodies of devils are tormented (*City of God* 21.10). Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) laid much of the foundation for the philosophical concept of Hell that shaped and informed the idea of Hell in the minds of poets, painters, sculptors, and novelists for centuries to come. For him, Hell never lacks space to accommodate the damned. It is a place where unhappiness infinitely exceeds all unhappiness of this world, a place of eternal damnation and torment where the suffering of the damned is intensified by recalling the glory of the blessed while no longer able to perceive the glory firsthand.

Dante (1265–1321 CE) derived the theological framework for his notion of the underworld from the Old and New Testaments and Thomas. In the third chapter of the *Inferno* he describes the descent into Hell. Accompanied by his guide Vergil, Dante approaches the Inferno and sees the gate of Hell, the entrance to the city whose inhabitants live in suffering and eternal pain. Dante is conducted along a circular pathway leading from the gateway to the bottommost zone of Hell. He passes in succession through nine separate circular zones, each of which contains smaller cells where individuals or groups of the damned live. Charon waits on the near bank of the river Styx, ready to ferry his miserable passengers across the waters. As Dante and his guide move from circle to circle they encounter a variety of types of sinners sorted into groups according to their chief vices. On reaching the fourth ring of the ninth circle, the two travelers are confronted by Dis (Lucifer), who with his three mouths devours Judas, Brutus, and Cassius. The arduous journey of Dante and Vergil through the Inferno is completed with a horrifying descent into the interior of the body of Lucifer. Finally they arrive at a spot situated directly beneath the place of Christ's crucifixion on Mount Golgotha from where they once more see the stars.

The history of Christianity is dotted with periodic expressions of heretical dissent concerning the existence

of Hell, notably by Origen, Erigena, Voltaire, and Nietzsche. But it was not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when rationalism began to find its voice, that a widespread decline of belief in Hell developed in Western culture. The concept of Hell as an actual spatial domain has virtually disappeared or been reduced to the level of allegorical interpretation. This transformation of the idea is exemplified in *The Fall* in Camus's warning "Don't wait for the Final Judgment. It takes place every day" and in Sartre's declaration in his play *No Exit* that "hell is other people."

Islam. Cosmology appears to have been a matter of interest in early Islam not for its own sake but "only as a doctrinal framework for understanding the cosmic field of divine providence and human accountability" (Smith, 1981, p. 9). Muḥammad himself does not seem to have held to a clearly defined and detailed picture of a realm of the dead.

According to the Qur'ān, there are seven layers of heaven extending above the earth toward the celestial abode of God. Corresponding to the layers of heaven are seven descending depths of a vast funnel-shaped fire (*al-nār*). The topmost level of the netherworlds is Gehenna. This realm of death and torment is connected to the world of the living by a bridge that all the souls of the dead must traverse on the day of judgment. The varieties of punishment meted out to the damned become more painful and severe with each level of descent.

At the partition between Paradise and the Fire stands Zaqqūm, a tree that exudes a stifling odor and has blossoms composed of demons' heads. Eating the fruit of Zaqqūm burns the stomach like molten metal (surah 7:46–50). The tree separates the two worlds, yet provides a point from which a person can see both realms simultaneously. Beside it is a wall or barrier that divides humanity into separate classes according to the moral quality of their deeds in the temporal world.

Each of the seven fiery realms is assigned a specific name. An inventory of these names reflects the Muslim attitude toward nonbelievers: *hāwiyah* (abyss for hypocrites), *jaḥīm* (fierce fire for idolators), *sa'ir* (blazing fire for Sabaeans), *jahannam* (purgatorial fire for Muslims), *lazā* (flaming fire for Christians), *saqar* (scorching fire for the Magi), and *ḥuṭāmah* (raging fire for Jews).

The Qur'ān depicts Gehenna in highly pictorial and terrifying terms. It is referred to as the "Fire of Hell" (89:23) and is depicted as a kind of four-legged beast. Each leg is composed of seventy thousand demons; each demon has thirty thousand mouths. Each of the seven layers of the Fire is punctuated by a gate manned by a guardian who torments the damned. The term *Gehenna* refers both to the topmost sphere and to the entire realm of seven spheres. Whenever this beast of hell is

transported to the place of final judgment, it sends forth a buzzing, groaning, and rattling noise, along with sparks and smoke that shrouds the entire horizon in total darkness (15:43–44, 39:71).

The realms of the blessed and the damned are separated by a towering wall. Men who inhabit the heights of this partition can view the inhabitants of both worlds and recognize each group by their distinguishing marks. The blessed are recognizable by their smiling countenances; the damned, by their black faces and blue eyes (57:13). There is also a hint of the existence of a purgatory or limbo for beings whose deeds are neither extremely good nor extremely bad.

Both the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* present a wide variety of reasons why a person may be condemned to a life of torment. The fundamental cause is lack of belief in God and in the message of his prophet, Muḥammad. Other reasons include the following: lying, corruption, lack of faith, blasphemy, denial of the advent of the judgment day and of the reality of the Fire, and lack of charity. Leading a life of luxury and believing that wealth brings immortality also lead to condemnation.

The postmortem journey of the soul of the redeemed or the blessed through the various layers of Heaven in the company of the archangel Gabriel is contrasted with the difficult and painful journey of the souls of the damned downward through the many spheres of Fire. The victims of the torments of Gehenna are represented as sighing and wailing in their wretched condition (11:106). Their skins are alternately scorched to a black crisp and then renewed so that they can suffer the torments of Fire over and over again. They are compelled to wear garments made of fire or scalding pitch, and boiling water is poured onto their heads, melting their insides and skins. Iron hooks are used to retrieve them every time they try to escape (22:19–22).

In time, Muslim theologians began to emphasize God's grace and mercy and to downplay his anger and wrath. The belief arose that after a certain period of purgation the angel Gabriel would intercede on the sinner's behalf and release him from the Fire. It was later believed that in time the Fire would be extinguished and all sinners pardoned.

Hinduism. Vedic references to an underworld are so few in number and so vaguely conceived that many scholars have argued that Vedic religion lacked a concept of hell. More recent studies (see Brown, 1941) have demonstrated that references to a realm of postmortem suffering do signal a genuine, if relatively undeveloped, conception of hell in the Vedic literature.

According to *Ṛgveda* 7.104 and *Atharvaveda* 8.4, the Vedic Hell is situated beneath the three earths, below the created order. It is characterized as a gigantic, bot-

tomless chasm or abyss, a place of no return. In this infinitely deep pit, there is no light, only deep darkness (cf. *Ṛgveda* 2.29.6). In the very deepest realm lies the cosmic serpent, the archdemon Vṛtra (*Ṛgveda* 1.32.10), who fell there after Indra slew him.

Some texts describe the Vedic Hell as insufferably hot or unbearably cold. It is a realm of absolute silence (*Ṛgveda* 7.104.5) and of total annihilation, a state that is depicted semi-anthropomorphically as lying in the lap of Nirṛti, the destroyer. This region of eternal torment is populated not by those who committed wrongs inadvertently but by those who consciously and intentionally pursued unrighteous ends: Vṛtra, antidivine forces (*asuras* and *dasyus*), demonic powers (*rākṣasas*), and sorceresses (*yoginīs*) dwell here. The inhabitants of Hell are those who live at cross-purposes with the universal law (*ṛta*).

Hell stands in an antithetical relation to the ordered universe, based not on *ṛta* but *anṛta*. Here there is no order, no gods, no sun, no warmth, no fecundating waters, nor any of the elements vital to the creation and maintenance of creaturely existence. Here in the lap of destruction (*nirṛti*), there is only death and nonexistence (*asat*). It is the opposite of the created, ordered, and illuminated realm.

Later, in the Vedānta, hell came to be conceived in more strictly philosophical terms as the realm of pure nonbeing. Contrasted with this was the realm of being (*sat*), the realm of living beings and of life itself that came to be referred to as *brahman*, the limitless and indefinable fulcrum of being.

In the Upaniṣads, the paths leading to the realms of the blessed and the wretched are envisioned as the way of the ancestors and the way of the gods, respectively. Little importance is accorded to the idea of hell as the destiny of the unrighteous. The emphasis is rather on rebirth as the consequence of an unrighteous past life. In the Yama-Naciketas episode in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, the young man Naciketas receives instruction on the postmortem state from Yama, the lord of the dead. Rather than directly addressing a matter so subtle that not even the gods understand it, Yama informs Naciketas of two paths leading to different ends: the way of pleasure and the way of goodness. Yama recommends that Naciketas choose the latter, thereby avoiding rebirth.

But in the Purāṇas (collections of classical Hindu mythologies), hells are depicted in terrifyingly graphic terms as places of extreme suffering and deprivation. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (7.21.10–20), Rāvaṇa, the ten-headed demon, witnesses a scene of indescribable wretchedness on entering Yama's abode. He hears the agonizing cries of the wicked being gnawed by dogs and devoured by

worms. Pitiful screams shoot across the Vaitaraṇī River from parched people on hot sand who are being sawed in half. The thirsty cry out for water; the hungry, for food. Pale, emaciated specters run to and fro. The righteous, on the other hand, inhabit grand palaces and dine on sumptuous meals, surrounded by beautiful, sweet-smelling maidens dressed in exquisite garments. In the *Mahābhārata* (12.2.25) Yudhiṣṭhira is ushered into an enormous dark chamber that is cluttered with foul-smelling hair, heaps of raw flesh, and countless pools of blood, corpses, worms, deformed animals, hideous monsters of incomparable ugliness, and ghosts of terrifying presence. As will become standard in the later Purāṇas, a specific form of punishment is assigned to each of the subterranean chambers. In the underworld called Kumbhīpāka ("cooked victuals") the wicked are boiled alive in giant vats of boiling oil; in Śālmali, thorns from a silk-cotton tree are used to torture the wicked.

The *Agni Purāṇa* (chaps. 340 and 342), one of the eighteen major collections of classical mythology, perpetuate a theme that blossomed in the Upaniṣads. This is the idea that the course of a person's life in this world is governed by the ritual and moral quality of his deeds. One's experience in the next world is governed by the fruits of those deeds. Yama determines the infernal region to which each wicked soul repairs or the womb into which it is to be born, according to the deeds of the previous existence. The terrifying members of Yama's retinue usher the soul to a place where they prepare an account of its good and evil deeds. The soul initially reaps the benefits of its good deeds in the form of physical and spiritual delights, after which it is returned to hell for a period of suffering in order to purge the residual effects of its evil deeds. If the number of merits outweighs the demerits, the person is reborn into a pure and prosperous family; if the obverse is the case, he may be committed to a lengthy life of suffering in one of the hells or be reborn as an animal, insect, or other base form of life.

The pathways connecting this world with the various hells are dreadful to behold and extend for a total of 164,000 human miles. According to most classical cosmologies, there are a total of 28 major infernal regions situated below the lowest stratum of another 7 netherworlds. Each region lies along a vertical line of descent and is subdivided into 144 smaller chambers, to each of which is assigned an appellation describing its definitive characteristics, for example: Ghora ("horrifying"), Taralātara ("trembling"), Bhayanaka ("terrifying"), Kālarātri ("dark night of devouring time"), and Dīpta ("the blazing realm").

Each chamber is presided over by five guards with

the terrifying faces of carnivorous animals and birds, who administer the form of punishment appropriate to the place. The guards cast their condemned wards into dreadful places of punishment. Some souls are cast into gigantic frying skillets or into caldrons filled with boiling oil, molten copper, or iron, while others are tossed onto the upturned tips of sharp pointed lances. Others are submitted to severe lashings with leather straps or heavy bastinados or are forced to drink beverages of boiling metals or noxious solutions of animal urine and human excreta. Still others are broken physically on the rack, dismembered, and then parceled out to vultures, hyenas, and other avaricious creatures of the infernal regions. Each of these dreadful realms is filled with the sounds of screaming, wailing, and moaning.

Secular Visions. Among a growing number of religious intelligentsia the world over, both heaven and hell are gradually being sublimated or transmuted into psychological entities or realms, with the personal and collective unconscious serving as the source of both positive and negative feelings, images, and attitudes. Even the general mass of people in industrialized countries who claim to retain a belief in an underworld of some description have, in practice, largely transposed many of the ideas and themes previously associated with the underworld (e.g., divine judgment, suffering, torment, disease, death, and mental and physical anguish) into the arena of contemporary human affairs.

[For discussion of the underworld together with other mythic views of life after death, see Afterlife.]

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UNGARINYIN RELIGION. To speak of the religious system, rituals, and beliefs of the "tribal" or language group that carries the label Ungarinyin (Ngarinyin) is to deal with the intellectual and spiritual culture of an Aboriginal group that, as a coherent traditional unit, has all but disappeared. It was, for instance, reported to the researchers of the Frobenius Expedition in 1938 (among them the main authors of the ethnographies of these groups, Helmut Petri for the Ungarinyin and Andreas Lommel for the Unambal) that ceremonial and ritual gatherings in 1928 could still draw several hundred adults; by the time of the expedition, however, only about one hundred people came together for an intergroup ceremony involving five major language groups of the Kimberley area in northwest Western Australia (Petri, 1954, p. 8).

The Ungarinyin inhabited the vast territory between the King Leopold Ranges and the lower Prince Regent River. Among the different people with whom they shared many aspects of their material and spiritual culture were the Unambal, who inhabited the northern and northeastern parts of the Prince Regent River area, and the Worora, who inhabited the region between the lower Prince Regent River and the Glenelg River. Between 1940 and 1955, this culture, this worldview, all but ceased to exist, either through the impact of European culture upon the Aboriginal value system—which led to a breakdown of the social structural arrangements and to consequent abandonment of the traditional knowledge and classifications that tied social structure to the natural and social environment (the whole of which was legitimated by myth)—or through the impact of cult innovations which have for a considerable time intruded into the Kimberley Plateau from numerically stronger and possibly more resilient language groups (movements such as the Kurangara).

This second phenomenon, the supersession of the traditional beliefs of the Kimberley people by foreign ones, gives the observer an insight into processes of acculturation and assimilation, as well as syncretion of worldviews, that might have been a feature of the whole region. The traditional system of Ungarinyin religion is certainly a mixture of diverse cult innovations with several older strata, the syncretion of which is not always coherent. Added to this problem is a greater one: religion here, as for other Kimberley peoples, has to be seen as a whole, for each local group has its own cult centers and specific mythic personnel. Since European occupation, many clans have died out, and with them has gone the knowledge of their local cult and myths, which they alone had the right to activate and transmit (the spiritual heritage of a local group is the communal property of that particular group). In these circumstances it is not always possible to understand the finer details of a system.

This region was known to the outside world through George Grey's *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in Northwest and Western Australia* (London, 1841), in which he published an account of the famous rock paintings of *wandjina*, discussed below. [See *Wandjina*.] The first systematic report, however, was written by A. P. Elkin (1930) after his research in 1927–1928. The only in-depth study of Ungarinyin culture appeared when Helmut Petri (1954) published his data, gathered during the Frobenius Expedition of 1938. The following description of the Ungarinyin religion relies on these two ethnographic reports, concentrating first on the general analysis of the creation during the Dreaming, or Dreamtime, as the period of cosmogony and anthropog-

ony has been known in anthropological literature since the work of Baldwin Spencer and F. G. Gillen at the turn of the twentieth century. This term is applied to all Australian Aboriginal conceptualization of events believed to have taken place at the beginning of time but to be of continuing relevance to contemporary belief and action. Second, I shall describe the origin of major social institutions as reflected in Ungarinyin cosmology through anthropomorphic spiritual beings, *wandjina*, which are of supralocal importance.

Spiritual Universe. Like many other Aborigines, the Ungarinyin believe in agents who, during a primordial period, shaped the natural environment into its present configuration and instituted the laws governing natural and social life. This creation by spirit beings, heroes, and deities is a constant and ongoing process. It is manifest on two levels. First, the reproduction of all fauna, flora, and human beings depends on the power emanating from the Dreaming characters: life ends without them. Second, human beings can participate in the power of the Dreaming through ritual actions and also through ordinary dreams, evoking the spirit beings and ensuring fertility of mankind and the environment. While all persons are able to contact the Dreaming, some are in a special position to do so through their ritual status and because of their direct linkage with specific spirit beings. Such persons are considered to be the vehicles through which these spirits can exert their power. In Petri's terms, these are medicine men (*ban-man*, Aboriginal doctors).

The Dreaming of the Ungarinyin is called by the term *Ungur* or *Lalan*, and all items belonging to or originating in that period are labeled by the possessive suffix *-nanga*, as in *Lalan-nanga*. Some items that derive from that Dreaming are rock paintings, stone arrangements, sacred places, water holes, bull-roarers (used in sacred ceremonies and also in trade between different groups), and dances and songs. Another term that connects the primordial Dreaming with the broader concept of the eternal Dreaming and that focuses on personal power is *yayari*. This word designates a dream or a dream experience and also a vision. It refers to a life force inherent in a person (as one aspect of his or her soul) and is connected with the states of feeling and thinking, as well as with the procreative force of sexual excitement. As one Aboriginal doctor said, "Yayari is the Ungur-part in myself" (Petri, 1954, p. 99). In particular, the Aboriginal doctor in trance is able to contact the powers of the Dreaming, sending his *yayari* to the creative powers, the source of which is the Rainbow Snake (Ungud). This is done by singing to his penis, which becomes Ungud-like, resembling a raised snake with two eyes. During erection, a thin thread rises from the penis of the Ab-

original doctor on which his *yayari* can ascend to the otherworld, the "world on top," as these Aborigines say.

Although the Aboriginal doctor has a specific gift of sending his *yayari* on trips over land and into the realm of the creator spirits and thus is a "living *wandjina*," everybody has a *yayari*. It is received during dreaming from the creator spirits that reside in sacred places, rivers, water holes, and billabongs: every father receives the spirit children during a vision or dream and transmits the essence, the *yayari*, in a dream to his wife. In Aboriginal thoughts, much stress is placed on the spiritual component of human life, but those psychoanalytically oriented Western authors who presume that Aborigines are unaware of the physiological basis of procreation should distinguish between theological and physiological discourse; the strong emphasis on the connection between "soul substance" (*yayari*) and the sexual excitement related to visionary experiences should have cautioned them against facile deductions.

The Ungarinyin see a close connection between the creative actions of Dreaming spiritual powers and the dreaming action of living human beings: the connecting link is established through the thought system that has become known under the term *totemism*. The Dreaming heroes, foremost among them the Rainbow Snake, Ungud, and the *wandjina* of tribal importance, as well as those of the many local areas of clans, traversed the world and not only created the landscape with all its present features but also, as shall be shown, instituted the rules for social and ritual life. At the same time, they were anthropomorphic beings, the ancestors of living human groups (in this case of patrilineal clans), and animal spirits, the prototypes and ancestors of the existing animal species of the tribe's territory. Many carry the names of the species they represent, such as the salt-water crocodile, the night owl, the emu, or the crane.

As they finished their creative work in primordial time (*ungur* time), they leaned on rocks, left their imprints or shadows (the *wandjina* rock paintings), and disappeared into places of permanent water to become *ungud* spirits (Ungud Snakes). It is at these sacred places (*ungud* places) that both people and animals can receive, while in dream states, the progeny incessantly produced by the *ungud* spirits of the particular place. Such locality is therefore the ancestral place of both a local human group and a particular animal species, creating a bond between humans and animals and between the spiritual essence of all existing living beings and the primeval creative forces. For this reason the Ungarinyin sometimes say, "Ungud, *ungur*, and *wandjina* are all one and the same." This does not imply that they are unable to make conceptual distinctions, but rather that they are aware of the participation in a life force that

surpasses species differentiation. Man is only one participant in the process (animals also find their progeny in dreaming), not master of it. The only superior form of action that human beings can (and must) fulfill is the ritual retouching of the rock paintings to ensure the continued fertility of man and nature. If this were not done regularly, the powers and forces would cease to be active.

This explains, to a degree, the disintegration of the social and religious culture of these tribal groups when because of decimation of population the ritual action can no longer be performed. It explains the Aboriginal perception of the running down of the world, and why Aborigines are often prone to slide into states of utter despondency, inactivity, and apathy when the visionary states of ecstatic or trance dreaming cease. According to Aboriginal self-perception in the region under discussion, this has occurred increasingly over the last forty years. If there are no more dreams, there are no more creative acts in nature and, concomitantly, human fertility decreases. This seems a vicious circle. The acculturative pressure of white society makes the Aborigines—by their own admission—unable to achieve dream states, which in turn leads to a lower fertility rate, which then results in the loss of more and more local and general traditions (since these are neither reinvigorated nor re-created), so that a general run-down of the Aboriginal world ensues. Psychologically and intellectually, this is causally explained through the decline in re-creative powers of man as his own sacred agent. Rarely do we find a religious system with so close a connection between individual and communal survival, and so concerned with the survival of the natural universe itself and the act of creation *in illo tempore*. It is one of the aspects that cannot be emphasized enough, as the general fragmentation of Aboriginal culture—indeed its very loss—cannot be explained purely from a mechanical process of cultural change. The Dreaming ethos is so strongly tied to the psychological and mental structure of individuals and communities, to every aspect of social action, that the weakening of links in the chain of tradition affects individual psychic dispositions to such degree that even biological survival might be threatened.

Cosmogony and the Origin of Social Rules. Within the mythical framework of the Ungarinyin, Ungud, the Rainbow Snake, plays without doubt the major role. It is said that she emerged from the primeval ocean, took a boomerang (not indigenous to this region), and threw it across the salt water, making land emerge from wherever the boomerang hit the water. Ungud then traveled across the land, depositing the innumerable eggs from which all *wandjina* hatched. In other versions, Ungud

herself (who can be of either or both genders) created salt water by urinating and fresh water by drawing it from the body of a long crab. In this version the *wandjina* are self-created, emerging from the earth. This is not necessarily incompatible with the Ungud creation, since Ungud is also seen as earth: "We walk upon her back," say the Ungarinyin. The category of primordial creative beings called *wandjina* includes some whose special significance derives from their introduction of major rules governing social relations. The most important of these culture heroes are Wallanganda, Ngunyari, and the twin brothers Banar and Kuranguli, who shall be presented in turn.

Wallanganda rivals Ungud in his power of creativity: in some versions the spirit children of all species are created by him through rain, when called upon by Ungud. He is also considered, together with his substitute Ngunyari, to be the bringer of the "blackfellow law" (i.e., marriage regulations and rules of ritual action). As such the symbols and meanings of the deeds of these two *wandjina* are dealt with specifically in the instructions that young men receive in the bush schools over a period of several months, accompanying the two main initiation ceremonies of circumcision and subincision (Kuramede).

Wallanganda represents the prototype of the great hunter, who invented some of the major hunting weapons, such as spears with quartzite tips and spear-throwers. After his creation deeds, Wallanganda retired to the sky, concretely symbolized by the Milky Way, where he is coiled up as a giant Ungud Snake and where he continues hunting with other *wandjina* in a paradise full of water, grass, and animals.

Wallanganda and other *wandjina*, as well as Ungud, share the trait of a certain incompleteness: all are described and depicted without mouth and ears. As the Ungarinyin say, if the *wandjina* had mouths, a great flood would occur and drown the creation. The *wandjina* can sing only through their noses: that is the noise of thunder. This relation to rain as the main agent of the fertility of nature is strengthened by the Aboriginal belief that only half the body of a *wandjina* is made of blood, while the other half is made of water. As for the incompleteness or handicap of Wallanganda, he shares one trait with Ngunyari: he got into a fight with another powerful *wandjina* during which one of his legs was crushed. From the broken leg originated the famous bull-roarers, the *mai-angari*, the most sacred items in the male initiation ceremonies.

In other versions the origin of the *mai-angari* is adduced to Ngunyari, who is supposed to have made them from his elbow and his blood. Ngunyari is also the *wandjina* who introduced circumcision with a quartz

knife and who is called "boss of the young men." When Ngunyari fastened the bull-roarers on strings and whirled them about, he could hear his own voice, the voice of thunder. He decorated the sacred woods with the sign of lightning, which he himself had painted on his chest. These *mai-angari* are kept in secret storehouses, to be seen only by circumcized young men and not by women or old men. From the myths of the Ungarinyin, as well as those of their neighbors in the Kimberley, it becomes apparent that the bull-roarers are introduced from a country outside their tribal territory; the design and shape of the bull-roarers also point to outside origin. Nevertheless, the Ungarinyin have incorporated them neatly into their concepts about Dreaming creativity: all bull-roarers belong to different classes of food items, and they control the food category after which they are labeled, which means that they affect the supply of the natural food. They thus fulfill a function equivalent to the totemic increase centers of the Dreaming. They are received and given away as trading objects and thus circulate constantly, and the exchange always involves food.

Men who have reached the age at which they put on the color of red ocher (the symbol of the blood of the *wandjina*) and are undergoing the second initiation ceremony (the subincision ritual) must take their *mai-angari* and trade them with the neighboring Unambal, Worora, and even the Nyigina of the Kimberley Downs. Such trade seems to have been well organized in former times. The Ungarinyin speak of a former historical "great boss" (*djoingari*) of trade relations, Balinar, who sat at a central location in the tribal territory, collecting the *mai-angari* from diverse local groups and redirecting their exchange.

In the myths concerning Ngunyari, about whose fate we are not informed, the importance of women in social as well as ritual life seems to be touched upon. Although no female ceremonies are known to have been held among the Ungarinyin, the role of women must have been important, if the transmitted myths are taken to be significant. It is said that Ngunyari made only his own bull-roarers (or received them in a far country from Wallanganda) and that his two wives made different ones: while the "male" bull-roarers are oblong, the extant "female" bull-roarers tend to have a more convex shape (see Petri, 1954, pp. 118–122). The probability that women were ritually important is strengthened in some myths about female *wandjina*. While the majority of *wandjina* (of male or ambisexual gender) seem benevolent and only concerned with the increase of fecundity, one specific category of female *wandjina* appear terrible. They are the Mulu-Mulu, who live at the bottom of certain wells and capture children and adults wander-

ing alone. They take these abducted people to their abodes, pull out their hair, skin them alive, then roast and devour them. However, these figures are ambivalent, as shown by their creation of new springs, since wherever they put down their digging sticks during their journeys, springs were formed. They thus support fecundity as well as destroy life through their cannibalistic voraciousness. The meaning of these female *wandjina* in Ungarinyin religious thought is not clear. It is possible that the behavior of these female *wandjina* can be compared with the southern Arnhem Land Kunapipi complex (see, e.g., Berndt, 1951, pp. 146–152).

Another line of comparison would offer itself were the data more explicit: the actions of the Mulu-Mulu resemble the initiatory visions and dream experiences of apprentice shamans as reported from other parts of the world. Among the Ungarinyin too, the Aboriginal doctors undergo an initiatory ordeal through Ungud that shows traces of the treatment the female *wandjina* mete out to their captives (see Elkin, 1945; Petri, 1952–1953).

Before discussing the last set of culture heroes of supralocal importance, it should be mentioned that the ceremonies connected with the bull-roarer myth and the accompanying circumcision have been largely abandoned in the area and superseded by new cult movements from other groups (such as the Kurangara cults; Petri, 1950). The last of the Dreaming culture heroes, who finish the creation of natural and social life that was begun by the actions and powers of Ungud, are the twin brothers Banar and Kuranguli (and their doubles Wodoi and Djungun), who become the initiators of a dual organization (patrilineal moieties) which permeates all aspects of life of the Ungarinyin and adjacent Kimberley groups and categorizes a society into two complementary but contrasting parts, which are exogamous.

According to the myth, men and women used to cohabit indiscriminately until Kuranguli and Banar went into the bush to seek wives other than their own: Banar ("wild turkey"), as representative of the Yara ("gray kangaroo") moiety, took a wife of the Walamba ("red kangaroo") moiety, of which Kuranguli ("native companion bird") is the representative. The clever brother Kuranguli lived with his daughter in the more fertile country that represented the inland (sweet) water moiety, but he did not sleep with her. However, his slower brother, Banar, lived with his own daughter as his spouse in a harsher environment associated with the salt water of the opposite moiety. In order to persuade his brother to follow the "correct" form of marriage, and for Banar to arrange that Kuranguli's daughter should marry Banar's son, Kuranguli deflowered her and took her to Banar. Banar and Kuranguli are there-

fore the originators of the incest prohibitions (while Banar is given credit for introducing the mother-in-law avoidance rule). Although it would appear from many myths that Banar and Kuranguli are often opposed (and even engaged in mortal combat), they always resolve their differences harmoniously, and indeed their rules for social life do stress mutual interdependence rather than antagonism. Generally, the Dreaming spirits belong to different localities and are identified on the one hand with particular natural species and on the other with specific human collectivities, conforming with the rule of moiety exogamy. Whether the religious, ritual, and mythological system reflects social relations and social classifications, or whether the mental categories involved can most usefully be seen as means of legitimizing the social order through myth, is open to question. What seems to be of paramount interest in the Ungarinyin system is the strong mythic and ritual basis of social relations and the tying together of individuals through descent and locality with the environment of natural species. The spirits of human beings and other species are eternally interdependent: their position in the natural order exists only as long as they can re-create or reproduce the basic Dreaming events and can follow the injunctions or exhortations expressed by these Dreaming beings.

[See also Rainbow Snake.]

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KLAUS-PETER KOEPPING

UNIATE CHURCHES. *Uniate* is the name given to former Eastern Christian or Orthodox churches that have been received under the jurisdiction of the church of Rome and retain their own ritual, practice, and canon law. The term carries a strong negative connotation in that it was first used by opponents to the union of Brest-Litovsk (1595) to indicate a betrayal of Orthodoxy. It is seldom used today by these churches to describe themselves. Attempts at the reunion of the Christian churches of the East and of the West usually ended in failure, especially in the centuries immediately after the mutual excommunications of 1054. [See Schism, article on Christian Schism.] Later, political necessity forced the emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus to seek the help of the Western powers for the support of Byzantium at the Council of Lyons (1274). Subsequently this agreement was revoked by the new pope in Rome, Martin V (1281–1285); in the East, its acceptance was forced, and it was soon repudiated by Michael's son, Andronicus II. The Council of Florence, after long negotiations, issued a bull of reunion, *Laetentur coeli*, on 6 July 1439, but the Greek signatories began to deny the reunion as soon as they arrived in their home environment. Yet all these attempts at union were not futile because they kept the idea of union alive in Christian consciousness.

Melchite Catholics. The term *Melchite* refers to a Christian of the Byzantine rite—Catholic or Orthodox—from the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, or Jerusalem. (The word derives from the Syriac word *malka* and the Arabic word *melek*, which mean "king" or "emperor." These Christians were given this name by the anti-Chalcedonian party because they adhered to the christological position of the Byzantine emperor after the Council of Chalcedon in 451.) Until the 1300s the

Melchites used the Antiochene rite. In the countryside the liturgy was celebrated in West Syriac or Aramaic, and in the cities in Greek. With the advent of Islam, Arabic gradually replaced Syriac. In the course of the fourteenth century the Byzantine rite replaced the Antiochene rite.

The Melchite faithful tried to preserve allegiance to both Rome and Constantinople. By 1724 renewed communication with Rome had resulted in the creation of a Catholic Melchite church alongside the Orthodox Melchite church, although no formal written agreement of union was ever drawn up. In the intervening history the Melchite Catholic patriarch of Antioch, Maximos Mazloum (1833–1855), added the sees of Alexandria and Jerusalem to his title. Patriarch Maximos IV Sayegh (1947–1967) defended the traditions of the East in his patriarchate and at the Second Vatican Council. Many Melchite Catholics immigrated to North and South America at the beginning of the twentieth century and formed two eparchies (dioceses), in Newton, Massachusetts, and in São Paulo, Brazil.

Maronite Church. The Maronite church traces its origins to the fourth century and to the monk Maron, who received a Greek and Syrian literary education and went to Antioch to complete his studies. There he met and befriended John Chrysostom, who was soon to be the bishop of Constantinople. Centuries later, a community of Maronites grew up around the Monastery of Saint Maron on the banks of the Orontes River in northern Syria. Seeking to escape from the persecutions of the caliphates of Damascus and Baghdad, Maronites began to seek refuge in the mountains of Lebanon. Although the Maronite church never rejected the primacy of the Roman see, communication between the two churches was interrupted for centuries, and only after 1182 and the advent of the Crusaders was Roman recognition of the Maronite rite restored. During the time of the Crusades Maronite priests and faithful were the only Eastern Christians allowed to worship in Latin churches. Maronites had the same rights as Latins, and their own magistrates judged them according to their own customs and laws. The head of the Maronite church began to use the title “patriarch” during the fifteenth century. The title became definitive in a bull of Pope Paul V in 1608.

The Maronite church is the only Uniate church that does not have a parallel Orthodox hierarchy. The church has undergone many influences tending to conform it to the Latin rite. The rite of the Maronite church belongs to a group of Antiochene rites, and its liturgical language is West Syriac or Aramaic. The Maronites adopted more and more the use of Arabic as that language became the vernacular. The words of institution

in the canon of the liturgy are usually sung in Syriac; the rest of the liturgy is usually recited in the vernacular language of the place. Political and economic turmoil in the Middle East has caused the immigration of a large number of Maronites to the United States. The Diocese of Saint Maron is now located in Brooklyn, New York.

Ruthenians. The most numerous Uniate church of the Byzantine rite is the Ruthenian. The term *Ruthenian* designates former Orthodox who come from the region that is bounded on the north by the Vistula and Neman rivers and on the south by the Danube and Dnieper and includes territories of present-day Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. *Ruthenian* is derived from the Latin *Rutheni*, meaning “Russian” and is used by Western historians to designate Catholic Slavs of the Polish-Lithuanian state or of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Russian authorities preferred the term *Little Russian* to distinguish them from the Russians to the north. The Ruthenians divided into two branches: to the north of the Carpathian Mountains under Polish or Russian control were the Galicians. The Subcarpathians lived on the southern side of the mountains and were influenced by Austro-Hungarian political and social conditions. The Galicians rapidly formed a church as a result of the union of Brest-Litovsk (1595), which was signed by several bishops. The union of Uzhgorod (1646) initiated a series of unions through the course of the next 125 years before Subcarpathian union was actually achieved and a see established at Mukachevo in 1771.

The subsequent political division of Galician territory subjected Byzantine Catholics there to persecution by their Orthodox brethren, who thought they had changed their traditions by allowing Latin rite deviations. The Catholics belonged to the peasant classes and lived in the villages, while the Orthodox for the most part belonged to the lesser landed nobility. Catholics were obliged to pass over to Orthodoxy under threat of violence, despite the assurances of Russian officials. In 1805 the see of Kiev was abolished and the Ruthenians placed under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Lvov (Lemberg), who was recognized as the primate of the Ruthenians of Galicia, Subcarpathia, Hungary, and Slovakia.

As nascent nationalism penetrated the Galician church, divisions began to arise. After 1848, *Ukrainian* designated the people and nation to the north of the Carpathian Mountains. The term *White Russian* meant those inhabiting the northern regions around the Pripet Marshes. The remaining Ruthenians slowly developed a national consciousness in the Subcarpathian region and

continued to refer to themselves as "Greek Catholics," an ethnic as well as a religious term. Those Ruthenians who assumed Hungarian culture called themselves Hungarians. The growth of Romanian nationalism created the same phenomenon among Byzantine rite Catholics in Romania. The creation of the Czechoslovak state and the advent of the Soviet Union reinforced these divisions. Ruthenian immigration to Yugoslavia in the sixteenth century had created a substantial community there that survived persecution after World War II.

After World War II the Soviet government actively persecuted Ruthenian Catholics to force them into the Russian Orthodox church. The major hierarchs of the Ukrainian Catholic church were arrested in 1945 and 1946 and exiled to Siberia or killed. In a council of reunion held at Lvov (Lviv), the remaining faithful, whose families had been threatened with deportation, voted in March 1946 to abolish the union with Rome. The metropolitan see of Galicia was placed under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate of Moscow. In the case of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians, the territory of the diocese of Uzhgorod was ceded to the Soviet Union by Czechoslovakia after its occupation by the Soviet army. The Orthodox began to occupy Catholic churches under the protection of the civil administration. The Ruthenian bishop, Theodore Romzha, died mysteriously in 1947. The abrogation of the union with Rome was signed in August 1949 in the Monastery of Saint Nicholas in Mukachevo.

The liturgy and ritual of the Ruthenian Catholics remained conservative for centuries and followed the main lines of the Orthodox tradition. Ancient Greek melodies were preserved in the Ruthenian *prostopenie* ("plainchant") at the time that the Russian Orthodox church introduced polyphony and Renaissance melodies into their church music. The Synod of Zamość (1720) did introduce a number of innovations as a result of pressure and persecution from the Polish government to conform the Ruthenian usage to the Latin rite. These included the addition of *filioque* to the creed; the commemoration of the pope; the teaching that the sacred moment of the liturgy, when the transformation of the elements occurs, was at the words of institution ("This is my body . . ."), and not at the *epiklēsis* (the calling down of the Holy Spirit) as had been taught in the East; the prohibition of communion to infants; the prohibition against using sponges to clean the *diskos* (paten); the prohibition against pouring hot water into consecrated wine; and the use of only one priest as well as a shortened formula in the administration of the anointing of the sick. Western types of Marian devotion and devotion to the Sacred Heart began to be introduced

TABLE 1. *Membership of Uniate Churches*

rites and churches	Members	Bishops
<i>Alexandrian</i>		
Coptic	105,000	5
Ethiopian	87,000	4
<i>Antiochene</i>		
Malankar	198,989	2
Maronite	1,398,780	15
Syrian	79,070	13
<i>Byzantine</i>		
Belorussian (outside U.S.S.R.)	5,000	1
Bulgarian	15,000	1
Greek	3,063	2
Hungarian	269,100	1
Italo-Albanian	61,286	3
Melkite	507,308	22
Romanian	13,000	2
Ruthenian (in U.S.A.)	287,758	6
Slovak	356,000	1
Ukrainian (outside U.S.S.R.)	826,703	23
Yugoslav	58,643	3
<i>Chaldean</i>		
Chaldean	279,586	16
Malabar	2,036,338	13
<i>Armenian</i>	102,250	13

under the influence of the Polish Jesuits. Popular hymnody was often Western-inspired or based on folk melodies.

Ruthenian emigration in large numbers began in the 1870s as a result of poor distribution of agricultural land, rising expectations from industrialization, and political and social pressures. The best statistics put the total emigration by 1919 at 220,000 to the United States; 180,000 to Canada; 128,000 to Brazil; 110,000 to Argentina; and 22,000 to Australia. Most of the Ruthenian immigrants to the United States arrived before World War I. A second wave of immigrants, consisting mostly of Ukrainian professionals and intellectuals, reached the United States after World War II, but large numbers of this group settled in Europe and the other previously mentioned countries.

Coptic Uniate Church. Despite attempts at union in the twelfth, thirteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth centuries, the numbers of Uniate Copts remained small. Pope Leo XIII created a Coptic patriarchate of Alexandria, Egypt, in 1895, and a Catholic Coptic synod elected Cyril Makarios as patriarch in 1898. The see remained vacant from 1908 to 1947, when Mark II Khouzam was elected patriarch. Four dioceses were erected, and the number of the faithful began to increase dramatically. Upon the death of Mark II in 1958, Stephanos I Sidarouss was elected patriarch and subsequently made the first Coptic cardinal.

Malabar Church of India. The Malabar church, according to tradition, was founded by the apostle Thomas. Hence the Malabarians refer to themselves as "Thomas Christians." From remote times Malabar fostered relations with the churches of Persia and Seleucia. From the ninth to the sixteenth century the Syro-Chaldean patriarchs alone were usually sending bishops to Malabar. Little is known about the Malabar church before the sixteenth century. Portuguese missionaries arrived in India in 1498. The Malabarians, who did not consider themselves to be separated from Rome, welcomed the Portuguese as brothers in the faith, but they refused to allow Latin practices into their church. After 1552 two lines of Syro-Chaldean patriarchs sent bishops to Malabar, but only the bishops of the line of Sulaqa were confirmed in office by the pope of Rome. When Mar Abraham, the last Chaldean bishop, died in 1597, the energetic Portuguese archbishop of Goa, Alexis de Menezes, acted against what he thought were Nestorian errors in the Malabar church. He convoked and presided at the synod of Diamper in June 1599. At the synod the Malabar liturgy was changed. The anaphoras of Theodore of Mopsuestia and of Nestorius were suppressed; the formula "mother of God" was introduced wherever "mother of Christ" was discovered; the calendar of saints was rejected; and many Latin practices were introduced into the eucharistic liturgy and other sacramental rites. Further, the creed was inserted immediately after the reading of the gospel; unleavened bread and communion of the faithful under one species only was introduced; and a consecration prayer, translated from the Latin, was inserted at the fraction rite, instead of before the anamnesis and epiklesis. Currently a reform of the liturgy is taking place in the Malabar church that restores some of the pre-sixteenth-century ritual.

Rome appointed bishop Roz, a Jesuit, as Abraham's successor in November 1599. His policy of latinization met with great opposition. Archdeacon George, who had earlier been given the right of succession to Abraham by Rome, died in 1637. His nephew Thomas assumed the leadership of the opposition. In 1653 when Ahattallah, a Syro-Chaldean claiming authority from Rome, was sent to Goa by the Portuguese, the opposition swore that they would never be under the control of the Jesuits. Four months later, twelve priests ordained Thomas as their bishop. Efforts were made by Rome to heal this breach, and over the course of the next decade eighty-four opposition congregations returned to Rome and thirty-two remained with Thomas. This party, now called the "new party" (*puthankuttukar*), accepted Jacobitism and the Syro-Antiochean rite. From them descend the Malankara Catholics. Attempts

at reunion made by Mar Thomas IV and Mar Thomas V in the early eighteenth century were fruitless. On 20 September 1930 Mar Ivanios, metropolitan of the Bethany congregation of Jacobite monks, Mar Theophilos, bishop of Tiruvarur, and their whole community signed a union agreement with Rome. These Malankara Catholics today retain the West Syrian liturgy but use the native dialect of Malayalam as their liturgical language.

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UNIFICATION CHURCH. The Unification Church was founded in Korea in 1954 by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. Within a quarter of a century it had become one of the most widely known and controversial of the contemporary wave of new religious movements. In Korea it is known as the Tong Il movement. In the West it is referred to by a variety of names, such as the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, the Unified Family, or the Moon Organization, but the movement's members are most popularly known as "Moonies." They believe in a messianic,

millennial religion and dedicate their lives to the goal of restoring the kingdom of heaven on earth.

Moon was born in what is now North Korea in 1920. He has claimed that on Easter Day 1936 Jesus appeared to him and asked him to assume responsibility for the mission of establishing God's kingdom on earth. During the next two decades Moon is said to have communicated with various other religious leaders (such as Moses and the Buddha) and with God himself. Moon's teachings were written down by his followers and eventually published in English as the *Divine Principle*.

During the movement's early days in Korea it met with considerable opposition from both the established churches and government officials. Moon was imprisoned several times, and at one point spent two and a half years in a communist labor camp (from which he was released by United Nations forces during the Korean War).

In the late 1950s Unification missionaries went to Japan and the West. After a slow start the movement began to grow in Japan and in the United States, but it was not until the early seventies, when Moon himself moved to America, that the Unification Church became known to more than a handful of Westerners. Over the next ten years, however, Moon's name became a household word. He went on numerous lecture tours, always speaking through a Korean interpreter; large rallies were organized; leading academics were invited to international conferences and local and national dignitaries to lavish dinners and receptions, all sponsored by the Unification Church. The movement supported President Nixon during the Watergate crisis. Meanwhile, some valuable properties (including the New Yorker Hotel and the Tiffany building in Manhattan and several large estates elsewhere in New York State) were acquired by the organization. Businesses (such as fishing and ginseng products) run directly by or affiliated to the movement seemed to prosper; cultural activities (including the Little Angels dance troupe, the Go World Brass Band, and the New Hope Singers) flourished; a seminary for postgraduate studies was founded; daily newspapers in Tokyo, New York, and, later, Washington were launched; and, most visibly of all, clean-shaven, well-groomed, well-spoken young Moonies became a familiar sight, selling candles, candy, cut flowers, potted plants, Unification literature—and the Unification Church itself—on the streets of towns and cities throughout the free world.

Those who join the Unification Church tend to be disproportionately well-educated, middle-class youth in their early twenties. In Japan and the West full-time members usually live in communal centers and work for the movement. In Korea, membership is more likely

to consist of families who live in their own homes and work for themselves or for Unification Church-related businesses. The number of fully committed members has been considerably lower than estimates in the media have suggested, partly because of a high drop-out rate; indeed, there have never been, at any one time, more than ten thousand full-time members in the whole of the West. (In the East, full-time membership has never exceeded about twice that number.) There is, however, a considerably larger category of membership, sometimes known as Home Church, which consists of those who are sympathetic toward the theology but continue to lead "normal" lives in the wider community.

The lifestyle of full-time Moonies is one of hardworking, sacrificial devotion to the task of "restoration." Frequently, long hours are spent raising funds or witnessing to potential converts. Members are expected to practice celibacy before marriage as well as for some time afterward. After they have been in the movement for two or three years, members can be "matched" with a partner suggested by Moon and, with hundreds or even thousands of other couples, take part in one of the movement's mass wedding ceremonies known as Blessings. The Blessing is the most important Unification rite, the members practicing relatively little else in the way of formal ritual, apart from a "pledge" which is taken on the first day of each week, month, and year and on the movement's holy days.

Unification theology is one of the most comprehensive to be produced by a contemporary new religion. The *Divine Principle* offers a reinterpretation of the Bible which, it is claimed, could unite all religions. God is portrayed as a personal being who created the world according to a few basic, universal principles. All creation consists of positive and negative (male and female) elements; these unite into larger units, which in turn unite through a give-and-take relationship to form a still larger whole. Adam and Eve were created in order that God might have a loving give-and-take relationship with them. The original plan was that they should mature to a stage of perfection at which they would be blessed in marriage and that, subsequently, their children and their children's children would populate a sinless world in complete harmony with God. This, however, was not to be. The Fall is interpreted not as the result of eating an apple, but as the consequence of a disobedience which involved the misuse of the most powerful of all forces: love. The special revelation claimed by Moon is that the archangel Lucifer, whom God had entrusted to look after Adam and Eve, became jealous of God's love for Adam and had a (spiritual) sexual relationship with Eve. Eve then persuaded Adam to

have a (physical) sexual relationship with her. As a result of this premature union, which was Lucifer-centered rather than God-centered, the Fallen Nature, or original sin, of Adam and Eve has been transmitted to all subsequent generations. According to the *Divine Principle*, the whole of history can be seen as an attempt by God and man, and, in particular, by certain key figures of the Bible, to restore the world to the state originally intended by God.

Ultimately, restoration is only possible through the person of the Messiah, who with his wife will faithfully play the roles in which Adam and Eve failed—i.e., those of True Parents. They (and those whom they bless in marriage) will have children born without original sin. But for this to happen, man has to create a foundation ready to receive the Messiah. In practical terms this involves the concept of “indemnity,” whereby a good, sacrificial deed can cancel “bad debts” accumulated in the past by a person or his ancestors. The role of the Messiah is seen as an office filled by a man born of human parents, but free of original sin. The *Divine Principle* teaches that Jesus was such a man, who could have restored the world, but, largely through the fault of John the Baptist, he was murdered before he had a chance to marry and he thus was able to offer the world only spiritual and not physical salvation through his death. Numerous parallels between the period before the time of Jesus and the last two thousand years are taken to indicate that the present time is the time of the Second Coming. Although it is not part of the official theology, members of the Unification Church believe that Moon and his wife are the True Parents, and it is apparent from the “internal” literature of the movement that Moon sees himself in the role of the Messiah and expects his followers to do likewise.

Throughout the world, the Unification Church has drawn considerable hostile attention from anticult movements and the media. Among the many accusations leveled at it are that it uses brainwashing or mind-control techniques to recruit and keep its members, that it breaks up families, that the leaders live in luxury while the rank-and-file membership is exploited and oppressed by its authoritarian organization, that it is strongly anticommunist and has (or has had) connections with the South Korean intelligence agency (the KCIA), that it produces armaments, that it is merely a front for a seditious organization which is attempting to take over the world and establish a theocracy with Moon at its head, and that it violates tax and immigration laws. (In 1982 a federal-court jury convicted Moon of conspiracy to evade taxes and sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment.) Needless to say, the movement has vehemently denied the criticisms leveled

against it, expressing particular concern where such accusations have been used to justify the practice of “deprogramming,” in which members of the movement are forcibly kidnapped and held until they are prepared to renounce their faith.

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EILEEN BARKER

UNION, MYSTICAL. See *Mystical Union*.

UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION. The Unitarian Universalist Association is a religious denomination that is the result of the 1961 merger of the American Unitarian Association and the Universalist Church of America. Those two denominations derived from different backgrounds.

Unitarianism. Unitarianism is a religious view that was organized in institutional form in Poland, Transylvania, England, and the United States. Its emergence is primarily the result of indigenous factors in each country. The separate movements had common characteristics: affirmations of the unity of God, the humanity of Jesus, and human religious responsibility, and rejections of the doctrines of the Trinity, the divinity of Je-

sus, and human corruption or total depravity. Formulations of these views differed in each country.

In Poland, disputes in the Polish Reformed Church in 1555 led to a schism and the formation of the Minor Reformed Church of Poland in 1565. The physician and theologian Giorgio Biandrata (1515–1588) encouraged Gregory Paul, Martin Czechowic, Georg Schomann, and other leaders of the new movement in their views. A central community was founded at Racow in 1579. Fausto Sozzini (1539–1604), who came to Poland in that year, became the recognized leader of the Polish Brethren, who adopted his name by calling themselves Socinians. [See the biography of Sozzini.] Sozzini's theology emphasized prayer to Christ, as the man whom God resurrected and to whom God gave all power in heaven and earth over the church. The Lithuanian Brethren, a sister group led by Simon Budny, were nonadorantist in theology, which meant they rejected prayer to Christ. The Polish and Lithuanian movements flourished primarily from 1580 to 1620. Roman Catholic opposition resulted in the destruction of the Socinians' famed school and printing press in Racow in 1632 and finally in a legislative decree in 1658 that required the Socinians to become Roman Catholics or go into exile or be executed. A few Socinian exiles found refuge with the Transylvanian Unitarians in Kolozsvár (present-day Cluj-Napoca).

Ferenc Dávid (1510–1579) was the outstanding leader of Transylvanian Unitarianism. Dávid converted from Roman Catholicism to Lutheranism after studying in Wittenberg and then became a leader, with Biandrata's encouragement, of the Reformed Church in Transylvania after debates with Peter Mélius. Together, Dávid and Biandrata published *Two Books on the False and True Knowledge of the One God the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit* in 1568, an antitrinitarian book that contained Lelio Sozzini's interpretation of the prologue to John's gospel. Sozzini, an uncle of Fausto Sozzini, denied that Christ's person was that of the cosmological Logos.

In 1568 John Sigismund, the Unitarian king of Transylvania, granted religious freedom to Catholics, Lutherans, members of the Reformed church, and Unitarians. (The name Unitarian gradually came into use after debates at Gyulafehérvár in 1568 and at Nagyvárad in 1569.) The Transylvanian diet (legislature) gave these four Received Religions constitutional recognition in 1571, shortly before Sigismund's death. The next king, Stephen Báthory, forbade innovations, that is, religious beliefs that were different from those that had prevailed under Sigismund. Dávid became increasingly insistent about his nonadorantist Christology, but his view was an innovation, which could endanger legal protection of

the Unitarian church. Therefore Biandrata cooperated in the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of Dávid in 1579, and Dávid died that year in prison. His nonadorantist theology eventually prevailed. The Transylvanian Unitarians still survive in Romania and Hungary.

In England, John Biddle (1615–1662) published *Twelve Arguments Drawn Out of the Scripture* (1647) and other works that based Unitarian beliefs on New Testament texts. Thomas Firmin and others spread Biddle's views. Unitarians were excluded from the protection of the Act of Toleration (1689), but their views lived on both in the Church of England and among Dissenting churches in the form of an Arian Christology. When Dissenting ministers met at the Salters' Hall in London in 1719, they split into two groups. One group insisted on agreement with confessional statements, the other group required only the use of biblical terms and conformity with biblical views. Members of the latter group and their congregations gradually moved toward Unitarian views.

Theophilus Lindsey (1723–1808) opposed the Anglican church's creedal restrictions, left that church's ministry, and founded Essex Street Chapel in London in 1774, the first English Unitarian congregation. Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) was an outstanding Unitarian leader whose scriptural rationalism, materialist determinism, and humanitarian Christology influenced many Unitarians. Richard Price (1723–1791) emphasized free will in opposition to Priestley's determinism. Priestley and Thomas Belsham, Lindsey's successor at Essex Street Chapel, made a humanitarian Christology the dominant view, driving out Arian views.

The British and Foreign Unitarian Association, founded in 1825, was aided by the repeal of laws against nonconformity and by parliamentary approval of the Dissenters' Chapels Act Christology. Boston minister William Ellery Channing (1780–1842) replied that, instead, most of the liberal ministers were Arians, for they believed that Christ's character included ethical, intellectual, and emotional perfection, and that he was subordinate to God. [See the biography of Channing.]

Channing's famous Baltimore sermon "Unitarian Christianity" (1819) gave the liberals a coherent theological view that embraced assertions of the unity and moral perfection of God; of the unity of Jesus Christ, his inferiority to God, and his mediatorial mission; and of human moral responsibility. The American Unitarian Association (AUA), an association of individuals, not of churches, was organized in 1825. Ralph Waldo Emerson, in his Cambridge Divinity School address (1838), and Theodore Parker in his sermon "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" (1841), challenged the prevailing Unitarian emphasis on the authority of ration-

ally interpreted scripture. These addresses initiated a controversy over Transcendentalism within Unitarianism. Parker has influenced many Unitarians as an exemplar of public ministry, for he expressed his theology in outspoken sermons on social and economic issues, ceaseless efforts for social reform, and a willingness to disobey the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which he regarded as immoral, in obedience to a higher moral law. [See the biography of Emerson.]

Henry Whitney Bellows led the effort to organize the National Conference of Unitarian Churches (an association of churches) in 1865. The preamble to the constitution was almost a Christian creed, so Francis Ellingwood Abbot and others withdrew in protest and formed the Free Religious Association in 1867. In 1886 in the Western Unitarian Conference, a regional organization founded in 1852, a similar controversy emerged over whether the conference should be limited to those who accepted a Christian, theistic religious belief. William Channing Gannett wrote a nonbinding statement, "Things Commonly Believed Among Us," which was adopted in the Western Conference in 1887. In 1894 the National Conference revised its constitution in a manner that enabled many members of the Free Religious Association to rejoin the conference. In 1925 the National Conference, which had been renamed the General Conference, was merged with the AUA.

In the early twentieth century, religious humanism appeared within Unitarianism under the leadership of John Dietrich and Curtis Reese, who were among those who signed the Humanist Manifesto (1933). A serious decline among the Unitarian churches during the depression led to the creation of a denominational Commission on Appraisal (1934–1936), whose chairman, Frederick May Eliot, reluctantly agreed to become president of the AUA. Eliot's leadership revived the movement.

Universalism. Universalism is a religious view that affirms the ultimate salvation of all humans. In some formulations, that has meant the ultimate reconciliation of all, even Satan, with God. *Acts* 3:21 is one of the scriptural bases for the belief that some Universalists have in a universal restoration (Gr., *apokatastasis*). Modern Universalism derives from radical pietism and from dissenters from the Baptist and Congregational traditions.

In 1681, Jane Leade (1624–1704) became the recognized leader of a Philadelphian Society of pietists in London. The group's name came from the sixth church mentioned in *Revelation* 3:7–13. In Germany, Johann Wilhelm Petersen, a follower of the founder of Pietism, Philipp Jacob Spener, became a convinced chiliast, anticipating the reign of Christ after his second coming.

Petersen led a group of German Philadelphian pietists. He reinterpreted Leade's views, gave them scriptural foundations, and published his reinterpretation in *The Mystery of the Restoration of All Things*, 2 vols., 1700–1710. Volume 1 contains a small treatise by one of Petersen's disciples, Georg Klein-Nicolai, under the pseudonym Paul Siegvolck. This effective treatise was reprinted frequently, for both in the original German, *Das von Jesu Christo . . . Evangelium . . .*, and in English translation, *The Everlasting Gospel . . .*, it converted many people to Universalism. The title was taken from *Revelation* 14:6. Groups of German Philadelphian pietists and people from other groups took copies of the treatise with them when they migrated to Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century. George de Benneville (1703–1793), who moved to Pennsylvania in 1741, maintained contacts with different groups in colonial Pennsylvania whose members affirmed Universalism and thus prepared the way for Universalism's later growth in America.

James Relly (1720–1778) left George Whitefield's movement in England in 1750. He wrote *Union, or A Treatise of the Consanguinity and Affinity between Christ and His Church* (1759), in which he argued that a result of the indissoluble union of Christ with his people is that there is no guilt and punishment for sins because Christ bore both the guilt and the punishment. All humans are among the elect, for whom Christ suffered. John Murray (1741–1815) brought Relly's universalized variation of Calvinist theology to New England in 1770. He became minister of the first Universalist congregation in America at Gloucester, Massachusetts, in 1780.

Elhanan Winchester (1751–1797), a Baptist minister, was converted to Universalism by *The Everlasting Gospel* and by his friend de Benneville. Winchester argued in *The Universal Restoration . . .* (1794) that future punishment is both finite and remedial in nature, to be followed by the ultimate reconciliation of all, even of the devil and his angels, with God.

Individuals in several European countries affirmed Universalism, but they founded no effective organizations. In England, however, Universalism survived within Unitarianism after Winchester converted William Vidler (1758–1816), a General Baptist minister, to Universalism. Vidler succeeded Winchester as minister of Parliament Court Chapel, London, and then became, also, a Unitarian, together with some members of his congregation. This congregation and other English Unitarian congregations soon contained as members former General Baptists and other persons who held universalist views.

The institutional growth of Universalism was to be in America, where Hosea Ballou (1771–1852) wrote *A Trea-*

tise on Atonement . . . (1805), which made him the movement's preeminent authority in the nineteenth century. Ballou argued that sin is finite in nature, that its effects are completely experienced in this life, and that therefore all will be saved. He rejected the doctrine of the Trinity and affirmed an Arian view of Christ. These views were soon widely accepted by American Universalists.

In 1803 at Winchester, New Hampshire, the General Convention of Universalists in the New England States adopted a statement of agreement that is referred to as the Winchester Profession. The wording of the document embraced the varied Universalist views of the time. Between 1831 and 1841, a temporary schism occurred when believers in finite, future punishment founded the Massachusetts Association of Universal Restorationists in opposition to Ballou's view. By the end of the nineteenth century, restorationism was the predominant view. In 1870 the Universalist General Convention approved a resolution that required the Winchester Profession to be interpreted so as to affirm the authority of scripture and the lordship of Jesus Christ. This creedal period ended in 1899, when the restrictions were rescinded and a noncreedal statement was adopted in Boston. A revised noncreedal Bond of Fellowship, known as the Washington Profession, was adopted in 1935 and revised in 1953.

Clarence Skinner (1881–1949), dean of Crane Theological School, was the leading spokesman for Universalists in the twentieth century. His influence and that of others led to a reinterpretation of Universalism as focused on the unities and universals of human life rather than on an endless life after death. Thus many Universalists no longer hold a supernatural worldview.

The Unitarian Universalists. Sporadic contacts between the Unitarians and the Universalists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were followed in 1953 by organization of the Council of Liberal Churches (Universalist-Unitarian). Cooperation in this council's departmental programs prepared the way for the churches' merger in 1961 into the Unitarian Universalist Association (UUA), of which Dana McLean Greeley became the first president.

The churches and fellowships of the UUA are primarily located in the United States and Canada. (There are a small number of fellowships in other countries in Central and South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia.) Ministers and ministers of religious education who are granted associate or full professional fellowship are required to have completed training at a theological school or through a supervised program of independent study. The UUA follows the practice of congregational ordination.

Unitarian Universalists hold a wide variety of religious views, including liberal Christianity, naturalistic theism, mysticism, religious humanism, scientific theology, and aspirations toward a universal religion. They emphasize such values as human dignity, freedom of religious belief, the use of reason in formulating religious beliefs, and the expression of such beliefs in movements for social reform.

The theological diversity that characterizes Unitarian Universalists is expressed in worship that varies greatly from congregation to congregation, ranging from structured liturgy to thematic or sermon-centered emphases. Von Ogden Vogt (1879–1964), minister of the First Unitarian Society of Chicago, contributed the view that worship, as the celebration of life, is the central discipline of religion. His books *Art and Religion* (1921), *Modern Worship* (1927), and *The Primacy of Worship* (1958) led many religious liberals to modify thematic or sermon-centered emphases in the direction of patterns of worship that express basic communal religious experiences: attention or vision, humility, exaltation, illumination, and dedication. The hymns and worship materials contained in *Hymns of the Spirit* (1937), jointly produced by Unitarian and Universalist commissions on hymns and services, were predominantly liberal Christian in character, with some expressions of religious humanism. *Hymns for the Celebration of Life* (1964), which was prepared by a new commission after the merger of the two denominations, contained an increased proportion of materials expressive of religious humanism, particularly through the hymns and readings of Kenneth L. Patton, who portrayed humanist worship in *A Religion for One World: Art and Symbols for a Universal Religion* (1964) and *Services and Songs for the Celebration of Life* (1967). In 1980 the UUA's Commission on Common Worship continued the task of the preceding commissions, that of providing materials that will enable people holding widely differing theological views to worship together.

The Unitarian Universalist Association is one of forty-nine member groups of the International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF). In 1984, adult membership in the UUA, including those in the affiliated Canadian Unitarian Council, totaled 138,110 in 1,010 churches and fellowships.

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UNKULUNKULU is a mythic figure among the Zulu people, a large ethnic group in South Africa. Properly speaking, uNkulunkulu, a name meaning "the old, old one," is not a deity (the Zulu had a weakly developed pantheon) but is rather the "first man." One oral tradition identifies uNkulunkulu as a man and a woman (often identified as uThlanga), but the common myth holds that uNkulunkulu is the first man. He appeared, or was created, by the "breaking off" of reeds—it is said of him that he "came out of, or broke off from, a bed of reeds." Thus, he is also called uMvelinqangi ("the first outcomer," i.e., "the ancestor of all"). All humans are derived from him and from his design and plan. It is also thought by some that uNkulunkulu was merely an early ancestral figure, understood as the ancestor of the Zulu, who was later believed—perhaps under the influence of Christianity—to have been the creator. There is a possibility, from the early sources, that uNkulunkulu was originally thought of purely as an ancestor and human being.

Because uNkulunkulu has no identifiable children there are no ancestral rites or specific families that can

claim to be descended from him. Nonetheless, he created humanity and even gave humans their social institutions, such as marriage and chieftainship. In addition, he gave them spirits (of the dead), diviners to discover the past and the future, and doctors to treat various diseases.

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JAMES S. THAYER

UPANIṢADS. The Upaniṣads are codified Sanskrit philosophical speculations of varying lengths in both prose and verse form, composed orally and set to memory mostly by anonymous South Asian sages, primarily in the classical and medieval periods. While the most important and influential Vedic Upaniṣads date from the eighth to the fourth centuries BCE, some lesser-known sectarian Upaniṣads appear as late as the sixteenth century CE. Individually and as a whole, the Upaniṣads present insights and doctrines that serve as the foundation for much of India's philosophical thought.

Traditional South Asian teachings based on the Upaniṣads have been called the Vedānta, the "end of the Veda," for the Upaniṣads chronologically and formally set the closure of the Vedic canon. Perhaps more to the point, Upaniṣadic lessons are said to be the end of the Veda in that they purport to present the "hidden meaning" or the "real message" of religious practice and thought.

The central teaching presented by the Upaniṣads as a whole centers on the notion that behind all of the spatial swirl and temporal flux of the world as it is experienced by the senses is a subtle, pervasive, timeless, and unchanging reality that is identical to the undying essence of the human being as well. The early Vedic Upaniṣads call this unified and imperishable world soul *brahman* or *ātman*, the former applying more typically to the godhead and the latter signifying the correlative divine "self" residing at the deepest level of one's person. The theistic Upaniṣads teach that this *brahman* or *ātman* is a single deity known generically as Īśvara or Īśa (Lord) living deep within one's being and identified particularly as Śiva, Viṣṇu, or the Goddess by particular sectarian communities.

While they explicitly or implicitly admit the difficulties of comprehending a hidden reality that either tran-

scends or simply cannot be known through the structures of time, space, and causation, the Upaniṣads hold that through disciplined practices of meditation and the cultivation of extraordinary knowledge, it can in fact be discerned. Such discernment releases one from the apparent cycles of life and death caused by one's ignorance of the fact that the essential self does not die. Thus, Upaniṣadic religious anthropologies, theologies, and soteriologies all revolve around a key lesson that appears ubiquitously but that might well be characterized by the *Adhyātma Upaniṣad*'s assertion that "he is a free person who through insight sees no distinction between his own self and *brahman*, and between *brahman* and the universe" and the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*'s proclamation that, having comprehended this identity, "one is released from the jaws of death" (3.5).

The Upaniṣads were first put into written form in 1656 CE, when Sultan Dara Shakoh sponsored the translation of fifty Upaniṣads from Sanskrit into Persian. In 1801–1802, these Persian works were then translated into Latin by Antequil du Perron, becoming the first, although poor, European version. Since that time, all of the Upaniṣads have been rendered into various Indian scripts, and the more important or influential ones have been translated into virtually all of the world's major languages. The Upaniṣads stand as works of monumental significance in the history of India and of the world.

Connotations of the Term "Upaniṣad." Built from the Sanskrit verbal root *sad* ("sit") and the prefixes *upa-* and *ni-* ("nearby"), the word *upaniṣad* represents the act of sitting at the feet of someone. The pedagogical tradition in which a student in search of sacred knowledge sat on the ground in front of a *guru* typifies, in part, the practices of the Vedic *vānaprasthas* ("forest dwellers") and *saṃnyāsins* ("renunciants") who had retired to forest retreats to meditate and study. [See also *Samnyāsa*.] The practice also appears in various Agamic and Tantric traditions, many of whose followers lived beyond the boundaries of settled civilization, where they practiced yogic meditation under the guidance of a *guru*. Through combinations of dialogues, monologues, questions and answers, riddles, and speculative discourses, the student privately heard from the teacher secret lessons that had been passed down through the generations of the sacred lineage. Such a "secret lesson" was an *upaniṣad*. Isolated as a textual genre, the collections of such secret teachings are known as the Upaniṣads.

The term *upaniṣad* thus connotes an element of esotericism. In fact, the Upaniṣads state explicitly that such lessons are not intended for the general population: "Let none who has not maintained the vow think on this," demands *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (3.12.11), and the *Rāmāpūrvatāpanīya Upaniṣad* warns the teacher to

"give not [his lessons] to common people" (84). That the teachings were to be heard by only select ears is demonstrated by the texts themselves, for synonyms and appositions of the word *upaniṣad* include not only such terms as *satyasya satyam* ("the truth of truth," *Bṛhad. Up.* 2.1.20), but also *rahasyam* ("that which is hidden," *Nṛsīmhottaratāpanīya Up.* 8) and *paramam guhyam* ("that which is a supreme secret," *Kaṭh. Up.* 3.17).

The esoteric tone of the Upaniṣadic teachings derives in part from the place they hold in the larger Vedic literary corpus. The earliest Vedic literatures are the inspired hymns, chants, and incantations of the *Ṛgveda*, *Sāmaveda*, *Yajurveda*, and *Atharvaveda*, which were composed by the visionaries and priests of the various Vedic traditions and codified around 1200 BCE (although some are earlier and some later). To these *Samhitās* ("collections") of poems and songs are attached ritual instructions known as the *Brāhmaṇas*, which date to roughly 1000 to 800 BCE. As early as the ninth century BCE, individuals and small groups of people, most often of the *kṣatriya* (warrior) rather than the *brāhmaṇa* (priestly) class of society (see *Bṛhad. Up.* 1.4.11), began to leave the villages to live and meditate in the forest. There, unable or unwilling to perform the sometimes elaborate and expensive Vedic religious ceremonies, they contemplated the allegorical rather than literal significance of the hymns and rituals. These allegorical interpretations formed the basis of texts known as the *Āraṇyakas*, or "forest books." Toward the early part of the eighth century BCE these contemplative sages began to formulate more abstract philosophical interpretations of the metaphors and homologies used in the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Āraṇyakas* as they sought to gain knowledge of the deeper ontological status of the world and of the place the human being holds in that world. Out of this context came the Upaniṣads, the non-sacerdotal philosophical musings on the nature of reality itself.

The composers of the Upaniṣads diverged from the religious tradition of their time in that, unlike earlier Vedic poets and visionaries, they found little interest in proclaiming the wonder of the objective world or in praising the gods said to have enlivened that world. The forest sages understood the outer world to be less significant than the inner, and the gods to be nothing more than reflections or expressions of subjective processes within one's own being. "All of the gods are within me," asserts an early forest work, the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* (1.14.2). The *Kaivalya Upaniṣad*, a later text, teaches that "the highest *brahman*, which is all forms, which is the supreme reality of the universe, which is the most subtle of the subtle and which is eternal, is nothing but yourself." The Upaniṣadic stress on the in-

ner world rather than on external religious practices similarly distinguished the forest sages from the composers of such ritual texts as the Brāhmaṇas and, later, the Kalpasūtras; for the forest sage had no need for “ritual baths, nor periodic rites, nor deity, nor location, nor sacred space, nor worship” (*Tejobindu Up.* 4).

The lines separating the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas, and the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads, as textual genres are not distinct; the early Āraṇyakas resemble in form the later Brāhmaṇas, and the later Āraṇyakas are nearly indistinguishable from the early Upaniṣads. Some traditions hold that the first true Upaniṣad is the *R̥gveda*’s *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (ninth century BCE), while most others mark that line with the emergence of the *Śukla* (“White”) *Yajurveda*’s *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and the *Sāmaveda*’s *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, both of which date to the eighth century BCE.

Upaniṣadic Teachings. Symbolic representations in the Upaniṣads of ultimate reality are consistent with the notion that such reality is unmanifest yet vital. *Brahman* (*ātman*, *Īśvara*, etc.) is described as life-giving breath (*prāṇa*), wind (*vāyu*), or empty space (*ākāśa*); as pure consciousness (*cit*), bliss (*ānanda*), or eternity (*ananta*); and as the infinite subject by whom all objects are known, the “inner guide” (*antaryāmin*) of all that is. [See also *Brahman*.]

Given its acknowledged immanent yet transcendent nature, ontological discourses in the early Vedic Upaniṣads depict *brahman* both cosmically (*saguṇa*, “with characteristics”) and acosmically (*nirguṇa*, “without characteristics”). *Saguṇa brahman* is understood to be the finest essence (*aṇimā*, *rasa*, etc.) of all things in the world, as honey is the essence of beeswax and oil is the essence of sesame seeds (see *Ch. Up.* 6.9ff.). Understood cosmically, therefore, *brahman* is the substance of the universe. This does not mean that *brahman* is the material stuff of the world which can be perceived sensually. Rather, it is that hidden and subtle reality which allows all things to exist in the first place. Thus, when the sages of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* note that “this whole world is *brahman*” and that *brahman* is the “hidden mover . . . within all that moves, breathes, and winks” (2.2.1–2), they imply the cosmic ontological notion that *brahman* is the very “beingness” of all beings, including the human being. Transformative insight allows one to understand that this cosmic substratum is unified and indivisible, or—as the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*’s Uddālaka Āruṇi teaches his son, Śvetaketu—“Thou art That!” (6.9.1–6.16.3).

Understood acosmically, *brahman* cannot be described through definitive or positive statements, since *brahman* transcends the limitations of language. Thus, *nirguṇa brahman* is not subject to categorization, and

therefore, can neither be perceived nor conceived. *Brahman* “cannot be heard, nor touched. It has no form [and] is imperishable. Similarly, it has no flavor, nor odor. It is eternal, without beginning [and] without end” (*Kaṭh. Up.* 3.5), and it “cannot be known through language, nor by the mind, nor by sight” (6.12). That the content of ultimate reality cannot be depicted is summarized most succinctly in the *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*’s recurring assertion that “the self [*ātman*] is not this, not that” (4.4.22ff.).

Thus, while the Upaniṣadic student seeking knowledge of *saguṇa brahman* was to comprehend the unity of all things in a world constructed on the essence of *brahman*, the student who looked for an understanding of *nirguṇa brahman* was to “deconstruct” the phenomenal world, as it were, in order to comprehend the imperishable self that lies behind the world of life and death.

Whether they considered *brahman* to be cosmic or acosmic, Upaniṣadic teachers generally distrusted empirical knowledge gained through sensual experiences. According to these thinkers, the physical world is a “measured” or “constructed” world, the world of *māyā*, a term which in the Upaniṣads denotes those aspects of the world which are empirically perceived but not ultimately real. *Māyā*, in other words, characterizes the world of time, space, and causation. According to Upaniṣadic teachings, then, that world which the ignorant call the “real world” is not, in truth, real. [See also *Māyā*.]

Upaniṣadic ontologies are thus closely linked with epistemology. They are similarly related to physiology and psychology. Drawing on Sāṃkhya metaphysics, the Upaniṣads generally recognize a dualism of matter (*prakṛti*) and spirit (*puruṣa*). The former constitutes the objective and phenomenal world. The latter comprises the knowing subject that has no temporal or spatial limitations, and at times is used as a synonym for *ātman*. Within the world of *prakṛti*, the human body and mind may be divided into the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*) and the subtle body (*sukṣma- or liṅga-śarīra*). Everyday consciousness revolves around the gross body made up of the senses and the objects of those senses (known collectively as the *indriyas*). Sensations gained from the gross body are then categorized by the subtle body, which consists of the mind (*manas*), the mechanism of personal identity or “ego” (*ahaṃkāra*), and the “awareness” (*buddhi* or *antaḥkāraṇa*), the basis of one’s ability to live and act in the world.

Upaniṣadic physiology declares that both the gross and subtle bodies, however, are phenomenal (and therefore unreal) constructions relative to the spirit, the true self (see *Kaṭh. Up.* 3.10–11). Thus, the farther one’s

awareness is removed from its attachment to the external world experienced by the gross and subtle bodies, the closer one comes to a full yet nonempirical experience of the true self. Accordingly, the Upaniṣads emphasize the importance of dream states in the comprehension of deeper realities (see, e.g., *Bṛhad. Up.* 4.3.9). In sleep one loses awareness of the outside world, a world that is in effect a bad dream to begin with. The deeper one sleeps, the closer to eternal reality one gets.

The Upaniṣads recognize four states of waking and dreaming awareness, each successively purer and closer to the direct comprehension of *ātman*. The grossest psychological level is that of waking consciousness, a level in which apparent objects are mistakenly understood to be distinct entities and in which the subject does not recognize itself. The second, more refined, level of awareness is that of active dreaming, a state in which objects lose their solidity and appear more as they really are—as changing and unreal events. The dreaming subject is a “creator” (*kartr*) of the world, which exists only because he “projects” (*srjate*) it (see *Bṛhad. Up.* 4.3.10). The third level is that of dreamless sleep (*samprasāda, susupti*), in which one loses all awareness of oneself as an object in relation to other objects and no longer experiences the constrictions of time and space. In dreamless sleep one is said to have gained complete tranquillity. Here, one momentarily enjoys complete reunion with *brahman* and experiences, albeit nonempirically, the highest bliss (*paramānanda*; see *Bṛhad. Up.* 4.3.32). [See also Samādhi.]

Later Upaniṣads, especially those influenced by the practices and ideologies of Yoga, add to these states another level to one’s psychological being, known simply as *turiya* or *turya*, “the fourth.” *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* 7 describes this state: “It is not cognitive, nor is it noncognitive. It is unseen, unable to be spoken of, ungraspable, without any distinguishing characteristics, unthinkable, unnameable. It is the essence of the knowledge of the One Self [*ekātma-pratyaya-sāram*], that into which the world resolves. It is peaceful and benign. It is indivisible.” Such a state sounds like the Upaniṣadic notion of ultimate reality. Indeed, the passage continues: “It [*turiya*] is *ātman*. It is to be known.”

The waking somatic body, therefore, is unreal relative to ultimate reality, a point which carries ethical and eschatological implications. The “self” of one’s being leaves the body at death, as the mango fruit at maturity separates from its stalk (see *Bṛhad. Up.* 4.3.36). If one has not renounced one’s attachment to the world of the senses, then one will be reborn in another physical body, the existential situations of which are determined by the ethical laws of *karman*; and sooner or later one will suffer and die again. This continually turning

wheel of death and rebirth (*saṃsāra*) is understood to be a painful trap from which one is released only when one understands that the physical body is not the real self, and that the world which the senses perceive is an insubstantial and effervescent illusion.

Most of the Upaniṣads agree that the best way one would cultivate such a freeing insight would be through the rigors of yogic meditation. While the Vedic Upaniṣads as a whole reflect the influence of yogic practice and ideology (see, for example, *Maitri Up.* 6.19–30 or *Śvet. Up.* 2.8–10), it is in the Yoga Upaniṣads that such teachings are most fully presented. For example, the *Amṛtabindhu*, *Śāṅḍilya*, and *Yogatattva* Upaniṣads, among others, contain long passages on the eight “branches” (*aṣṭāṅga*) of yogic practice (discipline, self-restraint, correct body posture, breath control, suppression of sensory awareness, mental concentration, intuitive meditation, and final union with the Absolute), the proper means to master each, and the characteristics of the successive levels of yogic “powers” (*siddhis*) one gains as one becomes more adept at the particular practices.

While continuing to uphold the efficacy of yogic practice, some of the Upaniṣads also present the more theistic teaching that one cannot truly know one’s soul without what might be termed the “grace” of the soul. Such appears to be the position of *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 2.23, which maintains that “this soul [*ātman*] cannot be attained through instruction, nor through rational thinking, nor by great learning. He is to be attained only by the one whom [the supreme self] chooses. The soul [*ātman*] reveals his own nature to such a one.” The soteriological dimensions of this theistic teaching are much more explicit in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*’s statement that “more subtle than the subtle, greater than the great, is the soul [*ātman*] that is set within the heart of the creature. One beholds it to be actionless and becomes free of sorrow, when through the grace of the Creator [*dhātuḥ prasādāt*] he sees the Lord [*Īś*] and his greatness” (3.20). [See also *Yoga and Soul*, article on Indian Concepts.]

Classification of the Upaniṣads. It is somewhat problematic to arrive at a precise number of Upaniṣads, since if all Sanskrit works claiming to present secret teachings were to be classified as Upaniṣads the number would be indefinite. Nearly 250 texts call themselves Upaniṣads—including the *Allopaniṣad* (“secret teachings about Allāh,” composed at the time of Akbar) and the *Christopaniṣad*, dated well after the rise of Christian communities on the subcontinent—but it appears that most of these do so merely as a way to align themselves with a respected literary genre or religious tradition.

The *Muktika Upaniṣad* and other medieval South In-

dian works mention 108 separate Upaniṣads in an enumeration that has become somewhat of a stock list. Using the methods of historical, thematic, and textual criticism, twentieth-century scholars have isolated 123 genuine Upaniṣads. These works may be classified into two general categories, the Vedic Upaniṣads and the later Upaniṣads.

The Vedic Upaniṣads. Virtually all Vedic and most sectarian traditions recognize ten to eighteen Upaniṣads as revealed authoritative scripture (*śrūti*). Furthermore, all of the more important traditional theologians and philosophers throughout classical and medieval India recognized the central importance of these ancient works, and have written extensive commentaries on them. For these reasons, the Vedic Upaniṣads have also been called the Major, or Principal, Upaniṣads. They may be divided into three historical and textual groups.

1. The earliest Upaniṣads (the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, and *Kauṣītaki* Upaniṣads and the prose parts of the *Kena Upaniṣad*) predate the rise of Buddhism in the sixth century BCE, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* being the earliest and the *Kena* being the latest. All are explicitly aligned with one or another of the various *sakhās*, or “schools” of Vedic interpretation, and are composed in a prose that closely resembles Vedic Sanskrit. These texts make frequent use of allegorical modes of interpretation and are often almost indistinguishable in style from the *Āraṇyakas*. In many ways these six works serve as the philosophical foundation for all of the later Upaniṣads.

2. A second group of Upaniṣads (the *Kaṭha* [or *Kaṭhakā*], *Īśa*, *Śvetāśvatara*, *Muṇḍaka*, and *Mahānārāyaṇa* Upaniṣads and the metrical parts of the *Kena Upaniṣad*) reflects a growing sectarian orientation and dates to the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. These works, which are composed primarily in verse, are only loosely attached to the Vedic *sakhās*, and make less use of metaphorical, allegorical, or other tropic means of expression.

3. The Upaniṣads of a third group (the *Praśna*, *Maitri* [or *Maitrāyaṇīya*], *Jābāla*, *Paīṅgala*, and *Māṇḍukya* Upaniṣads) return to prose form, but in a language that resembles classical Sanskrit much more than Vedic Sanskrit. They probably emerged in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE, although the dates for a few of them are uncertain.

All of these works are attached to the textual collections of specific priestly Vedic traditions. The *Aitareya* and *Kauṣītaki* Upaniṣads belong to the *Ṛgveda*. The *Kaṭha*, *Maitri*, *Taittirīya*, and *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads are attached to the *Kṛṣṇa* (“Black”) *Yajurveda*, while the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Īśa*, and *Paīṅgala* Upaniṣads are aligned with the *Śukla* (“White”) *Yajurveda*. The *Chān-*

dogya and *Kena* Upaniṣads belong to the *Sāmaveda*, and, finally, the *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍukya*, *Praśna*, and *Jābāla* Upaniṣads form a part of the conclusion of the *Atharvaveda*.

The later Upaniṣads. To this list of principal Vedic Upaniṣads most authorities would add a large number of less known and, for the most part, medieval works which may be classified as the later Upaniṣads. These works are not universally accepted as *śrūti*, and they have not received the extensive attention from traditional South Asian philosophical commentators as have the Vedic Upaniṣads. This does not mean that they are less important than others. Indeed, these texts may well be more influential in their respective communities than the principal Vedic Upaniṣads. Such works reflect the increasing influence of Sāṃkhya philosophy, Yoga practice and ideology, and sectarian theistic traditions through the classical and medieval periods. While many align themselves with the *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda*, or *Sāmaveda*, most of these Upaniṣads are attached, at least nominally, to the *Atharvaveda*. Most are in prose form and are composed almost entirely in classical Sanskrit.

The number of the later Upaniṣads is too large to list all of them here. Only the most important or representative ones will be mentioned; readers seeking a more complete list are directed to the bibliography.

1. *Vedānta Upaniṣads.* These works, which include the *Muktika*, *Piṅḍa*, *Garba*, *Ātman*, *Prāṇāgnihotra*, *Ādhyatman*, and *Brahmā* as well as perhaps two dozen other Upaniṣads, fairly consistently maintain the general doctrines presented by the Vedic Upaniṣads, and show relatively little sectarian influence. They differ from the Vedic Upaniṣads only in that they are not cited in traditional commentaries.

2. *Yoga Upaniṣads.* These texts arose out of a more specifically ascetic context than did many of the Vedic and Vedānta Upaniṣads, and reflect the influence of Yoga ideologies and practices within Upaniṣadic circles. This group includes the *Yogakuṇḍali*, *Nāḍabindhu*, *Śāṅḍilya*, *Yogatattva*, *Tejobindhu*, *Haṃsa*, *Amṛtabindhu*, *Dhyānabindhu*, and *Varāha* Upaniṣads. These works center on the direct experience of the eternal self (*ātman*) through specific techniques of Yoga and through the meditation on the sacred syllable *om*.

3. *Samnyāsa Upaniṣads.* These works tend to extol the life of the wandering ascetic’s search for release from the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*) and teach ways in which such release may be obtained. They include the *Nārada-parivṛājaka*, *Bhikṣuka*, *Paramahaṃsa*, *Āsrama*, and *Samnyāsa* Upaniṣads.

4. *Mantra Upaniṣads.* These teachings center on esoteric interpretations of specific sounds and syllables and place those interpretations into Yogic as well as Śaiva,

Vaiṣṇava, and Durgā theistic contexts. Typical of such works would be the *Tārasāra*, *Kalisantāraṇa*, and *Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣads*.

5. *Śaiva Upaniṣads*. The earliest Śaiva Upaniṣad might well be said to be the Vedic *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, which praised the role of Rudra (a Vedic precursor to the god Śiva) in the religious quest. The more well-known of the medieval Śaiva Upaniṣads would include the *Nīlarudra*, *Kālāgnirudra*, *Kaivalya*, and *Atharvaśiras Upaniṣads*, all of which understand the person of Śiva (also known as Maheśvara, Bhairava, Īšana, and other names) to be an embodiment of the deepest self, *ātman*.

6. *Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads*. These texts tend to interpret the various incarnations of the god Viṣṇu as representative forms of the *ātman*. Some Vaiṣṇava traditions look to the *Īsa Upaniṣad* as the Vedic antecedent to, or oldest sectarian representative of, this particular genre. Works associated with this group include the *Nṛsimhāpūrvatāpanīya*, *Nṛsimhottaratāpanīya*, *Mahā*, *Rāmāpūrvatāpanīya*, and *Ramottaratāpanīya Upaniṣads*.

[See also Vedānta.]

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Readers seeking a stock list of what have been termed Vedic and later Upaniṣads should turn to the opening lines of the *Muktika Upaniṣad*, which lists 108 such works. J. N. Farquhar, a historian of Indian religious literatures, has distinguished 123 distinct Upaniṣads, which he lists in his *An Outline of the Religious Literature of India* (1920; reprint, Delhi, 1967), p. 364.

The last hundred years have seen the publication of a large number of Upaniṣads in modern languages, many of which suffer from a lack of perspicuity due to the somewhat esoteric nature of the original works. The most objective English translation of most of the Vedic Upaniṣads remains Robert Ernest Hume's somewhat stilted *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, 2d rev. ed. (Oxford, 1949). A more fluid translation is Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's *The Principle Upaniṣads* (New York, 1953). Radhakrishnan's work is better than Hume's in that it includes the Sanskrit and it translates sixteen rather than thirteen works. Some students will find Radhakrishnan's commentaries on the works to be of some help, although many of them reflect his neo-Vedantic bias. Another good translation, and one which openly admits an Advaitic point of view, is Swāmī Nikhilānanda's *The Upanishads*, 4 vols. (New York, 1949–1959). Readers interested in the later Upaniṣads would be advised to look to Paul Deussen's *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda* (Leipzig, 1897), to K. Nārāyanasvāmi Aiyar's *Thirty Minor Upanishads* (Madras, 1914), and to Jean Varenne's *Upanishads du yoga* (Paris, 1974).

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UPĀYA is a Sanskrit and Pali term meaning “device, strategem,” or “means.” The term has a technical function in Buddhism, especially in the Mahāyāna, where it is frequently used in the compound *upāyakaṣālya* (“skill in means”). In Buddhist usage, it refers to certain manners of teaching or forms of practice that may be employed along the path to final release, and in which a Buddha or *bodhisattva* is especially skilled. Often, these involve the skillful evaluation of the spiritual capacities of beings on the part of a Buddha or *bodhisattva*, and a concomitant revelation of just that degree of truth that is most beneficial to the specific religious needs of the devotee. The usual Chinese equivalent is *fang-pien* (Jpn., *hōben*). Although *fang-pien* is an ordinary Chinese word with its own distinct meaning, owing to various terminological confluences its meaning in East Asian Buddhist texts is “(skillfully applied) means.” The usage has given rise to the convenient English expression “skillful means.” The concept of *upāya* also figures prominently in other Mahāyāna Buddhist cultures, notably that of Tibet.

Pali Usage. The terms *upāya* or *upāyakusala* occur in the Theravāda canon, but only incidentally or in late texts. The *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Anguttara Nikāya* speak of three kinds of skill: skill in entering (*aya*), skill in leaving (*apāya*), and skill in approach or means (*upāya*). Leaving etymological speculation aside, it is clear that this terminology refers to the spiritual attitude of a monk who is supposed to be expert in the management of his practice on the road to Buddhahood. In the *Suttanipāta*, it is the expert boatman taking others across a swift stream who is described as a “skillful knower of the means.”

In spite of the paucity of references in Pali writings, it is remarkable that *upāya* here assumes a double aspect, referring to the activities both of aspiring monk and good teacher, skilled in the ways of helping others across the spiritual threshold. Various emphasized, this double usage is frequently found in early Mahāyāna, although not direct textual lineage should be assumed. Other Pali usage is either nontechnical or late and incidental. This relative inattention to the term in

Pali texts does not mean, however, that the way of thinking assumed in this terminology is foreign either to Theravāda Buddhism in its fully developed form or to the earliest Buddhists in general. Admittedly, there is no direct evidence that the Buddha himself made use of this specific term to explain the way his teaching was to be understood. Nevertheless, there are many indications that his message was presented with conscious, pragmatic skill. In support of this, one need only think of such well known scriptural similes as the raft, the poisoned arrow, the pith, and the water snake, in which the provisional and practical nature of the Buddha's teachings is made clear.

Upāya in the Lotus Sutra. The opening chapters of the *Lotus Sutra* (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*) are an extended reflection on the nature of the Buddha's teaching. This reflection is advanced partly by means of a series of parables and partly by a retelling of the story of the Buddha's decision to teach others the religious path he had perfected (chaps. 2 and 7). The concept of skill in means plays an important role throughout, occurring over eighty times in the first eight chapters.

Traditionally, the story of the Buddha's decision to teach following his enlightenment had portrayed him as hesitant to do so because of the depth and subtlety of the Dharma and the sensuality and ignorance of mankind. In this account, only the urging of the god Brahmā led to the Buddha's decision to teach the Four Noble Truths and the Middle Way. To this hesitancy was linked the Buddha's perception of the diversity of human faculties and dispositions, a diversity that is likened to a pond full of lotuses, only some of which rise undefiled above the water. In the retelling of this story in the *Lotus Sutra*, the discrepancy between the Buddha's knowledge and the ignorance of living beings provokes an explanation that the teaching of the Buddha is an *upāya*, that is, a provisional expedient able to draw people into the Buddha's Dharma. In other words, although the Buddha realizes that the true, ultimate, and indeed originally nirvanic quality of things cannot be precisely stated in words, he nevertheless teaches the doctrine of *nirvāṇa* as a "means" to lead people toward detachment.

A parable in the third chapter of the *Lotus Sutra* tells how a father lures his children from a burning house by the expedient of offering them three fine chariots for their enjoyment. Only on emerging from the fire do they realize that they have been tricked, as it were, into safety by the attractive inducements offered by their father: their real reward, their lives, far outweighs their original expectations. So too, according to the parable, does the Buddha lure sentient beings from the "burning house" that is *saṃsāra* (the round of birth and death) by

proposing a variety of apparently distinct religious careers, all of which are in fact reducible to one: the path leading to Buddhahood. Thus understood, the otherwise polemically differentiated "vehicles" (*yāna*)—*śrāvaka* ("hearer of the Dharma"), *pratyekabuddha* (self-enlightened Buddha), and *bodhisattva*—are only provisional constructs designed to appeal to persons of different religious capacities. Ultimately, it is only the path of the Buddhas (*buddhayāna*) that is real.

While the means used to ensure deliverance may thus seem to involve an element of deception, or at least, of withholding the full truth, the discrepancy between the form in which the message is couched and its ultimate meaning is understood to arise owing to the relative ignorance of the living beings who receive it. The sincerity and the consistency of the Dharma regarded from the point of view of the Buddha is considered to be unimpeached. In chapter 5, the simile of a rain cloud, which bestows on diverse plants moisture equal to their needs, explicitly treats this point. Other parables stress that the religious path eventually brings rewards out of all comprehension to those just beginning their practice. In chapter 4, the process of winning enlightenment is compared to that of a son who abandons his father's estate. When the prodigal returns years later, in dire poverty and ignorant even of the fact that he has come to the place of his birth, his father only gradually reveals his patrimony to him, fearing that a premature revelation of the truth would frighten his son away once again.

Finally, not only is the teaching of the Buddha declared by this text to comprise a series of skillfully devised expedients, but the very appearance of the Buddha in this world is declared (chap. 15; chap. 16 in the Chinese) to be a mere stratagem to draw beings to the Dharma. The actual Enlightenment is an event that took place, if it occurred in history at all, aeons ago. The Buddha's apparent *pārinirvāṇa* at age eighty is a mere simulacrum, comparable to that of a physician who feigns death in order to induce his willful sons to take an essential medicine. Chapter 7 tells of a guide who leads his charges to a magic city he has conjured up as a resting place for the weary. Only when they have rested do the travelers learn that the city is a mirage, not the ultimate goal of their journey after all.

Thus, in the *Lotus Sutra* it is not merely a question of particular teachings being regarded as secondary formulations. The very appearance of the Buddha, his setting the wheel of the Dharma in motion, and his winning of *nirvāṇa*, have a provisional, dialectical nature related to the needs of living beings in their diversity.

Upaya in the Perfection of Wisdom Literature. In the early Mahāyāna *sūtras*, known as the Prajñāpāramitā

("perfection of wisdom") literature, the notion of skill in means is closely linked to that of *prajñā*, that is, to wisdom or insight into the true character of things. Such insight implies a recognition of the metaphysical voidness or insubstantiality of all phenomena and all factors of experience (*dharmas*). Insight and skill in means are two of the perfections in which a *bodhisattva* has to school himself. Hence, this usage (especially in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*) complements that of the *Lotus*. As an adept in training, the *bodhisattva* must manage the various features of practical religion that articulate his path, but without becoming attached to them in any way. He must, for example, practice *dhyāna* ("meditation, trance") without being subject to its karmic consequences, that is, without rebirth in the various *deva* heavens that such meditation entails. These heavens, the teaching holds, are pleasant but religiously irrelevant existences; attachment to them is an impediment to the religious life: "But what is the skill in means of a Bodhisattva? It is just this perfection of wisdom. And he applies himself to this skill in means in such a way that, endowed with it, the Bodhisattva enters into the trances without being reborn through the influence of the trances" (Conze, 1973, p. 250).

Upāya, however, is not only a matter of individual spiritual welfare. The *bodhisattva* would lose his own way if he abandoned living beings.

If the mind of a Bodhisattva forms the aspiration not to abandon all beings but to set them free, and if in addition, he aspires for the concentration on emptiness, the Signless, the Wishless, i.e., for the three doors to deliverance, then that Bodhisattva should be known as one who is endowed with skill in means, and he will not realise the reality-limit midway, before his Buddhadharmas have become complete. For it is this skill in means which protects him.

(Conze, 1973, p. 225)

Thus the *bodhisattva* is both the adept and the benefactor. In Mahāyāna thinking it is not possible to be the one without also being the other.

A closely related early Mahāyāna text, the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* (Teaching of Vimalakīrti) dramatizes this principle with a narrative centered on an illness feigned by the *prajñā*-adept Vimalakīrti. In conversation with Mañjuśrī he declares that his illness is without characteristics but arises only through compassion as a skillful means. It will be healed only insofar as all beings depart from belief in self and from dualistic thought. The close connection between *upāya* and *prajñā* ("insight") is evident in statements such as: "Again, insight without (skillful) means is bondage, but insight with (skillful) means is release; (skillful) means without insight is bondage, but (skillful) means with in-

sight is release" (T.D. no. 14.545). Applied to the body, that fundamental object of Buddhist meditation, the implications of this are as follows:

Yet again, seeing the body in terms of impermanence, suffering, emptiness and non-self, this is called insight. To stay in birth-and-death even though the body is sick, bringing benefits to all and not getting disgusted or tired, this is called (skillful) means . . . To see that the body is never without sickness . . . and that there is no renovation and no passing away, this is called insight. To recognize that the body is sick and yet not to enter eternal cessation, this is called (skillful) means. (T.D. no. 14.545)

Implications. The concept of *upāya* plays an incidental role in many other Mahāyāna texts, especially in connection with *bodhisattvas* as savior figures. Its implications are also clearly present, however, in the more philosophical Mādhyamika distinction between two levels of truth. Both provisional truth (*lokasaṃvṛtisatya*) and supreme truth (*paramārthasatya*) are essential, according to the *Madhyamakakārikā* (Middle Stanzas) of Nāgārjuna, for the proclamation of Buddhist Dharma.

Skill in means, or skillful means, is an idea known to every experienced monk in Mahāyāna Buddhism and has often been used to interpret the function of various aspects of Buddhist teaching or practice. Its role as a regulative principle in situations of accommodation or syncretism should never be overlooked. At the same time, many implications of its use as a principle of interpretation both in Buddhism and in a wider religious sense remain to be explored.

[See also Bodhisattva Path.]

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URMONOTHEISMUS. See Supreme Beings and the biography of Schmidt.

USENER, HERMANN (1833–1905), German classical philologist and historian of religion. From 1866 to 1902 Usener was professor at Bonn. His major writings include *Das Weihnachtsfest* (1889); *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen* (2 vols., 1889); *Götternamen: Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung* (1896); and *Die Sintfluthsagen* (1899).

In *Götternamen*, Usener presented a once-influential theory. Taking his method from philology and his data mainly from demons (the *indigitamenta*) invoked by name in ancient Roman rites, Usener claimed to show that the history of the idea of deity had three phases. First, the concept of deity emerges as that of momentary gods (*Augenblicksgötter*) whose power is manifested during some fleeting experience, such as plowing and harrowing, but then vanishes. Next, as activities are repeated, these deities gain a certain continuity; they come to stand as functional powers over an entire class of phenomena or activity. Usener calls these “special gods” (*Söndergotter*). In a later phase still, when the name of the god is no longer connected with his function, the god is seen as an autonomous being or personality. Such gods often have many divine names, but this means only that several special gods with different names have become fused into one. Usener also cited data on Lithuanian religions in support of his views.

Usener’s heavy reliance on philology and his claim that the history of the concept of deity could be adequately clarified through the history of the names of the gods was attacked by Jan de Vries, who pointed out that there is no instance of a specialized functional god having evolved into a principal deity. According to de Vries, the momentary gods likely represent a late phase of priestly speculation or juridical elaboration (de Vries, 1967, pp. 134–138). Georges Dumézil has argued similarly that a comprehensive historical approach shows that the *indigitamenta* are relatively unimportant phenomena (Dumézil, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 32–38).

Usener’s other major effort was to show how Christianity took over pagan rites and feasts. He traced the Christmas festival to the birthday of the pagan sun god celebrated on the winter solstice (25 December, according to the Julian calendar), and he argued that certain saints derived from pagan prototypes (e.g., Pelagius from Aphrodite).

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UṢŪL AL-FIQH. The Arabic phrase *uṣūl al-fiqh*, which means literally “the roots of understanding,” takes on a specialized sense in the classical literature of Islam; it may be rendered either as “sources of law” or as “principles of jurisprudence.” The former rendering may be regarded as best expressing the primary sense of the phrase and the latter as conveying a broader, extended sense. It must be kept in mind that “law” in Islam is much more comprehensive than Western law: it includes not only civil and criminal law but also regulations pertaining to worship, hygiene, and other aspects of the private lives of individuals. It furthermore recommends and disapproves actions as much as it requires and forbids them, and while it specifies temporal penalties for certain offenses, its ultimate sanctions are otherworldly.

There are two Arabic terms that may be translated as “law”—*sharī‘ah* and *fiqh*. The *sharī‘ah* is the law of God, immutable, all-encompassing, and transcendent. Strictly speaking, *fiqh* is the understanding of the law of God which jurists acquire through pious scholarship. However, since it is this understanding of the law of God, as expressed in concrete rules formulated by the jurists themselves, which governs the daily lives of Muslims, it may be considered law in its own right. It is, in fact, the nearest thing to a positive law which the Islamic tradition affords. *Uṣūl al-fiqh* thus designates, in its primary sense, the sources of this positive law, that is, the sources of a human *prudentia juris* conceived as a norm of human conduct. A source (*aṣl*) is that from which something else is derived. The law of God cannot, in its essence, be a derivative of anything; only human constructions of law can have that status.

The necessity for the distinction between the law of God and the positive law as the expression of the hu-

man understanding of that law becomes evident when we reflect on cases where the jurists differ among themselves in their construction of rules. Although some Muslim jurists subscribed to a kind of relativism, according to which any rules which emerged from the deliberations of a particular jurist constituted the law of God for him, the majority of Sunnī jurists insisted upon the absolute uniformity and convenience of that law such that, where jurists propounded conflicting rules, they could not all be right and the possibility of error had necessarily to be admitted. But as the Sunnī jurists acknowledged no higher authority which might resolve differences among them, they were constrained to regard all rules propounded by duly qualified jurists on the basis of a diligent investigation of the sources of law as equally valid and normative, even if contradictory. What was required for a rule to be normative, therefore, was not that it be an infallible statement of the divine law but simply that it express a qualified jurist's genuine understanding of that law. It is the fallibility of that understanding that compels us to draw a clear line between it and the law of God, its object.

The derivation of positive law from its proper sources is governed by carefully formulated methodological principles so as to leave as little as possible to human ingenuity. These principles, which are partly hermeneutical, partly text-critical, and partly theological, are included in the extended meaning of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. They, together with the sources of law, constitute the "principles of jurisprudence."

The Theory of the Four Sources and Its Origin. Classical Sunnī Muslim legal thought enumerates four primary sources of positive law: the Qur'ān; the *sunnah*, or custom, of the prophet Muḥammad; consensus (*ijmā'*); and analogical deduction (*qiyās*). The first three of these sources consist of, or are embodied in, texts and as such may be described as the material sources of positive law. The Qur'ān and the *sunnah* of the Prophet (as recorded in the special literature called *ḥadīth*) have, by virtue of their inspired character, a special status not accorded the consensus: they alone have been compiled into discrete textual corpora classified as *nuṣūṣ*. The consensus, though not ranked among the *nuṣūṣ*, is nevertheless necessarily expressed in relatively fixed verbal formulations which may be regarded as essentially textual, or at least quasi-textual, in character. These are preserved *within* the larger literature of Islamic jurisprudence. The fourth source of positive law, on the other hand, is, in contrast to the other three, a *method* of deriving from texts rules of law that are not contained within the meaning of the texts. It may accordingly be described as a formal source of law. To the ex-

tent that the principle of analogy is strictly applied, the exclusive authority of the texts as material sources of law is maintained, for although the derived rule may not be said to be contained within the meaning of the texts, it may quite definitely be said to have its ultimate *basis* in the texts, that basis being an analogous rule contained within the texts' meaning. To these four sources of law most theorists add further "supplementary" sources, to be considered shortly.

Joseph Schacht's monumental study of the early development of Islamic jurisprudence (*Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1959) singled out the famous jurist Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820) as the real architect of the "four source" theory. As Schacht showed, Shāfi'ī formulated this theory in response to the interaction of two movements which had been contending for supremacy in the shaping of Islamic law before his time. The earliest of these was represented by what Schacht called the "ancient schools of law." These schools, which were located in the principal Muslim urban settlements of the Umayyad period (661–750), especially Kufa and Medina, despite certain differences shared a common acceptance of the consensus of legal scholars as constituting the ultimate criterion of correct legal doctrine. While in no way minimizing the preeminence of the prophet Muḥammad, which the passing of generations only enhanced, the representatives of these schools came to view the *sunnah* of the Prophet as most faithfully represented in the unanimously agreed-upon doctrine. Thus the ancient schools in effect identified the *sunnah* of the Prophet with the consensus of legal scholars. In reaction to this view, the second movement, namely that of the traditionists (*ahl al-ḥadīth*), took the position that the consensus of the legists, far from adequately representing the *sunnah* of the Prophet, was in reality the product of human reasoning and was therefore of no value whatsoever and that the *sunnah* of the Prophet was properly represented only by formal traditions (*aḥādīth*; literally, "narratives") reporting actual sayings or deeds of the Prophet and accompanied by lists (*isnāds*) of accredited transmitters. The *sunnah* of the Prophet was thus, in their view, categorically distinct from the consensus of the legists. Both the ancient schools and the traditionists recognized, as any Muslim must, the authority of the Qur'ān, but as the Qur'ān supplies relatively little material of a specifically legal nature, the question of whether the consensus of legists or formal traditions from the Prophet was to be the primary norm *after* the Qur'ān was of crucial importance for the development of Muslim legal thinking.

Shāfi'ī himself leaned decidedly toward the tradition-

ist point of view. At the same time, being a lawyer by disposition, like the representatives of the ancient schools in whose circles he had studied (and unlike the traditionists, who though much preoccupied with piety had little instinct for legal matters), Shāfi'ī realized that some principle of legal construction beyond that of sheer adherence to texts was necessary if law was to develop in accordance with the ongoing needs of the community. He therefore affirmed the validity of analogical deduction, a technique of legal construction that had been developed to near perfection by the ancient schools. However, he distinguished analogical deduction sharply from the purely private judgments of the legists, which the ancient schools had permitted in certain cases. The latter he ruled out entirely, as he did likewise the consensus of the legists, which, like the traditionists, he believed to be the product of private judgment. In its place he did, however, accept the general consensus of the entire Muslim community on essentials. Thus did Shāfi'ī assemble as complementary principles of legal construction four items: the Qur'ān, the *sunnah* of the Prophet as represented by formal traditions, the consensus of the community as a whole, and analogical deduction from any of the foregoing. By insisting on adherence to formal traditions, which in Shāfi'ī's time were fast being fashioned into a textual corpus, Shāfi'ī secured for Islamic law a strong literary base, thus introducing into juristic activity a larger measure of stability and predictability than had previously existed.

The Classical Theory of the Four Sunnī Madhhabs. During the third century of the Islamic era (roughly the ninth century CE), the ancient schools of law gave way to a new type of school called the *madhhab*. Whereas the ancient schools had been essentially regional in character, encompassing all legists in a particular locality such as Kufa or Medina, the *madhhabs* derived their identity (and their names) from particular authoritative teachers of law, whom they claimed as their founders and whose essential doctrine they claimed to uphold. Two such "personal schools" (Schacht's term)—the Ḥanafī and the Mālikī schools—emerged out of the ancient schools of Kufa and Medina, within which they had originated as circles of followers of two teachers of great prominence, Abū Ḥanīfah in Kufa and Mālik ibn Anas in Medina. The emergence, after Shāfi'ī's death, of another school claiming to uphold his doctrine gave added impetus to the development of the new type of school. By the early tenth century at least seven such schools were in existence within Sunnī Islam, although only four of these survived beyond the thirteenth century: the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi'ī, and Ḥanbalī schools.

Despite certain differences which persisted between them and despite the diversity of their origins, the four *madhhabs* came eventually to agree upon a version of the theory of the four sources which is often described as the classical theory. This theory differed in one important respect from Shāfi'ī's version: it accepted the consensus of legal scholars as equal in weight to the consensus of the entire Muslim community, and since the latter was scarcely if at all ascertainable after the Muslim community had spread beyond its place of origin in Medina, it was the former alone that became the effective principle of legal construction (despite many difficulties in its application). Thus in effect the classical theory allowed the cardinal principle of the ancient schools, which Shāfi'ī had rejected, to creep back into Muslim legal thinking. Within the classical theory, it had, however, a position far less exalted than the one it had enjoyed in the thinking of the ancient schools, for it was now subordinated, not only to the Qur'ān, but also to the vast body of traditions. The classical theory, which inherited from Shāfi'ī the notion that the authority of the *sunnah* of the Prophet was grounded in the Qur'ān, went on to make the authority of the consensus dependent on both of these.

The differences between the four *madhhabs* in the realm of legal theory have to do with the so-called supplementary principles of legal construction alluded to above. Of these, two are predominant, namely those referred to by means of the terms *istiḥsān* ("preference") and *istiṣlāḥ* ("consideration of public utility"). The first, which is acknowledged by the Ḥanafī school, allows a jurist to set aside a rule deduced analogically from a text in favor of another rule, whose basis in the text is less obvious but which in the jurist's personal judgment provides a more equitable solution to the case at hand. The second, which originated within the Mālikī school but was also later accepted by some legists of the Shāfi'ī and Ḥanbalī schools, allowed a jurist to formulate a rule on the basis of a perceived contribution to the common good (*maṣlaḥah*). Discussions of what was entailed in the notion of the common good proceeded from the conviction that the essential guidelines were to be found in the texts and culminated in some very profound probings into the "ultimate purposes" (*maqāsid*) of the law of God. Since *istiḥsān* and *istiṣlāḥ* are kindred principles, and since neither in its classical formulation entailed a conscious turning away from the texts in favor of a totally independent use of human reason but looked to the texts for ultimate guidance, we may assess the differences between the *madhhabs* in regard to these principles as relatively minor.

The large measure of agreement which the four *madh-*

habs eventually arrived at in the theoretical realm helped to foster toleration of the differences between them in the realm of positive legal doctrine. The formulation of rules of law on the basis of the recognized sources was understood to be an arduous scholarly task, leading frequently to results of a quite tentative nature. A jurist who was qualified for this task was, in fact, called a *mujtahid* ("one who strives"), and the work of the *mujtahid* is accordingly called *ijtihād* ("striving"). The result of this work was classified as "opinion" (*ẓann*). Thus the rules formulated by the *mujtahids* represented at best their considered opinion, reached after much "striving," as to what the sources dictated with respect to specific cases presented to them. This recognition of the tentativeness of at least part of the positive law constructed by the jurists militated against a dogmatic attachment to any one *madhhab* as the sole valid expression of the law of God.

Alternatives to the Classical Theory. Although the espousal of the classical theory by the four Sunnī *madhhabs* assured it a position of undisputed predominance within the larger world of Islam, this theory by no means monopolized Muslim thinking completely.

The Zāhirī theory. Among the earlier Sunnī *madhhabs* which eventually disappeared, one—the Zāhirī *madhhab*—propounded a literalist theory of legal construction which, through the writings of the *madhhab*'s greatest representative, Ibn Ḥazm of Cordova (d. 1064), was to remain after the demise of the *madhhab* as a permanent challenge to the classical theory, to be considered whenever the works of Ibn Ḥazm were studied. The most distinctive feature of the Zāhirī theory was its decisive rejection of analogical deduction. Its literalism was of a radical sort requiring exclusive adherence to legal rules contained within the text's meaning as determined solely through the tools of the Arabic linguistic sciences. Analogical deduction was considered too speculative, as it seemed, in the Zāhirī view, to entail a purely human determination of a legal rule, even if the presumed basis (*'illah*) were said to be inferred from the texts; and rules, according to the Zāhirīyah, were not for man to determine in any degree. The presence of the Zāhirī legacy within the Islamic legal tradition promoted intensive reflection among the legists upon the fundamental question of what constitutes the meaning of a text. The Zāhirīyah, in the interests of legal development, tended to stretch the concept of meaning to include much of what the four principal *madhhabs* considered to be established by analogy, so that the dispute was, partly at least, over methodological justification for commonly accepted positive doctrine.

The Shi'ī theory. Even more potent than the Zāhirī theory as a challenge to the thinking of the four *madh-*

habs were the theories developed within Shi'ī Islam and especially within that branch known as Imāmī, or Twelver, Shiism. Twelver theory, like the Zāhirī, rejects analogical deduction, but the prevailing school of thought among the Twelvers, that of the *Uṣūliyah*, posits in its place "reason" (*'aql*) as the fourth source of law. Included under this rubric are a number of "rational" operations. Some of these are essentially interpretative activities and as such are considered to be "dependent" upon the texts, in the sense that they do not lead to any conclusion apart from the texts; others are completely autonomous. Of the latter operations, the most significant is the rational perception of good and evil, a notion derived from an early Muslim school of thought known as the Mu'tazilah but denied universally by later Sunnī thinkers. The three remaining sources posited by the Sunnī *madhhabs* are accepted in Twelver theory but with important modifications. The *sunnah* of the Prophet is expanded into the *sunnah* of the "infallible authority" (*al-ma'ṣūm*) so as to include also the sayings of the imams, or spiritual heads of the community, who are deemed no less infallible than the Prophet. As for the consensus, which Twelver theorists take to be the general consensus of the community as a whole, it is reduced to the role of disseminator of the doctrine of the infallible authority, and the notion of an infallible consensus coequal as a material source of law with the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* of the Prophet is regarded as a Sunnī aberration stemming from the treasonous election of Abū Bakr as the first caliph. During the long period intervening between the entry of the twelfth imam into a state of "occultation" (believed to have occurred in 876) and his anticipated return, the community depends on the spiritual guidance of *mujtahids*, who, though not infallible—even when in agreement—are qualified by virtue of their superior knowledge of the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* of the "infallible authority" (as enshrined in Shi'ī *ḥadīth* collections) to carry on the task of developing the positive law in response to communal needs. Unlike the Sunnī legists, however, these *mujtahids* are not divided into a plurality of *madhhabs*—a most reprehensible situation, to the Shi'ī way of thinking—but constitute one unified and exclusively valid *madhhab*, that of the imams and the Prophet themselves.

'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh. Interest in the methods and principles governing the derivation of positive rules from the sources of law gave rise to a special Islamic science called *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, whose business it was to spell out these methods and principles in detail and to deal with every conceivable issue that might arise in connection with them. This science was distinguished from *'ilm al-fiqh*, the science of positive law as such. To-

gether, these two sciences constitute the two main branches of what may be called, in the broadest sense of the term, Islamic jurisprudence.

Although Shāfi'ī, described already as the architect of the theory of the four sources, may also be regarded as the founder of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, especially by virtue of his treatise known generally as the *Risālah*, the primary agents in the development of this science in the century or so after Shāfi'ī were a number of prominent members of the Mu'tazilī school, mentioned above. There is, in fact, a close connection between the development of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* and that of speculative theology (*'ilm al-kalām*), in which the Mu'tazilah played a prominent role; and as the agents in the one were also the agents in the other, it is not surprising that the method of investigation which prevailed in speculative theology, namely that of dialectic, prevailed also in *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*. After the eclipse of the Mu'tazilī school of theology by the "orthodox" Ash'arī and Māturīdī schools, the further development of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* was carried on by theorists of all four *madhhabs*, many of whom adhered to these two later schools.

It should be noted, finally, that despite its great thoroughness and finesse *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* was seldom put to practice for the purpose either of producing new law or of reforming existing law. The greater part of the legal doctrine of the four *madhhabs* was formulated long before *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* reached maturity and is, in fact, in large measure a legacy of the ancient schools of law, as Schacht has shown. The methods and principles elaborated in *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* were consequently viewed as identical with those presumed to have been employed by the great masters of an earlier period, especially the eponyms of the four *madhhabs*. *'Ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*—at least in its later mature form—sought simply to articulate what was supposed to have been implicit in the work of the masters. At the same time it always stood as a potential resource for any daring mind which might wish to take a fresh and independent look at the inherited doctrine and embark on a new *ijtihād* in emulation of the masters themselves.

[See also *Islamic Law and the biographies of the figures mentioned herein.*]

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UTOPIA. The term *utopia* (from the Greek *ou-topos*, "no place," or *eu-topos*, "good place," and evidently coined as a pun by Thomas More for the title of his book published in 1516) has very diverse, often confusing connotations. Sometimes it is used to mean any idealization of the distant or primordial past, when humans lived closer to the gods (or God), as found in Sumero-Akkadian cuneiform accounts of Dilman; in the Hebrew story of Eden of *Genesis*; in portrayals of the Golden Age by Hesiod, Vergil, Symmachus, and other Greek and Roman writers; in myths of the "perfect great period" (*kṛtayuga*, *susamā*, etc.) in later Vedic, earlier Jain, and Buddhist traditions; or in accounts of the early age of the four (mythic) emperors of popular Chinese thought. [See Golden Age.] In some ancient cultures, the original inhabitants of certain foreign regions were imagined to live in an innocent, trouble-free state (the Greeks, for instance, wrote of the Ethiopians, Scythians, and others in this fashion), while not a few students of prehistory in modern times have visualized the earliest humans as herbivores, free from war (as held by Richard Leakey), or as without the sexual constraints and inequalities of later ages (as held by Friedrich Engels).

In contrast, the term *utopia* at other times refers to the future realization of some perfect place and time. It can take on futurist instead of primitivist associations, thus becoming a lost paradise regained, the projection of the hopes and dreams of a millenarianism (the kingdom of God or its equivalent on earth), or the establishment of an ideal society divinely or otherwise sanctioned to replace the glaring ills of the day. [See Millenarianism.] Occasionally notions of heavenly worlds—such as the mythic Isles of the Blessed in Greco-Roman belief, the Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhist Pure Land of the West, or the Qur'anic vision of heaven as fertile gardens with maidservants—have been described as utopian, as also have visions of an eternal city set above the known order, such as Augustine's City of God, which nevertheless partakes of earthly affairs.

A more traditional understanding of utopia (as in More) is that of a distant, wondrous land allegedly discovered and described by a traveler returning home. Hints of this are found in Homer's *Odyssey* (the account of the Phaeacians), and the earliest extant written description of utopia is that of Euhemerus, who not only argued that the gods were originally deified mortals but also described an idyllic social order outside the bounds and difficulties of ordinary human life. Interestingly,

priests are the effective rulers of the Sacred Isle, although they have no official political status.

Pertinent comparisons here include the Greek romancer (and perhaps Cynic) Iambulus writing on the island City of the Sun (early first century BCE), the church historian Socrates on the location of Eden (440 CE), More's *Utopia* (1516), the Spanish explorer Garcilaso de la Vega's impressions of the Inca empire (1617), the Rosicrucian Johann Valentin Andreae's *Christianopolis* (1619), the Dominican Tommaso Campanella's *City of the Sun* (1623), empiricist Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1627), and *philosophe* Denis Diderot's *Tahiti* (1772), all Western in origin. More's crescent-shaped, two-hundred-mile-long, substantially urbanized island utopia is the most famous, remarkable for its religious tolerance and its endearing priests, who do not persecute but instead constrain those few who happen to hold to the three destructive, forbidden views: that the soul is mortal, that the world is the outcome of mere chance, and that there is no reward or punishment after death.

Possible Eastern analogues to these strangely removed lands are found in Chinese and particularly Taoist beliefs from the fourth century CE onward. Accordingly, select individuals could secure, by some potion or other means, virtual immortality, and "not somewhere else out of this world," as Joseph Needham puts it, "nor in the underworld of the Yellow Springs, but among the mountains and forests here and forever." Looking further afield, from the pre-Christian Americans we learn of South American Indian migrations (the Guarini, in particular) in quest of the "land without evil" to the east. In transitional Melanesia, individuals who have managed to journey well beyond their own cultural bounds during colonial times (such as police, recruited laborers, and others) have often spun together novel mythic histories about where the whites came from—Britain, Germany, Jerusalem, Sydney, and so on—and how they acquired "cargo" (European goods). From such far-off utopias, where God, the ancestors, and culture heroes are present, cargo came as transformation and blessing to the islanders. [See Cargo Cults.]

In our day, the idea of utopia has become inseparable from utopianism, the systematic attempt to engineer a preferable, even perfect society. The origins of utopia in this sense might be said to go back to the construction of the first cities (according to Lewis Mumford) or at least to the schemes of Plato (and the lesser-known Greek thinkers Hippodamus and Phaleas). But many scholars do not consider this exercise in model building for revolutionary social transformation much older than the eighteenth century (the moderately aristocratic *Oceana* scheme by the Englishman James Harrington in 1656 being only faintly precursory), and they have

pointed out the central role of the Western ideal of universal progression toward utopianism's realization. They also recognize the secondary importance of practical experimentation in the Americas, where, especially in North America, European colonists attempted to establish new kinds of community or sought a new paradise in the wilderness away from the evils of the Old World.

Utopianist designs for social reconstruction have not always been distinctly religious, except insofar as their ethical stances reflect spiritual values. As the chief protagonist in Plato's *Republic*, Socrates was an atheist when it came to the old gods, yet the guardians of his new polity were to be fully enlightened by the supreme idea of the good (the equivalent of God). In modern times, utopianists have voiced radically anticlerical, if not anti-Christian sentiments, yet they have been dominated by a vision of what is ethically right regarding human relationships. The first utopia as a projected, future program rather than a millennial fiat was that of the French progressivist Sebastian Mercier. In his tract on the year 2440 (written in 1770) he expressed his wish that the church as he knew it would not survive, but nonetheless he imagined an initiation ceremony using telescopes and microscopes, in which young people would discover God, the author of nature (which, in turn, would serve as the basis of justice). Disillusioned with ecclesiastical orthodoxy, in 1825, one of his successors, Saint-Simon, wrote *New Christianity*, and the renowned Charles Fourier described a New Earth in the dawning of the Third Age, like Joachim di Fiore's Age of the Spirit (1847). If François-Noël Babeuf and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, two other French utopianists, were secular communists in their approach, each nevertheless preached with a religious intensity against injustice. There were other European utopian thinkers in the nineteenth century, both English and continental, from Scottish industrial reformer Robert Owen, a man touched by Christian millennial hopes in his *New Vision of Society* (1813), to vehemently antireligious anarchists, including Petr Kropotkin, a Russian litterateur active at the end of the century.

Marxism has been characterized as a species of secular utopianism, even millenarianism, for presaging a future, supranational society free of classes following a series of proletarian revolutions. Both Karl Marx himself and his collaborator Engels, however, detached themselves from the utopians (especially Proudhon) by arguing that the historical process rather than artificial reorganization would produce a radically better order. However, the fact that the programs of Lenin and Stalin in Russia, Mao Tse-tung in China, Kim Il Sung in North Korea, and others reveal massive political manipula-

tion and forced mobilizations to support communist state policies suggests that where Marxism has been dominant in certain societies, politics have typically drifted toward the utopian, social-engineering model that Marx himself disdained. The end product of these maneuvers was meant to be a society free not only from classes but from religion.

Communism and socialism take a number of forms, although many less obviously political expressions are often referred to as communalisms, communitarianisms, or communes. Many and varied small-scale utopian communities have been established in the modern-day West, with the greatest number in North America. One discovers parallel and prototypic communities in earlier religious history: the Chinese Taoist and Neo-Confucian retreats of sagehood (Chang Tao-ling at Dragon Tiger Mountain, Kiangsi, during the first century CE, or Chou Tun-i at Lu Shan, c. 1050); in the early monasticisms (both the Jain and Buddhist traditions in India, the Jewish Qumranites and Therapeutae, the Christian Pachomians, Benedictines and their medieval successors, etc.); in the elitist, and for all appearances sectarian, spiritual fraternities (Indian *āśramas*, the ancient gnostic and hermetic schools of Egypt, the medieval Brethren of the Free Spirit in Germany and the Low Countries, the Rosicrucian Order, and other esoteric groups in seventeenth-century England and Germany); and in the communities of the radical Reformation (Anabaptists, Hutterites, etc.) with this tradition generating Mennonite, Amish, and other experiments in North America, including the Quaker City of Brotherly Love, Philadelphia.

By the nineteenth century the United States was sprinkled with many religious communities, at that time often dubbed "socialisms" (John Humphrey Noyes documented at least forty-eight in his *History of American Socialisms*, 1870) but today more likely called utopias or (somewhat pejoratively) "cults." The most famous, distinctly religious examples were Amana in Iowa, New Harmony in Indiana (inspired by Owen), the Shaker and Oneida communities (in New York and elsewhere), as well as the Mormon settlements in Utah. During the first half of this century such communities were spawned in the northwestern states, and since World War II the popularity of life in communes or special retreats has grown, especially in California because of the impact of Eastern meditative traditions and the rejection of highly mechanized and plutocratic North American society (in favor of, for example, a drug culture, anarchy, or a more highly disciplined, ascetic way of life). Some have been inspired by Thoreau's *Walden* and other American celebrations of seclusion in the wild, others by ravaged Amerindian traditions. Compa-

rable postwar communes were established in northern Europe and Australia.

In view of these developments and the growth of state communism, Christian theologians have debated whether Christianity is a utopian faith. Reinhold Niebuhr characterized the Christian position as anti-utopian because evil can never be eradicated from society, while Paul Tillich argued that utopian dreaming has positive value in setting ideal goals but must be transcended when only enslavement or force can secure its long-lasting actualization. Modern Eastern philosophers, particularly Indian gurus who have encouraged or founded new communes, characteristically teach that such communities are but transitory supports before liberation from the realm of physical contingency and karmic law.

Utopia is a subject for both the sociology and psychology of religion. [See Community.] When attempts are made to realize a utopian scheme, it is important to ask questions about social dynamics, the role of a charismatic leader or elders, its degree of durability, and the rate of attrition. A stringently prestructured scheme usually results in a more legalistic orientation and a greater resort to authoritarianism, while in looser efforts at cooperation unity is maintained more by common hope of labors rewarded or a coming transformation. A shared sense of purpose, however, especially by the genuinely faithful, is crucial for the survival of either kind of movement. Apropos to religious categorization, utopianism tends to characterize sectarian, spiritualistic, and mystical persuasions, just as most utopists in the political arena tend to reject the current order of realpolitik, feeling it reflects the morally bankrupt established system.

Utopianism in practice is as attractive psychologically as millenarianism is for idealists, or for those in quest of some certainty and an anxiety-free existence in a sea of cultural, religious, and ethical pluralism. Utopia can also provide, as can the millennial transformation to come, satisfaction for feelings of resentment toward the world's ills or the society from which utopists secede. A need for the certainty a utopia can provide often coincides with extensive rule making and authoritarianism, while recriminatory tendencies can lead to isolationism and relative xenophobia.

Utopianism, when viewed as an oneiric tendency to project a vision of a better life or as exercises of the imagination that lead to social questioning, is more a product of the mind and religious intellectual activity than social organization. The contemplation of happiness and what it entails is a perennial feature of philosophical reflection in religious or quasi-religious traditions, and utopianism is one of its clearer manifes-

tations. Students of the unconscious will note that the displacement of reality for imagined visualization can compel archetypally vivid dreams and rich symbols. Psychoanalytically interesting, moreover, is the aspect of utopias that touches on sexual mores. Thomas More imagined an ideal marriage state, with children being brought up by the community as a whole. An actual attempt at reconstructing Eden-like conditions of the male-female union came with the Adamites, one pre-Reformation group of which was isolated on an island in the river Elbe in Germany from the fifteenth century onward. Members went naked (a reminder that nudist colonies are essentially utopian), and the "naturalness" in the sexual relations of later groups are portrayed in the indelible symbols of Hieronymous Bosch's *Garden of Worldly Delights* (1506?). A modern utopia of particular interest regarding the relationship of religion and sexuality is the Oneida community which was governed by Noyes's complex books of instruction. [See the biography of Noyes.]

Whether as a product of thought or action, or analyzed in a sociological or psychological sense, utopianism characteristically betrays assumptions about the limited relevance of historical change. Utopias are often conceived, sometimes unwillingly, "as good patterns of life in an ahistorical cosmos" (Olson, 1982). Little thought is given to what may lie beyond or develop out of these Utopias in the future, since, like the millennium, they constitute an end or proper fulfillment of the known order. Unlike the millennium, however, utopia can be discovered, and although it may also be the product of dreaming and imagination, it can be devised rationally and is not constructed only from the elusiveness and ambiguities of apocalyptic literary authorities. Admittedly some forms of millennialism, particularly those of American theologians who preached that the kingdom of God had to be worked for on earth (as documented best by Ernest Lee Tuveson), compare better with utopian visions. On the other hand, such visions are not intrinsically incompatible with noneschatological or more decidedly secular approaches to social reform. Marx, Freud, and other atheist commentators, however, suggest that all religion is inherently utopian in reflecting the presumptions or hypothesizing about a given realm—especially the afterlife—that escapes the ordinary contingencies of material existence and selfhood. And if this is at least arguable, so too it can be proposed that utopia is fundamentally a given of religious consciousness.

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UTU was the Sumerian god of the sun (he is identified with the Akkadian Shamash) and city god of Sippar. Utu was the son of the moon god, Nanna, and therefore brother of Inanna and Ishkur. As god of the sun, Utu was believed to ride the heavens from sunrise to sunset in a chariot pulled by four storm-beasts, and then to descend to the netherworld at sunset to continue his circuit until the morning. A frequent scene in cylinder-seal iconography shows Utu rising in the eastern mountains, depicted as holding a "saw" (the sun's rays).

Utu held an important position in the pantheon even though he does not figure prominently in mythological tales. According to the myth *Enki and the World Order*, Enki fixed the borders of cities and states and then placed Utu in charge of the entire universe, a confirmation of Utu's role as the preeminent judge of gods and men. Perhaps it is because the eye of the sun surveys the world that Utu held this position; his accompanying attendants were Justice and Righteousness. Judgment took place in the morning, when the gods assembled; without Utu's rising, there could be no justice. Similarly, other normal daytime events could not take place

without Utu, and therefore kingship, healing, oracular functions, hunting, fishing, weaving, and even warfare were said to be dependent on him.

As judge, Utu was considered the helper of the just man and the foil of evildoers. The guardian of justice and advocate of the oppressed, he safeguarded the orphan, the widow, and the poor, a role that was also attributed to the goddess Nanshe. It was Utu's function to right injustice, and the oppressed turned to him with their cry "I-Utu" ("O Utu!"), a term that became synonymous with oppression itself, and even with (complaining) malcontents.

Utu's role as judge extended to nonearthly matters. Afflictions such as illness could be envisioned as a contest between humans and demonic powers. The *bit rimki*, an ablution ritual known from the Assyrian period, included a cycle of hymns and prayers to the sun god Shamash, who was believed to judge cases brought by supplicants against demonic adversaries. There are bilingual Sumerian-Akkadian versions of some of the Utu-Shamash supplications, which may indicate that the Sumerian Utu, like Shamash-Utu in the later texts, was also conceived as judging between demons and people. Utu did have power over ghosts; the lengthy Sumerian hymnal *Incantation to Utu*, which celebrates Utu's role as judge, contains extensive supplications against evil ghosts who may roam the world (Castellino, 1969). Yet another Utu hymn, which also concerns

ghosts, may be imploring Utu to allow a dead man into the netherworld (Cohen, 1977).

Utu seems to have controlled access to and egress from the netherworld, a power possibly related to his own ability to enter the netherworld every evening and emerge at sunrise. Thus, in the myth *Gilgamesh, Enkidu, and the Netherworld*, Enkidu is trapped in the netherworld until Enki has Utu open a "window" so that Enkidu may ascend. Utu also served as judge of the netherworld, a function shared somewhat with the deified dead Gilgamesh. This judgment of the dead and of the other denizens of the netherworld does not seem to have involved a concept of eternal reward and punishment, and probably consisted of settling disputes and keeping the peace between the souls there.

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V



VAIKHĀNASAS. The chief “priests” (*arcakas*) in more than half the Viṣṇu temples in the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and parts of Karnataka—including the renowned Hindu pilgrimage center, Tirupati in Andhra Pradesh—Vaikhānasas are a tiny, widely dispersed brahman community of about 2,500 families. Claiming to be a surviving school of Vedic ritual performance, the Taittiriya *sākhā* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, Vaikhānasas have their own complete Vedic Kalpasūtra in addition to prescriptive manuals on temple performances exemplifying the so-called Āgama literature. Beyond the intrinsic interest of their literature and the evidence it provides for further inquiry into questions of continuity and change in India’s religious traditions, Vaikhānasas command special interest and attention because of their contemporary temple activities and efforts to maintain community integrity despite accelerating social and technical change.

Manu’s discussion of *vanaprastha* (“forest-dweller,” the third of the four classical *āśramas*) mentions a “Vaikhānasa rule” (*Mānava Dharmaśāstra* 6.21). As other ancient authorities seem to support this reference, it appears quite likely that there existed a distinct Vaikhānasa reclusive community some time before the beginning of the common era, though the extant Vaikhānasa *sūtras* seem to be no older than the fourth century CE. The Vaikhānasa *Gr̥hyasūtras* prescribe a daily worship of Viṣṇu that involves the fabrication of an image and is said to be “equal to the worship of all the gods” (*Vaikhānasa Gr̥hyasūtra* 4.10–12). In essential details, this devotional service prefigures the *arcanca* (service to images) detailed in the Vaikhānasa *Samhitās*; hence, it is plausible that Vaikhānasa literature docu-

ments the community’s transition from a Vedic “school” of ritual observance to a “school” of the religious performances characteristic of Hindu devotional cults.

Louis Renou proposed (*L’Inde classique*, vol. 1) that the Vaikhānasa is a *bhāgavata* tradition that, while emphasizing Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa *bhakti*, did not exhibit the sectlike exclusivity apparently characteristic of early Pāñcarātra *ekāntins* (“monotheists”). Certainly, the Vaikhānasas’ own insistence that they are *vaidikas* and not *tāntrikas* clearly evidences their concern with distinguishing themselves from *pāñcarātrikas*. This concern is further illustrated in their refusal (at least since the late nineteenth century) to undergo *Vaiṣṇavadīkṣā* (“initiation” as a Vaiṣṇava) on the grounds that they are “Vaiṣṇavas from birth” because their mothers underwent a particular life-cycle rite (*saṃskāra*) during their first pregnancies. Still, the exact historical relationship between Vaikhānasas and *pāñcarātrikas* remains unclear.

Inscriptions from perhaps the eighth century CE identify Vaikhānasas as temple functionaries. According to Vaikhānasa tradition, the sage Vikhanas (a manifestation of Brahmā or Viṣṇu) composed the *Vaikhānasa Kalpasūtra* and taught four disciples—Atri, Bhṛgu, Kāśyapa, and Marīci—the procedures of *samūrtārcana* (“devotional service [to Viṣṇu] in images”). *Samhitās* (“collections”) of versions of these instructions, said to have been authored by these four disciples, constitute the core of Vaikhānasa literature.

More so than their Pāñcarātra counterparts, the Vaikhānasa *Samhitās* are the literature of ritual prescription, providing detailed instructions from priest to priest for constructing and dedicating temples and im-

ages and for conducting religious ceremonies involving them. While not negligible (as some scholars have asserted), the explicit *jñāna* sections of these texts are brief, and thus certain important features must be inferred from their discussions of ritual. These texts emphasize the distinction between Viṣṇu as the pervasive, unfigured (*niṣkala*) presence in the universe and his figured (*sakala*) presence occasioned in his graceful response to intent devotional meditation. Initially, this is the meditation of the *arcaka* who conducts the proceedings through which the deity comes to dwell in prepared images; subsequently, it is the essence of the behavior of devotees toward images so enlivened. Discussion of cosmogony in the Vaikhānasa texts principally traces the backgrounds of the human predicament: our being caught in *saṃsāra*. According to Vaikhānasa teaching, *mokṣa* is "release" into Viṣṇu's heaven, and the nature of one's *mokṣa* depends on a devotee's service: attentive repetition of prayer (*japa*), sacrifice (*huta*), service to images (*arcana*), or meditation conforming to yogic regimen (*dhyāna*). Among these four, the *Marīci Saṃhitā* declares that *arcana* is the realization (*sādhana*) of all aims.

[See also Vaiṣṇavism and Tamil Religions.]

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Among helpful recent or forthcoming studies on ritual, architectural, and other aspects of Vaikhānasa literature and practice are Gérard Colas's "État des recherches sur les Visnouites vaikhānasa," *Bulletin d'études indiennes* 2 (1984): 73–86, and his annotated (French) translation of architectural teachings in the *Marīcisamhitā* (Institut Français d'Indologie). See also my "Mahāsaṃprokṣaṇa, 1981: Agama and Actuality in a Contemporary Temple Renovation," *Agama and Silpa* (Bombay, 1984), pp. 69–102, and "Tradition, Text, Person," *History of Religions* (May, 1986).

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VÄINÄMÖINEN is the protagonist of the Finnish national epic, the *Kalevala*, and an important figure in ten ancient Finnish poems in *Kalevala* meter. He is the inventor of the *kantele* (the ancient psaltery used to accompany the chanting of the *Kalevala* epics), an expert singer, and a master musician. Väinämöinen has taken part in the primeval acts of creation; were he to be killed, joy and song would depart this earth.

Väinämöinen's name is derived from the word *väinä*, meaning a strait or a wide, slowly flowing river. The derivation seems to indicate that Väinämöinen was originally associated with water, but scholars are not in agreement about this or any other explanation of the hero's original character. He often goes by the epithet "the old one," and he is repeatedly characterized as "the everlasting wise man."

The images of Väinämöinen that occur in folk poetry can be grouped into four basic types: (1) creator of the primeval sea, (2) culture hero, (3) shaman hero, and (4) sea hero and suitor.

1. As creator of the primeval sea, Väinämöinen shapes the seabed by creating holes and shoals in it. Once his work is done, a bird—an eagle, a scaup duck, or a goose—makes a nest on his knee and lays an egg (in some versions, eggs). When Väinämöinen shifts his knee the egg breaks, and the pieces become the various elements of the world:

What was the egg's upper shell
became the heavens above
what was the egg's lower shell
became mother earth below
what was the white of the egg
became the moon in the sky
what was the yolk of the egg
became the sun in the sky
what on the egg was mottled
became the stars in heaven
what on the egg was blackish
became the clouds in the sky.

(Bosley trans., in Kuusi
et al., 1977)

Väinämöinen then joins his brother Ilmarinen in the upper aerial regions to strike a spark that falls through the nine heavens to Lake Alue. Väinämöinen's association with celestial bodies is reflected in the old Finnish names for Orion and the Pleiades, which mean "Väinämöinen's scythe" and "Väinämöinen's birchbark shoes," respectively.

2. As culture hero, Väinämöinen builds the primeval boat, which one day strikes a great pike from whose bones he makes the first *kantele*, which he uses to enchant the world. In Ingria (the region between Estland and Lake Ladoga) various goods are made from the

great oak felled at Väinämöinen's command. In some regions Väinämöinen was believed to be the first cultivator of flax and hemp as well as the inventor of the fishnet. He is also credited with concocting various ointments and curing diseases and with the ability to stop the flow of his own blood. Like most culture heroes, Väinämöinen departed from the world, in his case in an iron-bottomed boat, once mankind had reached a certain level of development, and is prophesied to return in the future.

3. As shaman hero, Väinämöinen uses his singing to charm the young Saami (Lapp) Joukahainen, a rival shaman, into a swamp, where he abandons him by revoking his magical song. Other shamanistic motifs include Väinämöinen's crossing a river to visit Tuonela (the land of the dead) and returning as a snake, and his obtaining knowledge from Antero Vipunen, a dead wise man. [See also Tuonela.] Väinämöinen also resorts to shamanistic power in his quest for the *sampo*, a support of the world. A belt worn by Finnish shamans up to the nineteenth century, from which magic objects were hung and which was used as an aid in incantation, was known as "the belt of old Väinämöinen."

4. As sea hero and suitor, Väinämöinen appears in those parts of the extensive *Sampo* epic cycle concerning his theft of the *sampo* and the contest among heroes for the mistress of Pohjola ("homestead of the north"). In one episode a Saami shoots Väinämöinen, who falls into the sea and drifts until he is rescued by the mistress of Pohjola. At other times he engages in a dispute with Ilmarinen's sister Anni or makes an unsuccessful attempt to capture a mermaid. Finally, he orders the killing of a fatherless half-month-old boy in a marsh. When the baby suddenly begins to speak, deprecating the old man, Väinämöinen is compelled to rescind his order. In Elias Lönnrot's redaction, this final scene of the *Kalevala* is intended to be an allegory for the retreat of paganism and the rise of Christianity.

The tradition of poem-cycles and miniature epics with Väinämöinen as chief protagonist began in the distant past. The oldest stratum of this tradition represents Väinämöinen as an epic or cosmological figure. The newer stratum depreciates his role, or even satirizes him. The two strata tended to mix during the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries; Lönnrot brought this process to its logical conclusion when he compiled and edited the *Kalevala*. At the same time, he strengthened Väinämöinen's central position by casting him in roles originally occupied by other characters. He also divested him of mythological features and endowed him with human, though manifestly heroic, traits.

[See also Finnic Religions; Ilmarinen; and Lemminkäinen.]

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VAIŠEŠIKA. The Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy, founded by Kaṇāda (sixth century BCE?), has concentrated mostly on issues and themes of ontology and has closely cooperated with the Nyāya, its sister philosophical school, on matters of epistemology. Like many other schools of Indian philosophy, it upholds that all living beings, human or nonhuman, have souls that are different from the body, eternal, and ubiquitous; that the supreme goal of life is liberation from the bondage of *karman* and the cycle of birth and rebirth; and that the attainment of liberation is the only means of ensuring freedom from all suffering.

According to Vaiśeṣika teaching, the soul is a kind of substance that is conceived as the substratum of quality particulars (*guṇas*) and motion. Both quality particulars and motion are related to the substance by way of inherence (*samavāya*). *Samavāya* is a special kind of relation as well as an independent ontic category that binds only those two kinds of relata, one of which must be destroyed with the severance of the relationship. Substances, quality particulars, and motions share common properties, or universals, that are eternal and independent of their substrates and yet related to them by way of inherence. Physical substances are produced from combinations of atoms, which are eternal, indivisible, and imperceptible. Each eternal substance is characterized by an ultimate differentiator (*viśeṣa*), which serves as a basis of distinction under circumstances where no ordinary means of distinction is available. Besides the above six kinds of positive ontological categories—substance, quality particular, motion, universal, inherence, and ultimate individuator—there is a negative ontic category, including such entities as absence (as of a book on the table), difference (as of one thing from another), and so on.

The Vaiśeṣika school seeks to prove the existence of the soul by arguing that desire, cognition, and other attributes are quality particulars and must be supported by a substance that is nonphysical because they are radically different in many ways from the quality particu-

lars of physical substances. Such a substance must also be permanent and endure through time; otherwise no satisfactory account can be given of such phenomena as memory. It must further be eternal and in particular, preexistent before birth, or else one cannot account for the fact that a newborn child reaches out for its mother's milk, given that the infant's action is claimed to be purposive and involve memory (which can only have been acquired in a previous life).

One of the souls, called Īśvara (God), is said to be endowed with superhuman qualities such as omniscience. Īśvara's existence is inferred from the premise that a conscious agent is required not only for the creation of artifacts such as a pot, but indeed for all effects, and that the conscious agent responsible for bringing about a conjunction of atoms leading to the production of macrocosmic objects can only be Īśvara. He is also inferred as the author of revealed scriptures and further as the original bestower of significance on linguistic symbols, an act making all communication possible.

[See also Nyāya.]

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The best book on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is Gopinath Bhattacharya's edition and translation of the *Tarkasamgrahadīpikā* (Calcutta, 1976). For readers who are less technically minded, but still want a comprehensive and precise account, the best book is *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, edited by Karl H. Potter (Princeton, 1977), volume 2 of *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. The general reader may profitably consult Mysore Hiriyanna's *Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (London, 1949).

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VAIṢṆAVISM. [This entry treats the various regional and cultic manifestations of the worship of the god Viṣṇu and other related deities. It consists of three articles:

- An Overview
- Bhāgavatas
- Pāñcarātras

For discussion of the religious systems that developed around the god Kṛṣṇa, see also Kṛṣṇaism. Other specific expressions of Vaiṣṇavism can be found in Ālṅkāras; Śrī Vaiṣṇavas; and Vaikhānasas. Viṣṇu, Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa, and Rāma are also the subjects of independent entries.]

An Overview

The origin of Vaiṣṇavism as a theistic sect can by no means be traced back to the Ṛgvedic god Viṣṇu. In fact,

Vaiṣṇavism is in no sense Vedic in origin. Indology has now outgrown its older tendency to derive all the religious ideologies and practices of classical India—indeed, all aspects of classical Indian thought and culture—from the Veda. It must be remembered that when the Vedic Aryans migrated into India, they did not step into a religious vacuum. On the strength of newly available evidence, it is possible to identify at least two pre-Vedic non-Aryan cults. One was the *muni-yati* cult, which must be distinguished from the exotic Vedic Aryan *ṛṣi* cult. The *muni-yati* cult, with its characteristic features such as yoga, *tapas*, and *saṁnyāsa*, was an intrinsic component of both the Śiva religion, which had been deeply rooted and widely spread in pre-Vedic India, and the ancient Magadhan religiophilosophical complex, which later served as the fountainhead of such heterodox religions as Jainism and Buddhism. The second cult, that of *bhakti*, is more pertinent to our present purpose. The autochthonous character of *bhakti* in the sense of exclusive devotion to a personal divinity, as evidenced by several aboriginal Indian religions, is now generally accepted. These two cults can be seen to have influenced the hieratic Vedic cult to a certain extent both positively and negatively. Positively, the Vedic religion adopted into its pantheon the pre-Vedic non-Aryan Śiva in the form of Rudra. Similarly, there is every reason to assume that some of Vasiṣṭha's hymns to Varuṇa in the seventh book of the *Ṛgveda* reflect certain essential traits of *bhakti*. Negatively, the hieratic Vedic religion clearly betrays its aversion to such adjuncts of the Śiva religion as *yatis*, *śiśnadevas*, and *mūradevas*.

Once established, the Vedic religion succeeded in keeping the indigenous religious cults of India suppressed for a fairly long time. When, however, about the end of the period of the major Upaniṣads (eighth to sixth centuries BCE), the authority of Vedism began to decline, the non-Vedic religious cults again came into their own. Whereas some of them, like the ones that later developed into Jainism and Buddhism, refused to accept Vedic authority, the theistic cults sought its blessing and sanction.

Vāsudevism. The theistic cult centered on *bhakti* for the deified Vṛṣṇi hero Vāsudeva, who is not mentioned in any early text. With the decline of Vedism, the cult emerged as a significant force. Strangely, the available evidence shows that the worship of Vāsudeva, and not that of Viṣṇu, marks the beginning of what we today understand by Vaiṣṇavism. This Vāsudevism, which represents the earliest known phase of Vaiṣṇavism, must already have become stabilized in the days of Pāṇini (sixth to fifth centuries BCE), for Pāṇini was required in his *Aṣṭadhyāyī* to enunciate a special rule (4.3.98) to explain the formation of the word *vāsudevaka*

in the sense of a “*bhakta* or devotee of the preeminently venerable god Vāsudeva.”

The tradition of the Vāsudeva religion continued almost uninterrupted since that time. Megasthenes (fourth century BCE) must be referring to this religion when he speaks of the Sourasenoī (people of the Śūrasena or Mathura region) and their veneration of Herakles. A passage in the Buddhist *Niddesa* also points to the prevalence of Vāsudeva worship in the fourth century BCE. The *Bhagavadgītā* (third century BCE) eulogizes the man of knowledge, who, at the end of many births, betakes himself unto the god in the conviction that “Vāsudeva is All” (7.19). According to the Besnagar inscription (last quarter of the second century BCE), the Garuḍa column of Vāsudeva, the “god of gods,” was erected by Heliodoros, the Bhāgavata, of Takṣaśilā. The historical tradition that Vāsudeva originally belonged to the tribe of the Vṛṣṇis is also well attested. In the *Bhagavadgītā* (10.37) Lord Kṛṣṇa declares that of the Vṛṣṇis he is Vāsudeva. The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (150 BCE) also clearly speaks of Vāsudeva as belonging to the Vṛṣṇi tribe (*vārttika* 7 of 4.1.114). The inscriptions of Ghosundi and Nanaghat (both of the first century BCE) and the grammatical work *Kāśikā*, all of which associate Vāsudeva with Saṃkarṣaṇa (another deified Vṛṣṇi hero), further confirm the Vṛṣṇi lineage of Vāsudeva.

It may be noted that the Pāṇinian *sūtra* which establishes the Vāsudeva religion also suggests the existence of an independent religious sect, with Arjuna as its chief god. It would seem, however, that even in the initial stages of its development the Arjuna religion was subsumed by the Vāsudeva religion and thus disappeared completely from literature and history. The religion of Saṃkarṣaṇa also seems to have arisen independently of the Vāsudeva religion. In the *Mahābhārata*, Saṃkarṣaṇa (or Balarāma) is represented as the elder brother of Vāsudeva, but there is no indication in the epic of any religious sect having developed around him. However, the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (fourth century BCE) refers to spies disguised as the ascetic worshipers of Saṃkarṣaṇa (13.3.67). The Mathura sculpture (second century BCE) which depicts Saṃkarṣaṇa by himself is also highly suggestive in this context. The evidence of the *Niddesa*, the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, and the Ghosundi and Nanaghat inscriptions, on the other hand, shows that, presumably on account of their original Vṛṣṇi affiliations, the Saṃkarṣaṇa and Vāsudeva religions had come to be closely allied. With the development of the doctrine of the *vyūhas*, whereby Saṃkarṣaṇa came to be regarded as one of the *vyūhas* (standing for the individual self) subordinate to Vāsudeva (standing for the Highest Self), the Saṃkarṣaṇa religion lost its independent existence.

Kṛṣṇaism. Another theistic cult which gathered strength with the decline of Vedism centered on Kṛṣṇa, the deified tribal hero and religious leader of the Yādavas. There is sufficient evidence to show that Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa were originally two distinct personalities. The Yādava Kṛṣṇa may as well have been the same as Devakīputra Kṛṣṇa, who is represented in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (3.17.1) as a pupil of Ghora Āṅgīrasa and who is said to have learned from his teacher the doctrine that human life is a kind of sacrifice. Kṛṣṇa seems to have developed this doctrine in his own teaching, which was later incorporated in the *Bhagavadgītā*. In time, the Vṛṣṇis and the Yādavas, who were already related to each other, came closer together, presumably under political pressure. This resulted in the merging of the divine personalities of Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa to form a new supreme god, Bhagavān Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa. Evidence in Megasthenes and in Kauṭilya’s *Arthaśāstra* indicates that this new divinity was established as early as the fourth century BCE. Indeed, the names *Vāsudeva* and *Kṛṣṇa* began thereafter to be used indiscriminately to denote the same divine personality.

A third current was soon added to this swelling religious stream, in the form of the cult of Gopāla-Kṛṣṇa, which had originated among the nomadic cowherd community of the Ābhīras. Suggestions that the Gopāla-Kṛṣṇa cult shows traces of Christian influence or that it developed from Vedic sources are unacceptable. On the contrary, the religion of Gopāla-Kṛṣṇa seems to have spurned the Indra-dominated Vedic religion (as is evidenced by the Govardhana episode) and to have promoted religious sublimation of sensuous love (as represented by Kṛṣṇa’s relationship with the *gopīs*). The amalgamation of the Vāsudeva cult of the Vṛṣṇis, the Kṛṣṇa cult of the Yādavas, and the Gopāla cult of the Ābhīras gave rise to what may be called Greater Kṛṣṇaism. New legends came to be invented whereby Vāsudeva, Kṛṣṇa, and Gopāla were integrated into a single homogeneous mythological pattern. If Vāsudevism represented the first phase of Vaiṣṇavism, Greater Kṛṣṇaism represented its second (and perhaps most outstanding) phase.

Vaiṣṇavism. The seventh to fourth centuries BCE were a period of great philosophical ferment in India. Vedism was on the decline, and non-Vedic religions such as Jainism and Buddhism were gradually gaining ascendancy. That period also saw vigorous attempts by the vanguards of Vedism to resuscitate the Vedic way of life and thought through the Sūtra-Vedāṅga movement. Kṛṣṇaism followed an eminently practical course with a view to consolidating its position in the face of the expanding heterodoxy on the one hand, and the resurgence of Vedism on the other. The amalgamation of the

three theistic cults was an important step in the direction of such consolidation.

The other line of action adopted by Kṛṣṇaism was of a more vital character. Non-Vedic in origin and development, Kṛṣṇaism now sought affiliation with Vedism so that it could become acceptable to the still not inconsiderable orthodox elements among the people. That is how Viṣṇu of the *Ṛgveda* came to be assimilated—more or less superficially—into Kṛṣṇaism. Viṣṇu had already been elevated from the subordinate position that he had occupied in *Ṛgvedic* mythology to the position of supreme godhead (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 1.1). Further, the belief had already become well established that whenever *dharma* (righteousness) languishes and *adharmā* (nonrighteousness) thrives, Viṣṇu, the supreme God, incarnates in order to save the world. Kṛṣṇa accordingly came to be regarded as an incarnation (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu. Kṛṣṇaism thus grew in its mythological and practical scope so that in some ways it became a form of Vaiṣṇavism. One of the classic works of Kṛṣṇaism, the *Bhagavadgītā*, reflects the syncretic use of Vedic as well as Vāsudeva traditions in such a way that Kṛṣṇa himself is said to be the supreme Lord.

Pāncarātra; Bhāgavata. The inclusion of the Nārāyaṇa cult into Kṛṣṇaism is generally regarded as the second major factor in the process of the so-called brahmanization of Kṛṣṇaism. However, the Nara-Nārāyaṇa cult itself seems to have originated in Badari (the northern ridge of the great Hindu Kush arch) independently of the Veda. Indeed, tradition assigns great antiquity to that cult (*Mahābhārata* 7.172.51). It is not unlikely that the ancient non-Vedic concept of Nara-Nārāyaṇa was absorbed into the Vedic ideology in the form of Puruṣa Nārāyaṇa of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (12.3.4). The latter, in its turn, was perhaps later transformed into the pair Arjuna (Nara-Puruṣa) and Kṛṣṇa (Nārāyaṇa) of Kṛṣṇaism. Nārāyaṇa is represented as the founder of one of the two early sects of Vaiṣṇavism, namely, Pāncarātra, as distinguished from the other early sect, namely, Bhāgavata. The distinction between these two sects is emphasized if we consider that the Pāncarātrins were the worshipers of Nārāyaṇa, whereas the Bhāgavatas were the worshipers of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa; that the Pāncarātrins were the followers of Tantric Vaiṣṇavism, whereas the Bhāgavatas were the followers of brahmanic Vaiṣṇavism; and that the Pāncarātrins accepted the doctrine of *vyūhas* (according to which Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha were the four “emanations” [*vyūhas*] of God, standing respectively for the Highest Self, the individual self, mind, and egoism), whereas the Bhāgavatas accepted the doctrine of *avatāras* (ten incarnations of Viṣṇu).

Vaiṣṇavism in History. Vaiṣṇavism has generally enjoyed the patronage of various ruling dynasties, although foreign tribes like those of the Śakas and the Kushans (first centuries before and after the beginning of the common era) do not seem to have been favorably inclined toward that religion. Similar was the attitude of the early Vākātakas and the Bhāraśivas (second and third centuries CE). On the other hand, epigraphic and numismatic evidence shows that most of the Gupta sovereigns (who reigned from the fourth to the seventh century CE) were devout Vaiṣṇavas or Bhāgavatas, although their overall religious policy was remarkably liberal and tolerant. It was also during the age of the Guptas that most of the Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas and the Saṃhitās of Tantric Vaiṣṇavism took final shape. In the course of the post-Gupta millennium (700–1700 CE), Vaiṣṇavism, like Hinduism in general, came to be fragmented into further sects and subsects. The emergence of these sects and subsects usually followed a certain set pattern: some particular religious leader would start a movement either to reform the existing vulgarized religious practices of the parent sect or to widen the appeal of that sect by abjuring social inequalities. The main purpose of these new sects and subsects was not so much to sponsor any specific philosophical or theistic tenets as to establish and popularize certain distinct kinds of *bhakti*. This renewal of *bhakti* is known to have received its main impulse from South India. It is, indeed, striking that Nakkirār (late first century CE) should mention in one of his poems “the blue one with the eagle flag” (i.e., Kṛṣṇa) and “the white one of the plowshare and the palmyra flag” (i.e., Baladeva). But it was the Ālvārs (sixth to ninth centuries CE) who denounced all social distinctions and expressed in their Tamil songs a deeply emotional and intensely personal devotion for Viṣṇu. The *bhakti* tradition of the Ālvārs was given a Vedantic foundation by the *ācāryas* of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava school, such as Nāthamuni, Yāmunācārya, and Rāmānuja. Two subschools evolved out of the Vaiṣṇava theology of Rāmānuja: the southern school (the Teṅgaḷais) insisted that *prapatti*, or complete surrender to God, was the only way to obtain God’s grace, whereas the northern school (the Vaḍgaḷais) required the devotee to resort also to other ways of salvation prescribed by the scriptures.

Vaiṣṇava Bhakti Cult. It is in northern and central India that one sees a truly exuberant ramification of the Vaiṣṇava *bhakti* cult (thirteenth to seventeenth centuries CE). Two main currents of devotional worship can be distinguished in this connection, one relating to Rāma and the other to Kṛṣṇa. In the case of the latter, again, there are two distinct lines of development, one

centering on Kṛṣṇa and his spouse Rukmiṇī (as generally sponsored by the saints of Maharashtra) and the other centering on Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā (as popularized by, among others, Nimbārka, Caitanya, and Jayadeva). One of the most remarkable Vaiṣṇava saints of India, Kabīr (fifteenth century), was born to the family of a Muslim weaver of Banaras. Early in life he became influenced by the Hindu ascetic Rāmānanda (the fifth in descent from Rāmānuja), who symbolized for the young aspirant the spirit of revolt against religious exclusivism and abstruse philosophizing. Kabīr taught Sahaja-Yoga, which aimed at an emotional integration of the soul with God. The Kabīr sect extended to Kathiawar and Gujarat but in the process split up into twelve different Kabīrpanthas. Dādū (sixteenth century CE, Gujarat-Rajasthan), for instance, was a follower of Kabīr, but he founded his own Brahma-Saṃpradāya with a view to uniting the divergent faiths of India into a single religious system. Another outstanding Vaiṣṇava saint, Caitanya (or Gaurāṅga, 1486–1533), though not the founder of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, left the indelible mark of his personality on that religious movement. He initiated a new mode of congregational worship, called *kīrtana*, which consisted of choral singing of the name and deeds of God, accompanied by drums and cymbals and synchronized with rhythmic bodily movements, all this culminating in ecstasy. Among other typical teachers and saints who fostered Vaiṣṇava *bhakti*—each in his or her own way—may be mentioned Jñāneśvara (thirteenth century, Maharashtra), Narsī Mehtā (fifteenth century, Gujarat), Śrīpādarāja and Purandara-dāsa (both fifteenth century, Karnataka), Śaṃkaradeva (c. fifteenth–sixteenth century, Assam), Mīrābāī (sixteenth century, Rajasthan), Tulsīdās (sixteenth century, Uttar Pradesh), and Tukārām (seventeenth century, Maharashtra).

Literature. In the literature of Vaiṣṇavism, the first place—in time as in importance—has to be conceded to the *Mahābhārata*. Notwithstanding its ultimate encyclopedic character, there is no doubt that the *Mahābhārata* was, at an earlier stage, redacted in favor of Kṛṣṇaism, Kṛṣṇa having been represented almost as its prime mover. The inclusion in the Great Epic of such Vaiṣṇava religious tracts as the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Nārāyaṇīya* and of the *Harivaṃśa* (as an appendix) confirms its basic Vaiṣṇava orientation. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, on the other hand, can hardly be called sectarian.

Among the eighteen Purāṇas, six—the *Viṣṇu*, *Nārada*, *Bhāgavata*, *Garuḍa*, *Padma*, and *Vārāha*—are traditionally regarded as Vaiṣṇava or *sāttvika*. Out of these, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* has all along been looked upon as an authoritative scripture of Vaiṣṇavism. From

among the sectarian Upaniṣads, which, incidentally, are fairly late (second to fifteenth centuries CE), seventeen are said to be Vaiṣṇava. Several of them are of the nature of Tantras. However, the principal Tantric Vaiṣṇava sect is the Pāñcarātra. Traditionally, 108 Saṃhitās of the Pāñcarātra are mentioned, although their number is sometimes given as 215 or even 290. Among the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās, which are variously referred to as *Ekāyanaveda*, *Mūlaveda*, or *Mahopaniṣad*, the *Sāttvata*, the *Pauṣkara*, and the *Jayākhyā* are said to constitute the “jewel triad” (*ratnatrayī*). The more commonly known *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā* is believed to have been produced in Kashmir in the early fifth century. The four main Tantric topics dealt with in the Saṃhitās are *jñāna* (soteriological theology), *yoga* (psychophysical discipline), *kriyā* (cultic practices), and *caryā* (personal and social behavior). Side by side with the Pāñcarātra, there also developed a Tantric Vaiṣṇava cult known as Vaikhānasa. It may be noted that specific Saṃhitās govern the religious practices at specific Vaiṣṇava temples. Profuse philosophical literature has originated in the four major schools of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta. Reference may also be made to the various manuals dealing with *bhakti*, such as the *Bhaktisūtras* of Śaṅḍilya and Nārada (tenth century).

There are also quite a large number of prayers and hymns of praise (*stotras*), known for their great literary and religious appeal, which are addressed to Viṣṇu in his various forms. All this literature is in Sanskrit. However, many of the newly arisen sects and subsects of Vaiṣṇavism adopted as their gospels the sayings and sermons of their promoters (or of the immediate disciples of those promoters), which were usually delivered not in Sanskrit but in the vernaculars of the people for whom they were meant, and these were preserved in oral or written form.

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Bhāgavatas

Quite probably Hinduism's most famous and widely encountered epithet for divinity conceived as ceaselessly and actively solicitous of human welfare is *Bhagavat* ("having shares"). *Bhagavān* (the more commonly cited first-person nominative form of the word) occurs as early as the *Ṛgveda*; the term expressly refers to Rudra-Śiva in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (5.4), and is the common honorific of the Buddha in the Pali texts. *Bhagavān* doubtless is most familiar, however, in reference to Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa/Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa. And, indeed, *bhāgavata* ("related to or devoted to *Bhagavān*") may be the most common, even earliest, general designation of a devotee of Viṣṇu.

If it is readily agreed that history's most prominent *bhāgavatas* are Viṣṇu *bhaktas*, there is disagreement and not a little confusion concerning what—if anything—distinguishes them from *pāñcarātrikas* and other Vaiṣṇavas. In fact, *bhāgavata* frequently has meant simply a Vaiṣṇava (or proto-Vaiṣṇava) as such without further characterization. Until perhaps the eleventh century, this nonsectarian sense generally prevailed, and *bhāgavatas* were part of a growing but diffuse movement that emphasized a personal, active devotional relationship between the human and the Absolute but did not have a single, fixed set of specific beliefs and rituals. The variety of attitudes is readily seen by comparing Bhagavatism's most famous texts, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. The *Bhagavadgītā* is formal and intellectualized, and offers *bhakti* as a refined *yoga*, a way of release. Thus, its tenor contrasts distinctively with the vibrant emotionalism of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*'s *bhakti*. Further, the religion of the *Bhagavadgītā* harkens expressly to Vedic sacrificial models, whereas the religious inspiration of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is more varied. [See also *Bhagavadgītā*.]

Some have claimed that Bhagavatism and, indeed, the "*bhakti* idea" are rooted outside of Vedic ceremonialism altogether—that they originated from "indigenous" or "tribal" sources or perhaps are linked to extra-Indian (Iranian) prototypes. Suggestions that they are ultimately alien impositions or incursions, however, ought to be treated cautiously. For one thing, the available evidence will allow only the most hedged, vague, and inadequate historical account. For another, no aspect of Bhagavatism is encountered apart from the embracing set of characteristics of Hindu religious civilization that interpenetrate and link it with Vedic/Brahmanic values. Extant texts and current practices are embedded in this larger context, and this enables us to refer without discomfort to "Hinduism" and to mean

by it more than a mere collocation of discrete sects. As the *sāstrīs* and *paṇḍits*—the erudite commentators whose explications are the dynamics and the definition of Hindu tradition—have consistently attempted to show, often with considerable ingenuity, it is diversity rather than simple pluralism that ultimately characterizes Hinduism.

Linguistically, *bhaga*, *Bhagavat*/*Bhagavān*, and *bhakti* are derived from the Sanskrit root *bhaj*, meaning "apportion, distribute" as well as "partake, participate." Already in the *Ṛgveda Samhitā*, *bhaga* means "portion, share," *inter alia*, and it occurs also as the name of one of the divine Ādityas. *Bhagavān* thus denotes "having a share(s), lucky, fortunate, blessed." But the *Bhagavān* is more than simply fortunate. He is someone (human or divine) who both "takes a share in" and bestows shares. Being lucky encompasses beneficence.

Crucially, the *Bhagavān* known to the historical *Bhāgavata* movement is no other than the Absolute itself. *Bhāgavatas* identify themselves as beneficiaries of the *Bhagavān*'s essential nature: "involved with, participating in, linked to, serving, devoted to" the *Bhagavān*. Generally, "sectarian" *Bhāgavatas* will answer differently when asked questions concerning both the precise nature of this participation and how they, as *bhaktas*, can come to achieve some kind of union with the *Bhagavān*.

Earliest Bhāgavatas and the Pāñcarātrikas. Perhaps the earliest inscriptional evidence of Vaiṣṇava *bhāgavatas* dates from about 115 BCE, at a temple site at Beshnagar (Bhilsa District, Madhya Pradesh). Here, Heliodoros, native of Takṣaśilā and ambassador of the Greco-Bactrian king Amtalikita (Gr., Antialkides), declares himself a *bhāgavata* in the dedication of a *Garudadhvaja* (a column with *Garuḍa*, the bird that is Viṣṇu's distinctive vehicle, as its capital) to Vāsudeva, *devadeva*, "lord of lords." The inscription attests to Vāsudeva-Viṣṇu worship in North India in the late second century BCE among "foreigners" as well as native Indians (Heliodoros's mission was to king Bhāgabhadra, apparently another *bhāgavata*). Despite his name, of course, it is not known how "foreign" this Heliodoros was; and the suggestion that the Vāsudeva "sect's" popularity among foreigners indicates its distance from Brahmanic convention, or even its particular success among the *kṣatriyas* (nobles), is only conjecture.

Somewhat later—in the first century BCE—a cave inscription at Nanaghat (Western Maharashtra) includes reference to Vāsudeva and Saṃkarṣaṇa (the latter known from the *Mahābhārata* as Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa's brother); at Ghosundi (Rajasthan), Vāsudeva and Saṃkarṣaṇa are also invoked in a fragmentary inscrip-

tion at what is presumed to be a temple enclosure. Similar evidence is found near Mathurā (Uttar Pradesh), a traditionally celebrated center of Kṛṣṇa devotion.

These lithic records, in addition to references in the Pali Buddhist *Niddesa*, Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (4.3.92–95), and Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* seem to confirm the existence of a *bhāgavata* movement in north-central and northwest India in the centuries immediately preceding the common era. Still, none of this evidence clears up Vāsudeva's background or the way he became identified with Viṣṇu. There is unmistakable evidence of identifications but no clear pattern of the process(es) whereby they emerged. Even in the face of the most familiar evidence there is controversy. Witness, for example, J. A. B. van Buitenen's insistence that Viṣṇu "does not figure at all in the *Gītā* as author of the Kṛṣṇa *avatāra*" (*The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata*, Chicago, 1981, p. 167; cf. pp. 27–28), and Alf Hiltebeitel's counterargument that such claims (that Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā* "is not yet identified with Viṣṇu") are made "despite the clear evidence of the text" ("Toward a Coherent Study of Hinduism," *Religious Studies Review*, 1983, vol. 9, p. 207).

Beyond the psychological likelihood that certain aspects of Vedic belief and ceremony engendered at least some "proto-*bhakti*" sentiments, there are more substantial hints of *bhakti*-like attitudes discernible in a few hymns of the *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā*. Surely the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* shows that the basic elements of a Bhāgavatism are essentially in place, even though the Bhāgavān in this text is Rudra-Śiva. However, it is in three works—the *Mahābhārata* (Book Twelve), the *Hari-vaṃsa*, and the *Bhagavadgītā*—that a quite elaborate "Vaiṣṇava" Bhāgavatism first emerges in literature. Ironically, though, the *Mahābhārata*'s *Nārāyaṇīya* section (12.326–352) is almost too rich a source. It refers to "Sātvatas," "Bhāgavatas," "Ekāntī-bhāgavatas," and the "Pāñcarātra;" and, again, it is difficult to tell if these designate essentially one and the same movement or discrete sectarian groups.

Commonly, Bhāgavata and Pāñcarātra are held to be distinct movements. It also has been proposed that the Pāñcarātrikas are historically the first Bhāgavata sect or school. In both views, the majority of Bhāgavatas are considered to be both "eclectic" and conservative, concerned with reconciling and integrating *bhakti* with Vedic social and ritual order. Pāñcarātrikas, on the other hand, are characterized as coming from the fringes of the Aryan cultural and religious universe. This view tries to persuade us to see Bhāgavatas in a strict sense as *smārtas* ("orthodox" brahmans) of sorts and, by extension, *grhasthas* ("householders"). By con-

trast, the original Pāñcarātrikas would be socially marginal renunciant-ascetics—even "proto-*tāntrikas*." Some scholars also point out that the absence of the distinctive Pāñcarātra notion of *vyūhas* ("manifestations" of the divine) or, indeed, of any direct reference to the Pāñcarātra in either the *Bhagavadgītā* or the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* signals discrete historical traditions. Similarly, some have argued that the cosmogony and cosmology depicted in the Pāñcarātra *Saṃhitās* (the earliest of which date perhaps from the sixth century CE) emphasize distinctively the world-creating and world-maintaining instrumentality of Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa's *śakti*, whereas the *Bhagavadgītā*, in making roughly the same point, draws rather on other imagery: the Bhāgavān is fully and freely at work in the world without being limited by it in any way.

But early Bhāgavatas and Pāñcarātrikas seem rather to represent different tendencies of conceptualization and ritual orientation than formally distinct sects. Early Pāñcarātrikas, then, may well have been certain among the Bhāgavatas who were closely associated both with renunciant and with formal ritualist traditions. Their developing ideas and ritual practices possibly yielded, in their *Saṃhitās*, the first sectlike tradition among the Bhāgavatas. As Adalbert Gail put it succinctly, all Pāñcarātrikas were Bhāgavatas but not all Bhāgavatas were Pāñcarātrikas. (Adalbert Gail, *Bhakti im Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, Wiesbaden, 1969, p. 7.)

Bhāgavatas, Smārtas, and Vaiṣṇavas. Although it would be altogether wide of the mark to think of the earliest Bhāgavatas principally as brahmans accommodating ideas newly discovered by renunciant adventurers or encroaching from tribal or other extra-Vedic populations, the manifest processes whereby Bhāgavatism becomes an idiom of Hinduism center among brahmans. Of them, those who carefully uphold and observe the precepts set forth in Vedic Smārtasūtras are known as Smārta brahmans. Historically, this appellation has come to designate in particular those brahmans who adhere to principles and teachings usually attributed to Śaṅkara (or, occasionally, to Kumārilabhaṭṭa). These Smārtas are often mistakenly identified simply as Śaivas, but in fact, Smārta ritual centers expressly on observances enjoined by the *sūtras* and performance of *pañcāyatanapūjā* to five divinities: Śiva, Viṣṇu, Durgā, Sūrya, and Gaṇeśa.

Even taking into account Śaṅkara's (or Kumārila's) traditional reforming role, most scholars see in the Smārtas not a sect but rather a formalization and renewal of persisting Vedic values better thought of as constituting a Hindu "orthodoxy" or "orthopraxy." And, too, reaffirming obligations to Smārtasūtra injunctions

was to some extent a reaction to the emerging strength and popularity of the general *bhakti/bhāgavata* movement. In a sense, then, the Smārtas are an “antisept.”

Some have claimed that it is precisely among groups or “schools” of careful adherents to one or another Smārtasūtra that we find a Bhagavatism that is consciously concerned with linking itself to Vedic and Brahmanic proprieties. Hence it has been suggested that the Vaikhānasas represent either a Vedic ritual school accommodating Bhāgavata elements or a group of Bhāgavatas attempting Brahmanic legitimation by adopting the trappings of Smārtahood. Which hypothesis is closer to the historical truth cannot be determined now, but certainly Vaikhānasas are Bhāgavatas; and Vaikhānasas differ from Pāñcarātrikas in important part by identifying themselves as strict *vaidikas* (i.e., conforming to the Vedas) who carefully maintain Smārta standards. [See also Vaikhānasas.]

Early Bhāgavatas of Tamil Nadu: The Ālvārs. Although assumed to be rooted in North India, both Pāñcarātra and Vaikhānasa traditions are historically more prominent in South India than in the North, particularly in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. The spread of such movements as the Pāñcarātra, however, most likely was not the first introduction of Viṣṇu *bhakti* to the South, for Tamil literature of the first and second centuries already attests to the existence of a Viṣṇu cultus. Together with the Śaiva Nāyaṅārs, the most famous early South Indian *bhaktas* are the Ālvārs, Tamil Vaiṣṇava poet-ecstasies who apparently lived and sang praise to Viṣṇu from the sixth or seventh to the ninth centuries.

In fact, what is especially noteworthy about these Tamil Bhāgavatas—a fitting designation despite the fact that the word *Bhagavān* does not appear in their poetry—is the strongly emotional nature of their *bhakti*. In an important sense, it is in and through the Ālvārs that *bhakti* and Bhagavatism acquire a voice independent of Vedic or Vedantic formalism. With the Ālvārs, *bhakti* is neither the crowning achievement of yoga nor, as Śaṅkara especially would have it, the foremost among the preliminary practices aiding the attainment of final realization; rather, it is a self-validating expression of sentiment and a definition of the human-divine relationship. In the Tamil poetry of the Ālvārs *bhakti* is first heard in its independent maturity—as song. [See also Ālvārs.]

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa and Its Influence. Certainly written in South India and receiving more or less final form by the tenth century, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* was strongly influenced by the Tamil Ālvārs to such a degree that some portions of the text are little more than paraphrases or outright Sanskrit translations of Alvaric

originals. It is in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* that an intellectually and emotionally rich Bhāgavata perspective first appears in Sanskrit literature.

Only subsequent to the appearance of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* does a vigorous, specifically sectarian Bhagavatism emerge; the most famous Vaiṣṇava devotional sects trace their origins or crucial reforms to a period from the twelfth and (particularly) the thirteenth centuries to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Especially prominent among these are the four so-called classical *sampradāyas* (“traditions, sects”), all linked in one way or another to South India: Rāmānuja’s Śrīsampradāya, Madhva’s Brahmasampradāya, Nimbārka’s Sanakādisampradāya, and Viṣṇusvāmin’s Rudra-sampradāya, this last-named absorbed by Vallabhācārya’s Vāllabhasampradāya. Connecting these sects are commentaries in which their founders elaborate not only Bhāgavata devotional attitudes but also alternative interpretations of the Vedantic *pramāṇatraya* (“three authorities”): the *Bhagavadgītā*, the Upaniṣads, and the *Brahma Sūtra*. Through these commentaries Vaiṣṇava Bhagavatism becomes a full, articulate participant in Vedantic Brahmanism. No doubt the adherents of Hinduism’s various sects have tended to be relatively few. Most Hindus are not sectarians in any rigorous sense, identifying rather with individual *sampradāyas* without becoming initiates or being strictly bound to their teachings and practices. But if it could be written at all, a “history” of Bhagavatism would trace the rise of individual Bhāgavata sects, and, cumulatively, the particularities of each would highlight the concrete actualities of Bhagavatism.

The Bhāgavatas of Karnataka and the Mādhyas. The movement founded by Madhva (also known as Ānandatīrtha; 1199–1278) is commonly held to be the first founded solely on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. (Although the preexistent Śrīsampradāya of Rāmānuja is commonly considered a Pāñcarātra-based sectarian development, its principal indebtedness may be rather to the Ālvārs.) Earlier than Madhva and even the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, a formal Bhāgavatasampradāya had emerged in the Kannara/Tulu country of western Karnataka. Probably influential in the development of Madhva’s thought and still active today, this group descends from certain Smārta brahmins who became increasingly attached to Viṣṇu (possibly due to the growing general popularity of an informal Bhagavatism flowing in particular from the Maharashtra region).

Madhva’s fame in the history of Vedantic thought rests on his unconditional “nondualist” position. According to him, the ineradicable distinction between the Absolute and humans must be understood. Madhva’s goal is neither to become one with the Absolute nor to

realize essential unity with it but rather to participate in it. Knowledge and its concomitant joy in eternal individuality are the heart of Madhva's teaching, which represents the most eloquent articulation in traditional Vedantic idiom of devotees' heartfelt sentiments. And it is perhaps in Madhva's traditions and practices that the complexities of earliest Bhagavatism most authentically survive. [See also the biography of Madhva.]

Vāraṅkarīs and Others: Bhaktas of Maharashtra. Bhāgavatas are known to have existed in Maharashtra from before the beginning of the common era. A particularly vigorous and complex vernacular Maratha *bhakta* tradition began to emerge in the thirteenth century, however, partly in consequence of the coming together of several traditions both within and beyond Maharashtra. Most significant of these seem to have been the Mādhyas, the Nāthas, the Sants, and the resurgent Vāraṅkarī tradition. [See also Marathi Religions.]

The so-called Haridāsas or Vaiṣṇavadāsas, vernacular hymnists to Viṣṇu, seem to have been inspired directly or indirectly by Madhva's teachings. Their influence quickly spread beyond the Kannada-speaking area, partly because of increasing attention they paid to Viṭhobā/Viṭṭhal, the regional divinity whose cult center was and remains Pandharpur in Maharashtra. Viṭhobā may originally have been (partly) the focus of a Śaiva cult, but the identification "Viṭhobā-Kṛṣṇa-Rāma" quickly established Pandharpur as the principal pilgrimage center for Maharashtrian Bhāgavatas—a very significant factor in the spread of this popular, vernacular Bhagavatism in Maharashtra and also farther south and east.

In the mid-1200s the "radical" and secretive Mahānubhava (Manbhau) sect arose in Maharashtra, founded by Cakradhāra, who was a Gujarati. This Kṛṣṇa-centered movement evidences influences as various as Pāñcarātra and Vīraśaiva. But toward the end of the century, Jñāneśvar (or Jñāneśvara; also known as Jñāndev or Jñānadeva) founded or "reformed" the Vāraṅkarī order, which was to become the most celebrated of Maharashtra's *bhakta* traditions. The *Jñāneśvarī*, a Marathi commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, is Jñāneśvar's best-known work. His *abhaṅgas* (lyrical devotional hymns), however, may well have been more influential in the development of Maharashtrian *bhakti*, remaining a favored devotional vehicle of his successors. Tradition has it that Jñāneśvar's father had been a Nātha, which suggests that there were some Śaiva influences on the development of Jñāneśvar's own thought.

Possibly more important even than Jñāneśvar for the growth of the Vāraṅkarīsampradāya was Nāmdev (or Nāmadeva; 1270–1350?), a native of Pandharpur. Maharashtrian Bhagavatism owes to Nāmdev a strong tra-

dition of depreciating the externalities of devotional service. Giving up *pūjā* and pilgrimages and rejecting monkish asceticism, Nāmdev celebrated an inner quest for purity of spirit and direct communion with the Bhagavān through reciting his holy names. This rejection of the image cult has suggested an Islamic influence, but although Muslims were a significant minority in Maharashtra in Nāmdev's time, no clear evidence supports this suggestion. In addition, Nāmdev's influence has remained strong, even though subsequent important Maharashtrian Bhāgavatas such as Eknāth (or Ekanātha; 1548–1598?) and Tukrām (or Tukārāma; 1608–1649) did not advocate abandoning *pūjā* and the image cult. However, they stressed that cult images are more significant as "symbolic" aids to worship than as the literal, living presence of divinity.

Another noteworthy feature of Kṛṣṇa Bhagavatism in Maharashtra is the emphasis on Kṛṣṇa as the faithful husband of Rukmiṇī, herself viewed as embodying the Bhagavān's dynamic and creative nature. This contrasts markedly with the focus of many Kṛṣṇa-Bhāgavatas farther north and east—especially in Bengal and Orissa—for whom the central female is rather Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa's "mistress" and the personification of the Bhāgavata's longing for the Lord. [See also Rādhā.]

Rādhākṛṣṇa Bhāgavatas. Young Kṛṣṇa's amorous play with the *gopīs* epitomizes the many ways that *bhakti* is "new" in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. *Kāma* ("desire"), traditional enemy of the spiritual quest, is transformed through erotic imagery and becomes a symbol for the Bhāgavata's devotion to the Bhagavān. Selfless maternal affection for the child Kṛṣṇa influences the *gopīs'* love for the mature Kṛṣṇa. Their passion becomes *prema*, *kāma* transcendent: a love transcending the worldly, selfish love in the structured dharmic realm of spouse and family. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* hints that one *gopī* may be special to Kṛṣṇa, but does not name her. By the twelfth century, however, Rādhā is known in North India as Kṛṣṇa's favorite, eventually taken as an *avatāra* of Śrī-Lakṣmī. Rādhā is first celebrated in Sanskrit in Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda* (early thirteenth century?). [See also the biography of Jayadeva.] Subsequently, Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa together are central to Bhāgavata sects founded by Viṣṇusvāmin, Nimbārka, Vallabha, and Caitanya.

Nimbārka. Possibly a friend of Jayadeva and a contemporary of Madhva (though doctrinally linked rather to Rāmānuja), Nimbārka (thirteenth century?) was a Telugu brahman who settled early and permanently at Vṛndāvana. As was characteristic of Bhāgavatas, Nimbārka was captivated by the problem of the relation of the Absolute to the world. As a Vedantin, Nimbārka proposed an alternative to the positions of Śaṅkara, Rā-

mānuja, and Madhva through a realistic *dvaitādvaita* doctrine of *bhedābheda*, “distinct yet not different [from the phenomenal world].”

Unfolding in Nimbārka’s writings (all in Sanskrit) is the notion of *prapatti* (“surrender”); the notion was derived from Rāmānuja and was especially elaborated by certain of Rāmānuja’s successors. [See *the biography of Rāmānuja*.] According to Nimbārka, this is the necessary first of two stages of the Bhāgavata’s right relationship to the Bhagavān. The roles of human and divine in the drama of salvation are at issue; *prapatti* proposes that the initiative for this process is exclusively the Bhagavān’s. The Bhāgavata can only surrender utterly to the Bhagavān’s grace, abandoning all sense of personal capacity for efficacious action. To the sincere *pra-panna* (“suppliant”) the Bhagavān gracefully bestows direct perception of himself.

Although Nimbārka’s Sanakasampradāya, extensively reformed in the fifteenth century, is itself generally restricted to an area around Mathurā and to some centers in Agra and in Bengal, Nimbārka’s influence seems apparent in the teachings of Caitanya. Strongly influenced by Ramanujist tradition, Nimbārka distanced himself from an early, rather eclectic *smārta* Bhagavatism, emerging as among the most adventurous of those Bhāgavatas who explored *bhakti*’s more radical implications. [See also *the biography of Nimbārka*.]

Viṣṇusvāmin and Vallabha. Viṣṇusvāmin was the reputed founder of the Rudrasampradāya, which was regarded, along with those of Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Nimbārka, as one of the four great Bhāgavata schools or sects. Viṣṇusvāmin lived perhaps in the thirteenth century and, according to one account, was the *mantri* (“minister”) of a South Indian prince. Some traditions hold that Viṣṇusvāmin was a teacher both of Maharashtra’s Jñāneśvar and of Madhva, but the evidence is meager and conflicting. And, though Viṣṇusvāmin apparently was a Vedantin, his commentaries on the *Bhagavadgītā* and the Brahma Sūtra have not survived. We learn also from tradition that he was a “dualist” who taught that “creation” was inspired by Brahmā’s primordial loneliness and that individuals and the world itself proceeded from the Absolute as sparks leap from a flame.

Apparently, it is in Vallabhācārya’s teachings that Viṣṇusvāmin’s thought survives. Vallabha (1479–1531), son of a Telugu brahman and *Yajurveda* schoolman, was born in what is now Madhya Pradesh and spent his childhood mostly in Banaras. His Vedantic teachings are known as *suddhādvaita* (“pure, or purified, nondualism”). In his view, Vallabha “corrected” or “purified” Śāṅkara’s *advaita* by demonstrating that *māyā* (“ap-

pearance, illusion”) is entirely a power of the Absolute (that is, Kṛṣṇa), and thus is in no sense independent of it. Real fragments of that Absolute, individuals are lost in forgetfulness and egotism until Kṛṣṇa manifests himself. That crucial act of grace inaugurates the *puṣṭi-mārga* (“way of sustenance [of the soul]”), leading to eternal, joyous (re-)union with Kṛṣṇa.

Vallabha’s personal example was no less consequential than his theology. Tireless pilgrim, dedicated attendant on images, he became for his followers the preeminent, paradigmatic *sevaka* (“servant”) of Kṛṣṇa. Decrying external acts empty of sincere emotion, Vallabha the ritualist urged that all acts be performed fully in a spirit of sweet and playful joy, a spirit captured most impressively in the *rāsilā* celebrations associated with the Vallabhācārīs. [See also *Lila*.]

In literature, the emotional fervor engendered amongst the Vallabhācārīs is particularly evident in the poetry of Sūrdās (1483–1563). Occasionally, the emotional abandon urged by Vallabha’s example and nurtured by his successors led to “excesses” that, in the nineteenth century, even summoned restrictions from civil authorities. The teachings of Vallabhācārya are part of the inspiration for the “radical” Rādhāvallabhī and Sakhībhava movements in which Rādhā rather than Kṛṣṇa becomes central, Sakhībhava adherents going so far as to wear women’s clothing and to attempt to lead the life of Rādhā. Overall, Vallabhācārya’s *puṣṭi-mārga*—prominent and influential across North India—is a particularly impressive and vital expression of Bhagavatism and its pervasive influence on learned tradition and popular piety. [See also *the biography of Vallabha*.]

Caitanya. Bengal’s Sena dynasty (fl. twelfth through thirteenth centuries) championed the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, and its spirit is witnessed early in the Bengal/Orissa region in the Sanskrit *Gītagovinda* as well as in the devotional Bengali lyrics of such poets as Ḍimboka, Candidāsa, and Vidyāpati, who flourished from the twelfth through the sixteenth century. Doubtless the most famous Bhāgavata of this complex cultural region is Viśvāmbara Miśra, known best by the name he assumed as a *saṁnyāsin*: Kṛṣṇacaitanya.

Born in Nadiya, probably in 1486, Caitanya is reported first to have been influenced by an itinerant Mādhva teacher, though it is reasonable to assume that vibrant local devotional traditions were very significant as well. A definitive “conversion” to Kṛṣṇa Bhāgavatism seems to have occurred in his early manhood. Henceforth, Caitanya was a phenomenon rarely observed even in Bengal’s diverse culture. He became an extreme example of “god-intoxication”; and, swept at one moment by the ecstasy of experiencing Kṛṣṇa directly, and at the

next moment by the agony of separation (*viraha*), he is reported to have staggered, fallen, danced, sung, roared, wept, laughed, and ranted in ways that attracted, challenged, and even threatened many of his contemporaries.

Only a few lines traditionally attributed to Caitanya survive. But his personal example and direct teachings drew about him a group of disciples whose biographical, ritual, and theological writings—especially in the course of the sixteenth century—quickly and securely established an enduring religious movement that is the basis of the Gauḍīyasampradāya and the Hare Krishna group of our own time. [See also Bengali Religions and the biography of Caitanya.]

From the writings of his principal immediate disciples, the Gosvāmins, we learn that Caitanya's "religious Vedānta" is most aptly characterized as *acintyabhedābheda*: Kṛṣṇa, the Absolute, and the individual *jīvas* ("souls") are "inconceivably discrete (yet) not different." But it is less for this variant on a familiar theme of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta than for the living example of his person that Caitanya is most significant historically. From "intentional" enactment of Kṛṣṇa's sports Caitanya drifted almost insensibly to a personal sense of reactualizing them, or, at least, so he was experienced by many of his followers. Devotees and object of devotion lost clear-cut boundaries in such "performances," which became nearly a "Tantric" *sādhana* ("actualization"). As such, these witness also the potent influence of Bengal's (ultimately Buddhist?) Sahajīya tradition. However, the latter's monistic thrust properly differentiates it from the fundamentally dualistic vision evident in Caitanya's alternating joy and despair in his separateness from Kṛṣṇa. Caitanya, as other Bhāgavatas, remained a *bhakta*, a devotee whose enduring problematic was also his *raison d'être*.

[For further discussion highlighting regional aspects of Bhagavatism, see Hindi Religious Traditions. See also Bhakti.]

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mary sources in translation are A. K. Ramanujan's translation of selected hymns of Nammālvār, *Hymns for the Drowning* (Princeton, 1981); Barbara Stoler Miller's rendering of Jayadeva's *Gītāgovinda*, *Love Song of the Dark Lord* (New York, 1977); and Edward C. Dimock, Jr. and Denise Levertov's translation of representative Bengali lyrics, *In Praise of Krishna* (1967; reprint, Chicago, 1981).

G. R. WELBON

Pāñcarātras

A movement or sect called Pāñcarātra figures significantly in some of the earliest textual evidence used by scholars to trace the historical emergence of Hindu, specifically Vaiṣṇava, devotional (*bhakti*) cults. Pāñcarātra is known to have influenced the development of Vaiṣṇava sectarian thought in several parts of India, and it remains a vigorous presence in South India today as an essential constituent of Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion and one of two Vaiṣṇava *āgamas* (traditions) that inform South India's Hindu temple culture.

The beginnings of the historical Pāñcarātra—and even the original sense of the word *pañcarātra*—remain matters of uncertainty and considerable scholarly dispute. Initially, the movement may not have been associated with any single doctrinal position. And when it first became associated with one, that position seems only secondarily to have been Vaiṣṇava. "The origin of Pāñcarātra is obscure," J. A. B. van Buitenen observed, "because it has not one origin" (van Buitenen, 1971, p. 6).

The problems begin with the word itself. Deprived of context, the compound *pañca-rātra* yields no clue beyond its literal sense: as a noun, it means "five nights" or "night of (the) five"; as an adjective, "five-night (ed)." Explanations given in the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās (classical school manuals, none of which may be earlier than the sixth century CE) seem clearly *ex post facto* rationalizations embedded in apologetic and polemic. However faithfully such explanations record what certain Pāñcarātrikas (members of the Pāñcarātra tradition) came to mean by the word, they offer no secure insight into what it meant originally.

Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 13.6.1.1 asserts that the primordial Puruṣa Nārāyaṇa, "wishing to become all things," performed Puruṣamedha ("human sacrifice"), a *pañca-rātra sattra* ("five-day sacrifice"). In light of this occurrence (apparently the earliest) of the word in Vedic-Brahmanic literature, some scholars have found irresistible the temptation to seek the original meaning of the name Pāñcarātra in the Vedic sacrificial milieu. Thus, as F. Otto Schrader concluded, "it appears . . . that the sect took its name from its central dogma

which was the Pāñcarātra Sattrā of Nārāyaṇa interpreted philosophically as the fivefold self-manifestation of God by means of his Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin, and Arcā forms” (Schrader, 1916, p. 25). Quite possibly this passage from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* evidences Nārāyaṇa’s integration and legitimization into the Vedic ritual and intellectual world; but it may as well be an accommodation of certain Pāñcarātric associations as the source of them. In any case, except for Nārāyaṇa’s centrality, the details of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* ritual neither confirm nor reinforce the preoccupations and central features of historical Pāñcarātra literature and practice.

Moreover, van Buitenen has argued persuasively that particular literary, doctrinal, and ritual associations such as those mentioned above are only secondary or subsequent specifications of an older, more wide-ranging acceptance of the word. In his view, *pāñcarātra* initially referred to a characteristic of the way of life of itinerant recluses: their living apart from “towns” (that is, major settlements) except during the two-month rainy season. A *pāñcarātrika* in such early texts as the *Bṛhatkathāślokaśaṃgraha*, then, “is not distinguished by any particular faith or creed, but by a more or less ascetic life-rule,” one prescribing five nights in the forest for every night spent in a town (van Buitenen, 1971, pp. 14–15). If van Buitenen is correct, it would not be the first time in India that practice has crucially preceded systematic theory. And his thesis would support a plausible solution to the longstanding puzzle concerning the relationship between Pāñcarātrikas and Bhāgavatas: the former may simply have been Bhāgavatas who led generally reclusive and ascetic lives.

Epic Pāñcarātra. While certain texts (e.g., Ānandagiri’s *Śaṅkaravijaya*) distinguish between Pāñcarātras and Bhāgavatas—and, indeed, consider Vaiṣṇavas distinct from both—it is not clear that the two necessarily were discrete in any sectlike way. The essence of “epic” Pāñcarātra is *bhakti*: unconditional devotion to the Lord (Bhagavat). The earliest unambiguous evidence of this “historical” Pāñcarātra seems to be that found in *Mahābhārata* 12.321ff., the *Nārāyaṇīya*, or *Nārādīya*, section, which introduces a religious attitude and a cosmology that agree in essential details with the teachings of the later Saṃhitās. Responding to a query concerning what god to worship, this “secret” teaching tells of a “hidden” god, invisible to all but his *ekāntabhaktas* (“exclusive devotees”), to whom he graciously reveals himself. Such an *ekāntin* (“exclusivist”) was King Uparicara, who worshiped Nārāyaṇa according to Sātvata rites and, believing kingdom, wives, and wealth to be his by Nārāyaṇa’s boon, offered all these possessions to the Lord (*Mahābhārata* 12.322.17ff.). Other

ekāntins were the inhabitants of Śvetadvīpa (“white, or pure, island”), located to the north in the Milk Ocean, who, knowing the Pāñcarātra teachings, saw Brahman-Nārāyaṇa while others were blinded by his radiance (*Mahābhārata* 12.323.26ff.).

Sātvata is another name for the Vṛṣṇi, themselves part of a larger population of Yādavas, commonly thought to have been the society in which Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva *bhakti* rose. Epic Sātvatas are Nārāyaṇa *bhaktas* (“devotees”); but the *Nārāyaṇīya* explains that Nārāyaṇa, “formerly single-imaged,” caused himself to be born as the “fourfold” son of Dharma: Nara, Nārāyaṇa, Kṛṣṇa, and Hari (*Mahābhārata* 12.321.15–16).

The unitary god’s multiple births or manifestations are a familiar characteristic of Vaiṣṇava religious thought in general; and the historical Pāñcarātra seems to have contributed significantly to developing and enriching this notion. Doubtless, the epic Nārāyaṇa’s four *vyūhas* (“appearances, modes of being”) elaborate upon longstanding habits of identifying (or confusing) one divinity with another (and even a divinity with a devotee), habits reinforced by factors such as the multiplication of divine epithets and the intensifying interaction between socioreligious groups, their ideologies and practices. Practically, this scheme facilitated the organization and “rationalization” of historically discrete devotional cults under a single, overarching principle, here Nārāyaṇa-Vāsudeva. In the *Nārāyaṇīya*, in fact, we find not one but two sets of multiple births that possibly developed independently. In addition to the more or less abstract Nara-Nārāyaṇa-Kṛṣṇa-Hari tetrad, there is the genealogical series Kṛṣṇa-Saṃkarṣaṇa (=Balakṛṣṇa)-Pradyumna-Aniruddha; that is, Kṛṣṇa, his brother, his elder son, and his grandson. Which set is the prior cannot be determined, although the latter is ultimately the more significant. [See also Kṛṣṇaism.]

But something even more important is at work here: Pāñcarātrikas wanted to show how their supreme god could pervade the world and yet not be limited by it. To account for this, they drew upon several explanatory aids. *Vyūhas* were not the least important among them; for, as Jan Gonda observes, “already in Vedic ritualism the idea of *vyūha* implied an effective arrangement of the parts of a coherent whole” (Gonda, 1970, p. 50).

Epic *pāñcarātrikas*, then, are first and foremost *bhāgavatas* and *ekāntabhaktas*; and it is reasonable to conclude that the roots of their devotionalism are extra-Vedic. The Pāñcarātrikas are distinguished from similar groups of devotees by their particular efforts to show that their Lord is the underlying reality of all gods and that he is everywhere in our world without being subject to its manifest limitations. Crucial in this enterprise is their thoroughgoing exploitation of a theistic

Sāṃkhya to explain the relation between this world and the supreme reality. Thus, Vāsudeva is the supreme *puruṣa*. Through his contact with the (material) body arises the *jīva*, otherwise called Saṃkarṣaṇa, who in turn produces *manas*, that is, Pradyumna. And from Pradyumna issues the creative agent, the *ahamkāra* who is Aniruddha. Further, there is an equally insistent attempt to link the Nārāyaṇa-Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa of religious experience to prestigious Vedic explanations which, by allusion, include even the fourfold Puruṣa of the *Puruṣasūkta* (*R̥gveda* 10.90).

Pāñcarātra Thought in the Saṃhitās. The principal texts of historical Pāñcarātra are the Saṃhitās (“collections”), of which there are 108 works according to tradition, and more than double that number reckoning all titles cited in lists. Far fewer texts are readily available for study, and among them the most significant seem to be *Pauṣkara*, *Jayākhya*, *Sātvata* (constituting the “three gems” and presumably among the oldest), *Ahimbudhnya*, *Pārameśvara*, *Sanātkumāra* (quoted more than once by Yāmuna), *Parama*, *Pādma*, *Īśvara*, and *Lakṣmī*. It is uncertain exactly when any of these was composed. Some may be as early as the sixth or seventh century CE although confirming citations date no earlier than the tenth century, and several are referred to only in the thirteenth or fourteenth century and later.

Formally, these texts closely resemble the Śaivāgamas (indeed, in this context, the terms *saṃhitā*, *āgama*, *tantra*, and *sāstra* are essentially interchangeable). [See Tantric Literature.] Traditionally, they purported to deal with four topics: *jñāna* (“knowledge”), *yoga* (“disciplined concentration”), *kriyā* (“action”), and *caryā* (“conduct”). In fact, only one or two actually approximate this paradigm. Most concentrate almost exclusively on *kriyā* and *caryā*: prescriptions for constructing and consecrating temples and “images” (of various materials) in which Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa is pleased to dwell, and for conducting the appropriate daily and festival services. Essentially, this is the literature of temple priests, the bulk of which deals with practical details. The explicit *jñāna* sections (*pādas*) are usually brief and bound up with accounts of the creation of the world.

The extant Saṃhitās do not entirely agree on the details of the cosmogony, but they are in accord about the general “order of creation” (*sr̥ṣṭīkrāma*), which may be sketched here in simplified outline. At the beginning (of every world age), the *śakti* (“energy, force, power”) of *parabrahman* Nārāyaṇa-Viṣṇu awakens, opening her eyes as “action” (*kriyā*) and “becoming” (*bhūti*). She is Lakṣmī, as inseparable from Viṣṇu as sunlight from sun, yet ultimately distinct from him; Lakṣmī acts independently of Nārāyaṇa-Viṣṇu, although each of her

acts merely implements a wish of his. As *kriyāśakti*, Lakṣmī is identical with Viṣṇu’s great discus, Sudarśana. As *bhūtiśakti*, she is the “material cause of the universe,” governed by *kriyāśakti* as the thread governs pearls in a necklace.

In this *suddhasr̥ṣṭi* (“pure creation”), the first *guṇas* (qualities) appear. These qualities of the supreme Lord are non-prakritic (because they are “pre-prakritic”). They are six in number: knowledge, lordship, power, strength, virility, and splendor. The *guṇas* then pair together as knowledge/strength, lordship/virility, and power/splendor. The three pairs constitute the *vyūhas* Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. The Lord is entirely present (with all his six qualities) in every *vyūha*, but only one pair of qualities is openly manifest in each.

These *vyūhas* appear successively; then they act together—but again sequentially—in the second, or “nonpure,” creation, which appears initially as a chaotic, undifferentiated potentiality, rather like an embolism on the body of Saṃkarṣaṇa. The duality of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (“spirit” and “material potentiality”) appears with Pradyumna. Aniruddha organizes the potential he inherits by means of his quality of *śakti*. He is the *brahman* and the *māyā* (apparent reality) of the material world, presiding over the cosmic eggs whence life as we know it—the “prakritic” *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*), *karman*, and time—devolves. These *vyūhas* have important moral and religious as well as cosmological dimensions: Saṃkarṣaṇa teaches true monotheism, Pradyumna translates that teaching into practice, and Aniruddha gives concrete instruction in Pāñcarātra doctrine and the attainment of release.

Vibhavas (“manifestations”) or *avatāras* (“descents”) of the Lord are of two kinds. Those belonging to *suddhasr̥ṣṭi* are *mukhya* (“primary”), and the major Saṃhitās agree that they number thirty-nine. The “secondary” (*gauṇa*) *avatāras* are usually said to descend from Aniruddha. Primary and secondary *avatāras* differ importantly both in their natures and in the benefits to be derived by devotedly concentrating on them. Springing “like flame to flame” directly from the Lord’s supreme body, primary *avatāras* should be worshiped by those desiring *mokṣa*. Secondary *avatāras* are “ordinary” beings pervaded by a fraction of the Lord’s *śakti* to accomplish a particular purpose for world maintenance, and worshiping them yields worldly rewards such as wealth or sovereignty.

With this theory of secondary *avatāras* one reaches the central preoccupations of the compilers of the Saṃhitās. Not only “ordinary beings” are fit receptacles for the Lord’s descent. Properly consecrated through Pāñcarātra ritual, a representation in stone, metal, or wood

becomes an *avatāra* through the Lord's descending with a part of his inexhaustible *śakti*. Thereby, he becomes fully present in the object, which is then known as *arcā avatāra*, or "worthy of worship." [See also *Avatāra*.]

Pāñcarātra in Practice. At the heart of epic and later Pāñcarātra is the driving insistence that salvation comes only through knowledge of ultimate truth, a knowledge that is the grace of the Lord revealed by single-minded devotion. This knowledge, open to members of all four *varṇas* (classes), depends on an understanding of the Pāñcarātra teachings. Such understanding requires the assistance of a qualified teacher (*guru*), who guides the aspirant until he determines that the student is fit to be initiated. Initiation (*dīkṣā*) consists of five ceremonies (*pañcasamskāra*): branding the initiate's shoulders with the discus and conch emblems (Tāpa), instruction in the application of the cosmetic sectarian mark on the forehead (Puṇḍra), assigning a new name to the initiate (Nāman), confiding a secret *mantra* and explaining its sense (Mantra), and teaching the details of external ritual (Yāga). In addition, the adept learns a yoga for internal worship, that performed in the heart.

Services to the Lord combine with a life of purity and harmlessness (*ahimsā*) to the end of realizing "devotional union" with the Lord. The Pāñcarātrika is assured that there will be moments when "absolute union" with the Lord will be experienced. But this is not a realization of primordial unity in any metaphysical sense. Rather, it is an active experience of rapt devotion to the Lord, whereby individuals never lose their individuality. Indeed, as "parts" of Lakṣmī or Śrī, they too are eternally distinct from the Lord. Even during the intervals between world ages, they remain separate from if latent in him.

Pāñcarātrikas have made a considerable point of stressing that they are *vaidikas*, and hence that Pāñcarātra not merely ranks alongside the Veda but is in fact part of it. Nārāyaṇa-Vāsudeva, according to them, is the god of the Upaniṣads, author of the Veda and the world. They assert, in effect, that the world we know is incomprehensible on the grounds of *karman* alone. Underlying it, grounding everything, must be the supreme person.

The mildest rejoinders to such Pāñcarātra apologetics suggested that, at the very least, there was no way to prove their Vedic claims. Most responses were more severe. *Manusmṛti* 10.23 declares, for example, that Sātvatas and *ācāryas* are offspring of despised unions. And commentators identified both as temple functionaries. Denying the propriety of the lifestyles of temple priests, Smārta brahmans consider all their claims suspect. Association with a presumably extra-Vedic (i.e., tribal or nomadic) society—the Sātvata-Yādavas—combined with the importance assigned to the dynamic, creative, female principle, Lakṣmī, doubtless contrib-

uted strongly to the (negative) assessment that Pāñcarātrikas were *tāntrikas* (practitioners of Tantra). In an important sense, the assessment is correct; indeed, even the Pāñcarātrikas themselves called their system a *tantra*.

Pāñcarātra in History. It is generally accepted that the historical Pāñcarātra first emerged in northern, probably northwestern, India—it being clear, however, that Pāñcarātra itself was more an increasingly detailed set of cosmological speculations and devotional attitudes and procedures than it was a sect proper. This Pāñcarātra "system of thought" became the rationale of increasing numbers of Vaiṣṇava Bhāgavatas who were involved in temple and domestic devotional ritual. Its influence seems especially strong among the Mahānubhavas of Maharashtra (from the mid-thirteenth century) and among the Narasiṃhas. [See also *Marathi Religions*.]

Even more apparent than its northern heritage is the fact that Pāñcarātra has prospered more obviously in South India than in the north for at least the past millennium. Pāñcarātra's destiny in the south is closely related to the rise of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition, in which Pāñcarātra cosmological and ritual theory and practice combine with the unique vernacular devotional poetry of the Ālvārs. The early Śrī Vaiṣṇava "doctors" Nāthamuni, Yāmuna, and Rāmānuja become the most noteworthy personalities associated with the propagation and defense of Pāñcarātra ideas. Later developments in Śrī Vaiṣṇava theology and the emergence of two distinct traditions—Vaṭakalai and Teṅkalai—realize and expand upon more of what was present in Pāñcarātra thinking from the start than is often recognized. Through the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Pāñcarātra thought informed Rāmānanda (fl. mid-fifteenth century?) and his following of Rāma *bhaktas*, thus reentering North India. Again through Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, Pāñcarātra teachings strongly influenced the nonbrahman Sātānis in Karnataka. [See also *Śrī Vaiṣṇavas*.]

The circumstances of Pāñcarātra's introduction into South Indian temples are not entirely clear. Perhaps temple procedures had earlier been only customary and generally informal. In that case the Pāñcarātra systematically introduced order and regularity. It is also possible, however, that the earlier Viṣṇu temple ritual was conducted according to Vaikhānasa prescriptions. More self-consciously linked to Vedic ceremony, Vaikhānasas tended to a certain conservatism, resisting the incorporation of devotional material from the Ālvārs (to which the Pāñcarātra were quite receptive). [See also *Ālvārs*.] At the same time, Vaikhānasas are closer to earlier Pāñcarātra than to its later form in their conception of such deities as Rudra-Śiva as manifestations of Viṣṇu, and thus both groups appropriately included ritual proceed-

ings that the evolving Śrī Vaiṣṇavas often found offensive. On the other hand, however, modern-day Vaikhānasas have argued that both Pāñcarātra "tātrikas" and the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas offend the Lord precisely because they allow "saints" and teachers of Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition to intrude into temple devotional ritual in ways that improperly detract from the worship of Lord Viṣṇu.

[See also Bhakti.]

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Of course, it is best to encounter Pāñcarātra through primary sources. For this, F. Otto Schrader's classic *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnyā Saṃhitā* (Madras, 1916) remains the best point of departure. H. Daniel Smith's *A Descriptive Bibliography of the Printed Texts of the Pāñcarātrāgama*, vol. 1 (Baroda, 1975), and vol. 2, *An Annotated Index to Selected Topics* (Baroda, 1980), is an indispensable guide. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar's translation of the representative *Parāmasaṃhitā* (Baroda, 1940) is adequate. Sanjukta Gupta provides an authoritative reading of the *Lakṣmī Tantra* (Leiden, 1972), a later and more speculative ("philosophical") *Saṃhitā*. Finally, a precious record of actual practices is Kadambi Rangachariyar's *The Sri Vaishnava Brahmins* (Madras, 1931).

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VAJRABODHI (671–741), Indian Buddhist monk and Chen-yen teacher in China. Vajrabodhi (Chin., Chinkang-chih) was the second of three Vajrayāna missionaries to eighth-century China. He was born of a South Indian brahman family, and his father was a priest for the royal house. Vajrabodhi probably converted to Buddhism at the age of sixteen, although some accounts

place him at the Buddhist university of Nālandā at the age of ten. He studied all varieties of Buddhism and was said to have studied for a time under the famous Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti. Under Śāntijñāna, Vajrabodhi studied Vajrayāna teachings and was duly initiated into yoga, the "Three Mysteries," and *dhāraṇī*. Leaving India, Vajrabodhi traveled to Sri Lanka and Śrīvijaya (present-day Sumatra), where he apparently was taught a Vajrayāna tradition distinct from that taught at Nālandā. From Śrīvijaya he sailed to China and by 720 was ensconced in the Chien-fu Temple at the Chinese capital, Ch'ang-an. Accompanying him was his soon-to-be-famous disciple, Amoghavajra.

Like Śubhākarasiṃha, who preceded him by four years, Vajrabodhi spent most of his time in ritual activity, in translating texts, and in the production of Esoteric art. Particularly important was his partial translation of the *Sarvatathāgatātattvasaṃgraha* (T.D. no. 865) between the years 723 and 724. This Yoga Tantra—along with the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* (T.D. no. 848), translated by Śubhākarasiṃha the same year—provides the foundation of the Chen-yen school in China and the Shingon and Esoteric branch of the Tendai school (Taimitsu) in Japan. Like Śubhākarasiṃha, Vajrabodhi had ties to high court circles and enjoyed the patronage of imperial princesses; he also worked with the Chinese monk I-hsing. Vajrabodhi died in 732 and was buried south of the Lung-men caves. He was posthumously awarded the title Kuo-shih, "Teacher of the Realm."

Vajrabodhi's importance was twofold. Although the doctrines of the Yoga Tantras were known to Śubhākarasiṃha, Vajrabodhi was the first translator and systematic teacher in China of the *Sarvatathāgatātattvasaṃgraha* and of Vajrayāna as practiced in South India and in Śrīvijaya. Second, Vajrabodhi reinforced the presence and visibility of the Vajrayāna at the Chinese court, a presence that, under his disciple Amoghavajra, would become the dominant force in the court during the second half of the eighth century.

[See also Chen-yen and Mahāsiddhas.]

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VAJRAYĀNA. See Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Esoteric Buddhism.*

VALHOLL is the hall of Óðinn (Odin) in Norse mythology. The fullest descriptions of it are found in the

Prose Edda (c. 1220–1230) of the Icelandic mythographer Snorri Sturluson and in the Eddic poem *Grímnismál* (Lay of Grímnir), one of Snorri's main sources; tenth-century skaldic poems also make particular use of the conception. These and other texts describe Valhøll as a stately palace, with a roof of shields and spears. A wolf hangs by the west portal and an eagle droops above; both these animals are associated with Óðinn, the god of the spear, and their actions recall his self-sacrifice. Valhøll had 540 doors, through each of which 800 warriors could pass at once. (These numbers probably employ the Germanic long hundred and should be read as 640 and 960 respectively.)

Valhøll served specifically as a hall for the *einherjar*, the dead warriors of Óðinn. These chosen heroes were fetched from the battlefield by valkyries, who also served them mead in Valhøll, a scene probably reflected on such picture stones as the eighth-century Ardre VIII from Gotland, Sweden. Legendary heroes, human kings, and even the god of poetry, Bragi, are numbered among the *einherjar* in Valhøll. Baldr's arrival is mentioned once, although the mythology usually associates him with Hel. The *einherjar* spend their days in endless combat but in the evenings they join in reconciliation for feasting and drinking. The boar Sæhrímnir is boiled each day for their food but is restored again each night. Mead runs from the udders of the goat Heiðrún. She stands above Valhøll, feeding on the foliage of Læráðr (Yggdrasill), the world tree. The stag Eikþyrnir also chews on the tree; from his horns fluid runs into Hvergelmir, the well of wisdom, and thence into mighty rivers. The proximity of tree and well suggests that Valhøll is located at or near the center of the world.

The *einherjar* ("those belonging to one army" or "splendid warriors") share a special relationship with Óðinn. Called his *óskasynir* ("adopted sons" or "beloved sons"), they are his retainers, destined to fight with him in the final battle at Ragnarøk. This relationship may be the key to the religious background of Valhøll. Some scholars have sought this background in ecstatic cults of Óðinn, characterized by initiation into warrior bands, perhaps secret cult groups that used animal masks. [See Berserkers.] Valhøll would then represent a mythic projection of the Germanic chieftain's hall, and the activities within would be a similar projection of the warriors' life. Certainly other sources emphasize the ritual importance of feast and drinking.

Many scholars believe that the Norse sources express a late development of conceptions of Valhøll, appropriate particularly to the warrior elite of the Viking age. At an earlier period Valhøll may have simply indicated a grave mound. Supporting this notion is the Icelandic conception of a local mountain inhabited by dead fam-

ily members; the sagas report that feasting was occasionally glimpsed within. Furthermore, in Sweden, certain rocks associated with the dead are called *valhall*. If this explanation is correct, *Valhøll* ("carrion hall") may actually be derived from *valhallr* ("carrion rock, or hill"). Since *val-* may also mean "foreign," *valhøll* might also denote "foreign hall," and the term is used of kings' halls in the Eddic poem *Atlakviða*.

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VALKYRIES, female, supernatural figures of Norse myth and literature, share many features with the *ðtsir*, *fylgjur*, *hamingjur*, Norns, and *landvættir*, in the extant texts, and there is little terminological consistency. A primary function of the valkyries is indicated by the etymology of the word *valkyrja*, a compound of *valr* ("carrion") and a *nomen agentis* based on the verb *kyrja* ("to choose"). Regarded as the maidens of Óðinn, the valkyries chose who was to die in battle and brought the chosen ones to him in Valhøll, where they joined the *einherjar*, Óðinn's warriors. Valkyries rode through the air, bore weapons, and could be fierce in appearance, although they may have been shape-changers. [See Shape Shifting.] Their personal names ordinarily make reference to battle. In Valhøll, valkyries served mead to the *einherjar*, a scene perhaps portrayed on the Ardre VIII picture stone (Gotland, Sweden; eighth century) and elsewhere. Sometimes, however, valkyries protected heroes in battle, a characteristic shared with the *fylgjur*. The valkyrie Sigrdrífa of the Eddic poem *Sigrdrífumál* may be associated with healing, which suggests the *matronae* of early Germanic religion. Like the Norns, valkyries weave fate in the poem *Darraðarljóð*. There is also confusion with human or semidivine her-

oines, and in one heroic cycle a valkyrie is twice reborn in different identities.

Given the existence of the *matronae* in ancient Germanic times, the general prominence of male gods and the relative importance of the Æsir over the Vanir in Norse mythology, it seems apparent that female figures were of greater importance in Germanic religion than Norse mythology would indicate. Scholars have regarded the valkyries as derived from earlier goddesses of death or perhaps a fertility cult, but their association with Óðinn may be ancient and primary. If so, believers may once have attributed to valkyries shape-changing and the ecstatic "sending" of their spirits.

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JOHN LINDOW

VALLABHA (1479–1531), also called Vallabhācārya; Vaiṣṇava Hindu philosopher and religious leader. Vallabha was born in central India at Campāraṇya (Raipur District, Madhya Pradesh) into a family of Vaiṣṇava brahmins originally from the Telugu country. During his childhood, which was spent in Vārāṇasī (Banaras), Vallabha displayed unusual precocity in mastering the scriptures of orthodox Hinduism. In the course of his life he visited most of the holy places of India, publicly expounding his own interpretation of the events of Kṛṣṇa's life as presented in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. In a series of debates with adherents of the nondualism (*advaita*) promulgated by the eighth-century philosopher Śaṅkarācārya, Vallabha defended the doctrines of devotional worship (*bhakti*). On one of these occasions he was offered and accepted the position of leader (*ācārya*) of the Vaiṣṇava school established earlier by Viṣṇusvāmī.

Vallabha's own sect, the Vallabh Sampradāy, originated from two events that occurred in the Braj region around the city of Mathura. In the first of these, Kṛṣṇa appeared to Vallabha in a vision and revealed to him the *brahmasambandha mantra* by which human souls could be brought into direct relationship (*sambandha*) with the Supreme Being (*brahman*). In the second, Vallabha discovered on Govardhan Hill the stone image called Śrī Govardhananāthajī ("the auspicious lord of Govardhan"), usually abbreviated as Śrī Nāthjī; the

statue is a representation of Kṛṣṇa holding up Govardhan Hill as a shelter for his devotees. The *brahmasambandha mantra* remains to this day the primary component of the rite of initiation into the Vallabh Sampradāy, and Śrī Nāthjī, now at Nathdwara (Udairpur District, Rajasthan), is the sect's chief divine image. Vallabha was married and had two sons, Gopīnātha (1512–1543) and Viṭṭhalanātha (1516–1586).

After Vallabha's death, first Gopīnātha and then Viṭṭhalanātha took charge of the sect. Each of Viṭṭhalanātha's eight sons formed his own branch of the sect and the leadership within these branches passes down by inheritance through Vallabha's male line. With most of its membership drawn from the mercantile section of Hindu society, the Vallabh Sampradāy is found in all important Indian cities but is strongest in the states of Rajasthan and Gujarat and in the city of Bombay. Vallabha's sect was in decline during most of the nineteenth century, but in recent years it has regained its position of eminence among devotional varieties of Hinduism.

According to Vallabha the chief philosophical flaw in Śaṅkarācārya's concept of *advaita* is that it accepts illusion (*māyā*) as a force independent of *brahman*. Vallabha rectified this defect by presenting *māyā* as one of the powers of the Supreme Being. In this way he made pure (*śuddha*) the nondualism of his philosophical system, which is, in consequence, called *śuddhādvaita*. The fundamental principles of *śuddhādvaita* are as follows: Kṛṣṇa is the Supreme Being and sole existent entity. Both human souls and the material universe are real but limited manifestations that Kṛṣṇa projects out of himself. The souls on earth have, however, forgotten their true nature as fragments of the divine and have become centered on themselves. This egoism is the primary sin that dooms human beings to separation from Kṛṣṇa and to an endless succession of births and deaths. In his mercy Kṛṣṇa himself came in human form to earth in the Braj area and showed through his own actions the way to salvation through *bhakti*. The divine grace, which cannot be earned through mere piety or ritual, is available to anyone, regardless of sex or caste, who will forget the ego and center himself or herself on Kṛṣṇa. Since Kṛṣṇa's grace is said to be the way (*mārga*) for the nourishment (*puṣṭi*) of the soul, followers of Vallabha call their religion the Puṣṭimārg. Salvation, the goal of the Puṣṭimārg, consists of eternal association with Kṛṣṇa in his paradise beyond ordinary time and space.

[The Vallabh Sampradāy is but one of the various forms of *Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇavism*; for a synthetic discussion of these groups, see *Vaiṣṇavism*, article on *Bhāgavatas*. For further discussion of devotional Hinduism, see *Bhakti*.

See also Kṛṣṇa for other legends about the god and his life in the region of Braj.]

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R. K. BARZ

VALLÉE POUSSIN, LOUIS DE LA. See La Vallée Poussin, Louis de.

VĀLMĪKI. Legendary sage and author of the Hindu epic *Rāmāyaṇa*, Valmiki also plays a role in the epic itself. The first book of his *Rāmāyaṇa* tells the story of the invention of poetry by Vālmīki: One day Vālmīki saw a hunter kill the male of a pair of birds making love. Filled with compassion for the birds, the sage spontaneously uttered a curse at the hunter for his cruelty. Vālmīki's words came forth as well-formed, beautiful verse. The sage himself was surprised by his utterance, which was immediately memorized and recited on the spot by his disciple Bharadvāja, who had accompanied him. Later, after Vālmīki returned home, Brahmā, the creator, visited him and asked him to compose the story of the virtuous hero Rāma as outlined by the ṛṣi Nārada, using the new meter that Vālmīki had created. Indian literary tradition therefore considers Vālmīki as the first poet (*ādikavi*) and his *Rāmāyaṇa* the first poem (*ādikāvya*).

In the seventh book of the epic, Vālmīki is spoken of as a friend of King Daśaratha. Rāma's brother Lakṣmaṇa leaves the pregnant Sītā (Rāma's wife) in Vāl-

miki's hermitage. Finally, it is Vālmīki who shelters Sītā, raises her twin sons, and plays the role of reconciler between Rāma and Sītā by testifying publicly to Sītā's purity. In this context, Vālmīki describes himself as a son of Pracetas, which makes him a member of the family of Bṛhgu, an influential lineage of brahmins in ancient India.

A folk legend records that the sage was born out of an "anthill" (Sanskrit, *valmīka*) and therefore was called Vālmīki. This legend also records that he was originally a bandit, but some sages, pitying him, taught him the *mantra* "marā, marā, marā." As he repeated the syllables, they produced the name *Rāma*, and while he was deeply immersed in meditating on the name of Rāma, ants built anthills around him. This story appears with minor variations in the *Skāndapūrāṇa* and also in the *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa* and *Ānanda Rāmāyaṇa*. Many popular *bhakti* *Rāmāyaṇas*, including the *Krittivāsa Rāmāyaṇa* of Bengal, adopt this story.

Thus, there are two kinds of biographies for Vālmīki. One type describes Vālmīki as a sage-poet born of a high-caste brahman family and endowed with supreme wisdom and the divine sensibilities that made him the creator of poetry, while the other type describes him as a sinner transformed into a saint. The first type of biography is in conformity with the status of the *Rāmāyaṇa* as the great epic that it is in the Brahmanic tradition. The second type of biography relates to the status of the *Rāmāyaṇa* as a *bhakti* poem that transforms its readers from sinners into devotees of the god Rāma. The two types of biographies thus reflect the two major orientations and interpretations of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in Hindu culture.

Scholars have suggested a historical Vālmīki, who probably was a resident of Kosala (a region of the modern state of Uttar Pradesh) and traveled extensively in North India, though he did not know much of the South. This opinion is based on the textual evidence from the *Rāmāyaṇa* that gives detailed and geographically correct descriptions of North India, whereas its descriptions of South India are purely fanciful. It is also suggested that Vālmīki was one of the *kuśilavas* ("singers, bards") who sang the epic. No firm evidence is available, however, in support of a historical Vālmīki. Tradition holds, however, that Vālmīki is also the author of the medieval work *Mahārāmāyaṇa*, or *Jñānavāśiṣṭa*, a philosophical text in the form of a dialogue between the sage Vāśiṣṭa and Rāma.

[See also *Rāmāyaṇa*.]

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VELCHERU NARAYANA RAO

VAN DER LEEUW, GERARDUS. See Leeuw, Gerardus van der.

VAN GENNEP, ARNOLD. See Gennep, Arnold van.

VAN RUUSBROEC, JAN. See Ruusbroec, Jan van.

VANUATU RELIGIONS. Formerly known as the New Hebrides, Vanuatu is a Y-shaped archipelago of mostly volcanic islands located about 1,600 kilometers northeast of the Queensland coast of Australia. The physical, linguistic, and cultural diversity of the one hundred thousand or so indigenous inhabitants of the sixty-three occupied islands is extreme even for the western Pacific, a diversity that is fully reflected in religious belief and practice. While the dominant traits in all contexts may be described as Melanesian, Polynesian influences, including those pertaining to religion, are sufficiently widespread and important to set this area apart from the rest of Melanesia. In this article I ignore the profound impact of Christianity on contemporary religion. I should, however, stress that much of what I here describe as traditional continues today to be a major part of belief and practice, even among those who have been converted to Christianity for some generations.

Supernatural Powers and Spirit Beings. The traditional religions of Vanuatu, like religions universally, have as their identifying theme the cultural and social elaboration of peoples' ideas and emotions concerning the nature and locus of supernatural powers. Throughout the archipelago such powers, though mostly associated with various classes of spirit beings, are also commonly attributed to a wide range of "natural" phenomena, including humans, animals, birds, fish, plants, and stones. It is this diffuseness of supernatural power, together with its transferability, by means of ritual, from its various sources to human agents, that gives Vanuatu religions their distinctive character. The primary aim of Vanuatu religious practitioners is, through ritual, to gain direct control of extraordinary powers, rather than to supplicate spirit beings to act on their behalf. The ni-Vanuatu ("people of Vanuatu"), though deeply concerned with establishing and main-

taining positive relations with the relevant power sources, cannot be said to worship such sources. Their religions, though replete with the powerful, the sacred, and the tabooed, are almost wholly devoid of deities, priests, and acts of worship.

As R. H. Codrington (1891, p. 123) long ago noted, the ni-Vanuatu recognize two classes of spirits, those who were once living people and those who were not. Though the former, which include both the ghosts of the dead and ancestral spirits, are everywhere the prime focus of ritual attention, it is the latter who figure most prominently in an elaborate body of mythological tales.

Mythology. A widespread feature of Vanuatu mythology is the representation of the leading figures as of two distinct kinds—on the one hand, the exclusively male beings whose personal names are often local variants of such well-known Polynesian gods as Tangaroa or Māui, and on the other, the sexually variable, though frequently female, beings whose personal names are of a purely indigenous kind. The Polynesian-type beings—such as Qat and his eleven Tangaro brothers in the Banks Islands; Takaro and his brothers or supporters on Maewo, north Raga, and Ambae; Tahar in the Small Islands; Takaru and Tokotaitai in Malo; Barkulkul (or variant) in south Raga and north Ambrim; Ambat, Hambat, Kabat, and so forth on Malekula; and a variety of local variants of Māui from Efate southward—are commonly associated with the sky, mountain peaks, treetops, volcanic fires, the sun and the moon, acts of a creative or originating kind, and the attainment of a satisfactory life after death. By contrast, the non-Polynesian-type beings—such as Sukwe or Marawa in the Banks; Gaviga in Maewo; Mwerambuto or Nggelevu in Ambae; Lehevhev (or variant) in Malekula and surrounding islands; Marrelul in south Raga; Bugliam in north Ambrim—are commonly associated with the underground, caves, mazes, snakes, spiders, rats, acts of a devouring or destructive kind, and the failure to attain a satisfactory afterlife.

Pig Sacrifices. Though both classes of mythological beings are often depicted as having transformative powers that are greatly in excess of those normally possessed by humans, they are only rarely the subject of ritual attention and are generally deemed to be of small consequence in human affairs. There is, however, one major exception: throughout the northern and central islands there existed in the past, and still exists today in modified form in some of the northern islands, an elaborate institution that centers on the ceremonial slaughter of pigs, most especially tusked boars and hermaphrodites. Though this institution has important secular functions throughout the area, most notably in providing an elaborate social and political hierarchy, the

key symbolic act, that of pig sacrifice, is nevertheless of deep religious significance. This is evident in two contexts, one of which relates the institution to the mythological beings and the other to the ancestral spirits. In mythology there is a widespread belief that there are two alternative fates that await the spirits of the recently dead: all those who have sacrificed at least one high-grade tusked boar are admitted to a pleasant abode presided over by the principal benign spirit; all others are excluded from this abode, usually through being devoured by the principal malignant spirit.

These mythic themes are, however, of relatively minor significance in accounting for the religious importance of the institution compared with the belief that the sacrificial act results in the transfer of ancestral power from the slaughtered animal to its human executioner. Through a complex cognitive and emotional process the killing of the pig has as its end result a further advancement in the spiritual progress of the sacrificer toward the attainment of full ancestral status. Men who have advanced to high rank through the slaughter of numerous tusked boars are regarded as having attained a spiritual condition not very far removed from that of the ancestors. Such men must eat and sleep alone because of the danger that their high spiritual condition poses for others, especially women and children.

Ancestral Spirits. Further evidence for the importance of the ancestral spirits, especially in the context of the sacrificial rites, can be found in the Ambrim practice of setting up carved tree-fern effigies of the dead. Also on Ambrim, as on Malekula, Epi, and as far south as Efate, the slit-gongs, which are used both at pig sacrifices and at funerary rites, stand upright on the ceremonial ground and are carved and painted so as to represent human forms. On the Small Islands, and most probably elsewhere also, the sounds that issue from the gongs are said to be the voices of the ancestral spirits. In the southern districts of Malekula, life-size effigies of the dead are made in which the head is formed from the deceased's skull. These effigies are kept for some generations in the men's clubhouse and, though not the focus of specific rituals, are nevertheless treated as being in some degree sacred.

On Ambae Island, where one finds none of the above iconographic representations of ancestral spirits, they are nevertheless regularly made small offerings of food in the hope that they will not cause their descendants any problems. Such offerings are usually made in a generalized way to any potentially troublesome spirits that may be lurking in the vicinity of the living. Occasionally, ghosts, as well as other varieties of spirit beings,

are believed to befriend individual humans and to assist them by imparting magical knowledge.

Secret-Society Rites. In the period immediately prior to the spread of Christianity, there existed on many of the northern and central islands, though especially in such matrilineal areas as the Banks, Maewo, north Raga, and Ambae, a variety of more secret and voluntary cults that centered around the acquisition of highly dangerous powers of a predominantly destructive kind. Whereas the kinds of powers invoked through pig sacrifices derive from the benign ancestors and impart to practitioners a positive and highly esteemed form of sanctity, those invoked in the secret society rites derive either from malignant ghosts of the dead or from what may be described as the "dark" side of human spirituality. Prominent symbolic themes include representations of ghosts and sharks, usually in the form of masks and headdresses worn by members, and of such normally abhorrent and dangerous activities as incest, genital exposure, contact with menstrual blood, and sodomy. The powers generated in the context of these rites were primarily utilized by participants to create fear in others, and were hence closely associated both with warfare and sorcery. It is therefore no surprise that such rites mostly ceased to be practiced at about the same time that warfare was prohibited and sorcery came under increasing Christian and governmental attack.

Male Initiations. Though similar cultural themes figure in the ritual corpus of the more patrilineal areas of north Vanuatu (notably in Malekula, the Small Islands and Ambrim), in these communities they occur in the context of compulsory initiations into manhood rather than voluntary initiations into discreet secret societies. That the two institutions are closely related is evident in the common occurrence of shark symbolism, representations of threatening ghosts, long periods of seclusion, the importance of the phallus as a locus of power, and either real or symbolic ritual male homosexuality. But whereas the secret rites were deemed both dangerous and antisocial, the compulsory versions were, and in most communities still are, positively valued as generating a form of sanctity similar to that attained by pig sacrifices. Everywhere the key symbolic act is the removal of either part or all of the novice's foreskin and the subsequent wearing of a penis wrapper. Through such an act a boy takes his first step toward achieving spiritual maturity, a goal only fully attained when, after the slaughter of numerous additional tusked boars throughout his life, he finally succeeds, at death, in breaking his dependence on and identification with women. Needless to say, many men do not progress very far in their efforts to attain such a goal.

Women's Rites. The ritual life of women, though everywhere less elaborate than that of men, is nevertheless of importance in those relatively few areas about which we have adequate knowledge. In some of the districts of Malekula there is a ritual association known as Lapas whose membership is restricted to women and which in many respects parallels the principal male ritual association, Nimangki. As in the latter, the women kill pigs, purchase sacred insignia, erect effigies of the dead, and are secluded for some days in a ceremonial house that may not be entered by nonmembers of the association, especially men. Furthermore, just as the men are believed to generate through their ritual actions a specifically male form of sanctity or holiness, so too are the women deemed to generate a specifically female sanctity. These two forms of sanctity, though both ultimately derived from the ancestral spirits, are nevertheless so entirely antipathetic to one another that they must be rigorously kept apart. Hence the pervasive importance of the sex dichotomy in the religious life of the people of Malekula, the Small Islands, and Ambrim.

Elsewhere (though most notably in the northern maritlineal islands of Maewo, north Raga, and east Ambae, where the sex dichotomy is a great deal less pervasive and important) the women, though the principal participants in and organizers of rites that are of primary concern to themselves, such as first menstruation or body tattooing, do not exclude the men from such activities. Likewise, the men, though again the key actors in the sacrificial rites of the graded society, encourage their womenfolk to kill an occasional pig and take supplementary titles. In west Ambae the women even participate as novices in the local versions of what are elsewhere exclusively male secret-society rituals.

Sorcery and Magic. Various kinds of sorcery and magic are practiced throughout Vanuatu, though the former was, at least until recently, of special importance in Ambrim, while magic, rather than religion, seems to be the dominant ritual theme in some of the southern islands, notably Tanna. Indeed, in Tanna there are no major communal rites of the clearly religious kind that I have described for the northern islands. Even the male initiation rites, which, as in the north, focus on circumcision, seclusion, and the donning of penis wrappers, are seemingly of a more secular and ceremonial, rather than religious and ritual, character; the emphasis is primarily on individual status transition rather than on joint initiation into a secret male cult. However, ethnographic information concerning the traditional cultures of all the southern and central islands, including Tanna, is either fragmentary and unreliable or nonexistent. Since this applies most espe-

cially to their traditional magico-religious systems, I do not wish to be too emphatic in thus relegating the religious component to a secondary position.

Moon Worship. Such caution seems especially relevant in the case of Aneityum, where, in addition to the widespread practice of making offerings, usually of food, though sometimes also human sacrifices, to a variety of unnamed spirit beings (*natmas*), a more elaborate ritual of worship, including prayer, song, dance, and offerings of food and *kava* placed on wooden altars, was periodically performed in sacred groves dedicated to the moon. As on the neighboring islands of Aniwa and Futuna, the moon, who is known by the Polynesian name *Sina*, is represented in mythology as the wife of the sun. Unfortunately, little has been recorded of this mythology and even less of what seems to have been an important religious practice.

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MICHAEL ALLEN

VĀRĀṆASĪ. See Banaras.

VARDHAMĀNA MAHĀVĪRA. See Mahāvīra.

VARṆA AND JĀTI. Although the concepts of *varṇa* and *jāti* reflect quite separate dimensions of Indian social, economic, and ideological systems, the common practice of translating both terms as "caste" tends to obscure the very real differences between them. Furthermore, whereas the term *caste* is often used to typify social conditions in societies other than those deriving from South Asia, the terms *varṇa* and *jāti* are restricted in reference to that subcontinent.

Varṇa refers to the social divisions believed to have been characteristic of the Indo-Iranian-speaking groups (variously called *āryas*, "Aryans," and "Vedic peoples") that moved into South Asia from the west during the second millennium BCE. No historical records exist for the period, but from the hymns, legends, and other accounts we have, it would appear that the social system of the newcomers was composed of four major subdivi-

sions: the *brāhmaṇa* (brahmans), a sacerdotal or priestly category; the *rājanya* (or *kṣatriya*), a chiefly, noble, or warrior category; the *vaiśya*, who were variously perceived as commoners, yeoman farmers, or merchants or all three together; and the *śūdra*, a category of servants or commoners of a status lower than *vaiśya*.

These ancient categories have interested scholars, because *varṇas* are assumed by some to have been the cradle of the more recent "caste system"; indeed, some scholars believe that the actual *varṇas* evolved directly into contemporary "castes" (*jātis*). Many orthodox Hindus believe that the original *varṇas* are still in existence today and that they represent the manifest expression of transmigration of souls and of divine justice. In support of these views, both scholars and theologians cite two sources: (1) an early hymn in the *Rgveda* (the *Puruṣasūkta*; 10.90) and (2) the much later *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (Laws of Manu), in which the lawgiver Manu cites the *Puruṣasūkta* as the source and justification for the social system of his own time.

There is, nevertheless, considerable uncertainty about the four original *varṇas*. Scholars debate whether these groups were actually endogamous (marriage-restrictive) and whether a substantial body of population (perhaps including priests, merchants, and a large number of country folk) existed completely outside the *varṇa* structure. One curious area of uncertainty has to do with the original meaning of the term *varṇa* itself. Most scholars agree that the word originally meant "color," and some, particularly toward the end of the nineteenth century, concluded that it referred to skin color and therefore to racial categories similar to those found in modern European societies. This led to much (now generally rejected) speculation about the "racial" origin of the early social system.

Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of the present Hindu population of South Asia consider themselves members of distinctive social bodies commonly called *jātis* in India (although pronunciation and even the term itself vary from region to region and language to language). *Jāti*, too, is most commonly translated by Europeans as "caste."

There are thousands of *jātis* scattered throughout the subcontinent, and they vary widely in their attributes and characteristics. Each is characterized by a set of rules governing acceptable occupations, foods, associations (that is, with members of other *jātis*), marriage rules (concerning widow remarriage, for example), and much else. European observers have long been particularly interested in three areas of *jāti* regulation: the rule of endogamy, the presence of a characteristic (or at least traditional) *jāti* occupation, and the rules whereby *jātis* in proximity rank themselves and each other.

Some scholars have claimed that the widespread rule of *jāti* endogamy is the source of the word *caste*; Europeans were and are particularly impressed by what they assume is the Indian passion for maintaining “*jāti* purity”—for it is generally believed that *caste* derives from a Portuguese term (*casta*) usually translated as “chaste” or “pure.” Rules of endogamy are to be observed in societies all over the world, however, and the desire to maintain “purity of blood” is not, according to cultural anthropologists, the sole and invariable explanation of all such rules.

Punishment for disobeying the rules of endogamy, like that for other infractions, is rarely inflicted by the entire *jāti* but rather by the assemblage of a particular subcaste or “marriage circle” within the *jāti*. These punishments may take many forms, but violations of the marriage rules are often punished by expulsion. This practice may explain in part the widely held belief that the multitude of *jātis* came into existence from the four original *varṇas* through an intricate series of mismatings and subsequent expulsions.

According to some scholars, the distinctive characteristic of the *jāti* is the special and exclusive occupation claimed by or attributed to it. Throughout South Asia there are such *jātis* as “Barber,” “Potter,” and “Leatherworker,” whose very names indicate the primary occupation supposedly followed, now or at one time, by all the male members. Some writers have therefore theorized, if with little evidence and with diminishing scholarly support, that the present *jātis* of South Asia derive from hypothetical ancient occupational associations that in time became hereditary and endogamous marriage groups.

The tendency for *jātis* to be ranked hierarchically has drawn the attention of sociologists and anthropologists during this century. Research has focused on such areas as the following: criteria for ranking, regional differences in ranking, ranking and social distance, local conflicts over rank order, strategies and circumstances of change in rank order, and the significance of hierarchy in Indian thought and society.

For many Hindus, the *jātis* to which they belong are simply subdivisions of the classical *varṇas*. Thus all brahmins, although they are members of a wide variety of distinct and endogamous *jātis*, claim ultimate membership of their *jātis* in the India-wide *brāhmaṇa-varṇa*, supposedly of classical origin. Other *jātis* are assigned, or assign themselves, to the *ṣatriya*, *vaiśya*, and *śūdra varṇas*. In addition there is a large body of *jātis* considered (by people of more highly ranked *jātis*) to be outside, or even below, the entire *varṇa* system.

Finally, *varṇa* ascription has a particular significance for those Hindus who believe that it reflects an impor-

tant component of the reward or punishment each soul receives for its actions during a previous existence. For them, the sanctity of brahmins and the relative high or low rank attributed to each *jāti* in a given regional system is only partly a result of the current social and occupational practices of members of each *jāti*: much more significant is the supposed purity of members' souls as a result of their previous incarnations. Brahmins are thought to have the “purest” souls, but a wicked brahmin, although pure of soul in this incarnation, may among other prospective punishments be reborn as a member of another “lower” *varṇa*, or even as a member of a *jāti* outside the system, that is, as an “untouchable,” or *harijan*. Many Hindus today, however, although they are convinced of the reality of transmigration and of divine punishment, no longer believe that *varṇa* ascription is necessarily part of the divine scheme. The degree to which members of very low-ranked *jātis* accept, or have ever accepted, the orthodox view has been a matter of debate.

[For a detailed discussion of the system of *varṇāśrama-dharma*, see Rites of Passage, article on Hindu Rites. For a history of the Hindu priesthood and the distribution of religious responsibilities among members of different *jātis*, see Priesthood, article on Hindu Priesthood.]

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French sociologists have long been intrigued by the caste system of South Asia. Émile Senart's *Caste in India* (1896), translated by E. Denison Ross (New Delhi, 1978), was one of the first, and Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus: An Essay on the Caste System*, translated by Mark Sainsbury (Chicago, 1970), continues the tradition most brilliantly.

A. L. Basham's *The Wonder That Was India*, rev. ed. (New York, 1963), remains the best introduction to the subcontinent—its people, history, religions, social systems, and much else. The newcomer to the subject is advised to begin here.

MORTON KLASS

VARUṆA replaced the earlier god Dyaus as the sky god in the Vedic pantheon, but early in his mythologi-

cal career he became the god of the night sky; the myriad stars were his eyes and, still later, his spies. The importance of such a sky god seems to belong to the pastoral history of the nomadic Aryans. The Bogazköy inscription of the fourteenth century BCE mentions a Mitanni god, Uru-van-nas-sil, Varuṇa's prototype. Ouranos, Varuṇa's Greek parallel, was also a sky god.

With his thousand eyes, Varuṇa watched over human conduct, judging good and evil deeds and punishing evildoers. Varuṇa is the only god in the Vedic pantheon with such strong ethical bearings. The word used in the Vedas to refer to his eyes, *spaśa*, derived originally from the verbal root *spac* ("see"), later came to mean "spy." Still later, in the epics and the Purāṇas, the word underwent further linguistic evolution and became *pāśa* ("noose"); Varuṇa then ensnared the wicked in his noose.

Scholars have traced Varuṇa's name to various Indo-European roots such as *uer* ("bind"), *ver* ("speak"), *vr* ("cover"), *vār* ("shower"), as well as to noun stems like Lithuanian *weru* ("thread"). It is possible that these all contributed to the many layers of his mythological attributes.

Ahura Mazdā, the supreme god of the Avesta, is another parallel of the Vedic Varuṇa. In Vedic the Avestan name would be rendered *Asura Medhya* ("holy spirit"), and indeed the Vedas frequently refer to Varuṇa as an *asura*. In the Avesta, Mithra is closely related to Ahura Mazdā, just as the Vedic Mitra is related to Varuṇa. Mitra is the god of the daytime sky whose eye is the sun. Together Mitra and Varuṇa constitute the sky god and replace the earlier Dyaus. In the *Ṛgveda*, Varuṇa enjoyed sovereignty and supremacy for a brief period; he was frequently called *samrāj* ("emperor"), an epithet used only occasionally for Indra. The Rājasūya sacrifice, offered for attaining imperial grandeur, belongs to Varuṇa and Mitra; in the *Ṛgveda* Varuṇa is said to have performed this sacrifice, presumably with the intention of becoming the supreme god in the pantheon.

Because of his innumerable star-eyes, Varuṇa was regarded as omniscient. His knowledge and his function as a moral judge were the chief sources of his power, as he had no remarkable achievements to his credit. He watched over human beings: when two persons conversed, he was the invisible third; when anyone sinned, Varuṇa afflicted the transgressor with disease, and until the god relented, the victim would not be restored to health. In the solemn Varuṇapraghāsa rite, a seasonal sacrifice, the sacrificer's wife was required to confess her sin (i.e., conjugal infidelity) before the officiating priest. This is a unique instance of confession of sin in the early Vedic literature, and Varuṇa was the god associated with this sacrifice. The punishment he meted

out in such cases was called a "seizure," hence the elaborate prayers to Varuṇa for forgiveness of sins.

In later literature Varuṇa's ethical role diminishes, but early texts frequently associate his majesty or supremacy with his function as upholder of the moral order referred to in the *Ṛgveda* as *ṛta* or, sometimes, *dharma* (i.e., "that which upholds") or *satya* ("truth"). In the Avesta this all-pervasive moral order that controls and regularly maintains the cosmic forces is *arata*, *aśa*, *urta*, or *arta*; a cardinal concept in Zoroastrianism, it is first mentioned in the Tel-el-Amarna Tablet (c. fourteenth century BCE). *Ṛta* is Varuṇa's special domain, and it is often mentioned in connection with him.

Another concept associated with Varuṇa is the magical power known as *māyā*; we hear, for example, of Asura's (i.e., Varuṇa's) *māyā*. In the Vedic context *māyā* meant both wisdom and power. With his *māyā* Varuṇa envelops the night and creates the dawn. *Māyā* predominantly links him with demons, for in later literature *asura* meant "demon," and demons wielded *māyā*.

Varuṇa's dark associations bring him close to the primarily chthonic gods such as Yama, Nirṛti, Soma, and Rudra. As a chthonic god, Varuṇa is associated with snakes (indeed, in Buddhist literature he is sometimes called the "king of snakes"), with barren black cows, or with deformed and ugly creatures. His ritual symbols are dark, depraved, and deformed things or creatures. His son Bhṛgu is said to have descended into hell. His connection with Vaśiṣṭha, however, goes back to Indo-Iranian times: in the Avesta, Asha Vahishta (Vedic, *Ṛta* Vaśiṣṭha) is one of the Amesha Spentas who were Ahura Mazdā's active assistants. Varuṇa is Soma's brother. Of his wife, Varuṇānī, we know nothing more than her name.

The dynamic character of Varuṇa's mythological career subsided in the later Vedic literature, where he is associated with the celestial waters. In the epics and Purāṇas, however, his domain shifted from the firmament toward the earth, and he became the overlord of the terrestrial waters, rivers, streams, and lakes, but primarily of the ocean. He dwelt in royal splendor in an underwater palace. Like Poseidon, Greek god of the ocean, he is often associated with horses. Finally, he is relegated to the position of "lord of the West," another dark and chthonic association. Here the circle of his mythological career closes, because as a *dikpāla* ("lord of a quarter [of the sky]") he is no more than a wholly passive god.

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SUKUMARI BHATTACHARJI

VASUBANDHU (fifth or fourth century CE), an eminent Indian Buddhist teacher. Said to be a younger brother of the great Mahāyāna teacher Asaṅga, Vasubandhu was first ordained in the Hīnayāna Sarvāstivāda school but later converted to the Mahāyāna. Like his brother Asaṅga, Vasubandhu became a great exponent of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda teachings. He is believed to be the author of the *Abhidharmakośa* and many Mahāyāna treatises.

Various problems continue to vex historians concerning the biography of Vasubandhu. The *P'o-sou-p'an-tou fa-shih chuan* (Biography of Master Vasubandhu, T.D. no. 2049), translated—or rather, compiled—by Paramārtha (499–569), one of the main exponents of Yogācāra doctrine in China, is preserved in the Chinese Tripiṭaka and is the only complete biography. Apart from this, fragmentary information is found in various Chinese sources, the most important of which are the writings of the great Chinese translator Hsüan-tsang (600–664). Various histories of Buddhism written by Tibetan historians also give accounts of Vasubandhu's life. But Chinese and Tibetan sources alike disagree with the *Biography of Master Vasubandhu* (hereafter *Biography*) in many places. Moreover, two or three persons in Buddhist history bear the name *Vasubandhu*:

according to some texts, a Vasubandhu is the twenty-first patriarch in the transmission of the Buddha's Dharma; elsewhere, P'u-kuang (one of the direct disciples of Hsüan-tsang) refers to an "ancient Vasubandhu" who belonged to the Sarvāstivāda school; and both P'u-kuang and Yaśomitra, a commentator on the *Abhidharmakośa*, refer to a third, known as Sthavira-Vasubandhu. The identification of and relationship between these three persons is still unclear.

Biography. Vasubandhu's *Biography* can be divided into three sections. The first section is introductory. It begins with a legend of Puruṣapura (modern Peshawar), the native city of Vasubandhu, and then introduces his family: his father, the brahman Kauśika, and the latter's three sons, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Viriñcivatsa. After a brief reference to Viriñcivatsa's life, an account is given of Asaṅga's life, including the famous story of his meeting with the *bodhisattva* Maitreya in the Tuṣita Heaven. [See also Maitreya.]

Vasubandhu's life makes up the second section. It begins by sketching the history of the Sarvāstivāda school in Kashmir and tells of the composition of the Abhidharma treatises and the great commentary on them, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, there. Knowledge of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*'s contents was jealously kept secret from outsiders, the account alleges, but somehow it became known in Ayodhyā (near modern Faizābād), a city far removed from Kashmir. At the time, Vasubandhu was residing in Ayodhyā, then the capital of the Gupta dynasty. Vindhyaśālin, a Sāṃkhya teacher and a disciple of Vārṣaṅga, came to Ayodhyā to challenge the Buddhists there to a debate while Vasubandhu and his colleague Manoratha were absent. Their fellow teacher Buddhāmītra thus had to meet the challenge alone, but because of his old age he was defeated. This defeat deeply mortified Vasubandhu, who wrote a treatise, *Paramārthasaptatikā*, in order to confute Vindhyaśālin. It was after this that Vasubandhu composed his *magnum opus*, the *Abhidharmakośa* (hereafter *Kośa*), in six hundred verses (*kārikās*). The *Kośa* was an eloquent summary of the purport of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and it is reported that the Kashmiri Sarvāstivādins rejoiced to see in it all their doctrines so well propounded. Accordingly, they requested a prose commentary (*bhāṣya*), which Vasubandhu wrote. But the Kashmiris soon realized, to their great disappointment, that the work in fact *refuted* many Sarvāstivāda theories and upheld the doctrines of the Sautrāntika school. With the composition of the *Kośa*, however, Vasubandhu came to enjoy the patronage and favor of two Gupta rulers, Vikramāditya and his heir Bālāditya, who can be identified, respectively, as Skandagupta (r. about 455–467) and Narasiṃhagupta (r. about 467–473). Vasurāta, a grammarian and

the husband of the younger sister of Bālāditya, challenged him to a debate but was defeated. Then Saṃghabhadra, a Sarvāstivāda scholar from Kashmir, appeared to dispute the *Kośa*. He composed two treatises, one consisting of 10,000 verses and another of 120,000 verses. (According to Hsüan-tsang's report, it took twelve years for Saṃghabhadra to finish the two works.) He challenged Vasubandhu to a debate, but Vasubandhu refused, saying, "I am already old, so I will let you say what you wish. Long ago, this work of mine destroyed the Vaibhāṣika (i.e., the Sarvāstivāda) doctrines. There is no need now of confronting you. . . . Wise men will know which of us is right and which is wrong."

The third section of the biography describes Vasubandhu's conversion to Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to this account, Vasubandhu, now proud of the fame he had acquired, clung faithfully to the Hīnayāna doctrine in which he was well versed and, having no faith in the Mahāyāna, denied that it was the teaching of the Buddha. His elder brother, Asaṅga, a Mahāyānist, feared that Vasubandhu would use his great intellectual gifts to undermine the Mahāyāna. By feigning illness he was able to summon his younger brother to Puruṣapura, where he lived. There Vasubandhu asked Asaṅga to explain the Mahāyāna teaching to him, whereupon he immediately realized the supremacy of Mahāyāna thought. After further study the depth of his realization came to equal that of his brother. Deeply ashamed of his former abuse of the Mahāyāna, Vasubandhu wished to cut out his tongue, but refrained from doing so when Asaṅga told him to use it for the cause of Mahāyāna. After Asaṅga's death, Vasubandhu composed commentaries on various Mahāyāna sūtras, including the *Avataṃsaka*, *Nirvāṇa*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Vimalakīrti*, and *Śrīmālādevī*. He himself composed a treatise (or treatises) on the "representation only" (*viññaptimātra*) theory and commented on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, **Triratna-gotra*, **Amṛta-mukha*, and other Mahāyāna treatises. He died in Ayodhyā at the age of eighty.

The *Biography* contains legendary or even mythical elements; the time sequence of events is ambiguous and differs greatly in places from the accounts in Hsüan-tsang's *Hsi-yü chi*. For example, the *Biography* has Vasubandhu composing the *Kośa* at Ayodhyā and states that his conversion takes place at Puruṣapura; the *Hsi-yü chi* places the composition of the *Kośa* in the suburbs of Puruṣapura, and the conversion at Ayodhyā. According to the *Biography*, Vasubandhu's teacher was called Buddhāmitra, who, we are told, was defeated in a debate by Vindhyavāsin. The *Hsi-yü chi*, however, never mentions Buddhāmitra and names Manoratha as the

teacher of Vasubandhu. In the *Biography*, Vasubandhu engages in his literary activity on behalf of the Mahāyāna after Asaṅga's death. Hsüan-tsang, however, tells a strange story that suggests that Vasubandhu died before Asaṅga. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang are the two most credible authorities for Vasubandhu's life, but serious discrepancies still exist between their accounts.

The Date of Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu's life has been variously dated at 900, 1,000, and 1,100 years after the Buddha's *nirvāṇa*. The figure 900 appears in the *Biography*, but elsewhere Paramārtha is also said to have given another figure, 1,100. The figure 1,000 is found in Hsüan-tsang's report, but the figure 900 seems also to have been adopted by his disciples. Various theories concerning the date have been offered by scholars. Noël Péri and Shiio Benkyō give as Vasubandhu's dates the years 270 to 350 CE. Ui Hakuju places him in the fourth century (320–400). Takakusu Junjirō and Kimura Taiken give 420 to 500, Wogihara Unrai gives 390 to 470, and Hikata Ryūshō gives 400 to 480, placing him in the fifth century.

In order to resolve these issues, Erich Frauwallner (1951) proposed a new theory whereby two Vasubandhus, Vasubandhu the elder and Vasubandhu the younger, are distinguished. The elder would be the younger brother of Asaṅga. It is his activity that, according to this theory, is described in the first and third sections of the *Biography* and may be dated at around 320 to 380. The younger would be the author of the *Kośa*. His activity constitutes the second section of the *Biography*. Since he was associated with the two Gupta rulers, he may be dated around 400 to 480. Frauwallner supposes that Paramārtha confused the two Vasubandhus and conflated them into a single person. This mistake, he maintains, was inherited by later historians, including Hsüan-tsang.

Frauwallner's lucid and revolutionary theory has been endorsed by many scholars. But it does not seem to convince all. Especially doubtful is his treatment of early Chinese documents, many of which have been claimed by scholars to be spurious. Japanese scholars, who opposed the theory of dating in the fourth century by negating the evidence employed in its support, would reject Vasubandhu the elder for almost the same reasons. At any rate, Frauwallner's theory and the issues it raises remain a hypothesis.

Literary Activity. Vasubandhu is renowned as the author of one thousand works, five hundred in the Hīnayāna tradition and five hundred Mahāyāna treatises. However, only some forty-seven are extant, nine of which survive in the Sanskrit original, twenty-seven in Chinese translation, and thirty-three in Tibetan translation.

Among the independent expositions of Vasubandhu's own philosophy and doctrines, the *Abhidharmakośa* is the most voluminous. In the countries of "northern" Buddhism, including Tibet, it came to be regarded as a fundamental text to be studied by all students of the tradition. The *Karmasiddhi* (Demonstration of Karma) is a short, quasi-Hīnayāna treatise colored, as is the *Abhidharmakośa*, by Sautrāntika leanings. From the Yogācāra point of view the most important of Vasubandhu's works are the *Viṃśatikā* (Twenty Verses), *Triṃśikā* (Thirty Verses), and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* (Exposition on the Three Natures). Although these three texts are all very brief (and the last was totally unknown in China), they form a sort of trinity and represent Vasubandhu's final accomplishment as a Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda teacher. The *Triṃśikā* is especially important in that it became the basic text of the Fa-hsiang (Jpn., Hossō) school. The *Fo-hsing lun* (Treatise on Buddha Nature), although thought to be apocryphal by not a few scholars, exerted great influence on Sino-Japanese Buddhism by advocating the concept of *tathāgata-garbha*, or Buddha nature. Vasubandhu's works also include books on logic, polemics, and other sciences.

Vasubandhu's commentaries on *sūtras* and *śāstras* are by no means less important than the above-mentioned independent treatises. He wrote commentaries on three treatises: the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (Discrimination between the Middle and the Extremes), *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (Ornament of the Mahāyāna Sūtras), and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (also, *-vibhaṅga*; Discrimination between Existence and Essence). These three treatises are all ascribed to Asaṅga's teacher Maitreya and are therefore fundamental texts for the Yogācāra school. Vasubandhu also composed a commentary on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Compendium of Mahāyāna), the first systematic presentation of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda doctrines. His commentary (*upadeśa*) on the *Sukhāvativyūha Sūtra* is important in that it became a basic treatise of the Pure Land faith in China and Japan. The Indian Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda is represented in China by three schools, all of which developed around Vasubandhu's works. The first to appear, the Ti-lun school (established in the first half of the sixth century), took his commentary on the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* as its central text. The second, the She-lun school, emerged in the second half of the same century organized around a Paramārtha's translation of the *Mahāyāna-samgraha*. The last to appear, the Fa-hsiang school, founded by Hsüan-tsang and his disciple K'uei-chi in the seventh century, took the *Triṃśikā* as its basic text. [See also Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Chinese Buddhism*.]

With these works, Vasubandhu proved to be a highly

influential Mahāyāna teacher. He is reverently called a *bodhisattva*, or even "the second Buddha," in various traditions from India to China. Vasubandhu brought to fruition doctrinal developments in the Mahāyāna, especially in the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition, that had been begun by Maitreya and Asaṅga and advanced by other unknown teachers. He thus marks a culmination in Buddhist history. Before him, his school concerned itself chiefly with Buddhist practice (hence the name *Yogācāra*); after him, it emphasized theoretical problems such as the analysis of consciousness (hence the name *Vijñānavāda*), so that various ontological, epistemological, and logical investigations became more and more conspicuous. Compared with Asaṅga, who was gifted as a religious leader, Vasubandhu seems more scholarly, abhidharmic, and theoretical.

[For further discussion of Vasubandhu's contributions to Mahāyāna thought, see Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in India*; Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Mahāyāna Buddhism*; Yogācāra; and Vijñāna. See also the biography of Asaṅga.]

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VATICAN COUNCILS. [*The first and second Vatican councils are discussed here in two separate articles. For discussion of earlier church councils, see Trent, Council of, and Councils, article on Christian Councils.*]

Vatican I

When Pius IX decided to convoke an ecumenical council, his purpose, clarified by advice solicited from various bishops whom he regarded as trustworthy, was to complete the work of reacting against naturalism and rationalism. He had been pursuing this goal since the beginning of his pontificate by endeavoring to establish Catholic life and thought once again on the solid foundation of divine revelation. As a result of suggestions from the bishops he had consulted, he added to this purpose, first, defining the true nature of the relation between church and state while taking into account the new situation produced by the French Revolution and its consequences and, second, adapting church law in ways made necessary by the profound changes that had taken place during the three centuries since the last ecumenical council. [*See the biography of Pius IX and Modernism, article on Christian Modernism.*]

Preliminary Discussions. Despite the reservations of some in the Curia Romana, which caused him to delay for two years, Pius IX was encouraged by prominent members of the episcopate to announce his intention of convoking a council; on 29 July 1868 he officially summoned all the bishops of Christendom to come to Rome by 8 December 1869, along with others who had the right to attend (especially the superiors general of the major religious orders). During the preliminary consultations a number of bishops had suggested taking advantage of the council to try to renew contacts with separated Christians. Two apostolic letters, dated 8 and 13 September 1868, invited the Eastern prelates not in communion with Rome, the Protestants, and the Anglicans in order that they might be able to take part in the council. But this clumsy approach was considered very insulting by those addressed and may be regarded, from an ecumenical viewpoint, as one of the most distressing examples of a lost opportunity.

In the Catholic world the announcement of the council almost immediately intensified the opposition between currents of thought that had been in confrontation for several years: Neo-Gallicans and liberal Catholics, on the one hand, and ultramontanes and opponents of modern freedoms, on the other. The choice of the consultors who were to prepare the drafts of the conciliar decrees—the group included sixty Romans and thirty-six from abroad, almost all of them known for their ultramontane and antiliberal views—disturbed

those who had been hoping that the council would provide an opportunity for bishops from the outer reaches of the church to open up the church somewhat to modern aspirations and who thought they could discern a strategy at work: namely, to prepare for the council in secret, with no challenges raised by debate and with the curial viewpoint alone represented, and then to have the fathers accept without discussion a series of ready-made propositions. [*See Gallicanism and Ultramontanism.*]

The unfortunate "Correspondence from France" that was published on 6 February 1869 in *La civiltà cattolica*, the organ of the Jesuits in Rome, seemed to confirm this expectation by predicting a definition of papal infallibility by proclamation and thus without any possibility of restatement or discussion by the fathers. The reaction was especially intense in the Germanic countries. In particular, Ignaz von Döllinger, the well-known professor at the University of Munich, whose hostility toward the Curia had been on the increase for a number of years, published under the pen name *Janus* a violent and one-sided polemic against the overemphasis on papal primacy and Roman centralization. [*See the biography of Döllinger.*] Polemical articles, though more moderate in tone, were also published in the newspapers of France, where liberal Catholics regarded as inopportune the definition of papal infallibility for which the ultramontanes were calling. The question of papal infallibility, which had not come up in the initial program for the council, suddenly became a major issue during the months preceding the opening of the council. A number of prominent bishops, such as Victor Deschamps, archbishop of Malines, and Henry Edward Manning, archbishop of Westminster, asked insistently that advantage be taken of the council for a solemn definition of this truth, since it was now being publicly challenged. On the other side, at their annual meeting in Fulda (September 1869), the majority of the German bishops discreetly expressed clear-cut reservations with regard to such a definition.

Though unmoved by such theological discussions, a number of European governments did become apprehensive about possible conciliar decrees on civil marriage, the place of religion in public education, and the legitimacy of freedom of worship and the press. Such apprehensions could only be intensified by the desire that many bishops and some Catholic newspapers expressed, namely that the *Syllabus of Errors* (1864) be made the basis for the council's deliberations, a desire that seems to have been welcome in Rome. All those in the church who feared the triumph of the ultramontane party at the council did what they could to intensify this governmental mistrust in the hope of procuring

diplomatic warnings and cautions. At one point, France considered appointing a special ambassador to the council, as it had at the time of the Council of Trent, while Prince von Hohenlohe, chancellor of Bavaria, attempted to have the European governments take joint steps. In the end, these governments chose to limit themselves to an attitude of distrustful expectation.

Conciliar Debates. The council opened on 8 December 1869, in the presence of about 700 bishops, about two-thirds of those with the right to attend. Among them were 70 prelates of the Eastern rite who were in union with Rome, most of these being from the Middle East, and almost 200 fathers from non-European countries: 121 from the Americas (49 from the United States), 41 from Southern Asia and the Far East, 11 from Oceania, and 9 from the African missions, which were then in their infancy. One must remember that while the prelates from other parts of the world made up a third of the gathering, many of them were actually from Europe (the missionaries in particular) and that there was as yet no native bishop in Asia or Africa. This predominantly European gathering was also predominantly Latin. There was indeed a sizable English-speaking group (in which those of Irish origin were predominant) and about 75 Germans and Austrians. Spaniards and Latin Americans numbered barely one hundred; the French made up 17 percent of the gathering (the majority of the missionaries of that time were from France), and the Italians over 35 percent. In addition, two-thirds of the consultants, or experts, and all of the secretaries of the commissions were Italians, as were the five presidents of the council; of the primary leadership offices, only that of secretary general was not occupied by an Italian, namely, the Austrian Joseph Fessler.

The first three sessions of the council were spent on the election of the commissions. The most important of these was the doctrinal commission (*Deputatio fidei*), from which all bishops suspected of being opposed to a definition of papal infallibility were excluded by the maneuvering of a pressure group of which Archbishop Manning was one of the main leaders. This maneuver, which many wrongly believed was ordered by the Curia, was a serious mistake for two reasons: first, it gave the impression that the elections were only a front, with the result that fathers in various groups now began to have doubts about the freedom of the council; and, second, it prevented a possible dialogue that might have reconciled the two opposing viewpoints.

On 28 December the council began at last to examine the first drafted constitution, which was directed "against the numerous errors deriving from modern rationalism." This draft, which was the work of the Jesuits Johannes Baptist Franzelin and Clemens Schrader,

drew strong criticism because of its substance, which some found to be out of touch with contemporary forms of rationalism and too apodictic on points freely discussed among theologians, and especially because of its form, which was judged to be overly polemical and insufficiently inspired by pastoral concerns. After six meetings for discussion, which had the advantage of showing that the council would be freer than some had feared, the presidents announced on 10 January that the draft would be sent back to the commission for recasting and that meanwhile the council would tackle the drafts on church discipline. In this area twenty-eight drafts had been prepared that were rather tame and showed hardly any pastoral openness to the future; to these were added eighteen others, much superior in character, on the adaptation of canon law to the new circumstances of the religious orders and congregations. The discussion of the first four drafts that were distributed quickly got bogged down in details, especially since the time available to the speakers was unlimited. As a result, in order to speed up the pace of the work (as the great majority of the fathers wanted), the pope, on 20 February 1870, amended the regulations that had been distributed at the opening of the council. By and large, the modifications were to the good, but some fathers, who had already resented having a set of regulations imposed on them from above, saw in these modifications a new threat to full freedom of discussion.

While the examination of texts that had little chance of proving explosive was advancing with prudent caution in the council hall, the attention of both the fathers and the public was increasingly focused on the question of infallibility. Raised again by a clumsy statement of Bishop Felix Dupanloup in November 1869, the question soon led the fathers, who had initially tended to group together along national and linguistic lines, to form new groups that were inspired by ideological considerations.

On the one side, many fathers who were very hostile to their contemporaries' infatuation with liberalism were not at all reluctant to have the council restate the principles according to which, in classical teaching, the relations between church and state should be ruled in an ideal Christian society. Many—often the same—wanted a solemn definition of the personal infallibility of the pope. Even though they did not approve of all the centralizing steps taken by the Curia, they were convinced that the Gallican and Febronian theses, which tended to diminish the primacy of the pope in favor of the episcopate, were simply a departure from the ancient tradition to which, as they saw it, witness was given by certain scriptural texts (esp. *Mt.* 16:18), certain patristic formulas (e.g., the maxim "Rome has spoken,

the question is closed"), and the whole body of great scholastic doctors from Thomas Aquinas to Roberto Bellarmino and Alphonsus Liguori. Those fathers met the historical difficulties of their adversaries with an appeal to the living faith of the church and were especially impressed by the almost universal acceptance, in the church of their time, of the thesis of the pope's personal infallibility, a thesis repeated on a number of occasions during the preceding twenty years by many provincial or regional councils. Reasons of a nontheological kind strengthened many of these prelates in their conviction: their veneration of Pius IX; their belief that an increased emphasis on the monolithic character of the Roman church could only draw to this church various non-Catholics who were distressed by the hesitations and lack of resoluteness of the churches separated from Rome or by the contradictions of philosophical systems (Manning, a convert, laid great stress on this point); their concern to lend as much weight as possible to the principle of authority in a world weakened by aspirations toward democracy, a type of government they regarded as a mitigated form of revolutionary anarchy; and their desire, in the face of the religious crisis they saw growing before their eyes, to give an increasingly centralized form to the defensive and offensive strategy of the church.

A comparable mixture of doctrinal considerations and nontheological motives inspired other prelates to think that such projects would overthrow the traditional constitution of the church and might well threaten the most legitimate aspirations of civil society. Some bishops remained very attached to a conception of the ecclesiastical magisterium according to which the pope can never decide a point of doctrine independently from ratification by the body of bishops. More widespread seems to have been the concern to safeguard the second element in the divinely appointed structure of the hierarchy; to many of the fathers the proposed definition of papal infallibility seemed part of a program aimed at practically destroying the episcopate. In addition, the way in which the question of infallibility was presented in the most prominent ultramontane newspapers could only confirm in their views those who were convinced that "the intention was to declare the pope infallible in matters of faith in order thereby to make people think him infallible in other matters as well" (Leroy-Beaulieu), that is, in matters more or less related to the political order. But surely it was to be expected that the governments would not permit a development along these lines without reacting to it, to the great detriment of the local churches.

Over and above immediate tactical considerations there was a question of principle that greatly disturbed

all those who believed that the future in the political realm belonged to liberal institutions and that the church had everything to lose by standing forth as the champion of autocratic authoritarianism. There were also concerns of an ecumenical kind: the proposed definition would render even more difficult any rapprochement with Eastern Christians; it would intensify the militant hostility of some Protestant groups; it might even lead to a new schism in German intellectual circles, which had been deeply impressed by Döllinger's campaign. Those who declared their opposition to the definition were less numerous than those in favor of it—thus the designation of them as the "minority"—but the most prominent among them enjoyed great authority by reason either of their theological competence or of the important sees they occupied: the entire Austro-Hungarian episcopate under the leadership of Cardinal Othmar Rauscher, a renowned patrologist and strong defender of the rights of the Holy See against Josephist, or liberal, claims; all the major sees of Germany; a sizable number of French prelates, including the archbishops of Paris and Lyons; several archbishops of North America; the archbishop of Milan, the most populous of the Italian dioceses; and three Eastern patriarchs.

The two groups had an opportunity to count heads as early as January. The infallibilist pressure group, again acting independently (but in close contact with the Jesuits of *La civiltà cattolica*), circulated a petition asking the pope to put on the assembly's agenda a draft definition of papal infallibility, which the preparatory commission had preferred not to offer on its own initiative. The petition finally collected 450 signatures, and, despite a counterpetition signed by 140 bishops, Pius IX decided on 1 March to include the desired passage in the draft of the constitution on the church that had been distributed to the fathers some weeks earlier on 21 January.

The minority, now deeply disturbed, busied itself organizing the resistance that had until then been scattered and unfocused. The real center of this opposition was a young layman, John Acton, who as a historian shared the prejudices of his master, Döllinger, against the dogma and who feared even more the indirect effects of the definition on the future chances of Catholicism in a society increasingly based on the idea of freedom. Conzemius's publication of the Acton-Döllinger correspondence (3 vols., Munich, 1963–1971) has made fully clear the important role, unsuspected until now, that Acton played in organizing the conciliar minority.

The leaders of the minority did not limit themselves to making personal appeals to fathers they hoped they could win to their side. Convinced as they were of the deadly effects on the church of the definition now being

readied and of the legitimacy of taking all effective means to stop it, a number of them thought it necessary to rouse public opinion and so bring outside pressure to bear on the authorities of the council. Several of these fathers even tried to win governmental support, especially at Paris, because they knew how influential any mediation by Napoleon III would be, since his military and diplomatic support was indispensable in preserving what was left of the pope's temporal power.

Conciliar Constitutions. Amid the growing restlessness outside the council in the salons, newspapers, and chancelleries, the assembly itself was going ahead with its work. The draft of the constitution against rationalism, which had been recast by bishops Martin, Deschamps, and Pie with the help of the Jesuit Joseph Kleutgen, came before the council again on 18 March. The new version was favorably received by the fathers, and any discussion was now concerned only with individual points or improvements of details. On 24 April the council unanimously gave its solemn approval to its first dogmatic document, the constitution *Dei filius*, which responded to pantheism, materialism, and modern rationalism with a substantial exposition of Catholic teaching on God, revelation, and faith; this exposition was to be for almost a century the basis of the treatises which made up fundamental theology.

Chapter 1 condemns pantheist views and briefly sets forth Catholic teaching on providence. Chapter 2 defines, against atheism and traditionalism, the possibility of knowing the existence of God with certainty by the natural light of reason and, against deism, the absolute necessity of revelation if man is to have knowledge of the supernatural order. Chapter 3 defines the reasonableness of the act of faith as against the illumination of some Protestants and against those who deny the value of the external motives of credibility, such as miracles. It states that faith is both a free assent and a gift of grace and reaffirms the obligation of believing all the truths the ordinary ecclesiastical magisterium proclaims to have been revealed. It asserts that the church, which proposes the truths to be believed, at the same time carries within itself the guarantee of its own divine origin and that with his grace God confirms believers in their faith. Chapter 4 explains the relations that should exist between faith and reason, science and revelation: there are mysteries that cannot be demonstrated by reason, but reason can legitimately reflect on supernatural truths. While claiming a proper freedom for science, the council warns against abuses of this freedom. Finally, it explains what true dogmatic development is and condemns systems according to which philosophy may give new and more perfect meanings to revealed dogmas.

It quickly became clear that, given the pace at which

work was proceeding, the constitution on the church, the text of which had been distributed to the fathers on 21 January, would not come up for discussion for several months; this was even more true of its eleventh chapter, which dealt with the special prerogatives of the pope. Consequently, as early as March, new petitions requested that this chapter, which made the council restive, be discussed out of its proper order as soon as the examination of the constitution against rationalism was concluded. Despite the reservations of three of the five presidents of the council, Pius IX, who was increasingly displeased at the opposition of the minority group, decided to alter the schedule. In order to avoid the anomaly of treating this chapter before the others, it was expanded into a short, independent constitution devoted entirely to the pope.

The general debate on the text as a whole began on 13 May but was reduced from the outset to a discussion of the opportuneness of the definition; at times the discussion was impassioned. After some fifteen meetings, the fathers went on to examine the details of the texts; this discussion focused essentially on the chapter devoted to the definition of papal infallibility. The proposed text, although the commission had already improved it by comparison with the original draft, did not yet take sufficient account of the legitimate role that belonged to the episcopate, alongside and in collaboration with the pope, in the supreme teaching office of the church. Fifty-seven speakers took the floor, emphasizing theological arguments or historical difficulties, as well as the practical advantages or drawbacks of a definition in the circumstances of that time. These debates, though often tedious, at least gave an opportunity to qualify certain expressions and led to the elimination of some opposition.

Meanwhile, the behind-the-scenes lobbying intensified. For, apart from the zealots of the majority and the partisans of unyielding resistance, the great majority of the fathers were men of moderation who were deeply grieved and troubled by all the agitation. Far from desiring to see their opponents crushed, they wanted only to find a compromise formula that would keep the divisions within the assembly from becoming public. This was especially true of the Italians, as Michele Maccarone has clearly shown. By reason of their numbers these men, who had played no part in the initial steps taken to introduce the famous question, were a decisive bulwark of the informal "third party" that had been taking shape since the beginning and was finally able to win the day against the neo-ultramontane and anticurialist extremists.

There is reason for thinking that a much larger section of the minority would have finally accepted the nu-

anced solution that was gradually worked out if Pius IX had not been so intransigent. For recent research has also shown, with the help of previously unstudied documents, that the pope several times directly intervened on the side of the majority extremists as the discussion became protracted. Whatever the personal responsibility of Pius IX may have been, it is a fact that last-minute efforts to rally the opponents through small concessions proved fruitless, despite the good impression made by the recapitulatory explanation given by Bishop Gasser in the name of the theological commission (this authoritative commentary is of key importance for a grasp of the nuances of the conciliar text). When a final appeal of the minority to Pius IX had no result, some sixty bishops decided to leave Rome before the final vote in order not to have to cast a negative vote in the presence of the pope on a question that directly concerned him. The other members of the minority judged that the successive improvements of the text as well as Bishop Gasser's commentary had removed the principal substantive objections and they decided therefore to approve the final text. This text was solemnly accepted on 18 July by nearly everyone present.

Officially entitled First Constitution on the Church of Christ, the constitution *Pastor aeternus* expounds Catholic teaching on the privileges of the pope. After a lengthy introduction on the institution of the church by Christ and on the place therein of papal primacy as the foundation of the church's unity, chapter 1 asserts, against some Gallicans and Febronians, that Peter received directly from Christ, and not through the church, a primacy of jurisdiction over the entire church. Chapter 2 states that by Christ's will this primacy is to be continued perpetually in the successors of Peter, the bishops of Rome. Chapter 3 solemnly defines the nature of the pope's primacy: the pope has an ordinary, immediate, "episcopal" jurisdiction not only in questions of faith but also in matters of church discipline, and this authority, which does not depend on approval by an ecumenical council, is to be exercised over pastors as well as the faithful. The concern to provide explicit safeguards for the authority of the bishops is at the root of the third paragraph, the main point of which is that bishops govern their flocks as "true pastors" and are therefore not mere delegates of the pope.

The fourth chapter declares that authority as supreme teacher is included in the primacy and then recalls how over the course of time the popes had always exercised this function by drawing upon the faith of the universal church as expressed in particular by the teaching of the bishops. The chapter then goes on to define solemnly that this supreme teaching office has attached to it the prerogative of infallibility, provided the pope is speak-

ing *ex cathedra*, that is, provided that "in exercising his office as teacher and shepherd of all Christians he defines, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority" (that is, with the intention of unequivocally putting an end to all discussion) "that a doctrine concerning faith or morals must be held by the universal Church; such definitions are irreformable of themselves and do not require ratification by the episcopate (*ex sese non autem ex consensu Ecclesiae*)." This final formula is a bit ambiguous, for, according to the commentary given by Bishop Gasser in the name of the doctrinal commission, while the words reject the *consensus Ecclesiae* as the source of papal infallibility, they do not mean to deny that the pope, as spokesman for tradition, must remain in constant close contact with the "mind of the Church" (*sensus Ecclesiae*) in the exercise of his ministry.

After the vote taken on 18 July the council continued its work for two more months, but at a slower pace, since the majority of the fathers had left Rome for the summer. The occupation of Rome by the Italians on 20 September brought the work to a definitive end, and on 20 October the pope announced that the council was adjourned indefinitely.

The termination of the debates did not immediately bring a calm to all hearts. The agitation continued for some time, and there were sad apostasies, especially in the Germanic countries where the Old Catholic schism developed around some university professors who appealed to Döllinger's writings. Among the bishops of the minority a few, Hefele and Strossmayer among them, wavered for several months, but in the end none of them refused to accept the new dogma.

When the immediate results of the council were compared with its ambitious program (fifty-one drafts had still to be voted on) and especially with the great hopes the convocation of the council had raised, the First Vatican Council seemed to many to have been a failure, its principal outcome having been to aggravate the disunity among Christians. With the passage of time, however, people became aware of important results flowing from the intense intellectual ferment the convocation of the council had produced. The work done by the commissions which dealt with the improvement of church law was not wasted, nor were the many suggestions sent in writing by those at a distance. Extensive use was to be made of these materials in the encyclicals of Leo XIII and especially in the revision of the Code of Canon Law under Pius X. The first dogmatic constitution that had been passed in April 1870 exercised a clarifying influence on subsequent theological teaching, especially in the burning question of the relations between reason and faith. On the other hand, it also strengthened the tendency to enlarge the role of authoritative doctrinal

interventions in the development of Catholic thought; this tendency was strengthened even more by the definition of papal infallibility.

While the solemn approbation given to the ultramontane movement, which continued to develop for another half century, did not bring about the revolution in church government that some opponents had anticipated, it did nonetheless lead to more numerous direct interventions of the Holy See in the dioceses and to an emphasis on Roman centralization. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that by defining very strictly the rare cases in which the privilege of papal infallibility comes into play, the council ruled out the exaggerated ideas that were beginning to spread abroad before 1870 under the influence of bishops like Manning and journalists like Veuillot. In the final analysis, the nuanced character of the definition, which was the result of impassioned discussion and satisfied the legitimate demands of many minority bishops, was the best safeguard against the excesses of what has been called "neo-ultramontanism," a fashion of excessive devotion, more sentimental than theological, to the pope.

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Translated from French by Matthew J. O'Connell

Vatican II

The idea of holding a church council, which can be attributed to Pius XI and Pius XII, four hundred years after the Council of Trent and one hundred years after the First Vatican Council, as well as the realization of this idea, must be seen in historical perspective. The principal formative influence on the life of the Roman Catholic church until the Second Vatican Council, besides the impact of the institutional and doctrinal differentiation of Christian churches resulting from the Reformation, was the Council of Trent (1545–1563), especially through its decisions on faith and morals. [See Trent, Council of.] Although the First Vatican Council, through its definition of the universal jurisdictional primacy and infallibility of the pope, had expanded to some extent the decisions made at Trent, it did so without addressing the question of the relationship of primacy and episcopacy. The problem of conformity between proclamation of the faith and pastoral care was not considered, nor were the altered circumstances resulting from industrialization. On the one hand, the French Revolution and secularization had shaken the foundations of radical episcopatism evidenced in such national movements as Gallicanism, Josephism, and Fabronianism, but on the other hand, an extreme papalism (or rather curialism) was no longer possible after the dissolution of the Papal States.

The way was clear, however, for new forms of thinking about and actualizing the church and its relationship to the world. Before discussing the conduct of the Second Vatican Council itself, we shall examine these tendencies briefly.

The Church before the Council. The liturgical movement, whose roots go back to the time of the Reformation, reached a peak of activity in the twentieth century. The movement sought to revive liturgical forms in order to create the church anew by means of daily participation in the objective events of liturgy and the mysteries of the church. Connected with this was a new valuation of sacramentality and of the proclamation of the word (for example, in kerygmatic theology, that is,

pastoral theology, culminating in the development of a new practical theology). The liturgical movement found magisterial support in the encyclical *Mediator Dei* (1947) of Pius XII.

Paralleling the liturgical movement was the biblical movement, which rediscovered the immediate religious meaning of holy scripture by means of new translations into vernacular languages and the formation of Catholic Bible associations. The Bible was studied according to the norms of modern scholarship and the canons of scientific exegesis. The epoch-making encyclical *Divino afflante Spiritu* (1943) of Pius XII removed the prevailing ecclesiastical obstacles to a truly critical study of the Bible.

The involvement of the laity in the ministry of the church also changed. Catholic Action was founded in 1923. Laypeople were becoming conscious of their responsibilities and rights in the church. Manuals on doctrine and moral theology written especially for laypeople appeared, culminating in Yves Congar's *Lay People in the Church* (rev. ed.; Westminster, Md., 1965).

The church's consciousness of itself changed. This was primarily a matter of the dissolution of the one-sided canonical understanding of the church as juridical, an understanding that had been set forth in the late Middle Ages and was firmly established once and for all by the Code of Canon Law (1917). The change was signaled in 1922 by Romano Guardini, who declared the "awakening of the church in souls," and was confirmed in 1943 by the understanding of the church as the mystical body of Christ set forth in Pius XII's encyclical *Mystici Corporis*, which, however, still identified the church with the official hierarchical Roman church. The change culminated in ecclesiological projects during and after World War II that engendered an understanding of the church as people of faith subject to the Word.

The ecumenical movements, which since the beginning of the twentieth century had brought together and united the non-Catholic Christian church communities through world church conferences and the founding of the World Council of Churches, stood distanced for a long time from the Roman Catholic church. The opening of the Roman offices for ecumenism by John XXIII was made possible by contacts and conversations between Protestant and Catholic theologians and church leaders that took place for mutual defense against anti-ecclesiastical totalitarianism. These contacts were expanded after the founding of a Catholic ecumenical board in Fribourg, Switzerland, in 1951. The question of the reunification of all Christians appealed to parts of Catholic Christendom and exercised a great influence on theological reflection about the church's unity in di-

versity and its understanding of ministry, eucharist, and primacy.

Another important tendency in the Roman Catholic church before the calling of the council involved changes in theology itself. Certain theological efforts and approaches went beyond basic or scholastic theology and carried on a dialogue with the consciousness of the times and with the theologians of the separated Christian churches. The most important stages were attempts to overcome through kerygmatic theology the objectivistic and unhistorical or superhistorical point of view of neoscholasticism; "nouvelle théologie," which emphasized open thinking and opposed scholasticism; transcendental theology, which reflected on the conditions of the possibilities of man; the acquisition of a genuinely theological understanding of history in hermeneutical theology; and finally the inclusion of the societal dimension in political theology. These positions gained more and more significance with regard to the church's self-understanding and its relationship to the world. It became a church that no longer defined itself in the triumphalist terms of the Counter-Reformation but understood itself as a pilgrim church waiting for its eschatological completion.

The inner transformation of the church corresponded to a new orientation in the relationship of the church to the world. Integralism, the world viewed simply as material for the activity and self-preservation of the church, and esotericism, the world as irrelevant for salvation, prompting flight from it, needed new alternatives. Here especially the theology of earthly realities (Gustave Thils), the theology of the world, and the various projects in moral theology or ethics were preparatory for a new outlook. The true relationship of the Christian and of the church to the world lies between integralism and esotericism. And this middle ground must not be understood as a cheap compromise necessitated by circumstances, a compromise possible only because, unfortunately, the world cannot ever be integrated totally into the ecclesial-religious sphere or because the pious cannot avoid serving the profane reality of life. This is a middle that stands above the extremes as an original unity. Of itself, it actually constitutes the unity and difference between the explicitly Christian and churchly, on the one hand, and the world and worldly activity, on the other. And here there must be a clear distinction between the relationship of the official church to the world and that of the Christian to the world.

History and Themes of the Council. The Second Vatican Council was the twenty-first ecumenical council (according to the official count of the Roman Catholic

church), held from 1962 to 1965 at Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome. On 17 May 1959, after the first official announcement on 25 January 1959, John XXIII designated a commission that was to make preparations for the council under the direction of the cardinal secretary. All bishops, the Curia Romana, and the theological and canonical faculties voted on topics for discussion. On 5 June 1960 the pope ordered ten specialized commissions to work on the schemata (protocols). There were also two permanent secretariats (one for the mass media, another for Christian unity). A central preparatory committee was responsible for organizing the work of the council. The formal summoning of the council to Rome occurred on 25 December 1961. On 2 January 1962 the opening was set for 11 October 1962. According to the rules of procedure, ten cardinals were to head the ten council commissions assigned to work into the protocols the suggestions introduced in the general assembly. Two-thirds of the members of these commissions were to be chosen by the assembly; one-third were to be named by the pope. The council decisions required a two-thirds majority.

As so-called *periti* (expert advisers), about two hundred theologians (generally professors of theology) were called to Rome. Of the 2,908 legitimate delegates, 2,540 participated in the opening. Of the invited non-Catholic Christian churches and communities, seventeen were present through thirty-five representatives. In the end, twenty-eight non-Roman churches, including the Russian Orthodox church, were represented by ninety-three observers. There were eighty-six governments and international bodies represented at the opening.

The council met in four sessions: 11 October to 8 December 1962; 29 September to 2 December 1963; 14 September to 21 November 1964; and 4 September to 8 December 1965. Ten public sessions and 168 general assembly meetings were held.

From the time of its proclamation, the council was intended to have a double goal: reform within the church and preparation for Christian and world unity. But already in the opening address this goal was expanded and deepened. The council was given the task of proclaiming the entire Christian truth "through a new effort" whereby it was of great consequence to distinguish between the truths and the "way in which they are proclaimed." *Aggiornamento* (Ital., "coming together") was to demonstrate the credibility of the church, and the church's relationship to non-Christians was to be improved.

In the first session, which included the first thirty-six general assemblies, the commission members were not chosen according to the prepared list but rather, at the

suggestion of Cardinal Achille Liénart (Lille), according to recommendations of the different groups of bishops. John XXIII died on 3 June 1963. His successor, Paul VI, continued the council. At the reopening of the second session (general assemblies 37–89) on 29 September 1963, Paul VI emphasized the pastoral orientation of the council. It was to deal with the nature of the church and the function of the bishops, to make efforts toward the unity of Christians, and to set in motion a dialogue with the contemporary world. From the presidency, which had been expanded to twelve members, four moderates were named (Cardinals G. P. Agagianian, Julius Döpfner, Jacobus Lercaro, and L. J. Suenens), who were alternately to direct the general assembly. The protocols were contracted to seventeen, and a press bureau was set up. In the third session (general assemblies 90–127), the pope, by way of the theological commission, had the so-called *nota explicativa praevia* ("previous explanatory note") included in the Constitution on the Church as an authoritative explanation of the chapter on the collegiality of pope and bishops in their responsibility for the whole church. The decisions of the First Vatican Council were thereby once again maintained. At the opening of the fourth session (general assemblies 128–168), Paul VI announced the establishment of a synod of bishops to be convened regularly. This was to emphasize the idea of collegiality between the pope, the bishop of Rome, and the other bishops. All the decisions of the council were confirmed and proclaimed in public session. Paul VI solemnly closed the council on 8 December 1965. The task of carrying out the decisions of the council was assigned to the appropriate commissions. The Secretariat for Christian Unity continued in existence, and two new bodies were set up: a secretariat for relations with non-Christian religions and one for relations with unbelievers.

The Second Vatican Council was a council of the church about the church. In order to protect its freedom, John XXIII specifically avoided formulating a systematic plan of discussion. The council was to be pastorally oriented so that the church could ask itself all the questions about the contemporary situation that were being asked within it and in the world. Beyond that, however, nothing was really prescribed. That fact is demonstrated by the seventy preconiliar proposals for future council decrees, which had to do with almost everything with which the church could at all concern itself. Although the selected topics, reflected in the sixteen documents accepted by the council, may appear to be haphazard, these four constitutions, nine decrees, and three declarations do form a unified network that makes the council a council about the church.

The subjects treated in the documents produced by the council can be summarized briefly. The basic self-understanding of the church is addressed in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church. The inner life of the church is discussed in various documents: the work of salvation through liturgy (the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy); the church's function of oversight (the Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church and the Decree on Eastern Catholic Churches); the teaching office (the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, including discussions of scripture, tradition, and teaching office, and the Declaration on Christian Education); and vocations (the Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, the Decree on Priestly Formation, the Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious Life, and the Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity). The mission of the church to the world is likewise elaborated on in several documents: the church's relationship to non-Catholic Christianity (the Decree on Ecumenism and the Decree on Eastern Catholic Churches); its relationship to non-Christians (the Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to non-Christian Religions, which makes special reference to the Jews, and the Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity); its relationship to the contemporary secular situation of the world in general (the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World and the Decree on the Instruments of Social Communications); and its relationship to the philosophical pluralism of the present age (especially in the Declaration on Religious Freedom).

The council's understanding of the church. The church is the subject not only of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (*Lumen gentium*) but also of all the other documents. The Second Vatican Council, in contrast to Trent and to Vatican I, was oriented neither toward dogma nor toward theological controversy; rather it was pastorally oriented in that it set forth the meaning of the church, its message, and its missions for the world and for humanity. The church, it declared, wishes to encounter humanity through acceptance and solidarity, through dialogue and cooperation.

In *Lumen gentium* the council set aside juridical and controversial questions and defined the church first as a mystery, as a sacrament of unity between God and human beings and among human beings themselves. It presented the mystery of the church in the perspective of salvation history as people of God, body of Christ, and temple of the Spirit, and it articulated the mission of the church for faith and for service in word and sacrament. It made the designation of the church as people of God its central statement and thereby set aside a one-sided hierarchical understanding of the church. It emphasized the pilgrim character and historicity of the

church as well as its instrumental quality and its non-identity with the kingdom of God. The ministry of the church was characterized as gift and service. The council, in full support of Vatican I, dealt extensively with the college of bishops. It accentuated the principles of collegiality and synod as structural elements of the church and the meaning of the local church as representative of the whole church. With reference to the priesthood of all believers, the council stressed the dignity, role, and responsibility of the laity as well as the presence of the church in the world, which is often possible only through the laity.

Concerning the question of the identification of the Roman Catholic church with the church of Jesus Christ, the exclusive *est* ("is") was replaced by the more open *subsistit* ("subsists," *Lumen gentium* 8). The council characterized the church's relationship to the other churches and Christian confessions not through the instrumental definition of union with Rome but through the living realities in these communities that are constitutive of church. These realities make it legitimate, and also necessary, to address and recognize other churches as means of salvation. The relationship of these churches to the Roman church is defined by the formula "*coniunctum esse*" ("to be joined together"). This union is rooted in baptism, faith in God and Christ, and in other sacramental and spiritual realities. The call to Christian unity is understood not merely as a summons to the others but as an appeal to the church itself, a call for its own constant conversion. According to Vatican II, therefore, the unity of the church is not to be sought by imposing uniformity, that is, by an all-defining centralization, but in a legitimate plurality that strengthens unity and does not endanger it.

A council of the world church. The council seemed to be the first act in which the Catholic church began to realize itself as a truly worldwide community, but this does not dispute the importance of preceding events. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the church slowly and tentatively developed from a potential world church to an actual world church, from a European, Western church with European settlements around the world, to a universal church present in the whole world, even if in very differing degrees of intensity, and no longer seen in terms of European-North American affiliates. Throughout the world the church was developing a native clergy that was conscious of its independence and responsibility for itself. This world church acted for the first time at the council with historical clarity concerning faith and morals. In spite of the undeniably powerful presence and influence of the European and North American regional churches, the members of this council, in contrast to all previous councils, were bish-

ops from the whole world and not simply, as at Vatican I, European missionary bishops sent out to the whole world.

The council was also the cause of the abolition of Latin as the common cultic language. There will always be an ultimate liturgical unity among the regional liturgies because of the unity of the church and the sameness in theological essence of the Christian cult, but from the diversity of cultic languages there will develop, in a necessary and irreversible process, a diversity of liturgies. The relationship between sameness and diversity of the regional liturgies cannot be certainly and precisely predicted. In the long run, the liturgy of the universal church will not be a mere translation of the liturgy of the Roman church but rather a liturgy formed from the unity in diversity of regional liturgies in which each has its own unique form that does not result from its language only but also from other cultural factors such as gesture and dance. If the essence of the church, and thereby the essence and character of a local church, derives essentially from the liturgy, which is one of its highest actualizations, then a truly independent local church is formed. Such a church is more than an administrative district of a uniform, centrally organized state.

Relationship to the world. In several decrees, to which belong primarily the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the World (*Gaudium et spes*) and the Decree on Religious Freedom, the council attempted to describe its fundamental relationship to the secular world on the basis of its nature and not simply by the force of external circumstances. The council spoke about the renunciation of external means of force in matters of religion, the dignity even of an errant conscience, and the building of a legitimate secular world that was not to be judged by ecclesial standards alone. These may seem like statements forced upon the church against its most inner sensibilities by a secularized world rather than as objective expressions of the reality of Christianity itself. One must consider, however, that the church, even where it has or could have greater power in the secular realm, must support the renunciation of that power, as the council stated, because this is required of the church by virtue of its own nature (although in its history it has all too often disregarded this requirement). The temptation for the church to reassert a false superiority over the world continues to exist, but since the decisions of Vatican II the church in principle can no longer yield to this temptation, because the council formulated an irrevocable norm. No longer, since the decrees of the council, can the limitation of freedom in the name of goodness and justice be so easily rationalized by the church. For the sake of the common good,

as the council says, there will always be force and power in the world. But with Vatican II the church renounced a share of that power, which it had previously claimed without inhibitions whenever it could. A border over which it was no longer possible to return, not even in small matters, had thus been crossed.

Theology of the council. The theological situation in which the council found itself was transitional and difficult to define. On the one hand, neoscholastic theology was self-evident; it was the dominant theological position represented in the proposals that had been prepared for the council by Roman commissions. Linked inextricably with the Latin language, this neoscholastic theology used the New Testament in the old style as a collection of proofs (*dicta probantia*). On the other hand, the theology of the council was more critically related to scripture than was neoscholasticism. It had opened itself to subject matter that did not originate in the repertory of neoscholasticism. It exercised a certain braking effect against theological excess (for example, in Mariology). It made an effort to be considerate of ecumenical needs. It also held that one could say something theologically important even if one did not proclaim it solemnly as dogma. The theology of the council was, then, a theology of transition. The question still remains whether, how, and how quickly this theology will be further developed now that it has received a certain official legitimation by the council. Although impulses from the conciliar theology can be felt in the work of the Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith since the close of the council, that office remains too neoscholastic in its anxious defense against certain modern theological efforts and too fearful and not creative enough about the questions that engage contemporary theology.

Roman theology will not be able to lead the theology of the whole church back over the border crossed at the council. On the contrary, theology will almost of necessity become a world theology, in accord with the council. That is, it will no longer exist in the non-European and non-North American countries simply as a Western expression. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have already announced a claim to a theology of their own. Liberation theology does not have to remain the only watchword for such an independent Latin American theology. Perhaps East Asia will also soon develop a theology of its own in a creative dialogue with its own culture and history. These theologies will have to concern themselves with the questions that are foremost in the respective cultural arenas and are not the same everywhere. The undeniable diversity that emerges from this process will help shape and determine the character of the whole of theology. European and North

American theology can actually contribute to the development of non-Western theologies, in spite of the hoped-for independence of the rest of the world, because the West, with its Enlightenment and technological rationality, is becoming in increasing measure a partner in the fate of the rest of the world practically and theologically.

Change in ecumenical attitude. The council signified a break in the history of the relationship of the Catholic church both with other Christian churches and communities and with the non-Christian religions of the world. Naturally there were always contained in the faith consciousness of the church convictions that in principle legitimized the newly emerging relationship of the Catholic church with other Christian churches and communities and the non-Christian religions. But in the past these convictions had no effective impact. The theological grounds that legitimized this new breakthrough were already present in the past: the conviction of God's will for universal salvation in Christ and the doctrines of the possibility of justification without sacraments, of the implicit desire to belong to the church, and of the validity of baptism even outside the Catholic church, among others. This legacy, which is theologically self-evident and was always present, can give the impression that nothing has actually changed in the relationship between the church and the rest of humanity. But the Catholic theologian, in contrast to an all too naive nontheologian, cannot understand the new closeness and the positive relationship of the Christian confessions among themselves and the relationship of Christianity with the non-Christian religions as if serious differences, divisions, or tasks for unification do not exist. The Catholic theologian does not understand the Catholic church to be only a particular form of historical coincidence, which religious history or church history has produced among many other equally valid forms.

Christianity has always been convinced that there is a true history of revelation and faith in which the same thing does not just happen again and again but in which new and radical changes occur. Naturally, with the event of Jesus Christ there occurred an unsurpassable summit and irreversible stage of revelation history that should not be hidden or trivialized. Nonetheless, the council initiated a point of view that it ratified as truly Christian, namely, that Catholic Christianity had assumed a different and new position relative to other Christians and their churches and relative to the non-Christian religions of the world.

The crucial point in this ecumenical change of attitude, in the broadest sense, is that the extent and radi-

cality of this change is hidden and rendered innocuous in our ordinary consciousness by a modern liberal and relativistic mentality that assumes *a priori* that such a new ecumenical openness and readiness to learn is banal and self-evident. It should not be denied that this modern liberal mentality was part of the climate in which the new ecumenical consciousness could grow for the first time. But this consciousness also and especially grew out of a genuinely Christian root; it is in itself Christian. It definitively leaves behind an older mentality that had been operative for a millennium and a half; moreover, it remains obligatory for the history of the church, like other great decisive moments of faith history.

Without denying the seeds of the future in the past, it is necessary to maintain that before the council the Catholic church considered the non-Roman Catholic churches and communities to be organizations and societies of people who differed with the old church only through errors and deficiencies and who ought to return to it in order to find in it the full truth and fullness of Christianity. From the point of view of the old attitude, the non-Christian religions were all forms of paganism, that is, religion that human beings, sinfully and without grace, produced on their own. (This was also the opinion of Martin Luther and Karl Barth.) It was not at all explicit in the actual consciousness of the church that the non-Catholic churches could bring with them in an ecumenical accord a positive legacy of Christian history into the one church of the future, or that the non-Christian religions could exercise in their institutionality a positive salvific function for non-Christian humanity. Those views were changed by Vatican II, and since then a position of acceptance can no longer be excluded, because it is understood not as an aspect of the liberal modern mentality but rather as an integral element of Christian conviction.

Universal optimism about salvation. Given the multifaceted nature of Augustine's theology, the following characterization may not do him justice in every respect. One may also not ignore the fact that the history of the church's faith consciousness has progressed by many small steps from Augustine to the present. But if one considers these limitations and that many historical causes have functioned as catalysts in the above-mentioned change of faith consciousness of the church, one can still say that Augustine inaugurated and gave to Christianity a consideration of world history in which, because of the incomprehensibility of God's providence, world history remained the history of the damned, of whom in the end only a few were saved through a rarely given grace of election. The world was

dark for Augustine and only dimly illumined by the light of God's grace, the gratuitousness of which was manifested in its rarity. Even if Augustine knew that there were many in the church who seemed to be outside it, and vice versa, the circle of those who are to be saved was nearly the same as the group of those who believed explicitly in a Christian and ecclesiastical way. The rest, because of an incomprehensibly just judgment of God, were among the damned of humanity. On the whole, hell was the future of world history.

Augustine's pessimism about salvation was slowly reconstructed and transformed in the theoretical and existential consciousness of the church by an extremely painstaking process. The emerging optimism about salvation, consisting of insights acquired one by one, was viewed as limited only by the bad will of the individual, and even then it was hoped that the power of grace would once again transform this malice into free love for God. Until the council, however, the church had not yet actually ratified and taught these insights with dogmatic finality. It did teach, however, that even those who are convinced atheists are connected with the Easter mystery of Christ as long as they follow their consciences; moreover, all human beings who know God in some way are in touch with God's revelation and can, in the theological sense of a saving act, believe. The church through Vatican II declared that even those who search in shadows and images for the unknown God are not far from the true God who wills that all human beings be saved if only they make an effort to lead a righteous life. It was emphasized by the council that the church is not so much a society for those who are saved but the primary sacramental symbol and germination cell of salvation for the whole world.

One could say that the council's optimism about universal salvation remained hypothetical, that salvation could fail for individuals through unrepented guilt, and that, hypothetically, such optimism was the normal teaching of the church even before the council. It is true that the church, even after the council, does not proclaim universal reconciliation. It is likewise true that before the council the church already taught belief in a universal salvific will. But this preconiliar teaching was thought of very abstractly and was equipped with not a few "ifs" and "buts" that could no longer be maintained after the council. The council courageously postulated a real revelation and therefore a real possibility of faith where the Christian proclamation does not yet reach. It did not even consider a profession of atheism to be unequivocal proof of the hopelessness of salvation, which certainly did not agree with the traditional doctrine previous to the council. With its rejection of a

theoretical doctrine of universal salvation, the church, in the council and in its practical attitude, proceeded from the principle that the grace of God is offered to a person's free choice and that in this freedom it is also universally effective. This attitude has naturally had a long developmental history. In Vatican II, however, it became clear and irreversible because such a hope can certainly grow, but it cannot actually any longer diminish.

The world church made its appearance as such in the council, and it says to the world, at once incomprehensibly and self-evidently, that in all the abysses of its history and all the darkness of its future this world is surrounded by God and God's will. In boundless love this God is self-communicated to the world as its ground, power, and goal. Out of such love, God assures the effectiveness of this offer to the freedom of history. In the council the church became new because it became a world church. As such, it proclaims to the world a message that, although it certainly has always been the heart of the message of Jesus, is proclaimed today more unconditionally and more courageously than before—and thus it is new. In both respects, in the proclaimer and in the message, something new has happened that is irreversible.

[For further discussion of Vatican II, see Roman Catholicism.]

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Translated from German by Charlotte Prather

VEDĀNGAS (Skt., “limbs of the Veda”) are ancient (c. fifth to fourth century BCE) Vedic treatises centered on discussions of phonetics, ritual injunctions, linguistics and grammar, etymology and lexicography, prosody, and astronomy and astrology. These texts, usually composed in *sūtra* style, were applied to the proper performance of the ritual and thus are often understood as “ancillary” or “auxiliary” Vedic literatures. With the teachings expressed in the Vedāngas the Vedic priests were able to chant the ritual songs correctly, use the proper linguistic forms, determine the most auspicious time to establish the ritual site, and so on.

The Vedas, or *śrutis* (“heard texts”), composed between 2000 and 1500 BCE are regarded as three (and hence referred to as the *trayī*, “triad”), Ṛk, Yajus, and Sāma; later the Atharvan was added, making four. Each of the Vedas has four parts: *Samhitās* (“collections,” comprised of *ṛks*, individual hymns), *Brāhmaṇas* (“on *brahman*,” ritual compendia), *Āraṇyakas* (“forest treatises”), and *Upaniṣads* (“esoteric doctrines”). The Vedas were composed in an ancient language now called Vedic Sanskrit. Originally the Vedas were not written, but were transmitted from teacher to pupil orally through a process of precise repetition and memorization. Indeed, this process has continued to a certain extent even though the Vedas have long been a part of the written tradition.

By the fourth century BCE, aids or accessories to the study of the Vedas were introduced. Six of the categories are known as the primary, or original, Vedāngas, and the other four are called secondary (*Upāṅgas*).

Primary Vedāngas. The six primary Vedāngas are *Śikṣā* (literally, “teaching,” a category roughly equivalent to the study of phonetics), *Kalpa* (procedure or method set for practice, called order, ceremony, ritual), *Vyākaraṇa* (grammar or analysis), *Nirukta* (explanations, etymologies of ancient Vedic terms), *Chandas* (prosody), and *Jyotiṣa* (astronomy and astrology). Much of the literature of the primary Vedāngas has been lost.

Śikṣā. The literal meaning of the term *śikṣā* is “teaching or discipline.” Because the Vedas were taught and transmitted orally, the rules of pronunciation were extremely important. The system of Sanskrit phonetics was developed from these rules. Works on phonetics

were composed by Pāṇini, Nārada, Vyāsa, and others, on the nature of consonants and vowels, degrees of intonation and lengths of vowels, degrees of force (*balam*) to be used in pronouncing different syllables, different ways of chanting in recitation, continuity of syllables, and so on. This discipline has preserved the phonetic purity of the Vedas. [See also Pāṇini.]

Kalpa. Kalpa consists of injunctions (*vidhis*) prescribing the many actions or procedures for performance of sacrifices and other duties. They are given in the *Kalpasūtras*, comprised of the *Śrautasūtras* (aphorisms about Vedic ritual), the *Gṛhyasūtras* (aphorisms or manuals of household ritual), and the *Dharmasūtras* (aphorisms about ethical laws and traditions). Additionally, there are the *Śulvasūtras* (aphorisms about measurements), which give rules of measurement for the construction of sacrificial altars. Geometry, trigonometry, and algebra were developed in connection with such constructions. [See also *Sūtra Literature*.]

Vyākaraṇa. Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) is an important aid to the study of the Veda. It is described as that which explains the nature of the objective (purpose), means, agent (subject), object, action (*kriyā*, predicate), and the rules of compounds. All this is important for understanding the Veda, for it consists of injunctive sentences (*vidhis*) that must be correctly analyzed in order to be understood.

Nirukta. Nirukta, literally “explication,” consists of explanations and meanings of ancient Vedic terms. *Nirukta* is also the name of the first lexicon ever written by the Aryans, composed by one Yāska (c. eighth century BCE?).

Chandas. Chandas (prosody) gives rules for the various meters in which the Vedas are recited. For this reason, Chandas has come to be a synonym for the Veda itself. Knowledge of the rules of meter helps correct recitation by fixing the number of syllables, intonation and length of vowels, and so on.

Jyotiṣa. Jyotiṣa is both astronomy and astrology. Many of the Vedic sacrifices are efficacious only when performed under particular constellations. Thus astronomy was developed as an adjunct to ritual. Later, the idea of the influence of constellations upon sacrificial activities was extended to the influence of stars and planets on the lives of human beings, in particular those who perform sacrifices. In this way, astronomy and astrology became important for the study of the Vedas.

Secondary Vedāngas. Besides the six main aids to the study of the Vedas, four secondary aids (*Upāṅgas*) are prescribed by tradition: *Purāṇa* (mytho-ethical histories), *Nyāya* (logic or method of reasoning), *Mīmāṃsā* (inquiry, rules of textual interpretation), and *Dharma-*

śāstra (ethical codes). Some scholars include all the six systems of Hindu philosophy in this class.

Purāṇa. The Purāṇas are defined as works dealing with creation, dissolution, a particular dynasty, the succession of the several Manus, or progenitors of mankind, and the activities of the dynasty, whose members are supposed to live their lives according to the Vedas. The Purāṇas are regarded as exemplifying the Vedic teachings, giving praiseworthy examples (*arthavādas*) of their "historical" manifestations. [See also Purāṇas.]

Nyāya. Nyāya, or logic, is the discipline leading one to the conclusion according to rules; it is ordered or regulated thinking needed for interpreting the Vedas. Originally the word may not have meant the syllogistic form developed by Gautama's Nyāya school. [See also Nyāya.]

Mīmāṃsā. The word *mīmāṃsā* means "inquiry, investigation, or discussion." The term in this context is not to be identified with Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā school. Originally it must have referred primarily to rules for interpreting the Vedic texts, which in places are doubtful in meaning and conflict with one another.

Dharmaśāstras. Ethical codes like those of Manu and Parāśara, the Dharmaśāstras evolved from the original Dharmasūtras and from the concept of *dharma* ("merit, duty, virtue") as expounded by the Mīmāṃsā school. [See also Śāstra Literature.] By the time such ethical codes developed, non-Aryan tribes must already have been well incorporated into the Aryan culture, thus necessitating the recognition of their ways of life and their influence on earlier recognized customs.

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VEDĀNTA. The word *vedānta* literally means "end [*anta*] of the Veda," that is to say, the concluding part of the *apauruṣeya*, or revealed Vedic literature, which is traditionally believed to comprise the Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads. Vedānta thus primarily denotes the Upaniṣads and their teachings. Metaphorically, Vedānta is also understood to represent

the consummation or culmination (*anta*) of the entire Vedic speculation, or indeed of all knowledge (*veda*). The Hindu philosophical tradition, however, generally recognizes three foundations (*prasthānas*, literally, "points of departure") of Vedānta, namely, the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahma Sūtra*. Of these three, the *Bhagavadgītā*, which primarily deals with the problems of social ethics, and which attempts a kind of religio-philosophical synthesis, can hardly be characterized as a strictly Vedantic treatise. Historically, one may speak of three periods of Vedānta—the creative period represented by the Upaniṣads, the period of systematization and harmonization of the Upaniṣadic teachings represented by the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the period of exposition, elaboration, and diversification represented by the commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtra*, the commentaries on those commentaries, and many independent treatises. The traditional grounding of Vedānta is thus consistently emphasized, it being implied that Vedānta is largely an exercise in scriptural exegesis rather than an independent philosophical formulation.

Upaniṣads. Over two hundred texts call themselves Upaniṣads, but they include even such recent works as the *Christopaniṣad* and the *Allopaniṣad*. The *Muktikopaniṣad* gives a traditional list of 108 Upaniṣads, but, even out of these, many texts seem to have been called Upaniṣads only by courtesy. Usually 13 Upaniṣads, namely, *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, *Chāndogya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Svetāśvatara*, *Kauṣītaki*, and *Maitrāyaṇi*, are regarded as the principal Upaniṣads (eighth to fourth century BCE). They are traditionally connected with one Vedic school (*śākhā*) or another, and several of them actually form part of a larger literary complex.

The Upaniṣads do not, by any means, constitute a systematic philosophical treatise. They rather represent the fearless quest for truth by essentially uninhibited minds. They seek, among other things, to investigate the ultimate reality "from which, verily, these beings are born, by which, when born, they live, and into which, when departing, they enter" (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.1.1), to delve into the mystery of the *ātman* "by whom one knows all this" but whom one cannot know by the usual means of knowledge (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.15), and generally to promote "that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known" (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1.3). It is true the the Upaniṣads arose out of a kind of intellectual and social revolt against the closed mechanical sacerdotalism sponsored by the Brāhmaṇas. But the Upaniṣadic teachers soon realized that the ultimate reality could not be compre-

hended through mere logical reasoning, for “words return [from it] along with the mind, not attaining it” (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.9.1). “Not by reasoning is this apprehension attainable,” they declared (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.2.4). It is accordingly seen that the Upaniṣads present only the results of their speculation without making much ado about the logical processes, if any, which lead to those results. For the Upaniṣads the true consummation of all knowledge lies in the direct experience of the ultimate reality.

The Upaniṣads, however, presuppose a certain development of thought. The origin of some of their doctrines can be traced back to the *Ṛgveda*, or in certain cases, even to the pre-Vedic non-Aryan thought complex. It will also be seen that, from the methodological as well as from the conceptual point of view, the Upaniṣads owe not a little to the Brāhmaṇas, as a reaction against which they were largely brought into existence. The word *upaniṣad* is usually understood in the sense of esoteric teachings imparted by the teacher to his pupils who sit (*sad*) near (*upa*) him in a closed exclusive group (*ni*). But literally the word would rather seem to denote “placing side by side; equivalence, correlation,” and then, secondarily, doctrines taught through equivalences or correlations. In a sense, the Upaniṣads represent an extension of the tendency of the Brāhmaṇas toward *bandhutā*, that is, toward perpetually establishing equivalences between entities and powers apparently belonging to different levels and to different spheres. It is, of course, inevitable that there should be no uniformity of method and teaching in such composite and heterogeneous texts as the Upaniṣads, but there certainly is a definite uniformity of purpose and outlook in them.

The Upaniṣads clearly betray a trend toward inwardization and spiritualization, which presumably has its origin in their general aversion for the physical body and sensual experience (*Maitrī Upaniṣad* 1.3). The Upaniṣadic teachers have consistently emphasized the view that the essential or real self (*ātman*) has to be differentiated from the empirical or embodied self (*jīva*). Indeed, true philosophical knowledge consists in not confusing the one for the other. This teaching is very well brought out in the famous parable from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.7–12), in which Prajāpati is seen leading Indra progressively on the path of true knowledge and ending with the final instruction that the essential Self is different from and transcends the embodied self in its conditions of wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep. The essential Self is of the nature of pure self-consciousness. It is neither the knower nor the known nor the act of knowing, though this last necessarily presupposes the existence and direct awareness of the essential Self. The

essential Self does exist—it is *sat* (existence)—but not in any particular form; it is pure *sat*, that is to say, it is of the nature of existence *as such*. It is also conscious, but not of any particular object; internal or external; it is pure *cit* (consciousness), that is to say, it is of the nature of consciousness *as such*.

In another significant analysis of the human personality (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.2.5), the Upaniṣadic teacher proceeds from the grosser to the subtler forms of the Self, it being implied that each succeeding subtler and more internal form is more real and essential than the preceding one. He there speaks of the physical form (*annamaya*), the vital form (*prāṇamaya*) which inheres within the physical form, the mental form (*manomaya*) which inheres within the vital form, the form of consciousness (*vijñānamaya*) which inheres within the mental form, and finally concludes by affirming that within the form of consciousness inheres the subtlest and the most internal, and, therefore, the most real and the most essential form, namely, the form of bliss (*ānandamaya*). The essential Self is thus pure existence (*sat*), pure consciousness (*cit*), and pure bliss (*ānanda*).

Side by side with the analysis of the human personality, the Upaniṣadic thinker has attempted an analysis of the external world as well. He has thereby arrived at the conclusion that at the basis of this gross, manifold, changing phenomenal world—which ultimately is a conglomeration of mere names and forms—there lies one single, uniform, eternal, immutable, sentient reality (see, e.g., *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1). The natural and logical next step is to identify the deepest level of the subjective person, namely, the essential Self (*ātman*), with the ultimate basis of the objective universe, namely, the cosmic reality (*brahman*, also called *sat*). The world appearance or the relation of the world to *brahman* are not major concerns in the Upaniṣads.

The Upaniṣads have not developed any epistemology. Nor have they enunciated any ethical system as such. They are more or less exclusively concerned with the ideal of *mokṣa*, or man’s release from his involvement in the phenomenal world and the realization by him of the identity of his essential self with the cosmic reality. Even the doctrine of *karman* has not been systematically elaborated in the early Upaniṣads. It is regarded as something not to be spoken of openly (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.2.13). As for the doctrine of rebirth, its first clear indications are seen in a passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (6.2.15–16), where it is mentioned as one of three eschatological alternatives. [See also Upaniṣads.]

Brahmasūtras. For various reasons, the period immediately following the major Upaniṣads marked a kind of break in the continuity of Brahmanic thought

and tradition. But it proved to be only an interregnum. Soon a vigorous and comprehensive cultural movement was set in motion that sought to resuscitate the Brahmanic way of life and thought by reorganizing, systematizing, simplifying, and popularizing it. The literary monuments of this movement were generally clothed in a practical literary form, namely, the *sūtras*, or aphorisms, that were defined as being at once brief but unambiguous and to the point. By their very nature, the Upaniṣadic teachings, which were often sheer flashes of spiritual radiance rather than coherent philosophical formulations, were characterized by inherent ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions. In order that they should prove reasonably meaningful, it was necessary to systematize and, more particularly, to harmonize them. This is exactly what the *Brahma Sūtra* (also called *Vedānta Sūtra* or *Uttara-mīmāṃsā Sūtra*) of Bādarāyaṇa (third to second century BCE) attempted to do.

Apparently the *Brahma Sūtra* was not the only work of this kind, for Bādarāyaṇa mentions several predecessors as, for example, Ātreya, Āśmarathya, Kāśakṛtsna, and Jaimini. Little is known about the writings of these teachers except for Jaimini, who is believed to have been the author of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtra*. The literary form of the *Brahma Sūtra* no doubt eminently suited its original purpose; in the course of time, however, it inevitably rendered the *sūtras* multivocal. By themselves they could hardly be made to yield any cogent philosophical teaching. Yet it seems that the *Brahma Sūtra* favors a kind of *bhedābheda*, or doctrine of distinction-cum-nondistinction. The world is represented as a transformation of the potency of God, God himself remaining unaffected and transcendent in the process. Hardly any of Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtras* can be shown to be unequivocally nondualistic in purport. It also seems that the *Brahma Sūtra* is specifically disposed against Sāṃkhya dualism and Mīmāṃsā ritualism. But after all, the Vedānta of the *Brahma Sūtra* is what the different commentators have chosen to derive from them. Indeed, each commentator exploits Bādarāyaṇa's work to develop his own peculiar thesis with a relentless vertical consistency regardless of the consequences such a procedure may have on collateral issues. [See also *Sūtra Literature and the biography of Bādarāyaṇa*.]

Gauḍapāda. The earliest complete extant commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* is that of Śaṅkara (788–820 CE). But in his thinking Śaṅkara is more vitally influenced by Gauḍapāda (fifth to sixth century) than by Bādarāyaṇa. It is true that the doctrine of *bhedābheda* and, to a certain extent, the Yoga of Patañjali provide the technical framework for Śaṅkara's philosophy, but it is the uncompromising nondualism reclaimed by Gauḍapāda from the Upaniṣads that Śaṅkara strongly

vindicating, though he never goes so far in the direction of phenomenism as does Gauḍapāda.

Gauḍapāda is traditionally believed to have been the teacher of Śaṅkara's teacher Govinda, although there is clear evidence that he must have lived at least three centuries before Śaṅkara. True to the usual practice of Hindu thinkers, Gauḍapāda has set forth his philosophy in his commentary, in the form of *kārikās* or memorial verses. The *Gauḍapādakārikā* constitutes the earliest treatise on absolute nondualism (*kevala advaita*). The very names of the four books that make up the work—namely, *Āgama* (Scripture), *Vaitathya* (Unreality of the World Experience), *Advaita* (Nondualism), and *Alātaśānti* (Extinction of the Revolving Firebrand)—bring out the entire teaching of Gauḍapāda in a nutshell. The first book the *Gauḍapādakārikā*, which alone is directly related to the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, deals with the self in its four states: wakefulness, dream, deep sleep, and the "fourth" state (*turīya*), identified with *mokṣa*. In the second book, Gauḍapāda for the first time asserts that the world does not exist in reality, but that "the Self (*ātman*) apparently creates the self by the self" through its own *māyā* and cognizes various things (*Gauḍapādakārikā* 2.12). In other words, the world subsists in *ātman* through *māyā*. The third book teaches that duality does not exist in reality. Just as space (*ākāśa*), which is without duality, is manifested as portions of space, such as the space enclosed in a pot (*ghaṭākāśa*), so too is the Self manifested as *jīvas*. Similarly, just as when the pot is destroyed the space that it had enclosed merges into *ākāśa*, so too do *jīvas* merge into the Self. In reality no *jīva* is ever born. The fourth book speaks of the two standpoints—*saṃvṛti*, or the practical standpoint, and *paramārtha*, or the highest standpoint—and of the three stages in understanding, namely, *laukika* ("ordinary"), in which both objects and a subject are cognized as real; *śuddha laukika* ("purified ordinary"), in which perceiving itself, but not the objects of perception, is cognized as real; and *lokottara* ("supramundane") in which neither objects nor perceiving is cognized. This section emphasizes that consciousness (*vijñāna*) alone is real, though it may appear in various guises as objects with beginnings and ends, movements, and so on. It is analogous to a revolving firebrand that appears as a fiery hoop; in the same way *vijñāna*, when it flickers, appears as both perceiver and perceived.

There can be hardly any doubt about the strong Buddhist influence on Gauḍapāda's thought. The Buddhist terminology used in books two to four is quite unmistakable. One may leave aside such questions as whether Gauḍapāda himself was a Buddhist, or whether the authorship of all four books belongs to him, yet the *Gauḍapādakārikā* creates an irresistible impres-

sion that the Buddhist Śūnyavāda and the Vijñānavāda schools present philosophical positions that are in no small measure consistent with those presented by the major classical Upaniṣads. [See also the biography of Gauḍapāda.]

Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara is by far the most outstanding and the most widely known exponent of Vedānta, particularly of the doctrine of absolute nonduality (Kevala Advaita). Many works pass as having been written by him, but among the philosophical works that can be ascribed to him with reasonable certainty are the commentaries on nine Upaniṣads; the commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtra*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Gauḍapādakārikā*, the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, and the *Adhyātmapaṭala* of the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*; and the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (with its nineteen verse tracts and three prose tracts). Some scholars have suggested that Śaṅkara was originally an adherent of Pātañjala Yoga and only later became an Advaitin. His background of theism and a kind of doctrine of distinction-cum-nondistinction, though not directly discernible, may also be validly assumed. But it is clearly Gauḍapāda who influenced Śaṅkara's teachings the most. Many of Śaṅkara's doctrines, illustrations, and arguments are clearly anticipated by Gauḍapāda, though in rather extreme forms. Indeed, in his teachings Śaṅkara may be said to have represented Gauḍapāda's philosophy without its overtones of Buddhist Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda.

Śaṅkara's philosophy, like most Indian philosophy, is oriented toward the one practical aim of *mokṣa*, which implies liberation from suffering and regaining of the original state of bliss. It is based on *śruti* (scripture), especially the Upaniṣads, rather than on *tarka* (logical reasoning), which according to Śaṅkara belongs to the realm of *avidyā*. Śaṅkara takes for granted the validity of the Upaniṣads as an embodiment of the highest truth, and uses logic either to support his interpretation of the Upaniṣads or to refute other systems of thought. In his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* he seeks to harmonize the apparently contradictory teachings of the Upaniṣads through the assumption of two points of view, the ultimate (*pāramārthika*) and the contingent (*vyāvahārika*). He has obviously inherited this device of argumentation from Gauḍapāda. Indeed, it is in the many portions of his commentary that do not relate directly to the text of the *Sūtra* (that is, in the *utsūtra* discussions) that we get glimpses of Śaṅkara's original philosophical contribution.

The main plank of Śaṅkara's philosophy is the belief in the unity of all being and the denial of the reality of the many particular entities in the universe. Reality is that which is one without a second, which is not determined by anything else, which is not sublated at any

point of time, which transcends all distinctions, to which the familiar categories of thought are inapplicable, and which can be only intuitively realized. Such is *brahman* of Śaṅkara's Advaita. Śaṅkara's most distinctive contribution is the philosophical and dialectical development of the concept of *brahman* as without qualities (*nirguṇa*). *Nirguṇa brahman* is not to be understood as "void" or "blank"; it only signifies that nothing that the mind can think of can be attributed to it. *Sat* (pure, unqualified being), *cit* (pure consciousness), and *ānanda* (pure bliss), which are often affirmed of *brahman*, are not qualifying attributes of *brahman* but rather together constitute the essential nature of *brahman*.

Śaṅkara's main problem is how to reconcile the Upaniṣadic accounts of creation and the Upaniṣadic denial of plurality. He resolves it by pointing out that the world belongs to a level of being that is different from that of reality, namely, the level of appearance. The world (*jagat*) may be regarded as the imaginary translation of *brahman*—which is the only reality in the ultimate sense—to the space-time plane. The world is grounded in *brahman* as the illusory appearance of a serpent is grounded in a rope. The causal relationship between *brahman* and *jagat* is of the nature of *vivarta* ("manifestation, appearance"), which is to be clearly distinguished from *pariṇāma* ("evolution, transformation"). The ultimate reality that is one does not *become* many; it can only *appear* as many. *Jagat* is thus not absolutely real, for the experience of the world with its diversity of particular phenomena is sublated by realization of the one ultimate reality; but it is also not absolutely unreal, for until the world appearance is sublated by true knowledge it does possess empirical viability. Śaṅkara propounds a kind of phenomenalism without any suggestion of either nihilism or subjective idealism.

The world appearance, according to Śaṅkara's absolute nondualism, is the result of *avidyā* ("nescience"), which is a radical constitutive adjunct of the embodied self (*jīva*). *Avidyā* not only conceals (*āvaraṇa*) the true nature of *brahman* but it also distorts (*vikṣepa*) it, so that *brahman*, for the time being, appears as the phenomenal world. The oneness of *brahman* experience is made to give way to the multiple experience of the world of names and forms. Viewed from yet another angle, the world is described as the result of *māyā*. If *avidyā* represents the weakness of *jīva*, *māyā* represents the potency imagined of *brahman* for cosmological purpose. It is by means of *māyā* that *brahman*, or rather the empirically posited creative aspect of *brahman* that is referred to as *saguṇa brahman* (God), produces the illusion of the world. It is emphasized, however, that *māyā* does not constitute a duality with *brahman*, that

it does not affect *brahman*, and that it is not a permanent character of *brahman*, for when, as the result of true knowledge, the world appearance vanishes, *māyā* also vanishes and only pure *nirguṇa brahman* remains as the ultimate reality. In a sense, *māyā* and *avidyā* may be regarded as the two sides of the same coin.

The “why” of *avidyā* is, however, beyond comprehension. One, indeed, finds oneself in *avidyā*. For *jīva* is the Self (*ātman*), who, under the influence of *avidyā*, which is beginningless, has forgotten his essential identity with the one ultimate reality, namely, *brahman*. Like the world, *jīva* also is empirically real albeit transcendently unreal; but whereas with the dawn of true knowledge the world completely vanishes, *jīva* sheds its body and other appurtenances occasioned by *avidyā* and regains its essential nature, namely, identity with *brahman*.

Śaṅkara has not developed any significant epistemology. Nor has he specifically discussed any ethical issues. He seems to take the observance of *dharma* in the phenomenal world for granted. For him the four prerequisites for *brahman* realization are discrimination between the eternal and the temporal, renunciation of nonspiritual desires, moral equipment, consisting of tranquility, self-control, and so forth, and an intense longing for *mokṣa*. Śaṅkara’s personality is, in many respects, paradoxical. While strongly advocating the doctrine of Kevala Advaita, he is believed to have composed some very beautiful and moving hymns; while sponsoring a life of complete renunciation, he is himself known to have traveled almost the whole length and breadth of India as an active religious missionary with a view to founding *maṭhas* (monasteries) for the propagation of his teachings. [See also the biography of Śaṅkara.]

Post-Śaṅkara Teachers of Kevala Advaita. The school of Śaṅkara’s Kevala Advaita can boast of a long line of teachers and pupils who through their writings have brought tremendous popularity to that school. Some of them have reinforced Śaṅkara’s teachings with keen dialectic, some others have elaborated certain specific aspects of those teachings, while still some others have presented those teachings in the form of more practical compendia. Again, some of Śaṅkara’s followers have given a significant twist to the original doctrines of the great master and are, therefore, credited with having founded more or less independent subschools of Advaita.

Maṇḍana Miśra was a contemporary, perhaps a senior contemporary, of Śaṅkara. He was originally a Mīmāṃsaka and has written several treatises on Mīmāṃsā. But later he became an Advaitin. His *Brahmasiddhi* shows that he is directly influenced by Śaṅ-

kara’s philosophy. Indeed, there is a strong tradition—which is, however, equally strongly contested—that identifies Maṇḍana Miśra with Śaṅkara’s pupil Sureśvara. Maṇḍana Miśra emphasizes that it is the *jīvas* who by their own individual *avidyā* create for themselves the world appearance on the changeless *brahman*; he discountenances the theory that the world originates from the *māyā* of *brahman*. Tradition is unanimous in holding that Sureśvara was a direct pupil of Śaṅkara. Sureśvara’s *vārttika* on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is one of the longest philosophical treatises extant in Sanskrit. Its introductory part, called *Sambandha-vārttika*, deals with the relationship between the two sections of the Veda, the ritualistic and the spiritualistic. Sureśvara is also the author of the *vārttika* on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and of an independent Vedantic treatise called *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Some of the important points made by Sureśvara are that ritual action is in no way helpful to attainment of *mokṣa*; that *māyā* is only an aperture (*dvāra*) through which the one *brahman* appears as many; that *avidyā* is based not upon *jīvas* but upon pure *cit* itself; and that there is no reason to characterize the world as unreal before realization of the oneness of *ātman*.

Padmapāda is believed to have been the first pupil of Śaṅkara, and was, according to a tradition, nominated by the master as the first pontiff of the *maṭha* at Puri. His only available work, though called *Pañcapādikā* (“gloss [or *ṭikā*] on five quarters”), actually consists only of the *ṭikā* on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the first four *sūtras* of the *Brahmasūtras*. Padmapāda invests *māyā* with a sort of substantiality and also assigns to it cognitive as well as vibratory activity. *Brahman* in association with *māyā* as characterized by this twofold activity is, according to Padmapāda, the root cause of *jagat*, while *avidyā* manifests itself in *jīva*.

It is, however, Vācaspati (fl. 841), author of the *Bhāmatī*, a commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, who may be said to have founded an independent subschool of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. Vācaspati has sought to merge the teachings of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra into one system. He propounds the view that *avidyā* has *brahman* as its object (*viśaya*) and *jīva* as its support (*āśraya*). The *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman (tenth century), a pupil of Sureśvara, is a popular treatise in verse on the main teachings of Śaṅkara. Sarvajñātman asserts that *brahman* is the ultimate cause of everything through the instrumentality of *avidyā*. Like the Bhāmatī subschool of Advaita, Prakāśātman (fl. 1200) inaugurated another independent subschool—the Vivaraṇa subschool—through his *Vivaraṇa* (exposition) of Padmapāda’s *Pañcapādikā*. Prakā-

śātman endorses the view of Sarvajñātman that *brahman* is both the support and the object of *avidyā*. While in respect of *jīva* the Bhāmatī subschool puts forth the doctrine of limitation (*avaccheda*), the Vivaraṇa subschool puts forth the doctrine of reflection (*pratibimba*). The *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrīharṣa (fl. 1190) is a Vedantic dialectic against Nyāya, while the *Vedāntapari-bhāṣā* of Dharmarājadhvarīndra (sixteenth century) deals with, among other things, the epistemology of Vedānta. Among other writers belonging to the school of Śāṅkara are Vidyāraṇya (fourteenth century), author of the famous *Pañcadaśī*; Prakāśānanda (sixteenth century), who wrote the *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*; Madhusūdana Saravatī (sixteenth century), author of the *Advaitasiddhi* and the *Siddhāntabindu*; Appayya Dikṣita (sixteenth century), who wrote the *Siddhāntaleśamgraha* and the *Parimala*, a commentary on the *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda (thirteenth century); and Sadānanda Vyāsa (seventeenth century), who commented on the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Saravatī and also wrote a handy compendium called *Vedāntasāra*.

Śabdādvaita. Although there is generally evident a tendency to equate Vedānta with Śāṅkara's Kevala Advaita, one cannot afford to ignore the other schools of Vedānta that have been substantially influential. The doctrine of *śabdādvaita*, a monistic ontology presenting language as the basis of reality, was propounded by Bhartṛhari (d. 651) in his *Vākyapadīya*; this doctrine cannot be said to belong to Vedānta proper, since it is not derived from any of the three *prasthānas*. Still, according to Bhartṛhari the ideas that the ultimate reality, *brahman*, which is without beginning and end, is of the nature of the "word" and that the world proceeds from it can be traced back to the revelation of the Word *par excellence*, the Veda itself. This ultimate reality is one, but because of its many powers it manifests itself as many in the form of experiencer, the object of experience, and experience itself (the purpose of experience also being sometimes mentioned). This view of Bhartṛhari may be regarded as a precursor of Śāṅkara's theory of *vivarta*. The most important of the powers of *brahman*, according to Bhartṛhari, is time (*kāla*). The different kinds of actions and changes that bring about multiplicity in being all depend upon *kāla*. Bhartṛhari, however, adds that time itself is the first result of *avidyā*. In the state of true knowledge, there is no place for time.

Bhāskara. The proper post-Śāṅkara Vedānta begins with Bhāskara (fl. 850). Unlike the other post-Śāṅkara schools of Vedānta, Bhāskara's Vedānta does not seem to have gained wide currency, presumably because it was not linked up with any theistic sect. From his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* it becomes clear that

Bhāskara knew Śāṅkara's commentary, for he follows Śāṅkara's arguments for refutation point by point. It further becomes clear that, for much of their interpretation, both Śāṅkara and Bhāskara must have drawn on a common traditional source. According to Bhāskara, *brahman* has a dual form: *brahman* as pure being and intelligence, formless, the causal principle, which is the object of our highest knowledge; and *brahman* as the manifested effect or the world. Thus *brahman* represents unity (*abheda*) as well as distinction (*bheda*), both of which are real. *Jīva* is *brahman* characterized by the limitations of the mind substance. Thus, unlike the material world, *jīva* is not the effect of *brahman*. Bhāskara is at one with most of the post-Śāṅkara schools of Vedānta in rejecting outright Śāṅkara's view of the world appearance. Indeed, such rejection was the main obsession of those schools.

Viśiṣṭādvaita. To Rāmānuja (1017–1137) belongs the credit for successfully attempting to coordinate personal theism with absolutistic philosophy. Indeed, Rāmānuja may be said to have secured for Vaiṣṇavism the sanction of the Upaniṣads. In this, of course, he was heir to a fairly distinguished tradition of teachers such as Nāthamuni (fl. 950) and Yāmunācārya (fl. 1000), who is believed to have been Rāmānuja's teacher's teacher. Among the followers of Rāmānuja are Sudarśana Sūri (fl. 1300), Veṅkatanātha, more popularly known as Vedāntadeśika (fl. 1350), and Śrīnivāsācārya (fl. 1700). Rāmānuja's commentaries on two of the three *prasthānas*, namely, the *Brahma Sūtra* (called *Śrībhāṣya*) and the *Bhagavadgītā*, have been preserved. Rāmānuja is also the author of an independent philosophical treatise called *Vedārthasaṃgraha*. According to Rāmānuja, God, who possesses supremely good qualities, is the only absolute reality and therefore the only object worthy of love and devotion. Matter (*acit*) and souls (*cit*), which are equally ultimate and real, are the qualities (*viśeṣaṇas*) of God, but, as qualities, they are entirely dependent on God in the same way as the body is dependent on the soul. They are directed and sustained by God and exist entirely for and within him. Rāmānuja's doctrine is therefore known as Viśiṣṭa Advaita or the doctrine of one God qualified by *cit* (souls) and *acit* (matter). These three factors (*tattva-traya*) form a complex (*viśiṣṭa*) organic unity (*advaita*). The omnipotent God creates the world of material objects out of himself, that is, out of *acit* (which is eternal in him), by an act of will. Rāmānuja emphasizes that creation is a fact, a real act of God. What the Upaniṣads deny is the independent existence of material objects and not their existence as such. *Jīva* is made up of the human body (which is related to *acit*) and the soul (which is related to *cit*), which become associated with each other on account of

karman. Souls are eternal and atomic and are conscious and self-luminous by their very nature. The liberated soul, which is completely dissociated from the body, becomes similar to, but not identical with, God.

In Rāmānuja's theory, God can be known only through scripture; besides the Veda, Rāmānuja recognizes the *Pāñcarātra Āgama* also as revealed. For him, religious acts comprehend both Vedic ritual and the practices (*kriyāyoga*) prescribed by the Āgama. Rāmānuja recommends to all persons, irrespective of caste, rank, or sex, complete self-surrender to God (*prapatti* or *saraṇāgati*) as the most efficacious means of attaining the *summum bonum*. [See also the biography of Rāmānuja.]

Dvaitādvaita. The philosophy of Nimbārka (fl. mid-fourteenth century?) is generally known as Svābhāvika Bhedābheda or Dvaitādvaita. It is set forth briefly, precisely, and without much polemic or digression in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*, called *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*, and which is elaborated in such works as the *Vedāntakaustaubha* of Śrīnivāsa (who is believed to have been a direct pupil of Nimbārka), the *Vedāntaratnamāñjūṣā* of Puruṣottama (a pupil of Śrīnivāsa), and the *Vedāntakaustubhaprabhā* of Keśava Kāśmīrin (fourteenth century). Presumably influenced by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka assumes the ultimate reality of the three entities, namely, Paramātman or Puruṣottama (God), Jīva, and Jagat. He does not accept *avidyā* as a cosmic principle producing the world appearance. Rather, according to him, God actually transforms himself into the world of material objects and individual souls, but does not lose himself in these. He is simultaneously one with (*abheda*) and distinct from (*bheda*) the world of *jīvas* and matter. This is so, not because of any imposition or supposition (*upādhi*), but because of the specific peculiarity of God's spiritual nature (*svabhāva*). God alone has independent existence, while individual souls and matter, which are but derivative parts of God, are entirely dependent on and controlled by him. Liberation in Nimbārka's theory implies realization of and participation in the true nature of Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa (who is the ultimate *brahman*) and is possible only through Kṛṣṇa's grace. [See also the biography of Nimbārka.]

Śuddhādvaita. Tradition speaks of four main schools of what may be called Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, namely, the Śrī school of Rāmānuja, the Sanaka school of Nimbārka, the Brahma school of Madhva, and the Rudra school of Viṣṇusvāmin, which last is more commonly associated with its later exponent Vallabha (1479–1531). Many works, large and small, are ascribed to Vallabha, the most important among them being the *Aṅubhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* (up to 3.2.34); the *Tattvārthadīpanibandha*, an independent

philosophical treatise; and the *Subodhini*, a commentary on a major part of the *Bhāgavata*. Vallabha's son Viṭṭhalanātha (1516–1584) completed the unfinished *Aṅubhāṣya* and also composed independent works such as the *Vidvanmaṇḍana* and the *Śrīngārarasamaṇḍana*. The *Śuddhādvaitamārtanda* by Giridhara (1541–1621) and the *Prameyaranāṛṇava* by Bālakṛṣṇa Dikṣita (seventeenth century) are other notable works of the Rudra school. *Śuddha advaita* ("pure nondualism") and *puṣṭi-mārga* are the two fundamental tenets of Vallabha's Vedānta. *Śuddha advaita* implies that the one *brahman*, free from and untouched by *māyā*, is the cause of the individual souls and the world of material objects. *Jīvas* and the material world are, in reality, *brahman*, for they represent but partial manifestations of the essential attributes of *brahman*. *Brahman* (God) pervades the whole world. Vallabha's doctrine is therefore also known as *brahmavāda*. While explaining the relation between *brahman* and the world, Vallabha propounds *avikṛtāpariṇamavāda*, the theory that the world is a transformation of *brahman*, which latter itself, however, remains unchanged. It is like gold, which always remains itself no matter how it is formed into various ornaments or objects. God manifests his qualities of *sat* and *cit* in the form of *jīvas*, but the quality of bliss (*ānanda*) remains unmanifested. Vallabha teaches that it is through *puṣṭi* (literally, "nourishment, spiritual nourishment"), or the special grace of God, that *jīvas* attain *goloka* ("the world of cows"), the world of bliss, and participate in the eternal sport presided over by Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

Madhva. Among the Vedāntins, Madhva (1238–1317) is reputed to be a confirmed dualist (*dvaitin*). [See the biography of Madhva.] One wonders, however, whether the doctrine that Madhva advocates in his commentaries on the three *prasthānas* and in his other works—a doctrine endorsed by other teachers of his school, such as Jayatīrtha (fourteenth century) and Vyāsarāya (1478–1539)—can be designated strictly speaking as dualism in the sense in which the Sāṃkhya doctrine is designated as dualism. Madhva no doubt speaks of two mutually irreducible principles as constituting reality, but he regards only one of them, namely, God, as the one infinite independent principle, whereas the finite reality comprising matter, individual souls, and other entities is regarded as dependent. He emphasizes that Lord Śrī Hari, who is omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, and without beginning and end, is the highest independent reality. The ungodly traits that are sometimes imputed to his character in descriptions of his various incarnations are not native to him but are intended to delude the demons and similar evil beings. The material world is essentially real, for whatever is

created by God by veridical volition cannot be unreal. Furthermore, on the strength of the evidence of direct perception, inference, and scripture (which Madhva considers to be the only valid sources of knowledge) it can be established that the distinction between God and *jīva* is real and beginningless. Indeed, Madhva asserts the verity of the fivefold distinction, namely, the distinction between God and *jīvas*, the distinction between God and insentient objects, the mutual distinction among *jīvas*, the distinction between *jīvas* and insentient objects, and the mutual distinction among insentient objects. *Jīvas*, which are infinite in number, are subject and subservient to God. There is a gradation of high and low among them in accordance with their *karman*, and this gradation persists even in the state of emancipation. *Mokṣa*, according to Madhva, implies the unblemished blissful experience of one's pure intrinsic nature as a servant of Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, and devotion to him is the chief means of attaining *mokṣa*.

[For discussion of the "sibling" school of Vedānta, see Mīmāṃsā. Many of the personalities and technical terms mentioned in this article are the subjects of separate entries; see especially Avidyā; Brahman; Māyā; and Mokṣa.]

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VEDAS. Specifically, the Vedas are often understood to comprise four collections of hymns and sacrificial formulas. In a more general sense, however, the term *Veda* does not denote only these four books, or any single book, but a whole literary complex, including the Saṃ-

hitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, the Upaniṣads, the Sūtras, and the Vedāṅgas. The many texts, varied in form and content, that make up the Veda were composed over several centuries, in different localities, and by many generations of poets, priests, and philosophers. Tradition, however, will not admit the use of the word *compose* in this context, for the Veda is believed to be *apauruṣeya*, "not produced by human agency." It is eternal. Its so-called authors have merely "seen" or discovered it, and they are thus appropriately called *ṛṣis*, or seers.

Vedic tradition notes that the *apauruṣeya* character of the Veda accords it ultimate validity in every respect. Moreover, the Veda is said to comprehend all knowledge (*veda*). Indeed, most of the later Brahmanic disciplines claim the Veda as their fountainhead. The Veda has been passed from generation to generation by oral transmission. This fact explains the name *śruti* ("what is heard") by which the Veda is known. In order to preserve this extensive literature intact without the aid of writing, and to facilitate its precise memorizing, the Vedists devised various ways of reciting the Veda (*pāṭhas* or *vikṛtis*) that involve permutations and combinations of the words in *mantras* (verses) and prose formulas. The emergence of various schools (*śākhās*) and subschools (*carāṇas*) of Vedic study has also substantially helped the preservation of this large corpus of literature. At the same time, oral transmission may have resulted in the loss of a considerable portion of Vedic literature in the course of time.

Early History of the Veda. The literary history of the Veda is usually divided into four periods: the Saṃhitā period (c. 2000–1100 BCE), the Brāhmaṇa-Āraṇyaka period (c. 1100–800 BCE), the Upaniṣadic period (c. 800–500 BCE), and the Sūtra-Vedāṅga period (c. 500 BCE onward). Broadly speaking, these four periods represent a chronological sequence, and a thread of logical development running through them invests them with a kind of unity. Yet only the literature of the first three periods is traditionally regarded as *apauruṣeya*. In particular, four collections of texts from the Saṃhitā period are commonly referred to as the four Vedas. These are the *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā* (the oldest collection), the *Atharvaveda Saṃhitā*, the *Sāmaveda Saṃhitā*, and the *Yajurveda Saṃhitā*.

Before the Vedic Aryans migrated into the northwestern region of India, then called Saptasindhu ("land of seven rivers"), their ancestors had lived together with the ancestors of the Iranian Aryans, presumably in Balkh and its environs, for a fairly long time (2200–2000 BCE). It was there that the Proto-Aryan language and religion acquired their specific characteristics. The religion of the Proto-Aryans consisted mainly of the con-

cepts of cosmic law (Vedic, *ṛta*; Avestan, *aša*) and its administrator (Vedic, Asura Varuṇa; Avestan, Ahura Mazdā), a simple fire worship, and a cult centering on the sacred drink (Vedic, *soma*; Avestan, *haoma*). *Mantras* (magically potent verses) or hymns (groups of *mantras* usually involving a single theme) relating to this religion were composed by the ancestors of the Vedic Aryans in an earlier form of Vedic Sanskrit. In the course of time, the ancestors of the Vedic Aryans left their home in Balkh and proceeded toward the alluring "land of seven rivers," while the ancestors of the Iranian Aryans migrated toward Iran. During their expedition to Saptasindhu and because of subsequent conflicts and colonization in that region, a significant strain was imposed on the old Vedic religion in the form of a hero cult with Indra as its chief divinity. The activity of composing *mantras* and hymns relating to the old (Proto-Aryan) as well as the new Vedic (Indra) religion continued unabated throughout this time. Side by side with this religion of the "classes" among the Vedic Aryans developed the religion of the "masses," which was largely constituted of magic, sorcery, and witchcraft, and relating to which *mantras* were also being composed. When, soon after, the Vedic Aryans had settled down in their new home to a life of comparative peace, leisure, and prosperity, poet-priests collected all the scattered *mantras*, old and new and relating to both the Proto-Aryan and Vedic religions. They revised and edited them, grouped them together into suitable hymns (where they were not already so grouped), and arranged those hymns according to a certain plan. As a result, two primary "collections" (*saṃhitās*) were brought into existence: the *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā* and the *Atharvaveda Saṃhitā* (2000–1700 BCE).

Ṛgveda Saṃhitā. The *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā* has come down to us according to the recension of the Śākala school. It consists of 1,028 *sūktas* (hymns) made up of varying numbers of metrical verses (*mantras*, more commonly called *ṛks*, which accounts for the name *Ṛgveda*). The hymns are assembled in ten different books or *maṇḍalas* whose formation is governed mainly by the criterion of authorship. Among the classes of the Vedic Aryans, a few families had already acquired some measure of socioreligious prestige. The *mantras* or hymns, which were traditionally believed to have been "seen" by the progenitor and other members of a particular family, were collected together to form the book of that family. The nucleus of the *Ṛgveda* is formed of six such family books, which are numbered from two to seven and which are ascribed respectively to the families of Ḡṛtsamada, Viśvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Atri, Bharadvāja, and Vasiṣṭha. Within a family book, the hymns are grouped according to the divinities to whom they are related.

These divinity groups are then arranged in a certain fixed order, the group of hymns relating to Agni being placed first. Within each divinity group, the hymns are arranged in descending order according to the number of stanzas. The majority of hymns in the eighth book belong to the Kaṇva family. The first book is a collection of miniature *maṇḍalas*. Book nine is ritualistically oriented, all the hymns included in it, irrespective of authorship, being related to *soma*. The tenth book, which contains the same number of hymns as the first book (191), is a collection of residual hymns. There is another, later mechanical arrangement of the *Ṛgveda* that is obviously directed to the purpose of memorizing the *Saṃhitā*. According to this system, the entire *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā* is divided into eight divisions (*aṣṭakas*), each division into eight chapters (*adhyāyas*), and each chapter into about thirty-three sections (*vargas*) of about five stanzas each.

The bulk of the *Ṛgveda* consists of mythology and the panegyrics and prayers that are either dependent on or independent of that mythology. The exclusively naturalistic, or ritualistic, or mystic interpretation of Vedic mythology is now generally discounted, and an evolutionary approach is increasingly favored. One may speak of three main phases of the evolution of the Ṛgvedic mythology: the phase represented by Ṛta-Varuṇa, Agni, and Soma; the phase represented by Indra and other heroic gods; and the phase represented by the admission into the Vedic pantheon of popular Aryan divinities (e.g., Viṣṇu) and pre-Vedic non-Aryan divinities (e.g., Rudra). Apart from mythology, the *Ṛgveda* also contains a few hymns of sociohistorical and philosophical purport.

Atharvaveda Saṃhitā. The *Atharvaveda*, which is aptly described as the Veda of the masses, is more heterogeneous and less inhibited than the *Ṛgveda*. The name *Atharvāṅgirasah*, often used in reference to this Veda, indicates the twofold character of its contents—the wholesome, auspicious "white" magic of Atharvan, and the terrible, sorcerous "black" magic of Aṅgiras. Another name of this Veda is *Brahmaveda*. The name has been explained by the fact that the *Atharvaveda* consists of *brahmans* (magically potent formulas), or by the fact that this Veda is the special concern of the brahman priest in the Vedic ritual. There is another explanation of the name. Because of the peculiar character of the contents of this Veda, it was for a long time not recognized as being as authoritative as the other three Vedas (*trayī*). In reaction against this exclusivism, the Atharvavedins went to the other extreme and stated that the *Ṛgveda*, the *Sāmaveda*, and the *Yajurveda* were essentially "limited," for *brahman* alone was infinite, and this *brahman* was truly reflected only in the *Athar-*

vaveda. Thus, the *Atharvaveda* was called *Brahmaveda*. The *Atharvaveda* is also known by several other names, each of which emphasizes a specific trait of its character: it proves particularly efficacious in the performance of the duties of the *purohita* (royal priest), and is thus known as the *Purohitaveda*; it contains many hymns pertaining to the *kṣatriyas* (ruling or warrior class), and is thus called the *Kṣatraveda*; and it is the guide for the performers of the practices described in the five (*pañca*) main ancillary texts (*kalpas*) of this Veda, and thus is known as the *Veda of the Pañcakalpins*.

The *Atharvaveda* is available in two recensions, the *Śaunaka* and the *Paippalāda* (which is only partially available). The *Śaunaka* recension consists of 730 hymns grouped into twenty books (*kāṇḍas*). About five-sixths of these hymns are metrical (*arthasūktas*), whereas the remaining ones (*pariyāya-sūktas*) are made up of prose units (*avasānas*). The *Atharvaveda* is less sophisticated in its meter, accent, and grammar than the *R̥gveda*. The contents of the *Atharvaveda* may be broadly classified under the following headings: charms to counteract diseases and possession by evil spirits; prayers for health and longevity and for happiness and prosperity; spells pertaining to various kinds of relationships with women; hymns concerning the affairs of the king, as well as those intended to secure harmony in domestic, social, and political fields; and formulas for sorcery and imprecation and for exorcism and counterexorcism. Finally, the *Atharvaveda* contains quite a few hymns embodying highly theosophic and philosophical speculations.

Sāmaveda and Yajurveda Saṃhitās. The *Sāmaveda* and the *Yajurveda* are essentially liturgical collections and conceptually mark the transition from the Saṃhitā period to the Brāhmaṇa period. The *Sāmaveda Saṃhitā* is a collection of *mantras* to be chanted at the various soma sacrifices by the *udgātṛ* priest and/or his assistants. The name *Sāmaveda* is, however, a misnomer; it is not a collection of *sāmans*, or chants, but rather a collection of verses, mostly derived from the *R̥gveda*, which are intended to form the basis of proper *sāmans* (*sāmāyoni mantras*). Out of the traditionally mentioned thirteen *sākhās* of the *Sāmaveda*, only three are known today: the *Kauthuma*, the *Rāṇāyaniya*, and the *Jaiminīya*, or *Talavakāra*. The *Kauthuma Saṃhitā* of the *Sāmaveda* is made up of two parts, the *Pūrvārcika* and the *Uttarārcika*. The *Pūrvārcika* consists of 585 *mantras* and the *Uttarārcika* of 1,225 *mantras*. However, the total number of *mantras* in the *Sāmaveda*, not counting those that are repeated, is 1,549—all but 78 of them having been taken from the *R̥gveda*, mostly its eighth and ninth *maṇḍalas*. For their use in the *soma* ritual, the *sāmāyoni mantras* are transformed into chants or ritual

melodies, called *gānas*, by means of such devices as the modification, prolongation, and repetition of the syllables in the *mantras* and the occasional insertion of additional syllables (*stobhas*). Such *gānas* are gathered in four books: the *Grāmageyagāna*, the *Āraṇyagāna*, the *Ūhagāna*, and the *Ūhyagāna*. Of course, these *gāna* collections are quite distinct from the *Sāmaveda*. Since one *sāmāyoni mantra* can be chanted in a variety of ways, it gives rise to several *gānas*. Consequently, the number of *gānas* is much larger than the number of *sāmāyoni mantras*. For instance, the number of *gānas* belonging to the Kauthuma school is 2,722.

Whereas the *Sāmaveda* concerns itself exclusively with just one feature of the *soma* sacrifice, the *Yajurveda* treats the entire sacrificial system. Indeed, the *Yajurveda* may be regarded as the first regular textbook on the Vedic ritual as a whole. It deals mainly with the duties of the *adhvaryu*, the priest responsible for the actual performance of the various sacrificial rites. There are two major recensions of the *Yajurveda*, the *Kṛṣṇa* ("black") *Yajurveda* and the *Śukla* ("white") *Yajurveda*. The difference between them lies not so much in their contents as in their arrangement. In the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, the *mantras* and the *yajus* (sacrificial formulas in prose) and their ritualistic explanation and discussion (called *brāhmaṇa*) are mixed together. Thus, in its form and content the Saṃhitā of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* is not particularly distinguishable from the Brāhmaṇa or the Āraṇyaka of that Veda. In contrast, the *Śukla Yajurveda* contains only the *mantras* and the *yajus*, the corresponding ritualistic explanation and discussion being reserved for the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* that belongs to that Veda.

The Saṃhitās of four schools of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*—namely, the *Taittirīya*, the *Kaṭha* (or *Kāṭhaka*), the *Maitrāyaṇī*, and the *Kapīṣṭhala Kaṭha*—are available today either whole or in fragments. Incidentally, it may be noted that the *Taittirīya* school has preserved its literature perhaps most fully of all the Vedic schools, maintaining the continuity from the Saṃhitā period, through the Brāhmaṇa-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad periods, up to the Sūtra period. The *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* is divided into seven *kāṇḍas*, and, together with the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* and the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, it covers almost the whole gamut of Vedic ritual. However, in these texts, the different sacrifices are not dealt with in any rational order.

A significant feature of the *Śukla Yajurveda* is that its entire literary corpus has come down in two distinct versions, the *Mādhyandina* and the *Kāṇva*. However, there is little essential difference between them in content and arrangement. The *Śukla Yajurveda Saṃhitā*, which is also known as the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* in the

Mādhyandina version, consists of forty chapters (*adhyaṅgas*). The first twenty-five *adhyaṅgas* contain *mantras* and formulas relating to the principal sacrifices; the next four *adhyaṅgas* include additions to these basic *mantras* and formulas; *adhyaṅgas* 30–39 deal with such sacrifices as the Puruṣamedha, the Sarvamedha, the Pitṛ-medha, and the Pravargya; and the last *adhyaṅga* constitutes the well-known *Īśa Upaniṣad*. The *Kāṇva* version of the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* generally follows the same pattern.

[For specific discussion of the individual collections within the complex of Vedic literature, see *Brāhmaṇas* and *Āraṇyakas*; *Upaniṣads*; *Vedāṅgas*; and *Sūtra Literature*. The religious practices and traditions that accompany the four Vedas are discussed in *Vedism* and *Brāhmaṇism*. For discussion of the Vedic priesthood and its evolution throughout the Hindu tradition, see *Priesthood*, article on Hindu Priesthood.]

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VEDISM AND BRAHMANISM. The somewhat imprecise terms *Vedism* and *Brahmanism* refer to those forms of Hinduism that revolve primarily around the mythic vision and ritual ideologies presented by the Vedas. These terms are classifications that have been used by historians to categorize in a typological manner a variety of religious beliefs and practices in ancient and contemporary South Asia. Vedic and Brahmanic religious sensibilities are thereby distinguished from Agamic, Tantric, and sectarian forms of Hinduism, which look to a variety of non-Vedic texts as the source of religious authority. Vedism is older than Brahmanism, which developed from and remains true to the Vedic worldview but accommodated and remolded the religious ideas and practices of non-Vedic South Asian traditions.

Vedism applies more specifically to the religious ideas and expressions of the Indian branch of the Indo-Europeans who gradually entered the valley of the Indus River in successive waves in the second millennium BCE. These communities regard as sacred and authoritative texts only those orally transmitted collections of poetic hymns (*mantras*), ritual instructions (*Brāhmaṇas*), and some of the early philosophical speculations (*Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*) of the Vedic literary corpus. Together, these works are said to constitute sacred "knowledge" (*veda*, hence *Vedism*) and are known as *śruti*, "revealed truth."

Brahmanism developed as the Vedic Indians moved further into the subcontinent to settle in the regions drained by the Ganges River and then southward to the tip of India. It is loosely known as Brahmanism because of the religious and legal importance it places on the *brāhmaṇa* (priestly) class of society. Brahmanism takes as sacred truth, in addition to the Veda, various law books (the *Dharmaśāstras* and *Dharmasūtras*), mythic epics (the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*), and a wide range of non-Vedic myths recounted in the *Purāṇas*. These texts, the earliest of which may date to the second part of the first millennium BCE and the lattermost of which to the medieval period, are known as *smṛti*, "remembered truth."

Both Vedism and Brahmanism, then, accept the Veda as sacred. The difference between the two is that Brahmanism also includes doctrines and mythic themes that do not specifically derive from the Vedas and therefore is ideologically more inclusive than Vedism. Some of these ideas find expression in various ritual practices such as temple worship and the domestic ceremony known as *pūjā*, in the notion of a society arranged according to vocational function (*varṇa*) and stage of life (*āśrama*), in meditation and renunciatory practices, in vegetarianism and reverence for the cow, in the importance of the teacher (*guru*) for transmitting the tradition, and in other non-Vedic themes that play important parts in Hindu religious life and thought.

Textual Corpus. The collection of metric and prose texts that form the Veda (or, taken individually, Vedas) is by far the largest single documentary source of archaic Indo-European religious thought. At the same time, however, this collection amply documents a particular line of intellectual development that went far beyond its archaic beginnings and gave the Veda its pivotal but never undisputed place in Indian religion and philosophy.

Though no definite dates can be assigned to the Veda or any of its parts, some of its materials, especially in the metrical texts, may be dated back to the twelfth century BCE, or even earlier, when the later Indo-Aryans were still in direct contact with the Iranian branch of the Indo-European peoples. This common Indo-Iranian period is attested by linguistic, lexical, formulaic, and cultic similarities between the Veda and the Avesta (e.g., the sacred beverage, *soma* in the Veda and *haoma* in the Avesta, and the use of these beverages in the cult; the Vedic *hotṛ* priest and his Avestan counterpart, *zototar*). The formation of the Veda as we know it extended over the first half of the last millennium BCE, bearing witness to a gradual move from the northwest of the subcontinent, the upper Indus area, where the *Ṛgveda* had its original home, to the watershed between the Indus and Ganges basins and into the Ganges plain. This movement is epitomized in the story of the sacrificial fire, which was forced by means of a ritual formula to come out of the mouth of the legendary sacrificer Videgha Māthava (whose name recalls Videha, present-day Bihar); the fire then relentlessly rolled eastward from the Sarasvatī River in the west to the Sadānira, the boundary river of Videha, in the east, and finally was established even beyond that boundary (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.4.1.10–19). Bengal (Vanga), however, remained, as far as the Veda is concerned, a “barbarian” country.

Apart from its antiquity, the most striking features of the Veda are its rigid codification and internal organi-

zation as well as its faithful oral transmission among specialized brahmins up to the present day. Although no decisive arguments can be adduced, the codification of the Veda may date from the middle of the first millennium BCE. (This is to be distinguished from partial compilations, which are generally assumed to have already been in existence at the rise of Buddhism in the sixth century BCE.) During the second half of that millennium further ancillary texts were added to the corpus. [See Vedas.]

Organization of the Veda. The primary principle of the internal organization of the Vedic corpus is strictly ritualistic, the texts being arranged according to their function with regard to the sacrificial ritual. The initial textual layer consists of formulas (*mantras*)—both metrical and in prose—to accompany the ritual acts (*karman*) and descriptions of the ritual (Brāhmaṇas). The latter are thus differentiated in rules regulating the ritual (*karmavidhāna*) and in explanation or discussion (*arthavāda*; *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* 24.1.31–34). Though this primary division gives no special place to the Upaniṣads, the speculative extension of the Brāhmaṇa texts, it clearly illustrates the ritualistic divide between *karman*, or act, and *mantra*, or formula. [See Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas.]

The repositories of the *mantras* are known as the Saṃhitās (named after the continuous mode of recitation involving *saṃdhi*, or changes taking place at the juncture of words succeeding each other), first collected in the *Ṛgveda* or “Veda of the Stanzas.” Though the time of its final compilation may not greatly differ from the period of the Brāhmaṇas, the *Ṛgveda* contains, generally speaking, the oldest materials. The exposition of the ritual (including the explanation of the *mantras* and their use) in the Brāhmaṇas provides the second layer. The third layer is formed by the Āraṇyakas (“forest books”) and the Upaniṣads. They are attached to the Brāhmaṇas and are composed in the same style. The Āraṇyakas, which derive their name from their having to be studied outdoors, in the wilderness (*araṇya*) because of their supposedly dangerous or secret nature, deal with particular parts of the ritual. The Upaniṣads start from and often refer to the ritual but their meta-ritualistic content goes beyond and even supersedes it. [See Upaniṣads.]

To these three layers of texts, which form the *śruti* (lit., “hearing”), the “revealed” tradition in the strict sense, the Kalpasūtras (*kalpa*, “arrangement”; *sūtra*, “guideline”), concisely worded manuals, must be added. These comprise the Śrautasūtras—manuals for the *śrauta* (derived from the *śruti*), or “solemn” ritual based on the Brāhmaṇas—and the Smārtasūtras, summarizing the *smṛti* (“remembrance”), the secular tradition.

The latter are again divided into the *Gr̥hasūtras*, manuals for the domestic ritual (*gr̥ha*, “house”), which exhibit a ritual close to the *śrauta* pattern, and the *Dharmasūtras*, on religious law and custom, which are at a greater distance from the *śruti*, though they are supposedly authorized by it. [See also *Sūtra Literature*.]

The *Kalpasūtras* belong to the six *Vedāṅgas* (“members of the Veda”), ancillary branches of knowledge meant to explain the Veda and to sustain its preservation. In addition to the *Kalpa*, the system of ritual rules, these branches of knowledge are *Śikṣā* (“phonetics”), *Chandas* (“meter”), *Vyākaraṇa* (“grammar”), *Nirukta* (“etymology”), and *Jyotiṣa* (“astronomy”). While the systematic elaboration and standardization of *Kalpa* has the rationalistic trappings that qualify it as a “pre-scientific” science, astronomy and especially grammar developed into full-fledged sciences independent of the Veda. [See *Vedāṅgas*.]

The partly chronological division in *Samhitās*, *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, *Upaniṣads*, and *Kalpasūtras* is joined by a second, equally ritualistic, principle of organization running vertically through the successive layers. This division corresponds to the four priestly functions in the performance of the *soma* sacrifice, that is, the functions of the *hotṛ* (“reciter”); the *udgātṛ* or *chandoga* (“cantor” or “chanter”); the *adhvaryu* (officiating priest), who is in charge of the ritual acts and so of the overall proceedings; and the *brahman*, who acts as a mainly silent overseer and corrects possible mistakes in the performance of the ritual. To each of these four functions a separate Veda is assigned, consisting of its own *Samhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa*, and *Kalpasūtra*. Thus the *hotṛ*’s Veda is the *Ṛgveda*, from which the invitational and offering stanzas as well as the longer recitations (*sastra*) are taken. The *Sāmaveda* cites the texts of the *Ṛgveda* and their “melodies” (*sāman*) that are to be chanted by the *udgātṛ*. The *adhvaryu* operates with the *Yajurveda* or “Veda of the Formulas” (*yajus*). These “formulas” are defined as non-ṛc (that is, non-Ṛgvedic), although the *Samhitā* contains many Ṛgvedic *mantras* as well. [See also *Mantra*.] Finally, the *brahman* relies, at least in theory, on the *Atharvaveda*, but because of his overseeing function he should also be conversant with the other three Vedas. [See *Priesthood*, *article on Hindu Priesthood*.]

There are, then, four Vedas. Tradition, however, emphasizes the “Triple Veda” (*trayī vidyā*, “threefold sacred knowledge”), that is, *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda*, and *Sāmaveda*. The *Atharvaveda* was added as a fourth according to a well-known pattern based on the numbers three and four: the three “twice-born” *varṇas* (social classes) of *brāhmaṇas* (Eng., brahmins), *kṣatriyas*, and *vaiśyas*—their second birth being their initiation to

the Veda—joined by the fourth *varṇa* of the *sūdras*. The pattern also represents the three aims or duties of life: *dharma* (religious law), *artha* (wealth), and *kāma* (sexuality)—to which *mokṣa* (liberation from mundane existence) is added as a fourth. [See *Mokṣa*.]

The position of the *Atharvaveda* as regards the other three Vedas is somewhat puzzling. The name of a legendary priest and his descendants, *Atharvan* is related to the Old Iranian *āthravan*, or fire priest, but does not refer to a specific priestly function in Vedic ritual. The relationship of the *Atharvaveda* with the *śrauta* ritual is a slight one. The connection with the *brahman*’s function is made no earlier than in the comparatively late *Brāhmaṇa* of the *Atharvaveda* (*Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.2.9). The contents of its *Samhitā* appear to be related to special rites for promoting well-being, for averting or undoing evil, for curing illness, and for harming enemies, which belong to the sphere of activity of the *pu-rohita* (domestic priest or royal chaplain) rather than to the *brahman*’s function in the *śrauta* ritual. This seems also to be underlined by the fact that the *Atharvaveda*’s *Gr̥hasūtra* has priority over its *Śrautasūtra* in both age and importance. Although the *Atharvaveda*’s codification patterned after the “Triple Veda” is comparatively late, this does not mean that its contents are equally late in origin. Thus the so-called rice-dish sacrifice (*Savayajña*), though recast to parallel the *soma* sacrifice, may well have ancient roots. The *Savayajña* gives prominence to the sacrificial meal, which in the *śrauta* ritual is reduced to a minimum. Generally speaking, it would seem that the *Atharvaveda* became a repository of rites and incantations for which the fully developed *śrauta* system of ritual had no place anymore—such as, for instance, the exaltation of the *vr̥tya*, the warrior-sacrificer to whom the fifteenth book of the *Samhitā* is devoted.

Finally, there is still a third principle subdividing the Vedic texts, namely by “schools,” each having its own recension of one of the four Vedas. If such a “school” has its own version of the *Samhitā* it is known either as a *śākhā* (“branch”) or as a *caraṇa* (liturgical observance). The most subdivided of the four Vedas is the *Yajurveda*. First, there is the division between the so-called *Kṛṣṇa* (“black”) *Yajurveda* and *Śukla* (“white”) *Yajurveda* schools. The older *Black Yajurveda* is characterized by alternating *mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* portions in its *Samhitās*, while the younger *White Yajurveda* neatly separates the *mantras* from the *Brāhmaṇa*, the celebrated *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Whereas the *White Yajurveda* has two closely related *śākhās* (*Mādhyandina* and *Kāṇva*), the *Black Yajurveda* shows marked differentiation between *śākhās* and their subdivisions, or *caraṇas* (the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā* with the *Mānava* and *Vārāha*

Sūtras; the closely related *Kāṭhaka*, whose *sūtra* has been lost; and the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, with the *Āpastamba*, *Hiraṇyakeśin*, *Bhāradvāja*, *Baudhāyana*, *Vaiśkhānasa*, and *Vādhūla Sūtras*).

The *Saṃhitā* of the *Ṛgveda* is known in only one recension but has two subdivisions, *Āśvalāyana* (with the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* and the *Āśvalāyana Sūtra*) and *Śāṅkhāyana* (with the *Śāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa*—also known as the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*—and the *Śāṅkhāyana Sūtra*). The *Sāmaveda* boasts two *sākhās* that in fact differ only minimally, the *Kauthuma-Rānāyanīya* and the *Jaiminīya*; the *Brāhmaṇa* of the latter is called *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, and it is known for the richness of its mythical and legendary data. Finally, the *Atharvaveda* knows two *sākhās*, the *Śaunaka* and the *Paippalāda*.

Though scholarly attention has mostly been directed toward the *Ṛgveda* and the problems raised by its language, stylistics, and mythological conceptions, from the strictly Indian point of view the main interest of Vedism is in the structure and development of ritual. This is evident in the internal organization of the Vedic corpus of texts, which, as we saw, are arranged according to the needs of the *śrauta* system of ritual. The elaboration and standardization of this system are, however, a late Vedic development. The division of *mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* is more than a technical-ritualistic one. It represents a caesura between, on the one hand, the older state of cult and belief that forms the background of the *Ṛgveda's* stanzas, and on the other the standardized system of ritual that developed in the *Brāhmaṇas* and was perfected in the *Sūtras*. It is also to be observed that, although the standardized ritual draws liberally on the *Ṛgveda* as a source of metrical *mantras*, only part of it is actually used in the ritual. Only the ninth of the ten books (*maṇḍalas*) of the *Ṛgveda*, which contains the hymns (*sūkta*) addressed to the god Soma (in the form of the *soma* beverage), is directly related to the ritual, namely to the decanting and filtering of the *soma* (*soma pavamāna*). These hymns were assembled for the purpose of the ritual in a separate collection that was added at a later date to the *Ṛgveda* as the ninth of its ten *maṇḍalas*. Otherwise, the arrangement of the *Ṛgveda* is not related to the later ritual. In general, this text gives us few, if any, clear indications about its cultic context or about the occasions at which or for which the hymns were composed.

The *Ṛgveda*, then, for all its size and suggestive contents, does not allow us a clear view of Vedic religion, its cult, or its beliefs, nor do the *Brāhmaṇas*, with their single-minded concentration on ritual. Non-Vedic testimonies, such as the early Buddhist scriptures, may be put to use—regarding, for instance, the cult of spirits

(*yakṣas*)—but they will not suffice for a well-rounded picture. Nor does archaeology offer any reliable clues. It has not even been possible to find indubitable evidence linking the Vedic data with the preceding Indus civilization. Our only source for Vedic religion is the Vedic corpus, but it can only give part of the spectrum. Moreover, we must take into account the sharp divide between the *Ṛgveda* and the *Brāhmaṇas*.

Mythology. As regards mythology the *Ṛgveda* is a vast storehouse of mythic motifs that are partly taken up again and recast by the *Brāhmaṇas* in their explanation of the ritual. It would be a mistake, however, to expect a consistent mythology or a clearly structured pantheon. Individual outlines tend to be blurred and areas of activity indeterminate, whereas attributes and positions are to some extent interchangeable among the gods. The reason for the apparent indeterminateness of *Ṛgvedic* mythology is not to be found in the fluidity of archaic thought. In fact, the *Ṛgveda* bears witness to a highly developed state of verbal art. Though conventional and even formulaic, the mode of expression is characterized by great sophistication and flexibility, geared to interchangeability and conflation of images and formulations. The aim is not to arrive at a precise delineation of the deity invoked and his power, but, on the contrary, to compress several associations and layers of meaning within the bounded, metrical compass of a stanza. In this respect *Ṛgvedic* mythology is essentially different from the mythological statements of the *Brāhmaṇas*. The *Ṛgveda* works by multi-interpretable suggestion and allusion rather than by explicit statement, leaving unexpressed the inner connection of the images and meanings that are suggested or alluded to. In this way a vast or even unbounded field of symbolic relationships is evoked to enhance (and exploit) the power of the deity. Hence the indeterminacy of *Ṛgvedic* mythology, which is a matter of principle rather than of pristine fluidity.

This feature has given rise to F. Max Müller's well-known but misleading term *henotheism*, or *kathenotheism*, to characterize Vedic religion. Insofar as it describes the apparent tendency to provide the invoked deity with a maximum of divine associations to enhance his power, the term may still be useful. It should, however, not be taken as an intermediary stage on the way to some form of strict monotheism, nor can it serve to define *Ṛgvedic* religious thought. It does no more than indicate a marked feature of Vedic hymnology.

The mythological statements of the *Brāhmaṇas*, by contrast, are directly and unequivocally linked to the ritual and its details, which they are meant to explain and justify. The tersely and concisely recounted mythi-

cal and legendary episodes lack the sophisticated associativeness and multi-interpretability that characterize the *Ṛgveda*. Their only—and explicit—association is with the ritual. The many layers of meaning are reduced and systematized in three tiers referring respectively to the ritual (*adhiyajña*), to the godhead (*adhi-daiva*), and to the person of the sacrificer (*adhyātma*). Given the structure of the ritual as a collection of separate sacrifices and of each sacrifice as a lineal concatenation of clearly distinguishable acts and accompanying *mantras*, the mythological statements that refer to the separate sacrifices or to the successive acts of each of them cannot, by their nature, present a consistently structured mythology and cosmology. Moreover, there are clear traces of non-Aryan themes—often revealed by non-Aryan names—that raise the question of their whole or only partial integration. The search for an underlying unified pattern of mythic and cosmic conception will therefore to a large extent remain a matter of speculation.

Keeping in mind this caveat as well as the indeterminacy of the *Ṛgveda* and the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas, we may now proceed to a brief survey of Vedic mythology. In accordance with the not specifically Vedic or Indian custom of expressing the idea of totality by a number, the *Ṛgveda* often speaks of thirty-three gods. The Brāhmaṇas break down this number as eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, and twelve Ādityas, leaving two open slots. Essentially such numbers are, however, not meant to be filled out by a complete list.

Ādityas. In the same way, the most important group among the gods, the Ādityas, is equally marked by a number, namely seven or eight (although only six are named) and later, in the Brāhmaṇas, twelve. They are defined as the sons of the goddess Aditi, whose name means “boundlessness.” Her name has given rise to an opposite counterpart, the goddess Diti (dropping the privative *a*), who later is considered the mother of the gods’ enemies, the demonic *daityas*, better known as *asuras*. The notion of a mother goddess or Magna Mater is, however, not very prominent in the Veda. The Ādityas are connected with light and with celestial phenomena. Āditya also occurs as the name of the sun (otherwise *Sūrya*), and it has been proposed that the seven Ādityas be equated with the sun, the moon, and the five planets. On the other hand they are thought to represent various aspects of rulership or sovereignty; the first three, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, especially represent this capacity, whereas Bhaga (“dispenser”), Aṃśa (“share”), and Dakṣa (“capability”) are associated with social concepts. Some of these names, such as *Mitra*, *Aryaman*, and *Bhaga*, have direct correspondences in

Old Iranian, but the functions associated with them differ considerably. Apart from that, the Ādityas as a group have been equated with the (somewhat different) Amesha Spentas in the Avesta.

The foremost among the Ādityas—and at the same time the most problematic—is Varuṇa. His name is, without doubts, connected with the Greek Ouranos. He is a sovereign god, often characterized as *samrāj*, establishing and maintaining universal order, punishing transgressions, and binding the sinner with his ties. In this perspective we can also place his connection with *ṛta* (cosmic truth) and guardianship of the oath as well as with the waters, which are the abode of *ṛta*. At the same time Varuṇa exhibits a sinister and dark side, especially in his opposition to the warrior god Indra, who appears to have robbed Varuṇa of his virility and dethroned him (*Ṛgveda* 4.42; 10.124). In this connection Varuṇa’s qualification as an *asura* should be mentioned. Being preeminently an *asura*, a lordly being, he can be considered as the Vedic counterpart to the Avestan Ahura Mazdā, with whom he shares the connection with *ṛta* (Old Iran., *asha*). Varuṇa’s *asura* quality would seem to oppose him to the *devas*, or heavenly gods, even though the *deva/asura* opposition is less pronounced in the *Ṛgveda* than it is in the Brāhmaṇas. The problem Varuṇa presents is his two-sidedness. As the first among the Ādityas he is a *deva*, while at the same time he is prominent as an *asura*.

Varuṇa often occurs coupled with another Āditya, Mitra, who (in accordance with his name) represents contract and alliance. In the Veda he remains somewhat in the background. In the Avesta, however, he is more prominent and receives a fuller treatment; he is also a warrior and is associated with heaven and the sun. In contradistinction to the *Ṛgveda*, the Brāhmaṇas emphasize an opposition between Mitra and Varuṇa, the former being equated with the daylight, the latter with the night. The third Āditya, Aryaman, is concerned with marriage and hospitality. [See also Varuṇa.]

Indra. The god most often encountered is the warrior god Indra, who receives the most elaborate mythological treatment of all the Vedic gods. Although he does not belong to the Ādityas he is mentioned at least once as the fourth Āditya (*Ṛgveda* 8.52.7), so as to connect him with the three first, and sovereign, deities among the Ādityas. A few times in the *Ṛgveda* he is called an *asura*, as is Varuṇa. His appearance, strength, and liberality, and his prowess in battle, in drinking *soma* (sometimes obtained forcibly), and, later, in amorous ventures—as well as his chariot, his horses, and his weapon, the *vajra* (the thunderbolt)—receive ample attention. He is, however, not only a warrior and divine

prototype of the *kṣatriya* or *rājanya*: he also exhibits priestly or Brahmanic traits and as such is related to Bṛhaspati, or Brahmaṇaspati (lord of the greatness or of the *brahman*), who is credited with some of the heroic deeds usually ascribed to Indra. (Hanns-Peter Schmidt has even argued that *Bṛhaspati* may originally have been an epithet of Indra. Incidentally, this should warn us against setting too early a date for the separation of the four *varṇas* as closed, mutually exclusive status groupings.)

Indra's most vaunted deeds are the liberation of the waters by killing the monster Vṛtra ("obstruction")—hence his epithet *Vṛtrahan*, which equates him with the Avestan Verethraghna—and the freeing of the cows (metaphorically, the heavenly lights) from the Vala cave or from the cave where the Paṇis hid their cattle. [See Vṛtra.] In the Vala episode he is associated with the priestly Aṅgirases, who assist him by their chanting in opening the cave or enclosure. Here, Indra's relationship, or rather overlap, with Bṛhaspati/Brahmaṇaspati is most clear. [See also Indra.]

Maruts and Vāyu. Indra's usual companions and war-band are the Maruts, the sons of Prṣṇi, the spotted cow. They are depicted as chariot fighters and support Indra in the Vṛtra battle, but they also have a priestly quality as bardic chanters. In a naturalistic perspective the Maruts are the violent storm gods, just as Indra's weapon, the *vajra*, is the thunderbolt. As such, the Maruts are akin to Vāyu ("wind"). Equally a charioteer and associated with Indra, Vāyu is linked with the Maruts. His pneumatic character seems to connect him with ancient initiation rites as well as with the later, Upaniṣadic speculations on the life breath, or *prāṇa*. [See also Prāṇa.]

Trita. As a dragon slayer Indra has a minor double in Trita ("the third") Āptya ("the aquatic one" [?]), who is equally credited with slaying Vṛtra and Vala. These exploits, however, burden him, like Indra, with the guilt of manslaughter, which makes Trita into a kind of scapegoat. In the Brāhmaṇas he is identified with Agni, the fire, who hides from his cruel duty as the sacrificial fire. Trita is also known to the Avesta in a double form, as Thraetaona (Pers., Farīdūn) Āthwya, the slayer of the dragon Ashi Dahāka, and as Thrīta, the father of Kere-ṣāspa, equally a dragon slayer. Trita, and not Indra, may have been the original hero of the dragon fight.

Aśvins. The twin Aśvins ("possessing horses"), or, by their original name, the Nāsatyas, are chariot warriors—the chariot being typically manned by a pair, the driver and the fighter—conveying Sūryā, the bride of the sun. Equally, they are associated with the goddess Uṣas, or Dawn. They obtain the secret of the cultic *surā*

beverage (distilled from grain) from the demon Namuci and honey mead (*madhu*) from the horse-headed Dadhyañc. In this connection they are also known for their qualities as healers and miracle workers.

Rudra. A different type of warrior is the terrible archer Rudra ("the red one," or "the howler"), who inhabits the mountains and the wilderness. He is identified with the destructive, uncontrolled aspect of Agni, the fire. Generally, Rudra is surrounded by fear and taboo. In the ritual he typically receives the remainder of the oblation, thus being set apart from the gods and "bought off." The group of Rudras—their later standard number is eleven—are identified with the Maruts, Rudra being said to be their father. In post-Vedic religion Rudra developed into the transcendent god Śiva. [See also Rudra.]

Viṣṇu. Another Vedic god who was destined for post-Vedic prominence is Viṣṇu, who in many ways became a counterpart to Śiva. In the Vedic hymns Viṣṇu is a minor figure, associated with Indra in the Vṛtra battle. In the Brāhmaṇas he is identified with the institution of sacrifice. His characteristic deed, however, is the feat of crossing, measuring out, or conquering the universe by his three steps. This feat may be linked with his solar (and, possibly, also phallic) character as also with his later association with the *axis mundi*. As against the fearsome Rudra-Śiva, who resides outside human society, the consistently benevolent Viṣṇu takes up his position in the center of the universe and in the middle of the settled world, encompassing and organizing the universe with his three steps. [See also Viṣṇu.]

Pūṣan. The pastoral Pūṣan is the guardian of the roads, a trait that should probably be viewed against the background of the movement of cattle. The furthering of prosperity to which his name (from *puṣ*, "prosper") refers is primarily concerned with cattle (especially cows), the epitome of wealth. His guardianship of the roads easily connects Pūṣan with the path of the sun, which leads from heaven to earth. In this respect he may be viewed as a solar deity.

Agni. From the ritualistic point of view the most important deities are Agni, the fire, and Soma, the deified cultic beverage and draft of immortality (*amṛta*). In cosmic perspective they represent the fiery and watery elements. As the sacrificial fire, Agni is produced with the help of two special pieces of wood known as the "two *araṇis*" that are manipulated in a way explicitly imitating the sexual act. The domestic fire, on the other hand, is the fire used in the marriage ritual and so is derived from the bride's paternal home. This notion should alert us to any misunderstandings regarding the "ancestral fire"; insofar as it is ancestral it is transmit-

ted in the female line. Moreover, the upkeep of the actual domestic fire ends with the death of the householder, when it is used for the last time at his cremation. The fire—both domestic and sacrificial—is discontinuous, its transmission broken and its possession uncertain. The mythology of Agni is replete with his fleeing and hiding in plants or trees but especially in the waters, illustrating the basic though paradoxical interrelationship between the watery and fiery elements. This paradox is further indicated by one of the names for Agni, Apāṃ Napāt (“son of the waters”).

Time and again Agni has to be retrieved from his hiding places, that is, the fire must be obtained from elsewhere, from other people. Even though the “two *araṇis*” would, in principle, ensure the undisturbed possession of the fire, which then can be produced at will after a period of inactivity or hiding when it has been symbolically taken up in the sacrificer’s person, these drilling sticks are not an ancestral heirloom, but are obtained from the *adhvaryu* priest (fittingly, he is rewarded with a gift when fire is produced). Less ritualistically, the fire appears to be obtained by force or theft, as occasionally shown in the ritual texts. Conversely, the *śrauta* ritual for setting up the sacrificial fires (*agnyādhāna*)—obviously meant to have only one performance, whose effects were permanent—can be repeated after some, not clearly specified, mishap. This seems to point in the same direction: the fire may have been robbed or lost as the result of a hostile encounter. Although the Vedic myth of Mātariśvan (“swelling in the mother”[?], probably a name of Agni), who brings the fire to the human world, does not mention agonistic proceedings, the ritual seems to recall the well-known Indo-European myth of the theft of the heavenly fire.

On the other hand the fire is identified with the person of its possessor in a way that suggests the notion of an “external soul.” It defines the household and its master; in the sacrificial ritual it leads the triumphant procession to the sacrificial hearth (*āhavaniya*), where it is to be installed. In this latter triumphal aspect Agni is a victorious warrior moving about on his chariot and bringing the gods to the sacrifice or conveying the offerings to them as well as receiving offerings himself. In short, he is the linchpin of the universe viewed as sacrificial process. Although the *śrauta* ritual identifies Agni with the *hotṛ* priest, it would seem that originally this functionary is no other than the sacrificer striving to prevail over other sacrificers and their fires, as is still noticeable in the rite of the Pravara, the “election” of the *hotṛ*, immediately preceding the burnt offerings.

Both mythologically and ritually, then, the relationship of man with Agni, dispersed throughout many sep-

arate (and competing) fires as well as regularly disappearing, is critical and insecure. In his “terrible” (*ghora*) form, as Rudra, he may even endanger the sacrificer’s life. [See also Agni.]

Soma. *Soma* (Avestan, *haoma*) is predominantly the plant from which the cultic beverage is prepared as well as the beverage itself. Like the fire, Agni, it has to be won or obtained from elsewhere. “The one [Agni] Mātariśvan brought from heaven, the other [Soma] the eagle [*śyena*] took by force from the mountain” (*Rgveda* 1.93.6). In the Brāhmaṇas this bird is identified with the *gāyatrī*, which, having three eight-syllable feet, is the shortest of the Sanskrit meters and is emblematic of chant and recitation. The mountain where the *soma* plant grows is named Mūjavat. The main distinguishing feature of *soma* is that it is to be won or brought from the wilderness, far away from the settled world. In the ritual the stalks of the *soma* plant are bought from an outsider in exchange for a cow, after which the *soma* seller is beaten and chased. This latter feature, as well as other less explicit details, suggests that behind the trading lies a contest in which the seller represents the guardians of the *soma*, the heavenly Gandharvas.

Another way of winning the *soma*—or rather the *soma* draft—is by forcibly obtaining access to another’s *soma* sacrifice. Though the ritual does not account for this it is a well-known mythical theme. Thus Indra robs Tvaṣṭṛ and drinks the *soma* from his ritual vessels. In another myth Indra slays Tvaṣṭṛ’s son, the three-headed monster Viśvarūpa, at the sacrifice in order to obtain the *soma* draft. Or again, Indra obtains the *soma*—as well as Agni—by slaying Vṛtra, who is holding them within himself.

As a god, Soma rules over the waters and their cosmic circulation. As such he takes up a central position in the universe, parallel to that of Agni, with whom Soma is often coupled as a dual divinity in the ritual texts. Significantly the *Rgveda* associates him with the sun, illustrating once more the solidarity of the fiery and the watery elements.

As in the case of Agni, Soma’s relationship with man (i.e., winning him or losing him) is of crucial importance. However, unlike Agni, he is not identified with the sacrificer, but remains external to him. He is “the king” *par excellence*, ceremonially received as such on the place of sacrifice and often referred to by this title alone in the ritual manuals. This may perhaps explain why, whereas the fire is simply brought from heaven and the evidence for force or stealth is reduced to scattered and fragmentary indications, conflict and violence are involved in winning the *soma*. If the fire, as the sacrificer’s “external soul,” were to be the subject of an

equally open direct conflict, the consequences would be disastrous: just how disastrous can be seen when we consider the position of Soma, "the king." After his reception, he is pressed—that is, "killed." Having been prepared, sacrificed, and consumed, Soma is, in short, immolated. Obviously, this rules out the direct identification with the sacrificer. Such an identification is, however, still discernible, but shrouded in mystery as a dark, undeclared truth. Thus, when the royal sacrificer of the Rājasūya is proclaimed king, the priests inaudibly add "Soma is our king."

The original mystery of the sacrificer's immolation has been preserved in a different and innocuous form in the ritualistic mythology of the Brāhmaṇas, where the sacrificer is stereotypically identified with Prajāpati, the "lord" (*pati*) of "beings" (*prajā*). One of the many *pati* gods, he makes a fleeting appearance in the late tenth book of the *Rgveda* but reaches overall preeminence in the Brāhmaṇas. This Prajāpati, then, is the epitome of sacrifice, being at once the sacrificer and sacrificial victim. By that time, however, the ritual had developed into a closed, autonomous system that is ideally parallel to but not directly linked with the reality of the sacrificer's actual life and death. [See Prajāpati.]

A particularly knotty problem is the original identity of the *soma* plant. From the texts it appears that it must be a plant, often thought to be a creeper, with juicy stalks delivering the *soma* juice when crushed. R. Gordon Wasson's seductively argued theory of *soma* as the "divine mushroom of immortality," specifically fly agaric, is not generally accepted. The main difficulty is that fly agaric is not indigenous to the geographical area of the *Rgveda*. But if Wasson is right, this would mean that the elaborate imagery of the *soma* hymns would revolve around a substance no longer used or even known. Given the conventional nature of Vedic hymnology, this is certainly not impossible. The stalks actually used in the ritual appear anyway to be a substitute for the lost original.

As to the god Soma's celestial nature and abode the question of whether he represents the sun or the moon was at one time hotly debated. Though regularly associated with the sun in the *Rgveda*, Soma is usually identified with the moon in the Brāhmaṇas. The waxing and waning of the moon easily lend themselves to serve as an expression of the cosmic processes of growth, death, and renewal over which Soma presides. This led Alf Hillebrandt to postulate a lunar origin and character for Soma, which he expanded into a mythology involving other gods as well. This interpretation has, however, not been generally accepted, nor has Hermann Lommel's suggestion that Soma's identification with the moon would have come about by a restructuring

under external, non-Aryan influences found favor. When the naturalistic and celestial interpretation of Vedic mythology receded in favor of more sociologically, cosmogonically, or ritually oriented views, the question of the lunar as opposed to the solar interpretation slipped into the background. The naturalistic viewpoint has once again gained favor, and the debate may in some form or other be reopened. At any rate the central point of Soma's mythology is the circulation of the cosmic waters holding the ambrosia (*amṛta*) and linked with the alternation of life and death. [See also Soma.]

Female deities. As mothers, sisters, wives, and lovers of the gods, female deities receive frequent mention, but, with the exception of Uṣas (Dawn), they remain diffuse, lacking in profile and to a high degree interchangeable with one another.

First, there are the deified (primordial) waters, Āpaḥ (plural of *ap*, water), which hold the germ of life and are the abode or hiding place of Agni (Fire), the "son of the waters" (Apāṃ Napāt). As we have seen, they are also associated with Soma. Their most direct manifestation is formed by the rivers, especially those of the Punjab, such as the Sindhu (grammatically both masculine and feminine), also called Indus, and its tributaries. Mythologically the most important of them is the Sarasvatī, in the Brāhmaṇas identified with the goddess Vāc (Speech), especially in connection with the hymnic or ritual utterance. [See Sarasvatī.] We already met Aditi, the mother of the Ādityas. The Brāhmaṇas explain the latter's birth as the result of Aditi's eating the remainder of the rice mess (*odana*) prepared and offered by her to the gods. Other female deities are Śrī (Luster), Purāṃdhi (Bounty), and Iḍā, or Iḷā (Food, both as offering and as sacrificial meal).

The most individualized of the goddesses is Uṣas (Dawn). She is depicted as a nubile, eternally young woman, wife or lover of the sun and companion of the Aśvins. Her most important feature is her bounty and her association with the gift, especially the *dakṣiṇā*, the gift to the priests at the sacrifice. The Brāhmaṇas transfer the incest motif of the otherwise featureless sky god, Dyaus, and his daughter to Prajāpati, father of all and epitome of sacrifice, and Uṣas. Prajāpati is then chastised by the archer Rudra who shoots an arrow at him; the wound is represented by a small piece from the offering cake, "Rudra's portion," which is, because of its potency, given to the *brahman* priest to eat. It is striking that Uṣas, notwithstanding her clear delineation and the hymns addressed to her, does not have a part in the sacrificial cult. [See also Goddess Worship, article on The Hindu Goddess.]

Ancestors. Finally, mention must be made of a separate class of divine beings, the Ancestors (*pitarāḥ*, "the

fathers"). To them belong the *ṛṣis*, the seers to whom the Ṛgvedic hymns are ascribed. Stereotypically the ancestors form a group of seven (like the Ādityas) to which an eighth, Agastya, is added. They are the eponyms of the *gotras* (brahman lineages) systematically listed in the Pravara ("election") rite in the *śrauta* sacrifice where the names of the *ṛṣis* defining the sacrificer's *gotra* are mentioned.

Otherwise, the householder's lineage is defined by the last three ancestors—father, grandfather, great-grandfather—who receive offerings of water and rice balls (*piṇḍas*) in both the domestic (*gr̥hya*) and the solemn (*śrauta*) ritual. The feature distinguishing the cult of the ancestors from that of the gods is the use of the left hand; the right hand is used in the cult of the gods. Thus, though regularly associated with the gods and their deeds, the *pitaraḥ* are sharply differentiated from them. Similarly, the "way of the fathers" (*pitryāna*) is distinguished from the "way of the gods" (*devayāna*), the first "way" being associated with the moon and the second with the sun.

Yama. Another set of ideas regarding the world of the dead focuses on Yama and his twin sister Yamī (*yama*, "twin"). [See also Yama.] Also known in Old Iranian mythology, they form the primordial pair. The Ṛgveda knows, but apparently rejects, their incest: in a dialogue hymn (*Ṛgveda* 10.10) Yama refuses to respond to Yamī's entreaties. Yama is the first mortal and, in ancient Iran, the first king. In India his kingship is reserved for his righteous rule over the world of the dead, which he is the first to enter. In the Ṛgveda he is the son of Vivasvat, a solar figure ("the wide-shining") whom the Brāhmaṇas make into an Āditya. Although it is only in later Hinduism that Yama is equated with Dharmarājā, the king of the universal order, the idea underlying this notion does not seem to be alien to the Veda. [For further discussion of early Indo-Iranian religious motifs, see Zoroastrianism.]

Interpretations of Vedic mythology. The interpretation of the Vedic mythological data has, in the last hundred years or so, variously emphasized naturalistic, ritualistic, and sociological approaches. Abel Henri Bergaigne's *La religion védique d'après les hymnes du Ṛgveda* was the first and, thus far, unequalled attempt at a unitary synthesis combining both the naturalistic and ritualistic viewpoints. The mythical motifs are classified on two levels: on the one hand the celestial processes of light and darkness, on the other the atmospheric phenomena (clouds, rain, lightning) parallel to the celestial level. Both levels are further characterized by the opposition and interaction of male and female elements. The natural processes structured in this way are then seen as reflected in the cult. Bergaigne has

been criticized for his allegorical schematism and his tendency to view the Ṛgveda exclusively in terms of its rhetorics. But his lasting achievement is in his systematic textual approach, involving a rigorous attention to the phraseology and its formulaic aspects. On this basis, modified by Hermann Oldenberg, it has also been possible to obtain a clearer view of the formation of the Ṛgveda. In general, Bergaigne can be considered the founder of Vedic philology, which then is brought to full growth by Hermann Oldenberg.

The sociological approach has been forcefully represented by Georges Dumézil, who stresses the three functions of sovereignty, both spiritual and worldly (Varuṇa as against Mitra), physical force (exemplified by Indra), and fecundity or productivity (represented by the Aśvins and other groups of gods, such as the Vasus, in association with female divinities). The three functions or principles are at the same time seen as the (Indo-European) ideology governing a tripartite social organization exemplified by the three "Aryan" or "twiceborn" *varṇas* (classes): *brāhmaṇas*, *ksatriyas*, and *vaiśyas*. The problem with the social and ideological tripartition is that the number three, which is indeed strikingly frequent, is usually associated with either the number two—the third forming a link or intermediary—or four, when the fourth is an indeterminate or opposite element rounding out the whole (thus the three *varṇas* are supplemented by a fourth, the *śūdra varṇa*; compare also such configurations as seven or eight Ādityas). The theory of the three functions is, however, not primarily directed at the interpretation of Vedic (and later, epic) mythology as such, but at comparative Indo-European mythology—a field of study revived and stimulated by Dumézil's numerous and erudite publications.

Another approach, which is reminiscent of Bergaigne's cosmological comprehensiveness but is not dependent on naturalistic or ritualistic viewpoints, singles out cosmogony as the key to "the basic concept of Vedic religion." The cosmogonic approach, propounded by F. B. J. Kuiper, has been influenced by earlier work (in the 1930s) of Dutch structuralist scholars on Indonesian religion and society; it is an approach in which psychoanalytic insights also are heuristically brought to bear on cosmogonic thought. In this perspective, the central feature of Vedic cosmogony and of the world it brought about is the sudden breakup of the undifferentiated primeval unity of the waters into a dualistic cosmos. The cause of this dramatic change was Indra's heroic deed. The *asuras*, who were associated with the primeval state of affairs, are defeated and replaced by the "younger" *devas*. Henceforth, the dualistic cosmos of upper and nether world—rent apart by Indra—is determined by the conflict of *devas* and *asuras*, which periodically

breaks out again at the joints of the time cycle (as at the New Year) and is reenacted in verbal and other contests, particularly chariot races. In this scheme, the primordial unity is guaranteed by Viṣṇu, who, far from being a minor figure in the *Ṛgveda* as is usually assumed, transcends the conflict by his third step. The cosmogonic exegesis entails complex problems of textual analysis. Thus the opposition between *devas* and *asuras*, though clear and systematic in the *Brāhmaṇas*, is far from unambiguous in the *Ṛgveda*. The main problem is the nature of Varuṇa, an *asura* who belongs equally to the *devas*. In Kuiper's view Varuṇa went over to the victorious *devas* (keeping a hidden allegiance to the *asuras*), much as Agni and Soma left Vṛtra for Indra.

Whether cosmogony can deliver a basic or unitary concept underlying Vedic religion, or at least the Veda as known to us, is of course debatable. One may even doubt whether such a concept did indeed exist. At any rate the metaphorical language of the hymns, with its tendency to pack various meanings and images in a single suggestive stanza while leaving the connecting idea or concept unexpressed, makes it particularly hard to isolate and define such a basic concept.

There can, however, be no doubt about the importance attached to Indra's cosmogonic battle, if the number of references both in the hymns and in the prose texts is taken as a criterion. More generally, competition, conflict, and combat appear to permeate the Vedic world. If the gods are bountiful or the human patrons munificent, the point is more often than not that the bounty and munificence should not go to the opponent. In the *Brāhmaṇas* conflict is stereotyped as the perennial struggle between *devas* and *asuras*, but conflict does not stop there. The *devas* are also competing (often by running chariot races) or fighting among themselves. The hostile tension between Indra and his followers, the Maruts, that is noticeable in some hymnic passages is crudely expressed in the *Brāhmaṇas* as Indra plundering the Maruts. In the ritual texts the *bhrātṛvya* (rival kinsman), or the *dviṣat* (the foe), is all but ubiquitous. There clearly is the idea of a stable unalterable order—often associated with the unforgiving rule of Varuṇa—but this order is destabilized from within by the dualism of conflict for the goods of life. These goods, known under various, mostly indeterminate, all-encompassing terms, are mythologically luminous and celestial in nature and are associated with the waters. Thus, for instance, Indra's freeing Agni and Soma, the fire and the waters, from Vṛtra.

The "real life" substratum of the goods of life is cattle, especially cows, which then are transformed into theriomorph divinities (as, for instance, Pṛṣṇi, the mother of the Maruts). In this connection the complex of female

deities seems to be particularly important. Thus Uṣas is directly associated with the cow given as *dakṣiṇā* (gift to the priests), and the *soma* cow (the price for which the *soma* is traded) is addressed (among other names) as *Dakṣiṇā* (the deified gift cow), Aditi "facing both ways" (*ubhataḥśiṣṇī*), Rudrā (feminine form of Rudra), and Ādityā (belonging to Aditi); her footprint is that of Iḍā. Especially suggestive is the double-headed Aditi: she is reminiscent of the *Brāhmaṇa* motif of the rejected and therefore angered personification of the *dakṣiṇā* threateningly standing between the two parties of the Ādityas and the Āngirasas (a clan of ancient fire priests, especially associated with the *Atharvaveda* but here identified with the *asuras*); the two parties soothingly try to lure her, now identified with the goddess Vāc (Speech), each to his own side (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 3.5.1.18–22). The complex of female deities, then, are intimately connected with the cows (i.e., the goods of life) for which the conflicting parties contend.

This may explain the rather indeterminate nature of the female deities. They are the movable stakes in the ever-repeated contest. As such they have no fixed place or allegiance but keep shifting between the contending parties, dividing and connecting them. In this way it can perhaps also be understood that Uṣas (Dawn), though profusely eulogized, does not receive a sacrificial cult: standing for the bounty spent, contended for, distributed, and consumed, she is—like Iḍā, the sacrificial meal—not a recipient but the gift itself.

As party to the conflict the *asuras* are originally not so much demoniacal opponents and spoilers but rather settled rulers and holders of the goods of life. They are being despoiled by the aggressive wandering *deva* warriors led by Indra, who aspire to the status of settled lords. As the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* has it in a lapidary but probably ancient phrase: "The *devas* drove about on wheels, the *asuras* sat in their halls" (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 6.1.1.1). But eventually the *devas* prevail over the *asuras*, and that is why the "moving-about warrior" (*yāyāvāra*) holds sway over the settled people (*kṣemya*), as a parallel passage explains (*Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 5.2.1.7). Similarly, an isolated but telling rule recommends the would-be sacrificer who is going to set up his *śrauta* fires to take his cooking fire (*dakṣiṇāgni*, lit., "southern fire") from the house of a man of substance (*puṣṭa*) who is "like an *asura*" (*asura iva*; *Kāthaka Saṃhitā* 8.12; cf. *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* 5.14.1).

This does not mean that the world of the gods is modeled after human society, but rather that there is no sharp dividing line separating them. The worlds of gods and men smoothly blend into each other, forming a universe permeated by the divine and the sacral. If Indra's heroic warrior deed established the cosmic order, it is

an order of perennial conflict over the possession and the redistribution of the goods of life—a conflict in which gods and men equally take part—and the outcome is open to reversal at the next turn. This may explain the fact, usually considered a secondary extension, that Indra is in a few Ṛgvedic passages called *asura*.

The arena where the conflict was fought out was the microcosm of the place of sacrifice. The central institution that regulated and contained conflict was sacrifice (*yajña*). Though the *śrauta* ritual has no place for the enemy it does contain many mock contests, prominent among them verbal contests (*brahmodya*) and chariot races. The Brāhmaṇas do not tire of referring to enemies, and the explanatory passages continually link the sacrificial ritual and its details with the fights of *devas* and *asuras*, while the place of sacrifice is made the battleground.

Though we are ill-informed about the cultic background of the hymns, which may have known a great variety of concepts and forms, sacrifice, especially the *soma* sacrifice, clearly must have been of overwhelming importance. As the *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā* (1.164.50 and 10.90.16) says in an enigmatically involute statement: "With sacrifice the gods sacrificed sacrifice, these were the 'first ordinances' (*dharmāni prathamāni*)."¹ The second passage concludes the hymn celebrating the sacrifice of the *puruṣa*, the cosmic man, out of whose immolated body the ordered universe, including the four *varṇas*, was created. Although this cosmogonic sacrifice recalls Indra's Vṛtra-slaying, there is no reference to a fight or contest. Rather, it suggests the "monistic" form of the *śrauta* sacrifice propounded by the Brāhmaṇas, mythologically represented by Prajāpati, who creates the world by sacrificing himself. However, judging by the explanations in the Brāhmaṇas as well as by many features of the *śrauta* ritual itself, the form of the sacrifice preceding the one taught by them appears to have been characterized by a dualistic and agonistic structure.

The dualistic character is already implied in Paul Thieme's fundamental observation that the *śrauta* sacrifice is in all its details characterized as a guest reception, the sacrificer being the host. The guests at the sacrificial feast are not only the gods but equally the priestly participants who drink the *soma* and partake of the sacrificial food and who are identified with gods. The dualism of hosts and guests is clearly marked by tension and competition. Thus the Ādityas and the Aṅgirases—whom we met already in their (verbal) contest over the *dakṣiṇā* bounty—competed over the honor of inviting the other party to their own sacrifice. First the Aṅgirases invite the Ādityas, but the latter manage to

be "one up." Devising an equally important sacrificial ritual that can be performed on short term before the time set by the Aṅgirases, the Ādityas invite the latter and win out (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 6.34).

Apparently, being invited to a sacrifice is a challenge that one cannot honorably refuse. On the other hand, not being invited is a dishonor. And so we see uninvited guests forcing their way in to obtain or rather to contend for their share, as did the Śyāparṇas at the sacrifice performed by Viśvantara Sauśademaṇa (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7.27), or as did Indra at Tvaṣṭṛ's, where Indra even killed Viśvarūpa, Tvaṣṭṛ's son. It is this dualistic and agonistic form of sacrifice that the ritualists of the Brāhmaṇas and the Sūtras reformed and turned into the rigidly "monistic" system of ritual that is the apogee of Vedism. [See also Indian Religions, article on Mythic Themes.]

Ritual. The most striking feature of Vedic ritual is the thoroughly systematic nature of its structure and textual presentation. Whereas the Brāhmaṇas still show in many ways, but especially in the *arthavāda* discussions, traces of the formative process and sometimes explicitly mention former practices as against the new rules, the Sūtras, or "guidelines," are fully systematized to the extent of stating a set of "meta-rules" (*paribhāṣā*) for the proper interpretation and handling of the ritual precepts. This systematic character, definitively clarified by Willem Caland, caused Oldenberg to speak of "pre-scientific science" and Sylvan Lévi of "doctrine." Frits Staal has again called attention to what he considers to be the ancient Indian "science of ritual" as a system of "rule-governed activity" per se.

The ritual system. In the first place, there is the principle of the unity of act and formula. Unless stated otherwise each act is accompanied by a formula. The system is then built up in the way of nesting units, simpler acts being integrated to form ever more intricate complexes. The basic sacrificial unit is the pouring of a small portion of the oblatinal substance—milk, ghee (clarified butter), cake, gruel, meat, or *soma*—into the offering fire. This smallest unit, indicated by the verb *juhoti* ("he pours"), occurs as a separate act in all *yajñas*, but it is also an integral part of a more complex sacrificial act. The simple pouring is performed by only one person, usually the *adhvaryu*, but the more complicated form requires the cooperation of several priests. While standing at the offering fire the *adhvaryu* calls out to the *āgnīdhra*, "*omśrāvaya*" ("let there be hearing"), and the latter answers with "*Astu śrauṣaṭ*" ("be it, one should hear"); then it is again the turn of the *adhvaryu*, who now calls on the *hotṛ* to recite the offering verse (*yājyā*). The verse begins with the name of the god to whom the oblation is addressed and is followed by the

instruction to “worship” (*yaja*), that is, to recite the appropriate verse; the *hotṛ* complies, prefixing the words *ye yajāmahe* (“we who worship,” also known from Old Iranian) and ending with the word *vauṣaṭ*, at which the *adhvaryu* pours the oblation in the fire and the sacrificial patron (*yajamāna*) pronounces the *tyāga* (“abandonment”): “for [name of the god addressed], not for me.”

This scheme, indicated by the verb *yajati* (“he [i.e., the *hotṛ*] worships”), is the one used in the standard ghee libations preceding and following the main offering (*pradhāna*) in the vegetal sacrifices. In the case of the main offering the scheme is enlarged by a preceding invitational verse (*anuvākya* or *puronuvākya*) to be recited by the *hotṛ*, who is called upon by the *adhvaryu* to do so. The same scheme is then further elaborated in the animal sacrifice by the participation of one of the *hotṛ*’s assistants, the *maitrāvaruṇa*, who relays to the *hotṛ* the *adhvaryu*’s call for the *anuvākya* and *yājya* verse. In the *soma* sacrifice this complex is further enlarged by the chanting of the *stotra* (“laud,” from the verb *stu*, “to praise”), which is the task of the *udgātṛ* and his assistants, and the *śastra* (recitation) of the *hotṛ*, which follows the libation and the drinking of the *soma* by the participants. In all this the basic sacrificial act remains the libation in the offering fire.

This summary description of the basic sacrificial act and its enlargement cannot do justice to the intricate detail of the rules that, apart from the sacrificial act itself, also cover the no less complicated preparatory acts—taking the vow, choosing the priests, collecting the ingredients and implements (*saṃbhāra*), arranging the place of sacrifice, readying the fires, preparing the oblatinal substance (*havis*), its consumption and disposal, the *dakṣiṇās*—as well as the concluding phase. But the brief summary adequately illustrates the systematic buildup of the ritual. Each sacrifice consists of a lineal succession of such standardized units of act and formula, primarily the basic sacrificial act with or without its extensions. The alignment of acts again shows the nesting principle by boxing in a unit on both sides by two other mutually connected or similar units, as for instance is the case of the main offering (*pradhāna*), which is preceded by the “fore-offerings” (*prayāja*), and followed by the “after-offerings” (*anuyāja*). In this way a complicated concatenation is achieved spanning the whole of the sacrifice, its beginning and conclusion, mirroring each other so as to enclose the whole.

The same nesting principle governs the hierarchical taxonomy of types of sacrifices, the simpler types being incorporated in the more complicated ones. The simplest type of sacrifice is the Agnihotra, the evening and morning offering of boiled milk. It is essentially the basic sacrificial act of the *juhota* type, requiring only the

service of the *adhvaryu*. More complicated is the *iṣṭi* (from the verb *yaj*, “to worship”), a vegetal sacrifice of one or more cakes (*purodāsa*), cereal boiled with butter and milk (*caru*), or a dish of coagulated milk (*sāṃnāyya*). It involves the taking out, husking, and grinding of the grain, preparing the dough, baking the cake (on a specified number of potsherds heated on the embers), and dividing it into portions to be distributed to the deity and among the sacrificer and his priests. Moreover, before the main offerings are made, the sacrificial fire is fueled with pieces of wood (*samidh*). The *hotṛ* recites a verse (*sāmidhenī*) as the *adhvaryu* places each *samidh* as an offering into the fire.

This series of sacrificial acts is then followed by the *pravara* (“election”) of *hotṛ* and *adhvaryu*, in which the sacrificer’s ancestral names are mentioned, and finally the main offerings are made according to the *yajati* scheme. Of course, separate *juhota* offerings are equally part of the *iṣṭi* ritual. A more complicated version of this type of sacrifice requires four priests: apart from the *adhvaryu*, the *hotṛ*, the *āgnidhra* (counted with the *adhvaryu*, but as to his function associated with the *hotṛ*), and the *brahman*.

The next type, the *paśubandha* (“binding the animal victim”), or animal sacrifice, incorporates the *iṣṭi*. The acts concerned with the cake offering (*paśu-purodāsa*) are neatly intertwined with those of the animal sacrifice proper. Two more priests are added: the *maitrāvaruṇa*, who is associated with the *hotṛ*, and the *pratiprasthātṛ*, who assists the *adhvaryu*.

The most complicated type is the *soma* sacrifice, which incorporates both *iṣṭi* and *paśubandhas*. Its distinctive liturgical feature is the extensive use of the *Sāmaveda*, practically absent in the other sacrifices, for the chanted “lauds” (*stotra*), while the *soma* ritual proper is intertwined with an animal sacrifice. This involves the services of four specialized chanters (*chandoga*) led by the *udgātṛ*. Altogether the *soma* sacrifice needs sixteen or, according to some *sūtras*, seventeen priests, including the previously mentioned ones, divided into four groups according to the four Vedas: four *adhvaryu* priests (*Yajurveda*), four *hotrakas* (*Ṛgveda*), four *chandogas* (*Sāmaveda*), and four in the *brahman*’s group (*Atharvaveda*); the seventeenth, the *sadasya*, is assigned to the *brahman*. At the same time, however, seven, instead of only four, of these priests are counted as *hotrakas*, six of whom are actually charged with *śastra* recitations from the *Ṛgveda*.

In the *śrauta* system of ritual the *iṣṭi* in the form of the fortnightly New and Full Moon sacrifices (*Darśapūrṇamāsa*), the *paśubandha* and the one-day *soma* sacrifice known as Agniṣṭoma (“liturgy of Agni”) form the basic paradigms, or *prakṛti*. These *prakṛtis* can then be

modified mainly as to the sacrificial substance and the deity or deities addressed (such a modification is known as *vikṛti*). The modified part therefore is primarily the *pradhāna* offering(s) involving (apart from differences in the sacrificial substances used) different invitations and offering verses. The rest of the ritual, the *āṅgas* (members) or *tantra* ("the warp," the sacrifice regularly being said to be woven), remains, but for a few minor adaptations, essentially unchanged. Thus a particular sacrifice is said to be characterized by three criteria: *dravya* (sacrificial substance), *devatā* (deity, or deities, first addressed at the beginning when the sacrificial substance is taken out), and *tyāga* (the sacrificer's "abandonment" formula, again specifying the deity after the offering; cf. *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* 1.2.2).

Furthermore, sacrifices can be strung together either in a continuous series (*ayana*, "course") or in periodical clusters. The latter is the case, for instance, with the fortnightly New and Full Moon sacrifice (comprising two main offerings within the same *tantra*) or with the seasonal Four Month sacrifices, which are essentially clusters of *iṣṭi*-type offerings at the beginning of a four-month period. The *soma* sacrifice in particular has lent itself to such strings, which may stretch over a number of years (theoretically even a hundred years). Although a *prakṛti* form, the Agniṣṭoma lasts only one day (apart from the preparatory days) and as such is an *ekāha*; there are strings of up to twelve days known as *ahīna*. A twelve-day series can be performed either as *anahīna* or a *sattra* ("session"). The difference is that at a *sattra* there is not a sacrificer with his sixteen (or seventeen) priests but all the participants are homogenized into a single band of sacrificers who have put together their sacrificial fires, while at the same time each performs the task of a particular priest. Their leader is then called the *gṛhapati* ("master of the house"). The modifications that are needed make the twelve-day *sattra* into the *prakṛti* for all other, longer *sattras*, while the year-long *sattra* or *gavām ayana* ("course of the cows") is again the model for all other *sattras* within the duration of a year or longer.

The feature by which the *soma* sacrifices are usually distinguished, however, concerns the arrangements of the *stotras* and *śāstras*. The *stotras* involve intricate rules regarding the formation of the different standardized numbers of chanted units (*stotriyā*), composed of a group of two or three Ṛgvedic stanzas. These numerical arrangements are known as *stoma* ("liturgy"), which, like *stotra*, derives from the root *stu*.

Soma sacrifice. The *soma* sacrifice is the most important as well as the most intricate of the *śrauta* rituals. Its basic paradigm, the Agniṣṭoma, consists of an elaborate concatenation of sacrifices spanning five days and

involving a whole pantheon. The first day is marked by the consecratory bath (*dikṣā*) of the sacrificer, who remains a *dikṣita* (initiate) and as such subject to restrictions of diet and behavior until the concluding bath (*avabhṛtha*, "the carrying away," i.e., of ritual matter by means of the waters). Special libations and an *iṣṭi* are connected with the *dikṣā*. The next three days feature, in the morning and at midday, the ritual known as *Pravargya* and a ghee offering in the form of an *iṣṭi* called *upasad* ("sitting near" or "besieging"), after which these three days are called *upasad* days. The *Pravargya* ("to be removed," referring to the implements after the last performance) centers on a special clay pot (called *mahāvīra*, "great hero," or *gharma*, "heat"). Fresh milk is poured into this pot, which has been heated in the fire; of the milk boiled in this way a libation is made.

On the first *upasad* day the introductory (*prāyaṇīyā*) *iṣṭi* is performed. The *soma* stalks are bartered for the *soma* cow, and "King Soma" (in the form of the *soma* stalks) is given a ceremonial reception that takes the form of another *iṣṭi*. On the second *upasad* day the outline of the place of sacrifice (the *mahāvedi*) is traced and the earthen elevation for the offering fire is made. The third *upasad* day sees the construction of the other fireplaces and of the various sheds on the *mahāvedi*; fire and *soma* stalks are brought forward in an elaborate procession and a *paśubandha* is performed. The *soma* sacrifice proper, entwined with another animal sacrifice, falls on the next, the fifth day, known as the *sutyā*, or pressing day.

The *soma* stalks are pressed three times, in the morning, at midday, and in the afternoon, providing for three "services" or *savanas* ("pressings"). The pressing is done by four of the priests, who crush the stalks, spread on a bull's hide, with the pressing stones (*grāvan*). The *soma* juice is mixed with water and poured through a woolen filter into the wooden *soma* tub (*droṇakalaśa*). It is to this latter operation that the *pavamāna* hymns of the *Ṛgveda* refer. Apart from the *soma* pressing, the distinctive feature of the *sutyā* day is formed by the twelve rounds—five each during the morning and midday *savanas*, and two in the afternoon—of pouring the *soma* libation, drinking the *soma*, and conducting the liturgy of the variously arranged *stotra* chants and *śāstra* recitations. The afternoon service is followed by the final bath (*avabhṛtha*, "carrying away" of ritual matter to the waters), which forms the counterpart of the *dikṣā* bath. Next is performed the concluding (*udayanīyā*) *iṣṭi*, which corresponds to the introductory (*prāyaṇīyā*) *iṣṭi*. But this is not yet the end, for a last *paśubandha*—a cow for Mitra and Varuṇa—must still be conducted. Only then is the "breaking up" (*udavasānīyā*) *iṣṭi* performed, after which the sacrificer and the other participants re-

turn home (the *śrauta* sacrifice, and especially the *soma* sacrifice, take place outside the settled community, in the wilds).

This basic scheme allows for an unlimited but mostly unspectacular variation. Such variation concerns in the first place the numerical arrangement of the *stotras* and the melodies (*sāman*) to which they are sung. Second, as already mentioned, the number of *sutyā* days can be multiplied so as to form *ahīnas* and *sattras*. Third, special rites can be inserted, both regular sacrificial acts and rites that are, strictly speaking, external to the *śrauta* system. Prominent among the latter are consecratory baths (*abhiṣeka*, comparable to an elaborate *dīkṣā*), which have given rise to a special class of sacrifices called *sava* ("instigation"), as well as agonistic rites: chariot races, dice games, and verbal and other contests. Storytelling, singing (as different from the Sāmavedic chanting), and dancing are occasionally prescribed. Such rites are mostly inserted in the middle of the *sutyā* day, during the midday service. A well-known case is provided by the *mahāvratā* ("great vow"). Technically a *sutyā* day at the end of the yearlong *gavāmayana*, it offers an interesting array of popular, apparently ancient rites, including a chariot race, arrow shooting, and a tug-of-war between an *ārya* and a *śūdra* for a hide (believed to represent the sun), as well as the copulation of a "man from Magadha" (possibly meaning a musician) and a courtesan, and, of course, singing and dancing.

Similarly, the royal sacrifices, *Vājapeya*, *Rājasūya*, and *Aśvamedha* (horse sacrifice), are marked by such insertions. The *Vājapeya* ("booty" or "victory draft") follows the scheme of a one-day *soma* sacrifice which, however, combines the *soma* rites with those of the (popular) *surā* (grain liquor). Moreover, it features a race of seventeen chariots and a curious pole-climbing rite in which the sacrificer and his wife "ascend to heaven." The *Rājasūya* ("royal consecration") is essentially a series of five periodical *soma* sacrifices interconnected by *iṣṭi*-type sacrifices that stretch over two or three years. The important insertions are an elaborate *abhiṣeka* (water consecration), the enthronement, a game of dice, a chariot drive or race, and the recitation of the interesting legend of *Śunaḥṣepa* (a brahman boy bought by King *Hariścandra* as a substitute for his own son, whom he was bound to sacrifice to *Varuṇa*, the point of the story being how *Śunaḥṣepa* liberated himself by "seeing" and reciting stanzas in praise of *Varuṇa*). These rites are inserted in the second *soma* sacrifice, the *Abhiṣecanīya* (connected with the *abhiṣeka*).

The prestigious horse sacrifice (*Aśvamedha*) is a three-day *soma* sacrifice. The horse, accompanied by warriors, is left to roam about for a year on a tour of "world conquest" and is immolated, together with other

animals, on the second *sutyā* day (thus providing the animal sacrifice of the basic *soma* paradigm). The insertions concern first of all the treatment of the horse; the chief consort of the sacrificer has to go through a sham copulation with the immolated horse while exchanging prescribed obscene and enigmatic phrases with the other consorts. Further there is again a chariot race and a full-scale verbal contest (*Brahmodya*).

The *Puruṣamedha*, or human sacrifice, is modeled on the *Aśvamedha*. In this form it would seem to be no more than a theoretical possibility reflecting the *Ṛgvedic Puruṣa* hymn (*Ṛgveda* 10.90). It does, however, raise the question of human sacrifice in general, outside the strictly bounded realm of the *śrauta* ritual. Although the idea of such sacrifices appears to have been known to the ritualists, as witnessed by the *Śunaḥṣepa* legend, the actual practice would go against the grain of the *śrauta* ritual. The *Brāhmaṇas* repeatedly indicate that the sacrificer offers himself in sacrifice—like his mythical prototype *Prajāpati* or the *Ṛgvedic Puruṣa*—but the ritualistic solution is to "buy oneself free" (*niṣkrīṇīte*) by substitution. Or rather, the sacrificial ritual effectively cancels the ultimate violence of self-sacrifice. In a comparable way the royal sacrificer is mysteriously identified with the sacrificed "King *Soma*," a mystery that as such is not meant to be concretely realized but can only be hinted at. Nor is there a need for a human substitute. The *Puruṣamedha*, then, appears to be a theoretical construct that may reflect non-*śrauta* practices translated into the terms of the *śrauta* systems.

Separate mention should be made of the *Sautrāmaṇī*, named after *Indra Sutrāman* ("savior"). It is the sacrifice of *surā*, the grain liquor. In terms of the *śrauta* system it is an animal sacrifice in which three male animals are immolated for the *Aśvins* (who mythologically obtained the *surā* by force from *Namuci*), *Sarasvatī*, and *Indra*. The special feature is, however, the preparation, offering, and drinking of the *surā*. The way the animal sacrifice and the *surā* beverage are intertwined is patterned after the *soma* ritual (though without the *stotra-śāstra* liturgy). The *Sautrāmaṇī*, though also given as an independent sacrifice, is to follow a *soma* sacrifice in which an *abhiṣeka* has been inserted (a *sava*, as in the *Rājasūya*). Apparently it is meant to remedy any unspecified bad effect of such sacrifices, as it is also said to cure the sacrificer from excessive *soma* drinking. In this connection, the function of the *Aśvins* as healers is relevant. It should be observed, however, that the *surā* beverage is not favored by the ritualists, who concentrate on *soma* instead, and later, in the *dharma* texts, *surā* is even prohibited.

Place of sacrifice and fires. In contradistinction to the domestic (*gr̥hya*) ritual, the *śrauta* ritual requires a place of sacrifice separate from the home. Of the *soma*

sacrifice it is even said, "One undergoes the *dikṣā* at home; in the wilderness one performs the sacrifice." Although the *śrauta* ritual requires the presence of the sacrificer's wife, it appears originally to have been linked with life outside the settled community. Accordingly, the place of sacrifice is a temporary structure that is left when the sacrifice has been complete.

Just as the *śrauta* sacrifices are ordered by degrees of complexity, so also the place of sacrifice goes from simpler to more complex, enlarged forms. The basic form is that used for Agnihotra and *iṣṭi*. An oblong shed, oriented to the east, with openings to the four directions, shelters the three fire hearths. The round *gārhapatya* ("householder's") hearth, where the vegetal or dairy oblations are prepared, is on the west side, the square *āhavanīya* (offering hearth) is on the east side, and the half-moon-shaped *dakṣiṇāgni* ("southern fire"), where the food given to the priestly guests is cooked, is to the southeast of the *gārhapatya*. Between the *gārhapatya* and the *āhavanīya*, the *vedi*, the altar on which the oblations are placed, is arranged in the form of a trapezium. The upper layer of earth is taken off and the dug-out space is covered with grass. With its base to the west, its upper side to the east, and its sides bent inward, it is meant to suggest the form of a woman, broad-hipped and narrow-shouldered, holding the bounty of sacrifice (that is, the oblations placed on the *vedi*). To add to the *vedi*'s symbolism, the two shoulder points encompass the sides of the *āhavanīya*. Furthermore, there is a small mound (*utkara*) formed by the earth taken from the place of the *vedi* and used for rubbish disposal on the northern side. North of the *āhavanīya* a vessel with water is put down. The sacrificer has his seat south of the *āhavanīya*, as does the *brahman*, whose place is to the east of the *yajamāna*'s seat; the *hotṛ* is seated at the northwestern "hip" of the *vedi* and the *āguīdhra*, north of the *vedi*; the *adhvaryu*, who mostly moves around on the place of sacrifice, has no fixed place.

For the *paśubandha* (animal sacrifice) the place of sacrifice is enlarged by adding an open space, the "great *vedi*" (*mahāvedi*), equally traced out in the form of a trapezium and covered with grass, immediately east of the fire shed. On the east side of the *mahāvedi* the new ranged, and east of it the sacrificial pole (*yūpa*) is erected. The center of the action is shifted to the east: the fire is brought from the old *āhavanīya* hearth in the fire shed and the latter serves henceforth as the *gārhapatya*. Outside the *mahāvedi*, to the north of it, sits the *śamitra*, the shed where the *śamitr* ("appeaser") kills the victim (by suffocation) after it has been taken from the *yūpa*. The same special arrangement with fire shed and trapezoid *mahāvedi* is used for the *soma* sacrifice.

The *mahāvedi* is considerably larger, as various sheds are built on it. West of the new *āhavanīya* is the *haviṛdhāna* shed, where the two *soma* carts (one of which was used to bring up the store of *soma* stalks) are kept, as well as the *soma* tub (*droṇakalaśa*) and the other implements. On the western side, the north-south oriented *sadas* (seating hall) is erected. In the *sadas* six small fire hearths (*dhiṣṇīya*) are made, one for each of the six reciting *hotṛakas*; further on are the seats of the four chanters who perform the *stotra*. The drinking of the *soma*, after the libation in the fire, takes place in the southern part of the *sadas*. The entrances of the *sadas* are on the east and the west sides. When the participants enter the *sadas* in procession, they do so in a peculiar way "as if stalking a deer" (*prasarpaṇa*, "creeping," possibly the remnant of a hunting dance). Finally there are two more sheds, each with a small fire hearth, the *āgnīdhṛīya* (the *āgnīdhra*'s place) and the *mārjaliya* ("cleansing"), respectively on the north and south sides of the *mahāvedi*. Outside the *mahāvedi* is placed the *utkara*, as is the *cātvāla* (cesspit), from which the earth has been taken for the fire hearths.

Normally the hearths are made of earth mixed with other materials, such as gravel, earth from an anthill, mud from a dried-up pool, and so forth. In the case of the *soma* sacrifice it is also possible to enhance the prestige of the ceremony by using brick fire hearths. For the horse sacrifice this is obligatory. The focus of attention is the *āhavanīya*, which rests on the *mahāvedi*. The *āhavanīya* consists of a five-layered brick construction. This requires a full thousand bricks of various shapes and sizes so as to fit into the prescribed pattern—the form of a bird with spread-out wings representing Agni (the bricks, being fired, are intimately connected with Agni). At the same time the brick-built *āhavanīya* is equated with the immolated and reconstructed body of Prajāpati or of the cosmic man (Puruṣa). Various objects are buried in the ground beneath the brick construction, including the skulls of a man and of four animals (horse, bull, ram, he-goat) and a gold image of a man. This rather suggests a funerary tumulus (not unrelated to the Buddhist *stūpa*). The construction of the brick hearths (Agnicayana, "piling the fire") is a complicated ritual of fetching the clay in a ceremonial procession (which can be shown to derive from a *razzia* or war expedition), firing the bricks, and finally building the hearths, especially the bird-shaped *āhavanīya*. The Agnicayana takes place during the *upasad* days, so as to be ready for the animal sacrifice on the last *upasad* day. After the sacrifice the brick-built fireplaces, like the place of sacrifice itself, are abandoned, not to be used again. [See also Maṇḍala, article on Hindu Maṇḍalas.]

In this connection, mention should be made of the

special ritual for the first installation of the *śrauta* fires, which forms the starting point of the *śrauta* sacrificer's career. This ritual, called Agnyādhāna or Agnyādheya, concerns the transition of the domestic householder-sacrificer to the status of an *āhitāgni*, one who has set up the *śrauta* fires. Hence the first part of the ritual is still domestic in nature, namely the cooking of a rice dish (*odana*) on a fire taken from the domestic hearth. This rice dish is offered to four brahmins (the number four characterizing the smallest possible community, as it does in the case of the Buddhist monks' community). Over the dying embers the drilling sticks (the two *araṇīs*) are held and then given by the *adhvaryu* to the sacrificer. In the early morning of the next day the fire is drilled and put on the *gārhapatya* hearth. From the *gārhapatya* a burning piece of wood is taken and brought to the *āhavanīya* hearth, accompanied by a horse and a chariot wheel that is rolled in the same direction. This procedure for bringing over and setting up the *āhavanīya* fire, though easily interpreted as a solar charm, rather suggests a warlike expedition, especially when the accompanying *mantras* (referring to unnamed enemies) are taken into consideration. The *dakṣiṇāgni* is either drilled separately, is taken from elsewhere, or is taken from the remainder of the *odana*'s cooking fire.

The ritual involves the installation of two more fires: the *sabhya* ("of the assembly," *sabhā*) and the *āvasathya* ("of the residence," *āvasatha*, i.e., of the guests). Their installation involves a dice game for the portions of a cow, which may, however, be replaced by an *odana*. The total number of fires, then, is five, a number that is in later speculations connected with the five *prāṇas* (vital breaths). In the *śrauta* sacrifices these two additional fires are not used, but they may well represent an ancient tradition of communal sacrificial festivals—a tradition that may live on in the *Mahābhārata*'s description of the royal *sabhā* where the Rājasūya of the Pāṇḍava protagonists took place, as well as the fatal game of dice that set off the all-consuming war between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas.

The Agnyādhāna is then rounded off by the first Agnihotra and *iṣṭi*. The main point of the Agnyādhāna is, however, the bridging of the gap between the *grhya* (domestic) and the *śrauta* spheres. The two sorts of fire, domestic (called *aupāsada* or *āmātya*) and *śrauta*, are discontinuous. They are to be linked to each other by the person of the sacrificer, who after the completion of the sacrifice symbolically takes the fires into himself to reproduce them for the next sacrifice with the help of his *araṇīs*.

Domestic ritual. The domestic (*grhya*) ritual requires only the domestic fire (*aupāsada* or *āmātya*). It is, in principle, performed by the master of the house with the help of a house priest (*purohita*, lit., "put forward,"

apparently to ward off evil). The domestic sacrifices, including a domestic Agnihotra, cake and gruel offerings (*pākayajña*), and animal sacrifices, have undergone the influence of the *śrauta* system but are not directly derived from them. In many respects they may be nearer to the common source of both types of ritual, the material of this common source having been "recycled" and rigidly systematized in the *śrauta* ritual.

A prominent occasion for the animal sacrifice is the reception (*arghya*) of a prestigious guest to whom a cow is offered. The guest must then either order to kill and prepare the cow for a meal or release it. The burden for the killing falls on the guest, not on the host. This point is not without importance in connection with later notions about *ahimsā* (nonviolence) and the prohibition of cow slaughter. It may also explain the Buddha's refusal to have meat prepared for him.

The main part of the domestic ritual concerns the life cycle rituals. [See also Rites of Passage, article on Hindu Rites.] The first of these is marriage, at which time the domestic fire, derived from the fire lit for the occasion in the bride's home, is established in the new home. Further rituals are the furthering of the birth of male progeny (*Puṃsavana*), the birth rites (*Janmakarma*), first taking of solid food (*Annaprāśana*), first haircutting (*Cūḍākaraṇa*, "making the haircut," *cūḍā*).

Then follows the important initiation to the Veda (*Upanayana*, "leading up to" and acceptance of the boy by the teacher). This is said to be the "second birth" of the "twice born" *varṇas* of *brāhmaṇas*, *kṣatriyas*, and *vaiśyas*, which qualifies them for the use of Vedic *mantras* and for becoming, if they so wish, *śrauta* sacrificers. The period of pupilage or fosterage (*brahmacārin*, "walking in *brahman*") lasts, in theory at least, a varying number of years according to the *varṇa* of the pupil and is concluded by the *Samāvartana*, the "turning around" or return from the teacher. The former *brahmacārin* is now a *snātaka*, "one who has taken the bath" that ends his duties and restrictions as a pupil; the restrictions of the *brahmacārin* include chastity and are generally similar to those of the *dikṣita*. Originally, the *brahmacārin* would seem to have been a young warrior who commends himself as a vassal to a magnate or warlord rather than a pupil peacefully devoted to learning by heart the Veda. His "return" as a *snātaka* is preferably by chariot and thereby recalls the *dikṣita*, who, according to the older *Śrautasūtras*, also sets out on a chariot to the place of sacrifice. The term *samāvartana* seems, moreover, more appropriate to the warrior's art of turning around the horse-drawn chariot at high speed than to returning home. The long period of initiation to Vedic lore, then, appears to be largely a theoretical construct preserving the memory of an older situation rather than a generally applied rule. Accordingly, the

Upanayana is the decisive rite that gives access to the Veda, whether or not there is an extended period of pupilage and a *samāvartana* rite.

To the domestic ritual also belong the funerary rites. These concern the cremation of the body, the Piṭṛmedha ("ancestor sacrifice"), which, as the name indicates, is viewed as a (holocaust) sacrifice. The cremation fire is the household fire or, in the case of a *śrauta* sacrificer, his three sacrificial fires, which are placed around the pyre. The wife of the deceased lies down with the body of her husband on the pyre but is then ordered with a *mantra* to stand up again before the pyre is lit (the Veda apparently knows but rejects the burning of the widow). Then the parts of an immolated cow (or other female animal) are placed on corresponding parts of the body and burned with him. If the deceased was a *śrauta* sacrificer his sacrificial implements are also placed on his body. Afterward the ashes are gathered and at a later date interred under a tumulus (*loṣṭaciti*, "earth piling").

The period of mourning and impurity (*āśauca*) of the relatives at the death of a full-grown family member lasts for twelve days and is completed by a purificatory rite including a bath. The next stage is the incorporation of the deceased (who as a *preta*, or "one gone forth," is thought to roam about) into the ranks of the ancestors (*pitṛ*) to receive his part of the cult. The cult consists in the festive Śrāddha (from *śraddhā*, "faith"), a meal offered to brahmins. On this occasion three rice balls (*piṇḍas*) are put on the ground for the three immediate ancestors, represented by three brahmins who silently wait till the rice balls are cooled and they emit no steam. The ancestors are supposed to be fed by the steam of the hot rice balls, which are set on the ground and left there. Apart from the Śrāddha, which is very much a social occasion and is performed periodically as well as at particular auspicious occasions (such as the birth of a son), there are also daily offerings of water and food to the ancestors.

The *piṇḍa* offering to the ancestors has also found a place in the *śrauta* ritual, most notably on the preparatory day of the *iṣṭi*. Rice is cooked on the southern fire, offerings are made from it into the same fire, and three *piṇḍas* are placed on a special *vedi* near the fire. An enlarged version of this *piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña* is incorporated as the "great ancestor sacrifice" (Mahāpitṛyajña) in the Sākamedha, the third of the seasonal four-month sacrifices.

As already mentioned, the cult of the ancestors is characterized by the use of the left side and the left hand as well as by uneven numbers. [See also Domestic Observances, *article on Hindu Practices*.]

Interpretations of Vedic ritual. Vedic ritual is usually interpreted in the sense of magic, the Veda being the means to bring about well-being and to avoid pain, as

is stated by the fourteenth-century commentator Sāyaṇa. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the ritual texts dutifully declare which desire will be fulfilled by the performance of a particular sacrifice: health, wealth (especially in cattle), progeny, headmanship, or, less materialistically, (access to) heaven. More important, the ritual system as such is given in the Brāhmaṇas as a perfectly ordered mechanism to dominate and regulate the cosmic processes, both as regards the individual's life and the universe at large. In this context the gods are not free agents but, being themselves cosmic forces, they are compelled to do the sacrificer's bidding. The place of sacrifice is a microcosmos encompassing heaven and earth, and the ritual is identical with the cosmic order. When set in motion and correctly executed the ritual automatically controls the universe. Thus, for instance, it is said that the sun would not rise if the morning libation of the Agnihotra were not offered in the fire (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 2.3.1.5).

The Brāhmaṇas relate the ritual microcosmos to the macrocosmos and to the individual's life through the identification of ritual acts, objects, and implements with the elements of the macrocosmos and with parts of the sacrificer's body, the sacrificer being identified with Prajāpati, the mythical embodiment of sacrifice. Although these identifications, which form the central feature of the Brāhmaṇas, suggest a rich and multilayered network of symbolic relations, they are not so much multi-interpretable symbolic statements as one-to-one equations of ritual items with human and macrocosmic ones. They are, each one separately, isolated identificatory statements. As they occur in the Brāhmaṇas they make a singularly atomized impression. Taken together they are no more than a collection lacking consistency. Whereas Vedic hymnology capitalizes on the associative ramification of symbolic connections, such connections (*nidāna*, *bandhu*) are, in the Brāhmaṇas, reduced to single, unmistakable identifications. The connection on which the identification is based is often a number characterizing both items, which are then said to "coincide" (*sampad*) or to exhibit the same count (*samkhyāna*): for instance, three fires, three worlds; 360 *stotriyās*, 360 days in the year. Such equivalences are, of course, known to the Vedic hymns, but they are not directly made explicit as they are in the Brāhmaṇas. The explicit use of equivalence appears to have been viewed by the ritualists as an innovative technique—indeed their premier intellectual tool—to identify the ritual with the universe and so to reduce the universe to a strict, ritually controlled order.

The significance of identification and of the ritual system it underwrites is clearly set out in a ritualistic myth given in explanation of the *mahāvratā soma* sac-

rifice. Its theme is the sacrificial contest of Prajāpati and his antagonist Mr̥tyu (Death). In this contest Prajāpati's "weapons" are the *stotra*, the *śastra*, and the ritual act. The arsenal of Death consists of lute playing, singing, dancing, and improper acts. For many years the contest remains undecided. But the breakthrough comes when Prajāpati finally discovers ("sees") the (numerical) equivalence, namely, of his own "weapons" with those of Death. Once the equivalence is established, Prajāpati effortlessly subjugates Death's panoply to his own, cancels the rival sacrifice, and so defeats Mr̥tyu (*Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa* 2.69–70). It is to be noted that Prajāpati's "weapons" are elements of the *śrauta* system of ritual, such as *stotra*, *śastra*, and regular sacrificial acts. It is through their equivalences that Prajāpati overcomes and integrates the countervailing power of Death. The latter's rival sacrifice, incorporating singing, dancing, and improper acts, is clearly non-*śrauta*.

Such acts are indeed part of the *mahāvratā*, which features a number of contest rites and even copulation. What the ritualistic myth tells us, however, is that these rites are made harmless and are in fact superseded by Prajāpati's victory. Indeed, the term *mahāvratā* generally means no more than a *sutyā* day characterized by a particular arrangement of its *stotras* and forming part of a *sattra* made up of similarly differentiated *soma*-pressing days. In the same way other non-*śrauta* rituals and sacrifices were remodeled and fitted into the *śrauta* system. For instance, the guest reception offered to King Soma is made into a vegetal *iṣṭi*, not essentially different from any other *iṣṭi*. A more complicated example is provided by the so-called *vr̥tyastomas*, which are related to the *mahāvratā*. The *vr̥tya* (from *vr̥tā*, "gang, band," possibly derived from *vrata*, "vow") is a consecrated warrior in many ways related to the *dīkṣita*. The *Atharvaveda* in a long hymn celebrates the *vr̥tya* as a sacral cosmic figure. However, his disturbingly aggressive habits, which still shine clearly through the *Brāhmaṇas*, ill suit the perfect order of the ritual. The ritualists solved the problem they presented by remodeling the sacrifice of the *vr̥tyas* into the regular *soma* sacrifices of the *ahina* type.

The *Brāhmaṇa* myth of Prajāpati's and Mr̥tyu's sacrificial contest brings out the extent and depth of the reflection that went into the formulation of the ritual system. It also shows the aim of the ritualists' work. This is made clear by the story's conclusion: "Now there is no sacrificial contest (*samsava*) anymore; what was the other (rival) sacrifice, that came to nought; the sacrifice is only one; Prajāpati is the sacrifice." That is: conflict is canceled; the enemy, Death, has been subjected to the rule of ritual. Henceforth, the single sacrificer stands uncontested on his place of sacrifice where he establishes his own perfectly ordered universe gov-

erned by the ritual. The mythological battle of *devas* and *asuras* has been decided by the ritual system. Enemies, like the *asuras*, are still profusely mentioned in the *Brāhmaṇas*, but only as disembodied entities defeated in advance by the unfailing means of the ritual. The only remaining uncertainty is the ritual mistake, which, however, can be repaired by ritual means (*pr̥yāścitta*, "removal of concern").

The ritual system is an absolute, universal, and non-conflicting order: it is, in other words, transcendent. While the hymn's world of the gods imperceptibly shaded over the world of men, the suprahuman (*apauruṣeya*) *śruti* and its ritual is now separated by a gap from the mundane world of conflict. The *śrauta* sacrifice has been individualized and desocialized. It is the exclusive affair of the single sacrificer. He and his priests should form one single body; otherwise, they are separate individuals within a group of priests, all of whom are at once sacrificers in the *sattra*. The situation in which more than one sacrificer would exist in addition to the priests on the place of sacrifice is explicitly ruled out. This may explain the striking lack of public religious ceremonies. Although the royal *śrauta* sacrifices such as the *Rājasūya* (consecration of the king) contain ample indications of a former public festival, the royal sacrificer is a single sacrificer, no different from any other *soma* sacrificer. The public rites have been remodeled in accordance with the standard paradigms of the individualized ritual, or else they are dismembered as separate acts inserted into the standard *soma* paradigm. The *Rājasūya*, formally speaking, does not make a sacrificer a king, for it is stated that "a king who wants to attain heaven should perform the *Rājasūya*" (*Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* 18.8.1). That is: he is already a king who for his own reasons performs the sacrifice. This is recognized in the later *dharma* texts, which do not prescribe it as the required consecration. Similarly, the *Aśvamedha* sacrificer should already have the status of a world ruler (*Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* 10.1.1).

The *śrauta* ritual, as many details of its rules and the *Brāhmaṇa* explanations make clear, has its origin in the heroic and essentially tragic world of the warrior who like the gods must "move about on wheels" and contend for the goods of life with the *asura*-like settled magnate who "sits in his hall." He can only hope that he may survive and eventually quit the life of the warrior (*kṣatratvṛtti*) so as to become a settled householder and magnate himself. The warrior lives in the wilds (*araṇya*); hence the sacrificer's setting out from home. The settled community (*grāma*) on the other hand is the sphere of the magnate. The two spheres, *grāma* and *araṇya*, are clearly hostile to each other but equally complementary. The point of contact that held both together was their conflict contained by the sacrificial contest that

lived on in the hypertrophical imagination of the epic "sacrifice of battle" (*raṇayajña*). Both epics, the *Mahābhārata* as well as the *Rāmāyaṇa*, still show the alternation between the wandering warrior's life in the wilds and the sphere of settled rulership.

The *śrauta* ritual indicated a clear break with the cyclical alternation of *grāma* and *araṇya* and with the sacrificial contest as the joint holding the two together. By the elimination of conflict from the desocialized and individualized sacrifice the two spheres were definitively broken apart. This is illustrated by the *agnyādheya*, which physically separates the domestic fire from the *śrauta* fires. The resulting gap must then be bridged by the single sacrificer who alternates between his life in the world and the transcendent rule of the *śruti*. Put differently, he must fuse the two opposite rules of a substantial householder and a wandering warrior. Hence, only a householder can be an *āhitāgni*, that is, one who has set up the *śrauta* fires permanently and thereby submits himself to the absolute order of the *śruti*. This gives him access to transcendence, but by the same token this does not change his social position. Whether king or commoner, under the rule of ritual all sacrificers are equal. Sacrifice can only impoverish the *āhitāgni*, since he has to go on spending his wealth in sacrifices and *dakṣiṇās* without a chance to recoup through reciprocity at the sacrifices of others. Accordingly, there is no obligation for the qualified householder to set up the fires and to submit to the strict discipline of *śrauta* sacrifice. If he does, he must be sure of himself and his fortune, or, as the texts put it, he must have absolute faith (*śraddhā*). It is true that the *śrauta* sacrifice promises him the fulfillment of his wishes. In the sacrificial contest the possibility of fulfilling one's wishes was clear. The goods of life were concretely set out as the stakes and prizes of the contest. The *śrauta* ritual by contrast does not and cannot make clear how the desired results are to be brought about. It is *adr̥ṣṭārtha* (without visible object), that is, transcendent.

It is clear, then, that the *śrauta* ritual hinges on a paradox. It offers itself as an effective magical means for the gratification of the sacrificer's worldly desires. On the other hand it withdraws from all worldly concerns from which desocialization and individualization have cut it free. It is a closed system of rationalistically devised rules, complete in itself and regardless of the uses and abuses to which it may be put. In the last resort it rejects its own potential for magical and sacral meaning. Beyond magic and sacrality it stands by itself in sovereign transcendence.

Brahmanism. Though admittedly a vague term, *Brahmanism* is best defined in relation to Vedism. It does not primarily concern religious cults or institutions but rather propounds particular views, laid down in texts,

about man and the universe. These views are, however, equally fundamental to Hinduism in general. Their specificity resides in the claim to be related to or directly derived from the Veda. Brahmanism is, therefore, usually considered to be the Veda-oriented form of Hinduism, immediately following Vedism. However, since the textual tenets of Brahmanism are generally authoritative also in later Hinduism, a three-tiered succession of Vedism, Brahmanism, and Hinduism tends to be misleading. Moreover, like Vedism, Brahmanism is not likely to cover the whole of early Hindu religious belief and practice. Brahmanism is characterized by its acknowledgment of the Veda as the ultimate source of transcendent authority. Thereby it is clearly marked off from the "heterodox" sects or movements such as Buddhism, Jainism, Ajīvikas, and the materialist schools (Lokāyata, Cārvāka), which reject the authority of the Veda.

In Indian terms, the relationship between Vedism and Brahmanism is that of *śruti* ("hearing"), the transcendent "revelation" as against the worldly or human tradition, called *smṛti* ("remembrance"). The word *śruti* does not refer to the mode of receiving the revelations: the standard term is "seeing," not "hearing." *Śruti* thus refers to the transmission of the fixed and systematized texts. In this sense it is not essentially different from the *smṛti*, except for the unique care and efforts spent on its preservation and transmission. But the differentiation marked by the two terms is significant. Although the *smṛti* equally tends to give itself as revelation, namely by the godhead, the transcendent authority of the *śruti* does not derive from any godhead. It stands by itself without the intermediary of a divine agency. Its authority being ultimate, it can have no other, higher source. It therefore functions as the unassailable basis of the fluid and adaptive worldly *smṛti*. Another word for *smṛti* is *dharma*, universal law, which then is said to be derived from or to be already contained in the *śruti*. At any rate the *dharma* should not go counter to the *śruti*. In fact, however, the relationship is more complex and indeed problematic. [See also Dharma, article on Hindu Dharma.]

Texts. In addition to the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas, the texts to which Brahmanism, or, to use the Indian term, the *smṛti*, refers are the Upaniṣads, the Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras, the epics (*Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*), and the Purāṇas. The Upaniṣads can be chronologically distinguished by their form: the older prose Upaniṣads are extensions of the ritualist Brāhmaṇas. Most of the younger ones, often of sectarian origin and with a wide variety of contents, are metrical. The latter genre has been productive over a long period reaching far beyond the late Vedic texts, until at least the sixteenth century CE. The Upaniṣads belong to the

śruti, and this title is a claim to ultimate authority. In the same way, the set of 108 Upaniṣads (listed in the *Muktikā Upaniṣad*) are ascribed to the Vedic *sākhās* (schools), but it is significant that a large proportion is ascribed to the *Atharvaveda*, in which have been collected many other materials that do not fit into the *śrauta* system.

The Dharmasūtras are in the same condensed style as the Vedic *sūtras* and are equally affiliated with Vedic "schools" (*carāṇa*). This affiliation becomes looser with the metrical Dharmasāstras. [See Śāstra Literature.] No less important as a storehouse of mythology, religious notions, and *dharma* are the wide-ranging *Mahābhārata* (especially its twelfth book, the *Sāntiparvan*, and its sixth book, which contains the celebrated *Bhagavadgītā*) and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which has known a great number of reworkings. The encyclopedic Purāṇas ("ancient stories") deal, in principle, with five topics (*pañcalakṣaṇa*, "five characteristics"): creation, periodical re-creation, genealogy (of gods and holy men), the world periods (*yugas*), and the dynasties. But many other materials have been added at various unspecified times: *dharma* precepts, pilgrimage, hymns, and sectarian treatises. They have functioned over a long period as a storehouse receiving all manner of materials. The Purāṇas (the term occurs already in the *Atharvaveda*) continued the tradition of legends (*itihāsa*) that occasionally make an appearance in the *śrauta* ritual (e.g., the Śunahśepa story in the Rājasūya). *Chandogya-Upaniṣad* 3.4.1. mentions *itihāsa-purāṇa* as the "fifth Veda," which is later taken to comprise the epics as well. [For further discussion, see *Mahābhārata*; *Bhagavadgītā*; *Rāmāyaṇa*; and Purāṇas.]

Brahmanism, though primarily textual, does not have a fixed corpus of texts. Its tenets are recorded in a variety of texts stretching over a long and, in fact, indefinite period of time. Its impact has made itself felt in Hinduism, increasing and decreasing in various regions at different times. It would seem that rising regional dynasties have been instrumental in creating waves of "brahmanization." This will also have been responsible for the incorporation in the texts of materials of regional and sectarian origin. But such brahmanization equally carried the *śruti* with it, which as the source of ultimate authority was of singular importance for the ruler's legitimation.

Interiorization of the ritual. The crucial issue here is the relationship of Brahmanism with the Veda, that is, between *śruti* and *smṛti*. The *śruti* has exhausted itself in creating a closed system of ritual order. But the price that had to be paid for this achievement was the alienation from the worldly concerns of the mundane order. The *śruti* was—purposely—desocialized and individual-

ized. This created the problem of reconnecting it again with the mundane order. Propounding an absolute and seamless order, the *śruti* rejects conflict and places the rival beyond the pale. It therefore cannot speak to man's worldly concerns. Notwithstanding the proclaimed dependence of the *dharma* on the *śruti*, the latter's contents do not provide specific guidelines for the tensions and conflicts of social life.

Once it was desocialized and individualized there was only one way open to the *śruti*: interiorization. What then takes priority is no longer the faithful execution of the ritual but knowledge of the ritual and of the identifications on which it rests. This is already prefigured in the recurrent Brāhmaṇa phrase that a particular ritual act is effective only for him "who knows thus," that is, for him who knows the relevant identification. It is thus possible to perform the ritual in thought alone (*manasā*). The transcendent order of the ritual is realized internally in the way of discipline meditation.

An illustrative example is provided by the Agnihotra, offered in five breaths that are equated with the five sacrificial fires (*prāṇāgnihotra*). In mundane terms it is simply eating one's meal embellished with mouth rinsings and simple *mantras*. But the same pattern enables the brahman to participate in a festive meal to which he is invited (a Śrāddha, for instance). He is thus not just a guest obliged to his munificent host but an individual sacrificer who performs the sacrificial ritual independent of his host and the surrounding society. In other words, it enables the brahman to square the circle of living in society and of transcending it at the same time.

World renunciation. From the individualized sacrificer and his internalized sacrifice there runs a straight line leading to the extramundane world renouncer (*saṃnyāsin*), who gives up the three aims of mundane life—the socioreligious duties of the householder (*dharma*), the acquisition and management of wealth (*artha*), and sensual gratification (*kāma*)—to devote himself single-mindedly to a strict inner discipline that results in his liberation from earthly life (*mokṣa*). Though there is a wide variety of such inner disciplines they all share the ritualistic strictness of an internalized transcendent order. The renouncer's discipline obviously goes beyond, and in many if not most cases even rejects, Vedic ritualism. But it is the desocialization and individualization of Vedic ritual that has prepared the ground for the institution of *saṃnyāsa*, or renunciation. [See also *Saṃnyāsa*.]

In this connection two sets of ideas, both deriving from ritualistic thought, are fundamental. The first such notion is the Upaniṣadic identification of *ātman*, the individual "soul," with *brahman*. In the Vedic hymns

brahman is the multilayered and multi-interpretable, often paradoxical or enigmatic formulation. [See Brahman.] The unexpressed inner connection is the essence of the *brahman*. The Brāhmaṇa ritualists reduce the *brahman* to the explicit identification. In both cases, however, it is this fundamental force that makes the poetic statement as well as the rite effective. In this way the *brahman* came to be seen as the transcendent principle of universal order. The *saṃnyāsīn's* discipline, as already announced in the Upaniṣads, means the internal realization of the *brahman* as the principle of transcendent order through its identification with the *ātman*. It is the ultimate identification tying together and thereby canceling the dispersed identifications of the Brāhmaṇas in the single person of the renouncer, as was in fact already the case with the individualized *śrauta* sacrificer who was identified with Prajāpati or the *puruṣa*.

The other set of ideas, equally ritualistic in origin, is the concept of *karman*, or work. In the Brāhmaṇas *karman* is the sacrifice. Originally this sacrificial "work" had a social context. It rested on the competitive reciprocity of hosts and guests, the latter having to redeem themselves by acting in their turn as hosts. The individualization of the *śrauta* sacrifice, however, put an abrupt stop to all exchange and reciprocity. This meant that now the sacrificer had to exchange his *karman* with himself alone, one's *karman* inexorably bringing the next *karman* in its wake. This, combined with the not exclusively Indian notion of an unending alternation of birth, death, and rebirth (*saṃsāra*), created the urge to terminate the endless chain of ever-renewed *karman* that could no longer be transferred to the rival. The only way open was then to renounce all *karman*, all activity, by realizing internally the stasis of absolute order. Obviously, this signifies rejection of the external sacrifice as well. Even though it cancels Vedic ritualism, the ideal of terminating all *karman* can be seen as the consequence of ritualistic thought. [See also *Karman*, article on Hindu and Jain Concepts.]

The crucial importance of the institution of world renunciation in Brahmanism and in Hinduism in general is that it created two opposite and incompatible spheres: the transcendent sphere of the renouncer's individualistic rejection of society as against the social world and its requirements. At the same time, however, the renouncer paradoxically needs society, which must provide for his upkeep so as to enable him to preserve his discipline. On the other hand society wants to draw him into its web again as the holder of transcendent authority. That is: the *saṃnyāsīn* will gather a following. He is therefore especially known as the founder of a sect. The Indian sect typically has a *saṃnyāsīn* as

founder, who will be succeeded by one of his pupils to lead the worldly lay followers.

Varṇa and āśrama. The *dharma* or world order, being universal, must regulate both worldly and renunciatory life. This is the subject of *varṇāśramadharmā*, the order of caste (*varṇa*) and life stages (*āśrama*, "place of exertion," hence also dwelling place of ascetics). While caste orders worldly society, the life stages give a place to its opposite, renunciation. As regards caste, it is to be noted that the *smṛti* knows two terms, *jāti* (genus) and *varṇa* (shape, color). The two terms are to some extent interchangeable, but there is a marked difference. Although there are only four *varṇas*—*brāhmaṇas* (Eng., brahmins), *ksatriyas* (warriors), *vaiśyas* (producers), and *sūdras*, who serve the three "twice-born" *varṇas* (that is, those who have been initiated to the Vedic *mantras*)—the number of *jātis* is unlimited. The latter are said to have arisen in the first instance from mixed unions of the four *varṇas*. However, the scriptural order of the *varṇas* is based on their strict separation, that is, neither intermarriage nor commensality is allowed. As no society can exist on the basis of the single principle of separation, the *jātis* make society function. But this equally means that *jāti* society is based on a serious transgression, namely *varṇasaṃkara*, or "mixing of the *varṇas*." [See also *Varṇa and Jāti*.]

The principle of separation can be seen as deriving from the individualization of the Vedic sacrificer that resulted from the exclusion of conflict and competition. In fact, individualization did not stop at the boundary of the *varṇa*. The scriptural rules forbid marriages among even distant relatives, and so are directed against the formation of extended marriage networks. As in the case of the sacrificer's individualization, the separation of the *varṇa* aims at a static, conflictless order through the exclusion of social relations. The scriptural order of the separate *varṇas* is in the last resort incompatible with the reality of the associative and conflictive *jātis*.

Although it is not stressed in the texts, the religious principle of the *jāti* order appears to be the asymmetric interdependence of pure and impure, the impure being the "fallout" of life processes, including death and decay. Their hierarchy as well as their obvious complementarity led the French sociologist Louis Dumont to his impressive analysis of the Indian caste order as based on and encompassed by the religious principle of the pure-impure hierarchy. Although this analysis holds for the *jāti* order, it is undermined by the scriptural *varṇa*, which rejects relations of complementarity and interdependence in favor of separation and independence.

This problem is particularly clear in the case of the

brahman. As the ideal repository and upholder of the transcendent *śruti* the brahman should be immaculately pure. But this requirement threatens to make him dependent on the impure—such as the sweeper or the washerman—and such relations of dependence would fatally impair his purity. Purity, then, is the absence of relations. Strictly speaking he should not be a priest, because this would involve him in social relations of a particularly dangerous—because sacral—nature. Ideally, the brahman should stand outside of society, the highest brahman being the one who has no power or wealth or even provisions for the next day, and who performs the ritual in and for himself alone. Thus he bears the brunt of the incompatibility between *jāti* interdependence and *varṇa* separation. In other words, the ideal brahman should be a renouncer. The tension between *jāti* and *varṇa* is akin to the one between society and renunciation, and derives from the same source.

The scriptural theory of the four stages of life (*āśrama*) brings social and renunciatory life together in a single scheme. These four stages are those of the pupil memorizing the Veda (*brahmacārin*); the married householder (*gṛhastha*); the cenobitic forest dweller (*vānaprastha*), who still keeps up his domestic fire; and the individualized renouncer (*saṃnyāsīn*), who has interiorized the fire and consequently the ritual. Of these four it is only the *gṛhastha* who is fully a member of society and as such must perform the scriptural duties toward the Vedic seers by upholding the *śruti*, toward the ancestors by progeny, and toward the gods by sacrifice. Only after these duties, especially the continuation of the lineage, have been fulfilled, is the householder free to withdraw from the world and strive for final liberation (*mokṣa*). It would seem that the basic principle is again the opposition of social and renunciatory life. Originally, the two opposites were given their due in a pattern of the cyclical alternation of life in the established community, setting out into the wilderness and returning again. When this alternating cycle was broken, the opposite and now-incompatible phases were given their due by placing them in the linear succession of the four *āśramas*, spanning the individual's life. [See also Rites of Passage, article on Hindu Rites.]

Ahiṃsā, vegetarianism, and the cow. *Ahiṃsā* (non-violence) brings out the problematic character of the relationship between *śruti* and *smṛti*. It categorically forbids the killing of animals. Yet the *śruti* prescribes animal sacrifice and the consumption of the victim's meat, albeit only an insignificant part of it (the *iḍā*). Ludwig Alsdorf has distinguished three stages. First, there is no question of a general rule against meat consumption, but only against particular kinds of animals.

Next, meat-eating is forbidden, except in the isolated context of the animal sacrifice. The third and last stage brings the absolute prohibition of meat (together with intoxicating drinks, such as *surā*). This does not, however, explain the reason for the rise of *ahiṃsā*. Non-Hindu influences, such as Buddhism and Jainism, have often been assumed to be important factors. Alsdorf suggests the pre-Aryan Indian civilization as the source of the prohibition. Hanns-Peter Schmidt, however, has pointed out that the Vedic ritual itself evinces a strong aversion to the violence of immolation. Part of the ritual is concerned with undoing the harm of the sacrificial killing. In Schmidt's view it was the internalization of the ritual that brought about *ahiṃsā*. Internalization canceled the external acts needed to undo the evil of killing, which is still involved, even in the internal food sacrifice (of the *prāṇāgnihotra* type). From then on the only way open was the absolute prohibition of meat. [See also *Ahiṃsā*.]

The problem is further complicated by the sacrosanctity of the cow and the consequent prohibition—equally alien to the *śruti*—of cow's meat. Nevertheless, both *ahiṃsā* and the prohibition of cow's meat can be seen as deriving from the one *śrauta* ritual, though in a different way from the one proposed by Schmidt. Originally it may have been a matter of alternating phases, namely the phase of the trekking consecrated warrior (the *dīkṣitā*), who should preserve and, if possible, increase his cow herd (and consequently should not eat meat) as against the homecoming celebrated by a sacrificial festival that lifts the prohibition of meat-eating. The trekking phase of the warrior was decidedly violent, but vegetarian; the settled phase reversed the situation: meat-eating is allowed, even prescribed, but social relations should be marked by nonviolence. In this way vegetarianism and the cow taboo can be seen as different in origin and even opposite to each other, deriving from opposite phases. With the collapse of their cyclical alternation, both the trekking warrior and the peaceful householder had to be homogenized into the single householder-sacrificer. As such he was required not only to be both nonviolent and to abstain from the cow, but at the same time to perform the sacrifice, which, even if vegetal, still involved the killing (grinding and pressing being explicitly considered as "killing") of the sacrificial substances.

Although this may explain the origin of vegetarianism based on *ahiṃsā* and of the sacrosanctity of the cow, the fact remains that there is an unresolved conflict between the *śruti* and the *smṛti*. This conflict is formulated in terms of the two opposite spheres of social life and renunciation. Eating meat is the ongoing way of the

world (*pravṛtti*), but abstention (*nivṛtti*, the term for the cessation of worldly processes) brings ultimate spiritual rewards (*Mānava Dharmaśāstra* 5.56).

Cultic institutions. Separate from—but not wholly dissociated from—the impersonal cosmic principle there lies in the texts a profuse mythology. The Vedic ritual itself came to overshadow the gods as the central cosmic force and reduced them to mere names whose only place was in the *mantras*. Accordingly, the Veda is fundamentally aniconic. Brahmanism by contrast gives way to a rich stream of theistic beliefs and practices (which may never have been absent but were simply ignored by the Vedic scriptures). The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, considered as the gate to theistic Hinduism, places the “Lord” (*īśa* or *īśvara*) in the center. Being intimately connected with the impersonal *brahman* he is both transcendent and, in his relation to man, immanent. Such transcendent and immanent gods, who as such are to be distinguished from the great many divinities, are Śiva (Rudra), to whom the title *īśa* or *īśvara* primarily refers, and Viṣṇu. Together with the personified Brahmā (who hardly receives a cult) they are often represented iconographically as the *trimūrti*, the “triple body” or trinity.

Theism opened the way to cultic institutions, the first of which may be considered the temple, which developed from a simple open-air sanctuary to ever more elaborate complexes with a central cella and deity (*mūrti*) in an awe-inspiring towerlike and massive structure surrounded by smaller sanctuaries and niches for other gods, the whole of which was marked off by an outer wall. [See also Temple, article on Hindu Temples.] Second is the *pūjā* as the fundamental cult form, both in the household and more elaborately in the temple. Though the *pūjā* had existed before, its textual canonization by Brahmanism was a new development. Its basic pattern is the hospitable reception of an honored guest who is offered a bath, clothes, food, and a resting place. In the great temples of Śiva and Viṣṇu the *pūjā* is elaborated into a full and regal ceremony involving also the god’s consorts and divine retainers. In the sense of a hospitable reception offered to the guest the *pūjā* is closely related to the Vedic ritual, which, as Thieme has shown (see above), derives from the same pattern. This does not mean that the *pūjā* evolved out of the Vedic ritual. Rather, the two are different realizations of the same basic pattern. [See also Pūjā, article on Hindu Pūjā.]

The individualization achieved by Vedic ritualism is also a characteristic of Brahmanism. This is clearly noticeable in the *pūjā*. The domestic *pūjā*, like the Vedic *grhya* ritual, is strictly a family affair. The individual-

istic tendency is displayed most clearly in the temple. Although great crowds are usually present at the temple during particular festivals, they do not participate in the actual *pūjā*. To pay their obeisance and to obtain a view (*darśana*) of the deity, the devotees pass, one by one, before the opening of the cella. Like Vedism, Brahmanism is devoid of regular *sacra publica*. Public and royal festivals, such as the raising of the “Indra pole” (*Indradhvaja*, a sort of Maypole), are described in the epics and Purāṇas but are not in any way prescribed. In this respect it is significant that although the Śrāddha in honor of the ancestors can be celebrated as a social gathering with a large number of guests, the *dharma* texts explicitly prefer the patron to invite no more than three brahmans, or even only one (*Mānava Dharmaśāstra* 3.125, 126, 129). Whereas Hinduism involves large public festivals, Brahmanism holds on to the individualism of Vedism.

The most important cultic notion to pervade Indian religiosity as a whole is *bhakti* (“participation”), the single-minded loving devotion to the godhead (in this context usually known as the *bhagavat*, the “felicitous one”), in whose being the devotee (*bhakta*) strives to share. [See Bhakti.] Though at the opposite end from Vedic ritualism and Upaniṣadic thought, *bhakti* appears to be ancient. Its attitude of loving devotion is already commended in relatively early Upaniṣads (especially the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*). The term makes its first entry in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, which is generally known for its theistic stance. It is, however, in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (*Mahābhārata* 6.25–42) that *bhakti* is canonized as the third “way” (*mārga*), next to (Upaniṣadic) knowledge (*jñāna*, that is, “knowledge” of *brahman*) and ritualism (*karman*). There *bhakti* is connected with the concept of disinterested worldly action (*karmayoga*, “harnessing oneself to action”). This means that the devotee should perform all actions that his station in life requires of him (even if this means that the warrior Arjuna must kill his relatives), but without any self-interest. It is a renunciatory attitude: the devotee renounces the result, the “fruit” (*phala*) of his actions. This attitude is the answer to the gap that divides life in the world from world renunciation. But the fusion of worldly and renunciatory life can only be achieved at the price of a paradox: the devotee fully engages in worldly activity, including violent conflict, but does not engage himself.

The Bhagavat (or Bhagavān), the god of the *bhakta*, is most commonly a form of Viṣṇu. His connection with the cosmic pillar and his *avatāras* or “descents” in the world to restore the *dharma* and save mankind made him the ideal mediator between man and transcen-

dence. The devotee's *bhakti* is especially directed toward two of his forms of *avatāras*, namely Kṛṣṇa and Rāma. [See Kṛṣṇa and Rāma.] Kṛṣṇa is worshiped as the divine child or as the cowherd (*gopāla*), the beloved of the *gopīs*, the cowherd girls. As a charioteer and bard (*sūta*: the combination of the two functions is a standard one) he proclaims the *Bhagavadgītā* to the warrior Arjuna. His story is told in the tenth book of the *Bhāgavata Purāna*, a fundamental text for the *bhakti* cult and for religious art, especially miniatures. King Rāma is the protagonist of the epic *Rāmāyaṇa*. The basic text of Rāma devotionism is the Old Hindi *Rāmacaritamānasa* of Tulsidās (fifteenth century), one of the many reworkings of the classical epic. [See Tulsidās.]

Concentrating on the inner life and attitude of the devotee, *bhakti* as a cult form does not need specific installations or institutions. It does know, however, a "congregational," though informal, form of worship: the singing of devotional hymns (*bhajan*). Both in its individual interiorized and in its "congregational" forms *bhakti* easily associates itself with temples and with organized sects. In fact, *bhakti* imbues all Hindu religiosity. As such it translates the Western concept of religion better than the word *dharma*, which has come into use in this sense only in the last century, and misleadingly stresses religious law and doctrine.

In the marked absence of a well-defined clergy, the most important figure in Brahmanism, as well as in Hinduism in general, is the *guru*, the spiritual teacher and guide. Ideally, he is a world renouncer or at least is known for his lack of self-interest. Although not a priest in the sense of an officiant or dispenser of sacraments, he holds an all but absolute authority—even in matters not necessarily of a spiritual nature—in the personal affairs of his devotees. Even in the context of *bhakti*, which emphasizes the direct personal relationship of the devotee to his god, the *guru* is the indispensable mediator. He can be seen as the actual recipient of the cult. Indian religiosity would be able to dispense with its gods on the condition that there is a *guru*.

Itself not a cult or a sect, Brahmanism is receptive to a great variety of beliefs, practices, and institutions. Its characteristic as well as its specific contribution to Hinduism is the faithful acknowledgement of the authority of the *śruti*. More importantly, Brahmanism carries on the individualistic tradition of interiorization that resulted from Vedic thought.

Smārtas. Brahmanism is still represented to the present day by the Smārtas (adherents of the *smṛti*). Characteristically, they are not a sect in an institutional or doctrinal sense but a loose category of (South Indian) brahmins who uphold nonsectarian orthodoxy. Their cultic practices are primarily private in character and

reserve an important place for the Vedic *grhya* ritual. Smārtas will frequent particular temples, especially Śaiva ones, but they have no specific temples of their own. Worship takes place in the house, where a special room is kept for the *pūjā*. Smārta worship is especially concerned with the five gods Śiva, Viṣṇu, Durgā (consort of Śiva), Sūrya, and the elephant-headed Ganeśa, who are placed in the corners of a square with the preferred deity in the middle.

The Smārtas derive their tradition from Śaṅkara, the eighth-century founder of Advaita (monistic) Vedānta. [See the biography of Śaṅkara.] Accordingly, they recognize the head of the monastic establishment (*maṭha*) and center of the Śaṅkara tradition at Śṛṅgeri (in present-day Karnataka) as their spiritual leader. Another tradition connects the Smārtas with Kumārila, the eighth-century teacher of Mīmāṃsā (the interpretation of the Vedic ritual rules and so of the *dharma*). In this way the Smārta tradition claims to derive from both aspects of the *śruti*, the ritualistic and the Upaniṣadic (and thus the knowledge of *karman* and that of *brahman*, respectively), represented by the Vedānta tradition of Śaṅkara and the Mīmāṃsā tradition of ritualism. [See Vedānta; Mīmāṃsā; and Vaiṣṇavism, especially the article on Bhāgavatas.]

The Brahmanic Smārta tradition lacks the colorful drama and institutions often and not without justification associated with Hinduism. It does not propound an enchanted world of magic and numinous power. Instead, it focuses on the central problem of *karman* and *brahman* already prefigured in later Vedism. It therefore holds on to the *śruti* as the ultimate truth and source of *dharma*. Tolerant of sectarian doctrines and practices, which it tends to harmonize, the Smārta tradition is not a sharply outlined orthodoxy. But it does represent the central concerns of Hinduism, past and present.

[For discussion of Vedism and Brahmanism within a larger historical and cultural context, see Indian Religions and Hinduism. Many of the deities and technical terms in this article are the subjects of independent entries.]

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The basic paradigms of the vegetal, the animal, and the *soma* sacrifices have been described in Alfred Hillebrandt's *Das altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer in seiner einfachsten Form* (Jena, 1879); Julius Schwab's *Das altindische Thieropfer* (Erlangen, 1886); and Willem Caland and Victor Henry's *L'Agnis-toma: Description complète de la forme normale du sacrifice de Soma dans le culte védique*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1906–1907). The *sūtras* for the Agnihotra have been translated by Paul-Émile Dumont as *L'Agnihotra* (Baltimore, 1939) and the relevant Brāhmaṇa passages in H. W. Bodewitz's *The Daily Evening and Morning Offering according to the Brāhmaṇas* (Leiden, 1976). The Agnyādheya has been extensively studied by Herta Krick and Gerhard Oberhammer in *Das Ritual der Feuergründung (Agnyādheya)* (Vienna, 1982), giving full translations of the Brāhmaṇa portions. While Krick's interpretation is oriented toward Indo-European comparison, Timothy Moody's treatment in "The Agnyādheya" (Ph.D. diss., McMaster University, 1980) is more factual. The royal rituals of the horse sacrifice and the Rājasūya have been analyzed by Paul-Émile Dumont in *L'Āśvamedha* (Paris, 1927) and by me in *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration* (The Hague, 1957). The Agnicayana has been described from the texts and from Frits Staal's 1975 observations of the ritual as executed by Nambudiri brahmins in *Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar*, 2 vols., edited by Staal, with cassette recordings of chants and recitation (Berkeley, 1983).

The worldview of the Brāhmaṇas and especially their identification by modern scholars as the "prescientific" intellectual tool for ritual control of the universe have been dealt with by Sylvain Lévi in his *La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brāhmaṇas* (1898), 2d ed., with a preface by Louis Renou (Paris, 1966), and by Hermann Oldenberg in *Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇa-Texte* (Göttingen, 1919). Frits Staal has argued against the magico-cosmic meaning of ritual in general and, in particular, of Vedic ritual in "The Meaninglessness of Ritual," *Numen* 26 (June 1979): 2–23; Hans H. Penner's "Language, Ritual and Meaning," *Numen* 32 (July 1985): 1–16, emphasizes structure per se as against meaning. The continuity of the Vedic concept of sacrifice in Hinduism is the subject of Madeleine Biarreau and Charles Malamoud's *Le sacrifice dans l'Inde ancienne* (Paris, 1976). For the view of Vedic sacrificial ritual as originating in the conscious reform of a previous agonistic sacrifice, see my *The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society* (Chicago, 1985). A detailed bibliography is provided by Louis Renou's *Bibliographie védique* (Paris, 1931). It has been continued by R. N. Dandekar's *Vedic Bibliography*, vol. 1 (Bombay, 1946) and vols. 2–4 (Poona, 1961–1985).

Brahmanism. As a singular topic, Brahmanism has not been the subject of special monographs. Its definition fluctuates between a particular period of post-Vedic religious development (older Hinduism) and mainstream orthodoxy. Louis Renou and Jean Filliozat's *L'Inde classique: Manuel des études indiennes*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1947–1953), brings together the whole of the written records of Hinduism, including those in the regional lan-

guages, under the heading "Brahmanism" (vol. 1, chap. 6). Among older works may be mentioned Auguste Barth's *The Religions of India*, translated by J. Wood, 6th ed. (Delhi, 1969), chap. 2.

Central to Brahmanism is *dharma*. The best introduction is provided by Robert Lingat's *The Classical Law of India*, translated with additions by J. D. M. Derrett (Berkeley, 1973). P. V. Kane's *History of Dharmaśāstra*, 5 vols. in 7 (1930–1962; 2d ed., rev. & enl., Poona, 1968–1975) is an exhaustive survey of the topics that traditionally come under the heading of *dharma*. The institution of world renunciation has been analyzed from a sociological point of view by Louis Dumont in "World Renunciation in Indian Religions," *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 4 (April 1960): 53–62. The same author has dealt with caste and *varṇa* in his influential *Homo Hierarchicus: An Essay on the Caste System*, rev. ed., translated by Mark Sainsbury (Chicago, 1980). He argues that Indian caste society (and even Indian civilization as a whole) is encompassed and held together by the religious principle of hierarchy. This view, however, is debatable because of the textual concept of *varṇa*, which refers not so much to hierarchic encompassment as to strict separation, while the religious institution of renunciation tends to break up society.

The vexing matter of *ahimsā* is discussed in Ludwig Alsdorf's *Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien* (Wiesbaden, 1962) and in Hanns-Peter Schmidt's "The Origin of *Ahimsā*," in *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, edited by Jacques Robert (Paris, 1968), pp. 625–655. Like Schmidt, I argue for the ritualistic origin of *ahimsā* in "Nonviolence and Sacrifice," in *Indologica Taurinensia* (forthcoming).

As regards mythology, E. Washburn Hopkins's *Epic Mythology*, "Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde," no. 3.1.13 (Strassburg, 1915), gives a useful survey. *Classical Hindu Mythology: A Reader in the Sanskrit Purāṇas* (Philadelphia, 1978), edited and translated by Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen, offers an illustrative selection. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty's discussions of Puranic mythology, such as *The Origin of Evil in Hindu Mythology* (Berkeley, 1978), are of considerable interest.

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VEGETARIANISM. See Vegetation; see also *Ahimsā* and Greek Religion.

VEGETATION. The world's mythology and folklore offer one example after another of sacred plants, both wild and cultivated, as well as stories about the divine origins of plants, their magic or medicinal properties, and heroic quests to obtain them. These stories reflect a dual tendency, shared by our forebears in history and by our contemporaries in the so-called nonliterate societies: on the one hand there has been the tendency to "humanize" nature with sacred narratives whose pur-

pose is to explain how the world and humankind came to be the way they are; on the other hand analogies have been consistently drawn from the physical world—in this case, plants or perhaps the tools and techniques for cultivating them—to express those things about human living that can never be fully expressed, especially the perennial anxieties, fervent hopes, and nostalgias that expose immediately the limits of our situation in the world.

For example, the Warao Indians of the Orinoco Delta in South America have endowed basket making with a quite explicit religious meaning derived ultimately from their experience with a certain plant. Besides calabashes and makeshift containers put together by folding leaves or palm stipules, the Warao have only baskets for storage and carrying. The raw material used in the manufacture of baskets is the cortex of the stem of the *itiriti* plant, which grows in most parts of the Delta. The Warao say that they owe the existence of the plant to the selfless sacrifice of an ancestor in primordial times who, seeing that his people were in need of baskets to survive, transformed himself into the first *itiriti* plant and enjoined his descendants to employ his body in the manufacture of many useful things.

The plant itself has a number of magico-religious properties, the most important being its effect on the craftsman's hands. A Warao basket maker observes that over the course of his career his palms whiten as the pithy interior of the *itiriti* passes through his hands. He believes that eventually a small hole that only he can see will appear in each palm. Often, when the craftsman splits open an *itiriti* stem to get at the pith, he can see that a small snake has tunneled up from the roots of the plant, and he understands then by analogy what the Itiriti Spirit, conceived of as a snake, is accomplishing in his body. The spirit, he believes, is boring a tunnel from his chest, where the tutelary spirits reside, through both arms to the openings in his palms. When the craftsman finally observes the exit holes in his palms, he knows he has undergone a transformation from an ordinary man to a shamanic craftsman with the same healing powers and social status as the other religious specialists in his tribe.

At least two points deserve mention. First, when the Warao craftsman produces baskets, he complies with his divine ancestor's original intention that many useful things be made of his serpentine body. He validates the Spirit's sacrificial deed through the knowledge and practice of his craft, and by having the body of the god pass continually through his hands, he effectively reconstitutes the sacrality of the primordium. In other words, he "humanizes" nature, here not so much by narrating what took place in the beginning as by acting it out.

Second, thanks to the analogies he draws from the plant, the snake, and the physical effect of his contact with the sacred fiber, the basket maker possesses a language suitable for expressing—as well as a technique suitable for achieving—the transformation from ordinary status to that of shamanic craftsman, by means of which he gains a place for himself after death in the presence of the Creator Bird of Dawn. Such is the spiritual achievement to which he dedicates the better part of his life. Just as he masters his craft by understanding the nature of the material he employs and the secret of the manufacturing process, so, by analogy, does he achieve spiritual mastery over himself and the world. The Warao example thus illustrates an important function of religious symbols generally: by making it possible for the human situation to be translated into cosmological terms and vice versa, religious symbols reveal a fundamental oneness between human life and the structure of the world, drawing human beings out of their isolation in subjectivity and allowing them to take a stance vis à vis their own lives and the world that one could easily describe as a kind of transcendence.

Warao basket making describes only one of the ways that plants have entered and shaped religious life. The effectiveness of medicinal plants is often ascribed to the spirit or power they embody. For example, the Apinagé of South America believe that for each species of edible animal there is a corresponding wild plant that can be used should a person undergo the harm of ingesting the animal's soul.

Poisons have played extremely important roles in human affairs, especially in the hands of sorcerers and priest-physicians charged with knowing how to treat their toxic effects and who are themselves capable of using the poison against an enemy. The Canelos Quichua and the Jivaroan people in Ecuador say that forest demons reside in plants from which the poisonous curare is prepared, and it is they who kill the victim when a poisoned arrow penetrates the body.

The beer that the Chaco Indians brew from algarroba or other fruits is said to derive its intoxicating powers from the spirit present in the tree and especially in its fruits. As the beverage ferments, the indwelling spirit approaches the height of its powers. The mysterious process of fermentation can be hurried along by various ceremonies, the beating of drums, or the shaking of rattles.

Any plant that somehow bears or manifests the vital forces at work in the world, spontaneous growth and renewal, may host divine or magic powers; contact with such a plant will commonly transfer those powers for the benefit of one who understands its secret. An endless variety of agricultural rites and beliefs entail the rec-

ognition of a force manifested in the harvest. The Indo-chinese have a rice spirit that makes their crops grow and bear fruit. They treat the rice in flower as they would a pregnant woman, taking care to capture the spirit in a basket and store it carefully in the granary where rice is kept. When barley starts to germinate, the Ewe of West Africa ensure the fertility of the fields by consecrating a number of young girls to the python god. As the god's representatives, priests consummate a sacred marriage, and the girls or women thus consecrated engage in ritual prostitution for a period of time in the enclosure of the sanctuary. Elsewhere the presence of the sacred tree at wedding celebrations underscores the link between vegetation and human sexuality. In Java, when rice blossomed it was customary for the husband and wife to mate in the field.

These examples all express not only a certain solidarity between plants and human beings but also an ambiguous vulnerability or susceptibility to the spirits of plant life that causes humans to wish to coordinate their activities with the mysterious rhythms and circulating energies of vegetation.

It should also be clear that the sacrality of vegetation differs in marked ways from, for example, the sacred as it is revealed through the sky and its symbols. Whereas the latter communicates distance, overarching sovereignty, and "spirituality" in the sense of being elevated, not physical, and timeless, human relations with the plant world are characteristically close, physical, and time-bound (owing especially to the cyclic nature of plant life).

It is exceedingly difficult to account for the distance between ours and a properly religious world in which the spiritual powers of vegetation are a self-evident truth, at least not without demeaning the intelligence of religious people by repeating arguments akin to the Greek polemics against Egyptian religion or the Israelite polemics against the worship of idols. The Greek writer Plutarch, for example, insisted that the Egyptians worshiped plants, and they did so, he said, because of a verbal misapprehension. According to Plutarch, primitive peoples had once believed that the food plants they consumed were gifts from the gods, but later the habit of associating the gods' names with various plants caused their descendants to forget, that is, people of later times began to confuse the plant with the divinity who made it. Scarcely more helpful were writers in this century who, influenced by Darwin, simply reversed the order of Plutarch's hypothetical "devolution" of religion into superstition. Their claim was that theism came late not early in human history and that the nonliterate peoples we know, like the earliest peoples of whom we have record, are as yet incapable

of consistent, complex religious thought and self-understanding.

By contrast, a historian of religions would choose to say that even an expression such as "plant worship" is something of a misnomer, for it is usually not the plant itself that is worshiped but the sacred power present or embodied in the plant or symbolized by the plant; and that wherever the sacred is revealed, whether in vegetation, animal life, stones, or sky, it engages the whole human person—meaning his or her emotional, imaginative, and intellectual faculties taken together—in a vital relationship. We have no reason to assume that our earliest forebears were any less intelligent than we. In fact, if one compares the mythopoeic thought of non-literate or "primitive" peoples with modern scientific thought, the differences—and in this most scholars would now agree—turn out to be due to emotional attitude and intention rather than to any disparity of intellect.

In what follows I have tried to simplify things as much as possible by reducing the topic of vegetation to its two most important and revealing elements: the symbolism of the tree and the ideas and practices made possible by the discovery of agriculture. These two are in any case the models without which further discussion of vegetation as a religious phenomenon would prove difficult.

Tree Symbolism. In myth and ritual, trees serve as symbols of orientation, knowledge, and life. [See also Trees.]

The cosmic tree. One of the most widely disseminated motifs in mythology and religious iconography is that of the sacred tree as both *imago mundi* and *axis mundi*. There seems no way to reconstruct with certainty the process whereby the tree came to represent both the cosmos as a whole and its cardinal axis, joining the three domains (heaven, earth, and underworld) together and making communication among them possible.

We do know that the earliest sacred places were small-scale reproductions of the world *in toto* achieved by forming a landscape of stones, water, and trees. Australian totem centers were often located in a sacred group of trees and stones, and the tree-altar-stone pattern characterized sacred places throughout India and East Asia. Often a vertical post or pillar was added, presumably as a stylized tree meant to enhance the sacred power already present in this microcosmic landscape. Finally, it would seem that over the course of time the elements of such a landscape were reduced to the single most important element: the tree or sacred pillar.

One does not have to go far in the history of religions to find examples of the cosmic tree as an image of the world. The ancient Babylonians knew the black Kiskanu Tree that grows at Eridu, the center of the world.

It shines like lapis lazuli—meaning that it shines like the night sky—and spreads its branches out toward the cosmic ocean that surrounds and supports the world. The Upaniṣads speak of the universe as an inverted tree that buries its roots in the sky and spreads its branches over the whole earth. A Scandinavian creation story in the *Völuspá* tells of a cosmic tree called Yggdrasill with branches that reach to heaven and cover the whole world and roots that run under the earth and support it. At the base of the tree lies the cosmic serpent Niðhöggr, gnawing at its roots, and at the top is an eagle who battles daily with the serpent. Yggdrasill thus mirrors the precarious fate of the cosmos; though it may be bruised and shaken, the tree's ultimate renewal will mark the beginning of a new age and a new earth.

Furthermore, the cosmic tree also expresses one of the most profound nostalgias of religious people, namely, the desire to orient themselves to the center of the world. [See Center of the World.] Like other symbols for the center, the tree image calls attention to the vertical plane of the universe, and that means to the underworld as well. Chinese mythology tells of a miraculous tree that grows at the center of the universe and that unites the Nine Springs and the Nine Heavens. In other words, it marks the point at which the various cosmic levels intersect. The Abakan Tatars describe an iron mountain on which grows a birch tree with seven branches symbolizing the seven levels of heaven. A shaman is said to climb this tree in his ecstatic ascent. The Qur'ān refers in several places to the tree al-Zakkhūm, which has its roots in the lowest reaches of Hell. Its leaves are small, and its fruits bitter. It reverses the image of the heavenly Tuba Tree that is situated at the celestial Ka'bah directly above the earthly Ka'bah and linking the two.

The Tree of Knowledge. Perhaps partly because of its role in the cosmos as the cardinal axis and partly because of its connections with certain deities, the sacred tree sometimes has oracular functions, making it a tree of knowledge. Two of the roots of Yggdrasill reached to the sources of divine wisdom: one to the Spring of Mímir ("meditation" or "memory"), the other to the Fountain of Urðr ("fate"). Similarly, the Oak of Zeus at Dodona was said to have oracular powers on account of the extreme depth to which its roots extended. Whether in the creation story of the *Book of Genesis* the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge are in fact one tree or two has been open to dispute, but some have argued persuasively that only by eating first of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil could the hidden tree that conferred immortality be found.

The Tree of Life. When historians speak of the cosmic tree, they have in mind those meanings conveyed through the symbolism of the tree that refer specifically

to the structure and organization of the cosmos. But the tree, quite simply because of its other vegetative qualities—those related to its growth cycle and regenerative capacities—also conveys to religious people another set of ideas, expressive of the world's inexhaustible fertility. Most scholars, when they consider tree symbols with an eye to this latter array of meanings, refer to the tree of life as opposed to the cosmic tree; and it is true that in specific instances one or the other tends to be more fully expressed. Still, in some myths they are the same tree or at least are located near one another at the center of the world. For example, the second chapter of *Genesis* states that immediately after the Lord God breathed into Adam's nostrils, he

planted a garden in Eden, in the east; and there he put the man whom he had formed. And out of the ground the Lord God made to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food, and the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

(*Gn.* 2:8–10)

The garden stands, then, at the center of the world, and the tree at its center.

Numerous myths and iconographic motifs connect the tree of life (or its equivalent) with the Great Goddess and water and so confirm the basic meaning conveyed through the symbol: that is, a common concern for, and perhaps a deep anxiety over, life's changing cycles of fruitfulness and decay, youth and old age, poverty and abundance, sickness and health.

One of the most common themes associated with the tree of life describes how the cosmos itself and the various deities came into being. According to the Egyptian Pyramid Texts, Atum first emerged from a lotus drifting over the primordial watery abyss, but the rest of the gods originated from trees, including Hathor, the Great Mother, from the sycamore.

Excavations in the Indus Valley have unearthed artifacts picturing goddesses of the *yakṣiṇī* type beside a *Ficus religiosa* or plants emerging from a goddess's genital organs. In a pictorial theme found over a wide expanse of Africa and Asia, the goddess rises between two branches of a tree in the center of a circle.

The lotus, while not a tree, shares the same connection with the Great Goddess and cosmic fertility. The lotus is already a sacred flower in the Brāhmaṇas, where it represents the female generative organ, and that is its root meaning whether it becomes the female goddess, the cosmic lotus of Viṣṇu's navel and hence the womb of all creation, or the seat of divinity and spiritual power. It tells the story of being issuing forth pure and bright from the dark possibilities of watery chaos. [See Lotus.]

The legendary *soma* plant also has a connection with

water, for the *Rgveda* describes it both as a spring or stream and as a paradisiacal plant that promises life, fertility, and regeneration. [See Soma.] The *Book of Revelation* makes even clearer the cosmological and redemptive significance of water and the tree together:

Then he showed me the river of the water of life, bright as a crystal, flowing from the throne of God and of the lamb through the middle of the streets of the city; also, on either side of the river, the tree of life with its twelve kinds of fruit, yielding its fruit each month; and the leaves of the trees were for the healing of the nations. (Rv. 12:1–2)

One last theme deserves mention. Often a hero goes off in search of the tree of life (or some other divine plant for which the tree is a model) and the immortality it will bring. The quest usually entails great dangers and trials, for the tree is hidden (as the Tree of Life in the Garden of Eden may have been) or guarded by monsters, like the golden apples in the Garden of the Hesperides, and therefore difficult if not impossible to reach. [See Quest.] For example, in the Babylonian variant of the theme, Gilgamesh seeks a thorny herb of life which the sage Utanapishtim tells him is located at the bottom of the sea. A serpent thwarts his attempt and gains immortality for itself instead.

Similarly, Iranian tradition has an earthly tree of life with a heavenly counterpart. Like *soma*, earthly *haoma* is sometimes thought of as a plant and sometimes as a spring. [See Haoma.] The heavenly variety gives immortality to all who eat of it and grows where Ahura Mazda first planted it, among the thousands of other medicinal herbs at the source of the waters of Ardisura, on an island in the great sea Vourukasha. Angra Mainyu counters Ahura Mazda's creation with a creation of his own in the shape of a lizard that swims through the waters to attack the miraculous *haoma* tree.

The Discovery of Agriculture. The term *Neolithic Revolution*, its second component notwithstanding, denotes a period of gradual technological, economic, and religious innovation that took place roughly between 9000 and 7000 BCE, during which time many societies drifted away from their hunting and gathering economies toward an economy based on the domestication of animals and plants. Domestication resulted in the appearance of agriculture as a special form of animal and plant production and put human beings in the position of being, in a sense, creators of their food. [See also Agriculture.]

This new food-producing role brought with it many changes. For one thing, agriculture altered the division of labor, as women began to assume the better part of the responsibility for subsistence. It meant that early cultivators had to develop more accurate techniques for reckoning time, inasmuch as the complex activities in

which they were now engaged had to be planned months in advance and coordinated both with the yearly cycles and with the different cycles of plant life.

Agriculture also enriched the meaning of work. To be sure, farming is a profane skill, but for religious people it has always been first and foremost a ritual. It deals, for example, with the mysterious forces of growth somehow at work in the seed and furrow. It is carried out on the body of Mother Earth herself. It requires the planter to integrate his movements with beneficent and dangerous periods of time; and it forces him to contend with the spirits of vegetation, particularly those, like the tree and forest spirits, who grow angry when the land is cleared. It requires ceremonial action to assist the growth of crops and renew the earth's life-giving energies, and it draws the farmer into contact with the dead, for the earth is their abode.

Above all, agriculture provided for a vast store of analogies that made it possible for human beings to see the necessary links that joined plant life, women and sexuality, earth, moon, water, death, initiation, and resurrection in a single, integrated view of life. In effect it allowed the whole world to be apprehended as a living organism, governed by rhythmic cycles in which death and life belong necessarily to one another, and in which rebirth is all the more miraculous for the astonishing increase of new life that accompanies it. Long and intimate dealings with the soil and its seasons fostered the great hope that, like the seed hidden in the earth, the dead can hope to return to life in a new form: that is, death might be no more than a provisional change in the human mode of being. On the other hand, it also pointed to life's essential transitoriness and fragility.

Simply put, the discovery of agriculture created an opportunity for the human mind to grasp certain truths that had been much harder to grasp before. A primitive hunter, for example, would have understood the rhythm of the seasons perfectly well, but for agriculturalists that rhythm was the basis for a theoretical construction that gave meaning to life, and they experienced this rhythmic quality of life amplified many times over in patterns of activity and rest or of scarcity and plenty; in rituals meant to drive out the old season; in rites of sowing and harvest; and even in orgies, whose aim was to reproduce on the human level what was taking place in the ground and what did take place in the beginning—like seeds that lose their shape, disintegrate, and become something different, human beings lose their identities and try to enter a state of chaotic formlessness analogous to the formless state prior to the creation of the world.

Agriculture had certain tragic implications as well. As producers of their food, our ancestors learned to take

responsibility for the vegetable kingdom, for its perennality, even if that meant, as in the case of human sacrifice or cannibalism, the killing of their own kind so that life could be renewed. [See Human Sacrifice.] For example, an important Aztec festival dedicated to the maize goddess Chicomecoatl began every year just as the maize plant attained its full growth. A young female slave or captive, painted red and yellow to represent the colors of the plant, performed a ritual dance nightly for the duration of the festival. On the last night all the women in the community danced with her and chanted the deeds of Chicomecoatl. At daybreak, the men joined them in a solemn dance of death that brought the exhausted victim to the top of the pyramid of sacrifice. There the woman was finally offered up in a gruesome rite to the goddess. In this way the maize goddess, herself exhausted by her season's labors, was thought to be restored. For precisely the same reasons, the Khonds, a Dravidian tribe of Bengal, practiced human sacrifice at least until the middle of the nineteenth century, consecrating their victims to the earth goddess, Tari Pennu or Bera Pennu.

These examples give some hint of the essential, underlying ambivalence toward farming and vegetable life that has found expression in almost every myth we know concerning the origins of agriculture and the introduction of food plants. The German scholar Adolf E. Jensen divides these myths into two categories. One group of myths he attributes to cultivators of tuberous plants. Perhaps the most famous story comes from the Ceramese Islanders in Indonesia and tells how a young maiden, Hainuwele, was killed and buried on the ninth night of the Maro festival. Her father dug up the corpse, cut it in pieces, and buried the pieces around the sacred dancing ground. Then from the various parts of her body food plants sprang forth. This primordial murder radically changed the human condition. On the one hand, it was a creative death that permits the goddess to be continually present in the lives of her descendents, for every time one of them consumes a plant that sprang from her divine body, he or she partakes of the actual substance of the goddess. On the other hand, the story reveals how death and sexuality first entered the world and attributes all the religious and social institutions that are still in place to a criminal act at the beginning of time.

Myths belonging to Jensen's second category he attributes to cereal growers, and they recall a primordial theft of the food plant in question from heaven. The Dogon, for example, tell of a primordial blacksmith who stole cereal grains from the sky god and brought them back to earth hidden in his hammer. The Gula and Kulfa of the central Sudan say that a female spirit

pressed beeswax to the soles of her feet so that the grain that the sky god had spread out would adhere. The Chané in the western Gran Chaco believe that the fox god hid the small seeds of the algarroba fruit in a hollow tooth.

While there are differences between the two types of myths, a rigid distinction between them would be difficult to defend, partly because the origin of cereals is often attributed to a primordial murder as well; but it would also distract our attention from the variety of origin myths and the different themes they choose to emphasize. For example, one could construct another category of myths that tell of a benevolent woman who secretly provides food for human beings until she is discovered in the act of producing plants asexually from her body. According to one variant of the story, food plants (tubers and cereals both) came originally from the sweat or excreta of the goddess. Members of the tribe learn about the revolting source of their food and kill her; but following the advice she gives just before her death, they also bury the pieces of her dismembered body, whereupon food plants and other elements of culture (agricultural implements, for example) spring from the corpse.

All of the foregoing myths have one thing in common: they present the introduction of agriculture as an ambiguous event caused by a crime or mistake that took place during primordial times and fraught with difficult consequences. It would seem, in fact, that myths that account for the origins of agriculture also have things to say about the highly ambiguous achievement of civilization itself, and to the degree that *civilized* is the equivalent of *human*, they address those ambiguities that define our common lot.

We can see many of those ambiguities played out in the myth of Prometheus and in that story's profound effects on the religious life of the ancient Greeks. It is a story that recounts much more than just the origins of agriculture. As we have the myth from Hesiod, gods and men lived together and shared food in the primordial Golden Age. On the day he distributed the share from the first sacrificial animal, Prometheus established the diet that differentiates humans and the gods. Through Prometheus's deceit, humans received the edible portions, leaving the gods with only the bones and fat. [See also Greek Religion.] Zeus took his revenge by hiding fire so that it was impossible for humans to cook their meat. Prometheus then stole the seed of fire, hiding it in the hollow stalk of a fennel plant, and presented it as a gift to humankind. Feeling cheated, Zeus hid the seed of wheat, burying it in the earth, with the result that henceforth men would have to labor in the fields for food. At the same time, he created the first woman,

whom Hephaistos modeled out of clay, and thus sexuality entered the world too.

The myth of Prometheus was commemorated in ancient Greece as the passing of the Golden Age and the beginning of human time. For the Greeks, Prometheus had fulfilled the will of Zeus, who condemned human beings to the experience of hunger and death, but he had also provided the food needed to survive. Moreover, in leaving nothing for the gods except, significantly enough, the smells rising from the sacrifice, he validated the gods' supremacy, for in a sense the need to consume food is inversely proportional to the vital energy that makes gods different from humans in the first place.

The state sacrifice, though it was the cornerstone of Greek religion in the cities, reflected the ambivalence of the myth that served as its model or charter: on the one hand it brought gods and humans together to commemorate the start of human life as we know it, but it also underscored the distance separating people from the gods they worshiped. Various religious groups opposed the sacrifice out of a desire for a religious experience that was unlike that offered by official religion and that promised the devotee closer contact with the divine. Among the most important of these groups were the followers of Pythagoras, who embraced vegetarianism as a way of rejecting wholesale the type of communion with the gods that animal sacrifice had established as the norm. The foods they valued were cereals such as wheat and barley and plants such as mallow and asphodel, for in the Golden Age those plants—even though the first two are cultivated grains—were said to have sprung spontaneously from the earth and were the foods that men and gods had once eaten together. In other words, through rediscovering this lost commensality, the Pythagoreans hoped to achieve a return to the Golden Age. Like other forms of vegetarianism, the Pythagorean type is an example of ascetic practice that aims to purify and transform human life and, in a way, to undo the effects of civilization. Recalling the equivalence of the terms *civilized* and *human*, we might interpret Pythagorean vegetarianism as an example of one of the many different ways that people living in a world shaped by the ideas and values of agriculture have expressed their lives and imagined ways of transcending our all-too-human circumstances.

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VELES-VOLOS. The alternative names *Veles* and *Volos* denote different aspects of a deity of the pre-Christian Slavs, the god of death and of cattle. The bifurcation in meaning must have taken place in the East Slavic area, since *Volos* is confined to East Slavic; in South and West Slavic, the only known form is *Veles*. *Volos* very likely derives from the older **Velsu*. Some scholars (e.g., Michael Shapiro) consider Veles-Volos not as a composite figure but as distinct twin gods. It is true that the names *Veles* and *Volos* never occur together; however, both are associated with death and evil and with pastureland and cattle, as linguistic analysis suggests. Furthermore, the two aspects of Veles-Volos have close parallels in individual gods of other Indo-European pantheons, such as the Baltic Vels and Velinas, the Germanic Odin, the Indic Varuṇa, and the Iranian Ahura Mazda.

Downgraded to a demon in the Christian era, Veles is known in Czech demonology of the fourteenth to sixteenth century as well as in the toponymy of the South Slavic area. The medieval Czech phrase *k Velesu za more*, used to denote "beyond the sea (or water)," literally means "to Veles in the otherworld."

The character and function of Veles-Volos can, to some degree, be reconstructed by linguistic analysis, es-

pecially of names of parallel deities in other Indo-European pantheons. The Lithuanian name **Velinas* (now *Velnias*, "devil") and the Latvian name *Vels* or *Velis*, for example, identify a Baltic god of death and the underworld (recorded as a god at the end of the eighteenth century and later described as a devil, an adversary of Perkūnas, the Lithuanian god of thunder. The Lithuanian term *vėlė* or *velė* means "shade of the dead." Other related terms include the Latvian *Velu laiks* and Lithuanian *vėlinės* ("days of the dead"), the Tocharian *wāl* ("to die") and *walu* ("dead"), and a host of Germanic relatives: Old Icelandic *valr* ("dead on the field of battle") and *Valhöll* (abode of warriors fallen on the field of battle), Old English *wæl* ("corpse left on the battlefield"), and Old Norse *völlr* ("meadow," i.e., "the pastureland of the departed"), a term paralleled in meaning by the Hittite *wellu-* (**wel-nu*).

The Indo-European root **wel-* ("sight, insight, foresight") underlies the name of the Baltic deity Velinas or Velis, whose clairvoyance (by means of a single eye) is one of his chief attributes. The Old Russian *Velesov' vnuk* ("grandson of Veles") is an epithet for the musician and prophetic poet Boian of the epic *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, and the Old Russian word *v'lkhv'* means "sorcerer, magician, poet."

Another name for Veles is *Chernobog*, signifying the "black god" known to all Slavs. This name is still preserved in Slavic toponymy, and a curse invoking Chernobog is still used in the Ukraine: "May the black god kill you."

Volos is first mentioned in the Russian *Primary Chronicle* (c. 1111 CE), and in two tenth-century treaties with the Greeks, as *skot'i bog* ("god of cattle"). The etymology of the phrase reveals connections with theriomorphism, disease, and evil spirits. The Russian word *volos* ("hair, fur") also refers to a parasite that lodges under the skin of human beings and animals; the disease it causes is variously called *volos*, *volost'*, or *volosti*. The carrier of the disease, a worm, is also called *volosets* or *zmeevik*, from *zmei* ("serpent"). The related Russian words *volosen* and *volosatik* mean "evil spirit" or "devil." *Medved* ("fierce beast"), a term meaning "bear" in Russian dialect, is known from literary texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and is used as an epithet to describe the adversary of the prophet Elijah, the Christian successor of the Slavic thunder god, Perun.

The importance of Volos is indicated in various references to his idols. The eighteenth-century Russian collection *Skazanii o postroenii grada Iaroslavlia* (Legends about the Founding of Yaroslavl), first published in 1876, mentions a place where a statue of Volos once

stood: "The sounds of heavy breathing, of the psaltery, and of singing could often be heard from there, and dancing could be seen." Another text in the *Skazanii* mentions that cattle were driven around the idol of Volos. Of great interest also is a description of how a priest, Volkhv, first offered by fire a sacrificial victim, prophesied in the name of Volos, and was then himself sacrificed to the god, a parallel of the Germanic deity Odin's sacrifice to himself.

Etymologies, historical records, and comparative studies of Indo-European mythologies allow us to reconstruct the ancient Veles-Volos as a multifaceted god who was, on the one hand, a frightening god of death and, on the other, a divine seer: a god who ruled over the magic art and over cattle, who was a steadfast protector of peaceful settlements and a stern chastiser of their violation, and who was an adversary of the thunder god.

In the Christian era, Volos became identified with the saints Blasius (Vlasii) and Nicholas (Nikola), the patrons of flocks and crops. The connection between Volos and Blasius may be based on actual and functional similarity, considering that Blasius was "the guardian of the flocks" to the Byzantines. Northern Russian icons portray Vlasii seated on a horse or on a stone, surrounded by cows, sheep, and horses. In central and northern Russia, particularly in the Yaroslavl and Novgorod districts, the cult of Vlasii was popular up to the end of the nineteenth century. On 11 February, his name day, peasants did not work, thereby appealing to the god to preserve their village against epidemics of plague or cholera. Icons depicting Vlasii were placed in stables, and there was a custom of carrying the icon around each sheep, horse, and cow. In springtime, when the animals were driven out to pasture, special prayers were said: "Let the smooth lambs, the fat oxen go out playing, and let them come back hopping." The saying "Those who celebrate Saint Vlasii will always be in plenty" points to his ancient role as god of wealth.

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VENERABLE BEDE. See Bede.

VENERATION. See Worship and Cultic Life; see also Ancestors; Cult of Saints; Icons; Images, *article on Veneration of Images*; Relics; and Sainthood.

VENIAMINOV, INNOKENTII. See Innokentii Veniaminov.

VENUS is perhaps the most singular example from among the divinized abstractions that make up the Roman pantheon. The word *venus*, in its origin, is a neuter noun of the same kind as *genus* or *opus*. It is discernible in the derived verb *venerari* (**venes-ari*), which is confined to religious usage by all the authors of the republican period, especially Plautus. The Plautinian construction (not maintained by classic use) is of particular interest: *veneror . . . ut*, which can be translated, "I work a charm [upon such-and-such a divinity] in order to [obtain a result]." This notion of charm or seduction that defines the word *venus* is represented in Hittite (*wenzi*) and in the language of the Veneti (*wontar*). Yet the root *ven-* did not produce a divinity anywhere except in Latin. It is significant that, in the Oscan region (where is recorded a form that is probably borrowed from Latin), the homologue of the Latin *Venus* is *Herentas*, formed from another root: *her-*, "to will."

The neuter *venus* is part of a remarkable semantic series of the same kind as *genus/Genius/generare*, except that here the first term and not the second was divinized, passing from the neuter to the feminine: *Venus/venia/venerari* (sometimes *venerare* in Plautus). To the persuasive charm that the goddess embodies and that the *venerans* ("he who venerates") practices upon the gods, there corresponds the symmetric notion of *venia* in the sense of "grace" or "favor"—a notion that belongs to the technical vocabulary of the pontiffs (Servius, *Ad Aeneidem* 1.519).

This metamorphosis of a neuter noun into a goddess (in contrast, it is the shift from feminine to masculine that marks the divinization of Cupido) was very likely furthered by the encounter of this divinity with the Tro-

jan legend. This legend must have facilitated the relation drawn between a Venus embodying charm in its religious meaning and an Aphrodite personifying seduction in the profane sense. The notion of Aphrodite as mother of the Trojan hero Aeneas, the legendary founder of the Roman race, allowed for the application of a Greek legend to Roman benefit. The myth illustrated the rite. It made explicit in plain language the ritual employed by a Roman *venerans* when soliciting the *venia deum*, the favor of the gods. Set forth as their ancestor, the "pious" Aeneas conferred upon the Romans a privileged status in the eyes of the gods. Was it not therefore their lot as his descendants, the Aeneads, to be assured of obtaining the *pax veniaque deum* (the peace and grace of God), as frequently expressed by Livy, thanks to the mediation of Venus, the preferred daughter of Jupiter? This, to be sure, was on the condition that they fulfill the duties of *pietas* ("piety"). This explains the famous declarations whereby the Romans claimed the title of "the most religious people in the world" (Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.3.8, *De haruspicum responsis* 9.19).

The divinization of the notion of *venus* had to take place in a syncretic environment, Lavinium, which lent to Venus the smile of Aphrodite. According to tradition, Aeneas established at Lavinium, in Latium, a cult of Venus Frutis (the appellation *Frutis* is very likely connected etymologically to *Aphrodite*), and in the same place a federal temple of Venus, common to all Latins, was set up. Archaeology has uncovered at that site a *hērōion*, the shrine of a hero, which the discoverer identifies as the mausoleum of Aeneas mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.64.1–5).

The Trojan interpretation of Venus explains the development of her cult. Thanks to the enlightenment afforded by the association with the Trojan legend, the Romans were able to recognize their national Venus in the Aphrodite of Mount Eryx in Sicily at the time of the First Punic War and so erected a temple to her later on the Capitoline. On the basis of this same enlightenment, the goddess was associated with Jupiter in the cult of the Vinalia, the wine festival thought to have been instituted by Aeneas. The first temple erected in the goddess's honor had been dedicated to Venus Obsequens ("propitious Venus"). It had been vowed in 295 BCE by Q. Fabius Gurges while battle raged against the Samnites. Its dedication day, 19 August, coincided with the Vinalia Rustica. The Trojan interpretation was imposed in definitive and official fashion in the first century BCE: Julius Caesar offered a temple in the middle of the forum to Venus Genetrix as the grandmother of the Julian gens and the mother of the Aeneades. Lucretius's

literary expression *Aeneadam genetrix* thus was awarded liturgical consecration.

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VERIFICATION. See Logical Positivism.

VESTA. The name *Vesta*, with the archaic suffix *-ta*, is derived from the root **a₁eu*, "to burn." It encompasses two stems: stem 1, **a₁eu-s*, is found in the Greek *heuō* and the Latin *uro*, "I burn"; stem 2, **a₁u-es*, lies at the base of the Latin *Vesta* and most probably also of the Greek *Hestia*. The intrinsic bond between the goddess and fire, *ignis Vestae* ("fire of Vesta"; Paulus-Festus, ed. Lindsay, 1913, p. 94 L.), was understood perfectly by the ancients, even though they were sometimes tempted to propose fanciful etymologies; Festus, for example, in order to explain Vesta's round sanctuary identifies her with the round earth (*ibid.*, p. 320 L.). The semantic connection between the Latin goddess and the Greek goddess was conceded by Cicero (*De natura deorum* 2.67), who also believed that Vesta had been borrowed from the Greeks.

While the cult of Vesta was known throughout the Italic regions, evidence of it comes above all from Latium. Since it goes back to the origins of the Latin city, it escaped the anthropomorphism of the Etruscan and Greek environments. Proof of this is provided by Ovid, who writes that even in his time the *ignis Vestae* was sufficient by itself and had no cultic statue (*Fasti* 6.295–298). When Cicero (*De natura deorum* 3.80) tells of the episode in which the *pontifex maximus* Q. Mucius Scaevola was slain in 82 BCE in front of "the statue of Vesta" he must be referring to an honorific statue located in the vestibule or outside the sanctuary.

The goddess's round sanctuary (*rotunda aedes*; Paulus-Festus, *op. cit.*, p. 321 L.; Ovid, *Fasti* 6.267) was differentiated from a four-sided temple oriented to the

four cardinal points. This contrast, which the ancients attempted to explain by gratuitously comparing the goddess with the earth, becomes clear in the light of comparative studies. Vedic religion distinguished "the fire of the master of the house," which is "this world and, as such, is round," from "the fire of offerings," the smoke of which "carries men's gifts to the gods: this is oriented to the four cardinal points and is thus four-sided" (Dumézil, 1974, p. 320).

Vesta's influence was upon the altars and hearths (Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.67). The recommendation that Cato (*De agricultura* 143) made to the farmwife (*vilica*), who held the same place in the country as did the mistress of the house (*domina*) in the city, was appropriate for anyone responsible for the hearth: "Let the hearth be maintained by being swept each day before bedtime."

Since the goddess also watched, "as it were, over the hearth of the city" (Cicero, *De legibus* 2.29), she was designated *Vesta publica populi Romani Quiritium* in the official religion. At her service there were the six Vestal Virgins, whose principal task was to maintain the fire (ibid.). This fire was renewed once a year on 1 March, the beginning of the ancient year (Ovid, *Fasti* 3.135–144). "If by chance this fire were extinguished, the virgins would be flogged by the pontiff. Custom then obliged them to rub on a piece of 'fertile' wood [*felix materia*] until the fire thus produced could be carried by a Vestal in a bronze sieve to the sanctuary" (Paulus-Festus, op. cit., p. 94 L.). Although the Vestals were directed by a superior, the *virgo Vestalis maxima*, they were placed under the authority of the *pontifex maximus*. They had to maintain absolute chastity for the entire duration of their service (Ovid, *Fasti* 6.283ff.). The loss of virginity meant capital punishment: the guilty Vestal was buried alive in the Campus Sceleratus ("field of crime") near the Porta Collina.

The goddess's feast, the Vestalia, was held on 9 June. From 7 to 15 June her sanctuary was open exclusively to women, who were allowed to enter only with bare feet. On the last day it was cleaned. The end of this operation was noted in the calendars by the letters *Q(uando) ST(ercus) D(elatum) F(as)* (literally, "Once the dung is removed, the day is profane"). This archaic notion, which marks the specific moment at which the day changes from being a *dies nefastus* ("forbidden or holy day," a day on which no public business could be transacted) to being *fastus* ("profane"), recalls the time "when a pastoral society in camp had to clean away the *stercus* [dung] of its flocks from the site of its sacred fire" (Dumézil, 1974, p. 320).

The preparation of the various items needed for sac-

rifices was also entrusted to the Vestals. The *muries*, a brine produced by adding water to oven-cooked coarse salt (Festus, op. cit., p. 152 L.), and the *mola salsa*, baked wheat flour sprinkled with salt (ibid., p. 124 L.), which was spread over the heads of the victims (*immolare*) before they were slain, (*mactare*), were both prepared by the Vestals (Paulus-Festus, op. cit., p. 97 L.).

The sanctuary also contained some talismans that served as pledges of Rome's perpetuity. Among these was the Palladium, the statue of Pallas Athena, reputedly of Trojan origin (Servius, *Ad Aeneiden* 7.188; Livy, 27.27.14; Cicero, *Pro Scauro* 48). In contrast to the sacrificial ingredients preserved in the anterior part of the sanctuary (*penus exterior*), these "pledges of destiny" (*pignora fatalia*; Ovid, *Fasti* 6.445) were kept in the "holy of holies" (*penus interior*) that was closed off by a tapestry (Festus, op. cit., p. 296 L.) and accessible only to the Vestals. (This gave rise to the anecdote about the *pontifex maximus* L. Caecilius Metellus who, in 241 BCE, after having saved the Palladium from a fire, penetrated to the forbidden place and was struck blind; Pliny, *Natural History* 7.141, but cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 6.453.) Thus the symbolism of the "eternal fires" of Vesta (Ovid, *Fasti* 3.421) was reinforced by the presence of these "pledges of destiny."

The importance of Vesta is manifest in the liturgy. The goddess was invoked at the end of every prayer and sacrifice (Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.67), paralleling the opening invocation of Janus, who led the sequence of divinities. (This liturgical rule was the opposite of the Greek practice, which prescribed "beginning with Hestia." Curiously, in *Fasti* 6.303–304, Ovid applies the Greek practice to Vesta.) Esteem for the Vestals followed naturally. Once a year they appeared before the *rex sacrorum* ("king of sacrifices") and said to him, "Vigilasne rex? Vigila!" ("Are you watchful, king? Be watchful!"); Servius, *Ad Aeneidem* 10.228). In a solemn ceremony at the Capitol, the *pontifex maximus* officiated along with the chief Vestal (Horace, *Odes* 3.30.8). One can thus understand Cicero's statement (*Pro Fonteio* 48): "If the gods were to scorn the Vestal's prayers, it would be the end of our power."

In the third century BCE Vesta did not entirely escape a syncretism that made her the homologue of Hestia: during the *lectisternium* of 217 BCE she was coupled with Vulcan/Hephaistos. Thus the beneficial fire, kept inside the city, was uncustomarily associated with the harmful fire, relegated to outside the *pomerium*, the religious and ritual boundary of the city (Vitruvius, 1.7.1). Another innovation started with Augustus who, upon becoming *pontifex maximus* in 12 BCE, even while respecting the old sanctuary of the Forum, had a chapel of

Vesta (Aedicula Vestae) built on the Palatine near his palace and adorned it with a cultic statue (*Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin, 1863, vol. 1, no. 317).

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VESTMENTS. See Clothing.

VIA NEGATIVA is a technical term for the “negative way” of theology, which refuses to identify God with any human concept or knowledge, for God transcends all that can be known of him. Yet the term points to the possibility of union with God and the experience of his presence.

Via negativa was described by Dionysius the Areopagite (c. 500 CE) in his treatises *Divine Names* and *Mystical Theology*. He developed further the ideas of the fourth-century Cappadocian fathers, particularly that of Gregory of Nyssa, but the term derives originally from the writings of the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus (411–485). The writings of Dionysius were translated by John Scottus Eriugena (c. 810–880), who made *via negativa* the basis of his theology, arguing that it was more effective than the affirmative path. Since Eriugena the term *via negativa* has been used by other theologians of mystical contemplation, particularly by Meister Eckhart (1260–1327) and Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464).

The affirmative way of theology, *theologia kataphatika*, uses terms from our own experience to describe God and his qualities. According to the affirmative theology, every term that refers to the good and the beautiful in this world can be applied analogously to God: “God is good,” “God is love,” “God is light,” “God is truth.” Yet the seeker after God becomes aware that God transcends all qualities or attributes that are applied to the creator by his creatures. God is good, but he is beyond and above any concept of goodness that we may imagine. What we affirm about God does not express his reality. Whatever we may say of God we can also deny. We call him “Person,” but, at the same time,

we know that he transcends personal categories and empirical existence. God dwells in light that none can approach (1 *Tm.* 6:16), or he dwells in darkness, in which all names disappear. He transcends any concept that we apply to him. This *via negativa* is the basis of “negative theology” (*theologia apophatika*), which presents God as ineffable and a mystery.

Via negativa is both a way to the knowledge of God and a way of union with him. We know God by *via negativa* when we remove from the names, definitions, and statements we use about God all that he is not. God cannot be named or defined. Any name or definition imposes limits, and God is above (*hyper*) them. Incommensurable and incomprehensible, he cannot be reached by discursive reasoning; he is not an object of knowledge, for he is above knowledge. *Via negativa* means radical denial of all definitions, transcending reason while not abandoning it. The person following *via negativa* in order to know God engages in a paradoxical search. On the one hand, he or she denies that God can be identified with anything or that God can be expressed in words or concepts; on the other hand, the seeker must follow the road of *via negativa* to be united with the ultimate reality. The life of those who seek union with God is one of purification of soul and overcoming of passion as an approach to that union. God is nearer to us than we are to ourselves, yet he is inconceivable. Hence, those who experience union with God speak in negative rather than positive terms; God is even more incomprehensible than he is at the beginning of the religious quest. Worship, expressed in prayers and hymns, reflects *via negativa*. God, who transcends reason and thought, is honored in silence as well. Negative theology conveys the purest form of devotion and the experience of God’s ineffable presence.

Dionysius the Areopagite thought of God as a being beyond any conception or name, who “transcends all affirmation by being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and all negation by plenitude of his simple and absolute nature.” Any concept that can be applied to the world cannot be used regarding God. He is present in the world by providence, but not in his essence. Yet one can know God in the silence of unknowing. “Unknowing” (*agnosia*), a key word in the mystical theology of Dionysius, means much more than absence of knowledge. To know God by unknowing is to surrender one’s mind to him. God is not an object of knowledge. As the soul is saved by losing itself, so the mind knows God by unknowing. The mind is abandoned to be found and saved, for it is the mind itself that sees God at the last stage of union and contemplation. Knowledge of God is not simply knowledge but union with him. Still, God is incomprehensible even when this union is real-

ized. To attain “superessential darkness” is the goal of *via negativa*.

The Christian experience of God must be distinguished from that of Neoplatonic mysticism. Although Dionysius the Areopagite was a devoted disciple of Proclus, the last great Neoplatonist, his description of the experience of God is not Neoplatonic. The Neoplatonists would say that God is incomprehensible to the human soul, but that this is because of the soul’s union with the body. The “unbodying” of man leads to liberation: when the soul, free from the body or from finitude, returns to the One, it attains perfect unity with it. The One is no longer incomprehensible. The apophatic, negative way is transformed into a cataphatic, positive one. This Neoplatonic outlook is far from the views of Dionysius.

Via negativa was important in later Christian theology as well, as in the work of the fifteenth-century German Catholic cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, who built upon and developed some ideas of Dionysius and Eriugena. With his conception of “learned ignorance,” Nicholas teaches that God is ineffable, infinitely greater than anything that words or concepts can express, and that by the process of elimination and the use of negative propositions we come nearer to the truth about Him. Negative propositions are true, whereas affirmative ones are inadequate, Nicholas asserts. He emphasizes that negative theology “is so indispensable to affirmative theology that without it God would be adored, not as the Infinite but rather as a creature, which is idolatry.”

Via negativa is present in the Eastern religious traditions as well. The Hindu seeker’s goal is union with *brahman*, the ineffable, the nonconceptual. The Upaniṣads contain innumerable statements expressing or reflecting the unknowability and intangibility of ultimate reality. *Brahman* is “without beginning, without end, eternal, immutable, beyond nature, is the Self” (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*). The Self is to be described as *neti, neti* (“not this, not this”). The ignorant do not know *brahman*, for *brahman* remains hidden behind names and forms. To know *brahman* is to know what is beyond knowledge, and one who knows *brahman* becomes one with *brahman* (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*). Having attained the ultimate reality, the sage declares: “I am life” (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*). Meditation as practiced in Eastern religions reflects *via negativa* more strongly than is the case in modern Western religions.

The Tao of Taoism, like *brahman* of Hinduism, is ineffable, indescribable, indefinable, ungraspable. The Tao is actionless, yet active. The Tao, the way of all life, is “beyond the power of words to define.” The terms applied to the Tao are all relative, “none of them abso-

lute” (Bynner, 1944, p. 25). The Tao gives life to everything, yet it is humble and lowly: “Existence, by nothing bred, breeds everything” (Bynner, p. 27).

Via negativa also permeates the Buddhist view of *nirvāṇa*. According to the Theravāda teaching, *nirvāṇa* is a state into which one enters by achieving victory over craving through the extinction of desire. The nature of *nirvāṇa* is beyond ordinary human existence; no images or concepts derived from the world of human experience are adequate for describing or analyzing it. By using only negative terms, such as “unborn, not become, not made, uncompounded,” the Buddha pointed to the nature of *nirvāṇa*. Something very positive is conveyed in this negative way, for these negative terms overcome limitations that are implicit in positive terms.

The Mahāyāna conception of *nirvāṇa* dispenses with the image of entering *nirvāṇa* and emphasizes the state of ultimate perfection. The *arahant*, the saint of the Theravāda, is interested in “entering” *nirvāṇa*; but the *bodhisattva*, the saint of the Mahāyāna, when he reaches the state of perfection, does not “stay” in *nirvāṇa* but brings perfection back into *saṃsāra*, the flux of events in this world. How is this state of perfection of the *bodhisattva* described? Again, only a negative approach is found to be adequate. The experience of the *bodhisattva* does not fit ordinary experience. The perfection of the *bodhisattva* is experienced as “compassionate oneness with others,” when any thought of the self as separate is transcended, when *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* are known to be not two different realms of existence but one. To refuse to “enter” *nirvāṇa*, to remain in the world for the sake of others, is in fact to be in *nirvāṇa*. This state of perfection can be adequately expressed only in negative terms: “*nirvāṇa* is the annihilation of ego conception,” or, “*nirvāṇa* is bliss unspeakable,” that is, perfect, timeless bliss. A notion common to these and similar statements is that human language is inadequate for the expression of *nirvāṇa*, which is “the recognition of the oneness of existence.” The Buddha said, “I will teach you the truth and the path of the truth.” The truth is *nirvāṇa*, but *nirvāṇa*, the experienced eternal in Buddhism, is ineffable. *Brahman* is ineffable. Tao is ineffable. God is ineffable.

What positive theology affirms about God is not false, but it is inadequate. Negative theology tells us that God excels in everything. Yet the apophatic way alone, without the cataphatic, may lead anywhere. Cataphatic theology, without an apophatic dimension, may build a system of concepts without an underlying experience of God. The absolute terms of negation that are common to the mystical traditions (*emptiness, void, darkness, nothingness*) are paradoxically positive in content. They are the product of the experience of the divine, the nu-

minous. They are symbols that point to God, who is the "Wholly Other," with whom nothing in this world can be compared. *Via negativa* indicates and expresses his unconditional existence.

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VESELIN KESICH

VICO, GIOVANNI BATTISTA (1668–1744), Neapolitan philosopher of history and culture. Vico was born and lived his life in Naples except for nine years (1686–1695) spent as tutor to the Rocca family at Valtolla. He received a degree in law from the University of Naples (Salerno) in 1694. Vico was professor of Latin Eloquence, that is, rhetoric, at the University of Naples from 1699 to his retirement in 1741. Because of the low salary of his position, Vico provided for his family by working as a private tutor and by writing on commission.

As part of the duties of his professorship, Vico presented a series of inaugural orations marking the beginning of each university year. The last of these, *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* (On the Study Methods of Our Time), published in 1709, contains the first statement of Vico's original philosophical position. This was followed by an attack on Descartes, *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia* (On the Ancient Wisdom of the

Italians) in 1710, in which Vico states his famous principle of *verum et factum convertuntur*—the convertibility of the true and the made. Between 1720 and 1722 Vico wrote two works and a series of annotations that comprise a large study known as *Il diritto universale* (Universal Law), in one chapter of which Vico gives a first sketch of his concept of a new science of nations. The first version of his major work, now known as the *Scienza nuova prima* (First New Science), was published in 1725. The two parts of his autobiography were completed between 1725 and 1728. The definitive version of his major work, entitled *Principi di scienza nuova di Giambattista Vico d'intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni* (Principles of New Science of Giambattista Vico Concerning the Common Nature of Nations), was published in 1730 and revised in the year of his death. This version has come to be known as Vico's *Scienza nuova seconda* or simply as Vico's *New Science*. Vico's work was very little known in his time. It was revived in the nineteenth century by Jules Michelet and early in the twentieth century by Benedetto Croce and Fausto Nicolini. More recently Vico's thought has been given a further revival in works by a number of European and Anglo-American scholars.

In the *New Science* Vico claims that religion, marriage, and burial are the three "principles" (*principi*) at the basis of all human society. Vico intends to emphasize the genetic and etymological meaning of the word *principi* as "beginnings." The institutions of religion, marriage, and burial are the necessary and sufficient conditions required for a minimal human society, one that can generate and transmit culture. Vico's emphasis is on religion, the first term in this list of principles or institutions; through its beginning, marriage and burial begin.

In Vico's view, religion arises from a primordial fear of the actions of a divine being and from the attempt to establish a relationship to this being through auspices. The primordial phenomenon through which the divine appears is thunder and man's fear of it. In Vico's account, the first humans, who have grown to gigantic size and who are living in the great forests of the earth since the biblical flood, produce the first act of human speech by calling the thunderous sky Jove. Every people, or nation, has its Jove. Human speech and the culture of any nation begin at the sudden transformation of the physical states of the thunderous sky and man's fear of it into a spiritual meaning, the presence of a god. Jove is the first name forged in human consciousness. This is done not through an act of reasoning but through an act of imagination, or what Vico calls *fantasia*. *Fantasia* is not the passive formation of images from sensation, but an active power to form or make

something true in human experience. Vico calls Jove an "imaginative universal" (*universale fantastico*), which is the term he uses for the form of thought that characterizes the primordial religious-mythic or poetic mind.

In Vico's view, the nations of humanity begin at various times and places independent of each other, but all share a common nature. They all have structurally similar beginnings in the Jove experience and they all undergo the same course (*corso*) of historical development that passes through three ages, that of gods, heroes, and men. Within a *corso* various organized religions evolve from the impetus of the original religious mentality and life. The world of nations is a panorama of *corsi* and *ricorsi*. That all nations have a common nature—that they begin in an act of naming the divine and develop according to the pattern of three ages—is in Vico's view evidence of providence in history.

Providence, for Vico, is evident in this three-stage life of any nation. In the age of gods men see all of nature and social institutions in terms of the presence of gods. Social order exists through fathers who found cities and take auspices of the divine. In the age of heroes *fantasia* is directed to form not gods but certain human figures, such as Achilles, as imaginative universals. In the age of men all life and thought becomes secularized: abstract thought rather than *fantasia* dominates; natural piety fades; the forms of social life become dissolute. When this occurs a given *corso* comes to an end and a civilization falls. At this point God reestablishes the providential structure of history by a *ricorso* in which a new beginning is made by a return of the survivors to the original severe conditions of life and primordial religious experience.

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DONALD PHILLIP VERENE

VICTORINES. See Hugh of Saint-Victor.

VIERKANDT, ALFRED (1867–1953), German sociologist, whose early work focused on anthropology and social psychology. Born in Hamburg, Vierkandt studied at the University of Leipzig, where he was awarded the Ph.D. degree in 1892. He began teaching at the University of Berlin in 1900. In 1921 he was given the newly founded chair in sociology at Berlin, and he was awarded an honorary doctorate in 1932 by the University of Würzburg. Forbidden by the Nazis to lecture and give examinations, he was forced into retirement in 1934. After 1945 he took over the leadership of the Kant Society, and in 1946 he resumed teaching at the University of Berlin. He died in Berlin in 1953.

The influence of his teacher at Leipzig, Wilhelm Wundt, can be seen in Vierkandt's first major anthropological work, *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker* (1896), in which his differentiation between "primitive" and "civilized" peoples reflects Wundt's distinction between association and apperception. In his lectures Vierkandt dealt with the psychology, religion, art, and social conditions of "primitive people" with special attention to ethics and the philosophy of religion. Vierkandt focused upon the impact of a culture upon the individual

through language, myth, and custom in his idea of the determining influence of the group on the individual's character development. In *Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel* (1908) Vierkandt not only presented a theory of cultural continuity and cultural change but also attacked the mechanical theories of diffusionism then prevalent.

After World War I Vierkandt shifted his focus and sought to outline the contents and methodology for the discipline of sociology. In *Gesellschaftslehre: Hauptprobleme der philosophischen Soziologie* (1923; 2d ed., 1928), he described sociology as the study of the "ultimate facts" of society, which, for him, were manifested in the specific properties of the group and in the characteristics of group life, the group being the carrier of interaction between its members. He further proposed a phenomenological method for this study. Vierkandt also acted as editor for a comprehensive dictionary, the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* (1931; reprint, 1959), to which most of the leading German sociologists of his day contributed. His study *Familie, Volk, und Staat in ihren gesellschaftlichen Lebensvorgängen* (1936) received little attention during the Nazi period but was republished in 1949 under the title *Kleine Gesellschaftslehre*.

Vierkandt's focus on the group as having an identity in itself instead of just being the sum of its individual members suggested a new approach to understanding the phenomena of religious life. Although his attempt to introduce phenomenology as a methodology for sociology has been rejected as not acceptable if sociology is to be a science, his view of religion as a distinctive phenomenon to be studied has been taken up and developed by historians of religions. Vierkandt understood culture as a historical phenomenon, something that gradually develops with its own inherent dynamism, and thus he advocated a nonreductive approach that does not seek to explain the phenomenon by some outside "key" but rather looks at the inner essence of the thing itself. This has been the basis for most approaches to the study of religions.

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WALLACE B. CLIFT

VIETNAMESE RELIGION. Like the whole complex of Vietnamese culture, Vietnamese religion has long been presented as a pure copy of the Chinese model. Trained for the most part in the discipline of Chinese studies and associating mostly with the literati class and the townspeople, scholars have been constantly confronted by their interlocutors with the Chinese ideal, notably in the domains of moral and aesthetic norms, and they have gauged the value of a rite or particular behavior according to its degree of conformity with the rules laid down by the Han Chinese texts.

Historically, the Red River delta, cradle of Vietnamese civilization, was occupied by the Han for more than a thousand years. Moreover, the Middle Kingdom, as highly centralizing as the Roman empire, had an especially effective organization wherein each parcel of conquered territory was put under absolute control and strict surveillance militarily, administratively, and ideologically. Chinese writing served as a unifying and assimilating instrument of the first order. Nonetheless, Dongsonian civilization, which flourished in this region before its destruction by the Han invasions, must have possessed a certain vigor, for despite the very long coercive occupation that followed it, the Vietnamese preserved their language and a part of their culture, finally succeeding in the tenth century of the common era after numerous revolts in liberating themselves from their deeply implanted Chinese occupants. Paradoxically, the consolidation for independence reinforced the prestige of the Chinese model among the literati. Their influence in this regard even resulted in the promulgation in 1812 by Emperor Gia-long, who had recently reunified the country, of a new code that was nothing more than a translation of a Manchu dynasty treaty, despite the fact that for more than three centuries, the Vietnamese had a set of original laws known as the Lê Code.

Yet, in a population that was more than 90 percent rural, ideology directly concerned only a relatively small number of people, those who wielded power and prestige. The ideals and beliefs they held touched but superficially the great masses, who remained bound to a set of rules transmitted orally and put to the test through daily observance. That the Vietnamese spoke a language belonging to a different family (Austroasiatic rather than Sino-Tibetan) was a considerable asset for

the preservation of these rules. In addition, the development in the tenth century of the *chu nôm*, a demotic system of writing based on Chinese graphs, allowed for a closer contact between this popular culture and the literati class. This open attitude toward national beliefs and practices was reinforced with the extension of the *quôc ngu*, the romanized system of writing introduced in the seventeenth century by Alexandre de Rhodes. This system acquired its full acceptance, however, only in the nineteenth century and did not become universal until the twentieth century.

In the religious sphere, this situation created a coexistence, on the one hand, of a Chinese model followed strictly by the most erudite men or those instructed in the faith, and on the other, of popular cults observed by the great mass of people. Between the two there evolved a phenomenon of osmosis leading to a syncretism with multiple nuances.

The expansion southward along the entire length of the Vietnamese territory added further to this diversification of the religion by the absorption, on the small coastal plains, of the Chams, whose religious affiliation was divided between Brahmanism and Islam, and on the Mekong delta, of the Khmer adherents to Theravāda Buddhism. These three religions, with that of the Proto-Indo-Chinese on which they were grafted, effected a syncretism probably more intimately overlapping than was the Triple Religion (Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism) of the Vietnamese with these same Proto-Indo-Chinese foundations. Even at its source, at the edge of the Red River delta, mention must be made, albeit in passing, of the Tai influence on the beliefs and practices not only of the Muong, who speak archaic Vietnamese, but also on those of the Vietnamese, properly speaking, who inhabit the villages of the foothills.

Finally, it is still too early to evaluate the consequences of the Marxist-Leninist inspired governmental campaigns against all forms of religion. The twenty-year separation between the northern and southern halves of the country has introduced further variations in the religions. A great number of Catholics from the North took refuge in the South in 1954, where their political weight allowed them to extend their influence. It should not be forgotten that outside of the Philippines, where the majority of the population is Catholic, Vietnam has the strongest Christian minority in Asia.

Whatever the case may be, the picture I will give of Vietnamese religion is that of its situation before the entry of the country into its Marxist period. Furthermore, I will not emphasize the Chinese model, already treated elsewhere, but will focus only on those aspects that touch directly on Vietnamese religion.

On the level of the individual, a fundamental concept

is that of "souls" or "vital principles." This concept governs as many aspects of daily conduct as it does basic rituals such as funeral rites or ancestor worship. In this domain, Chinese influence predominates. One encounters the scholarly Han tradition of the three souls and the seven corporeal souls. They too carry Sino-Vietnamese names: *hôn* (Chin., *hun*) and *phách* (Chin., *p'ò*). However, if one follows Leopold Cadière, to whom we owe the most profound study on the subject, notable variations appear between the system of the literati and the vocabulary and conceptions of the common people. For example, with regard to *phách*, the "inferior vital principles," its Vietnamese equivalent, *voc*, remained confined to the physical aspect of the "body" (especially the external appearance of the body). Moreover, the most current term used is in fact Vietnamese: *via*, which is in the same semantic range as *phách* (from "form of the body" to "animal soul"). Qualities of these *via* vary according to individuals as well as within the same individual. A person endowed with "heavy" *via* exercises a harmful influence on others, while "light" *via* brings beneficial influence.

Appropriate funeral rites are absolutely essential for the benefit of the departed. There is fear of two categories of malevolent spirits, the *ma* (Chin., *ma*) and the *gui* (Chin., *kuai*), souls of the dead without sepulchers. In contrast, one can benefit from the aid of the *thân* (Chin., *shen*), souls of ancestors, understood in a noble sense. These three entities, expressed in Sino-Vietnamese words, testify to the survival of the *hon*.

From words of the same family comes the Vietnamese *hoi*, with its Sino-Vietnamese doublet *khi* (Chin., *ch'i*), whose meaning ranges from breath, inhalation, emanations from living or dead bodies, to "supernatural influence" over man's life and destiny. This influence can emanate not only from a man but also from an animal, the ground, stones, plants, and so forth. The concept provides the essential basis of popular cults as well.

The Chinese model reposes on the complex called *tam giao* (Chin., *san-chiao*, "triple teaching" or "triple religion"), that is, Buddhism (Phật giáo; Chin., Fo-chiao), Confucianism (Không giáo; Chin., K'ung-chiao), and Taoism (Lao giáo; Chin., Tao-chiao), or the teachings of the Buddha, Confucius, and Lao-tzu, respectively. Prior to 1975, when asked his religion, an educated Vietnamese generally would have answered that he was a Buddhist. On the civic or family level, however, he followed Confucian precepts; on the affective level or in the face of destiny, he turned to Taoist conceptions. Even if Mahāyāna Buddhism had an effect on his relationship with the otherworld, his personal behavior would have remained impregnated with Taoism. This fact was evident in his concern to conform with cosmic

harmony, to pay careful attention to sources and currents of energy traversing the universe, and to parallel equivalents between these and the human body. These concerns were manifested in his desire to withdraw into nature as well as in his recourse to geomancy and diverse divinatory procedures, even to magic. It was primarily Confucianism and Buddhism, however, that affected his moral conduct.

It goes without saying that, as in China, each of the elements composing the Triple Religion in no way presented itself as impervious to the other two. Mutual borrowings throughout the course of centuries increased to the point that it was sometimes difficult to know with certainty which rite or belief to attribute to which element. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, disputes, sometimes very intense, pitted Buddhists against Taoists and caused them to accuse each other of plagiarism on a number of points. Recourse to divination in its multiple forms was not a monopoly of Taoists; Confucians also employed this means of decoding destiny.

This mixture was more deeply rooted among the common people, where features of each of the Three Ways were known only very superficially. Nevertheless, their respective dosages seem to have been in inverse proportion to that predominating among the literati. There was among the common people much less preoccupation with correct rules of government and with mandates from Heaven than with recourse to aid of supernatural beings to resolve the grievous problems of the here and now or to assure for oneself a decent future, both here and in the otherworld. It is true that the observance of ancestor worship attested to the ascendancy of Confucianism, but the different Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* tended to join the ranks of the multiple divinities and deities of the Taoist pantheon. Taoism itself was immeasurably enriched with popular autochthonous beliefs and practices, to which it lent a certain respectability by a tint of sinicization; furthermore, magic played a proportionally more important role in activities of a religious type.

The geographical situation of Chinese-occupied Vietnam placed it in a privileged position on the route of Indian merchants and missionaries traveling from India to China and of Han and Vietnamese pilgrims taking the reverse route. From the first centuries CE, Indian monks were personally active in spreading Buddhist doctrine throughout the Middle Kingdom, including South China. It is thus that some Vietnamese participated in the first translations of canonical texts. From the sixth century, and especially the seventh century, Theravāda Buddhism in Vietnam gave way to Mahā-

yāna, which was also prevalent in China. And in the pagodas, the three Buddhas (*tam thê phât*; Chin., *san-shih fo*) of the present, the past, and the future occupied the principal altar, other altars being invaded by statues of numerous *bodhisattvas*. Distinctly autochthonous *dhyāna* (*thiên*; Chin., *ch'an*) sects sprang up in the course of the centuries, and Vietnamese, in ever-increasing numbers, went on pilgrimage to India. The assistance given by eminent Buddhist monks to those who liberated the country from the Chinese accorded to Buddhism a considerable hold over the first dynasties. One was even to see kings abdicating to end their days in monasteries. [See Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia.*]

Confucianism, which regulated the examinations for the recruitment of the literati (in other words, the mandarin cadres), was from the time of the Ly (1009–1225) the dominant official ideology. Moreover, beginning with the reigns of the Lê, Confucianism provided the state and family moral code and rituals of a once-again independent Vietnam that subsequently was to behave as a southern replica of the Celestial Empire. Before the image of the Son of Heaven, its “suzerain,” the emperor of Dai-Viet, was responsible for his acts before the all-powerful God. If he did not observe the rules correctly, the mandate to govern that he received from Heaven would be withdrawn from him by different means: war, revolution, lack of a male heir, and so forth. [See also Confucian Thought.]

In matters of cult ministry, the eminent positions occupied by Heaven and earth found expression through the sacrifices offered to them by the sovereign, who officiated in person. These ceremonies, said to belong to the *nam giao* (Chin., *nan-chiao*, sacrificial mound), appanage of imperial power, had always been vested with exceptional majesty and pomp. The *lê tích điền* (Chin., *chi-t'ien*, “opening ceremony of the rice fields”) also belonged to this cult complex. Here, too, the sovereign himself officiated—although he soon came to delegate the performance of this ceremony to a high-ranking mandarin. By tracing nine furrows on the royal field, the sovereign or his representative would open the plowing season.

Ancestor worship occupied a central place in the family cult. It represented the ritual expression of a cardinal virtue, filial piety (*hiêu*; Chin., *hsiao*), the pivot of interpersonal relationships. The Vietnamese followed with devotion the precept of Meng-tzu, “Duty toward parents is the foundation of all others,” that permeated all rules of conduct. The necessity of perfecting oneself morally and intellectually, loyalty to one’s friends, respect for one’s superiors, fidelity to the sovereign—all

these were believed to arise from the domain of filial piety. [See also Ancestors, *article on Ancestor Worship*.]

The extent of the economic impact of ancestor worship on a family depended on the wealth of that family. Reserved exclusively for the maintenance of such worship and for the performance of its ceremonies were revenues from property (rice fields, houses, etc.) that constituted the *huong-hoa* (Chin., *hsiang-huo*), the portion of "the incense and the fire" transmitted by inheritance from the father to his eldest son. It should be noted that Confucianism did not succeed in lowering the Vietnamese woman to the inferior rank occupied by her Chinese counterpart. Even in wealthy families the wife had the same status as her husband in family ceremonies, including those pertaining to ancestor worship in its strict sense. As the ideology of the mandarin type of government, Confucianism, by its very nature, became a target of Marxist-Leninist regimes. In Vietnam the offense has been less virulent and of shorter duration than in the People's Republic of China; it is true that Vietnam has not experienced any extremist phenomenon comparable to that of the Cultural Revolution in China.

Responsive as the literati were to the abstract universal order proposed by Confucianism, the idealized transposition of the bureaucratic hierarchy, they were equally responsive to the concrete universal order conceived by Taoist doctrine, with its correspondences (the human body, the microcosmic replica of the macrocosm) and its complementary contradictions (*âm* and *duong*, the Vietnamese equivalents of *yin* and *yang*). [See Yin-yang Wu-hsing.] The peasant, on the other hand, retained of Taoism principally the imagery presented in the temples (*đền*) in various forms. Dominating the whole ensemble was the August Jade Emperor, Ngọc-Hoang (Chin., Yü-huang), assisted by his two chief ministers, Nam-Tao (Chin., Nan-ts'ao, the Southern Constellation) and Bac-Đầu (Chin., Pei-tou, the Northern Constellation), who were charged respectively with keeping account of the birth and death of human beings and of governing a multitude of deities ranked according to an organization duplicating the imperial bureaucracy. [See Yü-huang.] Among these deities a special place must be assigned to Tao-quân (Chin., Tsao-chün), the hearth deity, who at the end of each year reports on the acts and deeds of men; the days surrounding this event are a period of transition that provides an occasion for the Vietnamese to celebrate their most spectacular collective feast, the Tết Nguyên Đán (Chin., Yüantan), the celebration of the New Year. In popular Vietnamese consciousness Tao-quân is actually a composite of three personages, a woman and her two husbands,

whose unhappy marriages were the subject of legends. The other important category in Vietnamese practice is represented by the immortals, whose Chinese nucleus of eight personalities has been enlarged by the addition of native deities. [See also Taoism, *overview article*; and Chinese Religious Year.]

The recourse to mediums and ritual decorative features representing the pantheon dominated by the Jade Emperor made possible the assimilation of Taoist elements into a certain number of Vietnamese popular cults. The one that came closest in form to a Taoist cult was that attributed to Trần Hưng Đạo, a spirit served by a male medium (*ông đồng*). Trần Hưng Đạo is a Vietnamese national hero from the thirteenth century, conqueror of the Han armies of the Mongol dynasty. The medium would perform a violent ritual in the course of which he inflicted on himself bloody ordeals and healed the sick by exorcising them of the traitor or vanquished general who possessed them.

The cult of the *chu vi*, "dignitaries" served by female mediums (*ba đồng*), borrowed from Taoism some elements of the decor, and at least in the north, the possession of the mediums by some immortals (whereas in the south it was spirits rather than immortals who "descended"). Here the medium (a *ba đồng* in this case) is "mounted" not by one god but successively, in the course of the same séance, by different spirits of both sexes and of different ages.

At the collective level, the cult of the tutelary deity (*thanh-hoang*; Chin., *sheng-huang*), the protector of the commune, held an eminent place in Vietnamese popular religion. Indeed, the most important public building in a village was the *đình*, both a communal house and a place of worship; it sheltered the altar of the tutelary deity and served as a meeting place of the notables for the settlement of questions of administration and internal justice. The *đình* was the center of collective life on the social as well as the religious level. It constituted the core of the system of peasant relations with the world beyond (through the intervention of the *thanh-hoang*) as well as with the state (the tutelary deity was confirmed by an imperial warrant obtained at the request of the notables).

The *thanh-hoang* could be a celestial deity, a deified legendary or historical personage, or even a disreputable person, such as a thief or a scavenger, whose violent death at a "sacred hour" endowed him with occult powers. It even would happen, although quite rarely, that an influential mandarin who had rendered an important service to the village became a guardian spirit during his lifetime. A deity who failed to protect the village at a critical moment or whose perfidy was denounced

by a mystical revelation would be chased away and replaced by another deity.

A maintenance service for the fire and the incense was celebrated throughout the year, and ceremonies were held at the *đình* on the first and fifteenth day of each month and on certain calendar feasts. The most important feast of the year was the Vao Đam, or Vao Hội (“to be in festivities”), which took place in spring or autumn, or on the anniversary of the birth or death of the tutelary deity. This feast lasted for two weeks, during which time it was forbidden to hold any funeral ceremonies. It was celebrated in great pomp with a series of processions, offerings, and prayers. Many villages undertook the organization of various entertainments: theater, cockfights, bullfights, and chess games with the people themselves acting as the chess pieces. Particular to this feast was a rite called Hem, often held secretly, recalling the salient features of the deity’s life. It was celebrated at night when commemorating a dishonorable act: a scene of robbery for a thief deity, an enactment of excrement collection (with the excrement replaced by peeled bananas) for a scavenger deity, and so forth.

Certain trees, rocks, and natural boundaries were objects of cults that could lead to the construction of small altars. This veneration, very often fearful, could have varied origins. The tree, for example, could influence by the simple force of its being. It could also shelter a malevolent spirit, such as a *ma*, the soul of an unburied dead person, or of a *con tinh*, the soul of a young girl or woman who died before having experienced the joys of marriage. The man she succeeded in seducing would lose his reason and die unless exorcised in time. Sometimes, however, the tree or stone was not simply the habitat of a spirit but was in itself a deity: a deity-tree or deity-stone, such as one finds among the Proto-Indo-Chinese of the hinterlands.

The dominant features of Vietnamese religion were its openness to all forms of spirituality and its profuse character that resulted from this openness. These features were manifested on the level of the literati, whose most erudite members sought to abide by the texts of the Triple Religion or at least of one of the religions, as well as on the popular level, where the cult of the tutelary deity was observed and that was above all responsive to the different spirits peopling the environment as well as to the counsels of specialists. A village might possess a temple of one or another of the Three Ways, peopled with saints of the other two. There might at the same time be a temple by the seaside dedicated to the whale deity washed up and stranded on the shore. It should be noted that the intransigence of Christianity would eliminate from the territory of a converted vil-

lage all monuments consecrated to another cult. This did not, however, prevent the majority of Christian peasants from having at least a minimum of respect for the spirits haunting the premises.

This general tendency toward syncretism made possible a strong implantation of Catholicism (but not of Islam) and encouraged Vietnamese, when emigrating in large numbers to foreign countries, to worship local deities until these were assimilated. This tendency has resulted, likewise, in the rise of new forms of syncretisms such as the Hoa-hao or Cao Dai, the first grafted on a Buddhist core, the other on a Taoist one.

[See also Southeast Asian Religions, article on Mainland Cultures, and Chinese Religion, overview article and article on Popular Religion.]

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GEORGES CONDOMINAS

Translated from French by Maria Pilar Luna-Magannon

VIJÑĀNA. In the earliest Upaniṣads (c. 700 BCE) the Sanskrit term *vijñāna* denotes “understanding” in both an ordinary and an exalted sense. Buddhist texts retained this meaning, but they employed the term in

other senses as well. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (2.5.1), for example, states: “Understanding (*vijñāna*) directs the sacrifice and it directs the deeds (*karman*) also. All the gods worship as the eldest the *brahman* which is understanding.” And according to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (7.7.1), “Understanding (*vijñāna*) assuredly is greater than contemplation (*dhyāna*). Verily, by understanding one understands the *R̥gveda* . . . [and so on, down to] the good and the bad . . . this world and yonder.” *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (2.1.16) states that when the person who consists of understanding (*vijñāna-puruṣa*) falls asleep, he rests in the space of the heart, and (at 4.3.7) that the person who consists of understanding is identified with the self (*ātman*). The early Upaniṣads also include cognate finite verbs that can be rendered as “one understands,” and so on (*The Principal Upaniṣads*, translated by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, New York, 1953).

A parable in the Pali language by Buddhaghosa illustrates the differences among the terms *saññā* (Skt., *sañjñā*), or “notion,” *viññāna* (Skt., *vijñāna*), or “understanding,” and *paññā* (Skt., *prajñā*), or “insight”: A lad (“notion”) accompanies his father (“understanding”) into a shop to buy an item from a shopkeeper (“insight”). The lad has only a notion about the value of the item; the father understands the value of the item he is buying; the shopkeeper has a trained insight into profit and loss. All three terms, however, came to be employed

in other senses as well. The usage of *vijñāna* as “understanding” was retained in Buddhism in the teaching that man is composed of the six elements, namely, the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind), space (*ākāśa*), and understanding (*vijñāna*). This theory, first seen in the Pali canon, continued in the Abhidharma literature, and also appeared in the Buddhist Tantras, especially in those preserved in the Shingon sect of Japan. [See Shingonshū.]

Contrast with Jñānā. As Buddhist Abhidharma theory developed, the term *vijñāna* (Pali, *viññāna*) was used particularly to indicate “perception”; as such it came to contrast with *jñāna* (here, in the form *parijñāna*) to mean “understanding” or, in the more exalted sense, “wisdom.” This contrast is shown in the theory of “final resort” (*pratisāraṇa*), which is set forth in four pairs of sayings. The pair for *vijñāna-jñāna* states: “One should not take final resort in ‘perception’ (*vijñāna*) but in ‘understanding’ (*jñāna*).” The contrast is also shown in the Yogācāra theory of “reversion” (*parāvṛtti*), when what is called the “personal aggregate of perception” (*vijñāna-skandha*) reverts to five wisdoms (*jñāna*). For the case of “final resort,” the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra* (vol. 23, my trans.) and the *Akṣayamatīrdeśa Sūtra* (vol. 34, my trans.) present six ways in which one resorts provisionally to “perception” and finally to “understanding,” as shown in table 1. As a mundane illustration of the sixth pair of contrasting meanings given

TABLE 1. *Perception versus Understanding: Six Pairs*

VIJÑĀNA (“PERCEPTION”)	JÑĀNA (“UNDERSTANDING”)
1. Is stationed in four of the five aggregates: form (<i>rūpa</i>), feelings (<i>vedanā</i>), ideas (<i>sañjñā</i>), and motivations (<i>saṃskāra</i>).	1. The understanding (<i>parijñāna</i>) of the perception aggregate that is stationed in the five aggregates of grasping (<i>upādāna-skandha</i>).
2. Perception of the earth, water, fire, and wind elements.	2. Understanding not based in the four elements and not separate from the <i>dharmadhātu</i> (realm of nature).
3. Cognizes the forms to be known by eye perception, the sounds by ear perception, odors by nose perception, tastes by tongue perception, touch by body perception, and <i>dharmas</i> by mind perception.	3. When understanding is resorted to, one is becalmed with respect to the external sense bases, does not course in external sense bases, does not make assignment of any nature (<i>dharma</i>).
4. Arises by way of a “support for consciousness” (<i>ālambana</i>), by way of “mental orientation” (<i>manaskāra</i>), or by way of a mental construct (<i>saṃkalpa</i>).	4. Does not apperceive, does not pursue, does not aim at, does not attribute, and is without mental construction.
5. The place of perception is in the <i>dharmas</i> , but there is no coursing of perception in the “unconstructed” (<i>asaṃskṛta</i>).	5. Cognizes the unconstructed.
6. Dwells in arising and passing away.	6. Dwells in the non-arising and the not-passing-away.

in table 1, “perception” of a book concerns an object that deteriorates—that is, the physical state of a book changes with the passage of time—whereas “understanding” of a book concerns the book’s ideas, which remain unchanged and unchanging.

For the case of “reversion” (*parāvṛtti*), Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasamgraha* (10.5) and commentary mention “reversion” of the *vijñāna* aggregate to yield the various wisdoms (*jñāna*). According to this Yogācāra Buddhist theory, the *vijñāna* aggregate (*skandha*) consists of “store consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), “defiled mind” (*kliṣṭa-manas*), “mind-based perception” (*manovijñāna*), and the five “outward-directed perceptions.” The reversion of the “store consciousness” yields the “mirrorlike wisdom” (*ādarśa-jñāna*); reversion of the “defiled mind” yields the “sameness wisdom” (*samatā-jñāna*); reversion of the “mind-based perception” yields the “discriminative wisdom” (*pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna*); reversion of the five “outward-directed perceptions” yields the “procedure-of-duty wisdom” (*krtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna*). [See Yogācāra.]

The above contrast of *vijñāna* (perception) and *jñāna* (understanding) has also been explained in terms of the three levels of “insight” (*prajñā*), as follows. *Vijñāna* is mundane insight with constructive thought (*vikalpa*), namely, insight consisting of hearing (*śrutamayī-prajñā*) and insight consisting of pondering (*cintāmayī-prajñā*). *Jñāna* is supramundane insight, devoid of constructive thought, namely, insight consisting of cultivation-contemplation (*bhāvanāmayī-prajñā*). Of course, *vijñāna* in this association with “insight” is a special case of the Buddhist usage of “perception.” [See *Jñāna*.]

Vijñāna as a “Personal Aggregate” (Skandha). The celebrated Buddhist formula of Dependent Origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) has twelve members. *Vijñāna* is the third term in the list; it is preceded by “neiscience” (*av-idyā*) and motivations (*saṃskāra*) and is followed by “name-and-form” (*nāma-rūpa*). [See *Pratītya-samutpāda*.]

The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, following early Buddhism in this respect, accepts a set of six “perceptions” for the “perception aggregate” (*vijñāna-skandha*), in which five perceptions are based on the five sense organs (i.e., eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin), and one is based on the mind (*manas*); the third member of the chain of Dependent Origination is explained as “mind-based perception” (*mano-vijñāna*). This kind of perception is a consciousness stream that has been attracted to a new birthplace, and that, perceiving the future parents, falls into the womb in a faint, gradually reviving as the embryo grows. In this birthplace it is part of “name-and-form,” which consists of the five personal aggregates (*skandha*), namely, the four mentioned above as the four stations of “perception” plus “perception” itself. The Yogācāra school of Buddhism

explains the third member of Dependent Origination as the “store consciousness” (*ālaya-vijñāna*) among the eight kinds that it espouses as constituting *vijñāna-skandha*.

The basic scripture of the Yogācāra is the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. The Tibetan Bstan-gyur (Tanjur) preserves a commentary by an unknown author on the tenth chapter of this scripture, which provides a fivefold variegation—clinging, defilement, situation, station, and diversity, as follows:

1. “Clinging” (*adhyavasāna*) is defined in terms of the three Buddhist realms. In the Realm of Desire, clinging is to external objects when there is perception (*vijñāna*) of desirable objects; in the Realm of Form, clinging is to inner “name-and-form” by perception of pure deities; and in the Formless Realm, clinging is to the inner “names” (i.e., feelings, ideas, and motivations) when there is perception of formless sentient beings.
2. “Defilement” (*saṃkleśa*) refers to the perception of spiritually immature persons (*bāla*), which is defiled in two ways: by way of involvement with external objects in the present life and by way of the sufferings of birth, old age, and death in a future life.
3. “Situation” (*sthiti*) refers either to the evolving (*pravṛtti*) situation of perception, which is based on the five sense organs and on the immediately preceding situation (*samanantara-pratyaya*) of the mind (*manas*), or to the “seed situation,” which is the “store consciousness” (*ālaya-vijñāna*).
4. “Station” (*sthana*) refers to the four stations of *vijñāna* already mentioned, but only in the Realm of Form (of the three Buddhist realms). In the Formless Realm, “form” (*rūpa-skandha*) is left out, as there is no form to perceive. Instead, perception is focused upon the other three *skandhas*.
5. “Diversity” (*vaicitrya*) is a variegation of twenty kinds. The twenty kinds of variegation are the same as the twenty kinds of thoughts (*citta*) listed for the “station of mindfulness” (*smṛtyupasthāna*) in Asaṅga’s *Śrāvakabhūmi*, as follows: (1) with craving (*sarāga*), (2) free from craving (*vigatarāga*), (3) with hatred (*sadveṣa*), (4) free from hatred (*vigatadveṣa*), (5) with delusion (*samoha*), (6) free from delusion (*vigatamoha*), (7) contracted (*saṃkṣipta*), (8) dispersed (*vikṣipta*), (9) faded (*līna*), (10) kept up (*pragṛhīta*), (11) excited (*uddhata*), (12) unexcited (*anudhata*), (13) pacified (*vyupaśānta*), (14) unpacified (*avyupaśānta*), (15) equilibrated (*samāhita*), (16) unequilibrated (*asamāhita*), (17) well-cultivated (*subhāvita*), (18) poorly cultivated (*asubhāvita*), (19) well-liberated thought (*suvimukta-citta*), (20) poorly liberated thought (*asuvimukta-citta*).

The “Store Consciousness” (Ālaya-vijñāna). In a theory promoted and defended by Asaṅga the “store consciousness” is explained as a store of seeds (*bīja*), that is, a collection of the seeds of all natures (*dharma*). Opponents of the theory did not acknowledge it as a teaching of the Buddha. Its defenders insisted that it was referred to by other terms in the older literature, namely, as *vipāka* (“maturation”) *vijñāna*, *ādāna* (“taking”) *vijñāna*, *mūla* (“foundation”) *vijñāna*, *bhavāṅga* (“subconscious”) *vijñāna*, and *pratyaya* (“conditional”) *vijñāna*. Thus, the “taking” *vijñāna* is so called because it is the third member of Dependent Origination, amounting to the appropriation of a new body in a birthplace, while the same *vijñāna* as “conditional” is the condition for the arising of *caitasika* (“mental”) *dharma*s, feelings, and so forth. The “subconscious” *vijñāna* has an equivalent theory in the Abhidhamma exegesis of Pali Buddhism, called *bhavāṅga*, or the “constituents of becoming.” The “maturation” *vijñāna* is involved in the Abhidharma set of three “mentalist” terms—*citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*—and can be illustrated in two verses of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (*Sagāthakam* 102–103), whose message may be epitomized as follows: *Citta* (collecting diverse thoughts) is the “store consciousness” (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and is always (morally) indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). *Vijñāna* (perception) is so called because it apprehends the sense objects and is virtuous (*kuśala*) or unvirtuous (*akuśala*) while functioning (in this role). Hence, *manas* (ego mind), which amounts to the sense of “I,” also behaves in those two ways. While in the Yogācāra treatise *Madhyāntavibhāga* (1.8; with Vasubandhu’s commentary) the term *ālaya-vijñāna* is used for the one that views the “thing-in-itself” (*arthamātra*), the term “foundation *vijñāna*” is also used in order to draw a contrast with the “evolving perceptions” (*pravṛtti vijñāna*), which merely view aspects of the thing (*arthaviśeṣa*). In short, truth is to be found within. [See *Ālaya-vijñāna*.]

The Yogācāra Context. According to the commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra*, there is no break of *vijñāna* until *apratiṣṭhita* (“without remainder”) *nirvāṇa*. The scriptures state that even the high trance state called “cessation-equipose” (*nirodha-samāpatti*) is accompanied by a form of consciousness. According to Asaṅga’s *Yogācārabhūmi*, possession or nonpossession of “store-consciousness” (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is subject to a fourfold analysis: (1) possessing “store consciousness” and not possessing “evolving perception,” namely, persons in dreamless sleep, faint, non-ideational equipose (*asamjñāsamāpatti*), non-ideational existence (*asamjñika*), or cessation-equipose (*nirodha-samāpatti*); (2) possessing evolving perception and not possessing “store consciousness,” referring to *arhats*, *pratyekabuddhas*, *bodhisattvas* on the last three of the ten *bodhi*-

sattva stages, and *tathāgatas*, when in stages “with thought” (*sacittika*); (3) possessing both, namely, persons other than those cited above, when in stages “with thought”; (4) possessing neither, namely, *arhats*, *pratyekabuddhas*, advanced *bodhisattvas*, and *tathāgatas* when in cessation-equipose or in *nirvāṇa*-realm “without remainder.”

Clearly, this system finds it difficult to explain the continuity of consciousness in cessation-equipose in the case of saints, irreversible *bodhisattvas*, and Buddhas. Apparently, the rationalization demands the “reversion” (*parāvṛtti*) of *vijñāna* to produce the “wisdoms” (*jñāna*). But, as I mentioned above, even *jñāna* in this sense was called *vijñāna* in early Upaniṣads and in some Buddhist lineages.

Early Buddhist scriptures assign various deities, states of consciousness, kinds of bodies, and so forth to the three worlds (of desire, form, and formlessness). According to traditional statements about the “formless realm,” it is said that when a meditator has transcended the ideas of form (*rūpasamjñā*) and avoids various other ideas (*samjñā*) he may dwell in the “base of infinite space” (*ākāśānantyāyatana*). Asaṅga’s *Samāhitabhūmi* adds that the best compassion (*karuṇā*) is here, since compassion seeks to free the sentient beings from their manifold sufferings (which are tied to their manifold ideas). The meditator gets to the next formless stage by a “perception” or “understanding” (*vijñāna*) that is convinced about the “base of infinite space;” thus he is in the “base of the infinity of perception” (*vijñānānāntyāyatana*). The *Samāhitabhūmi* adds that the best sympathetic joy (*muditā*) is here, because one can perceive those beings who are happy, have attained, and so on, and have sympathetic joy with them. The meditator is said to emerge from this base of infinite perception by looking for another object-support (*ālambana*) different from perception (*vijñāna*).

The “First” and the “Last” Vijñāna. The *Pitāputrasamāgama*, a Mahāyāna scripture, presents the terminology of “first” (*prathama*) and “last” (*carama*) *vijñāna*. Śāntideva cites this work in his *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: “And immediately after the cessation of that ‘first perception’ pertaining to birth, a contiguous matching ‘stream of consciousness’ proceeds. Among those, the cessation of the ‘last perception’ is counted as ‘death’ (*cyuti*) in this case; the emergence of the ‘first perception’ is counted as ‘birth’ (*upapatti*) in this case.” The *Pitāputrasamāgama* states further: “So, great king, a ‘first perception’ arises having two conditions pertaining to ‘birth’—by reason of the ‘last perception’ as predominant condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*) and by reason of *karman* as support condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*).”

Aside from these remarks, constituting the Buddhist attempt to define the beginning and end of life in terms

of a "first perception" and a "last perception," Buddhist thinkers attempted to explain the influence of one life upon the next, as both Hindus and Buddhists believe in transmigration. This theory of two conditions being present at the time of death—with a "last perception" constituting the expiration of the person, and attendant *karman* as a death vision—became important in the mythological elaboration of the "intermediate state" in the yogic concept of "symbolic death" and in such literature as the Tibetan *Book of the Dead*. The teaching of two conditions (predominant and support) for "birth" became important for the theory of being "twice-born" (*dvija*). Lineages of Tantra that came to Tibet and were elaborated there associated the Buddha's three bodies with these states, namely, the *dharmakāya* with death, the *saṃbhogakāya* with the intermediate state, and the *nirmāṇakāya* with birth.

The Tantric Context. The Tantric theory of "winds" (*vāyu*; *prāṇa*) began with five winds mentioned in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (3.13), namely, *prāṇa*, *vyāna*, *apāna*, *samāna*, and *udāna*. The Buddhist Tantric work *Pañcakrama* by the Tantric Nāgārjuna associates the mind-based perception (*manovijñāna*) with these five winds, and associates the five sense-based perceptions with five ancillary winds. The Tantric praxis in this regard aims to separate the "mind-based perception" from the five outer-sense-based perceptions, in order to produce a mysterious body called the "illusory body" formed of "wind and mind-only" (Wayman, 1977).

The Tibetan Bstan-'gyur contains Guṇamati's commentary (*ṭīkā*) on Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅga-nirdeśa* (translated by Surendrākara and Namphaḥ) in which the section on "name and form" in the context of Dependent Origination cites the following conclusive observations: "Some say that 'scarce cognition' is *vijñāna*, like eating hardly anything at all Bad cognition is *vijñāna*, like an ugly body When the activity of cognition is impotent cognition it is *vijñāna*, like a wandering mind. . . . Fully perfected cognition is *vijñāna*, like complete limbs [of the body]. . . . Unclear cognition is *vijñāna*, like undigested food."

[See Indian Philosophies and Buddhist Philosophy.]

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ALEX WAYMAN

VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU (c. sixteenth century CE), Indian philosopher and exponent of a syncretic Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Vedānta system. Nothing is known of the birthplace of Vijñānabhikṣu, but some scholars have suggested that he was a native of Bengal. His direct disciple was Bhāvāgaṇeśa, who may be the same as Gaṇeśa Dikṣita, the author of a commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā*.

Vijñānabhikṣu holds a significant position in the history of Indian philosophy. A Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinker, he is nonetheless recognized as having developed a distinct philosophical position all his own. He was the author of as many as sixteen or eighteen works, four or five of which are available as printed texts. The most notable are *Yogavārttika*, *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtrabhāṣya*, and *Sāṃkhyasāraḥ*. He also wrote commentaries on the *Brahma Sutra* and on many Upaniṣads, including the *Katha*, *Kaivalya*, and *Taittirīya*.

Although Vijñānabhikṣu was undoubtedly an original thinker, his originality was strongly tempered by his syncretic tendencies, as seen in his combining of Sāṃkhya-Yoga with Vedānta thought. One of his unique views was that the individual's ultimate goal is not the cessation of sorrow (*duḥkha*), but the cessation of the *experience* of sorrow. He maintained that the state of *mokṣa* ("liberation") is not blissful and that when the scriptures talk about the blissful state of the self (*ānandamaya*), what they really mean is the absence of sorrow.

Vijñānabhikṣu was primarily a yogin, both in theory and practice. In his *Yogavārttika*, he claimed that Yoga (as taught by Patañjali) is the best path to liberation. He believed that it was necessary to reconcile Vedānta philosophy with Yoga philosophy in order to combine knowledge and praxis. He was critical of Advaita Vedānta and charged that the Advaitins were crypto-Buddhists.

For Vijñānabhikṣu, sentient beings (*jīvas*) are not identical with *brahman* (Īśvara or Parameśvara) but are just parts of *brahman*. The relationship is one of the-part-and-the-whole, not total identity; the *jīvas* are the sparks of the fire that is *brahman*. *Brahman* creates the world, often referred to as *māyā* ("illusion"). However, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the world is not illusory, because *prakṛti* ("matter, nature"), being part of *brahman*, is eternal and real. The creation is a real, not an illusory, transformation (*pariṇāma*), as in the Sāṃkhya view.

Bhikṣu's interpretation of the *Yoga Sūtra* differed from that of either Vācaspati Miśra or Bhoja. His interpretation of *vikalpa* ("mental discrimination") indicates a Buddhist influence. The Yoga school regards *suṣupti* ("dreamless sleep") as a *vṛtti* ("transformation") of consciousness, while the Vedānta school argues that it is

not a *vṛtti* at all. Bhikṣu reconciles these viewpoints by saying that there are two states of dreamless sleep: *ar-dha* ("half") and *samagra* ("full"). The Yoga school talks about the first, while the Upaniṣads talk about the second.

God, the creator, is not simply an agent (as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold) who creates the universe as a potter produces a pot. The causality of God is said to be very different from the three types of causality mentioned by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: *samavāyin* ("inherent"), *asamavāyin* ("non-inherent"), and *nimitta* ("efficient cause"). Rather, Vijñānabhikṣu refers to *adhiṣṭhāna kār-āṇa* ("ground cause, container"). For Śaṅkara too, *brah-man* is the ground for all changes and causation. But while Śaṅkara believes that all changing phenomena are unreal and the ground cause is real, Bhikṣu asserts that all changes are real and that the unchangeable ground cause, *brahman*, sustains this principle of change within its individual unity. By rejecting non-dualism, Bhikṣu also fostered the *bhakti* movement. He interpreted *bhakti* as true devotion in the service of God, and referred to the Bhāgavata description of *bhakti* as "the emotion that melts the heart and brings tears to the eyes."

[See also Patañjali.]

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BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

VILNA GAON. See Eliyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman.

VINAYA is a Sanskrit and Pali term aptly translated into English as "discipline." Specifically, it refers to the prescribed modes of conduct incumbent upon Buddhist monks (*bhikṣu*) and nuns (*bhikṣuṇī*). The word is formed by combining the prefix *vi-*, meaning "difference, distinction, apart, away from," with the verb root *-nī*, meaning "to lead." When combined they mean "to lead away from." *Vinaya* is the reified noun form of this term and means "that which separates" or "that which removes." Within the context of Buddhist monasticism, it refers to the code of behavioral discipline that at once delineates the life of the householder and that of the monk, and binds the community of monks together into a common affective bond. In this sense, *Vinaya* is that which separates or leads away from the householder's way of life. It can also refer to the practice of mental

discipline that removes unhealthy states of mind from the monk's disposition. In either sense of the term, *Vinaya* is regarded as the affective expression or pragmatic implementation of the Buddha's *dharma* (teaching). It is precept put into practice.

Following the death of the historical Gautama in the fifth century BCE, tradition holds that his monastic followers gathered together at the First Council to organize and canonize his remembered teachings into three collections or "baskets" (*piṭakas*): the *Vinaya*, the *Sūtra*, and the *Abhidharma*. While the *Sūtra Piṭaka* is more doctrinally and cosmologically oriented, the focus of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* is upon proper courses of action conducive to making progress toward the final spiritual attainment of *nirvāṇa*. Although it is evident in early Indian Buddhism that categorical distinctions were made between groups of *bhikṣus* (referred to as *bhāṇakas*) who had committed all or parts of these three texts to memory for the purpose of preserving them through recitation, each "basket" stands in complementary relationship to the other and the whole represents an integrated system of religious teaching. Some scholars and Buddhist apologists have understood *Vinaya* to be the first stage of the spiritual path, an extended code of behavioral discipline elaborated from the basic principles of *śīla* (moral, ethical action).

About two-thirds of the over two hundred minor rules of the disciplinary code can be related to the *pañcaśīla*, the ancient fivefold moral maxim shared in common by Brahmanic and heterodox religious groups alike during the time of the Buddha: (1) abstention from the taking of life, especially human life, (2) abstention from sexual misconduct, (3) abstention from taking what is not given, (4) abstention from making false spiritual claims, and (5) abstention from taking intoxicants. This view of *Vinaya* is strengthened by the fact that the first four rules cited above constitute the first and most important class of *Vinaya* regulations, the *pārājikas*, violation of which leads to expulsion from the Buddhist monastic order. The cultivation of *Vinaya*, however, is not limited solely to moral concern and its expression. Its fulfillment is also dependent upon developing mental awareness, acuity of mind, and wisdom, which are by-products of leading a life of meditation (*samādhi*) and knowledge (*prajñā*). While *Vinaya* refers to a code of disciplined behavior that can be externally observed and monitored, according to the Buddhist theory of *karmaṇ*, external actions are the caused products of qualitative internal volition. At the heart of Buddhist monastic discipline is the notion that mental restraint leads to restrained action. Actions stand in direct reflexive relationship to the spiritual state of one's mind.

This theory of discipline and karmic action is thor-

oughly reflected in the *Sūtravibhaṅga*, the first of three major divisions that make up all recensions of the Vinaya Piṭaka. The *Sūtravibhaṅga*, sometimes referred to as the *Vinayavibhaṅga*, has incorporated what may be the oldest surviving Buddhist text, the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra*, itself a compendium of disciplinary rules that continues today to be recited ritually by individual *saṃghas* on the days of every new and full moon. Recitation of the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* forms a type of confession of adherence to the disciplinary code. Its recitation may also be the earliest instance of Buddhist ritual life, a possibility that underscores the crucially important role of Vinaya in defining the nature of the Buddhist religious vocation.

While the *Prātimokṣa* is essentially a listing of the entire code of disciplinary rules, the *Sūtravibhaṅga* embroiders the formal proclamation of each precept. This has been accomplished by the inclusion of stories, sometimes of a mythic nature, which attempt to provide a context and warrant for the rule's promulgation. The promulgation is followed by a carefully worded definition and then by a series of hypothetical cases that take into account circumstances that might require refined adjudication. All of these materials are regarded as *buddhavācāna* (veritable words of the Buddha) and as a whole form a remarkable blending of myth and legend, formal proclamations of behavioral standards, dictionary definitions, and casuistry. In each of the introductory tales and also in the following hypothetical cases pertaining to each rule, an errant *bhikṣu* is depicted as succumbing to the persuasions of passion (*rāga*), hatred (*doṣa*), or delusion (*moha*), and consequently acting in a manner deemed improper by the laity, who report the matter to the Buddha; acting as a judge, he in turn lays down the formal rule of discipline. From these "cases," it becomes clear that Buddhist monastic law was and continues to be predicated upon ascertaining the quality of disposition that affects volition to act. Consequently, the successful cultivation of discipline is understood to be a process of mental and spiritual purification whereby the *bhikṣu* is increasingly capable of resisting the power of the *āsravas* (passion, hatred, and delusion) to affect his internal volitions. In all cases of adjudication within Vinaya literature, a *bhikṣu* or *bhikṣuṇī* is judged guilty or innocent according to whether or not the action was intentional. Pure intentions, or actions not motivated by the influence of the *āsravas*, which are in turn rooted in an indulgent sense of "I-ness" (*ahaṃkāra*), are the mark of one in whom Vinaya has been instilled.

The overriding importance of the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* and the *Sūtravibhaṅga* portion of the Vinaya Piṭaka in the history of Buddhism is borne out by the fact that

the number and nature of specific disciplinary rules found in the various recensions of the Vinaya have remained remarkably consistent among the multitude of Buddhist schools in different parts of the Asian continent throughout history. There are no disagreements between the Pali Theravāda, Chinese Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Mahīśāsaka, and Mahāsāṃghika Vinayas with regard to six of the eight categories of rules constitutive of the disciplinary code (despite the fact that the Chinese recensions were originally written in Sanskrit). The major discrepancies between the lists of disciplinary rules are found in the seventh category of rules known as *saikṣa* (Pali, *sekhiya*), which, as a whole, are concerned with minor rules of etiquette and comportment. While there is no direct evidence to suggest that any of these recensions of the Vinaya text were fixed in writing before the first century BCE, their uncanny similarity suggests at once a common origin in a period of time preceding the emergence of Buddhist sectarianism and a fundamental unwillingness on behalf of *saṃgha* communities to alter the basic charter of monastic Buddhism.

However, when alterations, even of a very minor nature, were adopted by specific *saṃghas*, the consequences were such that schisms were provoked. The fourth-century-BCE schism between the Sthaviras (from whom modern-day Theravādins in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand claim descent) and the Mahāsāṃghikas (believed by some scholars to be the forerunners of Mahāyāna) over rules of a minor nature is a classic case in point. In subsequent periods of Buddhist history, purifications of the *saṃgha* were almost always exacted on the basis of applying Vinaya rules to the circumstances at hand. In the history of Sinhala Buddhism, various kings promulgated additional legal documents (*katikāvatas*) to enforce discipline within the *saṃgha*. Many reform movements in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Theravāda traditions of Southeast Asia were based primarily upon strict adherence and interpretation of Vinaya. Historically, it is clear that Vinaya has not only been the charter for the Buddhist monastic experience, but has continued to function as a legitimizing device for reform within the *saṃgha* as well. In this context, it is important to note that just as the laity play an important role within *Sūtravibhaṅga* literature by reporting infractions of discipline to the Buddha, so has the laity in modern times continued to display great interest in insuring that the *saṃgha* adheres to Vinaya. Many laity, like the kings of medieval Sri Lanka, have undertaken initiatives to make sure that Vinaya remains a primary concern, especially in times when monks have tended to interfere in the secular affairs of society. Lay concern for Vinaya, however, is not ex-

pressed only for the purpose of keeping monks in their proper places, but also out of the necessity of preserving a *saṃgha* that can truly function as a spiritual refuge and a worthy object of meritorious action necessary for the positive fruition of karmic efficacy. [See also *Samgha, article on Samgha and Society.*]

Whereas the *Sūtravibhaṅga* is primarily addressed to the disciplined behavior of the individual *bhikṣu*, the *Skandhaka* (Pali, *Khandhaka*; “chapters”) portion of the Vinaya is more essentially concerned with the collective acts of the *saṃgha* (*vinayakarman* or *saṃghakarman*). In content and focus this section in Vinaya, sometimes called the *Vinayavastu*, differs considerably from the *Sūtravibhaṅga*. Rather than being structured around the rules of discipline per se, the *Skandhakas* contain diverse materials (some of which are also found in the *Sūtra Piṭaka*) including a biographical account of the Buddha’s enlightenment and early missionary career, procedures for how the various rites of the community (*prātimokṣa*, *pavāraṇā*, *kaṭhina-attharaṇa*, etc.) are to be cultically celebrated, how disputes between *bhikṣus* should be settled, how probation should be administered, as well as accounts of the first and second Buddhist councils (in the Pali recension) amid a variety of other matters pertinent to collective fraternal life. The first *Skandhaka*, of which there are twelve (in the Pali recension), is perhaps the most significant, for, in addition to providing a biographical account of the Buddha and his enlightenment experience (an account written in such a way as to establish the Buddha as the authoritative founder of the *saṃgha* and a paradigm for monastic emulation), the background, procedures, and prerequisites for the administration of ordination (*upasampadā*) are given. It is in this first “chapter” that the Buddha transfers his authority to admit new members into the *saṃgha* to any previously fully ordained group of *bhikṣus* that must number no fewer than ten in India and no fewer than five in the “border regions.”

The delegation of this “Buddhaic” authority set into motion the various traditions of ordination that survive today. In fact, all lines of ordination are traditionally traced back through history ultimately to the Buddha himself. In this process all newly ordained *bhikṣus* are regarded as “sons of the Buddha” and are recognized as such by their lay supporters. Legitimate lines of ordination have been so important in the history of Buddhism that there are many historical instances in which pilgrimages have been made over thousands of miles from Japan to China, from China to India, from Burma and Thailand to Sri Lanka and vice versa in order to secure ordination validity and ultimate spiritual descendancy from the Buddha. It is in this sense that the *saṃgha* remains a repository not only of the Buddha’s

dharma, but an heir to his spiritual authority and charisma as well.

The *Skandhaka*, in addition to being a practical procedural manual for the carrying out of *saṃgha* rituals of maintenance, contains numerous discussions regarding the construction of *āvāsas* (retreats) and *ārāmas* (literally, “parks,” but here designating a monastic compound). Of singular importance to all of these discussions is the concept of *sīmā* (boundary), which has played a crucial role in the history of *saṃgha* sectarianism. The concept of *sīmā* as bounded space (or sacred space) has been further applied in a variety of contexts and has become as important to the continuation of lines of ordination as the presence of fully ordained *bhikṣus*. Each *nikāya* (school or subdenomination attached to a dominant monastery) must ordain its members in a consecrated space, usually at an auspicious spot in a river or in a lake on a specially constructed platform. The imagery at work in this application of bounded sacred space literally suggests that upon taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the *Samgha*, the newly ordained *bhikṣu* has climbed aboard the ferry crossing the ocean of *saṃsāra* to the farther shore of *nirvāṇa*.

The concept of sacred bounded space was also employed in the designation of *prātimokṣa sīmās*, where only those who had fully adhered to the rules of discipline during the previous fortnight could enter to declare their purity in conduct and thus their practical realization of *dharma*. *Sīmās* were also set to determine not only the boundaries of monastic compounds, but also the vicinities around monasteries, including village temples, from within which all *bhikṣus* shared in the celebration of cultic rites. In short, the Vinaya concept of *sīmās* created a sacred geography of Buddhist monasticism designating physical layouts of the land in which certain acts of piety and responsibility were enacted. It is possible that this concept may have contributed to the later development of Mahāyāna cosmological beliefs regarding the Pure Land.

The *Parivāra*, the last and third section of the Vinaya, is simply a compendium of the *Sūtravibhaṅga* and *Skandhakas*. It includes mnemonic summaries of the various Vinaya rules as well as additional commentarial material.

[See also *Samgha, overview article, and Monasticism, article on Buddhist Monasticism.*]

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VINOBA BHAVE. See Bhava, Vinoba.

VIOLENCE may be religious in form, an end in itself, or a dramatic symbol. It may be enacted with awe, as if its instigator or perpetrator has encountered the “mysterium tremendum.” Violence, as a means, may serve religious values or, more typically, a blend of religious and economic or religious and political ends. Limited mundane conflict may escalate into violence when the issues at stake are imbued with religious ultimacy. Violence may be rationalized by the perpetrator’s claim to have exhausted the alternative of social negotiation.

Peace, on the other hand, has traditionally been an eschatological hope of Western religions. Earthly peace has been a respite from battle, a monastic-like retreat from what Islam calls the *dār al-ḥarb*, the zone of battle. Ideologically, religions invoke violence and also demand peace.

Religion, when not overly rationalized, engenders an energy that may be experienced as despair or as enthusiasm. In either event, its personal locus is the “hot spot” in the brain, to use William James’s felicitous phrase. Despair can feed an urge to rid the world of pollution and sin. As enthusiasm, religion promotes hope and celebration. Religious verve, mixing these valences, helps shape our physical environment, develop a competitive capitalism, or, in its classical form, infuse the faithful with zealotry.

Sidney Hook, writing on violence for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1935), states, “in the social context, violence may be defined roughly as the illegal employment of methods of coercion for personal or group ends” (Hook, [1935] 1963, p. 264). It is difficult to distinguish between illegal violent acts and acts of what Sidney Hook calls “might,” or physical action legally sanctioned. What is illegal violence for the victim may be the legitimate expression of might for the perpetrator. Violence is the genus and legitimate and nonlegitimate violence the species. Some obvious victim-defined species of violence are: riot, assassination, massacre, terrorism, torture, and assault. The instigator of violence might claim that acts of legitimate violence include military defense, crusades, just wars, acts of purification, acts of faith, and heroic exploits.

Zealotry in Pursuit of Infidels. Religious leaders have called for violent attacks of other religious groups repeatedly in Near Eastern and European history. In eleventh-century Persia, a secret society of the Ismā‘īlīyah, a sect of Islam, tried to exert social control through assassination. They provided hashish to a select band of young men, invoking religious principles and a glimpse of the joys awaiting them in heaven until the young men were ready, even at the cost of their own lives, to kill. The Crusaders, another movement of religious zealots, modified the Arabic term *hashishin* into the European term *assassin*. [See *Crusades and Assassins*.]

Pope Innocent’s twelfth-century “crusade” against the Albigensians is a historical example of European religious violence. General of the church, Simon de Montfort charged the Albigensians with being enemies of God and addicted to incest and sodomy. Massacre seemed the proper response to the crime. When the soldiers tried to stop the slaughter because some orthodox Catholics were in danger of perishing too, the papal legate answered, “Kill! God will know his own.”

The king gave the first signal for the massacre of Saint Bartholomew’s Day in 1572, which accounted for the loss of fifty thousand lives and earned the congratulations of other Roman Catholic powers. The Sorbonne defended the achievement, and Pope Gregory XIII celebrated it by striking a medal.

In all these instances, religious, economic, or political motivations have worked together. The massacre of Roman Catholics by Cromwell in Ireland, for instance, may have been economically motivated, but religious rationales removed the victims from the range of scruple and sympathy. The victims were God’s enemies, despisers of the holy sacraments, or idolators. Russian Orthodox leadership, to cite another example, was implicated in anti-Jewish pogroms. Religious symbols,

such as the "blood libel" (the charge that Jews drink the blood of Christians in the Passover rituals), raised attacks on Jews to a frenzy (Brailsford, [1935] 1963).

Violence, Society, and the State. Scholarly work on religion over the years has emphasized the violence-reductive character of religion. Marx called religion "the opiate of the people." Freud theorized that in religion are sublimated the major motives of man, including aggression. Parsons, following Durkheim, discussed religion's function in maintaining common social values. These theories fit a religiously homogeneous society such as that of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the mid-seventeenth century, which enjoyed half a century of tranquillity. Puritanism provided a provincial identity. A single priestly class led the colonists and participated in their civil and ecclesiastical affairs (Breen and Foster, 1973).

A religion's promotion of violence varies according to the secular character of a society's elite. In a society that is dominated by rational bureaucrats, religion assumes a ritualistic character. Violence waits in the wings until summoned as an organizing force. In a society in which intellectuals are influential, religion tends to be more contemplative, and the intellect chains violence and subjects it to the aegis of calculated legal process. In a society dominated by a stratum of chivalrous warriors, on the other hand, fate, destiny, passion, and strong heroes are important, allowing violence to be always imminent.

Nonviolent positions are espoused by some smaller groups in the United States, such as the Quakers and Mennonites. No major Western religious organization is pacifistic, but all the Western religions assay the legitimacy of violence. Who may be delegated to execute violent acts, on which occasions, and for which goals? Religion in the United States has, by and large, supported the established order, thus opposing violence when it takes the form of riot and massacre but often supporting it when it takes the form of capital punishment and war. The posture of a religion may change with its situation. The Bābis of nineteenth-century Persia, for example, began as an aggressive, chiliastic violent movement that, suppressed mercilessly by the state, reemerged as the peaceful Bahā'īs (MacEoin, 1983).

Religious institutions tend to legitimate state violence in societies in which the religious and political elites are drawn from the same class or see an identity of interests. Russian Orthodox Josephite monks and the tsars following Vasily the Third (1479–1533) were mutually supportive. State implementation of violence for the sake of the religious group is illustrated by Isabella of Castile's support of the Spanish Inquisition.

The attitude of a religious group to state power becomes more positive as its adherents accede to that power. During the first century, some Christians refused to enter the Roman army, while others who did enlist presented disciplinary problems. As late as 295 CE, Maximilianus was martyred partly because, as a Christian, he refused to become a soldier. This pacifist strain in Christian thought declined early in the fourth century with the success of Constantine. The Council of Arles in 314 CE decreed that Christians who gave up their arms in time of peace should be excommunicated.

When religion and state are inseparable, as in ancient Egypt, religious and military concerns mingle naturally. In North America, among the Pueblo, the war cult involved a war priest expected to lead in the field or at least to contribute religious support. Modern religious groups have maintained military detachments, such as the Vatican's Swiss guards.

Conscientious objection, the refusal to give military service, is treated by the larger contemporary churches as an issue of individual conscience rather than as a statement of the church's position on violence. Churches do, however, take a position on the legitimacy of particular instances of state violence. Quakers were firm in opposing American participation in Vietnam during the 1960s. Some figures in the Roman Catholic church in contemporary times are on record as opposing the use of nuclear weapons in warfare.

The military chaplain who represents the church in the armed forces is expected to refrain from killing, even though he or she belongs to an organization for which killing or the threat of killing is the *raison d'être*. With longer military experience, the chaplain tends to become a representative of the military to the church. John M. Swomley (1964) maintains, for example, that the function of the chaplain is to spread the military version of religion in civilian churches.

The Courage to Be Violent. Individuals experience anxiety when called upon to execute violence. How, then, do religious groups enable individuals to act violently despite their fears? Participation in religious ritual helps to engender individual courage in general and can often call forth the courage to commit a violent act. [See Frenzy.]

In a religious environment, there are three steps in the ritual development of courage to act violently despite anxiety: (1) acceptance by the worshiping community of members on the basis of their intrinsic, not achieved, characteristics; (2) achievement of solidarity among the members; and (3) encouragement of activities that engender and release affect in support of religious values.

The first precondition for ritual is the definition of who belongs to the worshipping group. Typically, the criteria are the inherent qualities of the individual, whether he or she is of the "elect" or of a particular lineage. By assent to a common set of beliefs, individuals declare that they possess the signs of eligibility for membership.

Initiatory rites confirm membership. Initiation depends not so much on the initiate's performance as on a judgment by other members of the group that he or she possesses certain qualities. The criteria for acceptance in the worshipping community, it should be noted, have parallels in those criteria that exclude the targets of incipient violence from the group.

The ascriptive basis of membership in the worshipping community having been established, a second step is necessary: ritual acts that promote solidarity among the members. At this point, the achievement of brotherhood among the believers becomes primary. Physical convergence of members of the worshipping group demonstrates this unity. The congregants become as one in the sight of God through, for instance, pilgrimages to Lourdes, Mecca, or Jerusalem.

Ethical behavior contributes to this solidarity. Differences in ethical obligations to a brother and to an outsider point up the particularistic aspect of the ethical decision. Declarations of dedication to the belief system, which were simply signs of membership at the previous stage, now represent an assertion of a common bond.

Rhythms of religious ritual break down social barriers between worshippers. Moving in rhythm, members of a group pattern their relations in time and space. The larger rhythms of the yearly religious calendar guide people converging upon and diverging from the place of worship. Rhythmic worship, including the poetry of prayer, encourages this harmony. When worshippers chant and sing together or rise and bow at the same time, congregants are transformed into a congregation.

Ceremonies link the physically distant in space and time. Muslims, for instance, bow in prayer at the same appointed times, each in his locale, each day, and assemble at the mosque when, wherever they are, it is Friday noon. Common texts and the common language of prayer unite adherents in communities far removed from each other. Universal use of the Arabic language for prayer, whether or not it is understood by particular groups of the faithful, means that an Urdu can pray alongside a Turkish-speaking Muslim.

Suffering also contributes to this necessary solidarity. Sacrifice is one religious model for suffering. Part of the self is laid upon the altar, and God and man may become one as God, the gods, or the social group accepts

the offering. In a feast, celebrants are joined in the partaking of common manna from the deity.

Expiatory rites contribute to social solidarity as well, repelling death, the supreme differentiator. The bereaved reassert their solidarity in the face of the loss. Mourning is not intended to retrieve the victim, who in some cultures may now be an evil spirit, but to make sure that he or she is completely removed, not a danger to the courage of the survivors. The deceased may be a martyr and, thus, a positive image around which the group rallies. Martyrs are especially important to the development of an atmosphere conducive to violence.

The third stage in the ritual development of the courage to act violently is the release of affect, the precipitant of violence. In the context of group solidarity and loyalty, the release of emotional restraint becomes less dangerous. An inhibition may be thought of as an emotional secret, an intrusive disturbance in a society of brothers. Certain rites override inhibitions and encourage affective expression, ordinarily an expression short of orgiastic unreserve. (Wildly dissipated emotion might preclude action.) Emotion is released under controlled conditions, ready to be directed in support of religiously legitimated values.

Incense, for instance, which is a common feature in ritual, plays on the gentler emotions in establishing the atmosphere necessary for the release of affect. Dimness casts visual constraints into vagueness. The rhythmic and musical aspects of ritual, which unite people in the previous stage, here encourage emotion. Rhythmic rites climax with a quickening beat, pulsations becoming indistinguishable. The energy needed to overcome the fear of violence is released.

This energy can now be directed into action in support of religious values. At one extreme, it is channeled into violence. Religious culture abets social violence in three ways. (1) It helps convert mundane issues into matters of life and death. Religious culture offers an arsenal of ideational and ritual symbols that can adhere to and inflate economic and social differences into life and death crises. Because religion is, in Paul Tillich's words, a matter of "ultimate concern," it can absolutize a mundane issue. Violence is a more acceptable means for resolving a matter of life and death than it is for resolving a conflict over, for instance, resource allocation. (2) Religious culture helps identify the evil to be attacked. A conflict requires an antagonist for its protagonist. Religious groups are experienced in specifying the enemy. Individuals or groups may be charged as consorts of the devil, Antichrists, or heretics. (3) Religious culture helps provide the appointed violent "champion," individual or collective, with rationales for his or her act.

Religious Constraints on Violence. Thomas Hobbes said that a war of all against all would make life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (*Leviathan* 1.12). In response to this idea, how do religious institutions constrain tendencies to violence?

The church faces a dilemma in constraining zealotry. The very same factors that evoke the violent act are also associated with less intense constructive events. The conception of radical evil in Western religions, which aids in targeting a victim for violence, is also a goad to Western man's achievements.

Violence may be limited by attenuating the basic sources of social conflict—the differences of interests, the inequities in the distribution of social benefits, and the nature of social justice. Again, not violence as such but the legitimization of violence is the issue. When the governing policy is accepted as legitimate by all segments of the society, the very need for most violence is vitiated. In this sense, religious deterrence of violence emerges out of the prophetic ideal of social justice.

Religious institutions, while they may abet violence in what they see as the social weal, are intolerant of idiosyncratic acts of violence, such as those associated with crime for individual profit. Religion saps the roots of such idiosyncratic violence through, for example, the cure of souls, spiritual healing, or a bid to the individual to return to the fold and to adjust to social norms.

A second mechanism constraining violence is a cultural relativizing of issues. In enabling violence, religion associates a mundane conflict with its own ultimates. But religion may also juxtapose the issue to, and explicitly not associate it with, the ultimate. Here, religion may find appropriate such terms as patience, balance, and seeing things in proportion.

Religion, in this light, deters violence by imposing universal values. Rituals and beliefs may envision an ever-widening area of peaceful relations—an ideal of universal brotherhood. The ideal of brotherhood cannot erase conflict, any more than pleasure can erase pain, but it may support a consensus that removes occasions for conflict.

Perhaps the most significant way in which religion contains violence is the displacement of the ecstatic in religion by formal, rational law. Talmudic law, for instance, does not eliminate the principle of capital punishment but sets such conditions for its enactment that it becomes an unlikely occurrence. The Islamic *shari'ah* establishes that a *jihād* be restricted to self-defense or the expansion of Islam and legislates that young volunteers must have parental consent to enlist. Personal vigilante action is displaced by legal action to redress grievances. The ecstatic may be displaced by contemplative mysticism, which eschews violence, or by or-

giastic mysticism, which diffuses energy. That the holocaust was implemented by a rationalized bureaucracy shows that rationalization, while not necessarily reducing violence, increases the perpetrators' control over the means and objects of violence.

Darwinists are not alone in accepting conflict as necessary for both social and psychological growth processes. Religion has served as an endless source for conflict, for violence, and, thus, for growth. It is in this sense that Max Weber named ethical prophecy as the charismatic center of breakthrough to social change.

[For a discussion of violent behavior as part of an ecstatic form of spirituality, see Omophagia. For a survey of attitudes toward and religious valorization of the warrior, see War and Warriors.]

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VIRACOCHA is the name or title in the Quechua language of the Inca creator god at the time of the Spanish conquest of Peru in the sixteenth century. According to Inca beliefs, Viracocha (also called Ticciviracocha) made earth and sky, then fashioned from stone a race of giants. Displeased with them, he turned some giants back into stone and destroyed the rest in a flood. He then caused the sun and the moon to rise from Lake Titicaca, and created, at nearby Tiahuanaco, human beings and animals from clay. He painted clothing on the people, then dispersed them so that they would later emerge from caves, hills, trees, and bodies of water. He gave the people social customs, food, and other aspects of civilization. Appearing as a bearded old man with staff and long garment, Viracocha journeyed from the mountainous east toward the northwest, traversing the Inca state, teaching as he went. At Manta, on the coast of Ecuador, he spread his cloak and set out over the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

Viracocha is described by early Spanish chroniclers as the most important Inca god, invisible, living nowhere, yet ever-present. Texts of hymns to Viracocha exist, and prayers to him usually began with the invocation "O Creator." A temple in Cuzco, the Inca capital, was dedicated to him. He also appeared as a gold figure inside Cuzco's Temple of the Sun. Near this temple, a *huaca* (sacred stone) was consecrated to Viracocha; sacrifices were made there, particularly of brown llamas. At the festival of Camay, in January, offerings were cast into a river to be carried by the waters to Viracocha.

Viracocha may have been identified with the Milky Way, which was believed to be a heavenly river. His throne was said to be in the sky. The sun, the moon, and the star deities were subservient to him. Inti, the sun, was the imperial god, the one whose cult was served by the Inca priesthood; prayers to the sun were presumably transmitted by Inti to Viracocha, his creator.

Because there are no written records of Inca culture before the Spanish conquest, the antecedents of Viracocha are unknown, but the idea of a creator god was surely ancient and widespread in the Andes. Viracocha—who was related to Illapa ("thunder," or "weather")—may have been derived from Thunupa, the creator god (also the god of thunder and weather) of the Inca's Aymara-speaking neighbors in the highlands of Bolivia, or from the creator god of earlier inhabitants of the Cuzco Valley. The god's antiquity is suggested by

his various connotations, by his imprecise fit into the structured Inca cult of the solar god, and by pre-Inca depictions of a deity very similar to Inca images of Viracocha. Viracocha is sometimes confused with Pachacamac, the creator god of adjacent coastal regions; they probably had a common ancestor.

The eighth king in a quasi-historical list of Inca rulers was named for Viracocha. The god appeared in a dream or vision to his son, a young prince, who (with the help of the god, according to legend) raised an army to defend Cuzco successfully when it was beleaguered by the rival Chanca people. This prince became the ninth Inca ruler, Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui (r. 1438?–1470?), the great man of Inca history, who glorified architecturally the Temple of Viracocha and the Temple of the Sun and began the great expansion of the Inca empire. According to some authors, he was called Yupanqui as a prince and later took the name *Pachacuti* ("transformer"). He is usually referred to simply as Pachacuti (Pachacutic or Pachacutec), although some records refer to him more fully as Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui. It was he who provided the list of Inca rulers.

[See also Inti.]

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VIRGIN BIRTH. A virgin is someone who has not experienced sexual intercourse, and a virgin birth, or parthenogenesis (Gr., *parthenos*, "virgin"; *genesis*, "birth"), is one in which a virgin gives birth. According to this definition, the story of the birth of Jesus is a virgin birth story whereas the birth of the Buddha and of Orphic Dionysos are not. Technically what is at issue is the loss or the preservation of virginity during the process of conception. The Virgin Mary was simply "found with child of the Holy Ghost" before she was married and before she had "known" a man. So, too, did the pre-existent Buddha enter the womb of his mother, but since she was already a married woman, there is no reason to suppose she was a virgin at the time. In the Orphic story of Dionysos, Zeus came to Persephone in the form of a serpent and impregnated her, so that the maiden's virginity was technically lost.

To apply such strict requirements, however, would be to ignore the obvious mythical and symbolic connections between the many stories to which we traditionally apply the term *virgin birth*, including the stories of the Buddha and Dionysos. It would lead to meaningless questions as to whether, for example, the Phrygian maiden Nana lost her virginity when she was impregnated by a pomegranate seed and conceived Attis; as to whether Danae lost hers when Zeus descended upon her as a "shower of gold" to father Perseus; or as to whether any sort of intercourse took place when, according to African folklore, the Old Woman conceived the hero Litulone.

The point would seem to be that, in the context of myth and religion, the term *virgin birth* is rightly applied to any miraculous conception and birth. That is, whether the mother is technically a virgin is of secondary importance to the fact that she conceives and/or gives birth by some means other than the ordinary. The virgin birth story is ultimately not the story of a physiological quirk; it is the story of divinity entering the human experience by the only doorway available to it.

In this nontechnical sense, the concept of virgin birth is found in most cultures. It is familiar to several African peoples; to the Inuit (Eskimo); to the Tewa, Blackfeet, Apache, and Navajo Indians of North America; to the ancient Egyptians, Phrygians, Greeks, Toltec, and Persians; to readers of the Hindu epic *Mahābhārata* as well as of the Finnish *Kalevala*; and to followers of the Buddha as well as of Christ.

The specific event in which a woman who has not had ordinary sexual intercourse gives birth must be seen as one of several components of the story of the hero's emergence, which begins with his miraculous conception. The agent of conception is always unusual and always an embodiment of a higher cosmic power. The birth itself often takes place in a grove or other hidden place, and such elements as pain, blood, and afterbirth are often absent. The child sometimes possesses adult characteristics or other remarkable qualities at birth. It is not unusual for the mother, once she has produced the hero, to fade into the background or to die. The child is frequently threatened by evil forces, which are miraculously overcome. [See Hero, The.]

Although the best-known virgin birth narratives are those of the "great religions," there are many to be found in the religious systems of extinct civilizations and in those of groups to which some scholars apply the word *primitive*. In most of the oldest and simplest of these stories, a hero is born to a virgin who has conceived through some contact with a natural object or phenomenon—a feather, a piece of clay, a seed, a ray of the sun—containing the divine force. The Toltec and Az-

tec hero Quetzalcoatl was conceived when his mother, Chimalman, was breathed upon by God, who had taken the form of Morning. The Inuit trickster Raven was born of a virgin who had ingested a feather floating on the sea.

The Tewa Indians tell a particularly vivid story about Water Jar Boy. A maiden became pregnant when a piece of clay "entered" her as she was making a pot. She soon gave birth to a baby with no legs or arms, who was really a talking water jar. In twenty days Water Jar Boy had become big, and eventually, while hunting with his grandfather, he bumped into a rock; the jar broke, and from it emerged a tribal hero in full regalia who then went in search of his father. His father turned out to be Red Water Snake, an underworld divinity.

The Navajo tell the story of Changing Woman, who miraculously conceived and gave birth to twins who later went in search of their father, the Sun. The sun god Re was the father of certain Egyptian pharaohs, whose virgin mothers conceived through contact with the "breath" of heavenly fire.

The meaning behind these stories and many others like them seems to be basically twofold. They speak to a necessary unity between humans and their environment and to the need to search for the divine nature or significant source of that unity. Thus the pure virgin—the new, unused human vessel—conceives by way of a natural object, and the divine child, or *puer aeternus*, becomes the quester or sacred king, the supreme guide to divinity.

It is of interest to note that in Egyptian, Toltec, and Aztec virgin birth stories, the agent of conception is God's "breath." At its most profound level, the virgin birth story is, wherever it appears, the story of re-creation, of new beginnings, in which the virgin as *omphalos*, or center of creation, receives the divine breath or spirit (Lat., *spiritus*; lit., "breathing") of the divine in order that a new sacred creation in microcosm might take place. So the virgin is related to the primal element—the "face of the waters" on which the "spirit of God moved" in *Genesis*, or the "garden enclosed," the "spring shut up," the "fountain sealed" of the *Song of Songs*: "Awake, O north wind; and come, thou south: blow upon my garden, that the spices thereof may flow out. Let my beloved come into his garden, and eat his pleasant fruits" (Sg. 4:16).

The virgin birth motif exists in varying degrees of significance in at least four "world religions": Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and, of course, Christianity.

In the Hindu epic the *Mahābhārata*, the hero Karṇa is miraculously conceived and born of the virgin Pṛthā, or Kuntī. Karṇa's father is the sun god Sūrya, "the Light of the Universe," who restores Kuntī's maiden-

hood after the act of conception. Karna is born wearing armor and earrings. Like so many other virgin mothers, Kuntī hides her child from her family for fear of scandal. The child is placed, like Moses and Siegfried, in a basket in the river; subsequently he is rescued and reared by people of a lower station in life. Later, Kuntī is protected from what would be the defilement of her sacred virginity by a curse that is laid upon her husband. There is a hint here of the idea of immaculate conception, an implicit suggestion that Kuntī receives the divine seed without experiencing carnal desire. She later has three more sons by Sūrya, one of them in a wolf's den.

Kuntī is one of the many human representations of *prima materia*, the earthly womb that awaits the divine power of procreation. For Hindus, she is a pattern of the physical reality through which *ātman-brahman*, the Self, becomes known. We read in the *Bhagavadgītā*: "All things are changing; nothing dies. The spirit wanders, comes now here, now there, and occupies whatever frame it pleases. . . . Only the bodies, of which this eternal, imperishable, incomprehensible Self is the indweller, are said to have an end" (2.18). Kuntī is a virgin because her mate is nonphysical; he is of the eternal spirit that has no perishable form.

In Buddhism the virgin birth concept occupies a more central place, and the suggestion of immaculate conception is even stronger. We are told that the Buddha's future mother, Mahāmāyā, refrained from sexual activity and other worldly pleasures during the midsummer festival and was taken off during a dream to the Himalayas. There she was purified by water "to remove every human stain" before being placed upon a "divine couch." Nearby, the future Buddha had become a "superb white elephant," and "three times he walked round his mother's couch, with his right side towards it, and striking her on her right side, he seemed to enter her womb." After the conception, "no lustful thought sprang up in the mind of the future Buddha's mother. . . . And within her womb she could distinguish the future Buddha, like a white thread passed through a transparent jewel" (Warren, 1976, pp. 183–187).

The Buddha was carried for ten months in Mahāmāyā's womb and was delivered as she stood in the sacred Lumbinī Grove. He was born without "disagreeable, impure matter . . . like a preacher." He then "surveyed the four cardinal points, and the four intermediate ones . . . and with a noble voice he shouted . . . 'The chief am I in all the world.'"

As is always the case with mothers of Buddhas, Mahāmāyā died seven days after giving birth and was "reborn in the Tuṣita Heaven." In this way her immaculate

state was preserved, for "a womb that has been occupied by a future Buddha is like the shrine of a temple, and can never be occupied or used again."

The meaning usually ascribed to the Buddha's birth legend centers on the fact that he chose to be born of a woman so as to become human himself, which would enable him to inspire other humans with the possibility of achieving perfection. Details such as the absence of sexuality, the conception during a dream—that is, without the conscious carnal participation of the mother—the immaculate nature of the birth itself, and the death of the mother immediately afterward suggest a certain "docetism" in Buddhism but, more important, they signal the true Buddhahood of Gautama in that they are elements common to all births of Buddhas. They remind us in this sense of aspects of the Christian story that are said to fulfill prophecies of the Old Testament. As for the white elephant, it signifies the greatness of the Buddha. The fact that he is born standing and already preaching is also an indication of his greatness and his vocation.

The virgin birth motif is also of some importance in Zoroastrianism. Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), the great prophet of the religion, is said in one legend to be the son of Ahura Mazdā, the supreme god, who represents truth, wisdom, life, light, and order. The miraculous birth of Zarathushtra marks the beginning of the final stage of history, which will end with the virgin birth of a savior called the Saoshyant. This Saoshyant, as well as two previous saviors, will be born of fifteen-year-old maidens. These virgins are to be impregnated by the seed of Zarathushtra, which is preserved in a lake.

There are various versions of the birth of Zarathushtra himself, some of which contain elements of the virgin birth. According to the *Dēnkard*, a Pahlavi philosophical text, Zarathushtra, like the Buddha, existed spiritually before his birth. The one God, Ahura Mazdā, commanded "the coming of that glory from the spiritual existence to the worldly" (*Dēnkard* 7.2). When Ahura Mazdā "had produced the material of Zoroaster, the glory then . . . fled on towards the material of Zoroaster . . . to the light which is endless" (*Dēnkard* 7:3) and from there in several stages to the mother of Zarathushtra at the moment of her birth. The maiden Dughda then carried the light—the fire of Zarathushtra—within herself ("one is dazzled by the radiance from her body"; *Dēnkard* 7.7). The girl's parents were confused and disturbed, and she was married to a man in another village before Zarathushtra was born. At his birth on a riverbank, all of nature rejoiced, and the baby laughed as he entered the world. He was immediately threatened by evil forces, which he overcame.

This miraculous legend associated with the historical Zarathushtra seems to have developed to illustrate the preexistent nature of the prophet, that is, his direct association with Ahura Mazdā, the “endless light” of the universe. As in the cases of many heroes, the virgin birth here is an expression of the union between the sacred and the profane, the spiritual and the physical, God and the world. It is also a means by which Zarathushtra is related to later avatars in a natural messianic process. The struggle between the child and the evil forces is a model for the struggle between Ahura Mazdā and Angra Mainyu, “who is all death” and who will attempt to prevent the ultimate and inevitable omnipotence of the true God. The joy of the waters, trees, and the entire earth at the birth of Zarathushtra conveys the Zoroastrian belief in the sacredness of earth and in the need to rid it, as the process beginning with Zarathushtra will do, of the death that is represented by the hostile spirit of Angra Mainyu.

A relatively late and particularly complete virgin birth story is the Christian Nativity, found in the gospels of Luke and Matthew. The story of Jesus begins with the angel Gabriel’s announcement to a young Hebrew woman called Mary that she will conceive in her womb and bring into the world the Son of God: “Then said Mary unto the angel, How shall this be, seeing I know not a man? And the angel answered and said unto her, / The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, / and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee” (Lk. 1:34–35). After the angel’s announcement, Mary speaks the formula of acceptance, “Be it unto me according to thy word” (Lk. 1:38), and at that moment the Hebrew maid is transformed into the virgin mother. Mary joins company with Mahāmāyā, Kuntī, Nana, and all other earthly images of Sophia (Divine Wisdom, the *prima materia* who was the matrix out of which the word issued in the beginning), who in her earthly form as the many-masked Great Mother serves as the feminine catalytic attraction to and willing receptacle for the masculine Logos. The Virgin is the material without which the divine purpose (Word) cannot be made concrete (flesh). [See *Mary and Jesus*.]

In Christianity, the belief in Mary’s virginity (which does not seem to have been accepted until after the time of Paul, who never mentions it) is particularly important because of the earlier doctrine that holds that original sin is transmitted by way of carnal conception. The virgin birth story overcomes the problem of carnality and sin in Jesus’ conception. This idea is extended in the still later belief that Mary, too, was miraculously conceived apart from desire—which is to say, without sin.

In the Nativity story, Luke tells us that Joseph went to Bethlehem with Mary, “his espoused wife, being great with child” (Lk. 2:5) to be taxed there according to a decree of Augustus. As there was no room for them in the inn, they were forced to stay in a stable, where Mary “brought forth her first-born son . . . and laid him in a manger” (Lk. 2:7). The stable—like Dionysos’s cave, the myrrh tree that served as the birth vessel for Adonis, and the sacred grove of the Buddha’s birth—is a symbol for a more universal womb than that of any individual mortal woman.

The Christian nativity story is completed by the visit of the Magi, described by Matthew. The Magi remind us of the astrologers and magicians who appear in the stories of Zarathushtra and Kṛṣṇa and who come, like them, from the East in search of a king. They come following a star, for “in him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness” (Jn. 1:4f.). Just as holy men offer gifts of perfume and garlands to the newborn Buddha, so the Magi come bearing kingly gifts of gold, frankincense, and myrrh to the infant Jesus. The Christian virgin-birth story is but one version of the universal story of the birth of the eternal king, the light of divine spirit that by entering the world inevitably becomes its center.

[See also *Virginity*.]

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VIRGIN GODDESS. The virgin goddess of urban patriarchal societies did not in fact emerge full-grown from the head of Zeus as is claimed in the Homeric *Hymn to Athena*. The virgin goddesses have their origins in the prehistoric goddesses of the Paleolithic and Neolithic eras. [See *Lady of the Animals*.] The earliest goddess images, the so-called Paleolithic Venuses (dated before 10,000 BCE), are images of the awesome creative power associated with woman and nature. In the Neolithic or early agricultural era (which began c. 9000 BCE in the Near East), goddess images symbolized the cosmic energy of birth, growth, death, and regeneration on which farming, and indeed all life, depends. According to archaeologist Marija Gimbutas, goddess images gradually became differentiated into two functions, one as "the giver and taker of all," and the other as rebirth and regeneration. Eventually these two images were characterized as the Mother and the Maiden. The Mother was the sustaining power, represented especially by the enduring earth, the bedrock that undergirds all life. The Maiden, related to the forces of renewal and regeneration, was represented especially by the new life, plant and animal, that emerges in spring. The Mother, the eternal, and the Maiden, the ephemeral power of nature, were understood to be two aspects of the same whole. As the classicist Jane E. Harrison points out, "they are in fact, merely the older and younger form of the same person" (Harrison, [1903] 1907, p. 274). They did not require the male to complete or justify their power.

Beginning in the fifth and fourth millennia BCE, the peaceful, matrifocal, sedentary, agricultural societies of Old Europe and the Near East that worshiped the goddess were invaded by patrilineal warrior groups. In the patriarchal societies that emerged around 3500 BCE in the Near East and Greece, none of the goddesses retained their full power. In the myths of Sumer, Marduk established his power by slaying the primordial goddess

Tiamat. In Greek mythology, Zeus married and attempted to subdue the indigenous goddess Hera. "With the coming of patriarchal condition," Harrison wrote, "women goddesses are sequestered to a servile domesticity, they become abject and amorous" (*ibid.*, p. 272).

In a patriarchal and patrilineal society, it becomes critical to control the sexuality of women, so that a man can be certain that his children are his. (In earlier, matrilineal societies, all children were legitimate offspring of the mother.) Thus it was decreed that a woman must be a virgin at marriage and refrain from sexual intercourse with any man but her husband. In this context the polarity between virgin and wife develops. This polarity is expressed in Greek in the opposition between *gunē*, which means both "woman" and "wife" and is used to refer to married women, and *parthenos*, which means "maiden, girl" and "virgin" and is used to refer to unmarried girls.

It was in the context of the patriarchal city-state that the concept of the virgin goddess arose, reflecting a separation of the Maiden from the Mother. The Mother becomes defined as wife, while the Maiden becomes defined as unmarried, hence virgin. The goddesses designated virgin never became fully subordinated. The virgin goddess is not always entirely innocent of sexuality; she may be virgin in the sense of being unmarried or even in the sense of not being defined by marriage. The complex nature of the virgin goddess is further explicated by the fact the unmarried girl or woman poses a threat to patriarchal social order because her sexuality is not under the control of man. Thus *parthenos* also carries the connotation of being wild or untamed. The title of virgin goddess signifies both limitation and independence within a patriarchal context. The virgin goddess has lost her primordial power as Mother. But as virgin rather than wife, she remains independent of patriarchal marriage and the subordination it requires. In addition, as virgin, she retains access to the wildness that would be considered inappropriate in the wife. This wildness can manifest itself in at least three forms: as connection to wild places and wild animals not tamed or under control of the city; as passion for the shedding of blood, which draws hunters and warriors away from the city and the family; and as untamed sexuality.

According to the the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*, there are only three goddesses Aphrodite cannot sway: the virgins Athena, Artemis, and Hestia.

Hestia. The aniconic goddess of the hearth fire, Hestia represents the home as the ancient sphere of women. Even in patriarchal societies this is one sphere in which men are not fully in control. Her virginity represents the ancient matrilineal ties among women. Moreover,

since she was never really anthropomorphized, it was unnecessary to provide her with a husband. Artemis and Athena are more fully virgin goddesses.

Artemis. The goddess of the moon and the wild places, Artemis is known as Potnia Thērōn ("lady of the wild animals") in the *Iliad*, but as "slayer of wild beasts" in the Homeric Hymns. She is *parthenos*, both unmarried and virgin. Yet she is also invoked as Eleithia and Locheia, goddess of childbirth. These seemingly contradictory aspects can be understood if it is recognized that Artemis has connections with the prehistoric goddesses who combined the giving and taking of life with rebirth and regeneration. Artemis as the giver and taker of life was Mother Deer, as is indicated by the legend that pregnant does swam to her island in order to give birth (Gimbutas, 1982, p. 198). She was also Mother Bear: her temple on the Acropolis was dedicated to Artemis Brauronia, and she was served there by young girls who dressed as bears. The tradition of Artemis the Bear is thought to have originated in Arcadia.

As the taker of life, Artemis was also the one to whom animals of all kinds, including deer and bears, were sacrificed. Her wildness was acceptable in a patriarchal culture only if it was understood that she was not like other women. Thus her Maiden aspect was transformed to virgin, and she was portrayed as a masculinized huntress, clad in short tunic, slaying wild animals with arrows from her quiver. Yet, paradoxically, she remained the goddess of women. Except for her brother Apollo, she shunned men. She danced with her companion nymphs in the forests by moonlight. Her association with the moon also expressed her connection to women, for the menstrual and birth cycles of women have long been connected with the waxing and waning of the moon. Her aspect as Mother reemerged in the image of Artemis the midwife, who did not herself give birth but who always came to the aid of animal and human mothers.

Athena. Worshiped in her temple, the Parthenon, Athena Parthenos was a very different expression of the virgin goddess, for she was identified with the city and with men. Athena was said to have been born from the head of her father Zeus, and in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus she was said to have declared that she sided with her father against her mother in all things except marriage, which she shunned. She was born fully armed as a warrior and was usually imaged wearing a helmet and holding a spear and shield. Her title *polias* indicated that the city was her home; her titles *promachos* and *nikē* named her victorious against its enemies. She avoided the company of women but nurtured such heroes as Odysseus, Theseus, Herakles, Perseus, and Erich-

thonius. Her virginity meant that she could consort with men as an equal and engage in the masculine pursuit of war. Yet Athena's roots in the prehistoric goddesses were not fully obscured. Her companion animal the owl, the snake hiding behind her shield, and the olive tree that she caused to spring up on the Parthenon hill indicate her chthonic origins. Athena secretly fostered the infant Erichthonius, whom Gaia produced from the semen spilled in Hephaistos's attempt to rape her. Even her warlike character probably derives from an earlier role as protectress of the city. Moreover, she was patroness not only of the masculine art of warfare but also of the arts originally associated with women, including pottery, weaving, and healing. One of the rituals performed in her honor involved the weaving and presentation of a new robe (*peplos*) for her ancient wooden statue; girls and women played important roles in these rites. Today the bridal wreaths once offered to the virgin Athena are offered to the Virgin Mary at the church of Panaghia Kapnikarea in Athens.

Although the power of the prepatriarchal goddesses as Mother and Maiden can still be felt in Artemis and Athena, these goddesses are also diminished and distorted by being cut off from their sexual power. They are more independent and powerful than women who submit to patriarchal marriage, but there is a coldness about them. Athena barely remembers that the city too is dependent upon the powers of nature and sexuality. And when the taker of life is cut off from the giver of life, she can degenerate into a bloodthirsty huntress or warrior who glories in the shedding of blood for its own sake.

Hera and Aphrodite. Although both are sexual, and although according to Olympian mythology both are married and bear children, Aphrodite and Hera also deserve mention as maiden goddesses. Jane E. Harrison reminds us that both were honored with Athena as part of a maiden trinity that comes down to us in distorted form as a beauty contest in the so-called Judgment of Paris.

Hera, though known as wife of Zeus and as mother of Hebe, Eleithia, Ares, and Hephaistos, was also known as a virgin goddess. Before Zeus entered Greece, Hera was the indigenous goddess of the island of Samos, which was once called Parthenia, and of Argos; even at Olympus her temple is older than that of Zeus. In Arcadia, she was worshiped as a child, a fully grown woman, and a widow, the three stages of a woman's life echoing the three seasons of spring, summer, and winter. Her union with Zeus as presented in the *Iliad* was a sacred marriage that brought fertility to the earth. But another legend tells us that every year she renewed her virginity at a sacred spring called Canathus in Nauplia.

As Harrison explains, "Virginity was to these ancients in their wisdom a grace not lost but perennially renewed" (Harrison, 1907, p. 312). This custom reflects the prepatriarchal understanding that at all stages of her life a woman belongs primarily to herself; both her virginity and her sexuality are hers, not something she gives to another to control.

Although fully and joyously sexual, Aphrodite remains virgin in this sense. Her sexuality is unbridled, untamed, and her own. She is married to Hephaistos, according to Olympian mythology, but she is neither submissive nor faithful to him. Although she is a mother, her child Eros ("love, desire") is but a reflection of her sexuality. Her birth from the sea, can be interpreted as the ritual bath of her ever-renewed virginity. Often misunderstood as a trivial goddess of love and beauty, Aphrodite is clearly rooted in the ancient tradition of the goddesses of renewal and regeneration. As Mircea Eliade writes in *A History of Religious Ideas*, Aphrodite represents "one of the most profound sources of religious experience: the revelation of sexuality as transcendence and mystery" (Eliade, vol. 1, 1978, p. 283). Aphrodite was an island goddess who entered Greece through Phoenician ports in Cythera and Cyprus; her temples were often found in the marshy ground where sea transforms into land or on the cliffs where the sea rises as mist to the land. Her sacred places, like her sexuality, symbolize transformation. Aphrodite is also connected to the Near Eastern goddesses of renewal and regeneration, Ishtar and Astarte. Like them, she was identified with the morning and evening stars, which mark the transition between night and day. Like Ishtar and Astarte, she was served by priestesses who engaged in sacred sexual rituals. [See Prostitution.] Her connection to the ancient goddess as giver of life is evident from her companions, the amorous doves, and by her birth from the sea. The Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite* portrays her as followed by wolves, lions, bears, and leopards, in whom she awakens the spark of desire.

Hera and Aphrodite, like the goddesses of the Near East, Inanna, Ishtar, Astarte, Artemis of Ephesus, and Cybele, and unlike the Greek Artemis and Athena, are virgin in the sense of being independent of patriarchal marriage but not in the sense of being nonsexual. These goddesses fit M. Esther Harding's oft-quoted definition of the virgin goddess from *Women's Mysteries* (1955), "She is essentially one-in-herself. She is not merely the counterpart of a male god" (p. 125). The virginity of Aphrodite, Hera, and the other sexual goddesses is an expression of the prepatriarchal idea that sexuality is transformative power, not a matter of possessing or being possessed. Sexuality is an aspect of the eternal

renewal contained within the cycles of birth, fullness, death, and regeneration within nature and all life. Just as the seed and the moon wax to fullness and wane again, so the goddess returns to her maiden state, and the cycles begin again.

The Virgin Mary. Although not a goddess according to orthodox theological interpretation, the Virgin Mary deserves mention here because she functions as goddess to many of her worshipers. Throughout the Near East, Europe, and Latin America, churches to the Virgin Mary were built at the holy places of the goddesses. Even though she is not prominent in the New Testament, Mary eventually became the repository for all the lingering images of the goddesses. To the Greeks she is *panaghia*, which means simply "the all-holy." In the *Gospel of Matthew*, a prophecy from Isaiah that reads "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son" (Mt. 1:23) is applied to the birth of Jesus. Although the Hebrew world *'almanah* in the original prophecy might be translated "young woman" without the necessary imputation of "virgin," both the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, the Septuagint, and the *Gospel of Matthew* use *parthenos*. Lest there be any ambiguity as to its interpretation, the author of *Matthew* clarifies, Joseph "knew her not [a Biblical euphemism for intercourse] until she had borne a son" (1:25). The contradictions lurking in the background of the virgin goddesses of patriarchy were elevated to the level of theological paradox when it was later affirmed that Mary was a virgin before, after, and during the birth of Jesus. In spite of the fact that in Mary the Mother and Maiden aspects of the goddess, which were severed in patriarchy, were reunited in a single image, the power of the goddess was not restored in her. Like Artemis and Athena, Mary was cut off from the sexuality that was the original source of her power. [See Mary.]

Moreover, Christian theology affirmed the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—but not the Mother or the Maiden—as God. Reluctantly, the church agreed at the Council of Ephesus in 431 (held at one of the most important ancient sites of the worship of Artemis), that Mary would be called Theotokos ("God bearer"), as long as it was understood that she was not God. Although many Christians have continued to worship Mary as God, few have questioned the patriarchal fear of female (and ultimately all) sexuality implicit in her title as virgin. Until and unless the virginity of Mary is recognized in the ancient sense as the power of regeneration and renewal that is expressed in sexuality, Mary, like Artemis and Athena, will remain a truncated image of the goddess.

[See also *Virginity; Goddess Worship; and the entries on the specific goddesses mentioned herein.*]

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CAROL P. CHRIST

VIRGINITY is the condition of young male and female persons who have not had sexual intercourse and have preserved their sexual innocence. This state is partly biologically determined, in that children do not yet have sexual potency; but that condition can be voluntarily or obligatorily extended until marriage, so that virginal status becomes a social fact. The significance of virginity, therefore, has to be understood in a wider social context, in which it bears specific symbolic meanings. A basic fact in every society is the organization of the relationship of men and women into various kinship systems to guarantee the reproduction of the human species. Being a complete man or woman presupposes sexual potency and activity. A virgin boy or girl has not yet reached the condition of full maturity, and therefore retains a purity that makes him or her more suited for certain religious functions or specific activities.

In Classical Greece and Rome, virgin children of living parents often assisted with religious ceremonies. In

Greece, they had the task of cutting the olive branches with which the victors at Delphi and at the Olympic games were crowned. They also had a ceremonial role at weddings comparable to that of bridesmaids and pages, who are supposed to be unmarried and consequently virgins. In Christianity, virgin children or eunuchs (i.e., artificial virgins) often functioned as singers in the choir, because their pure status made them more appropriate for contact with the divine world.

Virginity is also believed to bring a man or woman into closer contact with nature, because he or she is still unspoiled by sexuality. In the Babylonian *Epic of Gilgamesh* Enkidu, who was created by the gods as Gilgamesh's opponent, lived among the animals until he was seduced by a prostitute. After that the animals left Enkidu, who was forced to join human society. For the same reason the Kaluli, a tribe of Papua New Guinea, believe that virgin youths are the most effective hunters, and the belief is endorsed by a Kaluli myth featuring Dosali, the mythical model of perfect manhood, and Newelesu, his clownish, violent, and uncivilized antithesis. Both stay a night with the Mother of the Animals. Dosali behaves like a decent guest and gets a lot of game. Newelesu forces the old woman to have intercourse with him, and all the animals flee the house. A virginal man still has close rapport with the animal world, because he is less entangled in the social world of marriage, exchange of property, alliance, and all other issues linked with the world of settled married people.

The virginity of an unmarried girl is likewise temporary, a transitory biological condition with a strong social value. The virginity of young women often acts as a symbol of the social purity of the whole group to which the women belong. In some societies, therefore, the chastity of the young women is a matter of concern for the whole group. In India, the purity of the social group, the caste, is dependent on the purity of the women, who transmit caste membership. Therefore the whole group scrupulously guards the chastity of the young girls until their marriage, and often kills them if they break the interdiction of sexual intercourse. In other societies, for example, in Samoa, a group of islands in the Pacific Ocean close to the equator, the virginity of the daughter of the chief was a symbol of the integrity of the whole society, whereas other girls were permitted to have sexual relationships as they pleased.

In all societies where men exchange women, as is the case in almost all Mediterranean and Arab countries, and where virginity is expected at marriage, the virginity of the woman is an essential part of the marriage contract between the families and the chastity of the young woman is of direct family concern. A bride who

is not a virgin breaks the contract and is often severely punished, even with death.

Virginity, however, has yet another aspect, in addition to sexual purity as a link to nature or as a symbol of social purity. Because of their lack or renunciation of sexual experience, virgins are not completely male or female, and consequently defy in a sense gender specificity. In a state of ambiguity, they have aspects of both genders, as sometimes becomes clear in mythology. Persephone, the corn maiden of Greek mythology, lives half the year with her mother Demeter and the other half with Hades, god of the underworld. As a virgin she belongs to both the female and the male world; she is a typically intermediary figure, a go-between. This mediating function of virgins makes them particularly appropriate for contact with the supernatural and implies their sacredness.

In imitation of this quality, chastity or temporary sexual renunciation is often a prerequisite for a visit to a temple or for the performance of religious rites. The participants in the Eleusinian mysteries were obliged to observe a period of chastity, just as in the Middle Ages lay people who wanted to take the Holy Communion had to remain chaste for some days before and after. The priests in Israel had to live apart from their wives during the period of their service in the Jerusalem Temple, and the priests of the Dea Syria, the Syrian mother goddess of fertility, were the so-called Galli, men who had emasculated themselves in the service of the goddess and had in this way made themselves into artificial virgins.

Priestesses of various cults in Greco-Roman antiquity had to be virgins. The Vestal Virgins are a good example of how an intermediary position implies sacredness and contact with the divine world. The Vestals were virgins, but they also had the main characteristics of married women: their dress was similar and they had some legal rights. They were also treated as brides. For example, they wore permanently the hairstyle typical of a bride on her wedding day. They even showed some male characteristics: like male magistrates they had the right to be escorted by a lictor. They were in every respect ambiguous, and so especially fit to mediate between human society and the powers that watched over it.

As brides the Vestal Virgins were permanently on the brink between the unmarried and married status. Their anomalous sacred position also entailed living outside a normal household: they lived together in a special house separated from common society. The same ambiguity is symbolized by the sacred fire that the Vestals guarded. Fire is life-giving and life-destroying; it is pure and sterile and a symbol of fertility, and thus a sacred

symbol linking two spheres. The Vestals were not an isolated case. The priestess at the Delphic oracle, the Pythia, was required to be an elderly woman of over fifty who might have been married but had to dress as a young virgin. In this way she acted as an intermediary between divine decisions and human affairs.

All these examples of virginity refer to a temporary status—even the Vestals were allowed to leave their service after thirty years and to marry if they wished. The symbolic aspect of virginity was often a motive for a permanent virginity, or what is often called celibacy. A permanent status of virginity, for instance, occurs in Buddhism as a requisite for monks and in the Roman Catholic church. Virginity was a widespread phenomenon in the early Christian church and was based upon specific concepts of human status and salvation. In view of the impending end of the world the apostle Paul considered the status of unmarried virgin as the most desirable (*1 Cor. 7*), in accordance with certain ascetical trends in the New Testament. Baptism in Christ represents the reunification of male and female, "being one in Christ Jesus" according to *Galatians 3:28*, and implies the abolition of sexual differentiation.

In particular during the second and third centuries CE, the ideal of following Christ as a virgin became a dominant element in the nascent Christian church. This development required broadening the idea of virginity to include those who had been sexually active but now chose to abstain. Just as Christ was unmarried and single, so his followers too should be virgins. But *imitatio Christi* means more than just an ascetic life of sexual renunciation. It is actually a reversion of the fateful division of mankind into sexually active males and females after the Fall, which started with the creation of Eve from Adam as described in *Genesis 2:21f*. According to an apocryphal logion of Christ quoted in *2 Clement*, a treatise dating back to the middle of the second century CE, the kingdom of God will come "when the two will be one, and the outer like the inner, and the male will be united with the female, so that there will be neither male nor female, but the two will be one."

The same language occurs in logion 22 of the *Gospel of Thomas*, an apocryphal gospel that originated in the Syriac-speaking East and dates from about 200 CE. The reunification of male and female is explained as the transformation of women into men. When Simon Peter said to Jesus and the disciples, "Let Mary go out from among us, because women are not worthy of the Life," Jesus said, "See, I shall lead her, so that I will make her male, that she too may become a living spirit, resembling you males. For every woman who makes herself male will enter the kingdom of Heaven" (logion 114).

This transcendence of sexuality is also described as

becoming like children who do not yet know sexual shame. In the same *Gospel of Thomas* the disciples ask Jesus, "When wilt Thou be revealed to us and when will we see Thee?" And Jesus said, "When you take off your clothing without being ashamed, and take your clothes and put them under your feet as the little children and tread on them, then shall you behold the Son of the Living One and you shall not fear" (logion 37). When the apostle Thomas converted a royal bridal couple from "filthy intercourse" to a pure virginal life, as we are told in the apocryphal *Acts of Thomas*, written in the Syrian East around 225 CE, the bride took off her veil, because "the veil of corruption is taken away from her, and the deed of shame has been removed." According to her own words, she is "betrothed to the true Husband," a situation recalling *Genesis 2:24f.*: ". . . and they shall be one flesh. And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed."

The union between the virgin and Christ the true bridegroom was often celebrated in the ritual of the Bridal Chamber that is attested in nascent Syrian Christianity as well as in sectarian gnostic groups. It represented the union with Christ the Second Adam that restored the asexual androgynous condition of mankind in paradise before the Fall. Where there is no longer male or female, a new world has come that is paradise regained. The life of the virgins is, therefore, often characterized as angelical life (*bios aggelikos*), referring to *Luke 20:27-40*.

The Christian virgins who had overcome gender differentiation demonstrated their paradisiacal state in different ways. They sometimes lived chastely together in one house or community, to show how they could live without passions. Often they lived singly outside common human society in isolation, for example, in the desert, because neutralization of sexuality implies a renunciation of all ties that link a person with society, since marriage and procreation are linked with its survival. [See *Eremetism*.] Sexually and socially the virgins were ambiguous: they were neither male nor female, and they lived an angelical eternal paradisiacal life among or on the outskirts of human mortal society. They even demonstrated the new life in their dress: the virgin Thecla in the apocryphal *Acts of Paul and Thecla* dressed like a man and had her hair cut short. She is reminiscent of Joan of Arc, the virgin of Orléans, who also dressed like a man and played an intermediate role.

The virginal life meant perpetual struggle with bodily passions, the manifestations of Satan. Like Christ, Christian virgins could win that struggle and undo the inheritance of Adam's fate of sexuality and death. Their life is, therefore, often depicted as a permanent war or

struggle, a motif that had its roots in the antique world and exercised a deep influence on Christian tradition. The virgins became saints who mediated between this world and God because they kept an intermediate, ambiguous position. Their symbolic behavior pointed to their mediating function, as did that of the stylites, early Christian ascetics who lived on the tops of pillars representing the link between heaven and earth.

But the most anomalous phenomenon connected with virginity is virgin birth. A virgin mother is a powerful symbol of the relationship between the natural (human) and supernatural (divine) world. Through the Virgin Mary, Christ became the mediator *par excellence*, being God and man at the same time. Thus virginity is also a sign of the power to cross the boundary of biological existence, to mediate between body and socioreligious ideals, between what is and what ought to be. In this way we can order our biological existence and social world through the most powerful symbols we have, the sexual body that is our only way of survival and our eternal fate.

[See also *Celibacy*; *Chastity*; *Virgin Goddess*; and *Virgin Birth*. Related discussions can be found in *Child and Androgynes*, which treat the imagery central to the religious theme of virginity.]

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VIRGIN MARY. *See* Mary.

VISIONS. Present-day usage of the term *vision* goes back to the thirteenth-century Italian theologian Thomas Aquinas, who first used the word to refer to a "supernatural" manifestation. It describes a religious experience that involves seeing and, frequently, the other senses as well. The quality of the experience suggests that the content of the perception is real, a direct, unmediated contact with a nonordinary aspect of reality that is external and independent of the perceiver. "[Vision] is very real," says Lame Deer, a medicine man of the Sioux nation. "It hits you sharp and clear like an electric shock. You are wide awake and, suddenly, there is a person standing next to you who you know can't be there at all" (*Lame Deer, Seeker of Visions*, New York, 1972, p. 65).

The explanation that visions are due to imaginings, pseudoperception, or errors of perception is an expression of the cultural difference between the visionary and the present-day Western psychologist in their views concerning the nature of reality, a topic that would take us too far afield here. But we do need to take a stand against those psychiatrists who clinically equate vision with hallucination. In hallucination the content of what is reported is something to which nothing real corresponds; it is a delusion. For the health professional the presence of delusions is a sign of insanity, and in an application of the so-called pathology model of religious experience, visionaries are classified as mentally ill—a diagnosis often imputed to shamans. Yet in clinically healthy subjects visions dissolve spontaneously (as will be seen below), and, what is even more important for the institutionalization of the visionary experience, they can be induced and terminated ritually. This cannot be said of the hallucinations that are associated with insanity. Furthermore, we should be wary when encountering references to dreams in religious contexts. Semantically, the English word *dream* includes the notion that its content does not represent anything real. Non-Westerners, however, often set in opposition a dream category that is taken to be "real" or "valid" with one that is considered "ordinary." The latter category includes fleeting, or "invalid," dreams. The dreams referred to in such remarks as "Old Spotted Wolf had a painted lodge, which he was advised to make by the buffalo, in a dream" (George B. Grinnell, *The Cheyenne Indians*, vol. 1, 1972, p. 234), the dreams known from shamanistic traditions of flying, initiation, and dismemberment, and even the many revelatory dreams of the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament) should all properly be considered visions.

Visionary Experience. Contrary to commonly held Western views, having a vision is not a singular or rare event. The father of this Western misconception is once more Thomas Aquinas, who held that the human world and the sacred realm are separated by a wide chasm. A report of a vision was therefore indicative of a rare event, something that could take place only under extraordinary circumstances. In reality, visions are known to all societies, and their use in ritual is widespread.

When a type of behavior thus crosses boundaries, irrespective of ethnic or religious divisions, we may have to look to physical rather than cultural reasons. After all, human beings constitute one species only. We all have the same kind of body, the same nervous system. And, indeed, countless reports and modern field observations by anthropologists indicate that, when a person has a vision, certain physical changes occur. In what is popularly called a trance, the pupils may widen, muscles become rigid, and breathing seem shallow. Some visionaries will fall into what appears to be a deep sleep or even a dead faint. In such a trance, as Barbara W. Lex, a medical anthropologist, maintains, two opposing arousals of the nervous system are experienced. Their alternating action produces relaxation, and this accounts for the trance's beneficial effect. Simultaneously, the brain synthesizes β -endorphins (the body's own painkillers), as I learned in a study in which the trance experience was induced in a religiously neutral environment. (See Ingrid Müller's M.D. dissertation, University of Freiburg im Breisgau, in progress.) These endorphins are thought to be responsible on the biological level for the joy, euphoria, and "sweetness" that are often reported in the visions of Christian mystics. As I also learned from fieldwork, these physiological changes must be produced before the visions can occur. In some mysterious way, then, the body becomes a perceiving organ for the sacred dimension of reality.

This manner of viewing the visionary event runs counter to another cherished notion inherited from the Middle Ages, namely that humans are dualistic in nature, consisting of a body and a separate soul. Rather, it seems to modern science that human beings are biopsychological systems. This view echoes ideas put forth by Galen, a Greek physician of the second century CE, who contended that mind and matter are different aspects of the same stuff. In other words, not the soul but the entire human being is having the vision.

The ritual trance, or ecstasy, as an altered state of consciousness, is responsible for even basic perceptions of a nonordinary quality. "Hearing" voices is not plain hearing. Those who experience voices can readily distinguish them from ordinary speech. "I do not hear it in so many words," explained a German university stu-

dent who reported being possessed by demons and hearing Jesus and Mary speaking to her; "I am given to know." (See my book *The Exorcism of Anneliese Michel*, New York, 1981.) "Seeing" also takes place on a different level. As a blind !Kung San explained, the great god kept his eyeballs for him in a little pouch, giving them to him only during the medicine dance; and when the dance was over, he had to return them to the god. That is, he could see only while in trance. A changed quality is also reported during experience with an incubus—that is, when a spirit has sexual intercourse with a human being. In classical Greek tradition such sexual contact might make a diviner out of a woman, as happened when Apollo "raped" Cassandra. The Inquisition endlessly quizzed women accused of witchcraft concerning intercourse with Satan. When given the chance, these women testified that this was not like making love in ordinary reality.

Under certain circumstances, about which we know very little, clinically healthy human beings may inadvertently create the necessary biopsychological preconditions for a visionary experience—that is, they may "stray" into it. When this happens, as I found during fieldwork observations of a millenarian movement in the Yucatán, in Mexico, a regular pattern will assert itself, which, if experienced in its entirety, will take about thirty-five or forty days. The trance episode is apparently most intense at the beginning, and what is seen by participants during this time typically is white. The man who started the Yucatán millenarian movement initially saw white demons. A woman from another apostolic congregation in the same area saw "white angels on white horses galloping by, carrying white flags, very, very white." From the New Testament we know that when the women went to Jesus' tomb, whatever they saw there—an angel, two angels, two men, or one young man—the vision was bathed in dazzling light, white as snow. The initial vision of Kotama, the founder of Sūkyō Mahikari, one of the "new religions" of Japan, was of a white-haired old man standing in a white cloud. The next phase of the trance is characterized by a gold or orange glow: the Yucatecan apostolic saw burning candles; Kotama's old man was washing clothes in a golden tub. Finally, there is a "double" vision, with ordinary and nonordinary perception overlapping. The Yucatecan went to the cathedral in Mérida and saw a procession of priests whose heads were those of demons. The woman from the other apostolic congregation saw a big Bible fastened above the entrance to the hospital where she was taken. The prophet Muḥammad watched the angel Gabriel astride the horizon, and no matter which way he turned, the angel was always there on the horizon. The widely reported voices are

probably also part of this last phase in many instances, as another superimposition of a visionary (i.e., auditory) perception on the ordinary environment. Kotama's episode, for instance, concluded with a voice telling him his new name and giving him instructions. Eventually the vision dissolves, leaving only ordinary reality as the perceptual field.

Not everyone goes through the entire visionary sequence. It is possible to stray into it anywhere along the way. But whether complete or not, its extraordinary and impressive character can result in a conversion experience for the visionary and if the social configuration is right, religious innovation follows. According to legend, the Buddha's enlightenment came at daybreak after a sequence of visions in which he saw first all his own rebirths, then other beings dying and passing into the five destinies of existence, and finally the chain that bound all beings to continued, recurrent death and rebirth. Muḥammad's prophethood was heralded by a complete visionary sequence. First he experienced "true visions" resembling the brightness of daybreak. Several days later the angel Gabriel came to him with a coverlet of brocade (gold?) with some writing on it and commanded him to read it. Still later, Muḥammad beheld Gabriel on the horizon. A hundred years ago Wovoka, the Ghost Dance messiah, told of his vision that, "when the sun died, I went up to heaven and saw God and all the people that had died a long time ago. God told me to come back and tell my people they must be good and love one another, and not fight, or steal, or lie. He gave me this dance to give to my people." And in this century, the cargo cults of Melanesia have been characterized by spontaneously occurring visions. Leaders of various cults have told of hearing voices, seeing lights, and meeting native gods and fairylike beings of the forests and waters. They have spoken, too, of journeys to heaven (an idea borrowed from Westerners) and of visits to the Hiyoyoa, their own otherworld. [See *Cargo Cults*.]

While these spontaneous episodes of visionary experience dissolve without the aid of ritual, there is another class of vision in which this is not the case. This is the so-called shamanistic illness, reported predominantly in Asia but also in Africa, North America, and, sporadically, other areas as well. Medical anthropologists suspect that in some instances the triggering mechanism may be biochemical, for example, resulting from a socially prescribed change in nutrition, but such causes cannot often be pinpointed. Its onset is variously signaled by high fever, swelling of either the limbs or the entire body, prolonged unconsciousness, and inability to eat; at times, there is also an indomitable urge to flee into the wilderness. These changes are preceded, ac-

accompanied, or followed by visions. The condition, which may linger for years, is classed not only as an illness but also as a sign that the sufferer is destined, singled out by an agency of the sacred ranges of reality, for a future as a religious specialist. Cure is effected by a ritual that is usually initiatory in nature.

One example among many comes from the German ethnographer Peter Snoy. In his book *Bagrot* (Graz, 1975), Snoy tells of a Yeshkun shaman from the Karakoram Mountains (part of the Himalayan system). When this man was about twenty he was walking home one day when suddenly he saw five fairies dancing in the fields. They did not talk to him, but the next day he had the unconquerable urge to run away into the mountains to join them. He started raging, and five men finally managed to tie him up. He was kept tied up in his house for a whole year, and the fairies visited him several times each day, descending through the smoke hole and singing and dancing for him. Eventually, the man's village arranged an initiation feast for him. A goat was sacrificed, and he drank its blood, which the fairies told him was milk. And for the first time he danced, performing what is in his society an important part of shamanistic séances. Now this man works as a healer and diviner.

Reporting from present-day Africa, the British social anthropologist Adrian Boshier, in "African Apprenticeship" (in *Parapsychology and Anthropology*, New York, 1974), tells the story of Dorca, a Zulu *sangoma*, that is, a diviner and healer. For three years, Dorca was sick in bed. During this time her spirit left her body every night, and she saw many things and visited places where she had never been. One night in a vision her dead grandfather came to see her. He told her that he liked her very much and that his spirit would enter her body so that she would be able to help her people. She refused, but spirit *sangomas* came to her every night, showed her beads and herbs and a feather headdress she was to make, and sang her a song that she was to learn. Finally her grandfather's spirit threatened to kill her if she continued to resist. Her mother thereupon took her to the house of an aunt who was also a *sangoma*. There Dorca sang the spirit song and danced for many hours. This was the beginning of her training as a *sangoma*.

In most non-Western societies, visions are an integral part of religious ritual. As Lame Deer says, "By themselves these things [rituals] mean nothing. Without the vision and the power this learning will do no good" (1972, p. 13). It is understandable, therefore, that such societies cannot rely on the fortuitous occurrence of visionary experiences but need ways for inducing them.

Many strategies for inducing visions utilize rhythmic

stimulation. Inuit (Eskimo) ritual specialists use drums, as do various Siberian shamans, for whom the drum represents the magic horse on which they ride to the beyond. [See Drums.] Such stimulation is so effective that by merely shaking a gourd rattle and using traditional postures, a visionary experience can be induced in volunteers in a religiously neutral environment. (See my article "Body Posture and the Religious Altered State of Consciousness: An Experimental Investigation," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 1984.) Other methods involve sensory deprivation, as used by the Shakers and by the Spiritual Baptists of Saint Vincent Island in their mourning ritual; isolation and fasting, as practiced by the Oglala Indians and other societies; and fasting and self-mortification, as in the initiation ritual of the Plains Indians, during which adolescents seeking a vision would fast, bathe in icy streams, and crawl naked over jagged rocks in order to acquire a guardian spirit. Christian mystics employed similar strategies. The German monk Suso (Heinrich Seuse, 1295–1366), for instance, was able to achieve several visions daily for a period of about sixteen years by fasting extensively and by sleeping in a tight undergarment through which nails protruded into his skin.

Even intense concentration in combination with nothing more than certain breathing techniques may bring about visions, as we have learned from the Chinese Taoist philosopher and mystic Chuang-tzu (369–286?). Chuang-tzu told of a master called Tzu-ch'i, who "sat leaning on his armrest, staring up at the sky and breathing—vacant and far away." The changes wrought in him were striking to his companion, who asked, "What is this? Can you really make the body like a withered tree and the mind like ashes? The man leaning on the armrest now is not the one who leaned on it before" (quoted in *Poetry and Speculation of the Rg Veda* by Willard Johnson, Berkeley, 1980, p. xxvii). Tzu-ch'i explained that by virtue of this change he was able to hear the piping of the earth and the piping of the heavens.

Other societies employ a number of different psychedelics to achieve visions. The use of such drugs goes back to antiquity and is widely distributed geographically. Mushrooms such as the fly agaric (*Amanita muscaria*) were probably known to Mesolithic Paleosiberians (about 8000 BCE). Mesoamerica and South America are particularly rich in plants that contain the requisite alkaloids, and many societies there utilize them ritually. But there are also reports of their religious application from every other continent. [See Psychedelic Drugs.] At first glance, the use of psychedelics seems to represent an easy way of achieving visions, and for this reason many North American Indians reject them. As

Lame Deer said contemptuously, "Even the butcher boy at his meat counter will have a vision after eating peyote" (1972, p. 64). Actually, though, matters are not quite that simple. Many of the substances bring about an undifferentiated condition of intoxication, and seeing the right vision requires training. Thus Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, in his book *Amazonian Cosmos* (Chicago, 1971), discusses the use of *Banisteriopsis caapi* by the Desana Indians of South America. He tells that during intoxication, the Desana religious specialist needs to learn to see the Milky Way as a road, the hills and pools as communal houses of the spirits, and the animals as people. Those who are unable to go so far in their visions see only clouds and stones, "and the birds laugh at them." In another instance reported by Reichel-Dolmatoff, during a communal rite of the same society, the men take the drug, and the priest, who has abstained, talks them through their visions.

Forms of Visions and Types of Society. It appears that, cross-culturally, the neurophysiology of visionary experience remains the same. Neither does the form in which it is expressed vary much, if we contemplate only the religions of a particular type of society, of agriculturalists, for instance. However, salient differences appear when we compare the religious expression of one societal type with that of another, that of agriculturalists, for example, with that of hunters. There are, of course, syncretic patterns, for societies change, and so do their religions. But it is still possible to recognize certain fundamental forms.

(In the following passages, the "ethnographic present" is used in giving examples from non-Western societies, although in many instances the rituals mentioned have fallen victim to Western conquest and aggressive missionizing.)

Visions of hunter-gatherers. The way of life of the hunter-gatherer is the most ancient and venerable of all human adaptations. Our antecedents were hunters and gatherers for a million years or more before any cultivation of the soil was introduced. In such societies that are still extant, visionary experiences are varied, involving a highly sophisticated use of religious trance. Hunter-gatherers understand the ordinary and the non-ordinary aspects of reality to be closely intertwined, indeed to coexist in time and space, as one Pygmy elder from the Ituri rain forest in Zaire expressed it. All adult men can easily switch from seeing ordinary reality to seeing its nonordinary aspect, having learned to do so early on, usually during initiation rites. In the sacred range a man can see the "spirits," that is, the non-ordinary aspects of stones, mountains, waters, and winds, of plants, insects, and animals. He sees the spirits of the unborn, one of which he has to take to his wife

before she bears his child. The spirits of the dead gather around when a feast is being prepared or during a medicine dance, and they need to be invited to take part. An individual spirit of a dead loved one may appear to teach a man or a woman a new song, game, or ritual. A murderer's essence may loiter at the tomb of his victim, and beings of curious shape may warn the living of danger. If they penetrate someone's body, they make him ill by leaving behind a bone, visible to the healer, who will remove it in a curing ritual by sucking it out. People also tell of seeing strange neighbors, such as the "no-knees" of the San, beings who catch the sun as it sets and kill it. After the sun has been cooked, the no-knees eat it and throw its shoulder blade to the east, where it rises once more.

The most spectacular institutionalized visionary experience of hunter-gatherers, however, is the spirit journey, a perfect expression of the hunter's life way, in which individual initiative is of paramount importance. The Pygmies embark on this journey by "crossing a river." On the "other side," they may visit the realm of the spirits of the dead, where everything is reversed but still as orderly as is earthly existence. For the !Kung San of the Kalahari Desert the great god used to let down a cord from the sky by which he allowed the medicine man to climb up to visit him. Nowadays, however, during the medicine dance, medicine men send their spirits out to fly into the veld while their bodies lie lifeless, for there is nothing to hold them up. They might see the spirits of the dead there, or the great god, or perhaps they go because they need to order a lion to stop disturbing people by roaring at night. An Australian medicine man takes a postulant up to the sky by assuming the form of a skeleton and fastening a pouch to himself into which he places the postulant, who is reduced to the size of a very small child. Sitting astride a rainbow, the medicine man pulls himself up with an arm-over-arm action. When near the top, he throws the young man out onto the sky as part of his initiation. An Inuit shaman will swim muscle-naked through rock to the underworld in order to seek out Tornassuq, the earth spirit, and inquire of him the reasons for recent misfortunes of his band. Other spirit journeys, as told of by North American Indians, are undertaken to recover a lost soul, whose absence makes its owner sick.

Visionary experiences serve many important functions within hunter-gatherer society. On the individual level, a vision bestows well-being and strength as well as power to speak impressively, to cure and to divine, and to protect the group against danger from the outside. For the community, visions are a part of many rituals. A spirit journey, for example, is an important communal event. When an Inuit shaman starts out on his

trip, the entire village is present, and all are there when he comes back to tell of his adventures. Among the Saliish, a tribe of North American Indians, the dramatization of the journey in a spirit canoe in quest of a lost soul is a most impressive performance. What was perceived in a vision is represented on cave walls, or on rocks, painted on bark, or carved in bone for all to see. For a while, such innovative iconography will be confined to the originating group, but unencumbered by written tradition, it eventually diffuses to neighboring bands and even to the wider cultural area, continually reinvigorating religious life.

Visions of horticulturalists. About ten to twelve thousand years ago human beings began growing some of their own food instead of merely collecting it. The areas cultivated were no more than gardens, hence the name *horticulturalist*. Horticulturalists also continued hunting, some extensively, others less so, depending on the ecology of their respective region. While European tradition retains no memory of the hunter-gatherer past, the horticulturalist way of life is reflected in recorded history. What we know of the Celtic, Germanic, and Greek societies clearly indicates their horticulturalist character. Societies of this type survive in Southeast Asia and, especially, in Mesoamerica and South America. Their members' visions have much in common with those of hunter-gatherers, but not all horticulturalists learn the behavior. Instead, there is a more or less pronounced tendency for religious specialists to assume the spiritual role that is performed by all male hunter-gatherers.

The spirit journey of the hunter-gatherer has undergone significant permutations in various horticulturalist societies. Their legends tell of full-fledged spirit journeys like those of the hunter-gatherers: of the Teutonic god Óðinn (Odin) who travels the earth, of a famous medicine man of the South American Guaraní who calls on First Woman in her maize garden in the mythical East. But horticulturalists cannot explore such distant ranges with impunity. Just as Orpheus cannot retrieve Eurydice from the underworld, no Amazonian Akwē-Shavante can ever visit the village of the spirits of the dead, although some have had offers from the spirits of friendly departed relatives to take them there. Instead, horticulturalists undertake a lesser experience, an actual journey that culminates in the desired vision. Initiates of the Eleusinian mysteries of ancient Greece descended into caves; the Huichol Indians of Mexico travel over land in search of peyote; adherents of Shintō climb Mount Fuji. Even the North American Indians' vision quest and their search for the guardian spirit is of this nature. The spirit journey may also be entirely vicarious, as when the Brazilian Yānomamö Indians send

their friends, the miniature *hekura* spirits who live under stones and in mountains, to enemy villages to eat the souls of the children there. (See Napoleon A. Chagnon, *Yānomamö: The Fierce People*, New York, 1977.) Visions are given shape in paintings on rock and in carvings, embroidery, and clay. They invest the practitioner not only with personal stature but also with power that leads to success in curing, hunting, and war, all in the service of the community.

Visions of nomadic pastoralists. Nomadic-pastoralist societies appear in a number of different adaptations. Some such societies arose from hunters who had attached themselves to wild herds of animals, such as reindeer, or from hunters who had acquired pet animals, such as horses, which had expanded into domesticated herds. Other nomadic-pastoralist societies arose as extensions of agriculturalist societies, and still others developed in which only the men are pastoralists, while the women cultivate the soil. The visionary experiences of nomadic pastoralists correlate with the differences in their origins.

Among reindeer herders, for instance, such as the Evenki of northern Siberia, the hunter's richly appointed sacred dimension is still preserved, although it is accessible only to the shaman. In his visions, the shaman constructs the fence that surrounds his clan's territory and protects it against enemy shamans. He communicates with the ruling spirits, the "masters" of waters, mountains, forests, and species of beasts. In his spirit journeys he guides departing souls to the lower world, at which time he must ask the mistress of that world for permission for the soul to enter. He also travels to the upper world, where he calls on Grandfather Spirit and the supreme spirit ruler of all animal and plant life as well as on the spirits of the sun, moon, stars, thunder, clouds, sunset, and daybreak. He even knows the way to the storehouse of the unborn, which is guarded by Bear. In addition, he masters the art of the vicarious spirit journey by swallowing his helping spirits and then sending them out to hunt down a disease spirit or fight an enemy shaman. He is healer and diviner, and the marvelous ritual dramas of his visions were, until their destruction by Soviet authorities, at the heart of his society's social life. [See Shamanism.]

Traditions die hard, however. The Hungarian horse nomads have been cut off from their own cultural area in Inner Asia for over a millennium. By the year 1000 they had been converted to Roman Catholicism, and their economy changed radically. Yet to this day they retain a clandestine shamanistic tradition, with one *táltos* (shaman) fighting the other in visionary battles, and with "women of knowledge" who are able to see the spirits of the dead.

In passing to a discussion of nomadic-pastoralist societies with important ties to agriculture, we leave the visionary world of the hunters entirely behind. The Nilotic Dodoth, for instance, whose women garden while the men tend the cattle—a pattern found only in Africa—have but one god. This god is so remote and vague that little is known about him. He communicates with humans by such messengers as shooting stars, and no shaman ever visits him, although his worshipers send him sacrificial oxen. The most important ritual specialist among the Dodoth is the diviner, whose oracles have a literal quality: “[Lomotin] would see it raining in a dream, then see a red ox being sacrificed and he would know, when he awoke, that the sacrifice of such an ox would bring rain. He was uncannily right” (Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, *Warrior Herdsmen*, New York, 1965, p. 173).

For the Tuareg, nomads of the Sahara and nominally Islamic, God (Allāh) is equally a distant overseer, who sends the spirits of Islamic saints as messengers, or angels, who are often identified with lightning. In a faint outline of pre-Islamic religion, Tuareg men have dealings with spirits called *kel asouf*, which attach themselves to their hair, help them divine, and are seen doing battle with each other.

The messenger complex is reminiscent of Judeo-Christian tradition, and, indeed, both Judaism and Islam have their roots in nomadic pastoralism. Angels as messengers abound in both the Hebrew scriptures and the New Testament, from the one that spoke to Hagar, the mother of Ishmael, to the heavenly host who announced the birth of Jesus and the white-haired angel wearing a golden girdle who appeared to John according to the *Book of Revelation*. Muḥammad's numerous contacts with the angel Gabriel have been mentioned before. [See Angels.]

Spirit journeys are reported both of Moses and of Muḥammad, with the former, for instance, going up Mount Sinai and there encountering God, and the latter rising through the night, ascending to heaven, and conversing with God. Traces of these journeys are even contained in the New Testament, as in *Matthew* 4:1–3: “Then Jesus was led into the desert by the Spirit to be tempted by the devil. And he fasted forty days and forty nights and afterwards he was hungry. And the tempter came to him.”

The spirit journey was later taken up by the Islamic Sūfī mystics. The first one of these to give a personal account of such experiences was Najm al-Dīn (c. 1145–1223), the famous mystic and teacher of the city of Khorezm (present-day Khiva in the Uzbek S.S.R.), an important center of learning at the time. Among the many mystic experiences he reported are visions of Mu-

hammad as well as numerous spirit journeys. (See *Die fawā'ih al-ḡamāl wa fawātiḥ al-ḡalal des Naḡmuddīn al-Kubrā*, translated by Fritz Meier, Wiesbaden, 1957.) Kubrā's spirit journeys were not metaphorical but were entirely real to him. He experienced the sensations of being lifted off the ground into the air, of being borne aloft by angels, and of flying. It was not his body that flew but “he himself, his heart or holy spirit, which leaves the body through a hole on the right side, opened by the formula of contemplating God.” Once in heaven, he encountered God's properties at various locations, and while passing them he incorporated them into his being. Kubrā, who traveled widely and who carried Classical Greek and medieval Christian ideas back with him to Inner Asia, no doubt also knew about the Jewish mystics of his time, such as Mosheh ben Naḥman (Nahmanides) and perhaps also of the Italian friar Francis of Assisi.

By the early thirteenth century, however, mysticism was no longer part of European popular culture but was, rather, an enterprise of the intelligentsia, who induced mystical experiences for personal enlightenment. In fact, Moses ben Naḥman was criticized for having made mysticism accessible to the masses, because it gave rise to visionaries, who supposedly were followed blindly by the credulous. Thomas Aquinas's premise that visions are a rarely occurring bridge between the human and the divine must be seen in this context. Barely two generations later, Suso warned some nuns not to attempt any mystic experiences, although he himself had extensive visions. Once, while in a faint, “it seemed to him in a vision that he was being conducted to a choir, where the mass was being sung. A large number of the heavenly host was present in that choir, sent by God, where they were to sing a sweet melody of heavenly sound. This they did, and they sang a new and joyous melody that he had never heard before, and it was so very sweet that it seemed to him that his soul would dissolve for great joy” (*Briefbüchlein*, my translation). The mystics soon found themselves in opposition to orthodoxy in all three monotheistic traditions, and within the century both Franciscans and Sūfīs were being executed for blasphemy. The pagan traditions of popular culture, with its legends of a wild huntsman and witches' sabbaths, deteriorated without institutionalization or support from the larger society, eventually to be wiped out by the Inquisition.

Visions of agriculturalists. As humans turn to tilling ever larger open fields and to the consuming task of exerting control over their habitat, the institutionalization of the visionary experience disappears entirely, and even spontaneous occurrence is suppressed because of its perceived threat to the written tradition. It is diffi-

cult, for instance, to gain recognition for a new shrine from the Vatican authorities, because claims of "genuine" visions are rarely credited. The predominant experience in the religions of large agricultural societies, such as Chinese popular religion, Christianity, and Hinduism, is instead spirit possession. [See Spirit Possession.]

The urban adaptation. The situation in modern urban centers is similar to that in agriculturalist religions. Large urban movements such as pentecostalism or Umbanda, an Afro-Brazilian healing cult, as well as some Japanese "new religions," rely on possession. If visions occur at all, they usually come about outside the religious context, as was the case with the near-death experiences investigated by the physician Raymond A. Moody, Jr.

In general, it seems that as human beings develop various adaptations to their habitat beyond that of hunting and gathering, the frequency and rich variety of visionary experience in their world begins to diminish. Indeed, this reduction appears to be in inverse proportion to their control over the habitat, for as control over ordinary reality increases, the grasp on the sacred dimension as it is expressed in visions starts to slip away. In the spirit journey the initiative belongs to humans; in spirit possession humans are manipulated. Institutionalization of the visionary experience causes it to dissolve even faster—in the West, ending with the mystics. Since the biological capacity I described earlier remains intact, however, we may see a resurgence of all modes of ecstasy as more leisure time becomes available in the postindustrial era. Tendencies toward such a development are evident in the countercultures of both the United States and Europe.

[*The relationship between visions and dreams is discussed in Dreams. For a treatment of the experience of the appearance of the divine, see Hierophany, and for a discussion of the many ways in which the divine communicates with mankind, see Revelation. The role of images in visionary experience is the topic of Images, article on Images and Imagination.*]

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struggles of pagan religion in Europe that involved contact with the sacred dimension, with special regard to the role of women. The footnotes in particular contain a wealth of interesting material. An excellent study of Sufism is Annemarie Schimmel's *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill, 1975).

Carlos Castaneda's work, especially *The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge* (Berkeley, 1968) and *A Separate Reality: Further Conversations with Don Juan* (New York, 1971), whether entirely reliable ethnographically or not, still represents a graphic description of the feel of altered states of consciousness. For an unimpeachably authentic view of American Indian visionary experience, *Black Elk Speaks* (1961; reprint, Lincoln, Nebr., 1979), as told by the holy man of the Oglala Lakota through John G. Neihardt, the poet laureate of Nebraska, remains unsurpassed. The anthropologist Michael Harner, in *The Way of the Shaman: A Guide to Power and Healing* (New York, 1980), provides instructions for self-experimentation on the basis of what he learned in his fieldwork with Indian societies of South America. The interest of the counterculture in such experiments is reviewed in Tom Pinkson's study *A Quest for Vision* (San Francisco, 1976). A readable collection of case histories of near-death experiences was put together by Raymond A. Moody, Jr., in *Life after Life* (New York, 1975).

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VIṢṆU. In the age of the *Ṛgveda*, India's oldest religious document (c. 1200–1000 BCE), Viṣṇu must already have been a more important divine figure than it would appear from his comparatively infrequent appearances in the texts. He is celebrated in a few hymns, of which stanzas 1.22.16–21 came to be a sort of confession of faith, especially among the Vaikhānasa Vaiṣṇavas, who adapted them for consecratory purposes and for invoking the god's presence and protection. [See Vaikhānasa.] These stanzas eulogize the essential feature of the character of the Vedic Viṣṇu: namely, his taking, from the very place where the gods promote man's interests, three steps, by which he establishes the broad dimensional actuality of the earthly space in which all beings abide (see also *Ṛgveda* 1.154.1 and 3, etc.). His highest step is in the realm of heaven, beyond mortal ken. Thus, his penetration of the provinces of the universe, in accordance with the traditional Indian interpretation of the character of the original god as the representative of pervasiveness, must be considered a central feature in the vast complex of ideas for which the name of the early Viṣṇu stood.

Virāj, the idea of extending far and wide the female principle of creation and the hypostasis of the universe conceived as a whole, came to be one of Viṣṇu's epithets. Being essential to the establishment and maintenance of the cosmos and beneficial to the interests of men and gods, his pervasiveness obtained ample room

for the former and divine power for the latter. To the sacrificer, who ritually imitates Viṣṇu's three strides and so identifies with him, the god imparts the power to conquer the universe and attain "the goal, the safe foundation, the highest light" (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.9.3.10). Viṣṇu's pervasiveness also manifests itself in the central cosmic axis, the pillar of the universe, whose lower end is visibly represented by the post erected on the sacrificial ground. This axis reaches the earth in the center or navel of the universe, putting the cosmic levels into communication with each other; it thus provides a means of traveling to heaven as well as a canal through which heavenly blessings reach man. In this navel is located the sacrifice with which Viṣṇu is constantly identified.

In the *Ṛgveda* Viṣṇu is Indra's ally and intimate friend. In the later Vedic Brāhmaṇa literature, two *Ṛgvedic* myths connected with Viṣṇu, or with Viṣṇu and Indra, are further developed so as to become, like two other myths, the seeds of some of the god's *avatāras*. After Indra slew a boar that kept the goods of the *asuras* (antigods), Viṣṇu, (i.e., the sacrifice) carried the animal off, with the result that the gods obtained the goods of their enemies. This boar, then identified with the creator god Prajāpati, is also said to have raised up the earth (*Śatapatha Brāh.* 14.1.2.11); in course of time Viṣṇu fuses with Prajāpati, and in the *Mahābhārata* (3.142.56, Bombay ed.) it is he who saves the overcrowded earth by raising it up. [See Prajāpati.] The great fish (*Śatapatha Brāh.* 1.8.1) that delivers Manu, the first human, from the deluge appears later as a form of Brahmā (*Mahābhārata* 3.185) and becomes in the post-epic Purāṇas an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu.

A conglomeration of religious currents contributed to the development of post-Vedic Viṣṇuism. In the centuries before the beginning of the common era, Viṣṇu fused with several divine, mythical, and heroic or legendary figures. Among them are (1) the primeval cosmic man (Puruṣa), embodying the idea that creation is the self-limitation of the transcendent person (*Ṛgveda* 10.90), which became the keystone of Vaiṣṇava philosophy; (2) the creator god Prajāpati; (3) Nārāyaṇa, a divine figure featured in the narrative of three ascetics who do not succeed in beholding him because this is a privilege of those who follow the path of *bhakti* (*Mahābhārata* 12.321ff.); and (4) Kṛṣṇa, who in the *Bhagavadgītā* (*Mahābhārata* 6.23–40) teaches, in human shape, how to combine a socially normal life with a prospect of final liberation. Although the names of these figures, when borne by Viṣṇu, came to represent particular aspects of his character and activities, they often also continued to indicate the principal persons of sometimes almost independent mythical themes. This plurality of names

also helped to overcome incongruities caused by the fact that Viṣṇu is both the supreme being and a deity responsible for particular duties and activities: "the only [triune] God, Janārdana [Kṛṣṇa], is called Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, accordingly, as he creates, preserves, or brings to an end" (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 1.2.62).

In the epic period (c. 500 BCE–200 CE) Viṣṇu definitely assumed that aspect of the godhead that he holds up to the present day, that of preserver and protector of the world, lord and ruler of all. Yet many of his names and epithets continue to refer to character traits proper to a great god in the mythological sphere. Moreover, the deeds and characters of parochial gods, especially those of Indra, are transferred to him. Whereas in the *Ṛgveda* he is not credited with warlike activities of his own but rather assists Indra in his encounters with demons, he is already at an early date described as fighting and killing antagonists who, like Jambha, the disturber of sacrifice, were in older versions slain by Indra.

In the extensive postepic Vaiṣṇava literature many mythical episodes are inserted to show that God, when devoutly worshiped, is willing to appear in one of his forms in order to help or protect his devotees. For instance, in the story of the two demons Madhu and Kaiṭabha—who in the older version (*Mahābhārata* 3.194) intimidated Brahmā and in the later version (*Jayākhyā Saṃhitā* 2.45ff.) stole the Veda so that the world fell to a bad state—the gods and demons praise Viṣṇu, who by his supernormal knowledge restores the Veda and who, after a battle of many thousands of years, kills the demons with a body consisting of *mantras* that represent his *śakti* (superempirical creative power). From this story originates his epithet *Madhusūdana*, or "destroyer of Madhu."

Viṣṇu is usually depicted as a four-armed, dark blue young man bearing in his hands a conch (an auspicious object that represents fertility and is supposed to strengthen the divine powers), a discus (his invincible flaming weapon), a mace, and a lotus (which, rising from the depths of the waters, evidences their life-supporting power). He wears the miraculous jewel Kaushtubha (which emerged from the churning of the ocean). The characteristic curl of hair on his chest is called the *śrīvatsa* ("favorite of the goddess Śrī), and characterizes him as the universal sovereign. These mythological attributes are often used as aids to devotion. The mere presence of Viṣṇu riding the eagle Garuḍa, the theriomorphic manifestation of his nature and energy, suffices, in myth, literature, and plastic arts, to subdue the demoniac serpents.

In the post-Vedic period Viṣṇu's consort is known by two names, *Śrī* and *Lakṣmī*; originally these were two different goddesses, the former representing fortune and

prosperity, the latter being closely connected with the ripe corn. Like Viṣṇu, Śrī-Lakṣmī is eternal and omnipresent. Associated in every possible way with the lotus symbol, she is said to have risen from the ocean to preside over earthly welfare. It is with the Goddess in such form that Viṣṇu is united in all of his incarnations: he, “the husband of Śrī,” is the creator; she, creation; she is the earth, he, its support; he is one with all male beings, she, with all female beings; and so on. In mythical imagery, Lakṣmī never leaves Viṣṇu’s side. In later Hinduism, she is, as Viṣṇu’s *śakti*, the instrumental and material cause of the universe, God himself being the efficient cause. Indissolubly associated with each other, they constitute the personal *brahman*, also called Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa. Nevertheless, they are distinct: she alone acts, but everything she does is the expression of his wishes. Lakṣmī also makes an appearance in various mythical stories under different names (Mahālakṣmī, Bhadrakālī, etc.). Many of these denote special aspects of Prosperity (Śrī-Lakṣmī); some appear, as companions of Viṣṇu, as the goddesses Victory (Jayā), Renown (Kīrti), and so on. While his alliance with his second consort, Bhūdevī, the Earth, stamps him as a bigamist, Viṣṇu’s relations with many incarnations of his spouse are often characterized by youthful passion, reckless adventure, and human—often too human—emotions. He ravishes Rukmiṇī—even though she has been intended for Śiśupāla, whom he beheads—and marries her (*Mahābhārata* 2.37ff.); soon she is said to be an incarnation of Śrī, destined to marry Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa (*Harivaṃśa* 104ff). [See also Goddess Worship, article on The Hindu Goddess.]

In his supreme and at the same time triune character, Viṣṇu, the Lord and highest Person, the unmanifest primordial principle, absorbs the universe at the end of a *yuga* (age of the world) by successively becoming the glowing sun, the scorching wind, and a torrential rain (*Matsya Purāṇa* 1.67). When the world has again become the undifferentiated water from which it once arose, Viṣṇu—according to some, together with Lakṣmī—sleeps on a thousand-headed serpent called Śeṣa, “the remainder” (because it represents the residue that remained after the universe and all its beings had been shaped out of the cosmic waters of the abyss), or Ananta, “the endless one” (who, symbolizing eternity, is identical with the ocean out of which the world will evolve as temporal existence and ultimately also with Viṣṇu himself). With the serpent and the ocean upon which this animal floats, Viṣṇu then constitutes the triune manifestation of the single divine cosmic substance and energy underlying all forms of phenomenal existence. During his sleep the world is “thought,” non-existent. When he awakes, he engages in meditation for

its re-creation. A lotus grows from his navel, and on this flower is born the demiurge Brahmā, who creates the world. Then, while residing in the highest heaven (Vai-kunṭha), Viṣṇu in the form of Puruṣa preserves the world until it is once again ripe for dissolution.

The development of many myths and mythical narratives attests to Viṣṇu’s adaptability and versatility. For instance, the older sources (*Mahābhārata* 1.16ff.) state only that Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa advised the gods and the *asuras* to churn the ocean in order to acquire from it *amṛta*; then, in the form of an anonymous woman, he recovered this drink of continued life from the *asuras*. Later versions relate his appearance as a fascinating young woman, Mohinī (“the deluding one”), tricking the *asuras* and distributing the *amṛta* among the gods.

In innumerable tales attesting to the popular belief in Viṣṇu’s intervention in the vicissitudes of individual lives, the mythical element is no less mixed up with legend than in the many hagiographic compilations, which, like devotional literature in general, reactivate the power inherent in the mythical stories. Invocation of the god’s protection is therefore often accompanied by a reference to one of his great exploits or important mythical aspects. Thus Kṛṣṇa-Viṣṇu, who made the gods happy by slaying Kaṃsa (*Mahābhārata* 2.13.29ff.), will no doubt prove a competent and reliable helper. Hearing the holy story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*—the heroic deeds of Viṣṇu descending to the earth to save mankind—is said to be a dependable way to long life, moral purity, and good fortune (*Rāmāyaṇa* 7, final chap.).

Synthesizing its theology, philosophy, mythology, and religious practice, Vaiṣṇavism distinguishes five forms of God:

1. God in his transcendent form with the six attributes: omniscience, activity based on independent lordship, ability, force, virtue combined with energy, and brilliant self-sufficiency.
2. The *avatāras*, in which God sends forth his Self to save the *dharma* (order, stability) and mankind and to protect the good and destroy the wicked, evidencing his providential concern with humanity as a whole. However full of the wonderful and miraculous, the *avatāra* myths represent Viṣṇu as an essentially human character whose actions are within the limits of our understanding. [See also Avatāra.]
3. The emanations (*vyūha*) of his power, namely, Vāsudeva (Kṛṣṇa), Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Anirudha (Kṛṣṇa’s brother, son, and grandson), which, like the *avatāras*, represent an attempt at maintaining a fundamental monotheistic principle while incorporating manifestations of his being. This is also an attempt to harmonize theology with mythology and

philosophy, for by assigning to these figures functions in a systematic explanation of the universe, theologians can account for Viṣṇu's part in its creation, preservation, and absorption. [See especially *Kṛṣṇa*.]

4. The immanent God, the inner ruler.
5. The *mūrti* (image or statue), God's most concrete form. [See also *Mūrti*.]

[For an overview of the worship of Viṣṇu in its various regional and historical manifestations, see Vaiṣṇavism. Viṣṇu's mythic dimensions are treated in Indian Religions, article on Mythic Themes. See also *Mahābhārata* and *Bhagavadgītā*.]

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VISUAL ARTS. See Architecture; Calligraphy; and Iconography; see also Aesthetics, article on Visual Aesthetics; Human Body, article on The Human Figure as a Religious Sign; and Modern Art.

VISUALIZATION. See Images, article on The Imaginal; Meditation; and Theosophy; see also Buddhism, Schools of, article on Esoteric Buddhism, and Taoism, overview article.

VITAL, ḤAYYIM (1543–1620), noted Jewish mystic. Ḥayyim Vital was born in Safad, the Galilean town north of Tiberias that was the site of an important renaissance of Jewish mystical activity in the sixteenth century. His teacher in rabbinic subjects was Mosheh Alshekh, who ordained him as a rabbi in 1590. In 1564 he became a student of Mosheh Cordovero, the most important teacher of Qabbalah (Jewish mysticism) in Sa-

fad before the arrival of Isaac Luria. When Luria came to Safad in 1570, Vital became his chief disciple, the role for which he is best known.

Following Luria's death two years later, Vital was one of several disciples who assembled a written version of the master's teachings, since Luria himself had recorded almost nothing on his own. Vital's corpus, the *Shemonah she'arim* (Eight Gates), is the most detailed version and the main one in which Lurianic teachings were circulated widely from about the year 1660. During his lifetime Vital sought to guard Luria's teachings jealously and to assume authority as the sole legitimate interpreter of his master's ideas. Thus in 1575 he secured the pledge of twelve of Luria's former disciples to study Lurianic teachings only with him, as well as a promise not to reveal more of Luria's doctrines than Vital wished. Such tactics were rooted partly in Vital's conviction that he alone was capable of explaining Luria's work, as well as in personal rivalries among Luria's disciples. In any case, this study fellowship lasted only a short time, for in 1577 Vital moved to Jerusalem where he served as a teacher and head of a school. In later years he lived again in Safad and in Damascus, where he died in 1620.

Besides his work as a teacher of Lurianic ideas and practices, Ḥayyim Vital composed a number of qabbalistic treatises on his own. He wrote a commentary to the *Zohar*, the classical text of thirteenth-century Qabbalah, based upon the teachings of Mosheh Cordovero, to which he subsequently added notes in accordance with Luria's ideas. An interesting and important treatise intended to appeal to a wide audience is Vital's *Sha'arei qedushah* (The Gates of Holiness). This book presents Vital's cosmological and anthropological views, culminating in an account of the process by which an individual might achieve a state of prophetic illumination. An adept, according to Vital's four-part program, must repent for all sins, meticulously observe all religious obligations, practice acts of purification such as ritual baths and the wearing of clean clothes, and enter into a state of perfect silence and solitude. Following these preparatory exercises the soul begins an ascent to its personal source in the divine realm as the adept meditates upon the ten *sefirot*, the divine qualities of personality that characterize the qabbalistic system. Successful contemplation results in various experiences of mystical inspiration, including having a revelation of the prophet Elijah.

Vital also composed a diary, *Sefer ha-ḥezyonot* (Book of Visions), which reveals his interest in all manner of magic and esoterica. Here Vital discloses his youthful enthusiasm for alchemy, which he later lamented, as well as his habit of visiting fortune tellers and magi-

cians in order to learn about the past history of his soul and promises for the future. *Sefer ha-ḥezyonot* also records his rich dream life, in which Vital communicates with various teachers and sages.

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VIVEKANANDA, religious name of Narendranath Datta, or Dutt (1863–1902), a leading spokesman for modern Hinduism in the late nineteenth century, founder of the Vedanta Society in the West and the Ramakrishna Mission in India. *Vivekananda* is the westernized form of the Sanskrit name *Vivekānanda* ("bliss of discerning knowledge").

Narendranath came from a Bengali family, *kāyastha* by caste, that since the early nineteenth century had raised its status through the process of westernization. Narendranath's grandfather had abandoned his wife and young son to become a traditional Hindu *saṃnyāsīn* ("renunciator"), but his son, Bisvanath Dutt, had become a prosperous lawyer in the Calcutta High Court. It was assumed that Narendranath would follow his father's profession. He entered college in Calcutta in 1878 and received his bachelor's degree in 1884, but when his father died shortly thereafter he turned from the law to a personal religious quest.

Narendranath belonged to the Brāhmo Samāj during his college years, supported its social reform programs, and agreed with many of its reformist religious doctrines, but he could not accept Brāhmo rejection of the *saṃnyāsīn* path to which he—like his grandfather—was attracted. In 1881 he met Ramakrishna (1836–1886), a celibate devotee of the goddess Kālī, a man unlearned in a formal sense but wise in religious experience. Although impressed by the depth of Ramakrishna's renunciation and spiritual attainments, Narendranath was disturbed by Ramakrishna's image-oriented worship of Kālī and his lack of social concern. As an intel-

lectual Brāhmo, Narendranath believed in the formlessness of God; Ramakrishna urged him to meet God in person by worshipping Kālī. Narendranath was deeply committed to social reform; Ramakrishna was concerned about individual spiritual transformation.

Unable to come to terms with Ramakrishna's views, Narendranath withdrew periodically during his college years to immerse himself in Western philosophy and science and in Indian music, for he excelled as a singer. Ramakrishna pursued him, seeing in Narendranath not only a youth whose singing touched his emotions but one who had the potential for greatness. It was only after Narendranath finished college and after his father died that he yielded to Ramakrishna's appeal. In 1885 Narendranath accepted Ramakrishna as his guru and began a period of intensive religious training that lasted until Ramakrishna's death in August 1886.

Before he died, Ramakrishna brought Narendranath to a personal experience of Kālī that he considered his pupil's final test and appointed him to guide his other disciples after his death. Narendranath accepted the responsibility, became a *saṃnyāsīn*, and taught the disciples as best he could for several years, but by 1889 he had lost confidence in his previous religious views. He left his fellow disciples in 1890 for an extended pilgrimage throughout India, during which he gradually developed a position that combined the nondualist philosophy of the Vedānta tradition, the devotional insights of Ramakrishna, and the social concerns that he identified with both the Buddha and modern reformers. When he heard that the World's Parliament of Religions was to be held in Chicago in 1893, he conceived a plan to seek Western material support for the revitalization of Hinduism and to share in return Hindu spiritual insights. After obtaining travel funds from the maharaja of Khetri and adopting the name *Vivekānanda*, suggested by his patron, he left for America.

Vivekananda was not the only Hindu representative at the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago in the autumn of 1893, but he was the most dynamic. In contrast to the learned dissertations by other Hindu speakers, Vivekananda gave a powerful argument for the universal truth of Hinduism that brought him widespread attention in the press and numerous speaking engagements. He soon began to attract a dedicated group of Western followers, and gradually shifted his plans from raising money for India to creating a worldwide religious movement based on the eternal truths of Hinduism. With that purpose, and with his new Western disciples as the core, he founded the Vedanta Society in New York in 1895. He soon had chapters in London and Boston, for which he summoned two swamis (Skt., *svāmīs*, "teachers") from India to help direct their work.

The mission to the West was well under way by the end of 1896 when Vivekananda left for India to begin the second phase of his program.

Vivekananda's arrival in India early in 1897 with a group of Western disciples was treated by the Indian press as a triumphal return, but not all Hindus were happy with his aggressive proselytizing of Westerners or with his unorthodox ideas. Ramakrishna's former disciples, whom Narendranath had left seven years earlier, were themselves uncertain how to respond to Narendranath-turned-Vivekananda and his Western disciples. They were even more uncertain when Vivekananda revealed his plan to turn them into a band of modern *saṃnyāsins* dedicated to social service, a plan that he claimed Ramakrishna himself had intended.

Vivekananda's dynamism and persuasive powers, however, carried the day, just as they had in the West. His orthodox critics were not all silenced, but the disciples were won over to his program of work in the world. To implement this program, Vivekananda founded the Ramakrishna Mission on 1 May 1897, and organized the disciples as monks in the Ramakrishna Order to carry out its work of education and service. In 1898, with money from Western disciples, he purchased a site near Calcutta for a center to house the Mission and Order. A worldwide organization was established by 1899, when Vivekananda turned over the active work to his Indian and Western disciples.

After visiting friends in America and Europe from 1899 to 1900, Vivekananda returned to India in semiretirement and died on 4 July 1902. In less than forty years of life, and in less than ten years of intensive effort, he had created a permanent link between Hinduism and the West in which Hinduism for the first time was the dominant influence. Vivekananda's teaching was not the Hinduism of the orthodox, however, or even that of Ramakrishna, but what Vivekananda called "practical Vedānta," a universal Hinduism that combined devotion and practical work for the world with the ultimate goal of union with the One.

[See also Brāhmo Samāj and the biography of Ramakrishna. For discussion of the Hindu tradition of renunciation, see Saṃnyāsa.]

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VLADIMIR I (d. 1015), founder and saint of the Russian Orthodox church. Vladimir (Volodimir, Valdimar?; meaning "he who rules the world") was the Varangian, or Scandinavian, prince of Kiev who established Christianity in the lands of Rus' and is thereby recognized as the founder of the Russian (and Ukrainian) Orthodox church. According to the legends recorded in the Russian *Primary Chronicle* (c. 1111), Vladimir, in his search for a religion for his pagan people, was courted by Latin Christians from the West as well as Jewish Khazars and Muslim Bulgars. He chose Greek Christianity when, the chronicle declares, his ambassadors reported to him after visiting the Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom (Hagia Sophia) in Constantinople: "We knew not whether we were in heaven or on earth. For on earth there is no such splendor or such beauty. . . . We cannot forget that beauty" (quoted in Dvornik, 1956, p. 205).

Vladimir married the Byzantine princess Anna and was baptized, with the Byzantine emperor as his godfather, by the bishop of the Greek city of Kherson, whose clergy came, at Vladimir's command, to christen the Kievan peoples in the Dnieper River in the year 988. Vladimir was partly motivated in his choice of religions by the political, military, and economic advantages of an alignment with the Byzantines, and he is also considered to have been influenced by the baptism of his grandmother Olga, who had become Kiev's ruler in 945 upon the death of her husband, Igor. Olga was a committed Greek Christian baptized in 957, perhaps in Constantinople with the empress Helen as her godmother.

Russian legends magnify the radical change in Vladimir after his conversion and the establishment of Christianity in Kiev, both in the prince's personal life and in his public policies. He is said to have abolished torture and the practice of capital punishment, an un-

heard-of action for his time and one allegedly opposed by the Greek bishops. He also gave up his five wives and hundreds of concubines (the *Primary Chronicle* speaks of eight hundred) in favor of monogamous fidelity to his Christian bride. He publicly desecrated statues to Perun and the other local gods and constructed a new cathedral for his Christian bishop. He also introduced the use of the Slavonic language into church worship, using the literary language developed a century earlier by the Greek missionary brother-saints, Cyril and Methodius, for their Slavic converts in Moravia and Bulgaria. The introduction of this language is considered to be the single most important factor in guaranteeing the Christian unity and development of the various peoples under his rule.

Vladimir was succeeded by his son Iaroslav the Wise (1036–1054) after a bloody war between Vladimir's sons from 1015 to 1036, during which his son Sviatopolk, who was ultimately defeated by Iaroslav, killed two other younger sons, Boris and Gleb. Boris and Gleb, who, in order to save the lives of their followers, refused to enter into battle against Sviatopolk, became the first canonized saints of the Russian church, known in tradition as the "passion-bearers." Vladimir, with his grandmother Olga, is a canonized saint of the Russian Orthodox church with the liturgical title of "equal to the apostles" because of his role in Christian conversion.

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THOMAS HOPKO

VOCATION is a divine call or election, of a revelatory character, addressed to religiously gifted or charismatic personalities. It forms the first phase of their initiation into an often unwillingly accepted intermediary function between human society and the sacred world. Unlike functionaries with a special, well-defined religious task in a given group or culture (such as priests or even heads of families and elderly men, who bring offerings

and give religious instruction), vocation is often felt by persons outside or on the fringe of the established institutions, whose charismatic and often abnormal psychic character makes them appear as prophets, founders or reformers of religion, saints, or shamans. Those called, therefore, often make their appearance in periods of social turmoil or crisis. Sometimes they start a new religious movement that implies a break with the past, or else they exorcise illness, famine, or drought, which destabilize personal or social health.

Vocation is experienced as divine revelation through various media (voices, visions, and dreams, exceptional accidents, severe illness, absentmindedness or insanity, and attacks of epilepsy), and it is sometimes accompanied by special cosmic phenomena such as a solar eclipse, an earthquake, or lightning. It usually provides the persons "called," often after initial resistance and unwillingness, with special knowledge and missionary zeal for the rest of their lives.

A true prophet was the Iranian Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), who probably lived at the beginning of the first millennium BCE and was called by his god, Ahura Mazda, to preach the coming of his reign. Zarathushtra's prophecy is characterized by an intimate personal relationship with his god and a highly moral and intellectual tone. It was Zarathushtra "who first thought the good, spoke the good and did the good, . . . the first revealer" (*Yashts* 13.88). Although of a wealthy aristocratic family, his vocation brought him into poverty, permanent conflict with the established priesthood, and even exile.

Further important material is provided by the reports on the vocation of the prophets of Israel and other chosen persons, as told by themselves or contained in the historical books of the Hebrew Bible. The prophet Isaiah tells about his vocation which took place in a vision in which he heard the voice of the Lord:

In the year that King Uzziah died I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphim, . . . and one cried to another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts. . . . Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips. . . . Also I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shall we send, and who will go for us? Then said I, Here am I, send me. (Is. 6:1–8)

The prophet Ezekiel saw the heavens opened and visions of God (*Ez.* 1:1), which he vividly described as the likeness of four living creatures forming running wheels, and above their heads the likeness of a throne, the so-called *merkavah* vision (*Ez.* 1:1–28). Ezekiel fell upon his face and heard a voice: "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak unto thee. And the spirit

entered into me when he spake unto me, and set me upon my feet, that I heard him that spake unto me" (*Ez.* 2:1-2). The prophet is filled with a divine spirit that dwells in him and gives him the necessary strength. Jeremiah is also unwilling to accept the vocation that comes to him through the word of the Lord: "Then said I, ah, Lord God! Behold, I cannot speak, for I am a child" (*Jer.* 1:6). Likewise Jonah, when the word of the Lord came to him, "rose up to flee unto Tarshish from the presence of the Lord. . . ." (*Jon.* 1:3). Moses was called to his task of redeeming the Hebrew tribes in Egypt by the angel of the Lord, who "appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush" (*Ex.* 3:2) and also showed great unwillingness to accept his vocation. Gideon received his vocation through the angel of the Lord (*Jgs.* 6), Samuel was called by the Lord himself at night when he lay down to sleep (*1 Sm.* 3:3), and Saul and David were called to kingship through the spirit of the Lord administered to them by Samuel.

Seeing visions, hearing voices, and being filled with a divine spirit are the most frequent media through which the prophets of Israel received their vocation to preach the word and will of their God, whose appearance often has ecstatic character. Their activities are sometimes accompanied by miracles, as in the story of Elijah and the priests of Baal (*1 Kgs.* 18), where Elijah brings down the fire of the Lord from heaven and performs the role of rainmaker, bringing a period of serious drought to its end. Like most of the other prophets of Israel, Elijah was in strong opposition to the religious establishment and practices of his time.

In the New Testament, Jesus' baptism in the river Jordan, during which he saw the heavens open, the Spirit descending like a dove upon him, and a voice from heaven saying: "Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (*Mk.* 1:9-11 and parallels), is a traditional vocation with the fixed elements of a vision, the Spirit, and a voice immediately followed by the temptation in the wilderness, which forms Jesus' initiation into his public role, again in opposition to the Jewish establishment of his days. The persecutor Saul became the apostle Paul through a vocation consisting of a vision of heavenly light, a voice calling to him, and a temporary blindness. After three days he was cured and filled with the Holy Spirit (*Acts* 9). The vocation initiates a process of rebirth, making Saul into the second founder of Christianity.

Mani (b. 216 CE), the founder of Manichaeism, received his first vocation at the age of twelve when an angel appeared to him like "a flash of lightning," ordering him to leave the community in which he was reared. The angel was sent by the King of Light and in Manichaean sources is called the Twin or the Paraclete.

It was a kind of heavenly double that guarded him during his youth, showed him many "visions and sights" and appeared again to him "in great glory" when he was twenty-four years old. The Twin revealed to him all the mysteries of the world: "what my body is, in what way I have come, . . . who my Father on high is, . . . the boundless heights and the unfathomable depths." The spirit sends Mani, who is very hesitant about his vocation, out into the world to proclaim his saving message, promising him: "You, then, expound all that I have given to you. I shall be your ally and protector at all times." Here again the first vocation is followed by a period of mental preparation in close relationship with the spirit, who functions as a guarding spirit and eventually brings about the revelation of perfect divine knowledge.

Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, obtained his vocation (in 609 or 610 CE when he was about forty years old) after a long period of mental crisis and growing unhappiness with religious practice in his birthplace, Mecca; as a result, there ensued serious conflicts with the local tribal establishment and his eventual departure (Hijrah) for Medina in 622 CE. The Qur'an contains some scanty allusions to the Prophet's vocation, which took place in a nocturnal vision, perhaps at Jerusalem, in which he saw Allāh or the angel Gabriel, who gave him the essence of the Qur'anic message (surahs 17:1, 53:1-18, 81:19-26). Muhammad was so confused that he believed himself mad. Later Islamic tradition developed this theme into the legend of Muhammad's nightly ascension to heaven and descent with the heavenly Qur'an.

The history of Christianity and its various offspring shows a wide variety of vocations of saints, reformers, and prophets. Joan of Arc (1412-1431) received a vocation as a little girl in a garden. She heard a loud voice and saw a brilliant light and the archangel Michael escorted by a legion of angels. Michael the Archangel announced the arrival of Saint Catherine and Saint Margaret, who urged her to help the French king and save France, a task she accepted after long hesitation.

Most nativistic cults and messianic movements that are the result of an acculturation conflict are initiated by the vocation of a prophetic leader, involving a remarkable amalgam of elements from the old and the new religion. Such is the case in the Shaker religion in the northwestern United States and in the Ghost Dance movement among the North American Indians. The second wave of the Ghost Dance was initiated by the Indian laborer Wovoka in 1890. During a solar eclipse he had an attack of fever and heard his fellow tribesmen make a loud noise to drive away the monster that devoured the sun. Then he had the following vision: When

the sun died, I went up to heaven and saw God and all the people who had died a long time ago. God told me to come back and tell my people they must be good and love one another and not fight, or steal or lie. He gave me this dance to give to my people. Other less peaceful messianic movements also began with the vocation of a prophet. W. W. Harris of Cape Palmas in Liberia was jailed in 1912 because his preaching was suspected of inciting rebellion against the Liberian government. In a nocturnal vision the angel Gabriel appeared to Harris and called him to become the prophet of Africa; thus began his very successful missionary travels along the west coast of Africa, which lasted for two years.

Also well-known is the vocation of the shaman, which forms the first phase of a long and difficult initiation into this ecstatic religious function that mediates between the world of the spirits and the world of men. Shamanism occurs all over the world, but principally in northern and Inner Asia and in North America. The vocation of the future shaman manifests itself in a significant change of behavior, in mental illness, hallucinations, epileptic attacks, strange accidents or ordeals, in all of which the activities of the guardian spirit are experienced. A shaman of the Yakuts in Siberia told how he became ill at the age of twenty, saw visions and heard strange voices, and struggled with the spirit for nine years. In the end he almost died; finally he began to be a shaman, and his illness was cured. The vocation of the shaman is in almost all cases associated with an initiatory sickness that brings him to the threshold of death, often resulting in a complete disintegration of his personality, which is then reintegrated in the initiation. It is a process of death and rebirth. The future shaman sometimes sees in dreams or visions his head chopped off, his body reduced to a dismembered skeleton or boiled in a kettle, symbols belonging to archaic cultural patterns in which the myth of life out of death is predominant. The powerful symbolism of the shamanic vocation as the initiatory phase of a process of rebirth is the most profound expression of the meaning of every vocation: being called and reborn into a new condition of life in order to minister to and save fragile human lives with the help of the divine world to which the vocation gives entrance.

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VODOU. See Voodoo.

VOGUL RELIGION. See Khanty and Mansi Religion; see also Finno-Ugric Religions and Southern Siberian Religions.

VOLOS. See Veles-Volos.

VON GLASENAPP, HELMUTH. See Glasenapp, Helmuth von.

VON GÖRRES, JOSEPH. See Görres, Joseph von.

VON HARNACK, ADOLF. See Harnack, Adolf von.

VON HÜGEL, FRIEDRICH. See Hügel, Friedrich von.

VOODOO, or *Vodou* (according to official Haitian Creole orthography), is a misleading but common term for the religious practices of 80 to 90 percent of the people of Haiti. A mountainous, poverty-stricken, largely agricultural country of approximately six million people, Haiti has a land area of 10,700 square miles that covers the western third of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. The term *voodoo* (or *hoodoo*, a derivative) is also used, mostly in a derogatory sense, to refer to systems of sorcery and magic

or to specific spells, or charms, emanating from such systems, which are for the most part practiced by the descendants of the African slaves brought to the Western Hemisphere.

Outsiders have given the name *Voodoo* to the traditional religious practices of Haiti; only recently, and still to a very limited extent, have Haitians come to use the term as others do. The word can be traced to *vodu* ("spirit" or "deity") in the language of the Fon peoples of Dahomey (present-day Benin). In contemporary Haiti, *vodou* refers to one ritual style or dance among many in the traditional religious system. Haitians prefer a verb to identify their religion: they speak of "serving the spirits."

Sensationalized novels and films, as well as spurious travelers' accounts, have painted a highly distorted picture of Haitian religion. It has been incorrectly depicted as magic and sorcery that involves uncontrolled orgiastic behavior and even cannibalism. These distortions are undoubtedly attributable to racism and to the fear that the Haitian slave revolution sparked in predominantly white nations. Haiti achieved independence in 1804, thus becoming a black republic in the Western Hemisphere at a time when the colonial economy was still heavily dependent on slave labor.

Voodoo is an African-based, Catholic-influenced religion that serves three (not always clearly distinguished) categories of spiritual beings: *lemò*, *lemistè*, and *lemarasa* (respectively, "the dead," "the mysteries," and "the sacred twins"). While certain Voodoo prayers and invocations preserve fragments of West African languages, Haitian Creole is the primary language of Voodoo. Creole (*Kreyol* in the orthographical system employed in this article) is the first and only language of 80 percent of contemporary Haitians; it has a grammatical structure influenced by West African languages and a largely French vocabulary.

Although many individuals and families regularly serve the Voodoo spirits without recourse to religious professionals, Voodoo does have a loosely organized priesthood, open to both men and women. The male priest is called *oungan* and the female, *manbo*. There are many different types of Voodoo ritual, including individual acts of piety, such as the lighting of candles for particular spirits, and large feasts, sometimes of several days' duration, which include animal sacrifice as part of a meal offered to the spirits. Energetic drumming, singing, and dancing accompany the more elaborate rituals. In the countryside, rituals often take place outdoors on family land that has been set aside for the spirits. On this land there is often a small cult house, which houses the Voodoo altars. In the cities, most rituals occur in the *ounfò* ("temple"). Urban altars are main-

tained in *jèvo*, small rooms usually off the *peristil*, which is the central dancing and ritualizing space of the temple.

The goal of Voodoo drumming, singing, and dancing is to *chofe*, that is, to "heat up," the situation sufficiently to bring on possession by the spirits. As a particular spirit is summoned, a devotee enters a trance and becomes that spirit's *chwal* ("horse"), thus providing the means for direct communication between human beings and the spirits. The spirit is said to ride the *chwal*. Using that person's body and voice, the spirit sings, dances, and eats with the people and offers them advice and chastisement. The people, in turn, offer the spirit a wide variety of gifts and acts of obeisance whose goal is to placate the spirit and ensure his or her continuing protection.

There are marked differences in Voodoo as it is practiced throughout Haiti, but the single most important distinction is that between urban and rural Voodoo. The great majority of Haiti is agricultural, and the manner in which peasants serve the spirits is determined by questions of land tenure and ancestral inheritance. Urban Voodoo is not tied to the land, but the family connection persists in another form. Urban temple communities become substitutes for the extended families of the countryside. The priests are called "papa" and "mama"; the initiates, who are called "children of the house," refer to one another as "brother" and "sister." In general, urban Voodoo is more institutionalized and more elaborate than its rural counterpart.

African Influence. Haiti's slave population was largely built up in the eighteenth century, a period in which Haiti supplied a large percentage of the sugar consumed in Western Europe. Voodoo was born on the sugar plantations out of the interaction among slaves who brought with them a wide variety of African religious traditions. But, due to inadequate records, little is known about this formative period in Voodoo's history. There are, however, indications that Voodoo played a key role in the organization of the slave revolt (Leyburn, 1941), as it apparently did in the downfall of President Jean-Claude Duvalier in February 1986.

Three African groups appear to have had the strongest influence on Voodoo: the Yoruba of present-day Nigeria, the Fon of Dahomey (present-day Benin), and the Kongo of what are now Zaire and Angola. Many of the names of Voodoo spirits are easily traceable to their African counterparts; however, in the context of Haiti's social and economic history, these spirits have undergone change. For example, Ogun among the Yoruba is a spirit of ironsmithing and other activities associated with metal, such as hunting, warfare, and modern technology. Neither hunting nor modern technology plays a

significant role in the lives of Haitians. Haiti does, however, have a long and complex military history; thus the Haitian spirit Ogou is a soldier whose rituals, iconography, and possession-performance explore both the constructive and destructive uses of military power, as well as its analogues within human relations—anger, self-assertion, and willfulness.

Africa itself is a powerful concept in Voodoo. Haitians speak of Gine (“Guinea”) both as their ancestral home, the continent of Africa, and as the watery subterranean home of the Voodoo spirits. Calling a spirit *frangine* (lit., “frank Guinea,” i.e., truly African) is a way of indicating that the spirit is good, ancient, and proper. The manner in which an individual or a group serves the spirits may also be called *frangine*, with similar connotations of approval and propriety.

Roman Catholic Influence. The French slaveholders were Catholic, and baptism was mandatory for slaves. Many have argued that slaves used a veneer of Catholicism to hide their traditional religious practices from the authorities. While Catholicism may well have functioned in this utilitarian way for slaves on the plantations, it is also true that the religions of West Africa, from which Voodoo was derived, have a long tradition of syncretism. Whatever else Catholicism represented in the slave world, it was most likely also seen as a means to expand Voodoo’s ritual vocabulary and iconography. Catholicism has had the greatest influence on the traditional religion of Haiti at the level of rite and image, rather than theology. This influence works in two ways. First, those who serve the spirits call themselves Catholic, attend Mass, go to confession, and undergo baptism and first communion, and, because these Catholic rituals are at times integral parts of certain larger Voodoo rites, they are often directed to follow them by the Voodoo spirits. Second, Catholic prayers, rites, images, and saints’ names are integrated into the ritualizing in Voodoo temples and cult houses. An active figure in Voodoo is the *pretsavan* (“bush priest”), who achieves his title by knowing the proper, often Latin, form of Catholic prayers. Though neither a Catholic nor a Voodoo priest, he is called into the Voodoo temple when the ritualizing has a significant Catholic dimension.

Over the years, a system of parallels has been developed between the Voodoo spirits and the Catholic saints. For example, Dambala, the ancient and venerable snake deity of the Fon peoples, is worshiped in Haiti both as Dambala and as Saint Patrick, who is pictured in the popular Catholic chromolithograph with snakes clustered around his feet. In addition, the Catholic liturgical calendar dominates in much Voodoo ritualizing. Thus the Voodoo spirit Ogou is honored on 25 July,

the feast day of his Catholic counterpart, Saint James the Elder.

Bondye, the “Good God,” is identified with the Christian God and is said to be the highest, indeed the only, god. The spirits are said to have been angels in Lucifer’s army whom God sent out of heaven and down to Gine. Although the spirits may exhibit capricious behavior, they are in no sense evil. Rather, they are seen as intermediaries between the people and the high god, a role identical to the one played by the so-called lower deities in the religions of the Yoruba and Fon. Bondye is remote and unknowable. Although evoked daily in ordinary speech (almost all plans are made with the disclaimer “if God wills”), Bondye’s intervention is not sought for most of life’s problems. That is the work of the spirits.

The Catholic church of Haiti has sometimes participated in the persecution of those who follow Voodoo. However, the last “antisuperstition campaign” was in the 1940s, and currently there is an uneasy peace between Voodoo and the Catholic church. Until quite recently, the Catholic clergy routinely preached against serving the spirits, and those who served routinely remarked, “That is the way priests talk.” Most Catholic events have a simultaneous Voodoo dimension that the Catholic church for the most part ignores. Since Catholicism is the official religion of Haiti and the church has been to some extent state-controlled, the degree to which Voodoo has been tolerated, or even encouraged, has been at least partly a function of politics. For instance, Haitian presidents Dumarsais Estime (1946–1950) and François Duvalier (1957–1971) were known for their sympathy with Voodoo.

Voodoo Spirits. The Voodoo spirits are known by various names: *lwa* (from a Yoruba word for “spirit” or “mystery”), *sint* (“saints”), *mistè* (“mysteries”), *envizib* (“invisibles”), and, more rarely, *zanj* (“angels”). In the countryside, the spirits are grouped into *nanchon* (“nations”). Although no longer recognized as such by Haitians, the names of the Voodoo spirit nations almost all refer to places and peoples in Africa. For example, there are *nanchon* known as Rada (after the Dahomean principality Allada), Wangol (Angola), Mondon (Mandingo), Ibo, Nago (the Dahomean name for the Ketu Yoruba), and Kongo. In rural Voodoo, a person inherits responsibilities to one or more of these *nanchon* through maternal and paternal kin. Familial connections to the land, where the *lwa* are said to reside in trees, springs, and wells, also determine which spirits are served.

In urban Voodoo, two *nanchon*, the Rada and the Petro, have emerged as dominant largely by absorbing other *nanchon*. Rada and Petro spirits contrast sharply

in temperament and domain. The Rada spirits are *dous* ("sweet") and are known for their wisdom and benevolence. The Petro spirits were probably named for the Spanish Voodoo priest Dom Pedro; they show a marked Kongo influence and are considered *cho* ("hot"), and their power is stressed. Each spirit group has drum rhythms, dances, and food preferences that correspond to its identifying characteristics. For example, *Dambala*, the gentle Rada snake spirit, is said to love *orja*, a syrup made from almonds and sugar. His worshipers perform a sinuous spine-rippling dance called *yanvalou*. By contrast, the Petro rhythm, played for such rum-drinking spirits as Dan Petro and Tijan Petro, is energetic and pounding, and the accompanying dance is characterized by rapid shoulder movements.

The Voodoo View of the Person. In Voodoo teachings the human being is composed of various parts: the body, that is, the gross physical part of the person, which perishes after death, and from two to four souls, of which the most widely acknowledged are the *gro bonanj* and the *ti bonanj*. The *gro bonanj* ("big guardian angel") is roughly equivalent to consciousness or personality. When a person dies the *gro bonanj* survives, and immediately after death it is most vulnerable to capture and misuse by sorcerers. During possession, it is the *gro bonanj* that is displaced by the spirit and sent to wander away from the body, as it does routinely during sleep. The *ti bonanj* ("little guardian angel") may be thought of as the conscience or the spiritual energy reserve of a living person and, at times, as the ghost of a dead person. Each person is said to have one spirit who is the *mèt-tet* ("master of the head"). The *mèt-tet* is the major protector and central spirit served by that person, and it is that spirit that corresponds to the *gro bonanj*. Because the *gro bonanj* is the soul that endures after death and because it is connected to a particular *lwa*, a person who venerates the ancestors inherits the service of particular spirits. In addition to the master of the head, each person has a small number of other *lwa* with whom there is a special protective connection. There is a rough parallel between the characters of the spirits and those of the people who serve them. Thus the language of Voodoo is also a language for categorizing and analyzing the behavior of groups and individuals. For example, when an individual, family, or temple is described as worshiping in a mode that is *Rada net*, ("straight *Rada*"), a great deal is also being said about how that person or group functions socially.

Voodoo and the Dead. In both urban and rural Haiti, cemeteries are major ritual centers. The first male buried in any cemetery is known as the Baron. Baron's wife is Gran Brijit, a name given to the first female buried

in a cemetery. Every cemetery has a cross either in the center or at the gate. The cross is known as the *kwa Baron* ("Baron's cross"), and this is the ritualizing center of the cemetery. Lighted candles and food offerings are placed at the foot of Baron's cross. In addition, many rituals for healing, love, or luck that are performed in the rural cult houses or the urban temples are not considered complete until the physical remnants of the "work" are deposited at crossroads or at Baron's cross, which is itself a kind of crossroads marking the intersection of the land of the living and the land of the dead.

Haitians make a distinction between *lemò* ("the dead") and *lemistè* ("the mysteries"). Within Voodoo, there are rituals and offerings for particular family dead; however, if these ancestral spirits are seen as strong and effective, they can, with time, become *mistè*. The group of spirits known as the *gèdè* are not ancestral spirits but *mistè*, and their leader is the well-known Baron Samdi, or Baron Saturday. In and around Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti and its largest city, the *gèdè* are the object of elaborate ritualizing in the cemeteries and Voodoo temples during the season of the Catholic Feast of All Souls, or Halloween.

The *gèdè* are not only spirits of death but also patrons of human sexuality, protectors of children, and irrepresible social satirists. Dances for *gèdè* tend to be boisterous affairs, and new *gèdè* spirits appear every year. The satirical, and often explicitly sexual, humor of the *gèdè* levels social pretense. Appearing as auto mechanics, doctors, government bureaucrats, Protestant missionaries, and so forth, the *gèdè* use humor to deal with new social roles and to question alienating social hierarchies.

Voodoo Ceremonies. In rural Voodoo, the ideal is to serve the spirits as simply as possible because simplicity of ritual is said to reflect real power and the true African way of doing things (Larose, 1977). In practice, rural ritualizing tends to follow the fortunes of the extended families. Bad times are said to be due to the displeasure of the family spirits. When it is thought to be no longer possible to satisfy the spirits with small conciliatory offerings, the family will hold a large drumming and dancing feast that includes animal sacrifice.

Urban Voodoo, by contrast, has a more routine ritualizing calendar, and events tend to be larger and more elaborate. Ceremonies in honor of major spirits take place annually on or around the feast days of their Catholic counterparts and usually include sacrifice of an appropriate animal—most frequently a chicken, a goat, or a cow. A wide variety of ceremonies meet specific individual and community needs: for example,

healing rites, dedications of new temples and new ritual regalia, and spirit marriages in which a devotee "marries" a spirit of the opposite sex and pledges to exercise sexual restraint one night each week in order to receive that spirit in dreams. There is also a cycle of initiation rituals that has both public segments and segments reserved for initiates. The latter include the *kanzo* rituals, which mark the first stage of initiation, and those in which the adept takes the *asson*, the beaded gourd rattle that is the symbol of the Voodoo priesthood. Certain rituals performed during the initiation cycle, such as the *brule zen* ("burning of the pots") and the *chire ayzan* ("shredding of the palm leaf") may also be used in other ritual contexts. Death rituals include the *desounen*, in which the *gro bonanj* is removed from the corpse and sent under the waters, and the *rele mò nan dlo* ("calling the dead up from the waters") a ritual that can occur any time after a period of a year and a day from the date of death. Good-luck baths are administered during the Christmas and New Year season. Many of the rituals of urban Voodoo are performed in rural Haiti as well.

Annual pilgrimages draw thousands of urban and rural followers of Voodoo. The focal point of events, which are at once Catholic and Voodoo, is usually a Catholic church situated near some striking feature of the natural landscape that is believed to be sacred to the Voodoo spirits. The two largest pilgrimages are one held for Ezili Dantò (Our Lady of Mount Carmel) in mid-July in the little town of Saut d'Eau, named for its spectacular waterfall, and one held for Ogou (Saint James the Elder) in the latter part of July in the northern town of Plain du Nord, where a shallow pool adjacent to the Catholic church is sacred to Ogou.

Voodoo and Magic. Serge Larose (1977) has demonstrated that magic is not only a stereotypic label that outsiders have applied to Voodoo, but also a differential term internal to the religion. Thus an in-group among the followers of Voodoo identifies its own ritualizing as "African" while labeling the work of the out-group as *maji* ("magic"). Generally speaking, this perspective provides a helpful means of grasping the concept of magic within Voodoo. There are, however, those individuals who, in their search for power and wealth, have self-consciously identified themselves with traditions of what Haitians would call the "work of the left hand." This includes people who deal in *pwen achte* ("purchased points"), which means spirits or powers that have been bought rather than inherited, and people who deal in *zombi*. A *zombi* may be either the disembodied soul of a dead person whose powers are used for magical purposes, or a soulless body that has been raised from the grave to do drone labor in the fields. Also included in the category of the left hand are secret soci-

eties known by such names as Champwel, Zobop, and Bizango. These powerful groups use magic not for personal gain but to enforce social sanctions. Wade Davis (1985) claims that *zombi* laborers are created by judgments of tribunals of secret societies against virulently antisocial persons.

The "work of the left hand" should not be confused with more ordinary Voodoo ritualizing that also has a magical flavor, such as divination, herbal healing, and the manufacture of charms for love or luck, or for the protection of the home, land, or person. Much of the work of Voodoo priests is at the level of individual client-practitioner interactions. Theirs is a healing system that treats problems of love, health, family, and work. Unless a problem is understood as coming from God, in which case the Voodoo priest can do nothing, the priest will treat it as one caused by a spirit or by a disruption in human relationships, including relations with the dead. Generally speaking, cures come through a ritual adjustment of relational systems.

Voodoo in the Haitian Diaspora. Drought and soil erosion, poverty, high urban unemployment, and political oppression in Haiti have led to massive emigration in the last three decades. Voodoo has moved along with the Haitians who have come to the major urban centers of North America in search of better life. In Miami, New York, and Montreal, the cities with the greatest concentrations of Haitian immigrants, Voodoo ceremonies are carried on in storefronts, rented rooms, and high-rise apartments. North American rituals are often truncated versions of their Haitian counterparts. There may be no drums, and the only animals sacrificed may be chickens. However, it is possible to consult a *manbo* or *oungan* in these immigrant communities with ease, and the full repertoire of rituals is found there in one form or another. Even the pilgrimages are duplicated. On 16 July, rather than going to the mountain town of Saut d'Eau to honor Ezili Dantò, New York Haitians take the subway to the Italian-American Church of Our Lady of Mount Carmel in the Bronx.

[For related discussion, see Santería and Yoruba Religion.]

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Haiti (1953; reprint, New Paltz, N.Y., 1983). In addition, Harold Courlander's *The Drum and the Hoe: Life and Lore of the Haitian People* (Berkeley, 1960) provides much helpful information about Voodoo, particularly about its music.

To greater and lesser extents all of the above works are outdated and faulty in their ethnography. For more recent and more detailed studies of Haitian Voodoo, the reader must turn to articles; useful sources include Ari Kiev's "The Study of Folk Psychiatry," in *Magic, Faith, and Healing*, edited by Ari Kiev (New York, 1964), Serge Larose's "The Meaning of Africa in Haitian Vodou," in *Symbols and Sentiments: Cross-Cultural Studies in Symbolism*, edited by I. M. Lewis (New York, 1977); Michel S. Laguerre's "Haitian Americans," in *Ethnicity and Medical Care*, edited by Alan Harwood (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), and "Voodoo and Urban Life," a chapter in Laguerre's *Urban Life in the Caribbean: A Study of a Haitian Urban Community* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); and Ira P. Lowenthal's "Ritual Performance and Religious Experience: A Service for the Gods in Southern Haiti," *Journal of Anthropological Research* 34 (1978): 392-415. Two other articles, although not recent, are helpful in filling gaps in the literature: Melville J. Herskovits's "African Gods and Catholic Saints in New World Negro Belief," *American Anthropologist* 39 (1937): 635-643, and George E. Simpson's "The Vodun Service in Northern Haiti," *American Anthropologist* 42 (1940): 236-254. Wade Davis's *The Serpent and the Rainbow* (New York, 1985), though more an adventure story than a work of ethnography, does contain a detailed and accurate account of the manufacture of *zombi* poison and the role of secret societies in administering it.

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The most thorough history of Haiti, including Voodoo, is still James G. Leyburn's *The Haitian People* (1941), rev. ed., with a new introduction by Sidney Mintz (New Haven, 1966). Finally, Robert Farris Thompson's *Flash of the Spirit: African and Afro-American Art and Philosophy* (New York, 1981) contains the best analysis yet done on the specific African retentions within Haitian Voodoo.

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VOTIVE OFFERING. See Vows and Oaths.

VOWS AND OATHS. With the vow to accomplish something, a person dedicates himself to the task wholly. Whoever takes an oath to accomplish something is required to answer for it, for he has named him-

self or some one of his belongings as a pledge of his commitment and is thus bound by his very life, his honor, and his property.

Vows and oaths therefore affect a person's whole being; they put his very existence in pawn. There is a distinct difference, however, between an oath and a vow: a vow is merely a personal promise, whereas an oath is a promise made before some institutional authority. In taking an oath, a person not only assumes an obligation but also becomes liable to prosecution; the state and society have an interest in his act. Oaths serve as objective guarantees of what is promised. Swearing to tell the truth, one guarantees that what one says is true. Oaths are self-endorsing.

The practice of oath taking by which a person places his very life at risk is an extremely ancient one. It is an institution of coercion, "the most powerful coercion known to primitive man" (Thurnwald, 1925, vol. 2, p. 39). Oaths are encountered among all peoples and in all cultures. They are a primal symbol of religion.

Because they are absolutely binding by nature, and because they are subject to both misuse and overuse, oaths are nevertheless looked upon with some suspicion in the fields of ethics, politics, and jurisprudence. They have to be judged in themselves, in relation to the particular substance of the promise they contain and the nature of the guarantee, as both tend to vary considerably depending on the level of the given culture and the conventions of the applicable code of law.

Giving and Receiving—An Institution of Life. In the archaic scheme of things, objects of barter, things that must be paid for, are not simply goods but rather gifts. They establish a substantial bond between giver and receiver, for the latter is obligated to provide something in exchange for the gift. Such exchange affects the social position of the participants: it turns the giver into a receiver and makes of the receiver a giver.

In this economy of mutual giving, the objects exchanged have both an objective and a subjective significance; they not only create the partnership, they also serve to insure it. They are subject to recall. They give rise to rights and obligations. They are pledges.

Vows and oaths have the same archaic structure. They create and solidify partnerships based on reciprocal giving. One swears by specific things, and in the exchange these pledges become extremely important. They guarantee the peace, subjectively and objectively. The bond of order they establish is affirmed in the oath itself, so that the oath, like the things by which it is sworn, is part blessing and part curse: it obligates one to a bond, and binds one to an obligation.

In many languages the word for "oath" is somehow associated with fate. The Assyrian *mamuti* translates as

"oath," but it also means "obsession" and "curse." The related term *tamitu* is also used for "oath," but in addition it can refer either to a divine oracle or the question put to the god (Pedersen, 1914, p. 2). Clearly one is oneself possessed by what one possesses. Property can have a fatal power.

The Arabic word *bai'* translates as both "purchase" and "sale," but it also means "convenant." The exchange of wares, accompanied by ceremonial gestures of bonding such as reciprocal touching and shaking of hands, confers certain rights and obligations to both parties. One sells a certain object, but one also sells oneself. The bond linking buyer and seller is an oath. Implicit in the word *bai'* are both the sealing of a compact and an exchange of oaths (ibid., pp. 52–58). The former secures the connection, while the latter constitutes "religion" (from *religare*, "to tie fast") in the truest sense, bondage to the gift of life. The Anglo-Saxon verb *swerian* ("to swear") suggests something of the magic in such a bond, for at one time it meant to recite mystic charms and spells in a strange, singsong kind of chant. Old Frisian *swera* meant simply "to sing"—in the service of religion.

Oaths in early Germanic times were not only a religious rite, they were themselves the religion. An oath was an *actus religiosissimus* in the truest sense (Lex, 1967, p. 24). The Middle High German word for "oath" contains the Indo-European root **it* or **lig*, meaning bond. An oath is an added confirmation, an absolute guarantee, of the word and intent of the person swearing, and it is also the fetter that binds him to the truth. The Latin term for "oath" is *ius iurandum* ("sworn law"). Oaths were firmly established legal instruments with statutory force: "An oath is an assurance backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God as one's witness, is to be sacredly kept" (Cicero, *De officiis* 3.104). The oath of allegiance was known as the *sacramentum*.

The things one swears by are pledges, and the promises to which one binds oneself in swearing by things are oaths. With the specific things to which he appeals, a person guarantees that to which he has committed himself. They can be demanded of him; they become objects for litigation. Greek mythology (according to Hesiod) speaks therefore of the oath as the offspring of contention. It issues from conflict over things to which one is obligated, namely heaven and earth, life and death, gods and men. The obligation to them is binding, and the bond with them brings with it obligation. The very earth avenges itself on the perjurer, for with his oath he has placed it in pawn. The Greeks speak of having to pass through the portals of the oath, for *horkos*,

their word for "oath," designates a separate space before which one has a sense of dread (*aidōs*), a border region. The strongest oaths of all were those sworn on the bank of the Styx, the underworld stream whose waters expose the guilty and cleanse the innocent of false accusations.

Oaths are a divine judgment. The good and evil that they decide between amount to fortune and misfortune. Hence one speaks of eating and drinking one's oath. It either confirms or threatens one's very existence.

Oath taking may entail trial by fire, duels, symbolic destruction of specific objects, or hypothetical self-condemnation. The Maasai of East Africa bite off a few blades of grass, then exclaim: "May this grass prove poisonous to me if I have lied before God!" (Lasch, 1908, p. 80).

The reciprocal giving and taking in the economy of barter is something that serves to solidify society, for the one who gives also has a right to receive. Gifts are therefore challenges: they bind the receiver to the giver; they are what establishes a compact with him. They are an opening ceremony. While they serve to guarantee the fulfillment of oaths, they also anticipate the fulfillment of a vow, which is not a pledge to the past, but to the future. A vow presumes a compact that is yet to be. Votive gifts are only down payments on future covenants. They serve as symbols in the here and now of future fulfillment, and they have personal meaning. They give objective reality to a subjective religion.

Like votive gifts, magical rites and animal and human sacrifice are typical examples of such objectivization. So are the conjuring of rain in Arizona, New Mexico, and southern Europe, and so were temple prostitution in the Near East, cult chastity among the Romans, continence in preparation for specific tasks (as in war vows), or the habit in Latin countries of placing votive offerings in the form of garments and models of healed limbs on altars and temple walls. Popular faith abounds with customs of this kind. In them, promises take the form of gifts, and gifts serve as promises, concrete expressions of personal religion.

Vows and Personal Religion. Gifts initiate the reciprocity of giving and receiving, and they have been used for that purpose since archaic times. They have personal importance, for the promises they imply must be kept only if the gifts are found acceptable.

Vows are promises of the same kind. Whether they are fulfilled is not a matter for the law but rather hinges on the person governing the giving and receiving. Nothing is given that is found unacceptable, and nothing is accepted that cannot be given. All involuntary vows are invalid. All voluntary ones are valid provided they sat-

isfy the controlling authority, the religion, under which they are made. The same authority has the option of annulling them.

The Bible, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism all limit the use of vows. They have rules applying to the pledges of individuals as well as those of whole groups, such as communal orders and sects.

The terms for *vow* in the Bible are the Hebrew *nazir* and the Greek *euchē* ("prayer"). There a vow is an unconditional pledge of special submission to Yahveh. The Nazirite, or the man who has made such a vow, must refrain from drinking wine (*Nm.* 6:3), cutting his hair (*Nm.* 6:5), and coming into contact with a corpse (*Nm.* 6:6). The charismatic warrior Samson is an example of such a man (*Jgs.* 13ff). What distinguishes a person under such a vow is not his asceticism but rather his symbolic strength, his total commitment to the advancement of Yahveh's cause. This same vow is met with in the New Testament as well: Paul had placed himself under one (*Acts* 18:18) even before the Jerusalem congregation required it of him (*Acts* 21:23–24). Such a vow can be either for life or for only a specified period.

The Talmud and Mishnah treat all kinds of vows, that is, vows of abstinence as well as vows of consecration, under the single rubric of *nedarim*, "vows" (*Ned.* 3.4). They advise that any such pledges be restricted as much as possible to basic religious practices. While admitting their usefulness as insurance of unconditional compliance with sacred obligations, the Jewish texts warn that vows must not be undertaken lightly and add that they have only limited validity when made by minors.

Christian vows consist of promises to obey the so-called gospel counsels: poverty, chastity, and obedience. They are taken in the various monastic orders and are implicit in their rules. Affirmation of the counsels is a sign of the Christian's calling within the church to give himself to God, to preach the gospel, and to personify the Lord's dominion. It constitutes an anticipation of heavenly existence. By referring to the calling and thereby underscoring the voluntary and charismatic aspects of monastic life, I deliberately skirt the notion of ascetic self-indulgence and personal gain rejected by Luther in his Reformation tract *De votis monasticis*. There is such a thing as an unconditional pledge that is of necessity only temporal and is therefore not binding for all eternity.

The Qur'ān and the six canonical works of the *sunnah* warn against excessive use of vows (*nudhūr*; sg., *nadhīr*) and make quite clear just what the nature of such pledges ought to be. According to the earliest thinking, they are best related to the basic religious duties and devotions, the intensity of which they tend to heighten.

Thus one might vow to pray at specified places and times, to fast on unusual occasions, to undertake pilgrimage to shrines other than Mecca, or—most important of all—to provide additional, voluntary alms. Moreover, it is acceptable to vow to free slaves or to be especially attentive to fellow Muslims, to visit the sick, to attend services for the dead, and to accept invitations to weddings. Restrictive vows, entailing abstinence from certain foods, celibacy, extreme penance, and professions of contrition, are not considered binding. They are rejected for the simple reason that a person who presumes to declare forbidden what is generally allowed is no different from the one who allows what is in fact forbidden. Therefore the Qur'ān explains that monasticism is an innovation "that was not instituted by God, one that was only invented by the generations before you" (surah 57:27).

In the broadest sense, vows are unconditional promises to do something specific—good or evil. In the narrower sense, they are unqualified pledges to do good, not evil, and as such they are directed solely to God. Often they are cast in hypothetical terms: one "promises to do this or that under the condition that this or that is forthcoming" (Gottschalk, 1919, p. 30). Muḥammad is supposed to have said that a vow does not hasten anything and cannot forestall anything. However the miser's vow makes him better, for essentially he tells God: "Give, that I may give—*da ut dem!*" (ibid., p. 4).

Vows encourage the fulfillment of obligations and the accomplishment of certain tasks. War vows and vows of revenge are clear examples of this; they enlist self-sacrifice and deprivation in the cause of securing just retribution. The *bodhisattva* vow of Mahāyāna Buddhism consists of the promise not to wish to enter *nirvāṇa* until all creatures have been released from the cycle of rebirth and have attained perfection. It first appears in the legend of the Buddha Amitābha in the second century BCE, and it continues to characterize the aspirations of major sects in China and Japan. It is the key to the salvation doctrine of Amida Buddhism. For if one gives what one receives, so does one receive what one gives. In promising to wait for salvation, one finds salvation in the waiting. Such a vow has cosmic significance. It constitutes sacrifice and self-denial.

Oaths and Their Institutional Forms. Oaths have both a constitutive and an instrumental force. They convey the truth of an assertion, but they also serve as a means whereby it can be determined whether or not that assertion is true. They confirm a promise, and at the same time provide by their very form proof positive of the accuracy of its content.

The instrumental nature of oaths becomes particu-

larly apparent when a judicial system becomes detached from the life of the community, when state and culture are no longer one and the same. In such cases, oaths no longer reveal their constitutive force. In a state trial they function as legally binding proofs. They are one method of arriving at the truth in legal proceedings, and as such they take on regulative importance.

The ritual of oath taking takes numerous forms. In every case there are strict rules governing the behavior of all participants, the rights and obligations of the person swearing, and the specific form in which he pronounces and confirms his pledge. There is a mystique associated with the taking of oaths, one that was especially pronounced in the Indo-European cultural sphere. An obsession with form is typical of such rites, each role being carefully prescribed. An oath could miscarry if for some reason it was impossible to observe strict conventions in the swearing of it.

These conventions applied not only to the person taking the oath but also to his oath-helpers. The use of witnesses is characteristic of the Germanic peoples and is in fact unique to them. They might be members of the oath taker's family or men with whom he has sworn brotherhood. They were not obliged to confirm the substance of his assertion but only to attest to this credibility. Once his oath had been taken, they were called upon to swear—by twos, threes, sixes, or twelves—that it was "pure and not forsworn."

Such oaths of purification could still count for naught in the event of so-called *eidschelte* (ON, "oath challenge"). If the accused chose to force down the raised hand of the person swearing, a duel had to be fought to decide the issue.

The spot where an oath could be sworn, its wording, and all of the attendant gestures were strictly prescribed. The setting was called the *malstat* ("justice site"), *dingstat* ("trial site"), or *richtstat* ("judgment site"). This was where the community regularly gathered for its *þing*, or legislative assembly, and it was here that sacrifices were offered to the gods and trials were held. An oath circle would be inscribed on the ground and the person swearing required to stand inside it. Under no conditions could he leave the circle or even place a foot outside its perimeter until the ritual was ended.

The wording of oaths differed considerably depending on the authority before which they were sworn and the persons or objects serving as pledges. A man might swear by his sword, his threshold, the plank of his ship, his wife and children, his own life, or one of the gods. The oath taker was required to stand and recite the *argumentum iuramenti*, called the *eidstab* ("oath stave"),

in a clear voice and without assistance. On occasion the phrases might first be spoken by either the judge or the accuser, then repeated word for word by the accused. This type of oath was known as a *gestabter eid* ("directed oath").

While swearing, the oath taker had to be touching his pledge with his free hand. It was this physical contact "that established the supernatural bond of the oath, the *mysterium iuramenti*, and gave it its magical force" (Brunner, 1906–1928, vol. 1, p. 257). If the oath was sworn by a god, such contact was accomplished through substitution. An animal was sacrificed to the god and the so-called *eidring* ("oath ring") dipped in its blood. The oath taker then took hold of the ring with one hand while raising the other. Local custom dictated how many of the fingers of his raised hand were to be extended, whether two, three, or all of them.

Everyone participating in the rite had to perform his role in accordance with fixed rules. No distinction was made between the miscarriage of an oath and outright perjury. Form and content were considered one and the same. If one of the oath-helpers swearing overstepped the margin of the oath circle by a fraction of an inch, forgot a portion of the formula, used a wrong word, lowered his hand too quickly, or failed to touch the pledges as required, the oath was useless and the guilt of the accused was established. It was clear that he had perjured himself, and he was required to leave the settlement in dishonor, stripped of all communal ties. Later it became customary to punish a perjurer by chopping off either the fingers he had used in swearing or his entire hand.

In Germanic law a man's whole life might hinge on his oath. Depending on its force in a trial, he could be either saved or doomed. Oaths of fealty and vassalage have the same constitutive importance, as does the citizen's oath of the Middle Ages. The Swiss *Eidgenossenschaft* ("sworn confederacy") takes its strength from the constitutive force of the citizen's oath, and the country's civil code is based on it.

There are, however, a number of traditions in which oaths are accorded only instrumental importance. This is the case in Greek rhetoric, Roman and Islamic law, and in the various modern judicial systems. For them an oath is not proof in itself but only a means of proof. It can be of assistance in determining the truth, yet it is not considered the truth itself.

In Roman civil cases the oath "occupies a less important position than in Germanic ones, for while in the latter it is a statutory right of the accused that regularly takes precedence over other proofs, in the former it only appears at the request of the adversary or the judge

when there are no other means for bringing the truth to light" (Bethmann-Hollweg, 1864–1874, vol. 2, p. 573). It serves as a kind of confirmation, strengthened by the fact that God is called to witness it. Here the form and content of oaths, their religious and legal significance, and their ethical and political aspects are distinctly separate.

The ancient writers produced numerous logical, rhetorical, philological, philosophical, and theological treatises on the problem of intent in oaths (*restrictio mentalis*), on the meanings of their terms and their differing connotations, on the degree to which an oath is binding depending on the rank of the deity by which it is sworn, and on the question of how frequently oaths may be required. They speak of sophistic oaths, in which the sense and the wording differ, of involuntary oaths (unlike Plato and Aristotle, Democritus considered all oaths to be valid, even involuntary ones), and finally of the proper form for the naming of pledges. We read of Rhadamanthys's struggle against the misuse of oaths and of Herakles' effort to do away with them altogether. The Hippocratic oath sworn by physicians has a venerable tradition, surviving as it does into our own time. Always there have been disputes over just what one ought to swear upon (as in the oath of allegiance or loyalty oath) and the degree to which one commits oneself (oaths of office, oaths of vassalage, the oath to the Führer).

In the Bible, oaths are treated in both their constitutive and instrumental senses. The Lord swears an oath by himself (*Dt.* 29:9ff.). That oath is the basis of the covenant with Israel, and he is bound and obligated by it. But for it, he would not have stood behind his chosen people and liberated them from bondage. That divine oath has constitutive force even for God himself. Men are permitted to swear oaths only as long as they call upon God in doing so, but they have not always observed this restriction. Hence Jesus' admonition not to swear at all (*Mt.* 5:34–37). Oaths are to be sworn before the Lord as God; they are not suited for the reinforcement of an intention that does not relate to him (*Mt.* 23:16–22). Jesus rejects the instrumental use of oaths. He nevertheless admits them when they serve to reaffirm the promise implicit in the Lord's name (*Mt.* 5:33). He also admits affirmation in the form of "Yea, yea," "Nay, nay." (*Mt.* 5:37).

This rule is applied by the early Christian church both positively (*Heb.* 6:13–19) and negatively (*Jas.* 5:12). Swearing is permitted, yet oaths are still rejected. Meanwhile the oath had come to serve in an instrumental sense as a confirmation of faith. In 251 CE the anti-pope Novatian required an oath of allegiance from his

followers; he was the first pontiff to do so. Later it became customary for bishops and teachers to take oaths of office, Christian significance was given to the fingers extended when swearing, and oaths were sworn on the Gospels and on relics.

One persistent problem has been whether priests ought to be required to swear oaths to secular authority, as in the oath to the emperor in antiquity, to the Republic during the French Revolution, or to the Führer under National Socialism. The Reformation rejected papal oaths. Various Christian sects—Anabaptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mennonites—refuse to take oaths of any kind.

[See also *Binding and Covenant*.]

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ELMAR KLINGER

Translated from German by Russell M. Stockman

VRIES, JAN DE (1890–1964), Dutch folklorist and historian of religions. Jan Pieter Marie Laurens de Vries was born in Amsterdam on 11 February 1890 and died in Utrecht on 23 July 1964. In 1926, de Vries was appointed to the chair for ancient Germanic linguistics and philology (comprising also Indo-European comparative grammar) at the University of Leiden. Among the numerous positions he held was the editorship of the fifth edition of Winkler Prins's *Algemene Encyclopedie* (General Encyclopedia; 16 vols, 1932–1938); this function occupied him for the entire period of publication. He established also a famous series of classical Dutch literary works, "Bibliotheek der Nederlandsche letteren" (1938–), sponsored by the Society for Dutch Literature and the Royal Flemish Academy of Language and Literature. Internationally famous as a Germanist, he became known in even wider circles as a folklorist. During the 1930s he pleaded fervently and often that the study of folklore (*volkskunde*) be considered a separate discipline, after having already championed the subject in congresses of philologists. The interest in the creativity of the *volk* (from which during this part of his life he excluded the intelligentsia and the urban proletariat, a view evinced in *Volk van Nederland*, published in 1937, which was a work by various authors that de Vries organized and edited, and of which he wrote a major part) was no doubt in tune with some scholarly and general interest fostered all over Europe at the time.

Unlike most scholars, de Vries had a career and lived in a time of history in which one's true colors could not always be kept concealed. After World War II, he was dismissed from his position at the University of Leiden because of his stance and his acts during the war. Under German occupation (1940–1945) he had served as vice-chairman of the Kultuurkamer (the body whose approval was required for any artistic or literary production). In the summer of 1940, shortly after the German invasion, he wrote a pamphlet, *Naar een betere toekomst* (Toward a Better Future), that promulgated his anti-democratic views and hailed the newly opened way toward a world in which the individual would be subordinate to a more encompassing, national structure. He published with National Socialist publishers, worked for a National Socialist journal, and by the end of the war even became a "sympathizing member" of the Schutzstaffel (SS). Many of de Vries's readers, and especially his students, have observed a mystifying inner contradiction in him.

No doubt, there is a conflict that is at the same time an essential ingredient in his work. De Vries was not only an industrious scholar but a very critical mind, a man who despised the crowd, yet longed for a truly har-

monious community, which he thought was reflected among ancient Germanic and Norse tribes. Solitary, romantic in his tastes, and of superb intelligence, he seemed blind to the vulgarity of Nazism, to which he committed himself with a fatalistic faithfulness, even seeing its impending defeat, and all the while incapable of realizing the harmony with people for which he longed. It is quite remarkable that de Vries's scholarly work does not show any feature of Nazi ideology or any of the kitsch it spawned. He pursued his scholarly goals unabated during, and also after, the war.

After his retirement in 1955 from a position as secondary schoolteacher in Dutch literature that he held for seven years, he wrote an impressive number of important books. Among them are his *Kelten und Germanen* (1960); *Forschungsgeschichte der Mythologie* (1961), in which his admiration for romantic impulses in history stands out clearly; and *Nederlands etymologisch woordenboek* (1963–1971). The best-known handbook of Germanic religion is the second edition of his *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte* (2 vols., 1956–1957). De Vries is among the foremost scholars who recognized the importance of Georges Dumézil's work. [See Indo-European Religions.] Throughout his career, however, de Vries maintained his own originality and erudite, critical competence in details. For instance, he points out the lack of clear evidence in Germanic sources for the existence of secret men's societies, yet, with implicit as well as explicit criticism on theoretical models employed by others, he demonstrates various other specific expressions of socioreligious cohesiveness.

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KES W. BOLLE

VRNDĀVANA is both a mythical site, mentioned in the Purāṇas, and a town in modern India that is one of

the most important Hindu pilgrimage centers of North India and the focus of much religious activity. As a sacred locality known in scripture, Vṛndāvana is ancient, but as a town it is comparatively new.

Mythical Site. Vṛndāvana (literally, “sacred basil grove”) is described in the Purāṇas, most notably in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, as a beautifully forested land associated with the cowherd god Kṛṣṇa. According to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, Kṛṣṇa was born in the royal city of Mathura, but to avoid slaughter by his wicked uncle Kāṁsa his father secretly took him across the Yamuna River to the cowherd settlement of Gokula, where he passed the early years of his infancy. Kāṁsa soon learned of Kṛṣṇa’s whereabouts, however, and began to send various demons to destroy him. When the danger grew too great, the cowherds who had taken in Kṛṣṇa moved to a new site—the beautifully forested land of Vṛndāvana—and there set up an idyllic village. In the land of Vṛndāvana, Kṛṣṇa charmed the elders of the village with mischievous pranks and frolicked in the forest herding cattle with his young companions. Most important, though, it was in the forests of Vṛndāvana that Kṛṣṇa would meet with the adolescent *gopīs* (cowherd-esses) of the village under the autumn moon for love trysts. Kṛṣṇa’s passionate affairs with the *gopīs* have been elaborated on extensively since medieval times, and one *gopī* in particular—Rādhā—rose to the position of Kṛṣṇa’s favorite. The intimate relationships exemplified between Kṛṣṇa and his lovers in Vṛndāvana came to symbolize the human’s true relationship with the divine. For the practicing Vaiṣṇava, Vṛndāvana is an eternal world, a heavenly paradise that the liberated soul achieves after ultimate success.

Modern-Day Town. The modern-day town of Vṛndāvana (also known as Brindavan) is located on the west bank of the Yamuna River, about eighty miles south of Delhi and forty miles north of Agra, and is situated in the modern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Vṛndāvana can best be understood, however, by viewing it as part of Vraja (Braj), a distinct cultural region, complete with a distinct language (Vrajabhāṣa, or Brajbhāṣa) and history, defined by its association with the Kṛṣṇa myth. Through complex historical developments of the sixteenth century, this region came to be identified as the very land where Kṛṣṇa actually lived long ago. The town of Vṛndāvana, in particular, was built on a site identified as the forest where Kṛṣṇa met with Rādhā and the other *gopīs* for their nightly trysts.

The historical development of Vṛndāvana was due primarily to the disciples of the Bengali saint Caitanya (b. 1486 CE), who came to be known as the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas. [See the biography of Caitanya.] The “reclaiming” of the sites of Kṛṣṇa’s exploits on earth was

a cherished dream of Caitanya. Although the saint himself visited the area surrounding Vṛndāvana only once, he had sent before him a close disciple named Lokanātha Ācārya and then later, a group of theologians known as the Six Gosvāmins of Vṛndāvana. The establishment of Vṛndāvana as an important religious center is chiefly the work of this group of theologians, especially two brothers among them, Rūpa and Sanātana Gosvāmin. These brothers were to have the first of the magnificent temples of Vṛndāvana built in the sixteenth century with the help of wealthy rajas of Rajasthan. They were also responsible for establishing the location of many of the sites associated with the Kṛṣṇa myth and for creating a center of Vaiṣṇava learning in Vṛndāvana.

Three other Vaiṣṇava sects were involved in the development of Vraja culture that took place in and around Vṛndāvana, namely, the Rādhāvallabhas, the Vallabhācāryas, and the Nimbārkas. [For further discussion of these three sects, see Vaiṣṇavism, article on Bhāgavatas.] Vṛndāvana continued to grow and develop as an important center for all Vaiṣṇavas, and with the construction of a large Śrī Vaiṣṇava temple in Vṛndāvana in the mid-nineteenth century, all major sects of Vaiṣṇavism came to be represented in Vṛndāvana.

Today hundreds of pilgrims flock into Vṛndāvana daily, their numbers increasing substantially during the four monsoon months when, as legend has it, all other pilgrimage sites come to reside in Vṛndāvana. These pilgrims come to walk the very land trodden by Lord Kṛṣṇa and to see the natural objects transformed by his contact. They come also to see Kṛṣṇa in another important form—as an image (*mūrti*) residing for the benefit of his worshipers in the many famous temples of Vṛndāvana. But most important, they come during the rainy season to see the numerous plays staged all over Vṛndāvana that depict stories of Kṛṣṇa and his intimate companions. Vṛndāvana continues to thrive—many new temples are being constructed today—making it a living center of traditional Hindu culture.

[See also Kṛṣṇa; Rādhā; and Hindi Religious Traditions.]

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Vṛndāvana before its development by the Vaiṣṇava Gosvāmins. For a good description of the Kṛṣṇa dramas of Vṛndāvana, see Norvin Hein's *The Miracle Plays of Mathurā* (New Haven, 1972) and John Stratton Hawley's *At Play with Krishna: Pilgrimage Dramas from Brindavan* (Princeton, 1981).

DAVID L. HABERMAN

VRTRA, whose name is probably derived from the Sanskrit verbal root *vṛ*, meaning "hold back, restrain, envelop," is a serpent slain by Indra in the *Ṛgveda*. This act, which is Indra's most famous, most important, and most frequently mentioned achievement, is the subject of several complete *Ṛgvedic* hymns (notably *Ṛgveda* 1.32 and 10.124). Vṛtra had coiled around a mountain, preventing the waters from flowing down; Indra pierced him with his thunderbolt and released the waters. This act has many symbolic resonances: slaying the dragon, releasing the waters or rains, bringing the ambrosial *soma* down from heaven or the mountains (an act that Indra is elsewhere said to accomplish by stealing it, on the back of an eagle), conquering the enemies of the invading Indo-Aryans (for Vṛtra is called a *dāsa*, or "slave," the name given to the indigenous non-Aryans), creating the world out of the body of the slain dragon, or rescuing it from the dragon who had swallowed it. The thunderbolt of Indra is a cloud, which, as a phallic symbol, is a source of seed as well as rain; Vṛtra is a cloud pierced in his loins or his bellies; and the cows to which the waters are compared are also rain clouds. Vṛtra, who is depicted as a serpent or as a dragon whose arms and legs Indra has cut off, is a symbol of danger, constriction, drought, and loss. The battle is waged with magic as well as with physical weapons; Indra uses magic to make himself as thin as a horse's hair, and Vṛtra uses magic to create lightning and fog. Indra wins, of course, and the hymns end on a note of affirmation for Indra's victory.

The killing of Vṛtra was closely associated with the killing of other demonic enemies, particularly Triśiras Viśvarūpa (the "three-headed, many-formed" son of Tvaṣṭṛ, the artisan of the gods), Namuci ("don't-let-go"), and Ahi (the Serpent, perhaps just another name for Vṛtra). Vṛtra is the younger brother of Triśiras, created by their father to take revenge upon Indra for the killing of Triśiras. This mythology is elaborated in the *Brāhmaṇas* (c. 900 BCE), where it is said that when Indra killed Viśvarūpa he cut off his three heads, which became three birds; Tvaṣṭṛ performed a sacrifice to create Vṛtra. Namuci is a demon whom Indra is said to have killed with foam (*Ṛgveda* 8.14.13); later, Indra kills both Vṛtra and Namuci with foam at the juncture of day and night (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1.7.1–7), when he had prom-

ised Namuci that he would kill him neither by day nor by night, neither with anything dry nor with anything wet (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 12.7.3.1–2). In the *Mahābhārata* (5.9–13), Indra kills Vṛtra alone by tricking him in this way. The cosmogonic implications of the killing of Vṛtra are spelled out in the *Brāhmaṇas*: Vṛtra lay covering all the space between heaven and earth until Indra killed him (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.1.3.4–5); when Indra killed Vṛtra, Vṛtra said to him, "You are now what I was; now cut me in two" (*ibid.*, 1.6.3.1–17).

The killing of Vṛtra, particularly when combined with the accessory acts of killing Triśiras and Namuci, fits a pattern that has strong resonances in other Indo-European mythologies. In the Avesta, Thraetaona kills a three-headed demon and sets free the cows that have been imprisoned. In Greece, Herakles kills the three-headed Geryon, and the Roman Hercules kills Cacus, the son of Vulcan (who is, like Tvaṣṭṛ, the blacksmith of the gods). Þórr (Thor), Indra's parallel in Eddic literature, kills the World Serpent. And in a more general way, Vṛtra can be assimilated to all the dragons killed by all the great heroes—to Python slain by Apollo, to the dragon killed by Saint George, and so forth.

As Indra's powers diminished during the period of transition from the *Ṛgveda* to the *Brāhmaṇas*, the killing of Vṛtra was no longer regarded as an act that he could accomplish in single combat. Other gods help him (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 2.3.5), or he uses the power of sacrifice rather than brute force (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 2.5.4.1–9); finally, as with Namuci, he hedges with words to break his treaty (*ibid.*, 1.6.3.10). In the *Mahābhārata*, Indra is so overpowered by Vṛtra's superior magic and prowess that the demon can be slain only with the aid of Śiva (who creates a fever in Vṛtra) and Viṣṇu (who places his own power in Indra's thunderbolt). Moreover, even after killing Vṛtra, Indra is so weakened and defiled (polluted by the sin of brahmanicide for having killed Vṛtra, a priest) that he runs away and hides in a lotus stalk; still the fury (*krtyā*) of brahmanicide incarnate seizes Indra until Brahmā distributes the sin among fire, water, the trees, and the celestial nymphs, and purifies Indra with a horse sacrifice (*Mahābhārata* 12.272–273).

Thus the ancient myth of the dragon whose body is dismembered to form the world (as Tiamat's body does in the Mesopotamian myth) is transformed into an epic myth in which the *sin* of the warrior who kills the dragon is dismembered, as it were, to provide the substances that guarantee the fertility of the world. In either case, it is, ultimately, the dragon that is the source of that fertility; the darker side of creation and the sin that inevitably arises in dealing with it, rather than the hero and his virtue, is the source of life.

[See also Indra; Snakes; and Indian Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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literature, are assembled on pages 74–90 and 320–321 of my *Hindu Myths* (Baltimore, 1975) and discussed on pages 102–111 of my *The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology* (Berkeley, 1976). Sukumari Bhattacharji's *The Indian Theogony* (Cambridge, 1970) summarizes the details of the encounter on pages 251–259.

WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY

VULVA. See Yoni.

W



WACH, JOACHIM (1898–1955), German-American historian of religions. Wach was born in Chemnitz, Saxony, and died while vacationing in Orselina, Switzerland. He was a descendant of Moses Mendelssohn, a lineage that affected his life and career both positively and negatively. His paternal grandfather, the noted juriconsult Adolph Wach, married Lily, the daughter of Felix Mendelssohn, the composer. His father, Felix, married Kathe, granddaughter of the composer's brother, Paul. Young Wach was early exposed to music, literature, poetry, and both classical and modern languages.

After two years of military service (1916–1918), Wach enrolled at the University of Leipzig, but in 1919 and early 1920 he studied with Friedrich Heiler at Munich and with Ernst Troeltsch at Berlin. He then returned to Leipzig to study Oriental languages and the history and philosophy of religion. For a time he came under the spell of the enigmatic poet Stefan George, whose writings spoke of a heightened sense of "experience," through which one perceives the multiple threads of the tapestry of life as a transparent whole. Wach received his Ph.D. degree in 1922 from Leipzig with a thesis entitled "The Foundations of a Phenomenology of the Concept of Salvation," published as *Der Erlösungsgedanke und seine Deutung* (1922).

When Wach started teaching at Leipzig in 1924, the discipline of the history of religions (*Religionswissenschaft*), still in its infancy, faced serious dangers. On the one side, its right to exist was questioned by those who insisted that whoever knows one religion (i.e., Christianity) knows all religions; on the other, its religio-scientific methodology was challenged by reductionist psychological and social-scientific approaches. Thus

in his habilitation thesis, *Religionswissenschaft: Prolegomena zu ihrer wissenschaftstheoretischen Grundlegung* (1924), Wach insisted on the integrity and autonomy of the history of religions, liberated from theology and the philosophy of religion. He emphasized that both historical and systematic dimensions are necessary to its task, and he argued that the discipline's goal was "understanding" (*Verstehen*): "The task of *Religionswissenschaft* is to study and to describe the empirical religions. It seeks descriptive understanding; it is not a normative discipline. When it has understood the historical and systematic aspects of the concrete religious configurations, it has fulfilled its task" (p. 68). His *Religionswissenschaft* is still regarded as a small classic in the field.

Wach's agenda centering on understanding led him to produce a three-volume work on the development of hermeneutics in the nineteenth century (*Das Verstehen*, 1926–1933). The first volume traced the hermeneutical theories of such major figures as Friedrich Schleiermacher, G. A. F. Ast, F. A. Wolff, August Boeckh, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. The second volume dealt with theological hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Johannes von Hofmann, while the third volume examined theories of historical hermeneutics from Leopold von Ranke to historical positivism. Understandably, Wach felt it absolutely necessary to establish solid hermeneutical foundations for the history of religions.

Wach was convinced that the history of religions (*Religionswissenschaft*) should not lose its empirical character. He felt that C. P. Tiele and P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye had failed to make an adequate distinction between the history of religions and the philosophy of religion. He was critical both of those who started with

philosophy and developed science and of those who started with science and moved toward philosophy. In his view, the history of religions lay, rather, precisely between the two. In this respect he followed Max Scheler, who posited a "concrete phenomenology of religious objects and acts" between a historical study of religions (a positive *Religionswissenschaft*) and the essential phenomenology of religion (*die Wesensphänomenologie der Religion*). According to Scheler, this intermediate discipline aims at the fullest understanding of the intellectual contents of one or more religious forms and the consummate acts in which these intellectual contents have been given. It was Wach's conviction that an inquiry such as Scheler envisaged could be carried out only by employing the religio-scientific method of *Religionswissenschaft*.

Wach's reputation for erudition attracted many students to Leipzig. However, his productive career there came to an abrupt end in April 1935. The government of Saxony, under pressure from the Nazis, terminated Wach's university appointment on the ground of his Jewish lineage, even though his family had been Christian for four generations. Fortunately, through the intervention of American friends, Wach was invited to teach at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, where he stayed until 1945. His adjustment to the new environment was by no means easy; he was especially anxious about his mother, sister, and brother, who were suffering under the Nazi tyranny. From 1945 until his death ten years later, Wach taught the history of religions at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.

Wach always asserted that the method of the history of religions must be commensurate with its subject matter, that is, the nature and expressions of the religious experience of humankind as that experience has been unfolded in history. Following his mentor, Rudolf Otto, Wach defined religious experience as the experience of the holy. Throughout his life, he never altered his views on the basic structure of the discipline: its twin tasks (historical and theoretical); the centrality of religious experience and its threefold expressions (theoretical, practical, and sociological); and the crucial importance of hermeneutics. But Wach emphasized three different methodological accents in three successive phases of his career.

During his first phase, Wach was preoccupied with the hermeneutical basis for the descriptive-historical task of the discipline. He was greatly influenced by the philological hermeneutics of August Boeckh, who defined the hermeneutical task as "re-cognizing" that which had previously been "cognized," that is, as artic-

ulating what has been recognized in its pristine character, even to the extent of "re-constructing" in its totality that which does not appear as a whole. Accordingly, Wach insisted that the historian of religions must first try to assimilate that which had been recognized as a religious phenomenon and "re-produce" it as one's own. Then he must observe and appraise that which has become one's own as an objective something apart from oneself.

During his second phase, Wach attempted to develop the systematic dimension of the history of religions by following the model of sociology. In Wach's view, the sociological (systematic) task of *Religionswissenschaft* had two main foci: (1) the interrelation of religion and society, which requires an examination, first, of the sociological roots and functions of myths, doctrines, cults, and associations, and, second, of the sociologically significant function and effect of religion in society; and (2) the study of religious groups. In dealing with religious groups, and especially with the variety of self-interpretations advanced by these groups, Wach employed the typological method. As he stated in his *Sociology of Religion* (1944), he was convinced of the need to develop a closer rapport between *Religionswissenschaft* and other disciplines, especially with the social and human sciences. In this sense, his *Sociology of Religion* was an attempt to bridge "the gulf which still exists between the study of religion and the social sciences" (p. v). Yet the ultimate aim of his sociological (systematic) study of religion was "to gain new insights into the relations between the various forms of expression of religious experience and eventually to understand better the various aspects of religious experience itself" (p. 5).

During the third phase, Wach's concern for an integral understanding of the various aspects of religious experience and its expressions led him to reassess not only the relationship of *Religionswissenschaft* with the social sciences but also its relationship with normative disciplines such as philosophy of religion and the various theologies. After Wach's sojourn in India, where he delivered the Barrows Lectures at various universities in 1952, this concern became more pronounced. It was, in fact, one of the key motifs of his lectures on the history of religions sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies in 1954. Increasingly the vocabulary of "explaining" (*Deuten, Erklären*) came to be used side by side with that of "understanding" (*Verstehen*) in his lectures. Wach shared his dream of pursuing a new grand synthesis for the study of the human religious experience, a sequel to earlier works such as *Religionswissenschaft* and *Das Verstehen*, with friends during the Seventh Congress of the International Association for

the History of Religion, held in Rome in the spring of 1955. But death came that summer and robbed him of this venture.

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JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA

WAHHĀBĪYAH. An Islamic renewal group established by Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (d. AH 1206/1792 CE), the Wahhābīyah continues to the present in the Arabian Peninsula. The term *Wahhābī* was originally used by opponents of the movement, who charged that it was a new form of Islam, but the name eventually gained wide acceptance. According to the teachings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, however, the movement is not a new Islamic school but, rather, a call or mission (*dāwah*) for the true implementation of Islam. The Wahhābīyah often refer to "the mission of the oneness of God" (*dāwat al-tawḥīd*) and call themselves "those who affirm the oneness of God," or *muwahḥidūn*.

Historical Background and Context. Renewal movements have deep roots in Islamic experience. The Qur'ān and the *sunnah*, or normative practice of the prophet Muḥammad, provide standards by which the belief and actions of Muslims in any age can be judged. A strict interpretation of these fundamentals has often provided the basis for an active call for reform. The Wahhābī call is one of the most famous of these so-called fundamentalist movements. Specifically, it can be seen as a continuation of the strict Sunnī tradition associated with the Ḥanbalī school of law based on the teaching of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855 CE).

Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328) is the Ḥanbalī scholar

whose works had the greatest influence on Wahhābī ideas. He became well known for his opposition to devotional innovations and popular religious customs not specified in the Qur'ān or *sunnah*. His preaching against even established scholars made his work controversial, while his polemical skills made him popular.

The core of his teaching was the "science of the oneness of God" (*ilm al-tawḥīd*), which stresses the comprehensive nature and unity of the Islamic message. Rationality, mystic intuition, and the legal prescriptions are seen as parts of a single whole. Ibn Taymīyah rejected claims by Islamic mystics that "the law" and "the [mystical] path" were somehow separate. He also stressed that independent interpretation (*ijtihād*) by scholars was possible, although subject to clear rules. He actively opposed what he considered innovations in devotional practices, such as the visitation of the tombs of famous figures. In these and other themes Ibn Taymīyah provided a basis for later Sunnī fundamentalism.

The Ḥanbalī school did not gain a mass following in the Islamic world, but groups of Ḥanbalī scholars had local influence in some regions. One such region was the Najd in central Arabia, where the Ḥanbalī tradition continued in towns with established families of Ḥanbalī teachers. Nevertheless, the local lifestyle in the Najd did not reflect a fundamentalist spirit. People commonly believed that trees and rocks possessed spiritual powers and that the graves of holy men were places of special holiness. Such a society contained many elements that Islamic fundamentalists view as manifestations of polytheism (*shirk*) and the ignorance of the pre-Islamic era (Jāhiliyah).

Najd was not unique in the eighteenth-century Islamic world. While Islam had flourished in the strong empires of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by the eighteenth century, compromises with local religious customs and ineffective political organizations led Muslims from West Africa to Southeast Asia to call for Islamic renewal. The Wahhābī movement emerged at the very center of this world.

History of the Movement. Wahhābī history can be divided into three periods, in each of which the movement is associated with the establishment of a state as well as a community of believers. While the call has been Wahhābī, the state in each case was based on leadership by the Sa'ūd family.

The era of Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, born in the central Arabian town of al-'Uyaynah in 1703, traveled and studied widely. In the process, he developed a belief in the need for purification of Muslim beliefs and practices, and this belief became his life's mission.

At first the mission took the form of preaching opposition to popular religious practices and Shi'i Islam, in Basra and eastern Arabia. Returning to his homeland to continue this call, he initially won some support from the ruler of al-'Uyaynah, but the vigor of his purification efforts soon aroused opposition, and he was forced to leave.

Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb then went to al-Dar'īyah, where the ruler was Muḥammad ibn Sa'ūd. In 1744 the two men formed an alliance that became the basis for both the subsequent Saudi states and the Wahhābī movement. The ruler and the teacher worked together in the creation of the first Saudi-Wahhābī state. [See the biography of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb.]

The deaths of Ibn Sa'ūd in 1765 and of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb in 1792 did not stop the expansion of the mission or the state. Political leadership remained in the hands of the Sa'ūd family, while the family of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, subsequently called "the family of the shaykh," or Āl al-Shaykh, maintained a position of intellectual leadership in the later history of the state and movement.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Saudi-Wahhābī community controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This central position and attacks on Ottoman territories in Iraq and Syria brought a reaction, however: the Ottoman sultan ordered the governor of Egypt, Muḥammad 'Alī, to use his newly reformed army to defeat the Wahhābīyah. In 1812, the Egyptian army took Medina and in 1818 captured the Saudi capital of al-Dar'īyah. With this defeat, the first phase of Wahhābī history came to an end.

The second Saudi-Wahhābī state. The Egyptian army did not remain long in central Arabia, and Saudi leaders soon reestablished their state with a new capital at Riyadh. Key figures in this restoration were a grandson of Muḥammad ibn Sa'ūd, Turkī (d. 1834), and his son Fayṣal (d. 1865). Although smaller than the first, the new state restored the political and religious mission of the original one. An important part of the Wahhābī heritage is the work of administering and consolidating a functioning fundamentalist state in the nineteenth century.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Saudi ruling family divided, and in the conflicts that followed the death of Fayṣal, other Arabian chieftains began to take control of Saudi lands. By the 1890s, the leaders of the Sa'ūd family were forced into exile and the second state came to an end.

The twentieth-century revival. The third period of Wahhābī history began in 1902, when a young Saudi

prince recaptured Riyadh. This man was 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān, often called Ibn Sa'ūd (1879–1953). 'Abd al-'Azīz reconquered many of the lands of the first Saudi state in a series of bold diplomatic and military moves. The final steps came in the 1920s when, among other areas, Mecca and Medina again came under Saudi-Wahhābī control. Although geographic expansion stopped during that decade, the new Wahhābī state continued to develop.

The twentieth-century state is based on the pillars of Saudi leadership and the Wahhābī mission. 'Abd al-'Azīz consciously adhered to Wahhābī teachings, and the official constitution of the state is the Qur'ān. The "family of the shaykh" and the learned teachers play important roles as advisors and legitimizers of the state. At first they were important in administration but later were active primarily in traditional education and legal interpretation. A key to early Saudi military success was the creation of the Ikhwān, tribal soldiers organized in special settlements as warriors for the faith. A critical transition in the development of the state came in 1929, when the Ihwān unsuccessfully revolted against the pragmatism of 'Abd al-'Azīz's policies. Because the Wahhābī program is identified with the Saudi state, state policies represent an important definition of its mission. Thus the pragmatic style became characteristic of the Wahhābī movement during the twentieth century. In the spectrum of Islamic reform movements, however, the Saudi state continued to reflect a fundamentalist orientation.

Since the consolidation of the Saudi monarchy, the predominant tone of the Wahhābīyah has evolved significantly. Generally, fundamentalism works to change the existing social order. It is not a conservative style. However, the success of 'Abd al-'Azīz and his successors in creating a relatively prosperous state, has favored a more pragmatic and conservative policy. While still within the tradition of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, the twentieth-century version of the Wahhābī mission works within the framework of a modernizing state.

A major factor in this development is the impact of Saudi oil revenues. Exploitation of oil resources began during the lifetime of 'Abd al-'Azīz, and Saudi Arabia became a major oil-exporting state under his sons and successors, Sa'ūd (r. 1953–1964) and Fayṣal (r. 1964–1975). Today Saudi policy is designed to implement the fundamentalist call in a wealthy and modernizing state. An example is Fayṣal's ten-point program presented in 1962, which, like subsequent policies of Fayṣal's successors, Khālid (r. 1975–1982) and Fahd (r. 1982–), affirms that a modernizing state can be based on the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*.

Basic Ideas and Concepts. Despite the development of a more pragmatic ideology, the basic concepts of the Wahhābī program have remained quite constant. The oneness of God, or *tawḥīd*, is the fundamental concept in Wahhābī writings. It is an affirmation of the comprehensive nature of the statement "There is no god but [the one] God." *Tawḥīd* means that the political and economic realms are as much subject to God as are the realm of creeds. Any action or belief that seems to recognize ultimate authority or spiritual power in something other than God becomes polytheism.

In the eighteenth century the concept of *tawḥīd* provided the basis for opposition to saint worship and other popular religious customs. In the consolidation efforts of the nineteenth century, *tawḥīd* formed the logical basis for the legal decisions and religious positions of the scholars in the state ruled by Turkī and Fayṣal. In the twentieth-century pragmatic fundamentalism of the Saudi state *tawḥīd* provides an Islamic basis for comprehensive planning and a Muslim orientation to all aspects of policy.

A second basic concept is *ijtihād*, or independent informed reasoning, which directs a person with the proper training to base opinions on direct analysis of the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*. The analyst using *ijtihād* is not required to accept the conclusions of the great medieval scholars. In fact, blind adherence to the teachings of such scholars could be regarded as polytheism.

The Wahhābīyah have not carried the emphasis on *ijtihād* to the extreme of rejecting all medieval Islamic scholarship. Instead, they have stayed within the Ḥanbalī tradition but have felt free to go beyond its limits at times. In the thinking of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, this flexibility opened the way for a more vigorous rejection of Sufism (mysticism) than is found generally among the Ḥanābilah. It also allowed the shaykh more freedom in developing the Islamic policy of the first Saudi-Wahhābī state and in later years has given the Wahhābīyah some freedom in adjusting to the changes of the modern era.

A different set of concepts involves aspects of life that the Wahhābīyah reject, including innovation (*bid'ah*), idolatry or polytheism (*shirk*), and sinful ignorance (*jāhiliyyah*). These concepts are in counterpoint to the positive positions involved in *tawḥīd* and *ijtihād*. The opposition to innovation is not simply a rejection of all change. After all, the Wahhābī movement began with the call for major changes in society. The Wahhābīyah oppose innovations for which a justification cannot be found in the Qur'ān or the *sunnah*. In this way many medieval devotional practices were rejected as "innovations." At the same time, the exercise of *ijtihād* can

provide justification for changes that fall within Islamic limits.

Idolatry and sinful ignorance represent a violation of *tawḥīd*; they are the identifying features of the real non-believer. In the early days of the Wahhābī mission, opposition to idolatry and ignorance focused on concrete issues such as saint worship, veneration of trees and stones, and ignoring explicit Qur'anic commands. In the twentieth century these concepts have been expanded to include ideologies that are viewed as atheistic (such as communism). Originally in Islamic history the so-called Age of Ignorance or Jāhiliyyah was the period before the time of Muḥammad. However, in modern fundamentalist thought, the concept of Jāhiliyyah has been broadened to include willfully ignoring the guidance for human life given in the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*. Such defiance makes people nonbelievers to be opposed by Muslims of the Wahhābī tradition.

General Impact and Significance. The establishment of the Saudi-Wahhābī state in the Arabian Peninsula represents the most concrete heritage and impact of the Wahhābī movement. Since the eighteenth century the Wahhābīyah have represented the spirit of fundamentalism in the central lands of Islam, establishing the tradition of a community based on the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*. However, the significance of the movement goes beyond the state. In the rigor of their attachment to the renewal mission, the Wahhābīyah have provided an example of what was and is possible. The implementation of the call for renewal contributed to the general spirit of fundamentalism in the eighteenth century. Some Muslims were directly inspired by Wahhābī teachings while others were affected more by their general effort. The fame of the Wahhābīyah spread to such an extent that almost any movement of rigorous fundamentalist reform came to be called a "Wahhābī movement."

The Wahhābīyah are the best-known example of a Muslim movement calling for strict recognition of the oneness of God, with all of the social and moral implications of that belief, and advocating the reconstruction of society on the basis of a strict and independent interpretation of the fundamentals of Islam. This message helped to inspire movements ranging from holy wars to modernist rethinking of medieval formulations. Following the Shi'ī fundamentalist revolution in Iran in 1979, the Wahhābī movement, with its more pragmatic approach, has become a moderating and conservative influence in a context of more radical Islamic revivalism. Both as the followers of the specific movement that developed in the Arabian Peninsula and as the adherents of movements of the "Wahhābī-type," the Wahhābīyah

have had and continue to have a significant role in the modern history of the Islamic world.

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JOHN O. VOLL

WAKANDA. See Power.

WALĀYAH, or *wilāyah*, an Arabic verbal noun derived from the root *wly*, carries the basic meanings of "friendship, assistance" and "authority, power." A fundamental notion of Islamic social and spiritual life, the term is used with a complex variety of meanings related to the function, position, authority, or domain of authority of a *walī* (pl., *awliyā'*; "next of kin, ally, friend, helper, guardian, patron, saint"); a *mawlā* (pl., *mawālī*; "cousin, close relation, ally, client, patron, master"); or a *wālī* (pl., *wulāh*; "administrator, governor, ruler"). It appears in Persian as *valāyat*, *vilāyat*, and in Turkish as *vilayet*.

A distinction is often made between *walāyah* and *wilāyah*, with the latter form generally preferred to convey the meaning of "power," "authority," or "domain of

authority" (e.g., a political subdivision of a country). However, the vocalization is not normally indicated in the texts, and the classical Arab lexicographers are not unanimous on this point.

Qur'anic Usage. Although the verbal noun *al-walāyah*, thus vocalized according to the standard text, occurs only twice in the Qur'ān (surahs 8:72 and 8:44), other derivatives of the root *wly* are found in more than two hundred instances. Most frequently, the verbal forms *wallā* and *tawallā* are used, in the sense of "turning" either one's back or face—properly or metaphorically speaking—toward somebody or something (e.g., a hostile army, a sacred place, a prophetic message; God himself "turns to" or "takes care of" the pious, as in 7:196 and 45:19).

The nominal forms *walī* and *mawlā* are used, without apparent distinction, for the two partners of a close social relationship, such as kinship and alliance, but also for those of the God-man relationship. A *walī* or *mawlā* can claim certain rights of inheritance and has certain duties or responsibilities to assist an ally against enemies, in such cases as the retaliation for unjust killing of kinsmen (*wilāyat al-dam*; see 17:33). Inheritance and assistance expected of a *walī* may also be of a spiritual kind, as in the Qur'anic version of the birth of John the Baptist, which seems to echo a messianic idea implicit in the Judeo-Christian background of that theme: Zacharias, having no (natural) son and fearing therefore the claims of his *mawālī* (secondary heirs, perhaps priest colleagues), asks God to give him a "noble offspring" (3:38), a "*walī* from thee, who will be my heir and will inherit [prophethood?] from the family of Jacob" (19:5-6).

Similarly in 4:75, but without the notion of kinship and inheritance, the oppressed (Meccan Muslims), left alone after the prophet Muḥammad's emigration, ask God to bring them out of "the city of the unjust" and to provide for them "a *walī* from thee and a helper [*naṣīr*] from thee" (see also 17:80). According to 41:28-31, the enemies of God will dwell forever in the fire, whereas the angels will descend upon the righteous as their "friends [*awliyā'*] in this life and the next," so that they shall have no fear; indeed, according to 10:62, the "friends of God [*awliyā' Allāh*, i.e., the pious] shall have no fear"—a verse frequently quoted in Ṣūfī manuals.

God's unique position as the most powerful friend and helper (*walī naṣīr*) is one of the major themes of Qur'anic preaching, and several verses make it clear that those who "turn away" (e.g., 9:74) and/or "are led astray by him" (e.g., 18:17) have no *walī* (42:8) or *mawlā* (47:11), that is, no one to turn to for help or guidance. The same message is also conveyed by the parable of the rich but impious owner of the two gardens and his

poor but godfearing companion (18:32ff.), which closes with one of the two Qur'anic verses in which *al-walāyah* actually occurs: it is the rich man who ends up the loser in spite of the prosperity of his gardens and the power of his clan, for, "Ultimately, the *walāyah* belongs to God, the Truth!" (18:44).

While this verse gives an idea of the prophet Muḥammad's attitude during the early stages of his career as a religious "warner" at Mecca, the other verse in which *al-walāyah* occurs (8:72) reflects the situation immediately after his emigration (Hijrah) in 622 CE from Mecca to Medina, where he began to organize his new community. The verse defines the relationship between three groups of believers (Muslims) in terms of *walāyah*: (1) those who emigrated and "fought on the path of God," (2) those who gave them asylum (in Medina) and helped them, and (3) those who did not emigrate. The first two groups, who came to be known later as the emigrants (*muhājirūn*) and the helpers (*anṣār*)—the nucleus of the future Muslim community (*ummah*)—are, according to this verse, allies or friends of each other (*awliyā'*); but "as for those who believed but did not emigrate, you have no *walāyah* with them [or: you should disregard their *walāyah*] until they emigrate!"

Traditional interpretation of this verse refers to a ceremonial "brothering" (*mu'ākhāh*) supposed to have taken place between the emigrants and their Medinese helpers. This event was to cancel the old ties of *walāyah* linking the emigrants to their blood relations back in Mecca; this radical measure was, however, later abrogated or modified through verses 8:75 and 33:6, which state that blood relations are "closer [*awlā*] in the Book of God." Regarding this "brothering," W. Montgomery Watt suggests that "Muḥammad was prepared to use the kinship principle to increase the cohesion of his religious community in Medina" ("The Charismatic Community in Islam," *Numen* 7, 1960, p. 84). However, since it is not clear who "those who believed but did not emigrate" were in the first place, the ties of *walāyah*, to be ignored "until they emigrate," may have been those of friendship or alliance rather than kinship, as is also suggested by the parallel passage 4:89.

At any rate, emigrants and helpers were the "true believers" (8:74), and "those fighting" (*mujāhidūn*) were definitely placed in a higher rank than "those sitting" (at home), according to 4:95–96. Clearly, the new charismatic community of true believers was an alliance of those following the Prophet and was directed against his opponents. Further, it should be noted that these opponents were also seen as forming such an alliance of "*awliyā'* of each other," whether they were "the disbelievers" (8:73), "the hypocrites" (9:67–72), "the unjust" (45:19; 6:129), or "the Jews and Christians" (5:51). As is

well known, the new Muslim community was patterned after the model of the nation of Abraham, but with Abraham as neither Jew nor Christian (see 3:64–68). The Jews in particular are frequently challenged in the Medinese surahs, notably to prove their claim to be "the exclusive friends of God" (*awliyā' Allāh min dūn al-nās*, 62:6–8; 2:94–95).

Walāyah as a socioreligious concept seems indeed exclusive: one turns either to the right or to the wrong side, and the two sides are always engaged in battle: "Those who believe fight on the path of God, while those who disbelieve fight on the path of al-Ṭāghūt; thus, fight against the *awliyā'* of Satan!" (4:76). (*Al-Ṭāghūt*, perhaps derived from Ethiopic *tā'ōt*, "idols," is used for Satanic powers and often applied to tyrants or unlawful rulers, especially in Shī'ī interpretations.)

God and his antagonist(s) lead their respective allies or friends their way: God as the "*walī* of the believers" leads them from darkness to light, whereas the disbelievers, who have al-Ṭāghūt as *awliyā'*, are led by them from light to darkness (2:257). The world seems to be divided into two antagonistic groups: the party of God (*ḥizb Allāh*, 5:56) and the party of Satan (58:19), but the party of God, that is, "whoever turns to [or follows, *yatawallā*] God and his messenger [the prophet Muḥammad] and those who believe," is winning (5:56), while "whoever takes Satan rather than God as *walī* is surely going to lose!" (4:119). As though the divine *walāyah* were spread among the charismatic community, verse 5:55 states that "Your *walī* is only God, his Messenger, and those who [truly] believe, who perform the prayer and give alms, bending the body." Thus, unlike the purely God-oriented *walāyah* of the "poor companion" of Mecca, the Medinese *walāyah* seems to be the charisma of the party of God, in which the person of the Prophet himself plays the central role. Though never elevated to divine status, this role of the Prophet is stressed in the later parts of the Qur'an generally; it culminates in the solemn pledge of allegiance (*mubāya'ah*) made to him in lieu of God in 628 at al-Ḥudaybiyah (surah 48:9–10). The ceremonial contract of allegiance (*bay'ah*) made with his successors—caliphs, imams, and later also Šūfī shaykhs—all of whom would claim *wilāyah* of a certain kind, was to reiterate this charismatic basis of Islam symbolically.

Legal Usage. A trace of the pre-Islamic kinship principle may be seen in the fact that the Qur'anic commandments preserve the blood feud in restricted form, namely, as a right of the victim's *walī* to kill the murderer personally (17:33). In Islamic law, this particular right of the *walī*, which is known as *wilāyat al-dam* or "*wilāyah* of blood," is one among other forms in which the requital (*qiṣās*) may be exercised.

Sunnī laws of inheritance, which were elaborated in the second Islamic century by the jurist al-Shāfi'ī (757–820), generally follow Arab tradition. The primary heir is the *walī* as the nearest male agnate in descending or ascending order (*'aṣabah*); but shares (*far'īd*) are also provided for secondary heirs in accordance with the Qur'anic dispositions in surah 4:7ff. Under certain conditions, the inheritance of a manumitted slave goes to his former owner, who has become his patron (*mawlā*) and is counted as such among the agnates according to Shāfi'ī law. A similar kind of legal kinship was presumed in the early Umayyad period between non-Arab converts to Islam and their Arab patrons, who “adopted” them as clients (*mawālī*).

Al-Jurjānī (1339–1413) defines *walāyah* as legal kinship (*qarābah ḥukmīyah*) resulting from either manumission or “adoption.” *Wilāyah*, on the other hand, he defines as the legal power “to carry through a decision affecting another person, whether the latter wishes or not.” The notion of *wilāyah* as legal power is not, as such, Qur'anic but was probably developed from the early second century AH onward in two different, though not unrelated, social spheres: family law and political thought.

Family law. The Qur'anic laws of inheritance are laid down in 4:1ff., together with general rules and indications concerning marriage and the gift of the bridal dower to the brides (or wives), as well as the protection of the goods of orphans and fair treatment of the mentally weak (*safīh*), who should be represented by their *walī* in legal matters (2:282). A number of specific legal responsibilities of a *walī* regarding brides, orphans, minors, and otherwise legally incompetent persons (*safīh*) were eventually defined as a kind of guardianship or trusteeship. Among these, the most important socially is undoubtedly the “guardianship of marriage” (*wilāyah al-nikāḥ*), the office of the bride's nearest relative, her *walī*, who must give her in marriage by contractual agreement with the bridegroom. The *walī* may refuse consent or, as *walī mujbir*, force his ward into marriage under certain circumstances. According to Joseph Schacht, the *wilāyah al-nikāḥ* was not, as a legal institution, “originally as self-evident as it became later,” and “marriage without a legal *walī* continued the easy-going practice of the pre-Islamic Arabs” during the early Islamic period (Schacht, p. 182f.).

Political thought. *Wilāyah* in the sense of political authority and sovereign power refers first of all to the authority of the “successor of the Messenger of God” (*khālifāt rasūl Allāh*), that is, the caliph, who is to be obeyed (*muṭā'*) as leader or guide (*imām*) of the Muslim community and as “commander of the faithful” (*amīr al-mu'minīn*). Although there is fundamental disagreement

between Sunnī and Shī'ī Muslims concerning the nature and scope of this authority, and the persons invested with it, both refer to the same *locus classicus* to justify their claims: “Obey God and the Messenger and ‘those in command’ [*ūlī al-amr*] among you!” (surah 4:59); it is therefore called *wilāyat al-amr*. This usage of *wilāyah* should be seen in relation to the development of the charismatic alliance of those who “follow [*yatawallā*] God, the Messenger, and the [true] believers,” or the party of God (5:55–56).

The question of who “those in command” were and how the alliance was to be preserved after the death of the Prophet was, perhaps not surprisingly, the primary concern of the early opposition parties. Among these, there were notably those who sided with Muḥammad's paternal cousin (*mawlā*) and son-in-law through Fāṭimah, 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 661), known as the party of 'Alī (*shī'at 'Alī*), later simply known as the Shī'ah, and those known as the dissidents (*khawārij*, Khārijīs). The early Shī'ah seem to have assumed that 'Alī was entitled to inheritance from the Prophet not only as his kin but also as his “emigrant brother”; his preeminent position is thus unique.

But the kinship principle alone was evidently not sufficient to guarantee 'Alī's exclusive right to what came to be known as *wilāyat al-amr*: it had to be completed by the principle of designation. This was made possible thanks to an inherent ambiguity of the term *mawlā*. According to a famous *ḥadīth* (prophetic tradition), the Prophet had made the following declaration at a solemn meeting after his last pilgrimage to Mecca and shortly before his death: “Am I not closer [*awlā*] to the believers than they are to themselves? . . . He whose *mawlā* I am, 'Alī is his *mawlā*! God, befriend the one who befriends him [*wāli man wālāhu*], and treat as an enemy the one who treats him as an enemy!” (see also surah 33:6). The earliest sure evidence for an interpretation of this *ḥadīth* as asserting 'Alī's *wilāyah* or right to be obeyed is found in the *Hāshimīyāt* of the pro-'Alid poet of Kufa, al-Kumayt ibn Zayd al-Asadī (680–743). 'Alī, however, was elected caliph only after the assassination of 'Uthmān, the third of the four Rāshidūn (“rightly guided”) caliphs in Sunnī Islam. 'Alī's caliphate was overshadowed by civil war, and he was himself assassinated by a Khārijī.

In the heresiographical literature the Khārijī movement is associated with the doctrine that anyone, “even an Abyssinian slave,” could serve as imam as long as that person was found to be a true believer. As may be seen from the earliest available Khārijī (Ibādī) texts (of uncertain date, between AH 70 and 150), a distinction between the “imams of truth” and the “imams of error” was essential to their doctrine, with the understanding

that the first were to be obeyed as “*awliyā*’ of the believers” and the second to be fought as unbelievers. The Khārijīs also developed the principle of *walāyah* in the sense of “associating with” or “following” (*muwālāh*, *tawallī*) prophets and “true believers,” and its correlative, “dissociating” or “freeing oneself” from the opposite powers (*barā’ah*, *tabarru’*). Exactly the same double principle (later known in Persian as *tawallā* and *tabarrā*) was adopted by the Shī’ah, but with the essential difference that the true believers to be followed were necessarily ‘Alī and subsequent imams issuing from his “holy family” (*aḥl al-bayt*, *āl Muḥammad*).

The assassination of ‘Alī, far from helping the Khārijī cause of Muslim “integralism,” led to its very opposite. The successful Umayyads established the dynastic principle in the Sunnī caliphate and introduced the practice of the designation of the heir apparent (*walī al-’ahd*) by the reigning caliph. Although the authority of an Umayyad caliph was hardly religious in nature, he was considered not only “successor of the Messenger of God,” but also “representative of God” on earth (*khalīfat Allāh*), a Qur’anic phrase that refers specifically to David as God’s “viceroys among men” (38:26) and that continued to be applied to the caliph well into the Abbasid period.

The dissatisfaction of the religious community with Umayyad worldliness, as well as the hopes of the Shī’ah, helped, among other factors, to bring about the so-called Abbasid Revolution in the Eastern caliphate. The descendants of Muḥammad’s paternal uncle al-‘Abbās were presented as members of the “providential family”; they showed, once in power, a marked zeal for religious affairs. The ‘*ulamā*’ (religious scholars) were now elaborating a Sunnī doctrine of *wilāyat al-amr* in close collaboration with the caliph. Hārūn al-Rashīd is addressed by the jurist Abū Yūsuf (d. 798), a disciple of Abū Ḥanīfah, as “*khalīfah* of God on his earth,” to whom God has “delegated the command” (*tawliyat al-amr*) and “given a light” to guide the subjects through clarification of the law and its enforcement. At the same time, Abū Yūsuf also strikes a Ṣūfī note. He exhorts the caliph to fulfill the duties of his high office and expresses the hope that God will not “abandon him to himself” (i.e., to his human weakness); that he will, rather, take care (*yatawallā*) of him as he takes care of his friends (*awliyā*), “given that he is the [ultimate] *walī* in the matter.”

During the later Abbasid period, when the real power was no longer exercised personally by the caliph, he was still considered the representative or guardian of the law (*walī al-shar’*). According to al-Māwardī (975–1080), it is the religious law itself that requires entrustment of all matters or delegation of general authority

(*wilāyah ‘āmmah*) to the elected or designated imam from the Quraysh, that is, the Abbasid caliph. The caliph in his turn delegates authority (*tawliyah*) to viziers, military commanders, governors, and judges, so that all public functions (*wilāyāt*) emanate in theory from the authority entrusted to him and are legally validated by it. But al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), recognizing that the caliph has no longer the military power (*shawkah*) to defend religion, justifies the transfer of this legal authority to the Seljuk sultan or king (*pādishāh*). Al-Ghazālī argues, with traditional Persian wisdom, that “religion [*dīn*] and kingship [*mulk*] are twin brothers in need of each other”; in effect, non-Arab sultans and kings were now to play the role of the “shadow of God on earth.”

Shī’ī Concepts. Contrary to the Sunnī acceptance of *wilāyah* as a state-building idea, the mark of Shiism is *walāyah* as devotion to ‘Alī and “the imams from the house of the Prophet,” that is, descendants of ‘Alī who are considered imams. Despite several unsuccessful ‘Alid attempts to seize power, or perhaps because of them—the martyrdom of ‘Alī’s second son Ḥusayn (d. 680) is an important aspect of Shī’ī Islam—imams of various lines of descent became the focus of a veneration that went far beyond the charismatic alliance of surah 5:55–56, from which “orthodox” Shī’ī doctrine nevertheless takes its pedigree: in effect, it became the apotheosis of the imam. In this process, through which Shiism became the major receptacle of messianic hopes and gnostic ideas in Islam, converts (*mawālī*), especially those of Iraq, seem to have played an essential role.

The transfer of *wilāyah* from Muḥammad to ‘Alī was understood as part of a more general *Heilsgeschichte*, a universal process of revelation to be completed by the imams as inheritors of the hidden (*bāṭin*) substance and knowledge of previous prophets, Arab and non-Arab, or as a process of transmigration (*tanāsukh*) that leads up to the final revelation of truth and justice with the coming, or return, of “the one who stands up” (*al-qā’im*, probably the gnostic *hestōs*). Despite the repudiation of the more extremist ideas of their enthusiastic followers (*ghulāt*) by the imams themselves, and although the imams are not placed above Muḥammad’s law according to standard Shī’ī doctrine, its major dogma insists that only the transfer of *wilāyah* from Muḥammad to ‘Alī and subsequent imams makes Islam the “perfect religion” (surah 5:3). In fact, *walāyah*, as adherence to the imams and as recognition of their mission as the true “holders of the [divine] Command” (*ūlī al-amr*) and the exclusive possessors of the true meaning of the Qur’ān and the “knowledge of the hidden” (*’ilm al-ghayb*), remains the key to salvation, without which no pious act of obedience to God (*ṭā’ah*) is truly valid. It is for these

reasons that *walāyah*, and not the profession of monotheism (*tawhīd*) as in Sunnī Islam, appears as the principal “pillar of Islam” in the classical collections of Shī‘ī traditions, both those of the Ithnā ‘Ashariyah, or Twelvers (e.g., al-Kulaynī, d. 940), and those of the Fatimid Ismā‘īliyah (e.g., Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān, d. 974), who follow a common line of imams up to Ja‘far al-Šādiq (d. 765).

The concrete meanings and functions of *walāyah*, however, were quite different in the two cases. Contrary to the generally quietist or neutral attitude of the Twelvers, the Ismā‘īliyah were politically active and succeeded in establishing, by the end of the third century AH, a Shī‘ī counter-caliphate in North Africa and later in Egypt that constituted a serious challenge to the Abbasid order. For the function of *walāyah* in this process, it seems significant that the Fatimid campaign in North Africa is seen in Ismā‘īlī sources (Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān) as a parallel to the prophet Muḥammad’s emigration (Hijrah) from Mecca to Medina: just as the Qur’anic emigrant fighters are placed above those sitting at home, the front fighters of the Fatimid agent Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Shī‘ī (d. 911) are distinguished as *awliyā’* from the ordinary (Ismā‘īlī) believers (*mu‘minūn*). The Fatimid caliph, referred to as *walī Allāh* and imam “of the time,” was evidently seen in the role of the Prophet himself. He was not only the political head of a counter-caliphate, but also the spiritual center of an esoteric hierarchy, the *da‘wah* (lit., the “call” or “mission”), initiation into which was expected to provide gradual access to gnosis (*‘ilm*)—a cause that al-Ghazālī feared would undermine Islam from inside.

From the point of view of an Ismā‘īlī missionary (*dā‘ī*) such as Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān, *wilāyah* was indeed much more than the legal foundation of the imamate: standing esoterically (*bāṭin*) for the true knowledge (*ḥaqīqat al-‘ilm*) bestowed primordially on Adam and inherited by prophets and imams, it is the very foundation of the sacred history of prophecy itself and its necessary fulfillment in the imamate. According to the grand *dā‘ī* al-Mu‘ayyad fī al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 1077), prophets and imams, each in their time, are the examples of “absolute human being” (*al-insān al-muṭlaq*, the gnostic Antrōpos). As the prophet Muḥammad is the Seal of the Prophets (surah 33:40), so the final (?) imam of resurrection (*qiyāmah*) is the Seal of the Imams (*khātām al-‘immah*).

The idea of the imam in Twelver Shiism, by contrast, is marked by the “occultation” (*ghaybah*) or absence of the twelfth imam, believed to have “disappeared” in AH 260 (873/4 CE); at his return (*raj‘ah*) at the end of time he will “fill the earth with justice as it is now filled with injustice.” In the absence of the imam, the ‘ulamā’ as-

sumed authority in theological and juridical matters much like their Sunnī counterparts before; they insisted, however, on the presence of the infallible (*ma‘šūm*) Hidden Imam as a “grace necessary upon God” (*lutf wājib*) that would validate their consensus (*ijmā’*). Gnostic Shiism, alien to the rationalism of the ‘ulamā’, reappears within Twelver Shiism by the fourteenth century in a Šūfī form. Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. after 1385) interprets Ibn ‘Arabī’s doctrine of the “two seals of *walāyah*” in terms of Twelver Shī‘ī imamology, with ‘Alī as the “seal of absolute *walāyah*” and the twelfth imam as the “seal of particular Muhammadan *walāyah*”; *walāyah* itself is both the “inner dimension of prophethood” (*bāṭin al-nubūwah*) and the transcendental vocation of humankind, or the trust offered (*al-amānah*, surah 33:72). [See Ghaybah.]

At the same time, Šūfī orders such as the Šafawīyah and the Kubrawīyah gradually turned Shī‘ī, possibly as an indirect result of the Mongol invasions. The Šafawīyah, supported by Türkmen “tribal Shiism” and claiming descent from the imams, became even “extreme Shī‘ī”; once its leaders assumed rule of Iran (with Shah Ismā‘īl I in 1501), they introduced Twelver Shiism, in a form hardly compatible with “orthodox” Shī‘ī doctrine, as state religion; their prayer carpet (*sajjādah*), symbol of the dignity of the Šūfī *shaykh*, or Šūfī *wilāyah*, became the symbol of the quasi-divine throne of Persia (*qālī‘ah-i saltanat*). Their success also brought about, perhaps paradoxically, the establishment of a real Shī‘ī “clergy” and its eventual politicization. For the first time in Twelver Shī‘ī history, the rationalist (Ušūlī) school of the clergy formally acknowledged in 1817/8 a division of labor between the ‘ulamā’ and the rulers—a long-established Sunnī practice—claiming general vice-regency (*wilāyah ‘ammah*) of the Hidden Imam for themselves, against the more traditionalist ideas of the Akhbārī school, and against the Šūfīs.

The very complex religious, social, and political situation in nineteenth-century Iran is also highlighted by the tensions between the majority of the clergy and the Shaykhī school, who developed a mystical concept of the “perfect Shī‘ah” on the basis of Akhbārī traditionalism and the philosophy of Mullā Šadrā (d. 1640). In the Shaykhī scheme, the imam presides over the realization of man’s vocation in the realm between matter and spirit, or the *mundus imaginalis* (*‘ālam al-mithāl*), not over the realization of a political project.

It should be noted that the leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1978–1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, still makes a fundamental, albeit theoretical, distinction between two kinds of *wilāyah*: that of the learned jurist (*wilāyat al-faqīh*), called relative *wilāyah* (*wilāyah i‘tibārīyah*) and that of the traditional imams of the prophetic

house, called real or creative *wilāyah* (*wilāyah takwīniyah*). [For further discussion of *Shī'i* concepts of *walāyah*, see also *Imamate and Iṣmah*.]

Ṣūfī Concept. *Walāyah/wilāyah* is also a key concept for Sufism; indeed, it is the very principle of Sufism itself according to al-Hujwīrī's eleventh-century systematic exposition of its doctrine, the *Kashf al-maḥjūb* (Unveiling of the Veiled). Yet once again, two notions appear to be involved. To use the typological distinction made above between "Meccan" and "Medinese" *walāyah*, one might suggest that the spiritual attitude of early Sufism, with its ideal of poverty (*faqr*, *darvīshī*) and reliance upon God (*tawakkul*), is more in line with the former. The Khorasani saint Ibrāhīm ibn Adham (d. 776), quoted by the reputed teacher of most of the Baghdad Ṣūfīs, the theologian al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857), puts it succinctly this way: "If you wish to be God's friend [*walī*] and care that he loves you, then leave this world and the next and do not heed either; free yourself from both and turn your face to God, so that he turns his face to you!"

A number of prophetic traditions, often in the form of *ḥadīth qudsī* (non-Qur'anic "words of God" transmitted by a prophet), suggest that there are indeed such friends of God. As with the Qur'anic notion of *awliyā'*, there is a certain ambiguity as to whether these friends of God are human or angelic beings. "Approaching [God] and approached by him," they have reached such a stage that God says: "I am his ear by which he hears, his eye by which he sees, his tongue by which he speaks, his heart by which he understands"; even the prophets will envy them at the Day of Resurrection. No tradition refers to them by name; indeed, according to a famous tradition, they are hidden "under God's tents, unknown to anyone but him." On the other hand, they are reminders of God for people and stand under his special protection: whoever turns against them, turns against God. "Marvelous is their story; and they know marvelous stories. The [heavenly] Book stands through them, and they stand through it; the Book speaks through them, and they speak through the Book."

Many of the traditions regarding these "friends of God," the first comprehensive collection of which is found in Abū Nu'aym al-Iṣbahānī's *Ḥilyat al-awliyā'*, are attributed to pre-Islamic prophets, especially Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā' (John the Baptist) and Jesus. This may suggest a gnostic origin; some are clearly of a mythological nature. According to the tradition known throughout the Ṣūfī literature as the *ḥadīth* of 'Abd Allāh ibn Mas'ūd, there are 355 or 356 such figures, upon whom life and death of all nations depends: 300 "whose heart is after the heart" of Adam; 40 who are in the same relationship to Moses (or Noah); 7 to Abra-

ham; 5 (or 4) to the angel Gabriel; 3 to Michael; and one to Seraphiel (Isrāfil, the angel of resurrection). If one of them dies, God substitutes for him one of the next lower class. The substitutes of the lowest class (the 300) are taken from the common people (*al-'āmmah*). The single one is commonly called the "pole" (*quṭb*) or the "rescue" (*ghawth*), while terms such as *abdāl* (usually for the 40 or the 7) and *ṣiddīqūn* (see surah 4:69) refer either to a class, or to saints generally, like *awliyā'*.

Wilāyah, then, is the special charismatic quality of a Ṣūfī, that which enables him to be the subject of miracles or, more precisely, *karāmāt* (charismata). The classical Ṣūfīs, especially the Khorasani school, were divided over the question of whether *awliyā'* should themselves be aware of their sainthood and whether the *karāmāt* should become public knowledge. For Bāyazīd al-Baṣṭāmī (or Bistāmī, d. 875 or earlier), the *awliyā'* should be hidden like the "brides of God"; he was extremely critical of public shows. By contrast, Tirmidhī al-Ḥakīm (ninth century), the reputed founder of the Ṣūfī doctrine of *wilāyah*, dismissed such restraint as a subtle form of self-consciousness. According to the definition of Tirmidhī's contemporary and disciple Abū 'Alī al-Juzjānī (which became more or less authoritative), a *walī* is "in oblivion [*fanā'*] of himself but subsisting [*baqā'*] in contemplation." Other well-known definitions distinguish an "active" from a "passive" aspect (al-Qushayrī), or a *walāyah* of "lordship" (surah 18:44) from a *wilāyah* (?) of "love" (al-Hujwīrī).

Typical connotations of Ṣūfī *wilāyah* are "insight into the hidden" (*al-'ilm bi-al-ghayb*, Tirmidhī) and control of souls (*taṣarruf*), psychognostic and pedagogic abilities, and the power to drive Satan away. Medieval Ṣūfī "saints" are famous for having the power to help the Muslim armies, and to intercede (*shafā'ah*) on behalf of the sinners. In postclassical Ṣūfī texts, *walāyah* or *wilāyah* generally refers either to the highest mystical stage that may be attained or to the authority exercised by a Ṣūfī master, or to both at the same time. Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 1221) identifies its highest stage with the experience of divine creative power (*takwīn*). By contrast, his followers in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, receptive to *Shī'i* ideas but not yet themselves *Shī'ah*, notably 'Alā' al-Dawlah al-Simnānī (d. 1336), emphasize the double experience of the prophet Muḥammad—his *walāyah* or mystical experience and his *nubūwah* or prophetic authority—as a necessary model for their own double experience of mystical attainment and Ṣūfī authority.

One of the major theoretical problems discussed in Ṣūfī circles from the beginning was the exact nature of the relationship between the *awliyā'* and the prophet Muḥammad, that is, between the Ṣūfī and the prophet

Muḥammad. The imam Ja'far al-Šādiq is quoted by Abū Nu'aym as follows: "Whoever lives in the 'outward' [*zāhir*] of the Messenger [Muḥammad] is a Sunnī, and whoever lives in the 'inward' [*bāṭin*] of the Messenger is a Šūfī." In the Qur'anic commentary of the Šūfī Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 896 in Basra), the heart or spiritual reality of Muḥammad is seen as the divine element enshrined in him and the source for the illumination of human hearts; his pre-Adamic Light-nature (*nūr Muḥammad*) is the source of the prophetic ancestors of mankind, and of "those desired [by God]," that is, *awliyā'*.

Divine *walāyah*, on the other hand, is conferred directly on the elect, who are also those who have the right understanding of God and of the Qur'ān, according to al-Tustarī. The fact that the Prophet is "the *walī* of the believers" (surah 5:55) means only that he was notified (in this world) by God to befriend those whom God had befriended (or elected) in the first place. There does not seem to be an essential distinction in al-Tustarī's view between prophets generally and *awliyā'*, although *šiddīqūn* occupy a lower rank; the charisma of the *awliyā'* are signs (*āyāt*) of God's power, and al-Tustarī himself claims to be the "proof of God" (*ḥujjat Al-lāh*). The Baghdad Šūfī Abū Sa'id al-Kharrāz, (d. 890/1), on the other hand, polemizes against "certain Šūfis" who "place the *awliyā'* above the prophets." For al-Kharrāz, prophecy is a grace additional to *wilāyah*, since prophets are *awliyā'* before they become prophets. The *awliyā'* are always placed under a prophet known by name, on whose behalf they call people to God, and their charismata are clearly of a secondary nature in comparison with the signs that are given exclusively to prophets.

Tirmidhī goes a step further in elevating the status of Muḥammad the lawgiving prophet, while at the same time elevating his own status: on the one hand, *awliyā'* and ordinary prophets rank lower than lawgiving prophets, among whom Muḥammad is unquestionably the greatest. All parts of prophecy are united in him; he is perfect in this sense, and impeccable (*ma'šūm*). But his being "the Seal of the Prophets" means just this, not that he was the last in time, Tirmidhī insists. There is also a mysterious "Seal of the *Awliyā'*," to be sent by God at the end of time. Tirmidhī often uses Shī'ī (although not necessarily Ismā'īlī) language, but clearly not with a Shī'ī intention: he explicitly denies that the "family of the Prophet" is the "kinship family." But the danger of a confusion with the Ismā'īlīyah was evidently felt by al-Hujwīrī, who, writing in the mood of the "Sunnī Revival," omits the doctrine of the Seal from his summary of Tirmidhī's teaching. Yet it was brought to light again, and enriched with elements of a breathtaking complexity, by Ibn 'Arabī (1164–1240), the real

master (*shaykh akbar*) of subsequent Šūfī thought. Ibn 'Arabī summarizes his concept of the relationship between the two Seals with the following proposition: "The Seal of the Prophets, considered from the point of view of his own *walāyah*, is toward the One who seals the *walāyah* in the same position as all other prophets and lawgiving messengers are toward him, for he is *walī*, lawgiving messenger, and prophet." But *walāyah* itself is divided into two, and, accordingly, there are two Seals of *Walāyah* in the shaykh's doctrine: Jesus, Seal of "General *Walāyah*," and Ibn 'Arabī himself, or his spiritual reality, Seal of "the Particular Muhammadan *Walāyah*." This doctrine, provocative as it sounds, is, however, balanced by the self-evident necessity for both Seals of *Walāyah* to follow the law of the Seal of Prophecy; and everything is placed under the primordial "reality of Muḥammad," also called "reality of realities," or the *logos*.

[For discussion of the closely related topic of prophecy in Islam, see Nubūwah. The Islamic concept of community is discussed in Ummah. See also Caliphate.]

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WALBIRI RELIGION. In the 1950s, the latest period for which figures are available, the Aboriginal group known as the Walbiri (Warlpiri) numbered about 1,400 members. Their tribal homeland, situated in Australia's Northern Territory at about 132° east longitude and 22° south latitude, covered approximately 100,000 square kilometers of relatively arid country. Traditionally, the Walbiri were seminomadic hunters and gatherers whose subsistence depended heavily on women's daily collection of vegetable foods. Four major communities made up the "tribe," and each claimed a large domain, within which foraged local groups whose size, composition, and itineraries varied seasonally. The constituent family hearth-groups were the basic units of economic production and consumption.

Reciprocally named patrimoiety were prominent in religious belief and action; they in turn included small patrilineages that provided the members of totemic cult lodges concerned with male initiation, transmission of religious dogma, revelation of sacred objects, and performance of increase ceremonies for the totems. Reciprocally named matrimoiety were of limited significance in everyday life, but within them small, nonlocalized matrifilial groupings convened irregularly to implement marriage choices and funerary and revenge obligations, although membership had few totemic implications.

Every Walbiri at birth was allocated to a subsection, its identity being indirectly determined by that of the individual's mother. Subsections defined categories of people, not groups, and they had little functional importance outside the realm of classificatory totemism in which the universe of totems was exhaustively divided among the father-son couples of subsections found in each patrimoiety.

Walbiri society was economically homogeneous and politically egalitarian; no chiefs or elected leaders ordered public affairs. In this democracy, considerations

of kinship status and of community membership were paramount in specifying the men and women who had the right and obligation to act in particular secular situations. Only in the sphere of religious dogma and action did senior men, by virtue of their tutelary functions in totemic lodges, exercise something approaching permanent authority over others. However, whatever the Walbiri might have lacked in rank differentiation, material wealth, and complex technology was offset by the manifest elaboration of their religious beliefs and practices, which in turn were seen to be inherently effective in ensuring natural and social reproduction and hence the continuity of the "tribe."

The Dreaming. Like many Australian Aborigines, the Walbiri postulated the earlier existence of the Dreaming, an era in which the behavior of demiurgic totemic beings ordered an inchoate world to the degree that all its components became subject to lawful processes and combined to constitute an environment in which people could live as social creatures. [See Dreaming, The.] The Dreaming heroes secured these changes by enacting for the first time the rituals the Walbiri were to perform and by naming the natural phenomena they met on their journeys. These endowments of the Dreaming also encompassed the cultural institutions that the Walbiri cherished, including their totemic religious philosophy. This was a monistic worldview that characterized people, society, and nature as interacting parts of a larger totality, in which each element was held to be morally constrained to maintain itself undiminished for the proper functioning of the system.

The Dreaming was not regarded solely as a finite period in which certain antecedent events took place only once in the distant past and so caused the sequence of subsequent events to unfold through time. It was also a perduring state of being that persisted as a noumenal ground to sustain the continuing stream of phenomenal existence. Walbiri (and other Aboriginal) men had therefore to repeat continually the rituals first instituted in the Dreaming to trigger the power that, distributed in the form of immaterial noumenal catalysts, ensured the recurrence of phenomenal events. Further, the entry of these noumena into representatives of all living species was responsible for their continuing reproduction. In the same way, the contemporary expression of totemic myths and songs was a repetition of the original naming initiated by the Dreaming heroes, and it specified the pattern that ordered the everyday phenomenal world. These Walbiri assumptions about the sacred and the mundane also informed the people's ideas of reciprocal social interaction, complementarity, and equivalence as fundamental characteristics of human society.

The implications of this worldview could readily be seen in the attitudes of Walbiri to their homeland. Their territory was the prime source of sustenance for constituent local groups, whatever their current size. Even though members of the local groups could on occasion utilize the products of districts of neighboring communities, including those of non-Walbiri, Walbiri as a whole had jural and moral title only to their own lands—those with which members had constitutive spiritual (noumenal) ties. Walbiri thus did not simply inherit the right to exploit the material resources of their own domain; they also incurred the heavy obligation of maintaining—through the performance of song, myth, and ritual—the sacred sites marked by ancestral Dreaming beings who first formed the land and its occupants. If contemporary Walbiri failed to enact the rituals or to hand on the myths, not only would the local territory and its resources suffer, but the precarious balance of the total system would be overturned. In this sense the Walbiri did not merely possess their land; it in turn possessed them. They were custodians of a patrimony, both iconic and material, which they held as a sacred trust for posterity.

Walbiri totems or Dreamings included many of the phenomena occurring in the environment before European contact—fauna, flora, minerals, celestial objects, meteorological events, and human artifacts. Some totemic species were thought to assume human shape and actions at will; others always exhibited their own characteristics. There were also male and female culture heroes who roamed in the Dreaming, always in human form. They too were totems, but they occupied a more important status than did other beings in the religious system—Walbiri believed that people differ from other creatures, not least in possessing a degree of free will.

Not all members of the Dreaming, however, were regarded as benevolent, for they included a class of maleficent demons with quasi-human characteristics. These beings were neither heroes nor totems in the strict sense, and they constantly aimed to injure other Dreamings as well as people.

Sacred Geography. All totems originated in the Dreaming, and each ultimately had a local reference, which could range from a path extending several hundred miles, to a specific tract occupying a few square miles. Dreaming heroes or species who possessed paths either sprang from the earth or sky within the Walbiri domain or arrived from an adjacent language-group's territory to make long journeys during which they shaped and identified the landscape and its occupants, enacted rituals, introduced cultural rules and practices, and left some of their spiritual essence wherever they camped. These places were all named

and known to the Walbiri. Their creative work done, the totemic beings either entered the earth or sky in Walbiri territory or traveled on to instruct neighboring groups. Nonhuman totems confined to particular, named locales arose from the earth to perform their rituals and deposit their essence there before returning underground. Often these Dreaming localities were places where the corresponding natural species abounded.

The sites within a particular Dreaming country or on a Dreaming track were not necessarily confined to the territory of one Walbiri community or even to the Walbiri domain proper. Particular Dreamings, like the inclusive concept of the Dreaming, were essentially "pantribal." The Long Path of the Two Kangaroos, for example, began in Waneiga Walbiri country, ran west and then south through Walmalla and Ngalia countries into the territory of the Pintubi in Western Australia, and finally entered the lands of other peoples in South Australia. Similarly, separate sites of Opossum Dreaming existed in all four Walbiri-community countries, as well as in neighboring group domains.

Despite such geographical dispersion of totemic localities, however, the men of each Walbiri community emphasized in a diacritical manner their relationships with certain of the more significant Dreamings. Thus, the Waneiga were more concerned with fire and the Mamandabari—the two heroes of the Gadjeri ritual complex; the Lander group of the Walbiri focused on the Walangari heroes; the Ngalia with the Two Kangaroos, Wallaby, and Traveling Women Dreamings; and the Walmalla with the Yam, Opossum, and Fire Dreamings. Understandably, the several tracks of the Rain Dreaming were held to be important by all the communities.

Although these totemic beings departed from Walbiri territory or entered the earth during the far-past Dreaming period, they continued to exist in noumenal form, and their powers impinged directly on Walbiri people. Men confidently believed that, when they performed songs and rituals, they became these Dreamings and actually participated, however briefly, in the ongoing Dreaming order, from which they returned spiritually invigorated to resume their phenomenal lives. The Walbiri thus assumed that potent and intimate relations existed between their Dreamings and themselves, whether as individuals or as social groups, and they incorporated Dreamings into the kinship, subsection, and moiety systems, as well as making them reference points in the local organization. However, the Walbiri use of the word *nguru* ("country") to refer to Dreaming places simply expressed the classificatory aspect of their totemism—the assumption that people, natural species, and localities comprised an interconnected totality. It had no direct bearing on secular economic or

residential arrangements, as is evidenced by the fact that many Dreaming localities associated with each patrimoiety might coexist in a single limited area. That is, such named tracts were not territories exclusively exploited by hypothetical patrilineal or patrilocal bands. Instead, they were foci of religious reference, identifiable points at which Dreaming beings acted and then deposited part of their spiritual essence.

These amorphous, immaterial particles, which permeated the environs of the sites, were held actually to be (and not simply to represent) particular Dreaming creatures or objects. As such, they were catalysts that could be stimulated through song and ritual to set off series of reactions that led to successful floral and faunal (including human) reproduction, the enhancement of human personalities, the recovery of people's health, and the intensification of social euphoria and solidarity. These catalysts and the totemic beings that created them were noumena that continued to inform contemporary natural species and objects.

Every Walbiri possessed a Conception Dreaming or totem, acquired as a consequence of a spirit essence's entry into the womb of his or her pregnant mother; the spirit essence animated the fetus from which the person later developed. The identity of the specific essence depended on the totemic identity of the locality where the woman was residing when she discovered her pregnancy. To the Walbiri, the association of a given Conception Dreaming with a particular individual was fortuitous. Thus, offspring of a widely traveled woman could all have different Conception Dreamings.

The Dreaming beings deposited their differentiated essences throughout the land to benefit both natural species and Aborigines; but the essences could not achieve these ends unless living men created the proper circumstances to stimulate their action. Groups of men were therefore taxed with the regular performance of sacred songs and rituals connected with Dreamings in the various localities. Each Dreaming or group of linked Dreamings significantly interconnected in the Dream-time was incorporated in a cult lodge, and as a rule each lodge drew its members from males of one small patrilineage. Their personal Conception Dreamings did not have to be the lodge totem.

Cult Lodge Rituals. All initiated men of a patrimoiety were entitled to act in rituals performed for any totem classified in that moiety, to wear appropriate totemic designs, and to manipulate related ritual objects; but only men of the associated lodge were legitimate custodians or masters of the Dreaming. Men of the opposite patrimoiety were required to make all preparations for lodge ceremonies, such as procuring necessary materials, "singing" and decorating the actors, and con-

structing temporary ritual paraphernalia. They also included the men who, as "brothers-in-law" of the particular Dreaming, made and cared for the lasting sacred objects (such as incised boards and bull-roarers) that embodied it.

Lodge members, whatever their actual agnatic ties or places of birth or residence, regarded their Lodge Dreaming as a spiritual father and themselves as spiritual brothers. They likewise referred to actual members of their totemic species as their "fathers" or "brothers," with whom they also shared the spiritual essence of the Dreaming—although they were not necessarily enjoined from killing or consuming them.

Every Walbiri boy was, as a rule, initiated into his father's lodge when he was circumcised at about the age of twelve or thirteen. Lads together saw the same rituals while they were secluded before circumcision, mainly enactments of the important myth of the two kangaroos. The structure and content of circumcision ceremonies were similar throughout the tribe, the critical difference being that on each occasion the large cross made from sacred incised boards and hair string to symbolize the particular Lodge Dreaming bore that totemic pattern on its face. The father's and mother's brothers of the novice constructed the cross, soaked it with their arm-blood, and chanted appropriate songs to impregnate it with the Dreaming essence of the lodge. Immediately before the boy's future father-in-law circumcised him, elder brothers pressed his chest against the design on the cross to ensure that the Dreaming spirit penetrated him, as it had earlier entered each of his senior agnates. When each member of the lodge died, his portion of the lodge spirit left him to reenter Dreaming sites associated with the lodge.

The operation of circumcision and its associated rites, performed before the assembled men, explicitly defined the youth's status in sacred and secular society. If he did not experience the ritual, he could not join his father's cult lodge, he could not acquire secret knowledge or act in religious ceremonies, and he could not legitimately marry and procreate; in effect, he could not become a Walbiri man.

A few years after initiation and before his marriage, the young man was subincised. This operation, although obligatory, did not carry the same sanctifying significance as did circumcision. Its main consequence was to enable a man to draw from his penile urethra potent blood with which to anoint novices and other men.

Women of a patrilineage were not formally initiated into that lodge and did not learn the songs and rituals that the men performed, although they were held to benefit from these actions. The sacred objects, whether

durable incised boards or temporary constructions of hair string, were also hidden from the women, who remained largely ignorant of the myths and dogma held by the lodge. Correlatively, Walbiri men knew little of the ceremonies and paraphernalia that women utilized to strengthen their own spiritual ties to their homelands or to ameliorate marital difficulties.

Spirits. People who were related matrilineally shared a "matrispirit." These, however, were not associated with particular Dreamings. A matrispirit resided in a woman's uterus, and during pregnancy part of this spirit passed into the fetus, male or female, to become a double of the parent spirit. Men could not pass on their matrispirit. At death the matrispirit became an ethereal ghost that resembled the deceased. It stayed near the tree platform where the corpse rested until the death was explained and, if necessary, avenged; it then dissipated. No other totemic rituals initiated or accompanied these transformations of maternal spirit.

Walbiri beliefs about the personal incorporation of patrispirits and matrispirits had important structural implications; in particular they expressed a principle of complementary filiation that allocated specific jural rights among paternal and maternal kin of each individual. To possess such a spirit signified membership in a social category, and the two forms of grouping—namely, patriline and matrilineal sets—performed correlative sacred and secular tasks that were crucial for the maintenance of the social system.

Moreover, the complex of ideas concerning the interconnections of patrispirits, matrispirits, and conception spirits within the individual provided a pragmatic account of personality traits. Possession of a matrispirit in common explained apparent similarities of appearance and temperament among maternal kin, just as a shared patrispirit or lodge spirit accounted for likenesses among men of that patriline. On the other hand, the particular Conception Dreaming held by a person connected the owner's psyche with a specific Dreaming locality and, because others of his patriline and matriline need not share this totem, its possession defined his or her distinctive individuality. Both lodge spirit and Conception Dreaming had mobile manifestations that could bring to the person warnings of distant or future events, in this way accounting for the occurrence of significant dreams and premonitions.

Finally, whereas men acquired patrispirits upon initiation into their fathers' lodges, women were not thus initiated, and they relied on male agnates to hold the lodge spirit in trust for them. Accordingly a woman's personality did not include this psychic component, which was an important reason why men and women

were thought to differ so obviously in temperament and behavior.

Death. Although Walbiri notions of the ritually induced transmigration of Dreaming or spirit essences implied a kind of reincarnation after death, the process was wholly impersonal. People did not believe that the human person survived the destruction of the body unchanged. Rather, they took death to mark the end of the previously coherent personality of the individual, which then disintegrated into its spiritual components. The Dreaming elements returned to their spirit homes, and the matrispirit dissipated completely. In consequence, the Walbiri did not regard with equanimity the inevitability of their own or their relatives' deaths. There was instead an elaborate complex of mortuary behavior that helped survivors close ranks against the fatal irruption.

Conclusion. The Walbiri attributed a vast importance to sacred and ritual matters. They regarded the Dreaming as the ultimate source of the charters of their social groups and of their rights to hold territories, with the result that the patriline and the lodges they manned maintained their jural and political identities by means of their ritual activities.

Moreover, both sacred and secular life were bounded by a multitude of explicit social rules to which the people in general conformed. The totality of the rules expressed, and indeed *was*, the law, the straight or true path. The law thus connoted an established and morally acceptable order of behavior for all phenomena, from which there should be no deviation. Rigorous adherence to Dreaming law was in itself a fundamental value and was believed to distinguish the Walbiri from other people, who were therefore their moral inferiors.

Because the law originated in the Dreaming, it was beyond criticism or deliberate change. Thus, all patterns of behavior were held to be subject to Dreaming law, with which they were coeval and which they maintained. In consequence, the normal was the normative—and vice versa. The monism of Walbiri totemic philosophy was inevitably moral and conservative, and it was ultimately circular. These mutually reinforcing characteristics were in an important sense its strength and its protection when the Walbiri eventually confronted the violent intrusion of Europeans into their world and struggled with considerable success to keep their religious life intact in the face of alien proselytizers.

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WALDENSIANS. The Waldensians, also called the Poor Men of Lyons, originated with Pierre Valdès, or Peter Waldo, a wealthy merchant of Lyons, France. The dates of his birth and death are not known, nor is his exact name. The name Peter was given to him later by his followers, probably to stress his affinity with Peter, first of Christ's disciples. About 1170 Valdès was converted from his worldly life after hearing the story of Saint Alexis, who on his wedding day abandoned his bride and all his worldly possessions to become a pilgrim. The account led Valdès to seek the advice of a priest on how he, too, could obey God and become perfect. The reply he received was the same text from *Matthew* (19:21) that Francis of Assisi was to come upon forty years later: "If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your possessions, and give to the poor, and then you will have treasure in heaven; and, come, follow me." Valdès acted on the injunction, and took to a life of wandering poverty and preaching, living on alms, in emulation of Christ's life on earth.

He was soon joined by others, among them priests who translated into French passages from the Bible for the group's use in preaching. Vernacular translations from the Bible were one of the Waldensians' hallmarks. Before long their unauthorized preaching alarmed the local clergy, and the archbishop of Lyons ordered them to cease. Valdès refused, with the reply that was to be the central Waldensian tenet, that God was to be obeyed before man (a reference to *Acts* 5:19).

The Waldensians decided to take their case to the

pope, Alexander III, and a party of them traveled to Rome for that purpose. They arrived during the Third Lateran Council in 1179, were heard, and their beliefs were examined. Alexander confirmed their vow of poverty, but he also, in effect, confirmed the archbishop of Lyons's ban on their preaching by declaring that they could preach only if they first gained the permission of the local clergy. That, however, was not enough for Valdès; he continued to preach, and although he made a profession of faith before a synod at Lyons in 1180, he and his followers were excommunicated in 1182 or 1183. At the Council of Verona in 1184, where the first concerted attack on heresy was begun, the Waldensians were included among the heretical sects condemned, a condemnation to be repeated many times during the next three centuries.

The Waldensians are the classic case of popular piety become heresy. What had begun as one more attempt, not uncommon in the twelfth century, by a few individuals to return to evangelical principles, ended outside the church. The Waldensians differed in that they, alone among these groups and individuals, were neither absorbed into a religious order nor eventually disappeared as a sect, but survived the Middle Ages to become one of the new reformed churches—albeit a small one—of the sixteenth century. They did so, in part at least, because, of all the heretical sects, they remained closest to the teachings of the gospel which they sought simply to preach and practice without theological or metaphysical overtones. Theirs was above all a moral and spiritual Christianity. In that there were strong similarities between Valdès and Francis of Assisi. But where Francis and his band were accepted both by the local church hierarchy and by the pope, Innocent III, Valdès was not, and he rebelled. Even so, there is no evidence that he ever departed from the church's teachings, and every indication that during his lifetime he devoted himself to combating heresy, especially that of the Cathari. The closeness of the Waldensians to orthodox belief is suggested by the reconversion of two groups under Durand of Huesca and Bernard Prim in 1207 and 1210, and their formation into separate religious orders by Innocent III to oppose the Cathari.

That was probably the period when Valdès died. By then the Waldensians had spread from Lyons into Languedoc and northern Italy as well as into Germany, in due course extending into central Europe. They became the nearest thing to a popular counterchurch, with their own congregations and priests and their own religious forms. But they did not operate as a single church. That was due partly to circumstances and partly to their popular, almost exclusively lay, character. In 1205 there

was a schism between the Lombard Waldensians and those from north of the Alps, the followers of Valdès. The Lombards had instituted their own sacraments and ceased to lead the life of wandering preachers but lived in towns and by manual labor. The followers of Valdès maintained their original pattern of mendicant preaching and poverty. The Lombards elected their own head, whereas for Valdès only Christ could be the head. Despite a further attempt to heal the split in 1218 and some degree of contact, the two different wings went their own ways.

The Waldensians were the one genuinely popular heresy (before the Hussites) who drew their support from artisans and peasants. Although they had their base in the cities, especially in Lombardy, they were also of the countryside, especially north of the Alps and in the Alpine valleys of Piedmont, where geography protected them. Cohesion was maintained by the Waldensian priests, often called the "perfect," an analogy with the Catharist perfect but having a very different character. The Waldensian perfect, especially north of the Alps—and by the fourteenth century the Waldensians had in effect become a northern phenomenon, with their main strength in Germany and central Europe—were preachers acting as Christ's apostles as Valdès had done. But now they acted clandestinely. They visited individual Waldensian believers and administered their simplified version of the sacraments. In return they were supported by the believers materially, sometimes by a voluntary tax or payment. Otherwise, the ordinary Waldensian led an ordinary life, earning his living and observing outward obedience to the Roman church. That may well have involved less of a conflict than among the ordinary Cathar believer. The difference between being a Waldensian and an orthodox Christian was less one of belief than of adherence to the Waldensian perfects, regarded by the Waldensian believers as Christ's true representatives. The opposition between them and the Roman church was the main source of Waldensian belief as it developed after the death of Valdès.

The Waldensians claimed that they were the one true church to whom the apostolic succession had passed after the so-called Donation of Constantine, which gave to the pope headship of the western Roman empire. Although a forgery, the Donation was believed to be true until the fifteenth century, and the Waldensians were not alone in treating it as the cause of the Roman church's decline. From it they argued that the Roman priests were not true priests and, following Valdès, further held that any man, and, indeed, woman, pure in spirit and in the quality of his or her life, was a priest and ordained by God. Like the Cathari, the Waldensians

accepted women as perfect, although there seems to have been a decline in the number of female perfect in the fourteenth century. Once adopted, those Waldensian beliefs became irreconcilable with those of the Roman church. The Waldensians also came to reject the Roman church's sacramental forms and most of its prayers and ceremony, including prayers for the dead, a belief in purgatory, or the very need for churches. In their place they had their own modified spiritual forms of baptism (and only for adults, not children), confession, and marriage. At the same time, true to the literal interpretation of Christ's own gospel teaching, they rejected all non-spiritual activities, including the swearing of oaths, the exercise of legal authority, the waging of war, or the taking of life.

In all those ways they sought to obey God rather than man by turning away from the man-made laws of the Roman church to direct communion with Christ through God's word in the Bible. Their influence is to be seen upon the Hussites.

[See also *Cathari and the biography of Hus.*]

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GORDON LEFF

WALĪ ALLĀH, SHĀH (AH 1114–1176/1703–1762 CE), properly Abū al-Fayyāḍ Quṭb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-Dihlawī, Indian theologian and reformer. Born in Delhi, Shāh Walī Allāh was precocious and inquisitive. Under his father's guidance he began the study of the texts of Qur'ān and ḥadīth (prophetic traditions) at an early age. Initiated by his father into the Naqshbandī Ṣūfī order, Walī Allāh acquired its ethos of social activism and individual contemplation within the limits of Muslim orthodoxy. At age sixteen, he became head of the Madrasah Raḥīmīyah, the religious institution founded by his father; this served as Walī Allāh's home base during his career.

His intellectual formation was completed during a

stay of more than a year in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, to which he traveled on pilgrimage in 1730. There he studied with prominent members of the international community of Muslim scholars. Following his return to Delhi he devoted the rest of his life to teaching and to propagating a new intellectual and moral system that would defend the Indian Muslim community from the decline of the Mughal empire and from dissensions among its members. On the one hand, he urged Indian Muslim princes to resist the political and military ambitions of their non-Muslim neighbors, particularly the Jāts and Marāthas. On the other hand, he composed over forty works in both Arabic and Persian designed to bring a fresh perspective to the Indian Muslim community and to reconcile sharp internal differences including those between Sunnīs and Shī'ah and among the rival systems of religious law.

His masterpiece is *Hujjat Allāh al-bālighah* (God's Strongest Proof), an encyclopedic treatment of metaphysics, politics, and economics. A commentary on *Al-muwatta'* by Mālik ibn Anas, the eighth-century *ḥadīth* authority, reflects Walī Allāh's training in *ḥadīth* studies at the hands of a Mālikī scholar from northwest Africa who resided in Medina. Finally, mention may be made of his controversial annotated translation of the Qur'ān into Persian, the literary language of Muslim India in Walī Allāh's time. The purpose of this work was to make scripture directly accessible to the literate and thus to bypass the religious scholars (*'ulamā'*) whom Walī Allāh regarded as hidebound, blind imitators of the scholastic texts of earlier jurists. Concomitantly, Walī Allāh argued for the revival of the legal principle of *ijtihād*. In a short work he defines *ijtihād* as "exhaustive endeavor" by a trained scholar to seek answers to current pressing concerns within the limits set by the authoritative texts of scripture and *ḥadīth*. His hope was to reinject a vital sense of engagement into the Muslim scholar's outlook and to encourage scholars to approach problems with open minds.

It is probably impossible to exaggerate Walī Allāh's influence on the development of Islam in India in modern times. By his concurrent insistence on orthodoxy and on breadth and synthesis of Muslim ideas, he laid the groundwork for most modern Islamic movements in the Indian subcontinent. Resistance to alien rule—first by non-Muslim Indians and then, after Walī Allāh's death, by the British—tempered by a critical and inquiring search for an authoritative religious tradition, had their foundations in Walī Allāh's life and work.

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WANDJINA. Australian Aborigines traditionally believed that a person's spirit existed before entering the human life-cycle and that it survived after bodily death. Life-spirits were identified as originating in a number of mythological beings, of which those called *wandjina* were important in central and northern Kimberley, with the mythical snake Ungud and other animal spirits playing less significant parts.

Identification of a person's life-spirit, or conception totem, was revealed to his or her father or to another senior male of the group during a dream. Dream communication with the mythological beings played a significant role in Aboriginal religion, for although the events of the creation period, or *lalai*, were generally known, the present state of the beings was of ongoing significance, and that could be revealed only through the dreaming process. The father-to-be was entitled to identify the origin of a life-spirit, but in other circumstances, a specialist, or *banman* ("dreamer"), could communicate with the mythological beings. Life-spirits of *wandjina* origin came from the clouds, (that is, the sky) to live in water. They entered the mother-to-be either directly or through food gotten from water: for example, fish. In his dream, the father would see the spirit and identify its place of origin, from which he could deduce the mythological being who then became the conception totem. One Aboriginal man summarized the se-

quence of events as follows: "Our fathers found us in the form of fish or turtles, but the Wandjina is our real father. He put us in the water from the sky. . . . We came from heaven through the water by dreams." The life-spirit is regarded as a reincarnated *wandjina*, and a person whose spirit is so derived will speak in a way that indicates continuity of the (mythological) past and the present.

The *wandjina* are depicted in paintings on the walls of caves. On approaching these shrines, Aborigines call out to the *wandjina* to announce the arrival of visitors. If this is not done by a person with the correct status, the spirits become upset and take revenge on the Aborigines. Sometimes Aborigines perform a ritual in which smoke from green branches is held beneath the paintings. Similar gestures are made as placatory gestures at the end of mourning ceremonies.

Many of the paintings are spectacular. The *wandjina* are anthropomorphic in form and are usually larger than life size. Individual figures may be as large as six meters long. Against a whitened background, the figures are painted in red ochre and black charcoal. The faces and heads are emphasized, with large eyes (usually black, sometimes also engraved) and haloes around the heads. On these haloes, and projecting from them, may be radiating lines. A curious feature of each face is the absence of a mouth, although the nose is invariably present. The *wandjina* may be represented by a face only, but often the whole body is shown. The shoulders are always white, and there is a small shieldlike motif high on the chest. The body is filled-in with a dot or short-dash pattern, and body ornamentation is indicated by waist and arm bands.

In Aboriginal mythology, the *wandjina* are said to have lived during the creation period. They came from the sky or the sea, traveled a short distance (usually), and then transformed themselves into the paintings. For the most part, the *wandjina* set examples of disruptive behavior, seducing others' wives and quarreling among themselves. All myths about the *wandjina* share one central action, in which the *wandjina* round up the Aborigines and slaughter them with lightning and flood because two Aborigine boys have offended them by torturing an owl, their sacred bird. Other episodes are purely local in significance. The paintings, are the transformation of the living spirits into a new form. Their general human appearance is unmistakable, and Aborigines identify many of the features in the paintings as human characteristics. In these interpretations, the haloes are hair, the lines radiating from the heads are feathers, the dots on the bodies are body paint, and the bands around the waists and limbs are body ornaments. However, the human model is not the only one

the Aborigines use in interpreting the paintings. *Wandjina* may take the form of clouds, and so the paintings may be interpreted as depicting the spirits in cloud form. In this case, the eyes are seen as dark patches of cloud, the haloes as the edges of clouds, the radiating lines as lightning, and the dot patterns as falling rain. Yet another model for interpretation is the owl, the bird sacred to the *wandjina*. Attention is then drawn to the round white faces, the large eyes, and the presence of beaks but the absence of separate mouths. In this interpretation, the body decoration represents the dappled markings of an owl's breast feathers.

The *wandjina* are often referred to as "the rainmakers." Toward the end of the dry season, when the heat has intensified, Aboriginal men who have *wandjina* as their conception totems may sing songs and perform rituals which are intended to entice the *wandjina* to send rain and alleviate their condition. Kimberley receives monsoonal rains starting in late December. Their arrival is a dramatic event. In the weeks preceding the arrival of the "wet," there are local showers and spectacular displays of lightning. With the rain come the banks of cumulonimbus clouds, which change shape rapidly and appear to have a life of their own. In them, the Aborigines see the *wandjina*. The call to the spirits, made in the songs and rituals, has been answered.

The rain that the *wandjina* bring is recognized by the Aborigines as a major factor in the fertility of the land. By the end of the dry season, when the Aborigines have burned off all the grass, the earth is parched and hot. Nothing grows, and animals hide from the heat. When the rains come, the earth, which is itself alive, drinks. Plants flourish. Animals emerge from their hiding places. To shelter from the rain the Aborigines build huts of bark or thatch or move into caves. Where the caves are painted, the figures on the walls appear brighter: in many cases, the painters have used huntite, a hygroscopic mineral, as the pigment for the white background, and so there is a noticeable change in the hue of the paintings when the humidity intensifies. As the wet season progresses, there may be flooding. The *banman* then must try to reduce the rain through further songs and rituals. These songs narrate episodes in the mythology of the *wandjina*.

Physical evidence implies that the *wandjina* have been repainted many times. Aborigines say that the original figures came into existence when the spirits transformed themselves into the paintings, and that the role of the Aborigines in the past has been restricted to maintenance. Some of the pigments are quite unstable in the presence of the high humidity that prevails during the wet season, and for this reason regular maintenance would always have been necessary. The custo-

dian of a painting might invite a noted artist to carry out the restoration, in which case a payment of goods to the artist would have been required.

The *wandjina* are seen by the Aborigines as fertility gods. By sending rain, they ensure the survival of life on earth. More directly, by sending the life-spirits for humans, they ensure the continuity of human life. The enormous powers of the *wandjina* can be seen in the displays of thunder and lightning that precede the monsoon and in the rains themselves. If provoked, the *wandjina* could use their powers to destroy life as they did in the mythological past. Through the rituals performed at the caves, through the songs, and, especially, through the mechanism of dream-communication, Aborigines have traditionally sought to influence the *wandjina* and thus to gain for themselves some measure of control over the natural world.

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I. M. CRAWFORD

WANG CHE (1112-1170), also known by his clerical name, Chung-yang-tzu; Taoist master of the Chin period (1115-1234) and founder of the Ch'üan-chen sect. The third son of a great landowner in Hsien-yang, Shensi Province, Wang received a Confucian education and entered the district school in Hsien-yang at the age of twenty. Following a disagreement with his teacher, however, Wang was denied permission to sit for the civil service examination and had to settle for success in the less prestigious military examination. Although

at first enthusiastic about a career in the military, Wang grew discouraged by his failure to advance in rank and resolved to abandon the military for a life of seclusion on Mount Chung-nan. He practiced Buddhism for a time, but in the sixth month of 1159 he received secret oral teachings from Lü Ch'un-yang and Chung Li-ch'üan. Thereafter, he converted to Taoism and was ordained a priest (*tao-shih*).

Accounts of Wang's career as a Taoist emphasize the ascetic character of his practice. On one occasion he is said to have slept on ice; at another time he dug a hole two meters deep in which to meditate, naming this austere cell "the grave of a living corpse." In 1163 he filled in this hole and built a small hermitage in the village of Liu-chiang, where he began to proselytize his newly attained religious faith. These efforts won him few converts at first, however, for he was regarded as little more than a madman. In 1167 he burned the hermitage and journeyed alone to Shantung Province, where Ma Tan-ying of Ning-hai became his disciple. Thereafter, in contrast to his experience in the Shensi region, many potential disciples came forward. Of these, Wang chose six to receive his transmission. With Ma Tan-ying they were called the Seven Perfected Ones of Ch'üan-chen Taoism. Wang was successful in organizing five Taoist societies in the northern coastal area of Shantung. These include the San-chiao Chin-lien Hui (Golden Lotus Society of the Three Teachings) and the San-chai P'ing-teng Hui (Equality Society of the Three Teachings). Following his success in Shantung, he decided to return to his home in Shensi. He set out with Ma Tan-ying and four other disciples but died en route at K'ai-feng in Honan Province.

The Ch'üan-chen school drew upon Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, the so-called Three Teachings, for its doctrine and practice. With a strong affinity for Ch'an practices, it emphasized meditation, clerical itinerancy, and nonreliance on the scriptures. The teachings of this school are summarized in Wang's *Li-chiao shih-wu lun*. Wang Che was also an accomplished poet. Even today his anthologized poetry, especially the *Chung-yang ch'üan-chen chi* and the *Chung-yang chiao-hua chi*, are highly regarded.

[See also Taoism, article on The Taoist Religious Community.]

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KUBO NORITADA

Translated from Japanese by James C. Dobbins

WANG CH'UNG (27–100? CE), critic and skeptic who proposed naturalist explanations for the relation between Heaven and man. Born into a poor family in Kuei-chi (in modern Chekiang), Wang studied in the Imperial Academy but then held office for a brief period only. Most of his life he lived in seclusion, devoting himself to writing. He wrote three works, *Cheng-wu* (The Conduct of Government), *Lun-heng* (Critical Essays), and *Yang-sheng* (On the Cultivation of Life). Of these only *Critical Essays* has been preserved.

According to Wang himself, the spirit of his *Critical Essays* may be summed up in one sentence: he detests what is fictitious and false. The fiction that Wang detested most was the theory of "mutual response between Heaven and man," which had dominated the mind of Han China since Tung Chung-shu had first propounded it 150 years earlier. According to this theory, aberrant natural phenomena (such as floods or the appearance of strange creatures) were omens, Heaven's comments on man's behavior. Wang wholly rejected this teleological cosmology, arguing instead that the Way of Heaven is one of spontaneity (*tzu-jan*) and nonactivity (*wu-wei*). "Heaven," he wrote, "does not desire to produce things, but things are produced of their own accord; Heaven does not desire to create things, but things are created of themselves." Because he defines Heaven in terms of spontaneity and nonactivity, Wang's philosophy usually has been characterized in modern times as naturalistic, even though he was traditionally classified as an eclectic (*tsa-chia*).

Wang's definition of Heaven led him to a thorough denunciation of all theories that claimed conscious interactions between Heaven and man. He compared man's place in the universe to a louse in the folds of a garment: if a louse cannot, by its actions, affect the movements of the man who wears the garment, then how can a man who lives on the earth's surface affect, much less cause, by his actions, the movements and changes of Heaven? For this reason, it is simply false to suppose that a causal relationship exists between auspicious or calamitous natural events on the one hand and good or bad government on the other. All the seeming coincidences between natural phenomena and human actions must be understood as pure chance.

Another area of Wang's philosophy that has been influential is his conception of life and death. Several of his essays are devoted to a vigorous refutation of the popular belief of his time that the soul can survive the body. He maintained that a man's soul exists within his body and that at death, when the body decomposes into dust and earth, his soul also disintegrates. He used a famous metaphor to illustrate this body-soul relationship: human death is like the extinction of a fire; when a fire is extinguished, its light ceases to shine, and when

a man dies, his consciousness also ceases to exist. To assert that the soul survives the body is like saying that the light survives the fire. Wang also argues against the existence of ghosts, another form in which the human spirit was believed to survive the body. According to Wang, since all accounts of ghosts report that like living persons they wear clothes, and since clothes certainly have no souls that can survive decomposition, how then can ghosts be seen with clothes on? In taking this atheistic position, however, Wang follows the Confucian rather than the Taoist tradition. In the Taoist thought of Han times, the soul leaves the body at death and returns to its "true home," where it continues a mystical existence.

Writing against the predominant beliefs of the day, Wang was indeed a bold thinker in his attempts to demolish a great variety of unfounded superstitious beliefs. But in other respects he was very much a product of his time. He accepted without question some of the fundamental assumptions of the *yin-yang* dualism and the theory of the Five Elements. He shared the contemporary view that life, whether cosmic or individual, arises out of the interaction and combination of the basic vital forces (*ch'i*) of *yang* and *yin*, and all things are made up of the five elements of wood, fire, soil, metal, and water. What essentially distinguishes Wang's cosmology is the absence of a cosmic purpose.

In Wang's naturalism is also grounded his theory of predetermined fate. Success or failure in the life of an individual or even of the whole state is, according to Wang, determined by what he called "fate" (*ming*). Fate, to Wang, controlled even precise areas of life. He held, for example, that a man's longevity, intelligence, social position, and wealth is fixed at birth by the kind of *ch'i* with which he is endowed. Order or disorder in the state is also predetermined. Thus Wang did assume a connection between celestial phenomena and human fate. However, he interpreted auspicious or calamitous natural events merely as signs of a predetermined fate, not purposive expressions of Heaven's pleasure or displeasure.

Wang was relatively obscure during his life, but his *Critical Essays* was rediscovered in the early third century and paved the way for the growth of Neo-Taoist naturalism during the Wei-Chin period (220–420).

[For further discussion of Chinese notions concerning life after death, see Afterlife, article on Chinese Concepts, and Soul, article on Chinese Concepts. See also Yin-yang Wu-hsing.]

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YÜ YING-SHIH

WANG FU-CHIH (*tzu*, Erh-nung; *hao*, Ch'uan-shan; 1619–1692), a Neo-Confucian philosopher. Now recognized along with Huang Tsung-hsi and Ku Yen-wu as one of the major thinkers to emerge in seventeenth-century China, Wang was almost unknown in his own lifetime outside of a small circle of followers in his native Hunan. He devoted his life to the task of revitalizing and restoring the cultural heritage and political autonomy of a Confucian China whose decline and fall, culminating in the overthrow of the Ming dynasty and the Manchu conquest, left him a virtual refugee in his own country. He was only thirty-one when in 1650 his patriotic foray into the political arena of the court of the Ming pretender Yung-li ended in temporary imprisonment as a result of factional strife. Thereafter he had to content himself with propounding his ideas in a prodigious number of works, none of which was published during his lifetime owing largely to the fiercely anti-Manchu sentiments and politically subversive theories expressed in them. Nevertheless, as he himself declared, "With my country ruined and my home destroyed, I set forth my opinions for posterity . . . In the future there will arise those who will carry on the task." In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, however, such historical and political writings as his *Tu T'ung-chien lun* (On Reading the *Comprehensive Mirror*), *Sung lun* (On the History of the Sung Dynasty), *Huang-shu* (Yellow Book), and *E-meng* (Strange Dream)—all published for the first time in 1865—fired the imagination of patriotic reformers and revolutionaries who regarded Wang as a prophet of modern Chinese nationalism. T'an Ssu-t'ung, Chang Ping-lin, and Mao Tse-tung all acknowledged him as a source of inspiration.

The same patriotic fervor that has attracted modern Chinese originally impelled Wang to undertake a radical reappraisal of the whole history of Chinese civilization. What had gone wrong? What were the remedies?—these were the two questions that inspired and informed all Wang's studies, which spanned the whole range of traditional Chinese scholarship. In typical Confucian fashion, however, his central concern was ideological: what had gone wrong with the transmission of the Confucian tradition, and what constituted the true

development of orthodox Confucianism? This concern was shared by many scholars at the close of the Ming dynasty, particularly by those associated with the Tung-lin Academy who, reacting against Buddhist influences and contemporary tendencies in the school of Wang Yang-ming, tried to give Confucianism a new direction. Wang Fu-chih admired their efforts to encourage scholar-officials to abandon the selfish pursuit of personal fulfillment and absolute truth and commit themselves to a social and political program in which moral philosophy was applied to contemporary realities. Indeed, as a young man he was certainly influenced by them. But whereas these scholars tended to arrive at various compromises between the Ch'eng-Chu tradition and the more moderate forms of the Wang Yang-ming tradition, Wang Fu-chih went further. He came to the conclusion that the moral decline of China could be traced to Sung times, when the Ch'eng-Chu school had first turned away from the "true doctrines" of Chang Tsai (1020–1077).

Although there had been some revival of interest in Chang's thought among Wang's contemporaries, Wang went so far as to declare himself a latter-day disciple of the Sung philosopher, according him precedence over Chu Hsi (1130–1200), whose systematization of the Confucian tradition in a grand synthesis (incorporating certain of Chang's ideas in the process) had created the Ch'eng-Chu school of Neo-Confucianism, the dominant orthodoxy until the twentieth century. Wang, however, proceeded to elaborate his own extremely coherent philosophical system on the basis of his Sung mentor's cosmology. He adopted Chang's concept (itself a refinement of such early Taoist naturalist views as found in the first-century-CE *Lun-heng* of Wang Ch'ung) of a universe that consisted of one vast mass of ether (*ch'i*) in a perpetual state of flux, agglomerating to form objects and dispersing to return to the "void" of apparent nonbeing as its *yin* and *yang* aspects interacted. Wang explicitly rejected the Ch'eng-Chu school's doctrine on principle (*li*) and ether, which entailed a dualistic approach both in its basic metaphysics and in its treatment of human nature. For Wang there was no duality: principle lay within the ether, and all ether was principle. His monistic conception of the universe led him to attack both Chu Hsi's attribution of evil to the physical nature and his consequent rejection of human desires.

Wang held that nothing was inherently evil: evil arose simply as excessive or incongruous activity in natural encounters within the movement of the organic whole. Man's vital role as an integral part of this dynamic universe was to ensure its harmonious functioning through cultivating himself and ordering human society. To fulfill this role required an understanding of the universal processes; these could be observed at

work in the course of history and in codified form in the ancient divinatory classic the *I ching* (Book of Changes). Chang Tsai too had set great store by this text, but his treatment of the archetypal patterns and symbols of the *Changes* had been mystical, the expression of his ideas poetical—as in his influential *Hsi-ming* (Western Inscription)—and he had paid little attention to history. Wang's approach was altogether more analytical, rational, and pragmatic—even utilitarian. Wang's emphasis on variable factors of time and place and prevailing conditions in determining what was appropriate, and hence, in a morally ordered universe, right, led him to make a critical evaluation of political institutions throughout Chinese history and to formulate his own proposals for reform based on radical changes in the system of land-tenure and taxation. In contemporary China Wang has been admired, patriotism apart, as a major contributor to the native tradition of philosophical materialism and as a historian critical of the old society.

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IAN MCMORRAN

WANG PI (226–249), a principal figure of the Chinese philosophical movement known as *hsüan-hsüeh* ("dark learning" or "school of mystery"). The adherents of this school were the source of a philosophical renewal that radically changed the interpretation of certain of the classics, whose exegesis had been dominated during the preceding period by cosmological and divinatory speculations. They strove to return to the simplicity of the canonical texts themselves and eschewed the elaborate scholasticism of the existing commentarial literature. Nonetheless, for these thinkers in turn, the basic texts of the movement, the *I ching*, *Lao-tzu* (*Tao-te ching*), and *Chuang-tzu* (known collectively as the "three mys-

teries"), served as the starting point for a variety of ontological and metaphysical speculations. Although they stem from different streams of thought, these three works were considered by the *hsüan-hsüeh* thinkers as complementary and mutually enlightening.

Wang Pi's works were all commentaries: one on the *Lao-tzu*, considered by many scholars to be unrivaled, and another on the *I ching*, unfinished at the time of his death at the age of twenty-three. His interpretations exerted a dominant influence on the subsequent understanding of these works and served as a model of a new type of exegesis, one that strove to grasp the meaning of the canonical scriptures instead of indulging in scholastic interpretations. The starting point of Wang Pi's thought is *wu*, "nonexistence," the absence of any determination or quality, the nonexistence of any distinct thing or phenomenon, and as such, the "root" (*pen*) of all existence. Wang Pi considered central the statement from *Lao-tzu* that "the myriad things come into being from being (*yu*); being comes into being from non-being (*wu*)" (chap. 40). The sphere of "existents" (*yu*) is characterized by limitation, imperfection, multiplicity, change, and movement; *wu*, on the other hand, is beyond limit or fixed definition. It is permanence, oneness, and stillness. Every being has a cause, is generated and dependent, and has its origin, life, and end in *wu*. Every phenomenon and every moment is produced, manifested, and sustained by this silent and dark fundamental Mystery (*hsüan*), the supreme *wu* that lies in a state of inaction and is not limited by any quality or "name." *Yu*, the sphere of phenomena that bear names and are located in time and space, is the "function" (*yung*) of *wu*. *Wu* manifests itself as *yu*.

It follows that mere words and symbols are inadequate to transmit this fundamental reality, for all terms necessarily define, whereas the Mystery is undefinable and undiscussable. It can only be provisionally denoted by words. The inadequacy of all verbal expression, the discrepancy between words and fundamental reality, the fact that words do not completely express ideas, lies at the core of the different viewpoints of the *hsüan-hsüeh* thinkers and their contemporary rivals, the *ming-chiao* ("school of names"). The latter stressed the importance of social and political duties and the need to harmonize "names" (i.e., titles and functions) with "reality" (i.e., the capacities of individuals).

Through his commentaries on the *I ching* and the *Lao-tzu*, Wang Pi gave to the word *wu* a new meaning and power, for in his interpretation, *wu* became the underlying ontological source of all created things. In time, the term became a symbol for the rejection of the world and, what Wang Pi could not have anticipated, a means of escape into gnostic speculations by later

hsüan-hsüeh thinkers. Wang's revaluation of *wu* also prepared the way for the introduction of the Buddhist notion of "emptiness" (Skt., *sūnyatā*; Chin., *k'ung*) into the philosophical vocabulary of the gentry intelligentsia of the third and fourth centuries. His concept of *yu* as the "function" of *wu* also prefigures the Neo-Confucian notion of the complementarity of *t'i* (substance) and *yung* (function).

Finally, Wang Pi also played a major role in redefining the nature and qualities of the sage, a perennial theme in Chinese intellectual and religious history. Wang held that Confucius was a sage, for although he spoke exclusively of *yu*, he was able to do so because of a fundamental inward appreciation of and identification with *wu*. Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, on the other hand, spoke endlessly of *wu* precisely out of their failure to fully understand it. As the *Lao-tzu* says, "He who speaks does not know; he who knows does not speak." Thus did Wang Pi use Taoist thought and terminology to reinterpret the concept of the sage and affirm Confucius's position as the epitome of the sage.

[See also the biographies of Lao-tzu and Kuo Hsiang.]

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ISABELLE ROBINET

WANG YANG-MING (1472–1529), literary name, Wang Shou-jen; the most influential Confucian thinker in Ming-dynasty China and one of the most important scholar-officials in Chinese history. Wang's intellectual impact on East Asian culture and his transformation of the spiritual orientation of the Confucian tradition in China made him one of the greatest philosophers of the relation between knowledge and action in any age or culture.

Born to a prominent gentry family in the Yangtze

River delta, Wang was subject as a youth to great social pressure to excel in Confucian learning. Hagiographical accounts relate that in his early teens Wang startled his teacher when, in response to the teacher's admonition that the most important thing in life was to study hard in order to pass the examinations with distinction, Wang said: "To learn to become a sage is of the utmost importance." Wang's competitiveness with his father, who had himself won highest honors in the triennial metropolitan (*chin-shih*) examinations, and his rebelliousness against the conventions of the time led him to the pursuit of a spiritual path characterized by Taoist and Ch'an practices. His failure to pass the metropolitan examinations three times before he succeeded, and his dissatisfaction with the vulgarity of other officials after he eventually obtained an official post further enhanced his determination to search for an alternative form of life.

Wang is noted for his lifelong quest to understand the mind and nature. His biography records that on his wedding day he became so absorbed in conversing with a Taoist priest about prolonging life through nourishing the vital force in one's body that he did not return home until the next day. At an early age he began a traditional education grounded in the Confucian classics, but he also studied military affairs, literary style, Buddhist philosophy, and Taoist techniques of longevity. In 1492, intent on putting Chu Hsi's (1130–1200) doctrine of the "investigation of things" (*ko-wu*) into practice, he devoted himself to the study of the "principle" (*li*) inherent in things by meditating in front of a bamboo grove for seven days. His abortive attempt to understand Chu Hsi's assertion that personal knowledge can be acquired through an understanding of external phenomena compelled him to probe the internal resources of his own "mind-and-heart" (*hsin*).

Wang started his official career at the age of twenty-eight. His primary goal in life, however, was to become an exemplary teacher so that he could share his intellectual insight and spiritual quest with friends and students. In fact, it took him some time to come to terms with his role as a scholar-official. While cultivating the Taoist arts of everlasting life in a cave near his home, he contemplated forsaking the world altogether. It was only after he had fully convinced himself that his longings for his father and the grandmother who had raised him were irreducible human feelings, necessary for the survival and well-being of the human community, that he decided to return to society permanently in order to transform it from within.

One of the most important events in this initial stage of his official career was his friendship with Chan Joshua, the disciple of the eminent Confucian master Ch'en

Po-sha (Ch'en Hsien-chang, 1428–1500). Wang sealed a covenant with Chan to promote true Confucian learning, the kind of learning that stresses an experiential understanding of the body and mind. Such learning they clearly differentiated from the study of the classics for the sake of passing the examinations.

Wang advocated his first doctrine, "the unity of knowing and acting," shortly after his decision to return to society. According to his famous dicta, "knowledge is the beginning of action; action is the completion of knowledge" and "knowledge in its genuine reality and earnest practicality is action; action in its brilliant self-awareness and refined discrimination is knowledge," have become defining characteristics of Wang's philosophy of mind, what Wing-tsit Chan refers to as his "dynamic idealism."

However, far from being a speculative thinker who made no attempt to put his ideas into practice, Wang described his doctrine as the result of "a hundred deaths and a thousand hardships." Indeed, he once almost lost his life when he protested against a powerful eunuch. For this, the emperor had him flogged forty times at court and banished to a small postal station in a remote mountainous area in present-day Kweichow. However, it was there that he experienced "enlightenment" and developed a unique approach to Confucian learning that emphasized the "learning of the body and mind."

A salient feature of Wang's thought is his inquiry into the internal landscape of the mind as the center of moral creativity. This emphasis is predicated on a vision that encompasses both the ontological reality of Heaven and the social reality of human relationships. In his philosophy, which is religious as well as ethical, self-cultivation is a holistic process of learning to be fully human. Wang argued that self-cultivation begins with a critical understanding of one's selfhood, but he remained fully within the Confucian tradition in placing the self at the center of relationships. Thus, for Wang the quest for self-knowledge necessarily involves active participation in the human community.

The Confucian idea of the human is not anthropocentric. Rather, humanity in its full realization here signifies an anthropocosmic reality often symbolized by the notion of "the unity of man and Heaven." This realization requires that we as humans respond to the ultimate source of creativity, namely, "the way of Heaven" (*t'ien-tao*). Thus, Wang's second important doctrine is "the preservation of the heavenly principle and the elimination of human desires." Human desires are egoistic demands and private, selfish ideas. The true self, which is not only the deepest source of moral creativity but also the "heavenly principle" (*t'ien-li*) inherent in our nature, is an open system. It extends horizontally to the human

community as a whole and, simultaneously, it reaches upward to Heaven. Therefore, the unity of man and Heaven is not merely an idea but an experienced ethico-religious reality.

Wang's attempt to integrate heavenly principle (ontological reality) and human relationships (social reality) in the moral creativity of the self (subjectivity) is well articulated in his third and most mature doctrine, often translated as "the extension of the innate knowledge of the good" (*chih liang-chih*; Chan, 1969, p. 656). Actually, the doctrine can well be stated as the full realization of our "primordial awareness," an awareness that we are capable of self-perfection. This doctrine may be regarded as a creative interpretation of the classical Mencian thesis of the goodness of human nature. Following Meng-tzu's notion that the moral feelings of the mind-and-heart are humanity at its best, Wang insisted that the uniqueness of being human lies in our ability to perfect ourselves through self-effort. The reason that some of us have become sages (the most genuinely realized humans) is because inherent in our heavenly endowed nature is our "great body" (*ta-t'i*), which never ceases to guide us toward the highest excellence of humanity. Wang underscores this dimension of Meng-tzu's teaching by adding the verb *chih* ("to extend, to fully realize") to the original Mencian term *liang-chih* ("innate goodness" or primordial awareness), thus transforming it into an active, dynamic, and creative principle of self-cultivation.

Wang formulated his interpretation of the Confucian way by wrestling with Chu Hsi's balanced approach to Confucian learning. Briefly stated, Chu Hsi held that moral development could only be attained through the simultaneous activities of dwelling in the spirit of reverence (*ching*) and investigating the principle inherent in all things. Wang, however, maintained that establishing the will to be good must be the focus of moral self-cultivation: neither the pursuit of empirical knowledge in and of itself nor the psychology of being serious and respectful will automatically bring about a good moral life.

In maintaining that the primary purpose of moral education is to establish in ourselves that which makes all humans great, Wang aligned himself with Chu Hsi's intellectual rival, Lu Hsiang-shan (Lu Chiu-yüan, 1139–1193). This concept that the quest for moral creativity begins with self-awareness was criticized by fellow Confucians as being Buddhist, but Wang himself never doubted the authenticity of his Confucian message. He conscientiously defended the content and method of his teaching by reference to the very books chosen by Chu Hsi to represent the core of the Confucian tradition. Since the thirteenth century, the Four Books—the *Lun-*

yü (Analects), the *Meng-tzu* (Mencius), the *Chung-yung* (Doctrine of the Mean), and the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning)—had served as virtual scripture for the educated elite in East Asia. Wang's challenge to Chu Hsi's interpretive authority was only partially successful, but the mark that he left on the overall design of Confucian education is indelible. His celebrated *Ta-hsüeh wen* (Inquiry on the *Great Learning*), which recapitulates the major themes in his philosophy, has become one of the most frequently cited treatises on Confucian humanism.

Inquiry on the Great Learning was written in 1527, roughly a year before Wang's death. It addresses the Confucian's ultimate concern, "forming one body with Heaven and earth and the myriad things," with great sensitivity:

That the great man can regard Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as one body is not because he deliberately wants to be so, but because it is natural to the humane nature of his mind that he do so. Forming one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things is not only true of the great man. Even the mind of the small man is no different. Only he himself makes it small. (Chan, 1969, p. 659)

Wang uses a descending scale of human sensitivity to depict the ordinary human responses to a variety of situations that easily evoke sympathetic feelings in us: encountering a child about to fall into a well, hearing pitiful cries and encountering frightened birds and animals, seeing plants broken and destroyed, seeing tiles and stones shattered and crushed. The feelings of alarm, commiseration, pity, and regret aroused in us vary in their emotional intensity, but indicate that fellow human beings, animals, plants, and stones all form one body in our primordial awareness.

This seemingly romantic assertion of the unity of all things is actually predicated on an ontological vision rooted in classical Confucian humanism. What Wang advocated was a re-presentation of the Mencian thesis that if we fully realize the "sprouts (*tuan*) of humanity" in our minds and hearts, we can experientially understand our human nature; if we understand our nature, then we know Heaven. Knowing Heaven, in the perspective of Wang's *Inquiry on the Great Learning*, is to regard Heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body, the world as one family, and the country as one person.

Yet this explicit emphasis on commonality and communality was not abstract universalism. On the contrary, a major contribution of Wang's philosophy is its subtle appreciation of concrete personal experience in moral self-cultivation. Wang's insistence that only through "polishing and disciplining in actual affairs of life" can one learn the art of being human suggests a strong existential quality in his teaching. Wang himself,

as a witness to his own teaching, acquired much practical knowledge: he concerned himself with local administration, legal cases, and military tactics. In fact, he was the only civilian official to be awarded a military lordship because of his unusual meritorious achievements in suppressing a rebellion that could have fundamentally changed the history of the Ming dynasty.

The Yang-ming school, known as the *Yōmeigaku* in Japan, has profoundly influenced modern East Asia. The spirit of the samurai, which emphasizes firm purpose, self-mastery, and loyalty, and the dynamic leadership of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 were partly Wang Yang-ming's gifts to Japan. In China, reformers such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873–1929) and T'an Szu-t'ung (1865–1898), revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), and philosophers such as Hsiung Shih-li (1885–1968) and Liang Sou-ming (b. 1893) have all been inspired by Wang's legacy, the *Ch'uan-hsi lu* (Instructions for Practical Living), which consists of his dialogues with students, scholarly letters to friends, and several short essays.

[See also Confucian Thought, article on Neo-Confucianism; Hsin; Li; and the biographies of Meng-tzu, Chu Hsi, and Lu Hsiang-shan.]

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TU WEI-MING

WAQF. The Arabic term *waqf* (pl., *awqāf*) refers to the act of dedicating property to a Muslim foundation and, by extension, also means the endowment thus created. The meaning of the Arabic word is "stop," that is, stop from being treated as ordinary property. The property is then said to be *mawqūf*. In the law of the Sunnī Mālikī school, and hence in North and West Africa, the terminology is *ḥabīs* or *hubs*, meaning "retention."

To create a *waqf*, the legitimate owner of a property

must state that it is blocked in perpetuity, inalienably and irrevocably, for the purpose of pleasing God. The property in *waqf* thereby becomes the sole property of God, according to the majority opinion among Muslim schools of thought, while the income or usufruct passes to a designated beneficiary such as a school, dervish convent, hospital, or mosque. According to some authorities (e.g., the Mālikī school), the property in *waqf* remains the possession of the founder and his heirs, but they are blocked from the usual rights of ownership. Many scholars insist that the good purpose accomplished by the creation of a *waqf* can only be an Islamic one; hence opinions differ as to whether Christians or Jews under Muslim rule may create *waqfs* for the purposes of their communities. In medieval Egypt and Syria, however, Christians and Jews were able to create *waqfs*, although the property was exposed to the risk of seizure by the state at a later date.

The most common form of property to be established as *waqf* is real estate. The property designated in an endowment deed may, however, be an object, such as an individual book or a whole library, but opinions differ as to whether it can legally consist of animals, slaves, or portable objects such as a saddle or a cauldron. Because of the Qur'anic ban on usury, money is not admissible; however, in the late twentieth century it became possible to put stocks, bonds, and bank credits in *waqf* in some Near Eastern states.

Waqf may be *khayrī*, that is, designated for a straightforward charitable purpose, such as feeding stray animals, teaching poor children, marrying off orphan girls, or assisting indigent mothers. It may also be *ahli* or *dhurri*, that is, designated for one's own descendants, since it is also laudable to provide for them. In the past, the advantage of making one's property or part of it *mawqūf* and designating the income for one's heirs lay in the fact that the state could not then seize the *waqf* at the founder's death. Such a seizure was particularly likely to happen in the case of a state official, on the justification that whatever property he had been able to amass had belonged to the state in the first place. The family *waqf* also served to avoid the application of the Islamic inheritance laws, which would normally entail a share of the property for other relatives, such as parents and brothers, and involve a progressive fragmentation of the property among the heirs of the heirs. Furthermore, family *waqf* allowed the founder to designate his heirs, while Islamic inheritance laws do not. In fact, some endowments were both *khayrī* and *ahli*; one might build and endow a school, for example, but stipulate that one's descendants were to live in an apartment on the premises or receive free education there. In the past, shops, warehouses, caravansaries, stables, tenements,

apartment houses, bathhouses, mills, soap and paper factories, oil and sugar cane presses, textile factories, agricultural lands, and private residences might all be put in *waqf*, to benefit either one's descendants or a favorite charity.

There has been a difference of opinion in the Ḥanafī school as to whether a *wāqif*, or founder, may irrevocably make a property *mawqūf*. To avoid complications, it was customary for a founder under Ḥanafī jurisdiction to bring suit for recovery of the property after putting it in *waqf*. A court ruling would then be made under the appropriate opinion in Ḥanafī law that the property could not be returned, and the *waqf* would thus be confirmed as irrevocable.

There were apparently no *waqfs* in pre-Islamic Arabia. There is some evidence, not altogether conclusive, that the Prophet dedicated the usufruct of certain properties to pious purposes. When the Arab lands of the Byzantine empire were conquered following his death, the Muslims had before them many examples of pious foundations among the Eastern Christians that could serve as models, or at any rate as stimuli. *Waqf* was a recognized procedure by the time of the second generation of Muslims.

Waqf was in many ways a beneficent institution, one that ministered to the poor and furthered piety and learning. Historically, however, it proved open to corruption and abuse. In making a *waqf*, a founder had to appoint a *nāzīr*, or overseer, with a fixed stipend. The overseers had considerable discretionary powers, and received their stipends whether they performed their functions or not; in fact they rarely bothered to maintain the income-producing properties, which thereupon began to deteriorate. Overseers might embezzle or divert funds, or lease out properties for unrealistically low rents, taking payment for this consideration. Occasionally, overseers even sold *mawqūf* properties and took a share of the proceeds for themselves, or, by forging documents, gained possession of them as personal property. As income shrank, the original purpose of the endowment was frustrated. It was next to impossible to improve or in any way develop *waqf* property. It stagnated in mortmain and was left unmaintained. In the late Ottoman empire, some three-fourths of all arable land was in *waqf*; this created problems in taxation as well. In an attempt to provide more efficient supervision, at least, Ottoman authorities set up a ministry of *waqfs* in 1840, thus putting *waqf* lands under state control.

Colonial powers and Muslim government alike came to see *waqf* as an impediment to progress and development. In the late Ottoman empire, for example, making use of the opinions of certain classical jurists, the au-

thorities first removed agricultural lands from *waqf*. In postrevolutionary Egypt, family *waqfs* were dissolved, the *mawqūf* becoming simply the property of the heirs, to be disposed of in a normal way. It then became illegal to make new charitable *waqfs*, though existing ones were retained and managed by a government ministry. Similar patterns of dealing with *waqf* have obtained in other modernizing Muslim countries.

[See also Islamic Law, article on Personal Law.]

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JOHN ALDEN WILLIAMS

WAR AND WARRIORS. [This entry consists of two articles: An Overview and Indo-European Beliefs and Practices. The first article presents a survey of religious attitudes connected with war and warriors. It is followed by a discussion of the religious valorization of the warrior class in Indo-European traditions.]

An Overview

For our purposes, war may be defined as organized and coherent violence conducted between established and internally cohesive rival groups. In contrast to numerous other modes of violence, it is neither individual, spontaneous, random, nor irrational, however much—like all varieties of violence—it involves destructive action, even on a massive scale. [See also Violence.] Being a complex phenomenon, war has multiple dimensions that are deeply interrelated, chief among them being economic, ideological, and social factors.

Of these, perhaps the most obvious and important (at least according to the majority of modern analysts) are the economic factors that precipitate war, war being the most extreme form of competition for chronically scarce resources, such as women, territory, movable wealth (including livestock), and/or the labor power of subjugated populations. One must note, however, that scarce and valued resources are not exclusively of a material nature, prestige being a crucially important example of a nonmaterial resource that is highly desired and that figures prominently in warfare. It is possible, in fact, to speak of a prestige economy that exists not only side by side but intimately interwoven with the material economy of any given people, and warfare provides a convenient means of reaping rewards in both. Thus, for instance, success in raiding was requisite for a Crow warrior to advance his position, for this provided him first with goods—above all, horses—that not only enriched him but also could be used to place others in his debt through a process of redistribution. Further, raiding furnished the successful warrior with a set of heroic deeds of which he could boast on regular, formalized occasions, thereby further elevating his standing in the group. Success in battle also opened up religious prerogatives for him, insofar as many important and prestigious ritual roles were reserved for those who had accomplished specific, highly regarded feats of war, such as touching coup, winning horses, killing an enemy, or leading a successful raiding expedition.

Indeed, accomplishments in battle provide a common means, in many cultures and periods in history, whereby individuals can seek to elevate not only their own individual prestige above that of their peers but also that of their group above others (conquered rivals, as well as those who remain outside the fray). Thus, for instance, among the Jalé-speaking peoples of highland New Guinea, the performance of stereotyped, formulaic songs is a prominent part of every public celebration. These songs, which preserve the memory of past warfare, are a crucial element in the local prestige economy as well as a stimulus to further conflicts, for they celebrate the glory of the group that sings them, while also heaping derision upon their foes:

The man Wempa will never eat again,
nor will Alavóm ever eat again.
But we live to see the sweet potatoes roast,
The sweet potatoes from Wongele and Tukui.
(Koch, 1974, p. 85)

One may observe similar processes in the well-wrought poetry of praise for successful warriors and blame for those who are less than successful (e.g., Hector's rebukes of Paris), which figures prominently in the

Homeric epic. Moreover, the heroes depicted there are presented as acutely self-conscious with regard to issues of prestige, as is evident, for example, in Sarpedon's speech just prior to the Trojan assault on the Greek camp, an assault that leads to his death. Here we are shown a warrior, himself the son of Zeus, weighing the relative value of the material and nonmaterial rewards of combat and setting greatest stock on the winning of a prominent and enduring reputation. In the last analysis, the pursuit of such a reputation—elsewhere called "undying fame" (*kleos aphthitos*)—becomes nothing less than a quest for immortality, although, ironically, it is a quest that regularly costs the quester his life. Among the most interesting aspects of this passage, however, is the absence of any tension or contradiction between the warrior's pursuit of material gain (booty, also land and privileged banquet portions) and his pursuit of glory. On the contrary, we see an effective coalescence of the material and the prestige economy, encompassed within an ideology and a poetics that decidedly emphasize the latter:

Glaukos, why is it you and I are honoured before others
with pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine
cups
in Lykia, and all men look on us as if we were immortals,
and we are appointed a great piece of land by the banks
of Xanthos,
good land, orchard and vineyard, and ploughland for the
planting of wheat?
Therefore it is our duty in the forefront of the Lykians
to take our stand, and bear our part of the blazing of
battle,
so that a man of the close-armoured Lykians may say of
us:
"Indeed, these are no ignoble men who are lords of Lykia,
these kings of ours, who feed upon the fat sheep
appointed
and drink the exquisite sweet wine, since indeed there is
strength of
valour in them, since they fight in the forefront of the
Lykians."
Man, supposing you and I, escaping this battle
would be able to live on forever, ageless, immortal,
so neither would I myself go on fighting in the foremost
nor would I urge you into the fighting where men win
glory.
But now, seeing that the spirits of death stand close
about us
in their thousands, no man can turn aside nor escape
them,
let us go on and win glory for ourselves, or yield it to
others.

(Homer, *Iliad*, trans. Lattimore)

The assignation of prestige to deeds of valor (the etymological connections between *valor*, *valiance*, and

value are significant, as are those between *virtue* and *virility*) is but one means whereby ideological factors influence warfare, albeit a tremendously important one. No less important is the way in which other ideological constructs supply the means necessary to persuade individuals to join in combat, providing them with motivation sufficiently great that they are willing to risk their lives, even in situations (as is true for the vast majority of warriors over the course of history) wherein they stand to reap quite little in the way of personal gain—material or immaterial—from even the greatest of military successes.

It is in this fashion that religion has played a most important role in war throughout history, and the examples of religious justifications that have been used to legitimate even the most tawdry of struggles are legion. Among these we must note calls to convert the heathen (as in the Christian Crusades and more recent European wars of colonial expansion); promises of a favorable afterlife for warriors who die in battle (as within Islam, Shintō, or among the ancient Aztec, Germans, and others); and ethical dualisms whereby warfare is cast as an unremitting struggle between good and evil (as in ancient Iran or the modern United States).

Among the most contemporary students of war, ideological factors are generally viewed as subordinate or epiphenomenal to material ones, religious and other forms of legitimation being understood as the convenient or even necessary means that serve to mask or mystify the acquisitive competition that is the primary motivation for armed conflict. Others, however, have challenged this view, particularly with regard to warfare in the ancient and preindustrial world, where (in their view) religious motivations played a much more powerful and directly causal role. A favorite example cited by adherents of this position is the case of Aztec warfare, which they claim was pursued above all else to obtain the victims necessary for the performance of human sacrifice, the central ritual act of the Aztec empire. [See *Human Sacrifice*.] Such a line of analysis, however, has been rendered untenable by the most recent studies of Aztec sacrifice, which reveal it to have been not an act of transcendent religiosity performed for its own sake and at any cost but, as John Ingham has cogently argued, an expression and an instrument of the same drives for wealth, power, and prestige that prompted Aztec warfare and imperial expansion in general. In Ingham's words:

Whatever else it may have been, human sacrifice was a symbolic expression of political domination and economic appropriation and, at the same time, a means to their social production. . . . The sacrificing of slaves and war captives and the offering of their hearts and blood to the sun thus

encoded the essential character of social hierarchy and imperial order and provided a suitable instrument for intimidating and punishing insubordination.

(Ingham, 1984, p. 379)

In this case, then, and others like it, one must conclude that, far from having been the ultimate cause of war, religion was intimately bound up with other causal factors more familiar to the world of *Realpolitik*.

Beyond the material and ideological factors, there are also powerful social factors that must be taken into account. Briefly, two social conditions are necessary for the occurrence of war, given the definition proposed above ("organized and coherent violence conducted between established and internally cohesive rival groups"). First, a given group of individuals must understand themselves as a group; that is, they must be bound together in some abiding fashion by sentiments, traditions, kinship ties, institutions, residence patterns, language, and the like. Second, they must understand members of some other group ("the enemy") as radically alien to them, outsiders to whom they are not connected and with reference to whom they need not refrain from violence. As the Jalé put it in a striking proverb: "People whose face is known should not be eaten." Moreover, prior to the outbreak of hostilities or at the very least shortly thereafter, this same set of conditions—internal solidarity coupled with external alienation and hostility—will prevail on the other side as well.

In short, warriors must be persuaded not only to risk their own lives but also to take the lives of others, and not merely random others but those whose otherness is most radically marked. Involving organized and relatively large-scale lethal violence as it does, warfare always poses serious ethical problems within the already thorny set of issues surrounding homicide. As a starting point, we must note that humans kill one another for many reasons and under many sets of circumstances, and all groups possess certain norms regulating how such killings are to be regarded and judged. Sometimes they are defined as murder (i.e., illicit homicide); in other instances they are not, for there are conditions under which the taking of a life is legally, morally, culturally, and/or religiously sanctioned or even (this is particularly relevant to the case of war) celebrated.

A fundamental concern in such adjudications, and one infinitely more complex and malleable than is ordinarily acknowledged, is the question of whether the victim(s) or would-be victim(s) of a given homicide are truly human. In any number of instances (e.g., infants, slaves, prisoners, outlaws, heretics and other social deviants, the aged and infirm, etc.), an individual may

conveniently be defined by the killer (and the community that passes judgment upon the killing) as something less than human: a "monster," a "beast," a "vegetable," and so forth. Patterns of verbal abuse, in fact, whereby such persons are referred to as animals, rotting matter ("garbage," "trash"), and the like, regularly accompany and assist the lethal redefinitions whereby it is established that effecting the death of such an individual is a permissible or even a worthy act.

Nor is it only individuals who may be defined as somehow less than human and thus freely killable. On the contrary, social borders are regularly constructed and maintained such that entire groups of others ("aliens" in the fullest sense of the word) are regarded thus by their neighbors and enemies. Such a state of affairs is evidenced, for example, in the frequent occurrence of self-referential ethnonyms by which a given people denote themselves as "humans," implicitly (and in many instances, explicitly) relegating all others to the category of nonhumans—nonhumans who may, moreover, be freely killed as the occasion arises.

An instructive case is that of the Yanoama of the Amazon Basin, who not only call themselves "humanity" (the meaning of their name) and all others "lesser sub-human beings" (*nabá*) but carry the process still further: members of one Yanoama village habitually accentuate the minor differences of dialect (or the like) that separate them from residents of other villages; then they deride the others for being less than fully *Yanoama*, which is to say, somewhat subhuman. Relations between Yanoama villages are always tense, partly as a result of this pattern of marking social borders and partly as a result of pronounced competition over women, for it is the goal of all Yanoama males to retain the women of their village while obtaining those of other villages through marriage or war. The central value of Yanoama life is *waiteri* ("fierceness"). To survive in this fiercely competitive atmosphere, a village must ally itself with others to resist the aggression of still others. As a means of overcoming the suspicions that normally prevail between villages, allies seek to bind themselves to one another through trade, marital exchanges, and reciprocal feasting, but the process is never a simple one. To form an alliance is to signal weakness, and allies, sensing this weakness, press ever-increasing demands for women as a condition for the alliance's continuation. Alliances thus often end in enmity, in warfare, or in an act that the Yanoama view as the ultimate form of fierceness and violence, being a parody and an inversion of the fragile festivals of inter-village solidarity: that is, a treacherous feast in which the male guests are all slaughtered and their women taken.

Again, with regard to the radical nature of social boundaries in situations of conflict and war, one may note the case of the Anggor in western New Guinea. As Peter Birkett Huber reports, each Anggor village "can be considered a cosmos in itself, an autonomous and essentially harmonious moral system confronted by a uniformly hostile, dangerous, and chaotic outside world. Violence between these villages is consequently not a form of policy or a distinct kind of political situation, but an inescapable feature of man's existential condition" (in Nettleship, Givens, and Nettleship, 1975, p. 620). Most violence perpetrated by residents of one Anggor village on those of another takes the form of sorcery, but revenge expeditions are ultimately organized and battles ensue in which Anggor warriors venture out from their homes to confront chaos itself and, by means of this confrontation, reassert the solidarity of their group and the order of their cosmos by inflicting retaliatory deaths on their enemies outside.

Although these are somewhat extreme cases, they are by no means unique, and all warfare involves sociopolitical suspensions of the ethical, whereby the otherness of the enemy is radically accentuated, a situation that permits and legitimates their victimization. War is, in truth, that situation in which the killing of other people on a grand (or even total) scale is rendered not only licit but requisite, even glorious, by virtue of the fact that they belong to a rival group to whom ethical norms do not extend, the enemy having been effectively defined as subhuman or even nonhuman.

Yet another example of these principles is found in the shields that form a crucial part of a warriors' equipment among the several Dayak peoples of Borneo. In general, shields function not only as an important implement of defense in warfare prior to the introduction of gunpowder but also as a movable social border that separates one's self, one's group, and that territory in which one feels some measure of security from the enemy. In an advance, shields mark the incorporation of conquered territory, booty, and prisoners into one's own group; in retreat, they mark the group's contraction, as land, stragglers, and the fallen are left outside. In the classic warfare of the Zulu, for instance, and in other powerful kingdoms of southern Africa, rival armies assumed formation in lines opposite to one another, each warrior holding a five-foot rawhide shield in front of him with his left arm. Standing behind this row of shields, the opponents exchanged insults with one another, verbal combat (in the forms I have discussed) preceding physical. Thereafter, the regiments closed, and each one tried to break through the enemy's walls of shields. Finally, when an army felt itself defeated, its members dropped their shields in token of surrender,

whereupon the battle would cease. What was signified in this action was that the vanquished group renounced the social borders that they had previously maintained, thereby relinquishing their independence and accepting incorporation as a subjugated part of the victors' polity.

Dayak shields are used in similar fashion and bear similar significance but are remarkable for the iconographic content of the designs painted and carved upon them (see figure 1). Most noteworthy is the bifurcation of design, for on the inside of most Dayak shields—that is, the side facing toward the bearer—is the image of two protective ancestral figures; on the outside is a snarling monster. The import of the ancestors is not hard to judge; being the founders of the bearer's social group, they define that group and represent it. Insofar as there are others who descend from these same ancestors, the warrior has comrades who will take up arms together with him to defend their group against outsiders (i.e., those descended from other ancestral lines). The group's sense of identity and solidarity are thus nothing more than the sentiments called forth by the image of these ancestors, and it is such sentiments—much more than the wooden shields—that provide protection and security in battle and beyond.

The monsters on the outer face of Dayak shields are more difficult to interpret, however, for they are suscep-



FIGURE 1. *Dayak Shield*. The outer face (left) is inscribed with a monstrous image; the inner face (right) depicts two protective ancestral figures.

tible to multiple readings. On the one hand, these ferocious figures, marked most prominently by bulging eyes and exaggerated fangs, would seem to represent the enemy, particularly when considered in juxtaposition to the ancestral figures. Accordingly, one may posit a series of correlated binary oppositions, the effect of which is to dehumanize the enemy (in fashions similar to those discussed above) and thereby render his killing licit:

Inside	:	Outside	::
Ancestors	:	Monsters	::
Own Group	:	Enemy	::
Protection	:	Menace	::
Solidarity	:	Hostility	::
Deaths suffered	:	Deaths inflicted	
must be avenged	:	constitute revenge	
Killings illicit	:	Killings licit or even requisite	

In light of such observations as these, I am inclined to propose certain revisions to a classic text of Simone Weil, her justly celebrated meditations on "The Iliad, or The Poem of Force," written in 1940, shortly after the fall of France to Nazi arms and also after her own combat experience during the Spanish Civil War. In this essay, reflecting on death in battle, particularly as described in the epic, Weil came to define force as "that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a *thing*," going on to observe, "exercised to the limit, it turns man into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him. Somebody was here, and the next minute there is nobody at all; this is a spectacle the *Iliad* never wearies of showing us" (Weil, 1983). To be sure, there is a power and a grandeur in so stark a formulation, yet, given what has been outlined above, particularly regarding the nature of social borders in warfare and those patterns of dehumanization whereby an enemy is defined as subhuman, nonhuman, and/or monstrous, one must reject the idea that it is force itself, acting as some sort of quasi-personified agent, that "turns a man into a thing." Rather, the process is quite the reverse, and one can say with more justice and precision, *pace* Weil, that it is only when human actors come to regard others as "things" that they become capable of employing force, particularly lethal force, against them. Force here only completes that process of "turning into a thing" that begins in the sentiments and social patterns of human subjects.

To return to the Dayak shields, however, there is more that can be said. Thus far, I have suggested that the image of the monster may be taken to represent the enemy, as seen through the dehumanizing gaze of the warrior. Such an interpretation, moreover, is consistent with a view of shields as a marker of social borders, for

in this instance we may clearly perceive the tenuous nature of such borders, something that becomes particularly obvious within the situation of battle, for it is then quite literally only the thickness of the shield itself that separates the ancestral (representation of) community from the monstrous (figure of the) outside, safety from danger, self from other. In addition, there is significant material evidence to support such a view, for in the construction of many Dayak shields the monster images are rendered more grotesque still by the use of human hair as ornament: hair taken from the trophy skulls of slain enemies. Such enemies, having been viewed as monsters, were treated as monsters, and their corpses were used to depict the monsters that they were (see figure 2).

This datum, however, suggests another line of interpretation that may be advanced regarding the complex and polyphonous image of the monster. For it is obvious that the outer side of any shield is directed toward the enemy, especially toward one's immediate adversary in hand-to-hand battle. Further, it is equally obvious that the intended (and also, one assumes, quite real) effect of such an image is to intimidate or even terrify opponents, for in its very material substance (the actual hair of fallen victims), this shield announces the force, the valor, and also the cruelty of its bearer. It supplies graphic and tangible witness to the fact that he has




FIGURE 2. *Dayak Shield*. The monstrous image of the outer face (left) is made more fearsome by its covering of human hair.

taken enemy lives in the past and stands ready and able to do so once more. The shield thus displays the bearer's face as seen through the eyes of his opponent or (to put it differently) the face that he wishes to present to all enemies: for he becomes a monster against those whom he regards as monstrous, even as they do conversely to him.

We reach here the final paradox of war and the warrior: a corollary to the pattern we have observed whereby one must dehumanize one's enemies in order to employ force against them. In practice, it appears that a warrior must also dehumanize himself before he can become an instrument of slaughter, effectively eradicating such human tendencies as guilt, fear, and compassion. A well-articulated example of this is found in the samurai ideal of "no-mind," this being that psycho-mental state—cultivated by years of meditation and training in martial arts—in which the samurai's body and arms act as if automatically, with no hesitation born of thought, weakness, or doubt. Elsewhere, warriors frequently speak of themselves as animals: "lions" or "leopards" (East Africa); "two-footed wolves" (India and Iran); berserkers, or "those who wear the bear's shirt" (Scandinavia); or "crazy-dogs-wishing-to-die" (Crow), to cite but a few examples. To these data one might add the fact that Yanoama warriors march off to battle imitating the noises of a host of carnivorous beasts, from insects on up. The war song of the Yanoama is also noteworthy as a supreme statement of the warrior's auto-dehumanization, being entitled "I am a meat-hungry buzzard."

[See also Martial Arts.]

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Among the most important case studies are those drawn from Melanesia, which, given the relatively late date of "pacification" there by colonial authorities, provided an extremely informative field for gathering data. Here, one ought to note

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BRUCE LINCOLN

Indo-European Beliefs and Practices

As Georges Dumézil, the leading contemporary expert on comparative Indo-European mythology, long ago demonstrated, war gods and the ideology that is associated with them played an extremely important role in the pantheons of most if not all of the early Indo-European-speaking societies. To cite several well-attested examples: the ancient Indic war god Indra, by far the most prominent of the Vedic divinities; the ubiquitous Roman god Mars, the Greek war god Ares, and the Norse god Þórr (Thor), thunderbolt-wielder *par excellence* and the most popular of the ancient Scandinavian divinities. Moreover, heroes and demigods, like Arjuna, Herakles, Siegfried, Cú Chulainn, Arthur, and Achilles, all occupied important positions in their respective traditions. Indeed, like most pastoral nomads, modern as well as ancient, the ancestors of the Greeks, Hittites, Aryans, Celts, Germans, and so forth, seem to have regarded warfare as a fundamental fact of life and to have held both the war band and its collective representations in high esteem.

The Indo-European Männerbund. As Stig Wikander pointed out (1938), the *Männerbund*, or war band, was clearly among the most important of ancient Indo-European social institutions. Examples of this phenomenon are legion, from the *kṣatriya* caste (or class, at least in the earliest period) of traditional India to the ancient Germanic *comitatus*. Moreover, the presence of such a

social stratum—that is, a class of military specialists whose prime purpose was to exercise physical prowess, either in defense of the society or in order to conquer new territory—was a uniquely Indo-European phenomenon. Armed with the shaft-hole battle-ax, among other weapons, and propelled by the light, horse-drawn battle chariot, this warlike elite greatly facilitated the spread, beginning around 3500 BCE, of the several Indo-European communities from the proto-Indo-European homeland in what is now southern Russia to the territory associated with this widespread language family in historic times. [See also *Secret Societies*.]

Ambivalent Attitudes toward the Warrior. Nevertheless, despite his importance in the scheme of things, there seems to have been a deep-seated ambivalence in the Indo-European attitude toward the warrior, if not toward warfare, and this, too, is reflected in the belief system. On the one hand, the war leader, or **reǵ-* (from which Latin *rex*, Sanskrit *rāj*, Old Irish *rig*, et al. derive), together with his war band, was generally regarded as the immediate secular authority, and his commands were typically obeyed without question. On the other hand, the *rex*, *rāj*, and so forth, was everywhere subordinate to—or at least no more prestigious than—the priests or holy men (e.g., the Indic brahmins, the Celtic druids, the Roman *flamines maiores*). And it is clear that ultimate sovereignty was vested in this most sacred of the ancient Indo-European social strata. Moreover, one finds everywhere a tension between the two classes in question, a sense that although the warrior was vital to the survival of the community, he was nevertheless a thoroughly ambivalent figure and prone to commit random acts of violence or treachery against nonwarrior members of his own society when not engaged in fighting external enemies. Indeed, throughout the ancient Indo-European-speaking domain one repeatedly encounters such concepts as *furor* (Latin) and *ferg* (Old Irish), as well as the Norse image of the *berserker*, all of which are expressions of what was believed to be the warrior's inherent (and, on occasion, uncontrollable) ferocity. [See *Frenzy and Berserkers*.]

Thus, the role of the warrior, and especially the warrior-leader, was steeped in paradoxes. He was at once at the apex of the social order and a potential threat to that order. Indeed, the contradiction here, which is reflected throughout Indo-European religious beliefs, is inherent in the profession of arms: it involves a social institution dedicated to the destruction of society. What follows is, in the main, a survey of these warrior-related beliefs, as interpreted by Dumézil. [See *Indo-European Religions, article on History of Study*.]

The Ideology of the Second Function. According to Dumézil, the ancient Indo-Europeans conceived of the

world and their relationship to it in terms of three fundamental, hierarchically ranked ideological principles, or “functions.” In descending order, the so-called first function includes the social and supernatural manifestations of ultimate sovereignty and is typically manifested in a pair of divinities, such as the Vedic divinities Mithra and Varuṇa, the Norse gods Tyr and Óðinn (Odin), and so forth, as well as in the priestly social strata mentioned above. The final function, or third function, reflects the sum total of activities and beliefs relating to the mass of society, the maintenance and promotion of fertility, physical well-being, and so on. However, it is the intermediate function, or second function, which includes the social, religious, and mythological manifestations of the exercise of physical prowess, that concerns us here, for it contains the ideology underlying the Indo-European conception of warfare and warriors.

As has been noted, that ideology is inherently ambivalent, for the canonical representations of the warrior figure are two in number. One is the apotheosis of the chivalrous warrior, the warrior who for the most part confines his violent behavior to the battlefield and does not habitually attack “civilians.” This figure is perhaps best reflected by the aforementioned divinities Indra, Mars, and Pórr, as well as in the Indian epic hero Arjuna, and, at least to an extent, in the Greek figures Herakles and Achilles. The other representation of the warrior is diabolical in nature; the emphasis here is on unpredictability and sheer nastiness. Examples are to be found in the Vedic figure Vāyu, who is equated with the wind, especially the ill wind that blows up suddenly out of nowhere and does indiscriminate damage; the Norse antihero Starkaðr; and the aforementioned Greek divinity Ares, whose companions were Deimos (“fear”) and Phobos (“fright”). Thus, the warrior has both a “light” and a “dark” side to his nature.

In several recent works, chief among them the second volume of the *Mythe et épopée* series (1971), Dumézil has suggested that this “dark/light” dichotomy can be detected throughout Indo-European ideology. That is, certain divinities are more remote from man, more unpredictable, and therefore “dark” in character (e.g., Varuṇa as well as Vāyu in the Indic tradition), while others, like Mitra and Pórr, are closer to man and therefore “light” in character. Thus, the distinction between the two types of warrior figures, which almost certainly is rooted in a perception of social reality, may be but one example of a much more deep-seated Indo-European ideological theme.

The Three Sins of the Warrior. However, even the most chivalrous of Indo-European warrior figures, divine as well as heroic, sometimes manifest “dark” traits. Typically, this involves the commission of three

“sins,” one against each of the three ideological functions. The best example, perhaps, can be seen in the ancient Indic traditions about the recalcitrant behavior of the otherwise “light” divinity Indra. In *Mahābhārata* 5.9.1–40, Indra slays Viśvarūpa, the monstrous, three-headed son of Tvaṣṭṛ, who has been threatening the divine community. However, as Tvaṣṭṛ is chaplain to the gods, his son is by definition a divine brahman, and Indra has therefore committed an act of brahmanicide, an unpardonable sin (and act of rebellion) against the first function and its representatives. Later, Indra is confronted by the warrior demon Namuci, with whom he had earlier sworn a pact of eternal friendship. As that pact contained the promise not to kill Namuci with anything either wet or dry, Indra forges a weapon made of foam—which, in the eyes of the ancient Indians at least, was neither wet nor dry—and, when the unsuspecting demon’s attention is diverted, he decapitates him. This, of course, is a sin against his own function, as the slaying was done by trickery, rather than in a fair fight. Finally, the god assumes the form of a man called Gautama and, so disguised, has intercourse with the man’s wife. This is an abuse of the ideology of the third function, that is, Indra performs an illicit act of procreation.

As a result of these transgressions, Indra progressively lost his first function, majesty, or *tejas*; his second function, physical prowess, or *bālam*; and his third function, beauty, or *rūpam*; all of which, as Wikander and Dumézil have demonstrated, were eventually reincarnated in the offspring of the epic hero Pāṇḍu (Yudhiṣṭhira, Arjuna, Bhīma, Nakula, and Sahadeva). The important thing here is that, from the standpoint of the Indo-European ideological system, Indra had by these acts clearly demonstrated his inherent recalcitrance and therefore his ultimate inferiority to Mitra, Varuṇa, and other representatives of the first function in the divine scheme of things. The lesson, of course, is that warriors, even the best of them, are capable of disrupting the social and natural order and therefore not to be fully trusted.

Another canonical example of the “three sins” can be found in the Greek traditions about Herakles, who (1) refuses to obey his sovereign, Eurystheus, (2) slays a fellow warrior, Iphitos, in violation of what amounts to a truce, and (3) although legally married to Deianira, abducts and then violates Astydamia after killing her father and sacking his city. The third prime example involves the Norse warrior Starkaðr, who sacrilegiously sacrifices his sovereign to the god Óðinn, abandons his cohorts in battle, and, for money, slays the Danish king Olo while he is relaxing in a bath. Still other examples

have been noted in the careers of Ares, Agamemnon, Siegfried, Sir Gawain, and Achilles.

As Dumézil puts it, what we have here is a “drama in three acts,” as it were, and in a very real sense it is a tragedy, as with each “sin” the warrior in question—god as well as hero—loses his powers or his life force. Thus, after violating Astydamia, Herakles is rendered powerless by his outraged wife and eventually causes himself to be burned on a funeral pyre, while Starkaðr commits suicide after killing Olo. The net effect is what amounts to a “cautionary tale”: warriors, even the best of them, are ultimately unreliable, and if their *furor*, and so forth, is allowed to go unchecked, the social order as a whole may very well collapse.

The Killing of the Three-Headed Monster. Among the more important themes involving Indo-European warrior figures is the killing of a three-headed monster. As we have already seen, Indra’s first “sin” stemmed from such a slaying. But the theme in question is distinct from that of the “three sins” and needs to be considered separately. Indeed, Indra is by no means the only Indic figure who slays a tricephalus. In *R̥gveda* 10.8.8 Viśvarūpa’s slayer is called Trita-Āptya, or the “third” of three Āptya brothers, and although the figure is sometimes held to be a hypostasis of Indra, there is no clear implication that Trita-Āptya’s action is considered a “sin.” The same can be said for the behavior of the onomastically related Iranian figure Thraetauna, who kills a three-headed monster called Azhi Dahāka (“foreign snake”).

Other reflexes of this theme can be found in the Greek story of Herakles versus the three-headed figure Geryon, the Norse myth of how Thor bested the giant Hrungnir, who is described as having a “three-horned” heart, the Irish account of the hero Cú Chulainn versus the three sons of Nechta Scéne, and the well-known Roman pseudo-historical account of the conflict between Horatius and the three Curiatii. The last two accounts are, of course, euhemerized, in that the three-headed monster has been transformed into a threefold set of human adversaries (in the Roman version they are a set of Alban triplets). Nevertheless, in the other accounts, the slayer performs the same service to his community: he eliminates a threat to the three fundamental elements of the tradition (i.e., the three functions)—hence presumably the three heads or triple character of the adversary.

But the recalcitrance and, indeed, antisocial proclivities of the Indo-European warrior are also very much in evidence here. In the Roman version, for example, when the victorious Horatius (also the last survivor of a set of triplets) learned that his sister mourned the death of

one of the Curiatii—she had been betrothed to him—he slew her in a fit of rage. As a result the Roman hero was forced to walk under a beam to divest himself of his *furor* before returning to polite society. Similar rituals of purification seem to have been characteristic of other early Indo-European societies; indeed the later Roman custom wherein a victorious army had to pass under a “triumphal” arch before it disbanded seems, in light of this evidence, to have been rooted as much in a need to divest the army of its collective *furor* as in a desire to humiliate the war captives that marched in chains behind the general’s chariot.

The War of Foundation. Another widespread Indo-European theme in which warrior figures necessarily play an important part is what Dumézil variously calls “the war of foundation” and the “war between the functions,” that is, a conflict between representatives of the first two functions and those of the third. The best examples come from the Germanic and Roman traditions. In the former, the Æsir, including Óðinn, Tyr, and, of course, Þórr, fight a war with the so-called Vanir divinities, the most prominent of whom are Njǫrðr, his son Freyr, and his daughter Freyja. As described in the *Ynglingasaga*, the Æsir fight their Vanir opponents to a standstill, and then, in reconciliation, incorporate them into the pantheon, rendering it complete.

Although scholars such as the late Karl Helm have interpreted this myth as a reflection of the conflict that must have occurred between the earliest Germans and the indigenous inhabitants of northern Europe, Dumézil has found a parallel in the Roman pseudo-historical account of the Sabine War, as preserved by Livy and others, and is therefore convinced that the theme is in fact Indo-European. In the latter case, shortly after founding the city of Rome, Romulus and his companions trick their wealthy neighbors, the Sabines, steal their wives and daughters, and then, as part of the truce following an inconclusive war, incorporate the whole Sabine community into the Roman body politic. In both examples, the defeated groups clearly represent the third function—neither the Vanir nor the Sabines were famed for their military prowess, and each was closely associated with fertility and the mass of society—while the victors represent the first two. Indeed, the Sabines eventually came to form one of the three founding tribes of Rome, the Titienses (named for the Sabine king Titus Tatius), completing a triad that also included the Ramnes (founded by Romulus and charged with priestly duties), and the warlike Luceres (reputedly named for the Etruscan hero Lucomon).

Thus, while the Roman version of the theme masquerades as history, it is as mythological in its roots as

the Norse account of the conflict between the Æsir and the Vanir and ultimately stems from the same Indo-European mythology. This conclusion is buttressed by several other examples of what appear to be “wars of foundation”—or at least traditions about an internecine struggle that broadly conforms to the pattern just discussed. One is the Vedic reference to a conflict between “two forces,” or *ubhe vīrye*, that are expressed in the principles later incarnated, respectively, in the *vaiśya* (third function) and in the *brahmana* and *kṣatriya* (first and second functions). Another can be found in the Homeric accounts of the Trojan War (e.g., the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*), as well as in accounts of its aftermath (e.g., Euripides’ *The Trojan Women*). The Greeks, led by Agamemnon and, after he returns to the fray, championed by the famed warrior Achilles, represent the first two functions, while the Trojans, consistently described as possessing vast wealth, are, like the Vanir and the Sabines, almost certainly representatives of the third function. Moreover, the fate of the Trojan women closely parallels that of their Sabine sisters: they are abducted by the victorious Greek kings and heroes.

Yet another possible example of a “war of foundation” can be seen in the Irish accounts of the conflict between the Tuatha Dé Danann and the Fomhoire, which culminated in the Second Battle of Magh Tuiredh. After this battle, the defeated Fomhoiran figure Bres, who together with his kind seems generally to reflect the third function, is incorporated into the body politic created by the victorious Tuatha (first and second functions), rendering it complete.

Sword Cults. An important feature that appears in several ancient Indo-European traditions is what can best be described as the cult of the named, magical sword. Found among the Celts, Germans, and particularly the North Iranian-speaking steppe peoples (Scythians, Alans, Sarmatians, etc.), the cult seems to have spread westward in the early centuries CE. Perhaps the best-known example here is contained in the medieval tradition surrounding King Arthur’s magical sword, Excalibur. Another example is Roland’s famous sword, Durandel. But as early as the fifth century BCE Herodotus described the Scythian practice of worshiping swords as manifestations of “Ares,” and in the fourth century CE Ammianus Marcellinus described the Alanic custom of thrusting swords into the earth and worshiping them as “Mars.” The modern Ossets, a Caucasian people who have the distinction of being the last descendants of the ancient Alans, still preserve an epic tradition in which magical swords play an important role (see, for example, Dumézil, *Légendes sur les Nartes*, Paris, 1930, pp. 61–63).

Although this theme cannot be documented throughout the ancient Indo-European domain and may well be rooted in the steppe traditions, its subsequent distribution from Britain to the Caucasus renders it a potentially important element in the Indo-European warfare mystique. [See also Blades.]

The Warrior-Divinity as a Fertility Figure. To conclude this brief survey of Indo-European warrior figures and the beliefs and practices associated with them, it is necessary to point out that several of the best known of these figures also had strong associations with plant, animal, and human fertility. Mars, for example, in certain of his aspects (e.g., the so-called Agrarian Mars) was regularly worshiped as a fertility figure. The Norse god Þórr was also invoked as an agricultural deity, and his sexual prowess is in some respects as remarkable as his fighting ability. The same can be said for several other Indo-European figures who are otherwise clear-cut representatives of the "second function," including, as we have seen, the demigod Herakles.

The warrior also has important connections with the principle of sovereignty, that is, the first function. As Dumézil points out, the Indo-European king is everywhere drawn from the warrior elite and must undergo a ritual wherein he acquires symbols of the other two functions as well as those relevant to his own. He thus necessarily becomes a transfunctional (or better, perhaps, a parafunctional) figure. Indeed, all Indo-European royal consecration ceremonies, from ancient India to modern Britain, emphasize this element.

Thus, Dumézil's conception of this most important component of the Indo-European ideology is much more complex than it might seem at first glance. There was, for example, a *Mars qui praeest paci* and there were *arma Quirini* (that is, armed representatives of the "third function"). Moreover, most of the female warrior figures—such as the Greek goddess Athena, who leaped into existence fully armed from the forehead of Zeus and who was typically portrayed in the costume of a warrior maiden—were also trifunctional figures in that they incarnated divine wisdom and the domestic arts as well as military prowess (cf. the three Irish Macha figures and the triple-figured Hindu goddess Durgā). For the most part, however, these fertility attributes seem to have been secondary, and the prime function of figures such as Mars and Þórr, if not Athena, was to ensure military success.

In sum, despite their periodic bouts of antisocial behavior and occasional double-duty as agricultural divinities, to say nothing of their periodic elevation to the transfunctional role of king, the great Indo-European war gods, as well as their heroic counterparts (Arjuna,

Achilles, Siegfried, Cú Chulainn, et al.), everywhere occupied a fundamental niche in the belief systems in question. And this niche was paralleled by that occupied by the warrior stratum in the real world of the ancient Indo-Europeans. Although never at the apex of the social or divine pyramid (unless elevated to the kingship), the warrior, mortal as well as divine or legendary, was a figure to be reckoned with, and the ideology associated with his was (and still is) perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Indo-European worldview.

[See also Indo-European Religions.]

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C. SCOTT LITTLETON

WARAO RELIGION. The Orinoco Delta, a landscape of swamps, islands, and waterways, is the territory of the Warao. Located between the modern republics of Venezuela, Guyana, and Surinam, the Warao today number approximately sixteen thousand. Heirs to a seven-thousand-year tradition of fishing adaptation, some twenty dialectal subgroups of Warao have been identified (Kirchoff, 1948, p. 869). Warao formerly was considered a linguistic isolate; recent research however indicates certain vocabulary correspondences with the Chibchan languages of northwestern South America (Wilbert, 1970, p. 22). Cultural and dialectical differences exist among the various Warao groups, but they are linked by a system of common beliefs.

Information on Warao religion is derived from three major areas: traditional narrative, cosmology, and shamanism.

Traditional Narrative. Traditional narrative is clearly cosmogenic in nature in that it recounts the origin of the plants, animals, and spirits that occupy the Warao universe. It also relates the feats of culture heroes, outlines the taboos people must observe, defines the soul, death, and reincarnation, and depicts other realms of being.

Myth explains that in precultural times the Warao lived in the sky, where a hunter's shot went wide one day. While searching for his arrow, the man found a hole. Descending by a rope to the earth, he discovered an abundance of food. On his return he informed the Warao of his extraordinary find. The other Warao immediately began lowering themselves to earth, until at one point a pregnant woman became stuck in the hole. Only her anus protruded, which became the morning star; or, in another version, her legs extruded, forming

the stars in the Big Dipper. Thus some of the Indians were forced to remain behind. On earth, the Warao learned from the spirit of palm leaf fiber that they must suffer and work. And so the first baby was born, the first sickness was inflicted by evil spirits, and the first death occurred (Wilbert, 1970, p. 309).

According to another tale, the sun was originally the property of one man. The world was dark, and men could procure food only with difficulty. One man, hearing the complaints of his wife, decided to send his two daughters in search of the sun. The first failed because she took the wrong turn and was raped by a monster. The second successfully reached the house of the sun's owner, had sexual intercourse with him, and received, as a gift, the sun in a container. Before she left, the man advised the girl not to break the sun. But on the girl's return home, amid the family's rejoicing, a piece of the sun broke off and escaped into the sky.

Aloft in the sky, the sun moved so swiftly through the day that men were unable to procure food. To remedy this situation, the Indians caught a turtle that they presented to the sun as a pet. Now obliged to wait for his slow-moving pet, the sun moved across the sky much more slowly, giving the Warao many hours of daylight in which to fish and to gather food (Wilbert, 1970, p. 311).

In another tale, the origin of the moon is sketched. Every night a young man was having incestuous relations with his two sisters as they slept. Anxious to learn the identity of their violator, the women smeared black genipa juice on their bodies. Waking the next day, they discovered the incriminating dye on their brother. Overcome with shame, their brother flew into space, where he became transformed into the moon. On occasions when the moon turns pink, the Warao believe that it bleeds. They therefore consider all women to be daughters of the moon, because they bleed periodically in menstruation (Wilbert, 1970, p. 63).

With profound sentiment, the Warao narrative also describes the origin of death. At the beginning of the world, the Warao chief warned his people not to sleep that night for they all would be visited first by death and then by a good spirit. To gain immortality, he urged them not to answer the first call but to respond to the second. That night silence reigned through the settlement. Toward midnight a voice was heard. One youth who had fallen asleep woke with a start and answered the first call, the call of death. In fulfillment of the chief's prediction, from that time on all Indians have had to die (Wilbert, 1970, p. 192).

Cosmology. According to Warao cosmology, the earth is a disk floating on water; its crust is fractured by the many waterways of the Orinoco Delta. The sea extends

to the horizon, where, contained within a vast gorge, it is bordered by mountains. At the cardinal and solstice points, these mountains soar upwards in the form of petrified trees.

The Warao universe is divided into various realms. The celestial realm is a smaller disk that parallels the terrestrial one. The maximum height of the solstitial suns determines the bell-shaped cosmic vault, which rests on the world's axis. Located to the northeast of the zenith is an ovoid house that is two-storied; the lower level is inhabited by a plumed serpent and the upper level by the Creator Bird, the ancestral shaman and his wife, and four pairs of insects. In the central space of the upper floor the male residents assemble to play a game that perpetuates humanity on earth. At the end of each game the plumed serpent emerges from below to produce a luminous ball. Ropes of tobacco smoke connect the house with the zenith and with the world's axis.

Coiled around the earth disk is a huge marine serpent that controls the tides and is the source of all forms of life. Below the terrestrial-aquatic is the subterranean realm, at the center of which resides the four-headed serpent-goddess of the nadir; her heads, crowned with deer horns, mark the four cardinal directions. The northern seas of the summer solstice are inhabited by the Butterfly God, and the southern seas of the winter solstice by the Toad God. The eastern and western seas are the domains, respectively, of the Avian God of Origin and the Scarlet Macaw. The ancient forefathers, called *kanobotuma*, reside at the four mountains at the cardinal points and once a year visit the Warao. At festival time, the forefathers enter the house of worship in a barrel of roasted palm pith, and, as carved images nailed to a central platform, they participate in the sacred dances of propitiatory ritual in which the Warao implore their gods of origin for protection (Wilbert, 1981, pp. 37–40).

Shamanism. Among the Warao common maladies are treated with simple herbal remedies. A serious illness or death, however, is always attributed to the malevolent action or intention of a supernatural agent. Three major types of sickness, and three specialists to treat them, are distinguished. *Bahana*, which results from the introduction of material objects into the body, is cured by the healer *bahanarotu*. *Hoa*, inflicted by plant and animal theophanies, must be attended by a shaman called *hoarotu*. And *hebu*, the possession by an ancestor spirit, is treated by the *wisiratu*, who is the shaman or priest who presides over the house of worship and who acts as the mediator between the *kanobotuma* and the Warao (Wilbert, 1970, p. 24). When someone is sick, all three practitioners assemble to diagnose the illness and

to determine which specialist must perform the appropriate ceremony.

At the beginning of the Warao cultural epoch, the primordial shaman ascended to the zenith, called the "bosom of the world," from which radiates a network of paths across the celestial canopy. Deities travel along these pathways, as do Warao shamans in their journeys to other worlds. Amid this traffic, men provide offerings for the gods, and the gods bestow life and health on mankind (Wilbert, 1981, p. 39).

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WATER. In the mythical narratives in which it is frequently employed, the image of water takes on many different aspects. In this article I shall try to classify its appearances and seek to understand how the diverse functions that it fulfills are ordered.

At the Time of Origins. Many peoples tell how the world, already created in ancient times, was trans-

formed and became what it is now. According to certain Australian traditions, the earth was originally surrounded by water, and in it were many spirits. Through the action of one of these spirits, the earth grew warm, and the first men emerged from it. According to the Zuni Indians, a complex network of waterways circulates underground; the first Zuni were born there, at the lowest level. A pair of twins created by the Sun then made them climb to the surface. A pond marks the spot where they finally saw the light of day. A northern Australian myth tells the story of a *dema* (ancestral) deity. After one of his sons struck him with a lance, he threw himself into the sea; there, another of his children drew the lance out of his flesh where it had remained embedded. During the voyage the god then undertook, a spring appeared everywhere he rested. Finally, he plunged into the river Victoria, whose waters he proceeded to stir up until they formed deep branches in the forest; he then disappeared under a rock. From time to time he rises to the surface and causes storms; according to some accounts, he also occupies the region of the rainbow, where rain is formed.

Myths of this type show us water as present in the world from the most ancient times on, but they ascribe to it many different situations. Whether peripheral to the land or underground, water is first a significant element of the universal order. Sometimes it figures simply as a geographical feature—the sea or a river defining the shape of a country. However, there is something more to take note of. Water can be passive, with a spirit independent of it taking the sole initiative in the act of transformation. And yet water is tied mysteriously to the birth of the first men or to the destiny of a god, who, after disappearing into its depths, remains bound up with storms and rain. The scope of these differences becomes clear when we consider lengthier accounts.

In seeking the origin of all things, many peoples relate how water appeared in the course of cosmogonic events. Their explanations fall into three principal mythic systems. According to the first system, the world is created by a god who remains largely transcendent to it. In this case water, like the entire world, is a product of divine action. According to the Desána of South America, "Sun created the universe. . . . [He] created the earth, its forests and its rivers. . . . He also created the spirits and water demons" (Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, *Desana: Simbolismo de los Indios Tukano del Vaupès*, Bogotá, 1968, pp. 48–49). An African lament evokes "the one eternal God, the creator of the ocean and of dry land, of the fish in the sea and the beasts in the forest" (Louis Vincent Thomas, *Les religions d'Afrique noire*, Paris, 1969, p. 218).

In the second mythic context, the cosmogony takes on

the aspect of a genealogy. The first ancestor is an entity whose simultaneously cosmic and divine attributes appear in the proliferation of his offspring. The waters that are then born throughout the generations are themselves generative. In a Greek system, the ancestral Earth gives birth to Heaven and to Pontos, the realm of the sea, composed of salt water. Earth then couples with each of these male principles. The first of the children she conceives from Heaven is Okeanos, a freshwater river, with deep eddies; he becomes the father of all the springs and rivers. Thus the deity who goes beyond the world remains immanent within it: in a way, he is present in the waters.

Finally, spirit may be presented as one of the primary agents of the formation of the world. Take for instance this Bambara myth: out of the original void and motion a force, and then spirit, come forth. While the principles of things are being ordered, a mass falls and gives birth to the earth. However, a part of spirit arises; this is Faro, who builds the heaven. Faro then falls to earth in the form of water, thus bringing life to it. Dispenser of life, water is a manifestation of the divine spirit itself.

It is, however, in another type of cosmogony that the breadth and diversity of the functions of water become most intelligible. Here, water symbolizes what existed before the unleashing of the cosmogonic process, or the state of the world in the first phases of its history. We find numerous variations on this theme.

1. In its fluidity and elusiveness water may suggest the absence of form, the unsubstantiality and confusion from which the world will emerge. Inert, water has no power; a god or other beings independent of water will be the sole agents of creation. For instance, the following tale was told in the Admiralty Islands. In the beginning, there was nothing but an immense sea; in it swam a great serpent. Wanting a place where he could rest, he said, "Let a reef arise!" A reef then arose from the water and turned into dry land.

Biblical cosmogony illustrates the meaning of water in myths of this sort. The Bible brings together various symbols, including the desert, the void and darkness, the abyss, and the mass of water that the abyss contains and above which hovers the breath of God. This divine breath alone signifies reality. The other images have a negative value, evoking the idea of nonexistence; theologians will see in them a symbol of nothingness. Vedic language can go even further:

Neither Non-Being nor Being existed then.

Neither air nor the firmament above existed.

What was moving with such force? Where? Under whose care?

Was it the deep and fathomless water?

(*Rgveda* 10.121.1)

In this question, the image of water alludes to the state of things prior to the distinction between being and nonbeing. We are still prior to nothingness itself.

2. Water has no form of its own, but rivers have a bed and the sea has a bottom. This simple fact inspires several myths. Here is a Siberian example:

In the beginning, water was everywhere. Doh, the first shaman, flew over the primordial ocean in the company of some birds. Finding nowhere to rest, he asked the red-breasted loon to dive into the ocean and bring back some earth from the bottom. This the loon did, and on his third attempt, he managed to bring back a little mud in his beak. Doh made of this an island on the original ocean which became the earth.

We find similar accounts in numerous regions. In two Hindu traditions, Viṣṇu himself went down to the bottom of the primordial waters in the form of a boar, in order to bring back some earth.

The original ocean can thus cover some solid element. Moreover, despite its fluidity, water itself has substance; it is itself matter, and may contain suspended matter. In some myths the gods capture this matter or condense it. Thus in the *Atharvaveda* (12.1) we read: "[The Earth] was originally a wave in the heart of the Ocean; the Sages went looking for it with their magic." A Guinean myth tells how Ha made an immense sea of mud and, then, by solidifying the mud, created the earth. According to the *Kojiki*, Izanagi and Izanami drove a lance into the sea that extended below them. When they withdrew it, the salty drops that fell from it solidified and formed the first land: the island of Onogoro. A Greek commentator on the myth of Proteus expresses himself in more abstract terms:

There was a time when all that existed was formless and muddy . . . there was nothing but matter that had been spilled out. A formless inertia reigned until the artisan of all things, having attracted order in order to protect life, imposed its imprint on the world. He disjoined the heavens from the earth, separated the continent from the sea, and each of the four elements . . . assumed its own form.

(Heracitus, *Homeric Allegories* 64ff.)

In this type of myth, water no longer signifies nothingness; it possesses a true existence. The gods use it, but it remains inert; they alone are active.

3. Very similar accounts, or even variants of the same myth, however, endow water with a certain spontaneity. This is the case in a story told by the Muskogee of North America. Before creation, they say, a vast expanse of water was the only thing visible, and two pigeons flew over the waves. At one end, they noticed a blade of grass growing on the surface of the waves. From this grass the earth gradually took shape, and at

last the islands and continents took on their present form. We may also refer to an Orphic Greek cosmogony, according to which the primordial water appears to have been muddy. The matter it contained was condensed to become earth, and then from water and earth was finally born the mysterious god who would engender the cosmic egg. Despite their very different styles, both of these myths share one feature: something happens in the original waters, without the intervention of any power external to the waters themselves. They therefore possess a certain intrinsic power. Other myths go on to explain the nature of this power.

4. In Hindu cosmogonies, waters are often represented as a receptacle of the divine egg or seed, which grows in the waters, carrying the god full of activity. But they do not give birth to what they carry. "In the beginning, he created only the waters, and then, in the waters, he laid his seed. And this became a golden egg In this egg Brahmā was born of himself, the ancestor of all living things" (*Mānava Dharmaśāstra* 1.8–9). Auspicious for the development of the divine embryo, such waters fulfill an almost amniotic function. Egyptian mythology has a similar body of water, known as Nun. The primordial water is considered divine. It bears its own name and assumes human attributes. It can speak, and it can form a couple with its feminine double, the goddess Naunet. In Heliopolitan tradition, it is in Nun that the autogenous solar god is born and later rests. There he begins his creative or generative activity, and there, perhaps, the first gods begin their existence.

5. The image of a vivifying water that favors the birth of a god or the growth of an embryo is in fact very close to that of a fecund and procreative water. Some Egyptian texts give the impression that Nun himself engendered the solar god, whom he calls "my son." Nun has thus been called the "father of the gods." For a more clear-cut example of an image of procreative water, however, we may turn to the Babylonians. The Babylonians recognized two beings, Apsu and Tiamat, who existed prior to the formation of heaven and earth. They are at one and the same time waters, whose currents, in the beginning of time, mingled in a single mass, and two personified divinities, one masculine and one feminine. Their union produces another divine couple, who in turn will have their own offspring, so that Apsu and Tiamat become the ancestors of all creatures and, in this sense, the first authors of the cosmogonic process. Greece had a similar system, which Homer has preserved. Simultaneously currents of water and anthropomorphic deities, Okeanos and Tethys couple and give birth; their descendants will include all beings who will constitute, rule, or people the universe.

Essential to the life of plants, animals, and men alike, water can be identified with the life-bearing forces and with fecundity itself. The regenerative nature can appear in a less biological fashion. We read in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (11.1.6.1): "In the beginning, the waters and the ocean alone existed. The waters had a wish: 'How shall we procreate?' They made an effort. They practiced ascetic heating [*tapas*], and so it happened that a golden egg appeared." This egg contained Prajāpati. Thus not only is water filled with the desire for procreation (*kāma*), it is also capable of truly creative effort and ascetic heat (*tapas*).

When we look at the role water plays in the later phases of the creation of the world, we see these observations confirmed. Within one and the same cosmogonic system, waters can successively assume attributes that allow us to distinguish different systems within the most ancient phases. For example, we have seen that the embryo of Prajāpati developed in the primordial waters. But then Prajāpati himself undertakes the creation of the waters. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (11.1.6.16–19), Paramestin, son and hypostasis of Prajāpati, wished to become all things on earth. So he became water. Similarly, Prajāpati will become breath, and Indra, the word. These notions are not contradictory; they represent different stages in creation. Whatever their amniotic qualities, the primordial waters are formless and not especially substantive, since Prajāpati still remains an embryo within them. After his birth, however, the god creates more defined and concrete waters outside of himself. In this way the text shows that the deity penetrates the waters just as he penetrates the entire universe.

Other narratives make simpler distinctions among the successive states of water. If primordial waters are an inert mass, it would be logical for them, during the course of creation, to be influenced by the actions of the gods who rule them. In the Bible, God creates a space in the midst of the original waters, dividing it into two masses, the upper and the lower waters. After creating a solid mass, he then separates that from the lower waters, thereby forming the sea and dry land.

Waters also submit to the demiurgical action in more ambiguous accounts. Here is a Fali (African) myth: one of the first animals, the tortoise, gave the world its first structure by laying out a ditch on the waters. After the first crisis, when rain threatened to submerge all things, the toad—another of the first animals—completed the structure. He separated standing water from running water and opened up a second path for the waters, cutting through the earlier ditch. Thus he divided the world into four parts.

Passive waters can also be mere instruments in the

hands of those who confront each other in the course of great cosmogonic battles. In Hindu mythology, the demon Vṛtra holds back the waters and prevents them from irrigating the earth. Indra, who is waging a difficult war against him, is finally victorious and gives life to the world by releasing the waters. Mesopotamian myths are more complex. When the god Enlil decides to destroy humanity, he first holds back the rains and prevents underground waters from reaching the surface. Then, in a second attempt, he unleashes the waters, causing a flood.

Although waters thus appear to be temporarily mastered by the gods who use them, they are not completely inert. Not only do they seem to help Indra in his combat, but they are used by the gods primarily because they have a power of their own. The gods retain them because they are fertilizing; they unleash them because they are destructive.

The life-bearing and generative qualities that we have recognized in some of the primordial waters become manifest in the later phases of the cosmogony. Thus in a later stage of the Sumerian cosmogony, Enki, the Sumerian water god, impregnates Nintur, a goddess close to the earth, by scattering his seed on a riverbank; he then becomes the father of the goddess Nimu. With Nimu he begets Ninkurra, and with Ninkurra, Ottu. Similarly in Greece, whether they be the primordial pair (as in Homer) or be born of Heaven and Earth (as in Hesiod), the river Okeanos and his spouse Tethys have many offspring in the form of springs and rivers; the latter also procreate. In this manner waters contribute to the growth and enrichment of the universe. They also do so in another way: Enki fills ditches, canals, and fallow land with water, thus participating in the organization of the world.

Amma, the Dogon creator god, also has close affinities with heaven and water. His children, the snake-shaped Nommo, who are associated both with water and with the primal word, are the most active and successful agents of the cosmogonic impulse. They contribute to the birth of sexuality and permit the birth of the first ancestors. The latter, who in turn acquire the dignity of Nommo, keep close ties with water. After eating the first dead person, one of them furnishes society with the principles of its structure by vomiting up water—a prefiguration of torrents and ponds, the source of the five rivers, and of the waters of parturition.

Finally, water is sometimes tied more specifically to the birth of humanity. A trout out of water couples with a man from the underground lakes to beget the first clans of the Desána. According to some New Guinea traditions, the *dema* deities once lived under the earth, except for one of them who dug a hole in the ground.

The others came out through the hole; then it filled up with water, and fish began to swim in it. After a complex sequence of events the fish became men. Finally, in Greek mythology, men often appear by coming out of a river.

We may now consider instances in which waters are portrayed as destructive. Several examples can be found in the ancient Near East. The Ugaritic Baal, god of the storm and of rain, symbolizes the forces of life. He periodically struggles against Mot, the incarnation of drought and death. He must also combat and conquer Prince Yamm, that is, the sea prince. Because of the gaps in our knowledge it is difficult to locate this conflict within the mythical history of the world. So much, however, is certain: Yamm is threatening, and Baal's victory is necessary to the survival of the universe.

Things are clearer in the *Enuma elish*. Troubled by the proliferation and activity of their offspring, Apsu and Tiamat, whose mingled waters had given birth to the most ancient beings of the Babylonian myth, one day tried to destroy their descendants. Apsu, who was the first to try, was quickly conquered by Ea's magic. Ea then built his temple on the waters of Apsu, which were henceforth underground. Tiamat, who tried next, was more formidable, but was killed in the end by Marduk. By blowing into and swelling up the monstrous body of Tiamat, the young god separated the celestial waters from the earth; he opened the way to mountain rivers as he imposed his order on the entire universe. The primordial beings thus appear to want to abolish the agitation that accompanies the rise of the world in order to recover the peace they knew in the undifferentiated state of the first ages. Their inertia proves destructive. Tiamat appears as a monster in the army of monsters she has raised. The original divine waters must be conquered before the organizing gods can accomplish their work by pushing them back to the ends of the world.

Water in the Present World. We again encounter the different qualities, functions, and powers of water when we look at the position it holds in the completed world. Waters are one of the great domains of the ordered universe. Evoking the totality of the world, an Egyptian tale lists the sky, the earth, the domain of night, the mountains, and the waters. The *Rgveda* refers more simply to the sky, the waters, the earth. But despite such seemingly straightforward classifications, water is not thereby reduced to its palpable appearance; it continues to occupy places that are inaccessible to us; it possesses unsuspected qualities and powers.

The cosmic waters. For many peoples waters constitute the limits of the universe. They make up a vast ex-

pense, in the middle of which lies the earth, like an island. They may be divided into two oceans on either side of the world, or they may flow in a river that surrounds the world, like the Greek Okeanos. They also frequently occupy the lower regions of the world in a more or less complex network of waterways underground. Or again, sometimes the entire earth is believed to rest on water. Finally, water is also found in the upper regions, above the heavens. Thus water can surround the world in any of the three dimensions of space. For the Desána Indians, a region bathed in water extends under the earth; water also circulates in the filaments of the Milky Way. In Mesopotamian texts the earth is built on the waters of Apsu, while the waters of Tiamat occupy the space above the heavens.

Waters can also help to define the center of the world. According to the Fali myth already cited, this center is located at the intersection of two open trenches in the waters. A character from an Iroquois myth runs around a lake to make the earth grow; the earth then develops on all sides under his steps. The great Ugaritic god El dwells at the source of the rivers in the midst of the course of the two oceans. The Guaraní Indians call the original abode of their ancestress the "Gushing Spring." It is the true center of the earth, the true center of the land of their first last father.

Since they occupy highly significant parts of the universe, waters help to define cosmic order. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* says categorically: "The waters are the order of the world" (11.1.6.24). In particular, bodies of water often establish important boundaries. In one widespread image, a lake or river separates the land of the living from the world of the dead. Examples of such a body of water include the river one crosses to reach the Babylonian Land of No Return and the Acheron of the Greeks. Furthermore, just as one must cross the waters to enter the realm of death, one must also cross the waters to enter the land of the living; according to the Ewe people, a child crosses a river when it is born.

Not all peoples make an explicit relationship between cosmic waters and the waters nearer at hand. Several do, however. Thus rains are sometimes believed to come from the celestial waters, and rivers from waters underground, if not from the waters surrounding the earth. Some texts provide more complex images. In a Babylonian poem, springs and rivers arise from the head of Tiamat's corpse; they therefore seem to come from the waters that occupy the upper regions of the world, even if these are near the earth, at the ends of the horizon. In ancient India, the Ganges was thought to descend from the heavens.

Waters and the divine. Wherever they are found, waters are often bound up with divine powers. The

Hindu world generally holds them to be goddesses. More explicitly, in other cases, it is the sea, certain rivers, and certain springs that are considered to be gods. People in Vedic India, for instance, sacrificed to rivers. The Tigris and the Euphrates appear in a list of Hittite deities. Rivers are invoked in one Homeric oath.

There is something remarkable about these water deities. They are something more than representations of a purely natural element. Thus while the Egyptian Nun is a waterway on which the boat of the Sun sails at night, he is also a personage who can speak. Similarly, the name of the Ugaritic god Yamm means the sea itself; another of his names evokes the image of a river, but he also appears with the features of a prince or judge who sends ambassadors to the divine assembly. The Greek Pontos is the salty expanse of the sea; he is also a masculine being who couples with Earth and sires offspring. In Egypt, the Nile (and its floodwaters) is honored as Hapi, an anthropomorphic god. Water is thus the manifestation of a divine power that does not exactly coincide with the tangible appearance of the liquid element. Nevertheless, its immanence within this element is such that water can be perceived as the divinity itself.

In other cases, however, waters simply serve as the abode of spirits or sacred powers. Such spirits may inhabit a lake, a river, or the waves of the sea, or like others may live in a grove, a rock, or a mountain. Several gods that exercise a more extended authority should be mentioned separately. First of all, there are lords of rain, who are in some sense believed to cause it. However, rain also depends on beings whose powers are not restricted to the control of rain. In order to obtain rain, therefore, one must invoke several gods together, or certain ancestors who have become powerful spirits. Rain is sometimes conceived of as a gift from the supreme being, or the god of rain may be made into the supreme being itself.

Several ancient Mediterranean and Near Eastern peoples had a storm god. He rides or gathers the clouds, causes thunder and lightning to strike, and makes the rain fall. This storm god occupies a preeminent position among the gods; he can reign over them, protect the cities or their kings, and extend his power over the entire universe. Less prominent in the Hindu pantheon, the storm god Parjanya is a destroyer of demons; in some texts, he seems to be in command of the whole world.

The power of the gods that reign over the waters in a more general fashion is similarly extensive. The Sumerian god Enki, who comes by sea from a faraway land, established his residence or temple on the underground waters of Apsu, whom he has subdued. Enki is the lord

of the waters. After being the major organizer of the world and one of the creators of humanity, he remains the master of fate. Along with An and Enlil, he belongs to the supreme triad. The same can be said of Ea, his Akkadian counterpart. King of the abyss, god of the vast sea, lord of the terrestrial waters, Ea has his place in the celestial world, and his counsel is heeded by the gods. Thus the power of the god of water usually transcends the domain of water.

The inverse phenomenon is also found. The authority of a more universal god is exercised in privileged fashion on the aquatic world. In the Veda, for example, Varuṇa is a major god who rules over nature, gods, and men; he is the guardian of *ṛta*, the religious order of things. He is often closely linked to water. With Mitra, he can cause rain; with Indra, he can declare: "It is I who have swelled the rushing waters" (*Rgveda* 4.42). He rests on the waters, and his golden house is built on them. The two oceans are his entrails; he is hidden in each drop of water.

The situation is more highly defined in Greece. Poseidon, the god of the sea, is not essentially an aquatic deity. His name and several myths prove that he has close affinities with the earth. Son of the ancient king Kronos, he was given sovereignty over the seas when the paternal heritage was divided up; one of his brothers got the netherworld and the other, the heavens. Thus he commands the waters and raises tempests, but he is not immanent in them. Other gods—Pontos, Nereus, and Proteus—are more intimately tied to water. But in the case of Poseidon, sovereignty originates in a region beyond the domain where it is exercised. Whatever their wealth and power, waters are not the source of a political type of power. Political power is closer to the heavens; this is why it cannot be held by a god of the storm.

The qualities and powers of water. In their varied manifestations, the water gods and the waters themselves possess in the present world qualities or traits comparable to those we have seen in the primordial cosmogonies. The waters that extend beyond the world and delimit it may in some cases be a symbol of the void, as they once were of nothingness; but this is not certain. These faraway waters sometimes feed terrestrial waters: they must have the same density. Water's fluidity and elusiveness are, however, manifested in the faculty of metamorphosis found in certain aquatic spirits or divinities. In a Vietnamese tale, a water spirit takes the shape of a seductive boy. Hindu nymphs turn into birds, and Greek sea gods, Proteus, Nereus, and his daughter Thetis, assume several forms in succession to escape those who attempt to detain them. This ability can be transferred. In Burmese narratives, the water of a certain pond transforms the man or animal who

drinks it, the former into an ape, and the latter into a man.

Water is essential for man's life; it ensures his nourishment by fertilizing the land. It is more than nourishment, since it is the source of nourishment. It may, therefore, be compared not only to milk, but more particularly to the cow. Because of its utility, it is perceived as a privileged support of vital forces. The Vendas, for instance, equate water with the blood, while the Desána view the rivers as umbilical cords joining people to the amniotic waters underground. In both Hindu and African texts, it is common to speak of the waters giving life and engendering mankind.

This is why we find water associated with sexuality. The Diola sing: "Women's sexual organs are full of water . . . , if Ata Sembe sleeps with a woman, he will always get her pregnant" (Louis Vincent Thomas, *Les religions d'Afrique noire*, Paris, 1969, p. 202). In this respect, waters often assume a feminine character. The Apsarasas of India and the Greek Naiads and Nereids are young women, caught up in erotic adventures. But the waters can also be masculine. "They rest on sperm, as Varuṇa rests on the waters," says the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.9.22. To the Greek poets, the heavens send rain, like seed, to the earth, in an amorous outburst. The Egyptian god of the floodwaters of the Nile—Hati, the dispenser of life—is androgynous, and the Nile is imagined as half man and half woman. Its waters are male, and its arable land is female. Together, they are father and mother. In Greece the rivers are strongly masculine, and like the gods of the storm and of rain, have the attributes of a bull.

As vital principle, water allows people to ward off illness and to keep death away. Because water makes the plants of the pharmacopoeia grow, or because of the effects of its intrinsic qualities, the Veda associates it with the origin of medicine. In particular, water is believed to be highly effective against the venom of snakes. In a more positive sense, water is said to give vigor, make old men young, and prolong life.

Water is even capable of conferring immortality. Gilgamesh finds the herb of life, which enables people to escape death, at the bottom of the waters. Several peoples speak of a "water of life" that bestows immortality. Similarly, to give her son Achilles eternal life, Thetis wants to plunge him into the waters of the Styx. The Greeks in general establish a relationship between Okeanos and ambrosia, as the Indians do between water and *soma*.

There is a more enigmatic aspect of water: it possesses wisdom and knowledge. Water seeks the truth, we read in the Vedas. The Mesopotamian water god Ea,

full of wisdom, dispenses counsel to the gods. As a sage, he protects the mythical old wise men who were born in the abyss in the form of fish. The most ancient Greek water gods engender daughters whose names denote qualities of intelligence. Among the Oceanids, these are Metis ("prudence") and Idyia ("the knowing one"); among the Nereids, Panopeia ("the all-seeing one") and Nemertes ("the veracious one"). The latter, says Hesiod, has the same quality of spirit as her father. Nereus is in fact frank, loyal, and gentle, always concerned with justice. He resembles Proteus, who knows the present, the past, and the future.

Where does this wisdom of water come from? A Guaraní narrative establishes a relationship between the freshness of water and the freshness of the soul accompanied by moderation. In a Vedic text the waves, which stave off all evils, also keep away lies. A Greek text associates the extent of knowledge with the immensity of the depths of the sea. But perhaps the wisdom of the water gods is a function of their age. In the Hellenic world, the wisest among them are called "the old men of the sea."

Waters, which at one and the same time are sages and generative forces—to the point of symbolizing at times the creative power itself—are close to the word. To the Dogon, water and the word are joined in the person of the Nommo, whose civilizing activity simultaneously links the arts of civilization with the word and with wetness; one finds similar associations among the Bambara. In *R̥gveda* 10.125, the ritual word itself, whose efficacy is cosmic, says of itself: "My origin is in the waters, in the ocean." Water is not always beneficent, however. In the present world, water can be hostile to man, just as it could be destructive in the remote time of myth. There are catastrophic rains and floods; people drown in rivers and seas. These are not simply accidents but the manifestation of evil powers allied with the liquid element. One example alone illustrates this: indigenous peoples of the north of Australia have a serpent-shaped spirit that lives in the clouds during the dry season and in marshes during the rainy season. It is he who drowns men in floods, he who swallows them up when they venture out into swamps.

The negativity of water can take other forms. For the Desána, water is a symbol of illness. In one Mesopotamian text, bad coughs are caused by Apsu. An account from Gabon goes even further: the water spirit embodies rain, cold, and death. Mesopotamia also has waters of death, just as it has waters of life.

This hostile power is sometimes incarnated in monstrous creatures. The Desána believe that a formidable centipede lives in the sea; they also talk of maleficent

serpentine creatures, some of whom eat children. The descendants of Pontos, the Greek god of the sea, include several hybrid beings with destructive powers, such as the Gorgons, who dwell near the waters of Okeanos, and the Hydra, in the marsh of Lerna. We recall that Tiamat took on the form of a monster. Such monsters survive in the beliefs of ancient Israel; they are the leviathan, Rahab, and the dragon Tannin.

In the Hebrew scriptures, the ocean itself is often represented as an adversary of Yahveh. Of course, in imposing his order on the world, Yahveh conquered the waters and subdued the monsters they harbor; he is henceforth their master. However, their menace continues; the sea monster might reawaken, and if he does, God, who watches him, will kill him.

At times beneficent and at others maleficent, close to the principles of life and to creative power but nonetheless capable of destruction, a relative of gods and monsters, water bears within it all the ambiguities of the sacred. It is an agent of purification not only because it bathes, dissolves, and carries off material filth; its cathartic power is even more mysterious. According to a Babylonian text, water banishes all evils, even those that have not yet had an impact but that have been foretold by bad omens. In a Vedic hymn, water frees man from the consequences of false oaths and from all the sins he has committed.

The purity conferred by water is a positive trait. Water conveys to man certain of its virtues. It causes vision, according to a Vedic text. In a Greek legend, Pherecydes predicts an earthquake after drinking some water from a well. When Okeanos and Tethys purify Glaucus, they render him capable of undergoing the deification process to which he is subject. Thus, waters are fully purifying to the extent that they are also, to a certain extent, sacralizing.

Several of the qualities of water we have just discussed are manifest in the world of the dead. For certain Zuni societies, the ancestors inhabit a village at the bottom of a lake. The members of the society believe that when they die they will go to sleep and wake up as young children in this village, at the bottom of the "whispering waters." These waters seem to be the symbol of a blissful condition where ancestral life and childhood commingle. The beliefs of the Desána go even further. A region bathed in water, Axpicon-dia, extends beneath the earth; from there came the first organizer of the world. It is a uterine domain, the source of all life, to which the men yet to be born are tied by a sort of umbilical cord. The best of the Desána will go there after death. Happy death is thus conceived as a return to the amniotic waters. Among the Polynesians, the

dead inhabit a sad region, located beyond the seas; the chiefs, however, go to a different land, where the god Tane gives them a water of life that brings them back to life.

Nun, the primordial water, crosses through the Egyptian land of the dead. At night, the boat of the sun sails over its waves to the east. In some texts, the dead board this boat and make its journey with it. In other texts, they bathe in Nun, into which the sun god also dives. Assimilated to him, they come out again, regenerated. But the infernal waters are not always beneficent and life-giving. They contain reefs that the ferryman's boat must steer clear of; they contain dangers and are disquieting. The Nun was supposed to be the site of mysterious drownings.

Among the Greeks, Hades contains rivers and lakes. The names of two of these rivers reveal their nature: *Pyriphlegethon* (*Puriphlegethōn*) means "burning and flaming like fire"; *Cocytus* (*Kōkutos*) means "groan, lamentation." The rivers terminate in the abyss of Tartaros where, according to Plato, evil souls suffer a temporary punishment. Other souls, however, purify themselves on the banks of the lake Acherousias, where they pass before reincarnation. Proclus states more clearly that the souls purified in Acheron attain a better fate.

One frequently recurring idea is that the dead are thirsty. Drink refreshes them; thanks to it, they regain some form of life, as suggested by Egyptian texts. Not all waters, however, are equally beneficent to the dead. In certain Greek traditions, there are two springs in the netherworld; the initiate knows he must drink from the one that comes from the Lake of Memory. Plato mentions a Plain of Forgetfulness where the Lake of Negligence is found. One of the infernal waters thus suppresses memory while the other maintains and reaffirms it, acting like the water of wisdom and knowledge already discussed. The importance of this opposition is apparent in the privilege granted to Pythagoras and Empedocles, who were said to have been allowed to retain the memories of their previous existences. It would appear from a reading of Empedocles that this privilege belongs to the souls who will shortly escape reincarnation.

Conclusion. In conclusion, the wide range of meaning given to the image of water is not without limits, and even opposing meanings given in different myths are not incoherent. These diverse meanings are in large part suggested by the diversity of our experience of water as a natural phenomenon.

Water can be ambiguous. As a fluid, it can symbolize a pure absence or an as yet still amorphous material that will be used by the gods. It may fulfill a positive

function. It bathes, dissolves, and purifies. Essential to human life and necessary for the growth of plants, it symbolizes a generative or life-giving quality, very similar to creative power. It is thus divine and sacralizing. Yet it is also capable of playing a negative role. The gods can utilize the destructive power of its waves. Active in itself, whether divine or monstrous, water erodes everything that takes form and tends to annihilate all distinctions in its own inconsistency. Finally, just as rivers and seas contribute to defining the contours of a country, so the dividing of the waters helps to define cosmic order.

The image of water therefore is not univocal. It can never be interpreted without considering the totality of the myth in which it figures. But it is not indifferent, defined only by the position it holds in the mythic system of a given society. Capable of calling forth the memory of various concrete experiences and numerous emotions, it carries specific meanings within it in a potential state. Each narrative actualizes some of these meanings.

No rule of logic requires that the meaning that water assumes in the evocation of the time of origins must remain unchanged during the course of the cosmogonic process or in the present world. On the other hand, in the small number of mythic systems that I have studied in some depth, it has struck me that the uses of the image of water, often quite diverse, nevertheless remain coherent, owing to the theological intention that inspires the whole of a given system.

[For symbolism associated with water, see Clouds; Flood, The; Lakes; Rain; Rivers; Spittle and Spitting; and Tears. For rituals involving water, see Ablutions and Baptism.]

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Translated from French by Erica Meltzer

WAWALAG. The most important myth and ritual constellation in Australia's north central Arnhem Land belongs to the Dua moiety. (Everyone and everything in this entire region belongs through patrilineal descent to one or the other of the two moieties, Dua and Yiridja.) The myth focuses on two sisters in human form who were swallowed by the Great Python, Yulunggul. [See Yulunggul Snake.] The sisters are known in northeastern Arnhem land as the Wawalag and in north-central Arnhem Land as the Wagilag. The dramatic story line, told in narrative or song form or in a combination of both, is now a popular subject of bark paintings created for sale to non-Aborigines.

Summary of the Wawalag Story. The two sisters leave their home near the Roper River in Wawalag country for their long journey toward the north coast. In some versions the elder, Waimariwi, is pregnant and in some versions already has a small child (or two). The younger, Boaliri, has just reached puberty. (In one version, she is pregnant.) Along with digging sticks and long food-collecting baskets (signifying a feminine domestic role) and one or two dogs, they bring heavy baskets of stone spear blades (also of the Dua moiety) from the stone-chipping quarries in Ridarngu-language territory, home of the Yiridja moiety, a source of eligible spouses for Dua moiety Wawalag people. The sisters give names to the places along their way, as well as to all the vegetable foods and small creatures they collect. They are tired when at last, late one afternoon, they come to a quiet water hole shaded by paperbark trees and cabbage palms. They do not know it is the home of the Great Python. They collect stringybark to make a small hut, paperbark for comfortable sleeping mats, and firewood to cook their meal.

At this juncture the emotional tone of the myth changes sharply. Either shortly before the sisters arrive at the complex of named sites centering on the water hole (Mirara-minar, or Muruwul), or soon after that, the elder sister (or the younger, according to which version is followed) gives birth to a child; in some versions, one of the sisters is menstruating. Now, blood (or the smell of blood) comes close to the water hole or falls into it.

The sisters begin to worry about the possible proximity of a Snake, but since it is too late to move on, they settle down to eat their supper. However, every item of food, as they reach out their hands for it, jumps from the hot coals and makes for the water hole. Dark clouds gather, and rain begins to fall, lightly at first, then heavily, with wind, thunder, and lightning engulfing the hut in a fierce storm sent by the Great Python. During the night the sisters, in turn, dance, sing, and call out ritually in an attempt to calm the storm. In one version the younger sister performs in men's singing style, using

two clapping sticks. The elder sister's efforts are more successful. They sing songs with increasingly greater sacred power: songs about the Great Python, about circumcision ritual, about blood, Kunapipi (Gunabibi) songs, secret-sacred songs. Then, thinking all is quiet, they fall asleep while the Great Python, who has emerged from his water hole, sings. Finally, he coils around the hut, puts his head inside, bites their noses, drawing blood, and swallows them—along with the stone spear blades, the baskets, the child(ren), and the dog(s). Later, when an ant bites him, he jumps and vomits them but then he swallows the sisters again.

He raises himself, with his head toward the sky, and talks with other great snakes to the east and southeast about what each of them had been eating. He mentions other food, but finally admits he has eaten the Wawalag and their stone spear blades. Lowering himself to the ground again, he sinks into his water hole with the sisters still inside him. An additional section in versions recorded by William Lloyd Warner (1937, pp. 257–259) tells how the women and children are revived. Then Yulungul kills them again, swallows them, and takes them back along an underground watercourse to Wawalag country, where he leaves the women, who turn to stone, but keeps the boys inside him because they are of the Yiridja moiety and he is Dua. Then come the linking episodes between the myth as such and its ritual counterparts, including dreams in which the Wawalag sisters teach men the secret-sacred songs and rites which become the responsibility of men of appropriate ritual and territorial status.

Comments and Interpretations. The Wawalag myth is usually long and quite detailed, covering small as well as large events, conversations, songs (referred to by name or included within the text), names of places and foods, brief descriptions of the environmental setting, and symbolic and ritual allusions. This simplified outline constitutes merely a set of clues to the content of the myth. As far as Aboriginal people in north-central and northeastern Arnhem Land are concerned, the range of acceptable versions—and therefore of acknowledged and potential meanings—hinges on factors of sex, age, ritual status, and regional perspectives. This last includes recognition of priority of rights and priority of ownership of the myth, accorded to a cluster of clans in north-central Arnhem Land.

The most extensive published account of the myth and associated rites derives from Warner's field research in the region, conducted in the late 1920s (Warner, 1937, e.g., pp. 248–259, pp. 376–411). He notes a number of differing versions but adds that "all the fundamental features and most of the secondary ones were always present, no matter how poor the narrator." Ron-

ald M. Berndt (1951) studied the myth from the north-eastern Arnhem Land side, with special reference to the Kunapipi complex. [See *Australian Religions, overview article*.] In both accounts, the principal meaning to local people lies in the dynamic interrelationship between the myth and three major ritual complexes: the initiatory Djunggawon, the Kunapipi, and the Ngurlmag; Warner adds (p. 249) a fourth, which he calls the Marn-diella (Mandiwala). [See also Gadjeri.] But these ritual meanings themselves include social implications and ramifications that are noted or hinted at in the myth. For example, in some versions the Wawalag sisters would have circumcised their son(s) if the Great Python had not intervened.

In men's versions (Berndt, 1951; Warner, 1937), the sisters commit incest before they begin their journey northward, and it is this "wrongdoing," as well as the "polluting" of the water hole with blood, that is responsible for their being swallowed by the Snake. Women's versions, however (Berndt, 1970), do not mention incest. They imply that, if there had been incest, it would have taken place at the Snake's water hole. Warner actually mentions that "incest" had occurred, in the sense that the women and children swallowed by the Snake are called "sisters" and "sisters' children" by him (pp. 193, 253). In the subsequent conversation between the Snakes (p. 257), when the Wessel Island Snake hears the truth, he is "disgusted. 'You've eaten your own [sisters and sisters' children],' he said. This was a terrible thing." Men's versions do not dwell on this point; instead they blame the women for their earlier "sin."

In regard to the blood in the water hole, the situation is less straightforward than it seems. Men's versions, reported by men, tend to emphasize pollution, uncleanness, or the "profaning" effect of menstrual or afterbirth blood. In many versions, and in associated discussions, the expressions used include "attraction" as well as "anger" and "repulsion," an approach that is certainly compatible with "eating" rather than with more direct killing; moreover, the terms for "eating" in these dialects can apply to sexual intercourse as well as to the ingestion of food. Attitudes toward blood are a central feature in definitions of sacredness in this region. Distinctions between men's blood and women's blood in relation to ritual and natural circumstances of bloodletting or blood emission have been associated with an arbitrary division between sacred and profane that needs much more rigorous scrutiny.

Nancy D. Munn (1969) is concerned with the general issue of the nexus of the Wawalag myth and its ritual interconnections; taking "collective symbolic forms as instruments for transforming subjective experience," says Munn, "the myth conveys body destruction images

saturated with negative feeling which the rituals convert into feelings of well-being" (p. 178). She also comments specifically on the importance of blood in the combination of myth and ritual. Basing her analysis on Warner's material, Munn notes that ritual swallowing by the Snake in contemporary settings is a men-only affair. Women's biological association with menstruation, for instance, aligns them closely with the Wawalag sisters, so that mythically they have already been swallowed: to be swallowed again in a ritual context would lead to their physical death, as it did for the Wawalag. Men's ritual bloodletting is symbolically equivalent to the emission of blood by the Wawalag, but in real life the two are incompatible. In terms of seasonal renewal, Munn says, it is men's blood, drawn and applied in the course of specific rites, that revitalizes the creatures who left the Wawalag sisters' fire and that "swings the wet season back into the dry, while women's blood regenerates the cycle of food loss and death and so turns the dry season into the rainy one." (p. 198). In its non-symbolic state women's blood is too close to natural physical reality; it must be transformed and brought under men's control in its ritual equivalent. On the other hand, Munn has already referred to "the significance of blood as a symbolic inheritance binding the two sexes as parties to an exchange: the two women gave men their blood and naming powers (or lost these powers through their death) and men, in return, memorialize the two women" (p. 184).

The theme of blood as an important but contentious issue in myth-based rites and relations between men and women, with special reference to the Wawalag myth, is also treated by Chris Knight, who suggests that "the symbolic potency of the menstrual flow was central to the establishment of culture itself." He argues (1983, pp. 42, 43) that women, because of their basic natural periodicity, have a life potency that is far stronger than that of men. And he asserts (1984, p. 154) that such myths have to do with women's ability to synchronize their menstrual cycles in a natural process used by men as a basis on which to construct their own ritual models.

Natural blood from women and ritual blood from men can be powerful in different ways—and mutually dangerous. They represent different kinds of sacredness, a possibility that Émile Durkheim began to explore in his distinction between "positive" and "negative" sacredness but did not carry through to a more comprehensive conceptualization. The Wawalag story has as its central focus a powerful mixture: blood, water, and the Snake. It is this mixture that produces the wet season, crucial for human beings and all other living things in the natural environment. The fertility of the land and

all its inhabitants could not be achieved either by the Wawalag alone or by the Snake alone. It came about as a result of the conjunction between them. And it can be ensured, in local belief, only through regular ritual reenactment of the event and its mythic and symbolic interconnections.

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to its sociocultural setting: for example, sorcery narratives, mortuary rites, "symbolic space" as "time," and male initiation rites as ritual transformation in the context of social hierarchy. Munn uses diagrams to illustrate her main contentions. Her chief source of data is Warner's volume.

Warner, William Lloyd. *A Black Civilization: A Study of an Australian Tribe* (1937). New York, 1958. Includes a very detailed discussion of versions of the Wawalag myth (Wawilak, in his spelling) told to him by men and of the rituals connected with it, as well as men's interpretations of all of these. A remarkably full and sympathetic study, considering Warner's admitted difficulty in coming to terms with the local dialects (for example, he apparently did not hear initial "ng" sounds), but his treatment of the Wawalag constellation exemplifies his negative view of women's religious roles in that region.

CATHERINE H. BERNDT

WAYANG KULIT. See Drama, article on Javanese Wayang.

WEALTH The relationship between religion and wealth can be analyzed in various ways. Economists of all persuasions have stressed the negative impact of religion on wealth. Adam Smith believed that clergymen, like lawyers and buffoons, are members of an unproductive, frivolous profession. Today, many argue that religion is one of the principal causes of economic underdevelopment. For example, in places like rural Burma, more than 30 percent of the regional income is spent on monks, monasteries, and religious festivals. In India, belief in *karman* (the sum of one's actions in successive states of existence), *dharma* (duties defined by the religious caste system), and *samsāra* (a cyclical sense of time and rebirth) has been widely criticized as a major cause of poverty. In Muslim countries, some believe that the Islamic law (*shari'ah*), insofar as it sanctifies the religious secular customs of the past, has made modernization difficult and slow.

While the German sociologist Max Weber emphasized the negative role of the religions of the East, he also called attention to the positive impact that religions based on this-worldly asceticism have had on economic development. Weber contended that Calvinism provided the "spirit" necessary for the initial rise of capitalism in the West. His argument, which has been criticized by many as being misinformed and ethnocentric, has nevertheless inspired many attempts to find analogies of the Protestant ethic in successful non-Western countries. Some scholars who have accepted Weber's general thesis have modified its logic. For example, R. H. Tawney, who was reluctant to talk about the

causal impact of Calvinism, recognized its importance as a "tonic" in the building of capitalism. Other scholars have found fault with Weber's idea that the rise of capitalism is necessarily accompanied by a decline in religion and magic. While Weber credited sectarianism with a positive role in the rise of capitalism, Liston Pope and others have pointed out the political conservatism and economic passivity of such groups in the southern United States.

If, on the other hand, scholarship on the impact of wealth upon religion is examined, one finds this impact characterized both positively and negatively. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels believed that Protestantism was the "most fitting form of religion" for the capitalist and that in the religions of the masses one could hear the "sigh of the oppressed creature." Along similar lines, twentieth-century scholars have drawn attention to the influence of economic deprivation on the spread of messianic and millenarian movements. Both Marxists and Weberians believe that an increase in wealth discourages a truly religious spirit. Some scholars, however, argue that a comfortable income seems to encourage piety and have drawn attention to the "de-churching" of the working classes.

Finally, there are scholars who have addressed the differences between religion and economics rather than their interrelationship. Émile Durkheim, for example, contrasted the centrifugal impact of economic life with the centripetal or integrating force of religion. Historians and sociologists of a materialistic bent have tended simply to ignore the problem of religion.

Characteristic Relations between Religion and Wealth. There is no simple way to characterize the relationship between religion and wealth in light of the determinate role played by the specific historical and social context. Religion's effect on the wealth or poverty of a country is usually achieved through, or in conjunction with, a complex of other social factors including secular institutions, modal personality systems, and values in general. Among the possible relations between religion and wealth, one that is generally overlooked is the ability, or inability, of religion to step out of the way of economic development. In such a relationship, religion plays the quiescent part of *laissez faire, laissez passer* that classical economics assigned to the state. Examples of this kind of passive collaboration with economic development can be seen in civilizations like Europe or Japan in which religious law does not absolutize or sanctify secular conditions of the past; it can also be seen when religious leaders do not interfere in the work of development; when religion abandons traditional, communitarian values; when it ignores the ethical problem of the unequal burdens imposed by devel-

opment; or when its rituals and taboos passively give way before the requirements of industry. It could be argued against Weber that the most significant contributions made by Protestantism to the development of capitalism were its general indifference to the social problem of poverty, its hostility to the labor movement, and its assumption that individualism is as “natural” in economics as it is in religion.

Since the relation between religion and wealth changes from one type of society to another, one must also attend to the historical stage and specific socioreligious traditions involved. In primitive, archaic, or prehistoric societies, religion tends to be diffuse and undifferentiated from the “material” side of life. Ownership and wealth are woven into a rich tapestry of myth, ritual, and values. Taboos and religious sanctions ensuring the common good and survival of the group put limits on possessions, competition, and market functions. Primitive myths and rituals often express the importance of a proper “ecological” relationship between nature and possessions. In hunter-gatherer societies, the lord of the animals not only guarantees a good hunting season, but also protects the animals from extinction. As the technological base of society changes—from, for example, hunting to agriculture—new religious symbols begin to appear. While hunters revere the symbols of animals (often their blood and bones), seeds and plants become the foci of the magic and religion of the cultivator. Since religion and wealth were so closely related in prehistoric societies, it has been strongly debated whether the “laws” of modern economics and the alleged natural instincts of “economic man” can be directly applied to people in less developed societies.

With the advent of cities, settled agriculture, writing, and the historic religions (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Islam), the relation between religion and wealth changes. To coordinate societies and economies that were increasingly complex, sacred kings appeared who had in their control not only political power, but also magical power over the well-being of crops, society, and the cosmos itself. Literate priestly classes created sacred texts and laws on the proper use and distribution of wealth. From Africa to the Far East, ancestral spirits were worshiped in order to bring wealth and prosperity to the family. Other deities appeared who had specific functions as gods of wealth and good fortune; by offering tokens of their wealth to these gods (or to priests), people hoped to receive still more wealth and good luck. This ritual exchange is expressed in the sacred Latin formula *do ut des* (“I give to you so that you will give to me”) and in the Sanskrit phrase *dadami se, dehi me*, which has al-

most the identical meaning. In general, the traditional religions sanctioned the family ownership of wealth, not individually owned private property. In Israel and Greece, religious authority guaranteed the integrity of family property with inviolable sacred landmarks and herms (phallic representations of Hermes). In the ancient Near East, and later in the Far East and Catholic Europe, religious institutions themselves became powerful landlords, controlling trade and the use of large tracts of land.

Reflecting the structure of society, ethical relationships (whether in ancient India, China, or the first-century Roman empire) were both hierarchical and reciprocal. Louis Dumont has called this an ethic of “hierarchical complementarity.” Masters and slaves, husbands and wives, older and younger brothers, teachers and students, rulers and the ruled all had responsibilities for each other. This responsibility included the distribution of scarce resources. In Islam, for example, an alms tax (*zakāt*) was used to support the poor (as well as to spread and defend the faith).

Hinduism. Throughout the ancient world, scattered proverbs and “wisdom literature” served as the only ethical guides to economics. Because traditional society was based on a zero-sum economy, greed was roundly condemned in scripture, myth, and folklore. As time passed, more specific guidance was offered. In India, Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* (c. 300 BCE to 300 CE) described an economy based on agriculture, guilds, family ownership, and a bureaucratically centralized state. Most interesting is the way that this text elevates the pursuit of wealth and power (*artha*) above traditional duty (*dharma*). Like the much earlier Code of Hammurabi in the Near East, the *Arthaśāstra* recognizes the taking of interest on loans. In contrast, the *Laws of Manu*, which took final shape during the period from about 200 BCE to 200 CE, reverses the relationship between *artha* and *dharma* and idealizes a more or less static economy based on caste duties (*varṇa dharma*). Generally insensitive to economic opportunity, the *Laws of Manu* limits moneylending to the *vaiśya* caste, allowing brahmins and the *kṣatriya* to lend money only for sacred purposes and then only “to a very sinful man at a small interest.”

Buddhism. While Buddhism has often been regarded as an “otherworldly” religion, it was first propagated by merchants and depended for its existence upon the financial support of lay householders. Sacred texts specified for the laity “right livelihoods,” which excluded the caravan trade, trafficking in slaves, weapons, poisons, or alcohol, and tanning, butchering, and other occupations, and directed how to make, reinvest, and share their wealth with others. Donations to the monas-

tic community (*saṃgha*) became the layperson's primary way of building up merit. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the aspirant to Buddhahood, the *bodhisattva*, was sometimes described as a rich man who provided material and spiritual sustenance for others. As was the case in the Hindu tradition, it was not wealth, but the "attachment" to wealth that was believed to be an impediment to enlightenment.

Confucianism and Taoism. In China, Confucianism and Taoism tended to favor a primitive system of "private" property that has been described as "free enterprise." This description, however, must be qualified. The Confucians were generally opposed not only to state monopolies but also to competition for profit. The development of a free labor market was delayed by the strength of the family and by the belief that each person should follow the rites, morality, and etiquette (*li*) of his family. As in medieval Catholicism, the merchant was assigned a lowly role. However, Chinese society did have some of the rudiments of a *laissez-faire* system. The Confucian historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145 BCE to c. 90 BCE) claimed that government intervention in the economy would be unnecessary if farmers, merchants, and other workers fulfilled their duties. The Taoists, emphasizing frugality and voluntary simplicity, were also opposed to the direct intervention by the state. The succinct expression, "the more laws are promulgated, the more thieves and bandits there will be," is found in the *Tao-te ching*.

Judaism and Islam. In Judaism and Islam, wealth was regarded as part of creation and therefore as good. Since God was the "owner" of the world, absolute property rights were impossible. Wealth was a sign of divine approval and poverty was thought to be the result of sin. The identification of wealth and righteousness, sin and poverty was disputed by only a few religious leaders, such as the prophet Amos, who spoke of the poor as "the righteous." Because property was deemed inalienable, it could not be taken from a family even by the king. The biblical custom of the Year of Jubilee (*Leviticus* 25) indicates that religious tradition established limitations on the possession of land and slaves. In both Judaism and Islam, religious laws concerning usury restricted markets in money.

Christianity. The New Testament radically inverted the traditional attitude toward wealth and power. In the Magnificat (*Luke* 1:52), it is stated that with the coming of the Son of man, God has "put down the mighty from their thrones and exalted those of low degree." Some pericopes, such as *James* 5:1-4 and *Revelation* 18, express an openly hostile attitude toward the rich. Soon, however, leaders like Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-c. 213) began to soften the hard sayings of Jesus

about riches to accommodate well-to-do converts. The problem with wealth now became one of "attitude," a position that was not unlike the Hindu and Buddhist problem of "attachment."

Although the early church fathers rarely addressed the issue of economic justice, they shared the antichre-matistic outlook of the New Testament and often taught a Stoic indifference (*apatheia*) to the things of this world. Another Stoic idea in their writings would have important consequences for radical sectarians much later on: the notion that the earth is a "common treasury" given by God to all people. Laboring under fervent eschatological expectations, the early Christians were more concerned about the injustice experienced by the oppressed than about the philosophical definition of the justice that was their due. Poverty, as the result of pride and greed, could be alleviated only by the voluntary charity of the church. Soon bishops became administrators of elaborate welfare systems. Only a few Christians, such as Ambrose (339-397), Victricius (c. 400), and Gregory I (c. 540-604) imply that poverty is a matter of justice. When the Parousia failed to occur as expected and as the Roman empire began to collapse, the church was forced to deal more positively with a world that had not come to its expected end. As part of a strategic compromise, the church borrowed deeply from such pagan doctrines as Stoic natural law, which provided a quasi-secular theory of juridical equity. Later, in the scholastic period, the distribution of wealth was treated from a point of view that combined scripture and the writings of the church fathers with the works of Aristotle and Islamic thinkers. One result of the synthesis was a hardening of the church's position against usury.

While the Protestant reformers were generally stricter in matters of economic morality than the casuists of the late scholastic period, they were followed by others who opened the door of compromise. Usury became legal in Protestant countries, which were fast becoming the most economically advanced in Europe. Protestants repudiated indiscriminate almsgiving and took repressive measures against the indigent. It is debatable whether concern for their own election or simple indifference to poverty contributed more to the economic success of the Protestant nations. Methodists, Baptists, Pietists, and other sectarians developed an economic rigorism that was similar to the medieval Catholic doctrine of "good works." Although by the nineteenth century English Methodists and Dissenters had risen to the level of the prosperous middle class, some supported political reforms that would primarily benefit the victims of economic development. Most Dissenters and Nonconfor-

mists assumed a conservative, antilabor stand or a position of indifference. This was especially true when they themselves became the majority or the "Establishment," as in the American South.

Contemporary Religious Attitudes toward Wealth. In modern times, traditional religious attitudes toward wealth and power have come under heavy criticism. This is largely due to structural changes in society's industrial base, especially the growth of competition and rapid social mobility, and to the spread of possessive individualism and hedonism in consumer-oriented economies. In communist societies, religious values have been attacked as feudalistic or bourgeois. But in capitalist countries too, modern social roles make the ethics of brotherhood and the spirit of "hierarchical complementarity" seem unrealistic. Traditional charity seems to put the poor at the mercy of the rich. Other traditional attitudes, such as the eschatological indifference of the New Testament and the otherworldly asceticism of the Middle Ages, seem incredible if not irresponsible. Considerations such as these have led to a secularization of economic values in both capitalist and socialist countries. R. H. Tawney claimed that the religious ethic has declined because the church has ceased to think, but it could be asked whether even a "thinking" religion has anything significant to say about contemporary economic problems. The Social Gospel movement of the early twentieth century had some impact on the clergy and on intellectuals but failed to make contact with the working class itself. The "liberation theology" coming out of Latin America and other developing areas has been sympathetically received by only a few in the industrialized West. Many have criticized it as Marxism disguised as Christian social concern. In Asian countries, several forms of "Buddhist socialism" have appeared. Muslims have developed various forms of "Islamic socialism" (which generally recognizes private property rights) and other kinds of "Islamic economics," often based on the welfare state and religio-nationalistic idealism. Such relatively recent movements in Islam have vehemently rejected Western hedonism and exploitation.

In North America, popular religious groups generally emphasize spiritual inwardness or salvation techniques, ignoring questions about economic and social justice in this world. The secularization of social and economic thought in the academic world is all but absolute. Theories that have the greatest impact in contemporary professional circles usually have the least explicit religious content. This lack of religious influence is especially poignant since religious ethics, both in the East and in the West, have sometimes been the last repositories of the common good.

[For related discussion, see Almsgiving; Charity; Economics and Religion; Mendicancy; Morality and Religion; Poverty; Tithes; and Zakāt.]

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WINSTON DAVIS

WEBER, MAX (1864–1920), German sociologist. The most influential (and in many respects the most profound) of twentieth-century social scientists, Max Weber was a sociologist of extraordinary breadth. Educated as a legal historian, he made original contributions to the study of modern social structure, to the analysis of the economy and the law, to the comparative analysis of civilizations, and to the methodology of the social sciences. Engaged in the politics of his place and time, he brought to his inquiries into authority and power an acute sense of reality. What gave significance and unity to his entire work, however, were his dark reflections on the problem of meaning in human culture. He was acutely aware of the conflict between what he called the metaphysical needs of the human spirit and the constraints of social existence, with the limits of human historical autonomy. It was in this context that his studies of religion acquired a depth and a pathos unmatched to this day.

Weber was the son of a prominent Berlin lawyer typical of the educated bourgeoisie of the German empire under Wilhelm I, immobilized between his abstract attachment to liberal values and his actual predilection for national power. His mother was a devout Lutheran given to charitable works. The view that the dualism

that permeated his life and work, between a sublime sensitivity to ethics and a no less pronounced regard for the iron demands of power, came from the conflict of values in his family is no doubt too simple. The dualism, however, was there, and another aspect of it was expressed in his own marriage to the strikingly independent feminist, Marianne Weber. The politicians and scholars of late nineteenth-century Berlin were familiar figures in the household of the Weber's father. Max himself eventually became a leading, if not the leading, figure of the cultural and political elite of early twentieth-century Germany. Ernst Troeltsch was his colleague and friend at Heidelberg, and the great figure of modern German social Protestantism, Friedrich Naumann, was a close associate. The young Georg Lukács, the revolutionary Ernst Toller, and the poet Stefan George frequented his home. Holding chairs successively at Freiburg, Heidelberg, and Munich, Weber quickly rose to fame as both scholar and publicist. He was an editor of the most distinguished social scientific journal of the time, the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. He did some of his own most important writing for the encyclopedic project that he planned with Joseph Schumpeter, Werner Sombart, and others, the *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, 14 vols. (1914–1928). His political activity included work with Naumann's Evangelischer Sozialkongress and with the "Socialists of the Chair" (a group of university professors advocating social reforms, using the Verein für Sozialpolitik as their main instrument of collective research). He frequently contributed articles and editorials to the press. A member of the German delegation to the Versailles peace conference (he abjured the treaty), Weber died before he could participate in the tormented politics of the Weimar republic—or the Third Reich. This bare sketch of his career suggests the complexities with which he struggled: his work is best understood as a desperate effort to effect a precarious synthesis between the contradictory ideas and warring impulses that threaten to sunder modern culture.

Weber's methodological work is often portrayed as an attempt to obtain detachment and distance from the flux and passions of history. This is perhaps true, but his methodology is inseparable from his metahistorical vision of the world. In opposition to those whom he dismissed as enthusiasts or sectarians, he espoused a politics of realism. For Weber, social science is a disciplined way to know reality, but its scientific status does not entail the promulgation of articulated general laws of the kind developed in physics. Rather, social science for him is concerned with particular historical complexes and sequences. Their unique status does not preclude, and indeed makes more necessary, empirical analysis of

their origins and structure. The manifold nature of social phenomena means that the starting point of empirical analysis is a question or a problem generated by the interests and values of the social scientist and his public. Once a particular set of interests and values generates a problem, however, its elements and terms can be stated with relative objectivity. A probable sequence of causation can be reconstructed, often with the aid of an instrumental abstraction that Weber terms an "ideal type." Against this model, the complexity and nuance of reality are illuminated.

Weber, then, insists on the distinctiveness of the human and social sciences but rejects a capitulation to total subjectivism or relativizing historicism. Social science relies on understanding of human motive in social contexts; he conceives of motive as the beliefs or values underlying action rather than a system of biological drives. Weber is therefore an exponent of an empirical and systematic hermeneutics that provides the essential elements for his reconstruction of institutions in their historicity. His methodological strictures, however, cannot be understood apart from his own empirical inquiries.

These inquiries are a singular amalgam of cultural and social analyses. In them the social organization, politics, and culture of the modern Western world are depicted as results of an irreversible process of rationalization. Behavior is controlled by explicit and formal norms, the person is legally separated from the function or office, and the relationship of ends to means is subject to continuous examination and revision. Rationalization makes possible an enormous expansion of market relationships and, therewith, the explosive productivity of the capitalist economy. The separation of market from community, household, and state is the work of modern law and lawyers. Bureaucracy, with its rules, is the opposite of a hindrance to economic development; it is its precondition.

In these arguments Weber is describing, of course, many of the processes others have termed secularization. Indeed, much of our modern analysis of secularization leads back to his work. His unmatched portrayal of the autonomy of modern social structures and his relentless critique of oversimplified notions of social conflict contributed to that systematic reinterpretation of Marxism that is one of the more enduring achievements of twentieth-century thought. Weber insists on the relatively restricted historical focus of Marxism and argues that the modern bureaucratic state (and ideologies like nationalism) has attenuated class conflict where it has not subordinated it to other social processes. The struggle of bureaucrats against citizens, he argues, is often as important as class conflict proper. Withal, his no-

tion of the nature of social causation is far from linear. His structural approach to the history of institutions is infused with a large component of Social Darwinism. Society is a system of meanings imparted to routine and of legitimations attached to power. It is also the locus of perpetual conflict in which groups and nations struggle for their very existence.

It was in this intellectual framework that, despite his description of himself as "religiously unmusical," he undertook those studies of religion and society that still read as if they were new. He began with the studies of Protestantism exemplified but hardly terminated in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905). It is not his intention, he writes, to oppose a one-sided idealistic interpretation of the rise of capitalism to an equally one-sided materialistic one. In fact, his work on Protestantism employs many of the sociological concepts later expanded in his studies of ancient Judaism, and of Chinese and Indian religions.

The analysis of the social identity of the bearers of Protestantism, the distinctive tasks imposed by its beliefs, and above all, the practical consequences drawn by Protestants from doctrine for the conduct of their lives, anticipates the recurrent elements of his sociology of religion. The idea of inner, worldly asceticism in *The Protestant Ethic* and of the pursuit of sanctification by ceaseless devotion to the world's work ultimately leads to the exquisitely passionate typology of paths to salvation that crowned his comparative studies.

Weber's early work on Protestantism places much emphasis on the differences between Calvinism and Lutheranism, the archetypical Protestant sects, and has much to say on Roman Catholicism as well. When Troeltsch, in his *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1912), achieved what was for the time being a definitive sociology of Christianity, Weber sought more distant horizons. He began to study the "universal historical relationship of religion and society." He dealt with prophets and priests in ancient Judaism, with the alternation and fusion of world rejection and world affirmation in Buddhism and Hinduism, with Mandarin rationality and Taoist pantheism in China, and with much else as well. He contrasted the religions of virtuous with those of popular strata and explored the world religions' very different consequences for communal life, economic system, and political structure. He examined their origins in the psychological response to social conflict, considered their compromises with social constraints, and showed how religions generated entire systems of belief and value, indeed, how they gave institutional structure and cultural content to civilizations.

Weber's studies of the world religions, like his work

on Protestantism, reflect his spiritual critique of modern culture. The world religions were theodicies, and in general attempted to answer the implacable questions of human existence. They sometimes affirmed their worlds, sometimes rejected them, and invariably formed them. Some believers thought of themselves as active instruments of the supernatural and others as passive vessels of divinity. All struggled against accident and appearance and sought the essence of things. Religions invariably conflicted with the concrete structures of existence, with family and the state, with economic forces, and with the immediate demands of sexuality. The "disenchantment of the world" effected by Calvinism also banished from the world the metaphysical pathos of religion. Contemporary bureaucratic and capitalist society is calculable and efficient. It is also without poetry and speaks only banal prose. Religious revivals, because inauthentic, are bound to fail. The substitute religions of aesthetics and sexuality in the modern world cannot perform the moral functions of the historical religions. In any event, they are baubles for the intelligentsia, not doctrines that can move nations. The West's course of cultural and social development is indeed unique, but it is impossible not to be skeptical about its ultimate value. Contemplation of the world religions can teach us stoicism about our own fate and admiration for the deep spirituality of other civilizations. The refusal of artificial spirituality and of nostalgia is the necessary corollary of the political attitude that Weber so favors. His ethic of responsibility is a piece of residual Protestantism, a determination to do the work of the world even when that world is brutal, corrupt, or merely profane.

Weber's influence on modern thought is ecumenical and large; it is also contradictory. Thinkers as different as Raymond Aron, Georg Lukács, Karl Mannheim, and Carl Schmitt have fashioned or refashioned his ideas to suit their purposes. His comparative and historical work influenced the *Annales* school in France well before World War II. The initial introduction of Weber's thought into the United States was the work of the reflective political economist G. A. Frank Knight. The European émigrés of the 1930s not only brought Weber with them, but they also gave us the world of thought (and politics) that rendered his work significant. Talcott Parson's reading of Weber was, by contrast, narrow and even tendentious. Among the American social scientists who have both grasped and extended Weber's legacy are Robert N. Bellah, Reinhard Bendix, Clifford Geertz, Alvin Gouldner, and C. Wright Mills. Not surprisingly, American Protestant theologians like H. Richard Niebuhr and Reinhold Niebuhr and historians like Perry Miller have recognized the implications of Weber's

oeuvre for their evaluation of the fate of the churches in the New World. They (with, to be sure, many of their Continental counterparts) have developed Weber's ideas for purposes true to one of Weber's main intentions: the self-critique of Protestantism.

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WEBS AND NETS. In general symbology, the act of weaving is usually understood to represent processes of creation and growth. Cognate symbols such as net, web, rope, fabric, and the like are frequently employed to suggest the unfolding of individual human lives and of the universe as a whole. [See Fate.] These symbols bear also negative connotations as instruments of binding or tools of entrapment. Included in the symbolism of the net, for instance, are those negative forces that interact with positive ones to make of life the ambiguous reality that it is, a condition composed of pleasure and pain, health and disease, life and death, and so on.

In ancient Greece, the net of life and death is said to have been fashioned by the Moirai, personifications of the abstract concept *moira* ("fate, destiny"). These three stern, grim-faced women spin the web of destiny for each person at the time of his or her birth. In Homer, it is the gods who do the spinning (*Iliad* 24.525f.). Sometimes this is done by Zeus (*Odyssey* 4.207f.), but *moira* itself may also be the agent (*Iliad* 24.209f.). Odysseus declares to his blind psychopomp, Tiresias, "My life runs on as the gods have spun it" (*Odyssey* 11.104). In Plato (*Symposium* 196b), the art of weaving as practiced by the goddess Athena is attributed to Eros, the god of love.

Images of the crafts of weaving, plaiting, and interlacing strands to form nets, webs, sieves, and fabrics appear frequently in the literature of ancient Hinduism. In one creation hymn of the *Rgveda*, the cosmogonic agent is described as "stretching the warp and drawing the woof . . . spreading [the fabric of heaven] upon the dome of the sky" (*Rgveda* 10.90.15). Elsewhere in this source (1.164.5), the "concealed footprints of the gods" seem to be thought of as an analogue for the sacrificial laws that are "woven" whenever the gods, in their function as divine priests, perform the sacrifice by the weaving of words.

In the *Mahābhārata*, *kāla* ("time, destiny") is represented as a cosmic weaver who composes the fabric of life for each individual and for the entire universe by intertwining the white threads of light, life, and well-being with the black threads of darkness, death, and sorrow.

Echoing earlier images such as *indrajāla* ("Indra's net") and *brahmājāla* ("Brahmā's net"), Vedānta texts sometimes compare the ultimate basis of the universe to a cosmic spider that in the beginning spins forth the multitudinous lineaments that form the fabric of the world and at the end withdraws those same threads back into its body.

Indian Buddhism makes similar use of these symbols, as an epithet of the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī—Māyājāla ("net of illusion")—and the title of a canonical text, the

Sandhinirmocana (Untying the Knots), attest. Echoing the term *bhavajāla* ("net of existence") contained in the *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti*, Śāntideva, a Mahāyāna poet-philosopher of the seventh century CE, employs the image of a fisher's net to describe the desperate plight of living beings: "chased by fishers, the emotional defilements, into the net of birth . . ." ("kleśavāgurikāghrātaḥ praviṣṭo janmavāgurām"; *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 7.4).

In defining the essential elements of the process of enlightenment, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (9.35) likens the realization of voidness (*śūnyatā*) and the cultivation of skillful means (*upāya-kauśalya*) to the warp and woof, respectively, of a fabric: "Just as the particulars of its knotting [*paṃśu*] determine whether a cloth [*vastra*] is colorful or not, so the liberating gnosis is determined as colorful [i.e., endowed with positive qualities] or colorless by the power of motivation."

[See also *Knots and Binding*.]

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J. BRUCE LONG

WEIL, SIMONE (1909–1943), essayist and religious mystic. Born in Paris of secularized Jewish parents, Simone Weil was part of a family whose outstanding trait was intellectual precocity. As a student at France's École Normale, a school noted for its lofty intellectualism and academic rigor, she scored highest on a nationwide entrance examination and in 1931 graduated with the highest rank. The most remarkable quality of this woman, beyond her surpassing intellectual brilliance, was her disposition to extend herself physically in following her sympathies. She also suffered from excruciating headaches, which added to the frailty and exhaustion that came from nervous disability and undernourishment.

From 1931 to 1934, Weil taught school in several French towns and engaged in political activity in behalf of unemployed and striking workers. This political activity, together with her eccentricities of dress and manner, did not make for a successful teaching career. Weil's growing concern with Marxism led her to take a job in a Paris factory, which she stayed with only four months. In 1936 she went to Spain to join Loyalist frontline troops as a battalion cook, but colossal inappetence for this work, plus a growing conviction that nei-

ther side wore the mantle of righteousness, led to her withdrawal from this venture as well.

Beginning in 1937, after several mystical experiences, she became a Christian, relating that in one of these experiences "Christ himself came down and he took me." After this experience her writing was largely concerned with religion. Weil did not write any books. What we know about her thought comes from her letters, journal, and essays, which may account for the lack of a coherent and developed statement of her religious views. The closest she came to a formal religious affirmation was to the Roman Catholic church but, curiously, she refused its baptism, partly on the grounds that Christianity claimed the Old Testament as the foundation of its truth. She rejected this because she felt that the Old Testament contained too much of war and was too tribal to sustain the Catholic claim to universality.

As a thinker in religion Weil is especially significant for her insights into the effect of mass material culture on the human spirit, especially in terms of the vitiating of freedom and the fragmenting of the idea of community. She died in England during World War II from what is now presumed to have been anorexia nervosa.

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WILLIAM D. MILLER

WELLHAUSEN, JULIUS (1844–1918), German Orientalist of signal importance for the study of the history of ancient Israel and early Islam. Wellhausen began his career as professor of Old Testament at the University of Greifswald (1872–1882) and continued as Semitist at the universities of Halle (an der Saale, 1882–1885), Marburg (1885–1892), and Göttingen (1892–1913). He received his early training from Heinrich Ewald (1803–1875) in Göttingen. Wellhausen represents a high point in the literary-critical method in Protestant historical theology: for Wellhausen the critical analysis of literary tradition according to motives and sources, whether in the Old and New Testaments or early Islam, constituted the basis for any historical research. He was critical of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (e.g., the work of Hermann Gunkel) that was in the early stages of development at this time. [See *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*.]

Wellhausen's work began with his Old Testament studies. With his works "Die Composition des Hexa-

teuchs" (in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1876–1877; published as a book in 1885) and *Geschichte Israels* (vol. 1, 1878; 2d ed. published as *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*, 1883), he provided the final breakthrough in the Pentateuch criticism that had been initiated by Edvard Reuss, Karl Heinrich Graf, Abraham Kuenen, and Wilhelm Vatke. With this advance in research Wellhausen also created the basis for a modern view of the history of ancient Israel, which he himself then presented in his work *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte* (1894). Wellhausen was the first to make use of the insight that the "law" (*torah*) as it dominates the Pentateuch as we know it, does not represent the earliest constituent of this collection but rather the final (postexilic) stage of its composition. He recognized, too, that the remaining historical sources (Yahvist, Elohist, and Deuteronomic sources) are older than this, the so-called Priestly source. For Wellhausen, Judaism is a new stage in the history of Israel and is to be distinguished from ancient Israel. For this reason Wellhausen also carried through the notion of historical development to its logical end.

In order to better understand ancient, pre-exilic Israel he applied himself increasingly to the study of Old Arabian and early Islamic history. Employing here a method that was characterized by a critical analysis of the sources, he gave impetus to the study both of pre-Islamic religious history (*Reste arabischen Heidentums*, 1887) and of the life of Muḥammad (*Muhammad in Medina*, 1882; *Medina vor dem Islam*, 1889), and early Islamic history (*Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams*, 1889; *Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam*, 1901). The consequences of these works are still felt today. His most significant achievement, *Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (1902), provides the crowning finish to his work.

Following this, Wellhausen devoted himself primarily to study of the New Testament. His explanations and translations of the Gospels and the histories of the apostles brought him less acclaim than his earlier works, but these, too, still belong in the inventory of indispensable historical-critical research. Wellhausen's works are outstanding not only for their masterful command of the source materials but also for an excellent and impressive style that is particularly conspicuous in his translations.

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KURT RUDOLPH

Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

WENSINCK, A. J. (1882–1939), Dutch Semiticist, historian of Syriac mystical theology, and Islamicist. Arent Jan Wensinck, born in Aarlanderveen, the Netherlands, began his scholarly career with a year's study of theology in Utrecht. He then changed to Semitic studies, including Arabic, working first in Utrecht under M. T. Houtsma (1850–1943) and then in Leiden under M. J. de Goeje (1835–1909) and Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936). He obtained his doctorate at the University of Leiden in 1908 and subsequently became privatdocent for Syriac and Aramaic at the University of Utrecht. In 1908 he became secretary of *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*. From 1912 until 1927 Wensinck was professor of Hebrew, Aramaic, and Syriac at the University of Leiden, and in 1927 he succeeded Snouck Hurgronje as professor of Arabic and Islam at the same university, at which post he remained until his death.

Wensinck is best known as an Islamicist. He studied Muḥammad's life; he was familiar with the immense *ḥadith* literature; and he wrote a masterly study on the development of Islamic creeds (*'aqidahs*) and their theological background. Against the same background he described the rise of a distinct Islamic culture during the first centuries of Islam, paying much attention to the development of liturgy and ritual. Wensinck also contributed significantly to our knowledge of Syrian mystical theology, after this field was opened by the works of Paul Bedjan and others.

Wensinck's major importance, however, seems to lie in his combination of various specializations within the historical study of religions. He was able not only to establish historical affiliations but also to reveal patterns within the Semitic religious world, patterns common to Israelite, Christian, and Islamic religious data. He explored areas as varied as cosmology, ritual behavior, ethics, mysticism, and folk religion, writing on such

varied topics as New Year celebrations, the veneration of martyrs, and the notion of intention in law. Focusing on data relating to devotional and mystical life and thought, Wensinck showed the historical relationship between Muslim and Syriac Christian mysticism: just as Isaac of Nineveh influenced Muslim mystics, Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī influenced Bar Hebraeus in a later period. Wensinck contributed much to our understanding of al-Ghazālī as a mystic.

At the end of his life Wensinck provided an incentive to study the Aramaic background of the New Testament, which has proved to be a fruitful field of research. Thanks to his sharp, refined mind Wensinck was particularly suited for research in the field of religion, where he let the texts speak for themselves.

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After his dissertation, *Mohammed en de Joden te Medina* (Leiden, 1908), Wensinck published two major studies on Syriac Christian mysticism: *Bar Hebraeus's Book of the Dove* (Leiden, 1919) and *Mystic Treatises by Isaac of Niniveh* (Amsterdam, 1923). There followed three important books in the field of Islamic studies. *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition, Alphabetically Arranged* (1927; reprint, Leiden, 1971) gives a broad classification in English of Islamic traditions (*ḥadīths*) according to themes. In 1932 he published the excellent study *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development* (reprint, New York, 1965). His *La pensée de Ghazzālī* was published posthumously (Paris, 1940).

Wensinck was an editor of both *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4 vols. with supplement (Leiden, 1913–1934), and the *Handwörterbuch des Islam* (Leiden, 1941); he contributed numerous articles to each. In 1916 Wensinck had initiated another international project, the *Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane*, 6 vols. (Leiden, 1936–1971), and he remained the supervisor of it until the end of his life. *Semietische studiën uit de nalatenschap van Prof. Dr. A. J. Wensinck, 7 Augustus 1882–19 September 1939* (Leiden, 1941) contains a number of Wensinck's papers in English and French, as well as a bibliography of Wensinck's published work. For a study, in Dutch, of Wensinck's work, see W. C. van Unnik's essay "Professor A. J. Wensinck en de studie van de Oosterse Mystiek," in his *Woorden gaan leven, 1910–1978* (Kampen, 1979), pp. 238–263.

JACQUES WAARDENBURG

WESLEY BROTHERS. John Wesley, English clergyman (1703–1791), attempted to revive the spiritual life of the Church of England but instead founded Methodism, a worldwide family of independent churches. His father, Samuel (1662–1735), and his mother, Susanna Annesley (1669–1742), changed their allegiance to the Church of England quite independently of each other before their marriage in 1688. John was probably their fifteenth child, and his brother Charles (1708–

1788) the eighteenth. John was educated at the Charterhouse School, London, going on to Christ Church, Oxford; Charles attended Westminster School, and also went on to Christ Church, as had their elder brother Samuel (1691–1739), an ordained clergyman, a schoolmaster at Westminster and Tiverton, and a competent minor poet.

John Wesley's preparations for ordination in 1725 led to a deepened spiritual awareness. He was elected fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, in 1726, served two years as his father's curate at Epworth and Wroot in Lincolnshire, and returned to Oxford in 1729 to resume his tutorial duties. He also took over the leadership of a religious study group organized by Charles. Similar groups soon arose. They were collectively known as "The Holy Club" and "Methodists," because of the methodical way in which they immersed themselves in the devotional classics and attempted to recreate the life of the apostolic church. In 1735 his sense of a mission to Oxford caused Wesley to refuse nomination at Epworth as his dying father's successor, but later that year he agreed to assume the spiritual leadership of the new colony of Georgia, recruiting as colleagues several Oxford Methodists, including his brother Charles, who was speedily ordained for the task.

John Wesley returned from Georgia after two frustrating years, realizing that his ministry lacked the spark of the personal assurance of salvation which he had witnessed among the Moravians there. Spurred on by another Moravian, Peter Böhler (1712–1775), who was in England on his way to America, he prayed for and received this spiritual certainty on 24 May 1738: "I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given me that he had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me from the law of sin and death."

After a three-month pilgrimage to the Moravian headquarters in Germany, Wesley persuaded many of the old religious societies in London to adopt his modification of the Moravian "choirs" to form cells known as "bands" for intensive spiritual sharing among five or six persons of the same sex and marital status. This fostered his own eager attempts to bring others to a personal experience of Christ as Savior and Lord—which offended more formal church people as "enthusiasm." He also formed new societies from those who asked for his spiritual direction. He enriched his followers' faith and worship with song, and with his brother Charles published a new volume of hymns and sacred poems every year from 1737 to 1742.

Pulpits were repeatedly closed to Wesley because he preached on salvation by faith. Encouraged by his former pupil, George Whitefield (1714–1770), on 2 April

1739 in Bristol, he "proclaimed in the highways the glad tidings of salvation . . . to about three thousand people." Nor did he respect parish boundaries, writing, "I look upon all the world as my parish." His "field-preaching" was supported by a wide-ranging preaching itinerancy, spreading from London to Oxford and Bristol, and thence in 1739 to Wales, in 1742 to Newcastle, in 1743 to Cornwall, in 1747 to Ireland, and in 1751 to Scotland.

To aid him in his task Wesley strove to enlist other clergy in a similar preaching itinerancy, or at least to convince them to maintain deeply spiritual ministries in their own parishes. It soon became clear that his ordained colleagues were too few for the proliferating societies, and Wesley turned to laymen as preaching helpers, thereby scandalizing many otherwise sympathetic clergy. In 1744 he invited the handful of cooperating clergy to meet with him in London to confer about the whole work and its lay helpers, the first of the annual conferences which in 1784 he incorporated as the governing body for Methodism after his death. The early conferences defined Methodist teaching on sin and salvation, teaching which he embodied especially in his *Sermons*. The *Sermons* formed a major part of his huge publishing enterprise, begun at Oxford, which undergirded Methodist private devotions, public worship, evangelistic mission, and the organization of the network of society and preachers.

From the outset Wesley's purpose had been to revive his beloved church from within. However, he was not content to go through normal channels—so frustratingly slow—but maintained an unshaken determination to follow what he believed to be providential guidance in experimentation. Thus he began field-preaching, the employment of lay preachers, the development of his own "connexion" of societies not answerable to church authorities, the building of his own "preaching-houses," the constitution of his own administrative annual assembly, legally incorporated in 1784, the ordination of his own preachers in that same year, as well as his publication of a revised *Book of Common Prayer*. All these things, together with his eventual readiness to open his own buildings during normal times of worship in the established church, proved that although he protested to his dying day that he was a loyal member and minister of the Church of England, his loyalty was certainly not to the church's outward form as it was familiar to him, but to what he considered its essence. Yet there seems little doubt that his remarkable ministry of sixty-five years brought about not only the formation of a new denomination but also the desired reformation of his native church.

[See also Methodist Churches.]

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Works by John Wesley. Under my editorial supervision, a new edition of *The Works of John Wesley* (Oxford, 1975–1983; Nashville, 1984–) is in progress. Thirty-five volumes are projected, of which volumes 1, 2, 7, 11, 25, and 26 have so far appeared. The most useful selection of Wesley's theological writings currently available is to be found in *John Wesley*, edited by Albert C. Outler (New York, 1964).

Works about John Wesley. No one has yet succeeded in presenting a full and fair portrayal of John Wesley in one volume, even a large one, although biographies by both Colwyn E. Vulliamy and Vivian H. H. Green can be recommended. Vulliamy's *John Wesley* (London, 1931) will please the general reader; Green's *John Wesley* (London, 1964), a more penetrating though brief study, will suit the scholar. Both will perhaps benefit from my own book, *John Wesley and the Church of England* (Nashville, 1970), in which I trace Wesley's life against the background of his gradual and largely unacknowledged estrangement from the established church.

FRANK BAKER

WEST AFRICAN RELIGIONS. West Africa lies between 5° to 23° north latitude, 23° east longitude, and 20° west longitude. It covers about one-fifth of the territory of sub-Saharan Africa and has a population of slightly more than 120 million people, about half of the total intertropical population of Africa. West Africa contains about six hundred "ethnic groups," a loose designation with no scientific specificity. Throughout West Africa one finds large cultural variety with various local features.

Traditional religions in West Africa are original systems of relations between human beings and the not ordinarily seen—but not wholly invisible—realm of the divine. There is no concept of original sin for either the individual or the group, but there is a central notion of redemption. The idea of humanity is equated with the lineage, especially with the clan, which is perceived as a social entity bearing the spiritual principle that defines the clan's originality and distinguishes it from other clans. In this context redemption is based in the individual; through the individual as intermediary, redemption extends to the level of the entire family or clan. Individuals can be seen, then, as their own redeemers; eschatology is thus a short-term operation, part "secular" and part religious. The role of this eschatology is to assure individuals of their "reincarnation" as ancestors or, still better, of their return to the earth to be among their people at some future time. Because of the diversity of West African peoples and religions, it is impossible to treat them all in a general review such as this one. Hence, in the interest of providing a panoramic view of West African religious experience, it has

been necessary to emphasize some traditions and overlook others.

The Creator and Creation. Knowledge of the supreme being does not center on a particular set of religious teachings. Rather, one might say, religious adherents achieve their knowledge of God's nature indirectly through iconic images, symbols, metaphors, and metonyms. The principal element of this knowledge is the belief in the distance of God. Compared with man, earth creature *par excellence*, the supreme being is so far away in space and in emotional perception that he sometimes cannot even be given a name, much less invoked or honored in worship. The Bwa of Mali, for example, have a name for God, but no cult is directed to him. The strategy of the African thought process concerning the nature of God is evident. The distance of God generates a religious need in humans; the absence of the divine gives birth to a quest for what is absent, a quest often satisfied through intermediaries more accessible than God himself.

The supreme being is not uniformly remote throughout West Africa. In a number of traditions, the supreme being is directly involved in everyday life, acting instead of, or in conjunction with, the lesser spirits. In these traditions, people feel a proximity to God that is analogous to the feelings they might have for their kin, and they appeal to and consult him through cults and rituals. Such is the case with Amma, supreme being of the Dogon, whose cults exist throughout all the villages of the Bandiagara cliffs in Mali. [See Amma.] Similiar, though less striking, examples are the cult of Rog among the Serer, that of Ata Emit among the Diola, and that of Chukwu among the Igbo. In other traditions, as among the Ashanti, for example, contact with the supreme being is even more intimate: nearly every morning elders pour libations and offer prayers to Nyame (and often Asase Yaa), thanking him for his beneficence and asking for continued prosperity. [See Nyame.] Supreme beings who are not remote are accorded a variety of characteristics; it is often believed that they control rain and fertility, are a source of appeal in times of affliction, a force for justice in the world, and the guardians of the moral order.

Intermediary spirits are often punctual divinities or gods of specific circumstances, for example, patrons of such important events as war and hunting (Ogun of the Yoruba and Edo; Ta Tao of the Ashanti; Aflim, Dade, Kumi, and Otu of the Fanti; Gua of the Ga, et al.). They may also be associated with atmospheric phenomena such as rain and wind, thunder and lightning, and rainbows (So of the Ewe, Xevioso of the Fon, Şango of the Yoruba, et al.). Finally, they may be deities of natural phenomena central to human life, such as the earth


(Asase Yaa of the Ashanti, Tenga of the Mossi, Oduduwa of the Yoruba, Odua of the Gu, Ayi or Li of the Ewe, et al.), the river (Faro of the Bambara, Yemoja and Oya of the Yoruba), the sea (Xu of the Fon), and the sun (Wende of the Mossi, Olorun of the Igbo, et al.).

Reference should also be made here to the "masters" of smallpox, which is a feared and sacralized disease in West Africa. Smallpox is incarnated in the Sakpata divinity of the Fon and Ewe, in Ojuku of the Igbo, and in Şoppona of the Yoruba. The religious importance of this illness lies in its royal character. In the myths of origin of the Kouroumba royalty (Yatenga kingdom in northern Burkina Faso), the first king descended from the sky carrying smallpox and was cured by agriculturalists. Smallpox is believed to be a sickness from the heavens that brings the mark of the starry firmament to the skin. Because its cure was provided by earth dwellers, the divinity who incarnated the disease is both God of the sky and of the earth.

Unlike all the secondary divinities, the supreme being is the creator. He alone enjoys this prerogative, although he does not constantly involve himself in the details of creation. For example, the creator assigns the task of organizing the creation to a lesser spirit, or "monitor," who thus becomes the first means of contact between the supreme being and man. This occurs among the Bambara (Faro is the monitor for Bamba), the Yoruba (Oduduwa is the monitor for Olorun), the Dogon (the Nommo are the monitors for Amma), and the Bwa (Do is the monitor for Debwenu).

Questions about the relations between the supreme being and the lesser spirits have been phrased in a number of ways. Are the lesser spirits extensions of the supreme being or his emissaries? Are they his "children"? Do they have independent wills, and is there antagonism between them and the supreme being? In a sense, there is no one answer; questions such as these cannot be answered according to set theological principles but vary according to the believer's level of knowledge. Noninitiates and those who have little training tend to believe that the lesser spirits are separate from the supreme being (whether they are in a collaborative or conflicting situation with him) rather than being refractions of his power. Only initiates possessing great knowledge abandon this anthropomorphic view of divine realities. For them, the separation is an artificial concern brought about by the "language of theology," invented by people who are unable to speak of God without humanizing him.

Africanists have often tried to establish "complete" inventories of the divinities encountered in one group or another. Some, for example, have found three hundred divinities among the Ewe, while others have



identified from five to six hundred. This passion for inventories and numerical estimation is praiseworthy enough, but it is of no scientific interest. What seems clear in the present state of research is that the different cultures in West Africa all possess the idea of a creator divinity in a more or less developed fashion. This creator is not worshiped with altars, prayers, and sacrifices in all parts of West Africa, which can give the mistaken impression that relations between the human and the divine are not fully articulated.

We must take great caution when we use the word *God* in speaking of the supreme being of Africans, to whom this word does not have the same meaning as it does, for example, to Christians. Among the two best-studied populations of West Africa, the Bambara and the Dogon, it appears that God is a being who engendered himself; the creation he produced was contained in himself in the form of symbols before it was externalized. Analogous reservations must be made concerning the terms "to create" and "creation." We often tend to associate these with the verb "to do" or "to make,"

but while this association is often accurate in African cosmological myths, it is not always so. Among the Bambara and the Dogon, for example, creation occurs by the thought and the word of God rather than by a manual act.

The Living and Their Ancestors. Not all deceased persons are elevated to the rank of ancestor, and death is not always a requirement for becoming an ancestor. In each society it is the living who select members for the rank of ancestor. Thus the notion of ancestralization relates, above all other considerations, to a social and religious model rooted in the idea of exemplarity, that is, in a model to be imitated in order to avoid perdition. Conduct in the human realm determines whether one is ancestralized and reincarnated (a good fate) or exiled into the bush to wander alone, eaten by animals and plagued by mosquitoes (as among the Diola), or condemned to the peppery place of potsherd (as among the Yoruba)—all bad fates. It is significant to note here that a bad fate is never eternal; the concept of eternal damnation is foreign to African religious thought.

To become an ancestor, one must possess certain qualities. The first requirement is longevity; this cannot be achieved through human measures to conserve health but must be bestowed by God. Thus only the elderly can become ancestors. Also important is the individual's physical integrity and morality. Those who die from an "ignominious" disease (such as leprosy), the insane, those who suffer an accidental death (after a fall or by being struck by lightning), thieves, and those who have committed reprehensible acts cannot become ancestors. Finally, the person's social standing in the community is important. An "outsider" (a slave, for example), although accepted by, and integrated within, the society, is excluded from the ranks of the ancestors. But above all, the preeminent attribute that allows one to become an ancestor is the self-knowledge that gives a person self-control; this poise is the moral quality *par excellence*. All ancestors were, during their lifetime on earth, models of wisdom, self-control, dignity, and purity.

Since death does not mark the end of human existence but only its changed status, death usually constitutes the necessary condition of being an ancestor. However, this is not true in all West African societies. In a sense, to become an ancestor, an individual must achieve a certain distance from his descendants. This distance is not created solely by death: age itself can provide sufficient reason for becoming an ancestor. Thus, among the Mossi of Burkina Faso a great-great-grandfather can become an ancestor during his lifetime but only in a marginal sense. Such an ancestor can, should the occasion arise, be reborn during his lifetime in one of his descendants. This assertion is based on my own research among the Mossi, as well as on research conducted by Doris Bonnet (see her "Le Retour de l'An-cêtre," *Journal de la Société des Africanistes*, vol. 51, 1981, pp. 133-147). When an old person returns during his own lifetime in the body of a newborn, the infant is not likely to live long. These beliefs deserve more extensive study, particularly because the Mossi are not the only group in sub-Saharan Africa to hold them. Recent research reveals a similar situation among the Mongo of Zaire. The ancestor cannot, however, benefit from the worship of his family group until after his physical death, which is marked by a second funeral or by rituals performed at the burial sites (such as libations and sacrifices, both widely prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa) and modifications to the burial site itself (for example, construction of altars on top of the ancestor's tomb).

Another important characteristic of the world of the ancestors is its representation as a perfect community. Unlike the society of the living, the community of ancestors is cleansed of antagonism and tension. Ancestors can, of course, become angry or even suffer, but such

feelings arise only as the result of neglect or of negative actions on the part of their living descendants.

The universe of the ancestors, sometimes seen as slow moving, is quite active. Although recollection of the ancestors fades because of the weakness of the collective memory of those on earth, the world of the ancestors is constantly renewed and kept vivid in the minds of the living through fresh deaths and reincarnations. Indeed, both worlds are enhanced by this process. For example, each death brings an ancestor "into play" in the world of the living; by dying or crossing the boundary caused by age, ancestors gain greater access to spiritual power and can thus assist their descendants as intermediaries. But at the same time, by gaining additional ancestors in their ranks, the ancestors acquire new cultural experiences and their world becomes enriched just as the world of the living is enriched by new births. Lastly, ties between the world of the living and that of the ancestors are further reinforced by reincarnation, or the "return of the ancestor." Each ancestor can take corporeal form and return to the world when a suitable occasion arises or when he simply longs to return to earth. In a general way each society possesses rules that regulate the ancestor's method of return. These are usually very precise; among the Sara of Chad, for example, a grandfather always inhabits the body of the first grandson born after his death. Among the Yoruba, the process of return involves consultation with the supreme being. Before an ancestor is reborn, the ancestral guardian soul appears before Ọḷọrun to receive a new body, a new "breath," and its destiny for its new life on earth. The guardian soul kneels before the supreme being and asks for whatever destiny it wishes, but Ọḷọrun will refuse to grant its desires if they are made arrogantly or selfishly. In most cases, the ancestor makes the decision concerning his or her own incarnation, while the living, with the help of various mediums or diviners, attempt to determine the ancestor's will.

The living interact with ancestors by offering them libations and sacrifices. Libations generally precede sacrifices and constitute an overture to dealings with the ancestors. The sacrifice, which is the high point of the ceremony, actively unites the living, in their quest and anticipation, with the dead, in their obligation to respond favorably. Dealings between the ancestors and the living should not be seen as one-sided attempts by weak humans to seek aid from the heavenly powers (as is the case in revelatory religions). These interactions are, in fact, bilateral obligations: man needs the ancestors because of his powerlessness and his indigence; ancestors need to be remembered by man so they can return to earth by being reborn within the bodies of children within their lineage. The relations between the living and the dead can thus be seen as a kind of indi-

vidual "redemption" brought about by man's quest for immortality.

Fresh water, millet flour mixed with water, and millet beer or palm wine are usually used in the libations. Fresh water, which usually precedes and sometimes introduces the other two offerings, is an emollient; when poured on the altar it serves as a tender and affectionate gesture to the ancestor. Water and millet flour rise when they are combined, evoking the act of swallowing and its immediate involuntary result, digestion. This offering pushes the ancestor into action. Millet beer and palm wine are stimulants that excite and exalt the ancestors. In a way these drinks make the ancestors lose control and behave as the living wish them to. This last libation represents the final resort to the will of the ancestors before the noblest offering, animal sacrifice, is made.

Animal sacrifice is the most profound means of communicating with the invisible world. The most frequent sacrificial victims are white chickens (male and female) and goats. Sometimes a royal family may sacrifice horses or, as was once the case among the Mossi, human beings. Sometimes cattle are sacrificed, but this occurs only on rare occasions. As sacrificial animals, cattle are reserved for extraordinary events and people (for example, the absolution of an incestuous act, the funeral ceremonies of a chief). The rarity and great significance of these sacrifices can be explained by the fact that West Africa is largely a region of agriculturalists, not pastoralists.

Altars for the ancestors vary but most often consist of one or several stones placed on the ground. They can also be chairs (Ashanti, Ewe, Attie), pottery, clay stools, or doorposts. The officiating priests are either the eldest of the lineage (clan) or a man specifically designated by the group. There are cases, however, as among the Dogon, in which the role is filled in part by a person designated by the ancestor himself.

Places of Worship. Generally West Africans have given more attention to the altar as the locus of the divine than to the sanctuary built to shelter it. There are exceptions: in Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, and Mali, there exist religious buildings in which one part is meant for the public and the rest for protection of cultic materials. ("Public" here refers to the faithful who have been or will be initiated.) Usually admission to the public parts of the sanctuary is available to the faithful who have been introduced to knowledge of the mystery evoked by the place of worship. The reserved part is only accessible to the high dignitaries of the community of the specific cult. In practice this separation suggests that religion does not merely pose problems of faith and adherence to a system of beliefs; more importantly, it raises questions about knowledge and power. Religion

is parceled out in as many sectors, either exclusive of one another or complementary over time, as there are different domains of knowledge.

The linkage between religion and knowledge, particularly prominent in West Africa, is not surprising. Indeed, one can say that it constitutes the characteristic trait of sub-Saharan cultures. The higher one's position becomes in the religious hierarchy, the more knowledge one possesses. The greater one's knowledge, the more likely one will be invested with religious power. All this reveals, on the one hand, the connection between sacred knowledge and power (including political power)—every sage exercises real power over the community he is part of—and, on the other hand, the ways that knowledge is distributed. For example, during initiation rites, knowledge is distributed to the adept "drop by drop," as if such instillation were the only possible method of instruction. If any other pedagogic method were used, the adept would reject the knowledge, much like his body would reject the intrusion of a foreign element such as a different blood type. However, there is another reason why knowledge is parceled out bit by bit. The adept is tested at each level to see how he or she reacts to it to ensure that the power that comes with such knowledge is not misused. In many West African societies, for instance, the sacred power to cure affliction through the manipulation of spiritual powers and material substances is not far removed from the practice of sorcery. Both sorcery and the practice of healing often involve the use of similar techniques and "medicines"; what distinguishes them is the practitioner's intention to do good or evil. Hence, before giving an adept religious knowledge, measures must be taken to ensure that he or she will use this power for the good of the community. An individual with sacred knowledge who is deluded by his or her own power, greed, envy, or malice can have disastrous effects upon the community.

Worship sites are numerous and varied and can be classified according to the four elements: water, earth, air, and fire. Throughout West Africa, water inspires feelings of uncertainty, fear, reassurance, and security; most importantly, it is seen as the source of life. Each body of water has its own spirit. Metonymically speaking, the body of water is both a sort of "water god" worshiped by riverine peoples and a temple of water in which the faithful, bearing offerings, immerse themselves. For example, the part of the Niger River that crosses Bambara country is said to be the body of Faro, the water spirit, who is responsible for the fecundity, multiplication, and proliferation of all living things. Among the Yoruba of Nigeria it is thought that Yemoja, daughter of Ọbatala and Oduduwa, gave birth to all the waters of the country and that she is the patroness of the River Ogu, her favorite sanctuary. For the Edo of

Nigeria, the waters of the regions belong to Oba. In Ghana and the Ivory Coast, the rivers, streams, and still waters are the property of Tano and Bia. Fresh water, by its very nature favorable to life, is humane. Seawater is inhumane and savage; it needs to be tamed. This negative view of seawater may have been formed during the era of colonization and slavery (both the early Europeans and slave traders arrived by sea); more likely, however, it may simply stem from the profound attachment to land that is often found throughout Africa.

Sanctuaries related to the land have as much, if not more, variety as those related to water. One must remember that at least 90 percent of the West African population is composed of sedentary agriculturalists and that for them land is the true reservoir of life. Land sanctuaries share one special feature. They are not temples in the true sense of the word because the land has no edifice; the land itself is a religious and sacred monument and thus it would be unseemly to try to limit it, to pretend to enclose it within walls. The sanctuaries of the earth are everywhere that human beings carry out gestures of deference to the nourishing soil. Mountains, grottoes, rocks, and stones that strike the religious imagination, pits and crevasses open to the unknown—all lend themselves admirably to being transformed into places of worship. Cultivated fields are particularly designated for sacralization.

The temples of the air, namely sacred trees and groves, are the most numerous sites of worship and the closest to the religious affections of West Africans. They are considered to have an airy nature because they are in harmony with atmospheric changes and with the seasons. There is not a single human community in West Africa that does not have high regard for this vegetation. The tree stands as an intermediary between the human being and spiritual powers. This mediation is often so central that man is considered to be an emanation of the vegetation. The Bambara believe in a kind of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls, in which one guidepost in the journey is a tree. One also encounters this belief among the Fon, for whom certain myths speak of how men and women descended from the branches of a tree in former times. Similarly, West African women desirous of becoming pregnant often implore a tree to give them a child. Trees acquire even more intense religious value when nature integrates them into sacred groves, which are the scenes of religious assemblies and initiation rites.

In West Africa, where there are no volcanoes, temples connected with fire are the most humble, the closest to daily life, and also the most ubiquitous. They are associated with the part of the home in which women prepare food. The fire, which transforms food, brings light and warmth to its users and mediates between the liv-

ing and the dead. If the faithful lack the resources to provide a sacrificial victim, they can use ashes from the hearth fire as a replacement. The omnipresence of this temple of fire is matched by the reality of the forge in almost all West African groups, even though the profession of blacksmithing is generally considered to be limited to members of a guild. The forge is more than a workshop; it is also a place of worship, a shelter in which human justice gives way to the gentleness of heaven. The most typical characteristic of the forge lies in the fact that it constitutes a place of creation comparable to that held by the creator himself when he established the foundations of the world. This explains why fire becomes a sanctuary wherein the prayer of an empty womb beseeching fecundity will, according to the beliefs of the faithful, surely be answered.

Generally speaking, religion in West Africa is men's business. Nevertheless, women, especially after menopause, often become ritual specialists (for example, among the Guere, Ubi, and Wobe of the Ivory Coast; the Dogon of Mali; the Mende of Sierra Leone; and especially, the Yoruba and Igbo of Nigeria). Religious duties, which are numerous and complex, are ordinarily the responsibility of the eldest member of the group. All cultic practices include an oral liturgical element that is of central importance because the word, invested with the characteristics of both water and heat, has fertilizing power.

Initiation and Spiritual Life. Initiation rites engender an internal disposition that guarantees a way of life different from ordinary existence. This disposition is acquired through the development of spiritual techniques that train the body and promote a sense of the abolition of finitude.

Initiation rites in West Africa fall into two types. In Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana (that is, among the Yoruba, Hausa, Ewe, Fon, Ashanti, and related groups), initiation is of a type one may term *epispānic*. Here the initiates attract (Gr., *epispāō*) the divinity to themselves, and the impact of the meeting between the human and divine translates into what is commonly called possession or trance. The introduction to and training for the spiritual life are accomplished either by individual training (as, for example, among the Ashanti and the eastern Yoruba) or by collective training in convents, as is the rule among the Ewe, Fon, western Yoruba, and Itsha. This form of initiation is available to both men and women. The physical tests that neophytes undergo during their initiation have a specific goal, even though the initiates may not be aware of it. It involves a spiritualization of the senses, particularly vision, hearing, and taste.

The second type of initiation, termed *allotactic* (Gr., *allos*, "other"; *taktikē*, from *tassein*, "to marshal"), is

common from Ghana to Guinea. Here the neophytes go to seek God. Clearly the physical tests here are equally rigorous as those in epispanic initiation, but what matters above all in allotactic initiation is the accession of the neophytes to a transforming knowledge that permits them to get closer to particular spiritual beings and even to become a bit like them, in other words, to become immortal, for only through immortality do human beings guarantee their chances for reincarnation. Such transforming knowledge cannot be gained in several months or even in several years. Among the Senufo of Mali and northern Ivory Coast, initiation into the Poro society lasts more than twenty years. For the Bidjogo of Guinea-Bissau initiation takes almost the same time. Men and women are segregated in this form of initiation. Allotactic initiation clearly demonstrates the leitmotiv of African spirituality, the human struggle against total disappearance from the earth.

African spirituality demonstrates that human beings are not born spiritual; rather, they must become spiritual. Hence, adherents to West African religions find recourse to initiatory techniques that view the body as the starting point of religious and mystical feelings. The body becomes the authentic symbol of the elevation of the human being to the peak of spirituality. Mystical life in African religion does not detach humanity from the earth; instead, it permits human beings to live and relive indefinitely on earth.

[For further discussion of particular West African Religions, see Akan Religions; Bambara Religion; Diola Religion; Dogon Religion; Edo Religion; Fon and Ewe Religion; Fulbe Religion; Igbo Religion; Tiv Religion; and Yoruba Religion. See also Amma; Mawu-Lisa; Nyame; Olorun; and Sango.]

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DOMINIQUE ZAHAN

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WEST SYRIAN CHURCH. See Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch.

WHEEL. See Cakras and Circle.

WHITE, ELLEN GOULD (1826–1915), prophetess and cofounder of the Seventh-day Adventist church. Ellen Gould Harmon was born 26 November 1827 on a farm near Gorham, Maine. As a child she moved with her family to Portland. When she was nine or ten, an angry schoolmate hit her in the face with a rock, knocking her unconscious for several weeks. The accident left her a semi-invalid, unable to continue her schooling (except for a brief period at the Westbrook Seminary and Female College) and unlikely to fulfill her ambition of becoming a scholar.

Raised a Methodist, Ellen in 1840 joined the Millerites, who believed that Christ would return to earth in 1843 or 1844. When he failed to appear on 22 October 1844, the date finally agreed upon, disappointment and confusion swept through the Millerite camp. In December, while praying with friends for guidance, seventeen-year-old Ellen went into a trance, the first of many visions during which she claimed to receive divine illumination. In this state God assured her that the Millerites' only mistake lay in confusing the second coming of

Christ with the beginning of the heavenly judgment, which had indeed begun on 22 October. In 1846 Ellen was shown the importance of observing the seventh-day sabbath. In both instances her visions supported doctrines that others were already teaching, a pattern that came to characterize her role as a religious leader.

In 1846 Ellen married James White, who became her editor, publisher, and manager. For several years they traveled throughout the Northeast preaching their sabbatarian message. When children began arriving, Ellen reluctantly left them with friends. In 1852 the weary, impoverished couple settled in Rochester, New York, where they collected their children about them and James acquired a printing press. After three discouraging years, the Whites moved to Battle Creek, Michigan, where in the early 1860s they formally created the Seventh-day Adventist church, then numbering about 3,500 members.

Health concerns dominated Ellen White's life during the 1860s. Since her childhood accident she had suffered almost constantly from an array of illnesses: heart, lung, and stomach ailments, frequent "fainting fits" (sometimes once or twice a day), paralytic attacks, pressure on the brain, breathing difficulties, and bouts of anxiety and depression. At times she feared that Satan and his evil angels were trying to kill her. In 1863, only months after using water treatments to nurse her children through a diphtheria epidemic, she received a special vision on health. Adventists, she learned, were to give up eating meat and other stimulating foods, shun alcohol and tobacco, and avoid drug-dispensing doctors. When sick, they were to rely solely on nature's remedies: fresh air, sunshine, rest, exercise, proper diet, and, above all, water. A second vision on health led her in 1866 to establish the Western Health Reform Institute in Battle Creek, the first of a worldwide chain of Adventist sanitariums.

During the 1870s the Whites spent considerable time proselytizing on the West Coast. In 1881, James died. Following a year-long depression, Ellen White resumed her ministry through missions to Europe (1885–1887) and to Australia and New Zealand (1891–1900). Upon returning to the United States in 1900, she purchased a farmhouse near Saint Helena, California, from whence she continued to guide her growing church. Although she never assumed formal leadership of the Adventist organization, White wielded enormous influence, especially late in her career, in matters relating to both doctrine and policy. While in semiretirement, she directed a major campaign to build an Adventist sanitarium "near every large city" and to open a medical school, the College of Medical Evangelists (now Loma Linda University), in southern California. She died on 16 July

1915, at age eighty-seven; over 136,000 Seventh-day Adventists mourned her passing.

Although better at speaking than writing—her modest reputation among non-Adventists derived largely from her lectures on temperance—Ellen White enjoyed her greatest success as an author. Between the late 1840s, when her first broadsides appeared, and 1915, she published over a hundred books and pamphlets and contributed thousands of articles to church periodicals. Since her death the Ellen G. White Estate has brought out dozens of additional books, compiled from her letters, sermons, and articles. Few subjects escaped her attention. Among her most notable works were three sets of books on biblical history and eschatology: *Spiritual Gifts* (1858–1864), *Spirit of Prophecy* (1870–1884), and the "Conflict of the Ages Series" (1888–1917), which included *The Great Controversy between Christ and Satan*, her major eschatological work. Her health writings began with a tract on the perils of masturbation, *An Appeal to Mothers* (1864), and culminated with the widely circulated *Ministry of Healing* (1905). In *Education* (1903), she emphasizes "the harmonious development of the physical, the mental, and the spiritual powers." Between 1855 and 1909 she published thirty-seven volumes of *Testimonies for the Church*, in which she relayed counsel that she had received in visions. The most popular of her books was *Steps to Christ* (1892), a brief devotional work that sold in the millions.

Since early in Ellen White's career critics have alleged that she sometimes contradicted herself, failed to acknowledge—and on occasion denied—her indebtedness to other authors, and allowed her testimonies to be manipulated by interested parties close to her. In response, she insisted on the consistency, originality, and independence of her inspired writings. "I do not write one article in the paper expressing merely my own ideas. They are what God has opened before me in vision—the precious rays of light shining from the throne" (*Testimonies for the Church*, vol. 5, p. 67). In recent years scholars have uncovered evidence that she borrowed extensively from other authors and that her literary assistants provided more than routine editorial and secretarial services.

Although Ellen White preferred to style herself as "the Lord's messenger" rather than as a prophetess, she classed herself with the biblical writers. "In ancient times God spoke to men by the mouth of prophets and apostles," she wrote in 1876. "In these days he speaks to them by the Testimonies of his Spirit" an unambiguous reference to her own work (*Testimonies*, vol. 4, p. 148). Many early Adventists, including her own husband, resisted efforts to equate her writings with the Bible and to make acceptance of her inspiration a "test of fellow-

ship." Nevertheless, by the early twentieth century Adventist churches were "disfellowshipping" members who questioned her gift, and were relying on her views to determine the correct reading of scripture. Among the faithful the very phrase "Spirit of Prophecy" became synonymous with Ellen White and her writings, which they regarded as authoritative not only in theology but in science, medicine, and history as well.

[See also Seventh-day Adventism.]

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To date, no full-scale biography of Ellen White has appeared. Of the several autobiographical accounts, the most complete is *Life Sketches of Ellen G. White* (Mountain View, Calif., 1915), the last part of which was compiled by assistants. In 1981 Arthur L. White, a grandson of the prophetess, brought out the first installment (volume 5, covering the years 1900–1905) of a projected six-volume official biography, *Ellen G. White* (Washington, D.C., 1981–), which, though unabashedly apologetic, presents considerable new detail. My own work *Prophetess of Health: A Study of Ellen G. White* (New York, 1976) offers a non-apologetic interpretation of White's health-related activities. For guidance in using White's own writings, there is a splendid three-volume *Comprehensive Index to the Writings of Ellen G. White* (Mountain View, Calif., 1962–1963).

RONALD L. NUMBERS

WHITEFIELD, GEORGE (1714–1770), English evangelist and itinerant revivalist in America. Born in humble circumstances in Gloucester, England, Whitefield received his bachelor of arts degree from Oxford in 1736, the same year in which Bishop Martin Benson ordained him as deacon in the Church of England. Associated with John and Charles Wesley in an effort to revive a sedate and passionless Anglicanism, Whitefield followed with keen interest the missionary labors of the Wesley brothers in the newly founded colony of Georgia in North America. After nearly three years of preaching in the New World, the Wesleys returned to England discouraged and dismayed by the enormity of the religious challenge abroad. Neither they nor Whitefield's own admirers, however, could discourage the twenty-three-year-old Whitefield from setting out for Georgia on the first of seven voyages to America.

After an absence of less than one year, Whitefield returned to England late in 1738 to receive his ordination as priest, to strengthen his ties with the trustees of the Georgia colony, and to learn that England's hierarchy looked askance at his cavalier attitude toward canon law and the liturgical form of the national church. No less an authority than London's bishop, Edmund Gibson, published in 1739 a pastoral letter condemning "enthusiasm," a dangerous zeal associated with young

Methodism in general, and with young Whitefield in particular. For evidence that Whitefield claimed a special and direct guidance from the Holy Spirit, Bishop Gibson turned to the young zealot's first journal, written from December 1737 to May 1738, in which "enthusiasm" seemed so conveniently and convincingly represented. Whitefield responded to this and to many other charges contained in the letter: that he preached extemporaneously in the open fields, that he criticized the national clergy, and that he claimed to "propagate a new Gospel, as unknown to the generality of ministers and people"—all this, said the bishop, in what is surely a Christian country already. Even as Whitefield sought to defend himself against the bishop's attack, he found pulpits in England closed to him and the clergy there growing increasingly wary of him. Overtures from the Georgia trustees enticed him once more, as he was now offered a pastoral charge in Savannah, together with a promise of five hundred acres of land for a proposed orphanage. Two weeks after the Gibson letter was published, Whitefield was on his way back to America.

This second visit, lasting from November 1739 to January 1741, was Whitefield's most successful evangelical tour of the American colonies. Wherever he went up and down the Atlantic coast, his reputation as a dramatic, divine messenger preceded him. Enormous crowds gathered in eager anticipation, in churches or outdoors, in town squares or country meadows. Calvinist in his own theological stance, Whitefield found his greatest reception from similarly oriented denominations: Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Dutch Reformed, and (later) Baptists. While the first Great Awakening could certainly have occurred without him, it is difficult to imagine that burst of intercolonial and interdenominational pietism arising so swiftly and to such heights apart from the labors of this thundering, persuasive, and tireless traveler.

Even as Bishop Gibson found in Whitefield's own writings his best evidence for the evangelist's excesses, so critics of revivalism in America rifled through his published journals for the ammunition so amply supplied there. Whitefield, for his part, repeatedly and needlessly alienated those who stopped short of uncritical adulation and applause. And although he eventually moderated his censorious tone (and even more important, stopped publishing his journals), damage was done to the evangelical cause on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Whitefield also damaged his relationship with the Wesleys by publishing an attack in 1741 upon the Arminianism evident in John Wesley's sermon "Free Grace."

Still, by the thousands the people came to hear and to believe, in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England as

well as throughout the American colonies. For an entire generation Whitefield not only created an evangelical Atlantic community, he embodied it. Any pious project that required broad support found George Whitefield either assisting or directing the effort. He raised funds for Princeton University, helped Dartmouth emerge as a school open to Native Americans, promoted union in England among Calvinist Methodists, pleaded for more support of the Bethesda (Georgia) orphanage, took up collections for victims of natural disasters in Europe or elsewhere, and sustained the hopes of hundreds of thousands that a great and sweeping revival of piety would enliven and awaken all of Christendom.

In 1770 Whitefield made his seventh and final trip to America. After preaching on Saturday, 29 September, to an impromptu crowd gathered in the fields of Exeter, New Hampshire, he urged his horse on to Newburyport, Massachusetts. The next morning at six o'clock, he died. He lies buried beneath the pulpit in the town's Presbyterian church.

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EDWIN S. GAUSTAD

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1861–1947), English mathematician and philosopher, much of whose influence has been on theology. Whitehead grew up in a vicarage in the south of England and studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he subsequently became a fellow and taught mathematics. In 1890 he married Evelyn Wade. The couple had three children, Eric, North, and Jessie. After 1914 Whitehead taught mathematics at the Imperial College of Science and Technology in Kensington. In 1924, at the age of sixty-three, Whitehead moved to Harvard University, where he taught philosophy until 1936. The death of his son Eric in World War I is reported to have deepened Whitehead's religious interests.

Whitehead did not make any major contribution to mathematics as such. His early writings were chiefly on the philosophy of mathematics (*Treatise of Universal Algebra*, 1898) and logic (with Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 1910–1913). Later he involved himself increasingly in the rethinking of the natural world required by developments in physics, publishing *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (1919), *The Concept of Nature* (1920), and *The Principle of Relativity* (1922). His writings also expressed still

broader interests, as, for example, in *The Organization of Thought* (1922), which was largely included with other writings in *The Aims of Education* (1929). After moving to Harvard he developed a full-fledged cosmology in such works as *Science and the Modern World* (1925), *Religion in the Making* (1926), *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* (1927), *The Function of Reason* (1929), *Process and Reality* (1929), *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), and *Modes of Thought* (1938).

Whitehead's cosmology may be understood best by contrasting it with the doctrine of mechanism. The world appears to contain both living, self-activating entities, such as birds and dogs, and inanimate, passive objects, such as stones and drops of water. Mechanism took the latter as fundamental and analyzed everything into inanimate and passive units. In classical atomism the ultimate entities are indestructible bits of matter. Contact imparts motion, but otherwise the atoms do not affect one another. Whitehead described his position as a philosophy of organism, arguing that not only living cells but also molecules and subatomic entities are internally interconnected with their environments.

All philosophies must explain both enduring things and events. Most Western philosophies have taken enduring things as basic and have explained events as the interaction of these. Mechanists see events as changing spatial configurations of unchanging material substances. Whitehead proposed that events are fundamental and that the relatively unchanging entities are "societies" of events exhibiting constancy of pattern.

A particular problem for mechanism is conscious experience. Some mechanists hold that this lacks full-fledged reality. Others accept a dualism of mind and matter. Whitehead rejected both positions, holding that an instance of human experience is an organic event and that it provides the model for discerning the basic structure of all individualized events.

Whitehead believed that cosmology and religion are bound closely together, whether or not the cosmology is theistic. Some who respond religiously to Whitehead's vision of the world want to separate it from talk of God, either because they are offended by such talk or because they are committed to other doctrines of God. Whitehead, on the other hand, believed that his cosmology was incomplete without God, although the God of organic events is quite different from that of the world machine. Instead of imposing laws of motion, God is the source of novelty, purpose, and freedom. God radically transcends each creature, but it is the divine presence that directs and enables each to reach toward richness in its own immediacy and in those future events to which it contributes. This cosmic urge to life is called by Whitehead the "primordial nature" of God.

Whitehead holds that God is not an exception to the

principle of interrelatedness of actual things. Just as God is effective in the world of temporal events, so temporal events in turn enter into the divine life. What perishes in the world is everlasting in God. This aspect of God Whitehead calls God's "consequent nature." Apart from the consequent nature of God the utter transitoriness of events would undercut the human sense of meaning and importance.

Whitehead described God as lure for adventure and ideal companion in polemical contrast to a supernatural will untouched by the suffering of creatures. His doctrine also differed systematically from the understanding of God as being itself developed especially by Thomas Aquinas. Since the ideas of sovereign will and being itself have shaped much of Christian theology, some have denied that Whitehead's doctrine can be accepted by Christians. Others have been attracted to Whitehead's idea of a conscious, all-loving, all-knowing, everlasting actuality from whom creatures derive all that is good. His image of God as "the fellow sufferer who understands" has gained increasing acceptance.

Whitehead's thought played an important role in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago from the late 1920s. Charles Hartshorne systematically developed Whitehead's dipolar theism. Elsewhere, however, Whitehead's influence was sharply circumscribed by dominant intellectual trends. Analytic philosophy and positivistic science rejected the cosmological enterprise. Neo-Thomist Catholics reemphasized the idea of God as being itself. Neoorthodox Protestants stressed God's sovereign will. However, beginning in the mid-1960s, analytic philosophy and positivistic science lost their hegemony; Vatican II, the writings of Teilhard de Chardin, and the rise of liberation theology generated a dynamic openness among Roman Catholics; and a somewhat chaotic pluralism replaced the neoorthodox consensus among Protestants. In this new context Whitehead's influence has grown among philosophers, scientists, and humanists, as well as among theologians. His Christian followers employed his conceptuality in reformulating many Christian doctrines. They led in discussions of problems of religion and science, especially with regard to ecology. They found allies among feminists and points of contact with Teilhardians and liberation theologians. They have helped shape interreligious dialogue.

Although most of Whitehead's influence has been among North American Protestants, he has a following among Catholics and Jews as well. There is also increasing interest in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. His influence is institutionalized in the Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, the European Society for Process Thought, the Japan Society for Whiteheadian and Process Thought, the Center for a Post-Modern World in

Santa Barbara, and the Center for Process Studies in Claremont, California, and its journal, *Process Studies*.

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JOHN B. COBB, JR.

WIKANDER, STIG (1908–1983), Swedish Indo-Iranologist and, after Georges Dumézil, the most important early contributor to the "new comparative mythology." Born on 27 August 1908, at Norrtälje, Sweden, Stig Wikander attended the University of Uppsala, where he studied under the eminent Iranologist H. S. Nyberg. In 1941 he became a docent at the University of Lund, specializing in Iranian languages. From 1953 until his retirement in 1974 he was professor of Sanskrit and comparative Indo-European linguistics at the University of Uppsala.

Wikander's contributions are many and seminal. In his first major work, *Der arische Männerbund* (1938), he convincingly demonstrated the presence of youthful and exuberant warrior bands, each led by a chief or king, throughout the ancient Indo-European domain. Among the prime examples of this phenomenon are the Maruts, as described in the *R̥gveda*, and the Indo-European-speaking Maryannu ("chariot warriors"), who established themselves in northern Syria around 1600 BCE. Needless to say, Wikander's monograph was extensively drawn upon by Dumézil in his delineation of the Indo-European warrior ideology—that is, the "second function" (see below).

However, his most important single contribution to the "new comparative mythology" came in 1947 in an article entitled "Pāṇḍava-sagan och Mahābhāratas mytiska förutsättningar" (The Pāṇḍava Saga and the Mahābhārata's Mythical Prototypes). Published in the Swedish journal *Religion och Bibel*, it concerned the extent to which the canonical divinities of the *R̥gveda*—Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra, and the Nāsatyas—were transposed into the Pāṇḍavas, that is, the five principal protagonists of the *Mahābhārata*: Yudhiṣṭhira, Arjuna, Bhīma, Nakula, and Sahadeva. Each of these protagonists reflects one of Dumézil's three Indo-European "functions," or ideological principles, and is an "offspring," as it were, of the divinity or set of divinities in the *R̥gveda* that incarnates it. Thus, Yudhiṣṭhira, eldest of the five and a rightful king, is a projection of the first or sovereign function, reflected in the Vedas by Mitra and Varuṇa; Arjuna, the greatest of India's epic war-

riors, is a transposition of Indra and reflects the second function; while Nakula and Sahadeva, whose primary purpose is to support their elder siblings' sacred and martial endeavors, are transpositions of the divine twins (the Nāstayas) and like them are representations of the third function, that is, nourishment, physical well-being, fertility, and so forth.

As Dumézil himself has frequently noted, this discovery had some profound implications. For example, it demonstrated that the common Indo-European ideology was so deeply rooted that it could pass from myth (the *R̥gveda*) to epic (the *Mahābhārata*) with relative ease and that the domain of epic is as important as that of myth when it comes to understanding the essence of the Indo-European *Weltanschauung*. In short, Wikander's 1947 essay was a brilliant piece of work, a truly fundamental contribution to Indo-European mythological studies that has led to a great many analogous discoveries in the Greek, Celtic, and Germanic traditions.

Wikander himself followed up this line of research in 1950, demonstrating that the Iranian *Epic of Kings*, or *Shāhnāmeḥ*, reflects a similar transposition between the divine and heroic levels and that the tripartite ideology is very much in evidence. For example, the *Shāhnāmeḥ* describes three sacred fires: the *atūr farnbāg* ("priestly fire"), the *atūr gūshnāsp* ("warrior's fire"), and the *atūr burzīn mithr* ("fire of the third estate"). Moreover, he was able to demonstrate some convincing parallels between the Indic Bhīma and the famous Iranian epic hero Rostam; each is traditionally defined as the offspring (or kinsman) of a second-function divinity, respectively Vāyu and Keresaspā. In 1957 Wikander turned his attention to the third function and succeeded in establishing a clear-cut distinction between its Indian epical representatives, Nakula and Sahadeva.

In the 1960s Wikander's focus became more broadly Indo-European as he attempted to demonstrate the extent to which the *Mahābhārata* can be compared to certain events in Scandinavian pseudohistory. The background and circumstances of the great battle fought at Brávellir, especially as described by the twelfth-century Danish historian Saxo Grammaticus, bear striking resemblances to those leading up to Kurukṣetra, the climactic battle in the *Mahābhārata*. As it is extremely doubtful that Saxo had ever heard of the *Mahābhārata*, the only possible explanation is Wikander's suggestion that both traditions reflect independent developments from a common Indo-European source.

Among Wikander's other notable contributions were an assessment of etymological implications of the Iranian divine name *Mithra* (1952), and two essays (1951, 1952) that attempt to demonstrate an Indo-European origin of the so-called "kingship in heaven" theme (e.g., by arguing that the Greek divine sequence of Uranus,

Kronos, and Zeus has counterparts in Hurro-Hittite, Babylonian, Phoenician, and Iranian mythology).

In 1959–1960 Wikander served as a visiting professor at Columbia University, and in 1967 he was invited to teach at the Collégio de México, as well as to lecture at the University of Chicago and the University of California at Santa Barbara and at Los Angeles. While in Mexico he discovered what he believed to be some philological connections between several Altaic languages and the language of the Yucatecan Maya.

In his later years Wikander was plagued by a variety of illnesses, and as a result he was forced to curtail most of his scholarly activities. He died on 20 December 1983 in Uppsala. His legacy to the new comparative mythology remains remarkable, and his impact on scholarship in this field continues to be extremely significant.

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C. SCOTT LITTLETON

WILĀYAH. See *Walāyah*.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM (1280?–1349?), English philosopher and theologian. William of Ockham was born between 1280 and 1285 at Ockham in Surrey, England. He entered the Franciscan order and studied at the Franciscan house in Oxford but without taking his doctorate; hence his title of "Venerable Inceptor," which indicated that he had not received a degree.

Ockham's career is divided into two phases. During the first phase he wrote his major theological, philosophical, and logical works; the most important were his *Commentary on the Sentences* and his *Sum of Logic*. The second phase began when in 1328 he fled from the papal court at Avignon with the general of the Franciscan order, Michael of Cesena, to the German emperor Ludwig of Bavaria, at Munich. Ludwig had become the adversary of John XXII, and Ockham joined the other Franciscan dissidents there who had quarreled with the pope over his denial of the Franciscan claim to be following Christ's life of absolute poverty. Ockham, who had originally been summoned to Avignon to answer accusations of error in some of his philosophical doctrines, spent the remainder of his life polemicizing against papal claims to absolute jurisdiction in temporal and spiritual matters. He died at Munich, probably in 1349.

Ockham was the most influential thinker of the later Middle Ages. Philosophically, he was the first to found his outlook upon the discrepancy between the individual nature of all created being and the universal nature of the concepts and terms constituting our proper knowledge. Since, he said, only individuals were real, all universal and general notions only had real, as op-

posed to conceptual or grammatical, meaning if they referred to real individual things. In contrast to the overwhelming weight of medieval tradition, Ockham held that there were no such things as universal natures or essences. Instead, therefore, of seeking to explain the individual as the particularization of the universal, as in the statement that the individual man Socrates is the expression of the essence humanity, or that a white object is the manifestation of the quality whiteness, Ockham inverted the order and sought to explain how the mind arrives at the universal concept of humanity or whiteness from exclusive experience of individual men or white objects. He did so psychologically, logically, and grammatically by seeking to show how the mind forms concepts and what their relation is to the terms and propositions in which knowledge of them is expressed. He thereby gave a new direction to philosophical inquiry, which effectively denied an independent place to metaphysics.

Theologically, the effect was to undermine the bases for a natural theology, since whatever lay outside intuitive experience of individual things lacked evidential status. Not only did that exclude proofs, as opposed to persuasions, for God's existence, but it confined theological discourse to the elucidation of the meaning of the articles of faith rather than providing rational support for their truth. Their truth was a matter of belief. And central to belief was the Christian's recognition of God's omnipotence. By Ockham's time, the affirmation of God's omnipotence had assumed a new importance, partly at least in response to the determinism of Greek and Arabic philosophy. It had come to be expressed in the distinction between God's ordained power (*potentia ordinata*), the power by which he governed the workings of the universe he had created, and his absolute power (*potentia absoluta*), which denoted his omnipotence taken solely in itself without relation to any order, and so is limited by nothing other than logical self-contradiction, which would have impaired it.

It was Ockham who more than anyone gave this distinction the currency which it acquired in the middle of the fourteenth century. He applied it to restate the accepted Christian truth that God could do directly (or indeed differently or not at all) what, ordinarily, by his ordained power, he did by secondary causes. Ockham was thereby reaffirming God's role as the direct ruler as well as creator of the universe. What was novel was the range and frequency of Ockham's application of God's omnipotence to virtually every aspect of creation: nature, knowledge, and matters of belief. Thus God himself could directly cause or conserve an effect which normally had a natural cause: the Eucharist, for example, where the appearance of the elements of the bread and wine could remain after consecration without any

longer existing as physical substances. Similarly, absolutely, God could cause direct intuitive knowledge of an object which was not immediately present to the knower. He could do so, not by creating an illusion that what appeared to exist did not really exist, but by himself directly conserving knowledge of an object which was real but not present, such as someone seen in Oxford who was at Rome. Theologically, the implications were perhaps most far-reaching of all—and here Ockham was following Duns Scotus—by substituting God's immediate agency for the agency of the church, above all in directly accepting individuals for eternal life without the requisites of sacramental grace. God was thereby rewarding an individual action or will and not the preceding grace which ordinarily an individual had first to receive as the condition of the reward. Although neither Duns Scotus nor Ockham went beyond stating such a conclusion as the consequence of God's freedom from created forms, many of their successors gave the notion much wider application, which virtually denuded sacramental grace of its intrinsic efficacy. The effect was to reinforce the tendency in the religious outlook of the later Middle Ages to make God's will the sole arbiter in individual justification and predestination. It had as its accompaniment a corresponding stress upon individual religious experience based upon faith as the foundation of all theological discourse and alone bringing certainty in a contingent universe.

The extent of Ockham's influence during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can be seen in the dominance of the so-called nominalist school which developed first at Paris University and then spread to the new universities founded throughout the German-speaking lands. Its hallmarks were precisely an emphasis upon God's absolute power and therefore on the immediacy of God's will in deciding whom to justify and accept for eternal life. With Ockham's attack upon the concept of the pope's plenitude of power, and his insistence upon the sole authority of faith residing in every believer to decide questions of doctrine, he did perhaps more than any other single thinker to transform the philosophical and theological outlook of the later Middle Ages.

[See also Nominalism.]

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GORDON LEFF

WILLIAMS, ROGER (1603–1683), English and American Puritan minister and prophet of religious liberty, founder of Rhode Island. Born in London, Roger Williams was the son of Alice and James Williams, a merchant tailor. Of his early education little is known, but his ability at shorthand probably attracted the attention of Sir Edward Coke, then lord chief justice, who enabled him to attend Charterhouse School, from whence he won a scholarship to Cambridge (B.A., 1627). After several years' further study in divinity at that Puritan stronghold, Williams became chaplain in the household of Sir William Masham, and he married Mary Barnard, who was to bear him six children. As a convinced Puritan at the time when Bishop William Laud was vigorously opposing the movement, he found it advisable to join the great migration to New England in December 1630.

Called to serve the church at Boston, Williams refused to accept the post because the Massachusetts Bay Puritans had not fully broken with the Church of England or rejected legal religious establishment, and Williams was by then a thorough Separatist. Instead, he ministered for several years at Plymouth Colony, where the Separatist element was stronger, and undertook missionary work among the Algonquin Indians, learning their language. Williams returned to Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1633, however, accepting a call to the church at Salem. But he angered colonial leaders by insisting that the churches profess separation, by claiming that the royal charter did not provide a valid title to the land, by denying that the unregenerate could take an oath of loyalty (which for him was an act of worship), and by arguing that magistrates could not punish breaches of the first commandments (which deal with religious obligations), but only of those that deal with moral or civil matters. Brought to trial in October 1635, he was banished. Williams fled southward, purchased land from the Indians, and founded Providence, Rhode Island, in 1636. In a departure new in Christian civilization, no church was established in the new colony—religious liberty was for all, even those with whom Williams was in sharp theological disagreement.

Williams earned his living by farming and (until 1651) trading with Indians at a lonely outpost on Narragansett Bay. His knowledge of Indian ways and his friendship with them permitted him to mediate among them, as well as between them and the English, on many occasions. His skill prevented what could have been a powerful Indian alliance against the colonies in 1637. His political abilities were also exercised in helping to keep order among the growing towns of Rhode Island. To secure a charter so that Rhode Island would not be swallowed up by Massachusetts Bay Colony, he

journeyed to England in 1643–1644. He became known to the rising Puritan leadership through such writings as *A Key into the Language of America* (1643) and *The Bloody Tenent of Persecution, for Cause of Conscience* (1644), a hastily written but forceful scriptural argument for religious freedom. Successful in obtaining the charter, Williams returned home, but political changes soon jeopardized that achievement. He sold his trading post to finance a return to England (1651–1654), where he associated with such powerful figures as John Milton and Oliver Cromwell. Again he published extensively, notably *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody, Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health*, and *The Hireling Ministry None of Christs*, all in 1652. Called home by political turmoil and family need, he left John Clarke of Newport to complete the diplomatic mission; Clarke remained until 1663, finally securing a permanent charter for Rhode Island from the Restoration government. Meanwhile Williams served three years as president of the colony he had founded.

Williams's deepest concern throughout his life was with matters of religion, the central theme of his extensive writings. He remained faithful to common Puritan presuppositions but doggedly pursued their implications to radical conclusions few could accept. A Calvinist in theology, he emphasized the authority of the Bible as the means by which the spirit of God speaks, interpreting many of its passages in typological and millenarian ways. His greatest divergence with other Puritans was over the doctrine of the church. He sharply differentiated the pure church from the secular world, but he had difficulty identifying it amid the warring sects of his time. Briefly in 1639 he believed that the Baptists came the closest to his ideal of the church. Williams was baptized by affusion (pouring), baptized others, and participated in the founding of the first Baptist church in America at Providence. He soon left the congregation, however, and became known as a "seeker," but was not a member of any Seeker group, although he was acquainted with the Calvinist Seekers in England in the early 1650s.

Williams became convinced that the apostasy of the churches since Constantine had engulfed Christendom and that until God raised up new apostles the true church could not be discerned. Meanwhile, God called "prophets in sackcloth" to preach and witness to the truth, but not to gather churches. As a "prophet in sackcloth" Williams ministered among both English and Indians, but he remained highly critical of Christendom in all its forms, as well as of clergy who earned their livings by ministering. He believed that the truly faithful must be prepared for misunderstanding and persecution, having as their sole defense the sword of the spirit—the word of God. Magistrates have no compe-

tence in matters of religion, he insisted, for their rule extends only to civil matters.

Although Williams believed ardently in religious freedom, he was not a tolerant man; he could attack vigorously with tongue and pen (though never by force) those with whom he disagreed in matters of theology and biblical interpretation. He was deeply opposed to George Fox and the Quakers; as a Calvinist he objected to their separation of Word and Spirit, as well as to what was for him their inadequate Christology. He hoped to debate Fox when the latter was in Rhode Island in 1672, but had to settle for sharp exchanges with other Quaker leaders, about which he wrote in his most polemical work, *George Fox Digg'd out of His Burrowes* (Boston, 1676).

Williams's role as a pioneer of religious liberty and the separation of church and state has been rightly celebrated as his major contribution; the twentieth-century renaissance in Puritan studies has made clear how deeply his work was rooted in his religious commitments.

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ROBERT T. HANDY

WILLIBRORD (658–739), pioneer of the English missionaries who crossed the seas to proclaim the gospel to the non-Christian peoples of the continent of Europe. Born in Northumbria, Willibrord as a boy came under the influence of the great Wilfrid, archbishop of York. From 678 to 690 he was in Ireland, and while there he became filled with the desire, which never left him, to preach the gospel to non-Christians.

In 690 Willibrord went to Friesland in the Netherlands, which became his home for forty-nine years. This part of Europe was in a state of great disorder from which it was emerging through the rise of Carolingian

power, destined to reach its climax in the empire of Charlemagne. Pepin I gave Willibrord the land near Utrecht on which later Willibrord was to build his cathedral. In 695 he was consecrated archbishop by the pope, who intended to establish Utrecht as a regular province of the church with archbishop and diocesan bishops. This goal was never attained, and after the death of Willibrord, Utrecht gradually lost its importance.

None of the correspondence of Willibrord has survived, and we have hardly anything from his hand. This makes it difficult to get a clear idea of his personality and his work. He seems to have been characterized not so much by brilliance as by steadfast continuance in the work that he had set himself to do. It is clear that his aims were greater than his achievements. He penetrated Denmark and brought back thirty boys who presumably were to be trained as missionaries to their own people, but nothing came of this. It is not clear whether he ever consecrated other bishops. He did, however, in 698 found the Monastery of Echternach in Luxembourg, which later became a great center of missionary work.

Willibrord opened a door to the evangelists of the rising English church, worked out a model of what a missionary should be, and set an example followed by many successors. The churches in the Netherlands are right in regarding him as the apostle of Frisia and the founder of the church in their land.

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WINE. See *Beverages and Eucharist*.

WINTER SOLSTICE SONGS. In Europe the celebration of the winter solstice, the longest night of the year, is a heritage that goes back to prehistoric times. The classical Greek and Latin authors, as well as the fathers of the church, attest to the fact that the festivities centered around the winter solstice in antiquity perpetuated traditions still more ancient that were deeply rooted in folk practice. Despite regional differences in the evolution of these feasts and in their cul-

tural significance, they all included elements of sun worship, revels, masquerades, and divination since the winter solstice was considered to be a time of great importance. The fertility of the fields, the reproduction of the cattle, the health of the people, and the conclusion of marriages in the coming year were all deemed to depend on the observance of the solstice rituals.

The celebration of the winter solstice also included the singing of special songs. Unfortunately, we know very little about the songs performed during the cycle of the Roman imperial feasts, the Saturnalia, the Dies Natalis Solis Invicti (the birthday of the Iranian god Mithra), and the Calendae Ianuari, which occasioned the exchange of congratulations and the start of the new administrative year. All that has come down to us are the texts of certain congratulation formulas. From Augustine we learn that in the fifth century CE, on the day of such feasts, songs that from the Christian point of view were "most vain and filthy" were still performed. In comparison with the celebration of the winter solstice in northern Europe, however, the Roman feasts, through their insertion into the official calendar and through their fusion with elements imported from different provinces of the empire, may be considered a relatively late cultural synthesis.

The winter solstice feasts celebrated in northern Europe display different features and have a much more archaic character. Nearly all records of the winter solstice feasts in this area relate only to the Germanic peoples. Nevertheless, as I shall try to demonstrate, most of these customs and beliefs can also be found in the folk traditions of eastern Europe.

According to Latin historians and church chronicles, as well as evidence derived from the laws and capitularies prohibiting pagan practices and early Anglo-Saxon and northern European literature such as the Icelandic sagas, the Germanic midwinter Yule feast celebrated the reappearance of the sun and had a marked funeral character. It was commonly believed that the spirits of the dead were most haunting during the period of the winter solstice. They would return to their former dwelling places in order to participate in the feasting, and unless they were treated with due honor, they would do harm to the living. On the other hand, the welcoming of the spirits, who were impersonated with masks, was believed to insure peace, health, prosperity, and fertility in the coming year.

Despite the relative richness of data about the mythology and customs of the Germanic peoples, precise information about the specific myths, tales, or songs that were performed during the Yule feast is lacking. Sources that mention the performance of Icelandic sagas on Yuletide are not really an exception. The Icelandic sagas, however, cannot be considered specialized

songs of the winter solstice since they were also performed on other occasions, such as weddings and night gatherings. It must also be borne in mind that the Icelandic sagas, although partly based on older oral literature, were composed during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and thus cannot properly be included among the pagan folk traditions of the winter solstice.

Through missionary propaganda and the skillful strategy of the church, these traditions were partly obliterated and partly assimilated into the patterns of Christian ideology. The winter holy days of the church were originally based on the calendar of the later Roman empire. While ostensibly expelling pagan winter customs, the winter holy days actually adopted some of them under Christian cover, first those of the Mediterranean area, then some of the ancient winter solstice traditions of the Germanic peoples. Thus in the sounds of our modern hibernal holy days one can still hear the echoes of the pagan celebrations of the winter solstice.

But the link that still connects the ancient winter solstice celebration to our own days must be sought in the traditions of the peasantry. If in the urban world the church succeeded in gradually assimilating pagan customs, wiping out their memory and finally supplanting them, its success among the peasants came later and was less definitive. Judging by the repeated admonitions that medieval priests addressed to the country folk, it seems clear that the peasants continued to cling to the pagan customs of the winter solstice, especially in northern Europe, where conversion to Christianity came late. Some of these customs still linger in the folk traditions of the Germanic peoples: to this day, the peasants of those countries attribute magical powers to the ashes of the old "Yule log" burned on Christmas and to the bread especially baked for this holy day.

It is not by chance that only in eastern Europe do we find a living folk tradition that in part continues the ancient pagan winter solstice traditions. In this outlying region of the continent, at the turn of the twentieth century, and in some areas even until the onset of World War I, the numerically superior peasant class continued to live in relative isolation, under conditions that were in many ways archaic. Owing partly to this gap in socio-historical evolution, elements of the sun worship referred to among the Germanic peoples in the sixth and seventh centuries can still be found in eastern European folklore. The survival here of winter solstice traditions is also to be explained by the fact that in this area the fight against pagan customs was far less methodical than in the west. Lacking adequate theological training, the village priests of eastern Europe were not intransigent adversaries of paganism; they themselves sometimes contributed unintentionally to the survival of pagan customs or to their symbiosis with Christianity.

The eastern European solstice songs, performed by casually organized groups of children during the winter holy days, resemble Christmas carols in the time of their performance and in some minor parallels in subject matter. Unlike Christmas carols, however, which circulated mainly in manuscript and in printed editions, the eastern European songs belonged to oral tradition. At their core, they preserved pagan rituals and myths that are integrated into a rich complex of folk customs.

Circulating in impoverished form among the Poles, Bylorussians, Moravians, and Serbians, and still in use in certain districts of Greece, the repertoire of winter solstice songs of eastern Europe is rich and well preserved among the Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and especially among the Romanians. The composer and ethnomusicologist Béla Bartók, who collected Romanian folklore from before World War I, noted that "among all the eastern European peoples, the Romanians have preserved best till this day these partly ancient songs of the winter solstice" (Bartok, 1968, p. xxviii).

It can be demonstrated on linguistic grounds that the terms designating the winter repertoire in eastern Europe (i.e., the Ukrainian *koliada* or *koliadka*, the Belorussian *kaliada*, the Bulgarian *koleda*, and the Romanian *colinda* or *corinda*) are all derived from the Latin *calendae*. When one adds to this the fact that early Christian documents, as well as archaeological evidence, prove that the Roman winter feasts enjoyed great popularity in the Eastern Roman Empire, one can conclude that the folk terminology designating the eastern European repertoire of winter solstice songs almost certainly referred originally to the *Calendae Ianuari*. However, whether or not the eastern European songs themselves derived from the Roman winter feasts may be decided only by an analysis of the genre at the level of ritual acts and at the level of verbal expression.

The performance of the eastern European repertoire of solstice songs, which I shall conventionally call "winter carols," is governed by unwritten regulations and occasionally shows traces of rituals, representations, and beliefs of mythological origin. Because of the present-day decline in the performance of the winter carol, in what follows I shall take into consideration not only contemporary evidence but also certain data concerning regulations and beliefs that were obtained from the older generation of carolers or that were recorded in archives.

Owing not only to local circumstances but also to the multiform, diffuse character of the myth itself, the performance of winter carols differs not only from people to people but very frequently from district to district inside the borders of the same country. Thus while I shall insist on the commonality of the custom among

the Ukrainians, Romanians, and Bulgarians, I shall also point out certain local peculiarities that eventually could contribute to clarifying the significance of the winter carol.

As mentioned above, the winter carols are performed during the period of the Christian holy days. According to certain witnesses, this period was once dedicated exclusively to winter carols, the performance of other songs being forbidden. In the past, various benefits were attributed to the performance of winter carols during the traditional period: an increase of the wheat and hemp harvest, welfare and health, the fecundity of the cattle. On the other hand, the performance of the carols at other times could harm the harvest and impair the health of children. Such opposing effects—beneficial and harmful—occasioned by the observance or neglect of the time period prescribed by tradition bears witness to the sacred character of the carols.

According to tradition, winter carols are performed by groups of varying composition and organization. Widely distributed and well structured among the Bulgarians, Romanians, and Ukrainians are groups composed of young men, and this may be considered the predominant traditional type. Some of the traditional rules connected with this type of group emphasize the ritual character of the caroling. Thus among the Bulgarians, illegitimate children and those having a physical defect were not permitted to join the group of young men. Archival records and frequent references in the carols to "lads" and "youngsters" show that in the past, at least in certain districts of Romania, caroling was the exclusive prerogative of young unmarried men. In certain districts of Romania, during the winter holy days, the young men of the group were obliged to live together in one dwelling and avoid sexual relations with women. During the same period, young carolers were permitted to behave rather wildly, even to cause minor damage, without being punished.

Today the group of young carolers includes married as well as unmarried men. The organization of such groups starts at the beginning of the Christmas fast (15 November) or at the latest a couple of days before Christmas. On this occasion different duties are assigned to the members of the group. Among the Bulgarians, Romanians, and Ukrainians, it is standard to elect a chief invested with absolute authority over the group and to name a young caroler whose task will be to carry the presents that are given as rewards to the carolers. Among the Ukrainians, the local priest traditionally arbitrated the election of the chief, and the carolers carried the cross with them.

Caroling often entails more than simply singing songs. In certain districts of eastern Europe the caroling is accompanied by the noise of bells, drums, or trum-

pets, probably aimed at neutralizing the influence of the spirits of the dead, who are widely believed to be especially dangerous during the winter solstice. The Hut-zuls, a Ukrainian ethnic group living in the northeastern Carpathian Mountains, associate caroling closely with dance and perform hieratic dances while singing the carols. In certain districts of Romania young carolers would dance with girls after singing the carols in order to bestow upon them joy and good health. In some areas caroling has also been associated with masks. In various districts of Romania, for instance, the dance of the Turk or the Stag (both zoomorphic masks) is performed while, or after, a certain carol is sung.

In Bulgaria, Romania, and the Ukraine, the actual performance of the winter carols takes place on the night of Christmas Eve, on Christmas Day, and sometimes on New Year's Day as well. In certain regions of Romania, groups of carolers sing a special carol at dawn while facing in the direction of the rising sun. The carols may be performed while standing by a window outside a house, in the house itself, or on the road as the carolers go from house to house. By custom the carolers must perform their carols at all the houses of the village, and in turn the people must welcome and reward them. The most common gift is a pastry especially baked for Christmas. It is believed that by eating morsels of this cake or, alternatively, by burying it in the ground or feeding it to cattle, one can ensure the good health of one's children and animals, as well as increase the fertility of the fields. Possibly related to Mediterranean and Near Eastern vegetation rituals is a custom recorded at the beginning of the twentieth century in certain districts of Romania: at the time the young men's group is disbanded, a simulation of the death and resurrection of one of the carolers is enacted. Finally, at the end of the holiday period, the carolers hold a banquet to which they invite the girls of the village.

Winter carols are classified in different ways. Some are named in accordance with the time or place of their performance, for example, "Carol at Night," "Carol at Dawn," "Carol at the Window." Most of the titles refer to the person addressed, such as "Carol for a Girl," "Carol for a Young Man," "Carol for a Widow." Very often the titles refer to the profession of the addressee: "Carol for a Shepherd," "Carol for a Plowman," "Carol for a Midwife," "Carol for a Priest," and so forth. Here and there, in houses where a member of the family has died, the carolers sing a special piece called "Carol for the Dead." Such titles, which have become rare in modern times, derive from an earlier period when the carols were connected with funeral rituals. While some of the winter solstice rituals were intended to repel the spirits of the dead, others were aimed at winning their good

will by inviting them to join the feasts and honoring them with songs, offerings, and banquets. The belief that during the period between 24 December and 6 January the souls of the dead come out of their graves and haunt the living is widespread in eastern Europe. In order to appease them, both Slavic peoples and the Romanians used to leave a table laden with food and drink on the night of 23 December.

Despite the Latin etymology of the terms designating the eastern European winter carol, the analysis of beliefs and rituals that underlie the performance of the genre does not support the hypothesis of a Roman origin of the custom. It may be assumed that the substratum of the winter carol precedes the romanization of the Thracian populations of eastern Europe. The regulations regarding the organization of young men's groups, as well as other related features, suggest the preservation of vestiges of puberty rituals. Most of the rituals and beliefs associated with the gift of the cake to the carolers, as well as certain remnants of sun worship (e.g., "Carol at Dawn"), seem to belong to a much more archaic stratum than do the Roman winter feasts, and they bear striking resemblances to the northern European celebration of winter solstice. One may deduce that the introduction of Roman winter festivals would not have entailed the abolition of the local festivals. The coincidence of data and certain analogies between the two traditions (revels and masquerades) could not but favor the perpetuation of the local folk tradition under the emblem of the conquerors. The Romans, for their part, were adept at assimilating foreign customs, rituals, and gods through their well-known system of *interpretatio Romana*. It seems very probable that, due to the political and cultural prestige of the imperial winter festivals, local customs relating to the winter solstice, as well as rituals performed at other periods of the year (such as the agrarian rituals performed on the vernal equinox, the old New Year), came to be focused around the new Roman New Year.

The foregoing considerations can be extended through an analysis of the actual repertoire of the winter carols themselves, their fundamental types and motifs. Here we encounter the same problems that are involved in the description of the practice of caroling but now at the linguistic level of the carol itself.

Students of the winter carols generally divide them into two groups: secular and religious. In doing so they mean to distinguish between winter carols that were not influenced by the church and those in which Christian characters or references do appear. A good number of both secular and religious carols contain properly mythological materials, such as the types of carols that present a non-Christian myth of creation in Christian dress. One type of carol, for example, tells how, at the

beginning of the world, Judas plunged the universe into darkness by stealing the sun and the moon. Saint John or Saint Elijah then brought the celestial bodies back and thus dispersed the darkness. Another type relates how God created the world by placing the sky on four silver pillars. Despite the references to saints or to God, the versions of creation disclosed by the winter carol have nothing in common with the biblical account in *Genesis* and obviously convey pagan myths about the foundation of the world.

Another category of winter carols, very possibly produced by peasant women, may be connected to feminine rites. In Romania until World War I a female folk society, called *Ceata Fetelor*, preserved traces of initiation rites for girls, practiced matchmaking charms, and was deeply involved in caroling. Apparently similar societies once existed among other east European peoples as well. Of course, only some of the carols dedicated to unmarried women may be associated with feminine rites. Most of the Romanian, Ukrainian, and Bulgarian carols in this category bear the mark of the traditions and history peculiar to each of these peoples. Common to all three is the well-known allegory of the wedding, which presents the bridegroom in the form of a hunter who pursues a deer.

The Romanian and Bulgarian repertoires contain a large number of carols that deal with hunting. Usually dedicated to young men, these carols were no doubt originally connected with puberty rites. The ritual significance of the hunt as a task preliminary to marriage can still be discerned in the carols that culminate with the killing of the game. As a rule, the victim is an edible wild animal, very often a stag, and the young man plays the part of an accomplished hunter. In a further extension of meaning, the hunter is frequently called the bridegroom, and the hunt is sometimes viewed as a preliminary condition for marriages. Particularly relevant for the relation between the hunt and marriage is the ending of this type of carol: in its death agony, the wounded animal announces the impending marriage of the hunter. It follows that the young man hunts as a candidate for marriage and that the shooting of the game makes him eligible as a bridegroom.

In a distinct group of carols, the hunter-quarry relation is associated with the miracle of metamorphosis. The hunter is confronted by an ambiguous character whose human or sacred identity is hidden behind the outer form of a wild animal, usually a stag. The creature's ambiguity is manifest from the very beginning: the stage has white or golden horns (colors with a well-known ritual significance); it laughs, sings, and openly defies the hunter. At the revelation of the animal's hidden identity, which entails the recognition of its prestige and authority, the hunter silently gives up the

hunt, sometimes breaking his bow into pieces. Here the hunt becomes the scene of a young man's encounter with the sacred. There is undoubtedly a relation between such metamorphoses described in the hunting carols, the dances with zoomorphic masks that sometimes accompany caroling, and the confrontations with disguised characters that often take place in puberty rites.

In addition to carols focused on hunters, shepherds have produced a repertoire of carols of their own. Many of these are clearly related to rites intended to encourage the growth of the shepherd's flock. Others have a cryptic character. For instance, in "Mioritza, the Clairvoyant Lamb," a carol known only to the Romanians, a shepherd is ritually condemned to death for reasons that remain obscure.

While the exact ritual significance of some of the carols sung within the restricted circle of the shepherds remains unclear, the significance of caroling within the context of the more ample agrarian rituals is more explicit. This is especially true of the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Ukrainian carols. These carols tell how God, the saints, or the carolers themselves sprinkle the courtyards and fields with water in order to increase the harvest. Quite often, the carol text preserves not only the ritual formula but a descriptive trace of the ritual actions as well:

Water in his mouth he has taken.
The cornfield he has sprinkled.
And thus he spake:
"Wheat, grow you up to my belt
And you, hemp, up to my armpits."

In the Romanian and Bulgarian repertoires one frequently encounters references to the sun, the sister of the sun, and sometimes to the daughter of the sun. Such personifications are typical of the sun worship that is proper to cultivators and seem to have been connected with the winter solstice celebration. In certain Romanian winter carols, the sun is presented as descending from the sky with a sickle under its arm or as the owner of a ship that harbors the soul of the deceased. We also find that some of the refrains of the Romanian winter carols refer to the sun, its rays, or the dawn, and in certain contexts the sun is referred to as "sacred." It would be impossible to distinguish a category of carols exclusively on the basis of references to the sun or to agricultural rituals. Rather, one finds such references scattered throughout carols of all sorts—hunting carols as well as those influenced by Christianity. It is clear that the point of view and the mentality of an agrarian society are predominant in the winter carol and that it is still rooted in prehistory. Nevertheless, an analysis of hunting carols reveals that many motifs that were passed

down from prehistory were reinterpreted to reflect interests of herdsmen and plowmen.

Even the archaic Romanian carol about the hunters who were turned into stags, a carol that served Béla Bartók in 1930 as the libretto of his *Cantata Profana*, did not escape the influence of herdsmen and plowmen. All the versions tell of an old man who, in teaching his sons to hunt, neglected other professions:

And he taught them not
Any kind of trade:
Neither husbandry
Nor herding of cattle
Only [taught them] hunting.

From the perspective of herdsmen and plowmen, hunting as an exclusive profession becomes a culpable activity.

Another important change can be seen in another set of carols in which the hunter is confronted with strange animals: not only miraculous stags but also fish that jump out of the sea in order to graze on flowers or pick apples, or (among the Romanians) a lion endowed with horns or equated with a human being or a dragon. Unlike the animals in the carols that feature the metamorphosis of the hunter's prey, however, these creatures do not pretend to have a hidden identity, and consequently they are neither spared nor feared. They are characterized by the harmful role they play. They are considered malefactors not so much because they steal to eat but because of the damage they do. The fish is blamed less for stealing apples than for spoiling them, and the lion is deemed guilty not only of plundering the vineyard but also of ravaging it.

Although it is possible to draw a parallel between the wild behavior ascribed to these creatures and the disorders permitted to neophytes in a puberty ritual, it is nevertheless evident that the relations between the harmful animals and the hunter described in this category of carols overstep the bounds of the ritual. While the hero continues to play the part of the hunter, he is at the same time represented as the owner of a house or a vineyard or as the protector of an apple tree. Crossing the borderline that separates what is wild from what is cultivated, the harmful animals endanger the interests of the farmers. The ritual matrix of the hunting carol is reduced to an empty shell in order to make way for the message of an agrarian society. The young hero has not dropped the emblem of the hunter; he has nonetheless become a manifest representative of the farmers' interests.

It was not only the agrarian mentality that brought about change in the winter carol but other factors as well; first among these was the influence of Christianity, which took several forms. It is probable that the earliest

direct influence of the new faith was the introduction of Christian refrains into the carols. One of the oldest of these is the "hallelujah," which one finds preserved in a corrupted form. In a more indirect way, Christianity served as a vehicle for conveying legends and beliefs from the Mediterranean and Near East to eastern Europe. For instance, the story found in an apocryphal gospel, which tells of the Mother of God asking a palm tree to lend her its shade, reappears in a winter carol, where the palm tree has become the poplar and fir common to eastern Europe. Such apocryphal legends form the basis of many of the carols.

Only a part of the corpus of religious carols was inspired by Christian apocrypha spread through the Slavonic-Byzantine church. Many others combine Christian themes with the local folk culture of eastern Europe. Here the distinction between religious carols and secular carols breaks down. Symbolic of this lack of a clear boundary is a magnificent robe, described in the carols as adorned with the heavenly bodies, which may be worn in turn by God himself, by Jesus, by a shepherd, or by the boy who, in the carol, is chosen as chief of the army. Similarly, the fusion of Christian motifs with older beliefs could result in surprising, hybrid characters. Judas, for instance, may be equated with a subterranean demon, with a serpent, or with an aquatic monster.

One occasionally encounters carols that betray a degree of tension between Christianity and the folk mythology. Thus in some of the hunting carols a stag pretends at first to be Saint John, and then denies it and reveals itself to be a sacred beast that measures the earth and the sky. In a large number of the carols, however, there is no such tension. Jesus is depicted dancing with the sister of the sun, Saint Nicholas saves the ships of the sun from sinking, and the birth of Jesus is announced by a fairy. In the mild climate of folk Christianity, which survived until quite late in eastern Europe, the association of the saints with mythological characters was neither resented nor felt to be inappropriate or desecrating.

One of the most straightforward forms of interaction between Christianity and folk motifs was the simple substitution of Christian saints for earlier mythological figures. At a deeper level, however, the Christian ideas of sin and punishment could occasionally give a new meaning to both the motivation and the denouement of the original myth.

Judging by a textual analysis of the carols and related documents, it appears that the process of the christianization of the carols has intensified in the last three or four centuries as a consequence of the increased influence of the church. Yet one can detect in the carol repertoire an old Christian nucleus. The fact that some of

the "religious" types conform well to the patterns of the genre and bear folk titles apparently proves their penetration into the winter carol's repertoire at an early date. Among these old Christian carols we may mention the type that represents Jesus surrounded by sheep, a type eventually inspired by the early Christian symbol of the good shepherd, and those that tell of a monastery by the sea or describe the Mother of God with the baby Jesus in her arms.

What one might call the "poetics" of the genre of the winter carol is in fact an ensemble of canons closely connected with the ritual function that the winter carol is intended to serve. Each carol consists of two parts: a first part that is sung, and which includes one or more descriptive or narrative sequences, and a second part that is spoken, and which includes a congratulation formula.

Although relatively concise and placed at the end of the carol, the congratulation formula was of the utmost importance. In a context where ritual formulas were believed to have concrete effects, the wish expressed through the congratulation formula was not intended as the mere expression of a desire but as a means of influencing reality.

The first part of the carol is in a sense the incarnation of the wish expressed in the congratulation formula. Thus, the carol's descriptions and narratives present a series of models, which may be ritual, social, heroic, professional, moral, or physical. Like the fairy tale, the winter carol conveys us into a world where dreams come true. But contrary to the fairy tale, which projects the wish into the realm of fiction and places the events in a remote age, the winter carol presents one with a concrete and immediate model of an ideal of life or behavior, an ideal that is supposed to be realized through the compulsory influence attributed to the congratulation formula.

In practice, the carol is always addressed to a specific person, and the name of this person is usually assigned to the hero in the carol. Thus the hero who shoots the stag or captures the lion in the carol is symbolically identified with the person at whose house the carol is performed. A happy ending is dictated by the logic of the ritual: in order to confirm and support the wish expressed in the congratulation formula, the hero, identified with the addressee, must attain victory and receive its rewards. It is to be noted that today this ritual symbolism is perceived as a mere stylistic device, however, or as an homage paid to the host.

There are, of course, exceptions to the aforementioned canons. Some of these are the result of the carols' different ritual functions. As noted, the winter carol can also have a funerary function. In the carols for the dead the rule of the happy ending must naturally be can-

celed. Other exceptions are to be explained on the basis of the process of a carol's composition. Compiled in stages and from different sources, a carol sometimes includes characters or sequences incongruous with the canons of the genre. The saints, for instance, cannot be identified with the addressee of the carol and consequently cannot take on their names. Various devices are employed to circumvent such difficulties. Thus in various Christian carols, in order to comply with the canons of the genre and at the same time avoid desecrating the sacred character of the saints, a human character is introduced—usually "the Good Man"—who receives the name of the addressee.

The vision presented by the winter carol is one in which harmony and peace reign over the world. The heroes appear in a halo of happiness, beauty, and glory, and conflicts are attenuated or resolved. Even tragic endings are accompanied by serene images: in "Mioritza, the Clairvoyant Lamb" the moon keeps watch over the corpse of the slain shepherd, and according to a winter carol on the theme of the foundation sacrifice, the baby of the immured victim is not abandoned but is nursed by full-uddered deer that descend from the mountains.

The sparkling festive atmosphere peculiar to the winter carol is enhanced by a profusion of gold and white (both originally magical colors) that pour over the most humble objects and turn them into sources of light and wonder. The broom, for instance, is made of gold, as is the spindle and the cradle, while the sea and the heath are all white.

Typical of the winter carol is its refrain. Although part of the refrains that survive are preserved in distorted versions, one occasionally detects certain analogies with the invocations. The refrains, as well as the versification in general, are closely intertwined with the melody, which, by itself, deserves the highest interest of the specialist.

From a stylistic point of view one may distinguish two types of carols: the Ukrainian type, which has a pronounced descriptive character and long final formulas, and the Romanian type, which includes epic segments and closes with concise formulas. The stylistic and typological analogies between the Romanian and Bulgarian repertoires suggest that the basic form of the eastern European winter carol was the creation of the Thracians, on either side of the Danube. The additional fact that a number of mythological carols are common to the Ukrainians, Romanians, and Bulgarians suggests that the Slavs took the custom of the carol from the Thracians at an early date, enriched it with their own traditions, and dispersed it over a wide area. The rich and original character of the Romanian repertoire recommends it as the best source for the study of the genre.

This general survey of the complex elements involved in the performance and texts of the eastern European winter carol requires that certain distinctions be made. Thus we may conclude that if the Christian influence is rather insignificant at the level of the customary practices associated with the carol, it cannot be neglected at the level of the text. Without shattering the mythological basis of the genre, the church succeeded in giving a Christian hue to a portion of the winter carol repertoire and, here and there, exerting an even stronger influence. The part played by the congratulation formulas in the structure of the carols may be seen as an echo of the Roman custom of exchanging congratulations on the occasion of the *Calendae Ianuari*. But in the empire's eastern provinces, the Roman New Year provided only a new label and framework for the well-rooted autochthonous celebration of the winter solstice.

Judging by certain aspects of the custom, and by references within the texts, the eastern European winter songs seem to have served as incantations directed against the evil influences of the dead and to have included elements of sun worship. Viewed from this perspective, the eastern European carol still displays its link with the ancient rituals of the winter solstice, but it has a diffuse ritual character. It incorporated not only the winter solstice rituals but also rituals of puberty, agrarian rituals of the vernal equinox, and the rituals and myths of the New Year.

In the folk traditions of eastern Europe the winter carol represents one of the oldest cultural strata. In it we find the vestiges of prehistoric rituals and cosmogonic myths, and this fact alone makes it important to the history of religions, ethnology, ethnomusicology, and linguistics. But the winter carol is more than a fossilized genre that provides data for the reconstruction of an earlier age. It has conveyed to us elements of myth and ritual that express fundamental experiences of humankind and thus still appeal to the contemporary reader. Moreover, the eastern European winter carol contains more than ancient myths and rituals; over the centuries, it has integrated a vast range of motifs into a complex synthesis. It may be fairly judged to be one of the purest voices that, emerging from the depths of magical belief, ever reached the heights of poetry. Had it not been embedded in provincial languages, the eastern European winter solstice song would have long ago joined the choir of those perennial songs inspired by faith that delight and strengthen the spirit of humankind.

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WINTI. See Afro-Surinamese Religions.

WISDOM. The term *wisdom* has been used with a great variety of meanings in the course of history. A survey quickly shows that every culture has or has had its ideal of wisdom and recorded it in oral or written sapiential literature. In particular, the relation, both historical and systematic, between wisdom on the one hand and religion and philosophy on the other, varies a great deal. This article can give only a limited selection from the broad range of sapiential traditions and ideas.

General Terminology. As far as we can judge from the terms used and their history, wisdom was originally a practical matter, namely "insight" into certain connections existing in human life and in the world and modes of behavior derived from this insight and put into the service of instruction and education. The Indo-European root of the word *wisdom*, **ueid-*, connotes "perceiving, seeing" (compare Greek *idein*, "idea," and Latin *videre*, "to see"). The German language has preserved the ancient connection between *Weisheit* ("wisdom"), *Wissen* ("knowledge"), and *Wissenschaft* ("science"). A person's wisdom depends on what he or she has seen and thereby come to know. It is therefore a practical knowledge, the primordial shaper of human behavior toward the enviroing world (to the extent that this knowledge resists the pressures for immediate action). The same practical element is manifest in other cultures as well. Thus the Hebrew *hokhmah* has to do with "skill, ability" (*hkm*); the Akkadian *nēmequ* with "dexterity and skill"; Greek *sophia* with "cleverness" or

"skill" in any of the arts or professions of life (carpentry, medicine, poetry, music, etc.). The Akkadian word for a teacher of wisdom or learned person, *ummanu*, was borrowed from Sumerian and originally meant "master craftsman." The cultivation and transmission of cumulative experience in coping intellectually with the world was done mainly in schools that were the seedbeds of literary culture and the forerunners of the later "schools of wisdom" or universities. Oral tradition was likewise controlled by specific groups that were responsible for the maintenance of tradition.

Wisdom, Religion, and Philosophy. If religion can be broadly conceived as a way of coping, theoretically and practically, with the problems of the world, nature, and society, then wisdom is one part of this effort. In fact, wisdom and the various contents of the religions have historically been closely connected. Wisdom was regarded as an area of religious tradition and derived its authority from its relation to particular gods (especially the sun, as in Mesopotamia and Egypt) or religious principles (e.g., concepts of world order, such as the ancient Egyptian *maat*). In this form, wisdom contributed to the development of theological thought and is part of its history ("priestly wisdom"). Particular divinities were venerated in cult and magic (the two are difficult to distinguish) as protectors or representatives of religious knowledge (Ea and Marduk in Babylonia, Ptah in Egypt). The legitimation of wisdom by more or less religious figures, such as kings, teachers, and priests, belongs in the same context. We know instances of wisdom being personified as a divine hypostasis (e.g., in Buddhism, Judaism, gnosticism, Zoroastrianism). In many religions wisdom is an attribute of the divinities; in monotheistic religions it is an attribute of the supreme God. The wisdom of God transcends that of human beings and makes it pale into insignificance; in Christianity the wisdom of God even turns human wisdom into folly (see below). This Christian revaluation of the value set upon wisdom in antiquity did not, however, lead to an abandonment of wisdom but to its relativization and to a radical transformation of the whole concept.

This more or less positive relation between wisdom and religion is only one side of the coin. Just as often, wisdom went its own way alongside official religion; it was even, as in the ancient Middle East, in tension or conflict with it. To the extent that this was true, it was a profane, secular way of coping with the world that avoided or excluded any appeal to traditional religious entities (gods, cult, priests). It thus paved the way for philosophical and ultimately also for scientific thinking (see the etymological connection mentioned earlier between the German words for wisdom and science). This development is most easily seen among the Greeks,

where the concept of philosophy, or “love of wisdom,” took shape. According to tradition (Diogenes Laertius, 1.12; Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes* 5.3.8) the term went back to Pythagoras and was then taken over by Plato and Aristotle, who gave it its normative meaning. It is clear that the projection of the Platonic conception of philosophy and science back onto Pythagoras meant a reinterpretation of the latter’s simple, prescientific notion of wisdom. Pythagoras was undoubtedly a teacher of wisdom, not a scientist or mathematician in the later sense of these words; his explanation of the cosmos had at its center a number symbolism that could not yet be called scientific, since in it number, ritual, and doctrine of the soul still formed a unity (Burkert, 1972). In any case, *philosophy* retained its practical meaning of “way of life” down through the centuries and has not lost it even today. Ancient Greek wisdom, documented in gnomic poetry (Hesiod, Mimnermos, Solon, Phocylides, Theognis), with its simple key idea of “moderation” (*mēden agan*) or “fitness of act to time and situation” (*kairon gnōthi*), found its extreme application in the so-called Sophists, who converted wisdom (*sophia*) into practical rationality and thereby brought its dangers to light for the first time. In contrast to the Sophists, Socrates avoided the concept of wisdom and reserved this quality for God alone (Plato, *Apology* 20–22). For Plato wisdom was the supreme virtue (*Republic* 441c–d). Aristotle distinguished between the practical wisdom of everyday life (*phronēsis*) and speculative wisdom (*sophia*), which concerns itself with “first things” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.5.2, 15.1.5). The distinction marked the transition to systematic wisdom, or philosophy. Nonetheless, in the history of philosophy its ancient root—“wisdom for living”—has repeatedly surfaced; in particular it has found ever new expression in ethical systems and endeavors (e.g., those of Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer). In his *Wörterbuch der Philosophie* ([1910–1911] 1980, vol. 1, p. 446), Fritz Mauthner formulates the difference between wisdom and practical “prudence,” and between wisdom and philosophy or science with their goal of theoretical knowledge, as follows:

In my opinion, *wisdom* seems to mean not only that those who have this quality, possession, or way of thinking are able on every occasion to act or think with rare prudence in pursuing their theoretical or practical goals; it means that in addition they are able to judge the value of the theoretical and practical goals in question. It also means perhaps that such persons act according to their judgments. Schopenhauer was certainly a philosopher but hardly a wise man. Montaigne was a wise man but not really a philosopher. We think of Socrates as being both wise man and philosopher.

Problems of a Typology. Since it is not possible at present (or ever, in my opinion) to write a history of the

various ideas of wisdom, scholars have quickly settled for providing at least a typology of the concepts of wisdom. Wisdom has taken these broad forms: an anthropological ability to cope with life (the oldest and most widespread form); a rational system (interpretation of the cosmos, philosophy, beginnings of science); and a personification, hypostasis, goddess, or attribute of God.

Any attempt at greater detail becomes mired in the problems of the given historical context. It is possible, for example, with Edward Conze to compare the Buddhist (Mahāyāna) Prajñāpāramitā (“perfect wisdom”) with the figure of Sophia in early Judaism and to find surprising similarities (Conze, 1968, pp. 207–209). There are even chronological correspondences: the hypostatization of both ideas of wisdom began about 200 BCE and yielded similar conceptions. Yet differences of content are unmistakable: Prajñāpāramitā is a personification of Buddhist insight into the “emptiness” of the world and has no connection with an idea of God; the Jewish Sophia became a divine hypostasis that can also be mediator of creation and identifiable with the Law (Torah). The situation is the same with parallels between Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Iranian ideas of wisdom, each of which retains its own special character and cannot be wholly assimilated to the others and made to coincide with them. By and large, the only common element is the shift in the thematization of wisdom from an anthropological skill to a central religious figure or person who mediates wisdom. In this shift wisdom changes from subject to object; an anthropological capacity for insight becomes a form of revelation about the cosmos or God. The content of wisdom as insight into the coherence of the world and life takes on a religious and, to some extent, esoteric character (as in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, gnosticism, and Mahāyāna Buddhism). This development did not occur wherever ideas of wisdom existed (thus except for Israel and Iran it did not occur in the Near East or in Greece). It looks as if a necessary condition of this development is the existence of a canonical literature that accepts the idea of wisdom. “Revelation” is identified with wisdom inasmuch as wisdom becomes the content of revelation and as a result either heightens the importance of canonicity or permits an extension of canonicity (as, for example, in the Prajñāpāramitā literature or the gnostic writings).

This literary documentation for the idea of wisdom makes possible some typological classifications that should not be overlooked. Thus the “typical” wisdom genre is the *gnōmē* (Lat., *sententia*), that is, the tersely formulated “sentence” or maxim, or, more generally, the proverb. The oldest collections of wisdom traditions are collections of proverbs that can be developed into literary works on the theme of wisdom or can at least

supply material for such ("teachings," "disputations," dialogues). Omens, riddles, fables, parables, and metaphors are also frequently storehouses of wisdom. Wisdom is thus not limited to a particular literary form, although it is closely linked with the proverb and maxim. Its origin in the oral tradition of the preliterate period of history can be demonstrated only through inference from the presence of such traditions among contemporary nonliterate peoples. There is hardly a people that does not possess some stock of wisdom traditions; this stock is the source of wisdom in the original sense of the term. Its beginnings are lost in the darkness of prehistory. The question whether the often asserted "international" character of wisdom literature is to be explained by evolution (from an original common possession) or by diffusion (through spread and borrowing) cannot be further answered. There are many arguments for the second hypothesis, but the first theory can also be helpful in examining many cultures. In any case, both forms of development can be seen at work in the course of history (the ancient Near East is a classic example of the borrowing of wisdom traditions). The important thing, however, is what particular cultures, literatures, and religions did with the common treasury of wisdom; these results are attractively multifaceted and pluralistic.

The Many Forms of Wisdom. Space allows only a limited survey of some of the principal forms taken by ideas of wisdom. The emphasis will be on the ancient Near East, which decisively molded the image of wisdom (transmitted through the biblical heritage). Only a brief glance can be taken at India and East Asia, which developed an independent form of wisdom that has influenced the culture and life of these peoples down to our own day.

Mesopotamia (Sumer and Babylonia). The Near East possessed expressions of wisdom at a very early date, although these did not lead later on to a unitary concept of wisdom. The dominant element in this wisdom was skilled proficiency in insightful understanding of the world, human beings, and society. No one doubted the divine origin of wisdom, even if an increasing awareness of the difference between divine and human wisdom manifested itself in later literature and led to a crisis in the wisdom tradition. The basic idea of the wisdom tradition was what scholars have named the "act-consequence connection," that is, the early insight that specific actions have or can have specific consequences in the lives of human beings. People attempted to find rules of behavior by observing their human environment, but they did not advance as far as systematic reflection or even develop an ethic of behavior (this step was left for the Greeks and the Chinese). Their observations, handed down in the form of aphorisms, provided

valuable counsel for kings, officials, and scribes. The storehouse for this wisdom was the school, and its teachers were the scribes, who were therefore regarded as wise beyond others. Wisdom derived its authority from its being traced back to divinities (especially Utu, Shamash, Ninurta, Enki, Inanna) or prehistoric wise men (Shuruppak, Gilgamesh). Because of its origin and approach this wisdom had a eudaimonistic and at times even a mantic character, but in the late period it turned pessimistic and skeptical. The dogma of the act-consequence connection to a great extent prevented the raising of new questions; when these were finally asked they led to a helpless skepticism (the problem of Job, the suffering just man; the problem of a just world order). Modesty, uprightness, consideration for others (love of neighbor), and deliberation were the principal virtues; their cultivation brought life, happiness, children (sons), and God's providential care.

The decisive force in the development of ancient Mesopotamian wisdom was that of the Sumerians. The Akkadians for their part mainly translated, transmitted, and interpreted, while adding a few new forms of their own (*Wisdom of Ahikar*, omen literature). The beginnings of wisdom are to be found in the early "lists" or "inventories" in which language was used as a means of "inventorying" the world and thus to some extent ordering or systematizing it. This kind of wisdom has therefore been called "list wisdom" and understood as a first approach to scientific effort (Soden, 1936). More developed approaches led from a simple listing of objects to an appraisal of them; this has come down to us in the form of disputations (literature of disputes over relative values). This kind of wisdom has been described as "value wisdom" (Hans Heinrich Schmid, *Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit*, Berlin, 1966). The rise of proverbs relating to occurrences in nature and society brought for the first time the formulation of simple factual situations (called therefore the "wisdom of events"). This stage paved the way for wisdom sayings in the narrower sense. The latter emerged from observation of human behavior (initially without thematizing the act-consequence connection), first in proverbs and then clearly in various "counsels," which unfortunately have come down to us only in fragmentary form (*Counsels of Shuruppak*, *Counsels of Wisdom*). Wisdom gradually made its way into various other genres; meanwhile links were also established between wisdom and ideas of a socio-ethical and legal kind from royal and legal texts (e.g., conceptions of protecting the weak, widows, and orphans; doing good and hating evil; practicing righteousness). Wisdom thus sought to formulate and thereby give insight into the basic rules governing the cosmos. The gods had established a just world order; it was for human beings to learn this order and act

accordingly. The challenge to this outlook by, for example, historical events led to a crisis of wisdom, since the act-consequence connection came into question and the theme of the “suffering just man” became topical. This was the subject of the “Job poems,” which followed the “complaint and response paradigm” (*ersha-hunga*). To this genre belong the following: *Sumerian Job*, the *Poem of the Righteous Sufferer* (also called *I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom* [*Ludlul bel nemeqi*], from its opening words), the *Babylonian Theodicy*, and the satirical *Dialogue of a Master and Slave* (or *Dialogue of Pessimism*), which probably does not belong to the wisdom literature but is nonetheless very informative in regard to it. The conclusion reached in these works is that God’s action is inscrutable and his wisdom different from that of human beings. The act-consequence connection is pushed into the background but not abandoned, since insight into the order governing the world is denied to human beings. In all this we can see wisdom in the process of leaving our earth and becoming a supratemporal system and part of the divine world (to which in fact it had always belonged).

Egypt. Unlike Mesopotamia, Egypt did not have a “list wisdom” as a preliminary stage of wisdom; instead the sapiential saying (maxim) served as the starting point of a wisdom literature (the various “counsels”). The sapiential saying either contained a simple statement about the world and social relationships or it already connected consequences with specific actions that were either recommended or disapproved. Unlike the Mesopotamians, the ancient Egyptians developed the concept of a cosmic order (*maat*) that became basic to the idea of wisdom. The goddess Maat was a daughter of Re, the sun god, and symbolized truth, justice, and order in cosmos and society. The pharaoh was her representative on earth. The wise had to act like Maat; agreement with her bestowed success, disagreement brought punishment (unhappiness). Subordination to Maat was therefore the mark of the wise. Wisdom supplied the needed rules, which were based on tradition and experience (which included successive reinterpretations). Examples of wisdom or, as Egyptologists prefer to say, of “counsels” or “instructions,” go back to about 2800 BCE. Only the names of the earliest have come down to us (*Instructions of Imhotep*, *Instructions of Djedefhor*). The *Instruction of Ptahhotep* is the oldest surviving document of this genre (fifth dynasty). It is filled with optimism about the order (*maat*) that exists and is known and with an unbroken confidence in the act-consequence connection. Modesty, uprightness, self-control, subordination, silence, are virtues of the wise. The idea of the silent sage influenced Egyptian biographical literature. Citations from the wisdom literature can be demonstrated in numerous inscriptions.

Most of the remaining “instructions” are from the Middle Kingdom (c. 2135–1660 BCE) and are “tendentious writings” that discuss problems of wisdom and are therefore also called “disputation literature.” Among them are the *Instruction for Merikare* (tenth dynasty), in which the first mention is made of the judgment of the dead; the *Instruction of King Amenemhet to His Son Sesostri* (twelfth dynasty), which was probably a model for *Proverbs* 22:17–24:22, although the former is more pessimistic and materialistic; and the *Instruction of Cheti, Son of Duauf*, a piece of publicity for the civil service. The threat to the old order shows through in the *Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage* and the *Protest of the Eloquent Peasant*.

To the period of the New Kingdom (c. 1570–1085 BCE) belong the *Instruction of Ani* (eighteenth dynasty), which defends traditional authority against criticism, and the *Instruction of Amenemope* (twenty-second dynasty), which is strongly pietistic and calls for humility toward the hidden rule of the sun god. From the late period (first millennium CE) we have only the very homespun *Instruction of the Papyrus Insinger* and the instruction of a certain Ankhsheshonk. Characteristic of later wisdom (from the eighteenth dynasty on) is the realization, in Egypt no less than in Babylonia, of the limitations of human knowledge and the freedom of the divinity; this meant that the act-consequence connection, though weakened, was not completely abandoned, but was considered to reside in the impenetrable recesses of the godhead. Authority, tradition, humility, circumspection, and silence continued to be themes of wisdom. In fact, in the late period wisdom and piety came to be more closely identified. Maat yielded to the godhead (Re). Devout individuals had as their partner no longer Maat but God; God became the guarantor of the act-consequence connection, which was hidden from the devout but which they nonetheless humbly accepted as existing. Wisdom now consisted in this knowledge of God and his free will, a knowledge that was familiar to the Bible and probably exerted an influence on it. For that matter, a monotheistic or henotheistic current runs through the entire wisdom literature.

Ancient Israel, Judaism. Israelite wisdom literature (*Proverbs*, *Job*, *Ecclesiastes*) underwent developments comparable to those in Babylonia and Egypt. [See Wisdom Literature.] In its earliest, preexilic form, wisdom is here, as in the ancient Near East generally, not specifically religious but focused on the act-consequence connection in the cosmos and in individual lives (see *Prv.* 22:13–23:11). It is not opposed to faith in Yahveh but on the other hand has only peripheral contacts with it (see *Prv.* 16:1–22, 16:28–29). Yahveh, like the ancient Near Eastern and Egyptian sun god, is guarantor of the cosmic order that governs the lives of human beings.

Wisdom is primarily concerned with this-worldly questions affecting the order and security of human life; observation and insight into what goes on in the world and society play their part here. From a literary standpoint the proverb or maxim is the basic form of transmission (*Proverbs, Ecclesiastes*; later on, the *Book of Ben Sira* and the *Wisdom of Solomon*). Ascription to Solomon (c. 970 BCE) has a historical basis to the extent that international communication (especially with Egypt) flourished during that period (see the *First Book of Kings* 5:9–14). From that time on in Israel, as elsewhere, the “wise man” (*ish ḥakham*) had his place alongside the priest and the prophet, and the area of tradition with which he dealt soon became one of the most important in Israelite literature (see *Ben Sira* 24:3–7).

In its historical development this literature reflects shifting approaches to wisdom until the latter’s crisis and disintegration (*Job, Ecclesiastes*). To begin with, ancient wisdom is increasingly theologized, that is, connected with the Yahvistic faith, but also systematized or dogmatized and reduced to a series of anthropological contrasts (see *Prv.* 10–15). The wise and the foolish are turned into contrasting types, as are the devout and the ungodly, the sensible and the ignorant, and so on. The act-consequence connection changes (in the post-exilic period) to a connection between behavior and its results (*Prv.* 10:30, 11:3–4). Corresponding dualistic traits make their appearance as human beings are divided into the just and the wicked, and the cosmos into good and evil, just and unjust. Wisdom itself withdraws into heaven and is personified (see below). The ancient program of wisdom, which urged insight into human beings and the world through observation and its application, comes under the control of strict monotheism and the doctrine of creation, both of which leave little room for independent human thought. As a result, the crisis of dogmatized wisdom becomes radical and leads in the *Book of Job* to its rejection. As in the Babylonian world, an appeal is made at this point to the inscrutability of God (see *Jb.* 40), a solution that is accepted in later Judaism. At the same time, however, a return to the ancient, authentic concept of wisdom is urged (*Jb.* 38–39): understanding of the world consists in the acknowledgement of its given order, even though insight into it is limited. The most radical break with the wisdom tradition comes in the Hellenistic period in the person of Qohelet (the purported author of *Ecclesiastes*), who abandons the act-consequence connection as a means of insight, is skeptical about an order in the world, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of human existence. Wisdom is no longer available in this world (see also *Jb.* 28). Reverence is still shown toward creation and its distant creator, but the “historicality of

human existence” and its transitory character are thematized for the first time. Qohelet offers no solution for the crisis; the world and human beings remain unintelligible.

This situation, which we meet only in the Bible, had consequences that probably led to the disintegration of the biblical worldview in gnosticism. But Jewish apocalypticism too had some of its roots in wisdom: the removal of wisdom from the world led to an eschatological hope; the introduction of dualism into the cosmos (see above) led to the apocalyptic doctrine of the two kingdoms; historical events had deprived the scribes, who were the transmitters of wisdom, of their ancient theater of operations, the royal court, and they dreamed of its future restoration. Gnosis and apocalyptic were connected.

Hellenistic influence probably played a part also in the complete transformation of the figure of wisdom (Ḥokhmah). It becomes a suprahuman, otherworldly personage, a divine hypostasis (*Prv.* 8:22–31; *Ben Sira* 4:11–19, 24:3–22; *Wis.* 6–9), a mediator of revelation and creation (*Prv.* 3:19, *Ben Sira* 24:3); it is even identified with the Torah, or Law, as the content of the word of God (*Ben Sira* 24:8, 24:23; *1 Bar.* 3:9–4:4). It takes on the traits of a goddess (perhaps Isis Panthea) and, as Lady Wisdom, becomes the antagonist of Lady Folly, another personification, modeled on Aphrodite or Astarte (*Prv.* 7:9–13, 9:1–18). [See Ḥokhmah.] “Kinship” with her, such as the just or the wise have, bestows immortality (*Wis.* 6:17) and even makes one like God (*Wis.* 6:18). This shift from a horizontal role, as an anthropological skill in understanding of the world, to a vertical role leads in the *Wisdom of Solomon* (first century BCE) and then especially in the work of Philo Judaeus (first century CE) to the idea of wisdom (Gr., *sophia*) as an otherworldly figure accessible only through esoteric “knowledge.” Communication with this distant heavenly wisdom is accomplished in the philosophy of Philo through the Logos (the divine intelligible word), which represents “wisdom close to us.” Sophia is thus accessible only through revelation and knowledge of the Logos. It is no longer available in this world, but has vanished from it (*Ethiopic Apocalypse of Enoch* 42:1–8, 4 *Ezr.* 5:9–10, *Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch* 48:36). At this point the way is already being paved for the gnostic conception of wisdom.

Christianity and gnosis. Early Christianity accepted the early Jewish conception of wisdom at various levels. On the one hand, the early Jesus tradition (the purported source of the sayings of Jesus, known as the Q source) took over the ancient Israelite proverbial wisdom (explicit reference is made to Solomon in *Mt.* 12:42, *Lk.* 11:31); on the other hand, Jesus himself is understood as the embodiment of wisdom (*Lk.* 7:35 and

parallels; cf. *Mt.* 23:34–36 with *Lk.* 11:49). He is “filled with wisdom” from his childhood (*Lk.* 2:40, 2:52) and surpasses even Solomon in this respect (*Mt.* 12:42, *Lk.* 11:31). His deeds and teachings demonstrate his wisdom (*Mk.* 6:2, *Mt.* 13:54). Scholars therefore speak of a “wisdom-Christology” as one of the earliest forms of christological statement. In the letters of Paul wisdom plays an important role in his dispute with the community in Corinth (*1 and 2 Corinthians*), where a wisdom that was probably already interpreted in a gnostic manner was being preached and was finding expression in ecstatic utterances (revelations). In response, Paul conceives the momentous idea that Christian wisdom, represented by the Redeemer, is foolishness (*mōria*) to the world, this wisdom being the cross that as sign of the “weakness of God” (*1 Cor.* 1:25) is the very sign of his “strength.” God has destroyed “the wisdom of the wise” and turned it into “foolishness” (*1 Cor.* 1:18–22, 2:6–8). In the presence of the true wisdom of God, which has been revealed in Christ, the traditional wisdom of this world has been reduced to naught, but at the same time it has also been fulfilled. Those who believe in Christ possess “the power of God and the wisdom of God” (*1 Cor.* 1:24, 1:30, 2:10–12, 3:18). Old Testamental and Jewish wisdom literature of two centuries before the common era is here given a completely new interpretation and thereby rescued from the crisis into which it had fallen; on the other hand, limits are also set for any future Christian conception of wisdom. The critical acceptance of ancient wisdom traditions and the ambivalent response of Christian theology to philosophy both have their roots here (see Thomas Aquinas on the one side and Martin Luther on the other). Meanwhile, as the *Letter of James* in particular shows, the principle is still accepted that wisdom shows its truth in ethico-moral practice: Christian life is wisdom made manifest (*Jas.* 3:13–17; cf. *Jas.* 1:5). The ancient idea of wisdom is thus revived here; it becomes a Christian virtue for coping with life.

In my opinion, gnosticism has its roots in those parts of early Jewish sapiential teaching that, like *Ecclesiastes*, challenged the traditional picture of the world. Independently of this heritage from tradition and the history of ideas, gnostic literature too continues to present wisdom in the guise of transmitted sayings, for the most part in Christian form (from the Nag Hammadi corpus, the *Gospel of Thomas* and the *Gospel of Philip*; see also *Silvanus* and the *Sentences of Sextus*), but also in new forms of its own (*The Thunder, Perfect Mind*). Most notable, however, is the figure of Sophia, or Pistis Sophia (“faith wisdom”), an ambivalent embodiment of the gnostic Pleroma, especially in the Barbelo and Valentinian forms of gnosis. [See Sophia.] According to some heresiological accounts and original (Nag Ham-

medi) texts, Sophia is a companion of the most high God; more precisely, she is the feminine aspect of his first manifestation or emanation, whose masculine aspect or consort may be identified with the Primal Man, the Son of man, or Christ (Seth). A second, lesser Sophia must also be included in the series of “syzygies” (paired aeons) that derive from the first pair. Other passages—and these are in the majority—describe Sophia variously as one of the final aeons: the one that, as mother of the demiurge (Ialdabaoth), is indirectly involved in the fate of the created world. But she is simultaneously active in the work of redemption, repairing the harm done by the loss of the spark of light, inasmuch as Sophia herself, split into two parts—an upper and a lower, a greater and a lesser, a part of life and a part of death, of truth and of lie, or simply as Sophia and Achamoth (the Aramaic word for “wisdom”)—suffers in an exemplary fashion the fate of the fall and redemption. This version is characteristic of the so-called Barbelo gnostics and of the Valentinians; it is also attributed to the Cainites and the Ophites, as well as to the Sethians. Several texts from Nag Hammadi also belong here (e.g., *Apocryphon of John, Hypostasis of the Archons, Gospel of the Egyptians, Trimorphic Protennoia*). Gnostic wisdom (*sophia*) serves to express many sides of gnostic thought. It serves as an image of the self-estrangement of God in emanation and reflection; thus it represents the feminine aspect in God, while leaving his perfect unity undiminished. But Wisdom is also (as aeon) the consort of the Savior and is intimately connected with both demiurgic (cosmological) and soteriological processes. This has nothing to do with feminist ideas; behind it, rather, stands the heritage of the Jewish wisdom tradition in its later form.

Iran and Zoroastrianism. It is often forgotten that Iran too has produced an extensive wisdom literature that goes by the Middle Persian name of *handarz* (early New Persian, *andarz*), meaning “advice, instruction.” This too has been handed down in various forms of *gnomai*. It is preserved only in Middle Persian, but it doubtless had Avestan (Old Iranian) precursors (such as the now lost *Barish nask*). At the center of this literature is “wisdom” (MPers., *khrad*, or *xrat*), whose representatives or transmitters were kings of the prehistoric period (e.g., Jam, Ōshnar) and the Sasanid period (e.g., Chosrau I), viziers (e.g., Wazurgmihr ī Bokhtagān), and priests (e.g., Ādurbad ī Mahraspandān). Here again collection and transmission were the work of priestly schools or the (fire) temples. Since thought, along with speech and action, played a dominant role in Zoroastrianism, great attention was paid to the teaching of religious knowledge. This knowledge was identified with wisdom. But in fact the “knowledge” in question was not only religious, theological, and cultic.

Iran had either taken over (via Hellenism) or had itself produced a great deal of secular knowledge.

Nonetheless, the religious framework within which the wisdom tradition was placed played a very important role. According to one of the principal works, *Mēnōg ī Khrad* (Spirit of Wisdom), all wisdom flows from a single wisdom that goes back to God. Two works in particular are important in this context. One is the sixth book of the encyclopedia *Dēnkard* (Acts of Religion); the other is *Dādīstān ī Mēnōg ī Khrad* (Book of Judgments of the Spirit of Wisdom). Both originated in the Sasanid period but preserve older material as well. Book 6 of the *Dēnkard* goes back in part to the Avestan *Barish nask*; other material comes from oral tradition. Its content is largely religious and has to do with Zoroastrian teaching on cleanliness; it is therefore highly ritualistic in character. In this context wisdom is correct knowledge and correspondingly correct behavior in things-religious. "This world was created by Ōhrmazd the Lord [Av., Ahura Mazdā] with knowledge (*dānāgih*). He maintains it with sagacity (*frazānagīh*) and manliness (*mardābagīh*); ultimately He will become joyful through it" (Shaked, 1979, sec. 311). This is interpreted as follows by the sages (*dānāgān*): "The thing of Wisdom (*khrad*) is this: sagacity (*frazānagīh*), manliness (*mardābagīh*) and the hope of the Renovation" (*ibid.*, sec. 312). The same passage goes on to say: "The substance of wisdom (*khrad*) is similar to that of fire. For nothing in this world may become so perfect as that which is done by wisdom (*khrad*)" (*ibid.*, sec. 313). In the *Dēnkard*, "character" (*khēm* or *xēm*) is superior even to wisdom, since "wisdom is in character; and religion is in both wisdom and character" (*ibid.*, sec. 6; see also sec. 2). Ōhrmazd creates creatures through "character," "holds them with wisdom, and takes them back to himself by religion" (*ibid.*, sec. 11).

In other, more secular *handarz* texts wisdom is at the head of the virtues and leads human beings to a knowledge of their duties. Ōhrmazd created the following spiritual realities that help human beings to that goal: "innate wisdom, acquired wisdom, character, hope, contentment, religion [*dēn*], and the consultation of the wise" (*Āyadgar ī Wazurgmīhr* 43, cited in Shaked, 1979, p. xxvi). Acquired wisdom is gained through education; innate wisdom preserves human beings from fear and sin. Clearly, in Zoroastrianism wisdom is firmly embedded in a religious context (although secular wisdom is not completely absent). Wisdom is primarily a matter of Zoroastrian knowledge; the latter defines its essence. It is therefore the duty of the faithful to follow the "wise" (teachers, priests) and ask them questions; association with them brings God close to one. Parts of Iranian wisdom literature, however, are also marked by a fatalistic pessimism reminiscent of *Ecclesiastes*

(Shaked, 1979, sec. D). "Destiny" (*bakht*, *brēh*, *zamān*) determines human beings; their action is geared to its accomplishment. We see here the influence of Iranian teaching on fate (i.e., Zurvanism), an influence also to be seen in modern Persian literature wherever this is in continuity with ancient Iranian wisdom traditions (proverbial literature, didactic poetry).

Wisdom clearly emerges as a heavenly person or hypostasis, the Spirit of Wisdom (*Mēnōg ī Khrad*), in the work of the same name. Wisdom is here viewed as one of the "holy immortals" (Amahraspandān; Av., Amesha Spentas); in fact, the author devotes more prayers to her than to the others (1.53). She is "original wisdom (*āsn khrad*) from the heavens and the worlds"; she dwells with Ōhrmazd and combines all wisdom in herself (57.3–32); she was created by Ōhrmazd (8.3, 8.8), and through her he created the world (1.11, 1.49, 57.5); through her Ōhrmazd keeps the world in existence (1.12). Her most important function is instruction or, as the case may be, revelation. Each of the sixty-two chapters following upon the introduction to the work begins with questions by an (anonymous) "wise man" (*dānāg*), which Wisdom then answers at length. The book is thus a compendium or catechism of Zoroastrianism and derives its authority from the heavenly wisdom of God. The "wise man" who passes its contents on is evidently a representative of the Zoroastrian community or priesthood. He had wandered through the world, from land to land and city to city, looking for wisdom, until he realized that true wisdom was to be found in his religion; then this wisdom appeared to him in bodily form as Ōhrmazd's Spirit of Wisdom (*Mēnōg ī Khrad*) and instructed him (1.14–61). The most likely equivalent of this Wisdom in the Avesta is Vohu Manah (Vahuman, Vahman), the Good Mind; "primordial or inherent wisdom" (*āsn khrad*) is found in *Yasna* 22.25 and 25.18 (*āsnō khratush*) in connection with the Zoroastrian concept of faith ("the innate understanding Mazda-made").

India. Some of the earliest Indian wisdom literature is found in the collections of proverbial wisdom that were made for rulers or kings, as, for example, the well-known *Pañcatantra* or the *Hitopadeśa* (Instruction in What Is Beneficial). The *Mahābhārata*, the Indian national epic, contains in its didactic sections a good deal of ancient wisdom tradition; this includes the *Bhagavadgītā* in particular. The important part played by knowledge or insight (*jñāna*) in ancient Indian thought (especially in the Upaniṣads) has given wisdom a central position in India. [See *Jñāna*.] It is difficult to distinguish this wisdom from philosophy, and philosophy in turn from religion; each shares in the character of the others. The *Bhagavadgītā* praises "the way of knowledge or wisdom" in preference to the way of action (*karman*): "A man of faith, intent on wisdom (*jñāna*), his senses

(all) restrained, wins wisdom; and, wisdom won, he will come right soon to perfect peace" (4.39; trans. Robert C. Zaehner, *The Bhagavad-Gita*, London, 1973). Brahmanic philosophy or religion did not, however, reach the point of personifying wisdom or knowledge. This step was taken only in Buddhism, in which the Indian ideal of knowledge, the way to deliverance from the cycle of births (*samsāra*) without reliance on the priestly tradition or extreme asceticism took new forms. But the objectification (hypostatization) of redemptive knowledge or transcendental wisdom (*prajñā*; Pali, *pañña*) came only in Mahāyāna Buddhism, beginning in about 100 BCE in southern or northern India. A whole literature arose (originally in Sanskrit) consecrated to what it termed the "perfection of wisdom" (*prajñāpāramitā*; lit., "the wisdom that has gone beyond"). The earliest *Prajñāpāramitā* works were composed between 100 BCE and 150 CE; from the fourth to the seventh centuries CE compendia and short versions were redacted under the influence of the Mādhyamika school; from the sixth century on, Tantrism also gained control of these texts and gave them ritualistic interpretations (to the extent even of introducing antinomian practices). As mentioned above, there are a number of parallels between the Buddhist and the early Jewish conceptions of wisdom. The Buddhist "wisdom books" (Conze, 1975) introduce a specifically new type of knowledge about redemption: an insight into the "emptiness" (*sūnyatā*) of existence that promises deliverance. These teachings are presented in the form of dialogues between the Buddha and some of his disciples. The manner of presentation lends authority to the new teaching and gives it canonical status. Here the virtue (*pāramitā*) of "insight" (*prajñā*, *pañña*), perhaps under the influence of the South Indian mother goddess, is sometimes personified as a goddess of wisdom, *Prajñāpāramitā*. In this form she is regarded as "mother" of all the Buddhas (*buddhāmātī*, *jināna mātā*) and *bodhisattvas*.

If a mother with many sons had fallen ill,
They all, sad in mind, would busy themselves about her:
Just so also the Buddhas in the world-systems in the ten
directions
Bring to mind this *perfection of wisdom* as their mother.
The Saviours of the world who were in the past, and
also those that are (just now) in the ten directions,
Have issued from her, and so will the future ones be.
She is the one who shows the world (for what it is), she
is the genetrix, the mother of the Jinās,
And she reveals the thought and action of other beings.
(Conze, 1973, p. 31)

Prajñāpāramitā is depicted iconographically with two, four, six, ten, or twelve arms. Her color is gold or white; her symbols are the lotus and a book (colored blue or red). She often resembles depictions of Mañjuśrī

(the male personification of wisdom) or Sarasvatī (the Hindu goddess of learning, eloquence, and intelligence) or Avalokiteśvara, Tārā, and Cunda. [See Mañjuśrī; Avalokiteśvara; Sarasvatī; and Tārā.] To ordinary Buddhists she is a goddess who can be invoked and who bestows merit, well-being, and blessing. Buddhist theologians, however, see in her simply a "spiritual" manifestation of redemptive or enlightening ("bodhi-giving") wisdom, which contains and sustains all things and is called "mother of enlightenment." Here the very essence of Buddhist doctrine is manifested and personified. The various interpretations of this doctrine in the Mahāyāna schools (Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Tantra) are also reflected in the figure of *Prajñāpāramitā* and the literature about her. One of the best-known hymns to her was composed by Rahulabhadra (c. 150 CE):

Homage to Thee, Perfect Wisdom,
Boundless, and transcending thought!
All Thy limbs are without blemish,
Faultless those who Thee
discern. . . .
Teachers of the world, the Buddhas,
Are Thine own compassionate sons;
Then art Thou, O Blessed Lady,
Grandam thus of beings all. . . .
When as fearful Thou appearest
Thou engender'st fear in fools;
When benignly Thou appearest
Comes assurance to the wise. . . .
By all Buddhas, Single Buddhas,
By Disciples courted, too,
Thou the one path to salvation,
There's no other verily. . . .
By my praise of Perfect Wisdom
All the merit I may rear,
Let that make the world devoted
To this wisdom without peer.
(Conze, 1959, pp. 168–171)

The Tantric school produced magical incantations or formulas (*mantras*) for *Prajñāpāramitā*, which were given by the goddess herself. The recitation of these sayings has liberating power; it is also meritorious on behalf of others. In this form of Buddhism the figure of Wisdom unites in itself all aspects of religion, both in theory and in practice. In fact, *Prajñāpāramitā* is probably its most notable expression. [See also *Prajñā*; *Tathatā*; *Upāya*; *Buddhism, Schools of*, *article on Mahāyāna Buddhism*; and *Goddess Worship*, *article on The Hindu Goddess*.]

China. Finally, I shall add a brief word on China, where, in contrast to India, wisdom has minimal connections with religion. In Confucianism it has an unambiguously ethico-moral character. [See *Confucian Thought*.] We are reminded of the Greeks when we find wisdom consisting in the avoidance of extremes and the

following of the mean. *Chih* ("wisdom") is one of the five cardinal virtues that characterize the Confucian "wise man" (*chün-tzu*). It includes knowledge of human nature and society, a command of language, and a practical behavior that obeys the Confucian rules (*li*). [See *Li*.] "The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom (*chih*)" (Fung Yu-lan, 1952, vol. 1, p. 121). Every human being has the native ability to become wise and needs only instruction and practice, since in the prevailing Chinese view human nature is good (another point reminiscent of Greek thought). [See *the biography of Meng-tzu*.] Confucianism nonetheless also offers the ideal of the "noble man" or "holy man" (*sheng-jen*) who surpasses even the wise man, since he complies perfectly with all the principles (*li*), lives in harmony with nature and society, and thus is the peerless teacher of an age. The ancient meaning of wisdom as the practical management of life through knowledge of the world and human beings has probably found its most impressive development in China and has for thousands of years profoundly shaped the character of the people. Wisdom is embodied in behavior and can be acquired by practice; it then becomes a habitual attitude.

[See also Knowledge and Ignorance.]

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Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

WISDOM LITERATURE. [This entry consists of two articles. *Biblical Books* is a discussion of the corpus of biblical writings identified as wisdom literature. *Theoretical Perspectives* discusses attempts to extend the concept of wisdom literature to nonbiblical bodies of literature and assesses the usefulness of the concept in religious studies. For a discussion of the parameters of the concept of wisdom, mainly in biblical but also in Jewish postbiblical literature, see *Ḥokhmah*. For a definition of wisdom as a form of religious knowledge, and a survey of the traditions that attach significance to it, see *Wisdom*.]

Biblical Books

Certain books within the Hebrew scriptures stand out as significantly different from the narrative and legal material comprising the Pentateuch as well as from prophetic and apocalyptic literature. This "alien corpus" is altogether silent with regard to the dominant themes found in the rest of the Bible, for example the promise to the patriarchs, the deliverance from Egypt, the Mosaic covenant, the centrality of Jerusalem and the Davidic dynasty, the prophetic word, and so forth. In the place of such emphases one finds ideas and literary forms that are closer to certain Egyptian and Mesopotamian works. That literary corpus contains a rational principle of the cosmic order that is worthy of

study (*hokhmah* in ancient Israel, *maat* in Egypt, *me* in Mesopotamia) and expresses a belief that conduct in accord with this principle brings well-being. Or the literature gives voice to various levels of doubt about the validity of this understanding of reality, a skepticism spawned by life's inequities. Since study of the underlying principle of the universe rather than proclamation of the divine word comes to prominence here, modern scholars designate these texts as wisdom literature.

Characteristics of Wisdom Literature. Decisive differences do exist between Israel's sapiential literature, on the one hand, and certain texts written in Egypt and Mesopotamia on the other. Egyptian wisdom functioned almost exclusively at the royal court. Its aim was to provide proper education for future bureaucrats in the pharaoh's court. Accordingly, this literature largely assumed the form of instruction (e.g., the *Instruction of Ptahhotep*, the *Instruction of King Amenemhet to His Son Sesotris*, and the *Instruction for Merikare*) and its setting was usually the scribal school (praise of which occurs in Papyrus Sallier, Papyrus Anastasi, and the *Instruction of a Man for His Son*.) In Mesopotamia the study of school texts also played an important role, but the fundamental feature of wisdom was cultic, indeed, magical, and the goal of wisdom was to manipulate the paraphernalia of the cult in order to ensure one's existence.

Israelite wisdom finds primary expression in the books of *Proverbs*, *Job*, and *Ecclesiastes* within the Palestinian (Masoretic) canon and in *Ben Sira* (*Ecclesiasticus*) and the *Wisdom of Solomon* in the Alexandrian canon (the Septuagint). Its influence extends beyond these texts to *Psalms* (Ps. 1, 19, 33, 39, 49, 127) and various other books. The precise extent of this influence is the subject of considerable discussion; scholars have claimed much of the Hebrew scriptures for the sages (*Genesis* 1–11, the Joseph story, *Deuteronomy*, *Amos*, *Isaiah*, *Micah*, *Jonah*, *Habakkuk*, *Esther*, the succession narrative in *2 Samuel* 9–20, *1 Kings* 1–2, and more). While such claims appear to be exaggerated, they do serve as a reminder that the sages did not dwell in isolation from the prophets, priests, and raconteurs in ancient Israel.

With the exception of *Job*, these Israelite wisdom books are pseudonymous. There is no historical basis for the attribution of the older collections within *Proverbs* to Solomon or for Solomonian authorship of *Ecclesiastes* and *Wisdom of Solomon*; in Egyptian wisdom literature pseudonymity and literary fiction of royal authorship also play a significant role. The unique example of pride of authorship is Yehoshu'a ben Sira, the author of *Ben Sira*, who claims to have run a school about 190 BCE during the high priesthood of Shim'on II. Confirmation of this date comes from information pro-

vided by Ben Sira's grandson, who translated the Hebrew text into Greek around 132 BCE, and from the hymn in praise of Shim'on. *Proverbs* contains several different collections from various times, some of which may be preexilic. *Ecclesiastes* probably comes from the end of the third century BCE, while *Wisdom of Solomon* is known to be considerably later, because it was written in Greek and because its thought patterns and rhetoric are thoroughly hellenized. In dating *Ecclesiastes*, grammar and syntax seem conclusive. *Job* is particularly hard to date, but a combination of things, including both language and thought, suggest the sixth century BCE or slightly later.

Themes, Literary Type, and Function. In general, wisdom literature comprises two quite distinct types: brief observations about the nature of reality and instructions deriving from experience or extensive reflection on the deeper meaning of life. The former are formulated in parallel half lines for the most part; one statement is thus balanced by another, either synonymously or antithetically. Three variants are "Better is this than that" (e.g., *Prv.* 15:16); a graded numerical proverb, such as "Three things . . . yea, four" (e.g., *Prv.* 30:18–19); and "There is . . ." (e.g., *Prv.* 20:15). Most of these brief aphorisms are complete in themselves, although larger paragraphs appear in the latest collection in *Proverbs* 1–9, *Ecclesiastes*, and, especially, *Ben Sira*, constituting paragraphs that resemble brief essays on a specific topic. Speculative wisdom literature (*Job* and *Ecclesiastes*) prefers dialogue and monologue as its peculiar mode of expression.

Another way of categorizing various types of wisdom literature derives from the four uses to which the texts were put: juridical, experiential, theological, and natural. Since the king was the final court of appeal, and since society relied on royal power to implement justice, the judicial ability to ferret out the truth amid competing claims was greatly prized, as the widely disseminated story about Solomon's royal verdict in the case of two harlots' dispute over a surviving infant suggests (*1 Kgs.* 3:16–28). Experiential wisdom encompasses the overwhelming majority of biblical proverbs. These represent conclusions based on experience, and they endeavor to assist others in the difficult task of coping. Some are content with stating the way things are; others engage the pedagogic enterprise with zeal, offering warnings and motivations for following a particular path of conduct. Theological wisdom is concerned with the first principle of knowledge in religious devotion, the fear of the Lord. It speculates on the presence or absence on earth of the divine rational principle (personified wisdom), and sometimes equates revelation of Torah and human reasoning. Natural wisdom refers

to encyclopedic data about heavenly bodies, atmospheric conditions, wild animals, and so forth. Although prominent in Egypt and Mesopotamia, such noun lists (onomastics) did not survive in biblical wisdom, although the divine speeches in the *Book of Job* resemble them in some ways.

The function of Israelite wisdom literature is by no means clear, partly because of the difficulty in tracing the history of this sort of thinking. At least three distinct stages seem likely. Wisdom's earliest phase seems to have coincided with early clan existence, when parents instructed their children in the ways of the world. The vast majority of proverbs attributed to Solomon may well have arisen in this early period because they rarely reflect the situation of the royal court. In the second phase, with Solomon perhaps, and certainly with Hezekiah, wisdom makes itself at home in the court. This phase placed a distinct mark on only a few proverbs, although it did evoke a tradition about "men of Hezekiah" who transmitted the collection in *Proverbs* 25–29. With *Ben Sira* the third phase comes to light, school wisdom. Precisely when this phenomenon first surfaced remains hidden. Certainly, the first epilogue to *Ecclesiastes* (12:9–12) identifies the unknown author of that book as a "wise man" who taught "the people," and the strange pen name *Qohelet* has often been interpreted as one who summoned people to a place of worship and study. (It is more likely that the word alludes to his assembling of proverbs about life's absurdity.)

School Texts. For various reasons, several scholars have proposed that biblical wisdom literature originated in Israel in monarchic or premonarchic times as texts for study in schools. This theory is based on analogy with schools in the pharaoh's court and in the Mesopotamian temple precincts. Israel's familiarity with international wisdom cannot be denied; witness Solomon's relations with Egypt, the incorporation of a portion of the *Instruction of Amenemope* in *Proverbs* 22:17–23:33, and the *Sayings of Agur and of Lemuel's Mother* in *Proverbs* 30:1–4 and 31:1–9. Corroborative evidence has come from the nature of canonical wisdom—its exceptional literary quality, its conscious rhetoric and pedagogic thrust. To these have recently been added data from Palestinian inscriptions (alphabetic series, drawings, inaccurate spellings, transposed letters, large and poorly formed consonants, and so forth). None of this evidence is altogether compelling, although its cumulative force merits consideration. The preservation of wisdom literature implies such a group of individuals, whether they attended a formal institution or not. At least one scholar has simply called this phenomenon "Israel's intellectual tradition."

Internal evidence suggests that the *Book of Proverbs*

was written for the instruction of young men. That conclusion seems inevitable for at least two reasons: the direct address to "my son" and the extensive warning against the foreign woman, Dame Folly, together with the erotic language about Dame Wisdom, which is appropriate only if the audience is male. This erotic language becomes fully evident in the *Wisdom of Solomon* where readers are invited to strive for marriage with Sophia ("wisdom"), here a divine attribute. Male dominance also explains the misogyny within canonical wisdom, particularly in *Ben Sira* but also in *Ecclesiastes* (although this explanation has been disputed). If the author of the epilogue to *Ecclesiastes* is trustworthy, a democratization may have taken place under this collector of sayings who taught "the people."

Wisdom as a Way of Thinking. Just what did the teachers wish to communicate to their students? The sages endeavored to discover ways to secure one's existence and to enrich it, as in *Ecclesiastes'* question "What is good for humans?" Their ultimate goal was to achieve life's good things: a good name, longevity, wealth, wise children. Believing that the creator had implanted within the universe the secrets to success, these sages looked for analogies that unlocked the doors to such insight. Observation of nature and human nature, the study of animals and insects—these were the ways in which they obtained information that was then applied to their own concrete situation. They also moved beyond the visible universe to speculate about God's nature and activity, and even their quest for pleasure was grounded in religious conviction. Since order in society, like cosmic order, is divinely ordained, the wise individual is not disruptive of society. Entirely missing, therefore, is the prophetic sense of social revolution. In its place prudence reigns, and a calculated use of bribes, silence, and the concealment of real thoughts and feelings. Self-control and the right word were their aim. The seekers of wisdom sought to know the appropriate word or proper deed for a given occasion, the one that would confirm their membership in the company of the wise and therefore the righteous.

A Crisis of the Intellect. Experience was sometimes ambiguous, forcing the wise to question their own hardened dogmas. That was especially the case with regard to the conviction that virtue flourished and vice resulted in calamity. Belief in reward and retribution evoked powerful protests from the authors of *Job* and *Ecclesiastes*. In Mesopotamia a similar crisis of faith produced such works as the Sumerian *A Man and His God*, *I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom*, the Babylonian *Theodicy*, and the *Dialogue of a Master and Slave*. Furthermore, to the biblical sages life was infinitely more complex than their proverbial formulations might suggest.

They therefore ventured to speculate about things that could not be verified in experience. Religion thus emerged into prominence, both as the essential ingredient of all knowledge and as a faith claim. Whereas Yahvism tended to ground its claims in history, the wise took creation as their starting point. They even posited a feminine principle (*hokhmah*) as active in the process of creation (*Prv.* 8:22–31), eventually identifying it with the Torah of Moses (*Sir.* 24:23). In general, creation faith functions to undergird belief in divine justice; only the creator has sufficient power and knowledge to assure justice on earth. As long as sages believed in the power of the human intellect to secure their existence, grace remained in the background. In time, loss of faith in the power of wisdom creates a vacuum into which competing forces come. These opposing responses are pessimism and divine mercy, and their spokesmen are *Ecclesiastes* and *Ben Sira*, respectively.

Skepticism's roots go back a long way prior to the time of *Ecclesiastes* (e.g., *Jgs.* 6:13, *Prv.* 14:1, 14:13, 16:9, 16:33). Integral to the earliest sapiential expression is the concession that human ingenuity has its definite limits. Those who devise plans for battle must ultimately acquiesce before an incalculable divine will. Life has its mystery, which cannot be penetrated. Even instances of injustice cropped up now and then. In time, those cracks in the fundamental conviction of the sages became more frequent, and the idea of wisdom's hiddenness suddenly emerged as a viable epistemological option. The poem, probably by another author, that has been inserted into the *Book of Job* (28) marvels at the remarkable achievements humans have to their credit but expresses the opinion that wisdom is accessible to God alone. The author of *Ecclesiastes* admits that wisdom is very deep, so much so that it cannot be fathomed. Ben Sira cannot endorse such skepticism, although he does advise against trying to understand that which is too difficult. In a sense, the nature of human knowledge has been greatly qualified as a consequence of man's limited powers.

Sometimes an inability to comprehend life's mysteries ends in awe rather than skepticism. That is the insight put forth with poetic brilliance in the *Book of Job*. The decisive issue here is whether faith can transcend self-interest. To be sure, the book offers counsel on how to respond when trouble strikes innocent victims, but even more central is the issue of whether anyone will serve God for nothing. Job's final submission before a self-manifesting deity points to a wholly different response from that of skepticism or banality: a bowed knee and silenced protest, a seeing with the eye of faith. A similar response occurs in Psalm 73, which is often

included in discussions of wisdom literature, where the believer comes close to abandoning the faith because of the prosperity of the wicked but in the end recognizes God's presence as the highest good.

Wisdom as a Tradition. Such shifts in perspective indicate that the wise were very much aware of history even if they did not ground their teachings in it. Indeed, a decisive transition takes place in the early second century with Ben Sira. In part a result of the Hellenistic environment within which he wrote, this borrowing of various features from Yahvism, for example, references to the primeval history, patriarchs, and prophets, was Ben Sira's way of salvaging the ancient teaching in a changing society. By means of mythological speculation he was able to identify earlier revelation with divine wisdom (*Sir.* 24:23) and locate its residence in Jerusalem (*Sir.* 24:1–12). Again and again Ben Sira alludes to biblical stories, until finally he compiles a hymn in praise of ancient heroes of the faith (*Sir.* 44:50).

The unknown author of *Wisdom of Solomon* continued Ben Sira's reliance on canonical tradition as a framework, particularly the account of Egyptian bondage and divine deliverance. This Exodus material generated unusual interest for the Jews who resided in Alexandria a millennium later. In this instance the author reflects on the events of the Exodus in Midrashic style; the running comments on scripture are designed to evoke psychological factors such as dread even though the central focus is a frontal attack on idolatry. Nevertheless, the Hebraic tradition shares equal billing with the Hellenic, and this is entirely new for the wisdom literature. The Greek influence is considerable: the style is replete with Greek rhetoric, and the content is equally Greek in origin, including the four cardinal virtues, the notion of immortality, the twenty-two attributes of deity, the description of the curriculum in a local school, the rhetorical device called *sorites*, and much more.

Personified Wisdom. The change within wisdom thinking from the sixth to the first century BCE is nowhere clearer than in the notion of personified wisdom. In the latest collection of *Proverbs* (1–9) Wisdom appears in the guise of a teacher; here she invites and threatens young men, seeking to deliver them from Dame Folly. In *Proverbs* 8 Dame Wisdom is a celestial figure who assists God in creation; she is the manifestation of divine thought, depicted in veiled erotic language. Interpreters have often compared this theologoumenon to the Isis myth and to the teachings about the Egyptian goddess Maat. Elsewhere in *Proverbs* (3:16), Wisdom holds life in her right hand, riches and honor in her left hand, just as Maat is depicted as holding in each hand emblems that symbolize these qualities. In

the *Book of Job* there is mention of an impenetrable wisdom who is known to the underworld by rumor but to whom only God has direct access (*Jb.* 28:20–28).

In contrast, Ben Sira writes that wisdom existed in heaven but searched the whole earth for a place of residence and finally chose Jerusalem as a permanent abode. This celestial figure then loses her enigmatic character, however, and becomes identical with the Mosaic law. Divine wisdom is thereby domesticated on earth, and Greek philosophy and the Hebraic tradition become equal in this aspect. In *Wisdom of Solomon* this heavenly figure is a divine attribute that guides the chosen people to their destiny. Those who desire to succeed in life must win her favor, and she is therefore to be courted like a bride.

To sum up, poetic imagery in *Proverbs* has by the time of *Wisdom of Solomon* become an actual figure who functions to bring well-being to God's people. By way of *Ben Sira* this imagery was particularized to refer to an actual body of literature, the Mosaic law. From first to last, however, wisdom's role in the initial act of creation was an active one. The intention was to give a name to the order that governs reality itself and thus to suggest a universe in which right thinking and acting would prosper. The author of *Ecclesiastes*, who did not endorse such faith, maintained silence with regard to personified wisdom. Instead, he echoes one feature of the poem in *Job* 28: the profundity of wisdom and, therefore, its hiddenness (*Eccl.* 7:23–29).

A Corpus of Literature. The thesis of a shift in wisdom thinking that took place with *Ben Sira* and *Wisdom of Solomon* does not imply monolithic thought prior to the second century, but it does assume that certain essentials held the literature together despite individual characteristics. A closer look at the actual contents of this literature may illustrate this point.

Proverbs. The *Book of Proverbs* comprises at least nine separate collections, four major ones—(I) 1–9, (II) 10:1–22:16, (III) 22:17–24:22, (IV) 25–29—and five minor ones—(V) 24:23–34, (VI) 30:1–9, (VII) 30:10–33, (VIII) 31:1–9, (IX) 31:10–31. Two (VI and VIII) are attributed to foreign authors (Agur and King Lemuel's mother, respectively), and another (III) makes extensive use of an Egyptian source (Amenemope). Three (I, II, and IV) are credited to King Solomon, and one (V; cf. III) is simply called "More Sayings of the Wise." Only two brief collections (VII and IX) have no superscriptions. The probable order of dating is IV, II, III, and V, from oldest to most recent; the relative ordering of the others is uncertain. The initial collection is probably the latest one, with the possible exception of IX. Affinities with Canaanite literature suggest an early date for

VI and VIII, but their religious content renders the issue unclear. In any event, much of the material probably arose in preexilic times.

In the older collections the dominant form is a single verse parallel with another. The parallel verse may be synonymous, antithetical, or ascending (climactic). Each brief aphorism registers an observation that compels assent; therefore, the sentence argues from what is presumed to be a general consensus. The other major proverb type is the instruction, which urges a particular course of action and reinforces it with threats of punishment or promises of reward. Instruction pervades the latest collection, but the decision about the date of composition is not based on form. In Egypt "instructions" (a form that has its own genre identification, and covers a wide spectrum of texts) date from very early times, while the late *Teaching of 'Onkhsheshonqy* resembles the brief aphorisms in the earliest collections of *Proverbs*. Thus we see that dating from form is tricky. In the later biblical material single proverbs give way to brief essays, some of which make their point by citing a proverb and developing it. *Ben Sira* develops this trend so that paragraph units result. In *Proverbs* one finds extended treatments of such themes as the relative value of various professions (38:24–39:11), the place of physicians in society since God punishes the wicked by sending illness (38:1–15), duty to parents, drunkenness (19:1–3), headstrong daughters (42:9–11), dreams, discipline (30:7–13), passions (40:1–11), and shame (41:16–42:8). The different form in *Proverbs* 1–9 is accompanied by a more self-conscious theology. Whereas wisdom literature throughout the ancient Near East prefers the general name for God, these chapters use the name *Yahveh* quite freely. Furthermore, they insist that the fear of the Lord is the *sine qua non* of true intelligence. It is possible that one passage (6:20–35) draws on language from *Deuteronomy* in juxtaposing the fire of lust and the lamp of parental instruction. In these chapters, too, personified wisdom functions to mediate divine presence. Accordingly, she addresses the people in the manner of a prophet or a prophetic depiction of God, and she offers life itself.

There are some brief sayings elsewhere in the *Book of Proverbs* that are wholly secular in tone. That does not necessarily indicate an early date. It is more likely that religious and secular proverbs existed simultaneously but that they served different constituencies. Some of these secular sayings call attention to social inequities without any indication that such situations should be rectified. Other proverbs identify areas in which humans confront their limits. Those who wage war can make careful plans, but the battle's outcome rests in

divine hands. This awareness of finitude crops up in Egyptian wisdom as well, where royal wisdom abounds. The attribution of wisdom to Solomon is therefore an interesting parallel, although it cannot be known whether this tradition of Solomonic authorship has any basis in history. One thing appears certain: the supposed Solomonic enlightenment never existed, and the type of wisdom credited to that king in *1 Kings* 4:29–34 (English version) does not correspond with sayings in the collections bearing his name. Nevertheless, Solomon may have sponsored a group of sages in his court, as Hezekiah did in the late eighth century. These sages may have shown their appreciation by attaching the king's name to their compositions. Unfortunately, these collections do not require an assumption of courtly provenance, although they do contain an occasional reference to royalty. The same is true of *Proverbs* 25:2, which states that God's glory consists in concealing things, whereas a king's glory lies in searching them out.

In general, the thrust of the sayings in the *Book of Proverbs* has a universal quality. Similar aphorisms exist in Egyptian wisdom and, to a lesser extent, in Mesopotamian. The biblical proverbs contrast the wise and the foolish (called the silent and the heated in Egyptian wisdom literature), offer advice on table manners, warn against laziness and sexual debauchery, endorse eloquence, observe human foibles for what they are, talk about responsibilities in given vocations, compare human conduct to that of animals or insects, encourage strict discipline of children, inculcate respect for parents and persons in authority, and treat social relations in all their complexity. Extended treatises occur outside the initial collection on significant issues, for instance, the dangers of strong drink and the virtues of a good wife.

The Book of Job. The fundamental presupposition underlying virtually all these proverbs is a belief in reward and retribution. The universal creator oversees the governance of the universe and makes certain that those who merit life's good things receive them. The author of the *Book of Job* questions this principle, although at first the argument set forth by his hero rests on the very premise it refuses to acknowledge. Were it not for this principle, Job would have no basis on which to complain, since there would be no anticipated correlation between conduct and life situation. The author of *Ecclesiastes* is much more thorough in rejecting this dogma, for in his view time and chance strike everyone without respect to behavior. In both cases, later tampering with the author's final product has radically altered its meaning.

The *Book of Job* resembles disputes in Mesopotamian

wisdom (such as *I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom*), but it also has elements of a lament (one critic has called the book a paradigm of an answered lament). An old folk tale in epic prose sets the stage for the poetic dispute: a patient Job loses everything and praises God nonetheless until God rewards him by doubling his original possessions. Apart from this narrative framework, *Job* consists of a dispute between Job and his three friends and a second dispute between God and Job. Speeches by the youthful Elihu interrupt these two disputes; like the poem in *Job* 28, these speeches (*Jb.* 32–37) are probably secondary. The hero of the poetic speeches is far from patient. Instead, he complains bitterly because God has become a stranger to him for no discernible reason. Although his three friends encourage him to pray for forgiveness, Job insists that he has done nothing to deserve such harsh treatment. His bitterness arises from a sense of an oppressive divine presence and an awareness that the deity he once knew can no longer be found. Now and again Job entertains the notion that a vindicator will set things right and establish his innocence. At last, despairing of assistance from his friends, Job utters an oath of innocence highly reminiscent of Egyptian cultic practice and challenges God to slay him or confirm his oath of purity (*Jb.* 31). God responds to the challenge but hardly in the way Job expected (*Jb.* 38–41). In a style similar to school questions in Egyptian texts, the deity addresses Job with a host of questions that force him to look beyond his own situation and survey the vast scope of creation. The shift in focus corrects Job's anthropocentricity while acknowledging divine solicitude for wild creatures beyond the parameters of human habitation. The divine speeches evoke a feeling of unworthiness in Job, who confesses that this new insight about God overshadows his former knowledge as immediate information does secondhand information. The resolution comes through repentance, if that is the true meaning of Job's final response to God. The Mesopotamian parallels to *Job* find their answer in the cultic realm, and proper ritual plays a significant role.

Ecclesiastes. Israel's contribution to skeptical literature, the *Book of Ecclesiastes*, presents reflections on life's vanity and concludes that everything is empty, like breath itself. Purporting to be written by the wisest and wealthiest king in Israel, it claims that all pursuits achieve no lasting results. For this book's author, wisdom no longer possesses the power to guarantee success; all human endeavors amount to a senseless "chasing after wind." He feels that even though some sages claim to know the truth about reality, they do not really penetrate to the heart of things (8:17). The great shadow hanging over life is death, which makes no distinctions

between good and bad people or between animals and humans. The universe is out of kilter, and God is indifferent to what takes place on earth (9:11–12). As a consequence humans are advised to follow a path of moderation, to be neither overly righteous (like Job) nor excessively wicked (7:15–18). Such dark thoughts eventuate in hatred for life (2:17), and stillborns are considered more fortunate than the living (6:1–6). To be sure, wisdom does bestow a relative advantage over folly, as light is usually superior to darkness. But oppression runs rampant, and there is no comforter. The positive advice given is to enjoy life during one's youth, before death wields its awesome power. The book closes with a poem about old age and death (comparable texts have been found in ancient Sumer and Egypt). Unhappy with the negative note on which the book ends, someone added an epilogue that characterizes the teacher and his work (12:9–12), to which yet another epilogue has been attached (12:13–14). This final word neutralizes the entire book by summing up its contents as fearing God (piety) and keeping the commandments (praxis).

Ben Sira. The author of *Ben Sira* strives mightily to combine traditional religious belief and the wisdom tradition. Although capable of soaring to lofty heights in poetic verse, his heart is especially stirred when priestly interests and prerogatives come to mind. This fact has led some critics to the view that religion (the "fear of the Lord"), not wisdom, was central to Ben Sira. The same emphasis occurs in the long poem celebrating heroes of the past, a poem that concludes with a lavish description of the high priest in attendance at the altar (44–50). Competing traditions are held in check in *Ben Sira*. This accounts for the acceptance of old belief in the functioning of reward and retribution, along with special attention to divine mercy.

In some respects *Ben Sira* resembles *Proverbs*, even with regard to the subject matter. Nevertheless, whereas *Proverbs* for the most part couches its teaching in succinct observations, *Ben Sira* systematically elaborates upon one topic after another. In so doing *Ben Sira* occasions a decisive stylistic change: refrains occur with regularity. The same phenomenon is typical of Egyptian instructions; in fact, Egyptian influence in *Ben Sira* is likely (cf. *The Satire on the Trades* and Papyrus Insinger).

One important concern in *Ben Sira* is theodicy, the defense of divine justice. *Ben Sira* employs an ancient form of debate to achieve the defense and adds two distinct answers, one metaphysical and the other psychological, to the problem of theodicy: that the universe itself fights on the side of virtue and punishes wickedness, and that reward or punishment may be inner states of tranquillity or anxiety. Furthermore, God will

set things right in a moment, so that one cannot be adjudged righteous or sinful until death; a similar expectation of future divine action furnishes comfort to the author of Psalm 73. Such faith finds appropriate expression in prayer and in hymnic praise; both modes of worship characterize Ben Sira the teacher. Wisdom has now become an integral facet of Yahvistic faith.

Wisdom of Solomon. The combination of piety and practical ethics continues in *Wisdom of Solomon*, which presents Hebraic ideas in Hellenistic dress. In this Hellenistic setting religious syncretism poses a problem of grave proportions; to combat the attractiveness of idols as an expression of devotion to the gods, the author ridicules this type of worship mercilessly. A similar attitude pervades the author's references to Egyptian rulers; like the earlier sages, this unknown author deals with only two categories of people, wise and foolish, who are, respectively, good and evil. The new element is an identification of good and evil along ethnic lines, a precedent for which occurs in *Ben Sira*. The earlier universalism that was an identifying mark of wisdom has faded under the mighty impact of national religious tradition.

Perhaps the single most radical departure from older sapiential teachings is the elevation of the erotic dimension as the dominant metaphor for the educational enterprise. Knowledge is a highly desirable bride of the one who is favored by the deity. The paradigm that functions effectively in this respect is grounded in the legend about King Solomon, wisest of men. But such intellectual superiority came as a divine gift in response to humble prayer. The power of wisdom transcends the personal inasmuch as it governs the affairs of a nation. In fact, wisdom functions in the same way that the holy spirit is described as functioning in the rest of the Hebrew Bible: as a personification guiding the prophets and leaders of Israel. Once again, an earlier characteristic of wisdom literature, its individualism, gives way to the nation of Israel.

With increased stress on divine activity come two further transformations of ancient wisdom: humanism bows before revelation, and eudaemonism bows before duty. Belief in immortality relieves the human finitude of its tragedy, because pleasures may be delayed until the next life.

Later Developments. The Jewish Alexandrian philosopher Philo Judaeus, who was born about 20 BCE, avails himself of Logos speculation from Greek and Jewish thinkers to present wisdom as the ordering principle of the universe and an expression of the divine will. Comparison with the Stoic Logos principle was almost inevitable, because this similarity in the two intellectual systems served as a bridge to bring them closer to-

gether. Like the author of *Wisdom of Solomon*, Philo was steeped in Hellenistic thought and expression. Nevertheless, the content of his thought is often thoroughly Judaic. Scholars cannot decide whether the language of mystery religions belongs to the heart of his message or is mere window dressing.

Philo does not borrow exclusively from Israelite wisdom literature but makes free use of the patriarchal stories. His elaborate allegorical exegesis of biblical texts is largely Greek, although certain writings from Qumran also employ a complex kind of hermeneutics (cf. the *Habakkuk Commentary*). This ancient sect in the region of the Dead Sea largely ignored the wisdom literature, with one possible exception—the erotic dimension of knowledge.

Late Jewish narratives—*Tobit*, for example—make occasional use of motifs and data from canonical and noncanonical wisdom. Certain affinities between older wisdom and *Pirquei avot* (Sayings of the Fathers) have often been cited, but these seldom extend beyond surface resemblances. Within the Apocrypha, *2 Esdras* (*4 Ezra*) wrestles with the difficult problem of theodicy, and the pseudepigraphic *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* contains ethical teachings that resemble wisdom texts.

The New Testament. The wisdom tradition seems to have influenced the unknown author of the earliest source for the Gospels, known as Q. Jesus is credited with a number of gnomic sayings, most of which function to orient by disorientation: they challenge listeners by forcing them to rethink their own presuppositions about a given situation. One noteworthy feature of these sayings attributed to Jesus is their unusual attitude toward women. Whereas aphorisms concerning women in the first-century Greco-Roman world and in Jewish literature contain a strong misogynistic element, the brief sayings placed in Jesus' mouth are remarkably free of this sentiment.

The prologue to the *Gospel of John* utilizes Logos speculation to express the belief that Jesus was an earthly incarnation of the deity, and the *Gospel of Matthew* dares to identify Jesus with divine wisdom, the embodiment of Torah (*Mt.* 11:25–30). Outside the Gospels, Paul's letters rely on Judaic speculation about wisdom to express Jesus' role in creation itself. Furthermore, just as the sages had developed a theory in opposition to theodicy as an extreme response to evil (that is, the very wish to defend God's honor is blasphemous, since the deity is by definition just), Paul ridicules human wisdom and proclaims that God's love and power are demonstrated by Jesus' death on the cross. It is conceivable that Paul's opponents were witnessing the birth of Christian gnosticism, perhaps even per-

forming midwife service. One other New Testament text is strongly influenced by Hebrew wisdom, the short *Letter of James*, which draws freely upon brief aphorisms to inculcate certain teachings in the minds of listeners.

Gnosticism. The influence of the wisdom tradition in gnosticism is somewhat anomalous. In Jewish tradition wisdom played a vital role during the creation of the world. For the gnostics the present material universe is the product of demiurges, inferior divine beings. Nevertheless, wisdom speculation was too appealing for gnostics to ignore, although they soon found ways to overlook wisdom's role in creating the universe. Three documents deserve consideration here: the *Gospel of Thomas*, the *Sentences of Sextus*, and a nongnostic text from Nag Hammadi, the *Teachings of Silvanus*. The influence of the wisdom tradition on Thomas may explain why instead of a passion story one finds a collection of sayings. The *Sentences of Sextus* (second century) contains over four hundred maxims of non-Jewish origin whose purpose is to describe the ideal Christian. The *Teachings of Silvanus* is a text that manifests typical Jewish stylistic forms: the address to "my son," which is reminiscent of the *Book of Proverbs*; poetic parallelism; and certain subjects and expressions that correspond to canonical ones. All this indicates that early Christians may have been drawn to some features of Hebrew wisdom and that they agree with their predecessors who believed that the intellect was a sufficient means of coping with reality and achieving the good life.

[For further discussion of the writings mentioned here, see *Biblical Literature*; see also, specifically, *Psalms*; *Job*; and *Ecclesiastes*.]

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JAMES L. CRENSHAW

Theoretical Perspectives

An initial difficulty in discussing wisdom literature arises from its definitional ambiguity with Jewish and Christian studies. What is biblical wisdom literature? In the course of its history, this literary corpus has been defined alternately as: (1) a precise canonical division of biblical books attributed to Solomon; (2) the literary product of a particular social class, the "sages" of Is-

rael; (3) an empirical literature developed to address the problems of government and administration (McKane); (4) an instructional literature developed to teach social conduct in the family unit (Gerstenberger); (5) a literary observation on creation in reaction to the failure of prophecy (Brueggemann, Crenshaw); (6) an international literature often characterized as "universal," "eudaemonistic," "secular," or "humanistic"; (7) a literature whose goal is to facilitate the reading and interpretation of sacred tradition and scripture itself (Robert, Sheppard); (8) a literature expressive of an "intellectual tradition" distinguishable from other types of thought in Hebrew culture (Whybray, 1974); and (9) most broadly, any literature that expresses a particular view toward reality (especially in clan, court, or scribal settings) in answer to the question "What is good for men and women?" (Crenshaw).

This representative, but by no means exhaustive, list of definitions reflects a lack of consensus about what "wisdom" is and how the "wisdom tradition" shaped the experience and literature of the biblical writers. The problem of definition, which derives primarily from ambiguities within the history of wisdom itself, may be elucidated by examining the history of the terms debated. How did the term *wisdom literature* come to be used to describe a biblical genre, and what was the evolution of the term?

The Wise as a Professional Class. Despite the pervasive use of the words *hokhmah* ("wisdom") and *hakham* ("wise") in the Bible, they do not explicitly function there as technically descriptive either of a professional class or a canonical division of scripture. Although the word *hakham* appears in *Jeremiah* 18:18 in a context that to some scholars suggests three professional classes—priests, prophets, and sages—such a reading is by no means conclusive and has been forcefully challenged by Roger N. Whybray (1968), among others. Other texts suggestive of a professional class of *hakhamim* ("sages") are similarly inconclusive (see *Is.* 5:21, 29:14, 31:2; *Jer.* 8:8, 9:22). Aside from these biblical references, certain external evidence of international school and scribal structures has been used to posit similar biblical institutions. But lack of direct biblical evidence makes these theories somewhat speculative.

The Wisdom-Torah Debate. Whether wisdom constitutes an intentional canonical category is likewise debatable. Not until the apocryphal *Book of Ben Sira* (second century BCE) is there even an allusion to the tripartite canonical division "Law, Wisdom, Prophets" (expressed in this unusual order at 39:1; see also 44f.). A related and more sharply defined issue in *Ben Sira* is the clear and striking identification of Torah and Wis-

dom in chapter 24. Here Wisdom, personified as a preexistent entity with God at creation, is said to have found a resting place in Israel (24:9). Furthermore, Wisdom is peculiarly merged with Torah so that there is no Torah study without the study of Wisdom. Beyond the association of Wisdom and Torah in *Deuteronomy* 4:6, the logic of this identification may be sought in the second-century encounter between Judaism and Hellenism, whose rich philosophical traditions challenged Israel to provide a philosophical foundation for its own sacred history. In such a setting wisdom takes on a decidedly apologetic task. For the author of *Ben Sira*, Torah is mediated or “interpreted” by wisdom, the same wisdom perhaps that provides the international standard for the conduct of human affairs. The concerns of *Ben Sira* are echoed in *Baruch* (3:9–4:4) and perhaps even in the final stages of earlier biblical books where wisdom interprets sacred tradition (Sheppard, 1980).

This early wisdom-Torah debate, begun at least by the second century BCE, persists in the later rabbinic literature. More typical of rabbinic interpretation, the Mishnah tractate *Avot* entertains the same wisdom-Torah juxtaposition but comes to the opposite conclusion. In the words of the rabbinic sage Simon the Just,

“He whose wisdom takes precedence over his fear of sin, his wisdom will not endure.” . . . That is why a person should first . . . carry out the commandments, even if he does not understand the reasons why. . . . “He whose wisdom exceeds his works” is one who does not carry out what he learns; therefore his knowledge of the Torah will not keep. (Avot 3.12)

A similar wisdom-Torah dialectic may be at work in the New Testament *Letter of James* where the “wisdom from above” (3:17) seems to replace explicit Torah language.

The coexistence of such varied perspectives on the role of wisdom testifies to the highly pluralistic milieu of Hellenistic Judaism. Ultimately, for Judaism, Torah remained the standard by which all other scripture was to be interpreted, for despite the eventual recognition of the Prophets and the Writings as canonical divisions, at no time were these placed on equal footing with Torah. To the contrary, the challenge at Yavneh in the first century to the canonicity of *Song of Songs* and *Ecclesiastes* testifies to their tentative status, although the view that these books “defile the hands” (i.e., are to be revered as sacred writings) prevailed.

Wisdom Attributed to Solomon. The ascription of three books to the hand of Solomon, Judaism’s preeminent wise man (*1 Kgs.* 3–5), is evidence of another link between wisdom and sacred history. *Proverbs*, *Song of Songs*, and (obliquely) *Ecclesiastes* all claim or allude to Solomonic authorship. While modern scholars, such

as Whybray, von Rad, Brueggemann, and Blenkinsopp, have tended to attribute a secular humanistic orientation to the literature of the Solomonic enlightenment, Josephus Flavius, the rabbis, and the early church fathers offer evidence for the inadequacy of this assessment.

Both Josephus Flavius and Origen refer to the Solomonic works as didactic, teaching divine wisdom. In his famous discussion of the twenty-two books of scripture “justly accredited” and “containing the record of all time,” Josephus observes that “four contain hymns to God and precepts for the conduct of human life [*hypothēkas*]” (*Against Apion* 1.39). These four are thought to be *Psalms*, *Proverbs*, *Ecclesiastes*, and *Song of Songs*.

Origen in his commentary and homily on *Song of Songs* places “three books from Solomon’s pen” in “didactic order” from *Proverbs* to *Ecclesiastes* to *Song of Songs*. In this order, he writes, the books present the “basic principles of true philosophy,” which prefigure and inform the “three Greek branches of learning . . . Ethics, Physics, and Enoptics” (i.e., the mystical sciences) (Origen, *Commentary on Song of Songs*).

Origen’s thought was further systematized in the fourth century by Gregory of Nyssa, who writes that God used Solomon as an instrument to show “in systematic and orderly fashion, the way which leads upward to perfection.” These three books, analogous to stages of growth in the physical body, reveal a particular order of development that brings human beings to virtuous life. From *Proverbs*’s “neophyte” wisdom, suitable for the child, to *Ecclesiastes*’s teaching that “beauty is that beyond anything grasped by the senses” to *Song of Songs*’s “initiation of the mind into the innermost divine sanctuary,” the human soul is directed gradually toward its final “mingling with the divine” (Gregory of Nyssa, *Homily on the Song of Songs*).

The curious circumstance that *Ecclesiastes* is ascribed, not to Solomon, but to Qohelet, who is nevertheless described in language appropriate only to Solomon (“Son of David, king in Jerusalem”), is regarded by Brevard S. Childs as evidence of “canonical shaping.” By means of this device, the reader who knows the tradition of wisdom surrounding Solomon is instructed to read *Ecclesiastes* as an authoritative part of that tradition. If this assessment is correct, the assignment of texts to Solomon provides our earliest glimpse of a biblical category functioning like our term *wisdom literature*.

Wisdom since the Enlightenment. With the Enlightenment and the rise of modern biblical scholarship came a departure from the canonical definition of wisdom literature as material attributed to Solomon. Attention turned to the issues of form and redaction criti-

cism and particularly to newly discovered so-called ancient Near Eastern wisdom parallels. In this period the term *wisdom literature* came to be a standard designation for a vaguely defined type of Old Testament literature.

A current interest in the implications of scientific findings for biblical theology arose, doubtless in reaction to the modern preoccupation with historical critical method. Von Rad's three-part chronological division of Old Testament wisdom history into "old [secular] wisdom," "theological wisdom," and "apocalyptic wisdom" is perhaps the most comprehensive result of such study, although it has received sharp criticism by such scholars as James L. Crenshaw and Gerald T. Sheppard.

In the 1950s, a new and extensive exploration of wisdom influence on biblical texts generally not defined as "wisdom literature" was initiated by von Rad's study of the Joseph narrative in *Genesis*. Von Rad's claim that the narrative, through its use of wisdom themes and vocabulary, presents Joseph as one trained in the wisdom of the Egyptian court drew much criticism but gave rise to a generation of similar studies. Studies of narrative texts, like Whybray's *Succession Narrative* and Talmon's study of the *Book of Esther*, followed von Rad's lead. Legal and prophetic texts were similarly explored by Weinfeld, Jensen, Whedbee, and others.

Cross-Cultural Studies of "Wisdom" in the Ancient Near East. The international context of biblical wisdom is already suggested by the claim in *1 Kings* 4:30 that Solomon's wisdom surpassed that of all the peoples of the East and Egypt. The comparison of Egyptian instructional literature to *Proverbs* by Adolf Erman (1924) and Paul Humbert (1929) opened a new phase of inquiry into this context. From the Egyptian *sebayit* ("teaching") with its central idea of *maat*, the divine order of truth established by God, to the Sumerian and Assyro-Babylonian instructional texts of Mesopotamia, parallels to nearly every presumed wisdom category in the Hebrew scriptures have been found. Egyptian texts relating advice to the student were found to bear strong resemblance to the biblical *Proverbs*, while texts listing the works of nature, such as the the *Onomasticon of Amenemope*, were compared to texts like *Job* 38–39. Likewise, the biblical theme of the suffering of the righteous and the skeptical tradition of Qohelet found rough parallels in certain Egyptian texts (such as the *Dispute over Suicide*) and even stronger resonance in Mesopotamian texts like the poem *Ludlul bel nemeqi* (the Babylonian *Job*), the *Dialogue of Human Misery*, and the *Dialogue of Pessimism*.

Despite these strong family resemblances, however, many scholars have objected that ancient Near Eastern parallels have been exaggerated in the secondary liter-

ature. W. G. Lambert's pivotal study of Babylonian literature stresses the inapplicability of biblical definitions of wisdom to the Akkadian word *nemequ*, usually translated "wisdom." Unlike biblical wisdom, *nemequ* most often refers to skill in cult and magic lore in which the wise man is the initiate. Although Babylonian literature exhibits thought patterns similar to those often characterized as biblical wisdom (e.g., proverbs, advice on living), "there is no precise canon by which to recognize them" as wisdom texts (Lambert, 1960). In any case Lambert cautions that the term *nemequ* does not adequately define these writings.

Equally problematic is the attempt to equate proverbial or folk sayings with wisdom. Once again the cross-cultural resemblance is undeniable and yet one cannot limit wisdom to proverbs without depriving the term *wisdom* of its rich nuance. Proverbs, after all, occur in the widest variety of cultures, often without any religious content or implication. The discovery of Egyptian parallels to biblical proverbs is far from establishing an international standard for wisdom.

Wisdom as a Category in the History of Religions. If it is somewhat problematic to speak of a cross-cultural wisdom literature in the ancient Near Eastern context, it is even more difficult to do so in the context of contemporary comparative religions. It would be tempting, for example, to draw a correspondence between Buddhism's *prajñā*, sometimes personified as a goddess who brings enlightenment to all Buddhas, and the personified Wisdom of *Proverbs* 8. Both figures are praised in hymns that endow them with feminine traits, and yet the practices directed toward achieving the two states, *prajñā* and biblical wisdom, are near opposites. Buddhism, particularly Mahāyāna Buddhism, undertakes to awaken *prajñā* "found slumbering under ignorance and karma which come from unconditional surrender to the intellect" (Suzuki, 1958), while biblical wisdom is often characterized as an intellectual tradition. Whereas wisdom in the biblical tradition is often associated with knowledge, *prajñā*, more like antiknowledge, is characterized by detachment from the intellect and the cultivation of a transcendental insight into things "just as they are" (*yathā bhūtam*), without conceptual distortion.

Closer to what scholars associate with biblical wisdom is the wisdom of Zoroastrianism, which is manifest in perfect control over the will, shown in "good deeds, righteousness and good repute." The source of this wisdom is the Creator "who is essential wisdom"; the created "receive it through their own faculties" (*Dēnkard* 380.19–382.3). As in much of the Bible, wisdom and righteousness go hand in hand.

Islamic mysticism offers another example of wisdom

as anti-intellectualism. For the Sūfis, all wisdom (*aqul*, "universal reason") is included in the letter *alif*, the first letter of the Arabic alphabet and symbol for God. It requires no study of books, no philosophical quest; knowledge is immediately derived from God. It is, furthermore, typical of Persian mystical literature to elevate love over intellect or to substitute "rapture for reasoning" (Schimmel, 1975).

Each of these traditions undoubtedly exhibits internal diversity and nuance in its definition of wisdom, equal to or exceeding the variations in biblical and other ancient Near Eastern texts. The problems encountered in the comparison of the latter, texts from similar temporal and geographical settings, are only exacerbated in the broader cultural context of contemporary history of religions. If there is no consistent use of the term in the ancient Near East, there is far less consistency of definition outside of that milieu.

The question remains, then, whether we may speak with confidence about wisdom as a category of literature either within the Bible or in the broader and more problematic cross-cultural context of world religions.

[For views of wisdom in a broader context, see Wisdom; Sophia; Ḥokhmah; and Prajñā.]

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ALEXANDRA R. BROWN

WISE, ISAAC M. (1819–1900), pioneer and leading organizer of American Reform Judaism. Born near Eger, Bohemia (now Cheb, Czechoslovakia), Isaac Mayer Wise led an impoverished childhood. He received a traditional Talmudic education, which, though irregular, gave him an extensive acquaintance with rabbinic literature and an appetite for wider knowledge. In 1846, after holding a minor rabbinical position in Radnitz, he left for America.

Essentially Wise was an autodidact. He appears to have imbibed Mendelssohnian ideas in Europe, but on his arrival in New York there was nothing to distinguish him from conventional Orthodoxy. The mainspring of his Reform inclinations, which surfaced in America, appears to have been a sense of the needs of Judaism in the New World. He became the rabbi at a synagogue in Albany, New York, and not only instituted reforms there but began to write and lead efforts designed to bring direction to the scattered elements of American Jewry—to formulate a particularly American Judaism. A quarrel within his synagogue over certain of these reforms led to his being forcibly ejected from his position in 1850; he thereupon started his own congregation. In 1854 he moved to Cincinnati, where he remained until his death. During the course of his lifetime Wise was twice married; he had ten children with his first wife and four with his second.

In Cincinnati, Wise started a weekly, *The Israelite* (later renamed *The American Israelite*), which was quickly followed by a German periodical for Jewish women, *Die Deborah*. He wrote voluminously: history, theology, poetry, catechisms, and liturgical writings is-

sued from his pen. Wise's overriding concerns were to provide the American Jewish community with a synod that would set qualifications for American rabbis and to establish a college that would train them and legitimize changes in ritual. This program incurred the suspicion not only of Orthodox Jews but also of the more doctrinaire Reform Jews, and it led to violent polemics with his colleagues.

Nevertheless, as a result of Wise's propaganda the Union of American Hebrew Congregations was established in 1873 in Cincinnati, and in 1875 the union opened Hebrew Union College, with Wise as its president. His energy, resilience, and single-minded devotion to his tasks nursed the college through a difficult beginning, and when in 1889 the Central Conference of American Rabbis was established Wise became its president. His place in the history of American Judaism rests on his intuition of the needs of an as yet inchoate community and his persistence in bringing his ideas to fulfillment.

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S. D. TEMKIN

WISE, JOHN (1652-1725), Congregational clergyman and proponent of ecclesiastical liberty in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. A graduate of Harvard College in 1673, Wise by the end of the 1670s had settled in the town of Ipswich as its parish minister, remaining in that capacity and locale until his death. Wise is remembered chiefly for his defense of a pure "congregational" polity, each local church being left free to conduct its own affairs without hindrance or help from "higher" or more numerous clerical authorities. In *The Churches Quarrel Espoused* (1710) and again in *A Vindication of the Government of New-England Churches* (1717), Wise ridiculed the notion that pastors were unable to lead their own flocks, perform their proper duties, or steadily "steer in all weather that Blows." It was quite unnecessary, he argued, and indeed potentially dangerous, to resort to councils or synods—to consociations or committees—to "advise" or "assist" the independent congregation. If men cannot direct their own worship,

he continued, perhaps they are incapable even of choosing their own wives. Some may even think that a committee is needed to "direct all Wooers in their Choice for the Marriage Bed; for that there is many a fond Lover who has betrayed the glory of Wedlock by making an unwise and unfortunate Choice; and why not particular Beds be overruled, as well as particular Churches?"

With such wit joined with even more convincing arguments from antiquity, from nature, and from Christian scripture, Wise argued narrowly for the congregational way, but he also argued broadly for local rule and individual liberty. That Wise's plea for ecclesiastical liberty had inescapable implications for civil liberty found explicit recognition in the republication in 1772 of both works noted above. After the Sugar Act (1764), the Stamp Act (1765), the Townshend acts (1767), and the Boston Massacre (1770), New Englanders welcomed the assurance that natural man is "a Free-Born Subject under the Crown of Heaven, and owing Homage to none but God Himself."

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EDWIN S. GAUSTAD

WISE, STEPHEN S. (1874-1949), American rabbi, Zionist leader, and social activist. Scion of a family of European rabbis, Stephen Samuel Wise was brought to America as an infant from Budapest to join his father, Aaron Wise. Educated at Columbia University, he received private rabbinic training and was ordained by Adolf Jellineck of Vienna. From service as assistant rabbi at the Conservative synagogue B'nai Jeshurun in New York, he moved to the pulpit of Reform Temple Beth Israel in Portland, Oregon, and returned to New York in 1907 to found and head the Free Synagogue. Its pulpit would be free, said Wise; its pews would welcome all; its purpose would be to make its congregants more "vitaly, intensely, unequivocally Jewish."

A religious liberal and social activist, Wise used the pulpit and lecture platform to promote both liberalism and social justice. As an American clergyman he involved himself in civic affairs and social and economic issues, helping to found both the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (1909) and the American Civil Liberties Union (1920); as a rabbi he made the plight of brethren abroad, Jewish rights at

home, and the democratization of Jewish communal life his central concerns. Above all was his lifelong devotion to the cause of Zionism. He was a founder of the Federation of American Zionists in 1898, and he twice served as president of the Zionist Organization of America (1913–1920; 1936–1938).

To help democratize the structure of the American Jewish community, Wise took leadership in the organization of the American Jewish Congress. He was its president from 1921 to 1925 and honorary president until his death. In the wake of the rise of Nazism, he organized the World Jewish Congress in 1936 and served as its president. To bring greater unity to American Jewry, he founded a nondenominational rabbinical seminary, the Jewish Institute of Religion, in 1922. Wise was acclaimed as one of the most stirring of pulpit orators and platform lecturers of his generation.

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ABRAHAM J. KARP

WISSOWA, GEORG (1859–1931), German philologist and historian of Roman religion. Georg Otto August Wissowa was born near Breslau, the son of a civil servant. His grandfather was a noted Tacitus scholar and the director of Breslau's Catholic *Gymnasium*, where Wissowa himself was educated, graduating with superior marks in 1876. That same year he entered the University of Breslau, where he studied under the classical philologist August Reifferscheid, who introduced him to the study of Roman religion. In 1880 Wissowa successfully defended his doctoral dissertation, "De Macrobiani Saturnalium fontibus." He subsequently continued his studies in Munich under Heinrich von Brunn, then one of Germany's foremost students of Roman antiquities. From Brunn he gained an appreciation of the importance of art and monuments for the understanding of Roman religious life, and in 1882 he produced a habilitation thesis on the images of Venus in Roman art ("De Veneris simulacris romanis"). Through Brunn, Wissowa also met that towering genius of Roman historical studies, Theodor Mommsen, whose methods he later applied to the study of Roman religion.

Upon the acceptance of his thesis, Wissowa joined the

faculty at Breslau as a privatdocent, but he spent his first year in that position doing research in Italy (his only trip to the homeland of Roman civilization). In 1886 he accepted a post as associate professor at Marburg, where he was promoted to professor ordinarius in 1890. In 1895 he left Marburg for the University of Halle (Saale), where he spent the remainder of his career.

During the early part of his career Wissowa wrote nearly a dozen articles dealing with Roman religious antiquities. These were, in fact, preliminary studies for what was to be his chief contribution to the science of religion, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (1902; 2d ed., 1912). In this work he traced the development of Rome's religion and described in detail its gods and practices. The book's importance lies in Wissowa's successful identification of the several strata of Roman religion, his clarity and precision in delineating the nature of its various facets, and his masterful treatment of its evolution by adoption of foreign forms. He demonstrated once and for all the essential dissimilarity of Greek and Roman religion, emphasizing that the latter was highly legalistic and almost totally lacking in mythology. In an era dominated by the comparative approach to religion popularized by James G. Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, Wissowa anticipated more recent anthropology by insisting on the need to understand Roman religion on its own terms and as an organic unit (cf. his remarks on Frazer in *Religion und Kultus*, 2d ed., p. 248, n. 3). *Religion und Kultus der Römer* soon became the foundation for all subsequent work in its field. Though other general treatments of the subject have appeared since its publication, it remains a standard and indispensable authority.

Hardly less important for the study of religion was Wissowa's decision to take on the task of reediting August Pauly's *Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. The resulting compendium, not completed until 1972, became a standard reference for all students of the ancient world. It naturally included numerous articles on ancient gods and cults, many of them written by Wissowa himself. He was, in addition, a contributor to W. H. Roscher's *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* and to James Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

Wissowa continued to be an active author and teacher until 1923, when his health failed. He spent the last eight years of his life as an invalid. It is to be regretted that his physical condition prevented him from participating in the discussion of new archaeological evidence unearthed during the 1920s that was to prove of major significance for the history of Roman religion.

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In addition to the works cited above, Wissowa wrote a collection of articles, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur römischen Religions- und Stadtgeschichte* (1904; reprint, New York, 1975), which supplement *Religion und Kultus*. Of his many other valuable articles, I would single out as particularly interesting "Zum Ritual der Arvalbrüder," *Hermes* 52 (1917): 321–347.

A bibliography of Wissowa's works (nearly complete, but add the articles listed in the index to the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hastings, Edinburgh, 1908–1927) may be found at the end of Otto Kern's obituary for Wissowa in the *Biographisches Jahrbuch für Altertumskunde* 60 (1934): 120–145. This article and Kern's *Georg Wissowa: Gedächtnisrede* (Halle, 1931) are the fullest treatments of Wissowa's life.

HENRY JAY WATKIN

WITCHCRAFT. [To examine the theory and practice of witchcraft, this entry includes two articles. The first, Concepts of Witchcraft, provides a historical review of ideas about witchcraft, especially in the West. The second article, Witchcraft in Sub-Saharan Africa, presents a theoretical overview of African witchcraft, showing how witch beliefs in a variety of sub-Saharan cultures shed light upon the wider scholarly debate.]

Concepts of Witchcraft

The term *witchcraft* embraces a wide variety of phenomena. The word *witch* derives from the Old English noun *wicca*, "sorcerer," and the verb *wiccian*, "to cast a spell." The original concept of witchcraft is sorcery, a web of beliefs and practices whose purpose is to manipulate nature for the benefit of the witch or the witch's client. Three quite different phenomena have been called witchcraft. The first is simple sorcery, which is found worldwide in almost every period and every culture. The second is the alleged diabolical witchcraft of late medieval and early modern Europe. The third is the pagan revival of the twentieth century. This article will distinguish sharply among these three phenomena, because the connections between them are tenuous and few.

Simple Sorcery. The simplest sorcery is the mechanical performance of one physical action in order to produce another, such as performing sexual intercourse in a sown field to assure a good harvest or thrusting pins into an image to cause an injury. However, sorcery often goes beyond the merely mechanical to invoke the aid of spirits. Thrusting pins into the image of a god is usually intended to release latent divine power rather

than to cause harm, but such power may also be sought by direct appeal. For example, if a member of the Lugbara tribe of Uganda was injured, he went to the shrines of his dead ancestors and invoked their aid. The distinction between the magical invocation of a god and religious prayer to a god is not clear, but the tendency of magic is to attempt to compel, or at least assure, the god's assistance, whereas the tendency of religion is to implore or beseech his cooperation.

Simple sorcery, which can also be called low magic, is usually practiced by the uneducated and unsophisticated. It assumes a magical worldview, implicitly and preconsciously, in distinction to the sophisticated magical worldview of high magicians such as astrologers and alchemists, whose philosophy is often highly structured. High magic is quite different from low magic, or simple sorcery, and has never been called witchcraft. The magical worldview professed explicitly by the high magicians and held implicitly by many sorcerers is a belief in a coherent universe in which all the parts are interrelated and affect one another. In such a universe a relationship exists between individual human beings and stars, plants, minerals, and other natural phenomena. Both science and magic make this assumption, but where science looks for empirically demonstrable connections, magic assumes a nexus of occult, hidden connections. High magic resembles natural science; simple sorcery resembles technology. A sorcerer fertilizes his field by slitting a rooster's throat over it at midnight, a technologist by spreading steer excrement on it at dawn.

The thought processes of sorcery are intuitive rather than analytical. They often spring from an emotionally charged experience that becomes a critical incident in one's life. In a rage you curse someone who has offended you; shortly afterward the person dies; you are filled with sensations of power and guilt; henceforth you are convinced that certain powers are available to you. Empirical methodology ignores such critical events because they cannot be verified by repetition, but societies whose worldviews are not empirical regard such events as direct and convincing evidence.

The Azande of the southern Sudan distinguished three types of sorcery. One was a benevolent magic involving oracles, diviners, and amulets; it was aimed at promoting fertility and good health and at averting evil spells. This benevolent magic was an accepted means of achieving justice in Zande society. The second kind of sorcery was aimed at harming those whom one hated or resented, perhaps for no just cause. A means of distorting or unbalancing justice, it was condemned as antisocial. The third kind was peculiar to the Azande: pos-

session of *mangu*, an internal spiritual power that a male Azande could inherit from his father and a female from her mother. Those possessing *mangu* held meetings at night at which they feasted and practiced magic; they used a special ointment to make themselves invisible; they sent out their spirits to seize and eat the souls of their victims; they had sexual relations with demons in the form of animals. They represented essential evil and were a source of terror to the other Azande. Yet the Azande used them as helpful scapegoats; every misfortune befalling the Zande community or an individual Azande could be blamed upon the dreaded *mangu*.

Sorcery ordinarily fills certain societal functions. In some societies it merges with public religion, and a priest or priestess may perform ritual acts to make rain, ripen the harvest, procure peace, or ensure victory in war. When such acts are performed publicly and for the public good, they are as close to religion as they are to magic and are generally considered to have a positive social function. But when they are performed privately and for private purposes, they are often regarded with suspicion. The Voodoo cults of Haiti and the Macumba cults of Brazil both make formal distinctions between public religious sorcery and private sorcery; the latter is condemned. The distinction between public and private magic often becomes the most usual distinction between "good" and "bad" magic.

Sorcery may have a variety of social functions: to relieve social tensions; to define and sustain social values; to explain or control terrifying phenomena; to give a sense of power over death; to enhance the solidarity of a community against outsiders; to provide scapegoats for community disasters; even to supply a kind of rough justice. Private sorcery has the additional functions of providing the weak, powerless, and poor with a putative way of obtaining revenge. In periods of great social tension, such as plague or defeat in war, recourse to sorcery tends to grow more common and more intense. In such situations the witches themselves may become the scapegoats for a community whose magic has failed. Under such circumstances of tension, anthropologists have observed, sorcery can often be dysfunctional, exacerbating and prolonging social tensions rather than relieving them.

Witch doctors, medicine men, or *curanderos* are sorcerers who by definition have a positive function in society, for their business is to cure victims of the effects of malevolent magic. Individuals consult witch doctors to obtain relief from disease or other misfortunes attributed to witchcraft; tribal and village authorities summon them to combat drought or other public calamities. Dances or other rituals, such as those performed by the *ndakó-gboyá* dancers of the Nupe tribe, serve to de-

tect and repel witches and evil spirits. The *ndakó-gboyá* dancers wore tall, cylindrical disguises and identified sorcerers by nodding these weird shapes at them. Such protective sorcery assumes special social importance in times of famine, war, or other severe stress in the community.

Sorcery is less a well-defined body of beliefs and actions than a general term covering marked differences in perceptions among societies and within a given society over time. Among the Nyakyusa of Tanzania it was believed that malevolent sorcerers might be of either sex. They were often accused of eating the internal organs of their neighbors or drying up the milk of cattle. The Pondo of South Africa usually thought witches to be women whose chief crime was having sexual intercourse with malevolent spirits. One reason for the difference is that the Nyakyusa were sexually secure but nutritionally insecure and so expressed their insecurities in terms of food, whereas the Pondo were more insecure sexually and so expressed their fears in sexual terms. The function of witchcraft has changed over time among the Bakweri of Cameroon. Before the 1950s the Bakweri were threatened by poverty and a low fertility rate, and they translated these threats into widespread fear of sorcery. In the 1950s their economic status improved radically owing to a boom in the banana crop. The new prosperity occasioned first a cathartic purging of suspected sorcerers and then a decline in accusations and a relative period of calm. In the 1960s bad economic conditions returned, and fear of sorcery revived.

Patterns of sorcery exist in virtually all present societies and have existed in virtually all past societies. The classical Greco-Roman and Hebrew societies from which Western civilization sprang entertained a great variety of sorcery, from public rituals that melded with religion to the activities of the hideous hags described by the classical poet Horace. Clothed in rotting shrouds, with pale and hideous faces, bare feet, and disheveled hair, they met at night in lonely places to claw the soil with their taloned fingers and invoke the gods of the underworld. The Greeks made theoretical distinctions among three varieties of magic. The highest was *theourgia*, a kind of public liturgy "working things pertaining to the gods [*theoi*]," in which magic and religion blended. [See Theurgy.] *Mageia* was the next variety; its practitioners worked technical magic privately to help themselves or their clients. *Goēteia* was the lowest form; "howlers" of incantations and mixers of potions, its practitioners were crude, ignorant, and widely feared.

The sorcery of most cultures involved incantations supposed to summon spirits to aid the sorcerer. In many societies the connection between sorcery and the spirits was not explicitly formulated. But in both Greco-

Roman and Hebrew thought the connection was defined or elaborated. The Greeks believed that all sorcerers drew upon the aid of spirits called *daimones* or *daimonia*. A Greek "demon" could be either malevolent or benevolent. It could be almost a god (*theos*), or it could be a petty spirit. In the thought of Plotinus (205–270 CE) and other Neoplatonists, the demons occupied an ontological rank between the gods and humanity. The Hebrews gradually developed the idea of the *mal'akh*, originally a manifestation of God's power, later an independent spirit sent down as a messenger by God. In Greek translations of Hebrew, *mal'akh* became *angelos*, "messenger." Christians eventually identified "angels" with the Greek "demons" and defined them as beings ontologically between God and humanity. But a different element gained influence through the apocalyptic writings of the Hellenistic period (200 BCE–150 CE): the belief in evil spirits led by Satan, lord of all evil. The idea had limited precedents in earlier Jewish thought but gained prominence in the Hellenistic period under the influence of Iranian Mazdaism, or Zoroastrianism. Under such influence the Christians came to divide the Greek *daimones* into two groups, the good angels and the evil demons. The demons were supposed to be angels who, under Satan's leadership, had turned against God and thereby become evil spirits. Sorcerers sought to compel spirits to carry out their will, but angels under God's command could not be compelled; thus it was supposed that one practicing sorcery might well be drawing upon the aid of evil demons. This was the central idea of the second main variety of witchcraft, the alleged diabolism of the late medieval and Renaissance periods in Europe.

European Witchcraft. Although simple sorcery had always existed, a new kind of diabolical witchcraft evolved in medieval and early modern Europe. The Christian concept of the devil transformed the idea of the sorcerer into that of the witch, consorter with demons and subject of Satan. Since 1880 this kind of diabolical witchcraft has been subject to four major schools of interpretation. The first, rooted in classical nineteenth-century liberalism, perceived witchcraft as an invention of superstitious and greedy ecclesiastics eager to prosecute witches in order to augment their own power and wealth. The second school, that of Margaret Murray, argued that witchcraft represented the survival of the old pagan religion of pre-Christian Europe. This religion (which never existed in the coherent form she believed) she supposed to be the religion of the majority of the people down into the seventeenth century, although subject to constant persecution by the Christian authorities. Murray's theory had great influence from the 1920s through the 1950s; unsupported by

any credible evidence, it is now rejected by all scholars. The third school emphasizes the social history of witchcraft, seeking to analyze the patterns of witch accusations in Europe much as anthropologists have done for other societies. The fourth school emphasizes the evolution of the idea of witchcraft from elements gradually assembled over the centuries. Most scholars currently belong to one or the other of the last two schools.

Historical development. The first element in diabolical witchcraft was simple sorcery, which existed in Europe as it did elsewhere. It persisted through the period of the witch craze and indeed has persisted to the present. Without this fundamental element, witchcraft would not have existed. The second, related aspect was the survival of pagan religion and folklore in Christian Europe, or rather the demonstrable survival and transmutation of certain elements *from* paganism. The Canon Episcopi, a legal document of the Frankish kingdom issued about AD 900, condemns "wicked women . . . who believe that they ride out at night on beasts with Diana, the pagan goddess. . . . Such fantasies are thrust into the minds of faithless people not by God but by the Devil." The wild ride with Diana (the classical name applied to the Teutonic fertility goddess Hilda, Holda, or Bertha) was a form of the "wild hunt," a troop of spirits following a male or female Teutonic deity. Such spirits were believed to ride out at night blowing their horns and striking down any human that had the temerity or ill fortune to encounter them.

Another element in the development of diabolical witchcraft in Europe was Christian heresy. The classical formulation of witchcraft had been established by the fifteenth century. Its chief elements were (1) pact with the Devil, (2) formal repudiation of Christ, (3) the secret, nocturnal meeting, (4) the ride by night, (5) the desecration of the Eucharist and the crucifix, (6) orgy, (7) sacrificial infanticide, and (8) cannibalism. Each of these elements derived from one or another charge made against medieval heretics. Heresy became the medium through which sorcery was linked with the Devil. At the first formal trial of heretics in the Middle Ages, at Orléans in 1022, the accused were said to hold orgies underground at night, to call up evil spirits, to kill and cremate children conceived at previous orgies and use their ashes in blasphemous parody of the Eucharist, to renounce Christ and desecrate the crucifix, and to pay homage to the Devil. The history of such charges goes at least as far back as the court of Antiochus IV Epiphanes of Syria (176–165 BCE), who made similar accusations against the Jews; the pagan Romans used them against the Christians, and the early Christians used them against the gnostics. An early eleventh-century pedant must have resurrected the charges from patristic ac-

counts of gnostic heresy and applied them to the Orleans group, applying the archetypal thinking common in the Middle Ages: a heretic is a heretic, and whatever one heretic does another must also do. Thus the *idea* of heresy, more than any actual heresy itself, became the basis for the connection of heresy with witchcraft. Some later heretical groups, such as the sect of the Free Spirit, also were accused of similar diabolical crimes. Not all heretics were so charged, however. On the whole the accusations were limited to those who had some connection with dualism, the doctrine that not one but two eternal principles existed. One evil and one good, the two principles struggled for control of the cosmos. Dualist influence on most medieval heresies was indirect, but upon Catharism it was both direct and pronounced.

Catharism was a dualist heresy imported into western Europe from the Balkans in the 1140s. [See Cathari.] Strong in southern France and northern Italy for well over a century, it dominated the culture of Languedoc and the Midi in the years around 1200; it was suppressed by the Albigensian crusade and eradicated by the Inquisition. The Cathari believed that matter, and the human body in particular, were creations of the evil god, whose intent was to hold the spirit imprisoned in the "filthy tomb of the flesh." The evil god is Satan, lord of this world, ruler of all material things and manipulator of human desires for them. Money, sex, and worldly success were the domain of the Devil. These doctrines brought the Devil closer to the center of attention than he had been since the time of the Desert Fathers a thousand years earlier. If only to refute Catharist theories, scholastic theologians had to give the devil his due. The Catharist designation of Satan as the lord of the things of this world may also have led some who desired those things in the direction of Satan worship.

Scholastic theology was the next major element in the formation of the witch concept. Tradition going back to the early church fathers had suggested that the Christian community, which formed the mystical body of Christ, was opposed by an opposite group forming the mystical body of Satan and consisting of pagans, heretics, Jews, and other unbelievers. It was not only the right but the duty of the Christian to struggle against this evil host. Saints' lives and legends of the intense struggles of the desert fathers against demonic forces kept this tradition alive, and it was reinforced by Catharist dualism. In the twelfth through fourteenth centuries the Scholastics developed the tradition of the body of Satan, refined its details, and supplied it with a rational substructure. They extended the Devil's kingdom explicitly to include sorcerers, whom they considered a variety of heretic. Simple sorcerers had become,

in the dominant scholastic thought of the later Middle Ages, servants of Satan.

The link between sorcerers, heretics, and Satan was the idea of pact. The notion of pact had been popularized in the eighth century by translations of the sixth-century legend of Theophilus. In this story, Theophilus was a clergyman who sold his soul to the Devil in exchange for ecclesiastical preferment. He met the Devil through a Jewish magician and signed a formal pact with "the evil one" in order to fulfill his desires. The Scholastics derived a number of sinister ideas from the legend of Theophilus. Their theory transformed the person making the pact from a relatively equal contracting party to an abject slave of Satan who abjured Christ, did feudal homage to "the dark lord," and kissed his master's genitals or backside in token of his submission. The Scholastics also broadened the idea of pact to include implicit as well as explicit consent. One did not actually have to sign a contract to be a member of Satan's army; anyone—heretic, sorcerer, Jew, Muslim—who knowingly opposed the Christian community, that is, the body of Christ, was deemed to have made an implicit pact with the Devil and to number among his servants.

The shift from Platonic to Aristotelian philosophy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries encouraged the process of demonizing the witches. Platonic thought allowed for the existence of a natural, morally neutral magic between divine miracle and demonic delusion; but Aristotelianism dismissed natural magic and denied the existence of occult natural forces. If no natural magic existed, it followed that wonders were worked either through divine miracle or demonic imposture. Magicians compel or exploit supernatural powers, and since God and the angels cannot be compelled or exploited, the powers with which sorcerers deal must be demonic, whether they know this explicitly or not. Thus scholastic logic dismissed simple sorcery as demonic witchcraft.

Theology, then, made a logical connection between witchcraft and heresy. Heresy is any persistently held belief counter to orthodox doctrine. One who used demons serves the Devil rather than God, and if one serves the devil, one acknowledges that correct theology involves serving the Devil rather than God: this was the worst imaginable heresy.

The final element in the transformation of sorcery into diabolical witchcraft was the Inquisition. The connection of sorcery with heresy meant that sorcery could be prosecuted with much greater severity than before. Late Roman laws against sorcery were extremely severe, but during the early Middle Ages simple sorcery, or natural magic, was treated with relative leniency.

Often it was ignored; when detected, it might bring no more than a fairly stiff penance. Elements of simple sorcery were incorporated into Christian practice, as seen in the combination of Christian prayer and pagan spells commonly said by parish priests in England during the tenth and eleventh centuries. Penalties for heresy, on the other hand, were severe. Suppression of heresy in the earlier Middle Ages was inconsistent, but in 1198 Innocent III ordered the execution of those who persisted in heresy after having been convicted and excommunicated. Between 1227 and 1235 a series of decrees established the papal Inquisition. In 1233 Gregory IX accused the Waldensian heretics, who were in fact evangelical moralists, of Satan worship. In 1252 Innocent IV authorized the use of torture by the Inquisition, and Alexander IV (1254–1261) gave it jurisdiction over all cases of sorcery involving heresy. Gradually almost all sorcery came to be included under the rubric of heresy.

The Inquisition was never well organized or particularly effective; in fact, most cases of witchcraft were tried before the secular courts. Nonetheless the Inquisition provided one essential ingredient of the witch craze: the inquisitors' manuals. These manuals told inquisitors what signs of Satanism to look for, what questions to ask, and what answers to expect. Having obtained the answers they expected by using torture or the threat of torture, the inquisitors duly entered the answers in formal reports, which then added to the body of "evidence" that witches flew through the air, worshiped the Devil, or sacrificed babies. It is unlikely that no one in the period ever practiced Satanism, but it is even more unlikely that any widespread Satanism existed. The great majority of the accused were innocent, at least of diabolism.

The witch craze. The number of executions for witchcraft was measured in the hundreds until the end of the mid-fifteenth century, but from 1450 to 1700—the period of the Renaissance and the origins of modern science—a hundred thousand may have perished in what has been called the great witch craze. The witch craze can be explained by the dissemination, during a period of intense social unrest, of the intellectual elements summarized above by the Inquisition, the secular courts, and above all the medium of the sermon. The popularity of the sermon in the later Middle Ages and in the Reformation explains how beliefs about witches spread in a period when the leading intellectual movements, such as nominalism and humanism, downplayed or even ignored witchcraft. For example, the mystic Johannes Tauler, who was capable of great theological sophistication, was also capable of exploiting lurid demonology in his sermons in order to impress his

didactic message upon his congregations. The invention of the printing press did its part in spreading the evil. In 1484 Pope Innocent VIII issued a bull confirming papal support for inquisitorial proceedings against the witches, and this bull was included as a preface to the *Malleus maleficarum* (The Hammer of Witches), a book by two Dominican inquisitors. Published in 1486, the *Malleus* went into many editions in many languages, selling more copies in Protestant and Catholic regions combined than any other book except the Bible. The *Malleus* colorfully detailed the diabolical, orgiastic activities of the witches and helped persuade public opinion that a cosmic plot directed by Satan threatened all Christian society.

Fears of cosmic plots increase in periods of high social tension. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed a growth of eschatological anxiety, a widespread belief that the Antichrist, the return of the Savior, and the transformation of the world were at hand. As the religious split between Catholicism and Protestantism widened during the sixteenth century and flared up into religious warfare, eschatological fears deepened. Catholics saw the Protestants as soldiers of Satan sent to destroy the Christian community; Protestants viewed the pope as the Antichrist. Terror of witchcraft and prosecution of witches grew in both Catholic and Protestant regions, reaching heights between 1560 and 1660, when religious wars were at their worst. No significant differences distinguished Catholic from Protestant views of witchcraft. The Protestants, who rejected so many of the accretions of doctrine in the Middle Ages, accepted beliefs about witches almost without modification. Luther declared that all witches should be burned as heretics in league with Satan; persecutions in the regions ruled by the Calvinists were comparable to those in Catholic and Lutheran areas. Millions were persecuted and tens of millions terrified and intimidated during one of the longest and strangest delusions in history. The craze was restricted almost exclusively to western Europe and its colonies. Since diabolism is virtually meaningless outside a Christian conceptual framework, it could not spread to non-Christian areas. Although the Eastern Christian church shared the same beliefs in the powers of Satan as the Western church, it experienced no witch craze. The absence of the witch craze in the Eastern church illustrates the hypothesis that for a craze to break out, three elements are required: (1) the appropriate intellectual structure; (2) the mediation of that structure from the elite to the people at large; (3) marked social tension and fear.

Skeptics such as Johann Weyer (fl. 1563) and Reginald Scot (fl. 1584), who wrote against belief in witchcraft, were rare and were often rewarded for their ef-

forts by persecution; Weyer, for example, was accused of witchcraft himself. More typical of the period were the works of the learned King James I of England and VI of Scotland (d. 1625). Personally terrified of witches, James encouraged their prosecution, wrote a book against them, encouraged the statute of 1604 against pact and devil-worship, and commissioned a translation of scripture (the Authorized Version or King James Bible) that deliberately rendered certain Hebrew words (such as *kashshaf*) as "witch" in order to produce texts such as "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," which supported the king's design of suppressing witchcraft legally. In 1681 Joseph Glanvill was still able to publish a popular second edition of a work supporting belief in diabolical witchcraft. But by that time the craze was beginning to fade. Cartesian and scientific thought had no room for witchcraft; ecclesiastical and civil authorities agreed that witch prosecutions had got out of hand; and European society was settling down to two centuries (1700–1900) of relative peace and prosperity. The greatest outburst in those centuries was the French Revolution; it occurred in an intellectual context (the Enlightenment) in which revival of witch beliefs was impossible. European society found other rationales by which to demonize aristocrats, Jews, communists, capitalists, imperialists, or whoever was selected as an object of hatred. The date of the last execution for witchcraft in England was 1684, in America 1692, in Scotland 1727, in France 1745, and in Germany 1775.

Witchcraft and society. The most important social function of the belief in diabolical witchcraft was scapegoating. Sometimes this process was conscious and cynical, as when Henry VIII added witchcraft to the list of charges trumped up against Anne Boleyn. Much more often it was unconscious. If one is impotent, or one's crops fail, or one becomes ill, it helps to blame a witch, not only because it relieves one of guilt but also because the belief that a witch has caused one's problems gives one the illusion of being able to solve them. If God or fate has caused your illness, you may have no remedy; if a witch caused it, then you may recover once the witch has been found and punished.

Another function of the belief in the existence of witchcraft was to promote the cohesion of Christian communities by the postulation of a powerful external foe. Witches thus served a purpose similar to that of external enemies in modern warfare, for they united the people against a common threat.

Historians have noted correlations between witch accusations and social position. Persons between the ages of forty and sixty were most commonly accused; the accused had fewer children than normal; children were seldom accused of witchcraft but were often believed to

be its victims; people accused of witchcraft had been previously accused of other crimes more frequently than normal, especially offensive language, lying, theft, and sex offenses. Chronic grumbling, abrasive personality, quarreling, and cursing also increased one's chances of being accused. The social status of accused witches was usually low or lower middle, though sometimes magistrates, merchants, and other wealthy persons were involved. Anyone connected with medicine, especially midwives, was prone to suspicion, because illness and death could so easily be blamed upon witchcraft.

The most striking social correlation is between witchcraft and women. Although in certain areas and for brief periods of time more men were accused than women, the opposite has almost always been true, and over the entire history of the witch craze women outnumbered men by at least three to one. In New England, for example, 80 percent of the accused were women. In the sixteenth century many more women were living alone than men. Given the patriarchal structure of European society at the time, a woman living alone without the support of father or husband had little influence and little legal or social redress for wrongs. Such women sometimes struck back at society with clandestine crimes such as arson or sorcery, which were difficult to detect. They also naturally tended to grumble or curse more than persons having effective influence in society. A physically weak, socially isolated, financially destitute, and legally powerless old woman could hope to deter only with her spells. But the explanation lies only partly in specific social conditions. The misogyny underlying the association of women with witchcraft sprang from deep and ancient psychological roots. C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, Wolfgang Lederer, and others have commented on the powerful ambivalence of the feminine in religions, mythologies, and literatures dominated by males. The male view of the archetypal feminine is tripartite: she is the sweet, pure virgin; she is the kindly mother; she is the vicious, carnal hag. From the twelfth century, Christian society developed a compelling symbol incarnating the first two types in the Blessed Virgin Mother of God. As the power of the symbol of the Virgin Mother grew, the shadow side, the hag symbol, had to find outlet for its corresponding power. In ancient polytheistic religions the dark side of the female archetype had been integrated with the light side in the images of morally ambivalent goddesses such as Artemis. Split off from the positive side of the archetype, the Christian image of the hag became totally evil. In the period of the witch craze, this one-sided image was projected upon human beings, and the witch, no longer simply a sorceress, became the incarnation of

the hag. Other androcentric assumptions in male-dominated religions encouraged the connection. God, the chief power of good, was imagined in masculine terms, and so the devil, the chief power of evil, was supposed to be masculine also. Since it was believed that the Devil's followers submitted to him sexually, it was naturally supposed that they should be women, some of whom described their intercourse with the Devil in lurid detail.

The outbreak of witch trials in Salem, Massachusetts, during 1692 has been the subject of careful social analysis. Although the first hanging of a witch in New England occurred in 1647, it was at Salem in 1692, when the craze was already fading in Europe, that the colonies produced their most spectacular series of witch trials, in which nineteen persons were executed. After a group of little girls became hysterical while playing at magic, their elders suggested that they might be the victims of a spell, and the witch hunt began. At the time, Salem village was in the throes of a long dispute concerning the church. An unpopular minister, John Bayley, was succeeded by a controversial one, Samuel Parris, in 1689, just at the time when England was undergoing a revolution and the lines of authority were blurred. The villagers split into factions supporting and opposing Parris, and, since no structured means of expressing dissent existed, its release took the form of vituperation and slander.

The outbreak was the violent expression of deeply felt moral divisions; the moral divisions were generated by the quarrel over the governance of the church, and the quarrel over governance was exacerbated by strongly felt neighborhood and family problems. Salem was a small, premodern village in which everyone knew everyone else, a situation that encouraged people to correlate unfortunate events with unpopular individuals and to blame them for their misfortunes. Intensely religious to a degree seldom paralleled in Europe at the time, the New England Puritans could not view the strife in their village in purely natural, personal, political terms. They interpreted it in religious terms, as a manifestation of the cosmic struggle between Christ and Satan, good and evil. The tradition of belief in the existence of witchcraft was a vehicle perfectly adapted to the expression of such assumptions. Many towns and villages had political controversies without becoming centers of the witch craze; clearly such controversies do not automatically produce witch accusations and cannot be considered their cause. Most sophisticated scholars give full weight to the history of religious concepts and avoid simplistic correlations between external phenomena and witch beliefs. Disasters and controversies can produce witch accusations only in the presence of

certain value systems. But such social tensions, once those value systems are there, can provoke the outbreak of a witch persecution.

Modern Witchcraft. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, with their secularism, scientism, and progressivism, were not conducive to witch beliefs of any kind. Yet already in the nineteenth century the basis had been laid for a new permutation, which became the third main variety of witchcraft: neopaganism. Franz-Josef Mone, Jules Michelet, and other writers of the mid-nineteenth century suggested that European witchcraft was really a widespread fertility cult surviving from pre-Christian paganism. Such arguments influenced anthropologists and folklorists at the turn of the century, such as James Frazer, Jessie Weston, and Margaret Murray. A fraudulent document entitled *Aradia: The Gospel of the Witches* was published by Charles Leland in 1899. Allegedly evidence that witchcraft was the survival of a fertility cult, *Aradia* influenced Murray and other twentieth-century anthropologists. Meanwhile, interest in the occult gained fashion among intellectuals and poets such as Algernon Blackwood and Charles Baudelaire. By the early part of the twentieth century, occultism enjoyed a certain popularity, especially among dandies and bohemians, and magicians such as Aleister Crowley, who styled himself "the Great Beast," attracted a following. Their doctrines were a mixture of high magic, low sorcery, affected Satanism, hedonism, dubious historical and philosophical arguments, and mere irony.

The occult tradition of Crowley merged with the spurious fertility-cult anthropology of the followers of Margaret Murray during the 1940s and 1950s to produce a new phenomenon. Around the time that the famous litterateur Robert Graves was writing his imaginative and wholly unreliable *White Goddess* (1948) about an alleged worldwide cult of the earth and moon goddess, modern witchcraft was being created in the mind of an Englishman named Gerald Gardner. According to his followers, Gardner, who was born in 1884, was initiated into the ancient religion in 1939 by a witch of the New Forest named Old Dorothy Clutterbuck. In fact, Gardner had invented the religion on the basis of his reading of the Murrayites and Aleister Crowley, and his experiences in occult organizations such as the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn and Crowley's Order of the Temple of the Orient. Gardner's claim to be the mediator of an ancient religion was spurious, but he launched a growing religious movement that has gained many adherents, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. Whatever its origins, it has become a small religious movement in its own right.

The overall world numbers of the witches must be

fewer than a hundred thousand. There are numerous schismatic groups. The tenets of witchcraft as it has evolved include a reverence for nature expressed in the worship of a fertility goddess and (sometimes) a god; a restrained hedonism that advocates indulgence in sensual pleasures so long as such indulgence hurts no one; the practice of group magic aimed (usually) at healing or other positive ends; colorful rituals; and release from guilt and sexual inhibitions. It rejects diabolism and even belief in the Devil on the grounds that the existence of the Devil is a Christian, not a pagan, doctrine. It offers a sense of the feminine principle in the godhead, a principle almost entirely forgotten in the masculine symbolism of the great monotheistic religions. And its eclectic paganism promotes a sense of the variety and diversity of the godhead.

This modern neopaganism has few connections with simple sorcery, and virtually none with diabolism. Diabolism has in fact almost ceased to exist in the late twentieth century, though a few self-styled and self-conscious Satanists can be found here and there. Among other problems, Satanism suffers from a glaring contradiction: in order to worship Satan, the Satanists redefine him as good according to their own ritualistic and hedonistic views. Simple sorcery, on the other hand, continues to flourish worldwide. *Curanderos* in Mexico and the American Southwest still practice healing with herbs and charms. Fear of sorcerers persists as widely as sorcery itself. In Germany those who suspect that they are the victims of malevolent sorcery still call upon the *Hexenbanner*, professional witch doctors who sell remedies, spells, and countermagic to protect their clients from witchcraft.

Sometimes sorcery has been transmuted by conceptions taken from Christianity or other more sophisticated religions. Voodoo, for example, is a syncretistic religion pieced together from West African religions, sorcery, Christian religion, and folklore. [See Voodoo.] It has become the real religion of many of the people of Haiti, including those who are nominally Catholic. Voodooists worship *lwa* ("spirits") whom the Catholics claim are demons; the Voodooists claim that the *lwa* are morally ambiguous and can be summoned for good or ill. Voodoo practices are in the shadowy area between religion and magic: it is difficult to define the Voodooists' address to their spirits as either prayer or magical incantation. Yet Voodooists themselves distinguish between religion, which is good, and sorcery, which is always evil whether worked mechanically or with the help of the *lwa*. Voodoo sorcery, a mixture of European and African elements, includes incantations, spells, the use of images, rain making, and a cult of the dead.

In syncretistic cults such as Haitian Voodoo and the

Macumba cult of Brazil, it is difficult to distinguish native from Christian elements, particularly because a similarity of themes worldwide seems to precede any cultural diffusion. One of the most surprising aspects of the study of witchcraft is that African, Asian, and European witchcraft all postulate the following: witches are usually female and often elderly; they meet at night, leaving their bodies or changing their shapes; they suck the blood or devour the internal organs of their victims; they kill children, eat them, and sometimes bring their flesh to the secret assemblies. Witches ride through the air naked on broomsticks or other objects; they have familiar spirits; they dance in circles; they hold indiscriminate orgies; they seduce sleeping people. The similarities go beyond the possibility of coincidence or cultural diffusion; the most likely explanation is that such ideas have an archetypal ground in the psychic inheritance shared by all humanity.

Conclusions. Witchcraft will continue to be examined theologically, historically, mythologically, psychologically, anthropologically, and sociologically. No single approach can completely explain the phenomenon; even together they do not seem to provide full understanding of such a diverse subject. Witchcraft dwells in the shadowy land where the conscious and unconscious merge, where religion, magic, and technology touch dimly in darkness. Its forms are so varied that it cannot be said to represent any one kind of quasi-religious expression. Modern, neopagan witchcraft is a naive, genial, nature religion. Simple sorcery is usually located across the border into magic yet is frequently combined with religion in two important ways: it is often incorporated into the liturgy of public religion; its charms and spells are often amalgamated into prayers. The Anglo-Saxon clergy of the tenth and eleventh centuries, for example, christianized charms by taking over from wizards the right to say them and then introducing Christian elements into them. By incorporating the sign of the cross or an invocation of the Trinity into a pagan charm, the clergy legitimized the magic. They argued that everything that occurred resulted from God's power and will, and that the use of herbs and charms simply drew upon benevolent forces that God had appointed in nature. It was essential to use them reverently, with the understanding that they were God's and that whatever one accomplished through them was achieved only by appeal to him.

Simple sorcery could be malevolent as well as benevolent. Malevolent sorcery, practiced for private, unjust purposes, was universally condemned. But in late medieval and early modern Europe, evil sorcery merged with diabolism, the result being a different dimension in the religious meaning of witchcraft. This dimension

is that of transcendent, transpersonal, or at least trans-conscious evil.

The sense of the witch as a manifestation of an uncontrollable, superhuman force of evil is not peculiar to Christianity. The Azande, for example, considered the witch a superhuman force of evil. The witch is often on the border between mortal and spirit; she expresses the same characteristics as the Lilitu of the Sumerians, the Lilith of the Hebrews, and the *ranggda* of Malaysia, evil spirits that roam the world at night sucking blood, killing babies, and seducing sleeping men. In many societies the witch is supposed to be a wholly evil being. In Christianity, with its belief in a supernatural power of evil, the witch became a human associate of the devil, closely associated with demons and occasionally indistinguishable from them. The witch came to be seen as a pawn of Satan, a tool used in his efforts to destroy humanity and block God's plan of salvation. Thus the witch in Christianity was a minor symbol of that transpersonal evil of which Satan was the major symbol.

Many people feel that evil exists in the world to a degree far beyond what one would expect in nature, and many are not satisfied by the traditional theodicy argument that evil arises from free will (which God creates for the greater good). We observe people performing monstrous acts of destruction and cruelty against their own self-interest as well as against that of the community; and we sense in ourselves monstrous urges transcending anything that we might consciously desire. Thus a power of evil seems to exist that exceeds our own personal limitations, ignorance, and sin. This brooding, pervasive power, whose purpose is to corrupt and destroy the cosmos, may be perceived as coming from an external being, or it may be felt to operate from within the soul. In either case it transcends the conscious, and, as Jung observed, one might as well call it the devil. The witch, melding the two archetypes of human hag and evil demon, is a powerful metaphor whose power may be diminished from time to time but is unlikely to disappear.

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African Witchcraft

As a set of beliefs that varies region by region and has a good many consequences in everyday life, African witchcraft is in many respects similar to corresponding sets of beliefs found among peoples of other continents. African systems, however, are of great interest because they have some unique features and because they have provided material for the formulation of definitions and the development of theories of worldwide application.

General Characteristics. Most African societies—though not all—hold the cardinal belief that certain members of the community are in the habit of using supernatural means for illicitly destroying the interests, or even the lives, of their fellows. This basic tenet has led Africans to attribute to persons designated by terms we might translate as "witches" or "sorcerers" characteristics that resemble those of their counterparts elsewhere. Beliefs about witches are, of course, not directly observable, but they may have overt consequences in everyday life.

Subjective aspects. Thus African witches (in the generic sense, including sorcerers) are believed to harm others either because they possess powers (of which they may not be aware and which their fellows find incomprehensible) that emanate from their aberrant personalities or because they perform antisocial magic,

technically referred to as "sorcery" (see below). Furthermore, they resemble witches in other continents in that they are believed to employ certain species of animals and, in some instances, spirits or humanoid creatures as their servants, messengers, or familiars. Familiars are sometimes reputed to drive their owners to their evil practices.

Like their counterparts elsewhere, African witches are believed to belong to associations that meet periodically (usually around a fire) to discuss the promotion of their interests, the regulation of relations among them, and to celebrate recent antisocial accomplishments by, for example, having a ghoulish feast of the revived body of someone they have killed supernaturally. These associations form distorted reflections of the societies in which they are believed to exist. On the one hand, they may mirror the authority structure of the polity of which they are a part, as when, among the Chewa, their meetings are presided over by a village headman who is himself a witch. On the other hand, among some peoples the organization of witch societies may contrast with that of everyday society; among relatively egalitarian peoples witch societies are more hierarchical and vice versa. In any case, witch societies invariably invert normal ethical standards by delighting in the practice of promiscuous sexual activity (including incest), by going naked, by frequenting forbidden places such as graveyards, and by murdering and eating their fellow human beings, often their close relatives (African witches are believed to attack their neighbors and kinsmen rather than distant and unrelated persons).

As in other parts of the world, African witches are often reported to be preponderantly women (although there are notable exceptions, such as among the Azande, Bemba, and Tonga). However, it is important to note that the actual summation of cited cases of witchcraft may yield a gender ratio that is at variance with the traditional one expressed in general statements made by informants. Thus, although Chewa tradition holds that most witches are women, it is men, the more socially and politically active sex, who form a clear majority of those cited in instances of witchcraft.

Finally, in Africa as elsewhere, the belief in witchcraft—together with other components of the religious system—provides an explanatory framework, a means by which the misfortunes that befall people may be understood and, in terms of their beliefs, avoided in the future. African societies vary in the degree that witchcraft (as opposed to the other elements of religious belief) plays in the explanation of everyday events and, more importantly, crises. Thus, among the Lugbara, misfortunes appear to be attributed more often to the intervention of ghosts rather than witches, whereas

among the Chewa the reverse is true. But in all societies where witchcraft is a component of the belief system—and this applies to the majority of African societies—witchcraft beliefs are of paramount importance insofar as they explain the persistence of evil and the inability of humans to eradicate it. As J. D. Krige (1947) puts it:

Witches and sorcerers are considered [by the Lovedu] to be the embodiment of malignant forces ever on the alert to enter into unholy matrimony with the criminal impulses of the human heart. Witchcraft particularly [as opposed to sorcery—see below] is the essence of evil, vicious and inscrutable, that whirls through the universe and seeks asylum in sinful souls in which the germs of wickedness lie ready to be quickened into life.

Overt consequences of belief. Some of the consequences of witch belief are visible to the ethnographer. This is because, given that people believe in and are concerned about witches, they take steps to protect themselves from them and (as individuals or assisted by professionals such as diviners, or perhaps backed by the political authorities) to detect, prosecute, and sometimes destroy by vengeance-magic those they assume to be bringing them harm. Many of the processes involved in self-protection, divination, and revenge are spiritual, usually involving magical substances (often translated as "medicines") of botanical origin, though activated by ingredients of animal or human origin which are of symbolic significance, such as a piece of human caul (protective in function) added to the powdered root of a particular species of tree to make a protective amulet.

Protective steps include not only wearing amulets but also taking "medicines" orally, washing the body in infusions of them, or rubbing them into incisions made in the skin. Huts and field crops can also be treated to make them invisible to, or impenetrable by, witches. Divination includes the use of oracles such as those of the Azande of the southern Sudan (adjective and singular noun, Zande), the best known of which consists of feeding *benge*, a poisonous substance, to chickens, mentioning the name of a suspect each time, and determining the guilt of a particular suspect by noting whether the chicken poisoned in accompaniment to his name dies.

Elsewhere in central Africa an ordeal is held in which a poison (*mwafi*, *mwabvi*, etc.) is administered to the human suspects themselves (and sometimes to the accuser as well to check that he is acting in good faith), and a person is deemed guilty if he retains the poison (an action that will cause him eventually to purge, faint, or actually die) and innocent if he vomits it. In southern Africa witches may be "smelled out" in a public ceremony by a diviner, who is guided by his audience's verbal responses to his tentative naming of the

suspects. All over Africa diviners use a variety of techniques—dreaming, manipulating various kinds of apparatus, throwing dice (“bones”), opening the Bible or the Qur’ān at random—to help clients identify their attackers.

From several parts of Africa it has been reported that persons found to be guilty of witchcraft were traditionally burned. This penalty is also suffered by convicted witches in some other parts of the world.

Distinctive Features. A comparison by E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1929) of Zande and Trobriand magic (and thus of the variant of witchcraft sometimes separately designated as sorcery—destructive magic illegitimately applied) suggests that whereas Melanesians regard the verbal element, or spell, in an act of magic (in general and sorcery in particular) as all-important and insist on its being word perfect, Africans place greater emphasis on the material element, or “medicines.” Hence in Africa the verbal element is less important, more properly being regarded as a relatively informal address made to the “medicines” to activate them and make them attack the proper victim.

Another feature setting off African witch beliefs from those found elsewhere is the range of animal species that witches are assumed to use as familiars. Whereas in Europe, cats, dogs, and weasels are commonly believed to be witches’ familiars (dogs and foxes in Japan), in Africa hyenas, owls, and baboons are commonly listed. While not unparalleled elsewhere, witches in some African societies are believed to be served by familiars of human origin or appearance, such as a “zombie” (*khidudwane*) among the Lovedu of the northern Transvaal or a “hairy dwarf” (*tokoloshe, tikeloshe*) among the Zulu and Xhosa-speaking peoples of Natal and the eastern Cape Province of South Africa. Within Africa, regional variations apply to the main list of familiars, with hyenas cited more often in central Africa and baboons in southern Africa.

There are similar regional differences in other aspects of witch beliefs and their everyday concomitants. For instance, while in most parts of the continent people accused of witchcraft are likely to refute the accusation and with it the long list of crimes (e.g., murder, incest, necrophagy) that it implies, there is a tendency, reported mainly from West Africa, for people to confess their witchcraft, sometimes voluntarily.

Debate over a Basic Distinction. An outstanding instance of how African ethnography has stimulated worldwide debates over terminology is provided by Evans-Pritchard’s seminal book on the Azande (1937). In witchcraft theory, the Azande make a distinction between two entities, *mangu* and *ngwa*. *Mangu*, a hereditary substance which can be discovered by autopsy in

the stomach of a witch, exerts a baleful mystical influence over the lives of others in the community when it is activated by hatred. On the other hand, *ngwa* (“magic”) is not identified with a particular substance; less of an object, it is subdivided into “good” magic (*wene ngwa*) and “bad” or “criminal” magic (*gbigbita ngwa*). Evans-Pritchard translates *mangu* as “witchcraft” and *gbigbita ngwa* as “sorcery.” He sums up:

To Azande themselves the difference between a sorcerer and a witch is that the former uses the techniques of magic and derives his power from medicines, while the latter acts without rites and spells and uses hereditary psycho-physical powers to attain his ends. Both alike are enemies of men, and Azande class them together.

(Evans-Pritchard, 1937, p. 387)

Although Evans-Pritchard emphasized that he expressed no opinion on the applicability of this distinction to peoples other than the Azande, several anthropologists working in Africa have found parallels to it, and this would, at first sight, justify its more general use. Thus the distinction between “night witch” and “day witch” made by the Sotho-speaking peoples of the plateau of South Africa, as well as the Lovedu, parallels that made by the Azande between witch and sorcerer. [See Tswana Religion.] Similarly, among the Chewa of east-central Africa the distinction between *nfiti yeniyeni* (“real witch”) and *mphelanjilu* (“killer for malice”) is similar, though not as clear since both are commonly referred to as *nfiti*. However, among the Nguni-speaking peoples of South Africa (including the Zulu, Pondo, Bhaca, Xhosa, etc.) the distinction is tenuous, applying simply to the mode of attack, that is, “with animals (familiars)” or “with medicines.”

Some anthropologists question the value of employing the witch-sorcerer distinction more widely than in the context to which Evans-Pritchard limited it. This position is taken by both Victor Turner (1964) and Mary Douglas (1967) in their respective review articles on the books by John Middleton and E. H. Winter (1963) and Maxwell Gay Marwick (1965). Turner’s conclusion is that “almost every society recognizes such a wide variety of mystically harmful techniques that it may be positively misleading to impose upon them a dichotomous classification” (Turner, 1964, p. 323); Douglas suggests that it would be better to use traditional English terms freely and to classify beliefs according to whatever criterion is significant (Douglas, 1967, p. 73).

A related debate has stemmed from the reports by Godfrey Wilson (1936) and Monica Wilson (1951a, 1951b) that the Nyakyusa of southern Tanzania believe that “the defenders” of the village, by exercising a supernatural power known as “the breath of men,” protect

their fellows and punish those who transgress; it is claimed that this power "comes from the same source as the power of the witches" (Wilson, 1951a, p. 97). In its antisocial form, that is, if it is illicitly used (and victim-transgressors are often likely to assert this), this power is indistinguishable from the witchcraft of other societies. Thus the Nyakyusa, who like peoples all over the world divide magic into good and bad forms, also dichotomize mystical influence in the same way, with "the breath of men" as its approved form and witchcraft as its disapproved form. [See Nyakyusa Religion.] Wilson reminds us that Henri A. Junod, in his classic study of the Tsonga of southeast Africa, first published in 1912–1913, came to the tentative conclusion that these people believe that the power of the magician, who protects the interests of society, and that of the witch, who destroys them, is derived from the same source (Junod, 1927, pp. 504–505, 516).

Alan Harwood (1970) has found a belief parallel to that of the Nyakyusa among the neighboring Safwa. Like the Azande, the Safwa distinguish between the power derived from medicine (*onzizi*) and a power that they refer to as *itonga* and that they believe to be inherited and hidden in its operation. But unlike the Azande (according to Evans-Pritchard's account) and like the Nyakyusa, the Safwa subdivide not only medicine but also "hidden power" into approved and disapproved forms. As to hidden power, "good *itonga*," according to Harwood, is believed to be used in divination to protect members of the community from external attack and to punish some of them for uncooperative behavior; "bad *itonga*" is used to introduce foreign substances into another person's body or into his gardens to diminish their effectiveness and is said to enable its possessors to "consume" members of their own lineage (Harwood, 1970, pp. 59–60). *Itonga* is thus conceived of as a neutral spiritual power and, since it is innate and can harm people, its bad (antisocial) form can reasonably be equated with the witchcraft of other societies. Harwood believes that, "appearances to the contrary, the Safwa are not alone with their neighbours the Nyakyusa in believing that the mystical power of 'witches' is morally neutral, and that perhaps the ethnocentric preconceptions of ethnographers are responsible for the dim light in which African 'witches' have traditionally been painted" (Harwood, 1970, p. 69). In particular, after carefully reexamining Evans-Pritchard's account of Zande witchcraft, Harwood concludes that Evans-Pritchard's finding that the Zande word *mangu* denotes an exclusively antisocial power—and should therefore be translated as "witchcraft"—is mistaken and comes from his having taken the perspective

of the witch doctor (diviner) rather than that of the ordinary villager.

Theoretical Approaches to African Witchcraft. With its rich variety of social structures and belief systems, Africa has provided useful material for the development of theories that account for the continued existence of witch beliefs and contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of society in general.

Evans-Pritchard's approach (1937) explains Zande witch beliefs mainly by showing their concordance with the basic assumptions and modes of reasoning, or philosophy of life, prevailing in the society and, somewhat incidentally, by relating them to social conditions, including stratification. The theoretical approaches to witchcraft taken by J. D. Krige (1947) in reference to the Lovedu, Monica Wilson (1951) in her comparison of the Mpondo of South Africa with the Nyakyusa, and Siegfried Frederick Nadel (1952) in his comparison of four West African peoples are of a more psychological orientation, showing varying degrees of similarity to Clyde Kluckhohn's analysis of Navajo witchcraft (1944). These writers explain witch beliefs as giving expression to the stresses, strains, and predilections that arise in the particular circumstances of the society concerned. The basic defect in these psychological approaches is that, based as they are on speculative propositions, for example, those of depth psychology, they do not generate hypotheses that are testable. More recently this approach has developed into, or been displaced by, a Lévi-Straussian structuralist model in which a society's cognitive system is taken to be a logical system in its own right rather than just a secondary reflection of social relations. This approach is found in Edwin Ardener's analysis of the witch beliefs of the Bakweri of west Cameroon (1970) and in subsequent studies by W. David Hammond-Tooke on the Cape Nguni of South Africa (1974) and by Michael D. Jackson on the Kuranko of northeast Sierra Leone (1975).

A more sociological orientation is found in the approaches of James Clyde Mitchell (1956), Middleton (1960), and Marwick (1952, 1965). By comparing the incidence of accusations and believed attacks of witchcraft in different categories of relationship, these writers relate witch beliefs to periodic social processes, such as the division of lineages into segments as their size increases in successive generations. Associated with this approach is a reemphasis of the principle, implicit in the writings of most students of witchcraft, that a society's conception of the characteristics of the witch reinforces its norms by providing a negative example.

All three types of approach try to make sense of what in modern society are regarded as bizarre and fallacious

beliefs, and because they provide functionalist justifications of the continuance of witch beliefs, they have been criticized. For instance, James R. Crawford (1967) has argued that placing too much emphasis on the idea that an allegation of witchcraft is merely a symptom of social malaise leads to a failure to recognize that the allegation usually embitters social relations and increases social tension by adding a new dynamic dimension to them, for example, making a previously private quarrel public. Similarly Douglas (1963) has pointed out that, though an accusation of witchcraft may facilitate developmental processes, such as lineage segmentation, "it is also an aggravator of all hostilities and fears, an obstacle to peaceful co-operation . . ." and "orderly social relations."

Turner warns against the use of any single explanation of the complex circumstances leading to an accusation of witchcraft, arguing that "each instance or set of accusations has to be examined within a total context of social action, which includes the operation of biotic, ecological, and intergroup processes, as well as intra-group developments" (Turner, 1964, pp. 315–316).

In the light of the criticisms that have been made of prevailing theories, we would do well to adopt a more comprehensive model for the analysis of African witchcraft. Ecological circumstances, including the prevalence of disease vectors and the level of medical understanding and associated hygiene, contribute to morbidity and mortality rates and thus provide the raw material of misfortunes requiring explanation; social structure and associated tradition lay down the general direction that the explanations (including accusations of witchcraft) will take. But far from resolving the tensions that cause them, accusations may often exacerbate them.

Witchcraft under Modern Conditions. The colonial authorities in Africa banned many divinatory practices such as the poison ordeal and smelling-out ceremonies, and they usually declared the imputation of witchcraft legally punishable. This led Africans to adopt alternative, and usually secret, ways of identifying those whom they believed to be witches. Antiwitchcraft cults developed and often recurred in many African societies, and some writers attribute their rise to the suppression of the traditional means of detection. Some of the African churches independent of the missions include witch finding among their activities.

The impression of most ethnographers has been that Africans' preoccupation with witch beliefs has increased in modern times and that this is to be explained by the conflict between the values of the economically egalitarian indigenous societies and the more individ-

ualistic ones of the intruders. Certainly people who have advanced educationally and financially are often concerned about protecting themselves from the witchcraft of those retaining a more traditional way of life.

This majority view was contested by Godfrey and Monica Wilson (1945, p. 120), who believed that the relative importance of witchcraft was declining and that of science increasing. Some statistical evidence has come forward recently (Mitchell and Mitchell, 1980; Hammond-Tooke, 1970), and this supports the Wilsons' view in that it demonstrates that modern social changes tend to be accompanied by a progressive, if slow, secularization of the beliefs that traditionally explained misfortunes.

[For further discussion of African witchcraft, see Southern African Religions, overview article.]

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MAXWELL GAY MARWICK

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1889–1951), one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Born of a wealthy family in Vienna, Wittgenstein did most of his philosophical work at Cambridge, England. He became a British subject in 1938 and succeeded G. E. Moore as professor of philosophy at Cambridge in 1939. His two principal works were largely responsible for the "linguistic revolutions" in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. The *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (German edition 1921, English translation 1922, second English translation 1961), completed in the Austrian army during World War I, was the only one of Wittgenstein's books published during his lifetime. It inaugurated a logical-structuralist approach to philosophical analysis. The *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1953) initiated what came to be called ordinary language philosophy. Some dozen other books of lectures, notes, letters, and various manuscripts and manuscript fragments have been published posthumously; the most important is probably *On Cer-*

tainty (Oxford, 1969). This material, on which Wittgenstein was working at the time of his death, seems to point the way toward still a third period of his philosophy.

Wittgenstein concerned himself primarily with the nature of language, a concern that for him entailed the understanding and clarification of meaning. Thus he believed language to be the proper subject of philosophy, for it is according to the terms of language that the world and human life become comprehensible. The function of philosophy is to see language clearly and thereby dissolve (particularly at certain critical nodes) metaphysical problems and anxieties created by deep misunderstandings about the grammatical possibilities of language. Wittgenstein excelled in the subtle examination of how ordinary words with ordinary uses come to seem fraught with metaphysical complexities.

The spirit in which these profound philosophical (and not merely linguistic) studies were carried out was the very reverse of a positivistic or scientific one, though some of Wittgenstein's early interpreters, such as Bertrand Russell, misunderstood him on this point. In his notebooks, excerpts from which have been published under the title *Culture and Value* (1977; Eng. ed., 1980), he declared himself out of sympathy with the scientific and progressivistic spirit of the age. Even in his early letters to Paul Engelmann and Ludwig Flicker, he made it clear that the purpose of the *Tractatus* was an ethical and not a scientific or positivistic one.

Wittgenstein once told a friend that he could not help seeing everything from a religious point of view. He belonged to no religious group or institution, though his mother was Catholic and he had been baptized a Catholic. (Three of his grandparents are said to have been of Jewish extraction.) During World War I he came under the influence of Tolstoy's writings on the Gospels and adopted a Tolstoyan mode of life, giving away his considerable inheritance and living ascetically as a village schoolteacher in southern Austria. To his friends he expressed admiration for Kierkegaard and Augustine and for some of the writings of George Fox and the prayers of Samuel Johnson. Engelmann reported that Wittgenstein believed in the Last Judgment but could make little out of the biblical doctrine of creation.

Wittgenstein wrote very little specifically on religion; the most important documents in this regard are *Lectures on Religious Belief* (Oxford, 1966) and *Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"* (London, 1979). Yet his philosophy is permeated with a religious spirit. It was one of his strongest convictions that religion should be shown and demonstrated in everything rather than talked about as a separate matter. He advised his students that

philosophical problems must arise out of a genuine need rather than as an expression of wit and cleverness. The important question about a philosopher, he said, is how much his ideas cost him. Wittgenstein believed that a philosophy is no better than the life out of which it arises and that in order to see things clearly it is necessary, above all, to destroy vanity. Unexamined biases and commitments are a mortgage against clarity.

Wittgenstein's reserve on the subject of religion arose not only from his feeling that it is more important to talk to God than to talk about God, but also from his awareness that in the present age religious expressions are almost certain to be misunderstood. Thus he considered dedicating one of his books, later published after his death as *Philosophical Remarks*, "To the glory of God," but decided against it.

What is evident from the study of Wittgenstein's life and work is that he was a clearcut "supernaturalist," in the sense that he sharply separated God from the world. He told a student, Friedrich Waismann, that it is more profound to believe that something is good because God commands it than to believe that God commands it because it is good.

Religion for Wittgenstein was a matter of belief, and such beliefs outranked any explanations, reasons, or logic. Wittgenstein had no patience with either sociological or psychological "explanations" of religion, and even less with scientific attempts to bolster religion or to create religious emotions as responses to scientific wonders. Religion had to do with a different and more important dimension than that of fact: the dimension of how we are to live.

His most important contribution to the philosophy of religion was in his analysis of belief in *Lectures on Religious Belief*, included in *Lectures and Conversations*, compiled by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees, and James Taylor (Oxford, 1966). Here Wittgenstein examines the role played by religious beliefs in the guidance of life and attempts to disentangle them from all factual matters, including claims about existence. He makes the important point that denying a religious belief or disagreeing with it is not contradicting anything, since the essence of religious belief has nothing to do with whether something is or is not the case, or was or will be the case. Rather, it has to do with how we live and die. When people are willing to suffer and die for their religious beliefs, it is not for some factual proposition that they are willing to suffer and die, though it may appear so. Thus a belief in the Last Judgment should not be taken as an assertion that a certain event is or is not going to take place, but as something like an icon guiding our thoughts and actions, particularly in times

of crisis. The attempt to make religious beliefs appear reasonable Wittgenstein regarded as often "ludicrous."

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HENRY LE ROY FINCH

WOLFF, CHRISTIAN (1679–1754), rationalist philosopher of the German Enlightenment. Born in Breslau, Wolff was educated there and at the University of Jena. Though he had studied theology and philosophy, Wolff's main interest while at the university was in mathematics. Wolff earned his master's degree from the University of Leipzig in 1703; in 1707, with the help of a recommendation from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, he was appointed professor of mathematics and natural sciences at the relatively new University of Halle, where he taught until 1723. In that year he moved to the University of Marburg, subsequently returning in 1740 to Halle, where he remained until his death.

Wolff's education familiarized him with Lutheran, Calvinist, and Roman Catholic viewpoints in theology, with Aristotelian and Cartesian school traditions in philosophy, and with emerging empirical methods in Newtonian science. The most important single influence on Wolff's thought was Leibniz, but it is too simple to say that Wolff merely systematized the views of his great predecessor.

Wolff began lecturing on philosophy in 1709. In 1713 he published his first major work in the field, a German logic. Later German works dealt with metaphysics (1720), ethics (1720), politics (1721), physics (1723), teleology (1724), and physiology (1725).

In 1728 Wolff turned his attention beyond the borders of Germany to the larger intellectual world. This new international audience was addressed in Latin in a series of works that are larger, more extensive in scope, and some would say more "objective" or "scholastic" in character than their German predecessors. They include treatises on logic (1728), ontology (1729), cosmology (1731), empirical and rational psychology (1732 and 1734), natural theology (2 vols., 1736–1737), universal practical philosophy (2 vols., 1738–1739), natural law (8 vols., 1740–1748), *jus gentium* (1749), and ethics (5 vols., 1750–1753).

Two aspects of Wolff's life and thought are perhaps

most significant for the history and development of religious thought. The first of these is his clash with Pietist theologians at Halle. Wolff's commitment to rational method, the content of his metaphysics, his success with students, and an abrasive personal style soon generated criticism. Among the issues at stake were Wolff's acceptance of the Leibnizian doctrine of preestablished harmony and his emphasis on God's intellect as the controlling framework for divine freedom and power. Wolff was accused of idealism, fatalism, determinism, Spinozism, and atheism—all fairly standard charges at the time, though in this case not without some basis in fact. When their efforts to alter his views or to limit his influence within the academic world did not succeed, some of Wolff's opponents made an external appeal to political authority. The result, in 1723, was an order from King Frederick William I—issued without a hearing—that removed Wolff from his professorship and banned him from Prussia within forty-eight hours on pain of death. This was perhaps a more serious escalation than even Wolff's enemies might have desired, with ominous implications for academic freedom. In fact, another post was immediately available at Marburg in Hesse-Cassel, and exile only heightened Wolff's popularity. Moreover, upon the accession of Frederick the Great to the Prussian throne in 1740, Wolff was recalled in triumph to Halle. In the meantime, he had switched from German to Latin in his writing and had published an eloquent essay on the freedom to philosophize in his "Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General" (1728).

The second issue worth noting is Wolff's commitment to natural theology. Wolff saw his philosophy as a support rather than a hindrance to religion. His account of God's existence and attributes was meant to lay the basis for a secure theology and ethics. This is in keeping with his goal to achieve through philosophy both a science and a wisdom. In retrospect, what Wolff has given us is the epitome of a rationalist tradition in philosophical theology. His demonstrations of the existence of God, for example, include both *a priori* and *a posteriori* proofs, forms of the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments. Their exposition presented Kant with a ready-made target for his well-known critique.

In both his teaching and early writings, Wolff made a major contribution toward establishing the German language as an accepted instrument for scientific work. The common opening phrase in the titles of his central German works ("Rational thoughts on . . .") and the equally common subtitle of his Latin volumes ("Treated according to the scientific method") mark Wolff's abiding concerns for method, order, and system. Wolff divided human knowledge into three parts: history

(knowledge of the fact), philosophy (knowledge of the reason for the fact), and mathematics (knowledge of the quantity of things). He subdivided philosophy into metaphysics, physics, and practical philosophy; further divided metaphysics into ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology; and popularized the distinction between empirical and rational modes of knowing. These divisions are implemented in both his German and Latin writings, which themselves enjoyed a huge success, often appearing in multiple editions right up to the time of his death. Wolff's views soon dominated the academic scene in Germany; his students filled key posts in institutions of higher education, and his prestige was immense. Kant called Wolff "the greatest of all the dogmatic philosophers." Despite contemporary adversities and relative obscurity today, Wolff was undoubtedly the most influential philosopher in Germany between the death of Leibniz in 1716 and the publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781.

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and the nurturing mother. In classical times the wolf, perceived in both aspects, symbolized transition. The "hour of the wolf," for example, is the time of emergence from darkness into light or, contrarily, of reversion to the world of darkness and ignorance. The biblical verse "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb" (Is. 11:16) is a metaphor for the assimilation of the lower to the higher and participates in the symbolism of the center. The Roman *signa* represents the wolf mounted on a cube (earth) and on a sphere (heaven). As an alchemical symbol, the wolf, together with the dog, stands for the dyadic nature of Mercurius, the philosophical mercury, the *nous* ("intelligence").

Many of the ancient war gods bore the name Wolf. Apollo, more widely known as a sun god, was associated with the wolf, and the epithets "wolf-born" and "wolfish Apollo" occur in Greek and Roman literature. In the *Aeneid*, the god assumed the form of a wolf in order to destroy the sorcerers of Rhodes, and a bronze statue of a wolf still stands at his shrine at Delphi. The Romans associated the wolf with the god Mars, and their legions marched into battle under the protection of the sacred wolf displayed on their banners. The Lupercalia, a festival of ancient Rome, has been interpreted as a wolf festival with wolf priests. Wolf deities were worshiped in Iran and Scythia, and in Japan the wolf was long regarded as a great god. The Teutonic war god Wodan (whose name derives from *wut*, "fury") and his Scandinavian counterpart, Óðinn (Odin), were accompanied by wolves when waging war. The Finns called wolves "dogs of the death spirit." American Indian tribes whose gods bore wolf names preceded their war sorties with wolf dances to ensure victory.

The most sinister wolf image is that of Fenrir, or Fenrisúlfr (Fenriswolf), in Norse mythology. The son of the trickster Loki, this monster embodied the destructive potential of chaos in the universe. Immured by the gods in the bowels of the earth, he broke out of his prison and devoured the sun and so brought about the twilight of the gods. In the thirteenth-century Icelandic Eddas, the cyclic cosmic battle between the gods and antigods is called "the war with the wolf."

Exaltation of wolves rather than fear of them prevailed in archaic times, for, as a hunter, man identified himself with the wolf, the exemplary predator. Animals were considered divine in those early societies and were the nucleus around which religious belief crystallized. The discovery of Neolithic figurines of men wearing wolf masks and wolf skins suggests ceremonies of a religious and initiatory character. When wolf totems were created and the name of the animal taken by the tribe, it was often in the belief that the tribe was descended from a wolf ancestor, an idea that reflects a religious

WOLVES. Wolf symbolism embraces the dual aspects of man's good and evil nature. Although the dark, menacing image of the fearless predator and ravaging killer preponderates, wolves also personify a protective spirit

concept of great antiquity. The Chinggisids attributed their origin to a wolf who had come down from heaven to mate with a doe. Analogous myths existed among various tribal peoples of Inner Asia. The wolf also figured in the mythology of the American Indian hunting societies, such as the Cheyenne, and for some tribes of the Plains and the Eastern Woodlands, it was a clan or gens animal. Awed by the skill of the wolf as predator, these tribes incorporated its image into their rituals and ceremonial dances with the aim of acquiring the animal's stamina and courage. Conversely, the wolf was anathema for agricultural societies, although, according to Herodotus, the priests of Ceres had wolf guides.

In ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, the wolf, symbolizing the warrior-hero, was a guardian figure on monuments. An emblem of valor, it was a dominant image in the *Volsungasaga* and in the Teutonic military societies, the Berserkers and Männerbünde. Fostering the cult of the fanatical warrior, these martial brotherhoods held initiation ceremonies for the purpose of transforming the neophyte into a wolf. By donning the skin of the invulnerable animal, the initiate was thought to acquire its ferocity and power. Such traditions of initiatory transformation are documented in cultures as remote as those of Iceland and Africa.

The widespread and enduring association of wolves with ferocity and greed, darkness and death, prevailed among the Hindus and Celts. For the Chinese, the animal signified avarice and voracity, for the Zoroastrians and Armenians, evil more malign than that of the serpent charms used to destroy it. The Abyssinians regarded wolves as demons in animal form. In Judaism, wolves connoted bloodthirstiness and the spirit of persecution, and the biblical epithet "stiff-necked" derived from the belief that the animal was unable to turn its head. In both testaments of the Bible, wolves are characterized as "ravening." The image of the wolf as Satan or his henchman, a devourer of men's souls, pervaded Christianity. The wolf represented the heretic, despoiler of the sheepfold of the faithful, of which Christ was the shepherd-protector. In "The Parson's Tale" Chaucer speaks of "the devil's wolves that strangle the sheep of Jesus Christ." Dante, in the first canto of his *Inferno*, names the she-wolf "laden with all craving" as one of the three dangerous beasts in the dark wood of fear; and in the eighth circle of Hell, thieves, liars, and hypocrites are condemned for "the sins of the wolf."

In many societies, the wolf was the symbol of outlaws, fugitives, and exiles, all of whom were believed to be under the protection of wolf gods. In the laws of the Hittites as well as those of Edward the Confessor, such men were required to wear a wolf-headed mask. Around

350 CE the first bishop of the Goths applied the term *wolf* to any man who had committed a capital crime.

Early associated with sorcery and superstition, wolves were said to be the mounts of warlocks and witches. In Norse mythology, they consorted with the Norns, and Circe's palace was surrounded by tame wolves that she had subdued by enchantment. "Tooth of wolf" is an ingredient of the witches' brew in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, and various parts of the animal's body were included in the armaments of magic of American Indian medicine men.

Perhaps the most colorful of the beliefs relating to wolves is that of lycanthropy, the ancient belief in the transformation of man into werewolf. This fearsome, night-roaming beast, avid for human blood, has been an almost universal specter. Legends of werewolves are known in almost every part of the world, and where no wolves have existed, the belief in were-animals has been associated with the fiercest native animal: the tiger in India, the jaguar in South America, the hyena in Africa, and the fox in Japan and China, where stories of the werefox have been preserved in the lore of popular Taoism. Werewolves played a role in the shamanism of Asia, and Inuit (Eskimo) and Chukchi shamans transformed themselves into wolves when in trance. Herodotus wrote of the Neuri turning into wolves annually, which suggests periodic religious ceremonies in which wolf masks and wolf skins were worn. Socrates refers to werewolves in Plato's *Republic*; Pliny gives an account of werewolfry in his *Natural History*; and Vergil wrote that the creatures were produced by means of magic herbs. Such beliefs may have had their origin in the mythico-religious complex of wolf gods or in rituals of the return of the dead. But it was in medieval Christian Europe that the werewolf most obsessed the human mind, and the Catholic Inquisition exploited the panic it aroused to further the suppression of heresy.

Wolves have been represented in Christian art as susceptible to spiritual persuasion and reform. The wolf of Gubbio, which had terrorized that Italian village, was converted by Francis of Assisi and is often depicted as his companion. Odo of Cluny, the tenth-century French saint, is said to have been rescued by a wolf when assailed by foxes, and the manuscript of the life of Edmund the Martyr (ninth century) contains an illustration of a wolf guarding the saint's severed head.

Wolves as nurturing figures occur in myth and legend, often mothering human infants who become founders of dynasties or nations. The best known of these, the Capitoline wolf that nursed Romulus and Remus, the legendary founders of Rome, is by no means the only surviving monument to this widespread legend. Coins

antedating the founding of Rome bear the images of wolves with twin children. Apollo's children by human mothers were also said to have been suckled by wolves.

Siberian and American Indian shamans regarded wolves as guardians or helpful spirits and a source of great power. The doctoring societies of the Quileute and Makah Indians of the Northwest Coast performed wolf dances to heal the sick, and the image of a wolf head was believed to be a safeguard against evil. For many Indian tribes the wolf represented the corn god. The Keresan Pueblo tribe of the Southwest ordered the world according to the four cardinal points plus the zenith and nadir, and each of the six points was said to be dominated by a god, with the wolf in the west.

Wolves are often represented in fairy tales and fables as helpful animals; they manifest a sagacity and acumen superior to human knowledge.

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ANN DUNNIGAN

WOMAN. See *Feminine Sacrality*.

WOMEN'S STUDIES in religion have emerged over the last two decades as an area of scholarship with major implications for religious life and thought. This scholarship is distinguished from other approaches to the study of religion by its fundamental concern for

gender as a crucial variable in religion. Taking gender as a primary category of analysis, women's studies in religion examine the function of gender in the symbolization of religious traditions, the institutionalization of roles in religious communities, and the dynamics of the interaction between religious systems of belief and the personal, social, and cultural condition of women. With gender as a primary analytical category, feminist scholars can pursue one of their main purposes, which is the recovery of women's distinctive historical and contemporary experience. On the basis of the recovered experience and perspectives of women, women's studies offer critiques of religious and cultural traditions, while at the same time making the experience and perspectives of women the starting point for the feminist reinterpretation and reconstruction of both religion and culture.

Critical and Constructive Task. The magnitude of the critical and constructive task undertaken by women's-studies scholars is indicated by the range of feminist publications to date across the fields of religion: scripture, theology, ethics, history of Christianity, psychology and sociology of religion, and world religions. In each of these fields, women's studies have begun to challenge the categories of thought underlying the traditional disciplinary methods and their contents that have shaped the study of religion. Emerging from these challenges are new feminist theoretical principles and frameworks. Women's studies are not concerned simply with adding to knowledge in these fields the heretofore overlooked record of women's religious thoughts and activities. Rather, this new scholarship is intent on building a methodological basis for developing a more adequate understanding of the whole of human religious experience.

The current discussions do not represent the first historical appearance of religious thought that explicitly or implicitly questions dominantly masculine religious imagery, language, and authority. Furthermore, one of the initial discoveries of women's-studies scholarship has been the extent to which women themselves have been over the centuries a central focus of religious debate. This certainly has been the case in Christianity. A significant body of research has uncovered that debate, particularly the concern since the origins of Christianity with the recurrent question of the proper role and status of women in the church. And in the last century, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the great leader of the movement for women's rights, linked the question of women's unequal status in religion directly to the larger question of their unequal status in American society. Arguing that the Bible defines woman as a secondary form of human being and that appeals to reli-

gious authority were being used to prevent the social emancipation of women, Stanton published women's commentaries on the position of women in the Old and New Testaments as *The Woman's Bible* (1895).

The contemporary development of women's studies has been in large measure a result both of renewed controversy about the proper role and status of women in religion and modern women's movements, particularly in the West. The sustained growth of feminist theory in religion and the breadth and depth of its critical and constructive contributions have been stimulated by the rapid rate of increase in the enrollment of women in theological schools in the United States and Canada from the early 1970s to the present. Women's studies have developed in large part in response to the increasing numbers of women seeking preparation for religious leadership, particularly within Judaism and Christianity, and to the explicit and subtle barriers to that leadership in major traditions. These barriers prompted female and male scholars alike to ask on what religious grounds women might be (and in some cases still are) excluded by official policy from religious leadership in major religions of the world. These questions led in turn to recognition of the male-centeredness of traditional religions and then to the broader and deeper question of how gender has functioned as a crucial variable in religious life and thought.

Critique of Religious Assumptions. Women's studies scholarship begins with the recognition that assumptions about gender historically have shaped the religions of the world. Yet these assumptions have gone largely unrecognized and unexamined. As a result, our knowledge of human religious experience is skewed and very partial. The religious experience and perspectives of women in various cultures and racial and economic groups in the past and present have been and are distinctive. Yet this experience and the examination of human religious experience from women's perspectives have never been significant foci or sources of scholarship in the fields of religious inquiry. Most scholarly work in these fields has been done by men, has drawn on primary and secondary sources that are male-dominated, and has focused on the religious experience of men and on institutions dominated by men.

Much of what has claimed to be objective scholarship about human experience actually has been a depiction of male experience from a male point of view. One of the primary claims of feminist scholarship is that this identification of the male with the human in religion is the root problem. Feminists argue that underlying this identification for centuries has been the fundamental and largely unchallenged assumption that maleness is the primary form of human experience, the measure of

human being and activity. Mary Daly's groundbreaking *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation* (1973) first demonstrated how profoundly this assumption has shaped Judaism and Christianity. Her systematic critique drew attention as well to the powerful role religion plays in legitimizing and reinforcing this assumption in society and culture.

Critique of Anthropological Assumptions. Feminists make a further claim: the assumption that maleness is normative has functioned in religion to set human and woman in opposition. This opposition follows from a persistent asymmetry in fundamental assumptions about gender in religion. The corollary to the assumption that maleness is the primary form of human being is the assumption that femaleness is a secondary and by comparison deficient form of human being. Daly and other feminists maintain that when the divine is imaged exclusively as male women are denied the full dignity and possibility of human being that sacred symbols represent for men. They are spiritually trapped in a state where their potential for being fully human and authoritative in their own lives and as social agents is cut off. In their own self-image and in society, women are conceived of as the second sex. These asymmetrical gender assumptions embedded in religious traditions have functioned in short to truncate women's experience, to prevent that experience from being understood and regarded as distinctive human experience, and to lock in place the male-centeredness and sexism of such major world religions as Judaism and Christianity.

Feminist scholars are drawing attention to something that has not been seen before: the normative structure of religions with regard to gender, particularly the normative anthropology embedded in religious traditions. Feminists are concerned, that is, with the conceptions of the nature of human being that implicitly and explicitly shape religious ideas and practice. This concern with anthropology is well illustrated in scriptural studies by Phyllis Trible in *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality* (1978). Trible argues that in Judaism and Christianity the anthropology set forth in the *Genesis* 2-3 creation myth traditionally has been interpreted to justify basic assumptions about the created inequality of male and female, providing key scriptural authority for the existence of these assumptions in all areas of religious thought, institutional life, and practice. Trible points out not only that these asymmetrical gender assumptions have shaped Judaism and Christianity as sexist traditions but also that these religions have in turn reinforced and justified sexual hierarchy in society.

Relation to Social Status. A primary characteristic of women's studies in religion is the underscoring of the powerful connection between religious conceptions of

reality and social institutions. More specifically, women's studies underscore the relationship between the image and status of women in theology and cultural patterns defining women's social roles and status. Mary Daly was one of the first to claim that the exclusively male symbol systems of Judaism and Christianity—a male God and in Christianity a male savior and Holy Spirit as well—function as a cosmic model for the proper order of human life. In *Beyond God the Father*, she identified the symbol of God the Father as the keystone in the arch of theological and social misogyny, arguing that it defines authority in the universe and therefore on earth as properly and naturally masculine: "If God in 'his' heaven is a father ruling 'his' people, then it is in the nature of things and according to divine plan . . . that society be male-dominated" (p. 13).

Feminists, however, do not understand the subordination of women as a narrow question of women's status in religion and society. They are concerned with investigating the broadest and deepest implications for modern humanity of women's religious and social oppression. This concern has led to examination of the very categories of thought by which religion and culture are understood. Rosemary Radford Ruether was one of the first to point to the systemic nature and significance of gender asymmetry in Western culture. She argued in *New Woman, New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation* (1975) that the asymmetry of male and female, the subject-object relationship of domination and subordination, is the primary form of and model for all dualisms. As a result masculinity and femininity, the most fundamental structural opposition, have come to symbolize a normative pattern of greater and lesser value that pervades intellectual as well as social systems. In her article "The Female Nature of God," in *God as Father?* (1981), Ruether argued the need for a radical criticism that calls into question traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity as constructs of patriarchal culture. She understands the feminist project as moving beyond this dualism. Rejecting androgyny as a feminist ideal, she rejects also an androgynous concept of God in which masculine and feminine characteristics are seen as united in one being:

. . . the vindication of the "feminine," as we have inherited that concept from patriarchy, will always be set within a dualistic scheme of complementary principles that segregate women on one side and men on the other. Even if this scheme is given a reversed valuation, the same dualism remains. (Ruether, *God as Father?*, 1981, p. 65)

The central insight of feminist scholarship in religion is, in short, that gender and value are deeply intertwined in cultural traditions. One of the most highly de-

veloped analyses of how the two are linked is given by Judith Van Herik in *Freud on Femininity and Faith* (1982), a study of the relationship between Freud's theories about femininity and religion. Van Herik describes in terms of religious and psychological phenomena how traditional ways of thinking in the West are themselves profoundly shaped by assumptions about gender difference. She shows how the assumption that the masculine is the human norm and of greater value than the feminine leads to the presumption that the masculine point of view is that of the general human subject. Here, as elsewhere, the feminist emphasis on the need to transform the intellectual bases of culture is clearly set forth.

Reconstruction of Historical Research. For many feminist scholars in religion the starting point for this transformation is historical research and the reconstruction of historical method. These scholars work from several premises. First, they refuse to equate religious traditions with the historical record and theological interpretation of those traditions set forth over the centuries by male scholars and religious leaders. Women's-studies scholars whose approach is historical do not accept as authoritative the history produced by traditional scholarship of such religions as Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism. They see these histories as accounts of human experience that are both partial and skewed by unexamined gender assumptions. The second premise of feminist historians is that all historical scholarship is inherently imaginative and that there is no such thing as objective reconstruction of the past or history that is simply descriptive. Feminist history calls attention to this imaginative dimension and to the need for its critical assessment. In *Image as Insight: Visual Understanding in Western Christianity and Secular Culture* (1985), Margaret R. Miles offers one of the most fundamental critiques of the all too frequently unacknowledged perspectival nature of traditional historical method, proposing wholly new bases for writing history that can recover the lives of women and other people commonly overlooked by historians. Third, feminists engaged in historical research see as their primary purpose the discovery of the historical experience of women that has been so systematically overlooked by traditional scholarship in religion. They view their scholarly task as responding to the need for massive historical work that in recovering women's past provides the basis for reconstructing understanding not simply of religious traditions but of the past itself. One of the first volumes to suggest both the scale of the historical work required and its far-reaching implications for reinterpretation was *Women of Spirit: Female Leadership in the Jewish and Christian Traditions* (1979), edited by Rosemary Ruether and Eleanor McLaughlin.

Work to date on a growing number of historical periods and increasingly varied cultural contexts illustrates feminist historical approaches. This work rejects the assumption of traditional male-centered historical methodology that women have not been a force in history insofar as they have been excluded for the most part from positions of official religious and social leadership. In rejecting this assumption, feminist historical methodology makes an important distinction. It locates women's history neither in the study of how women have been depicted in historical texts written by men nor in the study of exceptional women whose lives approximated male norms of social agency. Rather, feminist history moves beyond traditional historical methodology and sources to look often for the first time for women's actual experience and activities. Its task is to develop frameworks for interpreting this experience and these activities that do not take the norms of male history as the measure of human experience.

Together, this purpose and emphasis on the historical conditions of women's lives entail a new approach in religion to the treatment of historical texts written by men and, as they are discovered or reinterpreted, the far fewer yet increasing numbers of historical texts written by women. This new feminist approach does not take texts on their own as accurate descriptions of social reality but reconstructs the historical reality behind the text as a necessary step in understanding the meaning of the text and its point of view. Texts are examined in relation to the broader sociohistorical context out of which they arose and particularly in relation to the social conditions of women's lives. Two key books exemplify this new approach and its significance for the study of religion and history.

In *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (1983), biblical scholar Elizabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza argues that a focus on male-centered biblical texts produced by patriarchal culture will lead necessarily to an understanding of humanity and human history as normatively male. A feminist critical biblical-historical approach reconstructs the history of women's lives and contributions in early Christian beginnings, allowing us "to perceive the human reality articulated insufficiently in androcentric texts and research." Making women's agency an important interpretive category of historical work, Schüssler-Fiorenza explores the extent to which women as well as men were the initiators of the Christian movement, and to which early Christian history is women's history. This leads to a fundamentally new and more adequate understanding of the whole of Christian beginnings. It reveals that behind remaining glimpses in the biblical canon of the early Christian movement as a discipleship of equals lay a complex historical reality in which the

egalitarian ethos of early Christianity gave way to a process of patriarchalization.

Much historical work to date on women in varying cultures, historical periods, classes, and racial groups, like Schüssler-Fiorenza's, views women's religious history as a history not only of oppression but also of agency. *Mystic and Pilgrim: The Book and World of Margery Kempe* (1983) by Clarissa W. Atkinson, a study of the religious experience and vision of a fifteenth-century English woman, examines a rare female text in the context of its author's life and times to understand how religion shaped the nature and meaning of the lives of both ordinary and unusual women in the culture of medieval Europe. Atkinson uses biography to study the dynamics by which women's sexuality was related historically to theological ideas and symbols of female sanctity, by which religion played a role in shaping such cultural concepts as motherhood. In doing so, she shows how Christian symbols might interact with personal, social, and economic factors to provide some women with the tools to live unconventional female lives of spiritual leadership and adventure. This reinterpretation of Margery Kempe and her historical and theological significance places her in the context of a broader group of European women saints and a tradition of popular piety. In turn, it demonstrates that when women's experience is recovered, traditional interpretations of medieval religious culture and of late medieval history itself cannot stand and must be reconstructed.

Thus, feminist historical work represents a shift in scholarly vantage point that fundamentally alters the contours of historical periods. At the same time, it unearths the history of women's struggles to interpret and shape religious experience, constituting a new heritage for modern women and a resource for contemporary feminist theology. Feminist theologians argue that along with helping to define sexist social patterns, religion has contributed to women's oppression by excluding them officially from the main work of building culture, that is, the creation of frameworks of meaning and belief. Religions have denied women the human activity and the personal and social power of discovering their own interpretations of ultimate reality and truth. What distinguishes feminist theologians from women's studies scholars in disciplines outside religion is their view that the key to women's becoming creative forces in their own lives, in society, and in culture lies in the act of making and articulating their own religious meaning, of formulating their own theological problems and religious vision.

Reconstruction of Religious Beliefs. Feminist theologians agree that the crucial task facing contemporary women individually and collectively is the task of re-

weaving the sacred symbolic fabric of culture based on the distinctive female experience. Undertaking this task is precisely what the theoretical and practical revolution in religion is about. However, while feminists agree that Judaism, Christianity, and other religious traditions of the world are sexist and that religion has a powerful role to play in women's liberation, they disagree about whether or not traditional religions are irremediably patriarchal.

Some feminist theologians believe that established religions can and must be reformed. They see such traditions as Judaism and Christianity if unreformed as continuing barriers in society to women's achieving full human dignity and agency. More than this, they see both these religions (on which most feminist scholarship has focused to date) as important sources of liberating vision for interpreting and shaping women's contemporary experience. These feminists see women as theological subjects and identify the theological priority of women as systematic reinterpretation of these belief systems in light of women's own experience and perspectives. For these feminists the task of feminist scholarship is to reinterpret Judaism and Christianity to liberate them from historical distortion and self-serving patriarchal interpretation. Ultimately, the significance of feminist scholarship is, as illustrated by Christian feminist Rosemary Ruether in *To Change the World: Christology and Cultural Criticism* (1981), its historic potential for enlarging understanding of the prophetic Christian message.

Feminists have brought to theology a new criterion for conceptions of human being, God, and the universe. This new critical measure of theology and tradition is the liberation of women. The work of feminist theologians within established traditions cannot be reduced to a concern for feminizing language and images for God. Rather, feminists are engaged in critical reconstruction of the conceptual structure of belief systems. They are reconceiving the meaning of traditional notions of divinity, transcendence, salvation, human freedom, and justice in light of women's oppression and their search for liberation.

Mary Daly was one of the first to describe the historically unique promise for humanity of feminist reconceptions of God and ultimate reality. In *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism* (1978) she announced the feminist task as that of creating a new theology-philosophy that explores the process of women becoming themselves and finding their distinctive interpretation of God and the universe. New theologies that begin to articulate women's distinctive interpretations of God, the self, and the world are emerging. These reconstruct traditional masculine notions and symbols, beginning with those of divinity. In contrast to what

they see as the attributes of a patriarchal God, an otherworldly all-powerful father who places himself over against fallen human experience, many feminists understand God as immanent in the world and without gender. Isabel Carter Heyward proposes such a concept of God in *The Redemption of God: A Theology of Mutual Relation* (1982). The title captures nicely her sense of the feminist theological task. It also expresses her understanding of God as the creative power of relation in human life that allows individuals to realize in the activity of relation who they are, while calling humanity collectively to the concrete responsibility of creating justice, which for Heyward means mutual or "right" relation, in the world.

Traditional concepts of sin and salvation have also been foci of feminist thinking. Judith Plaskow has shown that when women's experience is taken into account an understanding of sin as pride or self-centeredness must give way to a new notion of sin as self-denial or avoidance of the necessity to become a self. Likewise, for women grace must be defined not as the shattering of pride through obedience but rather as a movement toward genuine self-love and acceptance of the responsibility for self and for self-realization. Plaskow argues this position in *Sex, Sin, and Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich* (1980). She maintains that insofar as women's experience reveals the inadequacy of traditional theological ideas for women, it identifies the need to explore previously submerged aspects of human experience and to redefine systematically an understanding of the nature of human being and its relationship to ultimate reality.

Rosemary Ruether was the first to attempt a systematic nonsexist theology that works through the implications of feminist critique for reinterpreting the central related doctrines of Christianity. Her book *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology* (1983) sets forth the vision many feminists share of a theology that begins with women's experience and represents a radical critique of the notion of hierarchy itself, of the fundamental structural dualism of privilege and dispossession that lies at the heart of all social patterns of oppression such as racism, anti-Semitism, poverty, and domination of nature.

Reconstruction of Ethical Thought. Such emphasis on the public or social spheres, specifically on programs for the transformation not only of the condition of women but of the human condition, characterizes feminist theology and moral discourse. The work of feminist ethicists illustrates especially the broad feminist orientation toward the concrete and away from universal claims that both ignore the particularity of human experience and do not have concrete implications for

action. In this way, just as it underscores the relationship between religious ideas and social structures, feminist thinking insists on connecting theory with practice. Further, feminists reconstructing Christian ethical thinking give priority in their approach to the problem of injustice and the criterion of liberation. Beverly Wildung Harrison's *Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion* (1983) exemplifies this important methodological shift. Viewing the well-being of women as a fundamental yet neglected moral problem, Harrison argues that the failure of the contemporary Christian community to act in an egalitarian mode calls into question the historical moral claims of the tradition. Her critique and reconception of traditional moral categories demonstrate a major tenet of feminist theory, that one's interpretation of the past is always shaped by one's commitments in the present. Feminists argue that the connection between ideas and practical commitments has always existed in scholarship although it has normally been unacknowledged.

New Religious Constructions. Yet by no means do all feminist theologians choose to work within established traditions or believe these can be reformed. A significant body of work has been developed by feminists who think it impossible for such traditions as Judaism and Christianity ever to symbolize or guide attainment of the fullness of human being for women as well as men. These feminists also look for sources of women's distinctive religious vision. But they do not look to the past, believing that women's authentic spirituality cannot be recovered in the history of patriarchal religious and cultural traditions that denied and distorted it. They disagree fundamentally with feminist theologians who believe women have a usable past or religious history on which contemporary women's spirituality can draw. Turning their backs on established faiths, they think that no amount even of radical surgery can root out the sexism of traditional religious symbols. With the publication of *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*, Mary Daly identified patriarchy itself as the prevailing religion of the world and argued that only by journeying beyond male-dominated religion and culture might women discover the power to become their authentic female selves. Like Daly, other post-Christian and Jewish feminists define the proper focus of feminist religious thinking as the creation of new moral vision, religious imagery, and ritual out of the experience of contemporary women.

These feminists are concerned with how contemporary women come to discover the nature and authority of their own interpretations of life. Like traditional feminists, they see the process of making meaning as the central dynamic in women's individual and collective

liberation. In *Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest* (1980), Carol Christ articulates this claim that the spiritual quest of contemporary women guides and sustains their social quest for equality. Non-traditional feminists like Carol Christ see as crucially important for women and their spirituality the symbol of the mother goddess who represents the creativity and authority of female power in the world. Like Naomi Goldenberg, author of *Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions* (1979), these "theologians" understand the goddess worship of feminist witchcraft as the religious alternative that alone will allow women to escape the physical, psychic, and social oppression they suffer at the hands of traditional faiths. Religious ritual celebrating the legitimacy and beneficence of female power is at the heart of the practice of witchcraft as set forth by Starhawk in *The Spiral Dance: A Rebirth of the Ancient Religion of the Great Goddess* (1979).

Critique of Universal Claims. The debate between feminists working outside of and within established religions has been intensified and enriched from the outset by strong internal critique of another kind. As the historical and cultural diversity of women's experience is increasingly explored, the extent to which feminist thinking has moved sufficiently away from the universalizing perspective and the universal claims of traditional scholarship is being questioned from a number of perspectives. At issue is whether feminist thinking fully comprehends its own insistence on the particularity and the historically conditioned nature of women's experience.

The perspectives of black and Hispanic women, ethnic women of color, Jewish women, and women from non-Western cultures reveal the extent to which feminist theory is still not free of the distortions of the religious and cultural traditions it criticizes. So, for instance, Jewish theologian Judith Plaskow and others have drawn attention to the anti-Judaism of Christian feminist literature that sharply contrasts Jesus interpreted as a feminist with patriarchal Judaism; attention has also been drawn to the anti-Judaism of post-Christian feminist literature that blames the extinction of ancient goddess religion on the patriarchal religion of Israel.

Early on, women of color identified as an important problem in defining women's common experience the fact that white women historically have been their oppressors. In these and other ways the experience of oppression is not the same for all women but rather is varied by such factors as race, class, religion, and cultural context. Black feminists like Jacquelyn Grant, in her essay in *Black Theology: A Documentary History*,

1966–1979, edited by Grayraud S. Wilmore and James H. Cone (1979), argue that the distinctive experience of black women cannot be addressed by feminist analysis that does not link gender with race and class. Black women in Western culture suffer a triple oppression, according to Grant, that often is not understood by many feminists or by black and Latin American male liberation theologians: “Where racism is rejected, sexism has been embraced. Where classism is called into question, racism and sexism have been tolerated. Where sexism is repudiated racism and classism are often ignored” (p. 418). The nature of the oppression suffered by women of color is distinctive and, according to black ethicist Kate Geneva Cannon, brings new dimensions to feminist questioning of the assumption of human freedom implicit in traditional moral discourse.

A third set of perspectives criticizes the ethnocentrism of much work on women and religion, not only the emphasis on Western traditions but also the too frequently unacknowledged and unexplored dominance of Western perspectives in the scholarly treatment of non-Western women and traditions. A central dimension of women's studies not yet as far developed as others is the investigation of the historical and contemporary experience and the depiction of women in non-Western world religions. Much of this investigation has been done in relation to such traditions as Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism. An important example is *Women, Androgynes, and Other Mythical Beasts* (1980), in which historian of religion Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty explores sexual metaphor in Hindu mythology (written by men), shedding light on the image of women and sexuality in Hinduism. *Beyond the Veil* (1975), by Fatima Mernissi, and *Women and Islam* (1982), edited by A. Al-Hibri, have both helped open the way for further exploration of Islam.

Work on these major traditions, as well as on others, such as African-based Caribbean traditions, helps correct tendencies to universalize the worldviews of Western women, religions, and cultures. This work provides a comparative perspective important for understanding any one tradition but also for identifying similarities and differences in women's experience cross-culturally. For instance, a study by anthropologist of religion Frédérique Apffel Marglin, “Female Sexuality in the Hindu World” in *Immaculate and Powerful: The Female in Sacred Image and Social Reality*, edited by Clarissa W. Atkinson, Margaret R. Miles, and myself (1985), examines the distinctive axis of value in Hinduism of auspiciousness and inauspiciousness, which gives to female sexuality a positive character. At the same time, Marglin argues that female goddesses, female sexuality, and Hinduism itself have been fundamentally misinter-

preted by Western scholars, who have projected onto all three the Western belief in the inherent danger of uncontrolled female power and sexuality and the need for male control of both through social relations. This and other studies of powerful female goddesses in non-Western traditions allow scholars to gain new insight into the dynamics of the relationship between positive female religious symbols and women's social roles. These dynamics are a central concern of a study by Anne Klein of female religious imagery in Buddhism, “Primordial Purity and Everyday Life: Exalted Female Symbols and the Women of Tibet,” also in *Immaculate and Powerful*. Klein examines one of the main assumptions in feminist theology, that religious egalitarianism will translate into social egalitarianism. She discovers that in the case of Tibetan Buddhism women's place in society does not necessarily mirror profound and positive female religious imagery.

Cross-disciplinary Discussion. A final aspect of the significance of women's studies for religion is the cross-disciplinary discussion that is being generated between scholars in religion and those in other fields of the humanities and the social and natural sciences. Scholars in religion are finding that examination of the normative and explicitly religious dimension of women's historical and contemporary experience requires the full range of disciplinary approaches. At the same time, scholars in disciplines outside religion are discovering the importance of religion for understanding women's personal, social, and cultural condition in the past and present. Mutually enriching discussion between women's studies scholars in general and those who study religion specifically is bringing to the latter new sources and data and a broader range of tools for social and cultural analysis. To women's-studies scholars outside religion this discussion is bringing more in-depth analysis of the ways in which social reality is shaped by religious symbols, ideas, and institutions.

It is becoming clear not only how significant the study of women is for religion but also how significant religion is for the study of women. Religion is important for the study of women's lives for several major reasons. It continues, as it has historically, to play a powerful role in defining women's social roles and status in this and other cultures. Further, the study of women and religion illumines women's interior lives by examining their interpretations of the meaning of their own lives, the world, and the universe. Finally, it focuses on an area, religious life and practice, that (like the domestic sphere) has been historically a major sphere of women's activity, as well as a context for their movement into public life. In short, the further significance of the new scholarship on women is the major

role it is playing in bridging the gulf that too often has developed in academia between religion and other disciplines in the humanities and in the natural and social sciences. In this way, and in terms of dominant concerns and purposes, women's studies have begun to transform the study and practice of religion.

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CONSTANCE H. BUCHANAN

by the Silla kingdom's Buddhist tradition, if not Korea's premier philosopher of all time.

Wŏnhyo was born into the Sŏl clan, a tribal league of the Chinhae region of the southern Korean peninsula, which had been assimilated into the Silla aristocratic system (*yuktu p'um*) in the early years of the common era. After his ordination into the Buddhist order, Wŏnhyo and his close friend, Ŭisang (625–702), founder of the Korean Hwaŏm (Chin., Hua-yen) school, twice decided to undertake a pilgrimage to China in order to study with the renowned Chinese translator Hsüantsang (d. 664). On their first trip in 650 the two Silla pilgrims were arrested as spys by Koguryŏ border guards and spent several weeks in prison before being repatriated. During their second attempt in 661 it is said that the friends traveled to a port in the Paekche region, where they hoped to board a ship bound for the mainland. Forced by a heavy downpour to spend the night in what they thought was an earthen sanctuary, they learned the next morning that it was actually an ancient tomb littered with human skulls. Marveling at his mind's ability to transform a thoroughly gruesome site into a comfortable haven, Wŏnhyo realized his world was created by the mind alone. His enlightenment rendered his planned pilgrimage to China unnecessary, and he returned to his home country to undertake a life of writing, preaching, and proselytizing. Sometime during his career, a liaison with a widowed princess led to the birth of a son, Sŏl Ch'ong (c. late sixth to early seventh century), who developed the Idu system of transcribing Korean, the first indigenous writing system used on the peninsula. Along with lecturing on Buddhism to the Silla aristocracy, which had only recently (and grudgingly) converted to the religion, Wŏnhyo also travelled among the peasant populace, instructing them with popular songs and verses. Hence, Wŏnhyo's prodigious efforts at proselytism helped to cement Buddhism's place as the national faith of Korea during the early years of the Unified Silla period (668–935).

Wŏnhyo was a prolific writer and commentator, authoring some one hundred works, of which over twenty are still extant. His interests ran the gamut of Buddhist materials then available in East Asia, from Mādhyamika, to Yogācāra, to Pure Land. Wŏnhyo played a major role in introducing to the Korean intelligentsia Buddhist scriptures and commentaries, which, prior to his time had been virtually nonexistent in Silla. Wŏnhyo was the first Korean Buddhist to attempt to reconcile the disparate teachings of Chinese and Indian Buddhist philosophy, in particular the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra traditions. In his commentaries he es-

WŎNHYO (617–686), Buddhist philosopher and putative founder of the Pŏpsŏng (Dharma Nature, also called Haedong) school of Korean Buddhist thought. Wŏnhyo is indisputably the greatest Buddhist exegete produced

chewed the explication of scriptures according to the hermeneutics of any particular school; rather, he attempted to reveal the unifying principle, the "one mind," that vivified each of those texts. In one of his principal works devoted to his syncretic philosophy, *Simmun hwajaengnon* (Ten Approaches to the Reconciliation of Doctrinal Controversy), Wŏnhyo states that his fundamental intent is to harmonize the differences that characterize the various schools of Buddhist philosophy and merge their views into two all-inclusive perspectives. These were, first, the dependent origination approach (*saenggi-mun*), in which the myriads of qualities were shown to be the products of a perdurable causal process, and, second, the return to the source approach (*kwiwŏn-mun*), in which all such phenomenal characteristics were abandoned so that one could return to their ultimate, eternal source, the one mind. This dichotomy is seen, with slight variations, in many of Wŏnhyo's writings.

Perhaps Wŏnhyo's most influential works were his commentaries to the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna) and the *Hua-yen ching* (Skt., *Avatamsaka Sūtra*, Flower Garland Sutra). In the former commentary, Wŏnhyo outlines a four-stage soteriology—from nonenlightenment, to apparent enlightenment, advanced enlightenment, and finally ultimate enlightenment—that demonstrates how ordinary persons can hope to achieve spiritual liberation. Both of these texts had such a profound effect on the philosophical development of Fa-tsang (643–712), the systematizer of the Chinese Hua-yen school of Buddhist thought, that Wŏnhyo is now considered to be an important vaunt-courier of that school. Wŏnhyo's many outlines (*chongyo*) to Buddhist *sūtras* also sought to treat those texts in terms that would result in fraternal harmony rather than sectarian controversy. The syncretic tendencies in Wŏnhyo's thought were to inspire all future Korean Buddhist writers and establish doctrinal synthesis as the hallmark of the Korean Buddhist tradition. It is for this reason that Wŏnhyo is traditionally regarded as the founder of the syncretic Pŏpsŏng school, one of the five Buddhist scholastic schools of the mature Silla tradition.

[See also Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Korea; Hua-yen; and the biographies of Fa-tsang and Ŭisang.]

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ROBERT EVANS BUSWELL, JR.

WORD. See *Logos and Language*.

WORK. Once, at the dawn of creation, in the Golden Age, when earth and sky were conjoined (or when there was only sky), when only children, or the first human pair, inhabited the world, there was no "work." Only God, or the gods, worked their divine eternal play, the uncompelled sport of inexhaustible creativity. Only the primordial smith, the primal maker, seeded or molded the earth as archetypal sower or first craftsman. The fruits of the earth were available to all.

The world range of the myth indicates the universality of the theme. In ancient narratives from the Vedic, Greek, and Judeo-Christian traditions, from Africa, from North and South America, the subsequent fall from this paradisiacal state is widely associated on the one hand with some false move or a human choice based on some petty, selfish desire and on the other with the plunge into the *condition humaine*—nakedness, the loss of immortality, the withdrawal of the sky, the opening of Pandora's box of woes, the cycle of birth and death, and the sentence to hard labor for life. [See Fall, The; see also Golden Age.]

The tale is compelling on several counts. We all experience lack of ease in our endeavors—as Marsilio Ficino notes in a letter on the work of the mind (*Epistolae* 2.1), we seem to be rolling the stone of Sisyphus up the steep slopes of the mountain—and wish to find rest. Equally it can be argued that on some level everyone, even the unemployed, the idle rich, and the thief, is working at *something* and longs to find fulfillment in that work. Indeed, the history of labor, from Adam and Eve to the arts (or, by extension, to the most advanced technology), is literally the history of mankind.

At the same time, myth informs us of a deeper level of universality: the sentence to work symbolizes man's physicality in the world in the sense of his separation from the divine, the cosmic, the natural. From this breach follows all suffering and toil. Significantly, in some versions of the story the point is made that in fact

some form of work was originally designated for human beings. The *Book of Genesis*, for instance, indicates that Adam was first placed in the garden to work (or till) and keep it (2:15; cf. 2:5); only after the Fall is there talk of toil or suffering (*itstsavon*) and the sweat of the brow. Similarly, according to a common African theme God originally meant the world to be a tilled garden, with no bloodshed, work, or sorrow. Depicting a reversed sequence of the human encounter with toil and ease, ancient Chinese myth relates that the primal figure Kun labored in vain to tame the great flood; only his son Yü, by going with the flow of things, was able to complete the task and make the earth suitable for cultivation. A distinct line is drawn between the first human participation in divine work—the easy yoke of conformance to the cosmic order—and the labor under which we burden. In the words of the Hebrew scriptures, ours is the heathen world of the “work of men’s hands” (*Dt.* 4:28, *2 Kgs.* 19:18, *Is.* 2:8), the cosmos bereft of hierophany. It is a treadmill on which we are bound to do it all ourselves, including the manufacture of our own clay gods.

Physical Work. Removed from sacred context, human activity is in itself simply neutral bodily movement. Whether the task is slopping the pigs or pushing papers around in a corporate office, work may be experienced as exhausting or, if the natural and efficient operation of the body is discovered, it may be felt as easy, enjoyable, even rewarding, at least up to the point when muscle fatigue or mental torpor takes over. But work unrelated to any higher meaning threatens to inspire the “work ethic” that so fascinated Max Weber: labor itself become the end of life, at best valorized as the worship of accomplishment, success, or physical prowess, at worst crystallized into a nightmare of the most menial physical chores, undertaken in a tortured attempt to keep one’s own body (and perhaps the body of one’s immediate family) alive “between a sterile earth and an uncontrollable sky” (Agee, 1960, p. 325).

By contrast, esoteric traditions in both primal myth and organized mystical discipline assign human activity to a hierarchy of levels among which our physical bodies constitute only the most readily discernible plane. Transcending that plane is the world of the mind, which has its own work and rest; beyond that, the realm of the inner self, or spiritual being. Within this context, religious work is the actualization of principle through action, to be realized on all three levels.

Physical work may be taken as a starting point of experience, since one has to begin where one is: in the physical world. But bodily work serves as a metaphor for work on some other level, as in the New Testament parables about laborers, or in this passage by the Palestinian tanna Ṭarfōn: “The day is short, and the work

is great, and the laborers are sluggish, and the reward is much, and the Master is urgent” (*Avot* 2.20, cited in *Sayings of the Fathers*, New York, 1945, p. 43). The performance of physical work may even be experienced as metaphor, as when sweeping the floor is taken as a spiritual task and becomes a means of revelation (cleansing myself, or the face of God).

Religiously viewed, physical work serves outwardly to maintain the world, in the sense of renewing its structure (maintaining the order of the cosmos) or in the simple sense of paying creation back for the life than one has received as a gift. Both work itself, as a reflection of the primal structuring of the world, and the cycles of rest that punctuate it are ways of acknowledging the creative source as supreme. (See *Shabbath*.) The injunction to serve the earth directly, to earn one’s daily bread literally, is an expression of this inexorable law of just returns. It is honored by the apostle Paul (“If any would not work, neither should he eat”; *2 Thes.* 3:10), the Ch’an master Hyakujo (“No work, no food”; in Paul Reps, *Zen Flesh, Zen Bones*, New York, 1957, p. 70), and Gandhi in his invocation of the *Bhagavadgītā* 3.12 (“He who eats without offering the sacrifice eats stolen food”). Since the world itself is based on sacrifice (the supreme deity’s creation of everything from nothing, or from his own substance), “this body, therefore, has been given us, only in order that we may serve all Creation with it” (Gandhi, 1960, p. 12). This fullhearted acceptance of the human condition as a call to labor in the sweat of one’s face may be the supreme act of obeisance (the Ṣūfī servant of God prostrate in the dust of the desert), or it may be an act of total obedience in penance for the original sin of disobedience, as Simone Weil proposed (Weil, 1952).

In another view, physical work expresses the primary function of the human being among all creatures: man is enjoined to subdue the earth and thus to reassert the hierarchical order of creation. At the same time, work subdues the earth of the human body, as anyone who has engaged in extended physical exertion will testify. Not only Western monastics but the Eastern Fathers as well called for severe labor (along with weeping) as ascetic practice. The early Shakers (for whom the terms *work* and *worship* were as synonymous as they were for the Benedictines) called their frenzied exercises *laboring* and communally shook off their physicality to the tune of such songs as *The Zealous Laborer* (“Oh, how I long to be released / from every feeling of the beast”). Yet consciously applied physical work is more than simple mortification of the flesh. It can be a strengthening, cleansing, a temporary bypass of the usual, interfering complex of mental associations, comparable to any other form of meditation.

Mental Work. In an essay that serves to define work at the mental level, Simone Weil reflected that the purpose of academic study is ultimately to “help form . . . the habit of that attention which is the substance of prayer” (Weil, 1973, p. 108). From the view of esoteric tradition, the function of mental work is to direct activity to the level of spirit (or the harmonious universe, or the gods). This is accomplished, first, by practicing a condition of attention at rest in which physical or intellectual activity can proceed naturally, and second, by deliberately dedicating the activity to the sacred realm. The outward work may be offered for the welfare of all (the *bodhisattva*’s vow) or to the god or goddess in charge of the specific field of endeavor; or its fruits may be sacrificed to the supreme self. By this direction of attention or intention, outward work of whatever kind is acknowledged to be sacred or construed as living prayer in the sense of the Christian monastics’ *laborare est orare* or what the Tibetan monk Chögyam Trungpa has called “meditation in action.” Such mental work serves the heart of orthodox spiritual praxis, which decrees all activity to be valorized at every moment by dint of its relationship to the divine and all work to have for its goal the realization of one’s natural being. This is the alchemical *opus* of transformation to a higher state.

Spiritual Work. Preparation for the spiritual event of self-realization is traditionally the only real work there is. It demands the most stringent of efforts, calling as it does for the elimination of such obstacles as egocentrism and attachment to results and the abandonment of compulsive human activity (the attempt to make things go as we would like them to). In the Ṣūfī classic *Mantiq al-tayr* (The Conference of the Birds) Farīd al-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār warns that on the path to God “a hundred difficulties will assail you. . . . You will have to make great efforts. . . . The Spiritual Way reveals itself only in the degree to which the traveller has overcome his faults and weaknesses, his sleep and his inertia, and each will approach nearer to his aim according to his effort” (trans. Nott, New York, 1954, pp. 98, 107).

Yet it is in keeping with the mystical paradox that whenever this spiritual effort is encountered consciously, the outward effort is negated. When the simple working of the laws of nature are perceived through attention, experienced as my own nature, and allowed to act unimpeded by personal interference, work on any level becomes “not doing,” “nonaction,” “inaction.” In the words of Chuang-tzu, “The mind of a perfect man is like a mirror. It grasps nothing. It expects nothing. It reflects but does not hold. Therefore, the perfect man can act without effort” (trans. Watson). Similarly, the *Tao te-ching* refers repeatedly to the sage who works

without doing; the *Bhagavadgītā* states that “the knower of truth, seated in the Self, thinks ‘I do nothing at all, though seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, eating, going, sleeping, breathing, speaking, letting go, grasping, opening and closing the eyes’ ”(5.8f).

Nondoing is an entirely pragmatic matter, as witnessed even by the dry psychological records of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s “flow experience” reports, descriptions of moments in which subjects engaged fullheartedly in activity have experienced a release from habitual limitations and the work is seen to “flow by itself.” “The secret of power,” wrote Emerson, “is delight in one’s work. . . . Place yourself in the stream of power and wisdom which animates all whom it floats, and you are without effort compelled to truth, to right and a perfect contentment.” The arts have been classically sacralized in this sense, of course. The spirit of the Shaker craftsmen no less than that of medieval scribes fostered an atmosphere of meditative stillness in which the direction of the work would present itself effortlessly in the moment of the creative act. Similarly, Simone Weil’s statement that “attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready to be penetrated by the object” has the ring of an instruction in Zen art. In a frequently translated passage from Chuang-tzu, Prince Wen-hui learns the art of life from his cook, who explains his observation of the Tao in carving up an ox: there are natural spaces through which the blade simply passes, and the carcass falls apart of itself.

Surely this is the message of Jesus’ invitation “Come unto me, ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest” (*Mt.* 11:28). If the Tao can arise in the interstices between a cleaver blade and the joint of the bullock, why not in the space between an iron and a shirtsleeve, or between an editor’s blue pencil and the manuscript page? In that space, work itself literally constitutes rest, earth and sky are conjoined, and the sentence of human work resolves back into its source, becomes what it has always been in reality: God’s work, the play of his creation.

[See also Attention; Prayer; and Arts, Crafts, and Religion.]

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The richness of the subject is hardly matched by the number of works that directly address it at any length. Dennis Clark’s *Work and the Human Spirit* (New York, 1967) offers a very general sociocultural discussion from the Christian view. Etymological considerations are well served by Klaus R. Grinda’s study *Arbeit und Mühe: Untersuchungen zur Bedeutungsgeschichte altenglischer Wörter* (Munich, 1975), which demonstrates that words in English meaning “work” and those meaning “effort, labor, suffering” stem from entirely separate se-

mantic fields. Readers who wish to address the theme of sacred and profane meanings of work may be moved by James Agee's intense, poetic vision of physical toil at a level utterly bereft of sacrality; see the section "Work" in Agee and Walker Evans's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (1941; Boston, 1960), pp. 319–325.

Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958; New York, 1976) presents his classic interpretation of the development of the "work ethic" of modern capitalism through the influence of ascetic Protestant doctrine. Gandhi's plea for widespread commitment to "bread labor" as a service to creation is offered in a small collection of his published statements and newspaper essays, *Bread Labour: The Gospel of Work* (Ahmedabad, 1960). For a document of the Catholic view of work, see the encyclical *Laborem exercens* from the pen of John Paul II, published as *On Human Work* (Washington, D.C., 1981). Much of the discussion is devoted to social-humane issues, but see pages 9–15 and the section "Elements for a Spirituality of Work" on pages 53–60.

Simone Weil's *The Need for Roots* (1952; New York, 1971) presents her vision of physical labor as simultaneously the most torturous "subjection to matter" and the most transcendent human activity. Her wonderful essay "Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God," in *Waiting for God* (1951; New York, 1973), pp. 105–116, offers profound insights regarding attention in work at any level. The same volume includes a brief discussion of physical work on page 170.

Finally, two books explore in depth the theme of craft as a way of self-knowledge: Carla Needleman's *The Work of Craft* (New York, 1979) and D. M. Dooling's *A Way of Working: The Spiritual Dimension of Craft* (New York, 1979), a collection of essays by various hands.

KAREN READY

WORLD'S PARLIAMENT OF RELIGIONS.

Held in Chicago from 11 to 18 September 1893, in conjunction with the Columbian Exposition, the World's Parliament of Religions was a milestone in the history of interreligious dialogue, the study of world religions, and the impact of Eastern religious traditions on American culture. The parliament's several delegates from Asia were among the first authoritative representatives of their traditions to travel to the West. The first Vedantist and Buddhist organizations in America that cater primarily to Westerners can be traced directly or indirectly to the conference and its delegates.

Though spurred by the "Yankee Hindoo" motif of New England Transcendentalism during the early part of the nineteenth century and furthered by the educational efforts of the Theosophical Society (founded in New York City in 1875), American interest in Eastern spirituality was enhanced by the publicity created by the conference. The number of courses in "comparative religion" at American colleges rose appreciably as a re-

sult of the event. At the same time, the parliament provided an occasion for dialogue, enabling Christian apologists to present forceful counterarguments to those of their Eastern colleagues, linking faith in Christ with "progress" and moral superiority, and justifying missionary endeavor. Indeed, while the parliament was undeniably liberal Protestant in tone, it was also a pioneering ecumenical event, international in scope. Roman Catholic and Jewish spokesmen took their places alongside representatives of those "mainstream" Protestant denominations that were, at that time, usually perceived as the dominant form of American religious life.

The idea of sponsoring a parliament of religions was proposed to the Columbian Exposition by Charles C. Bonney, a civic leader and a devout layman of the Swedenborgian church; his role could be said to epitomize the rising influence of the laity in American religion at that time. The leadership of the parliament itself, however, was clerical—preeminently in the person of John Henry Barrows, a prominent Chicago Presbyterian minister.

Nonetheless, the most lasting impression at the conference was made by three colorful, articulate representatives of Hinduism and Buddhism: Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), Anagārika Dharmapāla (1864–1933), and Shaku Sōen (1859–1919). Vivekananda, disciple of the saintly Ramakrishna Paramahansa, was the founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, which has since planted outposts of intellectual Hinduism (frequently known as Vedanta Societies) throughout the West. Dharmapāla, a Sinhala reformer, was the founder of the Mahabodhi Society, which aimed at revitalizing and promoting Buddhism in dialogue with modern thought; the society came to have a great deal of interaction with Western Buddhists. Shaku, a Japanese Zen priest, was particularly influential through his students, who included the first Zen monks to settle in America (a decade or so later) and the layman D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966), whose books have done much to introduce Zen to the West.

The parliament was not without difficulty or dissent. Islam was inadequately represented; the participation of Roman Catholics sparked much controversy within their church; and many conservative Protestants were horrified by the entire project. But its fruits, in the form of both enriched comparative religious studies and non-Western religious presences in America, remain visible in the twentieth century.

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ROBERT S. ELLWOOD

WORSHIP AND CULTIC LIFE. [*This entry surveys the practical expressions of the religious life of certain of the world's great religious traditions. It is designed to introduce the diverse ways in which adherents of these traditions give concrete expression, both as individuals and as communities, to their ideas and beliefs. The entry comprises eight articles:*

- Jewish Worship
- Christian Worship
- Muslim Worship
- Buddhist Cultic Life in Southeast Asia
- Buddhist Cultic Life in East Asia
- Buddhist Cultic Life in Tibet
- Hindu Cultic Life
- Taoist Cultic Life

A related entry, Ritual, attempts a definition and classification of fundamental types of religious activity. Religious Communities surveys various forms of social organization under which the religious life is practiced; Prayer and Meditation and Contemplation treat more interior forms of worship. For discussions of other dimensions of worship and cultic life, see Domestic Observances; Pilgrimage; and Rites of Passage. See also Dance; Drama; and Music.]

Jewish Worship

Beyond the spontaneous prayer, petition, and thanking that individual Jews may appropriately offer at any time to God, Judaism formally prescribes both private and public worship. Private worship is particularly to be found at home, where it is dependent on set occasions (especially meals) but may also be evoked spontaneously by the normal or the miraculous in life (e.g., seeing a rainbow, recovering from illness) or by the anticipation of performing divine commandments (e.g., kindling lights on Shabbat). In all such cases, Jewish tradition specifies standardized benedictions linking God (as sovereign and benefactor or commander) to the specific circumstance of the moment.

Public prayer is similar, in that it too is fixed by time (thrice daily and additionally on holy days), and is constructed around the literary style of the benediction. The contents of public prayer are relegated to prayer books (the *siddur* and the *maḥzor*), and their recitation

is directed by a prayer leader called the *sheliaḥ tsibbur*. The normal locus of public worship is the synagogue sanctuary, where Judaism's primary religious symbol, the Torah scroll, is prominently displayed.

Synagogue worship defies comprehension without a prior understanding of the ancient sacrificial cult, which preceded it and which constituted the central institution of Jewish worship until the Temple's destruction in 70 CE. This Temple cult consisted of a series of sacrifices arranged in scrupulous detail and allotted according to a sacred calendar: the Passover offering, for example, by which one recapitulated one's place in the formative Exodus experience; or the high priest's meticulous attention to his sacred Yom Kippur task in order to cleanse the people from sin and reinstate them to their rightful position of covenantal trust. This service, then, was highly structured and dependent on the expertise of a specific class—in this case, the priests—who represented the entire people as a collective covenantal partner and who based their activity on the single, central manifesto of Israel's pact with the divine, the Torah, which they preserved and interpreted.

By the first century CE, at least, we find an alternative locus for worship, the synagogue. Its origins are unknown, as are the details of its pre-70 worship patterns. But after 70, it filled the vacuum left by the defunct Temple cult. The most outstanding feature of synagogue worship was its dependence on a detailed system of legislation, frequently patterned explicitly after the cult. For example, the prime prayer (the Tefillah) was likened explicitly to sacrifice (B.T., *Ber.* 26b, 32a) and was scheduled to coincide with the precise times that animal offerings had once taken place. Even terminology was transferred intact; the terms *minḥah* and *musaf*, for example, which originally denoted the afternoon and additional Temple sacrifices, were used to name their equivalent synagogue prayer services instead. The synagogue was thus likened to a *miqdash me'at*, a "Temple in miniature" (B.T., *Meg.* 29a), in which words were offered as animals once had been, according to carefully adumbrated rules of time, place, and procedure.

This service too was dependent on a class of experts: rabbis schooled in oral interpretation of the written Torah. Any qualified person—traditionally, an adult male possessing proper ritual cleanliness, knowledge, and personal piety—might presume to lead worship. This was the *sheliaḥ tsibbur*, literally, "a [legal] agent of the worshiping community," who, like the priest, presented offerings (of words, however, not animals) on the people's behalf to God.

The ideological fulcrum for the whole rabbinic system, worship included, was still the Torah. A serialized

reading of scripture was itself presented as an integral part of the public act of worship, so that eventually the entire scroll would have been proclaimed publicly. This event was accompanied by *Simḥat Torah*, a holiday that celebrated the completion of one cycle and the simultaneous beginning of another, so that, symbolically speaking, no time elapsed during which the community was not engaged in studying holy writ as an integral part of equally holy devotion. Elsewhere too, early each morning, for example, descriptions of sacrifice were recited as if they were prayers addressed to God, so that study itself emerged here as a licit mode of worship.

We may summarize the classic rabbinic worship mode, therefore, by describing it as centered on the word: the people's words (as offerings) were presented to God, and God's word (as *torah*, "law") proclaimed in return. This took place in a representative community (a quorum of ten or more worshipers, called a *minyan*) and was led by agents who directed the presentation of the appropriate words in carefully delineated ways.

This classical pattern, however, represents only the rabbinic ideal, not the totality of Jewish practice extant in the formative post-70 years, nor its demonstrable variety through the centuries. Today the same activities and roles may predominate, but their original connection to the cult goes unrecognized, at least on a conscious level. While retaining its word-oriented focus, therefore, as well as its dependence on Torah, its utilization of the *sheliaḥ tsibbur*, and so on, Jewish practice has added layer after layer of later interpretation to its act of worship, and these are no less authentic than the original stratum.

Four specific examples without which today's totality of Jewish worship is hardly imaginable demonstrate this diversity:

1. In the same early rabbinic Jewry that developed the ideal worship patterns described above, it was common to pattern the linguistic structure of prayers and the manner of their recitation after the model of gnostic cosmology, so that much worship proceeded in a deliberate attempt to propel the worshipers to an immediate apprehension of God seated in a chariot of light and surrounded by praising angels. The angels' presumed antiphonal mode of recitation became the normative synagogue practice (to this day), as *sheliaḥ tsibbur* and worshipping assembly took turns expressing God's praise.
2. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century qabbalists saw their devotion as a necessary step to the reparation of a fragmented universe in which God, no less than humanity, is cast in a state best likened to the exile of a people from its home, or a husband and wife from each other, and even invented the now-popular service welcoming the Sabbath with its outstanding hymn, *Lekhah dodi* (Come, My Beloved), to express that motif.
3. Hasidism of the eighteenth-century elaborated upon qabbalistic theory but introduced the novelties of quietistic contemplation, on one hand, and ecstatic communal singing and dancing, on the other. [See Hasidism, *overview article*.]
4. Reform Judaism began in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a movement whose members looked askance at both Qabbalah and Hasidism. Instead, they emulated the cultic model of antiquity by outfitting the architecture of their synagogues (which they called "temples") with accoutrements typical of the Temple of old (the seven-branched lampstand, or *menorah*, for example) and by accenting the theological notion of a priestly people whose rabbinical leaders were awarded uniquely sacerdotal roles in prayer. Yet they differed fundamentally from that same cultic model, emphasizing instead a prophetic ideal, whereby prayer is seen as the highest spiritual activity, designed in part to render human beings morally sensitive to God's will.

Depending on time and place, Jews have been known to sing, to chant, to meditate, to cry out, and to read in unison; they have prayed sitting, standing, swaying, bowing, facing Jerusalem, or lying prostrate. Their prayers have begged, demanded, praised, petitioned, and thanked. They have worshiped for ends transcending the act of worship and for the sake of worship itself. The efficacy of prayer has been entrusted to adult males through most of Jewish history; to a specific *rebe* descended from the group's founder, in the case of certain Hasidic sects; and to all adult men and women in liberal American Judaism of today. Almost universally, men have worn specialized prayer garb, but the rules governing these items have varied considerably; in most Reform synagogues, to take one modern movement, for example, men do not wear them at all, while in others some men and also some women do. Most modern synagogues feature sermon commentaries on the weekly Torah reading.

In the face of all this flux, constants in Jewish public worship are harder to find than one would expect. But they include (1) the congregation as a symbolic representation of Israel, the covenanted community; (2) the ritual reassertion of that community's link to a covenanting God, who gave Torah, promised life beyond death, and guaranteed ultimate meaningfulness to human history and to whom, therefore, words of praise, petition, and thanks are appropriately offered, nowa-

days in a fixed verbal form codified in prayer books; (3) stipulated rules of procedure that are directed by specially designated leaders who represent the congregation and who achieve their status by knowledge of Torah; and (4) a symbolization of the Torah's centrality, insofar as it is studied, read publicly every week, and ritually presented as the mediating symbol between Israel and its God.

[For further background to synagogue-centered worship, see *Biblical Temple and Priesthood*, article on Jewish Priesthood. For normative Judaism, see *Synagogue*, article on History and Tradition, and, for the development of the liturgy, *Siddur and Maḥzor*. See also *Domestic Observances*, article on Jewish Practices; *Folk Religion*, article on Folk Judaism; *Rites of Passage*, article on Jewish Rites; and individual entries on *Shabbat* and *Jewish holidays*.]

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LAWRENCE A. HOFFMAN

Christian Worship

The death of Jesus of Nazareth by crucifixion and his resurrection on the first day of the week constitute the root paradigm of Christianity and, as such, are central to Christian worship in all its dimensions. Because that death and resurrection occurred at Jerusalem at the time of the Jewish Passover (Heb., *Pesaḥ*; *pascha* in the Greek transliteration of the Aramaic), this paradigm is frequently referred to as "the paschal mystery." Paul's *First Letter to the Corinthians* (5:7) identifies the death of Jesus with the sacrifice of the Passover lambs, and that same identification is made in the *Gospel of John* (19:32–36 refers to the prohibition against cracking the bones of the lamb eaten at Passover). References in early Christian literature to the Cross or to the death of Jesus should most frequently be understood as including Jesus' resurrection and glorification, the total paschal mystery as that paradigm of salvation in which the Christian participates. [See *Jesus*.]

Christian Initiation. The public ministry of Jesus began with his baptism by John in the river Jordan. [See *John the Baptist*.] The accounts of that baptism report that when Jesus came up from the water the Holy Spirit descended upon him and the voice of God proclaimed him to be the Son of God. This outpouring of the Holy Spirit is referred to (*Acts* 10:38) as an anointing by virtue of which Jesus is the expected "anointed one" (the Messiah, or Christ). Such ritual washings as the baptism of John were common in Judaism in the first century of the common era, and many scholars suppose that the early Christian baptismal rituals were influenced by the initiatory ritual employed for converts from paganism to Judaism, where circumcision was followed by a ritual washing. [See *Initiation and Baptism*.]

Early Christian baptism. The earliest accounts of Christian baptism focus on the confession of Jesus as Lord, usually in response to preaching, and on the ritual washing. The earliest church order, *Didache* (before

AD 100), describes that washing, following extended catechesis, as preferably accomplished by immersion in running water, but it allows for water to be poured over the initiate three times. In either case, the baptism is to be performed "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." It is uncertain whether such references to the anointing and sealing of Christians as that in *2 Corinthians* 1:21 refer to an actual anointing with oil in first-century initiatory ritual, but such anointings do appear in the course of the second century. In Syria an anointing prior to the water bath was called *rushma* ("mark") and has been interpreted as a Christian surrogate for the circumcision that preceded the water bath in Jewish proselyte baptism. Elsewhere such baptismal anointing was associated with the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon Jesus and so was performed after the water bath. Such postbaptismal anointing (referred to as the "seal") was frequently accompanied by imposition of the baptizer's hands upon the initiate. Such is the pattern reported for North Africa by Tertullian (*On Baptism* 7–8).

The most extensive of the early church orders, the *Apostolic Tradition* (third century), usually assigned to Hippolytus at Rome, reveals a more extensive initiatory process. After three years as catechumens (learners), candidates for baptism are selected after careful scrutiny and enter a final period of intensive preparation under direct supervision of the bishop. At the end of that period, concluded with a two-day fast, the initiates keep vigil through the night from Saturday to Sunday until cockcrow. Then, stripped of their clothing and having renounced Satan and his service, they are anointed with an exorcised oil. Next, entering the water, they profess belief in each of the persons of the Trinity in response to a threefold creedal examination and are immersed after each profession. Coming up from the water, they are anointed with another oil, the "oil of thanksgiving" (later known as *chrisma* or *muron*), and reassume their clothing. They are then led to the bishop before the gathered congregation and anointed again by him with the imposition of his hands upon their heads. The bishop then kisses each initiate, and they take their places in the congregation to participate in the prayer of the community and in the eucharistic meal for the first time. This complex initiatory ritual set the pattern discernible, with significant variations, in later centuries. The Eastern churches maintain only one postbaptismal anointing, while the anointing by the bishop was eventually separated from baptism in the Western church, coming to be known as "confirmation."

It is widely supposed that the initiation described in the *Apostolic Tradition* took place on Easter at the conclusion of the paschal vigil. In the course of the third

century such paschal baptism became the norm in most churches, and many scholars have suggested that the custom was much more ancient. Such a time for baptism is rendered particularly appropriate by the baptismal theology of Paul (*Rom.* 6), which associated baptism with participation in Christ's burial and resurrection, and by Jesus' references to his coming passion and death as his "baptism" (*Lk.* 12:50).

Normalization of infant baptism. While primitive baptismal practice with its extensive catechesis took adult baptism to be normative, in the third century the baptism of young children, although opposed by some, was practiced frequently. By the fifth century it was perhaps more common than the baptism of adults, and by the sixth century the catechumenate was reduced to a formality. Vestiges of that formative process perdured, nonetheless, and were still evident in the rites used by Western Christians at the time of the Reformation. The reforms of the sixteenth century removed from the baptismal rite many of the ceremonies that had belonged formerly to the catechumenate, and the postbaptismal anointings were also dropped from Protestant baptismal practice. Infant baptism continued to be the norm, however, and increasingly a postbaptismal formative process of instruction and discipline led to a rite of confirmation after age seven for both Catholics and Protestants, although for Catholics that rite usually followed well after admission to the Eucharist.

Opposition to the baptism of those too young to make a personal profession of faith occurred from time to time in the Middle Ages and became a significant wing of the Reformation with the Anabaptists. Since the seventeenth century, such refusal to practice pedobaptism and the insistence on believers' baptism has been characteristic of several Protestant churches, the Baptists being the most numerous. While Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and churches of the Evangelical and Reformed traditions continue to baptize infants, as do the Eastern churches, liturgical studies in the twentieth century have focused attention on the rich initiatory rituals of the patristic age, and restoration of that classic passage through catechesis to baptism, anointing, and eucharist has held an important place in the agenda of recent liturgical reform, the Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults in the Roman Catholic church being a significant instance.

The Holy Eucharist. As early as the *Didache*, participation in the communion meal, or Eucharist, was limited to the baptized, and such participation in the Eucharist is regularly found as the conclusion of the initiatory process. [See Eucharist.] The Eucharist is, indeed, the locus of that *koinōnia*, or communion, which is the mode of the Christian's unity with other Chris-

tians in the unity of the church, and of the church's unity with Christ: a unity expressed and realized in the believer's feeding on Christ's body and blood through the eucharistic signs of bread and wine. [See also Church, *article on Church Membership*.] The *Didache* speaks of the Eucharist as a sacrifice, and this may reflect a sense of continuity with the *zevah todah*, the "thank offering" of the Second Temple period in which those who offered a sacrifice consumed part of it, thus keeping communion with God, to whom the victim was offered.

In later centuries both this offering of the eucharistic gifts of bread and wine to God as a memorial of and thanksgiving for Christ's death and resurrection, and the consecration of these gifts to identify them with Christ's body and blood, would achieve explicit expression in the eucharistic prayer, the central prayer of the Eucharistic liturgy. The *Apostolic Tradition* presents the text of a eucharistic prayer that opens with a dialogue between the officiating celebrant and the congregation which has remained virtually unchanged in the West, and proceeds to a thanksgiving for the redemptive work of Christ, which comes to its climax in a recitation of the charter narrative describing the institution of the Eucharist by Jesus on the night before his crucifixion. The earliest such institution narrative is that in Paul's *First Letter to the Corinthians* (chap. 11), written around AD 55, which many exegetes consider to have been a text transmitted through liturgical tradition.

In the *Apostolic Tradition* that narrative's concluding command, "When you do this, make my memorial," is followed at once by the clause that accompanies the narrative in virtually all early liturgies, although the wording varies considerably. Such a clause, known technically as *anamnēsis* ("memorial"), is generally believed to have been attached to the institution narrative from the first inclusion of that narrative within the body of the eucharistic prayer. [See *Anamnēsis*.] In the prayer of the *Apostolic Tradition* the *anamnēsis* reads, "Remembering therefore his death and resurrection, we offer to thee this bread and cup, giving thanks to thee that thou hast made us worthy to stand before thee and to minister to thee." This is the earliest extant example of such an inclusion of the narrative and the *anamnēsis* in the body of the eucharistic prayer, but it is typical of the prayers of the fourth century and later. In the *Apostolic Tradition* the *anamnēsis* is followed by an invocation of the Holy Spirit upon the oblation of the church, praying that all who receive the holy gifts, being united, may be filled with the Holy Spirit for the strengthening of faith. Such an invocation of the Holy Spirit is referred to as an *epiklēsis*.

✓ That pattern for the eucharistic prayer was expanded

in most of the Eastern empire in the fourth century. In the first place, after the opening dialogue, a praise of God as creator, hymned by the heavenly hosts, was added before the christological thanksgiving. Such an opening praise of the creator, ending in the singing of the Sanctus (a liturgical hymn already in the Temple liturgy reflected in *Isaiah* 6:3 and continued in the synagogue liturgy after the destruction of the Temple), is characteristic of eucharistic prayers of Cappadocia, Syria, Palestine, and eventually Alexandria. A second development in these fourth-century prayers is the focusing of the *epiklēsis* on the oblations of bread and wine, invoking the Holy Spirit for their consecration as the body and blood of Christ. Also, the older content of that supplication, the gathering of the church into union with God, was expanded into a series of intercessions.

Influenced perhaps by a transitional phase in liturgical evolution at Alexandria, a different pattern for the eucharistic prayer emerged in the West. First visible in northern Italy in the late fourth century (in *De sacramentis*, a series of postbaptismal instructions commonly ascribed to Ambrose of Milan), this Western eucharistic prayer appears in virtually its final form in the *Gelasian Sacramentary*, an eighth-century document reflecting usages of sixth-century Rome. In this Western pattern the opening dialogue leads into a variable prayer of praise and thanksgiving, sometimes general in its content but more frequently phrased to reflect the varying emphases of particular feasts or seasons of the liturgical year. This variable praise leads into the Sanctus, and thereafter the prayer is relatively invariable and comes to be known as the Canon Actionis or Canon Missae, titles that reflect its regularity. This canon is supplicatory throughout, with intercessions and commendations of the eucharistic gifts preceding and following a prayer for their consecration, the institution narrative, and *anamnēsis*.

This Canon Missae became the standard eucharistic prayer for all the Western church from the ninth century. Unlike the Eastern prayers discussed above, this Western prayer contained no explicit invocation (*epiklēsis*) of the Holy Spirit for the consecration of the eucharistic gifts as Christ's body and blood. Theological reflection associated that conversion of bread and wine increasingly with the words of Jesus in the narrative of the institution: "This is my body" and "This is the chalice of my blood of the new and eternal covenant." While occasional theologians expressed the view that such identification of the gifts with the body and blood of Christ was to be understood symbolically or typologically, a more realistic interpretation prevailed, especially from the eleventh century, and this encouraged a

perception of the Eucharist as a sacramental representation of Christ's redemptive sacrifice, complete and efficacious even if none but the celebrating priest received Communion. That the people were disinclined to frequent Communion is indicated by the requirement of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) that all must communicate at least once annually.

In spite of the moderating expressions of sensitive theologians, such emphasis on the sacrificial character of the Mass (as the Eucharist was known in the West) and diminution of its character as communion meal grew stronger in the later medieval period and established the eucharistic agenda of the Reformation. While the reformers' understandings of Christ's presence in the Eucharist varied widely, there was broad agreement on two matters: the suppression of all reference to the Eucharist itself as a sacrifice and insistence on general reception of Holy Communion as constituting the divinely instituted memorial of Christ's death on Calvary, itself the sole and sufficient sacrifice for the sins of the world. For the reformed liturgies the narrative of the institution of the Eucharist, already central in medieval tradition as the formula of consecration, achieved even greater prominence, its scriptural origin excepting it from the general reaction against liturgical elements that could be ascribed to human composition.

Protestant eucharistic liturgies in general sought to give expression to the cardinal principle that it is only faith in the sufficiency of Christ's redeeming work which justifies sinners. Protestants opposed all liturgical practice that could be interpreted as a human "good work." Even so, such major reformers as Martin Luther and John Calvin assumed that the Eucharist would continue to form the core of the Christian observance of Sunday as it had from the first century, but the popular disinclination to frequent Communion proved too strong in the end, and in Protestant worship the Eucharist became an occasional observance, being celebrated only monthly or even less frequently. This brought the reading and preaching of the word of God much more strongly to the fore and established the contrast between Roman Catholic and Protestant forms of worship still visible today, although the extent of that contrast has been reduced vastly in the twentieth century, especially as a result of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965).

The Liturgy of the Word. As early as the second century the eucharistic meal was preceded by readings from the scriptures, preaching, and extended prayers of intercession. Justin Martyr, in chapter 67 of his first *Apology*, addressed to the emperor Antoninus Pius around AD 155, describes the assembly of Christian worshippers on Sunday and tells us that on such occasions

there were readings from the "memoirs of the apostles" or the prophets for as long as time permitted. Then the "president of the brethren" preached about what had been read, exhorting the congregation to perform good deeds. After that, the congregation prayed in common for themselves and for all the church. At that point, the gifts of bread and wine for the Eucharist were placed on the table, and the eucharistic prayer was begun.

The basic outline of the Liturgy of the Word has remained largely the same to the present, although introductory entrance rites (chants and prayers) appropriate to rich new architectural settings of the liturgy were added from the fifth century on. By that time, too, other musical elements, such as the singing of psalms or verses with "Alleluia" between scripture readings, as well as within the Eucharist proper, had begun to appear in many areas. In spite of these enrichments and eventual variation in the number of scripture readings, the basic picture given by Justin is still clearly discernible. [See *Liturgy*.]

Preaching. While in most traditions today the sermon retains the place it had in the second century, at the conclusion of the scripture readings, preaching has never been limited to that liturgical context. Throughout Christian history the gift of prophetic proclamation has been exercised within, parallel to, and apart from the regular ritual patterns of Christian worship. While preaching has regularly been considered a responsibility of officiating clergy, it has not been limited to them. At times, patterns in the official cultus have come to leave little place for preaching, and in such circumstances preaching has flourished alongside that cultus and on occasion as a vehicle of opposition to it. Even where preaching continued within the traditional Latin liturgy in the later Middle Ages, it frequently formed the centerpiece of a larger bloc of catechetical and devotional material in the vernacular, known by the collective term *prone*. Its variable content established by the preacher, a *prone* might include such didactic materials as the Ten Commandments or the Apostles' Creed, practical pastoral elements such as the announcement of proximate fasts or festivals or the publication of the bans of marriage, and devotional elements such as intercessions (replacing the Latin prayers of the faithful, which had fallen into desuetude in the early medieval period). Such a *prone*, including the sermon, might be found before the eucharistic liturgy, at its midpoint following the scripture readings, or apart from the liturgy. This provided the format for the Preaching Service, which achieved great popularity in some quarters of the Protestant Reformation where proclamation of the word of God in preaching took on the character of an alternative to the liturgical tradi-

tion. Such a preaching tradition continues to form the mainstream of much Protestant worship today, set in a context of instructional and devotional elements of the free composition that characterized the medieval prone. Other strongly homiletical traditions have set the sermon in the context of the Liturgy of the Word, even when no eucharist followed, or in the context of the traditional Liturgy of the Hours. [See Preaching.]

Liturgy of the Hours. Scholars disagree in their reconstructions of the regimen of daily prayer among Christians of the first two centuries, but there is broad agreement that this regimen, however described, grew out of the Christian continuation of patterns of daily prayer in first-century Judaism and the daily service of the synagogue, which furnished the public framework of that prayer.

The *Didache* (chap. 8) orders the Lord's Prayer three times a day, but it is not clear what hours are intended. The third-century *Apostolic Tradition* speaks of seven times for prayer during the day, the frequently mentioned third, sixth, and ninth hours, plus evening, midnight, cockcrow, and morning. These hours, interpreted as commemorative of moments in Christ's passion or focused on expectation of his triumphant return, are set forth as occasions for private prayer, although it seems that the morning hour (and occasionally the evening) were also times of public assembly. In the fourth and following centuries, public offices of prayer in the morning and evening form the daily pattern of the church's liturgical prayer, although monastic influence led to a much more complex regimen. The fully developed monastic liturgy consisted of a major vigil at cockcrow, and other assemblies for prayer at around 6:00 AM and at every third hour thereafter until the hour of retiring. The establishment of urban monasteries in connection with major basilicas brought a conflation of this monastic regimen with the simpler cathedral hours of prayer, and in the medieval period all clergy were obligated to recite a liturgy of the hours deeply shaped by the presuppositions of the monastic tradition. [See Monasticism, *article on Christian Monasticism.*]

Sixteenth-century reforms of the hours of prayer, such as that by Thomas Cranmer in the English *Book of Common Prayer*, returned to the simpler regimen of two hours in the day, morning and evening, but Cranmer's work still betrayed such monastic characteristics as the systematic reading in course of all the psalms (albeit within the space of a month, rather than a week as had been the custom). Twentieth-century reform of the Liturgy of the Hours in the Western churches has continued this emphasis on the morning and evening offices as times of public liturgical prayer, while providing for certain of the intervening hours for private use.

Liturgical Articulation of Time. The Liturgy of the Hours reveals the Christian perception of times as themselves symbolic of the paschal mystery and as the framework within which the church watches for the coming of Christ. However, derived as this daily regimen was from the traditions of Judaism, the hours of the day were not the only time cycle to receive Christian expression. This was equally true of two other important cycles in the Old Testament, the week and the year.

Liturgical week. None of the numerous scholarly efforts to get behind the Jewish seven-day week and to discover its origin apart from the history of Israel has achieved definitive success. That seven-day cycle seems to have been present with the earliest settlement of Israel in Canaan, and the question of the ultimate origin of the week must remain unsettled. What can be said more surely is that the cycle was defined by the treatment of every seventh day as a day of rest for servants and draft animals and, by extension, for the whole people. This Sabbath (meaning "to stop" or "that which stops") recurs every seventh day without regard to other time cycles, such as the month or the year, making the week an independent cycle. Not originally a day distinguished by obligations of worship, the Sabbath came to afford peculiar opportunity for public worship because of the rest from ordinary employment which it demanded. [See Sabbath.]

While early Christians participated in the worship of the synagogue as opportunity afforded, it is likely that the Sabbath, with its extended synagogue liturgy, was an especially important occasion for Christian witness. Some have suggested that the Christian observance of the first day of the week, Sunday, found its beginnings in the gatherings of Christians for their characteristic table fellowship following the conclusion of the liturgy at the closing of the Sabbath at sundown. Others have insisted that it was in the evening from the first day to the second (Sunday to Monday) that Christians began to assemble, on the model of the appearances of the risen Christ reported in *John 20*. What seems sure in either case is that the first Christians continued to observe the week as defined by the Sabbath and that, once growth of the movement required gatherings at a longer interval than daily, assemblies of a specifically Christian character were on the first day of the week, the day of Christ's resurrection.

Several writers have suggested that, because that weekly assembly was the time of the Eucharist, the Lord's Supper (*kuriakon deipnon*; *1 Cor.* 11:20), the first day of the week came to be known as "the Lord's Day" (*kuriakē hēmera*). Whether that is the reference of that phrase in *Revelation 1:10* or not, it is clear that the term

was used for the first day of the week as early as the *Didache* (chap. 14). Sources from the second century speak of that first day of the week, the first day of creation, as the Eighth Day, the day beyond the creation itself and the day of the new creation accomplished by Christ's paschal sacrifice (*1 Cor.* 5:7). Such thought reflects the strong sense of Christ's spiritual presence in the community constituted by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit (*Acts* 2), a "realized eschatology" that throughout Christian history expresses the sense of the presence in worship of both Christ's redeeming action in the past and a prolepsis of his future appearing in judgment at the end of history. The meeting of that memory of the past and that hope for the future in the Eucharist on each Lord's Day has been a constant dimension of classical Christian liturgical experience.

Beyond that festal Sunday, the weekly celebration of the paschal mystery, Christians very early began to observe every Wednesday and Friday as fast days (*Didache* 8). Friday was the day of Jesus' crucifixion, and most early interpreters of this custom treat Wednesday as the day of his betrayal by Judas Iscariot. However, one third-century source, *Didascalia apostolorum*, places Jesus' arrest in the early hours of Wednesday, a chronology that would put his last supper with his disciples on Tuesday night rather than on Thursday, as is the more common tradition. This alternative chronology, Annie Jaubert has suggested, may reflect the impact on early Christianity of the Essene community at Qumran. The unique calendar of that group always situated the Passover in the night from Tuesday to Wednesday and was so arranged that all important liturgical days occurring on fixed dates of the month would fall on Wednesday, Friday, or Sunday. (It remains unclear how such a calendar of exactly 52 weeks, only 364 days, would adjust for its significant error.) Tertullian speaks of these Wednesday and Friday fasts as "stations," a term encountered earlier in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, and it is clear that in the third century they were days of liturgical assembly, even for the Eucharist, in addition to the assembly on Sunday. While always secondary to Sunday, the primitive prominence of Wednesday and Friday continued in the later history of the Christian week and is still manifest in various ways in the several traditions.

According to Tertullian (*On Fasting* 14.3) it appears that some Western Christians (probably Romans) were deviating from the common practice of the church by ordering certain Sabbaths (i.e., Saturdays) in the year to be observed with fasting, a custom that Innocent I (*Epistle* 25, AD 416) reports for every week at Rome. Tertullian had complained that fasting on the Sabbath was forbidden except for the Sabbath before Easter. In this

he seems to reflect correctly a tradition still followed in all the Eastern church, a tradition probably rooted in the Jewish prohibition against fasting on the Sabbath. This suggests a much stronger continuation of Sabbath observance among Christians than some writers (e.g., Willy Rordorf) have supposed. Such continuation of observance, if there was any, would concern the Sabbath rest rather than a day for liturgical worship. The association of rest from secular employment with Sunday rather than the Sabbath stems from the time of Constantine, but the direct identification of Sunday as the Christian Sabbath and its rigorous observance according to Old Testament norms appears first in English and Scottish Protestantism, especially in the seventeenth century. Apart from that, the term *Sabbath* has continued to be understood to refer to the seventh day of the week and was employed to designate that day in all medieval liturgical books.

Liturgical year. While it seems likely from such texts as *Acts* 20:7 that the beginnings, at least, of the Christian week go back to the apostolic period, other passages such as *Colossians* 2:16 suggest that liturgical time patterns of Judaism were considered, at least in the gentile mission, to be matters of little importance, given the expectation of the proximate Parousia. Still other texts, however, make it clear that even Paul, the apostle to the gentiles, was far from insensitive to the festivals of Israel and did not hesitate to relate them to the paschal mystery. [See Christian Liturgical Year.]

The Christian Pascha. Many scholars have, with modifications, held to the notion that the celebration of the annual paschal festival of Easter was established on the Sunday after Passover at Rome in the apostolic period. This assertion can be documented only from the fifth century, and many other scholars consider it to be contravened by documents of the second century that seem to assert that there was no annual observance of Pascha (Easter) at Rome prior to Soter, bishop there from 165. According to Karl Holl, the Passover, continued by Christians at Jerusalem in the night from 14 to 15 Nisan, was accommodated to the structure of the week, by moving the feast to Sunday, only after the establishment of a gentile hierarchy in Jerusalem following the Bar Kokhba Revolt (c. 132–135). Prior to that, the Christian Pascha would have been observed annually on the same date as the Jewish Passover, being in fact a continuation of the Jewish festival, reinterpreted in light of the tradition that identifies the crucifixion of Jesus as coinciding with the slaughter of the lambs for the festival of Passover at the Temple. By the time of such an adjustment of the Christian Pascha to the structure of the week, Christians of Jewish background had been driven out of Aelia Capitolina, the new

Roman city built on the ruins of Jerusalem, to settle elsewhere, some in Mesopotamia, others in Asia Minor. It is in that latter area, especially, that we discover our earliest documents of a Christian celebration of Pascha, kept on the Jewish date in the night following 14 Nisan, the anniversary of the Crucifixion. Late in the second century, controversy developed over whether the Christian Pascha should be observed on that date or whether its preliminary fast should be terminated only on Sunday, the weekday of the Resurrection. This controversy was finally concluded by a decision in favor of a Sunday Pascha by the first ecumenical council at Nicaea in 325. By that time, however, the Pascha was almost universally observed on Sunday, and the original one day of fasting (now the Sabbath) had been extended to six days, the Holy Week that is still the most solemn time of the year for Christians.

Even when transferred to Sunday, the paschal solemnity continued to be spoken of as a memorial of the passion of Jesus. Much more than that was included in the content of the festival, however, and it can best be described as a total festival of Christ celebrating the incarnation, passion, death, resurrection, and glorification of the Savior. That unitive content was refracted, especially during the fourth century, and distinct events came to be associated with particular days: the death of Jesus with Friday of Holy Week, his resurrection with Easter Sunday, his ascension into heaven with the fortieth day after Easter, and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the church with the fiftieth day, corresponding to the Jewish Feast of Weeks (Shavu'ot), or Pentecost. From the end of the second century, at least, that entire fifty-day period from Pascha to Pentecost had been kept as the extended paschal rejoicing, and recent reforms of the liturgical year have sought to restore the integrity of that festal period. [See Easter.]

Christmas and Epiphany. Since the eighteenth century it has been commonly observed that the celebration of the nativity of Christ on 25 December, first discernible at Rome around 336, represents a Christian adaptation of the winter solstice festival established by the emperor Aurelian in AD 274. Some more recent studies have revived interest in the hypothesis of Louis Duchesne, who suggested that the date was arrived at by counting forward nine months from 25 March, a date taken in the West in the third century to be that of Jesus' death. Duchesne held that the impatience of symbolic number systems for fractions made this to be as well the date of Christ's conception. However arrived at, that date would have coincided with the solar festival at Rome, and later data make it clear that the themes of the two festivals merged in the celebration of Christmas.

Coincidence with pagan festivals has also been argued for the early Eastern date for the nativity of Jesus, 6 January, the Epiphany (Gk., *epiphaneia*, "manifestation"), although the argument is much less firm in this case. Here again, Duchesne's computation from a fixed date for Christ's death (6 April in Asia Minor, according to the fifth-century church historian Sozomen), taken to be as well the date of the Incarnation, would yield the nativity nine months later, on 6 January. That date seems to have been treated as the beginning of the year and, with that, the beginning of the reading of the gospel. Preference for a particular gospel in a particular church would lead to the association of different themes with the festival of Epiphany: at Jerusalem the reading of *Matthew* led to an emphasis on the nativity; at Alexandria a preference for *Mark* emphasized the baptism of Jesus; at Ephesus the predominance of *John* stressed the Cana wedding feast. While such an explanation is only hypothetical, those three themes are associated with Epiphany in the later fourth century. By that time the 25 December festival of the nativity had been accepted in the East (with the exception of Jerusalem and Armenia), and the 6 January festival of Epiphany had been adopted in the West. At Milan, Epiphany celebrated the baptism of Jesus, but at Rome it formed a duplication of the nativity observance, limited to the commemoration of the visit of the Magi. That visit of the Magi, the baptism of Jesus, and the miracle at Cana formed the *tria miracula* that were celebrated at Epiphany in Gaul. There a preparatory period, eventually six weeks, preceded the nativity festival, and this was adopted in the seventh century at Rome, though shortened first to five weeks and later to the present four. As Epiphany and Christmas had been considered the beginning of the liturgical year, so this season of preparation came to be considered the beginning of the year, and it is with the first Sunday of Advent that Western liturgical books begin. [See Christmas and Epiphany.]

Lent. The emergence of Pascha as the preferred time for the rites of initiation, in accordance with the death/resurrection theology of baptism taught by Paul, led to the development of a period for final catechesis and ascetical formation prior to paschal baptisms. While such a period is indicated as early as the third-century *Apostolic Tradition*, its length is indefinite prior to Nicaea. Thereafter it is spoken of as the fast of forty days and spans a period of six weeks either prior to Easter (as in Rome and fourth-century Alexandria) or prior to Holy Week (as in Syria, Constantinople, and eventually all the Eastern churches). The forty-day duration of the fast has traditionally been associated with Jesus' fast immediately following his baptism by John, and recent studies have supported Coptic sources that place

the original fast of forty days immediately following Epiphany (celebrating Jesus' baptism) at Alexandria. After Nicaea the prepaschal situation of the fast is universal, although its separation from the six-day paschal fast in the Eastern rites may still reflect the wider separation of them in early Alexandria. There, Coptic tradition maintains, the fast of forty days concluded with the administration of baptism in the sixth week and the Feast of Palms on the following Sunday, an arrangement similar to the later Byzantine conferral of baptism on the Saturday of Lazarus, the day before Palm Sunday. After Nicaea that Palm Sunday is the day before the paschal fast and, in the late fourth century, is considered to be the first day of Holy Week at Jerusalem.

Although preparation for baptism constituted the original agenda of the Lenten period, by the end of the fourth century in the West it was also a period for the ritual humiliation of penitents, those who for grave sin had been severed from the communion of the church. Such penitents were publicly reconciled in Holy Week so as to be able to celebrate Easter as restored Christians, and their penitential exercises during Lent gave that color to Lenten piety. In Byzantine tradition, which has known no such formal reconciliation of penitents in Holy Week, the Western penitential concern was long absent from Lent, although similar penitential piety did enter that tradition through monasticism from the eighth century on.

Christian liturgical traditions that observe the Lenten fast experience Lent as a time of ascetical development, of "dying to self," so as to participate fully in the renewal of life in the celebration of Christ's resurrection. This participation in Christ's dying and rising, focused in the annual observance of Lent, Holy Week, and the fifty days of Easter rejoicing, is that same paschal mystery experienced by each Christian in baptism, in every celebration of the Eucharist, and indeed in every dimension of the complex of worship and sacramental life for which the paschal mystery of Christ's redemptive death and resurrection is the root paradigm.

[See also Sacraments, *article on* Christian Sacraments; Lord's Prayer; and Christian Spirituality. *Distinctive features of the worship life of particular Christian churches are discussed in articles on those churches. For discussion of other dimensions of Christian cultic life, see* Cult of Saints; Popular Christian Religiosity; and Pilgrimage, *articles on* Eastern Christian Pilgrimage; Roman Catholic Pilgrimage in Europe; and Roman Catholic Pilgrimage in the New World.]

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THOMAS J. TALLEY

Muslim Worship

On three occasions, the Qur'an, the sacred scripture of Islam, reproaches unbelievers with the words "They do not reckon God with a true reckoning" (6:91, 22:74, 39:67). The accusation, in a very telling phrase, is that the cult of idols, the scorning of revelation, and the violation of duties all constitute a chronic disesteeming of God. Pagans do not esteem God duly. Their measures—for such is the root term—do not measure truly. They have altogether failed to weigh aright the reality, the rule, the lordship of God.

By contrast, a true Islamic worship brings to God all that is due from humanity in reverence, awe, submission, and obedience, as Muslims believe themselves commanded and equipped by their religion to give. The

being of God is to be acknowledged, just as the being of humanity is to be the acknowledger. For the Muslim, life is lived under a divine imperative, obligated to an absolute transcendence, religiously disciplined to a divinely given charter of mankind. Worship, therefore, must be defined as the due recognition of God, by the observances of the faith, the cult, and the practice which Islam affirms and provides.

It is useful to begin the theme with those unbelievers, for Muḥammad's mission was essentially a counter-theme. His context was a pluralism of worships, a pantheon of tribal deities and nature gods. These he insistently repudiated. He did not originate the name of Allāh as supreme deity: his own father bore the name 'Abd Allāh, "servant" of this ultimate lord. What distinguished the mission of Muḥammad, however, was the message of the sole existence of God he preached. All pseudoplural deities were nonentities and had to be repudiated as such, so that Muslims would "have no other gods but" God. Hence the form of the Islamic confession of faith: "There is no god but God," which contrasts *ilāh* (god), a common noun, capable of plural, and *Allāh* (God), grammatically incapable of plural, *the* God, God who alone is God and, as Latin Christianity has it, "not God unless God alone" (*non Deus nisi Deus solus*).

In studying Muslim worship, it is well to keep always in mind this circumstance of its first beginning. The necessary negative was, and is, on behalf of a great positive. Thoroughly Semitic in this quality, and sharply contrasted, for example, with the Hindu mind, Islam is jealous and zealous for the divine unity. Its monotheism has this militant, antiseptic, uncompromising character. It is not merely a creedal stance, a theme for acquiescence. It is a passionate requirement, an insistent call to "let God be God," against all that denies or impugns or obscures the total and inclusive lordship. Those who disallow God, old pagan or new modern idolators, are reckoning falsely. "In the name of God" the repudiators must be repudiated. It is only in giving the lie to the lie of pluralism that faith in the divine unity (what Muslim theologians call *tawḥīd*, effectively "having only God") can be truly positive. Only so, as the Qur'ān has it, are we "sincere in our religion before God."

Imbued characteristically with this incisive emphasis from its origins with Muḥammad, Muslim worship is a structure of religious acts and duties and intentions. These comprise the cult and the rites of its liturgy. Formal prayer is the fulfillment of *dīn*, meaning the practice of religion, in line with *īmān*, or faith. It is *'ibādah*, the proper posture of a human being as *'abd* to God as *rabb*, the servant before his lord. (The double meaning here of "service" and "worship" is exactly parallel to the English usage: divine service.) But the man-

datory rituals of worship are elaborated in rich, extracanonical devotion, in private piety, in the careful arts of Qur'ān recitation, calligraphy, and mosque architecture, and in a long and sometimes controversial texture of Ṣūfī, or mystical, recollection of God and disciplined search for the unitive stage. *Du'ā'*, or petition, covers the whole range of private devotion and personal religion, nurtured largely by the Ṣūfī orders, but breathing all the accents of human aspiration and wistfulness. *Tajwīd* (lit., "beautifying") is the technical term for Qur'anic recitation, while *dhikr* denotes the invocation of the divine names and the technique leading to *fanā'*, or mystical absorption in God, when the empirical self is lost in total union. These belong with the patterns of Sufism, a dimension of Muslim experience which often leaves behind the formal prose of religious duty in the longing for the ecstatic. It is that prose which must first be studied in the daily loyalty of Muslim *dīn*—a house built, as the technical term has it, on "five pillars": the witness to the faith, the prayer rite, almsgiving, the fast, and pilgrimage.

Shahādah, or Witnessing: The First Pillar. *Shahādah* is the foundation of all that follows. To make the creedal confession, also called the *kalimah*, or "word of belief," is properly an act of worship. That it should be so is parallel to the long tradition of Christian creed recital in eucharist and liturgy. By contrast, however, the Muslim *Shahādah* is terse in the extreme: "La ilāha illā Allāh; Muḥammad rasūl Allāh" ("There is no god save God alone; Muḥammad is the messenger of God"). It is one with the context, just noted, of Islam's origins in the mission of Muḥammad as a vibrant assertion of the divine unity. To that assertion it joins the mission itself, the indispensable counterpart of the truth that God is one. The *Shahādah* links them together inseparably. It uses what grammarians call "absolute negation" for the pseudo-deities, exempting exclusively from that negation the grand affirmation of God alone.

This conviction is not for the background of the mind. It is for constant verbal statement. It must be said with "intention" (*niyah*), with a deliberateness which must also characterize all the Pillars. The faith is not a bare formula: it is a personal confession. It could be recited merely to illustrate a point in grammar or to teach Islamics. [See also *Shahādah and God*, article on God in Islam.]

Ṣalāt, or the Prayer Rite: The Second Pillar. Five times daily, with two or four *rak'ahs*, or sequences of bodily postures and liturgical words, the Muslim renews response to God. The word *ṣalāt* means "bending, or inclining toward," so that the physical prostration of the body during the rite expresses the direction of the soul toward God. The whole is then a kind of personal

sacrament of submission, in that the brow, seat of the intelligence and sign of the dignity of man, is brought low to the earth. But the worshipers do not stay in that posture of obeisance. They resume the erect position with which they began and, retaking their sandals, return to the work of their world. There is thus a rhythm between prayer and affairs, between immediacies and ultimates, between human activity and divine claim.

That symbolism of the postures of the body from erectness to prostration and back again, performed in each *rak'ah*, or prayer sequence, obtains, too, in the five daily repetitions of the rite, namely after dawn, at noon, in the afternoon, at sunset, and at night. "Performed" is the right word and is used in the Qur'an whenever *ṣalāt* is enjoined, for *ṣalāt* is not merely said; it is done. The Qur'an itself does not enjoin the five prayers of the day, though it refers to "sunset and dawn" (17:78), and to "the two ends of the day, and at night" (11:114; see also 24:58). But five it became in very early tradition.

During the bodily movements come the words of praise and ascription of glory to God, "Allāhu akbar" ("Greater is God," a phrase known as the *Takbīr*; cf. the Christian *Magnificat*); the recitation of the opening surah of the Qur'an, or the *Fātiḥah*; other Qur'anic phrases, and finally the greeting of the prophet Muḥammad and the whole community of Muslims, expressed in the *Taslīm*, or "Peace," said with a turn of the head to left and right.

That expression of solidarity with the whole, like the Islamic reverence for the habitual, serves to intensify the prayer experience. It has its focus in the *qiblah*, or direction of prayer toward the Holy City of Mecca, marked in every mosque by a wall niche, or *miḥrāb*, so that the rows of worshipers are truly aligned toward Mecca when they face the niche. For the solitary worshiper also the correct stance toward the city of Muḥammad's birth is vital. Yet orientation only partly serves to describe this feature of *ṣalāt*, since the *qiblah* is multidirectional, depending on whether the individual is in Singapore, Trinidad, Chicago, Casablanca, Istanbul, or Tashkent. The praying world of Islam must be visualized as a large series of concentric circles, spreading outward from Mecca, its territorial hub, every point of which has its own radius, like the spokes of a vast wheel. This image is confirmed when, at the pilgrimage, those radii become roads or air routes converging physically where *ṣalāt* converges liturgically. Muslim prayer was initially oriented toward Jerusalem, presumably following Jewish custom; the ordaining of the Meccan *qiblah*, therefore, is to be seen as a sign of the growing independence of Islam after Muḥammad's move to Medina in 622 CE, the beginning of the Muslim era.

Habituation and solidarity reinforce the sharply

personal nature of *ṣalāt*. The ritual is the physical duty of each, rather than, as in some other faiths, the direct activity of a few. Further, it is preceded by the self-administered cleansing called *wuḍū'*. There must be water, or in drought, sand, available at the mosque for the ablutions, which entail the washing of the lower legs and feet, the hands and forearms, the face and nostrils, neck, and ears. *Ṣalāt* itself is a preservative from evil and must be prefaced by careful purification. This serves also to obviate inattentiveness and formalism by requiring effort and deliberation in a studied prelude to the ritual. The use of a prayer mat ensures the cleanliness of the immediate site, while some Muslims also use a small clay tablet on which to bring one's brow in prostration.

While the five daily performances of *ṣalāt* are mandatory, attendance at the mosque is not, except at the noon prayer on Friday, when the individual believer is required to join with the congregation. Otherwise, he or she may spread the prayer mat in any feasible place, whether in the aisle of a bus or the corner of a public building or between the stalls of the market. The body itself is said to have six *masājid* ("mosques"; sg., *mas-jid*), namely two knees, two palms, and two toes, the parts carrying the body at the time of prostration. Friday as the Muslim day of congregation probably derives from a concern to contrast with the Jewish Sabbath and the Christian Sunday. It is not a day of obligatory rest, and normal merchandizing may be resumed when the noon *ṣalāt* ends (62:9).

The *khuṭbah*, or mosque sermon, is an important element in the Friday worship. It provides a public occasion for the education and exhortation of the believers by the learned personnel of the mosque. The sermon conforms to the general tendency within Islam to consider fulfillment of precept more vital than exploration of theology. Accordingly, sermons tend to concentrate on recitation of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet and encouragement of the listeners to emulation and loyalty. Preachers are unlikely to engage in careful defense of doctrine or apologia for belief, since these are confidently assumed. But they may use their pulpits for political commentary and even incitement, and it is on this account that in many cases sermons are now controlled by ministries of religious affairs in Islamic states.

The surest index to the inner feel of *ṣalāt* in Islam is the opening surah of the Qur'an, recited in acts of worship by the faithful some thirty times a day. Often, if loosely, called "the Lord's Prayer of Islam," it runs:

In the name of God, the merciful lord of mercy. Praise be to God, lord of the worlds, the merciful lord of mercy, disposer of the judgment day. Thee it is we worship, thee it is to

whom we come for succor. Guide us in the straight path, the path of those on whom thou art gracious, not of those on whom there is wrath, nor of those who are in error.

Here are the integral themes of the soul in *ṣalāt*—praise, invocation, exclusive reliance, aspiration after rectitude, the plea for rightfulness buoyed in the final phase by the sense of contrast with non-Muslims. The whole of the Qur'ān, said Muḥammad, is in the Fātiḥah. [See also *Ṣalāt and Mosque*.]

Zakāt and Ṣawm, Almsgiving and Fasting: The Third and Fourth Pillars. These properly call for study under Islamic society and ethics, but, as aspects of *dīn*, or religion, they belong with worship as well. They concern the worshiper's liability to society and liability with the self. *Zakāt*, or the duty of alms payment, is almost invariably linked in the Qur'ān with *ṣalāt*: "Perform the prayer and bring the alms" (cf. 2:43, 2:83, 4:77). The root idea within *zakāt* is that one "cleanses," or legitimatizes, one's private property by applying a statutory part of it (a tenth to a fortieth, depending on the source and form of the income) to the relief of the needy, the cause of Islam, and whatever is *fi sabīl Allāh*, "in the way of God." The obligation to God which the prayer rite fulfills must be paired with the obligation to the neighbor in Islam. From the earliest days, *zakāt* was seen as attesting allegiance, transacting it, as it were, by bringing the donor into a community of mutual obligation and benefit; it is recruitment of, and through, the pocket. *Zakāt*, in the broadest terms, partakes in worship as the ideological sanction of a responsible society. [See *Zakāt*.]

Ṣawm, or fasting, is likewise an aspect of worship in that it is a fulfillment of the divine directive. Whatever pragmatic arguments moderns may muster for the value of fasting, its sufficient motive is the ordinance of God (2:183–187). The faithful Muslim must abstain from all intake of food, drink, smoke, injections, or the smelling of flowers through all the daylight hours of the twenty-eight (and sometimes twenty-nine) days of Ramaḍān, the month of fast. Since the lunar months of the Islamic calendar are not fixed, but move through the year's climatic seasons, the summer incidence of the fast can be a strenuous exercise in restraint and fortitude. It is obligatory on all, men and women, except the sick, the aged, pregnant and nursing women, and travelers. These must make good the waived fast, if and when their disability ends.

The corporate nature of the fast, its incidence in the sacred month, and the strong sanction of divine will and social conformity are another powerful example of the characteristic solidarity already noted in *ṣalāt* and the *qiblah*. There are, to be sure, lax Muslims in many quarters. Efforts, not notably successful, have been

made to adjust the form of the fast to the circumstances of modern life, industrial production, and time patterns. There have been appeals to the spirit aside from the letter of the ordinance, or to a freer interpretation of the *nīyah* (intention). But the instinct within traditional Islam is to believe that spirit without letter is precarious and that, anyway, the divine wisdom has its own counsel and must be followed without argument.

The discipline of abstinence is known as *imsāk*, meaning "holding back," restraining the will to indulge or to seek relief. This *imsāk* teaches the body to know its subordination, to realize its servant status, to recognize its true role as a Muslim's habitat. That strict discipline, however, is applied within the fasting month, for Islam, with some small exception, is not an ascetic religion. When the month, however taxing, ends, and normal life resumes, the gifts of the Creator, food, sex, relaxation, appetites, may properly be indulged, chastened perhaps, but not essentially denied or disavowed, by the recurring incidence of Ramaḍān. While it lasts, Ramaḍān teaches *ṣabr*, or patient persistence, which is a characteristic human virtue in the Qur'ān and one often linked with *ṣalāt*.

The emergence of *ṣawm* as one of the Five Pillars of Islam came in the Medinan period and is to be seen as part of the distancing of the new faith from its Jewish and Christian antecedents. It differs markedly from the fasts of the earlier monotheisms, not least in its occurrence in the specific month which is also understood to mark the initial revelation of the Qur'ān to the Prophet, as surah 97 has it, on "the night of power," an unknown night of Ramaḍān. As a result, this month of fast enjoys a special aura of sanctity, to which the Muslim responds with an intensification of religious devotion. Mosques are liable to be more frequented, more intently used, and supererogatory prayers recited. Piety is inspired to a more repentant scrutiny of self and a keener awareness of the unknown incidence of death. Through the remedial perspective of a self-imposed hunger, the body is recognized as belonging to a frail and fleeting tenant.

If the month-long fast carries with it something of the feel of a Christian Lent, the end of Ramaḍān has a quality comparable to the celebration of Christmas. The 'Īd al-Fiṭr, "the festival of the breaking of the fast," follows the sighting of the next month's new moon. Eating, which has been deferred to nighttime during Ramaḍān, now passes into daylight celebration. Gifts and cards are exchanged, and there is a generous sense of social well-being and religious satisfaction.

The social aspect of the month of fast, in both its keeping and its conclusion, has been a powerful factor in the spread of Islam, not least in Africa. Before they have known the Shahādah or appreciated the whole

content of Islam, interested pagans have observed the phenomenon, inquired as to its meaning, and been drawn into participating. It has been, in that sense, a powerful recruiter to the faith and one that Islam has been glad to employ or await as more effective and decisive than intellectual propagation, at least initially and perhaps for a generation. The first keeping of Ramaḍān is also an important waymark in the nurture of the young within Islam. At twelve, and in many families earlier, boys and girls will begin their Ramaḍāns as a vital rite of passage to maturity. [See *Ṣawm and Islamic Religious Year*.]

The tenor of the Ramaḍān fast may be sensed in a random extract from one of the numerous books of private devotion used by the faithful:

Praise be to God, whom none can resist in his sovereignty and none contest in his authority. Praise be to God, alone in his creating and unapproached in his exaltedness. Praise be to God whose command is manifested in his creation, whose honor is evident in mercy and whose glory is seen in the outstretched hand of goodness, he whose storehouses never fail, whom excess of giving cannot enrich save in graciousness and splendor. For he is the all powerful provider.

O God, I seek of thee a very little of what is so vast, though my need thereof is great indeed, while thou, without it, art rich from of old. With me it is a great thing, but for thee it is a simple trifle. O God [it is] thy pardon for my transgression, thy forbearance for my sin, thy mercy for my wrongdoing, thy covering for my unworthy deeds, thy indulgence for my multiplied iniquity, whether done in error or knowingly. Let me have boldness in beseeching thee for what I have no right to seek from thee, who hast bestowed upon me thy mercy and shown to me thy power.

Pilgrimage: The Fifth Pillar. Where all *ṣalāt* converges by means of the *qiblah*, all pilgrimage assemblies—statutory pilgrimage, that is, as distinct from devotional access to other shrines, especially within Shīʿī Islam. Canonical pilgrimage, known as the *hajj*, is obligatory for all able-bodied Muslims to perform, at least once in their lifetime, during the month of pilgrimage, called Dhū al-Ḥijjah. The *ʿumrah* is a lesser pilgrimage which may be performed at any time.

Here too corporate experience is deeply alive. Whether repeated within the life span, as is often the case, or made only once, pilgrimage engenders a compelling sense of Islam as participation. There is the long anticipation, the careful preparation, the status awarded and celebrated in local community, the thrill of travel, the rendezvous with history, the exhilaration of the ceremonies, the concourse of the faithful, the symbolic course, sequence, and close of the ritual state of *iḥrām*, or sanctity, and the near ecstasy of the culminating ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā, the feast of sacrifice.

The actual ceremonies begin on the tenth of the month, when the pilgrims move along the Marwah road from the Great Mosque to the site called Minā, some five miles distant; from there they proceed another nine miles to Arafat, beside the Mountain of Mercy, where the “standing” (*wuqūf*) begins which is the essential core of the whole. Prior to this communal act, the pilgrims have individually entered the state of sanctity known as *iḥrām* by stating their intentions, performing certain rites, and donning special pilgrim garb. They have also visited the Kaʿbah, the cube-shaped shrine in the center of the Great Mosque, to make seven circumambulations around it. These are prefaced and punctuated by the repeated cry known as the *talbiyah*: “Labbayka, labbayka” (“Here I am before thee, doubly at thy service”). It is the cry offered by the servant obediently present at Mecca, as God’s appointed rendezvous of the faith and prophethood, where the faith originated in revelation, and where Muḥammad was born and became a prophet. During the circuit, the pilgrims (if the concourse admits) kiss the meteoric Black Stone embedded in the northeastern corner of the Kaʿbah and press their breast against an area of the wall, the action known as *iltizām*, a physical symbol of due allegiance. There are both pagan and Semitic elements behind the circuiting (*ṭawāf*) of the Kaʿbah. The exit, after the prescribed *ṭawāf*s quickens into a run on the way to Marwah, sometimes attributed to the imitation of Hagar’s urgency in seeking water for her son, Ishmael, after they were sent away to Abraham, with whom Islam closely links the Meccan locale and the sacred house (14:37).

Once at Arafat, the vast assembly keeps vigil from noon to sunset of the ninth day. A recent narrator of the *hajj*, Aḥmad Kamāl, writes, “Tents of the faithful cover the undulating valley as far as the eye can see.” Cries of “Labbayka” fill the air. Two sermons are delivered. After sunset comes the *ifāḍah*, the “pouring out” to Muzdalifah, four miles further on, where “standing” continues through the night, and stones are gathered for use at Minā the following day. At dawn, or earlier, comes the return to Minā for the stoning of the pillar, or pillars, to the cry of “Allāhu akbar” when the *hajj* proper concludes and desacralization can begin. The stoning is a symbolic rejection of al-Shayṭān al-Rajīm, “the stoned Satan,” whom the Qurʾān describes in surah 2 as having decried and deplored the granting of the earth’s dominion to humankind. Here, at least suggestively, is the duty of mankind to deny the denier, to give the lie to the liar, to disprove by repudiation the Satan who schemes to disprove by demonstration God’s wisdom in risking mankind.

The four following days are devoted to the ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā, when an unblemished sheep, goat, or camel is

slaughtered, face toward the Ka'bah, accompanied by the pronouncement of the Takbīr (22:26–28 and 32–37). This is not a blood sacrifice, but an occasion for awareness of human dominion over animals and the goodness of the Creator, leading to grateful partaking and a mind for the poor. Shaving of hair, further *ṭawāfs*, and drinking of the water at the well of Zamzam within the Great Mosque complete the termination of the sacral state of *iḥrām* and bring the formal *ḥajj* to an end.

According to the Qur'ān, the prophet Ibrāhīm, the biblical Abraham, was responsible for establishing the Ka'bah as a center of pilgrimage. The Abrahamic associations of Mecca in Islam undergird the sense of Muslim faith in a pure relationship with God, antecedent to the Mosaic Torah, exemplified by Ibrāhīm as "a man of pure faith," a *ḥanīf*. The city is also linked with Adam, who dwelt there after his expulsion from Paradise in a tent that the Lord provided him with, prior to his building of the Ka'bah. Tradition has it that Mecca is his burial place, as well as being also the center, or navel, of the world. The role of the pilgrimage to Mecca was crucial in Muḥammad's strategy after his Hijrah or Emigration from it in 622 CE and played a vital part in his final possession of the city after his military campaign. It has remained so through all the centuries of Islam. There are numerous witnesses, medieval and contemporary, to the profound impact of the *ḥajj* experience. On a more mundane level it has served to foster the cosmopolitan quality of Islam. Over the centuries, tradition-seekers, architects, scholars, merchants, and calligraphers have all been able to utilize their pilgrimage journeys to discover their fellow Muslims and cross-fertilize their skills and minds. [See Pilgrimage, *article on Muslim Pilgrimage, and Ka'bah.*]

The Personal Piety of Islam. The ritual obligations of the Muslim in the Five Pillars of religion (*dīn*), shaping the habituation, the solidarity, and the conformity which belong characteristically with Islam, constitute Islamic worship. But they by no means exhaust the devotional life of the practicing Muslim. Liturgical *ṣalāt* is matched by a practice of *du'ā'*, or "calling" upon God, in a rich manifold of patterns, themes, and situations. While its most expressive and concerted forms belong with Islamic mysticism, it is not limited to esoteric circles and mystical sophistication. The popular and general aspects of devotion can serve here as preface to the more organized forms within the Ṣūfī orders since much of the vocabulary and temper is common to both.

Du'ā', the invocation of the divine names, is one with the supplication that these names invite. The *asmā' al-ḥusnā*, the "most beautiful names" of God, traditionally ninety-nine in number, have a central place in Islamic theology and life. By these names God is denoted

and addressed: theology and worship, in this sense, are one. Unless we can dependably "call" God so and so, unless we can name him, how can we call upon him? To do both is the meaning of *du'ā'*. It was problematic for the theologians to denote God by names, because of the acute problem of theological language, especially on Islamic premises which forbid the use of human terms about God. Yet one could hardly be religious and avoid using them. Some are adjectival (e.g., *al-Laṭīf*, "kindly"); others are nominal and indicate action (e.g., *al-Razzāq*, "provider"). Prayer as a petition is simply the invocation of the name of God, often prefaced by vocatives like *yā* or *ayyuhā*, "O!" In this way, the aspiration is implicit in the choice of the name; one need not specify at length what divine response to the name requires. "O thou Opener" ("yā Fattāḥ") or "O thou Provider" ("yā Razzāq") suffices as both ascription of praise and expression of desire, though devotion may well enlarge its theme with phrases either drawn from the Qur'ān or borrowed from the masters, breathing penitence, hope, dependence, and awe about eternal destiny.

Du'ā' is closely akin to *dhikr*, a rich term meaning both "remembrance" and "mention," that is, recollection of God. The term is very frequent and serves also as one of the titles of the Qur'ān. The Muslim recalls the presence of God in response to the divine address to man. The *asmā' al-ḥusnā* are rehearsed on the *subḥah*, or rosary, of beads, in triple thirty-threes, in line with the behest of the Qur'ān (17:110, 20:8, 59:24).

Inseparable from this recognition of God in daily thought and speech is the celebration of Muḥammad, known as *taṣliyah* and *taslīm*. Surah 33:56 declares: "God and his angels celebrate [*yuṣallūn*; lit., "pray upon"] the Prophet: so you who have believed celebrate him also and greet him with peace." The peace greeting (*taslīm*) is readily understood, but *taṣliyah* is more puzzling. The root verb is that which yields *ṣalāt*, clearly not applicable to God, so the term is taken to indicate the divine pleasure in the person of Muḥammad, the divine satisfaction in his discharge of his mission. With *taṣliyah* and *taslīm* Muslim devotion corroborates the confession of the Shahādah in both its parts and steep itself in the example, the fame, and the mystery of Muḥammad, the "seal of the prophets." It echoes the heavenly prestige which thrills the earthly faith. The Arabic formula based on surah 33:56, namely "Ṣallā Allāhu 'alayhi wa-sallam" ("May God celebrate over him and salute him with peace"), is traditionally recited or written after every mention of the Prophet's name, whether in speech or prose.

The expression of divine satisfaction in Muḥammad is sure ground for the inclinations of popular piety toward festival and invocation of the Prophet. There are few

prayers of personal devotion which do not pass from God to Muḥammad. The main occasion of public celebration is his birthday, known as the Mawlid al-Nabī ("birth time of the Prophet"). These annual times of acclaim for the Prophet bring newspaper editorials, domestic rejoicings, and mosque expositions, all serving to renew in day-to-day Islam the impress of his commanding status with God. His intercession, and his example as the moral paragon of all that the Muslim must aspire to be in conduct and character, serve the penitent and humble as a means of grace.

Any intercessory role for Muḥammad is repudiated, however, by purists like the Arabian Wahhābī school, as are the popular implications of the Mawlid al-Nabī festival. For rigorous unitarians, all such practices detract from the exclusive quality of the worship of God by misreading the unique instrumentality of Muḥammad within divine revelation. His Qur'anic vocation as prophet must, in this view, be loyally protected from the vulgar accretions popular superstition is liable to generate. Yet, for all their vigilant, and sometimes violent, disapproval, the guardians of purity have not been able to suppress the love and adulation which the celebrations of the Mawlid al-Nabī excite and fulfill for a Muḥammad of the heart.

What of the spirituality nourished by *dhikr* and *taṣliyah*? Its nature is best indicated by brief reference to certain themes in Qur'anic vocabulary which recur throughout *du'ā'*. Prominent among them is *iṭmi'nān*, denoting serenity or inward peace. "Truly," says surah 13:28, "is it not in the remembrance [*dhikr*] of God that hearts are at rest?" This verse echoes several others, among them surah 89:27, which greets Muḥammad himself with the words: "O soul at rest . . ." Commentators have linked this quality of inward peace with the contrasting states of the soul biased toward evil (12:53, in the story of Joseph's temptation) and the soul under its own reproach (75:2), both of which are seen as giving way, through *dhikr*, to the state of "pardon and peace."

That forgiveness is essential to the soul's tranquillity is clear from the frequency of the plea for divine mercy in *istighfār*. The term, meaning forgiveness-seeking, is derived from the verbal root which yields three of the *asmā' al-ḥusnā* relating to God as "pardoning." But forgiveness must be sought. In the view of some scholars, the term means, rather, protection-seeking from the wiles of Satan or one's own frailty. In any event, the hope of security is never far from the Muslim sense of pardon, given the constant awareness of the Day of Judgment (Yawm al-Dīn) in the Qur'ān and the reiterated emphasis on our human "return" (*raja'*) to God, with whom lies our decreed destiny. "Wa-ilā Allāh al-

maṣīr" ("And to God is our becoming") echoes through Qur'ān-inspired consciousness.

The call to *istighfār* is close to another favorite theme, namely "refuge with God" (*ta'wīdh*). "I seek refuge with God" ("A'ūdhu billāh") is a constant refrain in *du'ā'*. As the Qur'ān has it: "There is no refuge from God save unto him" (9:118, using *malja'*, a synonym for *ta'wīdh*). The two final surahs of the Qur'ān, which are among the earliest in the scripture and a telling index to the atmosphere of Islam at its origin, are built around the urge for shelter in divine mercy. That urge dominates the Muslim experience of human precariousness, in sickness, loneliness, fear, travel, suspense, sin, and guilt.

Although, as the Fātiḥah insists, it is to God "alone we have recourse" in need, the thought of refuge draws some in popular Islam to visit the tombs, relics, or haunts of holy men, pirs, *awliyā'*, in hope of gaining a precious *barakah* (blessing) to aid the needy—a stance, needless to say, which is deplored and reproved by the purists.

A theme clearly beyond such dispute is that of "desiring the face of God" (*ibtighā' wajh Allāh*, 2:272; see also 13:22 and 92:20). This has about it a deeply Muslim sense of worship free of ulterior purpose, "before God's face" being used even conversationally for acts that are disinterested. *Dhikr* and other expressions of sensitivity to God and his claims must not have ulterior purposes, even godly ones, such as reputation and private or public esteem. In the light which God is, there are no secrets, and there can be no presumption that one's spiritual aspirations will be acceptable to God. Even "desire" may only intend, and not assume, its own sincerity. Many Muslims would decline even to say: "I am a Muslim," phrasing their confession of identity more circumspectly by saying: "I am a Muslim if God so wills." Sincerity in religion (*ikhhlās*) is constantly enjoined in Qur'anic verses, the immediate historical circumstances of prudential hypocrisy (*nifāq*) in the feigned allegiance which attended Muḥammad's post-Hijrah successes. It also anticipates the final judgment when the books are opened and the scales are set—a judgment which only "that Day" will declare. [See also Attributes of God, *article on Islamic Concepts*, and *Dhikr*.]

Worship in Sufism. Many of the features of personal piety just reviewed recur, in more concerted and structured form, in Sufism, or Islamic mysticism. Mystical trends that were later followed by schools or orders developed as early as the first Islamic century in rejection of worldly compromise and doctrinal formalism within Islam. Though internal factors, such as the arguable example of Muḥammad's practice and Qur'anic em-

phases, were important, Sufism, especially in its most sophisticated forms, owed much to Persian, Hindu, and Christian influences encountered in Islamic expansion. At its most esoteric, mysticism hardly warrants inclusion in "worship," at least in the orthodox sense of the soul's relation ("I-Thou") with the personal, transcendent God. Rather, the empirical self and the divine Lord were thought to be fused into one undifferentiated reality, as expressed by the famous, oft-quoted (and misquoted) words of the martyr al-Ḥallāj (d. 922): "Anā al-Ḥaqq" ("I am the Real"). On the human side, this was the passing away of identity (*fanā'*). On the divine, it meant that *tawḥīd* signified not that God, as subject of a predicate, was "one," but that all was one. The central affirmation of Islamic faith, "Allāhu aḥad" ("God the One," 112:11), became a claim to absorption into God. The truth was no longer "the unity" (i.e., of God) but "the unitive."

Though traditional worship concludes under these terms, and Sufism was liable to develop a lofty indifference to the pillars of religion, the rarefied reaches of Sufism tolerated, albeit inconsistently, a tension with lower attitudes in their devotees. This intensified and regulated patterns already traced here, namely *dhikr*, *istighfār*, and *ta'widh*, (sincerity, "desiring God's face," and "the soul at rest"). Under the discipline of the Ṣūfī orders, *dhikr* became not merely the recitation or rehearsal of the *asmā' al-ḥusnā* but a technique for the inducement of trance and *fanā'*. The technique took several forms, involving repetition of invocations such as "Allāhu akbar" ("God is great"), "Subḥan Allāh" ("God be praised"), or the Basmalah ("In the name of God"), the Shahādah, and specific divine names (which should be invoked only under proper guidance), together with rhythmic swaying of the body, or whirling dance, calculated to inspire and sustain the ecstasy appropriate to *fanā'* and (Ṣūfī) *tawḥīd*. The various masters of the Ṣūfī discipline composed their prayer manuals (*awrād* and *aḥzāb*) to educate the soul and provide liturgy for devotion. These manuals, produced in great variety and treasured on the persons of innumerable devotees, have nourished the lives of generations of humble Ṣūfīs and perpetuated the legacy of their honored masters.

By this long cure of souls, as it might well be described, Sufism served to bring ardor, warmth, and grace into the daily life of Muslims. Those qualities have more than compensated for the element of charlatantry to which all religious fervor is prone and from which Sufism has not been free. They have also liberated into Muslim culture a poetry of worship exemplified by such poets as the great Persian founder and pivot of the Mevlevī order, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273), his

compatriot, Ḥāfiẓ Shīrāzī (d. 1389), and the Cairene Ibn al-Fārīd (d. 1235), who all reveled in the benediction of *dhikr* and celebrated its meaning in the poetic metaphors of wine and taverners, of doors and suppliant beggars, of fire and willing fuel, of sensuous and spiritual love.

If, to the uninitiated, there were ambiguities here, there were none in the treatises of al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), who more than any other single figure in Islam represents mysticism integrated into Islamic theology, at once intellectual, pastoral, and devotional. His large work, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), expounded the stages, and the attendant states, of the Ṣūfī "way" (*ṭarīqah*), the path of discipline which the seeker has to travel to become, in turn, the disciple and the initiate. Al-Ghazālī's autobiography, *Al-munqidh min al-dalāl* (The Deliverer from Going Astray), mirrors a deep disquiet, an existential search, and a spiritual discovery of selfhood transformed. His work, with its penetrating analyses of conscience, temptation, and guilt, its comprehensive discipline of character, and its religious quality, served to secure both orthodoxy and Sufism by a sound mutuality and, in so doing, to make him through many generations a wise mentor of Islamic worship. [See the biographies of al-Ghazālī, Ḥāfiẓ Shīrāzī, Ibn al-Fārīd, and Rūmī.]

Islamic Worship among the Shī'ah. In all the foregoing, the Sunni/Shī'ī distinction within the house of Islam has not been vitally significant. The Five Pillars of religion are common to all, as is much else in personal devotion and mysticism. With regard to worship, the distinctiveness of Shī'ī Islam has to do primarily with the sectarian temper and the spiritual issue of suffering.

Involved from the beginning in political conflicts through their adherence to the hereditary principle of ruler, the Shī'ah generated a brand of militancy which subtly affected the temper of their worship. Their doctrinal and emotional faith in the Prophet's family, *ahl al-bayt* (33:33), meant that devotion to 'Alī, Fāṭimah, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, and their descendants matched—or even overtook—their cherishing of Muḥammad himself. Their doctrine of the imamate understood the truth/faith relation, not in community fidelity, as Sunnīs broadly did, but in the imam's exclusive mediation of it as an emanation of the divine light himself. This lent a quality of intensity, not to say fanaticism, to the Shī'ī reception of belief and allegiance. It also provoked the characteristic tendency of Shī'ī to fragmentation, through the rivalry of separatist claimants and their partisans. When, as happened in the eighth and ninth century, the imam went into *ghaybah* ("hiddenness, occultation"), eschatological expectation of his return kin-

dled the two contrasting postures of hope as the Shi'ah awaited fulfillment. The one was a fervent apocalypticism, imbued with activist visions of liberation, justice, and the overthrow of tyranny. The other was a pious quietism, outwardly acquiescing by dissimulation (*taqiyyah*) under regimes against which resistance was currently imprudent or impossible.

These aspects of Shi'i Islam and its elaborate esoteric doctrines of the creation, sanctity, and mystery of the imams have given a distinct ethos to the worship of God within Shi'i ranks. Contentious or discreet by turns, the Shi'ah have always been consciously at issue with the Sunnī majority and have jealously possessed their own traditions, their own mystics, their own exegesis, their own premises about Islamic loyalty and Qur'an interpretation. But what has most vitally affected their divine worship is the dimension of suffering which attended their history. Largely frustrated in their political purposes early on, they came to constitute a minority verdict against the Sunnī Islamic assumption of success and, in the Qur'an's frequent phrase, "manifest victory," as the sign of divine favor. For the most part, the early Shi'ah enjoyed only "manifest defeat." In 'Alī, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn, and others, they acquired martyrs and a martyrology. The sufferings experienced by, the wrongs perpetrated against, these "pure ones," Muḥammad's own kin, innocent and holy souls, posed the puzzle of the tragic in history, about which Sunnī Islam had scant reason to care. The Shi'ah responded with an intense cult of the slain and, to sustain it, a deep theology of vicarious merit from which to gain forgiveness by association.

That theology found its central focus in the ritual celebration of the passion of Ḥusayn at Karbala, the fatal bid for power which he made in 680, with the result that he and almost all his family and followers were brutally liquidated in a forlorn encounter with the Umayyad army from Damascus. The grim and gory incidents of that tragedy are rehearsed and reenacted in the passion play (*ta'ziyah*) which annually commemorates the tenth of Muḥarram ('Āshūrā'), the most sacred of all days to the Shi'ah. [See 'Āshūrā' and Ta'ziyah.] While Shi'i Muslims hold loyally to the Meccan *hajj*, their own pilgrimage to Karbala, as well as to Najaf and Mashhad, other sanctuaries of the imams, has an equal, if not more intense, authority within their soul.

In the passion play, Karbala is seen as epitomizing innocence and suffering through all time. Jacob's anguish over Joseph, Mary's over Jesus, Muḥammad's over his tiny son Ibrāhīm, are all present, yet transcended, in the tragedy that befell Ḥusayn. The name *Karbala* is traditionally explained as a compound of *karb* ("distress") and *balā'* ("affliction"): there all human

sorrows meet. In one version of the play, a Christian woman traveling there is struck by the beauty of the place and decides to camp. But the tent pegs draw blood oozing from the ground as they are hammered in. In her sleep, a vision of Ḥusayn explains his story and brings her to Islam. Since such tragic wrong done upon the holy cannot have been deserved, its innocence must then avail for all who understand. It is an innocence in which they can take shelter and claim pardon. In its wounded heart, they may find forgiveness by the association of faith and devotion, which are forever kindled and intensified by the drama of the ritual. The host of grief himself (Ḥusayn) invites all souls to the banquet of lamentation. For all its daunting intensity, the Shi'i celebration of Karbala is instinct imbued with religious mystery and a deep commentary on the confident silence of Sunnī Islam about human suffering.

The Mosque in Worship. The body, as we have seen, is the individual's immediate mosque. Its members offer the place, as well as the means, for prostration. The mosque, further, is wherever the worshiper chooses, be it desert sand, palace marble, or common earth. But "houses God has given leave to be erected that in them his name might be remembered" (surah 24:36) have from the first Islamic century been the pride and tribute of Islam responsively to such "permission." The splendid Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, built in 691 to commemorate the triumph of Islam, was the first, and perhaps still the finest, of these architectural glories in his name. [See Architecture.]

Domes, though not original to Islam, were to become the most characteristic feature of its architecture, housing what might be called "the sanctification of space." Under the protection of the mosque domes, all the artistic skills consonant with Islamic precepts were employed diligently and religiously on the structures that upheld them, the walls that housed them, the lamps that lit them. Niche and pulpit and other items of immediate ritual relevance, carpets, Qur'āns, fountains, and minarets, required and received the careful practical devotion of calligraphers, ceramicists, dyers, weavers, engravers, gilders, and designers. Craftsmanship was tutored and recruited from the conquered cultures but always subject to the authority of the faith. Umayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids, Ottomans, Safavids, Mughals, emulated, rivaled, stimulated each other in the structural embodiment of their religion. So it is that a great cathedral mosque is a surer index to the genius of Islamic worship than many a margin of commentary or item in an encyclopedia. The only music is the vocal *tajwīd* of the Qur'an; the only representation, the flowing script of the Scripture; the only hidden sanctuary, the private heart of the believer. The mosque is the

structural, visual form in which Islam presents its most insistent plea: "Let God be God."

For the whole of the Qur'ān, according to Muḥammad, is in the Fātiḥah, and the whole of the Fātiḥah is in the Basmalah, the invocation of the name of God, merciful lord of mercy. And the whole of Basmalah, the mystics went on to say, is in that *bi-*, the vital particle by which God is named and praised, the crucial stance that betakes the soul to God.

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KENNETH CRAGG

Buddhist Cultic Life in Southeast Asia

[This article focuses exclusively on Buddhist practice in the Theravāda Buddhist cultures of Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka. For an overview of the development of Buddhism in the region, including the proliferation of non-Theravāda forms, see Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia.]

Buddhist cultic life may seem to present a paradox. The Buddha taught that attachment to rituals and other externals of religion was one of the three main hindrances to spiritual progress. The doctrine he preached was for each individual to internalize; it had nothing to do with shrine, locality, or society. The Buddhist path to salvation is traditionally conceived to consist of morality, meditation, and wisdom, a formulation which seems to leave no place for devotion. Moreover, within the Theravāda tradition the Buddha is regarded as mortal, possessed of no power to aid others beyond exhortation and example; he cannot answer prayers. One's spiritual welfare can be affected by no external agency, only by the moral quality of one's own acts, a quality which resides inside one, in intention, not outside one, in effect; this moral development alone leads to a good rebirth and eventually to *nibbāna*. One's material welfare is not the proper concern of religion.

The religious life of Theravāda Buddhists, however, lacks neither external observances nor the sentiments of worship and devotion. It may even—like the practice of other religions—be not indifferent to worldly goods. But the Buddha's teaching has ensured that external observances are not allowed to appear as empty forms; they are accompanied by words which give them an orthodox rationale. Acts of devotion produce spiritual welfare because they are said to calm the mind, and thus constitute part of the same mental training as morality and meditation. They may even produce material welfare (although, to be sure, this is not the best motive for undertaking them) via the transfer of merit.

Transferring Merit. The rationale for transferring merit is inherent in the doctrine that the moral quality of an act lies in the intention alone. Thus, to empathize

with a good deed, to enter into the state of mind of the doer, may be as meritorious as actually performing the deed. Further, to draw attention to one's good deed is in itself good, since it gives others a chance to empathize and so share the merit. At the same time, this sharing results in no loss to oneself; it is like lighting one candle from another.

Buddhists believe that human beings have more opportunity than gods to do good; life in the heavens is too comfortable for awareness of universal suffering, so there is not much Buddhist activity there. Thus, when they have done a good deed Buddhists invite the gods to rejoice in it with them and thus share the merit. They hope that in return for this consideration the gods will look after them on earth. [For further discussion, see Merit, article on Buddhist Concepts.]

Scriptural Authority. Scriptural authority for most Theravāda cultic observances derives from a single canonical text, the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*. This account of the Buddha's last days and death appears in every recension of the Buddhist canon and probably dates back to the fourth century BCE. In the Pali version, the Buddha advises two ministers that when one has fed holy men one should dedicate that act to the local gods, who will return the honor done them by ensuring one's welfare (*Dīgha Nikāya*, Pali Text Society ed., 2.88–89). Later in the same text, the Buddha recommends the building of stupas (2.142–143) and prescribes pilgrimage (2.140–141). The text ends by describing the distribution and worship of his relics (2.164–167). The Buddha says that whoever puts flowers or incense or paint on one of his stupas, worships it, or derives from it the religious emotion of happy tranquillity, will long benefit (2.142); furthermore, anyone who feels happy and calm at the sight of the stupa of an enlightened person will go to heaven (2.143), as will anyone who dies on pilgrimage (2.141). If we add that the commemoration of the Buddha's death is a principal event in the liturgical calendar, and that Thai Buddhists also commemorate his funeral, we see how important a charter the above-mentioned text is for Buddhist practice.

Interpretation of Religious Behavior. Like adherents of all religions, Buddhists profess various rationales for the same religious behavior. Interpretations will vary both with sophistication and with the context, individual or cultural. The more sophisticated interpretations, which generally coincide with the preservation of canonical orthodoxy, tend to be held by monks, though these days more and more laypersons are acquiring enough knowledge of Buddhist doctrine to manipulate its concepts and indulge in apologetics on their own account. To the sophisticated, "merit" (Pali, *puñña*) is just

a term for doing good, while its "transfer" (*patti*), in and of itself an important source of merit, can be rationalized in the way that has been explained above. But for the unsophisticated, merit is something more like money, a spiritual voucher system which, like sacrifice in other religions, enables one to earn material rewards from the gods. This example should not be read to mean that there are only two levels of sophistication, or that the least sophisticated understanding necessarily has the logical or historical priority implied by talk of "rationalization." On the contrary, the unsophisticated devotee who thinks of *nibbāna* as a place at the top of the sky rather than as the ideal spiritual condition represents change in the opposite direction, a coarsening of originally subtle concepts.

Any religion is a structure of symbols, and it is hazardous to assume that these are interpreted literally, even by the unsophisticated. For example, the Buddha is often referred to, and his image treated, as a king. Again, justification for this is found in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, in which the Buddha says his body is to be treated like that of a supreme emperor (2.141). When kings of ancient Sri Lanka endowed Buddhist relics with emblems of royalty and even gave them sovereignty over the country, the symbolic nature of their reverent acts was clear. So if Buddhists now treat the Buddha image as if it were a king, that does not mean they believe it to be one. [See also Cakravartin and Kingship, article on Kingship in Southeast Asia.]

Variation in context is just as important as variation in sophistication, and may even override it. Most Buddhists are fully aware that the Buddha is dead and cannot help them, but in a crisis even a sophisticated Buddhist may pray to the Buddha for help, even if afterwards he is ashamed to admit it. Such variations in context may be culturally patterned. For example, in Sri Lanka, when a new Buddha image is to be installed in a shrine (traditionally a public shrine; domestic shrines are a modern innovation), there has to be a ceremony at which its maker completes it by painting in the eyes. He must be left alone with the image and paint in the eyes without looking at them directly, by using a mirror. The incipient gaze of the Buddha image is treated as if it were dangerous, but such an idea conflicts with the orthodox Buddhist view that the Buddha is not only dead and no longer active but, in any case, wholly benign. The ceremony could not have arisen had someone not believed otherwise, and perhaps the traditional craftsman still does. Monks will strongly deny that the gaze is dangerous and may even dismiss the custom as a superstition. In between are many who will attend the ceremony without asking themselves what

they think about it. Thus a mere description of religious behavior can tell us nothing certain about the participants' motives, feelings, or ideology.

Lay Religious Statutes and Vows. This polyvalence of even verbal behavior is striking at the outset of any description of Theravāda observance. The layperson begins every public religious occasion, every private devotion, and in some societies every day in the same way. After reciting three times (in Pali), "Worship to the Blessed Arhat, the Fully and Supremely Enlightened One," he declares (again three times) that he "goes for refuge" to the Three Jewels of Buddhism: the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha. What does this mean? The Dhamma is necessarily present and the Sangha contingently still extant, but the Buddha? It is easy for orthodoxy to claim that the recitation is merely a way of declaring oneself inspired by the Buddha's example; but the devotee may feel the Buddha's presence in a more direct way. After the recitation of the Three Jewels, one takes the Five Precepts: not to kill, steal, be unchaste, lie, or take intoxicants. Most Buddhists are vividly aware that just to mouthe the words is nothing; one must mean them. Thus, the Buddha's insistence that good morals are the precondition for spiritual progress influences Buddhist ritual and daily life. The Sinhala service of Radio Sri Lanka begins every day with the Three Refuges and Five Precepts, intoned by monks for lay response as on public occasions. Although lay membership is rarely formalized, to take the Three Refuges and Five Precepts is to define oneself as a Buddhist.

The Buddhist liturgical calendar has lunar months. The quarter days of the lunar month (*uposatha*) are days of intensified observance. The full-moon day is the most important (most festivals occur then), followed by the new-moon day. Intensified observance mainly consists of visiting the temple and taking the Eight Precepts. These build on the basic five: the third is strengthened to exclude all sexual activity and one undertakes additionally not to take solid food after midday, not to watch entertainments, not to use adornments (in this formulation these last two form a single undertaking), and not to use grand beds. The person undertaking these abstentions behaves almost as if ordained, for the lower ordination or *pabbajjā* (novitiate) involves taking the Ten Precepts, which, treating the abstentions from entertainments and from adornments as separate injunctions, are the same as the Eight Precepts with an additional injunction against handling gold or silver (i.e., against using money). Taking the Eight Precepts on *uposatha* days is ideal conduct, but even at the full moon only a minority, predominantly women, do so.

One can also take the Ten Precepts without being ordained. This is done mostly by elderly and widowed people. Since the Theravāda order of nuns is extinct, the Ten Precepts represent the strictest formal category of observance attainable by women. Some women shave their heads, wear ochre robes, and live much like monks, their nearest male counterparts, in religious communities or as virtual hermits. They generally do not receive the same recognition as monks, although they usually lead ascetic lives and beg their food.

The minimum age for entering the order as a novice (*sāmaṇera*) is about seven. One can take the higher ordination (*upasampadā*) and so become a monk (*bhikkhu*) at twenty. Although anyone who feels unsuited to monastic life can leave at any time, in Sri Lanka it is always assumed that ordination is taken with lifelong intent. This is not so in other Theravāda societies. In Burma, every boy is supposed to enter the order temporarily as a novice, usually for at least a week. This temporary service has no bearing on whether he becomes a monk later in life. There is a similar system of temporary ordination, but one which is even more flexible, in Thailand. (Until the communist takeovers of the 1970s, Laos and Cambodia had similar Buddhist traditions and practices.) Even the king of Thailand spends one or more spells in monastic robes. The most common time for short-term ordination is the "rains retreat" (*vassa*, normally from July to October).

Merit Making. An often cited Pali verse lists ten good acts that comprise all the ways of making merit: generosity, observing the precepts, meditation, transferring merit, empathizing with merit, serving (one's elders), showing respect, preaching, listening to preaching, and right beliefs. Several of these are discussed below.

Generosity. Generosity (*dāna*) is considered the foundation of all virtues. In practice, the term usually refers to generosity toward the monastic order (which is described in liturgy as "the best field in which to sow merit"), and in particular to feeding monks—so much so that the word for "generosity" in Sinhala (*dānē*) commonly means a monk's meal.

Meditation. Traditionally, the only forms of meditation in which laity engaged were the simple recitation of Pali verses and formulas (*gāthās*), usually undertaken at the temple as part of *uposatha* ("quarter-moon") observance; such recitation is culturally defined as "calming" (*samatha*) meditation but does not strike Western observers as having the intensity they associate with meditation. The commonest subjects for meditation are the qualities of the Buddha, kindness (*mettā*), and the constituents of the body. The more technical forms of meditation, whether "calming" or "insight" (*vipassanā*)

meditation, have by custom been confined to the monastic order; but since about 1950 laypeople have become increasingly interested in meditation, and the more modernized sectors of society have seen the establishment of meditation centers (not necessarily in monasteries) at which laity take meditation courses, sometimes even under lay instruction. The most common technique now employed for teaching meditation to laity seems to be awareness of breathing. [See Meditation, article on Buddhist Meditation.]

Preaching. What is common to virtually all public occasions for making merit is that the laity feed monks and the monks respond by preaching. At the very least they preach a short sermon (which may be purely formulaic), instructing the laity to share the merit of this act and expressing the hope that it may help them to good rebirths and finally to attain *nibbāna* under the next Buddha, Maitrī (Metteyya; Skt., Maitreya). There are many other types of preaching, including sermons composed for the occasion and delivered in the local language. But the most distinctive form of Theravāda preaching is the recitation of a particular set of Pali texts called *paritta* ("protection, amulet"). *Paritta* recitation has the general aim of bringing good luck, not merely by the mechanisms which apply to all merit making but also by reminding potentially malevolent spirits, to whom some of the texts are addressed, of such Buddhist principles as kindness. The recital can be done by anyone, but usually several monks participate; for long sessions they take turns at reciting in pairs in a style which aims at an uninterrupted flow of sound. The commonest form of traditional *paritta* ceremony lasts one night, although there are versions lasting up to a week. Another common version consists of the first three texts of the full form: the *Maṅgala Sutta*, the *Ratana Sutta*, and the *Metta Sutta*, poems from the canonical *Suttanipāta*. Every monk must know these three texts by heart. At traditional *paritta* ceremonies the chanting endows thread and water with protective properties, and laypeople afterwards wear pieces of the sanctified thread as amulets.

Cyclical Ceremonies. The only life crisis solemnized by monks is death, unless we choose to regard the Burmese temporary ordination of boys as a puberty rite, which is not how the Burmese see it. Birth and marriage are themselves secular events, even if on these and other important occasions Buddhists naturally tend to make merit and seek religious edification. Monks must officiate at funerals; there is always a sermon, and the preacher is given cloth to use for robes, a surrogate for the shroud which was originally declared suitable stuff for a monk's robe. Death rites do not end at the funeral. The bereaved family must subsequently invite monks to

be fed and to preach, and transfer the merit to the newly dead, in case he has been reborn as a hungry ghost (*peta*) who can only accomplish good (and so hasten to a better life) by empathizing with this merit. Sinhala Buddhists give a *dānē* after a period of seven days, again after three months, and then annually following a death; the ceremony at three months is normally a major occasion with *paritta* chanting all night.

Buddhist calendrical rituals vary greatly from country to country, even among Theravādins. All Theravādins regard the full moon of Visākha, which falls in late May or early June, as the anniversary of the Buddha's birth, enlightenment, and death; it is the Enlightenment which is the most commemorated. But in Burma that festival is far less important than the end of the rains retreat. The monastic rains retreat takes three months, and its beginning and end are marked by important festivals. During the three months, no monk is to be away for more than seven days from the monastery where he began the retreat. During the month after the retreat there is a major ceremony at which one monk in each monastery, chosen by the incumbent, is presented by the laity with a special robe, the *kaṭhina* robe. The *kaṭhina* ceremony is the only calendrical ceremony involving the laity for which there is authority in the Pali canon.

Monks play a part in lay festivals but also have private observances, which are much more important to them. Every fortnight, on the *uposatha* days of the new and full moons, the monks are enjoined to gather to recite their disciplinary code, the *Pātimokkha*, after first confessing to one another their transgressions against it. A special ceremony of this kind, the *Pavāraṇā*, is held at the end of the rains retreat; then the monks ask one another's forgiveness for any offense they may have caused. Higher ordination ceremonies are crucially important to the order.

Sacred Objects. Since Buddhists know that the Buddha is dead but wish that he were alive to help them, it is not surprising that they worship relics, objects which help to bridge the gap between his physical absence and his psychological presence. Relics are traditionally classified into three groups, in descending order of holiness: (1) physical parts of the Buddha or other saints; (2) objects used by the Buddha; (3) reminders of him. By a slight extension, places associated with his life are categorized along with objects used by him, and form the major centers of pilgrimage. The most common "object used" is a Bodhi Tree; others are the Buddha's robes and begging bowl. The Buddha's physical remains were put under burial mounds, known as stupas. Stupas usually serve to enshrine a physical relic. Their mere shape, however, makes them reminders, or what we might call

visual symbols. A Buddha image is also a reminder relic, although it may contain physical remains as well. Scriptural texts, too, are sacred objects, perhaps because they embody the Dhamma, since, as the Buddha said, "He who sees the Dhamma sees me" (*Samyutta Nikāya* 3.120). Such texts are sometimes enshrined in stupas like physical relics. The offerings most commonly placed before relics are flowers, incense, and lights. [See Stupa Worship.]

Thai Buddhists commonly wear amulets, made by respected monks to bring safety and prosperity, or such sanctified objects as *paritta* thread, mentioned above. The sacredness of such objects derives from their association with a monk, better still a saint (*arahant*), best of all the Buddha. The main objects of veneration, both in theory and practice, are the monks themselves; even the most unworthy monk is a "son of the Buddha" and symbolizes Buddhist ideals.

[See also Saṃgha, overview article; Pūjā, article on Buddhist Pūjā; Pilgrimage, article on Buddhist Pilgrimage in South and Southeast Asia; and Buddhist Religious Year.]

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RICHARD F. GOMBRICH

Buddhist Cultic Life in East Asia

The abundance of rituals, ceremonies, and special observances among the great variety of schools and traditions of East Asian Buddhism precludes all but the most cursory survey of their cultic life, but for our purposes we may outline cultic practices under three major headings: those that are limited to, or primarily observed by, the clergy, generally in a monastic setting; those that involve lay participation and the wider public; and those that originated in Buddhist institutions but are now secularized. Although the practices I shall describe are more or less common to all East Asia countries, this article will focus on Japan, which has retained many of the traditional forms of Buddhist cultic life and remains the most active East Asian Buddhist culture.

Among the first group of cultic practices found among the monastic and priestly communities are rituals of ordination, accession ceremonies, religious disciplines (such as meditative and contemplative practices), monastic rituals (governing all aspects of the lives of the order), worship services, commemorative rituals, funeral and memorial rites, formalized lectures and debates, and Tantric rituals such as the *goma* and *kanjō* (consecration rites). Various other premodern observances expressed the Buddhist worldview. These rituals included ceremonies for the freeing of captured animals, prayer services for the imperial household, for peace, and for the prosperity of the state, observance of imperial birthdays, and rites of exorcism in times of danger to the person or the community.

Included in the second group of practices, those that involve mass participation and frequently integrate folk beliefs and local customs, are such cultic events as the New Year service and the midsummer Ullambana festival (sometimes referred to as All Souls' Day); the celebrations relating to the life of Śākyamuni Buddha—his birthday, his enlightenment, and his decease, or *parinirvāṇa*; vegetarian feasts and the honoring of Buddha relics; the observance of the spring and autumn equinoxes (primarily in Japan); the commemoration of the birth and death anniversaries of the Buddha, founders and successive masters of schools or lineages; daily home services before the family altar; wedding ceremonies, funerals, and memorial services; the taking of the formal vows of Buddhist life; the copying of scriptures and Buddha images and the sculpting of Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* as meritorious acts; pilgrimages and processions, and so on.

Among the third group are ritual traditions that originated in or were intimately connected with Buddhist institutions but have only nominal relations with them today: dance, theater, ballads, the arts of the tea cere-

mony and flower arranging, calligraphy, archery, and so forth. In this category we must also include the time-honored social practice (called *senbetsu* in Japanese) of giving envelopes containing money when a person leaves home on a voyage or for a more permanent sojourn, and a similar practice on occasions of marriage, birth, and death. This custom, emphasizing mutual help in times of need, is based on the Buddhist teaching of the interrelationship and interconnectedness of all life.

In many of these religious rituals the cultic ritual of chanting the scriptures is a central practice. The chanting of scriptures, chosen to suit the particular school and the occasion, fulfills several important functions: praise of the virtues of the Buddha and his teachings, expression of gratitude to the Buddha and all beings that make possible the deliverance from *saṃsāra*, repentance for past evils (which may be a separate ritual service by itself), the vow to attain supreme enlightenment, the celebration of the *dharma* lineage, and the wish to share the accumulated merits of religious practice with all beings on the Buddhist path. Functionally, the chanting intoned in various melodic and rhythmic patterns and punctuated with musical instruments—gongs, bells, wooden clappers, wind instruments, and so forth—creates the atmosphere of sacred space and time, preparing the participants to enter a religious mode of being.

No study of cultic rituals would be complete without mentioning the religious implements and icons used. These include the primary objects of worship—images in sculpture or painting of Buddhas, *bodhisattvas*, protective guardians, founding masters and their successors, as well as sacred tablets or scrolls with names of Buddhas or *bodhisattvas* or with *mantras* written on them—and symbolic implements, such as the stupa or pagoda, the wheel of *dharma*, and various kinds of reliquaries, denoting the presence of the Buddha. The altar generally holds the standard implements of religious worship. The home altar has a set of three implements: a candle holder, a flower vase, and a censer. In temples, the altar holds a set of five implements: a pair of candle holders, a pair of vases, and a censer. The candle symbolizes the wisdom of enlightenment, the flower, impermanence, and the incense, purification. Fruits, rice, and vegetables are offerings made as expressions of gratitude.

The rules and regulations concerning the proper array of the clerical robe in accordance with ecclesiastical rank and religious occasion are also important aspects of ritual life. There are also religious implements that are unique to particular schools: the almsbowl and fly whisk (*hossu*), among other items, in Zen; the single-

and three-pronged *vajra* and five-pronged *vajra* bell in Shingon; and extensive use of the rosary (*nenju*) in the Pure Land schools. We must also note the importance of the different musical instruments used especially to accompany chanting: gongs, bells, drums, wind and string instruments, and the *mokugyo*, the fish-shaped drum of hollow wood.

The range, variety, and complexity of Buddhist cultic practices limit our discussion to only a few selected examples of the major rituals (referred to by their Japanese names, since they are still observed today by the people). Unlike the Judeo-Christian tradition, which holds weekly religious services, the Buddhist life centers around annual and seasonal rites. While some are common to all schools of Buddhism, each school retains its own particular rituals and festivals. Many of them are observed both at temples and homes, and some on a national scale.

Common to all the various schools of Buddhism are the celebrations of the three major events in the life of Śākyamuni Buddha—birth, enlightenment, and death. These are held on different days in countries dominated by Mahāyāna Buddhism, unlike the Wesak observance in the Theravāda tradition, which combines all three major events of the Buddha's life into a single religious holiday in May. The birthday celebration of the Buddha, which is known under a variety of names (Kanbutsu-e, Kōtan-e, Busshō-e), is said to have begun as early as the fourth century in China. The Chinese pilgrim Fa-hsien, who left China for India in 399 and returned in 414, reported seeing this event during his travels in Magadha and Khotan. Traditionally, it was held on the eighth day of the fourth lunar month as part of the monastic rituals. At one time it was elevated to an imperial ceremony in both China and Japan and at other times it was held in individual homes. Today it is observed on 8 April by the clergy and laity alike. The central altar is a flower-bedecked shrine, especially made for the occasion, with a figure of the infant Śākyamuni standing in a basin of sweet tea. The shrine, covered with spring flowers, symbolizes the garden of Lumbini, where the Buddha was born. The standing figure with one hand pointing to the heavens and the other to the earth depicts the legend surrounding the Buddha's birth, in which he is said to have taken seven steps to the east and proclaimed to the world, "Heavens above, heavens below, I alone am the World-Honored One." At that time, the legend continues, the earth shook, beautiful music resounded throughout the universe, and flower petals and sweet tea rained from the sky. Following the procession of monks or priests and the chanting of *sūtras*, the believers, both young and

old, bow in obeisance to the Buddha image, pour sweet tea over it with a ladle, and receive flowers and sip sweet tea.

Local variations on this basic ritual include simultaneous lantern festivals, the drinking of the sweet tea made from herbs (thought to have a beneficial effect), prayer ceremonies for children's health and well-being, and the use of sweet tea to make ink for writing amulets as preventives against calamity. Basically, the birthday celebration is a festive occasion, a time for joyful springtime celebration, coinciding with the beginning of the agricultural cycle. Thus, in contemporary Japan it is referred to as the Festival of Flowers (Hanamatsuri). In some temples processions led by a white elephant (usually simulated on a float) carrying the flower-bedecked altar go through the village and towns, a legacy of ancient Indian practice.

The observance marking the Buddha's attainment of enlightenment (Jōdo-e), generally held on 8 December, is a far more solemn occasion. A religious service is held in remembrance of the Buddha's renunciation of the extremes of hedonism and asceticism and his forty-nine-day meditation under the Bodhi Tree that culminated in his supreme enlightenment. On occasion the painting depicting the Buddha descending a mountain (signifying his abandonment of asceticism) is shown as a reminder of the event. The Zen tradition holds an intensive training period, called *rōhatsu daisesshin*, from 1 through 8 December, emulating the enlightenment experience of Śākyamuni Buddha and culminating in an all-night sitting until the dawn of 8 December. A typical *sesshin* begins at 2:00 or 3:00 A.M. and is followed by a lengthy chanting service, alternate sitting and walking meditations throughout the day, mid-afternoon tea, lecture or *teishō* ("presentation of inner meaning"), and private interviews with the master, and meals. The sitting, eating, and sleeping are generally all observed on the mat (*tan*) assigned to the practitioner. The seven-day period is said to be the ideal length to take care of the successive and alternating moods of eagerness, dejection, doubt, boredom, resignation, and elation. The December training session is the most rigorous of all the *sesshin* held throughout the year.

The anniversary of the death of the Buddha, his *parinirvāṇa*, was traditionally commemorated on the fifteenth day of the second lunar month. The ritual, known as Nehan-e, was observed in India by the great pilgrim Hsüan-tsang (596–664), and in China it was held under imperial auspices as early as the sixth century, during the Liang (502–557) and Ch'en (557–589) dynasties. In Japan it is first mentioned during the reign of the empress Suiko, also in the sixth century. Today,

it is observed on 15 February or 15 March. The ritual centers on the huge painting of the Buddha's deathbed scene: the reclining Buddha lies peacefully on his right side, surrounded by waiting monks and nuns with animals and birds of the forest forming the background. In some monasteries the cremation ceremony of Śākyamuni Buddha is reenacted, and the Buddha's last sermon is chanted as a regular part of the service.

All the above observances began in the monastic setting; later they were patronized by some imperial powers, and in more recent centuries they included participation of the lay public. Among the most popular of the rituals primarily for the laity is the Ullambana festival, known in Japan as Obon. Observed on 13–16 July, and sometimes in August, it began in the sixth century in China and soon after was introduced to Japan, where it incorporated many folk beliefs and local customs. At one time it was considered the most important Buddhist ritual sponsored by the state; an emperor would often order all the monasteries of the land to give lectures on the *Ullambana Sūtra* in honor of seven past generations of parents. The origin of the Ullambana ceremony is found in the legend of Moggallāna (Skt., Maudgalyāyana), who through transcendental vision saw his mother suffering in Avīci hell. In order to save her he followed the advice of Śākyamuni Buddha and practiced charity by feeding hundreds of monks. Through this selfless act, he was able to save his mother. Moggal's deed is extolled as a model of filial piety. In the major temples the ceremony was used to publicly display rare possessions, and frequently dramatic performances were held for the laity.

Today, the main purpose of Ullambana is to remember the dead and to honor the ancestors. Buddhist household altars are prepared to receive the spirits of the dead, and the family graves are cleaned and flowers newly placed. Belief in the returning spirits is not Buddhist but originates in folk religion. In some areas bonfires are made to serve as beacons for the visiting spirits; in other areas the seasonal flowers placed before the graves are thought to carry spirits with them; in still others, dragonflies are believed to be carriers of the dead spirits. During Ullambana, colorful dances with drums, singing, and lanterns entertain the returning spirits. These dances originated with the *odori nembutsu* (dancing while calling on the name of Amida Buddha) of the Heian period (794–1185). Among some sects, the spirits of the dead are sent off in miniature sailboats, carrying candles, into the rivers and oceans. The Obon festivals held throughout Japan today are concluded with dancing around a temporary tower holding singers and drummers. Handclapping, drums, gongs, flutes,

and *shamisen* provide the rhythm and music. The local variations of Obon dances, which have become folk dances, are numerous and diverse. While much of the content of the Ullambana festival is non-Buddhist in origin, today the clergy holds services in both temples and homes and, while the chanting of *sūtras* and the remembrance of the dead is the primary ritual, the occasion is also used to instruct the people in the Buddha's teaching.

Another equally popular ritual, unique to Japanese Buddhism, is the Higan-e, the observance of the spring and autumn equinoxes. That it has become so much a part of the ritual life of the people is evident in the popular saying, "Winter cold and summer heat end at *higan* (the spring and winter equinoxes)." Originating in the Heian period, the Higan-e is observed for the three days before and after the equinox. The number of days of observance is said to have been based upon the six perfections (*pāramitās*)—giving, observance of the precepts, perseverance, effort, meditation, and wisdom—needed before one goes from this shore of *saṃsāra* to the further shore of *nirvāṇa* (the literal meaning of *higan* is "other shore"). The ritual includes repentance of past sins and prays for enlightenment in the next life. It also includes the remembrance of the dead and visits to the family graves. In some cases pictorial representation of hells are displayed, sermons on hell and paradise are given, and the people are exhorted to aspire to the Pure Land. The offerings for the services, including sweets, rice, vegetables, and so forth, are distributed to the congregation, friends, and neighbors. As with the Ullambana festival, the spring and autumn equinoxes are occasions for the clergy to hold services in private homes. It is thought that the spring and winter equinoxes, being the most temperate times of the year, are ideal moments to reflect on the meaning of life and hear the teaching of the Buddha.

Another popular Buddhist ritual is the New Year service. Special religious ceremonies are held close to midnight on New Year's Eve and early on the morning of New Year's Day. At midnight the temple gongs are struck 108 times, signifying the 108 kinds of blind passions (Skt., *kleśas*) that must be purified in the coming year. The New Year's Day service (Shūshō-e) was one of the most important observances in the imperial household in the Nara period (710–795). Although Shintō in origin and nature, it has become part of the Buddhist tradition, and in the temples it remains the first important ritual of the New Year. The service is held to express gratitude for the past year and to resolve to walk the Buddhist path in the coming year. It includes prayers for good health, success, and long life.

An important influence in the lives of East Asian peoples was the introduction of Buddhist funeral rites. After the advent of Buddhism, a number of rituals were observed to express gratitude to the dead, to console the spirits, and to channel the grief of the family and turn their thoughts to enlightenment. Funerary rites include the bedside service, wake, funeral, and cremation, as well as a series of memorial observances on the seventh, thirty-fifth, forty-ninth, and one-hundredth days, on the first, third, seventh, thirteenth, seventeenth, thirty-third, fiftieth, and one-hundredth years, and so on (some differences exist between the Chinese and Japanese practices). The determination of the memorial days and years is derived from a mixture of Buddhist ideas and ancestor worship. The most important of the memorial days is the forty-ninth, which, according to legend, is the length of time the spirit of the dead wanders before finding its final resting place.

When a person dies, the "last water" is applied to moisten the lips, the body is bathed and properly clothed, in some cases a knife is placed on the body to drive away evil spirits, and the wake service is observed. A posthumous Buddhist name is given to the deceased, a memorial tablet is placed on the altar, and people gather to present "incense money" (*kōden*) in memory of the deceased. This is an expression of mutual aid in times of distress and a demonstration of solidarity among relatives, friends, and neighbors. The funeral service consists of *sūtra* chanting, remembering and honoring the deceased, offering incense, and, as the conclusion to the rite, a vegetarian dinner during which sake and tea are served.

Major religious observances related to the funeral rites are found in the commemorative services for the founders and successive heads of each Buddhist school (birthday commemorations are also very important). The anniversaries observed every fifty or one hundred years are considered the most significant. These are occasions to renew one's commitment to the heritage, undertake the renovation of temple buildings, hold elaborate and colorful ceremonies, express gratitude to the teachers, and strengthen ties among the believers. An example of such a commemorative service is the case of Shinran (1173–1262), the founder of the Jōdo Shinshū branch of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism, whose seven-hundredth memorial anniversary was observed in 1962 and his eight-hundredth birthday celebration in 1973. Today there are ten subschools of Jōdo Shinshū, the largest being the Hompa Honganji, also known as Nishi Honganji, whose headquarters is in Kyoto, Japan. A monthly memorial service is held on the sixteenth day of each month, and in the Hompa Honganji a service,

called Hōonko, is held every year from 9 January through 16 January to honor Shinran. (This service is held from 21 through 28 November in the Higashi Honganji subschool). During Hōonko, members congregate in their respective temples for a seven-day period of religious services, consisting of chanting verses from Shinran's writings (*Shōshinge*), reading Shinran's biography (*Godenshō*), listening to sermons, and receiving the epistles of Rennyō, the eighth successor to Shinran and the principal preserver of the tradition. Traditionally, the followers ate only vegetarian meals for the seven days; in some areas all the shops were closed for the duration, since people went to the temples for services in the morning, afternoon, and evening and took some of their meals together there. As the most significant religious observance for Jōdo Shinshū believers, the memorial service is held not only to honor the founder, but to reestablish his religious message. Thus, devotees engage in praising the virtues of Amida (Skt., Amitābha) Buddha, listening to and discussing the teaching, and praying for the well-being of all people.

The true significance of Hōonko should be understood in the context of the historical evolution of Pure Land Buddhism. As early as the fifth century, Pure Land rituals consisted of five observances: worship, praise of Amida Buddha's virtues, aspiring for birth in the Pure Land, contemplative insight into reality, and turning over one's accumulated merit to all beings. The first three observances were elaborations of *samatha* (preparation for meditation), and the fourth was the equivalent of *vipassyanā* (insight into reality), which was the primary goal of the religious life. It was T'an-luan (475–542) who developed the basis of Pure Land thought centered around this fivefold practice.

Shan-tao (613–681) modified the ritual into the five true practices: (1) chanting and reading scriptures, (2) contemplation and meditation, (3) worship, (4) recitation of the name of Amida Buddha, and (5) praise consisting of obeisance as bodily act, singing as verbal act, meditation as mental act, aspiring to birth in the Pure Land, and transferring merits to all beings. For Shan-tao, the most important was the fourth, the recitation of the name of Amida.

By the time of Hōnen (1133–1212) in Japan the exclusive recitation of Amida's name (the Nembutsu) became the one and only practice of Pure Land Buddhists. For Shinran, the saying of the Nembutsu included the praise of Amida's view of salvation, gratitude for its blessings, repentance for one's karmic evil, wish for birth in the Pure Land, and prayer for the well-being of all people. Thus, in the Hōonko service the Nembutsu flows spontaneously from the lips of the faithful

throughout the seven-day observance, like ocean waves rising and falling as the religious mood dictates.

In Jōdo Shinshū the entire ritual act of the believer, then, is to be contained in the recitation of the Nembutsu. Being a simple act, albeit expressing profound depths, it can be practiced by anyone, at any time, and under any circumstances. The primary goal of the Buddhist life, to sanctify everyday existence, is thus realized in this simple utterance.

Such is the ultimate goal of all Buddhist cultic life—celebrating this life and affirming its value—not only in Jōdo Shinshū but also in Zen, Nichiren, Shingon, and other schools. In Zen Buddhism the emphasis is not on the *satori* experience but rather its manifestation in “everyday mind,” whether chopping wood or carrying water; in the Nichiren school this life is the arena of *bodhisattva* activity, calling for the transformation of the world, following the ideals of the *Lotus Sutra*; and in Shingon Buddhism one cherishes the five elements that constitute the universe—earth, fire, water, ether, and space—as the very body of the Buddha.

There are many other cultic practices that should be discussed, but space will permit us to mention only a few significant ones. A four-fold *samādhi* (meditation, trance) practice, originating in Chinese T'ien-t'ai and transmitted in Japanese Tendai, incorporated (1) sitting meditation, (2) chanting the name of Amitābha in circumambulation of the meditation area, (3) contemplation based on the *Dhāraṇī* and *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtras*, and (4) forms of meditative practice other than the preceding. The first influenced the formation of Zen, the second, the practices of Pure Land Buddhism, and the third came to be intimately connected with Shingon. Rituals of repentance, important in Tendai and Zen, among others, remind the practitioners of past and potential karmic sins. Shingon and Tendai Esoteric traditions, Tōmitsu and Taimitsu respectively, utilize sacred syllables (*mantra*), symbolic gestures (*mudrā*), and the cosmogram (*maṇḍala*), the essential characteristics of each handed down in secret oral transmission. The time-honored ritual of *sūtra* copying (*shakyō*), still popular among Jōdo, Shingon, and Tendai followers, is undertaken to bring repose to the spirits of the dead, accumulate merit for the practitioner, and deepen faith in the *sūtra* copied. Pilgrimages to holy sites, centered around the cult of Kōbō Daishi (Kūkai), founder of Shingon, have become a folk religious practice aimed at purifying the senses, cultivating self-awareness, and bringing a person closer to nature.

[See also Buddhist Religious Year; Meditation, *article on Buddhist Meditation*; Nien-fo; and Priesthood, *article on Buddhist Priesthood*. *The interrelationship of Bud-*

dhist practice and the fine arts and architecture in East Asia is treated in Drama, article on East Asian Dance and Theater; Music, articles on Music and Religion in China, Korea, and Tibet and Music and Religion in Japan; and Temples, article on Buddhist Temple Compounds.]

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TAITETSU UNNO

Buddhist Cultic Life in Tibet

Traditional Tibetan religion, which exiled Tibetans still practice in the Himalayas, can be considered at once primitive, medieval, and modern. It is primitive in the sense that the majority of Tibetans believe in a supernatural order that animates natural phenomena at all levels. It can be considered medieval because the sacred subculture of monasticism still flourishes, and it is modern in the sense that since the mid-seventeenth century it has been vigorously nationalistic, centering its national life on a fully elaborated cult of the state. Calling itself the "integration of the Three Vehicles"—the monastic (*Hīna-*), messianic (*Mahā-*), and apocalyptic (*Vajra-*) Vehicles (*yāna*)—Tibetan Buddhism is a continuation of the form of Buddhism that gradually developed over fifteen hundred years in India. The Indian masters who came to Tibet as missionaries followed their usual practice of preserving the folk traditions they encountered, keeping them within "cultural sight" and symbolically incorporating them, in modified form, into the Buddhist universe. This Buddhist missionary strategy, variously described as assimilation, amalgamation, and syncretism, can be better understood as a process of transformation or transvaluation by which an old religious form is symbolically sublimated and directed to a new end.

Before Buddhist missionaries reached Tibet, the Žaṅ-žun empire of western Tibet and Sinkiang followed the Bon religion, an amalgamation of Inner Asian religious ideas and, perhaps, Zoroastrianism and shamanism. When Buddhism began to flourish in Tibet, Bon adapted numerous Buddhist doctrines and institutions to its own ends. Following the early Tibetan Buddhist (later called the Rñiñ-ma-pa) scheme of "nine vehicles"—the three traditional vehicles (Monk, Hermit, and Bodhisattva) and six Tantric vehicles (Action, Performance, Yoga, and Great, Greater, and Ultimate Tantras)—Bon developed its own scheme of Nine Vehicles. The Bon vehicles either syncretized and systematized the shamanistic practices of ancient Tibet or mirrored the Buddhist vehicles. [See Bon.]

Tibetan Buddhists sharply distinguish between their cultic life and that of Bon. They have also attempted systematically to suppress shamanism, which they consider misguided, tribalistic, and violent. Certain Tibetan Buddhist rituals, however, are related to the first four shamanistic Bon vehicles: Oracle Priest, Visionary Priest, Magician, and Healer. But there are basic differences in the Tibetan Buddhist attitude toward, and the practice and content of, such rituals, which they considered mundane rather than religious. For example, because of their doctrine of transmigration and its concomitant respect for animal life, the Buddhists do not engage in blood sacrifice. In place of animals they use ritual cakes and effigies as sacrificial offerings.

While the Tibetan Buddhists believe in all the ancient gods of their nation and the numerous spirits of the land, sky, and underworld, they consider them to be fellow wanderers in *saṃsāra*. They take the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* much more seriously. Especially revered are the "precious incarnate lamas," who are considered the human incarnations and quintessential representatives of the Buddha and *bodhisattvas*. Thus, their faith is rooted in the historical presence of the Buddha Śākyamuni, his life teachings, and the monastic community (i.e., the Three Refuges); it flourishes by focusing on the celestial Tantric emanations of Śākyamuni, especially on the "terrific tutelaries" (such as Yamantaka and Hayagrīva); and the angelic *bodhisattvas*, especially Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Vajrapāṇi, and Tārā in all her forms; it culminates in their enjoyment of the presence of the Incarnations, especially the Dalai Lama. [See Avalokiteśvara; Mañjuśrī; Tārā; and Dalai Lama.]

The Tibetan mythic universe centers on the cycle of the *bodhisattva* of great compassion, Avalokiteśvara, who is believed to protect and cultivate the Tibetan nation. Most Tibetans firmly rely on his immanent presence in history. The great Dharma kings of Tibet—for example, the sixth-century monarch Sroñ-bstan-sgam-

po and, more recently, the Dalai Lamas—are considered his incarnations. Geographically, the city of Lhasa, with its Jo-khañ Monastery built by Sroñ-bstan, is the center of the blessed field of Avalokiteśvara, but the *bodhisattva's* most outstanding architectural symbol is the Potala Palace. This seventeenth-century palace, which stands on Red Mountain overlooking Lhasa, serves as an iconic memorial of the special covenant between the compassionate messiah and his people. All Tibetan Buddhist domestic shrines have a picture of this monumental edifice. The Potala, an ancient Inner Asian fort, a tomb for ancient kings, a temple, monastery, royal palace, and government bureaucracy, is also a *maṇḍala*—a heavenly palace of the perfect, pure land of the *bodhisattva* on earth. Inside, the ritual gateways to numerous other divine *maṇḍalas*/universes are simultaneously upheld. The building itself is an excellent example of the complexities of the Tibetan faith.

According to the Tibetan Buddhist idea of spiritual evolution, two stores—the store of merit and the store of wisdom—must be gathered for a person to advance toward better rebirths and eventual Buddhahood. The simple person mainly concentrates on merit while vicariously gathering wisdom by supporting those who pursue study, reflection, and contemplation in order to gain wisdom. Merit can be accumulated by body, speech, and mind as these evolve toward the evolutionary consummation of body, speech, and mind that is Buddhahood. An important religious act of Tibetan laity and monastics is pilgrimage to, and circumambulation of, sacred sites. For Tibetans from all walks of life, the Potala and Lhasa are the hub of this devotional movement. [See also Merit, *article on Buddhist Concepts*, and Pilgrimage, *article on Tibetan Pilgrimage*.]

The basic Tibetan religious service, whether one of solitary contemplation or public ritual, has seven branches: prostration/refuge, sacrifice/offering, confession/absolution, congratulation of others' merit, invocation of Buddhas to teach, prayer for the continuing presence of enlightened beings, and dedication of merit to benefit all beings. Tibetan pilgrims often spend months circumambulating Lhasa and the Potala, prostrating themselves in the road once every step, reciting their prayers, which they dramatize by making ritual gestures, and focusing their minds on the presence of the living messiah in his mansion. When not on pilgrimage, Tibetans chant the *mantra* wheel of the *bodhisattva*, his "heart *mantra*," "Om̐ mani padme hūṃ," keeping the rhythm of their work or motion or following their fingers touring the 108-bead rosaries they carry. During these physical and verbal devotions, the mind is focused on simple devices of visualization, such as a luminous wheel of light made of the six syllables of

the *mantra*. As they recite, the Tibetans visualize it turning, radiating rainbow light rays that drive away evil and fill them and all other beings with bliss and peace. As a reminder of this they often carry a *mani* prayer wheel. Tibetans also erect stupa monuments to represent the Buddha's mind, commission the printing and reading of texts to honor the Buddha's speech, and commission icons and statues to commemorate his body.

The monastics have other important ceremonies: rituals of ordination (for novices and fully ordained monks or nuns), monthly rituals of purification, summertime rituals of retreat, and rituals of accession to higher ranks and offices within the monastic hierarchy. In the Dge-lugs-pa, the largest Tibetan monastic order, a whole series of stages relate to education, practice, and attainment. For example, certain practices and fields of study, which take about twenty years, lead to the *dge-bśes* (*geshe*) degree. This is followed by passage into the nine-year program of the Tantric colleges, where the Esoteric study and practice intensify until one reaches the Vajra Master stage, involving a lengthy retreat. [See Dge-lugs-pa.] Then there is the process of transmitting what one has mastered to younger monks—through teaching, debate, composition, and in the ceremonial setting of initiation. The clergy performs many functions for the laity: they administer the refuges, supervise the entrance into Buddhism or renewal of the faith, give the *bodhisattva* vows and precepts, and conduct purification rites. Monks also consult oracles, give advice, dispense medicine, and in extreme cases, exorcise malignant influences. [See Priesthood, *article on Buddhist Priesthood*.]

The monastic government, centered in the All-victorious Dga'-ldan Palace, originally in 'Bras-spuñs Monastery but since the seventeenth century located in the Potala, continually renews the sense of national millennium through a cycle of yearly festivals and performances. The most important of these is the Great Prayer Festival, held in Lhasa at the lunar new year in spring, from the new moon to the full moon of the first month. Founded in 1409 by Tsoñ-kha-pa, the festival commemorates the fortnight when Śākyamuni Buddha performed triumphal miracles at Śrāvastī. The keys to the city are handed over to the abbots of the major monasteries and the entire city becomes a monastery for the two weeks. If we recall that monasticism itself is an institutional form of millennialism, a microcosmic society wherein individuals and their relations have been sanctified into a "pure land" millennial quality of goodness, then we can recognize in this yearly festival a renewal of the millennial sense of nationhood Tibetans enjoy as the chosen people of Avalokiteśvara. During the first celebration of this festival, Tsoñ-kha-pa of-

ferred a heavenly crown and royal ornaments to the Śākyamuni image in the Jo-khañ Cathedral to symbolize Tibet's commitment to the vision of Śākyamuni's eternal presence on the subtle plane, affirming the apocalyptic core of Tibet's culture. [See *the biography of Tson-kha-pa*.] The fifth Dalai Lama and his colleagues and successors invested considerable effort in writing history, in sponsoring the national theater troupe, and in instituting fashions of dress connected with the national pageant, masquerade dances, butter-sculpture contests, and so on. They sought systematically to foster the cult of the nation as a link to the benevolent *bodhisattvas*, its service a form of the merit and altruism central to the religious practices of the monastic and messianic vehicles.

Many of the ritual practices that link the monastics to the laity are formalized in the three lower categories of Tantra: Action (Caryā), Performance (Kriyā) and Yoga Tantras. The important deities are the *bodhisattvas* Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Vajrapāṇi, Tārā, and Uṣṇiṣavijayā, and such protectors as Mahākāla and Śrīdevī. For the lama's own spiritual progress, he concentrates on the Unexcelled Yoga Tantras (Anuttarayoga Tantra), wherein the highest practices are taught and studied. The major cycles of these Tantras are Guhyasamāja, Cakrasaṃvara, Yamantaka, Hevajra, Haya-grīva, Vajrakīla, and Kālacakra. These tutelary forms of Buddha are at the core of the culture, key to the study, personal practice, realization, identity, and activity of the most learned lamas, the reincarnations who are central within the national cult.

In practice, the Unexcelled Yoga Tantras are divided into two stages: creation and perfection. The creation stage centers on the discipline of the imagination known as "purification of perception." Here the yogin systematically envisions a perfect self-identity and a perfect environment, training himself to enter at will a fully elaborated alternative reality, more or less heavenly in quality. Its sequence is called the "conversion into the Three Bodies." The ordinary life cycle of death, between-state (*antarābhava*), and birth/life is converted into the perfection of the Buddha bodies of Truth, Beatitude, and Emanation, respectively. When the yogin can completely withdraw from all perceptions of ordinariness into a universe of aesthetic perfection, the creation stage is over.

The perfection stage, with its six-branch or its five-stage (depending on the system) yoga, now begins. Here the yogin goes beyond merely imagining the death, between, and rebirth stages and enters into trance states during which outer breath ceases and the coarse five sense-consciousnesses are dissolved. He or she enters in-

ner, subtle states of death and bliss, with the subtle consciousness directed toward achieving a conscious ability to control the subtlest biological processes. The famous "six yogas of Nā-ro-pa"—those of heat, magic body, dream, between-state, clear light, and transference—all involve the yogic technology of the perfection stage.

Whatever the reality underlying the depth psychology of these Unexcelled Yoga Tantras, the highest Tibetan lamas are considered masters of the Tantras and regarded with awe. Most Tibetans are aware of the existence and nature of these yogas and believe that the lamas are able to master the death and rebirth process and will return, through reincarnation, to bless and guide their people. These Tantras also have elaborate liturgies for bringing to fruition religious aims in the world. The goals of the Tantras are called "accomplishments" (*siddhi*) and are classified as either transcendent or mundane. The "transcendent accomplishment" is simply Buddhahood, which automatically contains all lesser accomplishments. And the most important liturgical forms—such as the Esoteric anointment or initiation (*abhiṣeka*) rites—lead to this accomplishment. Elaborate rites are needed to construct the *maṇḍala* palace and to transform the ordinary body, speech, and mind of the initiate into divine, or Buddha, body, speech, and mind. The yogin carefully integrates the patterns of these rites and reenacts them later during contemplation.

There are also numerous rites, which we might call magical in nature, performed to attain mundane accomplishments. These rites fall into four main categories: (1) pacification rites (to pacify, bless, and heal); (2) augmentative rites (to increase lifespan and good luck and to generate bounty and wealth); (3) empowering rites (to enhance control of divine and human individual and social forces, to tame and discipline); and (4) terrific rites (to protect against evil and remove obstacles; exceptionally, these rites may involve the taking of sentient life).

Interestingly, the functions of the Bon vehicles of oracle, visionary, magician, and healing priests are here assumed by the highest Buddhist leaders within the transcendentalistic framework of one of the Anuttarayoga Tantra cycles. Oracular functions fit in the third category, visionary in the second, and magical in all but especially the fourth; life-enhancing functions belong to the first and second.

There are so many elaborate ceremonies that it is impossible to deal with them in any detail. One of these is linked to the cult of the state oracle maintained at the Gnās-chuñ Monastery, originally next to 'Bras-spūis

near Lhasa, and now rebuilt at Dharamsāla. Pe-har, Tibet's major tribal deity, was tamed by Padmasambhava, the eighth-century apocalyptic Buddhist missionary. He was not destroyed but was bound by oath to give up the sacrificial cult with which he was previously worshipped. Instead, he was to be offered the sacrifice of egotism by people devoted to the Buddhist Dharma; in exchange, he would protect and counsel them. Thus, a ritual connected to the cycle of Haya-grīva, the major terrific form of Avalokiteśvara, was created. It was performed by specially trained monks who would evoke Pe-har's chief "minister" angel, as the deity himself was too potent to be evoked safely. This angelic minister, Rdo-rje-drag-ldan, would possess one particular monk, able to serve as medium, who would then demonstrate supernormal powers to prove the presence of the deity and, more importantly, provide information to the state, respond to questions, give warnings of impending danger, and so on.

During every New Year festival, the oracle monk, dressed in ceremonial garb, is brought before the Dalai Lama in public. While in a trance state, he blesses the state and the people, stalks about among the ministers of state in case there are any unworthy ones, and, to roars of public approval, shoots a symbolic arrow at the heart of the scapegoat effigy in which all the evil of the previous year is magically entrapped. The effigy, made of butter and flour, is then burned in a spectacular bonfire.

This ceremony contains the most primordial energies from the deepest recesses of the Tibetan tribal consciousness, yet it is fully integrated with the national devotion to Buddhism. It expresses the Buddhist ideals of compassion, selflessness, national nonviolence, and persistence in the monastic disciplines, which have as their aim self-transformation—the highest possible end of human life.

[See also Buddhism, Schools of, *articles on Tibetan Buddhism and Esoteric Buddhism*; Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Tibet*; Tibetan Religions, *overview article*; and Maṇḍalas, *article on Buddhist Maṇḍalas*.]

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Hindu Cultic Life

Although there is great variety in the forms of cultic life in Hinduism, some common themes may be identified that characterize the general religious impulse behind their variety. One important theme is that of ritual enhancement: cultic practice aims at sustaining or improving the circumstances of the worshiper. These aims may be immediate and practical, such as the healing of disease, avoidance of the destructive influences of malevolent forces, fertility of crops, animals, and persons, and maintenance of family solidarity; or they may be more soteriological in character, such as the pursuit of liberation (*mokṣa*) from the bondage of rebirth. In this way, cultic life may be seen as a series of elaborate strategies for the enhancement of an individual's or group's situation as defined in terms of both worldly and transcendent goals.

A second theme centers on the ordering function of cultic life. Ceremonies frequently require the creation and/or maintenance of conditions of ritual purity. This purity may be temporary, brought about through bathing, cleaning, and providing substances deemed pure and religiously efficacious for the various rites, or it may be of a more permanent sort, such as the employment of members of castes, especially in their roles as priests, who are deemed sufficiently pure within the caste hierarchy to make their participation in cultic performances ritually effective.

A third theme is that of negotiation or exchange, in which cultic performances become occasions for giving human resources of food, gifts, and devotion to supernatural entities and powers in exchange for human well-being, which is understood to flow from those persons and powers as a consequence of the rite. While this negotiation process may have as its goal the pursuit of order and the existential enhancement of the worshiper, it may also involve episodes that are chaotic and/or playful.

The major forms of cultic practice in the Hindu tradition include sacrifice (*yajña*); ceremonies for the ancestors (*śrāddha*); life cycle rituals (*saṃskāra*); meditative or ascetic practices (*tapas*); worship of deities (*pūjā*); pilgrimage (*yātra*); personal vows (*vrata*); festivals and fairs (*utsava, melā*); sacred calendars (*pañcāṅga*); and religious healing or exorcism (*cikitsā*).

Some of these cultic practices have ancient textual warrants for their authority that date back to the period of the Vedas and that are perpetuated by members of the traditional priestly castes, especially brahmins. Others are preserved in oral tradition among castes and communities further removed from the ritual texts and practices of the traditional religious elite groups. In both cases, these cultic traditions rest on the assumptions of their participants that they possess long-standing authority and efficacy.

Sacrifice. As both the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, books of ritual instruction and commentary, attest, sacrifice (*yajña*) is among the earliest forms of cultic life. The sacrifices are distinguished in the later literature between those performed in temporarily constructed enclosures or in the open air for larger communities (the *śrauta*, lit. "solemn," rites) and those that are restricted to individual households and are performed indoors. At the center of Vedic sacrifice is the use of fire and the ritual transformation of the patron or sacrificer (*yajamāna*), who is given rebirth through the sacrifice into the world of the gods. Fire is personified as the god Agni, who mediates between the worlds of gods and humans and who is associated with the warmth of the world and its creatures. Priests who maintain sufficient purity act on behalf of the patron who sponsors the sacrifice and for whom the benefits of the rite accrue. The Vedic *śrauta* sacrifices frequently employed sixteen or seventeen brahmins in various specialized roles. The priests offered oblations of milk, butter, honey, grains, fruits, animals, water, and *soma*, the elixir of immortality (*amṛta*), along with recitations of *mantras*. The *śrauta* sacrifices included the Agnihotra, a relatively simple morning and evening series of offerings; the *Āsvamedha*, in which a horse roamed for a year to measure the boundaries of the kingdom and then was captured and sacrificed to the gods for the protection and well-being of the kingdom; the *Rājasuya*, which consecrated the king by putting him through a ritual rebirth that included the rebirth of the cosmos; and the *Agnicayana*, which reinvigorated the cosmos by constructing an altar of fire, feeding the gods offerings of divine drink, and providing a voice for divine speech through the sustained recitation of sacred formulas.

Usually a king or tribal leader served as the sponsor of such sacrifices on behalf of his clan and the world as a whole. In this way, the sacrifice had as a specific goal the enhancement of a particular individual and as a general goal, universal enhancement. The fire served as the symbol connecting personal, political, cosmological, and metaphysical understandings of the world through its capacity to serve as element, deity, animating power in all beings, and receptacle of offerings. These offerings

usually involved the blood sacrifice of animals and the brewing of *soma*, a beverage having hallucinogenic properties and believed to contain immortalizing power much desired by the gods. The aim of the *śrauta* rites was to reestablish or maintain the welfare of the universe. They provided food, long life, sons, cattle, and power; they did not seek to confer release from the world (*mokṣa*) but to sustain it in its optimal form. The sacrifice, with its fire at the center, served as the axis around which the cosmos, containing all that moves and does not move, journeyed through time and space. Since the Vedic period these rites have undergone gradual eclipse, and in the present day they are performed only occasionally by groups of brahmins who raise the funds for their performance through contributions.

Following similar patterns resting on the same religious beliefs and assumptions, the domestic (*gṛhya*) rituals articulated the religious concerns of people rooted in the world of family and kingdom. The head of the household served as the patron or sacrificer before the household fire by offering butter and grain cakes variously directed at the gods, ancestors, all beings, sages, and men, all of whom often appear in the guise of guests and beggars. These rites, along with the life-cycle rituals (*samśkāras*), continue to be performed by traditionalist brahmins. In addition, the Vedic tradition of sacrifice has had a profound influence over other forms of cultic life beyond the boundaries of Brahmanical practice, from temple worship to popular fairs and festivals. [See also Vedism and Brahmanism.]

Ancestor Rituals. The Śrāddha rites, or ceremonies performed for the dead, begin at the conclusion of the corpse's cremation. According to the textual traditions of the Gṛhyasūtras, which were contemporary with the Brāhmaṇas, the rites should last for a year, although twelve days as a symbolic year is the more common pattern. These Śrāddha rites continue to be performed among brahmins and other castes traditionally understood to be "twice-born" and therefore eligible for the benefits of Vedic rites and knowledge. After the eldest son, serving as the sacrificer, has ignited the cremation fire and the body is consumed, a temporary ritual body (*piṇḍa*) fashioned from cooked rice is assembled over a period of ten days. This body contains the ghost (*preta*) and serves as a receptacle for subsequent offerings, thus enabling the deceased to be nourished on the long journey to join the ancestors in the divine world. On the final day the assembled body is cut into three pieces and merged with *piṇḍas* representing the deceased's father, grandfather, and great-grandfather dwelling in the earth, atmosphere, and heavens, respectively. These rites establish the deceased harmoniously within their appropriate worlds and prevent them from becoming

hungry and haunting their living descendants. In this way the ceremony honors and serves the needs of the ancestors, seeks their influence within the world of the dead for the benefit of the living, and protects the living community from potential peril wrought by ancestors insufficiently sustained in their respective worlds.

Other ceremonies, performed on the new-moon day of each month, provide ritual veneration of the ancestors as part of the regular rhythms of the religious calendar. In these rites a brahman—and in some parts of India, a crow—represents the ancestor and receives offerings of *piṇḍas*, water, and sesame seeds from his descendants. Annually the descendants journey to sacred sites and rivers to have *piṇḍa* ceremonies performed. [See also Domestic Observances, *article on Hindu Practices.*]

Life-Cycle Rites. The literal meaning of *saṃskāra* is “refined” or “well-accomplished,” and thus the *saṃskāras*, or life-cycle rites, are directed at the ritual perfection or consecration of an individual at various moments in life. The traditional number of these rites varies with different texts and performance traditions, most of them having from twelve to sixteen rituals that might be performed throughout a person’s life. These include rites for auspicious conception, the birth of a son, safe delivery, birth (*Jātakarman*), naming the child, first solid food, first haircut, initiation into learning the Vedas (*Upanayana*), and first hearing of the sacred *Gāyatrī mantra*—thus marking the transition into the first of the four life stages (*āśramas*), namely, studentship (*brahmacarya*). The marriage rite (*Vivāha*) marks the onset of the second stage, that of the householder (*gṛhastha*). *Saṃskāra* performance calls for fire, offerings, and brahmans to receive the offerings that remain after the gods and ancestors have been honored.

Although today only a relatively few groups of brahmans maintain the *yajña* traditions, the larger patterns of Vedic sacrifice have continued to shape later cultic life. The sacrifice’s concern for achieving ultimate conceptual order and performative effectiveness found new voice in the speculative and ascetic traditions making use of a number of meditative techniques, the best-known of which is yoga. The concern for the constituency of the ancestors continued to be articulated in the *Śrāddha* rites, in which descendants construct new and purified bodies for the dead. The worship of the gods, which is not emphasized in yoga and *Śrāddha* practices, becomes highly developed in the tradition of *pūjā*, which makes use of permanent or disposable images of gods and goddesses. [See also Rites of Passage, *article on Hindu Rites.*]

Ascetic and Meditational Practices. The practice of sacrifice in ancient India yielded a tradition of speculation on the sources and meanings of the sacrifice itself.

The ritual commentaries (*Brāhmaṇas*) invited meditations on the homologies between elements of the sacrifice and those of the cosmos and the individual in order to identify that which lay at the source of all reality. Knowledge paralleled ritual exactitude as a source of power to participate in and even transcend profane time and space. The practice of asceticism (*tapas*) provided the moral, physical, psychological, and intellectual environment in which the one who knows the inner meanings of the sacrifice might achieve proximate or ultimate religious transformation. [See *Tapas.*]

Ascetic and meditational practice is probably the most ancient Hindu religious practice. Evidence from images and cylinder seals from the Indus Valley of the third millennium BCE suggests that ascetic practices were part of this pre-Vedic culture. As speculation about the homologies between the sacrifice and the *yajamāna* (patron or sacrificer) grew during the late Vedic and Brahmanic periods, the fire of the sacrifice became identified with the bodily warmth produced during prolonged periods of meditation. As an acquired skill resulting from intense practice, *tapas* was principally a technique for achieving power and therefore had no inherently moral quality; it became a means by which one might appropriate the creative heat that animates the Vedic fire and thereby direct its power toward one’s own ends. In the epic and Puranic traditions, gods and demons alike make use of ascetic practice in order to overpower or resist their opponents. As the internalization of the creative heat of the cosmos, *tapas* came to be recognized by virtually every religious and philosophical tradition in South Asia as a valuable or necessary component in the pursuit of both proximate and ultimate religious goals. The *Bhagavadgītā* classifies *tapas* according to its uses or goals; it recognizes the purpose of release from rebirth, which it considers to be a “pure” goal; the purpose of obtaining supernatural powers; and the purpose of increasing one’s enjoyment of worldly pleasures. These three goals are classified as *sattva* (“luminosity”), *rajas* (“energy”), and *tamas* (“inertia”), respectively.

The traditions of *tapas* that have been most systematically formulated are those of *rājayoga*, that is, the classical system of Yoga as taught by Patañjali; the controlling of bodily and mental states, or *haṭhayoga*; and the use of complex visual and aural symbolization drawing upon sexual and ritual imagery in order to achieve powerful and highly desirable religious experiences, or Tantra. As a form of *tapas*, Yoga draws upon ancient traditions of South and Central Asian shamanism in which trances were induced through strict regulation of diet, breathing, bodily movement, and autosuggestion in order to ascend into ecstatic states.

During the Upaniṣadic period (c. 800 BCE–200 CE) there emerged further systematic formulations that classified bodily and mental states in a finely distinguished hierarchy leading to *mokṣa* (release from rebirth) as its ultimate goal. One of the most important of these various meditational traditions found precise articulation by Patañjali in his *Yoga Sūtra*, written probably during the Gupta period (320–540 CE), with important later commentaries such as the sixteenth-century *Yogavārtika* of Vijñānabhikṣu. The social contexts of yogic cultic practice were small communities of ascetics assembled around a *guru* (“teacher”) who was highly regarded for his skills in the practice and for personal religious charisma. This classical formulation of Yoga remained largely compatible with Brahmanical orthodoxy and orthopraxis. [See also Yoga; Haṭhayoga; and the biography of Patañjali.]

The practice of asceticism found particular favor among sectarian devotees of Śiva, the mythological embodiment of ascetic power. This tradition combined the classical with the more esoteric and eroticized practices and postures of the non-Vedic traditions of Tantra.

Unlike the ascetic traditions of Brahmanic culture, which held sensory experience suspect and emphasized celibacy and the restraint of erotic impulses, Tantric practice pursued the senses by integrating erotic desire into ascetic transcendence. [See Tantrism, article on Hindu Tantrism.] Building on the techniques of *haṭha-yoga*, the *vāmamarga*, or “left-path”—indicating deviation from the “right-path,” or Brahmanic orthopraxis—provides for practitioners to become initiated into “circles” (*cakras*) in which males identify with Śiva and females with Śakti, his consort. While Vedic and Tantric *mantras* are chanted the adept heightens his or her sense experience by consuming *Cannabis sativa* followed by fish, meat, aphrodisiacs, and liquor, and by engaging in sexual union with the consort. The female practitioners, called *śaktis*, imitate the active role of the Goddess in the cosmos by initiating sexual union with the males who take the role of Śiva. By a highly stylized process the male adept simultaneously retrains his mind, his breath, and the flow of his semen. The intensity of these forms of control is understood to pull up the animating power of the universe (*kuṇḍalinī*) through the physical body into the subtle body and finally to merge with the Śiva-Śakti principles at the center of the cosmos. This experience is believed to result in a quick, though potentially quite dangerous, path to *mokṣa*. [See also *Kuṇḍalinī and Cakras*.]

Tantric practice and imagery inspired much of India’s erotic art, much of which is founded on the iconography of Śiva’s ithyphallic emblem (*liṅga*) located in the

center of Śakti’s “seat” or “vulva” (*pīṭhā*). By reversing the logic of orthoprax asceticism, which stressed renunciation of sensuality as the means of overcoming attachment to the world and its consequences for *karman* and suffering, Tantra exploited sensual experience and placed the practitioner in the midst of heightened sensuality, using its power for mystical ends. This radical reinterpretation of the traditions of *tapas* never won favor in the Brahmanical tradition, but remained a marginal movement. It did, however, influence temple cultic life, especially in South India. [See also *Samnyāsa*.]

Worship of Deities. Derived from the Sanskrit root meaning “honor” or “worship,” *pūjā* involves the ritual offerings of foods, service, and gestures of respect usually bestowed upon deities in their iconic forms. As a cultic tradition, *pūjā* appears to have emerged during the late Brahmanic period from the practice of honoring brahmans during their visits to the home. The practice then became amalgamated into later *bhakti*, or devotional Hinduism, through its classical textual formulation from the sixth century onward in ritual sections of the *Purāṇas*. Today, *pūjā* is one of the most pervasive forms of Hindu worship, and is observed with varying degrees of complexity by most Hindus. The enduring popularity of *pūjā* as a cultic undertaking may be in part its ability to combine elements of Vedic practice with popular religious sentiment.

Pūjās vary widely in ritual complexity, from simple offerings of sips of water, flowers, food, the recitation of *mantras*, the singing of devotional songs (*āratis*, *kīrtanas*), and the waving of lighted camphor before the image, to extended ritual episodes that draw on Vedic texts involving offering hospitality, invocations, bathing and dressing the image, and offering many kinds of foods, flowers, and leaves. The image of the deity is frequently made of perishable materials such as clay or wood, and may be brought ceremoniously into the home. It is placed in a part of the household set aside for the deity’s residence and then ritually enlivened by establishing in it vital breath (*prāṇapratiṣṭhā*). There it dwells as a living member of the household for a period of time and is then taken to a nearby river, temple tank, or ocean to be immersed, thereby dissolving back into its primal elements.

Similar patterns of hospitality and praise may be seen in *pūjās* performed in temples. The temple traditions rely heavily on the images and mythologies of divine kingship: the deity is the king or queen of the universe and the shrine is his or her palace. The temple images are periodically enthroned and taken in procession around the ritual boundaries of the kingdom, where they are seen and adored by multitudes of wor-

shippers. The priests perform the duties associated with *pūjā* in both large public settings and small private ones for client worshipers.

Central to the religious appeal of *pūjā* for many Hindus is the experience of *darśana* ("auspicious seeing"). When an image of a deity is prepared and placed on view in the home or temple, appropriately honored and attired in festive costume, the deity makes himself or herself available to be seen by worshipers. The deity "sees" them and extends his or her grace to them, tangibly in the form of *prasāda*, the sacred food that, having been offered to the god or goddess and thus become sanctified by its proximity to the deity, is now returned to the worshiper. At the same time, the deity is "seen" by the worshiper, thereby establishing a visual and personal moment of mutual religious contact. [See *Pūjā*, article on Hindu *Pūjā*.]

Pilgrimage. As with many other religious traditions, Hinduism has long valued visits to sacred places. These places are frequently associated with geographical features such as rivers (Gangotri, Allahabad, Banaras), places marking land's end (Kanya Kumārī, Rameśvaram, Dvarkā), and mountains (Bādrināth). Other shrines derive their sanctity from the deities who reside there, for example, Viṣṇu at Puri and Tirupati, Kṛṣṇa at Vṛndāvana, Śiva at Ujjain and Nāsik, the Goddess at Kāmakhya, Madurai, and Kālighaṭ. Some pilgrimage centers have appeal throughout the subcontinent, drawing pilgrims from upper classes and providing religious merit for those who journey the distance to receive the *darśana* of the deity enshrined there. Other centers are more regional, or local; they serve pilgrims from the more immediate areas and may have large constituencies from particular castes and groups of castes. The pan-Indian shrines are generally the centers for the "high gods and goddesses" of the Hindu pantheon who are celebrated in the Sanskrit lore of the epics and Purāṇas, whereas the regional and local shrines house deities whose lore is carried more commonly through oral and non-Sanskritic literary sources; these regional deities are, however, frequently associated with one of the "high gods." Pilgrimages (*yātra*) may be made at any time, but those undertaken in conjunction with sacred times in the religious year are understood to be particularly efficacious.

Pilgrims make the often arduous journey to shrines for many reasons: in order to honor the deity who lives there, to bring offerings, to celebrate the magnificent and heroic deeds performed there as told in the sacred lore of the shrine, to receive the deity's grace through the experience of *darśana*, or "beholding," to gain personal religious merit, to derive specific benefits such as

healing or the expiation of past misdeeds, or to enhance their personal status in their home communities when they return. Pilgrims often visit shrines as part of the performance of a vow (*vrata*) in which the pilgrimage becomes a gesture of gratitude given in exchange for benefits bestowed by the deity. Pilgrimages also serve as occasions in which Hindus temporarily move out of the hierarchical structures of home and village and enter into a more amorphous realm in which the pilgrims encounter one another as parts of a single generic religious community with the shrine as its symbolic center. Finally, pilgrimages to shrines serve as occasions for religious educations and microcosms of the religious life; they are journeys, at once personal and collective, through auspicious temporal and spatial contexts that enhance the devotees' religious appropriation of their lives. [See also Pilgrimage, article on Hindu Pilgrimage.]

Vows. A *vrata*, or vow, is a ritual practice undertaken for a specific length of time in order to achieve a particular goal. It is usually undertaken by an individual and may include various forms of renunciation, such as fasting, celibacy, and an increased intensity of religious awareness that usually takes the form of reciting stories (*kathā*). A *vrata kathā* ("vow story") can be either ancient or contemporary, and its purpose is to disclose the origin of the vow and its efficacy. As a form of cultic practice, *vrata* is more commonly observed by women, and is often directed toward goddesses. The aims to be achieved through their observance of *vratas* are often quite immediate and pragmatic: the birth of children, particularly sons; success in business and on examinations; abundant harvests; healing of illness; return of an errant spouse; and so forth. The *vrata* involves a basic exchange in which the devotee demonstrates her (or his) heightened religious devotion and faith which the deity receives as a gift and in which she or he delights. In return, if the deity is satisfied that the vow was pure in its intent and execution, she or he rewards the devotee according to the request made in the vow. In this way the tradition of *vrata* makes use of the Hindu renunciatory impulse in order to contribute to the maintenance and enhancement of the everyday world.

Fairs and Festivals. Just as nature passes through seasons of cold weather, heat, and the rains, Hindu religious life passes through seasons marked by various collective religious observances. Each deity has his or her own month or season. Which festivals are observed is shaped in some measure by caste and sectarian affiliation. In North India, for example, the religious year begins in the month of Caitra (March–April), with the first festival being Navarātri, or "Nine Nights," in honor of the Goddess. [See Navarātri.] As the hot season ap-

proaches the festival life takes on a more austere and ascetic character. It is the season for honoring the goddess Śītālā, the bringer of fever diseases. Her images are cooled with water in an effort to prevent her (and the cosmos she embodies) from becoming overheated and thus conveying fever to worshipers. The monsoon, occurring during the months of Āśādhā (June–July) and Śrāvaṇa (July–August), disrupts travel from place to place. It is the time when the various mendicants cease their pilgrimages and settle in shrines and hermitages for the rainy season to observe Cāturmāsya, or the “four-month” retreat. This period has its mythical parallel in Viṣṇu’s cosmic sleep. The full-moon night of the month of Āśādhā (June–July) is called Guru Pūrṇimā and is the time when Hindus pay homage to their religious teachers.

With the conclusion of the rainy season, festival life increases in intensity through the relatively cool and dry months that follow. The months of Śrāvaṇa (July–August) and Bhādrapada (August–September) are filled with religious fairs (*melās*) held at shrines and temples, where the images of the deities are displayed for worshipers to receive their *darśana* (auspicious viewing). *Melās* are also recreational and commercial occasions for merchants and traders to set up temporary booths and sell their wares. An important festival during the waxing fortnight of the month of Śrāvaṇa is Nāga Pañcamī (“serpent’s fifth”), because it falls on the fifth night of the fortnight. Snakes are particularly dangerous during the rainy season because the flooding forces them out of the subterranean holes in which they had taken refuge during the preceding hot, dry months. Although especially associated with Śiva, the veneration and propitiation of the serpent is acknowledged by Hindus from many different ranks. The full moon of the month of Śrāvaṇa is the occasion for the honoring of brothers and sisters in the celebration of Rakṣā Bandhana (“tying the amulet”), in which sisters tie elaborately decorated wrist-ornaments on their brothers.

The goddess Gaurī and the gods Gaṇeśa and Kṛṣṇa are celebrated during the month of Bhādrapada (August–September), followed in the fall season by the month of Āśvina (September–October) with the rituals of remembrance of the ancestors (Pitṛ Pakṣa) in which the annual Vedic *śrāddha* ceremonies are performed. This is followed by the second Navarātri, or nine-night worship of the Goddess, called Durgā Pūjā. Rāma is worshiped with sacred dramas and processions celebrating his victory over the demon Rāvaṇa. During the following month of Kārtika (October–November), the popular festival of Dīvālī, a Vaiṣṇava celebration particularly popular among merchant castes, marks an-

other year’s return of Lakṣmī, the goddess of wealth and good fortune. It is a time of housecleaning and refurbishing, the purchase of new clothing and cooking pots, and general renewal of life. It is a highly auspicious time in the Hindu year, and Hindus, especially in the north, celebrate it with great enthusiasm. [See Dīvālī.]

The cold season lasts through the months of Mārga-sīrṣa, Pauśa, and Māgha, and brings about a decrease in the rhythm of fair and festival activity. The sun is worshiped especially during this season, and it is a good time for Hindus to undertake pilgrimages to near or distant shrines. As the weather begins to warm again during the months of Phālguna (February–March) and Caitra (March–April) the major celebration is Mahāśivarātri (“great night of Śiva”), the principal festival in honor of the god Śiva. Kṛṣṇa, the erotic cowherd, is celebrated with the dionysian festival of Holī in which devotees dance, play pranks, and douse one another with colored water. Although the new year does not actually begin for another fortnight, Holī serves as the event of chaotic renewal that marks the end of the old year and begins the new year with appropriate exuberance. [See Holī.]

As classified and prescribed by the sacred calendar, the Hindu year provides a temporal structure for an array of religious moods and activities to take place. As one moves through the days and weeks of the year, various occasions—both solemn and raucous—affirm the many gods, goddesses, ancestors, and auspicious as well as inauspicious powers. As a totality of time, the religious calendar provides an eternal architecture through which time as the experience of irreversible duration may pass. Every year is new and different from the last, yet through the observances of sacred festivals and fairs each year is a repetition of the enduring and paradigmatic forms of religious experience and community life.

Sacred Calendars. The Hindu sacred calendar is called the Pañcāṅga (“five limbs”). It contains the temporal structure of opportunities for religious enhancement by identifying those segments of time that are appropriate for various undertakings, whether they be moments of auspicious power or moments of danger. The Hindu year is based on the twelve lunar months, which are slightly shorter than the solar months of the Western calendar. Each month is made up of two fifteen-day fortnights (*pakṣas*, “wings”). The first is the waning or dark (*kṛṣṇa*) fortnight moving toward the new moon night (*amāvāsyā*); the second is the waxing or bright (*śukla*) fortnight, which culminates in the full moon night (*pūrṇimā*). Each day of the month is thus described by its place in fortnight (e.g., “the fourth day in the bright fortnight”). Days occurring during the

bright half of the month are generally regarded as inherently auspicious, since time, like the moon, is moving toward fulfillment; days occurring during the dark or waning half of the month tend to be associated with danger and inauspiciousness and often call for more cautious behavior and an increase in asceticism. Since the lunar months are shorter than the solar, the calendar adds an extra month every two to three years to make it coincide with the solar calendar.

The lunar days and weeks move through cycles overseen by deities. For example, Sunday is ruled by the Sun (Ravi) and is therefore called Ravivāra; Monday is governed by the Moon (Soma) and is called Somavāra; Tuesday is overseen by Mars (Maṅgala) and is known as Mangalavāra; Wednesday, ruled by Mercury (Budha), is called Budhavāra; Thursday, ruled by Jupiter (Bṛhaspati), is called Bṛhaspativāra; Friday, ruled by Venus (Śukra), is called Śukravāra; and Saturday, ruled by Saturn (Śani), is called Śanivāra. The Pañcāṅga details the auspicious and inauspicious powers inherent in each lunar day (*tithi*). This information is useful to Hindus in planning new undertakings such as setting out on journeys, opening businesses, and, especially, performing weddings. Because time is not merely neutral duration but already carries with it certain identifiable—and to some extent predictable—powers, the moment of one's birth serves to define or characterize one's character and destiny. Astrological information regarding the precise time of one's birth carries considerable weight in arranging marriages, and it is commonplace for the horoscopes of prospective brides and grooms to be scrutinized to determine if the potential marriage carries sufficient auspicious powers to ensure its success and its capacity to enhance the lives of others in the extended family. In cases where the astrological signs may be inauspicious, avoidance or compensatory ritual undertakings may be recommended by astrological specialists. [See also Hindu Religious Year.]

Religious Healing and Exorcism. The Hindu cosmos is a complex structure of interacting, and at times competing, powers with which (or whom) Hindus must align themselves to their maximum advantage through cultic actions that generate personal and collective enhancement. This enhancement is frequently represented through imagery and ritual strategies having to do with purity, renunciation, and propitiation. The pursuit of these forms of enhancement shape particular ritual actions, diets, and social associations. Nevertheless, even when these efforts are undertaken, but especially if they are neglected or held in contempt, individuals can fall prey to malevolent forces. These malevolent forces take the forms of "hungry ghosts"—those spirits who are

trapped in the interstitial realm between the living and the dead—witches, demons, and sometimes deities (such as Śītalā, the goddess of smallpox) who themselves have been victims of misfortune. They tend to inhabit territories of maximal pollution such as graveyards and cremation grounds, places where violent and untimely deaths have taken place, or in marginal areas, such as forests, at the edge of the inhabited worlds. They appear under cover of darkness, frequently attacking their victims in dreams. Diseases, particularly diseases of a psychosomatic or psychological character for which precise empirical diagnosis is lacking, are often understood to be the result of the malevolent intervention of one of these spirits, either out of the spirit's own bad temper or as the consequence of a curse of a worldly opponent.

Individuals are diagnosed as possessed by malevolent entities if, in addition to physical symptoms such as fever, they exhibit erratic behavior such as falling into trance and verbally abusing members of their family. Certain exorcist-healers are called upon to induce the evil spirit to come out. These healers, frequently from low-caste or tribal communities, are recruited on the basis of their personal charisma and their knowledge of and fearlessness within the territory of the demonic. They bring a specialized knowledge of *mantras* and medicines to the treatment of their clients or patients. Often the exorcist goes into shamanic trance and takes onto himself the voice and persona of the demon or argues with it in a way suggestive both of juridical proceedings and drama. The patient is frequently accompanied by members of his or her family, so that the diagnosis and treatment of the illness serve to integrate into rather than isolate the patient from his or her family. In some cases, shamanic healers maintain regular practices in or around religious shrines and pilgrimage centers and serve clientele who come to the shrine for general religious merit and treatment for specific disorders. [See also Indian Religions, *article on Rural Traditions*.]

Conclusion. While each of these general types of cultic practice has nearly infinite variations in textual tradition and local custom, they all serve as structures for symbols, actions, and understanding that help to locate Hindus in complex and at times conflicting worlds of meaning. The cultic practices of Hinduism hold in common the goal of moving individuals, groups, and the whole cosmos toward conditions of greater well-being. This movement is always undertaken in the face of counter movements, symbolized by particular forces such as demons or the more abstract formulations of cosmological entropy expressed in theories of the *yugas*

or in the belief in the deterioration of wisdom, virtue, and well-being through the mere passing of time. Cultic practices give Hindus something to do in the face of the desire for enhancement and the anxiety over its erosion or nonattainment, something to do that brings them together as siblings, families, castes, communities, and as the whole culture itself.

[*The practice of Hinduism in particular regions is discussed individually in Bengali Religions; Hindi Religious Traditions; Marathi Religions; and Tamil Religions. For discussion of Hindu religious expression through the arts, see Poetry, article on Indian Religious Poetry; Iconography, article on Hindu Iconography; Temple, article on Hindu Temples; and Music, article on Music and Religion in India. See also Bhakti.*]

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PAUL B. COURTRIGHT

Taoist Cultic Life

The Chinese have traditionally rendered a cult to a vast array of spiritual beings that includes, in addition to their own ancestors, great heroes of the past, spirits of place, and the souls of the unfortunate dead. Every geographical unity had its own god of the soil; every social grouping has its patron deity and temple. There were gods who judged the souls of the dead and gods who kept a watch on the conduct of the living; there were gods of healing and gods who spread epidemics. Even the latrine, as a distinct place, had its guardian spirit.

Chinese popular religion is essentially concerned with the cultivation of the good graces of these spirits, most of whom are at once potentially harmful and potentially beneficial. Their cults represent alliances or covenants between the worshipers and the worshiped: in exchange for the protection and assistance of the spiritual potentate, the faithful render it a cult. It is a reciprocal relationship, with obligations on both sides.

Taoism, by contrast, is the cult of the Tao ("way"); it denies neither the existence of the gods nor the legitimacy of the cults rendered them. It simply accords them an insignificant place in the world of the Tao. "In a world governed according to the Way," says Lao-tzu (fourth century BCE), "spirits are impotent, or rather, it is not that they are impotent, but that they have no power to harm people."

Unlike the gods of the popular pantheon, the Tao "gives life yet lays no claim, is generous but exacts no gratitude" (*Lao-tzu* 2); it "clothes and feeds the myriad creatures but does not lord it over them" (*ibid.*, 34). The natural model for this "highest good" is water. "Because water excels in benefiting the myriad creatures without contending with them and collects in a place ordinary people despise, it comes close to the Way" (*ibid.*, 8). "Greatly virtuous behavior," therefore, "consists in following the Way" (*ibid.*, 21), and the Taoist is simply one who, because he "acts in accord with the Tao, is like the Tao" (*ibid.*, 23).

A book of philosophical maxims, the *Lao-tzu* says nothing of the practices that most probably lie behind Lao-tzu's principles. Allusions to such practices are to be found in other philosophical texts of the third century BCE, but explicitly religious and technical texts prior to the second century CE have not survived. The

Lieh-hsien chuan (Biographies of the Immortals), a second-century collection of seventy hagiographic sketches, gives a good idea both of the range of these practices and of their social function. All the practices focus on the human body, which is conceived of as a kind of "energy bank" whose original capital can either be spent—the result is death—or "nourished" and so augmented until one obtains immortality.

Adepts "nourished their energy" (*yang-ch'i*) with a great variety of natural products thought to be particularly potent. The most remarkable of these products is without doubt the "essence of the mysterious female," obtained by means of the "arts of the bedroom." But most of the products were of either a plant or mineral variety: roots, thistles, chrysanthemums, pine seeds, mica, and cinnabar are among those mentioned. Inasmuch as most of these products could be found only by patient search in uninhabited regions, the future immortals (*hsien*) appear as solitary individuals who, having learned the techniques of search and use from a master, disappear in the mountainous wilds or in the "Far West" and are never seen again. But some return on occasion to cure people or save them from a natural disaster.

One Ts'ui Wen-tzu, for example, after having lived for a long time in obscurity at the foot of Mount T'ai—also called the Eastern Peak and considered to be the dwelling place of the souls of the dead—returns one day to human society to sell his "yellow potions and red pills." When later a great epidemic breaks out and the deaths number in the tens of thousands, the civil authorities come to Ts'ui begging him to save the people. Carrying a red banner in one hand and his yellow potion in the other, Ts'ui goes from house to house, and all who drink his potion are saved.

Ts'ui later goes off to Szechwan in western China to sell his pills. Although no cult is established in his honor, many of the immortals do become cult objects. Huang Yüan-ch'iu, a "Taoist" (*tao-shih*) who descends occasionally from his mountain to sell drugs, comes to be worshiped because he saves the local people from an earthquake by giving them advance warning of its imminence. A female "Taoist" (*tao-jen*) by the name of Ch'ang-jung likewise becomes the object of a cult when, over a period of two hundred years, she wins fame by giving away to widows and orphans all the money she makes selling a special plant from her mountain as a dye. Another mountain-dwelling Taoist first appears to give one Shan-t'u a recipe or an herbal drug that not only heals his wounds but also completely satisfies his hunger. When Shan-t'u returns to become his disciple, the Taoist reveals himself to be an "angel of the Five

Peaks," that is, one of the divine messengers of the five sacred mountains of China. [See also Hsien.]

Heavenly Master Taoism. If most of the immortals of the *Biographies* were hermits of the distant past, the second century CE also witnessed the appearance of the first mass movements in Taoism. The most important proved to be that of the Way of the Heavenly Masters (T'ien-shih Tao), which has survived to the present. Sometime in the middle of the second century—the traditional date is 142 CE—Chang Tao-ling, on the basis of a revelation received from the Most High Lord Lao (the religious title of the philosopher Lao-tzu), founded a "church" composed of twenty-four "governances" (*chih*). The twenty-four governances on earth corresponded to twenty-four energies in heaven, and the term therefore implied that the world of the Heavenly Masters was "governed" according to the same principles as Heaven.

Behind this program for an orderly world lay a detailed cosmology. The Tao was conceived of as a giant body containing three pure energies in a chaotic state. Over time, these energies separated out to form a three-layered universe composed of the heavens above, the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth. Each of these three layers spread out to the "eight confines," that is, the four directions plus the four corners. The twenty-four governances are the replica of these twenty-four regions of the universe; both are expressions of the twenty-four celestial energies, each of which is dominant in turn for fifteen days each year: $24 \times 15 = 360$.

The new religion was called the Cheng-i Meng-wei Tao ("way of the alliance of the orthodox one with the gods"). The Orthodox One was the "unique energy" of Lord Lao—his revelation—communicated to Chang Tao-ling. The gods were taken over from the popular pantheon, but they included only the gods who assisted in governing the Universe, that is, the gods of the hearth and of the soil, who reported at regular intervals to Heaven on the conduct of the family or the community of which they had the charge. In addition, there were the Four Generals, who "hold the year-star in place," that is, regulate time, and the Three Officers, who control the Three Realms of heaven, earth, and the waters. Explicitly excluded from this pantheon were the souls of the dead, which played so large a part in popular religion. They were considered "stale energies" that needed to be recycled, and whose worship, as it retarded their recycling and so contravened the natural order, could only cause harm to the living.

The Three Officers were particularly important because each governed a portion of time as well as of space. Every year, at the beginning of their respective

reigns, assemblies of the gods were held to bring the registers of merit and demerit of all beings up to date. On those days, called the days of the Three Assemblies, the Taoist faithful gathered for communal rituals and meals called *chai* or *ch'u*. The word *ch'u* means "kitchen" and therefore refers primarily to the communal meal. The word *chai* came to mean "vegetarian meal," in part because Taoist meals did not involve animal sacrifices like the meals associated with popular cults; however, its basic meaning is "to equalize," in the sense of "to compose oneself" in preparation for an important encounter, especially with the gods. The term "merit meals" was also used because, as with the meals in the popular cults, the food eaten was first offered to the gods. It was thus consecrated food that brought merit and blessing to its partaker.

The days of the Three Assemblies were also the occasions for bringing the registers of the faithful up to date. This was the job of the *chi-chiu* ("libationers"), as the heads, male or female, of the twenty-four governances were called. Everyone in his or her governance, layperson or priest, had a register that corresponded to his or her level of initiation. The texts concerning these registers are unfortunately late (sixth to eighth century) and contradictory, but we can deduce from them that the faithful were organized in a military hierarchy, conceived, no doubt, on the model of the heavenly host that was holding its assembly at the same time.

The lay initiations began at the age of eight, when a child became eligible for a register with one general's name and description on it. The next register, with ten generals, was for twenty-year-olds, and then could adepts receive a register of seventy-five generals. When two adepts married, they were united by a register that was the sum of their separate registers, so that they in effect shared 150 generals. The registers gave the names and physical descriptions of these generals so that the adept could at once invoke and evoke them. Their role was to guard and protect the adept, just as the gods of the popular pantheon, who are also often called generals, are supposed to do.

According to some texts, the body of the Tao—the universe—contains a grand total of thirty-six thousand energies. The bodies of earth-dwellers, however, contain only half that number, and adepts must, therefore, learn how to recognize the energies within their bodies so as to "hold them in place" and attract their eighteen thousand celestial counterparts to come and "attach themselves" to them. This latter term indicates how Taoism borrowed the practices of popular cults and rationalized them by making them controlled techniques in the context of a complete cosmological system, because it is

the same term used to describe the phenomenon of possession—the god "attaches himself" to the medium—on which many popular cults are based.

The expedition of petitions was also a characteristic feature of Heavenly Master Taoism. One surviving collection lists the names of some three hundred such texts, together with the offerings that were to accompany them. The petitions are confessions of sin, statements of merit obtained by the performance of a given ritual, prayers for children, for long life, and for deliverance from every imaginable kind of difficulty (drought, locusts, rats, tigers, sorcery, epidemics, etc.). The offerings invariably include rice, silk, money, incense, oil, and the paper, brushes, and ink needed to write the petition. The generic term for such offerings came to be *chiao*, a word that originally referred to the ceremonial offerings made in connection with a marriage or with male puberty rites. What distinguished such an offering from other offerings was that it was not performed "in response" to someone or "in exchange" for something. It was, in that sense, a gratuitous act, as opposed to an act of gratitude.

Chiao offerings of this kind remain to the present day the one truly distinguishing feature of Taoism in general. Nowadays, in addition to rice, they include tea, fruits, wine, precious objects, candles, even the texts used during the rituals. They are called "pure offerings" in order to distinguish them from the offerings of popular religion, which still include meat, either cooked or raw. These two different types of offering show better than anything else the real differences between the alliances of ordinary people with their gods and the Alliance of the Orthodox One with the Powers: ordinary alliances are "deals" between nonequals, and the offerings are often described quite frankly as "payoffs" such as one would make to a local hoodlum or mandarin. At the same time, such an alliance has nothing permanent about it: it can be broken by either of the contracting parties for "breach of contract."

The Alliance, being based on the structure of the universe itself, cannot be broken; it can only be recognized. Ritual action that is in accord with this structure automatically brings a response of "merit," for like is attracted to like. Adherents of the Alliance, therefore, must transcend the expectations of reciprocity and mutual obligation that normally determine social and spiritual relations and take responsibility for their own destiny. They must learn to become, like a king, "solitary, single" (*Lao-tzu* 42). All of this is expressed in the "pure offering," an offering that is pure because it includes no blood sacrifices, but also because it expresses the pure intentions of the participants in the offering. It is these pure intentions that will ineluctably attract to the par-

ticipants the pure energies that bring fortune, health, and salvation. The *chiao* offering continues to celebrate, thus, both a marriage and a coming of age. [See also *Chiao*.]

In addition to the vast range of rituals performed, either on the occasion of set feast days or at moments of crisis, Heavenly Master Taoism involved private practices. Recitation of sacred texts (of the *Lao-tzu* in the first place, but also of rhymed verses describing the spirits inside the body) was one of them. By recitation, the adept assimilated the text and thereby gained mastery over the spirits described in it. Cycles of recitation imitated the gestational cycles in the body of the Tao, and mastery over the energies within attracted their counterparts without.

Great emphasis was also placed on moral behavior, and each step up in the hierarchy of registers brought with it an increase in the number of commandments to be observed (180 for libationers). The basic idea of these many commandments was to preserve and nourish the pure energies within rather than squandering them on the outside in the pursuit of pleasure.

Individual Practices. The rise of communal Taoism did not put an end to the kinds of individual practice alluded to in the *Biographies of the Immortals*. Beginning in the fifth century, individual eremitism gradually gave way to monastic communities called *kuan*. The word means "to observe, to visualize"; it refers especially to the "inner vision." Such inner vision being the fruit of individual practice, the constitution of "hermitages" clearly did not put an end to the individual practice of the arts of immortality.

These arts included techniques of visualization, breath control and circulation, gymnastics, and alchemy. All of these techniques existed in a great number of forms, some of them purely internal, some of them purely external. The adept who set out to fabricate a material elixir of immortality, for example, could do so using a theoretically infinite variety of mineral and/or vegetal ingredients. Methods for collecting and mixing the ingredients, constructing the crucible, and firing its contents also varied greatly. Internal alchemical methods ranged from the relatively empirical, scarcely distinguishable from the more ordinary techniques of breath circulation, to the extremely abstract and symbolic, virtually indistinguishable from traditional cosmological speculation. [See also Alchemy, *article on Chinese Alchemy*.]

As examples of breathing techniques, we may mention purely internal methods such as "embryonic breathing" and "circulating the energy while ceasing to breath." Other methods involved the absorption of outside energies followed by the wedding of these energies

to their internal counterparts. Such techniques had usually to be practiced at times determined by the system of symbolic correspondences. Absorption of the energies of the five directions, for example, was linked to the cycle of the sun, whereas that of the energies of the sun and the moon was linked to the phases of the moon. The adept was to inhale the energies of the four directions on the first and central days of the corresponding season—the "eight segmental days" (*pa-chieh jih*) because they divided the year into eight equal segments—and those of the center on a day in the sixth month when the central element, earth, was dominant.

The adept who practiced the "method [*tao*] of the absorption of the essences of the sun and the moon" did so on set days on each month: on days 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 15. At daybreak, according to the fourth-century *T'ai-shang ling-pao wu-fu hsü* (Preface to the Five Symbols, Potent Treasure of the Most High), the adept would face the sun, close his eyes, and visualize a small boy, dressed in red, inside his heart. He would massage himself with both hands from his face to his chest twelve times; then,

the yellow energies of the true red of the solar essence come before his eyes. They enter his mouth, and he swallows them eighteen times, sending them downward with a massaging movement. He prays, "Original Yang of the Solar Lord, join your power to mine so that together we may nourish the young boy in my Scarlet Palace." After a moment, he visualizes [the energies] going down to the crucible [*tan-t'ien*, in the depths of the belly], where they stop. This leads to eternal life.

(T'ai-shang ling-pao wu-fu hsü 1.19a)

The comparable practice for the moon was to be performed at midnight on the night of the full moon. Absorption of the yellow energies of the moon was preceded by circulation throughout the body of the white energies of the kidneys; the "combined power" of the white and the yellow, swallowed twenty-one times, nourished the "young boy in the crucible." A slightly different version of this practice, described several pages later in the same text, adds the absorption of the essence of the Big Dipper. Its energies were to be swallowed every day at dawn, noon, dusk, and midnight. They entered the body by the "space between the eyebrows" and filled the heart, the gall, and the spleen. "The Mother of the Tao is in the spleen, where she sees to the feeding of the infant. Because he does not go hungry, you live forever" (*ibid.*, 1.26a).

Modifications in the Ritual Tradition. Breath practices such as these, as well as a great variety of alchemical procedures, continued to characterize the Taoism of individual adepts throughout Chinese history. From Sung times on, however, all such practices tend to be-

come symbolic and internal rather than external and operative. Alchemy, for example, virtually ceases to consist in the manipulation of vegetal and mineral ingredients and becomes instead the combination of bodily energies in accord with a complex symbolic system. Later alchemical texts are a kind of abstract poetry, in which the alchemy may well be purely verbal.

A similar process of interiorization occurs in the rituals of communal Taoism. The esoteric aspects of rituals for presenting memorials, for example—the hand gestures, the dance steps, the visualizations—become ever more important and complex. In extreme cases the external, written memorial disappears altogether. Perhaps most remarkable of all is the appearance, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of rituals of “universal salvation” (*p'u-tu*) performed by individual laypeople in the quiet of their own meditation rooms. Down to the present day the ritual of universal salvation is normally the most public, not to say noisy, of all rituals.

It is probably also during the Sung dynasty that communal Taoism of the kind described above died out. (It seems to have survived only among the Yao tribes of southern China and Laos into the twentieth century.) Lay initiation disappeared, and the priest became a ritual specialist serving a community that had by and large ceased to understand the nature of the rituals for which it still felt a need.

The result was not only an increase of ritual secrecy and esoterism, but also a proliferation of rituals. (Urbanization and mercantilization of the economy were also factors in this.) One of the most interesting cases of a new ritual is that of the posthumous ordination of laymen. People became thereby in the next life what they had ceased to be in this life, members of a Taoist community. The religious affiliation of common people in this life tended now only to be with the temples and gods of the very popular religion Taoism had originally set out to combat and replace. Taoism was on its way to becoming what it is in modern times, the servant of the religion of the people, called on primarily to perform offerings that legitimize the gods of the people by showing them how the order of the Tao works, and integrating them thereby into that order.

[See also *Priesthood*, article on Taoist Priesthood; *Taoism*; and *Chen-jen*.]

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JOHN LAGERWEY

WOVOKA (c. 1856/8–1932), Paiute religious prophet and messiah of the Ghost Dance of 1890; also called Jack Wilson by white settlers. Although he often referred to himself as Kwohitsauq (“big rumbling belly”), after his paternal grandfather, he was given the name Wovoka (or Wuvoka, “cutter”) by his father, Tavibo (“white man”), who was reported to have trained his son in Paiute shamanistic practices. Tavibo had been an active participant in the 1870 Ghost Dance led by the Paiute shaman-prophet Wodziwob. Central tenets of this earlier Ghost Dance were related to the later teachings of Wovoka, which in turn led to the Ghost Dance movement of 1890. Among these earlier revelations was the prediction of the return of the ancestral dead. This imminent return was to be assisted through the practice of a round dance, which would also effect an earthly cataclysm and so result in the removal of white men.

In addition to Paiute shamanic practices and the Ghost Dance of 1870, Wovoka was influenced by his contact with Skokomish Shakers, Mormons, and other Christians. The Puget Sound Shaker religion of the Skokomish leader Squ-sacht-un (called John Slocum by whites) was primarily concerned with healing. It combined native shamanistic and Christian religious practices. These Shakers produced twitching-ecstasies and trances that sometimes lasted for days. Wovoka's later teachings were also similar to Mormon doctrines regarding the rejuvenation of the American Indians, the radical transformations in the earth's terrain, and the return of the Messiah. Moreover, Paul Bailey indicates in his biography of Wovoka (1957) that the famous Plains Ghost Dance shirt bears a resemblance to Mormon holy garments. Finally, after his father died, Wovoka was hired by a white family named Wilson. This position brought him into close contact with Presbyterian Christianity, which involved Bible reading, moral exhortations, and pietistic stories about Jesus.

Around 1888 Wovoka is reported to have undergone his first deathlike trance-journey to heaven. From this point his teachings were derived from conversations with the ghosts of the dead. Wovoka's oral revelations were associated with the ritual performance of the

round dance, which promoted moral and spiritual renewal. His teachings were transmitted by means of a syncretic mythology and dramatized through the skillful use of his personal power symbols.

Wovoka's foremost revelations came in a deathlike coma experienced while he was suffering from scarlet fever during the solar eclipse of 1889. During this trance-coma Wovoka related that he saw God on a transformed earth where Indians and game animals abounded. Wovoka's messages increasingly focused on the presence of the Messiah, a role he himself gradually assumed. His mythology centered on the imminent revival of deceased Indians, who would be reunited with their living kin in an earthly paradise. His description of the fate of whites varied. He predicted that they would be either swept away by the cataclysm or amalgamated into the restored humanity. Many of these doctrines, such as the transformed earth, were more fully explicated by Wovoka's disciples, who disseminated the Ghost Dance in the years following 1889.

The later Ghost Dance, similar to that of the Ghost Dance of 1870, was a kind of round dance that lasted for five nights. Men and women, their fingers intertwined, shuffled sideways around a fire, dancing to the songs that Wovoka received from the dead. While the Paiute participants themselves did not go into a trance, Wovoka did occasionally journey in a trance state to the ghosts, who assured him that Jesus was already on the earth with the dead, moving about as in a cloud. Moreover, along with their remonstrations against lying, drinking, and fighting, the dead said that Indians should work for the whites and have no more trouble with them.

Wovoka's personal power-symbols were typical of native shamanic practices. Along with his sombrero he used eagle, magpie, and crow feathers and red ochre paint from the traditional Paiute holy mountain (now called Mount Grant). As with so many visionary symbol systems, their meaning is not fully known, but Wovoka often incorporated these symbols into his teaching so as to foster belief in his messianic role among his followers.

Wovoka went somewhat into hiding when news of the Wounded Knee massacre of 1890 reached him. He vigorously condemned the misunderstanding of his teachings, especially as reflected in the Lakota armed resistance. He also denied any influence in the development of the Ghost Dance shirts. He later reemerged as the countinuing leader of the much diminished Ghost Dance. He readjusted his predictions of imminent earthly transformation, explaining that Indian ritual and ethical behavior had not conformed properly to his visions. Wovoka died on 20 September 1932 in Schurz,

Nevada; his death was preceded a month earlier by that of his wife, Mary, his companion for over fifty years.

More is known of Wovoka than of other similar religious figures, but he can be seen as part of a larger revivalistic movement of the period. Various tribal groups, caught in the death throes of their traditional cultures and the inescapable morass of governmental reservation policy, responded to Wovoka's revelations from a variety of motivations that mediated between their present distress and their future hopes. Wovoka's injunctions against warfare, immoral behavior, and some traditional medicine practices enabled many who participated in the Ghost Dance to begin the psychic transitions needed to respond to the changing circumstances of life. Most important in this connection was Wovoka's orientation away from exclusive tribal recognition toward a pan-Indian identity.

[See also *Ghost Dance and North American Religions, article on Modern Movements.*]

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JOHN A. GRIM

WRITING, SACRED. See Sacred Writing; see also Calligraphy.

WUNDT, WILHELM (1832-1920), German physiologist, philosopher, and psychologist, best known as the founder of experimental psychology. Born the son of a Lutheran pastor, near Mannheim, Wundt studied at Tübingen, Heidelberg, and Berlin, took his Ph.D. and M.D. degrees at Heidelberg, and taught at the universities of Heidelberg, Zurich, and Leipzig. Early in his teaching career at Heidelberg he wrote *Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung* (1858-1862), considered to be the first treatment of psychology as an experimental science, and *Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Tierseele* (1863). Perhaps his most important work for psychology was *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie* (1874), in which he advocated investigating the immediate experiences of consciousness using a method

of introspection. In 1874 he was made professor of inductive philosophy at Zurich. In the following year, he accepted a professorship at Leipzig, where in 1879 he founded what is generally regarded as the world's first psychological laboratory. In 1881 he founded a journal of psychology, *Philosophische Studien*, which primarily published the results of research conducted at his Leipzig institute and which helped to establish experimental psychology as a separate discipline.

During his long career at Leipzig Wundt's most important works were *Grundriss der Psychologie* (1896) and his *Völkerpsychologie* (10 vols., 1900–1920). These two works represent diverse streams that Wundt held together: his interest in physiological psychology and his more philosophical approach to the analysis of ethnic groups. For him, they were not so disparate; he considered psychology the science that could study the phenomena of human consciousness in both its individual and its group manifestations. In his *Völkerpsychologie* Wundt considered an immense amount of anthropological data. He viewed religion, myth, morality, art, and language as phenomena of long duration and therefore as constituting a psychic reality distinct from individual consciousness. Wundt discerned a "folk soul," which for him was not a substance but rather a psychic actuality that could be studied. The idea of a collective unconscious was quite foreign to Wundt, who rejected any idea of the unconscious, advising his students that its study by psychology was a mistake. Wundt focused instead on the objective forms of language, morality, and religion. Nevertheless, his earlier association studies anticipated and inspired the work of his student, Emil Kraepelin, in psychopathology, and stimulated the development of the association test used by C. G. Jung and his associates in Zurich.

Although social psychologists (except possibly for those in Germany during the Nazi period) have rejected any notion of a folk soul and have operated from premises different from those established by Wundt, social psychology has continued the study of the objective forms of religion in society. Wundt's interests in the universality of mythological motifs and the nature of the language of religion have been taken up by students in the fields of history of religions (although the evolutionary approach implicit in Wundt's more philosophical works has been rejected) and psychology of religion, especially from Freudian and Jungian perspectives.

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WALLACE B. CLIFT

WYCLIF, JOHN (1330?–1384), English scholastic theologian, trenchant critic of abuses in the church, and promoter of a vernacular translation of the Bible. Wyclif was the most learned man of his generation in England. The rigor of his scholastic logic and, in his last years, his appeal to scripture as the sole authority for the church's life, led him into heresies. During his time and to this day, he has had both sympathetic admirers and caustic critics. Nonetheless, the real, human Wyclif remains an enigma. We know little about him except that he led an austere life marked by tireless study, lecturing, and writing.

Nothing certain is known about Wyclif's family or its resources. John Wyclif (or Wycliffe) was born near Richmond in North Riding, Yorkshire. At an early age he entered Balliol College, Oxford, and then served as its regent master from 1360 to 1361. The date of his ordination is unrecorded. Later he resided at Queen's College, where he studied for and received his bachelor of divinity degree (1369) and his doctor of divinity degree (1372). Early connections with Merton College and Canterbury Hall are disputed.

University scholars without means of their own were dependent upon "provisions to livings" of parishes or prebends and canonries in collegiate churches or cathedrals. From this income they were expected to pay vicars for service during their absence. Wyclif was no exception. In 1361 Balliol gave him its choicest living at Fillingham, Lincolnshire. The following year he received from Pope Urban V a prebend at Aust in the collegiate church of Westbury-on-Trym near Bristol, but he neither resided there nor ever provided a vicar. In 1368 Wyclif exchanged Fillingham for Ludgershall, a less lucrative living in Buckinghamshire, because it was nearer to Oxford. He left this in 1374 for a royal provision at Lutterworth, Leicestershire. There he spent the last three years of his life. He died on 31 December 1384 after a massive paralytic stroke.

In philosophy Wyclif was a realist and in theology an advocate of Augustine's doctrines of predestination and

grace. Only in the mid-1370s did he come into prominence outside Oxford for his views on *dominium* (lordship and ownership). Between 1376 and 1379 he published successively *On Divine Lordship*, *On Civil Lordship*, *On the Duty of the King*, and *On the Church*. In these treatises Wyclif argues that only God is the true Lord and owner of his whole creation. Whatever authority and property human beings possess they have from God, to whom they owe faithful service. Only the predestined have any right to them, but, like Augustine, Wyclif believed that no one could know who was and who was not among the elect. Hence one should suffer patiently under unjust and greedy masters until they repent or are removed and dispossessed.

Both estates of the realm, civil and ecclesiastical, should be under the authority of the king in all temporal matters. The ecclesiastical estate (including theologians) is of greater dignity because it is called to serve in spiritual teaching and guidance. It should be stripped of all temporal possessions, except what was necessary for food, clothing, and lodging, and no clergy should hold any civil office. The king should remove all unworthy clergy. All ecclesiastics, from the pope on down, should live in poverty as Peter and the other apostles did.

Although Wyclif's views were largely theoretical and not altogether unprecedented, they were noticed by Edward, Prince of Wales (the "Black Prince," 1330–1376), and his younger brother John of Gaunt (1340–1399), who became duke of Lancaster in 1362. The two virtually ruled England during the declining years of Edward III (1312–1377) and probably saw in Wyclif a front for their aim to plunder the church's wealth. In February 1377, Wyclif was summoned before the bishops at Saint Paul's, London, to answer for his views. He arrived accompanied by four friar doctors of theology and by John of Gaunt with some of his supporters. At once a bitter altercation broke out between Gaunt and Bishop William Courtenay of London, and the duke's party with Wyclif left before Wyclif could be heard or condemned.

In May, Gregory XI sent bulls to England denouncing nineteen propositions from Wyclif's writings and asking for a thorough investigation and Wyclif's arrest. Before the bulls arrived, however, ten-year-old Richard II had become king, and nothing became of the pope's directives. The archbishop of Canterbury, Simon of Sudbury, asked the faculty at Oxford to give an opinion on the propositions. They were unanimous in stating that some of them "sounded ill" but that they "were all the same true." In March, Wyclif appeared before Sudbury and Courtenay at Lambeth, just as a message arrived from the king's mother forbidding them to pass judgment on

Wyclif. A mob broke into the meeting, and the bishops concluded the meeting by merely enjoining Wyclif from publicly disputing and preaching about his controverted views.

If Wyclif's mouth was shut for a time, his pen was not stilled. In 1378 he wrote *On the Truth of Holy Scripture*, in which he affirms that the Bible taken literally is the sole law of the church and that a translation without interpretation is needed so that the humblest person can learn from it. The treatise *On the Eucharist* (1379) cost him much support. In it he denies the dogma of transubstantiation: it is unscriptural, unknown in the church before the twelfth century, idolatrous, and contrary to his realist position that no substance can be changed into another substance. Yet he affirms the real presence of Christ's body and blood sacramentally in bread and wine. His last major work, the *Triialogus* (1382), gives a summary of his views.

Wyclif's enemies blamed him for the Peasants' Revolt in 1381, but there is no evidence to support the connection. After Archbishop Sudbury's murder during the rebellion, Courtenay succeeded to the primacy (1382–1396), determined to root out Wyclif's teachings at Oxford. In May 1382 he presented twenty-four propositions from Wyclif's writings to a council of bishops and theologians in London. Ten were voted heretical, the others erroneous. Leading Oxford supporters of Wyclif were summoned to appear and persuaded to recant. In November, Courtenay held the Convocation of Canterbury at Oxford, where all doctors, masters, and bachelors made their submission.

Yet Courtenay never moved against Wyclif personally. Wyclif had retired to Lutterworth in 1381 and suffered his first stroke in 1382. In his last years Wyclif may have supervised the translation of the Latin Vulgate Bible and the training of "poor preachers," cleric and lay (the Lollards), to spread the gospel, but his personal involvement has been disputed. The translation has come down in two principal versions, a literal version and a later, more idiomatic English version.

The marriage of Richard II to Anne of Bohemia (1382) brought several leaders of the Czech reform movement to England who took many of Wyclif's writings back home. Jan Hus, the principal champion of that movement, admired Wyclif and quoted extensively from his writings, but he used them with care, especially those on the Eucharist. The Council of Constance in 1415 burned Hus as a "Wycliffite" heretic and ordered that Wyclif's remains be exhumed and burned. Bishop Richard Fleming of Lincoln did this in 1428 and cast the ashes into the Swift River.

The extent of Wyclif's influence on the sixteenth-century Reformation is open to debate. Luther knew of him

through Hus's writings. In England, Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury (1533–1556), owned a copy of the *Triologus* printed at Basel in 1525. Yet references to Wyclif, always with approval, are scanty in his writings. Cranmer's views on the Eucharist were similar to Wyclif's, and he too worked for an English translation of the Bible. He would have supported the reform of the church by the king, but not its disendowment and reduction to apostolic poverty.

After Elizabeth I's settlement of the church in 1559, Wyclif became a hero and a martyr to those who disented from it. Yet even they, contrary to Wyclif, would have had the church the dominant power in the kingdom. Wyclif's importance lies partly in his influence on Jan Hus, but even more in his propagation of reformed principles.

[See also the biographies of Hus and Cranmer.]

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X Y



XAVIER, FRANCIS (1506–1552), cofounder of the Roman Catholic Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), missionary, and saint. Francisco de Jassu y Xavier was born in the family castle in the kingdom of Navarre (now northern Spain), the fifth and youngest child of noble, wealthy, and pious Catholic parents. His early education took place at home and under the tutelage of local priests. In 1525 the keen, ambitious student left home permanently, bound for Paris. A handsome, slender, athletic youth, about five feet four inches tall, he was noted then, as throughout his life, for his cheerful and vivacious personality. At the University of Paris, Xavier gained a master of arts degree in philosophy in 1530, taught this subject for several years (1530–1534), and then studied theology until 1536.

During his years at the university, Ignatius Loyola, a fellow student since 1528, became an increasingly important influence on Xavier, and by 1533 Xavier had become one of his disciples. In 1534 Xavier made the Spiritual Exercises under the direction of Ignatius and on 15 August he joined Ignatius and five other students in a chapel in Montmartre, a district of Paris, where all of them vowed to lead lives of apostolic poverty, to labor for the salvation of their neighbors, to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and to place their services at the disposition of the pope. Together with three other students who joined the group when it renewed its vows a year later, these men were the ten founders of the Society of Jesus.

Beginning the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Xavier left Paris in November 1536 with eight of his companions and, traveling by foot, reached Venice nearly two months later. Ignatius met them there. In Venice, Xa-

vier, along with Ignatius and four other companions, was ordained a priest in June 1537. War with the Turks ruled out a voyage across the Mediterranean to Palestine, so in 1538 Xavier went to Rome and there shared in the discussions that led to the founding of the Society of Jesus. Until his departure from Rome in 1540, he served as secretary of the new religious order. [See also Jesuits.]

When the pious King John III of Portugal put out a call for missionaries, especially for the care of recently converted Paravas (Bhavatas) in southern India, Xavier left Rome for Portugal, traveling overland to Lisbon in the entourage of the Portuguese ambassador. While awaiting the annual departure of the India fleet, Xavier performed various priestly tasks in the city and at the royal court. His ship set sail in April 1541, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and wintered in Mozambique, where Xavier's two Jesuit colleagues remained. After further stops at Melinde (Malindi, in modern-day Kenya) and the island of Socotra (off the coast of modern-day Somalia, where Xavier had to be dissuaded from remaining), the voyage ended in May 1542 in Goa, a district on the west coast of India and the main Portuguese center in that country.

Until the end of the rainy season in September, Xavier ministered to the Portuguese and native Christians in Goa. Accompanied by three native helpers, he then sailed to the southern tip of the continent. For the next three years his apostolate was centered in Malabar and Travancore, the coastal regions northwest of Cape Comorin; in the regions northeast of the cape as far as São Thomé (modern-day Madras); and on the neighboring island of Ceylon. Much of his ministry consisted of in-

structing the thousands of Parava pearl divers and fishermen who had been converted to Roman Catholicism around 1535 but whose religious knowledge remained minimal. Spectacular numbers of conversions were made: Xavier reported baptizing over ten thousand villagers in Travancore in one month.

In September 1545 Xavier sailed from São Thomé to Malacca, a Portuguese settlement on the Malay Peninsula; then to the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, in the East Indies, where his main concern was the native Christians, left without clergy in the Portuguese centers of Amboina and Ternate; and then as far north as the Moro Islands. He returned to Malacca in June 1547 and to Goa in March 1548. After further work along the Fishery Coast he returned to Goa once again. In April 1549 he set sail with three Japanese converts and two fellow Jesuits to inaugurate the Christian mission in Japan. When he departed from Japan for Goa twenty-seven months later, he left behind some two thousand converts. Hoping to initiate a Christian mission to China, he took ship from Goa in April 1552, but he was not allowed to disembark on the Chinese mainland. After three months of fruitless waiting on the desolate island of Sancian (near Canton), he died on 3 December following a brief illness. His incorrupt body was taken in 1554 to Goa, where it is still enshrined and greatly venerated.

Xavier is ranked among the greatest missionaries in Christian history. His numerous far-ranging journeys were not those of a spiritual adventurer, restlessly seeking new fields to conquer. He served not only as missionary but also as apostolic nuncio and Jesuit superior, with the duty of investigating mission possibilities in areas then little known to Europeans. He was both a pioneer and organizer of the Jesuit missions in the Far East, intent on obtaining suitably trained European co-workers. He was eager to supply mission stations with churches, schools, and personnel and to be kept informed about them. Both his actions and his writings show practicality, prudence, and sound spirituality. His success was promoted also by his exemplary apostolic zeal, his personal holiness, and his ability to mix easily with persons of all classes, races, and beliefs. In addition, he was a man much devoted to prayer, a mystic. Unlimited confidence in God, his most basic spiritual trait, freed him from discouragement in the face of obstacles and reverses. These characteristics, together with his reputation as a wonder-worker, led Christians, Muslims, and pagans alike to refer to him as "the holy father," and "the great father." Since his death, he has been venerated as the ideal missionary and, as such, has inspired thousands to devote their lives to spread-

ing the gospel far afield. In 1622 he was canonized, and in 1927 he was designated by Pius XI as patron of all missions. His annual liturgical feast is celebrated on 3 December.

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JOHN F. BRODERICK, S.J.

YA'AQOV BEN ASHER (c. 1270–1343), Hispano-Jewish codifier. Ya'aqov was a son of the great German halakhist Asher ben Yeḥi'el, who settled with his family in Toledo in 1303. Ya'aqov ben Asher never accepted rabbinical office and at times suffered economic adversity, but he continued his father's lifework—the revival of Talmudic studies in Castile and the fusion of Franco-German and Spanish *halakhah*.

Ya'aqov's *magnum opus* was his code, the *Arba'ah turim* (lit., "four rows"; see *Ex.* 28:17). It consists of four books: *Orah hayyim*, on liturgy and holidays; *Yoreh de'ah*, on "the prohibited and permitted" and other topics, including mourning, charity, education, and filial piety; *Even ha-'ezer*, on family law; and *Ḥoshen mishpat*, on civil law. Ya'aqov sought to attain coherence and order in Jewish law, but in a manner less radically reductive and homogenizing than that of Maimonides in his *Mishneh Torah* a century and a half earlier. Instead of excising all disagreement and discussion, as Maimonides had done, Ya'aqov skillfully inte-

grated into his code brief discussions of legal cruxes and of the divergent views of major authorities who represented different schools, generally concluding with his father's view.

The language of the *Ṭurim* is clear and simple. Unlike *Mishneh Torah*, its arrangement aims at functionality rather than conceptual categorization. This practical orientation is evident also in its omission of all laws not applicable since the destruction of the Temple. Nor does the *Ṭurim* attempt the grand synthesis of law and theology to which *Mishneh Torah* aspires. It does, however, contain many homiletical and hortatory passages (especially in the section prologues) based on classical *aggadah* and the author's own pure and simple piety. Only rarely are there reflections of the Ashkenazic Hasidism of Ya'aqov's German forebears and of his opposition to philosophical rationalism. The spirituality underlying Ya'aqov's piety occasionally breaks through the surface, as in his recommendation, inserted matter-of-factly in "the laws of prayer," that one emulate the "men of piety and good deeds [who] would so meditate and concentrate in prayer, that they achieved a stripping away of corporeality and an intensification of the rational soul, which brought them close to the level of prophecy."

The *Ṭurim* became an immensely popular work among both Sefardic and Ashkenazic Jews and occasioned many commentaries. It was the second Hebrew book published (Piove di Sacco, 1475) and in the sixteenth century served as the basis for Yosef Karo's classic code, the *Shulḥan 'arukh*.

Ya'aqov also composed a commentary on the Torah (1806) that clearly summarizes the brilliant but difficult thirteenth-century Pentateuch commentary of Moses Nahmanides, without the latter's qabbalistic exegesis. To each section, Ya'aqov prefaced homiletical interpretations based on the numerical value of letters (*gematriyyah*) and the orthographic peculiarities of the Masoretic text. Ironically, these interpretations, mentioned as a relatively inconsequential afterthought in Ya'aqov's introduction, became extremely popular, eclipsing the main body of the commentary.

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BERNARD SEPTIMUS

YAKŞAS. See Nāgas and Yakşas.

YAKUT RELIGION. The Yakuts, who numbered 328,000 during the 1979 census, are the northernmost of Turkic peoples. Beginning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, under pressure caused by Buriat encroachment, they gradually emigrated northward from the Lake Baikal region of southern Siberia. They moved upstream along the course of the Lena River and finally settled in northeastern Siberia, the coldest region in the world. The horses and cattle bred by these semisedentary people have successfully adapted to the rigorous climate; however, hunting and fishing provide the Yakuts with a significant additional source of income. The Yakuts are organized in patrilineal and exogamic clans regrouped into tribes.

Under pressure from the Russians, who subjugated them during the first half of the seventeenth century, the majority of Yakuts were baptized by the end of the eighteenth century. They adopted Christianity primarily for material reasons (e.g., gifts of crosses, shirts, and various privileges). At the same time, they secretly preserved their own religious system, shamanism, which was modified superficially as the result of contact with Russian Orthodoxy. The practitioners of shamanism accepted the new idea of a reward after death and attributed the traits of God, the Virgin Mary, and the guardian angels to some of their spirits.

Cosmology. The Yakut universe is composed of three superimposed worlds. The "upper world" comprises nine skies of different colors. Spirits reside in each sky: in the east are the *aṭyys*, bright, creative spirits, and in the west are the *abaasys*, dark, harmful spirits. (The Yakuts are situated in the east.)

The "middle world," flat and octagonal, is populated by humans and by a host of spirits. The forest of this world is a formidable territory because the greatest number of spirits are found there: although they grant game, they also capture the souls of hunters who have pleased them.

The "lower world" is a crepuscular region solely inhabited by the harmful spirits who roam among a metallic, iron vegetation. Here, the "sea of death," composed of children's cadavers, churns its waves. The term employed for "lower world," *allaraa*, signifies "below, downstream, in the north." (The rivers of Siberia flow northward, hence the use of the same term for both "downstream" and "north.") It is possible that the lower world is not conceived of as a sinister and subterranean replica of the middle world but rather as a watery abyss in the northern regions. In any case, the contrasts of above and below and of upper and lower do not figure predominately in the Yakut religion. More important is the division of the sky into east (good) and west (evil): this division allows for the classification of the spirits.

The Pantheon. The bright, creative spirits, *aīyys* (from the Turkic root "ai," "to create"), assure the Yakuts their survival by granting them the souls of children and also of horses, cattle, and dogs, the Yakuts' only domesticated animals. However, the Yakuts must pay homage to the *aīyys* with milk offerings and prayers and must consecrate animals to them from their herd. The consecrated animal (*zykh*) is not slain; it is sent back to the herd and is treated with respect, for it no longer belongs to man but to the spirit to which it was consecrated. This spirit will reward the people for their care by granting fertility to the herd. The *aīyy* cult, called "white shamanism," disappeared in the eighteenth century and never was studied properly.

The White Lord Creator, Iurung Aīyy Toion, is the master of all the *aīyys* who are imagined to be like rich Yakuts and are organized in clans, as are the Yakuts themselves. Associated with the sun and the heat of summer, the White Lord Creator resides in the ninth sky, where "the grass is as white as the wing of a white swan." He rules the world, sends the soul (*kut*) to children, and assures fertility in cattle and the growth of plants, but he does not interfere in human affairs on his own initiative. During the great spring feasts called "libations" (*ysyakh*), he is first offered libations of fermented mare's milk; later, horses are consecrated to him. Occasionally a goddess, the wife of this god, is mentioned; she would become an avatar of the goddess of the earth. Such an identification of the goddess may be a vague indication of a marriage between the sky and the earth.

The *aīyysyts*, a group of spirits, female for the most

part, attend to human reproduction and the reproduction of certain species of animals (especially the domestic species). The *aīyysyt* who attends to human reproduction brings the soul of the child created by Aīyy Toion. She also comes to help women during childbirth. She is often associated with Iēiēkhsit, and is occasionally confused with her. When they are associated, Aīyysyt is the one who grants the soul and Iēiēkhsit is the one who delivers it. (The latter has been likened to a guardian angel.) Aīyysyt and Iēiēkhsit are both proper nouns and epithets that can be applied even to male personages: when one is begging for offspring one uses the epithet Aīyysyt, and when one desires an intermediary the epithet Iēiēkhsit is used. The three *aīyysyts* of man, of horned livestock, and of dogs are all feminine spirits, but the spirit that grants horses, "the formidable Dzhēsēgēi," is masculine. When mares and cows reproduce, and each time a child is born, relatives and cousins come together to offer a ritual of renewal to the spirit that granted the soul. However, the ritual for the spirit-master of horses is conducted by the (male) ruler of the house, while the other two rituals are celebrated by the women.

The goddess of the earth, who lives among beautiful white birches far from the evil spirits, takes care of the traveler, blesses the harvests, and occasionally decides the fate of the newborn. The spirit-master of the domestic fire assures the survival of the household: in his embers tremble the souls of children and calves yet to be born. He removes harmful spirits and purifies the accessories of the hunt that are soiled by the presence of a menstruating woman. This spirit-master also serves as an intermediary for other spirits by delivering offerings to them that are thrown into his flames in their honor. In exchange, one must not forget to feed him by throwing him a mouthful of food before each meal; otherwise, he may take revenge by, for example, burning down the house.

On the opposite side, in the western sky, loom the black spirits, *abaasys* (the Turkic root is probably *ap*, "enchantment"), "gigantic as the shadows of larches under the full moon." In fact, they appear to be more terrible than they really are, because once they have sent diseases (most often, various types of insanity), they will take them away if the shaman sacrifices horses with suitable coats. The supreme ruler of the nine clans of *abaasy* is Ulu Toion ("powerful lord"), who gave the Yakuts fire and perhaps one of the three souls that the Yakuts believe each person possesses (according to some, the soul he gave was the *siur*, vital energy). He is the protector of the black shamans, *abaasy oīun* (lit., "shamans in contact with the *abaasys*").

Other harmful *abaasys* populate the earth and the

lower world. The two most celebrated are the ruler of the lower world, Arsan Duolan (a pale replica of Ulu Toïon), who sends infant mortality and obstinacy, and Kudai Bagši, the ruler of the smiths, who cures the apprentice smith of his initiatory illness if the shaman offers him a black bull.

Among the harmful spirits are the unsatisfied deceased (*iuërs*) those who died without completing a full life cycle, such as young girls who died without having been married. The souls of suicides and of shamans become the most formidable *iuërs*.

In the domestic environment and in natural phenomena that directly influence man's well-being, there exists a supernatural force that the Yakuts call *ichchi* ("master, possessor"). This force is personified in the spirit-masters who reside in the object, house, or territory they possess. To ensure that a tool be effective or that a house not collapse, to avoid being crushed by a tree or hurled into the waters when crossing the forest or the river, one must make an offering to one's spirit-master.

Since the Yakuts believed the spirits were organized in clans as they themselves were, they recognized their right to have tribal property. This property was the game and fish existing in the territory of these spirits. They accorded part of this to man in exchange for food (milk products, alcohol, flesh of domestic animals) in an alliance that is similar to that formed between bartering human tribes. However, the spirits never give enough souls of game, cattle, and children. This is where the shaman intervenes.

The Shaman. To obtain the souls of wild game, the shaman provides the master of the particular kind of animal in question with food in return: he smears the blood of a sacrificed animal on a wooden statuette where he has caused the spirit-master of the forest, the rich Baïanaï or Baryllakh, to descend. He then gives a symbol of these souls (e.g., feathers, etc.) to the members of the clan. To obtain the souls of children and additional cattle, the shaman himself goes to the beyond to confront the *aïyysyts*. At first the spirits refuse, remembering the wrongs that men have committed. Then, after considering the supplications of the shaman, they give him the souls. The position of the shaman has changed: he no longer barter, he implores, because the *aïyy* spirits, dispensers of cattle and human offspring, are venerated, unlike the spirits of the hunt or of illnesses, whom the shaman treats as equals.

To cure illness, which the Yakuts conceive as the installation of an evil spirit in the body of the ailing person and also as the theft of the soul by a spirit "soul-eater," the shaman trades the soul of the sick person for that of a sacrificed animal, which he sends into the oth-

erworld. These negotiations with the spirits take place during the shamanic séance, which is generally held nocturnally at the afflicted person's home, with relatives and neighbors in attendance. The séance includes a purification ceremony; a convocation of the spirits through the shaman's chanting, accompanied on the tambourine; a voyage of the shaman himself into the otherworlds to find the spirits (a voyage mimicked by the shaman's dance); and an act of divination.

The shaman is aided by his principal spirit (*ämägät*), generally the shaman's ancestor, who chose the shaman from among his descendants in order to pass on the shamanic gift, a gift that always remains in the same family. Women also can become shamans (*udaghans*), but female shamans are less numerous because the clans are patrilineal. Once chosen by the ancestor, the soul of the future shaman takes on the form of a young bird and is educated atop either the mythic larch of the upper world or the pine tree of the lower world. It is during his initiation that the shaman seals his alliance with the spirits. In the course of his sleep, his body is cut up in the lower world and consumed like a sacrificial animal by several spirits. The spirits then reconstitute his body. Re-created in this manner, the shaman acquires rights over the spirits who have consumed his flesh and who will subsequently help him remove illnesses.

The shaman is also aided by zoomorphic spirits who transport him in the air or under the ground and who fight at his side. Moreover, the shaman possesses an animal double (usually a male moose or bull); it is in this form that he fights against shamans of enemy clans. If the shaman's animal double has been killed, he himself dies. The shaman also fights against the souls of dead avengers, the spirits of illnesses and epidemics. He also assures the survival of his clan by divination—predicting the future, the areas where game will be most plentiful, and so forth. In this dark universe, where mad spirits who populate three-fourths of the sky in the west predominate, where the bright spirits (*aïyys*) often refuse to grant offspring and prosperity, and where "soul-eating" spirits lurk about the earth and in the lower world, the shaman is the Yakuts' only support.

[See also Shamanism, article on Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanism, and Southern Siberian Religions.]

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LAURENCE DELABY

Translated from French by Sherri L. Granka

YAMA. In the earliest Ṛgvedic hymns, Yama is a benign god who looks after the well-being of the dead, whom he entertains with food and shelter. His abode and its environment are pleasant and comfortable; survivors supplicate him for the care of their departed relatives.

Yama is the son of Vivasvat and Saraṇyū; he has a twin sister, Yamī. In the *Ṛgveda*, Amṛta ("ambrosia") is Yama's son, but in the *Atharvaveda*, Yama has a son, Duḥsvapna ("bad dream"), by Varuṇānī. In the epic-Puranic literature, the Aśvins are his brothers, and Śani and Manu are his half brothers. The Aṅgirasas are his associates.

The name *Yama* is derived from a stem meaning "twins"; Latin *gemini* and the Avestan names *Yima* and *Yimeh* are cognates. In a Ṛgvedic hymn, Yamī implores Yama to unite with her, but he rejects her advances. The hymn has an abrupt, inconclusive end. In Buddhist literature, Yama is identified with *Kāma* ("desire") and *Māra* ("death"). In the Vedic literature, Yama has close relations with Rudra, Soma, Agni, *Kāla*, and Nirṛti. Yama also bears a remote relationship to Varuṇa.

Yama in the Vedas was the first mortal to die. He then went to heaven, where he ruled over the dead. But toward the close of the Vedic period sinister traits began to appear in him, and they grew stronger with time. Yama then became the god of death and the lord of Hell. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, as death personified, he holds a long discourse with the boy Naciketas, whom he initiates into the mysteries of life, death, and immortality. Prayers are offered to Yama for longevity and deliverance from recurring deaths. Yama also grants release from *aśanāyā* (hunger). In many rituals of ancestor worship, oblations are offered to Yama with prayers for averting recurring deaths. In the *Gṛhyasūtras*, oblations are offered to Yama's men, presumably his associates, in the realm of the dead.

Of the two paths in later Vedic eschatology, *Devayāna*

and *Pitṛyāna*, the latter is that of the fathers and of spirits doomed to rebirth. These spirits proceed through Soma, the moon, and are judged by Yama. In the epics and *Purāṇas*, Yama has a palace, *Śubhāvati*, in the netherworld. Yama's realm begins, in Buddhist literature, to shift from the heaven of the gods until, in the Hindu epics and *Purāṇas*, it assumes distinctly sinister characteristics. As god of death and lord of Hell, Yama is dark and malevolent, yet still a giver of boons.

The south is the region of Yama (as it is that of the Avestan *Yima*) and the region of death. Yama has two dogs, *Śyāma* and *Śabala*, who are associated with the final judgment of souls, as are Hades' dog, Kerberos, the Egyptian Anubis, and *Yima's* four dogs. Yama is also associated with oil and with the dove, eagle, and raven (all of which are endowed with sinister traits). The epic and Puranic Yama has a buffalo for a mount. Dread monsters (*rākṣasas*); semidivine *yakṣas*, demons, cruel messengers, the *Aṅgirasas*, and the souls of the departed throng his realm. His ritual oblations in ancestor worship are gruesome and evil. The symbols associated with his various aspects as *Kāla*, *Mṛtyu*, and *Antaka* are images of repulsiveness, cruelty, and deformity. In descriptions of Yama red and black colors predominate.

In the final stage of his evolution, Yama shares two significant characteristics with *Śiva*: he is *Kāla* ("time") and *Dharmarāja* ("lord of righteousness"). As *Kāla*, he is also *Antaka*, the "ender" (i.e., Death). As *Dharmarāja*, he takes over *Varuṇa's* role as the moral judge and punisher whose assistants torture the wicked in hell. At this stage his name is clearly derived differently, from the root *yam* ("to control"), from which are derived *yantraṇa* ("constriction") and *yantraṇā* ("torture"). As *Dharmarāja*, Yama can also be lenient to supplicants and revoke his own order (as he did for *Sāvitrī*) or modify it (as he did for *Pramadvarā* in the *Mahābhārata*).

Numerous episodes in the epics and *Purāṇas* contribute to Yama's almighty and sinister image. This image contrasts with his early Vedic appearance as a minor god who is simply a "gatherer of men." A cluster of hymns in the tenth and last book of the *Ṛgveda* presents him as a benign god like any other in the pantheon. But from the *Yajurveda* (especially in the *Puruṣamedha* sacrifice), where different oblations are prescribed for each of the various aspects of Yama, his personality undergoes a radical change: from the benevolent god of the dead he becomes the dread god of death. The theophany of Yama as *Kāla*, *Antaka*, and *Dharmarāja* brings him closer to *Śiva*.

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SUKUMARI BHATTACHARJI

YAMAGA SOKŌ (1622–1685), Japanese Confucian of the school of Ancient Learning (Kogaku). Sokō was born in Aizu, the son of a masterless warrior named Yamaga Sadamochi (1585–1664) and Sadamochi's mistress, Myōchi (d. 1677). He began studying the Confucian classics at the age of five or six, and at eight he was enrolled at the Hayashi school in Edo (present-day Tokyo). As a youth, he also studied Japanese literature, Shintō, and military science—the latter with Obata Kagenori (1572–1663) and Hōjō Ujinaga (1609–1670).

Sokō first achieved fame in 1642 when he published *Heihō yūbishū* (Collected Writings on Military Methods and Preparedness), a fifty-volume work on military science that treated a whole range of subjects from castle defense to warrior organization. Over the next two decades his lectures on military affairs and the Chinese classics attracted growing numbers of local warriors and lords. In 1652 Sokō entered the service of Asano Naganao (1610–1672), lord of the Akō domain, and served him until 1660, when he resigned to devote himself to teaching. Despite his service in the Asano house and his success as a teacher, Sokō longed to become a direct retainer of the shogun. Although he nearly realized this ambition on several occasions, his hopes were dashed in 1666 when the senior councillor Hoshina Masayuki

(1611–1672) had him exiled to the Akō domain. The ostensible reason for this was the publication of *Seikyō yōroku* (Essentials of the Sages' Teachings), in which Sokō criticized the officially sanctioned Neo-Confucianism. During his exile Sokō was well cared for by the Asano family, had an endless stream of visitors from Edo, and wrote more than seventeen books, the most important of which were *Takkyō dōmon* (A Child's Queries During Exile), *Chūchō jijitsu*, (The Truth about Japan), and *Haishō zanpitsu* (Last Testament in Exile). When he was pardoned in 1675 he returned to Edo, where he resumed his teaching career, once again lecturing on military science and Confucianism. He died of jaundice in 1685.

Sokō is best known as a military thinker, Confucian scholar, and nationalist. Early in his life he concentrated on formalizing and systematizing the essentially medieval mores, customs, and institutions of the warrior class. In the early 1650s, he developed the notion of what he called *bushidō* ("way of the warrior"), which, borrowing heavily from Neo-Confucianism, provided a philosophical basis for military science and described the ideal behavior of a class whose chief function was no longer to fight but to govern.

Sokō is also known as an advocate of Ancient Learning. While he had once subscribed to Neo-Confucianism, he came to oppose it, calling for a return to the teachings of the ancient Chinese sages and Confucius. In *Seikyō yōroku*, he attacked Neo-Confucianism's introspective concerns and in their stead, advanced a new utilitarianism, stressed the importance of social relationships, and recommended the revival of ancient Chinese regulations and rituals. Sokō began the work that Itō Jinsai (1627–1705) and Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), his successors in the school of Ancient Learning, would complete. While in exile, Sokō became an ardent nationalist. In *Chūchō jijitsu* and *Takkyō dōmon* he argued that Japan's indigenous religion, Shintō ("way of the gods"), was superior to Confucianism and that Japan itself was superior to China and all other countries in the world. [See the biographies of Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai.]

Sokō's writings reveal, first, an impressive eclecticism that reflects his having studied, at different times, Neo-Confucianism, Shintō, military science, Buddhism, and even Taoism. They also reflect his concern, associated with his utilitarianism, with the actual affairs of daily life and the larger problem of how best to govern the country. Finally, Sokō's writings give evidence of his fierce loyalty to the shogun and the government he headed. Although Sokō never became a direct retainer of the shogun, he taught hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Tokugawa retainers and formulated political principles aimed at strengthening shogunal rule.

[See also Confucianism in Japan and Bushidō.]

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SAMUEL HIDEO YAMASHITA

YAMATO TAKERU, legendary general of the early Japanese army in the formative period of the Japanese state. The son of the twelfth emperor, Keiko, Yamato Takeru, or Yamato the Brave, was first sent to southwestern Japan to conquer the Kumaso, a non-Japanese tribe. After completing the expedition successfully, Yamato Takeru was ordered to lead another, this time to conquer the area to the east, including present-day Tokyo, where the barbarian Emishi lived. As his army entered the land of Michinoku in the northeast, a great mirror was hung upon Yamato Takeru's ship, so that when he arrived at the Emishi frontier their chief, encamped at the harbor in preparation for battle, saw the ship from afar and was overcome with fear. The Emishi flung away their bows and arrows and bowed toward the invaders. This episode suggests that the mirror, one of the most significant and sacred religious objects in ancient Japan, played an important role on the battlefield as an object with power to intimidate the enemy.

Although this account of Yamato Takeru's conquests cannot be fully substantiated, it is likely that there was a very early story concerning Yamato Takeru's exploits that was later expanded until it evolved into the account found in the early chronicles.

After conquering the east, Yamato Takeru died on his way back to Yamato, the capital, and was buried at Nobono in Ise Province. The chronicles then relate:

Now Yamato Takeru, taking the shape of a white bird, came forth from the tomb, and flew towards the Land of Yamato. The officers accordingly opened the coffin, and looking in, saw that only the empty clothing remained, and that there was no corpse. Thereupon messengers were sent to follow in search of the white bird. It stopped on the plain of Kotobiki in Yamato. Accordingly in that place a mound was erected. The white bird flew on again until it reached Kawachi, where it rested in the village of Furuichi, and in this place

also a mound was erected. . . . At last it soared aloft to Heaven, and there was nothing buried but his clothing and official cap. (Aston, 1896, vol. 1, pp. 210-211)

Morris suggests that the myth of the white bird may reflect Chinese Taoist ideas concerning immortal spirits (1975, p. 10). The ancient Japanese, however, believed that when one dies the spirit moves into a bird (Aston, 1896, vol. 1, p. 66). It was on the basis of this belief that the death of Yamato Takeru developed into a beautiful myth.

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KAKUBAYASHI FUMIO

YAMAZAKI ANSAI (1618-1682), Japanese Confucian and Shintō scholar of the early Tokugawa period. The son of a samurai who lost his position in the turbulence of the early Tokugawa period, Ansaï was set at a young age on a career as a Zen priest. However, in his twenties he became acquainted with the anti-Buddhist writings of the Sung Chinese Neo-Confucian scholar Chu Hsi. Inspired by them, he rejected Buddhism in favor of Confucianism, left the monastery, and devoted himself to the study and explication of the ideas of Chu Hsi. He attracted a large number of disciples, drawn primarily from the samurai class, and developed close relations with a number of important political figures. He thus played a significant part in the spread of Confucian learning among the Tokugawa samurai class. Ansaï was also deeply interested in the fusion of Confucianism and Shintō that had been developed by contemporary Shintō scholars like Kikkawa Koretari. From Kikkawa, Ansaï received the Shintō religious name of Suika Reisha, and Ansaï's own version of Confucian-flavored Shintō is known as Suika Shintō.

Insisting that, like Confucius, he sought only to transmit, not to create, Ansaï wrote little of a systematic, interpretive nature. His preferred method was to compile selections of excerpts from the writings of Chu Hsi and to express his own views on Chu Hsi's teachings through lectures on these excerpts and a few chosen texts. Ansaï's ideas were thus transmitted primarily in the form of lecture notes taken down by his disciples. As reflected in these notes, Ansaï's lectures, delivered in a forceful, colloquial style, sought both to come to terms with the complexities of Chu Hsi's metaphysics and to convey them to a relatively uneducated audience

in a simple, direct fashion. This approach was undoubtedly an important factor behind the popularity and influence of his school.

Similarly, Ansai stressed mastery of a few basic texts rather than wide reading. Whereas other Tokugawa Confucian scholars, such as Hayashi Razan, stressed the importance of erudition and thereby presented Confucian learning as the special province of the professional scholar, Ansai decried the pursuit of erudition as encouraging dilettantism and as counterproductive to the development of a firm sense of moral priorities. Confucian scholars of other schools criticized his position as narrow and rigid, but it did serve to offer a large audience entry into the forbidding body of Chinese Confucian literature.

Ansai insisted that his selection of the core teachings of Chu Hsi constituted the orthodox tradition. In fact, however, he modified Chu Hsi's ideas in several important ways. For instance, he gave added emphasis to the moral importance of the relation between lord and vassal, depicting the obligation of the vassal to the lord in absolute terms comparable to that between parent and child. The Ansai school position on this subject contributed to the growth of the idea, found widely in the late Tokugawa period, of the absolute, eternal nature of the obligation of loyalty to the imperial line.

Another area in which Ansai deviated significantly from Chu Hsi was in emphasizing the importance of "reverence" over "investigation of the principle of things" in the process of the individual's cultivation of his innate moral nature. The resulting stress on cleaving to the norms of Confucianism and on rigorous introspection to ensure that one's behavior conformed to those norms contributed to the characteristically stern and dogmatic tone of the Ansai school.

Ansai's linking of Confucianism and Shintō was another distinctive feature of his teachings. Unlike other Confucian scholars such as Hayashi Razan, who sought to equate Shintō and the Confucian way, Ansai presented them as two distinct manifestations of a universal truth, each particular to the country in which it originated. Ansai's joining of Shintō and Confucianism added a note of mystery and religious authority to Confucianism that furthered its acceptance in Tokugawa society, while his insistence on the particularly "Japanese" character of Shintō endowed his school with a nationalistic flavor that tended to increase with the passage of time. However, many of the connections Ansai made between Shintō and Confucianism were forced and far-fetched, and his leading disciples, although declaring themselves faithful to the essence of Ansai's teachings, broke with him over the question of the relationship between Confucianism and Shintō. This

break led in later years to the division of the Ansai school into two major branches, one Confucian and one Shintō.

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KATE WILDMAN NAKAI

YĀMUNA (fl. c. 1022–1038 CE), known in Tamil as Ālavandār; Hindu philosopher, theologian, and devotional poet. Yāmuna lived in the Tamil-speaking area of South India and represented a learned family of brahmins who played a leading role in the formulation of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition and of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta, which is most widely associated with the name of Rāmānuja. The Śrī Vaiṣṇavas made a major contribution to the development of Hindu religion by being the first Brahmanic movement to integrate fully into the classical Vedic tradition a popular, predominantly non-Brahmanic religious movement, the ecstatic devotion (*bhakti*) of the Tamil hymnists called the Ālvārs. This synthesis of popular or vernacular elements with Vedic or Sanskritic ones provided a highly influential model for a number of later Hindu theistic sectarian movements.

Yāmuna is recognized as the fourth in the preceptorial line of *ācāryas*, or teachers, who provided the intellectual leadership of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava sect, and is the first for whom there are extant works. His incompletely preserved literary corpus thus provides the major beginning point for a study of the formulation of this important movement and its school of philosophical theology, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. Yāmuna's name is closely linked with that of his grandfather, Nāthamuni (c. tenth century), who is acknowledged as the first teacher in the Śrī Vaiṣṇava line. Nāthamuni, in addition to propounding a system of logic and epistemology (*nyāya*), was the head of a family of prestigious Bhāgavata brahmins devoted to Kṛṣṇa and is the one to whom tradition ascribes the canonization of the Tamil hymns of the Ālvārs in the collection entitled the *Divyaprabandha*. While the evidence for this traditional ascription is in-

conclusive, Yāmuna's two devotional hymns to Viṣṇu and Śrī, the *Stotraratna* and the *Catuśślokī*, reflect the influence of the Āḷvārs' ecstatic devotional style.

According to the tradition, Yāmuna's greatest contribution lay in attracting to the Śrī Vaiṣṇava sect Rāmānuja (eleventh to twelfth centuries), their sixth teacher and the classical exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Although the two never met, it is clear from the literary evidence that Yāmuna was the seminal thinker who provided the primary inspiration for Rāmānuja's major Vedantic writings. The basic structure for Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* was provided by Yāmuna's versified summary, the *Gītārthasaṃgraha*; and in his other works Rāmānuja regularly refers to and quotes from Yāmuna's major Vedantic philosophical writings, the *Siddhitraya*, a triad of critical works (*Ātmasiddhi*, *Samvitsiddhi*, and *Īśvarasiddhi*) that are now only fragmentarily preserved, having been eclipsed by Rāmānuja's own definitive works.

Another of Yāmuna's major contributions as represented by his largest completely preserved work, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, was his defense of the Pañcarātra revelation or scriptures (Āgamas) as being equal to the Vedas in authority. These Pañcarātra Āgamas, also called Tantras or Saṃhitās, provide the scriptural basis for the earliest post-Vedic, Tantric tradition to arise during the first millennium CE. Yāmuna's defense of these temple-oriented ritual texts as compatible with the Vedas and Vedānta facilitated a radical enlargement and enrichment of the Hindu scriptural base, as did the incorporation of the Tamil hymns of the Āḷvārs.

[See also Āḷvārs; Śrī Vaiṣṇavas; and Tamil Religions.]

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WALTER G. NEEVEL, JR.

YANTRA. Geometrical diagrams known as *yantras* form a very special class of religious symbols in Hinduism. Their forms and functions within the tradition vary according to their uses. The most important ones are those that serve as supports for daily ritual worship and as meditational aids to stimulate inner visualizations; others are employed in astrology and temple rites; some are meant for proficiency in occult arts, and many of these are used as talismans.

Meditational *yantras* are an indispensable constituent of Tantric worship and are a substitute for the deity's iconographic image. Basically, a *yantra* used in this context is an abstract icon of some personification or aspect of the deity. Most Indian divinities have been assigned aniconic symbols in their specific *yantras*. Whereas an anthropomorphic image is a static presentation, the *yantra* is a dynamic symbol of the totality of the cosmos. Hence it is represented as an expanding form emanating from the central nucleus, a dimensionless point, the *bindu*. A linear configuration, the *yantra* usually has around its center several concentric primal shapes, such as triangles, hexagons, circles, octagons, and rings of lotus petals. The figure's periphery is a square enclosure with four sacred doors opening toward the four cardinal directions. The centrifugal *yantras* are conceived of as a sacred dwelling in which the presiding deity and its retinue take up residence. The seat of the principal deity is in the center, while those of its emanations, or *parivāra devatās*, are arranged concentrically



FIGURE 1. Śrīcakra, after the *Nityaśoḍaśikārṇava*

in successive circuits known as *āvaraṇas* ("veils"), so called because they conceal the luminous splendor of the deity in the center.

At the subtlest level, *yantras* translate into visual terms the theory of cosmogenesis. They are to be read as dynamic graphs of the creative process of cosmic evolution and involution that takes place from the center and moves outward. The creative process is represented by the unity of the male and female principles, which, descending into the world of multiplicity, are symbolized by the concentric geometric circuits. The best example of this type of *yantra* is the Śrīcakra of the cult of the goddess Tripurasundarī. It is composed by the interlacing of two sets of triangles: four apexes point upward, representing Śiva, the male principle, and five apexes point downward, representing Śakti, the female principle. The Śrīcakra is devised to give a vision of the totality of existence, so that the adept may internalize its symbols for the ultimate awareness of his own unity with the cosmos. Every meditational *yantra* is in essence a psychic improvisation in which the closed concentric circuits of various geometric shapes, from the periphery to the center, correspond to the planes of the adept's consciousness. (See figure 1.)

Architectural *yantras* contribute substantially to the conceptual basis of the Hindu temple. An early example is the Vāstupuruṣa Maṇḍala, of which Hindu manuals of architecture provide thirty-two variations. (See figure 2.) The *maṇḍala* represents the diagram of the ordered cosmos. In Tantric temple rites, *yantras* were laid into the foundation of the womb chamber and were also embedded in cult figures installed in the shrine. *Yantras* were also used as compositional diagrams in the execution of sculptural images adorning the walls of the temple. The architectural *yantra* functions as an ideo-

gram, while the temple is a materialization of the concepts it embodies. [See also Temple, article on Hindu Temples.]

Occult *yantras* are distinguished from all other *yantras* by their practical applications. They serve as powerful diagrams of magical potency, used mainly in preventive medicine, as good luck charms, for exorcism, to ward off calamities, and so forth. The occult figures are not stereotyped; their designs vary according to the object of worship. One of the most popular is the Dhāraṇa Yantra; worn as an amulet for protection, this *yantra* is given to a person after the priest has consecrated it in a life-giving ceremony. Another kind that serves the same purpose is the magical square. The proven efficacy of such *yantras* is explained in psychological terms. To the individual who wears a *yantra* as a talisman or an amulet, the diagram manifests itself as a repository of power through which the presence of the divinity can be invoked at will. Ultimately, the efficacy of the *yantra* is brought about by the adept's own willpower, working through faith. (See figure 3.)




FIGURE 3. Curative Yantra

Yantras are most commonly drawn on paper or engraved on metals or rock crystals, although any flat surface, such as a floor or wall, can be used. The *yantras* are always used in conjunction with *mantras*, or mystical sound-units, that correspond to the deity's subtle form. *Mantras* are employed to energize the latent force inherent in the deity's *yantra*. Indeed, it is said that a *yantra* without its seed *mantra* is as lifeless as a corpse.

[See also Mantra and Maṇḍalas, article on Hindu Maṇḍalas.]

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


FIGURE 2. Four Types of Vāstupuruṣa Maṇḍala

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MADHU KHANNA

YAO AND SHUN were legendary sage-rulers of antiquity in China. According to traditional Chinese historiography, T'ang Yao (Yao of the T'ang clan or state; personal name, Fang Hsün), or T'ang T'ao, ruled from 2356 to 2256 BCE. A ruler of great virtue, he considered his son Tan Chu (or, in some versions, his ten sons) unworthy to rule the empire, and thus selected Shun to be his successor, having first given to him his two daughters in marriage. Yü Shun (personal name, Ch'ung Hua) served Yao first as minister, then in Yao's old age as regent, finally succeeding him and ruling for fifty years. Shun in turn considered his son Shang Chün (or, in some versions, his nine sons) unworthy to rule and so he selected Yü as his successor. Yü became the founder of the Hsia, traditionally considered to be the first hereditary dynasty in China.

In Chou dynasty (eleventh to third century BCE) texts, history conventionally begins with the time of Yao. All the great cosmological events took place during his rule. The ten suns appeared, nine of which were shot down by the archer I; Pu Chou mountain, the pillar of the northwest, was brought down by Kung Kung; and the great flood occurred, which was eventually controlled by Yü. During the Warring States period (403–221), however, other rulers, some of whom were originally the mythical ancestors of other houses, began to be placed before Yao, and in the *Shih chi*, the universal history compiled by Ssu-ma Ch'ien during the second century BCE, Yao and Shun are but the most recent of five emperors.

Yao abdicated to Shun because of Shun's virtue. An exemplar of filial piety since the Chou period, Shun often appears on temple frescoes, usually following a plow drawn by an elephant. His filial piety is exemplary because his wicked father, Ku Sou ("blind man"), and his younger brother Hsiang ("elephant") both tried to murder him. They first tried to kill him by removing the ladder and setting fire to a granary while he was repairing its roof; then they filled in a well that he had been sent to dredge. The earliest version of this story is in the *Meng-tzu*. In the more elaborate Han

dynasty version found in *Lieh-nü chuan* (Biographies of Exemplary Women), Yao's daughters advised Shun as to how to escape his father's evil schemes. Shun continued to serve his father as a son should and without resentment; according to the *Meng-tzu*, his father was in the end pleased.

Although Shun is a symbol of filial piety, in accepting the succession to Yao and in marrying Yao's two daughters, he both went against his father's will and displaced Yao's son from the succession. His role therefore is paradoxical, and his story exemplifies the conflict between the principles of rule by virtue and rule by hereditary right that is a common theme in the succession legends recorded in Chou dynasty texts. Motifs in the story of Shun's succession, such as the ruler's perception of his successor's virtue in spite of his lowly position and his willingness to rely on a man of low birth, also occur in the legends that surround the foundation of the hereditary dynasties.

Elements in the stories of Yao and Shun in early texts suggest still earlier legends concerning clan origins. The earliest record of the story of Yao and Shun is found in the "Yao tien" chapter of the *Shang shu*, a Chou dynasty text. In this text, Yao is called *ti* ("lord"), a title that suggests Shang-ti, the high lord of the Shang dynasty (c. sixteenth to eleventh century BCE) who is later equated with T'ien (Heaven). The succession story of Yao to Shun may contain the remnants of an earlier cosmogonic myth in which the Lord on High first gave the rule to Shun, the progenitor of the Shang people. Shun has been identified with Ti K'u (who gave birth to the first Shang ancestor, Hsieh, by means of the egg of a black bird) and with Chün, the husband of Hsi-ho (who gave birth to the ten suns) and possibly the highest ancestor claimed by the Shang kings in their oracle-bone inscriptions.

Shun is also closely associated with the Eastern Yi tribe. His two wives are sometimes identified with the goddesses of the Hsiang River in the "Nine Songs" of the *Ch'u tz'u*.

[See also Kingship, article on Kingship in East Asia, and Chinese Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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SARAH ALLAN

YAZATAS. The term *yazata* occurs in the Avesta, the collection of sacred books of Zoroastrianism, as an attribute or designation of divine beings. From this term is derived the Middle Persian *yazd* ("god"; pl., *yazdān*). The word appears frequently in the Avesta, although not in the five *Gāthās* ("songs") attributed to Zarathushtra (Zoroaster); in Gathic it appears only in the *Yasna Haptanhāit* (*Yasna of the Seven Chapters*), ascribed to Ahura Mazdā. Its meaning in this text is "worthy of worship, worthy of sacrifice" (from the verb *yaz*, "to venerate, sacrifice"), identical to that of its Vedic counterpart, *yajata*. This is the general meaning of the term, which is used to refer to divine beings, usually secondary gods, personifications, or cult gods of the pre-Zoroastrian Indo-European pantheon that had been absorbed into the religion. Thus, as Zoroastrianism reached a compromise with ancient polytheism, *yazata* came to designate a deity who was readmitted to the cult. At the beginning of the hymn dedicated to Vāyu (*Yashts* 15), for example, the god is called *yazata* in a sentence that is evidently meant to justify the integration of the hymn within the canonical list of the *Yashts*, a section of the Avesta.

In the Zoroastrianism that evolved following the prophet's reforms, some of the ancient *daivas*—the word is used here in its most general and archaic sense, to mean "gods"—became or were reinstated as *yazatas*. That is, they were transformed from beings whose worship was forbidden (*daivas* in the later sense of "demons") back into beings whose worship was permitted or even recommended. The *Yashts* is very instructive in this regard: many passages in various hymns provide justification for the readmission to the cult of one or another *daiva*, and often it is Ahura Mazdā himself who is said to approve such a reintegration. [See *Daivas*.]

The meaning of *yazdān* in Pahlavi texts (from the ninth and tenth centuries CE) is derived from this general meaning of *yazata*. It is used for various categories of divine beings: for the gods in general, for the ancient *yazatas* in particular, and for the Ameshā Spentas (MPers., Amahraspandān). [See *Ameshā Spentas*.] The *yazdāns* rule over the months, the days, and five liturgical periods of the day.

But in the Avesta *yazata* has a precise meaning: any entity to whom a hymn is dedicated. Besides Ahura Mazdā and Vāyu, *yazata* refers, as has been noted (Kellens, 1976), to the following beings: Mithra, Sraosha ("discipline"), Arshtāt ("justice"), Nairyōsanha ("of manly utterance"), Verethraghna ("victory"), Ātar ("fire"), Apām Napāt ("son of the waters"), Zam ("earth"), and Gairi Ushidarena ("mountain dawn-abode"). But in the so-called Younger Avesta it is, above all, the deities who form the escort of Mithra who are

defined as *yazatas*. From this it follows that not all the beings to whom a hymn in the Avesta is dedicated are in a strict sense *yazatas* and that *yazata* is not the Avestan equivalent of the Old Persian *baga*; the latter has no specific meaning but only carries the general sense of "god," as does the parallel Avestan *bagha*.

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Translated from Italian by Roger DeGaris

YEHOSHU'A BEN ḤANANYAH (first and second centuries CE), Palestinian tanna who taught in Jerusalem and later at Yavneh and Peqi'in. Legend has it that when he was a child his mother carried him to the study hall so that he would become accustomed to hearing words of the Torah (J.T., *Yev.* 3a). Because he was a Levite, it is assumed that he sang in the Temple before it was destroyed. He is said to have made his living as a needlemaker or blacksmith.

Yehoshu'a achieved prominence as a leading rabbinic authority of his day. He was one of the five prominent disciples of Yoḥanan ben Zakk'ai (*Avot* 2.8). With Eli'ezer ben Hyrcanus, Yehoshu'a is alleged to have carried Yoḥanan ben Zakk'ai out of Jerusalem in a coffin in 68 CE during the siege of the city by the Romans (B.T., *Git.* 56a). During Yehoshu'a's later career he was the center of contention within rabbinical circles. Several sources recount how he was humiliated by the *nasi* Gamli'el (B.T., *R. ha-Sh.* 25a). Yehoshu'a's dispute with Gamli'el over whether the evening prayer was compulsory or voluntary brought about the events that led to the deposition of Gamli'el and the ascension of El'azar ben 'Azaryah to the office of *nasi* (B.T., *Ber.* 28a).

Yehoshu'a was involved in many legal disputes with Eli'ezer ben Hyrcanus; one celebrated argument concerned the ritual cleanness of the ovens of 'Akhn'ai (a kind of tiled oven). Yehoshu'a ruled that the ovens were ritually unclean; Eli'ezer said that the ovens could not become ritually unclean (B.T., *B.M.* 59a-b). Eli'ezer an-

nounced that a heavenly voice had declared his own position correct. Yehoshu'a responded with the famous declaration: "It [the Torah] is not in heaven" (a quotation from *Dt.* 30:12)—that is, the rabbis alone have the authority to decide matters of law, not a supernatural voice or even a direct revelation.

An important teaching attributed to Yehoshu'a shows a positive attitude toward outsiders: He declared that pious gentiles will be able to enter heaven (*Tosefta, San.* 13.2). According to tradition, he engaged in many discourses with political figures and various groups, including the Roman emperor Hadrian, the elders of Athens, and the Jews of Alexandria.

Recent scholarship has questioned the legitimacy of attempts at reconstructing the lives of Yehoshu'a and his fellow rabbis from the scattered traditions in rabbinic literature. No systematic analysis has been made of Yehoshu'a's philosophical or religious beliefs.

[For discussion of the circle of sages to which Yehoshu'a belonged, see *Tannaim*.]

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TZVEE ZAHAVY

YEHOSHU'A BEN LEVI, Palestinian amora of the early third century. A native of Lydda (modern-day Lod), Yehoshu'a reflects the interests and traditions of Judaea at a time when rabbinic activity was becoming increasingly concentrated farther north in Galilee.

Yehoshu'a's son married into the patriarchal house (*B.T., Qid.* 33b), a fact that may explain the notorious incident in which Yehoshu'a arranged for a wanted Jewish nationalist to be handed over to the Romans (*J.T., Ter.* 8.10, 46b). In general, he was an active representative of Jewish interests before the Roman authorities, both in the regional capital at Caesarea (*J.T., Ber.* 5.1, 9a) and, apparently, even in Rome (*Gn. Rab.* 33.1, 78.5). On the other hand, by ordaining his own disciples (*J.T., Ned.* 10.8, 42b), Yehoshu'a contributed to one of the important developments in Palestine in the third and fourth centuries—the weakened prestige of the patriarchate among the rabbis of the Land of Israel.

Yehoshu'a's main distinction was as a master of *ag-gadah* (nonlegal rabbinic thought), a rubric of learning that he associated with the "honor" promised in *Prov-*

erbs 21:21 (*B.T., B.B.* 9b). He was a fervent advocate of Torah study (*B.T., Mak.* 10a, *Meg.* 27a, *'Eruv.* 54a). His descriptions of the fates of the righteous and the wicked after death (*B.T., 'Eruv.* 19a) and his reported conversations with the Angel of Death and with the prophet Elijah (*B.T., Ber.* 51a, *Ket.* 77b; *J.T., Ter.* 8.10, 46b) made him a favorite subject of later legend. It was to him that Elijah allegedly made his famous remark that the Messiah might come any day—any day, that is, that Israel was ready to listen to God's commands (*B.T., San.* 98a).

Although Yehoshu'a was technically not a tanna, he lived close enough to the tannaitic period, and his teachings were honored enough, that one of his sayings was added to the closing paragraph of the Mishnah (*Uqts.* 3.12) and another was included in the supplementary chapter added to the Mishnaic tractate *Avot* (known as *Ethics of the Fathers*, 6.2).

[See also *Amoraim*.]

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ROBERT GOLDENBERG

YEHUDAH BAR IL'AI (second century CE), Palestinian tanna. Born in Usha, in the lower Galilee, he was a student of 'Aqiva' and Ṭarfon and was ordained as rabbi by Yehudah ben Bava' during the Hadrianic persecutions in the aftermath of the Bar Kokhba Revolt.

Numerous traditions attributed to Yehudah are preserved in rabbinic literature where he is usually referred to without patronymic. Along with Me'ir, Shim'on, and Yose, he is one of the most frequently quoted authorities of his generation. His importance is reflected in the tradition that tells us that his contemporaries were called "members of Yehudah bar Il'ai's generation" (*B.T., San.* 20a). Yehudah is also one of the most important transmitters of rabbinic teachings from the Sanhedrin at Yavneh before the Bar Kokhba Revolt to the Sanhedrin at Usha afterward. He cites numerous legal rulings in the names of 'Aqiva', Ṭarfon, and other masters of the period of rabbinic activity at Yavneh.

To date, no systematic analysis has been made of Yehudah's traditions, probably because of the sheer size of the corpus of sayings attributed to him. There are, for example, some 180 disputes recorded between Yehudah

and Neḥemyah, yet these represent only a fraction of the entire collection ascribed to Yehudah. Jacob Epstein (1957) believes that the corpus of his traditions was one of the primary documents used in the redaction of the Mishnah by his student Yehudah ha-Nasi'. Several of his rulings deal with the standardization of rabbinic liturgy (*Ber.* 4.1), the regulation of prayer (*Ber.* 4.7; *Tosefta, Ber.* 1.9; *Tosefta, Ber.* 3.5), and the regulation of daily liturgical blessings (*Tosefta, Ber.* 6.18). Other rules ascribed to Yehudah emphasize the importance of concentration and intention during the performance of rituals (*Tosefta, Ber.* 2.2) and the importance of maintaining the proper frame of mind during recitation of prayers (*Ber.* 2.2). Yehudah is also associated with legislation concerning the recitation of blessings over foods (*Ber.* 6.4; *Tosefta, Ber.* 4.4–5) and with blessings over natural wonders, both those for which one is permitted to recite blessings (*Ber.* 9.2) and those for which one is forbidden to recite blessings because it would appear to be a form of idolatry (*Tosefta, Ber.* 6.6). Yehudah's legal, exegetical, and theological sayings range across the whole spectrum of rabbinic thought and life.

[See also Tannaim.]

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TZVEE ZAHAVY

YEHUDAH BAR YEḤEZQE'Ī (c. 220–c. 299), a leading second-generation Babylonian amora, based in Pumbedita. He studied chiefly with Rav and then Shemu'el. Although remaining subservient to the exilarch (B.T., *Qid.* 70a–70b), the leader of the Jewish community appointed by the Persian authorities, Yehudah was empowered by him to apply rabbinic law in the marketplace and in civil and other matters that fell under his jurisdiction, especially through the enforcement of documents (B.T., *Mo'ed Q.* 4b, *Yev.* 39b).

As a teacher of rabbinic tradition, Yehudah cited the Mishnah to draw out its subtle legal points and to emend or explain it to make it fit the physical and social conditions of Babylonian Jewry or extra-Mishnaic tannaitic traditions (Epstein, 1964). In interpreting and rewording the comments of Rav and Shemu'el, Yehudah played a crucial role in preserving and employing

their teachings (Bokser, 1980, esp. pp. 399–406, 414–415).

Yehudah was accorded high status due to his communal role, expertise in tracing peoples' genealogy, and devotion to Torah study (see, e.g., B.T., *Mo'ed Q.* 16b–17a, *Ḥag.* 15b). People believed that he was able to communicate with the dead, intercede for rain, and give insightful advice on health and other practical matters (B.T., *Ber.* 20a and parallels, 'A.Z. 28b–29a). He lectured in the *pirqa'*, a popular instructional gathering for both aggadic and halakhic subjects aimed at the general public but to which disciples were also expected to attend (B.T., *Shab.* 148a).

Notably, Yehudah speculated on the creation (B.T., *Shab.* 77b), handed down teachings on sacred objects such as the *mezuzah* and fringes (*tsitsit*) (B.T. *Men.* 35b, 39b, 41a), and proposed additional blessing formulas for the wedding ceremony (B.T., *Ket.* 7b–8a) and other situations. He reportedly concentrated on *neziqin* (Torts)—the area in which he had received actual authority from the exilarch. Stating that the laws of *neziqin* had to be carried out to obtain saintliness (B.T., *B. Q.* 30a), Yehudah asserted that equity in one's daily life was a criterion of one's faith. This rootedness in the practical realm and concern that people relate to the society in which they live may be further reflected in his teachings that discouraged his disciples from emigrating from Babylonia to Palestine (B.T., *Ber.* 24b; B.T., *Ket.* 110b–111a); he believed they should not hold their personal religious goals over the needs of the community in the here and now, in the Diaspora.

[See also Amoraim.]

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BARUCH M. BOKSER

YEHUDAH HA-LEVI (c. 1075–1141), Jewish poet, theologian, and physician. Born in either Tudela or Toledo, Spain, to a wealthy and cultured family, Yehudah ben Shemu'el ha-Levi was well educated. He studied the Bible, rabbinic literature, Arabic poetry, philosophy, and medicine. During his early travels in southern Spain he won acclaim for his poetic talent and was warmly received by many prominent Jewish families.

However, in the wake of the Almoravid invasions of the area to halt the Christian *reconquista*, his enjoyment of courtly life was cut short. Eventually he settled in Christian-held Toledo, supporting himself as a physician and continuing to write. But he viewed with growing alarm the disruption of Jewish life throughout Andalusia. Sometime after 1125, in response to the queries of a Karaite thinker, ha-Levi began to draft a defense of Judaism, which developed into his most famous work, the *Kuzari*. In the summer of 1140, various personal, political, and religious considerations prompted him to depart for Palestine. Legend claims that he was killed within sight of Jerusalem, although recent studies suggest that he died *en route*, in Egypt.

Ha-Levi's poetry is generally regarded as the finest Hebrew verse written in the Middle Ages. Besides addressing all the traditional secular and religious themes of his day, he also developed, in his poems of Zion, an entirely new genre expressing both his own and his people's longing for renewal in their ancestral home. This longing was intensified by the upheavals and persecution suffered by Jews on both sides of the Mediterranean following the Almoravid invasion of Andalusia and the First Crusade. As ha-Levi observes,

Between the hosts of Se'ir [Christians] and Qedar [Muslims],
My host is utterly lost . . .
When they wage their wars, we fall with their fall.

Dismayed by the upheavals within Spanish Jewish life and sensing its eventual dissolution, ha-Levi began to question the value of some of its main cultural pursuits, especially philosophic speculation about religion:

Let not the wisdom of the Greeks beguile you
Which has no fruit, but only flowers . . .
Why should I seek out crooked ways
And forsake the mother of paths?

While philosophy could produce a tantalizing array of opinions, it could not satisfy the spiritual hunger of men seeking concrete guidance for their actions. This required a return to the wellsprings of traditional Jewish piety, since one could approach God only by following "the mother of paths," the Torah.

I have sought Your nearness.
With all my heart have I called You;
And going out to meet You
I found You coming toward me.

Still, for ha-Levi, the path of return and religious renewal inevitably led to the Land of Israel as the chief site of past revelations and as the focus of God's promised redemption:

Have we either in the East or the West
A place of hope wherein we may trust,
Except the land that is full of gates
Toward which the gates of Heaven are open?

Ha-Levi's only theological work, the *Kuzari* (Book of the Khazars, or Book of Refutation and in Defense of the Despised Faith), develops these and other themes in a five-part dialogue, mainly between a pagan Khazar king who is converted to Judaism and the Jewish sage who instructs him. The king's conversion was factual, but ha-Levi created this dialogue with him to answer contemporary criticism of Judaism by representatives of philosophy, Christianity, Islam, and Karaism. The philosopher is clearly the most formidable spokesman of those who leave it to human reason to determine how best to serve God. The fact that a pagan king must evaluate their competing claims aids ha-Levi in giving all the participants, and notably Judaism, a fair hearing. It also underscores, inasmuch as a king is preeminently a man of action, the importance of practice over theory.

The story opens as the king repeatedly dreams that an angel is telling him that his intention is pleasing to God but his mode of worship is not. Convinced that this vision is genuine, he invites first an Aristotelian philosopher and then scholars of Christianity and Islam to instruct him.

The philosopher, expressing views reflecting the influence of Ibn Sinā and Ibn Bājjah, denies the presuppositions of the king's dream. God as a perfect and changeless First Cause has neither likes nor dislikes, he says, or even knowledge of the king's mutable behavior, for all these would imply deficiency and imperfection in God. Still, a man may perfect himself and even achieve prophecy by studying the eternal system of necessary causes that emanate from God, thus attaining union with the Active Intellect, the source of all human knowledge. Since the principal requirement for achieving that union is the purification of one's soul, it does not matter from a purely rational standpoint which religious regimen one follows.

The king finds the philosopher's argument plausible, but says it does not provide what he seeks. Nor does he find that philosophers are able to prophesy. Consequently, he turns to the Christian and Muslim scholars. Their expositions directly address his concern, but they do not provide adequate evidence for their respective claims. Still, because both scholars agree that their beliefs are based on God's well-attested revelation to Israel, the king finally consults a Jewish scholar.

The rabbi declares his faith in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, miraculously sustained them, and gave them his law in

the Torah of Moses. Subsequent discussion of these claims eventually convinces the king of their truth because they are supported by what he regards as compelling grounds: public, empirical, direct, and miraculous evidence. Over six hundred thousand initially skeptical Israelites saw and heard God personally reveal his commandments at Mount Sinai and transmitted a unanimous, reliable report of that occasion to subsequent generations.

The king regards the rabbi's account as superior not only to that of the other scholars but also to that of the philosopher. The philosopher infers the existence and nature of God from some aspect of the world's order, but such speculation is tenuous and uncertain, and it evokes no reverence for its object. By contrast, there is nothing tenuous or uncertain about the veracity of a collective experience of God, transmitted by a reliable, uninterrupted tradition.

The rabbi goes on to depict those few who are able to prophesy as quite literally belonging to the divine realm. Relying heavily on conceptions current in Shiism, he argues that in relation to the traditional hierarchy of inorganic matter, plants, animals, and human beings, this elect group (*ṣafwah*) constitutes an essentially separate order, manifesting extraordinary faculties and behavior. Because they are by nature conjoined with "the divine thing" (*al-amr al-ilāhī*)—ha-Levi's multivalent term for diverse aspects of divine immanence—they alone can communicate God's will to ordinary persons, whereas human speculation and cosmic powers, like the Active Intellect, cannot. Tradition identifies Adam as the first to possess this prophetic faculty or inner eye. From him it passed to the biblical heroes until it reached the children of Israel. Prophecy flourished among them because, like choice fruit, it was cultivated in the ideal climate of the Land of Israel, through use of the Hebrew language and adherence to the regimen of God's own laws. With exile and the neglect of many commandments, prophecy ceased, yet it will reappear once the original conditions are restored.

After converting, the king learns more about these matters and also that Israel remains a living focus of divine providence in the world, despite its exile and degradation. While other nations and religions imitate its religious institutions, they are "dead" by comparison; they rise and fall according to chance and natural causes, being subject neither to miraculous deliverances nor to catastrophic defeats. Israel, however, like a seed cast upon the ground, is governed by a secret, providential wisdom, whereby it transforms its surroundings and will eventually produce a unified humanity obedient to God's will.

The pious man personifies this obedience with a faith

that is natural and wholehearted, neither the product of speculation nor vulnerable to it. Ruling himself and his inclinations, he is uniquely suited to rule the city, for like Plato's philosopher-king he gives everything its due by exercising rational choice. The behavior of the pious man thus conforms to the rational, political laws (such as decrees of justice) that are preambles to the divine traditional laws (such as ritual rules), preceding them in nature and in time. The former constitute the indispensable prerequisite for the existence of any group, even a den of robbers. But the divine laws are more important than the rational laws, because they specify the application of the latter and also bring people to communion with God and to happiness in ways that reason cannot explain.

In their knowledge of God, both the pious and the prophets apprehend all that the philosophers do and more. They, too, recognize God generically as Elohim, the governing cause of the universe from whom the natural forms of all things emanate in regular ways, indifferent to the needs and merits of human beings. But they also experience God individually as YHVH (Adonai), who reveals himself to those suitably prepared and who overrides natural causes on their behalf at predetermined times. Only as YHVH does God evoke love and service, for in communion with him humans find their greatest happiness, and in separation from him, their greatest misery.

The rabbi's final exposition and critique of philosophy attempts to show the king that he need not be persuaded by many of its key claims, since they are untenable. Earlier he had suggested that the philosopher seeks wisdom only because he lacks a reliable tradition embracing wisdom, while Israel has received divine wisdom in a Torah that contradicts nothing truly demonstrated by philosophy. Apparently influenced by al-Ghazālī's *Incoherence of the Philosophers*, he now suggests that what has been so demonstrated is confined largely to mathematics and logic. In physics, he argues, the philosophers' account of the four elements is empirically unsubstantiated. In psychology, their theory of the Active Intellect entails numerous absurdities, and in metaphysics, their views on divine causation are riddled with inconsistency. The most we can know regarding metaphysics is that only God governs material things by determining their natural forms. Since philosophy offers little wisdom about matters of such importance, a turn toward the divine wisdom embodied in Israel's ancestral tradition is called for. But, as the rabbi recognizes, a wholehearted turn toward the ancestral tradition can be completed only by a return to the ancestral land. Accordingly, as the dialogue closes, he follows the logic of his position and departs for the Holy Land.

Ha-Levi was the first medieval Jewish thinker to appreciate fully the challenge posed to Judaism by Aristotelian rationalism and to address it in a philosophically literate way. Speaking as a religious empiricist and working from the sources of Judaism, he produced what has become a classic theological defense of Judaism as a suprarational religion of revealed practice.

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BARRY S. KOGAN

YEHUDAH HA-NASI' (135?–220?), called "Rabbi" or "Our Holy Rabbi"; Palestinian tanna. Yehudah was the son of Shim'on ben Gamli'el of Yavneh. With him

the office of *nasi'* (patriarch, head of the court) reached its zenith. Reestablished by the Romans after the disastrous defeat of the Bar Kokhba Revolt in 135 CE, the position of *nasi'*, by the end of the century, afforded Yehudah an authority recognized by Jews and Romans alike. Even the Jewish community in Babylonia looked to him as the head of the Jewish people.

As *nasi'*, Yehudah first established his court in Beit Shearim. [See the map accompanying Judaism, overview article.] However, for reasons of health he spent the last seventeen years of his life in Sepphoris (J.T., *Ket.* 12.3, 35a). Yehudah's major task as *nasi'* was to secure the economic recovery of Israel after the destruction caused by the Bar Kokhba Revolt. He and his court exempted several places from tithes (J.T., *Dem.* 2.1, 22c-d), enacted laws that allowed Jews to regain ownership of land confiscated by the Romans during the Bar Kokhba Revolt (B.T., *Git.* 58b), eased the laws of the Sabbatical years to increase the food supply in Israel (J.T., *Ta'an.* 3.1, 66c), took over the important task of proclaiming the new month and intercalating the year (J.T., *San.* 1.2, 18c), and introduced regulations that eased the taking of testimony and the dispatching of messengers to declare the court's decision concerning the new months (J.T., *R. ha-Sh.* 2.1, 58a). His support of the rabbinic class found expression in his exempting the sages from some taxes (B.T., *B.B.* 8a).

The significance of Yehudah's tenure as *nasi'* is seen in the many stories that depict a close relationship between him and the Roman emperor (B.T., *A.Z.* 10a–b, *San.* 9 1a–b; J.T., *Meg.* 1.11, 72b; J.T., *San.* 10.5, 29c; *Gn. Rab.* 11.4, 67.6, 75.7, 84.3). For example, we find the following in *Berakhot* 57b of the Babylonian Talmud: "And YHVH said to her, 'Two nations are in your womb' [*Gn.* 25:23]. Do not read nations [*goyim*], but 'lords' [*ge'im*], and Rav Yehudah [third century amora] said in the name of Rav: 'These are [Marcus Aurelius] Antoninus and Rabbi, whose table never lacked either radish, lettuce or cucumbers either in summer or winter.'" These many stories are meant to equate Yehudah (Rabbi) with the leader of the most powerful political force of his time. Whether the conversations reported in these texts actually occurred is open to question. However, the point they make is clear: our patriarch was as powerful and important as their emperor.

At the same time that the sages picture Yehudah as an outstanding political leader, they also describe him as an exceptionally learned rabbi. One proverb stated that "from the days of Moses until the days of Rabbi we did not find both Torah and Greatness in one place" (B.T., *Git.* 59a). We read that he wandered from academy to academy so that he might learn from all five of

'Aqiva' ben Yosef's major students as well as from the other leading sages of his time (B.T., 'Eruv. 53a, Yoma' 79b, Yev. 84a, Shab. 147b, Meg. 20a).

In addition, Yehudah ha-Nasi' exhibited the qualities of the "ideal sage." Shi'mon ben Menasya' said, "All of the seven characteristics which the sages attributed to the righteous—comeliness, strength, riches, wisdom, old age, honor, and children—all of them were established in Rabbi and his sons" (*Avot* 6.9). Although Yehudah was so wealthy that his house steward was said to be richer than the Persian ruler Shāpūr I (r. 241–272; B.T., *B.M.* 85a), his generosity was also well known. He used to invite the sages to his table, and during years of need, he opened his private storehouses to the hungry (B.T., 'Eruv. 73a, *B.B.* 8a). When a person strayed from the correct path, Yehudah was there to guide him gently back to God (B.T., *B.M.* 85a). He showed kindness and compassion to all of God's creatures, even to the insects (*Gen. Rab.* 33.3). He was willing to learn from all, and he never treated his contemporaries with disrespect or contempt; he often accepted their teachings when they differed from his own (B.T., *Ket.* 93a). One proverb stated that "when Rabbi died humility and fear of sin ceased" (B.T., *Soṭ.* 49b). He was noted for his support of the Hebrew language in favor of the vernacular Aramaic, and it was claimed that he spoke only Hebrew in his house and that the sages would come to him seeking explanations of Hebrew words and phrases (B.T., *B.Q.* 82b, *R. ha-Sh.* 26b; J.T., *Shevi'it* 9.1 38c).

No other political leader so captured the minds and imaginations of the ancient rabbis. Upon Yehudah's death the sages decreed a fast and offered prayers of supplication, and a voice from heaven proclaimed that "whoever has been present at Rabbi's death is destined to enjoy life in the world to come" (B.T., *Ket.* 103b–104a). His burial place in Beit Shearim was visited by generations of Jewish pilgrims.

During Yehudah's tenure as *nasi'*, the foundation document of postbiblical rabbinic Judaism, the Mishnah, was created. This collection of primarily legal statements formed the basis of both the Babylonian and Jerusalem (Palestinian) Talmuds, repositories of Jewish law and lore from the first six centuries of the common era which organized as commentaries on the Mishnah. The appearance of the Mishnah also marked a crucial stage in the process of the development of Judaism from a temple-oriented cult to a Torah-oriented culture of study and exposition. [See Rabbinic Judaism in Late Antiquity.]

Generations of scholars have maintained that Yehudah himself was the sole editor of the Mishnah. Many have attempted to explain the processes by which he

created this document from sources composed by Hillel the Elder, 'Aqiva' ben Yosef, and Me'ir. Basing themselves largely on the letter of Sherira' Gaon (tenth century), these scholars have argued that Yehudah merely did what others before him had done; he faithfully preserved and transmitted what he had received from his teachers. Although nothing was written down before Yehudah, the earlier oral traditions were part of a memorized corpus which was carefully preserved and which included the names of those who had written opinions or of the majority. Totally available to Yehudah, this material was organized by him into a unified text according to comprehensive principles.

More recently, Jacob Neusner has concluded, on the basis of detailed literary analyses, that the Mishnah is not the work of one man. However, there is no doubt that the Mishnah's reputation was enhanced by its completion at Yehudah's court and that its importance in the history and development of Judaism stems from the central place that Yehudah and his colleagues occupied in the minds and imaginations of subsequent generations of Jews.

[See also Mishnah and Tosefta and Tannaim.]

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GARY G. PORTON

YEHUDAH LÖW BEN BETSAL'EL (1520?–1609), known by the acronym MaHaRaL (Morenu ha-Rav Leib, "our teacher Rabbi Löw") of Prague. Löw was a Jewish teacher, preacher, and mystic, a social and religious reformer, and a community leader in Poland, Bohemia, and Moravia.

In the course of his long, eventful, and often controversial life, Löw served as chief rabbi of Moravia, of Poznań in Poland, and of Prague. Celebrated as a wonder-worker in both Jewish and Czech legend, Löw was deeply immersed in rabbinic and qabbalistic tradition.

His enormous literary output articulates a comprehensive although unsystematic mystical theology. His popularization of recondite qabbalistic notions establish him as a forerunner of Hasidism.

In Löw's epistemology, Jewish tradition, particularly Jewish mystical tradition, is both the essential source of and the only promising gateway to truth. Philosophical speculation can merely offer what tradition has already established. Löw sharply attacked the Jewish philosophical enterprise for its dependence on rational analysis and empirical observation, which he deemed epistemologically subordinate to tradition in the quest for truth. Moreover, Löw considered philosophy faulty, predicated on assumptions considered anathema by tradition (e.g., the eternity of the world), and therefore potentially heretical in its conclusions. For Löw, the higher truth of tradition measures the truth of philosophy; philosophy cannot evaluate tradition.

In his discussion of the nature of the Torah, Löw used a theory of complementary and contradictory opposites. Complementary opposites fulfill and complete one another. For example, male and female are incomplete when apart and are individually complete only when they are both together. Contradictory opposites conflict with one another and cannot coexist unresolved. The conflict may, however, be resolved through a synthesis of the two opposing factors. God and the world are such contradictory opposites. The Torah represents a synthesis of the spiritual God and the material world and therefore effectively mediates between God and the world.

Utilizing a notion of "natural place," Löw argued that until the Jews are restored to the Land of Israel—their natural place and origin—the world remains in disorder. This physical, geographic restoration will occur only in the messianic era after disturbances in the natural order have been rectified through a penultimate process of restoration. The goal of this process, according to Löw, is to restore the Jewish people to its proper and essential nature, thus fulfilling the necessary conditions for the act of divine grace that will initiate the messianic era. Löw maintained that proper study and observance of the Torah, which he felt were lacking in his time, are necessary for the Jewish people to realize its essential nature. Therefore, this restoration process entails a reformation of Jewish life. These theological assumptions served as the premise for Löw's program of social and religious reform. Most noteworthy in this regard are his plans for the reformation of rabbinic leadership and Jewish education.

Löw considered the poor rabbinic leadership and faulty education during his time as conditions vitally requiring rectification. For Löw, the rabbi is to his com-

munity what the heart is to the body. A rabbi was ideally a "saint-scholar" serving on the authority of his scholarship and piety, rather than a "political" figure, appointed and sustained through the influence of secular government authority and accountable to a board of Jewish laymen. Löw's educational reforms included the intensified study of the Bible (neglected in his day) and the restoration of study of the Mishnah as the basis for subsequent studies in rabbinics, as opposed to the dominant emphasis upon *pilpul* (hairsplitting dialectical reasoning). He advocated curricular reforms that correlated content studied and methods utilized to the intellectual and psychological development of the student and he favored a complete rejection of "secular" studies in the curriculum—a reaction to the Italian Jewish trend in response to the influence of the Renaissance, of including such studies in Jewish education. Löw called for reliance upon the entire scope of Jewish legal tradition rather than only upon legal codes in the process of decision making in matters of Jewish law and rejected contemporary trends that permitted socioeconomic factors to intrude upon the processes of legal adjudication.

Löw is popularly identified with the Jewish legend of the *golem*, an artificial man created by magical means. Those versions of the legend that connect Löw with the *golem* maintain that Löw created the *golem* to defend the Jews of Prague during pogroms related to a "blood libel" (a claim that Jews used the blood of Christian children in religious rites). The *golem* legend seems to have influenced Mary Shelley in the composition of *Frankenstein*, Goethe in the writing of the *Sorcerer's Apprentice*, and Karel Čapek in his drama *R.U.R.*, in which the term *robot* was first coined. The *golem* legend has been developed in contemporary literature in the works of Halper Leivick, Max Brod, Gustav Meyrink, and Jorge Luis Borges, among others.

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YESHIVAH. In contemporary usage, the Hebrew term *yeshivah* refers to an academy for the advanced study of Jewish religious texts, primarily the Talmud. Since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE, the

yeshivah has been one of the most important institutions of Jewish communal life. Although many *yeshivah* students go on to become rabbis and although the texts taught in *yeshivot* are among those a rabbi is expected to master, it should be emphasized that a *yeshivah*, an all-male institution, is not a rabbinical seminary. Its function is not to train professional religious leaders but rather to provide a framework for study. In the Jewish religious tradition, study of the Torah is seen as a central and meritorious religious act in and of itself, regardless of its relevance to the student's career plans. While *yeshivot* have been a common feature of Jewish communities, they have not been equally prevalent in every location and time. In various communities and at various times, aspiring scholars would study individually under the guidance of more advanced scholars and rabbis without taking part in a formal educational framework. The *batei midrash*, or communal study halls, that were common in many communities facilitated this practice. However, for much of Jewish history, advanced study rarely occurred outside the framework of the *yeshivot*.

The term *yeshivah* appears in tannaitic sources, where it refers to a rabbinical court (*beit din*), not to an institution of learning. The Jews of Palestine in the first and second centuries CE made no distinction between higher education and judicial activity, and they had no tradition of academic career training. Study of Jewish law (*halakhah*) was not seen as something that could or should be isolated from its practical applications.

Little is known of the precursors of the *yeshivot*. *Yeshivot* became central institutions in Palestine after the destruction of the Second Temple and in the absence of other central institutions. The academy founded by Yohanan ben Zakk'ai at Yavneh in 68 CE and its successors, first in Judaea and later in the Galilee, functioned, according to rabbinic tradition, as the continuation of the Sanhedrin (the legislative body that convened in the Temple) and as the training ground for future scholars and leaders.

Yeshivot in Babylonia. After the death of Yehudah ha-Nasi', the patriarch of Judaea (c. 220 CE), the *yeshivot* of Babylonia began to grow in importance and soon became the most highly esteemed authorities in the Jewish world. For a period of eight hundred years, Babylonian *yeshivot* functioned not only as the central religious-legal institutions of Babylonian Jewry, alongside the lay authority of the exilarchate, but also as the final arbiters of halakhic questions for most of the Jewish communities of the world.

Amoraic period. At any given time during the Talmudic period, there were usually two leading *yeshivot* that often competed for honor and prestige. The first of

these was the *yeshivah* of Nehardea, which flourished in the first half of the third century under the leadership of the Babylonian sage Shemu'el (d. 263?). [See the biography of Shemu'el the Amora.] Although the date of its foundation is unknown, it was already regarded in Shemu'el's time as a venerable institution and as an important center for the transmission of Babylonian Jewish traditions. In 219 Abba' bar Ayyvu (c. 155–247), known as Rav, a Babylonian who had spent many years in Palestine and was familiar with Palestinian traditions, settled in Nehardea. Shortly after, he moved to the town of Sura and opened a *yeshivah* there. Both Rav and Shemu'el had able successors, and even though the institutions they led sometimes changed location or were temporarily closed, they endured until perhaps the thirteenth century. The *yeshivah* of Nehardea moved to Pumbedita in the wake of the destruction of Nehardea in 259, and in the late ninth century it moved to Baghdad, followed soon after by the *yeshivah* of Sura. [See the map accompanying Judaism, overview article.]

The degree to which these Babylonian *yeshivot* (or *metivot*, as they were known in Aramaic) can be classified as educational institutions is still a subject of debate. They certainly continued to function as courts, and the scholars who were clustered around them formed an equivalent to the Sanhedrin. It would appear, though, that from early on young students came to study with the eminent *ro'shei yeshivah* (masters of the *yeshivah*) and that the pedagogic function of the *yeshivah* was seen as important. [See Amoraim.]

According to later sources (which may not be completely reliable), the *ro'shei yeshivot* in Babylonia were often appointed by the exilarch (*ro'sh ha-golah*, lit., "head of the exile"). The veteran scholars of the *yeshivah* sat at assigned seats in the study hall in a seating order based on age and scholarly reputation, wherein the more advanced sat in the front rows (this seating plan was also characteristic of non-Jewish academies in Babylonia). The contact between the *ro'sh yeshivah* and the students was often indirect. It was apparently a common practice for the *ro'sh yeshivah* to deliver his lecture in a soft voice and to have his words declaimed by an *amora'* (speaker) in a loud voice. Since many of the authoritative teachings of the Jewish tradition were transmitted orally, recourse was made to *tanna'im* (repeaters) who had committed them to memory.

Twice a year, in the spring and the fall, this pattern of study changed radically, with Jewish laymen flocking to the *yeshivot*, apparently by the thousands, for a month of popular and intensive study. These months were known as *yarhei kallah* ("months of assembly").

Geonic period. From roughly 550 to 1050 CE, Babylonian *yeshivot* continued to flourish as centers of both ed-

ucation and legal decision making. Students came not only from Babylonia but from Egypt, North Africa, Spain, Italy, and elsewhere to study and to prepare themselves for leadership roles in their home communities. Legal questions (accompanied by donations) were sent from many Jewish communities in the Mediterranean basin, and the *responsa* were copied down for the guidance of later generations. The geonim, as the heads of the *yeshivot* were called in the post-Talmudic period, wrote legal treatises and other works that were widely distributed. The widespread respect and authority that the geonim enjoyed no doubt contributed to the acceptance of the Babylonian Talmud as the authoritative source of Jewish legal and aggadic thought. Their institutions were funded not only by donations but by tax revenues from certain Babylonian Jewish communities. Much less is known about the *yeshivot* in the Land of Israel in this period. [For further discussion, see Judaism, article on Judaism in the Middle East and North Africa to 1492.]

The general decline of the Abbasid empire, long centered in Baghdad, anti-Jewish persecutions in the tenth and eleventh centuries in Iraq, and the rise of new Jewish centers elsewhere led to the decline of the Babylonian *yeshivot* and a corresponding rise in the importance of *yeshivot* in other locations. However, none of these newer *yeshivot* achieved the centrality and influence that the *yeshivot* of Babylonia had enjoyed. According to Avraham ibn Daud's account in *Sefer ha-qabbalah* (The Book of Tradition; c. 1161), around the year 990 a ship bringing four scholars to a *kallah* month was captured by pirates. Three of the scholars were sold as slaves in various ports—one in Egypt, one in North Africa, and one in Spain (the fourth met an unknown fate)—where each became the leader of an important *yeshivah*. While the legend is not a reliable historical source, it does illustrate the continuity between later *yeshivot* and their Babylonian predecessors as well as the weakening of the ties between other Jewish communities and Babylonia.

Yeshivot in the Medieval Diaspora. From the tenth century onward, *yeshivot* were to be found in most Jewish communities. In Spain, one of the first important *yeshivot* to develop was that of Cordova; others were located in Lucena, Toledo, Barcelona, and elsewhere. These *yeshivot* were often located in or near community structures such as synagogues. The curriculum of these *yeshivot* centered on the Babylonian Talmud and its legal application and at times included qabbalistic literature. The well-known interest of some Spanish Jews in secular subjects found no expression in the *yeshivot*; their study of languages and sciences was usually carried out with the help of tutors or, occasionally, through

enrollment in a non-Jewish school. The size and importance of a *yeshivah* was directly related to the fame and prestige of its head, the *ro'sh yeshivah*. Most of the central rabbinical figures of Spanish Jewish history, including Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Nahman, c. 1190–1270), Shelomoh ben Avraham Adret (c. 1235–1310), and Nissim Gerondi (d. 1380?), headed *yeshivot*. The notes taken by students were passed from hand to hand and formed the basis for many of the Spanish glosses on the Talmud.

In North Africa, *yeshivot* were often located close to Muslim academies, though the question of intellectual relations between Jewish and Muslim schools has yet to be explored. The first important *yeshivah* in North Africa was that of Kairouan, which had close ties with Babylonian *yeshivot*. The *yeshivah* of Kairouan rose to importance in the tenth century and upon its decline in the following century, the *yeshivot* of Fez and Tlemcen in Morocco became prominent. Fustāṭ, near present-day Cairo, was also the site of an important *yeshivah*.

In the Ashkenazic communities of northern Europe, the great intellectual flowering that produced Gershom ben Yehudah (c. 965–1040), Rashi (Shelomoh ben Yitshaq, 1042–1105), and the tosafists was achieved to a large extent within the *yeshivot*. These *yeshivot* differed from their predecessors in that they were chiefly educational institutions and no longer functioned as courts or as facilities for scholarly assembly. They tended to be small institutions with just a few tens of students who often lived with the *ro'sh yeshivah* and studied in a separate room in his house. Many of these students were Talmudic scholars in their own right, and they were not so much disciples of the *ro'sh yeshivah* as his partners in study. Beginners would prepare for admission to the *yeshivah* by studying with special teachers. The course of study in the *yeshivot* centered on Talmud and led to the conferment of formal degrees. The lowest, corresponding roughly to the bachelor of arts degree granted by universities of the time, was that of *ḥaver* ("fellow"), while more advanced students looked forward to receiving the title *morenu* ("our teacher"), which entitled them to open their own *yeshivot*. As in the medieval universities, the curriculum emphasized discussion and disputation rather than literary creativity; this phenomenon is reflected in the Jewish scholarly literature of the period, which was mainly in the form of commentaries and glosses and not extended expository works. Like their counterparts in the universities, *yeshivah* students were highly mobile and often studied in many schools in the course of their academic careers.

Both in Mediterranean countries and in northern Europe, *yeshivot* stressed creative study for their advanced students rather than rote learning. Often students were

required to resolve logical problems and contradictions in a text, or between authoritative texts, in a manner that led to a deeper understanding of the issues. In a very real sense, this kind of intellectual development was an organic continuation of earlier patterns. The members of the medieval *yeshivah* related to the Talmud in very much the same way as the tannaim (the rabbis whose teachings are collected in the Mishnah) related to the Hebrew Bible and as the amoraim (the rabbis whose teachings are collected in the *gemara*) related to the Mishnah.

There was a significant flow of ideas between the *yeshivot* of various areas. Rashi, who lived in northern France, was accepted in Spain and North Africa as the authoritative commentator on the Talmud, and the work of his successors in northern Europe, the tosafists, was eventually carried on in Spain. This tradition concentrated on reconciling texts and statements scattered through the rabbinic literature so that it would form a harmonious whole. [See Tosafot.]

One of the distinctive characteristics of the curriculum of the late medieval Ashkenazic *yeshivah* (thirteenth to seventeenth century) was the development of *pilpul*, a type of argumentation that uses highly contorted, often hair-splitting reasoning to resolve hypothetical cases or to reconcile opposing views. Most *pilpul* took place in oral debates, and few texts from the period survive. Many scholars found *pilpul* a fascinating intellectual stimulus, but others criticized it for its artificiality. *Pilpul* was eventually abandoned in favor of the more logical approach of the Spanish scholars, whose works were widely disseminated in northern Europe after the development of the printing press. Another activity popular in *yeshivah* circles of the time was the collection and study of *minhagim*, or local customs.

Yeshivot in the Modern World. The continuity of the Ashkenazic *yeshivah* was broken in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in two different ways. In German-speaking lands, there was a gradual decline of interest in Talmudic and rabbinic literature, exacerbated by the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment movement) and the increasing assimilation of Jews into the general community. In Polish lands there was a sharper break that was associated with (but not totally explained by) the Cossack rebellion of 1648, which destroyed many communities and their *yeshivot*. The failure of the Polish Jewish community to reestablish the network of *yeshivot* immediately after the rebellion was due, in part, to the economic decline of the Jewish community and perhaps also to the spread of Hasidism, which encouraged the study of Talmud but placed less emphasis on formal education.

The nineteenth century saw important growth in the number and role of European *yeshivot*. In central Europe a key part was played by Mosheh Sofer (1762–1839), the rabbi of Pressburg, Hungary (now Bratislava, Czechoslovakia). He was appointed to the position in 1806, and as his fame grew he became a major force in developing an active Orthodoxy in reaction to the Reform movement, which was gaining adherents in his native Germany and Hungary. One of the elements of his program was the development and expansion of the Pressburg *yeshivah*, whose student body soon numbered several hundred. Sofer's students went on to occupy many of the important rabbinical posts in the Habsburg empire. The *yeshivot* they founded were a great influence on the lives of students who studied there during their formative adolescent years and were a major factor in the stability and cohesiveness of Hungarian Orthodoxy. In Germany, however, no major *yeshivot* developed. The rapid pace of acculturation, the need for a general education for economic advancement, and the lack of prestige for Talmudic knowledge among wide sectors of the Jewish community were largely responsible for this.

The revival of *yeshivot* of eastern Europe began in the early nineteenth century with the foundation in 1803 of a *yeshivah* in Volozhin, White Russia, by Ḥayyim ben Yitshaq (1749–1821). It differed from earlier Ashkenazic *yeshivot* in that it was neither a private institution nor a communal one, but rather a regional institution supported by donations collected by fundraisers from Jews throughout Lithuania and later even farther afield. As such, the *yeshivah* of Volozhin was free from local pressures. This organizational model was not immediately imitated, and most Talmud students continued to study in *batei midrash* (local study halls). In the latter part of the nineteenth century there was a sharp rise in the number of *yeshivot* that were founded to counteract the appeal of secular education and Haskalah. Important *yeshivot* were founded in Telz, Slobodka, Ponevezh, Slutsk, Novorodok, and elsewhere. [See map accompanying Judaism, article on Judaism in Northern and Eastern Europe to 1500.] Many were founded to advance the aims of the Musar movement, founded by Yisra'el Salanter (1810–1883), which called for the study and practice of ethical behavior. [See Musar Movement.] These *yeshivot* appointed special preceptors (*mashgiḥim*) to teach and supervise ethical behavior; they functioned alongside the standard Talmud teachers, not always without friction. Other *yeshivot* emphasized new methods of study that stressed analysis of texts rather than legal casuistry. At the same time, and because of the same stimulus of competition from secular education and nontraditional influences, the Hasid-

ic communities also began to establish *yeshivot*. [See Hasidism, *overview article*.]

In the period between the world wars, all *yeshivot* in areas controlled by the Soviet Union were closed. However, in Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, *yeshivot* continued to flourish. These *yeshivot* were funded largely by subventions from Jews in the United States. The Holocaust led to the destruction of all of these institutions. [See Holocaust, *The, article on History*.]

Today the two main centers of *yeshivot* are Israel and the United States. Until after World War II, *yeshivot* in the United States were relatively unsuccessful in attracting students and had little influence on Jewish life. Most of the Jews who came to America from eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were not well educated, and the conditions of immigrant life in America were not conducive to the perpetuation of traditional customs. Those *yeshivot* that did exist followed the established patterns of the Old World. One important exception was the Rabbi Isaac Elhanan Theological Seminary, which grew into Yeshiva University. This institution, founded in the late nineteenth century in New York City, successfully introduced a new curriculum that included traditional Talmudic studies in the morning and secular studies, leading to the bachelor of arts degree, in the afternoon. After World War II there was a major increase in the number of American *yeshivot* and in the size of their student populations, as well as an improvement in the quality of instruction. These changes were due in part to the arrival of refugees from eastern Europe, who brought with them a strong commitment to tradition and expertise in Talmudic learning, and in part to the emergence of a native-born and self-confident American Jewish Orthodox community.

A similar pattern is found in the Land of Israel. In the early modern period, Sefardic Jews and Jewish communities in North Africa and Asia continued their traditional practice of financially supporting *yeshivot*, many of which were in the Land of Israel. They tended to be academies of established scholars rather than educational institutions in the Ashkenazic mold. These *yeshivot*, with their mature student bodies, often emphasized the study of Qabbalah or of Jewish law, not Talmudic study exclusively. The scholars who constituted the membership of the *yeshivot* were given stipends. When the Ashkenazic immigration to the Land of Israel began in the late eighteenth century, Ashkenazic *yeshivot* began to appear. They were intended for younger students, and the program of study was devoted almost completely to Talmud.

As the Jewish community in Palestine grew, there was

a corresponding growth in the number of *yeshivot*. In the interwar period there was even a case of a *yeshiva* that was transferred *in toto*—student body and staff—from Slobodka in Lithuania to Hebron in Palestine. After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 this growth continued, now with the financial support of the Israeli government. As in America, the *yeshiva* high schools drew many of the sons of observant families. The special security problems of Israel led to the establishment of *yeshivot* for soldiers, who were permitted to interrupt their military service for periods of Talmud study.

Today almost all *yeshiva* students are unmarried. Another institution, the *kolel* (pl., *kolelim*), provides married students with stipends to enable them to study full-time. Unlike *yeshiva* students, they usually study independently, without formal guidance or supervision. The *yeshivot*, with the *kolelim*, are now among the most important institutions of contemporary Orthodoxy. They play a major role in securing the loyalty of the younger generation to traditional patterns and values. It has become standard practice for groups within the Orthodox community to establish separate *yeshivot* for their youth. Now, for example, every Hasidic sect has its own *yeshiva*. *Ro'shei yeshiva* are among the most important leaders of Orthodox Jewry, and they often supplant the authority of communal rabbis.

There are probably more young men studying Torah (and especially the Talmud) full-time today than ever before. Only a small minority go on to serve as rabbis. While in traditional *yeshivot* the student body continues to be all male, similar institutions of study for women have been developed. [See the *biography of Sarah Scheiner, founder of the Bais Ya'akov movement*.] Recently, the term *yeshiva* has often been applied to Jewish day schools, on both the elementary and high school level, that have a program that includes general studies as well as Jewish studies. But the Orthodox *yeshivot* have managed to adapt to new conditions without compromising their basic commitment to the perpetuation of tradition.

[See also *Rabbinic Judaism in Late Antiquity and Rabbinite*.]

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Relatively few works have been written that deal specifically with *yeshivot*. However, almost anything written on the history of Jewish education touches on *yeshivot*, and so do many studies of Jewish history or religion. The best starting point for bibliographies on particular *yeshivot* or on higher education in a given community or area is Shlomo Shunami's *Bibliography of Jewish Bibliographies*, 2d ed. (Jerusalem, 1965; suppl., Jerusalem, 1976), which directs the reader to bibliographies on al-

most any topic of Judaica. The most useful guides to current literature are *Kiryat Sefer*, a quarterly listing of recent books of Judaica and Hebraica, and the annual *Index of Articles on Jewish Studies*. Both are arranged topically and are published by the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem.

There are a number of valuable monographs on *yeshivot*. The most recent book on the Babylonian *yeshivot* is David M. Goodblatt's *Rabbinic Instruction in Sasanian Babylonia* (Leiden, 1975). For the other end of the time spectrum, William B. Helmreich's *The World of the Yeshiva* (New York, 1982) provides a useful description of modern American *yeshivot*. A number of unpublished Ph.D. dissertations are relevant: Armin Harry Friedman's "Major Aspects of Yeshiva Education in Hungary, 1848-1948" (Yeshiva University, 1971), M. Breuer's "The Ashkenazi Yeshiva toward the Close of the Middle Ages" (Hebrew University, 1967), I. Gafni's "The Babylonian Yeshiva" (Hebrew University, 1978), and my own "Three Lithuanian Yeshivot" (Hebrew University, 1982); the latter three are in Hebrew with detailed English summaries. The most valuable collection of primary sources on the history of Jewish education, which includes a great deal of material on *yeshivot*, is Simha Assaf's *Megorot le-toledot ha-ḥinukh be-Yisra'el*, 4 vols. in 2 (Tel Aviv, 1936-1954).

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YETSIRAH, SEFER. See *Sefer Yetsirah*.

YHVH. See *God, articles on God in the Hebrew Scriptures and God in Postbiblical Judaism; see also Attributes of God, article on Jewish Concepts*.

YI. See *Jen and I*.

YIN-YANG WU-HSING. *Yin* and *yang* ("umbral" and "bright") and *wu-hsing* ("five phases," i.e., wood, fire, earth, metal, and water) are key ordering concepts in the organic worldview of traditional Chinese philosophy. Chinese thinkers from the era of the earliest philosophers (c. 500-200 BCE) onward generally shared the view that the cosmos was "organic"; everything was related to and affected by everything else, without regard for mathematically or mechanically demonstrable cause and effect. No distinction was drawn between physical and mental phenomena, or between the "human" and "natural" worlds.

To bring intellectual order to this infinitely interconnected universe, Chinese philosophy resorted to "categorical thinking," a system of grouping phenomena into heuristic or analogistic categories. Within and among such categories, relationships were held to be relatively regular and predictable. A given phenomenon could be assigned a position within each of several such categor-

ical sets: *yin* and *yang*, the Five Phases, the Eight Trigrams, the Ten Heavenly Stems and Twelve Earthly Branches, and others. An elaborate system of classification was developed by grouping together all phenomena that lay in the area of intersection of several sets.

A tendency toward categorical thinking can be discerned in Chinese culture at least as early as the second millennium BCE, with, for example, the development of the Shang dynasty calendar of sixty-day cycles based on the combination of the Ten Heavenly Stems and Twelve Earthly Branches. A tendency to view phenomena in dualistic terms is similarly ancient. However, *yin* and *yang* were apparently the first terms to be used to create an ordering category in an abstract, philosophical sense.

Yin and *yang* first appear in texts of the Spring and Autumn period (722-481) in their root meanings of "a hillside in shade" and "a hillside in sunlight," or, by extension, "cool" and "warm." By the latter part of this period, a wide variety of dualistic phenomena were being characterized in terms of *yin* and *yang*: female and male, low and high, earth and heaven, moist and dry, passive and active, dark and bright, and so forth. The use of the terms *yin* and *yang*, with their connotations of the changing ratio of shadow and sunlight on a hillside during the course of a day, aptly suited the Chinese concept of dualism, which was never absolute or antagonistic, but rather, relativistic and complementary. Coolness exists only relative to its complement, warmth. A minister is *yin* in relation to his ruler, but *yang* in relation to his wife. The *yin* of winter moves inevitably to the *yang* of summer, and back again: each contains the germ of the other.

The categories of the Five Phases apparently stabilized as an ordering principle of Chinese organic philosophy during the late Spring and Autumn period. Again, the concept derived from more ancient roots. The reasons for developing five categories, rather than some other number, are not clearly known; they may derive from astrological considerations of the five visible planets, or from the numerology of the magic square of three (a 3 × 3 grid arrangement of the integers 1 through 9, with 5 at the center; each row, column, and diagonal yields a sum of 15).

The term *wu-hsing* is often translated as "five elements," but that term is misleading, implying that wood, fire, earth, metal, and water are constituents of physical matter. The five are not "elements," however, but paradigms or analogies for specific modes of being or activity. Thus the translation "five phases" is now generally preferred. The five categories denote relationships among phenomena. The *wu-hsing* thus were used to distribute and classify into five categories phenom-

TABLE 1. *Attributes of the Five Phases*

PHASE	ATTRIBUTES				
	Planet	Color	Season	Direction	Taste
Wood	Jupiter	Green	Spring	East	Sour
Fire	Mars	Red	Summer	South	Bitter
Earth	Saturn	Yellow	Midsummer	Center	Sweet
Metal	Venus	White	Autumn	West	Acrid
Water	Mercury	Black	Winter	North	Salty

ena that shared a common attribute, as shown in table 1. The use of categories of five spread widely throughout Chinese schools of thought. For example, the Confucians spoke of the Five Virtues (humaneness, righteousness, propriety, loyalty, and trustworthiness), medical practitioners described Five Viscera, theorists of music and harmonics worked with a scale of Five Tones.

The separate categorical systems of *yin-yang* and *wu-hsing* were combined, systematized, and amplified during the Warring States period (403–221), especially under the influence of Tsou Yen (fourth century BCE). Tsou Yen is regarded as the founder of the school of Naturalists or Yin-yang Five Phases school (Yin-yang Wu-hsing-chia), which focused its attention on these categories of relationships and on their interaction through the concept of “resonance” or *ch'i*. Emphasis was placed on intersecting sets of classification; for example, Wood and Fire phenomena were *yang*, Earth phenomena were balanced, Metal and Water phenomena were *yin*. Wood was *yin* in relation to Fire.

The school of Naturalists tended to be concerned with natural phenomena rather than with social or political relationships, but their successors in the Former Han dynasty (206 BCE–7 CE), the Huang-lao school, emphasized the integration of human and nonhuman phenomena.

Tsou Yen and his followers saw the Five Phases as moving through regular and predictable cycles of succession; various permutations of the five formed cyclical orders to be applied in specific circumstances. The two most common and widely used were the “mutual production” order and the “mutual overcoming” order. In the former, Wood produces Fire (burning), Fire produces Earth (ash), Earth produces Metal (ore), Metal produces Water (smelting), and Water produces Wood (irrigation). In the latter, Earth overcomes Water (damming), Water overcomes Fire (extinguishing), Fire overcomes Metal (melting), Metal overcomes Wood (chopping), Wood overcomes Earth (growth). The order of mutual production was applied, for example, to the succession of the seasons; the order of mutual overcoming was applied to the sequential planting and harvesting of crops throughout the growing year.

These orders applied to human concerns as well. Thinkers in such schools as the Legalists (or Administrators), Huang-lao, and Strategists described the dynastic cycle in terms of the order of mutual overcoming: a dynasty that ruled “by virtue of” the phase Wood would be overcome by a new ruling house associated with Metal. Yin-yang and Five Phase considerations could be used to determine a propitious opportunity to attack another state, or the proper circumstances for conducting a ritual. Specialists called *fang-shih* (“masters of methods”) were employed by governments to ensure that all classifiable phenomena were properly assigned to categories of *yin* and *yang*, the Five Phases, and others, this being deemed essential to the welfare and proper functioning of the state.

With the formulation of a syncretic Confucian philosophy by Tung Chung-shu (179–104) in the Former Han period, Yin-yang, the Five Phases, and other systems of “categorical thinking” became wholly integrated into the mainstream of Chinese philosophical orthodoxy. Thereafter, such systems could not be associated with any one school, whether Confucian, Taoist, or other, but were instead the common property of Chinese philosophy, religion, and science as a whole.

[See also the biographies of Tsou Yen and Tung Chung-shu. For a discussion of the Yin-yang school in Japan, see Onmyōdō.]

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JOHN S. MAJOR

YISHMA'E'L BEN ELISHA' (c. 50–c. 135 CE), Palestinian tanna. Yishma'e'l was 'Aqiva ben Yosef's most famous contemporary; rabbinic tradition has constantly placed the sayings of these masters in opposition to each other.

Although some have argued that Yishma'e'l was a member of the priestly class, nothing in the traditions attributed to him supports this claim except for a number of dubious passages (B.T., *Ber.* 7a, *Ḥul.* 49a–b; To-sefta *Ḥal.* 1.10; *Avot de-Rabbi Natan* 38 [cf. *Mekhilta' de-Rabbi Yishma'e'l*, *Nez.* 18]). One story recalls that as a

child he was captured by the Romans and placed in prison, where he was discovered by Yehoshu'a, who predicted great things for the child (B.T., *Git.* 58a); however, not all manuscripts containing this story mention Yishma'e'l, and his appearance here is suspect. He is said to have studied with Yehoshu'a, Eli'ezer, and, especially, Naḥunya' ben ha-Qanah, who is said to have taught him the importance of exegesis of the Torah by means of logical arguments (B.T., *Shav.* 26a). The Talmud states that he rejected the study of Greek wisdom; he argued that one should study Torah day and night (B.T., *Men.* 99b), and his sayings demonstrate a tendency to reject gentiles and their wisdom ('A.Z. 1.2, 2.3, 4.1).

Yishma'e'l's importance has been based on his role as a biblical exegete. The opening of *Sifra*, a collection of exegetical comments on *Leviticus*, states that Yishma'e'l's exegesis of the Bible relied on thirteen principles. Based on this passage, most scholars of rabbinic Judaism have contrasted Yishma'e'l's "logical" method of interpreting scripture with the more "imaginative" techniques employed by 'Aqiva'. Yishma'e'l is said to have ignored such things as the repetition of words or phrases in biblical verses and the appearance of certain adjectives, adverbs, and conjunctions, while these supposedly were crucial to the exegetical enterprises of 'Aqiva'. Yishma'e'l's statement that such features of biblical Hebrew should be ignored because "Scripture speaks in the language of common men" (*Sifrei Nm.* 112) is taken as the underlying assumption of his exegetical techniques. However, recent scholarship has challenged this traditional picture.

It has been demonstrated that Yishma'e'l and 'Aqiva' often used the same "logical" exegetical techniques normally attributed to Yishma'e'l and that they both employed the more "imaginative" exegetical methods usually assigned to 'Aqiva'. In addition, it has been shown that we have no evidence that Yishma'e'l employed the majority of the thirteen exegetical techniques attributed to him in the opening of *Sifra*. In fact, he most often employed methods not found in that list, such as the analogy, but that were commonplace among the Hellenistic rhetoricians of his age.

Given the fact that the traditions attributed to Yishma'e'l and 'Aqiva' do not support the common scholarly picture, we must consider what has happened. It is likely that toward the end of the rabbinic period, two major schools of biblical exegesis had developed, one "logical" and one "imaginative." In an attempt to claim that these opposing views were very old, the later sages attributed their creation to Yishma'e'l and 'Aqiva', for the importance of 'Aqiva' in all areas of rabbinic thought, including biblical exegesis, had by then been well established. Thus Yishma'e'l's importance

probably stems from the frequent juxtaposition of his sayings with those of 'Aqiva', one of the most important sages of Jewish history, and not from anything he actually said or did, or at least not from anything attributed to him in the sources we have at hand.

[See also Tannaim.]

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GARY G. PORTON

YI T'OEKYE, pen name of Yi Hwang (1501–1570), founder of the Yōngnam school of Korean Neo-Confucianism. T'oebye is credited with having established in Korea the orthodox Neo-Confucian tradition as propounded by the Ch'eng-Chu school, so-called after its putative founders Ch'eng I (1033–1107) and Chu Hsi (1130–1200), and is widely regarded as the greatest of all Korean Neo-Confucian thinkers.

Yi T'oebye was born in Yeon in Kyongsang Province, in the southeastern part of Korea. He began his studies with his uncle, Yi U, and continued them at the Royal College in Seoul, which he entered in 1523. He passed the preliminary civil service examination in 1528 and the final examination in 1534, after which he joined the small governing elite by embarking upon a long official career. His career, which followed the pattern typical of the elite of the period, included posts in such metropolitan bureaus as the Office of Diplomatic Correspondence, the Censorate, the Office of the Crown Prince Tutorial, and the Royal College. He also served as a magistrate in local government. Despite the rather volatile political atmosphere of the time, his career was a smooth one. The highest positions he held included appointments as Minister of Rites, Fifth State Councillor, Director of the Office of Royal Decrees, and Director of Special Councillors. In 1569 he retired from public life and returned to his place of origin. The kings he served, Chungjong (r. 1506–1544), Myōngjong (r. 1545–1567), and Sōnjo (r. 1567–1608), all treated him with great re-

spect. Legend has it that King Myōngjong, to whom T'oegye submitted his celebrated *Ten Diagrams of Sage Learning* (*Sōnghak sipto*), was supposed to have been a devotee.

Despite his long and illustrious public career, T'oegye is remembered as having maintained, or perhaps even initiated, the tradition of scholarly independence from the state. While he did not shy away from public life, T'oegye seems to have been constantly attracted to independent scholarship and educational activity. He frequently professed his desire for the life of a private scholar devoted to learning and teaching. Whenever possible, either between official posts or during his service, he attempted to pursue this ideal. During his tenure as the magistrate of P'unggi County, T'oegye successfully campaigned for government support of a private academy in the area, setting a frequently observed precedent. Eventually, he founded the Tosan Academy in his place of birth, which attracted numerous students through the generations. It was to this academy that he retired periodically in pursuit of scholarship. His alleged preference for the scholarly life influenced the attitudes of later scholars; indeed, the majority of the scholars of the Yōngnam school (School of Principle) remained private scholars. This of course reflected political realities such as violent factionalism and fierce competition for office. But these scholars also preserved a certain pride in their independence from the state and in their exclusive devotion to scholarship. They believed they were true heirs of T'oegye not only in their scholarship but also in their mode of life.

T'oegye based his philosophy largely on that of Chu Hsi. He endorsed Chu Hsi's dual theory of *li* (Kor., *i*; "principle") and *ch'i* (Kor., *ki*; "material force"), but labored over the question of whether Chu Hsi's priority of principle over material force referred to a valuative or existential priority. He concluded that the priority of principle obtained in the realm of values. His belief in the superiority of principle, which he identified with original nature and the moral mind, defined his position on the *sadan* (Chin., *ssu-tuan*; "four beginnings") and the *ch'ilchōng* (Chin., *ch'i-ch'ing*; "seven emotions") in the famous debate with Ki Taesūng (1527–1572). Here, T'oegye argued for their separate origins, proposing that the Four Beginnings were initiated by principle and the Seven Emotions by material force. In order to maintain this position, however, T'oegye saw principle as having a generative power of its own. This position became a focus of the scholarship of the Yōngnam school.

A perhaps more meaningful aspect of his scholarship is his position on moral cultivation. Dismissing Wang Yang-ming's (1472–1529) theory of the unity of knowl-

edge and action as irresponsible in its disregard for the rationality of man, T'oegye was firmly committed to the need for a daily regimen of moral cultivation, a slow and painstaking process. He regarded sincerity and reverence as fundamental necessities in the acquisition of knowledge, which could be sought only through laborious step-by-step inquiry and meditation. The rather quiescent and meditative quality of his scholarship was inherited by his followers and remained a distinctive feature of the Yōngnam School.

[See also Confucianism in Korea and Confucian Thought, article on Neo-Confucianism.]

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JAHYUN KIM HABOUSH

YI YULGOK, pen name of Yi I (1536–1584), Korean Neo-Confucian thinker whose stature in the tradition is equalled only by that of Yi T'oegye. Yulgok is credited with having established the Kiho ("material force") school in Korea. Born in Kangnūng in Kangwōn Province in western central Korea, not far from the capital, Yulgok began his studies with his mother, Sin Saimdang, a well-known poet and painter. Her death when he was sixteen seems to have brought about a profound personal crisis. After three years of mourning, Yulgok retreated into a Buddhist mountain temple intending to become a monk. Although he changed his mind after a year of studying the Buddhist scriptures, his resulting familiarity with Buddhism supposedly influenced his scholarship. In 1564 he placed first in both the preliminary and final civil service examinations and thus acquired the nickname Lord First Candidate of the Nine Examinations. His ensuing reputation as a brilliant scholar and a quick study led to his meteoric rise in the bureaucracy. He served in numerous offices in both metropolitan and provincial government. In 1568 Yulgok traveled to China on an ambassadorial mission. His official posts included appointments as minister of military affairs, minister of public works, and minister of personnel, in which post he died at the age of forty-nine.

He enjoyed a close relationship with King Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608), whom he served as a royal tutor.

As was typical of Yi dynasty officials, Yulgok's illustrious public career was interrupted by short periods of retirement either for personal reasons or because of an unfavorable political climate at court. Nevertheless, he is regarded as representing the activist tradition of Confucian scholar-statesmanship. In this respect, Yulgok is viewed as the opposite of T'oegye, his scholarly rival, who is known for his preference for private life. This reputation seems to be based on Yulgok's wide range of interests and concerns. Unlike T'oegye, whose scholarship was confined mainly to philosophical issues, Yulgok was keenly interested in the practical aspect of government. He wrote copiously on such matters as fiscal reform, the problems of resettlement of landless peasants, military organization and finance, questions of disseminating Confucian mores to the populace, the relationship of the monarch and the bureaucracy and their respective roles, potential frictions within the bureaucracy, and the regulation and curricula of private academies. His proposal for a strong army of one hundred thousand, although unheeded, is often cited as prophetic in view of the disastrous Japanese invasions of the 1590s. He is said even to have written a memorial on his deathbed emphasizing the need for more effective government policies. His successors, the scholars of the Kiho school, inherited this activist tradition, and perhaps it is not purely coincidental that they maintained power throughout the Yi dynasty.

While Yulgok remained within Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy (named for the Chinese thinkers Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi) he rejected the dual theory of *i* (Chin., *li*; "principle") and *ki* (Chin., *ch'i*; "material force") held by Chu Hsi and T'oegye. While he accepted a conceptual distinction between the two, he maintained that they were inseparable in both function and manifestation. Rather than seeing principle as one, unchanging and immanent in all things, he saw the principle in each thing as distinct, conditioned by its material force and thus always changing. His belief in the primacy of material force as the determinant of an entity led to a corresponding theory of the *sadan* (Chin., *ssu-tuan*; "four beginnings") and the *ch'ulchŏng* (Chin., *ch'i-ch'ing*; "seven emotions"). Taking issue with T'oegye's position that the Four Beginnings and the Seven Emotions had separate origins, Yulgok insisted that they are both manifestations of material force that contain principle. Moreover, he held that the Four are "good" manifestations of material force. The difference between the Four and the Seven lies in how they are manifested, that is, the Four Beginnings are the Seven Emotions themselves manifested as good. This was a clear departure from the idea that

principle and material force were the sources, respectively, of good and evil. The scholars of the Kiho school continued to develop the primacy of material force, posing a scholarly as well as political alternative to the Yŏngnam school of Yi T'oegye.

[See also Confucianism in Korea and the biography of Yi T'oegye.]

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YOGA. Etymologically, the Sanskrit word *yoga* derives from the root *yuj*, meaning "to bind together," "hold fast," or "yoke," which also governs the Latin *iungere* and *iugum*, the French *joug*, and so on. In Indian religion the term *yoga* serves, in general, to designate any ascetic technique and any method of meditation. The "classical" form of yoga is ■ *darśana* ("view, doctrine"; usually, although improperly, translated as "system of philosophy") expounded by Patañjali in his *Yoga Sūtra*, and it is from this "system" that we must set out if we are to understand the position of yoga in the history of Indian thought. But side by side with classical Yoga there are countless forms of sectarian, popular (magical), and non-Brahmanic yogas such as Buddhist and Jain forms.

Patañjali is not the creator of the Yoga *darśana*. As he himself admits, he has merely edited and integrated the doctrinal and technical traditions of yoga (*Yoga Sūtra* 1.1). Indeed, yogic practices were known in the esoteric circles of Indian ascetics and mystics long before Patañjali. Among these practices Patañjali retained those that the experiences of centuries had sufficiently tested. As to the theoretical framework and the metaphysical foundation that Patañjali provides for such techniques, his personal contribution is of the smallest. He merely rehandles the Sāṃkhya philosophy in its broad outlines, adapting it to a rather superficial theism and exalting the practical value of meditation. The Yoga and Sāṃkhya *darśanas* are so much alike that most of the assertions made by the one are valid for the other. The essential differences between them are two: (1) whereas Sāṃkhya is atheistic, Yoga is theistic, since it postulates the existence of a "Lord" (Īśvara); (2) whereas ac-

according to Sāṃkhya the only path to final deliverance is that of metaphysical knowledge, Yoga accords marked importance to techniques of purification and meditation. [See also Īśvara.]

Thanks to Patañjali, Yoga, which had been an archaic ascetic and mystical tradition, became an organized "system of philosophy." Nothing is known of the author of the *Yoga Sūtra*, not even whether he lived in the second or third century BCE or in the fifth century CE, although claims to both datings have been vigorously defended. The earliest commentary known to us is the *Yogabhāṣya* of Vyāsa (seventh to eighth century CE), annotated by Vācaspatimīśra (ninth century) in his *Tattvavaiśārādī*. These two works, indispensable for understanding the *Yoga Sūtra*, are complemented by two works of later centuries. At the beginning of the eleventh century King Bhoja wrote the commentary *Rājamārtanḍa*, which is very useful for its insights into certain yogic practices, and in the sixteenth century Viṅṅānabhikṣu annotated Vyāsa's text in his remarkable treatise the *Yogavārttika*. [See the biography of Patañjali.]

Ignorance and Suffering. "All is suffering for the sage," writes Patañjali (*Yoga Sūtra* 2.15), repeating a leitmotif of all post-Upanṣadic Indian speculation. The discovery of pain as the law of existence has a positive, stimulating value. It perpetually reminds the sage and the ascetic that the only way to attain freedom and bliss is withdrawal from the world, radical isolation. To liberate the self from suffering is the goal of all Indian philosophies and magico-mystical techniques. In India, metaphysical knowledge always has a soteriological purpose, for it is by knowledge of ultimate reality that man, casting off the illusions of the world of phenomena, awakens and discovers the true nature of spirit (*ātman*, *puruṣa*). For Sāṃkhya and Yoga, suffering has its origin in ignorance of spirit, that is, in confusing spirit with psychomental states, which are the most refined products of nature (*prakṛti*). Consequently, liberation, absolute freedom, can be obtained only if this confusion is abolished. As the structure and unfolding of nature and the paradoxical mode of being of the self (*puruṣa*) are discussed elsewhere, here only the yogic practices themselves will be examined. [See Sāṃkhya and Puruṣa]

The point of departure of yogic meditation is concentration on a single object: a physical object (the space between the eyebrows, the tip of the nose, something luminous, etc.), a thought (a metaphysical truth), or God (Īśvara). This determined and continuous concentration, called *ekāgratā* ("on a single point"), is obtained by integrating the psychomental flux, *sarvārthatā* ("variously directed, discontinued, diffused attention"; *Yoga Sūtra* 3.11). This is the precise definition of yogic technique, and is called *cittavṛtti-nirodha*, "the suppression

of psychomental states" (*Yoga Sūtra* 1.2). The practice of *ekāgratā* tends to control the two generators of psychomental life: sense activity (*indriya*) and the activity of the unconscious (*saṃskāra*). A yogin is able to concentrate his attention on a single point and become insensible to any other sensory or mnemonic stimulus. It goes without saying that *ekāgratā* can be obtained only through the practice of numerous exercises and techniques. One cannot obtain *ekāgratā* if, for example, the body is in a tiring or even uncomfortable posture, or if the respiration is disorganized, unrhythmical. This is why yogic technique implies several categories of physiological practices and spiritual exercises, called *aṅgas*, "members," or elements. The eight "members" of classical Yoga can be regarded both as forming a group of techniques and as being stages of the ascetic and spiritual itinerary whose end is final liberation. They are (1) restraints (*yama*), (2) disciplines (*niyama*), (3) bodily attitudes and postures (*āsana*), (4) rhythm of respiration (*prāṇāyāma*), (5) emancipation of sensory activity from the domination of exterior objects (*pratyāhāra*), (6) concentration (*dhāraṇā*), (7) yogic meditation (*dhyāna*), and (8) enstasis (*samādhi*; *Yoga Sūtra* 2.29).

In addition to this classical Yoga comprising eight *aṅgas*, there exist a number of *ṣaḍaṅgayogas*, that is, yogic regimens having only six members. Their main characteristic is the absence of the three first *aṅgas* (*yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*) and the introduction of a new "member," *tarka* ("reason, logic"). Attested already in the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* (second century BCE–second century CE), the *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* appears especially in certain sects of Hinduism and in the Buddhist Tantras (Grönbold, 1969, 1983).

Restraints and Disciplines. The first two groups of practices, *yama* and *niyama*, constitute the inevitable preliminaries for any asceticism. There are five "restraints," namely, *ahiṃsā* (restraint from violence), *satya* (restraint from falsehood), *asteya* (restraint from stealing), *brahmacarya* (restraint from sexual activity), and *aparigraha* (restraint from avarice). These restraints do not bring about a specifically yogic state but induce in the adept a purified state superior to that of the uninitiated. In conjunction with the *yamas*, the yogin must practice the *niyama*, that is, a series of bodily and psychic disciplines. "Cleanliness, serenity, asceticism [*tapas*], study of Yoga metaphysics, and an effort to make Īśvara [God] the motive of all his actions constitute the disciplines," writes Patañjali (*Yoga Sūtra* 2.32). Obviously, difficulties and obstacles arise during these exercises, most of them produced by the subconscious. The perplexity arising from doubt is the most dangerous. To overcome it, Patañjali recommends implanting the contrary thought (*Yoga Sūtra* 2.33). To vanquish a

temptation is to realize a genuine, positive gain. Not only does the yogin succeed in dominating the objects that he had renounced, but he also obtains a magic force infinitely more precious than all these objects. For example, he who successfully practices *asteya* “sees all jewels coming near to him” (*Yoga Sūtra* 2.37).

Āsana and Prāṇāyāma. The specifically yogic techniques begin with *āsana*, the well-known bodily posture of the Indian ascetics. *Āsana* gives a rigid stability to the body while at the same time reducing physical effort to a minimum and finally eliminating it altogether. *Āsana* is the first concrete step taken with a view to abolishing the modalities peculiar to the human condition. On the bodily plane, *āsana* is an *ekāgratā*; the body is “concentrated” in a single position. Thus, one arrives at a certain neutralization of the senses; consciousness is no longer troubled by the presence of the body. Furthermore, a tendency toward “unification” and “totalization” is typical of all yogic practices. Their goal is the transcendence (or the abolition) of the human condition, resulting from the refusal to obey one’s natural inclinations.

The most important—and certainly the most specifically yogic—of these various “refusals” is the disciplining of respiration (*prāṇāyāma*), the refusal to breathe like the majority of mankind, that is, unrhythmically. Patañjali defines this refusal as follows: “*Prāṇāyāma* is the arrest [*viccheda*] of the movements of inhalation and exhalation and it is obtained after *āsana* has been realized (*Yoga Sūtra* 2.49). He speaks of the “arrest,” the suspension, of respiration; however, *prāṇāyāma* begins with making the respiratory rhythm as slow as possible; and this is its first objective.

A remark in Bhoja’s commentary (on *Yoga Sūtra* 1.34) reveals the deeper meaning of *prāṇāyāma*: “All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of respiration—there being always a connection between respiration and consciousness in their respective functions—respiration, when all the functions of the organs are suspended, realizes concentration of consciousness on a single object.” The special relation of the rhythm of respiration to particular states of consciousness, which has undoubtedly been observed and experienced by yogins from the earliest times, has served them as an instrument for “unifying” consciousness. By making his respiration rhythmical and progressively slower the yogin can penetrate—that is experience in perfect lucidity—certain states of consciousness that are inaccessible in a waking condition, particularly the states of consciousness that are peculiar to sleep.

Indian psychology recognizes four modalities of consciousness (besides enstasis): diurnal consciousness, consciousness in sleep with dreams, consciousness in

sleep without dreams, and “cataleptic consciousness.” Through *prāṇāyāma*, that is, by increasingly prolonging inhalation and exhalation (since the purpose of this practice is to allow as long an interval as possible to elapse between the two phases of respiration) the yogin can experience all the modalities of consciousness. For the uninitiated, there is a discontinuity between these several modalities; one passes from the state of waking to the state of sleeping unconsciously. The yogin must preserve continuity of consciousness; that is, he must penetrate each of these states with determination and awareness.

But the immediate goal of *prāṇāyāma* is more modest; it induces the respiratory rhythm by harmonizing the three “moments” of breathing: inhalation (*pūraka*), retention (*kumbhaka*), and exhalation (*recaka*) of the inhaled air. These three moments must each fill an equal space of time. Practice enables the yogin to prolong them considerably. He begins by holding his breath for sixteen and a half seconds, then for thirty-three seconds, then for fifty seconds, three minutes, five minutes, and so on. (Similar respiratory technique were familiar to the Taoists, to Christian hesychasts, and to the Muslim contemplatives; see Eliade, 1969, pp. 59–65).

Yogic Concentration and Meditation. Making respiration rhythmical and, as far as possible, suspending it greatly promotes concentration (*dhāraṇā*; *Yoga Sūtra* 2.52–53). The yogin can test the quality of his concentration by *pratyāhāra*, a term usually translated as “withdrawal of the senses” or “abstraction” but more accurately rendered as the “ability to free sense activity from the domination of external objects.” According to the *Yoga Sūtra* (2.54) and its commentators, the senses, instead of directing themselves toward an object, “abide within themselves” (Bhoja, on *Yoga Sūtra* 2.54). When the intellect (*citta*) wishes to know an exterior object, it does not make use of sensory activity; it is able to know the object by its own powers. Being obtained directly, by contemplation, this knowledge is, from the yogic point of view, more effective than normal knowledge. “Then the wisdom [*prajñā*] of the yogin knows all things as they are” (Vyāsa, on *Yoga Sūtra* 2.45). Thenceforth, the yogin will no longer be distracted or troubled by the activity of the senses, by the subconscious, and by the “thirst of life”; all activity is suspended. But this autonomy of the intellect does not result in the suppression of phenomena. Instead of knowing through forms (*rūpa*) and mental states (*cittavṛtti*) as formerly, the yogin now contemplates the essence (*tattva*) of all objects directly.

Such autonomy allows the yogin to practice a three-fold technique that the texts call *saṃyama*. The term designates the last three “members” of yoga (*yogāṅga*), namely concentration (*dhāraṇā*), yogic meditation

(*dhyāna*), and stasis (*samādhi*). They do not imply new physiological practices. *Dhāraṇā*, from the root *dhṛ*, meaning “to hold fast,” is in fact an *ekāgratā*, undertaken for the purpose of comprehension. Patañjali’s definition of *dhāraṇā* is “fixation of the thought on a single point” (*Yoga Sūtra* 3.1). According to some authors (cf. Eliade, 1969, pp. 66–68), a *dhāraṇā* takes the time of twelve *prāṇāyāmas* (i.e., twelve controlled, equal, and delayed respirations). By prolonging this concentration on an object twelve times, one obtains yogic meditation, *dhyāna*. Patañjali defines *dhyāna* as “a current of unified thought” (*Yoga Sūtra* 3.2) and Vyāsa adds the following gloss to the definition: “continuum of mental effort to assimilate the object of meditation, free from any other effort to assimilate other objects.” It is unnecessary to add that this yogic meditation is absolutely different from any secular meditation.

Samādhi and the Lord of the Yogins. Yogic enstasis, *samādhi*, is the final result and crown of all the ascetic’s spiritual efforts and exercises. The term is first employed in a gnoseological sense: *samādhi* is the state in which thought grasps the object directly. Thus, there is a real coincidence between knowledge of the object and the object of knowledge. This kind of knowledge constitutes an enstatic modality of being that is peculiar to yoga. Patañjali and his commentators distinguish several sorts, or stages, of *samādhi*. When it is obtained with the help of an object or idea (that is, by fixing one’s thought on a point in space or on an idea), it is called *samprajñāta samādhi*, “enstasis with support.” When, on the other hand, *samādhi* is obtained apart from any relation to externals, when it is simply a full comprehension of being, it is *asamprajñāta samādhi*, “undifferentiated stasis.”

Because it is perfectible and does not realize an absolute and irreducible state, the “differentiated enstasis” (*samprajñāta samādhi*) comprises four stages, called *bīja samādhi* (“*samādhi* with seed”) or *sālambana samādhi* (“*samādhi* with support”). By accomplishing these four stages, one after the other, one obtains the “faculty of absolute knowledge” (*ṛtambharāprajñā*). This is in itself an opening toward *samādhi* “without seed,” pure *samādhi*, for absolute knowledge discovers the state of ontological plenitude in which being and knowing are no longer separated. According to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, *asamprajñāta samādhi* destroys the “impressions [*saṃskāra*] of all antecedent mental functions” and even succeeds in arresting the karmic forces already set in motion by the yogin’s past activities (Eliade, 1969, p. 84).

Fixed in *samādhi*, consciousness (*citta*) can now have direct revelation of the self (*puruṣa*). For the devotional yogins, it is at this stage that the revelation of the Su-

preme Self, Īśvara, the Lord, takes place. Unlike Sāṃkhya, Yoga affirms the existence of a God, Īśvara. He is not a creator god, for the cosmos, life, and man proceed from the primordial substance, *prakṛti*. But in the case of certain men (i.e., the yogins), Īśvara can hasten the process of deliverance. Īśvara is a self (*puruṣa*) that has been eternally free. Patañjali says that the Īśvara has been the guru of the sages of immemorial times (*Yoga Sūtra* 1.26) and that he can bring about *samādhi* on condition that the yogin practice *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, that is, devotion to Īśvara (*Yoga Sūtra* 2.45). But we have seen that *samādhi* can be obtained without such mystical exercises. In the classical Yoga of Patañjali, Īśvara plays a rather minor role. It is only with the later commentators, such as Vijñāna-bhikṣu and Nilakaṇṭha, that Īśvara gains the importance of a true God.

The Yogic Powers; Deliverance. By practicing *saṃyama*—that is, by means of concentration, meditation, and the realization of *samādhi*—the yogin acquires the “miraculous powers” (*siddhis*) to which book 3 of the *Yoga Sūtra*, beginning with *sūtra* 16, is devoted. The majority of these powers are related to different kinds of supranormal or mystical knowledge. Thus, by practicing *saṃyama* in regard to his own subconscious residues (*saṃskāra*), the yogin comes to know his previous existences (*Yoga Sūtra* 3.105). Through *saṃyama* exercised in respect to “notions” (*pratyaya*), he knows the mental states of other men (3.19). *Saṃyama* practiced on the umbilical plexus (*nābhicakra*) produces knowledge of the system of the body (3.28), on the heart, knowledge of the mind (3.33), and so forth. [See also Cakras.] “Whatever the yogin desires to know, he should perform *saṃyama* in respect to that object,” writes Vācaspati-miśra (on *Yoga Sūtra* 3.30). According to Patañjali and the whole tradition of classical Yoga, the yogin uses the innumerable *siddhis* in order to attain the supreme freedom, *asamprajñāta samādhi*, not in order to obtain a mastery over the elements (*Yoga Sūtra* 3.37). We find a similar doctrine in Buddhism (Eliade, 1969, pp. 177–180; Pensa, 1969, pp. 23–24).

Through the illumination (*prajñā*) spontaneously obtained when he reaches the last stage of his itinerary, the yogin realizes “absolute isolation” (*kaivalya*), that is, liberation of the self (*puruṣa*) from the dominance of nature (*prakṛti*). But this mode of being of the spirit is not an “absolute emptiness”; it constitutes a paradoxical, because unconditioned, state. Indeed, the intellect (*buddhi*), having accomplished its mission, withdraws, detaching itself from the *puruṣa* and returning into *prakṛti*. The self remains free, autonomous; that is, the yogin attains deliverance. Like a dead man, he has no more real relation with life; he is a *jīvanmukta*, one “liberated in life.” He no longer lives in time and under

the domination of time, but in an eternal present. [See also *Jivanmukti*.]

To recapitulate, the method recommended by the classical form of Yoga comprises a number of different techniques (physiological, mental, mystical) that gradually detach the yogin from the processes of life and the rules of social behavior. The worldly man lives in society, marries, establishes a family; Yoga prescribes solitude and chastity. In opposition to continual movement, the yogin practiced *āsana*; in opposition to agitation, un-rhythmical, uncontrolled respiration, he practices *prāṇāyāma*; to the chaotic flux of psychomental life, the yogin replies by "fixing thought on a single point"; and so on. The goal of all these practices always remains the same—to react against normal, secular, and even human inclinations. The final result is a grandiose, although paradoxical, mode of being. *Asamprajñāta samādhi* realizes the "knowledge-possession" of the autonomous Self (*puruṣa*); that is, it offers deliverance, freedom, and, more specifically, the consciousness of absolute freedom.

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YOGĀCĀRA. The Yogācāra school is, with the Mādhyamika, one of the two main traditions of Indian Buddhism. As the name indicates (*yogācāra* means "one whose practice is *yoga*"), this school attaches importance to the religious practice of *yoga* as a means for attaining final emancipation from the bondage of the phenomenal world. The stages of *yoga* are systematically set forth in the treatises associated with this tradition. The particular doctrinal stance of the school is suggested by its alternate name, Vijñānavāda, or the "doctrine" (*vāda*) that all phenomenal existence is fabricated by "consciousness" (*vijñāna*).

In concert with those who uphold the doctrine of "voidness" (*śūnyatā*), the Vijñānavādins maintain that phenomenal existences are devoid of intrinsic nature, but unlike the Mādhyamika, they admit the reality of the consciousness by which phenomenal existences, subjective as well as objective, are fabricated. [See *Śūnyam* and *Śūnyatā*.] This consciousness, however, is not deemed to exist in the ultimate sense. It subsists for but a moment and is replaced by the consciousness in the next moment. It has no substantiality and its origination is dependent on the consciousness of the preceding instant. To use the Yogācāra terminology, consciousness is of dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) and, as such, is not ultimately real. The Prajñāpāramitā Sū-

tras teach the voidness, or the nonexistence, of all entities. However, it is a fact of experience that phenomenal existences appear as if they were real. By admitting the reality of the consciousness, the Yogācāra clarified the foundation of our daily experience.

According to the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, a Yogācāra text, the Buddha set the “wheel of the doctrine” (*dharmacakra*) in motion three times. On the first turning, the Buddha taught the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths (*catvāry āryasatyāni*), the Hīnayāna path culminating in arhatship; on the second, he taught the doctrine of universal voidness designed to advance practitioners along the path to Buddhahood. But because the complete meaning of the Buddha’s teaching was not fully elucidated during these “turnings,” the Buddha set the wheel in motion a third time, with the intention of making explicit (*nītārtha*) what was only implicit (*neyārtha*) in the *sūtras* composed in earlier times.

Formative Period. The Yogācāra philosophy was systematized by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, thinkers who lived in the fourth or fifth century. However, some important Yogācāra works, namely, the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and the treatises ascribed to Maitreya(nātha), predate them.

The *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*’s major contribution to the Yogācāra school is its formulation of the doctrine of the three “characteristics” (*lakṣaṇa*) of entities: the imaginary character (*parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*), the dependent character (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa*), and the perfected character (*pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*). (All are explained in chapter 6.) The imaginary character is the assignation of conventional names to things with respect to their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) and specific qualities (*viśeṣa*). The dependent character is the conditioned origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) of things. [See *Pratītya-samutpāda*.] The perfected character is the “thusness” (*tathatā*) of things or the emptiness of intrinsic nature in things. [See *Tathatā*.] These three characteristics are closely related to the “triple unreality” discussed in chapter 7. Since the characteristic features of things are established merely by the act of assigning them conventional names, these features are ultimately unreal. Thus, the imaginary character of things is related to the unreality of their characteristic features (*lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*). Since the origination of things is dependent on causes and conditions, it is also not real. Thus the dependent character is related to the unreality of origination (*utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*). The ultimate reality is manifested through the thusness of things or the emptiness of intrinsic nature in things. Thus, the perfected character is related to the unreality of intrinsic nature, which is the ultimate reality (*paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*).

The doctrine of three characteristics and triple unreality expresses what the Buddha had in mind when, in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, he taught that all entities are devoid of intrinsic nature. It is understood that the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* put forth a teaching, the meaning of which is inexplicit and must be drawn out (*neyārtha*). The *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* unfolds (*nirmocana*) the “intention” (*saṃdhi*) of the Buddha that was hidden in the doctrine of voidness. This purpose is brought to full expression through the doctrine of triple unreality. Thus, this *sūtra* is of explicit meaning (*nītārtha*).

Chapter 5 of the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* presents the concept of *ālaya-vijñāna* (“storehouse consciousness”), which is characteristic of the Yogācāra teachings. It describes this consciousness as possessing “all the seeds” (*sarvabījaka*) from which future phenomenal existences will grow. The storehouse consciousness is attached to the sense faculties and to the impressions of “differentiations” (*prapañca*) left by the conventional usages regarding phenomenal existences and is called “attachment consciousness” (*ādāna-vijñāna*). [See *Ālaya-vijñāna*.] Chapter 9 gives a detailed explanation of the practices of tranquilization (*śamatha*) and contemplation (*vipaśyanā*) through which a practitioner acquires the ability to concentrate his mind on certain ideas and to visualize and efface them at will. This practice forms the basis of the Yogācāra view that there is no external object.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* (Stages of the Follower of Yoga Practice) is a voluminous, comprehensive work comprising five parts. The main part, which is called “Basic Text of the Stages,” treats the seventeen stages (*bhūmi*) to be successively passed through by a follower of *yoga* practice. It begins with the stage of sense perceptions, proceeds through many stages of meditation and other practices, reaches the stage of “disciples” (*śrāvaka*), then of “isolated Buddhas” (*pratyekabuddha*), then of *bodhisattvas*, and ends with the stage of complete *nirvāṇa* (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*, or “*nirvāṇa* with no residue”), the ultimate goal.

The Buddhist tradition in China attributes this work to Maitreya, but in Tibet it is known as a work of Asaṅga. Regarding the composition of a treatise dealing with seventeen stages, Paramārtha’s *Life of Vasubandhu* (T.D. no. 2049) and Hsüan-tsang’s *Ta T’ang hsi yü chi* (T.D. no. 2087) provide the following account. Asaṅga often went up to the Tuṣita Heaven, where he was taught the Mahāyāna doctrines by the *bodhisattva* Maitreya. Complying with the request of Asaṅga, who wanted Mahāyāna Buddhism to spread among the people, Maitreya came down to the continent of Jambudvīpa and gave a series of lectures on the seventeen stages. He lectured every night for four months; the next day Asaṅga, for

the sake of the other attendants, gave a full explanation of what the *bodhisattva* had taught. (Asaṅga was the only attendant who had access to the *bodhisattva*; the others could merely hear him from afar.) This account may explain why the Chinese and the Tibetan traditions differ on the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Some scholars assume that Maitreya, from whom Asaṅga is said to have received instruction on the Yogācāra doctrine, was a historical person; others, however, debate Maitreya's historicity. [See Maitreya.] Recent studies of the *Yogācārabhūmi* have proved that it was not the work of a single person; it is now supposed that the text was gradually enlarged by successive generations of Yogācāra scholars.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* enumerates, classifies, and explains all elements that relate to the practice of each of the seventeen stages in the same manner as that of Abhidharma treatises. The doctrine of *ālaya-vijñāna* is found in the first two chapters of the "Basic Text" and in some sections of the "Compendium of Ascertainment" (an auxiliary division), while the doctrine of the three characteristics of entities is mentioned only in the latter division. The chapter dealing with the "stage of *bodhisattvas*" (*bodhisattvabhūmi*) is devoted to the detailed analysis of the religious practices of *bodhisattvas*, systematically explaining the matters with which their practices are concerned, the ways that their practices are to be conducted, and the results to be attained by the practices. It is known that this chapter once existed as an independent text.

In the Tibetan Buddhist tradition the following five works are ascribed to Maitreya(nātha): *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and *Abhisamayālamkāra*. The last two are not considered Yogācāra works.

The *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (Ornament of Mahāyāna Sūtras), which presents a systematic exposition of the practices of *bodhisattvas*, consists of about 800 verses and is divided into 21 chapters. According to the Tibetan tradition, the verse text was written by Maitreya-nātha and the prose commentary by Vasubandhu; the Chinese tradition assigns both to Asaṅga. This treatise has the same structure as the chapter in the *Yogācārabhūmi* dealing with the stage of *bodhisattvas* (*bodhisattvabhūmi*). The subject matter of chief concern to *bodhisattvas*—ultimate reality—is expounded in chapter 6, and the state of having attained the ultimate reality—enlightenment (*bodhi*)—is elucidated in chapter 9. The theoretical basis of the practices of *bodhisattvas* is given in chapter 11. The *Madhyāntavibhāga* (Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes), which gives the Yogācāra interpretation of the doctrine of voidness (*sūnyatā*), consists of about 110 verses and is divided

into 5 chapters. Both the Chinese and the Tibetan traditions ascribe the verse text to Maitreya and the prose commentary to Vasubandhu. This treatise places voidness in the middle (*madhya*) of the two extremes (*anta*), that is, existence and nonexistence. The *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (Discrimination of Phenomenal Existence and Ultimate Reality), a short treatise written in concise *sūtra* style, is commented upon by Vasubandhu. It was not transmitted to China. It shows that phenomenal existences, which are characterized by the duality of subject and object or of denoter and denoted, are in reality modifications of a conscious principle called "unreal imagination" (*abhūta-parikalpa*). Through the cognition of the true nature of phenomenal existences, the ultimate reality—the "thusness" (*tathatā*) that is free from the duality—is realized.

These works, attributed to Maitreya, describe the ultimate reality with such positive terms as "sphere of religion" (*dharmadhātu*), instead of characterizing it merely as "void" or "empty" (*śūnya*). Like space, ultimate reality is all-pervasive, and there is no phenomenal existence independent of it. It is also called the "essence of phenomenal existences" (*dharmatā*). The idea that the mind (*citta*) is essentially pure (*prakṛti-viśuddha*) and brilliant (*prabhāsvara*), a stance neglected in the dogmatics of the Abhidharma treatises, is fully supported, and the ultimate reality is identified with this pure and brilliant mind.

Whereas the concept of *ālaya-vijñāna* is not found in these works, the concept of "unreal imagination" (*abhūta-parikalpa*) plays an important role. The opening verse of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* clearly states that in emptiness (*sūnyatā*) there exists the unreal imagination. However, the unreal imagination is not admitted to exist in the ultimate sense. It is essentially "unreal," but it is supposed to exist as the basis of the wrong assumption of the reality of phenomenal existences, which are characterized by the duality of subject and object, denoter and denoted, and so on. Much importance is attached to the doctrine of the three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) or natures (*svabhāva*) of entities. In chapter 3 of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* this doctrine is considered the fundamental truth (*mūlatattva*), and some important doctrines, such as that of the Four Noble Truths, the two truths (ultimate and conventional), and so on, are elucidated in terms of the three natures. The stages of yogic practice (*yogabhūmi*) through which a practitioner is led to the "transformation of the basis of his existence" (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) and attains the ultimate reality, are explained systematically in chapter 11 of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*.

Period of Systematization. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are the most prominent figures in the history of the Yo-

gācāra school. Asaṅga first belonged to the Mahīśāsaka school of Hīnayāna Buddhism, but later, under the influence of the *bodhisattva* Maitreya, he became an advocate of the Mahāyāna. His treatises combine Abhidharmic analysis of the elements constituting phenomenal existences with Mahāyāna ideas. He composed, among others, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Compendium of the Mahāyāna), a comprehensive work on Yogācāra doctrines and practices. In the first two chapters of this work he gives a full treatment of the doctrines of *ālaya-vijñāna* and of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*) of entities, thus laying the firm foundation of the philosophical system of the Yogācāra school.

According to Paramārtha's *Life of Vasubandhu*, Vasubandhu was a younger brother of Asaṅga. He wrote two Yogācāra treatises: the *Viṃśatikā* (Treatise of Twenty Verses) and the *Triṃśikā* (Treatise of Thirty Verses). The *Viṃśatikā* repudiates the realist view that the image of an object in the consciousness has a corresponding reality in the external world and demonstrates that the image of an object appears in the consciousness as the result of a particular change (*pariṇāma-viśeṣa*) that occurs in the stream of the successive moments (*saṃtati*) of consciousness. The *Triṃśikā* presents a lucid, concise exposition of Yogācāra dogmatics. The first half of this treatise analyzes the structure and the function of consciousness; the second elucidates the three-nature doctrine and the stages of practice. Regarded as the standard textbook of the Yogācāra school, the *Triṃśikā* has been the subject of many commentaries by post-Vasubandhu scholars. Vasubandhu also composed a short treatise in verse dealing with the three-nature doctrine, the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*.

A number of other Yogācāra works have been handed down under the name of Vasubandhu, such as commentaries on the treatises attributed to Maitreya, on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* of Asaṅga, and on some Mahāyāna *sūtras*. The philosophical ideas expressed in these commentaries are not identical with those presented in the *Viṃśatikā* and the *Triṃśikā*. In the last two works, the influence of the Sautrāntika school of Hīnayāna Buddhism is noticeable, but this is not the case with the commentaries. Accordingly, some modern scholars believe that there were two Vasubandhus: one, Asaṅga's brother, composed the commentaries on *sūtras* and treatises; the other, the author of the *Viṃśatikā* and the *Triṃśikā*, also wrote the *Abhidharmakośa*, a summary of Sarvāstivāda dogmatics, and an autocommentary written from the Sautrāntika viewpoint. However, further investigations must be made before a more definite conclusion can be drawn. [See the *biographies of Asaṅga*

and Vasubandhu.] The fundamental doctrines of the Yogācāra school as formulated by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are surveyed below.

Representation only (*vijñāptimātra*). The Yogācāras maintain that phenomenal existences, which are generally supposed to have objective reality in the external world, are no other than the "representations" (*vijñapti*), or images, of objects appearing in our consciousness (*vijñāna*). According to the Yogācāras, the image of an object is produced by the consciousness itself; there is no external object independent of the consciousness.

The *Mahāyānasamgraha* indicates that the image of an object in the consciousness does not presuppose the existence of the object in the external world. Some of the reasons mentioned are as follows;

1. The one and the same thing is represented differently by beings in different states of existence; for instance, that which is perceived by a man as a stream of clean water is represented as a flaming river by an inhabitant of hell and as a stream of pus and filth by a *preta*. This shows that an object represented in the consciousness is a product of mental construction.
2. It is a fact of experience that a cognition arises even when there is no object, as in the case of a recollection or dream. It is also known that a person who has advanced in *yoga* practice perceives a future object.
3. Through the practice of meditation (*dhyāna*) or tranquilization of the mind (*śamatha*), man comes to acquire the ability to visualize an object at will.
4. A practitioner who has stepped into the "path of insight" (*darśana-mārga*) attains "supermundane cognition" (*lokottara-jñāna*), in which there is no image of an object. This cognition, which has no corresponding reality in the external world, is thus experienced in daily life as well as in the process of religious practice.

Consequently, it is known that the form of an object that appears in the consciousness does not belong to a thing in the external world but is attributed to the consciousness itself.

Modification of consciousness (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*). The Yogācāra maintains that human beings and objective things, to which various terms—such as "self" (*āt-man*), "living being" (*jīva*), "pot," and "cloth"—are applied, are in reality the "modifications of consciousness." The consciousness that undergoes modification consists of three strata: (1) the six kinds of consciousness produced through the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile senses and the mind; (2) the "I-consciousness," called *manas*, which accompanies the

six kinds of consciousness; and (3) the subliminal consciousness, called *ālaya-vijñāna* ("store consciousness"), in which the "impressions" (*vāsanā*) of past experiences are accumulated as the "seeds" (*bīja*) of future experiences. While the *ālaya-vijñāna* is latent, the six kinds of consciousness and the I-consciousness are in manifest activity and are thus called the "consciousness-in-activity" (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*). The *ālaya-vijñāna* and the consciousness-in-activity are dependent on each other: the latter is produced from the seed preserved in the former and leaves, in turn, its impression on the former. Thus the "modification" (*pariṇāma*), or "change," of consciousness takes place in two ways: (1) a seed planted by the consciousness-in-activity becomes ripe in the *ālaya-vijñāna*; and (2) the consciousness-in-activity arises from the seed. The term "modification" was first used by Vasubandhu, but the idea of the mutual dependence of the *ālaya-vijñāna* and the consciousness-in-activity was formulated by Asaṅga in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

The *ālaya-vijñāna* subsists only for a moment, then is replaced by another consciousness in the next moment. The successive moments of the *ālaya-vijñāna* form a stream that continues to flow until the seeds planted in it are completely destroyed. In each moment there arises the consciousness-in-activity, and thus a consciousness complex is formed. A human being is a stream of the consciousness complex, and the things that are thought to exist in the external world are but the images that appear in this stream of consciousness.

Three natures (*trisvabhāva*). The three natures of entities, that is, the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), and the perfected nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*), were expounded in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, but this text does not discuss the interrelation of the three natures and consequently the doctrine's religious significance is not quite clear. In the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, in which the three-nature doctrine is a major topic, Asaṅga sets forth the view that the imagined and the perfected natures are two aspects of the dependent nature; the dependent nature, he explains, appears as the imagined nature by dint of a false imagination and as the perfected nature when the false imagination is removed. It is thus shown that the three-nature doctrine is closely related to Yogācāra soteriology. The doctrine, as formulated by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, may be briefly summarized as follows. The consciousness that arises in each moment with the image of an object is of dependent nature because its origination is dependent on the impressions of past experiences preserved in the *ālaya-vijñāna*. Because of his false imagination, man ordinarily takes this im-

age for a real object and applies a name to it. The object thus superimposed upon the image in the consciousness is of imagined nature. When the false imagination is completely removed through the practice of *yoga*, man realizes the absence of the superimposed object, that is, the perfected nature.

Transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*). The stages of yogic practice leading to the "transformation of the basis of existence" are systematized in some early Yogācāra works, and no substantial changes were made by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. After passing the stage of accumulating merits and learning the Buddha's teaching, a *yogācāra* proceeds to the stage of "preparatory exercise" (*prayoga*). Through this stage he comes to understand clearly that a name or a concept has no corresponding reality in the external world and that the intrinsic nature and specific qualities of things are products of subjective construction. Thus, he realizes that there is no real object to be "seized" (*grāhya*) and, consequently, that the consciousness as the "seizer" (*grāhaka*) is also devoid of reality. At this moment he steps forward into the "path of insight" (*darśana-mārga*) and attains the immediate awareness of the ultimate reality. There arises in him the force to destroy the seeds of defilement that have accumulated from beginningless time in the *ālaya-vijñāna*. This force gradually becomes more powerful as he proceeds to the "path of intensive practice" (*bhāvanā-mārga*). Finally, the seeds are completely destroyed and the stream of the *ālaya-vijñāna* no longer constitutes the basis (*āśraya*) of his existence. In its place the ultimate reality reveals itself as the real, undifferentiated basis of all living beings. Through this transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) the *yogācāra* reaches the final stage of his yogic practice and attains Buddhahood.

Later Period: Transmission into China and Japan. After Vasubandhu, scholars in the Yogācāra school formed two subschools. One maintained that the consciousness (*vijñāna*) is necessarily endowed with the "form" (*ākāra*) of an object and that of a subject; the other held that the forms of object and subject are of imagined nature and false and that the consciousness itself, which is a pure luminosity, is real. Proponents of the former were called, from the eighth century onward, the Sākāra-vijñānavādins (that is, the upholders of the doctrine that the consciousness is endowed with forms) and proponents of the latter were termed the Nirākāra-vijñānavādins (that is, the upholders of the doctrine that the consciousness possesses no form). Dignāga (c. 480–540) and Dharmapāla (c. 530–561), prominent scholars in Nālandā, are recognized as the early representatives of the former and Sthiramati (c.

510–570) in Valabhī as an advocate of the latter. [See the biographies of Dignāga, Dharmapāla, and Sthiramati.] The Sākāra-vijñānavāda is doctrinally related to the Sautrāntika school, and a branch of the Nirākāra-vijñānavāda, represented by Śāntirakṣita (c. 725–788) and Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795), is united with the Mādhyamika. [See the biographies of Śāntirakṣita and Kamalaśīla.] Scholarly activities continued in both subschools until the twelfth century, when Buddhism declined in India. In the last period, Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrīmitra (eleventh century) maintained the former, and Ratnākaraśānti (c. eleventh century) was a powerful advocate of the latter. Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660) and Prajñākaragupta (c. eighth century) are recognized by both subschools as exponents of their respective doctrines. [See the biography of Dharmakīrti.]

As early as the fifth century some Yogācāra works were translated into Chinese, but a real interest in Yogācāra was not aroused until Bodhiruci (?–527) arrived in China in 508 and translated Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, the *Shih ti ching lun* (T.D. no. 1522), in which the doctrine of the *ālaya-vijñāna* is presented. This work was accepted as an authority among Buddhist circles in North China, and gave rise to the Ti-lun sect. In the meantime, Paramārtha (c. 499–569), who came to South China in 546, introduced several Yogācāra treatises to the Buddhist circles. [See the biography of Paramārtha.] He attached importance to the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, and his translation of this treatise, namely, the *She ta-sheng lun* (T.D. no. 1593), was treated as the basic text of the She-lun sect. In the seventh century, Hsüan-tsang (602–664) traveled to India and studied Yogācāra doctrines at Nālandā under Śīlabhadra, a disciple of Dharmapāla. [See the biographies of Śīlabhadra and Hsüan-tsang.] After returning to China in 645, Hsüan-tsang translated a number of important Yogācāra works. In his translation of Dharmapāla's commentary on the *Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ* of Vasubandhu, he incorporated the views of ten other commentators and composed the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*. This work was recognized as authoritative for Yogācāra dogmatics by the Fa-hsiang sect, which was founded by K'uei-chi (632–682), a disciple of Hsüan-tsang. [See the biography of K'uei-chi.] Both the Ti-lun sect and the She-lun sect were absorbed into and replaced by the Fa-hsiang sect, which itself soon declined under the new trend of Buddhism represented by the Hua-yen and Ch'an sects. [See Buddhism, Schools of, article on Chinese Buddhism.]

The dogmatics of the Fa-hsiang (Jpn., Hossō) sect were introduced into Japan during the Nara period (710–784) by some monks who had studied in China. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* was earnestly studied there by

Buddhist scholars of different sects until recent years.

[See also Mādhyamika; Sautrāntika; Vijñāna; Buddhism, article on Buddhism in India; Buddhist Philosophy; and Indian Philosophies.]

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HATTORI MASAOKI

YOḤANAN BAR NAPPAḤA' (d. 279?), leading Palestinian amora. Yoḥanan's father and mother had both died by the time he was born (B.T., *Qid.* 31b), and his apparent patronymic refers either to his trade as a smith (*nappaḥa'*) or to his legendary, "inflaming" good looks. Yoḥanan is always referred to either by his given name or by the epithet *bar Nappaḥa'*, never both.

Yoḥanan's studies began during the lifetime of Yehudah ha-Nasi', known as "Rabbi," the redactor of the Mishnah. Later, Yoḥanan remembered having attended Rabbi's lectures and not understanding them (B.T., *Hul.* 137b). A native of Sepphoris, Yoḥanan began his studies there, but ultimately he became head of a prestigious rabbinic academy in Tiberias, where he spent the major part of his career. The only Babylonian for whom he spontaneously expressed respect was Rav, with whom he had studied under Yehudah ha-Nasi'; he later came to acknowledge the mastery of Shemu'el (B.T., *Hul.* 95b), but the two never met. In general, Yoḥanan's career was limited to the rabbinate of the Land of Israel, though his reputation traveled far beyond that country and even in Babylonia equaled that of the great Babylonian masters (B.T., 'A.Z. 40a).

Yoḥanan inherited a considerable amount of wealth but was said to have allowed it to dissipate in his pursuit of advanced learning. He became the teacher, senior colleague, and brother-in-law of Shim'on ben Laqish. The latter, according to Talmudic tradition, was originally attracted to Yoḥanan because he was so handsome. Shim'on became Yoḥanan's colleague and eventually the two were inseparable. It is recorded that Shim'on died because of a slight from his companion. Later legend explained Yoḥanan's own death as the result of his grief over this incident. Yoḥanan was also embittered by the death within his lifetime of ten of his children (B.T., *B.M.* 84a, *Ber.* 5b).

In his halakhic teaching, Yoḥanan devised a number of rules for determining which of several conflicting opinions in the Mishnah was to be followed—for example, when Me'ir and Yehudah disagree, the *halakhah* ("law") follows Yehudah; when Yehudah and Yose disagree, the *halakhah* follows Yose (B.T., 'Eruv. 46b); whenever Shim'on ben Gamli'el gives a ruling in the Mishnah, the *halakhah* follows him except in three cases (B.T., *Git.* 75a); when Yehudah ha-Nasi' disagrees with his colleagues, the *halakhah* follows him (J.T., *Ter.* 3.1, 42a). He also formulated the much-quoted norm that

the law always follows anonymous Mishnaic rulings (see, for instance, B.T., *Shabbat* 46a, and J.T., *Shabbat* 3.7, 6c). Yoḥanan's influence on the development of rabbinic scholarship in the Land of Israel was so great that Moses Maimonides considered him the redactor of the Jerusalem Talmud, although this is surely an exaggerated report.

According to one tradition, the custom of placing decorative art on walls (probably the walls of synagogues) arose in Yoḥanan's time "and he did not object" (J.T., 'A.Z. 3.3, 42d). Yoḥanan also became an authority on calendrical astronomy (J.T., *R. ha-Sh.* 2.6, 58a–b; B.T., *Hul.* 95b). With respect to nonlegal lore, Yoḥanan was known as a student of *merkavah* mysticism, which he unsuccessfully offered to teach to his own student El'azar ben Pedat. The long *aggadah* (nonlegal rabbinic thought) on the destruction of Jerusalem that starts in the Babylonian Talmud tractate *Gitṭin* 55b is attributed to him, as are other narratives that purport to recount important events in the history of the rabbinate (B.T., *Hor.* 13b) or the circumstances that gave rise to particular rabbinical enactments (B.T., *B.Q.* 94b, *Bekh.* 30b). Yoḥanan also gave considerable attention to the etiquette of prayer and to methods for increasing its effectiveness. According to legend, his final instructions were that he was to be buried in neither a black nor a white shroud so that he would not be ashamed to find himself in the company of either the righteous or the wicked.

[See also *Amoraim*.]

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ROBERT GOLDENBERG

YOḤANAN BEN ZAKK'AI (c. 1–80 CE), sage and leader of Judaism in the Land of Israel after the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in 70 CE. Known to us only from sources brought to closure two and more centuries after his death, beginning with the Mishnah (c. 200), two facts about his life are certain: he lived before the destruction, and survived it:

Yoḥanan was the principal figure in the formation, in the aftermath of the calamity, of a circle of disciples with whom he laid the foundations of the Judaism presented by the Mishnah. This work of legal-theological formation defined Judaism as it would be known from

the second century onward. Yoḥanan himself is represented in the Mishnah principally through attributions to him of certain temporary ordinances, meant mostly to take account of the destruction of the Temple as an event in the sacred calendar of Judaism. These reforms, involving very trivial matters, signified a policy of surviving and carrying on. They meant that even without the Temple it would be possible to worship God and observe the festivals formerly focused upon the Temple. To Yoḥanan are attributed, also, certain interpretations of biblical stories, one of which stressed that Job had served God out of awe and reverence, not (merely) love. Finally, he is represented as having attempted to exercise authority even over the priesthood, which had formerly run the country. His rulings in matters of genealogy, on which priestly authority rested, indicate that he held that sages' mastery of Torah was paramount, priests' genealogical standing derivative. In these aspects Yoḥanan carried forward the position of the Pharisees of the period before the destruction. They had maintained that lay people might observe at home certain rules that were kept by the priests in the Temple, so indicating that the priests enjoyed no monopoly over access to the sacred.

In compilations of stories produced much later than the Mishnah, Yoḥanan's career is fleshed out. His surviving the destruction is represented as an encounter between Israel, the Jewish nation, and Rome, with a sage, Yoḥanan himself, negotiating on behalf of the Jews with a Roman general. In the principal version Yoḥanan is portrayed as having escaped from Jerusalem before it was fully invested and as having come before the Roman general Vespasian. He asked for the right to go to Yavneh, a coastal town where loyalists were held. There he would teach his disciples, establish a house of prayer, and carry out the commandments, the religious deeds of Judaism. He further informed Vespasian that the general would become emperor. (In other versions Yoḥanan is supposed to have asked for "the chain of Rabban Gamli'el and physicians to heal Rabbi Tsadoq.")

Yoḥanan's message to Israel, portrayed in other late sources, involved three elements. First, not to take too seriously the claims of messiahs: "If you have a sapling in your hand and people say to you, 'Behold, there is the Messiah,' go on with your planting, and afterward go out and receive him." Second, to obey God's will as the response to defeat: "Happy are you, O Israel! When you obey the will of God, then no nation or race can rule over you! But when you do not obey the will of God, you are handed over into the hands of every low-born people." Third, what God wants is acts of loving kindness. Yoḥanan held that even though sin could no

longer be atoned through sacrifice in the Temple, "We have another atonement as effective as this. And what is it? It is acts of loving-kindness, as it is said, 'For I desire mercy, not sacrifice' " (*Hos.* 6:6).

Whether or not these tales go back to the person, or even the time, of Yoḥanan ben Zakk'ai, we do not know. But they are the foundation legends of the kind of Judaism that has been paramount from the second century to the present, and Yoḥanan, above all, is credited with the definition of that Judaism.

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JACOB NEUSNER

YOM KIPPUR. See Ro'sh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur.

YONI is a Sanskrit word with various meanings such as "womb, vulva, vagina; place of birth, source, origin, spring; abode, home, lair, nest; family, race, stock, caste," and so on. It is etymologically derived from the verbal root *yu* ("join, unite, fasten, or harness"), from which is derived the English *yoke*; *ni* is added to the root to form a noun with active meaning. Thus *yonī* is "what joins or unites." The word *yoga*, derived from the same root, means "union, connection." The two words *yonī* and *yoga* are thus similar to the word *religion*, from the Latin *religio* ("binding, fastening, reuniting, or re-linking").

Icons representing the *yonī* alone or in conjunction with the male generative organ, the *liṅga*, are widespread in both popular Hinduism and in the Tantric traditions of India; such images, known in English as *yonis* and *lingams*, stand for the goddess *Devī* and the god *Śiva*. These traditions are the heirs of a female-dominated symbol system characteristic of the pre-Vedic worldview. Before the Indus and Ganges valleys were invaded from the north by Aryan pastoral nomads, bearers of an androcentric religion, there flourished an

agricultural civilization known as the Indus Valley civilization (c. 4000–1000 BCE). Archaeological remains from the sites at Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro abound in mother-goddess figurines, large stone yonis (and lingams), and a variety of seals. One of the most intriguing of these seals bears the figure of a man in a cross-legged posture typical of yogic discipline. The religious complex of ideas and practices called *yoga* has been identified as being pre-Vedic in origin; the yogic posture of the figure on this Indus Valley seal is one of the strongest pieces of evidence for the pre-Vedic origins of yoga. Scholars have until recently identified this horned yogic person as a proto-image of Śiva. More recent research has identified the scene depicted on the seal as being linked with an archaic form of the still-practiced buffalo sacrifice to the Goddess. On the seal the Goddess is represented next to her mount, the lion, which is shown in a dynamic posture facing the seated figure on its right, corresponding to the northern direction with the Goddess. The yogic posture of the buffalo-horned god has been interpreted as expressive of the destructive and creative power entailed by the sacrifice. The sacrifice itself aims at a symbolic unification with the Goddess. In many popular South Indian myths concerning this sacrifice, the buffalo is depicted as desiring or actually uniting with the Goddess in the guise of a lower-caste husband or suitor. As David Shulman has shown in his discussion of South Indian mythology (1980), Śiva becomes the buffalo. Through sacrificial death, Śiva as the buffalo consort of the goddess is reborn from her. In these myths and representations we seem to be able to apprehend the common etymology of the terms *yoni* and *yoga*. Union with the Goddess is the ultimate aim of the sacrifice; it is at one and the same time an abstract concept and a concrete act of union with the Goddess's icon, namely her yoni.

The symbolism on this famous Harappan seal, thus interpreted in the light of contemporary ritual practices and myths, brings up the extremely widespread symbolic themes of the mysterious and potent link between the *yoni* and death, and sacrificial death in particular. Perhaps the earliest evidence of the theme is to be found in the European Paleolithic caves dating from about 20,000 to 11,000 BCE. *Yoni* symbols have been found in profusion in these caves, many of them identical to some of the Indian representations of the *yoni*. The most often found Paleolithic *yoni* symbol is the same as the Tantric symbol, namely a downward-pointing triangle (see figure 1.1), with variations (figure 1.2, 1.3). What is even more remarkable is the association between the yonic triangle and representations of the bison found at several Paleolithic caves, since the bison is the Western cousin of the Eastern buffalo.




FIGURE 1. *Yoni* Symbols

The most striking such representation is the one found at the Abri du Roc aux Sorciers at Angles-sur-Anglin, France, dating from about 13,000 to 11,000 BCE. A colossal group of three female torsos with exaggerated *yonis*, all represented as cleft downward-pointing triangles (figure 1.2), are etched in the living rock wall. The three female figures are standing on a bison. The relief of two recumbent female figures dates from the same period; they flank both sides of the entrance to a shallow cave at La Madeleine in France. The figure to the right has at its center the same downward-pointing cleft triangle to represent the *yoni* (the left image is too damaged to discern the sexual parts); below the figure on the left is a bison.

The famous "Woman with the Horn," dating some five to seven thousand years earlier, depicts a nude female holding a bison horn in her right uplifted hand; it is incised on the rock wall of a shelter at Laussel in France. The bison horn is marked with thirteen lines, most likely representing the thirteen lunar months in the year. The crescent shape of the horn bears an unmistakable likeness to the lunar crescent. The analogy between the cycles of the moon and the menstrual cycle of women is found in most cultures of the world. The parallelism is most directly stated by the !Kung hunters and gatherers of the Kalahari Desert of southern Africa, among whom the menses are simply called "the moon."

Only a few miles from the Laussel rock shelter is situated the most grandiose of all Paleolithic painted caves, that of Lascaux. That caves were symbolic of the earth's womb is strongly suggested by the cave at La Madeleine, with its entrance flanked by two nude women. On the rim of the entrance to the Lascaux cave is incised a cluster of what André Leroi-Gourhan has termed "female vulvas in the shape of claviforms." Thus to enter a cave was to enter the deep, labyrinthine, dark womb of Mother Earth.

In India today there are several popular pilgrimage sites where the icon of the Goddess is situated deep in a cave whose access is through an extremely narrow, dark, and winding passageway. The most famous such natural icon of the Goddess's *yoni* is found in Assam in eastern India, at the shrine of Kāmakhya Devī. It is a natural cleft in the rock that is said to menstruate once a year, the period coinciding with the main festival of the Goddess. The shrine of Kāmakhya Devī is linked

with the myth of Satī, the consort of Śiva, who immolated herself after her father scorned her husband by not inviting him to a great sacrifice. The disconsolate Śiva carried Satī's corpse with him in his wanderings, and parts of her body fell to earth. Her *yoni* fell where the shrine of Kāmakhya Devī is located. At the shrine of Vaishno Devī in Jammu, pilgrims crawl on their bellies along a dark and wet narrow corridor to reach the cave of the Goddess. A spring originates there, completing the birth-rebirth imagery. Clearly the yonic symbolism of caves is extraordinarily ancient. [See Caves.]

The cave at Lascaux is immense, with several corridors and large chambers covered with spectacular rock paintings of animals. These caves were not habitats but ritual centers for the Paleolithic hunters and gatherers. The painted herds found in their depths, visible only by the flickering light of torches, may represent the animals in the earth's womb out of which animals come in the daylight and into which they return at night, only to reemerge in the morning. A painted scene in the innermost recess of this complex of caves, called "the Crypt" because it is sixteen feet below the general level of the cavern floor, has been interpreted by Joseph Campbell as representing a similar theme, that of the regenerative power of death. The scene shows a bison with a spear entering through its anus and emerging from its genitals, where its entrails hang out in the form of four concentric ovals. Next to the bison lies a bird-headed or bird-masked ithyphallic man and next to him a spear-thrower and a bird-topped staff. The figure in all likelihood represents a shaman, since birds are in contemporary shamanistic contexts the typical vehicles for the shaman's trance flight to the underworld or the heavens. [See Paleolithic Religion.]

The symbolic equivalence between spear and phallus is ethnographically widespread, as is the analogy between concentric ovals or other labyrinthine or spiral patterns and the female generative organs. The association between the *yoni* and a wound is widespread as well. It is an analogy still expressed today in South India and Sri Lanka. An ancient Tamil poem brings together the phallus-spear and *yoni*-wound analogies by depicting a man who views his newborn son for the first time wearing full warrior attire, a bloody spear in his hand and a freshly self-inflicted wound on his neck. Leroi-Gourhan, who has made an intensive study of the Paleolithic cave paintings, identifies the bison's hanging entrails as a *yoni* symbol. The speared bison, most probably a sacrificial victim, represents in death a sexual union. The scene is hauntingly reminiscent of the sacrifice of the buffalo-man to the Indian Goddess, also equivalent to sexual union. The womb-cave of the earth is a generative power, which brings forth life through death.

The view of the womb as the originator of both life and death is succinctly captured in the following Hindu saying: "Again birth, again death, again sleep in the mother's womb." In many so-called primitive cultures, the departed ancestors live in a place from which they come back to enter the *yonis* of women to be reborn. In the Trobriand Islands of Melanesia unborn and the dead are the very same beings. After death and the observation of the proper funerary rituals, the departed ancestor or ancestress goes to the island of Tuma. It is from that island that the departed return in the form of the soul of unborn children to enter the *yonis* of Trobriand women. In aboriginal Australia, the sacred engraved ancestral stones called *tjurungas* are hidden in hollows and caves; by visiting these sites the women become impregnated. It is in the light of such cyclical views of generation and regeneration that one can understand rituals in which death and the act of generation are made to coincide as they apparently do in the Lascaux crypt; the end is also the beginning.

Entering the womb/caves of the Paleolithic hunters and gatherers must have been a numinous experience for the participants, who had to creep through dangerously narrow, dark passageways to a world beyond night and day, beyond time itself. It is indubitable that the nearly universal analogy between the earth and woman implicit in the womb/cave identification is at least as old as those remotest of cultures.

The theme of the earth as a womb into which the dead are placed is found throughout the Neolithic period. In her work summarizing the archaeological finds in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean areas (6500 to 3500 BCE), Marija Gimbutas (1982) gives ample evidence of the prominence of triangular *yoni* designs as well as of goddess images in the act of giving birth, legs wide apart. The dual nature of the goddess as both giver and taker of life is most vividly represented in the many shrines found at the site of Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia. Breasts rising out of the shrine wall have open nipples out of which vultures' beaks protrude; the skull of the vulture is inside the breast. The wall paintings in these shrines show vultures pecking at the flesh of headless corpses. The evidence from burial sites in the shrines led the excavator of Çatal Hüyük, James Mellaart, to the conclusion that before burial in the earth, the corpses were exposed on elevated platforms for the purpose of excarnation. In some of the shrines, images of the naked goddess are represented giving birth to a bison or a ram's head. In other sites of this area, designated by Gimbutas as Old Europe, the dead are placed in egg-shaped pithoi in a fetal position. Like the grave pit, the pithos was considered to be a womb from which the child or adult could be born again. Often the body was sprinkled with red ocher, a

symbol of blood, to assure the restoration of life. [See Prehistoric Religions, *article on Old Europe.*]

Cave mouths and clefts in rock walls are not the only yonic associations one encounters cross-culturally. Mountains themselves have been associated with the *yonī*, as the Latin term *mons veneris*, meaning the yonic triangle, attests, since it literally means "mountain of Venus." Springs, rivers, ponds, lakes, and seas have female meanings in many cultures of all levels of complexity. From the *yonī* gush forth the maternal waters at the time of birth. The earth's stones and metals have been analogized to the Goddess's bones. In the realm of vegetation some of the best-known yonic icons are fruits whose shape are in some ways analogous to that of the *yonī*. Some of the best known are the pomegranate (Europe and West Asia), the mango (South Asia), the kidney bean (Rome), the fig and the almond (the Mediterranean world), and the peach and the apricot (Europe).

The active character of the etymology of the word *yonī* reveals itself in the mythological realm as the *śakti*, or power of the Goddess. These are contemporary Hindu concepts that seem to be the heirs of one of the oldest religious traditions of mankind. In the Tantric tradition—and much popular Hinduism as well—the Goddess is the active principle in the cosmos without whom her male consort Śiva would be just a corpse. The life-giving, animating power of the cosmos is Śakti, a personification that in its most concrete manifestation resides in the *yonī*. In the esoteric Tantric tradition the *yonī* is worshiped in an elaborate secret ritual in the form of several symbolic representations. It is worshiped literally as well: a woman sits nude and cross-legged, exposing her *yonī*, to which the ritual specialist makes a series of offerings. For Tantrics, all women are living incarnations of the Goddess. In popular Hinduism, the *yonīs* of sculpted female figures on entrance gates are ritually fingered by worshipers as they enter a place of worship.

Popular belief in Hindu India holds that vaginal fluids enter the man's penis during intercourse. This belief corresponds to the standard Indian poetic image for sexual union, that of the male bumblebee gathering honey in female flower buds. In intercourse, through the woman's vaginal fluids a man receives the *śakti* that is his wife's. Such ideas underlie the custom of the establishment of concubines for kings, chiefs, and other important males, a practice found not only in India but in certain West African and Pacific cultures as well. These ideas are by no means encountered solely among complex cultures based on agriculture, such as traditional Hindu India, but are also found among hunters and gatherers. A !Kung woman from the Kalahari Desert, named Nisa by her anthropologist biographer (Marjorie Shostak), says the following about women's genitals:

"Women possess something very important, something that enables men to live: their genitals. A woman can bring a man life, even if he is almost dead. She can give him sex and make him live again. If she were to refuse, he would die!"

The life-giving power of vaginal fluids is most concretely exemplified among the Kiwai people of New Guinea. Vaginal secretions are used extensively in garden rituals. For example, when the first shoots of yams, the culture's staple diet, have sprouted above ground, the mother of the owner of the garden smears her hands with her vaginal fluids and tugs at one of the shoots. At the time of planting taro, the mother lies down nude in the garden, and her husband inserts the digging stick in her vulva and then digs the hole in the ground between her legs. The fertile powers of the vulva and its secretions could not possibly be more concretely stated.

In most agricultural societies the furrow or the seed hole stand for the vulva. The seed stands for semen, and the plough or digging stick for the phallus. Sītā, the heroine of the Indian epic the *Rāmāyaṇa*, was born in a furrow; indeed, her name means "furrow." When she was abducted by the demon king Rāvaṇa, the vegetation wilted and the animals ceased to reproduce. Rāma, her royal husband, unable to unite with her, had to endure a barren realm until he was able to bring her back.

Underlying the symbolic associations between the earth, its caves, furrows, and waters and the vulva is the notion of the transformative powers of female sexuality. In the furrow the seed transforms itself into fruit or grain; in the cave/womb of the earth death transforms itself into life; in the womb of woman, male and female sexual fluids transform themselves into a human being. The transformative powers of the vulva account for much of the symbolism of initiation rites cross-culturally. The transformation of a child into a sexually potent adult or of an uninitiated person into an initiated one is very often effected by a symbolic return into the womb, the original transformative matrix. It is interesting to note that in Hindu India both the Vedic initiation for a brahman male and the Tantric initiation rite use basically the same womb symbolism. The following passage from the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (1.3), most graphically describes this process:

Him whom they consecrate the priests make into an embryo again. He should be bathed in water. . . , anointed with *navanīta* or clarified butter [a symbol of embryo, according to the text] and purified with *darbha* or *kuśa* grass. Then collyrium is to be put in his eyes, just as it is in the eyes of the new born. After this, the candidate will have to enter and stay in a hut shaped like a female organ.

One more example from a very different type of society will suffice to illustrate the transformative power of

the vulva in initiation ceremonies. The Navajo in the Southwest of the United States hold a ceremony called *Kinaaldá* at the time of a girl's first menses. During the five days that the ritual lasts, most activities take place inside the girl's family dwelling, the hogan. A hogan is a circular structure with a single opening to the east. It is partially sunk in the earth; the opening is so placed as to receive the first rays of the rising sun. During the ceremony the initiand sits by the western wall facing east. Sacred songs are sung that transform the hogan into the first primordial hogan situated at Emergence Rim, the center of the earth and its vagina. Through the songs the initiand becomes Changing Woman and the guests become the Holy People, the first human beings who appeared out of Emergence Rim. Changing Woman, the culture heroine of the Navajo, was impregnated by the sun at her *Kinaaldá*, the first one ever, as she sat in her hogan facing east. The hogan has an unmistakable womb shape.

The absence of any other openings except for the eastern entrance can only be explained in terms of a womb symbolism. The myth of Changing Woman makes it clear that impregnation by the Sun took place through the hogan's eastern entrance. Thus the initiand is transformed into a bringer of fertility to herself, the people, and the earth in a fashion identical to that of Changing Woman. The transformation was accomplished through a stay in a symbolic vulva that, through song, became the primordial hogan at the womb-gate of the earth.

Aside from the transformative religious mysteries of sacrifice and initiation, the obvious life-giving and growth-promoting powers of the vulva and its secretions have given rise to a widespread use of representations of the female genitalia as apotropaic devices. The custom of plowing a furrow for magical protection around a town was practiced all over Europe by peasants. It was still observed in the twentieth century in Russia, where villages were thus annually "purified." The practice was exclusively carried out by women, who, while plowing, called on the moon goddess. A similar apotropaic function seems to have prompted the placing of squatting female figures prominently exposing their open vulvas on the key of arches at church entrances in Ireland, Great Britain, and German Switzerland. In Ireland these figures are called *Sheelagh-na-gigs*. Some of these figures represent emaciated old women. These images are illustrations of myths concerning the territorial Celtic goddess who was the granter of royalty. When the goddess wished to test the king-elect, she came to him in the form of an old hag, soliciting sexual intercourse. If the king-elect accepted, she transformed herself into a radiantly beautiful young woman and conferred on him royalty and blessed his

reign. Most such figures were removed from churches in the nineteenth century.

This Celtic tradition bears a remarkable resemblance to certain Hindu myths and rites. The goddess *Lakṣmī* is also a granter of sovereignty. In union with her, a man becomes a king. If she leaves such a man, he loses his sovereignty and/or the power to ensure the fertility and well-being of his realm. *Lakṣmī*'s iconography is intimately associated with the lotus, one of the most ubiquitous South Asian *yoni* symbols. The lotus itself can stand for *Lakṣmī*. Her consort, *Viṣṇu*, who is an embodiment of sovereignty, has as one of his four attributes the lotus, which he holds in one of his hands. This denotes his union with the Goddess, the source of his sovereignty. Such beliefs underlie the apotropaic character of the couples engaged in sexual intercourse often found sculpted on the outer walls and entrances of Hindu temples. The magical protective function of the female genitalia is dimly preserved in the European folk custom of hanging a horseshoe over the threshold. The horseshoe, made from a substance from deep inside the womb of the earth—iron—is shaped like the loop in the yonic triangles.

A remarkable parallel to the Celtic *Sheelagh-na-gig* is found in the Palauan archipelago. The wooden figure of a nude woman, prominently exposing her vulva by sitting with legs wide apart and extended to either side of the body, is placed on the eastern gable of each village's chiefly meeting house. Such figures are called *dilugai*. Interestingly, the *yoni* is in the shape of a cleft downward-pointing triangle. These female figures protect the villagers' health and ward off all evil spirits as well. They are constructed by ritual specialists according to strict rules, which if broken would result in the specialist's as well as the chief's death. It is not coincidental that each example of signs representing the female genitalia used as apotropaic devices are found on gates. The vulva is the primordial gate, the mysterious divide between nonlife and life.

A final major cluster of meanings associated with the vulva relates to its association with wealth. Such an association expresses itself in a broad variety of cultures and in different ways. Shells in general have been and still are symbols of the vulva; the earliest known example is a Magdalenian (Upper Paleolithic) fragment of bone from Arudy in southwestern France depicting a horse's head in the act of licking a yonic shell. However, the link between the vulva and wealth has been represented perhaps most prevalently by the cowrie shell, which has served as a medium of economic exchange in several cultures, particularly in West Africa and India. This smooth univalve bears in its shape and coloring an unmistakable resemblance to the vulva, which un-

doubtedly accounts for the association in as widely separated regions as West and North Africa, South Asia, Japan, and the Pacific Islands.

The complex of ideas relating wealth and fertility to the vulva is further illustrated by an example from the West African Tiv culture. One of their most sacred objects, symbolizing the fertility of their tribal land and the well-being of its inhabitants, is a human tibia, decorated and ornamented in the shape of a woman, with cowrie shells for the eyes and sometimes on the front of the body as well. It has a hole at the place of the navel; the decorations around it are the same as the scarifications produced on women's bodies at puberty. When disaster threatens or has taken place, and also in annual renewal ceremonies, this object, called the *imborivungu* ("owl pipe") is used ritually. In a secret ritual the elders pour blood from a miscarried fetus into its navel hole. The *imborivungu* is then shaken over fields and in wells to ensure the fertility of the land and of the women. In this example, the yonic cowries, along with the abdominal designs, identify the sacred object as a fertile woman. The ritual is intended to bring about both material abundance—since good crops are the primary source of wealth in agricultural societies—and the fertility of women. Here again we find the nearly universal equation between the fertility of the earth, the source of wealth, and the fertility of women.

[See also *Feminine Sacrality*.]

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YORUBA RELIGION. The twelve to fifteen million Yoruba people of southwestern Nigeria, the Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey), and Togo (topographically the area is defined as that between 6°0'–9°5' north latitude and 2°41'–6°0' east longitude) are the heirs of one of the oldest cultural traditions in West Africa. Archaeological and linguistic evidence indicate that the Yoruba have lived in their present habitat since at least the fifth century BCE. The development of the regional dialects that distinguish the Yoruba subgroups and the process of urbanization, which developed into a social system unique among sub-Saharan African peoples, took place during the first millennium CE. By the ninth century the ancient city of Ile-Ife was thriving, and in the next five centuries Ife artists would create terracotta and bronze sculptures that are now among Africa's artistic treasures.

Both Yoruba myth and oral history refer to Oduduwa (also known as Odua) as the first king and founder of the Yoruba people. Some myths portray him as the creator god and assert that the place of creation was Ile-Ife, which subsequently became the site of Oduduwa's throne. Oral history, however, suggests that the story of Oduduwa's assumption of the throne at Ife refers to a conquest of the indigenes of the Ife area prior to the ninth century by persons from "the east." While it is increasingly apparent that the sociopolitical model of a town presided over by a paramount chief or king (*oba*), was well established in Ife and present among other Yoruba subgroups, the followers of Oduduwa developed the urban tradition and enhanced the role of the king. In later years, groups of people who sought to establish their political legitimacy (even if they were immigrants) were required to trace their descent from Oduduwa. Such people were known as "the sons of Oduduwa," and they wore beaded crowns (*adenla*) given to them by

Oduduwa as the symbol of their sacred authority (*aṣẹ*).

Origin myths, festival rituals, and oral traditions associate the indigenous peoples with Ọbatala, the deity (*oriṣa*) who fashions the human body. And since he too was an *ọba*, his priests wear white, conical, beaded crowns similar to those reserved for "the sons of Oduduwa." The myths and rituals also refer to a great struggle between Ọbatala and Oduduwa at the time of creation, following Oduduwa's theft of the privilege granted by Ọlọrun (Olodumare), the high god, to Ọbatala to create the earth and its inhabitants. [See Ọlọrun.] In the town of Itapa, the sequence of rituals that composes the annual festival of Ọbatala reenacts a battle between Oduduwa and Ọbatala, Oduduwa's victory over and the banishment of Ọbatala, and the rejoicing that took place among the gods and mankind with the return of Ọbatala at the invitation of Oduduwa. And there is the tradition among the Ọyọ Yoruba of the unwarranted imprisonment of Ọbatala by Ẓango and the thunder god's release of the wandering, ancient king after famine and barrenness threatened field and home.

In these myths and rituals there is a historical remembrance of a usurpation of power and the acknowledgment that a violent conflict and a tenuous reconciliation gave birth to modern Yoruba culture. The remembrance, however, has not only to do with a past time, with historical and cultural origins; it is also a statement about the nature and limits of the authority of kings in defining the moral basis of Yoruba society. It is also about the importance of Ile-Ifẹ as the symbol of Yoruba cultural homogeneity, while acknowledging the distinctiveness and the independence of other Yoruba subgroups.

There are approximately twenty subgroups, each identifiable by its distinctive variation in linguistic, social, political, and religious patterns born of the history of the region. Among the principal groups are the Ẹgba and Ẹgbado in the southwest, the Ijẹbu in the southern and southeast, the Ọyọ in the central and northwest, the Ifẹ and the Ijẹṣa in the central, the Owo in the eastern, and the Igbomina and Ekiti in the northeast regions. Throughout Yorubaland, the social system is patrilineal and patrilocal, although among the Ẹgba and Ẹgbado there are elements of a dual descent system. The extended family (*idile*), which dwells in the father's compound so long as space and circumstance permit, is the essential social unit and the primary context in which self-awareness and social awareness are forged. Thus, Ọdun Egungun, the annual festival for the patrilineal ancestors, is the most widespread and important festival in the Yoruba liturgical calendar. Elaborate masquerades (*egungun*), are created of layers of cloths of dark colors with white serrated edges. The costume cov-

ers the dancer, who moves about the compound or town with stately pace, occasionally performing whirling movements, causing the cloths to splay out in constantly changing patterns. In movement and appearance the masquerade depicts the presence and power (*aṣẹ*) of the ancestors. The ancestors are those persons who established the "house" (*ile*) and the family and who continue to stand surety for its integrity and survival against threats of witchcraft and disease, so long as their heirs acknowledge the ancestral presence.

While masquerades for the patrilineal ancestors are found among all the Yoruba, there are other masked festivals that are distinctive to particular areas, reflecting the regional history that has shaped the Yoruba experience. The Yoruba peoples of the southwest (the Anago, Awori, Ẹgbado, Kẹtu, and Ẹgba) celebrate the Gẹlẹdẹ festival at the time of the spring rains. The festival honors *awọn iya wa* ("the mothers"), a collective term for the female power (*aṣẹ*) possessed by all women but especially manifest in certain elderly women and in female ancestors and deities. It is the awesome power of woman in its procreative and destructive capacities that is celebrated and acknowledged. Among the Ijẹbu peoples of the south the annual festival for Agẹmọ, an *oriṣa* whose power is represented by the chameleon, brings sixteen priest-chiefs famed for their magical or manipulative powers from towns surrounding the capital city of Ijẹbu-Ode into ritual contests of curse and masked dance with one another and then into the city, where they petition and are received by the Awujale, the *ọba* of Ijẹbu-Ode. The secret power of the priest-chiefs meets the sacred power of the crown. Each is required to acknowledge the role of the other in the complex balance of power that constitutes Ijẹbu political life. The Ẹlẹfon and Ẹpa festivals are masquerades performed in the towns of such Yoruba subgroups as the Igbomina and Ekiti in honor of persons and families whose lives embodied the social values by which Yoruba culture has been defined in the northeastern area. The helmet masks with their large sculptures are balanced on the dancers' heads and are the focus of ritual sacrifice (*ẹbo*) and songs of praise (*oriki*) throughout the festival. They are images of the sacred power of those who founded the town or contributed to its life in important ways. Thus, while individual masks are associated with particular families, they also refer to the roles of hunter, warrior, king, herbalist-priest, and leader of women, roles that transcend lineage ties and express in their collectivity cultural achievement. Their powers are akin to those of the *oriṣa*, the gods of the Yoruba pantheon.

According to the Yoruba, there are 401 *oriṣa* who line the road to heaven. All of them are thought to have been

humans who, because they led notable lives, became *oriṣa* at the time of their death. For example, Ṣango, the god of thunder, was a legendary king of Oyo before he became an *oriṣa*. The extraordinary number of *oriṣa* reflects the regional variation in their worship. Ṣango is the patron deity of the kings of Oyo, and his shrines are important in those towns that were once part of the old Oyo empire (c. 1600–1790). But in Ile-Ife, or in communities to the south and east, the role of Ṣango and the degree to which he is worshiped diminishes markedly. As one moves from one part of Yorubaland to another, it will be Oṣun, goddess of medicinal waters, or Oko, god of the farm, or Erinle, god of forest and stream, or Obatala or Agemo whose shrines and festivals shape the religious life of a people. Furthermore, the *oriṣa* have multiple names. Some call Ṣango Oba Koso (“king of Koso”); others greet him as Balogunni Ado (“leader of warriors at Ado”). Ṣango is also addressed as Abinufarokotu (“one who violently uproots an *iroko* tree”), Oko Iyemonja (“husband of Iyemonja”), or Lagigaogun (“he who is mighty in the use of magical powers”), names that reveal the varied and distinctive experiences of his devotees and their relationship to the *oriṣa*. The multiplicity (or fragmentation) of the *oriṣa* is also a consequence of the historical dislocation of peoples that occurred during the intertribal wars of the nineteenth century. When persons and groups were forced to move from one area to another, their *oriṣa* went with them, shaping and being shaped by the new world of their devotees’ experience.

Of all the *oriṣa* it is Ogun, god of iron and of war, whose worship is most widespread. It is said that there are seven Ogun, including Ogun of the blacksmiths, Ogun of the hunters, Ogun of the warriors, and Ogun Onire. Ire is a town in northeast Yorubaland where Ogun was once the leader of warriors and where he “sank into the ground” after killing persons in a great rage, having misunderstood their vow of ritual silence as a personal affront. As with other *oriṣa*, Ogun expresses and shapes a people’s experience with respect to a particular aspect of their lives. In the case of Ogun, it is the experience of violence and culture: his myths and rituals articulate for the Yoruba the irony that cultural existence entails destruction and death. One must kill in order to live. And such a situation carries with it the danger that the destruction will go beyond culturally legitimate need, destroying that which it should serve. Thus, to employ Ogun’s power, one must be aware of Ogun’s character (*iwa*) and be cognizant that the beneficent god can become the outraged *oriṣa* who bites himself.

As with Ogun, each of the *oriṣa*, in the diversity and individuality of their persons and attributes, may be

understood as providing an explanatory system and a means of coping with human suffering. Rarely does only one *oriṣa* lay claim to a person. Ogun or Ṣango or Oṣun may dominate one’s life and shape one’s perception of self and world, but other *oriṣa* will have their artifacts on the shrine, as well as their claims and influence upon one’s life. Just as the Yoruba dancer must respond to the multiple rhythms of the drums, so must the soul attentive to the powers of the *oriṣa* respond to their diverse claims. The complexity of the response may overwhelm one. But as in the ability of the dancer to be conscious of and respond to every instrument of the orchestra, so in sacrificing to all the *oriṣa* who call, the worshiper (*olusin*, “he who serves”) can know the richness of life and its complexity and can achieve the superior poise, the equanimity of one who possesses *aṣe* amid the contradictions of life. Thus, when one considers the configuration of *oriṣa* symbols on a devotee’s shrine or the cluster of shrines and festivals for the *oriṣa* in a particular town or the pantheon as a whole, as a total system, one discerns that the total assemblage of *oriṣa* expresses in its totality a worldview. And it is in the reality of this worldview that Yoruba experience, at the personal and social levels, is given coherence and meaning.

In addition to the *oriṣa* of the pantheon, there is one’s personal *oriṣa*, known as *ori inun* (“inner head”), which refers to the destiny that one’s ancestral guardian soul has chosen while kneeling before Olorun prior to entering the world. It is a personal destiny that can never be altered. Birth results in the loss of the memory of one’s destiny. But one’s “*ori*-in-heaven,” which is also referred to as *ekejimi* (“my spiritual other”), stands surety for the possibilities and the limits of the destiny that one has received. Hence, one must make one’s way in life, acknowledging one’s *ori* as an *oriṣa* who can assist one in realizing the possibilities that are one’s destiny. One can have an *ori buruku* (“a bad head”). In such a case a person must patiently seek to make the best of a foolish choice and seek the help of the other *oriṣa*.

In *oriṣa* worship it is the wisdom of Orunmila, the *oriṣa* of Ifa divination, and the work of Eṣu, the bearer of sacrifices, that stand for the meaningfulness of experience and the possibility of effective action. The vast corpus of Ifa poetry, organized into 256 collections called *odu* (also known as *oriṣa*) is a repository of Yoruba cultural values. It is the priest of Ifa, the *babalawo* (“father of ancient wisdom”), who knows Ifa and performs the rites of divination. Using the sixteen sacred palm nuts or the *opele* chain, the priest divines the *odu* whose verses he will chant in addressing the problem of the suppliant and determining the sacrifices that must be made. For the Yoruba, every ritual entails a sacrifice,

whether it is the gift of prayer, the offering of a kola nut, or the slaughter of an animal. In the Ifa literature, sacrifice (*ẹbọ*) has to do with death and the avoidance of such related experiences as loss, disease, famine, sterility, isolation, and poverty. It is an acknowledgment that human existence is ensnared in the interrelated contradictions of life and death. But sacrifice is also viewed as the reversal of the situation of death into life. Sacrifice is the food of the *oriṣa* and other spirits, and one sacrifices that which appropriately expresses the character (*iwa*) of the particular *oriṣa* or spirit of one's concern. Hence, Ogun receives a dog, the carnivorous animal that can be domesticated to assist the hunter and warrior. Sacrifice is the acknowledgement of the presence of powerful agents in the world, and the sacrificial act brings the creative power of the *oriṣa*, the ancestors, or the mothers to the worshiper; sacrifice can also temporarily stay the hand of Death and ward off other malevolent spirits (*ajogun*). Such is the power of Eṣu, the bearer of sacrifices, the mediator and guardian of the ritual way, the "keeper of *aṣẹ*."

Those who have observed the ritual way and achieved the status of elders in the community may also become members of the secret Oṣugbo (Ogboni) society. Although Oṣugbo is found throughout Yorubaland, its role and rituals vary from one region to another. Oṣugbo members, who come from various lineage groups, worship Onile ("the owner of the house"). The "house" (*ile*) is the image of the universe in its totality, of which the Oṣugbo cult house is a microcosm. The *ẹdan* of the Oṣugbo society, which are small, brass, linked staffs that depict male and female figures, are the sign of membership and the symbol of the Oṣugbo understanding of reality. The secret of the Oṣugbo appears to be that its members know, and are in touch with, a primordial unity that transcends the oppositions characterizing human experience. Expressing the unity of male and female, the *ẹdan* and their owners possess the power of adjudicating conflicts among persons or groups; when blood has been shed illicitly (as in a murder) it is the Oṣugbo members who must atone for this "violation of the house."

The worldview of the Yoruba is a monistic one. The universe of their experience is pervaded by *aṣẹ*, a divine energy in the process of generation and regeneration. *Aṣẹ* is without any particular signification and yet invests all things and all persons and, as the warrant for all creative activity, opposes chaos and the loss of meaning in human experience. Thus, for the Yoruba the universe is one, and it is amenable to articulation in terms of an elaborate cosmology, to critical reflection, and to innovative speculation.

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JOHN PEMBERTON III

YOSE BEN ẖALAFTA' (second century CE), Palestinian tanna. Born in Sepphoris, Yose was a student of Yoḥanan ben Nuri, 'Aqiva' ben Yosef, and ẖarfon. Like many of his contemporaries, he worked at a humble occupation—he was a tanner (B.T., *Shab.* 49a–b)—but he was also a leader of the rabbinic court at Sepphoris (B.T., *San.* 32b). He is associated with early mystical traditions, and it is said that he studied with Elijah the prophet (B.T., *Ber.* 3a, *Yev.* 63a).

Numerous traditions attributed to Yose are preserved

in rabbinic literature. He is one of the most frequently quoted authorities of his generation, along with Me'ir, Shim'on, and Yehudah. Jacob Epstein believes that the corpus of his traditions was one of the primary documents used in the redaction of the Mishnah.

Yose was a product of rabbinic learning and culture in a time of adjustment after two devastating wars with Rome. His rulings and teachings, like those of other rabbis of the time, reflect the struggle to overcome the uncertainty of Jewish life in the Land of Israel and the attempt to establish a sense of order in religious and social life. Yose's legal, exegetical, and theological sayings contributed greatly toward this goal.

Yose's traditions evince a special interest in the events of biblical history, as well as in the entire range of theological topics, including the nature of God, the centrality of the Torah, and the special nature of Israel. His legal rulings reflect the concerns and activities of the rabbis of his generation, from agricultural taboos, table manners, and rules for holidays and family life to regulations for the rabbinic system of purities. Yose is associated, for example, with legislation concerning the recitation of blessings over foods in which he rules that one who alters the formula for blessings established by the sages does not fulfill his obligation (Tosefta, *Ber.* 4.4).

To date, no systematic analysis has been made of Yose's traditions, probably because of the sheer size of the corpus of sayings attributed to him.

[See also Tannaim.]

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TZVEE ZAHAVY

YOUNG, BRIGHAM (1801–1877), second president of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (hereafter LDS); chief architect of the form of Mormonism that flourished in the intermountain region of the western United States in the nineteenth century and expanded throughout the United States and into many other countries. [See Mormonism.]

Although he insisted on baptism by immersion, which he thought scripture required, Brigham Young joined the Methodists several years before he heard about Jo-

seph Smith's "golden bible." A skilled carpenter, painter, and cabinetmaker, Young came from a family of devout Methodists whose extreme poverty impelled them to leave New England for western New York, a family history that paralleled that of the Smith family. While Mormonism attracted many of his family members, Young held back. He read the *Book of Mormon* soon after its publication in 1830 but waited two full years before becoming a Latter-day Saint. Thus he was not converted in the very beginning when Mormonism's primary appeal was its claim that it had restored the priesthood of ancient Israel and that it was the only true church of Jesus Christ. He became a follower of the Mormon prophet, Joseph Smith, in 1832, when the character of the new movement was becoming as Hebraic as it was Christian, given the emphasis being placed on its "gathering" doctrine, its temple-building plans, its patriarchal office, and its assertion that Mormons are God's only chosen people. Convinced that these elements separating Mormonism from traditional Christianity were scripturally correct, Young accepted them wholeheartedly. Moreover, when temple ordinances were introduced that added plural marriage and baptism for the dead to Mormonism, and when the movement organized itself into a political kingdom, he accepted these innovations as well, albeit somewhat less enthusiastically.

After his rebaptism, Young devoted his entire energies to Mormonism. Following a preaching mission in the eastern United States, he moved to Ohio, assisting with the construction of the Kirtland temple and much else. He went with Zion's Camp, a paramilitary expedition that failed to rescue beleaguered Missouri Saints from their enemies, but nevertheless tested the mettle of future LDS leaders. Called to the highest council in Mormondom, the Quorum of the Twelve, in 1835, and made its president in 1841, Young rendered signal service, particularly in organizing the exodus when the Saints were driven from Missouri in 1839 and in establishing a successful Mormon mission in England in the early 1840s. In Nauvoo, Illinois, during the final years of Smith's life, Young served in the prophet's inner circle as the LDS political kingdom was organized and the secret practice of plural marriage instituted.

The struggle for succession to LDS leadership after Smith's murder in 1844 intensified a division within the movement. On one side were Saints who, regarding Mormonism as an idiosyncratic version of primitive Christianity, opposed plural marriage and the political organization of a kingdom in an Old Testament mode; on the other were Saints who supported these innovations as a part of the restoration of the "ancient order

of things." Although most historical accounts present Young as the clear winner in this succession struggle, recent demographic studies reveal that he was the acknowledged leader of the latter group, but that he by no means led the whole of the LDS community after Smith's death.

For the thousands who followed him, however, Young managed to effect the transfer of Mormon culture from Illinois to the Great Salt Lake Valley while preserving the vision of Mormonism that Joseph Smith held at the end of his life. He did this by assuming ecclesiastical, political, and spiritual leadership of his followers. In Nauvoo, he took practical charge of the chaotic situation and arranged the departure of the Saints. In 1847, he was sustained as president of the church by those who went west with him. In 1851, the federal government recognized his leadership by appointing him as governor of Utah Territory. From these dual positions of power, he established a new "Israel in the tops of the mountains" in which, in the manner of Solomon of old, he reigned supreme as prophet, church president, and political leader. Unlike Joseph Smith, however, Young was not a prophet who delivered new revelations and added lasting theological elements to the movement he headed. His great contribution was realizing Smith's vision through the creation of a literal LDS kingdom. Even changed, as it was at the end of the nineteenth century, this kingdom continues to animate and inspire Mormonism in much the same way that Solomon's kingdom has animated and inspired Judaism and Christianity across the ages.

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Until very recently, historical accounts of Young's life and career were either faith-promoting paeans of praise, based on nineteenth-century official LDS publications, or ill-concealed attacks, based on published sources unfriendly to the Mormons. Neither genre has disappeared, but as much of the primary source material on which studies of Young must rely is now available to scholars, new studies presenting a more balanced assessment of this important Mormon leader are appearing. The most significant of these new studies are Leonard J. Arrington's *Brigham Young: American Moses* (New York, 1985); Newell G. Bringhurst's *Brigham Young and the Expanding American Frontier* (Boston, 1985); and Ronald K. Esplin's "The Emergence of Brigham Young and the Twelve to Mormon Leadership, 1830-1841" (Ph.D. diss., Brigham Young University, 1981). Two valuable editions of primary source materials are *Letters of Brigham Young to His Sons*, edited by Dean C. Jesse (Salt Lake City, 1974); and *Diary of Brigham Young, 1857*, edited by Everett L. Cooley (Salt Lake City, 1980). Stanley P. Hirshson's *The Lion of the Lord: A Biography of Brigham Young* (New York, 1969) is not recommended; despite its reputable publisher and respected author, it is based on published sources, most of which are unfriendly to the Mormons.

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JAN SHIPPS

YOUTH, FOUNTAIN OF. See Rejuvenation.

YÜ, also known as Yü the Great; demiurge who rid China of a great flood, legendary founder of the Hsia dynasty, and oldest pan-Chinese culture hero. (Huang-ti, Yao, and Shun are in fact of later origin.) According to traditional accounts, Yü combated the flood by following the examples found in nature. Draining fields, dredging rivers, and cutting passes through the mountains, he thus succeeded where his father, K'un, who used dikes to restrain the floods and block their course, had failed (*Shu ching, Yü kung; Shih chi*). Credited with the shaping of China's waterways and irrigation systems, he became the patron saint of all hydraulic engineering (*Shih tzu, Huai-nan-tzu*). Yü also was a miner and a master of metals. He invented bronze weapons and cast the Nine Caldrons of Hsia, symbols of his sovereignty, on which the various regions of his empire were pictured (*Tso chuan*). The famous *Shan-hai ching* (Book of Mountains and Seas) is said to be the text corresponding to these images. Founder of metal-working confraternities, Yü is the patron saint of esoteric and magical arts that are at the roots both of alchemy and of Taoist longevity techniques.

Yü is one of the legendary model sovereigns upon whom the Yellow River and the Lo River deities bestowed the mystical diagrams Ho-t'u ("river chart") and Lo-shu ("Lo writing"). In Taoist traditions, these sacred emblems were reinterpreted into the *ling-pao wu-fu* ("five talismans of *ling-pao*"), which Yü received from a god as a source of magical aid in his Herculean labors. He is said to have hidden them in a sacred mountain, whence they were rediscovered to become the nucleus of a Taoist corpus of sacred scriptures (*Wu-yüeh ch'un-ch'iu; Ling-pao wu-fu hstü*).

One of the oldest rituals of Chinese culture, still practiced today by Taoist priests, is the Yü-pu, or "pace of Yü." Exhausted by his labors, Yü is said to have been stricken by hemiplegia, which gave him a limping gait (*Shih tzu*). Others say that spirits gave him control over men and nature by teaching him a hopping dance with one foot trailing behind the other. The ancient sovereigns danced in order to subdue rebels (*Huai-nan-tzu*), and sorcerers performed this dance to enter into trance.

The Taoists adopted the Pace of Yü both to gain access to supernatural powers such as those granted by plants that confer immortality and to overcome demonic forces (*Pao-p'u-tzu*). For them, it was not merely the gait that was important but also the labyrinthine pattern traced by the officiant's feet, the pattern of a hexagram, or, more often, the meander of the Big Dipper. The Pace of Yü or the "shaman's pace" (*wu-pu*) is considered to contain the magic rhythm for creating cosmic order and for summoning and subduing gods and demons. It became the favorite gait for the *tao-shih's* liturgical procession through the heavens (*Tao-tsang* 987, *T'ai-shang tsung-chen pi-yao* 8, 1116 CE). The Pace of Yü is still performed today as part of Taoist rituals in Taiwan.

[See also Chinese Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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ANNA SEIDEL

YÜ-HUANG, the Jade Emperor, has been the supreme deity of the Chinese popular pantheon since at least the tenth century CE.

An essential and deeply rooted feature of Chinese culture is the concept of a single, centralized empire under the sovereignty of an emperor who is a sacerdotal as well as a secular ruler. This concept influenced religion in many ways. Both the Taoist and the popular pantheon are modeled on the civil bureaucracy of the Chinese state. Communication between the gods and encounters between deities and mortals often involve ritual similar to that between the vassal and his sovereign or the administrator and his superior.

The highest deity of the religion of antiquity, the Emperor on High (Shang-ti) already was the ruler of a heavenly court. About the supreme deity of folk religion we know nothing until the ninth century CE. Belief and cult of the Jade Emperor took shape during the time of the most perfect realization of the bureaucratic universal empire, the T'ang dynasty (618–906). Poems and

paintings of the tenth century attest to a fully developed myth, in which the Great Jade Emperor (Yü-huang Ta-ti) is attended by his heavenly court composed of all the deities who rule above and below the earth, the gods of stars, wind, rain and thunder, mountains and lakes, and others. The Sung emperor Chen-tsung (r. 998–1022) reinforced his own authority by claiming descent from mythical culture heroes, a lineage that had been revealed to him by an emissary of the Jade Emperor. In 1017, a state cult was instituted for the Jade Emperor, and he was canonized under the title Great Heavenly Emperor, Majesty of [the Heaven of] Jade Purity (Yü-ch'ing-huang Ta t'ien-ti).

Jade Emperor is not a name but the title of a ruler with a particular function. Patterned after the terrestrial emperor, the Jade Emperor is the supernatural ruler of the universe, including the divine pantheon. His foremost role is to confer all advancement in the supernatural bureaucracy and in the religious hierarchies of this world, and to oversee the investiture of emperors and of gods, as in the popular novel *Feng-shen yen-i* (The Investiture of the Gods). Supreme arbiter, judge, and sovereign of the universe, he is nevertheless merely the executor of orders emanating from the highest heavenly triad, the Taoist Three Pure Ones (San Ch'ing) who are deities too remote and formidable for the popular cults.

His feast day is the ninth day of the first lunar month. His popular name is Master Heaven (T'ien-kung). He is represented in the dragon-embroidered robe and pearly headgear of the Chinese emperor, seated on a throne and surrounded by his courtiers. His canonical scripture, the *Yü-huang pen-hsing ching* (twelfth to thirteenth century; *Tao-tsang* nos. 10, 11, 12), plays an important role in Taoist ritual.

[See also Kingship, article on East Asian Kingship, and Chinese Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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ANNA SEIDEL

YULUNGGUL SNAKE. Yulunggul is the Great Python of north-central Arnhem Land, who swallowed the Wawalag sisters and their child(ren). [See Wawalag.] Yulunggul is most often identified as male, with or without female counterparts. One northeastern Arnhem

Land version specifies Yulunggul as female but with symbolic male (phallic) implications.

William Lloyd Warner's account (1937, e.g. p. 257) notes a variety of snakes, goannas, and snails as sons of Yulunggul. In a couple of women's versions, Yulunggul's python children, who live in the water hole with him, ask him to regurgitate what he has eaten so that they can eat it too. Warner refers to Yulunggul as "great father" (Yindi Bapa or Bapa Yindi), but it is possible that he misheard the more usual expression, "great snake" (Yindi Baapi).

Unlike so many of the great mythic characters, who came from elsewhere to sites that were to be spiritually associated with them, Yulunggul had always been at his special water hole, known as Mirara-minar and Muruwul; there is a cluster of names and waters in that area. The Wawalag sisters, in contrast, were travelers from a distant country and were strangers: the kinship terms identifying them as sisters of Yulunggul's were not consanguineously based. Nevertheless, all of the mythic Snakes in north and northeastern Arnhem Land, including Yulunggul, were good site guardians and knew who the travelers were.

The Wawalag sisters brought with them inland-type songs. These are in the compressed, key-word style typical of the Kunapipi (Gunabibi)—unlike the long, drawn-out songs of north-central and northeastern Arnhem Land, such as Yulunggul sang. The longer songs include names for physical and other attributes of the Snake that are used as personal names by present-day Aborigines of appropriate social and territorial status, and they include singing words for the monsoon, the coasts and offshore islands, and the rough seas. This introduction to inland people and inland songs and religious rites was not achieved without trauma, in the context of the myth, but it marked the acceptance of "new" items on a long-term basis.

In one of his roles Yulunggul is, explicitly, a culture-area indicator, or a boundary marker. During his conversation with the other great Snakes after he has swallowed the Wawalag, he faces east. This conversation is like a statement about a broad cultural zone that shares a range of common understandings and rules, though there are local variations. Its principal binding force is its religious system, actively expressed through ritual collaboration. The Snakes (in Warner's version, p. 253) underline this accord, agreeing that although they speak "different languages" (dialects), they share the same religious commitments. Significantly, then, Yulunggul looks to and talks to his counterparts in the east, turning his back on western Arnhem Land. That region is clearly outside the eastern Arnhem Land bloc, notwithstanding its mythic swallowing and vomiting

Rainbow Snakes and some cultural exchange and transmission; traditionally the westerners did not circumcise, and their marriage rules and language patterns were very different.

There are divergent views on whether Yulunggul is a Rainbow Snake manifestation. [See Rainbow Snake.] In the Milingimbi versions, when the two men from Wawalag country came to Mirara-minar, the water "shone like a rainbow. When they saw this they knew there was a snake there." (Warner, p. 258, also 385). Where his Rainbow Snake identification is not accepted, mainly on the eastern side of Arnhem Land, it is sometimes explained with, "Yulunggul is separate: he is *himself*."

As a weather symbol, Yulunggul has his own personal niche in the pantheon of deities (Warner, p. 378). He has both freshwater and saltwater affiliations. Although he is anchored spiritually to a special site, he is also spiritually mobile. He is the spirit of the monsoon, the west and northwest wind that brings the fertilizing rains of the wet season. Just as the copulations of the Snakes and clouds during the wet season ensure fertility in the dry season, so Yulunggul's "union" with the Wawalag transformed him into a symbol of seasonal fertility. He continued to inhabit his water hole but gained prominence in two additional dimensions. One was his role in the ritual constellations "given" to posterity by the Wawalag sisters. The other was spiritual mobility. In some Milingimbi versions (Warner, p. 254), he flies across the country with the Wawalag and their child(ren) inside him, naming various places and allocating local dialects. More generally, in all available versions he is identified in spirit with the *baara*, the fast-moving, rain-bearing monsoon storms and clouds from the west and northwest.

The full force of the monsoon can have a formidable impact on the people, creatures, landscape, and waters in its path. A skillful storyteller can convey the force dramatically in narrative versions of the Yulunggul myth. Warner (pp. 379–381) tried to communicate the power of the monsoon through a quotation from a geographer about the Darwin area, but the cycle of the seasons is much less "uniform" than his source suggests. It is the variability and unpredictability of the monsoon that has convinced Aborigines of the need to work ritually to regularize it.

In his Milingimbi study, Warner (pp. 381–382) mentions a number of named seasons, but his whole emphasis is on a twofold division between "wet" and "dry." Men are identified with the Snake, as a "purifying element" (p. 387), "with the positive higher social values," ritual cleanliness, the sphere of "the sacred" (p. 394), women with the dry season, "uncleanliness," and "the profane." Lévi-Strauss recognized the contradiction be-

tween these statements and the claim that Aborigines regarded the wet season as bad (too much rain, no food) and the dry season as good (plenty of food, greater mobility). But the seasonal picture and other suggested dichotomies are oversimplified and unreal.

Yulunggul's territorial, seasonal, and religious-ritual roles make him a powerful and majestic figure. Much of his ritual symbolism is secret-sacred, not to be discussed publicly, but his public persona is awesome enough. All of this gives rise to some intriguing questions. For example, in a Milingimbi version that is found only in Warner, after Yulunggul had regurgitated the sisters and they lay "dead," a great Yulunggul *didjeridu* (drone pipe) came out of Yulunggul's water hole of its own volition and revived them with the help of green ants. Yulunggul was angry. He "killed" the sisters and swallowed them again. The *didjeridu* that features so prominently in Kunapipi and associated rituals, however, is Yulunggul, and its sound is his voice. How to reconcile the contradiction? Contradiction is, up to a point, the essence of myth, and perhaps it merely reflects the approach of Yulunggul to the Wawalag sisters in the events of the myth as usually told and interpreted, in a relationship about which there is still much more to be said.

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CATHERINE H. BERNDT

YUN HYU (1617–1680), Korean scholar-official, leader of the Namin faction, and political and scholarly rival of Song Siyöl (1607–1689). Yun Hyu is primarily known for his position in the rites controversy and his daring challenge to the Chu Hsi orthodoxy that prevailed in Korean Neo-Confucianism.

The son of an inspector general, Yun Hyojön, he was recommended for office in 1656 on the basis of his scholarly reputation. Yun was offered a succession of posts, but chose to remain a private scholar until 1674. Like many Korean scholars of the period, he was deeply affected by the overthrow of the Ming dynasty by the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty in China. The Ming dynasty was viewed by Chinese and Koreans alike as the rightful inheritor of Confucian civilization, presiding over the center of the civilized world and the font of civilized values. Thus, the demise of the Ming was deeply troubling to contemporary Confucians, who saw in it a violation of the most fundamental tenets of the Confucian sense of world order and a challenge to the Korean position in it. Yun's decision to remain a private scholar was based on a desire to examine the causes of the fall of the Ming so that the Yi dynasty in Korea would not suffer the same fate, and to define a new role for Korea in the changed international situation.

Yun's intellectual endeavors fall largely into two categories. The first consisted of analyses of political institutions in historical dynasties and the conclusions regarding ideal government that he drew from them. The second consisted of purely speculative and philosophical scholarship. Yun's study of historical dynasties led

him to conclude that the erosion of monarchical authority led to the weakness and eventual demise of the regime. Thus, he proposed that the sovereign, as the head of the state, should reign as an institution rather than as an individual subject to familial obligations. Yun entered the rites controversy with this idea of strict separation between state and royal family. Defining the position of the Namin faction, he maintained that King Hyojong (r. 1649–1659), the deceased sovereign, should be mourned according to his *public* status by everyone, including his mother, who after all was his subject. Song Siyöl, heading the Söin faction, insisted that Hyojong's mother should mourn him on the basis of his *familial* position as a second son. Yun believed that this challenged Hyojong's status as rightful heir to the throne and would eventually compromise the legitimacy and authority of the throne.

When Sukchong (r. 1674–1720), irate over the unflattering implications of the Söin position, expelled them and brought the Namin faction into the bureaucracy, Yun Hyu decided to join the government, thinking that he might have an opportunity to practice some of his reform ideas. Serving in various offices including minister of personnel, minister of public works, and state councillor, he managed to enact some of his policies, particularly those on tax and military reorganization. He also worked closely with Sukchong, emerging as his moral guardian. Since Yun's version of the monarchical supremacy was based on the institutionalization of the sovereign's public status, and since he believed that the authority of the throne would best be maintained by the moral purity of its occupant, he did not take a particularly flexible approach to Sukchong's moral behavior, and his relationship to Sukchong showed a certain strain. Sukchong eventually initiated another change of power, restoring the Söin and purging the Namin; as a result, Yun Hyu was executed in 1680.

With many of his contemporaries, Yun took seriously the new role of Korea as the last bastion of Confucian civilization following the fall of the Ming dynasty. In defining Confucian civilization and how best to preserve it, Yun took a characteristically independent approach. He defined Confucian civilization as the whole of civilization known to human history, not merely the thought of the Ch'eng-Chu school, named for the Chinese Neo-Confucians Ch'eng I (1033–1107) and Chu Hsi (1130–1200). The characteristic of civilization was that it constantly evolved; thus, Korea's duty as the carrier of civilization dictated that it search for a new course consonant with the times. Yun regarded Chu Hsi as one of the greatest scholars of all times, but nevertheless as just one scholar in an evolving tradition. To be confined by his thought, or by that of Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy, ran

counter, Yun believed, to the creative spirit exhibited by Chu Hsi and the Neo-Confucian tradition. In this spirit, Yun wrote commentaries of his own on the *Chung-yung* (Doctrine of the Mean) and the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning). At the time, such an undertaking was viewed as a direct challenge to Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy. Although Song Siyöl consequently labeled him a traitor to Confucian culture, Yun professed to be not in the least disturbed.

[See also Confucianism in Korea and the biography of Song Siyöl.]

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JAHYUN KIM HABOUSH

YUNUS EMRE (d. 1321), Turkish mystic, initiator of popular mystic poetry in Turkish literature, and one of the greatest poets in that language. Apart from a few notes in sixteenth-century biographical works, the life of Yunus Emre remains shrouded in legend. More reliable biographical data can be gathered from his own corpus, which recent research (particularly by Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı) has sifted out from the mass of poems produced by contemporary or later anonymous authors who attributed their own work to him.

According to available evidence, he was born in the village of Sarıköy (modern Emre) in central Anatolia, educated in the classical Islamic sciences, and later trained in the mystic path by a certain Tapduk Emre, whom he often mentions in his poems with great veneration. He seems to have lived mostly in the region of his birth and to have died and been buried in the same village. There is also evidence that he traveled to Syria and Azerbaijan, as well as to Konya, where he may have met the great mystic poet Jaläl al-Din Rümî, whose thought and mystic fervor exercised considerable influence on him.

Yunus Emre's writings include a short didactic *mathnavî* and his *divân*, or collected poems. The *mathnavî*, *Risalet ün-nushiyye* (Book of Counsels), written in 1307, is an allegorical poem of 575 couplets in classical Persian meter, with a prose introduction. Elaborating on

certain human virtues and vices along orthodox Muslim lines, it is rather sober and uninspired in style and not typical of his work. Rather, his fame rests primarily on his *divân*, which is the first one in Turkish literature. It consists of about 350 poems, most of which dwell on variations of pantheistic thought, the tribulations of the initiate, the various stages of the mystic path, guidance to the "straight path," the nature of real knowledge (*'ir-fân*) as different from worldly science (*'ilm*), the confession of one's errors and shortcomings and the enjoyment of self-accusation (*melâmet*), and nostalgic and evocative themes of the years away from home. Smaller numbers elaborate on orthodox religious themes, with frequent reference to the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, and to popular stories of prophets and saints, or address the obsessive idea of death, other-worldliness, and eternity.

These poems are addressed to the masses of ordinary people. They are mainly written in the spoken Turkish of the early fourteenth century, with a moderate number of Arabic/Persian loanwords, and the predominant meter follows the traditional Turkish syllabic form. Their great popular appeal over the centuries can be ascribed to Yunus's simple and direct style, his enthusiastic lyricism, and the skill with which he made mystic and pantheistic philosophy accessible. Both the style and the language of his poems continued to exert a tremendous influence on most of the popular mystic poets down to the eighteenth century.

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FAHİR İZ

YURUPARY is the lingua franca name for an Amazonian culture hero who established order in nature and society and taught men rules of ritual conduct. The term refers also to sacred flutes and bark trumpets, taboo to women and children, played in a secret men's cult into which boys are periodically initiated, and to the celebrations held by the cult. These instruments, kept hidden under water, represent Yurupary in spirit form, and their sound is his voice. By extension the

term is used throughout Amazonia to refer to cannibal forest spirits. Christian missionaries have also erroneously identified Yurupary with the devil and attempted to eradicate his cult.

The Yurupary cult is found among nearly all the Indians of northwest Amazonia living in the area of the Japurá, Negro, and middle Orinoco rivers. In particular, it is characteristic of the Arawakan groups (Baníva, Baré, etc.) of the upper Río Negro and of their Tucanoan-speaking neighbors (Cubeo, Tucano, Desána, Barasana, etc.) of the Uaupés, whose culture shows strong Arawakan influence. The Arawakans call Yurupary Kowai, and a number of other names are used by the Tucanoans. These Indians share many cultural features, including division into patrilineal, exogamous phratries made up of a series of ranked clans, patrilocal marriage, and residence in communal longhouses.

Similar secret men's cults with flutes, trumpets, bull-roarers, and masks are a typical feature of many Indian groups of lowland South America, most notably the Mundurucú of the lower Tapajós, the Yagua and Tikúna of the upper Amazon, the tribes of the upper Xingu, and the nearly extinct Selk'nam of Tierra del Fuego.

Yurupary Myth. Numerous versions of the Yurupary myth have been published. What follows is a synthesis of these myths, designed to bring out the major episodes and themes. Yurupary was the child of Ceucy (the Pleiades), who was made pregnant by the juice of a *caimo* (*Pouteria caimito*) or *cucura* (*Pourouma cecropiaefolia*) fruit. She was a virgin, and a disguised incestuous union with a father, brother, or son identified with the sun, moon, thunder, or the constellation Scorpius is implied. Yurupary is himself often identified with the Sun. Lacking a vagina, Ceucy had a painful labor and had to be pierced by a fish. Her baby, taken from her at birth, was brought up by his shaman father or brother. Yurupary had no mouth so he had to be fed on tobacco smoke. He was asked if he was man, animal, or fish, but by shaking his head he indicated that he was none of these. Only when asked if he was Yurupary did he nod his head in agreement, an agreement which, by a process of elimination, also suggested that he was connected with the vegetable world. When given a mouth, he emitted a terrible sound, and sounds emerged from holes in his body, which was that of a monkey but with human face, feet, and hands.

He grew very rapidly and became a shaman leader who taught his people rituals and a regime of taboos and fasts and decreed that no woman should see him or hear his secrets on pain of death. He ordered the men to collect fruit from trees, and he conducted the first initiation rite, at which young boys saw him dressed in full costume.

While the boys were still under initiation taboos, he took them to collect *uacú* fruit (*Monopteryx angustifolia*), which, despite prohibitions, they roasted and ate. Angered by their disobedience, Yurupary sent a thunderstorm, and the boys took shelter in his mouth (or, in some versions, his anus), which they mistook for a cave. Having ingested all but one of them, Yurupary disappeared to his house in the sky, and the lone survivor returned home with the dreadful news.

The parents, angered by their loss and fearful of this cannibal monster, resolved to kill him. They tempted him back with offers of ever more exotic kinds of beer until, offered one he had never tried, Yurupary agreed to return. He knew they wished to kill him and made it known that he could be killed only with fire.

Arriving at dusk, Yurupary vomited up the boys (or their bones), into either an initiates' seclusion enclosure or flat baskets, along with the fruit the boys had collected. He danced and sang all night, getting increasingly drunk on beer and *yagé*, a hallucinogenic drink, and at dawn his hosts threw him on a fire. There followed a huge conflagration, which was the prototype of all future slash-and-burn fires. The burning of a cultivation site is now identified with this first fire. As he died, Yurupary announced that henceforth, though he would be immortal, all men would die.

From the ashes a *paxiuba* palm (*Iriarteia exorrhiza*) grew, together with vines for ritual whips and for poison and stinging ants, snakes, and other noxious creatures which shed their skins. The palm was his bone, and the poisonous plants and animals were his soft parts. The palm ascended rapidly to the sky, taking with it Yurupary's soul, which became a star in the constellation Orion. Squirrels cut the palm into sections, which were distributed among men and animals as their different voices. This distribution marked the differentiation of men from animals and, among men, the distinction between the different clans and phratries, which have corresponding linguistic differences. The sections of *paxiuba* palm, which correspond to paired parts of Yurupary's anatomy—arm and leg bones and fingers—make up the *yurupary* instruments, which are also in pairs, and their sound is his voice. From other parts of his body—skull, brain, tongue, and so on—were made gourds, tobacco snuff, coca, and beeswax, which play an important role in the rites.

Later on, the Sun told his son to rise early and play the *yurupary* instruments at the river. His daughter overheard and got up while her lazy brother slept on. She found the instruments and ran away with them, accompanied by the other women. With the women in possession of the instruments, the social order was reversed:

while the women dedicated their lives to ritual, the men menstruated and did all the heavy agricultural work.

The men then set about regaining the stolen flutes. With the aid of ritual whips and small piston whistles, they frightened the women into submission. In punishment for the rebellion, the men caused the women to menstruate and declared that if women should ever see the Yurupary rites and instruments they would be killed.

Yurupary Cult. A number of themes emerge from this myth which relate to the symbolic significance of the cult. Most notable are the astronomical character of the major protagonists; the importance of the vegetable world and its links with human fertility and growth; the links between periodicities in the human and natural worlds; the contrasts between men and women, humans and animals, life and death, and hard and soft parts of the body; and the ambiguity of Yurupary as both benevolent lawgiver and cannibal monster. The myth also serves as a charter for rituals which form the most important expression of the religious life of the people concerned and accounts for the origin of the sacred objects used by them.

There are two kinds of Yurupary ritual, one less sacred than the other. In the former, quantities of forest fruit, gathered by the men, are brought to the longhouse to the sound of the flutes and trumpets. During the day women and children are excluded from the house, but at dusk the instruments are removed and the women join the men to dance and drink manioc beer. The men chant origin myths and drink *yagé* to put them in contact with the spirit world. They also whip one another and the women and children to make them grow strong. The rites are held to increase the abundance of fruit and mark the ripening of each species. They also represent an exchange, in that the fruits are a gift from the spirits and in that fruit is often exchanged between longhouse communities.

These rites also form the first stage of initiation into the cult. Young boys are brought into the house along with the fruit, shown the flutes, given coca, snuff, and *yagé*, and whipped to make them grow. After participation in one or more such rites they then graduate to the more sacred rites, which are held once a year at the start of the rainy season as the Pleiades set at dusk. For these latter rites greater numbers of more sacred instruments are used, together with gourds of snuff, coca, and beeswax. These and other items, when assembled together, make up the body of the first ancestor, Yurupary or his equivalent. At the climax of the rites the ancestor appears in the form of two men dressed in full ceremonial regalia and adopts the initiates as his sons. The

boys are shown the flutes and whipped, then taken to the river to bathe while water poured from the flutes is "vomited" over their heads.

The initiates are then secluded for two months in an enclosure that is out of sight of the women. They must fast; rigid taboos govern various aspects of their behavior; and they are taught to make baskets, an exclusively male task. The adult men are also under strict taboos and all are in a state described as being like that of menstruating women. The women fend for themselves and a state analogous to the matriarchy of the myth pertains. This period is brought to an end when the initiates are given chili peppers to eat and hot liquids to drink, ending a taboo on contact with sources of heat. There follows a festive dance at which the initiates give women the basketry they have made, and thereafter the food taboos are progressively lifted and life returns to normal.

Themes and Interpretations. A number of different interpretations have been proposed for this cult and, given the simultaneous operation of a number of different symbolic levels, they are not necessarily incompatible. At a sociological level, the cult involves the ritualized opposition between men and women, an opposition which permeates the Indians' secular and ritual life. The *yurupary* instruments are the means whereby men dominate women. Not only are women excluded from important rituals but they are also excluded from the knowledge of mythology and shamanism which this entails. Such knowledge is also a source of prestige and power. In the same vein the cult emphasizes the equivalent status of women and uninitiated children and allows the subjection of young men by their elders, who have greater ritual knowledge and experience.

Among the Tucanoan Indians Yurupary is also an ancestral cult related to their patrilineal ideology. The death of the ancestor and the distribution of his flute-bones provides a model for the division of human society into discrete phratries and, at a lower level, for the segmentation of each phratry into a number of clans descended from a common ancestor. The ritual adoption by the ancestor of his sons, the initiates, each one the potential founder of a new patriline, reenacts and repeats this initial process of segmentation. The instruments, each set of which is owned by a clan, are the sons of the ancestor and founders of the clans, and they bear the names of these ancestors.

The exclusion of women further emphasizes clan solidarity and patrilineal ideology by implying that the clan can reproduce itself without the intervention of women from outside. Latent in the Yurupary and related myths is a tension between the extremes of in-

cest—as in the start of the myth—and its opposite, reproduction without the intervention of women—as when Yurupary is burned and becomes his sons, the flutes. Note too that Yurupary's bones become masculine flutes while his soft parts become things with feminine (and poisonous) connotations. This tension relates to that between a patrilineal ideology and the requirement that women must be brought in from outside for sexual reproduction. The symbolism of the cult plays upon this by dividing men and women into opposed groups while stressing the complementarity between male and female principles.

The Yurupary rituals can be seen as reenactments of elements of the central myth, and the symbolism of swallowing and regurgitation, a familiar theme of many initiation rites, is clearly present. The ritual, the myth, and statements by indigenous informants all suggest that the initiates are killed and swallowed and reborn by being vomited up again, a theme which can be linked to the etymology of Yurupary—from *yuru* ("mouth") and *parý* (initiates' enclosure, or a trap made of woven palm splints). The vegetable nature of Yurupary, shown in his fast growth and his associations with fruit, is clearly related to the association of the initiates with fruit and the stress on their growth. The cult involves magic designed to increase the fertility of nature and to ensure the growth and fertility of human beings. Whipping to promote growth is common throughout Amazonia, as is the use of stinging ants for the same purpose.

The myth accounts for the origin of human mortality and links it with human and natural periodicity. While death is final, society endures through sexual and social reproduction. Ritually this process is accomplished by a symbolic death and rebirth whereby young boys come to replace their ageing elders. The myth implies that death is not final: Yurupary's soul becomes an immortal star and his bones become flutes, and are his representatives on earth. The myth draws a parallel between his death and slash-and-burn agriculture, whereby new plants grow from the ashes of dead trees. The instruments thus mediate between life and death and turn their opposition into an alternating cycle.

The theme of periodicity also relates to that of menstruation, which figures in both the myth and the rites. The myth implies that menstruation and possession of the flutes are equivalent but inversely distributed between the sexes. Women are held to approximate Yurupary's immortal state both because they reproduce themselves through their children and because menstruation is seen as analogous to the sloughing of their skins by the immortal snakes and other creatures who

came from Yurupary's ashes. Though men lost the power to menstruate they gained the *yurupary*, which, although clearly masculine symbols, have an important feminine aspect appropriated and controlled by the men. The cult implies that whereas women give birth to children, only men can "give birth" to fully social adults.

That Yurupary and his mother and father are all identified with heavenly bodies further relates to this theme of periodicity. The myths and rites relate to the apparent movement of the stars in relation to that of the sun. The azimuth of the Pleiades corresponds with the winter solstice, Orion moves along the celestial equator, the azimuth of Scorpius corresponds with the summer solstice, and the heliacal rise of the Pleiades corresponds with the setting of Scorpius. Throughout northwest Amazonia the Pleiades are a seasonal marker, their heliacal rise coinciding with the start of the dry season and their setting with the rains, and the "opposition" between the Pleiades and Scorpius is a common symbolic theme in South American Indian cultures. Yurupary himself has both solar and masculine characteristics and a lunar, more feminine side.

Many of the themes mentioned above reappear in secret men's cults elsewhere in lowland South America. Among the Mundurucú the opposition between the sexes is more pronounced and antagonistic and corresponds with an apparent fear and jealousy of female sexuality and reproduction on the part of the men. With them, as with the Yagua, the link between sacred instruments and fruit is replaced by a link between the instruments and game animals. The flutes guarantee an abundance of game and luck in the hunt, in return for which they must be constantly fed. In the Xingu area the cults are again linked with the fertility of fruit. Among the Tikúna, sacred instruments are associated with female initiation involving the pulling out of the girls' hair. Female hair figures also in the Yurupary cult, for sacred masks representing Yurupary were made from hair shorn from girls at first menstruation. Finally, myths of matriarchy are common to all these groups.

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Thirty-second International Congress of Americanists, Copenhagen 8-14 August 1956 (Copenhagen, 1958), pp. 271-279, is also an important source. This version is translated into English in Robin Michael Wright's work "History and Religion of the Baniwa Peoples of the Upper Río Negro Valley," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1981), which also contains another very full version of the myth, an ethnography of Baniwa religion, and some important material on the links between the Yurupary cult and messianic movements. Jonathan David Hill's study "Wakuenai Society: A Processual-Structural Analysis of Indigenous Cultural Life in the Upper Rio Negro Region of Venezuela" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1983) gives an ethnography of the Wakuenai (Curipaco) with good material on Yurupary and a valuable ethnomusicological analysis.

No really full and general account of the Yurupary cult, dealing equally with mythology, ritual, and its social structural context, exists. Silvia Maria da Carvalho's *Jurupari: Estudos de mitologia brasileira* (São Paulo, 1979) is a comparative analysis of the Yurupary and related myths. The analysis, while not based on primary field research, provides a comprehensive survey and makes a number of significant points of interpretation but is marred by thinly supported discussions concerning population movements, evolution, and diffusion. Hector Orjuela's *Yurupary: Mito, leyenda y epopeya* (Bogotá, 1983) relies also on published works and again provides a valuable compilation of the relevant myths. The interpretation is, however, patchy, and includes unsubstantiated assertions concerning the supposed Colombian origins of the myth. Jacqueline Bolens's "Mythe de Jurupari: Introduction à une analyse," *Homme* 7 (1967): 50-66, is a structuralist analysis of several classic versions of the Yurupary myth which, though short, contains some important insights concerning the symbolism involved.

My book *The Palm and the Pleiades: Initiation and Cosmology in Northwest Amazonia* (Cambridge, 1979), based on field research, provides a full account of Yurupary myths and rituals among the Tucanoan Barasana and their neighbors and is perhaps the most accessible and rounded interpretation of the cult. It also gives a comprehensive bibliography.

There is no general account of secret men's cults in South America, but Yolanda Murphy and Robert F. Murphy's *Women of the Forest* (New York, 1974) and Anne Chapman's *Drama and Power in a Hunting Society: The Selk'nam of Tierra del Fuego* (Cambridge, 1982) provide accounts and interpretations, both based on primary research of such cults among the Mundurucú and Selk'nam.

Finally, *Rituals of Manhood*, edited by Gilbert H. Herdt (Berkeley, 1982), describes secret men's cults, this time in the New Guinea highlands, which show striking parallels with their South American counterparts.

STEPHEN HUGH-JONES

Z



ZAEHNER, R. C. (1913–1974), English Orientalist and historian of religions. Robert Charles Zaehner, born 8 April 1913, began studies in Persian while on a scholarship in classics at Oxford and received a master's degree in Oriental languages. After leaving his position as research lecturer at Christ Church, Oxford, in 1939, he entered government service and was attached to the British embassy in Tehran during World War II. He accepted appointment as lecturer in Persian at Oxford in 1950; and, after serving briefly as acting counselor in the British embassy in Tehran, he was designated to succeed Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan as Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford in 1952, a professorship he held until his death on 24 November 1974.

At the least, Zaehner was a controversial figure during his remarkably productive two-decade career as Spalding Professor, and an altogether equitable assessment of his substantial publications on mysticism, the religions of India, Islam, and the comparative study of religions is difficult. If a historian of religion should be thoroughly grounded as a specialist in at least one major religious tradition, then Zaehner's credentials, in this respect, can scarcely be criticized: his primary research on Zoroastrianism, especially evident in his invaluable *Zurvan* (1955), unquestionably demonstrated his specialist's knowledge. If, too, a historian of religions may be expected to learn the original language or languages of primary sources in traditions that have special significance for his research, then Zaehner's study of Sanskrit in order to read classical Hindu sources again adds to his credentials. And, if an unwavering concern to allow source materials to speak in

their own voices is essential to the prospering of serious primary and comparative investigations of religions, then Zaehner served his field of study well.

But if it is supposed that proper comparative history of religions must be so conducted as almost to render invisible the interpreter's presence, then Zaehner poses a problem. He is neither bland nor unobtrusive. In an age of increasingly "objective" and almost anonymous scholarship, Zaehner seldom left his readers uncertain of his position. He lauded, lamented, scolded, praised, and condemned. Unquestionably, he took seriously the materials he studied. Above all, he seems to have wanted the sources to present themselves fully and authentically and not partially or tendentiously. What Zaehner himself took to be authentic, of course, was disputed on more than one occasion. Thus, for example, Zaehner's struggle with the specter of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's happy Neo-Hindu universalism provoked counterassertions from Zaehner about the theistic dimension of Hindu thought that have been found extreme by many specialists.

For Zaehner, his source documents and what they represented were alive and not safely dead or distant. Misunderstood, his attitude could appear to be no more than a throwback to apologetic comparative studies of an earlier day. And it often was misunderstood. But in fact it seems that—his conversion to Roman Catholicism in the mid-1940s notwithstanding—Zaehner conceived his own "mission" to be the pursuit of comparative religious studies in ways that would not violate the uniqueness and integrity of the individual religions he studied. Unshakably convinced of the authenticity of his own youthful mystical experiences and the truth of his

conversion (as he was certain that chemically induced altered states of consciousness were worse than bogus mysticism), Zaehner was altogether ready to take religious documents completely seriously. And, believing himself to be a religious man, he had no difficulty accepting the existence and (occasionally wrongheaded) sincerity of other religious men.

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Zaehner's command of Zoroastrian material is indisputably documented in *Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma* (Oxford, 1955) and his more accessible and wide-ranging *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism* (London, 1961). Among the latter's several strengths not the least is its thorough and unusually entertaining bibliography. Zaehner's *Hinduism* (London, 1962) is among the most helpful overviews; and his *The Bhagavad-Gita*, a translation and commentary (Oxford, 1969), is one of the most significant scholarly encounters with this text. Vigorous and insightful also are Zaehner's Jordan Lectures, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* (London, 1960) and his *Mysticism: Sacred and Profane* (Oxford, 1957). The complex range of Zaehner's thought and style is nowhere better illustrated than in his stimulating and controversial Gifford Lectures, *Concord and Discord* (Oxford, 1970). Possibly the most engaging introduction to Zaehner's work, however, may be the eight late essays published posthumously as *The City within the Heart* (London, 1980), which is introduced by philosopher Michael Dummett's warm tribute.

G. R. WELBON

ZAKĀT is an Arabic term that literally means "purification," "sweetening," and "growth." In the religious terminology of Islam it stands for obligatory charity or alms that every rich Muslim should pay to those who are poor and in need. *Zakāt* is thus one of the five fundamental duties (*rukūn*; pl., *arkān*) within Islam. Like the daily prayers, fasting during the month of Ramaḍān, and pilgrimage to Mecca, it constitutes an act of devotion and piety. In the Qur'ān, the command for *zakāt* often comes together with that for *ṣalāt* ("prayers"), and one might say (with Jesus, *Mt.* 22:36) that on these two depends all Islam. *Ṣalāt* emphasizes the love of God, while *zakāt* promotes the love and concern for one's neighbor.

Mindful of the literal meaning of the word, Muslim writers never tire of mentioning that *zakāt* has both a kenotic or purificatory purpose and a plerotic or fulfillment aspect. *Zakāt* purifies the soul of the giver from greed and materialism, and it increases well-being and happiness in the society. It confers divine blessings upon giver and recipient alike. It is one of the functions of the Islamic state to collect *zakāt* from its citizens, but when a Muslim lives in a non-Islamic state or the state

neglects this duty, it remains a personal duty to deduct *zakāt* from one's wealth and to pay it to the poor and needy.

Non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state are exempt from the *zakāt*, but the state may collect another tax from them in lieu of *zakāt*. This tax, known as *jizyah*, is levied upon individual non-Muslims in return for the security and services rendered to them by the Islamic state. According to Islamic law, children, women, old, poor, and handicapped non-Muslims are exempt from the poll tax, although Muslim rulers have not always followed this rule scrupulously.

Like other religious duties within Islam, *zakāt* was established by the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* (practice, customs) of the prophet Muḥammad. Later Muslim jurists worked out a whole system of *zakāt* collection and distribution, so that it became quite an intricate and complex religious taxation system. Questions were raised as to who should pay the *zakāt*, how much should be paid, and how often. The definition of exemptions and rates, administrative procedures, and eligibility for distribution all generated discussions and a variety of opinions in the past and continue to be discussed even now.

Levies. *Zakāt* is obligatory upon every Muslim, male or female, who owns a certain minimum amount (*niṣāb*) fixed by the *shari'ah*, or Islamic law. According to most jurists, *zakāt* liability falls basically on wealth in excess of *niṣāb*, and whosoever owns an amount equal to the *niṣāb* is liable to pay the *zakāt*. Since the obligations in Islamic law are always addressed to those who are adult (*bāligh*), sane, and free, the Ḥanafī legal school exempts children, the insane, and slaves from *zakāt* liabilities, and *zakāt* is not taken from their properties.

According to the Sunnī schools, any type of wealth or agricultural product not meant for personal or household use is subject to *zakāt*, but a house occupied by the owner, a reasonable amount of furniture, utensils, home equipment, and clothing, a car, or agricultural land farmed by the owner remain exempt. Shī'ī law considers only nine items subject to *zakāt*: gold, silver, camels, cows or oxen, sheep, wheat, barley, dates, and grapes. Anything other than these nine items is covered under the rules of *khumus* among the Shī'ah. *Khumus* is one-fifth of one's total earnings after the deduction of personal expenses, and it is to be given to the imam for his use and for distribution among the relatives of the Prophet (*al-sādah*, also known as *ahl al-bayt*).

The *niṣāb* for gold is twenty *mithqāl* (about 85 grams) or its equivalent in cash value in the case of banknotes and coins. The *niṣāb* for silver is two hundred *dirhams* (595 grams). Jewelry for personal use is exempt from *zakāt* according to many jurists, but the Ḥanafī legal school considers all jewelry taxable. Items that are held

for trade purposes may be taxed if the value exceeds the *niṣāb* of gold. In all these cases the rate of *zakāt* is 2.5 percent of the total net worth after the deduction of loans, personal expenses, and items of personal or household use.

Zakāt on animals is explained in greater detail. Here the *niṣāb* is five camels, thirty cows or oxen, or forty sheep. Anything less than this number is exempt from *zakāt*. Agricultural produce is taxable at the time of harvest. The *zakāt* for these items is 10 percent if the land is irrigated by rain or rivers, but where the land is artificially irrigated, the rate is 5 percent only. For precious metals, gems, and minerals, the *zakāt* rate is 20 percent after expenses are deducted.

Zakāt is levied yearly, and it must be paid at the end of twelve lunar months after the acquisition of the minimum taxable wealth. For agricultural produce, treasures, and minerals, *zakāt* should be paid at the time these items are acquired.

Distribution. The Qur'ān (9:60) mentions eight categories of people who can receive *zakāt*. (In the text the word *ṣadaqāt* is used rather than *zakāt*, but it is interpreted as *zakāt*. *Ṣadaqāt* was later interpreted as voluntary charity to distinguish it from the obligatory *zakāt*.) These include the poor and indigent, those employed to collect and administer *zakāt*, those whose hearts are to be reconciled in favor of Islam, slaves seeking to buy their freedom, debtors, those engaged in defense of faith, and travelers who are stranded and in need of help.

Muslim jurists emphasize that *zakāt* is the right of the poor and needy and must be spent in such a way that it reaches those who deserve it. It is, therefore, forbidden to give *zakāt* to the rich or to one's own dependents. The Prophet also excluded his own family from the list of those who may receive *zakāt* in order to preserve the impartiality of the institution of *zakāt* and the dignity of his family.

In modern times efforts are being made to revive the institution of *zakāt* and to simplify its calculation and administration. Many individual Muslims have always continued to pay *zakāt* regularly and scrupulously, but Muslim states, especially those that came under colonial rule, have lost this important institution and even after regaining their independence they do not enforce collection and payment. Pakistan, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, however, have recently adopted laws to enforce *zakāt*.

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MUZAMMIL H. SIDDIQI

ZALMAN, ELIYYAHU BEN SHELOMOH. See Eliyyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman.

ZALMOXIS was the founder, possibly legendary, of a priestly line of succession closely linked with kingship of the Getae and the Dacians, the northernmost Thracian peoples of the ancient world. [See Geto-Dacian Religion.] Whether he is a figure of legend or of history is moot, as are questions of his religious functions. Associated both with priesthood and with kingship, he was divinized and became the object of a widespread cult among both northern and southern Thracian peoples. [See Thracian Religion.]

Name. The name *Zalmoxis* is attested by ancient authors from Herodotus and Plato (fifth–fourth centuries BCE) to Diodoros of Tyre (second century CE) and Jordanes (sixth century CE). Herodotus spells the name *Sal-moxis*; Strabo gives it as *Zamolxis*. The genuine form, however, is *Zalmoxis*, support for which is found in such Thracian names as *Zalmodegikos* and *Zelmutas* and in numerous composites formed with *-zelmis*, *-zelmos*, and *-selmios*. *Zamolxis* is only a metathesis, frequent since Strabo (first century BCE), with no parallels in Thracian onomastics.

Porphyry (third century CE) explains the etymology of *Zalmoxis* through the Thracian word *zalmos* ("skin"; Gr., *dora*), and in supporting this thesis he offers an etiological legend that tells of the covering of Zalmoxis at birth with a bearskin (*Life of Pythagoras* 14–15). Dimiter Detschew (1957, p. 175) has proved that Indo-European correspondents of *zalmos* also mean "shield, protection," which is perfectly fitting to both a god and the highest priest. But Porphyry also gives another explanation of the meaning of the name: "foreigner" (Gr., *xenos anēr*). On this basis Paul Kretschmer compared the metathetical form *Zamolxis* with the Phrygian *zemelen* ("barbarian slave"; Gr., *barbaron andrapodon*), with *Zemelo*, the name of a Thracian-Phrygian earth goddess (compare the Greek *Semele*), and with the Slavic *zemlja* ("earth") and thus explained *Zamolxis* as meaning "lord of men" (for *-xis*, compare the Avestan *xshaya-*, "lord, king"). Hence was developed (mainly by I. I. Russu) the

theory of the chthonic character of this god, which led to the ongoing dispute over his real functions.

According to Herodotus (*Histories* 4.94), some Getae also gave Zalmoxis the name *Gebeleizis* or *Beleizis*, which Kretschmer has related to the same Indo-European root, **g'hem-el-* ("earth"), that he traced in *Zamolxis*. Given that Herodotus spoke about a thundering god, Wilhelm Tomaschek corrected the name to *Zibeizis*, meaning "thunder sender" (compare the Lithuanian *žaiibas*, "thunderbolt," which has no clear etymology). More recently, Cicerone Poghirc (1983) has proposed, for reasons of textual criticism, the reading *Nebeleizis*, meaning "god of the [stormy] sky" (compare the Slavic *nebo*, "sky," and the Greek *nephelē*, "cloud").

Testimonies. Herodotus (4.95) refers to a story told by the Greeks in the Pontic colonies (on the western shore of the Black Sea) according to which Zalmoxis was a Getic slave of the Greek Pythagoras, who lived in Samos. After Zalmoxis was freed, he became wealthy and went back to his native country, where he taught the northern Thracians the Greek way of life based on Pythagorean ideas about immortality, vegetarianism, and so forth (see Strabo, *Geography* 7.3–5). In his homeland Zalmoxis had an *andreion* built (a room for the exclusive use of men), where he received the chiefs of the Getae and taught them that neither they nor their posterity would die. This concept of immortality refers in all probability to a paradise where warriors would enjoy eternal life and everlasting pleasure after death. While he imparted this teaching of the afterlife, Zalmoxis had an underground chamber constructed. When it was finished, he retired to it for three years, during which the Thracians mourned his death, but in the fourth year he reappeared, showing that death is not irreversible.

With slight variations, this legend is repeated by several Greek and Latin writers. Herodotus, however, opines that Zalmoxis was not a slave of Pythagoras but did in fact live long before him. Strabo adds that Zalmoxis learned from Pythagoras and from the Egyptians, whom he visited. He says that Zalmoxis was a prophet who became a priest of the principal god of the Getae and an associate of the king; later he was divinized. He dwelled in a cave, on the holy mountain Kogaionon, where scarcely anyone but the king and his messengers could join him (7.3–5). The kingship of Zalmoxis and his teaching on immortality are confirmed by Plato (*Charmides* 156d–e), who adds further that Zalmoxis had taught a highly praised method of psychosomatic medicine based on charms (*epōidai*, 157a).

Another piece of basic information provided by Herodotus (4.94) concerns the principal rite of the Getae, which consisted of killing a messenger every four years (or five years, according to Greek computation). A man

chosen by lot from among the warriors was given a message to be delivered to the god. Then he was cast on top of three spears. If he died instantly, this was interpreted as a good omen. If he failed to die, the sacrifice had to be repeated, and the first messenger was cursed. This cursing suggests that purity of some kind was required.

According to the Roman geographer Pomponius Mela (first century CE), Getic warriors were not afraid of death. Pomponius gives three different explanations for their contempt of life, each one believed by some among them: belief in metempsychosis (reincarnation); belief that the soul survives after death in a happy place; and belief that life is worse than death, although the soul is mortal. Of these interpretations, only the second refers to the genuine teaching of Zalmoxis according to Herodotus (4.95).

Herodotus's reference to Zalmoxis/Gebeleizis introduces the latter as a heavenly god. This description is supported by the claim that during thunderstorms the Getae shot arrows into the sky, thus threatening their god (4.94).

Decaeneus (also known as Dekaineus, Deceneus, and Dicineus), a high priest of Zalmoxis during the reign of the Getic king Burebista (c. 80–44 BCE), is mentioned in an account by Strabo (7.3–5), his near contemporary. According to a Greek commonplace, Egypt was a land where wisdom could be acquired, and Strabo also says that Decaeneus wandered there and learned soothsaying (7.3–11). The story that he ordered grape vines cut down in the kingdom of Burebista and an allusion to the vegetarianism of the Getae may be based on actual facts. It is also not impossible that Decaeneus was acquainted with the idea of metempsychosis, which fits well in the Pythagorean pattern of the religion of the Getae. An authentic feature of Getic high priesthood was Decaeneus's dwelling in a cave on Mount Kogaionon (Strabo, 7.3–5).

Interpretations. The history of the interpretations of Zalmoxis is somewhat disappointing. Distinguished scholars have disagreed about whether Zalmoxis's cult was a form of monotheism or of polytheism (it was not more monotheistic than, let us say, the Cretan cult of Zeus Idaeus); about whether Zalmoxis was a god or a man, perhaps a religious reformer; and about whether he was connected with the earth or with the sky (in fact he was associated with both). Spiritualistic evolutionists have tried to show that the cult of Zalmoxis represented for the Daco-Roman population a sort of primordial revelation and a *praeparatio evangelica*. Rationalists and Marxist evolutionists have tried to demonstrate that it was, on the contrary, much more "primitive" than some testimonies indicate. Hadrian

Daicoviciu, for instance, shared this last hypothesis even though it contradicted his own pertinent interpretation of the calendar temple of Sarmizegetusa Regia (modern-day Grădișteea Muncelului, Romania), according to which the Dacian priests were steeped in sophisticated astronomical speculations (*Dacii*, 2d ed., Bucharest, 1972).

The excellent study *Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God* (Chicago, 1972) by Mircea Eliade put an end to these discussions by showing that the testimonies concerning the cult of Zalmoxis have to be trusted and interpreted on the basis of a close comparison with other religious materials. According to Eliade, Zalmoxis was a mystery god in whose cult the divinity's "occultation" and "epiphany" were celebrated. In his attempt to decipher the Greek interpretation of Zalmoxis in its genuine dimensions, Eliade established important links between Zalmoxis and Archaic Greek traditions concerning soothsayers and medicine men like Pythagoras himself.

Zalmoxis and the Greek Seers. In the most ancient testimonies, Zalmoxis is constantly related to Pythagoras. Pythagorean features of his cult are further specified until the times of Strabo and Pomponius. A corpus of these features can be established as follows: Zalmoxis has an underground chamber built, disappears for three years, and then reappears (katabasis, occultation, and epiphany); he makes prophecies; he and his priests and successors live in a mountain cave, practice psychosomatic medicine, and make astronomical computations; there is among the Getae a group of ascetics who live in poverty and continence, abstaining from animal food. The core of the Zalmoxean teaching is the doctrine of immortality of the soul, which should actually be interpreted as a promise to the brave warriors that they would survive in paradise. Later, some among the Getae may have been acquainted with the idea of metempsychosis. All this sounds so Pythagorean that the Greeks were even disposed to understand the less attractive practice of human sacrifice without much ethical comment.

One of the false problems connected with Zalmoxis that has received much attention from scholars is whether the god—if he was a god at all—ought to be interpreted as a chthonic or as a heavenly divinity. In fact, from the perspective of the history of religions, this is not a logical contradiction, since divinities of the sky can be strongly connected with the earth, and vice versa. Furthermore, even in Greek religion, which is usually the model according to which Zalmoxis is interpreted, such heavenly divinities as Zeus and Apollo were worshiped in caves, whereas such a typically chthonic divinity as Persephone was associated very early with heavenly immortality. Pythagoras himself,

who was apparently connected with Apollo of Hyperborea, is also the character who descends to the underworld and who exhibits important features that establish his relationship with a chthonic goddess, or "great mother." Zalmoxis's "Pythagorean" structure connects him with both the earth and the sky.

Among the Greek characters belonging to the same class of seers, soothsayers, medicine men, and semidivinities as Pythagoras, the one who most closely resembles Zalmoxis is Epimenides of Crete, worshiped as a god in a local cult. Epimenides is said to have dwelled in the grotto of the infant Zeus on Mount Ida, where he slept for several decades. He avoided food and used only a plant called *alimos*, or hungerbane, to keep hunger in abeyance. He could foretell the future, he practiced purifications, and he was able to remember his previous existences as a human being. In one of these incarnations he was Aeacus, brother of Minos, who was a son of Zeus. Minos visited his godly father in the Idaean cave every eight years, and thus it is not surprising that Epimenides used this place for incubation. During his catalepsy, his soul was reported to be together with the gods, listening to their speeches.

According to another legend, once when Epimenides was about to dedicate a sanctuary to the nymphs a heavenly voice instructed him to dedicate it to Zeus instead. This could be interpreted as an indication that the Idaean cave did not belong to the sphere of influence of those divinities who normally preside over such places, that is, the nymphs, but to the heavenly god *par excellence*, Zeus. In fact, Epimenides was considered a "new infant" (*neos kouros*), the Idaean Zeus reborn. It is, then, no surprise to learn that he was the guide of Pythagoras when the latter descended into the Idaean cave. Nor is it surprising that Epimenides, the author of oracles and theogonies, worshiped by the Cretans as a god, was nevertheless transformed by the Neoplatonic Iamblichus (c. 250–330 CE) into a pupil of Pythagoras in precisely the same way as this happened with Zalmoxis; among Greek seers of pre-Socratic times Pythagoras was simply more famous than Epimenides.

The chthonic side of Epimenides is revealed by his dwelling in a cave and by his relationship with the nymphs. In the legends of Pythagoras and Zalmoxis this chthonic side is revealed by a detail that has only recently received a consistent interpretation. Walter Burkert (1972) has shown that Pythagoras was probably viewed as a representative of the chthonic goddess Demeter, a hypothesis confirmed by the tradition that Pythagoras once exhibited a "golden thigh." This probably means that the legend attributed to Pythagoras a tattoo on his thigh, which was the mark, or seal, of the Anatolian great goddess. At the same time it was an indi-

cation that Pythagoras could travel to Hades (Burkert, 1972, pp. 160–161).

In his *Life of Pythagoras* (15), the Neoplatonist Porphyry reports a strange legend according to which Zalmoxis was a disciple of Pythagoras; at the time of the revolt of the citizens of Croton against Pythagoras, Zalmoxis was captured by bandits who tattooed him on his face, which he kept covered ever after. This brief account seems to be extremely important, since tattooing among southern Thracian nobles is attested as early as Herodotus (5.6) and confirmed by several testimonies, and yet Artemidorus of Ephesus (fl. 100 BCE) reports that, whereas the southern Thracian nobles had their children tattooed, the Getae tattooed only the children of their slaves. From a fragment attributed to Clearchus of Soloi (sixth century BCE) one could infer that Getic women were tattooed over the whole body. The rhetorician Dio Chrysostom (first century CE) specifies that only the wives of Thracian nobles were tattooed, with red-hot irons.

Tattooing among the Thracians was probably a religious mark; among the northern Thracians, the Getae and the Dacians, it could have been associated with the pain once inflicted upon Zalmoxis by his captors. Since tattooing among the Getae is twice mentioned in relationship to slavery, one could infer that the ancient legend making Zalmoxis a slave was based on this character's genuine myth, which might have originally included suffering and imprisonment. Plutarch of Chaeronea (first century CE) reports that the Thracians tattooed their women in order to avenge the sufferings inflicted by Thracian women upon Orpheus. Plutarch, who was far better acquainted with Orpheus than with Zalmoxis, could have misinterpreted here an actual tradition connected with Zalmoxis. It is possible to a certain extent to state that the Getae tattooed their slaves and perhaps their wives as a religious record and possibly as revenge for the mark impressed upon Zalmoxis while he was a captive.

Much less convincing is the interpretation of Rhys Carpenter in his *Folk-Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics* (Berkeley, 1946), which is based on the testimony of Porphyry (*Life of Pythagoras* 14), according to which a bearskin was put on Zalmoxis at his birth. According to Carpenter, Zalmoxis actually was a bear, whose hibernation (i.e., occultation) was taken by the Getae as a religious model.

Conclusion. God or man, possibly also a religious reformer of the Getae, Zalmoxis fits almost perfectly into the Pythagorean pattern of a Greek seer and medicine man like Epimenides, who was also worshiped as a god. His myth is scarcely known, but it could have contained an episode of captivity and, possibly, suffering. Ritual

tattooing among the Getae was related to this episode, and might have been inflicted upon slaves and women as an expiation of a mythical sin. Zalmoxis probably taught immortality for valiant warriors. He was worshiped in a grotto, which might have played an important part in the initiation of priests and warriors. A chief priest, his representative in the grotto, was considered a prophet, and he gained such influence in political matters that the state of Burebista could be properly called a theocracy. A sanctuary, possibly the old sanctuary with an underground chamber at Sarmizegetusa Regia, described by Ion Horațiu Crișan in *Burebista and His Time* (Bucharest, 1977), was provided with a subterranean room, a substitute for the grotto. This indicates that the legend of the occultation of Zalmoxis referred to by Herodotus was connected with the existence of such an ancient sanctuary.

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IOAN PETRU CULIANU and CICERONE POGHIRIC

ZAMAKHSHARĪ, AL- (AH 467–538/1075–1144 CE), fully Abū al-Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn 'Umar al-Zamakhsharī; Muslim philologist and Qur'ān commentator. Born in Khorezm in northern Persia, al-Zamakhsharī traveled little outside his native province except for several years spent studying and writing in the holy city of Mecca. He was a native Persian speaker, but he believed strongly in the superiority of the Arabic language and excelled in Arabic philology. According to various historical records, he wrote some fifty works; thirty of these are known to exist today, a majority of which have been published in the original Arabic. Most of

these works deal with the Qur'ān or the Arabic language in general.

Al-Zamakhsharī's major work, and the one for which he is most famous, is his book of Qur'ān interpretation (*tafsīr*), *Al-kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl* (The Unveiler of the Realities of the Secrets of the Revelation), a work completed during a two-year stay in Mecca around 1134. The work is a phrase-by-phrase philosophical and philological commentary on the entire text of the Qur'ān, written in a concise, careful, and somewhat difficult style. Notable is its lack of tradition-oriented material; virtually no reports are attributed to the early authorities on interpretation; rather, all comments are directly stated with no concern for their authority in the past. Generally, al-Zamakhsharī presents first what he considers to be the obvious meaning of a verse and then notes other possible interpretations on the basis of grammar and textual variant readings, while always paying full attention to the notion of the rhetorical beauty (*i'jāz*) of the Qur'ān.

The distinctiveness of al-Zamakhsharī's Qur'ān commentary lies in his Mu'tazilī theological leanings. Beginning in the tenth century, the Mu'tazilah were apparently a powerful theological force in al-Zamakhsharī's birthplace. He states explicitly that *Al-kashshāf* was written in order to provide the needed comprehensive Mu'tazilī commentary to the Qur'ān. The most obvious result of this theological position in the commentary is the way in which he resolves apparent conflict between various verses of the Qur'ān. The Mu'tazilī doctrines of the unity and justice of God and the consequent ideas of the human free will and the need to deanthropomorphize the Qur'ān become the prime themes of the distinctive passages of interpretation. A typical example is found in his treatment of surah 6:125:

Whomever God desires to guide: those upon whom God bestows his benevolence, which only happens with those who are worthy. *He expands his breast to Islam:* bestowing his benevolence on them so that they long for Islam, and their souls feel at home there, and they desire to be Muslims. *Whomever he desires to lead astray:* those whom God leaves alone and wishes to abandon to their own deeds. What is meant is one who is not worthy of his benevolence. *He makes his breast narrow, tight:* He keeps his benevolence from them, so that their hearts harden, and they refuse and resist truth, and thus faith finds no path into them.

Here the emphasis is always upon the prior moral condition of the individual, to which God responds by enhancing the condition that the individual has already chosen.

Likewise the doctrine of the created Qur'ān (as opposed to the orthodox dogma of the preexistent, un-

created Qur'ān) is present throughout al-Zamakhsharī's work; apparently *Al-kashshāf* originally began, "Praise be to God who created the Qur'ān," but this was changed to "God who gave" or "God who sent down" in order to temper the tone somewhat.

Despite its theological argumentation, al-Zamakhsharī's Qur'ān commentary has been widely read and copied, especially in the eastern parts of the Islamic world. The work has consistently been subject to both explication and attack by later authors, who have provided many supercommentaries and derivative commentaries. The work by al-Bayḍāwī (d. sometime between 1286 and 1316), *Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-ta'wīl* (The Lights of the Revelation and the Secrets of the Interpretation), is the most famous attempt to distill the essence of al-Zamakhsharī's work while attempting to omit those views which were reprehensible to orthodoxy. For the Mu'tazilah, on the other hand, *Al-kashshāf* represents the peak of intellectual achievement in Qur'ān commentary.

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Al-kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl has been edited and published a number of times, but no particular edition has emerged as the standard one. No extensive portions have ever been translated, and the usefulness of such translations would be quite limited because of the precise and technical nature of much of the original. Short passages of the work are available in English throughout Helmut Gätje's *The Qur'ān and Its Exegesis: Selected Texts with Classical and Modern Muslim Interpretations*, translated and edited by Alford T. Welch (Berkeley, 1976), and in Kenneth Cragg's *The Mind of the Qur'ān: Chapters in Reflection* (London, 1973), pp. 64–69, where the commentary on Qur'ān surah 90 is translated. The most significant and extended treatment of al-Zamakhsharī's work on the Qur'ān is to be found in Ignác Goldziher's *Die richtungen der islamischen Koranlegung* (Leiden, 1920), pp. 117–177. Jane I. Smith's *An Historical and Semantic Study of the Term "Islām" as Seen in a Sequence of Qur'ān Commentaries* (Missoula, Mont., 1975), pp. 89–101, gives a useful summary of al-Zamakhsharī's work, provides examples of his method of interpretation, and locates it within the general historical framework of *tafsīr*. A number of articles by Lutpi Ibrahim have appeared on al-Zamakhsharī and his theological relationship to al-Bayḍāwī: "Al-Bayḍāwī's Life and Works," *Islamic Studies* (Karachi) 18 (1979): 311–321; "The Concept of Divine Justice according to al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī," *Hamdard Islamicus* 3 (1980): 3–17; "The Relation of Reason and Revelation in the Theology of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī," *Islamic Culture* 54 (1980): 63–74; "The Concept of *Iḥbāṭ* and *Takfīr* according to al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī," *Die Welt des Orient* 11 (1980): 117–121; and "The Questions of the Superiority of Angels and Prophets between al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī," *Arabica* 28 (1981): 65–75.

ZARATHUSHTRA, founder of the religion known as Zoroastrianism or Mazdaism (from *Mazdā* or *Ahura Mazdā*, the name of the god prophesied by Zarathushtra). The etymology and history of *Zarathushtra*, the Avestan and oldest form of the name, are uncertain, both in the various Iranian languages and in related forms elsewhere. There may have been an Old Persian form, *Zara-ushtra*, from which the Greek form, *Zōroastrēs*, may be derived, and there may have existed an Old Iranian form, *Zarat-ushtra*, to which may be linked the Middle Iranian *Zrdrwsht*, several Middle Persian forms (such as *Zrtwsht*), and the New Persian *Zardusht*. We can state with certainty only that the second half of the name, *ushtra*, means "camel." The form *Zoroaster*, derived from the Greek *Zōroastrēs*, was used traditionally in European culture until the eighteenth century, when *Zarathustra*, closer to the original (and as found in Nietzsche), came into common use after the rediscovery of the Avesta, the collection of sacred books of Zoroastrianism, and the resulting studies in Iranian philology. [See Avesta.]

Notwithstanding the great and continued popularity of Zarathushtra, even in Western culture, the sources available to us are few, extremely fragmented, and heterogeneous. Our principal sources are the five *Gāthās* ("songs"), attributed to Zarathushtra himself and included in the *Yasna* section of the Avesta: *Gāthā Ahunavaitī* (*Yasna* 28–34), *Gāthā Ushtavaitī* (*Yasna* 43–46), *Gāthā Spentāmainyu* (*Yasna* 47–50), *Gāthā Vokukshathra* (*Yasna* 51), and *Gāthā Vahishtëishti* (*Yasna* 53), the last of which was probably written after the prophet's death.

Other sources of considerable, albeit varying, importance are the Younger Avesta and the remaining Zoroastrian religious literature, in particular the Pahlavi texts of the ninth and tenth centuries CE. Although the Achaemenid inscriptions (sixth to fourth centuries BCE) never mention Zarathushtra, he is mentioned by some Greek sources of the time (not, however, by Herodotus, who seems unaware of him).

The Avesta does not provide any direct or explicit data concerning the true chronological history of Zarathushtra. But the text is useful in an indirect way, as it clearly implies that the environment in which Zoroastrianism arose was not that of Iran under the Medes or the Persians. The Greek sources, on the other hand, do provide some information concerning the time of Zarathushtra, although from a historical point of view they are unreliable. Some place him six thousand years before Plato or Xerxes, some five thousand years before the Trojan War (Xanthus of Lydia, Eudoxus of Cnidus, Hermippus, Hermodorus, Aristotle, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Pliny). The account by Xanthus of Lydia,

however, has also been interpreted by some to mean six hundred, rather than six thousand, years before the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. This interpretation is favored by Diogenes Laertius; who makes reference to Xanthus, but although a few scholars (A. S. Shabazi, Helmut Humbach) have recently attempted to rehabilitate it under various pretexts, it is generally rejected.

Although the historical value of the Greek sources is negligible, they are nonetheless important in that they show that the millenarian doctrine of the history of the cosmos had already been developed in Iran by the Achaemenid period, as the above account would seem to demonstrate. They also show that by this time Zarathushtra was already seen as an almost mythical figure, one from an extremely distant past. All of this leads to the conclusion that the prophet could not have belonged to a historical period contemporary with, or even close to, that of the Achaemenids.

Later Zoroastrian sources, the Pahlavi texts, do provide an absolute chronology for Zarathushtra, one that was also accepted by some Arab authors. According to these sources, Zarathushtra lived 300 or 258 years before Alexander. Again, scholars are divided on the validity of the chronology; some view it as historically reliable while others believe that it is devoid of historical justification. The most convincing arguments, however, seem to support the latter position. The figure of 258 years is accurate only on the surface because it represents, in fact, the more general one of 300, which was employed by Sasanid propagandists to locate Zarathushtra's lifetime roughly around the beginning of Iranian domination. For a number of reasons connected with complex problems inherent in the Iranian chronology, there was also a desire on the part of the Sasanid propagandists to avoid any millenarian threat. In this context, Zarathushtra, whom tradition places early in the ninth millennium after the beginning of the cosmos, converted Vishtëspa at the age of forty-two, and Vishtëspa's conversion was viewed by some as the beginning of the millennium (thus explaining the double date of 300 and 258 years before Alexander).

Given the unreliability of the few available sources, we are forced to reconstruct an absolute chronology on the basis of other elements, principally on the contention that Zarathushtra must have lived a few centuries before Cyrus the Great, Cambyses, and Darius, as there is no mention in the Avesta of the great political achievements that took place in western Iran in the middle of the first millennium BCE. Nor is there any mention of the history of that period, which was to lead Iran to a position of such predominance. At the same time, for a number of reasons, going back much further in history would not be justified. Consequently, the tra-

ditionally accepted theory placing Zarathushtra around the beginning of the first millennium BCE appears to be the most legitimate.

As to Zarathushtra's land of origin, many scholars agree, on the basis of valid arguments, that he must have come from eastern Iran. Some have held that he was a Mede, largely because of a late Iranian tradition linking Zarathushtra with Azerbaijan, but also because of linguistic reasons, based on the language of the Avesta. This hypothesis, however, should be discarded, as we can suppose, both on historical and linguistic grounds, that Zarathushtra came from the east, even though we do not know precisely from which region. There is a considerable variety of opinion on this particular matter, including the improbable view that he came from Chorasmia, or present-day Khorezm, or from a wider Chorasmian region, reaching as far as the oases of Merv and Herāt. Most likely, however, Zarathushtra's land of origin is somewhere in the vast area stretching from the Hindu Kush mountain range to the more southern reaches of Seistan, an area covering the ancient regions of Bactria and Arachosia (modern Qandahar), as well as Drangiana (the area of lake Helmand). It would thus be located in what is now Afghanistan or in the border regions of Iran.

Zarathushtra himself tells us that he belonged to the priestly caste (*Yasna* 33.6). He was a *zaotar* (cf. Sanskrit *hotṛ*), that is, a priest belonging to a specific group connected with a school that produced very elaborate and learned religious poetry. Even in the so-called Younger Avesta he is described as an *āthravan* (*Yashts* 13.94), a more general term encompassing the entire priestly caste. To enter it he had undergone a long and rigid training, which he used to lend dignity (as in the *Gāthās*) to the contents of his new message, the product of a great and original ethical mind.

Zarathushtra also belongs to that venerable priestly tradition, linking India to Iran in another way, by centering his teachings on the praise of the *ashavan*, or "possessor of *asha*," that is, the one who, as in the Vedic *ṛtāvan*, seeks truth and masters it, thus becoming *ashavan* in this life—almost an initiate—and blessed after death. Any good follower of such teachings seeks the "vision of *asha*," just as those choosing the right path in Vedic India aspired to the "vision of the Sun," a manifestation of *ṛtā*. Behind these concepts and this language lies the great tradition of "Aryan mysticism," that is, of Indo-Iranian mysticism.

Zarathushtra's greatness, however, does not lie in his having belonged to a particular religious tradition. Rather, it lies in the innovation and strength of his message, which was in itself a break in the tradition, one that forcefully and effectively introduced two great re-

volutionary ideas: dualistic monotheism (the Wise Lord who fathers two twin spirits, the beneficent and the evil); and the expectation of a transfiguration (Av., *Frashōkereti*; Pahl., *Frashgird*) of life and existence. [See *Frashōkereti*.]

Both his monotheistic and dualistic ideas and his particular soteriological doctrine deeply separate Zarathushtra's teachings from the Indo-Iranian traditions of his upbringing. They exemplify his rebellion against a formalistic and ritualistic religion that did not provide adequate answers to the problem of evil. Because of his basic tenets, Zarathushtra, who advocated an inward religiosity and the right of the individual to resist the imperatives of tradition, can be numbered among the greatest of religious figures.

Another original facet of Zarathushtra's message, one that is not easy to understand but which, however, holds the key to a deeper understanding of the complex intellectual and poetic structure of the *Gāthās*, is the doctrine of the Amesha Spentas, the "beneficent immortals." These are spiritualizations of the abstract notions of good thought, best truth, desirable power, bounteous devotion, wholeness, and immortality, all of which operate according to a system of interrelations and correlations and can simultaneously be the manifestations of a divinity and of a human virtue. [See Amesha Spentas.]

Other than the names of his father, Pourushaspa ("possessing gray horses"), and of his mother, Dughdōvā ("one who has milked"), we know almost nothing of Zarathushtra's life. A late Pahlavi text also gives the names of four brothers. According to tradition, Zarathushtra left home at the age of twenty, and at thirty he was subject to a revelation, both through an intense and powerful inspiration and through a vision. Only after ten years had passed, however, did he succeed in converting a cousin of his, Maidhyōimāh, to his beliefs. He was strongly opposed in his native land by *kavis*, *karapans*, and *usijs*, priestly groups associated with traditional teachings and practices. This hostility caused him to leave his region (*Yasna* 46.1) and to seek refuge at the court of Kavi Vishtāspa, a ruler who had been converted to the new religion together with his wife, Hutaosā, when the prophet, according to tradition, was forty-two years old. We also know the name of a son, Isat Vāstra ("desiring pastures"), and of three daughters born of his first wife, as well as the names of two more sons, Urvatatnara ("commanding men") and Hvarecithra ("sun-faced"), born of his second wife, Hvōvī, a member of the influential Hvōgva ("possessing good cattle") family. Two other figures belonging to the Hvōgva family are mentioned: Frashaoshtra and Jāmāspa, the former as Hvōvī's father, and the latter as the husband of the third daughter of the prophet, Pouruchistā ("very

thoughtful"), whose wedding is celebrated in the fifth hymn in the *Gāthās* (*Yasna* 53). Again, according to tradition, Zarathushtra died at the age of seventy-seven. He was assassinated by a *karapan*, a priest of the old religion, who belonged to the Tūiryā tribe and was called Tūr i Brādrēs (his name is known only in the Pahlavi form).

The paucity of information on the prophet's life is compensated by a tradition, rich in legendary detail, that arose through the centuries in Zoroastrian communities. The main texts documenting the tradition are the seventh book of the *Dēnkard*, a Pahlavi work dating from the ninth century CE, as well as passages from other Pahlavi texts and a New Persian work from the thirteenth century, the *Zarātusht-nāma* (Book of Zarathushtra), written by Zarātusht-i Bahrām-i Pazhdū. Mythical and ritual elements prevail in the later legends about Zarathushtra, which idealize him into a symbol and make him the archetype of the perfect man.

Zarathushtra's great popularity in the ancient world continued throughout the Renaissance until the Enlightenment. During the Classical and Hellenistic periods he was viewed as a wise man, a typical representative of an "alien wisdom," a master of the secrets of heaven and earth, a seer, astrologer, psychologist, and wonder worker. Pythagorean thinkers went so far as to see the influence of Zarathushtra on Pythagoras himself, and the Academicians always openly admired the Persian thinker who founded the school of the Magi and advocated a doctrine of dualism. Earliest Christianity viewed Zarathushtra as a precursor of the Christian faith, one who not only prophesied, as had the biblical prophets, the advent of the Messiah but also predicted the supernatural sign of his coming, the star that was to appear in the East and guide the three Magi to the manger in Bethlehem. [See Magi.] This Christian interpretation is derived from the Zoroastrian doctrine of the Saoshyant, the Savior of the Future. [See Saoshyant.] Later, however, religious struggles arose during the Sasanid empire in Persia (third to seventh centuries CE), which linked the spread of Christianity with the Roman empire. Zarathushtra's popularity in the Christian world began to decline. The Iranian prophet, who had been praised often by the gnostic schools and who had been seen by Mani as one of the three great messengers from the past, was now seen, instead, as a leader of imposture and heresy, a teacher of the diabolic arts of witchery. But during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, European cultures reverted to the image of Zarathushtra that had come down through Classical and Hellenistic antiquity. He was viewed, once again, as a great and wise man, as the author of the *Chaldean Oracles* and probable inventor of Qabbalah, as a teacher

of astrology, as a possible bridge between Christianity and Platonism, and, at times (as in Voltaire), as a symbol of non-Christian wisdom.

After Western philology rediscovered Zarathushtra during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Friedrich Nietzsche, in an intentional paradox, gave the name *Zarathustra* to the hero of his work *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883–1892). Nietzsche saw the Iranian prophet as the first to have discovered the true motive force underlying all things, that is, the eternal struggle between good and evil.

[See also Zoroastrianism.]

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Translated from Italian by Ughetta Fitzgerald Lubin

ZĀWIYAH. See Khānaqāh.

ZEALOTS. The Zealots were Jewish revolutionaries in first-century Judaea whose religious zeal led them to fight to the death against Roman domination and to kill or persecute Jews who collaborated with the Romans. Scholars disagree as to whether the name *Zealots* designated all revolutionary groups of the first century or only one of the factions active during the Roman-Jewish War of 66–70 CE. Josephus Flavius (37–c. 100 CE), the Jewish general who surrendered to the Romans and whose official Roman history of the war furnishes the major source, is ambiguous in his use of terminology. References in the New Testament, the Pseudepigrapha, and the rabbinic literature add to the confusion.

In 6 CE, Judah (Yehudah) the Galilean showed zeal for God's law and land when he led a revolt against the Roman census in Judaea. He and his followers fought to cleanse the land by taking vengeance against Jews who cooperated with the Romans. Judah considered such cooperation to be idolatrous recognition of a lord (Caesar) other than God. By such vengeance, he and his followers sought to appease God, who would thereby honor their cause against the Romans. The revolt failed, but Judah had originated the so-called Fourth Philosophy ("No Lord but God") based on the first commandment. Judah's followers emerged again after all of Judaea became a Roman province in 44 CE. Their subsequent revolutionary actions against the corrupt and incompetent authorities contributed to the outbreak of war in 66 CE. Josephus usually refers to Judah's group as Sicarii, after the *sikkah* ("dagger") used in assassinations.

For the war period, Josephus identifies (in addition to the wartime government) five revolutionary groups, each with its own social and geographic origins, motivations, methods, and goals. (Not all the groups shared a "zealous" mentality, and they usually cooperated only when confronted with a common enemy.)

1. The Sicarii fought for "No Lord but God" under the messianic leadership of Judas the Galilean's descendants. When other revolutionary groups forced them out of Jerusalem in 66 CE, they spent the war on Ma-

sada, where in 74 CE they chose suicide rather than capture by the Romans.

2. The Zealots, primarily priests from Jerusalem and the Judean peasantry, declared war by stopping the official sacrifices for Caesar. Later, under democratic leadership, they occupied the Temple, chose a high priest by lot, and, in 68 CE, overthrew the wartime government.
3. John of Giscala (Yoḥanan ben Levi), leader of a Galilean contingent, gained the confidence of the wartime government, which he then betrayed to the Zealots.
4. Simeon bar Giora, from Gerasa in the Decapolis, raised an army of freed slaves and peasants, then overran Idumea. In 69 CE, he was joined by some nobles and seized most of Jerusalem. A messianic strongman, Simeon led the defense of Jerusalem in 70 CE.
5. The Idumeans, a local militia, helped the Zealots to overthrow the provisional government.

Major scholarly controversies, arising primarily from the biased and often unreliable accounts of Josephus (in *The Jewish War*, as well as his *Jewish Antiquities* and *The Life*), have centered on the ancient usage of the title "Zealot," on the extent of religious zeal among the revolutionaries and the populace, and on the relative importance of social, economic, political, and religious factors in the war effort.

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DAVID M. RHOADS

ZEME. In Baltic religion, earth (Latv., *zeme*; Lith., *žeme*) is sacralized. On this basis, the Latvian goddess Zeme and the Lithuanian goddess Žemyna (diminutive, Žemynele) evolved. Called in Latvian Zemes Māte ("earth mother"), she takes a central place in the religious system of the Baltic peoples. Attested by Tacitus, who reports that the ancient Balts venerated ■ *deum matrem*, her role is determined by her femininity: like a mother she is connected with the promotion of fertility. Everything in nature that is born, grows, and dies belongs to her. Thus man, too, is drawn into this all-embracing cult, beginning at birth and ending with death.

Description of Zeme as *māte* is dependent on which of a variety of mother roles she plays, a variety that can be seen particularly clearly in Latvian traditions. Here appear such descriptions as *Lauku māte* ("field mother"), *Meža māte* ("forest mother"), *Krūmu māte* ("bush mother"), *Ogu māte* ("berry mother"), and *Sēņu māte* ("mushroom mother"), among a number of others. In the main, these are poetic personifications of aspects of nature without any religious connotations. The juxtaposition of religious and poetic personifications is a well-known occurrence, but this does not deny that in differentiating the variety of functions of Zeme as *māte*, new beings are created. These then become independent and assume the particular specialized function that is appropriate in a given tradition.

The central place of Zeme is revealed especially in cultic practices; together with those of Laima, these are the most fully developed in Baltic religion. There was, for example, a notion that children are created from springs, lakes, trees, and hills, all places that are connected with the earth. It is therefore understandable that at the birth of a child offerings were made to Zeme. These offerings were placed either by trees and stones close to the home or were thrown into the hearth fire. The offerings were accompanied by prayers: "My dear earth, my mother, sustain me, feed me." More widespread still were rituals concerned with encouraging fertility in both crops and animals. Thus, at the commencement of work in the fields in spring, the farmer plowed a piece of bread into the first furrow. On this day, too, a special meal was eaten at which the first measure of ale was thrown on the earth together with a small piece of meat. In the spring, when the animals were sent out to pasture for the first time, offerings were

made, normally eggs, a special gruel, and ale. The entire household, led by the paterfamilias, joined in the sacrificial meals, for which a piglet or cockerel was occasionally slaughtered.

More frequent still were rituals connected with the gathering of the harvest in autumn. After the last sheaf had been taken in, bread and salt were buried in the soil in its place, to the accompaniment of a prayer: "Dear earth, as you have given, so also do I give to you." A kind of cultic drama, in two parts, was then enacted. The first part, in which the female head of the household also generally participated, took place in the field. A festive meal was eaten, including special cakes, and, as at all country feasts, ale was drunk. This meal of thanksgiving was made festive by singing and dancing. The songs were commonly characterized by bravado directed at neighboring farmers who had not yet succeeded in harvesting their crops. After the feast, the participants returned home crowned with garlands made from ears of grain and bearing their tools, scythes and rakes, similarly decorated. The second part of the drama took place at the homestead. At the gate, the workers were met by the head of the household, who offered them a drink, usually ale, but often vodka in a later tradition. Afterward, the festivities continued inside the house, with more singing and dancing.

This résumé of the fertility cult of the Baltic earth mother shows that it embraced the countryman's whole life from the time of his birth, including all aspects of his activities at work. The practice of customary rites attests to the fact that by following them the individual believed that he secured the patronage of Zeme, the mother goddess. So intensive was this cult that even until the eighteenth century country people first said prayers to the earth and then kissed it both in the morning, at the beginning of their work, and in the evening, when their work was done. In these religious instances, the holy earth is the mother of all life. As the extensive collection of nineteenth- and twentieth-century folklore materials demonstrates, this understanding was never completely lost, in spite of centuries of Christian missionizing.

Complementing this positive aspect of the cult of the sacred earth, the giving of life, is its negative counterpart, the taking of life, for the rhythm of nature shows that everything that comes from the earth must at some point return to it. Zeme, the mother of life, is ruler of everything created on earth and of everything that takes place there. That is her positive aspect. Yet experience of life forces the conclusion that the earth is also responsible for the individual's negative experiences, that is, death and one's fate thereafter. Thus the earth god-

ness adopts simultaneously her other morphological role, that of a chthonic goddess. In this role she rules what takes place below the earth, and she is given titles appropriate to this function. In Latvian she is called Smilšu Māte ("sand mother"), a name arising from the custom of burying the dead in sandy knolls, or she is described directly as Kapu Māte ("mother of the grave") or Nāves Māte ("death mother"). Thus the mother of life, promoter of bounty and fertility, becomes her opposite, the mother of death. Although paradoxical, this morphological transformation is nonetheless understandable, for in the eyes of the Baltic farmer the processes of birth and death were manifest both in nature and in his immediate and extended families. The dead were buried in a nearby grave mound, and were thus ever-present as a reminder to the living.

In Baltic religion there is no metaphysical ontology contrasting the notions of life and death. Instead, these notions are simply two aspects of a single goddess. In the sources this is stated metaphorically: not only may one address petitions and give thanks to Zeme as Zemes Māte, but one may have an amicable discussion with her as Naves Māte, offering her substitutes for a dying person—an oak log to decompose or an ax or a plow to rust away. This final, unique trait of the Baltic earth goddess is explicable by reference to the farmer's close ties to the land.

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HARALDS BIEZAIS

ZEN. [This entry treats the development of the Zen school in Japan. The historical antecedents of this school, the practices and institutions of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism, are discussed in Ch'an.]

Among the three *sūtras* to which the Japanese regent Shōtoku Taishi (574–662) composed commentaries is the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, which reveals in a special way the spirit and manner of meditation proper to Zen. This spirit is evident not only in the way the *sūtra* ends, with the highest wisdom proclaiming itself in silence, but

also in the fact that the way of meditation that Vimalakīrti, the pious householder and lay *bodhisattva*, explains to Śāriputra contains the essential traits of Zen Buddhist Mahāyāna meditation. He presents it not as mere sitting but as a dynamic meditation, free of all objects, in which the dignity and activity of everyday life are bound up with a silent and profound centering in contemplation. It is a *sūtra* that met with great understanding in Japan.

Further stepping-stones to Zen Buddhism were offered by the schools of Hossō and Kegon, which both had considerable influence during the Nara period (710–794), when Japanese Buddhism was experiencing its first flowering. During the Heian period (794–1192) meditation was cultivated by the Tendai school, whose Japanese founder, Saichō (767–822), had also learned the way of Ch'an in China. Around the middle of the ninth century the Chinese Lin-chi (Jpn., Rinzai) master I-k'ung visited Japan, but soon returned to China without having achieved notable success. Nothing further is heard about Zen in Japan until the middle of the twelfth century, when Japanese monks in considerable numbers began to visit China and its distinguished Ch'an monasteries. Yet even before the time of Eisai, Kakua, Dainichi Nōnin, and Kakuan were propagating Zen meditation in Japan.

The Planting of Zen Buddhism in Japan

The early history of Zen proper does not begin until the twelfth century, when Myōan Eisai attempted to transmit the Lin-chi teachings to Japan.

Myōan Eisai. Myōan Eisai (1141–1215; also known as Myōan Yōsai) may rightly be called the founder of Japanese Zen Buddhism, although the title can be accorded him only with reservations. Despite his efforts to introduce Chinese Lin-chi Ch'an into Japan, the establishment of a Japanese Rinza school failed because of resistance from the powerful Tendai monks.

Eisai encountered Ch'an Buddhists during his first trip to China in 1168. Although greatly impressed by them, he did not delve very deeply into Ch'an at the time. Like many of his contemporaries Eisai felt the urgency for a fundamental renewal of Japanese Buddhism. To this end he proposed to press back to the sources of the religion of the Buddha in India. During his second trip to China (1187–1191), however, he was denied permission to travel to India and had to content himself with visiting the centers of Chinese Buddhism. He entered a Ch'an monastery where he practiced *tsōch'an* (Jpn., *zazen*) and *kung-an* (Jpn., *kōan*), achieved enlightenment, and was presented with the insignia of succession in the Huang-lung (Jpn., Ōryō) line of the

Lin-chi school. He did not, however, cut himself off entirely from the Tendai school to which he belonged and in whose doctrines and esoteric practices he was well versed.

Immediately upon his return to Japan, Eisai began to propagate the way of Zen in the southern island of Kyushu. His energetic labors stirred up the resentment of the Tendai monks, who succeeded in having a prohibition issued by the imperial palace against the "new sect" of the "Dharma school" (1194). Eisai proved prepared for compromise. In Shōfukuji, which he had founded at Hakata (Kyushu) and which has become renowned as the "first Japanese Zen temple," esoteric rites were practiced in addition to Zen meditation.

In his apologetic work of 1198, *Kōzen gokokuron* (Treatise on the Spread of Zen for the Protection of the Country), Eisai stresses the value of the Tendai tradition, in which meditation and enlightenment hold a place of prominence. Meditation is set alongside the perfect doctrine (*engyō*), secret rites (*mitsu*), and disciplinary commandments (*kai*) as one of the four essential elements of Tendai. On the other hand, he makes no attempt to conceal the high esteem he accords to Chinese Ch'an. In his view, Rinzaï Zen, as "the quintessence of all doctrines and the totality of the Buddha's Dharma," can contribute decisively to the renewal of Japanese Buddhism in the midst of the many evils with which it has become afflicted.

In the *Kōzen gokokuron* Eisai develops both these aspects without making his own standpoint clear and unambiguous. As conflicts increased, he went to Kamakura, where he was appointed founding abbot of Jufukuji. Later he took over the direction of the temple Kenninji in Kyoto, which was to become one of the centers of the early Japanese Zen movement. Kenninji contained cultic facilities for Tendai (Tendai-in) and Shingon (Shingon-in) and a Zen hall (Zen-in). Eisai felt that the time had not yet come for the organizational establishment of an independent Rinzaï school. The Zen that he left to his disciples showed a strong mixture of Tendai, especially Tendai esotericism (Taimitsu), in its spirituality. [See also Tendaishū and the biography of Eisai.]

Enni Ben'en. The central figure during the following period was Enni Ben'en (best known by his posthumous title of Shōichi Kokushi, 1201–1280), who was the founding abbot of Tōfukuji, one of the most important Zen temples in Kyoto. After studying the doctrines of Tendai, Enni entered the famous Tendai monastery of Miidera (officially known as Onjōji) at the age of eighteen and was ordained a monk in the sacred precincts of Tōdaiji in Nara. Later he studied a form of Zen mixed with Tendai under Eichō, who practiced Esoteric Buddhism even more than his master, Eisai, had.

The turning point in Enni's life came during the course of a seven-year stay in China (1235–1241). He entered the discipleship of the outstanding Lin-chi master Wu-chun Shih-fan (Jpn., Bushun Shihan), practiced pure Ch'an, and reached enlightenment. As abbot of Tōfukuji, his daily visits to Kenninji allowed him to bring life to monastic discipline and to rekindle the zeal for meditation that had declined after the death of Eisai. All the same, he did not change Eisai's style of mixing Zen with received rites. In Tōfukuji, facilities for the observance of Shingon and Tendai rituals were provided according to the wishes of its patron, Fujiwara Michiie.

The labors of Enni Ben'en mark a step forward in the long and drawn-out process of Zen's implantation in Japan. The high esteem he earned because of his deep understanding of Zen and his ten years of activity in Kyoto worked to the advantage of Zen. The "new sect" introduced from China gradually found acceptance in wide circles of the population. The establishment of an independent Zen school in Kyoto was not yet realizable, but Zen won a position of prominence. The disciples of Enni Ben'en lent weight to the school, and throughout the Kamakura period the line of Shōichi represented numerically the strongest group in the Japanese Rinzaï school.

Chinese Zen Masters in Japan. During the second half of the Kamakura period, under the patronage of the Hōjō and the leadership of Chinese masters, Buddhism witnessed the establishment of Zen, in particular the Rinzaï school. Four Chinese masters stand out here: Lan-hsi Tao-lung (Jpn., Rankei Dōryū, 1213–1278), whom the regent Hōjō Tokiyori appointed first as abbot of the temple Jōrakuji (Kamakura) and then, after its completion, as superior of the great temple of Kenchō; Wu-an P'u-ning (Jpn., Gotta Fun'ei, 1197–1276), who became abbot of Kenninji in Kyoto at the recommendation of Lan-hsi, whose disciple he had been when the latter was superior of Kenchōji; Ta-hsiu Cheng-nien (Jpn., Daikyū Shōnen, 1214–1289), a highly gifted master who introduced many young Japanese to the way of enlightenment of Zen; and Wu-hsü Tsu-yūan (Jpn., Mugaku Sogen, 1226–1286), a master who was invited to Japan by the regent Hōjō Tokimune after the death of Lan-hsi and who administered Engakuji, the second important Zen temple in Kamakura. These four Chinese masters taught unadulterated Lin-chi Ch'an. Observance of the rule of Chinese Lin-chi cloisters from the Sung period was enforced in the temples entrusted to their care. For these Chinese masters it was absolutely self-evident that their cloisters represented the Rinzaï school in Japan independent of the older schools of Japanese Buddhism. Their highly successful labors contributed greatly to the rooting of Zen in Japan, and the

cloisters they directed formed the core of a self-subsistent Japanese Rinzai school. With the establishment of this school in Kamakura the most difficult stage of the process of transplanting Chinese Ch'an was over. In the third and final phase, leadership passed to the Japanese.

Dōgen Kigen. The other school that flourished in China during the Sung period, Ts'ao-tung (Jpn., Sōtō), was brought to Japan by the Japanese monk Dōgen Kigen (1200–1253). As with Eisai's second stay in China, a key element in the motivation behind Dōgen's trip to China (1223–1227) was the desire to pursue the urgently needed reform of Japanese Buddhism.

In China Dōgen encountered the "authentic teacher" in the person of the master Ju-ching (Jpn., Nyojō) of Mount T'ien-t'ung. In this master he placed his entire trust, and under his expert guidance achieved the great experience of the "dropping off of body and mind" (*shinjin datsuraku*). By partaking in the perpetuation of the enlightenment experience through his master, Dōgen entered a line of what he considered to be the essential transmission of the patriarchs reaching back to Śākyamuni Buddha.

Dōgen's activity in Japan may be divided into two parts. During the first he worked in Kyoto and the surrounding areas. The temple cloister of Kōshōji near the capital city became the focal point of his successful labors. Numerous disciples and friends flocked to him as a result of important sections of his ninety-five-volume major work, *Shōbōgenzō*. The second part, the declining years of his life, he committed to the Eiheiji (Temple of Eternal Peace) in Echizen region (Fukui), where he and his disciples led a strict monastic life.

What Dōgen achieved for Japanese Zen Buddhism is significant. More than any other he is "the master of *zazen*." In his view, *zazen* embraced everything essential and valuable in Buddhism. In *zazen* practice and enlightenment come together. The seed of Buddhahood implanted in each individual at birth so that it might blossom to fulfillment—that is, the Buddha nature inherent in all reality—is disclosed in *zazen*. Dōgen's impact as a master of *zazen* continues to the present day.

Dōgen made further efforts in Eiheiji to realize the monastic ideal particular and essential to both Rinzai and Sōtō Zen. He spent a great deal of time and effort in drawing up a suitable rule that would assure monastic discipline. There, in the rough nature of mountain solitude, his disciples were to live Zen without compromise and to know its solitude and inner fullness. The community of monks that gathered about Dōgen at Eiheiji represented his elite. The monastic ideal was never given up entirely by Japanese Buddhism, although few have tried to live it to perfection after the example of Dōgen. [See the biography of Dōgen.]

Main Currents during the Middle Ages

Under the political leadership of the shoguns of the house of Ashikaga, the Muromachi period (1338–1573) witnessed the spread of Zen throughout the country and its opening out into art and culture. This expansion, combined with the all-important role played by the great numbers of Zen masters who were held in high esteem by the palace, the aristocracy, and the general populace, led to a blossoming of Japanese Buddhism never again achieved in its history. The keystone to the Rinzai school, which had come to enjoy great prestige, was the capital city of Kyoto, where the shoguns exercised authority near the residence of the imperial household with a display of pomp and splendor that belied their approaching demise.

The Five Mountains of the Rinzai School. The system of "five mountains" (*gozan*), "ten temples" (*jissetsu*), and affiliated temples (*shozan*) set up by the Japanese Rinzai school in imitation of the Chinese model helped the Zen movement to find its place in the order of Japanese society. Already in Kamakura the five main temples had formed a unit under the protection of the military government (*bakufu*). With the transfer of power to Kyoto, the prominent temples of the capital city came to be referred to as the Five Mountains. After some modifications the third shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408), established a definitive ranking of five temples each in Kyoto and Kamakura (1386):

Kyoto:	Tenryūji	Kamakura:	Kenchōji
	Shōkokuji		Engakuji
	Kenninji		Jufukuji
	Tōfukuji		Jōchiji
	Manjuji		Jōmyōji

Nanzenji in Kyoto stood above all the temples as the "first Zen temple in the empire." The shogun handed over the superintendence of the system to a Zen monk who became supreme official in care of administrative matters (*sōroku*). A network of Gozan temples spread across the land.

The leading personality in Rinzai Zen at the beginning of the Muromachi period was Musō Soseki (1275–1351), a monk of extraordinary intellectual power and high artistic gifts. Musō, originally an adherent of Shingon Buddhism, acquired a deep grasp of the spirit of Zen. Called out of solitude to the role of superior, he functioned as abbot of important Zen temples. To him is due the construction of the temple Tenryūji. His efforts to erect "temples for the pacification of the country" (*ankokuji*) and "pagodas for the use of the living" (*risshōtō*) helped to disseminate Zen Buddhism further in Japan. Musō took a tolerant attitude toward other

forms of Buddhism, cultivating associations with Pure Land Buddhism and practicing Shingon rites. But it was from the wellsprings of Zen that he drew his deepest inspiration and there that he left his mark on his age. [See the biography of *Musō Soseki*.]

In the broad sense of the term, the Gozan movement included the way of life of the Zen temples of the Gozan system, with its Chinese influence and its wider cultural significance. In Gozan culture (*gozan bunka*) it was literature (*gozan bungaku*) that occupied first place, but other arts, such as calligraphy, painting, the creation of gardens, and so forth were also cultivated. Gozan literature goes back to two Chinese Zen masters, I-shan I-ning (Jpn., Issan Ichinei, 1246–1317) and Ku-lin Chingssu (1262–1322). I-shan, abbot of many monasteries, including Nanzenji, worked in Japan during the final phase of the implantation of Zen. Literature, which for him tended toward the profane, was more important to him than religious practice. In contrast, the equally important Chinese master Ku-lin, who did not come to Japan but was sought out by many Japanese students, emphasized a religious Zen style in his first-rate literary productions. Through his disciples the serious character of Zen was preserved during the initial stages, but with the turn into the fifteenth century secularization took the upper hand on all sides. Gozan literature forfeited its inner worth and, surprisingly enough, also lost esteem in the eyes of the common folk. The reason for this subsidence lay as much in the waning power of the Ashikaga shogunate as in the radical worldliness of Gozan literature. The contribution of Gozan to the system of education remained as a positive contribution. The famous Ashikaga school (*Ashikaga-gakkō*) founded by the Gozan monks passed on the higher levels of Chinese education while temple schools (*tera-koya*), largely run by Zen monks, brought elementary knowledge to the common folk. The decline of the Rinzai school centered on the Five Mountains is signaled in the fact that none of the Gozan lines survived into the following era. During the modern period disciples from branches of the tradition not belonging to the Gozan system served as superiors in all the temples, even in the famous Gozan temples of Kyoto and Kamakura. [See also *Gozan Zen*.]

Daitokuji and Its Line. The temple Daitokuji, one of the most significant centers of the Rinzai school in Kyōto, did not number among the Gozan temples, even though initially it belonged to the system as a main temple and later as a temple of the second rank, voluntarily breaking ties in 1431. The main line of the monastery begins with Nampo Jōmyō (1235–1309), the most important figure in the third stage of Zen's establishment in Japan. His disciple Shūhō Myōchō (1282–1338)

founded Daitokuji under the patronage of the emperor Go-Daigo in 1327 and saw it through to full bloom. Nampo, who is known to history as Daitō Kokushi ("national teacher"), was both distinguished with honorary titles in his own lifetime and defamed with legends. Kanzan Egen (1277–1360) was designated abbot of Myōshinji, an important branch temple that predates Daitokuji. These three monks standing in master-disciple relationship to one another—Nampo Jōmyō, Shūhō Myōchō, and Kanzan Egen—represent pure Rinzai Zen, and their line produced numerous Zen masters of quality.

The influence of Daitokuji radiated far and wide into Japanese Zen culture and art in the Middle Ages. The famous artist of the Muromachi period, Ikkyū Sōjun (1394–1481), a monk of the Daitokuji line, developed his genius as poet, calligrapher, and painter in the Daitokuji environment. His restless life brought him in contact with all layers of society. Although his whimsical extravagances earned him great affection among the common folk, his way of life, unseemly for a Zen monk, wrinkled the brow of pious Buddhists. He was the most popular Buddhist monk of his time. [See the biography of *Ikkyū Sōjun*.]

After a change in fortune during the civil war, the temple Daitokuji became the favorite center for the arts toward the end of the Middle Ages. The "way of tea" (*sadō*) found a base there. Famous tea masters such as Sen no Rikyū (1522–1647) and Kobori Enshū gathered their disciples into buildings bordering on the cloister, inviting them into the calm and quiet of tearooms for reflective ceremonies.

Rinzai Monasteries in the Rural Areas. The Rinzai school owed its prestige to the great temples in the capital city of Kyoto; in the rural areas it played a secondary role to other forms of Buddhism. Nevertheless, certain of its temples earned a place of honor because of their eminent masters. Bassui Tokushō (1327–1387) of the Hottō line of the Rinzai school of Kōkakuji worked in the district of Kai (Yamanashi Prefecture). The line to which he belonged was named after the posthumous title of Shinchi Kakushin (Muhon Kakushin), who had practiced Ch'an in China under Wu-men Hui-k'ai, achieved enlightenment, and returned to Japan to represent the line of tradition of Wu-men, whose famous collection of *kung-an*, the *Wu-men kuan* (Jpn., *Mumonkan*), he brought back with him. Bassui, one of the most enlightened and experienced, and still today one of the most widely read of Japanese Rinzai masters, offered many students of Zen light and wisdom through his dharmic sayings. Many passages call to mind Lin-chi for their power and immediacy and show the doubts with which Bassui had to contend before his spirit became purified.

The temperament of Jakushitsu Genkō (1290–1367) was of another sort altogether. Eigenji in the district of Ōmi (Shiga Prefecture) is even today one of the more important Rinzai monasteries of Japan. Jakushitsu loved nature and roamed the countryside with his flute, composing poems and earning many friends for Zen. In his spiritual manner and his artistic productions he is one of the most outstanding representatives of the rural current of Rinzai Zen with its closeness to nature. As further examples of the fruitful labors of Rinzai Zen in rural areas we may mention Gettan Sōkō (1326–1389) at the temple of Daimyōji, Mumon Gensen (1323–1390) at Hōkōji, and Guchū Shūkyū (1323–1409) at Buttsuji.

The Sōtō School. Dōgen's beloved disciple and successor Koun Ejō (1198–1280), the second abbot of Eihei-ji, was unable to prevent a deep split within the community of monks. The so-called "strife over succession in the third generation" did not end in an open break, but the longtime superior of Eihei-ji, Tetsū Gikai (1219–1309), withdrew to Daitōji, a Shingon temple located in the Kaga district that had been taken over for use as a Zen cloister. There a second Sōtō center originated and came to wield great influence through Gikai's important disciple, Keizan Jōkin (1268–1325). Following the proclivities of Giun (1253–1333), the fifth abbot of Eihei-ji who favored a monastic life, and Keizan, who promoted a more popular movement, these two branches of the Sōtō school struck out in different directions. [See the biography of Keizan.]

Keizan Jōkin, revered by adherents of the Sōtō school as the "great patriarch" (*taso*), expanded Sōtō Zen into a popular movement. He founded the temples of Yōkōji and Sōjiji in the Noto area. Keizan's chief disciple, Gasan Jōseki (1275–1365), succeeded him as abbot in Sōjiji and there gathered a large flock of disciples. Twenty-five of them are spoken of as having spread Sōtō Zen throughout the entire country, so that from the end of the Middle Ages up to the present day it has remained numerically the second strongest Buddhist school. Gasan distinguished himself through his untiring recruitment of support for the realization of the *bodhisattva* mind, whose representative model was the founder Dōgen. In terms of doctrine he brought recognition to the formula of the "five ranks" of the house of Ts'ao-tung. During the Edo period, peace was reestablished with Eihei-ji. Since that time Dōgen's temple has been the primary center of the Japanese Sōtō school, followed by Sōjiji in the second place.

The Premodern Era

After the chaos of war that brought Japan's Middle Ages to a close, the modern era was ushered in politically by the accession to power of the Tokugawa shoguns,

who moved the capital to Edo (present-day Tokyo). The Tokugawa government (1603–1867) cut the islands off from outside contacts, imposed severe controls, and regimented religious activities beginning with Buddhism and including the Zen schools. These strict controls led to a spiritual stiffening that took its toll on Zen Buddhism. At the same time, the spectrum of Zen was widened at the outset of the era with the introduction from China of the Ōbaku school, which was based on the teachings of the Ch'an masters of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

The Ōbaku School. Japan's contact with China had never broken off entirely. Isolated Chinese monks living in certain temples on the southern island of Kyushu formed a basis that consolidated into a new school when the Chinese master Yin-yüan Lung-ch'i (Jpn., Ingen Ryūki, 1592–1673), accompanied by some of his disciples, crossed over from the mainland at the invitation of Japanese Buddhists. They established the temple Manpukuji in Uji near Kyōto (1661), and, as reinforcements came from China and as Japanese also entered Manpukuji, the Ōbaku school, which essentially belonged to Rinzai Zen and which did much to stimulate the study of its highly important work, the *Rinzai-roku*, enjoyed a modest flowering. [See the biography of Ingen.]

Preeminent among the Japanese monks was Tetsugen Dōkō (1630–1682), who prepared the canon of writings from all the Buddhist schools in 6,956 Chinese woodblock printed volumes. The Ōbaku school took an open attitude toward Buddhism as presented in the *sūtras*. It also cultivated the veneration of the Buddha Amida (Skt., Amitābha), which it interpreted in a Zen manner. The style of life in the monastery by and large followed Chinese ritual patterns. The architecture of Manpukuji imitated Chinese structures. The school has survived up to the present and has won general recognition, although its influence has been limited.

Masters during the Edo Period. Despite a stagnation of religious life in Buddhism, the names of quite a number of famous Zen monks from the Tokugawa period have come down to us. The founding abbot of Tōkaiji in Shinagawa (near Edo), Takuan Sōhō (1573–1645), like the Zen monk Ishin Sūden (1569–1633), collaborated in bringing order to religious communities, but he is best known as a teacher of swordsmanship, a traditional Japanese art inspired by the spirit of Zen. In a lengthy text he explains to the master swordsman of the shogun Iemitsu (1603–1651) the relation between Zen and swordsmanship: the spiritual attitude is the same in both, he claims, because no mental image should cloud the spirit of the swordsman, who must immediately respond to or anticipate every movement of his opponent.

Zen-inspired swordsmanship had not a little influence at the time on the way of chivalry, which was developed on Confucian foundations. [See also *Bushidō and Martial Arts*, *article on Buddhist Martial Arts*.]

Bankei Yōtaku (1622–1693), the most significant Rinzai master during the first half of the Tokugawa period, combined popularity with metaphysical insight. Belonging to the Myōshinji line, he studied as a youth under the masters of that line, above all under Gudō Tōshoku (1579–1661) and Daigu Sōchiku (1587–1669). Since humans possess the unborn, imperishable Buddha mind, Bankei felt they had no need for any particular practices. Ordinary everyday walking, staying, sitting, and lying are all *zazen*. The figure of Bankei and his “unborn Zen” is experiencing a renaissance in our own day. Mention should also be made of the lay Buddhist Suzuki Shōsan (1579–1655), whose humanism freed of conventions proclaimed the spirit of modernity, with a strong accent on the work ethic. [See *the biography of Suzuki Shōsan*.]

From the middle of the seventeenth century, revitalization came also to the Sōtō school, whose monasteries had suffered greatly from the devastations of local wars. Manzan Dōhaku (1636–1714), the most significant personality in Sōtō Zen of the day, labored industriously for the dissemination of his school. He acquired a new rule of succession for the post of temple superior from the shogun government. The restoration of the Sōtō school came to completion with Tenkei Denson (1648–1735) and Menzan Zuihō (1683–1769). These representatives of the Sōtō school, who gathered capable disciples about themselves, looked back to Dōgen and his work. To this restoration movement we owe not only the revitalization of the Sōtō school but also important contributions to the literature on Dōgen.

Shidō Munan (1603–1676) and Dōkyō Etan (1642–1721), masters of the Myōshinji line of the Rinzai school, were the immediate predecessors of Hakuin, the perfecter of Japanese Rinzai Zen. Munan, a disciple of Gudō to whom I referred earlier, experienced the Buddha indwelling in the human heart as witnessed in his moving dharmic sayings.

The reviving stimulus given the Zen movement in the Rinzai school by individual Zen masters reached its high point in Hakuin Ekaku (1686–1768). Hakuin spent the longest period of his life in Shōinji, the Zen temple in his hometown, Hara, to which he was assigned. His personality and work made him the most influential Japanese Zen master of the last four hundred years. Only a few details of his biography remain, most important among which are the enlightenment experience that came to him after heroic practice and the severest

of tests under the direction of the master Dōkyō Etan, a disciple of Munan, in the temple estate of Shōjuan (in the province of Nagano), and the serious illness that befell him after his return home.

Hakuin’s personality was unusually broad and multifaceted. Through him the insignificant temple of Shōinji became a center of Rinzai Zen in Japan. He directed numerous disciples in the strict and tested style of the Chinese masters of the T’ang and Sung periods. At the same time he opened a friendly heart to the poor people of the area who turned their trust to him in time of need. The great artistic qualities he possessed, and to which he devoted the little spare time he had, may be witnessed in his highly esteemed paintings and works of calligraphy.

Hakuin’s distinctive contribution lay in bringing unity and order to the Rinzai Zen of his time, drawing together the various lineages of the school. The Zen way he followed bore the mark of tradition at every turn. For him, the *kōan* was both an effective means for achieving enlightenment and a basis for the indispensable ongoing practice of those who have been enlightened. He made use mainly of the classical Chinese *kung-an* collections, with a scattering of creative devices (such as the *kōan* of the sound of one hand clapping), and promoted concentration. In his school the *kōan* were gathered into a system that presents a well-rounded method. This project was brought to completion by his disciple Gasan Jitō (1727–1797) and his dharmic successors, Inzan Ien (1751–1814) and Takujū Kosen (1760–1833).

Throughout the Japanese Rinzai school *kōan* are practiced systematically—that is to say, in the order laid down by Hakuin and his disciples—after the attainment of enlightenment. Additional particulars of Zen practice common to the Rinzai monasteries, such as the summarizing of the vision of enlightenment into a short motto or verse (*jakugo*), practice sessions (*sesshin*), addresses by the master (*teishō*), and individual, master-disciple guidance (*dokusan*), have also become part of the common inheritance of the Rinzai school since Hakuin. Tradition speaks of more than ninety disciples, who spread Hakuin’s style of Zen throughout the entire country of Japan.

The cultural influences of Zen in the Edo period did not achieve the same force that Zen art had had in the Muromachi period. Here we need mention only the great *haiku* poet Bashō (1644–1694), who followed a Zen lifestyle as a lay disciple, and the popular Zen monk Ryōkan (1758–1831), whose poems breathe the spirit of Zen and express his existential anguish and extraordinary sensitivity. [See *the biography of Hakuin*.]

The Modern Period

Official measures to separate Shintō and Buddhism taken by a government unfavorably disposed toward Buddhism led to a brief but violent suppression of Buddhism at the beginning of the Meiji period (1868–1912), which found expression in the slogan “Out with the Buddha, destroy the scriptures!” (*haibutsu kishaku*). But the persecution was short-lived, and after new legislation, the schools of Rinzaï, Ōbaku, and Sōtō were able to resume their customary activities.

During the repressive revolution, capable figures of resistance against the violent infringements of state authority appeared in the Sōtō school. Otori Sessō (1814–1904) merits special mention for having served as a mediator between the two chief temples of Eiheiiji and Sōjiji. At all events, the rural communities, up to that time the strength of the Sōtō school, were not greatly disturbed by the religio-political changes.

The most significant figure in Rinzaï Zen during the nineteenth century was Imakita Kōsen (also known as Kōsen Sōon, 1816–1892), a person of high scientific training who faced the changing times with understanding. In 1875 he was entrusted with the superintendence of the ten great temple estates of the Rinzaï and Ōbaku schools, while he himself was administering the temple of Engakuji (Kamakura) as abbot. Kōsen, a disciple of Gizan Zenrai (1802–1878), belonged to the dynamic Inzan line of Hakuin Zen. Outstanding among his students was Shaku Sōen (1856–1919), the teacher and friend of Suzuki Daisetsu (D.T. Suzuki, 1870–1966), who had also been in contact with Imakita before becoming Shaku Sōen’s disciple. [See the biography of D.T. Suzuki.] The widely traveled Shaku Sōen found understanding and support for his open approach to modern times among the gifted dharmic successors of the following two generations, Tetsuō Sōkatsu (1870–1954), Gotō Zuigan (1879–1965), and Sasaki Shigetsu (1882–1945). Sōen was also a participant at the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago, an interreligious congress that for many opened the door to new ways of looking at other religions. [See World’s Parliament of Religions.] Just as Zen had an important role to play in the revival of Buddhism at the start of the twentieth century, it continues to take an extremely active part in the relationships of Buddhism to the West [See Buddhism, article on Buddhism in the West.]

[See also Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Japan.]

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HEINRICH DUMOULIN

Translated from German by James W. Heisig

ZEUS was the last-born child of Rhea and the Titan Kronos. Like his brothers, he was destined to disappear because his father, fearing that one of his children would deprive him of power, swallowed them as soon as they were born. Only a trick of Rhea's allowed Zeus to see the light of day and afterward give it to mortals and the immortals. At the time of her confinement, Rhea went to Crete. Concealed by the darkness of night, she entrusted the infant to Gaia (Earth), who hid him and nurtured him in a cave on Mount Aigaion. Rhea presented Kronos with a stone wrapped in swaddling clothes, which he immediately swallowed (Hesiod, *Theogony* 453ff.).

On reaching adult age, Zeus overthrew his father by sheer strength and forced him to regurgitate his brothers and sisters and the stone that had replaced him. His grateful brothers offered him the thunder, thunderbolts, and lightning that he uses to command mortals and the immortals (*Theogony* 503ff.). Nevertheless, Zeus had dif-

ficulty in assuming the throne, because the Titans revolted and fought for ten years. After defeating them, Zeus pitted himself against the terrible son of Gaia and Tartaros, Typhon, who also threatened his supremacy (*Theogony* 820ff.). His subdued enemies were cast into the depths of Tartaros. In memory of his victories and his power, Zeus placed the stone that had served as his double in sacred Pytho (Delphi). This stone, the *omphalos*, or navel of the world, is the indestructible threshold of an epoch born under the sign of order and justice.

Zeus then parceled out the honors among the gods: to Hades he allotted the subterranean domain, to Poseidon that of the waters, and to himself the air (*Iliad* 15.188). Zeus is regarded as "the most powerful, the mightiest of the gods, the far-seeing master who fulfills everything" (Homeric *Hymn to Zeus* 1–2). To preserve his power, he did not hesitate to swallow his first spouse, Metis (Intelligence), which enabled him to distinguish good and evil. His sister Hera shares the honors of the Olympic throne, but Zeus, father of men and gods, has given proof of his guiding spirit and creative force of *cosmos* by innumerable unions with mortals and goddesses.

In Greek thought, "Zeus is air, Zeus is earth, Zeus is sky." Zeus is all, and the one who is over all. Thus from snowy Olympus he reveals himself to men as pleasant daylight and fecundating rain. He protects landed wealth, preserves household goods, and as lord of justice is the guarantor of social and moral order. The Fates alone have a hold over him. Thus, even knowing what is, what was, and what will be, Zeus dispenses to men success mixed with misfortune when he empties the earthenware jars at the threshold of his palace.

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JEANNIE CARLIER and SILVIA MILANEZI

Translated from French by Alice Otis

ZIMMER, HEINRICH (1890–1943), German Indologist and comparative mythologist. Son of the Sanskritist and Celticist Heinrich Friedrich Zimmer (1850–1910), Heinrich Robert Zimmer was born in Greifswald, in present-day East Germany, on 6 December 1890. Beginning his studies in Berlin in Hebrew literature, Ger-

manics, and art history, he received his doctorate in 1913 with a thesis on India's traditional system of *gotras*. After service in World War I, he qualified as professor at Greifswald and then moved to Heidelberg in 1922. Zimmer's marriage to Christiane von Hofmannsthal, daughter of the Jewish poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal, and his consistent outspokenness as an anti-Nazi were causes for his eventual dismissal from the university in 1938. After lecturing at Oxford and Johns Hopkins universities, Zimmer was appointed visiting lecturer at Columbia University in 1941. He died of pneumonia two years later, on 20 March 1943.

Although the son of one of Germany's pioneering Indologists, whose *Altindische Leben: Die Kultur der vedischen Arier* is a landmark in Vedic studies, Heinrich Zimmer is most often linked rather to two other persons: Joseph Campbell and, particularly, C. G. Jung. Jung apparently first learned of Zimmer through the latter's *Kunstsform und Yoga im indischen Kultbild* (1926), a work that introduced Tantric studies to Jung and to much of educated Europe. Zimmer and Jung first met in 1932, and their deep friendship, based on shared strong interests, had important consequences for both; not least important was their joint founding of the Psychology Seminar of Zurich. As editor of Zimmer's posthumous English publications, upon which Zimmer's reputation principally rests, Joseph Campbell's role also has been extremely important.

Zimmer's passionate interest in Indian thought and spirituality as witnesses to the universal aspirations of the human spirit marked something of a departure from contemporary and immediately preceding continental approaches to the study of India's religions, and is reminiscent rather of the attitudes of such late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century German Romantics as Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel. With Sir John Woodroffe (also known as Arthur Avalon), who seems strongly to have influenced his own thought, Zimmer was among the first in the twentieth century to urge that understanding the adventure of Indian religious and philosophical thought would help one better understand one's own situation in the world. This enthusiastic, personal element represents an early flowering of a new, "second-generation" attitude in the European study of non-European religious thought and culture. Rather than holding the "alien" cultural material at arm's length, Zimmer embraced it (though he was never able to fulfill his wish to visit India). While his enthusiasm led to certain excesses and disputable interpretations of India's religions, Zimmer's own example eloquently suggests the importance of such enthusiasm for true understanding. In Jung's words, Zimmer's was "a spirit

that overcame the limitations of the specialist and, turning towards humanity, bestowed upon it the joyous gift of eternal fruit" (Jung, *Collected Works*, vol. 11, 1963, p. 577).

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G. R. WELBON

ZINZENDORF, NIKOLAUS (1700–1760), German nobleman, theologian, leader of the Moravian church; born Count Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf on 26 May 1700 in Dresden, Saxony. At his baptism his parents invited the electress of Saxony to be his godmother and the Pietist leader Philipp Jakob Spener to be his godfather. These choices represented the influences of noble lineage and pietistic devotion that were to be so decisive in Zinzendorf's later life.

Even as a child Zinzendorf displayed an extraordinary interest in religious matters. At the age of ten, following private tutoring, he was sent to the Halle boarding school run by the Pietist leader August Hermann Francke. In 1716 he transferred to the orthodox Lutheran University of Wittenberg to prepare for a career as a lawyer, but he continued to read theological literature in his free time. His perennially irenic approach to theological disputes showed up in his ultimately unsuccessful attempts to arrange colloquiums for the exchange of views between the Pietists of Halle and the orthodox of Wittenberg.

With his formal training completed, Zinzendorf studied briefly at various universities and developed friendships with leading personalities, including the Jansenist cardinal archbishop of Paris, Louis De Noailles. Although Zinzendorf would have probably preferred or-

dination as a Lutheran pastor or to work with Francke at Halle, his family did not consider such possibilities appropriate for a nobleman, and he became a legal counselor. In September 1721 he married Countess Erdmuth Dorothea Reuss, also a committed Pietist, with whom he fathered twelve children.

In 1722 Zinzendorf purchased the Berthelsdorf estate from his grandmother and soon found himself with an unexpected opportunity to exercise his religious leadership when a group of religious refugees from neighboring Bohemia settled on his estate. They were heirs of the traditions of the Unity of the Brethren, a group that had thrived a century earlier during the Hussite reformation. Persecution had forced them to continue their religious practices underground and sometimes to leave their homeland as refugees. The leadership of these people consumed Zinzendorf's considerable energies for the rest of his life. The newly established town of Herrnhut, with its unique communal organization and economic self-sufficiency, became the center for the developing Moravian church, as it became known in the late 1740s. [See also Moravians.]

In 1735, after examination by the theological faculties of the Universities of Stralsund and Tübingen, Zinzendorf's desire to receive Lutheran ordination was finally realized. With the revival of the Brethren's clerical orders, he was consecrated a Moravian bishop in 1737. These events signaled the emergence of a new denomination and created legal difficulties for Zinzendorf, resulting in banishment from Saxony from 1736 to 1747. During this period he visited Moravian settlements and missions in Europe, England, the West Indies, and America. From the mid-1740s to 1750, Zinzendorf and some of his followers displayed a marked tendency to carry certain of his ideas to emotional excess. This approach was finally rejected and years later came to be regarded as the "sifting time." The Moravians were granted religious freedom in Saxony in 1749, and six years later the count returned to spend his last days in Herrnhut. When the countess died in 1756, Zinzendorf entered into a morganatic marriage with Anna Nitschmann, a leader of the Single Sisters Choir, one of the church's residential groups.

Zinzendorf's extensive involvement in the practical life of the church and his belief that it was not possible to produce a system of theology kept him from producing a comprehensive presentation of his often-original ideas. Throughout his life he worked at new translations of the Bible, incorporating the use of popular language, rearrangements of the books in order of historical origin, harmonization of the Passion accounts, and an abridged Old Testament. He also produced attempts

at Lutheran and Reformed catechisms, prepared numerous sermons, and wrote religious poetry and hymns.

In his theology Zinzendorf sought an alternative to the rationalism of the Enlightenment and the sterility of Lutheran orthodoxy. His answer was "heart religion." His christocentricity derived from his belief that God is a person, not a system, and can be known only through the Son, who reveals the Father. To experience Christ in the inner senses is the true essence of religion. From this central idea flows Zinzendorf's interest in experiential language, including reference to the Holy Spirit as "Mother." Likewise, "heart religion" knows no creedal or institutional boundaries; hence Zinzendorf's radical ecumenicity. The relationship with Christ produces joy in the believer; Zinzendorf's thought departed from traditional Pietism's emphasis upon struggle and conversion to focus on the results of this relationship. A startlingly creative thinker in his day, Zinzendorf's influences are apparent in the later theology of Friedrich Schleiermacher with his attention to religious feeling and in the Christocentric emphasis of Karl Barth.

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DAVID A. SCHATTSCHNEIDER

ZIONISM. The origin of the word *Zion* is unclear. It most likely derives from a word meaning "rock" or "stronghold" or perhaps "a dry place." The first occurrence of the name is in 2 *Samuel* 5:7, where David captures the Jebusite city of Jerusalem. The "fortress of Zion" appears to have been the Jebusite name for the place that was henceforth to be called "the citadel of David." But although Jebusite in origin, the name *Zion* (Heb., *Tsiyyon*) was assimilated into the Israelite vocabulary and became associated with the Davidic monarchy and its capital in Jerusalem. In writings of such prophets as "First Isaiah" and Jeremiah and in *Psalms*,

the name *Zion* is used as a synonym first for the Temple in Jerusalem, then for the kingdom of Judah, and finally, in postexilic literature, for the Land of Israel. In the Babylonian exile, the psalmist wrote: "By the waters of Babylon / There we sat down, yea, we wept / When we remembered Zion" (Ps. 137:1). Thus, what was first a specific place-name came to represent symbolically the whole Land of Israel whose people had been exiled. The particular associations between Zion and the Davidic monarchy gave the word a special resonance in later messianic literature that expressed longing not only for the return of the people to their land but also for the reestablishment of the kingdom of David.

A particular tension has informed the Jewish relationship to Zion since biblical times. On the one hand, the Land of Israel is regarded as a "holy land" specially promised to the ancient Israelites and their descendants. According to this position, the Israelite God can be worshiped only on this sanctified territory. Thus, when David flees from Saul to the land of the Philistines, he laments that "[men] have driven me out this day that I should have no share in the heritage of the Lord, saying 'Go and serve other gods'" (1 Sm. 26:19). In Psalm 137, the writer wonders, "How shall we sing the song of YHVH in a foreign land?" In both biblical and rabbinic law, much of the agricultural, ritual, and even civil law applied only to the Land of Israel.

On the other hand, a strong universalist tendency already developed in biblical times held that God rules over all the world and can be worshiped anywhere. This tendency became particularly prominent as a result of the Babylonian exile and found expression in such exilic writers as "Second Isaiah" (Is. 40ff.). In some of this literature, there is even a hint of criticism against those who wished to limit worship of God to Zion: "Thus says YHVH: with heaven my throne and earth my footstool, what house could you build me, what place could you make for my rest?" (Is. 66:1).

The realities of Jewish life during and after the Second Temple period (538 BCE–70 CE) made a combination of these positions necessary. From the time of the Babylonian exile, a large Jewish community developed outside the Land of Israel and became particularly prominent during the Hellenistic and Roman empires. Even before the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and the Bar Kokhba Revolt (132–135), the Jews of the Diaspora probably constituted a majority of the Jewish people. Nevertheless, these Jews maintained a strong connection with the Land of Israel and its religious institutions. They made regular pilgrimages to the Temple and contributed money to it for sacrifices. After the

Temple was destroyed, the Palestinian community remained important until the late third century, when it began to decline, and following the Muslim conquest in the seventh century, it ceased to play a significant role in Jewish life. Yet the centrality of the Land of Israel, which was accepted by all the Diaspora communities, owed much to the fact that the Palestinian authorities were so important for such a long period after the Temple was destroyed.

The rabbis developed rituals that could be practiced anywhere and yet were designed to preserve the memory of the Temple (*zekher le-hurban*). Such ceremonies include the breaking of a glass at weddings and leaving a small area of wall unfinished in one's house. It was during this period that prayers were added to the daily service that pleaded with God:

Sound the great shofar for our freedom; raise the standard for the gathering of our exiles, and assemble us from the four corners of the earth. . . . Restore our judges as of old. . . . And to Jerusalem thy city return in mercy and dwell therein as thou has spoken, rebuild it soon in our days as an everlasting building, and speedily set up therein the throne of David.

Theologically, the rabbis held that the *Shekhinah*, the aspect of God that dwelt in the Temple, had gone into exile with the Jews (e.g., B.T., *Meg.* 29a). God himself was therefore in exile from his land. Not only was God universal, but that aspect of him that specially protected the Jews was close at hand wherever they might wander. This position maintained the tension between God as universal and the hope for the reestablishment of his cult in the Temple in Zion.

Medieval Period. The spiritual connection to Zion was kept alive during the Middle Ages primarily through literature, although through the centuries there were also individual Jews who made pilgrimages or actually settled in the Land of Israel. The theme of Zion played an important role in the medieval liturgical poems (*piyyuṭim*) and especially in the lamentation poem (*qinot*) recited on the Ninth of Av (the day, according to tradition, on which the First and Second Temples were destroyed).

The best examples of secular poetry devoted to longing for Zion can be found during the "classical age" of the Spanish Jews (900–1200). Two themes intermingle in this poetry: descriptions of the beauty of Zion and lamentations for her ruin. Some of the Spanish Jewish writers achieved high positions in Spanish society, but their work reflects persistent attachment to the land of their forefathers. Shemu'el ha-Nagid (933–1055/6) was the vizier of Granada and the commander of its army.

One of his poems, entitled *My Heart Waxes Hot within Me*, celebrates victory over his enemies, but the first part is a lament over the destruction of Zion. Thus, Shemu'el's pride over his military accomplishments was tempered by the feeling that they were incomplete as long as the Jews lived in exile.

Perhaps the most outstanding representative of this school of poets was Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1075–1141) whose *Shirei Tsiyyon* (Songs of Zion) inspired many imitations later in the Middle Ages. One of his poems (*Zion, will you not seek the welfare of your prisoners?*) was included in the liturgy of the Ninth of Av. In another, he wrote:

My heart is in the East and I am at the edge of the West
 How then can I taste what I eat, how can I enjoy it?
 How can I fulfill my vows and pledges, while
 Zion is in the domain of Edom [i.e., the Christian Crusaders]
 and I am in the bonds of Arabia [i.e., Muslim Spain]?
 It would be easy for me to leave behind the good things
 of Spain, just as
 It would be glorious to see the dust of the ruined Shrine.

Many of these songs describe ha-Levi's trip to Israel, which he undertook in 1140. However, he never reached his goal and died in Egypt in 1141. Ha-Levi represents one important pole of medieval thought that emphasized the centrality and sanctity of the Land of Israel. Another medieval Spanish writer, one who succeeded in emigrating to the Land of Israel, was Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Nahman, c. 1194–1270), exegete, philosopher, and qabbalist. Nahmanides interpreted the verse in *Numbers* 33:53 ("And you shall take possession of the land and settle in it, for I have given the land to you to possess it") to be a positive commandment incumbent on all Jews. In this, he followed certain Talmudic dicta (see B.T., *Ket.* 11b) that, among other things, call a wife rebellious who does not follow her husband to the Land of Israel. This notion of the religious duty of living in Israel inspired numerous waves of immigration throughout medieval Jewish history, including, for example, a group of rabbis in 1211 and the messianic circle led by Yehudah Ḥasid ha-Levi around 1700. In the sixteenth century, following the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, the community of Palestine increased and a number of "proto-Zionist" efforts were undertaken to establish Jewish agricultural colonies and reestablish the ancient Sanhedrin.

This proto-Zionist sentiment cannot be dissociated from medieval Jewish messianism. All messianic thinkers in the Middle Ages considered the return to Zion to be among the primary tasks of the Messiah. Even as messianic expectations were embroidered with supernatural fantasies, such as the belief in the resurrection

of the dead, the core of Jewish messianism remained political and nationalistic: the Messiah would return the Jews to Zion, reestablish the kingdom of David, and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem. The movements mentioned here were all attempts to spark the messianic process by encouraging human beings to take the first steps of resettling the Land of Israel. In the seventeenth century, the Shabbatean movement caused Jews throughout the world to prepare themselves for the imminent return to Zion, a hope largely dashed when the putative Messiah, Shabbetai Tsevi, converted to Islam in 1667.

On the other hand, another group of medieval thinkers deemphasized the importance of immigration to Zion. Some, such as Ḥayyim Kohen (twelfth century), saw no obligation to live in the Land of Israel since the commandments pertaining to the land could not be observed until the coming of the Messiah. Meir ben Baruch of Rothenburg (c. 1220–1293) argued that it is permissible to leave the Land of Israel in order to study the Torah. Similarly, Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204), the most renowned of medieval Jewish philosophers and legal scholars, gave greater emphasis to the study of the Torah than to awaiting or hastening the coming of the Messiah. For Maimonides, the central event in Jewish history was at Mount Sinai, and the return to Zion in messianic times would be a means toward uninterrupted study of the law revealed at Sinai. Although Maimonides clearly believed in the coming of the Messiah (which he understood as a realistic and not solely supernatural process), he subordinated Zion to Sinai.

This trend of thought became even more pronounced in eighteenth-century Hasidism, which, as Gershom Scholem has argued, frequently played down expectations of the imminent coming of the Messiah. Dov Ber, the Maggid of Mezhrich (1704–1772), believed that the qabbalistic task of "raising the sparks" might be more effectively accomplished in the lands of the exile. Naḥman of Bratslav (1772–1810), who was perhaps the most messianic of the Hasidic masters, stretched the holiness of the Land of Israel to encompass all the lands in which the Jews lived, thus spiritualizing what had hitherto been a concrete concept. [*For further discussion, see Messianism, article on Jewish Messianism.*]

The Nineteenth Century. In the nineteenth century the forces of modern nationalism, released by the French Revolution, awakened nationalist hopes among the Jews throughout Europe. Although emancipation and assimilation caused many Jews, particularly in western and central Europe, to identify with the national aspirations of the countries in which they lived, increases in anti-Semitism and the failure of emanci-

pation to fulfill its promises refocused attention on Zion. The nineteenth century thus witnessed a fusing of traditional messianism with modern nationalism that culminated in the emergence of modern Zionism at the end of the century.

Two important intellectual developments in the nineteenth century, among both modernizing and traditional Jews, prepared the ground for Zionism. The first was the movement of Jewish Enlightenment (*Haskalah*), which began in Germany in the late eighteenth century and spread to eastern Europe in the nineteenth. The *Haskalah* developed in two directions with respect to Zion. On the one hand, there was a general tendency to promote the emancipation of the Jews in Europe by glorifying the European nations. The Reform movement in Germany, which was one product of Enlightenment, deleted references to Zion in the prayer book and emphasized the patriotic attachment of Jews to their native countries. Some *Haskalah* writers used messianic language to describe European rulers such as Joseph II of Austria and Alexander II of Russia, who were perceived as particularly sympathetic to the Jews.

On the other hand, much of the new Hebrew literature written by *Haskalah* authors, especially in eastern Europe, harkened back to the land of the Bible. Avraham Mapu (1808–1867), the first Hebrew novelist, placed the plots of two of his novels, *Ahavat Tsiyyon* (*Love of Zion*) and *Ashmat Shomron* (*Guilt of Shomron*), in romantic biblical settings. Hebrew newspapers such as *Ha-shahar* and *Ha-maggid* also fostered interest in the Land of Israel, and countered assimilationist tendencies by arguing for a Jewish national consciousness. In addition, the activities of western European Jewish philanthropists such as Adolphe Cremieux and Moses Montefiore in settling Jews in Palestine fostered the beginnings of the modern settlement in the country. Thus, both in literature and philanthropy, modern “enlightened” Jews created the basis for a Zionist movement.

One secular Jewish thinker of particular importance was Moses Hess (1812–1875). Hess was one of the early leaders of European socialism. Following the 1848 revolutions, he withdrew from political activity and became interested in the history of national groups. He rediscovered his Jewish origins and became a fervent advocate of Jewish nationalism. In his *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862), he advanced a proposal for the renewal of the Jewish state, arguing that the continuation of the Jewish people could be justified only on national, rather than religious, grounds.

The second important nineteenth-century development was among traditional Jews. Tsevi Hirsch Kalischer (1795–1874) appealed to Meyer Anshel Rothschild to buy the Land of Israel from Muḥammad ‘Alī,

the ruler of Egypt. Kalischer developed a plan to reinstitute the ancient sacrifices on the Temple mount as a way of hastening the coming of the Messiah. He based his messianic doctrine, which called for human initiative, on Moses Maimonides, who had argued that certain human actions might precede the actual coming of the Messiah. Later, following the Damascus Blood Libel Affair of 1840 and the attempt by Western philanthropists to rescue the Damascus Jews, Kalischer advocated agricultural settlement in the Land of Israel. However, even in his later writings, which put forward this kind of practical suggestion, Kalischer never abandoned his messianic expectations, nor did he give up his hope that the sacrifices might be reinstated by the new settlers.

A similar kind of religious “Zionism” can be found in the writings of Yehudah ben Shelomoh Alkalai (1798–1878), who, until the Damascus Affair, was an obscure preacher in the Balkans. Like Kalischer, Alkalai argued in numerous pamphlets for Jewish settlement in the Holy Land as a means toward bringing the Messiah.

The writings of Kalischer and Alkalai had little immediate effect, although there was an increase in immigration to Palestine by Orthodox Jews throughout the nineteenth century. New communities of religious Jews were established outside the walls of Jerusalem, in some cases with the help of philanthropists like Montefiore. In 1878 a group of Orthodox Jews established the first agricultural colony, Petach Tikva. Scholars have come to appreciate the contribution that these religious Jews made in laying the groundwork for the later Zionist settlement.

Modern Secular Zionism. The rise of anti-Semitism in France, Germany, and Russia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century raised serious questions about the prospects of Jewish integration into European society. Under the influence of modern nationalist ideas, a number of secular or partially secular Jews in several countries began to conceive of a Jewish homeland as the only answer to the Jewish situation. In addition to the political problem of anti-Semitism, many of these thinkers felt that the growing problem of Jewish assimilation could be addressed only by the creation of a Jewish society with its own national culture.

The new Zionist thinkers attempted to combine the ideas of secular nationalism with the messianic aspirations still cultivated by the large population of traditional Jews. Indeed, it might be argued that Zionism emerged when it did as a result of the influence of modern nationalism, but that it emerged at all was a result of the persistence of the age-old religious longing for Zion. Yet the tensions between these seemingly similar national ideals were evident from the inception of modern Zionism, and they continue to characterize the con-

flict between the secular and the religious in modern Israel.

Following the pogroms in Russia in 1881, a group of eastern European intellectuals formed the *Hibbat Tsiyyon* ("love of Zion"). The members of this movement came from both of the groups previously mentioned: followers of the *Haskalah* and religious figures. *Hibbat Tsiyyon* was primarily a practical movement that sought to foster settlement and agricultural development in Palestine. It borrowed its ideology of "productivization" of the Jews from the earlier *Haskalah*. The *Hibbat Tsiyyon* was a response to the mass emigration of Jews from Russia that began in the wake of the pogroms, and it tried to direct the immigration to Palestine instead of to western Europe and America. Although the *Hibbat Tsiyyon* sponsored a number of colonies in Palestine, it never became a mass movement, and its impact was largely on Russian Jewish intellectuals.

Modern Zionism really began with Theodor Herzl (1860–1904). The term *Zionism* was coined in 1890 by Nathan Birnbaum in his journal *Selbstemanzipation* and was adopted by Herzl and his followers at the first Zionist Congress in 1897. Although some rabbis supported Herzl, most members of the movement, including Herzl himself, were secular and westernized. Nevertheless, Herzl was greeted by many eastern European Jews as a messianic figure. The first substantial Zionist emigration from eastern Europe to Palestine started after the pogroms of 1903 and 1905–1906 and was largely made up of young secular Russian Jews, many of whom were influenced by the Russian radicalism of the period.

The attitude toward religion among the early secular Zionist thinkers was frequently quite hostile. Traditional Judaism was viewed as the religion of the exile and the Zionists saw themselves as a movement to "negate the exile" (*shelilat ha-golah*). This position received its sharpest expression in the writings of M. Y. Berdichevsky (1865–1921), J. H. Brenner (1881–1921), and Jacob Klatzkin (1882–1948). Berdichevsky, for example, saw the whole religious Jewish tradition, going back to Mount Sinai, as being opposed to a proud national life, and he wished to create a "new Hebrew man" based on a "Nietzschean" countertradition of strength and naturalism. Berdichevsky traced this countertradition back to the biblical period when, he believed, the ancient Hebrews followed a revelation from Mount Gerizim, mentioned in *Deuteronomy* 27:11–26, that was opposed to the "ethical" Torah of Mount Sinai. The prophets, and later the rabbis, suppressed this Torah of nature, but it persisted in heretical movements and splinter sects such as the first-century Zealots and the eighteenth-century *Hasidim*. This idea, that the Jews had been misled

by the rabbis and had followed a tradition alien to their roots, had an important influence on the secular Zionist attitude toward the Jewish religion and especially on extreme secular groups such as the "Canaanites" of the 1940s.

Nevertheless, there were other secular Zionists who tried to base the new Zionist culture on elements from the religious tradition. *Aḥad ha-'Am* (the pen name of Asher Ginsberg, 1856–1927) tried to develop a secular Judaism based on certain principles from the Jewish heritage. He believed that the Jewish religion was one expression of a wider Jewish national culture. The elements that a secular Judaism might borrow from the tradition varied in *Aḥad ha-'Am's* writings (sometimes "absolute monotheism" was stressed, other times "liberal ethics"), but he held that the development of this culture was possible only in a Jewish national home. This national cultural center would in turn revitalize the Jewish Diaspora, which had been spiritually weakened by assimilation and the decline of the Jewish religion.

A number of the leaders of the secular Zionist labor movement also tried, with varying degrees of success, to incorporate a more positive attitude toward the Jewish religion into their secular ideologies. Aaron David Gordon (1856–1922), who was one of the pioneers of the early agricultural settlements, developed a religion of labor based on a mystical bond between the Jew and the Land of Israel. Physical labor on the national soil is a way of renewing the self and bringing it into harmony with the cosmos. Although Gordon was not a practicing Orthodox Jew, his philosophy relied heavily on Jewish mysticism and Hasidism as well as on Tolstoyan ideals.

Another labor leader, Berl Katzenelson (1887–1944), argued for the adaptation of traditional Jewish holidays and rituals to the new national home. Katzenelson, who was enormously influential as a cultural and ideological writer, laid the groundwork for a secular national culture that had its roots in Jewish tradition. Similarly, the first prime minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion (1886–1973), sought to base the new national culture on a return to the Bible, a theme that had precedent among the *Haskalah* writers of the nineteenth century.

The ambivalence toward the Jewish tradition that one finds in many of these early secular Zionists had much to do with their biographies. In most cases, they came from traditional homes and were educated in the *yeshivot* (rabbinic academies) of eastern Europe. Zionism was a radical revolution for them against the world of their childhood, but they never fully broke with their positive memories of this religious culture. Even if their way of life was secular, they wished to recreate an authentic Jewish culture on a new, national basis.

If the labor Zionists were ambivalent at best toward the Jewish religion, their counterparts in the Revisionist Zionist party (organized in 1925) were militant. The Revisionists were led by Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880–1940), the Russian-Jewish journalist and poet, and they acquired the reputation of a right-wing, nationalist movement. Although Jabotinsky had a few religious followers, his movement was generally adamantly secular and opposed to religion. In the 1940s, a splinter group under the poet Yonatan Ratosh broke off from the Revisionists and formed the Young Hebrew, or “Canaanite,” movement (the latter term was originally used by their opponents). The Canaanites saw the Jews as a religious group whose history was in the exile, whereas the new Hebrew community in Palestine was to break from the religious past and develop its own indigenous culture. The Canaanites were inspired by the myths of the ancient Canaanites that were uncovered in the Ras Shamra excavations of the 1930s. Although the Canaanites were an extreme nativist movement, their thought points to an important trend in Israeli culture away from traditional Jewish religion and toward a new national culture that might incorporate ancient Near Eastern myths.

Religious Zionism. Although the majority of the Orthodox Jewish world was either indifferent or opposed to Herzl’s Zionist movement, there was a significant group that responded favorably to the idea of a Jewish state. Among the first rabbis to join Herzl were Isaac Reines and Samuel Mohilever, who was perhaps the most prominent rabbi in the Hibbat Tsiyyon movement. In 1902, Reines formed Mizrahi, a religious faction within the World Zionist Organization (the name is a composite of some of the Hebrew letters from the words *merkaz ruhani*, “spiritual center”). Mizrahi consisted of two groups: one that opposed the introduction of any “cultural” issues into the Zionist movement, for fear that the secularists would set the tone in such endeavors, and another that saw that Zionism could not avoid confronting cultural issues and demanded that Mizrahi try to influence the Zionist movement in a religious direction. Although the “political” faction was initially predominant, the Mizrahi movement ultimately saw as its *raison d’être* the fostering of religious education and public religious practice in the Zionist settlement in Palestine and, later, the state of Israel.

Mizrahi played a major role in mustering support for Zionism among Orthodox Jews in Europe and the United States. It created a network of schools in which Zionism was taught together with traditional religious subjects. At the same time, Mizrahi established schools in Palestine that formed the backbone of the religious educational system that is an important part of the gen-

eral educational system in the state of Israel. The Mizrahi youth movements, Young Mizrahi and Benei Akiva, began establishing agricultural settlements in Palestine in the 1920s.

The Mizrahi joined three other religious parties to create a religious faction in the first Israeli governing coalition. In 1956 they formed the National Religious Party (NRP) and Po’el Mizrahi (“Mizrahi workers”). The NRP has sat in every Israeli government (with the exception of one year) and regularly receives approximately 10 percent of the vote. However, this percentage dropped in the 1981 and 1984 elections with the defection of more nationalist elements to other, nonreligious, parties. Despite its relatively small share of the national vote, the NRP has constituted an important “swing” element in all Israeli governments since neither the Labor Alignment nor the Likud Party has been able to win a clear majority. Thus the NRP has been able to exert disproportionate influence on Israeli politics and on the role of religion in Israeli society.

Since their inception the Mizrahi have sought to avoid the problem of the relationship of Zionism to Jewish messianism. Much opposition to Zionism in the religious world stemmed from the belief that human beings should not “force the end” (i.e., initiate messianic times by secular means). Instead of answering this position with a new messianic theory, the Mizrahi took a cautious stance, claiming that the Zionist movement constituted a “beginning of redemption.” They saw their role as guaranteeing that the future redemption would not be ruined by the heretical actions of the secular Zionists.

There were, however, certain elements among the religious Zionists who took a bolder approach to the question of messianism. Primary among these was Avraham Yitshaq Kook, who was chief rabbi of Jaffa from 1904 and then chief Ashkenazic rabbi of Palestine from 1921 until his death in 1935. Kook held that redemption had begun with the Zionist movement and, in anticipation of imminent messianic times, he fostered study of the sacrificial laws in his *yeshivah*. Unlike other religious Zionists and religious anti-Zionists, Kook believed that the secular pioneers were a necessary force to prepare the material foundation for messianic times. He argued dialectically that the profane was necessary for subsequent emergence of the sacred. Kook met frequently with leaders of the labor Zionist movement and developed close ties with them. As chief rabbi of Jaffa he played a central role in 1909 in the attempt to solve the problem of the *shemittah*, the agricultural sabbatical during which land owned by Jews in the Land of Israel is supposed to lie fallow. Kook arranged for sale of such land to a non-Jew, thus allowing it to be worked by

Jews, which permitted the continuation of the agricultural settlements. Kook's unusually positive attitude toward the secular Zionist movement was based on his belief that when Zionism succeeded, messianic times would come and the Zionist movement would itself return to its unconscious religious roots.

Kook's messianic philosophy had little direct impact on the religious Zionist parties, but it did influence a new generation of religious Israelis, particularly through the Merkaz ha-Rav Yeshivah in Jerusalem, established by Kook and headed by his son Tsevi Yehudah Kook until the latter's death in 1982. This new generation did not accept the compromise position of the older leaders of Mizrahi, who believed that the religious parties should primarily guard the religious status quo in the state of Israel. The young religious Zionists, who grew up after the creation of the state in 1948, believed strongly in Zionism as the fulfillment of traditional Jewish messianism. This belief took political expression after the Six Day War of 1967. Young religious Israelis reestablished the settlements in the Etsion bloc south of Jerusalem and created a Jewish outpost in Hebron in 1968. (This illegal settlement was later recognized by the government and developed into the town of Qiryat Arba outside of Hebron.) In 1974, following the Yom Kippur War, these religious activists founded the Gush Emunim ("bloc of the faithful") movement, which advocated the incorporation of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank of the Jordan River) into Israel. The Gush Emunim led a settlement drive in these areas, sometimes with the support of the Israeli government and sometimes illegally. They constituted a significant messianic force in Israeli politics and formed alliances with secular nationalist forces.

Religious Institutions in the State of Israel. Under both the Ottoman empire and the British Mandate, Jewish religious courts enjoyed official jurisdiction over matrimonial and inheritance law. The office of the *hakham bashi* in the Ottoman empire was succeeded by the Ashkenazic and Sefardic chief rabbis under the British Mandate. These functions were carried over to the rabbinic courts and the chief rabbinate of the state of Israel, which were given jurisdiction over matters of personal law by a Knesset enactment of 1953. Rabbinical judges were given the same status as district court judges and their decisions were enforced by the civil authorities. Thus, in matters of marriage, divorce, and child custody, rabbinic courts—ruling according to Jewish law (*halakhah*)—have state sanction. Civil marriage and divorce do not exist, although civil marriages are recognized if contracted abroad. A Ministry of Religious Affairs deals with the needs of the various religious communities in Israel and funds the construction

and maintenance of synagogues, *yeshivot*, and other religious facilities.

Although both the Conservative and Reform movements have followings in Israel, their rabbis are not authorized by the rabbinate to perform marriages and they do not benefit from the budgets available through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Conversion to Judaism is supervised by the rabbinate, and thus Conservative and Reform conversions are not recognized as valid.

Although the majority of the Jewish citizens of Israel are secular or quasi-traditional, a religious status quo is maintained. The Sabbath is the national day of rest and Jewish holidays are national holidays. Sabbath rules apply in public places at the discretion of local municipalities, but the various political parties have undertaken to maintain the practices that have existed since the creation of the state. In the 1977 and 1982 coalition agreements, the Agudat Yisra'el party, which represents some of the most orthodox elements, demanded certain changes in the status quo such as cancellation of Sabbath flights by the national airline, El Al. [See Agudat Yisra'el.]

The problem of religion in the state of Israel is connected more generally to the question of a Jewish state. According to the Orthodox interpretation, a Jewish state would have to be a "theocratic" state governed by Jewish law (*halakhah*). At the opposite extreme, the secular nationalist argument holds that Israel should be a secular state in which church and state are strictly separated and whose Jewish character is determined purely by the sociological makeup of its population. For the Orthodox, the identity of the Jews can only be determined by the *halakhah*: one is a Jew only if born of a Jewish mother or converted by a halakhic procedure. For the secular Zionists, anyone who declares himself a Jew should be considered as such. Moreover, some secular nationalists argue that a new Israeli identity should take the place of Jewish identity, which they regard as a religious relic of the years of exile. In a case in the 1960s, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that Jewish identity is not determined by the *halakhah*. The case concerned a Carmelite monk, Brother Daniel, who was born a Jew and had fought against the Nazis as a partisan. He requested Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return, arguing that, according to the *halakhah*, he remained a Jew even though he professed another religion. The Court ruled against him with the argument that the conventional understanding of who is a Jew contradicted the *halakhah* in such a case and, since Israel is not a halakhic state, that the common definition should prevail. Similarly, in 1970, the Court ruled that a child born of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother might be registered as of "Israeli" rather than "Jewish"

national identity. This decision would have set aside the concept of a corporate Jewish state in favor of a new secular Israeli identity. As a result of pressure from the religious Zionist parties and of discomfort on the part of many secular Zionists, the Knesset passed a law providing that only persons recognized as Jews by the *halakhah* might be registered as Jews by nationality. In 1980 the Knesset passed a law stipulating that in matters in which there is no specific law or precedent, judges should be guided by "Hebrew jurisprudence" (*mishpat ivri*). Judges were directed to follow traditional Jewish law, but by avoiding the term *halakhah*, the Knesset was able to satisfy the secular refusal to accept a theocratic state. Thus, the judicial system has generally attempted a secular definition of Jewish identity, whereas the legislative system, responding to religious sentiments, has avoided such a break with tradition.

Anti-Zionism. There are a number of expressions of anti-Zionism based on religious motivations. In both Europe and America, nineteenth-century Reform Judaism was unalterably opposed to a national definition of Judaism. The Pittsburgh Platform of 1885 specifically rejected any expectation of a return of the Jews to Zion. By 1937, however, the Reform movement had moved to a more neutral position and adopted the Columbus Platform, in which the "group loyalty" of the Jews is recognized and the upbuilding of Palestine is supported "not only [as] a haven of refuge for the oppressed but also [as] a center of Jewish culture and spiritual life." Nevertheless, a wing of the Reform movement, which formed the American Council for Judaism, actively opposed the creation of Israel in the 1940s. Following the Six Day War, the Reform movement became explicitly Zionist and joined the World Zionist Organization. Reform Jews established several *kibbutsim* and congregations in Israel.

Among the Orthodox, Zionism was initially greeted with skepticism or hostility. The initial plan to hold the first Zionist Congress in Munich was canceled as a result of opposition by the German rabbis. In 1912, Agudat Yisra'el was formed by rabbis from Germany, Hungary, and Poland as an organization to advance orthodoxy in Jewish life. The Agudah opposed secular Zionism, but maintained an ambivalent attitude toward settlement in the Land of Israel. Following the establishment of the state, the Agudah became a political party advocating a state based on the *halakhah*. The ideology of the movement opposes participation in Zionist governments, although its representatives have nevertheless from time to time held cabinet seats and although they provided coalition support for the government after 1977. The Agudah has used its political

influence to strengthen its educational and religious institutions and has sought religious concessions from the Knesset such as exemptions for religious girls from national service and stricter adherence to Sabbath rules. As opposed to the National Religious Party, the Agudah considers itself non-Zionist and does identify with the national goals of the state.

A more extreme anti-Zionist group is the Neturei Karta ("guardians of the city"), which broke off from Agudat Yisra'el in 1935. The Neturei Karta are largely followers of the Satmar Hasidic sect. Neturei Karta opposed the creation of the state of Israel and regarded Zionism as a heinous sin that prevents the coming of the Messiah. They believe that the Nazi Holocaust was punishment for secular Zionism and they declared their willingness to participate in an Arab government in Palestine. They clashed violently from time to time with the Israeli police when they demonstrated against what they regard as violations of Jewish law in the state. The members of Neturei Karta live for the most part in Jerusalem, where they govern themselves, taking no services from the state and paying no taxes. They also have significant support from certain ultra-Orthodox Jews in the United States.

Conclusion. Modern Israel is the product of both secular and religious tendencies that have their origins in modern nationalism and in the traditional messianic connection to Zion. With the exception of the small anti-Zionist group, most Jews in the world, representing virtually the whole religious spectrum, support the basic aspirations of Zionism. Thus, the character of the Jewish state—religious, secular, or some combination of both—remains an issue of political conflict among Zionists, but this conflict is also emblematic of the larger question of the relationship of religion to nationalism in the modern world.

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DAVID BIALE

ZODIAC. See Astrology.

ZOHAR. *Sefer ha-zohar* (The Book of Splendor) is the central book in the literature of Jewish mysticism (Qabbalah). It is attributed to Shim'on bar Yoḥ'ai, a second century tanna, but modern scholarship has concluded that it is a compilation dating from thirteenth-century Spain. Quotations from the *Zohar* first appear in qabbalistic writings after 1280, and analysis of the book's terminology and prose style shows that its real author is Mosheh de León (1240–1305), a Castilian qabbalist.

Written mostly in Aramaic, the *Zohar* presents an elaborate and comprehensive, though not always coherent, mystical system that employs audacious anthropomorphic and sexual imagery to express a mythical and symbolic perception of divine reality without precedent in medieval Qabbalah. The *Zohar* was accepted by qab-

balists as an authoritative ancient work, and its influence on the later evolution of Jewish mysticism was felt principally through the impact of its mythical conceptions on qabbalistic theosophy.

The *Zohar* encompasses a series of qabbalistic works that can be divided into three main layers:

1. *Midrash ha-ne'elam* (The Hidden Midrash) is considered to be the earliest stratum. Written partly in Hebrew, partly in Aramaic, it has overt affinities with Mosheh de León's early Hebrew works and an obvious tendency toward allegorical exegesis of biblical verses.
2. The bulk of the *Zohar* consists mainly of a homiletical interpretation of the Pentateuch, written in Aramaic and using symbolic exegesis. To this layer belong several shorter compositions, of which the most important are *Sifra' de-iseni'uta'* (The Occult Book), *Idra' rabba'* and *Idra' zutta'*.
3. The latest stratum is formed by two large compositions: *Tiqqunei zohar*, which is composed of seventy interpretations of the word *bere'shit* (the opening word of *Genesis*), and *Ra'ya' meheimna'* (The Faithful Shepherd), a qabbalistic interpretation of the rationale for the commandments.

The first two strata, presumably written by Mosheh de León, circulated independently in manuscript and were published together in 1558 in Mantua and Cremona. The third was written by an anonymous qabbalist in the early fourteenth century. It differs from the earlier strata both in style and in its qabbalistic concepts.

Immediately after their appearance, the earlier strata of the *Zohar* were the subjects of commentaries by qabbalists. Yosef Angelino (early fourteenth century) compiled a commentary entitled *Livnat ha-sappir* on the portions of the *Zohar* that explain *Genesis* and *Leviticus*. In the late thirteenth century David ben Yehudah he-Ḥasid wrote *Sefer ha-gevul*, a commentary on *Idra' rabba'*. In the second half of the sixteenth century several important commentaries were composed including, Shim'on Lavi's *Ketem paz*, Mosheh Cordovero's *Or yaqar*, and works by Mosheh Isserles, Eliyyahu Loans of Worms, Avraham Azulai, Avraham Galante, and Ḥayyim Vital. All subsequent commentaries extant were written under the influence of the reinterpretation of qabbalistic ideas by Isaac Luria, a fact that diminishes their contribution to understanding the text. The most important of these are by Shalom Buzaglo (seventeenth century) Eliyyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman (known as the Gaon of Vilna [Vilnius]) in the eighteenth century, and Yitshaq Eizik Safrin of Komarno in the nineteenth century.

There are several Hebrew translations of the *Zohar*; the earliest, dating from the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, is that of David ben Yehudah he-Ḥasid, who incorporated parts of it in his own qabbalistic works. Parts of the *Zohar* have been translated into Latin by Guillaume Postel and Knorr von Rosenroth. Larger translations exist in English (by Harry Sperling and Maurice Simon, 1931–1934; by Daniel Chanan Matt, 1983); in French (by Jean de Pauly, 1906–1911; by Charles Mopsik and B. Maruani, 1981); in German (by Ernst Müller, 1932 and 1984); and in Italian (by L. Balducci, 1978).

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MOSHE IDEL

ZOROASTRIANISM. With a history of some three thousand years, Zoroastrianism is one of the most ancient living religions. It is the most important and best-known religion of ancient, or pre-Islamic, Iran. It takes its name from that of its founder, Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), who probably lived around the beginning of the first millennium BCE. It was, therefore, the religion of Iran under the rule of the Iranian-speaking Aryan populations, members of the Aryan or Indo-Iranian group of the more extended Indo-European family. Another name for Zoroastrianism, Mazdaism, is derived from the name of the religion's supreme god, Mazdā ("wise"), or Ahura Mazdā ("wise lord"). Some scholars believe that a non-Zoroastrian Mazdaism also existed, but this hypothesis is most likely without foundation, as all historically documented forms of Mazdaism, even those mentioned in the inscriptions of the Achaemenid rulers (sixth to fourth century BCE), appear to be Zoroastrian.

Thus we can consider Zoroastrianism and Mazdaism synonymous.

The roots of Zoroastrianism can be located in an eastern Iranian, tribal, and basically pastoral society. The religion originated around 1000 BCE and developed further under the first Persian empire, but its clear conservatism and strong traditionalism appear to be manifestations of a cultural attitude that emerged during the Sasanid period (third to seventh century CE). The evolution and profound transformations of Zoroastrianism are the consequences of its history. It survived the Macedonian conquest and the periods of Seleucid and Greco-Bactrian overrule. After the Arab conquest, it was handed down from generation to generation, throughout the time of the Mongol empire and the local hegemony of Turkic and Persian Islamic rulers, all the way to today's small and poor communities of Iranian Zoroastrians. It was also passed down to the influential Parsi communities in India (Gujarat, Bombay, the Deccan) and in modern Pakistan.

As a result of its history, attempts have often been made to distinguish between various phases of Zoroastrianism and to endow each with a slightly different name. Thus it has been suggested that the religion contained in the *Gāthās*, the texts attributed to Zarathushtra himself, be called "Zarathushtrianism," that the contents of the Younger Avesta be called "Zarathushtricism," and that the religion of the Sasanid period be called "Zoroastrianism" (Gershevitch, 1964). These definitions should be extended to include the religion of the Zoroastrian communities in Iran and India today.

Sources. Zoroastrian scholarship has always had to contend with considerable difficulties because sources of knowledge about the religion, in particular those pertaining to its earliest period, are few and conflicting. The Avesta, a collection of texts gathered in writing during the fourth or the sixth century CE, has survived only in part, and it presents a heterogeneous picture. In addition to the *Gāthās*, attributed to Zarathushtra himself, we find texts with very diverse structures and goals, dating from many different periods and handed down orally for many centuries, perhaps even a thousand years or more. The main sections of the Avesta are the *Yasna* (Act of Worship), which contains the *Gāthās* (Songs); the *Yashts* (Hymns of Praise to the Divine Entities), dating from various periods and partially reflecting an Indo-Iranian background; the *Vendidad* (Code against Demons), which has survived in its entirety and which is basically a code of purity to be used in the struggle against the evil power of the *daivas*; the *Vispered* (Worship of All the Masters); the *Nyāyishn* and the *Gāh* (Periods of the Day), a sort of Zoroastrian breviary containing prayers for priests and laymen; and the

Khorda, or Little Avesta, a prayer book comprising selections from other Avestan texts, for everyday use. There also exist fragments of Avestan texts, including parts of the *Hadhōkht Nask* (Book of Scriptures) and the *Aogemadaēchā* (We Accept), which are important for their concept of the afterlife; and the *Nīrangistān* (Precepts for the Organization of the Cult). The language of the Avesta, particularly the more archaic forms found in the *Gāthās*, is extremely difficult, and in some cases interpretation of the text is uncertain and the results of philological work far from satisfactory. Such difficulties are made all the more serious by problems related to the codification of the texts, as well as to their transmission, as they were transcribed in a fairly late alphabet, created ad hoc and derived, basically, from Aramaic.

Sources of equal importance are the Pahlavi books, written in Middle Persian and dating, more or less, from the ninth century CE, a period in which Zoroastrian religious literature was flourishing, especially in the province of Fārs. During this time Iran had mostly been totally converted to Islam, and the adherents of Zoroastrianism had become a minority. Some parts of the vast Pahlavi literature are extremely important, such as the *Zand* (Interpretation), an exegesis of Avestan texts with commentaries, translations, and glossaries; the *Bundahishn* (Book of Primordial Creation), or *Zand-Āgāhīh* (Knowledge from the Zand), which pertains to cosmogony, cosmology, and eschatology; the *Dēnkard* (Acts of Religion), a summary of the knowledge of the time (ninth to tenth century CE) concerning various subjects; the *Wizīdagihā* (Selections) written by the priest Zadspram; *Dādistan ī Denīg* (Religious Judgments), in which the priest Mānushcihr answers ninety-two questions on various matters; *Dādistan ī Mēnōg ī Khrad* (Book of Judgments of the Spirit of Wisdom), a typical text of Zoroastrian wisdom literature (the *andarz*); *Shkand-gumānīg Wizār* (Doubt-destroying Exposition), an apology of Zoroastrianism, containing a critique of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and Manichaeism, which were interpreted as dangerous and deviant; and *Ardā Wirāz Nāmāg* (Book of Arda Wirāz), a work, widely known in Zoroastrian communities, that contained a description of a trip to the hereafter and a vision of heaven and hell, written in the style of a mantic composition. Many other Pahlavi texts are also extremely important in the study of Zoroastrian doctrine during the Sasanid and post-Islamic periods.

Zoroastrian religious literature did not, however, come to an end after the flowering of the Pahlavi books under the Abbasid caliphate; it continued to develop, in the context of the communities in Iran and India, using new graphic systems, such as *pazand* and *parsi*, and

new languages, such as Persian, Gujarati, and even Sanskrit. The Parsis of India developed a considerable body of religious literature, written in both Gujarati and English, beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century.

Although the inscriptions of the rulers from the two great Persian dynasties, the Achaemenid—especially Darius I (522–486 BCE), Xerxes (486–465 BCE), Artaxerxes II (402–359 BCE)—and the Sasanid—especially Shāpūr I (241–272 CE) and Narses (293–302 CE)—do not belong to the religious genre, they are nonetheless important for the study of the historical development of Zoroastrianism. Historical and doctrinal inscriptions are also significant, especially those of the high priest Kerdēr, an influential figure under the early Sasanid rulers. Kerdēr was one of the authors of the refounding of Zoroastrianism and helped transform it into the state religion during the third century CE.

In addition to Zoroastrian sources, mention should be made of the classical ones, Greek in particular, as well as the Christian and Muslim ones. Herodotus, Plutarch, Strabo, and Diogenes Laertius, for example, are very important for the study of pre-Sasanid Zoroastrianism, as were Christian sources (Armenian and Syriac, particularly the *Acts of the Martyrs*). Muslim sources, in both Arabic and Persian, are also valuable for the study of the Zoroastrian religion during and after the Sasanid period.

Origins. Zoroastrianism originated in the eastern and south-central regions of the Iranian world, between the great mountain ranges of the Hindu Kush and Seistan, an area that today is divided between Iran and Afghanistan. According to one tradition, Zarathushtra came from Azerbaijan, but this theory has no historical foundation; apparently, during the Parthian or Sasanid period, the clergy of a local sanctuary claimed that the cult originated in their region in an attempt to confer a higher stature and authority upon their own traditions. Moreover, the hypothesis that Zarathushtra lived on the outskirts of northeastern Iran, in part of the province of Chorasmia, at the eve of the establishment of the empire of Cyrus II, is based on arguments that do not stand up to critical analysis. Current research on the religion's origin is based on geographical information contained in the Avesta, as well as on an evaluation of archaeological findings and on a reinterpretation of the few available sources.

The geographical boundaries of the Avesta define the eastern Iranian world and include all of modern Afghanistan as well as some neighboring regions. The text does not mention any regions, areas, or places in western Iran, Media, or Persia. We also notice a complete absence of information about both Medes and Persians

during the first half of the first millennium BCE. Furthermore, there is no indication of familiarity with urban civilization. All this seems to confirm that the world from which Zoroastrianism emerged was distant, both in space and in time, from the Achaemenid empire and from the founding of the unitary monarchies of the Medes and the Persians during the eighth and seventh centuries BCE. Rather, Zoroastrianism grew out of a politically fragmented tribal society whose civilization centered upon oases rather than upon fixed urban settings—although in certain areas this tribal society superseded an urban civilization that had flourished in the third century BCE (such as the Hilmand civilization, which was brought to light by excavations in Shahr-i Sukhta in Iranian Seistan). The society was ruled by a warrior aristocracy, that is, by one of the three classes—priests, warriors, and shepherds—that made up the original social structure of the Arya.

Within this society, religion most likely revolved around young warrior (*mairya*) fraternities (the Aryan or Indo-Iranian *Männerbund*), with their bloody cults, violent gods, sacrificial rites, initiations, and ecstatic practices that climaxed in a state of “fury” called *aēshma*. Animal sacrifices, especially those involving the slaying of a bull (*gav*) and the ingestion of hallucinogenic substances such as *haoma*, were certainly widely practiced. Zarathushtra inveighs strongly against them in the *Gāthās*, by giving a voice to *Geush Urvan*, the “soul of the bull” (*Yasna* 29), who is presented as the victim of the fury of evil masters, and by condemning *haoma* as the urine of a stimulating and hallucinogenic drug (*Yasna* 48.10, 32.14).

Distinctive Characteristics. The primary innovation of Zoroastrianism, which sets it apart from the religions of other Indo-European peoples in the Near East and Central Asia, is its emphasis on monotheism. Its outstanding feature, in the religious context of the entire Indo-Mediterranean world, resides in its radical dualism. Both aspects are fundamental to Zarathushtra’s philosophical and religious doctrine. Zarathushtra’s high esteem for speculation caused the Greeks to view him more as a wise man than as the founder of a religion; they saw the author of the *Gāthās* as one of the highest and most significant representatives of “alien wisdom.” Nor is it pure coincidence that he was mainly known for his dualistic teachings, as were his most direct disciples, the Magi.

Monotheism and dualism are closely linked in the *Gāthās*. They are not in conflict with each other, for monotheism is in opposition to polytheism, not to dualism (Pettazzoni, 1920). In fact, dualism, far from being a “protest against monotheism” (Henning, 1951), is a necessary and logical consequence thereof; its purpose

is to explain the origins of evil. The basis of dualism is essentially ethical: the nature of the two opposing Zoroastrian spirits, Spenta Mainyu (“beneficent spirit”) and Angra Mainyu (“hostile spirit”), who are twin children of Ahura Mazda, results from the choice they made between “truth,” *asha*, and the “lie,” *druj*, between good thoughts, good words, and good deeds and evil thoughts, evil words, and evil deeds. The choices made by the two spirits (*Yasna* 30.5) lie at the root of Zoroastrian dualism, and they act as a prototype (*Yasna* 30.2, 49.3) of the choices that face each man as he decides whether to follow the path of truth or that of untruth (Gershevitch, 1964). The good or evil nature of the two spirits derives from his own moral choice and is not, as suggested by some scholars, innate, ontologically given, or predetermined.

The concept of Ahura Mazda as the creator of heaven and earth, day and night, and light and darkness (*Yasna* 44.3–5), as well as the ethical context in which Zarathushtra conceived his answer to the problem of evil, demonstrates that the prophet was an original thinker, a powerful religious figure who introduced radical changes to the spiritual and cultural world in which he was reared. He responded to a deeply formalistic and ritualistic religion by strongly and insistently praising human worth and dignity. Early Zoroastrianism set itself apart from the sacrificial cult of a society in which militaristic values were still pervasive. It advocated an inward-seeking religion and favored an intellectual cult rooted in the Indo-Iranian priestly tradition—that of “Aryan mysticism” (Kuiper, 1964)—which had high regard for thought and knowledge.

The original Zoroastrian message, however, was profoundly transformed by the first generations of the prophet’s disciples. Later, elaborations by the clergy even went so far as to allow various aspects of the old polytheistic and ritualistic practices to reemerge, albeit with some limitations. Contact with other religions, as well as historical developments in Iran, also contributed to the evolution of the religion. Ultimately Zoroastrianism, which had arisen in reaction to an archaic and formalistic religion, absorbed many of the concepts and values that belonged to the very world it had rebelled against, in particular those elements not linked with the ideas, practices, and ethics of the warrior aristocracy. The result was a complex religious tradition that has persisted throughout thousands of years of Iranian history. Zoroastrianism is based on an ethical approach and tends toward abstraction. Halfway between a prophetic and monotheistic type of religion, it incorporates elements and beliefs that also belonged to the great monotheistic religions that arose to the west of the Iranian world. At the same time it is a ritualistic,

somewhat polytheistic religion, rich in mythology. Nonetheless it formed a highly original model that exercised a great and deep influence well beyond the Iranian world, both to the east and to the west.

Theology, Pantheon, and Pandemonium. In Zarathushtra's conception, a dualistic vision is almost a natural consequence of monotheism, for dualism explains the evil that resides in the world and afflicts it. The problem of evil and suffering is basic to Zoroastrian thought, and the urgent human necessity of providing an answer to the problem is reconciled with an abiding faith in the dignity and freedom of humanity by means of belief in the so-called myth of choice.

Within the dualistic vision of Zoroastrianism, it is not only Angra Mainyu and Spenta Mainyu who are confronted by moral choices. The *daivas* ("gods," a term that in later Zoroastrianism became a generic reference for the demonic powers), who are the progeny of bad thought, untruth, and pride, became evil because they made the wrong choice. As a result, the *daivas* serve as the inspiration of humanity, which is poised in the center of the struggle between the two opposite poles of truth and untruth, of good and evil, of life and nonlife. In the *Gāthās* we read:

The two primordial Spirits, who are twins, revealed themselves in a dream. They have two ways of thinking, of acting: the good and the bad. And, of the two, the one who acts well has made the right choice, not the one who does evil. And when these two spirits met, they established, at the beginning, life and nonlife, and the consequence, in the end, of the Worst Existence for evil, and Best Thought for good. The evil one of the two Spirits chose to do bad things, and the Most Bounteous Spirit, clothed in the hardest stones, chose Truth, as is also true for all those who constantly strive to please the Wise Lord with honest actions. The *daiva* did not get to choose between the two, because the *Deceiver* approached them as they were making their decision. So they chose the Worst Thought, and then ran to join Wrath, and together with it they have afflicted the world and humanity.

(*Yasna* 30.3–6)

Above and beyond the *daivas* and the two Mainyus is the Wise Lord, Ahura Mazdā, who was most likely created by Zarathushtra. The name itself has no parallel in India—apart from the first half, *ahura*, "lord" (Old Indian, *asura*)—and in this it differs from the names of many other deities or divine entities derived from the ancient Iranian pantheon. Ahura Mazdā's existence may have owed something, at least in part, to the Varuṇa of Vedic India or to an Indo-Iranian *ahura* or *asura*, which we might be able to reconstruct by using a comparative method. Yet Ahura Mazdā presents unique features that can only be explained by Zarathushtra's concept of divinity and by his particular intuitions. Zarathushtra's

creation of Ahura Mazdā reveals that the prophet was a great religious reformer, a wise man in search of knowledge and enlightenment, rather than a follower of any traditional doctrine. Here Zarathushtra addresses his god:

This I ask you, oh Lord, answer me truthfully: who was created father of the Truth, at the very beginning? Who set the course for the sun and the stars? Who, if not yourself, causes the moon to wax and wane? This, and other things, oh Wise One, I want to know from you. This I ask you, oh Lord, answer me truthfully: who holds down the earth and up the sky so that it does not fall? Who [set down] waters and plants? Who harnessed the two steeds to the wind and to the clouds? Who, oh Wise One, is the Creator of Good Thought? This I ask you, oh Lord, answer me truthfully. Which craftsman wrought sleep and wakefulness? Who is responsible for morning, noon, and night, to remind the wise man of his duties? This I ask you, oh Lord, answer me truthfully if what I say is true: will Devotion strengthen Truth by its action? Did you, as good thought, institute Power? For whom did you make the cow a giver of prosperity? This I ask you, oh Lord, answer me truthfully: who created Devotion, and anointed it with Power? Who made the son respectful of his father in his own heart? I am the one who seeks, through these questions, to make you known, oh Wise One, as Good Thought, as the Creator of all things. (*Yasna* 44.3–7)

In the passage quoted above we find terms such as Truth, Good (or Best) Thought, Devotion, and Power. These, together with others, such as Wholeness and Immortality (or Long Life), as well as the Wise Lord or, rather, his beneficent spirit, form a group of seven "beneficent immortals," the Amesha Spentas, who are of fundamental importance for understanding Zarathushtra's thought. They are mentioned again and again in the *Gāthās*, sometimes in reference to a divine subject, that is, the Wise Lord, and sometimes to a human subject, that is, Zarathushtra or other men. The seven are Vohu Manah ("good thought"), Asha Vahishta ("best truth"), Khshathra Vairya ("desirable dominion"), Spenta Ārmaiti ("beneficent devotion"), Haurvatāt ("wholeness"), and Ameretāt ("immortality"). These are entities as well as abstract concepts, aspects, or virtues of the Wise Lord and of the man who follows truth, or *asha* (Vedic, *ṛta*). Theological speculation after the *Gāthās* has arranged them by codifying their order and their attributes and is also probably responsible for devising for them a system of interrelations, based on an analysis of the physical world. Thus Vohu Manah is traditionally linked with cattle, Asha with fire, Khshathra with metals, and Ārmaiti with earth. According to Georges Dumézil's theory of the Indo-European tripartite ideology, subscribed to by a number of scholars of Iranian studies (e.g., Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin and Geo Widengren), an analysis of the Amesha Spenta sys-

tem reveals what appears to be the typical framework of functional tripartition. In other words, Asha and Vohu Manah would appear to be Zoroastrian substitutes for the two main Aryan deities, Varuṇa and Mitra, representing the first function, that of magical and juridical sovereignty. Khshathra Vairya corresponds to Indra, representing the warrior function; Haurvatat and Ameretāt, of the Nāsātya couple, together with Ārmaiti, a polyvalent entity, conform to the function of fertility and fruitfulness.

It is not easy to understand the Zoroastrian concept of the beneficent immortals who form the retinue of the Wise Lord. In order to comprehend its meaning, one should probably keep in mind the double structure of opposites—good and evil, spirit and matter—that characterizes the Amesha Spentas, their interrelations, and their reciprocal conditioning. Their dual character—they are both divine and human—can perhaps be explained by a mystical experience. In this experience, Zarathushtra, or the man “who possesses *asha*” (*ashavan*), assumes divine virtues and powers while in a state of ecstasy called *maga* and, in so doing, joins the beneficent immortals and becomes identified, in a way, with the beneficent spirit who made the right choice. We should, of course, view the Zoroastrian language, however greatly innovative, in the context of the priestly tradition clearly identified as Aryan mysticism. The *Gāthās* shows us an inner religiosity, one that allowed ample space for individual experience.

Sraosha (“obedience”), the lord of prayer, is by his nature analogous to the entities in the *Gāthās*. He is particularly important both in the *Gāthās* and in later Zoroastrian tradition, where he protects against the evil of death and judges the soul after death. The other divine or superhuman beings of Zoroastrianism are essentially different from those in the *Gāthās*. Most are old deities from the Indo-Iranian pantheon, dominated by the figure of the Wise Lord. Because he was the only god in the Gathic message, the Wise Lord was subsequently, and increasingly, viewed as the supreme, although not the only, god of later Zoroastrianism. In the later form of the religion, monotheism became diluted, and with time it came to represent more of a tendency than a reality. This is made clear by older documents—other than the *Gāthās*—both religious ones, such as the Younger Avesta, and secular ones, such as the royal Achaemenid inscriptions, as well as by the Greek sources concerning the Persian religion, Zarathushtra, and the Magi.

Zoroastrianism did not integrate all of the ancient gods into its pantheon. Only those not thought to be in contrast with the main tenets of the prophet’s new religion were absorbed into it. For the most part, the an-

cient *daivas* censured by Zarathushtra remained outside of the new pantheon, but a few deities, who had probably been widely and deeply venerated, reappeared in Zoroastrianism. Their features and aspects, however, were partly modified, partly kept intact, and generally only thinly disguised under a veil of zoroastrianization. Thus the ancient gods became *yazatas* (“ones worthy of worship”) in the new religion; in a language more secular and less priestly and theological, they can be called *bagas*, as in the Achaemenid inscriptions.

This major development in Zoroastrianism, that is, the tendency to reabsorb many elements from the Indo-Iranian “pagan” religion, even animal sacrifice and the cult of *haoma*, was the result of a long historical process that began in the eastern regions of Iran during the pre-Achaemenid period. The evolution took place over a number of centuries and was brought about by priestly groups that at first were eastern and can be called, for lack of a more precise definition, “Avestan priests,” that is, *āthravans* or *athaurvans* (Old Indian, *átharvan*), and later western, that is, the Median priestly tribe known as the Magi. Their theological elaborations led to a precise structuring of a pantheon and a pandemonium; each is characterized by analogous hierarchical structures and precise interrelations between the worlds of good, or of *asha*, and that of evil, or *druj*, so that each positive or beneficent entity has a corresponding negative or maleficent entity.

Not even the Zoroastrian doctrine of the beneficent immortals was left untouched. The Amesha Spentas, which had been mere abstractions and aspects of a divine entity, or qualities of those who attain the status of *ashavan*, became full beings, in line with a tendency to angelicize that can be found throughout the entire history of religion in Iran. Within this framework, a significant development was the demonization of ancient Indo-Iranian gods, such as Indra, Nānhaithya, and Saurva; Indra, in particular, became a symmetrical opposite of Khshathra Vairya and the probable usurper of the role of the Indo-Iranian Vṛthraghna.

The *Yashts* section of the Avesta is the principal and most clear evidence available to us regarding the process of zoroastrianization of ancient deities within a new cultural context, dominated by the figure of the supreme god, Ahura Mazdā. The *Yashts* are hymns dedicated to the various beings worthy of worship: Ahura Mazdā himself, the Amesha Spentas as a group, Asha Vahishta, Ameretāt, and Aredvī Sūrā Anāhitā, a goddess also known to us through the Achaemenid inscriptions, who corresponded to the Indian Sarasvatī; Hvare Khshaēta (the “brightly shining” sun); Māh (“the moon”); Tishtrya, the star Sirius, a rain god; Druvāspā (“possessing sound horses”), a female *yazata*, closely as-

sociated with Gēush Urvan; Mithra, who also appears in the Achaemenid inscriptions; and Sraosha and Rashnu, who, together with Mithra, judge the soul after death. Also considered worthy of reverence are the *fravashis*, or spirits of the soul, whose worship was probably a surviving trace of an ancient cult of the spirits of the dead and of a concept of immortality typical of a warrior society; Verethraghna ("smiting of resistance"), the *yazata* of victory; Vāyu ("wind"), the *yazata* of the wind; Daēnā, the etymology of which is uncertain, probably meaning "image," as well as "conscience," "self," and "religion"; Ashi ("reward, recompense"), a female *yazata* of abundance and fertility; Arshtāt, a female *yazata* personifying justice, the companion of Mithra; Khvarenah ("splendor"), a *yazata* personifying an igneous and luminous energy, seen as a vital force, and the bearer of success and fortune, traditionally linked with royalty; Haoma, personifying the object of the sacrifice and worshiped as the "priest of the sacrifice," whose hymn is preserved in the *Yasna* section (9.10, 9.11); and, finally, the star Vanant (Vega).

Of all these entities, Anāhitā and Mithra are certainly the most important, forming a triad when joined with Ahura Mazdā. The two also appear in the Achaemenid inscriptions, beginning with those of Artaxerxes II. During the Achaemenid period, Anāhitā was seen as a great goddess whose worship, according to Herodotus, was adopted by the Persians from the Assyrians and the Arabs. She descended from the great Near Eastern female deities, who were linked to the functions of fertility and fruitfulness, as well as to royalty. Mithra, on the other hand, had already become a solar deity, the god of covenants and of light, prior to the diffusion of his cult to Rome, where it became a mystery religion. Throughout the deity's history, both within and outside of Iran, Mithra maintained regal and militaristic attributes. Both Mithra and Anāhitā show signs of a very strong influence of religious concepts from Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, and, more in general, the Near East.

Accounts given by Herodotus concerning Persian religion show a picture similar to that found in the Younger Avesta. Herodotus (1.131–132) asserts that the Persians were not in the habit of building statues, temples, or altars, and that they would offer sacrifices from high places, in the open air, to "Zeus" (Ahura Mazdā), a name by which they called the entire sky, the sun, the moon, the earth, fire, water, and the wind. He adds that they would not carry out a sacrifice without the attendance of a Magus, a priest of the Magi, who chanted a "theogony" during the ceremony. This account refers to western Iran at the middle of the fifth century; thus it was written about five hundred years after Zoroastrianism originated.

Cosmogony and Cosmology. Zoroastrian cosmogony contemplates three basic moments: the creation of the world, the revelation of the Mazdean "good religion," and the final transfiguration. Although most ancient texts do not present the cosmogonic doctrine systematically, it can be reconstructed with the aid of the Pahlavi religious literature, in which the three cosmogonic moments are called, respectively, Bundahishn ("creation"); Gumēzishn (the mingling of the two opposing spirits); and Wizārishn (their final separation). Everything that exists does so in a double state, the mental, or spiritual (Pahl., *mēnōg*), and the physical, or material (Pahl., *gētīg*). The spiritual state also possesses an embryonic, seminal value in relation to the material one, which is almost like its fruit. According to the Pahlavi literature, only the evil spirit is incapable of transforming its creation from the spiritual to the physical state because it is innately sterile and destructive. Material existence is therefore not seen as negative in itself; rather, in the state of "mixture," it is contaminated by the aggressive activity unleashed against it by the evil spirit. In the *Gāthās*, too (*Yasna* 30.4), life and nonlife, good and evil, result from the meeting of the two spirits.

The world was created in six consecutive stages. First, the sky was made of stone and rock crystal, then water, earth, vegetation, animal life, and humanity were formed. The earth is surrounded by a great mountain range, Harā Berezaiti ("high Harā"; Pahl., Harburz; Pers., Alburz), which is linked, through subterranean roots, with Mount Harā, located at the center of the earth. The first and largest of the seven areas in which the earth is divided is a region called Khvaniratha; it is the only one inhabited by man. The remaining six sections of the world (Pahl., *kēshwar*) surround the Khvaniratha. From Mount Harā descend waters that flow into the Vourukasha ("having many inlets") Sea, which covers a third of the earth toward the south and has at its own center a mountain made of the same matter as the sky. Two great rivers, Good Dāityā and Ranhā, originate in the Vourukasha Sea, and they mark the eastern and western borders of the Khvaniratha *kēshwar*. Mount Harā, also known as Hukairya ("of good activity"), is thus the highest spot on earth, and from it the souls of the dead depart on their heavenly voyage. In the middle of the Vourukasha Sea is found the Tree of All Seeds, as well as another tree that is endowed with healing powers and confers immortality. It is identified as White Haoma, the "chief of plants."

Gav-aēvō-dāta (Pahl., Gaw-ī-ēw-dād), or "uniquely created bull," who was killed by the evil spirit, and Gaya-maretan (Pahl., Gayōmard), or "mortal life," also killed by Ahriman, were the prototypes, respectively, of

animals and men. From their seed there originated all manner of good animals, as well as the first human couple, Mashya and Mashyānag.

The Indo-Iranian background of many of these doctrines is evident. We are reminded, for example, of Mount Meru or Sumeru in Indian mythology and cosmography; of the seven *dvīpas*, which echo the seven *kēshwars*; of the Jambū Tree, to the south of Mount Meru; and of Mārtāṇḍa (“mortal seed”), whose myth contains some important analogies with that of Gayōmard.

The most original aspects of Zoroastrian doctrine lie not so much in its cosmological conclusions as in its history of the cosmos and in its teachings concerning the two states of *mēnōg* and *gētīg* and the three stages of Bundahishn, Gumēzishn, and Wizārishn. In particular, the notion of the two states, which is also analogous in some of its aspects to a number of Greek ideas (a fact that has led to speculation concerning Greek influences, either Platonic or Aristotelian, as the doctrine is recorded systematically only in relatively late texts), is nonetheless rooted in very early Zoroastrianism. We find traces of it even in the *Gāthās*, which describe the two states of being and of life as “spiritual” and “with bones,” that is, “endowed with a body.” In fact, the concept of two worlds or two existences is deeply rooted in all of Zoroastrian thought.

The teachings concerning the three stages are also original in specific ways. The first stage involves the separation of the two spirits in the *mēnōg*; the second stage is that of their mingling, in the *gētīg*; the third is that of their final separation, in a state of perfect purity, *abēzagīh*, in which man will live in his future body, *tan ī pasēn*. According to these teachings, purity and separation are one and the same, which probably helps to explain the Zoroastrian path to spiritual realization. The initiate, the man who possesses *asha* (*ashavan*), can, through the power that results from his state of purity—which, in the *Gāthās*, seems to be what is called *maga*—obtain the benefits of a spiritual existence, that is, enlightenment and an intellectual vision. Through such a process the initiate may come to resemble, in life, the man who is blessed after death.

Eschatology and Soteriology. The history of the cosmos is a sacred one, and it develops through three high points, each with its own protagonist: Gayamaretan, Zarathushtra, and Saoshyant (Pahl., Sōshans), or the future savior. These figures, however, are only the main characters, representing the beginning, the middle, and the end. A host of other figures, heroes, and defenders of the faith, organized in a complicated sequence and in groups and dynasties that are, for the most part, mythical, fills the sacred history of Zoroastrianism. With

time and historical changes, these other figures became increasingly identified with history itself and with the fate of Iran, following a process that is clearly exemplified during the Sasanid period.

The Zoroastrian eschatological doctrine was not developed suddenly; rather, it underwent a sequence of theological reworkings. Its core, however, can already be seen in the *Gāthās*, where it certainly reflects Indo-Iranian or, at least, pre-Zoroastrian concepts of the individual.

The Avesta teaches that after death the soul can reach Heaven, or the Infinite Lights (*Anagra Raocha*), by following three steps, a succession of increasingly bright and intense lights: the Stars (good thoughts, *humata*), the Moon (good words, *hūkhta*), and the Sun (good deeds, *hvarshata*). In order to undertake the celestial journey, the soul must undergo a dramatic trial: the crossing of the Chinvat Bridge, the “bridge of separation.” Only those souls who have been deemed just by Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnu will be able to cross the bridge; the souls of the evil will fall into Hell, for the bridge will narrow to the width of a razor’s edge when they attempt to cross it. Three days after death and the painful separation of the soul from the body, the just will meet their *daēnā*, the image of their own self, who will be disguised as a beautiful fifteen-year-old girl. There is an intermediate area for those who do not deserve either Heaven or Hell because the total weight of their good thoughts, good words, and good deeds is equal to that of their bad thoughts, bad words, and bad deeds. These souls remain in a sort of limbo called Hamistagan (“region of the mixed”), a dwelling place of shadows where there is neither joy nor torment.

Even as early as in the *Gāthās* the collective eschatology is dominated by the notion of an ordeal by fire. Fire, a son of Ahura Mazdā, is Asha’s instrument, and good men will be separated from the evil by a torrent of fire, like a river of molten metal. At that time the Last Judgment will take place, and Frashōkereti (Pahl., Frashgird) will “transfigure” existence and “rehabilitate” the world and life. Then the dead will come back to life, with indestructible bodies clad in glory. The sacrificial ceremony performed by the savior (the Saoshyant), who will use the fat or marrow of a miraculous cow, blended with white *haoma* (rather than the yellow kind used in regular ceremonies), will bring about the final transfiguration and the resurrection of the bodies.

This version of the doctrine, probably the result of a relatively late elaboration, is codified in the Pahlavi texts. Its premises, however, are ancient and can be found in the teachings of the *Gāthās*. They represent a yearning for a transfiguration of our beings and of life and are strongly fueled by eschatological hope. Zara-

thushttra himself exclaimed, "If only we could be the ones to transfigure the world!" (*Yasna* 30.9).

The idea of a future savior is, in any case, an archaic one, appearing in one of the oldest hymns (*Yashts* 19.86–96). According to later tradition, the savior is born of a virgin who was impregnated by the seed of Zarathushtra while she was bathing in the waters where it was deposited (the great Hāmuñ-i-Hilmand Basin, in Iranian Seistan). One legend holds that there will be three saviors: Ukhshyatereta ("he who makes truth grow"), Ukhshyatnemah ("he who makes reverence grow"), and Astvatereta ("he who embodies truth"). All three saviors, each the son of Zarathushtra, will appear at three different times, each at the end of one of the last three millennia in the history of the cosmos (there are twelve millennia in total). According to the *Bundahishn*, the twelve-thousand-year period is subdivided into four segments, each lasting three thousand years. The first period is that of the creation made by Ōhrmazd (the Pahlavi form for Ahura Mazdā) in the *mēnōg* ("ideal") stage; during this time, Ahriman (the Pahlavi form for Angra Mainyu) starts his struggle against the forces of good. The second period, which resulted from an agreement between the two opponents to establish a period of nine thousand years in which to mingle, witnesses Ōhrmazd's transformation of his creation from the *mēnōg* stage to the *gētīg*. The third period begins with Ahriman's attack against the world created by Ōhrmazd, after which the latter creates the *fravashi* of the prophet. The fourth begins with the revelation to the prophet of the "good religion," an event that takes place in the year 9000 of the history of the world and continues with the advent of the three saviors at the end of each millennium.

In this complex body of eschatological and cosmological doctrines, known to us through a literature that is rather late in its traditional versions, we see what appear to be foreign influences, especially Western ones (Babylonian or Hellenistic). There is no doubt, however, that eschatological hope and the faith in a future savior were among the earliest components of Zoroastrianism and that they exercised a widespread and deep influence on other religions outside of the Iranian world.

Customs, Rituals, Festivals. Despite its original antiritualistic character, Zoroastrianism soon became a religion in which ceremony played a leading role. It is not possible to know which religious rituals were recommended by the prophet to his disciples in addition to prayer. The importance of prayer was always fundamental, and some forms, particularly revered ones, have lasted through the centuries, for example, a type of traditional *manthra* (Skt., *mantra*) that is endowed with magical powers. The main prayers are Ahuna

Vairya, Airyēmā Ishyō, Ashem Vohū, Yenhē Hātām. Even in modern times, the day of a pious Zoroastrian is divided into five prayer periods. Most likely, alongside the recitation of the *manthra*, Zarathushtra recommended meditating before the only basic symbol of the new religion—fire.

Although modified to fit the tenets of the Zoroastrian message, the old ritualism reemerged and asserted itself anew during the first centuries of the new faith. The re-emergence most likely took place before the advent of the great Achaemenid empire. Animal sacrifice became accepted again, although only in forms that could be seen as compatible with the new ethical values, and even the *haoma* cult was reestablished. In fact, Haoma became a *yazata* in the new Zoroastrian pantheon. This reconstruction of the earliest history of Zoroastrianism, the result of traditional scholarship, must still be considered valid, despite claims by some scholars (Marijan Molé, Mary Boyce) that it is fundamentally incorrect.

The strongest analogy with Vedic sacrifice and its ideology is to be found in the cult of *haoma*. Like the Indian *soma*, which is also Soma, a divine being, the Iranian *haoma* is an immortalizing potion, one that brings various benefits, such as inspiration, victory, fertility, and riches, to the person performing the sacrifice. We do not know whether *haoma* was originally a mushroom or a plant of some kind, but Zoroastrians have traditionally used a species of *Ephedra* in the sacrificial ceremony. Using a mortar, they extract the juice from the plant, then drink this liquid while a complex set of rituals is performed. *Haoma* was also given to the dying, functioning as a kind of viaticum that would allow them to obtain immortality and to be resurrected. The *haoma* sacrifice is seen in some ways as a precursor of the eschatological one, in which the future savior is to prepare the ambrosia with white *haoma*.

Herodotus's statement that Persians did not use statues, temples, or altars as part of their religious worship is basically confirmed by archaeological evidence. We must, of course, keep in mind that the absence of temples resembling the Greek or Babylonian ones does not preclude the existence of other sacred areas dedicated to religious ceremonies, such as those with outdoor fences and altars. We learn of anthropomorphic images of a deity only under the rule of Artaxerxes II, who put up statues of the goddess Anāhitā in the main centers of his empire, reflecting the influence of Near Eastern religious concepts and cults. In fact, some scholars have seen this move by Artaxerxes II as the initial cause of a religious struggle that lasted many centuries (Boyce, 1975) and opposed "houses of idols" (Pahl., *uzdēs kadag*) to "houses of fire" (Pahl., *ātaḫsh kadag*; Pers., *ātesh-gān*). The latter, typically built on the model of a *cahār*

tāq ("four arches"), became widespread during the Sasanid period.

The tendency to reject anthropomorphic representations of divine entities is typical of later Zoroastrianism. During the Sasanid period we find anthropomorphic representations of Ōhrmazd, Mihr (Mithra), and Anāhīd (Anāhītā) in large rupestrian reliefs in Fārs; during the Achaemenid period, in addition to the accounts of statues of the goddess Anāhītā, we find torsos of Ahura Mazdā, emerging from a disk or a winged ring from which there emerge, as well, two paws and a bird tail. This symbol, of ancient Egyptian origin, was widespread, and it was the subject of a number of different interpretations throughout the Near East; it was found among the Hittites, Phoenicians, Syrians, Urartians, Assyrians, and Babylonians. We can state with certainty that the winged disk represents Ahura Mazdā despite the divergent opinions of some scholars and some Parsis, the latter concerned about preserving the aniconic coherence of their religion. Other traditional symbols of Zoroastrianism are the fire altars and the *barsom* (Av., *baresman*), a ritual object consisting originally of a bunch of herbs and later of a bundle of consecrated twigs.

The complex Zoroastrian rituals involve many of the most significant moments in the lives of the faithful. Thus we find initiation rites, Naojot (a term deriving from an older one indicating a "new birth"), in which a child, at age seven or ten, is fitted with a shirt, *sadre*, and girded with a cord called *kustī*. Zoroastrians also celebrate marriage rituals, as well as purification rituals (e.g., Pādyāb, ablution; Nāhn, bath; Bareshnūm, the great purification for the initiation of priests and corpse-bearers), in which an important part is played by *gōmez*, consecrated urine, originally cow's urine, following Indo-Iranian practices and ideas. Funeral rites (for example, Zōhr ī ātash, in which animal fat is poured onto the fire, obviously reminiscent of some ancient animal sacrifice) take place in the *dakhmas*, the "towers of silence," and are meant to free the soul of the dead man from the demon of corpses (Druj ī Nasu) and to assist it along its heavenly journey, which begins four days after death. Confession of one's sins is made during Patet, a ritual of penance. Also important in the Zoroastrian liturgy are the rituals surrounding the founding of an *āteshgah* and the consecration of a *dakhma*. These involve the entire community.

But Yasna ("sacrifice"; Skt., *yajñah*), the sacrifice of *haoma* before a fire, performed in a different room from that where the fire is usually kept, is the main Zoroastrian liturgy. The Yasna is preceded by a preparatory rite, the Paragra, which consists of a number of meticulous ritual operations and ends with the preparation

of the sacrificial liquor. The ritual is performed by two priests, known as the *zōt* (Av., *zaotar*; Skt., *hotr*) and the *rāspī*. The former recites the *Yasna*—that is, the seventy-two chapters included in this section of the Avesta—and the latter fuels the ceremonial fire. The entire ceremony takes place in twelve stages, during which the *Yasna* is recited in a rhythmical way. The sacrifice is commissioned by the faithful and is carried out for their intentions.

Fire is not only the main symbol of Zoroastrianism; it is also the most venerable witness of the Yasna. It is the object of the priest's address and of the offering of the *haoma*. In Iran, as in India, there are three ritual fires: *farrbay*, the fire of priests; *gushnasp*, the fire of warriors; and *burzēn mihr*, the fire of farmers. There are also five natural fires, which reside, respectively, in front of Ahura Mazdā, in the bodies of men and animals, in plants, in clouds, and in the earth. Thus, fire is a vital element and is present in all of nature. Two divine entities are associated with it: Apām Napāt ("grandson" or "son of the water"), the *ahura* "who created male human beings," and Nairyōsanha (Pahl., Neryōsang, "of manly utterance"), the *yazata* of prayer. Also related to fire is the concept of *khvarenah* (Pahl., *khwarrah*, *farr*), meaning "splendor" or "divine grace" and represented as an igneous fluid and vital seed (Duchesne-Guillemin, 1962). This is a basic concept in the cosmogony, in the eschatology, and in the psychology of Zoroastrianism. Because of the symbolic values they attribute to fire, Zoroastrians have been erroneously considered fire worshippers, especially by the Muslims.

A strongly ritualistic religion, Zoroastrianism marked the year with a series of fixed holidays, thus incorporating traditional ways and customs that were hard to eradicate. But there have always been problems connected with this calendar, throughout thousands of years of history, and many things, especially those from the earliest times, are still far from clear to us. We do know for certain, however, that a lunar-solar calendar, whose roots are clearly Babylonian, was adopted under the Achaemenids. But, most likely under Artaxerxes I in 441 BCE, a Zoroastrian calendar came into use. Under the Sasanids, the year was divided into 365 days, into 12 months of 30 days, to the last of which were added 5 days, each dedicated to a group of *Gāthās* (*Gāh*-days). This, of course, did not prevent confusion or the superimposition of dates, which, in turn, caused modifications, attempts at reform, and drawn-out debates that continue even into the twentieth century in Parsi communities.

The first month of the year was dedicated to the *fravashis*, the spirits of the just, who were originally thought to be transcendental doubles of the soul. Zo-

roastrians believed in the *fravashis* of the dead, of the living, and of the yet unborn. According to a most likely pre-Zoroastrian tradition, the *fravashis* returned to earth at the end of the year, before the vernal equinox, the Nō Rūz ("new day"), or the first month of the new year. Zoroastrians also celebrated six additional great feasts: Maidhyōizaremaya ("midspring"); Maidhyōishema ("midsummer"); Patishahya ("bringing in the corn"); Ayathrima ("the homecoming"); Maidhyāiryā ("midwinter"). Also very important were the feast of Mithra (Mithrakāna), the god to whom the seventh month was dedicated, held at the beginning of the second half of the year (autumnal equinox), and that of Tirī (Av., Tishtrya), a deity who corresponds to the star Sirius, to whom was dedicated the fourth month.

Nō Rūz probably originated as an ancient pan-Iranian celebration of the vernal equinox and was later adopted and modified by Zoroastrianism. It was connected to the legend of Yima (the New Persian Jamshīd), the first king, who had reigned over the earth in an ancient golden age. An important figure in ancient Iran's religious and national tradition, Yima appears to correspond (but not without question) to the Indian figure of Yama, the lord of hell. The "new day" of the new year, a day of good auspices and of renewal of creation and of life, was celebrated with a joyous feast. During the Achaemenid period, the feast acquired special relevance, becoming associated with the concept of royalty.

Historical Development. While the *Gāthās* contain the original teachings of Zarathushtra, the Younger Avesta shows how Zoroastrianism synthesized its new ideas with older beliefs and traditions, always, however, maintaining precise theological standards. Thus the concepts that were absorbed by the new Zoroastrian religion were undoubtedly deeply rooted in the Iranian religions of the first half of the first millennium BCE, but they were reinterpreted in a way that did not conflict with the ethical and spiritual values originally advocated by Zarathushtra. That is, in the terminology of the "tripartite ideology" of Georges Dumézil, the religion absorbed those elements reflecting the values of the first and third functions, priests and shepherds (later farmers), rather than those reflecting ideologies and attitudes typical of the second, the warrior, function. The violent and aggressive character of some deities of the ancient Iranian and Indo-Iranian pantheon, such as Indra, irretrievably condemned them to be downgraded to the role of *daivas*, or demons. At the same time, whatever positive elements could be perceived in the warrior values were put in the service of the new faith and attributed to gods from the other two functions, in particular the first. Such is the case with Mithra, who is, in Iran, strongly marked by warrior

traits yet also has positive qualities, for he is the god of light and the guardian of truth and order in the cosmos.

These first syntheses were carried out by the Avestan priests in pre-Achaemenid times and were handed down through the Magi during the entire period of the Achaemenid empire. The mediation of the Magi was important from a historical point of view, and it marked an important stage in the development of Zoroastrianism. On the one hand, the Magi ensured the transmission and survival of the religion throughout the entire Iranian or Iranized world; on the other, they modified Zoroastrianism in a deep way, not only from a philosophical and theological point of view (i.e., the dualistic doctrine) but also from a more general point of view. They widened its scope and allowed it to interpret other religious traditions, especially the Near Eastern ones. They opened it to syncretism and to eclecticism, a development that acquired considerable importance when the Mesopotamian civilization was encountered. Political elements, of course, played a part in these developments: they were strongly fostered by the great supra-national Achaemenid empire, whose rulers needed to affirm a concept of royalty that could fit into the political universalism of the Persians without conflicting with the cultural, social, and religious traditions found in other countries of their vast empire. The concept of royalty that emerged during Achaemenid rule, which was transmitted, under various guises, to later Iranian and non-Iranian dynasties, was as far from the ideologies and the values of the archaic world of early Zoroastrianism as it was close to the millenarian, monarchic traditions of Near Eastern societies.

The most important change made by the Magi, however, was their modification of the doctrine of dualism. According to the original doctrine, the beginning of everything, the root of the conflict between the forces of good and evil, could be traced to the principle of Time as Destiny (Pahl., Zurwān). No one, not even the human soul, can escape this principle. The Magi's new formulation, however, no longer considered Ahura Mazdā as the transcending principle but, rather, placed him in a lesser role as one of the two opposing spirits. Thus was born Zurvanism, whose existence is documented by sources from the Sasanid period, as well as by Christian, Armenian, and Syriac sources and by Greek sources referring to the Achaemenid and Parthian periods. Zurvanism must have been an earlier expression of the new Iranian dualism. It seems to indicate a tendency, originating inside Zoroastrianism, to reconcile the original Zoroastrian dualistic inspiration with Babylonian astral religiosity as well as with Mesopotamian demonology. The tendency was the result of an encounter between the western Magi and the Chaldeans, the

Babylonian priesthood known for its occultism. (The meeting also produced Mithraism during the Parthian period.) Time was thus endowed with an overpowering and regulating authority.

The Seleucid period (Greco-Bactrian in the easternmost areas of the Iranian world and later Parthian) was characterized by Hellenistic influences. These were partly accepted, partly rejected by the Parthians. The resistance developed after the break in tradition caused by Alexander the Great's conquest of Iran. The break, however, proved not to be radical, as Zoroastrianism survived. In the end, in fact, its basic tenets, its soteriological inspiration, as well as its dualistic approach, exercised a deep influence far beyond the Iranian world. This influence extended even into the Judeo-Christian and Buddhist cultural areas, possibly contributing to the development of the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) Buddhist pantheon. Some aspects of the Zoroastrian religion even spread east of the Parthian territories to the Kushan empire, as we can see, for example, by the coin iconography of that dynasty.

The Sasanid period witnessed the refoundation of Zoroastrianism. The religious traditions that had survived the break caused by the Greco-Macedonian hegemony—and partly connected to the concepts and ideology of royalty that flourished during the Achaemenid period, especially in Fārs—were elaborated in the context of a vast reorganization, codification, and canonization of tradition. This was carried out by priests of the *mōbad* (from the ancient *magupati*, “master of the Magi”) and *hērbad* (Av., *aēthrapaiti*), who were based in the power centers of the new dynasty, the most influential shrines of western Iran, Media, Shiz (Takht-i Sulaiman) and of Fārs and Stakhr (near Persepolis). Several outstanding figures emerged as the creators and defenders of the new orthodoxy, such as Tōsar, during the reign of Ardashīr I (224–241 CE); Kerdēr, under the first rulers, from Ardashīr I to Wahrām II (276–293); and Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān, under Shāpūr II (309–379). Thanks to the refounding, Zoroastrianism acquired new connotations: it became a religion in the service of the ruling classes, the warrior aristocracy and the clergy, as well as the crown. It became a hierarchically organized state religion, an epic and nationalistic tradition increasingly identified with the Iranian nation. From a universal religion, which had shown its best throughout the Parthian period, Zoroastrianism was transformed into a national religion. The “good religion” (Pahl., *wēh-dēn*), and Iran became, in a certain sense, synonymous.

The nationalistic evolution of Zoroastrianism continued even after the Arab conquest of the Sasanid empire. Zoroastrian communities that survived the first centuries of Islam, as well as the priests who were responsi-

ble for the flowering of the Pahlavi religious literature, kept alive the memory of the imperial era in Iran as a happy time for the “good religion” and for the doctrine of the future savior and the apocalypse. They railed against Arabs, Romans, and Turks, planting in the mind of the faithful the dangerous certainty of revenge. In fact, during the Sasanid period Zoroastrianism had not been able to hold up against other universalistic religions. If it did succeed in stifling Manichaean universalism in Iran during the third century (as it also later suppressed the Mazdakite movement), it was nonetheless not able to mount effective opposition against the spread of Christianity, the Nestorian church in particular, and, later, of Islam.

Uprisings against Arab domination, for example, the revolt in the city of Shīrāz in 979, not only failed but also resulted in harsh repressive measures. By the tenth century, Zoroastrians began to leave Iran and head for India, where they today form a small but flourishing community known as the Parsis (“Persians”). Along with the reduced Zoroastrian community in Iran (found especially in the regions of Yazd and Kermān), the Parsis have perpetuated the ancient religion of Zarathushtra to this very day, notwithstanding the deep transformations brought about by complex and varied events throughout three millennia of history.

Thus the communities in Iran and India, the two main branches of modern Zoroastrianism, evolved throughout many centuries into separate and independent forms. The first lasting contacts between the Parsis of India and the Zoroastrians of Iran were made around the end of the sixteenth century, through the traditional exchange of *rivāyat*, texts providing answers to liturgical and doctrinal questions. Although the Iranian communities remained isolated for centuries, holding together in a hostile environment, the Indian ones were able to exercise considerable influence on the society in which they had settled, not only from a social and political point of view (aided later by the position of privilege they acquired under the British rule of India), but also from a religious one. This is shown by the presence of Zoroastrian ideas in the syncretic and archaizing religious reform carried out by the emperor Akbar around the last quarter of the fifteenth century.

The history of the Parsi communities in India, which have their main center in Bombay, is characterized principally by two phenomena. The first phenomenon is their contact with other religious traditions (Hinduism, Islam, Christianity), as well as with forms of modern spiritualism, such as theosophy, astrology, esotericism. This has led to considerable problems of a theological and doctrinal nature, especially concerning monotheism and dualism, and has resulted in a number of revi-

sions. The second is the dialogue—sometimes struggle—between the conservative and the reform-oriented tendencies within the Parsis. The cult of the dead and questions related to the calendar and to feast days are traditional subjects of debate within the Indian communities. Moreover, the rediscovery of the Avesta in the eighteenth century and the resulting studies by Western philologists have also, in some instances more directly than in others, caused divisive doctrinal conflicts among the Persis in their interpretation of traditional teachings.

After the end of the British rule in India, and at the birth of the Indian union and of Pakistan, the Parsis found themselves divided into Indian communities (the vast majority) and Pakistani communities in Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta (in 1976, there were about 5,000 members). There is also a small Parsi community in Sri Lanka. In 1976, it was estimated that the world's Zoroastrian population numbered 130,000, of whom, in addition to the ones just mentioned, 82,000 were in India, 25,000 in Iran, and most of the others in North America. Zoroastrians from around the world have been able to meet and to establish working relationships at international symposia and conferences, as in Tehran in 1960 and in Bombay in 1964, 1978, and 1985.

Modern Zoroastrianism is characterized by its lack of a proselytizing impulse. Historical reasons have contributed, especially among the Parsi communities, to such an attitude, which was also related to the fear of an influx from the lower castes. Historically Zoroastrians have never shown a great interest in conversions, except in the earliest times. In India, the Parsis eventually became a sort of caste, one that became economically strong within Indian society. They are also perceived as a group that sees religion as strictly linked to birth and lineage. This perception was fostered by their custom of marriage between blood relatives, generally cousins, in accordance with Zoroastrian tradition, which in ancient times recommended marriage even between brothers and sisters.

Zoroastrian communities show great vitality and, very often, a considerable interest in the study and interpretation of their millenarian religious tradition. In Bombay, in particular, there are various institutions, even secular ones, devoted to the study of the religion, and they have valued the scholarship of Western philology of the past three centuries. In addition, religious institutions have arisen in Bombay and Naosari for the special purpose of teaching the religion to future priests.

[For further discussion of Zoroastrianism, see Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu; Ahuras; Airyana Vaejah; Amesha Spentas; Anāhitā; Ateshgah; Avesta; Chinvat

Bridge; Daivas; Dahkma; Frashōkereti; Fravashis; Haoma; Khvarenah; Magi; Saoshyant; and Yazatas. See also the biography of Zarathushtra.]

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Classic works, again very different from each other in approach and method, are Herman Lommel's *Die Religion Zarathustras nach dem Awesta dargestellt* (Tübingen, 1930) and H. S. Nyberg's *Irans forntida religioner* (Stockholm, 1937), translated as *Die Religionen des alten Iran* (1938; 2d ed., Osnabrück, 1966). Lommel's work is a faithful reconstruction of ancient Zoroastrianism, more philological than historical-religious; Nyberg's study, also based on a careful philological analysis of the sources, is more involved with historical and religious problems, and its approach is highly original, if somewhat controversial.

Other Swedish scholars, following the guidelines traced by Nyberg, have contributed in a significant fashion to the study of the earliest Iranian religions, from both a philological and a historical-religious point of view. Notable are Geo Widengren's *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran* (Uppsala, 1938) and Stig Wikander's *Feuerpriester in Kleinasien und Iran* (Lund, 1946).

As the result of long and demanding work, gathered for the most part in the *Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran* in 1929–1930, Ernst Herzfeld, an archaeologist and historian of Iran, published, some years later, a vast reconstruction of the religion of ancient Iran: *Zoroaster and His World*, 2 vols. (1947; reprint, New York, 1973). Although vast in scope, Herzfeld's work is not systematic but is, rather, a fragmented account in independent chapters.

Against the conclusions expressed by Herzfeld concerning Zarathushtra and the early period, as well as against the main theses of Nyberg, W. B. Henning, one of the foremost authorities in Iranian philology, published the texts of some of his own lectures in *Zoroaster: Politician or Witch-Doctor?* (Oxford, 1951). Nyberg's position was later defended, however, by Geo Widengren, from his own original point of view, in two long articles published in *Numen* and later in his *Stand und Aufgaben der iranischen Religionsgeschichte* (Leiden, 1955). Nyberg himself defended his position in his introduction to the second printing of his *Religionen des alten Iran* (Osnabrück, 1966).

One of the new elements in Widengren's work, as well as in that of Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, is the acceptance of Georges Dumézil's theory of a tripartite Indo-European ideology, and of its applicability to Iran and Zoroastrianism. Dumézil has offered a number of contributions along these lines, of which the most famous is still *Naissance d'archanges* (Paris,

1945), in which he interprets the Zoroastrian system of the Amesha Spentas in the light of his theory.

Preceding Widengren in his application of the Dumézilian theory to Zoroastrianism was Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin in his *Zoroastre: Étude critique avec une traduction commentée des Gâthâ* (Paris, 1948), which he followed, a decade later, with *The Western Response to Zoroaster* (Oxford, 1958). The latter work is extremely clear yet, at the same time, critical and problematical. Dumézil's theory is also applied in a rather original way to ancient Iran by Marijan Molé in *Culte, mythe et cosmologie dans l'Iran ancien* (Paris, 1963), in which he tries to provide a structural, rather than a historical, picture of the entire Zoroastrian tradition.

Following in the footsteps of Henning's work, Ilya Gershevitch gives a clear and perceptive reconstruction of the Zoroastrian teachings and of the early development of Zoroastrianism in a short but fundamental article: "Zoroaster's Own Contribution," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 23 (1964): 12–38.

A number of works concerned with particular problems and subjects are nevertheless important for general Zoroastrian studies. Among them are Émile Benveniste's *The Persian Religion according to the Chief Greek Texts* (Paris, 1929), which presents an interpretation of the main Greek sources so as to allow the reconstruction of the historical development of religion in ancient Iran, and H. W. Bailey's *Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books* (Oxford, 1943), which deals with various subjects on the basis of an extraordinarily erudite understanding of the Pahlavi literature of the ninth century CE. Also to be numbered among essential works is R. C. Zaehner's *Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma* (Oxford, 1955), a reexamination, after more than twenty years, of the question of Zurvanism that had been so masterfully tackled by Nyberg in his "Questions de cosmogonie et de cosmologie mazdéennes," *Journal asiatique* (1929): 193–310 and (1931): 1–134, 193–244. Zurvanism was later the subject of Ugo Bianchi, in his *Zamān i Ōhrmazd: Lo zoroastrismo nelle sue origini e nella sua essenza* (Turin, 1958), as well as of other scholars.

Works that, to a certain extent, show their age but that are nonetheless useful as general references are J. H. Moulton's *Early Zoroastrianism* (London, 1913), M. N. Dhalla's *Zoroastrian Theology* (New York, 1914), Raffaele Pettazzoni's *La religione di Zarathustra nella storia religiosa dell'Iran* (Bologna, 1920), and M. N. Dhalla's *History of Zoroastrianism* (New York, 1938). Good for its second part is another book by R. C. Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism* (1961; reprint, London, 1976), originally published in the same year as Walther Hinz's *Zarathustra* (Stuttgart, 1961) and Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin's *Symbolik des Parsismus* (Stuttgart, 1961), a consideration of all aspects of Zoroastrian symbolism.

General works on Zoroastrianism written with more of a popularizing intent include Marijan Molé's *L'Iran ancien* (Paris, 1965); Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin's "L'Iran antique et Zoroastre" and "L'église sassanide et le mazdéisme," in *Histoire des religions*, edited by Henri-Charles Puech, vol. 1 (Paris, 1970), pp. 625–694, and vol. 2 (Paris, 1973), pp. 3–32, respectively; and Mircea Eliade's "Zarathustra and the Iranian Religion" and "New Iranian Syntheses," in his *A History of Reli-*

gious Ideas, vol. 1 (Chicago, 1978), pp. 302–333, and vol. 2 (Chicago, 1982), pp. 306–329, respectively. Other useful works are Jivanji Jamshedji Modi's *The Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Parsees*, 2d ed. (Bombay, 1937), and Louis H. Gray's *The Foundations of the Iranian Religions* (Bombay, 1929), which is particularly helpful on the listing of the members of the Zoroastrian pantheon and pandemonium.

In addition to *A History of Zoroastrianism*, her *magnum opus*, Mary Boyce has produced a number of other valuable works on Zoroastrianism. In *A Persian Stronghold of Zoroastrianism* (Oxford, 1977), she paints an interesting and accurate picture of the religion in today's Iranian communities. In *Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (London, 1979), she gives a clear and useful synthesis of the medieval period, the post-Islamic period, and the modern era of the Zoroastrian religion, both in Iran and in India. And in *Textual Sources for the Study of Zoroastrianism* (Manchester, 1984), she has gathered a vast selection of translated texts from various periods and sources.

Two of my own works are dedicated to questions relating to the origins and early development of Iranian religion from Zarathushtra to the third century CE: *Zoroaster's Time and Homeland: A Study on the Origins of Mazdeism and Related Problems* (Naples, 1980) and *De Zoroastre à Mani: Quatre leçons au Collège de France* (Paris, 1985).

Important chapters concerning Zoroastrianism and particular subjects pertaining to the religious history of ancient Iran are to be found in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 2, edited by Ilya Gershevitch, and vol. 3, edited by Ehsan Yarshater (Cambridge, 1983), in particular the contributions of Martin Schwartz, Yarshater, Boyce, Carsten Colpe, and Duchesne-Guillemin. This volume of *The Cambridge History of Iran* covers the Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanid periods; a volume dedicated to the Achaemenid period is forthcoming.

GERARDO GNOLI

Translated from Italian by Ughetta Fitzgerald Lubin

ZULU RELIGION. After nearly 150 years of missionary activity the majority of the some 5.5 million Zulu-speaking South Africans are Christians. For many, however, the *amadlozi* (ancestors or shades of dead kin) who once dominated Zulu religion are still a force to be reckoned with and propitiated. The acceptance of the power of the *amadlozi* to intervene in the lives of their descendants and to help them is manifested in the beliefs and rituals of most of the African independent churches to which, indeed, over a quarter of all Zulu Christians belong. The basic concerns of traditional Zulu religion—the pursuit of health, fertility, and a balance between man and man and between man and nature—are as relevant today as ever. Since these are the very areas in which the ancestors are thought to be most powerful, offerings to the *amadlozi* occur in many contexts both traditional and Christian. These offerings take place

both in the far-flung areas of rural KwaZulu (the geographical area situated on the east coast of South Africa between 28° and 31° south latitude from which most Zulu originated even if they have no ties there today) as well as in cosmopolitan urban centers where Zulu mingle with other South Africans as residents and work-seekers.

Attention is focused here upon the major enduring features of Zulu religion as first reported in the writings of early travelers and missionaries, and later in contemporary anthropological work in KwaZulu, notably that of Harriet Ngubane, whose study of the Nyuswa-Zulu provides a picture of how Zulu religion is practiced today and highlights the previously neglected role of women in belief and ritual.

In Zulu thought the ancestors are only one part of a more extensive system of beliefs. Within this system, the natural order is thought to impinge closely upon man for human beings are thought to be related both physically and psychologically to their environment and to be vulnerable to harmful forces in nature. Such forces either operate automatically or are manipulated by sorcerers (*abathakathi*) who cause ill health, misfortune, and the general state of vulnerability known as *isifo*. The ancestors also harm the living but only as a warning when they are angry; in fact, the *amadlozi*, many of whom were once known to the living, are the major protectors against sorcery. Appropriate ancestral offerings are cattle or goats that are sacrificed, the meat being left overnight for the ancestors to "lick" (*khotha*) and to share with the living. Diviners called *izangoma* (sg., *isangoma*) are consulted whenever illness, misfortune, or unusual events occur, for it is they alone who can ascertain the cause. They also recommend paths of reparation in the case of ancestral anger and, in the event of sorcery, may point out the sorcerer or suggest countermeasures. Diviners are called to their profession by their own ancestors, who possess and guide them, and they undergo a lengthy training in their art. Herbalists (*izinyanga*) also treat disease and provide protective medicines but, because they are not possessed by the spirits, they lack powers of divination.

Zulu Cosmology and the Natural Order. The Zulu say that in the beginning there was uMvelinqangi, literally the first "comer-out," who broke off from a reed bed followed by human beings, animals, and nature as a whole. He sent a chameleon to humanity with the message that they would live forever. Later, growing impatient with the chameleon's slowness, he sent a lizard with the message that all humans would die, and because it was the faster animal, the lizard arrived first. In some tales uMvelinqangi is portrayed as the source of the known social order, for he gave human beings

their ancestors and decided how the ancestors should be approached and placated. There is, however, little evidence that uMvelinqangi was worshiped directly. Ideas about him probably served largely as explanatory constructs for the natural order (and some features of the social order), and in traditional times such ideas would have played a minor role in everyday religious practice. Another name for uMvelinqangi was uNkulunkulu ("the old, old one"), a term that missionaries used for "God," thus causing some confusion by conflating Zulu ideas of a pure creator with Christian notions of a creator and supreme being to whom regular worship must be directed. Distinct from uMvelinqangi is iNkosi yeZulu, the lord of the sky and personification of heaven. He is associated with thunder and lightning, which are greatly feared and against which specially trained herbalists offer protection.

Linked also with the sky or the "above" (*ezulwini*—a critical concept that contrasts with *phansi*, the "below," where the dead go before becoming ancestors) is iNkosazana yeZulu, or merely iNkosazana, the princess of heaven (uNomkhubulwana). The latter term is derived from *khubula* ("to sow again after rain or sun has destroyed crops"), and this female deity is closely associated with abundance and sufficient (but not too much) rain. She bestows fertility on crops, cattle, and human beings and is often actively placated in times of drought and searing heat. The patron of women and particularly of young girls, iNkosazana is said to appear in the fructifying mists of spring and to stand on the threshold of summer like a girl whose puberty ceremonies mark her entry to marriage and procreation. The same songs are sung both at girls' puberty ceremonies and at ceremonies held in honor of iNkosazana; in both cases the songs are thought to promote fertility and good rains. Before hoeing begins, women sometimes plant a small field for iNkosazana near a river, and a libation of beer is poured on the ground to the accompaniment of a prayer for a fruitful harvest. Other ceremonies connected with the goddess are aimed at warding off pests that affect crops, cattle diseases, and maladies common in spring and summer such as malaria and gastroenteritis. The word *ukushweleza* ("to make an apology"), which is used in connection with these rituals, suggests the placation of iNkosazana's anger and the setting of things in order so that the season will proceed without mishap. Because of its conceptual links with fertility and girls' puberty ceremonials, the cult of iNkosazana must be seen against the background of the widespread emphasis upon fertility in African cosmological systems. Her cult has a counterpart in the *uyali-vuhwera* fertility cult and the *gomana* drum cult of the north-eastern Transvaal Lowveld, but the Zulu are unique

among Bantu-speaking peoples in southern Africa in their conception of a female deity associated with fertility who is worshiped even today.

The natural order impinges on life in other ways which affect health and well-being. In contrast to illnesses caused by sorcery or ancestral anger, there is an extremely wide range of diseases stretching from the common cold to more serious epidemics like smallpox or measles, which are said to "just happen." These maladies may be due to natural causes such as the changing of the seasons or the inevitable processes of aging and maturation. Many are treated with medicines which are potent in themselves and do not necessarily require ritual or religious accompaniment, although protection against certain seasonal illnesses may be sought from iNkosazana. Another important class of natural illnesses are thought to result inevitably from imbalances in nature. All living things are believed to leave behind something of themselves and absorb something of the atmosphere through which they move. Such influences, called *imikhondo* ("tracks"), may be detrimental to the individual. Treatment, while bringing relief to one person, may release the dangerous element to affect others. To keep the immediate environment pure, people seek to discard *imikhondo* in public places such as highways and crossroads, where they are thought to mix with other noxious substances placed there by sorcerers; these areas are thus extremely dangerous to travelers. Moving into a new environment may in itself be dangerous, as one is not yet attuned to its influences. Several categories of people are particularly at risk from environmental influences including newcomers to an area, infants who have only recently entered the world, and all those who are temporarily in a weakened state, known as *umnyama*. This last category includes the bereaved, newly delivered mothers, homicides, and menstruating women. Although all people should be strengthened from time to time against alien environmental influences, these people must be given specific treatments, often both medicinal and ritual, aimed not only at strengthening them but also at achieving or restoring order or symmetry between them and their environment. The word commonly used to describe such treatment is *ukuzilungisa* (from *lunga*, "to be as should be," and *isa*, "to come to be"), which implies the restitution of balance not only between man and nature but sometimes between man and man or between man and his ancestors.

Certain natural processes are thought to weaken the individual. The most important and general is *umnyama*, to which reference was made above, and which may be literally translated as "darkness," "blackness," or "heaviness." This state results from contact with

death or birth, which renders the individual open to sorcery, other malign influences, bad luck, and misfortune, and also makes him or her a danger to others. Women are extremely vulnerable to *umnyama* because of their biological association with procreation and because the chief mourners at funerals are always women. Indeed, Ngubane argues that because of this dual association with the beginning and end of life, women occupy a "marginal" position in Zulu cosmology and serve as a symbolic bridge between "this world" (the world of the living) and the "otherworld" (that of the spirits). Women, however, not only link this world and the otherworld, but in their roles as daughter in one kinship group and mother in another they form a bridge between two distinct patrilineages. Zulu society is strongly patrilineal, and marriage may occur only outside the clan. A bride is thus an outsider in her affinal home, yet it is only through her that her husband's group can reproduce itself. This social marginality is indicated by certain linguistic avoidances or restrictions (*hlonipha*) placed upon a bride and also by the fear that married women are potential sorcerers in their husband's homestead. Since the bearer of children is thus paradoxically also a threat to continuity of the patriline, Zulu social structure places married women in an ambiguous position which complements the marginality they derive from their biological and cultural association with birth and death. Diviners are also seen to be marginal in that they intercede between the living and the dead, between this world and the otherworld, and it is significant that most diviners are women and that men who are called to this position are transvestites.

Ancestors and Social Life. As Eileen Jensen Krige has pointed out, "the real vital religion of the Zulus is their ancestor worship" (Krige, 1936). Indeed, when things are going well, the Zulu say that their ancestors are "with them," but when misfortune strikes, they say that the ancestors are "facing away." Revelations are made in dreams and visions as well as through misfortune, and what angers the ancestors most is neglect and failure to fulfill kinship obligations. Different aspects of the overall conception of the ancestors are indicated in the various Zulu words used for the dead. *Amadlozi* is derived from *dloza*, meaning "to care for, keep an eye on," but because the spirit world is thought to be situated "below" (*phansi*), the ancestors are often referred to simply as *abaphansi*, "those of the below." Another word frequently used is *amathongo*, from *ubuthongo*, "deep sleep," a reference to one of the ways in which the ancestors contact the living. Diviners address their ancestors as *makhosi*, from *inkhosi*, "chief," and *ubukhosi*, "authority, power, glory," thus emphasizing the

major nuances of the unique relationship between them and the spirits which possess them. The word *isithunzi*, from *umthunzi*, "shadow," refers to the force or personality that leaves the body at death and wanders aimlessly until it is "brought home" (*buyisa*) by a special ceremony designed to integrate it (as an *idlozi*, or ancestor proper) into the body of powerful ancestors who have control over the living. Since the spirits are dependent upon their descendants to perform this and other ancestral rituals, the relationship between the living and the dead is one of mutuality which excludes non-kin and reflects the major emphases of Zulu kinship and particularly patrilineal organization.

A man's most important ancestors are his father, mother, father's father, and father's mother, as well as the father's brothers who act with and share sacrifices offered to deceased parents and grandparents. Among the Nyuswa-Zulu, about whom we have recent knowledge from the work of Ngubane, *amadlozi* more than three generations removed from a homestead head are not thought to be dangerous. They are said, however, to come to sacrifices along with closer ancestors, and may even possess a diviner as a supporting spirit. The living kin who gather for ancestral rituals largely include the patrilineal descendants of a grandfather, and the women who have married these men. At sacrifices, it is the genealogically senior male (*umnumzane*) who officiates. Among the Nyuswa-Zulu the married men of this cluster or segment (*umndeni*) of two or three generations often live close to each other and, under the headship of the *umnumzane*, act as a corporate group in the control and management of common resources (such as land) and in the settlement of internal disputes. The authority of the *umnumzane* is bolstered by his ritual position and the fact that younger agnates can approach the ancestors only through him. The rituals of the ancestor cult therefore both demonstrate and, in the Durkhemian sense, promote the corporate character and social continuity of the *umndeni*. On the political level, the ancestors of the king guard and protect the whole society and are sacrificed to at national festivals. Prior to the defeat of the Zulu nation and the disbanding of the army by the British, the king's ancestors were always called upon before warriors went into battle.

The ancestor cult reflects a number of other important aspects of Zulu social life. The role of the chief wife who bears the heir is emphasized, for it is on the *um-samo* of her hut (the rear part of the dwelling associated with the spirits) that sacrificial meat is placed for the ancestors to share. Individual social identities are often fixed unambiguously by calling on the ancestors. Thus a baby is placed formally under the control of the ancestors to whose line it belongs by the sacrifice of a

goat known as *imbeleko*, the skin of which is used to secure the baby on its mother's back. This ceremony is usually performed by the child's father or father's father, but in the case of an unmarried woman, the responsibility lies with her father and his *umndeni* to which the child belongs.

In former times abandoned children were adopted by an *imbeleko* sacrifice, thus demonstrating that it is social rather than biological paternity which is important. By the same token, one of the objectives of wedding ceremonies is to introduce the bride, who comes from another descent group, to her husband's ancestors and to put her under their care. Neglect of this formality may result in failure on the part of her affinal ancestors to recognize and protect her and her children. Barrenness is sometimes, however, attributed to a married woman's own ancestors who may, for instance, be angry that the correct puberty ceremonies were not performed for her. They may also make her ill if they want her to become a diviner. In both cases it is her father's responsibility to set matters in order. The fact that a married woman can be affected by her own ancestors as well as those of her husband serves both to underline the separate identity of affinal groups linked by marriage and to indicate the married woman's role as a bridge between the two patrilineages. With time and the birth of children she is effectively transferred from the one descent group to the other. After menopause she may eat those parts of ancestral sacrifices reserved for members of her affinal kin group, and she may even call on the ancestors if no suitable male is present. At death she is fully incorporated into her affinal group when she is brought back by her son as one of his patrilineal ancestors. She has then completed the "long journey" (*udwendwe*) that she began as a bride, and in so doing she had mediated between the conflicting interests of patriliney and exogamy in Zulu society.

Spirit Possession. Spirit possession is an important and dynamic aspect of Zulu life. The call to be a diviner takes the form of recognized mental and physical affliction, the cure for which are initiation and professional training. The traditional *isangoma* (and her counterpart in many Christian sects) is a pivotal force for order and rapprochement between man and the spirit world. There are, however, new forms of spirit possession that were first reported at the turn of the century, which have intensified since the 1930s. These are destructive and anarchic; Ngubane relates them to the disruptive effects of social and industrial change. *Indiki* and *ufufunyane* (or *iziwe*) are the most prevalent types, resulting from possession by the deceased spirits of foreigners, which have not been integrated into the body of the ancestors. *Indiki* are possessed by male spirits who en-

ter the individual's chest by chance and manifest themselves in a deep bellowing voice which speaks in a foreign tongue. Treatment often involves replacing the alien spirit with an ancestral spirit, and the *indiki* may become a diviner. *Ufufunyane* is diagnosed as due to sorcery and is a particularly intractable form, for the alien spirit becomes violent when challenged. The possessed individuals become hysterical and may attempt suicide in a frenzy. Treatment involves dispelling the alien spirit—or often hordes of spirits of different race groups—and replacing them by spirits controlled by the doctor and referred to as a regiment (*amabutho*). The image is one of war against the sorcerer's evil medicine; no attempt is made to call an ancestral spirit, and no cult membership or professionalization results.

Traditional Belief and Zulu Christianity. Zulu cosmological ideas have been incorporated into Zulu Christian thought in a number of subtle ways. The word for "breath" (*umoya*) is translated as "Holy Spirit," and people said to be filled with the Holy Spirit become leaders in African independent churches that have split off from orthodox congregations. In these churches Christian beliefs coexist with aspects of traditional Zulu belief, and leadership reveals striking similarities to traditional divination in that the prophet, with the help of the Holy Spirit, explains misfortune and prescribes remedies. These may include ancestral offerings as well as orthodox Christian prayer. Protection against sorcery and misfortune is given by prayer and also medicine, and the blend of the two religious systems is basic to the vibrancy of African Christianity as it has developed, not only in the independent churches, but recently in orthodox congregations as well. Healing, purification, and the search for fertility are major issues in African Christianity, and many of the sects and churches that have proliferated in town and country serve not only the spiritual needs of their members but perform important social and welfare functions in the context of the chronic poverty and political subordination that has characterized the lives of many Zulu in the twentieth century.

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sources, but placing both belief and practice in their wider social context, is to be found in Eileen Jensen Krige's *The Social System of the Zulus* (Pietermaritzburg, 1936), pp. 280–296.

Two studies that deal with the present situation, both based on detailed anthropological research, are the Reverend Axel-Ivar Berglund's *Zulu Thought-Patterns and Symbolism* (London, 1976), and Harriet Ngubane's *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine* (London, 1977). The first work offers an exhaustive compilation of detail, which provides some important insights, and also discusses a number of problematic conceptual issues. However, for scholars and laymen alike, Ngubane's book is the best starting point; an ethnographic study of one community, it is written lucidly and with the insight of a Zulu anthropologist. For doctors and those involved in the medical field, it is a *sine qua non* as it examines religious beliefs as part of Zulu ideas about the causation and treatment of disease.

Researchers seeking to become conversant with the details of Zulu thought patterns should consult Otto F. Raum's *The Social Functions of Avoidances and Taboos among the Zulu* (Berlin and New York, 1973), as it presents fascinating but very detailed data on a wide range of beliefs and their associated avoidances. The writings of Katesa Schlosser will also be of interest, especially *Zauberei im Zululand: Manuskripte des Blitz-Zauberers Laduma Madela* (Kiel, 1972), a study of Zulu mythology as told by a lightning doctor. Although the latter work shows how one Zulu philosopher has rethought and to some extent reinterpreted and expanded traditional Zulu cosmological notions, none of the above works concentrate specifically on change. Those interested in this aspect should consult Bengt Sundkler's *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1961), and his more recent *Zulu Zion and Some Swazi Zionists* (Lund and Oxford, 1976). The sociological and welfare concomitants of many African independent churches are discussed in the work of James P. Kiernan; see in particular "Pure and Puritan: An Attempt to View Zionism as a Collective Response to Urban Poverty," *African Studies* 36 (1977): 31–41. The continuing influence of the conception of the ancestors in literature and worldview is demonstrated by a recent collection of poems by the Zulu poet Mazisi Kunene, *The Ancestors and the Sacred Mountain* (Exeter, N.H., 1982).

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ZURVANISM. It is not clear whether Zurvanism is a pre-Islamic Iranian religion independent of Zoroastrianism, and in some sense competing with it, or a current of philosophical and religious thought that developed within Zoroastrianism itself. The second hypothesis is probably the correct one, but several elements militate in favor of the first (Widengren, 1938, pp. 300ff.; 1968, pp. 314–327). In any case, Zurvanism cannot be defined as a Zoroastrian heresy, since it seems to have been the special form that Zoroastrianism assumed for a good part of its history, from the rule of the Achaemenids to the Sasanid empire.

The name of the religion is derived from the Pahlavi

name of a deity, Zurwān (Av., Zrvan) or Zamān, meaning "time." Time is at the center of Zurvanist speculation and is also the protagonist of the cult's mythology, several significant fragments of which have survived.

The Avesta, the collection of sacred books of Zoroastrianism, places little emphasis on Zrvan, rarely mentioning him. Indeed, a single reference is made to the "road created by Zrvan," a road that both the just and the wicked must travel (*Vendidad* 19.29). In another part of the text a distinction is made between Zrvan Akarana, "infinite Zurwān," and Zrvan Dareghō-khva-dhāta, "Zurwān of the long dominion" (*Yasna* 72.10; *Sīrōza* 1.21, 2.21). The Pahlavi texts from the ninth century CE treat Zurwān in a similar fashion: a distinction is made between Zurwān ī Akanārag, the first, and Zurwān ī Dērang Khwadāy, the second, who is also called Zurwān ī Kanāragōmand or Zurwān ī Brīnōmand—that is, "bounded time" or "finite time."

We owe our knowledge of the myth of Zurwān to Christian authors: the Armenians Eznik of Kolb and Elishe Vardapet and the Syriac Theodoros bar Kōnāi and Yoḥannān bar Penkayē. They may have a common source in Theodore of Mopsuestia (Cumont, 1938, vol. 1, p. 63; vol. 2, pp. 88ff.), but this is not certain. According to the myth, Zurwān is the father of twins, Ohrmizd (Pahl., Ōhrmazd; Av., Ahura Mazdā) and Ahrman (Pahl., Ahriman; Av., Angra Mainyu). The first was born of a sacrifice that Zurwān performed for a thousand years in order to have a son, who would create heaven and earth; the second was born of the doubts concerning the efficacy of the sacrifice with which Zurwān was assailed while performing the rite. Since he had determined before they were born that the first who saw the light of day would be made king, Zurwān was forced to give the firstborn, Ahrman ("dark and stinking"), the insignia of sovereignty, but he set a limit to his rule of nine thousand years (limited time). At the end of this time, Ohrmizd ("luminous and perfumed"), the son for whom Zurwān had offered the sacrifice, would assume absolute rule.

This myth has several archaic elements; for example, the concept of sacrifice directly reflects an Indo-Iranian heritage. The concept of the opposed gods Ōhrmazd and Ahriman (noted in Greek sources, such as Aristotle, Eudemus of Rhodes, and Plutarch) as the symmetrical poles of a dualistic formula did not originate in the Sasanid period (third to seventh century CE); it can be traced to the Achaemenid era (sixth to fourth century BCE). We must perceive a special kind of dualism in Zurvanism, one that is different from the original form of Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), who opposed the Beneficent Spirit (Spenta Mainyu) to the Evil Spirit (Angra Mainyu), placing above them the "father" god, Ahura Mazdā. The Zurvanists, however, made Ōhrmazd and

Ahriman twin brothers, the sons of Zurwān, and in so doing they modified Zarathushtra's original doctrine that held that good and evil are absolutely separate.

The Zurvanist problem—one of the questions that has most troubled scholars of ancient Iranian religions, especially in the search for elements of Zurvanism in Pahlavi literature (Nyberg, 1929, 1931; Zaehner, 1955)—will perhaps be resolved as a historical development, a result of the contact, during the Achaemenid period, between the original Zoroastrian dualism and Babylonian influences that were strongly impregnated with the ideas and beliefs of an astral religion. The conception of a universal law governing men and stars grew stronger and stronger throughout the first millennium BCE, favoring various syncretic phenomena in the Hellenistic period.

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GHERARDO GNOLI

Translated from Italian by Roger DeGaris

ZWINGLI, ULRICH (1484–1531), Swiss Protestant theologian. Born in Wildhaus, Switzerland, Zwingli was educated in Vienna (1500–1502) and later in Basel (1502–1506), where he studied under Thomas Wytten-

bach. He read Erasmus during his first pastorate in Glarus (1506–1516). During his second pastorate in Einsiedeln (1516–1518), he began to preach against indulgences. In 1518 Zwingli became preacher in the Zurich Cathedral, a post he retained until his death in 1531. He married Anna Reinhart in 1524.

From the beginning of his work in Zurich, Zwingli declared scripture to be the sole ultimate authority for the life and teaching of the church, thereby repudiating hierarchical authority. He preached against indulgences, stating that Christ's sacrifice is sufficient to remit all penalties for sin. He also preached against ascetic religious orders, fasting, the invocation of the saints, and the doctrine of purgatory. As a fervent Swiss patriot, Zwingli opposed Pope Leo X's recruitment of Swiss mercenaries.

In 1522 the civil authority of the canton of Zurich declared that a disputation should take place between those who advocated and those who opposed the Reformation principle that scripture alone should be the ultimate norm of church life and teaching. In preparation for this disputation, Zwingli, the leader of the Reformation group, wrote his lengthy *Sixty-seven Conclusions*, in which he repudiated the authority of the pope, the transubstantiation of bread and wine, the veneration of the saints, the existence of purgatory, and the necessity of fasting. The disputation was held on 29 January 1523; the council of Zurich decided in favor of the Reformation, and Zurich became a canton of the Reformation.

Zwingli's attention then turned toward a radical Reformation group, the Anabaptists, which had begun to flourish in Zurich during the early 1520s. The Anabaptists opposed the baptism of infants and denied the validity of such baptisms. They opposed any jurisdiction of the civil authorities in church life. They placed ultimate church authority in the local congregation rather than in larger church or civil councils. They aspired to establish "sinless congregations." In 1526 the government of Zurich, with Zwingli's support, suppressed the Anabaptists. The government also suppressed Catholicism in the canton. In retaliation the papal forces made war on Zurich. In a battle at Kappel on 11 October 1531, Zwingli fell and was executed on the battlefield.

While Zwingli, Luther, and Calvin had in common such great Reformation themes as the justification of the sinner by faith rather than by works and the acknowledgment that the church in all of its teaching is subject to the greater authority of scripture, there were also disagreements among them: principally in their understandings of the church, the Lord's Supper, and the relationship between church and civil authority. Zwingli's influence on subsequent Protestant teaching is apparent chiefly in these areas.

Doctrine of the Church. Luther and Calvin identify the church with the preaching of the word and the administration of the sacraments. Zwingli agrees but offers a more developed understanding of the church as community. He does so by identifying three meanings of the word *church* and then interrelating those meanings. He defines the church as (1) the communion of saints, the heavenly church called and gathered by Christ, (2) the historical church, made up of those who throughout the world confess Christ as Lord, and (3) the local congregation. It is Christ who chooses the members of his church and gathers them into a fellowship with him. This is the heavenly church that must exist here and now as the historical church, the means by which Christ makes himself visible in the world.

There is no historical church, however, except as it is composed of the many local congregations. The unity of the historical church exists not by the mere assertion that all these local congregations belong to it but rather by the fact, known through faith, that all local congregations have been chosen and gathered by the same Lord. Moreover, this unity is emphasized by the fact that every congregation has the same pattern of life to emulate. The earthly Jesus chose and gathered a local congregation, the apostles. Now the risen Lord, by the power of the Holy Spirit, continues to call and gather local congregations and commands them to emulate the pattern of the first congregation, as it is described in the New Testament. Zwingli, through his interrelation of these three meanings of *church*, represents Christ's choosing and gathering of his saints as the basic meaning of the church. He then explains preaching and the sacraments as means by which Christ calls and gathers his people into fellowship with him. These same means are to be used by his people to gather themselves around their invisible Lord, thereby making him visible. The invisible "being gathered" and the visible "gathering" constitute Zwingli's church.

Lord's Supper. For Zwingli, the Lord's Supper could not be understood in isolation but only as a moment in Christ's calling and gathering of his saints. The Lord's Supper is a pledge of loyalty by God's people made to their Lord, who commands this of them. It is one moment, but a central moment, of Christ's calling and gathering activity; it is not a moment in which Christ becomes suddenly present. Rather, Christ is understood to be present in the whole of that calling and gathering activity, which is the church. Zwingli does not deny that transubstantiation takes place in the Lord's Supper. He declares, however, that it is not the elements of bread and wine but rather the people who are changed; they are changed into saints by the calling and gathering activity of Christ. Luther and Calvin differed with Zwingli; both, in different ways, continued the tradition

of the church that focuses attention upon the elements of bread and wine. Zwingli and Luther quarreled about this focus at the Marburg Colloquy of 1529.

Church and Civil Government. According to Zwingli, Christ not only gathers a church, he also ordains the existence of the civil community, a body of free citizens. The authority of the civil community, while ultimately Christ's, rests derivatively in the consent of the citizenry. Each of these two communities—the civil rulers and the citizenry—has responsibilities toward the other. The civil rulers are to keep the peace and rule according to a concept of justice derived from scripture. Preachers are, therefore, to proclaim not only the gospel but also the demands of human justice that are derived from the gospel announced in scripture. The members of the civil community are guided away from self-interest by such preaching. The civil rulers, then, have the power and responsibility to protect the church's preaching of justice and the responsibility to be guided by it. The church and its preachers have no direct power to rule in civil affairs, but they have the responsibility of preaching human justice to citizens and civil rulers.

Zwingli's emphasis on the preaching of God's justice as the basis of the human justice of the civil community and on the importance of the consent of the governed distinguishes his teaching from Luther's. Luther taught that the function of civil rulers is, primarily, to restrain disorder. Zwingli's emphasis on the preacher as the people's tribune before the civil rulers and his willingness to accept some civil jurisdiction over church life distinguish his teaching from Calvin's. Calvin advocated a stronger separation between the ecclesiastical and the civil authorities.

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