

**The
Encyclopedia
of Religion**

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The Encyclopedia of Religion

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The Encyclopedia of Religion



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Abbreviations and Symbols Used in This Work

- abbr.** abbreviated; abbreviation
abr. abridged; abridgment
AD *anno Domini*, in the year of the (our) Lord
Afrik. Afrikaans
AH *anno Hegirae*, in the year of the Hijrah
Akk. Akkadian
Ala. Alabama
Alb. Albanian
Am. Amos
AM *ante meridiem*, before noon
amend. amended; amendment
annot. annotated; annotation
Ap. *Apocalypse*
Apn. *Apocryphon*
app. appendix
Arab. Arabic
'Arakh. 'Arakhin
Aram. Aramaic
Ariz. Arizona
Ark. Arkansas
Arm. Armenian
art. article (pl., arts.)
AS Anglo-Saxon
Asm. Mos. *Assumption of Moses*
Assyr. Assyrian
A.S.S.R. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
Av. Avestan
'A.Z. 'Avodah zarah
b. born
Bab. Babylonian
Ban. Bantu
1 Bar. *1 Baruch*
2 Bar. *2 Baruch*
3 Bar. *3 Baruch*
4 Bar. *4 Baruch*
B.B. *Bava' batra'*
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
bc before Christ
BCE before the common era
B.D. Bachelor of Divinity
Beits. *Beitsah*
Bekh. *Bekhorot*
Beng. Bengali
Ber. *Berakhot*
Berb. Berber
Bik. *Bikkurim*
bk. book (pl., bks.)
B.M. *Bava' metsi'a'*
BP before the present
B.Q. *Bava' qamma'*
Brāh. *Brāhmaṇa*
Bret. Breton
B.T. Babylonian Talmud
Bulg. Bulgarian
Burm. Burmese
c. *circa*, about, approximately
Calif. California
Can. Canaanite
Catal. Catalan
CE of the common era
Celt. Celtic
cf. *confer*, compare
Chald. Chaldean
chap. chapter (pl., chaps.)
Chin. Chinese
C.H.M. Community of the Holy Myrrhbearers
1 Chr. *1 Chronicles*
2 Chr. *2 Chronicles*
Ch. Slav. Church Slavonic
cm centimeters
col. column (pl., cols.)
Col. *Colossians*
Colo. Colorado
comp. compiler (pl., comps.)
Conn. Connecticut
cont. continued
Copt. Coptic
1 Cor. *1 Corinthians*
2 Cor. *2 Corinthians*
corr. corrected
C.S.P. *Congregatio Sancti Pauli*, Congregation of Saint Paul (Paulists)
d. died
D Deuteronomic (source of the Pentateuch)
Dan. Danish
D.B. Divinitatis Baccalaureus, Bachelor of Divinity
D.C. District of Columbia
D.D. Divinitatis Doctor, Doctor of Divinity
Del. Delaware
Dem. *Dema'i*
dim. diminutive
diss. dissertation
Dn. *Daniel*
D.Phil. Doctor of Philosophy
Dt. *Deuteronomy*
Du. Dutch
E Elohist (source of the Pentateuch)
Eccl. *Ecclesiastes*
ed. editor (pl., eds.); edition; edited by
'Eduy. 'Eduyyot
e.g. *exempli gratia*, for example
Egypt. Egyptian
1 En. *1 Enoch*
2 En. *2 Enoch*
3 En. *3 Enoch*
Eng. English
enl. enlarged
Eph. *Ephesians*
'Eruv. 'Eruvin
1 Esd. *1 Esdras*
2 Esd. *2 Esdras*
3 Esd. *3 Esdras*
4 Esd. *4 Esdras*
esp. especially
Est. Estonian
Est. *Esther*
et al. *et alii*, and others
etc. *et cetera*, and so forth
Eth. Ethiopic
EV English version
Ex. *Exodus*
exp. expanded
Ez. *Ezekiel*
Ezr. *Ezra*
2 Ezr. *2 Ezra*
4 Ezr. *4 Ezra*
f. feminine; and following (pl., ff.)
fasc. fascicle (pl., fascs.)
fig. figure (pl., figs.)
Finn. Finnish
fl. *floruit*, flourished
Fla. Florida
Fr. French
frag. fragment
ft. feet
Ga. Georgia
Gal. *Galatians*
Gaul. Gaulish
Ger. German
Git. *Giṭṭin*
Gn. *Genesis*
Gr. Greek
Ḥag. *Ḥagigah*
Ḥal. *Ḥallah*
Ḥau. Hausa
Ḥb. *Ḥabakkuk*
Heb. Hebrew
Heb. *Hebrews*
Hg. *Haggai*
Hitt. Hittite
Hor. *Horayot*
Hos. *Hosea*
Ḥul. *Ḥullin*
Hung. Hungarian
ibid. *ibidem*, in the same place (as the one immediately preceding)
Icel. Icelandic
i.e. *id est*, that is
IE Indo-European
Ill. Illinois
Ind. Indiana
intro. introduction
Ir. Gael. Irish Gaelic
Iran. Iranian
Is. *Isaiah*
Ital. Italian
J Yahvist (source of the Pentateuch)
Jas. *James*
Jav. Javanese
Jb. *Job*
Jdt. *Judith*
Jer. *Jeremiah*
Jgs. *Judges*
Jl. *Joel*
Jn. *John*
1 Jn. *1 John*
2 Jn. *2 John*
3 Jn. *3 John*
Jon. *Jonah*
Jos. *Joshua*
Jpn. Japanese
JPS Jewish Publication Society translation (1985) of the Hebrew Bible
J.T. Jerusalem Talmud
Jub. *Jubilees*
Kans. Kansas
Kel. *Kelim*

- Ker.** Keritot
Ket. Ketubbot
1 Kgs. 1 Kings
2 Kgs. 2 Kings
Khois. Khoisan
Kil. Kil'ayim
km kilometers
Kor. Korean
Ky. Kentucky
l. line (pl., ll.)
La. Louisiana
Lam. Lamentations
Lat. Latin
Latv. Latvian
L. en Th. Licencié
 en Théologie, Licentiate
 in Theology
L. ès L. Licencié ès Lettres,
 Licentiate in Literature
Let. Jer. Letter of Jeremiah
lit. literally
Lith. Lithuanian
Lk. Luke
LL Late Latin
LL.D. Legum Doctor,
 Doctor of Laws
Lv. Leviticus
m meters
m. masculine
M.A. Master of Arts
Ma'as. Ma'aserot
Ma'as. Sh. Ma'aser sheni
Mak. Makkot
Makh. Makhshirin
Mal. Malachi
Mar. Marathi
Mass. Massachusetts
1 Mc. 1 Maccabees
2 Mc. 2 Maccabees
3 Mc. 3 Maccabees
4 Mc. 4 Maccabees
Md. Maryland
M.D. Medicinae Doctor,
 Doctor of Medicine
ME Middle English
Meg. Megillah
Me'il. Me'ilah
Men. Menahot
MHG Middle High German
mi. miles
Mi. Micah
Mich. Michigan
Mid. Middot
Minn. Minnesota
Miq. Miqva'ot
MIran. Middle Iranian
Miss. Mississippi
Mk. Mark
Mo. Missouri
Mo'ed Q. Mo'ed qatan
Mont. Montana
MPers. Middle Persian
MS. manuscriptum,
 manuscript (pl., MSS)
Mt. Matthew
MT Masoretic text
n. note
Na. Nahum
Nah. Nahuatl
Naz. Nazir
- N.B.** nota bene, take careful
 note
N.C. North Carolina
n.d. no date
N.Dak. North Dakota
NEB New English Bible
Nebr. Nebraska
Ned. Nedarim
Neg. Nega'im
Neh. Nehemiah
Nev. Nevada
N.H. New Hampshire
Nid. Niddah
N.J. New Jersey
Nm. Numbers
N.Mex. New Mexico
no. number (pl., nos.)
Nor. Norwegian
n.p. no place
n.s. new series
N.Y. New York
Ob. Obadiah
O.Cist. Ordo
 Cisterciencium, Order of
 Citeaux (Cistercians)
OCS Old Church Slavonic
OE Old English
O.F.M. Ordo Fratrum
 Minorum, Order of Friars
 Minor (Franciscans)
OFr. Old French
Ohal. Ohalot
OHG Old High German
OIr. Old Irish
Olran. Old Iranian
Okla. Oklahoma
ON Old Norse
O.P. Ordo Praedicatorum,
 Order of Preachers
 (Dominicans)
OPers. Old Persian
op. cit. opere citato, in the
 work cited
OPrus. Old Prussian
Oreg. Oregon
'Orl. 'Orlah
O.S.B. Ordo Sancti
 Benedicti, Order of Saint
 Benedict (Benedictines)
p. page (pl., pp.)
P Priestly (source of the
 Pentateuch)
Pa. Pennsylvania
Pahl. Pahlavi
Par. Parah
para. paragraph (pl., paras.)
Pers. Persian
Pes. Pesahim
Ph.D. Philosophiae Doctor,
 Doctor of Philosophy
Phil. Philippians
Phlm. Philemon
Phoen. Phoenician
pl. plural; plate (pl., pls.)
PM post meridiem, after
 noon
Pol. Polish
pop. population
Port. Portuguese
Prv. Proverbs
- Ps.** Psalms
Ps. 151 Psalm 151
Ps. Sol. Psalms of Solomon
pt. part (pl., pts.)
1 Pt. 1 Peter
2 Pt. 2 Peter
Pth. Parthian
Q hypothetical source of the
 synoptic Gospels
Qid. Qiddushin
Qin. Qinnim
r. reigned; ruled
Rab. Rabbah -
rev. revised
R. ha-Sh. Ro'sh ha-shanah
R.I. Rhode Island
Rom. Romanian
Rom. Romans
R.S.C.J. Societas
 Sacratissimi Cordis Jesu,
 Religious of the Sacred
 Heart
RSV Revised Standard
 Version of the Bible
Ru. Ruth
Rus. Russian
Rv. Revelation
Rv. Ezr. Revelation of Ezra
San. Sanhedrin
S.C. South Carolina
Scot. Gael. Scottish Gaelic
S.Dak. South Dakota
sec. section (pl., secs.)
Sem. Semitic
ser. series
sg. singular
Sg. Song of Songs
Sg. of 3 Prayer of Azariah
 and the Song of the Three
 Young Men
Shab. Shabbat
Shav. Shavu'ot
Sheq. Sheqalim
Sib. Or. Sibylline Oracles
Sind. Sindhi
Sinh. Sinhala
Sir. Ben Sira
S.J. Societas Jesu, Society
 of Jesus (Jesuits)
Skt. Sanskrit
1 Sm. 1 Samuel
2 Sm. 2 Samuel
Sogd. Sogdian
Soṭ. Soṭah
sp. species (pl., spp.)
Span. Spanish
sq. square
S.S.R. Soviet Socialist
 Republic
st. stanza (pl., ss.)
S.T.M. Sacrae Theologiae
 Magister, Master of Sacred
 Theology
Suk. Sukkah
Sum. Sumerian
supp. supplement;
 supplementary
Sus. Susanna
s.v. sub verbo, under the
 word (pl., s.v.v.)
- Swed.** Swedish
Syr. Syriac
Syr. Men. Syriac Menander
Ta'an. Ta'anit
Tam. Tamil
Tam. Tamid
Tb. Tobit
T.D. Taishō shinshū
 daizōkyō, edited by
 Takakusu Junjirō et al.
 (Tokyo, 1922–1934)
Tem. Temurah
Tenn. Tennessee
Ter. Terumot
Ṭev. Y. Ṭevul yom
Tex. Texas
Th.D. Theologiae Doctor,
 Doctor of Theology
1 Thes. 1 Thessalonians
2 Thes. 2 Thessalonians
Thrac. Thracian
Ti. Titus
Tib. Tibetan
1 Tm. 1 Timothy
2 Tm. 2 Timothy
T. of 12 Testaments of the
 Twelve Patriarchs
Toh. Tohorot
Tong. Tongan
trans. translator,
 translators; translated by;
 translation
Turk. Turkish
Ukr. Ukrainian
Upan. Upaniṣad
U.S. United States
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet
 Socialist Republics
Uqts. Uqtsin
v. verse (pl., vv.)
Va. Virginia
var. variant; variation
Viet. Vietnamese
viz. videlicet, namely
vol. volume (pl., vols.)
Vt. Vermont
Wash. Washington
Wel. Welsh
Wis. Wisconsin
Wis. Wisdom of Solomon
W.Va. West Virginia
Wyo. Wyoming
Yad. Yadayim
Yev. Yevamot
Yi. Yiddish
Yor. Yoruba
Zav. Zavim
Zec. Zechariah
Zep. Zephaniah
Zev. Zevahim
- * hypothetical
 ? uncertain; possibly;
 perhaps
 ° degrees
 + plus
 – minus
 = equals; is equivalent to
 × by; multiplied by
 → yields

S

(CONTINUED)



SAINTHOOD. *Saint* is a designation that Christianity has used to recognize individuals deemed to have lived lives of heroic virtue and who, as a result, dwell eternally with God. They therefore may be venerated in a public cult. Historians of religion have liberated the category of sainthood from its narrower Christian associations and have employed the term in a more general way to refer to the state of special holiness that many religions attribute to certain people. The Jewish *ḥasid* or *tsaddiq*, the Muslim *walīy*, the Zoroastrian *fravashi*, the Hindu *ṛṣi* or *guru*, the Buddhist *arahant* or *bodhi-sattva*, the Taoist *sheng-jen*, the Shintō *kami*, and others have all been referred to as saints.

The Category of Sainthood. The problem for the historian of religions is whether the term *sainthood* so broadly applied retains any meaning. Can a category that grows out of one religion be properly and usefully extended cross-culturally? William James described universal saintliness in psychological terms, while Joachim Wach defined the saint as a particular type of religious authority alongside the founder, the reformer, the priest, the prophet, and others. But sainthood may embrace persons of diverse psychological constitutions and religious offices. Fundamentally, then, sainthood may be described as a religion's acclamation of a person's spiritual perfection, however that perfection is defined. Persons so acclaimed exemplify the religion's highest values and thus function as models for others to follow. At the same time, the special holiness that inheres in such people endows them with supernatural powers that their devotees may call upon in their own spiritual quests. These figures may serve as wonderworkers, helpmates, or intercessors. In other words, saints are recognized by their religions as both subjects for imitation and objects of veneration. The tension between imitability and inimitability, between likeness to us and otherness than us, lies at the core of the saint's identity. While the extent to which particular saints or classes of saints are either emulated or worshiped var-

ies greatly within and among religions, all saints attract some measure of both imitation and veneration.

Usually sainthood is a posthumous phenomenon. While recognition and proclamation of a person's exemplary virtues and exceptional powers may begin during his or her lifetime, a saint is one who stands the test of time. Indeed, a saint's exemplariness and powerfulness must transcend his or her death and be available to those who did not know him or her in the flesh. Thus, those who function as saints after their deaths may have been priests or prophets, activists or ascetics, rulers or the simple pious during their lifetimes. Sainthood, so understood, may embrace the holders of any number of religious offices but depends more on personal charisma than on religious status. Some religions even sponsor mythical saints, legendary people who lived long ago or dwell anonymously in the present world but who function for their followers much the same as do the historical human beings more commonly deemed saints.

Saints, however, should probably be distinguished from founders, the initiators of religious insights and religious communities. While founders may also be imitated and venerated posthumously, as are, for instance, Jesus of Nazareth and Gautama Buddha, they occupy a position of uniqueness in the structure of their religions that no saint can claim. Saints often imitate a founder, devoting themselves to living in his or her image. They may "translate" the founder's life and teachings for their own time and place. Saints come in quantity, collectively mapping out a topography of holiness that renders accessible the founder's example and power.

Sainthood in Major World Religions. Sainthood, as here typified, does not exist universally. Not all religious communities acclaim holy individuals as both paradigms to be imitated and intercessors to be venerated. Classic rabbinic Judaism, for instance, stressed the redemption of the entire Jewish people rather than individual salvation. Thus personal intercessors had lit-

tle function in the religion. Furthermore, Judaism forbids the worship of human beings. Protestant Christianity, while emphasizing individual salvation, repudiated the Catholic cult of saints, finding in God's grace alone the key to redemption. Yet some forms of both Judaism and Protestantism recognize saints: the Besht (Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer), spiritual leader of Hasidism, and Mary Baker Eddy, founder of the Christian Science church, for example, are given the status of sainthood by their followers. Archaic and primitive religions tend to associate holiness more with certain offices, such as shaman or medicine man, than with unique individuals.

Christianity. The recognition of the special holiness of certain people began early in the history of Christianity. Under the Roman persecution that began in the first century, many Christians gave up their lives rather than renounce their faith. These martyrs became the first persons to be given the title *hagios* ("saint"), though earlier the word had been used in the plural to designate the faithful in general. [See Martyrdom.] A martyr's willing renunciation of life demonstrated to other Christians his or her superhuman strength and convinced them that this person had conquered death. By the third century, commemorations in Rome marked the anniversaries of these deaths and celebrated the martyrs' rebirth into heavenly lives. Meanwhile the power of dead martyrs in drawing the faithful to their cemeteries had attracted the attention of the bishops, who made altars of their tombs and claimed them as their heavenly patrons. Christian officialdom thus embraced the popular veneration of martyrs and made it the cornerstone of ecclesiastical power.

At first the martyrs were remembered primarily as witnesses, examples to encourage others in times of persecution: other Christians were urged to follow their model of imitating Christ by submitting to death. But at the same time, because they had transcended death and dwelled in heaven, martyrs possessed extraordinary powers, which the faithful could summon. At martyrs' tombs one could pray for cures of ills, for forgiveness of sins, or for protection from enemies. Indeed, after the establishment of Christianity as the state religion in the fourth century diminished persecution, the martyr was seen less as a paradigm and more as a hierophant. [See Cult of Saints.]

With martyrdom on the wane, confessors, those who suffered but did not die for the faith, joined the ranks of the saints, as did ascetics, solitaries, and monks. By suffering voluntarily these saints imitated Christ and separated themselves from the world in order to know God better. They renounced food, money, marriage, human company, and even their own free will in order to dis-

cipline themselves for the contemplative life. In Eastern Orthodox Christianity the life of contemplation came to be the quintessential model of holiness. In the West in the thirteenth century, the mendicant orders, such as the Franciscans and Dominicans, promoted the contrasting saintly ideal of active service in the world. The image of Francis of Assisi overflowing with love for all creation balances the specter of pathological self-torture attributed to so many other Christian saints.

Although martyrdom was clearly believed to transport a person to heaven and sainthood, other forms of superlative piety required the evidence of miracles to substantiate posthumous heavenly domicile. Thus the miraculous element in the lives of the saints was increasingly stressed: saints healed, exorcised, prophesied, and mastered the elements of nature. [See Miracle.] Although the Roman Catholic church insists upon the moral quality of a candidate for sainthood, only miracles constitute absolute proof that the candidate is in heaven and thus can intercede for those on earth.

Saints, especially monks and royal figures, are also central to the piety of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Saints are venerated in icons, elaborated and stylized pictures, not only found in churches but also prominently displayed in homes. These pictures aim to show the power that emanates from union with Christ and to depict graphically the unity of the church by linking the dead with the living.

In the sixteenth century Martin Luther attacked the Catholic cult of saints, which then included a huge traffic in relics. He ridiculed the veneration of saints as idolatry, for like the old pagan gods, many saints had special realms of expertise and particular places from which they could be invoked. While maintaining a belief in the exemplary value of some saints, Luther denied their intercessory efficacy. Protestant Christianity on the whole follows his lead, although some groups, such as the Mormons and the Christian Scientists, tend to revere their founders as saints.

Islam. The monotheistic religion preached by Muhammad and exhibited in the Qur'an abhorred and forbade the association of anything or anyone with God. Even Muhammad himself was seen only as God's spokesman. The Arabic term generally translated as "saint," *walī* (pl., *awliyā'*), is used in the Qur'an to refer both to God and to God's "friends," that is, pious people in general. Those who obey God are *awliyā'* and God acts as *walī* to them. Nevertheless, popular Islam came to understand the *walī* as a particular kind of friend of God, one whose special closeness to divinity mediated between the ordinary faithful and that all-powerful and distant deity. Islam embraced and sanctified charis-

matic sons and daughters in its vast empire as vehicles for the popular transmission of the scriptural faith. These *awliyā'* personalized and localized the stern and austere faith of Muḥammad.

No formal canonization process, as exists in Roman Catholicism, determines who is to be *walī*. According to Islamic beliefs, a saint is made not by learning, asceticism, or piety but rather through a spontaneous enrap-turing by God. Saints know who they are and may even proclaim their own sainthood. Together they form a single hierarchy headed by the *quṭb*, the pillar or axis, a legendary figure who dwells at the center of the universe and sustains it. Despite their power, saints occupy a lower spiritual rank than prophets, persons who bear special messages from God. Islamic theologians and jurists were forced by popular consensus to recognize saints and to acknowledge their miracles, but they did protest against pilgrimages to saints' graves and the practice of cultic activities there.

The figures who best illustrate the saint as imitated and venerated holy person are the Ṣūfī masters. Sufism, the general term for Islamic mysticism, traditionally traces its origins to Muḥammad himself, for his reception of revelation is seen as a mystical experience. [See Sufism.] Ascetic tendencies among individuals who sought to interiorize their Islamic faith had led by the twelfth century to the formation of Ṣūfī brotherhoods. In these associations disciples were expected to submit to the way of the master like, it was said, a corpse in the hands of an undertaker. The Ṣūfī shaykh modeled the mystical path for his disciples and guided them along its stages. The stages of this path are epitomized in a Turkish saying:

Sharī'ah ("law"): Yours is yours and mine is mine.
Tariqah ("way"): Yours is yours and mine is yours too.
Mā'rifah ("gnosis"): There is neither mine nor thine.

Veneration of a Ṣūfī master continued posthumously at his tomb, especially on the anniversary of his birth. In Tanta, Egypt, for instance, the autumn *mawlid* ("birthday") of Sidi Aḥmad, the founder of a Ṣūfī order, is celebrated as a huge agricultural fair. The present head of the order, the caliph, bestows Sidi Aḥmad's blessings during a long parade to the tomb-mosque complex, where prayers, sermons, and circumcision rituals take place. Relics of Ṣūfī saints, such as their clothes and utensils, are often preserved by their orders.

Not all Muslim saints are Ṣūfīs, however. Even an outspoken opponent of the cult of saints, the jurist Ibn Taymīyah (of the thirteenth to fourteenth century), who championed the equal access of all Muslims to superlative piety, was venerated after his death by those who

sought his intercession and *barakah* ("spiritual power"). In Morocco, marabouts (warrior-saints), who claim descent from the Prophet and possession of thaumaturgic powers, are believed to preside after death over the territory around their tombs and bestow blessings through their descendants, some of whom will in turn become saints. Through the marabout, it is believed, the *barakah* of the Prophet directly touches the common person.

If saints play an important but unofficial role in Sunnī Islam, they lie at the very heart of Shī'ī orthodoxy. In Shī'ī Islam the term *wilāyah* denotes not sainthood in general but rather the position of authority of the imam who claims direct descent from the Prophet. This imam alone knows the esoteric interpretation of the Qur'ān, and he alone sustains the world. For one group of Shī'īs, the Twelvers, the last imam went into occultation (hiding) centuries ago but continues to exert cosmic influence. For another group, the Ismā'īliyah, the contemporary Aga Khan IV is the latest in an unbroken chain of imams who embody holiness for their followers. [See *Imamate*.]

Judaism. Although classic rabbinic Judaism gave no sanction to hagiography or hagiolatry, it revered a whole galaxy of exemplary figures. Biblical heroes such as Abraham and Moses, rabbinic sages such as Hillel and Me'ir (of the first and second centuries, respectively), and martyrs such as 'Aqiva' ben Yosef (also of the second century) all displayed imitable virtues commended to the faithful in the legends of the Talmud and Midrashic literature. Martyrs were especially sacred to a people so often persecuted; their sacrifices were believed to atone for the community's sins, and as a group they were remembered in various liturgies. Generally speaking, however, rabbinic Judaism honored above all others the scholar who through learning, righteousness, and piety sanctified himself and the community at large.

If the rabbis of the Talmud never countenanced the veneration of human beings alive or dead, popular sentiment was often otherwise. Reputed graves of biblical and rabbinic worthies, for instance, were the objects of pilgrimages in ancient and medieval days, and among Middle Eastern Jews they still are. Mystical groups have been especially prone to lionize their founders. Yehudah ben Shemu'el, leader of a medieval German ascetic and pietistic movement, was transformed into a wonder-worker in later legends, while among Spanish qabbalists the second-century rabbi Shim'on bar Yoḥ'ai was considered a patron saint. The sixteenth-century mystic Isaac Luria, of Safad, Palestine, called a *tsaddiq* ("just man") by his followers, saw himself as a reincar-

nation of Shim'on bar Yoḥ'ai and "discovered" the graves of other ancient sages, with whom he communed. His teachings and habits were reverently preserved by his disciples and had great influence on later Jewish mysticism.

In eighteenth-century Poland the pietist wonder-worker Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer, called the Besht—an acronym of Ba'al Shem Tov (Master of the Name [of God])—initiated the modern revivalist movement of Hasidism, which focused on the intercessory powers of the *tsaddiqim*. This movement appealed to Jews who were repelled by rabbinic elitism and learning. [See Hasidism.] The *tsaddiqim*—the Besht, certain of his disciples, and certain of their descendants—functioned for their followers as living, personal embodiments of Torah (law). In the "court" of the *tsaddiq* the *ḥasid* (disciple) found a warm and fervent piety and a man who understood his innermost thoughts and needs. The *tsaddiq* could intercede with God on behalf of his followers and raise them to higher spiritual achievement. Thus the *tsaddiq* represents the clearest specimen of contemporary Jewish sainthood.

Hinduism. The boundary between humanity and divinity is far more fluid in Hinduism and in Eastern religions generally than it is in the monotheistic faiths. Thus devotees do not always distinguish human saints from divine incarnations. Hindu deities are regularly described anthropomorphically, and highly spiritual humans manifest divinity. The god Kṛṣṇa, for instance, appears in the *Bhagavadgītā*, Hinduism's most popular text, as both instructor and object of devotion to the young warrior Arjuna, while the sixteenth-century Bengali teacher Caitanya is sometimes deified by his followers as an incarnation of the same Kṛṣṇa.

Classic Vedic religion focused on the elaborate priestly performance of the sacrifice rather than on individual personalities; yet the ancient *ṛṣis*, legendary composers of Vedic hymns and renowned wonder-workers, and *śramaṇas*, self-mortifying ascetics, were highly revered. As the Vedic heritage was criticized and reinterpreted, human exemplars came more to the fore. The first famous historical model and teacher was Śaṅkara (788–838), whose monist philosophy revitalized orthodoxy and in the twelfth century provoked the dualist response of the equally revered Rāmānuja.

But it was the *bhakti* ("devotion") movements, focused on the worship of theistic gods, principally Viṣṇu and Śiva, in which the *guru* ("preceptor") as saint became prominent. In literature as early as the Upaniṣadic texts the *guru* was seen not only as a teacher of the Vedas but also as a model whose daily habits pointed the way to spiritual liberation. The student not only learned from his master but also served him by

attending to his sacred fire, his cattle, and his other priestly needs. In the *bhakti* tradition, however, the *guru* was honored not because of his knowledge or birth but because of the wholehearted devotion to his god that he manifested. The *guru's* experience of liberation (*mokṣa*) became his disciples' goal. The tenth-century poet Jñāneśvara described the total fulfillment that he experienced in the worship of his *guru* Nivrīti to be like bathing in all the holy waters of the world. In the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva sects the *gurus* were considered divine incarnations and were worshiped with incense and offerings.

In modern times *gurus* have continued to be an important force in Hindu religion, and some have found substantial followings beyond India. The gentle and sensitive Ramakrishna Paramahansa (1836–1886) came to the attention of the West through the efforts of his disciple Vivekenanda, who spread his teaching worldwide. Similarly, the teachings of Caitanya are continued in the International Society for Krishna Consciousness. The most famous modern Hindu saint, Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948), exemplified ancient Indian religious ideals and employed them to work for the cause of Indian nationalism. In so doing he became a "guru" for social justice movements in the West.

Buddhism. The two major divisions of Buddhism, Theravāda and Mahāyāna, have different understandings of sainthood. The Theravāda, whose adherents live primarily in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, acclaim the *arahant* as the acme of human perfection. The *arahant* achieves the final stage of the monastic quest for release from suffering and rebirth. The seeker begins by renouncing the householder's life in favor of homelessness and then passes countless lifetimes pursuing the "three trainings" in higher morality, higher concentration, and higher wisdom. At the end the *arahant* achieves the destruction of the *āsavas*, the wrong mental states that bind one to *kamma* (Skt., *karman*) and rebirth. He declares, "Destroyed is rebirth, lived is the higher life, done is what is to be done; there is no further becoming for me." The numerous legends of the *arahants* in the Pali canon complement the descriptions of the path by relating stories about the previous lives of the *arahants*, the ways they attain wisdom, their virtues, and their miraculous powers.

Remote from the ordinary person, the *arahant* provokes veneration rather than imitation. Indeed, few *arahants* have been recognized since the time of Gautama Buddha. Yet a person can and should imitate the developing *arahant* as he is portrayed in the stories about his previous lives. By making offerings at pagodas containing the *arahants'* relics, the householder purifies his own mind and earns merit. Moreover, by providing food,

clothing, and housing to monks, laymen enable them to pursue enlightenment while, at the same time, accruing merit for themselves.

While Theravāda Buddhism idealizes the world-renouncing saint who follows the Buddha's reported last words to "seek your *own* salvation with diligence," Mahāyāna schools, dominant in East Asia, stress the power of saints to aid ordinary laymen to attain enlightenment. The *bodhisattva* (lit., "Buddha-to-be") is a saint who has postponed his complete enlightenment in order to help others along the path. He emulates the compassion of the Buddha by nurturing the seeds of enlightenment that are present in all beings. [See Bodhisattva Path.]

The *bodhisattva* path is open to all people. Those who after many lifetimes have reached the stage of "arousing the thought of enlightenment" (*bodhicitta*) resolve to work for the welfare of others. Through the practice of the six perfections (*pāramitās*)—giving, morality, patience, vigor, meditation, and wisdom—*bodhisattvas* overcome their self-motivated behavior. By imitating the virtues of a *bodhisattva* and having faith in his compassion, a person can be assured of eventual enlightenment. The *bodhisattva* is capable of transferring his own merit to the sincere seeker and thus directly speeding his progress.

The most advanced *bodhisattvas* are mythical figures who became venerated as divine saviors. Closely related are the celestial Buddhas, counterparts of Gautama Buddha existing in other worlds. In China and Japan devotion to the Buddha Amitābha, for instance, assures one of rebirth in the Pure Land. There the hindrances on the way to enlightenment are far fewer than they are in this world.

Tibetan Buddhists venerate the lama ("preceptor"), who may be either a scholar-monk or a wonder-worker like the most popular lama, Mi-la-ras-pa (1040–1123). The most famous saints of Tibet are the Dalai Lamas, incarnations of the celestial *bodhisattva* Avalokiteśvara. Upon the death of a Dalai Lama, the incarnation passes to an infant born forty-nine days later, who must be discovered and properly raised for his exemplary and yet inimitable role.

Confucianism. As one of the several religious components of precommunist China, Confucianism offers a distinct notion of sainthood. For Confucius (551–479 BCE), as recorded in the *Analects*, the ideal humans were the sage-kings, the legendary ancient rulers who disclosed the ways of Heaven to humans and ruled in accord with those ways. Meng-tzu, a late fourth-century BCE follower of Confucius, did not restrict the *sheng* ("sage") to antiquity but recognized the ongoing possibility of such exemplars. For Meng-tzu the sage was by

nature the same as other people, so through learning and self-cultivation anyone could aspire to sagehood.

The Neo-Confucians worked out the ways to this goal. The school of Principle stressed the effort and discipline necessary to investigate *li*, the moral order in oneself and other things, while the school of Mind insisted that the highest good is waiting within to be uncovered and brought to fruition. For both, sagehood consists of the full realization of one's nature or mind and the sense of oneness with all things. A sage can be recognized by his peacefulness, warmth, honesty, and empathy for all beings. Sagehood thus became a reachable even if rarely realized goal.

As saint the sage is not only exemplary but also venerated. When, during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Confucianism became the official state religion, temples devoted to Confucius and noteworthy Confucians proliferated. Even in modern times the Wen-miao (Temple of Learning) was the site of sacrificial rites to Confucius. Such devotion arose out of respect for Confucian teaching, however, and not from the desire to seek intercession from Confucian masters. In the official religion the heroes were not deified. Yet in more popular circles Confucius was taken up as a deity in family shrines, along with ancestors, Buddhas, and popular gods.

Paths to Sainthood. Recalling that the most diverse types of people have been acclaimed as saints, as individuals both imitable and inimitable, we can nonetheless identify three broad paths to sainthood: moral, intellectual, and emotional.

The moral path is followed by those who seek to control and purify their will in order to do but one thing well: serve their god or realize ultimate truth. The spiritual soldier is one who cultivates discipline in order to do his duty. Frequently that duty demands asceticism: by denying himself the ordinary pleasures of life, the ascetic reaches for extraordinary bliss. Among Christian saints chastity divided the world of spirit from the world of flesh. Eradicating bodily desires and mortifying the flesh, the Christian ascetic sought to remove the impediments that blocked his or her total communion with God. Similarly, for the Theravāda Buddhist monk the renunciation of the household life and the taking up of the begging bowl represent sacrifice of self-interest in the pursuit of enlightenment. Martyrdom represents the most extreme form of volitional control, a sure path to heaven in Christianity and Islam.

Other saints pursue an intellectual road to sanctity. Exercising the mind to know deeply oneself, the world, and ultimate reality has often been deemed a saintly vocation. The Confucian sage seeks the correlation between his inner self and the structure of the world outside, while the Jewish mystical sage aims to discover in

Torah, God's revelation, the secrets of creation itself. For both, the mind is the road to truth. Judaism and Islam especially emphasize mastery of the written divine law as the prerequisite for further spiritual pursuits. On the other hand, education alone cannot make a saint. Religions typically emphasize supernatural intellectual qualities such as intuition, clairvoyance, and prophecy when elaborating sagely wisdom. The saint in this category rarely rests in his wisdom but reaches out instead as a teacher to share his wisdom with others. The master or preceptor type of saint, the Muslim *shaykh* or the Hindu *guru*, for instance, aims to guide others. Less by communicating objective knowledge than by teaching a way to live, the master exemplifies wisdom for his disciples.

The third path to sainthood is the way of the emotions, the perfecting of the heart to love unqualifiedly. Mystics of all religions are great lovers, and those acclaimed as saints have expressed that love in ways that inspire others to love. The Christian saint Bernard of Clairvaux and the Muslim saint Rābī'ah al-'Adawiyah did not hesitate to express their love for God in frankly erotic terms. Perfected love overflows into love for other human beings; thus saints are acclaimed for their healing and redeeming actions. The modern Jewish Ḥasid who experiences the love of his *tsaddiq* is elevated to new levels of holiness and feels all his earthly cares melt away in the master's presence. The typical *wali* can be depended on to listen to the prayers of barren women, paralytics, and the poverty-stricken and to respond compassionately. The quintessential lovers are the *bodhisattvas*, who aid their fellow creatures on the road to enlightenment. By assuming the sufferings of others they advance all beings toward final peace.

Finally, special note must be taken of the woman's path to sainthood, for it often varies from that of her male co-religionists. In general women have not had equal access to sainthood, especially in Judaism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Still, the cults of Hindu goddesses such as Kālī and popular Chinese heroine-goddesses such as Ma-tsu are likely functional equivalents to the veneration of established, male saints. Elsewhere, the ways to sainthood for women seem more rigid than those for men. In Roman Catholicism women are far more dependent upon supernatural powers to establish their holiness than are men and, as female nurturers, constitute a high proportion of the helping and healing saints. Their stories also typically feature penitential acts especially aimed at obliterating their debilitating sexuality. The Mahāyāna *bodhisattva* ideal, although asexual, requires of women, more so than men, a purge of their sexuality. In many cases a woman must undergo a sexual transformation in either this or a fu-

ture life in order to become a *bodhisattva*, although some celestial *bodhisattvas* do retain their femininity.

[See also Perfectibility; for further discussion of the role of the saints in the lives of the laity, see Merit.]

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ŚAIVISM. [This entry treats the worship of the Hindu god Śiva in its various regional and historical contexts. It consists of the following articles:

An Overview
 Śaiva Siddhānta
 Viraśaivas
 Nāyaṅārs
 Krama Śaivism

Trika Śaivism
 Śaivism in Kashmir
 Pratyabhijñā
 Pāśupatas
 Kāpālikas

For further discussion of the god Śiva, see the entries Śiva and Rudra. The Tantric worship of Śiva is also treated in Tantrism, article on Hindu Tantrism.]

An Overview

Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism form the two principal religious currents of classical and modern Hinduism. Śaivism centers on the worship of the god Śiva and Vaiṣṇavism on that of Viṣṇu. In classical Hindu mythology Śiva is the god of destruction, generally portrayed as a yogin who lives on Mount Kailāsa in the Himalayas. His body is smeared with ashes, his hair piled up in matted locks. He wears an animal skin and carries a trident. A cobra often serves as his garland and the crescent moon as his hair ornament. He has a third eye, kept closed, in the middle of his forehead. He may be surrounded by his beautiful wife, Pārvatī, and their two sons, the six-faced Skanda and the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa.

The migration of bands of people called Aryans into the northwest of the Indian subcontinent initiates the Vedic period (c. 1200–600 BCE), known to us through the religious texts called Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, and Upaniṣads. In them the minor god Rudra serves as a prototype of the later Śiva. The two gods, each with his own varied forms and names, are identified with each other in the classical Hindu tradition represented by the Sanskrit texts known as the *Mahābhārata* (300 BCE–300 CE) and the *Purāṇas* (200–1300 CE). Beginning in about the second century of the common era, a number of important Śaiva sects appear, each with its own texts and doctrines. Many worshipers of Śiva belong to such sects, but the majority simply count themselves as Hindus who believe in this god over all others.

Discussions of Śaivism traditionally begin with an examination of the so-called proto-Paśupati seals of the ancient pre-Aryan civilization centered in the Indus Valley of Pakistan. The most interesting of these seals depicts an anthropomorphic and apparently ithyphallic figure seated on a low dais in a yogalike position with his heels meeting in the perineal region, the hands of his extended and braceleted arms resting on his knees, and his head—which may or may not be triple-faced and/or bovine—bearing a horned headdress. Surrounding this figure are small representations of a rhinoceros, a buffalo, a tiger, and an elephant. Under the dais are two goats or deer. The seal also bears a seven-sign inscription.

Starting from the hypothesis of the archaeologist George Marshall, most scholars have accepted the identification of this figure as the precursor of the god Śiva in his Paśupati, or Lord of Animals, form. The most important dissent from this consensus was made by D. D. Kosambi, who pointed out that the horns of the figure were those of a buffalo and not of a bull (the latter being the animal most closely associated both with the Vedic Rudra and the later Śiva). Kosambi further proposed a historically improbable identification of the proto-Paśupati figure with the buffalo demon named Mahiṣāsura (which dates at least 1,500 years later) and through this demon back to Śiva. Until further evidence or an accepted reading of the Indus script becomes available, it seems best to suspend judgment on the whole problem.

Still, the discussion clearly bears directly not only on the question of the historical origins of Śiva, the god of Śaivism, but also on that of the transition from the minor Vedic god Rudra to the major post-Vedic Śiva. Among the varied hypotheses on these questions, several basic tendencies can be distinguished. A. B. Keith (1925) suggests that the attempt to distinguish Aryan and non-Aryan elements in Rudra-Śiva is basically fruitless. The character of the god develops through a constant process of accretion resulting from the identification of other minor gods, both Aryan and non-Aryan, with the Vedic Rudra. Jan Gonda (1970) prefers to see a fundamental continuity between the Vedic Rudra and post-Vedic Śiva, and between Vedic and post-Vedic religion in general. He regards the lack of reference to many aspects of the god in Vedic literature as due in large part to the class bias of the priestly authors, who ignored or excluded many of the god's more popular traits. Louis Renou (1953), on the other hand, suggests that there was a decisive break between Vedism and Hinduism. He notes the absence of any obvious connection between the Veda and the earlier Indus civilization and accepts the possibility of some connection between Indus religion and later Hinduism. With less caution, R. N. Dandekar (1967, 1971) speaks of the religion of the Vedas as an "interlude" between protohistorical and historical Hinduism. However this case may be, Dandekar also makes the important observation that Vedic mythology is an "evolutionary mythology," one that evolves in accordance with the ethos of a historical period and with the changing conditions of life.

It is now clear that there was a gap of five hundred years or more between the end of the mature phase of the Indus Valley civilization (c. 1800 BCE) and the hymns of the *Rgveda* (c. 1200 BCE). It is also evident that Hinduism, as opposed to Vedism, grew up—together with Buddhism, Jainism, and other non-Vedic cults—in

the Ganges River valley (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar). The rise of these new movements corresponds to the transition from an economy based on pastoralism mixed with shifting cultivation to one based on sedentary grain production, and to the political transition from migratory tribal oligarchies to kingships with clearly demarcated territories. These historical changes imply the existence of dramatic cultural and religious changes as well, changes that did not derive from the influence of the ancient and distant civilization of the Indus Valley. Elements of the new religions may ultimately be traced to that civilization—and to the little-known culture of the early non-Aryan inhabitants of the Ganges Valley—but the new religions as systems should be considered new creations arising in conjunction with the new and radically changed economic and political conditions.

The Vedic Rudra is a fierce and terror-inspiring god of storms, disease, and the untamed aspects of nature. He is exclusively invoked in only four of the 1,028 hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, although he is frequently mentioned in it as the father of the Maruts, gods of the winds, and as one of the *viśvadevas*, or All-Gods. The hymns contain only brief allusions to the mythology of Rudra, but the epithets he receives and the attitude with which he is invoked give a clear picture of his basic character. The name *Rudra* itself is traditionally derived from the known root *rud*, meaning “cry” or “howl,” and is evidently related to his association with storms. An alternative derivation from a postulated root **rud*, meaning “be red” or “shine,” can be connected with a proposed derivation for the name *Śiva* (“auspicious”) from a Dravidian word meaning “red.” In the hymns the poets implore Rudra to be “compassionate” and “easy to invoke,” not to kill cows or men, and to keep men “prosperous and free from disease.” He is frequently described as a “bull,” as being “brown,” and as “terrible.” He possesses a “sharp weapon,” a “thunderbolt,” and “swift arrows.” He wears “braided hair” (*kapardin*) and brings a “cooling [?] medicine.” Although in two hymns he is associated with Soma, god of the intoxicating sacrificial drink, his principal association in Vedic literature as a whole is with Agni, the god of fire, with whom he is already identified once in the *Ṛgveda* and several times in the Brāhmaṇas.

In the *Yajurveda* Rudra is invoked at length in the section called the *Śatarudriya*. Among the noteworthy epithets he receives in this text are “mountain dweller,” “lord of cattle” (*paśūnāṃ patiḥ*), “wearer of an animal hide,” “blue-necked,” “ruddy,” and the names or semi-names *Kapardin*, *Śarva*, *Bhava*, *Śambhu*, *Śaṅkara*, and *Śiva*. His prowess as an archer is repeatedly mentioned, as is his association with the untamed aspects of nature and with hunters, thieves, and brigands.

An important passage in the *Atharvaveda* (15.5.1–7) closely associates seven apparently independent gods, all of whom early become identified as names or forms of Rudra-Śiva, with the enigmatic *vrātyas*, a class or group of religious officiants who were only partly aryanized. These gods are Bhava, Śarva, Paśupati, Ugra, Rudra, Mahādeva, and Īśāna. Each is associated with a particular region. Quite similar lists appear in the Brāhmaṇas and other later Vedic texts, with the addition of an eighth name, Aśani or Bhīma (and in one text the names Hara, Mṛda, Śiva, and Śaṅkara as well). In post-Vedic Hindu texts the same eight names of Śiva are sometimes listed, but more important are the five forms or faces of the god: Sadyojāta, Vāmadeva, Aghora, Tatpuruṣa, and Īśāna.

A key theme that first appears in later Vedic literature is the god’s rather ambiguous relation to the sacrificial oblations and offerings. Originally Rudra seems to have been at least partly excluded from orthodox Vedic sacrifices and thus has to demand his share of the offerings, sometimes described as the share that is “left over” (*ucchiṣṭa*). In the classical mythology of Hinduism, this theme is incorporated into Śiva’s conflict with his father-in-law, the brahman named Dakṣa, whose sacrifice Śiva destroys because he was not invited to it. Śiva beheads Dakṣa and then replaces the head with that of a goat, the sacrificial animal. This myth again suggests popular, nonhieratic origins for the god.

The god Rudra-Śiva appears for the first time as the object of monotheistic devotion rather suddenly in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, a text often described as a Śaiva *Bhagavadgītā*. The *Śvetāśvatara* is one of the later of the early Upaniṣads, possibly dating from about the sixth century BCE, and clearly illustrates how these texts mark the historical transition from Vedism to Hinduism. It refers explicitly to important aspects of Sāṃkhya metaphysics and Yoga practice. Its own metaphysical position is not entirely consistent, but it bears some resemblance to the later system of “qualified monism” (*viśiṣṭādvaita*) propounded by Rāmānuja (twelfth century). In the Upaniṣad, Rudra is described as the “one God” (*eka deva*), the ruler and cause of all, the *brahman* itself, and he is addressed as Hara, Īśa, Mahāpuruṣa, Īśāna, Bhagavat, Śiva, and Maheśvara.

Between the Upaniṣads and the *Mahābhārata* epic, chronologically the next major source for our knowledge of Śiva, there appears to be a gap of several hundred years in the course of which Vedism is replaced by an already mature Hinduism. In recent years the classical mythology of Śiva in the *Mahābhārata* and in the later Purāṇas has been extensively analyzed by Wendy O’Flaherty, Stella Kramrisch, J. Bruce Long, and others, using methodologies influenced by the the-

ories of Mircea Eliade and Claude Lévi-Strauss. The resulting emphasis on symbolic archetypes and on thematic structures and motifs has provided a clearer idea of the mental structures and contents of the myths, but it has also tended to exaggerate their consistency and to isolate them from their sociohistorical contexts.

In classical Hindu mythology Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva are linked together as the gods of creation, preservation, and destruction, respectively. In the varied Śaiva versions of the myths, however, Śiva is generally portrayed as the one God over all, who is ultimately responsible for creation and preservation as well as destruction. Vaiṣṇava versions do the same for Viṣṇu. This informal monotheism takes more systematic forms in the theological works of the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava sects.

Many of the main episodes in the Śaiva myth cycle revolve around the dynamic tension between Śiva as the god equally of asceticism and eroticism, a master of both yogic restraint and sexual prowess. This tension is frequently expressed in terms of the image of castration: the real castration of the god himself and symbolic castrations (loss of eyes or teeth, beheading) of his opponents.

Śiva destroys Kāma, the god of erotic love, with the fire from his third eye when Kāma attempts to disturb his ascetic trance. Subsequently Pārvatī, daughter of the Himalaya, wins Śiva's love through her own ascetic penance and persuades him to revive Kāma in disembodied form. For his visit to the pine forest Śiva wears the guise of a naked, ash-smearing ascetic, but he uses the occasion to seduce, or to attempt to seduce, the wives of the forest sages. As a result either of the sages' curse or of his own action, Śiva is castrated and his phallus, or *liṅga*, becomes fixed in the earth. The stylized stone *liṅga*, mounted on an equally stylized vulva, or *yonī*, has become the central image of Śaiva worship and serves as the dual symbol of the god's creative and ascetic power.

By chopping off the fifth head of the god Brahmā, Śiva is charged with the major sin of the murder of a brahman and must undertake the penance, or Great Vow (*mahāvṛata*), of the Skull-Bearer (*kapālin*), an ascetic who wanders about with a skull as a begging bowl. This Great Vow becomes the archetypal basis of the ascetic sect of the Kāpālikas or Mahāvratins, who are equally noted for their indulgence in orgiastic rites of Tantric character.

The complicated myth of the birth of the six-faced Skanda, a son of Śiva, exists in a number of very different versions. In part, Skanda is the son of Śiva and Pārvatī, but he is at the same time the son of Agni and of the six Kṛttikās. His role is to destroy the terrible demon Tāraka. In South India, the Dravidian god Muru-

kaṅ was early identified with Skanda and contributed to the historical development of his mythology.

The three sons of Tāraka later establish the mighty triple city of the demons, which Śiva eventually destroys with a single arrow from his bow, Pināka. Another demon, named Andhaka, the blind son of Śiva and/or of the demon Hiraṇyākṣa, lusts after Pārvatī but is defeated and reformed by Śiva. Śiva beheads his son Gaṇeśa, whom he has never met, when Gaṇeśa tries to prevent the apparent stranger from entering the room of Pārvatī, Śiva's wife and Gaṇeśa's mother. Śiva then replaces his son's head with that of an elephant with one broken tusk, just as he once replaced Dakṣa's head with that of a goat. Historically, Gaṇeśa was perhaps originally an independent elephant god. As part of Śiva's family he serves as the god of obstacles and hence of luck, to be invoked at the beginning of any undertaking.

The existence of an extensive mythology of Śiva in the *Mahābhārata* suggests the existence of an important cult dedicated to the god by about the beginning of the common era. Unfortunately, direct historical evidence for the cult before that date is not plentiful. Megasthenes, a Greek ambassador to the court of Candragupta Maurya (c. 324–300 BCE), mentions the presence in India of worshipers of Herakles and Dionysos. These two gods are usually identified as Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, respectively. The early grammarian Patañjali (c. 150 BCE) mentions Śiva Bhāgavatas who carry iron lances. These must be Śaiva ascetics. The earliest example of a Śiva *liṅga* seems to be the large, realistic stone *liṅga* from Guḍimallam in southeastern India, estimated by some to date from the first or second century BCE.

Coins and inscriptions that give evidence of Śaiva worship are plentiful from the period of the Kushans (first and second centuries CE) and, more important, that of the Guptas (300–550 CE). Although the Gupta emperors mostly preferred Vaiṣṇavism, they also sponsored temples of Śiva. The kings of the contemporary Vākāṭaka dynasty were mostly followers of Śiva, as were those of the slightly later Maukhari dynasty. From about the seventh century, Śaivism became the dominant religious current in the south, largely replacing the Jains and Buddhists and competing successfully with the Vaiṣṇavas. The southern dynasties of the Pallavas, Cōlas, and Cālukyas were all patrons of Śaivism.

The age of the Guptas seems to mark the beginning of distinct Śaiva sects. Except for the Pāsupatas these sects do not appear in the *Mahābhārata*, but they become prominent in the Purāṇas. The sects are made up chiefly of ascetics but also have some sort of lay following. The Pāsupata sect was founded by Lakuliśa, who was born near Broach in western India about the begin-

ning of the second century. Lakuliśa is already regarded as an incarnation of Śiva in several Purāṇas, and the Pāsupata sect became important, particularly in southern India, from about the seventh to the fourteenth century. The Kālamukhas, a closely related sect, were influential in the Karnataka region of the south during much the same period. Another early Śaiva sect, of considerable symbolic interest but uncertain historical importance, was that of the Kāpālikas.

A fourth early sect is that of the Śaiva Siddhāntins, often simply called Śaivas. This sect grew out of a devotional movement centered in the Cauvery River basin of the southeast and led by the Śaiva Nāyaṅars (Nāyaṅmār), poet-saints of the seventh to tenth centuries whose devotional hymns composed in Tamil even today occupy a central place in Śiva worship in this region. The sect is still active and has produced, or appropriated to itself, an extensive literature in both Sanskrit (the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas) and Tamil (the twelve Tirumuṛai and the fourteen Meykaṇṭasāstras).

The Pāsupatas, Kālamukhas, and Śaiva Siddhāntins all maintain monotheistic theological systems in which the grace (*prasāda*) of God and devotion (*bhakti*) to him play essential roles in attaining personal salvation. All accept an ontological distinction between God (*pati*), the individual person (*paśtu*), and mundane existence (*pāśa*).

The Pāsupata and Kālamukha sects are now extinct. In the Karnataka region they gave way to another Śaiva sectarian movement known as the Viraśaivas or Liṅgāyats. This sect, especially in its initial stages, has been noted for its advocacy of social reforms, including attacks against casteism and the subjugation of women. Its metaphysics is less dualistic than that of the other southern sects, though it also stresses the importance of devotion and God's grace. The most important literature of the sect consists of devotional hymns composed in Kannada by various inspired devotees beginning with Basava (c. 1150), often considered the founder of the sect. Many of the hymns are collected in the *Śūnya-saṃpādane*.

In the north, the Śaiva sect known as the Trika or Kashmiri school became important from about the ninth century. It incorporated Tantric and Buddhist influences and adopted a monistic metaphysical position similar to that of nondualist (*advaita*) Vedānta. The extensive literature of the sect is divided into the categories of Āgama Śāstra, Spanda Śāstra, and Pratyabhijñā Śāstra. Its greatest thinker was Abhinavagupta (c. 1000).

Tantric influences have been strong in Śaivism since about the end of the Gupta period, when this religious current first became important. Tantrism blended with

yoga, particularly *haṭhayoga*, forms the doctrinal basis of the medieval Śaiva sect of the Nāths, also called Siddhas and Kānpaṭa Yogīs. This group emphasizes yogic control over mind and body, including the winning of magical powers (*siddhis*), and aims at spiritual enlightenment through the domination of the inner "serpent power" (*kuṇḍalini*), which lies trapped within the veins or nerves (*nāḍīs*) and centers, or ganglia (*cakras*), of a supraphysical yogic anatomy. A few Nāth Jogīs still exist, although the influence of the sect continues mainly through the diffusion of *haṭhayoga* into the mainstream of Hinduism and beyond.

During the past few centuries the worship of Viṣṇu and his *avatāras* has proved to be more adaptable to the emotional devotionism of modern Hinduism than has the worship of Śiva. Śaivism, however, still claims many millions of devotees. Most of them are not followers of specific sects, nor even necessarily exclusively devoted to Śiva. They patronize Śiva temples and make offerings of flowers, sweets, coconuts, and money to the god and his priests. The holy city of the Hindus, Banaras, is the city of Śiva, and the temple of Śiva Viśveśvara there is one of the chief pilgrimage sites of all India. Similarly, in Hindu mythology the holy river Ganges is portrayed as a goddess who descends to earth through Śiva's matted hair.

The priests of Śiva temples often belong to the non-sectarian, orthodox tradition of the Smārtas, who practice the worship of five shrines (*pañcāyatana-pūjā*) dedicated to the gods Viṣṇu, Śiva, Sūrya, Gaṇeśa, and Dūrgā. This Smārta tradition is compatible with a variety of metaphysical positions, but is often linked with the nondualist (*advaita*) theology derived principally from Śaṅkarācārya (c. 700–750).

According to tradition, Śaṅkarācārya was a devotee of Śiva and composed a number of devotional hymns dedicated to this god. Although his authorship of these hymns has often been disputed, the orthodox monastic sect of the Daśanāmīs, which he is said to have founded, retains this Śaiva influence. Today the monks (*saṃnyāsins*) and abbots of the Daśanāmī monasteries are the dominant arbiters of theological orthodoxy and socio-religious tradition (*varṇāśrama-dharma*). Through them Śiva has come full circle from his role as the heretical outsider of Dakṣa's sacrifice to that as the patron deity of Hindu orthodoxy.

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Śaiva Siddhānta

Śaiva Siddhānta is an important medieval system of Śaiva thought. The term technically refers to a set of Śaiva theologies written in Sanskrit and Tamil in South India, although this classification need not be considered a rigid one. While Śaiva Siddhānta differs in many ways from the theologies presented by Kashmir Śaivism (most particularly in its assertion that the world and individual souls are real entities and that final release depends on the grace of Śiva, in contrast to Kashmiri idealistic and monistic ontologies and soteriologies), both schools accept as canon the Vedic Saṃhitās and Upaniṣads as well as the twenty-eight Sanskrit Śaiva and Raudra Āgamas, which date to the seventh century CE. The Śaiva Siddhānta distinguishes itself from other Śaiva systems, however, in that along with these literatures it accepts as scriptural authority the twelve Tirumuṟai and the fourteen Meykaṇṭaśāstras.

The Tirumuṟai consist of devotional poems written in Tamil in South India by Śaiva mystics and gathered in the latter part of the tenth century by Nampi Āṅṭār Nampi. The Meykaṇṭaśāstras are doctrinal works written in Tamil in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries by Śaiva theologians, the most influential of whom was Meykaṇṭa Tēvar (Meykaṇṭār), a *śūdra* who lived to the north of Madras in the thirteenth century.

Meykaṇṭa Tēvar's important work known as *Civaṇṇa-pōtam* (Instructions on the Knowledge of Śiva) consists of Tamil translations of twelve *sūtras* from the *Raurava Āgama*, a seventh-century Sanskrit Śaiva work, to which he added Tamil commentaries and analogic interpretations. The system he taught became known as the Śaiva Siddhānta, the "doctrine of the followers of Śiva."

The Śaiva saints portray a vivid personal experience of God (Śiva), the fundamental theme of which is expressed by Tirumūlar: "The ignorant say that God and love are different; when they know that love and God are the same, they rest in God's love." Elsewhere Tirumūlar writes, "They have no love for God who have no love for all mankind." Appar (seventh century) speaks of the man who has unshakable belief in God's mercy and love. Śiva indwells every creature in a subtle form and manifests himself to his devotees. All that is required to be saved is to attune one's mind to Śiva and to be intent on his love and service. Inward and spiritual worship is the essence of religion, according to Appar. Without love for Śiva, the knowledge of scriptures, external rituals, and asceticism are of no avail for salvation. Campantar (seventh century) and Cuntarar (ninth century) stress the need of *bhakti* (love of God) in order to be freed from fetters. The mystic formula "Namo Śivāya," which represents the essence of the four Vedas and the essence of Śiva's name, when pronounced with true devotion, saves even nonmystics. Māṅṅkavācakar (ninth century) describes in his *Tiruvācakam* the progress of a soul out of the bondage of ignorance and passion to the liberty of light and love. The main themes of this work are strong monotheism; infinity of bliss in Śiva alone; the purification, by grace, of the soul from delusion, as a preparation for eternal fellowship and communion with Śiva; prayers for forgiveness of sin; and enthusiastic love of God. Great prominence is given to the working of divine grace in Śaiva Siddhānta. *Aruḷ* (grace) is the remedy against *iruḷ* (ignorance). The illuminating grace takes the form of divine and mystical knowledge by which the soul, liberated from darkness, realizes its oneness with Śiva.

According to the Śāstras, there are three eternal and real substances: God (*pati*), souls (*paśu*), and bondage (*pāśa*). God (Śiva) is immanent in everything and yet transcends everything. He is pure being, pure consciousness, and pure bliss. He is the efficient cause, and his *śakti*, composed of knowledge, action, and desire, is the instrumental cause of the world and of souls. He stands in relation to the universe as the soul to the body. As eyes cannot see but for the light of the soul, the soul cannot know but for the light of God. God and souls are one in the sense that they cannot be disjoined;

they exist and function together. *Advaita* means inseparability, not identity; hence souls preserve their distinct character even in the final state of liberation.

Souls are endowed with knowledge, volition, and the ability to act, but they are bound by the fetters of *āṇava* (ignorance), *karman* (the effects of action), and *māyā* (changing reality), and therefore they experience themselves as independent of God. Śiva imparts to the soul instruments of empirical knowledge when it is in the *kevala* state (the state of the soul only with *āṇava*) and illuminating knowledge when it is in the *sakala* (embodied) state. Empirical knowledge leads to good and evil acts, and the result is the rebirth of the soul in different states. The three paths of salvation are those of service (*caryā*), worship (*kriyā*), and meditation (*yoga*), all of which should be animated by the love of God. All these ways dispose the soul to receive gratuitously from Śiva divine knowledge (*patijñāna*), by which is realized perfect union with Śiva in supreme love. This divine knowledge is imparted to souls either directly through intuition in the case of advanced souls or through a *Śivaguru* to the less advanced.

[For a view of Śaiva Siddhānta within its regional context, see Tamil Religions. See also the biographies of Meykaṅṭār, Māṅikkavācakar, and Umāpati Śivācārya.]

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Viraśaivas

The Indian religious movement of the Viraśaivas ("heroic Śaivas")—also known as Liṅgāyats ("bearers of a liṅga")—appeared as a reformist Śaiva sect in Hinduism probably in the middle of the twelfth century in the border regions of Maharashtra and Karnataka. Its founder is said to have been a brahman named Basava or Basavanna (1106–1167), though the main reformist role may have been that of Ekantada Ramayya, a contemporary of Basava. The Viraśaiva doctrine was probably further elaborated in the following centuries.

The sect now has about six million adherents, mostly

in Karnataka, where, though officially classified as "backward," they are a not unimportant group. Viraśaivism may have appeared as a reaction of Dravidians against Brahmanic (and therefore Aryan) domination. Temple worship, sacrifice, and pilgrimages are condemned as useless. The caste system is rejected, the sexes are declared equal, child marriage is forbidden, and widows are allowed to remarry. Caste distinctions tended, however, to reappear in the course of time. There are, for instance, hereditary priests, the *jaṅgamas*, while the sect itself is regarded as a caste.

All Viraśaivas must belong to a group connected with one of the sect's five main religious centers or *mathas* (Kedarnath, Śrīśaila, Balehalli, Ujjain, Varanasi). All must have a *guru*, undergo initiation, and carry a small *liṅga* in a tube fastened to the neck or arm (hence the name Liṅgāyat). The sect mark is a white dot on the forehead. The dead are buried, not cremated.

Though they condemn all ritual, Viraśaivas still admit some rites, but these are performed by *jaṅgamas*, not *brāhmaṇas*, the main rite being initiation (*dikṣā*) of male children. They must also pay homage at least twice a day to the small *liṅga* they wear. Fundamental to their religion and deemed indispensable for salvation are the so-called eight covers (*aṣṭāvaraṇa*): the *guru*, who is even more revered than God; the *liṅga*; the *jaṅgamas*; holy water (*padodaka*); returned offerings (*prasāda*); holy ashes (*vibhūti*); the rosary (*rudrākṣa*); and the *mantra* "Namaḥ Śivāya." Viraśaivas believe in reincarnation, except for those who attain a certain degree of holiness in this life.

The metaphysical creed of the Viraśaivas is "qualified dualism" (*viśeṣādvaita*), a Śaiva variant of Rāmānuja's doctrine [see Rāmānuja], from which it may derive. Śiva acts through his energy (*śakti*), which divides itself into the Lord as manifested in the *guru* and the *liṅga* and into all individual souls (*aṅgas*). *Māyā* is the cause and origin of the material world. Liberation from this world is gained by devotion to God and through a six-fold practice, the six phases (*sthalas*) of which will eventually bring the devotee to union with Śiva (united with Śakti), a union that is not, however, complete identity with God.

The literature is in Sanskrit, Kannada, and Telugu. That in Sanskrit is mostly doctrinal; some Āgamas include Viraśaiva elements. The most important and popular texts are in Kannada, the main part being made up of *vacanas* ("sayings"). These are sermons, poems, and mystical utterances of the great Viraśaiva saints and masters (Basava, Kasimayya, Mahādēviyakka, Allama-prabhu). This literature, in which *bhakti* and Tantric elements combine to form a very remarkable synthesis, is often of great poetic beauty.

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ANDRÉ PADOUX

Nāyaṅārs

The sixty-three Nāyaṅārs (c. 500–750 CE) are the early leaders (Tam., *nāyaṅār*, “lord, leader”; pl., *nāyaṅmār*) and canonized saints of the Tamil Śaivas, a Hindu sect that commands a large following in the Tamil linguistic area of South India. Along with the Vaiṣṇava Āḷvārs, the Nāyaṅārs were among the first saints of a regional, vernacular *bhakti* (devotional) tradition in Hinduism.

Preeminent among the Nāyaṅārs are Nāṅacampantar (also called Tiruñāṅacampantar or Campantar; c. 650), Tirunāvukkaracar (also called Appar; c. 580–670) and Cuntaramūrtti (also called Nampi Ārūr; seventh to eighth century), authors of the Tamil hymns of the *Tēvāram*, which form the first seven books of the Tamil Śaiva canon, and are sung during temple rituals. Māṅikkavācakar, author of the *Tiruvācakam* (c. ninth century), is revered as the fourth saint-teacher (*camaya-kuru*) of the tradition, although he is not included among the Nāyaṅārs. [See the biography of Māṅikkavācakar.] Next in popularity to the four poet-saints are the woman hymnist Kāraikkāl Ammaiṅār (c. 550–600), Tirumūlar (c. eighth century), author of the mystical text *Tirumantiram*, and the legendary figures Kaṅṅappār and Caṅṅēcar.

The contributions of Nāṅacampantar, Appar, and Cuntaramūrtti are embodied in their hymns, which Tamil Śaivas consider equal to the Vedas, holiest of Hindu scriptures. In the Tamil hymns—the first vernacular religious texts in Hinduism—the saints eloquently express emotional love for a personal God (Śiva), a form of religiosity new to Hinduism. The three Nāyaṅārs traveled to 260 shrines of Śiva in Tamil country and celebrated his presence in these places. The saints' emphasis on Tamil cultural elements, such as emotional love in the setting of particular places, endeared their religion to the Tamils. The *Tēvāram* helped to drive Buddhism and Jainism out of the Tamil region and to establish Tamil Śaivism as the national religion of the

Tamils, patronized by the kings and practiced by the masses.

In his Tamil work *Periyapurāṅam* (The Great History), the hagiographer Cēkkiḷār (c. 1135) narrates the lives of Cuntaramūrtti and the sixty-two historical and legendary saints named in a hymn (*Tēvāram* 7.39). The Nāyaṅārs came from all segments in Tamil society. The majority were from the upper castes and classes—kings, brahmans, cultivators—but the list also includes a hunter, a low-caste musician, and even an untouchable. In contrast to the traditional Hindu caste hierarchy, the saints formed an ideal society, a spiritually egalitarian community of devotees of Śiva. The extreme acts of Kaṅṅappār, who dug out his own eyes to replace the miraculously bleeding eyes of the *liṅga* image of Śiva that he was worshiping, and of Ciṅṅuṅṅar, who upon request cooked and served his own son to a Śaiva devotee, are dramatic yet typical examples of the pattern of the saints' lives. At the end of such episodes, Śiva reveals himself, commending the saint as an exemplary “servant” (*aṅiyār*). The lives of the Nāyaṅārs articulate the Tamil Śaiva view of devotion as love of God expressed with intensity; as emotional poetry; and as ritual service (*tonṅtu*) to God and service to his devotees, rendered with total and selfless love. To this day, Tamil Śaivas celebrate the saints by worshiping their images, singing their hymns, and retelling their lives.

[For discussion of the Nāyaṅārs within the Tamil religious tradition, see Tamil Religions. For a comprehensive view of devotional poetry in India, see Poetry, article on Indian Religious Poetry.]

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study render it more useful to the scholar than to the general reader. Kamil Zvevbeil has provided a stimulating and insightful analysis of the lives of the Nāyaṅārs and of the hymns of the four poet-saints as religious literature in *The Smile of Murrukan: On Tamil Literature of South India* (Leiden, 1973), chap. 12, "Śaiva Bhakti: Two Approaches," pp. 185–206. Two other recent essays of interest are George W. Spencer's "The Sacred Geography of the Tamil Shaivite Hymns," *Numen* 17 (December 1970): 232–244, and my article "Singing of a Place: Pilgrimage as Metaphor and Motif in the *Tēvāram* Songs of the Tamil Śaivite Saints," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102 (January–March 1982): 69–90. The former explores the political, cultural and historical dimensions of the travels of the saints, while the latter offers translations of hitherto untranslated *Tēvāram* hymns and assesses the contribution of each of the three poet-saints to Tamil religion and culture.

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Krama Śaivism

The term *Krama Śaivism* refers to a number of closely related mystical cults of the goddess Kālī and her emanations, which, originating in Uḍḍiyāna (Swat) and Kashmir before the ninth century, propagated an idealist metaphysics that exerted a decisive influence on the Trika and thence on the Śrīvidyā. The Krama rituals and their wild, skull-decked, often theriomorphic deities place them within the Kāpālīka culture of the cremation grounds.

The branch of Krama scriptures that originated in Uḍḍiyāna (of these, manuscripts survive of the *Devīpāñcaśataka*, *Kramasadbhāva*, *Devīdvyardhaśatikā*, and *Yonigahvara Tantra*) has assimilated Kaulism and so professes to have distanced itself from this Kāpālīka background. Nonetheless, several Krama *gurus* in Kashmir, though they followed these scriptures, were Kāpālīka ascetics, while in the other major scriptural source of the Krama, the Kashmirian *Jayadrathayāmala*, the reforming influence of Kaulism is absent and the Kāpālīka context of the Krama is vividly described. Here we see that the Krama arose within a tradition of Kālī worship principally concerned with Kāpālīka rites of spontaneous and controlled possession. The concept of possession developed into that of an enlightenment in which social individuality, with its constituent belief in a world of external powers and in the objectivity of Brahmanical criteria of purity, is displaced by the radiant expansion of Kālī from within as an impersonal, value-free, and infinite power of consciousness that projects and resorbs the universe within itself.

All forms of the Krama ritual are designed to induce this liberating intrinsicism through assimilative worship of Kālī (the true Self) in and as a "sequence" (*krama*) of sets of divine powers. This "sequence" embodies all the phases through which this cyclical dyna-

mism manifests itself in the microcosm of the individual's cognition, as it fills and empties itself from moment to moment in the flux of experience. Thus in its commonest form the Krama ritual culminates in the worship of a sequence of deities that successively encodes the projection of content, immersion in content, retraction of content into the state of latent impression within the subject, and finally the dissolution of these subjective impressions in the implosion of consciousness into its pristine, nondiscursive potentiality. In some traditions, pure luminosity (*bhāsā*) is worshiped as a fifth phase englobing these four as its creative vibrancy. Fortifying this gnostic ritual with the expansive joy of caste-free sexual union and the consumption of wine, flesh, and the impurities of the body, the initiate penetrates through the inhibition of external values and the rebirth-generating bondage of self-awareness that this inhibition entails, thereby attaining the conviction that his individualized consciousness is but the spontaneous play of these universal powers. No longer enslaved by the appearance of subjection to the not-self in consciousness, he achieves liberation within the very flow of extroverted cognition.

This neo-Kāpālīka mysticism of the Krama reached its highest theoretical and liturgical coherence in Kashmir in the preceptorial lineage of Jñānanetraṅātha (fl. c. 850–900). Emerging out of the Krama of Uḍḍiyāna, the outstanding works of this Kashmirian tradition are three texts, each entitled *Mahānayaaprakāśa* (Illumination of the Great Doctrine), one anonymous (between 1000 and 1200) and the others by Arṇasimha (fl. c. 1050–1100) and Śitikaṅṭha (fifteenth century?). While remaining a distinct sectarian tradition, the Krama strongly influenced the Trika, the other major Śaiva soteriology in Kashmir. Krama deities were incorporated into the core of the Trika pantheon in the second phase of Trika, and in its third phase the *gurus* who propagated the Pratyabhijñā (in the tenth century) took initiations in the lineage of Jñānanetraṅātha. It is probable that this Krama background inspired their idealist nondualism. Among them Abhinavagupta contributed to the literature of the independent Krama, while his better-known exegesis of the Trika attempts to show that the Trika's categories contain the Krama as their essence. [See the biography of Abhinavagupta.] The independent Krama, influenced in turn by the Pratyabhijñā, spread in the twelfth century to the Śaiva centers of the far South. Of this phase we have the *Mahārthamañjarī* (Flower-cluster of the Great Doctrine) by Maheśvarānanda of Cidambaram (fl. c. 1175–1225) and the *Cidgaganacandrikā* (Moonlight of the Sky of Consciousness) by Śrīvatsa, probably of Śucīndram (between 1075 and 1150).

Apart from these Kashmirian and southern develop-

ments, forms of the Krama flourished outside Kashmir as the basis of the cult of the goddess Guhyakālī. The earliest and richest work of this tradition is the *Kālikulakramārcana* of Vimalaprabodha (before 1000), drawing on both the tradition of Uḍḍiyāna and that of the *Jayadrathayāmala*. Many liturgical texts of this branch of the Krama survive in the Kathmandu valley, where the cult of Guhyakālī (often identified with Guhyeśvarī, the principal local goddess) has continued into modern times. It is also to the Śaiva Newars of Nepal that we owe the preservation of manuscripts of the Krama scriptures, which are mentioned and quoted by the early authors of Kashmir but have not survived there.

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ALEXIS SANDERSON

Trika Śaivism

The Śaivas of the Trika tradition were the principal propagators of the nondualist idealism that flourished in Kashmir from about 900 CE. Although all the known exegetical literature of the Trika is Kashmirian or inspired by Kashmirian authors, there are reasons to doubt that the tradition was Kashmirian in origin. The earliest and probably pre-Kashmirian phase of its development is seen in the *Siddhayogeśvarīmata Tantra*, the *Mālinīvijayottara Tantra*, and the *Tantrasadbhāva Tantra*. These Tantras lack the exegetes' doctrine that the world is the projection in and of consciousness, and their liturgies and yogic systems share the absence of the goddess Kālī/Kālasaṃkarṣiṇī, whose cult was later central to the Trika.

In the earlier period (probably before 800 CE) Trika Śaivism is defined by a system of ritual whose goal is the assimilation of the power of a "triad" (*trika*) of goddesses, Parā, Parāparā, and Aparā, the first benevolent, the other two wild and terrifying, garlanded with skulls and brandishing the *khatvāṅga*, the skull-topped staff of the Kāpālikas. Associated with the cult of these sect-defining deities was that of the eight mother goddesses and their embodiments in "clans" (*kula*) of *yoginīs*. The latter are both supernatural apparitions and human females considered to be permanently possessed by the mother goddesses. They were to be invoked and/or placated with offerings of blood, flesh, wine, and sexual

fluids by power-seeking adepts whose affinity with one or other of these clans was divined at the time of initiation.

This cult of supernatural power through the manipulation of impurity incorporated Kālī in the second phase of its development, first alone, as the transcendental goddess immanent in the original three as her emanations (this is seen in the *Devayāmala Tantra* and in parts of the *Jayadrathayāmala Tantra*), and then accompanied by the pantheon of Krama Śaivism's cycle of cognition, as in the *Trikasadbhāva Tantra* and *Trikaḥṛdaya Tantra*. Since the Krama originated in the far Northwest, it is probable that this second phase of the Trika developed in Kashmir.

The third phase of the Trika (from c. 900 CE), represented principally by the *Tantrāloka*, *Mālinīvijayavārtika*, and *Parātrimśikāvivarāṇa* of Abhinavagupta, shows the tradition competing with the Śaiva Siddhānta for authority within the mainstream of Kashmirian Śaivism. Equipped in the Pratyabhiññā with a respectable metaphysics, it distanced itself from the visionary, power-orientated world of the early Trika. Its sect-defining rituals are directed inward to self-contemplation in unmotivated performance, so that in principle they can be abandoned when gnostic self-cultivation no longer requires their support.

Behind this level of Tantric ritual, which gave the sect its broad base in the Śaiva community, this phase of the Trika preserved, as the cult of the virtuosi, a variety of the erotico-mystical Kaulism associated with the perhaps mythical saint Macchanda (also known as Matsyendranātha). This tradition had its roots in the cult of the clans of the eight mother goddesses seen in the first phase of the Trika, in related Śaiva cults (e.g., that of the *Picumatabrahmayāmala Tantra*), and in Buddhist adaptations in the Heruka Tantras, but broke away from this substratum by rejecting the external aspects of the culture of the cremation grounds. This trend toward mystical interiorization is extremely marked in the Trika Kaulism of Abhinavagupta, who propagated a meta-aesthetics in which orgasm with the consecrated female partner or "messenger" (*dūtī*)—the key moment of higher Kaula practice—was to reveal the all-containing dynamism of the absolute self radiating in blissful consciousness as the reality embodied and less directly perceived in the structure of its divine powers worshiped by lesser adepts in the Tantric and preliminary Kaula rituals.

Distinctive of the third phase of the Trika are (1) the doctrine of the co-essentiality of the "triad" (*trika*) of the individual (*aṅu* or *nara*), cosmic power (*śakti*), and the ground of *śakti*, Śiva; (2) the equation of the worship of the three goddesses in their Kālī-ground with liberating awareness of the unity in pure consciousness of (a) pre-

cognitive impulse, cognition, and action, (b) object, medium, and agent of cognition, and (c) projection of, immersion in, and retraction of content in consciousness; (3) the ascent through the three means of salvation: the *āṇava* (through action, both ritual and yogic), the *śākta* (through the gradual intensification of a purely intellectual representation of reality toward its self-transcendence in nondiscursive revelation), and the *sāmbhava* (self-realization unmediated by thought, in the inner vibrancy of the precognitive impulse); (4) the hierarchy of seven levels of the contraction of the self, from the Śivamode to that of the individual; and (5) the claim to catholicity: the third phase of the Trika claims to be the summation of and key to all Śaiva traditions, both “orthodox” (i.e., Śaiva Siddhānta) and “heterodox” (i.e., the Bhairavatantras, Kaulism, and the Krama). After Abhinavagupta and his pupil Kṣemarāja, the third phase of the Trika spread to the Tamil country. There it provided the theoretical basis for and influenced the form of the cult of Śrīvidyā.

[See also the biography of Abhinavagupta.]

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ALEXIS SANDERSON

Śaivism in Kashmir

From the second half of the ninth century CE, Tantric Śaivism in Kashmir advanced in various forms into the front line of Brahmanical thinking. Learned authors superimposed upon roughly homogenous groups of scriptural traditions uniform systems of metaphysics and soteriology that could be defended not only against each other but also against the major non-Śaiva doctrines of the time. By the tenth century the Śaiva scene was dominated by the confrontation of two radically opposed schools, on the one hand, a group of nondualistic traditions, principally the Trika and the Krama, and on the other, the dualistic Śaiva Siddhānta. The nondualists, upholding the doctrine that the world and persons are no more than the play of the power of a universal consciousness-self, operated from within transgressive cults “tainted” by the Kāpālika culture of the cremation

grounds and the erotico-mystical soteriology of the Kaulas. The Kashmirian Śaiva Siddhānta sealed itself off from these “impure,” visionary traditions. It sustained a “pure” cult of Śiva, based on the twenty-eight Āgamas, with a soteriology that subordinated gnosis to the ritual praxis of indissolubly individual agents, claiming, moreover, that this praxis was entirely compatible with orthodox Brahmanical duty and caste purity.

The outstanding authors of this conservative Śaivism were Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha (fl. c. 950–1025 CE) and his son Rāmakaṇṭha. The most outstanding work is the latter's *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*. The rise of the nondualist theology that opposed the Śaiva Siddhānta began with Vasugupta and his pupil Kallaṭa (fl. c. 850–900), was philosophically refined by Somānanda (fl. c. 900–950) and his pupil Utpaladeva, and culminated in the monumental works of Abhinavagupta and his pupil Kṣemarāja (fl. c. 1000–1050). This tradition also sought to accommodate orthodox life, but by a different route. While the dualists adapted Śaivism to the orthodox view of the castebound ritual agent, the nondualists offered the initiate an esoteric self concealed within his perceived individuality, a blissful, transindividual consciousness which, being the cause and substance of all phenomena, could be seen as freely assuming the appearance of his limitation by an “outside world” and its values, as though it were an actor playing a role. Behind this outer conformity the Śaiva householder initiated into the Trika could experience the power of transcendence through contemplative worship that involved not only consumption of meat and wine but—in the case of the elite of *vīras* (“heroes”)—sexual intercourse.

This nondualistic tradition with its relatively sect-neutral metaphysics has generally been called Kashmir Śaivism. This term, however, obscures the fact that in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the period of most of our Śaiva literature, it was the Śaiva Siddhānta that was the dominant Śaiva doctrine (*jñāna*) in Kashmir, whereas the principal Śaiva cult in that region was then, as it has remained, neither that of the Śaiva Siddhānta nor that of the Trika or Krama. Rather it was the worship of Svachandabhairava and his consort Aghoreśvarī, a form of Śaivism that falls between these two extremes. Naturally, the two schools competed for authority over this middle ground. The Śaiva Siddhānta had propagated a dualistic and socially conservative exegesis of its principal scripture, the *Svacchanda Tantra*, which Kṣemarāja countered from within the newly consolidated nondualism in his own, subsequently authoritative commentary.

The new nondualism also entered the Kaula cult of

the goddess Tripurasundarī, or Śrīvidyā, which rose to eminence in Kashmir during the eleventh century. This Kashmirian tradition of the Śrīvidyā, which, by the twelfth century, had spread to the Tamil country, came to be adopted in Trika circles with the result that the Trika became less a system of Tantric worship than a matrix of metaphysics and soteriological theory. Outstanding representatives of this Trika-based Śrīvidyā in Kashmir were Jayaratha (fl. c. 1225–1275), Sāhib Kaula (b. 1629), Śivopādhyāya (fl. c. 1725–1775), and Harabhaṭṭa (1874–1951). The cult of Tripurasundarī also permeated the worship of the local family goddesses of Kashmir (Jvālāmukhī, Śārikā, Rājñī, Bālā, etc.). Indeed, she was generally seen as the archetype and source of all the goddesses enshrined in the valley.

Although Trika ritual seems largely to have been replaced by that of the Śrīvidyā, that of the Krama retained its vigor, being preserved in such late texts as the *Mahānayaprakāśa* of Śitikaṇṭha, the *Chummasaṃpradāya*, and the *Śivarātrirahasya* of Nityasvatantra, in which Krama ritual is seen to play an important role in the annual Śivarātri festival. It is also probable that a related tradition based on the *Mādhvakula* of the *Jayadrathayāmala Tantra* and worshiping Kālī as the consort of Narasiṃha, the man-lion incarnation of Viṣṇu, survived into the late Middle Ages. At present, nondualist Śaiva doctrine and some techniques of meditation continue to be accessible to the brahmans of the valley, but the tradition of Tantric ritual maintained by the priests (*gōrini*) through the centuries of Muslim rule has declined to such an extent that it faces imminent extinction.

[See also *Tantrism and the biography of Abhinavagupta*.]

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ALEXIS SANDERSON

Pratyabhijñā

The Pratyabhijñā system of thought is part of what is called Kashmir Śaivism, a name applied to nondualist forms of Śaivism that flourished approximately between the ninth and thirteenth centuries in Kashmir and other parts of northern India but also elsewhere.

The importance of the Pratyabhijñā in nondualist Śaivism is underscored by the fact that Mādhava (fourteenth century), in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, a classical work on Indian religious and philosophical systems, describes this school as Pratyabhijñā. The doctrine was first formulated systematically by Somānanda (ninth century?) in his *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, then by his disciple Utpaladeva in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (Verses on the Recognition of God) and in a subsequent commentary (*Vṛtti*) on them. It was further elaborated by Abhinavagupta (tenth to eleventh century) in two important commentaries, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Vimarśinī* and the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Vivṛttivimarśinī*. Abhinavagupta's disciple Kṣemarāja gave a short and clear exposition of this doctrine in the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*. These treatises, all from Kashmir, rank among the main Indian philosophical works.

The term *pratyabhijñā* is usually translated as "recognition." The word has been explained as knowledge (*jñāna*) of an object to which one turns back (*prati*) and which then faces (*abhi*) the knower. It is the knowledge regained of the identity of the individual self and of the world with the Supreme Source of all.

For this school, to quote Kṣemarāja, "it is the divine Consciousness alone, self-shining absolute free will, that flashes forth in the form of the multitudinous universe": it is the unique cause, the inner reality and the substratum of cosmic manifestation, which it projects as a shining forth (*ābhāsa*) on itself as on a screen. This consciousness, Śiva, is the one absolute reality. The world is insubstantial—though not illusory, for it is, in its ultimate nature, of the same stuff as consciousness, from which it has evolved and with which it remains merged. But this identity is hidden because of the action of *māyāśakti*, the limiting and obnubilating power of Śiva. The world, in such a vision, exists only as a kind of cosmic oblivion of reality, hence the role of recognition through which the "forgotten" truth is rediscovered. *Pratyabhijñā* is not remembrance, however. It does not result from memory, despite the important metaphysical role of remembrance—*smaraṇa*—in nondualist Śaivism, but from a synthetic activity of the mind that destroys the misconceptions veiling the real nature of the supreme Self and finally brings one to realize the truth: "I am Śiva, the only true consciousness, omniscient, the only active power of the universe."

This knowledge, brought about by intense spiritual concentration (*bhāvanā*) and with the necessary help of God's grace (*anugraha* or *śaktipāta*, the "descent of divine energy"), is attained by the yogin after having reached the state of *samādhi*, where he experiences a merging with (*samāveśa*) or a unifying contemplation of (*samāpatti*) the Supreme. It is said to shine as an intuiti-

tive vision (*pratibhā*), destroying all illusion. When this state becomes permanent, the yogin is freed from all bondage and is totally identified with Śiva, master of the whole cosmic process. The highest cosmic bliss (*ja-gadānanda*) is then experienced while one is still in life (*jīvanmukti*); it is a state in which empirical awareness and perfect transcendental consciousness coincide.

[See also the biography of *Abhinavagupta*.]

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ANDRÉ PADOUX

Pāśupatas

The Pāśupatas were possibly the earliest, and certainly one of the most influential, of the Hindu religious sects dedicated to the god Śiva. The probable founder of this sect was called Lakulīśa, meaning "the lord [*īśa*] with the club [*lakula*]." According to several of the Purāṇas, and other sources as well, Lakulīśa was an incarnation of Śiva, who entered a human body in the village of Kāyāvatarāṇa or Kāyārohaṇa, located in western India near the city of Broach. He had four disciples named (with variants) Kuśika, Gārgya, Kauruṣa, and Maitreya. Each of them established an important genealogy of religious preceptors. An inscription from Mathura of 380 CE mentions a Śaiva *guru* who was tenth in descent from Kuśika. Assuming that this Kuśika was his direct disciple, Lakulīśa must have lived in about the first half of the second century.

The Pāśupata sect seems to have died out by about the end of the fifteenth century. Nonetheless, its doctrines and practices are reasonably well known from two surviving Pāśupata texts: the *Gaṇakārikā*, attributed to Haradatta, with a commentary attributed to Bhāsarvajña (tenth century), and the *Pāśupata Sūtra*, with the commentary of Kauṇḍīnya. Both of these texts are cited by Sāyaṇa-Mādhava (fourteenth century) in the chapter on this sect in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. The influence of the Pāśupatas is evident in several Śaiva Purāṇas and in the late *Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad*, but the Pāśupata doctrines and practices described in these works differ considerably from those of the *Gaṇakārikā* and *Pāśupata Sūtra*.

The Pāśupatas were quite influential over much of South India from about the seventh to fourteenth cen-

turies. The Kālamukhas, a closely related sect that also traced its foundation to Lakulīśa, controlled many temples and monasteries in the Karnataka region of the South during much of the same period. The ascetics of both sects actively participated in the revival of Śaivism that virtually eliminated Jainism and Buddhism from South India and competed successfully with the rival Hindu Vaiṣṇavas as well. As a result, even today Śiva remains the principal god of the Hindus of this region.

According to the *Pāśupata Sūtra*, the doctrine of the sect is based on the analysis of five major topics: effect (*kārya*), or the created universe; cause (*kāraṇa*), namely God; union (*yoga*), the purposeful association of the individual soul with God; observance (*vidhi*), ascetic and devotional practice; and end of sorrow (*duḥkhānta*), or salvation. The *Gaṇakārikā* describes five different stages (*avasthā*) in the adept's spiritual progress, each connected with a particular place, strength, impurity, purification, procedure, attainment, and aspect of initiation. In the first, "marked" (*vyakta*) stage, the adept stays with his *guru* in a temple. In an act typical of Śaiva ascetics he daily "bathes" in ashes and offers six different acts of worship dedicated to Śiva. In the second, "unmarked" (*avyakta*) stage, he leaves the temple to live among ordinary men and engages in the curious practices called "doors" (*dvāra*), the aim of which is to earn the active contempt of the uninitiated populace. These practices include walking about as if sick or crippled, making "amorous" gestures toward women, and acting and talking as if without any wits. The ascetics thereby pass their own bad *karman* to their unsuspecting revilers while at the same time absorbing these revilers' good *karman*. The remaining three stages are basically progressive levels of spiritual enlightenment unrelated to external behavior.

As in the possibly related doctrine of the Śaiva Sidhāntins, the Pāśupatas make an ontological distinction between the individual soul (*paśu*), God (*pati*), and the fetters of this world (*pāśa*). Their basic metaphysical position is thus both dualist and monotheistic. The grace of God is believed to be essential for salvation, which is conceived of as an intimate association of the soul with Śiva (*Rudrasāyujya*). Several Pāśupata theologians were renowned as logicians (*naiyāyikas*).

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Sarvadarśanasamgraha in *Indo-Iranian Journal* 2 (1958): 8–32, is excellent on Pāśupata doctrine and practice.

DAVID N. LORENZEN

Kāpālikas

In the South Indian text *Periya Purāṇam* by Cēkkiḷār (c. 1100), a Śaiva ascetic visits the home of a seventh-century householder-saint, one of the sixty-three Nāyaṇārs, and demands to be fed with the flesh of the saint's only son. With limitless devotional zeal, the saint promptly beheads his young son, helps his wife prepare a curry of their son's flesh, and finally agrees even to join the ascetic in the gruesome feast. At the last moment the cruel guest disappears and the sacrificed son returns to life. The ascetic reveals himself to be none other than the god Śiva come to test his devotee. This legend is typical of those associated with the Kāpālikas, or Bearers of the Skull (*kapāla*), a heterodox Śaiva sect often accused of both necrophilic and orgiastic practices.

The true character of the Kāpālika sect is difficult to determine since it is known almost exclusively from the text of its opponents, especially from dramatic works such as the *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra (c. 1050–1100) and the *Mattavilāsa* of Mahendravarman (c. 600–630), and from the hagiographies of the great theologian Śāṅkarācārya written by Mādhavācārya (c. 1700?), Anantānandagiri (c. 1400?), and others. It is even possible to suppose that the Kāpālika sect has been created by these authors to personify the varied groups of unorthodox and Tantric ascetics who worshiped the god Śiva. There does, however, exist sufficient evidence to indicate the probable historical reality of a specific Kāpālika sect between about the fifth and fifteenth centuries CE.

First, the Kāpālikas, sometimes also called Kapālins or Mahāvratins, are frequently mentioned as one of the four principal religious sects dedicated to the god Śiva. The historical existence and importance of the others—the Pāśupatas, Kālāmukhas, and Śaiva Siddhāntins—is beyond doubt. Second, two inscriptions from western India, dating from the seventh and eleventh centuries, record donations to what must have been Kāpālika ascetics. In the first inscription the recipients of the gifts are described as Mahāvratins who reside in the temple of Kāpāleśvara, Lord of the Kāpālas; in the second the recipient is described as a Mahāvratin ascetic who is "like the Kapālin Śāṅkara in bodily form." This Kapālin is none other than Śiva in the form of a Kāpālika ascetic. The myth of Śiva-Kapālin is the third and most important basis for supposing the existence of a specific Kāpālika sect, since this myth evi-

dently serves as the archetypal model for the religious practices of the ascetic members of the sect. The myth is not clearly referred to in texts earlier than the Purāṇas (c. 200–1300), but it is indirectly linked to the early Vedic myth of the conflict between the gods Prajāpati and Rudra and to the *Mahābhārata* myth of Rāma Rāghava and the sage Mahodara.

The Puranic myth of Śiva-Kapālin begins with an argument between Śiva and the creator god, Brahmā. The upshot of the dispute is that Śiva removes one of the five heads of Brahmā and thereby is afflicted with the sin of *brahmahatyā*, the killing of a brahman. To free himself from this sin, symbolically represented by the skull of Brahmā sticking to his left hand, Śiva must undertake a twelve-year penance, wandering about in the guise of a Kāpālika ascetic who uses the skull as a begging bowl. This penance is known as the Great Vow (*mahāvratā*), and Śiva consequently becomes a Mahāvratin (Follower of the Great Vow). The penance is eventually completed in Banaras, the holy city of Śiva, at the sacred bathing place (*tīrtha*) on the Ganges called Kapālamocana, where the skull finally falls from his hand.

The descriptions of human Kāpālika ascetics likewise conform to those of the Kapālin form of Śiva. They wander about with a skull begging-bowl, their bodies smeared with ashes, wearing bone or skull ornaments and loincloths of animal skin, with their hair in matted locks. They sometimes carry a special club called a *khaṭvāṅga*, consisting of a skull mounted on a stick.

In none of this is there any suggestion of orgiastic behavior. Nonetheless, the more heterodox Śaiva sects generally are associated with the religious current known as Tantrism, which does feature rites that break, either symbolically or in fact, orthodox socioreligious injunctions concerning both food and sex. The best known of such rites is that of the five *ma* sounds (*pañcamakāra*) in which the devotee partakes of liquor (*madya*), meat (*māṃsa*), fish (*matsya*), parched grain (*mudrā*), and coition (*maithuna*). Kāpālika ascetics are frequently regarded as libidinous hypocrites who practice the Tantric reversals of conventional morality on a daily basis.

In Tantric cults, salvation (*mukti*) is often imagined as a state of bliss homologous to the bliss of the sexual union of Śiva and Pārvatī. The doctrine of the Kāpālikas is usually called Soma Siddhānta, a term that is traditionally explained as the doctrine (*siddhānta*) of Śiva united with his wife Umā (*sa-umā*).

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DAVID N. LORENZEN

SAKA RELIGION. See Scythian Religion.

ŚAKTI. See Kuṇḍalinī and Tantrism.

SALANTER, YISRA'EL (1810–1883), born Yisra'el Lipkin, Lithuanian rabbinic scholar and leader, founder of the Musar movement. Yisra'el Lipkin, the son of a rabbi and an exceptionally educated woman, showed scholarly promise at an early age. At the age of twelve he traveled to the town of Salant to continue his studies under the tutelage of the noted scholar Tsevi Hirsh Braude. From his stay of some fifteen years in Salant derives Rabbi Yisra'el's usual designation, Salanter.

The young Yisra'el came under the influence of the charismatic but reclusive rabbi, Yosef Zundel of Salant. Characteristic of the latter's approach were an intense concern with the moral aspects of Jewish law and the development of psychological techniques meant to heighten moral sensitivity and inspire righteous action. Yisra'el Salanter's discipleship under Zundel also put him in a direct line of discipleship from Zundel's teacher Ḥayyim of Volozhin to Ḥayyim's master, Eliyyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman (the "Vilna Gaon," 1720–1797), the most revered figure in the Lithuanian rabbinic tradition.

Salanter's public career began upon his arrival in Vilna (modern Vilnius) in 1840. He first served as the head of a major *yeshivah* in the city but soon left to found his own academy in a Vilna suburb. During this period Salanter began his efforts to set up a mass movement dedicated to individual ethical improvement. He addressed audiences of all social classes, arranged for the reprinting of classical ethical tracts, established the *musar-shṭībl*, a place for the study of moral works, and formed a nucleus of disciples who would spread the Musar doctrine.

Salanter was a widely revered figure known for his scholarship, his personal saintliness, and his concern for the suffering of others. His independent spirit and his moral authority in the community are illustrated by an incident in which Salanter suspended the Yom Kippur fast during a cholera epidemic in 1848. That same year government officials offered him the post of Talmud instructor in a newly opened modern rabbinical seminary, but Salanter, who opposed cooperation

with government-sponsored Enlightenment programs or with *maskilim* ("enlightened" Jews), instead took up residence in Kovno (modern Kaunas).

In Kovno, Salanter forged the model of the Musar *yeshivah*, where the study of ethical works and the practice of self-contemplation became regular parts of the curriculum. From Kovno, Salanter sent letters to his followers outlining aspects of his Musar doctrine. These letters, later collected and printed in numerous editions, constitute the greater part of Salanter's written legacy.

In 1857, seeking medical treatment for depression and nervous disorders, Salanter moved to Germany, where he remained the rest of his career. In 1860 he published one of the first Orthodox periodicals, *Te-vunah*, and in 1877 founded an advanced *yeshivah* in Kovno for married students. In Germany he met with university students, proposed a project to translate the Talmud into other languages, and asked that Talmud study be accepted as part of the university curriculum. He helped organize religious institutions for eastern European immigrants in Memel (modern Klaipeda, Lithuania), Paris, and other cities. Throughout his later years Salanter maintained correspondence with and influence over his disciples in Lithuania.

[See also Musar Movement.]

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GERSHON C. BACON

ŞALĀT is the name of formal ritual prayer in Islam; informal prayer is called *du'ā'*. *Şalāt* has an exact prescribed form and is always performed in the Arabic language. Among the Five Pillars (*arkān*; sg., *rukūn*) of Islam, it holds the second most important position, immedi-

ately after the declaration of faith (*shahādah*). The other three pillars are almsgiving (*zakāt*), fasting (*ṣawm*), and pilgrimage (*ḥajj*).

There are five daily prayers that are obligatory (*farḍ*) upon every sane, adult Muslim, male or female (though women are excused from this duty during their periods and postnatal bleeding). Children are encouraged to pray at the age of seven and are urged to observe this duty at the age of ten, but it becomes obligatory when they reach the age of puberty (*bulūgh*).

The Qur'ān has spoken about *ṣalāt* in many places: "Say to my faithful servants to observe *ṣalāt*" (31:14); "Observe *ṣalāt* and pay the *zakāt*" (2:43, 2:83, 2:110, 22:78, 24:56, 33:33, 73:20). *Ṣalāt* is prescribed, says the Qur'ān, as a duty to be performed by believers at fixed times (4:103). The Qur'ān has generally referred to various times of prayers: "Establish prayer at the two ends of the day and at the approaches of the night" (11:114); "Establish prayer at the sun's decline till the darkness of the night and morning prayer and reading . . ." (17:78); and "Celebrate the praises of thy lord before the rising of the sun and before its setting; celebrate them for part of the hours of the night and at the sides of the day" (20:130). The five prayers are not mentioned in the Qur'ān by name, however. Details about the names, timings, rules, and regulations of *ṣalāt* are based upon the authority of the *ḥadīth*. Among various schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*madhāhib al-fiqh*) and sects (*fi-raq*) there are minor differences in *ṣalāt*, but its main features are everywhere the same.

Ablutions. Ritual cleanliness (*ṭahārah*) is the prerequisite of *ṣalāt*. The person performing *ṣalāt* must make sure about the cleanliness of the body, clothing, and the place of prayer. Cleanliness of the body means that one must make ablution (*wuḍū'*) before prayer. An ablution is good for several prayers as long as one has not broken it by answering the call of nature, passing wind, sleeping, bleeding from any part of the body, or touching a member of the opposite sex with lustful desire (*shahwah*). According to the Shāfi'ī jurists any touching of the opposite sex nullifies ablution except the touch of minors and of those whom one is not allowed to marry (*maḥram*). In all these circumstances one has to renew the ablution by washing one's hands; rinsing the mouth and nose; washing the whole face from the top of the forehead to the bottom of the chin and from the right ear to the left; washing the arms up to and including the elbows; wiping the head, ears, and neck with wet hands; and washing the feet, including the ankles (Shī'ī Muslims wipe the feet instead of washing them). All washing in ablution should be done three times.

In case of water scarcity one washing of all parts is considered sufficient. If water is not available at all or

is so scarce that it must be kept for drinking, or if one cannot use water because of sickness or some other valid reason—such as prevention by an enemy—then one is allowed to make a gesture of ablution (*tayammum*) by touching clean earth and, after shaking the dust from the hands, rubbing them over the hands, face, and arms up to the elbows. After sexual intercourse or lustful emission of sperm, or cessation of menstrual or postnatal bleeding in the case of women, a *wuḍū'* is not enough; a full bath (*ghusl*) becomes necessary. A person in these conditions is not allowed to pray, enter the mosque, or read the Qur'ān without taking a full bath. In case of sickness or other valid reasons *tayammum* can also become a substitute for bathing; the procedure in such cases is the same as for ablution.

Most jurists allow wiping over the socks with a wet hand instead of washing the feet in subsequent ablutions, on the condition that one has put on one's socks, at first, after washing one's feet in full ablution, and has not taken them off at any time during this period. This wiping over the socks (*mash' alā al-khuffayn*) is allowed for one day and one night only except for travelers, who are permitted to take benefit of this provision for three days and nights. In the past jurists considered only the very thick (leather) type of socks for this concession. Modern jurists allow all type of socks as long as they go over the ankles and have no holes showing a three-finger-sized portion of the foot individually or collectively. Wiping the hand over wounds and bandages is allowed in ablution as long as it is necessary.

The Five Daily Prayers. *Fajr* (morning prayer) can be performed anytime from dawn (about one hour and a quarter before sunrise) until sunrise. *Zuhr* (noon prayer) can be performed shortly after midday until afternoon (when the shadow of every thing becomes its equal, according to Shāfi'ī law, or its double, according to Ḥanafī). *'Aṣr* (afternoon prayer) time begins at the end of *zuhr* time and ends a little before sunset. *Maghrib* (evening prayer) time begins immediately after sunset and ends quickly at the setting of the red twilight. *'Ishā'* (night prayer) time begins when the white twilight disappears and darkness overtakes the horizon; it lasts until the middle of the night. While prayer can be performed at any time between these limits, it is recommended that it be performed at the earliest time possible. A prayer missed in its time can be made up (*qaḍā'*) later. There are three times when one is not supposed to offer any prayers: at sunrise, when the sun is at the meridian, and at sunset. The *ḥadīth* explains that these restrictions are intended to avoid any resemblance with sun worship.

Each of these five prayers has a fixed form and prescribed readings; there is very little liturgical choice in

ṣalāt. All readings have to be done from memory: reading from a book, including the Qur'ān, is not allowed. All readings and supplications are based upon the *sunnah* (custom, practice) of the prophet Muḥammad. In *ṣalāt* every care is taken to do the prayer exactly as the Prophet did it. It is reported that the Prophet said, "Pray as you have seen me praying." To Muslims the meaning and spirit of *ṣalāt* lie in their deep conviction that they are praying to God as did the prophet of God.

Performance. All prayers must be performed facing the Ka'bah in Mecca, which is the *qiblah* (direction of prayers). Each *ṣalāt* consists of two or more *rak'ahs* (lit., "inclining forward" or "bowing," but the term is applied to a whole set of motions, including standing, bowing, prostrations). Each *ṣalāt* also has some *fard* (obligatory, that which is enjoined by God) elements, some *sunan* (based upon the practices of Muḥammad) elements, and some *nafl* (voluntary) elements. Table 1 outlines these divisions as prescribed for each prayer in the order in which they are performed.

TABLE 1. *Elements of Daily Prayers (Ṣalāt)*

TYPE OF PRAYER	SUNAN	FARD	SUNAN	NAFL/WITR ²
<i>Fajr</i>	2 required	2		
<i>Zuhr</i>	4 required	4	2 required	2 <i>nafl</i>
<i>ʿAṣr</i>	4 optional	4		
<i>Maghrib</i>	2 optional ¹	3	2 required	2 <i>nafl</i>
<i>ʿIshā'</i>	4 optional	4	2 required	3 <i>witr</i>

¹According to Shāfi'ī and Ḥanbalī law.

²*Witr* literally means "odd number"; these are mandatory according to Ḥanafī law.

Ṣalāt requires various positions and movements of the body. It starts with a determination of intention (*nīyah*); then one raises both hands with open palms facing the *qiblah*. Hands are raised in such a way that the thumbs almost touch the earlobes; women raise their hands up to the shoulders only. Men then fold their hands upon the stomach under the navel with the palm of the right hand over the back of the left hand; women fold their hands over the chest. There are slight variations regarding the raising of the hands and the place where they should be folded. Mālikī Sunnīs and the Shī'ah do not fold their hands in the standing position and leave them to the sides. The Fātiḥah (opening chapter of the Qur'ān) is recited in each *rak'ah*, followed by some verses or short chapters from the Qur'ān. After the standing position (*qiyām*), one goes into bowing (*rukū'*), then stands again and goes into prostration (*sujūd*) twice. In the second *rak'ah* one sits with folded knees after *sujūd*. There are special supplications for

each position. Transfer from one position to another is indicated with *takbīr* (the words *Allāhu akbar*, "God is the greatest"). The prayer ends in the sitting position with the greeting of peace (*salām*) said first on the right side and then on the left.

Ṣalāt can be performed individually as well as collectively. It is highly recommended in the *ḥadīth* that wherever there are two or more Muslims they should perform their *fard* (obligatory) prayer in congregation. *Sunan* and *nafl* prayers are usually offered individually. Five daily prayer services held at the mosques (*masājid*) consist of the *fard* part of these prayers only; the *sunan* and *nafl* parts are offered at home or individually at the mosque. It is recommended that nonobligatory prayers should be offered in privacy.

Congregational Prayer. The congregational prayers (*jamā'ah*) begin with a call to prayer (*adhān*). As soon as the time of an obligatory *ṣalāt* arrives, the muezzin (Arab., *mu'adhḥin*, the person who calls the *adhān*) goes up the minaret of the mosque or any tall, elevated place to announce the prayer. The prescribed words of the *adhān* are chanted in a loud voice. There are minor differences among the Sunnīs and the Shī'ah in the *adhān*. All Sunnīs agree on the wording of the *adhān*, which must be said in Arabic. Its translation is as follows:

God is the greatest.
God is the greatest.
God is the greatest.
God is the greatest.

I bear witness that there is no god except God.
I bear witness that there is no god except God.

I bear witness that Muḥammad is the messenger of God.
I bear witness that Muḥammad is the messenger of God.

Come to prayer.
Come to prayer.

Come to salvation.
Come to salvation.

God is the greatest.
God is the greatest.

There is no god except God.

In the *fajr adhān*, after "Come to salvation" is added "Prayer is better than sleep" (twice). The Shī'ah add the statement "Come to the best deed." Some Shī'ah also add after the second witness a third one, "I bear witness that 'Alī is the friend of God and the successor of the Messenger of God."

A few minutes after the *adhān*, the *iqāmah* is called to announce the beginning of the *ṣalāt*. The words of the

iqāmah are the same as those of the *adhān*, with an additional phrase announcing, "The prayer has started."

Congregational prayers are led by an imam (leader) selected from the congregation by virtue of his knowledge, piety, and age. The imam must be male if the congregation is mixed or men only. A female imam can lead the prayers of women only. Women are allowed to attend the mosques according to all schools of law, but they are often discouraged from attending public prayer services. In the mosques women always stand behind men in separate rows of their own. Some mosques reserve a special section for women either at the back or, in new mosques, on the mezzanine floor. Children can also attend the mosques but form their own rows, boys behind men, and girls with women. All worshipers make straight rows behind the imam facing the *qiblah*. In the morning prayer and in the first two *rak'ahs* of the evening and night prayers readings are done with an audible voice, while the rest are made quietly. The congregation follows the imam in all movements but whispers the readings quietly.

Special congregational prayers are held on Fridays at *zuhr* time instead of the daily *zuhr* prayer. Prayer is preceded by two short sermons (*khuṭbah*): the first explains the Islamic rules and principles on any matter, and the second basically consists of words of divine praise, sending blessings on the Prophet, his followers, and the congregation.

Two major Islamic festivals (Īd al-Fiṭr and Īd al-Aḍḥā) also begin with congregational prayers held in an open ground. Both of these prayers consist of two *rak'ahs* with additional *takbirs*. An *'id* sermon follows the prayers and is very much like the sermons on Fridays, with special emphasis on the significance of the occasion.

Special Circumstances. *Ṣalāt* is emphasized in all situations and circumstances. A sick person can make *ṣalāt* sitting or lying in bed. Armies on the battleground can divide themselves into smaller groups and should offer prayers by taking turns. While on a journey prayer can be shortened; this is known as *ṣalāt al-qasr*. During travel as well as in emergencies and dire circumstances one is allowed to combine (*jam'*) the second and third prayers and can perform them at the time of either one of them. Similarly, the fourth and fifth prayers can be combined and performed at the time of either one of them.

During Ramaḍān (the month of fasting) *tarāwīḥ* prayers are performed after the *'ishā'* prayer every night. There are special prayers at the time of lunar or solar eclipses, and prayers at the time of droughts, epidemics, and wars. Devout Muslims also offer night prayers (*tahajjud*) during the middle of the night and

morning prayers (*ishrāq*) after sunrise and midmorning prayer (*al-ḍuḥā*). All these are voluntary prayers (*nafl*).

[See also *Dhikr and Postures and Gestures*.]

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MUZAMMIL H. SIDDIQI

SALT has been a necessary additive to man's diet from the time he began cooking meat. The use of salt as a preservative and condiment became so important that it soon acquired a truly astonishing variety of symbolic meanings.

The Egyptians and Greeks used salt in certain sacrifices, but it is not clear with what intent. In Brahmanic sacrifices, in Hittite rituals, and during the New Moon festivals of Semites and Greeks, salt was thrown on fire to produce a crackling sound that may have had symbolic significance. This interesting multicultural custom, however, does not seem to be related to Mark's enigmatic saying: "Everyone must be salted with fire" (*Mk.* 9:49).

The Hebrews had a "covenant of salt" with Yahveh (*Nm.* 18:19, *2 Chr.* 13:5) and sprinkled their sacrifices with the "salt of the covenant" (*Lv.* 2:13). Though this practice probably developed from the use of salt as a preservative, for these Semites salt signified the fellowship of the table and the shared meal, just as it did for the Greeks and Romans. This association of salt (which was served as a separate dish) with the communal meal is also mentioned in *Ezra* (4:14). The Samaritans invoked their sharing of salt with the king of Persia as proof of friendship. In medieval Europe, it was considered wrong to harm someone with whom salt had been shared. Even today, Arabs offer salt to visitors as a sign of hospitality.

Furthermore, in the *Acts of the Apostles* (1:4), the

Greek word *sunalizomenos*, usually translated “eating together,” means literally “taking salt together.” This word was adopted in the Clementine homilies (*Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 2, cols. 332, 345), and its meaning was similarly understood by the Greeks and Romans.

A very ancient ritualistic use of salt occurred in exorcisms. Some exegetes understand Elisha’s throwing of salt in the bitter waters as a form of exorcism (2 *Kgs.* 2:20–22). This concept was borrowed by the church fathers, and salt was used for its apotropaic qualities in the Roman liturgy. Salt drives out the devil, according to a number of prayers for catechumens and the making of holy water that are found in the *Gelasian Sacramentary* (sixth century). This symbolic use of salt derived from its ability to preserve meat from corruption.

Similar reasoning has applied to the rubbing of salt on newborn babies, a custom among Semites, Persians, and ancient Greeks, still practiced today by such varied peoples as the Toda of South India and the Lao of Southeast Asia. Even though salt was applied primarily for medicinal purposes, its use often involved ritual to ward off evil. In fact, this apotropaic quality of salt is found in the folklore of societies all over the world. Salt is considered to have power over demons in Southeast Asia, over witches in Germanic traditions, and over the evil eye in Arab lands.

The practical use of salt to enhance the flavor of foods has evoked a number of taste-related symbolisms. The words for “tasteless” or “insipid” in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin also mean “foolish.” Salt, therefore, confers wisdom, according to the rite for catechumens in the Roman liturgy. This play on words is likewise evident in the saying of Jesus: “If salt loses its savor [becomes foolish], with what will it be salted?” (*Mt.* 5:13). An extension of this theme was developed by the church fathers, who interpreted salt as God’s word, spiritual discourse, and preaching. Paul thus exhorted Christians to season their language with salt (*Col.* 4:16). For the Athenians and Romans, salt stood for wit.

Especially in the Roman liturgy, salt symbolized spiritual health, unquestionably because salt was an ingredient in many medications (cf. Pliny, *Natural History* 31.102). The delicate but vital role that salt plays in the human metabolism was implicitly acknowledged in ancient times when the Roman legions were given their ration of salt and, at a later date, a *salarium* (“salary”) with which to buy their own salt.

As with most other symbols, salt also has a negative aspect. In *Judges* (9:45), salt was sown on a destroyed city to signify sterility. The practice was followed by the Assyrians and Hittites and was later adopted by Attila at Padua and Frederick Barbarossa at Milan. A curse

could produce a salt marsh (*Ps.* 107:34), a salt pit (*Zep.* 2:9), or a land of brimstone and salt (*Dt.* 29:23).

Salt has many other meanings that appear, for example, in Brahmanic and early Hindu literature. In the Upaniṣads, a grain of salt dissolved in water is a symbol of the reabsorption of the ego in the “universal self.” In other Brahmanic texts, salt refers to cattle, seed, and the sacrificial essence of sky and earth.

References to salt among indigenous Americans are rare except in the context of ritual fasting and sacred fire. There was, however, an Aztec goddess of salt, Huixtocihauhtl.

The purifying and protecting virtue of salt is evoked in Japanese Shintō ceremonies. Izanagi, during the creation, constituted the first central island of Onogorojima with the help of salt extracted from the primordial waters.

In alchemy, salt had more to do with a basic principle than with actual substance. In hermetic symbolism, salt is the product and the equilibrium of the properties of its components, sulfur and mercury.

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JAMES E. LATHAM

SALUTATIONS are more or less formally ordered expressions acknowledging the presence of another. They occur generally upon meeting but also upon departure from the person met. Salutations include an enormous variety of oral and ritual forms that differ significantly in length and elaborateness and that express a range of emotions from kindness to humility or dread. Among these are bowing, prostration, ritual attack and defense, the firing of arms, the baring of the head, the clasping of hands, embracing, weeping, kissing, and smelling, as well as the utterance of short to very lengthy verbal prescriptions. The form of salutation appropriate in one civilization is very often offensive or ludicrous in another, and in any particular civilization the salutation varies with context. Most research on salutations has attempted to account for the relative elaborateness or simplicity of traditional greet-

ings by seeing the relation of these to other aspects of religion and culture.

Ceremonial Greetings. While the salutation has been largely neglected in the study of religion and culture, it has been observed that salutations between equals tend to be brief and simple while those offered to sovereigns by their subjects or to higher ranking persons by lower ranking persons tend to be more ceremonious. Early visitors to such regions as Melanesia, Thailand, and parts of Africa reported that visitors to a chief approached him crawling on hands and knees. Ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian sculptures show the lowly prostrations of subject kings before a conquering monarch. Subjects, advisers, even the wives of kings of ancient Israel (*1 Sm.* 24:8; *2 Sm.* 24:20; *1 Kgs.* 1:23, 1:31) did obeisance to them with face to the ground, as did ancient personalities to God, his emissary, or his prophet (*Gn.* 17:3, 18:2; *2 Kgs.* 1:13). In the Hindu tradition, the person of inferior caste is expected to salute his superior, but the superior is not to acknowledge the greeting. On the other hand, as the historian Herodotus (485?–425? BCE) observes, in the ancient Near East the kiss was common between equals, a form of greeting that Paul recommends among the brethren of the church at Corinth (*1 Cor.* 16:20).

The above observations, of themselves, help little toward an understanding of ceremonial greetings involving the reception of visitors whose status may not be known. An early European traveler to Pemba, an island off the coast of Tanzania, observed that the otherwise friendly king ordered his musketeers to fire their arms upon his arrival in order to expel evil spirits. An early visitor to Africa reported being received with what he called war dances. Among the Maori of New Zealand, ritualized combat was performed at the arrival of visitors. In the Tonga Islands near Fiji, presents were offered to new arrivals as well as to natives who had been away. At the same time, the newcomer could be challenged by anyone to a mock fight that the rules of protocol forbade him to decline.

Material such as this evoked the view that the stranger, like the divine king, chief, or priest, was regarded as being replete with magical power that could discharge itself upon anyone with whom he came in contact. Just as taboo acts performed with respect to the king were designed to preserve his contagious spiritual force, the formalized greetings offered to strangers, according to James G. Frazer, were precautionary observations—an elementary dictate of savage prudence—intended to guard against the stranger's possibly baneful influence. Because such magical influence could infect anyone who traveled to strange and distant

lands, the same observations would naturally accompany the arrival of a villager who had been traveling a distance from his home. Acknowledging this insight, Arnold van Gennep, in 1909, drew the conclusion that ceremonial greetings to strangers are rites of incorporation intended to reinforce the social cohesion of the group to whom the stranger is introduced. The length of greeting, then, understandably varies according to the extent to which the person arriving is a stranger.

These conclusions, however, do little to explain the lengthy and elaborate greeting ceremonies between persons of equal status who may even be acquainted. In ancient China such a ceremony began with the arrival of the visitor, carrying, in winter, a freshly killed pheasant, in summer, a dried one, held up by both hands, with the bird's head facing left. The visitor begins: "I have desired an interview for some time, but have had no justification for asking for it; but now his honor So-and-so orders me to an interview." To this the host replies: "The gentleman who introduced us has ordered me to grant you an interview. But you, sir, are demeaning yourself by coming. I pray your honor to return home, and I shall hasten to present myself before you." The guest replies: "I cannot bring disgrace on you by obeying this command. Be good enough to end by granting me this interview." This ceremony (which continues for several similar self-deprecating exchanges, accompanied by specified bows, and ends finally with the reception of the guest and the gift) is described in *The Book of Etiquette and Ceremonial* (c. 100 BCE), one of three ancient Chinese texts that deal with the subject of *li*, known to be the warp and woof of heaven and earth and consisting of the rules of propriety and politeness according to which all human relationships ought to be governed. The foundation of *li*, according to the Confucian tradition, is the heart that is willing to defer.

Greetings Prescribed by Law. The context that determines the relative length and elaborateness of the salutation evidently reflects the view of reality perpetuated by the tradition in which it occurs. For example, an ancient formulation of Hindu law, the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* (c. 500 BCE), provides that every day and after any absence, a student is to salute his parents, his grandparents, and his teachers with a kneeling embrace of the feet. The same salutation is to be observed for elder siblings in order of their seniority. Upon meeting an officiating priest, a father-in-law, or an uncle (even one younger than himself), the student is to offer this salutation or the salutation normally prescribed for his caste. A *brāhmana* is to salute by extending his right hand on a level with his eye; a *kṣatriya* by extending his hand on a level with his breast; a *vaiśya* by extending it

on a level with his waist. A *sūdra* is to salute bending forward, his joined hands held low. These salutations are performed standing with shoes off, with empty hands, and with head uncovered. On the other hand, in a state of impurity the student is to salute no one. He is not to salute anyone who is impure, and the impure person is not to return a salute.

Greetings as Tools of Spiritual Achievement. The salutations prescribed in this system of laws reflect not only the social system that they support but attitudes underlying the social system. The salutation is an act productive of merit toward earthly weal, heavenly bliss, and final liberation. The man of high caste, especially the teacher, is regarded as replete with vital power, the result of the accumulated merit of his present and former lives. The higher the age and caste, the greater the store of power. The higher the vital power of the person one salutes the greater the merit achieved. In this respect, a *brāhmana* of ten years and a *kṣatriya* of one hundred stand to each other as father to son, the ten-year-old *brāhmana* as the father. Another text, the *Laws of Manu* (c. 200 BCE), states that the vital airs of a young man mount upward to leave his body when an elder approaches. By rising to meet and salute the elder, his vital powers are recovered.

The powers achieved through the merit of worthy acts, however, must constantly be guarded against depletion, since they are inclined to flow, as it were, downhill from the person of higher prestige to the person of lower prestige. A salutation to a lower-caste person or an unclean person, the acknowledgment of his salute, or an unnecessary conversation with him, can result in the loss of vital force. If conversation with a lower-caste person is necessary, one must assume a posture of psychic neutrality in order to prevent such dissipation of power. Hindu salutations also reflect the fear of the evil eye, whose untoward effects can be invited even by a careless word. In traditional Hindu society, one does not comment upon another's pleasing appearance, the attractiveness of his children, even the pleasantness of the day. Whatever is offhandedly declared to be good is likely to attract inauspicious elements, tempting disaster. Against this, meticulous precautions are taken.

In contrast, the salutations we find in the early Buddhist tradition reflect the elevation of spiritual achievement above hereditary status and an absence of occult concerns. "No brahman is a brahman by birth; no outcaste is an outcaste by birth." This shift is neatly expressed in the story of the meeting of the Buddha with the five ascetics with whom he had spent the years prior to his enlightenment. Upon seeing the Buddha walking toward them, the five agreed not to rise in sal-

utation, because he had abandoned his former vows and given up ascetic practice. Yet as he approached, they involuntarily rose, and in spite of their resolution they greeted him and offered the customary refreshments, although in addressing him they employed his family name. To this the Buddha responded that he was indifferent as to whether he was treated with respect, but that it was rude and careless so to address a person (i.e., by his family name) who looks with equal kindness upon all-living beings: Buddhas bring salvation to the world, therefore they ought to be treated with the respect that children pay to their fathers (Aśvaghōṣa, *Buddhacarita*, vv. 1229ff.). In Theravāda Buddhist countries, the act of prostration before the image of the Buddha or the pagoda (his principal symbol) is an integral part of worship. To perform this act the worshiper kneels, places his clasped hands to his forehead, and three times touches his forehead to the ground. Similar acts are performed by a layman when he comes into the presence of a monk, by a younger monk in the presence of his senior, by young children when they meet their parents, and by adults when on prescribed holy days they visit their parents' homes to pay them special respect.

Over and against all of this, the salutations prescribed in the Muslim tradition reflect the belief in the absolute sovereignty of God and the brotherhood of man. The Qur'ān commands: "When you are greeted with a salutation, reply with a better one, or at least return it" (surah 4:86). In the Islamic world the usual greeting is "Al-salām 'alaykum" ("Peace be upon you"). The appropriate reply is "Wa-'alaykum al-salām" ("And upon you be peace"); or to this may be added "Wa-rahmat Allāh wa-barakātuhu" ("And God's mercy and blessings"). This, according to Islamic tradition, is the greeting with which Adam was commanded to greet a group of angels when he was created. His and their reply was to be the greeting for all of his descendents. The *ḥadīth* specifies particular situations in which the salutation ought to be offered and who is to initiate it. The younger person should greet the older person. The person riding should salute the person walking. The person passing should salute the person sitting. The smaller group should greet the larger group. Regardless of the circumstances, the greeting remains the same. While forms of the peace greeting are found in other documents of the ancient Near East (e.g., *Gn.* 43:23, *Jgs.* 19:20, *1 Sm.* 25:6, *1 Chr.* 12:18), it is significant that in this tradition the act of prostration to the ground, also found in the ancient Near East, is reserved for the worship of God.

Salutations, then, seem to express and perpetuate values and sentiments about the person greeted that are

appropriate to the conception of reality of the culture or tradition in which they occur and serve to preserve such sentiments and values from subversion, thereby supporting the solidarity and continuity of the culture or tradition in question. Even when it is not explicit in the prescribed words of greeting, the sentiment that is communicated in traditional salutations is often of a religious nature. To an outsider, "Al-salām 'alaykum" uttered by a Muslim may not express any specifically religious idea. To another Muslim, however, the relation of peace, as earthly well-being, to submission to God is understood. In *Nuer Religion* (London, 1956), E. E. Evans-Pritchard observes that the most common greeting among the Nuer people of eastern Sudan is a phrase that translates as "Have you slept?" What he thinks is implied, however, is something like "Are you at ease?" This interpretation is confirmed by the question that follows, "Are you well?" implying "Are you at peace?" That this is understood to be related to the peace that comes from God is implied by the further question, "Have you prayed?" and the next, "Does smoke rise from your hearth?" which is to say, "Is everything well at home?" A final question sometimes asked is "Has it dawned?" implying "Is it well for you?" When the answers are affirmative we get the picture of easy sleep, contentment, prayer, a person at peace with God, his neighbor, and himself.

Secularization of Salutations. It has also been observed that salutations tend to be longer and more elaborate in ancient, primitive, and traditional societies, shorter and simpler in modern industrial civilization. Salutations reflect the processes of cultural interpenetration and secularization occurring in many parts of the world at the present time. Words and gestures of salutation are perhaps among the most commonly borrowed of customs. In India, the gesture of touching the breast, the lips, and the forehead with the fingertips, as well as the bow with the right hand over the breast, are forms of the Muslim *salām* greeting introduced to India during the Mughal empire (1526–1857), from which influence came also the custom of the close embrace. It is interesting that the *salām*, which is normally used among Muslims to greet fellow believers, but not the infidel, is sometimes used by Hindus as a form of greeting for strangers. In India, as well as in Buddhist countries, the Muslim world, and elsewhere where Western influence has been felt, the handshake is growing in acceptance despite opposition, although in rural areas it remains less adopted. Among the most striking evidence of Western influence is the recent spread of the use of the greeting card for the exchange of good wishes on occasions that would once have required a visit. This phenomenon, which suddenly grew to a grand scale in

England and America in the middle of the present century, is now being employed for the exchange of greetings at Jewish holidays and also on the occasion of the great annual Islamic festivals. In general, where cultural borrowing occurs, it is the simpler, shorter, and less ceremonious custom that is appropriated by persons outside the tradition, and in the exchange the more subtle religious sentiments are likely to be lost.

The effect of secularization upon salutations is evident in the presence in modern greetings of the relic of a religious sentiment. The Namaskāra, perhaps the most general of salutations in India today, was originally a *sūdra* salute. The two open hands held together accompanied by the word "Namaste" or "Namaste" was originally an exclamation of homage meant for the deity. Likewise, in modern European salutations like the French "Adieu" (lit., "to God"), the Spanish "Adios" (from "Vaya con Dios," meaning "Go with God"), the remains of the religious sentiment, now barely intended, can still be seen. In others, like the French "Bonjour" and "Au revoir" or the German "Auf Wiedersehen" and "Guten Morgen," the relic is perhaps more deeply submerged. In English the word *good-bye* is taken by most etymologists as a derivative of "God be wi' ye" (i.e., "God be with you"), which appears in Shakespeare as "God buy you" (*Twelfth Night* 4.2). Likewise, "Good morning" is taken as a short form of "God be with you this morning," or "God give you a good morning." In general, the secularization process abbreviates the originally religious salutation as the religious conception within it is no longer seriously intended. As scholarship has focused upon those aspects of religion that pertain to the more enduring of institutions and social structures, salutations have been far from the center of attention. With increasing interest in aspects of religion that pertain to social and cultural change, these eminently changeable cultural forms may prove to be an important subject of research.

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SALVATION. See Soteriology; see also Enlightenment; Eschatology; Justification; and Redemption.

SALVATION ARMY. The Salvation Army is described in its official statements as a "fellowship of people who have accepted Jesus Christ as their personal Savior and Lord" whose "primary aim is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ to men and women untouched by ordinary religious efforts." The movement is a denomination of the Church of Christ; its members—called Salvationists—are officially required to subscribe to eleven doctrines, which are fundamentalist, evangelical, and Protestant. The Army's theological position is based on that of John Wesley (1703–1791), the founder of Methodism, and in particular is a restatement of the orthodox belief that love is the single motive for all true Christian endeavor: as God loved his children and sent his Son to die for them, so his children desire to love God and to show love to each other and to all people, especially the unsaved. Salvationists show this love through aggressive evangelism and through a broad range of charitable and socially ameliorative activities. Except for the omission of sacramental observances, the doctrinal beliefs of the Salvation Army have excited little controversy.

History and Aims. The doctrinal positions, objectives, and military structure of the Salvation Army have not

changed since its beginning in 1878, and in many aspects even its methods of operation have changed but slightly. The movement was the brainchild of William Booth (1829–1912), an English evangelist, and his wife Catherine (1829–1890). The founders' influence over the contemporary Army remains strong, although they are long dead and the last member of their family to hold an important position of leadership—their daughter Evangeline (1865–1950)—retired in 1939.

The forerunner of the Salvation Army was a preaching mission, called the Christian Mission, that the Booths established in the East End of London in 1865 to evangelize the urban poor. Booth and his associates believed that this segment of the population had been ignored by the organized religious bodies of their day. While this is not strictly true, Booth's efforts developed into the first systematic and large-scale program to reach London's poor with the gospel. A degree of social conscience was characteristic of the Christian Mission almost from the beginning. Efforts to relieve the destitution of those who attended their religious services were a natural outgrowth of the missionaries' evangelical zeal: alms and hospitality were commanded by Christ, and on the practical level, hunger and cold kept many potential converts from attending to the gospel. By 1867 four small-scale charitable activities, including a soup kitchen, were listed in the mission's annual report.

The military structure, by which the Christian Mission was transformed into an army, was the inspiration of a moment, although Booth and his closest associates had been dissatisfied with the conference system of governing the mission for some time. While preparing the mission's annual report for 1878 Booth deleted the term *volunteer army* in describing the work and substituted *Salvation Army*. The term was catalytic. Booth became the "General"; full-time mission workers became "officers" and adopted a variety of military titles; converts and members became "soldiers." Brass bands, long popular with the English working class and especially well suited to the Army's street-corner evangelism, were added in 1879, along with a weekly devotional and news publication suitably called *The War Cry*. In 1880 the first regulation uniform was issued to George S. Railton (1849–1913) as he departed for the United States to establish the Army's first official overseas mission. Comrades who died were "promoted to Glory," and children born into Army families were hailed as "reinforcements." Since 1890 soldiers have been required to subscribe to the "Articles of War," a statement of doctrine, allegiance, and zeal for the "salvation war."

Booth and his officers were driven by an overpower-

ing sense of urgency. The new Salvation Army grew rapidly. Its social relief activities did not reflect any commitment to bringing about change in the social structure, however; the great work was not revolution but rescue, while time yet remained. The Army's most frequent self-portrayal, which appeared in posters, on *The War Cry* covers, and in songs, was as a lifeboat or a lighthouse, with eager Salvationists shown snatching the lost from the waves of drunkenness, crime, and vice. The thrill of losing oneself in a triumphant crusade, the military pomp, and a constantly expanding scheme of social relief proved irresistible to large numbers of the poor, and to many working- and middle-class persons as well. Despite legal obstructionism from municipal authorities and ridicule from the movement's opponents, by 1887 there were a thousand corps (i.e., stations) in Britain, and by the end of the decade work had been started in twenty-four other countries and British colonies.

Doctrines and Practices. The Salvation Army held its converts at least partly on the strength of its doctrines, which were formally established by an Act of Parliament in 1878. The Army's doctrinal statement proclaims, on the one hand, both the atonement of Christ and the necessity of radical conversion and, on the other hand, the "privilege of holiness." In Army terms holiness means that the sincere believer can live for love, in adoration of Christ, in joyful fellowship within the ranks of the Army, and in kindly service to a dying world. Salvationists see religious questions in stark and simple terms; anything that is not deemed absolutely essential to salvation or helpful to evangelism or that is regarded as inherently confusing to unlettered converts is simply jettisoned. It was partly for these reasons that the Booths abandoned sacramental observances; in addition, they had committed their movement almost from the start to the temperance (abstinence) crusade, which disallowed the use of sacramental wine.

As appealing as the doctrines of the Salvation Army may be, however, they are neither original nor unique, and they only partly explain its strength as a religious movement. The rest of the explanation has been the use to which the Army puts its members, its system of discipline, and its social relief program. Converts are put promptly to work giving testimony about their own conversion, distributing *The War Cry*, playing a band instrument at indoor and outdoor religious meetings, or visiting prisoners, the elderly, and the sick. Soldiers expect a lifetime of such service, and occasional natural disasters add to the ordinary demands on local Army personnel. In addition, a number of entertaining and useful programs have been developed to utilize the en-

ergy of young people. Parades, military regalia, and an effective use of music augment, where they do not actually create, joy and pride in being part of the "Army of God."

Salvationists are comfortable within the Army's autocratic structure, which emphasizes obedience, loyalty, and efficiency; the system has changed little in fact, and not at all in spirit, since 1878. The single major alteration in the absolute autocracy established by William Booth came in 1929 (the Act of Parliament was formally amended in 1931), when the general's privileges of serving for life and naming his own successor were abolished. The generalship became an elective office at the disposal of a council of all territorial commanders, and the leader so chosen serves only until a certain age. Once a general is installed, however, his powers differ little from those of the founder; every subordinate officer is expected to obey without question the orders of a superior, and much the same is required of the soldiers.

Aside from its religious and operational distinctiveness, the second part of what the Salvation Army calls its "balanced ministry" is the vast system of social welfare activities that has grown up under its auspices. There were important beginnings in the 1880s in England, America, and elsewhere, but the turning point in the development of the Army's social welfare program came in 1890 with the publication of General Booth's manifesto entitled *In Darkest England and the Way Out*. The book, and the scheme it offered for relieving the sufferings of the "submerged tenth" of Victorian society, attracted considerable publicity, controversy, and in the end financial support. Food and shelter depots, industrial rehabilitation centers, rescue homes for converted prostitutes, hospitals for unwed mothers, orphanages, day-care centers, halfway houses for released convicts, programs for alcoholics and drug addicts, camping trips for poor city children, a variety of family relief and counseling—all have grown up since 1890, especially in the American branch of the Army.

By 1982 the Salvation Army was operating in eighty-six countries. Its greatest strength is in English-speaking countries and Scandinavia; just over 50 percent of all active officers and 70 percent of all lay employees are found in five countries: the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Although the international headquarters remains in London, the American branch is by far the largest.

The Army in the United States is divided into four territorial commands, each with its own headquarters and training school; the officers who command these territorial operations report to the national commander, whose headquarters is in Verona, New Jersey.

The large majority of the 3,600 Salvation Army officers in the United States are engaged in "field work"; they serve as ministers to the 1,056 local corps congregations and direct the numerous social services that flow from the typical corps. Officers not in field work serve in staff and educational appointments or as administrators of the Army's many social institutions. The Men's Social Service Department, which offers residential care and alcoholic rehabilitation to transient alcoholic men (and in a few places to women), is particularly well developed.

[See also the biography of Booth.]

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SAMĀ' is an Arabic term for the music or listening parties arranged by Muslim mystics in the belief that music serves as spiritual nourishment (*qūt-i rūhānī*) and attunes one's heart to divine communion. The word *samā'*, which literally means "hearing," does not occur in the Qur'ān but was used in ancient Arabic in the sense of "singing." 'Alī ibn 'Uthmān al-Hujwīrī (d. 469?/1076? CE) thought that through *samā'* the last of the veils between man and God could be lifted. Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and others after him be-

lieved that mystics who devoted most of their time to austere practices such as penitences, vigils, and fasts needed listening parties to relieve the heart's boredom, to infuse it with fresh energy and vigor, and above all, to channel, rather than annihilate, emotion. Criticism of this institution by orthodox theologians, however, obliged the mystics to lay down elaborate rules and conditions for its organization. As a result, the legality of *samā'* became contingent upon the fulfillment of four conditions: (1) the singer should not be a youth or a woman but an adult man; (2) the audience should be continuously in divine contemplation alone; (3) no obscene verses should be recited; and (4) no musical instruments should be used.

Al-Hujwīrī laid down even more detailed rules with regard to *samā'*: (1) it should be practiced seldom and only in response to an inner craving for it; (2) the spiritual mentor should be present at the listening party; (3) no person unfamiliar with the mystic path should be permitted to join the assembly; (4) the singer should be a like-minded person; (5) the audience should cleanse its heart of all worldly thoughts; (6) the emotions aroused by the music should not be checked; (7) a beginner should not be allowed to attend *samā'*; and (8) women should not look at the dervishes from rooftops.

Shaykh Abū al-Najīb 'Abd al-Qāhir Suhrawardī (d. 1167), the founding saint of the Suhrawardī order, distinguished three groups who listen to mystical music: (1) those who are with their creator while listening to songs and who attain the vision (*mushāhadah*) of God, (2) those who listen to music with their hearts fully absorbed in it and achieve the benefits of spiritual seclusion (*murāqabah*), and (3) those who listen with their lower self (*nafs*) involved in it and need spiritual penitence (*mujāhadah*) to achieve their objective, because *samā'* is "for one whose heart is alive and whose *nafs* is dead." Suhrawardī considered music a means of igniting the fire of love in the heart of a mystic. Like al-Hujwīrī, he made the legality of *samā'* conditional. *Samā'*, he said, is like rain: it fertilizes the productive land but has no effect on barren fields. He also quoted Mimshad-i Dīnawar (d. 911), who was told by the Prophet in a dream that there was nothing objectionable if the *samā'* meetings began and ended with the recitation of the Qur'ān. Suhrawardī considered that in music heart, soul, and the lower self (*nafs*) are all involved. Its effect, however, varies from individual to individual; it is spiritual nourishment or medicine for some and poison for others. The early Islamic mystic Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 861) used to say, "Audition is a divine influence which stirs the heart to seek God: those who listen to it spiritually attain unto God, and those

who listen to it sensually [*bi-nafs*] fall into heresy." For perfect spiritual enjoyment through *samā'*, the Iranian mystic Rūzbihān (d. 1209) considered three things to be essential: fine odor, a beautiful face to look at, and a lovely voice. He regarded the beauty of the singer as a prerequisite for spiritual happiness.

Saints of the Chishtī, Bektāshī, and other Ṣūfī orders constructed *samā' khānahs* (music halls) in their *khānqāhs* (lodges) for the exclusive purpose of holding listening parties. While listening to music, mystics often fell into ecstasy and stood up to dance, weep, and cry. Sometimes they gave everything they possessed, including the clothing they wore, to the musician. According to the rules pertaining to such ecstatic conditions, if any verse stirred up the emotions of a listener, the singer was expected to continue reciting the same couplet until the emotional storm had passed. It was said that Shaykh Quṭb al-Dīn Bakhtiyār Kākī (d. 1235) listened to a verse of Aḥmad Jām for several days and finally gave up the ghost while the verse was still being recited.

Mystics have adopted special types of behavior in *samā'*. Some of them have controlled their emotions in such a way that, except for fleeting expressions on their faces and tears trickling down their cheeks, there is no physical movement. By contrast, however, the Ṣūfīs belonging to the Mevlevi order of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī dance with amazing abandon. In India, disciples of Shaykh Burhān al-Dīn Gharīb (d. 1337?), who came to be known as Burhānīs, also danced in a special manner. Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, the renowned world traveler of the fourteenth century, refers to the *samā'* of the Rifā'i dervishes which had its own unique features.

The Arab jurist and theologian Ibn Taymīyah (1263–1328) was a bitter critic of the institution of *samā'*, and under his influence contemporary and later generations of religious scholars ('*ulamā'*) severely criticized the practice. The followers of Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–1787), founder of the Wahhābī movement in Arabia, were equally vehement in their opposition to this practice. Though some of the mystic orders, such as the Qādiriyah and the Naqshbandiyah, did not take to *samā'*, they rarely joined the '*ulamā'* in their criticism of it. Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (1317–1389) is reported to have remarked about *samā'*: "Neither do I practice it nor do I refute it." This remained the general attitude of those mystics who did not themselves arrange *samā'* meetings. However, Shāh Walī Allāh (1703–1762), a leading Naqshbandī saint of Delhi, went a step further and arranged *samā'* in his religious college, or *madrasah*, for the visit of the famous Chishtī saint Shāh Fakhr al-Dīn (1714–1785).

The mystics who advocated *samā'* defended their po-

sition by referring to the Qur'anic verses that attribute a sonorous voice to the prophet Dā'ūd (34:10; 21:79; 38:18–19, as explained by Mawdūdī in light of the traditions of the Prophet), to the tradition of the Prophet in which he is reported to have listened to the songs of girls on the eve of his return from a victorious campaign, and to the tradition that the Prophet did not allow people to disturb girls who were singing on a feast day. In the fourteenth century, Mawlānā Fakhr al-Dīn Zarrādī wrote a brochure, *Uṣūl al-samā'* (Principles of *Samā'*) to refute the arguments of the '*ulamā'* at the court of the Indian ruler Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughlaq.

While there could be no method of testing the subjective state of a mystic's mind when listening to music, the other, outward conditions were strictly enforced and deviations sternly dealt with. Shaykh Niẓām al-Dīn Awliyā' of Delhi (1238–1325) reprimanded those who used musical instruments, and Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad 'Alī of Khayrabād (d. 1849) expressed his condemnation of mystics who allowed recitation of verses by women.

However, these restrictions were not always kept in mind by the mystics, especially during the later centuries when the mystic orders lost their centralized structure and many of them became specific to their geographic setting. A corollary to this process was the trend through which saints, using mystic channels and idiom to convey their message to the common people, failed, unlike their predecessors, to check the reverse flow of popular superstitions, distortions, and accretions to their own ways. *Samā'* was no exception to this tide, and conditions regulating it were flouted. The orthodox criticism of *samā'*, which had never really subsided, only became more poignant.

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KHALIQ AHMAD NIZAMI

SAMĀDHI. The Sanskrit term *samādhi* (from *sam*, "together," the intensifying particle *ā*, and the verbal root *dhā*, "place, put") literally means "placing together." It hints at the merging of subject and object, the essential characteristic of the mystical state of unification to which it refers. It is most frequently rendered by *ecstasy*, but because of the emotive charge of that Greek loanword, the neologism *enstasy*—from the Greek for "standing in [oneself]"—was suggested (Eliade, 1969) and is gaining increasing acceptance.

The earliest mention of *samādhi* is in the Buddhist Pali canon, where it stands for "concentration." Buddhist authorities define it as "mental one-pointedness" (*cittasya ekāgratā*; see, e.g., Buddhaghosa's *Aṭṭhasālinī* 118). This is not, however, the sporadic concentration of the conventional mind, but the creative yogic process of abstracting attention from external objects and focusing it upon the inner environment.

Slightly later than the Buddhist references is the mention of *samādhi* in the *Bhagavadgītā* (2.44, 53, 54) in the sense of one-pointedness as communion with the divine being. This enstatic and transformative experience of the divine is said to be fostered through strict meditative practices (see, e.g., *Bhagavadgītā* 6.12–15), but also through disinterested action (see, e.g., *Bhagavadgītā* 12.10) and simple devotion to the personal God (see, e.g., *Bhagavadgītā* 12.11). Prior to these usages is the employment of the past participle *samāhita* ("collected") in reference to mental concentration (see, e.g., *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.23).

As "perfect concentration" (*samyaksamādhi*), the term figures in Hīnayāna Buddhism as the last limb of the Eightfold Path of the Buddha. As such it comprises all the techniques of meditative introversion known as *dhyāna* (Pali, *jhāna*), of which eight stages of progressive simplification of the contents of consciousness are distinguished. The first four stages pertain to the category of "meditation with form" (*rūpa dhyāna*), the last four to that of "formless meditation" (*arūpa dhyāna*). Beyond these mystical realizations lies the unconditional, transcendental reality, *nirvāṇa*.

The most elaborate metapsychology of *samādhi*

states, modeled in part on the Buddhist schema, is found in the literature of classical Yoga. According to the *Yoga Sūtra* (2.11), *samādhi* ensues when the five types of fluctuations (*vṛtti*)—perceptual or inferred knowledge, error, conceptualization, sleep, and memory—are perfectly suspended. That suspension (*nirodha*) is achieved by means of sensory inhibition (*pratyāhāra*), concentration (*dhāraṇā*), and meditation (*dhyāna*), even though the state of suspension is only a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for the occurrence of the enstatic consciousness (grace motif).

In classical Yoga, *samādhi* designates the *technique* of mystical identification with the intended object, whereas the underlying *process* is more properly expressed by the term *samāpatti* ("coincidence"), which is reserved in Buddhism for the four states of formless meditation. Similarly, the expressions *dhāraṇā* and *dhyāna* represent types of yogic technique, while their essential processes are more accurately referred to as *ekāgratā* ("one-pointedness") and *ekatānatā* ("one-flowingness"), respectively.

The *Yoga Sūtra* (1.42–44) mentions four levels of enstatic coincidence: (1) *śavītarka samāpatti*, or "cogitative coincidence"; (2) *nirvītarka samāpatti*, or "transcogitative coincidence"; (3) *śavīcāra samāpatti*, or "reflexive coincidence"; and (4) *nirvīcāra samāpatti*, or "transreflexive coincidence." The first two levels are practiced in relation to an intended object pertaining to the "coarse" dimension, whereas in the latter two the yogin's consciousness merges with a "subtle" (psychic, unmanifest) object. These four progressively "higher" stages belong to the category of *saṃprajñāta samādhi*, or "enstasy with [object-]consciousness."

In the *Yoga Bhāṣya* (1.17) two further levels are mentioned: (5) *ānanda samāpatti*, or "blissful coincidence" (according to Vācaspati Mīśra's *Tattvavaiśārādī* 1.17, the intended object is here a sense organ), and (6) *asmitā samāpatti*, or "coincidence with the sense of individuation." Vācaspati Mīśra makes a further distinction between (7) *nirānanda samāpatti*, or "coincidence beyond bliss," and (8) *nirasmitā samāpatti*, or "coincidence beyond the sense of individuation," but the existence of these types is adamantly denied by Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Yoga Vārttika* (1.17).

The evidence of the *Yoga Sūtra* itself suggests that the highest form of enstasy associated with object-consciousness is *nirvīcāra vaiśāradya*, or "autumnal-lucidity in the transreflexive (state)." In this condition the transcendental Self (*puruṣa*) is intuited over against the nonself or ego-mechanism of nature (*prakṛti*). When even that "vision of discernment" (*viveka khyāti*) is suspended, there occurs a sudden, unpredictable switch-over into *asaṃprajñāta samādhi*, the enstasy devoid of

object-consciousness in which only subconscious activators (*saṁskāra*) are operative. As this state is cultivated over a period of time, these activators neutralize each other, ultimately leading to *dharmamegha samādhī*, the "enstasy of the cloud of *dharma* [constituent, truth]." That condition is nowhere clearly defined, but it appears to be the terminal phase of *asamprajñāta samādhī*, being responsible for the cessation of the five causes of affliction (*kleśas*) and all *karman* (see *Yoga Sūtra* 4.30), thus giving rise to final emancipation (*apavarga, kaivalya*).

The dualist ontology and metapsychology of classical Yoga suggest that emancipation coincides with the demise of the finite body-mind. This goal of "disembodied liberation" (*videhamukti*) contrasts with the ideal, in nondualist traditions like Advaita Vedānta, of "liberation in life" (*jīvanmukti*). Whereas the abovementioned forms of enstasy represent realizations based on the introversion of attention, the enstasy associated with liberation in life is founded on the transcendence of attention itself. It is known as *sahajasamādhī* or "spontaneous [i.e., natural] enstasy"—the enstasy "with open eyes" (Da Free John, 1983), transcending all knowledge and experience, both secular and esoteric.

[For a discussion of *samādhī* within a broader meditative context, see *Yoga*.]

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GEORG FEUERSTEIN

SAMARITANS is a term used to designate a people from that part of the northern kingdom of Israel generally corresponding to the tribal allotments of Ephraim and western Manasseh, who have lived in the region since biblical days. The territory is known by the name of the ancient capital city, Samaria. The Samaritans prefer the designation *Israelite* but accept *Samaritan*, which they translate as "keeper [of the faith]." Jewish sources, in contrast, have considered them "schismatic" Jews, who, led by Eli, moved the sanctuary from Shechem (modern-day Nablus) at the foot of Mount Gerizim to Shiloh in the eleventh century BCE.

The Samaritans claim that they are the descendants of the northern tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh, not colonists transplanted to Samaria from Mesopotamia by the Assyrians in the eighth century BCE, as the Jews have maintained (2 Kgs. 17; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 9.14.3, 10.9.7). Considering the relatively small number of Israelites (27,290) that the Assyrians claim to have deported, the basic contention of the Samaritans is probably accurate.

History. According to *Ezra* 4:1–6, the separation of Samaritans and Jews was fixed when the latter, returning from Babylonian exile, refused to allow the northerners to join in the building of Jerusalem and the Samaritans responded by trying to thwart the rebuilding plans (c. 445 BCE). Samaritan tradition accuses Ezra of introducing a new script for the Hebrew letters and altering key scriptural texts, including the substitution of *Ebal* for *Gerizim* in *Deuteronomy* 27:4.

Cleavage between Samaritan and Jew was dramatized when the Samaritans rebelled against Alexander the Great in 332 BCE. In return, Alexander destroyed the city of Samaria and stationed six hundred troops there. The Samaritans fled to Mount Gerizim and with Alexander's permission built a temple very similar to the Jerusalem Temple, an act that provided separate fo-

cuses for the two communities. John Hyrcanus, a Jewish high priest and ruler, added a significant element of animosity to the schism when he destroyed Shechem and ravaged the Samaritan temple about 128 BCE.

Thus, rather than a dramatic single episode ending with a final schism between Jews and Samaritans, there was more likely a gradual drifting apart that was not explicitly pronounced until the second or first century BCE, when it is clearly reflected in such apocryphal and pseudepigraphal works as *Ben Sira* (50:25), *2 Maccabees* (6), *Judith* (5,9), the *Testament of Levi* (5,7), and *Jubilees* (30).

In New Testament times the Samaritans shared practices and beliefs with both heterodox and orthodox sects of Judaism. With the Qumran sectarians they shared a renunciation of the Jerusalem Temple, emphasis on the significance of Moses, a messianic interpretation of *Deuteronomy* 18:18, and usage of the term "the sons of light." Indeed there were apparent schisms within the Samaritan community itself. Simon Magus (*Acts* 8:9ff.) may have been the leader of the Dositheans, an unorthodox, possibly gnostic-influenced, Samaritan group.

Some New Testament books, particularly the *Gospel of John*, appear to address a Samaritan audience. Some examples are the attention to the Samaritan woman in chapter 4, the reference to "other sheep" in 10:16, and the use of the important Samaritan imagery of light. Some argue that the speech in *Acts* 7 betrays Stephen's Samaritan origins since he, like the Samaritans, challenges the Jerusalem Temple and priesthood and refers to the key Samaritan biblical verse, *Deuteronomy* 18:18. Furthermore, since the Samaritans sometimes referred to themselves as Hebrews, it has been suggested that the *Letter to the Hebrews*, preoccupied with the Samaritan hero Moses, may have been addressed to the Samaritans.

Some time in the early Christian era, there was a flowering of Samaritan theology, epitomized in the fourth-century works of the theologian Markah, the reformer Baba, and the hymn writer Amram Darah. Remnants of Samaritan synagogues suggest reasonable prosperity within the community until the time of the emperor Justinian. At that time, in 529 CE, the Samaritans tried unsuccessfully to rebel and were so severely suppressed that they never fully recovered. In 636 they fell under Muslim rule; in 1099 the Crusaders gained control; and in 1244 the Muslims returned.

During these periods of oppression the Samaritans often fled Palestine, and colonies of Samaritans appeared in various places throughout the Mediterranean world. There was a synagogue in Thessalonica (present-day Salonika), another in Constantinople, and, by the sixth century, one in Rome. Aleppo, Tyre, Caesarea,

Ashqelon, Gaza, and, particularly, Damascus and Cairo became centers of the Samaritan dispersion in the Middle East.

The fourteenth century was a time of consolidation for the Samaritans. The Abisha Scroll of the Pentateuch (the present community's most valued artifact) was rediscovered and repaired. Orthodox and Dosithean branches of Samaritanism were reunited, and the high priest Phineas commissioned Abu al-Fatih to write a history of Samaritanism. The fifteenth century was apparently a time of relative security; the largest group of surviving manuscripts comes from that period.

The Samaritans survived during the Ottoman empire in spite of great hardships. During the nineteenth century they were denied access to their sacred site, Mount Gerizim; their literary efforts had long since dwindled; and by the early twentieth century their total population was less than two hundred. By the late twentieth century that number had more than doubled, with the community equally divided between Nablus and a suburb of Tel Aviv called Holon.

Literature. The Samaritans' chief literary possession is their sacred scripture, the Pentateuch, which has been transmitted in Samaritan Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and Arabic. In many manuscripts, parallel to the Samaritan Hebrew text, on the same page, is an Aramaic paraphrase (a *targum*). Sometimes a third column contains an Arabic translation. The Hebrew and Aramaic (and not infrequently the Arabic) are written in Samaritan characters. Usually the scribe, date, and place of writing are recorded in an acrostic running vertically through the center of the page using letters from the biblical text. For aesthetic reasons and possibly to help locate passages, scribes created graphic patterns by intentionally aligning identical letters and words in vertical columns where possible.

Most recent scholarship asserts that the Samaritan Pentateuch evolved independently from Judaism beginning with or following the Hasmonean period (142–63 BCE). The major explicit and intentional differences from the Hebrew Pentateuch relate to the Samaritan concern with establishing the priority of Mount Gerizim, most dramatically in the addition of a commandment to build an altar there (added to *Exodus* 20:17), and the reading of *Gerizim* for *Ebal* in *Deuteronomy* 27:4 (a reading that many scholars believe is correct).

Although the Samaritan Pentateuch was known to the early church fathers, it disappeared from Western consideration until 1616, when Pietro della Valle returned to Europe with a Pentateuch and other writings. In the late nineteenth century, certain European scholars spearheaded a revival of interest in this community, and manuscripts of Samaritan literature were acquired

in increasing quantities. There are now extensive holdings of Samaritan materials in the British Museum, the Bodleian Library at Oxford University, the Vatican, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the John Rylands Library at Manchester, and the Hermitage in Leningrad.

The most valued copy of the Samaritan Pentateuch is the previously mentioned Abisha Scroll, which Samaritan tradition attributes to the great grandson of Moses' brother Aaron. Scholarly opinions on the origin of this scroll vary widely, although there is a consensus that it was written between 1200 and 1400 CE. It is housed today in the modest modern synagogue at the foot of Mount Gerizim.

Late copies of two or three works probably originally composed in the fourth century CE survive. The Samaritan Targum, mentioned earlier, offers striking parallels to the Targum of Onkelos (a Hebrew *targum* finally revised in Babylon in the fifth or sixth century). A second work, chronologically the earliest, is the part of the liturgy called the Defter, whose earliest hymns were composed by Markah and by Amram Darah and his son Nanah. With subsequent additions it constitutes the prayer book of the Samaritan community. Markah is also responsible for the Memar Markah (Sayings of Markah), a series of sermons expressing Samaritan theological beliefs.

In Islamic times a wider diversity of literature developed, chief among which was a series of chronicles. *Al-Asāṭīr* (Stories) of Moses, an Arabic translation of an Aramaic work of about the twelfth century, preserves ancient traditional stories. *'Al toledah* (Genealogy) was composed in Hebrew in 1346 and contains genealogical lists to the time of the entry into Canaan. A Samaritan *Book of Joshua*, quite independent of the book of the same name in Hebrew scripture, is written in Arabic and contains legendary material from the time of Joshua up to the fourth century CE. Two other chronicles date from the fourteenth century: the Arabic *Annals of Abu al-Faḥ* and *The Chain*, a genealogy of high priests begun by El'azar ben Pinḥas in the twelfth century, continued by Ya'aqov ben Yishma'e'l in the fourteenth century, and brought up to date by Ya'aqov ben Harun in the twentieth century. In more recent centuries a great variety of literature has appeared: commentaries, grammars, astrological observations, letters, and halakhic, moral, and religious texts.

Beliefs. The Samaritan creed succinctly outlines the basic beliefs: "We say: My faith is in thee, Yahveh; and in Moses son of Amram, thy servant; and in the Holy Law; and in Mount Gerizim, in Bethel; and in the Day of Vengeance and Recompense."

A clear monotheism, parallel to the rigorous affirmation of Judaism and Islam and borrowing the Muslim

slogan "There is no god but God," is central to the Samaritan faith. God among Samaritans is most commonly referred to by the name *El* or *Ela* (akin to the Arabic *Allāh*), but the tetragrammaton, *YHWH*, is also in regular use. Samaritans, like Jews, avoid the use of images, but unlike Jews, they show less anxiety about using the divine name, and a pronunciation (*Yahveh*) still survives. God reveals himself through the creation and the Torah.

Torah, God's law, is the second affirmation of the Samaritan community. It is read and revered in all services. Verses from it have been carved in stone as decorations on synagogues and carefully copied by hand on parchment or good paper. Wealthy families own beautifully hand-printed copies that have been passed down through many generations.

Moses mediates God's law and deserves adoration as the third focus of the Samaritan faith. Many blessings are offered "in the name of Moses the faithful," the first and most exalted of the prophets. Parallels between Samaritan adoration of Moses and Christian adoration of Jesus are close and perhaps intentional.

Mount Gerizim is uniquely connected with God. It is the navel of the world, where Abel built the first altar and Abraham offered to sacrifice Isaac. In Samaritan tradition it is the highest mountain in the world, and its peak survived the Flood. Here the Samaritans built their temple to rival the temple at Jerusalem. Some remains, a large structure of unhewn stones built in the Hellenistic period, have been excavated beneath the ruins of the later Zeus temple. No earlier remains have been found on the mountain. Although the temple was destroyed in 128 BCE, to the present day the Samaritans continue to celebrate their festivals on this site.

The *taheb*, "the restorer" whose coming is foretold in *Deuteronomy* 18:18, will herald the day of vengeance and reward that takes its name from *Deuteronomy* 32:34–35. The temple on Gerizim will be restored, the sacrifices reinstated, and the heathen converted. At the judgment, the worthy will enter the garden of Eden while the wicked will be delivered to flames.

Practices. Although partisans for lay authority have enjoyed some influence during brief periods of Samaritan history, the community has been essentially controlled by the priesthood, which officiates at the many rituals, of which circumcision and celebration of the Sabbath are the most common. Sabbath is strictly observed, with services held in the synagogue. The main festival of the synagogue is the Day of Atonement, when the Torah is read and the Abisha Scroll is exhibited for adoration.

The remaining services are held on Mount Gerizim. They include Passover, the coincidental but distinct

Feast of the Unleavened Bread, and Pentecost, which is celebrated on the fiftieth day after the first Sabbath of Passover. Passover is the holiest of Samaritan celebrations, and during its observance lambs are sacrificed, an act that serves as one of the last vestiges of explicit animal sacrifice among the religions of the West. The priests receive their due on the Days of Simmuth, sixty days before Passover and sixty days before the Festival of Booths (Sukkot), when each member of the community pays a half shekel and receives the calendar in which the priest has calculated the festivals for the next six months.

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Among the more recent helpful works are John Bowman's *Samaritan Documents relating to Their History, Religion, and Life* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1977) and *The Samaritan Problem* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1975), R. J. Coggins's *Samaritans and Jews: The Origins of Samaritanism Reconsidered* (Atlanta, 1975), and James D. Purvis's *The Samaritan Pentateuch and the Origin of the Samaritan Sect* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). An excellent source is Alan D. Crown's *Bibliography of the Samaritans* (Metuchen, N.J., 1984).

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SAMGHA. [This entry deals with the Buddhist monastic community, the *saṃgha*, and its relationship to the larger societies in which it functions. It consists of two articles: An Overview and *Saṃgha and Society*.]

An Overview

The word *saṃgha* (or *saṅgha*) is a common noun found in Sanskrit, Pali, and the various Prakrit languages, meaning "multitude" or "assemblage." For Buddhists it became the technical term for their religious community, and the term in this sense was also adopted by followers of Jainism and of other contemporary religious groups.

The Buddhist *saṃgha* in the wider sense of the word consists of four "assemblies" (Skt., *pariṣad*; Pali, *parisā*);

they are the monks (*bhikṣu*; Pali, *bhikkhu*), the nuns (*bhikṣuṇī*; Pali, *bhikkhuni*), the male lay followers (*upāsaka*), and the female lay followers (*upāsikā*). A similar wider understanding of the term "fourfold *saṃgha*" is also known from Jain sources. In the narrower sense of the word, *saṃgha* is the community of monks and nuns only.

The Buddhist *saṃgha* was established by the Buddha himself when he accepted as his first disciples five men before whom he had preached his first sermon in a park near Varanasi. During his lifetime, the community grew considerably, and the Buddha is credited with having regulated its life and organization in a very detailed manner.

Sources. The law book for the Buddhist *saṃgha* forms the first part of the Buddhist scriptures. This collection, called the Vinaya Piṭaka (Basket of Monastic Discipline), has been handed down in a number of different recensions, each belonging to a particular "school" (*nikāya*) of early Indian Buddhism. The rather close similarity of the main parts of these texts clearly points to a common source. The complete text of the Vinaya Piṭaka of the Mahāvihāra (the main tradition of the Theravāda school) has been preserved in Pali. Most other versions were originally composed in Sanskrit, but only parts of the original texts are preserved. Several complete recensions are available in Chinese translation, and the Mūlasarvāstivāda version is available in Tibetan translation. In Chinese translation we possess more or less complete Vinaya Piṭakas of the Sarvāstivāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Mahīśāsaka, and Mahāsāṃghika schools. Parts of the Vinaya texts of the Lokottaravāda, Kāśyapīya, and Sammatīya schools and of the Abhayagirivihāra subschool of the Theravāda tradition are also extant.

All versions of the Vinaya Piṭaka consist of three main sections: the *Vinayavibhaṅga*, the *Skandhaka* (Pali, *Khandhaka*) or *Vinayavastu*, and the *Parivāra*. The most ancient part of the *Vinayavibhaṅga* is represented by the group of rules known as the Prātimokṣa (Pali, Pātimokkha), injunctions regulating the behavior of monks and nuns; all of them are believed to have been issued by the Buddha himself. Their number is slightly different for each of the various early Buddhist schools, ranging from 218 rules for the Mahāsāṃghikas to 263 rules for the Sarvāstivādins. These rules are also handed down as a separate work serving as the confession formula to be recited at the regular confessional ceremonies of the *saṃgha*. In the *Vinayavibhaṅga*, all these rules are listed along with an account of the occasion on which the Buddha issued each one, casuistry, and additional explanations. The work is divided into two parts, one listing regulations for monks and the other

giving rules for nuns. Since each rule is an injunction whose transgression is followed by a particular sanction, the *Prātimokṣa* and *Vibhaṅga* represent a compendium of the penal laws of the *saṃgha*.

The *Skandhaka*, or *Vinayavastu*, functions as the procedural law of the *saṃgha*. Here, detailed regulations are given for admission to the order, the confessional ceremony, and various aspects of monastic life, such as the behavior prescribed for monks and nuns during the rainy season, what possessions they are permitted, the use of medicines, and so forth. Most versions of this text contain as an appendix an account of the first two Buddhist councils. The *Parivāra* contains additional material in the form of mnemonic summaries, explanations, and so on.

Rules and Procedures. Admission to the *saṃgha* was a rather informal process during the Buddha's lifetime, but detailed formalities were instituted later on. Two steps are required in the complete transformation of a layman to a fully ordained monk. The first step is *pravrajyā* (Pali, *pabbajjā*), the "going forth" by which a candidate becomes a novice (*śrāmaṇera*; Pali, *sāmaṇera*). The second step is *upasampad* (Pali, *upasampadā*), the "obtaining" of ordination, whereupon the novice is admitted as a *bhikṣu*, a full-fledged member of the *saṃgha*. Admission as a *śrāmaṇera* requires a minimum age of eight years. The novice remains under the guidance of a preceptor and a spiritual master even after ordination, for which the minimum age is twenty years. *Śrāmaṇeras* and *bhikṣus* are expected to follow the respective rules of monastic discipline (*vinaya*). The novice obeys ten precepts (*śikṣāpada*; Pali, *sikkhāpada*), whereas a *bhikṣu* is expected to obey all injunctions listed in the *Prātimokṣa*. These regulations are divided into seven groups according to the seriousness of offenses against them. Violation of the four *pārājika* injunctions, which forbid sexual intercourse, theft, the intentional taking of human life, and falsely or self-interestedly claiming superhuman powers, is cause for permanent expulsion from the *saṃgha*. A monk who transgresses the rules of the second group is subject to temporary demotion in the *saṃgha*. For minor offenses, confession is considered sufficient.

Further procedures of the *saṃgha* include the *poṣadha* (Pali, *uposatha*), or confessional ceremony, which is held on the days of the new moon and the full moon, during which time the *Prātimokṣa* is to be recited. All procedures must strictly follow the established rules in order to be valid. They must be performed by a complete *saṃgha* within an established "boundary" (*sīmā*) by using the particular *karmavācānā* (Pali, *kaṃmavācā*), or prescribed formula; all monks living within a particular place defined by boundaries that have been fixed

for a formal act of the *saṃgha* must meet and act together exactly in the prescribed way. The minimum number of monks who may perform valid "acts of Vinaya" (*vinayakarma* or *saṃghakarma*) is four, but for particular acts a larger number is prescribed; for example, ten monks are required for the performance of an ordination in India, but only five are required in the "borderlands." For most formal acts, unanimous decision is necessary; for less important decisions, a majority vote may be permissible.

The term *saṃgha* may be used in a general sense denoting "the *saṃgha* of the four directions" (i.e., the Buddhist monastic communities as a whole), but in the context of the juridical prescriptions of the Vinaya Piṭaka, it designates the *saṃgha* of a particular place that may perform a "Vinaya act." If the *saṃgha* of a particular place fails to assemble in full, or if it cannot agree, *saṃghabheda* ("division in a *saṃgha*") has occurred; such a schism was considered a grave offense. The first *saṃghabheda* was created by Devadatta, the adversary of the Buddha, who unsuccessfully tried to make himself the head of the Buddhist community.

The community of nuns was organized in a similar way, but additional regulations make their *saṃgha* dependent on that of the monks.

Life of the Monks. The early *saṃgha* was a community of mendicants. Upon leaving worldly life, the candidate gives up all possessions and thenceforth depends on the laity for his subsistence. The number of requisites he owns is prescribed. He lives on the food that is placed in his begging bowl during his daily alms round. He is also allowed to accept personal invitations for meals, but he should not eat after midday.

The *saṃgha* as a community was allowed to accept most kinds of donations, including property, and generous contributions to the *saṃgha* by laity were considered highly meritorious acts. In this way, some monastic communities became wealthy, and the way of life of their members came to differ from original doctrinal and canonical ideals. Therefore, the application of the formal rules of monastic discipline grew more imperative, and the degree of strictness in the fulfillment of these regulations was considered a measure for the standard of a Buddhist monastic community.

The original *saṃgha* had practically no hierarchical organization. During his lifetime, the Buddha was the highest authority, but he declined to appoint a successor, saying that his doctrine alone should guide his followers. The only hierarchical principle accepted by the early *saṃgha* was that of seniority, counting from the day of ordination. An elder monk is called *sthavira* (Pali, *thera*). In principle, all monks had equal rights and equal obligations. However, particular monks would be

elected by the *saṃgha* to serve in various functions, including the solution of disputes, the resolution of cases of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and various administrative duties in the monastery. The importance of these responsibilities grew with the transformation of the *saṃghas* from groups of mendicants into residential monastic units.

The Place of the Saṃgha in the Teachings of the Buddha. If we consider the structure of the *saṃgha* as described above we realize that it was defined by formal regulations that might characterize it as a legal system. We know, however, that the Buddha stressed that all of his teachings were proclaimed for the exclusive purpose of guiding his disciples on their way to final enlightenment. The texts make it clear that monastic discipline and the *saṃgha* represent only the outer form, which was created in order to give people the opportunity to abandon their secular responsibilities and worldly connections in order to concentrate on enlightenment. Monastic discipline is the formal aspect of morality (*śīla*, Pali, *sīla*), which is the right mode of mind and volition and, as such, the first foundation of the way to liberation. Morality in this sense is practiced through self-restraint; thus the observance of the Vinaya is an integral part of the spiritual training of the Buddha's disciples.

In relation to the laity, a member of the *saṃgha* is legitimized as a disciple of the Buddha by his adherence to the laws of Vinaya. The *saṃgha* is worthy of respect and donations because it follows and perpetuates the Buddha's law, thereby embodying the "highest field of merit." On the other hand, the existence of the *saṃgha* is a precondition for the continuation of Buddhism inasmuch as it hands down the teaching of the Buddha. The Buddha ordered his monks to preach his Dharma, but in a decent, restrained manner, and only if asked to do so.

History of the Saṃgha. Immediately after the death of the Buddha, a first "council" (*saṃgīti* or *saṃgāyanā*) of Buddhist monks is said to have assembled in Rājagṛha and collected the words of the Buddha, thereby compiling the Buddhist scriptures. Although the extant scriptures are of later origin, the ancient record seems to reflect a historic event. It is likely that the earliest version of the Prātimokṣa was collected during this meeting. A second council is said to have assembled at Vaiśālī one hundred years later to resolve certain disputes on monastic discipline. The division of the Buddhist tradition into various schools or groups (*nikāyas*), which are often wrongly termed "Buddhist sects," began at this time. In the first period, the formation of these groups was based mainly on the geographic diversification of local *saṃghas* and on different views about details of monastic discipline. The texts

were handed down orally; their written codification began only in the first century BCE. In most cases, the formation of the "schools" took place in such a way as to avoid the formal violation of the above-mentioned injunction against *saṃghabheda*.

The *nikāyas* handed down separate recensions of the scriptures, and they also organized additional councils or convocations for the task of collecting and correcting them. The collections of the scriptures arose in different parts of India and were originally transmitted in Middle Indo-Aryan dialects. Most of them were translated later into Sanskrit, with the exception of the scriptures of the Theravāda school, which remained in Pali, a dialect originating from central India.

Historical accounts of several schools contain traditions on a third council at the time of King Aśoka (272–231 BCE), but from the rather contradictory accounts it becomes clear that the diversification of the schools was already far advanced by that time. [See Councils, *article on Buddhist Councils*.]

When, around the beginning of the common era, Mahāyāna Buddhism came into existence, the organization of the early *nikāyas* was unaffected, precisely because the *nikāyas* were differentiated by their acceptance of a particular version of the Vinaya texts and not by dogmatic opinions. Therefore, in some instances monks holding Śrāvakayāna or Hināyāna views could live together and perform *vinayakarmas* together along with followers of Mahāyāna. In contrast, monks belonging to different *nikāyas* would not form a common *saṃgha*, though they might accept similar dogmatic views. In the course of time, new *nikāyas* were also formed on the basis of dogmatic dissensions. All Buddhist monks, whether Hināyāna or Mahāyāna, accept and (at least theoretically) follow one particular recension of the Vinaya Piṭaka, and thus can be connected with one of the *nikāyas* of early Buddhism,

The Saṃgha in Theravāda Buddhism. The validity of a monk's ordination depends on an uninterrupted line of valid ordinations going back to the Buddha himself. Since *pārājika* offenses incur mandatory expulsion from the order, the validity of the succession can be assured only if the monks who belong to the particular *saṃgha* lead an irreproachable life. Whenever the discipline in the *saṃgha* deteriorated, its legal existence was in danger, whether the transgressors continued to wear the monks' robes or not.

Originally, the Buddhist *saṃgha* was an autonomous body; interference by the laity was not provided for in its original laws. In this respect the Jain order was different, because there the laity exercised a considerable degree of control over the *saṃghas*. However Aśoka acted in order to achieve a purification of the Buddhist

saṃgha, but he did so in conformity with Vinaya rules. This tradition shaped the history of Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka from the time of its introduction during the reign of King Aśoka. Several purifications of the Sinhalese *saṃgha* under royal patronage are recorded. Later, additional law books termed *katikāvata* were enacted to regulate the affairs of the *saṃgha*, and a hierarchical system was established. Parallel developments can be observed in the history of the *saṃgha* of the other Theravāda communities in Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. A characteristic feature of Buddhism there is the introduction of ordination traditions from other countries that were deemed superior to the local tradition on the occasions of *saṃgha* purification. Royal patronage over the monastic institutions went far beyond the role played by ancient Indian rulers and in some countries (e.g., in Thailand) the administration of the monasteries developed into a kind of government department. After the breakdown of royal patronage of the *saṃgha* in Burma and in Sri Lanka, these two countries witnessed the interference of monks in secular affairs during the colonial and in the early postcolonial era. In Burma, a new effort to form an autonomous hierarchical organization of the *saṃgha* under the patronage of the government has been made since 1978.

However, the old tradition that the *saṃgha* should be devoted to its spiritual aims only has also survived in Theravāda countries. To this end, monks formed groups of "forest dwellers" (*araññavāsīn*). In the course of time, such groups were integrated into the structure of the official *saṃgha* organization, while other monks decided to leave the established ways of fully organized monasticism and go into solitude. Membership in the *saṃgha* always implies, of course, certain minimal relations with other monks so that the prescribed *vinaya* *karmas* may be performed.

The history of Theravāda has seen the formation of new schools (*nikāya*) at various times. In ancient Sri Lanka the Abhayagirivihāravāsīn formed a separate *nikāya* in the first century BCE, as did the Jetavanavihāravāsīn in the fourth century CE. In the twelfth century, the three *nikāyas* were ordered to reunite and the Mahāvihāra tradition was declared authoritative by King Parākramabāhu I. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the *saṃgha* of Sri Lanka has split into a number of *nikāyas* again. In Burma, the first great schism arose when Chapaṭa and his disciples established the Sihaḷa Sangha (based on a tradition of ordination introduced from Sri Lanka), in contrast to the local Mramasangha. From the early eighteenth century until a royal decision of 1784, the *saṃgha* of Burma was divided over the correct way of wearing the monastic

robes. During the nineteenth century, a number of new *nikāyas* were established there. In Thailand and in Cambodia, the *saṃgha* currently comprises the Mahānikāya and the reformist Dhammayuttikanikāya (founded in 1864 by King Mongkut while he was still a *bhikkhu*). These divisions prevent monks belonging to different *nikāyas* from performing *vinaya* *karmas* together but do not prevent them from cooperating in many other ways, including performing other rituals. Most of these divisions have arisen not from dissensions about dogma but from controversies about the validity of *vinaya* *karmas*. For the Buddhist laity, such divisions are largely irrelevant.

Typically, the *saṃgha* became involved with communal life in many ways, particularly in areas where almost the whole population identified themselves with Buddhism. The study of the holy scriptures (*pariyatti*) and the realization of the road to salvation (*paṭipatti*) remained the traditional tasks of the monks, but religious practice largely concentrated on the gaining of merit, which is accomplished through the cooperation of monks and laymen. The everyday relationship between *saṃgha* and laity is characterized by copious gifts from laymen to the monks and monasteries, and invitations to take part in important functions, such as funerals. The monks give religious addresses, readings of sacred texts, and ceremonial recitations of *paritta* texts, thus providing protection from evil forces and disaster. Until the creation of modern school systems, monks also acted as teachers, giving general education to the laity in their monasteries. A highly sophisticated system of monastic schools and ecclesiastical examinations and titles still functions in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand.

However, there have always been monks who have concentrated almost exclusively on asceticism and meditation, and a living tradition of meditation masters is maintained in a number of Burmese and Thai monasteries. In recent years, meditation centers headed by famous monk-teachers have also been opened for interested laity in these areas.

The Saṃgha in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Many of the ancient *nikāyas* survived in India until the final destruction of Buddhism by Islamic conquerors. Their monasteries housed Hināyāna and Mahāyāna monks, and the situation was similar in eastern Turkestan. Mahāyāna Buddhism prevailed in China, Korea, Japan, and Tibet, but the *saṃgha* as an institution continued to be based on one of the old Vinaya traditions. The Chinese monks follow the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptaka school, and this has been adopted in other countries where Buddhism was introduced from China, including Vietnam. The Tibetans follow the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition,

and this version of the Prātimokṣa is still recited today in their monasteries. Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhism encompass other forms of religious initiation, and religious communities outside the structures of traditional monasticism came into existence. But the histories of Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism recount several successful efforts to revive the ancient monastic discipline, and the formal distinction between monks and laity is still observed. This, however, does not apply to all forms of East Asian Buddhism. Particularly in Japan, the ancient monastic tradition has lost much of its original importance, and a majority of Buddhist schools there no longer form monastic communities.

The central role of the *saṅgha* for the Buddhist religion is still acknowledged by most Buddhist communities, both Therāvāda and Mahāyāna. In 1966, an international *saṅgha* organization, the World Buddhist Sangha Council, was created in Colombo by delegates from Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Nepal, Cambodia, Korea, Pakistan, India, Singapore, Thailand, England, and Laos, and a special delegation of the Tibetan *saṅgha* in exile. In a declaration made at its third congress (Taipei, 1981), this organization stated that there are more than one million Buddhist monks in the world today.

[For further discussion of the monastic ordinances, see Vinaya. The historical development of monastic communities in Buddhism is treated in Monasticism, article on Buddhist Monasticism. The role and function of Buddhist clerics is the subject of Priesthood, article on Buddhist Priesthood.]

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HEINZ BECHERT

Saṅgha and Society

[This article focuses principally on the relationship of the *saṅgha* to the societies of Southeast Asia. For discussion of this relationship elsewhere, see Buddhism, overview article and the articles on Buddhism in India; Buddhism in China; and Buddhism in Japan. See also Buddhism, Schools of, article on Tibetan Buddhism.]

The Sanskrit word *saṅgha* (Pali, *sangha*) denotes the Buddhist monastic order, although in its early usage (c. 500 BCE) in North India the word referred to the gatherings of the tribal republics of the time. The *saṅgha*’s relationship to society can best be prefaced with a consideration of its historical origins. Since the *saṅgha*’s significance is inseparable from that of Buddhist thought and philosophy, this will include a consideration of the social origins of that philosophy as well.

The details of ancient Indian history are controversial, but the major outlines are generally accepted. Accordingly, we can focus on the material and social background immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism in the region of its birth, the area known as the Middle Country (*madhyadeśa*), in northeastern India. The eastward-moving Aryans, who entered India around 1500 BCE, seem to have established themselves in the region by the sixth century BCE, the time of the Buddha’s birth. The demographic picture, however, is far from simple, for the area also seems to have been populated by people who were of Tibetan and Burmese extraction.

This period was one of extensive development of settled agriculture, a change from the nomadic type of existence ascribed to the predominant Aryans. Along with other developments such as crafts and industry, this economic progress led to surpluses, the rise of cities, and changes in political organization from ancient tribal republics to monarchies. Six great cities figure prominently in the Buddhist texts: Sāvattī (Śrāvastī), Sāketa, Kosambi (Kauśāmbī), Kāśī (modern Vārāṇasī), Rājagaha (Rājagṛha), and Champa (Campā). Smaller cities such as Kapilavastu, Mithilā, Vesālī (Vaiśālī), and Gayā are also mentioned frequently. The cities seem to have had high population densities and to have developed a complex division of labor.

The replacement of the collective rule of the tribal republics by a monarchial form of rule reflected the centralization of power in one person, the rise of cities, and the division of labor, which emphasized the worth of the individual specialist. These factors are understood by some scholars to be indicative of a fundamental change in the evaluation of the individual within society. From a status of submergence in the group the individual gradually achieved a relative independence somewhat analogous to that of the individual in the modern West. Furthermore, many hold that the rise of the individual during this period, with the complementary need to competitively foster that individuality, set in motion potentially anomic forces that tended to minimize traditional social values of mutuality in favor of an egoistic construction of the self.

It therefore comes as no surprise that Buddhism, a tradition that is conspicuous for its early association with urbanism, should conceive of the problem of existence as one caused by an exaggerated notion of the ego or "self." The visible, tangible misery caused by excessive individualism in the realm of politics or economics (or wherever competitiveness and the display of egoism are dominant) is easily translated into the sphere of the transcendental as the idea that the malaise of the individual being is the exaggeration of the ego or the individual self. According to this analysis, the source of tranquillity must be sought in a devaluation of that self. This step is accomplished by the philosophical formulation that the self is an illusion. It is not that those who adopt this view attempt to reduce Buddhist philosophy, in particular its central doctrine of *anātman* (Pali, *anatta*, "no-self"), to a sociological phenomenon; rather, what is suggested is merely a correspondence.

If man's suffering stems from his exaggerated perception of an ego and from clinging to its desires, then suffering can be alleviated only by the denial of that ego and its desires. Just as the ego grew out of all proportion within the social context, the same social mecha-

nism can be used to vitiate it, to realize that there is no immutable soul, but only process created by the perceiving aggregates. This realization must ultimately be a personal one, but it is facilitated by social organization. That facilitating social organization is the *saṃgha*, a unique idea in Indian religious thought. Groups of wandering ascetics existed before and after the founding of the Buddhist *saṃgha*, but none was so organized and institutionally complex. Unlike previous groups, the *saṃgha* was structured around a sophisticated code of discipline and monastic etiquette, the *Vinaya*. [See *Vinaya*.] Although the pursuit of mental cultivation by withdrawal to the forest or cave persisted, it appears that this "rhinoceros [i.e., solitary] ideal" was a survival from pre-Buddhist practice. Religious quest within a well-organized social group, the *saṃgha*, was a specifically Buddhist innovation. Although the ideals of the *saṃgha* were spiritual, its nonegoistic, socialistic, and republican features made it a model for a secular society at peace with itself, just as the uncompromising commitment of the renouncer was a virtue to be emulated by the individual layman. [See also *Monasticism, article on Buddhist Monasticism*.]

The Economic Life of the Saṃgha. Although some Western interpreters have maintained that Buddhism is concerned with the salvation of the individual renouncer, from its inception the tradition also clearly had a ministerial component. The Buddha's instruction to the seekers who heard his message was to carry it far and wide "for the good of the many, the comfort of the many." Yet alongside this purely missionary function grew functions of a pedagogic and parish nature arising out of the *saṃgha*'s scholastic bent and the instructional needs of the laity. Thus in the *saṃgha* two divisions grew, the "bearing of contemplation" (*vipassanā dhura*), or meditative development of one's own spirituality, and the "bearing of the books" (*gantha dhura*), the scholastic and parish functions. Eventually, the latter would gain in valuation, indicating the close relation the *saṃgha* was expected to maintain with society. At the same time, society took on the obligation to support and maintain the *saṃgha*. This arrangement, however, can be considered a consequence, albeit an early and a necessary one, of the rise of Buddhism within a social context.

There was a more basic reason why the economic life of the *saṃgha* could not exist apart from the munificence of the laity. An individual member of the *saṃgha*, the *śramaṇa* (f., *śramaṇā*), or renouncer, renounced what belonged to him or her in order to tread the path of purity and spiritual release. Providing such renouncers with their needs was an excellent opportunity for those who must remain within the bounds of household

life to gain stores of merit (*puñña*) that would bear them fruit in the form of good fortune and good future births. The poverty of the *saṃgha* thus perfectly suited a laity in search of opportunities to perform good deeds (*puñña kamma*; Skt., *punya karman*), for it was held that no deed was so good in its potential for generating merit as the support of the *saṃgha*. The *saṃgha*'s economic dependence on the laity for subsistence is, therefore, no mere necessity, but, as more than one scholar has observed, an outward token of the renouncer's abandonment of personal resources to depend on those of the community that he serves. Thus, early in the development of Buddhism, the renouncer's needs were confined to the *catu paccaya* ("four requisites"), namely food, clothing, shelter, and medication. An individual monk ideally owns nothing privately but the *aṭṭha parikkhāra* ("eightfold items"), robes, begging bowl, and other basic personal accoutrements.

During the historical development of Buddhism, especially in the Buddhist kingdoms of Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Burma, the economic life of the *saṃgha* went through radical transformations. Extensive monastic properties grew, paradoxically arising from the sacred poverty of the *saṃgha*. Similarly, it was the fundamentally nonhierarchical nature of the *saṃgha*, among other reasons, that led to its being closely allied with the political order. In Sri Lanka, Buddhism was established as the state religion from its very inception: according to tradition, the king was the first Buddhist. Thus it was incumbent upon the king to endow the *saṃgha* generously, as did successive kings of all Buddhist polities, to bring under the purview of the *saṃgha* vast properties in the form of land. The king's act was exemplary and was followed by his patrimonial bureaucracy, down to the petty chiefs. Thus, paralleling the political hierarchy grew a hierarchy of monasteries owning vast stretches of property. The ideal of monastic poverty, however, was never abandoned, even though individual monks may have had access to considerable economic resources. This ideal was maintained in two ways. First, although land grants were made to the monasteries, their administration was separated from them and entrusted to lay officials. Second, lands granted to the monasteries, especially by the king, could in theory be taken away, although in fact this hardly ever occurred. However, in Sri Lanka sectarian schisms occasionally prompted monarchs to transfer properties of one monastic sect to another. The policy of making large-scale land grants contributed enormously to the longevity of the *saṃgha* and to its ability to survive economic adversity. In those agricultural societies that depended on the vagaries of rainfall for the cultivation of crops, especially the staple rice, prosper-

ity could not be taken for granted, and often war and famine made it difficult for the laity to continue unbroken their pious donations. Indeed, the Sinhala term for famine, *durbhikṣa*, literally means the "absence of shares [i.e., food given as alms]." Thus the wealth of the monasteries can be considered to have played no small role in the viability of the *saṃgha* in the Buddhist polities of South and Southeast Asia.

The king's munificence toward the *saṃgha* served a politically legitimizing function. In addition, the land grants had a more direct political use, arising from the king's choice of their location. The king in Sri Lanka, for example, sometimes donated areas of property located in a province too distant for his immediate control (and hence potentially rebellious) and placed it under the control of a loyal subordinate. The tract of land thus demarcated, often extensive in size, essentially constituted a pocket of royal authority that acted as a counterforce to the threat posed by the provincial ruler.

A related point of great interest is the argument that monastic properties gave rise to monastic social structures. This intriguing theory has an important kernel of truth, especially when viewed in the context of the absence of hierarchical organization in the *saṃgha*. It can plausibly be argued that certain monastic social structures are indeed a function of the management of properties. The weakness of the theory lies in its very limited explanatory potential. Monastic properties, although in theory granted to an idealized *saṃgha* unbounded by time and space, are in fact granted to actual worldly institutions. It is in the context of particular space- and time-bound social structures that such properties must be understood. Even here it is doubtful whether the holding of property preceded evolution of the social structure, for the simple reason that it was an existing institution that received the property, an institution whose sociological structure could, of course, be modified by virtue of the new acquisition. At the broadest levels, and in the long run, it is difficult to maintain the materialist view that social structures are the product of property relations, although certain dynamic interrelations between the two are undeniable.

Saṃgha and Political Authority. One of the striking contrasts presented by early Buddhism is that whereas the *saṃgha* was ordered according to the political principles of the ancient tribal republics of India, its preferred political ally was clearly the monarchy. This may be explained by several factors. As I have indicated, Buddhism has been viewed as a reaction to a spirit of individualism that it perceived as the cause of social and individual suffering. Since the rise of the monarchical principle epitomizes that same individualism, it would seem appropriate for the *saṃgha* to organize it-

self on nonindividualist, nonmonarchical, nonhierarchical lines. However, Buddhism, always realistic in spirit, seems to have accepted the likelihood that the propagation of its message would be better facilitated by good relations with the monarchy. It must not be supposed, however, that this was a one-way process. The benefits were mutual. As Buddhism was from its very inception a movement that appealed most to urban strata, the task of controlling the powerful urban centers and sub-centers was rendered easier for the political authority, the monarch, once he espoused the religious ideology of the socially and economically dominant urban strata.

The affinity of Buddhism and its *saṃgha* to kingship is expressed in diverse ways, including myths and symbols of Buddhist kingship. Buddhist literature and lore have elevated the Buddha's father, the Śākya ruler of a small kingdom, to the status of a monarch of imperial stature. The close relations between the Buddha and the kings of the Middle Country such as Kośala and Bimbisāra are no doubt characterized by some literary embellishment, but the historicity of the Buddha's affinity with contemporary monarchs of the region cannot be doubted. The most elaborate correlations between Buddhism and kingship are perhaps those in the symbolic sphere, in particular the identity between the Buddha and the *cakravartin* ("wheel turner"), the universal monarch. The auspicious bodily marks of the Buddha and the *cakravartin* are considered in Buddhist lore to be the same. The *cakravartin* turns the wheel of political conquest while the Buddha turns the wheel of the Dharma, the philosophy of Buddhism as well as its moral law of righteousness. The obsequies of the Buddha are considered in Buddhist literature to be those appropriate to a *cakravartin*. [See *Cakravartin*.]

The absence of hierarchy in the *saṃgha* has already been noted. Although this does not by any means make the *saṃgha* a democracy in the modern political sense—distinctions of senior and junior, teacher and pupil, ordained and novice are definitely observed—the *saṃgha* had no effective encompassing organization with laws, edicts, and codes smoothly flowing down a hierarchy of *saṃgha* officials. Since the *saṃgha* had no effective coercive authority within the bounds of its own organization, it had to look elsewhere for the sustenance and objectification of its moral and political integrity and for the adjudication of its conflicts. The preeminent repository of these functions was the king. Thus the *saṃgha* was politically as well as economically dependent on the king. This dependence most often took the form of "purification of the order" (*śāsana viśodhana*; Pali, *sāsana visodhana*), that is, by the staging of periodic purges of the *saṃgha* to free it from monks who

violated the code of discipline. In addition, the purifications signified public reaffirmation of the *saṃgha*'s purity, on which depended its high esteem in society. The general public welcomed the purges because they guaranteed a virtuous and exemplary *saṃgha*, donations to which surpassed, in popular belief, all other acts of merit. The purifications were thus generally beneficial to all parties. Hence it is possible that these were regularly staged in Buddhist polities, as the historical record illustrates, whether or not an objective purificatory need existed. Apart from purifications, the king's organizational role in relation to the *saṃgha* was also manifest in the codification of doctrine and other acts that would enhance the *saṃgha*'s collective integrity. Historically, then, the king was indispensable to the *saṃgha*. Today, in Buddhist societies bereft of monarchy, this role is performed by the state.

Often, the integration of the *saṃgha* was historically effected by a hierarchy, imposed on it by the king, a hierarchy that duplicated the hierarchy of his secular patrimonial bureaucracy. The effectiveness of such imposed hierarchy, however, depended on the king's firm exercise of authority. At such times, the *saṃgha* may be considered to have had a more-than-usual political integration. In fact, it is more accurate to say that at all other times the *saṃgha* was merely a collection of politically disparate and inarticulate local communities. A king, however, was only able to integrate the *saṃgha* if he were an able ruler who integrated the secular polity itself, which in these systems was in a chronic state of tension between centripetality and centrifugality. Thus the king's integration of the *saṃgha* by the imposition of a hierarchy was no more than an extension of the integration of his secular power. Paradoxically, when the *saṃgha* was most politically integrated, and therefore most powerful, it was most dominated and regulated by the secular authority. At the same time, the king, while dominating the *saṃgha*, dared not alienate the monastic order lest it strike at the source of his legitimacy. Acceptance by the *saṃgha* was politically crucial for the king. It was part of the general cultural ideology of the Buddhist polity that the religion was the true sovereign over the land. Thus in Sri Lanka, kingship was described as being conferred by the *saṃgha* in order to maintain the religion. Kings periodically enacted symbolic abdication in favor of the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha), and the *saṃgha* "in keeping with custom" restored the kingship to the king, accepting in return a token of its overlordship, such as a land grant made on the occasion by the king.

One of the fundamental dilemmas of the association between kingship and the *saṃgha* is their respective

ideal representation of two divergent realms, the temporal and the spiritual. The tension between the two spheres becomes reality when, as is the case with the Buddhist polity, righteousness is declared the foundation of the state. Statecraft necessitates not only the maintenance of internal law and order ultimately backed by coercive means but also the suppression of external enemies by bloodshed, not to mention more covert Machiavellian (or, the Indian context, Kautilyan) acts by means of which the state's ends are maintained. Such practices are far from "righteous."

Two resolutions of this dilemma are discernible in the history of Buddhist polities. First, the ruler's reign is divided into two periods, an unrighteous period followed by a righteous period, with the implication that the sins of the former are washed away by the pure waters of the latter. The empirical prototype of such a king, and indeed of all Buddhist kingship, is Aśoka (268–231 BCE), who, as Caṇḍāśoka ("Aśoka the cruel"), ruthlessly expands the empire bequeathed him by his Mauryan ancestors; his reign climaxed in the bloody conquest of Kāliṅga. Later, as Dharmāśoka ("Aśoka the righteous"), he proclaims the end of conquest by the sword and the dawn of the reign of *dharma* alone. The emperor's inner transformation thus serves as the resolution of the might-versus-right conflict. [See the biography of Aśoka.]

The second resolution of the king's dilemma, like the first, is initiated by the personal remorse of the conqueror, although the process takes a less ethicized form. Apprehensive of the moral retribution that may befall him in future lives, the conqueror grows afraid of the demerit of bloody conquest overtaking the merit column of his moral balance sheet. The resolution of this conflict involves a diminution of the universal perspective, for it takes the form of personal reassurance granted the conqueror that the bloodshed he caused was for the purpose of protecting from alien threat the *dharma* and maintaining its dominance. Thus in the Sri Lankan chronicle *Mahāvamsa*, the hero Duṭṭhagāmaṇī is assured by the *saṃgha* that of the thousands massacred during the conquests, the number of human beings killed amounts to a mere one and a half (the rest being heathen whose extinction has little consequence for the king's moral state). This second resolution, in which elements less than universalist are apparent, can be further evaluated as ethically inferior in its relative valuation of human life (believers are truly human, heathens fit for slaughter). [See the biography of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī.]

This tension between the ideals of the *saṃgha* and those of the king are meaningfully characterized precisely because the two are in relation. Had they been

fully and completely separate from each other, as in the case of a hypothetical fully secular king and an equally hypothetical forest-dwelling ascetic having no relations with the society of men, there would be no occasion for this dilemma to arise. However, in the actual world, the spiritual and the temporal, though ideally separate, are in fact coexistent. In the case of the Buddhist polity this "dialectical tension," as Stanley J. Tambiah has called it, is generated by the location of the *saṃgha* in society even while the *saṃgha* is not of the society. Such tension is based not so much on any social relationship between king and *saṃgha* or on the king's role as conqueror and converter of the heathen as on the indistinguishability of the spiritual and the temporal in the office of the sovereign as conceived in the Buddhist notion of kingship. Furthermore, this indistinguishability forces on the king the paradoxical obligation to deal with schisms in the *saṃgha*. This obligation involves the use of force against members of the *saṃgha* who are deemed offenders against orthodox purity. But such a judgment can by no means be objectively assured. Not infrequently in the history of the Buddhist polities "purges" of the *saṃgha* constitute a "unification" of the church, the meaning as well as durability of which may be dubious. Yet at least at the time of its accomplishment the act itself would appear to represent a victory both for the king and the section of the *saṃgha* he supported, and, in its "unified" sense, for the *saṃgha* as a whole. In principle, the king, now armed with the force of a purified and unified *saṃgha*, gains important political and religious prestige through his action, although such action presupposes considerable political power in the first place.

The relationship between kingship, that is, political authority, and the *saṃgha* has been so close in Buddhist polities that it is sometimes said that the existence of the *saṃgha* presupposes Buddhist kingship. The functional complementarity of the two parties centers around the *saṃgha*'s dependence on the king for economic and organizational sustenance and the king's need of the *saṃgha* to legitimize his authority. *Saṃgha*-society relations are, however, broader than *saṃgha*-king relations, for the whole of society includes a third crucial party that makes up the whole, the mass of the lay population. Thus, it has been observed that the Buddhist polity consists of a triadic relation between *saṃgha*, king, and people. In time, such a polity could develop a strong identity fortified further by a common language and a real or imagined common ethnicity. Such an entity could grow to possess considerable integrative potential submerged in its chronic tension between centripetality and centrifugality. This potential could manifest itself with vigor at times of crisis, such

as the external threat of some alien religion, language, and/or ethnic group. At such times, an ordinarily dormant and structurally vague *saṃgha* might awaken, assume formidable solidarity, and inspire the people to heightened states of patriotic fervor. Characteristically, it would return to its structural somnolence at the abatement of the crisis. The Buddhist polity is thus capable of producing two remarkable phenomena: (1) a unification of the *saṃgha* from within, inconceivable during normal times, when unification is achieved only by state imposition, and (2) a sense of political unity and identity, rare in the traditional world, which becomes historically ubiquitous only with the rise of the modern nation-state. Clearly, this crisis-triggered phenomenon represents neither a true unification of the *saṃgha* nor political centralization.

Saṃgha Sects and Sectarianism. It is sometimes observed that there are no doctrinally differentiated sects in Buddhism. Yet Theravāda and Mahāyāna can both be considered sects in this sense. So can the numerous schools that developed within Theravāda in the early period of Buddhism. But throughout most of the history of Buddhist kingdoms, sects in this sense did not survive. As the schisms, purifications, and unifications show, however, differences of opinion and their corresponding social manifestations as sects (*nikāya*) were an integral part of the history of Buddhist kingdoms.

It is possible to posit two kinds of sects as ideal types. First are those sects that have as their basis some doctrinal difference. Ideology here determines the social categorization. Second are *saṃgha* sects derived from or influenced by secular social organization. The term *ideal type* is used because empirically neither type is found in pristine form. The ideologically determined sects have social factors contributing to their genesis; the socially determined ones often have ideological differences (however hairsplitting they may be), or at least cover the social origins of their differences in ideological apparel. [See also Buddhism, Schools of, *overview article*.]

Present in both modern times and antiquity are sects that express the tension in the *saṃgha* between eremitical and cenobitic ideals, forest dwelling and village dwelling, "bearing of contemplation" and "bearing of the books." Although Buddhist liberation is an act of personal endeavor, I have noted above that from its inception Buddhism conceived of the greater facility with which this end can be reached within a community framework; hence the vast importance in Buddhism of the *saṃgha* as the "third jewel." At the same time, the pre-Buddhist orthodox means of salvation by resorting to solitary confinement in forest or cave, the rhinoceros ideal, continued to be followed by some, if only a mi-

nority. Perhaps because the very solitariness of the search suggested greater purity and commitment, free from any obligations either to fellow members of the *saṃgha* community or to the laity, the solitary ideal was always held in high esteem. Sects or breakaway groups in the history of the *saṃgha* that were founded on doctrinal differences exemplify the ascetic/monastic tension and have invariably proclaimed their departure from the fold of orthodoxy as a movement toward greater purity and a renunciation of the comforts and social involvement of monasticism. Undoubtedly, such proclamations are idealizations; the true picture is more complex and allied with less lofty causal variables. Nevertheless, in terms of the renouncing group's own conceptualizations, movements toward asceticism can be viewed as purifications generated within the *saṃgha* itself, as opposed to those imposed upon it by the political authority.

In the history of the *saṃgha* such rebel movements, often inspired by and centered upon charismatic leadership, have in time succumbed to the very monastic organizational structures (and their secular economic, political, and adulatory accompaniments) that they denounced to begin with. Eventually, they have been lured back to the fold of worldly monasticism within which they may either rejoin the original parent group, remain within it as a distinct subgroup, or form a new sect altogether. Whichever of these forms the newly returned group assumes, its organizational form will normally be identical with that of the established sects. This "routinization of charisma" is neatly expressed in microcosmic form in the rite of ordination, in which the neophyte takes extreme vows of asceticism and, at the end of the ceremony, emerges with a higher status in the monastic establishment. Just as the rite of ordination is no more than a reaffirmation of high and pure ascetic ideals, so ascetic movements are periodic reminders of the true path of renunciation.

When confronted with cases in which elements of the secular social order have played a decisive role in the formation of Buddhist sects (as was true of the role of the Sinhala caste structure in the formation of certain nineteenth- and twentieth-century sects), some sociological observers have seen no more in these movements than the intrusion of society into the *saṃgha*. While this view is not wholly without merit, to assert it unequivocally is to reduce to social form phenomena that are ideologically autonomous and irreducible to social or other causal factors. To have recourse to this deterministic view is also to ignore the role of symbolic classification in the generation of sects. The evidence from Sri Lanka in particular suggests that certain sectarian divisions followed successive binary differentiations.

Sects, Saints, and Millennial Buddhism. The forest dwellers, a group that either came into being as a result of the self-purifying tendency within the *saṅgha* or arose anew from the laity (a less likely possibility), symbolically represent physical distance from the established secular order. They also typify a politically peripheral status in their habitation of the traditional sanctuary of the politically rebellious, namely the untamed forest. Hence, their appeal to the established political center can be vast. Furthermore, forest dwelling is synonymous with virtue and purity, and in the Buddhist polities of East Asia in particular, forest dwellers are often attributed great miraculous powers. As Tambiah's study of Thai Buddhism illustrates, the forest saints not only exemplify true asceticism as described in the classic text on the subject, the *Visuddhimagga*, but are also sometimes considered by the laity to have actually reached liberation by achieving "the winning of the stream" in the voyage to *nirvāṇa* (Pali, *nibbāna*). The politically central personalities—kings, prime ministers, generals—are thus forced by both spiritual and temporal interests to recognize and pay homage to them, a task that temporarily forces them out of their central fortresses to make uneasy journeys to the physical and political periphery where saints coexist with rebels. In general the saints are not interested in politics; their concern is spiritual commitment and the spiritual welfare of their immediate disciples and votaries. Nor is it possible for the political center to devote its sole energy to the veneration of the saints. In Thailand a happy medium is struck in medallions and amulets blessed with the saint's miraculous powers. In these cultic metal objects, which are made available to those who inhabit and control the political center, spiritual and temporal interests are welded together in much the same way as they are in the saint of the forest, whose path of purification also leads to the cosmic mountain symbolic of world conquest.

Today as in the past, a group surrounding such a forest saint is a potential threat to the political center, a threat to which the latter typically reacts in either of two ways. First, as already observed, it can make peaceful and devoted overtures and invoke the power of the miraculous objects blessed by the saint. Second, if the group surrounding the saint turns hostile, the center may resort to military action, against which the rebels, armed more with millennial expectations than military hardware, are no match. The forest saint's implicit premise that the established *saṅgha* and polity are corrupt may become the rallying point of rebellion, although this need not necessarily be so. In the established realm, *saṅgha* and political authority are separate but bound in reciprocity and mutuality,

whereas in millenarianism, one possible rallying point of which is the forest-dwelling exemplar, the roles of renouncer and ruler tend to fuse together. This brings back full cycle, however fragile and illusory, the ideal unification of world renunciation and world conquest.

[See also Kingship, *article on Kingship in Southeast Asia*; Priesthood, *article on Buddhist Priesthood*; and Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia*. For a historical discussion of the development of the *saṅgha* in Sri Lanka, see Theravāda.]

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All three works display vast learning and contain excellent bibliographies. Among the modern masters of social thought, Max Weber alone dealt with Buddhism in *The Religion of India*, translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (1958; reprint, New York, 1967), where he characteristically constructs an ideal type of the early *saṃgha* as separate from society yet in time transforming itself to accommodate lay religious needs. Although many of Weber's views are disputed, most forcefully by Tambiah, whose sociological imagination and expository style are reminiscent of Weber's own, there is still a great deal of potency and suggestiveness in his observations. Bardwell Smith has edited two volumes, *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos and Burma* and *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka* (both Chambersburg, Pa., 1978), that contain several useful articles on the subject.

The Mahāyāna monastic orders of Japan and Tibet are vastly different from the Theravāda *saṃghas* of Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma, which constitute data for the analysis presented in this article. For Tibet, there is little scholarly focus from a social science point of view, the bulk of the work being textual and religio-philosophical. Authoritative though brief discussions on Tibetan monasticism ("Lamaism") are found in Giuseppe Tucci's *The Religions of Tibet* (Berkeley, 1980) and Rolf A. Stein's *Tibetan Civilization* (Stanford, Calif., 1972). Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga's *Foundations of Japanese Buddhism*, 2 vols. (Los Angeles and Tokyo, 1978), deals with, among other things, the development of scholastic Buddhism as a magical agent of the Ritsuryō government, and the generalization of Buddhism from an aristocratic religion to one embracing all strata, and suggests the cyclically regenerative and reinterpretive nature of Japanese Buddhism. For a historically based discussion of the relationship of church and state in early Chinese Buddhism, see Erik Zürcher's *The Buddhist Conquest of China*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1972).

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SĀṂKARA. See Śaṅkara.

SĀṂKHYA, a Sanskrit word meaning "enumeration," is derived from the substantive *saṃkhyā* ("number") and is the name of one of the six orthodox Hindu philosophical schools.

The Teachings of the School. As the name implies, the Sāṃkhya school relies on distinct and recognizable patterns of enumeration as methods of inquiry. The different patterns of enumeration can be grouped into three main separate divisions according to their overall function in the system: the principles of twenty-five (constitutive), the dispositions of eight (projective), and the categories of fifty (effective).

Basic to an understanding of the Sāṃkhya school is the importance it places on the distinction between contentless consciousness (*puruṣa*) and materiality (*pra-*

kṛti), two essentially different principles. Nothing exists apart from these two principles. This distinction caused the Sāṃkhya school to be labeled "dualistic." Contentless consciousness is the opposite of materiality in that it is inactive, yet conscious, and therefore not subject to change. Materiality, on the contrary, is potentially and actually active, but unconscious. Materiality is both unmanifest and manifest. The unmanifest materiality may also be called the "original materiality" because it is from this that the whole manifest universe emerges.

The universe undergoes cycles of evolution and absorption. During absorption, the original materiality is dormant, and the three constituents of materiality (the *guṇas*: *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*) are in a state of equilibrium. On disturbing this equilibrium of the three constituents, the original materiality starts to reproduce itself. Unmanifest transforms into manifest materiality and keeps on transforming from one principle to the other until the original materiality has manifested itself in twenty-three principles. This is the constitutive pattern of enumeration, which is an extension of the fundamental duality. According to some accounts, the first principle to emerge is "the large one" (*mahat*); other accounts maintain that intellect (*buddhi*) emerges first. Either of these two principles produces ego (*ahaṃkāra*). Ego, in turn, produces ten faculties—five sense faculties (*buddhīndriya*) and five action faculties (*karmendriya*); ego also produces the mind (*manas*) and the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*). These subtle elements produce five gross elements (*bhūta*). Figure 1 (fashioned after the Sāṃkhya classic, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa) gives an overview of the twenty-five principles that constitute the universe: the twenty-three produced principles and the two basic principles, contentless consciousness and original materiality.

All twenty-three principles of manifest materiality are a transformation of one thing, namely, the original materiality. These principles, in fact, are not new products or effects; their effects already exist in their causes. The essence of this theory of causality (*satkāryavāda*) is that an effect must be connected to preexisting necessary conditions, otherwise anything could be a cause of anything else; in other words, there must be a dependent relation between cause and effect, such that milk alone, for example, and not water, produces yogurt.

The Sāṃkhya school postulates that materiality is one, and that the evolution of a number of things out of that one materiality is understood as causation. The numerous things in this world are different from the original materiality, and yet they are the same. The things of everyday reality—ourselves, our minds, egos, and intellects—are materiality. Mental functions are transformations, too. Contentless consciousness itself gets con-

FIGURE 1. *The Constitutive Pattern: The Twenty-five Principles That Constitute the Universe*

Contentless Consciousness (<i>puruṣa</i>)	(1)
Original Materiality (<i>prakṛti</i>)	(1)
The Large One (<i>mahat</i>) / Intellect (<i>buddhi</i>)	(1)
Ego (<i>ahaṅkāra</i>)	(1)
Ear	} Five sense faculties (<i>buddhīndriya</i>) (5)
Skin	
Eye	
Tongue	
Nose	
Voice	} Five action faculties (<i>karmendriya</i>) (5)
Hand	
Foot	
Anus	
Genitals	
Mind (<i>manas</i>)	(1)
Sound	} Five subtle elements (<i>tanmātra</i>) (5)
Touch	
Color	
Taste	
Smell	
Air	} Five gross elements (<i>bhūta</i>) (5)
Wind	
Fire	
Water	
Earth	
	(25)

fused with these transformations, although in reality contentless consciousness is merely a witness to them. But since contentless consciousness does not undergo any change and does not produce any activity, this confusion must be rooted in materiality. If anything is to be effected, it has to happen in materiality. It is not clear from Sāṃkhya literature how the two basic entities interact, if indeed they do.

It is here that metaphysics and epistemology merge. The confusion of contentless consciousness with materiality gives ground to epistemology. How does one remove this confusion, this ignorance that keeps the world in the repeating cycle of existence? Bondage in the cycle of lives is contingent upon ignorance of the distinction between materiality and contentless consciousness. The removal of confusion and ignorance can be achieved by knowledge, in particular, the knowledge that differentiates or discriminates contentless consciousness from materiality. By means of this knowledge, one wins liberation, and one's subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*) ceases its transmigration from life to life.

Intellect, ego, mind, the five sense faculties, the five action faculties, and the five subtle elements together form the subtle body. This subtle body is attachable to, and detachable from, the gross body; by attaching itself to the gross body, it animates it. On the other hand, by detaching itself from the gross body at the time of

death, the subtle body transmigrates. This subtle body includes the eight dispositions inherent in the intellect that form the projective pattern of enumeration, shown in figure 2. With respect to liberation, the left-hand column lists four dispositions that are constructive, and the right-hand column lists four dispositions that are destructive. Their composition changes depending on which disposition is predominant.

The effective pattern of enumeration results from the interaction between the eight dispositions of the intellect (the projective pattern) and the twenty-five principles that constitute the universe (the constitutive pattern). This pattern enumerates fifty categories of intellectual creations:

Five misconceptions	(5)
Twenty-eight incapacities of the sense, action, and mental faculties	(28)
Nine contentments	(9)
Eight spiritual attainments	(8)
	(50)

These categories have still further subdivisions. At the same time, this pattern is interpreted in terms of four created forms of life: plants, animals, gods, and humans.

Patterns of enumeration were designated as a scientific system that employs methodological devices (*tantrayukti*) based on a careful enumeration of subjects, features, and topics of things organized according to the different disciplines of the intellectual tradition in ancient India. These devices developed in various branches of learning, such as medicine and statecraft. According to the *Yuktīdīpikā*, a commentary of the Sāṃkhya school of the latter half of the first millennium CE, the list of devices of the scientific system begins with mnemonic verses, followed by the instruments of knowledge, the members of inference, the complete set of the sixty topics of the Sāṃkhya system, doubt and proof, brief and detailed explanation, the order of topics as known in the evolution of the universe, and the description of things by name.

As is apparent from this enumeration of methodological devices, there is an emphasis on philosophical devices. These were employed to establish knowledge

FIGURE 2. *The Projective Pattern: The Eight Dispositions of the Intellect*

CONSTRUCTIVE	DESTRUCTIVE
Merit	Demerit
Knowledge	Ignorance
Nonattachment	Attachment
Power	Impotence

of things as they are, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge to attain liberation. Knowledge must be acquired by proper devices or instruments of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, and verbal testimony. The SāṀkhya school gives special attention to inference since it is through inference that one can know the two principal entities—contentless consciousness and original materiality—that are beyond immediate sensory perception.

Historical Overview. The SāṀkhya school grew out of naturalistic concerns. In the earliest articulation of SāṀkhya ideas in the Upaniṣads (900 BCE to the first centuries of the common era), the most prominent ideas were often those characterized by the enumeration of various principles, such as elements of nature.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, two of the oldest Upaniṣads, contain numerous explanations of this world in terms of sets of three constituents (*guṇas*), sometimes in the form of colors (black, white, and red), basic necessities of life (food, water, and heat), or seasons (summer, rains, and harvest), and so on. Obviously these oldest Upaniṣads represent layers of various thought structures. It is, however, possible to see that there were only two elements, opposites, beneath the triple system: black and white, food and water, summer and rains, and so on. By adding a third element, such as the color red, the necessity of heat, or the season of harvest, the tension between the opposites was removed, and thus the triad lent itself to endless combinations. These triplings form the origins of the three constituents of materiality. [See *Guṇas*.]

The analysis can continue by breaking this triad down into a dyad and the dyad into a single thing (the first Being). This process recalls the one-by-one involution of the twenty-three principles of the manifest materiality into the unmanifest original materiality at the time of reabsorption of the universe.

The polarity of contentless consciousness and materiality is characterized by the tension inherent in opposites. These two things cannot be combined. At most, they appear to interact; and in order to describe their relationship the SāṀkhya teachers gave figurative illustrations. For example, a lame man can be of use to the blind man, and vice versa.

At the beginning of the common era, syncretism found its way into most intellectual environments. One of the middle-group Upaniṣads, the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, gives evidence of syncretism by documenting the relationship between SāṀkhya and Yoga (6.13). Nevertheless, the names *SāṀkhya* and *Yoga* might not refer at this time to philosophical schools. *SāṀkhya* may be a name for any system of metaphysics, knowledge of

which leads to liberation. *Yoga* may be a name for any system of meditative and postural practices that lead to liberation.

SāṀkhya and Yoga are often considered sibling schools, yet it is not clear whether their origins were symbiotic. Yoga was probably an inheritance from the aboriginal inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent and assimilated by the Indo-European invaders who gradually conquered the subcontinent from 2000 BCE onward. Thus Yoga may have existed alongside the newly formulated ideas that constituted the beginnings of the SāṀkhya teachings. Since both these trends, SāṀkhya and Yoga, were the most extensively articulated teachings of the time, both may have found acceptance. One was seen as the theoretical representation, the other as the practical representation, of a teaching aimed at the same goal. This interrelatedness of SāṀkhya and Yoga was reflected in such works as the *Bhagavadgītā* (most prominently in the second chapter) and the *Mokṣadharma*, both of which are parts of the great epic the *Mahābhārata* (fourth century BCE to fourth century CE).

The time of syncretism was also clearly marked by theistic tendencies. References to the SāṀkhya school indicated two directions, one theistic, the other atheistic, despite the fact that the school of SāṀkhya, unlike that of Yoga, explains the creation and the existence of the universe in the absence of God. In discussions of SāṀkhya and Yoga, reference to “the theistic school” usually means Yoga. Historically, SāṀkhya and Yoga were closest to each other during the period of syncretism. It seems that from this time the two schools went their respective ways until the medieval period, when they again merged.

There is no independent work of the SāṀkhya school’s teachings from the first centuries of the common era. In later philosophical literature, there are references to *śaṣṭitantra* as a system of SāṀkhya teachings. Again, it is not clear whether *śaṣṭitantra* was originally a name for a system of teachings or the title of a written work. When the fourteenth-century Jain scholar Guṇaratna mentions a revision of the *Śaṣṭitantra*, he is presumably referring to a work of the SāṀkhya school. Apparently, just as SāṀkhya and Yoga originally were names for teachings and only later became the designations of the schools, so also *śaṣṭitantra* was likely first a name for a system of teachings and later a title of a work.

As the name indicates, *śaṣṭitantra* refers to “sixty topics” of a system. These topics are the ten basic topics characterizing the two entities (contentless consciousness and materiality) and the fifty categories mentioned above as intellectual creations. The date and authorship of the *Śaṣṭitantra*, either the original or the revised

work, are difficult to verify. Estimated dates range between the first and fourth centuries CE. Authorship is attributed variously to Pañcaśikha or Vṛṣagaṇa or sometimes to the founder of the Sāṃkhya school, Kapila.

The list of Sāṃkhya teachers points to a rich intellectual heritage; unfortunately, none of their works has survived. One of these teachers, Vindhyavāsin, won a reputation as an ardent opponent of the Buddhists. He is also renowned for his statement that the mind is the sole instrument of the cognitive processes, as opposed to the assertion of the mainstream Sāṃkhya school that cognitive processes result from the internal instruments of intellect, ego, and mind. Vindhyavāsin thus expressed the understanding of the Yoga school, that is, the idea of only one internal instrument, the mind. Another Sāṃkhya teacher, Mādhava, diverged from the mainstream of the Sāṃkhya school by interpreting the three constituents in terms of atoms, quite likely under the influence of the Vaiśeṣika school.

Literature. The first extant independent written work of the Sāṃkhya school is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. This work has been variously dated between 350 and 550 CE. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is a sort of codification of the Sāṃkhya teachings; it deals with the various patterns of enumeration and sets forth the purpose of the teaching, that is, liberation through discrimination between contentless consciousness and materiality. This work marked the Sāṃkhya school with a philosophical emphasis because its goal—religious experience—is accomplished through a cognitive process employing logic and epistemology.

A number of commentaries were written about this classic work over subsequent centuries: the *Suvarṇasaptati* (preserved in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha), *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptavṛtti*, *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya*, *Mātharavṛtti*, *Jayamaṅgalā*, *Yuktidīpikā*, and *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*. With the exception of the *Yuktidīpikā* and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, the commentaries are mostly rephrasings and glossings on the mnemonic verses of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

The *Yuktidīpikā*, which was made available in its first published edition in 1938, is the main source of information on many aspects of the Sāṃkhya teachings that have not been accessible otherwise. The *Yuktidīpikā*'s date and authorship are unclear. Moreover, Albrecht Wezler has shown that it contains two types of commentaries. One commentary, the *Rājāvārttika*, is written in concise nominal statements (*vārttika*); the other is a commentary on these concise statements rather than on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* itself. Thus it will be necessary to determine the dates and authors of the *Rājāvārttika* and the *Yuktidīpikā*, respectively. The *Yuktidīpikā*

properly deals with philosophical issues of the Sāṃkhya school in an argumentative style. The author presents a series of challenges posed by opponents (primarily Buddhist) and uses them to explain and prove the Sāṃkhya position.

The *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, a commentary written by Vācaspati Miśra I (fl. c. 976), was the most important commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* before the discovery of the *Yuktidīpikā*. After this, there was no significant work until the sixteenth century, when the Sāṃkhya teacher Vijñānabhikṣu wrote the *Sāṃkhyapravacana-bhāṣya* and the *Sāṃkhyasāra*. The *Sāṃkhyapravacana-bhāṣya* is a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*. Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of the Sāṃkhya teachings was influenced by the Vedānta school, at that time the most widespread philosophical school. This work represents the fusion of Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

The Sāṃkhya teachers continued into modern times to write commentaries on earlier Sāṃkhya works. Of the twentieth-century commentaries, the one of Bālārāma Udāsīna on the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* called *Vidvattoṣinī* is considered by the traditional scholars of India to be a fresh and lucid explanation of the Sāṃkhya teachings. The twentieth-century Sāṃkhya ascetic and teacher Hariharānanda Āraṇya followed the example of the old teachers: he spent most of his life meditating in solitude, only occasionally emerging to teach or to write such works as *The Sāṃkhya-sūtras of Pañcaśikha* and *The Sāṃkhyatattvāloka*. Finally, Pandit Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, a contemporary Sāṃkhya teacher and scholar, has reedited significant old Sāṃkhya works and contributed articles to various journals.

[For discussion of Sāṃkhya's "sibling" school, see Yoga. See also Indian Philosophies.]

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On the historical origins, see E. H. Johnston's *Early Sāṃkhya: An Essay on Its Historical Development according to the Texts* (1937; reprint, Delhi, 1974).

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SAMNYĀSA. The Sanskrit term *saṃnyāsa* commonly means "renunciation of the world." It refers both to the initiatory rite at which a renouncer (*saṃnyāsīn*) formally breaks all his ties with society and to the way of life into which he is so initiated. The term is absent from the Vedic texts and from the Buddhist and Jain literature. It is used exclusively in the Brahmanic tradition and the Hindu sectarian traditions deriving from the medieval period; it refers to renunciation as practiced only within these traditions. The word entered the Brahmanic vocabulary probably around the second century BCE.

Renunciation and Brahmanism. There is no consensus among scholars regarding the origin of world renunciation in India. Given the fragmentary nature of the evidence, this is an issue that is likely to remain unresolved. Recent scholarship, however, has shown that the claim once made that the renunciatory ideal originated exclusively among the non-Brahmanic or even the non-Aryan population is unfounded. The earliest available evidence shows that by the sixth century BCE the institution of world renunciation formed an important part of the entire spectrum of religious traditions and sects of North India, including Brahmanism.

Renunciation, nevertheless, questioned the value of major Brahmanic institutions such as marriage, sacrificial rites, and the social hierarchy of castes. Because it proclaimed the path of renunciation, divorced from ritual and society, as the acme of religious life, the way of renunciation posed a special challenge to the society-centered Vedic religion, which recognized only one socioreligious role for adult men, that of the married householder with his social, procreative, and ritual obligations. The Brahmanic tradition, however, has al-

ways demonstrated the ability to absorb the new without discarding the old. Attempts were made to find theoretical legitimations for the lifestyles of both the renouncer and the householder, the most significant of which was the system of the four *āśramas* (orders of life). Renunciation was sometimes redefined to accommodate life in society. The devotional traditions (*bhakti*), for example, considered true renunciation to be the inner quality of detachment from the world and from the results of one's actions rather than the physical separation from society. Some of these traditions defined renunciation as surrender to God. Despite such efforts at synthesis, a tension between these two ideals has continued to exist within Brahmanism. [See also *Bhakti*.]

Lifestyle and Goal. The main features of the renunciant life are substantially the same in all sects. Renouncers are homeless. Except for the four months of the rainy season (June through September), they are required to wander constantly. Their ideal residence is the foot of a tree. Renouncers shave their heads and either go naked or wear an ochre robe. They practice celibacy and poverty, obtaining their food and the other few necessities of life by begging. Several terms for a renouncer, such as *parivrājaka* ("wanderer") and *bhikṣu* ("mendicant"), reflect these aspects of his life. All these features, moreover, need to be understood not merely as ascetic practices but as symbolic rejections of social customs and institutions.

A significant feature of the renouncers' style of life is the abandonment of fire. It symbolizes their separation from Vedic society and religion, and in a special way their rejection of the Vedic sacrifice. Though it is present in all renouncer traditions, the abandonment of fire occupies a central position in Brahmanic renunciation, which is often defined as the abandonment of all ritual actions. The absence of fire gave rise to two other customs. Unable to cook for themselves, renouncers beg cooked food daily. After death they are not cremated like other people but are buried either on land or in water, for cremation is performed with the sacred fires of the deceased and constitutes his last sacrifice (*antyeṣṭi*).

The greatest transformation of renunciation occurred in early Buddhism with the establishment of permanent monastic communities and the consequent abandonment of the itinerant lifestyle. [See *Monasticism*, article on *Buddhist Monasticism*.] Monastic orders were not organized within Brahmanism until a much later period. The best known among them is the Order of Ten Names (*Daśanāmīs*), reputedly founded by the Advaita philosopher Śāṅkara (788–820 CE). In spite of the drift toward settled monastic living, however, it was never accepted either as law or as ideal. The rule of homeless

wandering was maintained at least theoretically both within and outside Brahmanism.

Although lower goals, such as attaining a heavenly world, are often mentioned, liberation (*mokṣa*) from the constant cycle of births and deaths (*saṃsāra*) is considered the goal of renunciation. Many sects regard it as a precondition for liberation. *Samnyāsa*, therefore, is often referred to as *mokṣāśrama* or simply as *mokṣa*.

Brahmanism establishes a hierarchy among renouncers based on the degree of their removal from the world and from social norms. The lowest is called a *kuṭīcaka*. He lives a life of retirement in a hut and receives his food from his children. The next is a *bahūdaka*, who begs his food and adopts a wandering life. A *haṃsa* carries a single staff. He is thus distinguished from the first two, who carry three staffs tied together. The fourth and highest type of renouncer is a *paramahaṃsa*. He breaks all social ties, discarding the sacrificial thread and the tuft of hair on the crown, the two basic symbols of his former ritual and social status.

Initiation. All renouncer sects devised some form of initiation, and Brahmanism was no exception. In fact, one of the earliest usages of the term *saṃnyāsa* was with reference to the Brahmanic rite of renunciation. No uniform rite, however, evolved within Brahmanism, and even the medieval handbooks give different versions. On the major features, nevertheless, there is agreement.

The rite takes two days, although most of the major ceremonies are performed on the second. On the first day the candidate performs nine oblations for the dead (*Śrāddha*), the last of which he offers for himself. The following day he performs his last sacrifice and gives away all his worldly goods. He then symbolically deposits his sacred fires within himself by inhaling their smoke, burns his sacrificial utensils, and extinguishes his sacred fires. The abandonment of fire and ritual is interpreted as an internalization; a renouncer carries the fires within himself in the form of his breaths (*prāṇa*) and offers an internal sacrifice in these fires every time he eats. He then utters three times the *Praīṣa*, or renunciatory formula: "I have renounced" (*"Samnyastaṃ mayā"*), and gives the "gift of safety" (*abhaya-dāna*) to all creatures with the promise never to injure any living being. He is now a renouncer. He ceremonially takes the requisites of a renouncer, such as staff and begging bowl, the emblems of his new state (*yatiṅga*).

Qualification. The rite of renunciation results in the ritual abandonment of all rites. Paradoxical as this seems, it enabled the socioritual norms of Brahmanism to control the entry into the very state that aims at transcending them. The question of qualification pre-

cedes any discussion of a ritual action, including the rite of renunciation. Only the three twice-born classes (*varṇas*) are qualified to perform rites, and, therefore, to renounce. Opinion, however, is sharply divided as to whether only brahmins or all three upper classes are so qualified.

A person, moreover, has to pass through the *āśramas* of student, householder, and forest hermit before renouncing, although with the obsolescence of the hermit's *statē* this rule was interpreted to mean that a person should be free from the three debts incurred at birth, namely Vedic study, sacrifice, and procreation, which are paid by fulfilling the obligations of the first two *āśramas*. One view, however, holds that these provisions apply only to ordinary people; one who is totally detached from the world may renounce immediately.

The position of women is also ambiguous. Orders of nuns exist in Buddhism, in Jainism, and in some medieval Hindu sects. Female renouncers are referred to frequently in Sanskrit literature, and their position is recognized in Hindu law. Brahmanic authorities generally deny the legitimacy of female renunciation, although occasionally dissenting voices are heard in this regard.

Ritual and Legal Effects. The renunciatory rite is regarded as the ritual death of the renouncer. Although dead, he is nevertheless visibly present among the living and occupies an ambivalent position within Brahmanism. He is excluded from all ritual acts. His status as far as ritual purity is concerned is unclear. Although theologically he is often considered the acme of purity, within ritual contexts his presence is feared as a cause of impurity.

In Hindu law, the renouncer's ritual death constitutes also his civil death. The renunciation of the father, like his physical death, is the occasion for the succession of his heirs. It also dissolves his marriage, and some authorities, such as the *Nārada-smṛiti* (12.97), would permit his wife to remarry. Renouncers, moreover, cannot take part in legal transactions and are released from previous contractual obligations and debts. They are not even permitted to appear as witnesses in a court of law.

Renunciation is considered an irreversible state, both ritually and socially. A renouncer who reverts to lay life (*ārūḍhapatita*) becomes an outcaste (*cāṇḍāla*) and is excluded from all ritual and social contact.

Conclusion. Renunciation was one of the most significant developments in the history of Indian religions. It influenced the post-Vedic worldview based on the central concepts of *saṃsāra* and *mokṣa*. The founders of almost all major Indian religions and sects were renouncers. The mentality of the renouncer influenced even the religious life and the value system of people within society. The society-centered and the world-renouncing

ideologies represented by the householder and the *saṃnyāsīn* continued to exist side by side within Brahmanism. As Dumont (1960) observes, "The secret of Hinduism may be found in the dialogue between the renouncer and the man-in-the-world" (pp. 36–37). Hinduism in general and Brahmanism in particular cannot be understood adequately if we ignore either of these two poles and their interaction.

[For a detailed discussion of the four āśramas and the special relationship between the stages of householder and renouncer, see Rites of Passage, article on Hindu Rites. The metaphysical and cosmological ideals of *saṃnyāsa* are discussed in Mokṣa and Saṃsāra. For a view of two extreme renunciant sects, see Śaivism, articles on Pāśupatas and Kāpālikas.]

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SAMOYED RELIGION. The Samoyeds are peoples of northern Eurasia who speak a systematically related set of languages. Most of them live in western Siberia, in the region extending from the Yamal and Taimyr peninsulas in the north to the Sayan Mountains in the south; a few live in northeasternmost Europe, on the Kola Peninsula and near the Pechora River. As a linguistic group, Samoyed is related to Finno-Ugric; together they form the Uralic language family.

Currently numbering about 35,000, the Samoyed peoples are broadly divided into the northern Samoyeds and the southern Samoyeds. Northern Samoyed groups include the Nentsy (also called the Yurak Samoyeds or the Yuraks), who, with approximately 30,000 members, are by far the largest Samoyed group; the Nganasani (or Tavgi), with about 900 members; and the Entsy (or Yenisei Samoyeds), with about 450 members. Of the southern Samoyeds, only one group survives, the Selkup (formerly called the Ostiak Samoyeds), with some 3,500 members. Some extinct southern Samoyed groups (e.g., the Kamassians, the Koibal, the Motor, and the Taigi) are known from records. Before the formation of the present Samoyed languages and groups, a proto-Samoyed group presumably existed some 3,500 years ago, when it seceded from the larger proto-Uralic parent group.

The neighbors of the Samoyed are, or have been in the course of history, the Khanty and the Komi (Finno-Ugric peoples), various Siberian Turkic peoples, the Evenki (a Tunguz people), the Ket (sometimes classified as a Paleosiberian group), and, most recently, the Russians. Samoyed traditional culture is based primarily on hunting for fur-bearing animals, gathering, fishing, and reindeer breeding; collectivization was introduced into the Samoyed economy by the Soviet government in the 1920s.

The Spirit World. The principal deity of the Nentsy is Num, the creator of the world, of men, and of things. His role is ambiguous: in general he distances himself from human beings and abstains from interference in their affairs, except when explicitly implored for help in the struggle against Nga, the god of evil, death, and hell. In Nenets religion, Nga is Num's son, but this father-son duality is not found among other Samoyed groups, where the high benevolent gods and their antipodes are considered independent of one another. Sacrifices are made to Num twice a year, at the beginning of winter and again in the spring. They are either bloody, involving the killing of dogs or reindeer, or bloodless, involving the offering of money, clothing, and food. [See Num.]

Another inhabitant of the spirit world is Ilibemberti; in Nenets religion he is reported variously as a spirit

who grants good fortune in the pursuit of reindeer and foxes and alternately as a protector of reindeer. He does not have the status of a god, which is reserved for Num and Nga. Freely translated, the name *Ilibemberti* means "the spirit that gives riches or sustenance (in reindeer or game)." The significance of this supernatural personality lies in the fact that *Ilibemberti* is involved in the concrete here and now, and is as such opposed to Num, the highest god and creator, who is shapeless and transcends time. The Samoyeds also recognize an earth-mother deity who is sympathetic to humans, especially to women in childbirth.

The Nentsy are reported to worship stones and rocks. Properly speaking, this means that certain mountains and rocks, as well as some rivers and lakes, were considered to have individual spirits deserving reverence. Among the Nganasani it was even believed that some man-made artifacts could understand human language. The Nganasani hierarchized supernatural beings into three classes: benevolent master spirits of fire, water, the forest, hunting, and fishing; evil, anthropomorphic spirits; and the shaman's auxiliary spirits (mostly zoomorphic). Among the Selkup, master spirits were sometimes considered repositories of good fortune. In general, spirits were conceived of as intermediaries between Num and humans and as being in contact with shamans. Each person was thought to have a corresponding star in the heavens—a belief that brings man closer to Num than Num's disinterested attitude mentioned above would suggest.

Rituals. Besides the cyclic sacrifices to Num mentioned above, other sacrifices are made at specific sites, where wooden or stone representations of certain spirits are erected. Among the Selkup these sites are phratri-local. Of the rites of passage celebrated by the Samoyed groups, the most important are the shaman's initiation, rites after childbirth (primarily involving purification of the tent), and ritual ceremonies for the dead.

It is believed that the dead continue to live as shadow souls—varieties of lower spirits—in the underworld. Among the Entsyt, the deceased is left in the tent, wrapped in hides, for a number of days, while family life continues unchanged. At a certain point, bread is placed in a pot with a lid, brick tea is scraped, and some of the belongings of the deceased are made ready. The corpse is then transported to the burial site and placed in a coffin (which has been fastened together with iron nails) with the corpse's feet pointing north. Before the coffin is lowered into the freshly dug grave, it is loaded with the gifts that have been prepared earlier, as well as with hide-processing utensils. The nearest surviving relative chants laments. Later, sticks are placed over the footprints leading to the burial site, and

the mourning party, pointing to the north, exhorts the deceased not to return.

The Nentsy also deposit a dead man's broken sled near his grave and slaughter reindeer on the occasion. Infants who die soon after birth are wrapped in bundles and suspended from trees or poles. After a man's death, his wife makes a wooden amulet or doll-effigy in the shape of her husband; she clothes and feeds it, and sleeps with it for six months after his death; she may not remarry during this period. Among some groups this amulet is kept for three years. Amulets are generally kept on a specially designated shelf in the sacred, rear part of the tent.

Specialized rites among the Samoyeds include tent-cleaning ceremonies (among the Nganasani in February) and, among the Nentsy, the burning of loon skins to ensure good weather or the burning of locks of someone's hair or clippings of his fingernails in order to cause that person misfortune.

Relations between Men and Animals. One animal is expressly singled out as evil: the wolf, which is the reindeer's most dangerous foe. Some fish, such as the pike, are revered. The reindeer is regarded as a pure animal, and white reindeer, in particular, are associated with the sun and considered sacred. As elsewhere in Siberia, the bear is accorded special respect. Bear meat must be chewed in a prescribed manner and may not be consumed at all by women. Women are also forbidden to eat the heads of reindeer or of certain fish (e.g., pike, raw sturgeon).

Certain Samoyed clans associate their origins or ancestors with specific clan-protector spirits envisaged as animals. Such totemistic beliefs govern specific attitudes and behavior patterns (especially taboos) in regard to particular animals. As has already been implied, many taboos were traditionally engendered by attitudes toward women; because women were considered unclean, they were forbidden to step over hunting equipment.

Shamanism. Broadly speaking, the Samoyed shaman's functions and role in society are the same as those in other societies in the long shamanistic belt that stretches over northern Eurasia from Lapland to the Kamchatka Peninsula. The shaman is the prime religious functionary. He mediates between man and the supernatural: he treats the ailing (disease is considered the temporary absence of the soul from the body), predicts the future, summons protection and help in hunting and fishing, finds objects that have disappeared, and officiates at funeral rites. There are three categories of Nenets shamans: the powerful miracle workers, an intermediate class, and "small" shamans. (There is also a class of soothsayers, but these are not, properly speak-

ing, shamans. They have no shamanic power, but even natives often confuse them with shamans.)

The office of the shaman is inherited. Traditionally, each kin group (clan or phratry) had its own shaman who passed his office on to a successor during his own lifetime. Female shamans are said to have existed among the Samoyed of the Turukhan area (in the south).

Reports on the shaman's initiation vary. Essentially, the shaman-to-be—who may be a boy of fifteen—is selected and trained by an older kinsman. Training can involve ordeals such as blindfolding and beating, and the candidate may declare that he has had dreams in which he has traveled to distant forests and settlements or communicated with supernatural beings. It is believed that during the process of selecting a new shaman all of the ancestor-shamans' spirits, as well as other spirits (such as those of water and earth and even the spirit of the pox, a female Russian spirit), are present. These spirits are asked to assist the candidate in his future office.

The shaman officiates during a séance when, as one of them reported, he sees "a road to the north" (another report equates the séance with a trip to the south). The shaman is accompanied by his assistant spirits during the journey; locomotion is provided by an animal, generally a reindeer. During the séance, the shaman addresses questions to Num, and if contact is established, he reports Num's answers. His primary accessories are his drum—round, broad rimmed, covered with skin on one side, from thirty to fifty centimeters in diameter—and his drumstick. The noise that results from drumming represents both the voyage to the other world and the shaman's interaction with Num and his assistants. During the séance the shaman's eyes may be covered with a kerchief so that he may concentrate on the journey more effectively.

A shaman's costume survives among most Samoyed groups (but not among the Nentsy). Nganasan shamans each have three costumes because it is believed that shamans are born three times. The name of the Selkup shaman's headgear is said to be borrowed from the Tunguz; this suggests relatively recent cultural contacts in the sphere of religion. It is also known that Nenets shamans occasionally visit Evenk shamans.

Payments for the services of a shaman range from a pair of mittens to a deerskin or several reindeer. If at the time of a shaman's death his successor has already been chosen, the shaman is buried in his everyday clothes. After the death of a Nenets shaman, a wooden replica of a reindeer is made and is wrapped in the hide of a reindeer calf; the reindeer represents the shaman's assistant spirits.

Samoyed Religion in Transition. The Russians, in their expansion toward the east, reached the Yenisei River in 1603 and brought about a gradual revolution in the economic and spiritual life of the Samoyeds. Although there was planned missionary activity, it was superficial. Samoyed Christianity was quite nominal, and autochthonous beliefs survived. Contact with Europeans brought the Samoyeds new weapons, tools, and goods in exchange for furs, but it also introduced alcohol, syphilis, and smallpox. Thus, the Samoyeds developed an ambiguous relationship with the Europeans. Although in one sense traditional religion was weakened, in another it was strengthened because it served as a rallying point for ethnic self-awareness and survival. This contradiction is inherent in the cultural history of Siberia's native populations in general.

A second radical change came with the Russian Revolution of 1917, but even this change preserved and perpetuated the old, inherent contradiction in a new garb. On the one hand, the ideology of the new Soviet regime dictated a protective attitude toward the natives, guaranteeing the right for tribal self-assertion, which had been inhibited or stifled during tsarist rule. Thus, the Nenets and Selkup languages were systematically reduced to writing (for practical, everyday purposes) after 1917; an institute for the study of the peoples of the North was founded in Leningrad and provided higher education for young natives. On the other hand, the new government was explicitly committed to atheism and therefore to the destruction of the social apparatus that lay at the foundation of native religion. The natives were again caught in the paradoxical middle.

This ambiguous situation continues, with one or the other tendency prevailing at a particular point in time. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, Soviet ethnographers, benefiting from a tolerant attitude on the part of their government, have uncovered many aspects of shamanism (such as séances, with texts and music) that had been thought extinct.

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ROBERT AUSTERLITZ

SAMSĀRA is a Sanskrit word meaning "to wander or pass through a series of states or conditions." It is the name for the theory of rebirth in the three major indigenous Indian religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. *Saṃsāra* is the beginningless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, a process impelled by *karman*. Taken together, *saṃsāra* and *karman* provide Indian religions with both a causal explanation of human differences and an ethical theory of moral retribution.

The term *saṃsāra* is also applied to phenomenal existence in general to indicate its transient and cyclical nature. *Saṃsāra* is the conditioned and ever changing universe as contrasted to an unconditioned, eternal, and transcendent state (*mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*). In all three Indian religions, the soteriological goal is defined as liberation from *saṃsāra*, that is, as release from bondage to the cycle of rebirth through rendering the process of *karman* inoperative.

The origins of the theory of rebirth in India are disputed. Some scholars trace the belief to the ancient Aryan religion of fire sacrifice known as Vedism. The Vedic view that a sacrificial act produces a future result is regarded as the precursor to the *karman* theory, and the Vedic notion of "redeath" in heaven (*punar mṛtyu*) is seen as the forerunner of "return" (*punar avṛtti*) to new life on earth. Other scholars believe that the rebirth doctrine had its origin among the non-Aryan tribal peoples of ancient India. Still others think it was produced by one or another of the mendicant and anti-Vedic groups of the ancient Gangetic regions. In any case, by the sixth century BCE, the time of the rise of early Buddhism and Jainism on the one hand and of the Upaniṣads on the other, the theory of rebirth was nearly universally accepted. Since then all Indian religions, sects, and philosophies, save only the Cārvākas or materialists, have assumed the doctrine of *karman* and rebirth.

There is no one all-embracing view of the nature of *saṃsāra* and the process of rebirth. Each religion has a

distinctive position and within each religion there will be sectarian variations. Some generalities, however, may be stated. In general, all traditions concur in characterizing *saṃsāra* by suffering and sorrow, as well as by impermanence. The source of those intentional acts leading to perpetual rebirth is usually found in desire (and especially the desire for continued individual existence) and in ignorance of the true nature of reality. One may be reincarnated in various heavens, as a human or an animal on earth, or in hells of one sort or another, depending on one's *karman*. Some traditions also claim that rebirth as an insect, a plant, or even a rock is possible, though obviously not desirable.

The predominant theory of Hindu traditions regards the rebirth process as similar to the movement of a caterpillar from one blade of grass to another. The eternal and universal self (*ātman*) is totally unaffected by *karman* and rebirth. The transmigrating entity is the individual self (*jīva*), which is endowed with a "subtle body" and encumbered with karmic residues that determine the direction it takes as it leaves the body at death. There are three possible paths it may take. The "way of the gods" leads to the highest heaven, equated with final liberation, from which there is no further rebirth. The "way of the ancestors" leads to the moon, where the soul is converted to rain and brought back down to earth, where it attaches itself to a plant. When eaten by a human or animal, the transmigrating soul is then transformed into semen, which subsequently brings new life to the individual self. The third possible course results in rebirth in hell or on earth as a small animal, insect, or plant.

Buddhist theories of rebirth are distinguished from others in that they postulate no enduring entity that moves from one existence to another. The problem that has exercised the minds of Buddhist philosophers over the ages is how to explain "transmigration" in light of the central teaching of "no-self" (*anātman*). The Pudgalavādins, or Personalists, came very near to contradicting the *anātman* doctrine with their concept of a personal entity (*pudgala*). Other schools posited an "intermediate being" (*antara bhāva*) that, impelled by *karman*, goes to the location where rebirth is to take place and attaches itself at the juncture of its future parents' sexual organs. The Theravādins, however, strongly denied the existence of the "intermediate being," preferring to identify consciousness with its karmic dispositions as the link between death and rebirth. There is not a transmigration of consciousness but only a causally connected series of discrete moments. To illustrate this notion, Buddhist writers often rely on similes. The rebirth process is likened to the lighting of one lamp with the flame of another, the lamp representing the body

and the flame standing for consciousness, or to the transformation of fresh milk to curds. The milk is not the same as the curds (i.e., there is no enduring essence), but the latter are produced out of the former (as one existence is karmically related to its predecessor).

Saṃsāra, artistically represented as a "wheel of life," is analyzed into its twelve preconditions (the doctrine of "dependent origination," or *pratītya samutpāda*), which express the Buddhist law of cause and effect and explain on what suffering depends and the points at which the chain may be broken. In Theravāda Buddhism the conditioned realm of *saṃsāra* is opposed to *nirvāṇa*, while in Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhism the two are ultimately equated, both considered equally "empty" (*śūnya*) of essence.

Jainism is centered around the belief in an originally pure and perfect soul (*jīva*) that is trapped in *saṃsāra* because of the *karman* that accumulates on it. *Karman*, here regarded as a kind of substance, forms itself into a "body" that is constantly attached to the soul until liberation. There are four categories of *karman* responsible for the mechanism of rebirth. *Nāmakarman* determines different aspects of the future body, including its class (human, animal, or other) and its sex. *Gotrakarman* produces the spiritual quality of the new life. *Vedanīyakarman* determines the pleasant or unpleasant tone of that life, and *āyuhkarman* its duration. Jain texts do not explain how the soul enters the womb but emphasize that there is no interval between death and rebirth. Reincarnation occurs instantaneously after death as the karmic body conveys the soul to its predetermined destination.

Although all three religions officially declare *saṃsāra* to be bondage and recommend the cultivation of knowledge in order to attain liberation from it, in practice many followers engage in what has been called "samsaric" forms of religion, that is, good works designed to procure a better birth in the next life. Gift giving, acts of devotion, vows of austerity, and other methods of merit making are designed not to obtain release from the cycle of rebirth but rather to achieve a better position within it.

[See also *Karman*; *Mokṣa*; and *Reincarnation*]

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BRIAN K. SMITH

SAMSKARAS. See *Rites of Passage, article on Hindu Rites*.

SAMSON, or, in Hebrew, Shimshon; legendary Israelite hero who flourished, according to tradition, circa the twelfth century BCE. The thirteenth to sixteenth chapters of the *Book of Judges* recount the adventurous life of Samson, a charismatic leader, or "judge," of the tribe of Dan. His name, *Shimshon*, means "one of the sun." Endowed with superhuman strength, an impetuous nature, and a penchant for verbal wit, Samson delivered the Israelites from their enemies to the west, the Philistines, in a series of personal vendettas. While biblical traditions may have crystallized around an actual figure, the present narrative is encrusted with mythological (especially solar), folkloristic, and literary motifs and patterns that obscure whatever historical facts underlie the story.

Samson was born to a childless Israelite couple. His birth was announced by a messenger from God in the manner of other traditional heroes. He performed a number of feats, all of them paralleled by such heroes of the ancient world as the Mesopotamian Gilgamesh and the Greek Herakles. Samson ripped apart a lion with his bare hands, burned Philistine fields by unleashing three hundred foxes with torches fastened to their tails, slew a thousand Philistines with the jawbone of an ass, and hoisted the city gates of Gaza. He succumbed to a lust for Philistine women three times. The third woman, Delilah, tricked him into revealing the secret of his strength—his unshorn hair—and sold him to his Philistine adversaries. In the end, blinded by his captors, he collapsed the temple of the Philistine god Dagon upon himself and upon a crowd of the enemy who were taunting him and the God of Israel.

As the primitive saga took on its biblical shape, the unshorn Samson was transformed into a Nazirite, a person dedicated to God by vows, chief among which was abstention from cutting or shaving one's hair (see *Nm.* 6:2–6). His story follows the pattern of the people Israel as described in *Judges*: bound to God by vows, enjoying the divine spirit, he broke vow after vow and lost divine favor, but in a final moment of returning to God, he regained his strength.

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EDWARD L. GREENSTEIN

SAMUEL (twelfth century BCE), or, in Hebrew, Shemu'el; a judge and prophet of Israel. The story of Samuel's birth and the account of his youth present him as a Nazirite, dedicated to God's service through his mother's vow and raised in the sanctuary at Shiloh to be a priest (*1 Sm.* 1–2). While still a youth in this priestly service he is called to be a prophet to deliver a message of judgment to the house of Eli, and in one scene (*1 Sm.* 19:18–24) he appears as the head of an ecstatic band of prophets and the protector of David in his flight from Saul. The prophetic role predominates in the rest of the narratives about him. In addition, however, Samuel is considered by the author of *1 Samuel* to be a judge and is included in his scheme of a succession of judges—charismatic leaders—who ruled in Israel before the rise of the monarchy (*1 Sm.* 7:15–17, *Jgs.* 2:16–19). As such Samuel is depicted as a transitional figure, the last of the old order and the one who consecrates the new. This variety of roles in the tradition makes it difficult to reconstruct his historical role in early Israelite society.

The story of Samuel's birth follows a common folk-tale pattern of explaining a hero's name and future destiny from the circumstances of his birth. Yet because the story seems to involve a wordplay upon the name Saul (see Ackroyd, 1971 and McCarter, 1980) it has often been taken as a story about the birth of Saul that was later transferred to Samuel. The difficulty with this view is that none of the story's details fits with Saul's known origins, nor does the birth announcement presage a royal destiny. Instead, the announcement leads directly into the account of Samuel's youth, so that *1 Samuel* 1–3 must be taken together. In this *vita* of Samuel's birth, dedication, and prophetic calling, the historian marks out Samuel as one of the major figures of his history.

In *1 Samuel* 7, Samuel is a spokesman of religious reform, calling the people to repentance. At the same time, as judge he saves the people from their enemies, not by feats of military prowess but by intercessory

prayer and sacrifice. When the people raise with Samuel their desire for a king to replace the institution of judgeship (*1 Sm.* 8), the author of the book uses the speeches of Samuel to express his own feelings of ambivalence about the monarchy, both as a source of social and religious sins (*1 Sm.* 8, 12) and as a divinely instituted political order (*1 Sm.* 10:17–27, 11:12–15).

In the folk tale of Saul's search for his father's donkeys (*1 Sm.* 9–10:16) Samuel is only a local seer with clairvoyant powers. But the historian has transformed his role by adding an account of the secret anointment of Saul by Samuel, identifying him as the divinely chosen king in anticipation of his later public acclamation. In a similar fashion, Samuel anoints David (*1 Sm.* 16:1–13) and thus assures his destiny.

Samuel is also a prophet of judgment to Saul. The scene of Saul's secret anointment is linked directly to an act of disobedience in which Samuel announces God's rejection of Saul's kingship in favor of another, David (*1 Sm.* 13:8–15; cf. *1 Sm.* 10:8). In a second episode (*1 Sm.* 15), in which Samuel commands Saul to exterminate the Amalekites, Samuel again declares God's rejection of Saul, this time for not completely carrying out all of the prophet's instructions; this episode leads directly to the account of the secret anointment of David as Saul's replacement. This rejection scene also anticipates the final episode of Samuel's appearance, as a ghost (*1 Sm.* 28), at which point rejection is reinforced and Saul's imminent death along with that of his sons is predicted.

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JOHN VAN SETERS

SAMUEL THE AMORA. See Shemu'el the Amora.

SANCTIFICATION. See Blessing. For discussion of the role of sanctification in Christian soteriology, see *Justification and Grace*.

SANCTUARY. As etymology suggests, a sanctuary is a sacred place, a place set apart from the space of ordinary existence (LL, *sanctuarium*, from *sanctus*, "sacred, holy," by analogy with *sacrarium*, "shrine," from *sacer*). Thus, the term implies a distinction between "the sacred" and "the profane" that may not be universal; consequently, "sanctuaries" may, strictly speaking, be found only in a limited if significant number of religious traditions.

Virtually any place can serve as a sanctuary. It is essential, however, that a sanctuary be marked off, that is, that the distinction between sacred and profane be perceptibly indicated, whether by natural means (e.g., a cave) or by artificial means. The latter may range from the technologically simple (a ring of stones) to the technologically elaborate (ornate Buddhist stupas). In addition, the shapes that a sanctuary's construction assumes generally carry symbolic meanings appropriate to notions of the sacred found in the community by which the sanctuary has been constructed. European cathedrals have taken the form of a cross, Mesopotamian zigurats represent the sacred mountain, and so on.

But the term *sanctuary* usually carries one (or both) of two more specific meanings, one cultic, the other social. In the first case, it denotes a place of worship. The place where the sacred dwells or manifests itself becomes the place where human beings encounter it. Such a sanctuary may be used by groups of varying size, from individual dwelling units (e.g., shrines in Nuer dwellings, the *pūjā* room in Hindu households) to large communities (e.g., city temples). If it stands separately, it may be called, somewhat ethnocentrically, a *domus dei* ("house of god"). Harold W. Turner isolates four dimensions of the *domus dei*: it is the center with reference to which life is oriented, the point at which heaven and earth meet, the microcosm of the heavenly realm, and the locus of the divine presence, often signaled by a cult object or image.

The sanctuary as *domus dei* invites a great deal of specialization and elaboration. The result may be large buildings and complexes of buildings containing areas of varying sanctity, including one or more sanctuaries in a more specialized sense: particularly isolated areas or chambers where the sacred is most powerfully present, such as the "Holy of Holies" in the Jerusalem Temple or the *aduton* of Greek temples. Access to this sanctuary is limited, often to only the highest religious functionaries (e.g., the chief priest) at very specific, culturally significant times.

Besides the *domus dei*, there is another sort of religious sanctuary, not the place where the sacred dwells but the place where the religious community (itself sa-

cred) worships. This type, which lacks the four dimensions of the *domus dei* isolated by Turner, may be designated by the parallel term *domus ecclesiae* ("house of the gathered assembly"). Its paradigmatic form is the Jewish synagogue, on which the Muslim mosque and various Christian houses of worship are patterned (such as the meetinghouse of the Society of Friends).

In the social sense, a sanctuary is a place of refuge or asylum, a place set apart from the regulations of ordinary social intercourse. Places of refuge are found widely in conjunction with religious sanctuaries. For example, in Greek mythology Orestes was safe from the Erinyes (the Furies) so long as he remained in contact with the *omphalos* ("navel"), a sacred stone at Delphi. Just as entire cities can be set aside as religious sanctuaries (e.g., Kasi/Banaras in India), so too entire cities have been set aside as social sanctuaries, as were the cities of refuge in ancient Israel. In the West, the right of sanctuary was formulated by law as early as the end of the fourth century, and in time specific provisions became quite complex. But movements to curb rights of sanctuary began in the early modern period (sixteenth century), and by the end of the eighteenth century such rights had virtually disappeared in western Europe.

The sanctuary as legal asylum finds an intriguing antitype in an institution that arose as the right of sanctuary disappeared: the penitentiary. As it developed in religiously valorized form in the early nineteenth century, the penitentiary, too, was a place set apart from ordinary social intercourse. But in the penitentiary the guilty were not protected from punishment by the presence of the sacred. Instead, the guilty had to come to terms with themselves and their misdeeds. That is, they had to repent (hence the name) and "convert"—convicts were forced to listen to sermons—before emerging from confinement as new persons.

[See also Ḥaram and Ḥawṭah.]

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ŞANGO, one of the most complicated and venerated of Yoruba gods, is worshiped throughout much of West Africa under other names. In this sense Şango is comparable to the Ewe deity So and to the Ga deity Gua.

Şango is the god of thunder and lightning. Even though he is said to be a beautiful *orişa* ("deity"), he is much feared. People who have been struck by lightning and not killed must undergo extensive rituals involving propitiatory offerings. If a person is killed by lightning such rituals are obligatory even before the body can be buried (and it can be buried only by priests of the Şango cult). Moreover, no one can sleep in the house of the dead person until these rites have been performed.

The myth of Şango relates that he was a historical figure, the fourth king of Oyo. At that time the kingdom of Oyo stretched from the kingdom of Benin to that of Dahomey. Şango was said to have been a fearsome and tyrannical king, literally breathing out smoke and fire. He discovered a charm by which he could call down lightning, but when he did so, the lightning destroyed his house and family. Overcome with despair, Şango hanged himself. Other versions of the myth relate that he was taken up to heaven during a storm; still others talk of his disappearance into the earth. Nonetheless, he is thought to be the controller of thunder and lightning from that time.

Şango's cult is universal among the Yoruba. At the sound of thunder, it is customary for Yoruba to say, "Welcome to your Majesty" or "Long live the king." The shrines of Şango consist of a three-pronged, forked branch set in the ground. In the crotch of this branch is placed a bowl containing "thunder axes." These artifacts are actually Neolithic stone tools or axheads dug up by Yoruba farmers; they claim that they are the evidence of the presence of lightning and thus of Şango. The head priest of the Şango cult is responsible for initiating the "king," or *alafin*, of Oyo into the cult mysteries. The king of Oyo claims lineal descent from Şango.

In Yoruba country the ritual paraphernalia of the Şango cult is recognizable by the appliquéd leather shoulder bags worn by the priests and by the batons, adorned with human figures, that they carry. Many of the rituals invoking Şango have to do not only with thunder or lightning but also with healing. In days past, Şango was thought to be especially efficacious in the treatment of smallpox.

The emphasis on healing is particularly evident in

those areas where large numbers of Yoruba settled outside their native land. In Sierra Leone, where many Yoruba slaves were freed, a cult of Şango thrived throughout the nineteenth century. In the New World, the cult of Şango is a type of possession cult, whereby one of the priests or adepts is "mounted" by Şango during a festival or ritual. Such a cult is found in Brazil, Cuba, and in various parts of the Caribbean. Often Şango is found in a syncretized form as a Christian saint. In Trinidad, for example, Şango is often equated with, or identified as, Saint John, and in Cuba he is associated with Saint Barbara.

Regardless of the form he takes, Şango continues to be associated in the New World with thunder and lightning and with cures for certain diseases. His colors are red and white, and he is offered sacrifices in times of need.

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SANHEDRIN, a Hebrew and Jewish-Aramaic loanword from the Greek *sunedrion*, is believed to be the name of the supreme autonomous institution of the Jews of Palestine during the Roman and early Byzantine periods (63 BCE to the fifth or sixth century CE). The generally accepted view of the Sanhedrin is as follows. Composed of seventy or seventy-one members, it possessed administrative, judicial, and quasi-legislative powers that were also recognized by the Jews of the Diaspora. Until 70 CE the Sanhedrin met in the precincts of the Jerusalem Temple. Following the destruction of the Temple in that year, a reconstituted Sanhedrin met at various sites in Palestine.

Historical Evidence. The historicity of the Sanhedrin is the subject of much disagreement in modern scholarship. The disagreement results from inconsistencies among the sources used to reconstruct the history of the institution. Strictly speaking, the Sanhedrin is mentioned only in Hebrew and Aramaic sources, of which the most important is the rabbinic literature of the first five centuries CE. In addition, scholars adduce evidence from references to the word *sunedrion* in Greek sources relating to the Jews of Roman Palestine. The most im-

portant of these are the writings of the Jewish historian Josephus Flavius (37–c. 100 CE) and the Gospels and *Acts of the Apostles* in the New Testament. The use of the Greek sources poses two problems. First, the word *sunedrion* exhibits a variety of meanings: “place of assembly, session, assembly, council, court.” Thus not every mention of the word in Josephus or in the New Testament necessarily refers to *the* Sanhedrin. Second, even when *sunedrion* seems to refer to the supreme Jewish institution, that institution is rather different from the Sanhedrin of rabbinic sources. The latter is an assembly of Torah scholars presided over by the leader of the Pharisees. The Jerusalem *sunedrion* of the Greek sources is an aristocratic council presided over by the high priest.

The attempt to resolve this inconsistency has produced three basic approaches. Some simply reject one set of sources, usually the rabbinic, as unhistorical. A second approach posits the existence of two Sanhedrins in Jerusalem. The Greek sources describe a political Sanhedrin closely associated with the Roman provincial authorities, while the rabbinic sources describe a purely religious Sanhedrin that dealt with issues of Jewish law. Since none of our sources hints at the simultaneous existence of two supreme assemblies, a third approach attempts to harmonize the sources by less radical means. Some argue that the composition and competence of the Sanhedrin varied over time. Others suggest that it comprised subcommittees, each with its own chairman, that dealt with different types of issues. All three approaches appear in current scholarship. In the following sections I shall summarize the evidence of each set of sources in the light of historical criticism.

Evidence in rabbinic literature. Since relatively few rabbinic traditions explicitly mention the Sanhedrin, they may be supplemented by other traditions, more numerous and more detailed, that use the Hebrew term *beit din* (pl., *batei din*), meaning “court.” These two sets of traditions, one referring to the Sanhedrin and one to the *beit din*, overlap in many details and appear side by side in rabbinic documents. That the terms *Sanhedrin* and *beit din* refer to the same institution emerges clearly from the overlap of their function and structure recorded in rabbinic literature. According to these traditions, each town with a certain minimum population could establish a “small Sanhedrin” or *beit din* of twenty-three scholars, competent to try even capital cases. Matters that the local institutions could not resolve were referred to the “Great Sanhedrin” or “Great Beit Din” (*beit din ha-gadol*, i.e., “great court”) of seventy-one members. This latter body, meeting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in the Jerusalem Temple,

would resolve the matter on the basis of precedent or by majority vote. Some traditions that speak of the *beit din* describe a “four-tier” system, interposing two additional bodies of three members each between the local and supreme bodies (e.g., Tosefta *Ḥag* 2.9; *Sheq.* 3.27, *San.* 11.2–4). Membership in a lower body was a prerequisite for appointment to a higher one.

The supreme body, whether called the Great Beit Din as in Tosefta *Ḥagigah* 2.9 or the Great Sanhedrin as in Mishnah *Middot* 5.4, had authority over the priesthood. It possessed political as well as religious powers: declaring offensive wars, playing a role in the appointment of kings, and so forth. The sources also allude both to Sanhedrins and to *batei din* of the tribes (e.g., *San.* 1.5; cf. *Hor.* 1.5) and to the possibility of small Sanhedrins outside of Palestine (Tosefta *San.* 1.5).

The most important feature of the rabbinic account of the Sanhedrin is that it describes an idealized and admittedly distant past, which will be renewed only with the full restoration of the Israelite polity. The tradition of the four levels of courts (Tosefta *Ḥag.* 2.9) relates how at first this system prevented dissension by resolving all questions of law. But then, in the generation after Hillel and Shammai, dissension was rampant. Thus, the source implies that the system had broken down by the beginning of direct Roman rule in 6 CE, for Hillel and Shammai are generally considered contemporaries of King Herod. Further, the rabbinic account is replete with details that concern things the sources admit did not exist in the Roman period, such as the tribal system and prophecy. Moreover, rabbinic traditions on events from the Roman conquest (63 BCE) onward assign no role whatsoever to the Great Sanhedrin or Great Beit Din. By contrast, rabbinic literature does mention Sanhedrins of the biblical period, from the time of Moses to the Babylonian exile. In sum, the rabbinic sources on the Sanhedrin make no claim to describe an institution of the Roman period.

Evidence in Josephus Flavius. Jewish literature in Greek from before 70 CE never mentions a supreme Jewish institution called the *sunedrion*. The word does occur, but only in the general sense of “assembly, council, court.” The same situation prevails in the writings of Josephus. In almost every case Josephus uses the word to denote what the Romans called a *consilium*. This was an *ad hoc* assembly of friends and advisers convened by an official to assist in policy decisions or in trying a case. In only three instances does Josephus use *sunedrion* to designate a formally constituted ongoing institution.

In one instance he refers to the leadership of the Jewish revolt against Rome in 66 CE as “the *sunedrion* of the Jerusalemites” (*The Life* 62). But elsewhere (in *The*

Life and in *The Jewish War*) he designates this body by a variety of names, most commonly *koinon* (“corporation, community”). Hence, *sunedrion* was not the formal or usual name.

More apropos is the second instance, concerning Aulus Gabinius, the Roman governor of Syria in 57 BCE. Gabinius stripped the high priest John Hyrcanus II of his political powers and divided the Jewish state into five districts, each ruled by what Josephus calls a *sunodos* in one place (*War* 1.170) and a *sunedrion* in another (*Jewish Antiquities* 14.96). One of these bodies sat in Jerusalem. This recalls the measures taken by Rome in Macedonia in 168 BCE. The latter kingdom was divided into four regions, each administered by a council of senators that Livy calls a *synhedros* (*Annals* 45.32.2). In any case, Gabinius’s arrangements lasted no more than ten years, for in 47 BCE Julius Caesar restored Hyrcanus to nationwide political power.

The third instance of Josephus’s mention of the term is the closest parallel to the rabbinic Sanhedrin. His *Jewish Antiquities* (14.158–184) reports the trial of the future king Herod before “the *sunedrion*” in Jerusalem in 47/6 BCE. From this account it emerges that the latter was an ongoing institution with nationwide jurisdiction and unique competence in capital cases. However, in a parallel account of these events in his earlier history, *The Jewish War* (1.204–215), as well as in a brief reference to them in *Jewish Antiquities* (15.3–4), Josephus does not mention the *sunedrion*. The version in *Antiquities* 14 has a close parallel in rabbinic literature (B.T., *San.* 19a–b), but with no mention of the Sanhedrin. The *sunedrion* as described in *Antiquities* 14 does not reappear in the writings of Josephus. Given the rabbinic parallel (one of several in *Antiquities*) and the fact that the hero of the story is a Pharisee, it appears that Josephus transmits here a Pharisaic version of the trial of Herod—a version whose historicity is not certain.

Josephus also mentions three judicial or administrative bodies of seventy members each, all from around 66 CE, but does not call any of them a *sunedrion*. These are (1) the assembly established by Josephus himself when he assumed command of Galilee in the revolt against Rome, (2) the deputation of the leading men of the colony of Babylonian Jews in Batanaea, and (3) a jury convened in the Jerusalem Temple to try a charge of treason. Josephus’s arrangements in Galilee reflect his interpretation of *Deuteronomy* 17:8–9 in *Antiquities* 4.214–218, where he calls the assembly of priests, Levites, and the judiciary a *gerousia* (council of elders). The number seventy obviously derives from the seventy elders assembled by Moses according to *Numbers* 11:16. But aside from the regional *sunedrions* (or *sunodoses*)

established by Gabinius and the *sunedrion* that tried Herod (according to a unique version of this event), Josephus does not mention any continuing institution by this name.

Evidence in the New Testament. The New Testament includes several instances of the word *sunedrion*, usually translated as “council” (RSV). In a few cases the word refers to local Jewish courts (certainly in *Mark* 13:9 and parallels in *Matthew* 10:17 and possibly in *Matthew* 5:21). However, in the accounts of the passion of Jesus and the trials of the apostles, *sunedrion* seems to designate the supreme Jewish institution in Jerusalem. Closer analysis reveals several uncertainties. The synoptic Gospels and *Acts of the Apostles* frequently allude to the Jewish leadership as composed of “the chief priests, elders, and scribes” or the like. As is generally agreed, this means the priestly and lay aristocracies along with a professional class of experts in Jewish law. In certain passages these three elements constitute some sort of *sunedrion*. In some of these passages, the term *sunedrion* can be interpreted in its general meaning of “assembly” or “session.” This is the case in *John* 11:47 (cf. *Mk.* 11:48 and *Lk.* 19:47), *Luke* 22:66 (cf. *Mk.* 15:1 and *Mt.* 27:1), and *Acts* 4:15. In other instances *sunedrion* appears to be a proper name. Thus in *Mark* 14:55 and *Matthew* 26:59 we have “the chief priests and the whole council [*sunedrion*]” conduct a formal trial of Jesus on the night following his arrest. In *Mark* 15:1 (but not *Mt.* 27:1; cf. *Lk.* 22:66–23:1) “the chief priests, with the elders and scribes, and [Gr., *kai*] the whole council [*sunedrion*]” reconvene the following morning. Presumably, here the *kai* is explanatory, to be translated as “that is.” *Acts*, attributed to the author of *Luke*, refers to the *sunedrion* in connection with the second arraignment of Peter and the arraignments of Stephen and Paul (e.g., *Acts* 5:21, 6:12, 23:1). But the terminology of *Luke* and *Acts* is not consistent. According to *Luke* 22:66, the consultation on the morning following the arrest of Jesus was attended by “the assembly of the elders of the people [*presbuterion*] . . . , both chief priests and scribes.” Similarly, in *Acts* 22:5 Paul calls on “the high priest and the whole council of elders [*presbuterion*]” to attest his earlier persecution of the believers in Jesus. And *Acts* 5:21 has Peter brought before “the council [*sunedrion*] and [*kai*] all the senate [*gerousia*] of Israel.” The word *kai* here may be explanatory, or it may reflect the author’s belief that the *sunedrion* was more exclusive than the *gerousia*.

It may be noted in passing that only *Mark* and *Matthew* report a trial of Jesus before the *sunedrion*. *Luke* reports only a morning consultation of the *presbuterion*, chief priests and scribes. And *John* merely has “the

Jews" accuse Jesus before Pontius Pilate. In the present context we can ignore the much-debated questions of whether the trial is a Marcan invention and whether *Luke* or *John* relies on independent sources. What is consistent in the synoptic Gospels and *Acts* is the characterization of the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem as composed of the priestly and lay aristocracies and the scribes. This much is confirmed by Josephus, as is the New Testament picture of these groups consulting and acting in consort. But the institutionalization of these consultations and joint actions in the form of a regularly meeting assembly called the *sunedrion* is not clear from the New Testament evidence itself. And Josephus, who was born in Jerusalem within a decade of the crucifixion of Jesus and still lived there during the troubles of Paul, makes no mention of the *sunedrion* as an ongoing body in his account of this period.

The Sanhedrin after 70 CE. Some scholars posit the existence of a Sanhedrin at Yavneh after 70, at Usha (in the Galilee) after 135, and still later at other locations. Whatever the nature of the institutions that existed at these places, they are never called Sanhedrins in the ancient sources. In fact, two second-century traditions refer to the Sanhedrin as a thing of the past: Mishnah *Sotah* 9.11 explicitly and *Makkot* 1.10 implicitly. A single post-70 reference to a contemporary "Great Court," at Tosefta *Ohalot* 18.18, is probably only rhetorical. A relatively late and probably non-Palestinian tradition in the Babylonian Talmud (*R. ha-Sh.* 31a–b, with parallel at *Gn. Rab.* 97) lists a number of towns, mostly in Galilee, as consecutive sites of post-70 Sanhedrins. This tradition probably reflects the fact that these towns served as the residence of Jewish patriarchs (sg., *nasi'*) and the site of rabbinical conclaves. The sources do mention groups of rabbis meeting together to resolve questions of law, fix the calendar, and make similar decisions, but these meetings are never called Sanhedrins. (See, for example, *Shabbat* 1.4, *Ohalot* 18.9, *Yadayim* 4.1; Tosefta *Ohalot* 18.18; B.T., *Berakhot* 63 b; J.T., *Hagigah* 3.1, 78d; *Song of Songs Rabbah* 2.5.) The reference in a law of Theodosius II from 429 to "the *sunedrions* of the two Palestines" probably refers to local Jewish courts and reflects New Testament usage. Finally, a Babylonian source, perhaps from the eighth century, mentions a Sanhedrin in Tiberias in 520, but this source probably misconstrues an earlier text that does not mention this institution.

Conclusion. The accounts of the Sanhedrin in our sources neither overlap chronologically nor confirm one another. Moreover, each account is problematic. The rabbinic is idealized, and the New Testament is inconsistent. Josephus describes in one case a short-lived sys-

tem imposed by the Romans, and in the other case his own parallel accounts know nothing of the *sunedrion*. So we have no unequivocal historical evidence for the Sanhedrin. What we probably do have in the Greek sources are the historical realities from which the rabbinic account of the Sanhedrin was created: an aristocratic council (*gerousia* or *presbuterion*), judicial or administrative bodies of seventy, and possibly a municipal council (*boulē*) in Jerusalem.

One should also note that unlike other Greek administrative terms borrowed in the Semitic vernaculars of the Roman East, *sunedrion* is a loanword only in Hebrew and Jewish-Aramaic (apart from a very few instances in Syriac, probably from writers who knew Greek). This unique borrowing, especially as a term for an important Jewish institution, suggests that some Jewish body of Roman times was called *sunedrion* in Greek. But as we have seen, the evidence does not establish what that body was. Thus the existence of a supreme governing body in Jerusalem called the Sanhedrin cannot be proven by the sources before us, and if it existed, it cannot be described.

[For another view of the historicity of the *Beit Din ha-Gadol* and *Boulē*, see Pharisees.]

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The two major studies in English both adopt the theory of two Sanhedrins. They are Sidney B. Hoenig's *The Great Sanhedrin* (New York, 1953) and Hugo Mantel's *Studies in the History of the Sanhedrin* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961). Mantel presents detailed summaries of the scholarly debate and a very full bibliography. For a recent, sophisticated version of this theory, see Ellis Rivkin's "Beth Din, Boulē, Sanhedrin: A Tragedy of Errors," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 46 (1975): 181–199.

Other recent surveys adopt variations of the moderate harmonistic approach. Most useful are Edmund Lohse's "Sunedrion," in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, edited by Gerhard Kittel, vol. 7 (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1971), pp. 860–867; Samuel Safrai's "Jewish Self-Government," in *The Jewish People in the First Century*, edited by Samuel Safrai and Menachem Stern, vol. 1 (Assen, 1974), pp. 379–400; and Emil Schürer's *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ*, a new English version revised and edited by Géza Vermès et al., vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 199–226.

ŚAṄKARA (c. 700 CE), also known as Śaṅkara or Śaṅkarācārya; Hindu metaphysician, religious leader, and proponent of Advaita Vedānta. Śaṅkara is generally acknowledged to be the most influential of all Hindu religious thinkers. The many modern interpretations and popularizations of his uncompromisingly intellectual metaphysics represent the dominant current of contemporary Hindu religious thought. For scholars of Sanskrit his compositions, above all his famous commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *Brahma Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, serve as models of philosophical and literary excellence.

Śaṅkara's dates remain a matter of scholarly controversy. Many accept the traditional dates 788–820; in recent years, however, several scholars have argued for a longer life span centered around the beginning of the eighth century. The considerable number of Sanskrit hagiographical accounts of the life of Śaṅkara all appear to be comparatively recent compositions. It is difficult to judge to what extent they embody factual historical traditions. The most influential of these hagiographies is the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* or *Saṅkṣepa Śaṅkarajaya* of Mādhava, composed sometime between 1650 and 1800 and possibly reworked about the middle of the nineteenth century. This is a composite text that includes verses taken from a number of somewhat earlier works, notably those of Vyāsācala and Tirumalla Dikṣita. The *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Anantānandagiri is another important hagiography representing an independent tradition associated with the Advaita center at Kanchipuram, Tamil Nadu.

According to Mādhava, Śaṅkara was born to a brahman family of the brahman village of Kālaṭi in Kerala, South India. Mādhava states that his parents had long been childless, but that the god Śiva finally agreed to become incarnate as their son to reward their devotion and penances. This son, Śaṅkara, was a miraculously precocious student: by his sixth or seventh year he had already resolved to bypass the householder stage of life (*gṛhasthāśrama*) and become a religious ascetic (*saṁnyāsin*). With the reluctant consent of his widowed mother he left home and became a disciple of a Govindanātha or Govindapāda somewhere on the river Narmada. In some of his own works Śaṅkara identifies his guru's guru (*paramaguru*) as Gauḍapāda, and tradition claims that Govindanātha was a disciple of this earlier Advaita thinker. Govindanātha later sent Śaṅkara to Varanasi (Banaras), where he acquired his first important disciple, Sanandana, later called Padmapāda. After some time Śaṅkara moved on to Badarī in the Himalayas, where he wrote (at the age of twelve, according to Mādhava) his famous *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*. While at Badarī he also composed commentaries on various Upaniṣads and on the *Bhagavadgītā*, and produced

other commentaries and independent treatises such as the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. The rest of his life he spent traveling from place to place defending the views of Advaita Vedānta against opponents from a variety of different religious sects and philosophical schools.

Where Śaṅkara spent his final days is disputed by his biographers. Mādhava says that toward the end of his short life Śaṅkara was afflicted with a debilitating rectal fistula occasioned by the evil magic of Abhinavagupta, a Tantric opponent. Śaṅkara was allegedly cured of this ailment but died not long afterward at Kedarnath in the Himalayas. Anantānandagiri places his death at Kanchipuram, while other sources mention still other locations.

According to traditions not preserved by either Mādhava or Anantānandagiri, Śaṅkara established four or five monastic centers for the spread of Advaita Vedānta: one at Badarī in the Himalayas (north); one at Dvārakā in Gujarat (west); one at Puri in Orissa (east); one at Śṛṅgerī in Karnataka (south); and another, not considered to be of equal status by some, at Kanchipuram. Through these centers an extensive network of Advaita teachers and monasteries was organized that did much to establish the dominance of Advaita over rival sects and schools. The religious ascetics who belong to this network are divided into ten (*daśa*) monastic orders, the members of each order taking a distinct final name (*nāma*). For this reason they are collectively called Daśanāmīs.

The study of the enormous number of Advaita works attributed to Śaṅkara has long been handicapped by the inability of critical scholarship to distinguish his genuine compositions from works falsely attributed to him. Recently, however, Paul Hacker, Mayeda Sengaku, and others have established criteria that have largely resolved this problem. They conclude that the works that may be reliably attributed to Śaṅkara are (1) the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*; (2) the commentaries on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya*, *Aitareya*, *Īśa*, *Kaṭha*, *Kena* (two), *Muṇḍaka*, and *Praśna* Upaniṣads; (3) the commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*; (4) the commentaries on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* with the *Gauḍapādiyakārikā*; and (5) the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. All other works, including the many devotional hymns attributed to Śaṅkara, are probably compositions of later authors.

In these works Śaṅkara generally subordinates philosophizing to the goal of liberation (*mokṣa*) from the bonds of transmigratory existence (*saṁsāra*), which arise from the consequences of our action (*karman*). Unlike some of his more scholastic successors, Śaṅkara often prefers to leave certain perplexing, and perhaps insolvable, philosophical problems unanswered. In his view, the sole means to achieve this liberation is right

knowledge (*jñāna*) leading to an instantaneous spiritual illumination that somehow dissolves all except the residual effects of past deeds (*prārabdhakarman*). After death, liberation is complete and final. The alternative religious paths of devotion (*bhakti*) and moral or religious works (*karman*) may lead to a better rebirth either in this world or in the world of the gods, but they are of no use whatsoever for the illumination that is absolute liberation. For this the sole prerequisites are non-attachment to the things of this world; mental and emotional restraint and tranquillity; a suitable guru; and the study, under his supervision, of the "knowledge portion" (*jñānakāṇḍa*) of the Vedas, especially the Upaniṣads. Since this last prerequisite is permitted only to members of the higher castes, *śūdras* are explicitly ineligible for this illumination.

The word *advaita* means "non-dual." In contrast to the rival school called Sāṃkhya, which assigns a separate but full reality to both spirit (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*), Advaita Vedānta asserts that absolute (*paramārthika*) reality, called *brahman*, is non-dual. The manifold visible world around us (*saṃsāra*) has merely a functional (*vyāvahārika*) reality. It is considered to be a transformation (*pariṇāma*) or, more commonly in Advaita, a mere appearance (*vivarta*) that somehow arises from *brahman*.

A central doctrine of Śāṅkara's thought claims that from the point of view of the supreme truth (*paramārthataḥ*) our inner self or soul (*ātman*), the essence of consciousness (*cit*), is identical with the essence of being (*sat*), *brahman* itself. This doctrine, Śāṅkara believes, cannot be fully established by rational discourse alone. In the final analysis its truth rests on revelation, namely the texts called Upaniṣads, which form the "end of the Vedas" (*vedānta*). The Upaniṣads, the *Brahma Sūtra*, and the *Bhagavadgītā* constitute the threefold scriptural foundation of all schools of Vedānta. Although each school interprets these texts in often radically different senses, the texts do establish definite parameters within which the discussion must operate. These include the ideas that *ātman* and *brahman* are entities somehow closely related to each other and to individual living beings (*jīvas*) and to God (Īśvara) respectively, and that these living beings are subject to *karman* and the pains of transmigratory existence until they somehow manage to win liberation.

How and why does *saṃsāra* make its appearance? According to Śāṅkara it is ignorance (*avidyā*), sometimes called illusion (*māyā*), that occasions the appearance of *saṃsāra* through a process known as superimposition (*adhyāsa*). Through this process *ātman-brahman* becomes reflected as many individual conscious beings (*jīvas*) on the one hand and as God (Īśvara) on the other.

God in turn becomes the cause, both efficient and material, of the physical universe, which evolves indirectly from a primal "substance" called "name-and-form" (*nāma-rūpa*). In this psychophysical cosmology, liberation is nothing but the removal of ignorance, the deep realization that from the point of view of the ultimate truth *ātman* and *brahman* are identical and represent the only reality, the very substance of being and consciousness. All else—the physical universe, our individual selves, even God—are things conditioned by ignorance and hence ultimately unreal.

But how does this process of superimposition operate? On this subject Śāṅkara elaborates a series of sophisticated and often controversial epistemological arguments based in part on a set of analogies drawn from everyday experience. The most famous is that of the rope and the snake. When in a dim light we mistake a rope for a snake, we are making a superimposition of false attributes derived from memory. Once we realize our error, the real object, the rope, eliminates and replaces our false perception of a snake. In an analogous way we superimpose false attributes on *ātman-brahman*. If we eliminate ignorance, this superimposition is dissolved and *ātman-brahman* alone shines forth. Transmigratory existence and our bondage to it are immediately broken. We become liberated. It is as simple, and as difficult, as that.

[See also Vedānta; Sāṃkhya; Brahman; Jñāna; Avidyā; and Māyā. For discussions of the principal Vedantic texts, see Upaniṣads; Bhagavadgītā; and the biography of Bādarāyaṇa.]

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SAN RELIGION. See Khoi and San Religion.

SANTERÍA is a religious tradition of African origin that developed in Cuba and that was spread throughout the Caribbean and the United States by exiles from the revolution of 1959. Santería began in the nineteenth century when hundreds of thousands of men and women of the Yoruba people, from what are now Nigeria and Benin, were brought to Cuba to work in the island's booming sugar industry. Despite brutal conditions, some were able to reconstruct their religious lives through a fusing of the traditions remembered from their homeland and from their encounter with the folk piety of the Roman Catholic church.

The Cuban Yoruba often used the iconography of Catholic saints to express their devotions to Yoruba spirits called *orishas*. The name *Santería*, "the way of the saints," is the most common Spanish word used to describe these practices, and the word *santero* (m.) or *santera* (f.) indicates an initiated devotee. Later generations of *santeros* would construct elaborate systems of correspondences between *orishas* and saints, leading observers to see this Caribbean religion as a model for understanding religious syncretism and cultural change. Despite the frequent presence of Catholic symbols in Santería rites and the attendance of *santeros* at Catholic sacraments, Santería is essentially an African way of worship drawn into a symbiotic relationship with Catholicism.

Santeros believe that every individual, before he or she is born, is given a destiny, or road in life, by the Almighty. It is the responsibility of the individual to understand his or her destiny and to grow with it rather than to be a victim of it. *Santeros* recognize a pantheon of *orishas* whose aid and energy can bring devotees to a complete fulfillment of their destinies. The basis of Santería is the development of a deep personal relationship with the *orishas*, a relationship that will bring the *santero* worldly success and heavenly wisdom. Devotion to the *orishas* takes four principal forms: divination, sacrifice, spirit mediumship, and initiation.

For the ordinary devotee, Santería serves as a means for resolving the problems of everyday life, including problems of health, money, and love. Divination can reveal the sources of these problems, and it points the way to their resolution. Santería has preserved several Yoruba systems of divination in a hierarchical ranking according to their reliability and the amount of training required to master them. The most complex system of divination in Santería, Ifa, can be "read" only by male priests called *babalawos*. In response to a querent's problem, a *babalawo* will throw a small chain (*ekwele*) that has eight pieces of shell, bone, or other material affixed to it. Each piece is shaped so that, when thrown, it lands either concave or convex side up. This arrange-

ment results in 256 possible combinations, each representing a basic situation in life. The combination that falls at any particular time is the purest expression of fate, and thus of the God-given destiny of the querent. Most of the patterns refer to stories that tell of the problems faced by the *orishas* and heroes in the past, and that relate the solutions that were found. These solutions become the archetypes used by the querent to resolve the problem that he or she has brought to Ifa.

Nearly all problems are resolved by deepening the devotee's relationship with the *orishas*. There is no firmer way for the devotee to show this relationship than through the symbolism of shared food—that is, through sacrifice. The *orishas*, like all living things, must eat in order to live. Although they are immensely powerful, they are by no means immortal, and for continued life they depend on the sacrifice and praise of human beings. Each *orisha* enjoys certain special foods, ranging from cakes to stews, fruits, or drinks. If an *orisha* requests, *santeros* will sacrifice fowl, sheep, or other animals. The slaughter is always performed quickly and cleanly according to ritual rules, and the flesh is nearly always cooked and consumed by the congregation as part of the *orisha's* feast.

The most dramatic form of devotion to the *orishas* is ceremonial spirit mediumship. At certain ceremonies called *bembes*, *guemileres*, or *tambores*, a battery of drums calls the *orishas* to join the devotees in dance and song. If an *orisha* so chooses, he or she will "descend" and "seize the head" of an initiate. In this state the incarnated *orisha* may perform spectacular dances that the human medium would be hard put to imitate in ordinary consciousness. More important, an incarnated *orisha* will deliver messages, admonitions, and advice to individual members of the community, bringing their heavenly wisdom to bear on their devotees' earthly problems.

As a devotee grows in these ways of devotion, one particular *orisha* may begin to assert itself as the devotee's patron, and the love of this *orisha* will provide the devotee with his or her basic orientation in life. When this *orisha* calls for it, the devotee will undergo a demanding and irrevocable initiation into the mysteries of the patron *orisha*. The initiation ceremony is carried out with great solemnity and care in the home of an initiate of long experience. During a lengthy period of isolation and instruction, the devotee is brought to a spiritual rebirth as a true child of the *orisha*. During this ceremony the *orisha* is "enthroned in the head" of the devotee, seated and sealed as a permanent part of the devotee's personality.

As the initiate grows in this new level of devotion, his or her relationship with the seated *orisha* becomes in-

creasingly fluid. The sacrificial exchange between them comes to be seen as the outward manifestation of an inner process. Thus Santería culminates in a mysticism of identity between human and divine, where the road of life is the way of the *orishas*.

Santería continues to grow in the late twentieth century. Its popularity in Cuba seems to have been little affected by the socialist revolution, and thanks to nearly one million Cuban exiles, it is thriving in Venezuela, Puerto Rico, and the United States. The number of full initiates is difficult to determine because of the tradition of secrecy that *santeros* have maintained in order to survive a history of oppression and misunderstanding. The presence of Santería in a given neighborhood may be gauged by the profusion of *botánicas*, small retail stores that sell the herbs and ritual paraphernalia of Santería ceremonies. In 1981, there were at least eighty *botánicas* in Miami, Florida, and more than a hundred in New York City.

[See also Afro-Brazilian Cults; Voodoo; and Yoruba Religion. An analysis of the treatment of Santería devotees in the American press is presented in Journalism and Religion.]

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Among Spanish sources, pride of place belongs to the works of Fernando Ortiz. Between 1906 and his death in 1969, he published hundreds of pieces on all aspects of Afro-Cuban culture. The work that deals most directly with Santería is perhaps *Los bailes y el teatro de los negros en el folklore de Cuba* (Havana, 1951). The most widely available works in Spanish in the United States are those of the great exiled folklorist Lydia Cabrera. Among her many books in print on Afro-Cuban themes, *El monte* (Miami, 1968) and *Koeko iyawo: Pequeño tratado de regla Lucumi* (Miami, 1980) are considered authoritative by practitioners and observers alike. Two books by anthropologically trained scholars provide excellent surveys of the tradition: Julio Sánchez's *La religión de los orichas* (Hato Rey,

Puerto Rico, 1978) and Mercedes Cros Sandoval's *La religion afrocubana* (Madrid, 1975). Sandoval's book makes use of Pierre Verger's classic *Notes sur le culte des Orisa et Vodun à Bahia* (Dakar, 1957), which traces the connections between the religion of the *orishas* in Africa and that in Brazil and includes invaluable texts of prayers to the *orishas* as well as excellent photographs.

JOSEPH M. MURPHY

ŚĀNTIDEVA (seventh and eighth centuries CE), Indian Buddhist monk, philosopher, and mystic of the Mādhyamika school. Although the life dates of Śāntideva, or Śāntadeva, cannot be determined precisely, there are grounds to presume that he was active between 685 and 763. For information about the life of Śāntideva, we must depend largely on Tibetan hagiography. In addition to three closely related Tibetan accounts, we possess a Nepalese biography probably derived from a Sanskrit source. This same Sanskrit text may be the source of a biography that appears in the Tibetan version of Vibhūticandra's (c. 1200) lost Sanskrit commentary to Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (Entering the Career of Enlightenment).

According to these documents, Śāntideva was born in Surāṣṭra (modern Surāt, in Gujarat), the son of a king named Kalyāṇavarman or Mañjuvarman. His life is generally epitomized in seven extraordinary events: the acquisition of his tutelary god, the "excellent deed" at Nālandā, the pacification of some dissidents, the refutation of the heretics, the help to beggars, the conversion of a king, and the defeat of an impious man. His spiritual career began as a young man, when, taking the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī ("he of charming beauty") and the goddess Tārā ("star") as his spiritual guides, Śāntideva reached the famous Buddhist monastery of Nālandā after a long peregrination and many adventures. There he was accepted by the prior, Jayadeva, and became a monk. As he was unknown and simple the other monks thought that he was an idler and thus named him Bhusu-ku (a name formed with the initial syllables of three Sanskrit words meaning that he only ate, slept, and went to the toilet). For this reason it was decided that he would be submitted to a test. The community was assembled on a fixed date to recite sacred texts; when Śāntideva's turn came he too was invited to recite something. He asked if the assembly wanted to hear something already known or something new. When they asked for something new, he recited his *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, which treats in detail every stage of the Buddhist ascetic life. Legend has it that as he neared the end of that portion of the recitation in which he discoursed on the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) he disap-

peared, but that his voice continued to be heard. After this display of spiritual achievement he left the monastery and journeyed south, having consented to live naked, as was usual for the devotees of Ucchuṣman. (Ucchuṣman, literally “fire,” is the terrific appearance of Jambhala, a spirit. Devotees of Ucchuṣman had to live naked because, it was said, the heat they generated in their bodies would burn clothing.) Little further is recorded concerning Śāntideva’s career.

The works of Śāntideva are the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (in ten verse chapters, of which the last is perhaps spurious), the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Compendium of Instructions, nineteen chapters in prose, preceded by twenty-seven “stanzas”), and perhaps a *Sūtrasamuccaya* (Compendium of Scripture), which has not reached us. A work of this title, found only in the Chinese and Tibetan versions, is attributed to Nāgārjuna (third century CE), the founder of the Mādhyamika (“middle way”) school.

The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* describes the path of a *bodhisattva*, a “saint” of the Mahāyāna, or Great Vehicle to salvation. It is esteemed for its lyric inspiration and has been compared to Thomas à Kempis’s *Imitation of Christ* by virtue of its religious importance and the spiritually profound topics it treats. The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is a virtual anthology of various texts of the Great Vehicle. Śāntideva treats here the same themes addressed in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. He supports his theses with copious quotations, making the work all the more valuable as he quotes many Mahāyāna texts now lost. Because the prose constitutes a commentary on the few verses at the opening of the work, some scholars have advanced the hypothesis that the verses themselves constitute his *Sūtrasamuccaya*.

Śāntideva belongs to the third period of the Mādhyamika school. Like all the Mādhyamika writers, he emphasizes the importance of the perfection of wisdom, which is itself emptiness (*śūnyatā*). In order to reach perfection, one has to overcome not merely all passion but everything knowable (*jñeya*) as well. In fact, wisdom is beyond discursive knowledge. The Buddhist ascetic has to establish calm within himself to give free reign to insight (*prajñā*). In this manner he defeats ignorance and ceases to believe in the existence of an autonomous self and in the elements of existence. The *bodhisattva* reaches his goal when he becomes free of the causal nexus, *pratītya-samutpāda* (“dependent origination”), and enters into a total abandonment (*nirvāṇa*) where even the idea of emptiness has disappeared.

Buddhism is a way of knowledge, and Śāntideva, like other philosophers of the school of the Middle Way, uses dialectics to clear the ground of all mental constructs. In the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* he manifests his great interiority, revealing his deep faith and the richness of his

spiritual imagination. After having paid homage to all Buddhas, he humbly accuses himself of all the sins he has committed and promises that he will never again offend the Great Ones (i.e., the Buddhas). He vows to follow the example of the Buddha to save people from suffering.

Śāntideva’s considerable influence on Tibetan Buddhism is attested to by the existence of numerous Tibetan commentaries to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and by the attention paid his biography by Tibetan historians. By contrast, his name appears to be unknown to the Chinese. But the influence of his work, and that of the school it represents, endures in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist thought in India.

[See also Mādhyamika.]

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AMALIA PEZZALI

ŚĀNTIRAKṢITA (eighth century CE), also known as Śāntarakṣita, Śāntijīva, Ācārya Bodhisattva, Bodhisattva Abbot, and, in the Tibetan, Zhi-ba-’tsho; Indian Buddhist monk-scholar, who, along with Padmasambhava, is credited with having first established Buddhism in Tibet. Of the so-called two disseminations of Buddhism in Tibet, the first occurred gradually over time and primarily during the reigns of three local kings known in the Tibetan annals as the three *dharmarājas*, or “royal protectors of the Buddhist doctrine.” The three *dharmarājas* were Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po (609–649), Khri-sroṅ-lde-btsan (742–797), and Ral-pa-can (805–836). King Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po married two Buddhist queens (one from Nepal and one from China) and commissioned the creation of the first Tibetan scriptural language, but it was really during the reign of King Khri-sroṅ-lde-btsan that Buddhism began to make genuine advances into Tibet. This was accomplished

primarily with the aid of three Indian Buddhist personalities: Śāntirakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Padmasambhava. While the personality of the last is shrouded behind much legendary material, Śāntirakṣita and his chief disciple, Kamalaśīla, were undoubtedly important historical personages.

Śāntirakṣita's dates are elusive and very little is known about his early life. The Tibetan sources say that he was born in eastern Bengal, the son of a king of Zahor. He is described as having later become either simply a teacher or an important abbot of the famed Nālandā Monastery in India prior to his journey to Tibet. Some sources further claim that while at Nālandā, Śāntirakṣita gave instruction on some Mādhyamika works to the *ācārya* Haribhadra. It would certainly have been during his tenure at Nālandā that Śāntirakṣita met and taught his main disciple, Kamalaśīla. Presumably, it was also during this period that he wrote a massive logical treatise, the *Tattvasaṅgraha*. Speaking in this work from the philosophical viewpoint of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrika, Śāntirakṣita sought to refute all the rival philosophies of his time, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. In addition to the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, ten other texts, some of them treatises on the Tantras, are attributed to Śāntirakṣita in the Bstan-'gyur.

Śāntirakṣita's great fame among Tibetans, however, stems from the fact that he was the first monk-scholar to preach in Tibet the genuine message of Śākyamuni. Having been invited by a minister of King Khri-sroñlde-btsan, he journeyed to Tibet and there taught the basic principles of Buddhist ethics (i.e. the Ten Precepts and the ten *pāramitās*, or "transcendental activities") and the Buddhist causal theory known as the "twelve links of dependent origination" (*pratītya-samutpāda*). Such teachings came into direct conflict with indigenous Bon theory and practice. One can also imagine that the prospect of the new teachings becoming aligned with the royal house was viewed as a threat to the older sociopolitical order. Whatever the actual case, following a fierce lightning storm, a flood, and the subsequent outbreak of disease, Śāntirakṣita's "new teachings" were blamed and he was forced to flee Tibet. At Śāntirakṣita's urging, Padmasambhava, the "Lotus-born" Tantric *siddha*, was then summoned by the king; this figure is credited with successfully subduing the country's evil spirits by his Tantric powers and the teachings of Vajrayāna Buddhism. Conditions having been ameliorated, Śāntirakṣita returned.

Thereafter, the Buddhist histories record, Śāntirakṣita and Padmasambhava together planned and helped to construct the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet. It was named Bsam-yas ("inconceivable") and was completed in approximately 779. Śāntirakṣita is credited

with having drawn up the plans for the monastery, basing them upon the model of the famed Odantapurī Monastery in Bihar, India. Later, at Bsam-yas, Śāntirakṣita instructed and subsequently ordained the first seven Tibetan monks. Śāntirakṣita himself served as Bsam-yas's first abbot; his Tibetan student, Vairocana, succeeded him in the position.

During his tenure as abbot, Śāntirakṣita established the first translation bureau in Tibet for the purpose of translating the many Sanskrit Buddhist texts that had been brought to the country in former times. It is also from this period that the precursors of the excellent Sanskrit-Tibetan dictionaries (Skt., *vyutpattis*) date. Śāntirakṣita remained at Bsam-yas for some thirteen years, until his death in approximately 792. He is said to have died as the result of being kicked by a horse. According to Bu-ston's *Chos-'byuñ* (History of Buddhism), the last statement attributed to Śāntirakṣita was his prediction that the Tibetan Buddhists would soon be split into two rival sects, at which time his student, Kamalaśīla, was to be brought from India to pacify the strife and reestablish the true teaching.

[See also Tibetan Religions, *overview article*; Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Tibet*; Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Tibetan Buddhism*; and the *biographies of Kamalaśīla and Padmasambhava*.]

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JANICE D. WILLIS

SAOSHYANT. The Avestan term *saoshyant* ("future benefactor"; MPers., *sōshans*) designates the savior of the world, who will arrive at a future time to redeem humankind. The concept of the future savior is one of the fundamental notions of Zoroastrianism, together with that of dualism; it appears as early as in the *Gāthās*. Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), as prophet of the religion, is himself a Saoshyant, one who performs his works for the Frashōkereti, the end of the present state of the world, when existence will be "rehabilitated" and "made splendid." [See Frashōkereti.]

Later Zoroastrian tradition developed this notion into a true eschatological myth and expanded the number of Saoshyants from one to three. All the saviors are born

from the seed of Zarathushtra, which is preserved through the ages in Lake Kansaoya (identified with present-day Lake Helmand, in Seistan, Iran), protected by 99,999 *fravashis*, or guardian spirits. The greatest of the awaited Saoshyants, the victorious Astvatereta ("he who embodies truth"), the son of the Vispataurvairi ("she who conquers all"), is the third, who will make existence splendid; he appears in *Yashts* 19. Upon his arrival humankind will no longer be subject to old age, death, or corruption, and will be granted unlimited power. At that time the dead will be resurrected, and the living will be immortal and indestructible. Brandishing the weapon with which he kills the powerful enemies of the world of truth (that is, the world of the spirit, and of *asha*), Astvatereta will look upon the whole of corporeal existence and render it imperishable. He and his comrades will engage in a great battle with the forces of evil, which will be destroyed.

The name *Astvatereta* is clearly the result of theological speculation (Kellens, 1974), as are those of his two brothers, *Ukhshyatereta*, "he who makes truth grow," and *Ukhshyatnemah*, "he who makes reverence grow"; the names of the three virgins (*Yashts* 13) who are impregnated with the seed of Zarathushtra when they bathe in Lake Kansaoya and give birth to the Saoshyants, are equally speculative. Each of these Saoshyants will arrive at the beginning of a millennium, initiating a new age and a new cycle of existence; Astvatereta will appear in the third and final millennium to save mankind.

The doctrine of the future savior had already taken shape in the Achaemenid period (sixth to fourth centuries BCE). It was not, perhaps, the principal element in the formation of the messianic idea, but it was certainly a determining factor, one that enjoyed great success in the Hellenistic period beyond the confines of the Iranian world. A similar concept, that of the future Buddha, Maitreya, was most likely indebted to it, and Christian messianism can trace its roots to the same source.

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GHERARDO GNOLI

Translated from Italian by Roger DeGaris

SARAH, Abraham's wife and Isaac's mother. *Genesis* 20:12 identifies Sarah as Abraham's half sister; however, this may be an attempt to justify Abraham's self-serving statement in verse 2. According to the Bible, Sarah was originally called Sarai until her name was changed as part of God's blessing to Abraham. Although the Septuagint renderings (*Sara* and *Sarra*) suggest otherwise, the two forms are generally regarded as dialectical variants of the same name, probably meaning "princess." Sarah was already married to Abraham in Mesopotamia and migrated with him to Canaan, where they wandered until her death at the age of 127; she was buried in the cave of Machpelah, near Hebron.

The narratives of *Genesis* focus on Sarah's beauty and infertility. Twice the Bible recounts Abraham's fear that her desirability would lead foreign kings to have him killed so that they could marry Sarah and his resultant plan to present her as his sister in order to avoid this fate (*Gn.* 12:10-20, 20:1-18). Documents from fifteenth-century Nuzi (modern-day Yorgha Tepe) have suggested to many scholars that especially honored wives in this North Mesopotamian culture were granted the title "Sister"; however, these texts can be interpreted in several ways, and this theory is now generally regarded as unlikely. Sarah's beauty is also praised in rabbinic literature and greatly elaborated in the *Genesis Apocryphon*, a pre-Christian text found among the Dead Sea Scrolls.

Sarah's infertility is noted the first time she is mentioned (*Gn.* 11:30). In accordance with a widespread ancient Near Eastern practice, attested both in Nuzi documents and in the Code of Hammurabi, she gave Abraham her slave girl Hagar with the intention that the offspring of this union be credited to her as owner of the slave. When, in accordance with God's promise, Sarah herself conceived and bore Isaac, she insisted that Hagar and her son Ishmael be expelled (*Gn.* 21); another version of this incident suggests that Hagar fled while still pregnant because of mistreatment at Sarah's hands (*Gn.* 16).

Rabbinic tradition identifies Sarah with Iscah, Abraham's niece (*Gn.* 11:29), perhaps because no explicit genealogy is provided in the Bible, and ascribes prophetic powers to her. In the New Testament, Sarah is regarded as a symbol of faith (*Heb.* 11:11) and wifely submissiveness (*1 Pt.* 3:6).

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FREDERICK E. GREENSPAHN

SARASVATĪ is a goddess of pan-Indian importance best known as the patron of learning and the fine arts. Her name means "flowing, watery," and indeed, she first appears in the *R̥gveda* as a sacred river. Since *R̥gvedic* times Sarasvatī has been associated with knowledge and learning, and quite early she developed a special connection with music, as is shown iconographically by the lute (*vīṇā*) that she often holds. In texts beginning with the *Yajurveda* she is identified with *Vāc*, a female personification of sacred speech.

Sarasvatī's primary mythic association is as the wife (or sometimes the daughter) of the god *Brahmā*; as his cult waned, she came increasingly to be represented, along with *Lakṣmī*, as a spouse of *Viṣṇu*. Although she has been assimilated in this way to various deities of the Brahmanic tradition, her primary religious importance is as a goddess in her own right. Thus, in spite of her frequent consort status, she is popularly viewed as unmarried, and she is commonly worshiped alone. Images characteristically portray her as fair, wearing white garments and many ornaments, sitting with one leg pendant, and playing the *vīṇā* with two of her four arms while holding one or more other objects, such as a manuscript, a white lotus, a rosary, or a water vessel. A ruddy goose or swan (*haṃsa*), her usual mount (*vāhana*) and emblem, is often represented at her feet; less commonly, she has been depicted with a ram.

Mythology. From the *R̥gveda* onward, Sarasvatī's mythic associations have been various and complex. As one form of the sacrificial fire, she is conceived of as the wife of *Agni*, whose mount is also a ram. In the *Āpī* hymns of the *R̥gveda* she is praised together with *Ilā* and *Bhāratī* as the triple tongue of the sacrificial fire. Yet her closest Vedic associations are with *Indra* and with the twin *Aśvins*, the physicians of the gods. Vedic accounts portray her as healing, refreshing, and giving strength to *Indra*, either as a river or by the power of her speech, and she is sometimes said to be *Indra*'s wife and sometimes the wife of the *Aśvins*. Her banks were considered the most sacred place for sacrifices, and her

waters alone were deemed capable of purifying humans from that most heinous of crimes, brahmanicide.

In the later tradition, Sarasvatī's river aspect gradually diminished, perhaps at the same time that the actual river by that name receded and eventually disappeared; certain epic and Puranic myths do, however, retain a sense of her earlier identity. In a *Mahābhārata* story she preserves the Vedas during a twelve-year drought by feeding her son *Sārasvata* on her fish when other brahmins have become too weak to remember the sacred texts; she is also praised in the *Purāṇas* and in inscriptions for bearing the virulent *Aurvā* fire to the sea. Yet increasingly she is conceived of as an anthropomorphic goddess, whose beauty and quick temper cause problems for those around her. In a Puranic elaboration of a Vedic kernel, *Brahmā* so desires to keep his lovely daughter in view as she circumambulates him that he grows a face in every direction. Other *Purāṇas* tell of a quarrel among the three wives of *Viṣṇu*—*Sarasvatī*, *Lakṣmī*, and *Gaṅgā*—which becomes so fierce that *Viṣṇu* gives *Sarasvatī* to *Brahmā* and *Gaṅgā* to *Śiva*.

Although Sarasvatī has continued to be associated with *Brahmā*, she early developed connections not only with *Lakṣmī* and *Viṣṇu* but also with *Durgā* and *Śiva*. Images of *Viṣṇu* from the ninth century CE or earlier in eastern India represent her, together with *Lakṣmī*, at *Viṣṇu*'s side. In Bengal, *Sarasvatī* and *Lakṣmī* are popularly viewed as the daughters of *Śiva* and *Durgā*, and their rivalry is proverbial. In certain *Purāṇas* and images *Sarasvatī* is herself assimilated to the great goddess *Durgā* and is provided with *Durgā*'s mount, a lion.

Cult. Although the worship of Sarasvatī has been as various as her mythology, there are notable points of continuity. The ram, the he-goat, and the ewe are prescribed in Vedic texts as sacrificial offerings to her, and this custom has continued into the twentieth century in the district of *Dacca*, Bangladesh, where a ram fight has also served as entertainment on the day of her worship. Rice and barley, which are also among her offerings from Vedic times, suggest a connection with fertility, as does early spring, the season of her festival in Bengal. Prosperity and cure, as well as success in marriage and procreation, are chief among the boons requested of her since ancient times.

Sarasvatī's continuing importance for scholars is attested to by her prominence in the invocatory (*maṅgala*) verses of Sanskrit manuscripts, in which she appears more frequently than any other deity except *Gaṇeśa*. Her role as the goddess of learning is prominent in her worship in homes, where students place their books before her image on her festival day. On that day, too, the

family priest puts chalk in the hand of the youngest child and guides the child's hand in writing his or her first letters. Musicians, especially in South India, place their instruments before her shrine and worship them—with fruits, coconut, cloth, incense, and lighted oil lamps—as the very body of the goddess.

Buddhist and Jain Traditions. Sarasvatī as the goddess of learning has also figured prominently in both the Jain and the Buddhist traditions. She has been worshiped by the Jains since ancient times as Śrutadevatā, the deity who presides over the sacred teachings, and in later Vajrayāna Buddhism she became the female counterpart and consort of Mañjuśrī, the *bodhisattva* of wisdom. Through Indian Vajrayāna her cult spread to Nepal, Tibet, and Mongolia, as well as China and Japan, and it has remained popular among Buddhists of those lands.

[See also Goddess Worship, *article on The Hindu Goddess*; Indian Religions, *article on Mythic Themes*; Ganges River; and Rivers.]

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There is no single comprehensive study of Sarasvatī. Most works treating her have focused almost entirely on texts or images, rarely combining the two approaches. Among textual studies are Manisha Mukhopadhyay's "Lakṣmī and Sarasvatī in Sanskrit Inscriptions" and A. K. Chatterjee's "Some Aspects of Sarasvatī," both included in *Foreigners in Ancient India and Lakṣmī and Sarasvatī in Art and Literature*, edited by D. C. Sircar (Calcutta, 1970). The earlier and more comprehensive article of Haridas Bhattacharyya, "Sarasvatī the Goddess of Learning," in *Commemorative Essays Presented to Professor Kashinath Bapuji Pathak* (Poona, 1934), pp. 32–52, goes beyond these two in giving brief but suggestive accounts of popular conceptions and practices. Sushila Khare's *Sarasvatī* (Varanasi, 1966) provides a useful compendium in Hindi of Vedic, epic, and Puranic sources for understanding the goddess. Although Khare includes a chapter treating the various directions for making Sarasvatī's images as found in Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist treatises, her work is largely limited to the elite Brahmanic tradition and takes little or no account of popular conceptions or contemporary practice. Still more specialized is the richly detailed monograph by Jan Gonda, *Pūṣan and Sarasvatī* (Amsterdam, 1985), in which he attempts through a close study of Vedic literature to determine the early history of the conceptions of these two deities.

The almost exclusively textual approach of the above studies of Sarasvatī requires correction by a careful examination of her extant images. T. A. Gopinatha Rao's *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, 2 vols. (1914–1916; 2d ed., New York, 1968), treats her briefly, showing certain simple correlations between descriptive and prescriptive texts and selected images. The studies of Nalini Kanta Bhattasali and Jitendra Banerjea offer fuller analyses and more imaginative interpretations of the data. Bhattasali's landmark work, *Iconography of Buddhist and*

Brahmanical Sculptures in the Dacca Museum (Dacca, 1929), is unique in its effective juxtaposition of textual and iconographic evidence, especially regarding the connection of Sarasvatī with Viṣṇu. In *The Development of Hindu Iconography*, 2d ed. (Calcutta, 1956), Banerjea shows the influence of popular iconographic types—represented by terracotta figurines from the Maurya and Śuṅga periods—on early images of the goddess. Curt Maury's provocative *Folk Origins of Indian Art* (New York, 1969) provides evidence that Sarasvatī is a regional variant of an ancient lotus goddess, called also Śrī and Lakṣmī.

Art-historical studies are themselves incomplete without a knowledge of the contexts in which the images have been used. In the case of Sarasvatī, these contexts have not been sufficiently explored. Also needed is a close investigation of her contemporary cult, especially in the villages. It is likely that further research will identify other indigenous elements that have coalesced with the more readily traceable Brahmanical ones to form her composite character. A thorough historical study of the interplay among popular and literary conceptions and practices should thus yield a more accurate and balanced view of the religious significance of this major Indian goddess.

DONNA MARIE WULFF

SARMATIAN RELIGION. The Sarmatians were Iranian-speaking nomadic tribes that formed in the middle of the first millennium BCE in the southern Urals. In the last centuries before the common era they spread from there in a westward direction—to the lower Volga region, the Ciscaucasus, and the northern Black Sea shore—where they were still dominant in the first centuries CE. In language and culture, the Sarmatians were close to the Scythians. Their ethnonym is similar to that of the Sauromatians, who inhabited the left bank of the Lower Don in the middle of the first millennium BCE. Classical tradition often treated both these names as identical, but in contemporary scholarship the question of the degree of relationship between the Sauromatians and the Sarmatians remains debatable.

The Sarmatians' lack of a written language has severely limited the scope of available data about their religion. The only evidence about their pantheon is the indication by a writer of the fifth century CE that in the language of the Alani (a tribe of the Sarmatian group) the name of the town Feodosia in the Crimea was Ardabda ("seven gods"). This is a reflection of the tradition, common among the ancient Indo-Iranians, of worshipping seven gods, a practice also characteristic of Scythian religion. [See Scythian Religion.] The actual makeup of this Sarmatian pantheon is unknown to us. Perhaps it was about one of the gods of this pantheon that Ammianus Marcellinus (31.2.23) wrote, comparing him to the Roman Mars and informing us that the Alani worshiped him in the form of an unsheathed sword

driven into the ground. This ritual may be interpreted as the erection of the *axis mundi*, which joins the world of people with the world of the gods. Such an interpretation is confirmed by information about the Scythians, who had a similar ritual; but the Scythians performed it on special stationary altars, whose complete absence among the Sarmatians (and of all other monumental religious structures as well) was specifically noted by the classical writers. Hence the religious practices of the Sarmatians had a more nomadic character, entirely suited to their mobile way of life.

The ancient writers also indicate that the tribes living along the Don worshiped that river (the ancient Tanais) as a god and that, moreover, they called the Sauromatians "fire worshipers." The worship of fire and water as gods is an ancient tradition of all Iranian peoples, and it may be assumed that the deities of these elements were part of the Sarmatian pantheon of seven gods, as was the case among the Scythians.

These sparse data constitute the sole written evidence on the religion of the Sarmatians. To some extent they have been correlated with archaeological findings, the basic sources for the reconstruction of this religion. It is true that, owing to the nomadic character of the Sarmatian way of life, the only monuments left by them are burial mounds. Thus they reflect only those aspects of Sarmatian religion that focus on Sarmatian burial practices. For example, data on Sarmatian fire-worship have something in common with their extensive use of fire in one form or another in their burial practices. The Sarmatians did not practice cremation of the dead or the burning of the grave construction, but quite often they covered the graves with the remnants of the ritual bonfire, which sometimes led to the combustion of the grave's wooden covering and even to the scorching of the corpse. The earth tempered by such fires was sometimes spread in a ring around the grave or was admixed with the soil from which the burial mound covering the grave was formed. Traces of such fires are often found in the burial mound itself, not far from the grave. It is not clear whether the fire in these rituals was considered as an element to which the dead person was consigned or only as a purifying principle.

Also connected with the worship of fire are the stone or ceramic censers, used for burning aromatic substances, that have frequently been found in Sarmatian graves. Archaeologists also consider fragments of a red mineral dye, realgar, often found in Sarmatian graves, to be a substitute for fire in a burial. The same interpretation for chalk—another mineral commonly found in Sarmatian graves—is more debatable. But its purifying function is completely obvious. Chalk was either put in the grave in pieces or strewn on the bottom of the

grave. The latter custom, like the tradition of laying grass under the burial, was evidently meant to prevent the corpse from coming into direct contact with the earth and thus being defiled. This custom, as we know, was a prominent characteristic of Zoroastrian burial practice, which developed from ancient Iranian beliefs.

The Sarmatian custom of placing burial mounds around one of the oldest mounds may be interpreted as evidence of the worship of ancestor graves and, in the final analysis, of an ancestor cult. In some burial mounds in which persons of high social rank were interred, there have also been found the bodies of people who were deliberately killed—servants, swordbearers, and so forth—indicating that the Sarmatians practiced human sacrifice. Far more widespread was the custom of placing in the graves food for the dead, in the form of parts of the carcass of a horse or a sheep. A typically Sarmatian feature is the placing in the grave of a specially broken mirror, or of its fragments, perhaps indicating that the Sarmatians regarded the mirror as the person's "double," who died together with him.

There is no doubt that animal-style art, widespread in Sarmatian culture, is connected with the religio-mythological concepts of the Sarmatians. Zoomorphic motifs were used to decorate ritual objects and to adorn the trappings of horses and warriors. However, no study has yet been made of the Sarmatian animal style, and the iconography remains obscure.

Among the objects most frequently decorated with zoomorphic images are the Sauromato-Sarmatian portable altars—small stone dishes with or without supporting feet—used for grinding chalk and realgar, for igniting fires, and, probably, for other ritual activities. The small size of these altars again bears witness to the mobile nature of Sarmatian religious practice, which had been adapted to a nomadic way of life. An interesting feature of these altars is that they are found exclusively at female burials. Evidently, the rituals connected with them were the monopoly of priestesses. This fact is usually related to the information from Herodotus and other classical authors about the high position of women in Sauromato-Sarmatian society. It is not by chance that ancient authors connected the origins of these people with the Amazons, and even called them "woman-ruled."

The rather sparse data cited here on the Sauromato-Sarmatian religion are constantly being supplemented with archaeological investigations of the monuments of this people. In time these will enable us to give much more detailed and well-grounded reconstruction of the Sarmatian religion.

[See also Prehistoric Religions, *article on The Eurasian Steppes and Inner Asia, and Inner Asia Religions.*]

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D. S. RAEVSKII

Translated from Russian by Mary Lou Masey

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL (1905–1980), French philosopher and man of letters, generally regarded as the chief exponent of the atheistic branch of existentialism. Soon after World War II, Sartre wrote in *Existentialism and Humanism* (London, 1948): "Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares . . . that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man" (pp. 27–28). Sartre's existentialism, given its most sophisticated expression in *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (New York, 1956), is a philosophy of human reality that views human beings without recourse to any divine creator, that is, without appeal to God. Neither a virulent nor a polemical atheist, Sartre is not interested in the traditional philosophical or theological proofs for the existence of God. It would be more precise to say that Sartre is concerned with other matters, for, according to him, even if God did exist, his existence would be irrelevant to Sartre's fundamental project: to draw the final conclusions of a view of reality in which human beings define themselves through the choices that they make of their lives and that form the portraits of their being. In *Existentialism and Humanism* Sartre quotes Dostoevskii's statement that "if God did not exist, everything would be permitted" and adds: "that, for existentialism, is the starting point" (p. 33). Whether or not God does exist, it might be said, in Sartrean terms, "everything is permitted"—and that means that human beings are the source of value, choice, and responsibility. At the same time, Sartre holds that the individual's choice is not a solitary event but a moment of responsibility in which the chooser chooses an image of existence for all of us.

Although Sartre considers the existence of God irrelevant, he "finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven" (*Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 33). That "embarrassment" is explored more cautiously and profoundly in *Being and Nothingness*, where Sartre maintains that the basic polarities of being, the "For-itself" and the "In-itself," are incapable of synthesis. The For-itself, or the human reality, is understood as consciousness (both pre-reflective and reflective), a continually nihilating movement of temporality that arises, absurdly, from being In-itself. The In-itself is simply that which it is: an opaque plenum. The In-itself is underivable from God or from any divine act of creation; in its utter density, the In-itself, according to Sartre, "is never anything but what it is" (*Being and Nothingness*, p. lxviii). The For-itself is empty and seeks to fill itself, to ground itself in the fullness of the In-itself. But a paradox ensues: the more human beings endeavor to become "something," stable, fixed, assured in their status, the more they are In-itself-like, the more they lose their freedom and choose "bad faith," a negation of human authenticity. Yet the primordial ontological project of the For-itself is to achieve a stable synthesis with the In-itself. That synthesis, for Sartre, would be God. "To be man means to reach toward being God. Or, if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be God" (*Being and Nothingness*, p. 566). What Sartre calls the "passion" of the human being to unite itself with the plenum of being In-itself and become For-itself-In-itself is from the ontological outset doomed to defeat. Sartre writes:

Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute the In-itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the *Ens causa sui*, which religions call God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion. (*Being and Nothingness*, p. 615)

The striking feature of Sartre's atheism is that it remains so closely in touch with—even in ontological terms—the concept of God. The anguish of human beings, ultimately, is that they cannot be God and that in consequence they are forced back upon themselves—utterly and without recourse. But it is evident that however "religiously unmusical" Sartre's writings may be, there is not only in *Being and Nothingness* but in later works, such as his book on Genet and his study of Flaubert, the intransigent recognition that fellow human beings *believe*. The faith of others haunts the hu-

man reality. In his autobiographical study *Words* (London, 1964), Sartre explores the complex religious background of his childhood. The harsh and thorough repudiation he has given his Protestant-Catholic heritage has negated its essentials; but he has not succeeded altogether in ridding religious nuances from his writing: "I depend only on those who depend only on God, and I do not believe in God. Try and sort this out" (ibid., pp. 172–173). Sartre's atheism is not a state of being or a fixed condition. Rather it is a provocative affirmation that "becoming-an-atheist is a long and difficult undertaking" ("The Singular Universal," in *Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City, N.Y., 1972, p. 264).

In contrast to Camus, a writer whose honey of the absurd has attracted many theistic readers—that is, believers—Sartre's bitter gift to the faithful and the theologians is a replication of Hegel's "unhappy consciousness" (see Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 90). Viewed in religious terms, Sartre is an aberrant supplicant to a shattered God.

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MAURICE NATANSON

SARVĀSTIVĀDA. The school of Sarvāstivāda was one of the so-called Eighteen Schools (*nikāya*, *ācariyavāda*) of early Buddhism. The term *Sarvāstivāda* is also

used to designate the body of doctrine and literature associated with this community. The sociological nature of the group, however, remains unknown to us.

Historical Development. Although it is customary to refer to the Sarvāstivāda as a Hīnayāna "sect," it seems evident that it was primarily a monastic and intellectual movement—thus the term *sect* might be inappropriate. The term *Hīnayāna* is equally problematic, and in this case it must be taken to establish only a definition by exclusion—"that which is not Mahāyāna." The Sarvāstivāda was one of the parent lines in the genealogical tree of the Eighteen Schools, consistently identified in traditional doxography as one of the earlier Sthavira groups. From the Sarvāstivāda arose in turn, according to most accounts, the schools of the Sautrāntika and the Mūlasarvāstivāda, and perhaps that of the Dharmaguptaka.

Our knowledge of the history and teachings of the early schools is based on late sources, and there is little agreement among scholars as to the true affiliation of the sects mentioned in these sources. It is not clear, for instance, whether the Mahīśāsaka school should be classified under the Sarvāstivāda or under "mainline" Sthaviras. There is, nevertheless, agreement among the classical sources on the derivation of the Sarvāstivāda from a main Sthavira trunk, most probably after the great schism that separated the early Sthavira from the Mahāsāṃghika. The separation of Sarvāstivāda from its trunk of origin is supposed to have taken place at the Third Buddhist Council, held under King Aśoka. They separated from the Sthaviras according to some accounts, from the Mahīśāsaka, according to others.

It is known from inscriptional evidence that the area of greatest strength of the Sarvāstivāda was the Northwest, from Mathurā to Afghanistan and the Central Asian desert. But they also were known in East and South India. Their influence extended to Indonesia, and, indirectly, to China.

The Sarvāstivādins received the royal patronage of Kaniṣka (second century CE). According to tradition, the Tripiṭaka of this school was finally closed during his reign. But it is not clear whether this legend is due to a confusion between the writing of their Abhidharma and the compilation of the canon. It is more likely that most of the Sarvāstivādin Tripiṭaka was redacted earlier, and that by the second century CE Sarvāstivādin scholars were engaged in exegetical work. This was the time for the major systematic works, and the beginning of the work of synthesis such as would develop into the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.

As a school of philosophy Sarvāstivāda was gradually absorbed by the Sautrāntika and the Mahāyāna. But it remained a strong monastic institution, especially in

the Northwest. Sarvāstivāda survived at least into the ninth century CE through the Mūlasarvāstivāda sub-school. By counting Mūlasarvāstivādin texts as works of Sarvāstivādin imprint, one can form an approximate idea of the greater part of the Tripiṭaka of this school. The combined literature of both groups almost constitutes a complete canon, preserved mostly in Chinese and Tibetan translation, but also in several Sanskrit fragments from Central Asia. This body of literature is an important source for the study of the so-called Hīnayāna schools, eclipsed in this respect only by that of the Theravāda tradition.

Literature. The Sarvāstivādin canon is a Tripiṭaka only in the sense that it was conceived as having three parts. But it is characteristic of this canon that in addition to the three traditional Piṭakas (Sūtra, Vinaya, and Abhidharma), it eventually developed a Kṣudraka Piṭaka to accommodate miscellaneous works of late origin. Also characteristic of this canon was the exclusion of texts such as the *Dharmapada* (considered paracanonical) and the composition of extensive commentaries on the Abhidharma Piṭaka.

A good part of the Sarvāstivādin canon survives in Chinese translation. The *Madhyama Āgama* found in the Chinese canon is definitely Sarvāstivādin; some scholars also regard the Chinese translation of the *San'yuktāgama* as of Sarvāstivāda origin, although this collection is probably a Mūlasarvāstivāda work. The Dharmaguptaka *Dīrghāgama* may be quite similar to the corresponding Sarvāstivāda collection, now lost. The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya is also preserved in Chinese in several versions, including a short, early version, and an expanded version accompanied by a commentary, the *Vinaya-vibhāṣā*. This last text became the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya, which is also preserved in Tibetan. Another recension has been recovered in Sanskrit manuscripts from Gilgit and Afghanistan. The Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda is preserved in its entirety in the Chinese canon (some books in more than one translation). Only fragments remain in the original Sanskrit.

Fragments of the Sarvāstivādin canon have been found in Central Asia (the Tarim Basin). These Sanskrit manuscripts include parts of the Vinaya, the *Bhikṣu-* and *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa*, and the Sūtra Piṭaka. The same region has yielded several manuscripts of the *Udānavarga* (a collection similar to the Pali *Dhammapada*). One of the seven books of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the *Abhidharmasaṃgītiparyāya*, has been found in Afghanistan (Bāmiyān). A Sanskrit manuscript of a postcanonical work of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, the *Abhidharmadīpa*, was recovered in Tibet. It is believed that this is the work of Saṃghabhadra (fourth century) or one of his disciples.

The greater part of the remaining Sanskrit works of

the school belong to the *avadāna* literature and are for the most part late compositions or redactions. The *Lalitavistara*, for instance, a biography of the life of the Buddha (up to his enlightenment), shows strong Mahāyāna influence. Two other important works of this genre, the *Avadānaśataka* and the *Divyāvadāna*, are probably associated with the Mūlasarvāstivādin subsect. To this same group belongs the Vinaya discovered at Gilgit and some of the fragments from Turfan (e.g., the *Mahāpārinirvāṇa Sūtra*).

The Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. The Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Piṭaka is divided into six treatises and a seventh work of synthesis ("the six feet and the body" of Abhidharma): (1) *Prakaraṇapada*, (2) *Vijñānakāya*, (3) *Dharmaskandha*, (4) *Prajñāptiśāstra*, (5) *Dhātukāya*, (6) *Samgītiparyāya*, and (7) *Jñānaprasthāna*. Each of the works has a putative author, but sources vary on their attribution (e.g., Mahākauṣṭhila or Śāriputra for the *Samgītiparyāya*, Śāriputra or Maudgalyāyana for the *Dharmaskandha*). However, the last (and latest) of these seven books, the *Jñānaprasthāna*, is consistently attributed to Kātyāyanīputra; his authorship is generally accepted as factual, although the *Mahāvibhāṣā* claims that he was merely the redactor of the text and that its real author was the Buddha. Three of the works in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma reflect the style and content of earlier catechistic (*mātrkā*) and cosmological *sūtras*, found in the Sūtra Piṭaka of other schools. In all probability these form the original core of the Abhidharma and explain the Sarvāstivādin claim that the Abhidharma was also the word of the Buddha (*buddhava-cana*).

The most influential text of the school was the fruit of its dedication to Abhidharma studies, a collective work of exegesis, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (150–200 CE), purporting to be a commentary to Kātyāyanīputra's *Jñānaprasthāna*. But this work is more than a commentary; it provides invaluable information on the earlier traditions of Abhidharma (e.g., the doctrines of the "four great masters," Vasumitra, Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣa, and Buddha-deva), and on rival schools, including some non-Buddhist philosophical schools (e.g., Sāṃkhya). Apart from its value as a major source of information on Buddhist scholastic traditions, this work influenced the development of other schools, including the Mahāyāna. Even when criticized (as in the *Abhidharmakośa* of the Sautrāntika philosopher Vasubandhu, or in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa Śāstra* of the Mahāyānist pseudo-Nāgārjuna), the *Mahāvibhāṣā* continued to provide the basic model for intellectual order and spiritual typologies. Moreover, the two above-mentioned critical works contributed to the diffusion of Sarvāstivādin ideas in East Asia. Because of the central role of this text in defining Sarvāstivādin orthodoxy, mainline Sar-

vāstivādins are sometimes known as Vaibhāṣikas, that is, followers of the (*Mahā*) *Vibhāṣā*.

Characteristic Doctrines. A characteristic doctrine of this school, the one from which the school derives its name, is the theory of time. According to this doctrine—summarized in the phrase *sarvam asti* (“everything exists”)—all of the three dimensions of time (past, present, future) exist; that is, the present continues to exist when it becomes the past, and so forth. This doctrine seems to have been developed as a way to protect the laws of causality (especially as they apply to karmic or moral retribution) from the potentially undermining effect of the doctrine of impermanence.

Dharma theory. Another means of insuring continuity and order in the philosophical world of Sarvāstivāda was the doctrine of *dharma*s. According to the Sarvāstivāda understanding, although all things are impermanent, the basic building blocks of reality including even some attributes and relations, are substantial and real. These substantial entities (*dravyasat*) are known as *dharma*s. With the exception of three elements of reality, all things are compounds of *dharma*s; they can be broken into their component parts and are in that sense impermanent. Some compounds and the *dharma*s that compose them are pure, others impure. Only *nirvāṇa* is both pure and permanent (as well as un compounded). There are, however, two other *dharma*s that are un compounded: cessation without conscious discrimination, and space. [See Dharma, article on Buddhist Dharma and Dharmas.]

Karman and no-self. The Sarvāstivāda theory of *karman* is based on the *dharma* theory. All actions resulting from human intention affect the constituents of the personality—that is, they change its *dharma* composition. This effect of action is made possible by a relational *dharma* called “appropriation” or “acquisition” (*prāpti*). *Prāpti* was a key concept in the attempt to establish the rationality of moral responsibility in an impermanent world; that is, it was meant to account for karmic continuity in the absence of an agent, or self [See also Soul, article on Buddhist Concepts.] But the key term used in formulating a rational account of the element of continuity in the empirical self was *santāna* (“series”). The term *self* was considered a misnomer for a series of *dharma*s. With no lasting element or underlying substance, this series is held together only by the laws of causality. The doctrine of *prāpti* was criticized by the Sautrāntikas—mainly in the work of Vasubandhu (c. fourth century CE)—but the concept of *santāna* remained a central tool of philosophical explanation in later Buddhist philosophy.

Buddhology. In soteriology and in their theory of the Path, the Sarvāstivāda developed perhaps the most complex and complete of the Buddhist maps of spiritual

growth. They were concerned with the path of the *bo-dhisattva* as well as that of the *arhat*, although they still perceived the former as a rare occurrence. Their Abhidharma literature considers the goal of arhatship the only ideal to which one could aspire, but the *avadāna* literature (possibly of late Mūlasarvāstivādin composition) gives numerous legendary accounts of faithful taking the vows to “become a Buddha” in a future life. In the same way, although the Sarvāstivāda had a doctrine of the “perfections” (*pāramitā*) of a *bodhisattva*, a theory of the two bodies of the Buddha (*rūpakāya* and *dharmakāya*), and a belief in the Buddha’s “great compassion” (*mahākaruṇā*), and although they accepted the mythology of the vow and the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*) in the career of the Buddhas, they do not seem to have developed these ideas as possible models for religious life.

Sectarian Outgrowths. A number of important subgroups appear to be related to the Sarvāstivāda. Unfortunately, the sources offer contradictory information. Two movements are definitely derivative schools: the Sautrāntikas and the Mūlasarvāstivādins, both of which were especially active in Central India. The Dharmaguptaka school may also be derived from Sarvāstivāda, although this case is more problematic than the other two. They were concentrated in South India. Another important subgroup of the Sthaviras, the Mahīśāsaka, must be related to the Sarvāstivādins; but the nature of the relationship remains unclear. They had monasteries in the Punjab and Andhra.

Tradition has it that after the council at Pāṭaliputra a Sarvāstivādin scholar by the name of Madhyāntika took the teachings of the school to Kashmir, where it flourished. He is believed to belong to the spiritual lineage of Ānanda and to have been originally from Mathurā. The latter region was the missionary province of Upagupta. Both locations were important cultural centers in the empire of the Kushans and provided the base for imperial patronage of the Sarvāstivāda under Kaniṣka. The Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-tsang, who visited India between the years 629 and 645, reported the existence of Sarvāstivādin monasteries only in the Northwest and in the upper Ganges River valley. Another pilgrim, I-ching, who was himself a Sarvāstivādin, visited India half a century later (671–695) and reported a much wider distribution of monasteries under Sarvāstivādin influence. Although he found Sarvāstivādins in almost all parts of India, they were the dominant group only in Northwest India and in the Indonesian archipelago.

Sautrāntikas. A subgroup of the Sarvāstivādins, the Dārṣṭāntikas—followers of Kumāralāta’s *Drṣṭānta-pañkti*—gave rise to a new movement in reaction to Sarvāstivādin emphasis on the Abhidharma. Whereas the Sarvāstivādins were of the opinion that the Buddha had

preached the Abhidharma at Śrāvastī, this new group maintained that the Abhidharma was not the word of the Buddha. Only the *sūtras* had canonical authority for them. They claimed that the term *Abhidharma Piṭaka* could refer only to those *sūtras* belonging to the *mātykā* genre. Therefore, they called themselves Sautrāntikas (“followers of the *sūtra* or *sūtrānta*”). Their first great master was Śrīlāta, a disciple of Kumāralāta (both from around the first century BCE). But their most distinguished scholar was the independently minded Vasubandhu (fourth to fifth century), whose major Abhidharmic work, the *Abhidharmakośa*, championed certain Sautrāntika doctrines. Vasubandhu’s work, however, had its critics, among whom the most famous was Saṃghabhadra, whose *Abhidharmanyāyānusāra* was written as a polemic against the *Abhidharmakośa*. [See the biography of Vasubandhu.]

The Sautrāntikas opposed the Sarvāstivādin belief in substantial entities and what they saw as surreptitious ways of retaining notions of permanence. They denied that the unconditioned or uncompounded *dharma*s have any existence, preferring instead to regard them as bare nonexistence or absence (*abhāva*). They asserted that some of the *dharma*s of the Sarvāstivāda are mere denominations or conceptual constructs (*prajñāpti*). Among the *dharma*s whose reality they criticized in this way was the concept of appropriation (*prāpti*). In order to explain the process of *karma*n, the Sautrāntikas brought to prominence an old concept shared by most Buddhist schools, the concept of karmic seeds (*bīja*). These Sautrāntika theories were first proposed by Śrīlāta and developed by Vasubandhu. The doctrine of *bīja* became one of the cornerstones of Mahāyāna idealistic philosophy.

The Sautrāntikas also formulated a radical theory of impermanence known as the doctrine of *kṣaṇikavāda* (“momentariness”). This doctrine denied the Sarvāstivādin theory of the displacement through time of a permanent entity or essence (*svabhāva*). It also contributed to the development of a theory of knowledge that would have a major impact on the formation of Mahāyāna epistemology. They proposed that the senses cannot apprehend an object directly (among other reasons, because of its momentary existence); accordingly, perception is the arising of mental images or representations that are only analogical or coordinated with their objects (*sārūpya*). In this way the Sautrāntikas became the first Buddhist phenomenologists, perhaps the first in the history of world philosophy. Their influence continued to be felt in the Buddhist logicians and in the metaphysics of Mahāyāna idealistic philosophy until the end of Buddhist monasticism on Indian soil; it continues today in Tibetan philosophical speculation. [See also Sautrāntika.]

Mūlasarvāstivādins. This school seems to have been a late development in the Sarvāstivāda tradition. It was dominant in North India from the seventh to the ninth century and became the main source of non-Mahāyāna texts for the Tibetan canon. The Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya is preserved in Tibetan translation (early ninth century, now incorporated into the Bka’-’gyur) and has also been recovered in a Sanskrit manuscript from Gilgit. Some scholars would consider this Vinaya an early compilation, but others believe the work is late.

Although their doctrines do not seem to have differed significantly from those of the Sarvāstivādins, their literature—at least what remains of it—contains some materials that must derive from non-Sarvāstivāda sources. In addition to their Vinaya, several works from their *avadāna* literature have survived; these include the *Divyāvadāna*, *Avadānaśataka*, and *Aśokāvadāna*.

Dharmaguptakas. It is not clear whether the Dharmaguptakas should be regarded as a subset of the Vibhajyavādins (through the Mahīśāsaka line) or a subset of the Sarvāstivādins. They tended to emphasize Vinaya and Sūtra more than Abhidharma. Their Vinaya is preserved in Chinese translation (the *Ssu-fen lü*) and became the model for monastic rules in China. Another work of great importance for the study of early Abhidharma, the *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*, is of Dharmaguptaka provenance. This text also shows strong influence from the Mahāsāṃghika school. The connection of this school with the development of Mahāyāna is confirmed not only by the eclectic nature of this text but also by their frank criticism of the limitations of the *arhat* ideal, by their addition of Bodhisattva and Dhāraṇī Piṭakas to their canon, and by their role in the formation of Chinese monasticism, the connection of which to Mahāyāna thought owes much to the exegesis of the Chinese monk Tao-hsüan (596–667), founder of the Southern Mountain (Nan-shan) tradition of Chinese Vinaya (Lü) studies.

Influence. The geographical expansion of Sarvāstivāda represents only one of the aspects of its influence, for the sophistication and maturity of its philosophy clearly won many followers, even among those who disagreed with its basic presuppositions. Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma was a standard element in the classical curricula of Indian universities, not only at their centers in Puruṣapura (Peshawar) and Valabhī (Kathiawar), but in Mahāyāna centers of learning as well.

Sarvāstivāda as Hīnayāna. The study of Sarvāstivāda as the representative doctrine of Hīnayāna philosophy continued in India long after the school had declined. Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa* became the standard textbook and was the object of numerous commentaries (those of Guṇamati, Sthiramati, Vasumitra, and, above all, the *Sphuṭārtha-abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* of Yaśomi-

tra). Buddhist and Hindu doxography to this day recognizes four main schools of Buddhist philosophy, among which Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika are the only representatives of non-Mahāyāna philosophy. This is still the basic model even among contemporary scholars in Japan and the West, where the *Abhidharmakośa* continues to be required reading for the Buddhist scholar.

The Sarvāstivāda school also provided the model for Hīnayāna in the Far East. In China, it was transmitted mainly as part of the Chū-she (Abhidharmakośa) school. Of Sautrāntika inspiration, this school was the main competitor of the other two Abhidharmic schools, the Ch'eng-shih (Satyasiddhi) school (perhaps Bahuśrutīya), and the Fa-hsiang (*dharmalakṣaṇa*, that is, the Mahāyāna Yogācāra school, which has Mahīśāsaka roots).

As a source for Mahāyāna. The evident role of the Mahāsāṃghika school in the formation of Mahāyāna tends to eclipse the contribution of other Hīnayāna schools. The Sarvāstivāda in particular was a decisive element in the formation of the higher doctrines and philosophy of Mahāyāna. The first developments in the *bodhisattva* theory—especially as it is supposed to fit in the map of the Path—were probably those found in Sarvāstivādin literature. The basic structures of Mahāyāna soteriology and Abhidharma are clearly derived from Sarvāstivāda and Mahīśāsaka sources, and so is much of their philosophical terminology. The Sarvāstivāda also contributed, through Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas, the underpinnings for Mahāyāna epistemology.

[For an overview of the relationship of the Sarvāstivāda to the other schools of early Buddhism, see Buddhism, Schools of, article on Hīnayāna Buddhism. See also Indian Philosophies and Buddhist Philosophy.]

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ŚĀSTRA LITERATURE. The Sanskrit term *śāstra* means, first, “precept, command, rule”; hence, a treatise in which precepts on a particular topic have been collected; and, finally, any branch of technical lore. *Vāstuśāstra*, for example, refers both to a treatise on *vāstu* (“architecture”) and to the science of architecture generally; *Cikitsāśāstra* indicates both a treatise on medicine and the science of medicine; and so forth.

In this article we will be primarily concerned with the *śāstras* connected with the three goals (*trivarga*) that a Hindu is supposed to pursue during his lifetime: *dharma* (“spiritual obligations”), *artha* (“material welfare”), and *kāma* (“pleasure, enjoyment”). It is worth noticing that the texts in each of these three categories, to a greater or lesser extent, also recognize the impor-

ance of pursuing the other two goals. In fact, a harmonious pursuit of the *trivarga* is a necessary condition to reach a Hindu’s ultimate goal: *mokṣa*, final liberation from the cycle of deaths and rebirths (*saṃsāra*). [See also *Mokṣa and Saṃsāra*.]

Most important—and most voluminous—are the Dharmaśāstras. They basically cover the same material as the Dharmasūtras, but they are more detailed and better organized, are mostly in verse (the thirty-two syllable *anuṣṭubh*, or *śloka*), and are considered to be more recent. Like the Dharmasūtras, they are attributed to ancient sages or “seers” (*ṛṣi*), the most important of whom was Manu. The date of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (Laws of Manu) is uncertain, but falls somewhere between about 200 BCE and 100 CE. It was followed, probably in this order, by the Dharmaśāstras attributed to Yājñavalkya, Viṣṇu, Nārada, Bṛhaspati, Kātyāyana, and others.

The Dharmaśāstras, together with the *sūtras*, constitute what is known as the *smṛti* (from the root *smṛ*, “to remember”); hence the titles *Manusmṛti* (the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*), *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, and so forth. The *smṛti* is considered to be a form of revelation based on the Vedas, which in turn form the *śruti* (from the root *śru*, “to hear”). The *śruti* is the only more authoritative body of writings than the *smṛti*; the *śāstras* themselves state that, in case of a conflict between *śruti* and *smṛti*, the former shall prevail. Although all *smṛtis* theoretically have equal authority, in practice the *Manusmṛti* is recognized as being superior to the others.

The *Manusmṛti* represents the Indian ideal of a Dharmaśāstra. After an introductory section on the creation, the text devotes five chapters to the description of the *saṃskāras*, that is, those ritual performances that mark off the successive periods in a Hindu’s life, and of the duties to be performed in each of the four principal stages (*āśramas*). The next three chapters concentrate on the *dharma* of one individual: the king. He is to protect those among his subjects who adhere to their own *dharma* against those who do not. The section on the king’s *dharma* (*rājadharmā*) naturally includes those passages for which the text first became known to Westerners, those on Hindu law. (Hence the title *Laws of Manu*.) Among the miscellaneous topics treated in the last three chapters are the duties and occupations of the different castes (*varṇa*) including “mixed castes,” expiations of sins, and the rules governing specific forms of rebirth.

The beginning of this century witnessed the discovery—and publication—of the text of the *Arthaśāstra* attributed to Kauṭilya (or Kauṭalya; occasionally Cāṇakya or Viṣṇugupta). Even though minor Arthaśāstra texts had been known before that time, and even though

some Arthaśāstra materials also appear in the Dharmaśāstras, until 1905 the text called *Arthaśāstra* was known from a few quotations only. Kauṭilya, unlike the composers of the Dharmaśāstras, is a historic figure. If he was indeed a minister of the Maurya king Candragupta, he must have lived at the end of the fourth century BCE. Some scholars, however, do not believe in Kauṭilya's authorship; based on detailed comparisons of elements in the *Arthaśāstra* with their appearance in various other works of Sanskrit literature, they assign the text later dates, down to the fourth century CE.

The *Arthaśāstra*, in prose occasionally mixed with verse, is a manual for the king and for the successful administration of his kingdom. It provides detailed prescriptions on the various administrative departments, the duties of their heads, and their internal organization. Perhaps the text has become even better known for its ideas on foreign policy. Each king is considered a potential world conqueror (*cakravartin*), and the *Arthaśāstra* provides him with various ways to achieve that goal. Kauṭilya's view that one's neighbor is, by definition, one's enemy who must be defeated with the support of his neighbor (who is, again by definition, a temporary ally), and his ruthless instructions on how to use spies and secret agents, are some of the reasons why he has been labeled "the Indian Machiavelli." [See also Cakravartin.]

Within the area of Kāmaśāstra literature the principal text is undoubtedly the *Kāma Sūtra* attributed to Vātsyāyana. The *Kāma Sūtra* shares a number of important characteristics with the *Arthaśāstra*: the *Kāma Sūtra* is also mostly in prose, interspersed with verses; like Kauṭilya, Vātsyāyana repeatedly quotes the opinions of predecessors, some of whom are the same as those named by Kauṭilya; and most important, both texts exhibit a number of passages that correspond, word for word. There seems to be general agreement that Vātsyāyana lived after Kauṭilya; his date, therefore, varies according to the individual scholar's opinion on the age of the *Arthaśāstra*.

The *Kāma Sūtra* instructs the *nāgaraka*, the prosperous citizen, on how to enjoy life to its fullest. Even though this involves, to a certain extent, the *nāgaraka*'s relationship with women—including married women and courtesans—the *Kāma Sūtra* also treats numerous other topics that shed light on the way of life and worldview of one section of ancient Indian society.

The true nature and purpose of the Indian *śāstras* is still the object of much discussion among scholars. Contrary to the early belief of Westerners—which led to the adoption, in 1772, of "the shaster" as the main source of Hindu family law in British India—it was soon recognized that, at least as far as the Dharmaśāstras are

concerned, they may very well have painted an ideal picture that did not necessarily correspond to real life situations. Hence the high expectations on the occasion of the discovery of the *Arthaśāstra*; scholars believed, and wrote at length, on the extent to which a book on *artha* was bound to provide a more realistic description of classical Indian society. I prefer to look upon the *śāstras* as—no doubt highly stylized and systematized—compendia of existing customs and practices. They provided the overall theoretical framework that authorized each individual—mostly groups of individuals—to engage in the practice (*prayoga*) of his (or their) traditionally recognized ways of behavior.

[See also Manu; Sūtra Literature; Dharma, *article on Hindu Dharma*; and Law and Religion, *article on Law and Religion in South Asia*.]

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LUDO ROCHER

SATAN. Although the name *Satan* sometimes has been connected with the Hebrew verb *saṭ*, which means "to roam" (perhaps suggesting that Satan acts as God's spy), it is more commonly derived from the root *saṭan*, which means "to oppose, to plot against." The word thus basically connotes an adversary. Its use in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament) covers three types of beings as opponents: (1) a human being, as in 2 *Samuel* 19:22, (2) an angelic being, as in *Numbers* 22:22–35, and (3) a particular adversary, as in *Zechariah* 3:1–2, where *saṭan* functions as a common rather than a proper noun and does not refer to "the Satan," but where the idea of a being having a distinct personality is still conveyed. This supernatural being not only acts as an adversary: his name itself means "an obstructor" (Russell, 1977, p. 190). In the New Testament, Satan as the Devil is called the "great dragon" and "ancient serpent" (*Rv.* 12:9). However, while echoes of a Canaanite myth of God's conflict with the dragon and the sea may be found in

the Old Testament, Satan is not associated with these references but is clearly mentioned in three contexts (except for *Psalms* 109:6, in which he is inferred). The first of these contexts is in the *Book of Job*, where Satan belongs to the court of God and, with God's permission, tests Job. By contrast, in a second occurrence (*Zec.* 3), Satan, on his own initiative, opposes Joshua. The third passage in the Old Testament in which Satan figures (*I Chr.* 21:1) is, according to George A. Barton (1911),

a further witness to the fact that Satan is now held to be responsible for evil. The chapter gives an account of David's census and of the punishment for it, and is dependent on 2 Samuel 24; but whereas it is said in Samuel that Jahweh said to David, "Go, number Israel" because he was angry with the people, it is said in Chronicles that Satan "moved David to number Israel." Satan is clearly a development out of the group of spirits which were in earlier days thought to be from Jahweh's court, members of which were sent upon errands of disaster to men. (p. 598)

Scholars seem somewhat divided on the question of the extent to which evil may be associated with Satan in the Old Testament. It has been argued that Satan "was not evil but became evil by identification with his functions" in the course of time (Robbins, 1966, p. 130). One might distinguish here between two approaches toward Satan in the Old Testament. According to one approach, represented by Giovanni Papini, Jeffrey Burton Russell, John Noel Schofield, Gustav Davidson, and others, Satan is still not quite God's adversary, only his minion. Other scholars, such as Edward Langton and Ronald S. Wallace, see a more definite movement toward an association of evil with Satan. But the transition from the *saṭan* of the Old Testament, which prefigures the Devil in some way, to the *Satanas* of the New Testament, who *is* the Devil, is clear enough.

The figure of Satan in noncanonical Hebrew literature intensifies his identification with evil. He not only emerges as an adversary of God, but, as such apocalyptic works as *Jubilees*, the *Testament of Reuben*, the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* (2 *Enoch*), and the Qumran documents show, he is also the leader of the fallen angels. It should be noted, however, that although Satan comes to stand for evil, in "Hebrew thought in the Old Testament there is no suggestion of any dualism, whether temporal, spatial or ethical . . . any philosophy of evil culled from the Bible must find room for evil within the concept of God and within his purpose." This also holds true for much apocalyptic literature; signs of temporal, spatial, and ethical dualism begin to emerge only in later Judaism. At the temporal level, the view is developed that history consists of two ages. The present age is marked by the Devil's power, which will be nullified

at the end of the present age when the divine age is ushered in. At the spatial level, the kingdoms of the Lord and Satan are contrasted as being in cosmic opposition; at the ethical level, man is seen as being affected by sin, which will be overcome in a divine denouement. Persian influence has been traced in this movement toward dualism. But Hebrew and Christian thought stopped short of specifying that the Devil is entirely evil in essence. This tension between explicit monotheism and implicit dualism became characteristic of Judaism and Christianity, as contrasted with Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and gnosticism. "The Devil," as Luther said, "is God's Devil."

Christianity synthesized Greek and Jewish concepts of the Devil. The word *devil* is actually derived from the Greek *diabolos*, which has the dual sense of "accuser" and "obstructor." If the Old Testament, according to later tradition, implicates Satan in the fall of man, the New Testament refers clearly to the fall of Satan himself in 2 *Peter* 2:4 and in *Revelation* 12:7-9. Again, in contrast with the Old Testament, the power of the Devil is often mentioned (e.g., *Lk.* 4:6). He is also identified with other names: *Beelzebub* ("lord of flies"), *Beelzebub* ("lord of dung"), and, with somewhat less critical certainty, *Lucifer*.

In the ministry of Jesus Christ, "there is a constant campaign against Satan from the temptation after Jesus' Baptism until his death on the cross, and, in each act of healing or exorcism, there is anticipated the ultimate defeat of Satan and the manifestation of the power of the new age," as is the case in Mark's gospel, the central part of which calls upon Jesus' disciples "to participate through suffering in his own confrontation with the power of Satan" (Davis, 1984, p. 952). Indeed, Mark and Paul are more inclined to use the name *Satan*; other New Testament writers prefer other forms. Nevertheless, the motif of both the original (*Rom.* 16:20) and the ultimate and eschatological fall of Satan (*Rv.* 20:2, 7-10) undergirds the New Testament, though the latter is more prominent. The Devil is the lord of both *aiōn* and *kosmos*, words used in the context of sinful human society and probably suggestive of the dichotomy of spirit and matter in Greek thought. Russell summarized the chief characteristics of the Devil in the New Testament as follows (1977, p. 256): (1) he is the personification of evil; (2) he physically attacks or possesses humans; (3) he tempts people to sin in order to destroy them or recruit them in his struggle against God; (4) he accuses and punishes sinners; (5) he leads a host of evil spirits, fallen angels, or demons; (6) he has assimilated many evil qualities of ancient destructive nature spirits or ghosts; (7) he will rule this world until the coming of the kingdom of God, and in the meantime

will be engaged in constant warfare against Christ; (8) he will be defeated by Christ at the end of the world. Above all, he is identified with temptation and death, like his counterpart Māra in Buddhism.

In early Christianity it was believed that the death of Jesus redeemed mankind from the Devil, who had been overcome in his own house by Christ's descent in hell (*Mt.* 12:29). Thus, although the idea of the final conquest of evil or the Devil is not unique to Christianity but is also present in Zoroastrianism and Judaism, "the unique note in the Christian message is the announcement that Satan is already being defeated in Christ" (Ling, 1961, p. 102). Despite this general picture, however, Russell notes that the position of the Devil remains anomalous in the New Testament, and the "elements of cosmic dualism in the synoptic gospels are much stronger in Luke than in Mark and Matthew and stronger in John than in any of the synoptics" (1977, p. 232).

Satan's name appears as *Shayṭān* in the Qur'ān, although it is not clear whether the name is Arabic or not. *Shayṭān* shares certain functions of the Judeo-Christian Satan, such as leading people astray (4:83), but there is a significant extension of this view in that Satan is accused of tampering with divine verbal revelation (22:52). However, it is in his role as *Iblīs* (2:34, etc.) that al-*Shayṭān* is most striking (Watt, 1970, p. 155). He is deposed for refusing to bow before man as the other angels had done, but is allowed, after his refusal, to tempt mortals. According to an established tradition, "Satan sits in the blood of Adam's children" and thus "could be equated with *nafs*, the lower principle, the flesh" (Schimmel, 1975, p. 193). In Islam, the figure of Satan achieves a mystical dimension not found in Judaism and Christianity, where the Devil is more or less exclusively associated with evil and the underworld. This association may help "account for the Western tradition that Satan is not only Lord of evil and of death but is also associated with fertility and sexuality, a trait evident in the witches' orgy and in the horns the Devil often wears" (Russell, 1977, p. 64).

Satan plays an important role in the folklore of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Already by the end of the apocalyptic period he had been identified with the following mythological themes in Jewish demonology and folklore: darkness, the underworld, and the air, sexual temptation and molestation, the goat, the lion, the frog or toad, and the serpent or dragon. In rabbinic folklore, Satan is not linked with the legend of Lilith, but he appears to Eve as a beautiful angel, and tempts Rabbi 'Aqiva' ('Aqiva' ben Yosef, first-second century CE) in the form of a woman. According to the Talmud he was created on the sixth day of creation. His great

rival was Michael, the leader of the angels. Satan was deemed capable of assuming any form, and there are accounts in hagiographic literature of his grappling physically with Christian saints.

Both similarities and differences may be noted between Christian and Islamic perceptions regarding Satan. One difference, according to A. J. Wensinck (1971, p. 669) lies in the fact that "Muslim thought remains undecided as to whether he was an angel or a *djinn* and does not pronounce an opinion on the possibility of his being 'a fallen angel.'" A similarity is found in Satan's characteristic ability of assuming any shape, or none at all. His ability to appear as an angel, the dreaded "mid-day Devil" of the *Psalms*, was what made Mary fearful at the Annunciation. As a *hātif* (one who is heard but not seen), Satan similarly almost beguiled 'Alī into not washing the body of the Prophet, until 'Alī was corrected by another *hātif*. Thus the imperative of distinguishing between good and bad spirits due to Satan's operations is common to both Christianity and Islam.

The serpent or snake is perhaps the best-known symbol associated with Satan. *Genesis* (3:1ff.) mentions the serpent but not Satan; in *Romans* (16:20), however, Paul suggests that the serpent was Satan, an association already made in apocalyptic literature. This would imply that Satan tempted Adam, but the consensus of early Christian tradition was that Satan fell after Adam (Russell, 1977, p. 232). There may be good reason for believing that not until Origen in the third century CE was it clearly established that Satan's sin was pride, that he fell before Adam's creation, and that he was the serpent in the garden of Eden. Agobard of Lyons (ninth century) saw Satan as seducing Eve through the serpent, and Peter Lombard (eleventh century) saw him as becoming the serpent. In a Jewish text, the *Apocalypse of Moses*, it is written that the serpent who tempted Eve was merely the tool of Satan, who, as a shining angel, tempted the serpent to share his envy of Adam and Eve. In later Jewish literature, the identities of Satan and the serpent coalesce, or are closely associated with one another.

Satan is referred to by two different names in the Qur'ānic account of creation: he is called *Iblīs* when he refuses to bow down before Adam, and al-*Shayṭān* ("the demon") when he is the tempter (Wensinck, 1971, p. 669). Though there is no allusion to the serpent in the creation account in the Qur'ān, the term *shayṭān* was probably applied by the Arabs to serpents (Langton, 1969, p. 9). Once Satan had been identified with *nafs*, or man's lower appetites, according to Annemarie Schimmel, the *nafs* was seen as taking the form of a snake. "This serpent can be turned into a useful rod, just as Moses transformed serpents into rods. More frequent,

however, is the idea that the power of the spiritual master can blind the snake; according to folk belief, the snake is blinded by the sight of an emerald (the connection of the pir's spiritual power with the green color of the emerald is significant). Thus, his influence renders the *nafs*-snake harmless" (Schimmel, 1975, p. 113). The contrast with the *kuṇḍalīnī* in some forms of yoga is very striking.

Satan is persistently, if not consistently, associated with the serpent. Leaving aside the question of the actual nature of Satan as formulated by the Council of Toledo (447), or the tendency to consider him an imaginative personification of evil, the association with the serpent needs to be accounted for. Several views have been advanced. At a homiletic level, the serpent has been taken to represent cunning. At a psychoanalytic level, the serpent has been associated with emergent sexuality. From a broader, history of religions approach "the serpent is the symbol of the Gods of vegetation; without being the representative of sex as such, he represents the temptations of the divinities that sacralize sex" (Ricoeur, 1967, p. 249). But perhaps in the end one inclines toward the hermeneutic suggested by Ricoeur that the serpent

represents the aspect of evil that could not be absorbed into the responsible freedom of man, which is perhaps also the aspect that Greek tragedy tried to purify by spectacle, song, and choral invocation. The Jews themselves, although they were well armed against demonology by their intransigent monotheism, were constrained by truth, as Aristotle would say, to concede something, to concede as much as they could without destroying the monotheistic basis of their faith, to the great dualisms which they were to discover after the Exile. The theme of the serpent represents the first landmark along the road of the Satanic theme which, in the Persian epoch, permitted the inclusion of a near-dualism in the faith of Israel. Of course, Satan will never be another god; the Jews will always remember that the serpent is a part of the creation; but at least the symbol of Satan allowed them to balance the movement toward the concentration of evil in man by a second movement which attributed its origin to a prehuman, demonic reality. (ibid., pp. 258–259).

Although Satan has come to symbolize evil so closely as to become synonymous with it, he has also been associated with some positive concepts. He was worshiped in certain gnostic circles for enabling knowledge to be brought forth. The Ṣūfī tradition has tended at times to see in him the ultimate monotheist who would bow down before naught but God, even in defiance of God's own command. It is also worth noting that there is no such fixed focus of moral evil as Satan in Hinduism (but see O'Flaherty, 1976), notwithstanding its shared cultural matrix with Buddhism, which did pro-

duce the figure of Māra. Despite the nuances of difference in Jewish, Christian, Greek, and Islamic conceptualizations of Satan, they may all share a common heritage.

[See also Antichrist; Devils; Job; and Māra. For further discussion of the symbolism, philosophy, and theology associated with the figure of Satan, see Dualism; Evil; and Theodicy. See also Witchcraft, article on Concepts of Witchcraft.]

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ARVIND SHARMA

SATIRE. See Humor and Satire.

SAUL, or, in Hebrew, Sha'ul; son of Kish, a Benjamite, and first king of Israel (c. 1020 BCE). The beginning of the monarchy under Saul, and with it the creation of a national state out of a loose association of tribes and clans, is attributed in the tradition to external threats from east and west. Saul's kingship is presented in *I*

Samuel as a transition from the time of the judges, temporary charismatic leaders of individual tribes or regions, to that of a more unified and permanent military rule.

Saul's ability to rally support from the Israelite tribes in order to relieve Jabesh-gilead from the Ammonite siege and achieve a victory for the Transjordanian tribes (*1 Sm.* 11) was the actual occasion in the oldest tradition for making him king. In subsequent military activity his forces also had some success against the Philistine garrisons in the central hill country (*1 Sm.* 13–14), but in a major encounter between the two armies Saul and his sons lost their lives in battle (*1 Sm.* 31).

The length of Saul's reign (cf. *1 Sm.* 13:1) and the exact extent of his domain are not known. His authority probably did not include Judah. His residence, in Gibeath of Benjamin, did not include an elaborate court. Yet he did much to pave the way for David's later success (*1 Sm.* 14:47–51).

The older traditions about Saul's monarchy, including a folk tale about his youth (*1 Sm.* 9–10:16), have been expanded by the historian of *Samuel* and *Kings* in order to depict the prior divine election and designation of Saul as king (*1 Sm.* 9:15–17, 10:1, 17–27) and his later rejection (*1 Sm.* 13:8–15; cf. *1 Sm.* 15) through the prophet Samuel. The author also expresses his ambivalence about the monarchy as both a divinely sanctioned institution and a possible source of religious waywardness, injustice, and corruption (*1 Sm.* 8, 12). Finally, in his account of David's rise to power, the rejected Saul is used as a foil for the virtues of David, God's chosen successor.

[See also *David and Samuel*.]

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JOHN VAN SETERS

SAURA HINDUISM is the branch of Hinduism in which the sun is worshiped as the principal deity. The first clear evidence of sun worship in India comes from the Vedas, the collections of ritual hymns produced by the Aryans who entered India around 1500 BCE. Several *devas* ("powers" or "deities") praised in the Vedas had

solar qualities, and the sun was also a *deva* in his own right as Sūrya or Āditya, the visible sun, and as Savitr, the stimulator of life. Vedic ritual practice honored the sun with daily recital of the Gāyatrī *mantra* to Savitr and sacrifices to Sūrya. Despite this recognition, however, the sun was never considered the most important *deva* during the Vedic period.

Vedic sacrificial religion was basically aniconic. The only visible solar *deva*, Sūrya was represented in some Vedic rituals by symbols such as a twelve-petaled lotus, a wheel, or a golden disc, but the first anthropomorphic images of the sun god were stone reliefs of Sūrya in a one-wheeled chariot from Buddhist sites at Bodh Gayā and Bhaja in the first century BCE. These images indicate the emergence of Sūrya as a popular, but subsidiary, deity, a status that he maintained throughout southern India. In the North, however, Sūrya worship was transformed by foreign influence into Saura Hinduism.

The context of this transformation was the conquest of northern India late in the first century CE by the Indo-Scythian empire of the Kushans, which extended from Central Asia through Bactria to its capital at Mathura. Contact with the neighboring Parthian empire opened the way for Iranian as well as Scythian influences during the century and a half of Kushan rule. Together, these influences changed the earlier solar religion into a popular theistic sect with distinctive foreign features.

The first change was the iconographic remodeling of Sūrya to look like a Kushan ruler with a close-fitting Scythian tunic and boots, an iconography that was preserved in all subsequent images of Sūrya in northern India. The second development, as described in the main text of Saura Hinduism, the *Sāmba Purāṇa*, was the creation of a major center of Sūrya worship at Multan in the Punjab by Sāmba, a son of Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa, who also brought magi from Iran to serve as priests. A major concern of the *Sāmba* was thus not only to exalt the worship of Sūrya as savior but to justify the use of magi as brahmans in the cultic ritual.

There was already a major temple at Multan by the time the oldest portion of the *Sāmba* was written early in the sixth century; the text mentions further centers of Sūrya worship in Mathura and Orissa. Expansion continued throughout northern India for many centuries, but the sect went into rapid decline after the fifteenth century. The temple at Multan has not survived, and most Sūrya temples show the effects of long neglect. The eighth-century Sūrya temple at Martand in Kashmir and the eleventh century temple at Modhera in Gujarat, however, show the range of Saura influence, and the great thirteenth-century Sun Temple at Konarak in Orissa proves the grandeur of its vision.

[For a cross-cultural discussion of sun worship, see Sun.]

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THOMAS J. HOPKINS

SAUTRĀNTIKA. Most available sources agree that the Sautrāntika school separated from the Sarvāstivāda perhaps some four centuries after the death of Śākyamuni Buddha. Its followers were called Sautrāntika, meaning those who take the *sūtras* as the last word, because although they accepted the two main parts of the Buddhist canon (the Tripiṭaka), namely, the Vinaya and the Sūtras, as the true word of the Buddha, they rejected the third part, the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, considering it later philosophical disquisition, which for them had no binding authority. However, the Sautrāntikas must have remained effectively a branch of the Sarvāstivāda, as they continued to follow the same Vinaya, or monastic discipline, and their differences remained not so much practical as philosophical. They are sometimes referred to by such variant names as *Sūtrāntavādins* or *Sūtrapramāṇikas* (meaning the same as *Sautrāntika*), or as *Samkrāntivādins*, referring to their theory of rebirth or transmigration (*saṃkrānti*). Names such as *Saurodayika* ("like the sunrise," perhaps a reference to one of their famous teachers) and *Dārṣṭāntika* ("users of similes") are also applied to them. As a philosophical movement deriving from the Sarvāstivāda school, they distinguished themselves primarily from the Vaibhāṣikas, namely, those who adhered to the *Vibhāṣa* (Philosophical Disquisition), a text based upon the (Sarvāstivāda) Abhidharma literature, and who maintained the reality of *dharma*s

in all three times: past, present, and future. [See Dharmas, article on Buddhist Dharma and Dharmas.]

According to the Chinese monk Hsüan-tsang, who visited India between the years 627 and 645, the Sautrāntika recognized Ānanda, the closest disciple of Śākyamuni, as their chief master. According to another Chinese scholar their founder was called Uttara. Some Tibetan sources say that this school was called Uttarīya ("superior") in recognition of its superiority with regard to Dharma. Bhavya, tells us that the *Samkrāntivāda* was also called Uttarīya and that its founder, Uttara, seceded from the Sarvāstivāda. Tāranātha maintains that the names *Samkrāntivāda*, Uttarīya and Tāmraśatīya all referred to the same school. A Chinese source asserts that one Pūrṇa, who propagated the Vinaya and Abhidharma teachings, encountered opposition from some monks who thereupon took Ānanda, the master of the Sūtras, as their patron. Vasumitra informs us that the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda held similar teachings, but Vasubandhu and *Samghabhadra* concentrate mainly on the polemics between these two schools. In the Abhidharma literature there are references to four people who are said to have been the "four suns" of the Sautrāntikas: Kumāralābha, reputed as the founder of this school, Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, and Śrīlābha. Some modern scholars assert that such well know Buddhist thinkers as Vasubandhu, Dignāga, or even Dharmakīrti were adherents or sympatizers of the Sautrāntikas. [See the biography of Vasubandhu.]

Like the teachings of several other early Buddhist schools whose writings have been lost, Sautrāntika theories are known mainly from the surviving literature of other philosophical schools, Hindu as well as Buddhist, who most often refer to the Sautrāntikas in the process of refuting views at variance with their own. Although such references are bound to be partisan, it is nonetheless possible to gain a fair idea of Sautrāntika doctrines from them. In that these doctrines clearly serve as a link between the realistic atomizing theories of the earlier schools and the "mind only" (*cittamātra*) theories of the Yogācāra tradition, such an endeavor is all the more rewarding.

While the Sautrāntika adhere to the fundamental Buddhist "dogma" of *anātman* ("no-self," i.e., no transmigrating element) they reinterpret the earlier theory of *dharma*s (elemental particles), of which the five components (*skandhas*) of individual personality are said to be composed. [See also Soul, article on Buddhist Concepts.] Individual personality is essentially a nonentity (a "no self"), definable as a constant flux of elemental psychophysical particles, momentarily composing themselves under the effect of *karma*n as form or matter (*rūpa*), feelings (*vedanā*), perceptions (*saṃjñā*), impulses (*saṃ-*

skāra), and consciousness (*vijñāna*), namely as the five components. The main point at issue between the Vaiśbhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas concerns the operation of *karman* upon the elemental particles resulting in a new interpretation of their nature. According to the Sarvāstivāda, all elements exist in past, present and future; hence their name, coined from *sarvāsti* ("everything exists"). An individual personality is therefore an ever-changing flow of real elements, the components of which vary from moment to moment in accordance with its *karman*. The Sarvāstivāda argue that every action projects its eventual effect upon the fluctuating stream of elements in the form of a fresh type of elemental particle known as *prāpti*, literally "acquisition" or "appropriation." Although itself of momentary existence like all other particles, *prāpti* continues to re-manifest itself in the general stream of elements until an appropriate combination with other elements, themselves the effects of subsequent actions, produces the "fruit" or retribution of that particular action. Thus, *prāpti* may be regarded as the force that acts within a particular stream of elements (i.e., an individual personality) keeping it united as a seemingly coherent entity, not only within a single life-stream but also in the passage from one life to the next.

Since personality is also regarded under the threefold aspect of body, speech, and mind, action (*karman*) is definable as physical, vocal, or mental. Probably all Buddhists agree that mind or thought predominates in some way, but the extent and manner of its predominance presented a major area of discussion and disagreement among the early schools. Applying the theory of real elemental particles to everything, the Sarvāstivāda identified mental action as "volition" (*ce-tanā*), while vocal and physical action, treated as an "expression" (*vijñapti*) of volition, were classed as elements within form or matter (*rūpaskandha*). Thus, mental action would cause the arising of vocal or physical action according to the normal process of *karman* throughout past, present, and future, and all elements in the process remain equally "real." The Vatsīputriyas, on the other hand, argued that vocal and physical acts are not real elements or "things in themselves" but a mere "process" or "motion" (*gati*) provoked by mental *karman* or volition, which receives expression (*vijñapti*) thereby.

The Sautrāntikas rejected the concept of action as operative in the past, present, and future; thus, strictly speaking, an action cannot result in an effect in the future, since neither past nor future can exist simultaneously with the present. The past *has* existed and the future *will* exist in relationship to the ever passing present, but only the present can actually exist and its ex-

istence is momentary (*kṣaṇika*). Thus bodily and vocal action resulting from mental action (i.e. thought) cannot exist in the manner envisaged by the Sarvāstivāda or Vaiśbhāṣika, and their concept of *prāpti* as a holding force can have no meaning. Likewise, *vijñapti* as the "expression" of thought has no real existence in itself; indeed, it is only the mental action as volition that exists, possessing moral value as good, bad, or indifferent. The Sautrāntikas analyze volition under three aspects: "deliberation" (*gaticetanā*), "decision" (*niścayacetanā*), and "impulsion" (*kiraṇacetanā*). It should be noted that all three terms include *ce-tanā*, "mentation," or the process of thinking. The first two constitute the "action of thinking" (*ce-tanākarma*), which in effect is volition, manifest as mental reflection (*manaskāra*) or thoughts (*caitta*). They both represent the "action of thought" (*manaḥkarma*). The third aspect, "impulsion" (*kiraṇace-tanā*), is twofold: that which impels bodily movement and that which impels speech. This explanation reduces the actions of body and speech, conceived by the Vaiśbhāṣikas as realities (classed within the *rūpaskandha*) that succeed mental action throughout a time process, to mere aspects of volition, which alone is a reality, manifesting itself momentarily in what is always effectively the present. It is thus thought alone that has moral value as good, bad, or indifferent.

The Sautrāntikas claim that the maturing of *karman* as the "fruit" or effect of morally qualifiable volition can be explained by the manner in which the mental series evolves. An action, being a thought associated with a particular volition, is momentary (*kṣaṇika*). It disappears the very moment it is committed (and thus has no real duration as explained by the Sarvāstivāda) but it impregnates (*vāsanā*) the mental series (*cittasam-tāna*) of which it forms a starting point with a particular potentiality (*śaktiviśeṣa*). The impregnated series undergoes an evolution (*pariṇāma*) of varied periods of time and culminates in the final transformation-moment (*viśeṣa*), which constitutes the state of retribution. The evolution of the series is compared to a seed and its gradual transformational growth until it matures as a fruit.

The Sautrāntikas had to answer certain objections as to what happens when the series is interrupted, as for instance in suspended meditation. A primitive interpretation, as represented by the Dārṣṭāntika view, assumed the theory of two simultaneous series, one mental, constituted by the six consciousnesses, and one material, constituted by the corresponding sense organs. When the mental series is interrupted it resumes in due course its evolution from its seeds or germs (*bīja*) that are preserved in the material series. Similarly, the material series, when it is interrupted (in death or in the medita-

tive trances of the *ārūpyadhātu*), becomes reborn from its seeds preserved by the mental series. But where, it may be asked, is the continuity of the series as such? How are the germs retained? The answer of the Sautrāntikas is to assert the existence of a subtle thought (*sūkṣmacitta*) underlying the mental series and constituting its continuity.

Subtle thought was defined by the Sautrāntika thinkers in two different ways: some said it was mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) free of concepts (*saṃjñā*) and feeling (*vedanā*); others envisaged it as mental consciousness (*citta*) free of mentations (*caitta*). Both groups agreed that its objective sphere (i.e., its real nature) is "imperceptible" (*asaṃvidita*). This subtle consciousness was known by such other names as *ekarasa-skandha* ("aggregate[s] of one flavor or nature"), *mūlāntikaskandha* ("origin and cause of the five *skandhas*"), and *paramārthapudgala* ("true and real person"). Later, the nature of "subtle consciousness" was explained by distinguishing two kinds of thought: a multiple or complex mind (*nānacitta*) as represented by the six kinds of active consciousnesses, and a store or subtle thought (*ācayacitta*). The complex mind and the elements (*dharma*s), all of which evolve simultaneously, impregnate the subtle thought with their seeds or germs.

The complex mind functions through different objects (*ālambana*), aspects (*ākāra*), and modalities (*viśeṣa*). The Sautrāntikas argued that when these functions of complex mind are absent, as in, for instance, a state of suspended meditation, the state is deprived of thought in the sense that the series is interrupted, but that in fact this absence does not indicate total interruption because subtle thought continues to exist, serving as a repository of all the seeds (*sarvabīja*) deposited by the complex mind. As the series evolves, the seeds mature and produce their "fruit" (retribution), which consists of a new (good or bad) complex mind and elements. As the subtle consciousness is the sustainer of these new or matured seeds, it is also called the "consciousness of retribution" (*vipākaphalavijñāna*). From the time of birth until the moment of death the subtle mind constitutes the continuity of the series and it transmigrates (*saṃkrāmate*) from one existence to the next, assuming different manifestations (reincarnations). Once it reaches the moment of passing into *nirvāṇa* (final retribution or deliverance) it is cut off and completely extinguished. This interpretation was criticized but also adopted with modifications by the Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika schools. [See also Yogācāra.]

The Sautrāntika rejected the existence of the unconditioned elements (*asaṃskṛta*). For them, these elements were not real or distinct entities but represented mere

denomination of absence. Thus, space (*ākāśa*) represented an absence of tangible bodies (*sprṣṭavya*) and *nirvāṇa* denoted the nonmanifestation of passions and adverse psychophysical elements. They also denied the reality of the fourteen "unassociated" elements (*cittavi-prayuktasamskāra*), among which origination, duration, decay, and impermanence in particular were viewed not as entities but as mere denominations of the flux of the elements.

The Sautrāntika maintained that the objects of the external world are not really perceived because, being momentary, they disappear before they can be perceived. Thus, the object of cognition, being already passed as soon as it appears, is not perceived directly; it leaves behind an image that is reproduced in the "act of cognition." Such a process gives the impression that it exists, while in fact it only did so in the now nonexistent past.

In opposition to other schools, which maintained that only a man who was advanced on the path toward arhatship might possess the potentiality (*anāsravaskandha*) of liberation, the Sautrāntika maintained that ordinary people (*prthagjana*) had the same potentiality. Finally, they also asserted that apart from the Noble Eightfold Path (*āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*) there was no other way to destroy the *skandhas*; meditation and other practices can suppress the passions (*kleśas*) but cannot eradicate them completely.

[For an overview of the relationship of the Sautrāntikas to the other schools of early Buddhism, see Buddhism, Schools of, article on Hīnyāna Buddhism, and Sarvāstivāda. See also Indian Philosophies and Buddhist Philosophy.]

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SAVONAROLA, GIROLAMO (1452–1498), Dominican preacher, reformer, and prophet. Savonarola was born in Ferrara, Italy, and under the eye of his grandfather, the distinguished court physician Michele Savonarola, was educated in religious and liberal studies before going on to medicine. A story that he was disappointed in love, and his early poem *De ruina mundi* give some insight into his decision to enter the Order of Friars Preachers in 1475. In Bologna he completed his novitiate and attended the Dominican Studium Generale. In 1482 he went to Florence as reader in the Observant Dominican convent of San Marco. The recently rediscovered Borromeo Codex, containing Savonarola's sermon notes, poetry, and other writings from this period, shows us a young reformer in process of development rather than the born prophet portrayed by his hagiographers. The moralizing, ascetic sermon drafts contain none of the spectacular visionary themes, still less the millenarian themes, of Savonarola's later preaching. Still under the influence of Scholastic homiletics with its labored, allegorical exegesis, he was just beginning to find a more personal and direct, if as yet unflamboyant, style.

In 1484, ruminating on the wickedness of the world, he conceived "on the basis of scripture" that the church had imminently to be scourged and reformed, and he announced his new apocalyptic reading of scripture in his Lenten sermons in San Gimignano in 1485 and again in 1486. He was appointed *magister studiorum* in Bologna in 1487, and in the next few years he gained attention as a preacher in various north Italian cities. In 1490 he was reassigned to San Marco at the request of Lorenzo de' Medici, unofficial ruler of Florence, who may have been prompted by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, one of the friar's admirers. Elected prior, he briefly considered taking his friars into the woods of a nearby mountain valley, but instead he concentrated upon reforming San Marco and preaching in the city. He began to criticize tyrants as corrupters of the people, and he warned of coming tribulations. He was aware that he might share the fate of other preachers, most recently Bernardino da Feltre, who had been expelled from Florence for stirring up unrest; but the city's rulers made no effort to pluck this latest thorn from the flesh of the body politic, perhaps because they were pleased by Savonarola's fruitful efforts to create a new Tuscan congregation of Dominican houses with San Marco at its center, perhaps because they knew it would be difficult to dislodge him without scandal among his widespread following. With Piero de' Medici, who succeeded Lorenzo in 1492, he seems to have been on good terms.

By the 1490s rumbles of the earthquake that was to destroy Italy's facade of collective security were beginning to be heard. Charles VIII (1483–1498) was heralded as the new Charlemagne, who would restore French imperial glory, cross the sea to conquer "the Infidel," and convert the world into a single sheepfold under one shepherd. To Savonarola he was the *flagellum Dei* who would scourge the church and carry the children of Israel into captivity. Florence, that den of iniquity, would suffer with the rest. In the fall of 1494 Charles invaded Italy, and his opposition melted away as he marched to the frontiers of Tuscany. A frightened Piero de' Medici hurried to the king's camp and surrendered the key Florentine strongholds. Returning to Florence, Piero encountered a city in revolt, and he fled. After sixty years of Medici domination Florence had recovered its liberty.

Savonarola's standing as a popular champion and prophet gave him unrivaled authority. Holding no civic office, he exercised his influence through preaching (now supported by visions), through meetings with civic leaders, and through political allies in the city's councils. He charted a course between direct democracy and narrow oligarchic reaction, the chief feature of which was a new Great Council with hereditary qualifications for admission and sovereign powers on the model of Venice. In the city's religious institutions he changed little, but he sought to introduce a spiritual revolution through moral reform. Ascetic conduct was urged from pulpits and enjoined by new laws and by youthful vigilantes organized from San Marco. Religious processions replaced secular festivals; bonfires of "vanities" consumed the tokens of "worldliness"; specially written lauds celebrated the millennial glories of a spiritually revitalized Florence. The Jews, tolerated by the Medici regime, were expelled, and a public loan fund (Monte di Pietà), advocated by Franciscan preachers, was set up. Ignoring his earlier warnings of tribulation and doom, Savonarola now envisioned Florence as the New Jerusalem, center of liberty and virtue, from which would radiate the new era, when Florence would be "richer, greater, more powerful than ever."

Inevitably, however, Savonarola's insistence that the French king was Florence's divinely elected champion led to the city's political isolation in Italy, and the longer Charles put off his return, the lower Savonarola's credit dropped. His avoidance of the pope's summons to Rome and his disobedience to a command of silence led to his excommunication, and a papal interdict for harboring him threatened the city. All this created a situation that Savonarola's enemies could exploit. He was unable to block a Franciscan's challenge to a trial by

fire, and he bore the brunt of the blame when this eagerly awaited test failed to take place. A mob attacked San Marco, and Savonarola and two other friars were imprisoned, interrogated, and tortured. Altered versions of Savonarola's confession to false prophecy and political conspiracy were published. On 23 May 1498 the three friars were hanged and burned on a specially constructed scaffold in Florence's main civic square.

The Savonarolan republic survived until 1512, when the Medici were restored by Spanish troops. It was revived by a revolt in 1527, in which *piagnone*, or Savonarolan, ideology played a fundamental role. Once again revolutionary millenarianism and puritanical republicanism flowed from San Marco. Once again the Jews were expelled. Prostitutes were banned. Pro-Medicean utterances were made a capital offense. Enemies of the regime were exiled. Blasphemers and sodomites were put to death. Such uncompromising fanaticism alienated republican moderates and strengthened the hand of the Medici, who came back to the city in 1530. As a political movement "piagnonism" was finished, although the cult of Savonarola thrived and has been revived periodically up to the present day. Its traces can be discerned in the Risorgimento biography by Pasquale Villari, the Catholic modernist life by Joseph Schnitzer, and the cinquecentennial biography by Roberto Ridolfi. Hagiography apart, Savonarola's sermons and devotional works continued to be printed and read in Italy, Spain, France, and Germany. Savonarolan piety, with its emphasis upon individual religious experience, charity, and the way of the cross of Christ, was admired by Martin Luther. A statue of the Dominican was erected in Wittenberg, although Savonarola surely belongs more to the Catholic than to the Protestant reformation.

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Muhammad introduced it in AH 1 (622 CE) by fasting and asking his followers to fast on 'Āshūrā', the tenth day of the month of Muḥarram, in deference to the Jewish practice. The following year came the Qur'anic revelation (surah 2:183ff.) whereby the 'Āshūrā' fast was replaced by the fast of Ramaḍān.

The Qur'ān indicates that fasting is an inalienable part of the religious life of people, since it was prescribed for Muslims as well as "for those before you," in order "that you become pious" (2:183). The earmarking of Ramaḍān, the month in which "the Qur'ān was sent down" (2:185), for fasting seems to be a recognition of the centrality of the Qur'ān in Muslim religious life and an attempt to reinforce it. In Muslim understanding, fasting is a means of fostering piety, of celebrating the glory of God, and of thanking him for revealing the Qur'ān, "a guide for mankind, and clear signs for guidance, and judgment" (2:185).

Except for a very few days of the year, Muslims may fast whenever they wish to as an act of supererogation. Fasting is so meritorious that in addition to obligatory fasting pious Muslims frequently observe voluntary fasting (*ṣawm al-taṭawwu'*), seeking self-purification and spiritual growth. Certain days and months have been specially recommended for voluntary fasting.

Fasting is obligatory for anyone who makes a vow to fast. In certain circumstances fasting has been prescribed as an alternative means of atonement. In addition, those who miss any days of the Ramaḍān fast (apart from the elderly or incurably sick) must make up the fast at a later date.

Ramaḍān. As one of the "Five Pillars" of Islam, the fast of Ramaḍān has a special position in Muslim religious life. All Muslims who have attained puberty and are in full possession of their senses are obliged to fast. Persons who are sick or traveling, and pregnant or nursing women, are exempted. Women in their periods of *ḥayḍ* ("menstruation") or *nifās* ("bleeding on the childbed") are not allowed to fast, although they are required to make up later for those days missed. The elderly and the incurably sick are totally exempted from fasting, but for every day of fasting missed they should feed one poor person.

Each day's fast commences when "the white thread of dawn appears to you distinct from the black thread" (2:187), and fasting restrictions remain applicable until sunset. This poses a problem in the polar regions, where days and nights are sometimes indistinguishable; it has been suggested, therefore, that the times of sunrise and sunset at the forty-fifth parallel be considered standard for determining times for fasting for places lying between the forty-fifth parallel and the pole.

It is recommended that those who fast should have a

ŞAWM in Islam signifies fasting, an act of worship that consists of religiously intended abstention from eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse from dawn until dusk.

meal (*saḥūr*) before dawn, preferably as late as possible. Likewise, it is highly recommended that after sunset one should hasten *ifṭār*, the breaking of the fast. Any food or beverage may be taken for *ifṭār*, although dates or water is preferred. *Ifṭār* is usually a light meal and is taken hastily, since the *maghrib* ("sunset") prayer is performed minutes after sunset. It is considered highly meritorious to provide *ifṭār* to others, especially to the poor. It is common among Muslims to have *ifṭār* together in the neighborhood mosque and to invite friends, relatives, and neighbors to *ifṭār* parties.

Infractions of fasting such as eating, drinking, smoking, sexual intercourse, or indulgence in love play leading to seminal emission invalidate the fast. Such infractions variously necessitate *qaḍā'* ("restitution") alone, or *qaḍā'* and *kaffārah* ("atonement"). *Qaḍā'* consists of fasting one day for each day of invalidated fasting, whereas *kaffārah* necessitates the liberation of one Muslim slave, two months of consecutive fasting, or the feeding of sixty of the poor. Both *qaḍā'* and *kaffārah* are necessary when the fast of Ramaḍān is deliberately and voluntarily broken without extenuating reasons such as travel or sickness. The jurists are agreed that sexual intercourse necessitates both *qaḍā'* and *kaffārah*. In cases of eating and drinking, the Shāfi'i and Ḥanbalī schools prescribe only *qaḍā'*, whereas the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools prescribe *qaḍā'* and *kaffārah*.

Ramaḍān is a month of concentrated worship and charity. Muslims have been urged to perform special prayers in the evening called *tarāwīḥ*. These consist, according to most Muslims, of twenty *rak'ahs*, or prayer sequences; they are generally performed in congregation, with the whole of the Qur'ān recited over the month. The last ten days of Ramaḍān, especially the nights, are considered highly blessed, since one of them is Laylat al-Qadr, the Night of Power, which is "better than a thousand months," the night in which "angels and the spirits descend and it is peace till the rising of the dawn" (97:4–6). Devout Muslims spend the better part of these nights praying and reciting the Qur'ān. It is also recommended that Muslims observe *i'tikāf* ("withdrawal") during Ramaḍān, especially in its last ten days. *I'tikāf* consists of withdrawing to a mosque and devoting oneself exclusively to worship. Moreover, following the example of the Prophet, whose charitable-ness and philanthropy were heightened during Ramaḍān, Muslims show much greater propensity to charity at this time.

The end of Ramaḍān, signaled by the sighting of the new moon, is celebrated in the 'Īd al-Fiṭr (the festival marking the end of fasting). The religious part of the 'Īd consists of two *rak'ahs* of prayers in congregation and payment of a fixed charity, *ṣadaqat al-fiṭr*. The 'Īd, how-

ever, also has an important social dimension. Muslim cities and villages take on a festive look, people usually wear their best clothes, and friends, relatives, and neighbors meet in mosques or on streets, congratulating, embracing, and kissing each other. The exchange of visits is also quite common.

Significance and Inner Dimension of Şawm. The legal minutiae associated with *şawm* sometimes prevent appreciation of its religious significance and inner dimension. Religiously sensitive Muslims are not satisfied merely with observance of the outward rules, which serve as an assurance against the invalidity of the fast but not of its acceptance by God. The Prophet is reported to have said that "he who does not abandon falsehood and action in accordance with it, God has no need that he should abandon his food and drink." The desire to make one's fasting acceptable to God has led devout Muslims to emphasize the qualitative aspect of fasting. Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), for instance, emphasized that abstention from food, drink, and sexual satisfaction is only the elementary level of fasting. At a higher level fasting means keeping one's ears, eyes, tongue, hands, and feet free from sin. And at a still higher level fasting means a withdrawal of the heart and mind from unworthy concerns and worldly thought in total disregard of everything but God.

A major object of fasting, in al-Ghazālī's view, is for humans to produce within themselves a semblance of the divine attribute of *şamadīyah*, freedom from want. Another scholar, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 1350), viewed fasting as a means of releasing the human spirit from the clutches of desire, thus allowing moderation to prevail in the carnal self. Shāh Walī Allāh (d. 1762), one of the most famous South Asian theologians, viewed fasting as a means of weakening the bestial and reinforcing the angelic element in humans. A contemporary Muslim thinker, Sayyid Abū al-A'lā Mawdūdī (d. 1979), emphasized that fasting "for a full month every year trains a man individually, and the Muslim community as a whole, in piety and self-restraint; enables the society—rich and poor alike—to experience the pangs of hunger; and prepares people to undergo any hardship to seek the pleasure of God."

[For further discussion of Ramaḍān, see Islamic Religious Year. See also Worship and Cultic Life, article on Muslim Worship.]

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are available in English translation: see *The Translation of the Meanings of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, 4th ed., 9 vols., translated by Muḥammad Muḥsin Khān (Chicago, 1977–1979), and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, 4 vols., translated by Abdul Hameed Siddiqui (Lahore, 1971–1975). See also Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Khaṭīb al-Tibrizī's *Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ*, 4 vols., translated by James Robson (Lahore, 1963–1965). For useful works in English with full chapters on ṣawm, see *Inner Dimensions of Islamic Worship* (Leicester, 1983), a partial translation by Muhtar Holland of al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*; Abulhasan Alī Nadwī's *The Pillars of Islam*, translated by Mohammad Asif Kidwai (Lucknow, 1972); and G. E. von Grunebaum's *Muhammadan Festivals* (New York, 1951).

The impact of ṣawm on the lives of people, especially the ways in which Ramaḍān has been and is being observed in different Muslim lands, is a subject worth exploring. Good sources are travel accounts written by Muslims as well as outsiders.

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SAXO GRAMMATICUS (c. 1150–1216), Danish historian whose writings (*Gesta Danorum*) constitute one of the few important early sources on Germanic mythology and religion. Saxo studied in France and later became secretary to the Danish archbishop Absalon, who suggested that he write a history of Denmark. By 1200 he had completed seven books covering the monarchy from Harald II (known as Bluetooth) to Knut IV (936–1202). During the next decade, he wrote nine more books on the mythical traditions of antiquity prior to Harald II. He drew upon all available sources, both oral and written, and wrote excellent Latin, including verse in various classical meters. He was well acquainted with Norse saga traditions, which he had either heard as a boy or learned from Icelandic poets. He wove the legendary material into a continuous narrative, taking liberties as he pleased.

Saxo's importance is threefold. Much of his material provides corroboration of other mythological documentation, in particular the works of Snorri Sturluson. Furthermore, some of Saxo's material is all that exists on certain topics, because of the loss of original texts. Finally, his legendary tales demonstrate his euhemeristic method of transforming myths into history. A fine example of all three points is the saga of Hadingus (*Gesta Danorum* 1.5–8). The main character, Hadingus, is none other than the god Njǫrðr transformed into a hero. The parallels are striking. Both figures have two relationships with women. The earlier relationship in each case is incestuous (Njǫrðr with his sister, Freyja, and Hadingus with the giantess Harthgrepa, who had nurtured him as a child). The later relationship for each comes about when the woman uses a special method of

selecting her mate (Skaði chooses Njǫrðr on the basis of his beautiful feet, while Regnilda picks out Hadingus by his legs). In this saga, Saxo corroborates the information provided by Snorri on Njǫrðr. Like Njǫrðr, Hadingus is a master of the ocean, having power over the winds and familiarity with the seas. Saxo provides copious detail on how Hadingus acquired this mastery; such detail in respect to Njǫrðr is completely lacking in other sources. There are many other examples of Saxo's euhemerization of the Norse pantheon, such as his transformation of Freyr to Frothi, Baldr to Balderus, and Hǫðr to Høtherus.

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SCANDINAVIAN RELIGION. See Germanic Religion.

SCAPEGOAT. The word *scapegoat* goes back to early English translations of *Leviticus* 16, the description of the Day of Atonement, especially verses 5–10, 20–22, and 26. The Hebrew text has *la-'aza'zel*, which the Septuagint translates *apopompaios* and the Vulgate as *caper emissarius*. It is these translations that are reflected in *scapegoat* and in the French *bouc émissaire*. The German *Sündenbock*, on the other hand, expresses a more narrowly defined concept connected with the confession of sins mentioned in *Leviticus* 16:21–22.

In the science of religions the term *scapegoat* is used in a very broad sense for every kind of eliminatory rite in which sin, illness, or any other misfortune is ritually transferred to a concrete carrier (especially living beings such as animals or men, but also inanimate objects) and thus removed. These eliminatory rites are to be distinguished from sacrifice, substitution, and certain rites of purification.

Sacrifice (including propitiatory sacrifice) presupposes a recipient who is thought of as a personal being. Substitution is either (1) the replacement of one sacrificial object by another of lesser value (a surrogate), as, for example, the replacement of a human sacrifice by an animal sacrifice or, more generally, of one cultic instrumentality by another; or (2) the replacement of a human being who is threatened with disaster by another living being, human or animal, or by an image. Finally, in certain rites of purification (lustration), while an external instrument such as water or fire plays a role, there is no concrete individual entity (human being, animal, or image) that functions as carrier of the misfortune.

The Israelite Scapegoat Ritual. In the final literary redaction of the Pentateuch, the scapegoat ritual forms part of the rite of the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), which was celebrated on the tenth of Tishri (September–October); the scapegoat ritual, however, had been introduced at a relatively late date. The bloody propitiatory sacrifices for the sins of the priests and the people and for the purification of the sanctuary are accompanied by the (originally independent) scapegoat ritual, which involves the choice of a goat by lot, an imposition of hands on the goat together with a confession of sins, and the sending of the goat into the wilderness “for ‘Aza’zel.” The majority of modern exegetes interpret ‘Aza’zel to be a demon who dwells in the wilderness; in the Old Testament, he is mentioned only in this passage, but he appears in the apocryphal literature as one of the fallen angels. As Gispén (1948, p. 159) points out, the scapegoat ritual is not a sacrifice to this demon, such sacrifices being forbidden in the Levitical legislation; rather, “this deed of sending the he-goat with all the iniquities and all the transgressions and all the sins of the children of Israel to Azazel is a scorn to this evil spirit.”

According to statements in the postbiblical sources, the propitiatory goat was driven over a cliff into a gully and thus killed; this, however, does not prove that the rite was a sacrificial one, as some authors assume. The goat had become unclean and therefore could no longer serve as a sacrificial gift; he was killed simply to prevent his returning and thus bringing the sins (or calamity) back with him. In the text of *Leviticus* as we now have it, the efficacy of the rite is connected with the confession of sins in the presence of Yahveh; it is usually assumed, however, that a once purely magical rite of elimination has here been reinterpreted.

Parallels in Mesopotamia? In the cuneiform literature, scholars have claimed to find parallels to the Israelite scapegoat ritual, especially in three kinds of rites: incantations over the sick, the ritual killing of a

ram at the New Year, and the practice of the substitute king.

In incantations made on behalf of the sick, an animal (a lamb, a kid, or sometimes a young pig) was frequently offered to the demon of illness as a substitute for the sick person; at times, this took the form of dismembering the animal and laying its parts on the corresponding parts of the body of the sick person. In these cases there was, however, simply a substitution and not a ritual of elimination. During the Babylonian New Year festival (Akitu) a ram was killed on the fifth day, its blood was smeared on the walls of the temple, and its head and trunk were thrown into the Euphrates; the two cultic assistants who had killed it were considered to be unclean until the end of the festival. Some writers see fundamental points of agreement between this ritual and the Israelite scapegoat ritual. Others, however, emphasize the differences: in Babylon, the ram was not removed alive but slain, its blood served to purify the sanctuary, and there was no question of the removal of sins.

The ritual of the substitute king (Shar Pukhi) is attested in the following form in neo-Assyrian documents (eighth to seventh century BCE): when omens, especially astronomical, gave reason to fear that some disaster threatened the king, another individual was installed in his place as a substitute king for a certain period of time and dressed in the royal insignia, while the real king withdrew into retirement. If the substitute king died during the dangerous period, the danger to the real king was thought to have been averted; if, however, he did not die a natural death, then after the prescribed period he may have been slain.

An isolated report from the nineteenth century BCE shows that a similar custom was practiced in the Old Babylonian period, and this older ritual may be inferred for the later period as well. James G. Frazer sought to explain the ritual humiliation and ensuing reinvestiture of the king at the Akitu festival as deriving from the supposedly regular installation of a substitute king at the festival and, ultimately, from a ritual slaying of the king, in connection with the myth of a dying and reviving god of vegetation.

A final point is to be made: the ritual of the substitute king is neither a pure substitution ritual nor an eliminatory scapegoat ritual. Furthermore, the humiliation of the king during the Babylonian New Year festival is not to be regarded, as has been claimed, as vicarious expiatory suffering; still less is the substitute king an innocent vicarious sufferer. There is therefore no justification for describing the substitute king as a “propitiatory goat,” and it is completely erroneous to derive the suffering Servant of God (Eved Yahveh) in “Second

Isaiah" from such a source, as is done by S. H. Hooke (1956, pp. 218–221) and Geo Widengren (1969, pp. 296–299).

Parallels among the Hittites. Hittite rituals from the fourteenth to the thirteenth century BCE attest both the practice of the substitute king and the transfer of sicknesses and other misfortunes to animals or human beings. When unfavorable astronomical or other omens announced some misfortune threatening the king, a representative—preferably a prisoner of war—was anointed, invested with the royal insignia, installed as a substitute king, and then removed to hostile foreign parts. The Hittites took over these rituals from Mesopotamia, but "only the Hittite rituals connect the motif of an eliminatory rite of the so-called 'scapegoat' type . . . with the motif of a magical representative of the king . . . that is, with a substitution rite in the proper sense" (Kümmel, 1967, p. 191).

A still closer kinship with the scapegoat ritual may be seen in the Hittite rituals for arresting epidemics. Through a ritual transference, animals—usually rams, but in one instance also a prisoner of war and a woman—were burdened with the pestilence and then driven into hostile foreign parts. These practices probably derive from a common (pre-Semitic and pre-Indo-Germanic) substratum.

Parallels among the Greeks and Romans. At the Thargelia in Athens, which was celebrated in May, two men known as *pharmakoi* were led out of the city as carriers of some evil. There are also reports from various places in Ionia of Thargelia festivals involving similar rites; comparable customs, as for instance the dispelling of epidemics, are also attested for other places on the Greek mainland and for the Greek colony at Marseilles. In some cases, it is expressly said that the human carriers of the evil were stoned or killed in some other manner while, in other cases, they were perhaps only driven out by having stones thrown at them, though frequently they were also beaten.

At Rome, where the year originally began on 1 March, on 14 March a man clad in an animal skin and designated as Mamurius Veturius ("the old Mars") was struck with rods and thus driven through the streets and out of the city.

Other Parallels. According to a report from the mid-nineteenth century, in the port city of Yenbo' on the Red Sea, during an epidemic a camel was driven through the neighborhoods where the disease was widespread and then killed "in a holy spot." Among various tribes in India, illnesses used to be ritually transferred to animals, especially cocks or goats, which were then driven away. In Indonesia and Oceania, miniature boats are often used to send illnesses away, whether in times of epidemic or periodically.

Magical and Ethical Aspects. The Israelite scapegoat ritual as described in *Leviticus* 16 is usually interpreted as follows: an action originally regarded as working magically and automatically—the transference, through an imposition of hands, of the uncleanness of sin, considered to be something material—was transformed into a symbol accompanying a confession of sins, sin now being interpreted in ethical terms. According to James G. Frazer, Raffaele Pettazzoni, and others, only at a late stage did an ethical concept of sin develop out of the earlier notion of sin as material and magical. Other scholars, however, see the ethical concept of sin and the scapegoat ritual that accompanied confession of sins as having independent origins and separate development.

Finally, in an extended sense, the word *scapegoat* is used to refer to individuals or groups to whom some offense is falsely ascribed and who are, consequently, persecuted or even killed. This phenomenon, testified in numerous historical events (e.g., the persecution of minorities) and reflected in myths and literature down to the present day, has been taken by René Girard as explaining the origin of the sacrificial victim and indeed of sacrality itself.

[See also Atonement.]

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JOSEPH HENNINGER

Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

SCARIFICATION. See Bodily Marks.

SCHECHTER, SOLOMON (c. 1847–1915), Talmud scholar and educator. A product of four distinct European cultural ambiances, Solomon Schechter came to New York in 1902 to lead a reorganized Jewish Theological Seminary of America. During the thirteen years of his presidency he exerted a formative influence on an emergent American Judaism by facilitating the gradual transfer of the academic study of Judaism from the old to the new world and by creating the institutions, leaders, and rhetoric of a movement for Conservative Judaism.

Born in the still largely traditional Jewish society of eastern Romania, Schechter came to Vienna in his mid-twenties with a formidable mastery of classical Jewish texts. A four-year stay in the 1860s at the rabbinical school founded by Adolf Jellinek gave him rabbinic ordination, command of the new Western methods of Jewish scholarship, and a lasting affection for his teacher, Meir Friedmann. In 1879 Schechter moved on to Berlin to continue his training as a Jewish scholar at the recently opened Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, where he came under the influence of Israel Lewy, the outstanding critical Talmudist of his generation. In 1882 he received an invitation from Claude Montefiore, whom he had befriended at the Hochschule, to come to England as Montefiore's tutor in rabbinic literature. Five years later he gave resounding evidence of his scholarly abilities with a model critical edition of an early homiletical rabbinic text, *Avot de Rabbi Natan*. Dedicated to Montefiore, it combined Friedmann's love of *midrash* with Lewy's critical method.

By 1890 Schechter had achieved academic respectability, though not financial security, with a lectureship (later a readership) in rabbinics at Cambridge University. During the next decade he moved quickly to the forefront of a lackluster generation of Jewish specialists ensnared by the pulpit and polemics. His scholarship was marked by a sweep, competence, and originality usually associated with the polymaths who had founded the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. Prior to his departure for America, Schechter published the first fruits of his

eventual synthesis of rabbinic theology (1894–1896), a collection of popular essays on Jewish history and literature (1896), a good part of the Hebrew original of *Ben Sira* (1899), and the first volume of a large Yemenite *midrash* on the Pentateuch (1902). Of still greater consequence was Schechter's dramatic foray in January 1897 into the long-abandoned *genizah* of Cairo, where he was compelled "to swallow the dust of centuries" in order to exhume and bring to Cambridge an inexhaustible trove of manuscripts from ancient and medieval sources related to Jewish society and culture.

A scholar of international renown, a superb expositor of Judaism in English, a charismatic personality, a religious moderate, and a man of culture—these were the qualities that made Schechter so attractive to the plutocracy of American Jews of German descent who were eager to revitalize the Jewish Theological Seminary. For his part, Schechter wished to escape the growing burdensomeness of his religious isolation and inadequate salary at Cambridge.

Once in New York, Schechter moved to replicate the academic model pioneered in Breslau, Vienna, Berlin, and Budapest: a nonpartisan rabbinical school free of outside rabbinic control whose graduates would be immersed in the academic study of Judaism. Schechter insisted that every applicant have the B.A. degree, "bearing evidence of his classical training," and recruited a young, largely European-trained faculty of great promise to challenge the often unsympathetic Christian scholarship on Judaism.

Religiously, Schechter articulated an inchoate conception of Judaism that was anti-Reform, pro-Zionist, while remaining open to all historical expressions of Judaism, all-embracing, and responsive to change. He rejected Reform's excessive rationalism, eagerness to "occidentalize" Judaism, preoccupation with Judaism's mission, and minimal commitment to the Hebrew language. His own broad embrace is best documented in his inimitable three-volume *Studies in Judaism* (London, 1896, 1908; Philadelphia, 1924), which cherishes every historical expression of Judaism. Choice and change are ultimately effected "by the collective conscience of Catholic Israel," and history supplements scripture as a medium of revelation. Despite the implicit historicism of this view, Schechter failed to enunciate a procedure for sanctioning change and, indeed, dedicated most of his energy to defending what the past had sanctified. In 1906 he dared to defy his own benefactors, the wealthy and anti-Zionist Jews who had brought him to the United States, by avowing Zionism as an antidote to the erosion of Jewish identity.

The persistent weakness of the Seminary forced Schechter by the end of his first decade of leadership to

consider building a congregational base that would provide additional support. After protracted deliberations, the United Synagogue of America was founded in 1913 with Schechter as its first president. The occasion, however, did not provide for further ideological clarification. The omission of any reference to "Conservative" in the organization's preamble epitomized the reluctance of Schechter and his associate Cyrus Adler to form a "third party in Israel." The coalescence of a religious movement was to be the achievement of others during the interwar period, after Schechter's death. [See Conservative Judaism.]

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ISMAR SCHORSCH

SCHELER, MAX (1874–1928), German philosopher. Scheler was born in Munich on 29 August 1874, and died, after a dramatic life filled with personal misfortunes, in Frankfurt on 19 May 1928. He taught philosophy at the universities of Jena, Munich, and Cologne.

His thought is divided into two periods. In the first, up to 1921, he concentrated on value ethics and the strata of human emotions; in the second, he was occupied with metaphysics, sociology, and philosophical anthropology. Both periods are characterized by numerous studies in religion, culminating in the thought of the "becoming" Deity that is realizing itself in human history.

The first period centered on three major works: *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1913), *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (1913–1916), and *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (1921). It is characterized by Scheler's phenomenology and, extrinsically, by Roman Catholicism, to which he had been converted in his early life. Scheler's phenomenology is distinct from Husserl's in that (1) Scheler, unlike Husserl, did not

conceive consciousness to be absolute but, rather, dependent on the "being of person," and also because (2) for Scheler all regions of consciousness through which entities are given in their particular nature (e.g., as animate or inanimate, etc.) are ultimately based in the region of the absolute, in which each person relates to what he holds to be absolute. This made Scheler the forerunner of phenomenology of religion.

In *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* and other works Scheler showed how this region of the absolute can be "filled" by various gods, fetishes, or even nihilism. Therefore, he posed a basic question: what is it that gives itself adequately—and how does it accomplish this—in this region of the absolute of human consciousness? His answer: God as person. For Scheler, God is experienceable only through "love" of divine personhood, not through rational acts. Love itself is an emotive act and prior to perception and knowledge. Love reveals an order (*ordo amoris*) in which values are "felt." The highest value is the "holy." The human heart, as the seat of love, has its own "logic" (as Pascal held). In the heart, and not in knowledge, God as person is phenomenologically "given."

In his second period, Scheler abandoned this form of theism, without however abandoning the primacy of love. He now conceived the deity as unperfected, becoming, and in strife with itself. He explained this process in terms of two opposite divine attributes: urge (*Drang*) and spirit (*Geist*). Scheler reached his conclusion about the deity through a "transcendental elongation" of man's own nature, that is, by setting man's own vital urge, which posits reality, in opposition to man's mind, which bestows ideas on reality. The vital urge is our self-moving, self-energizing life center in which the deity's urge also pulsates. Without urge and drives the mind would remain "powerless" and "unreal." There is no mind unless it is "in function" with the self-propulsion of life. Hence, God's spirit also requires divine urge for its realization. The theater of this divine process is human and cosmic history, in which deity "becomes" as it struggles for its realization. Man is called upon to "co-struggle" with this divine becoming.

Scheler died without resolving the question whether or not the theogenetic process would ever reach completion. He held, however, that the uncreated process of the becoming of man, world, and deity had reached a "midpoint" toward both spiritualization and divinization of both man and life. In 1926, Scheler envisioned the future as a new, long, and perilous "world era of adjustment" between the too-intellectual and active West and the more passive East. The future, thought Scheler, would reflect gradual balance and less struggle

between spirit and urge; history will become "less historical" as God ever more "becomes" in it.

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MANFRED S. FRINGS

SCHELLING, FRIEDRICH (1775–1854), German philosopher. Born at Leonberg in Württemberg, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling received his early education at the preparatory seminary at Bebenhausen, where his father, a Lutheran minister, was professor of Old Testament studies. From an early age, Schelling was exposed both to Lutheranism and to the Swabian mystical pietism of Bengel and Oetinger. Precociously entering the University of Tübingen at fifteen, he enthusiastically espoused (with his comrades G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich Hölderlin) the ideas of the French Revolution and the philosophy of Kant. At the time of his first professorship in 1798, at Jena, Schelling had met J. G. Fichte, had published in significant journals, and had offered a synthesis of the new philosophy and the new natural sciences.

Schelling's philosophical career unfolded in four major periods: Fichtean transcendentalism (to 1796); systems synthesizing the history of consciousness and nature (to 1806); explorations of the ground of freedom

and consciousness in the mode of mysticism (to 1820); and the final system, whose second and third parts describe the unfolding of idealism in the history of religion (1827–1843). Because of the years of friendship with Hegel at Jena after 1800 and their years of enmity after Hegel's first publications, we can only suspect Schelling's creative influence in ideas that today are associated with Hegel.

Of the great philosophers of the early nineteenth century, Schelling remains comparatively little known, and his thought is usually falsely presented as a sterile, unwieldy structure of mental forms drawn from his early works. Despite his youthful break with church and orthodoxy, Schelling's philosophy by 1802 had reexamined religion; his move first to Würzburg and then to Munich was crucial, for these cities placed him in contact with Franz von Baader, the rehabilitator of Meister Eckhart and Jakob Boehme, and with the vigor and sacramental mysticism of the Bavarian renaissance under Ludwig I. Stimulated particularly by Boehme, Schelling, in his important *Essay on Human Freedom* (1809), led German philosophy from the consideration of structures of consciousness to the enterprise of will. Beyond necessity and freedom, good and evil, a ground of the divine being in its longing for its own identity sets in motion an exoteric process. This process realizes itself in a triad of powers that guides the universe, human history, and God's own life.

After some years at the University of Erlangen, Schelling returned to join Baader, Joseph von Görres, Johann von Döllinger, and Johann Möhler at the new University of Munich. There, in 1827, he announced his final system, one that was not an exploration of transcendental concepts but a presentation of the birth of God in a trinitarian dialectic: a vast but real extension of dialectic into history, into religion, and then into the incarnation and kenosis of Christ. Although Schelling presented this system for over fifteen years, the final section on the age of the Holy Spirit and the church—the synthesis in the Johannine church of the dynamics of both Peter (Catholic) and Paul (Protestant)—was never developed beyond a few pages.

Theologically, Schelling was influenced by Neoplatonism, Lutheran Christianity, and forms of mysticism; he read extensively in the theological writings, Protestant and Catholic, of his time. From 1798 to 1830 he was the mentor of progressive Catholic theologians in the south, while Protestant theologians such as Karl Daub were initially impressed with his work. Schelling influenced Russian philosophy and theology and, through Coleridge, English culture; although rejected by the young Kierkegaard and Engels, in thinkers

such as Paul Tillich and Gabriel Marcel the existentialism of his final thought touched the twentieth century. Since the centenary year of his death, 1954, there has been a growing interest in Schelling: major works, bibliographies, and volumes of a critical text have appeared.

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THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.

SCHENIRER, SARAH (1883-1935), pioneer in religious education for Jewish females, founder of Baiš Ya'aqov educational institutions. Born to a Belzer Hasidic family in Cracow, descendant of rabbinic scholars, Schenirer was a devout Jew who worked as a seamstress by day and spent her evenings in the private study of biblical texts and rabbinic legends, a discipline begun in her youth. This was unusual for a woman in her times and even as a child she was affectionately teased as "the little pious one."

In 1914, inspired by a sermon, Schenirer conceived the idea of Jewish classes for women. Until that time, Jewish education in eastern Europe was designed exclusively for men, inasmuch as rabbinic tradition interpreted the commandment to study Torah as incumbent upon males only. But Schenirer's religious fervor and love of sacred texts, combined with her fear of the inroads of cultural assimilation, secular Zionism, and Polish feminism, led her to radical innovation: the creation of a school that would both increase the knowledge and strengthen the faith of young Jewish women.

Despite initial setbacks, Schenirer persisted. Securing the blessings of the influential *rebe* of the Belzer Hasidim, in 1918 she opened her first school in her home, with two young aides whom she sent off after a year to establish schools in other communities. In 1919, the Or-

thodox Agudat Yisra'el movement adopted and expanded the network of Baiš Ya'aqov (Yi., House of Jacob). [See Agudat Yisra'el.] By 1925, twenty schools were operating, including several high schools. In combining religious studies with secular and professional training, Baiš Ya'aqov represented a synthesis of Polish Hasidic piety and Western enlightenment.

Schenirer soon relinquished executive duties but remained a central figure in the movement, a role model and personal source of inspiration to the students. She also founded the Baiš Ya'aqov Teachers' Seminary and established the Bnoš (Daughters) Youth Organization for religious females.

Little is known of her personal life. Her first marriage ended in divorce; a primary factor in the couple's incompatibility was that her husband was less religiously committed and observant than she. She had no children and died of cancer at the age of fifty-two.

The Baiš Ya'aqov movement suffered a terrible blow in the Holocaust. Most of the students and teachers who had been involved with Baiš Ya'aqov between 1918 and 1939 did not survive. After the war, Baiš Ya'aqov and Bnoš were reestablished and expanded in the United States, Israel, and Europe—with more of an eye, however, to conserving tradition than to bridging tradition and modernity, as was its aim in Schenirer's lifetime.

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BLU GREENBERG

SCHISM. [This entry consists of two articles: An Overview and Christian Schism. The first treats the phenomenon in terms of its religious and social ramifications: types of schism, origins, and effects. The second surveys movements, disagreements, and conflicts in the history of Christianity that have resulted in segmentation of church unity.]

An Overview

Schism is the process by which a religious body divides to become two or more distinct, independent bodies. The division takes place because one or each of the bodies has come to see the other as deviant, as too different to be recognized as part of the same religious brotherhood. Often disputes over doctrine or organization brew for years before some triggering incident incites the final break. During that preparatory period, groups of adherents slowly come to understand their procedures and convictions as being fundamentally different from those of the opposing group. The psychological and sociological process of separation is often complete before an organizational break occurs.

Types of Schisms. One way to classify schisms is to look at who defines whom as deviant. Either the parent group or the departing group, or both, may see the other as having diverged from the true faith. In the first instance, when the parent group defines the schismatic group as deviant, the charge against it (or more often against its leader) is usually heresy. [*See Heresy.*] Ironically, such heretics do not usually set out to leave the parent body. Rather, they have new ideas about how the faith should be practiced or how the religious body should be organized; but in the course of promulgating their ideas, these reformers are found intolerable by the parent body and forced out. Such a process was most visible in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. But it also occurred within Protestantism as, for instance, when Puritan dissidents such as Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams were cast out of the Massachusetts Bay Colony as heretics, forcing them to form new schismatic groups. Although reformers may declare the current leadership and practice of their body to be corrupt, in this kind of schism the body itself is not usually condemned until the separation is imminent.

In the second instance, schism may occur when a departing group declares the parent body to be illegitimate, and the parent body seeks to retain the schismatics within the fold. Such an occurrence is most common when the schism parallels clear political or ethnic divisions. The parent body seeks to retain a broad definition of itself and its power, and the schismatics seek more local, independent control. For instance, the Philippine revolution of 1897–1898 was followed in 1902 by a schism of many local churches away from the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Because the church had become a symbol of imperial rule, religious schism followed political independence. Throughout their history, the Sikhs of the Punjab have claimed that their way of life should be both politically and religiously independent of

Hindu India, whereas India has taken a more inclusive (some would say imperialistic) stance. In the United States, various nineteenth-century Protestant schisms resulted from ethnic and cultural differences introduced by immigrants. As in the 1963 split in the (American) Serbian Orthodox church, these schismatic groups came to see the parent body as unresponsive to their needs and probably irredeemable. Schisms took place despite protests from the parent group.

The third kind of schism is probably the most common. Here each side comes to see the other as having deviated from the true path. Although each may try for a time to convert the other, their final separation is a recognition that they can no longer work and worship together. This pattern has been typical for American Protestantism, from the regional divisions of the mid-nineteenth century to the fundamentalist departures of the 1920s. Since no single Protestant body monopolizes religious authority, charges of heresy can be made by almost anyone. When the charge has found fertile ground in popular discontent, Protestant doctrinal disputes have often led to schism.

Ideological Factors. Religious schism, of course, by definition is an ideological matter. Differences in belief and practice are almost always at stake. In Eastern cultures, the scale is likely to tip toward differences in religious practice as the source of division, whereas in Western society, dogma assumes a more central role. The ultimate values of most groups are vague enough to allow for differences in practical interpretation. In religious groups those practical differences can create divergent paths to salvation and opposing definitions of good and evil, with each side nevertheless seeking to justify its beliefs in terms of the same core of sacred values.

Even organizational and political disputes, when they occur within religion, are infused with sacred meaning. In *The Religion of India* (1958), Max Weber argues that the original division between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism was more organizational than dogmatic. The Mahāyāna tradition began to allow more leniency in relationships to worldly affairs, the laity, and money. Today, leaders of religious organizations are not just subject to accusations of inefficiency and poor administration but to charges of violating a sacred trust. When dissidents seek to reform a religious organization, they often charge that those in power have corrupted the true ideals of the group. Typical bureaucratic intransigence can become proof of evil intent. The battle cries of religious conflict originate in arguments about ultimate truth, and for that reason they must be taken seriously as factors in the divisions that occur from time to time.

Social Factors. It is, however, impossible to treat religious schism exclusively as a theological matter. The ideas over which believers fight and divide make sense only as a part of the lives of people in a given time, place, and social position. When social change occurs, people's understanding of the religious life changes as well. Separation occurs not only because people come to hold incompatible views about salvation but because those views are born of different life experiences. The kinds of social differences that can lead to religious schism fall into three broad, interrelated categories.

Economic differences. H. Richard Niebuhr claims that "the division of the churches closely follows the division of men into the castes of national, racial, and economic groups" (1929, p. 6). Although class divisions are rarely a perfect predictor of religious schism, they often play an important role. Niebuhr's argument is that sects (that is, schismatic groups) arise as the socially disinherited seek a religion that more nearly meets their needs. They are more concerned with emotion, informality, ethical purity, and the coming new age than more established, well-to-do believers either need or wish to be.

More recently, Dean R. Hoge (1976) has demonstrated that the class base for current divisions is not so much in objective differences in income, occupation, or region as in the degree to which individuals perceive middle-class values to be threatened by change. At a theological level, the differences are seen in disagreements over the dualistic nature of humanity. At an organizational level, the two parties differ on how the church should order its priorities. The result is an incipient schism across American Protestantism that pits the traditional conservatism of the upper class and of the lower middle class against the innovation of those in the upper middle class who are neither so entrenched nor so insecure as to feel threatened by change.

Beyond these divisions within advanced capitalist societies, changes in the world economic order as a whole can also create a climate for schism. When either masses or elites find themselves in a new economic context, displayed from old loyalties, living in a world that operates by different rules, religious revolutions are possible. In medieval Japan, political and economic chaos provided the setting in which the Pure Land and Nichiren sects were formed within Buddhism. It was no accident that the Protestant Reformation occurred in the context of declining feudalism and rising nationalism. It is also no accident that the independent churches in Africa today have arisen with the decline of imperialism. Again in Japan, cultural change since the middle of the nineteenth century has been enormous,

and there has been a parallel proliferation of new religious movements. Changes in the economic and political order create new religious questions and leave spaces into which new religious solutions can fit.

Modernization. Much of the social change that leaves people open to religious reorganization and schism can be seen as part of the long-term process of modernization. [See Modernity.] To be modernized is, among other things, to learn new skills for encountering and manipulating the world, among the most important being literacy. Having personal knowledge of sacred texts often distinguishes a schismatic group from its parent body. As early as the fourteenth century, reformers such as John Wyclif were teaching their followers to read and thereby sowing the seeds of the revolt from Catholicism that would follow. More recently, David B. Barrett (1968) has demonstrated that African independent churches are springing up most predictably in the areas where the Christian scriptures are available in the vernacular. Having personal access to scripture is part of a climate of individualism that is neither necessary nor possible in an unmodernized world. It is also part of the social process of religious schism.

Modernization not only creates social dislocation and encourages individualism, it also creates a world in which there are multiple versions of truth, in which there is pluralism. [See Religious Pluralism.] Ironically, one of the factors most important in predicting schism is a preexisting state of division. Where differences are already an everyday fact of life, religious schism is more likely and more easily accomplished. For this reason, it is not surprising that in the Philippines, Protestantism was most successful in precisely the same areas that had first experienced schism from the Roman church as part of the development of the Philippine Independent Church. When Islam began to dominate India in the fifteenth century, one of the responses to its spread was new religious differentiation within Hinduism. Likewise, Barrett has documented that schism in Africa is more likely where independent African churches have been established in neighboring tribes, where the culture is not dominated by Islam, and where there is a relatively large Christian population. Where monolithic religious authority is absent and examples of division are at hand, schism is more likely.

Political differences. Religious schisms also occur because religious life cannot be separated from the political circumstances in which people exist. The Donatist schism, among the earliest divisions in the Catholic church, happened in part as a result of political tensions between North Africa and Rome. Later, during the Middle Ages, the formal schism between the Eastern

and Western churches had its greatest practical reality in places like Russia, where religious schism followed the lines of political animosity between Russians and Poles. The Protestant Reformation might have taken very different form but for the rivalries among various heads of state and between them and Rome. Likewise, the shape of Protestantism in America has been undeniably affected by divisions among ethnic and immigrant groups, divisions over slavery, and divisions between frontier and city, local and cosmopolitan.

In most of Asia, religion and communal life have been so inextricably intertwined that political change has, by definition, meant religious change, and vice versa. The nineteenth-century Taiping rebels in China adopted a religious synthesis of Christian and Confucian thought that propelled them into military conflict with the Manchu rulers. Today, religious divisions often parallel political ones within the Indian subcontinent. The prejudices and divisions of everyday life are more often reflected in religious separation than overcome by religious unity.

Organizational Dynamics of Schism. All of the theological, cultural, economic, and political factors that give rise to schism are necessary causes, but they are not sufficient causes in themselves. They cannot explain why one missionized culture experiences schism and another does not, why some ethnic groups share a religious heritage, and others see each other as religiously alien. To explain those differences, one must take into account the organizational structures in which divisions are encountered. Some organizations make schism likely, whereas others prevent division from occurring. Those who have studied social movements have identified various ingredients in organizations that may make schism possible. The factors they list may be divided into two broad categories.

Conditions in the parent body. Most basically, conditions that produce cohesiveness also inhibit schism. If there are strong incentives of loyalty and reward binding people to the parent body, splinter groups will have difficulty forming. Likewise, when the members have few competing ties to other organizations, their religious commitments are more central and less likely to be disturbed.

However, since conflict is always a possibility in the application of religious values to everyday life, organizations that learn to control conflict can avoid schism. Often this means simply hearing and responding to grievances. It may mean establishing structures in which disagreements can be contained and made useful (e.g., the establishment of monastic orders in Catholicism). When organizational hierarchies are too author-

itarian to change or to allow diversity, they may be confronted by schism.

Conversely, organizations that have too little dogma, too loose an identity, are equally vulnerable. The incredible diversity of Hinduism can in part be accounted for by the lack of concrete dogma, organized clergy and congregations, or any central group giving it limits of belief and practice.

Equally important, the form of authority in the organization provides the raw materials out of which schisms can occur. The more democratic the group's polity and the more autonomous its constituent units, the more it is susceptible to division. As authority is dispersed, it is more easily claimed and protected by dissident groups. Schism is, after all, at least in part a struggle for organizational power. It is an attempt to impose one group's views on the whole. That imposition can take place only as long as the instruments of power are also under the group's control. Decentralized religious organizations provide niches of power that can be used by dissidents mobilizing a revolt.

An implication of the foregoing is that parent bodies with effective means of social control are less likely to experience schism. When organizational hierarchies know what their members are doing and are able to apply effective sanctions, dissidents are less able to mobilize. Heretics who are banished or burned only occasionally become the inspiration for later schisms.

Conditions in the dissenting body. To achieve a successful withdrawal from a parent body, dissenters must mobilize a variety of resources. They must make it rewarding for people to participate in their movement by offering them opportunities to lead, to be recognized, and to feel they are defending important values. Followers must be promised not only a more sure path to eternal salvation but a way to achieve more tangible goals as well. Where punishment seems more immediately likely than reward, reformers must be able to turn even that to their advantage.

Most especially, dissenters must be able to manipulate symbols of good and evil so as to define the conflict in cosmic terms. A dissenting group must therefore develop effective means of communicating its ideas and overcoming the counterarguments of the parent body. The emphasis on literacy in schismatic groups nicely serves this purpose.

All of these undertakings require resources of time, money, and skill. Often it is those at the bottom of the social structure who can contribute time, a powerful benefactor who can contribute money, and trained people on the fringes of the parent organization who can contribute skill.

Finally, most schismatic movements need a charismatic leader. One person provides the ideas and inspiration that motivate others to follow.

Conclusion. Schism, then, is a division in a religious body in which one or each of the separating groups defines the other as having departed from the true faith. It always involves conflict over what is ultimately true and how that truth should affect human lives. Yet schism also occurs in a social context in which economic divisions and changes, the process of modernization, and political differences impinge on the way people organize themselves into religious bodies. Those structural conditions provide the background and raw materials of schism, and specific organizational conditions provide the means by which a separation is finally accomplished.

[See also Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy.]

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movements can happen only if the organizational conditions are also right.

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Christian Schism

In ecclesiastical contexts, *schism* is both a technical term and a general term referring to a split or division within a segment of the Christian church or between segments of the Christian church. It is a category of ecclesiology that is basic to understanding the history of the Christian church, because the church, in its understanding of itself as an institution, has placed great emphasis on the unity and integrity of structure, order, and dogma.

Schism appeared early in the history of Christianity and took a variety of forms, which makes it difficult to apply any one legal or canonical definition to the phenomenon or the term. Schisms were noted in the earliest documents of the church, including the New Testament. The first and second letters of John note the centrality of ecclesiastical harmony and the danger of heretical distortions of the teaching handed down. The same fear of divisions (*schismata*) is noted in other letters, such as Paul's letters to the Corinthians.

Historically, the notion of schism has been and continues to be important to a large part of the Christian community because of its emphasis on theological and eucharistic unity as fundamental to the nature of the church. But schisms are inherent in any society that claims to have access to the truth and believes that truth is essential to salvation. Schism makes sense only in communities that have the will and the agency—whether pope, council, or Bible—to establish norms of behavior and parameters of belief without excluding the possibility of diversity in theological emphasis.

The foundational nature of this unity was made evident from different perspectives in the writings of Ignatius of Antioch in the first century and Irenaeus in the second century in response to confrontations with heresy. Ignatius emphasized the centrality of the local bishop, and Irenaeus stressed the importance of the canon of scripture and apostolic succession. In addition to the theological affirmation, the birth of the church within the Roman empire and its expansion in the Byzantine milieu heightened this sense of institutional and dogmatic unity within the context of the diversity encouraged by geography and distance. In an empire as multinational as the Byzantine empire, it is easy to understand how schism came to be a political threat and why, as in the example of Constantine and the Donatists, immediate imperial intervention was called for. [See Donatism.]

While schisms have had a variety of causes, they did exhibit similar sociological dynamics. For instance, they tended to be aggravated as the initial causes and antagonists became lost in the phenomenology of the separation itself. In fact, it is not unusual in Christian history to find that the original factors and personalities causing a schism were forgotten as each party to the dispute forced its own position to a logical extreme in opposition to the other. Hence the very diversity that the early church and even the medieval church demonstrated became perverted as differences in emphasis became dogmas in opposition, as in the cases of monophysitism and Nestorianism. [See *Monophysitism and Nestorianism*.]

Early Schisms. Among the earliest schisms of any significance were those related initially to historical phenomena and ecclesiastical discipline. Such was the case with the Donatists in North Africa and the Meletians in Egypt during the early fourth century. These two cases, as well as the Novatian schism in Rome in the third century, demonstrate the historical conditioning of schism (in these cases persecution) and that questions of order and discipline can and did develop into theological and ecclesiological issues.

The first significant schisms to affect the Christian church were those based on heresy or a one-sided emphasis on a particular, albeit accepted, aspect of Christian belief. These were the withdrawals of Nestorian Christians in Persia in 431 as a result of the Council of Ephesus, and the so-called monophysite Christians in Syria, Egypt, Armenia, and Ethiopia in 451 after the Council of Chalcedon. Political and cultural factors would crystallize these churches in their isolation from the mainstream of Christianity, consisting of Latin and Greek portions of the empire. [See *Heresy, article on Christian Heresies*.]

Unity was not guaranteed between the two largest geo-cultural portions of the Christian church—the Latin West and the Greek East. The efforts of Emperor Zeno (474–475; 476–491) to reconcile the monophysites to the official church by publication of the *Henoticon* (482) occasioned the thirty-five-year schism between Rome and Constantinople. The *Henoticon*, compromising the Chalcedonian formulations, was opposed by Felix II, who excommunicated both Zeno and his patriarch, Acacius. The schism lasted from 484 to 519, when it was brought to an end by Emperor Justin I and Pope Hormisdas (514–523). The churches of Rome and Constantinople continued to experience minor and short-lived conflicts based on theological and political issues in the seventh-century Monothelite Controversy and the eighth-century Iconoclastic Controversy. [See *Icons and Iconoclasm*.]

Rome and Constantinople. Relations between the churches of Rome and Constantinople continued to degenerate during the eighth century as these churches grew increasingly hostile as well as distant in their ecclesiology and politics. The most notable feature of the ecclesiastical developments of the eighth century was the new alliance that the papacy forged in mid-century with the new Carolingian kings. The logical result of the geographical and cultural isolation to which Rome was subjected was its turn toward the Franks, consummated by Pope Stephen II's alliance with Pépin III in 754. The Franks could give the papacy the military support that the Byzantine emperor could not supply. The crowning of Charlemagne in 800 by Leo III was both a symptom and a cause of the growing ecclesiastical hostility between Rome and Constantinople.

In the ninth century, through the agency of the Carolingians, the issue of the *filioque* was thrust into the already hostile relations between Rome and Constantinople. The *filioque*, Latin for “and the Son” (asserting that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both God the Father and from God the Son) had been inserted into the Nicene Creed in sixth-century Spain to protect the divinity of the Son against residual Arianism and adoptionism. Charlemagne welcomed, endorsed, and adopted the *filioque* officially at the Council of Frankfurt (794) and used its absence among the Byzantines as the basis for charges of heresy. By the mid-ninth century, the two main issues that would characterize East-West ecclesiastical disputes, the *filioque* and papal primacy, were defined.

Photian schism. In 858, Photios assumed the patriarchate of Constantinople on the occasion of the deposition and later resignation of Patriarch Ignatius (847–858). Ignatius's partisans appealed to Rome for his restoration. Their cause was taken up by Nicholas I, who was looking for an opportunity to intervene in Eastern ecclesiastical affairs to enhance his authority. A Roman council in 863 excommunicated Photios as a usurper and called for the restoration of Ignatius, but the council had no way of enforcing its decisions in the East, and the Byzantines bitterly attacked the move as an uncanonical interference in their affairs.

During the same period, the Byzantines had collided with the Frankish missionaries operating in central Europe and Bulgaria over the question of adding the *filioque* to the creed as well as its theological propriety, both of which Photios was to attack in his *Mystagogia*. In 867, Photios held a council and excommunicated Nicholas. In the same year he addressed a letter to the Eastern patriarchs, condemning Frankish errors being propagated in Bulgaria.

The schism, though short-lived, was significant in

that it embodied two of the main issues that would poison ecclesiastical relations until the fifteenth century. In 867, Photios was deposed and then, in 877, restored to the patriarchate. The schism ended when the Latin church, through the attendance of three papal legates at the council of 879/880, endorsed by John VIII, confirmed Photios's restoration and the end of the internal schism between the Photians and the Ignatians.

Fourth marriage controversy. The next schism between the churches of Rome and Constantinople concerned the fourth marriage of Emperor Leo VI (886–912). Though married three times, Leo had failed to produce a male heir. When he did sire a son, it was with his mistress, whom he wished to marry so that he could legitimize his son as his successor, Constantine VII. Because Byzantine canonical tradition grudgingly permitted only three marriages, Patriarch Nicholas I refused to permit the emperor to marry a fourth time. Leo appealed to the Eastern patriarchs and to the pope, Sergius III, for a dispensation. In 907 a council approved the fourth marriage, partially on the basis of the dispensation of Sergius. Nicholas I resigned and was replaced by the more cooperative Euthymios. A schism resulted within the Byzantine church between supporters of Nicholas and supporters of Euthymios.

When Leo VI died in 912, his successor, co-emperor Alexander I reappointed Nicholas to the patriarchate. Nicholas addressed a letter to Pope Anastasius III (911–913), optimistically informing him that the schism within the Byzantine church had ended and asking him to condemn the authors of the scandal, but he did not name either Leo or Sergius. The letter was never answered, and Nicholas removed Anastasius's name from the diptychs, the ecclesiastical document maintained by each church that records the names of legitimate and recognized hierarchies, effecting thereby in 912 a formal schism whose significance depends on the value accorded the diptychs.

In 920 a council in Constantinople published a tome of union, which condemned fourth marriages and restored harmony to the two Byzantine factions. By 923, John X sent two legates to assent to the 920 agreement and anathematize fourth marriages. The formal schism between Rome and Constantinople ended in 923 with the restoration of the pope's name to the Constantinopolitan diptychs.

The Great Schism. The issue of the *filioque* was to arise again in the eleventh century. In 1009, Pope Sergius IV (1009–1012) announced his election in a letter containing the interpolated *filioque* clause in the creed. Although there seems to have been no discussion of the matter, another schism was initiated. The addition of the *filioque* was, however, official this time, and the in-

terpolated creed was used at the coronation of Emperor Henry II in 1014.

As the papacy moved into the mid-eleventh century, the reform movement was radically altering its view of the pope's position and authority. This movement, as well as the military threat of the Normans to Byzantine southern Italy, set the stage for the so-called Great Schism of 1054.

The encounter began when Leo IX (1049–1054), at the Synod of Siponto, attempted to impose Latin ecclesiastical customs on the Byzantine churches of southern Italy. Patriarch Michael Cerularios (1043–1058) responded by ordering Latin churches in Constantinople to conform to Byzantine usage or to close. Michael continued this attack on an aggressive reform-minded papacy by criticizing Latin customs, such as the use of azyme (unleavened bread) in the Eucharist and fasting on Saturdays during Lent. The issues of the eleventh-century crisis were almost exclusively those of popular piety and ritual; the *filioque* played a minor part.

Michael's reaction did not suit Emperor Constantine IX (1042–1055), who needed an anti-Norman alliance with the papacy. Michael was forced to write a conciliatory letter to Leo IX offering to clarify the confusion between the churches, restore formal relations, and confirm an alliance against the Normans. Leo sent three legates east. Seeing the legates as part of a plot to achieve a papal-Byzantine alliance at the expense of his position and the Byzantine Italian provinces, Michael broke off discussions.

The attacks of Humbert of Silva Candida (c. 1000–1061), one of the legates, on the Byzantine church made clear for the first time the nature of the reform movement and the changes that had taken place in the Western church. In his anger at Byzantine opposition to papal authority, Humbert issued a decree of excommunication and deposited it on the altar of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople. In it he censured the Byzantines for permitting married clergy, simony, and removing the *filioque* from the creed. The value of the excommunication is questionable, because Leo had died several months earlier. A Constantinopolitan synod, giving up hopes for an alliance, excommunicated the legates.

By the mid-eleventh century, it became clear to the Byzantines that they no longer spoke the same ecclesiological language as the church of Rome. This was to become even more evident during the pontificate of Gregory VII (1073–1085), whose *Dictates of the Pope* could find no resonance in Byzantine ecclesiology.

What is interesting about the mutual excommunications of 1054 is their insignificance. As John Meyendorff notes in his *Living Tradition* (Tuckahoe, N.Y., 1978), "One of the most striking facts about the schism be-

tween the East and the West is the fact that it cannot be dated" (p. 69). In fact, when in December 1965 Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras lifted the anathemas of 1054, they noted that nothing had actually happened. The anathemas were directed against particular people, not churches, and they were not designed to break ecclesiastical communion. In addition to this, Humbert had exceeded his power when he excommunicated Michael and his supporters in the name of a deceased pope.

The equivocal nature of the events of 1054 was made evident in 1089 when the emperor Alexios I (1081–1118), seeking the West's assistance against the Turks in Anatolia (modern-day Asia Minor) as well as papal support against Norman designs on Byzantine territory, convoked a synod to consider the relations between the two churches. An investigation produced no documentary or synodal evidence to support a formal schism. Patriarch Nicholas III (1084–1111) wrote to Pope Urban II (1088–1099), offering to restore the pope's name to the diptychs on receipt of an acceptable confession of faith. There is no evidence that the pope responded to this offer. What is clear is that what was lacking in the relationship between East and West could have been rectified by a simple confession of faith. The theological issue of the *filioque* was considered by Byzantine theologians to revolve around a misunderstanding stemming from the crudeness of the Latin language.

Effect of the Crusades. If the intensity of the reform movement in the West accelerated the process of schism, the Crusades were the factor that formalized it on a popular level. [See Crusades.] Early in the crusading enterprise, Pope Urban II was able to maintain harmonious relations between the Crusaders and the Christians of the East. With his death in 1099, however, relations between Latin and Eastern Christians in the Levant degenerated after the appointment of Latin-rite patriarchs in Jerusalem and Antioch in 1099 and 1100, respectively. It is with the establishment of parallel hierarchies that we can first pinpoint a schism on the structural level. The close contacts between Latin and Greek Christians made differences immediately obvious; not only were they two different peoples, they were also two different churches.

The Fourth Crusade painfully brought the reality of the schism home to the Byzantines with the Latin capture, sack, and occupation of Constantinople and the expulsion of Patriarch John X Kamateros. Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) established a Latin hierarchy and demanded an oath of allegiance from Byzantine clergy. With the Fourth Crusade the central issue of the developing separation of the Eastern and Western churches came to the fore: the nature of the church itself—the

universal jurisdiction of the papacy and the locus of authority within the church. The existence of parallel hierarchies in Constantinople, Antioch, and Jerusalem, the centers of Eastern Christendom, marks the fruition of the schism. The dating of the schism, therefore, depends on the locale.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, both the Latin West and the Greek East formalized their theologies in two radically divergent schools of thought: Thomistic scholasticism and Palamite hesychasm, respectively. Thus, by the fourteenth century the schism was formalized on popular, doctrinal, and methodological planes.

There were several noteworthy efforts to heal the schism between the churches of Rome and of the East, but it is ironic that it was the union efforts of Lyons (1274) and Florence (1439–1441) that formalized the schism, crystallized Byzantine opposition, and provoked schisms within the church of Constantinople itself. Union efforts failed during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries because there was no agreement on the locus of authority in the church and because the Eastern and Western churches had developed not only different theologies but also divergent methods of doing theology. Rome sought submission and Byzantine military assistance against the Turks. With the capture of Constantinople by Mohammed II in 1453, all possibility for union was lost.

The Great Western Schism. The church of Rome, for which centralization was essential, underwent one of the most significant schisms in the history of Christianity. Its beginnings lay in the opening of the fourteenth century, when Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) lost the battle with Philip IV (1285–1314) over nationalization of the French kingdom. In 1305, the cardinals, divided between Italians and Frenchmen, elected Clement V (1305–1314) to succeed Boniface. Philip pressured Clement, a Frenchman, to move the papal residence from Rome to Avignon in 1309. It remained there, in "Babylonian Captivity," until 1377. The stage for the Great Western Schism was set in the corruption and decadence of an exiled papacy.

The papal thrust for independence from the French kingdom came in the context of the need to protect its Italian holdings. The Romans threatened to elect another pope should Gregory XI (1370–1378) not return. Gregory arrived in Rome in January 1377.

When Gregory died in 1378, the cardinals elected the Italian Urban VI (1378–1389). Although the majority of the cardinals in Rome were French and would have gladly removed the papacy to Avignon, the pressure of the Roman popular demands forced the election. Urban immediately went about reforming the Curia Romana

and eliminating French influence. The French cardinals proceeded to elect another pope, Clement VII (1378–1394), who after several months moved to Avignon. The schism within the Western church had become a reality.

This second election would not have been so significant if Urban and Clement had not been elected by the same group of cardinals and had not enjoyed the support of various constellations of national interests. The schism severely compromised papal universalism. The Roman line of the schism was maintained by the succession of Boniface IX (1389–1404), Innocent VII (1404–1406), and Gregory XII (1406–1415). The Avignon line was maintained by Benedict XIII (1394–1423).

In the context of the schism, it was difficult to maintain even the appearance of a unified Western Christendom. The schism produced a sense of frustration as theologians and canonists searched for a solution. In 1408 the cardinals of both parties met in Livorno and, on their own authority, called a council in Pisa for March 1409, composed of bishops, cardinals, abbots, heads of religious orders, and representatives of secular rulers. The council appointed a new pope, Alexander V (1409–1410; succeeded by John XXIII, 1410–1415), replacing the Roman and Avignon popes, who were deposed.

The newly elected Holy Roman Emperor, Sigismund (1410–1437), and Pope Alexander V called a council to meet at Constance in 1414. Voting by nations, the council declared that it represented the Roman Catholic church and held its authority directly from Christ. John XXIII and Benedict XIII were deposed, and Gregory XII resigned. With the election of Martin V (1417–1431), Western Christendom was united once again under one pope. But the papacy had to contend with the challenge of the council that had settled the conflict. [See Papacy.]

By 1441 the schism between the Latins and the Greeks was declared ended, and conciliarism was effectively eviscerated by the success of Eugenius IV (1431–1447) in uniting the Greeks, who sought union as well as military assistance against the Turks, and other Eastern Christians with Rome. For many modern historians, however, the tragedy of the period was the failure of the councils and the papacy to face the need for ecclesiastical reform. This failure laid the foundation for the Reformation of the sixteenth century.

The Reformation. The Reformation of the sixteenth century was the second great split to strike Christianity. [See Reformation.] The same issues that determined the relations between Rome and the East figured in the separation of a large number of the Christians in Germany, Scotland, and Scandinavia. Martin Luther gradually moved from objecting to specific practices of the church

of Rome to challenging papal authority as normative. Authority does not reside in the papacy, but rather in scripture; *sola scriptura* became the hallmark of his reforms.

The Reformation was a schism in the Western church and had nothing fundamentally to do with the Orthodox East. It was not, however, uncommon for Western ecclesiastical dissidents to use the Eastern church as an example of an ancient “popeless” Christianity. For many contemporary Eastern Christians, however, the reformers were but another example of the heresy spawned by the schism in the Roman church. As late as the nineteenth century, Eastern Christians, such as Aleksei Khomiakov, noted that all Protestants were but cryptopapists, each Protestant being his own pope.

The history of schism, particularly the schism between the churches of the East and the West, may be considered from the perspective of social, cultural, and political factors. While these are necessary to an adequate understanding of conflict in Christianity, they are not sufficient. Only a consideration of theological and ecclesiological factors allows full appreciation of the roots of schism in Christian history.

[See also the biographies of the church leaders mentioned herein.]

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JOHN LAWRENCE BOOJAMRA

SCHLEGEL, FRIEDRICH (1772–1829), one of the leading figures of the German Romantic movement. Schlegel's personality was influenced by various poets and thinkers, including Schiller, Goethe, Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Leibniz, and Spinoza. It was not unusual for him first to be attracted by a philosopher or poet and then to turn vehemently against him. Thus Schlegel's personal development was marked by a constant search for new intellectual horizons. He never developed a system of thinking as such, but rather turned ultimately, in 1805, to Roman Catholicism. Hence his concern with general religious history was limited to particular phases of his life.

After studying law, classical philology, and philosophy at Göttingen and Leipzig, Schlegel devoted himself to Greek classicism. In his first publications he propounded the idea that the Greek image of man was the most perfect expression of the human ideal of harmony

and totality. Yet soon, in turning to Romantic poetry, he rejected the notion that the classical ideal was universally valid, emphasizing instead the necessity for a continuing development of the human spirit.

Of Schlegel's various intellectual activities, the most interesting for the historian of religions is his concern with Indian religion. While at Paris from 1802 to 1804, he studied Sanskrit, for he sought in India the source of human wisdom. The writings of the Indians, which he initially found dignified, sublime, and significant in their reference to God, would point, so he believed, to an original revelation of the true (i.e., Christian) God, one that might be perceived despite the superstition and error that had crept into the Indian tradition. In Schlegel's view, one of the major errors of Indian thinking was the lack of a pronounced ethical conception of the divine; another was the idea of emanation, the idea that God continually unfolds himself to create the world. Feeling a strong aversion to the pantheistic belief that God and the universe are identical in substance, he yet saw pantheism as having a provisional value in that it formed an essential stage in the development of religion, which culminated in Christianity.

Increasingly, however, Schlegel came to believe that the religion of the Indians, whose language he believed to be the world's oldest, did not yield evidence of an original, pure faith. After the publication of *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians* (1808), which contains a linguistic analysis of Sanskrit, a discussion of various Indian systems of thought, and translations of portions of Indian scriptures, Schlegel abandoned Indian studies. Yet his enthusiasm for things Indian had been communicated to his brother August Wilhelm, who was to become the first professor of Sanskrit in Germany. Despite his prejudices, Friedrich Schlegel can be regarded as a pioneer in the Western study of Indian religions.

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HANS J. KLIMKEIT

SCHLEIERMACHER, FRIEDRICH (1768–1834), German Protestant theologian. Schleiermacher's reappraisal of the task and content of Christian dogmatics has earned him the honorific title "father of modern theology." But his distinctive approach to Christian doctrine gave him also an importance for the beginnings of nontheological ways of studying religion; and as an eminent figure in church, academy, and society, he influenced public life in Germany well beyond the circle of professional theologians.

Life and Works. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born on 21 November 1768 in Prussian Breslau, Lower Silesia (now, as formerly, Wrocław, in southwestern Poland). His father, Gottlieb, was a Reformed pastor and a chaplain in the army of Frederick the Great, after whom the boy was named. Schleiermacher's earliest memories were not of Breslau but of Pless and Anhalt, where his father's duties carried him during the Bavarian War of Succession (1778–1779). Previously a thinker of the "enlightened" variety, Gottlieb Schleiermacher encountered the Moravian community at Gnadenfrei and underwent a spiritual reawakening; and there, five years later (1783), his fourteen-year-old son also experienced the new birth. Friedrich went on to attend the Moravian Brethren's school at Niesky (1783–1785) and their seminary at Barby (1785–1787).

The impress of Moravian pietism on Schleiermacher was permanent. It was among the Brethren that his piety took the distinctive form of devotion to the lively image of "the Savior," and many years later (in 1802) he recalled that at Gnadenfrei he first awoke to humanity's relationship with a higher world, acquiring the mystic tendency that had carried him through all the storms of skepticism. He professed himself "a Herrnhuter again—only of a higher order." But at the time, his experience among the Moravians ended in pain and failure. In the seminary, he and a group of friends smuggled in forbidden works of Goethe, Höltz, Wieland, and others. Doubts grew about the truth of what they were taught in the classroom, until Schleiermacher confessed that he could no longer believe in the divinity or the vicarious sacrifice of Christ.

He moved on to a period of study at the now rationalist University of Halle (1787–1789), followed by a brief stay (1789–1790) with his maternal uncle Samuel Stubenrauch, who had exchanged a professorship at Halle for a pastorate in Drossen (Ośno). Schleiermacher took the first theological examination prescribed by his church, doing well or excellently in all subjects except dogmatics, and a post was found for him as tutor in the family of Count Dohna in Schlobitten, East Prussia (1790–1793). After the second and final examination, in

which his performance in dogmatics was again undistinguished, he assumed an assistant pastorate at Landsberg (Gorzów Wielkopolski, 1794–1796), where he remained until his move to Berlin.

Direct evidence of Schleiermacher's thought in the period between matriculation at Halle and arrival in Berlin (1787–1796) is provided not only by sermons and letters published later but also by a series of unpublished manuscripts that remained virtually unknown until Wilhelm Dilthey included them in part in an appendix to his life of Schleiermacher. They show him struggling with Kant: "My belief in the Kantian philosophy," he wrote in a letter of 1790, "grows daily." Religion he now understood, like Kant, in strongly ethical terms, but he was troubled by Kant's overriding emphasis on the moral law, by his attempt to ground the ideas of God and immortality in moral experience, and by his argument that morality requires "transcendental" (as distinct from merely psychological) freedom. Moreover, Schleiermacher had become acquainted with another philosophical option: Spinozism. Reflection on the philosophy of Spinoza led him to some of his earliest thoughts on the concept of "the individual," and he was to find Spinozism's monistic and religious vision of nature, as filtered through the pantheism debate, increasingly attractive.

It is not difficult to trace lines of continuity from these early philosophical musings on Kant and Spinoza to Schleiermacher's first books. And one must not underestimate the extent to which he was also drawing inspiration, like so many of his contemporaries, from the ancient Greek philosophers. Yet he himself (in his *Monologen*) viewed his intellectual progress after leaving the Moravian community almost as a second conversion brought about by a revelation that did not come to him from any philosophy. "I discovered humanity," he wrote, "and knew that henceforth I should never lose it." His first two major books, written when he was Reformed chaplain at the Charité Hospital in Berlin (1796–1802), were the fruits of this revelation. He had fallen in with the group of intellectuals that gathered around Friedrich Schlegel, with *Das Athenäum* as the organ of their new romanticism, and he wrote enthusiastically from within the Romantic circle.

The very first book, *Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* (On Religion: Addresses to Its Cultured Despisers; 1799), is a defense of religion as an indispensable aspect of full humanity. *Monologen: Eine Neujahrsgabe* (Soliloquies: A New Year's Gift; 1800) is its ethical counterpart in the form of the author's candid meditations on the course of his own inner life. The great (Kantian) illusion that everyone must conform to a common standard yields to the

conviction that each person is meant to represent humanity uniquely in his or her own way. Not the outward, physical world but the free spirit within is the primary reality, and the world is its creation. Those who have learned to look within, to the domain of the eternal and the divine, can even enjoy in imagination what they cannot attain in fact. For them, old age itself is only a self-inflicted evil, and Schleiermacher promises that he, at least, will remain young until the day he dies.

The ecclesiastical authorities were eager to remove Schleiermacher from the seductions of Berlin, and for two years (1802–1804) he served as pastor in the East Pomeranian town of Stolp (Słupsk), in what was then West Prussia. He continued alone the project, begun with Schlegel, of translating Plato's dialogues, and he published his dry and abstruse *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre* (Outlines of a Critique of Previous Moral Philosophy; 1803). Then began the first, brief stage of his career in the academy. A call to the new University of Würzburg, in Bavaria, lost all attractiveness when the Prussian authorities invited him to return as professor and preacher to his own university, Halle. In his lectures at Halle (1804–1806), which ranged widely from philosophical ethics (or philosophy of culture) and hermeneutics to theological encyclopedias, New Testament exegesis, church history, dogmatics, and Christian ethics, Schleiermacher's intellectual system began to take shape, partly under influences from Fichte and Schelling. His little book *Die Weihnachtsfeier: Ein Gespräch* (The Celebration of Christmas: A Dialogue; 1806) gave clear evidence of a fresh approach to traditional Christian beliefs, taking its point of departure not from dogma, nor from the biblical story, but from the fact of the Christian community and its experience of redemption.

The work begun in Halle had to be resumed in Berlin. In 1806, Halle was taken by Napoleon's troops, and its university was closed. Schleiermacher remained for a while, preaching, translating Plato, and writing a commentary on *1 Timothy*. But the next year (1807) he went back to Berlin, where he became active in politics as a German patriot and a constitutional monarchist. In a succession of appointments, he became a civil servant in the Department of Education (1808), Reformed pastor at Trinity Church (1809), and finally professor at the new University of Berlin (1810). At various times in the climactic stage of his career (1810–1834), he also served as member of the commission for organizing the University of Berlin, columnist for *Der preussische Correspondent*, dean of the theological faculty (four times), rector of the university, and secretary of the Prussian Academy of Sciences (first of the philosophical section,

then of the historical-philological section). In addition, as a leading ecclesiastical statesman, he became embroiled in controversies over the union between the Lutherans and the Reformed, and the liturgy, constitution, and confession of the united church.

The thirty volumes of Schleiermacher's collected works (*Sämtliche Werke*) disclose the extraordinary breadth of his intellectual activities. In his lectures at Berlin he continued all the subjects he had taken up at Halle and ventured into so many new ones (including dialectic and life-of-Jesus research), that every branch of theology except Old Testament is represented in the first division of the collected works and every branch of philosophy in the third. Ten volumes of sermons make up the second division. Schleiermacher's correspondence and the incomplete translation of Plato's dialogues (6 vols.) were not included, and a great deal of manuscript material remained unpublished, some of which is receiving attention in the new edition of his works (*Kritische Gesamtausgabe*). And yet Schleiermacher did not leave a completed system. He died of pneumonia in the midst of his labors on 12 February 1834. Besides, he always felt more at home in speech than in writing. Most of the volumes in the *Sämtliche Werke* had their origin in the spoken word; many of them represent lectures never revised for publication by Schleiermacher himself, who neither preached nor lectured from a full manuscript. Of the finished works most important for religious studies, the first book, *Über die Religion*, was cast in the form of addresses, and *Der christliche Glaube* (The Christian Faith; 1821–1822), the ripest fruit of the mature period, grew out of his lectures on dogmatics.

Interpretation of Religion. In the addresses on religion, Schleiermacher defended religion by redefining it. Eighteenth-century debates between Deists, skeptics, and rational theists commonly presupposed on all sides that religion is a system of factual beliefs that are alleged to have immense moral significance. At issue was which beliefs are essential to religion, whether the essential beliefs are rationally defensible, and whether they really have the beneficial consequences attributed to them. The Christian apologist was expected to show that Christian beliefs were essential and true, or at least could not be refuted, and that civic virtue would collapse without them. Kant's critical philosophy undercut the debate, up to a point, by moving the idea of God out of the domain of theoretical knowledge and giving it the status simply of a moral postulate. But Schleiermacher's proposal owed more to the new world of thought created by Johann Georg Hamann, Johann Gottfried von Herder, and others, a world in which feeling and imagination took their place alongside the intellect and

morals and in which the drive to reduce the quantity of religious matter could be reversed by a new appreciation of individuality.

What the cultured despisers despise, according to Schleiermacher, is not religion but dogmas and usages—only the husks and not the kernel, a mere echo and not the original sound. But what the defenders of religion defend is not religion either, since they make of it a mere prop for morals and social institutions. Religion, or piety, has a sphere of its own, which it can maintain only if it renounces all claims on anything that belongs either to knowledge or to morality. To make the idea of God the apex of your science, for instance, is not the religious way of having God. And to make religion a matter of good behavior is to miss its true, passive nature: it is not human activity, but being acted upon by God. If human nature is not to be truncated, religion must be allowed to take its place as an indispensable third alongside knowing and doing.

To discover religion, one must look away from its outward manifestations and associations and must try to see inside a devout soul. Such an endeavor, though something of a challenge, is finally possible, in Schleiermacher's view, because every human being is either actually or potentially a devout soul. The challenge is to look into our own soul or consciousness. We will then discover a feeling for the unity underlying all our commerce with the multiplicity of finite things—an immediate consciousness of the existence of all finite and temporal things in and through the infinite and eternal. Religion, in short, is a sense and taste for the infinite, and by "the infinite" is meant the underlying unity or wholeness of the perceptible world—a unity that is not present to the senses like an object but reveals itself to feeling. Reflected upon, this feeling generates the idea of God, and it is the individual imagination that moves the idea of God either toward the theistic Supreme Being outside the world or else toward the pantheistic All, to which personal characteristics are not assigned.

In these reflections, Schleiermacher made an astute apologetic move. Feeling and imagination were two attributes of humanity that the Romantics wanted to save from the arid intellectualism and moralism of the Enlightenment. His strategy was to harness the cause of religion as far as possible to the cause of romanticism, and he went on to identify as the real enemies of religion the analytical spirit that reduces the universe to fragments in the attempt to explain it and—even more—the narrow, pragmatic cult of the material and the useful. Schleiermacher, in other words, detested in the spirit of the age what his friends detested, and their aspirations were close to his religion. Without knowing it, the supposed despisers were actually the rescuers and cherishers of religion.

But what about organized religion? Here the hostility of the despisers became most vehement, and once more the apologist was careful not to defend what the critics attacked. Indeed, he offered his own biting attack on the empirical church as an institution held captive by the civic interests of the state. But he contrasted it with the ideal church, a community of the genuinely devout who are drawn together for mutual religious communication simply because they are social beings. Pietistic influence is evident in this ecclesiology, as it already was in Schleiermacher's distinction between doctrines and religious experience. There are no official ministers in the "Church Invisible," but from its midst the ministers of the "Church Visible" must be drawn if the actual community is ever to approximate the ideal. The pietistic insight harmonizes perfectly with Schleiermacher's discovery of humanity. The cultured despisers are again disarmed: religious association, like religion itself, is rooted in humanity—this time in humanity's social nature, which calls for communication that is free, spontaneous, and without any trace of priestcraft.

The cultured despisers could walk a good part of the way with the apologist in the final stage of his argument as well. The Deists had wished to reduce all religions, Christianity included, to a common core—a bare minimum of essential beliefs. For Schleiermacher, by contrast—and he was sure the Romantics would see the point—individuality was indispensable to real, live religion, and reductionism was therefore wrong. The "natural religion" of the Deists, he believed, is an armchair construct, "a vague, sorry, poor thought that corresponds to no reality," and there is not much that is distinctively religious in it, being in fact a mere hodgepodge of morals and metaphysics. Only in concrete, particular, historical religions does religion make its appearance. "Humanity" is again the key: the diversity of religions is rooted in human individuality, each person naturally having a greater receptiveness to one religious experience than to others. A particular religion is constituted when one relation to the deity becomes the point of reference for all others. Christianity exemplifies the rule; it is distinguished by the centrality it assigns to mediation, the intuition of corruption and redemption that makes Christianity a critical, polemical religion. The divine in Jesus was precisely the clarity with which he exhibited the idea of mediation, and while Schleiermacher's reverence for individuality will not permit him to claim an exclusive superiority for the religion of Jesus, he does assure the cultured despisers that Christianity has a long future ahead of it.

Schleiermacher's first book offered much more than a shrewd, *ad hominem* defense of Christianity; it inaugurated a fresh stage in the critical analysis of religion. The importance of his search for a distinctive religious

category is acknowledged even by those who reject his findings. He not only exposed the urgent need to reconceive the task of theology, but he also, at the same time, opened the way to more profound and sympathetic treatments of the psychology and history of religion than either traditional theology or freethinking critiques had been able to achieve. Calvinistic divines and the freethinkers had agreed in treating the study of world religions as the anatomy of a sickness (the difference being that the freethinkers were not inclined to make Christianity an exception). Schleiermacher looked at religions as manifestations of human wholeness.

Misunderstandings of Schleiermacher's position have sometimes been occasioned by his own language. He did not really mean to move religion out of the domains of knowledge and morals and to confine it within the domain of the emotions instead. He expressly denied that he intended any such separation, and by "feeling" he meant the immediate, prereflective self-consciousness that cannot be confined to any single department of human selfhood but that underlies the whole of it. Neither did he fall into a psychologism that would shut the religious subject up in its own subjectivity. For all his interest in the imagination, his theory of religion is marked by a strong sense of the reality of the transcendent, even though he thought it impossible to have the transcendent as an object.

Reinterpretation of Dogma. Some of the ground traversed in the addresses on religion is covered again in the introduction to Schleiermacher's theological masterwork, *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt* (Christian Faith Systematically Presented According to the Principles of the Protestant Church; 1821–1822), which he had intended to dedicate to F. H. Jacobi (d. 1819), the philosopher of faith and feeling. In his *Glaubenslehre*, as he liked to call it (literally, "doctrine of faith"), Schleiermacher again located the irreducible essence of religion or piety in feeling—immediate self-consciousness—as distinct from knowing and doing. But the immediate self-consciousness of religion is now specified as "the feeling of absolute dependence."

A little introspection will show us, according to Schleiermacher, that immediate, prereflective self-consciousness is a consciousness of self and world in a relationship of reciprocal activity, that is, of mutual or *relative* dependence. But if we look again, we become conscious even of our own spontaneous activity upon the world as coming in its entirety "from somewhere else." This deeper consciousness cannot arise from the influence of the world upon us, since we exercise a counterinfluence upon the world; it is precisely an immediate consciousness of both self and world together as *absolutely* dependent. The concept of God is not a sec-

ondary inference from this immediate self-consciousness, but a thematization of it. In other words, God is not the remote cause of the consciousness; rather, in the feeling of absolute dependence, God is actually experienced in the only way open to us, and to be conscious of being absolutely dependent is to be conscious of being in relation to God.

As Schleiermacher explained it in a letter on the *Glaubenslehre* to his friend Lücke, "What I understand by 'religious feeling' . . . is the original attestation of an immediate existential relationship." And he indicated that the purpose of his dogmatics was to describe this feeling in its specifically Christian form. The religious feeling then becomes the object of the knowledge that constitutes *Glaubenslehre*. Most properly, dogmatics is about the religious consciousness itself, but it is also the theologian's task to develop out of the religious consciousness such conceptions of God and the world as are implicit in it and can be understood as representations of it. Schleiermacher executed the task in two parts: the doctrines of creation and redemption, in which he made the pioneering effort to produce a genuinely modern reconstruction of Christian belief immune from the devastating effects of eighteenth-century natural science and historical criticism.

The doctrine of creation, which Schleiermacher takes up in part one of his *Glaubenslehre*, is reconceived as an attempt to thematize the feeling of absolute dependence itself. "Creation" is not about a particular divine *act* (or series of divine acts) in the primeval past, but about the creature-consciousness that is a universal phenomenon of human existence in every time and place. The doctrine of creation is therefore indistinguishable in content from the doctrine of preservation (or providence): it is concerned with what can be said of the continuous divine *activity* on the basis of the religious consciousness of absolute dependence. The question of a temporal beginning of the world and humankind is irrelevant to dogmatics. If it nevertheless intrudes, it tends to give rise to misrepresentations of God's activity, as though it were akin to the activity of a human craftsman. Schleiermacher finds a corresponding misrepresentation in the interventionist view of providence, which pictures God as one cause or one agent (albeit preeminent) interacting with others, arbitrarily suspending the progress of natural events or undoing the effects of human behavior.

Schleiermacher's God does not intervene in the closed causal system of modern natural science but is identified as its timeless and spaceless ground, this being what is meant by attributing eternity and omnipresence to the divine causality. That God is "omnipotent" does not mean that he can do whatever he pleases—that he can even interrupt a course of events he did not approve

and make things turn out differently than they otherwise would. This would imply that, even if only for one fleeting moment, some chain of events had slipped outside the divine causality, whereas the proper sense of "omnipotence" is exactly that God's power does and effects *all*. Not, however, in the same way finite causes do and effect things! God is omnipotent in the sense that the entire system of nature rests on his timeless and spaceless causality; the world is as it is solely by virtue of "the divine good-pleasure."

There can be no question of taking such personal language, in Schleiermacher's view, for anything more than a poetic mode of speech carried over from the primary level of everyday religious discourse. We do not call the divine omnipotence "omniscient" or "spiritual" because God has a consciousness like ours, nor because he is a kind of sentient world soul, but because the feeling of absolute dependence is unlike a feeling of dependence on blind and dead necessity; and there is simply no better way available to us of denoting this difference than to contrast the dead and the blind with the living and the conscious, conscious life being the highest thing we know.

All this cannot, of course, be simply deduced from the feeling of absolute dependence; it is, rather, the religious view of the world to which the religious consciousness gives rise when joined with what Schleiermacher calls "the sensible self-consciousness," that is, with perception of the world of nature and other persons. He held that the consciousness of absolute dependence is present in every positive religion, and that the doctrine of creation articulates it in a monotheistic form that is not peculiar to Christianity. But to describe the feeling of absolute dependence in isolation is only an abstraction. In Christianity, creature-consciousness is contained within the consciousness of redemption through Christ: it is as believers in Christ that Christians are aware of themselves as God's creatures. It does not follow that Christianity is simply a republication of the religion of nature; rather, in the experience of redemption, according to Schleiermacher, the purpose of the divine omnipotence is made known as the purpose of omnipotent love. The kingdom of God established by Christ must extend its influence throughout the world, and all religions are destined to pass over into Christianity.

The figure of Christ is correspondingly portrayed in more absolutist terms than in the earlier addresses on religion. He was the Second Adam, the completion of the creation of humanity, and there was an actual existence of God in him. To be sure, the way Christ works upon Christians, as Schleiermacher sees it, is not supernatural; it may be compared to the personal influence

of a strong, charismatic teacher on a circle of followers—except that in the case of Christ the influence is now indirect, mediated through the community he established. But the work of Christ, which is nothing other than the imparting of his own sense of God, is nonetheless unique, because it radiates out from one who possessed a uniquely powerful, indeed, perfect, consciousness of God. Only this affirmation answers to the Christian consciousness that dogmatics seeks to describe. And although Schleiermacher did not shirk the historical problems of the New Testament, as his lectures on the life of Jesus demonstrate, he clearly believed that dogmatics could and should deduce its christological affirmations directly from the Christian consciousness: he asked what Christ must have been like if we are to account for his perceived effects upon the Christian community.

Schleiermacher's Legacy. The historical importance of Schleiermacher is hardly in question, but, from his own day on, it has been hotly disputed whether his approach and his positions amount to permanently fruitful gains in the history of religious thought. Theologically, he has been assailed from both the left wing and the right. The left-wing critics have probably been more impressed, on the whole, with his attempt to deal with natural science than with his approach to historical science. He may have been right to move the initial focus of the christological problem from the Jesus of history to the Christ of faith, but one cannot go on to deduce the one from the other. And even when he asked not what Christ must have been like but what historical research makes of him, Schleiermacher seems to have known in advance what he wanted to find in the Gospels, namely, as David Friedrich Strauss pointed out, the Savior of his Moravian piety.

The theological right objects that Schleiermacher, out of well-meaning apologetic motives, made the initial methodological blunder of beginning with human experience and then moved on to force the Christian revelation into a preconceived theory of religion. Historians of religion, on the other hand, are more likely to reverse this line of criticism and to object that, despite his good intentions, Schleiermacher's treatment of religion remained incorrigibly Christian and dogmatic; and this, of course, would not necessarily imply the unfruitfulness of his approach as a venture in Christian dogmatics.

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B. A. GERRISH

SCHMIDT, WILHELM (1868–1954), German anthropologist and Roman Catholic priest. Born on 16 February 1868, in Hörde (now Dortmund-Hörde), Germany, Wilhelm Schmidt was the son of a factory worker. In 1883 he entered the missionary school in Steyl, the Netherlands, that served as the motherhouse of the Societas Verbi Divini (the Society of the Divine Word), which had been founded in 1875. There he completed his secondary philosophical and theological studies and was ordained a priest in 1892. He studied Semitic languages at the University of Berlin from 1893 to 1895. In 1895 he was appointed professor of several theological disciplines at the Society of the Divine Word Mission Seminary of Saint Gabriel in Mödling, Austria (established 1889).

Various questions and problems of missionaries (especially from New Guinea) prompted Schmidt to undertake studies in linguistics, ethnology, and comparative religion. In 1906 he founded *Anthropos*, an international review of ethnology and linguistics, and in

1931 he established the Anthropos Institute in Mödling, an organization of the Society of the Divine Word; he served as the institute's director until 1950. (Since 1962 the institute has been located at Sankt Augustin, near Bonn.) From 1921, Schmidt was professor at the University of Vienna.

Schmidt directed the establishment of the Missionary Ethnological Museum in Rome (1922–1926), under the authorization of Pius XI. From 1927 to 1939 Schmidt was director of the museum. After the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, Schmidt resettled with the Anthropos Institute in Switzerland and became professor at the University of Fribourg (1939–1951). On 10 February 1954, Schmidt died in Fribourg; he was buried at the seminary in Mödling. Schmidt was a member of many scholarly societies and held honorary degrees from six universities.

Schmidt began his linguistic studies by examining the native languages of New Guinea, but he soon expanded his field of research to include all of Oceania. He showed the relationships between the Austronesian (known previously as Malayo-Polynesian) languages and a certain group of languages of the Southeast Asian mainland that Schmidt called "Austroasiatic" languages. His study *Die Mon-Khmer-Völker: Ein Bindeglied zwischen Völkern Zentralasiens und Australasiens* (The Mon-Khmer Peoples: A Link between Peoples in Central Asia and Australasia; 1906) was of particular importance. His interest gradually shifted to ethnology (i.e., cultural anthropology). In 1910 he published a book on Pygmy peoples, *Die Stellung der Pygmäen-völker in der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen* (The Place of Pygmies in the Historical Development of Man); in 1924 he published *Völker und Kulturen*, which he wrote with Wilhelm Koppers. The latter is an attempt at a worldwide presentation of cultural history based on a system of "culture circles" (*Kulturkreise*). His interest in this direction came from the work of the anthropogeographer Friedrich Ratzel and the ethnologists Leo Frobenius and Fritz Graebner. [See *Kulturkreiselehre and the biographies of Frobenius and Graebner*.]

According to Schmidt's system, the oldest culture of humanity (what he called the *Urkultur*) was that of the hunter-gatherers, remnants of which are found among the Pygmies and pygmoids as well as in the Arctic-American area and in southeastern Australia. From this *Urkultur* there arose, independent of one another, the three "primary cultures": (1) a culture based on the cultivation of plants, associated with matriarchy and developing out of the plant-gathering of women, (2) a "higher hunting-culture," controlled by men and associated with totemism, and (3) a patriarchal pastoral culture based on nomadic animal husbandry.

Each one of the three primary “culture circles” identified by Schmidt arose, on his view, only once in a given geographical area and then spread through migration. Through the intermingling of the primary cultures, secondary and tertiary cultures took shape that in turn grew into the high cultures. The aforementioned changes in the economic bases of culture also had their effect on society as well as religion. In his work *Die Sprachfamilien und Sprachenkreise der Erde* (Linguistic Families and Linguistic Circles of the World; 1926), Schmidt attempted an ethnological-linguistic synthesis. The Viennese prehistorian Oswald Menghin undertook on his part a comparison of prehistoric and ethnological cultures in his *Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit* (World History of the Stone Age; 1931). Later, Schmidt sought to elaborate on Graebner’s culture-historical method in his *Handbuch der Methode der kulturhistorischen Ethnologie* (1937; published in translation as *The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology*, 1939) and, at the same time, to organize his own ideas into a thoroughly systematic form. With his overview of the development of cultures, Schmidt wanted to substitute a historically grounded system for the evolutionist position, which had been influenced by the natural sciences. It was realized by Schmidt’s critics, however, that this new approach was too rigid and schematic. Although the cultural forms that he identified cannot be considered historical realities, they were nevertheless valuable as tools for classification. His pioneering work represents a stage of research that cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Despite various criticisms of the details of his system by his contemporaries, the widest acceptance was accorded his insight that even nonliterate cultures evince historical development.

Soon after 1900, the main objective of Schmidt’s research became the elucidation of the development of religion. His interest in this topic was decisively aroused by Andrew Lang. In 1898 in his book *The Making of Religion*, Lang had contradicted the then-influential theory of E. B. Tylor that animism was the origin of all religion. Lang pointed out the overt presence of belief in a supreme being among Australian aborigines and other very simple peoples. Relying on his own studies, Schmidt from 1908 to 1910 published in *Anthropos* a series of articles under the general title “L’origine de l’idée de Dieu.” In these articles, Schmidt took issue with existing theories of the origin of religion and thoroughly examined the material available on southeastern Australia. The German original of this study was published in revised form in 1912 as volume 1 of *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee* (2d ed., 1926). Volumes 2 through 6 (1929–1935) of this work deal with the religions of “primeval peoples” (*Urkulturvölker*). Volumes 7

through 12 (1940–1955) treat the nomadic peoples of Africa and Asia.

Schmidt arrives at the following conclusions in *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*. First, he notes that monotheism is the religion of the extant hunter-gatherer peoples investigated by him: their supreme being, the creator of the world, is tied to their ethics and is venerated with a cult. Second, he argues that since these peoples represent for us the oldest accessible form of human culture, it stands to reason that monotheism is the oldest religion of humanity. Third, he declares that since the religions of these peoples—especially their representations of the supreme being—display so many characteristic points of agreement, one must concede that they have a single historical origin. Fourth, Schmidt speculates that the image of the supreme being that is held by primitive peoples is so sublime that it could not have been acquired from human experience and that therefore it must be traced back to a divine primitive revelation. Finally, he postulates that in the course of later developments, progress in external culture was achieved by many peoples, yet decadence often occurred in religion and ethics.

According to Schmidt, the original idea of God is conserved with the greatest relative purity in nomadic peoples’ belief in a heavenly God; in other cultures the idea lost ground. Sun worship and magic came to prevail in totemistic cultures, and the matriarchal planting cultures made room for earth and fertility cults, lunar mythology, and worship of the dead.

There were a number of objections to Schmidt’s arguments. Schmidt believed that one can, in general, speak of monotheism when qualities are attributed to a single supreme being that surpass the qualities of all other beings. According to Raffaele Pettazzoni, however, monotheism came into being only after a struggle by some religious reformer against an already existing polytheism.

Schmidt was able to see the purity of the representation of a supreme being only when he forced statements about this being into an interpretation that permits its characteristics to correspond more or less to a scholastic-theological concept of God. Schmidt also often traced details considered to be of inferior value found in the religions of the “primeval peoples” back to degeneration or to influences of later cultures (especially totemistic and matriarchal cultures); however, this line of argument rises and falls with the validity of his system of culture circles.

A general methodological problem lies in the question as to whether the points of agreement among the supreme beings of the different peoples are so characteristic that they demonstrate a single historical origin of

this idea. With the claim that the fact of a primitive revelation is demonstrated by the idea of the supreme being, Schmidt oversteps the bounds of the historical study of religions and makes philosophical and theological statements.

It can be said that Schmidt's establishment of belief in a supreme being among primeval peoples (among whom this belief cannot be the end result of long antecedent developments) retains its value in the area of the description of religion. However, the historical, philosophical, and theological conclusions that Schmidt drew from this fact cannot be regarded as certain. An enduring service provided by Schmidt and the research launched by him is that greater attention has been focused on the belief in supreme beings among nonliterate peoples. Along with the question of the idea of God, Schmidt also made important contributions to the understanding of other religious phenomena, especially sacrifice, mythology, and shamanism.

[For a thorough discussion of the place of supreme beings in the mythic traditions of many primal societies, see Supreme Beings.]

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JOSEPH HENNINGER

Translated from German by Paul C. Duggan

SCHOLARIOS, GENNADIOS (c. 1400–1478), born Georgios Scholarios; patriarch of Constantinople (1454–1456; 1463; 1464–1465), educator, philosopher, theologian, defender of Orthodox Christianity; also known as Georgios Kourtesios. Born in Constantinople, Scholarios began as a student of Mark Eugenikos, metropolitan of Ephesus, an opponent of the papacy. Later, Gennadios schooled himself in the humanities, philosophy, and theology. Unlike most Greeks of the time, Gennadios also learned Latin and was an admirer of Thomas Aquinas, some of whose works he translated into Greek. While still a layman, he preached regularly at court, taught in his own school, and served the Byzantine emperor John VIII (1425–1448) as imperial secretary and Judge General of the Greeks.

Gennadios has usually been pictured as a supporter of the union of the Latin and Greek churches at the abortive Council of Florence (1438–1439), but he subsequently made an about-face following the death of his teacher, Mark of Ephesus, and became the leader of antipapal forces during the last days of Byzantium. In fact, his complete change in attitude had caused some scholars to believe that there was more than one person named Georgios Scholarios. Recent scholarship, however, has unanimously discarded the latter notion. Moreover, the latest substantive study on Scholarios questions the authenticity of some of the pro-Latin writings attributed to him, so that according to this view, Scholarios was consistent in his opposition to Latin theology, and, therefore, to the union of churches based on the acceptance of Latin doctrines.

Shortly before the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks (1453), Scholarios became a monk, and according to tradition changed his name from Georgios to Gennadios. Taken captive following the capture of the city, he was released at the instigation of Sultan Mehmed II, who saw in Gennadios, because of his anti-papal views, the ideal candidate for the vacant patriarchal throne. Enthroned on 6 January 1454, Patriarch Gennadios maintained a friendly relationship with the sultan, and together they worked out the terms under which Orthodox Christians would live under the Ottomans for the next five centuries.

Despite the friendship of Mehmed II, however, Gennadios's tenure as patriarch was a stormy one. He strove to retain order within the Orthodox church, and in order to prevent conversions to Islam attempted to relax marriage canons. However, he was opposed by those who demanded strict adherence to the letter of the law. Gennadios was successful in reorganizing the Patriarchal Academy in Serres (present-day Serrai, Greece), recognizing the important need of a higher institution of learning for the training of the future lead-

ers of the Greek people and church. After serving as patriarch for three brief terms, he finally abandoned the throne and took up residence in the Monastery of Saint John the Baptist at Serres.

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NOMIKOS MICHAEL VAPORIS

SCHOLASTICISM. An abstract noun formed from the Latin-Greek stem *scholastic-*, pertaining to "school," *scholasticism* signifies principally the type of training used in the schools, and secondarily, the doctrine given, usually in the universities of the Latin Middle Ages. In a pejorative sense, it connotes dictatorial or authoritarian methods, or a hidebound and unimaginative view, much like the "correct" answer that a schoolmaster would demand from his pupil in the classroom.

Method. Principally Scholasticism indicates a method of training and learning that developed in Christian schools between about 1000 and 1650 and reached its peak in the thirteenth century. It arose naturally and spontaneously in the early Middle Ages as teachers lectured on a fixed text, pausing to explain a difficult passage by posing a question and lining up authorities pro and con, *sic et non*. Divergent resolutions of difficulties were often written in the margins of the Bible or lawbook. Abelard's work *Sic et non* is both a collection of seemingly contradictory theological texts and a reasoned methodology for resolving such apparent contradictions. The underlying supposition was the commonly held conviction that truth cannot contradict itself and that all truth is from God. Thus, logic, coupled with a respect for antiquity, was always considered the chief instrument of Scholastic teaching in the Middle Ages.

From its earliest beginnings in the classroom two distinct elements appeared, which developed independently into two Scholastic functions by the thirteenth century: the lecture (*legere*), or explanation of the text, eventually restricted to the morning sessions; and the academic disputation (*disputare*) of a special point, eventually restricted to the afternoon sessions and to special days. In the patristic period only the bishop or a qualified delegate could expound the sacred text or settle disputes; in the Middle Ages these became the formal functions of a "master" (*magister*). Thus a medieval commentary is the master's statement (*sententia*) of the

meaning intended in the text; and a medieval "disputed question" is the master's resolution (*determinatio*) of the debate.

When universities (*studium generale*, in the singular) were founded in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the association of masters established rules for the induction of new masters into the guild. The basic liberal arts studies, prior to theology or other higher faculties and required of all, took about eight years and led to the master of arts degree at the age of twenty-one (minimum), followed by two or more years of teaching the arts. There were three higher faculties: theology (the minimum age for the master being thirty-five), law (civil and canon), and medicine. Each faculty had its own masters with chairs, required textbooks, and agreed upon statutes by which the faculty was governed by a chancellor, dean, or rector. The preferred term for a qualified teacher in the Middle Ages was "master," but by the thirteenth-century Bolognese lawyers preferred to be called "doctor."

By 1230, in the faculty of theology, there were apprentices called "bachelors," who assisted the master in the performance of his duties by reading the text to the younger students in a cursory manner and by responding to questions raised by the students. Soon the subordinate role of the bachelor was subdivided into that of the *cursor biblicus*, who did the preliminary reading of the Bible, and that of the *bachelarius sententiarum*, who lectured on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (1100–1160), a collection of patristic texts organized according to doctrinal points.

In all scholastic training the chief instrument of learning was logic, the purpose of which was to acquire scientific knowledge (*scientia*) through definition, division, and argument. For this art the fundamental source was Aristotle, originally in the version of Boethius (d. 524). Before all of Aristotle was known in the late twelfth century, studies preliminary to the study of Bible or any of the higher subjects consisted in studying the seven liberal arts (logic, grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy), with special emphasis given to logic and grammar. Organization of universities at Bologna, Paris, and Oxford took place just as the "new learning" made its appearance in the Latin West from Greek, Arabic, and Hebrew sources in the twelfth century. New works of logic (the rest of Aristotle's *Organon*) and Ptolemaic and Arabic astronomy were simply worked into the known seven arts, but other books—namely those on natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and first philosophy, or metaphysics—could only be added to the arts as "the three philosophies" to make up the faculty of arts and sciences.

The method of teaching these new sciences, although

basically the old method, was perfected by these books of "the new logic," especially *Posterior Analytics*. A distinct philosophical content was given to medieval teaching in arts, which inevitably flowed over to theology, thus creating a diversity of scholasticisms.

The Scholastic method, therefore, was universally one and the same throughout the Middle Ages: (1) it was always in Latin, of varying proficiency and elegance on an approved text universally acknowledged as worthy of study; (2) it was structured according to the Aristotelian logic of defining, dividing, and reasoning in its exposition of the text and its resolution of difficulties; and (3) all studies, even the related field of law, led to theology as the "Queen of the Sciences," that is, to the understanding of the Bible. But considering the great diversities that existed among outstanding masters and their followers in terms of loyalties and priorities, it is possible to speak of various schools, movements, and *-isms* among Scholastics of different periods.

Teachings. Scholasticism as a doctrine is usually divided into three periods: (1) medieval, up to the Reformation; (2) second scholasticism, or the renewed Thomism of the sixteenth century; and (3) a revival of Thomistic philosophy from around 1850 to the Second Vatican Council, or Leonine Thomism. Medieval Scholasticism is also divided into three periods: early medieval, before the introduction of Aristotle to the universities around 1200; high medieval, a vigorous assimilation of Aristotelian thought despite strong opposition in the thirteenth century; and late medieval, usually considered as declining around 1350, after the Black Death.

In early Scholasticism special emphasis was given to grammar and logic during training in arts prior to a long study of the scriptures. Among its outstanding masters were Alcuin at York; Lanfranc and Anselm, first at Bec, then at Canterbury; Anselm and his brother Ralph at Laon; Ivo and his successors at Chartres; Peter Abelard in and around Paris; and the canonist Gratian at Bologna. Although the problem of "universals" ranked high, the principal theological problems concerned the Eucharist, the trinity of persons in one God, and the incarnation of the Son of God.

High Scholasticism, incorporating the works of Aristotle in the universities and assimilating his thought, notwithstanding a background of Augustinian Platonism, necessarily includes the vast works of Albertus Magnus, Robert Grosseteste, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Thomas Bradwardine, and their contemporaries—with all their philosophical differences and similarities. This was the age of assimilation and of new syntheses of thought, such as Thomism, Scotism, and

nominalism (Ockham). [See Nominalism.] Within these syntheses one should note the varying influences of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroës), and certain pseudo-Aristotelian works, such as *Liber de causis*.

Late Scholasticism, depending on where one makes the division (some put it at 1277, others around 1315), is generally considered to be a period of intellectual and spiritual decline before the Italian Renaissance (fifteenth century) or the Protestant Reformation (sixteenth century). Wherever its bounds, the period witnessed the rapid spread of universities, a special stirring of popular devotion (*Devotio Moderna*) in prayer, hymns, and sermons, and a widespread interest in the spoken word of God (the Bible), especially in the vernacular. Heiko Oberman sees this period as the ripening of medieval thought preparatory to Luther's harvest of Christianity. While one must recognize the flowering of art, the spread of printing, the expansion of global exploration, and a growing literacy among the laity, one must nevertheless admit that as far as Scholasticism is concerned, the period yielded a sterile and barbarous formalism performed with perfunctory brevity.

Second scholasticism is a term given to the brief spring of scholastic thought in the sixteenth century, when the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas replaced the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in major Catholic universities. This change was accomplished mainly by Dominicans such as Peter Crokaert in Paris, Thomas de Vio Cajetan at Pavia, Konrad Koellin at Heidelberg and Cologne, and Francisco de Vitoria at Salamanca. All of these men had many disciples with considerable influence later. This revival was given special impetus when the Council of Trent (1545–1563) redefined much of Catholic doctrine, utilizing Thomistic as well as traditional patristic teaching, and when the prestigious Society of Jesus (Jesuits) was founded by Ignatius Loyola in 1534, pledging to follow the teaching of Thomas Aquinas and subsequently renovating Catholicism throughout the world. The revival found expression not only in official documents like the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent, but also in its *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, issued by order of Pius V in 1566, and in the innumerable textbooks of scholastic philosophy and theology (*iuxta mentem S. Thomae*) for use in colleges and seminaries established under the Tridentine reform. The leading Jesuit scholastics of this period were Roberto Bellarmino, Francisco de Toledo, Francisco Suárez, Luis de Molina, professors of the Collegio Romano founded by Ignatius in 1551, and the Complutenses, namely, teachers at the Jesuit college at Alcalá, founded by Cardinal Francisco Ximénes de Cisneros in 1508. [See Trent, Council of.]

The scholasticism of this period was not simply a rep-

etition of older views, but its theology was substantially invigorated by clashes with the reformers and its philosophy by a renewed interest in the science of nature. Its theology is best seen in the polemical literature and the great number of exceptional commentaries on Thomas's *Summa*. Its philosophy is best seen in treatises on motion and in thoughtful commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics*, *De caelo*, and other books on nature, notably by Domingo de Soto, Diego de Astudillo, and Juan de Celaya at Paris, and the Jesuit professors, notably Christopher Clavius (1538–1612), at the Collegio Romano. One should distinguish these progressive Aristotelians from the textual type, who were more interested in editing and translating from books than from nature.

Within the context of this revived philosophy must be seen the astronomy and the two new sciences of Galileo (1564–1642), and to a much lesser extent, the new philosophy of René Descartes (1596–1650). Galileo's early writings depend heavily on the lecture notes of Jesuit professors of philosophy at the Collegio Romano; the butt of his gibes turns out to be the parrots who would not look at the heavens, but only at the text. Descartes, on the other hand, had a less venturesome scholasticism from the Jesuits at La Flèche (1609–1613). While later Descartes sought to replace their teaching with entirely new first principles, their roots, as Étienne Gilson has shown, were medieval and scholastic. Nevertheless both Galileo and Descartes dealt the death-blow to scholasticism and laid the foundation of modern thought.

Meanwhile Catholic theology, which felt the greatest impact from this revival, experienced a second spring. Under Pius V, Thomas Aquinas was declared a doctor of the church, the first so considered since the patristic age; and the first edition of his multivolume *Opera omnia* was published in Rome (1570–1571). Notable commentaries on Thomas's *Summa* began to appear, such as those of Thomas de Vio Cajetan (Lyons, 1540–1541), Conrad Koellin (Cologne, 1512), and Franciscus Silvester Ferrariensis on the *Summa contra gentiles* (Paris, 1552). The original constitution of the Jesuits (1550) obliged its members to study and promote the teaching of Thomas alone. But in the bitter controversy over grace (*De auxiliis*, 1597–1607) that broke out with the Dominicans over the publication of Molina's *Concordia* (1588), a new Thomism emerged in the writings of Francisco de Suárez (1548–1617), that tried to reconcile Thomism with Scotism. After 1607 theology was reduced to repetition and division into diverse specialties, courses, and tractates; and moral theology bogged down over probabilism and, later, Jansenism. For all practical purposes, scholasticism was dead by 1650.

A third appearance of scholasticism occurred in more recent times, when there was a revival of solely the philosophical aspects of Thomism, blessed and fostered by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879). Dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of contemporary philosophy to solve pressing problems had been expressed in Italy early in the nineteenth century by teachers of philosophy in Catholic colleges and seminaries. These professors were concerned primarily with future priests and the state of the world vis-à-vis philosophy. Seminary textbooks were often thoroughly Cartesian, and "Christian" only by reason of a few biblical quotations and references to Augustine or Bossuet without a mention of Thomas Aquinas or the Middle Ages. In the Rhineland the distinguished Georg Hermes (1775–1831) sought to adjust Roman Catholic principles to the supposed requirements of Immanuel Kant; his adjustment was condemned in 1835. In Vienna the prolific Anton Günther (1783–1863) sought to do the same for Hegel; his works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1857. The principal errors of the day were listed in the *Syllabus of Errors* of Pius IX (1864), ranging from pantheism and liberalism to communism and indifferentism. In the eyes of many only the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas could bring mankind back to sanity.

Small beginnings were made by Vincenzo Buzzeti in Piacenza, Joseph and Joachim Pecci (later Pope Leo XIII) in Perugia, and the Sordi brothers and Taparelli among the Jesuits in Naples and Rome. By 1850 the ideas of Thomas were again familiar to readers of *Civiltà Cattolica* and the five-volume *Philosophia Christiana* (Naples, 1853) by Gaetano Sanseverino (1811–1865). These beginnings were augmented in Germany by Josef Kleutgen, in France by Henri Lacordaire, in Spain and the Philippines by Zeferino Gonzales, and in Italy by Tommaso Zigliara. The first major encyclical issued by Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris*, called for "the restoration in Catholic schools of Christian philosophy according to the mind of St. Thomas, the Angelic Doctor." In all subsequent encyclicals Leo promoted the teaching of Thomas applied to the modern world, with the result that by the time of his death in 1903 Leo had rehabilitated Thomas.

By the turn of the century, the Scholastic philosophy of Thomas began to take root in all the main centers of the Catholic world. In this revival, philosophy, not theology, was the central issue, since reason seemed to be common to Christianity and the secular world. In this case scholasticism was identified with Thomistic philosophy, somehow conceived as perennial (*perennis*) and common to all great minds of all ages. For Leo XIII this philosophy was to be found in the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas. When cries were raised about other philoso-

phies, such as those of Bonaventure and Suárez, the reply from Rome (1907–1950) was that all others were to be evaluated by the standard of Thomas. This did not mean that other philosophies were wrong, but rather that only the philosophy of Thomas was to be promoted urgently for the church in the modern world. Throughout this same period there were many Catholics who were unconvinced and impatient, insisting that a more modern and relevant philosophy was needed. These were known as “modernists,” eager to secularize Christian principles in order to be accepted. [See Modernism, *article on Christian Modernism.*]

Before the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) almost all Catholics were exposed to some shades of Thomistic philosophy, especially through seminaries and colleges, despite the specter of modernism. During the first half of the twentieth century a large number of distinguished Thomists, both Catholic and non-Catholic, addressed important issues in almost every field of human interest: historical, philosophical, sociological, psychological, scientific, and political. Countless journals were founded throughout the world claiming to be scholastic or Thomistic, and the names of Gilson, Maritain, Adler, Grabmann, and Chenu became household names. For many reasons, none of them philosophical, the Second Vatican Council served as a watershed for Leonine scholasticism.

[See also *biographies of theologians, philosophers, and church leaders mentioned herein.*]

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For such a vast subject, it is perhaps best to start with overviews. As such, several entries in *The New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1967) can be recommended: “Scholasticism,” by Ignatius Brady, J. E. Gurr, and me; “Thomism,” by me; and “Scotism,” by C. Balic and me; each has an extensive bibliography.

On Scholastic method, the standard work by Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2 vols. (1909–1911; reprint, Basel, 1961), can serve as a starting point for the early period, or even Anders Piltz’s *The World of Medieval Learning* (Oxford, 1981). For clarification of its technical meaning, one should consult Artur M. Landgraf’s “Zum Begriff der Scholastik,” *Collectanea Franciscana* 11 (1941): 487–490; M.-D. Chenu’s *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas* (Chicago, 1964); and *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales: Définition, critique et exploitation* (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982).

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JAMES A. WEISHEIPL

SCHOLEM, GERSHOM (1897–1982), the founder of a school of rigorous historical and philological study of Jewish mysticism (Qabbalah). Although earlier Jewish historians had treated Qabbalah, they generally regarded it either as disreputable or, at best, as a part of Jewish philosophy. Scholem showed that the mystical tradition was a discipline in its own right, and, by the discovery and dating of hundreds of manuscripts, he established its textual and intellectual history. A prolific writer, he issued his findings in numerous publications.

Scholem was born in Berlin to a family of printers. Although his parents were partly assimilated, Scholem became a passionate Jew and a committed Zionist. He taught himself Hebrew and acquired a Jewish education while still in secondary school. Opposed to World War I on Zionist grounds—that it was against the interests of the Jews—he was expelled from school for circulating a pamphlet against the war.

Scholem was initially influenced by Martin Buber but broke with him over the question of the war. He criticized Buber for using mystical categories to support the German war effort. Later, he developed this criticism of Buber into a polemic against Buber’s ahistorical treatment of Jewish sources, especially Hasidism.

In 1919, Scholem decided to write his doctoral dissertation on Qabbalah, and he chose as his subject the early qabbalistic text *Sefer ha-bahir*. Completing this work in Munich in 1922, the following year he emigrated to Palestine, where he found a position as librarian in the emerging Hebrew University. When the university opened in 1925, he was appointed lecturer in Jewish mysticism and was promoted to professor several years later. He served in this capacity until his retirement in 1965.

Scholem’s studies of the history of Jewish mysticism can be found in 579 entries in his bibliography. His most important works include *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (first published in 1941), *Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah* (Hebrew ed., 1957; rev. English ed., 1973), *Ursprung und Anfänge der Kabbala* (1962), and *The Messianic Idea in Judaism: And Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality* (1971).

At the heart of Scholem’s historiography is the belief that myth is crucial to the vitality of a religious tradition, an idea that betrays the influence of German ro-

mantic thinkers such as von Baader. Scholem identified the central myth of Qabbalah as gnostic. He argued that already in late antiquity, Jewish mystics had developed a monotheistic version of gnostic dualism. This Jewish gnosticism persisted in underground traditions and made its way from Babylonia via Italy and Germany to southern France, where it surfaced in *Sefer ha-bahir*. In a number of important books and articles, Scholem described how these ideas sparked the development of the qabbalistic movement of Provence and Spain in the thirteenth century. He showed how this movement culminated in *Sefer ha-zohar* (The Book of Splendor), which he demonstrated to have been the work of Mosheh de León at the end of the thirteenth century. [See Zohar.]

Scholem traced the history of the gnostic myth of Qabbalah through sixteenth-century Lurianic Qabbalah to the Shabbatean messianic movement of the seventeenth century. His work on Shabbateanism argued that this heretical movement was not a marginal phenomenon in Jewish history but instead the central event of the seventeenth century. By undermining the hegemony of the rabbis, Shabbateanism became the great watershed between the Middle Ages and modernity and foreshadowed the rise of antinomian secularism. Thus, Scholem argued that the rise of modern Judaism was a consequence of an event within the Jewish religious tradition and not simply the result of outside influences. Secularism, rather than constituting a break from Jewish history, was a product of a dynamic within Jewish history itself.

Scholem's history of Jewish mysticism sweeps from late antiquity to the threshold of modernity, and in his hands, Qabbalah became the key to the history of the Jews during this long period. Scholem argued that Judaism is not a monolithic tradition but consists instead of a dialectical interplay of conflicting forces. Only by understanding this tradition in its anarchistic entirety can one grasp the "essence" of Judaism.

Behind Scholem's historiographical achievement lay a philosophy of modern Judaism that combined Zionism with a kind of religious anarchism. Scholem held that only in a Jewish state could nonapologetic history be written, and only there could the Jews again become the subjects of their own history. He saw the Judaism that would come out of the Zionist movement as something different from either Orthodoxy or the rationalism of the nineteenth century. Similar to his version of historical Judaism as a dynamic conflict between opposing forces, the new Judaism would be pluralistic rather than monolithic.

[For further discussion of Scholem's interpretation of Qabbalah, see Qabbalah.]

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DAVID BIALE

SCHWEITZER, ALBERT (1875–1965), philosopher, theologian, musicologist, and humanitarian physician. Schweitzer was born in a Lutheran parsonage in Kaysersberg, Upper Alsace, which was then in Germany. This locale, which included his childhood hometown of Günsbach, and his university city, Strassburg, later became part of France.

In 1899 Schweitzer received a doctorate in philosophy and in 1900 a doctorate in theology from Strassburg. Yet philosophy and theology could not contain all his energies, some of which he directed to music. Between 1905 and 1911 he began making intensive studies and contributions to the literature on Johann Sebastian Bach, whose organ music he also edited. Regarded by his teachers and critics as a man with sufficient talent to be world-renowned as an organ performer, he chose instead to write on the almost mystical spirituality of Bach. Schweitzer later took a zinc-lined organ with him to the damp climate of equatorial Africa and occasionally returned to his Günsbach bench and performed elsewhere in Europe to raise funds for his African ventures.

It was these African endeavors that made a world citizen out of Schweitzer and that led to his winning the Nobel Peace Prize for in 1952. After having shown his ability to excel in philosophy, theology, and music, Schweitzer felt a call to become a physician so that he could address human suffering. He recognized a vocation to this role after having been moved by a Strassburg statue of an African, and he chose for his work a site called Lambaréné in Gabon, in French Equatorial Africa. There he went with his wife, physician and researcher Hélène Bresslau, after he received the M.D. degree in 1913, and there he spent most of his remaining fifty years.

Schweitzer became one of the best-known figures in the world, a pioneer in a form of humanitarianism that was to know no boundaries of ideology, nation, or religion. Although the administration of his hospital clinic was often arbitrary, patriarchal, and paternalistic, and although his attitude toward African blacks was so condescending as to be regarded as racist by critics, Schweitzer gained and held credentials because of his

ability to serve suffering natives. He attracted volunteers from all over the world, and for decades Lambaréne was a goal for pilgrimages. Visitors ordinarily brought back enthusiastic, almost unrestrained, reports of Schweitzer's motivation and a humane spirituality that emanated from his work and life. Lambaréne was an easy image to grasp, one that left a much bigger stamp on the religious world than did anything Schweitzer was to write or say.

Yet the physician also had much to say in philosophy and religion, and some of his writings on the New Testament found a permanent place in the canons of biblical criticism. It is clear that Schweitzer wanted to make his mark through a multivolume *Kulturphilosophie* (1923), which was translated as *Philosophy of Civilization*. He worked on its third volume for many years between surgical operations in Africa. Its first volume, with its survey of history, has had little impact and would be little read were it not for curiosity about the author.

The second volume, however, includes Schweitzer's personal religious philosophy, identified by his famous phrase "reverence for life." One day in 1915 on a boat on the Ogooué River, Schweitzer had an almost mystical revelatory experience. This led him to concentrate his disparate energies on the notion and ethos of reverence for all life. It was this passion that made the doctor well known, sometimes notorious, because he did not want to kill mosquitoes or bees or any other living things, even though they add to misery by spreading diseases. He felt that reverence for life, for which he presented little philosophical justification but toward which he assembled all his religious energies, made its own claims on humans, whose future depended upon how they regarded all life.

Schweitzer's more vivid theological work concentrated on radical studies of Jesus. Gradually his Lutheranism was transformed into a reverent attention to the "spirit of Christ," and some thought of him as a Unitarian. His *Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus* (1930) elaborated on some of these themes, but *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (1906), translated as *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (1910), had epochal significance. The book traces the history of biblical criticism, chiefly in Germany, through a century of liberal efforts to establish a revitalized Christianity around the figure of "the historical Jesus."

Schweitzer devastated the reputation of many predecessors by showing that their search for the historical Jesus was not sufficiently historical. There was no "historical Jesus" to be found, he said, since the biblical records left such figures irretrievable, and he showed that German scholars had usually stopped their quest

short, at the point where they found a Jesus who projected their own liberal ideals. The evidence, Schweitzer said, reached instead to a Jesus who turned out to be virtually useless for such purposes. Jesus was an apocalyptic zealot who had thought that God would break into world history and usher in his Kingdom after Jesus began his ministry. When God failed to do this, Jesus by his own sufferings tried to bring on that divine action. There was no way such an eschatologically minded figure could be anything but alien to moderns.

Paradoxically, this did not mean the end of following the spirit of Christ. Schweitzer often wrote in almost mystical terms about following Jesus. In the eyes of many he successfully promoted a search for the divine will in the path of this remote and mysterious Jesus. While Schweitzer's positive theology held limited appeal, serious biblical scholarship has subsequently had to build its New Testament historical research on new foundations.

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Taken together, two biographies—*Schweitzer* (New York, 1971), by George N. Marshall and David Poling, and *Albert Schweitzer* (New York, 1975), by James Brabazon—provide a comprehensive portrait of Schweitzer's eclectic talents and undertakings. Jackson Lee Ice restricts himself to a study of a single aspect of Schweitzer's career, namely, his impact on theological and historical studies of Christianity, in *Schweitzer: Prophet of Radical Theology* (Philadelphia, 1971), and Henry Clark probes *The Ethical Mysticism of Albert Schweitzer: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Schweitzer's Philosophy of Civilization* (Boston, 1962). Concise presentations of the highlights of Schweitzer's life and work abound in *Albert Schweitzer: An Anthology*, edited by Charles R. Joy (Boston, 1965), which reprints excerpts, organized by topic, from Schweitzer's prolific writing career, on issues ranging from "Bach's World-View" to "The Cause of the World War," and in *In Albert Schweitzer's Realms*, edited by A. A. Roback (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), a collection of addresses and essays presented at a symposium in his honor. The latter includes articles by Jacques Maritain, Paul Tillich, and Tom Dooley. Many of the themes in these works are discussed in George Seaver's substantial study, *Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Mind*, 6th ed. (New York, 1969).

MARTIN E. MARTY

SCIENCE AND RELIGION. [This entry traces an argument concerning why modern science could have arisen only within the philosophico-cosmological framework established by Christianity. For further treatment of issues involving the relation of the sciences to religion, see Artificial Intelligence; Evolution; Neuroepistemology; and Physics and Religion.]

It is a widely held view that to speak of religion and science is to embark on a long recital of conflicts, for most if not all of which religion is to blame. In the same view most of the conflicts have been resolved in favor of science or at least will be in due course. And if some conflicts will be found unresolvable, underlying the stalemate there will be found an unfathomable intellectual perplexity that can hardly give comfort to any religion that claims to satisfy the demands of a reason that is often equated with science.

What Science? What Religion? That both religion and science are vast entities is, in this view, the only feature they may have in common. The differences between the two may appear striking even to a casual onlooker. Science is relatively new; it became robustly manifest only about three hundred years ago. The professedly exclusive concern of science is easily definable as an observation of empirical data and their being cast, as much as possible, into a mathematical mold. With its ever heavier reliance on mathematics, science is achieving an ever broader knowledge of, and technology a firmer control over, empirical processes. The same reliance also assures to science an ability to predict phenomena that has at times a revolutionary novelty. Its subject matter (empirical reality) and its method of interpretation (ever wider and deeper quantification) secure for science, taken as a communal inquiry, a stunning facility in communicating and in achieving consensus.

Ever since its rise in the seventeenth century the scientific community has not been seriously divided as to what constitutes science. The rise of that community was marked by its signal success in discrediting alchemy and astrology as scientific pursuits. It proved itself just as effective in distancing itself from *Naturphilosophie* in the first half of the nineteenth century. In our own times students of extrasensory perception and telekinesis have had but meager success in becoming a recognized part of science. The passing away of a particular generation of scientists is usually sufficient to make dissent on a topic a thing of the past. Even when dissenting groups such as non-Darwinian evolutionists endure over three or four generations, the matter is hardly considered a real rift in science. Neither is any rift implied in disagreements among scientists as to what extent the quantitative method is applicable to the life sciences, or, especially, to the sciences that are on the borderline with the humanities, such as psychology, sociology, and historiography.

To science's impressive measure of youth, uniformity, consensus, coherence, and definability, religion presents an unflattering contrast. Religion predates recorded history and easily appears as a fossil of bygone ages. Reli-

gion repeats old sayings, and if it offers something "new," the novelty turns out to be either a studied vagueness or an eventual boomerang. The statements of religion, if truly theological, are never testable in a scientific sense. Perhaps no other word than *religion* has ever been used, with apparent equanimity, to denote outlooks that are not only widely different but at times mutually exclusive. Confucianism, Shintō, and Buddhism, which do not consider man a being dependent on a personal, transcendental creator, pass for religion no less than do the three great monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. These three in turn all profess to be the privileged recipients of a supernatural message of the creator who has a personal hold over human history.

Supernatural revelation may seem to be an especially effective source of further fragmentation in the religious landscape. At one end of the spectrum are those Jews, Christians, and Muslims for whom such revelation has become an unbearable burden and for whom the force of revelation has dwindled to mere adherence to cultural traditions. At the other end are the fundamentalists for whom the primordial revelation must be preserved in a pristine, literal sense. This latter trend is, within Protestant Christianity, an offshoot of the infallibility which the reformers had ascribed to the pious and informed reading of the Bible. In Roman Catholicism, doctrinal infallibility is assigned to concrete human beings, such as the pope and, under certain circumstances, the college of bishops.

A portrayal, however brief, of religion as an actual phenomenon that can react to science cannot be complete without a reference to unitarianism and to deism. The former has increasingly approached the erstwhile position of deism, whereas the latter is now hardly distinguishable from a kind of cosmic "religion" to which Albert Einstein has given much currency. The residue of "religion" can be detected at times in secular humanism, which rejects even the vague pantheism of cosmic religion; mere aestheticism might be a more appropriate label for this religiosity.

It may seem well-nigh self-defeating to attempt a meaningful discourse on the relation between an entity such as religion, which has such disparate features, and another entity, science, which to all appearances is the paragon of coherence and consistency. And it may appear a sort of sectarian preference to center such a discourse on the relation of science to a Christianity that still holds onto a set of propositions that are distinct enough to pass for dogmas. Such a restriction commends itself as a dictate of logic, and it is also imposed by history. The emergence of science in the seventeenth

century took place in western Europe (taken in a broad sense that includes Italy), where dogmatic Christianity still had a sway and where church structures—Catholic hierarchy and Protestant synods—still had a strong public influence. From that century date some of the chief confrontations between Christianity and science, such as debates regarding free will and mechanical laws, natural laws and miracles, and nature and revelation as God's two messages.

The Christian Matrix of the Rise of Science. The emergence of science in the Christian West in the seventeenth century has until recently been seen in the framework of Comtean positivism. [See *Positivism and the biography of Comte*.] According to Comtean positivism, Christianity could conceivably have had a role in that emergence by providing a set of metaphysical tenets that ultimately led to a rationalist view of nature. Comtean historiography tried to play down the actual presence of Christianity in the seventeenth-century scientific context and emphasized rather the contribution of eighteenth-century deism, which was quite acceptable to the leaders of the Enlightenment. The seventeenth-century emergence of science relates strongly to Christianity, however, partly because most of its representatives were sincerely believing Christians. Huygens and Newton were two notable exceptions, of whom the former harbored an outright hatred for the Christian religion he knew, Calvinism, while the latter tried as best he could to conceal his unitarianism in order to maintain his peace and position in the Anglican establishment.

An especially telling aspect of the Christian background of the seventeenth-century emergence of science relates to the history of the three Newtonian laws of motion. Newton himself can be credited only with the third, the force-acceleration law. The second, the action-reaction law, predates Newton, and so does the first, the law of uniform inertial motion realizable when no resistance is present. While the first law is customarily ascribed to Descartes, he was undoubtedly heir, as was Galileo, to a trend of thought that began with Buridan and Oresme at the University of Paris in the fourteenth century. Among their doctrines, which were carried by a large number of students to other places of learning in Europe, was a sharp dissent from some tenets of Aristotelian science and cosmology. Aristotle's theory of the cosmos was based on his doctrine of the eternity of the world, as well as on his pantheism—that is, his doctrine that the world is the ultimate living entity. Such tenets were at variance with the Christian creed, which is pivoted on the doctrine of creation. Creation in time meant a finite cosmic past, and this in

turn imposed an absolute beginning on all motion, and in particular on the motion of the sphere of stars, which in the Aristotelian view determined other motions in the lower realms, celestial and terrestrial.

Buridan, and after him Oresme, took the view that the sphere of stars received, when created by God, a certain amount of motion (*impetus*). Furthermore, they saw that *impetus* as conserved, because the motion was taking place in a frictionless area. Most significantly, Buridan and Oresme discussed in the very same context such ordinary cases of motion as the throw of a javelin or any other projectile. That they discussed celestial and terrestrial kinds of motion on the same basis was an enormous break with the past and a major portent for the scientific future. Newton's view of the fall of an apple as identical with the fall of the moon in its orbit should come to mind in this connection as one of the greatest breakthroughs in all scientific history. It was also a feat that the Christian creed had enabled, for, according to Christian doctrine, the heavens were as mere creatures as was anything on earth.

Buridan and Oresme in fact made a complete departure from Aristotle's theory of motion, which rested ultimately on the divinity of the heavens and on the Prime Mover's essential identity with the outermost sphere. It was this identity that ultimately imposed on Aristotle the notion that the mover had to remain in uninterrupted contact with the moved in order to assure its continued motion. While this seemed to be an innocuous postulate with respect to the study of the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars, it was straddled with great difficulties in respect to planetary motion, and invited contradiction in terms when it came to terrestrial projectiles. Thus Aristotle had to postulate the closing in of the air behind the projectile as its continued propellant. This was the logical equivalent of raising oneself by one's bootstraps, and the contradiction proved a very high price for Aristotelian physics to pay for its author's being steeped in pantheism.

It was that pantheism that put physics into a straitjacket for almost two thousand years. Tellingly, the only serious critic of that theory in ancient times was Philoponus, a Christian, who objected to it with explicit reference to some consequences of the Christian doctrine of creation. That a break from that straitjacket could have been achieved apart from a commitment to Christian doctrine is not at all likely. Major events of intellectual history, to be discussed shortly, also suggest that unlikelihood.

As a breakthrough in the direction of full-fledged modern science as it emerges in Newton's *Principia*, the fourteenth-century formulation of the *impetus* theory

was not an isolated event. Speculations on uniformly accelerated motion followed in the same century. That in such motion, of which the free fall of bodies is a case, the distance covered after starting from rest is directly proportional to the square of the time elapsed was a widely voiced notion two generations before Galileo went on record on this point. In this respect, as Pierre Duhem, the great discoverer of medieval science and of its being steeped in reflections on the Christian creed, had aptly noted early in this century, "there was nothing for Galileo to discover." Galileo's immortal contribution was the mathematical proof of the time-squared law and its empirical demonstration in the famed inclined-plane experiment.

The striking novelty of medieval speculations on motion was of a piece with the trend in which the world was gradually divested of its animistic properties. These properties were the invariable accompaniments of classical pagan pantheism, which was incompatible with the absolute transcendence ascribed to the creator in Christianity. It was no accident that in the cosmology of Giordano Bruno, a professed pantheist and a wizard of Qabalah, all material entities, especially the stars and planets, were members of an infinite, eternal, living entity. As such, they were subject to eternal cycles of birth, growth, death, and rebirth. Furthermore, as part of a pantheistic organism, each material entity could, almost as if prompted by willfulness or caprice, turn into any other part. Such an outlook was diametrically opposed to the consistency and stability that science presupposes in all changes in nature, if nature is to be truly investigable. Not surprisingly, Bruno decried Copernicus's reliance on "the file [exactness] of geometry." Again, there is no hint in Bruno's writings of a view, already popular in the fourteenth century, of the world as a clockwork mechanism. Such a mechanism, unlike Bruno's pantheistic world-animal, full of caprice and volitions, was clearly germane to investigations that could be scientific in the best Newtonian sense.

The investigability of the universe in strict quantitative terms received further invaluable support in the medieval popularity of a verse in the *Wisdom of Solomon* to the effect that the creator "arranged everything according to measure, number, and weight." This verse was the most widely quoted biblical passage in medieval writings, according to E. R. Curtius, a prominent authority on medieval literature. The *Wisdom of Solomon* also contains the emphatic insistence, repeated almost verbatim by Paul in his *Letter to the Romans*, that the human mind is capable of recognizing the creator from his works. Since, however, the creator was believed to be fully rational, his works had to possess the same quality. The understanding of God's works had to

be eminently within the reach of man, as precisely because of his rationality man was believed to have been created in the image of God.

Galileo made much of this in setting forth the methodology of the new science in his famed and ill-fated *Dialogues*. Tellingly, the most serious fault in Galileo's methodology consists in his becoming Archimedean at the expense of his Christian belief. According to the latter the human mind could fathom the laws of nature, but it could not dictate them. A truly created world had to have a rationality that, whatever its consistency and permanence, could only be contingent in the sense of being one of an infinite number of possibilities available to an infinitely powerful creator. This point too received much emphasis in late medieval centuries. Oversight of this exacted its due when Galileo, in view of the alleged absolute perfection of the sphere, dictated that the motion of planets had to be perfectly circular. Such was the apriorism that prevented Galileo from recognizing the crucial value of Kepler's three laws of planetary motion. Quite similar was the trap that apriorism had set for Descartes, who did his best to underplay the significance of the elliptical orbit of planets as established by Kepler.

It was also a part of that Christian view of the created mind, which became a widely shared cultural matrix in medieval times, that man as an analogous image of God was also God's steward over creation. This view was part and parcel of the medieval explosion of technological inventiveness. Weight-driven clock mechanisms, first produced in the late thirteenth century, soon found industrial applications. A similar technological breakthrough was the cam, which made possible the transformation of linear motion into circular motion and vice versa. In addition to original inventions, the medievals made enormous improvements on techniques they had inherited from Roman times or learned from the Arabs. Such improvements related to windmills, horse harnesses, crop rotation, and various architectural devices that made possible the construction of Gothic cathedrals. It could indeed be stated that until the industrial application of steam power and electricity in the nineteenth century, modern western Europe thrived on a technology of essentially medieval make.

The conception of the sudden emergence of science from Galileo's mind, as the leap of a fully armed Athena from the head of Zeus, is no longer the kind of undisputed tenet that it was only fifty or so years ago. Not much more creditable than some rear-guard defenses of that tenet are the efforts of some historians of technology who aim at distracting attention from the medieval theological matrix of the rise of modern science. At best those efforts offer pleasing similes in place of explana-

tion. Such is, for instance, the reference to the medieval confluence of important ingredients for the making of science, as if it were then merely a case of self-ignition. To see the true merit of such similes, even when they are buttressed by references to psychological, sociological, and economic factors at play, one has to consider the fate of science in all great ancient cultures. In reviewing them, and in particular the cultures of Greece and the Islamic world, it is well to recall that culture has much to do, even etymologically, with cult, that is, religion.

Ancient Religions and Science. Studies of ancient Greece rarely fail to contain something equivalent to the phrase "the Greek miracle." With respect to science, the Greeks' achievements give also an unintended twist to a remark of Einstein's, according to which the real problem is not why science was not born in any of the ancient cultures but why it was born at all. Marvel should indeed yield to perplexity on pondering the two-century-long creative work in geometry that Euclid systematized at the beginning of the Hellenistic period (c. 300 BCE—c. 600 CE). The Euclidean synthesis is undoubtedly one of the great "monuments" of the human mind. Yet it almost immediately became a monument that failed to inspire further construction for those almost one thousand years. The same is true of Aristotle's work in biology, an achievement that prompted Darwin's remark that Linnaeus and Cuvier were mere schoolboys in comparison with the Stagirite.

There were many other Greek men of science whose achievements would undoubtedly be judged today as of Nobel-prize caliber. One example is Hipparchos's discovery of the precession of equinoxes. Another is Eratosthenes' method of estimating the size of the earth, which yielded a value in close agreement with modern measurements. It helped Aristarchos of Samos to devise a method for measuring the sizes and distances of the moon and the sun, a method that yielded rather poor results with respect to the sun only because of the difficulty of making one of the necessary measurements with sufficient accuracy. Aristarchos of Samos is, of course, best remembered as the proponent of the heliocentric theory—the ancient Copernicus, in short.

Yet even in Greece, so often and so much praised for its championing the *logos*, or reason, these splendid advances failed to issue in an intense intellectual reflection. Archimedes, for one, did not endorse the heliocentric theory, although he made much of the foregoing distance estimates in his *Sand Reckoner*. Ptolemy, who made the widest application of Euclidean geometry to astronomy, had only scorn for heliocentrism, as was also the case a century or so before him with Plutarch, who is often praised for the daring modernity with

which he spoke of the moon as a body similar to the earth. Yet, the modernity of Plutarch is only apparent. His discussion of the tides is a revealing instance. To be sure, he attributed the tides to the moon's influence, but the latter was for him a volitional sympathy for the earth and vice versa. As such it was a throwback to the organismic view that Ptolemy himself endorsed when doing astronomy not as a mathematician but as a physicist. The harmonious motion of planets was for him equivalent to that of a group of dancers intent on not colliding with one another.

This organismic view of nature varied from the crudest to the most refined. The latter was exemplified in Aristotle's cosmology, which in turn was a sophisticated codification of precepts laid down by Socrates as, in the *Phaedo*, he argued to his friends the correctness of his decision to drink the hemlock. The exchange of arguments as recorded in this dialogue is of crucial importance for an understanding of the theological or religious underpinnings of the ultimate fate of Greek science. On one side were Socrates' friends, who with the atomists insisted on a mechanistic view of nature in order to dissuade Socrates from his belief in the immortality of the soul. They were as unable to conceive that matter and spirit were not necessarily contradictory as Socrates himself had once been. In his youth an avid student of Anaxagoras and therefore a convinced mechanist, Socrates saw only one way of vindicating purpose, value, and soul (in short, humanities and religion). The way consisted in the rejection of mechanism through the universalization of purpose, volition, and soul. In the dramatic context provided by his own imminent death, Socrates argued that to demonstrate the immortality of the human soul, one had to recast the entire physical science in terms of purpose.

In fact, the methodical precept that Socrates imposed as the first and ultimate question about any event, motion, or thing was whether it was *best* for it to happen, to be so, or to proceed in this or that manner. Obeying that precept amounted to turning the entire cosmos into an animated being. In few other cases did intellectual history serve a more momentous proof of the truth of the saying that all science is cosmology, which, it is well to recall, has always had the closest ties to considerations that are the very domain of religion.

The *Phaedo* marks the beginning of a volitional or organismic physics that found its major installment in the third part of the *Timaeus*. The same was presented on an even grander scale in Aristotle's *On the Heavens*. The statement there that of two bodies the one with twice as much mass as the other would fall twice as fast has been recalled on countless occasions with that ridicule that betrays rank superficiality. Hardly ever recalled is

the broader reason given by Aristotle, who simply put in concrete form the Socratic program, which was a dramatic resolve to save the purpose, cosmic and human. It was that resolve, infused with religious inspiration, that ultimately prevented Greek science from aiming at more than a mere saving of the phenomena of the physical world.

The agony of the Greek mind was to see only an all-or-nothing choice between science (mechanics or dynamics) and purpose (religion). The Greek mind lost out on both because it did not seem to possess the fiducial strength to accept irreducible features of existence (materiality and spirituality) and to give both their due. The problem lies in the heart of the relation of science and religion, compared with which all other problems pale in significance. The clue to it would not be on hand without the subsequent ability of medieval and early modern Christian Europe to trust in the ultimate harmony of these two apparently contradictory features of experience. To the Europeans in question that trust came from their belief in a transcendental rational creator, the very belief that the Greeks did not possess. It is well to recall that in the half-dozen occasions when the question of a creation out of nothing emerged on the Greek philosophical horizon, it was invariably dismissed with scorn and ridicule.

The Socratic solution for which Greek posterity overwhelmingly opted was a move hardly helpful either for science or for soul. As to science, and Aristotle's physics in particular (which dominated the scene for almost two thousand years), it has been aptly said that it contains not one correct page. It is an illustration of the fact that the often acclaimed birth of science in ancient Greece was a stillbirth, one of the two most momentous such cases. Just when the various conditions for a mathematical treatment of motion, including the ubiquitously present accelerated motion of free-falling bodies, were on hand, the Socratic insistence on treating all moving bodies as sorts of living entities that aspire to their proper place nipped in the bud the true birth of science.

Archimedes, who applied methods adumbrating infinitesimal calculus to static bodies (such as the computation of the volume of a cone), failed to do the same in kinematics. Insofar as he was part of the post-Socratic Greek "religion" he had no encouragement for doing so. His failure is all the more significant as he was a genial student of the balance, and in general of mechanical as well as of hydrostatic equilibria. Those studies of his might have conceivably led him to the formulation of the principle of virtual velocity, on which all Newtonian dynamics ultimately rests.

Tellingly, this first decisive step toward the exploita-

tion of the scientific significance of balance took place in the late thirteenth century, when there was on hand that Christian religion that provided a balanced trust in matter as well as in spirit. Had the Greeks of old been able to approach nature with that trust, they not only might have saved their science but also their soul or religion. With a trust in the value of two sides (matter and spirit) of a single human existence, they would have had a much greater chance to resist the inroads of the Eastern mysticism and worldview that flooded the Mediterranean just when the golden age of Athens was over.

Elements of that worldview are already distinctly apparent in Plato's major dialogues, especially in the *Republic*. It contains among other things the graphic account of what is the quintessence of Eastern and in particular of Hindu thought: the coming of the universe to a full stop and its restarting, a mere incident in a recurrence that has been going on since eternity and will go on for unending ages. For Plato's student Aristotle the same notion of eternal cycles provided that smugness with which he looked at his own times as the crest of the wave with respect to technological comfort and learning. The price of that smugness was despondency, the worst threat to scientific enterprise. For the specter of cycles evoked for Aristotle the logical prospect that all technology and learning had already been achieved innumerable times in each of the innumerable bygone ages or world cycles. It could hardly be an encouraging thought that the same argument would be made time and time again in an eternal succession of ages. For the cosmos of Aristotle was eternal; indeed, its eternity was the decisive vote for its divinity, a belief unanimously shared in all Greek antiquity.

The whole debate among the Greeks of old concerning the doctrine of recurrence related to the question of whether only the classes of beings would reappear, or all individual beings in their uniqueness. Not even this touch of skeptical questioning arose with respect to the doctrine of eternal cycles in its classic home, ancient Indian culture.

Ancient India was also the place that witnessed the formulation of the decimal system, including place notation with the use of zero, at least a thousand years before the common era. Ancient South Asians can also be credited with advancing algebra to second-degree equations, but their scientific exploration of the material world surrounding them showed little if any sophistication. Practical know-how was, however, considerable in ancient India, as witnessed by the nonrusting iron pillars set up during the reign of Aśoka, who unified in the third century BCE much of the Indian subcontinent. Its coming into close contact with Greek learning and science during the time of Alexander the Great

laid bare in one stroke the marked inferiority of Indian science.

Attention to chronology is obviously a function of the prevailing notion of time, which in ancient India had little to do with linearity. Because of the recurrence of world ages, or *yugas*, in the ancient Indian conception of time, the uniqueness of events, which in a sense constitutes the linearity of time, could not but be largely lost. Time then easily became the prey of pessimism. The pessimism that such a perspective enhanced is well evidenced in the *Purāṇas*, the chief literary form throughout much of the well over one thousand years corresponding to the Hellenic and Hellenistic periods. In the *Purāṇas* one finds the major ancient Indian use of the decimal system, the computation of the number of years in the *yugas* in ever more encompassing units of cycles of which the Day of Brahmā was the largest. Yet the Day of Brahmā did not suggest at all an end to what would appear a perennial treadmill. Some modern Indian writers, among them accomplished cosmologists, clearly betray a disregard for context when they quote some of those calculations as being in close agreement with modern scientific estimates of the age of the universe. Not a few modern Indian scholars, however, have concluded that only a radical break with ancient patterns of thought would secure for science a flourishing role in their country.

While in ancient China preoccupation with world cycles was not so prominent as in ancient India, it was still a distinct part of their markedly organismic view of nature, epitomized in the doctrine of *yin* and *yang*. Confucians subscribed to it no less unreservedly than did Taoists. It entrenched a long-standing reluctance to de-animize considerations about the physical universe, a reluctance evident prior to the exposure of China to Western civilization with the arrival of Jesuit missionaries, as well as long afterward. As late as 1921 such a prominent Chinese thinker as Fung Yu-lan was not reluctant to claim that China needed no science as it was wholly alien to the best in Chinese thought. Whereas similar statements made around 1800 by Chinese scholars on being shown a microscope (a falsifier of true perception, in their eyes) may seem a minor matter, the situation in the twentieth century, when world powers stake their strategy on the successes of their respective scientific research, should seem quite different. Indeed it was the rise of China after World War II to the status of superpower that prompted major studies on the failure of China to become the birthplace of science.

As is well known, there has never been in China a lack of social organization or dearth of talent and technological inventiveness (the compass, gunpowder, ceramics, block printing, the stirrup, to mention only a few major

items). There were also long periods of peace, of which the four centuries of the Han dynasty and the three centuries of the Sung are the most memorable. In fact, in the most massive of studies of Chinese scientific thought, *Science and Civilisation in China* (5 vols. to date, 1954–), Joseph Needham was forced to conclude that religion played a crucial role in that failure. According to Needham, a sort of monotheism was replaced about a millennium before the onset of the Confucian era (c. 500 BCE) by a vague pantheism or naturalism. Needham argued that after they had parted with a belief, however inchoate, in a transcendental rational creator, the Chinese retained no confidence that men, whose powers of reason are far more limited, could fathom nature in such a way as to provide control over at least some of its parts. Similar analysis of three other major ancient cultures, the Egyptian, the Babylonian, and that of pre-Columbian America, also reveals the inhibiting impact of the religious idea of an eternal world subject to perennial cycles.

Two cultures, Jewish and Muslim, demand special consideration here, as they are both steeped in monotheism, the kind of religion most at variance with the organismic pantheism prevailing in the other main ancient cultures. Yet neither Jewish nor Islamic ambience has become the birthplace of science.

The case of Judaism shows that whatever potential spur monotheism may provide in that respect, it may not be effective in the absence of certain other factors. Some of those factors, such as social organization, were denied to Jews following the destruction of Jerusalem and the Diaspora. Yet that scatteredness acted also as an exposure to the most varied data of learning and culture. Philo Judaeus (first century), Moses Maimonides (twelfth century), and, even later, Hasdai Crescas (fourteenth century)—all show the openness and acumen of Jewish scholars. Yet to some extent already in the writings of Philo, and certainly in the works of Maimonides, whom Thomas Aquinas referred to as the "Great Moses," one can see evidence of the growing inability of Jewish thinkers to keep the creation dogma from the inroads of pantheism, a point clearly acknowledged in all the great twentieth-century Jewish encyclopedias. This is also a rarely noted but all-important point to be made in connection with the development of Muslim thought.

Within a century or so after the Hijrah the Islamic world was a vast cultural entity in full possession of the Greek philosophical and scientific corpus. Muslim studies of this body of work, intense as they were, did not, however, lead to its critical development. Scientific advances within the Muslim world were restricted either to medical skill, centering on the treatment of eye dis-

eases, or to algebra and geometry, the latter being also a part of optical studies. Concerning the study of motion, or physics and cosmology in a broader sense, Muslim studies fell into two main categories, which correspond broadly to Islam's two major theological trends, known as the Mu'tazilah and the *mutakallimūn*.

These two trends resulted in two possible reactions to the notion of physical law, or laws of nature. One reaction was that of an Islamic orthodoxy for which the laws of nature represented a curtailment of the freedom of God as set forth in the Qur'ān. Among orthodox Muslim thinkers, one finds an emphasis on the inscrutable will of God, the creator, with some implicit detriment to the full rationality of his creation. Such prominent Muslim thinkers as al-Ash'arī and al-Ghāzālī took a distinctly occasionalist view that could but discredit the notion of physical law. The other trend, represented above all in the writings of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroës), took Aristotelian science with all its apriorism as the last word in learning. Of course such a stance, or patent rationalism of the worst kind, is incompatible with belief in a creator and a revelation, and had to be presented in an expeditious way. Such was the doctrine of triple truth: one (the plain Qur'ān) for the common faithful, another (ritualistic theology) for the clergy, and still another (Aristotle) for the truly learned.

It did not occur to the Mu'tazilah that natural laws and the creator's freedom were not irreconcilable. It only had to be recognized that the actual laws of nature were created and therefore contingent, that is, representing the realization of only one of an infinite set of possible laws available for the creator's choice. The failure to perceive this was all the more telling because the notion of contingency was clearly set forth by al-Fārābī with an eye precisely on some passages of the Qur'ān where it is stated that only God exists necessarily. Yet even an al-Fārābī would not entirely free himself of the necessitarianism of Aristotelian physics and cosmology. For al-Fārābī the heavenly parts of the universe appeared to be necessarily eternal and unchangeable. Needless to say, the Averroists subscribed with no hesitation to Aristotelian apriorism or necessitarianism.

An aspect of this seeming schizophrenia among some Muslims concerning faith and science was the widespread espousal both of the doctrine of cycles and of astrology. These in turn, as was the case everywhere in other ancient cultures, lent strong support to an organismic view of nature, the very opposite of a de-animated worldview, so indispensable for the purposes of exact physical science.

The result was a stillbirth of science within the Islamic world. Ibn Sīnā, for one, failed to perceive the

implications of his own reflections on inertial linear motion in a void. The leading Muslim scholars became convinced that the cultivation of the science of motion, or physics, was in a sense a waste of time, and if it was to be pursued at all it had to be in terms of volition and similar psychological frameworks. A major illustration of this position is the *Muqaddimah*, a vast survey of the various branches of learning, by Ibn Khaldūn. Written around 1370, the work presents a revealing contrast to the very different reaction to Aristotle's physics and cosmology in the Christian West. For it was almost exactly at that time that Oresme, with his commentary on Aristotle's *On the Heavens*, lent powerful support to the trend started by his teacher, Buridan, a generation earlier.

Religion versus Scientism. The Islamic world did not lack economic strength, cultural cohesion, or contact with other cultures, both Eastern and Western. Moreover, it was steeped in monotheism. Therefore, the still-birth of science in Islam invites a further look at the very different outcome in the Christian West. Christian monotheism obviously must have had a special character capable of fostering the rise of the scientific worldview, and it is not difficult to identify the source of this quality in the doctrine of the incarnation of God in Christ. The incarnation enabled Christian consciousness to reject unconditionally the idea of a cyclic universe. Whereas the average Greek or Hindu felt little if any revulsion to the idea of his own reappearance in an infinite number of future ages, the mere thought of a replay of Christ's suffering and resurrection filled the Christian mind with overwhelming dismay. It is precisely this point that brings to its highest pitch Augustine's *City of God*, perhaps the book most influential in molding medieval Christian consciousness.

The securing of the dogma of incarnation in its pristine form had been a supreme concern throughout patristic times, and the struggle for the Nicene Creed against Arians, Semi-Arians, Monophysites, and Nestorians had momentous consequence for the notion of the physical universe as well as for subsequent theology. In that antique world, where the universe was invariably looked upon as a pantheistic entity, or an emanational product from the godhead, the Christian doctrine about Jesus as "only begotten Son" represented the sharpest conceivable form of dissent. For if Jesus, a flesh-and-blood reality, was alone begotten (*monogenes*), the existence of no other thing could be ascribed to divine generation, which like all generation produces an offspring of the same nature. Rather, each and every thing had to be seen as the result of a very different process, creation out of nothing, which can but produce beings very different in nature from the creator.

Once the dogma of incarnation secured the dogma of creation, the effective escape from Aristotelian necessitarianism was secured, thus creating the possibility for the view of cosmos required by science. A created universe had to be rational and consistent, but also contingent, that is, only one of an infinite number of possibilities available to an infinite creator who cannot but be infinitely powerful and rational. Such a universe is not, however, investigable by the limited human mind in an *a priori* way, but only in an *a posteriori* fashion, which is precisely what is needed by the experimental method. Christians, furthermore, looked upon themselves as heirs to the injunction given in *Genesis* and *Psalms* where man is spoken of as God's appointed steward who has to explore and exert power over the entire material realm.

The claim that this worldview is closely tied to dogmatic Christianity and uniquely germane to creative science is subject to several tests. These in turn represent major interactions between science and religion in modern times. One of those tests relates to the difference between the foregoing worldview, essentially a set of philosophical propositions, and the primitive world-picture, such as given in *Genesis* 1, in which that worldview was originally adumbrated. The test is in a sense the kind of answer that can be given to the question "What has been the measure of awareness of that difference, especially when the progress of science demanded drastic revisions of that world-picture?" In his *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina*, written in 1616, Galileo, for one, quoted extensively various church fathers, especially Augustine, concerning the revisability of the biblical world-picture in which the earth was floating on waters and the sky was a solid roof with the sun and the moon sliding on it. In the two treatises of Augustine on the interpretation of *Genesis*, which were widely read during medieval and Renaissance centuries, the faithful are warned against taking literally biblical details about the external world that are at variance with what reason and observation (science) had established. Underlying this warning was the conviction that the God of creation and the God of revelation were the very same God to whom no logical or factual contradiction could be ascribed.

As is well known, Galileo's *Letter* could circulate only in manuscript copies for twenty or so years. Augustine's awareness of the limitations of revealed religion was hardly to the taste of the fundamentalist literal exegesis that the Catholic church supported in Galileo's time in order to meet Luther, the first to denounce Copernicus, on his own ground. Three generations earlier Copernicus had no problem with church authorities or with scriptural exegesis. It was the Lutheran Kepler who first

deemed it appropriate to preface a major scientific work, his *De stella Martis* (1610), with a dissertation on biblical exegesis that echoed Augustine and anticipated Galileo's *Letter*. Copernicus himself, in his own preface to his *De revolutionibus* had set forth a variant of the cosmological proof of the existence of God. The heliocentric arrangement was in his eyes precisely an embodiment of a worldview most worthy of God and most germane to science. Catholic officialdom, however, seemed to learn from its bungling in the Galileo case, about which Catholics can take the sole though no small comfort that Paul V, a rather impetuous personality, refrained, in the last moment, from making an irrevocable and infallible pronouncement on the case by leaving it to lower-echelon authorities.

Two hundred or so years later, not only the theory of evolution and the discovery of the vast geological past but also the specific mechanism set forth by Charles Darwin of the origin of species had to be faced by dogmatic Christianity. Interestingly, the real opposition to Darwin's ideas came from the Protestant side, which, apart from its liberal sector, regarded the Bible as literally true in the sense bequeathed by Luther and Calvin. The quarrel of "Darwin's bulldog," T. H. Huxley, was with the Anglican bishop Samuel Wilberforce, and not with the Roman Catholic cardinal Henry Edward Manning. Wilberforce might have fared better had he kept in mind that both Huxley and Manning belonged to the Metaphysical Society, where Manning was spoken of as "Professor" while Huxley was known as "Archbishop."

T. H. Huxley was neither the first nor the last man of science to speak as if science were the exclusive source of truth and scientists its ordained priests. Not entirely unaware of the difference between empirical science and philosophy, Huxley even admitted that the Darwinian evolutionary view was essentially a metaphysical generalization. Huxley was, however, too much a professed agnostic to suspect the extent to which such and similar admissions of his undermined his scathing indictment of theologians as so many dead snakes lying around Darwin's pedestal. Much less could one expect from Darwin, or from most Darwinists, that they perceive the contradiction (to recall a pregnant remark of Whitehead's) between their crusade against purpose anywhere in nature and the purposefulness of their crusade. Much of the vast literature produced by Darwinists betrays indeed a rank disregard of the ontological and metaphysical (and therefore implicitly religious) problems involved in the notions of species and of evolution, a disregard that relates to the other side of the test mentioned above.

In going through the crucible of the conflict with Ga-

lileo and Darwin, a recognizable segment of Christian thinkers has developed a fair measure of awareness of the limitations of the propositions of religion. Insofar as they deal with ethical and metaphysical issues, those propositions cannot be touched upon by science, nor can they touch on anything specific in science, save its use. At the same time it has also become widely recognized among religious thinkers that the ultimate truth of any empirical aspect of any dogmatic statement lies with empirical science. But such recognition is hardly a part of the recent resurgence of Creationism. The existence of a matching lack of awareness on the part of a not negligible sector of the scientific community is no less evident. Metaphysical and ethical aspects of existence are too often ignored or blissfully reduced to purely quantitative statements by a considerable number of scientists and by many of those responsible for the *haute popularisation* of science (its "popular" popularizations do not deserve intellectual respect in most cases). They show little if any concern for the potentially self-defeating impact of their dicta. Their procedure is the very essence of what Jacques Maritain was the first to call "scientism."

Scientism is also known as reductionism or physicalism. According to it, statements have truth content only in the measure to which they relate to quantities and empirical facts. Scientism can but produce conflicts with any religion with meaningful metaphysical ingredients, let alone with claims to supernatural revelation. It was in fact no coincidence that David Hume, who urged the burning of all books that present anything beyond quantities and empirical facts, was also a resolute critic of miracles and revelation. While Hume's grasp of science, as it stood a generation after Newton, was very meager, he certainly had the philosophical acumen to perceive that his scientism (radical empiricism clothed in copious though hollow references to science) had nothing to quarrel about with a religion reduced to mere sentiments but only with a religion that unequivocally proclaims man's eternal responsibility to a transcendental personal creator, a creator who obviously can give revelation and work miracles.

Liberal Christianity, be it in its semantic paraphernalia Protestant or modernist and neomodernist Roman Catholic, is a matter of sentiments, and therefore its dialogue with science is at best a good poetry in prose. This kind of dialogue is particularly apt to run out on trivialities, with Christianity being invariably reduced to statements to which most pantheists, transcendentalists, ethical naturalists, Buddhists, Confucians, adherents of Shintō, and even secular humanists can readily subscribe. To that dialogue quite a few theologians and scientists have in recent times contributed books that

show two main characteristics: one is protestation, not always convincing, that the quantitative method and empirical study are not the whole story; the other is a not much more convincing set of allusions to man's uniqueness.

All too seldom does this literature testify to philosophical perplexity as powerful as that felt on occasion by Darwin, who, it is well to recall, was a professed materialist from almost the moment he had disembarked from the *Beagle*. If man, as Darwin put it on two different occasions, was but a haphazard offshoot of brutes, could any thought, however scientific, be taken for anything that truly transcends haphazard events and processes? Last but not least, could in that case man's ethical strivings, his conscience, sense of justice and sin, his dedication to human dignity and equality, be anything but a mere pragmatic convenience helpful only to the powerful individual, nation, and race?

Particularly silent on these problems are the advocates, in our times, of extraterrestrial intelligence. They are one of the main groups claiming credit for the recent "scientific" abolition of the uniqueness of man's mind. The two other groups are mostly made up of biochemists and computerologists. All three groups are the just targets of a remark made by Sir Andrew Huxley, president of the Royal Society, who in November 1980 warned his Darwinist colleagues against resorting to the sleight of hand whereby the problems of the origin of life and of consciousness are considered solved by shoving them under the rug.

A religion that is essentially a matter of intellectually coated sentiments and aesthetics is no match for the reductionist and scientific leveling of man that characterizes the ideology of a capitalist liberalism aimed exclusively at some kind of hedonism. The outspokenness of Marxist ideology, no less steeped in scientism, which holds religion to be, in Marx's phrase, the "opium of the people," seems to be a lesser threat to dogmatic Christianity, which under duress is forced to fall back on its orthodox roots. The ethical relativism that is an inseparable part of that capitalist liberalism is being proclaimed with rapidly decreasing concern for the sensibilities of the truly religious in contemporary Western society. Thus the author of the article "Keeping Up with the Genetic Revolution" (*New York Times Magazine*, 16 November 1983) quotes a geneticist with no sign of unease: "Morality changes as the times change. What we deem unacceptable today could be embraced by generations in the future." The increasingly scientific intellectual community takes for granted the demise of absolute moral and religious values with the passing of the Victorian age. It has no eyes for the fact that "societal consensus," as the sole basis of culture, paves the

way for anarchism. The latter receives enormous assistance from the ease with which scientific technology can produce and make widely available tools of destruction.

Neither to this problem nor, much less, to the problem of global nuclear holocaust can scientism provide an answer, let alone the moral strength for implementing it. A religion of aestheticism is just as ineffective in this regard. An alternative can come from dogmatic Christianity, as it combines absolute truths about human dignity with an emphasis on humility and forgiveness. That scientific circles keep viewing that religion, on account of its dogmatism, as the only real threat to their aims and "freedoms" (a threat that they often equate with the threat of dogmatic International Communism) is very logical. It is not so logical that their conflict with dogmatic Christianity has for some time been taken as the conflict between science and religion.

Actually, the science in question is a science that has grown into a religion, called scientism, and that is all too aware of its true physiognomy though it is not always ready to show its true colors. The religion in question is not any religion, and certainly not religion's liberal variants, but only a dogmatic Christianity. Its "incurability" is in the eyes of its antagonists its chief crime. In the eyes of its most penetrating analyst in modern times, John Henry Newman, that "incurability" is the very thing that should most commend it. Insofar as it remains aware of its complete lack of mission to decide about empirical facts and measurements, it will remain clear of any serious conflict with science. But aware or not on that score, its worldview, which it bequeathed historically and culturally and which is still held by its orthodox theologians, is yet a worldview within which alone creative science can survive and progress even in the twentieth century.

The Twentieth-Century Perspective. An analysis of science in the twentieth century is particularly germane to an analysis of science and religion that is centered on fundamental epistemological issues. Positions taken on these issues will invariably decide the appraisal of any particular aspect of interaction between science and religion in our times. To any student of science who focuses on twentieth-century science, scientific advance will not chiefly be located in space probes, atomic energy, and microtechnology. Rather, he will single out the arrival, for the first time in the history of science, of a cosmology that is scientifically sound.

That arrival was signaled by Einstein's formulation in 1917 of the cosmological consequences of general relativity. Prior to 1917 scientific cosmology was either a misnomer, as it dealt with only a part of the cosmos, such as the solar system and the Milky Way, or it was

in the grip of self-defeating paradoxes, as was the case with the notion of an infinite Euclidean homogeneous universe usually referred to as the "Newtonian" universe, although Newton never held that view. Scientific cosmology has become during the last fifty years a vastly expanding field of study in which the study of stars and galaxies is intimately connected with fundamental particle physics. Underlying that study is the conviction that it is possible to speak meaningfully about the totality of consistently interacting things, or the universe, partly because already in Einstein's work the universe has emerged as an entity with very specific—that is, extremely particular—overall features. This is equivalent to a rebuttal of the Kantian position in which religion is reduced to the level of mere sentiments, however important practically, because, according to Kant, the notion of universe, "a bastard product of the metaphysical cravings of the intellect," cannot function as the basis for a rational inference to the existence of a fully transcendental creator.

Half a century after Einstein's paper, cosmic specificities are being unfolded at a stunning rate. They relate above all to the early phases of the evolution of the universe that appears to be the more specifically constructed the more closely cosmologists investigate ever earlier phases of cosmic evolution. These phases are also the shorter the earlier they are, with the result that the perspective of an absolute cosmic beginning imposes itself ever more forcefully on scientific minds.

Theologians who have seized on that development as a means of establishing the moment of creation have proved only their unawareness of the limitations of the scientific method. The scientific method cannot establish about any physical configuration, however primordial, that only "the nothing" could have preceded it. Rather, these theologians should focus their attention on the cosmic specificities that have been unraveled in ever larger number by modern scientific cosmology. These specificities include the specific total mass of the universe and the specific space-time curvature it provides, the specific rate of the expansion of the universe, and the slight imbalance that obtained between matter and antimatter preceding the "cooking" of the elements, to mention only a few. Invariably laden with their own, at times dubious, specificities—such as the specific rate of emergence of hydrogen atoms out of nothing (and without a creator); the specific, progressive lengthening of the universe's expansion-contraction phases; and the strangely asymmetrical initial postulates—the proponents of various cosmological theories (steady-state, oscillating universe, and inflationary universe, respectively) have with more or less explicitness aimed at glossing over the theological pointers of the very spe-

cific cosmos unveiled by modern scientific cosmology. The universe as revealed by all such specificities, true and contrived, is a far cry from an infinite, homogeneous universe, in which, if it were truly homogeneous, nothing could happen or be perceived as genuinely real.

Realist metaphysics is to be distinguished from Kantian and Hegelian, that is to say idealist, metaphysics, and also from a so-called rational metaphysics, which empties metaphysics of its meaning by being in fact sheer rationalism. Realist metaphysics secures reality precisely through attention to the specificity of things. Such metaphysics is powerfully buttressed by cosmic specificities in its view of the universe as the valid notion that grounds the cosmological argument, the sole foundation of a religion that is both genuinely religious and soundly intellectual. Furthermore, the derivation, on an *a priori* basis, of actual cosmic specificity as a necessary form of existence, a derivation that would pose a most serious threat to theism, is not feasible. Proof of this impossibility is tied to the nontrivial set of mathematical postulates that scientific cosmology must embody. Such a set, if Gödel's incompleteness theorem is true, cannot have its proof of consistency within itself. What is, however, not consistent can hardly be necessary. In other words, science in its most comprehensive form, cosmology, assures the theologian that no objection can be raised on scientific grounds to the recognition of the contingency of the universe.

Undoubtedly, Einstein's general relativity and the scientific cosmology it inspired are a classic case of creative science at its best. That it strongly supports metaphysics at its best, which is the intellectual inference of the existence of a creator, is but a replay of a now fairly old pattern of science. Scientific methods—it is enough to think of the ones proposed by Descartes, Bacon, Hume, Comte, Mach, and the logical positivists—that on account of either their rationalism or their empiricism blocked the way of the cosmological argument proved ultimately to be so many roadblocks for science. It is hardly an accident that Newton, who by early conviction was a Cartesian and by ambience a Baconian, was helped by his scientific creativity to choose an epistemological middle ground in his mature scientific work.

As to quantum theory, the other great monument of modern science, a distinction should be made between it as science and its prevailing philosophical interpretation by the Copenhagen school. The pivotal point in that interpretation relates to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, according to which no two conjugate variables, such as position and momentum, can be measured simultaneously with complete precision. According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum me-

chanics, what cannot be measured exactly cannot take place exactly. Such an inference amounts to a confusion of the operational with the ontological to the detriment of the latter. Indeed, the essence of the Copenhagen interpretation is that statements about being are meaningless.

Yet the same interpretation includes the assertion that while beings as such cannot be the object of valid discourse, their aspects, such as the complementarity of waves and particles, can and ought to be. Such a claim is equivalent to taking for real, say, a pair of horns but not the head in which they are rooted. It is well to recall that Einstein's fierce opposition to the Copenhagen school went far deeper than an objection to its denial of causality. For in that denial Einstein rightly saw, as he put it, "a dangerous game played with reality." [See *the biography of Einstein*.]

Clearly, reality becomes meaningless if, as Ilya Prigogine claims on the basis of his work in quantum thermodynamics, novel things can arise in nature with no sufficient causes behind them. No less destructive of meaning, or at least of its communicability, should seem the multiworld theory in which the Copenhagen interpretation is carried to its logical end with the assertion that there are as many worlds as there are observers. This radical subjectivism, if not plain solipsism, also unmasks speculations in which the Taoist outlook is taken for a prophetic anticipation of the "true" message of quantum theory.

Not a few theologians have seen in the "aspects only" philosophy a scientific justification of the exclusive validity of the phenomenological method in the study of religion. The method itself is a resolve to limit one's discourse to phenomena. Yet, since no discourse is feasible without ontological statements, such a resolve will soon turn into the answering of ontological questions in terms foreign to them. The result is the kind of subjectivism that with respect to the interpretation of science has already worked its havoc in the view according to which science is but an incoherent succession of paradigms or revolutions. Without ontology those paradigms cannot be coherently linked together, and as a result their totality, science, will appear incoherent. The recent emulation by theologians of the paradigm method is only the latest example of an old pattern. It shows theologians seizing on what is the latest fashion in science and ignoring the lessons of history.

Whatever the truth of the claim that science is revolutionary, true religion is not and cannot be revolutionary if it is really about eternally valid truths. This type of religion proved to be an essential ingredient in the only viable birth of science, and science, in its subsequent great creative advances, has been driven back to

the essential philosophical worldview embodied in that religion.

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SCRIPTURE is the generic concept used in the modern West and, increasingly, worldwide, to designate texts that are revered as especially sacred and authoritative in all major and many other religious traditions.

As a General Concept. In popular and even in scholarly use today, the term *scripture* is commonly used as though it designated a self-evident and simple religious phenomenon readily identifiable anywhere in the world, namely the idea of a "sacred book." However, as a concept adequate to encompass the functional roles of the great sacred texts of history, *scripture* is a term of considerable ambiguity and complexity.

In the first instance, the specific form and content of scriptural books vary sharply from tradition to tradition and even within a single scriptural corpus. Ritual books, legal codes, myth and legend, historical accounts, divine revelations, apocalyptic visions, ecstatic poetry, the words of teachers and prophets, and hymns or prayers to a deity have all served as scripture. The love lyrics of the *Song of Songs* in the Hebrew Bible, the talismanic prayers against evil in the last two surahs of the Qur'ān, Kṛṣṇa's self-revelation in chapter 11 of the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the Buddha's parable of the burning house in chapter 3 of the *Lotus Sutra* have had significant roles as scripture, yet they have little or nothing in common in their style, form, subject matter, or intent. Such disparity makes any reasonably comprehensive yet still simple definition of *scripture* all but impossible.

Second, a major obstacle to delimiting the phenomenon of scripture is its very medium of expression. The term *scripture* is usually reserved for religious texts that have been committed to the written or printed page, as the word itself and its common equivalents (e.g., “holy writ”) suggest. Yet in most religious traditions, sacred texts were transmitted orally in the first place and written down only relatively late. Nor do written sacred books exhaust the full range of texts that function clearly as scripture. The Hindu tradition, for example, presents a major problem for defining “scripture” in terms of the written word. Its holiest texts, the Vedas, have been orally transmitted for three millennia or more—for most of that time, in explicit preference to writing them down. Despite their great length, they have been committed to writing only in comparatively recent centuries. It may also be argued that nonliterate communities have oral texts that function in similar ways to written sacred texts in literate societies, insofar as these cultures use traditional recitations in cultic practice or hold certain myths or other oral texts sufficiently sacred to be worthy of transmission over generations. For these reasons, a descriptive distinction between oral and written scriptures (or oral and written uses of the same scripture) may on occasion be necessary, even though etymologically “oral scripture” is a contradiction in terms and “written scripture” a redundancy.

A further ambiguity of “scripture” as a conceptual category lies in the wide variety of texts that might be classified as “scriptural.” A key problem in this regard involves those “classic” texts in literate cultures that have many cultural, social, or often even religious functions usually associated with more overtly “religious” texts. Examples would be the *Iliad* of Homer in later antiquity; the five (or six, nine, twelve, or thirteen) “classics” (*ching*) and the four “books” (*shu*) in traditional Chinese culture; the great Sanskrit epics, the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*, in India; and the *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan) and *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters) in Shintō tradition. Such texts do have “scriptural” qualities, such as the veneration they inspire and the authority they command, and thus might be treated as “scripture” in certain contexts.

Another problem in delimiting “scripture” is distinguishing the primary sacred text(s) of a religious tradition from others that are also sacred but secondarily so. Such distinction between a community’s preeminent scripture(s) and the rest of its sacred texts is helpful in understanding many religious traditions, but others not at all: in some cases, the panoply of texts revered is so great and the relative distinctions of authority and sacrality among them so unclear or unimportant that all have some legitimate claim to the title of scripture. In

the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition as a whole, the number of texts treated as sacred is so vast that it is not possible to single out some as more deserving of the title *scripture* than others, save in particular segments of the tradition where one *sūtra* is given extraordinary status (e.g., Nichiren Buddhist veneration of the *Lotus Sūtra* in Japan). Even in a community with a scriptural book or canon that is clearly more sacred than other revered texts, the decision to reserve the status of “scripture” only for the former can be a debatable one. For example, the Purāṇas function scripturally across a wide spectrum of Indian society even though they are not *śruti*; in rabbinic Jewish tradition, the Mishnah is held to be the oral Torah, also revealed at Sinai; the *ḥadīth* serve in Islam not only to clarify and to explain but to supplement the Qur’ān as a religious authority, especially in matters of practice; and in Theravāda Buddhist traditions, texts such as Buddhaghosa’s *Visuddhimagga* are greatly revered even though they do not report the “word of the Buddha” (*buddhavacana*) in the strict sense.

As a Relational Concept. As these considerations indicate, neither form nor content can serve to identify or distinguish scripture as a general phenomenon. It is true that the form, content, or other specific attributes of a text may be perceived by the faithful as the guarantee of the extraordinary character of their major scripture (note, for example, Muslim faith in the literary “matchlessness” [*i’jāz*] of the Qur’anic style). Nevertheless, from the historian’s perspective, the sacrality or holiness of a book is not an *a priori* attribute but one that is realized historically in the life of communities who respond to it as something sacred or holy. A text becomes “scripture” in living, subjective relationship to persons and to historical tradition. No text, written, oral, or both, is sacred or authoritative in isolation from a community. A text is only “scripture” insofar as a group of persons perceives it to be sacred or holy, powerful and meaningful, possessed of an exalted authority, and in some fashion transcendent of, and hence distinct from, other speech and writing. What is scripture for one group may be a meaningless, nonsensical, or even perversely false text for another.

This relational, contextual quality is of paramount importance for the study of “scriptural” texts in the history of religion. The “scriptural” characteristics of a text belong not to the text itself but to its role in a community. “Scripture” is not a literary genre but a religio-historical one.

Origins and Development of the Concept. Whatever the subtleties and difficulties of defining it, scripture is a major phenomenon in the history of religion and thus an important concept in the study of religion. Whence it came and how it has come to serve as a general as

well as a culture-specific concept are questions basic to understanding and using it intelligently and adequately as a descriptive term.

The idea of a heavenly book. The development of the concept of a scriptural book is often linked to the notion of a heavenly book. The idea of a heavenly book containing divine knowledge or decrees is an ancient and persistent one found primarily in the ancient Near Eastern and Greco-Roman worlds and in subsequent Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. As Leo Koep points out in *Das himmlische Buch in Antike und Christentum* (Bonn, 1952), it can take one of several forms, typically that of a book of wisdom, book of destinies, book of works, or book of life. References to a celestial book or tablet of divine wisdom appear in ancient Babylonia and ancient Egypt and recur in almost all subsequent Near Eastern traditions, apparently as an expression of divine omniscience. Geo Widengren argues (*The Ascension of the Apostle and the Heavenly Book*, Uppsala, 1950; *Muhammad, the Apostle of God, and His Ascension*, Uppsala, 1955, esp. pp. 115–139) that such a book was coupled in the ancient Near East, in Judaism, and finally in Islam to a messenger figure to whom the book is given in a personal encounter with God or verified through such an encounter (e.g., Moses at Sinai, Muhammad on his ascension). The idea of a book of destinies or fates, in which the allotted days and assigned end of human lives are written down, was known, as art and textual evidence show, in ancient Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and especially late antiquity. Israel also knew this motif (see *Ps.* 139:16–17), and the sealed book mentioned in *Revelation* 5:1ff. may well be a Christian reflex of it. The similar notion of a book of works, in which a heavenly record of human deeds is kept, was also widely known of old. References to the writing down of good and bad deeds, often in connection with a last judgment, are found among the ancient Babylonians, Egyptians, Persians, and Hebrews, as well as Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Christian writers of later antiquity. However, it is in the biblical traditions of Judaism and Christianity (cf. *Ex.* 32:32, *Phil.* 4:3) that the notion of a book of life, in which the names of God's elect are inscribed, finds a special place.

While the precise relationship of these ideas to that of a revealed scriptural book remains to be clarified, elements of all of them do appear in the developed concepts of Jewish and Christian scripture and the Qur'ān, and all of them do reflect the antiquity and strength of the idea of a written book as the repository of divine knowledge or divine decrees.

The idea of a sacred book. The quintessential "book religions" are those that trace their lineage in some fashion to the Hebrews, the prototypical "people of the book." We do not yet fully understand how Judaic ideas

of the sacred or heavenly book joined historically with influences from other sectors of the ancient Near Eastern world and the growing status of the book in later antiquity to set in motion the "book religion" that plays so large a role in Christianity, Manichaeism, and, most spectacularly and pronouncedly, in Islam. Wilfred Cantwell Smith has, however, pointed to the gathering strength in the period after Alexander the Great, and especially from the second century CE, of the idea of a sacred book or "classic," a text that carries ultimate authority. Christianity's increasing emphasis on authoritative writings, the point of departure for which was Jewish reverence for the Torah, was especially decisive in this development. Mani's self-conscious effort to produce books of scriptural authority reflects the degree to which by his time (third century CE) a religious movement had to have its own scriptures. The fourth century in particular seems to have been a time when scriptures, notably the Christian and Manichaean, were coming into their own. But it was the Qur'ān's insistence upon the centrality of the divine book, given now in final form as a recitation, that carried the development of book religion to its apogee in the early seventh century. Later developments such as Sikhism's veneration of its "book" (*Granth*) have to be seen as but new variations on a theme already fully articulated in Islam, the book religion *par excellence* (Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Scripture as Form and Concept: Their Emergence for the Western World," unpublished article, 1984).

Semantic background. The most basic meaning of *scripture*, as of its Indo-European cognates (Ger., *Schrift*; Ital., *scrittura*; Fr., *écriture*; etc.), is "a writing, something written." It is derived from the Latin *scriptura*, "a writing" (pl., *scripturae*). The Latin word translated the Greek *graphē* (pl., *graphai*), which corresponded in Classical and Hellenistic usage to the postexilic Hebrew use of *ketav* (pl., *ketuvim/kitvei*) as a term for a writing: a letter, inscription, written decree, or a holy writing. These terms could even refer to the written law (Plato, *Laws* 11.934)—in the Septuagint, specifically to the Mosaic law, or Torah (*1 Chr.* 15:15). In the Mediterranean world of later antiquity, pagan, Jewish, and Christian writers used these words (or their plurals) to refer to various kinds of written texts in the Hebrew Bible, the Greek Septuagint, and the Old Testament books of the Latin Vulgate (e.g., *Ex.* 32:16, *Tob.* 8:24, *Ps.* 86:6). By the time of the Christian New Testament writers, however, the terms had gradually come to be used especially for sacred books, above all the three divisions of the Hebrew scriptures, the Pentateuch (Torah), Prophets (Nevi'im), and (other) Writings (Ketuvim). In early Christian usage, they were extended also to the Gospels, Pauline epistles, and other texts that eventually formed the New Testament.

In Jewish and Christian usage, the singular forms were applied primarily to a particular passage or particular writing, and the plurals were used in a collective sense for the whole. For example, *Daniel* 10:21 employs *bi-khetav emet* (Septuagint, *en graphē alētheias*; Vulgate, *in scriptura veritatis*), “in a true writing/scripture”; *Luke* 4:21 employs *hē graphē autē* (Vulgate, *haec scriptura*), “this [passage of] scripture” (referring to *Is.* 61:1f.), and *Matthew* 21:42, *Acts of the Apostles* 17:11, and other passages employ *hai graphai* (Vulgate: *scripturae*), “the [Old Testament] scriptures.” The Christian fathers used both singular and plural forms collectively to refer to the Old and New Testament books (e. g., *Epistle of Barnabas* 4.7, 5.4; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* 2.24.3, 2.27.1). Although in the New Testament these terms in singular or plural refer uniformly to scriptural as opposed to other kinds of writings, there is some dispute as to whether the singular *graphē* (*scriptura*) ever refers collectively to the whole of the scriptures or only to one or a part of one of them (as in *Jn.* 10:35 or *Rom.* 11:2).

Other terms, usually also associated with writing or books, were used in like fashion to refer to sacred, authoritative writings. In Greek, *grammata* (sg., *gramma*, “what is written; writing”; Lat., *littera*), used generally for literature or documents (as in the Septuagint, where it usually translates the Hebrew *sefarim/sifrei*, plural of *sefer*, “writing, book”), came in Hellenistic times, in pagan as well as Jewish and Christian contexts, to refer especially to any sacred text (e.g., *2 Tm.* 3:15, *ta hiera grammata*; Vulgate, *sacras litteras*). Scriptural citations in the New Testament and early Christian works are commonly introduced by the formula used in the Septuagint: “(As) it is written,” (*Kathōs gegraptoi* (*Mt.* 4:4, 4:6, 21:13; *Rom.* 1:17, 2:24; *1 Cor.* 2:9, etc.). The Greek *biblos* (“book”), or, more commonly in the Septuagint and New Testament, its diminutive form, *biblion* (pl., *biblia*), referred originally to any type of written document—scroll, codex, book, or letter. In the Septuagint and subsequent Jewish and Christian Greek sources (for example, the Greek preface to *Ben Sira*, *1* and *2 Maccabees*, *1 Clement*, and the writings of Philo Judaeus, Josephus Flavius, and Origen), although not in New Testament writings, terms like *hiera biblos*, “sacred book,” and (*hierai*) *bibloi*, “(sacred) books,” were used for the Pentateuch or the entire Hebrew scriptures. From the earliest days of the Christian church, in which “the books” (Heb., *ha-sefarim*; Gk., *ta biblia*) of Hebrew scripture were “the bible of the church” (Hans von Campenhausen, *Aus der Frühzeit des Christentums*, Tübingen, 1963, pp. 152–196), the Greek neuter plural *biblia* or the Latin *biblia* (a neuter plural formed from the Greek) was used in Christian contexts to refer specifically to the Hebrew scriptures. By the end of the second

century, or at least by the end of the fourth, the generally recognized writings of the emerging New Testament were also included in “the books” (Harnack, 1928). In the Middle Ages (certainly from the twelfth century and probably earlier), *biblia* came to be treated commonly as a feminine singular, whence such modern singular forms arose as *the Bible*, *die Bibel*, and *la Biblia*.

In the New Testament (e.g., *Rom.* 1:2, *2 Tm.* 3:15) and in the works of the Christian fathers, and as well as in Philo and Josephus, various adjectives were added to the words for “scripture(s)” and “book(s)” to emphasize their special, holy character: for example, *hieros*, *hagios*, *sanctus* (“holy”); *theios*, *divinus* (“divine”); *theopneustos* (“divinely inspired”); *kuriakos* (“of the Lord”). Such usage had much earlier precedents, such as the use in Ptolemaic times of *ta hiera grammata*, “the holy writings,” to refer to the sacred Egyptian hieroglyphic literature in contrast to the demotic writings, or the use of the Hebrew equivalents, *kitvei ha-qodesh* (“the Holy Scriptures”) in rabbinic writings, or *sifrei ha-qodesh* (“the sacred books”) in later, medieval writings, for the sacred scriptures.

Generalization of the Concept. In these ways, the Jewish and Christian worlds gradually appropriated the use of such terms as *scripture*, *holy scripture(s)*, *books*, *sacred books*, and so forth, primarily as proper-noun designations for their own holy texts. In particular, as Christian culture and religion triumphed in the Mediterranean, especially in southern Europe, (*sacred*) *scripture* came to mean specifically the Christian Bible. Such limitation of the idea of scripture to a proper noun referring only to the Old and New Testaments continues even today in many Christian circles. Apparently the use of *scriptura(e)* and *scriptura(e) sancta(e)* (or their European-language equivalents) to designate sacred texts in general was until recently, chiefly in the past century or two, unusual at best. *Scriptura* could, of course, always be used as a neutral term for any writing, and it is not a giant step from such usage to a generalized concept of religious writings in other cultures. For example, such a concept may be present when Peter the Venerable (d. 1156) contrasts “sacra scriptura,” or Christian scripture, with Muḥammad’s “nefaria scriptura,” the Qur’ān (*Summa totius haeresis saracenorum*, cited in James Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, Princeton, 1964, p. 206). A clearer example of the notion of “scripture” as something appearing in many cultures can be found as early as the mid-thirteenth century. In 1254, at the Mongol capital in Inner Asia, the Franciscan traveler William of Rubrouck warned a group of Nestorian Christians about tactics in their coming debate on religion with Buddhists and Muslims before the Great

Khan: "They do not have faith in [our] Scriptures; if you recite one [scripture], they will recite another" (in Anastasius van den Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, Florence, 1929, vol. 1, p. 294).

Such Western generalization of the concept of scripture was, to be sure, hardly novel. In the Muslim world, the concept of sacred "scripture" (*kitāb*) had already been generalized in the Qur'ān, where especially Jews and Christians are spoken of as "people of scripture" (*ahl al-kitāb*). The term designates those communities that have previously received "books" (*kutub*) sent by God, which were then eclipsed in the perfection of his final "sending" of *the book* [*al-kitāb*], the Qur'ān, through Muḥammad. *Ahl al-kitāb* status was early extended to Zoroastrians and Mandaeans, and later even in some cases to Hindus. There seems, however, to be no evidence of direct influence of the Muslim use of *kutub* on modern Western generic usage. It appears rather that it was the growing Western awareness in the eighteenth century of the Indian Veda in particular, and the Chinese "classics" to some degree, that led to wider acceptance of the idea of other scriptures and books of wisdom that could claim great antiquity as well as importance in their own cultures—not unlike that of the Bible in the West.

In English, clearly generic use of *scripture* can be dated from at least the eighteenth century. George Sale wrote in 1734 that the Qur'ān shares things with "other books of scripture" (pace the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which can cite no use of *scripture* to refer to non-Christian religious texts before 1764). By the nineteenth century, the generic use of the term or of approximate equivalents like *sacred writings* was much more common. The ambitious series of translations of the great scriptures of the world that was inaugurated in 1879 by Max Müller under the title "The Sacred Books of the East" reflects a clear recognition by this time in the modern West of the worldwide existence of texts that function as scripture in ways analogous to those of the Hebrew or Christian Bible.

The extended use of the term *scripture* for any particularly sacred text is now common in modern Western usage and widely current internationally. Even the word *Bible* has been used, albeit less often, in a similarly general sense to refer to any sacred scripture (cf. Franklin Edgerton's reference to the *Bhagavadgītā* as "India's favorite Bible" in *The Bhagavad Gītā, or Song of the Blessed One*, Chicago, 1925). However, *scripture* is the term that today is most commonly and properly used as the generic term for particularly sacred texts.

Characteristic Roles. Scriptural texts function in a variety of ways in a religious tradition. Some of their major functions are discussed below.

Scripture as Holy Writ. The significance of the written word of scripture is difficult to exaggerate. If the etymology of *scripture* and its common association with the written or printed word have strengthened the tendency in Judeo-Christian culture (and even more in modern, print-dominated society) for Westerners, especially scholars, to treat sacred books primarily or even exclusively as written documents, there is good historical cause for this practice. With the important exception of the Hindu world, the writing down of the major religious text(s) of a community is an epochal event in its history, one that is often linked to the crystallization of religious organization and systematic theological speculation, as well as to the achievement of a high level of culture. The written scriptural text symbolizes or embodies religious authority in many traditions (often replacing the living authority of a religious founder such as Muḥammad or the Buddha). Such authority is well expressed in the aforementioned formula, "(As) it is written," which typically prefaces a biblical citation (whereas in the more orally-oriented Islamic and Buddhist worlds, respectively, "God says" introduces a Qur'anic citation, and "Thus I have heard" is the traditional introduction to a *sūtra*).

Although the fixity and authority of the physical text have been felt particularly strongly in the last two thousand years in the West, the idea of an authoritative sacred writing is not limited to one global region. The "book religion" that Siegfried Morenz contrasted with "cult religion" (Morenz, 1950) has flourished notably in the Mediterranean and, later, the wider Western and Islamic worlds, yet veneration for the sacred word as book has also been important, if not always central, in most of the Buddhist world of Southeast and East Asia. It has been suggested, for example, that there was an early Mahāyāna cult of the book (*sūtra*) that vied with the *stupa* relic cult, and high esteem for the written *sūtras* has been generally prominent in Mahāyāna tradition. Furthermore, it was in India, not the West, that the veneration of the written text reached one of its heights in the Sikh movement (the Sikh focus on the sacred book reflects, to be sure, considerable Muslim influence, much as the emphasis of the Mormons on the book reflects Judeo-Christian attitudes to Holy Writ). It is also in Asia that some of the more recent book religions have appeared, as for example, Bābism in Iran and Tenrikyō in Japan.

One of the overt ways in which the importance of the written text is revealed is in the religious valuation of the act of copying and embellishing a sacred text. Christian and, still more, Jewish and Islamic scriptures boast especially strong calligraphic traditions. In the Islamic case, for example, where a considerable iconophobia

has held sway in the public sphere, magnificent calligraphic renderings of the Qur'anic word have been not only the favorite expression of the art of the book but also the chief adornment of mosques and most other monuments. Mani (d. 277), the founder of Manichaeism, placed great importance on painting pictures to illustrate his own canon of sacred books, and Manichaean missionary concerns led to the production of beautifully embellished calligraphic texts as well as a picture volume on the teaching. Here holy book and holy image come together (Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, *Manichaean Art and Calligraphy*, Leiden, 1982). Besides furthering fine calligraphy and manuscript illumination, Christians have extensively cultivated rich illustration of the Bible, notably in early medieval Byzantium and late medieval western Europe (Ernst von Dobschütz, *Die Bibel im Leben der Völker*, Witten, 1954, pp. 82f., 123f.). In Tibetan Buddhist monasticism, the zealously careful production of the Bka'-gur (Kanjur) and Bstan'-gur (Tanjur), whether by hand copying or block printing, is yet another example of the great attention paid to the form of a sacred written text. [See Calligraphy.]

Scripture as spoken word. Whatever the central place of the written word, the oral roles of scripture in religious life are equally striking. Morenz (1950) touched upon the oral dimension of every sacred text when he traced the creative genius of "book religion" to the Israelite capacity for "hearing," in contrast to the "seeing" that dominates "cult religion," such as that of ancient Greece. Scripture's importance rests ultimately on the perceived importance of the sacred word that the memorized or written text seeks to fix forever (Heiler, 1979, pp. 339ff.). However much the written text dominates in any form of book religion, its presence in a community is still primarily realized orally and aurally. All but a few of those who have "had" a scripture have been illiterate, and even in highly literate communities the scriptural text is "heard" in worship, teaching, and preaching even more than it is "seen" in silent reading. It is only relatively recently that any kind of reading has become a silent rather than an oral activity (Balogh, 1926–1927; Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy*, London, 1982).

Recitation or reading aloud of scripture is a common feature of piety, whether in Islamic, Sikh, Jewish, or other traditions. Many scriptures have primary or secondary schemes of division according to the needs of recitation or reading aloud in the community (e.g., the 154 divisions of the Torah for synagogal reading over a three-year span). Great esteem is given to the person who knows all of the sacred scripture "by heart"—in the Muslim case, such a person is honored with the special epithet *ḥāfiẓ*, "keeper, protector, memorizer [of the

Word]". In the early synagogue and in the early Christian church, the reading aloud of scripture in worship was fundamental to religious life (Ismar Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst*, Leipzig, 1913, chap. 3; Paul Glaue, *Die Vorlesung heiliger Schriften im Gottesdienst*, Berlin, 1907; but cf. Walter Bauer, *Das Wortgottesdienst der ältesten Christen*, Tübingen, 1930), just as it was in pagan cults of the Hellenistic Mediterranean, such as that of Isis (Leipoldt and Morenz, 1953, p. 96). The Jews call both "the reading of scripture and the passage read *miqra'* (Neh. 8:8), "what is recited, read aloud, a reading." In Talmudic usage, the term came to refer to the Torah (Pentateuch), the Prophets, and the Writings that make up the Tanakh, or Hebrew scriptures. An ancient Greek synagogal inscription in Jerusalem reads, "The synagogue is for the reading aloud (*eis anagnōsin*) of the Law" (*Theologischer Begrifflexikon zum Neuen Testament*, ed. L. Coenen et al., Wuppertal, 1967–1971, vol. 1, p. 153). The Greek *anagnōsis* or *anagnōsma* (Lat., *lectio*) was also used in the same sense in the early Christian context for public scripture reading on the Jewish model. The Arabic word *qur'ān*, which is not attested in pre-Qur'anic sources, probably derives from *qeryānā*, the Syriac equivalent of *miqra'*, and is likewise a verbal noun meaning "reciting, recitation" (Graham, 1984).

In other traditions, notably the Islamic and Buddhist, the recitation of the sacred word is even more central to religious practice, despite the frequently massive importance of veneration of the written text in the same traditions. In Hindu practice, the oral, recited word completely eclipses the importance of any written form of it and presents the most vivid instance of the all but exclusively oral function of scripture. It appears that until the coming of Islam stimulated the writing down of the Avesta as a book, the most sacred Zoroastrian texts, those in Old Persian, were transmitted and used only orally, in recitation, while the less sacred commentaries (*Zand*) and other religious books in Pahlavi had long been written (Geo Widengren, *Die Religionen Irans*, Stuttgart, 1968, pp. 245–259).

Oral use and even oral transmission of scripture should not be confused with folk oral tradition in which verbatim accuracy is not aspired to (i.e., in which "formulaic composition" predominates: see, for example, Albert B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960). The technical mnemonic methods of oral transmission have sometimes been so highly developed for sacred texts as to render the oral text more reliable than the manuscript tradition—notably in the Islamic and Hindu cases. In any event, few if any scriptural books have the verbatim uniformity popularly associated with the written and especially the printed word. Even the "fixation" of a sacred canon in writing has

rarely meant that one definitive documentary text is universally recognized or that variant texts disappear.

Scripture in public ritual. Whether the written or the oral text of a scriptural book predominates, the most visible religious role of a scripture is in public worship. In some instances a scripture is explicitly a ritual text that orders and explains the rite itself, as in the case of the Brāhmaṇas in Vedic tradition. In other cases it is a sacred text either recited in ritual acts (e.g., the Qur'ān, the Zoroastrian *Gāthās*, the Vedic *mantras*, and the Shintō *norito*, or ritual prayers taken from the Engishiki) or read aloud from a written copy in communal worship, as in Jewish or Christian practice. Such recitation or reading is often a major if not the central element in worship. In some traditions, particularly initiatory sects, the sacred character of a text has led to its being kept secret from the masses and read or recited only by and for initiates. Leipoldt and Morenz (1953, pp. 88ff.) have treated this scriptural "secrecy" in the Mediterranean world in some detail.

Sometimes, perhaps most prominently in the case of the *Ādi Granth* of the Sikhs, a sacred exemplar of the holy scripture even plays a functionally iconic role in the liturgical setting. Ritual veneration of the physical sacred text is also seen in the Tibetan monastic practice of circumambulating the *sūtra* collection of the monastery, the solemn procession of a copy of the Qur'ān in some Muslim funerary rites (Edward W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, 5th ed., London, 1860, p. 514), and Jewish ritual handling of Torah rolls in the synagogue.

Scripture also characteristically provides the fundamental elements of ritual language, the basic vocabulary as well as texts for hymnody (as in the Christian Psalter), sermon (e.g., the marketplace preaching, or "speaking about *sūtras*" [*shuo-ching*], of Buddhist monks in Sung China; see Overmyer, *Folk Buddhist Religion*, Cambridge, Mass., 1976, p. 179), and especially prayer (as in the Lord's Prayer, the Psalms, the Shema', the Fātiḥah, or the Triratna). Its words frequently form the texts used for recitation in the major rites of passage and other important festival and ritual occasions of a tradition: for example, surah 36 (*Yā Sīn*) is recited especially on 15 Sha'bān (the Muslim "Night of Quitance") and at Muslim funerals, as are the *Lotus Sutra* in mortuary and ancestral ritual in Nichiren Buddhist practice in Japan and the *Gāyatrī mantra* (*Rgveda* 3.62.10) at the Upanayana ritual of Hindu initiation.

Ritually important passages of a scriptural text are sometimes pulled together into special anthologies or collections that serve the liturgical needs of the community, as in the Christian breviary, psalter, lectionary, or evangeliarium; the Pāṭimokkha selection from the

Vinaya that is recited as a regular part of Buddhist monastic life; or the *Blue Sutra*, an abridgement of the *Lotus Sutra* that is used in the ritual of the modern Rei-yūkai Buddhist sect in Japan (Helen Hardacre, *Lay Buddhism in Contemporary Japan*, Princeton, 1984). Whether it is read or recited aloud, given physical prominence as a ritual object, or cited or paraphrased in prayers, homilies, hymns, or litanies, a scriptural text plays one of the most visible and important parts in worship in most traditions.

Scripture in devotional and spiritual life. Closely tied to public ritual, and equally or more important to religious life, is the role of scripture in personal devotion and in mystical, ascetic, and other traditions of spiritual discipline and realization. Aspects of the devotional role of scripture have been treated in the preceding sections, but some further points bear mention.

Recitation and reading aloud are not only central to formal worship (see above), but also to private devotion and the practice of diverse spiritual disciplines. *Meditatio* in the Christian tradition was from the start basically an oral activity of learning the text "by heart" through reciting with concentrated attention and reflection. In turn, as Jean Leclercq has eloquently stated in *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God* ([1957] 1974), meditation formed the basis of the monastic *lectio divina*, the active, oral reading of and reflecting on scripture upon which the monk's discipline was based in Pachomian, Benedictine, and other rules. Buddhist monastic discipline similarly focuses upon constant meditation upon scripture through reading and recitation, whether in Sri Lankan Theravāda, Tibetan Vajrayāna, or Chinese Mahāyāna monasteries. Study of the Vedas which centers on recitation and memorization—is said in the *Laws of Manu* (2.166f.) to be the highest austerity, or ascetic discipline. In Islam, Qur'anic recitation (*qirā'ah*) is a public and private form of devotional practice that also demands mindfulness of and meditation on the meaning of the sacred text as well as recitative technique.

Closely related to meditative practices involving scriptural texts are the recitation of and meditation upon formulas derived from scripture. The chanting of Hindu and Buddhist *mantras* and of Buddhist *dhāraṇīs*, as well as the recitation of Sūfī *dhikr* litanies (many of which are Qur'anic) are major examples of formulaic use of scripture in devotional life.

Other uses of scripture in devotional and spiritual life abound. The setting of scriptural texts to music has been important in diverse traditions of piety. Chant and hymnody are prominent foci for scriptural use in both public and private worship in Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, and other traditions. Simi-

larly, reverence for the physical text of scripture and ritual copying or illumination of it have also been important parts of piety in many scriptural traditions. Nor is it by chance that most reform efforts in religious communities with a scripture mandate a “back to the book” piety that seeks (usually literal) authority in the pages of scripture. Where human beings may prove changeable, the sacred word stands secure for every generation as the unchanging guide to individual as well as group morality and action.

Magical and superstitious use of scripture. All of the previously discussed uses of scripture can tend at times toward bibliolatry—the treatment in an extreme fashion of scripture as an object of worship or a locus of supernatural power. Such treatment of scriptural texts results from the power associated with the written and spoken word. Bibliolatry can take many forms, from doctrinal emphasis on the infallibility of the literal text to overt bibliomancy, the superstitious or magical use of scripture. The answer to a problem or guidance for any occasion is often sought through scripture divination. Thus turning to sometimes random, sometimes specific pages of scripture in times of adversity, uncertainty, bereavement, or the like is a time-honored but little-documented use of scripture in Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, and many other traditions. Similar examples of bibliomancy as a protective or empowering device are placing a Bible in the bed of a sick child as a curative, using a tiny Qur’ān or Bible as a protective charm or talisman, seeking omens in scriptural verses, or dissolving slips of paper with words of scripture on them in a drink to make a medicine (Rühle, 1941; Bertholet, 1949).

Quasi-magical notions of scripture can even be seen in “orthoprax” religious life. The proper chanting or reading aloud of scripture is commonly seen as efficacious in a variety of situations. In Theravāda Buddhist practice, collections of scriptural texts known as *parittas* are recited by the monks to ward off the actions of demons and to bring prosperity, health, and other blessings (Lynn de Silva, *Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices in Sri Lanka*, Colombo, 1974, pp. 81–90). In Vedic sacrifice, the efficacy of the rite depends upon the absolutely accurate recitation of the sacred text. Talmudic literature contains many statements about the proper biblical passage to be used for protective or other magical purposes (M. Grunwald and Kaufmann Kohler, “Bibliomancy,” *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, 1901–1906). In Nichiren Buddhism, the sacred formula of adoration of the *Lotus Sutra*, the Daimoku, is said to encapsule the whole of truth in a single invocation. Protestant doctrines of the literal inspiration of every word of the Bible have been used to justify very diverse ideas and

practices. Numerology and alphabet mysticism connected with a scriptural text are as prominent in such traditions as those of the qabbalists and the Sūfis and well known in virtually every religious tradition (cf. Bertholet, op. cit., 1949, pp. 14–17).

Characteristic Attributes of Scripture. The scriptures of any given religious tradition possess a number of characteristic attributes. Some of the most important are as follows.

Power. The major functional attributes of scripture are bound up with the power felt to be inherent in scriptural word. Both the written and the spoken word carry a seemingly innate power in human life. At the most basic level, a word is an action: words do not signify so much as they perform. Hence to speak a name ritually is in some measure to control or to summon the one named. For the faithful, a sacred word is not merely a word, but an operative, salvific word. Its unique, transformative power often rests upon its being spoken (or written) by a god (as in Jewish, Christian, or Muslim tradition). In other cases, the sound itself is holy (as in India), or the message or teaching embodied in the scriptural word is considered to be salvific truth, with little or no reference to a divine origin (as in many Buddhist traditions).

The power inherent in the spoken word is vividly seen in the idea of a divine, creative word. Many traditions have cosmogonies in which a god creates the world or men or animals through speech: as, for example, the Memphite cosmogony of ancient Egypt (in which the god Ptah creates by thought and speech), *Genesis* 1:3 (“God said, ‘Let there be light . . .’”), Qur’ān 40:68 (“[God] said, ‘Be,’ and it was”), or tribal mythologies, such as those of the African Dogon and South American Witóto peoples, in which the gods create with a spoken word (Marcel Griaule, *Conversations with Ogotemméli*, London, 1965, pp. 16–40; Konrad T. Preuss, *Religion und Mythologie der Uitoto*, Göttingen, 1921–1923, pp. 633–634).

The power of the spoken word of scripture also appears in a variety of other religious contexts, most prominently in worship (see above). Also noteworthy are the aforementioned practices of *mantra* recitation in Hindu and Tantric traditions, where the sound of the Vedic formula or hymn enables the worshiper or meditator to appropriate the power of a particular divinity (*devatā*); the *dhikr*, or “remembrance,” practiced in Šūfī tradition in Islam, in which Qur’anic or other phrases or texts are chanted or sung as a means of focusing consciousness and being upon God; and Buddhist chanting and singing of *sūtras* (and *mantras*) as a meditative practice or act of worship.

The power of the written word has already been

touched upon. The Jewish designation of holy books as "that which renders the hands unclean" expresses well the widespread sense of the power latent in every copy of scripture. In most scriptural traditions, such perceived power manifests itself within both "orthoprax" and "popular" spirituality in tendencies towards bibliolatry—the treatment of scripture as an object of worship or as a locus of supernatural power. Magical notions of the power that lies in a copy of a sacred scripture are an extreme extension of religious sensibility to the presence of divine wisdom or ultimate truth in a scriptural text.

Authority and sacrality. The power of scripture is clearly expressed in its most common attributes as well as its most common uses. Of all those attributes, the most essential ones are the extraordinary authority and sacrality of scripture vis-à-vis other texts. In both theocratic and nontheocratic religious traditions, scriptural books possess a supramundane authority and degree of holiness for the faithful that no other texts command.

The authoritative character of scripture is most vivid in those cases in which a sacred text provides the legal basis of communal order. This is especially evident in the Jewish tradition, where the written Torah is the pediment upon which the entire edifice of Jewish life is built, and in the Islamic tradition, where the minimal legal prescriptions and much larger body of moral injunctions found in the Qur'ān are viewed as the ultimate bases of the *shari'ah*. It is also evident in the role of the Vinaya ("discipline") section of the Tripiṭaka, the "law" of Buddhist monasticism.

The extraordinary sacrality of scripture is seen in almost every facet of its use in communal life. The way in which a scriptural text is handled, the formulas of respect that accompany its mention, citation, recitation, or reading, and the theological doctrines that are developed to set it apart ontologically from all other texts are common evidence of such sacrality. Among many examples that reflect this kind of holiness of scripture are the enshrinement of the ornate Torah scrolls in their special cabinet, the ark, in the synagogue; the tokens of homage paid to the *Ādi Granth* in Sikh worship; the "Little Entrance" procession in Eastern Orthodox churches (or, in Anglican divine service, standing) to honor the reading of the Gospel; the ritual purification required for recitation of the Qur'ān; the merit held to accompany recitation of Buddhist *sūtras*; the virtue attached to copying or memorizing sacred texts such as the Bible or the Qur'ān; the aforementioned folk traditions of the healing power of scripture; and the stress placed upon the eternal, transcendent nature of the Veda, the Torah, the Qur'ān, the Buddhist *sūtras*, and so on.

There is often more than one level or degree of sacred texts in a community. As already noted, it is possible in most traditions to distinguish among various sacred books one text or corpus of texts that is the scripture *par excellence* (e.g., the Qur'ān, Hebrew Bible, Avesta, or Veda). Other texts or groups of texts (e.g., the Ḥadīth, Mishnah, Pahlavi books, or Purāṇas) may, however, achieve a quasi-scriptural status as sacred books of nearly or effectively equal importance in the life of the tradition. While, strictly speaking, such texts may be denied fullest scriptural status, they often function in a community in remarkably similar ways to the major scripture of other traditions. Conversely, the supreme scripture in a tradition may play a functionally less important role or less visible role in piety than a theoretically second-order sacred text. India offers the best example of this in the major Vedic Saṃhitās, or collections, which are recognized as the supreme holy texts in all Hindu traditions yet functionally are virtually a *scriptura abscondita* for many Hindus, who make greater active use of non-Vedic or later Vedic texts. In Hindu tradition, an explicit distinction is made between *śruti* ("what is heard," the product of the *ṛṣi*'s revelatory experience) and *smṛti* ("what is remembered"), the former applied to the whole of the diverse corpus of Vedic texts, the latter to later sacred texts. Yet in many Hindu sectarian groups, especially those of a devotional (*bhakti*) bent, the most sacred scriptural texts in actual use are *smṛti* texts like the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Such popularity of a *smṛti* text takes nothing away from the sacrality of the Veda; rather, it indicates the tendency to elevate ever more texts to the functional status of sacred scripture in everyday piety.

Unicity. A further quality of scripture is its perceived unicity of source, content, and authority in the community involved with it (see especially Leipolt and Morenz, 1953). No matter what the historical origins or textual development of its constituent parts, and no matter how diverse those parts, a scriptural corpus is commonly conceived of as a unified whole, both in its ontological origin as sacred word and its authoritativeness and internal consistency as sacred truth. The many originally separate texts that were collected into the Egyptian *Book of Going Forth by Day*, the diverse "holy scriptures" of the Hebrew or Christian Bible, the myriad *sūtras* of the Chinese Buddhist canon, or the various kinds of Vedic texts revered as *śruti*—these and other bodies of sacred texts are each conceived as an ontological and conceptual unity, whether that unity is one of God's holy word (as in ancient Egypt or Islam), the Buddha-word, or the "sound" (Skt., *śabda*; Chin., *sheng*) of ultimate truth or wisdom heard by the ancient Indian and ancient Chinese sages. If scriptural texts such as the

Qur'ān or the *Book of Mormon* can boast a single-source origin with considerable historical justification, the greatest number of scriptures in the world represent collections of material put together not by one person or even one generation but by a gradual process of recognition of sacred texts usually referred to as "canon formation." Nevertheless, once the community has reached general agreement about which texts it accepts as sacred, it is common for it to affirm unity of origin and message in its scriptural corpus.

Inspiration and eternity/antiquity. The tendency to see one's own formal or informal canon of scriptures as a unified whole is closely linked to the characteristic development of a theory of inspiration, revelation, or some other kind of suprahuman and primordial origin for its words. All of the prophets and teachers whose words become part of scripture are held to have been inspired in their speech (as with the Hebrew prophets), to have been given God's direct revelation to their fellows (as with Muḥammad and Mani), or to have had an experience in which they transcended the contingent world to grasp ultimate reality (as in the Buddha's enlightenment). Whether the sacred word is vouchsafed to them in a vision or an auditory experience, or given to them as heavenly tablets or books, the earthly bringers of the holy word have been chosen to be, or have become through their own special power, a bridge between the transcendent and the mundane.

The divine word is also commonly held to be eternal, as in the role of Vāc ("speech") as primordial being or goddess in Vedic thought, in the Hindu concept of the eternal Veda (cf. *Laws of Manu* 12.94, 12.99), in the Muslim doctrine of the uncreated, eternal Word of the Qur'ān (which, as God's very Word, is an eternal divine attribute), in the Sikh concept of the *bani* ("word") that preexists and extends beyond the gurus and the *Ādi Granth* (W. Owen Cole and Piara S. Sambhi, *The Sikhs*, London, 1978, p. 44), and in Buddhist ideas of the eternal Dharma or the *buddhavacana* ("Buddha word") in Mahāyāna thought.

A scripture is virtually always conceived to be, if not eternal, at least of great antiquity. The Japanese *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, the Avesta, and the Five Classics of China are all prime examples of sacred texts to which hoary antiquity is ascribed. The authority of a scripture is guaranteed both by its divine or otherwise supramundane origin and by its venerable character as an age-old, if not eternal, word that has been preserved by unbroken and faithful transmission through every generation. These characteristics hold whether the sacred text embodies revelation from a god, preserves the teaching of a master or the wisdom of ancient sages,

reports the sacred myths or history of a community, or records the inspired utterances of seers and prophets.

Related Developments. When a scripture emerges in (or helps to create) a religious community, its presence engenders a variety of new phenomena and its influence extends beyond the specifically cultic or confessional sphere into the wider culture as well. A development tied to the emergence of scripture in some traditions is the delineation of an authoritative "canon" of scripture to set it apart from other texts. Traditionally thought of as basic to scripture, the idea of a canon of sacred texts is historically a secondary development in which a community reaches some kind of consensus about the texts that have made it what it is.

Another development is the growth of traditions of scriptural interpretation by means of which scripture is appropriated as a continuing authority in new circumstances. New circumstances often raise the question of translating the sacred word of scripture, which can pose a dilemma for theories of scripture in the community. Finally, the importance of scripture in religious life has important consequences for culture more broadly. Some of the most evident of these are in the spheres of language, literature, and the arts.

Canon formation. The perceived unicity of scripture leads often to a felt need for an authoritative "canon" (from the Greek *kanōn*, "rule, measure"), or "list," of texts that properly belong to sacred scripture—properly, that is, in the view of those who want to prescribe authoritative as opposed to less authoritative or non-authoritative texts. [See Canon.] Nowhere in the history of religion has the process of canon formation been a clear or unequivocal one, dependent as it usually has been upon the pressure of defining one "orthodoxy" against one or more competing interpretations of faith. In most cases, it is finally not the fiat of a council or individual religious authority seeking to forge a canon in order to delimit orthodoxy, but rather the usage of the majority that determines any canon of sacred and authoritative scripture. This has been especially true of the three traditions in which "canonical" lists of scriptural books have received the most attention: the Christian, Jewish, and Buddhist traditions.

In other cases, such as the Manichaean, Islamic, and Sikh traditions, the early recognition of a single scriptural corpus has meant that the problem of diverse texts eligible for admission or exclusion from a "canon" has hardly arisen. In the Hindu case, the general reverence for the four major Vedic collections, which together with subsequent related texts like the Upaniṣads are given the status of *śruti*, has been complemented by the popular veneration and use of a variety of other texts

that strictly rank only as *smṛti* (e.g., the Purāṇas; see Coburn, 1984) but whose sacrality and centrality in Hindu religious life is indisputable. In general, the vast array and diversity of functionally sacred texts, as well as the tendency to be inclusive rather than exclusive in defining even *Veda* or *śruti*, have worked against the elaboration of any clear idea of a canon in the Hindu case.

The influence of ideas of a designated canon of scripture such as we find in Christianity in later antiquity or in classical Theravāda Buddhist thought has been undeniably great. An excellent example is the Chinese Buddhist (as also Taoist) recognition of a *tsang*, or “basket,” of scriptural texts on the original model of the “Three Baskets” (Tipiṭaka) of Pali scripture. What modern scholarship often rather glibly calls a “canon” in traditions as diverse as the Jain or the classical Chinese (Confucian) would not be recognized uniformly in these traditions—or at least not until very recent times, and then often under the influence of Western scholarly conventions—as a body of scripture (or “classics”) analogous to a biblical canon.

Interpretation. Every text that achieves scriptural status in a religious community elicits extensive popular and scholarly exegesis and study of its contents. [See, for example, Biblical Exegesis.] The varied kinds of scriptural interpretation are fundamental elements in a community’s relationship to its sacred book, for they provide a bridge between the text and its application to life and between the era in which the text originally arose and all subsequent ages in which it must serve changing needs in new situations. Every application of a scriptural text, from superstitious, talismanic use to use in theological argument, is in some degree an act of interpretation and must be considered a part of the history of a text as scripture. Even some scriptural books themselves are actually interpretation and elaboration of previous scripture: thus the Abhidhamma segment of the Pali Tipiṭaka is a philosophical expansion on the basic teaching of the Buddha in the Sutta Piṭaka, much as the speculation of the Upaniṣads is built upon the earlier Vedic texts. [See Buddhist Literature, article on Exegesis and Hermeneutics.]

All scriptural communities boast impressive formal traditions of scholarly interpretation, many of which form the basis of all learning in their respective traditions. The imposing knowledge of a good Talmudic scholar, a learned Theravāda *bhikkhu*, or a first-rate Muslim *‘alim* is focused upon knowledge of the interpretive tradition tied to the Torah, Tipiṭaka, or Qur’ān, respectively, and its vast oral traditions and written literature. Most esoteric and mystical traditions also rely

heavily upon various forms of scriptural exegesis to buttress their ideas. Less formally, the preaching or teaching of a religious message normally relies heavily upon more or less sophisticated and overt forms of exegesis of a scriptural text, just as visual or musical artistic rendering of scriptural themes provide commentary on and interpretation of the meaning of scripture.

Translation and resistance to translation. A common phenomenon related to the role of scripture in changing circumstances is the development of the idea that a scripture cannot be translated from its original, sacred language: only the original form is felt to carry the inspired and exact meaning or sound. This idea is very old: ancient Egyptian sacred texts were not translated, even when Nubians ruled Egypt in the eighth and seventh centuries BCE (Leipoldt and Morenz, 1953, pp. 66f.). Resistance to translation of the “Arabic Qur’ān” (surah 12:2, 41:3, et al.) has been especially strong in Islamic tradition. Even when translated by Muslims, the Arabic text is customarily still written or printed beside (or interlinearly with) the translated text of the Persian, Turkish, Swahili, Malay, or other language, since the Arabic text alone is the speech of God *ipsissima verba*. Translation of Vedic texts is unheard of in Hindu tradition, and Jews similarly have placed overwhelming importance upon retaining the original Hebrew text of the Bible in worship (with the major exception of the several centuries in later antiquity when the Septuagint translation was the text used by hellenized Jews).

Nevertheless, translations can also come to be viewed as themselves inspired, and their texts as sacred. Salient examples can be found in later antiquity, where the Septuagint was considered an inspired text by hellenized Jews and later by Origen and the other Christian fathers. The Latin translation of Jerome (d. 419) that later developed into the “Vulgate” has been treated as an inspired text by the Roman Catholic church (and was used exclusively for mass until Vatican II), and the major Protestant vernacular translations have been widely held to carry the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. (Resistance to the vernacular mass and resistance to acceptance of the Revised Standard Version of the Bible are recent evidence of just how effectively sacred a translation can be.) Another important example is the Buddhist case, in which the Chinese translations of Sanskrit *sūtras* became the holy texts still used in Chinese and Japanese Buddhist traditions as the scriptural canon.

Some traditions, however, have little or no objection to the translation of scripture into vernaculars accessible to diverse peoples. As one might expect, such an attitude is most often found in explicitly “missionary”

and “universalistic” traditions such as the Christian, Buddhist, and Manichaean, and that of the Mormons. The Mormon case is doubly interesting in this regard, as Joseph Smith himself claimed to have translated the *Book of Mormon* from its original “reformed Egyptian” (*Mormon* 32) idiom into English. Here even the earthly “original” of the scriptural “prophet” is a translation of the original golden tablets of the angel.

Cultural Consequences. The influence and importance of a scriptural text extends far beyond the specifically religious sphere in a culture. One of the most obvious ways that scripture leaves its imprint upon culture and society is through its effect upon language. A scriptural text, whether in its original language or a translation, may provide a major standard for the “classical” grammar and style of an entire language, as in the case of the Qur’ān for Arabic, the “Classics” for Chinese, the Authorized Version of the Bible for English, or the *Lutherbibel* for German. In any culture with an important scripture, the linguistic influence of scriptural vocabulary, metaphors, similes, linguistic conventions, and so forth, can be pervasive. Examples from English alone make this vivid: “hardening of the heart,” “a land of milk and honey,” “wise as Solomon,” “a good Samaritan,” “the patience of Job,” “a Judas,” or “a prodigal son.”

Scripture also serves as one of the richest sources for later literature in a cultural tradition. Nowhere is this more evident than in Western Christendom, where we need only think of Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, or Goethe to recognize the generative influence of the Bible upon this tradition’s greatest authors. Scripture is, in the first instance, immensely influential as the ultimate proof text in most traditional cultures. This is especially vivid in Muslim writing and speaking, where the Qur’ān is the final word to be quoted as the seal to any argument, large or small. Western Protestant traditions are also traditionally rife with this kind of use of the Bible. Scripture usually provides the great symbols and lasting images in a culture, whether it is the figure of Abraham in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim cultures (in each case with different emphasis and textual basis), Agni (Fire) in Hindu culture, or the Buddha’s great “going forth” to seek enlightenment in Buddhist cultures.

Scripture also has considerable influence upon the arts in most cultures. The most obvious areas of influence are two: the elaborate calligraphy, referred to above, that is commonly developed for the scriptural text itself and manuscript illumination and illustrations that depict scriptural stories and ideas. The massive importance of the calligraphic art in Islam, the scriptural tradition *par excellence*, deserves particular stress. In Is-

lamic culture, calligraphy and abstract (e.g., “arabesque”) design associated with calligraphy extend far beyond the scriptural text to provide even the central forms of decoration in Islamic architecture. Prime among the calligraphic subjects used on Islamic buildings is the Qur’anic word.

In Western culture, traditions of Bible illustration expanded well beyond the biblical text itself to become major strands in all of the visual arts. The stained-glass masterpieces of western and eastern Europe and the Byzantine mosaics of Ravenna and Balkan Europe are major religious examples. The masters of Western art all employed scriptural themes and events in their works, whether explicitly in icons or the Sistine Chapel ceiling, or more subtly in the works of a Chagall or Rouault. In India, iconographic presentation of scriptural figures and stories has always been a vastly important part of the Hindu scene. In the Buddhist world, the most striking example of scriptural representation in the arts is probably the vast stupa of Borobudur, around whose facade stretch hundreds of stone reliefs telling in pictures myriad scriptural stories of the Buddha. The *maṇḍala* in Tibetan and East Asian Buddhism often presents a pictorial condensation of a major event or teaching from the *sūtras*.

The scriptural books of a culture also often provide the themes and even the literal text for musical compositions of all kinds. This is very familiar in the great works of European music, but it is also evident in the music of Hindu, Islamic, and other cultures as well—especially since the line between “secular” and “sacred” music is if anything less clear in most other cultures than it is in the West. “Religious” chant and hymnody (largely drawn from or based on scripture) remain in many of these traditions the most popular forms of musical performance. The Hindu and Islamic worlds provide numerous examples of this.

The cultural consequences and influences of scripture go far beyond these few examples. Even these suggest, however, the immense importance of scripture in human affairs. In and of themselves, scriptures can be forces for good or evil—as Shakespeare reminds us, “The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.” What is ultimately significant about scripture as a concept and a reality is its role in expressing, focusing, and symbolizing the faith of religious persons and their communities around the globe, both for the faithful themselves and for the outsider who seeks a glimpse into another world of faith and discourse.

[For general treatments of sacred literatures, see *Literature, article on Literature and Religion*; for discussions of particular scriptures, see *Epics*; *Vedas*; *Brāhmaṇas*

and Āraṇyakas; Upaniṣads; Śāstra Literature; Sūtra Literature; Biblical Literature; and Qur'ān.]

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SCYTHIAN RELIGION. The Scythians were predominantly nomadic, Iranian-speaking tribes inhabiting the steppes of the northern Black Sea region from the seventh to the third century BCE. Owing to their lack of a written language, what is known of Scythian religion has been reconstructed on the basis of archaeological sources and information from Greek and Roman authors. This reconstruction is partly corroborated by data on the religion of Indo-Iranian peoples kindred to the Scythians.

The basic Scythian pantheon included seven gods. Their functions, which are not always clear, have been determined chiefly on the basis of their identification with Greek gods by Herodotus (4.59) and sometimes on the basis of the etymology of their Scythian names. It is clear, however, that the pantheon was divided into three ranks. In the first rank was Tabiti (the Greek Hestia), in the second were Papaeus (Zeus) and Api (Gaia), and in the third were Oetosyrus or Goetosyrus (Apollo); Artimpasa, or Argimpasa (Aphrodite Ourania); and two gods whose Scythian names are not known but who have been identified with Herakles and Ares. It is possible that the first of these unnamed gods is identical

with the primeval figure of Scythian mythology, Targitaus (Herodotus, 4.5-10), who was also identified in the classical tradition with Herakles.

The structure of the Scythian pantheon is not so much a system reflecting the cultic hierarchy of the gods as it is a system mirroring the structure of the universe. The very number of gods reckoned in the Scythian pantheon corresponds to ancient Indo-Iranian tradition. The predominant position of the goddess of fire and the hearth, Tabiti (Iran., Tarayati, "the flaming one, the burning one"), corresponds to the Indo-Iranian concept of fire as the primeval substance and the basis of the universe. The conjugal couple, Papaeus ("father"?) and Api (from the Iranian *ap-*, "water"), personifies the concept, common among the Indo-Iranians, of the marriage of heaven and earth (or water) as a cosmogonical act. From their union was born Targitaus, the forefather of the Scythian people and of the Scythian royal dynasty. His mythological birth may be interpreted as the formation of the middle zone of the cosmos—"the world of people," between the heavenly and chthonic worlds.

The inclusion in the third rank of the pantheon, on a level with this Scythian "Herakles," of three additional gods corresponds to the archaic cosmological conception of the four sides of the world as a structure regulating the universe, and of four gods as their custodians. Of these Scythian gods, Artimpasa (if this reading of her name is accepted) is conjectured to be the Iranian Arti (Ashi), a deity connected with the idea of material abundance, which conforms to her identification with Aphrodite, as proposed by Herodotus. The Scythian "Ares," who was venerated in the form of an ancient iron sword (Herodotus, 4.62), is, evidently, predominantly a war god, corresponding to the Iranian Vere-thragna. The meaning of the figure of Oetosyrus, the Scythian "Apollo," is still highly debatable.

Besides the seven gods of the basic pantheon, other personages of the Scythian religio-mythological system are also known. For example, a myth noted by Herodotus tells of the three sons of Targitaus, in whom, according to the most valid interpretation, can be seen the personification of the three zones of the cosmos and the ancestors of the three strata into which, corresponding to Indo-European tradition, Scythian society was divided: warriors, priests, and agriculturalists. However, in the specific interpretation of each of these personages, there is divergence among scholars. Besides the gods common to all the Scythians, there were also deities that were venerated by separate tribes. For example, the Royal Scyths, the most powerful of the Scythian tribes, worshiped Thagimasadas, identified by Herodotus with Poseidon.

Data on cult leaders among the Scythians are highly

fragmentary. The most complete information is on the Enarees, a group of priests connected with the worship of Artimpasa. Divination was among their ritual functions, and sexual transvestism was apparently a feature of their cultic practices. It is not entirely clear whether membership in this group was hereditary; according to some sources, the Enarees came from the Scythian aristocracy. About other Scythian priests there is almost no information. Undoubtedly the Scythian king himself was an important, if not the chief, performer of cultic practices. The most significant evidence of this is the abundance in royal burials of ritual objects, including those having complex cosmological and social symbolism.

Although Scythian religious beliefs, originating in the main in the Common Iranian period, do not specifically express the values of a nomadic people, such values are manifested distinctly in the forms of Scythian cultic life. For example, according to Herodotus—and this has been confirmed archaeologically—the Scythians had neither temples nor monumental images of their gods, a fact connected, apparently, with the mobility of their way of life.

However, certain cultic structures did exist in Scythia. Thus, in the center of each of the districts of Scythia, huge brushwood altars were heaped up in honor of the Scythian "Ares," in the form of square platforms, accessible on one side. At the top of the platform a sword personifying the god was placed vertically, and domestic animals and every hundredth prisoner were sacrificed to it (Herodotus, 4.62). This structure may be interpreted as a cosmogram mirroring the form of the "four-sided universe," and the sword as one of the equivalents of the *axis mundi*, uniting the world of the gods and the world of people. Also known is the existence in the area between the Dnieper and the Southern Bug rivers of a place called Exampaeus, whose name Herodotus translates as "holy ways." Here, according to legend, there was a huge copper caldron cast from arrowheads brought by all the inhabitants of Scythia. This caldron was unquestionably a sacred object for all the Scythians and may be interpreted as one of the symbols of the center of the world.

It is possible that precisely in this Common Scythian cultic center was held the annual Scythian festival connected with the worship of golden sacred objects: a yoked plow, an ax, and a cup that had fallen, according to Scythian myth, from the sky, and that symbolized the cosmic and social order. This festival is one of the few Scythian ritual activities about which relatively detailed information has been preserved. The golden sacred objects, which had a fiery nature and were, perhaps, connected with the goddess Tabiti, were carefully

guarded by the Scythian kings and were annually venerated with rich offerings.

According to Herodotus (4.7), during the festival a man would sleep among the golden sacred objects, and he would die less than a year afterward (it is obvious that a violent killing took place); meanwhile, he was allotted as much land as he could cover on horseback in a day. The meaning of this story is not entirely clear, but most probably reference here is to a temporary ritual "deputy king" and his imitation "kingdom." Insofar as the horse in the mythology of the Indo-Iranian peoples is connected with the sun, the method of determining the size of the "kingdom," and also the life span of its "owner," allows us to reconstruct the existence among the Scythians of the concept of the solar nature of the king, and to interpret the festival as calendrical, connected with the yearly cycle of the sun.

Most probably, in the course of this festival was repeated the fate of Targitaus's youngest son, the mythical first king of the Scythians, Colaxais. (The Soviet Iranologist V. I. Abaev has proposed that this name derives etymologically from the Iranian *hvar-xšaya*, "sun king.") The golden sacred objects, obtained, according to the Scythian myth, by this Colaxais, served as proof of the god-given nature of the power of the Scythian kings. This idea also found embodiment in the different investiture ceremonies practiced in Scythia, about which we have, unfortunately, only highly obscure evidence.

There is information about the methods of sacrifice among the Scythians. Animals (most commonly horses) were asphyxiated while a salutation was made to the god to whom the sacrifice was offered. The flesh was then boiled, and the part intended for the god was thrown on the ground, in front of the sacrificer. There also were ecstatic rituals, in particular purification rituals, during which hemp seeds were burned and wine imported from Greece was used.

The most complete information we have on any aspect of Scythian culture—which has been confirmed, moreover, by archaeological data—is on burial rituals. When a man died, his corpse (apparently embalmed) was carried by cart on a round of visits to the homes of his friends; after forty days the body was buried. The form of the grave (usually a deep chamber-catacomb) and the collection of objects accompanying the dead man were quite uniform and were regulated by tradition. When a king died, his body was carried through the territory of all the tribes subject to him, and this journey was accompanied by various mourning rites. Together with the king were buried retainers of various ranks, and royal horses, and over the grave a monumental burial mound was erected. The graves of ancestors

and especially of kings were considered national holy sites and were carefully protected from profanation.

In the early stages of their history, the Scythians (in conformity with the aniconic traditions characteristic of many Indo-Iranians) had virtually no images of gods. During the period of the campaigns in the Near East from the seventh to the early sixth century BCE, they attempted to adapt ancient Eastern iconography for the depiction of personages of their own pantheon. Such depictions were not large-scale monuments but were, rather, decorative elements on ritual objects; however, even these were not widespread in Scythia.

From the sixth to the first half of the fourth century BCE, Scythian art was dominated by the animal style, employing motifs of animals connected to the religio-mythological concepts of the Scythians. The strictly canonical depictions of only certain animals served as a symbolic system for the description of the Scythian mythological model of the world. A definite connection has been established between the repertoire of the animal forms of Scythian art and the archaeological evidence of sacrificial animals found in Scythian monuments. In the fourth century BCE anthropomorphic motifs based on Scythian myths and rituals played an important role in Scythian religious life. These motifs ornamented various ritual objects that were made by Greek artisans from colonies on the northern coast of the Black Sea. In the rich Scythian burials of this time, objects with motifs from Greek mythology have also been found. These most probably reflect not the adoption of Greek cults by the Scythian aristocracy, but yet another attempt to adapt another culture's iconography to embody local religio-mythological concepts.

The religion of the steppe peoples of Asia who were related to or similar in culture to the Scythians was evidently close to that of the Scythians, but data on it are almost completely lacking. The sum of the data on the religious life of the Scythians permits us to assume that the overall aim of their ceremonies and rituals was above all to ensure the stability, going back to mythic times, of the cosmic and social order and to guarantee the well-being of the community.

[See also *Prehistoric Religions*, article on the Eurasian Steppes and Inner Asia, and *Inner Asian Religions*.]

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Translated from Russian by Mary Lou Masey

SEAS. See Oceans.

SEASONAL CEREMONIES. In all parts of the world and in all ages, it has been the custom to mark the beginning of a year, season, or agricultural cycle by a series of public ceremonies. These were designed originally to dramatize the conclusion of one lease on life and to procure, by quasi-magical procedures, fertility, prosperity, sunshine, and rainfall for the next. They fall into a standard pattern. First the rites of mortification, symbolizing the temporary eclipse of the community. Next the rites of purgation, by which all noxious elements that might impair the community's future welfare are eliminated. Then the rites of invigoration, aimed at stimulating the growth of crops, the fecundity of men and beasts, and the supply of needed sunshine and rainfall throughout the year. Finally, when the new lease is assured, come the rites of jubilation; there is a communal meal at which the members of the community re-cement their bonds of kinship by breaking bread together, and at which their gods are present. For this occasion, the shades of their ancestors and deceased relatives temporarily rejoin them.

Rites of Mortification. The initial stage of mortification is exemplified principally in the form of fasts, abstinences, and the suspension of public offices and routine business. [See Mortification.] Thus the Babylonians regarded the first ten or sixteen days of the year in some of their cities as a lenten period, and the Israelites pre-faced their autumnal Ḥag ha-Asif ("feast of ingathering") by Yom Kippur ("day of purgation"), on which the sanctuary and its vessels were purified, members of the community ritually aspersed and "cleansed," a fast ob-

served, and all normal activity suspended. In Rome, a fast preceded the feast of Ceres (goddess of crops) in April. In the present day, the Choctaw, Cherokee, and Creek of North America fast at New Year, and among the Mao of Manipur a *genna*, or period of taboo, is observed for four days at the commencement of the harvest. The month of Muḥarram, at the beginning of the year, is a time of abstinence in Morocco, and the Ossets of the Caucasus keep a daily fast during the month before harvest. These examples could be readily multiplied. The Christian Lent and the Islamic Ramaḍān, it may be added, are, in the main, reinterpreted survivals of this usage. [See Fasting.]

The annual or seasonal eclipse of communal life is exemplified also by the deposition, execution, or temporary humiliation of the king or chieftain, by whom that life is personified and epitomized. In Babylon he was formally degraded on the fifth day of the New Year (Akitu) festival. A major priest stripped him of his robes, slapped his face until he wept, and forced him to his knees. He was then obliged to recite a penitential prayer before he was reinstated. In Cambodia, the king was formerly required to abdicate annually for three days in February, and, in Thailand, he was confined to his palace in late April or early May.

In many cases, the new year did not follow immediately upon the close of the old; there was an intervening "vacant" period, reckoned as outside the calendar. Among the Aztec, for example, it was known as *nemontemi* ("the days unfit for work"); all religious ceremonies and civil activity were then suspended. Similarly, the Maya of Yucatán had a period of *xma kaba kin* ("nameless days") at the end of the year, during which they abstained from all heavy work and even from personal ablutions. In the Central Provinces of India, this period was actually termed *malmas* ("excreta"), and the institution survives in European popular custom in the abstinences and restrictions imposed during the twelve days between Christmas and Epiphany. During this time, when the real king was temporarily out of office, a substitute was (and is) installed. This was the practice, for instance, in the kingdom of Jambi in Sumatra, among the Kwotto of northern Nigeria, the Kitara of Uganda, and the Bastar of the Central Provinces of India. Such a temporary king, or *interrex* (Gr., *zōganēs*), in the person of a slave, is reported also to have held sway at the ancient Iranian feast of Sacaea, and it has been suggested that the so-called flight of the king (*regifugium*), recognized in ancient Rome as an institution associated with 24 February, was a lingering relic of the earlier expulsion of the temporary monarch at the end of his brief term.

Another popular method of symbolizing the expiration of one lease on communal life is to bury a puppet that personifies it and to subsequently disinter it when the succeeding lease begins. Thus, in Romania, a clay doll called *kalojan* (from Gr. *kalos Ioannēs*, "beautiful John") is buried on the Monday preceding Assumption (15 August) and later dug up; in the Abruzzi, the same ceremony is performed with a similar figure named *Pietro Pico* ("little Peter"). In both cases, these are but christianized versions of an older pagan usage known to us from the burial and disinterment of the god *Attis* in Phrygia and of *Osiris* in Egypt. In parts of Russia, an effigy named *Kostrobunko* was similarly buried on Saint Peter's day and later disinterred.

The buried spirit of life and fertility is ritually bewailed, usually by women (as regular practice at funerals). Such wailing is attested, on a mythological level, in the cults of *Dumuzi* in Babylonia, of *Attis* in Asia Minor, of *Osiris* in Egypt, and of *Adonis* in Syria, and in the *iouloi* ("howls") uttered in the cult of *Demeter* and *Persephone* in Greece. In this connection, however, it is pertinent to observe that tears are regarded in several cultures as regenerative. The Egyptians are said to have shed them while they sowed the first seeds, and at Great Bessan, in Guinea, oxen are slain and made to weep at an annual ceremony designed to insure a good harvest. Indeed, it has been suggested that the familiar words of Psalm 126:5, "They that sow in tears shall reap in joy," were inspired by such a custom, and it is significant that the wailing cry, *eleleu*, was a feature of certain Greek seasonal festivals. [See Tears.] Hence, it is not impossible that what came eventually to be interpreted as weeping for the slain or buried spirit of fertility was originally functional shedding of tears.

Rites of Purgation. Ceremonies of purgation, or the ritual removal of noxious elements and of the contagion of latent sin, such as might jeopardize the continued life and health of the community or evoke retribution from the gods in the form of blight, drought, plague, war, or other calamities are likewise virtually universal. [See Purification.] In Babylon, a ceremony called *kuppuru* (clearance, purgation), involving the cleansing and renovation of the temple, was part of the New Year ceremonies, and as stated above, a similar ceremony, *Yom Kippur*, was observed among the Israelites before the autumnal harvest. In Rome the month preceding the new year, March, was characterized as the period of *februatio* (whence our February), fields and human beings being then lustrated and temples scoured. Such rites of purgation often include a collective confession of sins. Examples of these are the semiannual Japanese ceremony of *Ofuharahi* ("purification"), at which the *Mi-*

kado or a member of the *Nakatomi* order of priests shrives the people, and the *Ashanti* festival called *Od-wira*. It was similarly a prominent feature of the ancient Israelite *Yom Kippur* (Day of Atonement), a usage that survives in Jewish ritual to this day.

Latent sins that remain unconfessed are removed in many cases by being loaded symbolically on a scapegoat (either animal or human) who is ceremonially dispatched from the community. This was a prominent feature of the aforementioned Babylonian and Israelite ceremonies, while in Greece it was observed at the feast of *Thargelia*, in May.

Sometimes the latent evil is removed by expelling an effigy called "Death" or the like. The Inca of Peru, for example, drove out disease before the rainy season in this manner, and in Thailand noxious spirits are ceremonially banished on the last day of the year. In Cambodia the rite is performed in March, and among the Inuit (Eskimo) of Point Barrow, Alaska, the same ceremony is performed as soon as the sun reappears and ushers in a new lease on life. The modern practice of ringing bells, clanging gongs, blowing whistles, and cracking whips on New Year's Eve is a relic of such expulsion of evil and disaster, designed originally to scare away demons—raising, as it were, a pandemonium surpassing theirs.

Finally, evil is often removed by lighting bonfires at such crucial times of the year as New Year, midsummer, and midwinter. This ritual is too familiar to require documentation. It is common not only in most parts of Europe but also among Muslims at the 'Ashūrā' festival among the Berbers; and it was observed in antiquity at the *Isia* (the festival of *Isis*) in Hellenistic Egypt. Here, however, a word of caution is in order. Fire is also used in popular custom to lustrate fields in order to stimulate crops and also to relume the sun when it reemerges from its winter sojourn underground. Hence, some of the rites that have been interpreted as designed to burn up evil may really be directed toward these alternative purposes.

Rites of Invigoration. The elimination of the old leads naturally to the inauguration of the new, that is, to rites of invigoration. The most widespread of these is the staging of a ritual combat between Fertility and Blight, Rainfall and Drought, Summer and Winter, or simply Life and Death, the positive protagonist (the one who personifies renewal) being always the winner. This seasonal usage is attested among the ancient Hittites of Asia Minor and in reliefs on the walls of an Egyptian temple at *Deir al-Bahri*. Similarly, among the Iroquoian-speaking tribes of North America, a ritual battle was fought annually in late January or early February

between the god of summer or life (Teharoniawagon) and the god of winter or death (Tawiskaron). Often the combat comes eventually to be explained as the commemoration of a historical encounter. The Hittites, for instance, identified the antagonists respectively as themselves and a neighboring people, the Masa, and Plutarch tells of a periodically recurring joust between characters popularly called Alexander and Darius. In the English Mummers' Play, which is really a survival of the same usage, the combatants are sometimes likewise identified as Saint George and the Turkish knight (probably a distortion of Saladin), or as King George and Napoleon, or even (in more recent times) as Churchill and Hitler.

Sexual license is another popular rite of invigoration. Among the Pipils of Central America, it is observed when the first seeds are sown, and in the Ukraine it is (or was) a popular method of stimulating the growth of crops on Saint George's Day (23 April). The Garos encourage sexual intercourse at seasonal festivals, and it is held by several scholars that the familiar stories of the rape of the Sabine women at a festival and of the women of Shiloh (*Jgs.* 21:19–23) reflect the same custom.

The usage was mythified in the "sacred marriage" of god and goddess at the New Year in various ancient Mesopotamian cities and in the marriage of the god Horus and goddess Hathor at an annual celebration at Idfu (Behdet) in Egypt; the mating of the god (impersonated by the pharaoh) with a divine bride is portrayed on reliefs at Deir al-Bahri. [*See Hieros Gamos.*] Similarly, Aristotle tells us that a marriage between Dionysos and the king's consort took place annually in the Bucolicon (*boukolikon*) at Athens. A burlesque of this ritual is a feature of the festival plays still performed in northern Greece. The offspring of the "sacred marriage"—the spirit of the new life—is often introduced as a baby in a crib and thus finds its echo in our own New Year cards. The famous passage in the *Book of Isaiah* (9:6), "Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given," is believed by many modern exegetes to have been inspired by this usage.

New members of the tribe or community, especially children, are often initiated at seasonal festivals. This initiation is (or was) carried out, for instance, by Muslim Arabs before the spring harvest and by bedouin at Mecca and at the Nebi Musa (Eastertide) festival at Jericho, as well as by the Haida Indians of the Queen Charlotte Islands at an annual potlatch. Significant in this connection is the statement in the *Book of Joshua* (5:2–8) that when members of the new generation were formally received into the community after the Exodus

from Egypt, the initiating rite of circumcision was performed before the festival of Passover. The initiation is sometimes represented as a rebirth. Indeed, among certain people of the lower region of the river Kongo it is termed *kimbasi* ("resurrection"), and the neophytes have first to fall as though dead at the feet of the officiant.

Rites of Jubilation. The seasonal program concludes with a communal feast, at which the ancestral dead are also present ("our founders are with us in spirit"). Thus to cite but a few examples, the Greeks supposed that these "ghosts" returned temporarily at the festival of Anthesteria, and the Romans, at the festival of Lemuria; the Mandaeans of Iraq and Iran hold a feast of the dead at the beginning of the year. In the Trobriand Islands, the dead rejoin the living at an annual festival called Milmala; in Thailand, at the New Year festival in April; among the Huzul of the Ukraine, at Easter and Christmas; and among the ancient Celts, at the feast of Samhain. This return of the dead, which survives in the folklore of Halloween, is, of course, the counterpart of the initiation ceremonies; past and future are alike involved in the renewal of corporate life, since both are constituent elements of its continuum. The gods, too, often attend the banquet, either as guests or as hosts, because they too belong to the "kindred."

All of the seasonal rites here described—the initial period of disorder and chaos, the combat, the defeat of the powers of evil and disaster, the installation of the victor as king, the resurrection of the dead, and the inauguration of a new era of the world, sometimes also a "messianic banquet"—are retrojected mythically into cosmogony and projected into eschatology. What happens at the end of each periodic lease on life is held to have happened also at the beginning of the present cycle of the world's existence; the supreme god vanquished a contumacious monster, was installed as king, promulgated a new dispensation, and tendered a banquet to his divided subordinates and sometimes also to ancient heroes. When this era ends, he will do so again. The process is cyclic; as Vergil puts it, "the great order of the centuries is born afresh." Seasonal ceremonies, originally functional means of renewing life from year to year, thus become paradigms of human existence throughout time.

[*See also Agriculture.*]

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THEODOR H. GASTER

SECRET SOCIETIES. The term *secret society* can be used to describe all groups whose membership or very existence is unknown to nonmembers or that keep certain of their practices or conceptions hidden from nonmembers no matter how public or recognized they are as a group. Within these broad limits one could include subversive political groups, criminal gangs, and some professional guilds. There may be a religious dimension to these organizations, perhaps in ritual behavior, legends about their origins, or other counterparts to phenomena typical of religious groups. In this article, however, attention will be given to groups that are more clearly religious, as determined by their recognition of supernatural powers or their subscription to certain values and ideals. It must be admitted, however, that there is no clear border between those secret societies that definitely celebrate religious matters and those that are secular. (A prominent indication of this problem is the prohibition of Masonic membership for Roman Catholics and some Lutherans despite the claim of many Masons that they represent in no way a counterreligion.)

In the following analysis a theoretical pattern of religious secret societies will be outlined. This pattern is derived from fairly obvious examples in Oceania, China, West Africa, Europe, and North America. It can then tentatively be applied to other secret societies and other religious groups. The goal is not to establish one neat, inclusive category into which various social phenomena can be placed, but instead to describe a pattern of social organization that may be recognizable despite many variations in historical situations, in combination with various programs or specific goals, and despite characteristics that are only more or less distinctly religious.

Distinguishing Features. The secret society is characterized first by its being a voluntary or selective group within a natural community. Although there may be times and places in which nearly everyone of a certain

gender, age, and status may be included, there is always the theoretical possibility that some otherwise eligible person will not be elected to join the group. The possibility of exclusion is a powerful factor in the sociopsychological dynamics of a secret society. The pool of potential members is also restricted, usually to men beyond puberty. There are few secret societies that include women or children, although secret societies restricted to women are known, such as the Bundu society among the Mende people of Sierra Leone.

Obviously, another primary characteristic of the secret society is secrecy. It is not characteristic of religious secret societies, however, that their very existence or their membership be secret. Instead, it is knowledge of their activities, rituals, texts, doctrines, myths, and offices that is restricted to the group. Some have argued that such secrets are new, dangerous, or deep matters that demand the protection of secrecy. From this argument it might be said that the secret society is humankind's nursery for new insights and new political or social structures. No matter what the depth or the power of the secrets, however, there is always a measure of artificiality in keeping them secret. Furthermore, it seems that at least in some cases the secrets so carefully guarded are actually trivial and assume importance only because they are shared secrets. At the base of secrecy lies not so much a set of hidden facts as experiences.

A third major feature of the religious secret society is initiation. There is a logical necessity that entrance into the group be clearly marked so that the group and the individual can be sure exactly who is and who is not included. Many of the initiatory practices can be understood as means by which the simple fact of inclusion in the group is emphasized and reinforced. There are other dimensions to these often elaborate initiation practices, however. In their use of ordeals and trials, the symbolism of death and rebirth can become apparent: one does not merely join an organization but undergoes a transforming experience and achieves deeper contact with the meaning of life and the world.

Closely related to the phenomenon of initiation is the hierarchical structure of the secret society. Often the society seems to be an outgrowth and extension of puberty-initiation practices. As such, it is based on the notion that human life does not merely grow into maturity but that a distinctive, new ontology must be attained in the transformation from child to adult. Likewise, then, it is reasonable to recognize yet higher stages of life with yet other initiations. The secret society itself represents such a stage beyond the status of simple adulthood, and within the secret society there

may be other stages or levels of advancement. Role differentiation within the society is from this perspective, not merely a differentiation in function but a manifestation of degrees of metaphysical weight or height.

Finally, the religious secret society regularly posits a myth concerning its origins that is central to its self-consciousness. Such myths are probably not historically accurate but should be read as indications of the concerns or mind-set of the group. Many primitive secret societies, for example, tell a story in which their secrets are said to have been derived from a woman but subsequently were kept from other women. This does not necessarily mean that the male secret society was a device by which the men in a previous age wrested control from the women in matriarchal society, but it does indicate a tension in their psychology: they are keeping from the women something in which the women also have or have had a stake.

Theories concerning Origin and Function. Many suggestions concerning the basic motivation for secret societies have been proposed. Some of these have been mentioned already in the course of describing the major characteristics of secret societies. One theory emphasizes the sexual element. In this view secret societies constitute an attempt by men to establish a life independent of women, a rejection of feminine power and influence. Secret societies that are not exclusively male are reluctant concessions or counterreactions to this motive. Other theories deriving from reflection on the all-male composition of so many groups include suggestions of homoerotic attraction and the observation that many male animals cultivate activities limited to their sex. This pattern of male bonding can be as casual as the camaraderie incidental to the hunt or the neighborhood bar, or it can take the highly organized form of the secret society. Patterns of sexual grouping in regard to work, war, and play may have their roots in male bonding also and thus contribute to the strength of the secret society phenomenon.

A second kind of analysis emphasizes the social and political functions of the societies. On the one hand, the secret society may be consonant with the existing social and political order and may reinforce that order through the fear it inspires. On the other hand, a secret society may be an agency for change, rebellion, or reform. In the latter situation, it will be opposed by the dominant forces in society, and its need for secrecy will be greater. In such circumstances, its membership and its very existence are also kept secret if possible. Certainly such groups will be labeled criminal by the dominant society, but they may also be understood as supporting an alternative political or social structure.

In many historical situations, the phenomenon of secrecy has given rise to the attitude that every secret organization is a conspiracy against the welfare of the rest of humankind. The rest of society, if sufficiently distressed, might blame all social ills on a real or even a supposed secret society. Probably few secret societies have been as powerful or as conspiratorial as public opinion has, on occasion, conceived them to be. Especially pernicious when used as a basis for discrimination and repression is the supposition that subversive secret societies exist among minority populations. In any event, it seems that the threat, real or imagined, that a secret society represents to the total community is an important factor in the social dynamics of such a group.

A third way of discussing the bases of organization of secret societies stresses more positive social functions. It is argued that secret societies foster a person's sense of identity, although perhaps in different ways in different situations: in tribal societies by affording some people a sense of privacy in the midst of proximity, and in modern societies by giving the individual a special status in the midst of pressures for conformity. It is clear that in some societies the secret group is a primary means of education and socialization. Insofar as the desire to improve oneself or to achieve greater power and status can be considered a beneficial motivation in human life, the secret society has also had the positive function of offering people a way to advance their programs of social and even financial success.

Such aspiration to greater significance and fuller existence brings us to the religious motivations and functions of the secret society. There is a style of being religious in which the reason and goal of religious activities is the improvement of one's strength or ontological status. By performing certain ritual, ascetic, or ethical acts, or by thinking certain thoughts and controlling the mind, this kind of religion is thought to promote one's career in this or another world. In light of this kind of religious motivation, the secret society is a major arena for structuring, formulating, and traveling a path toward that goal.

The goal, as well as the path, varies from society to society, of course. Among tribal peoples the attempt to progress beyond the stage of adulthood, which is achieved through puberty initiation, often takes the form of more and more rigorous physical ordeals, or it may involve learning magical techniques. The goal is often conceived in terms of transcending the ordinary human condition, especially by identifying with the dead and the spirits who occupy the next higher rung in the hierarchy of being and power. Many masked

dancing rites performed by secret societies are understood to represent the return of the dead to the world of the living. Some of the most shocking practices of secret societies—for example, the eating of raw human flesh in a secret society of the Kwakiutl Indians of North America—can be seen as a way of demonstrating the transhuman (and certainly nonhuman) nature of the life of a secret society member. The right of secret society members to frighten or steal also derives from this supposed superior existence.

The higher status and power bestowed through the secret society might be conceived as benefiting the fertility of the earth, improving one's health or wealth, giving greater power to the tribe, or enhancing one's interior life. When the secret society is seen as a school for attaining ecstatic states or mystical knowledge, its similarity to the monastic structure becomes apparent. The element of secrecy is not so prominent in the usual monastic community, hence the connection between monasticism and secret societies has seldom been recognized. Nevertheless, monastic communities do cultivate religious advancement and identify with a stage of humanity beyond the ordinary, as do many secret societies.

There is also a religious function ascribed to the secret society in those theories that see such societies as the nurseries or nursing homes of religions. The secret of some groups may be a new religious insight that is protected from persecution or ridicule by restricting its rites to believers' eyes. This theory may have been persuasive to some who interpreted the semisecrecy of early Christian ritual in this way. It has also been argued, however, that secret societies can preserve for a small group some outmoded religious ideas and practices that the rest of a population has abandoned. Through secrecy and mystification ancient religious patterns might retain some attraction that they would not enjoy in the full light of public scrutiny. Thus the secret society could embody the first or the last stage in the history of a religious movement.

Throughout this summary of theories concerning the basic nature of secret societies, the contrast between positive and negative views is striking. One can conclude from this that there is nothing inevitably good or bad in the form of the secret society itself, but that it is a powerful human phenomenon that can be turned to purposes either beneficial or harmful to its members, the larger society, or both. It should also be obvious that many of the factors listed here can be operative at the same time; thus they can strengthen the attraction of a secret society for its members by fulfilling many expectations, both religious and secular.

Prominent Examples. One of the richest areas for research into secret societies in tribal or primitive cultures has been the islands of the South Pacific. The Melanesian Dukduk society and others like it provide classic examples of their type. There is some problem, however, in distinguishing the voluntary secret society from the secret rites performed for all young men of the tribe. The important distinction lies in the selective nature of membership in the secret society, no matter how similar the society's initiation is to the general puberty initiations. Also, the activities of the secret society tend to take place in special grounds or in buildings away from the village and not in the centrally located "men's houses" that are often found in these cultures.

West Africa has witnessed a proliferation of secret societies. Some of them, for example, the Poro society in Sierra Leone, existed among aboriginal cultures and are apparently unconnected with specific modern religious traditions. Other secret societies in this area are Muslim, or contain a mixture of Muslim and native elements, and may have been influenced by the Šūfī orders of North Africa. There are also some women's secret societies and some with members of both sexes, but these are not so old as the all-male groups.

In the recent history of Kenya, the Mau Mau secret society has figured prominently. It was mainly derived from the large Kikuyu population group and emerged sometime in the 1940s as a reaction to the distress this population was experiencing under colonial administration, modernization, and Christian evangelism. A link between nostalgia for the old ways and political aspirations is especially clear in this example.

The secret societies of China are well-known examples of this type, although in many of them the religious factors do not seem to have been prominent. These groups have been known since the first century CE and bear such names as White Lotus, Dragon Flower, and Big Swords. It is thought that they provided those people who did not have a strong family with an alternative affiliation by which to promote their interests. They also provided some authority and "order" in situations where social and political structures were weak or absent. Where political structures were strong, however, they often constituted the chief form of political opposition or religious dissent. At the beginning of this century the Boxers, a xenophobic secret society, became known worldwide because of the rebellion that bore its name. More recently the Triad societies have gained notoriety in Hong Kong and elsewhere for their criminal activities.

In North America, secret societies existed first among Native American groups, for example, the Kwakiutl.

Settlers from Europe contributed Freemasonry to the American tradition of secret societies. There are now five million or more Freemasons in the world, about two-thirds of them in the United States. The Masonic orders may not have been founded before the seventeenth century, although in their mythology they claim ancient origins. The fact that modern American Masonic lodges are often assumed to be primarily social organizations is an indication of the difficulty in measuring the religious factor in any secret society. Mozart's opera *The Magic Flute* (1791) reflects a period, however, in which more than relics or playful references to ancient religions influenced the lodges. In the eighteenth century, Freemasonry was linked to various programs of political and religious reform, programs that emphasized freedom of thought, worship, association, and the press and that may have contributed to the French and American revolutions.

In the Ku Klux Klan the United States has seen another kind of secret society organization. Founded in the southern states following the Civil War, the Klan was a reaction to the distresses of change experienced by the white population. Again, it is impossible to ascertain to what degree religious factors were used superficially to bolster the organization's strength and to what degree these factors indicated a real religious fervor, however misguided. There was a resurgence of Klan activity during the 1930s in which the objects of Klan fear and opposition were expanded beyond blacks and northern white politicians to include Jews and Roman Catholics. The Klan remains in the United States as an organization ready to provide a format for revolt against any social or religious change that some of the population cannot affirm.

Other examples of secret societies might be mentioned: Rosicrucians of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, the Mafia, the medieval Knights Templar, the Thugs of India, and the Assassins of Persia. Clearly a complete list of secret societies would include many feared groups whose programs were and are condemned by the rest of society. Even in these instances it is nevertheless possible if not probable that religious motivation of some sort lay at the foundation of each society and provided it with its major source of dedication and devotion. It is perhaps nowhere clearer, therefore, that a phenomenon worthy of the designation "religious" according to most definitions need not be good or true in the opinion of most people. The structure of the secret society, with its religious characteristics or dynamics, is in itself a neutral form, but it may embody and promote thoughts or acts deemed wonderful or horrible.

[For treatments of specific secret societies, see also As-

sassins; Freemasons; Rosicrucians; and Millenarianism, *article on Chinese Millenarian Movements.*]

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GEORGE WECKMAN

SECT is a term that has been widely used to denote a group or faction holding common views or having the same leadership; thus it has been applied to philosophical and political groups, as well as to religious ones. Etymologically, the term can be related to the Latin *sequi* ("to follow") rather than to *secare* ("to cut"), and hence it carries no necessary implication of schism, although frequently it has been used with such a negative connotation. Especially in societies with a dominant or established church, the label "sect" has been assigned to all religious organizations separated from such a

church: in nineteenth-century Britain, for instance, "the sects" was a collective label for such Nonconformist bodies as the Congregationalists, the Baptists, and the Methodists.

The more precise sociological definition of the term *sect* derives from essays originally published by Max Weber in 1904–1905 and translated as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930; London, 1976). From the outset, sectarian organization was identified as one side of the dichotomy between church and sect, since Weber drew attention to a fundamental difference between the church, which he described as "an institution, necessarily including both the just and the unjust" (p. 144), and the "believer's church," which viewed itself "solely as a community of personal believers of the reborn, and only these. In other words, not as a church but as a sect" (p. 145). It is important to note that Weber introduced this distinction in the course of a discussion of Christian organizations—Baptists, Mennonites, and Quakers—since the sociological use of the concept of sect has been largely confined to groups within the Christian tradition. Another significant feature of the initial formulation of the sect concept is the importance which Weber attached to the basis of membership of a sect, namely, that "only adults who have personally gained their own faith should be baptized" (p. 145). A related characteristic was the sectarian principle of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*—a belief in exclusive salvation which the sect shared with the church when the latter was in a socially dominant situation—and Weber also noted the sectarian response of separation from the world.

Weber subsequently added further detail to the definition of sect. In the context of an account of Protestant sects in the United States he pointed to the alternative paths of development which a sect might take: on the one hand it might find accommodation within a larger church structure, as Pietism had done, or it might emerge as an independent organization. Implicit in his statement that sects embody personal rather than official charisma is the notion that over a period of time sects are likely to become routinized and to resemble more institutional religious organizations. Because the process of scrutinizing new members is such a vital part of sect maintenance, Weber thought that sects were necessarily autonomous, voluntaristic organizations. He also drew a significant parallel between the strict moral discipline practiced within the sectarian community and that of a monastic order, pointing out that in both a period of probation was often required before full membership was accorded.

Although Weber indicated numerous lines of inquiry which were later to be taken up by sociologists in their

studies of sects, in his own work he made little use of the church-sect dichotomy, and it was left to his colleague Ernst Troeltsch, whose interests were more distinctly theological, to provide an extensive treatment of sects. In *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (London, 1931) Troeltsch traced the origin of competing forms of Christian organization to the gospel ethic, within which both sect and church types of organization were prefigured. The sect type could be identified in the idealistic, love-inspired communism of such passages as the Sermon on the Mount, in which were combined "radical indifference or hostility toward the rest of the social order with the effort to actualize this ideal of love in a small group" (vol. 1, p. 82). In contrast to the sect was the church type, characterized by its accommodation with secular institutions. Central to Troeltsch's argument is the assertion that both elements could be contained within a single institution, albeit in a state of tension: for example, the monastic community represented the sectarian strain within institutional Christianity. Increasingly, argued Troeltsch, the tension between church and sect resulted in separate organizations—a tendency identifiable in late medieval Christianity and accelerated by the Reformation.

Troeltsch depicted the sect as a comparatively small collectivity which had renounced the goal of dominating the world and in which members were seeking direct personal fellowship. The stance of the sect toward the surrounding society was one of avoidance and might be marked by either aggression or indifference, a characteristic which Troeltsch associated with the recruitment of sect members from the lower classes and the disaffected. The sectarian upsurge could be identified historically, argued Troeltsch, in lay protest against ecclesiastical hierarchy in the late medieval towns, and it was in the same social milieu that the origins of a third religious response, which he labeled mysticism, could also be traced.

Mysticism (to which later sociologists were to give the alternative label "cult") was depicted as "a foreshadowing of coming developments in the interplay of church and sect" (vol. 1, p. 381), and was seen in terms of a growing individualism in which there was little emphasis on fellowship and consequently a fluid, shifting basis of affiliation. Troeltsch clearly envisaged mysticism as the end point of Christianity, in the sense that it drew on modern scientific ideas and was closely related to the individualism of contemporary societies: what remained was "simply a parallelism of spontaneous religious personalities" (vol. 2, p. 744).

The next important contribution to the analysis of sects was made by H. Richard Niebuhr, who, like Troeltsch, approached the topic from a theological per-

spective. Niebuhr's significance lies in the fact that he examined religious organizations in a North American context, where there had never been an established church. Consequently, there was not the same degree of polarization between church and sect types of organization as in the European context, in which these dichotomous types had been constructed.

In *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York, 1929) Niebuhr sought to expose the links between denominationalism, or Christian division, and socioeconomic factors. More specifically, he took the view that "vital" religious interests existed principally, probably exclusively, among the poor and were expressed in a sectarian form, which over a period of time became "compromised" by generational changes and a raising of the socioeconomic status of members. Thus, he thought that sectarian organization was valid for one generation: "Rarely does a second generation hold the convictions it has inherited with a fervor equal to that of its fathers, who fashioned these convictions in the heat of conflict and at the risk of martyrdom" (p. 20). At the same time, an unintended consequence of the disciplined, ascetic lifestyle of the sect was the accumulation of wealth, which led to compromise with the surrounding society and eventually to the more relaxed, bourgeois organization of the denomination. Niebuhr's image of the sect as an inherently transitory organization which was likely to be eroded by "compromise" and change in the composition of its membership was to have considerable influence on subsequent discussion of types of religious organization.

Further advance in the analysis of sectarian characteristics can be found in Howard Becker's attempt to systematize the range of organizational types within Christianity. Like Niebuhr, Becker thought that a crucial dilemma facing any religious organization was the clash of values derived from a religious source with those derived from the social sphere, and he argued that this tension could never be totally neutralized. The section of his *Systematic Sociology on the Basis of the Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre of Leopold von Wiese* (New York, 1932) devoted to religious organization expressed it thus: "The church combines, after a fashion, the water of the religious and the oil of the social" (p. 617). Following Troeltsch, Becker defined the sect as a small, separatist group based on voluntary, religiously qualified membership and having an exclusive character; like Niebuhr, he saw it as a precarious form of organization prone with age to compromise and to transformation into a denominational type. "Denominations are simply sects in an advanced stage of development and adjustment to each other and the secular world"

(p. 626). Becker adopted Troeltsch's category of mysticism and called it the "cult," attributing to it a high degree of individualism. He distinguished it from the sect by the fact that adherents of this loosely knit and unstructured form of religious expression were little concerned with protecting their organization but were seeking "purely personal ecstatic experience, salvation, comfort, and mental or physical healing" (p. 627). Examples of groups Becker included in the category of cult were Spiritualism, Theosophy, Christian Science, and a variety of "pseudo-Hinduisms" linked with "Swamis and Yogis who consent, for a consideration, to carry their messages to the materialistic Western world" (p. 628).

Niebuhr's influence is clearly evident in a study by Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers* (New Haven, 1942), which examines the religious situation in a textile region of North Carolina in the late 1930s. Pope described the process of sectarian accommodation to the world as movement along a sect-denomination-church continuum, or "scale of transition" (p. 120), and he broke down the process into a number of variables which he viewed as indicators of such transition. Among them were the change from poverty to wealth, as indicated by the value of church property and level of ministerial salaries; the change from a moral community excluding unworthy members to a social institution embracing all who were socially compatible within it; the development of a professional, full-time ministry; and the abandonment of spontaneity and congregational participation in worship in favor of a more restrained, fixed order of service. On the basis of these criteria, Pope ranked Free Will Baptist Holiness and Pentecostal Holiness groups at the "sect" end of the continuum, Methodist and Baptist in the "denomination" band, and Protestant Episcopal and Roman Catholic groups at the "church" end. Pope's work represents an early attempt to transform the abstract types of religious organization into simpler, observable phenomena by means of clusters of empirical characteristics.

The observation, made by Weber and expanded by Troeltsch, that sectarian tendencies may be contained within a larger church-type organization was developed further by Joachim Wach in his *Sociology of Religion* (Chicago, 1944). He distinguished two forms of religious protest—secession, leading to the formation of an independent organization, and "protest within," leading to the formation of an *ecclesiola in ecclesia*. Wach ranked such groups according to the degree of protest they exhibited, ranging from a low degree in the *collegium pietatis*, which is composed of members who are striving for a higher spiritual level than that of the church as a

whole and is exemplified by early Methodism and Tractarianism; through the *fraternitas*, in which there is clearer demarcation of membership, as found in the Brethren of the Common Life; to the *order*. The order represents a more formal and segregated variety of internal protest and entails a complex and dynamic relationship between the group and the church of which it is part. Some of the analogies that are apparent between the sect and the order as types of religious organization were later taken up in my *The Religious Order* (London, 1973).

Becker's student J. M. Yinger made several refinements in the study of sects. In *Religion in the Struggle for Power* (Durham, N.C., 1946) he introduced the important subtype of the established sect to refer to second- or third-generation sects which had not undergone the process which Niebuhr regarded as inevitable but had retained clear boundaries between their membership and the surrounding social order; the Quakers were an example. Yinger applied the simple term *sect* to a fluid, noninstitutionalized group held together by the common beliefs and religious experience of its members, a form of religious affiliation that is clearly very similar to Becker's category of cult.

In practice, numerous sociologists have found the distinction between sect and cult difficult to maintain, but in a later formulation, in *Religion, Society and the Individual* (New York, 1957), Yinger introduced a characteristic of the cult type which has frequently been used to differentiate it from the sect: he defined cults as "groups that are similar to sects, but represent a sharper break, in religious terms, from the dominant religious tradition of a society" (p. 154). In more recent discussions, some sociologists have maintained that, for definitional purposes, sects are a product of schism within the religious tradition of a particular society, whereas cults represent the importation of an alien religious tradition. In his 1957 formulation, Yinger also distinguished three further subtypes of sect: (1) acceptance sects, characterized by individualism and exemplified by the Oxford Movement, (2) aggressive sects, characterized by a rejection of existing society as totally evil and exemplified by the Anabaptists, and (3) avoidance sects, characterized by pessimism and an emphasis on a new life in the hereafter, and exemplified by various "holiness" groups in the United States.

The focus on subtypes of sect has been extensively developed by Bryan Wilson in various articles and in his books *Sects and Society* (London, 1961), *Patterns of Sectarianism* (London, 1967), and *Religious Sects* (London, 1970). Wilson's earliest work was directly concerned with the tendency of some sects to become denomina-

tions and with the evidence that others could persist over several generations. In order to identify more precisely the alternative patterns of development he devised subtypes of sect—initially four, but eventually seven. In his article "An Analysis of Sect Development" (*American Sociological Review* 24, 1959, pp. 3–15), he gave a succinct general definition of the sect which has been retained in subsequent work:

Typically a *sect* may be identified by the following characteristics: it is a voluntary association; membership is by proof to sect authorities of some claim to personal merit—such as knowledge of doctrine, affirmation of a conversion experience, or recommendation of members in good standing; exclusiveness is emphasized, and expulsion exercised against those who contravene doctrinal, moral, or organizational precepts; its self-conception is of an elect, a gathered remnant, possessing special enlightenment; personal perfection is the expected standard of aspiration, in whatever terms this is judged; it accepts, at least as an ideal, the priesthood of all believers; there is a high level of lay participation; there is opportunity for the member spontaneously to express his commitment; the sect is hostile or indifferent to the secular society and to the state.

Within this general definition, Wilson distinguished four broad subtypes:

1. Conversionist sects, in which activity centers on evangelism and beliefs are based on literal interpretation of the Bible. Membership is accorded on the basis of conversion experience, and revivalism, emphasizing the themes of sin and redemption, is common. Fundamentalist groups such as the Salvation Army and Pentecostal sects are examples of this category.
2. Adventist or revolutionist sects, in which attention is focused on the imminent overthrow of the existing social order and the Bible is interpreted through allegory and exegesis. Membership is conferred on the basis of knowledge of doctrine rather than by conversion experience and there is hostility toward the surrounding society. Jehovah's Witnesses and Christadelphians exemplify the adventist category.
3. Introversionist or pietist sects which direct the attention of their followers away from the world and toward the community itself, which is seen as an enlightened elect. Withdrawal from the world and a disinterest in evangelism are typical of sects of this kind, which are exemplified by the Amana community and some Holiness groups.
4. Gnostic sects, emphasizing a special body of esoteric teaching and offering a new or revived interpretation of Christian teaching. Stress is placed on applying

this teaching in everyday life, especially for the achievement of material success, health, and self-realization. The cultural standards of the surrounding society are accepted and there is no withdrawal from the world. Examples of such sects are Christian Science and New Thought. In this subtype Wilson has explicitly subsumed the category of cult or mysticism.

Using these subtypes, Wilson argued that only certain kinds of sects were likely to be transformed into denominations. Adventist sects are insulated against such a tendency by their insistence on a rigorous training in complex doctrine before membership is bestowed; introversionist sects are insulated by their withdrawal and avoidance of proselytism; and gnostic sects have an individualistic appeal which is less likely to attract the children of first-generation members. This leaves conversionist sects as the category most likely to denominationalize, both because their membership requirement of conversion experience is an inefficient filtering mechanism and because their goal of evangelism brings them into constant contact with—and hence erosion by—the values and structures of the surrounding society. Wilson has subsequently distinguished additional subtypes, identifying manipulationist and thaumaturgical sects (the former exemplified by Scientology, the latter by spiritualist organizations), reformist sects (of which the Quakers are a primary example), and utopian sects, such as the Oneida and Bruderhof communities. The utopian category has been studied in some depth by John M. Whitworth in *God's Blueprints* (London, 1975).

Sectarianism has been a frequent topic of sociological research since the mid-1970s—partly, as one writer has pointed out, because the sect approximates the anthropologist's tribe and has come to be viewed as a manageable area of fieldwork. At the same time there has been considerable debate about the utility of the conceptual models so far developed. In particular, there has been criticism of the theological assumptions in Troeltsch's and Niebuhr's characterizations of the sect, and the argument has been made that Weber's original formulation of the sect type, stressing as it does the mode of membership of such groups rather than the lack of "compromise" in their beliefs, is more conducive to comparative research since it focuses on the interaction between religious organizations and the sociocultural system. A further area of debate has centered on the distinction between sect and cult. The latter term became popular in lay usage during the 1970s and has percolated much more frequently into sociological discus-

sion, where it has sometimes retained its pejorative sense of spurious religion. Again, the origin of the cult concept in the fluid individualism of Troeltsch's "mysticism" has been reexamined, with a view toward rehabilitating the term. The strong parallels between the cult form of religiosity and the "cult of man" predicted in 1897 by Émile Durkheim in *Suicide* (London, 1970) as the final outcome of religious individualism suggest that there is value in maintaining the distinction between sect and cult. Whether the terms will persist in the context of continuing research on new religious movements is an open question: at least one sociologist of religion has called for a new conceptual framework to interpret such movements (Beckford, 1985, pp. 69–93).

[See also the biographies of the principal scholars mentioned herein. For a discussion of Protestant forms of Christianity, see Denominationalism.]

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Finally, Frances Westley, who finds in Durkheim's work a portrayal of future religious individualism that has much in common with Troeltsch's "mysticism" presents this view in "'The Cult of Man': Durkheim's Predictions and New Religious Movements," *Sociological Analysis* 39 (1978): 135-145. The call for conceptual rethinking in the study of new religious movements is made in James Beckford's *Cult Controversies: The Societal Response to the New Religious Movements* (London, 1985).

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SECULARIZATION. The term *secularization* came into use in European languages at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, where it was used to describe the transfer of territories previously under ecclesiastical control to the dominion of lay political authorities. The term *secularis* was already in use, and the distinction between sacred and secular, roughly equivalent to the differentiation of Christian conceptions of the supernatural from all that was mundane or profane, was widely invoked to assert the superiority of the sacred. Furthermore, the church had long distinguished between those priests called "religious" and those designated as secular priests, that is, between those clergy who functioned within a religious order and those who served the wider society. Later, the term *secularization* was applied in a different, though related, sense, to the dispensation of priests from their vows. The term was applied in even more diverse ways once the concept acquired a more general, sociological connotation in the twentieth century. Sociologists have used this word to indicate a variety of processes in which control of social space, time, facilities, resources, and personnel was lost by religious authorities, and in which empirical procedures and worldly goals and purposes displaced ritual and symbolic patterns of action directed toward otherworldly, or supernatural, ends.

The term was later applied to denote a pattern of social development that earlier sociologists, including Auguste Comte (1798-1857), had already recognized before the term *secularization* was in general sociological use. In the process thus described, the various social institutions become gradually distinct from one another and increasingly free of the matrix of religious assumptions that had earlier informed, and at times had inspired and dominated, their operation. Prior to this change, social action over a very wide field of human activity and organization (including work, decision-making, social and interpersonal relationships, juridical procedures, socialization, play, healing, and life-cycle transitions) is regulated in accordance with supernaturalist preconceptions. The process of structural dif-

ferentiation in which social institutions (the economy, the polity, morality, justice, education, recreation, health maintenance, and familial organization) become recognized as distinctive concerns operating with considerable autonomy is also a process in which conceptions of the supernatural lose their sovereignty over human affairs, a pattern broadly identified as secularization. Conceptions of the supernatural are gradually displaced from all social institutions except those specifically devoted to cultivating knowledge about, and maintaining relationships with, the posited supernatural order. While these agencies still seek to influence other areas of social life, they become recognized as separate and increasingly circumscribed religious institutions.

Definitions. This brief discourse already indicates the changing nature of the concept of secularization and the difficulty of providing a fully encompassing definition for it. The concept is distinguishable from secularism, with which it is sometimes confused. Secularization relates essentially to a process of decline in religious activities, beliefs, ways of thinking, and institutions that occurs primarily in association with, or as an unconscious or unintended consequence of, other processes of social structural change. Secularism is an ideology; its proponents consciously denounce all forms of supernaturalism and the agencies devoted to it, advocating nonreligious or antireligious principles as the basis for personal morality and social organization. Secularism may contribute in some degree to processes of secularization, but the evidence, even from officially secularist societies such as the Soviet Union, suggests that it does so only very gradually and much less fundamentally than do broad processes of social structural change such as industrialization and urbanization.

Definitions of secularization are intimately bound to definitions of religion. As long as religion is defined substantively, as beliefs, orientations, attitudes, activities, institutions, and structures pertaining to the supernatural (the definition assumed in this article), it is possible to assess the extent to which religion declines or loses significance for the operation of society. Some sociologists, however, have defined religion in functional terms, that is, as any set of beliefs, ideas, and activities that fulfills certain social functions. (The use of functionalist analysis, which is a standard sociological method, does not, of course, imply commitment to functional definitions; indeed, the combination may produce circular arguments.) Where religion is defined functionally, a wide variety of ideologies and activities that have no reference to the supernatural, to morality, faith, destiny, ultimate meaning, or final purposes, may

sometimes be held (by definition) to be religion. Insofar as certain functions are regarded as indispensable for the continuance of society or for its cohesion, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, once functionalist definitions are used, to speak of secularization, since religion is identified by definition with whatever supplies certain indispensable functions. The very discussion of secularization and of the social processes that lead to the decline of supernaturally orientated activities and beliefs implies that a substantive definition of religion is being employed. When reference is made not to religion but to specific religions or religious systems, the definitional problem (itself partly an artifact of the sociological penchant for abstract universalistic concepts) disappears.

The concept of secularization lacks a standard definition. The associated phenomena to which it refers occupy a wide social range. What those phenomena have in common is a pattern of diminishing recourse to supernaturalist explanations, diminishing resources employed for supernatural ends, and diminishing support of agencies or activities that promote relationships with, or dependence on, supernatural forces. Other, somewhat narrower terms that allude to some of the same developments include *desacralization*, *laicization*, and *dechristianization*. *Desacralization* refers specifically to the loss of the sense of the sacred as it pertains particularly to places, properties, and activities; it has less relevance to religious organization and is less applicable to thought processes. This essentially negative term fails to specify the character of what replaces the dislodged sense of the sacred once sacrality disappears. As a concept, it allows less gradation than does secularization. *Laicisation* in French is sometimes used as synonymous with *sécularisation*, but the English term *secularization* has a narrower connotation: it refers specifically to the abrogation of priestly offices and functions or to the transfer of certain functions, such as judicial roles, teaching, and social work, to specialists for whom theological qualifications are no longer deemed necessary or appropriate. *Laicization* refers also to the disavowal of the explicitly sacerdotal claims of religious professionals. *Dechristianization* is clearly more concerned with the decline of only one religious tradition, particularly in its control of institutional activities. As a term it lacks the ethical neutrality of the term *secularization*.

Briefly defined, secularization is the process in which religious consciousness, activities, and institutions lose social significance. It indicates that religion becomes marginal to the operation of the social system, and that the essential functions for the operation of society be-

come rationalized, passing out of the control of agencies devoted to the supernatural.

Indices of Secularization. Analysis of social structure will reveal in broad terms to what extent the order and operation of society depend on conceptions of the supernatural and activities related to it; that is, the extent to which a society is secularized. Short of a complete analysis of the social system, various social facts may serve as indications of secularization, although these vary in specificity and relevance from one social and cultural context to another. Broadly, it may be said that the increasing specialization of function and role entailed in structural differentiation has invariably reduced the influence of religion over other social institutions. Religion in the West has generally become merely a department of the social order rather than the pervasive, or even determinant, influence it once was.

We may say that religious consciousness declines as empirical and matter-of-fact attitudes develop. Depictions of the supernatural become increasingly abstract, and its operation is regarded as remote, while individual convictions concerning obligation, dependence, and remorse appear to be less compelling. Recourse to the supernatural declines, whether as a means for the cognitive understanding of the world or for personal emotional support. There is less allusion to God's will as the guide for attitudes, comportment, and action, and resort to prayers or curses is less frequent. Religious symbols lose their vibrancy and meaning, and charms, rosaries, and crosses become largely decorative items, while magic—for example, in the form of popular astrology—becomes a titillating amusement. Everyday life is negotiated by pragmatic attitudes and cause-and-effect thinking.

As religious action (action directed toward the supernatural) is regarded as less effective in relation to worldly experience, so it diminishes in scope and scale. Religious observances cease to be obligatory to members of society and become entirely voluntary; this indicates, at the least, a diminished regard for such practices by state authorities. While the abandonment of obligatory religious practice may eliminate one set of extraneous motivations for religious action, it does not eradicate others; for example, traditional habits of life, conformity with custom, or the search for social prestige may continue as possible extrareligious inducements for participation in religious rituals and collective performances. The same social act, for instance church going, baptism, or religious marriage or burial, may be prompted by different motives and carry widely different meanings in different cultural contexts. However, despite these considerations, church attendance,

church memberships, *rites de passage*, grace at meals, public prayer, pilgrimages, votive offerings, fasting, penances, religious festivals, and church weddings all decline in incidence and in the depth of their sacrality.

To be significant in modern society, religion must be public and organized, a potential resource for all collective and public concerns, influencing the social system to operate in conformity with religious principles and with due regard to the supernatural. In the early evolution of modern societies, religious institutions occupied just such a position, but that influence has waned everywhere throughout the Christian West. This loss of social significance is manifested most explicitly in the diminishing proportion of social resources (taken, for instance, as a proportion of the gross national product) devoted to religion and to the maintenance of the personnel and property that serve supernaturalist goals. Labor, energy, skill, wealth, and time are increasingly employed for other than supernatural ends. Relative to population, the number of churches declines, as does the number of religious functionaries. The monetary remuneration and social status of clergy diminish relative to those of other professions. Ancillary agencies (schools, colleges, hospitals, social welfare facilities) pass from religious to lay, secular, and state control.

The application of the concept of secularization to society at large has an analogue in the process of change occurring within religious institutions *per se*. Not only is the wider society less influenced by religion, but religious institutions and behavior are themselves increasingly influenced by values and standards that prevail in the secular society. As society increasingly orders its affairs in accordance with technical and scientific criteria, religious institutions themselves are affected. The sacramentalist and sacerdotal orientations of religion become less congruous with the assumptions of everyday life, and the tendency in religious performance is for the distance between sacred and secular to diminish. The special language of liturgy is changed to accommodate secular understanding, organization is increasingly rationalized, economies of scale are sought through ecumenism, and activities necessarily adjust in duration, scheduling, style, and tenor to accommodate external secular constraints and preferences. Church leaders become less certain about the nature of the supernatural, less committed to dogma or the formal creeds to which on induction they subscribe, and increasingly devote themselves to good works, general moral exhortation, community activities within their congregations, fund raising for their churches, and occasional commentary on political issues. This pattern of

change has been designated as the internal secularization of the churches.

Secularization as a Historical Process. Secularization has occurred throughout history, unevenly but in a broadly discernible pattern. In preliterate societies, apprehensions that may be considered supernaturalist were both ubiquitous and inextricably intermingled with empirical knowledge and rational techniques. Explanation invoked superempirical entities, social goals were confused with symbolic acts, and magical means were intermixed with pragmatic procedures. Steadily, the process, which Max Weber designated *die Entzauberung der Welt* ("the disenchantment of the world"), drained natural phenomena of their magico-religious meaning as men acquired more matter-of-fact, positivistic orientations.

In this analysis, magic may be subsumed with religion under the general rubric of supernaturalism; indeed, the establishment of a distinction between them may in itself be regarded as one aspect of the process of secularization. The development of monotheistic religions involved the rationalization and systematization of conceptions of the supernatural. This process, very evident in the history of Judaism, steadily extinguished the preexisting plethora of random, local magical ideas and local deities; it introduced a more universalistic spirit, made religious apprehensions ethical, and gradually established a coherent conception of an increasingly transcendent and universal deity. The monotheistic religions were themselves agencies of rationalization, and hence, insofar as they reduced the belief in supernaturalism, they were agencies of secularization. Magical beliefs and practices were not immediately eradicated; they sometimes persisted as subterranean currents reappearing periodically. Judaism and Protestantism were generally more effective secularizing agencies than Roman Catholicism, for although all three formally excoriated magic and folk belief, and sought to disseminate orderly, internally consistent teachings and practices, the Roman Catholic Church sometimes countenanced, absorbed, or accommodated pagan elements.

It is sometimes objected that to regard secularization as a cumulative, long-term historical trend necessarily implies the existence at some unspecified time of an unparalleled age of religious faith. Against this implication, it is argued that Christian history reveals the recurrent complaints of clerical authorities about unbelief, laxness in religious observances, and a variety of contingent derelictions. The historical evidence cannot be denied, but religiosity should not be equated with Christianity. Paganism and heresy were often in-

dicted in the complaints about laxity, but these are manifestations not of the secularity of society but rather of its religiosity. Further, church religion and attendance are only two among many indicators of relative secularity; they intimate nothing either of religious consciousness or of the significance of religion (and its institutions) for the operation of the social system. As long as supernaturalist conceptions (of whatever sort) were effective in everyday life, or as long as religious institutions were sustained by the secular authorities and fulfilled functions as agencies of legitimation, official ideology, and social control, society had not yet experienced any radical modern process of secularization.

In recent Western history, dissociation of religious and political institutions, seen most conspicuously in the separation of church and state (now generally effective despite vestigial links that persist, for example, in England, Scotland, and the Scandinavian countries), implies the secularization of society. At times, ethnic and regional minorities have reinforced their distinctive identity and their political dissent by reasserting religious differences (as in Northern Ireland throughout this century, as in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, or, much less dramatically, as in the Netherlands). In this same manner, societies in which religion has been associated with national independence have found religion to be a conveniently available means of rallying opposition to politically oppressive regimes (as in Communist Poland). Religion may, then, become a form of surrogate politics, but the continuing vigor of religion in such circumstances is artificially sustained by the prevailing political, ethnic, or regional situation. Where no such conditions prevail, the general course of secularization results in the increasing separation of religion from other institutions, most rapidly and markedly from those on which societal arrangements depend (law, politics, economics, and, eventually, education) and more slowly from those rooted in local community life (marriage, the family, and personal morality).

Against the dominant trend, there are occasional revivals of religion. What such movements achieve has not always been contrary to secular tendencies. Reform movements that seek to purge religion of cultural, traditional, or superstitious accretations may be almost explicitly secularizing in their impact. Even religious revivals that seek a return to what are taken to be pristine ideas and single-minded dedication may have the incidental consequences of eliminating elements of folk religiosity, of widening the gap between religion and other social institutions, of more narrowly specifying religion's social role, and of encouraging privatization by emphasizing personal piety. Reform movements such as Renaissance Humanism, Lutheranism, Calvin-

ism, Deism, and Unitarianism were all secularizing forces within Christianity, purging faith and practice of immanentist conceptions of deity, progressively applying the canons of reason to doctrine, and reducing mystical, miraculous, sacramental, and sacerdotal claims. Revivalism, recurrent in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Christendom (in Methodism, Holiness movements, and Pentecostalism, for example), ostensibly sought to enhance individual emotional commitment and certainly not to put religion to the test of rationality. Yet, expressive religiosity also came to demand discipline and order. When such movements, unencumbered by traditional liturgy and ritual, sought to socialize and organize their followings, they tended to do so by systematic rational procedures, sometimes adapting these from the secular society. Worship assumed forms closer to everyday styles, and the emphasis on subjective awareness, rather than on the supposed objective power of external ritual forms, led to a systematic demand for sustained and calculable performances from individual members. Arcane elements were replaced by goal-oriented methods of propaganda, mission, education, and mobilization. The demand for consistency, methodical regularity, and self-sustained individual responsibility conformed fully to the nature of demands being made in the context of secular employment. Even revivalist religion channeled secularizing tendencies into sections of the population as yet unsocialized.

Contemporary Manifestations. Just as religious institutions have ceased to be central in society, and just as society no longer endorses religious goals as its primary ends, so religious consciousness, although less visible as a phenomenon, appears also to have diminished. These different aspects of religiosity reveal varying degrees of persistence. Thus, the formal civic representation of the church in public life is more evident in societies, such as England, with established national churches than in the United States or Germany. Religious schools are more numerous in France and in Belgium (where state and church institutions are alternatives in many departments of social organization) than in England or the United States. Church attendance is significantly higher in North America than in northern Europe, and church membership in the United States is significantly higher than in England. Such national variations reflect different patterns and degrees of secularization. They do not predicate specific consequences (such as, for instance, a growth of atheism) or a determinate loss in church affiliation or in religious observance, even though these consequences often occur. Nor do they preclude the endurance of enclaves of persisting spirituality or the emergence of new expressions of re-

ligious commitment. The patterns vary and, despite other indicators of secularization, spiritual survivals and new religious initiatives do occur.

Even so, none of these manifestations of religiosity refutes the evidence of general secularization. Indeed, as religion loses significance in the public arena, we may expect that it will appear correspondingly more conspicuous in private life, commitment becoming more distinctive as it becomes more exceptional. Again, in some societies, involvement in church life may fulfill cultural or social functions little related to intrinsic religiosity, and its persistence at relatively high levels of participation (for example, in the United States) may relate more to traditions of voluntarism, the need for community identity, or a generalized search for surrogate national ideology than to the societal, or even the personal, significance of religious faith. Numerous new religious movements have emerged in recent decades, and these may even be seen as a response to general secularization: since they provide meaning, purpose, association, and support for particular sections of the population, their appearance testifies to the inadequacy, irrelevance, or ineffectiveness of the mainstream churches, at least for this particular clientele. Given the traditional exclusivism of Christianity, religious pluralism, to which these new movements are conspicuous testimony, occurs only where secularization is relatively far advanced.

Causes. To unravel completely the complex tissue of causal agencies contributing to secularization would be tantamount to reconstructing the entire web of social history. Any trend as pervasive and persistent in the course of human affairs as this one must be extensively related to all other facets of social change. We have noted the way in which conceptual order was developed and rationalized within the evolution of religion itself. Intellectuals (who themselves were often religious functionaries) were responsible for early secularization, but the initial marginalization of all supernaturalism is attributable to a deepening and more reflective apprehension of the natural order. The beginnings of science and, more generally, the development of empirical inquiry, detachment in observation and experimentation, and the sensed need for ordered, general concepts (incipient universalism) introduced new assumptions about nature and society. The rational and systematic coordination of empirical knowledge led both to the confutation of received supernaturalist conceptions and to an enhanced awareness of man's own capacity to harness nature and to organize his own economic and social well-being. Eventually, skepticism became steadily institutionalized in science, providing an implicit challenge to untested and untestable hypotheses, even

though many early scientists such as Roger Bacon, Johannes Kepler, Isaac Newton, and Michael Faraday were men whose thought encompassed both rationalist and mystic concerns.

The application of science, particularly to productive activities, and the evolution of new techniques reduced man's sense of dependence on the divine. As society became industrialized and urbanized, increasing proportions of the population came to live their lives and make their livelihoods in ways more removed from nature. The possible intervention of the supernatural into everyday life became less plausible except in the interstices of social organization, that is, in marginal pursuits and interests, and even here only for the minority. New ways of thinking evolved as man came to inhabit an environment that was progressively more and more a product of his own making. Magical, mystical, and metaphysical patterns of thought became steadily less congruous, particularly in all manifestly functional activities, which are governed by well-articulated structures of specific roles. Man's increased capacity to assess and supply his own needs led to the assumption that social well-being depended not on God's providence but on social planning. Whereas in earlier epochs the past had dominated the present—a past sacralized by the supposedly timeless truths of religion—modern society was future-oriented, and that future was mundane and material, no longer the future of postmortem salvation in some supraterrrestrial existence.

Social and geographic mobility, which occurred with increasing intensity in order to accommodate the productive demands and distributive rewards of technological society, promoted individualism, and detached men from the stable communal contexts and the settled order of past generations in which religious predilections had themselves been rooted. Simultaneously, social organization became less dependent on the local community. The role-articulated social system necessarily made human beings into its calculable parts, while the social environment, following the natural environment before it, became increasingly man-made. Its rational structures elicited, through the role system, rational patterns of instrumental and impersonal action and neutralized, in relations with others, those personal, affective dispositions that religion had traditionally sought to summon and sustain. Eventually, even personal and intimate relationships became invaded by impersonal techniques—for example, in the matter of birth control—so that issues once thought to be very much in the realm of the sacred became matters of rational, calculated planning. Thus, the wider course of social change produced secular contexts and induced patterns of rational social action, as well as changes in

individual consciousness that expunged ideas and assumptions about the supernatural and its derivative dispositions.

Secularization in Other Contexts. Secularization is a Western concept descriptive principally of a process that has occurred in Western society, most conspicuously during this century. Certainly, all the world religions in some degree disciplined and systematized immanentist conceptions and magical apprehensions and practices, but they did so with varying persistence and effectiveness. Hinduism and Buddhism, unlike Judaism and Christianity, absorbed or tolerated more primitive supernaturalism rather than excluding or eradicating it. Islam, although theoretically even more rigorously monotheistic than Christianity, lacked effective centralized organization with which to regulate local magical dispositions, which have widely persisted in Muslim societies into the present day. The long-term historical processes favoring secularization—the extension of rational principles to all areas of social life—were less intense and persistent in the Middle East and in Asia. Nonetheless, as industrialization occurs in developing societies, similar pressures accumulate toward the routinizing and rationalizing of work roles, social relationships, and the framework of social and civic order. Technological development brings similar consequences by reducing the significance of religion for the operation of the social system. Yet, since so many local manifestations of immanentist religiosity persist in these contexts, the paradox of a close juxtaposition of overtly magical practices alongside sophisticated industrial techniques is often found. The course of secularization follows a different path and occurs in different sequence from that familiar in the West.

In Latin America, profound religious changes have occurred with the still incipient process of technologization, and developments that were sequential in Europe have been contemporaneous on that continent. Thus, in recent decades there has been a rapid spread of Protestantism (apparently still carrying many facets of the work ethic); political radicalization has occurred (affecting the Roman Catholic church in significant respects); some separation of the Roman Catholic church from the dominant political structure has been effected; and quasi-magical movements (such as Umbanda and Kardecism in Brazil) have significantly rationalized their teaching and organization. Supernaturalism is being relocated within the social system by diverse patterns of change of a secularizing kind.

Some Islamic countries (e.g., Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia) have undergone considerable secularization, but in others (e.g., Iran) the resurgence of fundamentalist

movements indicates the strains accompanying this process and the extent to which, in the least sophisticated sections of society, religious dispositions can still be mobilized against modernization. A religion in which a specific and concrete system of law occupies so important a place cannot but find itself compromised by the exigencies of modern life. A similar situation, which is a source of conflict between orthodox and liberal (or nonreligious) parties, prevails in Israel, a secular state in which religion retains a unique ideological significance as the locus for a people so often exiled from its mythically promised land. In both Islam and Judaism, religiously enjoined behavior is subject to growing challenge from certain indispensable elements of a modern social system: a rational framework of law (both as an agency of social control and as a regulative instrument for contract); a systematic use of economic incentives and deterrents (whether through a free market or by socialist controls); the use of education to disseminate empirical knowledge, inculcate pragmatic attitudes, and teach rational procedures; and a political system concerned with economic well-being rather than with the implementation of religious principles. Nor is private life exempt from such challenges; for example, a prerequisite of rational social organization, in contradiction of Muslim and Jewish assumptions of male superiority, is equal rights for men and women, an idea that affects such matters as divorce, birth control, custody of children, remuneration for work, and even such customary matters as dress and comportment.

If secularization implied that what had decayed was necessarily a well-integrated and coherent religious tradition, then it might be maintained that this term was inappropriate to Japan, where diverse, loosely related, symbiotic religious traditions never constituted anything remotely equivalent to the "age of faith" of Christian Europe. Nonetheless, it is apparent from the plethora of its traditional magico-religious practices that Japan was eligible for secularization. The Japanese social system operates with only token reference to supernatural assumptions: the emperor is no longer divine. Most Japanese are only loosely attached to Buddhist temples or Shintō shrines. Ancestor worship has sharply declined in recent decades, and in the homes of young people, both the god-shelf (*kamidana*) and the memorial altar (*butsudan*) have become less common. Japan's technological advance has been so rapid, however, that magico-religious dispositions are still far from eclipsed; various magical practices continue in healing, fortune-seeking, and propitiatory acts, some of them institutionalized by the temples or in new religious movements. These phenomena occupy the interstices of institutional

life, but they are as little accommodated to the increasingly rational socioeconomic order as is the Confucian precept of filial piety, which, today, is challenged by the premium that modern technology puts, not on age, but on youth.

In the largely village-centered society of India, religious dispositions remain perhaps more powerful than in most other parts of the world, even if they have less hold in the centers of population and industry. In a society with such strong religious and mystical traditions, the secularizing effects of social change are slow. Even so, the state now stands above religious particularism, declares itself to be a secular state, and has acted against religious tradition in official disavowal of the caste implications of Hinduism. Nor is secularization very apparent in Africa, where christianization and islamization are still proceeding and magic is far from displaced. If the term is to be applied to Africa, it must refer to a relatively early stage of a long-term historical process. Even among the dominant social strata in African states, not everyone has renounced magic, but as the echelons of technical and administrative personnel proliferate, education and experience of urban life are likely to make bush witchcraft less common. Christianity is still growing and still plays a significant role in various institutional spheres, particularly education and health, despite secularization of facilities by some states. Churches remain a powerful focus of voluntary allegiance and provide important links between local, poorly organized communal life and the incipient secularized societal system.

[See also Bureaucracy; Modernity; Modernism; and the more general discussions in Politics and Religion and Society and Religion.]

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BRYAN R. WILSON

SEDNA. The concept of an owner, or master, of the animals appears in many hunting and fishing societies. For the Inuit (Eskimo) of Canada and Greenland, for whom sealing was of vital importance, this powerful being was the mistress of seals and other sea animals. Franz Boas, in his monograph about the Inuit on Baffin Island (1888), gave her name as *Sedna*, which probably means "the one down there." Other Inuit groups referred to the Sea Woman under different names, such as *Nerrivik* (Polar Inuit, "the place of the food") and *Nuliajuk* (Netsilik Inuit, "the lubricious one").

An origin myth tells how Sedna was once a girl who was thrown overboard from a vessel. While she tried to hang on, her fingers were cut off at the joints. She sank to the bottom of the sea, the segments of her fingers turning into sea mammals, and she became the Sea Woman, who was in control of these animals. According to some Iglulik Inuit and Baffin Islanders, she also ruled over the souls of those who had gone to the undersea land of the dead.

Variants of this myth have been recorded from many localities in Greenland and Canada, but from Alaska only a single reference exists. In some variants an orphan girl is thrown overboard, but more often the myth begins with the story of a girl who was fooled into marrying a petrel that had taken on human form. When her father tried to rescue his unhappy daughter and to take her away, the petrel pursued them and stirred up a heavy storm. The father tried to pacify the petrel by

throwing his daughter overboard. When she tried to cling to the side of the boat, her father cut off her fingers at the first joint. Her fingertips fell into the sea and became small seals. When she again grasped the side of the boat, her father cut off her fingers at the next joint; these segments fell into the sea and became big, bearded seals. When she still clung to the side of the boat with the stumps of her fingers, her father cut them off at the last joint, and these segments turned into walrus. Sometimes the order of the creation of the sea animals is different, with whales being created first (the girl's nails are associated with baleen), followed by small seals and bearded seals.

In some variants the girl's father forces her to marry a dog because she has refused to marry. Her children become Indians, white people, and so on. In this way the mother of the sea animals is made the mother of men as well; as such, she represents the female principle of the world.

According to Inuit belief, the Sea Woman had the power to withhold the sea animals when certain hunting, birth, and death taboos had been broken. In Greenland it was told that the transgressions would materialize as dirt in the Sea Woman's hair, making her feel uncomfortable; because she had no fingers, she was unable to comb her hair. During a séance, the shaman, whose job it was to rectify this situation, would undertake a journey to the Sea Woman while the others attending the séance would sit silently in the darkness. Before the shaman could comb Sedna's hair he had to fight her. Afterward, she would set the sea animals free, and the shaman would return—that is, wake from his trance—and make the good result known.

In Greenland, ritual wife-exchanges were sometimes held in order to please the Sea Woman and to ensure good hunting, but otherwise the Sea Woman's ritual role was less important there than in Canada, even if myths about shamans' dangerous travels to her under-sea house were well known.

In Canada, powerful shamans would draw the Sea Woman up and make her promise to send seals, or the shamans would themselves visit her in the sea. Among the Copper Inuit a shaman might be possessed by the Sea Woman and during a séance tell what caused the lack of seals. Then the participants would quickly admit the taboos they had broken. The dangerous situation was neutralized when its cause was made known.

The Inuit on Baffin Island held great feasts, lasting several days, in which Sedna was ritually killed. These calendar feasts took place in the autumn when sealing was prevented by storms that broke the ice open. Sedna was harpooned through a coiled thong on the floor,

which represented a seal's breathing hole. A shaman followed her and stabbed her, thereby cleansing her of the transgressions of taboos that had taken place the previous year (and thereby securing that she no longer would withhold the sea animals). When the lamps were lit again after the séance, blood was seen on the harpoon point and the knife; the blood was an omen of good hunting in the future.

One of the rites that took place as part of the Sedna feast at this change of season was a tug-of-war between those born in the summer and those born in the winter. The result predicted the weather. During the Sedna feast of Baffin Island, normal social bonds were temporarily dissolved when a ritual wife-exchange took place under the leadership of disguised figures representing spirits. These figures were later ritually killed and then revived with a drink of water in the same way as killed seals were given a drink.

Seals and other sea animals were the basis of the existence of nearly all Inuit. The relationship with the Sea Woman was therefore important but very sensitive: she not only controlled these animals, they originated from her.

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INGE KLEIVAN

SEFER YETSIRAH (Book of Creation) is an ancient Jewish cosmogonical and cosmological treatise that forms part of the literature of Qabbalah; falsely attributed to Abraham the patriarch and to 'Aqiva' ben Yosef, a second-century tanna. Composed of six short chapters, it describes God's creation of the world by means of the ten cosmic numbers (*sefirot*) and the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet.

The date of composition of *Sefer yetsirah* is the subject of controversy among scholars. Gershom Scholem assigns it to the tannaitic period (second to third centuries CE), whereas N. Aloni argued that it is a work of the eighth or ninth century, written under the influence of Arabic linguistics. The treatise is extant in two main versions, one short and one long, without major divergences in ideas between them. It has been translated into several European languages.

A major contribution of *Sefer yetsirah* is its discussion of the magical properties inherent in combinations of letters and the use of these combinations in the creation of the universe. The book's explanation of the proper pronunciation of the letters was the earliest phonetic theory introduced in Judaism. *Sefer yetsirah* also develops a system of correspondence between the Hebrew letters and the limbs of the human body.

The influence of the treatise was felt strongly in several trends in Jewish thought. It affected the development of early Jewish philosophy as in the case of Sa'adyah Gaon (882–942) and his contemporary Dunash ibn Tamim. Avraham ibn 'Ezra wrote a commentary on it, although it has since been lost. Ashkenazic Hasidism, or German pietists, of the early thirteenth century produced several commentaries, of which three are still extant: the first by El'azar of Worms, the second falsely attributed to Sa'adyah Gaon, and the third by Elhanan ben Yaqar. Almost all the early qabbalists of Provence and Spain wrote commentaries in a theosophic vein; the important ones are those of the thirteenth century qabbalists Yitshaq Sagi Nahor (also known as Yitshaq the Blind), 'Azri'el of Gerona, and Moses Nahmanides. According to the German pietists and some qabbalists, the permutations of letters and holy names discussed in *Sefer yetsirah* may be used by initiates to create a *golem*, or humanoid creature. The medieval qabbalists also developed elaborate theories of the *sefirot* as divine manifestations.

In the second half of the thirteenth century, *Sefer yetsirah* became the starting point of the ecstatic Qabbalah of Avraham Abulafia, who was influenced by Barukh Togrami's highly esoteric commentary *Maftehot ha-Qabbalah* (Keys of the Qabbalah). The most important of Abulafia's several treatises on *Sefer yetsirah* is *Otsar 'eden ganuz* (Bodleian Manuscript 1580). The techniques of letter combination described in *Sefer yetsirah* were developed by Abulafia and his school for use in ecstatic practices.

The commentary of the fourteenth-century Spanish qabbalist Yosef ben Shalom Ashkenazi, erroneously attributed in print to Avraham ben David of Posquières, is a classic work that influenced the "practical Qabba-

lah" of Isaac Luria. Me'ir ibn Avi Sahula compiled in 1331 a lengthy and eclectic commentary (Rome-Angelica Manuscript 45). Since the fifteenth century only a few commentaries have been composed, notably those of Mosheh Cordovero in the sixteenth century and Eliyyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman (known as the Vilna Gaon) in the eighteenth century.

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MOSHE IDEL

SELECTI refers to the most important gods of the Roman state. The term "the select gods" (*di selecti*) derives from Marcus Terentius Varro, the learned Roman antiquarian (116–27 BCE). One chapter of his encyclopedia of religious and historical lore (*Antiquitatum rerum humanarum et divinarum, libri XLI*) was entitled "Concerning the Preeminent and Select Divinities" (*De dis praecipuis atque selectis*). Under this heading Varro discussed twelve gods and eight goddesses: Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Genius, Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Neptune, Sol, Orcus, Liber Pater, Tellus, Ceres, Juno, Luna, Diana, Minerva, Venus, and Vesta. They are deities whose functions and personalities permit an explana-

tion of the natural world that was considered both profoundly religious and philosophically satisfying.

Drawing upon the central elements of Stoic philosophy, Varro's theology assumed a supreme divine force that controlled all things and, under a variety of divine names and forms, effected its power throughout the course of natural and human affairs. Varro's integration of Roman religion and Greek philosophy was an intellectually rigorous attempt to give unity and meaning to the complex layers of Roman cult life. As such it deserves a better hearing than that given it by Augustine, whose polemics in *City of God* (especially book 7) are our primary source for Varro's concept of the select gods and for his theology as a whole.

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J. RUFUS FEARS

SELK'NAM RELIGION. The Selk'nam (also known as the Ona) inhabited the largest island of the Tierra del Fuego archipelago, the Isla Grande. The population of the Selk'nam and their neighbors the Haush (Mánekenka), who lived in the southeastern tip of the island and had a similar culture, was estimated by Martin Gusinde (1931) at approximately four thousand in 1880. During the final decades of the nineteenth century most of the Indians either were slaughtered by the white colonizers or died of diseases brought by them. In 1919 Gusinde (1931) counted 279 Selk'nam and Haush. Fifteen years later, following several epidemics, there were fewer than one hundred. When I first went to Tierra del Fuego in 1965 there were about fifteen Selk'nam and Haush, including the mestizos. In 1985 there were four, all of whom spoke fluent Spanish and three of whom also had some knowledge of the Selk'nam language. I had the privilege of working, as an ethnologist, with the last woman shaman, Lola Kiepja, who died 9 October 1966, and during the years that followed with many of the remaining Selk'nam.

The Selk'nam and the Haush were strictly a land-bound people. They were seminomadic hunters. Their most valued game was the guanaco, genetically related to the llama, vicuña, and alpaca. As the Indians were frequently on the move, they used guanaco skins lashed to poles and trees for shelter, though on occasion they built log huts in the form of tipis. They divided their island into a number of territories, called *haruwen*, that

were occupied by patrilinear and patrilocal exogamic lineages. Each *haruwen* was associated with one of the four cardinal points, called *shó'on* ("sky"). These were also exogamic units. Although the boundaries of each *haruwen* were well known, they were not always respected. Trespassing was one of the main causes of conflict among the Selk'nam. Another cause for contention was vengeance for the death of a kinsman alleged to have been killed by the supernatural power of a shaman of some other *haruwen*.

The Selk'nam language is related to that of the Tehuelche Indians, former inhabitants of the Patagonian mainland just north of the Strait of Magellan. [See Tehuelche Religion.] The language spoken by the Haush has not yet been classified.

The oral tradition of the Selk'nam and Haush was extremely rich and vital. What is termed mythology and shamanism were to them not only explanations or symbolic interpretations of the why and how of "being in the world," but were also inspirations that generated inquiries, stimulated new questions, and revived debate on old ones in the group's constant search for comprehension of the ordering and contradictions of the intangible cosmos and its tangible earthly manifestations.

Mythology. It is not surprising that Selk'nam and Haush mythology concerns itself with origins, of which the fountainhead is Pémaulk, or Témaukel, whom Gusinde identified with the supreme being. Unlike the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, Témaukel is an abstract concept. Though Témaukel is the source of all that exists, it is not an anthropomorphic deity, and therefore it is not accessible to expressions of human aspirations and feelings.

Some of the more tangible subjects of the oral traditions are personages of the previous, prehuman epoch (*hóowin*); these superhuman immortals subsequently became transformed into elements of nature. Moon, as a mighty shaman and incontestable leader of the matriarchy, is the dominant figure of the prehuman epoch; she survives as the actual moon, the symbol of the female threat to the male domination of society, that is, of the dangers of a revival or resurgence of the mythological matriarchy of the *hóowin* epoch.

Since the world has become what it is, Moon has not forgiven the men for provoking her downfall and the destruction of the matriarchy over which she reigned as the all-powerful matron. Even as late as the nineteenth century when the moon entered into an eclipse, the men were wary, frightened, and even fraught with anguish. The reddish tint of the moon was interpreted as a sign of the blood of the men who were to be killed in coming battles and whose deaths were part of her vengeance.

The shamans were thought to know by means of their dreams when such an eclipse was to occur. The spirits (*wáiuwen*) of the shamans soared into the heavens to visit her and to discover upon whom her wrath was to fall. Male shamans were in special danger of being "seized by the Moon," for she considered them to have caused her disgrace.

During an eclipse the people who lived nearby gathered to appease Moon's anger. If there were no shaman in camp during an eclipse, the people extinguished the fires in their dwellings and simply huddled under their guanaco capes until the danger passed, remaining silent or speaking only in whispers. When a shaman was present he ordered them to extinguish the domestic fires and to gather around him. The shaman daubed a red circle of paint on each cheek to represent the moon. He also donned a special headdress made of the feathers of a certain hawk. Meanwhile the women painted their bodies red and drew a white stripe across their faces from ear to ear, under the nose. While the women made sweeping movements toward the moon with long sticks or with their guanaco capes to drive away the eclipse, to appease Moon they chanted, "Beautiful heart. Ample face." Then the shaman sang to prepare his spirit to soar to Moon's sanctuary, imitating the call of the hawk as it flies high into the sky, just as the shaman's spirit traveled through the nocturnal heavens to Moon's abode. As he felt his spirit soaring, he repeatedly chanted, "Let us go to the Daughter of the Sky." Moon awaited the arrival of the shamans' spirits. If she disdained a shaman, his spirit would be drawn into her shadow, beneath her knees, and the shaman on earth would know that he was doomed to perish in an approaching combat. He would lament his fate, chanting, "Moon has my headdress beneath her knees." In protest, the women would insult her, singing, "Moon—burnt face. Moon—face full of rage" (Chapman, 1972, chants nos. 5 and 32, and 1982, p. 73).

Ritual. During the great ceremony called Hain, which sometimes lasted a year or even longer, the young men (*klóketen*) were initiated into adult life. All the men had to be initiated and were obliged to submit to the ordeals and hardships of at least one, or even two or three, separate ceremonies—that is, until the elders were satisfied with their outward and inward signs of maturity. The Hain ceremony also sought to reinforce male dominance over the women. The men's power, the patriarchy, was thought to derive not from legitimacy of any kind, but rather from the fact that the men were in control of the secret that the superhuman men of legendary times (of *hóowin*) had wrested from the women. This had taken place at the time when the formidable

male shamans shattered the matriarchy, forcing the great female leader and shaman, Moon, to flee to the heavens and killing all the women in the ceremonial hut, that is, all the females except for the young uninitiated girls and babies who were not in the hut.

The "secret" the men thought they were keeping from the women was that the spirits who appeared in the Hain ceremony were not supernatural, but only men disguised by masks and paints. All the spirits, male and female alike, were impersonated by the men except for the terrifying female from the underworld, Xálpen, a being reputed to be half flesh and half rock, man-eating, voracious, and raging. From within the ceremonial hut the men voiced her cries and the groans she made when she gave birth to a beautiful creature, the baby K'ternnen. Only rarely did Xálpen emerge from the ceremonial hut onto the "stage" in view of the women, and then always as an effigy (constructed of bows tied together to form a large oblong shape that was filled with branches, grass, and weeds to give it body and covered with guanaco hides). The men would push this "monster" onto the stage to overawe the women. But all was not frightening to the women. For instance, they chanted with joy when the baby K'ternnen (in reality a slim *klóketen* disguised with down pasted to his body and to his mask) appeared on the stage. They also were much amused by other frequently repeated scenes, such as that of the faithless wife, the lovely Kula (also a young *klóketen*), who descended from the heavens to be wooed by excited admirers, much to the chagrin of her pitiful husband, Koshmink, whose frenzies of jealousy provoked laughter and derision among the women.

The religious content of this ceremony may not be apparent from this very brief description, nor in the long, minutely detailed account of it that we owe to Gusinde (1931), but it is implicit in his study and is revealed by the information given to me by some of the last Selk'nam (Chapman, 1982). It consists in the conviction of the women that the Hain spirits were real, even though they may well have known that the men were impersonating them (they were very cautious not to reveal their knowledge to the men). And the men also believed in the spirits. In the case of one very important spirit—Shoort, the husband of Xálpen—the "actor" had to perform certain rituals before disguising himself. That is, the ceremony was not simply an initiation ritual and a hoax to fool the women and justify the patriarchy, it was also an enactment, a representation, of sacred nature, and it was taken very seriously by all the participants, despite its moments of profane hilarity. The Hain ceremony is a beautiful example of the im-

mense range of feelings and sentiments, of ritual and dramatic actions, a symbolic system can create.

The mourning ritual was another expression of religious faith. As the living grieved the loss of a beloved one, they darkened their bodies with black paint made from coals of the fire and chanted laments that each adult inherited from a near kinsman. Moreover, mourners had the right to chant a lament of the "sky" (*shó'on*) with which they were associated. While chanting, mourners at times would lacerate their bodies with sharpened stones or mussel shells until they bled profusely. Another sign of mourning was the shaved crown of the head. Individuals might chant and lacerate themselves for months or even several years following the death of a loved one, especially a son or daughter. When someone well known died, fires would be lit as signals to neighbors to come and participate in the ritual, and if the deceased had been a renowned shaman or hunter, part of the bush or forest would be set on fire to show that his land too was mourning.

The corpse was usually buried near the dwellings, but with no external evidence of the tomb on the surface of the ground. The site was respectfully avoided for some time. Also, the name of the deceased was not pronounced for years following his or her death. Although Gusinde (1931) states that the soul (*kaspi*) of the dead joined the supreme being, Témaukel, beyond the stars, my informants declared that the soul achieved a new being in the realms of the "skies" of infinity, the sky with which the deceased had been associated in life.

The last Selk'nam shaman, Lola Kiepja, sang these words the year she died: "I follow the trail . . . of those who departed. . . . I want to speak of the *cordillera* [Span., "mountain range"]. . . . Those of infinity gave it [power] to me. I receive it. . . . They speak beautifully, they of infinity of Ham-nia [the *cordillera* of infinity of the western sky]" (Chapman, 1972, chants nos. 1 and 3).

Shamanism. The shamans (*xo'on*) were held in great esteem for their curing abilities and supernatural power, called *wáiuwen*. But they were also feared, especially those reputed to possess the faculty of throwing a sickness a great distance or provoking instant death simply by staring at a victim. Although all the shamans could cure by drawing sickness out of the body of the patient, not all could "kill" or inflict illnesses. Very few female shamans had such power, and most were exclusively dedicated to curing.

Before beginning to perform, the shamans would don special headgear made of guanaco hide adorned with feathers of certain birds and decorate their faces with painted designs. Supernatural power, *wáiuwen*, took possession of them only when they achieved a trance

state, which was induced by self-hypnosis, through chanting and concentration. No stimulants were employed. Once they were in a trance, their singing and body movements would become almost automatic. Experienced shamans would usually require thirty to forty minutes to produce this state of mind. During the séances, they would jump and leap about, pounding their feet and even fists on the ground, vigorously shaking their fur capes to increase the excitement and as a kind of accompaniment to their chants. This sort of extreme tension, however, did not last for the entire period of the trance. In order to cure, the shamans had to pay strict attention to their patients.

Other than provoking death and curing, the shamans were expected to control the weather. Moreover, the male shamans were solicited to predict the outcome of a feud or combat and to aid in the hunt. Certain shamans achieved great fame by attracting whales to shore and killing them with invisible arrows. Others could bewitch guanacos, certain birds, and seals, and even create an abundance of mussels or fish.

The shamans were highly competitive and challenged one another to ordeals, each attempting to demonstrate the superior power of their *wáiuwen*. There were several sorts of ordeals, but only the most expert and daring male shamans would venture to perform the ordeal of the arrow called Kuash-metchen. The shaman, having achieved a trance state, concentrates on his body, more specifically, on "preparing" the canal through which he is to insert the arrow (made entirely of wood and smaller than those used in the hunt). Completely naked, he massages himself as he chants. When he feels ready, he pierces himself with the arrow just below the collar bone and cautiously draws the arrow under his skin, diagonally across his chest, removing it at his waist. Or he might insert the arrow on one side of his waist and move it across his body, extracting it at the opposite side. While performing the feat he chants repeatedly "My body is in darkness. I am myself piercing it with an arrow." (Lola Kiepja recorded this chant; see Chapman, 1972, chant no. 22.) Though the competing shamans would not necessarily meet nor perform at the same time, this feat had to be witnessed by a public. Of the three shamans whom my informants had seen or heard about performing the ordeal, one died from the wounds shortly thereafter.

The shamans, even the most renowned, did not form a privileged sector of society, and neither did the "fathers and mothers of *láiluka*" (the sages) nor the "fathers [*chan-ain*] and mothers [*chan-am*] of the word" (the prophets). The sages were specialists in the tradition called *láiluka*, which consisted of the myths of origin, accounts of supernatural heroes, and of other

"events" that took place during the *hóowin* epoch. The prophets had knowledge of the more mystical tradition, which was concerned with the more abstract symbols, such as the "skies" and the "invisible *cordilleras*." Moreover, they were deemed capable of predicting the future of the local group and of the society as a whole. According to my data, in the last half of the nineteenth century, the prophets were also shamans or sages and some were both. The prophets were at the summit of the prestige hierarchy, but like the shamans and the sages they received little or no material compensations, and they performed the same tasks as others of their sex. The societies of the Selk'nam and the Haush, though highly individualistic and competitive, were, on this level, egalitarian.

The religion (mythology, shamanism, and rituals) can be analyzed in terms of a coherently articulated symbolic system. Though constantly modified, their religious system maintained a traditional structure and also the basic concepts that probably formed part of a millenarian tradition characteristic of other indigenous groups in America, and in Asia as well, and of archaic cultures the world around.

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ANNE CHAPMAN

SEMANTIC-ANALYTIC METHOD. See Study of Religion.

SEMANTICS conveniently divides into two branches, the theory of designation and/or denotation and the theory of meaning. The former constitutes *extensional*, the latter *intensional* semantics. Both branches are thus parts of the modern trivium of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, which is often called "logical semiotics" for short. Semiotics is in fact modern logic in full dress, and is thought by many, especially perhaps at Oxford University, to occupy a central place in the study of the liberal arts. Syntax is the theory of signs as such and how they are interrelated to form longer signs, phrases, sentences, texts, and so on. In semantics, signs are interrelated in one way or another with the objects for which they stand. And in pragmatics the user of language is brought in fundamentally, as well as the various relations that he or she bears to signs and combinations of signs in particular occasions of use.

Signs are often understood in a broader, nonlinguistic sense to allow for "natural" signs, human artifacts, and the like. Thus a weathercock is a sign that the wind is blowing in a certain direction, smoke is a sign of fire, a Stop sign on the highway is a sign to the driver, and so on. The study of nonlinguistic signs harks back to the medieval period and in the nineteenth century was given a considerable boost by the work of the American philosopher C. S. Peirce. Even so, it has not yet achieved the exactitude of logical semiotics and, pending such a development, remains somewhat controversial.

Designation is the fundamental relation between a sign and what it stands for. In the theory of meaning, much more is taken into account. Thus, in Frege's famous example, the phrases "the morning star" and "the evening star" designate the same object, the planet Venus, but differ considerably in meaning. What is meaning? No easy answer is forthcoming. In any adequate theory of it, however, account should surely be taken of the contexts, linguistic and nonlinguistic alike, in which signs or expressions are used, including, where needed, reference to the user.

A detailed history of semantical concepts, and of the broader domain of semiotical concepts, has not yet been written. Especially important here is the material in book 2 of Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine* and book 4 of Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences* that sustains the doctrine of sacramental theology even to the present day. The contributions of the Scholastic logicians also constitute a rich mine of material that has not yet been sufficiently studied from a modern point of view. Logi-

cal semiotics, including semantics, has an important role to play in the study of the languages of theology, both those of fundamental theory and of particular religions.

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R. M. MARTIN

SEMIOTICS. See *Study of Religion and Structuralism*.

SEN, KESHAB CHANDRA (1838–1884), Indian social and religious reformer. Sen represented for many the prototype of the Indian intellectual who adjusted to the intrusion of the West into Indian society in the second half of the nineteenth century. He graduated from Hindu College, Calcutta, in 1856, and shortly thereafter came under the influence of Debendranath Tagore, the leader of the Brāhmo Samāj. Sen became one of the most ardent advocates of social and religious change, arguing for the eradication of untouchability, the breaking of caste barriers, the education of women, and the ending of child marriage. He was also an advocate of vocational education as a means for improving the economic condition of the people. One of his innovations was the use of cheap, popular literature to spread his ideas; he started at least a dozen journals, including magazines for women, a children's paper, and a daily newspaper. It was, however, as an orator on religious themes and as an organizer of branches of the Brāhmo Samāj throughout India that he was best known.

In 1870 Sen went to England, where he met many of the great figures of the time, including John Stuart Mill, William Gladstone, and Queen Victoria. His popularity in England rested in part on two themes that became central to his preaching and writing. One was an emphasis on Christ as the greatest of religious teachers; the other was his declaration that the British conquest of India was intended by God to help India "in the path of moral, social, and political reformation." He was, however, one of the first to suggest that the West must also learn from India: "Let modern England teach hard

science and fact; let ancient India teach sweet poetry and sentiment."

Sen gradually came into conflict with Tagore and the older members of the Samāj, for whereas they insisted that it was a movement within Hinduism and did not involve a break with traditional values and customs, he argued that the Samāj was outside Hinduism and was meant to unite all people in a universal brotherhood. In 1866 he took many of its members into a new organization which he called the Brāhmo Samāj of India. In 1878 the group divided again when Sen, who had preached for years against child marriage, married his thirteen-year-old daughter to the Hindu prince of Cooch Behar, a small princely state. Many of Keshab's followers left him to form a new organization, the Sādhāran Brāhmo Samāj.

For years Sen had been studying the teachings of the world religions, and in 1881 he proclaimed what he called the New Dispensation, which was a synthesis of Hindu Tantrism, *bhakti*, and Christian rituals, with an emphasis on divine revelation. The New Dispensation was the successor, Sen declared, of the earlier revelations—the Hindu, the Jewish, the Christian. Another theme of his preaching during this period was that the image of mother was a better symbol for the divine than the image of father, since a mother is "tender-hearted and indulgent."

After his death in 1884 little remained of Sen's many enterprises, but his importance is to be seen in the enormous appeal of his views to his generation, particularly young people. His vision of a new spirituality that encompassed both Christianity and Hinduism made it possible for Indians to believe, as he put it, that there could be a "European Asia and an Asiatic Europe, a commingling of oriental and occidental ideas and principles" and that he had summoned "ancient India to come into modern India."

[See also Brāhmo Samāj.]

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AINSLIE T. EMBREE

SENG-CHAO (373–414), Chinese Buddhist monk of the Eastern Chin period (317–420) and scholar of the

first Chinese Mādhyamika tradition. According to the standard biography in the *Kao-seng chuan* (Biographies of Eminent Monks), Seng-chao was born in the vicinity of Ch'ang-an (modern Sian) and as a young man earned his living as a transcriber and copyist. Exposed in this way to the Chinese classics, he initially acquired a secular education. He developed a liking for the writings of Taoism, the *Tao-te ching* and the *Chuang-tzu*. However, his biography states that upon reading the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*, a text expressing the Buddhist concepts of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and nonduality, he was converted to Buddhism and became a monk. Although his reputation in the Buddhist community of his day was initially established as a debater, Seng-chao's mark on Chinese Buddhism and his stature as a leading Buddhist literary figure were fixed as a result of his association with the famed Kuchean translator of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist literature, Kumārajīva (344–413). From 401, when Kumārajīva arrived in Ch'ang-an, Seng-chao served as one of his personal disciples and translating assistants. A gifted stylist, the author of a commentary on the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* and the writer of prefaces to Indian *sūtras* and *sāstras*, Seng-chao was one of the most prolific Buddhist writers of his age. His fame as an independent thinker, however, rests primarily on four seminal essays, now collected as the *Chao lun* (The Treatises of Seng-chao): "Wisdom Is Not Knowledge," "Things Are Immutable," "The Emptiness of the Unreal," and "Nirvāṇa Is Nameless." Through these essays Seng-chao interpreted for his contemporaries the Mādhyamika teaching that Kumārajīva brought to China for the first time. Historically, the essays were formative in the thinking of the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) tradition during the sixth century, which later came to be known in East Asian Buddhism as the San-lun (Three-Treatise) tradition. These essays also show that Seng-chao, while remaining true to the core of Buddhist teaching, utilized the insights of Taoism to expand and clarify certain problems in Buddhist texts and, conversely, utilized Buddhist texts to answer fundamental problems posed for him in Taoist writings. His use of a basic Taoist paradigm of "origin and end" (*pen-mo*) and its variants (*pen-chi*, "root and trace," and its later cousin, *t'i-yung*, "essence and function") eventually became the basic framework for the analysis of Buddhist doctrine beginning in the Northern and Southern Dynasties period (420–589). Because of his innovative attempts to bridge Indian Buddhist and Chinese concepts and ideals, Seng-chao remains a pivotal figure in the transmission of Indian Buddhism to China as well as in the transformation of Buddhism into its Chinese form.

[See also Mādhyamika.]

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AARON K. KOSEKI

SEPTUAGINT. See Biblical Literature, article on Hebrew Scriptures.

SERAFIM OF SAROV (1759–1833), Russian Orthodox priest, monk, mystic, and renowned spiritual elder (starets); born 19 July 1759 in Kursk, central European Russia, and died 2 January 1833 at the Monastery of Sarov in the forests to the north. Serafim is regarded as the preeminent example of Eastern Orthodox spirituality in modern times. In a troubling time of westernization in Russia, he lived during and was himself part of a remarkable flowering of spirituality in Russian Orthodoxy centered around monastic communities such as Sarov and Optina, a spirituality that had deep roots in the Bible, the writings of the Greek fathers, the celebrated *Philokalia* (a collection of ascetic and mystical writings of the fourth to the fifteenth century), and the sacramental life of the Orthodox church. Serafim's impact on his contemporaries and his immense popularity with later generations won him canonization as a saint in 1903.

There is ample information about Serafim's life (including testimonies by eyewitnesses, fellow monks of Sarov, nuns of Diveevo Convent of which he was spiritual patron, and confidants such as N. Motovilov), but no critical edition of the primary sources has been published. Born Prokhor Moshnin, Serafim was attracted to the highly spiritual life of monasticism by virtue of a miraculous healing and other religious experiences in his youth. During a pilgrimage to the Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, he was advised by a starets to enter the Monastery of Sarov, at which he subsequently became a novice (1778), was later tonsured as monk Serafim (1786), and ordained a deacon in the same year. After

his ordination to the priesthood (1793), he embraced the life of a hermit in absolute simplicity and spent most of his remaining forty years in various degrees of seclusion both without and within the Monastery of Sarov. However, during the period from 1815 to 1825, he was led by what he regarded as divine revelation to welcome visitors and to give counsel to numerous people, whom he often greeted with the words "My joy!" and "Christ is risen!," and thus himself became an influential starets.

A man of profound prayer and rare spiritual gifts of discernment, healing, and prophecy, Serafim's presence was marked by radiant joy, peace, and love that does not seek its own. He was a child of traditional monasticism and yet "transcended monasticism" (Paul Evdokimoff). His spirituality was thoroughly biblical, trinitarian, and Christocentric, based on the Jesus Prayer and the reading of the Gospels. Although he adopted austere monastic disciplines, he counseled others to practice ascetic labors according to their strength and to make the flesh a friend in performing virtues. He valued devotional practices and good works, but he taught that the essence of the Christian life, which he insisted was one and the same for all, was the experience of the grace of the Holy Spirit enkindling the heart with divine fire.

His brief work, *Instructions*, consisting of notes set down by the monks of Sarov, reflects the traditional teachings of the Eastern church fathers on such subjects as prayer, guarding the heart from evil, solitude, silence, and the active and contemplative life. His most sublime expression of Orthodox spirituality, as the remarkable *Conversation with N. Motovilov* shows, was his own personal testimony to the radiant presence of the Holy Spirit.

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THEODORE STYLIANOPOULOS

SERGII (1867–1944), born Ivan Nikolaevich Stragorodskii; Russian Orthodox theologian and patriarch of Moscow. Sergii was one of the leading advocates of church reform in tsarist Russia. Among his earlier writings are *The Question of Personal Salvation* (Moscow, 1895), *Eternal Life as the Highest Good* (Moscow, 1895), and contributions to *Meetings of the Religious Philosophical Society* (Saint Petersburg, 1901–1903) and to *Responses of the Diocesan Bishops* (Saint Petersburg, 1905–1906). In 1927 Sergii formally acknowledged the U.S.S.R. as the true motherland of the Orthodox people and was enthroned as patriarch in 1943 with the approval of Joseph Stalin.

Sergii's purpose in accommodating himself to the Soviet regime was to enable the church to achieve at least a minimal visibility during the time of the Soviet holocaust. In signing the controversial Declaration of Loyalty in 1927, he agreed to publish a clear and unambiguous statement of loyalty to the Soviet regime, to exclude from church administration those hierarchs and clergy whom the government deemed unacceptable, as well as those who had emigrated abroad, and to establish defined relations with organs of the Soviet government. His declaration immediately caused confusion and schism within the church in Russia, for millions of the faithful, together with many leading bishops and clergy who were not yet in prison, refused to accept it.

The regime did not repay Sergii with freedom for the church. Instead, the church was subjected to repeated waves of persecution (1929–1930, 1932–1934, and 1936–1939), each more devastating than the last. By 1940, when Russia lay broken and exhausted by the Stalinist revolution, only a few of the prerevolutionary churches remained open and only a fraction of their clergy remained alive and at liberty.

Sergii gambled that the Soviet system would either collapse or moderate enough to permit the church to function as an autonomous institution in accordance with canonical norms. In the meantime, he publicly denied that the church was being persecuted and became a subservient supporter of Soviet propaganda.

Soviet attitudes toward the church softened in 1939 and 1940 for two reasons. In 1939, as a result of the Stalin-Hitler pact of mutual nonaggression, the U.S.S.R. annexed eastern Poland, which contained a substantial Orthodox population. Persecution diminished as the regime sought to utilize the church in integrating the newly acquired population into the U.S.S.R. Further, in 1941, Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. and quickly overran large land masses. In the occupied areas the church speedily revived, and Stalin

knew that Sergii was the only one who might be counted upon to defend Moscow's interests behind German lines.

In 1942, Sergii published *The Truth about Religion in Russia* in which he denied that there was any persecution in the U.S.S.R. In September 1943, he was summoned by Stalin and granted permission to formally reestablish the patriarchal administration. Churches were reopened on the Soviet side of the war frontier, and plans were laid to reestablish a network of seminaries and theological academies. Most of the surviving schismatic bishops recognized Sergii's administration before his death in May 1944. Although he died before the details of his agreement with Stalin could be accomplished, Sergii had outwaited the regime and had ensured a period of revival and stabilization for the church that lasted until the outbreak of the persecution by Khrushchev (1959–1964).

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JAMES W. CUNNINGHAM

SERGII OF RADONEZH (1322?–1392), Russian Orthodox monastic saint; founder of Holy Trinity–Saint Sergii Monastery (in present-day Zagorsk). The life of Sergii is known largely from two fifteenth-century hagiographical accounts, supplemented by Russian medieval chronicles. Sergii himself wrote nothing.

Sergii (in secular life known as Bartholomew) was born in the principality of Rostov, but early moved with his family to the Muscovite village of Radonezh. In search of the ascetic life, he persuaded his already tonsured brother Stephen to venture with him into the neighboring forests. The severity of their life as hermits caused Stephen to withdraw within the year. For the succeeding two or three years (c. 1345–1348), Sergii tested his vocation alone. However, news of the solitary spread, and he attracted a company of independent monks around the wooden Trinity Church he had

erected with his brother. In about 1353 Sergii accepted abbacy and the priesthood.

Soon Sergii received a missive from the patriarch of Constantinople urging him to establish a community rule and thus to transform an essentially idiorrhythmic monastery into a cenobitic one. Although Sergii's monastery may not have been the first Russian monastery of the early Muscovite period to accept such a transformation (c. 1356), it was to be the most influential in so doing. It provided the model (and the founding fathers) for thirty such monasteries in Sergii's lifetime, and perhaps five times that number by the middle of the following century.

The establishment of community life at the Trinity Monastery encouraged not only its spiritual but also its economic development; perhaps for this reason the Muscovite state acted both as Sergii's patron and his client. Sergii's spiritual authority was seen to fit him for several demanding diplomatic tasks. The blessing that he gave Grand Prince Dmitrii (1380) to proceed against the Mongol horde acted as a vital spur to the Muscovite troops and helped to ensure their victory in the battle of Kulikovo, a watershed in Russian history.

But Sergii cannot be described simply as a political saint. When he was offered elevation to a bishop's (and in due course to the metropolitan's) chair he refused it firmly. Regardless of office held or proffered he continued to dress in the roughest of robes and persist with the most menial of tasks. His humility was deep-seated: it informed his prayer and predisposed him to visions. These visions were several and various. A number were centered on light or fire, and two of these were linked with the celebration of the Eucharist. But the one most carefully described in the lives of Sergii involved the appearance of the Mother of God, who assured Sergii that his monastery was under her direct protection.

Such visions had no precedent in Russian hagiography, and even elsewhere precise parallels are difficult to find. It may be that they are among the first fruits of that school of mystical (hesychast) prayer which was beginning to make inroads into Russia from Mount Athos in Greece.

Sergii died in 1392. His relics were exposed for veneration in 1422. The monastery (soon to be renamed the Trinity–Saint Sergii Monastery) expanded, and by 1561 it was designated first among all Russian monastic communities. Catherine the Great confiscated much of its great landholdings, but it was the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 that challenged its very existence. However, the revival of church life during the war years (1941–1945) eventually promoted the reopening of the monastery and the restoration of the relics to the

church (1946). The tomb of Saint Sergii once again attracts countless pilgrims year after year.

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SERGEI HACKEL

SERPENTS. See Snakes; see also Dragons.

SERRA, JUNIPERO (1713–1784), Spanish founder of Franciscan missions in California. Educated at the Royal and Pontifical University of Palma in Spain, Serra was a tenured professor of philosophy there when in 1749 he volunteered to go to Mexico as a missionary. There he served his apprenticeship among the Pamé Indians of Sierra Gorda (1750–1758) and in Baja California (1767–1769).

In 1769, when Spain decided to occupy Alta California to prevent Russian or English encroachments, Serra established his first mission there at San Diego, on 16 July. In all, he began nine missions on carefully selected sites after first obtaining the consent of the natives concerned.

After a careful survey of the territory from San Diego to San Francisco, he formed a plan for the development of the whole area. It was a vision not of isolated missions and military presidios but of an interrelated system of ports, presidios, towns, and missions. In 1773 Serra traveled the 1,500 miles to Mexico City to consult with the viceroy, Antonio María Bucareli y Ursúa. In a series of meetings, Serra discussed his plan and his needs with Bucareli and his staff. At their suggestion he wrote a brief in thirty-two sections. Serra's vision was to become the catalyst of the official program.

First, there was a need to regulate relations among the ruling military, the missionaries, the Indians, and the townspeople. This regulation was formulated in the Reglamento Echeveste (July 1773), which was to become the basic law of the state of California. Next, a supply system had to be invented, with the procurement and shipping office in Mexico through the port of

San Blas, for a fleet to transport people, animals, and goods to and from California. Such a system was established by the end of the year 1773. Serra also needed mules and oxen to put his California society on wheels. He was granted 150 mules; it was hoped that more animals would be shipped on the hoof via an overland route, then being explored. In January 1776 the first overland expedition arrived at Mission San Gabriel from Tubac, Arizona, bringing 244 people together with provisions and herds of horses and cattle. Later arrivals permitted the founding of four towns, among them San Francisco and Los Angeles.

Above all, Serra needed role models for his neophytes, to train them in the crafts and in Christian living. Five artisans were granted to each mission for this purpose. Only married couples would be accepted as settlers: this set an example of a Christian family as the foundation of a stable society. The money for all these expenditures was to come from the Pious Fund of expelled Jesuits. California remained within the Spanish empire until it became part of the United States in 1850. In 1931, the state of California placed a statue of Serra in Washington, D.C.

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ANTONINE TIBESAR, O.F.M.

SERVETUS, MICHAEL (1511?–1553), born Miguel Serveto; Spanish physician and theologian. Servetus was born in Villanueva, Spain, in 1509 or 1511. During his legal studies in Toulouse, he became convinced that the dogma of the Trinity is not based on scripture. Thus in 1531 he published *De Trinitatis erroribus*, in which he argued that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God by nature (not by adoption), and that he is God by grace, whereas the Father is God by nature. Servetus emphasized a distinction between the Word and the Son. The Word had existed from eternity as one mode in which God expresses himself. When the Word was completely incarnated in the man Jesus, the Son came into being. The Holy Spirit is another mode in which God expresses himself among humans, but it is not a separate person. Servetus believed that scripture speaks of the three persons of the Trinity as the varying appearances of God. This heretical view has been called modalistic trinitarianism, with a subordinationist Christology. Both in *De Trinitatis erroribus* and in

later works, Servetus drew on passages from the ante-Nicene fathers Irenaeus and Tertullian to support his views.

Servetus's book aroused so much opposition that in 1532 he published *Dialogorum de Trinitate*, in which he made some conciliatory changes without altering his basic conclusions. Pursued by the Inquisition, he assumed the name Michel de Villeneuve and found work as an editor in Lyons, France. In 1538 he began medical studies in Paris, upon completion of which he became physician to the archbishop of Vienne, France, still under his assumed name.

In 1546 Servetus sent parts of an early draft of *Christianismi restitutio* to John Calvin; the revised book was published anonymously in 1553. A copy of this work fell into the hands of a Catholic named Guillaume de Trie, who suspected that Servetus was its author, and soon the Inquisition had arrested both Servetus and the printer. Servetus escaped but was apprehended in Geneva. He was tried, condemned for antitrinitarianism and opposition to infant baptism, and burned at the stake on 27 October 1553 at Champel, near Geneva.

In *Christianismi restitutio*, Servetus modifies and supplements the views expressed in his previous works. He adds an emanationist philosophical context, a millenarianist historical view, and a celestial flesh Christology. In his emanationist philosophy, he sees God as above light, above essence, and as describable only in negative terms. According to Servetus, God relates to the world through a continuum progressing from God's hiddenness to his participation in the world. Servetus uses light symbolism to describe this continuum. Everything in this unfolding emanation is part of God, including the Logos (God's internal reason), Wisdom (ideas which are the exemplars of things), and the Word (through which God made the visible world appear). The Word forms a bridge between the invisible world and the visible world, for it is both immaterial and physical. Thus the essence of God is in everything. This view is not pantheistic, for in it the world is dependent on God for its being; yet God in his being extends beyond the world—God is not dependent on the world.

The millenarian theme appears in the conflict between God's modalistic presence in Christ and Satan's modalistic presence in the Antichrist. This conflict, pursued throughout five ages of world history, began in the garden of Eden when God's creation, including humankind, came under the control of the serpent, and God withdrew. The conflict continued when, after the incarnation, the Antichrist came to the papal throne, whereupon Christ withdrew from the world. All Christian history since the time of Constantine has been under the

reign of the Antichrist. In the imminent fifth age, the archangel Michael will destroy Satan, releasing Christ's power.

Prior to the incarnation Christ was prefigured in the Word. In the incarnation the divine nature mixed with (not united with) Christ's human nature, the mortal body of the man Jesus. Christ came through Mary, but he did not receive Mary's substance, for his divine nature and his human nature or flesh were both of heavenly origin. After the resurrection Christ was again the Word with a celestial nature, that of God's heavenly substance.

All persons receive a first grace, which comes through the air as the spirit of God (to be distinguished from the Holy Spirit). Receiving the first grace makes it possible to live in accordance with codes of morality but is not sufficient for divinization. Christ's celestial nature makes possible a second grace, by which man is regenerated and physically transformed.

Servetus relates these themes to his view of the sacraments. In baptism the soul receives illumination, a wisdom from the Holy Spirit that combats Satan's serpentine wisdom. Baptism is a covenant with God and a commitment on the part of the person; hence it is not for infants. The Lord's Supper is a sacrament involving the real presence (not only a symbolic presence) of Christ's celestial flesh in the bread and wine. This sacrament effects in man both a spiritual and a physical change. Man is changed to the nature of God, divinized.

Christianismi restitutio contains Servetus's discovery of the pulmonary circulation of the blood, a result of his medical dissections. This discovery is presented in theological terms to illustrate how each person receives God's spirit just as air circulates through the body. (A thirteenth-century Arab, Ibn al-Nafis, preceded Servetus in his medical discovery, but Servetus's description was more explicit.)

Despite the attempts by the publisher and the Roman Catholic Inquisition to destroy every copy of *Christianismi restitutio*, a few copies survived. Servetus's execution gave rise to an important controversy among Protestant church leaders over religious toleration, initiated by the publication in 1554 of *De haereticis, an sint persequendi*, written principally by the French Protestant theologian Sébastien Chateillon under a pseudonym, and by other publications. Servetus's antitrinitarian views influenced prominent leaders in the antitrinitarian movements in Poland and Transylvania, but these leaders did not accept his emanationist philosophy or his celestial flesh Christology. These latter themes were not among the sections of *Christianismi restitutio* that were reprinted in 1569 in *De regno Christi*.

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JOHN C. GODBEY

SETH. In Egyptian mythology Seth figures prominently, usually as a villain. He was the son of Geb and brother of Osiris. Jealous of Osiris' rule of the earth, he tricked and slew him, dismembered his body, and scattered the parts. Isis, the sister of both and consort of Osiris, bore Osiris' son, Horus, who had to avenge the death of his father. According to late mythological stories, the case was judged by the tribunal of gods with some contests that showed that the cleverness of Horus was certainly more than a match for the strength of Seth. From earlier mythical allusions in mortuary texts, we know that Horus emasculated Seth and lost his eye in the conflict. For his role in this drama, Seth became a symbol for evil, trickery, blundering, and blustering. He was identified with the Mesopotamian storm god and was a supporter of Egypt's Asian enemies.

The animal representation of Seth is readily recognizable from its tall, upright, flat-topped ears and long, up-

right tail divided at the top, but it is not certainly identifiable. It usually appears to be some sort of hound or jackal, but is occasionally more like a hippopotamus, a pig, or an ass. If one single animal were intended, perhaps it would be a feral hog.

From earliest times there seems to have been some connection between Seth and Ash, a Libyan deity. Even before the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt there were probably shrines to Seth in both south and north. Ombos was his principal cult center, but it has provided almost no information about the god or his cult. He is usually associated with the north, and his defeat by Horus represents the conquest of Lower Egypt (the north) by Upper Egypt (the south). The myth of the conflict between Horus and Seth may also have been associated with a struggle over the right of succession, that from father to son winning out over that from brother to brother.

Apparently Seth was not always an evil figure in Egyptian history. During the second dynasty one king identified himself with Seth rather than Horus, and another identified himself with both gods. Later the kings of the fifteenth and sixteenth dynasties were regarded as Sethian, but this is easily explained by their foreign origin. In the New Kingdom Seth was regularly shown as one of the gods accompanying the sun god, Re, on his bark sailing through the day and night skies. In this case Seth clearly assists Re, and the evil being to be opposed by spells or force is Apopis, the serpent who threatens to devour the sun. In the nineteenth dynasty, not only were divisions of the Egyptian army named for Seth, but two kings also took Sety as their throne name.

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LEONARD H. LESKO

SETON, ELIZABETH (1774-1821), first American-born Christian saint, first founder of a sisterhood in the United States. Elizabeth Ann Bayley Seton was born, probably in New York City, the second daughter of Richard Bayley by his first wife, Catherine Charlton. Little is known of her formal education save that she attended a school called Mama Pompelion's, learning to play the piano and to speak French.

On 25 January 1794, at the age of nineteen, she married William Magee Seton, a young New York mer-

chant. The union produced five children. In 1797 she cooperated with Isabella Marshall Graham in forming a society to aid destitute widowed mothers. In 1800 she came under the influence of John Henry Hobart, an assistant at Trinity (Episcopal) Church in New York City, and under his guidance her spiritual life deepened perceptibly.

The next nine years tested these spiritual resources to the full. Her husband's business failed, along with his health. He died while on a trip to Italy in 1803. While waiting for passage back to New York, she was befriended by Antonio and Filippo Filicchi and their wives, who introduced her to Roman Catholicism. On her return to New York on 4 June 1804, she entered a period of religious indecision, torn between the entreaties of Hobart and her Protestant friends and relatives, and the urgings of the Filicchis and the American Catholic clergy enlisted by them to sway her. On 14 March 1805 she became a Roman Catholic.

Unable to earn support for herself and her five children in New York, she agreed to the proposal made by William Valentine DuBourg that she come to Baltimore to start a Catholic school for girls. Having already placed her two sons in Georgetown Academy, she embarked for Baltimore with her three daughters on 9 June 1808. Her year there as mistress of the Paca Street School confirmed her vocation to educate girls and found a community, the Sisters of Charity of Saint Joseph. In June–July 1809, she moved both the school and the sisterhood to Emmitsburg, Maryland, where she spent the remainder of her life.

In Emmitsburg, Saint Joseph's School for boarders from more prosperous families soon furnished sufficient income to extend free schooling to needy girls of the local parish, which later earned Seton the title "foundress of the parochial school system in the United States." Adopting a modified rule of the Daughters of Charity of Saint Vincent de Paul in 1812, her sisters rapidly extended their work to include nursing the sick, caring for orphans, and aiding the poor. The community spread to Philadelphia (1814), New York (1817), and Baltimore (1821) under her guidance. Since her death on 4 January 1821, her work has been spread by her spiritual daughters not only at Emmitsburg but also by the New York Sisters of Charity of Mount Saint Vincent-on-the-Hudson, the Cincinnati Sisters of Charity of Mount Saint Joseph, the New Jersey Sisters of Charity of Convent Station, the Pennsylvania Sisters of Charity of Seton Hill at Greensburg, and, in Nova Scotia, the Sisters of Charity of Halifax.

On 28 February 1940, the Roman Congregation of Rites formally introduced her cause for canonization.

On 14 December 1961, the validity of two miracles was confirmed, and on 17 March 1963, John XXIII beatified her. On 14 September 1975, Paul VI proclaimed her Saint Elizabeth Ann Seton.

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ANNABELLE M. MELVILLE

SEVENERS. See Shiism, article on Ismā'īliyah.

SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISM. The origins of Seventh-day Adventism run back to the interdenominational Millerite movement in the United States in the early 1840s, when William Miller, a Baptist lay minister and farmer, sought to rekindle a second awakening by predicting that Christ would soon return to earth. On the basis of *Daniel* 8:14 ("Unto two thousand and three hundred days; then shall the sanctuary be cleansed"), he calculated that the end would come "about the year 1843," two thousand and three hundred years after Artaxerxes of Persia issued a decree to rebuild Jerusalem. Following a series of failed time-settings, Millerites fixed their hopes for the second advent of Christ on 22 October 1844, the Day of Atonement, which, according to a Jewish calendar, fell on the tenth day of the seventh month. The "great disappointment" that resulted from this miscalculation splintered the movement into several factions. The majority, including Miller, admitted their exegetical error but continued to expect Christ's imminent return; eventually they coalesced into the

Evangelical Adventist and Advent Christian churches. A much smaller number embraced the suggestion of Hiram Edson, an upstate New York farmer, that only the event, not the date, had been wrong: “that instead of our High Priest *coming out* of the Most Holy of the heavenly sanctuary to come to this earth on the tenth day of the seventh month, at the end of the 2,300 days, he for the first time *entered* on that day the second apartment of that sanctuary and that he had a work to perform in the Most Holy before coming to this earth.” Millerites of this persuasion formed the nucleus of what, in the early 1860s, evolved into the Seventh-day Adventist church.

The Formative Years: 1844–1863. Edson’s sanctuary doctrine, which held that Christ in 1844 inaugurated a new era in the history of salvation, became one of the most distinctive and central tenets of Adventist theology. However, other beliefs, for example, in the “shut door,” the seventh-day sabbath, and the gift of prophecy, brought them their greatest notoriety and earned them the name “sabbatarian and shut-door” Adventists.

Early beliefs that 22 October marked the date when God shut the “door of mercy” on all who had rejected the Millerite message gradually gave rise to an open-door theology and to evangelization. The observance of Saturday as sabbath, as required by the Ten Commandments and practiced by the Seventh Day Baptists, became the most obvious symbol of Seventh-day Adventist distinctiveness and served as a means by which legalistic members sought to attain the higher morality expected of God’s people at the close of history.

Shortly after the “great disappointment,” Ellen Gould Harmon, a sickly, introverted adolescent ecstatic from Portland, Maine, began having visionary experiences that validated the sanctuary, shut-door, and sabbath doctrines. The Millerite movement produced numerous mystics and trance mediums, and the believers in Portland were especially infamous for their “*continual* introduction of *visionary nonsense*”; thus Ellen Harmon would probably have been lost in the crowd of enthusiasts had she not been discovered by James White, a young Adventist preacher and teacher, who became her protector, her promoter, and, in 1846, her husband. Together James and Ellen White built the Seventh-day Adventist church, James serving as organizer and entrepreneur, Ellen as exhorter and visionary. The Adventist brethren, under James’s leadership, functioned as the sect’s theologians and biblical exegetes, frequently relying on Ellen’s “gift of prophecy” to support their doctrinal positions. Committed to *sola scriptura* biblicism, Adventists regarded Ellen White’s charismatic role as confirmatory rather than initiatory; her testimonies re-

lated to the Bible as a “lesser light to the greater light.” Despite sporadic questioning of her authority, even by her husband, her visions helped to identify Adventists as God’s end-time people and thus assured her of a singularly precious place in Adventist history.

In many respects Seventh-day Adventism developed as a typical nineteenth-century American sect, characterized by millenarianism, biblicism, restorationism, and legalism. Its Old Testament orientation, its self-image as the chosen people, its sabbatarianism, and its sense of cosmic destiny all betrayed the influence of eighteenth-century American Puritanism, while its Arminianism, its doctrine of soul-sleep (in contrast to the eternal punishment of Calvinism), its concern for religious liberty, and its adoption of medical and educational reforms revealed it to be also a product of antebellum evangelicalism. Adventists, however, especially during their early years, stressed their distinctiveness and separateness rather than their many points of similarity with the religious landscape of nineteenth-century America.

By 1850 sabbatarian Adventists, still looking for the soon appearance of Christ, composed a “scattered flock” of about two hundred loosely structured sectarians who sought to restore such primitive Christian practices as foot-washing, greeting with the “holy kiss,” and calling each other “brother” and “sister.” As time passed uneventfully, their radical millenarianism, which had led some to predict the end in 1845, 1847, and 1851, gave way to a more realistic attitude. As early as 1848 Ellen White in a vision had seen Adventism spreading “like streams of light . . . clear round the world,” a scene that implied long-range involvement in earthly affairs. In 1850 her husband began editing *The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald*, which became the official Adventist organ. In 1855 the Whites moved on to the fresher evangelistic pastures of southern Michigan, where the church eventually enjoyed enough material prosperity to elicit, in 1857, a notable jeremiad from the prophetess on its “Laodicean condition.”

By the late 1850s the institutionalization of Seventh-day Adventism was well under way. In 1859 the Adventists adopted a plan of “systematic benevolence” to support a clergy; the next year they selected the name Seventh-day Adventist; by 1863 there were 125 churches with about 3,500 members. That year they organized a General Conference and invited James White to serve as their first president, an honor he temporarily declined. In 1866, in the wake of an epidemic of sickness among church leaders and Ellen White’s discovery of the virtues of the “water cure” and vegetarianism, the Adventists established a sanatorium at Battle Creek, Michigan—the Western Health Reform Institute—and

began publishing the *Health Reformer*, a monthly magazine.

Years of Transition: 1863–1915. The years following the formal organization of the Adventist church and its emergence as an established sect saw American Protestantism split into modernist and fundamentalist parties, divided by such issues as evolution and higher criticism. Not surprisingly, Adventists in this period generally, but idiosyncratically, followed the fundamentalists. Because the Adventists observed the seventh-day sabbath as a memorial of creation and because Ellen White insisted on a recent six-day creation, they rejected all compromises with evolutionary biology and geology. They also rejected higher criticism in favor of biblical inerrancy, but they displayed less concern about the integrity of the scriptures than about the writings of Ellen White, whose apotheosis occurred during this period. For years Ellen White had lived in the shadow of her husband, providing visionary endorsement for the opinions of the founding fathers of Adventism. But after James's death in 1881 she assumed a more assertive role, directing the activities of a younger generation of male leaders, who quickly learned to clear matters of doctrine, development, and policy with the prophetess. By the time of her death in 1915 she had, despite disclaimers to the contrary, become the real authority for Adventists in matters of behavior as well as belief.

Acceptance of Ellen White's prophetic role set Adventists apart from other fundamentalists, as did their peculiar doctrines regarding the sanctuary and the sabbath. In fact, nothing distinguished Adventists as a separate religious community as much as their sabbath-keeping, which led them to distrust not only evolutionists (who undermined belief in a literal sabbath) but Catholics (whom they blamed for changing the sabbath from Saturday to Sunday), labor unionists (who they feared would force them to work on Saturday), and blue-law-minded evangelical Christians (who, the prophetess said, would pass a national law requiring Sunday observance). Efforts to enact such legislation in the 1880s, coinciding as they did with hard-labor sentences for up to fifty church members who violated blue laws in the South, proved to the Adventists that they were indeed living in the "last days."

Adventist theology shifted in the 1880s, when two West Coast editors, Ellet J. Waggoner and Alonzo T. Jones, both still in their thirties, challenged the legalistic emphasis that had come to characterize the sect. In opposition to General Conference leaders, who maintained that salvation depended upon observing the Ten Commandments, especially the fourth, Waggoner and Jones followed evangelical Christians in arguing that

righteousness came by accepting Christ, not by keeping the law. At a pivotal general conference in 1888 Ellen White broke with the Battle Creek administrators—and the view of her late husband—to endorse this controversial "new light," a move that symbolized her "coming out" as the Adventists' matriarch. But despite her pronouncements in favor of "righteousness by faith," the issue of grace versus law remained a sensitive one within Adventism.

For decades Adventists confined their evangelistic efforts almost exclusively to North America. In the early 1870s, however, church leaders became convinced that they had an obligation to carry their message "into all the world" (*Mk.* 16:15), and in 1874 they sent J. N. Andrews, a former General Conference president, to Switzerland as the first Adventist missionary. Other appointments followed in quick succession, first to the large white, Christian populations of Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, later to the nonwhite peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. By 1900 the Adventists were supporting nearly five hundred foreign missionaries, and over 15 percent of the more than seventy-five thousand Adventists lived outside North America. In part to provide for the growing needs of its foreign missions, as well as to shield its youth from worldly influences, the church developed an extensive educational system. By the second half of the twentieth century Adventists were operating one of the largest Protestant school systems in the world.

To train medical personnel for service at home and abroad, Adventists in 1895 opened the American Medical Missionary College, with campuses in Battle Creek and Chicago. The school's dominant force was Dr. John Harvey Kellogg, a former protégé of the Whites. In his mid-twenties Kellogg became superintendent of the Western Health Reform Institute (later Battle Creek Sanitarium) and after 1893 headed the Medical Missionary and Benevolent Association, the Adventist body responsible for operating medical institutions around the world. By the early twentieth century the association's two thousand workers considerably outnumbered General Conference employees, an imbalance that aggravated the friction between the imperious and imperialistic Dr. Kellogg and the equally ambitious ministers who ran the General Conference. In 1906 the latter arranged for the doctor and his cohorts to be disfellowshipped for questioning the authority of Ellen White, thus for the first time making the acceptance of her testimonies a "test of fellowship." When Kellogg, the most prominent Adventist in the world, left the church, he took the medical college and Battle Creek Sanitarium with him, forcing loyalists in 1909 to open an orthodox medical school, the College of Medical Evangelists

(now part of Loma Linda University), in southern California.

In the years since the Whites moved their fledgling church to Michigan, Battle Creek had grown into the administrative, publishing, medical, and educational center of Adventism. Such centralization and concentration of power concerned Ellen White, who recommended dismantling the Battle Creek colony. As a result, Battle Creek College (now Andrews University) was moved in 1902 to rural southwestern Michigan and administrative and publishing activities were moved to the outskirts of Washington, D.C., which became international headquarters.

Contemporary Adventism. In 1915 Ellen White died, leaving a church of more than 136,000 members. By 1980 membership had swelled to nearly 3.5 million, roughly 85 percent of whom lived outside of North America. Despite the preponderance of third-world believers, and the fact that recent growth in North America had come to a great extent from Hispanics and blacks, the administrative and economic power of the church remained largely in the hands of white, male leaders. In the mid-1940s the General Conference created segregated black conferences in North America, but it later rejected demands for separate unions that accompanied the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Similarly, as the feminist movement gathered momentum in the 1970s, Adventist women, long relied upon for cheap labor, began demanding equal pay for equal work—but won their case only after resorting to the courts.

As their church grew and prospered, Adventists felt increasingly uncomfortable with their sectarian identity. Thus they were greatly cheered in the 1950s when such prominent evangelicals as Donald G. Barnhouse and Walter R. Martin, after studying Adventist beliefs, certified them to be Christians rather than cultists. Many Adventists, nevertheless, continued to live in tension with the church's teachings on the sanctuary and the authority of Ellen White. Dissident voices became increasingly audible in the 1960s, especially after a group of Adventist academics and professionals in 1967 created the independent Association of Adventist Forums (AAF) and began publishing a lively journal, *Spec-trum*. During the 1970s and early 1980s Adventism was torn by claims of Adventist scholars that they had uncovered evidence that the writings of the prophetess not only contained historical and scientific errors but in many instances paralleled the prose of other authors—discoveries that forced a rethinking of White's role in the community. During the same period an Australian biblical scholar, Desmond Ford, announced to an AAF

group that the church's distinctive view of the sanctuary derived more from White than from the Bible and that it infected Adventism with an unhealthy and unbiblical legalism. Although Ford and a number of his ministerial colleagues were promptly defrocked for their heresy, they still effected a subtle recasting of the sanctuary doctrine, orienting it more toward the atonement than toward last-day events and bringing it more into conformity with evangelical Protestantism. Thus as Adventists approached the last years of the twentieth century, they continued to move haltingly along the path from radical millenarian sect to conventional denomination.

[See also the biography of Ellen White.]

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tion upon which it is based; and Ronald L. Numbers's *Prophecy of Health: A Study of Ellen G. White* (New York, 1976), a critical analysis of White's health-related activities.

JONATHAN M. BUTLER and RONALD L. NUMBERS

SEVERUS OF ANTIOCH (c. 465–538), rhetorician, theologian, and monophysite patriarch of Antioch (512–518). Severus was born in Apollonia, Thrace (modern-day Sozopol, Bulgaria), most likely in 465. He studied philosophy in Alexandria and rhetoric in Berytus (present-day Beirut), where, under the influence of Zacharias the Scholastic, he also acquired an interest in religious questions. After his baptism in Tripoli in 488, Severus became a monk at the monastery of Peter of Oberian, at Maiouma, near Gaza. In an attempt to live a more ascetic life, he left the monastery for the desert. But this soon proved harmful to his health, so he eventually returned to Maiouma.

There he established his own monastery and was ordained presbyter and archimandrite. The monophysite monks sent him to Constantinople in 508 to protest the subversive activities of the Orthodox monk Niphalius, who had managed to turn the Maiouma monks against Severus. Once in Constantinople, Severus gained the favor of the emperor Anastasius I (491–518) for the persecuted monophysite monks. Severus bided his time in Constantinople writing polemical works against the Council of Chalcedon. It was during this period that he wrote his most important work, the *Philalethes*.

In 512 Severus left Constantinople for Antioch where he was subsequently elected patriarch. As patriarch he attempted to strengthen monophysitism through the election of bishops, but his efforts failed. The death of Anastasius I in 518 precipitated a drastic change in ecclesiastical policy. With the ascendancy of the pro-Chalcedonian emperor Justin I (518–527), monophysitism lost favor, and Severus was eventually deposed as patriarch and expelled from Antioch. Severus fled to the Monastery of Ennaton in Egypt and lived for a time with Timothy IV, the monophysite patriarch of Alexandria. He encouraged the Copts at Ennaton to oppose the orthodox patriarchs. Severus also came into conflict with the former follower, Julian of Halicarnassus, whom he had known since his first visit to Constantinople in 508, over his colleague's extreme monophysitism. Severus was an intelligent thinker who sought a middle ground between the orthodox position and monophysitism.

In 535 Severus received (through the ministrations of the empress Theodora) an invitation from the emperor Justinian to come to Constantinople; there he worked

with the patriarch Anthimus in an effort to restore monophysitism. Opposition arose to their proposals, and Anthimus was deposed and Severus condemned by the Synod of Constantinople (536).

He was once again forced to flee to Egypt, where he continued to write until his death in Alexandria in 538. Jacobite Syrians and the Copts venerate him as a saint; his feast day is celebrated on 8 February.

Severus wrote a great number of works in Greek, but only a small portion of them is extant. A homily is preserved under the name of Gregory of Nyssa (*Patrologia Graeca* 46.627–652). Most of his writings are preserved in Syriac, such as the *Philalethes*, in which Severus refutes 244 chapters from the work of Cyril of Alexandria. He also wrote five treatises against Julian of Halicarnassus; three discourses against the orthodox patriarch Grammaticus; four letters against the extreme monophysite Sergius; and two letters against the orthodox Niphalius. A collection of his letters has been preserved as well as the homilies he delivered on various feasts. He is incorrectly identified as the author of a Syriac anaphora. Many liturgical hymns are also attributed to him, and he is regarded by many as the author of the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius). Many modern scholars have concluded that his teachings approximate those of Cyril of Alexandria. He continues to influence the thought of non-Chalcedonian Syrians and Copts.

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THEODORE ZISSIS

Translated from Greek by Philip M. McGhee

SEXUALITY. [This entry consists of two articles. The first, An Overview, treats the valorization of sexuality in various religious traditions. The second, Sexual Rites in

Europe, is a discussion of the incorporation, both actual and alleged, of sexual rites in the religious ritual of European esoteric traditions.]

An Overview

In many archaic and traditional societies, sexuality is imbued with religious significance. Myths and rituals exhibiting overt sexual symbolism are often concerned with fertility, both on a cosmic and human level; they are associated with certain religious conceptions, such as divine androgyny, or with the reintegration of the primordial, beatific state that existed before the creation of the world and its social institutions and moral order.

Female sexuality and fertility were important concepts even in the earliest sedentary agricultural societies, which appeared in the Mediterranean region around 7000 BCE. With the development of agriculture, gender roles were differentiated and became more specialized. The question of whether preliterate cultures were aware of the causal relationship between sexual intercourse and pregnancy is still controversial. However, one finds a recurrent identification between woman and furrow (soil), man (phallus) and plow, and intercourse and the act of plowing. Thus human sexuality was associated with the fertility of the natural order. [See *Yoni and Phallus*.]

One can distinguish several general trends in religious attitudes toward sexuality. A "positive" or "naturalistic" attitude may manifest itself in fertility rituals or ritual orgies; a "negative" one, in asceticism and techniques of sexual self-control like those practiced by the Taoists of ancient China. [See *Virginity*.] Sexuality may also be perceived as a means for spiritual development, as in the Hindu and Buddhist Tantric tradition. [See *Tantrism*.]

The sacred character of the ritual orgy is especially evident in some preliterate cultures, where collective rituals followed by intercourse illustrate the religious value of sexual activity. The Aranda and other tribes from central and northwestern Australia practice brief intervals of ritual orgy, during which all sexual proscriptions are suspended. The Aranda believe that they thus return to the freedom and beatitude of their mythical ancestors. Likewise, in Arnhem Land, initiations into the secret cult of the Kunapipi (Gunabibi) emphasize the sacrality of sexual experience and the mystery of feminine fecundity. The final rituals consist of a ceremonial exchange of wives. Ritual license is believed to establish goodwill, friendship, and group cohesiveness.

Also for the Ngaju Dayak of Borneo, sexuality has a

sacred character. According to their mythology, the world was created by a godhead conceived as two divine adversaries who engaged each other in violent battle. During the collective annual ceremonies, there is a return to this precosmic sacred time, when as a result of the fighting between the two divinities the world has ceased to exist and social rules and moral interdictions are suspended. While waiting for a new creation, the community lives in the presence of the godhead, which is depicted as the primordial water-snake or the tree of life. Through ritual, its members participate in a sacred orgy, which takes place in accordance with divine commandments (Schärer, 1946, pp. 94ff.).

Another significant sacralization of sexual activity is found in the concept of androgyny. [See *Androgynes*.] Among the Australian Aborigines, sexual symbolism and activity are considered sacred; only through collective orgies or ritual androgynization can the unity and totality of the primordial time be reenacted. This androgynization is accomplished first through circumcision and then through subincision, an operation that symbolically supplies the initiate with a vulva. The subincised member then represents both the female and male organs. The ritual symbolism of androgyny results in the integration of opposites that constitutes the Australian Aborigines' idea of religious perfection. Ritual practices that transform the male initiate into a "female" are found in societies in Africa, South America, and New Guinea.

In many creation myths, the sexual intercourse or masturbation of a solitary primordial being results in the genesis of the cosmos. In an ancient Egyptian cosmogony, the primeval god is said to have intercourse with his own hand (see Hans Bonnet, *Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte*, Berlin, 1952, p. 676). This theme is more abstractly stated in a gnostic myth (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* 1.30.2) where the "light-dew" emanating from the primordial Father fecundates the Mother and represents a sort of seed. In the myth of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (1.7.4), a part of this seed (light) falls below.

Intercourse between gods and mortal women is a common mythological theme. In several cultures, the mythical event is repeated in recurrent rituals that result in the transfer of spiritual "power" from a deity to a human being. During a ceremony of the Cheyenne Indians called "intercourse with the buffalo," married women have intercourse with the elders of the tribe in order to transfer "power" (*xo'pini*) to their own husbands. This rite reenacts the myth of the primordial intercourse between a woman and the Great Spirit, who probably appeared as a buffalo. The Great Spirit's

power was further sexually transmitted to the first shaman (see Duerr, 1984).

Horse sacrifices in Ireland and India also reenact a mythical intercourse between a mortal and a god in animal form, through which a transfer of power takes place. According to Gerald de Barri (c. 1146–1223), an Irish king copulated with a mare, after which the mare was killed, cut into pieces, and boiled. The king bathed in this broth, drank it, and ate the boiled meat. This rite is connected with the Celtic equine goddess Epona (from Proto-Indo-European **ekwos*, “horse”). In India, the horse sacrifice (*aśvamedha*) consists of a simulated copulation between the queen and a dead stallion. The queen (*mahiṣi*) lies down beside the stallion and entwines her legs with the hind legs of the horse. The ritual suggests that the force of the white stallion will be received by the queen and transmitted to the king.

One aspect of the sacrality of sexuality is expressed in fertility rites; another, in religious techniques of self-control and asceticism. These techniques, however, are not necessarily based on a dualistic tension between “spirit” and “flesh.”

Chinese sex manuals of the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 CE) hint at a Taoist technique of sexual control. This technique was one of the procedures for “nourishing the vital principle” by which a Taoist would achieve immortality. In addition to this sexual practice, two other procedures (“embryonic respiration” and *tao-yin*, “gymnastics”) have been brilliantly described by Henri Maspero (1937). Essentially, practice was that of *coitus reservatus*: ejaculation was stopped by pressure on the seminal duct, while the seed was supposed to turn back and rise to the brain, which was thus “restored.” The “female fluid” (vaginal secretions) was “reabsorbed” and contributed toward prolonging life. During one ritual, it was recommended that the participant change partners as frequently as possible (texts mention as many as one hundred partners, but ten seems to be the standard). Despised by Confucians for being both immoral and ruinous to one’s health, this practice nevertheless continued until the seventeenth century.

In India, sexuality has played a significant role in religious life and thought since the Vedic period (cf. Eliade, 1969, pp. 254ff.). But it was not until the emergence of Tantrism that sexual practices were considered a means of obtaining spiritual perfection and absolute freedom or immortality. Ritualized sexual union, *maithuna*, is the last and most important of a series of yogic bodily techniques and meditations. Such a union can be realized either spiritually (i.e., with a divine image mentally constructed and projected in front of the practitioner) or physically with one’s wife. In contrast

to this “right-hand” Tantrism, the “left-hand” schools require as rite partner a *ḍombī* (lit., “washerwoman”), a girl from a lower class or a courtesan. The more depraved and debauched the woman, the more fit she is for the rite. In accordance with the Tantric doctrines of the identity of opposites, the “noblest and the most precious” is hidden precisely in the “basest and most common.”

Tantric texts are often composed in an “intentional language” (*sandhyā-bhāṣā*), a sacred, dark, ambiguous language in which a state of consciousness is expressed by erotic terms and sexual meanings. For example, *bodhicitta* (“thought of awakening”) means also *semen virile*; *padma* (“lotus”) is interpreted as *bhaga* (“womb”); *vajra* (“thunderbolt”) signifies *liṅga* (*membrum virile*). But in certain sectarian movements (such as the Saha-jīyā, for example), *vajra* also means *śūnya* “emptiness” and *lalanā* “woman” means *iḍā* (one of the “veins” of the Indian mystical physiology), *abhāva* (“nonbeing”), *candra* (“moon”), *prakṛti* (“nature”), “the Ganges,” “vowels,” and even *nirvāṇa* (cf. other examples in Eliade, 1969, pp. 253ff.). Thus, a Tantric text is to be read on several different levels. For instance, the verse “The woman and the tongue are immobilized on either side of the sun and the moon” can be understood to refer to the arrest of breath but also the arrest of seminal emission.

Sexual union, *maithuna*, serves to make respiration rhythmical and to aid concentration. The final goal of *maithuna* is the simultaneous “immobilization” of breath, thought, and seminal emission. To lead to this paradoxical state, which surpasses the structure and the limits of the human condition, sexual activity must be radically transformed. The instruction and yogic preparation of the disciple are long and difficult. Even the young female partner is duly instructed by the *guru*; she consecrates her body by *nyāsas* (ritual “projections” of divinities). Thus, sexual union becomes a ritual through which the human couple is changed into the divine pair Śiva and Śakti. The texts emphasize the idea that *maithuna* is above all the integration of the two divine principles: for example, the *Kūlārṇava Tantra* (5.111–112) states that “the true sexual union is the union of the *parāśakti* with the *ātman*; other unions represent only carnal relations with women.” The “sacralization” of sexuality through rituals and specific types of meditations is strongly and frequently emphasized. “By the same acts that cause some men to burn in hell for thousands of years, the yogin gains his eternal salvation” (Indrabhuti, *Jñānasiddhi* 15).

According to Vajrayāna mythology, the Buddha himself set the example; by practicing *maithuna*, he suc-

ceeded in conquering Māra, and the same technique made him omniscient and the master of magical powers (see Eliade, 1969, pp. 263ff.). The ideal of a final reintegration of opposites is a common goal in both Hindu and Buddhist (Vajrayāna) Tantrism. *Mahāsukha*, the “great bliss” (i.e., the beatitude of realizing one’s Buddhahood), is the paradoxical state of absolute nonduality (*advaya*); it cannot be known dialectically but can be apprehended only through actual experience. In esoteric Vajrayāna, *mahāsukha* can be obtained by the unification of *prajñā* (wisdom) and *upāya* (the means to attain it), *sūnyatā* (emptiness) and *karuṇā* (compassion), and other pairs of opposites that designate “female” and “male.” These terms are often represented iconographically by a couple in sexual embrace. Such a union (*yoga*) is known as *advaya*. [See also Hieros Gamos.] Sometimes the two deities are combined into one body. The transcending of sexuality is expressed thus in the form of the androgyne.

The idea that semen contains a vital force is common to the Chinese, Indian, and Greek traditions. For the Chinese, the “vital essence” (*ch’i*) is to be spared and increased; in the Indian tradition, the fire of asceticism (*tapas*) produces supernatural powers (*siddhi*); in Greek medicine, sperm contains “spirit” (*pneuma*), a substance whose loss would diminish the vitality of the whole organism. On the contrary, the accumulation of *pneuma* is an essential requisite for those who perform magic. The Indian follows the same logic: an *apsara*, or heavenly nymph, caused the great ascetic Dadhīca (*Mahābhārata*, *Śalyaparvan* 1) to lose his semen, rendering him powerless (see David N. Lorenzen’s *The Kāpālikas and the Kālāmukhas*, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 91–92). [See Asceticism.]

In my article “Spirit, Light, and Seed” (1971), I have analyzed gnostic evidence within a broad religious context in which semen plays an important role. It has been recently demonstrated that gnostic experiences are connected with the Greek theories of the *pneuma* (see Giovanni Filoramo’s *Luce e Gnosi*, Rome, 1980). The original gnostic testimonies (preserved in Coptic) portray gnosis as a meditative and ritual process in which the strenuous efforts of the adept are intended to achieve a sort of ecstasy. These testimonies belong to ascetic trends of gnosis. They contain polemic undertones directed against the followers of libertine trends. Unfortunately, the original testimonies of the latter have not survived.

[See also *Homosexuality and Hierodouleia*.]

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MIRCEA ELIADE

Sexual Rites in Europe

In the first centuries of the Christian era, the repression of sexuality was a common theme. The Desert Fathers were usually converts with a stormy past whose temptations sometimes led them to the brothels in Alexandria. However, the desert standards of asceticism

were very repressive, comparable, as far as sexuality was concerned, to the well-known rule of Mount Athos. The sight of a female, even a hen, was a great spiritual danger. When Poemen heard that a ship had landed not far from the brethren's dwellings and that a woman had disembarked, in a warlike mood he led the brethren to the shore armed with sticks. Frightened, the sailors and the woman left. When old Saba and a disciple passed an attractive girl, Saba stated that the girl had one eye, but the disciple protested; he had seen that the girl had both eyes. This was a trick by Saba to see if the disciple had taken a good look at her. The disciple was dismissed. As a young man, Macarius was compelled to marry in order to please his parents. By feigning illness, he escaped the marital bed. When his wife died shortly after, he was very relieved and thanked God (see L. Leclair, "Infiltrations dualistes chez les Pères du désert," in *Gnosticisme et monde hellénistique*, edited by Julian Ries, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982, pp. 326–336). The apostles Andrew and Thomas exhorted rich women to avoid intercourse with their husbands.

Sexuality was sometimes violently repressed by self-mutilation. Castration was practiced by the priests of Cybele, called Galli. It has been suggested that their practice of emasculation could have had a certain influence on the Christian rejection of sexuality, which is exemplified by Origen's act of self-castration. [See also Castration.]

The Skoptsy. Another much later sect that practiced self-mutilation was the Skoptsy ("the castrated"), a sect that originated in Russia in the eighteenth century as a dissenting sect of the Russian Orthodox church. They still existed in Leningrad and Moscow in 1919, and even later in eastern Romania, where they traditionally exerted a monopoly on coach driving. The Skoptsy are representatives of a view of the world in which the spirit is strongly opposed to the flesh; they believed that only through contempt and mortification of the flesh could the spirit be fully developed. Their efforts to suppress physical lust led in extreme cases to the excision of genitalia. It was said that, in one of their ceremonies, the left breast of a girl aged fifteen or sixteen was excised in a warm bath, after which the assembly took communion by eating the raw flesh that had been cut into fine pieces (Gehring, 1898, pp. 149–150). Even if this story was invented by their detractors, gruesome practices were common among the Skoptsy. Women sometimes had parts of their external genitalia and even one or both breasts cut off. [See also Clitoridectomy.] For men, emasculation took place in five stages, called "seals": in the first, the testes were removed; in the second, the penis; in the third, a part of the pectoral muscles. Cross-shaped brandmarks followed on the

shoulders, the abdomen, and the legs. One could thus become an "angel with five wings."

The Khlysty. The Skoptsy derived from an earlier sect whose members called themselves Christy, that is, apt to become Christ themselves. They were contemptuously nicknamed the Khlysty (i.e., "whips," or flagellants). Constantly persecuted by the authorities but secretly supported by the fervent nuns of the Ivanovskii cloisters in Moscow and by several merchants, the sect was active until 1762. The Khlysty were ascetic puritans who abstained from meat, alcohol, and tobacco; they fasted, prayed, and performed severe penances. They were said to have practiced infanticide and cannibalism in their secret meetings and to have performed a Black Mass on the naked body of the woman whose child had been sacrificed, called *bogoroditsa* ("bearer of God"). They were also said to have practiced a kind of *lucerna extincta* rite, a rite in which men and women came together at night and, turning off the lights, had intercourse. They were sometimes alleged to have indulged in incestuous or homosexual intercourse. For the Khlysty, promiscuous intercourse took place after lengthy dances and after forty to fifty strong collisions between groups of men and women gathered in opposite corners of the room (Gehring, 1898, pp. 153–154).

Entering into a trance by mere physical means was practiced in Russia by several other sects derived from the Khlysty. One such group was the Skakuny ("jumpers"), a group of Finnish Lutheran peasants from the area around Saint Petersburg who participated in jumping contests that ended in promiscuous intercourse. A group derived from the Skakuny, the Priguny (also "jumpers"), introduced bigamy for the laymen and polygamy for their chief, who was proclaimed "King of the Christians." By 1897, a neo-Khlyst of Voronezh, Lubkov, who was an "incarnation of Christ," decided that he was entitled to have several wives, since he believed that the three women in the Gospels who came to embalm Christ's body could only have been his wives.

Lucerna Extincta. The rite of *lucerna extincta* as practiced by the Khlysty has a long history. Livy attributed its origin to the Dionysian groups in Rome in 186 BCE. According to the Apologists Minucius Felix and Tertullian, enemies of the church attributed it to Christians in the second century CE. In 719, John of Odzun accused an Armenian adoptionist sect of practicing *lucerna extincta*; in 1050, Michael Psellus accused the Bogomils in Thrace; and in 1090 Paul of Chartres said the heretics of Orleans performed it. In 1180 Walter Map stated that French heretics practiced this rite; Gregory IX in his bull *Vox in Roma* (1233) attributed it to heretics in Germany and to the Waldensians. Several fifteenth-century

sources said the Franciscan "Fratricelli" were involved in *lucerna extincta* practices.

There are also more recent cases of *lucerna extincta* rites, for instance, those practiced by the followers of the Russian peasant Daniil Filippov (d. 1700). In 1645 Filippov convinced several people that God the Father had come to abide in his own "pure body." Thenceforth, Filippov called himself Sabaoth and gained several followers. Seven years later, he recruited a son, the peasant Ivan Timofeevich Suslov, as Christ. Suslov was said to have been miraculously born in 1616 (a purely fictitious date) from one-hundred-year-old parents. The trinity was completed by a young girl who bore the titles of "bearer of God" and "daughter of God." Twelve apostles completed the picture. Suslov was repeatedly arrested and tortured, and, though his followers claimed that he was resurrected twice, it seems more probable that he was eventually released. He lived his last thirty years in Moscow and died in 1716 at the age of one hundred, a mythical age attributed to many founders of sects in Russia.

In addition to *lucerna extincta*, fornication and debauchery were also attributed to other heretics of the Middle Ages. The followers of Tanchelm of Antwerp (d. 1115), for instance, were said to have organized revels in which young girls were deflowered in the presence of their mothers; wives and children were offered to Tanchelm's lust (see Russell, 1965, p. 65).

In *Europe's Inner Demons* (1975), Norman R. C. Cohn analyzes the histories of groups that were said to engage in esoteric sexual practices. In dealing with the period from 186 BCE to the end of the fifteenth century, Cohn found that in all allegations of promiscuous intercourse there was a suspicious pattern of uniformity. Promiscuity was frequently associated with more gruesome practices, the most common of which was infanticide. He noted that testimonies of *lucerna extincta* and other practices are directed against groups that seem to form a direct threat to the state or the church and are meant to discredit these groups. These testimonies present a regular pattern, whether they describe Bacchanalia in 186 BCE or witch hunts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; they belong to a stereotype of detraction used by several power groups against their opponents. Cohn admits that the idea of sexual promiscuity is consistent with the dualistic view of the world held by groups like the gnostics, Manichaeans, Paulicians, Bogomils, and Cathari. But the first four groups were ascetic, and even the sexual freedom of the Cathar "believers" (in contrast to the asceticism of the "perfect") found its expression in individual deeds, not in collective rites. Among the first gnostics, Epiphaneus, son

of Carpocrates, preached community of wives (Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 3.6.1–8, 3.6.3) but did not mention collective orgies. The sexual rites ascribed to some gnostics by Bishop Epiphanius belong to the fourth century; the description of the rites seems to be authentic but may represent a later invention.

Renaissance Magic. In the sixteenth century, in a cultural context in which the ancient theories concerning *pneuma* or *spiritus* were still popular (see Daniel P. Walker's *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella*, London, 1958), the philosopher and magician Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) achieved a spectacular synthesis between the love theories of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), the art of memory (see Frances A. Yates's *The Art of Memory*, Chicago, 1972), and magic. The result, found in two manuscripts probably written in Wittenberg (*De vinculis in genere*), is an erotic magic aimed at the total sexual self-control of the adept. The adept, acquainted with the practices of the art of memory, is instructed to learn to keep his fantasies under control. The images or phantasms produced are under certain circumstances transmitted to the individual or group that is to be magically "bound" (this is the meaning of the verb *vincire*, from which the noun *vinculum*, "bond," is derived). The images consciously produced by the adept are intended to correspond to the erotic expectations of the subjects to be "bound." The magician operates with phantasms that are sometimes sexual, yet he is at the same time completely immune to sexual stimuli. Bruno recommends that the adept never release sperm, for sperm retention represents the correct way to make "bonds" (*vincula*). But Bruno does not seem to have any particular exercise of semen retention in mind. His practices, which are meant to control sexuality through imagination, are similar in principle to Indian Tantric doctrines. [See *Tantrism*.]

Sexual Rites since the Seventeenth Century. During the witch-craze period that began around 1468 and intensified after 1484, public fears were raised about the sacrilege of the Black Mass. However, by the end of the seventeenth century, these fears were replaced by a skeptical attitude. In 1682 Louis XIV, king of France, transferred all of the processes for prosecuting witchcraft from ecclesiastical to secular tribunals and ended witch hunting in France. Witches were to be prosecuted only if they had committed crimes against civil law. Louis XIV's edict is connected to one of the most gruesome affairs of the time: the *Affaire de la Chambre Ardente*, or *Affaire des Poisons*. During the legal proceedings, which were directed against a prosperous gang of poisoners, it was discovered that in Paris the Black Mass was accompanied by erotic practices and infant-

cide. The Marquise de Montespan, Louis XIV's mistress, was involved in the affair. Several scholars claim that her naked body served as an altar on which the Black Mass was performed. Intercourse with the celebrating priest usually followed the profanation of the wafer. The performers of the mass were priests; infant sacrifices seem actually to have been performed.

In the seventeenth century, sexual repression in nunneries manifested itself as erotic delirium, which became common under the guise of diabolic possession. Several cases in France became famous, such as those of Madelaine de Demandolx de la Palud (Aix-en-Provence, 1611), Jeanne des Anges (Loudun, 1633), Magdelaine Bavent (Louviers, c. 1644), and Catherine Cadière (Aix-en-Provence, 1731). One story of diabolic possession is that of Elizabeth de Ranfaing (Nancy, 1618–1625), an attractive woman who subjected herself to self-mortification in an attempt to make herself ugly. In 1617 she succumbed to an erotic delirium that lasted until 1625. When cured, she founded a monastic order noted for its emphasis on iron discipline and sexual repression.

Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Magia Sexualis. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sexual magic became the focus of the ceremonies of erotic—"satanic" clubs. Members of these clubs were usually wealthy young men like the dandy Francis Dashwood of the Hell-fire Club of England. In 1753 Dashwood formed his own sexual brotherhood in Medmenham Abbey, adopting the motto "Fais ce que veux" from the Thélème Abbey of François Rabelais. Dashwood influenced Aleister Crowley (1875–1947), who installed his own community in Cefalù, Sicily, in a villa called Thelema Abbey; he also used the motto "Do what thou wilt." Crowley was called both a quack and "the greatest magician of the twentieth century"; he called himself "the Beast," in reference to the Antichrist. He organized sexual entertainments under the guise of "secret societies." One of these, founded in 1902, was called O.T.O., or Ordo Templis Orientis, whose "supreme and holy king" or "Baphomet" (from the idol allegedly worshiped by the Templars) was Crowley himself. He based his rituals on Tantric principles in an attempt to exploit the power of sexuality. He submitted his "Scarlet Women"—the name given to each of his new partners—to strenuous sexual practices. He used prostitutes in his rituals, but the women were untrained and could not understand what was expected of them. Neither the Ordo Templis Orientis nor the Cefalù community was successful. Crowley became increasingly dependent on heroin, and the Italian authorities expelled him from his "abbey" in 1924.

Crowley combined the decreasingly shocking old "satanic" practices with fashionable Tantrism freshly imported from India by dilettantes or by adepts like John Woodroffe, who wrote under the pseudonym Arthur Avalon. The Tantric vogue was continued by "laymen" like Ernest A. Payne (*The Shaktas*, New York and London, 1933) and by the Italian Julius Evola, the author of *Metaphysics of Sex*. The popularity of Tantrism at the end of the nineteenth century contributed to the short-lived but powerful interest in sexual magic. One of the most interesting theorists of sexual magic was Pascal Beverly Randolph, who in 1870 founded the Eulis Brotherhood. Like Crowley, Randolph started as a member of one of the many secret societies of the Victorian era. For Randolph, like Bruno, magic was based on sexual control. Randolph's work *Magia Sexualis* was later published by Maria de Naglowska, the leader of a pseudo-Tantric circle in Paris.

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Sexual self-control in Renaissance magic is described in my *Eros et magie à la Renaissance 1484* (Paris, 1984), and "satanic rites" are the subject of Montague Summers's *Witchcraft and Black Magic* (1946; London and New York, 1974), his best-known book. Sexual experience, including Taoist, Tantric, and magical practices, is presented from a traditionalist viewpoint by Julius Evola in his *Metaphysics of Sex* (New York, 1982).

IOAN PETRU CULIANU

SHABBAT. The Hebrew word *shabbat* is from a root meaning "to desist" or "to rest," that is, from work and labor. The Sabbath is the day of rest each week after six days of work. The resemblances to the ancient Babylonian *shapattu*, the day of the full moon, as well as the

biblical juxtaposition of the Sabbath with the new moon festival (Ro'sh Hodesh) in the Bible, have often been noted, and it may well be that originally there was some connection between the Babylonian and the Hebrew institutions. In the biblical narrative (*Gn.* 1:1–2:4), God rests on the seventh day from his creative activity and thereby sanctifies and blesses this day.

The command to keep the Sabbath holy is found in both versions of the Decalogue (*Ex.* 20:8–11, *Dt.* 5:12–15), but the reasons given for Sabbath observance differ. In *Exodus* the creation motif is stressed: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth and sea, and all that is in them, and he rested on the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day and hallowed it." This does not necessarily mean, as Philo of Alexandria understood it, that man must imitate God by resting as he did on the seventh day. It may mean that by resting on the day on which creation was complete, man acknowledges God as creator. In *Deuteronomy* the social motivation is prominent. Man must rest on the Sabbath and allow his slaves to rest with him so that the slaves are released from the burden of unceasing toil. A slave, subordinate to his master, cannot rest when he wishes. Therefore, by resting on the Sabbath, the Israelite demonstrates that he is free to rest because he has been redeemed from bondage.

The nature of the "work" (*mela'kha*) that is forbidden on the Sabbath has received many different interpretations in the course of Jewish history. The only types of forbidden work specified in the Pentateuch are baking and cooking (*Ex.* 16:23), kindling fire (*Ex.* 35:3), and gathering wood (*Nm.* 15:32–36). From the sudden interposition of an injunction to keep the Sabbath into the narrative in which the Israelites are instructed by Moses to build the Tabernacle (*Ex.* 35:1–3), the Talmudic rabbis (B.T., *Shab.* 49b, B.Q. 2a) deduced that all the types of work required for the building of the Tabernacle are those forbidden on the Sabbath. This led to a listing (*Shab.* 7.1) of thirty-nine main categories of work, from which many others were derived by analogy.

In addition, various restrictions were introduced by the rabbis, as on the handling of money or of objects normally used for work, and all business activities. According to the rabbis it is forbidden to carry even the smallest object from a private into a public domain. But in cities like Jerusalem and Tel Aviv it is permitted to carry objects within the confines of the city by means of the *'eruv* ("mingling" of domains), an elaborate arrangement of posts and wires encircling the city that, by a legal fiction, converts the whole area into a private domain within which it is permitted to carry.

Reform Judaism largely ignores the rabbinic rules governing acts forbidden on the Sabbath, preferring to understand "work" as gainful occupation alone, and the spiritual atmosphere of the Sabbath as generated chiefly by means of rituals in the home and services in the synagogue. Orthodox Judaism follows the traditional regulations in their entirety. Where new inventions create problems, these are solved by a process of analogy. For instance, Orthodox rabbis have considered whether switching on electric lights falls under the heading of "kindling fire" since there is no combustion of the filament. The consensus today among Orthodox rabbis forbids the use of all electrical appliances on the Sabbath. A rationale for the Orthodox understanding is that work does not mean physical effort as such, but the creative manipulation of the physical world. Moving heavy objects, for example, does involve effort but is not creative, as is writing a letter or lighting a cigarette (since the ability to make fire was man's first great step toward civilization). By refraining on the Sabbath from creative manipulation of the world, people demonstrate that they enjoy their talents as gifts from God, the creator. They are theirs not by right but by permission. People have a stewardship for which they will be called to account by God. Conservative Judaism in the United States follows the traditional view of the Sabbath laws, but Conservative rabbis generally permit switching on electric lights, using a microphone and telephone, and riding in an automobile to the synagogue.

The positive aspects of the Sabbath as a day of spiritual and physical refreshment, as a day of delight (based on *Isaiah* 58:13), are constantly invoked in Jewish literature. In the poetic rabbinic statement (B.T., *Shab.* 119b), man has an additional soul on the Sabbath, and when he comes home to the Sabbath meal he is accompanied by angels. The thirteenth-century Spanish exegete Nahmanides, in his commentary on the *Exodus* version of the Decalogue, sees the prohibition of work on the Sabbath as an instance of the fear of God, whereas the positive injunction to celebrate the Sabbath as a sacred day is an instance of the love of God.

The ideas of honoring the Sabbath and taking delight in it are expressed in the wearing of special clothes, having a well-lit home, forgetting worldly worries and anxieties (for this reason petitionary prayers are not recited on the Sabbath), the study of the Torah, the three meals (instead of the two eaten on weekdays in ancient times) of good food and wine, and the union of husband and wife. This last emphasis would seem to be in reaction against sectarian opinions that sexual congress on the Sabbath is sinful as a creative act. The Karaites have interpreted the prohibition of kindling fire to

mean that there must be no fire or light in the home. In all probability the rabbinic emphasis in the Middle Ages on the Sabbath lights is in conscious reaction to this view and an attempt to make the Sabbath a day of joy and tranquillity rather than a day of gloom. At the festive Sabbath meals joyous hymns (*zemiroth*) are sung by the family.

Just before the advent of the Sabbath on Friday evening, the mistress of the house prays for her family as she kindles two candles in honor of the day: one candle represents the prohibition of work, the other the positive injunction of Sabbath joy and tranquillity. The festive meal begins with the Qiddush (sanctification), a praise of God in which he is thanked, over a cup of wine, for granting Israel the precious boon that is the Sabbath. The grace before meals is recited over two loaves of bread, covered with a white cloth, representing the manna of which a double portion fell to the Israelites before the Sabbath (*Ex.* 16:22–27).

At the beginning of the synagogue service on Friday night, the Sabbath is welcomed with song. The mystics of Safad in the sixteenth century used to go out into the fields before the Sabbath to welcome the Bride Sabbath. Based on this is the now-universal custom of singing the hymn *Lekhah dodi* (Come My Beloved), composed by Shelomoh Alkabetz, a member of the Safad circle. At the termination of the Sabbath the *havdalah* ("distinction") benediction is recited over a cup of wine. In this ceremony God is praised for making a distinction between the holy and the profane, light and darkness, the people of Israel and other peoples, and between the Sabbath and the six working days. He is also thanked for the gift of light over a special candle kindled after the Sabbath. Sweet spices are smelled to restore the soul, which is sad at the departure of the Sabbath.

The central feature of the synagogue service on the Sabbath is the reading of the Torah from a handwritten scroll—the Sefer Torah (Book of the Law). The Torah is divided into portions, one section (*sidrah*) of which is read each Sabbath. The whole Torah is completed in this way each year, and then the cycle begins anew. In ancient times the seven persons called up (to the platform where the reading is done) read from the scroll itself, but nowadays they only recite the benedictions praising God for giving the Torah to his people, and the actual reading is carried out by the rabbi or cantor, who uses a traditional chant. In Reform congregations only a part of the weekly *sidrah* is read, and there is no chanting. Before the reading begins, the Sefer Torah is taken out of the ark that houses it and is borne ceremonially around the synagogue, adorned with a richly

embroidered cloth, silver bells, and a silver pointer. After the reading, the Sefer Torah is held aloft with its columns open for all to see while the congregation sings in Hebrew: "This is the Torah which Moses set before the children of Israel by the mouth of God at the hand of Moses." In addition to the Torah reading, a member of the congregation reads from one of the books of the Prophets. This portion is known as the *haftarah* ("conclusion"). The choice of the Prophetic readings was made to coincide in theme with that of the weekly Torah reading.

There are a number of special Sabbaths marked by additions to the standard liturgy and by relevant Prophetic and extra Torah readings. The earliest of these are the four Sabbaths of the weeks before Passover. These are Shabbat Sheqalim (Sabbath of Shekels), a reminder of the practice in Temple times of beginning the annual collection of money for the sacrifices at this period (based on *Exodus* 30:11–16 and *2 Kings* 11:17–12:17); Shabbat Zakhor (Sabbath of Remembering), a reminder of Amalek (based on *Deuteronomy* 25:17–19 and *1 Samuel* 15:1–34); Shabbat Parah (Sabbath of the Red Heifer), a reminder of the purification rites in Temple times in preparation for Passover (based on *Numbers* 19:1–22 and *Exodus* 36:16–38); and Shabbat ha-Ḥodesh (Sabbath of the New Moon), the declaration that the "first month," Nisan, is the beginning of the new annual cycle for the festivals (based on *Exodus* 12:1–20 and *Ezekiel* 45:16–46:18). The *haftarah* for the Sabbath immediately preceding Passover is from the third chapter of *Malachi*, concluding with a reference to the great (*gadol*) day of the Lord, after which this Sabbath is called Shabbat ha-Gadol (the Great Sabbath).

The Sabbath on which the weekly *sidrah* includes the Song of Moses (*Ex.* 16:1–21) has for the *haftarah* the Song of Deborah (*Jgs.* 4–5) and is known as Shabbat Shirah (Sabbath of Song). On the three Sabbaths preceding the fast of the Ninth of Av, commemorating the destruction of the Temple, the *haftarot* consist of Prophetic readings dealing with calamity, and the seven Sabbaths following the fast have portions from the second part of the *Book of Isaiah*, dealing with the theme of consolation. Since the *haftarah* of the Sabbath preceding the fast begins with the word *hazon* ("vision," *Is.* 1), this Sabbath is called Shabbat Ḥazon; the *haftarah* of the Sabbath immediately after the fast begins with the word *naḥamu* ("comfort ye"), and this Sabbath is called Shabbat Naḥamu. The Sabbath between Ro'sh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur falls during the penitential season. Its *haftarah* is from *Hosea* 14, beginning with the words "*shuvah Yisra'el*," hence this Sabbath is called Shabbat Shuvah.

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LOUIS JACOBS

SHABBETAI TSEVI (1626–1676), Jewish messianic pretender (in the definition of those who did not believe in him) and founder of the messianic movement known as Shabbateanism. The Shabbatean movement is in many ways unique, yet it is also representative of the forces at work in Jewish history and of the interaction of external and internal factors.

Background. With the expulsion of the Jews at the end of the fifteenth century from Spain and Portugal, a new phase began in Jewish history. The magnitude of the disaster and sufferings seemed to indicate the "birth pangs" of the messianic age as foretold by tradition. Messianic expectations and speculations were rife, and false messiahs arose and disappeared, but still salvation tarried, and new and greater afflictions followed instead, reaching a climax in the Cossack massacres led by Bogdan Khmel'nitskii. Tens of thousands of Jews were slaughtered in these massacres between 1648 and 1658 in Poland and the Ukraine; the decade was a peak of suffering in the postmedieval period, unparalleled until the twentieth century. But now at least every Jew knew that the Messiah was coming, for he had to come. By that time the doctrine of the sixteenth-century qabbalist Isaac Luria had come to dominate Jewish thought and piety, not least because of its profoundly messianic orientation. The qabbalists focused all their religious fervor and asceticism, their power of prayer and meditation, on the imminent advent of redemption. And it was indeed from the circle of qabbalists that the messiah appeared.

Life. Shabbetai was born in 1626 into the prosperous Tsevi family of merchants living in Smyrna (İzmir), a city in Asia Minor situated within the Ottoman empire. There, Jews—because of their knowledge of languages, their international connections, and their familiarity with local conditions—were much in demand as agents and brokers by English, Dutch, and other merchants and companies that operated in the Levant. As was customary in Jewish families, Shabbetai, the gifted son, did not go into business but devoted himself to study, first of the Talmud and then of Qabbalah. He seems to have been not only gifted as a scholar but also endowed with a magnetic personality. He soon exhibited eccentric behavior and strange fantasies, which probably also included messianic elements. To avoid scandal, the rabbi and the family made him leave his hometown, and after some wandering through Turkey, he came to Jerusalem. There the winsome young ascetic did not fail to attract attention, not least because of his strange behavior. Nevertheless, he seems to have been sufficiently respected to be sent as emissary of the community to Egypt to collect alms for the Holy City. On his return to Palestine he met in Gaza another young rabbi from Jerusalem, Natan (henceforth known as the prophet Natan of Gaza), who claimed that during the Shavu'ot vigil in May 1665 he had experienced a vision in which it was divinely revealed to him that Shabbetai was the Lord's anointed one, the Messiah of Israel.

Some historians argue that this proclamation was the climax of a messianic plan carefully laid and hatched by Shabbetai and his supporters, who had long cultivated messianic fantasies. Gershom Scholem, on the other hand, maintains that the event was sudden and unpremeditated, that its explosive result was due to a combination of circumstances: the messianic mood of the age, Shabbetai's peculiar character, and Natan's charismatic and prophetic personality. Shabbetai's erratic behavior, diagnosed by Scholem as a manic-depressive condition (an interpretation contested by others), proved to be of theological significance. In his manic states, which would indeed account for his eccentric actions, Shabbetai invented new rituals, at times involving deliberate and highly ritualized transgressions of Jewish law. These instances of messianic anti-nomianism would occasionally be accompanied by a blasphemous pun. For the traditional liturgical formula "thou who looseneest [*mattir*] those in bonds [*asurim*]," Shabbetai would substitute, when transgressing the law, the benediction "thou who permittest [*mattir*] all prohibitions [*issurim*]." This incipient messianic anti-nomianism would prove a major factor in the subsequent development of the movement.

After disciplinary floggings had failed to quench Shabbetai's antinomian behavior, he was eventually excommunicated by the rabbis of Jerusalem in 1665. Nevertheless, the glad tidings of his coming quickly spread. Whereas earlier messianic movements had been outbreaks of short duration, leaving no permanent traces, the Shabbatean message spread throughout the Diaspora, and within a short time Shabbetai was venerated as "our lord and king" from Cairo to Hamburg, from Salonika to Amsterdam, from Morocco to Yemen, from Poland to Persia. With few exceptions the skeptics kept their doubts to themselves, not daring to speak out and risk the wrath of popular enthusiasm. Returning triumphantly to his hometown, Smyrna, Shabbetai was riding high on a wave of manic exaltation and messianic enthusiasm that did not shrink from terrorizing his opponents. By then the Turkish authorities felt that things were going too far, and when Shabbetai continued his royal progress from Smyrna to the capital, Constantinople, he was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress of Gallipoli.

Yet the faith continued to spread; after all, everyone knew that the Messiah would have to suffer tribulations before revealing himself with miracles and in all his power and glory. Since the Turkish prison guards were amenable to bribes, Shabbetai lived in captivity like a king, receiving embassies that came to pay him homage and celebrating his bizarre new rituals. The Turkish authorities handled the matter with remarkable restraint. In due course Shabbetai was summoned to the Diwan (the sultan's privy council) and faced with the choice between death under torture and apostasy to Islam. From the palace there emerged shortly afterward not the rabbi Shabbetai Tsevi but a turbaned Mehmet Efendi. But he continued to play a double game: a Muslim in his relations with the Turks (he also persuaded some of his followers to apostatize) and the Messiah to his Jewish believers. This duplicity finally led the authorities to exile him to Albania, where he died in 1676.

Aftermath. Now only did the well-nigh incredible happen. Betrayed and disillusioned, Jews had to choose once more. Many of those who had believed—not with an easy faith without works but with great sacrifice, flinging aside their chattels to meet and follow the Messiah—now recognized, shamefacedly and with heavy hearts, that they had been duped. There had been no change in the world and no salvation: they had to go on waiting for the true Messiah.

But not all were ready to submit to the verdict of history. They had experienced salvation and the thrill of renewal within their hearts, and nothing would undo this change. The reality of messianic experience could

not be invalidated by outward history, at least for those who saw with eyes of faith. Whereas the majority of those originally gripped by the wave of messianic frenzy slowly returned to the traditional forms of belief and observance, a considerable number, the self-designated *ma'aminim* ("believers"), continued for some time to persevere in the "faith," living outwardly as orthodox Jews but inwardly as believers in the mystico-messianic mission of Shabbetai Tsevi, which in the fullness of time, they trusted, would be fully vindicated. Shabbetai's apostasy was held to be part of the mystery of the Messiah's unique mission and hence not to be imitated. (The prophet Natan, among others, was a forceful spokesman for this view.) A more extreme wing, however, held that the faithful had to follow in the footsteps of the Messiah also in this respect, especially as Shabbetai had occasionally pressured followers to apostatize.

These groups subsequently gave rise to a Shabbatean "heresy" and sectarian theology that first went underground and subsequently partly dissolved and partly left Judaism altogether, thus vanishing as far as Jewish history is concerned. The Shabbatean Dönme sect, which adopted the outward guise of Islam, survived clandestinely in Turkey until the twentieth century. A somewhat similar development took place in Poland, where Ya'akov Frank (1726–1791), an antinomian and megalomaniac nihilist who donned the messianic mantle of Shabbetai Tsevi as his incarnation, having first converted to Islam, subsequently led his followers to conversion to Catholicism, although they remained crypto-Jews. The members of the Frankist movement were gradually assimilated into Polish society and possibly influenced the "messianic" character of nineteenth-century Polish nationalist ideologues such as the poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), whose mother was descended from a converted Frankist family.

Gershom Scholem has argued that the mystico-theological rationalizations of the messiah's apostasy were in a way prepared and prefigured by Shabbetai's antinomian behavior in his youth and during his messianic heyday. Of interest to the historian of religions is the analogy, in certain respects, with Christianity. Since with the death of Jesus of Nazareth history had proved a disappointment, there developed a theology of paradox that turned the rational and moral stumbling block and *skandalon* into its cornerstone. Both Christianity and Shabbateanism owe part of their emotional appeal to their very paradoxicality. Because the messiah had seemingly failed so shockingly, the belief arose in his divine nature and in his second advent (in later Shabbateanism, also in his reincarnation). Since salvation

was not manifest to those who saw with eyes of flesh, a distinction had to be made between an invisible redemption, accessible to the eyes of faith only, and the final consummation when all things, and especially the messianic mystery, would become manifest. Because the messiah had ended his earthly career in disgrace, a theology evolved that explained how and why this disgrace actually constituted the climax of the messianic ministry. In the case of Jesus the paradox took a metaphysical form: by dying he had overcome death. For Shabbatean believers the paradox was of a mystico-moral kind: Shabbetai had had to accept worse than death (after all, Jews were dying a martyr's death in every generation), namely, the most abominable sin, apostasy. By descending into the abyss of impurity, sin, and evil, he had vanquished impurity, sin, and evil. The details of this doctrine were elaborated in the technical terminology of Lurianic qabbalistic theology.

Other aspects of Shabbateanism are of greater relevance to Jewish history. After the Shabbatean outbreak and its ignominious debacle and aftermath (Dönme, Frankism), there were no more "automessianic" movements (Martin Buber's term for messianic movements headed by a leader who claims to be the Messiah). The subsequent spiritual disarray prepared the way for the Hasidic revival in eighteenth-century eastern Europe. The collapse of the last great messianic outburst also contributed (according to Scholem) to the process of modernizing assimilation. Brief but violent, the messianic dream had destroyed, for some believers, the traditional structure of faith; the bridges had been burned and there was no way back. Yet, even though the Shabbatean dream had failed in its original form, it had stimulated new dreams: those of redemption as successful entry into modern society.

[For the wider theological and historical background of Shabbateanism, see Messianism, article on Jewish Messianism, especially the discussion of the messianic character of Lurianic Qabbalah. See also Qabbalah.]

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SHABISTARĪ, AL- (d. AH 720/1320 CE), more fully Sa'd al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn 'Abd al-Karīm ibn Yaḥyā al-Shabistarī; celebrated Ṣūfī author and Persian poet. He was born in the second half of the thirteenth century at Shabistar (Cabistar), a village near Tabriz in Azerbaijan, but spent the greater part of his life at Tabriz, then capital of the newly established Mongol (Il-khanid) empire. Little is known about him, except that he was married, probably at Kirman, and devotedly attached to one of his disciples named Shaykh Ibrāhīm.

In both the Islamic world and the West, his fame rests on the *Gulshan-i rāz* (Rose Garden of Mystery), a versified compendium of Ṣūfī teachings discovered by European travelers about 1700. In 1838, J. F. von Hammer-Purgstall published a Persian text along with a German verse translation. In 1880, E. H. Whinfield critically edited what has become the standard Persian text with an annotated English translation and an abstract of its contents.

The *Gulshan-i rāz* (in the meter *hazaj*) was al-Shabistarī's reply to fifteen questions posed by Mīr Fakhr al-Sādāt Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī al-Ḥusaynī (1273–1323), a Ṣūfī friend from Herat. Its 1,008 rhyming couplets, cast in the form of questions and lengthy answers on a variety of mystical topics, focus on the unity of being and the perfect human being, the central concepts of Ṣūfī theory after the time of Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240).

Many of the same topics are treated in al-Shabistarī's Persian prose works: *Ḥaqq al-yaqīn* (Certain Truth), published in little-known miscellanies (see *Ma'ārif al-'awārif*, Shiraz, 1283/1867, pp. 1–44, and *'Awārif al-ma'ārif*, Shiraz, 1317/1938, pp. 4–54); *Mirāt al-muḥaqqiqīn* (The Mirror of the Mystics), published in the same miscellanies (pp. 44–81 and section 2, pp. 1–46 respectively); *Kanz al-ḥaqā'iq* (The Treasure of Realities), edited by Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī-i Ṣafīr (Tehran, 1344/1965); and possibly *Risālah-i shāhid* (Epistle of the Witness), apparently no longer extant. Al-Shabistarī is also said to be the author of the *Sa'adat-nāmah*, a collection of 3,000 couplets, and a Persian translation of the *Minhāj al-'ābidīn* by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111).

Al-Shabistarī's *Gulshan-i rāz* became a traditional handbook of instruction in the Ni'matullāhī Ṣūfī affiliation, and its influence was further enhanced because of the numerous commentaries written on it in Shī'ī Iran for four centuries. One outstanding commentary, *Mafātiḥ al-i'jāz fī sharḥ-i Gulshan-i rāz* (ed. Kaywān-i Samī'i, Tehran, 1337/1958), was compiled in 1473 by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Lāhijī (d. 1506), a follower of Nūrbakhsh (d. 1465). The best-known nineteenth-century commentaries are the lithograph of Mīrzā Ibrāhīm al-Sabzawārī (Tehran 1314/1898 and 1330/1912) and *Sharḥ-i Gulshan-i rāz* (Tabriz 1334/1955)

by Mirzā 'Abd al-Karīm Rāyiḍ al-Dīn al-Zinjānī (d. 1882), a Dhahabī shaykh of Azerbaijan known as 'Ārif 'Alī Shāh U'jūbah. The anonymous extract of an Ismā'īlī commentary (*Ta'wilāt*) discovered by W. Ivanow and edited by Henry Corbin (*Trilogie ismaélienne*, 1961, pp. 131–161, with an introduction, section 3, pp. 1–196), documents a survival of Ismā'īlī ideas under the mantle of Sufism long after the destruction of Alamūt in 1256.

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SHĀFI'Ī, AL- (AH 150–208/767–820 CE), more fully Muḥammad ibn Idrīs; the founder of a school of law and the author of several works of Islamic law (*sharī'ah*). Perhaps more important, he wrote the first treatise of jurisprudence in Islam, in which he discussed the nature and sources of law and developed a legal methodology for the systematic study of the *sharī'ah*.

Al-Shāfi'ī flourished in the early Abbasid period, a time of consolidation for the Islamic empire. Even before the Abbasid dynasty had been established, Muslim jurists were grappling with legal problems resulting from the rapid expansion of the empire and the absorption of new elements of law and local tradition. As a consequence, the Islamic community abounded in legal doctrines, and several schools of law had emerged in response to the new conditions and demands. At this point, the need for a synthesis of divergent legal doctrines became apparent, and in order to derive underlying norms and principles to resolve legal problems, several jurists began to examine the problems that the prophet Muḥammad and his immediate successors had dealt with. It devolved upon al-Shāfi'ī to provide a method of legal reasoning that would make it possible to resolve problems and develop the law into a coherent system. He was the first jurist to examine the *sharī'ah* in accordance with jurisprudential method, and the impact of his method, to which his successors added only refinements, has remained permanent.

Life. Little is known of al-Shāfi'ī's childhood and early life. The earliest biographies are very brief, while

the detailed accounts given by classical biographers are mixed with legendary stories. The authorities disagree on whether al-Shāfi'ī was born in Gaza, a small town on the coast of Palestine, or in Ashkelon, a larger town not far away. His ancestors belonged to the Banū Hāshim, the clan of the prophet Muḥammad. Some of them, it seems, went with the Arab armies in the early days of the Muslim conquests and stayed in the eastern Mediterranean region. When al-Shāfi'ī was about ten years old, his father died, and his mother took him from Palestine to Mecca. Traditional stories, legendary for the most part, state that he learned the Qur'ān by heart at the age of seven, committed Malik's *Muwaḥḥa*' (a digest of law) to memory at the age of ten, and was declared fit to give legal opinions at the age of fifteen.

After his arrival in Mecca, al-Shāfi'ī studied under several jurists, then went to study in Medina under Mālik ibn Anas (d. 796), the leading jurist of the Hejaz and founder of the school of law bearing his name. Al-Shāfi'ī was then probably twenty years of age. In Medina, he studied Mālik's *Muwaḥḥa*' and became a follower of the Mālikī school of law, soon distinguishing himself as a student of the *sharī'ah*. He attracted the attention of the governor of Yemen, who was on a visit to Medina and who helped him to enter government service at the age of thirty. But al-Shāfi'ī was soon to become involved in local controversies, and this led not only to dismissal from his post but also to his deportation in chains to Iraq on the allegation that he was a follower of the Zaydī imam Yaḥyā ibn 'Abd Allāh, a pretender to the caliphate and an opponent of the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad. Al-Shāfi'ī appeared before the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd with other conspirators in 803 but was pardoned after eloquently defending his loyalty to the caliph on the grounds that his great-grandfather was related to the great-grandfather of the caliph himself. It is said that al-Shaybānī (d. 804), the leading jurist of the Ḥanafī school and a court counselor, defended him and said that he was a well-known jurist, and this incident brought al-Shāfi'ī into contact with al-Shaybānī, whose books he had studied. Despite the outcome, al-Shāfi'ī was never again to seek government service.

Until his deportation to Iraq, al-Shāfi'ī was known as a follower of Mālik. His study of Ḥanafī doctrines, which filtered to him through al-Shaybānī's works and contacts with Ḥanafī followers, seems to have broadened his knowledge of the law, and he began to see points of strength and weakness in both the Mālikī and Ḥanafī positions. Although he held his own legal opinions, he had not yet emerged as the leader of a new school of law.

In 804 al-Shāfi'ī suddenly left Iraq. The authorities differ on his subsequent travels: some state that he went

to Syria and the Hejaz and returned to Iraq in 810; others do not mention his visit to the Hejaz, reporting that he left Iraq in 814 and went to Egypt after stopping in Syria. But they all seem to agree that he left Iraq for Egypt and that his departure from the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools had become so pronounced that he preferred to settle in a country where he could discuss his own legal doctrine with greater independence.

In Egypt, al-Shāfi'ī found himself in a congenial position. He was on good terms with the governor, who seems to have encouraged him to leave Baghdad and to develop his teachings in Egypt, far from the center of court intrigues and rival doctrines. During the five years he lived there, al-Shāfi'ī devoted all his time to teaching and dictating his works to his students. But it was still not without difficulty that he preached his own doctrines, and his disagreement with Mālikī teachings brought him into conflict with some Mālikī followers. According to one authority, after a particularly heated controversy al-Shāfi'ī was attacked by an opponent who had lost the argument. Al-Shāfi'ī was already suffering from an intestinal illness that kept him frail and ailing during the later years of his life; seriously injured in the attack, he was taken to his house and died a few days later.

Works. Al-Shāfi'ī's legal system is to be found in his collected works, the *Kitāb al-umm* (The Mother Book). It is said that his leading disciples, especially al-Rabī' al-Murādī (d. 880), al-Būwayṭī (d. 845), and al-Muzanī (d. 877), were in the habit of transcribing al-Shāfi'ī's lectures, and that al-Shāfi'ī would correct the text when it was read aloud to him. Al-Shāfi'ī's disciples in Egypt, therefore, are responsible for all the books that have reached us, whether copied or dictated from his original writings. Doubts have been raised as to whether the *Kitāb al-umm* was not actually composed by a disciple. Even if some words have been changed or rephrased, the book as a whole contains al-Shāfi'ī's own ideas and legal reasoning, and al-Shāfi'ī's biographers agree that his works were handed down to us as recorded by his disciples. Al-Shāfi'ī's book on jurisprudence, *Al-riṣālah fī uṣūl al-fiqh* (Treatise on the Sources of the Law), was originally written in Iraq, long before he settled in Egypt, but it was revised and rewritten after he left Iraq, and it was also dictated to and put into writing by his disciples. Although al-Shāfi'ī wrote or dictated several other works, including a book on the Qur'ān called *Kitāb aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (Treatise on the Legal Precepts of the Qur'ān), and a compilation of traditions called *Al-nuṣnaḍ* (Collected Traditions), his legal doctrines and methodology are to be found mainly in the *Risālah*, a book on jurisprudence and legal method, and the *Kitāb*

al-umm, a book on the law, in which his own system is set forth in accordance with his legal reasoning. The *Risālah*, in particular, is a novel work in the literature of Islamic law, dealing essentially with the sources of the law (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). The *uṣūl* ("roots" or "sources") of the law had been discussed by earlier jurists, each stressing a particular derivative source (in addition to the Qur'ān and traditions, which are agreed upon by all as the primary sources), which distinguished him from other jurists; but none seems to have dealt with the subject in so coherent and systematic a way as al-Shāfi'ī, who discussed the nature and relative significance of each source, and how legal rules are derived from it.

Before al-Shāfi'ī, there were two predominant schools of law: the Mālikī school in the Hejaz and the Ḥanafī in Iraq, each representing local traditions and interests, although they were in agreement on fundamental principles. Both recognized the primacy of the Qur'ān and the traditions as sources of law, but they diverged on other sources, such as custom and local practice (sanctioned by their inclusion in the *sunnah* and the traditions ascribed to the Prophet) as well as the use of personal reasoning (*ijtihād*) and consensus (*ijmā'*). In the *Risālah*, al-Shāfi'ī tried to define and set the limits for each source and indicate how it should be used.

According to al-Shāfi'ī, the Qur'ān, as the embodiment of divine revelation, and the traditions, consisting of the Prophet's practices and decisions, are equally binding as sources of law, on the ground that the traditions, though not revelation in the literal sense, are based on divine wisdom inspired in the Prophet. God has imposed on believers the duty of obeying his prophet as they would obey God himself, and he has given evidence that he regards disobedience to the Prophet as disobedience to himself. "When God and his apostle have decreed a matter," says God to the Prophet in a revelation, "it is not for a believing man or woman to exercise a choice in that matter; whoever opposes God and his Apostle has deviated into manifest error" (surah 33:36). In law, therefore, the Prophet's traditions are as valid and binding as the Qur'ān. However, in raising the Prophet's *sunnah* to the level of revelation, al-Shāfi'ī warned that the traditions (consisting of the *sunnah*) must be authentic, since the Prophet's authority had often been invoked by the citation of traditions of doubtful authenticity. In the *Risālah*, al-Shāfi'ī devoted two chapters to a study of the nature and scope of traditions and laid down rules on how to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic traditions. Once a tradition is proved authentic, it must be binding. For this reason, he disagreed with Mālik, who considered

the practice (*'amal*) of Medina as representing the traditions of the Prophet irrespective of authenticity (on the grounds that the practice of the city of the Prophet was assumed to be equal in validity to the Prophet's traditions). Al-Shāfi'ī also disagreed with Abū Ḥanīfah, representing the Iraqi school of law, who applied *istiḥsān* (juristic preference) to his choice of traditions as a basis for legal decisions without distinguishing between the traditions of the Prophet and those of his companions.

The other sources of the law, based essentially on the exercise of *ijtihād* (legal reasoning), may be called derivative sources because they must have a certain basis in one of the textual sources (Qur'ān and traditions). Al-Shāfi'ī rejected the use of unlimited *ijtihād*, save in the form of *qiyās* (analogy), since this form of legal reasoning presupposes the existence of a general principle in the Qur'ān or a precedent in the traditions. He rejected all other forms of *ijtihād*—*istiḥsān* (juristic preference), *istiṣlāḥ* (common good), and others—because they permit the use of sources for legal decisions outside the framework laid down in the Qur'ān and traditions. In pursuing this method of legal reasoning, al-Shāfi'ī sought to idealize the law by insisting that it must be derived ultimately from divine revelation and divine wisdom, and to islamize it by confining its sources to the sacred texts of Islam—the Qur'ān and the traditions—and not to other sacred sources (see Khadduri, 1960, pp. 42–45).

Finally, al-Shāfi'ī discussed *ijmā'* as another derivative source, one with which he was familiar as a former follower of Mālik. But Mālik's doctrine of *ijmā'* was limited to the agreement of the scholars of Medina, because he held that only the scholars of the Prophet's city understood what the Prophet's *sunnah* really meant, and that by their consensus on all matters of law they could make decisions in conformity with precedents set in the *sunnah*. Other jurists outside Hejaz, especially in Iraq, maintained that they were as competent to exercise *ijmā'* as the scholars in Medina, and claimed that they were no less familiar with the Prophet's *sunnah* than their peers in Hejaz. But the Iraqi jurists, especially those of the Ḥanafī school, considered *ijmā'* to be secondary to *qiyās* as a derivative source. Al-Shāfi'ī went beyond both Mālikī and Ḥanafī jurists by investing *ijmā'* with higher authority as an expression of public action. The concept of *vox populi vox Dei* implied in al-Shāfi'ī's formulation of the *ijmā'* of the community is based on the tradition of the Prophet that states: "My people will never agree on an error," although al-Shāfi'ī did not cite the tradition in this form. By investing *ijmā'* with high authority, he ranked it higher than

qiyās as a source of law and second only to the textual sources.

Al-Shāfi'ī's doctrine of the *ijmā'* of the community was opposed by other scholars, including his own followers, but al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) supported the doctrine by confining it to fundamental principles and leaving matters of detail to the agreement of the scholars. Al-Shāfi'ī's doctrine of *ijmā'*, though sound in principle, suffers from a procedural weakness in that it provides no adequate method for the community to arrive at an agreement. Some of the jurists offered a corrective measure by proposing that if a few scholars reached an agreement and no objection was raised by others, or if the majority of the scholars agreed and only a few raised an objection, agreement should be binding upon the community. The process remained undefined until modern times, however, when Shaykh Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) proposed in his book on the caliphate, *Al-khilāfah aw al-īmāmah al-'uẓmā* (The Caliphate and the High Imamate; Cairo, 1924), that an elected assembly, composed of members including men knowledgeable in the *sharī'ah*, should exercise *ijmā'* on behalf of the community of believers. This device seems to satisfy al-Shāfi'ī's call that on all important matters the action of the community should prevail. At the end of the chapter on *ijmā'* in the *Risālah* he stated: "He who holds that which the Muslim community holds shall be regarded as following the community, and he who holds differently shall be regarded as opposing the community he was ordered to follow. So the error comes from separation."

Al-Shāfi'ī probably never intended to found a school bearing his name, for he warned against *taqlīd* (conformity to one school of law) and encouraged independent legal reasoning; but his legal methodology, which laid restrictions on the use of the sources of the law, necessarily limited differences of opinion on legal questions. After he settled in Egypt, his disciples became active in writing down and spreading his teachings, not only there but also in other lands. Within a century after al-Shāfi'ī's death, his doctrine began to spread to the Hejaz, Syria, and Central Asia. Although it was diminished in Egypt under Fatimid rule, it again became predominant under Sultan Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (known to the West as Saladin, d. 1169). By the time of the Ottoman occupation of Arab lands, the Shāfi'ī school had become the most widespread. Despite the official adoption of the Ḥanafī school by the Ottoman empire and the spread of Shiism in Iran after the rise of the Safavid dynasty at the opening of the sixteenth century, the Shāfi'ī school remains dominant to the present day in Egypt, Syria, the Hejaz, western and southern Arabia, parts of the

Persian Gulf, East Africa, the Malay Archipelago, Dag-
 estan, and parts of Central Asia.

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MAJID KHADDURI

SHAHĀDAH is a term used in Islam to denote the all-important confession or affirmation of the unity of God and the apostleship of Muḥammad. It derives from the Arabic root *shahida*, meaning "to attest," "to give decisive word," hence "to acknowledge as true," and is used in referring to eyewitness testimony or other dependable evidence. The same root yields one of the names of God in Islam, *al-Shahīd*, "the one whose word is authentic," a term used in the Qur'ān in contrast to *al-Ghā'ib*, "the one in hiddenness" or simply "hiddenness."

For Muslims, the term *shahādah* means giving open, verbal evidence of what is incontestably true. "I bear witness," the phrase runs, "that there is no god but God,

and Muḥammad is the messenger of God." The Arabic reads "Ashadu an lā ilāha illā Allāh: Muḥammadun rasūl Allāh." Witness is always in the singular. It is a corporate faith, but the witnessing unit is the person.

These words constitute the vital first "pillar" of Muslim religion; the other four are *ṣalāt* (prayer), *zakāt* (alms), *ṣawm* (fasting), and *ḥajj* (pilgrimage). As with all of the Five Pillars, the *niyyah*, or intention, has to be present in the recitation of the Shahādah if it is to avail as a genuine confession; its casual citation, as, for example, in a classroom discussion, would not amount to confession as faith.

The precise words in the ritual form do not, in fact, occur verbatim in the Qur'ān. But the theme of the sole lordship of Allāh was germinal to Muḥammad's mission, and his prophethood (*rasūliyyah*) was the sole agency entrusted by God with the Qur'ān. Muḥammad's prophethood therefore came to be conjoined inseparably in the Shahādah with the theme of God.

The word *Allāh* is precisely equivalent to the English word *God*, capitalized and without the definite article. *Allāh* is not a happy English usage, though it is sometimes employed in translations of the Shahādah. Care should be taken not to capitalize the word *ilāha* since it is a different term and should be translated as "god" with lowercase *g*. To write "There is no God but God" is without meaning. *Ilāha* is certainly capable of being pluralized ("gods many and lords many"). Not so *Allāh*. The core of Muḥammad's mission was this affirmation of divine unity. The term *Allāh* was already current, and well known to the Meccans, in Muḥammad's day. His own father (who died before his birth) was called 'Abd Allāh, meaning "servant of God." Thus it was not the existence of Allāh that the Prophet proclaimed, but his *sole* existence. All other deities, agencies, or powers intervening between humanity at the base of a hierarchical pyramid and Allāh at its apex, were nonentities, fictions, leaving God and man in unmediated relation.

The force of the word *lā* in the Shahādah is, as the grammarians say, that of absolute negation: "There does not exist any deity except . . ." The seven *l*'s of the Shahādah (i.e., occurrences of the Arabic letter *lām*) make the recitation lyrical poetry, and serve, in their simple verticals (eleven verticals plus two rounded letters), as a favorite calligraphic device. Numerous passages in the Qur'ān cite the phrase "There is no god except he" (e.g., 2:163, 2:255, 3:2, 3:6, 3:18, 4:84, 6:102). "There is no god but thou" occurs once (21:87), and surah 16:2 reads "There is no god save I." Clearly more than a bare propositional monotheism is meant, as is evident in surah 6:164: "Say: 'Shall I desire as lord any other than God when he is lord of everything?' " Here

the confessing "theist" is brought close to Psalm 73:25: "Whom have I in heaven but thee?"

That Muḥammad is the *rasūl*, the "messenger" or "sent one" of God is axiomatic and fundamental in Islam. *Rasūl Allāh*, "apostle of God," is his constant designation in the Qur'ān and in tradition. Indeed, the personal name Muḥammad occurs only four times in the Qur'ān (3:144, 33:40, 47:2, and 48:29). This is indicative of how the personality is absorbed into the vocation. *Rasūl* conveys a higher dignity than does *nabī* ("seer, prophet-seer"), though this term also is sometimes used of Muḥammad. Whereas earlier prophets and apostles had limited messages or areas of meaning and of vocation to particular people or situations, Muḥammad's mandate was final and universal as "a mercy to the worlds."

Within Islam, the brevity and simplicity of the Shahādah are seen as great assets, inasmuch as it avoids the complexities or subtleties attached to the Christian confession of "God in Christ." The theologians in Islam were, of course, involved in subtle issues when they developed their sophisticated *'aqidahs*, or creeds. But ordinary believers find ready assurance in what is terse, direct, and uncomplicated. Faith is not so much an exploration of mystery as an acknowledgement of that which warrants submission.

One theological complexity which cannot be avoided, however, is the question whether confession in itself, apart from behavior, constitutes Muslim adherence. In the Umayyad period and beyond, a form of Islam emerged in which Muslims, even caliphs, were utterly ready to recite with intention the confession, or *kalimat al-shahādah* (the "words of witness"), even as they lived profligate or negligent lives. Were they, then, true Muslims? Was a measure of ethical attainment and allegiance necessary? Was a faith without works enough? If not, who was to assess the modicum of acceptable conduct? The questions had political implications where rulers were unworthy. Some interpreters insisted that works were vital, that standards were not merely verbal. Others, frightened by the toils of assessment, preferred to leave the question with God and stay hopeful.

It is not clear when the form of the Shahādah was established, but it was certainly well within the Medinese period of Muḥammad's mission, when accessions to Islam used this formula. The formulation probably belongs to a very early period, the time when Muḥammad's status as the sole recipient of the Qur'anic revelation had become assured to his followers. As in the other Semitic faiths, in Islam the concepts of "witness to faith" and "witness unto death" were closely linked by a single cognate term, here *shahīd*, meaning both

"testimony giver" and "martyr." During the definitive early expansion of Islam the *Shuhadā'* (from the plural form of *shahīd*) were warriors in battle.

Šūfī, or mystical, Islam has its characteristic dimension for the Shahādah as for the *tawḥīd*, or unity, of God to which the Shahādah witnesses. The formula "Lā ilāha illā Allāh" in Šūfī rhythmic recitation, accompanied by bodily swaying and at gradually increasing tempo, serves to induce ecstatic experience of what Šūfīs call the unitive state. *Shahādah* in this esoteric sense may be said to contain "all metaphysics. . . . It negates all relativity and multiplicity from the Absolute and returns all positive qualities back to God. . . . Through its repetition this Unity comes to leave its permanent imprint upon the human soul and integrates it into its Center" (Seyyid Hossein Nasr, *Islam and the Plight of Modern Man*, London, 1975).

[See also *Worship and Cultic Life*, article on Muslim Worship.]

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SHAHRASTĀNĪ, AL- (1086–1153), more fully, Abū al-Faṭḥ Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Muslim theologian, heresiographer, and historian of religions. His extant biographical profile, derived from the thirteenth-century biographical dictionary of Ibn Khallikān, remains thin. He was born in 1086 in the town of Shahrastān in Khorasan (Iran). There he obtained his earliest education, studying both jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and theology (*kalām*) under accepted masters. He aligned himself with the dominant Ash'arī school of *kalām*, although his independent intellect led him to declare the shortcomings as well as the benefits of al-Ash'arī's system.

The formative period in his life began at age thirty. On his return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, he stopped in Baghdad for three years to pursue further theological studies. His presence was forceful: by his interaction with some of the finest religious minds of his generation he gained respect as the most articulate exponent of

Ash'arī *kalām* at the prestigious Baghdad Niẓāmīyah. After leaving Baghdad he briefly engaged his theological peers in debate at Jurjānīyah and Nishapur then resettled in Shahrastān, where he spent the remainder of his life as a teacher and author until his death in 1153.

Among al-Shahrastānī's several writings, only one, *Kitāb nihāyat al-iqdām fī 'ilm al-kalām* (The Height of Daring in the Science of Theology), has been critically edited and translated into English. His most influential work is *Kitāb al-milal wa-al-niḥal* (The Book of Sects and Creeds). In it al-Shahrastānī attempts, as its title implies, an extended investigation into religious sects and philosophical groups. It has been frequently cited, by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, as the most significant Muslim heresiography of the premodern period. It surpasses its predecessors—al-Baghdādī's *Farq bayn al-firaq* (Difference among Differences), al-Isfarā'īnī's *Tabṣīr fī al-dīn* (Clarification in Religion), and Ibn Ḥazm's *Fīṣal fī al-milal* (Distinctions among Sects)—in objectivity and insight as well as detail and scope.

Al-Shahrastānī's scholarship rests on the shoulders of his Muslim predecessors; he interprets what they only report. Among the novel aspects of his eclectic methodology is his reliance on a group of Neoplatonic spiritualists known as the Sabians, with whom he probably came into contact while in Baghdad and to whom he ascribes both a limited concept of prophecy and a rational system of statutes and ordinances. By upgrading the theological status of the Sabians, he is able to stretch the category of *ahl al-kitāb* ("people of the Book") to accommodate non-Muslims like the Sabians, including Indian Brahmans, Buddhists, and even some enlightened idolaters, into an ecumenical Muslim worldview.

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BRUCE B. LAWRENCE

SHĀH WALĪ ALLĀH. See Walī Allāh, Shāh.

SHAIVISM. See Śaivism.

SHAKERS. Members of the American religious group the United Society of Believers in Christ's Second Appearing are popularly called Shakers. One of the longest-lived and most influential religious communitarian groups in America, the Shakers originated in 1747 near Manchester, England, in a breakaway from the Quakers led by Jane and James Wardley. The group may also have been influenced by Camisard millenarians who had fled from France to England to escape the persecutions that followed revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. The nickname Shaking Quaker, or Shaker, was applied to the movement because of its unstructured and highly emotional services, during which members sang, shouted, danced, spoke in tongues, and literally shook with emotion. Under the leadership of Ann Lee, a Manchester factory worker who became convinced that celibacy was essential for salvation, the core of the Shakers emigrated to America in 1774 and settled two years later near Albany, New York. Until Lee's death in 1784 the Shakers remained a loosely knit group that adhered to Lee's personal leadership and to what they viewed as a millenarian restoration and fulfillment of the early Christian faith. [See *the biography of Lee.*]

During the 1780s and 1790s under the leadership of two of Ann Lee's American converts, Joseph Meacham and Lucy Wright, Shakerism developed from a charismatic movement into a more routinized organization. Meacham and Wright oversaw the establishment of parallel and equal men's and women's orders. Adherents lived together in celibate communities and practiced communal ownership of property inspired by the Christian communism of *Acts* 2:44–45. Supreme authority was vested in the ministry at New Lebanon, New York, usually two men and two women, one of whom headed the entire society. Each settlement was divided into "families"—smaller, relatively self-sufficient communities of thirty to one hundred men and women living together under the same roof but strictly separated in all their activities. By 1800 eleven settlements with sixteen hundred members were functioning in New York, Mas-

sachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine. A second wave of expansion, inspired by the Kentucky Revival and drawing heavily on the indefatigable Richard McNemar, a "new light" Presbyterian minister who converted to Shakerism, led to the establishment of seven additional settlements, in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana, by 1826.

The high point of Shaker membership and the last major effort to revitalize the society came during the decade of "spiritual manifestations" that began in 1837. Frequently called "Mother Ann's work" because many of the revelations purportedly came from the spirit of Ann Lee and showed her continuing concern for her followers, the period saw a rich outpouring of creativity in new forms of worship, song, and dance, including extreme trance and visionary phenomena. Following the great Millerite disappointments of 1843 and 1844 when the world failed to come to a literal end, hundreds of Millerites joined the Shakers, bringing membership to a peak of some six thousand by the late 1840s. Thereafter the group entered into a long, slow decline. The loss of internal momentum and the changing conditions of external society led the Shakers to be viewed increasingly not as a dynamic religious movement but as a pleasant anachronism in which individuals who could not function in the larger society could find refuge. As late as 1900 there were more than one thousand Shakers, but today the group has dwindled to virtual extinction.

As the largest and most successful religious communitarian group in nineteenth-century America, the Shakers attracted the attention of numerous visitors, writers, and creators of more ephemeral communal experiments. The Shakers were known for their neat, well-planned, and successful villages; their functional architecture, simple furniture, and fine crafts; their distinctive songs, dances, and rituals; and their ingenuity in agriculture and mechanical invention. They also were sometimes criticized because of their sophisticated and highly unorthodox theology, which stressed a dual godhead combining male and female elements equally; perfectionism and continuing revelation; and the necessity of celibacy for the highest religious life. They were unique among American religious groups in giving women formal equality with men at every level of religious leadership, and they created a fully integrated subculture that has increasingly come to be viewed with interest and respect.

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LAWRENCE FOSTER

SHAMANISM. [To explore the nature of shamanic ecstasy, the shamanic vocation, and the role of the shaman in society, this entry consists of four articles:

- An Overview
- Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanism
- North American Shamanism
- South American Shamanism

The first article discusses the origin and history of the term and its application to phenomena in various religious traditions. The companion articles focus on three areas of the world where shamanism occupies a central place in the religious life of traditional cultures.]

An Overview

Shamanism in the strict sense is preeminently a religious phenomenon of Siberia and Inner Asia. The word comes to us, through the Russian, from the Tunguz *šaman*. Throughout the immense area comprising the central and northern regions of Asia, the magico-religious life of society centers on the shaman. This, of course, does not mean that he is the one and only manipulator of the sacred, nor that religious activity is completely usurped by him. In many tribes the sacrificing priest coexists with the shaman, not to mention the fact that every head of a family is also the head of the domestic cult. Nevertheless, the shaman remains the dominating figure, for throughout the vast area of Asia in which the ecstatic experience is considered the religious experience *par excellence*, the shaman, and he alone, is the great master of ecstasy. A first definition of the complex phenomenon of shamanism—and perhaps the least hazardous—is that it is a technique of ecstasy.

As such, shamanism was documented and described by the earliest travelers in the various regions of Siberia and Inner Asia. [See, for example, Buriat Religion.] Later, similar magico-religious phenomena were observed in North and South America, Indonesia, Oceania, and elsewhere. Because of their shared characteristics, there is every reason to study them together with Siberian and Inner Asian shamanism. But the presence of a shamanic complex in one region or another does not necessarily mean that the magico-religious life of the corresponding people is crystallized around shamanism. This can occur (as, for example, in certain parts of Indonesia), but it is not the most usual state of affairs. Generally, shamanism coexists with other forms of magic and religion. As is well known, magic and magicians are to be found more or less all over the world, whereas shamanism exhibits a particular magical specialty, such as mastery over fire, or magical flight. By virtue of this fact, though the shaman is (among other things) a magician, not every magician can properly be termed a shaman. The same distinction must be applied in regard to shamanic healing; every medicine man is a healer, but the shaman employs a method that is unique to him. As for the shamanic techniques of ecstasy, they do not exhaust all the varieties of ecstatic experience documented in the history of religions and religious ethnology. [See Ecstasy.] Hence not every ecstatic can be considered a shaman; the shaman “specializes” in the trance state, during which his soul is believed to leave his body and to ascend to the sky or descend to the underworld.

A similar distinction is also necessary to define the shaman's relation to spirits. All through the primitive

and modern worlds we find individuals who profess to maintain relations with spirits, whether they are possessed by them or control them. [See Spirit Possession.] But the shaman controls his helping spirits, in the sense that he is able to communicate with the dead, demons, and nature spirits without thereby becoming their instrument. To be sure, shamans are sometimes found to be possessed, but these are rather exceptional cases. In Inner and Northeast Asia the chief methods of recruiting shamans are (1) hereditary transmission of the shamanic profession and (2) spontaneous vocation (“call” or “election”). There are also cases of individuals who become shamans of their own free will (as, for example, among the Altaic Turkic peoples) or by the will of the clan (as with the Tunguz), but these self-made shamans are considered less powerful than those who have inherited the profession or who have obeyed the call of the gods and spirits.

However selected, a shaman is not recognized as such until after he has received two kinds of teaching: (1) ecstatic (dreams, trances, etc.) and (2) traditional (shamanic techniques, names and functions of the spirits, mythology and genealogy of the clan, secret language, etc.). This twofold course of instruction, given by the spirits and the old master shamans, is equivalent to an initiation. Sometimes the initiation is public and constitutes an autonomous ritual in itself. But absence of this kind of ritual in no sense implies absence of an initiation; the latter can perfectly well occur in a dream or in the neophyte's ecstatic experience. The syndrome of the shaman's mystical vocation is easily recognized. Among many Siberian and Inner Asian tribes, the youth who is called to be a shaman attracts attention by his strange behavior; for example, he seeks solitude, becomes absentminded, loves to roam in the woods or unfrequented places, has visions, and sings in his sleep. In some instances this period of incubation is marked by quite serious symptoms; among the Yakuts, the young man sometimes has fits of fury and easily loses consciousness, hides in the forest, feeds on the bark of trees, throws himself into water and fire, cuts himself with knives. The future shamans among the Tunguz, as they approach maturity, go through a hysterical or hysteroid crisis, but sometimes their vocation manifests itself at an earlier age—the boy runs away into the mountains and remains there for a week or more, feeding on animals, which he tears to pieces with his teeth. He returns to the village, filthy, bloodstained, his clothes torn and his hair disordered, and it is only after ten or more days have passed that he begins to babble incoherent words.

Even in the case of hereditary shamanism, the future shaman's election is preceded by a change in behavior. The souls of the shaman ancestors of a family choose a

young man among their descendants; he becomes absentminded and moody, delights in solitude, has prophetic visions, and sometimes undergoes attacks that make him unconscious. During this period, the Buriats believe, the young man's soul is carried away by spirits; received in the palace of the gods, it is instructed by his shaman ancestors in the secrets of the profession, the forms and names of the gods, the worship and names of the spirits. It is only after this first initiation that the youth's soul returns and resumes control of his body (see the examples quoted in Eliade, 1964, pp. 13ff.). This hereditary form of the transmission of the vocation is also known in other parts of the world (*ibid.*, pp. 21ff.).

A man may also become a shaman following an accident or a highly unusual event—for example, among the Buriats, the Soyot, and the Inuit (Eskimo), after being struck by lightning, or falling from a high tree, or successfully undergoing an ordeal that can be homologized with an initiatory ordeal, as in the case of an Inuit who spent five days in icy water without his clothes becoming wet.

Shamanism and Psychopathology. The strange behavior of future shamans has not failed to attract the attention of scholars, and since the middle of the past century several attempts have been made to explain the phenomenon of shamanism as a mental disorder (*ibid.*, pp. 25ff.). But the problem was wrongly put. On the one hand, it is not true that shamans always are, or always have to be, neuropathics; on the other hand, those among them who had been ill became shamans precisely because they had succeeded in healing themselves. Very often in Siberia, when the shamanic vocation manifests itself as some form of illness or as an epileptic seizure, the initiation is equivalent to a cure. To obtain the gift of shamanizing presupposes precisely the solution of the psychic crisis brought on by the first symptoms of election or call.

But if shamanism cannot simply be identified with a psychopathological phenomenon, it is nevertheless true that the shamanic vocation often implies a crisis so deep that it sometimes borders on madness. And since the youth cannot become a shaman until he has resolved this crisis, it is clear that it plays the role of a mystical initiation. The shock provoked in the future shaman by the discovery that he has been chosen by the gods or the spirits is by that very fact valued as an "initiatory illness." His sufferings are exactly like the tortures of initiation. Just as, in puberty rites or rites for entrance into a secret society, the novice is "killed" by semidivine or demonic beings, so the future shaman sees in dreams his own body dismembered by demons. The initiatory rituals peculiar to Siberian and Inner Asian shamanism include a symbolic ascent to Heaven

up a tree or pole; in a dream or a series of waking dreams, the sick man chosen by the gods or spirits undertakes his celestial journey to the world tree. The psychopathology of the shamanic vocation is not profane; it does not belong to ordinary symptomatology. It has an initiatory structure and significance; in short, it reproduces a traditional mystical pattern.

Once healed of his initiatory psychopathological crisis, the new shaman displays a strong and healthy constitution, a powerful intelligence, and more energy than others of the male group. Among the Buriats the shamans are the principal guardians of the rich oral literature. The poetic vocabulary of a Yakut shaman contains twelve thousand words, whereas the ordinary language—the only language known to the rest of the community—has only four thousand. The same observation applies to the shamans of other regions, such as North and South America, Oceania, and Australia (see some examples in Eliade, 1964, pp. 29ff.).

Initiatory Ordeals of Siberian Shamans. Relating their ecstatic initiations, the Siberian shamans maintain that they "die" and lie inanimate for from three to seven days in their yurts or in solitary places. During this time, they are cut up by demons or by their ancestral spirits; their bones are cleaned, the flesh scraped off, the body fluids thrown away, and their eyes torn from their sockets. According to a Yakut informant, the spirits carry the future shaman's soul to the underworld and shut him in a house for three years. Here he undergoes his initiation; the spirits cut off his head (which they set to one side, for the novice must watch his own dismemberment with his own eyes) and hack his body to bits, which are later distributed among the spirits of various sicknesses. It is only on this condition that the future shaman will obtain the power of healing. His bones are then covered with new flesh, and in some cases he is also given new blood. According to another Yakut informant, black devils cut up the future shaman's body and throw the pieces in different directions as offerings, then thrust a lance into his head and cut off his jawbone. A Yurak Samoyed shaman told Toivo Lehtisalo that spirits had attacked him and hacked him to pieces, also cutting off his hands. For seven days and nights he lay unconscious on the ground, while his soul was in Heaven.

From a long and eventful autobiography that an Avam Samoyed shaman confided to A. A. Popov, I shall select a few significant episodes. Stricken with smallpox, the future shaman remained unconscious for three days, so nearly dead that on the third day he was almost buried. He saw himself go down to Hell, and after many adventures he was carried to an island, in the middle of which stood a young birch tree, which

reached up to Heaven. It was the Tree of the Lord of the Earth, who gave him a branch of it to make himself a drum. Next he came to a mountain. Passing through an opening, he met a naked man plying the bellows at an immense fire on which was a kettle. The man caught him with a hook, cut off his head, chopped his body to bits, and put the pieces into the kettle. There he boiled the body for three years, and then forged him a head on an anvil. Finally he fished out the bones, which were floating in a river, put them together, and covered them with flesh. During his adventures in the otherworld, the future shaman met several semidivine personages, in human or animal form, each of whom instructed him in the secrets of the healing art. When he awoke in his yurt, among his relatives, he was initiated and could begin to shamanize.

A Tunguz shaman relates that, during his initiatory illness, his shaman ancestors pierced him with arrows until he lost consciousness and fell to the ground; then they cut off his flesh, drew out his bones, and counted them before him; if one had been missing, he could not have become a shaman. According to the Buriats the candidate is tortured by his shaman ancestors, who strike him, cut up his body with a knife, and cook his flesh. A Teleut woman became a shamaness after having a vision in which unknown men cut her body to pieces and boiled it in a pot. According to the traditions of the Altaic shamans, their ancestral spirits open their bellies, eat their flesh, and drink their blood (see examples in Eliade, 1964, pp. 42ff.).

The ecstatic experience of the initiatory dismemberment of the body followed by a renewal of organs is also known in other preliterate societies. The Inuit believe that an animal (bear, walrus, etc.) wounds the candidate, tears him to pieces, or devours him; then new flesh grows around his bones. In South America, during the initiation of the Araucanian shaman, the master makes the spectators believe that he exchanges the novice's eyes and tongue for others and puts a stick through his abdomen. At Malekula, in the South Pacific, the initiation of the medicine man includes, among other things, the novice's dismemberment: the master cuts off his arms, feet, and head, and then puts them back in place. Among the Dayak, the *manangs* (shamans) say that they cut off the candidate's head, remove the brain, and wash it, thus giving him a clearer mind. Finally, cutting up the body and the exchange of viscera are essential rites in some initiations of Australian medicine men (ibid., pp. 59ff.). [See also Dismemberment.]

One of the specific characteristics of shamanic initiations, aside from the candidate's dismemberment, is his reduction to the state of a skeleton. We find this motif

not only in the accounts of the crises and sicknesses of those who have been chosen by the spirits to become shamans but also in the experiences of those who have acquired their shamanic powers through their own efforts, after a long and arduous quest. Thus, for example, among the Inuit group known as the Ammasilik, the apprentice spends long hours in his snow hut, meditating. At a certain moment, he falls "dead" and remains lifeless for three days and nights; during this period an enormous polar bear devours all his flesh and reduces him to a skeleton. It is only after his mystical experience that the apprentice receives the gift of shamanizing. The *angakkoqs*, or shamans, of the Iglulik Inuit are able in thought to strip their bodies of flesh and blood and to contemplate their own skeletons for long periods. Visualizing one's own death at the hands of demons and final reduction to the state of a skeleton are favorite meditations in Indo-Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhism. Finally, it is worth noting that the skeleton is quite often represented on the Siberian shaman's costume (ibid., pp. 62ff., 158ff.).

Public Rites of Shamanic Initiations. Among the public initiation ceremonies of Siberian shamans, those of the Buriats are among the most interesting. The principal rite includes an ascent. A strong birch tree is set up in the yurt, with its roots on the hearth and its crown projecting through the smoke hole. The birch is called *udeši burkhan*, "the guardian of the door," for it opens the door of Heaven to the shaman. The birch will always remain in his tent, serving as the distinguishing mark of the shaman's residence. On the day of his consecration, the candidate climbs the birch to the top (in some traditions, he carries a sword in one hand) and, emerging through the smoke hole, shouts to summon the aid of the gods. After this, the master shaman, the apprentice, and the entire audience go in procession to a place far from the village, where, on the eve of the ceremony, a large number of birches have been set upright on the ground. The procession halts by a particular birch, a goat is sacrificed, and the candidate, stripped to the waist, has his head, eyes, and ears anointed with blood, while the other shamans play their drums. The master shaman now climbs a birch and cuts nine notches in the top of its trunk. The candidate then climbs it, followed by the other shamans. As they climb they all fall—or pretend to fall—into ecstasy. According to G. N. Potanin, the candidate has to climb nine birches, which, like the nine notches cut by the master shaman, symbolize the nine heavens (*Ocherki severo-zapadnoi Mongolii*, 4 vols., Saint Petersburg, 1881–1883).

In the initiatory rite of the Buriat shaman, the candidate is believed to ascend to Heaven for his consecra-

tion. The climb to Heaven by the aid of a tree or pole is also the essential rite in the séances of the Altaic shamans. The birch or pole is likened to the tree or pillar that stands at the center of the world and that connects the three cosmic zones—Earth, Heaven, and Hell. The shaman can also reach the center of the world by beating his drum, for the body of the drum is supposed to be made from a branch taken from the cosmic tree. Listening to the sound of his drum, the shaman falls into ecstasy and flies to the tree, that is, to the center of the world (see Eliade, 1964, pp. 115ff.). [See also Flight.]

Techniques of Ecstasy. Whether he is chosen by superhuman beings or himself seeks to draw their attention and obtain their favors, the shaman is an individual who succeeds in having mystical experiences. In the sphere of shamanism the mystical experience is expressed in the shaman's trance, real or feigned. Shamanistic ecstasy signifies the soul's flight to Heaven, its wanderings about the earth, or its descent to the subterranean world, among the dead. The shaman undertakes these ecstatic journeys for four reasons: first, to meet the celestial god face to face and bring him an offering from the community; second, to seek the soul of a sick man, which has supposedly wandered away from his body or been carried off by demons; third, to guide the soul of a dead man to its new abode; or fourth, to add to his knowledge by frequenting higher nonhuman beings.

Through his initiation, the shaman learns what he must do when his soul abandons the body—and, first of all, how to orient himself in the unknown regions that he enters during his ecstasy. He learns to explore the new planes of existence disclosed by his ecstatic experiences. He knows the road to the center of the world: the hole in the sky through which he can fly up to the highest heaven, or the aperture in the earth through which he can descend to the underworld. He is forewarned of the obstacles that he will meet on his journeys, and knows how to overcome them. In short, he knows the paths that lead to Heaven and Hell. All this he has learned during his training in solitude, or under the guidance of the master shamans.

Because of his ability to leave his body with impunity, the shaman can, if he so wishes, act in the manner of a spirit: he flies through the air, he becomes invisible, he perceives things at great distances; he mounts to Heaven or descends to Hell, sees the souls of the dead and can capture them, and is impervious to fire. The exhibition of certain *faqir*-like accomplishments during ritual séances, especially the so-called fire tricks, is intended to convince spectators that the shaman has as-

simulated the mode of being of spirits. The ability to turn into an animal, to kill at a distance, and to foretell the future are also among the powers of spirits; by exhibiting such powers, the shaman proclaims that he shares in the spirits' condition.

Celestial Ascents and Descents to the Underworld. The Buriats, the Yakuts, and other Siberian tribes speak of "white" shamans and "black" shamans, the former having relations with the gods, the latter with the spirits, especially evil spirits. Their costumes differ, being—as among the Buriats—white for the former and blue for the latter. The Altaic "white" shaman himself sacrifices the horse offered to the god of heaven; afterward, in ecstasy, he conducts the animal's soul on its journey to the throne of Bai Ülgen, lord of the upperworld. Putting on his ceremonial costume, the shaman invokes a multitude of spirits, beats his drum, and begins his celestial ascent. He laboriously mimes the difficult passing through heaven after heaven to the ninth and, if he is really powerful, to the twelfth or even higher. When he has gone as high as his powers permit, he stops and humbly addresses Bai Ülgen, imploring his protection and his blessings. The shaman learns from the god if the sacrifice has been accepted and receives predictions concerning the weather and the coming harvest. This episode is the culminating moment of the ecstasy: the shaman collapses, exhausted, and remains motionless and dumb. After a time he rubs his eyes, appears to wake from a deep sleep, and greets those present as if after a long absence. [See also Ascension.]

The Altaic shaman's celestial ascent has its counterpart in his descent to the underworld. [See Descent into the Underworld.] This ceremony is far more difficult, and though it can be undertaken by both "white" and "black" shamans, it is naturally the specialty of the latter. The shaman makes a vertical descent down the seven successive subterranean levels, or regions, called *pudak*, "obstacles." He is accompanied by his dead ancestors and his helping spirits. At the seventh "obstacle" he sees the palace of Erlik Khan, lord of the dead, built of stone and black clay and defended in every direction. The shaman utters a long prayer to Erlik, then returns to the yurt and tells the audience the results of his journey.

The Shaman as Psychopomp. These descents to the underworld are undertaken especially to find and bring back a sick person's soul, or to escort the soul of the deceased to Erlik's realm. In 1884 V. V. Radlov published the description of a séance organized to escort the soul of a woman to the underworld forty days after her death. The ceremony takes place in the evening. The shaman begins by circling the yurt, beating his drum;

then he enters the tent and, going to the fire, invokes the deceased. Suddenly the shaman's voice changes; he begins to speak in a high-pitched falsetto, for it is really the dead woman who is speaking. She complains that she does not know the road, that she is afraid to leave her relatives, and so on, but finally consents to the shaman's leading her, and the two set off together for the subterranean realm. When they arrive, the shaman finds that the dead refuse to permit the newcomer to enter. Prayers proving ineffectual, brandy is offered; the séance gradually becomes more lively, even to the point of the grotesque, for the souls of the dead, through the shaman's voice, begin quarreling and singing together; finally they consent to receive the dead woman. The second part of the ritual represents the return journey; the shaman dances and shouts until he falls to the ground unconscious (*Aus Siberien: Lose Blätter aus dem Tagebuche eines reisenden Linguisten*, Leipzig, 1884).

Medical Cures. The principal function of the shaman in Siberia and Inner Asia is healing. Several conceptions of the cause of illness are found in the area, but that of the "rape of the soul" is by far the most widespread. Disease is attributed to the soul's having strayed away or been stolen, and treatment is in principle reduced to finding it, capturing it, and obliging it to resume its place in the patient's body. The Buriat shaman holds a preliminary séance to determine if the patient's soul has strayed away or if it has been stolen from him and is a captive in Erlik's prison. The shaman begins to search for the soul; if he finds it near the village, its reinstallation in the body is easy. If not, he searches the forests, the steppes, and even the bottom of the sea. Failure to find it indicates that it is a prisoner of Erlik, and the only recourse is to offer costly sacrifices. Erlik sometimes demands another soul in place of the one he has imprisoned; the problem then is to find one that is available. With the patient's consent, the shaman decides who the victim will be. While the latter is asleep, the shaman, taking the form of an eagle, descends on him and, tearing out his soul, goes with it to the realm of the dead and presents it to Erlik, who then allows him to take away the patient's soul. The victim dies soon afterward, and the patient recovers. But he has gained only a respite, for he too will die three, seven, or nine years later.

Survival and Metamorphosis of Some Shamanic Traditions. Shamanic symbolism and practices were well known in Tibet, China, and the Far East (see Eliade, 1964, pp. 428ff.). The Bon shamans were believed to use their drums as vehicles to convey them through the air. Their cure included seeking the patient's soul, a shamanic ceremony popular also with the Tibetan exorcists.

In the Tantric rite named Gcod, the practitioner offers his own flesh to be eaten by demons: they decapitate him, hack him to pieces, then devour his flesh and drink the blood. Since sickness is interpreted as the flight of the soul, the Lolo shamans of southern Yunnan, as well as the Karen "doctors" of Burma, read a long litany imploring the patient's soul to return from the distant mountains, forests, or fields. Among the Lolo and the Mea of Indochina, the shamans climb a double "ladder of knives," symbolizing their ascent to Heaven. A great number of shamanic symbols and rituals are to be found among the Tibeto-Burmese Moso (or Na-hsi) inhabiting southwestern China: ascension to Heaven, accompanying the soul of the dead, and so forth. In China, "magical flight" or "journeying in spirit," as well as many ecstatic dances, present a specific shamanic structure (see examples quoted in Eliade, 1964, pp. 447–461). In Japan shamanism is practiced almost exclusively by women. They summon the dead person's soul from the beyond, expel disease and other evil, and ask their god the name of the medicine to be used. According to Charles Haguenaux, the essential functions of a female shaman consist in causing a soul to descend into a house support (a sacred post or any other substitute) and incarnating a soul in order to make it serve as intermediary between the dead and the living, and then sending it back (cited in Eliade, 1964, p. 464).

A number of shamanic conceptions and techniques have been identified in the mythology and folklore of the ancient Germans (*ibid.*, pp. 379ff.). To quote only one example: Óðinn descends on his eight-hoofed horse, Sleipnir, to Hel and bids a long-dead prophetess rise from the grave and answer his questions. In ancient Greece, Abaris flies through the air on his arrow. Hermotimos of Clazomenae had the power of leaving his body "for many years"; in his long ecstasy he journeyed to great distances (see other examples, *ibid.*, pp. 389ff.). Shamanic practices are also to be found in ancient India as well as in the traditions of the Scythians, Caucasians, and Iranians (*ibid.*, pp. 394–421). Among the aboriginal tribes of India, of particular interest is the shamanism of Savara (Saura), characterized by an "initiatory marriage" with a "spirit girl," similar to the practice of the Siberian Nanay (Goldi) and Yakuts (*ibid.*, pp. 72ff., 421ff.).

Some Conclusions. It is as yet impossible to reconstruct the prehistory and earliest history of different shamanisms. But we can appraise the religious and cultural importance of the shamans in those archaic societies dominated by a shamanistic ideology. To begin with, the shamans have played an essential role in the defense of the psychic integrity of the community. They

are preeminently the antidemonic champions; they combat not only demons and disease, but also the "black" magicians. In a general way, it can be said that shamanism defends life, health, fertility, and the world of "light," against death, disease, sterility, disasters, and the world of "darkness."

It is as a further result of his ability to travel in the supernatural worlds and to see the superhuman beings (gods, demons, spirits of the dead, etc.) that the shaman has been able to contribute decisively to the knowledge of death. In all probability many features of funerary geography, as well as some themes of the mythology of death, are the result of the ecstatic experiences of shamans. The lands that the shaman sees and the personages that he meets during his ecstatic journeys in the beyond are minutely described by the shaman himself, during or after his trance. The unknown and terrifying world of death assumes form and is organized in accordance with particular patterns; finally, it displays a structure and, in the course of time, becomes familiar and acceptable. In turn, the supernatural inhabitants of the world of death become visible; they show a form, display a personality, even a biography. Little by little the world of the dead becomes knowable, and death itself is evaluated primarily as a rite of passage to a spiritual mode of being. In the last analysis, the accounts of the shamans' ecstatic journeys contribute to a "spiritualizing" of the world of the dead, at the same time that they enrich it with wondrous forms and figures.

There are certain likenesses between the accounts of shamanic ecstasies and certain epic themes in oral literature (see Eliade, 1964, pp. 213ff., 311ff., 368ff.). The shaman's adventures in the otherworld, the ordeals that he undergoes in his ecstatic descents below and ascents to the sky, suggest the adventures of the figures in popular tales and the heroes of epic literature. Probably a large number of epic subjects or motifs, as well as many characters, images, and clichés of epic literature, are, finally, of ecstatic origin, in the sense that they were borrowed from the narratives of shamans describing their journeys and adventures in the superhuman worlds.

It is likewise probable that the preecstatic euphoria constituted one of the universal sources of lyric poetry. In preparing his trance, the shaman drums, summons his spirit helpers, speaks a secret language or the "animal language," imitating the cries of beasts and especially the songs of birds. He ends by attaining a "second state" that provides the impetus for linguistic creation and the rhythms of lyric poetry.

Something must also be said concerning the dramatic

structure of the shamanic séance. The sometimes highly elaborate staging of this session obviously exercises a beneficial influence on the patient. In addition, every genuinely shamanic séance ends as a spectacle unequaled in the world of daily experience. The fire tricks, the "miracles" of the rope-trick or mango-trick type, the exhibition of magical feats, reveal another world—the fabulous world of the gods and magicians, the world in which everything seems possible, where the dead return to life and the living die only to live again, where one can disappear and reappear instantaneously, where the laws of nature are abolished and a certain superhuman freedom from such structures is exemplified and made dazzlingly present.

It is difficult for us, modern men that we are, to imagine the repercussions of such a spectacle in a "primitive" community. The shamanic "miracles" not only confirm and reinforce the patterns of the traditional religion, they also stimulate and feed the imagination, demolish the barriers between dream and present reality, and open windows upon worlds inhabited by the gods, the dead, and the spirits.

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MIRCEA ELIADE

Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanism

Shamanism is a fundamental and striking feature of Siberian and Inner Asian cultures. The religions of these regions have therefore been described as shamanistic. Shamanism itself is not, however, a religion, but rather a complex of different rites and beliefs surrounding the activities of the shaman connected with very different religious systems. Shamanism is founded on a special technique for achieving ecstasy by means of which the shaman enters an altered state of consciousness, and on the idea that the shaman is accompanied by helping spirits who assist him in this state. While in a state of trance, the shaman is regarded as capable of direct communication with representatives of the otherworld, either by journeying to the supranormal world or by calling the spirits to the séance. He is thus able to help his fellow men in crises believed to be caused by the spirits and to act as a concrete mediator between this world and the otherworld in accompanying a soul to the otherworld, or fetching it from the domain of the spirits. The shaman acts as a healer and as a patron of hunting and fertility, but also as a diviner, the guardian of livelihoods, and so on.

The Origin of Shamanism. The ecological and cultural differences among the peoples of Siberia and Inner Asia are considerable. The way of life of the Arctic sea-mammal hunters and reindeer breeders differs greatly from that of the nomads of the steppe or the

hunters and fishermen of the taiga. It follows that, despite certain basic similarities, the shamanistic complexes are not uniform either. There are variations in the shaman's status in the community, as there are differences, for example, in his ritual accessories or the tradition of beliefs he represents. Tracing the history of shamanism is thus a complicated matter. Shamanism is generally thought to be founded on the animistic concepts of the northern hunting peoples. On the other hand, soul flight, the ability of the shaman to journey to the otherworld, a striking feature of northern and western shamanistic complexes, has led scholars to regard a dualistic concept of the soul as the ideological basis of shamanism. According to this belief, man has one soul confined to the body and a second soul, or part soul, capable of leaving the body freely during sleep, trance, or sickness.

The word *shaman* comes through Russian sources from the Tunguz word *šaman* (*xaman*). There are such varied names for the shaman in Siberia and Inner Asia that these names cannot be used to throw light on the origin of shamanism. A theory was put forward in the nineteenth century that the word derived from the Pali *samaṇa* (Sanskrit, *śramaṇa*) and Chinese *sha-men*. Although this theory has been disproved (Németh, 1913–1914; Laufer, 1917), the cultural-historical foundations of shamanism have been sought in Buddhism or others of the great scriptural traditions of the East. It is indeed a fact that Buddhism and Lamaism had a significant effect on the development of shamanism among the Evenki (a Tunguz people), the Mongols, and the Buriats. The wide distribution of the phenomenon of shamanism and the endemicity of certain of its basic ideas—soul flight, soul dualism, the link with animal ceremonialism—in Arctic and sub-Arctic cultures do, however, support the view that the roots of shamanism lie in the Paleolithic hunting cultures. In his fundamental work *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* (1964), Mircea Eliade regards the ideas of ecstatic experience and soul flight as the basis of shamanism, and asserts that shamanism grew out of the ancient Paleolithic inheritance, fertilized by Buddhism, Lamaism, and even more ancient East and South Asian influences.

The Shaman in the Community. The small hunting and fishing communities of northern Siberia have provided a setting for shamanism completely different from that of the agrarian cultures of Inner Asia rooted to one locale. Both the status of the shaman in the community and his tasks depend on the supporting culture, its economy, the nature of its social structure, and its practice of religion as a whole. Variations in the status of the shaman and the importance of shamanism as an institution spring from the relationship between the

shaman and the group supporting him as well as from the nature of the particular group.

The clan shaman. The Yukagir and the Evenki retained their clan system until relatively recent times, and their shamanism is clearly connected with the organization of the clan. Even at the end of the nineteenth century the Yukagir, a Siberian tribal people, lived off deer hunting and reindeer breeding, the latter having been assimilated from the Evenki. The population, consisting of the remains of formerly larger clans, lived in camps or villages of related families. The shaman, who had to be related to the clan by ties of blood, was one of the leaders of the clan and acted as its general patron. It was also his job to maintain contact between the living and the dead members of the clan and to arrange the shamanizing connected with the calendrical hunting rites. It was during these rites that the shaman would retrieve the souls of the animals to be hunted from the keeper of the species in the otherworld store. The shaman helped individual members of the clan by curing diseases and infertility, by prophesying, and by preventing misfortune threatened by the spirits.

A highly advanced clan system existed among the Evenki, who were spread over a wide area and were divided into different occupational categories: hunters and fishermen, reindeer breeders, and hunters breeding horses and cattle. Their chief social unit was the clan, which had its own area or "river"; the clans were in turn grouped into larger tribes. One of the leaders of the clan was a shaman. Such special status among the Evenki living along the Podkamennaia Tunguska is illustrated by the belief that the shaman's hair may not be cut because it is the dwelling place of the souls of the members of the clan. As the protector and leader of his clan, their shaman set up a *marylya* (a fence made of spirits) around the clan's lands; he also possessed knowledge of the mythical clan river leading to the otherworld. The clan shaman held séances on behalf of his supporters, shamanizing in the course of hunting rites and helping individual members of the clan. At the end of the nineteenth century there also were professional Evenk shamans who would shamanize on behalf of members of a different clan for a fee. These "false" shamans were not accorded the honored and important position of the clan shaman.

The small-group shaman. The shamans in circles of neighbors and relatives among the hunters of northwestern and northern Siberia had a relationship with their supporters comparable to that of the clan shaman. For example, the Nganasani (a Samoyed people) were spread over such a wide area that the clan was of no significance as an economic or local unit. It retained its significance mainly in religious connections, such as in

annual rituals. On an occasion such as the clean-tent festival of the Nganasani, held in February when the sun began to rise again, the shaman might act as representative of the clan. He did not, however, achieve a status symbolizing clan unity and the welfare of the clan. He was equipped by his own small community, the tent community or village whose members he assisted as a healer, a bringer of success in hunting, a guardian at difficult births, and so on.

The professional shaman of the north. The relationship between the shaman of the north and his supporters was not as close as that described above in northeastern Siberia. The Chukchi and the Koriak—small tribal peoples indigenous to Siberia—fell into two occupational categories interacting closely with one another: reindeer breeders and sea-mammal hunters. They showed no signs of a clear clan system, their basic social unit being the hunting communities and nomad camps made up of relatives and neighbors. The annual occupational rites were handled by the family or occupational unit, one typical feature being family shamanism. In this type of shamanism, which cannot be considered shamanism proper, anyone attending a festival could drum and dance in the manner of a shaman. Since the occupational and other important rites were performed among the family or kin, the shaman was not tied to any clearly defined band of supporters. He was a healer and a resolver of various incidental crises. The status of the shaman who was able to choose his clients freely depended on his personal skills. Thus the performance of various tricks played a considerable part in the competition between shamans.

Shamanism in the south. The hierarchical community of the nomads and farmers of southern Siberia and Inner Asia (e.g., the Yakuts, the Buriats, the Tuvin, the southern Altai, the Khakasy, and the horse-breeding Evenki of Transbaikalia) and the rise in status of the area to an administrative unit (called "patriarchal feudalism" by Soviet scholars) above the clan provided a background to shamanism that differed from that of the northern hunting communities. Under the influence of the Lamaism and Buddhism of the south, the ritual aspects of shamanism and the beliefs concerning the supernatural world here developed in a richer and more complex form than shamanism in the north.

While contact with the clan may be significant, regional factors often determine the shaman's sphere of activities. Since becoming a shaman and the passing down of the shamanic tradition is under the strict control of older shamans, shamanism in the south clearly has more institutionalized forms than in the north. Among the Buriats, for example, a large number of initiated shamans join the new candidate in taking part in

the shamanic initiation ceremony, thus demonstrating the importance of control from within to the institution of shamanism. In addition to acting as a healer and a diviner and carrying out other conventional tasks, the shaman may also assume the role of sacrificial priest. Practices such as the sacrifice made by the Altaic Tatars of a horse to the god in the sky rely on the ability of the shaman to accompany to the otherworld the soul of the animal sacrificed.

Categories of Shamans. In addition to the fundamental differences in the status of shamanism as a whole, shamans differ in their nature and prestige from one ethnic group to another. The Hungarian expert on shamanism Vilmos Diószegi observed on interviewing former Tofa shamans in the late 1950s that they fell into different categories according to clan, the color symbolism of their accoutrements, their power, their skill, and ultimately also their own personal characteristics.

The categories of shaman used by different ethnic groups themselves are evident in the names for types of shamans. For example, the most highly respected shaman among the Entsy (a Samoyed people) was the *bud-tode*, who is in contact with the spirits who live in heaven. The less highly regarded *d'ano* was able to protect humans from evil spirits, and the least respected *sawode* shaman could contact the dead. In the same way the lowest category of shaman among the Nanay (Goldi) was the *siurinka*, shamans who cure the sick. *Nemati* shamans were able both to cure the sick and to perform the shamanizing at the first festival in memory of the dead. Among the shamans with the greatest prestige were the *kasati* shamans, who had command of all shamanic knowledge and who are capable of the most important task of the Nanay shaman, that of accompanying the souls of the dead to the otherworld.

The Yakuts believed that the shaman's prestige was determined by the status of the god who granted him his chief spirit helper, and by the height of the branch on the mythical shaman's tree on which the shaman was instructed by the spirits during his initiation. The division of shamans into black and white, encountered among the Yakuts and elsewhere (e.g., among the Altaic peoples) points to the nature of the spirits with whom the shaman came into contact. White was the color of the sky, black that of the earth. According to the shamanic tradition, the shaman's nature and rank are determined by the spirits initiating him. In practice the distinguishing features were probably the skills and ability to achieve ecstasy of the initiate and the nature of the tradition that he assimilated. A shaman could also rise to a higher category as his knowledge increased. A great shaman often bore the epithet "old."

Initiation. Gaining command of the shamanic tradition and the ecstatic rite technique called for special training on the part of the beginner. The nature and length of the initiation period depended on the position of the shaman in his community and the importance of shamanism in the culture in question. The length of the apprenticeship, the amount and nature of the tradition to be internalized, the initiate's instruction, the number of initiation rites, and the control of the initiate's abilities varied from one region to another. Two features common to all areas were the shaman's meeting of spirits and winning of spirit helpers while in a state of ecstasy and the recognition of a new shaman by his supporters.

The shaman's disease. A potential shaman could be recognized by an abnormal, often highly nervous, disposition. All over Siberia and Inner Asia, selection was often preceded by the shaman's sickness. The first symptoms might be states of mental unbalance, fits of hysteria, periods of seclusion, unusual visions and the hearing of voices, or states of physical torment. Usually the sickness struck at adolescence, but people stricken as adults might also become shaman initiates. It is impossible to give any specific account of the illness from reports of the symptoms. The point is that shamanizing was the only recognized cure. Often a shaman called in to cure the sufferer would teach him how to shamanize.

Scholars such as Waldemar Jochelson, an expert on the tribal peoples indigenous to Siberian and Inner Asia, have compared the shaman's initiatory sickness to hysteria. The healing effect of shamanizing would then mean that the novice, under the instruction of an older shaman, learned to control his ego functions and the regression of hysteria became an ego-controlled regression during the initiation stage. It is significant that shamans suffering from a preliminary sickness have found that repeated shamanizing is a condition for remaining healthy.

The shaman's sickness was interpreted as the call of the spirits to become a shaman; since the task was so dangerous, shamans say they often resisted the call to the very end. Internal compulsion was not the only reason for selection; there could also be external reasons. A young Chukchi, for example, might choose to become a shaman in the hope of gaining wealth and prestige. Among the Evenki the clan elders or clan shaman might select a child of suitable temperament for training as a shaman.

The position of shaman was handed down within the family, especially in the areas of clan shamanism and the professional shamanism of the south. A. F. Anisimov, an expert on the shamanism of the Podkamennaia

Tunguska Evenki, observed that shamans deliberately tried to keep this important position within the family. The inheritance of shamanism is founded on shamanistic ideology. In the northern regions, where selection as shaman was often a matter of incidental vocation, the spirits encountered by the novice were chiefly spirits of nature. The principle of inheritance within the family is a reflection of the notion that the spirits preparing the initiate to become a shaman were ancestor shamans or spirits of nature undertaking the task at the request of the ancestor spirits.

The initiation period. At the start of the initiation period the initiate retired in solitude, learned how to use the drum in seeking ecstatic experiences, and steeped himself in the shamanic tradition. One of his main tasks was to compose his own shaman songs. The songs for calling the spirits sung at séances of Chukchi shamans, for example, were products of the initiation period. In the shamanic view the novice is taught by the spirits; there are, however, reports of situations in which older shamans guide the novice in the art of shamanizing.

The next phase of the initiatory period is one of visions and the hearing of voices, during which the novice undergoes his initiation by the spirits. During these experiences the novice feels that the spirits are actually destroying his old ego, dissecting or boiling it, after which he is to be reassembled as a new shaman, capable of seeing that which is hidden to ordinary men. Thus is repeated the theme of death and rebirth. Despite individual differences the visions follow traditional patterns. For example, among the Samoyeds, the novice is given his spirit helpers by the initiating spirits, and he promises to follow his calling. The handling of his bones, the dismembering and reassembling of his skeleton by the spirits, plays a significant part in the visions describing the shaman's rebirth. In the background here is the idea also found in animal ceremonialism that the bones are the point of attachment for the soul.

Following his initiation by the spirits the shaman still had to prove his powers to his community. He did so at various test shamanizings and through public rites. The small-group shaman of northwestern Siberia acquired his attributes gradually in the course of annual rites. His dress and ritual objects were made by neighbors and relatives who were among his supporters and who also took part in the shamanizings at which these objects were first used. Similarly, great test shamanizings were held in the clan shamanism region and were attended by the entire clan. Through prayers and sacrifices, an ancestor shaman might be asked to indicate a suitable animal for making the shaman's requisites. As

we have seen, the rituals surrounding the initiation of the shaman were most richly developed in the shamanism of the southern regions. The Buriat shaman, for example, promised during a great initiation festival to fulfill the obligations of his profession.

The shaman's initiation was less formal among the tribal peoples of Siberian and Inner Asia than elsewhere. The mysteries surrounding the call of the spirits and the experience of meeting them were paramount; as there were few requisites, the ritual announcement of the new status was not of itself significant. The shaman's later actions proved whether or not he was capable and whether he had gained any supporters.

The Shamanistic Belief Tradition. Some indication of the nature of the shamanistic belief tradition is provided by the visions of the initiation period and the shaman songs describing, for example, the shaman's journey to the otherworld. Although the cosmographic concepts vary greatly over Siberia and Inner Asia, and although the influence of Lamaism and Buddhism is very much in evidence among the southern peoples, there are certain structural features shared by all and of wide distribution. Among these are concepts of a multilevel cosmos, the world above, the middle world inhabited by man, and the world below, which is divided into three, seven, or nine levels. The layers are connected either by the world stream (among the Ket, it is by holy water), which begins in heaven and flows through the earth to the underworld, or by a hole at the North Star in the center of the globe through which the Chukchi, among others, believe it is possible to pass from one layer to another. Besides believing in a multilayered cosmos, the northern peoples in particular believe in the concept of a tentlike upper world, the firmaments spanning a round or square world. Supporting it in the center is the cosmic pillar. Phenomena parallel to the cosmic pillar are the cosmic mountain and the cosmic tree. The latter's counterpart in the shamanistic belief tradition is the shaman's tree, by means of which the shaman might travel from one world level to another.

During his initiation period the novice had to study the structure of the cosmos and above all learn the topography of the otherworld: the paths and rivers leading to the otherworld and the dwellings of the various gods, the guardian spirits, the demons of disease, and the dead. The way to the otherworld was usually described as being fraught with difficulties and dangers. The Nanay shaman, for example, was able to list the landmarks along the road to the kingdom of the dead and the dangers in store along the way.

At the séance the shaman turned to various gods and

spirits as it became necessary. Linked directly with the shamanistic complex were the spirits of his initiation and his ecstatic experiences. In some cases the shaman enters the service of these spirits; at other times, they are at the shaman's command.

The spirits influencing a shaman's initiation in north-eastern Siberia were mainly spirits of nature. One Koriak shaman described how spirits of the wolf, the raven, the bear, the sea gull, and the plover appeared before him in the forest, sometimes in human form, sometimes in the form of an animal, demanding that he enter their service. The Chukchi believed that "everything lives," that even inanimate objects have some sort of soul principle. Thus the shaman's band of spirits might also include various objects, stones, or household utensils. It is significant that there is no difference between the guiding spirits of the initiation period and the spirit helpers proper: the spirits appearing before the novice become his spirit helpers when he is a shaman.

In the small-group shamanism of northwestern Siberia, too, the spirits influencing a shaman's initiation are mainly spirits of nature. The initiation visions of the Nganasani demonstrate that the novice meets a number of spirits who help him in different ways. The selection of a shaman might be made by spirits of nature, such as the spirit of water, who give the novice zoomorphic guides on his journey to the otherworld. The shaman's initiation is performed by special smith spirits, who forge a new shaman on their anvil. The guiding spirits leave the shaman after his ecstatic initiation, by which time he has gotten to know his spirit helpers proper.

The spirits of ancestor shamans play an important part in a shaman's initiation in clan shamanism and the professional shamanism of the south. For example, the Transbaikalia Evenki say that a dead shaman appears before a prospective candidate and orders him to follow. The spirits of ancestor shamans may appear as candidate selectors, as the novice's supranormal teachers, or as initiators carrying out the dissection process, as in the Lower Tunguska region. The spirit of an ancestor shaman usually remains as the shaman's spirit helper proper. Although most of the spirit helpers of, for example, the Evenk shaman are in the form of an animal or a bird, he is usually also supported by shaman's spirits in human form.

Another inherited spirit is the Nanay *ajami*, the tutelary spirit of the novice period, who instructs the novice in matters of the otherworld and provides him with the spirits necessary for shamanizing. The relationship between the *ajami* and the shaman is erotic, the spirit in question being a spirit wife or husband handed down from one shaman to another within the family. Similar

marriagelike relationships between spirit and man are also reported elsewhere. The transvestite shamans among the tribal peoples indigenous to Siberia and Inner Asia, for example, might have a spirit lover.

An important part is played in the initiation tales of Yakut shamans by the Animal Mother and the spirits of ancestor shamans, the evil *abaasy* spirits that may perform the novice's initiation mysteries. The Animal Mother, who is the incarnation of the shaman's *kut* soul, his invisible double, was thought to show itself on the birth or death of a shaman and during his supranormal initiation. The Animal Mother, in the form of a bird with iron feathers, was thought to sit on a branch of the shaman's tree, incubating an egg containing the soul of a novice until the soul hatches from the egg.

The nature and number of spirit helpers proper varies from one ethnic group to another. Among the Ob-Ugrians (i.e., the Khanty and Mansi), the shaman might have seven spirit helpers, most of them in the form of an animal, such as a bear, a deer, a wolf, a horse, a snake, a fish, or a bird. Birds common to the northern regions were the eagle and the owl, as well as various waterfowl, in whose form the shaman was said to travel the underwater routes to the otherworld. The beliefs concerning the relationship between the shaman and his spirits are complex. The shaman might travel in the form of the animal accompanying him; the Yakut shaman, for example, fights other shamans in the form of his Animal Mother, as an elk or a deer. On the other hand, the spirit helpers may accompany him as outside assistants. For example, the Evenk shaman of the Podkamennaia Tunguska region had command over a large band of spirits on his journeys to the underworld.

The Shaman's Activities. The shaman's public activities took place at the *séance*, a ritual performance. While there were many reasons for calling a *séance*, there was a need to make direct contact with representatives of the spirit world in all cases. All the vital elements of shamanism were present at the *séance*: the shaman and his assistant, those in need of assistance, an interested audience, and representatives of the spirit world called on by the shaman.

The shaman's attributes. The ritual objects and the shaman's attributes symbolize the shamanistic worldview. The most important item is the drum. Names for the drum are usually connected with the idea of the shaman's journey. For example, the Transbaikalia Evenki call the drum a boat, while the Yakuts, Buriats, and Soyot call it a horse. In this case the drumstick is a "whip." By means of his drum the shaman "rides" or "flies"; in other words, he achieves an altered state of consciousness. The frame of the drum is made from a

special tree—a representative of the cosmic tree—indicated by the spirits, and the membrane from the skin of an animal also chosen by the spirits. The drum-reviving ceremonies in the Altaic regions indicate that the drum animal represents one of the shamanistic spirits: during these ceremonies the animal from whose skin the membrane was made “comes to life again,” telling of its life and promising to help the shaman. The motifs carved on the drum frame or drawn on the skin likewise symbolize shamanistic spirits and express cosmological concepts.

Although the shaman’s dress, along with the drum, is one of the most striking features of shamanism in northern and Inner Asia, the number and type of attributes varies from one area to another. There is no shaman’s dress proper among the Chukchi. While preparing for a séance the shaman was, like the Inuit (Eskimo) shaman, stripped to the waist. Similarly, the only item that identified the shaman among the Nentsy (a Samoyed people) in the northwest of Siberia was the headdress that he wore. The dresses with the greatest number of symbolic ornaments are to be found in central and southern Siberia and in Inner Asia.

The shaman’s dress is made of leather or cloth, and onto it are sewn pendants of metal, bone, and cloth depicting spirits in animal or human shape or phenomena associated with the supranormal world. On the back of the Yakut shaman’s dress are metal disks, the shaman’s sun and moon, providing light on the dark route to the otherworld. Despite the variety of symbolic emblems, the basic idea behind the shaman’s dress is clear. The feathers attached to the headdress, the winglike or furry appendages on the sleeves, the antlers or bear’s snout on the headdress show that the dress basically represents some kind of animal. The most common type is a bird, found not only in the Altai-Sayan region but also in northern Mongolia and different parts of Siberia. In the Altaic region the dress most often imitates an owl or an eagle, in northern Siberia a deer. The Samoyeds and the Ket also wear a dress reminiscent of a bear.

In addition to the pictures associated with the spirits or the otherworld, the shaman’s dress also has iron or bone appendages resembling a human or animal skeleton. These symbolize the death and rebirth experienced by the shaman during the ecstatic visions of his initiation period. The dress represents the mysteries experienced by the shaman and is the dwelling place of the spirits. Thus the dress itself is thought to possess supernatural power. In the areas of clan shamanism the dress could not be sold outside the clan, because the shaman’s spirits belonging to the clan were attached to it. A worn-out shaman’s dress might be hung on a tree in the

forest, so that the spirits could leave it gradually and enter a new dress.

The shamanic séance. The shamanizing séance requires that both the shaman himself and the setting for the rite be meticulously prepared. The séance is often preceded by a period of time during which the shaman goes into seclusion, fasts, meditates, and recalls the details of the rituals he must perform during the séance. He transfers to the role of shaman by putting on the ritual dress and by tuning the drum.

The actual séance is usually held inside after dark, in a dwelling with a fire burning in the center. Because the spirits are thought to be afraid of light, darkness is a prerequisite for shamanizing. The settings for séances varied greatly, depending on the status of the shaman and the importance of his task. In the Podkamennaia Tunguska region the shaman and protector of the clan held his séance in the *sevenčedek*, a tent specially erected for the purpose. Here he acted out the fundamental features of the shamanistic world concept: the middle world inhabited by humans, the upper and lower worlds with their spirits, and the cosmic stream and cosmic tree as landmarks along the shaman’s route in the otherworld. The séance was attended by the entire clan, members helping with the preparations. Similar large séance settings are found among the Nanay, whose shaman, being the representative of his clan, transported the souls of the dead to the otherworld. It seems that the higher the status of the shaman and the bigger the group he represented, the richer were the symbolic requisites of the dress and the setting for the séance and the more theatrical the course of shamanizing. The imposing settings of the séance in the southern areas are probably a later development influenced by the great scriptural traditions of the East.

Before the séance, the shaman’s assistant, those in need of the shaman’s help, and the audience would assemble. At the start of the séance the shaman concentrates on calling his spirit helper by singing and drumming. The themes of the shaman’s songs are the calling of the spirit helpers, a description of the spirits’ journey, an account of the shaman’s own journey to the otherworld, and a description of the topography of the supranormal world. In the songs calling the spirits, during which the shaman might imitate the sounds of his zoomorphic spirit helpers through whistles, shouts, and growls, the shaman invites the spirits to the séance and may also give a step-by-step description of their journey to the séance from their dwelling in the otherworld.

The calling of the spirit helpers is the trance-induction stage. The rhythmic drumming, dancing, and sing-

ing gradually become louder and more frenzied as the shaman, while concentrating on the world of the spirits, achieves an altered state of consciousness. This phenomenon, similar to Western hypnosis, is brought about by rhythmical stimulation of the nervous system, growing concentration, motivation on the part of the shaman, and the emotional charge produced by the expectations of the audience. The effect of rhythmical stimulation was further enhanced among the Ob-Ugrians and the tribal peoples indigenous to Siberian Asia by, for example, eating amanita mushrooms. Other common means were the burning of various herbs producing intoxicating smoke, and, more recently, smoking tobacco and consuming alcohol. The use of hallucinogens and other intoxicants is not, however, essential to or even a vital factor in the shaman's trance technique.

The ecstatic climaxes of the séance come at the point where the shaman meets his spirit helpers, journeys with them to the otherworld, or banishes, for example, a disease demon that has taken up residence in a patient. The biggest cultural differences in the shamanistic rite technique are manifest at precisely this stage. The forms of meeting the spirits are based on different belief traditions.

Common to the central and eastern parts of Siberia, for example, among the Yukagir, the Evenki, the Yakuts, the Manchus, the Nanays, and the Orochi is the possession séance, during which the shaman's chief spirit helper enters his body and speaks through him. The shaman fully identifies with the spirit; he in fact turns into the spirit and manifests this change in his gestures, movements, and speech. Another person present at the séance, usually the shaman's assistant, then becomes the shaman, talking to the spirit. In regions where this type of possession-trance is common, the usual explanation for disease is that a demon has entered a person. It is then the shaman's task to banish the demon, and to do this the shaman takes the disease demon upon himself after his spirit helper; in other words, he turns into the demon. There are also complex possession-trance séances at which the shaman, having manifested various spirits, travels with his spirit helpers to the otherworld—when banishing a demon, for example.

The shaman may also create an illusion that the spirit helpers are present at the séance without identifying with them. The Chukchi display great skill in the manifestation of the spirits by the technique of ventriloquism. The shaman brings one spirit after another to the séance, and the audience can hear the spirits speak outside the shaman's body. Meetings of shaman and spirits at séances without possession are also known in

western Siberia and Inner Asia. Among the Minusinsk Tatars, for example, the shaman's assistant sprinkles water around for the spirits to drink, so that they will not come too close to the shaman.

If the main idea of the séance is soul flight, or the shaman's journey to the otherworld, the manifestation of the spirits is not as dramatic as at séances of the possession type. Typical séances in the western and northern parts of Siberia—among the Samoyeds and the Ob-Ugrians, for example—are those at which the shaman is imagined as traveling to the otherworld with his spirit helpers. The emphasis is not on role-changing and talking to the spirits but on the description of the shaman's journey. At this type of séance the shaman's trance usually deepens steadily and ends with loss of consciousness. At possession-type and ventriloquist séances the shaman often calls his spirits again after his return, by singing and drumming. In other words, the depth of the trance moves in waves. Since concentration on the spirit world leads to a change in consciousness and focusing his attention on the audience brings the shaman back to his waking state, the depth of shamanic ecstasy depends upon the extent to which he must allow for the audience's wishes during the séance, and thus ultimately on the relationship between the shaman and his supporters.

The séance usually ends with an episode during which the shaman sends his spirit helpers away, answers questions from the audience, and issues instructions on the sacrifices or required propitiations to be made. The basic structure of the séance is thus relatively uniform, regardless of the object of shamanizing, showing variation according to the way in which the spirits are encountered. The various rites, manifestation of the presence of or banishing of spirits, and tricks or demonstrations of skill proving the supranormal abilities of the shaman do, however, vary from one area to another. Despite cultural differences, the basic features of the shaman's technique of ecstasy, his main requisites, the concept of the spirits helping the shaman, and the part played by the audience as a chorus assisting at séances are elements of shamanism common throughout northern and Inner Asia.

[See also *Arctic Religions, overview article*; *Southern Siberian Religions*; *Yakut Religion*; *Samoyed Religion*; *Buriat Religion*; *Tunguz Religion*; and *Khanty and Mansi Religion*.]

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North American Shamanism

In the general literature on native North Americans, every sort of priest, healer, ritual specialist, and sorcerer is somewhere called a shaman. Here the term is synonymous with some unarticulated notion of "primitive religious specialist." A clearer understanding of shamanism can be discerned from those scores of descriptions of Native American religions and cultures where romantic and primitivist biases are less influential, although the statement of what distinguishes shamanism from other phenomena is necessarily complicated because of the diversity of shamanism in North America.

In broad terms, North American shamans are individuals with extraordinary access to spiritual power. Shamans must not be simply equated with priests, although they may serve priestly functions. Shamans must not be equated with the recipient of a guardian spirit through vision quest or dream, although they frequently find access to spiritual power in vision and dream experiences. Shamans must not simply be identified with healers, for not all healers are shamans, and further, there are numerous shamanic functions other than healing.

Shamanic Traits. Given the ambiguity of these broad criteria of North American shamanism, a fuller presentation may take the form of an outline of shamanic traits. This outline is a set of features no one of which is, by itself, distinctive or adequate and no set or single combination of which constitutes an exclusive definition of shamanism. This approach has advantages over the attempt to define North American shamanism in terms of a single necessary distinguishing feature. The outline establishes a framework in which to investigate and study a variety of often complex religious phenomena that may be interrelated around the idea identified by the term *shamanism*.

North American shamans invariably have extraordinary spiritual power, that is, the capacity to influence the world through spiritual forces. Thus a central element of North American shamanism is spiritual power—its nature, acquisition, accession, use, and loss. Native American spiritual concepts are very difficult for the outside observer to comprehend, and herein lies what is both a major obstacle and a challenge to the study of North American shamanism.

Spiritual powers are usually identified in some way that allows them to be humanly conceivable. The spirit forms vary widely; some are identified with animal (or other natural) forms, others with mythological figures and deities. Even the ghost of an ancestor or the soul of

some living thing may be identified as a shaman's spirit power.

Individuals initially gain access to spiritual powers in a variety of ways, including inheritance, personal quest, purchase, election by society or by the spiritual power, and extraordinary experience accompanying the suffering of a malevolence. In North America quests for power only rarely involve the use of hallucinogenic drugs; these quests more commonly involve fasting and isolation. The quest for shamanic power and the quest for a guardian spirit are usually distinguishable, although the techniques may not be. In some cultures there is continuity between guardian spirit practices and shamanism. Initiatory experiences, as well as the periods of training that usually follow initiations, may be brief or may extend over a considerable period of time. Initiatory experiences may include images of skeletonization, death, and rebirth or images of magical flight with extended revelatory scenarios, but more often they contain none of these elements.

The acquisition of power is commonly accompanied by the revelation of a power object or other means by which to objectify, display, and make contact with spiritual power. There are endless varieties of power objects held by North American shamans. They are often referred to by native terms commonly translated as "medicine." Power and access to power may also take the form of formulas, charms, and songs. Objects of power and special songs are also commonly held by those who are allied with a guardian spirit. The presence of power is demonstrated by its use in any of the many shamanic functions and, occasionally, in highly dramatized power performances using legerdemain.

Throughout North America, healing is the most central function and use of spiritual power. The most common and widespread theories of disease are those of object intrusion and soul loss. According to the first theory, illness results when a health-obstructing object enters the body. Object intrusion is most commonly believed to be a consequence of malevolent intent and is ascribed to sorcery and witchcraft, but sometimes it is simply an objectification, even personification, of an illness. The corresponding treatment usually involves a technique of sucking, in which the curer, entranced or not, sucks the object from the body using an instrument such as a tube, horn, or his or her mouth directly on the person's body at the place where the object is diagnosed to exist. The object, once removed, may or may not be presented in material form to demonstrate to those present the success of the treatment. Soul loss, the other common theory of disease, is based upon a variety of often complex theories of soul or life forms that may

depart the body or be drawn or stolen from the body. Entranced magical flights, dramatized spirit journeys, and prayer recitations are techniques used to retrieve and return the soul or life form, thus restoring health and life.

Several other functions are common among North American shamans: weather control; hunting-related functions, such as game divination, game charming, and intercession with master or mistress of animals; war-related functions; and general clairvoyant and divinatory practices, such as diagnosing disease, foretelling the future, and finding lost objects. These functions are usually, but not always, secondary to healing. While most shamanic actions are clearly understood as having a benevolent intent in societal terms, the shaman is commonly seen within his or her society as potentially, if not actually, malevolent. Shamanic powers may thus be used for sorcery, witchcraft, or revenge, either on the shaman's initiative or at the behest of another.

Shamanic performances occasionally include the use of esoteric languages through which shamans communicate with spirits. In some cultures shamans employ speakers or assistants who interpret shamanic speeches to those present.

The shaman's characteristic attraction to the mystical is often a distinguishing feature of his or her personality. The role of the shaman in society varies widely, from reclusive eccentric on the fringes of society to leader and teacher at the very center of the authority and political structure of the society. Very commonly a community expresses a sense of ambivalence toward its shamans. While they are sought after and held as highly important individuals, they are feared and avoided because of the powers they control. Few North American cultures totally exclude females from shamanic roles, and in some cultures, particularly those found in northern California, females even predominate; nonetheless, throughout the region shamans tend to be more frequently male.

Culture Areas. Shamanism and related beliefs and practices occur widely throughout North America. The following brief review of culture areas presents some of the major religious phenomena in North America that may be considered shamanism or closely related to it.

The Inuit (Eskimo) tribes, both along the coast and in the interior, have figures that most closely resemble Siberian shamans, with whom there is a likely historical connection. Inuit shamans, working individually or in groups, use techniques of ecstasy as well as dramatic performances and clairvoyance to serve individuals in need of curing, and they serve the community by controlling weather and procuring game for the hunt. Mag-

ical flights and transformations into spirit beings are characteristic of Inuit shamans; they are also conduits through which the spirits speak. Spiritual power is demonstrated through combats between shamans and the use of legerdemain in dramatic performances.

Tribes along the Northwest Coast have complex shamanic practices. The experience of trance is common to both initiatory experiences and shamanic performances, although techniques of ecstasy are not used everywhere in the region or by all shamans in any one community. While curing is their most important practice, shamans also perform other functions, such as locating food supplies and, in former times when wars were fought, weakening the enemy. The great ceremonial periods in the winter include shamanic festivals during which groups of shamans demonstrate their spiritual powers. Groups of Coast Salish shamans perform dramatizations of canoe journeys into dangerous spirit worlds where they struggle to win back the lost soul of a sufferer. Throughout the area sucking techniques are used to remove malevolent objects. Considerable variation occurs within this area.

The shamanic practices of the Northwest Coast exhibit some continuity with those of the adjacent Basin, Plateau, and northern California areas. Sucking techniques are common, and there is some use of ecstatic techniques. The costume of the shaman is believed to be very powerful, and is a vehicle through which the shamanic tradition is passed from one person to another.

In the Plateau area male and female shamans using song and formula in ritual performances serve a variety of needs. Illness is commonly attributed to witchcraft and ghosts, and shamans act to combat these malevolent forces. The prophetic and millenarian movements that arose in the nineteenth century, which culminated in the Ghost Dance movement of 1890, developed from a shamanic religious heritage. [See Ghost Dance.] Elements of shamanism also influenced the Indian Shaker religion that arose in this area. [See North American Religions, *article on Modern Movements.*]

On the Plains and the Prairies, there are many kinds of medicine and holy persons. Fasting and praying in quest of spiritual power is widespread, and while most tribes in this region distinguish between the individual recipient of a guardian spirit and the shamanic figures, there is a continuity between them. Evidence of spiritual power can manifest itself in various forms, such as a public ritual, a tipi or lodge decoration, special garments, and medicine bundles. Medicine bundles are especially important as the residence of spiritual powers; the bundles are kept by a community and passed from generation to generation.

The shamans of these tribes perform many functions, acting either individually or in groups and societies. Besides curing, they were at one time important for success in war, and during the hunt they charmed and called game. Their powers of clairvoyance and prophecy are still widely exercised in various forms of spirit lodges or the Shaking Tent ceremonies. In these ceremonies, the shaman enters a lodge and reads the messages communicated by the spirits through the shaking of the lodge or the appearance of little flashing lights.

The Midewiwin, or Great Medicine Society, is an important part of the religious, social, political, and economic systems of central Algonquin and other tribes in the Great Lakes region. The initiation practices of the Midewiwin call for the ritual shooting and killing of the initiate, who is then revived as a newly born member of the society. The Midewiwin includes graded levels of shamanic figures. The curing performances are complex and involve many in the community.

A variety of shamanic activities are important to the tribes in the Northeast and Southeast Woodlands areas. The earliest records of some of these activities were set down by Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth century. For some tribes in the eastern portion of this area, shamans served the needs of family groups. Costumes and paraphernalia were elaborate in the shamanic practices of many of these tribes. Shamans tended to specialize according to function: curing, weather control, and hunting. "Societies of affliction," that is, societies composed of all those treated, exist among the Seneca.

The North American Southwest is culturally and historically complex. Among Pueblo cultures there are both shamans and priests, although their roles sometimes overlap. Shamans may either participate in or remain aloof from the dramatic ceremonial performances distinctive among the Pueblo tribes. The integration, yet distinction, of shamanic activities and functions in intensely communal contexts is important to the understanding of these cultures and their religions.

Navajo religion centers on conceptions of health. Extraordinarily complex curing ceremonials that last as long as eight days and nine nights are performed by individuals who learn through apprenticeship the many songs, prayers, and ritual procedures as well as the accompanying story traditions. Many ceremonies are directed toward associated classes of disease etiology.

Among the Pima of the Southwest, shamans treat many kinds of illnesses attributed to spirit forces identified with animals and other natural forms. The treatment is private and includes sucking, blowing, and singing.

In recent decades in Oklahoma and other areas where Native Americans have experienced significant intertri-

bal contact, as well as contact with non-natives, innovative forms of shamanism have resulted that are directed toward the complexities and dangers associated with an acculturative environment.

The development and widespread practice of the peyote religion, legally organized in the twentieth century as the Native American Church, are rooted in an older shamanic tradition. This religious movement commonly serves some of the same needs as does shamanism; its techniques and practices are often similar to those of shamanism. [See *North American Indians, article on Indians of the Plains.*]

This brief survey is perhaps adequate only in suggesting the extent, complexity, and importance of shamanism among tribal peoples throughout North America. In many respects the study of shamanism in North America is undeveloped. The publication of Mircea Eliade's *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* (1951; Eng. ed., New York, 1964) widely expanded the interest in the study of shamanism as a worldwide religious phenomenon but has had relatively little impact on the study of North American shamanism. Conversely, the consideration of the North American religious practices we have called "shamanism" has had little impact on the broader study of shamanism. North American shamanism therefore raises many important issues that constitute an enriching challenge to the study of the phenomenon worldwide.

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Surprisingly few widely comparative studies of shamanism exist. Leonard L. Leh's "The Shaman in Aboriginal North American Society," *University of Colorado Studies* 21 (1934): 199-263, is a relatively extensive survey by geographic area. Willard Z. Park's study *Shamanism in Western North America* (1938; reprint, New York, 1975) compares Paviotso (Northern Paiute) shamanism with shamanic practices throughout western North America.

The great resource for the study of North American shaman-

ism is the ethnographic record. Although uneven in most respects, it often includes extensive material on shamanism. Exemplary studies that focus on shamanic practices of a single tribe are Park's work on the Paviotso; *Piman Shamanism and Staying Sickness* (Tucson, 1974) by Donald M. Bahr and others; the section on shamanism in Franz Boas's *Religion of Kuakiutl Indians*, vol. 2, *Translations* (New York, 1930); and David E. Jones's *Sanapia, Comanche Medicine Woman* (New York, 1972).

SAM D. GILL

South American Shamanism

In particulars of cosmology, ritual, and paraphernalia, shamanism in South America has obviously been shaped by, and has adapted to, local environments and local historical and cultural processes. Nevertheless, in its mental universe and its dialectics and techniques of the sacred, South American shamanism exhibits similarities not only within the subcontinent but to shamanism in North America, the Arctic, and Siberia, indicating historical relationships that must date back to the early peopling of the Americas. This suggests that the basic ideology of shamanism may be sufficiently fundamental to the human condition to have favored its survival over enormous distances in time, space, environment, and social context.

General Motifs of Ecstasy. Shamanism and religion among the Selk'nam (Ona), Yámana (Yaghan), and Hala-kwalip (Alacaluf) of the Tierra del Fuego, on the southernmost edge of South America—all presumably descended from the earliest migrants to the subcontinent—appear to represent survivals of archaic ideological systems. But many of the same archaic traits also appear—sometimes attenuated or overlaid with elaborations resulting from outside influences or internal dynamics, often little modified from their ancestral forms—across the whole South American continent, not excluding the high culture areas of the Andes. These common traits include familiar motifs of Siberian and Inuit (Eskimo) shamanism: mystic vocation; initiatory sickness; skeletonization, dismemberment, and contemplation by the shaman of his own bones; recruitment of supernatural helpers; rock crystals as manifestations of helping spirits; marriage to spirit wives, or, in the case of female shamans, spirit husbands; “rape” of the soul; sickness through soul loss or intrusion of illness projectiles into the body by magical means, and, conversely, restoration of health, in the first case through retrieval of the patient's strayed or abducted soul by the shaman, and in the second by sucking out the disease-causing foreign object; stratified upperworld and underworld through whose levels the shaman travels in celestial flight or in descent into the chthonic regions; world

trees as sky supports with both phallic and uterine associations; great ancestral First Shamans and culture heroes as shaman/transformers; and divination of future events, weather, or favorable hunting conditions.

Of first importance everywhere is the ecstatic trance, mainly attained through the use of botanical hallucinogens, during which the shaman projects his soul into otherworlds, and from which he returns with word of the departed, the wishes of the greater powers, and enhanced knowledge and confirmation of the sacred geography and cosmology by which the community orders its social and supernatural environment. This knowledge makes the shaman indispensable to the maintenance of the social and metaphysical equilibrium, and accounts for his chieftlike role in societies that otherwise lack chieftainship. As demonstrated by Johannes Wilbert's work among the Warao, a fishing people of the Orinoco Delta, even among preagricultural peoples and incipient horticulturalists, shamanic cosmologies and cosmic models constructed on the common foundations of a pan-Indian, archaic shamanistic worldview can reach extraordinary heights of complexity. Wilbert's and other recent studies (e.g., Swiss ethnologist Gerhard Baer's work among the Matsigenka of eastern Peru) confirm the shaman's central role across the whole spectrum of indigenous life, from religion, ritual, and curing to social organization and politics.

Specific Features. Notwithstanding shared motifs in pan-South American shamanism that seem to be survivals of a common archaic substratum, shamanism in the subcontinent exhibits culture-specific tropical New World traits that are at least as significant.

The rattle. Among these distinctive features is the replacement of the drum by the gourd rattle as the indispensable percussion instrument in the shamanic arts over most of South America. Even where the shaman's drum persists, as among the Mapuche, or Araucanians, of Argentina and Chile, it is generally used in combination with the rattle. The symbolism and functions of the rattle are complex and varied. But, in general the rattles functions parallel the functions of the shamanic drum, including the connection with the world tree as *axis mundi*. Indeed, even more obviously than the iconography of the Siberian shaman's drum, the hollow gourd represents the cosmos; the staff that pierces it and serves as handle symbolizes the world tree as cosmic pathway. The small stones or seeds inside the rattle, in turn, are ancestral souls and spirits whom the shaman activates when he shakes the instrument. The sound of the rattle, in combination with the chants the shaman has been taught by the spirits, enable him to concentrate his (or her) powers for the flight or descent to otherworlds. Despite the extraordinary prominence

and complex ideology of this instrument in South and Central American shamanism, the literature on the subject is poor, with Wilbert's study of the feathered *hebumatarao*, the "spirit rattle" of the Warao shaman (1973), the outstanding exception.

The jaguar. Another trait specific to the American tropics is qualitative identification between the shaman and the jaguar (*Felis onca*). This dominant motif cuts across linguistic, geographical, and cultural boundaries on the subcontinent. In pre-Columbian times it extended into the high cultures of Mexico. Still another leitmotif is the widespread use of one or more potent psychoactive plants as a "technique of ecstasy," not only by shamans but, in specified ritual contexts, a wider adult community under the shaman's direction. Jaguar transformation and the use of plant hallucinogens, in turn, are ideologically and experientially linked.

In the belief systems of many South American Indians, shamans, alone among their fellows, can transform themselves at will into jaguars, whose inherent qualities they share; conversely, jaguars may not actually be animals but transformed shamans, or soul bearers of deceased shamans. Hence, killing a jaguar is fraught with supernatural risk. Reported by early travelers, these beliefs persist to the present day. Thus, the Tacana of eastern Bolivia told the German ethnologist Karin Hissink in 1952 that their *yanaconas* (shamans) regularly transform themselves into their jaguar alter egos through such techniques as somersaulting or taking hallucinogenic snuff. Theodor Koch-Grünberg, who traveled widely among the Indians of northern Brazil and Venezuela (1911–1913) reported that all the shamans he met or heard of identified themselves with the jaguar. All had techniques of jaguar transformation, including the donning of jaguar pelts, claws or teeth as well as intoxication with psychoactive plants. Maquiritaré (Yecuana) shamans believed that specialized benches carved in the likeness of their jaguar counterparts were indispensable to their magic art.

The conceptional identification of shaman and jaguar is confirmed by linguistics. Koch-Grünberg found all Betoï-speaking groups using the same or closely related words for "shaman" and "jaguar." The Dätuana, for example, call the shaman *djaika* and the jaguar *dzaja*. Even though the approximately thirty tribes belonging to the Tucanoan language family are separated into a western division and an eastern division, with little contact between the two branches, all identify shamans with jaguars and most use the same or a closely related term for both. Ute Bödiger reported in 1965 that the common term for shaman and jaguar among the Siona was *yái* and among the Coreguaje, *dyái*. Since Siona

shamans are themselves jaguars in human form, no jaguar ever attacks them; all they have to do to protect themselves when encountering a jaguar is call out, "My name is Yái!" The Huitoto, whose language is identified by linguists as independent and whose culture is intermediate between Paleo-Indian hunters and Neo-Indian tropical forest cultivators, call their shamans *ikodyai*, a term derived from two Tucanoan words, *dyái* ("jaguar") and *iko* ("soul"). Irving Goldman (1963) reports that the Tucanoan Cubeo differentiate between two kinds of shaman, the *pariékokü*, meaning "man of power," and the *yaví*, meaning "jaguar." The latter has greater prestige: every *yaví* is a *pariékokü*, but not every *pariékokü* is a *yaví*.

Bird symbolism. Several other animal species also play a more or less important symbolic role in shamanism, alongside the great jungle cat. Outstanding among these is the harpy eagle (*Harpia harpyja*) and its close relatives. Its role as shaman's alter ego was first examined in detail in 1962 by the German ethnologist Otto Zerries; in 1977 his student Hildegard Matthäi followed with a study of the general role of raptors among extra-Andean South American Indians, with particular attention to the harpy eagle and the king vulture, *Sarcorampus papa*. The ecology of these high-flying, carrion-eating birds clearly fits them especially well for a shamanlike role as mediators between the celestial and chthonic spheres. The brilliant plumage of parrots, macaws, and other spectacular tropical forest birds is widely used for feather crowns and wands or prayer sticks, and here the symbolism extends beyond that of shamanic flight to that of "light." Thus, Gerhard Baer (1978) reports that the Matsigenka shaman's feather headdress "gives light and brightness" during the nocturnal séance, just as the feather crowns of the personified sun, moon, star beings, and spirits do. Light, which the shaman can also activate with hallucinogens and chants, in turn, is potentiated communication between the human and extrahuman spheres. The Matsigenka shaman numbers many birds among his spirit helpers, and one, the swallow-tailed kite, *Elanoides forficatus*—or, more correctly, its female spirit (*i'nato*, "its Mother")—is his most important tutelary. This bird is known as *i'vanki*, meaning "his wing." On the other side of the subcontinent the Venezuelan Warao credit the same bird with having established *bahana* shamanism, one of the major orders of shamanism whose main concern is human reproduction and its attendant biological, psychological, and social concerns (Wilbert, 1986).

Still, it is the jaguar that predominates in the imagery of South American shamanism, perhaps because like the shaman, and unlike most other species, it seems

not to be confined by its nature to one cosmic realm or one ecological niche. It is nocturnal and inhabits caves, behaviors that associate it with the underworld. It hunts principally on land but is so well adapted to water and so expert a swimmer in pursuit of fish and aquatic game that many Indian mythologies tell of powerful "water jaguars" that spend their lives in the watery underworld to which only shamans have access. Finally, in the manner of the shaman ascending the tree as metaphorical world axis, the jaguar is an agile climber of the great forest trees. Among some tribes it also has powerful, dualistic sexual associations. Like its human counterpart, the jaguar is thus a mediator *par excellence*. The most detailed studies of the shaman-jaguar complex are those of the Colombian anthropologist Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff among the Tucanoan Desána of the Vaupés in the northwest Amazon of Colombia. His 1975 work, *The Shaman and the Jaguar*, presents the jaguar-shaman transformation complex and its interrelationship with hallucinogenic plants in a specific social and ideological context.

Plant hallucinogens. Reichel-Dolmatoff found that among the Desána "practically all shamanistic attitudes and practices" are based on the ecstatic trance induced by powerful plant hallucinogens, notably *yagé*, an infusion of the *Banisteriopsis caapi* vine. The same drink is called *ayahuasca* by Quechua-speakers in the Andes. Especially in the Peruvian Amazon, *ayahuasca* is often used in conjunction with one or more species of *Brugmansia* (an arboreal form of the well-known shrublike daturas traditionally used by Indians in Mexico and, in North America, by native peoples in California, Nevada, and the Southwest), as well as with thickened tobacco juice. The Matsigenka shaman may use either or all in curing rites. Like *Banisteriopsis*, the different species of *Brugmansia* have their spirit "Mothers," whose "sons" are recruited by the shaman as his helpers (Baer, 1978).

Along with *yagé*, South American Indians have discovered the psychoactive properties of many other species that are employed alone or as admixtures to heighten or, otherwise, modify the metaphysical experience. The ethnobotanist Richard Evans Schultes and his collaborators have identified between eighty and one hundred different plant hallucinogens used now or in the past by American Indians, the greater part in South America. Of special interest are several kinds of potent snuffs, including those based on the seeds of *Anadenanthera peregrina* and its sister species *A. colubrina*, and on the inner bark of trees of the genus *Virola*, with admixtures of other plant materials. The former are legumes related to the acacias and mimosas; the latter, like nutmeg, a popular spice of Old World origin, are related to the *Myristicaceae*. Snuffs made from *A. pere-*

grina were being used in the shamanistic rituals of Arawakan Indians when Columbus first landed in the Antilles; he and his men mistakenly identified the potent powder as tobacco. *Anadenanthera colubrina* was, and is still, employed by Andean Indians as the ritual intoxicant known as *huilca*. *Huilca* is presumably the snuff used by the ancient preagricultural inhabitants of coastal Peru, where Junius Bird excavated the oldest snuffing paraphernalia thus far known from South America—a whalebone snuff tablet and bird-bone snuffing tube dating from the second millennium BCE.

Such Indian populations as the several subgroups of the Yanoama of the upper Orinoco, until recently one of the last pure hunting and gathering societies in South America, employ intoxicating snuffs derived mainly from scrapings of the inner bark of *Virola*, whose effects on the central nervous system are activated by the addition of certain other plant materials. Such sophisticated knowledge of the properties of plants suggests long experimentation.

Archaeological and iconographic evidence has also established a time depth of more than three thousand years for the ritual use and deification of yet another important South American plant hallucinogen that remains in use to this day, the mescaline-containing San Pedro cactus, *Trichocereus pachanoi* (Sharon, 1978). Now widely used by a class of mestizo folk healers whose practice includes symbols and techniques inherited from traditional indigenous shamanism, San Pedro is depicted on ancient Peruvian pottery and painted textiles of the Chavin culture, significantly in association with the jaguar, from the late second millennium BCE. Somewhat later the ceramic sculptors of the brilliant Nazca culture of the early first millennium CE personified San Pedro as a supernatural being with the columnar cactus projecting, hornlike, from his forehead and from his shoulders. Like other hallucinogens of Amazonia, the San Pedro beverage is used in conjunction with tobacco juice, and is usually administered through the nostrils. Indeed, tobacco (*Nicotiana*, especially *N. rustica* and *N. tabacum*, both native to South America) plays an important role in ritual intoxication, most often in conjunction with another psychoactive species that is considered of first importance to the ecstatic experience. Less commonly tobacco is the consciousness-transforming plant of choice. A prime example is the tobacco shamanism of the Venezuelan Warao, a phenomenon of which Wilbert (1972, 1975) is the outstanding student. But even where tobacco is not the primary activator of the ecstatic shamanic trance, it is conceptually linked to the shaman. Thus, the Matsigenka term for tobacco is *seri*, and that for the shaman *seripigari* (Baer, 1976).

Hallucinogens and the shamanic vision quest. To the question why the Indians of South America, and also those to the north, should have developed such an extraordinary interest in botanical hallucinogens, the hypothesis of anthropologist Weston La Barre provides an elegant answer: their ancestors, as carriers of an archaic Asiatic shamanistic tradition that valued the ecstatic trance experience, arrived in the New World predisposed toward exploration of the environment for plants capable of triggering that experience. American Indian religions, La Barre proposed in 1970, including those of the great pre-Columbian civilizations of South and Mesoamerica, are or were essentially shamanistic, and so may be seen as extensions into the New World of Mesolithic and even Paleolithic antecedents in north-eastern Asia. Shamanism values the ecstatic vision quest.

In some areas of North America the preferred techniques for the vision quest apparently were sensory deprivation, lonely vigil, self-torture, and other non-chemical "techniques of ecstasy." In others, especially the tropics, shamans must have searched their new environments from the start not only for potentially therapeutic flora but for species capable of altering consciousness, and, as among the Colombian Desána, at least temporarily and in strictly structured ritual settings, conferring even upon ordinary persons capabilities otherwise reserved for the religious specialist. Universally the special power of these plants was, and is, attributed not to chemicals but to the divine nature of the species, that is, to the male or female spirit believed to inhabit the individual plant. In a sense the communal use of sacred psychoactive plants represents, like the North American vision quest, a "democratization" of the shamanic experience, akin to the occasional communal ritual consumption by Siberian natives of the fly agaric mushroom, *Amanita muscaria*, under the leadership of the shaman. However, even where a relatively high proportion of adult males lays claim to some shamanic powers, or where, as among the Desána or Yanoama, most men ritually partake of the ritual hallucinogen, those individuals who have been mystically recruited as religious specialists and "technicians of the sacred"—the true shamans—remain uniquely the indispensable mediators between the world of humans and the greater powers of the natural and supernatural environment and of the larger universe.

[See also *Jaguars and Tobacco*.]

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SHAMASH. *See* Utu.

SHAME. *See* Sin and Guilt.

SHANGO. *See* Şango; *see also* Caribbean Religions, *article on* Afro-Caribbean Religions.

SHANG-TI. During the Shang dynasty (c. 1550–1050 BCE), prayers and sacrifices were offered to a large number of gods, collectively referred to as *ti*. Regarded as the deified ancestors (real or putative) of the Shang royal clan and high aristocracy, the *ti* were worshiped at regular intervals in accordance with a liturgical calendar. At appropriate times they were also consulted for aid and advice by means of the cracking of oracle bones (i.e., the practice of scapulimancy).

The Shang kings also worshiped a more powerful god, known as Shang-ti (High God, or God Above). Owing to the absence of plural forms in Chinese, it is not certain that there was only one god known as Shang-ti—the phrase could also mean, collectively, "high gods." But most authorities agree that it was a single deity. Shang-ti might also have been regarded in some sense as an ultimate human ancestor; however, the deity was not included in the regular liturgical round of ancestral sacrifices and oracular consultations.

There is no mythic account of Shang-ti's origins, nor does he appear in the mythic accounts of the founding personages (whether gods, culture heroes, or sage-emperors) of Chinese high antiquity, such as Yao, Shun, and Yü the Great. There is, however, reason to suppose some correspondence between Shang-ti and Huang-ti, the Yellow Thearch (a name that first appears in texts long postdating the Shang), the mythic culture hero, patron of metallurgy, and god of the center.

Unlike the lesser *ti*, who had authority over such human-centered affairs as the king's health and his fortunes in marriage, warfare, and the hunt, Shang-ti had jurisdiction in larger-scale natural and cosmic matters. According to surviving oracle-bone inscriptions, Shang-ti had the power to prevent, or put an end to, plagues,

drought, floods, violent storms, and other such phenomena. Shang-ti apparently was never consulted directly by means of scapulimancy, and only rarely were prayers offered to him directly. Rather, when necessary the lesser gods were consulted to learn his will; they could also be asked to intercede with him on behalf of the king and his people.

While the surviving evidence does not permit a very exact description of Shang theology, it seems probable that Shang-ti was thought of as a cosmic god, dwelling in or above the sky at the apex of the rotating heavens. Indeed, Shang-ti might have been a deified embodiment of the pole star itself. It is certain that a few centuries after the fall of the Shang dynasty gods were thought of as being, in part, personifications of stars, planets, and astral configurations.

With the conquest of the Shang state by the Chou dynasty around 1050 BCE, Shang-ti's place as the paramount deity of the royal cult was usurped by the Chou high god, T'ien ("heaven"). T'ien was not simply Shang-ti under another name, but the two high gods were similarly regarded as conscious but relatively impersonal cosmic forces.

The term *shang-ti*, however, survived the fall of the Shang dynasty and continued to appear in religious and cosmological texts for centuries thereafter. In such texts it is not so clear that the reference is always to a unitary high god; in some contexts it seems preferable to construe the term as "high gods." In some texts of the Warring States period (481–221) a near-synonym, *t'ai-ti* ("great god"), is substituted for the term *shang-ti*. Regardless of which term is used, it is clear that the reference is to a celestial god (or gods) dwelling at or around the celestial pole. According to chapter 4 of the *Huai-nan-tzu* (139 BCE), "If the height of the K'un-lun [cosmic] mountain is doubled . . . [and redoubled, and again redoubled], it reaches up to Heaven itself. If one mounts to there, one will become a demigod. It is called the abode of the Great God [T'ai-ti]." In his commentary to the *Huai-nan-tzu*, Kao Yu (fl. 205–212) states that "the Ch'ang-ho Gate is the gate [through which] one begins an ascent to Heaven. The Gate of Heaven is the gate of the Purple Fortified Palace [i.e., the circumpolar stars] where Shang-ti dwells."

With the development of the organized religion of Taoism around the end of the Latter Han dynasty (third century CE), the term *shang-ti* took on new prominence. As a Taoist term, however, it rarely appears alone; rather it has the general meaning "high god" in the elaborate compound titles given to the numerous divinities in the hierarchical, bureaucratically organized Taoist pantheon. *Yü-huang Shang-ti* ("jade sovereign

high god") is a characteristic example of such a divine title of nobility.

Meanwhile, the old sense of *Shang-ti* was preserved through the officially sponsored study of classical texts by the Confucian bureaucratic elite. Every examination candidate knew by heart such stock phrases from the classics as "[King Wen] brilliantly served Shang-ti and secured abundant blessings." With the development of the state cult of Confucianism and the imperial worship of and sacrifice to Heaven (T'ien), *Shang-ti* came to be regarded as a virtual synonym, perhaps somewhat more concretely conceived, of *Heaven*.

Finally, the term *Shang-ti* was adopted by Protestant missionaries, and their Chinese converts, to designate the Judeo-Christian God. More commonly, however, that deity is known in Chinese by a name that was coined by the early Jesuit missionaries, T'ien-chu, "Lord of Heaven."

[See also Yü-huang; Huang-ti; and Chinese Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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SHANKARA. See Śaṅkara.

SHAN-TAO (613–681), eminent Buddhist scholar and major figure in the Chinese Pure Land (Ching-t'u) movement. Shan-tao was born in the village of Lin-tsu (Shantung Province) and was ordained while still a youth. Eventually, his study of Buddhist scripture led him to the *Kuan wu-liang-shou ching* (Meditation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life Sutra), a text that teaches devotion to the Buddha Amitābha as a means of universal salvation. Profoundly impressed by the message of this text, Shan-tao retired to Mount Chung-nan to pursue his religious career. Later, he became a disciple of the Pure Land scholar Tao-ch'ō (562–645) at the latter's monastic home at the Hsüan-chung Ssu. Through him, Shan-tao became convinced that the deliverance of ordinary sentient beings was possible through the power of the Bud-

dha Amitābha, and thus he gave himself up to the practice and propagation of Pure Land Buddhism. His lifelong practice of recitative *nien-fo* (the recitation of the name of the Buddha Amitābha) began when he was in his thirties.

In addition to being a learned scholar, Shan-tao was known as a charismatic preacher. After his conversion to Pure Land belief he devoted his life to propagating *nien-fo* practice among clergy and laity alike. Owing to his ardent belief in Amitābha's saving grace and his strict adherence to the Buddhist precepts, Shan-tao came to be popularly regarded as an incarnation of the Buddha. According to legend, whenever Shan-tao recited the name of Amitābha a beam of light issued from his mouth. Tradition has it that he copied the "smaller" *Sukhāvativyūha Sūtra* (Chin., *O-mi-t'ō ching*) over ten thousand times and painted some three hundred scenes of Amitābha's Pure Land. Between the years 672 and 675 he supervised, at the insistence of the empress Wu, the construction of a great image of Mahāvairocana Buddha in the caves at the Lung-men escarpment, presiding over the inaugural service upon its completion. Among his many writings are a commentary to the *Kuan ching*, the *Kuan wu-liang-shou ching shu* (T.D. no. 1753), and four books treating practical rules for devotions to Amitābha.

Like many of his Buddhist contemporaries, Shan-tao believed that the era of *mo-fa* (Jpn., *mappō*: the "latter days of the law" or "era of the decadent Dharma"), a degenerate age foretold in scripture in which few devotees would be able to observe Buddhist principles faithfully and attain salvation through their own efforts, was at hand. Shan-tao's writings are infused with the deep conviction that he was a common mortal, thoroughly immersed in ignorance and delusion and possessing only a minimal capacity to attain enlightenment. Shan-tao argued that it was precisely for these reasons that one must place faith in Amitābha Buddha, who, in a series of vows made at the beginning of his religious career, had promised to create a Pure Land in which beings might win salvation. One of these vows, number eighteen in the most common Chinese translation of the *Larger Sukhāvativyūha Sūtra*, promises birth in the Pure Land for all those who, with undistracted mind, direct their thoughts to Amitābha up to ten successive times. This practice (represented by the Chinese term *nien-fo*) was variously interpreted by Buddhist exegetes, but by Shan-tao's time was held to include the verbal recitation of Amitābha's name.

Shan-tao's originality lay in his claim that the recitation of the name of Amitābha was the *single* direct cause of the attainment of supreme enlightenment. Prior to Shan-tao, the tradition of *nien-fo* devotion had

encompassed a range of practices—meditation on the Buddha's body, circumambulation of his image, and recitation of his name. In most Buddhist sects *nien-fo* was done in conjunction with other practices, including the chanting of *sūtras*, observation of Vinaya precepts, repentance of sins, and praise of the adornments of the Pure Land. But in most cases, the recitation of Amitābha's name was considered an inferior, expedient, or merely provisional method for achieving rebirth in the Pure Land. It was Shan-tao who first elucidated the notion of recitative *nien-fo* as an independent and soteriologically decisive action that would assure birth in the Pure Land in its own right. Shan-tao attributed the efficacy of recitative *nien-fo* to the inconceivable power of Amitābha's vows.

For Shan-tao, the most important element in *nien-fo* devotion, and thus the sole requisite for rebirth in the Pure Land, was a profound faith in Amitābha's saving grace. Acknowledging the frailty of human nature, Shan-tao taught that the devotee should first become fully convinced he or she has been, from time immemorial, possessed of sinful passions and subject to the cycle of birth and death. He must then believe, with the deepest sincerity, that Amitābha's forty-eight vows embrace him and all other sentient beings, and that such belief assures him of birth in the Pure Land as a *bodhisattva*.

Shan-tao's reputation spread with the fame of his religious parable known as the "Two Rivers and a White Path." This parable relates the story of a lone traveler who suffers the attacks of bandits and wild animals, successfully crosses a narrow path between the River of Raging Waters (symbolizing greed) and the River of Blazing Flames (symbolizing anger), and finally reaches the safety of the opposite bank (the Pure Land). The traveler finds the White Path by following the instructions of his two teachers, Śākyamuni Buddha and Amitābha Buddha. According to Shan-tao, the bandits and wild animals represent the human hindrances to enlightenment (e.g., the six sense organs and six corresponding kinds of defilements), while the White Path signifies Amitābha's salvific power as expressed in his vows. The parable, with its ultimate resolution of these obstructions, acts as a guide to Buddhists who desire to faithfully follow Amitābha's teachings.

In general, Shan-tao's many disciples advocated the practice of recitative *nien-fo* as the principal cause of rebirth in the Pure Land. They did, however, endorse a variety of adjunct disciplines, including meditation. Therefore, from the middle of the T'ang dynasty (618–907), Pure Land devotion gradually synthesized and unified the three practices of meditation, monastic discipline, and invocation. Shan-tao's notions of recitative

nien-fo and faith, however, continued to be recognized in later Pure Land Buddhism as the purest and the most essential means to winning rebirth in the Pure Land.

After its introduction to Japan, Shan-tao's teachings enjoyed wide acceptance. There, the notion of recitative *nien-fo* (Jpn., *nembutsu*) underwent further development and refinement, culminating in doctrines expounded by Hōnen (1133–1212) and Shinran (1173–1262), the founders of the Jōdoshū (Pure Land sect) and Jōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land sect), respectively. Shan-tao's emphasis on recitation and absolute faith became the hallmarks of Japanese Pure Land devotion.

[See also Ching-t'u; Nien-fo; and the biographies of T'an-luan, Tao-ch'o, Hōnen, and Shinran.]

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FUJIWARA RYŌSETSU

SHAPE SHIFTING can be defined as the alteration in form or substance of any animate object. There seems no limit to the kinds of objects susceptible to such alteration. Examples abound of the shape shifting of plants, animals, humans, and gods. Shape shifting can be caused either by the object changed or by an external force; it can occur for good or for ill and for reasons simple or profound.

Shape shifting is found in essentially every religion and mythological tradition. By no means is it a phenomenon restricted to unsophisticated cultures remote in history and geography from the dominant civilizations. An enduring fascination with shape shifting is easily detected in modern popular culture as well as in the major religions: comic-book and cartoon characters such as Superman and Spiderman are typical shape-shifters, and shape shifting is certainly an element in the deepest spiritual insights of Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism as these religions are currently practiced.

Because of the rich variety of contexts and levels of subtlety in which it is found, it is impossible to assign shape shifting a universal meaning. Zeus's appearance as a swan and Christ's transfiguration are both instances of shape shifting, but they have quite distinct meanings and importance. It is possible, however, in a survey of the phenomenon in its manifold occurrence, to distinguish between types of shape shifting and to

find within those types a common meaning and function.

The most frequent type of shape shifting involves strategic deception. Strategic shapeshifters change themselves for reasons of aggression, seduction, or trickery. A second class of shapeshifters are those who use the device for escape from another's aggression or seduction. A third type has the simple function of punishment, and a fourth rewards or compensates the changed object, usually by immortalization. A frequent but often subtle kind of shape shifting seeks liberation from bondage or punishment. A somewhat murkier, though widely found, type may best be described as instances of borderline or confused identity, where one mode of existence is so much like another that the two are repeatedly exchanged. Finally, by far the most profound variety of shape shifting is that which has revelation as its design.

Strategic Deception. Stealth is so essential an ingredient in any conflict that it is in the interest of all contestants to be something or somewhere else than their opponents expect them to be. Kuloscap, for example, the major god of the Micmac Indians of the Maritime Provinces of Canada, overcomes a series of enemies by clever ruses and rapid shape shifting. His power to change himself includes the power to change others, for he will occasionally grant immortality, in the form of a tree or stone, to those who request it. The Maruts, bellicose deities in the service of the Hindu god Indra, can enter undetected into the presence of their enemies by such means as changing themselves into apparently helpless infants. Perhaps the most prodigious of all the shapeshifters of this type is another Hindu god, Viṣṇu, who assumes a great number of incarnations, or *avatāras*, in his battle against evil. The best known of the *avatāras* of Viṣṇu are Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, each of whom is remembered for epic struggles involving shape shifting.

Seduction is probably as usual a reason for shape shifting as is aggression, and it certainly takes more colorful and ingenious forms. At its most basic level seductive shape shifting consists in taking the appearance of another's beloved. Thus the magician Merlin gives Uther Pendragon the form of the duke Gorlois, that he may satisfy his sexual longing for Gorlois's wife. The fruit of this union based on deception is Arthur, king of Britain. So too Zeus, the foremost of the Greeks' Olympian deities, appears to Alcmena in the form of her beloved Amphitryon. But Zeus is usually more inventive, coming to his unsuspecting lovers as a satyr, a shower of gold, a white bull, a swan, and once even as the goddess Artemis. Seductive shape shifting can sometimes be reversed, as commonly happens in Arthurian legend, for example, where the seducer appears as an irresisti-

ble young woman but is in fact an agent of evil or death in disguise.

Trickery is the theme of an enormous body of folk tale and myth. Tricksters, displaying remarkably similar characteristics, can be found in a diversity of cultures. [See Tricksters.] They typically take the form of animals but can also be such borderline beings as dwarfs, elves, imps, and trolls. Not always, but frequently, tricksters carry out their mischief through shape shifting. A trickster *mây*, for example, present himself as a person of supernatural powers in order to win a bride or change himself into a snake to steal meat hidden in a skull. A common feature of trickster stories is that these deceptions either are exposed or they backfire on the trickster. The false bridegroom is revealed as a malevolent fox, the trickster finds that his own head has grown onto the snake's body he has assumed, making it impossible for him to draw it out of the skull. Tricksters very often suffer, and even die, for their blundering misdeeds, but they nonetheless return miraculously for more adventure, changing from death back into life—the ultimate feat of the shapeshifter.

The line between trickery and evil is often fuzzy. Satan, for example, has a great supply of tricks, many of which involve shape shifting, but he is certainly no mere trickster. Similarly, the great mischief-maker of Norse mythology, Loki, capable of assuming such diverse forms as bird, flea, milkmaid, or fish, sometimes seems to be the originator of evil itself and not just another divine trickster.

Escape. If stealth is valuable to the aggressor, it is no less valuable to the intended victim. The Greek goddess Daphne is changed into a laurel tree to elude the amorous advances of Apollo. Zeus transforms Io into a heifer to protect her from the wrath of Hera. But such shape shifting is filled with risk. The Celtic god Cian transforms himself into a boar to escape his pursuing enemies. They in turn become greyhounds, hunt down their quarry, and kill him. When Demeter, in the shape of a mare, flees Poseidon, he accomplishes the seduction by taking the shape of a stallion.

Punishment. Shape shifting has such obvious utility for pursuit and flight that examples of it have little inherent intellectual or religious weight. When it takes the form of punishment it becomes considerably more nuanced. There are, to be sure, numerous simple instances of direct retribution. Thus, Lot's wife is transformed into a pillar of salt for violating the command not to look back at Sodom; in Roman mythology Picus pays for his rejection of Circe's sexual advances when she transforms him into a woodpecker.

In its more refined form shape shifting as punishment emerges in a number of traditions as the transmigra-

tion, or reincarnation, of souls. In Hinduism, where the concept is most thoroughly developed, the reincarnated soul has a new shape determined by the quality of its spiritual life in previous existences. There is no end to this serial shape shifting until the soul is able to cleanse itself of all attachment to the changeable. In other words, the soul will be punished by shape shifting until it has no shape left whatsoever. This idea persists in Buddhism, though with much less emphasis. Plato gives the idea considerable authority in the West. In the *Phaedo*, for instance, he has Socrates argue that souls will go through an indefinite number of rebirths but with appropriate transformations. Those who are gluttons in this existence will be asses in the next; the unjust and tyrannical will become wolves and hawks; and those who practice the civil and social virtues will be bees or ants, if they are not changed "back again into the form of man." Elsewhere Plato suggests that we have fallen into this earthly shape from one more desirable.

Liberation. For every tale of punishment by shape shifting there is one of liberation. The princess of one of the tales of the brothers Grimm must weave six shirts out of flower petals and keep silence for six years in order to break the witch's spell that has changed her six brothers into swans. Cinderella must be found by the prince, the café waitress by the movie producer, each thus to be freed from her humiliating bondage.

The shape shifting of liberation, since it must always come from without, grants unusual, often unknown or hidden, powers to the changers. Pygmalion, a Greek sculptor of great skill, innocently shapes a statue, then finds he has fallen in love with it; Aphrodite secretly brings the statue to life as the woman Galatea. Just as innocently a child in another Grimm tale takes a frog to dinner and then to bed, acts of affection that transform him back into the prince he really is.

There is often the assumption in this kind of shape shifting that the change from one state to another is the liberation of a being from its false to its true nature. The water-jar boy of the Indian tale not only springs into human form; he leads his mother into a secret well where she is joined with the supernatural beings who are her true family. The Christian thinker Boethius, tortured to death by the Ostrogoth ruler of Rome Theodoric in 524 CE, wrote that Philosophy, in the shape of a woman, entered his cell to console him with the message that he suffered from his punishment only because "you have forgotten what you are." As long as he could remember that he was in truth pure soul he would be freed from the torment suffered by his earthly shape. The idea that we are liberated from a false existence to a true one is widely found in mystical literature. Is-

lamic mystics, for example, declare that it is their desire "to be who I am before I was."

A highly sophisticated and extreme form of liberation by shape shifting is found in classical Taoism. For the ancient Taoists the spiritual goal was not a transformation from one kind of being into another, but continuous transformation. All that is, they taught, is in the process of change. Therefore, the path (or *tao*) of the liberated person does not have a goal; it is a path of endless change. Chuang-tzu, a Taoist philosopher who lived several centuries before the common era, wrote that the liberated person "rides on the flow of heaven and earth and the transformation of the six elements and wanders in the infinite" (*Chuang Tzu*, trans. Jane English and Gia-Fu Feng, New York, 1974, p. 9). In other words, the liberated person is an eternal shapeshifter, possessing no shape that is truly his or her own.

Immortalization. A relatively small number of shape-shifting tales and beliefs fall into the category of immortalization. At the simplest level are the stories in Greek mythology of Hyacinth, a lover of Apollo who was changed into a lily; of Narcissus, a lover of his own image who also became a flower; and of Echo, a lover of Narcissus, who was cruelly immortalized in the disembodied form of a voice that could never speak for itself.

It has been a common belief in many cultures that gods and heroes have taken permanent places in the night sky. This belief enters into Plato's philosophical speculation, in the *Timaeus*, that the stars are the souls of those liberated from their earthly shapes. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body also shares in the general character of immortalization by shape shifting. "Lo, I tell you a mystery," Paul wrote; "we shall not all sleep but we shall all be changed." It is a change in which "this mortal nature must put on immortality" (*1 Cor.* 15:51-53). This more philosophical, or theological, understanding of shape shifting, it should be noted, is the precise opposite of that of the Taoists, in which all possibility of immortality is rejected.

Borderline and Confused Identities. There is a large class of shapeshifters who seem to be existing in two realms at the same time, who seem to be both human and animal, or both deity and natural phenomenon. [*See both Therianthropism and Monsters.*]

The best example of this kind of shape shifting in Greek mythology is Dionysos, a god of multiple origins and traits. There is only one continuous characteristic of Dionysos through all his often contradictory manifestations: he is always closely associated with natural process. His usual dwelling place is in the wild, physically and psychically far from civilized human exist-

tence. The natural order from which he is inseparable usually causes social disorder. He is widely known as the god of wine and revelry. Even his birth has a strange ambiguity about it: he was born twice, once prematurely of the goddess Semele, and once from the thigh of Zeus. This double birth may account for the fact that he can sometimes be found in female form. He can assume a great number of shapes, as though the line between his divinity and natural process has no restraining effect. Dionysos is as closely associated with death as he is with life. He was raised in the forest by the satyr Silenus, who was fond of saying that the only happiness in life is to die and leave it as soon as possible. Dionysos dies by being pulled apart by women in an ecstatic ritual and is thus also known by the name Zagreus, the Torn. Once dead, however, he comes back to life, a symbol of the natural process itself, which requires death for the regeneration of life.

Other Greek deities, notably Artemis, Poseidon, and Demeter, have identities bound up with nature, though none so closely as Dionysos, whose origins are, in any case, more Middle Eastern than Greek. The ancient religions of Mesopotamia and Egypt included the worship of a great many gods who changed their shapes in a manner imitative of nature. Ishtar, the Assyro-Babylonian goddess of love and voluptuousness, performs an annual ceremonial killing of her lover Tammuz, "lord of the wood of life," who vanishes into the earth like the threshed and planted grain, only to rise again in the spring into the arms of Ishtar, who then repeats the process. This particular kind of agricultural shape shifting has distant but unmistakable echoes in many other mythological and religious traditions. Note the parallels in the story of Christ: scourged and crowned in a mock ceremony, he is executed and buried at the time of a spring festival, shortly to rise in the midst of women as a new food for the life of the community.

These are instances of the elusive sort of shape shifting that seem at once to be both divine and natural. Equally elusive is the shape shifting caused by the intimate identity of the human with the animal. Popular Chinese legend commonly has the trickster fox posing as a respected citizen, often without anyone ever seeing his fox form. In Europe werewolf legends are found everywhere. Indeed, until the eighteenth century it was widely believed that some human beings could periodically pass into the form of a wolf; the belief even encouraged a quasi-scientific study of such creatures, thought to be afflicted with a form of insanity called lycanthropy (from the Greek words for "wolf" and "human").

Revelation. Finally, there is the shape shifting that appears to have as its principal function the awakening or enlightening of observers to an otherwise unnoticed

reality. Þórr (Thor), the hero-god of Norse mythology, was once admitted with his companions to a magical castle where they had to prove themselves by such feats as racing with a giant who seemed to reach the finish line as soon as he started, lifting a cat whose single paw Thor could not raise from the floor, and wrestling with an old woman of frail appearance but astounding strength. When they had lost these contests it was explained to them that they had been competing with thought, the world serpent, and time, as though these were realities about which the heroes needed instruction.

The Greek god Proteus offers an interesting variation on this theme. Because he possessed the gift of prophecy, Proteus was often asked to reveal what the future held for a person. As though to impress his suppliants with the anguish that comes from such revelations, he would change himself into monstrous forms meant to terrify them. To those who refused to be intimidated he offered the requested knowledge.

Revelatory shape shifting does more than simply occur in Christianity; it is its central affirmation. The doctrine of the incarnation is properly to be understood as the revealing self-transformation of God. "In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God. . . . And the word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory," the *Gospel of John* begins. Only once, however, do we find in the Gospels an event in which something of Jesus' divine form is revealed. Jesus took several of his disciples up a mountain "and was transfigured before them." His face shone as the sun and his raiment was of a brilliant light. The disciples fell on their faces in fear and reverence.

A remarkably similar event can be found in one of the best-known works of Hindu literature, the *Bhagavad-gītā*. This text is the account of a conversation between the famed warrior Arjuna and the god Kṛṣṇa, who was in the form of Arjuna's chariot driver. Near the end of this discourse Arjuna begged Kṛṣṇa to show himself in his true divine form. When Kṛṣṇa did so his face shone with the light of a thousand suns, and Arjuna "beheld the universe, in all its multitudinous diversity, lodged as one being within the God of gods." Like the disciples of Jesus, he was both terrified and worshipful before this transformation.

In referring to Jesus and Kṛṣṇa as shapeshifters it may seem that their spiritual importance has been trivialized, that they have been placed in the company of tricksters and seducers. On the contrary, these self-transforming powers of Jesus and Kṛṣṇa show how immensely varied the phenomenon of shape shifting is. What the many shapeshifters have in common is only an external resemblance. When we look into the inner

meaning of each instance of shape shifting and try to understand it in its context, similarities rapidly disappear. Shape shifting is a universal phenomenon to which no universal meaning can be applied. To cite an event as an example of it is not, therefore, to state its meaning, but to encourage inquiry into its meaning.

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JAMES P. CARSE

SHARĪ'AH. See under Islamic Law.

SHAVU'OT, or Pentecost, is the Jewish festival that falls on the sixth day of the month of Sivan (and also on the seventh day, outside Israel). In the Pentateuch (*Ex.* 34:22, *Dt.* 16:10) the festival is called Shavu'ot ("weeks") because it falls after seven weeks (forty-nine days) have been counted from the "morrow of the Sabbath" (*Lv.* 23:15) of Passover. In the Talmudic literature a debate is recorded between the Sadducees and the Pharisees: the former understood the word *Sabbath* in the verse to mean literally the Sabbath of Passover (so that, for them, Shavu'ot always fell on Sunday), while the latter, whose view is accepted, understood "the Sabbath" to be the first day of Passover. It is difficult to know what doctrinal issues really lie behind these two opinions, since, if the report is accurate, it is unlikely that the debate was purely exegetical.

In the Pentateuch the festival appears to have been a purely agricultural one. The rabbinic name for the festival, 'Atseret ("assembly"), the term used in *Numbers* 29:35 for the additional festival of Sukkot, suggests that originally the festival was no more than an adjunct to Passover. But beginning no later than the second cen-

tury CE a vast transformation of the festival took place. The arrival at Mount Sinai of the people coming from slavery in Egypt (*Ex.* 19:1) occurred in the third month from the Exodus (the month of Sivan, as it came to be called). Through examination of the texts, a view developed that the theophany at Sinai had taken place on the sixth of Sivan, and Shavu'ot was then celebrated as the anniversary of the giving of the Torah. (Although the passage speaks only of the Decalogue being given at Sinai, later Jewish tradition held that the whole of the Torah was given to Moses at that time.)

The liturgy of the day contains references to the Torah and the 613 commandments (the rabbinic figure for the sum total of positive precepts and negative injunctions of the law). A feature found only on this festival is the recital of an Aramaic hymn on the first day in praise of the Torah. It is generally held that these hymns are vestiges of introductions in Aramaic to the Targum, the Aramaic translations of the texts that, in ancient times, were always read in the synagogue. The Pentateuchal reading is from the Sinai narrative (*Ex.* 19–20), and the Prophetic reading from *Ezekiel* 1, the vision of the heavenly chariot. The link between the two is that of revelation, to the people as whole and to the individual prophet. The *Book of Ruth* as well is read in the synagogue. Ruth, the prototype of the righteous proselyte, took upon herself the observance of God's laws, as did the Israelites at Sinai.

There are no special Shavu'ot rituals, in view of the late origin of the festival in the form in which it is now celebrated. However, there are a number of customs, such as decorating the synagogue with plants and flowers (because beautiful plants are said to have flowered on the barren mountain when the Torah was given) and eating dairy dishes at the festive meal (because, like milk, the Torah nourishes young and old). The sixteenth-century mystics of Safad introduced the all-night vigil on Shavu'ot night, a practice that has been widely adopted by all Jews. During this night an anthology of readings from all the classical sources of Judaism is studied.

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LOUIS JACOBS

SHAYKH AL-ISLĀM (Turk., *seyhülislam*) is a title associated with Islamic religious figures; it was used most commonly in the period of the Ottoman empire, when it denoted the chief jurisconsult, or *muftī*, of Istanbul, who was the supreme religious authority in

the empire and the administrative head of the Ottoman hierarchy of religious scholars (*'ulamā'*). The title seems to have come into use in the Islamic east in the late tenth century. From that time it served to distinguish individuals who had achieved prominence in some branch of the faith. Although pre-Ottoman biographical literature mentions the title in connection with Ṣūfī notables, it was even then more commonly, and later almost exclusively, applied to specialists in Islamic holy law, the *sharī'ah*.

The transition of the term from an honorific to an actual office defies charting. However, from the tenth century certain local religious officials are known to have held office under the title (although not necessarily performing the same functions) in such disparate lands as Seljuk Iran and Anatolia, Mamluk Egypt and Syria, the Delhi sultanate of India, Safavid Iran, Timurid Transoxiana, and the Muslim regions of China. It was under the Ottomans, however, that the office achieved both its full definition and its preeminence.

According to Ottoman tradition, the first *shaykh al-Islām* was Şemseddin al-Fenari (d. 1431), a celebrated *sharī'ah* scholar and *qādī* ("judge") appointed by Sultan Murād II (1421–1451). With the conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453, the *shaykh al-Islām*, always chosen from among the noted jurists of the day, thereafter resided in the capital city as its chief *muftī*.

Like any *muftī*, the *shaykh al-Islām* was responsible for issuing written opinions (*fatwās*), based on established *sharī'ah* authorities, in response to legal questions submitted for his expert interpretation of the law. Such opinions were not binding. The petitioner was under no legal obligation to follow a *muftī*'s findings, or even those of a *shaykh al-Islām*. Nonetheless, a *fatwā* delivered by the *shaykh al-Islām* possessed compelling moral authority. A *shaykh al-Islām* presumably earned his post as much through a reputation for integrity as for scholarship. Moreover, he was the only officer in the realm entitled to pronounce on the sultan's fitness to rule. The subordination of the worldly to the spiritual was more in theory than in practice, but many *shaykh al-Islāms* did not hesitate to issue opinions at odds with their sovereign's wishes. In any case, for the entire span of the empire, the *shaykh al-Islām's fatwā* was the emblem of legitimation, required for the deposition of the sultan as well as for the undertaking of any major imperial policy.

During the tenure of the post's most renowned incumbent, Mehmed Ebussüüd (d. 1574), the *shaykh al-Islām* came to control the examination and appointment of the major judges and professors in the empire. As a result, the independence of the office was further compromised, and subsequent holders of the post became in-

creasingly subject to political pressures, including summary dismissal.

With the secularizing reforms of the nineteenth century, the *shaykh al-Islām*, with the entire body of Ottoman *'ulamā'*, was systematically deprived of authority and importance. In November 1922, the last *shaykh al-Islām* left office when the nationalist Turks under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (d. 1938), founder of the Turkish Republic, abolished the Ottoman sultanate. The post was never reconstituted, but local officials in Muslim countries outside Turkey have occasionally used the title in the modern era.

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MADELINE C. ZILFI

SHAYKHĪYAH, a controversial school of theology within Twelver or Imāmī Shiism, originated from the teachings of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsā'ī (1753–1826). His thought is a creative synthesis of considerable merit and complexity, selectively drawing from the theosophical philosophy (*ḥikmat ilāhī*) of Mullā Şadrā Shirāzī and other famous Shī'ī gnostics, from certain elements of the Akhbārī school of Shī'ī scholarship, and apparently from Ismā'īli eschatological theories. Though advancing several criticisms of the *ḥikmat ilāhī* tradition and of Sufism, the Shaykhiyah may be regarded as the most powerful expression of theosophical dissent from the strident orthodoxy and claims to authority of the dominant Uşūlī *'ulamā'* of Iran during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Shaykh Aḥmad: Life and Thought. Shaykh Aḥmad was born in the eastern Arabian province of al-Ḥasā. From an early age, he showed an inclination toward learning and an ascetic form of spirituality. In his au-

tobiography, he relates how as a child and young man he experienced a series of initiatory dreams and visions in which certain of the twelve Shī'ī imams and the prophet Muḥammad taught him esoteric knowledge. These visionary experiences later became central in the formation of his philosophical and religious teachings on the nature and functions of the imams in creation (al-Aḥsā'ī, 1957).

In the early 1790s, Shaykh Aḥmad left his native country for Iraq. Here he came into close contact with the controversies then stirring among the Twelver 'ulamā'. In religious debates dominated by questions of authority, the 'ulamā' were largely divided into two camps: Uṣūliyah and Akhbārīyah. The Uṣūlī reformation of the eighteenth century successfully raised the Uṣūlī *mujtahids* (the preeminent religious scholars) to a dominant position within Shiism through their doctrine of *taqlīd*, which dictated that the Shī'ah must follow the rulings of a living *mujtahid* on all matters of faith and practice. For their part, the Akhbārīyah held that only the now-hidden twelfth imam is infallible, immune from sins, and therefore worthy to be followed; all persons, including learned scholars, are to follow the imam. Consequently, they held that the Qur'ān and traditions reveal the will of God and provide sufficient guidance for the practice of Shiism.

Shaykh Aḥmad remained uncommitted to either party. In Iraq, he studied under leading representatives of both schools, but his theosophical worldview kept him aloof from identification with either Uṣūlī rationalism or Akhbārī conservatism. He quickly established a reputation for piety and learning and attracted a large following of students and admirers. In 1806 he ventured to Iran where he gained increasing fame, not only among the clerics but also with a large number of Qajar royalty, including Fatḥ 'Alī Shāh, and powerful merchants.

In Iran, he wrote his most important works dealing with the spiritual exegesis of Shī'ī traditions (1861) and critiques of the philosophical systems of Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (1861) and Muḥsin Fayḍ Kashānī (1856). His writings appear to have been widely circulated and commented on. Although he expressed his views cautiously and frequently resorted to *taqīyah* (pious dissimulation of one's true beliefs), his growing popularity and unorthodox beliefs soon made him the target of fierce attacks from certain *mujtahids*.

Al-Aḥsā'ī was accused of attributing divinity to the imams, a charge that arose from his understanding of certain traditions of the imams dealing with ontology and the mystery of the emergence of being. Shaykh Aḥmad advances a strict apophatic theology in which God remains forever beyond human comprehension and, in-

deed, beyond being as the essential divine ground (*kunh al-dhāt*). Yet other traditions and Qur'anic verses indicate that the very purpose of human existence is to know and love a God who is closer to us than our life vein. The bridge between the transcendence and immanence of God is the primordial Muhammadan reality (*ḥaqīqah muḥammadiyah*), which is, for Shaykh Aḥmad, none other than the pleroma of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones (*chahārdah-i ma'ṣūm*, namely Muḥammad, Fāṭimah, and the twelve Shī'ī imams). Here, the imams are held to be eternal spiritual realities who, in their unity, are the creative primal will of God and the means through which God is known to persons. In the Shaykhī hierarchy of being, the Fourteen Immaculate Ones are also designated as the "Light of Lights" (*nūr al-anwār*). It is only through the imams in their reality as the primal will that a manifestation (*mazḥar*) of God occurs. On this point, al-Aḥsā'ī differs with the Ishrāqī school of Shī'ī Neoplatonism, which sees the Light of Lights as the originating source of being.

Shaykh Aḥmad maintains that the imams' nature as spiritual beings demands, in contrast to legalistic Shiism, that the imams exist within spiritual bodies situated in the visionary realm of Hūrlqalyā, an intermediate world of archetypal figures (*'ālam al-mithāl*). Within this imaginal world, the soul encounters the imams and is transformed through a divine anthropomorphosis designated as a second or spiritual birth (*al-waladah al-rūḥānīyah*). It is in this archetypal region of being that the night journey (*mi'rāj*) of the Prophet and the final resurrection occur, a belief that undermines the literalism of orthodox Shiism (see Corbin, 1977, chaps. 9–11, for translations of Shaykhī texts on this theme).

Shaykh Aḥmad's rejection of the *mujtahids'* claims to authority also caused conflicts. As with the Akhbārīyah, Shaykh Aḥmad denies that believers must submit to the rulings of some *mujtahid*. Instead he advances his doctrine of the Fourth Support (*al-rukn al-rābi'*). Shaykh Aḥmad logically reduces the traditional five bases of Shiism to three: the unity of God, prophethood, and the imamate. In addition, there must always exist the "perfect Shī'ah" (*al-shī'ah al-kāmilah*): Shī'ī saints who serve as intermediaries between the imams and believers. The perfect Shī'ah partake of the grace of the imams through spiritual vision and not through the fallible discursive reasoning of the *mujtahids*. Consequently, their knowledge of religious truths is immune from error by virtue of their intimacy with the imams. Although Shaykh Aḥmad did not specifically claim to be the "bearer" of this Fourth Support, his description of the attributes of the perfect Shī'ah appears to be a self-portrait. Thus he distinguishes himself from earlier phi-

losophers and theologians by asserting that he is at variance with both these groups because of his unique spiritual relationship with the imams. Unlike the former, he “does not speak without being guided by the imams” (al-Aḥsā’ī, 1957, p. 14).

In about 1822, he was accused of holding heretical beliefs by an undistinguished *mujtahid* from Qazvīn. Although most of the leading ‘*ulamā*’ remained sympathetic or neutral toward Shaykh Aḥmad, the accusation served to set his close followers apart as a separate school within Shiism. This controversy prompted the shaykh to leave Iran for Iraq. There, too, he found himself at the center of debate with many ‘*ulamā*’ antagonistic to his views. Deciding that it was wiser to move once more, he set out for Mecca but died at the age of seventy-three before he reached the holy city.

The Shaykhī School. Al-Aḥsā’ī designated Sayyid Kāzim Rashtī (d. 1843) as his successor. Under Rashtī’s leadership, the Shaykhī school emerged as a separate and organized movement within Shiism. Rashtī clearly formulated the Shaykhī doctrine of salvation history and the evolutionary cycles of revelation that had been cautiously advanced by his master (al-Aḥsā’ī, 1956, vol. 1, p. 103). Possibly influenced by Ismā’īlī theories, the Shaykhīyah hold that there are two ages of the dispensation of Muḥammad: the period of outward observances (*ẓawāhir*) and perfection of the *sharī’ah*, followed by the period of inward realities (*bawāṭin*) and the disclosure of esoteric truths. The first age ended at the close of the twelfth Islamic century (eighteenth century CE), and Shaykh Aḥmad is held to be the first promulgator of the new age of inward realities (Rashtī, *Sharḥ Lāmīyat ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-‘Amrī*, cited in Amanat, p. 43). These views, not widely circulated but well known among Rashtī’s closest followers, heightened a sense of millenarian hope among some Shaykhīyah for the full disclosure of the new age through the guidance of the perfect Shī’ah, or possibly even the long-expected return of the Hidden Imam.

Despite opposition, the Shaykhīyah attained its greatest successes under Rashtī’s leadership. Indeed, the Shī’ah became divided into Shaykhī and Uṣūlī factions. When Rashtī died without designating a successor, the movement splintered into several antagonistic parties, of which the two most important were the Kirmānī Shaykhīyah led by Ḥājj Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kirmānī (1810–1870) and the Bābī movement led by Sayyid ‘Alī Muḥammad Shīrāzī (1819–1844), known as the Bāb. [See Bābis.]

The Bābī movement’s eventual rejection of Shī’ī orthodoxy forced Karīm Khān to adjust Shaykhī teachings in order to distance himself and his party from the Bābis. In contrast to the Bābis, he emphasized the con-

tinuing role of the imams and accepted the Uṣūlī program of law. He also denied that either Shaykh Aḥmad or Sayyid Kāzīm was to be regarded as the Fourth Support of their day, for this is a general category of guides consisting of all Imāmī ‘*ulamā*’ (Kirmānī, *Al-rukn al-rābi*’, Kirman, 1949). Eventually, the Kirmānī Shaykhīyah returned to the more theosophical position that the Fourth Support is an unnamed spiritual hierarchy of saints who, like the Hidden Imam, remain unknown to the general populace. The Kirmānī Shaykhīyah came to regard themselves as an elite minority within Shiism, preserving and deepening the esoteric dimensions of Shiism through the guidance of their shaykhs (see Corbin, 1972). Kirmānī Shaykhī groups are found today in Iran and Iraq.

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SHCHERBATSII, FEDOR. See Stcherbatsky, Theodore.

SHEEP AND GOATS appear frequently in the history of religions, from prehistoric times down to the present, and across a wide geographic area. Both appear most commonly as animals of sacrifice, but the ram and especially the goat have also served as symbols of sexual virility and so are often associated with fertility cults.

Prehistoric Times. Evidence of the symbolic importance of sheep and goats in prehistoric times comes primarily from their representation in art. Their importance as totemic animals among some contemporary tribal peoples also presumably reflects much more ancient beliefs.

Prior to their domestication in the Neolithic period, wild sheep and goats were hunted as game and seem to have become cult objects quite early. In Upper Paleolithic art, for instance, 7 percent of the animal representations consist of images of rams. From the Neolithic period to the Bronze Age, depictions of both goats and rams (most commonly the former) are encountered quite often in the art of Mesopotamia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. We may assume that beliefs and myths connected with these animals underwent a considerable development at this time.

On a diadem from Hissar III (Iran, first half of the second millennium BCE) images of rams and goats are arranged in mirrorlike symmetry. In Çatal Hüyük (Asia Minor, seventh and sixth millennia BCE) ram heads are depicted on the walls of sanctuaries. Rams seem to have been associated with the goddess who is also depicted there as a kind of proprietress of human beings and of both wild and domestic animals. On a wall of the Leopard Sanctuary, also at Çatal Hüyük, there is a depiction of a stylized tree with a goatlike animal on either side. This general motif, a tree or a plant with flanking sheep or goats, is very common in pottery decoration and glyptic art from this period. Symbolic representations of water (perhaps rain) and of snakes are also found in connection with it. These mythologems became very widespread and existed up to modern times in Central Asia.

More indirect evidence for the religious importance of sheep and goats in Neolithic times comes from the practices of various tribal peoples. Their survivals of wor-

ship of sheep as totemic animals up to the modern period may represent a practice that goes back to very ancient times. One such practice was the prohibition against eating mutton among some tribes of Madagascar, who believed that tribal members were descended from sheep. The sheep was also a totemic animal for the Kharia of Bengal, the Kalanga of South Africa, the Batoro of Uganda, and the tribes of the Altaic region, among others. The fact that the word for "ram" is contained in the Greek family name Krioid (from the Greek *krios*) may hint at an earlier totemic belief in Greece as well. Finally, we may note that the goat has served as a totemic animal among some San (Bushmen) tribes of southern Africa.

Historical Times. In historical times we begin to find more differentiated notions of the symbolic importance of sheep and goats and are thus able to discuss each in more detail.

Sheep. Because of the innate traits and behavior of sheep, such qualities as gentleness, timidity, inoffensiveness, and passivity have been consistently attributed to them. These qualities have also been interpreted as expressions of innocence, mildness, simplicity, and love, and, consequently, as a willingness to be sacrificed. The sheep's defenselessness against predators (some animals are actually called "sheep eaters") also made a deep cultural impression. Considering such perceptions of sheep, and taking into account their relatively high fecundity (and hence their availability and expendability), it becomes easy to understand how the idea of the sheep as a sacrificial animal came into being and became widespread in Judaism, ancient Greece, ancient China, and elsewhere.

Numerous examples of sheep as sacrificial animals can be found in the Judeo-Christian tradition. A lamb was slaughtered in the Israelite Passover rite (*Ex.* 12:21–24, *Nm.* 8:8–12). In the New Testament, in both the *Gospel of John* and the *Book of Revelation*, Christ is referred to as the lamb of God who redeems the sins of the world (*Jn.* 1:29, 1:36; *Rv.* 5:6–14, 6:1): that is, the killing of Christ is directly compared to the slaughtering of a sacrificial sheep in order to take away sins (compare the motif of the scapegoat). Lamb is the traditional meal during Christian celebrations of Easter; marzipan and chocolate lambs holding flags—to represent Christ victorious—are also popular at Easter time.

Sheep have been sacrificial animals among many other peoples as well. In the Islamic world, the ritual slaughter of a sheep is called for during the feast of the pilgrimage. Just as in the Judeo-Christian tradition a ram is sacrificed in the place of Isaac, in the Islamic tradition a ram is substituted for Ishmael.

Among the ancient Greeks sheep were sacrificed to

Aphrodite and Zeus, and also to the chthonic gods. For sacrifice to the last a black sheep or ram was used and was allowed to be completely consumed by fire, whereas when sacrifices were made to other gods most of the animal's flesh was reserved to be eaten. The most important sacrifice was the Kriobolion ("slaughter of sheep"), an orgiastic and mystical event associated with the cult of Attis.

In addition to their use in sacrifice, sheep have also been associated with weddings and thus with fertility. In ancient Athens, for instance, the fleece of a sacred sheep (*aegis*) was brought by a priestess to newly married women. The ram, viewed primarily as a symbol of sexual power, played an even more important role in Classical Greece. It was associated mainly with the cult of Hermes but also with the cults of Aphrodite, Zeus, Poseidon, Cybele, Hera, Hephaistos, the sileni, and the satyrs. Although Hermes was often depicted next to sheep or riding a sheep, particular emphasis was placed on the ram and especially on its connection with virility. The size and weight of the ram's sexual organ were commented upon, and it was believed that a good ram could cover fifty ewes. Such beliefs are reflected in mythology: Hermes, burning with love for Persephone, decided to approach her in the form of a ram. It was thought that a god could have much more amorous enjoyment in the form of a ram than as a human. The ram was also connected with gold and the sun, both symbols of vital power.

In Rome there were similar beliefs and practices. Sheep were favored as sacrificial animals and were offered to Mars, Faunus (the protector of sheep and flocks), Pales, and Dea Dia. They were also associated, as in Greece, with weddings: a bridegroom and his bride were required to sit on a sheepskin that was specially sanctified for the occasion. Finally, sheep also seem to have acquired a chthonic meaning in Rome: they were used in the cult of the *lares* and *manes*, sacrificed to the dead, and depicted on tombs.

In ancient Egypt the cult of the ram was widespread. On the island of Elephantine the ram was believed to embody the local god Khnum. Excavations there have revealed the burial ground of the sacred rams of Khnum's temple, and actual mummies of sacred rams have been found. In Mendes (which means "ram"), the ram embodied Osiris, the Egyptian god of the underworld, and in Thebes the sun god Amun was depicted as a ram.

Various Hindu deities are associated with the ram as well. Indra, the warrior god, is called a ram in the *Rgveda* (1.10.2, 1.51.1), and one of the forms of the god of fire, Agni, was that of a ram.

The ancient and modern peoples of Iran and Central

Asia have many beliefs concerning sheep. Among the Pamiri of Central Asia, sheep are believed to have a divine nature and are associated with the sun. A story is told of a sacred sheep, illumined by a sacred flame, descending from the mountains. In the Islamic version of this story, the sheep is said to have been sent by the Prophet. In the Pahlavi-Sasanid work *Karnamag* (eleventh century), an enormous ram symbolizes the happiness (*farr*) of the king and his dynasty, and more broadly the happiness and well-being of any man. In Iranian Sasanid art, rams are depicted with ceremonial ribbons around their necks, for sheep were believed to bring happiness and health; if one walked through a flock of sheep one would free oneself of disease. There is a striking parallel to these Iranian themes in the Chinese tradition, where the term for happiness consists of the graphs for "man" and "ram." For the Kalmuks, a Mongolian people, the ram is a symbol of fertility and abundance, and a white ram is believed to be a creature from heaven. The connection of the ram with fertility is found in Hittite and Russian rituals as well. The mountain Tajiks annually attach drawings of a ram's horn to the front walls of their houses in order to increase fertility.

Many ancient beliefs and practices were connected with the chthonic nature of the ram. The late Bronze Age cemeteries of northern Afghanistan and southern Uzbekistan contain separate burials of goats and rams isolated from the human graves and supplied with a large number of vessels and even funeral food—part of the carcass of a ram! Evidently the animals were substituted for human corpses that for some reason could not be buried here. Much later, in graves in Ferghana (Central Asia) dating from the seventh and eighth centuries CE, rams were buried equipped with saddles and bridles, evidently as substitutes for horses. The mountain people of the Iagnob River valley in Tajikistan held a funeral feast for a dead sheep as though it were human. The Tajiks believed that if a person killed a ram for a purpose pleasing to God, a ram would meet him in the next world to carry him across the bridge leading to paradise; similar beliefs are found in Islamic culture generally and among the Turkmens, who thought it necessary to slaughter a ram at the moment when a corpse was brought out of the house for burial. Zoroastrians have also believed that one could be helped to cross the Chinvat Bridge leading to Heaven by the ritualistic sacrifice of a ram.

Goats. In religious practice and mythology, goats have been important as symbols of extraordinary virility and fecundity and as animals associated with the profane. Like the sheep, the goat has also long been a favorite animal of sacrifice.

Many references to goats can be found in the ancient Near East. A Babylonian hymn compares Ishtar to a goat and Tammuz to a kid. Also in Babylonia, a goat was sacrificed in order to rid a person of disease. The goat was killed while a tamarisk knife was drawn across the person's throat, and the goat was then buried as if it were a person. Among the Hittites, the parts of the body of a newborn child were homologized to the body of a sacrificed goat. In a Sumerian tradition the goat was linked with the god Enki, who had the form of a goat in front and a fish's tail in back and who was crowned with the head of a ram. This bizarre combination reflects Enki's nature as ruler of both water and plants.

In the Israelite religion the goat was the preferred sacrifice to Yahveh. Here we also find the institution of the "scapegoat." A goat was brought before a priest, who placed his hands upon its head while enumerating the sins of the people. A special envoy then took the goat into an impassable wilderness and let it go. Upon return the envoy had to undergo a ritual purification (*Lv.* 16:3–28). The practice was not limited to the Israelites alone, however, but was common to many peoples, although the expelled animal was not always a goat. [See Scapegoat.]

The goat was less important to the Greeks. Nevertheless, depictions of goat-demons appeared at a very early period in Greek art. In Classical Greece this was Pan, with hooves and horns but with a man's body and head. His Roman analogue was Faunus, who was called the "goat god," although he was originally worshiped as a wolf god.

The Olympian god most closely associated with the goat was Dionysos. According to one legend, Zeus changed the young Dionysos into a kid, which Hermes brought to the nymphs at Mount Nysa. Dionysos was able to assume the form of a goat and was sometimes regarded as a goat. His progeny were often seen as goat-like; goats were offered to him in sacrifice, and the goat was his attribute. Such beliefs and practices were doubtless connected with the cult of vegetation and fertility, which is also the link between the goat and the cult of Aphrodite. The goat was her sacred animal, which she was often portrayed as riding. The goat also played a role in the cults of Zeus, Hera, Apollo, Artemis, and Hermes, and the Greeks had the institution of the scapegoat as well. In Rome, goats were sacrificed during the Lupercalia and were also associated with the storm deities.

Goats appear in ancient Indian religion in several connections. The god Agni sometimes had a goat as his mount. The *Aśvins* were compared to two goats (*Rgveda* 2.39.2–3). The deity *Pūṣan*, who was associated with the

sun and with roads, rode on a chariot harnessed to goats (*Rgveda* 6.58.2), and during the *Aśvamedha* (the horse sacrifice) a goat was sacrificed to him. The goat's connection with fertility is also apparent in ancient India; a woman wanting a child had to eat the ritually cooked flesh of a red goat (*Kauṣītaki Śāṅkhayāna* 35.17ff.). The milk of a red goat was believed to protect one from misfortune.

In Zoroastrianism, Verethraghna, the god of victory, is sometimes described as a "beautiful wild goat with sharp horns" (*Yasht* 14.8.25). In Mithraic reliefs the goat symbolizes a mortal being at the peak of vitality and power.

A cult of the goat was widespread from ancient times in Central Asia. The depiction of a goat on a figurine dating from the beginning of the third millennium BCE establishes the existence at that period of a goddess in whose cult a goat figured importantly. Traces of this cult can still be found among the inhabitants of the Pamir and among the Nuristani, inhabitants of the Hindu Kush. The latter have even retained the altars of this goddess, Markum, to whom women annually sacrifice a goat. For the Pamiri this goddess has become a *peri*, or fairy, who is recognized as the sole owner and proprietress of the mountain goats. When a hunter kills a goat, his kill is believed to be the gift of the heavenly owner of goats, the *peri*.

Ancient beliefs about goats have survived in the folklore of various modern peoples. The sacrifice of a goat figures in the Russian fairy tale about Alenushka and her brother Ivanushka, for instance, and the goat Schmierbock appears in Norwegian folk tales as the owner of a treasure of gold. Goats are often described as sources of light and milk and are associated with the Milky Way. The goat Heiðrun gives mead in Valhøll, while in Indian stories the goat gives neither milk nor mead but coins. An Estonian folk tale features a serpent king with a golden cup that contains the milk of a heavenly goat and has the properties of a magic mirror. Modern-day mummers continue to link the goat with the ancient cult of fertility when they sing "Where the goat goes, there the wheat grows" and when they portray the mock death of a goat and its subsequent resurrection.

As in ancient times, the goat continues to be associated in various traditions with the netherworld and with chthonic power. In this respect the goat is opposed to the "pure" lamb. A Slavic popular belief holds that a water sprite can be appeased with the pelt of a black goat; among the Slavs a black goat was sometimes sacrificed to a deceased person. In Slavic and Germanic folklore the Devil has the hooves of a goat.

Finally, it should be noted that the goat figures im-

portantly in astrological symbolism (Capricorn the Goat is a sign of the zodiac, as is Aries the Ram), folk medicine, heraldry, and the interpretation of dreams.

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SHEKHINAH. The Hebrew term *shekhinah* (lit., "dwelling, resting") first appears in early rabbinic literature, referring to the divine presence in the Jerusalem Temple, in Palestine, among the people of Israel, and more generally, within the world. It also signifies an intermediate aspect or emanation of divinity that links the divine realm to the realm of creation. Finally, in a number of medieval mystical texts, the term *shekhinah* represents the divine hypostasized in feminine form.

As Conveyer of the Divine Presence. Although the verb *shakhan* ("dwell") can be found in the Bible, the first occurrence of its noun derivative, *shekhinah*, is in the Targum Onkelos, an Aramaic translation-paraphrase of the Hebrew Bible written sometime between the first and fourth centuries CE. Here, biblical anthropomorphisms that seem to compromise Jewish belief in the incorporeality of God are explained away through the substitution of *shekhinah* or *God's shekhinah* for *God*. Hence, "I dwell among them" (*Nm.* 5:3) becomes, in the Targum, "My *shekhinah* dwells among them"; "You cannot see my face, for man shall not see me and live" (*Ex.* 33:20) is paraphrased "You cannot see the face of my *shekhinah*"; and so on. In the Targum of Onkelos, as in other Targums, the word *shekhinah* does not refer to a separate entity or divine being. It is simply an

abstract noun, grammatically feminine though not in gender, used to convey God's presence in the world and among his people Israel. One finds this conceptual use of the word in other rabbinic sources as well, most notably in the Talmud and Midrash.

Early rabbinic references to the *shekhinah* associate it with the Tabernacle erected to God in the wilderness. According to such sources as *Genesis Rabbah* 3.9 and *Shabbat* 87b of the Babylonian Talmud, God sought to dwell in the universe from the very first day of creation, yet he did not do so until the Tabernacle was built. Once this was accomplished, his *shekhinah*—God's presence—came to rest within it. Similarly, the *shekhinah* is said to abide on Mount Sinai (B.T., *Soṭ.* 5a) and later, in the Jerusalem Temple (*Ex. Rab.* 2.2). The *shekhinah*, then, is closely associated with specific objects or places, all of which are bound up in Israel's history as a people chosen by God.

The *shekhinah* is said to rest only on those who are righteous, departing from those who sin (B. T., *Soṭ.* 3b, *Yoma'* 22b) and refusing to rest on those who are indolent, gloomy, or frivolous (B. T., *Pes.* 117a). According to the Babylonian Talmud, the *shekhinah* further disassociates itself from scoffers, slanderers, hypocrites, and liars (*San.* 103b). The removal of the *shekhinah* from the sinner led some rabbis to maintain that with the destruction of the First Temple, brought about by the sins of Israel, the *shekhinah* departed from the world. Hence, the *shekhinah* was not present in the Second Temple as it had been in the First. Others, however, claimed that the *shekhinah* was present, though intermittently (see, for example, the discussions in *Yoma'* 21b and *Shabbat* 33a). Later, following the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE, it came to rest in a number of major synagogues in Babylonia. It is also considered present in all places where a *minyán* (a quorum of ten men gathered in prayer) has been established (B.T., *Ber.* 6a). Finally, as *Megillah* 29a of the Babylonian Talmud maintains, it is present wherever the Jewish people are, even in exile, and in the future will be with them when they are redeemed. God's presence, in other words, may depart from certain types of persons but not from Israel as a whole.

Yet despite this frequent association of *shekhinah* not only with the people of Israel but with specific persons and places, the Talmud claims that God and his *shekhinah* are everywhere. The *shekhinah*, then, despite its coming into the world on account of Israel, does not only dwell among its people. It is omnipresent. As *Sanhedrin* 39a rhetorically asks, if the sun, one of God's servants, shines upon the whole world, how much more must the *shekhinah* of God himself shine?

As Intermediate Aspect of Divinity. With belief in God's transcendence creating a sense of distance be-

tween God and his creations, the word *shekhinah* came to be understood as an intermediate aspect of divinity, a concept that is most fully developed in Jewish mystical literature. Yet even within nonmystical rabbinic sources, *shekhinah* serves as more than a theologically acceptable substitute for *God*. It becomes a means of emphasizing the immanence or indwelling of God both in the world and among his people.

In the Targum, as in the Talmud, Midrash, and numerous medieval mystical texts, *shekhinah* becomes equated with *kavod* ("glory" of God), heir to the biblical "cloud of glory" that dwelt in the sanctuary as a visible manifestation of the presence of God (*Nm.* 9–10). The Targum further associates the Hebrew *shekhinah* with the Aramaic *memra* ("word") although, as Joshua Abelson (1912) maintains, *memra* (like the Greek *logos*) goes beyond *shekhinah* to signify divine wisdom, power, love, and justice. In the Talmud, *shekhinah* further becomes associated with *ruah ha-qodesh* ("the holy spirit"). Both serve as expressions of God's nearness in relationship to Israel and the world. Both are also used in particular connection with outstanding personalities and with the gift of prophecy. Thus, the *shekhinah* is said to rest on men who are wise, strong, tall, and wealthy (*B.T., Shab.* 92a). Certain Talmudic sages are also singled out as worthy of having the *shekhinah* rest upon them. So, in former times, were the prophets, those who spoke "by the Holy Spirit," and upon whom the *shekhinah* was said to rest (*B.T., Yoma*' 9b, *San.* 11a, *B.B.* 15b).

According to the rabbis, the *shekhinah* maintained an especially close relationship with Moses. It was with him from his infancy through adulthood (*B.T., Sof.* 11a, 12b; *San.* 11a), continually speaking to him. Consequently, Moses separated himself from his wife so as always to be ready for the *shekhinah* (*B.T., Yev.* 62a, *Shab.* 87a). Raphael Patai (1967) speculates that a third-century synagogue mural from Dura-Europos (in southeastern Syria), depicting the infant Moses in the arms of an unnamed woman, does not show Moses with the Iranian goddess Anāhita, as Erwin R. Goodenough suggests in his *Jewish Symbols of the Graeco-Roman Period* (New York, 1964), but rather with the *shekhinah*. Although one cannot dismiss the possibility that the figure may only represent Pharaoh's daughter, should Patai's claim be true, the Dura-Europos mural takes on special significance as the earliest extant depiction of the *shekhinah* as feminine in physical form. Testifying to the influence of Hellenistic art on the Jews of that community, it predates Jewish literary descriptions of the *shekhinah* as a feminine figure by approximately eight hundred years.

Yet even within the Talmud and Midrash, the *shekhinah* takes on certain personifications. Like the Holy

Spirit, it is often described as light or fire. An example of "fire that eats fire" (*B.T., Yoma*' 21b), its light, more radiant than that of the sun, shines upon the righteous in heaven (*B.T., San.* 39a, *Hul.* 60a, *B. B.,* 10a). In addition, again like the Holy Spirit, the *shekhinah* is associated with sound. Thus, for example, in *Lamentations Rabbah*, the *shekhinah* verbally despairs over the Israelites' unwillingness to repent. Similarly, it utters cries of grief over the deaths of the wicked and the righteous (*B.T., Hag.* 15b). In a number of rabbinic passages, the *shekhinah* is described as having wings. Proselytes are particularly singled out as those entering under the protective wings of the *shekhinah* (*B.T., Yev.* 48b, *Shab.* 31a). As George Foot Moore maintains in his two-volume study *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (Cambridge, 1927–1930), these and other personifications often give the rabbinic *shekhinah* a "semblance of personality." It is this personality that is expounded upon and given deeper significance in numerous mystical texts.

Gershom Scholem, in *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (1941), points out that in Jewish mystical literature the *shekhinah* serves as a reminder not of God's immanence but of his remoteness from the world of creation. Though Scholem acknowledges a connection between these conceptions, in medieval Jewish mysticism the *shekhinah* takes on significance as an intermediate figure between God—who remains remote and unknowable—and the lower, material realm of being. The role of the *shekhinah* here is analogous to that assumed by angels in Qabbalah (twelfth- through sixteenth-century Jewish mysticism) and *merkavah* mysticism (a mystical tradition roughly dating from the first century BCE through the tenth century CE) and by the Demiurge, the divine creator, who stands in contrast to the "true" God, again, in the *merkavah* tradition. According to Scholem, *merkavah* visionaries exercised a kind of "mystical anthropomorphism" in order to maintain that the Demiurge was in effect God appearing on the throne of glory, visible, and yet, because of his transcendent nature, unable really to be seen.

In the thirteenth-century *Zohar* and other early qabbalistic texts, creation occurs through a series of ten male and female *sefirot* ("emanations") that emerge from the hidden God, who is Ein Sof (lit., "endless, infinite"). *Shekhinah* is here identified with the feminine Malkhut ("kingdom"), the lowest of the ten *sefirot* and, consequently, the one closest to creation itself. While Patai and others have compared the *shekhinah* to the Virgin Mary of medieval Catholicism, this comparison is superficial. Although both appear as feminine figures who help forge a link between God and the material world, the *shekhinah*, unlike Mary, does not assume the role of intercessor. To the qabbalists, knowledge of the

shekhinah might bring about greater vision, but nothing could bridge the infinite gulf between the mystic and the hidden God.

As Divine Hypostasis. Alongside the view of the *shekhinah* as one of many feminine emanations of divinity appears a vision of Shekhinah personified as the feminine form of God. Indeed, as Scholem writes in *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism* (New York, 1965), by the thirteenth century the Shekhinah had emerged as a “quasi-independent feminine element” within God, envisioned as queen, princess, bride, and “Matrona,” or lady. This conception of the Shekhinah contains a vivid eroticism that enables human sexuality to serve as a mirror of divine structure. Here, the ninth emanation of God, Yesod (“foundation”), together with all of the higher emanations, forms a male image of the celestial bridegroom or king. The union of the king with his bride, Shekhinah (the tenth emanation), produces what Scholem calls a “procreative life force,” a force dynamically active in the world of creation (Scholem, 1961, p. 227).

Correspondence between the human and divine realms is found in numerous qabbalistic texts. Set within the context of rabbinic Judaism, Qabbalah views the human performance of the *mitsvot* (God’s “commandments”) as affecting the cosmic order. Thus, in the *Iggeret ha-Qodesh* (The Holy Letter), an early qabbalistic marriage manual, proper, carefully timed sexual intercourse within marriage is said not only to produce pious sons but also to mirror the sexual activity in the realms above, helping to unfold the mystery of God’s unity and leading God—through the Shekhinah—to participate in the act of creation. Sexual union between a man and his wife therefore brings the lower world into a chain of resemblance with the three worlds above it and, replicating the divine harmonic balance of male and female, enables the couple to act, and thus be, like God.

One further finds in qabbalistic literature the identification of the Shekhinah with the mystical community of Israel. Going beyond the early rabbinic depiction of the *shekhinah* in exile as conveyor of divine presence, one here sees human actions mirrored in a separate divine realm, with the Shekhinah experiencing on the divine level that which the Jews experience historically. Thus she too is said to have gone into exile following the destruction of the Second Temple, causing the feminine and masculine elements of God to be alienated from one another. In the *Zohar*, the Shekhinah appears in this context not only as queen, bride, and daughter, but also as mother, likened to the biblical Rachel, who weeps for her children. According to Scholem, the Shekhinah of the *Zohar* becomes a symbol of “eternal wom-

anhood.” As such, she assumes countless images and names.

As the Divine Feminine. In *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, Scholem credits the concept of the Shekhinah as the feminine element of God with being one of the most significant and lasting innovations of qabbalistic literature. He maintains that its widespread popular recognition is evidence of its having responded to a “deep-seated religious need” among the Jewish people. Indeed, despite the theological problems that the mystical vision of the Shekhinah created by calling into question in reality if not in theory the absolute unity of God, the popularity of this feminine concept of deity continued at least through the seventeenth century.

Arthur Green (in Heschel, 1983) suggests that the Shekhinah of medieval Qabbalah raises two important questions for contemporary Jewry. (1) Are both men and women in need of a feminine image of the divine, and if so, what role does this image play? (2) Can the image of the Shekhinah, created exclusively by a male community, be appropriated by those Jewish women who have begun to re-image the divine as feminine out of the conviction that they too have been created in the image of God? While Green seems to believe that a “truly feminine [Jewish] spirituality” might begin by reexamining and possibly appropriating the traditional image of the *shekhinah*, most Jewish feminist theologians have thus far directed their efforts elsewhere, either reappropriating early feminine images of deity that were later rejected by the tradition, drawing upon images from other religious traditions, or creating new images altogether (see the essays by Judith Plaskow and Rita Gross in Heschel, 1984). Some have begun to alter traditional blessings from “Barukh attah Adonai” (“Blessed are you, O Lord”) to “Brukhaḥ Yah Shekhinah” (“Blessed are you, Shekhinah”) (see *Response: A Contemporary Jewish Review*, nos. 41–42, 1982); others, however, reject the use of the *shekhinah* as an image, claiming that it reveals more about men’s concept of womanhood than it does about divinity itself.

[See also Attributes of God, *article on Jewish Concepts, and Qabbalah.*]

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The best sources of information on the appearance of the *shekhinah* in Jewish mysticism remain the writings of Gershom Scholem; see especially *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (1941; reprint, New York, 1961), *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism* (New York, 1965), and *Kabbalah* (New York, 1974). See too his book *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York, 1971), for a discussion of the appearance of the *shekhinah* in the heretical Shabbatean and Frankist movements and in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Hasidic thought. More generally, volume 1 of *Understanding Jewish Mysticism*, edited by David R. Blumenthal (New York, 1978), provides a useful view of intermediate aspects of divinity in Jewish mysticism, while Isaiah Tishby's *Mishnat ha-Zohar*, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 1957–1961), presents a thoughtful analysis of the sefirotic system in early qabbalistic literature. The anthology edited by Susannah Heschel, *On Being a Jewish Feminist* (New York, 1983), includes a provocative essay by Arthur Green entitled "Bride, Spouse, Daughter: Images of the Feminine in Classical Jewish Sources," pp. 248–260.

ELLEN M. UMANSKY

SHEMBE, ISAIAH (c. 1870–1935), founder of the Zulu amaNazaretha church and the most outstanding figure in the independent church movement in South Africa. The large majority of the three thousand African independent churches are either "Ethiopian" or "Zionist." The Ethiopian churches are carbon copies of mission-related churches (mainly of a Methodist or Congregational type) that have seceded from white mission churches over the issue of apartheid in the church. The Zionist churches, whose name implies an identification with the holy mountain of Zion in the Old Testament, are largely charismatic prophet-led healing groups. Worship in the Zionist churches is an African variant of Pentecostal spirituality. Shembe is the outstanding personality associated with a very small group of churches, often referred to as African "messianic" churches, where the leader is ascribed by his followers with supernatural powers.

Fountains and mountains are the holy places where these prophets generally receive their calling. Shembe was told by a voice to climb a mountain, and it directed him to a cave where he had a dream. From this lofty position he was invited by the voice to survey the earth, and he there discovered his own putrefying corpse. The voice warned him against sexual sins, and he woke up exclaiming, "I have seen Jehovah." This experience on the mountain was to remain with him as a determinative factor throughout his life. By a divine call he had been set apart for a prophetic task on behalf of the Zulu.

These were turbulent times in Zulu society and South African politics, and Shembe was closely related to

Meseni Qwabe, one of the militant leaders of the Zulu "reluctant rebellion" of 1906. At the same time he met W. M. Leshega, a leader of a newly formed African Baptist church, who was also one of the leaders of the "Ethiopian" movement. In 1911 Shembe founded his own organization, the amaNazaretha Baptist Church, which differed from Leshega's organization on one elementary point: Saturday rather than Sunday was observed as the holy day of the week.

In 1912, Shembe once again had a revelation and was compelled to climb a particular mountain, called Inhlangakazi, located inland from the city of Durban. This mountain retreat lasted twelve days. During that time Shembe felt that he was being challenged by mysterious and supernatural powers, but he met all their temptations with the answer, "No, I am waiting for Jehovah." Angels then brought him heavenly food in the form of bread and wine; having received these gifts, he knew that he had acquired a new identity and was now a new man. When he returned to his people he also discovered that he had received a new and surprising power, one which he interpreted as the characteristic gift of Jesus of Nazareth: that of driving out demons and healing the sick. To Shembe, these were fundamental experiences: the pilgrimage to the mountain with its asceticism and its nearness to God, the identification with Moses who had climbed another mountain and was then received as the liberator of his people, and the acquisition of the power of healing. He was now ready for his task as a prophet to his people.

Compared with other African charismatic church leaders, Shembe's originality stands out on a number of points. Especially noteworthy is his creative use of traditional Zulu culture in the life of worship within the church. During church festivals the whole congregation, divided into different gender and age-groups and arrayed in traditional Zulu dress, expresses its collective religious experience in a slow-moving, dignified, and solemn dance. The annual pilgrimage to the Inhlangakazi mountain provided an opportunity for intense group cohesion of the multitude arriving from near and far.

Hymns in other independent and mission-related churches are sometimes just mechanical translations of Anglo-Saxon revival songs or ancient ecclesiastical rhymes. Shembe's hymns, on the other hand, convey the very heartbeat of Zulu religious experience from birth to death. Shembe was highly auditive; new hymns—both lyrics and melodies combined—often came to him while he was sleeping. This was, indeed, his strongest motive for learning the art of writing. Having remained illiterate until he was roughly forty years of age, Shembe acquired this new ability in order to commit to

writing these irresistible songs that would well up from his unconscious: solemn, simple, and searching. His congregation—probably without exception—shared the feeling of being healed by the prophet, by his incisive exorcism, and his healing hand, mesmerizing the expectant crowd with his mystical black veil.

Shembe's Zulu hymn book, John L. Dube's biography of Shembe in Zulu, and Absalom Vilakazi's recent work (1986) are the main sources for a study of Shembe's faith and spirituality, and they remain a unique testimony that provides insight into the mind and spirit of an independent church leader of that period. The title Shembe claimed for himself was that of "the Servant," sent by the Lord to his deprived and despised Zulu people: "But I alone come from afar, / Sent by the Lord among you."

Just as Moses and Jesus had been sent to the Jews, so the Servant was sent to the Zulu. What once was biblical experience had now become a Zulu reality. "So it is also today / on the hilltops of Ohlange" (Ohlange being the place where Shembe built his church center called Ekuphakameni). In a manner that can easily be misinterpreted, he draws a comparison between himself and the biblical archetypes Moses and Jesus. One of his hymns comes close to being a creed for the amaNazareth church. It begins "I believe in the Father and the Holy Spirit / and the communion of saints of the Nazareth." Here the Son is omitted so as to provide room for the Servant of the Spirit. But it is important to emphasize that while referring to his own role as a servant, healer, and helper, he is at the same time aware of Christ on the throne in heaven. Shembe knew that he himself, "having come with nothing and leaving with nothing," would stand before the judgment seat of God.

In order to understand Shembe's relationship to Jesus the Christ one must recall that in hierarchial Zulu society, a visitor could not directly approach the king but first had to turn to junior chiefs whose task it was to introduce the visitor to the ultimate authority. According to Nazareth belief, this is the task of Servant Shembe in heaven, concerning the approach to the King of Kings on the throne. The Zulu prophet is seen as having a mediating role. In the words of Shembe's hymns there is ambiguity and richness of meaning. And those words, no less than the totality of Shembe's religious practice, must of course be understood in the context from which they emerged: in the worship and struggle of the Nazareth community.

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BENGT SUNDKLER

SHEMINI 'ATSERET. See Sukkot.

SHEMU'EL THE AMORA (c. 180–c. 263), called Mar Shemu'el; a first-generation Babylonian amora, son of Abba' bar Abba'. With his contemporary, Rav, Shemu'el spread the Mishnah—edited in Palestine—and thus laid the foundation for the rabbinic movement outside the Land of Israel. He learned the Palestinian tradition primarily from masters who had been in Palestine and combined it with the native Persian Jewish heritage.

Shemu'el's influence as a teacher was enhanced by his authority as a judge in the Jewish court of Nehardea, a city on the Euphrates River. He probably functioned not as a head of an actual academy but rather as a rabbi with a circle of disciples. The prestige he enjoyed is reflected in the portrayal of him as a master devoted to Torah study, extremely honest, enjoying divine protection, friendly with the exilarch and the Sasanid king Shāpūr, an expert in monetary law, and unusually well versed in dreams, medicine, astronomy, and other natural sciences (B.T., *Ber.* 18b, 19a, 56a, 58b; *Shab.* 129a; Goodblatt, 1975).

Shemu'el played a pivotal role in the history of Judaism in that he enabled the Mishnah to become not only a central work of study but also a source of guidance in the actual life of Jews. The present arrangement of his and Rav's dicta in the *gemara'* is probably the result of a decision to use them as a literary framework for post-Shemu'el traditions. Many of Shemu'el's teachings in their original, oral form may have consisted of

brief explanatory glosses to individual *mishnayot*. Longer traditions of Shemu'el used the Mishnah as a point of departure for extending its teachings. Although Shemu'el comprehensively treated the Mishnah, including those laws inapplicable in the Diaspora, he especially responded to topics relevant to a third-century Babylonian audience.

Following the rise of the new Sasanid empire in 226 and the disruption of the existing relationship between the Persians and the Jews, Shemu'el worked out a *modus vivendi* with King Shāpūr I (r. 241–272?) and thereby provided guidelines for a Diaspora Jewish life. He declared that for certain matters, "the law of the kingdom is the law" (B.T., *Git.* 10b), and he offered a "realistic" definition of the messianic age as entailing the end of political subjugation for the people of Israel and not a supernatural transformation of the world (B.T., *Ber.* 34b). He drew from the *Book of Esther* the message that Jews can live peacefully in the Diaspora.

He was concerned with establishing the proper prayer texts and, especially, with the need for the right intention in praying (e.g., J.T., *Ber.* 2.4). By asserting that the divine presence is found in the whole world, he made traditional liturgical and other religious language applicable in the Diaspora.

Shemu'el believed that learning the Mishnah lengthens one's life, that explicating one's Mishnaic learning gives one peace of mind (B.T., *Eruv.* 54a, *Ḥag.* 10a), and as seen in his formulation of a blessing that is to be said before Torah study (B.T., *Ber.* 11b) that studying enables a person to achieve an experience of the sacred.

[See also Mishnah and Tosefta and Amoraim.]

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BARUCH M. BOKSER

SHERIRA' GAON (c. 906–1006), Babylonian halakhist and head of the academy at Pumbedita for some thirty years. Sherira' was a major legal authority whose many *responsa* circulated throughout the whole Jewish

Diaspora. He combined his legal preeminence with a rational attitude toward Talmudic legend, thus setting the pattern that was followed by his son and successor, H'ai. [See H'ai Gaon.]

The single most influential work by Sherira' is the book-length *Iggeret* (Epistle), sent as a response to the community of Kairouan in North Africa. Ya'aqov bar Nissim had asked on behalf of his co-religionists that the gaon explain how the oral law had reached its present form in the Talmud, how and when the various rabbinic works had been compiled and edited, and what was the import of the frequent disagreements among the Talmudic rabbis. This series of questions doubtless reflected the anxiety felt among rabbinites confronted by the Karaite claim that the Talmud was a human product anchored in history rather than a divine oral law. In the *Epistle*, which Salo Baron has called the "outstanding historiographic contribution of the geonic era," Sherira' provided indispensable literary and historical data on the process by which the Talmud evolved; indeed, he defined the terms of much future discussion of this topic, both medieval and modern. The *Epistle* divides into two parts: the first traces the history of Talmudic literature through the pioneering inductive use of selected source materials, while the second is a history of exilarchic and geonic leadership probably based on the academy's archives. The basic ideological position of Sherira' is that the oral law had a literary history but did not substantively develop through the Mishnaic and Talmudic periods. The Mishnah and the Talmud are authoritative crystallizations of the law possessed by the earlier generations, and even Talmudic discussion simply recaptures, on the whole, the knowledge of the ancients. This conservative theory of Talmudic law, much of it based on statements and materials found in the Talmud itself, has remained the ideological basis of Orthodox Judaism until present times.

[For further discussion of the geonim and their use of responsa, see Halakhah, article on History of Halakhah, and Judaism, article on Judaism in the Middle East and North Africa to 1500.]

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GERALD J. BLIDSTEIN

SHIISM. [This entry concerns one of the two main branches of Islam. It consists of three articles:

An Overview

Ismā'īliyah

Ithnā 'Ashariyah

The introductory article traces the general historical development of Shiism; the companion articles focus on two major subdivisions.]

An Overview

Shiism is a major branch of Islam with numerous subdivisions, all upholding the rights of the family of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*) to the religious and political leadership of the Muslim community. The name is derived from *shī'at 'Alī*, the Arabic term for the "party" of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, cousin of the prophet Muḥammad and husband of Muḥammad's daughter Fāṭimah.

Origins and Early Development. Historically, the Shī'ah emerged in support of the caliphate of 'Alī (AH 35–40/656–661 CE) during the First Civil War, which followed the murder of the third caliph, 'Uthmān. The Shī'ah see the foundation of Shiism, however, in Muḥammad's appointment of 'Alī as his successor, a choice which the Prophet is claimed to have made at Ghadīr Khumm not long before his death, and one which the Muslim community ignored in recognizing Abū Bakr as the first caliph. After the murder of 'Alī and the abdication of his eldest son, Ḥasan, in 661, the Shī'ah continued a latent opposition to the Umayyad caliphate from their center in 'Alī's former capital of Kufa in Iraq. Their attachment to the family of the Prophet, and especially to 'Alī's sons and descendants, reflected local resentment of both the loss of the caliphate to Damascus and the Umayyad denigration of 'Alī and his caliphate. Reports about the activity of one 'Abd Allāh ibn Saba', who in some anti-Shī'ī sources is described as the founder of Shiism and as having denied 'Alī's death and taught his divinity, are legendary. If such beliefs arose at this early stage, they remained marginal.

Kufan revolts. The violent death of 'Alī's second son, Ḥusayn, at Karbala, Iraq, in 680 led to the formation of a radical wing within the Shī'ah. After the death of the caliph Mu'āwiyah, the Kufan Shī'ah invited Ḥusayn from Medina, promising to back his claim to the caliphate. The Umayyad governor gained control of the situation, however, and it was a Kufan army which met Ḥusayn and killed him together with many of his relatives. A Penitents movement arose in Kufa; they lamented the death of the Prophet's grandson at his grave in Karbala and sought revenge from those responsible. In 685 the leadership of the Penitents was taken over by

al-Mukhtār ibn Abī 'Ubayd, who revolted in Kufa and proclaimed another son of 'Alī, Muḥammad, to be the imam and Mahdi, the messianic Restorer of Islam. Unlike Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, Muḥammad was not the son of Fāṭimah, and he was known, after his own mother, as Ibn al-Ḥanafīyah. The movement backing him was called the Kaysānīyah after Abū 'Amrah Kaysān, chief of al-Mukhtār's guard and leader of the non-Arab clients (*mawālī*) in Kufa. These clients, local Semites and Persians, now joined the Shī'ah in large numbers for the first time, although the leading role in the movement was still played by Arabs.

The Kaysānīyah movement, which survived the collapse of al-Mukhtār's revolt and the death of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyah in 700, elaborated some of the beliefs and doctrines which came to distinguish the radical wing of the Shī'ah. They condemned the first three caliphs before 'Alī as illegitimate usurpers and considered 'Alī and his three sons, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, and Muḥammad, as successive, divinely appointed imams endowed with supernatural qualities. Many of them denied the death of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyah, the Mahdi, in the belief that he was hiding and would return in glory to rule the world. They taught *raj'ah*, the return of many of the dead at the time of the coming of the Mahdi for retribution before the Resurrection, and *badā'*, the possibility of a change in the decisions of God.

Abbasid revolution. A branch of the Kaysānīyah known as the Hāshimīyah continued the line of imams to Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyah's son Abū Hāshim, who, in contrast to his father, took an active part in the leadership and organization of the movement. After his death in about 717/8 the Hāshimīyah split into several groups over the succession. The majority recognized Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, a descendant of the Prophet's uncle 'Abbās, as the imam after Abū Hāshim; they became historically important as the core of the revolutionary movement in Khorasan which overthrew the Umayyad dynasty and established the Abbasid caliphate in 750. The Abbasids initially espoused the Shī'ī cause, establishing the reign of the family of the Prophet and demanding revenge for 'Alī and his wronged descendants. Soon, however, they distanced themselves from their mostly extremist Shī'ī followers to seek broader support in the Muslim community, while the Shī'ah increasingly confined their backing to the descendants of 'Alī and Fāṭimah. After the collapse of a widely supported Shī'ī rebellion in favor of the 'Alid Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyah, Caliph al-Mahdī (775–785) pressed the Abbasid Shī'ah to trace the line of divinely invested imams back to 'Abbās through his own ancestors, thus de-

nying that the Abbasids had inherited their title from Abū Hāshim and 'Alī. The Abbasid Shī'ah disintegrated soon afterward.

Extremists and moderates. Other minor offshoots of the Hāshimīyah were notable for their extremist doctrine. Bayān ibn Sam'ān (killed 936) taught in Kufa that Abū Hāshim, who had conferred prophethood on him, would return as the Mahdi. 'Abd Allāh ibn Mu'āwīyah (d. 748/9), a descendant of 'Alī's brother Ja'far and recognized by some as the successor of Abū Hāshim, claimed that the Divine Spirit had devolved upon him through the prophets and imams and that he was able to revive the dead. To 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Hārith, one of his followers in al-Madā'in (Ctesiphon), Iraq, is ascribed a major role in the elaboration of key doctrines including metempsychosis, the preexistence of human souls as shadows (*aẓillah*), metaphorical interpretation of the resurrection, judgment, paradise, and hell, and a cyclical history of eras (*adwār*) and aeons (*akwār*) initiated by seven Adams. Such teaching became characteristic of many groups of extremists (*ghulāt*) excommunicated by the mainstream Shī'ah in the following centuries. The Kaysānīyah as a whole was repudiated by the more conservative, moderate Shī'ah in Kufa. All of its branches rapidly disintegrated after the rise of the Abbasid caliphate and virtually disappeared by the end of the second century AH. Its place in the radical wing of the Shī'ah was taken by the Imāmīyah, who traced the line of imams after 'Alī through Ḥasan, Ḥusayn and the latter's descendants.

The increasing prominence of the Husaynid imams within the Shī'ah was connected with a shift in the function of the imam. With the rise of legal and theological schools espousing conflicting doctrines in the late Umayyad period, many of the Shī'ah sought the guidance of the imam as an authoritative, divinely inspired teacher rather than as a charismatic leader. The first to perform this new role was Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 735?), a grandson of Ḥusayn who was widely respected for his learning among both the Shī'ah and non-Shī'ah. His teaching of religious law and Qur'ān exegesis attracted a large number of the Kufan Shī'ah. Keeping aloof from revolutionary activity, he laid the foundations of Imāmī Shī'ī law. A few years after his death his brother Zayd ibn 'Alī came to Kufa and was persuaded to lead an anti-Umayyad revolt. Although he was widely supported by the Kufan Shī'ah, including some prominent former followers of his brother, the more radical followers of al-Bāqir refused to back Zayd ibn 'Alī after he declined to condemn the first two caliphs unequivocally as unjust usurpers. They turned instead to al-Bāqir's son Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, who, like his father,

strictly refused any involvement in armed rebellion. Zayd's revolt ended quickly in failure, and he was killed in 740. The movement backing him survived, however, and formed a Shī'ī sect known as the Zaydīyah. They were moderate both in defining the religious rank of their imams and in condemning the rest of the Muslim community for its failure to do so, yet they were militant advocates of armed uprising against the illegitimate rulers. In contrast to the Zaydīyah, the Imāmīyah exalted the rank of the imams and broke radically with the Muslim community at large, accusing it of apostasy for failing to accord the imams their proper rank and rights. Politically, however, they remained quietist. They were called Rāfiḍah, "rejectors," by the followers of Zayd because of their refusal to support his revolt. The term became a pejorative nickname among Sunnī Muslims, who used it, however, to refer to the Imāmīyah's repudiation of the three caliphs preceding 'Alī. Those Shī'ī moderates of Kufa who shrank back from the Zaydī commitment to revolt were soon absorbed into Sunnism as 'Alī came to be accepted generally as the fourth of the "Rightly Guided" (Rāshidūn) successors of Muḥammad.

The Imāmīyah and Twelver Shī'ah. The Imāmīyah became a significant religious community with a distinctive law, ritual, and religious doctrine under Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. 765), the foremost scholar and teacher among their imams. Ja'far elaborated the legal pronouncements of his father into a comprehensive doctrine; in recognition of his role, Imāmī law is sometimes called the Ja'farī legal school. In theology, some of his statements upheld intermediate positions on controversial questions such as human free will versus predestination, and the nature of the Qur'ān. These were developed into systematic theological thought by certain contemporary Imāmī scholars who took a prominent part in the intercommunal theological debates of his time. Ja'far enjoyed a high reputation as a teacher of esoteric and mystical thought, though his actual role in this field is obscure.

The imamate. The constitutive element of the Imāmī community is its doctrine of the imamate, which was definitely formulated in this age. It was based on the belief that humanity is at all times in need of a divinely appointed and guided leader and authoritative teacher in all religious matters. Without such a leader, according to Imam Ja'far, the world could never exist for a moment. In order to fulfill his divine mission, this leader must be endowed with full immunity (*iṣmah*) from sin and error. Following the age of the prophets, which came to a close with Muḥammad, the imams continue their prophetic mission in every respect except

that they do not bring a new scripture. The imamate is thus raised to the rank of prophethood. Rejection, disobedience, or ignorance of any of the divinely invested imams constitutes infidelity equal to rejection of the Prophet. The great mass of the companions of Muḥammad had thus apostatized from Islam when they accepted the caliphate of Abū Bakr and ignored the Prophet's divinely inspired designation of 'Alī as his legatee (*waṣī*), and the majority of the Muslim community continued to live in a state of apostasy. After 'Alī, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn, the line of legitimate imams had passed through Ḥusayn's descendants to Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, the sixth imam. It would continue to be handed down by designation from father to son until the end of time. Although the imam was the only legitimate ruler of the Muslim community, his imamate did not depend on his actual reign or an active attempt to gain it. Imam Ja'far did not aspire to rule and forbade his followers from engaging in revolutionary activity on his behalf. He predicted that the imams would not regain their rightful position until the emergence of the Qā'im (lit. "riser," i.e., the Mahdi) from among them to rule the world.

The succession to Ja'far al-Ṣādiq was disputed and led to a schism among the Imāmīyah. His eldest son and designated successor, Ismā'il, had died before him. A group of his followers considered the designation as irreversible, however, and either denied Ismā'il's death or recognized Ismā'il's son Muḥammad as the imam. They became the founders of the Ismā'īliyah. In the absence of a new designation, the majority of Ja'far's followers at first recognized his eldest surviving son, 'Abd Allāh al-Aṭṭaḥ. When 'Abd Allāh died a few months later without sons, they turned to his brother Mūsā al-Kāẓim, the seventh imam of the Twelver Shī'ah. Some of them, however, continued to recognize 'Abd Allāh as the rightful imam before Mūsā. They were known as the Faṭḥīyah and constituted a sizable sect in Kufa until the late fourth century AH (tenth century CE). Mūsā was arrested later in his life by Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd and died in prison in Baghdad in 799. His death was denied by many of his followers, who considered his position as seventh imam to be of momentous significance and expected his return as the Mahdi. They did not recognize 'Alī al-Riḍā, the eighth imam of the Twelver Shī'ah, although some of them considered him and his successors as lieutenants (*khulafā'*) of the Mahdi until his return. They also formed a sizable sect known as the Wāqifah and competed with the group which was to become the Twelver Shī'ah. In the Sūs region of southwestern Morocco they gained a following among Berber tribes which survived until the sixth century AH (twelfth century CE).

The Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn attempted to bring about a reconciliation between the 'Alid and Abbasid branches of the family of the Prophet by appointing 'Alī al-Riḍā as his successor in 817, but this move ended in failure. 'Alī al-Riḍā died two years later, and the caliph was widely accused of having poisoned him. The succession after al-Riḍā down to the eleventh imam, Ḥasan al-'Askarī, produced only minor schisms, but the death of the latter in 874, apparently without a son, left his followers in disarray. The main body, henceforth known as the Twelver Shī'ah (the Ithnā 'Asharīyah in Arabic), eventually came to affirm that a son had been born to him before his death but had been hidden. This son had become the twelfth imam and continued to live in concealment. Identified with the Qā'im and the Mahdi, he was expected to reappear in glory to rule the world and make the cause of the Shī'ah triumphant. The time of his absence (*ghaybah*) falls into two parts. In the age of the lesser *ghaybah* he was in regular contact with four successive agents (sg., *wakīl* or *safīr*) who represented him among the community of his followers, communicating their questions and requests to him and his answers and instructions to them. In 941, the fourth intermediary died without appointing a successor, and the greater *ghaybah* began. During this *ghaybah* no one can claim to be in regular contact with the Hidden Imam. He continues to live unrecognized on earth, however, and may occasionally identify himself to one of his followers or otherwise intervene in the fortunes of his community. [See also *Ghaybah*; *Imamate*; and *'Iṣmah*.]

Intellectual currents. The absence of the imam strengthened the position of the scholars (*'ulamā'*) in the Shī'ī community as transmitters and guardians of the teaching of the imams. They now undertook to gather, examine, and systematize this teaching. For the most part, the first transmitters of the statements of the imams had been Kufans, while the compilation and sifting of the traditions into more comprehensive collections was the work of the school of Qom in northwestern Iran. Some Kufan Shī'ī families had settled early in this town, and it became a bastion of Imāmī Shiism, adhering to the imamate of 'Alī al-Riḍā and his descendants in the ninth century even though the Imāmīyah had been eclipsed in Kufa by the predominance of the Zaydiyyah, Wāqifah, and Faṭḥīyah. The traditionist school of Qom reached its peak in the works of Abū Ja'far al-Kulaynī of Rayy (d. 941) and Ibn Bābawayhi al-Ṣadūq of Qom (d. 991/2).

A rival school in Baghdad progressively adopted the rationalist theology of the Mu'tazilah, who espoused human free will and an anti-anthropomorphist, abstract concept of God in sharp conflict with the predominant theology of Sunnī Islam. The Baghdad school rejected

Mu'tazilī doctrine, however, where it clashed with the basic Imāmī beliefs about the imamate; thus it repudiated the Mu'tazilī thesis of the unconditional, eternal punishment of the unrepentant sinner in the hereafter, affirming the effectiveness of the intercession of the imams for sinners among their faithful followers. In fact, faith in the power of the imams' intercessions was a vital motive for the visits to their shrines which have always been a major aspect of popular Shī'ī piety. Twelver Shī'ī theologians also maintained, against the Mu'tazilī position, that the opponents of the imams occupied the status of infidels and that the imamate was, like prophecy, a rational necessity, not merely a revealed legal requirement. The leading figures of the theological school of Baghdad were Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 1022) and Sharīf al-Murtaḍā 'Alam al-Hudā (d. 1044). Their student, Shaykh Abū Ja'far al-Tūsī (d. 1067), became the most important early systematizer of Twelver Shī'ī law; his work has remained fundamental for all later developments. [See more on Ithnā 'Ashariyah below.]

The Twelver Shī'ah today constitute the great majority of the Shī'ah and are often referred to simply by the latter name. Most of the people of Iran and southern Iraq are Twelvers. There are sizable Twelver Shī'ī communities in Bahrein, in al-Ḥasā and Qaṭīf in eastern Saudi Arabia, in southern Lebanon, in Aleppo in northern Syria, and in parts of Afghanistan. On the Indian subcontinent Twelver Shī'ah are widespread, especially in Punjab, Delhi, and Baroda, as well as in the Deccan, where the first Shī'ī missionaries appeared in the fifteenth century, and where the majority of the Quṭb-shāhīs of Golconda and the 'Adil-shāhīs of Bijapur were Shī'ī. In recent years, a considerable number of Pakistani families have also joined the Twelvers.

Extremist Sects. On the fringe of the Imāmīyah and the Twelver Shī'ah there arose numerous minor sects of varying nature classed generically as *ghulāt* ("extremists") and frequently excommunicated by the mainstream. Common grounds for the charge of extremism were deification of the imams and antinomianism.

Imāmī ghulāt. The most prominent figure among the early Imāmī *ghulāt* in Kufa was Abū al-Khaṭṭāb al-Asadī, who was excommunicated by imam Ja'far and killed together with seventy of his followers, the Khaṭṭābiyah, about 755. The Khaṭṭābiyah recognized Abū al-Khaṭṭāb as a prophet sent by Ja'far, whom they viewed as God. Al-Mufaḍḍal ibn 'Umar al-Ju'fī, who is sometimes described as the head of an offshoot of the Khaṭṭābiyah, but who became a trusted agent of Imam Mūsā al-Kāẓim, appears to have played a major role in the transmission of gnostic teaching about the preexistence and transmigration of souls and the cyclical history

earlier associated with the Kaysānī 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥārith.

The heresiographers speak of two complementary currents among the *ghulāt* in the second half of the eighth century. The Mukhammisah (Pentadists) believed in a divine pentad consisting of Muḥammad, 'Alī, Fāṭimah, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn. The five were united in meaning (*ma'nā*) but distinct in name (*ism*) and had manifested themselves throughout history in the form of prophets and imams. The Mufawwiḍah (Delegationists) taught that the Eternal One, whose name is unknowable, had delegated the creation of the world to the divine pentad. At the beginning of the *ghaybah*, the *ghulāt* of this tradition coalesced into two rival sects, the Ishāqīyah and the Nuṣayriyah. The Ishāqīyah was founded by the Basran Ishāq al-Aḥmar (d. 899), who disputed the position of the second *safīr* of the twelfth imam. The sect spread from Iraq to Aleppo and the Syrian coast. In Syria it was wiped out by its Nuṣayrī rivals in the thirteenth century and disappeared in Iraq about the same time.

Nuṣayriyah and 'Alawīyūn. The Nuṣayriyah took their name from Muḥammad ibn Nuṣayr al-Namīrī, a companion of the ninth and tenth imams. They became a fully constituted sect under his successors, especially al-Ḥusayn ibn Ḥamdān al-Khaṣībī (d. 957 or 969), who carried the sect's teaching to northern Syria and was buried in Aleppo. It was extinguished in Iraq after the Mongol invasion but has survived to the present in Syria, especially in Latakia and the Jabal al-Anṣariyah region to the east and in the regions of Alexandretta and Cilicia (Adana and Tarsus). In modern times the Nuṣayriyah are commonly referred to as 'Alawīs or Alawites. [See 'Alawīyūn.]

The name 'Alawī (Turk., *Alevi*) is frequently also applied to other extremist Shī'ī communities in Anatolia. Similar groups in Iran are often pejoratively called 'Alī-Ilāhī ("Alī deifiers"). Such groups generally have their roots in the late Mongol age (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) and represent a mixture of popular extremist Shiism and Sufism. Strong pro-'Alid sentiments on a popular level were already widespread among Türkmen tribes during the great Turkish expansion into Iran and western Asia in the Seljuk period. These sentiments were reinforced during the Mongol period by the Sufism spread by some of the great religious orders which were themselves moving toward Shī'ī beliefs. In the fifteenth century the Kizilbash Türkmen federation and religious order adopted such extremist Shī'ī doctrine under the leadership of the Safavids, who now claimed 'Alid descent. After the foundation of the Safavid state, however, the rulers furthered orthodox Twelver Shiism as the official religion and gradually divested themselves

of the religious veneration and backing of the Kizilbash. Under the Ottomans, the Bektāshī dervish order, which became closely associated with the Janissaries, embraced a similar mixture of Şūfī and extremist Shī'ī beliefs.

A major sect among the so-called 'Alī-Ilāhīs are the Ahl-i Ḥaqq ("people of the truth"), whose origins apparently go back to the fifteenth century and whose main centers are in the Kurdish regions of western Iran and eastern Iraq and in Azerbaijan. They represent a syncretism of popular Şūfī rites, legends, and folklore superimposed on an extremist Shī'ī foundation. While 'Alī is recognized as one of the seven avatars of the divinity, he is completely overshadowed by the figure of Sultan Seḥāk (Ishāq).

Shaykhiyah. In modern times Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥṣā'ī (d. 1826), the author of a Twelver Shī'ī theosophical doctrine, has been charged with extremist views and excommunicated by the *mujtahids* in Iran. He was specifically accused of denying the physical resurrection and the physical nature of the ascension of the prophet Muḥammad. He thus became the founder of the Shaykhī sect which, besides espousing his theosophical teaching, also opposes the authority of the *mujtahids*, in accordance with the Akhbārī position. The sect is scattered throughout Iran and Iraq, with its center in Kirman. Out of it also developed the Bābī and, indirectly, the Bahā'ī religions, but these fall outside the pale of Shiism. [See Shaykhiyah.]

The Ismā'īliyah. An offshoot of the Imāmīyah, the Ismā'īliyah first became historically important after the middle of the ninth century as a secret revolutionary movement promising the impending advent of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, grandson of Ja'far al-Şādiq, as the Mahdi. The movement soon split into two. One of its branches recognized the hidden leaders of the movement as imams descended from Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il. With backing of this branch, the leaders rose to rule as the Fatimid caliphate (909–1171). The other branch, commonly known as the Qarāmiṭah, broke with the leadership and refused to recognize the imamate of the Fatimid caliphs. Their most conspicuous success was the establishment of a Qarṣāṭī state in eastern Arabia which lasted from 899 until 1076. [See Qarāmiṭah.]

The Fatimid branch was rent by a schism during the caliphate of al-Ḥākīm (996–1021), whose divinity was proclaimed by a group of enthusiastic followers. The sect arising from this deviation is known as the Druze. [See Druze.] After the death of the caliph al-Mustaṣṣir in 1094 the Persian Ismā'īli communities recognized his eldest son, Nizār, who did not succeed to the caliphate,

as their imam. Known as the Nizāriyah, they established their headquarters, and later the seat of their imams, in the mountain stronghold of Alamūt in the Elburz mountains. In Syria, where they also occupied some mountain fortresses, they became known to the Crusaders as *hashishiyin* ("hashish addicts"), a name which was then deformed to "Assassins." The main line of Nizāri imams has continued down to the Aga Khans in modern times. [See Assassins and Aga Khan.] A second line, which split off soon after the Mongol conquest of Alamūt in 1256, came to an end in 1796. The branch continuing to recognize the Fatimid caliphs was further split after the death of al-Āmir in 1130. The majority of the Ismā'īliyah in Yemen and India now recognized as their imam al-Ṭayyib, the caliph's infant son, about whose fate nothing is known. In his absence the spiritual leadership of these sectarians, known as Ṭayyibi-yah, became vested in their *dā'ī muṭlaq*. As the line of these spiritual leaders became divided in 1591, the Ṭayyibi-yah split into two communities, the Dā'ūdīyah and the Sulaymāniyah. That part of the Ismā'īli community adhering to the Fatimid caliphate until its fall disintegrated thereafter. [For more on the Ismā'īliyah and its subdivisions, see Ismā'īliyah, below.]

The Zaydiyyah. Retaining the politically militant and religiously moderate attitude predominant among the early Kufan Shī'ah, the Zaydiyyah developed a doctrine of the imamate distinctly at variance with Imāmī beliefs. They neither accepted a hereditary line of imams nor considered the imam as divinely protected from sin and error. Rather they held that any descendant of Ḥasan or Ḥusayn qualified by religious learning could claim the imamate by armed rising against the illegitimate rulers and would then be entitled to the allegiance and backing of the faithful. Thus there were often long periods without legitimate Zaydī imams. The list of recognized Zaydī imams itself has never been entirely fixed although there is general agreement on many of them. In the absence of any claimant possessing the high qualifications of religious learning, the Zaydiyyah often supported 'Alid rulers as mere *dā'īs* ("summoners," i.e., imams with restricted competence). Although they, like the Imāmīyah, generally affirmed that 'Alī, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn had been invested as imams by Muḥammad's designation (*naṣṣ*), they maintained that the designation had been obscure so that its meaning could be discovered only by investigation. Thus they minimized the offense of the companions of the Prophet and the Muslim community in ignoring that designation and in backing the early caliphs. In theology, the Zaydiyyah from the tenth century on mostly accepted Mu'tazili doctrine.

For over a century after the revolt of Zayd, the Zaydī movement remained based in Kufa near the center of Abbasid power, where various 'Alid rebellions backed by it were quickly suppressed. In the second half of the ninth century, however, two Zaydī reigns were founded in remote regions protected by mountain ranges. In Ṭabaristān (modern Māzandarān) on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea, the Hasanid Ḥasan ibn Zayd rose to power in 864. This first Zaydī state lapsed in 900 but was restored in 914 by the Husaynid imam al-Nāṣir al-Uṭrūsh, who had converted to Islam many of the natives of Daylam and Gilān living west of Ṭabaristān. He was also the founder of a legal school doctrine to which his converts adhered, although the older Zaydī community in the region followed the legal doctrine of the Hasanid imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (d. 860). The two communities, known as the Nāṣirīyah and the Qāsimīyah, were often at odds, and, although eventually recognizing each other's doctrine as equally valid, for long periods supported different 'Alid imams or *dā'īs*. They survived until the sixteenth century, when the Caspian Zaydīyah converted to Twelver Shiism under pressure from the Safavid shah Ṭahmāsp.

In Yemen the imam Yaḥyā al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq, a grandson of al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, established Zaydī rule in 897. He introduced the legal and theological doctrine of his grandfather, which he elaborated and modified in his own writings. The unity of the Zaydī community in Yemen was rent in the eleventh century by the rise of two heterodox sects, the Muṭarrifiyah and the Ḥusayniyah. The former was opposed to some aspects of the Mu'tazilī doctrine espoused by the Caspian Zaydī imams and elaborated a distinctive theory of nature which it attributed to al-Hādī and his sons. The Ḥusayniyah denied the death of the imam al-Ḥusayn al-Mahdī in 1013 and expected his return as the Mahdi. Both sects disappeared by the fourteenth century. Relations with the Caspian community were intermittently close for some centuries, and much of its religious literature was transferred to Yemen in the twelfth century. Only exceptionally, however, was an imam ruling in either region able to extend his control to the other. The Zaydī community in Yemen, living mostly in the northern highlands, has survived to the present, although the last imam, Muḥammad al-Badr, was overthrown by the revolution of 1962.

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Scholarly literature on Shiism is still limited and uneven. There is no comprehensive survey of Shiism in its full range. In the wider context of schisms in Islam, the development of the various branches of Shiism is outlined by Henri Laoust in

Les schismes dans l'Islam (Paris, 1965). There are brief chapters on Twelver Shiism, the Zaydīyah, and Ismā'īliyah in *Islam*, edited by C. F. Beckingham, volume 2 of *Religion in the Middle East*, edited by Arthur J. Arberry (Cambridge, 1969).

The origins and early history of the Shī'ah and the Khārijīs in the Umayyad age was classically described, chiefly on the basis of the early Kufan historian Abū Mikhnaḥ, in Julius Wellhausen's *Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam* (Göttingen, 1901), translated by R. C. Ostle and S. M. Walker as *The Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam* (Amsterdam, 1975). A recent study, taking into account later Shī'ī sources, is S. Husain M. Jafri's *Origins and Early Development of Shī'a Islam* (London, 1979).

Twelver Shiism is treated in Dwight Donaldson's *The Shi'ite Religion* (London, 1933) and, from a Shī'ī perspective, in 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabaṭabā'ī's *Shi'ite Islam*, translated from the Persian by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany, 1975). Ṭabaṭabā'ī has also gathered significant Twelver Shī'ī texts, sermons, and sayings of imams in *A Shi'ite Anthology*, translated with explanatory notes by William C. Chittick (Albany, N.Y., 1981). The papers of the 1968 Colloque de Strasbourg, published as *Le Shiisme imāmite* (Paris, 1970), offer scholarly contributions on various aspects of the history of Twelver Shiism. John Norman Hollister's *The Shi'a of India* (London, 1953) deals with the Twelvers, Ismā'īliyah, Bohoras, and Khojas on the Indian subcontinent. A well-informed survey of the role of Shiism in Iran, especially in recent history, is provided by Yann Richard's *Le shi'isme en Iran* (Paris, 1980).

On contemporary Shī'ī *ghulāt* sects, much material has been gathered in Klaus Müller's *Kulturhistorische Studien zur Genese pseudo-islamischer Sektengebilde in Vorderasien* (Wiesbaden, 1967), whose conclusions about the genesis of these sects are, however, open to question.

A sketch of the history of the Ismā'īliyah is given by W. Ivanow in *Brief Survey of the Evolution of Isma'ilism* (Leiden, 1952). The genesis of Ismā'īlī gnostic doctrine has been reexamined in H. Halm's *Kosmologie und Heilslehre der frühen Ismā'īliya* (Wiesbaden, 1978).

Cornelis van Arendonk's *De Opkomst van het Zaidietische Imamaat in Yemen* (Leiden, 1919), translated into French by Jacques Ryckmans as *Les débuts de l'imamat Zaidite au Yémen* (Leiden, 1960), offers a history of the Zaydīyah until the foundation of the Zaydī state in Yemen. I have studied the development of Zaydī doctrine up to the twelfth century in *Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen* (Berlin, 1965).

WILFERD MADELUNG

Ismā'īliyah

A major branch of the Shī'ah, the Ismā'īliyah traces the line of imams through Ismā'il, son of Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. AH 148/765 CE). Ismā'il was initially designated by Ja'far as his successor but predeceased him. Some of Ja'far's followers who considered the designa-

tion irreversible either denied the death of Ismā'il or accepted Ismā'il's son Muḥammad as the rightful imam after Ja'far.

The Pre-Fatimid Age

The communal and doctrinal history of the Ismā'īlyah in this period poses major problems which are still unresolved for lack of reliable sources. The Muslim heresiographers mostly speak of two Ismā'īli groups after the death of Imam Ja'far: the "pure Ismā'īlyah" held that Ismā'il had not died and would return as the Qā'im (Mahdi), while the Mubārakīyah recognized Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il as their imam. According to the heresiographers, al-Mubārak was the name of their chief, a freedman of Ismā'il. It seems, however, that the name (meaning "the blessed"), was applied to Ismā'il by his followers, and thus the name Mubārakīyah must at first have referred to them. After the death of Ja'far most of them evidently accepted Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il as their imam in the absence of Ismā'il. Twelver Shī'i reports attribute a major role among the early backers of Ismā'il to the Khaṭṭābiyah, the followers of the extremist Shī'i heresiarch Abū al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 755?). Whatever the reliability of such reports, later Ismā'īli teaching generally shows few traces of Khaṭṭābi doctrine and repudiates Abū al-Khaṭṭāb. An eccentric work reflecting a Khaṭṭābi tradition, the *Umm al-kitāb* (Mother of the Book) transmitted by the Ismā'īlyah of Badakhshān, is clearly a late adaptation of non-Ismā'īli material.

Nothing is known about the fate of these Ismā'īli splinter sects arising in Kufa in Iraq on the death of Imam Ja'far, and it can be surmised that they were numerically insignificant. But about a hundred years later, after the middle of the third century AH (ninth century CE), the Ismā'īlyah reappeared in history, now as a well-organized, secret revolutionary movement with an elaborate doctrinal system spread by missionaries called *dā'īs* ("summoners") throughout much of the Islamic world. The movement was centrally directed, at first apparently from Ahwāz in southwestern Iran. Recognizing Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il as its imam, it held that he had disappeared and would return in the near future as the Qā'im to fill the world with justice.

Early Doctrines. The religious doctrine of this period, which is largely reconstructed from later Ismā'īli sources and anti-Ismā'īli accounts, distinguished between the outer, exoteric (*ẓāhir*) and the inner, esoteric (*bāṭin*) aspects of religion. Because of this belief in a *bāṭin* aspect, fundamental also to most later Ismā'īli thought, the Ismā'īlyah were often called Bāṭiniyah, a name which sometimes has a wider application, however. The *ẓāhir* aspect consists of the apparent, directly

accessible meaning of the scriptures brought by the prophets and the religious laws contained in them; it differs in each scripture. The *bāṭin* consists of the esoteric, unchangeable truths (*ḥaqā'iq*) hidden in all scriptures and laws behind the apparent sense and revealed by the method of esoteric interpretation called *ta'wīl*, which often relied on qabbalistic manipulation of the mystical significance of letters and their numerical equivalents. The esoteric truths embody a gnostic cosmology and a cyclical, yet teleological history of revelation.

The supreme God is the Absolute One, who is beyond cognizance. Through his intention (*irādah*) and will (*mashī'ah*) he created a light which he addressed with the Qur'anic creative imperative, *kun* ("Be!"), consisting of the letters *kāf* and *nūn*. Through duplication, the first, preceding (*sābiq*) principle, Kūnī ("be," fem.) proceeded from them and in turn was ordered by God to create the second, following (*tālī*) principle, Qadar ("measure, decree"). Kūnī represented the female principle and Qadar, the male; together they were comprised of seven letters (the short vowels of Qadar are not considered letters in Arabic), which were called the seven higher letters (*ḥurūf 'ulwiyah*) and were interpreted as the archetypes of the seven messenger prophets and their scriptures. In the spiritual world, Kūnī created seven cherubs (*karūbiyah*) and Qadar, on Kūnī's order, twelve spiritual ranks (*ḥudūd rūḥāniyah*). Another six ranks emanated from Kūnī when she initially failed to recognize the existence of the creator above her. The fact that these six originated without her will through the power of the creator then moved her to recognize him with the testimony that "There is no god but God," and to deny her own divinity. Three of these ranks were above her and three below; among the latter was Iblīs, who refused Kūnī's order to submit to Qadar, the heavenly Adam, and thus became the chief devil. Kūnī and Qadar also formed a pentad together with three spiritual forces, Jadd, Faṭḥ, and Khayāl, which were often identified with the archangels Jibrā'il, Mikhā'il, and Isrā'il and mediated between the spiritual world and the religious hierarchy in the physical world.

The lower, physical world was created through the mediation of Kūnī and Qadar, with the ranks of the religious teaching hierarchy corresponding closely to the ranks of the higher, spiritual world. The history of revelation proceeded through seven prophetic eras or cycles, each inaugurated by a speaker (*nāṭiq*) prophet bringing a fresh divine message. The first six speaker-prophets, Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muḥammad, were each succeeded by a legatee (*waṣī*) or silent one (*ṣāmī*) who revealed the esoteric meaning hidden in their messages. Each legatee was succeeded by

seven imams, the last of whom would rise in rank to become the speaker of the next cycle and bring a new scripture and law abrogating the previous one. In the era of Muḥammad, 'Alī was the legate and Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il the seventh imam. Upon his return Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il would become the seventh speaker prophet and abrogate the law of Islam. His divine message would not entail a new law, however, but consist in the full revelation of the previously hidden esoteric truths. As the eschatological Qā'im and Mahdī, he would rule the world and consummate it. During his absence, the teaching hierarchy was headed by twelve *ḥujjahs* residing in the twelve provinces (*jazā'ir*). Below them were several ranks of *dā'īs*. The number and names of these ranks given in early Ismā'īlī texts vary widely and reflect speculative concerns rather than the actual organization of the hierarchy, about which little is known for either the pre-Fatimid or Fatimid age. Before the advent of the Qā'im, the teaching of the esoteric truths must be kept secret. The neophyte had to swear an oath of initiation vowing strict secrecy and to pay a fee. Initiation was clearly gradual, but there is no evidence of a number of strictly defined grades; the accounts of anti-Ismā'īlī sources which name and describe seven or nine such grades leading to the final stage of pure atheism and libertinism deserve no credit.

Emergence of the Movement. The sudden appearance of a widespread, centrally organized Ismā'īlī movement with an elaborate doctrine after the middle of the ninth century suggests that its founder was active at that time. The Sunnī anti-Ismā'īlī polemicists of the following century name as this founder one 'Abd Allāh ibn Maymūn al-Qaddāh. They describe his father, Maymūn al-Qaddāh, as a Bardesanian who became a follower of Abū al-Khaṭṭāb and founded an extremist sect called the Maymūniyah. According to this account, 'Abd Allāh conspired to subvert Islam from the inside by pretending to be a Shī'ī working on behalf of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il. He founded the movement in the latter's name with its seven grades of initiation leading to atheism and sent his *dā'īs* abroad. At first he was active near Ahwāz and later moved to Basra and to Salāmīyah in Syria; the later leaders of the movement and the Fatimid caliphs were his descendants. This story is obviously anachronistic in placing 'Abd Allāh's activity over a century later than that of his father. Moreover, Twelver Shī'ī sources mention Maymūn al-Qaddāh and his son 'Abd Allāh as faithful companions of Imams Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 735?) and Ja'far al-Ṣādiq respectively. They do not suggest that either of them was inclined to extremism. It is thus unlikely that 'Abd Allāh ibn Maymūn played any role in the original Ismā'īlī sect and impossible that he is the founder of the ninth-

century movement. The Sunnī polemicists' story about 'Abd Allāh ibn Maymūn is, however, based on Ismā'īlī sources. At least some early Ismā'īlī communities believed that the leaders of the movement including the first Fatimid caliph, al-Mahdī, were not 'Alids but descendants of Maymūn al-Qaddāh. The Fatimids tried to counter such beliefs by maintaining that their 'Alid ancestors had used names such as al-Mubārak, Maymūn, and Sa'id in order to hide their identity. While such a use of cover names is not implausible, it does not explain how Maymūn, allegedly the cover name of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, could have become identified with Maymūn al-Qaddāh. It has, on the other hand, been suggested that some descendants of 'Abd Allāh ibn Maymūn may have played a leading part in the ninth-century movement. The matter evidently cannot be resolved at present. It is certain, however, that the leaders of the movement, the ancestors of the Fatimids, claimed neither descent from Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il nor the status of imams, even among their closest *dā'īs*, but described themselves as *ḥujjahs* of the absent imam Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il.

The esoteric doctrine of the movement was of a distinctly gnostic nature. Many structural elements, themes, and concepts have parallels in various earlier gnostic systems, although no specific sources or models can be discerned. Rather, the basic system gives the impression of an entirely fresh, essentially Islamic and Shī'ī adaptation of various widespread gnostic motives. Clearly without foundation are the assertions of the anti-Ismā'īlī polemicists and heresiographers that the Ismā'īlīyah was derived from various dualist religions, such as Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Bardesanism, Mazdakism, and the Khurramdīniyah.

The movement was rent by a schism about 899 after 'Abd Allāh ('Ubayd Allāh), the future Fatimid caliph al-Mahdī, succeeded to the leadership. Repudiating the belief in the imamate of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il and his return as the Mahdī, al-Mahdī claimed the imamate for himself. He explained to the *dā'īs* that his predecessors in the leadership had been legitimate imams but had concealed their rank and identity out of caution. They were descendants of Imam Ja'far's son 'Abd Allāh, who had been the rightful successor to the imamate rather than Ismā'il; the names of Ismā'il and his son Muḥammad had merely been used to cover up their identity as the imams.

This apparently radical change of doctrine was not accepted by some of the leading *dā'īs*. In the region of Kufa, Ḥamdān Qarmaṭ and 'Abdān broke with al-Mahdī and discontinued their missionary activity. Qarmaṭ's followers were called the Qarāmiṭah, and the name was often extended to other communities which broke

with the Fatimid leadership, and sometimes to the Ismā'īlīyah in general; it will be used here for those Ismā'īlīyah who did not recognize the Fatimid imamate. 'Abdān was the first author of the movement's books. He was murdered by a *dā'ī* initially loyal to al-Mahdī, and Ḥamdān Qarmaṭ disappeared. On the west coast of the Persian Gulf, the *dā'ī* Abū Sa'īd al-Jannābī followed the lead of Qarmaṭ and 'Abdān, who had invested him with his mission. He had already seized a number of towns, including al-Qaṭīf and al-Aḥsā, and had thus laid the foundation of the Qarmaṭī state of Bahrein. Other communities which repudiated al-Mahdī's claim to the imamate were in the region of Rayy in northwestern Iran, in Khorasan, and in Transoxiana. Most prominent among the *dā'īs* who remained loyal to al-Mahdī was Ibn Ḥawshab, known as Maṣṣūr al-Yaman, the senior missionary in the Yemen. He had brought the region of Jabal Maswar under his control, while his younger colleague and rival, 'Alī ibn al-Faḍl, was active in the Bilād Yāfi' further southwest. The *dā'ī* Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Shī'ī, whom Maṣṣūr al-Yaman had sent to the Kutāmāh Berber tribe in the mountains of eastern Algeria, and probably also the *dā'ī* al-Haytham, whom he had dispatched to Sind, remained loyal to al-Mahdī. Some of the Ismā'īlīyah in Khorasan also accepted his claim to the imamate. Residing at this time in Salāmīyah, al-Mahdī then left for Egypt together with his son, the later caliph al-Qā'im, as his safety was threatened because of the disaffection of the leading Syrian *dā'ī*. At first he intended to proclaim himself as the Mahdī in the Yemen. Increasing doubts about the loyalty of 'Alī ibn al-Faḍl, who later openly defected, seem to have influenced his decision to go to the Maghreb, where Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Shī'ī, having overthrown the Aghlabids and seized Tunisia, proclaimed him caliph and Mahdī in 910.

The Fatimid Age (910–1171)

With the establishment of the Fatimid countercaliphate, the Ismā'īlī challenge to Sunnī Islam reached its peak and provoked a vehement political and intellectual reaction. The Ismā'īlīyah came to be condemned by orthodox theologians as the arch-heresy of Islam. The Fatimid Ismā'īlīyah was weakened by serious splits, first that of the Qarāmiṭah and later those of the Druzes, the Nizāriyah, and the Ṭayyibiyyah.

The Qarāmiṭah. The Ismā'īlī communities which repudiated the claim of the Fatimid al-Mahdī to the imamate were initially left without united leadership and in doctrinal disarray. Soon after the rise of the Fatimid caliphate they recovered some organizational and doctrinal unity on the basis of a reaffirmation of the belief in the imamate of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il and in his

expected return as the Qā'im. This belief was also espoused by the Transoxianan *dā'ī* Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Nasafī in his *Kitāb al-maḥṣūl* (Book of the Yield), which gained wide authority among the Qarmaṭī Ismā'īlīyah. The book itself is lost, but numerous quotations from it and discussions in later works attest to its importance and make it possible to reconstruct its contents. Al-Nasafī introduced in it a Neoplatonic cosmology which superseded and partly replaced the earlier cosmology and became basic to much of Ismā'īlī esoteric doctrine throughout the Fatimid age.

In this cosmology Kūnī and Qadar were replaced by the Neoplatonic Universal Intellect and Soul. God, who is beyond any attribute and name and even beyond being and non-being, has originated (*abda'a*) the Intellect through his divine order or volition (*amr*). The Intellect is described as the first originated being (*al-mubda' al-awwal*) since the *amr* has become united with it in existence. The Universal Soul emanated from the Intellect, and from the Soul in turn issued the seven spheres of the heavens with their stars. These spheres revolve with the Soul's movement, producing the mixture of the four single natures—dryness, humidity, cold, and warmth—to form the composites of earth, water, air, and ether. Out of the mingling of the composites arise the plants with a vegetative soul, which in turn give rise to the animals endowed with a sensitive soul. Out of the animal realm arises the human being with a rational soul which seeks to ascend through the spiritual hierarchy and to rejoin its origin in the Intellect.

Proclamation of the Mahdī. The *dā'ī* of Rayy, Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 934), claimed superior authority among the Qarmaṭī *dā'īs* as the lieutenant of the absent imam. He succeeded in converting a number of powerful men in the region, sent his *dā'īs* throughout northwestern Iran, and maintained a correspondance with Abū Ṭāhir al-Jannābī, who had succeeded his father, Abū Sa'īd, in the leadership of the Qarmaṭī state in Bahrein. The Qarmaṭī *dā'īs* were at this time predicting the advent of the Mahdī after the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn in the year 928, an occurrence which they believed would bring the era of Islam to an end and usher in the seventh and final era. As the date approached, Abū Ṭāhir carried out daring attacks ever farther into southern Iraq and finally threatened the Abbasid capital of Baghdad itself. In 930 he sacked Mecca during the pilgrimage season, slaughtered pilgrims and inhabitants, and carried off the Black Stone of the Ka'bah as a sign for the end of the era of Islam. In 932 he proclaimed a young Persian from Isfahan as the expected Mahdī.

Events now took a different course than had commonly been predicted by the Ismā'īlīyah for the coming of the Mahdī. According to the erudite expert of the

chronology of nations, al-Bīrūnī (d. 1050?), the date was chosen to coincide with the passing of 1,500 years after Zoroaster, the end of the year 1242 of the era of Alexander, for which prophecies ascribed to Zoroaster and Jāmāsp had predicted the restoration of the reign of the Magians. The Persian was said to be a Magian and a descendant of the Persian kings. His hometown of Isfahan had long been associated by the astrologers with the rise of a Persian dynasty which would conquer the Arab caliphate. The Persian is reported to have ordered the worship of fire and the cursing of all the prophets and to have licensed the most outrageous abominations. After the Persian put some Qarmaṭī leaders to death, Abū Ṭāhir felt compelled to kill him and to avow that he had been duped by an impostor.

The significance of this episode must be judged with caution. The Persian, anti-Arab aspect was evidently a spontaneous development among the leaders of the Qarmaṭī community of Bahrein. It does not confirm the assertions of the Sunnī polemicists that the Ismā'īlī movement originated in an anti-Islamic and anti-Arab plot of Persian dualists, but it may have given rise to them. More deeply rooted in the movement were the antinomian sentiments radically expressed in the cursing of the prophets, the founders of the religious laws. Antinomian tendencies were naturally inherent in religious thought which looked for an esoteric spiritual meaning concealed behind the exoteric surface of scripture and law. Though sometimes latent for a long time, they manifested themselves powerfully at various stages in the history of the Ismā'īliyah.

The ignominious course and outcome of the affair led to massive defections of adherents and shocked the leading *dā'īs*. Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī's *Kitāb al-iṣlāḥ* (Book of Correction), in which he criticized and "corrected" various points of al-Nasafī's *Kitāb al-maḥṣūl*, appears to have been written in reaction to the events. Abū Ḥātim in particular objected to the antinomian tendencies apparent in some of the teaching of al-Nasafī. Arguing that all esoteric truth inevitably requires an exoteric revealed law, he affirmed against al-Nasafī that both Adam, the first speaker prophet, and Jesus had brought a religious law. While admitting that the seventh speaker prophet, Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, would not bring a law but reveal the spiritual truths, he insisted that the era of Muḥammad had not come to an end with the first presence and disappearance of the seventh imam. There was in each prophetic cycle an interval (*fatrah*) between the presence of the seventh imam and the advent of the speaker prophet who would inaugurate the new era, during which time the seventh imam was represented by his lieutenants (*khulafā'*).

Abū Ḥātim's ideas failed to rally the Qarmaṭī com-

munities around his leadership as the lieutenant of the imam. In his *Kitāb al-nuṣrah* (Book of Support), the younger *dā'ī* Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī consistently upheld al-Nasafī's views against Abū Ḥātim's criticism and categorically rejected Abū Ḥātim's thesis that esoteric truths could be attained only through the religious law. In Khorasan and Transoxiana in particular the authority of al-Nasafī's *Kitāb al-maḥṣūl* seems to have remained paramount after the author's death in 944. The *dā'īs* in Iraq continued to recognize the authority of 'Abdān, in whose name they composed numerous treatises tinged with popular philosophy. After repudiating their pseudo-Mahdi, the Qarāmiṭah of Bahrein again claimed to be acting on the orders of the hidden Mahdi. Abū Ṭāhir soon reached an agreement with the Abbasid government under which he guaranteed the safety of the pilgrimage to Mecca in return for an annual tribute and a protection fee paid by the pilgrims. The Black Stone of the Ka'bah was returned to Mecca in 951 after payment of a high ransom. [See Qarāmiṭah.]

Decline of the movement. In preparation for his conquest of Egypt and the East, the fourth Fatimid caliph, al-Mu'izz (953–975) strove to win the dissident eastern Ismā'īlī communities for the Fatimid cause and to this end made some ideological concessions to them (see below). His efforts were partly successful, and he gained the allegiance of Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī, who in his later works fully backed the Fatimid imamate. Other *dā'īs*, however, resisted his overtures. Most important, he failed to persuade the Qarāmiṭah of Bahrein, who even allied themselves with the Abbasid caliphate and fought the Fatimid conquerors in Syria and Egypt. Although they later concluded a truce with the Fatimids and at times officially recognized the Fatimid caliphate, they never accepted its religious authority. In the later tenth century they lost their military prowess and were reduced to a local, self-contained power while the Qarmaṭī communities elsewhere either were absorbed into the Fatimid Ismā'īliyah or disintegrated. The Qarmaṭī state in Bahrein survived until 1077/8. Little is known about the specific religious beliefs of the sectarians there. Muslim law and rites such as prayer and fasting were not practiced, and all mosques were closed. Much property was owned communally, and some of the revenue from tributes and imposts on sea trades was distributed among the members of the community. Such institutions were, however, not directly founded on the religious teaching, which promised a rule of justice and fairness but did not develop a social program.

The Brethren of Purity. Much discussed and still unresolved is the question of the relationship of the *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'* (Epistles of the Brethren of Purity) and their anonymous authors to the Ismā'īliyah. This ency-

clopedia of fifty-two treatises on all sciences of the ancients pervaded by an esoteric religious message was, according to two authors of the later tenth century, composed by a group of secretaries and scholars in Basra about the middle of the century. Later Ismā'īlī tradition, however, claims that it was written by one of the hidden imams and his *dā'īs* a century earlier. The treatises speak of the imam as in hiding, though accessible, and foresee his appearance. Some modern scholars have argued that a part or most of the encyclopedia was composed in the pre-Fatimid Ismā'īlī community and that quotations and references in the text which belong to the tenth century are later additions. Others consider it as essentially non-Ismā'īlī though influenced by Ismā'īlī thought; this judgment is usually based on a comparison with Fatimid Ismā'īlī literature. It is evident that the authors, if they did live in the tenth century, could not have been adherents of the Fatimid imamate. Yet the thought and terminology of the treatises are pervasively Ismā'īlī and must have originated in an Ismā'īlī environment. In the middle of the tenth century Basra was dominated by the Qarāmiṭah of Bahrein. It is not unlikely that the authors undertook their project with the approval of the Qarmaṭī leaders, but nothing definite is known about their relationship and the attitude of the later Qarāmiṭah to the encyclopedia. [See Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'.]

The Fatimid Ismā'īliyah. The first Fatimid caliph rose with the claim of being not only the imam but also the expected Mahdi. This claim inevitably raised questions concerning the acts and the eschatological role ascribed to the Mahdi in apocalyptic traditions. Al-Mahdī answered such questions by maintaining that the prophecies concerning the Mahdi would be gradually fulfilled by himself and by the imams succeeding him. He gave his son and successor the caliphal title al-Qā'im, another eschatological name which usually had been considered to refer to the Mahdi. In one basic respect he uncompromisingly countered the Ismā'īlī expectations for the advent of the Mahdi: while the pre-Fatimid teaching affirmed that the Mahdi as the seventh speaker prophet would abrogate the law of Islam and make the esoteric spiritual truths public, al-Mahdī insisted on strict observation of the religious law of Islam and severely punished some *dā'īs* who ignored it and published esoteric teaching. Official Fatimid doctrine always emphasized the equal validity and necessity of the *zāhir* and the *bā'in*, of religious work (*'amal*) in accordance with the law and esoteric knowledge (*'ilm*).

Ismā'īlī law. Under al-Mahdī began the career of Qāḍī al-Nu'mān (d. 974), the founder of Ismā'īlī law and

author of its most authoritative compendium, the *Kitāb da'ā'im al-Islām* (Book of the Buttresses of Islam). In the absence of an Ismā'īlī legal tradition, Qāḍī al-Nu'mān relied primarily on the legal teaching of Imams Muḥammad al-Bāqir and Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, transmitted by Twelver Shī'ī traditionists, and secondarily on Zaydī traditions. As a former Mālikī jurist, he was evidently also influenced by Mālikī legal concepts. In substance Ismā'īlī law naturally agrees closely with Twelver Shī'ī law, it prohibits, however, the temporary marriage (*mut'ah*) allowed in the latter and nullifies bequests to a legal heir except when consent of the other legal heirs is obtained. It gives the imam authority for determining the beginning of the month without regard to the sighting of the new moon as required by all other Muslim legal schools. Since the early Fatimid period the beginning of the months was generally established in practice on the basis of astronomical calculation and thus often fell one or two days earlier than for other Muslims; this discrepancy often caused intercommunal quarrels about the beginning and end of the fasting month of Ramaḍān.

Esoteric doctrines. The Ismā'īlī law codified by Qāḍī al-Nu'mān was adopted by the fourth Fatimid caliph, al-Mu'izz, as the official law of the Fatimid empire to be applied to all its Muslim subjects. Al-Mu'izz also substantially reformed the Fatimid esoteric doctrine with the clear aim of making it more acceptable to the dissident Qarmaṭī communities in order to gain their backing for the Fatimid imamate. Thus he reaffirmed the early belief that Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il as the seventh imam was the seventh speaker prophet and the Qā'im and ignored al-Mahdī's claim that 'Abd Allāh rather than Ismā'il had been the legitimate imam after Ja'far al-Ṣādiq. In his view, the acts of the Qā'im in the physical world would, however, be carried out by his lieutenants (*khulafā'*)—a term familiar to the Qarāmiṭah, who also spoke of the lieutenants of the Qā'im who were to head the hierarchy during his absence. For al-Mu'izz, however, these lieutenants were imams and descendants of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, who would not return to the physical world but would head the spiritual hierarchy at the end of the world. The lieutenants of the Qā'im formed a second heptad of imams in the sixth era, which the prophet Muḥammad had been granted as a special privilege. Following the earlier Fatimid caliphs and three hidden imams descended from Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, al-Mu'izz was the seventh imam of this heptad. He seems to have envisaged an early end of the physical world and is quoted to have affirmed that there would not be another heptad of imams after him.

Al-Mu'izz also opened the door to the Neoplatonic

cosmology of al-Nasafī, which so far had been rejected by the Fatimid Ismā'īliyah. Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī, who was converted to the Fatimid Ismā'īliyah, became their main representative of Neoplatonic thought. Many of his books and treatises are extant. The esoteric teaching, severely restricted under al-Mahdī, was now organized in formal lecture sessions (*majālis*) held twice weekly. The lectures were prepared by the official chief *dā'ī* and submitted to the imam for approval. Attendance at the lectures was restricted to the initiates, who were required to pay religious dues. The Ismā'īlī communities remained a small minority throughout the Fatimid reign.

The Druze. During the later reign of the sixth Fatimid caliph, al-Ḥākim (996–1021), the eschatological expectations that al-Mu'izz had incited gave rise to a new schismatic movement. Encouraged by al-Ḥākim's abnormal conduct, some of the Ismā'īliyah came to speculate that he might be the expected Qā'im. While the official teaching hierarchy strove to counter these speculations, an enthusiastic follower, Ḥasan al-Akhram, publicly proclaimed al-Ḥākim's divinity in 1017. He told his Ismā'īlī audience that their resurrection (*qiyāmah*) had occurred and that the era of their concealment had come to an end. In spite of the favor shown him by the caliph, Ḥasan was murdered a few months later. In 1019 the movement reemerged, now led by Ḥamzah ibn 'Alī, the true founder of its doctrine.

Its adherents were called *durūz* (Druze) after al-Dar(a)zī, an early rival of Ḥamzah who caught the eye of the public. Ḥamzah claimed to be the imam, the Qā'im of the Age (*qā'im al-zamān*), and the embodiment of the Universal Intellect. He identified some of his assistants with the Universal Soul and other ranks of the spiritual hierarchy of the Ismā'īliyah: al-Ḥākim and his ancestors back to the second Fatimid caliph, al-Qā'im, were held to be manifestations of the transcendent godhead. Ḥamzah proclaimed the abrogation not only of the exoteric religious law but also of the esoteric teaching of the Ismā'īliyah through the appearance of God on earth in royal dignity. He defined his own message as the pure doctrine of unity (*tawḥīd*) which renewed the message of the Adam of Purity (*Ādam al-safā'*), who had opened the cycle of humanity. The six prophets of the following eras from Noah to Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl had each brought a blameworthy law ordering the worship of nonbeing and the unity of the idol (*'ibādat al-'adam wa-tawḥīd al-ṣanam*). Ḥamzah thus employed many Ismā'īlī concepts but transformed them so radically that the Druze religion is usually considered to be outside the Ismā'īliyah. After the death of al-Ḥākim the new sect was persecuted and quickly suppressed in

Egypt. It has survived to the present, however, in the mountains of Syria and Lebanon. [See Druze.]

Leading figures. A prominent part in the initial fight of the official Fatimid teaching hierarchy against the founders of the Ḥākim cult was played by the *dā'ī* Ḥamid al-Dīn al-Kirmānī. Active in Baghdad and Basra, he came to Cairo about 1015, presumably invited to assist in the struggle against the heretics. Recognizing that the heresy was essentially rooted in the fervent hopes for the advent of the Qā'im with its antinomian implications raised by traditional Ismā'īlī teaching, al-Kirmānī reacted sharply against them. In a letter addressed to Ḥasan al-Akhram he scornfully repudiated the idea that the resurrection had occurred with the appearance of al-Ḥākim and that the era of the prophet Muḥammad had come to an end. The resurrection would not occur before the signs predicted by Muḥammad had appeared. The era of Muḥammad and the validity of the law of Islam would continue under the reign of al-Ḥākim's successors. Ignoring the traditional Ismā'īlī theories about a limited number of heptads of imams, al-Kirmānī envisaged the triumphant rule of the hundredth imam in the era of Muḥammad.

In one of his larger works, the *Kitāb al-riyād* (Book of Meadows), he critically reviewed the controversy between Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī and Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī over al-Nasafī's *Kitāb al-maḥṣūl*. Almost invariably he backed the position of Abū Ḥātim but went even further in his affirmation of the indispensibility of the law. The belief that the Qā'im would abrogate the law was faulty, for spiritual knowledge could never be based on anything but the prophetic laws and their rules for worship. Rather the Qā'im would restore the laws in their original form and abolish the teaching hierarchy which would no longer be needed since knowledge would become actual and general while ignorance would be reduced to potentiality. Abū Ya'qūb, he argued, was mistaken in asserting that after the Qā'im a time of pure spiritual knowledge without work and law would begin like the great era before Adam. Rather, before Adam pure ignorance had reigned among the creatures since they did not know the hierarchy, and likewise, after the Qā'im ignorance would be gradually actualized again and knowledge would become potential because of the abolition of the hierarchy.

Although al-Kirmānī thus maintained, against Abū Ya'qūb, the absolute priority of the law over spiritual knowledge, he also made a major contribution to the esoteric teaching. In his most famous work, the *Kitāb rāḥat al-'aql* (Peace of Mind), he propounded a new cosmology evidently influenced by the Muslim philosophers of al-Fārābī's school. He replaced the pair of the

Intellect and the Soul ruling the spiritual world by a hierarchy of ten Intellects. The place of the Soul thus was taken by the Second Intellect or First Emanation (*al-munba'ith al-awwal*), which proceeded from the higher relation of the First Intellect. From the lower relation of the First Intellect proceeded the Third Intellect, or Second Emanation, which is the first potential being, equated with matter and form and thus the basis of the physical world. Seven further Intellects originated jointly from the First and Second Intellects. The tenth one is the Active Intellect (*al-'aql al-fa'āl*), the demiurge governing the lower world. The structure of the astral world and of the religious hierarchy was described by al-Kirmānī as closely paralleling that of the spiritual world. Al-Kirmānī's cosmology had little impact on Fatimid doctrine, which mostly preferred the older cosmology of al-Nasafī and Abū Ya'qūb. It was later adopted by the Ṭayyibī Ismā'īliyah in the Yemen.

A prominent *dā'ī* during the long caliphate of the Fatimid al-Mustanşir (1036–94) was Nāşir-i Khusraw, well known as a Persian poet and as the author of a travel narrative. Because of his activity as a Fatimid *dā'ī*, he was forced to leave Balkh and found refuge in a Badakhshān mountain village in the upper Oxus valley, where he wrote and taught until his death about 1088/9. He became the patron saint of the Ismā'īlī community of Badakhshān, which has preserved many of his Ismā'īlī works. Some of these are Persian translations and adaptations of earlier books in Arabic; most important is his *Kitāb jāmi' al-ḥikmatayn* (Book Joining the Two Wisdoms), in which he analyzed agreement and disagreement between the views of the Muslim philosophers and the prophetic wisdom of Ismā'īlī gnosis. [See Nāşir-i Khusraw.]

Another leading figure in the contemporary Fatimid teaching hierarchy was al-Mu'ayyad fī al-Dīn of Shiraz, the son of an Ismā'īlī *dā'ī* active at the Buyid court. Al-Mu'ayyad succeeded his father and converted the Buyid emir Abū Kālījār and some of his Daylamī troops to the Ismā'īliyah but was forced to leave because of pressure on Abū Kālījār from the Abbasid court. He fled to Cairo where he was appointed chief *dā'ī* in 1058. Although he was soon dismissed and exiled for a time, he regained wide influence as a *dā'ī* before his death in 1077. His early career is described in his autobiography. His poetry, gathered in a *dīwān*, is strictly doctrinal. The most massive of his numerous works is an eight-volume collection of eight hundred of his teaching sessions (*majālis*). His doctrine was later considered highly authoritative, especially among the Ṭayyibī Ismā'īliyah in the Yemen and India.

Later schisms. During the latter part of the caliphate of al-Mustanşir the Ismā'īlī movement in Iran was

spurred to revolutionary activity by the teaching and leadership of Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ, who in 1090 seized the mountain stronghold of Ālamūt northwest of Qazvin and made it his headquarters. He had earlier visited Cairo when Nizār, al-Mustanşir's eldest son, was the designated heir. After the death of al-Mustanşir, the powerful vizier al-Afḍal put the youngest son, Aḥmad, on the throne with the caliphal name al-Musta'li and captured and immured Nizār, who had resisted. Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ, however, continued to recognize Nizār as the legitimate imam and claimed that Nizār had escaped and broken with the Ismā'īlī leadership in Cairo. He gained general support among the Ismā'īliyah in Iran and northern Syria and thus became the founder of the Nizārī branch. Al-Musta'li was recognized by most of the Ismā'īliyah in Egypt, the Yemen, India, and by many in Syria and Palestine.

A further split among the Ismā'īliyah still backing the imamate of the Fatimid caliphs occurred after the assassination of al-Musta'li's son and successor, al-Āmir, by a Nizārī in 1130. Eight months earlier al-Āmir's newborn son, al-Ṭayyib, had officially been proclaimed his prospective heir, but a cousin of al-Āmir, 'Abd al-Majīd al-Ḥāfiẓ, was now put on the throne. First merely appointed regent, he was later proclaimed caliph and imam. Some Ismā'īlī communities, especially in the Yemen and India, repudiated his claim and continued to recognize al-Ṭayyib, about whose fate nothing is known, as the rightful successor of al-Āmir. They were led by the Sulayhid queen al-Sayyidah residing in Dhū Jiblah in central Yemen. Most of the Ismā'īliyah in Egypt, southern Syria, and southern Yemen, where they were led by the Zuray'id rulers of Aden, accepted the imamate of al-Ḥāfiẓ in spite of the irregularity of the succession of a cousin. They were known as the Ḥāfiẓīyah or Majīdīyah. The Fatimid caliphate was now in full decline and was overthrown in 1171 by the Ayyubid Şalāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin), who restored Sunnism as the official religion in Egypt. Ḥāfiẓī communities survived chiefly in Upper Egypt and continued to recognize as their imams certain descendants of the last Fatimid caliph, al-'Ādiḍ, who were kept prisoners in Cairo. Under official persecution the Ḥāfiẓī communities gradually disintegrated; the last mention of them occurs in the late thirteenth century.

The Post-Fatimid Ismā'īliyah

With the disintegration of the Ḥāfiẓī branch, only the Nizārī and Ṭayyibī communities, which had separated from the official Fatimid Ismā'īliyah before the fall of the Fatimid dynasty, remained. Both branches, though further divided by schisms, have survived to the present.

The Nizāriyah. With the seizure of Alamūt, Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ initiated a policy of armed revolt against the seljuk sultanate. The Nizāriyah captured and fortified numerous mountain castles in the Elburz range, towns in Quhistān in northwestern Iran, and later also mountain strongholds such as Qadmūs and Maşyāf in northern Syria. In the face of the overwhelming military superiority of their opponents they relied on intimidation through the spectacular assassination of prominent leaders by *fidā'īs*, self-sacrificing devotees. Because of their apparently irrational conduct they were commonly called *ḥashīshīyīn* hashish addicts. Stories that the *fidā'īs* were in fact conditioned for their task by the use of hashish are legendary. Their designation as *ḥashīshīyīn* was taken over by the Crusaders in Syria and entered European languages as "assassins." [See Assassins.]

Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ also elaborated an apologetic missionary doctrine which became known as the "new preaching" (*da'wah jadīdah*) of the Ismā'īliyah. At its core was the thesis of humanity's permanent need for *ta'līm*, divinely inspired and authoritative teaching, which was basic in much of Shī'ī thought. Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ developed it in a series of arguments establishing the inadequacy of human reason in gaining knowledge of God and then went on to demonstrate that only the Ismā'īlī imam was such a divinely guided teacher. The Nizāriyah came to be commonly called the Ta'līmīyah after this doctrine, and Sunnī opponents such as al-Ghazālī concentrated their efforts on refuting it. Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ further stressed the autonomous teaching authority of each imam in his time, independent of his predecessors, thus paving the way for the Nizārī radicalization of the doctrine of the imamate as compared with Fatimid doctrine.

Among the Sunnis apparently attracted by the "new preaching" was the heresiographer and Ash'arī theologian al-Shahrastānī (d. 1143). Although he kept his relations with the Nizāriyah secret, they were revealed by his student al-Sam'ānī. Among his extant writings are some crypto-Ismā'īlī works including an incomplete Qur'ān commentary in which he used Ismā'īlī terminology and hinted at his conversion by a "pious servant of God" who had taught him the esoteric principles of Qur'ānic exegesis. Most notable, however, is his refutation of the theological doctrine of the philosopher Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) from a concealed Ismā'īlī point of view, entitled *Kitāb al-muṣāra'ah* (Book of the Wrestling Match). Here he defended the Ismā'īlī thesis that God, as the giver of being, is beyond being and nonbeing, rejected Avicenna's description of God as the involuntary necessitating cause of the world, and suggested that the Active Intellect which brings the human intellect from

potentiality to actuality is the prophetic intellect rather than the intellect of the lunar sphere as held by the followers of Avicenna.

Qiyāmah doctrine. After his death in 1124, Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ was succeeded as lord of Alamūt and chief of the Nizārī community by his assistant Buzurgummīd. On 17 Ramaḍān 599 (8 August 1164) the latter's grandson, known as Ḥasan 'alā Dhikrihi al-Salām, solemnly proclaimed the resurrection (*qiyāmah*) in the name of the absent imam and declared the law of Islam abrogated. He interpreted the spiritual meaning of the resurrection as a manifestation of the unveiled truth in the imam, which actualized paradise for the faithful capable of grasping it while condemning the opponents to the hell of spiritual nonexistence. Two years later Ḥasan was murdered by a brother-in-law who objected to the abolition of the Islamic law. His son Muḥammad (1166–1210) further elaborated the *qiyāmah* doctrine. While Ḥasan seems to have indicated that as the *ḥujjah* of the imam he was spiritually identical with him, Muḥammad maintained that his father had been the imam by physical descent; apparently he claimed that Ḥasan was the son of a descendant of Nizār who had secretly found refuge in Alamūt.

According to the *qiyāmah* doctrine, the resurrection consisted in recognizing the divine truth in the present imam, who was the manifestation of the order to create (*amr*) or word (*kalimah*) and, in his revelatory aspect the Qā'im. The imam thus was raised in rank above the prophets. There had been imam-Qā'ims also in the earlier prophetic cycles: Mechizedek (Malik al-Salām), Dhū al-Qarnayn, Khiḍr, Ma'add, and, in the era of Muḥammad, 'Alī. They were recognized by the prophets of their time as the manifestation of the divine. In the *qiyāmah*, the spiritual reality of the imam-Qā'im manifests itself openly and directly to the faithful. The teaching hierarchy intervening between them and the imam thus had faded away as unnecessary in accordance with the earlier predictions about the advent of the Qā'im. There remained only three categories of humanity: the opponents of the imam adhering to the law of Islam, his ordinary followers known as the "people of graduation" (*ahl al-tarattub*), who had advanced beyond the law to the esoteric (*bāṭin*) and thus had attained partial truth, and "the people of union" (*ahl al-waḥdah*), who see the imam plainly in his spiritual reality discarding outward appearances and have therefore reached the realm of pure truth.

Muḥammad's son Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan (1210–1221) repudiated the *qiyāmah* doctrine and proclaimed his adherence to Sunnī Islam. He publicly cursed his predecessors as infidels, recognized the suzerainty of the Abbasid caliph, ordered his subjects to follow the law

in its Sunnī form, and invited Sunnī scholars for their instruction. Thus he became commonly known as the New Muslim (*naw-musulmān*). His followers mostly obeyed his orders as those of the infallible imam. Under his son 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad (1221–1255) the application of the law was again relaxed, though it was not abolished.

During 'Alā' al-Dīn's reign the philosopher and astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274), originally a Twelver Shī'ī, joined the Ismā'īlīyah and actively supported the Nizārī cause, though he later turned away from them and wrote some theological works backing Twelver Shī'ī belief. In a spiritual autobiography written for his Ismā'īlī patrons he described his upbringing as a strict adherent of the law and his subsequent study of scholastic theology and philosophy. While he found philosophy intellectually most satisfying, he discovered that its principles were shaky when the discourse reached its ultimate goal, the knowledge of God and the origins and destiny of humanity, and recognized the need for an infallible teacher to guide reason to its perfection. He then chanced upon a copy of the sacred articles (*fuṣūl-i muqaddas*) of Imam Ḥasan 'alā Dhikrihi al-Salām and decided to join the Ismā'īlīyah. While some of Ṭūsī's works written in this period, such as his widely read Nasirean Ethics (*akhlāq-i Nāṣiri*), show traces of Nizārī thought, he also composed some religious treatises specifically addressed to the Nizārīyah. The contemporary Nizārī teaching is primarily known through them, particularly his *Rawḍat al-taslim* (Meadow of Submission) or *Taṣawwūrāt* (Representations).

Return to concealment. The restoration of the law by Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan was now interpreted as a return to a period of precautionary dissimulation (*taqīyah*) and concealment (*satr*) in which the truth is hidden in the *bāṭin*. The resurrection proclaimed by Ḥasan 'alā Dhikrihi al-Salām had come at about the middle of the millennium of the era of the prophet Muḥammad and had set the pattern for the final resurrection at the end of it. In the era of Muḥammad, the times of concealment and of resurrection might alternate according to the decision of each imam, since every imam was potentially a Qā'im. The contradictions in the conduct of the imams were merely in appearance, since in their spiritual reality they were identical and all acted in accordance with the requirements of their time. In the time of concealment the state of union with the imam was confined to his *ḥujjah*, who was consubstantial with him. His other followers, the "people of gradation," were divided into the strong (*aqwiyyā'*) and the weak (*ḍu'afā'*) according to their closeness to the truth.

Post-Alamūt Developments. In 1256 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad's son and successor Khūrshāh surrendered

Alamūt to the Mongol conquerors and was killed soon afterward. The Nizārī state was thus destroyed, and the Persian Ismā'īlī communities were decimated by massacres. Thereafter the imams lived mostly in concealment, and there is considerable uncertainty about their names, number, and sequence. Following a disputed succession their line soon divided into two branches, one continuing with Muḥammad-shāh, the other with Qāsim-shāh. Of the Muḥammad-shāhī imams, Shāh Ṭāhir Dakanī (d. 1549?) achieved fame as a religious scholar and leader. The popularity of his teaching aroused the suspicion of the Safavid shah Ismā'īl, who exiled him to Kashan. Later he was forced to leave Iran and eventually found refuge in Ahmadnagar in the Deccan, where he became an adviser of the ruler Burhān Nizām Shāh, whom he encouraged to proclaim Shiism as the official religion. His writings consisted mainly of commentaries on Twelver Shī'ī and philosophical treatises, although he also maintained relations with his Ismā'īlī followers. The last known imam of the Muḥammad-shāhī line was Amīr Muḥammad Bāqir, with whom his Syrian Ismā'īlī followers lost all contact after 1796. After a vain search for a descendant of his, a section of the Syrian community changed allegiance in 1887 to the Qāsim-shāhī line represented by the Aga Khans. A smaller section known as the Ja'fariyah, is at present the only community still adhering to the Muḥammad-shāhī line.

Imams of the Qāsim-shāhī branch are known to have lived in the later fifteenth and again in the seventeenth century in the village of Anjudān near Maḥallāt in Iran, where their tombs have been found. They were in this period, and until the nineteenth century, commonly associated with the Ni'matullāhī Sūfī order. With the appointment of Imam Abū al-Ḥasan Shāh as governor of Kerman in 1756 they rose to political prominence. His grandson Ḥasan 'Alī Shāh Maḥallātī married a daughter of the Qajar king of Persia, Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh, who gave him the title of Aga Khan, which has since been borne hereditarily by his successors. Ḥasan 'Alī Shāh moved to India in 1843 and after 1848 resided in Bombay. Opposition to his authority in the Ismā'īlī Khoja community led to court litigation ending in 1886 in the judgment of Sir Joseph Arnould in his favor. It recognized the Khojas as part of the wider Nizārī Ismā'īlī community. The present, fourth Aga Khan, Karīm Khān, succeeded his grandfather in 1957 [See Aga Khan.]

Religious literature. The wide dispersal of the Nizārī communities, language barriers among them, and their often tenuous relations with the concealed imams led to largely independent organization and literary traditions. In Persia conditions after the fall of Alamūt encouraged the imams and their followers to adopt Ṣūfī

forms of religious life. Šūfī ideas and terminology had already influenced the *qiyāmah* and late Alamūt doctrine; now Ismā'īlī ideas were often camouflaged in apparently Šūfī poetry, the imam being revered as the Šūfī saint. Doctrinal works, written again from the sixteenth century on, essentially reflect the teaching of the late Alamūt age with its emphasis on the role of the *ḥujjah* of the imam as the only gate to his spiritual essence and truth. Interest in the traditional Ismā'īlī cosmology and cyclical prophetic history waned as the religious literature of the Fatimid age was no longer available.

The community of Badakhshān, which accepted the Nizārī imamate probably before the fall of Alamūt, remained attached to the writings, both genuine and spurious, of Nāṣir-i Khusraw, although many Persian Nizārī works of the Alamūt and post-Alamūt age also found their way there. It also transmitted and revered the *Umm al-Kitāb*, the anonymous Persian work sometimes erroneously described as proto-Ismā'īlī. It reflects some of the gnostic thought of the Kufan Shī'ī *ghulāt* of the eighth century, but its final redaction may be as late as the twelfth century.

The literature of the Nizārī community in Syria, written in Arabic, developed independently of the Persian literature even in the Alamūt period. There is no evidence that Persian works were translated into Arabic. Although the resurrection was proclaimed in Syria, apparently with some delay, the *qiyāmah* and post-*qiyāmah* doctrine of the Persian Nizārīyah with its exaltation of the imam as the manifestation of the divine word made practically no impact there. The Syrian community preserved a substantial portion of Fatimid and Qarmaṭī literature, and scholarly tradition continued to concentrate on the traditional cosmology and cyclical prophetic history. In some religious texts of a more popular character, Rashīd al-Dīn Sinān (d. 1193?) the leader of the Syrian Ismā'īliyah, known to the crusaders as the "Old Man of the Mountain," is celebrated as a popular hero and assigned a cosmic rank usually reserved for the imam.

The Indian subcontinent. The origins and early history of the Nizārī community on the Indian subcontinent are largely obscure. The Nizārīyah there are often collectively referred to as Khojas, although there are other, smaller Nizārī groups such as the Shamsīyah and Momnas, while some Sunnī and Twelver Shī'ī Khoja groups have split from the main body of the Nizārīyah. According to their legendary history, the Nizārī faith was first spread by pir Shams al-Dīn, whose father is said to have been sent as a *dā'ī* from Alamūt. The community was ruled thereafter by pirs descended from Shams al-Dīn. Pir Ṣadr al-Dīn, who can be dated with

some likelihood in the later fourteenth century, is credited with the conversion of the Khojas from the Hindu caste of the Lohanas and to have laid the foundation of their communal organization, building their first *jamā'at-khānahs* (assembly and prayer halls) and appointing their *mukhis* (community leaders). The center of his activity was in Uchch in Sind. A substantial section of the community seceded in the sixteenth century under the pir Nar (Nūr) Muḥammad Shāh, who broke with the imams in Iran claiming that his father, Imām Shāh, had been the imam and that he had succeeded him. This community, known as Imām-Shāhīs or Satpanthis, has further split on the issue of leadership and lives chiefly in Gujarat and Khandesh. It has tended to revert to Hinduism but shares much of its traditional religious literature with the Nizārī Khojas.

This literature, which is known as Sat Panth (True Path), consists of *gināns* or *gnāns*, religious poems composed in, or translated into, several Indian languages and meant to be sung to specific melodies in worship. Most of them are attributed to the early pirs but cannot be dated accurately and may have undergone substantial changes in the transmission. They include hymns, religious and moral exhortation, and legendary history of the pirs and their miracles, but contain no creed or theology. Islamic and Hindu beliefs, especially popular Tantric ones, are freely mixed. While idol worship is rejected, Hindu mythology is accepted. 'Alī is considered the tenth avatar (incarnation of the deity), and the imams are identical with him. The Qur'ān is described as the last of the Vedas, which are recognized as sacred scriptures whose true interpretation is known to the pirs. Faith in the true religion will free believers from further rebirths and open paradise, which is described in Islamic terms, to them, while those failing to recognize the imams must go through another cycle of rebirths. [See Ginan.] The Arabic and Persian Ismā'īlī literature has been virtually unknown among the Khojas except for the Persian *Pandiyāt-i jawānmardī*, a collection of religious and moral exhortations of the late fifteenth-century Nizārī imam al-Mustanṣir which was adopted as a sacred book. Khojas live chiefly in lower Sind, Cutch, Gujarat, Bombay, and in wide diaspora, particularly in East and South Africa, Arabia, Ceylon, and Burma.

Further Nizārī communities are found in the mountains of Chitral, Gilgit, and Hunza in Pakistan, in parts of Afghanistan, and in the region of Yarkand and Kashgar in Chinese Turkistan. Organization, religious practices, and observance of *sharī'ah* rules vary among the scattered communities. The recent Aga Khans have stressed the rootedness of the Nizārī Ismā'īliyah in Shī'ī Islam and its continued bonds with the world of Islam.

The Ṭayyibīyah. After breaking with the Fatimid teaching hierarchy, the Ṭayyibīyah in the Yemen recognized the Sulayhid queen as the *ḥujjah* of the concealed imam al-Ṭayyib; with her backing they set up an independent teaching hierarchy headed by a *dā'ī muṭlaq* ("unrestricted summoner") whose spiritual authority since her death in 1138 has been supreme. The second *dā'ī muṭlaq*, Ibrāhīm al-Ḥāmidī (1151–1162), became the real founder of the Ṭayyibī esoteric doctrine, which he elaborated especially in his *Kitāb kanz al-walad* (Book of the Child's Treasure). The position remained in his family until 1209, when it passed to 'Alī ibn Muḥammad of the Banū al-Walid al-Anf family, which held it for over three centuries with only two interruptions. The political power of the Yemenite *dā'īs* reached a peak during the long incumbency of Idrīs 'Imād al-Dīn ibn al-Ḥasan, the nineteenth *dā'ī muṭlaq* (1428–1468). He is also the author of a seven-volume history of the Ismā'īlī imams, *Kitāb 'uyūn al-akhbār* (Book of Choice Stories) and of a two-volume history of the Yemenite *dā'īs*, *Kitāb nuzhat al-akhbār* (Book of Story and Entertainment), as well as works of esoteric doctrine and religious controversy. While the Yemenite *dā'īs* had been able to act relatively freely with the backing or protection of various rulers during the early centuries, they usually faced hostility from the Zaydī imams and in the sixteenth century suffered relentless persecution. In 1539 the twenty-third *dā'ī muṭlaq* appointed an Indian, Yūsuf ibn Sulaymān, as his successor, evidently in recognition of the growing importance of the Indian Ṭayyibī community. Yūsuf came to reside in the Yemen, but after his death in 1566 his successor, also Indian, transferred the headquarters to Gujarat in India.

Doctrines. The Ṭayyibīyah preserved a large portion of the Fatimid religious literature and generally maintained the traditions of Fatimid doctrine more closely than the Nizāriyah. Thus the Ṭayyibī *dā'īs* always insisted on the equal importance of the *zāhir* and *baṭin* aspects of religion, strict compliance with the religious law and esoteric teaching. Qāḍī al-Nu'mān's *Da'ā'im al-Islām* has remained the authoritative codex of Ṭayyibī law and ritual to the present. In the esoteric doctrine, however, there were some innovations which gave the Ṭayyibī gnosis its distinctive character. The *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'* were accepted as the work of one of the pre-Fatimid hidden imams and were frequently quoted and interpreted.

The cosmological system of al-Kirmānī with its ten higher Intellects replaced that of al-Nasafī predominant in the Fatimid age. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥāmidī changed its abstract rational nature by introducing a myth which Henry Corbin has called the Ismā'īlī "drama in

heaven." According to it, the Second and Third Intellects emanating from the First Intellect became rivals for the second rank. When the Second Intellect attained his rightful position by his superior effort, the Third Intellect failed to recognize his precedence; in punishment for his haughty insubordination he fell from the third rank behind the remaining seven Intellects and, after repenting, became stabilized as the Tenth Intellect and demiurge (*mudabbir*). The lower world was produced out of the spiritual forms (*ṣuwar*) which had also refused to recognize the superior rank of the Second Intellect, and out of the darkness generated by this sin. The Tenth Intellect, who is also called the spiritual Adam, strives to regain his original rank by summoning the fallen spiritual forms to repentance.

The first representative of his summons (*da'wah*) on earth was the first and universal Adam, the owner of the body of the world of origination (*ṣāhib al-juththah al-ibda'iyyah*), or higher spiritual world. He is distinguished from the partial Adam who opened the present age of concealment (*satr*), in which the truth is hidden under the exterior of the prophetic messages and laws. After his passing the first Adam rose to the horizon of the Tenth Intellect and took his place, while the Tenth Intellect rose in rank. Likewise after the passing of the Qā'im of each prophetic cycle, that being rises and takes the place of the Tenth Intellect, who thus gradually reaches the Second Intellect.

Countless cycles of manifestation (*kashf*) and concealment alternate in succession until the great resurrection (*qiyāmat al-qiyāmāt*) which consummates the megacycle (*al-kawr al-a'zam*) lasting 360,000 times 360,000 years. The soul of every believer is joined on his initiation to the esoteric truth by a point of light; this is his spiritual soul, which grows as he advances in knowledge. After his physical death the light rises to join the soul of the holder of the rank (*ḥadd*) above him in the hierarchy. Jointly they continue to rise until the souls of all the faithful are gathered in the light temple (*haykal nūrānī*) in the shape of a human being which constitutes the form of the Qā'im (*ṣūrah qā'imīyah*) of the cycle, which then rises to the horizon of the Tenth Intellect. The souls of the unbelievers remain joined to their bodies, which are dissolved into inorganic matter and further transformed into descending orders of harmful creatures and substances. Depending on the gravity of their sins they may eventually rise again through ascending forms of life and as human beings may accept the summons to repentance or end up in torment lasting the duration of the megacycle.

Indian communities. The Ṭayyibīyah in India are commonly known as the Bohoras. There are, however,

also Sunnī and some Hindu Bohoras; they are mostly engaged in agriculture, while the Ismā'īlī Bohoras are generally merchants. The origins of the Ṭayyibī community in Gujarat go back to the time before the Ṭayyibī schism. According to the traditional account an Arab *dā'ī* sent from the Yemen arrived in the region of Cambay with two Indian assistants in 1068. The Ismā'īlī community founded by him, though led by local *wālīs*, always maintained close commercial as well as religious ties with the Yemen and was controlled by the Yemenite teaching hierarchy. It naturally followed the Yemenite community at the time of the schism. From Cambay the community spread to other cities, in particular Patan, Sidhpur, and Ahmadabad. In the first half of the fifteenth century the Ismā'īliyah were repeatedly exposed to persecution by the Sunnī sultans of Gujarat, and after a contested succession to the leadership of the Bohora community, a large section, known as the Ja'fariyah, seceded and converted to Sunnism.

After its transfer from the Yemen in 1566, the residence of the *dā'ī muṭlaq* remained in India. The succession to the twenty-sixth *dā'ī muṭlaq*, Dā'ūd ibn 'Ajabshāh (d. 1591), was disputed. In India Dā'ūd Burhān al-Dīn ibn Quṭbshāh was recognized by the great majority as the twenty-seventh *dā'ī muṭlaq*. However, Dā'ūd ibn 'Ajabshāh's deputy in the Yemen, Sulaymān ibn Ḥasan, a grandson of the first Indian *dā'ī muṭlaq* Yūsuf ibn Sulaymān, also claimed to have been the designated successor and after a few years he came to India to press his case. Although he found little support, the dispute was not resolved and resulted in the permanent split of the Dā'ūdī and Sulaymānī factions recognizing separate lines of *dā'īs*.

The leadership of the Sulaymāniyah, whose Indian community was small, reverted back to the Yemen with the succession of the thirtieth *dā'ī muṭlaq*, Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn Fahd al-Makramī, in 1677. Since then the position of *dā'ī muṭlaq* has remained in various branches of the Makramī family except for the time of the forty-sixth *dā'ī*, an Indian. The Makramī *dā'īs* usually resided in Badr in Najrān. With the backing of the tribe of the Banū Yām they ruled Najrān independently and at times extended their sway over other parts of the Yemen and Arabia until the incorporation of Najrān into Saudi Arabia in 1934. The peak of their power was in the time of the thirty-third *dā'ī muṭlaq*, Ismā'il ibn Hibat Allāh (1747–1770), who defeated the Wahhābiyah in Najd and invaded Ḥaḍramawt. He is also known as the author of an esoteric Qur'ān commentary, virtually the only religious work of a Sulaymānī author published so far. Since Najrān came under Saudi rule, the religious activity of the *dā'īs* and their followers has

been severely restricted. In the Yemen the Sulaymāniyah are found chiefly in the region of Manakha and the Ḥarāz mountains. In India they live mainly in Baroda, Ahmadabad, and Hyderabad and are guided by a representative (*manṣūb*) of the *dā'ī muṭlaq* residing in Baroda.

The *dā'īs* of the Dā'ūdīyah, who constitute the great majority of the Ṭayyibīyah in India, have continued to reside there. All of them have been Indians except the thirtieth *dā'ī muṭlaq*, 'Alī Shams al-Dīn (1621–1631), a descendant of the Yemenite *dā'ī* Idrīs 'Imād al-Dīn. The community was generally allowed to develop freely although there was another wave of persecution under the emperor Awrangzīb (1635–1707), who put the thirty-second *dā'ī muṭlaq*, Quṭb al-Dīn ibn Dā'ūd, to death in 1646 and imprisoned his successor. The residence of the Dā'ūdī *dā'ī muṭlaq* is now in Bombay, where the largest concentration of Bohoras is found. Outside Gujarat, Dā'ūdī Bohoras live in Maharashtra, Rajasthan, in many of the big cities of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Burma, and the East Africa. In the Yemen the Dā'ūdī community is concentrated in the Ḥarāz mountains.

After the death of the twenty-eighth *dā'ī muṭlaq*, Ādam Ṣafī al-Dīn, in 1621, a small faction recognized his grandson 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm as his successor and seceded from the majority recognizing 'Abd al-Ṭayyib Zakī al-Dīn. The minority became known as 'Alia Bohoras and have followed a separate line of *dā'īs* residing in Baroda. Holding that the era of the prophet Muḥammad had come to an end, a group of 'Alia seceded in 1204/1789. Because of their abstention from eating meat they are called Nagoshias (not meat eaters). In 1761 a distinguished Dā'ūdī scholar, Hibat Allāh ibn Ismā'il, claimed that he was in contact with the hidden imam, who had appointed him his *ḥujjah* and thus made his rank superior to that of *dā'ī muṭlaq*. He and his followers, known as Hibtias, were excommunicated and persecuted by the Dā'ūdīyah. Only a few Hibtia families are left in Ujjain. Since the turn of the century a Bohora reform movement has been active. While recognizing the spiritual authority of the *dā'ī muṭlaq* it has sought through court action to restrict his powers of excommunication and his absolute control over community endowments and alms. All of these groups are numerically insignificant.

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WILFERD MADELUNG

Ithnā 'Ashariyah

The Twelver Shī'ah, known also by their Arabic name, Ithnā 'Ashariyah, constitute the largest group within Shī'ī Islam, and their moderate juridical and theological doctrine has always placed them at the center of the entire Shī'ī spectrum, to the extent that they are often identified with Shiism as such.

Centrality of the Imam

For all the Shī'ah, the being of the imam is necessary for the continuation of the world and of human history; according to a famous Shī'ī *ḥadīth*, "The earth shall never be destitute of the proof (*ḥujjah*) of God," namely the imam. In the words of Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, the sixth imam in the line of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the imams are God's witnesses on earth, his "signs" (*'alāmāt*), and those who are "firm in knowledge" (*al-rāsikhūn fī al-'ilm*) according to the Qur'anic dictum. They are the gates (*abwāb*) toward God and his vicegerents (*khulafā' Allāh*) on earth. They possess perfect knowledge not only of the Qur'ān but of all revealed books in both their outward (*ẓāhir*) and inward (*bāṭin*) aspects. They also possess knowledge of God's supreme name (*al-ism al-a'ẓam*) as well as the "books" containing all esoteric knowledge, including the science of the symbolic meaning of the letters of the Arabic alphabet (*al-jafr*). On the Night of Power (*laylat al-qadr*), commemorating when the Qur'ān was first revealed, God reveals to them knowledge of all events of the year to come. The imam is chosen by God and the Prophet or by the previous imam through clear designation (*naṣṣ jalī*) and possesses "initiatory" power (*wilāyah*), while the Prophet possesses the powers of both prophecy (*nubūwah*) and "initiation" (*wilāyah*).

The Twelve Imams. The various branches among the Shī'ah separated from each other on the question of the number of imams which they accepted; the Ithnā 'Ashariyah are so called because for them the twelfth imam is that last in the chain which goes back to 'Alī and Fāṭimah. [*For the general evolution of the different Shī'ī subdivisions, see the overview article, above.*]

The twelve imams of the Ithnā 'Ashariyah are as follows:

1. 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. AH 40/661 CE)
2. al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī (d. AH 49/669 CE)
3. al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī (d. AH 60/680 CE)
4. 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, Zayn al-'Ābidīn (d. AH 95/714 CE)
5. Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. AH 115/733 CE)
6. Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. AH 148/765 CE)
7. Mūsā al-Kāẓim (d. AH 183/799 CE)
8. 'Alī al-Riḍā (d. AH 203/818 CE)

9. Muḥammad Jawād al-Taḳī (d. AH 220/835 CE)
10. 'Alī al-Naḳī (d. AH 254/868 CE)
11. al-Ḥasan al-'Askarī (d. AH 260/874 CE)
12. Muḥammad al-Mahdī, al-Qā'im al-Ḥujjah (entered major occultation in AH 329/941 CE)

The Shī'ī emphasis upon the imam is to be seen not only in the central role accorded to esoteric hermeneutics (*ta'wīl*) in relation to the power of *wilāyah* possessed by the imam, but also in the central function of the imam in daily religious life and his eschatological significance. Shī'ī Muslims must know their imam in order to be saved, and the imams, as well as the Prophet, of course, can and do intercede for believers before God at the hour of judgment. The imam continues to be a living presence in religious life, a link between believer and God, the source of grace and the fountain of knowledge. Endowed with a transhistorical reality, he is not experienced simply as a figure belonging to religious history. [For further discussion, see *Imamate and Wilāyah*.]

The Hidden Imam. The ever-present reality of the imam is felt especially in the case of the twelfth imam or the Mahdī who is, according to the Twelvers, in occultation (*ghaybah*). The imam went into minor occultation (*al-ghaybah al-ṣuḡhrā*) in 872, during which time he had direct representatives (*bāb*) among his followers; beginning in 941 he went into the major occultation (*al-ghaybah al-kubrā*) which has lasted until today and during which the institutionalized channels to him are no longer accessible. The major occultation is not simply a state of being hidden. Rather, it signifies the miraculous mode of life of the imam, who, while being alive and participating in the worldly experience, also resides in the higher planes of existence. He is the ruler of the universe and the Lord of the Hour (*ṣāḥib al-zamān*). He is the pole upon which religion stands (*qā'im*) and the guarantee for the preservation and perpetuation of the tradition. He is also the guide to the spiritual world and appears in person to those possessing the necessary spiritual qualifications to see him. Devout Twelvers pray continuously for a vision of him, and sites where such visions have taken place have often become sanctuaries and sacred precincts to which the faithful make pilgrimage in the same way that they visit the tombs of the other imams. [See *Ghaybah*.]

The twelfth imam is also the Mahdī who will come out of occultation at the time when oppression and inequity in the world reach their peak. He will destroy evil, establish the rule of justice according to the divine law, and reveal the inner unity of religions. He will prepare the second coming of Christ with which the history of present-day humanity will come to an end. All Twel-

vers pray for his coming, and as a result of this belief, there exists a strong messianic view in Shiism, a current which has manifested itself in many political and nonpolitical forms over the centuries. While most Sunnīs also believe in the coming of the Mahdī, such a belief is not a necessity for Sunnī Islam, while among the Twelvers the identity of the Mahdī is known, and the expectation of his coming colors the whole ethos of the religion and influences all its manifestations from the theological to the political.

Historical Development

The historical development of Twelver Shiism can be envisaged both from the viewpoint of its involvement in sociopolitical events of history and from that of the development of Shī'ī thought. The two are certainly inter-related but not identical. In either case, however, the period during which the imams were alive and functioning as living leaders of the community provides the model which different forces and groups among the Twelvers have sought to emulate in one way or another in all later ages.

Twelver Shiism in Islamic History. The participation of the imams in Islamic history was certainly not uniform, nor was it based on a single pattern. The imams all acted on the basis of the same principles but, in accordance with the circumstances and situations confronting them, sometimes followed the path of quietism and other times that of activism.

Origins. Two events in the formative period, however, stand out as crucial to the later history of the Twelvers and in fact all of Islam: the Battle of Ṣiffīn at the end of the caliphate of 'Alī (661) and the uprising of Imam Ḥusayn against the Umayyad caliph Yazīd (680). The nearly five and a half years of 'Alī's rule remain of course an ideal to which the Shī'ah have referred over the centuries, for these years constitute the only period during which a Shī'ī imam actually held political power. The Battle of Ṣiffīn, which marked the first open breach in the Muslim community (*ummah*), was fought between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah, the governor of Syria who had refused to pay allegiance to 'Alī as caliph on the pretext that the death of the third caliph, 'Uthmān, had not been avenged. That 'Alī was murdered by the Khārijīs after the battle, that Mu'āwiyah survived to found the Umayyad caliphate with its capital in Damascus, and that henceforth the followers of 'Alī were persecuted all helped to consolidate the Shī'ah and cement them together as a distinct group within the Muslim community. [See *the biography of 'Alī ibn Abī Tālib*.]

It was the death of 'Alī's son, Imam Ḥusayn, that made this cleavage definite and final and helped to crystallize the distinctive ethos of Shiism. Imam Ḥusayn

had refused to pay allegiance to Mu'āwiyah's son Yazīd and, rather than suffer humiliation, decided to move from Medina to Kufa, where he had been promised help to confront the mighty Umayyad military power against overwhelming odds. Surrounded in the desert of southern Iraq, he and his family—all the nearest descendants of the Prophet—were killed after a valiant fight, while the female members, along with Imam Ḥusayn's son, the fourth imam, Zayn al-'Ābidīn, who was then ill, were taken prisoner and brought to Damascus. The severed head of Ḥusayn was sent to Yazīd in Damascus where Ḥusayn's sister, Zaynab, protested violently before the general public and spread the news of the tragedy that had befallen the Prophet's favorite grandson. The event shook the conscience of the community at large, but it was especially effective in consolidating the Shī'ah, and it resulted in many proto-Shī'i political movements which finally brought about the downfall of the Umayyads and made possible the coming of their political successors, the Abbasids. From the purely religious point of view, the event at Karbala was all-important in providing the element of suffering and "redemption" through participation in the tragedy of the imams so characteristic of Shī'i piety. [See the biography of *Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī*.]

Political quietism. Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn, witness to the indescribable tragedy which befell his father and other members of his family, withdrew from active life to devote himself to the dissemination of inner knowledge as had his uncle Ḥasan, the second imam. The events of Karbala had a special effect upon Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn in that they brought out an exceptional poetic eloquence in his words and sayings; his *Ṣaḥīfah*, a collection of prayers and litanies in exquisite Arabic, is called the "psalm of the Family of the Prophet."

With the weakening of Umayyad power, the Shī'i imams received a greater degree of freedom to disseminate their teachings; thus, the great majority of Shī'i traditions come from the fifth, sixth, and seventh imams. The fifth imam, Muḥammad al-Bāqir, was in fact called Bāqir al-'Ulūm, "garden of knowledge," and his sayings are a major source of both the law and the esoteric sciences, while the sixth imam, Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, played such an important role in the formulation of Shī'i law that as a school of law it is known as the Ja'farī school. He influenced Sunnī jurisprudence as well, and the great Sunnī jurist Abū Ḥanīfah is said to have studied with him. Imam Ja'far was not only a master of the Islamic esoteric sciences and the author of the first extant esoteric commentary upon the Qur'ān, but also knowledgeable in the natural and occult sciences. Many treatises in these fields, especially in al-

chemy, are attributed to him. Imam Ja'far trained a vast number of students and is the father of formal Shī'i religious education. In fact he must be considered as the founder of the first "circle of learning" (*ḥawzah-yi 'ilmīyah*), which was to develop later into the well-known medieval universities. [See the biography of *Ja'far al-Ṣādiq*.]

Imam Riḍā, the one imam who was close to the Abbasid court, was especially important as a source of Ṣūfī teachings in both Shī'i and Sunnī Islam but also had a particularly royal aspect to him. To this day he is referred to as the Shah of Khorasan, and throughout history the Persian rulers have been custodians of the vast endowments which manage the architectural complex of his mausoleum in Mashhad.

After the death of Imam Riḍā, the Abbasids resumed a close watch on the activities of his successors, who mostly remained imprisoned or under heavy surveillance until the disappearance of the twelfth imam, Muḥammad al-Mahdī. During his minor occultation he continued to discourse with the Shī'i community through his "gates" (*abwāb*, sg., *bāb*), four revered men who were highly respected by the community, but with the death of the last *bāb* the major occultation began and Twelver Shiism entered into a new phase.

During the next six centuries Shiism remained a quietist movement from the political point of view, but its influence and numbers continued to grow in Persia and India, and it waxed and waned in Syria. During the later tenth century, with most of Persia and Syria ruled by the Twelver Shī'i Buyids and Egypt and North Africa controlled by the Ismā'īlī Fatimids, Sunnī Islam seemed to be fighting a defensive battle. It was only with the help of Sunnī Turks, supported by the weakened Abbasid caliphate, and with the defeat of the Fatimids by the Crusaders that the power of Shiism began to wane.

Although the Shī'i Buyids were Persian, the Sunnī Ghaznavids and Seljuks were Turks, and the Abbasids were Arabs, it is wrong to conclude simply that the Persians were Shī'i and the Arabs and Turks Sunnī. The situation is much more complex. While it is true that most of the great Twelver Shī'i scholars have been Persian and that with the Safavids Persia became mostly Shī'i, it is also a fact of Islamic history that during the tenth and eleventh centuries the intellectual defense of Sunnī Islam also came from the Persian province of Khorasan with such figures as al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī. Moreover, while the Turks of Sunnī persuasion helped to prevent the spread of Shiism in the eleventh century, five centuries later Shī'i Turkish tribes brought Shah Ismā'īl to power in Persia and helped make Twelver Shiism the state religion of Safavid Persia.

In any case, with the destruction of both Seljuk and Abbasid power by the Mongols, Shiism began to gain ground once again. The period following the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century marks a rapid spread of Twelver Shiism thanks to both the appearance of such outstanding Shi'ī statesmen and scholars as Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and 'Allāmah Ḥillī and the spread of certain Ṣūfī orders such as the Nūrbakhshī, which prepared the ground for the consolidation of Safavid power in Persia through the spread of their Twelver tendencies.

The Safavid state. With the advent of the Safavids in the sixteenth century, Twelver Shiism identified itself for the first time with a distinct political power, as the Ismā'īliyah had done centuries before with the establishment of the Fatimid caliphate in Cairo and the Zaydiyyah with their own imamate in Yemen. (On a lesser scale the same event was taking place in India with the establishment of small Twelver kingdoms in the South.) Paradoxically enough, the Twelvers, who were the most numerous among the Shi'ah, were the last to enter the political arena.

Ruling with the help of Twelver Shiism, the Safavids in turn helped it spread within Persia while supporting Shi'ī communities outside their borders. An alliance was created between the Persian monarchy and the Twelver *'ulamā'* (sg., *'ālim*: "scholar"). While the central authority of the kings remained strong, an equilibrium was maintained between the state and the Twelver establishment, and in fact, certain religious offices, such as those of the *ṣadr* (chief minister) and *imām jum'ah* (Friday prayer leader) were filled by the monarch. However, as the power of the state began to wane, the class of Shi'ī *'ulamā'*, led by such figures as Mullā Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī (d. 1700), sought to assert greater power and authority as representatives of the Hidden Imam, to whom all real authority, political as well as religious, belonged. Still, when the Safavid state was destroyed as a result of the Afghan invasion in 1722, far from taking power into their hands and fighting for the preservation of a Shi'ī state, nearly all of the outstanding Twelver *'ulamā'* chose the path of quietism, with many retiring to Najaf in Iraq and devoting themselves to purely religious concerns.

Renewed activism. For several decades from the rule of Nādir Shāh (r. 1736–1747) and Karīm Khān Zand (r. 1750–1779) to the establishment of the Qajars in 1779, Twelver Shiism remained politically quiet and somewhat peripheral. It was only during the long reign of Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh in the beginning of the nineteenth century that the power of the Twelver *'ulamā'* began to rise again. The king favored and even encouraged religious courts and ceased to appoint judges as had been done

in the Safavid period. The religious scholars came to be favored directly while the privileged position of the descendants of the Prophet (the *sādāt*) so emphasized by the Safavids weakened.

This new period of ascendancy of Twelver political power resulted in the participation of the *'ulamā'* in many major political events, culminating in the Tobacco Rebellion of 1891–1892 and finally the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, in which the role of the *'ulamā'* was central. Despite the direct participation of the Twelver establishment in political power, however, at no time during the Qajar or, for that matter, the Safavid, period does one see a Twelver doctrine of the illegitimacy of the government or the state. Occasionally one does see a figure such as Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī, who in his *'Awā'id al-ayyām* (Benefits of the Times) argues for the strengthening of the juridical power of the jurispudent (*faqīh*), a view which some scholars have interpreted as the historical antecedent of Ayatollah Khomeini's thesis of the "rule of the jurispudent" (*vilāyat-i faqīh*). But even if such a doubtful interpretation is accepted, such views remained rare and indeed anomalous. The almost unanimously held position was that of perhaps the most celebrated Twelver juridical scholar of the age, Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī, who continued to the end of his life to remain piously opposed to all activity in the political order, even to the administering of justice according to the *shari'ah*.

During the Constitutional Revolution the Twelver *'ulamā'* were leaders on both sides of the debate about a parliamentary system and constitutional monarchy. While those who opposed such a system rallied behind Shaykh Faḍl Allāh Nūrī, the leading Twelver *'ālim* of the day, the pro-Constitution forces, although often partly secularized and imbued with Western, liberal ideas, also rallied behind and were supported by leading figures among the class of *'ulamā'*, such as Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Sayyid 'Abd Allāh Bihbahānī. As a result of this participation, with the final victory of the pro-Constitution forces the power of the "liberal wing" of the *'ulamā'* grew even more than before, and they remained, despite the modernization which was to follow during the next seven decades, the most politically powerful body of *'ulamā'* in the whole of the Islamic world.

Pahlavi rule. From the time of the Constitutional Revolution through the Pahlavi period, the power of the *'ulamā'* decreased in relation to what had existed in the Qajar era but nevertheless remained considerable. As the state became more powerful during the reign of Riḏā Shāh Pahlavi (1925–1941), juridical power was taken out of the hands of the *'ulamā'* and bestowed on

the government once again. Education was taken out of their hands as well, but the traditional educational institutions were allowed to survive and were in fact strengthened during the rule of Muḥammad Riḏā Shāh (1941–1979), who had a more lenient attitude toward the 'ulamā' than had his father.

During this period the erosion of the power of the 'ulamā' did not, however, come so much from direct government action (although such measures as land reform did affect the 'ulamā' adversely) as from the general process of modernization. But since the government did not oppose religious activity in any way, religious reaction to secularization and modernization also thrived. It manifested itself first and foremost in a veritable revival of Shī'ī learning and religious thought and finally by sociopolitical action seeking to oppose the process of modernization. In this domain not all the voices of Twelver Shiism were by any means in accord nor were all the voices of dissent of a religious character. The majority of Twelver authorities continued to preach the traditional doctrine of abstention from direct involvement in politics, while those who spearheaded political opposition in the beginning were often forces of the secular left, although they used images, symbols, and slogans of a Shī'ī coloring. In the end, however, the minority Shī'ī voice which preached direct political control and rule of society won the day, destroying its secular partners and silencing at least for now and at least within Iran those Twelver voices which preached the traditional political doctrine of quietism and withdrawal from worldly activity.

Islamic Revolution. Twelver Shiism thus entered another new phase of its history with the Revolution of 1978–1979. While the nature, direction, and outcome of that history cannot as yet be judged or evaluated from a religious point of view (whatever one might be able to say of its immediate political, economic, and social consequences), the one fact which is certain is that this event will have a deep effect not only upon the future role of Twelver Shiism within Iran but also upon the destiny of Shiism in those countries with Shī'ī minorities. It will also bear upon the question of the preservation of unity or the possibility of further segmentation within Shiism itself.

The Development of Shī'ī Thought. Although intertwined with the development of Islamic thought in general, Twelver Shī'ī thought possesses a distinct historical development of its own. For the sake of convenience in this analysis it is possible to divide that development into five periods.

First period: the era of the imams. The first period, which is unique in that it contains at once the root and inner content of all later Twelver thought, spans the life

of the Prophet and the imams to the occultation of the twelfth imam. This seminal period of three centuries saw not only the sayings of the Prophet and the imams (*aḥādīth*), which, along with the Qur'ān, serve as the source for all Shī'ī thought from law to theology and philosophy, assembled, but also the earliest distinct schools of Shī'ī thought became crystallized, especially around the fifth and sixth imams. By the ninth century Ja'fārī law was already formulated, theological and theosophical thought received their earliest formulations, and other intellectual and occult sciences began to be cultivated within the Twelver worldview.

Second period: ninth to eleventh centuries. This period, which coincides with the rise of the Buyids in Persia and Iraq, produced the first group of important Twelver scholars who codified the teachings of the imams and brought Shī'ī learning to its first golden age. Especially noteworthy is Muḥammad al-Kulaynī (d. 941), the author of *Kitāb al-kāfī*, perhaps the most influential of the four canonical collections of Shī'ī *ḥadīth*. Al-Kulaynī, born and educated near Qom, taught in Baghdad, where he lies buried. The *Kitāb al-kāfī* consists of three major parts: the *uṣūl*, dealing with theology, prophetology, theodicy, and similar subjects; the *furū'*, dealing with jurisprudence; and the miscellaneous articles at the end.

Al-Kulaynī was followed successively by the other two major Shī'ī scholars of tradition, Ibn Bābūyah (or Ibn Bābawayhi, known also as Ṣadūq, d. 991/2) and Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067/8), who was also the founder of the Twelver university at Najaf, which survives to this day as the most important and ancient Shī'ī center of learning. Another eminent Twelver scholar of the period was Sayyid Sharīf al-Raḏī (d. 1016), who assembled the sayings of 'Alī in the *Nahj al-balāghah*, which many Western scholars, in contrast to traditional and contemporary Twelver views, believe to have been written by Sayyid Sharīf al-Raḏī himself.

A student of Ibn Bābūyah and Sayyid Sharīf, Shaykh al-Mufīd, marks the beginning of rational Twelver theology. Although the Nawbakhtī family had begun employing certain Mu'tazilī theses in ninth-century Twelver thought, it remained for Shaykh Muḥammad al-Mufīd (d. 1022) to inaugurate the full employment of rational arguments in religious debates.

Third period: eleventh to thirteenth centuries. The third period of Twelver thought stretches from the fall of the Buyids and the temporary eclipse of Shiism to the Mongol invasion. By and large the Seljuk opposition to Shiism had the direct effect of diminishing the intense Twelver intellectual activity of the two previous centuries. Nonetheless, there were some notable figures, including Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī (d. 1068), the author of the

famous *Kitāb al-istibṣār* (Book of Examination) and *Tahdhīb al-aḥkām* (Purification of Principles), and Abū 'Alī Ṭabarsī (d. 1153/4), well known for his Qur'ān commentary, *Majma' al-bayān* (Compendium of Discourse).

Fourth period: thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. The Mongol invasion, despite its ravaging effects, also marked the beginning of a new phase of widespread Islamic intellectual activity. This fourth period of Twelver thought begins with the towering figure of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274), who not only revived Avicennian philosophy in the matrix of Twelver thought but also wrote the *Kitāb al-tajrīd*, which is considered as the first systematic work of Twelver theology and which is without doubt the most widely read work on the subject. Naṣīr al-Dīn was also responsible for the revival of Twelver learning, the consequences of which stretched over the centuries into the Safavid and even later periods. His contemporary Najm al-Dīn Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī (d. 1277) was an expert on the principles of Twelver jurisprudence (*uṣūl*), for which he wrote the authoritative work, *Kitāb al-ma'arīj* (Book of Scales), while also developing the science of the application of these principles (*furū'*) in his equally famous *Sharā'i' al-islām* (Laws of Islam).

Ṭūsī's successor and student, Jamāl al-Dīn 'Allāmah al-Ḥillī (d. 1325), was one of the most prolific and many-faceted intellectual figures of Twelver Shiism, at once a theologian, jurist, philosopher, and political thinker. He also acted directly upon the political scene by being instrumental in the conversion of the Ilkhanid ruler Öljeitu to Twelver Shiism and participated in religious polemics by answering Sunnī criticisms against Shiism and attacking Sunnism himself. His polemical *Minhāj al-kirāmah* (Way of Munificence) was in turn refuted by Ibn Taymīyah. Al-Ḥillī is also especially known in the annals of Twelver thought for his *Kaṣḥf al-murād* (Discovery of the Desired End), a commentary upon Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd* and the first of a long list of commentaries and glosses written upon this work over the next seven centuries.

This period is also marked by the continuation of Islamic philosophy in a specifically Twelver climate in the hands of such figures as Ṣā'in al-Dīn ibn Turkah Iṣfahānī (d. 1427), the Dashtakī family, and Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 1502/3), the theologian and philosopher who began as a Sunnī Muslim but was later converted to Shiism. Most of these philosophers were at once followers of the Peripatetic school of Ibn Sīnā as revived by Ṭūsī and Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 1310/11 or 1316/7) and the Illuminationist or Ishrāqī school of Suhrawardī (d. 1191).

The gnostic teachings of the Andalusian Ṣūfī Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī (d. 1240), who was himself a Sunnī,

also began to penetrate Twelver circles and to become integrated with Shī'ī gnosis (*'irfān-i shī'ī*) during this period. Such Twelver gnostics as Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī (fourteenth century), author of *Jāmi' al-asrār*, one of the *summas* of Shī'ī gnosis, and Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsā'ī, author of *Kitāb al-mujlī* (d. after 1496), were disciples of both the school of Ibn 'Arabī and the gnosis which issued from the teachings of the Twelver imams. Other figures of Twelver Sufism during this period included Ibn Ṭā'ūs (fifteenth century), Sayyid Muḥammad Nūrbakhsh (d. 1464), and Muḥsin Kāshifī (d. 1500/1 or 1504/5), all of whom were of considerable importance for the subsequent conversion of Persia to Twelver Shiism. In this process the Kubrawīyah order in general played an important role, but more significant still was that of the Ṣafavīyah. This specifically Twelver Ṣūfī order, founded by Ṣafī al-Dīn Ardībīlī, was to inaugurate a new phase in the history of Shiism with the conquest of Persia by Shah Ismā'il Ṣafavī in 1499.

Fifth period: sixteenth to twentieth centuries. The fifth and final phase of the history of Twelver thought begins with the Safavid declaration of Twelver Shiism as the state religion of Persia and lasts to this day. The state support of Shiism naturally caused a major revival of Twelver thought in nearly every field. Jurisprudence and theology began to thrive with such scholars as 'Alī ibn Ḥusayn Karakī, who was already well known before the advent of the Safavids. Other jurists and theologians were brought by the rulers to Isfahan and other major Persian cities from Jabal 'Āmil, Bahrein, and Ḥillah in Iraq.

Among the most colorful of these figures was Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn 'Āmilī, the religious leader (*shaykh al-islām*) of Isfahan, who was at once jurist, theologian, Ṣūfī, mathematician, architect, and poet. He helped popularize Twelver jurisprudence by writing the *Jāmi'-i 'abbāsī* on jurisprudence in Persian while composing several Ṣūfī poems in simple Persian which could be understood by people in the streets and bazaars. His friend and contemporary, Mīr Dāmād (d. 1630) was the founder of the new school of Islamic philosophy which has now come to be known as the "School of Isfahan"; he wrote numerous works in Arabic and Persian, of which the *Qabasāt* is perhaps the most important. His student Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1640) is certainly the greatest of the later Islamic philosophers; he wielded immense influence not only upon Persia but also in India, where his monumental *Al-asfār al-arba'ah* (Four Journeys), which summarizes his theosophical teachings, was translated into Urdu only during the nineteenth century. Although his most famous immediate students, Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1680) and 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī (d. 1661/2), turned

mostly to the religious sciences, *kalām*, and Sufism, the "transcendent theosophy" (*al-ḥikmah al-muta'aliyah*) of Mullā Ṣadrā began to gather followers from near and far and soon became the central intellectual school of Twelver Shiism.

Toward the end of the Safavid period the onset of an antiphilosophical and anti-Ṣūfī trend caused Sufism to go underground and partially eclipsed the school of Mullā Ṣadrā. This was the age of Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī, the author of the monumental Twelver encyclopedia *Biḥār al-anwār* and many other juridical and theological works. This period was also witness to treatises on popular piety.

After an interim period of uncertainty and chaos marked by the Afghan invasion, the conquest of Persia by Nādir Shāh, and the rule of Karīm Khān Zand, the establishment of the Qajars in 1779 marked once again a revival of Twelver thought. The nineteenth century was witness not only to the major jurists and theologians already mentioned, but also to several notable philosophers such as Mullā 'Alī Nūrī (d. 1831), Mullā 'Alī Zunūzī (d. 1889), Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qum-shā'ī (d. 1888), and the most famous of the Qajar philosophers, Ḥājji Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī (d. 1871), whose *Sharḥ al-manẓūmah* remains a favorite philosophical text to this date. These men revived the teachings of Mullā Ṣadrā as well as those of Ibn 'Arabī in its Twelver form. Their disciples were in turn the direct teachers of the outstanding Twelver philosophers of the late Qajar and Pahlavi periods such as Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan Rafī'ī Qazwīnī, Sayyid Muḥammad Kāzīm 'Aṣṣār, and 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī, all of whom died in the second half of the twentieth century. This period marks in fact a most active and fecund era during which the Twelver intellectual tradition encountered the challenges of the modern West for the first time, traditional Twelver thought was revived, and Islamic modernism began to penetrate into certain strands of Twelver Shiism.

Twelver Shī'ī Doctrines in Relation to Sunnism

Twelver Shiism shares with Sunnī Islam the acceptance of the unity of God, the text of the Qur'ān, and the prophetic function of the Prophet, including the finality of his prophetic function and belief in eschatological events described in the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth*. It differs from Sunnism in its emphases upon the quality of justice ('*adl*) as innate and intrinsic to the divine nature and upon the significance of the imam with all the consequences this doctrine entails as far as esoteric knowledge, the role of '*aql* or intellect, and attitude toward intellectual sciences are concerned. Also in contrast to Sunnism, for which *ḥadīth* means the sayings of the

Prophet, Shiism also includes in its *ḥadīth* collections the sayings of the imams, although it does distinguish clearly between prophetic traditions (*al-ḥadīth al-nabawī*) and the traditions of the imams (*al-ḥadīth al-walawī*). As far as the prophetic traditions are concerned, the lines of transmission are usually different for Sunni and Shī'ī Muslims, but the content of most of the sayings are the same. [See *Ḥadīth*.]

Twelver Shiism possesses the same sacred law (*sharī'ah*) as Sunnī Islam, with small differences in the ritual aspects which are practically no greater than differences between the four Sunnī schools themselves. Injunctions concerning transactions are also similar in most instances, the most important exceptions being the Shī'ī acceptance of temporary marriage (*mut'ah*) and also a religious tax (*khums*) in addition to the general religious tax (*zakāt*) accepted by Sunnīs. Altogether, despite many polemics with Sunnism, over the ages, Shiism represents an essential aspect of Islamic orthodoxy and has its roots in the Qur'anic revelation and the soul of the Prophet as does Sunnism.

The doctrines of the Twelvers are summarized in the "principles of religion" (*uṣūl al-dīn*) as stated in the sayings of the imams. These principles include *tawḥīd* (attesting to God's unity); '*adl* (accepting that God is just by nature); *nubūwah* (prophecy or accepting the prophetic function of all the prophets beginning with Adam and ending with the prophet of Islam); *imāmah* (accepting the twelve imams from 'Alī to the Mahdi); and *ma'ād* (accepting the immortality of the soul, the responsibility of human beings for their actions, divine judgment and the paradisaal, purgatorial, or infernal states which people experience in accordance with the fruits of their actions and divine mercy).

The Twelvers understand these principles, as well as the whole Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, according to not only their outward meaning but also their inner sense and reality. Thus *ta'wīl*, this process of going from the outward to the inward, is emphasized in every aspect of Twelver Shiism, whether it be the Qur'anic sciences or the interpretation of religious rites. Through the Twelver understanding of the meaning of the imam and the power of *wilāyah*, there exists an esoteric character even within the exoteric aspects. It might in fact be said that whereas in Sunnī Islam the exoteric and the esoteric are clearly separated (and the latter identified with Sufism), among the Twelvers, in addition to the presence of Sufism in its Shī'ī form, esotericism flows into the exoteric domain and bestows a mystical aspect on the whole manifestation of Shiism, including popular piety.

Jurisprudence. Twelver Shiism, like Sunnī Islam, emphasizes the importance of the divine law (*sharī'ah*) and

the necessity of following its injunctions, most of which are in fact like those of Sunnī Islam. Twelver jurisprudence, or *fiqh*, although related to the Sunnī schools of *fiqh* in accepting the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* as the two basic sources of law, also differs from them in certain important ways. The four Sunnī schools of law accept with different degrees of emphasis the use of *ijmā'* (consensus of the community) and *qiyās* (analogy) as sources for drawing legal injunctions where the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* and *sunnah* do not provide direct guidance.

Divine injunction. For the Twelvers, however, every event which occurs in the world comes as a result of divine injunction (*ḥukm*), which includes for them the sayings and actions of the imams. Basing themselves on the famous saying of the Prophet (the *ḥadīth al-thaqalayn*) according to which the Prophet mentioned to his companions that after his death he would leave Muslims the Qur'ān and his family, the Twelvers base their *fiqh* completely on the injunctions issued by the Prophet and the imams and consider both *ijmā'* and *qiyās* to be inadmissible for juridical decision-making. For them there are but two sources for juridical injunctions: the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* and *sunnah* understood in their Shī'ī sense. *Ḥadīth*, in fact, is also seen by the Twelvers as being nothing but commentaries upon the Qur'ān and the extension of Qur'ānic teachings by the Prophet and the imams so that the Qur'ān becomes ultimately the sole source of the *sharī'ah*.

Juridical authority belongs exclusively to the Prophet and the imams. According to the *Furū' al-kāfi* of al-Kulaynī, this authority was transferred by Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq to the jurists (*fuqahā'*), who, in the absence of the imams, receive their authority from the Hidden Imam, or the Mahdi. Real judges, in fact, should be chosen by the imam and according to Twelver belief, one should not accept judges chosen by political authorities unless it is necessary and under conditions which necessitate *taqīyah* "dissimulation." [See *Taqīyah*.]

Ijtihād. The Twelver concept of *ijtihād* (use of legal reasoning) implies, therefore, not drawing conclusions from and on the basis of the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, *ijmā'*, and *qiyās*, but seeking answers to problems facing the community or the individual from the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* (including the sayings of the imams) alone, and relying completely on the emulation of the Prophet and the imams and their understanding of the teachings of the Qur'ān. In this sense the range of *ijtihād* among the Twelvers is more limited than among the Sunnīs, but from the point of view of the actual practice of *ijtihād*, it can be said that it occupies a more central and living role in Twelver Shiism. In Sunnī Islam the gates of *ijtihād* are said to have been closed since the establishment

of the schools of law a thousand years ago, whereas for the Twelvers, the gate of *ijtihād* has always remained open. In fact, a Twelver is supposed to imitate and follow a living *mujtahid*, the person who can practice *ijtihād*. Each person who reaches the degree of *ijtihād* must derive the injunctions of the law afresh from the traditional sources, and the *mujtahids* have always exercised greater power and influence in Twelver Shiism than in Sunnī Islam, especially since the late Safavid period. [See *Ijtihād*.]

Another unique feature of Twelver jurisprudence is the institution of the "source of imitation" or *marja'-i taqlīd*. In the middle of the nineteenth century, as the power of the *mujtahids* grew, there came into being the office of the supreme *mujtahid* whom all Twelvers were to imitate. This transformation was brought about by Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī (d. 1864), who formulated the doctrine in his *Farā'id al-uṣūl* (Precious Pearls of Uṣūl). The institution continued for over a century until 1962, the year of the death of Ayatollah Burūjirdī, who was the last *mujtahid* to be universally accepted as the supreme head of the Twelver hierarchy and who was imitated by all Twelvers.

The importance of *ijtihād* as used currently by Twelvers has not, however, been always the same for all segments of the community. During the Safavid period there existed a fierce struggle between the Akhbāriyah, who relied solely upon the sayings (*akhbār*) of the Prophet and the imams as incorporated in the four canonical collections of Shī'ī *ḥadīth*, and the Uṣūliyah, who relied upon the use of reason in the principles (*uṣūl*) of jurisprudence and their application on the basis of the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*. The founder of the Akhbārī school was Muḥammad Amin Astrābādī (d. 1623/4), who, in his *Al-fawā'id al-madanīyah* (Civil Benefits), attacked the *mujtahids* strongly and accused them of destroying Islam. During the early Qajar period, when the Russians were fighting against Persia, an Akhbārī religious leader named Mīrzā Muḥammad Akhbārī of Bahrain promised the ruler Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh the head of the Russian general if he were to ban the Uṣūliyah. When Mīrzā Muḥammad kept his promise and brought the head, Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh, fearing his power, exiled him to Iraq. Henceforth Akhbārī influence, which had been paramount in the Zand period, began to wane, and soon they were totally eclipsed as a result of the works of the Uṣūlī Muḥammad Bāqir Waḥīd Bihbahānī (d. 1792). The nineteenth century became, as a result, the golden period for the science of principles of jurisprudence, *uṣūl al-fiqh*, and the period when the *mujtahids* rose to power.

The Akhbārī-Uṣūlī debate which has characterized much of Twelver thought during the past few centuries

resembles in many ways the earlier Mu'tazilī–Ash'arī debate in Sunnī Islam, but of course in the context of elements and factors which are typical of Twelver Shiism. The Uṣūliyah emphasize the competence of reason in interpreting the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* and the necessity of *ijtihād*. They do not accept uncritically the four canonical codices of Shī'ī *ḥadīth* and rely heavily upon the ever-renewed and living interpretation of these sources of law to the extent of forbidding the imitation of a deceased *mujtahid*. The Akhbārīyah oppose the Uṣūliyah on all these counts, criticizing them especially on the role they allot to reason in the interpretation of the injunctions of the divine law. [See *Islamic Law for further discussion*.]

Philosophy and Theosophy. The Twelver attitude toward the so-called intellectual sciences (*al-'ulūm al-'aqliyah*) was from the beginning more positive than that of the school of theology (*kalām*) which came to dominate Sunnī Islam from the fourth century AH (tenth century CE). This more open attitude can be found in some of the sayings of the sixth and eighth imams, not to speak of the metaphysical discourses of 'Alī contained in the *Nahj al-balāghah*. As a result, philosophy or theosophy (*al-ḥikmah al-ilāhīyah*) also constituted an important aspect of Twelver religious thought and is far from being only Greek philosophy in Arabic or Persian dress.

Philosophy. While many of the early Islamic philosophers, such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā (Avicenna), were either Twelvers or had Twelver tendencies, from the Mongol invasion and the advent of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī onward, Islamic philosophy took refuge for the most part in the Shī'ī world, and some of the greatest of the later Islamic philosophers following Ṭūsī, such as Ibn Turkah Iṣfahānī, Mir Dāmād, and Mullā Ṣadrā, were also Twelver thinkers.

Later Islamic philosophy following Suhrawardī and Ṭūsī also drew directly from specifically Twelver sources, especially the *Nahj al-balāghah* and the *Uṣūl al-kāfī* of al-Kulaynī. One cannot study a work such as the *Asfār* of Mullā Ṣadrā without becoming aware of the central significance of the teachings of the Qur'ān as interpreted by the Prophet and the imams and the Shī'ī *ḥadīth* corpus in the development of later Islamic philosophy. Some of the most significant pages of Shī'ī theological and religious thought as ordinarily understood are to be found in such late works. [See *Falsafah and Ishrāqīyah for further discussion of philosophy*.]

Religious sciences and theology (*kalām*). From the beginning Shiism emphasized the importance of religious knowledge. While cut off from worldly power, the early Shī'ah, including of course the imams, devoted most of their energy to the dissemination of religious knowledge

as transmitted by the Prophet through the chain of the imams. This knowledge included Qur'anic commentary, *ḥadīth*, and law as well as the esoteric sciences. Gradually there developed a sizable body of specifically Twelver religious works in nearly every field. After the *Nahj al-balāghah* and the *Ṣaḥīfah al-sajjādīyah* (Scroll of Sajjād) of Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn, the most important specifically Shī'ī religious works are the four codices of the sayings of the Prophet and the imams assembled in the tenth and eleventh centuries: the *Kitāb al-kāfī* of al-Kulaynī, *Man yaḥḍuruḥu al-faqīh* of Ibn Bābūyah, and *Kitāb al-tahdhīb* and *Kitāb al-istibṣār* of Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī. Henceforth all Twelver religious thought from the philosophical and theological to the juridical and political drew from these four canonical collections or *al-kutub al-arba'ah*.

Kalām, as the discipline dealing with the rational defense of the tenets of the faith, developed much later in Twelver Shiism than it did in either Sunnī Islam or Ismā'īlī Shiism. The Twelvers began to develop *kalām* in a systematic sense with Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, whose *Kitāb al-tajrīd* is the first the most important Twelver *kalām* work, commented upon by generations of theologians starting with the author's own celebrated student 'Allāmah al-Ḥillī. Shī'ī *kalām* was rejuvenated during the Safavid period when such figures as 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī wrote major works devoted to this discipline. During this period, however, the philosophers (*ḥukamā-yi ilāhī* in Persian) strongly opposed the whole discipline of *kalām* and claimed that the "science of God" or theology in its universal sense was the subject of their discipline rather than the science of the *mutakallimīn*, those who followed the field of study known technically as *kalām*. [See *Kalām*.]

Political and Social Thought. During most of its history Twelver Shiism has followed the example of Imam Ḥasan and most other Imams in remaining aloof from the everyday world and its political entanglements, shunning even the ministering of justice and turning temporal defeat into spiritual victory by placing before itself a political ideal identified with the rule of the imam and the *parousia* he will bring about. The imams themselves shied away from direct political activity even when the opportunity arose, as in the case of Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq who was offered the caliphate by Abū Muslim, or else they were prevented from doing so, as in the case of Imam Riḍā who was poisoned after being chosen successor of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn.

Relation to power. Nonetheless, the case of Imam Ḥusayn, who arose against the Umayyad caliph Yazīd, presents the other strand in Shiism, which is that of political protest against iniquity and injustice. After the

occultation of the twelfth imam, practically all the major Twelver jurists and scholars reiterated the political theory according to which the Sunnī caliphate was illegitimate, the real ruler of the world was the Hidden Imam, and in his absence the ruler or sultan who was just and who supported or at least permitted the practice of Shiism should be conditionally supported, although there were also occasional Shī'ī revolts against established authority. With the Safavids' establishment of a Shī'ī Twelver kingdom of Persia, or on a smaller scale with the establishment of Twelver states in Bijapur and other states in the Deccan in India, this agreement between the Shī'ī authorities and the state in a sense became formalized and served as the basis of a pact between religion and the state upon which the sociopolitical order functioned. In Qajar Persia this theory was on one or two occasions repudiated in favor of the theory of direct rule of the jurisprudents as in the case of Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī (d. 1828/9) as he has been interpreted by certain later figures, while others such as Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir Shaftī (d. 1844) took the administration of justice into their hands. But it was not until the declaration of the rule of the jurisprudent (*vilāyat-i faqīh*) by Ayatollah Khomeini that the classical Shī'ī theory was rejected in the name of the direct rule of the jurisprudent and the latter view was put into practice.

Socioeconomic issues. As far as social thought is concerned, Twelver ideas are not very different from those of the Sunnīs, with the emphasis upon the family as the most important social unit. Twelver Shiism permits temporary marriage (*mut'ah*) which, although definitely practiced at the time of the Prophet, was banned in Sunnī Islam under the caliphate of 'Umar. It also emphasizes inheritance for the female members of the family and the children rather than brothers and sisters more than do Sunnī schools of law.

As far as the economic order is concerned, although the craft guilds and orders of chivalry have existed throughout the Islamic world, because these orders traced their origin to 'Alī, they were easily integrated into the Twelver religious world and its piety and possessed a more open and organic link with the formal, exoteric aspects of the religion than was the case among the Sunnīs. In fact, even in the Sunnī world the religious ambience of the orders of guilds (*aṣnāf*) and those of chivalry (*futūwāt*) have resembled that of Shiism, since these organizations have been linked to the Ṣūfī orders, most of which trace their chains of transmission (*silsilahs*) back to 'Alī. (Even in Shiism, however, where these organizations have been linked to the formal and exoteric dimension of the religion, there have been important Ṣūfī orders such as the Khāksār which have

linked the guilds and the chivalric associations to the general religious framework.)

Religious Practices. The Twelvers share with the Sunnīs the belief in the performance of the obligatory rites of canonical prayer (*ṣalāt* or *namāz*), fasting (*ṣawm*), and pilgrimage (*ḥajj*), although in each case there are small differences with the four schools of Sunnī law. In the case of the prayers, for example, the postures, numbers, and times are the same, but the Twelvers add two formulas to the call to prayers (*adhān*) and usually group together the noon and afternoon prayers, as well as the evening and night prayers, rather than waiting for an hour or two between them. Again, the fast is usually begun a few minutes earlier and terminated a few minutes later than in Sunnī practice, and there are likewise minor differences in the *ḥajj* ceremonies, the most important of which is an extra circumambulation of the Ka'bah performed by the Shī'ah.

Special rites. What is more distinctive of Twelver religious practices, however, is the performance of certain rites in addition to the obligatory ones. In the case of prayer, the Twelvers invoke many long litanies and chant many prayers derived totally from the sayings of the imams, a practice that occurs in the Sunnī world only in the climate of Sufism. Among the most famous of these prayers are the *Du'ā'* (Supplication) of Kumayl and the *Du'ā'* of Ṣabāḥ by 'Alī, the *Scroll of Sajjād* by Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn, and the *Jawshan-i kabīr* (Great Armor), attributed to the Prophet and usually recited during the nights of Ramaḍān. There are also numerous other prayers by the imams that are recorded in al-Kulaynī's *Uṣul al-kāfī* and Majlisī's *Biḥār al-anwār* and form part of Twelver devotional life; these range from the most contemplative and metaphysical statements on the doctrine of the divine nature to intimate yearnings of the soul for the love of God. Twentieth-century compilations such as the *Mafātīḥ al-jinān* of 'Abbās Qummī assemble prayers which, woven around the cardinal rites of canonical prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, punctuate the whole calendar of the life of the Twelver community.

Pilgrimages. The tombs of all the imams are considered extensions of the supreme centers of Mecca and Medina, and thus, pilgrimage to these sites, not to speak of the authentic *imām-zādahs*, or tombs of the imams' descendants, are strongly encouraged by the jurists and the official religious hierarchy and play a very important role in Shī'ī religious life. The most important of these holy places are Najaf, where 'Alī is buried (although Mazār-i Sharīf in Afghanistan is claimed by some to be his tomb); Karbala, where Imam Ḥusayn and his family are interred; Kāzīmāyān, the tombs of the fifth and ninth imams; Mashhad, the mausoleum of

Imam 'Alī al-Riḏā; and Samarra, where the tenth and eleventh imams are buried and where the twelfth imam went into occultation.

Some of these major sites, such as Mashhad, feature distinguished monuments of Islamic art; others, including Najaf and Qom, have become important university centers over the centuries, and pilgrimages there have also involved the dissemination of religious knowledge through both oral transmission and written works.

In addition to the major sites, other important Shī'ī pilgrimage centers include the tomb of Sayyidah Zaynab, the sister of Imam Ḥusayn, outside of Damascus (she is also honored with a *maqām*, or "station," in Cairo), and that of Ḥazrat-i Ma'šūmah, the sister of the eighth imam, in Qom. A unique pilgrimage site sacred to both Shī'ī and Sunnī Muslims is the Ra's al-Ḥusayn in Cairo, where the head of Imam Ḥusayn lies buried; the mausoleum remains to this day a spiritual pole of the city of Cairo.

Popular practices. Among the many popular Shī'ī observances, the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn at Karbala on the tenth day of the month of Muḥarram marks the peak of the religious calendar in terms of emotional intensity and commitment. Outside of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, there is no more impressive religious ceremony in the Islamic world than the vast 'Āshūrā' processions in Persia and the Indian subcontinent. From the fifteenth century on, there developed the practice of *rawḏah-khvānī*, the chanting of the story of Karbala, and soon after, the *ta'ziyah*, or passion play in which the same tragedy is acted out. [See 'Āshūrā'; Rawḏah-Khvānī; and Ta'ziyah.] There are many other Shī'ī observances, ranging from such religiously acceptable acts as sacrificing animals to ward off evil, paying a sum of money (*ṣadaqah*) to the poor for the same reason, or serving a religious meal (*suf-rah*), the remains of which are given to the poor, to different forms of magic and popularized occult sciences which are given a religious garb and have become part of popular religious tradition despite official religious opposition to them.

[See also Domestic Observances, *article on* Muslim Practices; Folk Religion, *article on* Folk Islam; and Worship and Cultic Life, *article on* Muslim Worship, as well as the *biographies of the principal scholars and other figures mentioned herein.*]

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SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR

SHIM'ON BAR YOḤ'AI (second century CE), Palestinian tanna, rabbinic leader, mystic, and ascetic. Shim'on was one of the two most prominent students of 'Aqiva' ben Yosef (the other was Me'ir); he was the student who provoked the deposition of Gamli'el from the position of *nasi'* of Israel (cf. B.T., *Ber.* 28a). Shim'on was one of the five rabbis ordained by Yehudah ben Bava' during the Hadrianic persecutions that followed the Bar Kokhba Revolt. After the Sanhedrin was reestablished in the Galilean city of Usha, Shim'on taught in nearby Tiberias and Meron. According to several leg-

ends, he was responsible for locating many lost tombs and removing these sources of ritual uncleanness from Tiberias, thereby restoring its prominence in the region.

Shim'on is the subject of many rabbinic legends. The best known of these recounts how he and his son hid in a cave after he was sentenced to death by the Romans; according to some versions, when he emerged from the cave after twelve years and saw people who were engaged in farming rather than in the study of Torah, he set their fields afire by only a glance in their direction (B.T., *Shab.* 33b). As a punishment Shim'on and his son were sent back to the cave by God for another year. Shim'on demonstrated magical powers in other stories as well: he filled a valley with gold coins (J.T., *Ber.* 9.2, 13d) and exorcised a demon from the daughter of the Roman emperor (B.T., *Me'il.* 17b).

Shim'on is one of the most frequently mentioned authorities in the Mishnah, where he is referred to without patronymic; his rulings cover most of the major topics taken up in rabbinic sources. One of the more famous sayings attributed to him declares that if the Jews properly observed two consecutive Sabbaths, they would be redeemed immediately (B.T., *Shab.* 118b). There is no systematic critical study of his traditions. Jacob Epstein believes that the corpus of his traditions was one of the primary documents used in the redaction of the Mishnah.

The Talmud considers Shim'on to be the paradigm of the scholar who is totally immersed in the study of the Torah. A rabbi of his caliber was not required to interrupt his study even for the important daily recitation of the Shema' (J.T., *Ber.* 1.2, 3b). Concerning the study of Torah, he said: "If I had been at Mount Sinai at the time the Torah was given to Israel, I would have asked God to endow man with two mouths, one to talk of the Torah and one to attend to his other needs. . . . But the world can barely withstand the slander of [persons with] one [mouth]. It would be all the worse if [each individual] had two" (J.T., *Ber.* 1.2, 3b). Shim'on himself believed that he was the holiest person ever to have lived: if one individual were to merit entering heaven, he said, it would be Shim'on (J.T., *Ber.* 9.2, 13d).

Shim'on is assigned authorship of several Midrashic compilations: the *Sifrei* on Numbers and Deuteronomy (B.T., *San.* 86a) and the *Mekhilta' de-Rabbi Shim'on bar Yoh'ai*, a midrash on the Book of Exodus. Several short apocalyptic mystical compilations are also linked with his name. Medieval mystics credited him with the authorship of the *Zohar*, one of the most important texts of the Qabbalah (an attribution still considered valid by many contemporary mystics despite evidence to the contrary). [See *Zohar*.]

The holiday of Lag ba'Omer, on the eighteenth of

Iyyar, is thought to be the anniversary of his death; it is celebrated at his traditional place of burial in Meron.

[See also Tannaim.]

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Jacob N. Epstein's *Mavo' le-sifrut ha-tanna'im* (Jerusalem, 1957) discusses the place of Shim'on's traditions in the development of the Mishnah. In *Rabbi Shim'on ben Yoh'ai* (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1966) Israel Konovitz collects all the references to Shim'on in rabbinic literature.

TZVEE ZAHAVY

SHIM'ON BEN GAMLI'EL II (second century CE), Palestinian tanna. He held the hereditary office of *nasi'*, or president, of the Sanhedrin. It is said that he studied Greek and that he supported a policy of peace with Rome.

According to a Talmudic source, two of his rabbinic colleagues—Me'ir, the *hakham* of the Sanhedrin, and Natan, its *av beit din*—sought to oust Shim'on from his position as *nasi'* during a power struggle within the ranks of rabbinic leadership. In the Talmudic account, the two masters became angry when Shim'on decreed that the students in the academy at Usha should not stand in their honor when they entered. Me'ir and Natan then conspired to test Shim'on on an obscure tractate of the law in order to bring him to disgrace. Shim'on was coached by one of his supporters, passed the test, and banished Me'ir and Natan from the academy. Nonetheless, they continued to send the scholars advice about problems in the interpretation of the law and they were eventually readmitted (B.T., *Hor.* 13b).

On the basis of a reference in this story to a ceremonial sash worn by Natan, Jacob Neusner (1969) suggests that Natan was the head of the Jewish community in Babylonia, son of an official in the Parthian government, and that he had come to Palestine to advance the influence of the Parthians in preparation for their struggle against Roman authority. Shim'on's sympathy to Roman interests, Neusner says, may have made him the primary target of a conspiracy by Natan. It is equally plausible, however, that the events were part of a struggle within the Palestinian community as Shim'on tried to restore authority to the office of *nasi'* after some of its powers were usurped by the scholars.

Many legal rulings in Shim'on's name appear throughout the major rabbinic compilations, and his views are almost always decisive: the Talmud declares that the law follows Shim'on ben Gamli'el in all but three instances (B.T., *Ket.* 77a). His statement that not all who wish to recite God's name in the prayers may do so (*Ber.*

4.8) is an example of his restrictive views regarding the use of divine names for liturgical purposes. Shim'on sometimes cites precedents for religious prescriptions and rulings; for example, he refers to several customs for fellowship meals in Jerusalem (Tosefta, *Ber.* 4.9). He also serves as a transmitter of teachings by his contemporaries Yehudah, Me'ir, and Yose.

[See also Tannaim.]

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No full critical analysis of the corpus of Shim'on's tradition has been undertaken. In volume 3 of *Tannaitic Symposia* (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 159–228, Israel Konovitz collects all the references to Shim'on in rabbinic literature. Jacob Neusner's *A History of the Jews in Babylonia*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1969), pp. 79–85, proposes a historical approach to the analysis of one major tradition.

TZVEE ZAHAVY

SHIM'ON BEN LAQISH, third-century amora, generally known in the Jerusalem Talmud by his full name and in the Babylonian Talmud by the acronymic form ReSH (Rabbi Shim'on) Laqish. Although Shim'on may have had some early training in rabbinic learning (see J.T., *Kil.* 9.4, 32b), he eventually became a circus gladiator, perhaps out of financial distress (see J.T., *Git.* 4.9, 46a–b; *Ter.* 8.5, 45d). Later, a chance encounter with Yoḥanan (bar Nappaha') led him to marry that sage's sister and enter the world of the rabbinate. He settled in Tiberias, the site of Yoḥanan's academy, and there became his colleague and close companion. The Talmud refers to them as the "two great[est] men of the world," that is, of their time (J.T., *Ber.* 8.6, 12c; and see B.T., *Ket.* 54b). [See the biography of Yoḥanan bar Nappaha'.]

As a scholar Shim'on was noted for the encyclopedic breadth of his learning, his faithful loyalty to received tradition, and his dialectical acuity (J.T., *Git.* 3.1, 44d; B.T., *San.* 24a). In his teaching he emphasized the importance of regular study of Torah (J.T., *Ber.* 9.5, 14d) and was reputed to review each day's lesson forty times in advance of presenting it before his teacher (B.T., *Ta'an.* 8a). Shim'on defended the honor and privileges of the learned elite against patriarchal pressures for a more monarchical structure in rabbinic leadership (J.T., *San.* 2.1, 19d–20a; *Gn. Rab.* 78.12). While he condemned the Romans as more cruel than all previous oppressors combined (*Lv. Rab.* 13.5), he also praised them for enforcing justice in the land (*Gn. Rab.* 9.13; to be sure, he also spoke in defense of flattery, B.T., *Soṭ.* 41b). He was noted for his custom of avoiding anyone whose personal

honesty was subject to question and, perhaps as a result of his earlier career, he was noted for his personal bravery.

Some of Shim'on's aggadic opinions are interesting for their counter-traditional stand. For example, he is said to have claimed that the Jews borrowed the names of the angels from the Babylonians during their enforced stay in that land and that the events described in the *Book of Job* never took place (J.T., *Soṭ.* 5.6, 20d).

Shim'on is said to have died of grief after his dear friend Yoḥanan made mocking reference to his martial skill during a halakhic argument (B.T., *B.M.* 84a). Yoḥanan himself, it is said, thereupon wasted away of remorse.

[See also Amoraim.]

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ROBERT GOLDENBERG

SHINGONSHŪ. The Shingonshū is a school of Japanese Buddhism established in the Heian period (794–1185) by the monk Kūkai (Kōbō Daishi, 774–835), who took as the model for his teachings the form of Tantric Buddhism, Chen-yen, that was transmitted to him during his stay in T'ang China between the years 804 and 806. The term *shingon* is the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese term *chen-yen*, meaning "true word," which is itself a translation of the Sanskrit word *mantra*. The translation of *mantra* as *chen-yen* or *shingon* points to the notion that the Buddhist concept of truth (i.e., "emptiness" as ultimate reality) is contained in an incantational syllable. The teachings of this school are also referred to as Shingon Mikkyō (Shingon Esoteric, or "secret," teachings), underscoring the distinction between Esotericism and other forms of Buddhism, collectively referred to as Kengyō ("revealed, or exoteric, teachings"). Whereas Kengyō refers to the teachings revealed by Śākyamuni Buddha, the historic, manifest Buddha, Mikkyō refers to the teachings and enlightenment of Buddha Mahāvairocana, the cosmic Buddha and personification of truth.

During the Heian period, Esoteric rituals and practices were much favored by the imperial court and aristocracy. Although the other major Buddhist school to emerge in the Heian—Tendaishū, founded by Saichō—

incorporated Esotericism into its curriculum, which was focused primarily on the *Lotus Sutra*, Shingonshū was the first Japanese school of Buddhism to base its doctrines and practices solely on Esoteric texts. During his travels in China Kūkai studied with the Chen-yen master Hui-kuo, who initiated Kūkai into several Esoteric rituals as yet unknown in Japan and ordained him as a master of Esoteric Buddhism. Kūkai brought back to Japan a detailed understanding of Esoteric doctrine that was aided by his knowledge of Sanskrit, the two *maṇḍalas* that were to form the centerpiece of Shingon iconography, and the two *sūtras* that form the basis of Shingon doctrine.

Texts and Transmission. Shingon teachings are derived from two Tantric Buddhist scriptures, the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* and the *Sarvataihāgatattvasaṃgraha Sūtra*. Assumed to have been composed in Northwest India in the early seventh century, the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* was discovered by Wu-hsing, transmitted to China by one of his disciples, and translated into Chinese (T.D. no. 848) in seven fascicles (*chüan*) by Śubhākarasiṃha (637–735) and his disciple I-hsing (683–727). The original form of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* is said to have been composed in South India in the early eighth century and was organized into one hundred thousand verses consisting of the sermons purportedly delivered by the Buddha at eighteen assemblies. Three versions of this *sūtra* are preserved in the Chinese Buddhist canon: selections translated by Vajrabodhi (671–741) in four fascicles (T.D. no. 866), selections translated by Amoghavajra (705–774) in three fascicles (T.D. no. 865), and the complete translation by Shih-hu (late tenth century) in thirty fascicles, (T.D. no. 882). [See the *biographies of Śubhakarasiṃha, Vajrabodhi, and Amoghavajra.*]

According to traditional Chinese scholarship, Śubhākarasiṃha transmitted the northern Indian Tantric tradition represented by the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* and Vajrabodhi transmitted the southern tradition represented by the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. The two masters are said to have synthesized the traditions when they met in the T'ang-dynasty capital, Ch'ang-an. According to Shingon tradition, this syncretic doctrine formulated in Ch'ang-an was transmitted to Japan by Kūkai, who had studied the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* with Hui-kuo, a second-generation disciple of Śubhākarasiṃha, and the *Tattvasaṃgraha Sūtra* with Amoghavajra. Such traditional accounts, however, need to be examined critically. First, the orthodox schools of Chinese and Japanese Esotericism incorporated a selected number of Tantric texts available in the Indian tradition. Second, the assertion that the two main *sūtras* used by the Chinese and Japanese schools represent northern and southern tradi-

tions is historically questionable—parts of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, for example, are preserved by schools in Nepal, which is in the north. It might be more accurate to say that the texts transmitted to China represented only two of a variety of Indian Tantric Buddhist traditions that had spread to numerous locales throughout India. Finally, in light of the political climate of Heian Japan and the evolution of Japanese Buddhism, it is perhaps overly simplistic to view Shingon as a tradition whose teachings relied solely on the synthesis of two *sūtras*. Tendai and Shingon, the main sects of Heian Buddhism, emerged as a reaction to the scholasticism, elitism, and corruption of Buddhist sects of the Nara period (710–784). This is evident in Kūkai's major works, including his *Jūjūshinron* (The Ten Stages of Development of the Human Consciousness; T.D. no. 2425) and his *Hizōhōyaku* (The Jewel Key of the Secret Store; T.D. no. 2426), in which he ranks the schools of the Nara period below Shingon. The Nara sects offered salvation only to a very few spiritually perfected beings after aeons of rebirths and vigorous practice, whereas Shingon offers the Buddhayāna, a vehicle designed to elicit the realization, in this world and in this lifetime, that the nature of Mahāvairocana, the cosmic Buddha, is inherent in all beings. It should also be noted that Kūkai's interpretation of the two Esoteric *sūtras* grew out of his knowledge of such texts as the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (Treatise on the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith; T.D. nos. 1666, 1667) and the *Bodhicitta Śāstra* (T.D. no. 1665).

Doctrine. Kūkai's notion of enlightenment as a universal property inherent in and potentially attainable by all beings is predicated on the nature and function of the Buddha as described by the so-called triple-body theory. Kūkai's use of this theory, which is thought to have been developed in fifth-century India, owes much to Kegon (Chin., Hua-yen) cosmology, which maintains that a mutual relation and interdependence exists between phenomena and emptiness, matter and consciousness, enlightenment and suffering, man and Buddha. In other words, distinctions and dichotomies are erased in the understanding that all phenomena penetrate and influence all other phenomena. [See Hua-yen.] For Kūkai, however, the ultimate realization of truth is an experiential, practical awakening that cannot be arrived at through discursive thought or philosophical deduction.

Triple-body theory. According to the triple-body theory, the *dharmakāya* ("body of *dharmā*") is truth *per se*. It is the cosmic Buddha, Mahāvairocana ("great light"; Jpn., Dainichi, "great sun"), the central deity of the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*. The *nirmāṇakāya* is the form or his-

torical body into which truth is transformed—as for example, the “manifest” Buddha, Śākyamuni—in order that all suffering beings be aided. Between these two “bodies” is the *saṃbhogakāya* (“body of bliss,” or “reward body”), generated as a result of having perfected *bodhisattva* practice. Just as a mathematical symbol is the means to realizing a mathematical truth but is not that truth *per se*, *saṃbhogakāya* is actually the means through which man realizes truth. While Shingon claims that Mahāvairocana is *dharmakāya*, his attributes, represented by a host of Buddhist and non-Buddhist deities, are either *saṃbhogakāya* or *nirmāṇakāya*. Orthodox Shingon, however, holds that the nature of Mahāvairocana is inherent in both *saṃbhogakāya* and *nirmāṇakāya*. Not only does Shingon conceive of truth *per se* as inherent in its attributes but, further, it makes no essential distinction between the two. [See also Celestial Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.]

Integration of man and Buddha. While the basis of Shingon theory is the supposition that the nature of Mahāvairocana is inherent in all men, the goal of Shingon practice is to realize one’s integration with Mahāvairocana. Such integration is referred to as “perfection of Buddhahood in the body, just as it is” (*sokushin jōbutsu*). Since man is thought to be a microcosm of Mahāvairocana, integration claims not only the identity of the human consciousness with the cosmic consciousness but also the identity of the human *body* with the cosmic body. The term *integration* implies that inherent in man is the seed of Mahāvairocana (i.e., *bodhicitta*, “the seed of enlightenment”). According to the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, a Mādhyamika-oriented text, “*bodhicitta* is the cause, compassion (*karuṇā*) is the root, and skill-in-means (*upāya*) the ultimate [i.e., the outcome].” While exoteric schools of Buddhism interpret this as indicating a progression through time along the *bodhisattva* path, Esoteric schools view the three components as a whole in which each factor embraces the other two. Thus, in Shingon thought the seed of enlightenment is the cause of enlightenment, which is nurtured by the practice of compassion and aided by the employment of skill-in-means to enlighten others. [See also Prajñā, *Karuṇā*, and *Upāya*.] In other words, although *bodhicitta* is generally referred to as the causal aspect of enlightenment, indicating a state of awakening, Shingon holds that the state of awakening is in itself the resultant aspect, or the unveiling of one’s inherent Buddha nature. The terms *bodhicitta* and *Buddha nature* are, here, synonymous. However, while Shingon argues that the concepts of Buddhahood and integration preclude the notion of “becoming,” it holds that the realization of integration is experiential and empirically verifiable, requiring a prescribed form of practice. Therefore, the

theory described in the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* represents the ideal, and the practices prescribed by the *Tattvasaṃgraha Sūtra* represent the real. Furthermore, although Shingon recognizes such existential dichotomies as enlightenment and nonenlightenment, purity and impurity, good and evil, and so forth, rather than negating them it posits a universal truth—*Dharmakāya* Mahāvairocana—that encompasses all such paradoxes. In order that the practitioner resolve the tensions created by these paradoxes and actualize complete integration within his body, Shingon upholds an experiential approach based on practice and discipline.

What distinguishes the Shingon notion of inherent enlightenment from that of other Mahāyāna schools is that, in Shingon, Mahāvairocana is conceived of as *dharmakāya*, which is identified as the creator. In his *Hizōhōyaku* Kūkai says:

The Great Space [emptiness], boundless and silent,
encompasses ten thousand [phenomena] in
its vital forces;

The Great Sea [emptiness], deep and still, embraces ten
thousand elements in its single drop;

The all-embracing Mahāvairocana [the personification of
emptiness] is the mother of all things.

Kūkai’s concept of truth is dynamic; it has the power both to encompass and create all things and to communicate truth by creating, nurturing, and regulating all phenomena. This power, which the *Mahāyānasamgraha* refers to as the “inevitable consequence” (*niṣyanda*) of the Dharma, inevitably flows out of truth for it is power personified as truth.

Interdependence of emptiness and phenomena. Since Shingon personifies emptiness as the creator, its conception of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) as truth differs somewhat from that of Nāgārjuna, who refuted the errors of discursive thought and employed a negative dialectic to reveal truth. [See Śūnyam and Śūnyatā.] Shingon endorses the notion of inherent enlightenment expounded in the *Awakening of Faith*. Presupposing an identity between the nature of ultimate reality (i.e., the known) and the nature of human consciousness (i.e., the knower), this text calls for the reduction of the world of ultimate reality into the realm of human consciousness. This consciousness, wherein the knower reflects the known, is referred to as *tathāgata-garbha* (“repository of the Tathāgata”). The term *tathāgata*, an epithet for the Buddha, is composed of the words *tathā* and either *gata* or *āgata* (both etymologies have their defenders). The former compound, meaning “thus gone,” refers to one who has “gone” to the realm of enlightenment. The latter, meaning “thus come,” indicates one who has “come” to the realm of empirical reality to ease its

problems by implementing the insight of enlightenment. *Tathāgata* is a synergistic term implying the interdependent arising of two factors. It may be understood as a twofold thrust—an internal thrust toward enlightenment and an external thrust toward empirical reality. Each thrust is contingent on the other so that while wisdom must be cultivated internally in order to confront the problem of empirical reality, at the same time, practice must be engaged in externally in order that wisdom may be cultivated. [See *Tathāgata and Tathāgata-garbha*.]

The term *tathatā* (“thusness”), the etymological root of *tathāgata*, is used as the antithesis to such concepts as “this” and “that” established by discursive thought. *Tathatā* indicates the interrelatedness of emptiness and phenomena, “thus gone” and “thus come,” or, in the words of the *Awakening of Faith*, the inseparability of water and waves. Thus, *tathatā* underscores the flux of ultimate reality, that is, the perceptible aspects of emptiness. There can, of course, be no flux if the elements of existence (*dharmā*) are absolute and unchanging. [See *Tathatā*.]

Six elements and the Gorinhōtō. *Tathatā*, as identified with the cosmos in its totality, is analyzed by Shingon in terms of six elements (*rokudai*)—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. In its iconography Shingon represents *tathatā* as a five-level stupa. (See figure 1.) Here, earth symbolizes truth as the source of creation; water symbolizes truth as it flows to all corners of the world without discrimination; fire symbolizes truth as it destroys the errors of discursive thought; wind symbolizes truth as liberation from the bounds of discursive thought; and space symbolizes truth as all-encompassing. The first five elements of the stupa are collectively identified as “the known.” The sixth element represents consciousness and is identified as “the knower,” upon which the known is reflected. Thus, the ultimate inseparability of knower and known, matter and consciousness is revealed.

The Two Maṇḍalas. Among the teachings Hui-kuo transmitted to Kūkai were two *maṇḍalas* depicting, through the iconographic presentation of a variety of deities, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, the central message of Shingon thought. The Garbhakośadhātu, or “Womb,” Maṇḍala (Jpn., Taizōkai) depicts the ideal and the integration with the known as described in the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*. The Vajradhātu, or “Diamond,” Maṇḍala (Jpn., Kongōkai) represents the real as prescribed by the practices in the *Tattvasaṃgraha Sūtra*. Together, these *maṇḍalas* depict the integration of knower and known, the Garbhakośadhātu symbolizing the realm of the known, the Vajradhātu, the realm of the knower.




FIGURE 1. *Gorinhōtō*

Garbhakośadhātu Maṇḍala. The realm of the known as seen in the Garbhakośadhātu—the term *garbhakośa* means the repository, or “embryo,” of truth—represents the cosmos as the embodiment and transformation of the truth and compassion of Mahāvairocana. It is also an iconographic rendering of the *bodhicitta* (seed of enlightenment) in all beings. The twelve halls arranged into three courts in the *maṇḍala* embody the threefold theme of *bodhicitta*, compassion, and skill-in-means. (See figure 2.) The central court (halls 1–5 in the diagram), where Mahāvairocana is depicted with four Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, symbolizes *bodhicitta*, which is identified as *dharmakāya*. The intermediate court (halls 6–11), depicting various *bodhisattvas* such as Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuśrī, symbolizes compassion, which is identified as *saṃbhogakāya*. The outer




FIGURE 2. *The Twelve Halls of the Garbhakośadhātu*

court (the twelfth hall) symbolizes skill-in-means, which is identified as *nirmāṇakāya*, and is represented by a variety of deities. Just as the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* presupposes inherent enlightenment and articulates an experiential approach to the realization of such enlightenment, its *maṇḍala*, the Garbhakośadhātu, depicts the blooming of *bodhicitta* as it informs all activities. Thus ultimate wisdom resides not in the noetic apprehension of truth but, rather, in the employment of skill-in-means to enable wisdom-based compassion to pervade the world.

Vajradhātu Maṇḍala. The realm of the knower as depicted in the Vajradhātu Maṇḍala—*vajra* refers here to the seeker of truth—is based on Yogācāra notions of consciousness and is represented by nine halls, one for each level of consciousness or agent of cognition. Yogācāra posits eight levels of consciousness: the five sense consciousnesses—visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile; the conceptualizing agent (*mano-vijñāna*), or that which collates what the sense agents transmit; the evaluating agent (*manas*), or the agent that discriminates, measures, and evaluates what is conceptualized; and the karmic repository (*ālaya*). According to Yogācāra thought, the correlation between *ālaya* and *manas* is cyclic, each influencing and shaping the quality of the other. For example, a seed of violence deposited in the karmic repository shapes the manner in which *manas* evaluates the world—in this case, a violent world. In turn, the manner in which *manas* evaluates the world shapes the quality of the karmic repository by depositing within it the seed of violence. The goal of Yogācāra teachings is to transform “unwholesome” seeds into “wholesome” seeds in order to break this vicious cycle, allowing the individual to experience a complete revolution of the mind (*āśraya parāvṛtti*) and to see the world from an entirely different perspective. [See Yogācāra and Ālaya-vijñāna.] Each of the nine halls in the Vajradhātu Maṇḍala represents one of Yogācāra’s eight cognitive agents plus a ninth, the all-encompassing Mahāvairocana. (See figure 3.) While these halls symbolize the stages of realizing ultimate wisdom, they are not conceived of in a fixed linear progression. Rather, the arrangement of the halls represents the metaphor of the twofold thrust spoken of earlier. The external thrust from the first hall, where Mahāvairocana sits, to the ninth hall represents the path from enlightenment to nonenlightenment. Progression in the opposite direction, that is, from the ninth hall to the first, is the internal thrust from nonenlightenment to enlightenment. Again, the practice enabling one to cope with the problems of the empirical world (i.e., the external thrust) is at the same time the means to cultivate wisdom (i.e., the internal thrust). Since here

5	6	7
4	1	8
3	2	9

FIGURE 3. *The Nine Halls of the Vajradhātu*

wisdom means insight into Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana, whose nature is *bodhicitta*, compassion, and skill-in-means, it also implies the application of compassion and skill-in-means toward the solution of problems in the empirical world. [See also Maṇḍalas, article on Buddhist Maṇḍalas.]

Practice. While the Garbhakośadhātu Maṇḍala is a map of the realm of truth, the known, and the ideal, and the Vajradhātu Maṇḍala is a map of the realm of practice, the knower, and the real, the integration of these two realms, that is, of knower and known, is Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana, of which man is thought to be a microcosm. Given that Shingon posits an experiential approach, empirically verifiable, to the realization of enlightenment, it proposes a set form of practice and discipline that is to be accompanied by the use of these two *maṇḍalas* simply as visual aids. Shingon practice is divided into two paths: *adhiṣṭhāna* (Jpn., *kaji*), that is, the path leading to the realization of the known, and the *bodhisattva* practice, or the path leading to the implementation of that which has been realized.

Adhiṣṭhāna and the Three Mysteries. Although the term *adhiṣṭhāna* commonly refers to the means or instrument for acquiring supernormal powers, in Shingon thought it refers to the practitioner’s faith. In order to realize integration and enlightenment, the practitioner must have faith in the efficacy of the *sanmitsu* (“three mysteries”) as the practice for attaining Buddhahood. *Sanmitsu* practices include *mudrā* (sitting positions) for the body, *mantra* (symbolic syllables or phrases expressed verbally) for the speech, and *yoga* (concentration or meditation) for the mind. [See also Mantra; Mudrā; and Meditation, article on Buddhist Meditation.] The practice of the Three Mysteries enables the devotee to realize complete integration with the body, speech, and mind of Mahāvairocana, or, in the words of the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, to perfect Buddhahood in this very body. When one’s faith in the Three Mysteries has led to the realization of physical, vocal, and mental in-

tegration with Mahāvairocana, *adhiṣṭhāna* becomes the instrument enabling one to acquire supernormal powers. Still, as illustrated in the Vajradhātu Maṇḍala, these practices constitute only one part—the internal thrust—of the compete integration of knower and known and must be cultivated through *bodhisattva* practices.

Bodhisattva practices. Originally described in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (The Perfection of Wisdom Sutra), *bodhisattva* practices represent the mainstream of Mahāyāna Buddhist discipline. They consist of charity (*dāna*) and the use of skill-in-means to enlighten all sentient beings, morality (*śīla*) to restrain the ego, patience (*kṣānti*) so that one does not succumb to obstacles, effort (*vīrya*) so that one is not idle, meditation (*dhyāna*), and wisdom (*prajñā*). [See Pāramitās.] Collectively, the first four practices represent the external thrust toward the empirical world, wisdom represents the internal thrust toward enlightenment, and meditation is the discipline that integrates these two movements. *Bodhisattva* practices provide empirical and experiential verification of the integration of man and Buddha, for it is only in practice that such integration can be validated. Essentially integration implies that the practitioner is aware of Mahāvairocana as an integral entity of the human personality. In other words, integration is the realization of *bodhicitta*, compassion, and skill-in-means (i.e., the attributes exemplified by Mahāvairocana) within oneself. *Bodhisattva* practices thereby deify the human personality. In Shingon thought the term *deify* is used in the sense of honoring all forms of life, both animate and inanimate, as Mahāvairocana, the cosmic Buddha and the universe itself. [See also *Bodhisattva Path*.]

Legacy of Shingon. Today, Shingon stands as the sole Esoteric school to keep the tradition of Mahāvairocana alive. Although the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* originated in India and there are extant Chinese and Tibetan translations, its teachings and practices have fallen into disuse in those countries. Because of its cosmopolitan origins, Shingon willingly accepted the religious ideas and practices formulated outside the framework of Buddhism. Since Shingon identified Mahāvairocana as both the cosmos itself and the creator of all things, it easily incorporated native Japanese deities (*kami*) and religious practices within the context of the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*. Kūkai's ecumenical approach and willingness to compromise with and encompass Shintō and Confucianism allowed Shingon to enjoy great imperial patronage during the Heian. However, after Kūkai's death, the lack of a charismatic leader and the success of Tendai Esotericism (Taimitsu) caused Shingon's popularity to decline. Still, Kūkai stands as one of the

towering figures not only of Shingon but of Japanese religious history. His theory of cosmology with Mahāvairocana at the center, his development of a practice that satisfied both spiritual and intellectual aspirations, and his emphasis on universal enlightenment and man's inherent integration with Buddhahood, were all echoed in the thought of the schools of Buddhism that emerged in the Kamakura period. Kūkai's deference to and respect for Shintō gods is identified as the origin of the synthesis of Buddhism and Shintō of later periods, and his use of iconography, particularly the two *maṇḍalas*, played a significant role in the development of a syncretic aesthetic that characterises much of Japan's literary and artistic tradition.

[See also Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Esoteric Buddhism*; Soteriology, *article on Buddhist Soteriology*; Nirvāṇa; and Mahāvairocana. For the Chinese antecedents of Shingon, see Chen-yen. See also the biography of Kūkai.]

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MINORU KIYOTA

SHINKŌ-SHŪKYŌ. See *New Religions*, article on *New Religions in Japan*.

SHINRAN (1173–1262), the founder of the Jōdo Shinshū, or True Pure Land school, of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Born in Japan during a period of social turmoil and religious change, Shinran became a Tendai monk at age nine and followed that discipline on Mount Hiei. At age twenty-nine, moved by a deep spiritual disquiet, he meditated for one hundred days in the Rokkakudō Temple in Kyoto, where he had a vision that led him to become a disciple of the Pure Land teacher Hōnen in 1201. He later received Hōnen's permission to copy his central work, the *Senchaku hongan nembutsu shū* (Treatise on the Nembutsu of the Select Primal Vow), and to make a portrait of the master. Because of strong criticism voiced by the monks of Mount Hiei and Kōfukuji in Nara and the indiscretions of certain of his disciples, Hōnen and his leading disciples were exiled. Shinran went to Echigo (now Niigata Prefecture) in 1207 under the criminal name of Fujii Yoshizane.

During the next period of approximately seven years of exile and residence at Kokubu in Echigo, Shinran married Eshin-ni and fathered six children. Shinran is particularly noted for establishing marriage among the clergy and abandoning monastic precepts as a religiously justified act. He was inspired by a dream vision of the *bodhisattva* Kannon (Skt., Avalokiteśvara, Bodhisattva of Compassion), who promised to take the form of a woman to be his helpmate in his mission to spread Pure Land teachings to the masses.

Pardoned in 1211, Shinran left Echigo in 1213 bound for the Kantō. There, he gradually created a sizable community by establishing small *dōjō* (meeting places) in followers' homes throughout the region. Upon his return to Kyoto in 1235 or 1236, Shinran engaged in correspondence with his disciples, answering questions on doctrine and giving advice about various issues raised by the nascent community. Among his literary efforts,

he completed and revised the *Kyōgyōshinshō*, wrote various commentarial texts such as the *Yuishinshō-mon'i* and *Ichinentannenmon'i*, and composed collections of *wasan* (hymns) expressing basic themes of his teaching or praising the texts and masters of the Pure Land tradition. For the most part, Shinran wrote in the language of the common people.

Variant interpretations of Shinran's teachings inevitably led to conflicts among his followers. These issues were a persistent theme of Shinran's later letters, and continued to plague the community after he died. However, in Shinran's last years, Zenran, his eldest son, created conflict and misunderstanding among the disciples by claiming to have received a special teaching and authority from Shinran. After Shinran dispelled these misunderstandings by disowning his son, peace returned to the community. Shinran expressed some of his deepest insights in his final letters and writings. Among these are his assertion that believers are "equal to the Tathāgata" and his expression of faith in the absolute "other power" (*tariki*) of Amida (Skt., Amitābha) Buddha. In 1262 Shinran died peacefully at the home of a brother.

Shinran's spiritual disillusionment with monastic discipline and his experience of faith in Amida Buddha's Primal Vows (*hongan*) under the guidance of Hōnen became the basis and inspiration for the development of the Jōdo Shinshū as a major and distinctive expression of Pure Land teaching in Japanese history. Influenced by *hongaku* ("primordial enlightenment") thought in Tendai philosophy, as well as by contemporary Chinese Pure Land scholarship, Shinran expanded the vision of the meaning of Amida Buddha's compassion stressed in the Pure Land tradition.

Shinran maintains that there are two stages in the salvation process established by the virtue of Amida Buddha. These are *ōsō*, "going to the Pure Land," and *gensō*, "returning." *Ōsō* refers to the elements of religious experience that lead to rebirth in the Pure Land. *Gensō* indicates the altruistic end of salvation whereby we become part of the salvation process guiding all beings to enlightenment. Shinran analyzes the first stage, that of going to the Pure Land, into four dimensions, discussed in the four sections of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*. These are Teaching, Practice, Faith, and Enlightenment.

The section on teaching refers to the *Daimuryōjūkyō* (Larger Pure Land Sūtra), which narrates the story of how, ten *kalpas* ago, the *bodhisattva* Hōzō (Dharmākara) completed five *kalpas* of religious training and became Amida Buddha in the Western Pure Land through the fulfillment of his forty-eight Primal Vows.

The section on practice establishes that the recitation of Amida's name (the Nembutsu, from Chin., *nien-fo*) is

the way provided by the eighteenth vow for the salvation of all beings. Shinran maintained that the Nembutsu is the great practice praised by all Buddhas, for the name itself is the embodiment of Amida's virtue.

The section on faith reveals Shinran's most distinctive understanding of Pure Land teaching. Here he shows that faith is the true and real mind of Amida Buddha expressed in human consciousness. Against the background of the Mahāyāna tradition, he asserts that faith itself is the realization of Buddha nature (*shinbusshō*).

In developing this interpretation, Shinran went beyond the limited conception of Amida portrayed in the *sūtra* myth narrative. He understood Amida as the sole reality of the cosmos, joining Pure Land teachings to the concept of Primordial Enlightenment (Jpn., *hongaku*) of the Tendai philosophy. Amida Buddha was no longer merely one Buddha among others, limited in time to his Enlightenment ten *kalpas* ago. Rather, he is the eternal Buddha (*Jōdo wasan* no. 55). According to the *Jinenhōnishō*, Amida, as the ultimate, formless body of Dharma (Skt., *dharmakāya*), takes form in order to manifest his essential nature, which is beyond all comprehension and definition. Amida Buddha is the symbol for eternal life and light, the compassion and wisdom that makes salvation possible for every human being, no matter how evil and corrupt. The power of his vow is manifest in human history through the name, formulaically expressed in the words "Namu Amida Butsu" ("Hail to Amida Buddha"), which serve as the external cause of salvation.

The Light (*kōmyō*) is the inner condition of salvation experienced as undoubting faith in the name and vow and the simultaneous exclamation of the Nembutsu. Faith is not a human act but ultimately the bestowal of Amida's true and real mind within the human consciousness as the immediate awareness both of one's own spiritual incapacity and of the unflinching embrace of Amida's compassion. In that moment, the assurance of salvation is attained as a deep inner movement of total reliance on the vow. It is for this reason that Shinran emphasized the "power of the other" (*tariki*), that is, the salvific power of Amida, rather than one's own effort (*jiriki*), as essential to salvation. The awareness received in that moment indicates that the disciple has attained the level of the truly assured (*shōjōjū*). All the causes, and therefore also the fruit, of salvation have been perfected. The believer's spiritual status in the life is "equal to the Tathāgata," although his actual enlightenment awaits him in the future as the causal basis for this final attainment has been established through his presently experienced faith in Amida's vow.

According to Shinran, the recitation of the Nembutsu

is not performed as a means to gain rebirth in the Pure Land through one's own merit. Rather, it is a spontaneous outflow of gratitude for the assurance of salvation received. The section designated Enlightenment teaches that the final destiny of beings is birth in the Pure Land, which is identified with *nirvāṇa*. It is also to become a Buddha and, after the manner of the *bodhisattva*, to return to this defiled realm to save all beings.

The community initiated through Shinran's efforts and teaching eventually differentiated into several branches. Among them, the most significant have been the Takada Senjūji and the Honganji, which latter would later divide into East and West branches. At first a relatively minor movement within Japanese Buddhism, Jōdo Shinshū was transformed into a powerful religious and social institution through the eloquence, simplicity, and determination of the eighth patriarch, Rennyo (1415–1499). [See the biography of Rennyo.] Despite internal divisions, it has remained a major popular religious force in Japan.

[See also *Jōdo Shinshū and the biography of Hōnen. The complex of religious beliefs and practices that inform Shinran's thought are discussed in Amitābha; Nien-fo; Pure and Impure Lands; and Mappō.*]

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ALFRED BLOOM

SHINTŌ is the name given to the traditional religion of Japan, a religion that has existed continuously from before the founding of the Japanese nation until the present.

General Characteristics

The ancient Japanese did not themselves have a name for their ethnic religion, but when in the sixth century of the common era Buddhism was officially introduced from the Asian continent, the word *Shintō* ("the way of the *kami*") was used to distinguish the traditional religion from Buddhism (*Butsudō*, "the way of the Buddha"). The first literary usage of the word *Shintō* is found in the *Nihonshoki* (720). However, this word was used at the time to refer to particular rites, *kami* (supernatural forces or gods), or shrines, and it was not until the end of the twelfth century that it gradually came to refer to the way of the *kami* in a sense that included doctrine.

Definition. One representative prewar scholar of Shintō, Kōno Seizō, defined Shintō as the way of the *kami*, the principle of the life of the Japanese people, as inherited from time immemorial. He also held that Shintō is the traditional creed and sentiment of the Japanese people. In 1948 the staff of the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers, then occupying Japan, stated in *Religions in Japan* (a statement of Occupation thinking on religion) that Shintō is "a composite of man's multifarious responses to his natural and human environment," and again, as "a way of life inextricably woven into the texture of Japanese thought and conduct." While agreeing with these definitions, in the ex-

planation that follows I define the word *Shintō* as the traditional indigenous religious practices of the Japanese people as well as their worldview, based on their concept of *kami*. Shintō is a "national religion," practiced for the most part by Japanese (including overseas immigrants), and which, with the exception of several sects, has no founder but instead developed naturally.

Shintō's concept of *kami* is basically polytheistic, and Shintō includes prayer to the *kami*, festivals (*matsuri*), ascetic disciplines, social service, and other elements. In Shintō there are perennial religious characteristics and historically specific assertions or doctrines but no fixed dogmas or sacred scriptures in the strict sense. Shintō has permeated the life of the Japanese people not so much through a firmly established theology or philosophy as through its basic code of values, its behavior pattern, and its way of thinking.

Typology. In modern times, Shintō can be classified into three broad types, all of which are mutually inter-related: Shrine Shintō, Sect Shintō (including postwar new religions), and Folk Shintō.

Shrine Shintō (Jinja Shintō). Shrine Shintō, consisting principally of worship of the *kami* at local shrines (*jinja*), dates from the beginning of Japanese history to the present day and constitutes the main current of Shintō tradition. It has played an important role in the unification and solidarity of the nation and of rural society. While Shrine Shintō has no founder, it possesses an organization based on believers, (parishioners) and others, festivals and other religious practices, doctrines rooted in Shintō traditions and Japanese myth, all centered upon the shrines' spiritual unification. In *Shintō no kiso chishiki to kiso mondai* (1963), Ono Sokyō expounded the cult of Shrine Shintō from a theological standpoint. According to Ono, Shintō is the way of life based on the ancient traditions of the Japanese people; it reverences Amaterasu Ōmikami ("great heavenly illuminating goddess") as the highest deity, celebrates the *tenshin chigi* ("gods of heaven and earth") and ancestors, serves society in a spirit of serving the gods, and prays both for the development of the ancestral country in a spirit of great peace as expressed by the emperor and for the happiness of the peoples of the world.

Sect Shintō (Kyōha Shintō). Also known as Shūha Shintō, Sect Shintō is the term for the Shintō movement centering upon thirteen groups formed during the nineteenth century. The distinguishing feature of Sect Shintō is the fact that each of its sects has founders or organizers, that for the most part their founders or organizers established groups among the common people, and that in addition these sects were developed from an individual's religious experience or upon the basis of

Fukko (“revival”) Shintō. Generally, these groups do not have shrines but instead use churches as their centers of religious activity. Since World War II, schisms have occurred in a considerable number of these groups. Tenrikyō has asserted since the end of the war that it is not Shintō, but for academic reasons it is treated as a Shintō sect in this essay. Furthermore, those Shintō-derived new religions that have appeared successively since 1945 are treated as Shintō sects herein.

Folk Shintō (Minzoku Shintō). Folk Shintō is an aspect of Japanese folk belief that is closely connected to other types of Shintō. Folk belief exists among the common people at the bottom of the social pyramid and has no systematic thought that could be called doctrine or dogma, nor does it feature church organization. Japanese folk belief derives from three sources. The first of these is the survival of ancient traditions such as divination, magical shamanic rituals, folk medicine, and the like. Second are those elements forming the base structure of Shintō: customs of abstinence and purification and the cult of house and field deities. Third are those fragments of foreign religion such as Taoism, Buddhism, and medieval Catholicism, or elements that have combined with these. *Folk Shintō* mainly refers to the second of these three.

The three varieties of Shintō described above are all mutually interrelated. In fact, only rarely do these distinctions figure in the understanding of Shintō devotees themselves. The main difference between Shrine Shintō and Folk Shintō is the scale and the strength or weakness of organization. In many cases their festivals and the intent of their practices are identical, and it is difficult to draw a clear academic distinction between the two. Furthermore, most believers of Sect Shintō are also parishioners (*ujiko*) of Shrine Shintō, as well as practitioners of Folk Shintō.

Historical Outline

Seen from the perspective of intellectual history, Shintō's history is that of interaction and combination with other religions and the periodic reformulation and recovery of its independent cultural identity. From the standpoint of social history, Shintō has been predominantly a religion of the clan, the village, or the nation, a religion of naturally existing (and overlapping) social groupings. However, Shintō later developed aspects of a religion of individual commitment, preserving both types of functions thereafter.

Ancient Shintō. By ancient Shintō is meant Shintō in the period before it came to be influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism, and other foreign religions. It is difficult to give precise dates, but one can say that the ancient period lasted from the seventh to the early eighth

century, while partially overlapping with the next period.

The racial composition of the Japanese people is made up predominantly of Southeast Asian and Mongolian stock, with a mixture of that of neighboring peoples. Japanese myth and cult are inevitably of the same type as those of surrounding ethnic groups. For example, Japan's myth of the “cave of heaven” (*ame no iwato*) closely resembles that found among the Miao of southern China as well as myths existing among peoples on the border of India and Burma. The myth in question tells how a *kami* concealed herself in a cave, plunging the world momentarily into darkness, and is perhaps an attempt to explain the phenomenon of the solar eclipse. Cosmogonic myths of the splitting apart of heaven and earth are found in southern China and Indonesia as well as in Japan. Moreover, folklorists point out that such elements as the belief that gods come to rest on mountains or in trees, the worship of patrilineal ancestors, shamanism, and the architecture of old tombs (called *kofun*) are intimately related to the ancient culture of the Mongolian area and the Korean Peninsula.

The character of Japanese religion in prehistory is unclear. The Yayoi (or West Japan) culture, beginning in northern Kyushu (around 300–200 BCE) is directly linked to modern Japanese culture, but the existence of agricultural rites and shamanism can only be supposed. In ancient Japan many small principalities were formed in various areas. These various principalities were loosely unified into a single nation, predominantly by the ancestors of the present-day imperial household. On the evidence of continental epigraphs, we can surmise that this unification probably took place before the mid-fourth century. However, even taking into consideration these early archaeological findings, it is not until the early eighth century, with the first appearance of Shintō texts, that we can grasp the actual situation of ancient Shintō.

Concepts of deity. In ancient Japanese the word *kami* was used adjectivally to mean something mysterious, supernatural, or sacred. In the classic definition of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), *kami* means “anything whatsoever that is outside the ordinary, that possesses superior power or that is awe-inspiring.” In other words, a *kami* is a being that is capable of inspiring awe in humankind and is mysterious and supernatural. The simple objects of the folk cult, as well as the deities of the imperial house and those revered by the great clans, are all considered *kami*.

According to Muraoka Tsunetsugu and Miyaji Na-oichi, the ancient *kami* may be divided into three categories: (1) natural deities (deities dwelling in natural

objects or natural phenomena, or deities that control these objects or phenomena); (2) anthropomorphic deities (heroes, great personages, and deified ancestors); (3) conceptual deities (deities who serve an ideal or symbolize an abstract power). It is thought that ancient Japanese believed that the souls of their deceased near relatives would become spirits after a period of purification and would merge with the ancestors, thereafter to return to their dwellings in life once a year or so in specified seasons, bestowing happiness and protection. However, the most important *kami* was the *ujigami*, or clan deity, believed to protect the life and social functions of the most basic social unit of the period, the *uji*, or clan. The *ujigami* was not in all cases an ancestral deity but rather a deity intimately related to the clan's mode of subsistence or to its geographical or political situation. Nevertheless, a tendency to conceive of the *ujigami* as an ancestor grew stronger in later years. [See also *Kami*.]

Ritual and ritual sites. Shintō originally had no shrines. Instead its rites were carried out at places regarded as sacred, such as at the foot of a beautiful mountain, beside a pure river or stream, in a mysterious grove, or a place providing the temporary seat of the deity, such as an evergreen tree (*himorogi*) or a rock in its natural setting (*iwakura*).

The participants at such rituals eventually built small, temporary huts to protect themselves and the altar from wind and rain; later they began to leave these standing even after the ritual had ended; these were the origins of later shrine buildings. In accordance with this development, the concept of *kami* also changed from one in which the deity visited humankind whenever ceremonies were held to one in which the *kami* was believed to be perpetually present in the shrine, protecting humankind. The representative prototypes for shrine architecture are the inner sanctuary of the Grand Shrine at Ise (the *shinmei zukuri*) and that of the Izumo Grand Shrine (the *taisha zukuri*). The former was probably patterned upon a grain (rice) storehouse, and the latter was patterned upon ancient dwellings, which later developed into shrine buildings.

Because Japan's primary mode of subsistence until the nineteenth century was agriculture, the main rites of ancient Shintō concerned agriculture. Among these, the spring Prayer for Good Harvest (Kinensai) and the autumn Shintō Thanksgiving (Niinamesai) were especially important. At these rituals the ancients first received the *kami*, provided food and drink, presented music, song, and dance to pacify the deities, prayed for protection, and gave thanks for blessings. In addition to public prayers for the peace and safety of the group, there were also family and individual prayers.

The ancient Japanese employed many methods to de-

termine the *kami*'s will regarding their lives and the success of their undertakings. The most important of these was a form of divination in which the shoulder blade of a deer was burned and the cracks examined; later, the continental tradition of employing a tortoise shell in the same way was added. Divination of dreams was also practiced. Parties to lawsuits were forced to plunge their hands into boiling water in an effort to render a sacred judgment in a religious court. There were cases of oracles rendered in a state of spirit possession (*kamigakari*) during rituals, as well as spontaneous outbreaks of possession. Purification with water before ritual participation or as a means of banishing calamity was performed, and there was also a type of purification in which criminals were forced to hand over their possessions in a punishment that itself constituted a purification.

Cosmology. In the time of ancient Shintō, two cosmologies existed simultaneously. The first conceived of the world as having a vertical pattern, featuring three planes, namely, Takamanohara ("plain of high heaven"), the world of the gods; Nakatsukuni ("middle land"), the world of humankind; and Yomi ("underworld"), the land of the dead. This vertical structure is of the same type seen in Mongolian and North Asian shamanistic cultures. It was this vertical cosmology that played the dominant role in Japanese myths. The second cosmology saw the universe as a horizontal, two-tiered structure in which Tokoyo ("perpetual land") exists at the edge of the phenomenal world. Tokoyo was believed to be a utopian country far beyond the sea. This type of cosmology belongs to the Southeast Asian type, and while its influence upon the Japanese classics is slight, it can be seen at work in contemporary funeral rites and beliefs about ancestral visits. In this sense it remains a strong presence in the cosmology of the common people.

Shintō's universally this-worldly attitude can be seen as early as mythic times. In ancient Japan Takamanohara and Tokoyo were portrayed in outline as extensions or reflections of the phenomenal world and were not glorified as having a greater value than the human world. A mild climate combined with relatively abundant production supported this attitude of unsophisticated affirmation of the present world. The youthful vitality and optimism of natural man emerging from primitive darkness is evident in literary works, but more than this, remains a strong undercurrent in Japanese culture through the ages. [See also *Japanese Religion, article on Mythic Themes*.]

Development of Ancient Shintō. Under the influence of continental culture, ancient Shintō began to develop in many ways. One such development is the ethical consciousness that came about through the influence of

Chinese culture, introduced to Japan around the fifth century. People began to seek a standard in the myths and to pattern their lives upon the will and action of the *kami*. *Magokoro* (purity of mind or sincerity) was valued highly in the days of ancient Shintō, and as time went on it became more and more highly valued.

The unification of myth was another new development. Now the various clans' myths were compiled and edited within the framework of the myths of the imperial household, and it was in this way that the myths of the Japanese people were systematized and structured. The time of the compilation of the myths is believed to coincide with the reign of Emperor Temmu (672–687), as it says in the preface of the *Kojiki* (712), and analysis of the *Nihonshoki* suggests this as a possible date as well.

With the appearance of a unified nation, Amaterasu Ōmikami, previously the tutelary deity of the imperial clan, came to be worshiped outside the imperial palace as the protective deity of the nation and its people. At the same time, the clan deities of the great clans, in addition to their original functions, were made protective deities of the entire nation, and every year offerings were devoted to them by the central government. The powerful clans that had submitted to the central government were not forcibly required to worship its deities, but instead the local deities of a particular area were paid tribute by the government; it is noteworthy that this situation contributed to the unification of the nation.

The systematization of such national ritual probably coincided with the importation on a broad scale of the Ritsuryō system (Chinese political system) under the Taika Reforms of 645. In the central government, the Bureau of Kami (*jingikan*) was made responsible for these rites, while in the provinces local governors had that responsibility. There were great rituals for the emperor's enthronement, the core of which was called Daijōsai, the Great Thanksgiving, as well as prayers and thanksgivings regarding disasters, war, and national auspicious occasions. Just as the Ritsuryō system was largely patterned on the Sui and T'ang bureaucracies, some Japanese rituals also closely resembled those of China. One example is the Prayer for Good Harvest, or the offerings of clothing to the imperial ancestors made before summer and winter. Of course, the basis in faith enabling these to be accepted already existed in Japan. However, there were elements of the Japanese system not present in the Chinese code, such as the Bureau of Kami and the prohibition of the eating of meat before ceremonies, proof that the Chinese system was not simply copied.

The national system of Shintō rites was completed in the early Heian period (late eighth century to late

twelfth century). At the beginning of the tenth century, there were nearly three thousand shrines receiving offerings from the government. In the late Heian period this system weakened along with the weakening of the Ritsuryō system, but in the medieval period government patronage of such especially large shrines as the Twenty-two Shrines continued. In the house codes of the warriors of the civil war age and in the law of the Kamakura shogunate, the spirit of worshiping the *kami* at the seat of government and of according priority to ritual was carried forward. Eventually, this ancient system described above was revived by the Meiji Restoration.

Amalgamation of Buddhism and Shintō. From around the time of the Taika Reforms until the early Heian period, Chinese influence in thought, ethics, law, literature, technology, and industry was very great, but in religion Buddhism's influence and power of permeation increased quickly following its introduction in 538. Initially, the Buddha was thought of as "the neighboring country's [i.e., China's] *kami*" and was not rigorously distinguished from the *kami* of Japan. However, Buddhist art, worship, and notions of transience eventually won the hearts of the people, beginning with the ruling elites. Buddhism of the Nara period (710–784), like Shintō, pervaded state ritual, but from the beginning of the Heian period Esoteric (*mikkyō*) prayers and incantations and the belief in Amida's Pure Land gained popularity among the people. However, because Shintō continued to live on strongly as a religion of the people, many connections between the two religions were formed. Such a situation was possible because both religions were very accepting of other traditions. [See also Buddhism, *article on* Buddhism in Japan.]

Three stages of assimilation. Three stages in the assimilation of Buddhism and Shintō can be distinguished. The first was that in which the *kami* were made protectors of the Buddhas; from the middle of the eighth century Shintō tutelary deities were worshiped in Buddhist temples. An early example may be seen at the time of the building of the Great Buddha at Tōdaiji, when in 749 a shrine for the *kami* Hachiman was built nearby. The second stage coincided in time with the first. Among the Buddhist clergy arose the idea that in the Ten Realms of Beings (ten levels of karmically determined existence, ranging from denizens of the various Buddhist hells to Buddhas) the *kami* correspond to the Buddhist *devas* ("gods"), who occupy the highest position in the Realm of Ignorance. Accordingly, it was thought that the *kami* suffer endless cycles of transmigration, as do human beings, and cannot escape suffering; thus, to assist the *kami* to achieve liberation, worshipers built Buddhist temples near the precincts of shrines and recited *sūtras* before the altars of the *kami*.

The third stage, beginning at the end of the eighth century, held that *kami* are *avatāras*, or incarnations, of *bodhisattvas* and assigned *bodhisattva* titles to the *kami*. Later, it was held that Buddhas are the original form of *kami*, while *kami* are phenomenal manifestations of the Buddhas. In accordance with this theory, Buddhist statues were placed on the altars of Shintō shrines as divine images, or *kami* statues were made in the guise of Buddhist priests. There were many cases in which Buddhist priests were placed in charge of shrines and shrine festivals. However, as in the case of the Ise and Izumo Grand Shrines, there were also shrines in which assimilation with Buddhism was resisted, and the Shintō side remained strong.

Buddhist theories of Shintō. Until the year 1000, the vague idea that *kami* were *avatāras* of the Buddhas was dominant, but by 1100 specific assignments of *kami* to particular Buddhas had been made. Buddhist Shintō was based on the concepts of *kami* held by the Buddhist clergy. These concepts were fully developed by the Kamakura period (late twelfth century to early fourteenth century). Typical examples of Buddhist Shintō were Tendai Shintō and Shingon Shintō. Tendai Shintō was centered on the Enryakuji at Mount Hiei, near Kyoto. In Tendai's philosophy of ultimate reality, primordial Buddha nature as represented by Śākyamuni Buddha was held to be the reality behind all phenomena, including the *kami*. The main deity of the Hiei Shrine, the tutelary deity of Enryakuji, was considered an incarnation of Śākyamuni.

Shingon Shintō was begun by Shingon priests living in the Ise area, probably in the lands held by the Grand Shrine at Ise. In Shingon thought Mahāvairocana ("great illuminator"), symbolized by the sun, is held to be the source of the universe and all existence, uniting its two aspects, the Diamond cycle (*kongōkai*) and the Womb-store cycle (*taizōkai*). [See Maṇḍalas, article on Buddhist Maṇḍalas.] It was held in accordance with this principle that the original form of the deity of the Inner Shrine at Ise, Amaterasu Ōmikami, was the Womb-store cycle (the feminine aspect), and that the original form of the deity of the Outer Shrine was Mahāvairocana, of the Diamond cycle. In the case of shrines enshrining many *kami*, both types of Shintō held that the original form of the *kami* are Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, and as time went on relations between the two religions became increasingly complicated. [See also Honjisuijaku; Tendaishū; and Shingonshū.]

Movement toward Recovery of Autonomy. The situation described above continued until the end of the Edo period (1603–1867), and it is estimated that Buddhist priests were in charge of over half of all the Shintō shrines in the country by that time. But a movement in

opposition began as far back as the early Kamakura period. Ise, or Watarai, Shintō, while continuing to be influenced by Shingon Shintō, developed among the priests of the Grand Shrine at Ise, and was the first anti-Buddhist Shintō. One of its theories held that *konton*, or chaos, was the original form of all phenomena, including Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*. Later, this theory was modified so that *kizen*, non-being, was accorded such a role. Purification, a tradition handed down from ancient times, was divided into outer purification (*geshōjō*, purification of the body) and inner purification (*naishōjō*, purification of heart and mind). As methods for approaching *kami* and receiving their blessing and salvation, prayer and *shojiki*, uprightness or righteousness, were recommended.

Yoshida Shintō was founded by Urabe Kanetomo (1435–1511), priest of the Yoshida Shrine in Kyōto, in the latter half of the fifteenth century. According to him, the fundamental god of the universe, Taigen Sonjin ("great exalted one"), is identical to the *kami* that appears at the beginning of the *Nihonshoki*, Kuni no Tokodachi no Mikoto. Yoshida held that all beings originate from this deity. Man's body stems from the same source as heaven and earth, but the heart or mind (*kokoro*) can become the abode of *kami* if it is purified. Humanity's goal is to live celebrating the *kami* residing in our heart-minds, a mystical state of mind. Yoshida Shintō was built on the scholarly tradition of the Urabe family by getting influence from Watarai Shintō, Taoism, and Shingon metaphysics. It accepted even the invocation rites and fire ceremonies of Esoteric Buddhism. However, in practice, Yoshida Shintō stressed the cult of Amaterasu Ōmikami and strengthened the training of the priesthood. Yoshida Shintō controlled the great majority of those shrines not controlled by Buddhist clergy during the Edo period.

Confucian Shintō. In the early Edo period the man called the "restorer" of Watarai Shintō, Watarai Nobuyoshi, was active, but it was Confucian Shintō that made the greatest strides philosophically at this time. Confucian scholars tried to interpret Shintō in terms of Neo-Confucianism as expounded by Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming and proclaimed that Shintō and Confucianism are one. [See Confucianism in Japan.] The two main schools promoting this view were Yoshikawa Shintō and Suiga (also read Suika) Shintō. Yoshikawa Koretaru (1616–1694) unified Neo-Confucianism and Yoshida Shintō and spread what he called Rigaku (or Yoshikawa) Shintō among daimyo and warriors. He emphasized Shintō's usefulness as a philosophy for governing the realm. The *t'ai-chi* ("great ultimate"), the supreme reality according to Neo-Confucianism, was identified with Kunitokodachi no Mikoto. [See T'ai-chi.]

At birth, the heart-mind has within it *ri* (Chin., *li*), the source of all existence that is this deity, but if at the same time the *ki* (Chin., *ch'i*; the physical element) is not purified, the *kami*'s divine wisdom will be obstructed by egoistic desire and will fail to be activated. Therefore, he held, it is necessary to pray and to purify heart and flesh in order to recover humanity's original oneness with the deity by eradicating egotism. In government, the "three sacred treasures" symbolize the way of the emperor: benevolence, loyalty, and service. Benevolence is the ruler's chief virtue while loyalty and service to the imperial house is held up as a subject's highest ethical ideal.

Suiga Shintō was founded by Yamazaki Ansai (1618–1682), who became a great Neo-Confucian scholar, but who founded a school of his own at about the age of fifty under the influence of Yoshikawa and Watarai Nobuyoshi. The name Suiga Shintō derives from a passage in the text of Watarai Shintō, the *Shintō gobusho* (the Shintō pentateuch). Ansai accepted many of the theories of Yoshikawa Shintō and developed them further. Although he had sometimes farfetched explanations, his teachings were accompanied by the emphasis on reverential exactitude (*tsutsushimi*), purity of mind, prayer, fervent loyalty to the imperial house, and so on. They later became one of the sources of the political movement to overthrow the shogunate. [See *the biography of Yamazaki Ansai*.]

Revival of Shintō. Kokugaku (the school of National Learning), arising in the atmosphere of free scholarship, of the early Edo period (late seventeenth century), sought to recover and clarify the ethos of ancient Japan through exacting literary research. Established by Motoori Norinaga, Revival Shintō (Fukko Shintō) refers to the Shintō research and religious movement that was based on Kokugaku. Motoori criticized the syncretistic theories linking Shintō with Buddhism and Confucianism and urged that through study of the classics the spirit of ancient Shintō be revived. He recognized the polytheistic concept of deity that had existed since ancient times. It was he who forced to center stage in theology the concept, forgotten in name but having existed continuously in cult, of *musubi*, the mystical power of becoming or creation. He was able to attach the new meaning of "imperial ancestor" to Amaterasu Ōmikami, who held the central role in the structure and development of Japanese myth. All things unfold through the will of the *kami*, and the way of humanity is to entrust all things to *kami* and to strive in a given pursuit in this world. This doctrine finds many supporters even in modern Shintō. [See *Kokugaku and the biography of Motoori Norinaga*.]

Among Motoori's disciples, Hirata Atsutane (1776–

1843) was the most important successor in the field of Shintō. He perpetuated Motoori's methodology and confined himself to philological studies, but being a more rational and practical personality than Motoori, he surpassed Motoori theologically. He read the works of Ming dynasty Jesuits and was influenced by them. He proclaimed Ame-no-minaka-nushi, the deity who appears first at the beginning of the *Kojiki*, the absolute god and ruler of the universe. Further, he identified the two deities of *musubi*, who appear next, as the dynamic manifestation of Ame-no-minaka-nushi, and ended by proclaiming a trinitarian doctrine of the unity of these three *kami*. Hirata's view of humanity held that human nature is originally good, but that this world is only a temporary one that *kami* have established to test us. He goes on to claim that there will be retribution for past bad deeds in the next world. These Catholic influences were continued by some of Hirata's disciples, but in later Shintō they were unable to command significant following.

However, Hirata's doctrines laid the theoretical groundwork for Shintō funerals among the people through his idea of the otherworld, in the same plane as ours but invisible to us, and whence the *kami* and the ancestors protect us. Hirata also promoted domestic rites and composed many prayers. He furthermore propounded the notion that Japan is the center of the world and advocated emperor worship. He did not directly criticize the shogunate, but his disciples did, and many of them became leaders of the movement to restore political rule to the emperor. [See *the biography of Hirata Atsutane*.]

Popular Cults and Post-Meiji Shintō. Folk Shintō has been sustained not so much by doctrine as by numerous festivals, purifications, abstinences, and annual rituals. Vestiges of the *ujigami* of the ancient clans may be seen today in the protective deities of small-scale kinship groups, the *dōzoku*, but since the Middle Ages such territorial units as the *shōen* (manor) or the village have become the units for the cult of tutelary deities, to whom prayers or thanksgiving were offered at important junctures in life or in times of danger.

With the restoration of political order at the beginning of the Edo period, ancient national rites and customs that had fallen into desuetude began to be revived; these included the periodic rebuilding of the Grand Shrine at Ise, the Great Thanksgiving, and the festival of the Kamo Shrine. It was also from this time that certain schools associated with prominent feudal domains, such as the one at Mito, began to perform formal worship of the *kami*. Among the people as well, town and village festivals flourished, and *sumō*, archery, and plays were performed, thus heightening the

people's attachment. Religious confraternities organized beginning around the year 1200 became popular, and pilgrimage to distant great shrines, including the "thanks pilgrimages" (*okagemairi*) to the Grand Shrine at Ise, occurred on a wide scale.

In order to purge Buddhist elements from the shrines, the Meiji government issued an order for the separation of Buddhism and Shintō. Lands conferred upon temples and shrines by the shogunate and daimyo were confiscated, and shrines were ranked according to the system of national shrines that had fallen into disuse since the Middle Ages. At the same time, the "Great Promulgation Movement" (*taikyō senpu undō*) was instituted to make Revival Shintō the spiritual foundation for the emerging Japanese nation. After the campaign failed, the government distinguished Shrine Shintō from ordinary religion and sheltered and promoted it as a system of ethics and ritual for the sake of unifying rural society with the rest of the nation. Thus from 1882 to the end of World War II, priests of national shrines were prohibited from officiating at funerals and from preaching. This prohibition brought to a halt the theological development that had just begun and was one reason that Shintō was late in cultivating a fully religious character.

Of the Shintō sects that had been developing since the end of the Edo period, thirteen had achieved official recognition by the end of the Meiji period. They carried out their religious activities without state support. In the area of Folk Shintō, such folk practices as divination and prayer healing were prohibited early in the Meiji era.

However, apart from the rising and falling fortunes of Shintō as it was allied with the state, purification, confinement in shrines for devotional purposes, the custom of shrine visits, and faith in the protective deities of life and generation continued with few changes. Even now these form the substratum of Shrine Shintō and Sect Shintō.

The Shintō Directive, issued by the Occupation after World War II, broke the long and intimate relation between Shintō and state that had existed since before the Taika Reforms. The postwar constitution and various legal directives followed the spirit of the Shintō Directive, and it is still in force. However, while public support from the government and from local-level public organizations has ceased, local communities increase their solidarity through festivals, and this function lives on in many areas.

Establishment of Sect Shintō. The thirteen sects of Shintō developed out of Shintō, Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Shugendō, and folk beliefs. These groups show a variety of patterns of development, patterns on the one hand growing out of the teachings and

actions of a religious leader looked upon as founder by believers, or developing from Revival Shintō, or from the conflation of a number of related, preexisting groups. The reasons for the development of these groups included the shock felt by the people in the face of the social and political changes surrounding the end of the Edo Period and the Meiji Restoration, the impotence of Buddhism when it lost the support of the shogunate, the impact of Revival Shintō, and the necessity of autonomous proselytization on a grass roots level after the failure of the Great Promulgation Movement.

The Shintō sects may be classified into the following five types:

1. Mountain-worship sects such as Fusōkyō and Jikkōkyō, which grew out of the cult of Mount Fuji, and Ontakekyō, which developed from the cult of Mount Ontake in Nagano Prefecture. All these represented the reorganization of mountain worship confraternities. [See Shugendō.]
2. "Faith-healing" sects, groups formed around a founder and his religious experience and activity: Kurozumikyō, Konkōkyō, and Tenrikyō. [See Kurozumikyō; Konkōkyō; and Tenrikyō.]
3. Purification sects, groups that perpetuate the tradition of water purification to cultivate body and mind: Misogikyō and Shinshūkyō.
4. Confucian sects, groups arising from the combination of Confucianism and Revival Shintō: Shintō Shūseiha and Shintō Taiseikyō. (These incorporate elements of the cult of sacred mountains and of purification).
5. Revival Shintō sects, those that grew out of Restoration Shintō, or in which its influence is very strong: Izumo Ōyashirokyō, Shinrikyō, and Shintō Taikyō.

Some of these groups, such as Ontakekyō, Kurozumikyō, Konkōkyō, and Tenrikyō, had been active since the Edo period; but the period over which they won governmental recognition spanned thirty-odd years, from 1876, when Kurozumikyō and Shintō Shūseiha were recognized, until 1908, when Tenrikyō was recognized. With the abolition of governmental control after World War II, these groups and their churches experienced repeated schisms combined with the appearance of new, Shintō-derived religions, producing a complicated picture.

Sacred Books and Mythology

Shintō has no founder and, strictly speaking, no sacred canon. However, there is a highly venerated group of texts, of great antiquity, which preserve a record of the myth and religious life of the ancient Japanese.

Sacred Texts. The *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters, 712) and the *Nihonshoki*, also known as the *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan, 720), may be considered the sacred books of Shintō. The former begins with the “three creator deities” in Takamanohara, relates the appearance of various deities, including Amaterasu Ōmikami, explains the descent of the Heavenly Grandchild, the foundation of the Japanese nation, and its unification through imperial virtue. The latter relates variants of the same myths, explains the construction of the nation and imperial unification, and tries to demonstrate that the development of the nation after the Taika Reforms was based upon divine will and reverence for the ancestral *kami*.

This religious ethic and ideal of government later became the source for the formation of Shintō thought in the medieval and early modern periods. The early eighth-century *Fudoki* (Records of Wind and Earth) relate old regional myths and legends; in the late eighth century *Man'yōshū* (Collection of Ten Thousand Poems), the religious faith and customs of the ordinary people are presented in poetic form. The *Sendai kujihongi* (Narration of Ancient Things), believed to date from the ninth century, records the history of great provincial lords and the cult of the Mononobe lineage, while the *Kogoshūi* (Collection of Omitted Ancient Sayings) relates the traditions of the Imbe line and presents material omitted from the mythic compilations. In the *Taihōryō* (Taihō Codes, 701) and the *Yorōryō* (Yorō Codes, 718) the outline of national ritual and the duties of Shintō priests are described. The first ten books of the *Engishiki* (Procedures of the Engi Era, 927) give the specific details for carrying out these codes and describe national rites in detail, as well as including ancient *norito* (prayers). [See *Norito*.] The *Shoku Nihongi* (Continued Chronicles of Japan, 794) compiles the *senmyō*, imperial edicts of the years 697 to 789, and is a valuable resource on the ethics of Shintō and its concept of time. [See also Japanese Religion, *article on* Religious and Philosophical Texts.]

Japanese Mythology. The Japanese myths contain material which in part is of the same type as that of neighboring peoples, and one can recognize Chinese influence in certain expressions. However, the core of the Japanese myths concern Amaterasu, the ancestral deity of the imperial house, and the story of how her direct descendants came to this world, the Middle Land, and, representing her authority as the ruler of Takamanohara, unified the Japanese nation. The myths relate how a group of *kami* appear spontaneously at the time of the division of heaven and earth. The last of these, a male-female pair called Izanagi and Izanami, brought forth the seas, mountains, and plants as well as the Japanese

archipelago, and gave birth to the ancestors of various clans. Among the *kami* produced by them, the most important are Amaterasu, Tsukiyomi no Mikoto (“moon ruler”), and Susano-ō (“ruler of the nether regions”).

Susano-ō's descendant, Ōkuninushi no Kami, was the first to control Japan, but he yielded the land to Ninigi no Mikoto, grandson of Amaterasu Ōmikami, and then Ninigi's grandson Jimmu became the first emperor of the nation. Even now the Three Treasures symbolizing the emperor's authority are said to be given to the emperor by Amaterasu.

Legends of many *kami*, the so-called eight hundred myriad gods (*yaoyorozu no kami*), are recounted in the Japanese classics. Some of these are the clan deities of certain clans that later became the tutelary deities of the local community. However, many others have not been worshiped historically in shrines. With the exception of myths of gods of a certain locale, the great body of Japanese myths was not popular until the appearance of Revival Shintō. Since the war there has been insufficient education in these myths in the public schools, and the education of children in this respect has become an important concern of Shintō believers. [See Japanese Religion, *article on* Mythic Themes; Izanagi and Izanami; Amaterasu Ōmikami; Susano-ō no Mikoto Ōkuninushi no Mikoto; and Jimmu.]

Beliefs and Teachings

Although there are no absolute dogmas in Shintō, various doctrines have been espoused historically and in modern times. The three grounds of Shintō theology are (1) an understanding of the meaning of Japanese myth; (2) Shintō tradition, including *matsuri* (festivals), believers' organizations, customs, and historical Shintō theories; and (3) the faith and conduct of the modern Shintō believer.

Concept of Kami. The core of Shintō is the belief in the profound and mysterious power of the *kami* (*mu-subi*, namely, the power of harmony and creation) as well as the way of the *kami* or the “will” of the *kami* (*makoto*, namely, truth or truthfulness). The essence of *kami* transcends the ability of words to explain and is an ineffable existence far beyond humanity's powers of comprehension. However, devoted believers are able to know the will and the existence of *kami* through faith.

Shintō believers generally think of *kami* polytheistically. This conception is related to the fundamental ontological pattern of the Japanese. However, in historical Shintō doctrines influenced by Buddhism and Confucianism one can discern a tendency to identify the “one source” or “origin” of things with the “original form” of *kami*, but these theories did not prevail for long. The real faith of Shintō is necessarily a faith in individual

kami as proximate beings who bestow many kinds of blessings; behind this lies no monistic reality. The *kami* are not abstract existences. They are beings who respond to the sincere prayers of humanity and who have separate, divine personalities. The pious *ujiko*, parishioners of shrines, believe that their *ujigami* makes possible their life and prosperity in this world.

The Nature of Humanity. The fundamental assumption of Shintō's conception of the nature of man is the idea that "human beings are the children of *kami*." The meaning of this phrase is first of all that man has received his life from *kami*, and that accordingly the life of a human being is sacred. Second, our daily life and work is made possible through the blessings of *kami*. Thus a human being's life and person is to be respected, and as each values himself, he must respect the fundamental human rights of others, without regard to race, citizenship, and so on. This respect for human rights is the theoretical foundation of the Shintō peace movement. In Shintō there is no conspicuous conception of original sin. Instead, since man is believed to have received life from the *kami*, man has within him the sacrality that is the essence of *kami*. However, actual human beings seldom exhibit that sacred essence. In order to "polish" the light of this essence, it is necessary to purify the heart, removing from it the dust and pollution obscuring its surface.

Purification and attitudes toward life. Shintō advocates *makoto no kokoro* ("the heart of truth") or *magokoro* ("the true heart") as the best attitude toward life. These are generally translated as "sincerity," "purity of heart," or "uprightness." These attitudes reveal *kami*'s truthfulness and humanity. In common-sense terms they refer to the attitude of doing one's best in work and human relations, but the most basic source of these attitudes is the awareness of the divine. In other words, the source lies in prayer. Shintō ethics does not ignore loyalty, filial piety, love, faithfulness, and other individual moral virtues. However, it is held that all these virtues are different names for actions springing from *magokoro*. In ancient Shintō, *magokoro* was also described as "bright and pure mind," or "bright, pure, upright, and sincere mind." Succinctly, it referred to a condition of having purity of mind. As is held now and as was held in the past, achieving this condition of the heart by purifying the heart and mind is an absolute prerequisite for communing with *kami* and for receiving *kami*'s blessing.

Role of the individual in society. The word *yo*, which in ancient Japanese meant a generation or a human life, comes from the same root as the word meaning "between nodes of bamboo" (the span from one node to another). Bamboo cannot fulfill its function and grow into

a long, pliant stalk unless each *yo* is complete. In the same way, a human being's life also has the meaning of social action between the two fixed points of beginning and end. Before and after those points are the generations of ancestors and descendants. Shintō may be called the "religion of continuity." Of course, the Japanese recognize that individuals possess particular personalities, but they do not think of the individual as an independent being, cut off from others. Instead, the individual human being is one in a vertical tradition linking ancestors to descendants. Horizontally, he is a responsible member of various social groups such as family and workmates. The coordinates of life are unbreakable links in a vertical and horizontal chain.

Shintō does not speculate about an end of the world. Motoori Norinaga spoke of the human life as ceaselessly developing and growing while at the same time mutating. This teaching was drawn from an analysis of the course of Japanese myth. The eternal existence of Japan, united by the imperial house, is proclaimed in Japanese myth as the divine edict of Amaterasu. Interpreting this edict from the standpoint of modern man, we can say that it implies the eternal perpetuation of the history of the world, including Japan (specifically, in the context of the perpetuation of the imperial house).

In addition, Shintō believers, limited to the perspective of finite, individual human existences, emphasize the notion of *naka ima* ("middle present"), as seen frequently in imperial edicts of the eighth century. *Naka ima* is a conception of the eternal flow of time in which the present is the center point, the meeting place between oneself and eternal history, and thus holds the highest value among all times that humanity can conceive of. On the basis of this conception of time, when we examine our way of life, the way to participate directly in the eternal development of world history is to live each moment as fully and meaningfully as possible.

Cult

As in other religions, numerous festivals have developed in Shintō, as have a variety of customs and taboos surrounding them. Especially in the case of Shrine Shintō, festivals are the most popular of all religious activities even now. There are no weekly religious services in Shintō. Some people occasionally visit shrines and churches to calm and strengthen themselves through prayer. Others worship on a certain day each month, for example, early in the morning of the first and fifteenth days, or on festival occasions, and of course fervent believers visit shrines daily.

Rites of Passage. There are many Shintō rites of passage. The rite of the first shrine visit for newborn children (*hatsumiyamairi*) is carried out on the thirtieth or

hundredth day after birth; in ancient times this was a day of admitting the new child to the *ujiko* group. The *shichigosan* rite of the fifteenth of November is carried out by taking children of three (*san*), five (*go*), and seven (*shichi*) to the shrine to give thanks for their swift growth and to pray for them. *Seijin no Hi*, the day of attaining adulthood, celebrated on the fifteenth of January, was previously the day on which young people were taken into local village youth groups in provincial society. Nowadays, it is a celebration for young people who have reached the age of twenty and have the right to vote. Eighty percent of all Japanese weddings are Shintō. The spread of the custom of Shintō weddings dates from the Meiji period, but the idea of concluding a marriage by a vow before the *kami* arose in the mid-eighteenth century. Only about 10 percent of the nation's households perform Shintō funerals. Most Japanese simultaneously practice Buddhism and Shintō, but most have Buddhist funerals. In traditional Japanese homes there are two types of altars; one, the *kamidana*, or "god shelf," is dedicated to a tutelary *kami*, to *Amaterasu* or some other *kami*; the other is a Buddhist altar (*butsudan*), enshrining ancestors and Buddhas or *bodhisattvas*. However, pure Shintō or Sect Shintō families carry out all rites in a Shintō mode.

Aside from domestic rites, there are Shintō festivals relating to professional or daily life. Examples of such festivals are a ceremony for purifying a building site or for setting up the framework for a new building, a firing or purifying ceremony for the boilers in a new factory, a ceremony for the completion of construction works, a ceremony for the launching of a new ship, a ceremony for protecting *kami* of various occupational groups, and so forth.

Types of Festivals. Shintō shrine festivals include annual festivals and occasional festivals, divided into grand, middle-sized, and minor festivals. Among the grand festivals are spring festivals (of prayer for good harvest and the success of various industries), fall festivals (Shintō Thanksgiving), annual festivals, and divine processions. In divine processions, generally performed on the occasion of an annual festival, a divine palanquin (*mikoshi*) is paraded through the parish on the shoulders of parishioners, and many special ceremonies are performed. Among the occasional festivals are the ceremony of shrine dedication and the ceremony of shrine removal.

The general plan of grand festivals is roughly as follows:

1. Purification: before the formal worshipers enter the shrine building, purification is carried out in the shrine precincts' purification site; sometimes it may

be performed at the beginning of rites within the shrine building.

2. Adoration: following the chief priest, everyone bows before the altar as a greeting to the *kami* at the beginning of a ceremony.
3. Opening of the door of the inner sanctuary: this is carried out by the chief priest.
4. Presentation of food offerings: rice, *sake*, rice cake, fish, fowl, seaweed, vegetables, fruit, salt, water, and so on are offered. Since it is taboo to pollute the sacred space with blood, animal meat is not included in the offering. In ancient times prepared foods were offered, but now food is generally not cooked. Accordingly, the meaning of the offerings has changed from that of offering food for the feast with the *kami* to that of simple thanksgiving.
5. Prayer: the chief priest gives prayers (*norito*). The *norito*, based on the model of the ancient prayers included in the tenth-century *Engishiki*, are given anew on the occasion of each festival.
6. Sacred music and dance: to praise and pray to the gods *gagaku* ("elegant music") and newer forms of music based upon it are performed.
7. General offerings and prayer: worshipers offer a symbolic gift of a small branch of the *sakaki* sacred tree before the altar of the *kami* and pray.
8. Taking offerings away: the offerings are removed.
9. Shutting the door of the inner sanctuary: this action signals the return of the *kami* to its original place after having been present at the festival.
10. Final adoration: this is a greeting to the *kami* at the end of the ceremony.
11. Feast (*naorai*): it was believed in ancient Japan that by sharing the food offered to the *kami*, a worshiper could take into his own body the mysterious power and blessing of the *kami*, and that the feast was a communion with the *kami*. This custom is still observed even now in the imperial household's Shintō Thanksgiving and in the festivals of a few old shrines. Nowadays, however, communion with the *kami* in most shrines takes the form of receiving *sake* that has been offered upon the altar. Since World War II, it has become customary for a priest to make a short speech before the feast.

There are also cases in which special rites and observances are carried out at the annual festival or on other occasions. Examples are confining oneself in a shrine to offer prayers (*okomori*), water purification (*misogi*), divine procession by boat or sacred palanquin (*mikoshi*), ceremonial feasts (*tōyamatsuri*), *sumō*, horse racing, archery, tug-of-war, Shintō music and dance with hot-water purification (*yudate Kagura*), and lion dances (i.e.,

performers wear a lion mask and costume); of these last, some developed from divination.

Institutions

The main facilities of Shrine Shintō are, of course, shrines. Sect Shintō and Shintō-derived new religions, however, make use of "churches," structures specifically designed for formal, congregational worship.

Shrines, in their several architectural styles, combine with their surrounding forests to fulfill their functions and to give the appearance appropriate to these functions. Therefore, the entire precinct should be considered as the shrine. At the entrance to the shrine stands the *torii*, the classic Shintō double-linteled gateway, demarcating the boundary between the sacred place and the secular world. As one proceeds along the approach, one finds the ablution basin, where visitors wash their hands and rinse their mouths. In its vicinity are the shrine office, the gathering hall, the purification hall, the treasury, and other buildings.

Entering the tower gate, directly ahead one finds the hall of worship (*haiden*), and before it, in some shrines, the *kaguraden* ("hall of sacred dance"). The most sacred place is the inner sanctuary, located far to the back; in it are sacred symbols called *shintai* ("kami bodies") or *mitamashiro* ("divine spirits' symbols"). Most of these are mirrors, but some are jewels (*magatama*), swords, wooden statues, or in some cases precious goods of the deity enshrined. The *shintai* is wrapped in silk and kept reverently in a container located on the divine seat of the inner sanctuary. No one is permitted to see it but the chief priest. The inner sanctuary was the earliest structure of Shintō architecture. After the end of the sixteenth century, shrines appeared in which the inner sanctuary and the hall of worship were connected by the hall of offerings (*heiden*). Most people who worship at shrines make a small offering before the hall of worship and pray. Occasionally, they might ask a priest to perform rites of passage or give special prayers, announcements, and thanksgiving.

Believers' Organizations

Sociologically, there are many patterns of organization in Shintō believers' associations (*sūkeishakai*). In the case of the Shintō sects and the new religions, these are all, in the words of Joachim Wach, "specifically religious groups." In contrast, in Shrine Shintō we find both specifically religious groups and "identical religious groups," in which "natural" and religious groupings are identical. In the latter case we find that such natural groups as branch and stem family groups, territorial groups, age groups, and professional groups have become the units for the performance of festivals,

and even in modern times this phenomenon is frequently found in agricultural areas.

After the end of World War II, parishioners' associations (*ujikokai*) were reestablished. These are associations of believers in local communities formed by the "children" (*ko*) of the tutelary *kami* (the *ujigami*). They are numerous in urbanized areas. In contrast, the specifically religious groups of Shrine Shintō did not exist in ancient Shintō but were first seen in confraternities around the year 1200. These were not only found in the big shrines of Shintō; they also contributed to the growth of Buddhism and Sect Shintō. The greatest confraternity of the Edo period was that formed to make pilgrimages to the Grand Shrine at Ise. It was not unusual for Shintō believers to follow the cult of more than one shrine. Believers' associations are groups of devotees of a shrine—in some cases, very distant—other than that of the tutelary deity of the place where they live. Before the war these devotees were not formed into groups (except for confraternities), but after the war the practice became common at the large shrines. For example, in the case of the Meiji Shrine, there are some 250,000 members of the association in and around Tokyo.

Other developments since the end of the war include the founding of such voluntary associations as children's groups, Boy Scouts, *ujiko* (parishioners') youth groups, women's groups, *mikoshi* (divine palanquin) carriers, and groups for the preservation of *ohayashi* (shrine music). However, it should be noted that the new religions and the Shintō Sects are better at organizing youth groups, students' groups, women's groups, men's groups, and so on, than is Shrine Shintō.

In 1946 the Association of Shintō Shrines (*Jinja Honchō*) was founded by most of the shrines of the nation. A branch office of the association exists in each prefecture, and beneath it are ranked subbranches attached to the member shrines. The Association of Shintō Shrines is not a "mother church." It is an association carrying out the education of believers, the training of priests, the development of shrines, and other necessary business, recognizing the Grand Shrine at Ise as the most respected shrine.

In the case of the Shintō Sects and the new religions, most divide the country into wards formed by the territories of their constituent great churches and churches. Within these territorial divisions are further geographical divisions according to prefecture, city, town, and village, as well as lineages formed by tracing the links of proselytization from the founder. In each sect the exact structure is somewhat different, making for a complicated situation.

As for professional leaders, there are "priests" in the

case of shrines and “ministers” in the case of Sect Shintō. Most of them are men, and they may marry. The main training centers for the priesthood are Tokyo’s Kokugakuin University and the Kōgakukan University of Ise. The Shintō Sects have training facilities at their separate headquarters. Any believer who has received the necessary training can become a leader, but most leadership posts are hereditary.

Art

Since ancient times the Japanese have excelled in the expression of religious experience through an aesthetic and emotional penetration to the heart of things by intuition, rather than through the logical construction of systems of thought. Raised amid clement and abundant natural surroundings, they have been inclined to perceive the beauty and power of nature as the workings of the *kami*, thus fostering the development of religious poetry, architecture, and the visual arts.

Shrine Architecture. A shrine itself may frequently be called a work of art. Enveloped in the green of the trees of the precincts of a shrine, a place for calming the heart, the devotee is borne up by the still and solemn atmosphere. Surrounded by an expansive forest, a great shrine with mountains in the background maintains a beautiful harmony between nature and the architecture of the shrine building. The inner sanctuaries of the Grand Shrine at Ise or Izumo even today provide a fine example of ancient architecture. However, after the ninth century, shrine architecture began importing complicated techniques such as the *nagare zukuri* (curving roof style) from China. The shrine buildings, if built in the ancient style, should be of unadorned white wood, but in the shrines where Buddhist Shintō was practiced vermilion lacquering techniques of Chinese origin are used even now.

The *torii* is the characteristic structural feature of a shrine and is not found in Shintō churches. There are rare cases of *torii* being erected at Buddhist temples, as at Ōsaka’s Tennōji. The origin of the *torii* remains a matter of conjecture. It may derive from India’s Sāñcī Gate (*torana*) or the Chinese *hua-piao*, and it may be related to the Manchurian gate or other continental styles. We can not rule out the possibility that the *torii* is of ancient Japanese origin. There are more than fifteen styles of *torii*. A pair of dogs of the Korean Koguryō period or lions of the T’ang dynasty placed before a shrine are clearly of Central Asian or Indian origin. From ancient times they have been believed to expel evil or pollution and to protect the sacred building. After the ninth century they were used in the palace before the emperor’s throne as a ritual decoration, but eventually they came to be used generally in shrines.

Painting and Sculpture. Originally, no custom of worshipping the *kami* in the form of painting or sculpture existed, but under Buddhist influence, images were made at a few shrines. Most Shintō *maṇḍalas* belong to the thirteenth century or later, but they have not been used since the Meiji era. Some of them were used in Buddhist temples to celebrate protective Shintō deities and were hung in worship halls and elsewhere. Figures of the *kami* were used to explain the mysterious virtues and history of the shrine, and in some paintings groups of pilgrims were shown in the shrine precincts with the shrine buildings in the background. Scrolls depicting the establishment of the shrine or the disposition of the buildings or processions of *matsuri* have great value not only as works of art but as historical documents. In venerable shrines are hung many votive pictures dedicated centuries ago by ordinary people for the purpose of prayer. Some of these are now considered national treasures, so great is their aesthetic merit.

Sculptures of the *kami* date from as early as the second half of the eighth century, but because initially they were hidden deep within the inner sanctuary they were not directly worshiped as were Buddhist statues. Clearly, *kami* images were a direct response to the iconographic challenge of Buddhist culture. Interesting enough, with the gradual amalgamation of Buddhism and Shintō, statues of a Buddhist divinity were often enshrined as the original form of the *kami* of various shrines.

After the twelfth century, there were even statues of *kami* depicted in the guise of Buddhist monks. Separate from this development, court styles influenced the shrines, and *kami* came to be depicted in the style of court nobles and court ladies. Concomitantly, the clothing, weapons, appurtenances, and articles of daily use of the *kami* came to be contributed by the imperial house, the nobility, and by feudal daimyo, as were paintings, calligraphy, swords, and sculpture. Of these superlative works several hundred have been designated, along with the shrine buildings, as National Treasures (*kokuhō*) or Important Cultural Properties (*jūyō bunkazai*).

Music. Shintō music was for the most part intended to pacify the *kami* and to gladden the hearts of human beings rather than to serve as a solemn hymn to deity. The reason for this is probably to be found in the ancient Japanese belief that it is possible to soften the heart of the *kami* and to receive their protection by creating, in festival, a place for the mutual enjoyment of *kami* and humankind, thus avoiding the wrath of the *kami*, which might manifest itself in crop failure, natural disaster, or epidemic. However, under the influence of Confucian theory and the change in the concept of

kami, the song and dance performed in festivals to cheer the *kami* gradually became the accompaniment of festival. At the same time, a solemn music and dance of prayer and hymn also appeared.

Gagaku is representative of Shintō music. It is made up of T'ang and Koguryō elements. T'ang music originated in Persia and India but came to Japan after further development in China. Koguryō music derives from the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria. These forms combined with Japanese elements to create Japanese sacred music and dance, which were established in the last half of the ninth century. *Gagaku* has both vocal and instrumental components. It was patronized as the music of the court and was performed at the Institute of Music established in 701, but its more solemn pieces came to be used as religious music at temples and shrines.

In addition to *gagaku*, there are also local forms of music for the added entertainment of the deities, for dedications, and for prayers. Music accompanying prayers includes *kagura*, rice-planting songs rendered as prayers for a bountiful harvest, and *ta asobi*, a magico-religious act performed before rice cultivation. *Matsuribayashi* (festival music), so reminiscent of one's hometown, is a type of music played in divine processions atop floats and elsewhere in which most of the tunes are medleys of melodies stitched together. The lively rhythm of the flute and drum buoys the mood of the festival. No doubt the future of Shintō music will see the respect for traditional music preserved, along with the importation of Western music, expressing a religiosity incorporating a new perception of the times. [See Music, *article on* Music and Religion in Japan.]

Social Functions and the Present Situation

Historically, Shintō's functions may be divided into two broad categories. The first concerns the search for the meaning of life and the solution to basic human problems of individual and family life. The second is the ability to nurture in people the feeling of mutual belonging and solidarity as members of regional society, and to unify them as citizens in the larger, national society. The second of these functions is particularly conspicuous in Shrine Shintō.

Considered from social and political perspectives, the duty of the emperor and other authorities in ancient times was not limited to ordinary politics but included service to the gods. The expression *saisei itchi*, meaning, "Shintō ceremonies and political affairs are one and the same," belongs to a later epoch. But also demanded of those in power was equality in government, true-hearted government based on a religious sincerity under the protection of the gods and the worship of

them. That even in periods of weakened central authority, the shogun and daimyo protected shrines and frequently prayed at them is a fact that derives from the same tradition. Village people strengthened their solidarity by worshiping tutelary deities in their various communities, praying for peace and well-being, and participating every year in their village festivals.

Under the influence of these traditions, the Meiji government revived the tenth-century system of national shrines. The Constitution of 1889 guaranteed the conditional freedom of religion (i.e., to the extent that this freedom did not infringe upon one's performance of patriotic duties), but Shintō was favored as a cornerstone of the nation's structure. Shintō education was carried out in public schools, and most national holidays coincided with Shintō festivals. As of 1945, there were 218 national shrines, including 14 overseas, and 110,000 local shrines.

After World War II, the Occupation authorities ordered the Japanese government to sever all official affiliation with Shintō shrines and to cease all financial support for the shrines from public funds. The national rites carried out by the emperor came to be treated as private religious rites of the imperial family. This revolution, carried out in the name of the separation of church and state and the freedom of religion, persists in the constitution and occasions many debates over the harmony of this country's cultural traditions with democracy.

After the end of the war Shrine Shintō experienced a period of economic, social, and political difficulty. However, through the private support of the people, ruined shrines have been rebuilt, and *matsuri* and various rites of passage have been revived. At present, Shrine Shintō is faced with two main problems. The first is the question of how to preserve Shintō's historical function of promoting regional and national solidarity without infringing upon the principle of freedom of religion. The second concerns how to revive the harmony between man and nature and to confront human problems in a time of rapid modernization.

According to statistics of the Agency for Cultural Affairs, in 1982 there were 79,700 shrines. Most of these belong to the Association of Shintō Shrines. Of these, 570 are independent or belong to small religious organizations. The number of Shrine Shintō believers stands at 74,660,000.

After Tenrikyō gained independence in 1908, the number of Shintō sects was limited to thirteen, and the establishment of new groups was prohibited. During the war, the churches of the Shintō sects numbered 16,521; of these, about 15 percent were destroyed. The Shintō sects were not directly affected by the Shintō Directive,

but because of the declining concern for Shintō generally as well as the appearance of schismatic movements, the sects spent bitter years after the war. Now they face the same sort of problems accompanying urbanization as other religions, but they cooperate with people in their search for salvation. Figures current at the end of 1982 show that Tenrikyō had 2,620,000 followers, Izumo Ōyashirokyō had 1,150,000, Ontakekyō had 735,000, Konkōkyō had 471,000, Shinshūkyō had 300,000, Shinrikyō had 290,000, and Kurozumikyō had 220,000.

Even now, Shintō is intimately connected with the cultural and social life of the Japanese people and cannot be ignored whenever the cultural identity of the Japanese is discussed. Generally, its relations with other religions in Japan are friendly, cooperative, and harmonious. Accompanying the expansion of international relations, opportunities for Shintō to associate with other religions of Asia and the world are increasing. Most Shintō followers are convinced that mutual understanding and cooperation among religions contributes to world peace. However, this does not imply a willingness to fall into an easy eclecticism. While each must preserve the uniqueness of faith and the purity of its inner depth, each must cooperate in pursuing the shared purpose of the peaceful coexistence of all humanity and the harmony of man with nature.

[See also Priesthood, *article on Shintō Priesthood*; Domestic Observances, *article on Japanese Practices*; New Religions, *article on New Religions in Japan*; and Kami. *Many of the topics discussed above are also treated in Japanese Religion.*]

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HIRAI NAOFUSA

Translated from Japanese by Helen Hardacre

SHIPS. See Boats.

SHĪRĀZĪ, MUḤAMMAD ṢADRĀ. See Mullā Ṣadrā.

SHIVAISM. See Śaivism.

SHNE'UR ZALMAN OF LYADY (1745–1813), founder of the Habad school of Hasidism. Born into a prominent Jewish family in Liozno, Belorussia, Shne'ur Zalman had an extensive rabbinic education before he became associated with the Hasidic movement. At the age of twenty he joined the circle of students around Dov Ber of Mezhrich (Międzyrzecz, Poland) and was immediately recognized as a person of unusual intellectual abilities. Dov Ber encouraged him to continue with his legal studies as well as to cultivate his developing mastery of the *Zohar* and the Lurianic mystical writings. Legend has it that he was the teacher of Dov Ber's son, Avraham "the Angel" (1739/40–1777), in exoteric matters while the latter initiated him into the secrets of Qabbalah. Shne'ur Zalman's profound legal knowledge is reflected in the *Shulḥan 'arukh shel ha-Rav* (1814), an updating of the code of Jewish law.

As the major theoretician of the Hasidic movement, Shne'ur Zalman is author of a number of works that are classics of the movement's thought. His popular *Liqqutei Amarim (Tanya)*, published anonymously in 1797, is the most important systematic theological treatise that Hasidism produced. His collected homilies (*Torah Or*, 1836; *Liqqutei Torah*, 1848) detail the system first laid out in that work, deftly reinterpreting the entire prior corpus of qabbalistic writings.

Shne'ur Zalman was also an important political figure in the spreading Hasidic "empire." After the emi-

gration of Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk, the leading Hasidic figure in Belorussia, to the Holy Land in 1777, Shne'ur Zalman became, de facto, the leader of Hasidism in that area. This authority was formally recognized in 1788 when he was appointed leader of *kolel Reisin*, the institution responsible for that district's support of the Hasidic efforts in the Land of Israel.

As leader in the district closest to the anti-Hasidic stronghold of Lithuania, Shne'ur Zalman undeservedly bore the brunt of the sharp anti-Hasidic polemics of the 1780s and 1790s. A moderate who certainly believed in Torah study, respect for sages, and other matters that concerned the *mitnaggedim* ("opponents" of Hasidism), his efforts at peacemaking between the warring camps ended in failure. In 1798 he was arrested and imprisoned in Saint Petersburg, after leaders of the *mitnaggedim*, including the rabbi of Pinsk, accused him of disloyalty to the tsar and of leading a dissenting sect. He was released on the nineteenth of the Jewish month of Kislev in that year, a day still celebrated by Habad Ḥasidim as a festival. Imprisoned again in 1801, it seems likely that his notoriety in the eyes of the Russian authorities increased his popularity as a leader among the Ḥasidim.

After settling in Lyady in 1801, Shne'ur Zalman was established as a major figure in the Hasidic world. His distinctive personal style, combining rigorous intellectuality and a detached, self-negating mysticism, cast its stamp on the religious life of his disciples and made Habad a unique subculture within Hasidism. He devoted himself fully to the education of these disciples, and Lyady became the major center of study in the Hasidic world.

Shne'ur Zalman left two disciples who continued to develop a mystical theology along the lines of his thought. These were his son Dov Ber of Lubavitch (1773–1827), who became the leader of the Habad community upon his father's death, and Aharon Horwitz of Starosielce (1766–1828), a profound scholar whose previously little known work has recently been the object of much scholarly interest.

[*The teachings of Shne'ur Zalman are further described in Hasidism, article on Habad Hasidism.*]

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ARTHUR GREEN

SHŌKŪ (1177–1247), also known as Zen'ebō; founder of the Seizan branch of the Japanese Jōdo (Pure Land) sect of Buddhism. This branch, along with the Chinzei branch, is today one of two dominant branches within the Jōdo sect. Shōkū was born as the first son of Minamoto Chikasuye, but was adopted at the age of nine by Koga Michichika, the minister of internal affairs (the prime minister). He became a disciple of Hōnen at the age of fourteen, and eventually was chosen to help with the compilation of Hōnen's principal doctrinal work, the *Senchaku hongan nembutsu shū*. During the persecution of Hōnen's Nembutsu movement in 1207 (the so-called persecution of Jōgen), Shōkū was sentenced to exile as one of the major advocates of the Nembutsu, but he was spared through the influence of the eminent Tendai abbot Jien. After Hōnen's death in 1212, Shōkū studied Tendai Esoteric Buddhism (Taimitsu) under Jien, and received the Esoteric *abhiṣeka* (Jpn., *kanjō*) ordination from him. At Jien's urging, he took up residence in the Ōjōin of the Seizan Yamashinadera. During his residence there, he spread Pure Land teachings among the aristocracy of Kyoto and lectured extensively on the *Kuan wu-liang-shou-fo ching*. During a later Nembutsu persecution in 1227, Shōkū was once more marked for exile but again was spared. He died in Kyoto at the age of seventy-one.

An important feature of Shōkū's Pure Land teachings is their extensive incorporation of Tendai and Esoteric Buddhist elements. Shōkū maintained close ties with the Tendai sect and Taimitsu thought. Furthermore, his thought is highly philosophical and intellectual, in marked contrast to the teaching of Benchō (founder of the Chinzei branch), who emphasized the practical aspect of simple recitation of the Nembutsu.

The recitation of "Namu Amida Butsu" expresses the basic unity of the Nembutsu practitioner and Amida Buddha. Hence the goal of Nembutsu recitation is one's awakening to this truth. Shōkū also considered it possible to attain birth in the Pure Land through practices other than the Nembutsu, such as keeping the precepts and engaging in virtuous acts. Of the three Pure Land *sūtras*, Shōkū held the *Kuan wu-liang-shou-fo ching* to be most important. Shan-tao's commentary on this *sūtra* in particular played a central role in the doctrine of Shōkū's Pure Land Buddhism.

[See also Jōdoshū.]

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BANDO SHŌJUN

SHONA RELIGION. Bantu-speaking peoples first moved into the central area between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers (what is now Zimbabwe) some two millennia ago. Over the centuries, small polities formed and combined into a number of complex states, which in turn divided in the face of internal and external pressures. The term *Shona* is relatively new and is applied to the indigenous inhabitants of this region, excluding only the small ethnic groups at the northern and southern peripheries and the nineteenth-century Nguni invaders from the south, namely, the Ndebele, who now occupy southwest Zimbabwe, and the Shangane in the southeast. The Shona peoples are often classified according to four main dialect groups: the Zezuru in the center, the Korekore to the north, the Manyika to the east, and the Karanga to the south. The Shona are the dominant ethnic group in contemporary Zimbabwe, comprising about eight million people, or four-fifths of the population of the country.

At the time of colonization at the end of the nineteenth century, the Shona comprised a large number of independent petty chiefdoms. They lived in scattered villages based on patrilineages. They subsisted primarily on agriculture and kept some livestock—especially cattle, which had significance in marriage payments and for religious purposes. There was considerable internal trade in such goods as agricultural products, ironwork, and tobacco; the earlier external trade in gold and ivory had fallen to a mere trickle by this stage. Now, a century later, even rural Shona benefit from the technology and consumer comforts bought from the proceeds of wage labor and cash cropping. At least a quarter of the Shona population now claim affiliation to some Christian denomination, and Christian beliefs have infiltrated the thinking of professing traditionalists. Traditional beliefs and practices are, however, still dominant, even among many professed Christians.

Traditional Religion. Shona religion traditionally focused on relations with spirits of the dead. These include spirits of strangers, spirits of deceased ancestors, spirits of the land, and spirits of ancient heroes. Most Shona also acknowledge a high god (known by a variety of names) who is too remote to be concerned with the affairs of humans; he was, however, accessible through the cult in southern Shona country and is becoming more widely accessible through the influence of Christianity.

Superficially, the Shona believe in a clear hierarchy of spirits, with the high god at the top, followed by spirits of heroes, of the land, of ancestors, and finally of strangers. Indeed, to many Shona, the spiritual world appears fixed in a permanent and ancient hierarchy. In

practice, however, the relative status of different spirits often varies with locality and changes over time. The relative importance of different spirits often depends on the activities of their mediums.

Spirits of all levels may be associated with mediums or hosts. When a man or woman is about to become a medium, the first sign is usually sickness, often accompanied by mental disturbances, which a diviner interprets as a call by a spirit for the sick person to become its host. The patient is initiated as a medium and from time to time is possessed by the spirit. In the state of possession, the medium goes into a kind of trance during which he or she is supposed to lose consciousness, and the spirit is believed to speak and act through the medium. Mediums of the more important spirits are the major religious specialists in traditional Shona society.

Divination is most frequently performed by a possessed medium, although certain mechanical means, especially the use of various types of dice, are also used. Most ritual activity takes place in response to illness or other misfortunes, and mediums who have been through similar sufferings themselves are often best able to help others to cope with their problems. Misfortune is usually explained in terms of the influence of spirits, although occasionally it may also be explained in terms of the evil machinations of a witch.

Shona maintain that certain persons, aided by evil spirits, have perverted values and delight in their esoteric powers to do harm. This belief is likely to come into practice only when there are severe social tensions, and accusations of witchcraft may be used to justify rifts in a formerly close-knit community.

The ancestral cult. When illness or other misfortune is sufficiently worrying for a diviner to be consulted, the most common result of divination is that the trouble is attributed to the spirit of a deceased ancestor who wishes to be honored. The deceased head of a family is believed to be responsible for the well-being of all his descendants. A deceased mother or maternal grandmother may also be considered influential, especially in matters concerning the fertility of girls. It is said that not even a witch can attack a member of a family without the cooperation of aggrieved ancestral spirits.

When a man dies, his spirit is believed to wander around restlessly until it is settled in the family homestead by a ritual normally performed a year or more after death. After this, his spirit is frequently invoked in the homestead, particularly when any important event takes place within the family. He may have a bull dedicated to him from the family herd of cattle, which may be sacrificed in his honor should divination reveal this to be his wish. At any ritual in his honor, descendants must gather together with their spouses to reaffirm

their unity as a group and the necessity of cooperation between them. The same is true for a female ancestor. The spirits of family ancestors are seen as spirit elders who continue to control and to care for the family groups for which they were responsible during their lives. Many such ancestral spirits are believed to preside over important family gatherings through a possessed medium, who is a member of the family. As the extended kinship system weakens, especially in urban areas, the ancestral cult becomes a more private affair, providing a means of explaining and coping with personal misfortune.

Spirits of the land. Ancestors of chiefly lineages are responsible for all the people living in their territorial domains. The domain for which any chiefly spirit is responsible may be the chiefdom as a whole or a section of the chiefdom particularly associated with the spirit. Such a spirit is, in most of Shona country, called *mhondoro* ("lion") and frequently will have a medium who has high status in the community as a whole.

Where there is a history of invasion of one people by another, a differentiation of function has often developed between the cult of the chiefly spirits, which is concerned with political power, and the cult of the defeated autochthonous spirits, which concerns rainfall and the fertility of the land. In such cases, the autochthonous spirit might be considered equal to, or even more powerful than, the chiefly lion spirits.

Rituals are held in honor of territorial spirits to request good rains before a harvest and to give thanks after the harvest. Such rituals principally involve the brewing of millet beer, to which all families in the spirit's domain should contribute, and singing and dancing over a couple of days in honor of the spirit, often at a tree shrine in the veld. At the directions of the possessed medium, rites may also be held to avert threats to crops through drought or pests. Certain days are considered holy to the spirit guardians of the land, and on these days no traditional work may be done in the fields.

Mediums of territorial spirits preside at all rituals in honor of their spirits. They may also preside at the trial of someone accused of a crime against the spirit, such as incest or working on a holy day. In many parts of Shona country, the possessed mediums of chiefly spirits are responsible for electing a new chief, who is to be their representative in the government of the country. Chief and mediums are subsequently expected to consult with one another and to cooperate on important issues. Since the territorial spirits are responsible for all people in their land, a possessed medium may be consulted over the private difficulties of residents and may acquire a reputation for divining and healing beyond the territorial limits of the domain.

A medium's reputation depends on his ability to convince people at séances and to acquire a large clientele. In practice, if the medium is to acquire and maintain a position of influence, his oracular pronouncements, whether in private divination or concerning the election of a chief, must accord with public opinion. In many situations, therefore, mediums serve to crystalize and to voice public opinion. More generally, spirit mediums represent great figures of the Shona past and have frequently become symbols of rejection of white dominance.

Regional cults. Certain spirits spread their influence beyond the territorial domain of any political authority. Such spirits may be associated with powerful political figures of the past, symbolizing conglomerations of chiefdoms that for a period may have been subject to a single ruling dynasty. Or they may be conceived as spirits of ancient heroes who lived before the establishment of any present dynasties. The mediums of such spirits are consulted by clients from a number of neighboring chiefdoms on private problems and on public issues such as drought and chiefly inheritance. Some of these spirits, such as Chaminuka and Nehanda, have become national figures on account of the activities of their mediums in successive wars against the Ndebele and against white settlers.

The most widespread regional cult is that of the high god, Mwari, which is centered on a number of shrines in southern Shona country. In the past, this was the dominant religious cult among most Karanga and Kalanga peoples, and it received some attention from the invading Ndebele. The main shrines in the Matopo Hills are maintained by a hereditary priesthood. There, sacrifices for rain are offered and a voice from a cave utters oracles for those who wish to consult Mwari. Selected young boys and girls dedicated to Mwari live for a time at the center to help maintain the shrine and dance at rituals; often they become important spirit mediums when they return home on reaching maturity, thus maintaining close contacts between the cult center and outlying traditional cults. Mwari was accepted as the Shona name for God by early Christian missionaries, and through Christian influence it has now been accepted far beyond the sphere of influence of the traditional cult centers.

Peripheral cults. Throughout Shona country, certain spirits are believed to be the concern of their hosts only. These are usually conceived as spirits of aliens, or occasionally of animals, who died away from home and so wander about, unsettled and restless, until they find a human host they can possess. Such a spirit may confer special powers on the host, particularly those of divining and healing, as well as such skills as hunting or

playing music. Often, however, alien spirits are said only to want to dance, and they possess their hosts only at dances held in honor of such spirits, when a number of hosts of similar spirits are likely to be present and to become possessed simultaneously. These séances, usually held in response to illness in one of the hosts, allow persons who are undergoing some kind of strain to find relief in the attention they receive and in the dramatic dancing they perform.

Christianity among the Shona. Christian missionaries, active in Shona country for nearly a hundred years, have strongly influenced contemporary Shona religion. Initially, conversion to Christianity was largely associated with the acquisition of wealth, mainly through education and consequent employment but also through access to improved agricultural techniques. For many, Christianity was a symbol of the new ways of life that colonization introduced and, in particular, of the comforts that the new technology made possible; for others it became a symbol of white oppression.

Different mission churches were located in different rural areas; branches of these churches in the cities were able to provide places where migrants could meet others from their home areas. They also established accessible means of communication with the rural areas. With its emphasis on the high god rather than on local cults, Christianity was better adapted than traditional religion to cope with the new situation of high mobility and intermingling of people from different regions, especially in the urban centers.

Christianity does not, however, incorporate mechanisms for coping with tension at the family and local level, and as presented by missionaries it retains an impersonal approach to illness. Consequently, professed Christians still frequently revert to ancestral and local cults when faced with persistent illness and other personal problems, particularly when these reflect social tensions.

Since the early 1930s, many Shona have joined the new independent churches, which have adopted forms of Christianity but are free from foreign control. These pay more attention to traditional cosmologies, and particularly to the belief in afflicting spirits and in witchcraft as causes of misfortune, but like the mission churches they provide a means of overcoming the boundaries of family and local cults. These churches tend to attract many disparate peoples, although most of their followers are relatively uneducated. Faith healing, a central activity in most of them, is a major means for attracting converts. Afflicting spirits are exorcised, rather than being accommodated as in traditional religion or simply dismissed as in the mission churches.

Although in ritual and belief independent churches

are much closer to traditional religion than are the mission churches, the antagonism between them and traditional cults is much greater than in the case of mission churches because their adherents are drawn largely from a common body of people. For those outside positions of leadership, however, there is an easy intermingling of religious systems. Individuals may move in and out of the various religious groups depending on the circumstances of the moment, and most Shona see nothing wrong in such religious mobility. For most Shona, the various forms of Christianity together with the various traditional cults all provide a pool of religious responses from which an individual can choose, depending on his or her needs of the moment.

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M. F. C. BOURDILLON

SHŌTOKU TAISHI (574–622), posthumous name of Umayado no Toyotomimi no Mikoto, also known as Jōgū Ō; regent of Japan from 593 until his death thirty years later. His father, Emperor Yōmei, died of natural causes in the second year of his reign (587). In the same year, the Mononobe family was defeated by the Soga family, and Emperor Sushun ascended the throne. In the fifth year of his reign (592) he was assassinated by

Soga no Umako. Under these unsettled conditions the first female ruler in Japanese history, Empress Suiko, the thirty-third monarch and consort of the thirtieth monarch, Emperor Bidatsu, ascended the throne. She designated Emperor Yōmei's eldest son, nineteen-year-old Shōtoku, as imperial prince (*taishi*) and placed him in charge of the government.

For the next thirty years Shōtoku worked to establish sound foundations for the Japanese state and to further Japanese culture. To that end he embraced Buddhism, encouraged education and supported people of talent, established a constitution, and brought about a complete change in the national government. He also sent emissaries and students to Sui-dynasty China and thus was instrumental in bringing the advanced culture of the continent to Japan. He patronized the arts, encouraged industry, gave medical aid to the sick, succored the orphaned and the aged, set about developing transportation routes, instituted rules protecting animals, and compiled a national history. Thus, in a single lifetime a brilliant cultural flowering took place in Japan.

In 594, the second year of Empress Suiko's reign, on the first day of the second month, Shōtoku issued an imperial edict promoting the Three Treasures. The edict held that these "treasures"—the Buddha, the Buddhist teachings (*dharna*), and the Buddhist brotherhood (*sangha*)—were not three separate entities but were to exist eternally, indestructibly, as one. This can be considered the first year of the Buddhist epoch in Japan. Furthermore, contemporary sources indicate that "all subjects and parties were vying to build a Buddha house in gratitude to the emperor and to their ancestors." According to the *Nihonshoki*, this "Buddha house" means "temple," so designated because until then there were no temples in Japan. But whereas in India, monasteries (*vihāra*) had been places of religious practice for Buddhist adherents, in Japan temples may have first been built to express gratitude to the emperor and to one's ancestors; only later did they become specifically consecrated to Buddhist ends. The chief functions of the clergy at these early Buddhist temples were to perform funerals and memorial services, and to maintain graves for their patron families.

In 604, ten years after the Three Treasures Edict, the so-called Seventeen Article Constitution was promulgated. (In recent years some scholars have come to believe that the constitution was actually composed after the death of Prince Shōtoku.) In its second article the constitution held that the Three Treasures were the final refuge of all living beings and the ultimate objects of faith of the whole world. It also taught that everyone, in all ages, must revere the Buddhist teachings.

Two years later, in 606, Shōtoku Taishi lectured to Empress Suiko on the *Shōmangyō* (Skt., *Śrīmālā Sūtra*). In the same year he lectured on the *Hokekyō* (Skt., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*). Shōtoku's interpretation of these scriptures constitute the first commentaries on Buddhist texts in Japan. Prince Shōtoku was determined that they would survive for future generations. To that end, he sent Ono no Imoko as emissary to Sui China in the following year in order to collect writing materials, commentaries, and other reference works. Ono no Imoko's second mission to China, the following year, was again probably for the purpose of securing commentaries to three *sūtras*. Shōtoku's resulting commentaries, the *Shōmangyō gisho*, in one fascicle, the *Yuimagyō gisho*, in three fascicles (based on the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*; Jpn., *Yuimagyō*), and the *Hokekyō gisho*, in four fascicles, are the first and oldest writings in Japan. The four-fascicle *Hokekyō gisho* preserved in the imperial archives is said to be in the handwriting of Shōtoku Taishi, and as such is one of the great treasures of Japan.

By comparison with many of the other major *sūtras* in the Mahāyāna canon, the *Hokekyō* (seven fascicles, translated into Chinese in 406), *Yuimagyō* (three fascicles, translated in 406), and the *Shōmangyō* (one fascicle, translated in 436) are short works, but in terms of content, they are at least as important as many of the longer texts. They constitute the Mahāyāna scriptures at their highest stage of development. The *Yuimagyō* is a work that is critical of Hīnayāna thought and that idealizes Mahāyāna Buddhism. Both the *Hokekyō* and the *Shōmangyō* propound the "single vehicle" (Skt., *ekayāna*) teachings, which reconcile Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna doctrines and thus represent a higher stage of development and synthesis. The Single Vehicle teachings transcend the differences between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and teach Buddhahood for all living creatures. This Buddhahood is predicated on the eternality of the Buddha's "dharma body."

The Buddha esteemed by Shōtoku Taishi was, then, this Buddha of ultimate "dharma body," and the teaching that he believed in was the Single Vehicle teaching of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In this Single Vehicle teaching clergy and laity are not strictly divided. These scriptures emphasize that even in everyday life deliverance from worldly desires can be attained; hence, they reject such Hīnayāna practices as abandoning wife, family, and society, and going off to the forests to practice meditation. Here we can detect the lay-oriented nature of Japanese Buddhism as it was to evolve in later centuries. Thus, although there is much in the commentaries on the three *sūtras* that does not derive from Indian an-

notations of the scriptures or from the commentaries of China's Buddhist thinkers, Shōtoku's interpretations are still firmly rooted in the classical Single Vehicle concepts of Mahāyāna.

Shōtoku Taishi is credited with establishing both the Hōryūji of Nara and the Shitennōji of Ōsaka, the latter in 593. The Shitennōji is traditionally said to have been built on the former land of the Mononobe family in honor of the four *deva* kings who protect all on earth in the four directions. What are commonly called provincial temples (*kokubunji*) were formally known in the Nara period as the Temples of the Deva Kings of Golden Light Who Protect the Nation (*Konkōmyō Shitennō gogoku no tera*). One was built in each of the sixty provinces, an extension of the idea of guardian temples exemplified by the Shitennōji.

After the death of Shōtoku Taishi in 622, the despotism of the Soga family intensified. Shōtoku's branch of the Soga, beginning with Prince Yamashiro no Ōe, committed suicide or was put to death at Ikaruga Shrine in 643 during a bitter succession dispute. His family had put into practice what Shōtoku Taishi had taught: "Do no evil, perform only good." They shunned the taking of life by force of arms, whether of enemies or of friends, and they sought lasting peace. This is because they believed in the revered and eternal "dharma body" of the Buddha, rather than in a physical body that sooner or later would pass away. Two years later, in 645, the Taika Reforms were proclaimed, and the Japanese imperial family was established on the secure and lasting base initiated earlier by Shōtoku.

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HANAYAMA SHINSHŌ

SHRINES, from the Latin *scrinium*, meaning "box" or "receptacle," are containers of sacred meaning and power. Although shrines can be small enough to be carried or drawn in procession, as was the Ark of the Covenant in ancient Israelite religion, usually they are fixed locations, associated often with such natural phenomena as mountains, rivers, and caves. Shrines often

bear strong associations with significant religious persons or traditions and have continuity with the past: Mecca derives its sacred power in part from having been the major center of Muḥammad's prophecy and teaching; the wall of the Second Temple in Jerusalem is a shrine because it is the tangible object linking Jewish tradition to the land of Israel and its ancient temple traditions.

Shrines Define Sacred Space. Not only is the shrine itself regarded as a holy ground by its devotees, it often serves as a marker of the sacred geography of a religious tradition. The shrine may mark the center of the religious geography. The Great Mosque at Mecca defines the center; all other mosques in the Islamic world face toward Mecca, thus mapping out Islamic religious geography as a vast enclosure with Mecca as its center. A shrine may also mark the farthest reach of the periphery of the religious geography, as in the case of the four *dhāms*, or divine "abodes" of the Hindu tradition. At the far north in the Himalayas is the Śaiva shrine of Badrināth, to the east the Vaiṣṇava shrine at Puri, to the far south the shrine at Rāmeśvaram, and in the west the Śaiva shrine at Dvārakā. These four shrines stake out the periphery of the Hindu religious universe, and a pilgrimage to all four, in a clockwise direction, constitutes a circumambulation (*pradakṣiṇā*) around the island mountain of Jambudvīpa (India), which itself lies at the center of the cosmos. [See Center of the World.]

The Shrine Is a Threshold. Extraordinary claims of particular kinds of power frequently surround shrines, and strong expectations of one sort or another characterize the hopes and moods of pilgrims. At the loftiest levels of religious imagination, shrines may be regarded as places of ultimate fulfillment. In the Hindu tradition, pilgrims are taught in their sacred literature and oral tradition that a visit to the river Ganges at Banaras, along with homage paid in the shrines of that sacred city, will bring release from suffering, and that death within the sacred precincts of the city will bring about the end of all rebirth. Hindus call shrines *tīrthas*, meaning "crossing points" or "fords." This word reflects the view that shrines are crossing points between this world and the world (or worldlessness) that lies beyond this present existence.

Shrines serve more proximate needs as well. They may be locations of the ancestors, and the living descendants implicitly acknowledge bonding to them by the mutual honoring of the clan, tribe, or society's progenitors, its deified dead. This pattern is widespread and can be seen, for example, among the Ganda of southern Uganda, where the shrines of royal ancestors mark the identity, solidarity, and ethos of the Ganda people. It is also evident in the monuments of American civil reli-

gion, such as shrines that commemorate the heroic sacrifices of warriors and defenders of the nation and receive special attention during Memorial Day and the Fourth of July. The monumental structures in Washington frequently become the setting for rekindling nationalistic pride through the recollection of the work of the founding fathers and others. Tour buses to Washington include visits to shrines such as the Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Vietnam Veterans memorials, and Arlington National Cemetery. Implicit in these visits is the assumption that stepping into the proximity of these markers of the religious and social ethos will enhance the visitor's life. As thresholds, shrines connect persons to reservoirs of religious and social meaning and solidarity.

Shrines Are Centers of Healing. Frequently shrines include substances that are explicitly understood to carry healing or transforming powers. The shrine at Lourdes is built over a natural spring whose waters are understood to heal those who drink and bathe in them. The spring and its healing appeared in the context of a vision of the Virgin Mary attributed to Bernadette Soubirous in 1858. The water's miraculous powers are perceived within the context of religious faith and the vision of the Virgin. Shrines may derive their healing power from the mystical presence of a sacred person. [See Relics.] In India, among both Hindus and Muslims, healings and exorcisms take place in or near the burial sites of saints. At fixed times in the ritual calendar, or spontaneously, the power of the saint is thought to appear at the shrine with beneficial results. Shrines also serve as locations for psychic battles. Pilgrims more readily go into trance at shrines, and religious specialists act as mediums for the voices of pilgrims in trance and seek to adjudicate their intrapsychic conflicts.

Shrines Serve to Order Religious Life. Because sacred power and meaning is bonded to a particular place, the process of getting to and from the place itself contributes to its religious significance. Thus, pilgrimage to a shrine is a way of gaining religious merit by fulfilling a vow or central tenet of a religion. In the process of moving from the familiar world of the home and the village to the shrine, pilgrims tend to break out of their day-to-day social relationships and meet one another in a less restricted, more generic, human community. This softening of social boundaries contributes in part to changes in collective mood, depending on the shrine and its traditions. The mood may be penitential and somber, or ecstatic and playful. Often social structure is relatively suspended in the pilgrimage process as all devotees may be seen to be equal in the divine presence, though social and religious hierarchy also may be reinforced by the shrine through rituals performed that re-

quire specialized knowledge, techniques, or powers of priests or mediums.

Shrines Are Centers of Transmission of Religious Lore. Many shrines draw their appeal from their association with events in the life of a deity or saint. Others celebrate a religiously momentous event that took place on the site of the shrine. Often it is claimed that the shrine was placed there by the god. In the Hindu tradition, for example, Kurukṣetra is sacred because it is where the great war of the *Mahābhārata* was fought; Rāmeśvaram, at the southern tip of India, is where Rāma established a *liṅga*, or emblem of Śiva, after crossing to the island of Lanka to rescue his wife, Sītā; Mathura and the surrounding land of Vraja (Braj) are dotted with shrines calling attention to moments in the life and deeds of Kṛṣṇa. Medieval Christian shrines in Palestine similarly marked the places where Mary nursed Jesus or where the food for the Last Supper was prepared. The major Christian shrines in and near Jerusalem focus primarily on events in the life of Jesus: his birthplace in Bethlehem, the Garden of Gethsemane, the Upper Room (the scene of the Last Supper), and Golgotha, where he was crucified. Pilgrims come to these shrines to see them, touch them, and receive from them things both spiritual and tangible. In this way shrines serve as crossing points linking the narrative traditions of the religion with the lives of the devotees.

Devotees frequently bring to and receive something from the shrine. They may bring donations of money, symbols of ancestors, emblems of personal asceticism, prayers, food, and petitions to divine beings or ancestors. Pilgrims take things away from the shrine as well as they return to their homes. These things may be water, as from the Ganges or the Jordan, a relic, food that has been offered to the deity, an audience with or blessing from a sacred person or office, or some specific instruction from a deity, ancestor, or demon reached through a medium. Many large shrines sponsor institutions of religious learning such as schools and retreat centers. Publishing enterprises for the dissemination of religious pamphlets and literature are a common feature of many shrines.

Shrines Attract Specific Clienteles. Some shrines attract devotees from across an entire tradition, but others have a more limited following. In the case of Christianity, Bethlehem is a shrine to all Christians, but the cathedral at Canterbury draws mainly Anglicans. The Hindu sacred center at Banaras (called Kāśī—"the shining one"—by the faithful) draws Hindus from the widest cross-section of caste and society. The Śaiva shrine at Gaṅgotri in the Himalayas appeals mainly to those belonging to the brahman and merchant castes—the

former because of their traditional involvement with religious matters and the latter because they have greater resources of time and money to make the arduous journey to that remote location. Some shrines draw a more local and particular clientele, restricted as they are to a specific tribe, caste, language group, or gender.

Shrines Are Centers of Religious and Social Continuity. Shrines and clusters of shrines often sustain religious functionaries—priests—who take care of the management of the shrines and provide services for pilgrims who visit them. These services may include performance of rites on behalf of the pilgrims, taking care of their housing and feeding while at the site, and providing them with religious instruction. These services may also extend over many generations. In the case of Hinduism, for example, it is common to find shrines maintaining records of pilgrims' visits and genealogies of pilgrim-clients over many generations. Hence a particular family's relationship with a shrine is a fictitious kinship link with the shrine through its lineage of priests. Pilgrims feel that they are returning "home" to the shrine; even though they themselves may never have been there, their ancestors have, and these ancestors' names are duly recorded.

Shrines Are Agencies of Modernization. Although it would appear that shrines and their mystique belong to the premodern world, the opposite seems to be true, particularly in Third World areas. Modern communications make it possible for more people to learn about shrines and be exposed to the claims made on behalf of them by their sponsors. In the case of the annual pilgrimage to the Islamic shrines at Mecca and Medina, access to these sites has been enhanced enormously by air, ship, and bus transportation networks. Consequently, more pilgrims from greater distances come to these sacred centers, and Islam's sense of community is enlarged. Secular governments often take advantage of the shrine as a drawing point for large numbers of pilgrims and set up educational or political activities there. In India, government-sponsored displays attract pilgrims and create ready-made audiences for efforts at family planning, health care, and small-scale technologies appropriate to agricultural populations with limited resources.

Shrines May Be Viewed from Many Angles. Shrines are locations and containers of religious power and meaning. They connect the world lived on the human plane with divine and or ancestral worlds. They define the center and periphery of religious traditions, marking off spatially the traditions of religious geography. They provide the setting for sacred moments that may occur according to the designs of religious calendars or that may arise spontaneously through the religious

charisma of mediums. Shrines are centers of social and religious circulation. They serve as centers of education, healing, maintenance of family, ancestral, political, and social continuity. Shrines form one of the most enduring influences within a religious tradition. Fixed in space, preserved in tradition, looking back to events that took place at the beginning of the universe or at paradigmatic moments in the traditions of religious history, shrines serve to protect and engender the vitality of the religious traditions to which they bear witness.

[See also Pilgrimage.]

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The shrine as object and the religious responses associated with it cannot be separated; therefore, the study of shrines is also the study of pilgrimage. Two highly influential theoretical studies on shrines and pilgrimage phenomena are Mircea Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York, 1959), which explores the notion of "sacred space" as a distinct ontological region in human religious experience, and Victor Turner and Edith Turner's *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* (New York, 1978), which examines the social and symbolic dimensions of the pilgrimage process in ways that can be applied fruitfully to religions other than Christianity.

General theoretical frameworks finally need to be explored in relation to specific shrines, and here the reader should turn to specific case studies. For example, on Lourdes, see Ruth Cranston's *The Miracle of Lourdes* (New York, 1955); on Canterbury, see Richard Church's *Portrait of Canterbury* (London, 1968); on Jerusalem, see John Gray's *A History of Jerusalem* (New York, 1969); on Mecca and Medina, Emel Esin's *Mecca, the Blessed; Madinah, the Radiant* (New York, 1963); on Banaras, Diana L. Eck's *Banaras: City of Light* (New York, 1982); on South Indian shrines, David D. Shulman's *Tamil Temple Myths: Sacrifice and Divine Marriage in the South Indian Śaiva Tradition* (Princeton, 1980); on North Indian shrines, Surinder M. Bhardwaj's *Hindu Places of Pilgrimage in India* (Berkeley, 1973); and on Shintō, see Wilhelmus H. M. Creemers's *Shrine Shintō after World War II* (Leiden, 1968).

PAUL B. COURTRIGHT

SHUGENDŌ is a distinctive Japanese tradition combining both indigenous and imported traditions, particularly Buddhism, and featuring the mastery of magical and ritual techniques to be practiced in and around sacred mountains. The name *Shugendō* means literally "the way [*dō*] of mastering [*shu*] extraordinary religious power [*gen*]"; the connection with sacred mountains is not included in the term but is implicit. Practitioners were called *shugenja*, "persons [*ja*] who master extraordinary religious power," but the more common name by which they have been known is *yamabushi*, "those who sleep [or lie down, *bushi*] in the mountains [*yama*]"—in other words, those who make mountains

their home. Shugendō arose in part out of the ancient Japanese tradition of sacred mountains, but also features some Taoist influence, and especially ritual, divinities, symbolism, and doctrine from Buddhism.

Although Shugendō groups trace their origin to the late seventh- and early eighth-century tradition of En no Ozunu, the institutional organization of Shugendō did not take place until about the eleventh century. Eventually more than a hundred mountains were headquarters for a number of main traditions and many local variations of Shugendō, which was never unified on a national basis by a single teaching or a single authority. *Shugendō* is the general term referring to all aspects of this way—the mountain headquarters, the ecclesiastical organization, the teachings and practices, and the overall ethos of gaining magico-religious power through special training in sacred mountains.

This pervasive movement, which spread rapidly throughout all areas of Japan except the island of Hokkaido (which was developed later), was one of the main channels for disseminating religious teachings (such as elements of Buddhism) to the common people. It flourished until shortly after the feudal period, when in 1872 the government abolished Shugendō (partly in the attempt to "purify" Shintō and separate Buddhism from Shintō). With complete religious freedom in 1945 after World War II, some Shugendō groups have been able to reorganize, but they do not compare in size or vigor to the flourishing movement that existed from the eleventh through the nineteenth century.

Formation. The two main formative elements for Shugendō are the prehistoric Japanese heritage of sacred mountains, and imported traditions (from Korea and China) of religious realization. Although these two sets of elements eventually became almost imperceptibly intertwined, it is important to distinguish them in order to understand the emergence of Shugendō.

Sacred mountains—including particular beliefs and practices associated with them—have been so important in Japanese religious history that scholars have used the terms *sangaku shinkō* (mountain beliefs or cult) and *sangaku shūkyō* (mountain religion) to refer to this nationwide but unorganized, highly localized phenomenon. Prehistoric practices surrounding sacred mountains were shaped by the character of the *kami* associated with a site and the type of worship accorded that spirit.

The claim has been made that in prehistoric times, before rice agriculture was introduced to Japan, there was a "pure hunting culture" and that the "original" mountain *kami* was a hunting divinity worshiped on the summit of the mountain. The significance of this theory is that, if substantiated, it would point to a hunting cul-

ture and a mountain *kami* related to hunting as the first Japanese precedent of religious practices on the mountain peak. However, there is insufficient evidence to support the claim, and because prehistoric conditions are so poorly documented, it is unlikely that such evidence will be found.

The earliest form of religious practices at Japanese sacred mountains for which there is archaeological evidence is related to the protohistorical period just before and after the common era, and closely associated with agriculture. These archaeological finds occur at the foot of mountains (rather than at the peak), often in conjunction with large boulders. Some of the finds are the stone representations of jewels, mirrors, and swords—the so-called imperial regalia, important to the imperial family and in Shintō. The ritual bowls and mortars also found there have led some scholars to conclude that the boulders (often venerated even today as the temporary dwelling place of *kami*) were the altars on which offerings were made. The mortars and ritual bowls may well have been for brewing and offering a special “overnight” sake (rice wine) that is mentioned in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, early chronicles of Japan. The protohistorical evidence for sacred mountains shows that *kami* were believed to dwell within the mountains and that they were worshiped at the foot of mountains, probably in connection with fertility (offering of rice wine in connection with the rice harvest, a venerable tradition still honored in Shintō).

The second set of formative elements for Shugendō was the host of beliefs, symbolism, and ritual imported to Japan from the Asian continent. Especially Buddhist—but also some Taoist—notions and techniques of religious realization interacted with the indigenous Japanese phenomenon of sacred mountains to create the peculiar blend of traditions that coalesced into Shugendō. One of the major changes brought about by the imported traditions is that it shifted interest in sacred mountains from the foothills to the peak. The primary influence for this change seems to have been Buddhism, whose practitioners viewed sacred mountains as ideal locations for practicing Buddhist austerities and mastering ritual and magical techniques. Taoist notions were added to the mystique of Japan’s sacred mountains, so that they came to be viewed as the dwelling place of “mountain wizards” (*hsien* in Chinese, *sen* or *sennin* in Japanese).

The legendary figure En no Ozunu is viewed by Shugendō followers as having established the precedent of practicing Buddhist austerities, overlaid with a Taoist mystique, in Japanese mountains. He is first mentioned in the *Shoku nihongi* record of 699, when he was banished on the charge of misusing his magical powers to

control people. This simple notice connects his practice of magic with a sacred mountain, Katsuragi. The ninth-century account of the *Nihon ryōiki* contains the full-blown tradition of En no Ozunu used by Shugendō leaders to glorify their legendary founder: here he is treated as a miraculous figure who exemplified the ideals of Buddhist asceticism and Taoistic mysticism, in the context of sacred mountains. Following these ideals, En no Ozunu withdrew into a mountain cave and practiced the Buddhist magical formula of the Peacock King (Kujaku-ō), thereby gaining magical powers such as the ability to fly through the air. After competition with a jealous *kami*, he became a Taoist wizard and ascended to Heaven. In this account he is called En no Ubasoku (*ubasoku* is the Japanese rendering of the Sanskrit term *upāsaka*, “unordained Buddhist practitioner”); in Shugendō he is honored as En no Gyōja, in other words, En the Ascetic. Legends developed proclaiming that En no Gyōja had opened up the mountains of Yoshino, Ōmine, and Kumano, some of the earliest institutional centers of Shugendō.

There is no substantial record of the life and activities of En no Ozunu, but his tradition of gaining special religious powers by practicing Buddhist and Taoist techniques of religious realization within the precincts of sacred mountains became the precedent for a host of practitioners on many sacred mountains. Especially during the Heian period (794–1185), unorganized wandering ascetics developed such practices. There were various names for these practitioners: *ubasoku* (Skt., *upāsaka*) drew heavily on Buddhism; *hijiri* (“wise man, holy man”) and *onmyōji* (“master of *yin* and *yang*,” fortune-teller) utilized especially the techniques derived from Onmyōdō (“the way of *yin* and *yang*”); *genja* (“person of extraordinary religious power”) used various techniques. [See Onmyōdō.] These practitioners conducted austerities and pilgrimages within sacred mountains while practicing specific techniques (such as reciting Buddhist *sūtras* and magical formulas) to gain special religious powers; some of them used this power to provide rituals of blessing and healing to laypeople. Gradually some sacred mountains became centers for organizing these practitioners into institutional groups. One of the foremost was Kumano, which from about the eleventh century had become popular as a pilgrimage site for the imperial family and, increasingly, for the nobility and other people as well.

Shugendō was a major channel for unifying and continuing such diverse practices. Prominent sacred mountains became Shugendō centers that attracted large numbers of practitioners and molded their beliefs and practices into distinctive blends of doctrine and action. While revering En no Gyōja as the founder of Shugendō

and generally accepting all the diverse elements within this tradition, local centers revered a specific person who founded practice at that mountain (usually called the one who “opened the mountain”) and developed a particular pattern of holy sites, symbolism, doctrine, and ritual.

Dynamics and Significance. By about the thirteenth century, Shugendō had become a highly organized tradition with many well-established local variations. Although each center emphasized its own particular blend of teachings and practices, some features were common to most groups. Distinctive forms of dress and ritual tools were arranged in sets of twelve or sixteen items: several characteristic items by which Shugendō practitioners were recognized are the small black cap (of Buddhist origin), the seashell or conch, the priest’s staff, and a portable altar. The set of twelve or sixteen items had its own symbolism, as did each aspect and measurement of a particular item. For example, the portable altar, which contained a few Buddhist scriptures, tools, and maybe a small statue (such as Fudō) for worship while the practitioner was on pilgrimage in the mountains, symbolized the cosmos from which the initiate was reborn as a result of his mountain practice.

Such complex symbolism could also occur on a grander scale. For example, worship at Kumano featured a pattern of three sacred mountains viewed as three interrelated cosmic worlds (*mandara*, from Skt. *maṇḍala*): one mountain represented the Womb World Maṇḍala (*taizōkai*), a second mountain represented the Diamond World Maṇḍala (*kongōkai*), and the third represented the higher union of these opposites in a Womb and Diamond World Maṇḍala. In doctrinal terms, the three *maṇḍalas* express the teaching of Esoteric Buddhism of a higher reality; in practical terms, the *maṇḍalas* and Japanese sacred mountains became permanently interrelated, so that the pilgrim who visited these sacred mountains and followed prescribed rules of purity and training was sure to realize the attainment of Buddhahood. Similar patterns of three sacred mountains, with local variations, are found at other Shugendō headquarters throughout Japan.

The most conspicuous religious performances within Shugendō are the ascetic procedures followed by pilgrims during periodic retreats on sacred mountains, tracing a Buddhist pattern of ten stages from hell and beastly existence to heaven and the enlightened status of Buddhahood. The formal pattern of ten stages is common to Buddhism generally, but Shugendō centers gave dramatic turns to such doctrinal teachings. For example, the first stage of hell, which meant weighing one’s *karman*, or past (here, evil) conduct, was acted out in some Shugendō traditions by lowering a *yamabushi*

over a precipice with a rope, in which position he was required to confess all his sins. This is typical of the Shugendō emphasis on asceticism in concrete and experiential terms. Perhaps the outstanding ritual performance of Shugendō is the fire rite called Saitōgoma, which may derive in part from indigenous Japanese fire rites. (The word *goma* is related linguistically to the Indian terms *soma* or *homa*.) The immediate precedent of Saitōgoma is the heritage of fire rituals in Esoteric Buddhism, but the Shugendō rite, an outdoor night ceremony performed as the culmination of a period of religious realization, combines the notion of attainment of Buddhahood with the general sense of gaining power from ritual association with sacred mountains.

By participating in successive mountain retreats (often called “peaks”), a Shugendō initiate acquired the ability to minister to laypeople, and the veteran *yamabushi* increased in rank in the local organization. Each center had its own complex rules of training and sets of ranks. As Shugendō became more highly institutionalized, especially from about the thirteenth century, the older tradition of wandering, unorganized practitioners gave way to the establishment of a central headquarters that trained and controlled individual *yamabushi*. These *yamabushi* lost their status as individual wandering ascetics, and although they continued to be viewed as possessing the mystique and power of sacred mountains, they spent more of their time in an itinerant ministry, dispensing charms and blessings from the sacred mountain to common people. There emerged complex networks of parish relationships between Shugendō headquarters and many families in the surrounding area, with itinerant *yamabushi* both carrying blessings from the mountain to the people and also guiding individual believers on pilgrimages to the mountain. As *yamabushi* leaders called *sendatsu* guided their parishioners on the pilgrimage, walking from outlying areas to the sacred mountain, they stayed each night at specially designated lodging houses.

At times the competition between rival Shugendō groups erupted into violence and disputes that had to be settled by secular authorities. In their role as itinerant ministers, sometimes accompanied by wives who assisted in rites of possession and exorcism, *yamabushi* were very influential in spreading religious traditions to the populace; they taught practical versions of Esoteric Buddhism, and disseminated the Kōshin cult (derived in part from Taoist tradition). As they mingled with the people, *yamabushi* came to be associated with the long-nosed mountain goblin called *tengu*; they were also suspected of abusing their right of free travel by acting as military spies. By Tokugawa times (1600–1867), people viewed *yamabushi* more as popular exorcisers than as

mountain ascetics, and *yamabushi* frequently appeared in plays as pseudoreligious or comical characters. In short, the institutionalization of the *yamabushi* career led to their popularization at the expense of their ascetic and religious character.

The proscription of Shugendō by the Meiji government in 1872 was due primarily to the desire of the new rulers to "restore" Shintō to a pure state, free from foreign—that is, Buddhist—influence, in order to support the notion of the emperor as head of the nation and its indigenous religion (Shintō). Shugendō, being a patent amalgam of Shintō and Buddhism, was an obvious obstacle to such a program. The moral and financial corruption that had plagued Shugendō since the late Tokugawa period was another possible reason for the proscription, which resulted in the splitting of Shugendō centers into independent Buddhist and Shintō elements. With the enactment of freedom of religion in 1945, however, some Shugendō traditions surviving in Buddhism and Shintō were revived and new Shugendō organizations appeared.

Shugendō is significant as a good example of the emergence of Japanese religion from the interaction of indigenous and imported traditions. Most of the elements that make up Shugendō are found throughout Japanese religious history, even to the present day: indeed, several founders of Japanese new religions have been connected with Shugendō, or have displayed similar patterns of religious behavior, such as retreat on sacred mountains for the practice of austerities and the attainment of sacred power.

[See also the biography of *En no Gyōja*.]

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Western-language publications on Shugendō are still relatively few. The first modern work on Shugendō is Gaston Rondeau's *Le Shugendō: Histoire, doctrine et rites des anachorètes dits Yamabushi* (Paris, 1965), which emphasizes historical documents and treats Shugendō mainly in terms of doctrinal developments out of Tendai and Shingon. Hartmut O. Rotermond has written two major works on Shugendō. His earlier

work, *Die Yamabushi: Aspekte ihres Glaubens, Lebens und ihrer sozialen Funktion im japanischen Mittelalter* (Hamburg, 1968), traces Shugendō as viewed in Japanese literature. His later work, *Pèlerinage aux neuf sommets: Carnet de route d'un religieux itinérant dans le Japon du dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1983), is a detailed study of the travels and experiences of one *yamabushi* through his writings. In *A Religious Study of the Mount Haguro Sect of Shugendō: An Example of Japanese Mountain Religion* (Tokyo, 1970) I have utilized my fieldwork with a contemporary Shugendō group to interpret its religious worldview.

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SHUN. See Yao and Shun.

SHUNNING. See Expulsion and Excommunication.

SIBERIAN RELIGIONS. See Arctic Religions; Prehistoric Religions, *article on* The Eurasian Steppes and Inner Asia; Shamanism, *article on* Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanism; and Southern Siberian Religions.

SIBYLLINE ORACLES. In Greek tradition (accepted by the Romans not later than the fourth century BCE and by the Jews not later than the second) a sibyl is an old woman who utters ecstatic prediction of woe. The etymology of the name is unknown; in Greece the earliest mention of the term is found in the writings of the philosopher Heraclitus, about 500 BCE. In the following years, the tradition of sibylline oracles became well established (and was caricatured by Aristophanes in late fifth-century Athens).

The sibyls were thought to wander through the world and to attain an extraordinary age—as much as a thousand years. But Delphi, Samos, Erythrae in Ionia, Marpeessus in Troas, and Cumae and Tibur in Italy each had its own resident sibyl. Other individual sibyls were known respectively as Persian, Chaldean, Phrygian, and Egyptian; and there were less famous sibyls elsewhere. The first mention of the Hebrew Sibyl in classical sources is in Pausanias (10.12.9), in the second century CE, but such a figure was associated with oracles long before then. Like other sibyls, she had a personal name, which Pausanias gives as *Sabba* (a variant is *Sambethe*). She is referred to in extant oracles as a pagan daughter-in-law of Noah.

Places in which sibyls were supposed to deliver their oracles, such as the cave in Cumae, were revered and visited by pilgrims. Few people, however, claimed to have seen a living sibyl. In Petronius's *Satyricon* (chap. 48) Trimalchio does, but he is not meant to be believed. In reality, people were primarily acquainted with col-

lections of ancient (or allegedly ancient) oracles that were attributed to individual sibyls and that seemed to be relevant, or could be applied, to given situations.

The oracles were written in Greek hexameters, and their content was often protected by acrostics. Latin sibylline oracles appear only late (for instance in Procopius, concerning the Goths of the sixth century CE). The oracles of the Cumaean Sibyl were supposed to have been originally inscribed on palm leaves.

History of the Oracular Texts. The Romans claimed to have received a partial collection of the prophecies of the Cumaean Sibyl under one of the two Tarquinian kings, in the sixth century BCE. What is certain is that a collection of such books existed in Rome and was preserved in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus during the republic. These books were entrusted to a special priestly commission, composed first of two, then of ten, then of fifteen, members, who could consult them only when ordered to do so by the Senate in times of recognized emergency. When the temple of Jupiter burned in 83 BCE, the Sibylline Books were destroyed and were ultimately replaced by a new collection. Augustus transferred these oracles to the newly built temple of Apollo on the Palatine and ordered a severe pruning of the texts. Rome seems to have been unique in making the sibylline oracles a monopoly of the state. Elsewhere, sibylline books seem to have circulated openly. Being authoritative everywhere, the sibylline texts were of course controversial and often suspected to be forgeries.

We have only scattered examples of pagan sibylline oracles. The most famous are perhaps those preserved by Phlegon of Tralles (early second century CE). One seems to belong to 125 BCE, another perhaps to Sulla's time, and a third certainly refers to the celebration of the Secular Games under Augustus, though it may incorporate older texts. Roman tradition attributes, perhaps correctly, to sibylline oracles the initiative for building the first temple to Ceres, Liber, and Libera in Rome, for introducing the cult of Asklepios from Epidaurus, for the human sacrifices of 226 BCE, for the consultation of Apollo at Delphi in 216, and for the introduction of the cult of Magna Mater in 205. In Rome there seems to have been steady collaboration between Apollo and the Cumaean Sibyl; elsewhere Apollonian divination and sibylline prophecy did not always agree.

A Roman law against reading sibylline books is mentioned in an obscure context by Justin Martyr in his first *Apology* (44.12), from the middle of the second century CE. The sibylline texts remained authoritative in Rome until the fourth century, when they were still consulted by Julian. According to the contemporary account of Rutilius Namatianus, these texts were destroyed by Stilicho not later than 408 CE. But the au-

thority of Vergil, who had given such prominence to the Cumaean Sibyl in his fourth *Eclogue* and in the *Aeneid*, saved the prestige of the sibyls among the Christians, as one can clearly see in the writings of Lactantius, Eusebius, and the emperor Constantine himself. The Christians found in Vergil and in other sibylline texts prophecies of the annunciation of Christ. Independently of the Christians, and in fact before Christianity existed, the Jews had produced sibylline texts that purported to convey divine expectations and reactions from a Jewish point of view and invited recognition of the true God. The Christians accepted these Jewish texts, occasionally interpolated them, and added to them other texts of unequivocally Christian character. The collection of sibylline books that has reached us is thus of mixed Jewish and Christian authorship, but the extant manuscripts are all of Christian origin. Collectively, they are known as the *Sibylline Oracles*.

These manuscripts can be roughly divided into two groups. Some, published as early as the sixteenth century, contain the first eight books. Others (made known chiefly by Cardinal Angelo Mai in the early nineteenth century) include books numbered from 9 to 14, but books 9 and 10 contain material already included in the first eight books, whereas books 11 to 14 add new material. In modern editions, beginning with that by Charles Alexandre (1841–1856), the two series are conflated, and therefore books 9 and 10 are not present. Books 3, 4, and 5 were already known in some form to Clement of Alexandria; books 6, 7, and 8 were known to Lactantius in about 300 CE. Some Christian fragments of sibylline oracles are to be found outside the present collection, in quotations by ancient writers.

Content of the Sibylline Oracles. As is evident from Vergil's reference to the "final age" in his fourth *Eclogue*, the division of world history into periods was a feature of pagan sibylline prophecies. This is confirmed by a pagan literary text, Lycophron's *Alexandra* (third or second century BCE), which is influenced by pagan sibylline texts. The authors of the Jewish and Christian sibylline books developed the universal aspect that distinguished them. The influence of the *Book of Daniel* is unmistakable. Like the *Book of Daniel*, the sibylline authors embraced the theory of the four monarchies. They combined with it the division of history into ten "generations." The note of hostility toward Rome (and toward the Hellenistic rulers, as long as they existed) is quite clear but not ubiquitous. As such, these texts belong to the resistance literature of the Near East against foreign domination. As in the *Book of Revelation*, the return of Nero at the head of the Parthian army figures prominently in books 4, 5, and 8. The fate of man after death is reflected in the Christian texts of books 2, 7,

and 8 but not in the Jewish texts. Given our poor knowledge of the Greek-speaking Jews in the Diaspora after the first century CE, these sibylline oracles are perhaps altogether more important for the history of the Jewish Diaspora than for early Christianity.

The first two books (not clearly separated in the manuscripts) are Jewish in origin but have been elaborated and reworked by Christians. The present text assumes the fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE; its curious interest in Phrygia may point to its place of origin. Book 3, perhaps the most important historically, contains texts of ideological orientations dating from various periods: lines 1–96 seem to be later than Cleopatra and the Battle of Actium (31 BCE) and perhaps even later than Nero; lines 350–380 seem to refer to anti-Roman movements of the first century BCE; and lines 466–469 seem to refer to the era of Sulla. The main corpus is a messianic prophecy involving Jews and Greeks, with special attention given to Egypt. Three allusions to a seventh king of Egypt (ll. 193, 318, 608) in all likelihood refer to Ptolemy Philometor (180–145 BCE). There is a reference to the *Book of Daniel* in line 396, but its implications are doubtful. In lines 194–195 there is a reference to the resurgence of the Jews after some catastrophe, possibly the reign of Antiochus IV. In lines 388ff. a strange oracle about a king of Asia presents problems. Finally, in lines 653ff. there is a prophecy about a savior from the East or from the sun. It is by no means obvious that this king should be identified with the seventh king of Egypt. The book as a whole, though at certain points strongly anti-Roman and anti-Macedonian, is not radical in its hostility and seems to hope for, and to wish to foster, good relations between Jews and Egyptian Greeks.

Book 4 seems to be based on pagan sibylline oracles of the end of the fourth century BCE. The text (ll. 49–101) knows of four empires and ten generations and identifies the tenth generation and the fourth empire with Macedon. The Jewish elaboration presupposes the rise of Rome and the end of the Temple of Jerusalem, the legend of Nero's flight to the Parthians, and the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE. It insists on baptism as a prerequisite of salvation and on the rejection of Temple cult. This points to some Jewish sectarian groups, not necessarily to a Judeo-Christian sect.

Book 5, which has a Christian allusion in lines 256–259, knows of the destruction of the Temple and the legend of Nero, and Hadrian is still favorable to the Jews; a date before 132 CE seems probable, but line 51, with its reference to Marcus Aurelius, must be treated as a later interpolation. The text is strongly hostile to Rome and Egypt and contains a mysterious allusion to a temple in Egypt destroyed by the Ethiopians (ll. 501ff.).

Book 6 is a very short Christian text known to Lactan-

tius. Book 7 is Christian in its present form, with possible, but puzzling, Jewish and gnostic traits. Book 8 seems to be a combination of Jewish and Christian texts with a puzzling reference to an eschatological queen (l. 194) in the Jewish section (ll. 1–216), which is very hostile to Rome and was probably written before 195 CE. The Christian part is, at any rate, earlier than 300 CE.

Books 11–14, taken together, are an apocalyptic outline of world history since the Flood. Book 11 is Jewish and may not be much later than Vergil's death in 19 CE, alluded to in line 171; lines 160–161, however, seem to point to a later date and are perhaps interpolations. Book 12 is Jewish, with Christian interpolations, and was written not long after 235 CE; it reflects a time and milieu (Egypt) in which Jews were inclined to accept the Roman empire. Book 13 is Jewish with Christian interpolations, is dated around 265 CE, and contains propaganda for Odenathus of Palmyra. Book 14, a confused text of Jewish origin that still awaits satisfactory interpretation, seems to end with the Arab conquest of Alexandria, and with Jewish collaboration in it, in the middle of the seventh century. If this is correct, it shows Jews composing sibylline texts in Greek at a very late date.

Christians maintained an interest in sibylline oracles and composed new ones throughout the Middle Ages. The queen of Sheba was sometimes identified with the sibyl Sabba. The Tiburtine Sibyl became especially popular both in the West and in the East; some of her texts, though now in medieval redactions, probably go back to the fourth century CE. As late as the thirteenth century Thomas of Celano alludes to her in his *Dies irae*.

[See also Oracles.]

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SIDDHĀRTHA. See Buddha.

SIDDHAS. See Mahāsiddhas.

SIDDUR AND MAḤZOR. The *siddur* and the *maḥzor* (pl., *siddurim* and *maḥzorim*) are the prayer books used in Jewish public worship. The term *siddur* ("order"; from the Hebrew root *šdr*, "order, arrange") signifies an order of prayer and generally denotes weekday and Sabbath liturgy. The term *maḥzor* ("cycle"; from the root *ḥzr*, "return, come around again") denotes the annual cycle of prayer for holidays that come but once a year; the *maḥzor* is therefore usually subdivided nowadays into separate volumes for each holiday: that is, the *maḥzor* for Passover, Sukkot, or Shavu'ot (the Pilgrimage Festivals) or for Ro'sh ha-Shanah or Yom Kippur (the Days of Awe, or High Holy Days). Surprisingly, the determination of a standardized text for

these volumes is a relatively late phenomenon and, in fact, is still open to editorial discretion. Even though there now exists authorized wording for all standard prayers, and even though one can anticipate generally what basic prayers each *siddur* or *maḥzor* will contain, many *siddurim* published today also contain selections drawn from the *maḥzor*, and different editions vie with each other to be more comprehensive.

History. No comprehensive textual standardization seems to predate the ninth century. Until then, and particularly before the promulgation of the Mishnah (c. 200 CE), the very nature of early rabbinic liturgy militated against prescribed texts for prayer, in that a single authorized set of fixed wording was avoided. Instead, prayer leaders were given a certain order of mandated themes that they were encouraged to express creatively as worship proceeded; they thus combined the complementary principles of structural fixity (*geva'*) and linguistic spontaneity (*kavvanah*). After the close of the tannaitic era (c. 200), we hear of isolated individual orders of prayer (called *seder tefillot*), and the very act of saying prayers is often described by the verb meaning "to order" them, as if an official "order," or *siddur*, were in existence; but except for specific prayers attributed to the personal taste of individual rabbis, there is evidence against the existence of authoritative, generally accepted, inalterable sets of wording such as we find in the *siddur* or *maḥzor* of today.

This principle of freedom within structure is particularly evident in the prayers of Palestinian Jewry where it continued in force even beyond the amoraic (or Talmudic) age (after c. 500), at least until that community's partial destruction by the Crusades, at which time Palestinian spiritual independence was interrupted. True, we have Palestinian orders of service from that time with their own typical linguistic preferences, but these are marked by enormous poetic variation, both within the basic prayers themselves and in the insertions or additions for special occasions.

Babylonian Jewry, on the other hand, favored ever-increasing linguistic fixity, particularly after the middle of the eighth century, under the leadership of its newest scholarly elite, the geonim. In their attempt to standardize worldwide Jewish practice, these authorities initiated the practice of sending *responsa* to outlying Jewish communities, in which they described their own liturgical preferences and declared them as universally binding. By the middle of the eleventh century, they had penned at least two complete orders of prayer, and it is from these compositions (especially the first one) that today's *siddur* and *maḥzor* eventually evolved. Later sources mention a third prayer book, compiled by Ha'i Gaon (d. 1038), but it has not survived.

The first of these comprehensive compendiums of prayer, and the most influential to this day, is *Seder Rav Amram*, sent by Amram Gaon (d. 871) to a Jewish community in Spain, whence it circulated widely to become the model for all western European rites. In content, it is Amram's prescribed wording for a comprehensive set of prayers—both *siddur* and *maḥzor* combined—along with detailed legal instructions regarding how worship is to proceed. Extant manuscripts of *Seder Rav Amram* are somewhat undependable with regard to the text of the prayers, which scribes did not always copy accurately, but the accompanying legal commentary is preserved faithfully enough for us to see that Amram relied on Babylonian precedent and was motivated, in fact, by the desire to universalize its practice at the expense of Palestinian alternatives that were vying for cultural influence in newly established Jewish settlements of North Africa and western Europe. So Amram sought to demonstrate a clear chain of authority going back to the Babylonian Talmud, via geonic interpreters, such as his predecessor in office, Naṭronai (d. 858), who had tried to accomplish the same goal by recording a list of daily blessings incumbent on every Jew, and whose list Amram now borrowed for inclusion in his *Seder*.

The second geonic prayer book is *Siddur Sa'adyah*, the work of Sa'adyah Gaon (d. 942). In an introduction thereto, Sa'adyah states his intention: to help the average worshiper differentiate the proper from the improper in the baffling array of liturgical customs then extant. Like *Seder Rav Amram*, *Siddur Sa'adyah* is comprehensive, being at once both *siddur* and *maḥzor*. But it differs from *Seder Rav Amram* in at least five ways: (1) it contains only short, uncomplicated instructions on the conduct of worship, rather than lengthy excursions; (2) these are recorded in Arabic, not Aramaic; (3) Sa'adyah incorporates Palestinian material; (4) he favors *piyyuṭim* (poetic insertions in the standard body of prayers); and (5) in general, he displays a mastery of the Islamic liturgical aesthetic typical of his day, particularly in his preference for logical order, grammatical purity, linguistic precision rooted in scripture, and philosophy (see his two *baqqashot*, petitions, following the Tefillah, for example).

By the tenth century, the center of the Jewish world had shifted to western Europe. There, each nascent community proceeded to define its own liturgical identity, paying special heed to Amram's paradigmatic *Seder*, but in some cases showing familiarity also with *Siddur Sa'adyah* or other independent geonic precedents, and also with decisions reached by earlier authorities in North Africa (especially in Kairouan) and in Palestine itself. Thus every community developed its own liturgical rite, which amounted in each case to a

local modification of geonic prototype, in which Amram's prayer book predominated. All such European variations eventually became classified as rites common either to Ashkenaz (Franco-Germany) or to Sefarad (the Iberian Peninsula), but in either case, the resulting liturgical corpus did not yet differentiate its material calendrically, so that daily, Sabbath, and holy day prayers were all combined indiscriminately in one volume called variously *maḥzor* or *siddur* (or even *seder*, as in *Seder Rav Amram*). By the fourteenth century, however, the liturgy had expanded to the point where its unmanageable bulk resulted in a subdivision into several works. In Ashkenaz, these were the *siddur*, for daily and Sabbath prayers; the *maḥzor*, for holiday liturgy; and a further subdivision of the *maḥzor*, which more and more frequently appeared as a separate work, the Haggadah, a Passover Eve home devotional "order," or *seder*.

By the 1520s both the *siddur* and the *maḥzor* appeared in printed form, with the result that mass-produced standardized texts began to whittle away at long-standing local points of diversity. These texts, however, were often the work of printers whose competence lay in the new technology and its business-related affairs, not in rabbinic scholarship relevant to the rigorous reproduction of authentic texts. Consequently, texts from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century featured efforts to emend their errors. Especially noteworthy in this regard is Shabbetai Sofer, a prominent Polish grammarian and qabbalist, who (from 1613 to 1618) attempted to fix a scientifically accurate rite. Wolf Heidenheim (1757–1832) extended his critical spirit into the modern age by printing scientifically annotated editions; and in 1868, Heidenheim's disciple, Seligman Baer, summarized critical opinion up to his time in *Seder 'avodat Yisra'el*.

By then, the Sefardic rite had been carried throughout the Mediterranean, Holland, England, and even the New World by Spanish émigrés and their descendants, where it evolved further according to liturgical canons of these lands. The Ashkenazic rite was carried eastward across northern Europe to Poland and Russia, and then to North America where it now predominates. Qabbalists after the sixteenth century and their spiritual descendants, Polish Ḥasidim, combined the two rites.

In the 1800s, liturgical reform based on theological, academic, political, and aesthetic considerations was the norm for much of European Jewry, particularly in Germany, but increasingly also in America. The most significant works, perhaps, are the 1819 *Hamburg Prayer Book*, which first introduced comprehensive and theologically based liturgical reform to Germany, and

David Einhorn's *'Olat tamid* (1858), which became the model for the Reform movement in the United States and Canada, where a standardized *Union Prayer Book* has existed since 1894/5.

Alongside those of the Reform movement, the most numerically significant liberal prayer books in America are those of the Conservative movement. The original series emerged in the 1940s as the Conservative movement sought to delineate its own ideological specificity. But the appearance of its *Maḥzor for Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur* in 1972 heralded a major liturgical renaissance, in which all Jewish communities now find themselves, and the older books are being replaced.

Since the work of Leopold Zunz (1794–1886), prayer books have been studied according to geographic provenance, so that rites are assumed to correlate with the rise and fall of Jewish communities around the world. Actually, the determining factor is not geographic, but social, distance; prayer books today reflect ideological positioning of specific Jewish groups and their consequent social distance from each other. Prayer book preference derives from a prior communal self-definition—as British Reform, or Hasidic (according to this or that sect), or American Conservative, and so on. A few years after publication of the American Conservative movement's new *maḥzor* in 1972, a new Reform *siddur*, *Gates of Prayer*, appeared in 1975, and its companion *maḥzor*, *Gates of Repentance*, was published in 1978. These were patterned to some extent after *Service of the Heart* (1967) and *Gate of Repentance* (1973), the twin volumes issued by Great Britain's Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues. Clearly, world Jewry is in the process of defining a new post-World War II identity, replete with remarkable liturgical creativity, including a proliferation of alternative prayer books that replicate on the level of whole books the very principle of "freedom within structure" that has marked rabbinic liturgy from its earliest days.

Structure and Contents. Every *siddur* and *maḥzor* is identical in that the public liturgy consists of a specified core of daily prayers, which are elaborated on holy days so as to reflect their relevant calendrical themes and moods. This normal daily structure calls for three services: morning (Shaḥarit), afternoon (Minḥah), and evening ('Arvit, or Ma'ariv); the latter two are generally combined, in practice, and recited together just before and just after nightfall. On holy days, an additional service (Musaf) is appended to the morning one. On Yom Kippur (originally, on all fast days) a concluding service (Ne'illah) is recited.

Daily service. Traceable in part to pre-70 days, before the destruction of the Temple, are two central rubrics: (1) the Shema' (*Dt.* 6:4–9, 11:13–21; *Nm.* 15:37–41) and

its blessings and (2) the Tefillah (lit., "the prayer"), also known as the 'Amidah (The Standing Prayer) and as the Shemoneh 'Esreh (The Eighteen Benedictions). Derived from *Deuteronomy* 6:7, "You shall speak of them . . . when you lie down and when you rise up," the Shema' approximates an evening and morning creed that asserts the unity of God. Its accompanying blessings further define God as creator of light; loving revealer of Torah to the covenanted chosen people, Israel; and redeemer in history (at the paradigmatic salvific event, the Exodus from Egypt, and by analogy, ultimately, for final redemption at the end of days).

The subsequent Tefillah presents nineteen benedictions of which the middle thirteen constitute the basic liturgical petitions. Gamli'el of Yavneh (c. 90 CE) is credited with arranging eighteen of them. Until then, numerous alternative sets of benedictions—"proto-*tefillot*," so to speak—were the norm, and these varied in both number and content. Those who accept the authenticity of chapter 51 of the *Book of Ben Sira* consider it the earliest known example of such a proto-*tefillah* (c. 280 or 180 BCE). But Gamli'el's standardized formulation superseded local usage, and (perhaps a century or two later, in Babylonia) the single petition for a messianic rebuilding of Zion was divided into two separate requests, so that the "Eighteen Benedictions" now number nineteen.

Theologically speaking, the Tefillah's first three benedictions assert (1) the continuity of Israel's covenant with God, in that the merit of the biblical patriarchs is said to warrant messianic deliverance to their descendants ever after; (2) God's power, particularly, to resurrect the dead; and (3) God's sanctity. The last three blessings may have originated in the Temple cult, as they (1) anticipate a restoration of that cult (in messianic times), (2) offer God thanksgiving, and (3) pray for peace. Some scholars see a further theological message in Gamli'el's arrangement of the middle blessings, which are said to reflect the classical Jewish doctrine of salvation, beginning with knowledge of God, repentance, and divine forgiveness; and culminating in the ingathering of the exiles, establishing a system of justice for the appropriate meting out of reward and punishment, and rebuilding Zion under messianic rule.

Not every current liturgy includes all these classical theological statements. Since the *Hamburg Prayer Book*, Reform Jews in particular have modified some of these positions in one way or another, and even Orthodox prayer books that hew faithfully to the received texts have often emended their literal message by the inclusion of running commentaries that accompany the prayers in question.

In time, other rubrics were added to the Shema' and

the Tefillah. Personal prayer within the context of public worship, for example, originally followed the final blessing of the Shema'; but with Gamli'el's mandate to say the Tefillah in that place, it was postponed until the Tefillah's conclusion. The current *siddur* includes an ideal example of personal prayer attributed to one of the rabbis of the Babylonian Talmud, instead of calling for personal devotion from individual worshipers upon conclusion of the Tefillah. Similarly, a Talmudic tradition that as much as an entire confession is appropriate after the recitation of the Tefillah led, by the Middle Ages, to a series of fixed supplications called Taḥanun, which beg God to act graciously despite humankind's paucity of good works. So today's *siddur* appends to the Tefillah first the "private prayer" from the Talmud and then the Taḥanun. On Mondays and Thursdays a scriptural reading then precedes the conclusion of the service (a practice ascribed by tradition to Ezra).

Concluding prayers include the 'Aleinu and the Qaddish. The 'Aleinu is a second-century composition intended for Ro'sh ha-Shanah, but by the fourteenth century it was recited here too, where it provides a daily reminder of two polar attitudes in Judaism: universalism (in that God is sovereign over all), and particularism (in that God selected Israel as the chosen people). The Qaddish resembles Christianity's "Our Father" (the Lord's Prayer), in that both it and the Qaddish date from the first century and request "the coming of the Kingdom." Originally, the Qaddish was intended as the conclusion to a daily study session that culminated in a sermonic exposition on the theme of God's promise, but by the eighth century it had become associated with death; it was known in Austria, some five hundred years later, expressly as a mourners' prayer. It is said as such today, though it appears elsewhere in various forms to divide the sections of the service.

These expansions—"private prayer," Taḥanun, reading of scripture, the 'Aleinu, and the Qaddish—after the second major rubric, the Tefillah, are balanced by comparable additions before the first one, the Shema'. A second-century practice of preparing for formal prayer by the informal recitation of psalms, grew by the ninth century (at least) to become an entire rubric called *Pesukei de-Zimra* (Verses of Song). Its essence is *Psalms* 145–150, followed by a benediction known as *Birkat ha-Shir* (Blessing of Song). These psalms are known as the Daily Hallel, and thus form one of three *hallels* in the *siddur* and *maḥzor*, the other two being the Great Hallel (*Ps.* 136) and the Egyptian Hallel (*Ps.* 113–118), which, in general, characterize holy day worship.

Even these introductory Verses of Song are now prefaced by another lengthy unit known as *Birkhot ha-Shaḥar* (Morning Benedictions). It arose as private home

devotion but was included as public worship in Amram's *Seder*, and it has remained so despite centuries of debate. *Birkhot ha-Shaḥar* contains (1) several blessings, generally predating 200 CE, relevant to awakening and preparing for the new day and (2) study material devoted in the main to recalling the Temple cult.

The afternoon service consists primarily of a Tefillah. The evening service presents the nightly Shema' with, however, an additional blessing requesting divine protection at night (the Hashkivenu). There then follows a Tefillah, which was originally optional but has been treated as obligatory since at least the twelfth century. Both services conclude with the 'Aleinu and the Qaddish.

Sabbath prayers. The basic core just outlined is altered for special days, by (1) a variety of linguistic changes in standard prayers and (2) the inclusion of new material befitting the Sabbath theme. For example, the Sabbath is treated as a foretaste of the perfect messianic age, so the thirteen intermediary Tefillah petitions, which imply a lack, and therefore imperfection, drop out. Instead, one finds a single benediction affirming the day's holiness, "Qedushat ha-Yom" ("Sanctification of the Day"). The morning Torah reading is supplemented by a correlated reading from the Prophets called the *haftarah*, and the Torah alone is read again on Sabbath afternoon.

The *siddur* calls also for introducing the Sabbath at home by another Qedushat ha-Yom (known as Qiddush) which accompanies the drinking of wine and the lighting of candles; these practices date from the first century, if not earlier, though the benediction accompanying the Sabbath lights is a later addition (c. ninth century). At Sabbath's end, the Havdalah prayer asserts Judaism's fundamental binary dichotomy of reality into opposite realms of sacred and profane.

In the sixteenth century, a service of welcoming the Sabbath (Qabbalat Shabbat) was added to the *siddur* for Friday evening. Rooted in qabbalistic theology, it portrays creation as a series of continually advancing stages of divine emanation, so that creation and creator are one and the same entity seen from two different perspectives, both of which eventuate in the Sabbath. *Sabbath* (Heb., *shabbat*) thus signifies not only the last day of creation but also the final emanation of the godhead, the female part, so to speak, of an androgynous God who is pictured as if its masculine and feminine aspects are in exile from each other, paralleling the fragmentation of this, our unredeemed world. Accordingly the Qabbalat Shabbat service welcomes the Sabbath not only as the seventh day of creation but also as the female aspect of the creator, God, personified as the Sabbath bride. The service progresses through the recita-

tion of six psalms, representing the first six days of creation, after which the Sabbath arrives and is greeted with the sixteenth-century poem *Lekkah dodi* (Come, My Beloved), in which the masculine aspect of God is invited to greet his feminine counterpart, or bride, in preparation for divine union.

Holy day liturgy. Like the Sabbath prayers of the *siddur*, the holy day *maḥzor* demonstrates the principle of relevant thematic expansion of a basic liturgical core. But it differs in that it is rich in *piyyuṭim* (sg., *piyyuṭ*). These are highly stylized poems initiated in Byzantine-ruled Palestine from the fourth or fifth to the seventh century and composed continually thereafter elsewhere, until the dawn of modernity. Scholars do not agree on an explanation of the phenomenon: some see *piyyuṭim* as a form of natural creativity, akin to surrounding Byzantine church hymnody; others follow medieval etiology and explain this poetry as a Jewish response to persecution. Whatever the case, some *piyyuṭim* were somehow selected for retention in the versions of the *maḥzor* that survived history to become the extant rites actually practiced, and thousands more are still being uncovered in manuscript caches. *Piyyuṭim* are categorized and named according to their poetic form and function, and the liturgical place they occupy. The most important *piyyuṭim*, for example, are *qerovot*, by which one designates those interwoven in the benedictions of the Tefillah.

The mood and message of specific holy days are implicitly imparted by their *piyyuṭim*. Sukkot *piyyuṭim*, for example, focus on the booths (*sukkot*) and the taking of the *lulav* and the *etrog* (the “four species” commanded in *Leviticus* 23:40); and, following rabbinic interpretation of Sukkot as a day of judgment, the Sukkot *maḥzor* features *piyyuṭim* called *hoshanot* that implore God to save. Shavu’ot, the holiday that celebrates revelation on Sinai, includes *piyyuṭim* called *azharot*, which list commandments. Passover is recognizable from *piyyuṭim* regarding the Exodus and related traditions, such as the law and lore pertinent to the making of *matsah* (unleavened bread). Passover has also a home Seder with its accompanying liturgical Haggadah. Its contents and structure are largely recognizable by the first or second century, though many passages now in use are medieval, and some reach back only a few hundred years.

The two minor festivals of Purim and Ḥanukkah, which celebrate divine redemption as reported in the *Book of Esther* and in *Maccabees*, respectively, are marked liturgically by a special Tefillah insertion acknowledging thanksgiving “for the miracle.” Purim also features public liturgical recitation of the scroll of *Esther*, a practice paralleled since the Middle Ages by the reading of four other biblical “scrolls”: *Lamentations*,

on Tish’a be-Av; *Ecclesiastes*, on Sukkot; *Song of Songs*, on Passover; and *Ruth*, on Shavu’ot. The Ḥanukkah home ritual of kindling lights for eight days contains two blessings, one that interprets the practice as being derived from divine command and another that affirms the Ḥanukkah miracle. Both blessings are Talmudic, and the second one is used by later authorities as a paradigm for the benediction over the Sabbath lights.

Like the other holy days, Ro’sh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur present us with their own *maḥzorim*. The former is marked by a service for the blowing of the shofar (ram’s horn) on two separate occasions. The more important of the two asserts the trifold doctrine of *mal-khuyot*, *zikhronot*, and *shofarot*, that is, (1) God’s sovereignty, (2) God’s abiding remembrance of the covenant with Israel, and (3) the significance of the shofar sound as, first, an evocation of the covenant at Sinai and, second, its role in foreshadowing the messianic era. *Malkhuyot* (“sovereignty”) seems to have been added only in the second century; the other two elements are observable in pre-70 fast-day liturgy.

Two of the many Ro’sh ha-Shanah *piyyuṭim* deserve mention. First, *Unetanneh toqef* posits the grand imagery of judgment before God, and a book of life in which human deeds are recorded, such that one’s fate is written down on Ro’sh ha-Shanah and sealed on Yom Kippur; but (it concludes) penitence, prayer, and charity effect atonement. Legend ascribes this poem to an era of persecution in medieval Germany, but its actual origin lies in Byzantine Jewish hymnody centuries earlier. Second, *Avinu malkenu* begs for grace despite our lack of works. It began as a brief prayer for rain by ‘Aqiva’ ben Yosef (second century), but it is today a much expanded litany, each line beginning with “Avinu malkenu” (lit., “Our father and king”; today often rendered “Our parent and ruler”).

The *maḥzor* for Yom Kippur, the climax of the penitential season, contains a suitably day-long compilation of prayer, which begins with the famous Kol Nidrei, an Aramaic liturgical legal formula, deriving either from post-Talmudic Palestine or from Babylonian magical folk-traditions. It became popular despite the condemnation of authorities, and in Ashkenazic worship it became known for its chant, which bears traces of the oldest stratum of synagogue music (called *mi-sinai*, “from Sinai”), traceable to twelfth- or thirteenth-century northern Europe. The Yom Kippur *maḥzor* repeats some Ro’sh ha-Shanah liturgy too, notably *Avinu malkenu*, certain alterations in the Tefillah that emphasize the themes of divine judgment in the year ahead and the inscription of one’s fate in the book of life, and *Unetanneh toqef*.

A short and a long form of communal confession are

embedded in the services for Yom Kippur Day. The rabbinic concept of *confession* (*viddui*), implied originally *profession* as well, that is, recognition of human failure and virtue alike. Thus, for example, pilgrims bringing their second tithe (*Ma'as. Sh. 5.10–13*) profess their successful fulfillment of covenantal responsibility and call on God to respond in appropriate measure. But *confession* of shortcomings was emphasized on Yom Kippur, as we see from the formula recited by the high priest in the Temple then (*Yoma' 3.8, 4.2, 6.2*). That formula later entered the synagogue service, along with spontaneous personal confessions, a format favored at least until the sixth century (B.T., *Yoma' 87b*). But by the eighth century, our standardized communal confessions had become the norm.

The Yom Kippur *maḥzor* is known also for the 'Avodah and for Yizkor. The 'Avodah is a lengthy poetic saga detailing sacred history from creation to the appointment of Aaron and his descendents as hereditary priests. The Temple cult is then portrayed in loving detail, drawing heavily on rabbinic recollection of what once transpired there on Yom Kippur Day. Yizkor (more properly, *Hazkarat Neshamot*) is a memorial rubric consisting largely of prayers composed in the wake of massacres by Crusaders in central Europe, and the Khmel'nitskii persecutions in seventeenth-century Poland. Liberal liturgies have expanded these two rubrics, so that their 'Avodah sometimes extends sacred history up to the present and anticipates the future; their memorial services regularly include explicit reference to the Holocaust. (Indeed, the Holocaust and the subsequent birth of the modern state of Israel have emerged as newly celebrated holy days—Yom ha-Sho'ah and Yom ha-'Atsma'ut—with their own liturgical insertions in some *siddurim* printed today.)

Finally, it should be noted that both the *siddur* and the *maḥzor*, even though they are intended primarily for public worship, contain home prayers as well. In addition to those already mentioned—Sabbath lights, Qid-dush, and Havdalah; Ḥanukkah lights; Passover Seder; the *sukkah* and waving the *lulav* and *etrog*—the *siddur* contains regular table liturgy—blessings over diverse foods and grace after meals—which go back to first-century strata, if not earlier.

[For further discussion of the liturgy on specific days, see Shabbat and the individual entries on the holy days, fasts, and festivals mentioned herein.]

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The *siddurim* and *maḥzorim* resulting from modern-day prayer book reform have attracted much attention. The issues facing German reformers are beautifully summarized, albeit with considerable bias, by an early American Reform rabbi, David Philipson, in his classic account *The Reform Movement in Judaism* (1907; rev. ed., reprint, New York, 1967). A more scientific account is Petuchowski's *Prayerbook Reform in Europe* (New York, 1968) and his essay "Abraham Geiger, the Reform Jewish Liturgist," in his *New Perspectives on Abraham Geiger: An HUC-JIR Symposium* (New York, 1975), pp. 42–55. American alterations in the *siddur* and the *maḥzor* can be traced by looking first at Eric L. Friedland's "'*Olath tamid* by David Einhorn," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 45 (1974): 307–332, and "The Atonement Memorial Service in the American Maḥzor," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 55 (1984): 243–282. The former details the influence and style of Einhorn's epochal '*Olath tamid*, and the latter treats the memorial service from its origins to date. The *Union Prayer Book* is treated in Lou H. Silberman's essay "The *Union Prayer Book*: A Study of Liturgical Development," in *Retrospect and Prospect*, edited by Bertram Wallace Korn (New York, 1965), pp. 46–80, and in my article "The Language of Survival in American Reform Liturgy," *CCAR Journal* 24 (1977): 87–106. The prayer books that defined Conservative Judaism in the 1940s can be approached through a reading of Robert Gordis's candid account of the *siddur* he himself directed, "A Jewish Prayer Book for the Modern Age," *Conservative Judaism* 2 (October 1945): 1–20.

The liturgical renaissance of today arises out of the initial, somewhat inchoate, strivings of a "creative liturgy" movement that I surveyed in "Creative Liturgy," *Jewish Spectator* 40 (Winter 1975): 42–50. The Conservative movement's new *Maḥzor for Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur*, edited by Jules Harlow (New York, 1972), is reviewed in Petuchowski's "Conservative Liturgy Come of Age," *Conservative Judaism* 27 (1972): 3–11. The Reform movement's current *siddur*, *Gates of Prayer*, and its *maḥzor*, *Gates of Repentance*, both edited by Chaim Stern (New York, 1975–1978), are accompanied by companion volumes, prepared under my editorial supervision, that discuss

the purpose and philosophy behind them: *Gates of Understanding*, 2 vols. (New York, 1977–1983), in which see especially vol. 1, pp. 131–168. Finally, my own thought has most recently been published in *Beyond the Text: A Wholistic Interpretation of Liturgy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986).

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SÍDH. Various occasional titles are used to designate the otherworld in early Irish, but the normal generic term for it is *sídh* (pl., *síthe*). Its common currency in this sense is confirmed, if that were necessary, by the fact that it was borrowed by the author of the Old Welsh poem *Preideu Annwn* (The Spoils of Annwn). The poem tells of a raid by Arthur and three shiploads of his followers on the otherworld stronghold of Kaer Sidi (from the Old Irish genitive *sídh*) with the aim of carrying off the magic caldron of abundance which belonged to the lord of the otherworld. *Annwn* is a common term in Welsh for the otherworld, conceived in this instance as somewhere reached after a journey by boat but more generally described as somewhere beneath the ground. [See *Annwn*.] Similarly the Irish otherworld, whether designated by *sídh* or by another word, is occasionally envisaged as being overseas but much more frequently as being underground.

It is said that when the Gaels (the Irish Celts) came to Ireland and defeated the divine Tuatha Dé Danann, their poet and judge Amhairghin decreed that Ireland be divided in two and that the underground half be given to the Tuatha Dé Danann and the other half to the Gaels. So it was done, and the Daghdha, the senior of the gods, assigned to each of the chiefs of the Tuatha Dé his own fairy dwelling. As Marie-Louise Sjoestedt has commented, this division "marks the end of the mythical period when the supernatural was undisputed master of the earth, and the beginning of a new period in which men and gods inhabit the earth together. From that moment the great problem of religion becomes important, the problem of the relationship between man and the gods" (*Gods and Heroes of the Celts*, London, 1949, p. 47).

But while the otherworld was generally associated with the subterranean regions, it was not confined to them. Transcending as it did the limitations of human space as well as time, its location was perceived with considerable flexibility: it could be under the sea as well as under the ground, in nearby or distant islands, in houses which may disappear as suddenly as they first appeared, or it could be coextensive with the secular world. It could be reached through a cave, the waters of a lake, a magic mist, or simply through the acquisition of heightened insight. But it was not merely a spiritual

world, which is presumably why the creators of Celtic mythic narrative sought in many instances to give it a clear geographic identity: Lucan in his *Pharsalia* (5.452) wrote that the continental Celts had no fear of death since it was for them only the middle of a long life. According to him, their druids taught them that after death human souls continued to control their bodies in another world (*alio orbe*); *mutatis mutandis*, this would also be a fair summary of the view of the afterlife implicit in early Irish and Welsh tradition.

Very frequently in Irish tradition the subterranean location of the otherworld is identified with certain hills and mounds, whether natural or man-made—so much so, in fact, that the word *sídh* commonly means simply “fairy or otherworld hill,” in other words, an ordinary hill, usually modest in size, within which a whole world of supernatural beings live their own varied lives. Sometimes the *sídh* is a megalithic burial mound, as in the case of the great tumulus of Newgrange at Bruigh na Bóinne, which was pre-Celtic but was assimilated to Gaelic mythology and considered to be the home of the god Mac ind Óg, the Irish equivalent of British and continental Celtic Maponos. The related Welsh term, *gorseidd* (“mound”), had similar supernatural associations, though these are less fully or clearly documented. But evidently this denotation of “hill” was not the primary meaning of **sēdos*, the Celtic form from which Irish *sídh* derived. Based on the Indo-European root *sed-* (“sit”), its semantic evolution seems to have moved from “residence in general” to “residence of the gods,” that is, the otherworld, and then to those hills within which the gods were believed to reside. Nor does its evolution end there, for by semantic transference Irish *sídh* came to refer also to the supernatural beings who inhabit the *sídh* residence, and in modern spoken Irish the generic term for an otherworldly being or fairy is *sídhéog*, the diminutive of *sídh*.

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SIHR. See Magic, article on Magic in Islam.

SIKHISM. The word *Sikh* is derived from the Pali *sikha* and the Sanskrit *śiṣya*, meaning “disciple.” The Sikhs are the disciples of ten *gurūs* (Skt., *guru*), beginning with Nānak (b. 1469 CE) and ending with Gobind Singh (d. 1708). A Sikh has been defined as “one who believes in the ten *gurūs* and the *Granth Sahib*,” a scripture compiled by their fifth *gurū*, Arjun Dev, in 1604.

Sikhism was a later offshoot of the *bhakti* (devotional) cult of Vaiṣṇava Hinduism, which developed in Tamil Nadu and was based upon the teachings of Āḷvār and Adiyar saints. Its chief propagators were Ādi Śaṅkara (eighth century), who expounded *kevalādvaita* (pure monism), and, later, Rāmānanda (1360-1470) and Kabir (1398-1518), who were influenced by Islam and accepted Muslim disciples. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw the spread of *bhakti* throughout India: Caitanya in Bengal; Jñāneśvar, Nāmdev, and Tukarām in Maharashtra; Mīrā Bāi in Rajasthan; Sādhana in Sindh. The *bhakti* tradition taught that God is the one and only reality; the rest is *māyā*, or “illusion.” The best way to serve God is by absolute submission to his will. The best way to find his will is through the guidance of a spiritual mentor, a *gurū*. The best way to approach God is by meditating and singing hymns of love and praise. [See also *Bhakti and Poetry*, article on Indian Religious Poetry.]

Foundation. Nānak, the founder of Sikhism, was the Punjab’s chief propounder of the *bhakti* tradition. Born in April 1469, Nānak was the son of a revenue official in the village of Talwandi, about forty miles from Lahore (in present-day Pakistan). A member of the *kṣatriya*, or warrior class, and of the *bedi* (one versed in the Vedas) subsect, he received elementary education in Sanskrit, Persian, and Punjabi. Many of his boyhood years were spent taking the family cattle to pasture or in the company of itinerant *sādhus*. He married at age thirteen and was the father of two sons. For a while Nānak worked as an accountant in the office of the nawab of Sultanpur, where he met a Muslim minstrel named Mardana. The two began to organize community meetings where hymns written by Nānak and set to music by Mardana were sung. These hymns were later incorporated into the Sikhs’ sacred hymnology and are to this day sung in musical measures (*rāgas*) prescribed at the time.

A mystical experience at age twenty-nine was the turning point in Nānak’s life. While bathing in a nearby rivulet, he disappeared from view and was given up as drowned. According to the Janamsakhis (“life stories”),

he was summoned by God and charged with his mission in the following words: "Nānak, I am with thee. Through thee will my name be magnified. . . . Go in the world to pray and to teach mankind how to pray. Be not sullied by the ways of the world. Let your life be one of praise of the 'word' [*nām*], 'charity' [*dān*], 'ablution' [*ishnān*], 'service' [*sevā*], and 'prayer' [*simran*]." It is reported that Nānak was missing for three days and nights but reappeared on the fourth day. The opening pronouncement of his mission was, "There is no Hindu; there is no Muslim."

Abandoning worldly pursuits, Nānak undertook four long voyages. On the first, he went eastward as far as Assam, visiting Hindu places of pilgrimage and meeting and discussing spiritual problems with ascetics and holy men. It was either on this journey or on the final one that the famous offering of water to the dead took place at Hardwar. The pilgrims were throwing palmfuls of water to the rising sun as an offering to their ancestors in heaven. Nānak, however, threw it in the opposite direction. When questioned, he answered simply: "If you can send water to your dead ancestors in heaven, surely I can send it to my fields in the Punjab." Nānak thereby demonstrated what he considered to be the futility of meaningless ritual.

He returned to his home for a short time before setting out on another long tour. This time he went southward, through Tamil Nadu and as far as Sri Lanka. Upon his return to India, he spent a few years with his family in a new township he built and named Kartarpur ("abode of the creator"). His third journey was to the northern regions of the Himalayas; his fourth and last of the long journeys began in 1518. This time he went westward to Mecca, Medina, and as far as Basra and Baghdad. It was on this journey that a now-famous incident took place. Nānak unwittingly fell asleep with his feet pointing toward the Ka'bah. An enraged mullah rudely woke him and told him of the indignity he had committed by having his feet toward the house of God. "Then turn my feet in some other direction where God does not exist," answered Nānak.

By the time Nānak returned home, he was too old to undertake any more strenuous journeys. He decided to settle down at Kartarpur and instruct people who came to him. Large numbers of peasants—both Hindus and Muslims—flocked to hear him. Many became his disciples, or *śiṣyas*, from which the Punjabi word *Sikh* is derived. His death came on 22 September 1539 at age sixty-nine. The legend goes that both Hindus and Muslims clamored for his body: the former wanted to cremate him as a Hindu, the latter to bury him as a Muslim.

Nānak accepted most of the traditional beliefs of Hinduism pertaining to the origin of creation and its dissolution. For example, his version of the genesis of life, *arbad narbad dhundu kāra*, follows the Ṛgvedic hymn of creation: "Nonbeing then existed not, nor being. . . . Desire then entered the one in the beginning; it was the earliest seed, of thought, the product. . . . Creative force was there and fertile power: below was energy, above was impulse." Nānak likewise accepted the theory of *saṃsāra*—of birth, death, and rebirth. He describes this process with a picturesque simile: "Just as the pots of a Persian wheel go down, fill with water as they come up, empty and go down again, so is this life—a pastime of our Lord."

According to Nānak, God changed his own nature and function after the creation of the world—and God is himself the author of duality and delusion. In the *Āsā-di-Vār* (The Dawn Hymns), he writes, "Āpinai ap sājio, āpinai raceo nāu / Duyī qudrat sāj kai kar āsan ditho chāu" ("He himself created creation and gave currency to the Name / And then assumed a second nature and with pleasure regarded his creation seated on his prayer mat"). It is this God who, having set the world as well as life in motion, threw in it, as it were, *moh thagauli*: an opiate used by thugs to drug their victims before robbing them. "Amal galola koor kā dittā devan hār," writes Nānak ("The Great Giver himself gave us the pill of falsehood. We forget death and for four short days indulge in pleasure. The temperate abstain, find truth and the court of God"). Thus both good and evil emanate from God; man's role is to choose the one and avoid the other, to follow the ordinances of God (*hukum Rajāi chalnā*) and earn his grace (*nadar*).

The opening lines of *Japjī*, the Sikhs' morning prayer, clearly state Nānak's concept of God:

There is one God.
He is the supreme truth.
He, the creator,
Is without fear and without hatred.
He, the omnipresent,
Pervades the universe.
He is not born,
Nor does he die to be born again.
By his grace shalt thou worship him.

Before time itself
There was truth.
When time began to run its course
He was the truth.
Even now, he is the truth,
And evermore shall truth prevail.

Nānak's God was one, omnipotent, and omniscient.

Nānak also believed that God was *sat* (both “truth” and “reality”), as opposed to *asat* (“falsehood”) and *mīthya* (“illusion”). He thus not only made God a spiritual concept but also based principles of social behavior on this concept. In other words, if God is truth, to speak an untruth is to be ungodly. Untruthful conduct not only hurts one’s neighbors; it is also irreligious. A good Sikh, therefore, must not only believe that God is the only reality, but he must also not harm his fellow beings, for hurtful conduct—lying, cheating, fornicating, trespassing on a person or his property, and so on—does not conform to the truth that is God.

Nānak’s God is ineffable because he is *nirankār*, or “formless.” The best one can do is to admit the impossibility of defining him. But the fact that God cannot be defined should not inhibit us from learning about truth and reality. This we can do by following the path of righteousness.

God is the Father (Pitā), the Lover (Pritam), the Master (Khasam, Mālik, or Sāhib), and the Great Giver (Dātā) of all gifts. He is good, but evil also emanates from him, perhaps to purify us or to test our faith. He is known as Rab, Rahim, Rām, Govinda, Murāri, and Hari. Nānak first called God Aumkāra, a name familiar to readers of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, but later referred to him as Sat Kartār (“the true creator”) or Sat Nām (“the true name”).

The Sikh word for “god” is *wah gurū*. It started as an exclamation of praise meaning “Hail *gurū*!” (just as the Muslim’s “Subhan Allāh,” or “Allāh be praised,” came into use). Later it was used to personify God. Every chapter of the *Ādi Granth* begins with the invocation “Ek Onkar Satgurūparśād,” which translates as, “The one God—by the grace of *gurū*—worship.” *Gurū* Nānak took other aspects of God from the Vedas, such as the concept that God was *nirguṇa* (without quality) and in *śūnya samādhi* (a state of profound meditation) before creation. After creation, however, he became the repository of all qualities (*saguṇa*). Likewise, the symbolic representation of God as the mystic syllable or sound *om̐* (in the *Māṇḍūkya* and the *Prasna Upaniṣad*), which “contains all that is past, present, and future”—“Bhutam, bhavad, bhaviṣyad iti sarvam aumkāra evaḥ”—is found in the *gurū*’s *Dakhni Onkar*. He writes in this work that God is “the creator of Brahmā, of consciousness, of time and space, of the Vedas, the emancipator, the essence of the three worlds.” The concept of *om̐*, which is somewhat elusive in Hinduism, is crystallized in Sikh theology and given the status of a symbol—the symbol of God. It invariably emphasizes his singularity, expressed in the saying “Ik Aumkar” (“There is one God”).

In equating God with the abstract principle of truth, Nānak bypasses the difficult questions encountered by religious leaders who describe God only as the creator or the Father: If God created the world, who created God? If he is the Father, who was his father? But Nānak’s system had its own problems. It raised such questions as, If God is truth, what is the truth? Nānak’s answer was that in situations in which believers cannot decide for themselves, they should let the *gurū* guide them.

Nānak made the institution of “guruship” the pivot of his religious system. Without the *gurū* as a guide, he insisted, no one can attain *mokṣa* (“release”). The *gurū* keeps his followers on the path of truth; he acts as a goad stick, keeping man, who is like a rogue elephant, from running amok. He applies the “salve of knowledge” (*gyān anjan*) to a follower’s eyes so he can see the truth that is God; he is the divine ferryman who takes him across the fearful “ocean of life” (*bhava sāgar*). The *gurū* or the *satgurū* (“true guru”) is just a shade below God.

Nānak insisted on the separation of God and the *gurū*. The *gurū* is to be consulted, respected, and cherished—but not worshiped. He is a teacher, not a reincarnation of God, an *avatāra*, or a messiah. Nānak constantly referred to himself as the bard (*dhādi*), slave, and servant of God.

Nānak describes the qualities one should look for in a *gurū*: “Take him as guru who shows the path of truth, who tells you of the one of whom nothing is known, who tells you of the divine word.” The *gurū* was not only man’s bridge to union with God but also his mentor. The *gurū* taught a man how to conduct himself toward his fellow men and what general pattern of living he should follow.

Nānak strongly disapproved of asceticism, of penance, and of torturing the flesh as a step toward enlightenment. “Be in the world but not worldly,” he said.

Although Nānak abandoned his family when he first launched his spiritual quest and often left it when he was away on his travels, he always came back to it. He propagated the *gr̥hastha dharma*—the religion of the householder. He advocated the company of holy men (*sādh sangat*) as an essential requisite of righteous living. And although he equated truth with God, he put righteous behavior above truth.

Because Nānak advocated associating with righteous people, he rejected the social class system, which not only vitiated the relationship between people but also ran counter to the ordinances of God, who was the embodiment of truth. He refused to grant audiences to people unless they first broke bread in the community

kitchen (*gurū kā langar*), where the brahman and the untouchable, the Muslim and the Hindu sat alongside one another as equals. He was just as critical of concepts of purity and impurity that had sprung out of notions of higher and lower categories of human beings.

Human birth, said Nānak, is a priceless gift. It is the opportunity that God gives us to escape the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. The aim of life should be *yoga*, or union with God. Salvation lies in the blending of our light with the Light Eternal. The *Bhagavadgītā* advocates three alternative paths to salvation: that of action (*karmamārga*), of knowledge (*jñānamārga*), and of devotion (*bhaktimārga*). Nānak accepted the path of *bhakti*, emphasizing the worship of the name of God (*nāmamārga*). "I have no miracles except the name of God," he said.

Nānak believed that by repetition of the *nām*, one can conquer the greatest of all evils: the ego, or *hau-main* ("I am"). So great is the power of the ego, said Nānak, that those who conquer it attain salvation while still alive; they become *jīvanmuktas*. [See also *Jīvanmukti*.] According to Nānak, the ego carries within itself the seed of salvation, which can be fully nurtured by the repetition of the *nām*. Once the power of the ego is properly channeled, the conquest of the other five sins—lust, anger, greed, attachment, and pride—follows as a matter of course. The wanderings of the restless mind stop, and it attains a state of divine bliss (*vismād*). It is in this state of superconscious stillness (*divya dr̥ṣṭi*) that the tenth gate, the *dasam dvār* (the body having only nine natural orifices), is opened. One then receives a vision of God and merges one's light with the Light Eternal. "Nām japo" ("Worship the name of the Lord") was Nānak's constant exhortation. But this meant more than a parrotlike repetition of "Rāma, Rāma, Rāma." To Nānak, *nām* implied not only prayer but also the understanding of the words of that prayer and the acceptance of them as the rules of life. The path of *nāma* (*nāmamārga*) required three things: realization of the truth within the heart (*hriday gyān*), its expression in prayer (*mukh bhakti*), and detachment from worldly things (*vartan vairāg*). Nānak believed that a man's real battle in life is fought with himself. "Mansa mār mano seo lujhai" ("Overcome the base desires and battle with the mind"), he wrote, adding, "Gyān Kharag lai man seo lujhai mansā manah samāi" ("Use knowledge as a double-edged dagger, then will base desires subside within the mind"). He who conquers these desires ends the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth and attains salvation.

Nānak believed in the triumph of human will over fate and predestination. He believed that all human beings have a basic fund of goodness that, like the pearl

in the oyster, only awaits the opening of the shell to emerge and enrich them. But most human beings are as ignorant of the goodness in them as the deer is of the aromatic *kasturi* in its navel; and just as the deer wanders about in the woods and falls into the snares of poachers or becomes a victim of the hunter's darts, so man falls into the snares of *māyā* (illusion). The chief task of the guru is to make man aware of the treasure within him and then help him unlock the jewel box.

A method advocated by Nānak was the gentle one of *sahaj*. Just as a vegetable cooked on a gentle fire tastes best because its own juice gives it the proper flavor, so a gradual training of the body and mind will bring out the goodness that is inherent in all human beings. There is no general rule applicable to everyone; each person should discipline himself according to physical capacity and temperament. Ascetic austerity, penances, celibacy, and other such measures have no place in Nānak's religion. In addition to self-imposed discipline of the mind, he advocated listening to and participating in *kīrtan* (hymn singing). Nānak's verses were put to music in *rāgas* (modes) that were best suited to convey their meaning. He advised his followers to rise well before dawn and listen to the soft strains of music under the light of the stars. He believed that one was best able to have communion with God in the stillness of the ambrosial hours (*amritvela*).

Gurū Nānak believed in prayer and in *kīrtan* to focus one's mind on God. He did not believe in pilgrimages, and to this day no place of pilgrimage is sanctified by the Sikh scriptures. He also did not believe in the profession of priesthood (as distinct from that of the *gurū* or the teacher), and the class has not been able to establish itself firmly in the Sikh community.

Development. Nānak had founded the town of Kartarpur and built a *dharamsāla* (abode of faith) where his disciples went to congregate and chant the many beautiful hymns he had composed. This congregational worship was formalized by his successor, the second *gurū*, Angad (1504–1552), who used the *gurmukhī* script to compile a hymnal. Apparently Angad also tried to collect information on the earlier life and travels of Nānak. In addition, Angad put the *gurū-kā-langai*—the *gurū*'s kitchen—on a regular footing in order to feed the disciples who came to the *dharamsāla*. Thus began the drift away from the parent communities—the Hindus, from whom the majority of disciples were drawn, and the Muslims. The process was carried a step further by the third *gurū*, Amar Das (1479–1574), who organized the Sikhs into twenty-two *manjis*, or bishoprics, for the purpose of collecting the *dasvandh* ("the tenth"), a tax to defray the expenses of the *gurū*'s establishment and

of the communal welfare. He also built another *dharmsāla* at Goindwal.

The fourth *gurū*, Ram Das (1534–1581), carried the process still further. He bought land, set up a new town, and had a large tank dug that came to be known as Amritsar, the “pool of immortality.” Amritsar was in the heart of the country populated by Hindu peasants, who had begun to join the Sikh movement in large numbers. It soon developed into the most important trading center of the Punjab. Goods from distant Bukhara, Kabul, and Kashmir were exchanged there for products from eastern and southern India. In addition, Ram Das was held in esteem by Emperor Akbar. This not only helped him to build temples and towns but also to assume leadership of the Hindus of the Punjab. His most important innovation, which gave a sort of continuity to guruship, was making the office of *gurū* hereditary: thereafter it remained in one family, the Sodhis. This gave a sense of expectancy to the community as well as a sort of sanctity to the family.

The fifth *gurū*, Arjun (1563–1606), freed the Sikhs of the tutelage of the parent communities—the Hindus and the Muslims—and launched them on their own. One of his most important accomplishments was the compilation of the *Ādi Granth*, a collection of the writings of the first four *gurūs*, the works of Hindu and Muslim saints from all over northern India, and his own compositions. He installed it as the sacred scripture of the Sikhs, a step that had most important consequences. The Sikhs, who understood neither Sanskrit nor Arabic, stopped turning to the Hindu or Muslim scriptures for inspiration and, instead, looked to the *gurus'* hymns, which were couched in a language intelligible to them. Moreover, Arjun had been judicious in his choice of hymns, taking only the very best compositions by the saints of northern India. The poetic excellence, the spiritual content, and the haunting, lilting melodies of the hymns of the *Ādi Granth* are Sikhism's greatest attraction to this day. Arjun also gave Amritsar a permanent place in Sikh religious geography by building a new temple on the site of the temple his father had built. It is believed that he had the Muslim divine, Mian Meer of Lahore, lay the foundation stone of the new temple. This was not just another Sikh *dharmsāla* but the Hari Mandir (temple of God); it was the Sikh counterpart of the Haridwar or Banaras of the Hindus and the Mecca of the Muslims. Arjun built another temple at Taran Taran, a few miles from the city, to cater to the peasantry, which by now had turned Sikh.

Gurū Arjun was fully conscious of the new role he was planning for his community. In a passage from the *Ādi*

Granth, he mentions the separate identity the Sikhs had acquired in their hundred years of existence:

I do not keep the Hindu fast nor the Muslim Ramaḍān.
I serve Him alone who is my refuge.
I serve the one Master, who is also Allāh.
I have broken with the Hindu and the Muslim,
I will not worship with the Hindu, nor like the Muslim
go to Mecca;
I shall serve Him and no other.
I will not pray to idols nor heed the Muslim's *azān*;
I shall put my heart at the feet of the one supreme being,
For we are neither Hindus nor Muslims.

Arjun was probably most responsible for the growth of the Sikh church. He organized a revenue system, appointed tax collectors, and tapped other sources of income. He sent his followers across the northwest frontier to Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey to trade goods and to sell Indian silks and spices and buy horses. These ventures brought the Sikhs money and, above all, set up a tradition of good horsemanship among them. Although Arjun was a devoutly religious man, his varied activities to promote the well-being of his following made him an important merchant-prince and radically changed the status of the *gurū*. The *gurū* was no longer a recluse who devoted himself exclusively to prayer and preaching; he had become a *sachā pādshāh*, the true emperor of the nebulous kingdom of the Sikhs. He had come to wield secular power. He held court and received emissaries from rulers of states.

But Arjun's rising importance, as well as the support he gave to Emperor Jehangir's rebellious son Prince Khusro, brought the wrath of the emperor on his head and led to his downfall. He was arrested and tortured in Lahore Prison, where he died in June 1606. Before his incarceration, Arjun named his son Hargobind as the sixth *gurū* and girded him with two swords that symbolized spiritual and temporal power. “Let him sit upon the throne and maintain an army to the best of his ability,” he ordered.

Temperamentally, Hargobind (1595–1644) was inclined to the role his father had outlined for him. Fond of hunting and martial exercises, he abandoned the vegetarianism of his predecessors and enjoined his followers to eat meat and build their physique. He maintained a cavalry and a bodyguard of three hundred Sikhs. He was in and out of favor with Emperor Jehangir and had to spend some years as a prisoner in the fort of Gwalior. This new temporal role of the *gurū* was not well received by all disciples; some complained that he was “too much Mohammadan and military exercises.” The role, however, had come to stay. On his release from the

fort, Hargobind raised an army and became an important military leader in the Punjab. He fought and won three battles against the Mughals.

The next two *gurūs*—Har Rai (1630–1661) and Hari Kishan (1656–1664)—maintained peace with the authorities. When Emperor Aurangzeb secured the throne, he tried to take action against Har Rai, who had espoused the cause of the emperor's brother Dara Shikoh, by summoning Har Rai's infant son, Hari Kishan, to Delhi. But Hari Kishan escaped the emperor's vindictiveness by becoming a victim of smallpox. Aurangzeb's wrath had to fall on the successor—the ninth *gurū*, Tegh Bahadur (1621–1675), a devout man with ascetic habits who emerged from the seclusion of a hermit's life to assume the *guruship*. When the Hindus asked him to face Aurangzeb, he did so with complete disregard of the fate that he knew awaited him. He came to Delhi and was promptly put in prison and charged with criminal extortion. It is believed that he was offered his life if he would abjure his faith. On his refusal to do so he was beheaded. It is also said that he was asked to perform a miracle and, in response, he wrote some words on a piece of paper and strung it around his neck, saying that it would be a charm against death. After his execution, the paper was opened. It read: "Sīs diyā par sirr nā diyā" ("I gave my head but not my faith"). The final transformation of Sikhism from a pacifist sect to a militant fraternity came with Tegh Bahadur's son Gobind Singh, who succeeded him as the tenth and last of the Sikh's *gurūs*.

[For further discussion of the main figures of Sikhism, see the biographies of Nānak and Gobind Singh. The Sikh scriptures are further discussed in Ādi Granth and Dasam Granth. For the development of Sikhism in the context of other North Indian religious movements, see Hindi Religious Traditions.]

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Press (Delhi, 1979–1983), which brings the history of the Sikhs to the year 1977.

KHUSHWANT SINGH

SIKKIMESE RELIGION. See Himalayan Religions.

ŚĪLABHADRA (c. 529–645; Tib., Nān-tshul-bzañ-po; Chin., Chieh-hsien; Jpn., Kaiken), Indian Buddhist dialectician belonging to the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school, master of the Nālandā monastic university, disciple of Dharmapāla, and teacher of Hsüan-tsang. Several accounts of Śīlabhadra's life are extant. The Tibetan sources are fragmentary, but, owing to the fact that Hsüan-tsang gives an account of him in his writings, those in Chinese are more informative. From the Tibetan biographers, such as Tāranātha and Sum-pa-mkhan-po, we learn only that Śīlabhadra was contemporary with Śākyamati, Yaśomitra, and Sa'i-rtsa-lag. But Chinese biographies such as those found in Hsüan-tsang's *Hsi-yu chi* (viz. T.D. 51.914c–915a) and I-ching's *Nan-hai chi-kuei nei-fa chüan* (T.D. 54.229b) allow us to construct an outline of his religious career.

Śīlabhadra belonged to the royal family of Samataṭa in East India and was a member of the brahman caste. Fond of study even as a child, he traveled through several countries of India in search of religious teachers and arrived finally at the monastic university at Nālandā. There he studied under, and was ordained by, the Yogācāra master Dharmapāla, attaining the highest level of scholarship under his guidance.

During this period, a non-Buddhist teacher from South India, jealous of Dharmapāla's scholarly and religious attainments, wished to challenge him to a doctrinal debate. At the request of the local king, Dharmapāla accepted this challenge. When Śīlabhadra heard of this he volunteered to debate in his master's place. Although only thirty years old, Śīlabhadra was victorious in the debate and was rewarded with a town, where he then built a monastery. He succeeded Dharmapāla as head of the Nālandā monastic university and became known by the respectful epithet Cheng-fa Tsang ("treasury of the good law").

The Vijñānavāda theory of Dharmapāla insisted on distinguishing among five categories of people: (1) those destined to be *bodhisattvas*, (2) those destined to be *pratyekabuddhas*, (3) those destined to be *śrāvakas*, (4) those of undetermined spiritual destination, and (5) those who can never be emancipated (*icchantika*). His theory

that there exist people who will never attain Buddhahood is in clear contrast to the "One Vehicle" teachings (*ekayāna*), according to which everyone has a Buddha nature and will eventually become emancipated. It was Śīlabhadra who transmitted the Vijñānavāda theory of Dharmapāla to Hsüan-tsang. Although Śīlabhadra was 106 years old when Hsüan-tsang met him, he taught the Vijñānavāda theories to Hsüan-tsang for about five years. Hsüan-tsang in turn transmitted Dharmapāla's theory to K'uei-chi (632–682), who founded the Fa-hsiang sect in China.

A notable doctrinal disputation between Śīlabhadra and Jñānaprabha (unattested; Chin., Chih-kuang; Jpn., Chikō) was held at Nālandā. Fa-tsang (643–712) gives an account of this conflict in his works *Hua-yen ching t'an-hsüan chi* (T.D. 35.111c–112a), *Shih-erh-men lun tsung-chih i-chi* (T.D. 42.213a, b), and *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun i-chi* (T.D. 44.242a–c). This account was related to him by Divākara, an Indian Dharma master and translator, at the Ta-yüan Ssu in Ch'ang-an.

The topic of the debate was the "three times," or "three steps," of the Buddha's teaching. Śīlabhadra, who was of the Vijñānavādin line based on the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*, expounded the Three Steps as follows: (1) the teaching of the Hīnayāna principles regarding the Four Noble Truths and the emptiness of the self (*pudgalanairātmya*), (2) the teaching of the imaginary nature of things (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) and the emptiness of things (*dharmanairātmya*), and (3) the teaching of "consciousness only" (*cittamātra*). On the other hand, Jñānaprabha, who was of the Mādhyamika (Madhyamaka) line based on the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* and the Mādhyamika *śāstras*, interpreted the Three Steps as (1) the teaching of the "Lesser Vehicle" (Hīnayāna), (2) the teaching that the external world does not exist but that the mind does, and (3) the teaching that neither the external world nor the mind exists. Each thinker regarded the third step as the highest. It is interesting that this ideological difference was stated so clearly by the seventh century, because we find the same kind of hermeneutical discussion later in Tibetan Buddhism, in the *Dran nes legs bśad sññ po* of Tson-kha-pa, for example. Unfortunately, as there are no sources other than Fa-tsang's report regarding this conflict between Śīlabhadra and Jñānaprabha, its historical credibility remains uncertain. In Hsüan-tsang's biography, for example (T.D. 50.261a, b), Jñānaprabha appears as a disciple of Śīlabhadra, and there is no mention of this doctrinal dispute.

The only extant work by Śīlabhadra is the *Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna* (a commentary on the *Buddhabhūmi*

Sūtra). This work is preserved in the Tibetan canon (Derge edition no. 3997; Peking edition no. 5498).

[See also *Yogācāra and the biographies of Dharmapāla and Hsüan-tsang*.]

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MIMAKI KATSUMI

SILENCE is one of the essential elements in all religions. It lies behind the words, supports the rituals, and shapes the way of life, whatever the actual words, rituals, and way of life may be. And precisely because it does so much and appears in so many unexpected places, we perceive it rather as the blind men perceived the elephant: it is much too big for us to understand fully, and if we grasp one part firmly, we miss a great deal more. One obvious reason for this is that ours is a highly verbal culture: "to understand" has come to mean "to be able to explain in words." To try to understand something that by its nature cannot be put into words requires some mental gymnastics.

A major source of the problem, however, is that—insofar as we can talk about it at all—the term *silence* covers several distinct states. It can be environmental, communal, or personal; if personal, it can be external or internal, something one does or something one is, or some mixture of all of these. There is nothing intrinsically "religious" about these basic types of silence. They appear in characteristic ways in the various religious traditions, but ultimately they have a place in religion simply because they occur wherever human beings are organized in groups.

Yet there is also a silence specific to religion, and it presents a further difficulty. Human silence is useful and may therefore be defined and discussed; although it is a negative state, a state of nonwords, it has clearly beneficial functions. Mystical or divine silence, however, cannot be used but can only be experienced; those who have done so insist that there is nothing of deprivation in it, but rather a fullness beyond words. Such

silence—in form so like, and in essence so unlike, everyday silence—has no place in mundane reality, and therefore bewilders the mind.

Environmental Silence. Is a quiet environment necessary for the exercise of silence? Certainly, monasteries were first established far from the noise of civilization, in the jungles of India and the deserts of the Middle East, and quiet country is still the preferred location for contemplative communities. It is also true that non-monastic religious groups for whom silence is important, such as the Old Order Amish, prefer rural to city life. One of the early Christian monks was even amazed to find that some younger brothers had built their cell near a bed of reeds. “When one who is living in silence hears the song of a bird, his heart no longer has the same peace,” the old man exclaimed. “How much worse it is when you hear always the rustling of those reeds” (*Sayings of the Fathers: Alphabetical Collection*, Arsenius, 25). On the other hand, John Climacus, the late sixth-century author of *The Ladder of Divine Ascent*, a classic work of Christian ascetic literature, declared that “the beginning of *hēsuchia* [Greek for “silence”] is to throw off all noise as disturbing for the depth of the soul. And the end of it is not to fear disturbances and to remain insusceptible to them” (27.5).

In an increasingly noisy world, the question is still being debated in those communities for whom silence is important. Personal silence can be inviolable; environmental silence is easily destroyed. Any group will have some members who can maintain their peace anywhere, but more who require quiet around them.

Communal Silence. The main purpose of communal silence is to facilitate the maintenance of silence by individual members—especially those novices who are still easily tempted to talk—but it has other uses, too. All arguments that begin “Why did you do such a stupid thing?” are stopped before they start if personal questions are never asked. Should a quarrel break out nevertheless, silence can be an effective gesture of forgiveness. And a misdeed confessed, repented of, and covered thereafter with perfect silence is the more easily forgotten.

Traditionally, communal silence has been made up of the environmental silence surrounding the community and the personal silence of its members. Yet it is something more than the sum of these two. As John Hostetler observes in his study *Amish Society* (Baltimore, 1980): “Silent discourse prevails where people are deeply involved with one another. The collective awareness is developed to such an extent that it becomes a religious experience, and it can be neither uttered in sound nor communicated in words” (p. 374). This bonding quality of silence is especially strong in those communities that

use silent group meditation. In a real, albeit inexplicable, way, the silence draws the members together and makes the many one.

Personal Silence. In developing personal silence, the first stage is learning simply to keep one’s mouth shut. The initial lesson is usually taught in childhood by the harassed mother who says, “Sit in that corner and don’t make another sound!” In maturity, the struggle for silence becomes more intense. Abba Agathon, an early Christian monk, held a pebble in his mouth for three years until he learned thoroughly to hold his peace; Pythagoras imposed on new disciples five years of total silence. Few monasteries are so severe. Usually, total silence is required only in specific places or at specific times—East and West are agreed, for example, that silence must be maintained in the refectory—otherwise, necessary conversations are allowed, although not encouraged.

Silence is sometimes imposed as a punishment. *Luke* 1:5–25, 57–80, records the story of the Jewish priest Zachariah, who is struck dumb by an angel when he questions the amazing message that his aging wife Elizabeth will bear a son whom they are to name John. (He recovers his voice ten months later at the boy’s circumcision.) Most of the time, of course, silence is imposed much less dramatically and thoroughly. The *Rule of Saint Benedict* specifies that a brother guilty of a lesser fault may continue to sing the divine office but must be silent outside of chapel. One who is guilty of a grave fault, however, may use his mouth only for breathing and eating. The Old Order Amish turn the Benedictine practice around: an unrepentant sinner is “shunned”; he may remain at home and talk as he wishes, but no one may speak to him, nor may baptized Amish eat at the same table with him. The Quakers, who use silence as an effective group response to persecution and as a public protest as well as for worship, have also developed it into the gentlest form of correction. In their traditional, unstructured meeting for worship, anyone so moved is free to rise and speak. Sometimes, however, a speaker goes on after inspiration has ceased. If this continues, one of the elders—a “weighty Friend” respected by all—may rise quietly and simply stand there, gaze lowered. Usually this brings the speaker at once to his senses, and he joins in the silence.

Thus silence reflects the intent: used harshly, silence becomes harsh; used with love and concern, it reveals the failing without condemnation and provides space for the individual to overcome his fault. Moreover, silence is an ever accessible form of self-discipline, and hence an essential practice for the spiritual aspirant, even when there is no overt sin. Silence allows God to speak directly to the heart, and it allows the person

to overcome human pettiness and to depend directly on God.

In time, the stillness of the mouth penetrates the mind and heart, and the person becomes silent within. This is a primary goal of the monastic regime, but it need not be such only for monks. In the fourteenth century, hesychasm as elaborated by Gregory Palamas was officially endorsed by the Eastern Orthodox church; Palamas stressed that unceasing prayer flowing from internal silence was commanded of all believers.

Inner silence is also necessary for attaining wisdom. Ambrose of Milan (d. 397) declared in his *Three Books on the Duties of the Clergy*: "Now what ought we to learn before anything else, but to be silent, that we may be able to speak? . . . It is more difficult to know how to be silent than how to speak." 'Aqiva' ben Yosef, writing two hundred years earlier, observed: "The fence of wisdom is silence" (*Avot* 3.17). "Guard your tongue in youth," advised the Lakota chief Wabashaw, "and in age you may mature a thought that will be of service to your people!"

Wisdom itself, and the teaching of it, are rooted in silence. This is seen clearly in the vision quest of the Algonquins. Whenever a young man sought the vision that would direct and give meaning to his life, he would leave his people to fast in solitude and silence. In the silence the Spirit would come and speak to him.

Even in the more literary religions, the disciple's inner silence mirrors the absolute silence from which God's word emerges. *Exodus* 20 relates how God proclaimed the Law: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. You shall have no other gods before me." While he was speaking, "the people were afraid and trembled; and they stood afar off, and said to Moses, 'You speak to us, and we will hear; but let not God speak to us, lest we die.'" The Talmudic tractate *Shabbat* gives the comments of three rabbis on this passage. The first taught that before fear overcame them, the people had been able to hear no more than the first two words, "I am the Lord." According to the second, they heard only the first word, the divine name, "I am." The third held that the people heard only the first letter of the first word, *alef*, which is silent.

It is possible so to grow in silence that, after years of maintaining silence by effort, one comes to *be* silent. At this point the personality is integrated and the passions are calmed. One gains insight into what is really going on, along with knowledge of the next necessary step, and the unexpected may happen. The Zen master Rinzi used to help students stuck on a *kōan* by screaming suddenly at them. Startled, their minds would make the necessary leap. Rinzi called the scream "silence," and

the early Christian Desert Fathers would have agreed with his choice of terms. From them comes the teaching that one man says nothing, yet is never quiet, while another speaks from morning till night, yet maintains perfect silence.

John Climacus, looking at the question from the other side, wrote that "a discerning hesychast will have no need of words, because he expresses words by deeds" (*The Ladder* 27.4). This saying the Buddha demonstrated when a philosopher once asked him, "Without words, without the wordless, will you tell me the truth?" The Buddha kept silent. Since real silence is beyond both words and wordlessness, by this answer the philosopher was freed from delusion.

From the early Christian monastic tradition comes the story of a pilgrim who went into the desert to see two of the great fathers, Abba Arsenius and Abba Moses. He was taken first to Abba Arsenius who, because he then lived in total silence, would not so much as look at him. Discomfited, the pilgrim rose quickly and was led to Abba Moses, who received him kindly, entertained him as well as was possible in that desolation, and sent him away in peace. Afterward, his guide asked, "Which of the two do you like better?" The visitor replied, "To my mind, the one who gave us a good welcome and a good meal seems the better."

A saintly father heard of this, considered it, and prayed: "Lord, reveal this to me, I pray: how is it that one man for Thy sake withdraws from all sight and speech of men, while another for Thy sake is a good fellow with all?" He saw the answer in a vision of two boats floating: in one were Abba Arsenius and the Holy Spirit, sitting together in peace and silence, while in the other was Abba Moses with the angels of God, who were popping honeycomb into his mouth.

Mystical Silence. "We learn silence from the gods, speech from men," Plutarch observed. Isaac the Syrian (late seventh century) agreed: "Speech is the organ of this present world. Silence is the mystery of the world to come." The one who has patiently struggled through the dry, tiresome stages of forced silence comes at last into a radiant peace, a blessed stillness that is too beautiful for words, too full for speech.

It does not seem to matter greatly whether the silent one believes that he is experiencing union with the Holy Trinity or with *brahman*; in all religious traditions the blissful silence appears to be the same. Nor does it seem to matter whether one tries to talk about the experience of silence in the context of Islam or that of Buddhism: in all traditions it appears to be equally impossible. Here the maxim "He who speaks does not know, he who knows does not speak" necessarily holds true.

Of the mystical value of silence, Abū Yazīd al-Bis-

ṭāmī, the ninth-century founder of the ecstatic school of Sufism, once said, "No lamp I saw brighter than silence, no speech I heard better than speechlessness." This is, perhaps, all that can be said.

[See also *Spiritual Discipline; Meditation; and Language, article on Buddhist Views of Language.*]

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ELIZABETH McCUMSEY, C.H.M.

SILVER. See Gold and Silver.

SIMEON BAR YOHAI. See Shim'on bar Yoh'ai.

SIMEON BEN GAMALIEL II. See Shim'on ben Gamli'el II.

SIMEON BEN LAKISH. See Shim'on ben Laqish.

SIMEON THE NEW THEOLOGIAN. See Symeon the New Theologian.

SIMONS, MENNO (1496–1561), Dutch priest, the major northern European leader of an Anabaptist group that later came to be known as the Mennonite church. His firm leadership and numerous writings helped to consolidate the pacifist wing of early Dutch Anabaptism and to make it normative, after the ill-fated attempt of some to establish the kingdom of God by force in the northern German city of Münster in 1534–1535.

Simons was born of peasant stock in Witmarsum, in the province of Friesland, in 1496 and was enrolled in a monastic school at an early age. Since Friesland was dominated by the Premonstratensian Order at that time, and since Simons was installed in 1524 by that order as a priest in Pingjum as well as in his home parish of Witmarsum in 1531, we may assume that he was a member of that order and received his training in it, perhaps in the nearby monastery of Vinea Domini. The

order was known for its excellent libraries and the emphasis it placed upon education.

Simons's religious struggle began early in his career as a priest, in connection with his celebration of the Mass. His doubts about the real presence of Christ in the bread and wine indicate that Reformation ideas had reached Friesland. He wrote later that he had searched the writings of the reformers in vain for answers to the question of infant baptism, which became his second concern. His problem with the Mass was most likely inspired by the antisacramental movement in the Netherlands, as well as by Erasmian humanism and the teachings of the Brethren of the Common Life. Questions about the validity of infant baptism may have arisen when Simons heard that an Anabaptist tailor named Sicke Freerks had been publicly executed in nearby Leeuwarden for having himself baptized a second time, but it appears also that Simons had already encountered literature on the subject before this event.

In his search for answers Simons eventually turned to the scriptures, which he had apparently not read during his days as a student at the monastery. Yet he must have held the scriptures to be a significant authority, for he expressed deep disappointment at not finding in them the kind of support he felt necessary for the practice of the Mass and infant baptism. He continued to serve in his priestly office, but his new studies must have begun to change his emphasis, for by 1528 he had become known as an "evangelical preacher." According to Simons's own account, his spiritual pilgrimage was a gradual transition, lasting eleven years, from a routine reliance on tradition to a deep personal faith in Christ and reliance on the scriptures as final authority in matters of faith. Gradually his views became known, and by January 1536 he had found it prudent to go into hiding. He used this time for spiritual exercises and writing. After nearly a year had elapsed he accepted a call from a representative Anabaptist delegation to be the spiritual leader of the scattered groups of believers. He was baptized and ordained by Obbe Philips. Sometime during this interim period Simons also married a woman about whom we know little more than that her name was Gertrude.

Simons's personal and theological point of departure was the new birth. His first major treatise, entitled *The Spiritual Resurrection* (1536), was followed a year later by a restatement of this theme under the title *The New Birth* (1537). This emphasis on conversion occurs centrally in his subsequent writings, particularly when he refers to his own spiritual struggle before 1536.

Intimately related to this theme was his emphasis on the nature of the church. Simons was convinced that the church had fallen from its apostolic purity in both

doctrine and life. Reformation of the present structures was no longer possible; a new beginning patterned after the church in the Bible was called for. This was, in large part, the content of his three writings of 1539: *Foundation of Christian Doctrine*, *Christian Baptism*, and *Why I Do Not Cease Teaching and Writing*. Grace and ethics were to go hand in hand. The true church is the bride of Christ and must, therefore, be without spot or wrinkle (*Eph.* 5:27). Simons did not believe in sinless perfection, but rather that Christians must help each other achieve the fullness of life in Christ through both faith and obedience.

This vision of the church, as well as cultural acceptance and economic prosperity, led to a dynamic witness at all social levels. But it also led to numerous divisions that were to trouble the later years of Simons's work. Because of these tensions, many of his writings came to be unduly defensive and polemical. Circumstances, and his co-workers, forced him into a harsher stand on excommunication and the ban (exclusion from membership) than he had taught earlier.

The doctrine of a pure church also forced him into polemical exchanges with Reformed theologians and others on his view of the incarnation. A pure church required a pure Savior. Hence Simons believed that Jesus had received both his divine and his human nature directly from God, and that Mary was as passive as a glass of water through which a ray of sun passes. Although this Christology of heavenly flesh was not new by that time, and was also taught by others, it brought ridicule to Simons as he tried, with increasing bitterness, to defend the doctrine.

Simons led a harried and persecuted life. In 1542 a bounty of one hundred guilders was offered by Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500–1558) for his capture; this did not seriously disrupt his travels, even though some who had given him lodging and food were executed. His journeys extended from Friesland to the Cologne area, and east to Danzig (present-day Gdansk). He was eventually permitted to settle in Holstein, northeast of Hamburg, perhaps because he had broken with earlier Anabaptists in expressing his belief that a Christian could also be a magistrate, provided that he lives in obedience to Christ. Extensive writings continued to flow from his pen and press in Holstein until his death on 31 January 1561.

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CORNELIUS J. DYCK

SIN. For discussion of the Mesopotamian moon god, known in Akkadian as *Sin*, see Nanna.

SIN AND GUILT. The human being, as *homo religiosus*, is a creature that worries. His worrying is both his burden and his distinction. In the dark age of his mutation to *Homo sapiens*, at the turning point between animality and humanity, his intuition of the presence of the numinous around him tipped the balance toward humanness. As soon as this ape could stand on his feet, his glance could lift itself from the earth, the source of food, and direct itself toward the stars, that is, to a sphere higher—not only spatially—than that of the satisfaction of his bodily needs and functions. In this way man discovered the universe and, concomitantly, the existential problem of his place in the cosmos, assigned to him by some power, for some particular reason, toward some goal. He thus invented an entire mythical universe in answer to the questions evoked by his fundamental anxiety.

Mircea Eliade has shown time and again that the central characteristic of myth is a narrative of origins. If one knows how things started and why they went awry, one finds some kind of solace, as does the patient when he learns from his physician the name of his disease. This reassurance is, however, partial at best: the essentials for living are the most precarious for man among all the creatures of the earth. Reflecting on the origins of his human condition, man came inevitably and universally to the conclusion that this present life is not what it was meant to be by the god(s) *in illo tempore*. In short, from being anxious, man became unhappy, stricken with guilt feelings about an initial accident that is repeated endlessly throughout human existence and can be called "sin."

Sin and guilt, however, come in a great variety of shades, according to the various sensitivities represented by the great number of religious and philosophical feelings and systems. In this article the classification of the different approaches to the issue is of primordial importance. I shall attempt to distribute the material from a phenomenological point of view, starting with the cosmological apprehension of man as surrounded by taboos and continuing with the tragic conception that to live at all is a sin. In a second major

section, the transition from such a naturalistic understanding to an ethical conception will be assessed. The third area of investigation concerns the Judeo-Christian tradition and its antitaboo, antideterministic, antinaturalistic notion of sin as a breach of a personal covenant with God and man. A brief excursus discusses the very different notions of sin and guilt among the ancient Greeks. Finally, a particular case is made of Islam as another branch of the monotheistic tradition.

The Cosmological Vision. Martin Heidegger in his *Sein und Zeit* (1929) speaks of the "fall" of man into the world. This is a felicitous rendering of the basic feeling that developed as soon as man became aware of being part of the vast cosmos. From the dawn of his consciousness, man felt impotent, an unbearable condition. That is why he resorted to magic. When all rational response to reality becomes pent up and frustrated, the only alternative to passive inaction is the biological function of magic. Magic is the manipulation of occult forces in nature; it is a way of participating in cosmic functions. Here specific acts are wrought as mimesis of their archetypal models; they deal with objects that are never indifferent, although some are of common use and, so to speak, tolerated by the gods, while others are taboos, that is, reserved by the gods for themselves. Man's manipulation of a taboo is a dangerous business and demands ritual reparation. But it is not *sensu stricto* a sin, and there is here no true guilt. The violation of a taboo is often absolutely unavoidable, like everything pertaining to sexuality or the return home of the victorious warrior. Making reparation to the numinous consists in magically purging the offender through specific magical acts, sometimes through death. It is not a punishment however, for that would imply personal culpability, that is, violation of a commandment expressing a divine will. What is dreaded by the "primitive" is not offending a transcendent being but upsetting the cosmological order. Thanks to myth, he knows what is taboo, and thanks to magical rites, he knows what to do and how to do it: he confesses and expiates. [See also Magic.]

If we follow Raffaele Pettazzoni (*La confessione dei peccati*, 1929–1936) and pick up the one conception of sin that he calls magical (in contrast to theistic), we are struck by the biological aspect of what is called sin in confessions. [See Confession of Sins.] They tend to focus, for example, upon sexuality, but more generally, in agrarian cultures, they are clearly oriented toward a cosmobiology. The appropriate expiation transfers to another object the threat of biological evil. It is so little a matter of guilt on the part of the confessant that he lists sins that he obviously never committed. Sin, in this context, is not a personal but a material object.

We must therefore complement what has been said above about purgation of the offender with a more objective aspect of the ritual. As Robert Hertz has noted, more often than not the point is not only to purge the transgressor of the mystical substance he unduly appropriated, but to bring it back to its original focus. The personal participation in upsetting the cosmos is, of course, not ignored. But it is not the center of concern, for man finds himself living after a cosmic catastrophe whose "culprit" is anonymous. Death is no punishment but belongs to life structure and to world order. Everything is here determined before the anthropogony occurs. Later, when man discovered agriculture, he applied to himself its cyclical resurgence, the "eternal return," and so were born the initiation rites whose center is the symbolic death of the initiate followed by his symbolic return to life. Again on this score, death does not imply any consciousness of a guilt to be atoned for.

At this point, one can discern two variants in the treatment of the presence of evil in the world according to the cosmological view. The second variant will be reviewed below in the section on Mesopotamia. This first division may be concluded with the mention of the first variant, namely, the conception of individual life as being by itself already an offense, an injustice, an arrogance, to be atoned for. Such a view is found in geographical areas as remote from one another as Central America and Greece. According to the Maya and Aztec myth, this world is the last extant in a series of creations destroyed by cataclysms. This one endures only on account of the sacrifices of human hearts offered to the gods, who themselves made the first oblation (see K. Garbay, *Historia de los Mexicanos por sus pinturas*, 2d ed., Mexico City, 1973).

Thus, the most archaic form of fault is defilement, that is, "a strain or blemish that infects from without" (Ricoeur, 1967, p. 8). The focus is on the world rather than man, and the ethical sin is confused with the material evil, for all failure upsets the cosmological order and brings with it defilement, thus drawing between sacred and profane a dividing line that often makes no sense to modern man. This, however, constitutes what Ricoeur calls "our oldest memory," for which the concept of retribution is central. That is why it took no less than the questioning of this foundational myth to dissociate ethical sin from physical evil and suffering.

Mesopotamian Religion. This second variant to the cosmological conception I mentioned earlier is found in Mesopotamia. There for the first time, the anonymity of evil was felt intolerable. The phenomenology of evil had to find a language by which a responsible agent could be incriminated as the bearer of guilt. Two ways were open: either through demonizing powers and forces ma-

nipulating men as pawns on a chessboard or through designating human culprits, thus making them the bearers of guilt. Both solutions are found in Mesopotamian mythologies. The former, however, is fundamental. It gives expression to the all-important human sentiment that evil was already present before the anthropogony. Before he becomes guilty through participation, man is a victim. This tragic conception found expression in the text *Ludlul bel nemeqi*, where the so-called Babylonian Job cannot make sense of his misfortune. Similarly, in *A Dialogue about Human Misery*, the so-called Babylonian Qohelet concludes that one cannot know the divine intentions. But already a Sumerian confessional says, "Whether man has acted shamefully, whether he has acted well, he knows not at all."

One is struck by the pessimism of the Mesopotamian myths. The cosmological myth *Enuma elish*, for example, resembles a Greek tragedy. Man falls into sin as he falls into existence. In the background of all Babylonian and Assyrian penitential psalms, the free will of man is never up to the demands of the divine standards of purity: "Mankind as many as there be [commit] sin . . . the food that belongs to God I have eaten." So man is naturally sinful, and this can be explained by a kind of generative transmission of that status. "The penalty of my father, of my grandfather, of my mother, of my grandmother, of my family, of relations through brothers and sisters, may it not come nigh me" (Langdon, 1927).

If the defilement of sin is "our oldest memory," the inexorability of sin is also very much with us today, to the extent that we have maintained a dualistic view of reality. This finds expression in phylogenetic laws (Darwin), in the psychological fabric of man (Freud), and in societal structures (Marx). But until now the word *sin* has been used here only by approximation, for it is only when the fault is put in the context of a covenantal relation with God that one can speak, *sensu stricto*, of sin (against an expressed divine will). Here, taboos and magic have no role to play. If they are still found in the documents, they are reduced to the state of traces. We thus turn to the next religious venture; it has been characterized by some as a process of demythologization.

The Religions of Israel. Starting with those remnants of the fault as defilement, let us observe with Ricoeur (1967, p. 70f.) the customary positive character of the stain; purity's characteristic, on the other hand, is negative. When, as in the Bible, sin becomes a breach in the living relation with God, there is conversion of the positive to the negative. Sin is "the loss of a bond, of a root, of an ontological ground" counterbalanced by the positive "fundamental symbolism of the return." We have entered another world, but not one isolated from the rest of the universe.

One central characteristic of the Hebrew scriptures is that they are polemical in reaction to the ways of thinking of the neighboring world. It is clear that such documents cannot be read in isolation from their environment. Taking issue, for example, with the ontological dualism present everywhere, Israel understands the profane as being in analogy with the sacred. Man has been created in the image of God (*Gn.* 1:26f.). Something of the kind existed in Mesopotamia, where the king was the image of the divine, in contradistinction to all other human beings. Israel "demythologized" this notion through a process of democratization. Not the king only, but man *qua* man is *imago Dei*. The creator has granted him creative faculties: speech, sexuality, conscience. Conscience is here no intrinsic human quality but a gift of God; it is the Hebrew *lev* (*Ex.* 35:21–22, 29). It makes man an ethical being. For the first time, we meet a vivid consciousness of sin: Abel's blood cries out from the ground (*Gn.* 4:10); Joseph's brothers acknowledge their guilt (*Gn.* 42:21ff.); the psalmist laments "my sin is ever before me" (*Ps.* 51:5). Sin is now assessed within a context of interrelationship between God and man, that is, of the covenant. It is thus no longer just an ethical fault. Neither is it a juridical offense only. Being in covenant with God entails an existence in holiness; sin therefore is deviation (*'avon*), a straying from the norms of holiness, understood as the very dynamism of life. It is a crime against God's sanctity, and it is only to be expected that it would occasion the far-ranging disturbance of life. For God's holiness and the holy human response to it keep the cosmos and humanity in *shalom* (peace, integrality, wholeness, sanity.) Far from the face of God, there can be only disease and catastrophe (*Lv.* 26:1ff.; *Dt.* 28:1ff.).

Thus is the notion of sin oriented toward a liturgical understanding. To the microcosmic concentration of the liturgy in the Temple of Jerusalem corresponds the macrocosmic liturgy of the world with man at its center. This, which is especially true of the Priestly source, is also fundamental for Yahvism in general (*Is.* 6:3, 6:5). Pushed to the extreme, sin becomes a *pesha'*, that is, an apostasy, an abandonment of rectitude, of justice, of fidelity—in brief, of Torah. Thus there is in the Bible no theory of sinfulness, but, very practically, there are sins, a thousand and one ways to go astray from an existence whose whole *raison d'être* is to be holy. Here the realism is such that sins corrupt the whole "heart," which therefore must be replaced by a pure heart, and not only on the individual level but, eschatologically and actually, on the communal level when all Israel is made "new," "whole," "holy."

Thus, for Israel, since man is created coresponsible for the governance of creation and indeed is high priest

in the cosmic temple (*Gn.* 1:26ff. and the whole literary Priestly "layer" in the Pentateuch), he is also ultimately responsible for the presence of evil in the universe and in history. The world as we know it is a perverted "garden" where even the generative and the creative powers of man are twisted in their process and their aim, and diverted from their natural bliss. In sorrow is man to produce his food amid a plantation that is the reverse of the one of Eden, as it is full of thorns and thistles. Ultimately he returns, not to "paradise," but to dust (*Gn.* 3:16-19).

That deviation is the product of both the human "heart" (internal) and an external power, personified in *Genesis* 3 as the "serpent," which is an evil spirit according to other texts. There is between the two a correspondence. The serpent's discourse is immediately intelligible to man, evoking in him favorable echoes. For man is inclined to do evil (*Gn.* 6:5). Later this inclination is conceptualized in the Apocrypha and rabbinism as the *yetser ha-ra'* (*4 Esd.* 7:118, *2 Bar.* 40:42f.). Thus there is present here a trace of a tragic anthropology, insisting upon the passivity and the alienation of man. The point these texts want to make is that by birth, the status of man is to be separated from God. Before any human act, sin is already there. It follows from this that the divine covenant is a gracious gift, undeserved and productive of a second birth, the birth of a "circumcised" life (i.e., marked by the intimate relationship with God).

As, however, the *yetser ha-ra'* is no radical evil but a permanent temptation, there is here no *servum arbitrium* or original sin in the sense of an inherited corrupt nature. Sin is a kind of second nature in man (*Jer.* 13:23); it is human obstinacy to alienate oneself. Ezekiel speaks of the human *niddah* (impurity), and Paul, later, uses the Greek term *hamartia* in the singular.

From the pragmatic concern with sins one has now passed to the reflective elaboration of a theory of sin that underscores man's congenital weakness. He is "flesh"; he is born a sinner (*Ps.* 51:7). He is capable of only relative justice (*Is.* 51:1). Sinning has become an attitude connatural to man, a permanent blemish (*Is.* 6:5). This realism leads the New Testament to the conclusion that the world is ruled by evil (*Rom.* 3:9, *Col.* 1:13, *1 Jn.* 5:19), because man has enthroned it.

Sin is not only a fault before God, it is also an act wronging one's neighbor. David claims that he did not sin against King Saul (*1 Sm.* 19:4; 24:12); in return, Saul would be committing a sin against David in attempting to kill him, something Saul acknowledges later (*1 Sm.* 26:21). Time and again the prophets, in particular, equate the one aspect of man's sin with the other. No one denounces more forcefully than Amos so-

cial ills as sins against men and against God. When, later, Jesus is asked which is the greatest commandment, he replies by equating the commitment to love God with that to love one's fellow man (*Mt.* 22:36-40; cf. *Dt.* 6:5, *Lv.* 19:18).

Sin entails the curse. A classic description of the latter is found in *Deuteronomy* 28 (cf. *Lv.* 26). As Johannes Pedersen writes, "Sin breeds the curse, and the curse breeds sin" (1959, vol. 1, p. 441). "The sinner is charged with a curse, for the curse is a dissolution which takes place in the soul of the sinner" (*ibid.*, p. 437). This is why there is an intimate relation between sin and disease or other misfortunes. In the first case as in the second, one "is stricken in the soul" (*1 Kgs.* 8:38). Man-made evil includes military defeat, drought, famine, and so forth (8:33-40). There are thus three possible causes of illness: one's own sin, the curse of others, or the sinfulness of humanity in general (cf., *Ps.* 32:1ff., 38:3ff., etc.; *Sir.* 38:1-15).

The Israelites did not distinguish between performance and performer, sin and sinner. Sin is the doing of the sinner; the sinner sins. There cannot be a judgment of the deed that would not be a judgment of the doer. Beyond illness and disease, death is the ultimate punishment of sin. But death is not just the final accident ending man's existence. As we have seen, sin is the dissolution of the soul; life is torn apart by sin (*Dt.* 27:15-26). It is really the presence of death in the midst of life, and suffering is its foretaste. As Paul is later to proclaim, "death is the wages of sin" (*Rom.* 6:23).

Being phenomenologically a movement of radical reform within Judaism, one deeply influenced by apocalypticism, early Christianity crystallized the notion of sinfulness into a state of universal corruption (*Mt.* 7:11). In contrast to the rabbis, Paul emphasized the unavoidability of sin. It is due to Adam's "fall" (*Rom.* 5:12ff.), on the one hand, and to an equation made between weakness of the flesh and its antagonism to God (*Rom.* 8:3, "the flesh of sin"), on the other. Moreover the law has brought man's sinfulness to a paroxysm, for the law makes sin real and sanctionable (*Rom.* 4:15). It is this very paroxysm that expresses itself in the crucifixion of the just *par excellence*, its total reversal by the grace of God making Christ's death atone for our sins. Paul writes, "Christ died for our sin" (*1 Cor.* 15:3), and further, "Christ was innocent of sin, and yet for our sake God made him one with the sinfulness of men, so that in him we might be made one with the goodness of God himself" (*2 Cor.* 5:21). Thus "in Christ" (a favorite expression of Paul) it has become possible to lead a saintly life, which as we saw above is, according to the Hebrew Bible, the goal of creation. In summary, the final answer to our guilt, according to the New Testa-

ment, is given by the death of Christ which overcomes our state of sin and guilt and thereby inaugurates the kingdom of God on earth.

The Greeks. For the sixth-century philosopher Anaximander, being itself is already evil. We find in Greece other echoes of such pessimism. Tragedy is, after all, a Greek invention. According to this conception of existence, man's fault (not sin) is a blindness sent by the gods, a fatal error that the Greeks called *hamartia*. In Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, the hero says, "In me personally you would not find a fault [*hamartias*] to reproach me with to having thus committed these crimes against myself and against my kin" (ll. 967f.). Let us observe that Oedipus is the ambivalent symbol of crime and excusable fault. For Aristotle, *hamartia* is the terrible and tragic fault made by distinguished individuals, by heroes. He insists on their nobility. In sum, there is more fascination in Greece with hero worship than with hamartology. As E. R. Dodds has shown, in the Greek tradition we are dealing more with a "shame culture" than with real guilt. The Homeric hero "loses face"; his public reputation (*timē*) means everything to him. Although with time there occurred a moralization process whereby shame became guilt, the ground for feeling guilty remained murky. It is tied with *hubris*; still, the sixth-century poet Theognis says, "No man . . . is responsible for his own ruin or his own success: of both these things the gods are the givers. No man can perform an action and know whether its outcome will be good or bad" (ll. 133–136). So, despite the protest of the fifth-century philosopher Heraclitus that "character is destiny" (frag. 119), one's *daemon* was in general more important, for an ancient Greek, than one's character.

Plato adopts the opinion of Socrates that "no one sins willingly," for wrongdoing is an error of judgment. No one who knows what is good (which is also happiness), would choose not to imitate it. *Ananke* (necessity) exists, but it operates within the kind of life freely chosen by the soul. "He who chooses is responsible, not God" (*Republic* 10.617e). The only sin is to shift from the voluntary to the involuntary. When this is avoided, the soul can be assimilated to God by contemplating the world of the Forms, which is divine and well ordered. By imitating such a world the soul becomes divine and well ordered as well.

Aristotle takes issue with Socrates' optimism that no one sins voluntarily. For, in the first place, we are responsible for the way we figure out what is good for us. Second, once a goal is set, human reflection decides what are the appropriate means to reach it, and the means selected make us guilty or innocent. The human soul disposes of a power of choice (*proairesis*); it is the root of liberty, but the passions can overcome intellec-

tion. There is indeed a guilty *lack* of knowledge, which, for an alcoholic, for instance, is self-inflicted. Euripides has Medea say, "I do realize how terrible is the crime I am about, but passion overrules my resolutions, passion that causes most of the misery in the world" (*Medea* 1078–1080). Happiness, however, is submission to intellect (*nous*), that is, to what is most divine in us. There is a veritable rational determinism concerning the ends of such submission. To obey *nous* assures contact with the immortal. But there is no notion here of sin in the sense of a breach in a personal relationship with God. For God is a Thought thinking itself and is totally indifferent to man and the world.

The Stoa puts the emphasis on individual autonomy within a human communion (*koinonia*, *philia*, *oikeiosis*) whose cement is Reason which permeates the whole. [See Logos.] In the second century CE, Marcus Aurelius wrote:

All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been coordinated, and they combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and participate in the same reason. (*Meditations* 7.9)

Here universal laws are identical with divine laws, so that human life is conceived by the Stoic thinker Epicurus (c. 55–c. 135) as a divine service (*huperesia* or *diakonika*). The ideal is to live according to nature, for the world order is totally rational and anything that happens must therefore be accepted. Providence is another name for necessity. Sin is error, the violation of the cosmic laws.

Finally, a more clearly religious solution is proposed by Orphism. In Orphic thought, the root of evil is the body; it is a prison for the soul. The soul is punished in the body for earlier sins. If these sins are not expiated during one incarnation, the soul transmigrates to another body. This doctrine of reincarnation provided an elegant solution to the moral dilemma of divine justice and human suffering. The way to purify the soul of sin is to emancipate the individual from group solidarity and its corollary, vicarious suffering for another's fault. The goal is to escape from the wheel of deaths and rebirths through rituals that bring *katharsis*, that is, a cleansing from the old taint of carnality.

The Christian Church. I plan to deal here—all too briefly, to be sure—with three Christian theologians chosen for their towering stature in the history of the Eastern and the Western churches and for their lasting

influence on Christian thinking and philosophy until the present day. Irenaeus (c. 120–202), with whom I shall start for reasons of chronology, has a conception of man before the Fall that Augustine found himself incapable of sharing. For Irenaeus, the time before the Fall is that of Adam's immaturity. He has been created in the "image of God" but is still to be brought to the stage of the "likeness of God." The Fall delayed the process of maturation, but on the other hand, it also marked a kind of human weaning from the parental God. Only a relatively independent being can enter a meaningful relationship with the creator. Human history consists of the vicissitudes of that relationship. It would however end in total failure were it not for the incarnation. Christ is his father's manifestation (*manifestatio, phanerōsis*), thus making God visible. To see God in Christ is the way for man to be divinized. God came down to man, and man climbs up to God.

When we turn to Origen (c. 185–c. 254), we find a man at the crossroads of two diverging theologies: the theology of Justin and Clement, "Greek" and indifferent to the role of the flesh, and the theology of Irenaeus, deeply biblical and christological. In *On First Principles* (*Peri archōn*), there is no mention of an original sin committed by Adam. Rather Origen emphasizes the fall of souls. These are preexisting pure spirits that strayed from their creator and fell into human bodies. They are in pilgrimage back to God. This process of salvation is also a process of restoration, of mending, of putting the world back in order. This is possible because there is between God and the world a kinship the trace of which in man is the *nous*. There is here no autonomous existence of darkness. Evil is simply a turning away from God.

It is thus with no surprise that we find Origen focusing upon Christ's work rather than on his person. Christ is the great educator who brings man from deficiency to perfection. The goal (*teleiōsis*) is the perfection of human nature by the Logos, the divinization of man. The means is obedience to God, which Christ teaches by his word and by his death: "The Son . . . made himself obedient unto death to teach obedience to those who could reach salvation only by way of obedience." Salvation is *apokatastasis pantōn* (a restitution of all things and a definite achievement). Even Satan will be saved. But until the eschaton, the movement of drawing near to God is endless. All has been revealed; but all is to be discovered. Christ has come; but he ceaselessly comes.

The church father Augustine (354–430) is without rival as regards the theology of the West. Augustine inaugurates a "new type of discourse, that of onto-theology," says Ricoeur. The question *unde malum* would be

legitimate only if evil were substantial, as the Manichaeans teach. But it is not so. Already Basil of Caesarea (330–379) had stated that there is no ontological reality to evil (*Hexaemeron* 2.5). Augustine follows suit and says that the problem is rather *unde malum faciamus*, stressing more forcefully still that evil is no substance, no creature. All creatures participate in being and are therefore good. It is only through his free choice that man brings sin from potential to real, from nothingness to an act. Evil is negative. It is *amissio boni* or *privatio boni*. It is a deficiency of the created that makes freedom possible and hence human history.

Augustine had the opportunity to underscore this theologoumenon of the gratuitousness of God's grace in his polemics against Pelagius (fl. c. 400–418). This British monk taught that man can reach perfection in holiness by the practice of virtues and asceticism. He therefore bears the sole guilt for his sins, as he is endowed with free will. "If sin is innate, it is not voluntary, if it is voluntary, it is not innate." Pelagius of course chooses the second proposition. Children are in the situation of Adam before the Fall. Some of them imitate Adam; others become perfectly washed of all sin.

In response to Pelagius, Augustine considerably hardened his stance. He developed the "original sin" theory (inaugurated by Cyprian, 200–258, and by Ambrose, c. 330–397) and stated that all men are born sinful and guilty, meriting eternal damnation. With the Fall, the human spirit has been victimized by the rebellion of the body, which should have been its servant. (By contrast, the animal, although under the dictum of nature, is not guilty, because it has no reason, no spirit.) Originally nature was *natura sana*, but it has become *natura vitata*. This explains why sin is transmitted from one generation to another, making sin as unavoidable as life itself. This inherent nothingness in us impairs our liberty. Evil is an act; it has an existential character and can be described as a *defectus*, an *aversio a Deo, conversio ad creaturas* (*Against Secundinus the Manichaeus* 17). For this, which is a perversion, God is not responsible. He is responsible for the musical instrument, not for its discord.

Augustine's theories are not exempt from ambiguities. They have remained so in the church for sixteen centuries (Tresmontant, 1961, p. 611). For the freedom and the culpability of man is on the other hand predestined by God. Augustine developed the doctrine of double predestination, which had such a powerful impact on Calvin and on so many Christian theologians. The seminal transmission of sin and guilt was Augustine's way of counterbalancing the culpability of the individual. Man finds evil already present before he actualizes

it himself. But the fact that perverted nature is inherited considerably relativizes man's ultimate responsibility, for Augustine attributed to evil a quasi nature through a continuous contingency.

Islam. In the Qur'an, sin is essentially pride and opposition to God. The model of such misbehavior is given by Iblis (Satan), who refused to prostrate himself before Adam. Human sin is minimized to the level of a weakness that has become a kind of habit: "the heart is prone to evil" (12:53). In fact, the original mistake of Adam proved beneficial for humanity, for through this mistake the world became populated and God worshiped by a great number of men. Besides, the forgiveness of sin is within easy reach for all (57:28 and passim). Repentance does not require atonement, and the pilgrim on the *hajj* to Mecca returns home as innocent as a newborn child. Prophets and saints are delivered in this life from moral and physical evils. Believers are further delivered from eternal punishment. However, good works as well as faith are necessary for salvation.

The power of God stands at the center of Muslim faith. That power is such that it can even be arbitrary. For example, God commands reprehensible acts from Muhammad. The Qur'an (35:9) declares that God leads astray those he chooses (cf. 42:12, 40:36). If God willed, everyone in the land would believe. But God does not impose his will on man so that he may be responsible for himself (10:99f., 18:28). This does not detract from the fact that all has been decreed beforehand by God, including man's failings.

[See also Evil.]

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There are many monographs on "sin and guilt" according to the Jewish and Christian understanding, written in several languages. Few of them, however, have the scope and soberness of expression of the French collective work *Théologie du péché* (Tournai, 1960), by Philippe Delhay et al. Here one finds invaluable information on the notion of sin in "primitive" religions, in the Bible, among the Greeks, in Roman Catholic theology, and to a lesser extent in Eastern Christianity and Protestantism. On Protestantism, one should, of course, turn to Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 3.1, *The Doctrine of Creation* (New York, 1958), and to Paul Tillich's *Systematic Theology*, vol. 2, *Existence and the Christ* (Chicago, 1960). Another synoptic treatment of sin in the history of religions is provided by the collective work *Man and His Salvation*, edited by Eric J. Sharpe and John R. Hinnells (Totowa, N.J., 1973), which explores aspects of Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, early Christianity, Jewish Hasidism, Zoroastrianism, and so on.

The French theologian A.-M. Dubarle has written extensively on the problem of sin in the Bible and in church doctrine. Especially deserving notice here is his *Le péché originel: Perspectives théologiques* (Paris, 1983). Claude Tresmontant, another French theologian, gives an excellent presentation of the problem of creation and anthropology from the origins of Christianity to the time of Augustine in *La métaphysique du christianisme* (Paris, 1961), which is particularly important for its treatment of Origen and Augustine. Pierre Nautin's *Origène, sa vie et son œuvre* (Paris, 1977) reconstructs with great care Origen's biography and the tenets of his thinking.

The best treatment of Greek thought about sin and guilt is E. R. Dodds's *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951), especially his chapter on shame. On the Buddhist conception of sin, offense, and illusion, Henri de Lubac's *Aspects of Buddhism* (New York, 1963) has the merit of being a reliable translation for Western readers of Eastern concepts that are not easily understood by noninitiates.

ANDRÉ LACOCQUE

SINGH, GOBIND (1666–1708), the last of the ten *gurūs* ("teachers") of Sikhism. After his death the Sikh *gurū* was understood to be the *Ādi Granth*, the sacred book. Until Gobind Singh, the Sikh community, whose religious ideals and practices were a North Indian combination of Vaiṣṇava devotional movements from South India and elements of Islamic Sufism, had been led by a series of *gurūs* beginning with Nānak (1469–1539) and passing through to Gobind Singh's father, the ninth *gurū*, Tegh Bahādur.

Gobind Singh (originally Gobind Rāi) is known as the paradigm of the chivalrous, proud, martial, and loyal

religious ideal to which members of the Sikh Khālsā, “the community of pure ones,” aspire. In fact, it was Gobind Singh who established the Khālsā, and gave all male Sikhs the surname Singh (“lion”) and Sikh women the name Kaur (“lioness”). Gobind Singh is further known as the reported author of the *Dasam Granth* (Tenth Volume), an epic work that stands second only to the *Ādi Granth* in prestige in the Sikh community. Under Gobind Singh’s rule (1675–1708) Sikhism was transformed from a persecuted sect to a powerful religious community that has stood as the political and economic mainstay of the Punjab ever since.

Gobind Singh was born at Patna (in the Indian state of Bihar) on 26 December 1666, the only child of Tegh Bahādūr and his wife Gujarī. He spent the first few years of his life in Bihar before returning to his ancestral home, Anandpur, in the foothills of the Himalayas. He was nine years old when his father was summoned by the Mughal emperor to answer charges of extortion, and was executed in Delhi on 11 November 1675. Before he died, he proclaimed Gobind as his successor. Fearing further reprisals, the young *gurū* and his entourage moved farther back into the mountains and set up their camp at Paonta, on the banks of the Yamuna River. Here Gobind was taught Sanskrit and Persian (in addition to the Punjabi and Braj he had learned at Patna) and the arts of war. He spent much time hunting and composing poetry. His favorite themes were based on Hindu mythology, notably the exploits of the goddess Caṇḍī, the destroyer of demons.

In his autobiography, *Bicitra nātak* (The Wonderful Drama), Gobind wrote, “I came into the world charged with the duty to uphold the right in every place, to destroy sin and evil . . . that righteousness may flourish: that the good may live and tyrants be torn out by their roots.” As he grew into manhood Gobind decided to organize his followers into a fighting force. Soon he raised a small army that came into conflict with neighboring Rajput chiefs. Gobind defeated their combined forces at Bhangani in 1686 and those of the Mughal governor of Punjab at Nadaun a year later. His increasing strength alarmed the Mughals, and the emperor Aurangzeb sent his eldest son, Prince Moazzam, against him. The prince discreetly decided to leave Gobind alone and directed his generals to reduce the hill chieftains. Gobind utilized these years to fortify Anandpur by building a chain of fortresses. He married three wives, who bore him four sons.

Gobind gave religious sanction to practices introduced by his father, Tegh Bahādūr, and his grandfather, the sixth *gurū*, Hargobind. Early in 1699 Gobind sent out *hukumnāmahs* (orders) to the Sikhs to present themselves at Anandpur on the Hindu New Year’s day with

their hair and beards unshorn, as was customary among certain ascetic sects.

On 13 April 1699, after the morning service, Gobind drew his sword and asked for five men to offer their heads for sacrifice. He took them behind a tent and reappeared before the congregation, his sword dripping with blood, but then revealed that instead of the men he had slaughtered five goats. He addressed the volunteers as the “five beloved,” *pañj piyāre*, who were destined to become the nucleus of a new community, the Khālsā (from the Persian *khālis*, “the pure ones”). He baptized the five men (who came from different Hindu castes) by making them drink, from a single bowl, *amrit* (nectar) he had churned with a double-edged dagger. He gave them a new family name, Singh (“lion”), and after his own baptism changed his name from Gobind Rāi to Gobind Singh. Five emblems (*kakkār* or the “five ks”) were prescribed for the Khālsā: to wear their hair and beards unshorn (*kais*); to carry a comb (*kanghā*) in their hair to keep it tidy; to wear the knee-length breeches (*kachhā*) then worn by soldiers; to wear a steel bracelet (*karā*) on their right wrist as a symbol of poverty and pledge to their *gurūs*; and always to carry a saber (*kir-pān*) to defend their faith. In addition to these five emblems, the converts were forbidden to smoke or chew tobacco, to consume alcoholic drinks, to eat the flesh of animals slaughtered by being bled to death (as was customary among Jews and Muslims); they were permitted only *jhatkā* meat, that of an animal dispatched with one blow. Because their adversaries were largely Muslims, the Khālsā were forbidden to molest their women. The idea, in short, was to raise an army of *sant sipāhis* (soldier-saints).

The vast majority of the *gurū*’s followers underwent baptism and became hirsute Kesādhāri Khālsā, as distinct from the Sahajdhari Sikhs (“those who take time to adopt”). The eruption of this militant force alarmed the neighboring Hindu chieftains as well as the Muslim Mughals. Gobind was compelled to evacuate Anandpur. No sooner had he left than his two youngest sons were captured and executed. The *gurū* was left with forty men who stockaded themselves at Chamkaur. In the skirmishes that ensued the *gurū* was able to escape, but his two elder sons fell in battle. Tradition holds that despite these adversities Gobind sent the emperor a defiant poem entitled *Zafarnāmā* (The Epistle of Victory). There he wrote, “What use is it to put out a few sparks when you raise a mighty flame instead?”

Gobind eluded his pursuers and found safe refuge at Muktsar. He spent a year in the region baptizing large segments of the Hindu peasantry, including those of the Phulkian States: Patiala, Nabha, Jind, and Faridkot. With the assistance of a disciple, Manī Singh, he pre-

pared a definitive edition of the Sikh scripture, the *Ādi Granth*, compiled by the fifth *gurū*, Arjun, in which he inserted compositions of his father, Tegh Bahādur. He also collected his own writings in the *Dasam Granth*.

It is not clear whether or not Gobind intended to complain to the emperor against Wazir Khan, governor of the Punjab, about the murder of his infant sons, but he was on his way to the Mughal capital when he received news of the emperor's death and the conflict over succession between his sons. The *gurū* decided to back Prince Moazzam, and a detachment of Sikh soldiers fought a victorious battle on his side at Jajau on 8 June 1707. Later Gobind visited the new emperor at Agra and stayed on for several months. The emperor did not take any action against his governor of the Punjab, and when he marched to his southern domains against his rebellious brother, Kam Baksh, the *gurū* followed him as far as Nander (now in Maharashtra). At Nander two young Pathans who were in his entourage entered his tent and stabbed him. It is most likely that the assassins were hirelings of the Punjab governor. Before he succumbed to his wounds on 7 October 1708, Gobind proclaimed an end to the succession of *gurūs* and exhorted the Sikhs to look upon the *Ādi Granth* as the symbolic representation of their ten *gurūs*.

Gobind Singh remains the *beau ideal* of the Khālsā Sikhs, the paradigm of chivalry combined with valor, poetic sophistication, and generosity. He is referred to as *dasam padshāh* ("tenth emperor"), *nīle ghorey dā asvār* ("rider of the roan stallion"), *citiān bājān vālā* ("lord of white hawks"), and *kalgi dhar* ("wearer of plumes").

[See also *Ādi Granth*; *Dasam Granth*; *Sikhism*; and *the biography of Nānak*.]

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Whereas few English-language sources deal exclusively with Gobind Singh, a number of general works on the Sikh religion contain sections dealing with his life and writings, based on his own work and contemporary records in Persian and Gurmukhī. Gokul Chand Narang's *Transformation of Sikhism*, 5th ed. (New Delhi, 1960) deals with the gradual rise of Sikh militancy that culminated with Gobind Singh. The volume *Poetry of the Dasam Granth* (Delhi, 1959), compiled by Dharmapal Asta, is the only attempt to present the *gurū's* own compositions and others traditionally ascribed to him. Unfortunately, the translations do not do justice to the original.

KHUSHWANT SINGH

SINHALA RELIGION. The Sinhala of Sri Lanka are for the most part Buddhists, yet their practical religion is a composite system derived from a variety of sources, including pre-Buddhist indigenous beliefs, Indic astrology, popular Hinduism, Brahmanism, and

Dravidian religion, especially that of South India. [See also *Tamil Religions*.] Over many years these seemingly non-Buddhist beliefs have been incorporated into a Buddhist framework and ethos. The religious beliefs that have derived from non-Buddhist sources have been labeled "spirit cults." This is a heuristically useful label if one does not make the mistake of defining them as non-Buddhist or anti-Buddhist. Some aspects of the spirit cults, such as the beliefs in *pretas*, or the malevolent spirits of departed ancestors, are very ancient popular beliefs that have been assimilated by Buddhism. Furthermore, Buddhist canonical texts are full of references to pious laymen who on death have become reborn as gods, which means that, as Marasinghe puts it in *Gods in Early Buddhism* (Colombo, 1974), the *karman* theory is a kind of machine that can create its own gods. The theory of *karman* can, at the very least, easily justify the creation or continuing existence of the many kinds of supernatural beings that inhabit the behavioral universe of Buddhist nations in South and Southeast Asia. The crux of the issue is not whether these beliefs are Buddhist or non-Buddhist: it is that one can remain a Buddhist, and a citizen of Sri Lanka or Burma or Thailand, *without* subscribing to a belief in the spirit cults. The latter is not a necessary condition to being a Buddhist. Being a Buddhist is necessary for one's ethnic and national identity in the Theravāda societies of South and Southeast Asia, whereas the spirit cults have little or no bearing on one's larger identity. One is not a "heretic" if one rejects the popular religions; indeed, in some instances it may indicate affirmation of Buddhist orthodoxy and the ideal cultural values of the group.

To place the Sinhala spirit cults in a larger perspective it is useful to begin with a consideration of Vādda religion as described by C. G. Seligmann and Z. Seligmann in *The Veddas* (Cambridge, 1911). These aboriginal inhabitants of Sri Lanka speak a Sinhala dialect and were at least peripherally part of the traditional political system, owing allegiance to the king of Kandy. Although they were Sinhala-speaking, and their spirit cults showed considerable overlap with that of Sinhala Buddhists, most Vāddas never converted to Buddhism. An examination of Vādda religion will help us understand more fully the nature of the Sinhala spirit cults and their relationship with Buddhism.

Cult of the Nā Yakku. The Vāddas, unlike the Sinhala Buddhists, had as the basis of their religion a system of ancestor worship. Vāddas who die are said to become deities known as *nā yakku* (sg., *yakā*), literally "kinsmen deities"; the transformation of a person's spirit to a *yakā* occurs a few days after his death. Ancestral spirits help the living but show wrath if neglected.

Complementing the spirits of the recently dead is a pantheon of major Vādda deities. This pantheon is headed by Kandē Yakā (“lord of the mountain”). Ancestral spirits are considered to be feudal attendants of Kandē Yakā and have his warrant to assist or punish the living. The concept of permission or warrant (*varan*) and the system whereby the higher gods engage lower deities as attendants are identical with Sinhala beliefs.

Kandē Yakā then is a benevolent deity who brings prosperity and wealth to Vādda society. He is sometimes propitiated as Kandē Vanniya (Lord Kandē). Several other major deities are propitiated in Vādda collective rituals. There is Baṃbura Yakā, a grim spirit who presides over yams, and for whom a mimetic ritual of the boar hunt is performed; Iṅdigollē Yakā, also called Galē Yakā (“lord of the rock”), who is often propitiated with his spouse Iṅdigollē Kiri Ammā; and Biliṅdi Yakā, an infant deity also widely propitiated in Vādda country (nowadays in parts of the Eastern and Ūva provinces). In addition there is a whole class of female deities called *kiri ammā* (“milk mother, grandmother”). These *kiri ammā* are the spirits of eminent Vādda women, generally the wives of Vādda headmen or chiefs, many of whom are thought to haunt mountain springs and rocky hillsides. A few of these *kiri ammā* are prominent enough to have individual names. These named *kiri ammā* are often invoked for curing children’s diseases and for sickness in general. In addition to these major deities are minor deities, all of whom are the spirits of prominent deceased Vāddas. Thus, the Vādda religion recognizes a pantheon that is comprised of individual ancestors as well as a special class of deities who are deified heroes. Although these deified ancestors and heroes are an important element in Vādda worship there are also Vādda deities such as Iṅdigollē Yakā, who are believed to have come from across the oceans. These latter beliefs—those of deified ancestors and foreign deities—directly link Vādda religion with that of their Sinhala neighbors, at least in parts of the Northwestern and North Central Provinces, and in Ūva and in the Central Province (the Kandyan region). [See also Nāgas and Yakṣas.]

The Sinhala Buddhists have no system of ancestor worship like that of the *nā yakku*, but they do believe in a cult of deified ancestors and foreign deities, which Parker, in his *Ancient Ceylon* (London, 1904), has labeled the *baṅḍāra* cult. *Baṅḍāra* means “chief,” and this cult is that of a group of deities who are viewed as “lords” or “chiefs.” Parker has called this a form of ancestor worship, but this is an erroneous identification, for the Sinhala do not deify their immediate ancestors. Rather, deified heroes or leaders of a local area or region constitute a major part of the cult. The striking

feature of the *baṅḍāra* cult, however, is that all deities, both local and foreign, were originally human beings who have been deified. Many of them have the title *baṅḍāra* (“lord”); all of them are viewed as lords or chiefs and are subordinate to the great gods or *devas* of the Sinhala Buddhist pantheon, who are viewed as kings or world rulers (*cakravartins*).

The Baṅḍāra Cult among the Sinhala. The *baṅḍāra* cult has been formalized in many parts of the Kandyan region into a cult of the Doḷaha Deviyō (“twelve gods”). The Twelve Gods are individually and collectively propitiated in group rituals. The operative pantheon in most parts of the Kandyan region thus consisted of the *baṅḍāra* cult, formalized into a numerological category of the Twelve Gods. Many of these gods have in fact demonic attributes and are often referred to in rituals as *devatā* (“godling”), a composite of the demonic and the divine. The Twelve Gods are associated with most of the social, economic, and personal needs of the worshiper—hunting, animal husbandry, and rice cultivation, as well as individual afflictions such as illnesses due to demonic incursions.

There is, then, a striking similarity between the Vādda gods and the Sinhala pantheon of the *baṅḍāra*. The deities in both pantheons are chiefs or lords (but not kings); they are euhemerized beings, often ancestral heroes. In collective rituals the Vāddas propitiate their gods with meat offerings; among the Sinhala, however, only some of these deities (those possessing demonic qualities, like Gaṅgē Baṅḍāra) are offered meat (impure) offerings. Furthermore, and this is of crucial significance, both Vādda and Sinhala pantheons show considerable overlap. Thus, Kiri Ammā is the operative female deity among both the Vādda and the Kandyan Sinhala. The Vādda god Kandē Yakā, the benevolent deity of the hunt, is perhaps none other than Kandē Deviyō of the Kandyans. In Kandyan rituals Kandē Deviyō also appears as the god of the hunt. The Vādda term *yakā* appears to have been transformed into *dēviyō* (“god”) by the Sinhala, since *yakā* clearly means “demon” in Sinhala. Several other deities are shared by both Vādda and Sinhala. In addition, many ritual terms are common to both cultures: *haṅgala* (priest’s robe), *āyuda* (arms, ornaments of the deity), *kapurāla* (priest), *aḍukku* (meal served to the deity), *doḷa* (offering to demons), and *puda* (offering to gods). These terms, as well as the *baṅḍāra* cult itself, are not confined to the Kandyan area exclusively but constitute (or historically constituted) a series of overlapping circles covering most of Sinhala-speaking Sri Lanka. Even when the numerological category of twelve was not used (as in the North Central Province), there was throughout Sri Lanka a system of local village worship of *baṅḍāras*, or

lords, who constituted a pantheon of euhemerized ancestors or heroes.

Both Vādda religion and the *baṇḍāra* cult of the Kandyan Sinhala show striking resemblances to the *nat* cultus of the Burmese and the Thai cult of the *phī*. [See Nats.] Worship of both *nats* and *phī* constitutes an indigenous cult of ancestors, having a role similar to the cult of the Kandyan *baṇḍāra*. Note that *baṇḍāra* means "lord," which is exactly what *nat* (from the Sanskrit *nātha*) means. Furthermore, the *nats* are associated with natural phenomena, as are many Kandyan and Vādda deities. It is indeed likely that a form of euhemerism was the old indigenous, pre-Buddhist religion, not only of Sri Lanka, but of other Theravāda nations of this region. The full significance of *nat* or *baṇḍāra* comes out clearly in relation to the great, often Brahmanic-derived *devas*, who constitute the upper level of the pantheon. These *devas* are kings or *cakravartins*; the *baṇḍāras* are lesser beings and thus are chieftains or lords who owe formal suzerainty to the "god-kings."

As institutionalized at the village and tribal level, the form of village religion described above is intrinsically associated with that of the inspired priest acting as a medium or mouthpiece of the apotheosized ancestor or hero. The Seligmanns and other anthropologists writing on tribal India refer to him as "shaman." This designation is somewhat misleading since "shamanism" in South and Southeast Asia is different from the classic Siberian type. In the latter the soul of the shaman leaves the body. In the South Asian type this rarely happens; the deity possesses the priest and the god is thus physically "present" in the human community. Furthermore, the extreme individualism of classic shamanism is not found here. The possessed priest activates a formal, publicly accepted pantheon of deities; he rarely has personal guardian gods or individual spirits as in classic shamanism.

Traditional Sinhala religion probably coexisted, as it does today, with other forms of religious belief and practice, such as witchcraft, sorcery, and divination. When the great historical religions like Buddhism were introduced into this region the older religion had to adapt itself to the new situation. The basic mechanism whereby non-Buddhist beliefs were incorporated into Buddhism was the theory of *karman*. Deified ancestors could easily be incorporated through the theory of *karman* so that the death of the ancestor and his subsequent rebirth as a deity could be explained in terms of his good and bad actions in previous births. Over and beyond this, the older system of spirit cults had to be integrated with those of the great traditions, which included the great Brahmanic *devas* and the Buddha himself. This relationship between the older spirits and the

devas and Buddha was expressed in the political idiom of the secular state.

The Baṇḍāra Cult and the Worship of Devas. The *baṇḍāra* cult, or the cult of the Twelve Gods, was the operative folk religion of many villages in the Kandyan kingdom for many centuries. But the cult of the *baṇḍāras* was in turn enveloped in the cult of the *devas*, the superordinate god-kings of the pantheon. What then is the relationship between the *baṇḍāra* cult and the great *devas*, most of whom derived historically from Brahmanism? To appreciate the full significance of this relationship one must shift one's ground from the narrow perspective of Vādda or Kandyan religion to the larger perspective of a Sinhala Buddhist nation. The *baṇḍāras* were local or regional deities, and although some of them, such as Maṅgara and Devatā Baṇḍāra, were widely dispersed they were viewed as chieftains, not kings. The *devas* by contrast were national deities, viewed as kings, holding jurisdictional sway over Sri Lanka; they were protectors of that Sinhala Buddhist nation. The *baṇḍāras* are subservient to the *devas*, and the latter, according to popular religion, are in turn subordinate to the Buddha. The *devas* have a warrant (*varan*) from the Buddha himself, whereas the lesser *baṇḍāras* generally exercise their authority with permission from the *devas*.

The concept of divine protectors of the secular and sacred realm is an ancient one in Sri Lanka. First, there was the ancient Buddhist doctrinal notion of the guardians of the four quarters of the universe. In addition to this there developed in Sri Lanka the idea of four guardians of the state. If the Buddhist guardians protected the cosmos the *devas* were protectors of the nation, and therefore were of great significance in the practical religion. The concept of the four gods (*hatara dēviyō*) and the four shrines (*hatara dēvāle*) were clearly established in the kingdoms of Kōṭṭe (fifteenth century) and in Kandy. In popular usage the term *hatara varan dēviyō* ("gods of four warrants"), which should in theory have referred to the four Buddhist guardians of the universe, came to be synonymous with the concept of the Four Gods—the guardians of the kingdom.

In relation to the concept of the Four Gods, numerology is once again very important. There have always been four guardian gods, but the deities occupying these positions show considerable variation. In general one would say that the positions of the Four Gods from the fifteenth century onward were filled from the following list of *devas*: Viṣṇu, Nātha, Vibhīṣaṇa, Saman (Lakṣmaṇa), Skanda, and the goddess Pattinī. If the *baṇḍāras* were part of the operative village religion, the *devas*, in particular the Four Gods, were part of the state cultus. In the Kandyan kingdom, for example, the Four Gods

were paraded in the annual state procession along with the tooth relic. The king, the chiefs, and their retinue also participated in this event. The procession reflected in microcosm the larger macrocosmic structure of the Kandyan state.

Underlying the organization of the pantheon is a political idiom, very much like that found in the *nat* cultus in Burma as described by Melford Spiro in *Burmese Supernaturalism* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967): the Four Gods are the kings and guardians of Buddhism and the secular state and the Twelve Gods are the chiefs, attendants, or ministers or the god-kings. The order in the pantheon is based on the idea of order in the political state. Crucial to the feudal idiom underlying the pantheon is the notion of *sīmā* ("limit, boundary"), which has several meanings in the political sphere. First, in relation to territory, it indicates the boundary or border of a kingdom, province, or village; second, in relation to authority and control, it is the limit of a political domain, for example, the king has *sīmā* over the kingdom, the chief over a province, and the headman over a village; third, in relation to time, it means a "time limit" (*kāla sīmāva*) on the exercise of political authority, that is, the *kāla sīmāva* for the king is the king's lifetime, for a chief only a year. All these meanings of *sīmā*, so important in the political idiom, are transferred intact to the religious context. Thus, the deities in the pantheon all have their *sīmā* in terms of territory, authority, and time. The *baṇḍāras* have the village, region, or province as their *sīmā*. However, these boundaries are not permanently fixed: a regional deity may eventually come to have a national reputation and worship, as in the case of Kiri Ammā and Maṅgara, and more recently of Dēvatā Baṇḍāra. Nevertheless the ideology that the *baṇḍāras* are regional chiefs is important in that it defines their status in the overall religious system of the Sinhala. The Four Gods by contrast have as their *sīmā* the whole of Sri Lanka, but they also have their special *sīmā* over which they have more direct control. These generally are the regions surrounding the pilgrimage center(s) of each deity.

Demons, Gods, and the Buddha. At the lowest level of Sinhala religion are such demons and evil spirits as *pretas*, who are viewed as the malevolent spirits of dead kinsmen. All these evil spirits embody Buddhist notions of spiritual and ethical hindrances, such as craving (*taṇhā*), hatred (*krodha*), greed (*lobha*), defilements (*kleśa*), and enmity (*vaira*). Evil beings, like good beings, are *karman*-bound creatures who, because of their propensity to cause harm, are caught in a situation where salvation is difficult if not impossible. They cause illness, both physical and psychic, and may possess people, especially women. They are born in blood and

violence, and they must be propitiated with meat and other impure substances. In the western and southern parts of Sri Lanka they are propitiated in elaborate ritual dramas, described by Paul Wirz (1954) and more recently by Bruce Kapferer (1983).

The demons are under the authority of the *devas* (i.e., the great gods of the pantheon), who must control them to ensure a just social order. The *devas* are essentially rational and just deities, viewed by Sinhala Buddhists as future Buddhas or *bodhisattvas*. These *devas* (as well as the lesser *baṇḍāras*) are bound to the worshiper in a nexus of mutual obligation: the god protects man, his cattle, and his crops, and ensures the common weal; man in turn expresses his gratitude by transferring the merit he has earned to the gods and thus hastening the *nirvāṇa* and Buddha-aspiration of the latter. These transactions are formally expressed in the annual post-harvest thanksgiving rituals where the myths of the gods are sung, where ritual dramas celebrating their lives are enacted, and where thanks are offered to them by the village community.

Over and above the cults of the gods and demons is the worship of the Buddha. The Buddha himself is viewed as the supreme deity and totally benevolent, reigning over the rest of the pantheon. In his role as overlord of the pantheon he is referred to as "king"; in his role as the teacher of salvation he is "monk." In public parades known as *perahāra*, the Buddha's role as king is predominant; in the rituals and prayers addressed to him inside the *vihāra*, his role as monk comes to the fore. These latter prayers and rituals in the Buddhist temple are standard throughout the nation, whereas there exist regional variations in the cult practices associated with the gods and demons. If the rituals to the gods and demons have to do with this world (health, wealth, fertility), the Buddhist rituals have to do with the next world, or with one's rebirth and the eventual realization of *nirvāṇa*. The unity of the Sinhala Buddhists as a moral community is expressed in *Buddhist* symbolism. The omnipresence of the Buddha in Sri Lanka is expressed in the symbolism of his sacred footprint embedded at Srī Pada Mountain (known also as Adam's Peak), the visible presence everywhere of monks and *dagobas* or *stūpas* containing relics of the Buddha or the saints of the early Buddhist church, and the sacred places of Buddhist pilgrimage where people from different regions come together to celebrate their collective unity as Buddhists. Sinhala religion as a totality has been adapted, through its long history, into a Buddhist framework.

Change in Sinhala Religion. Changes in the religious beliefs of the Sinhala have occurred in a variety of ways without radically affecting the formal structure of the

pantheon, which has the Buddha at the apex, followed by four guardian gods of the realm, followed by the regional and village gods and godlings (*baṇḍāras*), followed by the malevolent demons, spirits, and ghosts. The most common forms of change are as follows.

1. Migrations of peoples and cults from South India are a common phenomenon to this day. Hindu gods and deities are, however, incorporated into the Buddhist pantheon and given Buddhist legitimation. For example, Hindu gods like Viṣṇu and Saman (Lakṣmaṇa) appear with their consorts in early Sinhala iconography. When they are converted into *bodhisattvas* in Sinhala religion they lose their consorts as befits good Buddhist salvation aspirants.

2. Sociopolitical and economic conditions may favor the rise or decline of a god. Thus the cult of the god Nātha, who was in charge of the sovereignty of the Kandyan kings, dramatically declined after the British conquest of Kandy in 1815. Similarly, a god may rise into prominence and eclipse others in terms of public popularity.

3. The external changes mentioned above are rationalized in terms of a dialectic of internal change in the pantheon. The more popular a deity, the more favors he grants his devotee; this in turn means that the devotee transfers merit to him, thereby bringing the god closer to his goal of Buddhahood. But the closer the god is to the Buddha model the less he is interested in the affairs of the world. Consequently, he must eventually become otiose, and more world-involved—even demonic—beings from the lower reaches of the pantheon move up to take his place. Thus, the logic of *karman* and the transfer of merit govern internal mobility in the pantheon. [See also Merit, *article on Buddhist Concepts*.]

4. Finally, social changes may produce radical changes in the formal structure of the pantheon. In my *The Cult of the Goddess Pattini* (pp. 290–291), I note that the political conditions of the Kōṭṭe Kingdom (1410–1544) in Sri Lanka resulted in the extension of the jurisdictional sway of the major guardian gods into the village and regional areas and eroded the cult of the *baṇḍāras*. Similarly, modern sociopolitical conditions, including the centralization and democratization of the state and the development of modern communications, have tended to erode the spheres of influence of minor gods and demons. Today, some gods are coming into especial prominence, while other gods and their cults are declining.

It is likely that modern socioeconomic and political conditions may produce radical changes in the formal structure of the pantheon as sketched above. Nevertheless, Sinhala religion will retain its basic core. The pantheon headed by the Buddha and the system of worship

associated with him are not likely to change. Even if the cult of the Four Gods and the Twelve Gods should collapse, some deities will continue to preside over man's "this-worldly" destiny—and so will the belief in named demons and *pretas*, the spirits of dead ancestors. All deities will continue to embody Buddhist values and remain bound to each other and to man by the ethics of *karman* and the transfer of merit.

[See also Theravāda and Saṃgha, *article on Saṃgha and Society*. For a discussion of the interrelation of popular and elite traditions in local Buddhist cultures, see Folk Religion, *article on Folk Buddhism*.]

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GANANATH OBEYESEKERE

SIOUX RELIGION. See Lakota Religion.

SIRHINDĪ, AḤMAD (AH 971–1034/1564–1624 CE), an eminent Indian Muslim Ṣūfī, known also as *mujaddid-i alf-i thānī* ("renewer of the second millennium [of the Islamic era]"). He was a prolific writer on Islamic mysticism and theology. His celebrated collection of letters, addressed to his fellow Ṣūfīs as well as to a few officials of the state, was repeatedly hailed as a landmark in the development of Muslim religious thought in India.

Sirhindi's religious activities were conducted within the Naqshbandī order of the Ṣūfīs, which was introduced into the subcontinent by Sirhindi's spiritual men-

tor, Muḥammad al-Bāqī Billāh. Sirhindī became a prominent personality in the order, brought about an expansion of its influence in India and elsewhere, and attracted numerous disciples, whom he instructed in the Naqshbandī mystical doctrine. He devoted a great deal of attention to the spiritual progress of the believer toward perfection. His works reflect an unrelenting effort to integrate the basic concepts of Islam into a comprehensive Ṣūfī outlook. True to the classical Ṣūfī tradition, he endeavored to analyze Islamic concepts in a two-fold fashion in order to discover in each of them the inner and secret (*bāṭin*) aspect in addition to the outward (*ẓāhir*) one. In other words, all things have form (*ṣūrah*) and essence (*ḥaqīqah*), and the highest achievement lies in understanding the inner, essential aspect of commandments and articles of faith.

The most original contribution of Sirhindī to mystical thought seems to be his description of the spiritual transformation that occurred at the end of the first millennium of the Islamic era, following intricate changes in the structure of the mystical "realities" (*ḥaqā'iq*), the spiritual condition of the Muslim community improved in a substantial manner. Prophetic perfections, which had been fading away since the death of Muḥammad, regained their splendor. The person in possession of these perfections was the *mujaddid*, the renewer or revivifier of the second millennium. It is likely that Sirhindī considered himself to be fulfilling this religiously crucial role; his disciples certainly saw him in this light.

Most scholars of medieval Muslim India maintain that Sirhindī performed a crucial role in the history of Indian Islam. Indian Muslims have always faced a dilemma concerning the attitude that they should adopt toward Hindu civilization, and two streams of thought developed among them: some held that Indian Muslims should take into account the sensibilities of the Hindus and seek a common ground for the two civilizations, while others maintained that the Muslim minority, in constant danger of assimilation into the polytheistic Hindu environment, must preserve the pristine purity of Islam and reject any local influence. Sirhindī appeared on the Indian scene during the reign of the Mughal emperor Akbar (1556–1605), who systematically attempted to make Islam and the ruling dynasty more acceptable to the non-Muslim Indians. The most conspicuous step in this direction was his abolition of the *jizyah*, a tax that Islamic law imposes on the non-Muslim inhabitants of a Muslim state. Sirhindī strongly opposed Akbar's conciliatory policy toward the Hindus. He made devastating attacks on Hinduism and maintained that the honor of Islam required the humiliation

of the infidels and the resolute imposition of Islamic law upon them. Since Sirhindī expressed these views in letters to officials of the Mughal court, numerous scholars have credited him with reversing the heretical trends of Akbar's era and with restoring pristine purity to Indian Islam.

Recent research has shown, however, that this interpretation is far from certain. It is true that Sirhindī wrote to state officials and suggested changes in the imperial policy, but there is no evidence that the Mughal empire changed its attitude toward the Hindus as a result of his activities. Sirhindī was first and foremost a seeker after religious truth. The overwhelming majority of his epistles deal with typically Ṣūfī issues. The concepts of prophecy (*nubūwah*) and sainthood (*wilāyah*), the relationship between religious law (*sharī'ah*) and the mystical path (*ṭarīqah*), the theories of unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*) and unity of appearance (*waḥdat al-shuhūd*)—these command Sirhindī's attention in most of his works. In dealing with these matters, Sirhindī belongs to the stream of mystical thought established by Ibn al-'Arabī, though they differ in certain aspects. Questions of the relationship between the Islamic state and its Hindu population, which have acquired tremendous importance in the modern period and have therefore been central in numerous modern interpretations of Sirhindī's thought, do not seem to have been in the forefront of his interests.

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YOHANAN FRIEDMANN

ŚIVA. The ancient name of Śiva is *Rudra*, the Wild God. His seminal myth is told in the most sacred, most ancient Indian text, the *R̥gveda* (c. 1200–1000 BCE; hymns 10.61 and 1.71). When time was about to begin he appeared as a wild hunter, aflame, his arrow directed against the Creator making love with his virgin daughter, the Dawn. They had the shape of two antelopes. Some of the Creator's seed fell on the earth. Rudra himself as Fire (Agni) had prepared the seed,

from which mankind was to be born. From a rupture of the undifferentiated plenum of the Absolute some of the seed fell on the earth. Rudra's shot failed to prevent its fall; time, which was about to begin, came in between, in the shape of the flight of his arrow. The Creator, Prajāpati, terribly frightened, made Rudra Lord of Animals (Paśupati) for sparing his life (*Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* 4.2.12; after 1000 BCE). The gods, as they witnessed the primordial scene, made it into a *mantra*, an incantation, and out of this *mantra* they fashioned Vāstoṣpati, "lord of the residue (*vāstu*)," "lord of the site (*vāstu*)," or "lord of what is left over on the sacrificial site." However, Paśupati—"lord of animals," "lord of creatures," "lord of the soul of man"—is Rudra-Śiva's most significant name.

Fundamental pairs of antitheses inhere in the primordial Ṛgvedic myth of Rudra Paśupati and Rudra Vāstoṣpati. As Fire he incites Prajāpati toward creation; as the formidable hunter he aims at the act of creation, meaning to prevent the "incontinence" of the Creator, the shedding of the seed. Rudra acts as hunter and yogin in one. The scene has for its background the plenum of the uncreated or the Absolute that was and is before the mythical moment of the inception of the life.

In the Vedic sacrificial ritual, Vāstoṣpati receives as an oblation the remainder of the sacrifice. The power of the completed sacrifice is left in the remainder and magically ensures the continuity of the rites, of the entire tradition—and of the order and rhythms of art. Vāstoṣpati is the guardian and protector of the site, the buildings and their content, in later Hinduism.

Jan Gonda, in his article "The Śatarudriya," in the festschrift *Sanskrit and Indian Studies* (Dordrecht, 1980, p. 75), considers Rudra "the representative of the dangerous, unreliable and hence to be feared nature." Looking at Śiva from another angle, Daniel H. H. Ingalls, in "Kālidāsa and the Attitudes of the Golden Age" in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1976), sees that "Śiva represents the reconciliation of good and evil, of beauty and ugliness, of life and death—the vision solved all problems and could transmute a man's suffering into joy." Neither of these views refers to the primordial and central myth of Rudra, in which Rudra acts as consciousness of metaphysical reality or the Absolute in its relation to life on earth.

In Vedic times, the fierce hunter had the power over life and death, to afflict a mortal wound or to heal it. He was worshipped with the words "Do not hurt me" and also invoked as "lord of songs, lord of sacrifice, bringing cooling remedy, radiant like the sun, like gold" (*Ṛgveda* 1.43.4–5). He was praised as the lord of the high and the

low, of robbers, of the ill-formed, but also of craftsmen working in wood, metal, and clay. Praise went to him in the flux of waves, in young grass and the desert, in soil and air, house and palace. This is how the *Śatarudriya* hymn of the *Yajurveda* (after 1000 BCE) invokes him, an omnipresent power whose shape reverberates in uncounted Rudras like him who are his retinue. Rudra's color is copper red, his throat deep blue; one of his names is the Blue-Red One. His home is everywhere, but particularly in the North, in Himalayan caves but also on crossroads, cremation grounds, and the battlefield.

The gods meant to exclude Rudra from the Vedic sacrifice. This is mythically accounted for by the primordial flight of his arrow. Rudra, though he had been made lord of animals, was not himself born yet as a god. The story of Rudra's birth has several versions. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (9.1.1.6; c. mid-first millennium BCE) tells of Prajāpati, from whom all the gods departed except Manyu (Anger). Prajāpati cried. His tears fell on Manyu, who became thousand-headed, thousand-eyed, hundred-quivered Rudra. Rudra was hungry. Prajāpati asked the gods to gather food for Rudra, who stood there flaming. The gods appeased Agni-Rudra. By the *Śatarudriya* offering and hymn they drove out his pain, his evil. The *Śatarudriya* sacrifice was the first to be performed on completion of the Vedic sacrificial altar. Rudra, as soon as he was born from Prajāpati, was given this place in the Vedic sacrifice. To this day the *Śatarudriya* hymn is recited in Śaiva temples every morning.

On being born, Rudra was invested with the cosmos by Prajāpati. His eightfold domain consisted of the five elements—earth, water, fire, air, and space—together with sun and moon, the measurers of time, and the sacrificer, or initiate. Rudra is the totality of manifestation. He did not create the cosmos. He became and is the cosmos. God and the world are one. As the cosmos is a product of Śiva's eight forms, so is the human being, the microcosm.

The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (c. late first millennium BCE), like the *Ṛgveda*, implores Rudra not to injure man or beast. The formidable hunter is everywhere, he merges with the ogdoad and transcends it, he rules over all the worlds, makes them appear and withdraws them at the end of time. In him at the beginning and at the end the universe is gathered. The dweller in the mountain resides in the cave of the heart of man. He is immanent and transcendent, the one supreme God. Though he has a face, a hand, a foot on every side, no one can see him; he is seen only with the mind and heart. Those who know the Lord by introspection, yoga,

and loving devotion (*bhakti*) are freed from the fetter (*pāśa*) of worldly existence, for he is the cause of worldly existence and of liberation. In his auspicious, unterrifying form he is the Lord, the omnipresent Śiva, hidden in all beings.

Rudra, the “wild god,” is one with Śiva, the auspicious, supreme god whose splendor encompasses his primordial form. His being in manifestation is to be meditated upon as a river of five streams from five sources (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1.5). They are the five senses with their objects “an impetuous flood of five pains.” If Rudra as the ogdoad is the cosmos, as the pentad he is the five senses, the sense perception and experience of the cosmos. Five is Śiva’s sacred number in particular. His *mantra*, “*Namaḥ Śivāya*,” has five syllables, and his “body” is said to be constituted of five *mantras* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10.43–47; c. third century BCE). They evoke the body of God in the five directions of space, in the five elements, in the five senses.

Vedic Rudra, the fierce hunter, is clad in the skins of wild animals. In the *Mahābhārata* (c. 400 BCE–400 CE), Śiva is seen by the hero Arjuna, in a vision, as an archer and an ascetic. A hymn of the *R̥gveda* (10.136), on the other hand, celebrates Rudra drinking from one cup with an ascetic. The *Mahābhārata* sums up the relation of Śiva to yoga, saying that “Śiva is yoga and the lord of yogins; he can be approached by yoga only.”

In post-Vedic times Prajāpati’s role as creator was taken over by Brahmā. Rudra decapitates his father, Brahmā. Various reasons are given in the Purāṇas (fourth through fourteenth centuries CE); one of them, the longing of Brahmā for his daughter, recalls the primordial scene. The head of Brahmā clings to Śiva’s hand. Śiva as a penitent beggar, the skull his begging bowl, goes on a pilgrimage of expiation. After twelve years the skull falls from Śiva’s hand in Banaras, and Śiva is released from his sin. His pilgrimage takes the god to a hermitage in a forest of deodar trees. The hermits believe that the young, naked beggar has come to seduce their women—and Śiva’s phallus (*liṅga*) falls from his body, by his own will or by a curse of the sages; it then arises as a flaming pillar. These events are part of the play (*līlā*) of Śiva in this world to enable his devotee to recognize God in the guises he assumed. The sages apparently fail to identify the begging bowl, Brahmā’s head or skull (*brahmaśiras*), in the beggar’s hand. Brahmaśiras is also the name of Śiva’s most formidable weapon, the Pāśupata weapon.

Most of Śiva’s myths are known to the *Mahābhārata*. The myth of Śiva the ascetic, paradoxically, is the theme of his marriage to Pārvatī, daughter of Parvatarāja, “Lord Mountain.” In it is included the story of the destruction—and resurrection—of Kāma, the god De-

sire, an archer who aimed his arrow at Śiva but was reduced to ashes by a glance from Śiva’s third eye. Fire and ashes belong to Śiva as much as serpents and the moon’s crescent, for Śiva’s nature is twofold: he is fierce as fire, yet cool and calm as the moon. He is the reluctant bridegroom, the indefatigable lover, and the ascetic. He is the savior of the world; he swallowed its poison, and it left a dark blue mark on his throat. He destroys demons or shows them his grace. He defeats death; he is the death of death, for he is time and transcends time as eternity. He is the teacher who in silence expounds to the sages music, yoga, gnosis, and all the arts and sciences. He is a dancer, Lord of Dancers, who dances the world in and out of existence. He is a male god inseparably united with his female power (*śakti*). One image shows him half male, half female. His theriomorphic form is the bull called Nandin (Joy). His main attributes are trident, skull, and antelope. His symbol is the *liṅga*, the (phallic) pillar, the most sacred object of worship—although none is known in India prior to the third to second century BCE. The *liṅga* stands erect in its double significance; full of creative power, and also of the yogic power to withhold the seed. Its symbolism is akin to the meaning of the primordial scene.

Whereas the relation of Śiva to Brahmā-Prajāpati is crucial, that of Śiva to Viṣṇu is one of coexistence or subordination but also of amalgamation and interchange. Viṣṇu sometimes carries the name of Śiva or Rudra; Viṣṇu is conjoint in one type of image with Śiva as Harihara; in one painting Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa carries Śiva’s insignia, trident and serpent, whereas Śiva holds Kṛṣṇa’s flute. Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism are complementary, although sectarian rivalry led to the conception of the gruesome Śarabheśa. To each of the three great Hindu gods is assigned one of the three tendencies (*guṇa*) of cosmic substance (*prakṛti*), that of Śiva being *tamas* (darkness), the disruptive tendency that precedes every new creation.

In the darkness of the flood between the dissolution of the universe and the beginning of a new world, the flaming pillar of Śiva’s *liṅga* arose and was worshiped by Brahmā and Viṣṇu. This is celebrated by vigil, vows, fast, and worship on Mahāśivarātri, the Great Night of Śiva, the climax of the religious year, on the fourteenth lunar day of the dark half of the last month of the lunar year. The last night of each month is Śiva’s Night (Śivarātri) and the evening of each day throughout the year is the time for his worship.

[For the Vedic antecedent of Śiva, see Rudra. Śiva in Hindu mythology is discussed in *Indian Religions, article on Mythic Themes. The worship of Śiva is discussed in Śaivism and Tantrism.*]

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STELLA KRAMRISCH

SKANDHAS. See Soul, *article on* Buddhist Concepts.

SKEPTICS AND SKEPTICISM. The term *skeptic* comes from the Greek words *skeptikos* ("an inquirer, one who reflects") and *skeptesthai* ("to view, to consider"). Philosophical skepticism arose from some of the observations made by early Greek philosophers. Heraclitus said that the world is in such flux that "one cannot step twice in the same river." The only truth, he asserted, was that everything changes. Cratylus went further and said that, since everything changes, we change, and our language changes, so that knowledge and communication are not really possible. The Sophists Protagoras and Gorgias asserted additional skeptical views. Protagoras argued that man is the measure of all things; by implication, each person measures the world individually, so there are no general human truths. Gorgias is said to have argued that nothing exists, but even if it did we could not know it, and even if we did know it we

could not communicate it. The culmination of these early skeptical comments was Socrates' remark, at his trial, that all he knew was that he knew nothing.

Systematic accounts of human inability to gain accurate knowledge about the world were first rendered by Arcesilas (c. 315–241 BCE) and Carneades (213–129 BCE). They developed arguments, directed primarily against Stoic and Epicurean opponents, to undermine any claims of knowledge and to establish that nothing can be known. This view, termed "Academic skepticism," presented a series of arguments against the truth of purported sense and rational knowledge, and against any standard that could be employed to distinguish between truth and falsity. Cicero presented this view in his *De Academica* and *De natura deorum*.

A more skeptical group claimed that the Academic skeptics were really negative dogmatists, as they indeed asserted that nothing can be known and that "all assertions are merely probable." Following the legendary Pyrrho of Elis (360–275 BCE), who would not make any judgment, a movement called Pyrrhonism developed about 100 BCE. Its theoretician, Aenesidemus (100–40 BCE), and his successors set forth a series of "tropes," or ways of suspending judgment on all questions, scientific, mathematical, metaphysical, theological, and ethical. The Pyrrhonian materials were gathered together by Sextus Empiricus in his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Dogmatists* (c. 200 CE) and were to play a most important role in the rise of modern skepticism.

Both the Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptics offered their doubts as ways of finding peace of mind and of conforming with popular religion. Their opponents claimed to know what the world was like, and to base their way of life on such knowledge. However, if these opponents were to find they were mistaken in their knowledge they would become mentally disturbed and uncertain as to how to live. The skeptics, however, by suspending judgment, would attain peace of mind. They would live undogmatically, doing what was natural and/or conventional. They would behave normally and accept the laws of their society and its customs, including religious ones. Others might scoff at popular religion because it did not conform to their "knowledge" of the world. The Academics and Pyrrhonians suspended judgment on such questions as "Do the gods exist?" and simply followed the religious customs of their communities undogmatically, without committing themselves to any theological claims. The skeptics thus could say that they were no threat to accepted religion.

The Greek skeptics, from Arcesilaus to Sextus, had apparently little effect on Judaism or Christianity (although Pyrrhonism flourished principally in Alexandria, Athens, and Rome). In Jewish postbiblical writing,

the word for “skeptic” is *aipikuros*. Obviously derived from the name *Epicurus*, the term denotes both a general doubter and one who doubts crucial features of Judaism. Criticisms of *aipikuros* indicate some awareness of skepticism in the Jewish community.

Church fathers occasionally comment on skeptical views, although only Augustine appears to have taken them very seriously. He had read Cicero’s account. When he became a Christian, he wrote various dialogues about the status of religious knowledge; one of them, *Contra Academicos*, showed how faith and grace aided in overcoming problems of skepticism.

During the Middle Ages ancient skeptical views were little known or discussed, except through Augustine’s rebuttal. Some Muslim and Jewish philosophers, however, pointed to basic skeptical problems in the acceptance of revealed religion. Ibn Rushd (Averroës) had shown that Aristotle’s philosophy conflicted with certain revealed claims, such as the statement that the world was created and the individual soul is immortal. Maimonides argued that some religious claims could be proved and also disproved by reason and therefore had to be accepted on faith. The Muslim mystic al-Ghazālī sought to show that science and reason could not lead to satisfactory knowledge about the world and that God’s omnipotence prevents people from being able to know God or God’s handiwork. The skeptical implications of these Jewish and Muslim views appeared in discussions in the late Middle Ages, especially among the Latin Averroists and in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa.

In the sixteenth century a new period in skepticism began, partly as a result of the humanist revival of the classics (including the rediscovery of Cicero’s accounts of Academic skepticism and the writings of Sextus Empiricus), partly as a result of new data about the geographical, human, and astronomical world that contradicted previously accepted theories, and partly because skeptical arguments were employed in theological conflicts between Roman Catholics and reformers. Erasmus, disputing Luther, appealed to ancient skeptical arguments to deny that one could tell if people had free will. Erasmus suspended judgment on theological issues while accepting on faith the views of his church. Montaigne, after reading Sextus Empiricus, modernized the ancient skeptical arguments into a thorough attack on the science and theology of his time. He showed how attempts to know the world led to contradictions and absurdities. He also introduced a fideistic note, that we should turn to God and accept on faith whatever knowledge God gives us. In view of all the doubts about religious claims to knowledge (of such subjects as the nature of God, God’s relationship to man, and man’s spiritual nature and religious destiny), we should ac-

cept the faith into which we are born. Changing faiths would require knowledge of the merits of various faiths, whether they are true, or truer than one’s own.

Whether or not Montaigne was sincere in his fideism, his position was adopted by various Counter-Reformers in France who sought to show that the Calvinists made indefensible claims about the source of religious knowledge and the nature of such knowledge. These Catholics sought to reduce the Calvinists to complete skeptics. The Calvinists, in turn, tried in a similar way to reduce the Catholics, by arguing that it was uncertain who the pope was, what he and church councils had said, and so on.

Montaigne’s presentation of the new Pyrrhonism brought about a general skeptical crisis among many intellectuals in the seventeenth century. Descartes’s philosophy was designed to overcome all doubts by pushing skepticism even further than Sextus or Montaigne. By finding one fundamental truth (“I think, therefore I am”), one could then establish a general criterion of truth and discover truth in mathematics, physics, and theology. Others, faced with the same skeptical crisis, sought a solution in the interpretation of biblical prophecies (Joseph Mede and Henry More), in a desperate appeal to faith (Pascal), or in moderating one’s quest for knowledge to a kind of probabilism (Gassendi, Chillingworth, and the English latitudinarian theologians).

Many sought to undermine Descartes’s optimistic answer to skepticism, and to cast doubts on any metaphysical foundation to modern science and any rational basis to theology. This attempt was coupled with skeptical criticism of scripture as a collection of books containing special indubitable knowledge—criticism launched by La Peyrère in his *Men before Adam* and by Spinoza in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. The French Protestant philosopher, historian, and theologian Pierre Bayle joined these skeptical strands together in his massive *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697–1702), casting doubts on the new philosophies of the seventeenth century, from Descartes to Locke and Leibniz, as well as on older philosophies. Bayle’s only advice to his readers was to abandon reason for faith. Voltaire and Hume developed the more irreligious implications of Bayle’s attacks. Voltaire called Bayle’s work “the arsenal of the Enlightenment,” and used it to undermine any confidence in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Hume used Bayle’s skepticism to show that we have no rational basis for our beliefs in any area whatsoever. Our beliefs in science or religion are based on natural factors, on animal faith. Kant developed Hume’s skeptical criticism of arguments about the nature of God, contending that knowledge of the nature and existence of

God is beyond the capabilities of pure reason and that all theological arguments about the existence and nature of God are faulty.

Hume's naturalistic skepticism and the limitations placed on human reason by Kant's analysis would seem to have led modern thought into an unconquerable skepticism. Many more recent philosophies have suggested ways of avoiding, overcoming, or living with skepticism: ways that others, in turn, have shown to be impracticable. Hume and Kant ended a tradition of seeking rational knowledge about the existence and nature of God. This skepticism about theological knowledge produced a vital form of fideism. J. G. Hamann, a religious friend of Kant's, argued that Hume was actually the greatest voice of orthodoxy. By eliminating any appeal to reason or evidence in religion, he showed it rested on faith. Hume had said skepticism is the first step toward becoming a true and believing Christian. It is doubtful, however, that Hume was any kind of Christian but, rather, was a deist or an agnostic. Hamann, however, used Hume's writings to urge Kant to turn to faith. Kierkegaard found the basis of his fideism in Hamann's interpretation of Hume and developed the total skepticism that he regarded as inherent to religious belief.

Modern skepticism from Montaigne onward has eroded confidence in traditional metaphysical and theological systems, a process that is reflected in the accommodation of its tenets in pragmatism, positivism, and existentialism. This process has also led to radical expressions of fideism as the basis for religious belief, such as those of Pascal and Kierkegaard, and to various forms of Neoorthodoxy in the twentieth century.

[See also Doubt and Belief; Positivism; Existentialism; Neoorthodoxy; and the biographies of the philosophers mentioned herein.]

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RICHARD H. POPKIN

SKY. [This entry consists of two articles. The first, *The Heavens as Hierophany*, is a brief essay on the universal experience of the sky as transcendent and divine; the second, *Myths and Symbolism*, is a cross-cultural survey of stories told about the sky and of symbolic values attached to it.]

The Heavens as Hierophany

The concept of a close relationship between the starry heavens and human beings is ancient, multifaceted, and widespread. The changing colors of the sky, the alternation between night and day, different weather patterns and seasons, eclipses, the appearance and disappearance of the sun, moon, and stars, all contribute to the interest, awe, and attraction humans feel for the sky and sky-related phenomena. Throughout human history, this fascination with the celestial world has given rise to a great many myths, rituals, and monuments. For heuristic purposes this association between the cosmic and the human may be divided into two categories: technomorphic representations and anthropomorphic representations. Anthropomorphic representations may be further divided into two classifications: heavenly divinities, often considered to be personifications of the sky and/or the heavenly bodies, and human beings of celestial essence or those who have been transferred to the heavens.

Technomorphic Representations. Since very ancient times, men have tended to construct cosmologies based on an analogy between the structure of the heavens and

human activities. [See Cosmology.] Such cosmologies are sometimes called technomorphic representations (from the Greek *technē*, “craft”). The sky was often imagined as a solid object (vault, bucket, etc.) made of iron, stone, wood, or other material. The stars might be simply holes or windows in the solid sky, or they might be torches, flames, lights, nails, flowers, plants, or animals. Naive ideas were not infrequent, such as the notion that stars are shards of the old sun and moon broken off by the spirits and continually polished by them.

The shapes formed by an arbitrarily selected number of stars give rise to the constellations. The free play of imagination made one great cluster of stars into the Milky Way and another group into an animal (the Great Bear) or a wagon: the first wagon made by man, the wagon of Óðinn (Odin), Icarus, Jason, Philomelus, Abraham, David, Elijah, Peter, Mary, or Jesus, a wagon whose wheels creak at midnight and whose tremblings produce snow.

In these naive cosmologies, the North Star often plays an important role, being one extremity of the *axis mundi* on which the heavenly vault turns. [See Stars.] Thus Estonians call the North Star, “nail of the firmament” (*põhja nael*), around which the heavenly dome turns. The Saami (Lapps) have similar representations. They also believe that if the nail is not in place, the sky would fall to earth; this will happen at the end of the world when everything will be consumed by fire. The Finns say that the sky is the lid of the earth. In contrast, the Buriats see it as a big turning bucket. The Yakuts thought it was made of several animal skins spread over one another. The Buriats added to this that the Milky Way was the place where the skins were sewn together. A great number of representations relating to the “cosmic mantle” and to the “heavenly tent” have been analyzed by Robert Eisler in his *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt* (1910). Influenced by the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule, Eisler looked for Oriental prototypes for all Mediterranean astral beliefs. At the same time, he related sacred kingship to the idea of a cosmic ruler whose attribute was usually a starry mantle, and showed that this tradition was carried over by Christianity down to the present times.

The idea that the stars are the signs of a mysterious heavenly writing is related to the shapes of the constellations. The “heavenly book,” or the celestial vault in its entirety, may be a register kept by a specific deity (e.g., the Babylonian god Nabu). This register contained the past, present, and future of the entire universe. In all probability, this concept forms the background of astrology. [See Astrology.]

The sun and the moon, the largest heavenly bodies, are also the object of technomorphic representations. In

Manichaeism, for instance, they are simply two boats navigating in the sky, whose role is to aid in the transfer of the light kept prisoner into the material world.

Anthropomorphic Representations. Personifications of objects and natural phenomena have allowed people in all times and cultures to explain and understand the world around them. In this context, the personification of the heavens has been an essential element of human concepts as projected in myths, legends, and theologies. The personification of the heavens is expressed essentially as divinities or as purified people who have been translated there.

Heavenly deities. In many cultures the sky, the sun, the moon, and the known planets were conceived as personal gods. These gods were responsible for all or some aspects of existence. Prayers were addressed to them, offerings were made to them, and their opinions on important matters were sought through divination.

We know that many world mythologies—including some of those considered the most ancient from a historico-cultural viewpoint—make a distinction between a primordial divinity of the sky (like the Greek Ouranos) and an active divinity (like Zeus), head of a pantheon of gods. The sky divinity usually tends to become remote and otiose. E. O. James has shown that a sky god was known among various groups of both Indo-European and Semitic people. This sky god ranged from a tribal supreme being, often remote and ineffectual, to an active creator and ruler of the universe. [See Supreme Beings.]

Among the astral gods, the sun god is one of the most important. [See Sun.] He was very prominent in the Nile Valley as Re-Atum but less prominent both in Mesopotamia (where Shamash had a subordinate position) and among the Indo-Europeans. The sun divinity may also be female.

A moon goddess (or god, usually in those cultures where the sun god is female) is also very important in several cultures. [See Moon.] In Mediterranean religions, the moon goddess could be featured as a Great Mother responsible for fertility. The Iranian Anāhitā had a moon crescent as her attribute. Artemis of Ephesus was a lunar divinity. Later on, the Greek Artemis and the Roman Diana were definitely identified with the moon.

On the other hand, Anāhitā’s own name was related to the name of the planet Venus. In Pahlavi, *Anāhid* is Venus’s name. Other Venus goddesses are the Babylonian Ishtar, the Phoenician Astarte, Aramean ‘Attar-‘at-teh, and the Arabian ‘Attar or Astar. Venus as morning and evening star often may be represented as a male god.

In late Babylonian religion, the planetary gods had

precise identities. They were divided into two groups: the beneficent (Marduk, Ishtar-Sarpanîtu, and Nabu) and the maleficent (Ninib and Nergal). Marduk was Jupiter and together with Venus/Ishtar, the principle of creation, he gave life to Mercury/Nabu, the representative of the happy destiny of man. Mars/Nergal, the war god, and Saturn/Nergal, the death god, were destructive powers. Among the Babylonians, the moon god—Enzu of Lagash, Sin of Akkad, or Nanna of Ur—was more important than the solar god, Shamash, Babbar, or Nigirsu.

The relationship between men and the stars. Catasterism, the transfer of human beings to heaven, usually in the shape of a constellation, is related to the very ancient beliefs that dead children become stars, that a falling star foretells the death of a relative, and that even the human soul is a star. Less naively expressed, the last statement is attributed to Heraclitus by the fourth-century Neoplatonist Macrobius: "Anima scintilla stellaris essentiae."

As early as the fifth century BCE, the playwright Aristophanes mocked catasterism in his comedy *Freedom*. Alcmaeon of Croton, a physician, thought that the soul was immortal like the endless movement of the divine stars. The playwright Euripides reported that Helen of Troy was translated to the "palace of Zeus" beyond the starry sky. Even according to the "materialists," Leucippus and Democritus, the fiery soul was cognate with the sun and the moon.

Catasterism was also attested to in Egypt in the third century BCE. According to the Pyramid Texts, the king follows Orion and Sirius to the sky. During his heavenly ascent, Sothis/Sirius is his sister. According to Wilhelm Gundel, the idea that men continue to live after death in the stars (and were stars in heaven even before their birth) is Egyptian in origin. Walter Burkert also emphasizes the differences between Babylonian and Egyptian astral religion: whereas the divinity of the astral bodies is particularly important in Babylonia, the Egyptians stress the idea of a correspondence between men and the stars. The belief in an astral immortality, already featured by Plato as a possibility of posthumous reward, became commonplace among his disciples Xenocrates, Crantor, and Heracleides Ponticus. Later, mythology and science converged toward impressive representations like those of the eschatological myths of Plutarch (c. 46–c. 119 CE). These representations cannot be ascribed to an uninterrupted Pythagorean tradition, as the French scholar A. Delatte and his school suggest. The most prominent representative of this school was L. Rougier, who defended the Pythagorean thesis against Franz Cumont, defender of the Oriental thesis of the German Religionsgeschichtliche Schule. During the

Hellenistic period and late antiquity, the underground hell of the platonic myths was transferred to a place in heaven.

In no religious tradition except gnosticism did all the astral gods become evil demons. A strong polemic against astrology is implicit in gnostic mythology. Astrology, based on an ancient Babylonian and Egyptian inheritance, took shape in the third century BCE. In astrology, a particular relationship between human destiny and the heavenly bodies is expressed. This relationship takes on complicated forms, which can often be retraced to basic representations such as the "heavenly book" and the heavenly figures, or constellations. Astrology also put into mathematical language some methods of divination, which probably were based on the idea of the influence of the planets upon human individual and collective history.

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IOAN PETRU CULIANU

Myths and Symbolism

Before considering sky symbolism in its many rich and diverse forms, it seems worthwhile to recall a simple truth about human beings, namely, that we cannot live without expressing our lives, which we do largely by means of symbols. In fact, many would argue that symbolic thought and symbolic behavior are the most singularly human characteristics we possess. Because it always takes place in the framework of space and time, even religious experience, though on occasion it may seem to transcend ordinary limitations, can only be ex-

pressed by analogies drawn from what is already familiar. Religious symbolism thus often formulates a paradox, for it represents the efforts of men and women to express what can never be fully expressed, using analogies taken from the physical life they know: the sky, celestial bodies, plants, animals, and so on. And the universality of sky symbolism in the history of religions would seem to suggest that the sky has expressed more fully than any other symbol at least a part of the religious experience of life.

Life as we know it today seems always to be moving in different directions, without a plan or point of orientation. But contemporary peoples living in so-called traditional societies, as well as our religious forebears, have known very different worlds in which the interconnectedness of things is readily apparent or even taken for granted. The difference between our fragmented world and a specifically religious world of meaning derives from a special property of symbols, which oppose life's divergent tendencies with a tendency of their own: to unify as much as possible, by means of endless series of analogies, many different levels of reality at once. Symbolic thinking, in other words, permits one to apprehend life as a meaningful whole. It also makes the individual himself a symbol, hence "open" to the powers at work in the world and capable of overcoming the fragmentary, alienated condition of human existence in a way that we, for the most part, cannot.

The present article aims to reconstruct something of the unified view of life to which the sky symbolism has contributed. First, I shall attempt to make clear what philosophers and historians of religions mean by a logic or system of symbols and in particular what it means to speak of the "structure" of the sky symbolism per se. Then I shall attempt to flesh out that structure with examples of sky symbols drawn from religious traditions the world over and grouped under two headings: myths and conceptions of deity.

Sky Symbolism as a System. In nonliterate and traditional cultures the sky has always been at once a natural phenomenon and a religious conception. If one were to arrange schematically all the ideas religious people have commonly associated with the sky, the result might be something along the lines of a bipolar complex, with conceptions about the physical sky at one end, purely religious ones at the other, and a gray area in between. The complex would include, for example, pairs of opposites, such as sky-earth or heaven-hell; and if the scheme were broad enough to include the Asian religions, it would also take in such notions as emptiness or the universal void.

The Jewish and Christian scriptures can help to illustrate the sky's full semantic range. Semitic peoples in

the ancient Near East divided the universe conceptually into several layers whose exact number varied from one place and period to another. *Exodus* 20:4 reflects the division of the Hebrew universe into three parts: the heavens, the earth, and the watery abyss beneath the earth; or, as in *Psalms* 115:16, the heavens, the earth, and She'ol. The phrase "heaven and earth" in *Genesis* 1:1 means simply the visible universe taken as a whole. As a rule the Bible imagines the physical sky to be a vast hemisphere, sometimes, as in *Psalms* 104:2, stretched out over the earth like a tent. In *Genesis* 1:6 the sky is also a firmament, meaning a thin, beaten metallic plate; in the *Book of Job* it is a building supported by columns (26:11), a storehouse for snow and hail (38:22), the winds (37:9), and water (38:37). In *Genesis* 7:11 the sky has windows through which rain falls to the earth.

Cosmological thinking, however, is not exhausted by speculations concerning the world's physical composition and the arrangement of its parts, for it also tries to answer perennial questions about the origin of the universe, the meaning of time and history, eschatology, the place of human beings in the cosmic order, and human destiny. [See *Cosmology*.] In *Genesis* 1:7 it is precisely God who separated the waters above and below and who called the firmament Heaven. *Genesis* 11:5 refers to the heavens as God's house, although in *1 Kings* 8:27 it is said that even the highest heaven cannot contain him. When Elijah is taken up to Heaven from among the living on earth, he receives a distinction unique in the Old Testament, whereas in the New Testament Heaven becomes the place of dwelling and reward for every believer. The end of time will mean the collapse of Heaven (*Is.* 34:4), but then "new heavens and a new earth" (*Is.* 65:17) will issue forth from God's hand. In all four gospels the heavens open up for the baptism of Jesus, who is taken up to Heaven after his resurrection from the dead. According to Paul, every risen believer, like Christ, acquires a glorious heavenly body, incorruptible, luminous, like the sky (*1 Cor.* 15:35ff.), which implies that a person must undergo transformation before he or she will have the qualities proper to the heavenly existence for which all of humankind was destined.

Ethnological reports from early travelers, the detailed and systematic investigations conducted in this century by professional anthropologists, and records, like the Bible, that have come down to us from the literate religions offer one illustration after another of divine figures who share in the sacredness always attributed to the sky, myths about the sky, and rites connected with its worship. Taken together, the meanings that those examples of symbolic thought and behavior convey could also be schematically arrayed along the very same bi-

polar complex alluded to earlier. That they may be so arranged suggests that sky symbolism as a whole has a certain inherent structure, and the present article's chief aim will be to explain that structure, at least in a summary way.

To "explain" here entails a method akin to the descriptive one employed by a botanist or anatomist, for whom structures are relational categories. If in approaching a topic like symbolism of the sky one were to simply compile a number of myths about it or list some of the countless sky deities, without any further attempt to understand their similarities and differences, the chances are good that one would have produced little more than a catalogue of brute facts. The so-called morphological method, on the other hand, "explains" by tracing the pattern of relations—the structure, in other words—that connects a phenomenon in isolation to the larger system of which it is a meaningful part; and sky symbolism, like the symbolism of earth, stone, vegetation, immersion in water, and so on, is one of many discrete but necessarily overlapping "systems" to be found in the history of religions.

Sacred stones, for example, typically derive their magico-religious meanings from a presumed connection with the sky, quite apart from what their hardness, shape, or permanence alone might signify to religious people. [See *Stones*.] The symbolism of stone can therefore tell us a great deal, albeit indirectly, about what meanings the sky has conveyed over time and across cultures. Meteorites and thunderstorms present the most obvious case in point. Having fallen from the sky, they possess a certain power that can be used and communicated, forming, as it were, multiple centers on earth of what was originally a sacrality peculiar to the sky. One of the most famous meteorites is the Ka'bah at Mecca. A ninth-century Islamic text attributed to al-Kisāi of Kūfa describes the Ka'bah as the highest point on earth because it lies directly beneath the polestar, the "center" or "gate" of heaven and the opening in the celestial vault through which the "sky stone" must have fallen. The Ka'bah thus marks a visible point on the *axis mundi* along which communication between the divine and human worlds takes place in an especially powerful and significant way.

In a great many places meteorites are looked upon as emblems of fertility. The Buriats of Siberia are convinced that certain stones from heaven help to bring rain, and in time of draught they offer sacrifices to them. Most beliefs relating to the fertility of "rain stones" derive from their meteoric origin or from a connection felt to exist between them and some force or being governing rain: they fall with rain-bringing thunder from the sky, a supremely sacred and fertile place.

For analogous reasons, certain crystals figure prominently in Australian magic and religion, and their importance is well documented throughout Oceania and the two Americas. In Euhlayi belief, the sky god Baiame throws fragments of rock crystals detached from his heavenly throne down to earth; and he himself is said to perform the initiation of young medicine men by sprinkling them with a "sacred powerful water," thought to be liquefied quartz, which renders the initiates mystically akin to the sky and, among other things, able to fly. Shamans of the Sea Dayak of Sarawak in Borneo have "light stones" that reflect whatever happens to a patient's soul and so reveal where it has strayed.

Among the Desána and other Colombian Indians, hexagonal shapes and outlines constitute fundamental ordering principles. The recurring shapes are observed first and foremost in the structure of rock crystals, which are common shamanic power objects. But the Desána also see them in honeycombs, wasps' nests, the womb, ritual enclosures, the plates on the back of a tortoise, and in any number of other places. Hexagonal shapes indicate life's creative-transformative energies concentrated and at work. Hence all places and objects where transformations take place are imagined as hexagons, or as hexagonal containers, for which there is a celestial prototype: a number of bright stars centered on Epsilon Orionis describe a celestial hexagon that, projected upon the earth, defines the boundaries of the Desána world. The celestial hexagon, in turn, suggests the image of an enormous transparent rock crystal standing on end, the six corners of which are six stars, while six waterfalls located nearby mark the corners on earth. The human brain itself is believed to be modeled after the celestial vault, and serious reflection by religious specialists on the implications of such a connection between human life and the sky has produced rich and complicated forms of "spirituality." Shamans, for example, insist on the moral value of observing the heavens and speak of a path or way that men and women must follow over the courses of their lives.

Even so brief a consideration of sacred stones as the one just given should suffice to indicate some of the most important qualities and powers of which human beings have been made aware through the symbolism of stone and sky: clairvoyance, wisdom, guidance, moral force, the power of divination, the ability to ascend to heaven (or to change one's ontological status), creativity, fertility, and supreme sacrality—all of them implied by or inherent in the structure of sky symbolism, yet accessible to us through the related symbolism of stone. Thus when we speak of the symbolism of sky or of stone, we refer to systems that have a certain co-

herence of their own but that, owing to the nature of religious symbols themselves, always seek to expand in the direction of some larger, integrated expression: sky symbolism to include the symbolism of stone, and vice versa. There is, in other words, a logic of symbols and also a tendency in symbolic thinking to make an integrated whole out of life's apparent multiplicity and dis-parateness.

Myth: The Sky In Illo Tempore. Put very simply, myths are narratives intended to explain at length what symbols express only in condensed form. They attempt to answer enduring questions: Where do we come from? Why do we act in the ways we do? Why do we mature and then die? As indicated above, mythic conceptions of the sky appear varied and very different in their details. The Barasana of Colombia liken the sky to one of the hemispherical gourds with black-glazed interiors that they use to hold coca powder. Elsewhere the sky appears as an overturned bowl, a lid, a tent, or the upper half of an egglike sphere, as in a creation myth of the Society Islands that tells how Ta'aroa (Tangaroa), ancestor of the gods and creator of all things, dwelt alone in his shell from all eternity. Finally he broke through the place of his confinement, whereupon the two halves of his shell formed heaven and earth, while its smaller fragments became the islands. In Egypt the sky was the goddess Nut, pictured either in human or bovine form reclining over her husband, the earth.

The sky as an apparent vault of infinite height, a place where celestial bodies move and dramatic meteorological events occur, has always confronted human observers with a great mystery. Height and infinite expanse naturally suggest what is transcendent; light, heat, and moisture point to the source of all fertility and sustenance. Simple reflection on the sky's mysterious otherness has consistently prompted religious people to visualize a world above the earth, an altered, dreamlike version of this one, with flora, fauna, topographical features, and inhabitants of its own. For example, the Milky Way is often mythically conceived as a great river of water, milk, or semen that traverses the sky; or it is the trunk of an enormous tree divided into branches (as among the Dinka of the Sudan and the Tlingit of western Canada); the trail of footprints left behind in the snow by an ancestral hero (for the Inuit [Eskimo] and the Tlingit); or two huge snakes, one being the luminous rainbow boa and the male principle, the other a giant anaconda, the dark female (as among the Desána). For certain Chinese of the T'ang dynasty, the Milky Way was a kind of crystalized water, a counterpart to the great rivers of the Middle Kingdom, which made its way in silence along the curving sky

dome, passing beneath the two horizons and eventually into the ocean's hidden springs.

The elaborate funerary geographies found in so many of the world's religions often tell of another world in the sky or in some spiritual realm high above the earth where the deceased journey to a place of rest or final judgment. Souls of the dead must negotiate difficult mountain paths, clamber up a tree, or ascend to heaven by way of a rope, vine, spider's web, or rainbow. Egyptian funerary texts describe a ladder offered to Re, and pictures of ladders and staircases have been recovered from many Egyptian tombs. It is impossible to trace the origins of such geographies, but many attribute their extraordinary richness of detail to the dreams and ecstatic experiences of shamans, who characteristically would have recounted the details of a journey to some fabulous place and of encounters with divine figures there or along the way. Shamanic recitations thus had the effect of "humanizing" death, so to speak, by making it a storied event and primarily a species of travel or rite of passage to a different, spiritual mode of being.

Funerary myths that depict an ascent to the sky or to heaven have as their model another ancient body of myths that tell of a primordial age when the sky and earth were very close and when communication between the two took place as a matter of course. This primordial epoch ended when the sky abruptly moved off, when supernatural beings withdrew to heaven, or when divine heroes or mythical ancestors returned there after their cultural activity (as creators or founders) ceased. The Dieri of Australia, for example, recall a time when the sky was like a curtain of clouds so thick they appeared solid and seemed to rest on the treetops. The clouds formed a great plain inhabited by strange monsters, who would often descend to earth. One day the monsters fell, perforating the cloud plain, and the vault of heaven took shape as the opening widened until it became the sky as it is today. The sky is thus called Puriwilpanina ("great opening"). Other Australian peoples commemorate the activity of two heroes who in the beginning captured a kangaroo, skinned it, attached its hide to the ground with four pegs, and formed the heavenly vault by pushing the skin up in the middle.

The motif of raising the sky, pictured as almost touching the earth in the beginning, is especially prominent in the cosmogonies of Polynesia and Micronesia. In Mangaia people say that in the beginning heaven rested upon the broad leaves of the *teve* plant, spread out like open hands. On Onoatoa and Nui, a serpent who kept heaven and earth apart raised the former by arching its back. The Ewe of Nigeria remember when the sky was so near the earth that when their ancestors lit cooking

fires, the smoke would rise up in the sky god's eyes; that is why the latter withdrew. The Mantra, who inhabit the Malay Peninsula, conceive of the sky in its present form as a vessel suspended over the earth by a cord. Long ago it hung very low and close to the earth, so much so that Blo, one of the first human beings, bumped against it in raising his pestle to grind rice, whereupon he raised the sky up with his hands. More commonly a woman grinding rice is held responsible, directly or indirectly, for the sky's banishment. The Akwapim of Africa say there was a time when a person who wanted to fish had merely to poke at the sky with a stick and fish would pour down like rain. One day a woman pounding *fufu* in a mortar found the sky a hindrance and ordered it to rise. The sky obeyed.

The origin of death is usually attributed in myth to an accident or mistake on the part of the ancestors; and with death came a structural rearrangement of the entire cosmos: the tree, liana, or ladder connecting earth and sky was broken or the cosmic mountain flattened. Following the primordial mistake, the gods retired to the highest heaven, and now only a privileged few or those, like shamans, skilled in the necessary spiritual techniques can reach them. All journeys to the land of the dead thus have as their prototype the departure of supernatural beings or mythical ancestors at the close of the primordium, which marks the beginning of human time.

Myths that relate how and why the sky and earth were parted assign different values to the state of union or closeness preceding the separation. For some the primordium contained only the potential for life as we know it. In Japan an eighth-century collection of myths called the *Nihongi* pictures Earth and Heaven before their separation as a single chaotic mass like an egg, "which was of obscurely defined limits and contained germs." The purer, lighter part diffused to form Heaven, while the heavier, grosser element settled to form Earth.

Some myths describe the primordium as a paradise before a fall from grace. The Khāsis, most of whom live in the state of Meghalaya in northeastern India, believe that in early times, when no sin or crime existed, the sky lay close to the earth, and human beings and gods associated freely. Later the sky moved off as a consequence of humankind's wicked deeds, and the state of paradise ended.

Other myths regard the closeness of sky and earth as a destructive, barren, or dangerous condition, at least so far as human beings were concerned. According to certain Tai subgroups in mainland Southeast Asia, the sky in the beginning hung so low that women could not

move their pestles freely to pound rice; the spindles they used for weaving would not turn; and domestic animals (most often cows and pigs) could not move because their backs rubbed up against the sky.

All of the preceding examples that tell of the sky's emergence from primordial chaos or of its separation from earth disclose a certain enmity between human beings and the sky (or its denizens). Often, violence and anger accompany the sky's departure: a woman takes a knife and cuts the string binding earth and sky together or strikes the latter with her pestle, or the divine couple's children force them apart so as to escape the destructive or inhibiting effects of the sky's being too close; movements essential to daily living are obstructed or darkness renders the world unfit for living things. The Maori of New Zealand recall that Rangi and Papa, Sky and Earth, were in the beginning locked in a cosmic embrace, only to be forcibly separated by their children, who had grown weary of living in perpetual darkness and who were, moreover, caught in the narrow space between their parents as the latter continued to reproduce. The myth in Hesiod of the castration of Ouranos by his children (in league with their mother) is a variant of this motif, and variants of the story occur also in China, India, North America, Africa, and among the ancient Egyptians.

Myths like the classic story of Rangi and Papa express in greater and lesser degrees an ambivalence toward the sky that is inherent in sky symbolism generally. It is an ambivalence typical of humanity's attitude toward the sacred, which attracts and repels for the way it intimates death and immortality at the same time. The desire to live in close communion with the divine always stands in apparent opposition to the requirements of human life, which myth argues is viable only at an extreme distance from the creative powers operative at the beginning of the world.

On the other hand, the new structure of the cosmos, the altered one that makes possible human life as it is today, allows for continued communication between earth and heaven on the part of religious specialists, the "elect," souls of the dead—in short, all who "ascend" to heaven—or on the part of divine figures who come down to earth from on high. Thus myths that tell of the sky's separation and banishment have as complements myths, rites, and symbols of ascent. The cosmic tree, sacred mountain, the rainbow, chain of arrows, ladder, bridge, vine, or sunbeam all represent the *axis mundi*, which defines a vertical plane along which the various regions of the cosmos communicate after the primordial catastrophe has occurred. No less important is the symbolism of the center of the world, which every ascent to

heaven implies, for around the cosmic axis lies the human world oriented to the point of contact with the heavenly world above.

Proximity to the sky, raising or banishing the sky, forcing the sky and earth apart, and the emergence or diffusion of the sky from chaos are the most common motifs found in myths about the sky. There is a widespread tendency to view such stories not so much as products of symbolic thinking but as prescientific attempts to account for the origin of the world and, in particular, of the material sky. While it is true that creation myths that tell how the sky came into being or how it was fashioned do have a certain explanatory value for the people who believe in them, it is important not to overlook their essentially religious intent; for above all else, myths are true stories that both describe what took place *in illo tempore* and fix the models for all significant human activities and aspirations. It would seem that the "true story" that sky myths have to tell is this: a violent separation of sky from earth, or at least a major alteration in the structure of the cosmos, was needed to make room for human life. Paradoxically, sky myths also contain the germ of a solution to the very dilemma they pose, for the withdrawal of the gods and mythical ancestors becomes the model for myths, rites, and symbols of ascent to and descent from the sky. [See Ascension.]

It is sometimes useful to think of the sky in creation myths as the spatial correlate of what is from the temporal point of view the mythic age vis-à-vis the present. In reciting myths about the sky, a person proclaims his knowledge of events that took place in the beginning and, in effect, reconstitutes that time when supernatural beings, ancestors, and culture heroes labored creatively on earth. To the degree a human being succeeds in imitating the divine models they produced, he lives in the time of origins, drawing near to the gods and participating in the "surplus of being" out of which they created in the first place. Reciting the myth thus expresses at once a desire for what is most real (the sacred) and, if you will, a longing for the fullness of being that was lost long ago. Myths about how the sky came to be therefore have far less to do with knowing the world in the manner of the natural sciences in the West than with a sort of pragmatic soteriology, and that much alone accounts for their predominantly religious character.

Sky Gods. In most of the nonliterate cultures we know, as in the earliest civilizations of history, in the eastern Mediterranean, western Asia, and India, the sacrality of the sky personified in the figure of a sky god at some point came to stand for what is "highest" in religious life, most sacred, and yet for that reason far

removed from public life. Of all the elements of nature that the human mind might have seized upon as adequate to the expression of supreme being—or, put another way, of all the elements of nature that might have revealed to humankind the existence of a supreme being—the sky in its infinite height, permanence, and luminosity is perhaps better suited than any other. Paradoxically, the very attributes that contribute to the sky's "adequacy" as a symbol, however, betray once again the symbolism's ambivalent structure, for those attributes also imply extreme distance, inactivity, passivity, and a certain indifference to human affairs. The sky gods are typically invoked only as a last resort when death or dire consequences threaten from their direction, as in cases of drought or serious illness, and they tend everywhere to be displaced by concrete, dynamic, and fertile divinities more accessible and more pertinent to the needs, desires, and worries of human life, be they religious, economic, or medical.

To say that the sky god is in some way "higher" than other deities or powers already raises the question of a possible connection between sky gods, supreme beings, and "primitive monotheism." Scholarly debate on that question has actually been a formative influence on the discipline of history of religions over the past 120 years or so; but because a number of points in the debate remain unresolved, it is difficult to discuss the topic without alluding to its controversial history or to make general statements about the sky gods without fear of raising old (or even new) objections. [See Supreme Beings.]

As many authorities have been quick to point out, not all supreme beings are sky gods, whose characteristic powers and attributes place them at the forefront of religious life among cereal growers and pastoral peoples in the same way that, for example, the religion of the earth mother is more fully expressed in farming cultures and that of the lord of the animals among hunters and gatherers. The Indo-Europeans, for instance, brought with them to Europe and India a nomadic, patriarchal, pastoral culture, albeit one already influenced by agriculture, which included the worship of a sky father who was all-seeing, all-powerful, and all-knowing. The Semites, Hamites, and Finno-Ugric and Ural-Altaiic peoples, among others, all recognized such a deity; and inasmuch as those peoples shared comparable forms of culture, their sky gods are comparable: the Greek Zeus and the Latin Jupiter with the Chinese T'ien, and even Yahveh with Zeus.

On the other hand, as is also well known, people who are not cereal growers or pastoral nomads are often familiar with a supernatural power or being having its abode in or beyond the sky, who directly or indirectly

created the world and is somehow responsible for its maintenance. In cultures in which the lord of the animals is the supreme being, there is usually a sky god present, and both forms of deity may be found, and in fact are well documented, in agricultural societies. The evidence therefore suggests that the configuration of powers and qualities ascribed to any one supreme being does not, as some have argued, derive only from the most pressing existential concerns of the cultural milieu out of which it arises.

Following E. B. Tylor, many others have contended that sky gods appeared late in history, but again the facts now at our disposal give us little reason to doubt the antiquity of the sky gods or, for that matter, any cause to assume they were ever worshiped to the exclusion of all other deities. The sky gods seem always to have been a part of human religiosity, since wherever they occur they show evidence of histories already long and complicated. It is never a question of their having evolved from simpler forms or having degenerated from initially pure ones. It may be that the sky god as a symbol has the capacity to take on certain religious meanings that the earth mother and lord of the animals cannot, which would help to account for the sky god's presence in most of the religious systems we know, including those judged to be ethnologically the oldest; and it forces us to consider the sky god equally a product of religious experience and of history. Also, it would appear that no one form of supreme being, even that of the celestial supreme being, can speak for the total religious life of any people. Symbolic forms are always more or less adequate but never wholly so, for then their "otherness" would completely disappear and they would become signs, not symbols. The relative adequacy of religious symbols has led to constant experimentation with religious forms, which one might interpret as an effort to recover the fullness of being that, as we have seen, myth locates "in the beginning." That history of experimentation is in a sense the history of religions, inasmuch as one partial experience of the sacred provokes the need for fuller experience through other forms. As for the relation between sky gods and the historical monotheisms, we can only say that to the degree the sky gods may express a supreme being more adequately than other symbols the potential for monotheism exists wherever the sky god is present in religious life.

Each sky god, then, is at once a unique religious creation and a product of history. A morphology of all the sky gods would again yield a broad continuum with at one end deities who display most fully characteristics related to sovereignty, lordship over the world, and moral oversight—the Chinese T'ien, the Indian Varuṇa,

and Iranian Ahura Mazdā, to name three—and at the other deities whose chief traits mark them as creators, spouses of the earth mother, or givers of rain and hence prone to develop into more specialized storm gods and fecundators—Zeus, Indra, Rudra, Baal, Jupiter, and Þórr (Thor), for example. In the middle of the array would stand the figure of a cosmocrat like Mahāvairocana, the cosmic Buddha of the Shingon school in Japan.

Unfortunately sociological, psychological, and economic explanations do little to account for both the variety and consistency of the sky gods' forms, nor is there any way of constructing an evolutionary history of the sky god or of tracing its diffusion from one or more geographical centers. We can only attempt to list the powers and qualities that combine most frequently to give the sky gods a discernible structure and then pursue the logic or patterns that emerge from a comparison of their forms. The remainder of this section will accordingly treat the sky god's connection with the material sky, its chronological priority with respect to other deities, creative role, inactivity or remoteness, role as moral overseer, omniscience, place in worship, and tendency to give way to lesser beings and powers.

Sky gods vary from impersonal or barely personal conceptions to anthropomorphic ones. The fundamental idea of the holy is expressed in Algonquin by the word *manitou* and finds an Iroquois equivalent in *orenda* or *oki*, both names for celestial supreme beings and both referring to "what is on high." Among the Selk'nam hunters of Isla Grande in Tierra del Fuego, the sky god is Témaukel, whom they refer to ordinarily as "dweller in the sky" or "he who is in the sky" for fear of uttering his name directly. He is an eternal, all-knowing, omnipotent creator, though his creation was accomplished by the mythical ancestors he fashioned before his withdrawal beyond the stars. He has no images or priests. He is author of the moral law, judge, and master of all destinies, and yet he sits apart, indifferent to the world's affairs. People pray to him only in time of illness and make offerings in bad weather. Among the Samoyeds the word *num* is used both to mean the material sky and as the name of the chief sky god, hence any divine being and, in the adjectival sense, "holy."

The word *tengri* in one form or another belongs to the majority of Altaic languages and expresses the idea of supreme deity. The root meaning is "sky," and from its radical sense there develops on the one hand the meaning of sky as a living divine being, the heavenly principle and governing law of the universe; but it also comes to mean god, divine being, or divine image generally, and God in the absolute monotheistic sense, a synonym for the Zoroastrian and Manichaean Öhrmazd/Ahura Mazdā and the Buddhist Burkhan (the Buddha) or even

the God of Nestorian Christianity and Islam, owing chiefly to the influence of those religions as they made their way among the Turco-Tatar and Mongolian peoples.

On the Andaman Islands Puluga is the chief divine figure, who is believed to live in a large stone house in the sky. In New Zealand it is Io, or Iho; this concept seems to be derived from Rangi, the Maori sky god. The latter corresponds not only to the Indonesian Upu Langi/Upu Lanito but also to the Chinese T'ien, the Mongol Tengri, the Vedic Dyaus, the Greek Zeus, the Latin Jupiter, and the Germanic Týr, each of whom represents the sky and yet something other than the sky.

As a rule the sky god's activities receive scant elaboration in myth, but his chronological and ontological priority with respect to other deities is a regular feature of stories in which the sky god makes an appearance. Often his primordality is pictured as old age. The Yámana (Yahgan) of the southern portion of Tierra del Fuego speak of Watauineiwa, "the ancient one who changes not." The Oglala Lakota consider the Sun (Wi) as the chief god; but his power comes from Skan, the Sky, whom their medicine men call To ("the blue one"). In the Oglala theogony, Skan and Tate (Wind) form a pair older than Wi and Hanwi (Moon). Skan is the Great Spirit, arbiter of the living and judge of the dead.

Otherwise the sky god's primordial nature can be plainly deduced from the role frequently assigned to him in myth as supreme creator. When the sky god does create, it is typically a creation *ex nihilo* by thought or word. In the beginning the Zuni Awonawilona (called "the maker and container of all" and "the all-father father") "conceived within himself and thought outward in space, whereby mists of increase, steams potent of growth, were evolved and uplifted. Thus, by means of his innate knowledge, the All-container made himself in person and form of the Sun" (Long, 1963, p. 187). The Maori and Hebrew cosmogonies both give us classic examples of creation by power of the word, as does the creation account included in the *Popol Vuh*, the sacred book of the Quiché-speaking Maya.

In many cases the sky god delegates creation to other supernatural beings, particularly to culture heroes or transformers; or else he may engender new beings destined to carry on the work he started. The Yoruba of Nigeria have such a deity in Ọlọrun, originator of all powers, beings, and things, who created part of the world and left the remainder to a class of lesser deities known as *oriša*. Ọbatalá (Oriša-nlá), to name one of these, created the earth and brought to it sixteen persons whom Ọlọrun had already made.

No matter how the creative activity of the sky god is

depicted, however, it is always clear that he stands apart from his creation in a condition mythically portrayed as a kind of loneliness. In the Tuamotuan story of creation, Kiho first dwelt in the void. He had no parents, no friend, no mate: "It was said that, at that time, Kiho conversed only with his Astral-double (Activating-self). His musings were within himself; his acts were performed by his Activating-self" (Long, 1963, p. 175); and having entrusted the world to Atea, "the completer," he returned to the dark realm whence he had come. The sky god's inactivity or remoteness derives from his eternal permanence, for active manifestations of his power and presence would imply changeability and, moreover, would imperil the world's established order.

The sky gods are not only all-powerful creators; their celestial natures usually render them omniscient as well and hence the founders and guardians of moral law. Among the Iroquois the moral oversight exercised by Oki was applied especially to oaths and treaties, implying that he possessed the power of knowing what went on in the world and especially of hearing what people said and understanding what they thought. Likewise did Jupiter, the supreme god of Roman religion, punish violators and watch over contracts, treaties, and oaths. The oldest and most sacred Roman oath was taken in the name of Jupiter Lapis, the *lapis* in question being a thunderstone, that is, a pointed flint believed to be the remnant of a thunderbolt. To swear *per Iovem Lapidum* meant that the swearer, if he broke his promise, exposed himself to Jupiter's wrath.

The sky god's all-present, all-powerful, and all-knowing being is the model *par excellence* for both knowledge—as a thing to be revered, sought after, or necessary for salvation—and mystery. According to an *angakok* from Nunivak Island, Sila is

a great spirit, supporting the world and the weather and all life on earth, a spirit so mighty that his utterance to mankind is not through common words, but by storm and snow and rain and the fury of the sea; all the forces of nature that men fear. But he has also another way of utterance, by sunlight, and calm of the sea, and little children innocently at play, themselves understanding nothing. . . . When all is well Sila sends no message to mankind, but withdraws into his own endless nothingness, apart. So he remains as long as men do not abuse life, but act with reverence towards their daily food. No one has seen Sila; his place of being is a mystery, in that he is at once among us and unspeakably far away. (Knut Rasmussen, *Across Arctic America*, 1927;

New York, 1969, pp. 385–386)

It should therefore come as no surprise to find the sky god associated with initiation ceremonies and secret so-

cieties where sacred knowledge passes from one generation to the next. In Australia the sky god plays a central role, for example, in male puberty rites: novices are consecrated to him, they learn the secret of his name and deeds, and they come to recognize his voice in the bull-roarer, a sign of his abiding presence in the rite.

Although the sky god's transcendent mode of being may help to explain his absence from scheduled cult and the easy way in which he is forgotten, merged, or fused with lesser, more vital divine forms, it seems worth remembering how often the sky god is spontaneously invoked as a last resort when illness or disaster threatens. Sometimes the sky god may be so ordinary a feature of conscious life or so much a part of private prayer and devotion that his presence becomes difficult or impossible for an outsider to detect and hardly noteworthy enough for an informant to elaborate on. [See *Deus Otiosus*.]

It remains only to mention some of the deities, powers, or philosophical conceptions to which the sky god has typically yielded his place in religious life: deities specializing in fertility, solar and lunar divinities, storm gods, mythical twins, vegetation deities, culture heroes, ancestors, world sovereigns, and even abstract, theoretical formulations of cosmic law or a divine principle, which, like the sky god, is universal and unchanging and which even the gods cannot resist. All of the above preserve the structure of sky symbolism in their forms and derive their ultimate coherence from it.

[For mythic traditions associated with the sky, see Stars; Sun; Moon; and Heaven and Hell.]

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SLAVIC RELIGION. The exact origin of the Slavs, an indigenous European people, is not known, but by about 800 BCE pockets of Slavs were scattered in a region east of the Vistula and the Carpathians and west of the Don. Some six hundred years later the Slavs inhabited a large area in central and eastern Europe. Over the centuries they were driven north, south, and east by successive migrations of Germanic and Asiatic tribes.

Around the sixth century CE the Slavs began separating into three groups, the West, South, and East Slavs. Proto-Slavic, an Indo-European language, was spoken in an area extending from the north of Russia to the south of Greece, and from the Elbe and the Adriatic coast to the Volga. By about the tenth century, Proto-Slavic had separated into three subgroups, the ancestors of the West Slavic, South Slavic, and East Slavic language groups.

The West Slavs lived in a region reaching beyond the Elbe and were bounded on the west by Germanic tribes. The language they spoke developed into modern Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Wendish. (The Wends settled between the Elbe and the Oder, in what is now Germany,

and their descendants today are entirely surrounded by Germans.) The South Slavs, covering the area east of the Adriatic, south of the Danube, and west of the Black Sea, had the Magyars and Vlachs as their northern and eastern neighbors. Their language was the forerunner of Slovenian, Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian. The ancestors of today's Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, the East Slavs lived in an area bounded by Lake Ladoga, the upper Volga and Don, and the Dnieper. To the southeast were the Khazars and Pechenegs, Asiatic steppe dwellers; to the north and east were Finno-Ugric peoples; and to the northwest were Balts.

Formation of Slavic Religion. The term *Slavic religion* can be used to refer to the mythology and cultic life common to all Slavs from the sixth to the tenth century. The basic structure of Slavic mythology, composed of Old European and Indo-European elements, stems from the proto-Slavic culture in the Slavic homeland. Strong affinities with the mythology and religious nomenclature of the early Slavs have been found among their close neighbors, the Balts, the Iranians, and the Thracians.

Three important factors must be borne in mind in regard to Slavic religion. First, literacy came to the Slavs in the aftermath of christianization. As a consequence, there is no pagan literature as such. However, songs, fairy tales, and oral epics such as the Russian *byliny*, which survived among peasants, are representative of pagan religious traditions.

The worship of pagan gods did not disappear immediately with the arrival of Christianity. Descriptions of pagan temples, idols, and practices can be found in early church chronicles. Later, with the advance of Christianity, many pagan practices found new manifestations that were compatible with the new religion. This was especially true in the Byzantine sphere of influence, and, in fact, the best examples of pagan prototypes that merged with Christian figures are found in Russia.

The second important factor in the formation of the Slavic religion was the close contact of the Slavs with neighboring peoples, especially the Balts and Indo-Iranians. This contact is attested by some common Slavic words pertaining to religion that have clear affinities with Iranian.

The third and most essential factor is the heritage of mythological images. In the tradition of Celtic, Baltic, Greek, and other related mythologies of Europe, Slavic beliefs strongly preserved very ancient pre-Indo-European images typical of an agricultural, matrifocal, and matrilinear culture. (This oldest substratum is called Old European.) Slavic paganism as described by Chris-

tian missionaries, however, was clearly dominated by male gods of Indo-European origin. Their names and functions can be reconstructed by means of comparative Indo-European mythology and linguistics. These gods belonged to a pastoral, patriarchal, and warlike people of the Eurasian steppes who superimposed their social system and religion upon the Old European culture about 3000 BCE.

The stratigraphy of Slavic religion and mythology thus contains the following levels: (1) Old European, rooted in a local Neolithic culture; (2) Indo-European, derived from the pastoral; patriarchal culture of the Eurasian steppes; and (3) Christian, in which pagan prototypes fused with Christian figures, producing a "double faith." (Christianity was introduced into Moravia in 863, Bulgaria in 885, Poland in 966, and Russia in 988.)

Sources. Written sources begin with the sixth-century Byzantine historian Procopius, who wrote that the Slavic Sclavenian and Antes tribes worshiped a thunder god as "lord of the whole world." They sacrificed bulls and other animals to him, and they made other offerings at times of death, illness, or war to ensure salvation. They also venerated and made sacrifices to rivers, nymphs, and "other demons." Divination and sacrifice were carried out together.

Scarcely any other reliable written information is available for the sixth through the tenth century. In the East Slavic area, the only Slavic pantheon on record is that set up by Vladimir I in 980. Eight years later he cast down the pagan deities and forcibly baptized the population of Kiev. The Russian *Primary Chronicle* (compiled c. 1111) says: "And Vladimir began to rule Kiev alone, and he set up idols on a hill outside the palace court—a wooden figure of Perun, and his head was of silver and his mouth was of gold; Khors and Dazhbog and Stribog and Simargl and Mokosh—and he and his people made sacrifice to the idols." Simultaneously, "Vladimir also placed Dobrynja, his uncle, in Novgorod, and after Dobrynja came to Novgorod, he set up an idol of Perun above the river Volkhov, and the people of Novgorod revered him as a god."

The descriptions that we have of Slavic idols and temples, it must be remembered, come from the writings of the very people who destroyed them. The most reliable sources on the religion of the West Slavs are provided by Otto, a twelfth-century bishop of Bamberg, whose war with the pagan gods of the Slavs in northern Germany was recorded by three biographers, Ebbo, Herbord, and Monachus Prieflingensis, as well as by Thietmar, bishop of Merseburg, who wrote firsthand accounts of eleventh-century Wendish paganism (see

Palm, 1937). Early sources on the pre-Christian religion in Poland, Bohemia, Moravia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia are either biased or very scant. Slavic religion and mythology cannot be reconstructed on the basis of written records alone. Of utmost importance are archaic motifs in folklore, linguistic reconstructions, and archaeological monuments. In the past, very few scholars drew upon all these sources; in this respect, much research is yet to be done.

Temples and Idols. The most precise descriptions of temples and idols come from the eleventh through the thirteenth century in the area of the northwestern Slavs, present-day Germany. The best-documented site is Arkona, a citadel-temple of the god Sventovit, which was destroyed in 1168 by Christian Danes when they stormed the island of Rügen. According to Saxo Grammaticus (*Gesta Danorum* 14), Arkona was a red-roofed log structure of consummate workmanship, encircled by a yard and protected by a splendidly carved wooden fence bearing various symbols painted in "heathen" style. The fence had a single entrance. In the inner chamber of the temple loomed the awe-inspiring statue of Sventovit, larger than life and with four heads that faced the cardinal directions. Carl Schuchhardt's excavation in 1921 proved the existence of the temple. Repeated excavations in 1969 and 1970 revealed an earlier layer of the sanctuary dating to the tenth century, and possibly to the ninth.

After conquering Arkona, the Danish armies took Garz (Karentia), also on the island of Rügen, which Saxo describes as a castle hill with swamps on all sides. Of its three temples, the largest had an inner room consisting of roof, posts, and purple hangings. In the middle of this room stood an oaken statue of Rugievit—whose name, according to Saxo, meant "god of Rügen [Rugia]"—having seven heads, with seven swords hanging from his girdle and an eighth sword held in his hand. Saxo says the other temples belonged to "Porevit" and "Potenut," respectively.

The earliest source, Thietmar (1014), describes a similar temple on the castle hill of Riedegost or Radigast (Rethra). It was made of timber, and the exterior was adorned with sculptures to which animal horns were attached. It contained several hand-sculpted idols dressed in helmets and armor and each dedicated to a god, the most important being that of Zuarasici (Svarozhich).

Carl Schuchhardt, who excavated Rethra in 1922, concluded that the temple, presumably built about 1000 CE, was destroyed by fire about 1068, but that its floor plan was square. Thietmar said that Riedegost was principal among all the local temples. People came to it with homage before going to war, and with offerings on

their return. The priests determined reconciliation offerings by means of dice and horse oracles. It was apparently the sanctuary for the entire Lutici confederation, of which the Retharii were one tribe.

Bishop Otto of Bamberg went twice to Szczecin (Stettin), where there were two temples (according to Ebbo) or four (according to Herbord). The most important of these temples stood upon one of the three hills and was dedicated to Triglav, the three-headed "summus deus" (Ebbo, 3.1). It was richly sculptured inside and out, and its interiors were decorated with war booty. On his first trip there (about 1124), Otto cut off the idol's three heads and sent them to Pope Calixtus II. Another idol of Triglav was destroyed in Brandenburg, probably by Albrecht the Bear (Albert I), sometime between 1150 and 1157.

At Wolin, according to Monarchus Prieflingensis, Otto found a temple with a sacred spear that, as legend had it, had been placed there in memory of Julius Caesar. According to Ebbo, there was also an outdoor cultic center with idols, which became the site of the new Adalbert Church. The practice of building a church on the site of a pagan sanctuary was one of the most effective, and most commonly employed, methods of combating paganism all over the Slavic area. It attracted the people to whom the place itself was still holy, and it removed all traces of the worship previously performed there.

Otto's mission of 1128 destroyed the temple at Wolgast. According to Ebbo, when Otto's men entered the temple in search of idols, they found only a gigantic shield hanging on the wall. Fearing the crowd that had gathered outside, they carried the shield with them for protection, whereupon the crowd fell to the ground, thinking it was an appearance of the war god Gerovit (Iarovit). Herbord describes the shield as covered with gold leaf, and he equates Gerovit with Mars.

Helmold of Bosau, writing of the pagan revival among the Wends in 1134, mentions "Prove deus Aldenburgensis terrae." On his trip with the bishop Gerald of Oldenburg and to the interior between that city and Lubeck in 1156, he saw a grove where an oak tree was enclosed within a courtyard surrounded by a fence of stakes. It was dedicated to the god of that land, Proven, for whom no idol was present. The monk Herbertus describes a sacred grove where a large tar-covered idol stood leaning against a tree (presumably an oak). Most likely, the name *Proven* is a distortion or variant of *Perun*, the name of the Slavic thunder god.

According to the Russian *Primary Chronicle*, when Prince Igor made a peace treaty with Byzantium at Kiev in 945, he and his men went to a hill where there

was a statue of Perun. There they laid down their arms and swore to keep the treaty. In his treaty with Byzantium in 971, Prince Sviatoslav made a similar oath, stating that those who would not respect the treaty would be cursed by Perun and Volos and that they would become as yellow as the gold of their ornaments and be destroyed by their own weapons.

A ruined temple, perhaps of Perun, was discovered in 1951 near Novgorod in a place called Peryn. The wooden structure itself was not preserved, but the floor plan, an octagonal rosette shape, was clearly evident. In the center was charcoal, indicating where the idol and a place for fire had probably been located. Nearby was a flat stone, apparently a part of an altar. In 1958, at Staraja Ladoga, a wooden effigy of a god with mustache and beard and wearing a conical helmet was found in a layer dated to the ninth or tenth century.

From all that is presently known of East Slavic temples, wooden idols stood on hills within temples for which there are no descriptions. On the analogy of the excavated temples of the Balts in the Smolensk area dating from the fifth to the seventh century, such hills were fortified and had wooden structures on the inner side of the ramparts. A round temple containing a wooden idol stood in the center or at the end of the hill fort.

A tradition going back millennia is evidenced by carved images of gods, produced throughout proto-Slavic periods and later times, that are similar to those of early history. A number of stone statues, some with three or four heads, others holding a drinking horn, wearing a conical cap, and decorated with incised horse figures or sun symbols, are known from excavations. Similar idols from Stavchany in the upper Dniester Valley date from the fourth century CE (see Gimbutas, *The Slavs*, 1971, fig. 61).

Idols were dedicated to various gods. In the West Slavic area, the richest temples belonged to the warrior god of "heavenly light" in his various aspects (Svarozhich, Iarovit, Sventovit), whereas the thunder god (Perun) was worshiped outdoors, in a grove where an oak tree stood. The East Slavs also erected temples for Perun.

It is clear that at the time when Christianity arrived, the official religion was dominated by warrior gods of Indo-European heritage. Following the destruction of their temples, these gods sank into the subculture so that only vestiges of their earlier glory survived.

Gods of Indo-European Heritage. Three divine archetypes of the Indo-European religious tradition are clearly represented in the Slavic pantheon: the god of heavenly light, the god of death and the underworld,

and the thunder god. The first two stand in opposition to each other, but the relationship of the three deities is triangular, not hierarchical.

The god of heavenly light, also known as the white god, and the god of death and the underworld, also known as the black god, form a fundamental polarity in the Slavic religious tradition. This opposition of mythological figures is reflected in the semiotic system of Slavic languages, based on the arrangement of oppositions such as day and night, light and dark, life and death, good and evil. The white and black gods are mentioned in Helmold's twelfth-century *Chronica Slavorum*, pertaining to the West Slavs: "They expect a fortunate lot from the good god and from the evil one an unfortunate [lot]; for this reason is the evil god called devil in their language, or 'black god.'" The *Gustinskii Chronicle* of 1070 reports that ancient sorcerers were convinced that "there be two gods: one heavenly and the other in hell." The white god is the deity of daylight while the black god is the god of night. Both have close analogies in the Vedic Mitra-Varuṇa and the Baltic Dievas-Velinas oppositions.

The Slavic thunder god, Perun, deity of justice and fecundity, stands close to the god of heavenly light; he was the chief adversary of the black god. Although described as the "lord of the whole world" by Procopius and listed first in Vladimir's pantheon, Perun was never addressed as "summus deus" ("highest god") as was the god of heavenly light (Sventovit).

The god of heavenly light. Many different names identify the god of heavenly light: the forms *Belobog*, *Belbog*, and *Belun* (all meaning "white god") are common in Slavic place-names and folklore. Close relatives in the Kievan pantheon are the sun gods Dazhbog [see Dazhbog], Khors (an obvious borrowing of the Iranian name for the personified sun, *Khursid*), and possibly Stribog (whose name is perhaps related to the Iranian *srira*, "beautiful"). The personified sun appears throughout Slavic folklore: each morning he rides out from his golden palace in the east in a two-wheeled chariot drawn by horses. He begins the day as a youth and dies each night as an old man. He is attended by two lovely virgins (the morning and evening stars), seven judges (the planets), and seven messengers (the comets). As a "year god," this deity ages with each season. The polycephalic images, three- or four-faced gods, known as Triglav or as Chetyregod, represent different faces of the year god. [See Triglav.]

Among the West Slavs, Iarovit, Porovit, Sventovit, and Svarozhich, described in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, represent various aspects of the year god: spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Several of these

names had calendrical significance. *Iaro* was connected with *iaru*, meaning "young, ardent, bright," and *Porovit* may have been related to *pora*, "midsummer." *Sventovit*, whose name is from *svent-*, "light" and "holy," was worshiped in October, during the harvest. [See *Sventovit*.] *Svarozhich* was worshiped in the temple at Radigast. Judging from his name (a diminutive of *Svarog*, signifying that he was a son of *Svarog*, the heavenly smith), *Svarozhich* probably represented the aspect of the newborn winter sun. However, *Svarog* (glossed as *Hephaistos* in thirteenth-century records) and *Svarozhich* could also be a single god, since the diminutive form of addressing deities is a characteristic Slavic phenomenon. (For instance, *bozhich*, "little god," is a form frequently used instead of *bog*, "god.") As in all other Indo-European religions, this deity was portrayed as a warrior, dressed in armor and a helmet, carrying a sword and shield, and accompanied always by a horse. Weapons and horses were manifestations of his powers.

In Christian times, the god of heavenly light fused with the Christian God and Saint John (Ivan). Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, the spring aspect of the god survived in Belorussia and Russia in the image of *Iarilo*, who was worshiped in the week following Whitsuntide. Folklore preserves the image of *Iarilo* riding upon a white horse: he wears a white cloak, is crowned with wildflowers, and carries a sheaf of wheat. Girls honored *Iarilo* by performing choral dances upon newly sown fields. In the eighteenth century, the Orthodox bishop of Voronezh in central Russia proscribed a pagan festival and "satanic" games centered on an idol called *Iarilo*. In Kostroma, until 1771, people buried an idol with exaggerated male attributes. The burial of a phallic idol typifies the year god's cycle. The death of the year god, symbolized by submerging his image in water or by burning a birch tree, was commemorated in Belorussia until the early twentieth century.

Reminiscent of the Indo-European archetype of the divine twins—the Dioscuri of Greek myth, the *Aśvins* of the Vedas, the *Dievo Sūneliai* of Lithuanian folk songs—are the saints Boris and Gleb, Cosmas and Damian, and Flor and Lavr. The emblem of Boris and Gleb, the youthful martyrs, was a young shoot. They sometimes appear as *bogatyri* ("knights") who have vanquished a dragon and harnessed him to a plow, and on Serbian icons they are depicted as doctors holding the tools of their trade. In Russia, Flor and Lavr were the protectors of horses. Their holiday was 18 August, at which time animals were sacrificed to them and the flesh cooked for a feast in their honor.

The cult of the dawn was common among all Slavs.

The Slavic deity *Zoria*, or *Zaria*, is the heavenly bride, the goddess of beauty, the dawn. At daybreak she is greeted, like *Uṣas* of India, as "the brightest maiden, pure, sublime, and honorable."

Certain Slavic myths give an anthropomorphic interpretation to the relationship between the sun and the moon. The Russian word for "moon," *mesiats*, is masculine, but many legends portray the moon as a beautiful young woman whom the sun marries at the beginning of summer, abandons in winter, and returns to in spring. In other myths, the moon is the husband and the sun is his wife, as in Baltic mythology. In folk beliefs, *Mesiats* is addressed as *kniaz'* ("prince") and is believed to have powers over the growth of plants. In Polish, the word for "moon," *księżyc*, is the diminutive form of the word meaning "prince" or "lord."

The god of death and the underworld. The names *Veles* and *Volos* apparently represent two aspects of the same god: (1) a sorcerer god of death, related to music and poetry, and (2) a god of cattle, wealth, and commerce. [See *Veles-Volos*.] The etymology suggests ancient functions: *vel-* is connected with "death," "the dead," and "giant" on one hand and with "sight, foresight, insight" on the other. *Volos* has connections with "hair, fur" and with "disease, evil spirit." The original name of the god must have been *Veles*, not *Volos*.

Veles was degraded to a devil at the beginning of Christian times. All that remains of this god are such expressions as *k Velesu za more* ("to *Veles* in the otherworld") and the formula *Velesov' vnuk* ("grandson of *Veles*"), apostrophizing the musician and prophetic poet *Boian* of the Old Russian epic *Slovo o polku Igoreve*. Place-names incorporating *Veles* imply sites where this god was worshiped, such as *Titov Veles* in Macedonia.

Volos was merged with the image of Saint *Blasius* (*Vlasii*) and also partly with that of Saint *Nicholas* (*Nikola*), the patrons of flocks and crops. He was honored as such up to the twentieth century on his holiday, 11 February. Such forms as *Volosovo* and *Volosovskii* were frequently used as names for monasteries and churches in Russia. According to legend, they were founded on the spots where the idols of *Volos* stood in pre-Christian times.

Idols and places of *Volos* worship are mentioned as late as the eighteenth century. Of utmost importance is the description of the sacrifice of the priest *Volkhv* in *Skazanii o postroenii grada Yaroslavl'ia* (Legends about the Founding of Yaroslavl), published in 1876 and based on a manuscript of 1781. Having burned the sacrificial victim and prophesied in the name of *Volos*, the priest was himself sacrificed to the god. This is a parallel to the self-sacrifice of the Germanic god *Oðinn* (*Odin*).

The thunder god. Overseer of justice and order, purifier and fructifier, and adversary of the devil, Perun is feared to this day in some Slavic areas. His presence and actions are perceived in lightning and thunder. His animals (the bull and the he-goat), his birds (the dove and the cuckoo), and his weapons (the ax and the arrow) are pervasive symbolic motifs in Slavic folk beliefs and songs.

Parallels in other Indo-European mythologies, such as the Baltic Pērkons and Perkūnas and the Germanic Þórr (Thor), attest to the antiquity of this god. The root *per-/perk-* (“to strike, to splinter,” “oak, oak forest,” “mountaintop”) is common to Indo-European languages. [See Perun.] The oak was Perun’s sacred tree. Oak forests and mountaintops—where a god of storms might easily alight—are attested by literary sources as places of veneration. The name *Peryn*, known from Russia and the Balkans, must have preceded the name *Perun*. The original name of the god is likely to have been **Perkyn*, which conforms to the Baltic *Perkūnas* and to Indo-European words for “oak” (Latin *quercus*, from **perkus*) and “oak forest” (Slavic **pergynja*, Celtic *hercynia*); hence the origin of the designation “oak god” (Brückner, 1980, p. 106).

With the onset of Christianity, Perun gradually merged with Saint Elijah (Il’ia), who is portrayed in Russian icons crossing the heavens in a chariot. Bull sacrifice and a communal feast on Saint Il’ia’s Day, 20 July, were recorded in northern Russia in 1907. Saint Il’ia’s Day was most reverently celebrated into the mid-twentieth century in the Rhodope Mountains of Bulgaria. The festival, during which a bull was sacrificed and prepared for the communal feast, took place on a hill or summit.

Household guardians. Slavic names for household guardians—Russian *ded*, *dedushka* (dim.), and *domovoi*; Ukrainian *did*, *didko*, and *domovyk*; Czech *dedek*; and Bulgarian *stopan*—have the meaning “grandfather” or “house lord,” suggesting their origins in ancestor worship within a patrilineal culture. The guardian is commonly represented as an old man wearing a fur coat, or as an animal (a dog, bear, or snake). He was believed to live behind or beneath the oven. He cared for animal herds and protected the entire home and its occupants from misfortune. If not honored, *Domovoi* might leave the house, his departure bringing on illness or the death of householders or cattle. There is a related belief among the Slavs that well-being cannot establish itself in a newly built house until after the death of the head of the family, who then becomes its guardian. If the family moves into a new home, it takes its guardian with it.

The Russian forest spirit, *Leshii* or *Lesovik* (from

les, “forest”), also appears as an old man or an animal. His principal function is to guard forests and animals.

Ancestor worship, a prominent practice among all pre-Christian Slavs, is evidenced in gifts presented to the dead. A strong belief in life after death is indicated by prehistoric and even modern burial rites. Food offerings are made in cemeteries to this day. Everything deemed necessary for the afterlife—weapons, tools, clothing, wives, slaves, horses, hunting dogs, food—was buried in the grave or was burned if the deceased was cremated. The richer one was in life, the more pompous the burial. Slavic royal tombs of prehistory and early history are as elaborate as those of other Indo-European groups: Phrygian, Thracian, Baltic, or Germanic.

The Arab traveler Ibn Faḍlān stated (922) that when a Slavic nobleman died, his body was laid provisionally in a grave for ten days while his property was divided. The deceased, who was dressed in rich garments and equipped with weapons, food, and drink, was seated in a boat. His wife (who chose death voluntarily in order to enter the afterworld with her husband) was killed by stabbing and seated next to him. Then all was consumed by fire. A funeral banquet (*trizna*) continued for days and nights.

Thereafter, the deceased was commemorated and offered food on the third, seventh, twentieth, and fortieth days after death. Similar observances took place six and twelve months after death. In addition to these family observances, general festivals commemorating the dead occurred three or four times a year. These feasts, called “holy *dziady*,” were offered in the home and in cemeteries. The holy *dziady*—the word literally means “ancestors”—show that the Slavs looked upon their forefathers as guardians.

Mythic Images Rooted in Old European Religion. The primary figures of the oldest stratum of Slavic culture are predominantly female: Fates, Death, Baba Yaga, Moist Mother Earth, and a host of nymphs and goblins (water, mountain, and forest spirits) largely preserved in folklore and attested by written records. In all these feminine figures may be discerned features of the goddesses of Old Europe: the life-giving and life-taking goddess, the goddess of death and regeneration, and the pregnant earth goddess.

Life-giving and life-taking goddesses and their associates. *Mokosh* is the only female deity mentioned in the Kievan pantheon of 980. In folk beliefs, *Mokysha*, or *Mokusha*, has a large head and long arms; at night she spins flax and shears sheep. Her name is related to spinning and plaiting and to moisture. The life-giving and life-taking goddess, or Fate, was the spinner of the thread of life and the dispenser of the water of life. *Mokosh* was later transformed into the East Slavic goddess

Paraskeva-Piatnitsa, who was associated with spinning, water, fertility, health, and marriage. [See Mokosh.]

Up to the twentieth century, it was believed that fate took the form of birth fairies who appeared at the bedside of a newborn baby on the third or the seventh day after birth. In anticipation of the fairies, the baby was washed and dressed in new clothes while a special dinner was prepared. Bread, salt, and wine were put out for the fairies. Three Fates of different ages were believed to appear. They determined the infant's destiny and invisibly inscribed it upon his or her forehead. If the parents feared the Fates, they hid the infant outside the home, a practice common among the South Slavs.

Fate was given various names by the Slavs. To Russians she was Rozhenitsa or Rozhdenitsa ("birth giver"); to Czechs she was Sudička; to Serbs and Croats she was Sudjenica or, earlier, Sudbina (cf. Russian *sud'ba*, "fate"); and to Bulgarians she was Narechnitsa (from *narok*, "destiny"). Both Rozhenitsa and the male Rod, to whom offerings were made, are mentioned in a thirteenth-century Russian text, *Slovo Isaia proroka*.

The Russian *dolia* and the Serbian *sreča* represent the fate of a person's material life. There were good and bad *dolias* and *srečas*. The benevolent spirit protected her favorites and served them faithfully from birth to death. The malevolent spirit, *nedolia* or *nesreča*, usually personified as a poor and ugly woman, capable of transforming herself into various shapes, bestowed bad luck. The person who attracted an evil *dolia* would never succeed, and all efforts to shake bad fortune would be in vain.

Fate could also appear as two sisters, Life and Death. Her deathly aspect was known as Mora, Marà, or Smert' ("death"). She was perceived as a tall white woman who could change her shape. When chased by dogs, she turned into a stick, a block, a bat, or a basket. The plague was personified as a slim black woman with long breasts who sometimes had the legs of a cow or horse and the eyes of a snake. To Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs she was known as Kuga; to Bulgarians and Russians she was Chuma.

Associates of the life-giving and life-taking goddesses were female spirits filled with passionate sensuality, who mingled with humans and dwelt in forests or in mountain caves. They helped with household chores, spun hemp, and reaped grain and tied it into sheaves. They worked rapidly and produced crops that never diminished. The Bohemians called them *divoženky*, the Poles *dziwożony*, the Slovaks *divja davojke*, and the Bulgarians *divi-te zheny* ("wild women"). Tall and naked, they had long breasts and long hair, which they flung over their shoulders. They were distinguished by short feet or chicken legs. They yearned for mother-

hood, and they often took care of neglected babies and punished bad mothers. Sometimes they substituted their own ugly offspring for handsome human children. In response to an injury or malicious joke, they could kill by touch or tickle. Being half human, they could marry and become model wives and housekeepers, but if their true identity became known, they disappeared instantly.

Another related spirit, Paludnitsa ("midday spirit"), had the appearance of an airy white lady or of an old woman who wandered at noon in the fields during harvesttime. She also floated upon violent gusts of wind. Whomever she touched died a sudden death. Her most common victims were young women who either already had children or were in childbed.

Baba Yaga and Ved'ma. The Old European goddess of death and regeneration is reflected in the Slavic deity Baba Yaga, who has been preserved in folk tales as a witch. [See Baba Yaga.] She was said to live in darkness and to devour humans, but she was also believed to have a gift for prophecy. She was usually old and ugly, with bony legs, a long nose, and disheveled hair, but she might also appear as a young woman, or as two sisters. Baba Yaga was represented as a bird or a snake, and she could turn herself into an animal or even into an inanimate object. The first half of her compound name, *baba*, suggests "grandmother" and "pelican"; the second, *yaga*, from Proto-Slavic *(y)ęga, means "disease" or "fright." The word *baba* can also mean "block," or "woodpile," which connotes destruction, death, and decay.

In East Slavic tradition, Baba Yaga has a male counterpart: Koshchei Bessmertnyi, "Koshchei the Immortal." His name, from *kost'* ("bone"), suggests the notion of the dying and rising god, that is, a deity who cyclically dies and is reborn. In folk tales, Baba Yaga is either the mother or the aunt of Koshchei. Another male equivalent of Baba Yaga in her role of the "mother of the winds" is Morozko ("frost").

Ved'ma ("witch") is a demonized goddess. She can be seen flying beneath the clouds and over the mountains and valleys on a broom or a rake. She departs from the house through the chimney as a bird or a fiery snake. She can produce rain or cause a storm simply by touching an object with her broom. She possesses a magical ointment, the source of water, which she sprinkles on herself before flying. Ved'ma can be old and ugly or very beautiful. She can make herself invisible, turn into a ball of yarn, and move rapidly. She knows the magical properties of plants and is the keeper of the water of life and death.

Moist Mother Earth and Corn Mother. The sacred deity known as Moist Mother Earth (Mati Syra Zemlia) was

perceived as pure, powerful, and pregnant. Up to the twentieth century peasants believed that in springtime it was a grave sin to strike the earth with anything before 25 March, because during that time the earth was pregnant. Plowing and digging were forbidden on the holidays of this deity. For centuries, peasants settle disputes over property by calling upon Mother Earth to witness the justice of their claims. Marriages were confirmed by the participants' swallowing lumps of earth (a tradition recorded in nineteenth-century northern Russia). Oaths were taken in a similar manner (attested as late as 1870 in the Orel district of central Russia) or by putting earth on one's head.

The corn (i.e., grain) spirit was personified as the Corn Mother or as the Old Rye (Barley, Wheat, or Oat) Woman. She made crops grow. At harvest, it was believed that she was present in the last stalks of grain left standing in the field. In Pomerania, the person who cut the last stalks of grain fashioned them into a doll, which was called Corn Mother or Old Woman and was brought home on the last wagon. In some areas, the Corn Mother, in the form of a doll or a wreath, was symbolically drenched with water (drowned) and was kept until the following spring, when some of its grain was mixed with the new seed grain at planting time. The agricultural cycle of death (harvest) and rebirth (planting) was thus ensured, life-taking and life-giving in turn.

Nymphs. Two types of nymph were known to the Slavs: *vilas* and *rusalkas*. Both are usually depicted as beautiful young women, although *rusalkas* are also described as children or as old women.

Vilas. Many Slavs believed that *vilas* originated like blossoms with the morning dew or that they were born when the sun shone through the rain. Others said that *vilas* were born from meadow grasses whose roots resembled garlic bulbs; still others believed that they were born of the mountains.

The *vila* is depicted as a very beautiful young girl who wears a thin white dress and whose long, loose, red or gold tresses fall over her back and breasts. She is distinguished from a human maiden by her feet, which resemble the hooves of a donkey or a goat. She can turn into a horse, a swan, or a falcon. Because she is so beautiful, she cannot tolerate the presence of anyone more beautiful than she or anyone who laughs at the sight of her feet. Possessed of supernatural strength, she can, with a single glance, kill anyone who displeases her.

There are three kinds of *vila*, associated with mountains, with water, and with clouds. The mountain *vila* helps care for children and orphans, the water *vila* can poison springs, and the cloud *vila*, who has wings, can

fly. Well known throughout the South Slavic area is the story of the Swan Maiden: she was a cloud *vila* forced to become the wife of a mortal when he stole her wings; later she finds her wings and flies off to the clouds. The water *vila* lives near water, either by mountain lakes and springs or on the seacoast, sometimes in caves or pits in the earth. All the *vilas* can understand the languages of fish and birds. They often gather near water where they dance in a *kolo* ("circle"). If a human interrupts their *kolo*, they may blind him or make him dance until he drops dead. Sometimes, the *vilas* dance their *kolo* in the clouds.

In Slavic folklore *vilas* are associated with diseases and injuries. Nevertheless, they can also heal wounds with herbs and can cure grave afflictions, especially blindness and barrenness.

Rusalkas. Descriptions of *rusalkas* vary from region to region. They are sometimes said to live in the forest, but in most accounts they are reported to live at the bottom of lakes and rivers, in the deepest water. The *rusalka* is seen as the mistress of water, the female counterpart of the male spirit of water, the *vodianoj*. In early Russian religion, water itself was personified and venerated, often in the form of a female spirit.

The *rusalka* is depicted as a beautiful young woman with a white body and long, loose, green or gold hair that she combs while sitting on a riverbank. Always naked, she loves to swing on branches and to play, sing, and dance. She entices men off forest paths or lures them into her dance so as to tickle them to death and carry them into the water. In some accounts, the *rusalka* is said to have a tail like a fish; in other accounts, she is a seven-year-old girl. In northern Russia, the *rusalka* was believed to be an ugly, hairy old woman with long, sagging breasts.

Many narratives attest to the human origin of *rusalkas*. They were believed to be the spirits of drowned or strangled women, young female suicides, or the souls of unbaptized dead children (sometimes drowned by their mothers); in other words, they originated from unclean deaths.

Goblins. In the West and South Slavic areas, goblins were perceived as little men (dwarfs) who, if they were fed and cared for, brought good harvests and money. The Bohemian *šetek* or *šotek* stayed in sheep sheds or hid in pea patches or wild pear trees. The Slovak *škra-tak*, Polish *skrzat* or *skrzatek*, and Slovene *škrat* (cf. German *Schrat*) appeared as a small bird emitting sparks. The Polish *latawiec* ("flying goblin") took the shape of a bird or a snake. A close parallel is the Lithuanian *ait-varas*, who usually appeared as a bird (rooster) or a fiery snake and who brought forth milk products and

grain. It was generally thought that goblins could be hatched from an egg carried for a certain length of time in one's armpit.

Conclusion. Except in the northwestern Slavic area (present-day Germany), Slavic religion can today be studied only at the folkloristic level. In the northwestern Slavic area, eleventh- and twelfth-century records describe temples housing warrior idols of Indo-European heritage and religious ceremonies presided over by a priestly order. Enough evidence has been preserved to give a fairly clear picture of Slavic religion in that area.

In Christian times, peasants amalgamated Old European and Indo-European goddesses and gods with Christian figures and saints into a typically Slavic folk religion. They preserved those heathen images that were best suited to their agrarian way of life. Strongly preserved are Mother Earth and Corn Mother; Iarilo, the stimulator of crops; Perun, a stimulator of slumbering vegetation and purifier of evil powers; and personifications of the moon and the dawn. Of these, Mother Earth was revered most of all; even in the field of law her powers were great. The thunder god, Perun, remains influential to this very day, appearing in the battle with cosmic chaos in the shape of a serpent or dragon hiding in whirlwinds.

[For discussion of Slavic religion in broader context, see Indo-European Religions. For discussion of closely related Indo-European traditions, see also Baltic Religion and Germanic Religion.]

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MARIJA GIMBUTAS

SLEEP, as a periodic, recurrent state of inactivity and altered consciousness, marks a boundary line in human experience. However sleep is culturally evaluated and understood, it is a state quite different from ordinary, waking life. As such, it has been a universal object of religious interest and imagination. The various traditions, symbolisms and rituals of sleep are closely related to religious understanding of night and the role of dreams, to assessments of death, and to themes associated with its apparent opposites: dawn and awakening.

Mythologies of Sleep. Figures and notions associated with sleep appear in numerous mythologies and folk traditions.

Personifications of sleep. While personified figures of sleep appear in mythology, poetry, and artistic representations, they are rarely themselves the focus of cultic activity. The personifications often reveal the ambiguous assessment of sleep: it is peaceful and restorative, and it is like death. For example, while the early Iranian *Vispe Ratavo* (7.4) can enjoin the worship of sleep, sleep is more usually understood within that tradition to be a negative force controlled by the demon *Būshyastā*; in India, the ambivalent deities Rudra (*Kaivalya Upaniṣad* 6–9) and Śiva (*Uṇādi Sūtra* 1.153) are identified as lords of sleep.

The most developed personification of sleep occurs within the Greco-Roman tradition with the archaic figure of Hypnos (Lat., Somnus). Schematically, the poet Hesiod (eighth century BCE) located Hypnos and his brother, Death (Thanatos), along with the race of Dreams, as the asexually produced children of Night. Sleep is the friend of man; Death, his pitiless adversary (*Theogony* 211–213, 756–766). In other poetic and artistic materials, the fraternal relations of Sleep and Death are further developed; they are twin brothers (*Iliad* 14.231). Hypnos or Somnus is personified as a small winged bird, an infant, or a young warrior. In some traditions, Sleep carries a horn or a poppy-stalk from which he drips a liquid that causes slumber. The only recorded instance of a regular cult of sacrifice to Hypnos is at Triozon (Pausanias, 2.31.3); rather it is Hermes, in his role as conductor of dreams, who was the object of nightly libations and petitions for a good sleep.

Sleeping gods. At its most complex level, the notion of sleeping gods is tied to cosmic cyclical patterns of the periodic dissolution and re-creation of the world. Thus Viṣṇu falls asleep on the back of the cosmic serpent (Śeṣa or Ananta) at the end of each world-age. In late Puranic texts, Nidrā, the personified goddess of sleep, is depicted as entering Viṣṇu's body. Viṣṇu sleeps until Brahmā commands Nidrā to depart so that Viṣṇu might awake and re-create the cosmos (*Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 81.53-70). Viṣṇu also is represented as undergoing an annual period of sleep. During the monsoon months, beginning in June and July, Viṣṇu—and therefore the world—sleeps (*Padma Purāṇa* 63, 125). In late traditions, Indra is thought to perform Viṣṇu's functions during this period (*Harivaṃśa* 50.26).

The notion of a deity undergoing periodic durations of sleep is not uncommon and may be expressed in ritual as well as myth. Thus there was an annual Syrian ritual of the "awakening" of Melqart-Herakles (Jose-

phus Flavius, *Jewish Antiquities* 8.146), while, from earliest times through the Roman period, the daily Egyptian temple service began with a hymn awakening the sun (Pyramid Text 573).

However, gods are most commonly celebrated for being sleepless and hence all-seeing. YHVH (Psalm 121:3–4), the Adityas (*Rgveda* 2.27.9), Mitra (*Rgveda* 3.59.1), Ahura Mazdā (*Vidēvdāt* 19.20), Sraosha (*Yasht* 11.10–12), and others are praised for never sleeping. A special motif is that of a god with multiple eyes, some of which are always open, while others are asleep, thereby guaranteeing their omniscience (for example, Argos and El-Kronos in the account of Philo of Byblus). The opposite motif, that of the sleeping and therefore powerless deity, is represented by Elijah's taunts to the priests of Baal (*1 Kgs.* 18.27–28) and east European Christian dualistic creation myths that have the Devil working while God sleeps during the sabbath that followed creation.

Sleep in heroic tales and folklore. One of the more persistent folkloristic themes is that of a lengthy sleep, a Rip Van Winkle motif in which sleep serves as a sort of suspended animation for a period of years. While occasionally the emphasis is on perpetual sleep, conferred as either a punishment or a boon (both are claimed in different accounts of the Greek hero Endymion), there is, more frequently, a terminus. Best known is the widely distributed eschatological tale of the Sleeping Emperor, asleep within a cave or mountain. Frederick Barbarossa is held to be asleep within the Kyffhäuser, seated at a marble table surrounded by his knights, awaiting his awakening, when he will lead Germany in a glorious battle and usher in a golden age. The same sort of claim is made for Charlemagne asleep in a hill near Paderborn, Wittekind in Westphalia, Siegfried in Geroldseck, Henry I in Goslar, Thomas of Erceldoune in the Eildon Hills, and others. These beliefs may at times fuel apocalyptic movements, as in the case of the flagellants of Thuringia, led by Konrad Schmid in the fourteenth century. The same motif occurs in the hagiography of wise men: Epimenides sleeping fifty-seven years in the Dictaeon cave near Knossos, Shim'on bar Yoḥ'ai in Palestine for twelve, Zalmoxis in Thrace for three.

The widespread legend of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, first recorded in a Western language by Gregory of Tours in the sixth century, has also found its way into the Qur'ān (18.8–25); the legend narrates how the seven Christian anti-idolators slept in a cave for 367 years before being awakened during the reign of Theodosius II. Subsequently, they returned to sleep, not to be awakened again until the general resurrection. Related, but different from this motif of cave hibernation, are the Jewish legends of two figures who sleep during a period

of tribulation: Abimelech the Ethiopian, who slept for sixty-six years from the destruction of the Temple by the Babylonians; Hōni ha-Me'aggel ("the circle maker"), who slept for seventy years, in one account from the destruction of the Temple, in another, from the period of the conflict between Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus II.

Equally persistent, although not well organized into a narrative scheme, is the motif of magical sleep most familiar from tales such as that of Sleeping Beauty, wherein a potion, a spell, or an object causes unnatural sleep that either cannot be undone or must be undone by countermagic or by an act of accidental or innocent intervention.

In heroic quest-sagas, the hero is often put to a test, one of which is that sleep is forbidden until the quest is accomplished. The best known instance is a negative example: Gilgamesh's failure to stay awake. In such sagas, the hero frequently confronts a sleepless adversary, such as the dragon in the *Argonautica* who guards the Golden Fleece until it is overcome by Jason through the intercession of Medea and her magic song invoking "Sleep, highest of gods" (Apollonius Rhodius, 4.146).

Soul loss and transformation. A tradition of exceedingly wide distribution is that the soul becomes separated from the body during sleep and that death will result if the individual is awakened or the body moved before it returns. So ubiquitous is this belief that E. B. Tylor thought it one of the basic human experiences that gave rise to religion and James G. Frazer devoted the third volume of *The Golden Bough* to its ramifications.

Closely related to the theme of the separable soul is the notion that sleep is a time of shape-changing (often expressed in folklore in accounts of were-animals). [See Shape Shifting.] These traditions are most fully elaborated in shamanism. The shaman is, among other things, an expert in the retrieval of lost souls by being able to achieve a sleeplike trance and pursuing them. [See Shamanism.] In South America, one of the tests for shamanic abilities is that the candidate frequently experiences lengthy periods of deep sleep. Throughout shamanism, the return of the shaman from an ecstatic journey is most commonly described as an "awakening." During his journey, the shaman will frequently change shape. Snorri Sturlson's description of the shamanic attributes of the Norse god Óðinn (Odin) is representative of this related set of elements: while his body lay "as if sleeping or dead," he assumed the form of a bird, animal, fish, or snake and traveled to far lands "on his own or other men's errands" (*Ynglingasaga* 7).

Rituals of Sleep. Religious practices related to sleep or the interruption of sleep are characteristic of many traditions.

Social location. Who sleeps with whom is a central question of religious etiquette. This is not only a matter of sanctioned sexuality. Within many societies, a mark of male adulthood is residential segregation in the men's house, a location of secret rituals forbidden to women. Elements of rituals of initiatory separation focus on this shift in social location. In other societies, the blueprint of a domestic house represents a map of such social and sexual relations. For example, in central Thailand, only certain members of the family sleep in the bedroom; other close relations may enter the room but may not sleep there; guests are restricted to an entrance room, separated from the sleeping room by a clearly demarcated threshold.

Incubation. Going to a particular sacred place to sleep in order to gain a religious end is common. Most frequently such incubation is for the purpose of gaining a revelation or a cure. [See Asklepios.] The former is to be related to similar phenomena such as the American Indian dream quest; the latter, to the general ideology of shrines. Perhaps the most extensive record of incubation is that by Aelius Aristides in the second century who has left, in his *Sacred Teachings*, a report of his experiences in a variety of Asklepiian shrines over a twenty-seven year period.

Sleep interruption or deprivation. The regular interruption of sleep is a common practice in religious asceticism, especially in monastic communities. Thus the Christian "canonical hours" in which monks would be aroused at either midnight or 2:00 AM for prayer. Similar interruptions figure in other spiritual regimens such as the Taoist practice of the "expulsion of the breath" that must be undertaken at least five times during the period of midnight to noon.

Sleeplessness is an often recurring feature of religious asceticism and vision quests. In the lists of five sins that must be "cut off" by a yogin, sleep appears (*Mahābhārata* 12.241.3). Like the sleeplessness of the hero, sleep deprivation is the mark of a spiritual athlete. The hagiographies of holy men frequently celebrate either their ability to sleep far less than ordinary men or to do without sleep entirely. For example, the pre-Christian Syrian Stylites were said to resist sleep for seven days while perched on columns. According to legend, if they fell asleep, a scorpion would sting them awake (Lucian, *Syrian Goddess* 29). In the traditions of the Christian Desert Fathers, preserved in texts such as Palladius's *Lausiac History*, monks such as Doretheus, Macarius of Alexandria and Pachomius are praised for never sleeping. All-night vigils, spending days and nights immersed in cold water, and sleeping only in a sitting position were frequent ritual means for achieving sleep deprivation. Sleeplessness is also a feature of initiatory

ordeals. In Australia, novices are prevented from sleeping for periods of up to three days. The goal in these varied practices appears to be twofold: to transcend the normal bodily processes and to achieve heightened consciousness.

Metaphors of Sleep in Religious Speech. References to sleep in myth and religious literature reflect its metaphorical significance as the state of death, ignorance, or enlightenment.

Sleep as death. In many languages, sleep is a metaphor for death. While this may serve as a euphemism, the connection, as the Greek myth of Death and Sleep as twin brothers suggests, is deeper. At one level, there is the physical resemblance of a sleeping body to a corpse. This association is heightened by burial ceremonies that treat the grave or receptacle as a bed and place the corpse in a position of repose (either prone or sitting). The parallel is stronger in cultures that hold that the soul escapes from the sleeper's body just as it does from the corpse at death. Finally, there is the view that the land of the dead is a land of sleep. To return from the dead is to be awakened.

Some myths of the origin of death lay emphasis on the sleep motif. For example, the Selk'nam of Tierra del Fuego tell of the repeated attempts of the ancestors, who were tired of life, to achieve a deep sleep. After many failures, another group of ancestors wrap them in blankets and teach them the way of "transformation sleep." After a few days of such sleep (i.e., death), they will either be reborn on earth or, if they do not wish to return, they will be reborn as another kind of being or take up a celestial existence.

Sleep as ignorance. The understanding of sleep as a cessation of consciousness leads readily to the use of sleep as a metaphor for ignorance. In gnostic traditions within a diversity of religions, sleep, forgetfulness and oblivion have become characteristics of earthly existence. Salvation consists of awakening and recollection. In these traditions, the archaic language of the darkness and sleep of the land of the dead has been transferred to ordinary, mundane existence. The waking world of light and consciousness has been transferred to the "beyond."

Sleep as enlightenment. While enlightenment is most frequently expressed in terms of awakening (as in the root *budh*, "to wake, be awake," which has given rise to such words as *Buddha*, *bodhisattva*, and *bodhi*, "perfect knowledge," all reflecting the sense "to be awake from the slumber of ignorance and delusion"), it can, at times, be expressed in the language of sleep. This is especially the case in mystical systems where lack of consciousness of the world and contact with the supramundane is emphasized. In her various writings, Teresa of

Ávila uses terms such as *sleep*, *falling asleep*, *being numb*, *repose*, *languishing*, and *stupor* to describe ecstasy. This builds on the Augustinian tradition that ecstasy is a state midway between sleep and death, more than sleep, less than death, where the soul is withdrawn from the bodily senses (Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.26.53). In the Indic Upaniṣadic tradition, the language of sleep in relation to enlightenment is further developed. The brief *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* presents the common fourfold schematization: (1) waking consciousness, (2) dream consciousness, that is, ordinary sleep, (3) deep sleep (*suṣupti*), a sleep without consciousness or dreams, and, the goal, (4) pure consciousness. Deep sleep is the realm of the "Knower"; the only danger is to confuse this penultimate stage with the true gnosis of the fourth state.

[See also Consciousness, States of, and Dreams.]

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Material on sleep can be gleaned from monographs on related topics—for example, the classic study of incubation by Ludwig Deubner, *De incubatione* (Leipzig, 1900)—and from the large body of literature on dreams, of which Ernesto de Martino's *Il sogno e le civiltà umane* (Bari, 1966) is most useful. Still, there is no reliable cross-cultural overview of sleep. The chapter on the interrelationships of sleep, death, and the erotic titled "On the Wings of the Morning: The Pornography of Death" in Emily Townsend Vermeule's *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley, 1979) is an exemplary study that needs to be matched for other cultures.

JONATHAN Z. SMITH

SMITH, JOSEPH (1805-1844), the founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, popularly known as the Mormons. [See Mormonism.] Joseph Smith, Jr. was perhaps the most original, most successful, and most controversial of several religious innovators—including Ellen Gould White (Seventh-day Adventists), Mary Baker Eddy (Christian Science), and Charles Taze Russell (Jehovah's Witnesses)—who created important religious movements in nineteenth-century America.

Born in Sharon, Vermont, on 23 December 1805, Smith was the third of the nine children of Joseph and Lucy Mack Smith. He grew up in the unchurched and dissenting, but God-fearing, tradition of a New England Protestant biblical culture, which attracted many of those whose economic standing in established society had been eroded. In 1816, plagued by hard times and misfortune, the sturdy, self-reliant, and closely-knit Smith family left New England for western New York in search of economic betterment; they settled in the village of Palmyra, along the route of the Erie Canal.

During the 1820s, as the Smiths continued to struggle against economic reversals, the religiously inclined young man had a number of visions and revelations. These convinced him that he was to be the divinely appointed instrument for the restoration of the gospel, which in the opinion of many of his contemporaries had been corrupted. Under the guidance of an angel he unearthed a set of golden plates from a hill near his parents' farm. He translated these golden plates with divine aid and published the result in 1830 as the *Book of Mormon*. Smith claimed that this book, named after its ancient American author and compiler, was the sacred history of the pre-Columbian inhabitants of America, migrants from the Near East, some of whom were the ancestors of the American Indians. In 1829, divine messengers had conferred the priesthood—the authority to baptize and act in the name of God—on Smith and his associate Oliver Cowdery. Shortly after the publication of the *Book of Mormon*, Smith and Cowdery officially organized the Church of Christ in Fayette, New York, on 6 April 1830. In 1838, the name was changed to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

Prominent among those attracted to Smith's teachings was Sidney Rigdon, erstwhile associate of Alexander Campbell. Rigdon invited Smith and his New York followers to establish a Mormon settlement in Kirtland, Ohio. It was there that Smith greatly amplified and broadened his theological and organizational principles in a series of revelations (first published in 1833 as the *Book of Commandments*, and later enlarged into the current, canonical *Doctrine and Covenants*). The Saints were enjoined to gather in communities as God's chosen people under an egalitarian economic system called the Law of Consecration and Stewardship. They were also directed to build a temple as the sacred center of the community. These revelations initiated a patriarchal order that harkened back to Old Testament traditions.

In the meantime, Smith also established settlements in Missouri, which he regarded as the center of a future Zion. In 1838, economic difficulties and internal dissension forced Smith to give up the Kirtland settlement. His intention of gathering all the Saints in Missouri, however, had to be deferred after the Mormons were ruthlessly driven from the state in 1839. It was in Nauvoo, a settlement founded in 1839 on the Mississippi River, that Smith further expanded his ambitious vision of a Mormon empire that was to be both spiritual and temporal. By 1844, Nauvoo had become the largest city in Illinois, with a population of about eleven thousand. This city was under the full religious, social, economic, and political control of the Mormon kingdom, with Joseph Smith as its charismatic leader.

Some historians suggest that he may have become

touched by megalomania; he assumed leadership of the Mormon militia in the resplendent uniform of a lieutenant general and announced his candidacy for the presidency of the United States. Smith ostensibly made his gesture toward the presidency in order to avoid making a politically difficult choice between the two major parties, but he was also imbued with the millennial belief that if God wanted him to be president and establish Mormon dominion in the United States, no one could hinder him. Innovative ordinances, such as baptism for the dead, and especially plural marriage—with Smith and his closest associates secretly taking numerous wives—offended the religious sensibilities of many Mormons. Likewise, controversial doctrines such as pre-existence, metaphysical materialism, eternal progression, the plurality of gods, and man's ability to become divine through the principles of Mormonism, failed to gain universal acceptance among the Saints. A group of alarmed anti-Mormons effectively capitalized on internal dissent and were able to organize a mob that killed Smith and his brother Hyrum on 27 June 1844.

History has shown the killers of the Mormon prophet wrong in thinking that they had delivered a mortal blow to Mormonism, although their crime was an implicit recognition of Smith's crucial role in creating and sustaining the new religion. It was his spirituality, imagination, ego, drive, and charisma that not only started Mormonism but kept it going in the face of nearly insurmountable internal and external opposition. At the same time, these were the very characteristics that had generated much of that opposition. Smith's was a multifaceted and contradictory personality. Reports of encounters with him by both non-Mormons and believers give the impression of a tall, well-built, handsome man whose visionary side was tempered by Yankee practicality, geniality, and a sense of humor that engendered loyalty in willing followers. Though after his death his followers could not all agree on precisely what he had taught and split into several factions, they all accepted Smith's central messages of the restoration of the gospel and the divine status of the *Book of Mormon*, continuing revelation by prophets, and the establishment of the kingdom of God with Christ as its head.

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The literature on Joseph Smith is as controversial as his life. Most of the anti-Smith polemics are based on affidavits collected by Mormon apostate Philastus Hurlbut and published by Eber D. Howe as *Mormonism Unveiled* (Painesville, Ohio, 1834). Smith's mother, Lucy Mack Smith, presented the other side in *Biographical Sketches of Joseph Smith the Prophet* (1853; reprint, New York, 1969). *History of the Church of Jesus Christ*

of *Latter-day Saints*, by Joseph Smith, Jr., 2d rev. ed., 6 vols., edited by B. H. Roberts (Salt Lake City, 1950) is an indispensable source collection. The most authoritative account of Smith's family background and early career is Richard L. Bushman's *Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism* (Urbana, Ill., 1984).

The nineteenth-century theory that the *Book of Mormon* was Sidney Rigdon's plagiarized version of a novel by Solomon Spaulding was first demolished by I. Woodbridge Riley in *The Founder of Mormonism: A Psychological Study of Joseph Smith, Jr.* (New York, 1902), who suggested that Smith's visions were the result of epilepsy. The first modern interpretation is Fawn M. Brodie's *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith, the Mormon Prophet* (1945; 2d ed., rev. & enl., New York, 1971), which advances a psychoanalytic interpretation and sees him as a product of his cultural environment. Donna Hill's *Joseph Smith, the First Mormon* (Garden City, N.Y., 1977) provides useful additional information but does not supersede Brodie. The most successful attempt to avoid the prophet-fraud dichotomy is Jan Shipps's *Mormonism: The Story of a New Religious Tradition* (Urbana, Ill., 1984).

KLAUS J. HANSEN

SMITH, W. ROBERTSON (1846–1894), Scottish biblical and Semitic scholar and encyclopedist. Reared in the conservative Free Church of Scotland, William Robertson Smith was educated at the University of Edinburgh and in 1870, immediately after his graduation, became professor of Hebrew at the church's college in Aberdeen. Prodigiously learned, he promoted the new biblical criticism then being advanced in Germany, Holland, and France. His publication of these views soon led to dismissal from his chair after the most publicized religious trial of the Victorian age. After several difficult years without a post, Smith joined the faculty of Cambridge in 1883, eventually becoming professor of Arabic, fellow of Christ's College, and university librarian. Smith's early reputation as a controversial figure largely stemmed from his biblical essays in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. At Cambridge Smith became editor in chief of that monument to Victorian scholarship, thereby coming into contact with the foremost British intellectuals of his time; he himself wrote over two hundred entries in the encyclopedia and thus exerted enormous influence on biblical scholarship.

Smith may well have been the founder of modern comparative sociology of religion. Émile Durkheim indicated that he owed Smith his insights regarding the close relation between people's perceptions of nature and their experience in society, his views on the periodic need for ritual to reinforce social beliefs and values, and his method of explaining religion in terms of the irreducible elements exhibited in its most primitive

state. (Less fortunate was Durkheim's adoption of the distinction made by Smith between public religion and individualistic magic.) It was under Smith's direction that James Frazer published his first essay on totemism in 1887, and it was under Smith's influence that Frazer later developed his notions regarding the sacrifice of divine kings.

Smith developed his theories about the evolution and function of religion in order to promote a clearer understanding of scripture. He never doubted that scholarly research and speculation served God, and appeared unaware that his ideas would lead to a demystifying reduction of religion to a product of social experience, much as Durkheim had argued. Unlike most biblical scholars of his day, Smith spent extended periods in the Near East, and this field experience lent force to many of his arguments.

Besides numerous articles and reviews, Smith published three books on religion: *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church* (1881), which presents his views in response to conservative criticism; *The Prophets of Israel* (1882), which argues that the prophets can be properly understood only within their relative social contexts rather than in any timeless sense; and *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (1889; rev. ed., 1894), unquestionably his most influential work, a synthesis and development of earlier positions.

Smith viewed religion evolutionistically, and saw modern Protestant Christianity as its culmination. Consequently, biblical and other writings are approached in terms of their own relative times, which in turn necessitated sociological reconstruction of these contexts. The Bible was likened to a vast geological deposit, each section preparing the way toward clearer development of God's final truths. Smith further argued that the best way to understand the essence of religion was to examine its most primitive form. In the case of Semite religion, he claimed this was the tradition followed by bedouin pastoralists, and to make his argument he published a reconstruction of early Arab social structure, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (1885). Unfortunately, Smith gave prominence to his friend J. F. McLennan's theory that totemism was a necessary early stage to all religions, and emphasized two key points: that the abstractions of God and society require palpable expression through material objects, and that such objects must be employed ritually at periodic intervals to sustain the group. The very substance of the symbolic objects facilitates belief, especially where they are endowed with affect and communally shared, as in a ritual feast (such as a sacrificial meal). In this way Smith related the concept of totemic, communal sacrifice to Christ's death and the subsequent Christian practice of

periodically consuming Christ in the Eucharist. In the course of his argument he drew heavily upon ethnographic reports of beliefs and practices among a wide range of non-Semitic, preliterate peoples. This interpretation horrified Smith's church and was omitted from the second edition of his *Lectures*.

For Smith, ritual, or social interaction, takes analytical precedence over myth, or belief. His work emphasizes the communal, ethical aspects of religion and downplays its demonic side, leading him to divide beliefs and practices into true religion (which is social and magic) and taboos (which are individualistic and regressive). This ambiguity of the sacred preoccupied Smith but proved ultimately inimical to his congregational and ethical biases.

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SMOKING. Plants whose properties when consumed place the user in an unusual state have always been looked upon as being endowed with supernatural power. Such plants play an important part in both religious ceremonies and in healing. In such a context, these plants have been either used as symbols or consumed in different forms, including smoking. The one plant that has consistently maintained such religious association is tobacco, a New World contribution to the world's flora. Other plant products that can be smoked, such as hashish and opium, both of which originated in the Near East, have never had significant functions in religious ritual, although most recently some midwestern sects in the United States claim hashish smoking as part of their religious rituals.

The genus *Nicotiana* (tobacco) consists of seventy-four species, all but two of which are native to the North American continent. The latter two, *N. fragrans* and *N. suaveolens*, grow wild in Australia but were not used

for smoking before the arrival of the white man. The most popular species are *N. rustica* and *N. tabacum*. Several others, such as *N. bigelovii* and *N. attenuata*, grow wild in the western United States. Indian tribes of California, the northern Plains, and the Northwest Coast are known to have planted these as their only agricultural effort.

Ancient Native American and European reports describe tobacco as a strong and addictive herb smoked with apparent hallucinogenic effects. Tobacco as it is known today produces no such effects. The indigenous people of the American continent may have been using more potent admixtures, or tobacco may have only induced a state that allowed its user to ease into altered states of consciousness.

It is possible that the use of tobacco was at first confined to shamans, priests, and medicine men. Data indicate that the tobacco plant and products derived from it were held in high esteem and those who grew or could obtain the plant used it as a precious offering to both worldly and supernatural rulers. Later, due to the interchange of ritual customs, the abundance of tobacco in some areas, and European influence, tobacco smoking became a worldwide custom; but its sacrosanct character among the natives of the Americas survived.

North America. Tobacco initially grew wild. Gathered as a cultivated plant, it made its appearance with maize in North America. The two primary modes of tobacco consumption were smoking pipes and cigarettes and chewing. Tobacco pipes have been found in archaeological excavations of Basket Making culture sites (some as early as 2500 BCE) in the Southwest.

The Plains Indians developed considerable skill and ingenuity, as well as aesthetic sensitivity and care in making pipes. As Peter T. Furst points out,

No object, no matter how splendidly proportioned or complex in iconography, can convey the enormous depth of feeling, ritual and belief, the very conception of the universe and how it came to be, the mutuality and interdependence of the sexes, and, indeed the whole relationship of human beings to the holy earth and sky, which are embodied in these traditional Native American smoking instruments. (Furst, 1982)

The famous Plains pipes are made of catlinite, thought to represent the flesh and blood of dead ancestors and dead buffalo, poured together and turned to stone. Catlinite had been mined in southwestern Minnesota by the Oto and Iowa tribes, who were replaced in the seventeenth century by Siouan-speaking groups, who became sole owners of the sacred material and compelled all other tribes to buy the stone from them.

Bowl and stem of the ritual pipe were carried separately when not in use. Apart, the instruments had no

supernatural power. In many tribes women carved or decorated the stems, which had male attributes, and men fashioned the bowls, which were considered to have female attributes. The Plains Indians undertook no ceremony or ritual act without smoking pipes, which were kept in their medicine bundles. When an Indian died, his tobacco and pipe were placed with him in his burial place.

Kinnikinnick was the native name for the smoked material. This term means "mixture" to the Algonquin. They mixed their tobacco with different plant materials, such as sumac, bearberry, manzanilla, and dogwood bark. Though they used plants other than tobacco for smoking, none had the sacred nature attributed to tobacco.

The Indians of the Northwest Coast were introduced to smoking by Western explorers, who found them chewing their tobacco with lime. These tribes limited tobacco to important rituals, especially to commemorative feasts for the dead. Their pipes were carved out of wood or ivory and decorated with pictures of animals or mythological scenes. The shamans smoked pipes primarily to communicate with their guardian spirits and also during healing ceremonies. For them, tobacco was the symbol of the equilibrium of the universe and of divine benevolence from generation to generation.

South America. Both *N. tabacum* and *N. rustica* were modified by selection or by hybridization in South America, probably in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and northern Argentina. Even today, tobacco is used by many native tribes, but is rarely smoked by them. The preferable form of consumption is chewing or drinking in the form of a syrupy juice. Tobacco juice is taken either by mouth or through the nostrils, or administered as an enema. The last method has been documented for the Inca and Tihuanaco of the pre-Conquest periods.

Smoking tobacco for the purpose of divination was practiced by Venezuelan tribes, who also offered tobacco as a gift to their gods. The Guajiro of Colombia, the Kumaná of the Orinoco River, and the Warao and the Shipibo-Conibo on the Ucayali River also celebrate healing ceremonies by smoking, or smoke in preparation for other drug use. The Piro and the Machiganga of Peru inhale tobacco snuff through tubes made of bird bones as medicine against colds. This old remedy was adopted by Europeans in the sixteenth century.

Mesoamerica. The most extensive depictions of smoking and the oldest and most abundant data on the pre-Columbian use of tobacco (mostly in the form of cigars) are found in Maya art. The word *cigar* is Maya in origin; the word *tobacco* might be derived from an Arawak word for "cigar." The Maya also depicted cigarette smoking, for which we have no early records elsewhere.

Pipe smoking did not appear in Maya art, and it is doubtful that it was a custom. Early Spanish reports describe the coating of cigars with a varnish of clay, which was then decorated, and the stuffing of small tubes of cane, clay, and other materials with shredded tobacco, which was either smoked or used to blow smoke.

Besides smoking, the Maya also chewed, licked, ate, and drank tobacco, social customs reported frequently from Conquest times to the present day. Tobacco as a form of incense, however, had an exclusive and important role in ceremonial healing. The Maya attributed most diseases to supernatural intervention, and native healing was, and still is, a predominantly religious act of communication with supernatural forces in which religion and medicine remain inseparable.

The pre-Columbian Maya often depicted their divine rulers, nobles, and gods smoking. Among the deities, god L appears to be a heavy smoker; the death god, the rain god, god D of the creation, and the ancestral god N could be characterized as only occasional indulgers. God K not only smokes on occasion but he is shown with a smoking cigar stuck through his forehead. Some of the mythological animals, usually representing gods, are also shown smoking: monkeys have a strong lead, with jaguars second, and frogs or toads third. All of these animals are also patron deities of days or months.

Noble Maya lords were also frequently shown smoking or handling cigars or cigarettes either alone or in the company of others. Apparently no women participated in these rituals, although they are sometimes shown on ancient paintings and monuments in proximity to smokers. The context of these scenes is varied and not always clear. There are processional scenes with supernaturals and their impersonators, and there are scenes with offerings of human victims or other sacrifices. Other smoking scenes commemorate ancestors and still others show smoking to be one of several ways to achieve a state of trance.

The Lacandon, a few hundred Maya Indians still living in the Chiapas rain forest, continue to cultivate tobacco in the ancient ways. They believe that the Nohoch Yum Chacob, the white-haired, bearded servants of the god of rain and thunder, live in the second highest level of the heavens and smoke cigars. Comets or meteorites are thought to be the glowing butts they throw away. Until recently the Lacandon placed cigars as offering to their gods in the holy area. There is a special ceremony of thanksgiving during their tobacco harvest: thanksgiving is offered to the deity depicted on a "god pot," who is usually smoking, seated on the hieroglyph for "earth."

The Maya of Yucatán believe that the Balams, the

gods of wind and the four directions, are heavy cigar smokers. When the gods light the cigars by pounding heavy rocks together to create a spark, there is thunder and lightning on earth. Tobacco smoking also has an important role in a number of milpa (corn patch) ceremonies.

The Tzeltal Maya of Oxchuc offer thirteen calabashes of tobacco in their celebration of the New Year. The Tzotzil tribe attributes magical power to tobacco and uses it as a defense against evil forces, such as Pucuh, the demon of death. Tobacco in all its forms is considered by most Maya tribes as the most effective agent against the numerous underworld threats, evil spirits, demons, and any form of witchcraft that may cause illness or death. The healing shaman uses tobacco to divine the exact cause of the illness and to find out how to help the patient. Maya travelers protect themselves from evil influences by chewing tobacco and by carrying gourds filled with tobacco. In many of the Mesoamerican areas, tobacco and smoking paraphernalia are placed in graves to accompany the spirit of the dead as a protection during the journey to the underworld and as a gift the dead can offer to the gods.

The main body of data on tobacco use among the Aztec comes to us from observations and reports by Europeans. Torquemada (1615) wrote that the old earth goddess, Cihuacoatl, female warrior and creator of mankind, had a body composed of tobacco, and she was the incarnation of the plant. Hernando Ruiz de Alarcón (1629) described rites to honor the war god, Huitzilopochtli, to whom an offering of tobacco is as pleasing as one composed of other drugs. Fray Diego Durán (c. 1581) reported that the fire god, Xiuhtecuhtli, received tobacco, incense, and pulque daily, sprinkled onto the fire in his temple. The priests who prepared victims for sacrifice to the goddess Toci (old earth or moon goddess, patron of the day named Jaguar) wore small tobacco gourds on their backs, as did the priests serving Tezcatlipoca, the counterpart to the Maya god K. Both in the Codex Mendoza and in the Codex Florentine several of the figures participating in sacrificial rites are pictured carrying tobacco gourds (*yetecomatl*) and pouches (*yequachtli*) or incense ladles (*tlematl*), the insignia of Aztec priesthood. Tobacco was carried in powder form or shaped into balls and used as a form of incense. When actually smoked it was mixed with other herbs, among them jimsonweed (*Datura stramonium*). During a beautiful ceremony called Dance of Flowers, the vegetation goddess Xochiquetzal invited other gods to sit with her; they smoked together and were entertained by her court.

Among the Mexicans tobacco was a protection against witchcraft or wild animals, but it could also be

used to cast spells. Fray Bernardino de Sahagún (1569–1582) described a hunt for snakes, which were enfeebled and stunned when powdered tobacco was hurled at them.

The Totonac of Papantla de Olarte believed that tobacco protected them not only against snakes but also against the dead, and they offered it to the supernatural rulers of the forest. The Cuicatec used wild tobacco in rituals conducted on hilltops or in caves. Among the Mazatec the healer used a paste of powdered tobacco and lime to render pregnant women invulnerable to witchcraft. The Tlaxcalan offered tobacco to their war god Camaxtli. Bowls of tobacco, eagle feathers, and two bloodstained arrows were sent to the enemy camp by the cacique of Michoacán to announce the outbreak of war. The Huichol regarded tobacco as a prized possession of Grandfather Fire. They made small tobacco balls, touched them with feathers, and wrapped them in corn husks. During pilgrimages, these "cigarettes" were carried in small gourds tied to their quivers to symbolize the birth of tobacco. After completion of the pilgrimage, they burned and smoked tobacco in honor of Grandfather Fire.

These ancient and recent reports show that tobacco was used by the Aztec and numerous tribes living between the Maya and North American Indians in the form of incense, as a drink, or by smoking. Smoking of the sacred herb was also practiced by the gods. Tobacco in all its forms and modes of consumption was regarded as a substance of pervading holiness, a gift from the gods, an offering to the supernatural forces of the heavens and the underworld, and a means to communicate with them.

[See also Tobacco.]

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SNAKES. Because of their shape and their relation to the environment, snakes play an important role in the beliefs of various peoples. Their swiftness and peculiar locomotion, along with the periodical sloughing of their skin, their glistening beauty, and the venom of some species have given them a place apart in the animal world. Their supposedly sinister character and dangerousness cause fear; their enigmatic and ambivalent nature has led human beings to contradictory assessments of them: on the one hand, they are thought of as evil and as a cause of death; on the other, they are believed to embody beneficial and even divine powers. As a result, in some religions they may be both accursed and worshiped. The serpent Apophis was regarded by the ancient Egyptians as the worst enemy of Re, the sun god; yet Re is also protected by the serpent Mehen on his journey through the underworld. In the Bible the scaly reptile can be a symbol both of death (the fall of man, *Gn.* 3) and of life (the brazen serpent, *Nm.* 21:6–8). In Indian mythology Kāliya, the prince of serpents, is the embodiment of evil and is overcome by Kṛṣṇa; yet the serpent Śeṣa is companion and couch for Viṣṇu.

The Serpent and Origins. In the mythology of many peoples a serpent is linked to the origin of the world and to creation; it is the primordial material or the primordial being. According to an ancient tradition of the druids (priests among the Celtic peoples) the world originated from an egg that came from the mouth of a serpent. Various of the oldest Egyptian gods were thought of as serpents: as, for example, Atum before he ascended from the primeval ocean, and Amun of Thebes, who was also called Kematef (“he who has fulfilled his time”). In the philosophical speculations of the ancient Near East on creation, serpents and dragons symbolized that which had not yet been made manifest: the still undivided unity that held sway before the creation of the world. Only after the Babylonian god Marduk had overcome the dragonlike monster Tiamat could he form heaven and earth from the latter’s body. In the Old Testament we frequently find the motif of God’s struggle against the serpentlike or dragonlike monster of chaos that lives in the water; it is with the victory

over Rahab that the mighty waters of the primeval deep are dried up (*Is.* 51:9–10). Indra’s victory over the monster Vṛtra, who has neither feet nor hands, is a cosmogonic act by which water and light are liberated from the embrace of the forces of chaos. Also among the Indian sagas of creation is the story of Vāsuki, the world serpent, who is pulled this way and that by the gods and demons (*asuras*) so that Mandara, the world mountain that stands in the ocean of milk, is set in motion like a creative whisk. According to a myth of the Nahuatl (ancient Mexico), in primordial times there existed a formless mass of water in which a great female monster lived; the gods Quetzalcoatl and Tezcatlipoca transformed themselves into serpents, tore the monster into two parts, and from these formed heaven and earth. Ceremonies carried out by American Indian tribes of the Northwest Coast (Kwakiutl, Haida) in the winter, when there is little sunlight, commemorate the primordial time when the sun was imprisoned by the powers of darkness and water, which are symbolized by the serpent Sisiul. The inhabitants of Rossel Island (Louisiade archipelago, Melanesia) used to believe that Wonajö, who had the form of a serpent, created their island and the stars. Among the Ungarinyin (Aborigines of northwestern Australia), the primeval serpent Ungud is linked to the origin of the earth; from its eggs emerged the Wandjina, the ancestors of man.

The Serpent, Ancestors, and Souls. It is likely that representations of serpents on monoliths from the Neolithic age in France were connected with the veneration of ancestors. A belief in the Mediterranean world is that a snake that lives in the house embodies the soul of the family’s first ancestor; among the Romans, the serpent embodied the *paterfamilias*. Thus the Roman poet Vergil (*Aeneid* 5.83ff.) tells how Aeneas visits the tomb of his father, Anchises, and how the sacrificial foods offered to Anchises are accepted by a speckled serpent. Many murals at Pompeii show vipers protectively surrounding an altar as symbols of the *genius loci*, or tutelary deity of the place. In Greece, ancestors such as Kekrops and Erechtheus, who had been transformed into heroes, were venerated in the form of serpents. A serpent and a vessel on ancient Greek tombstones depicts a libation to the dead. The ancient Scythians who lived north of the Black Sea regarded themselves as descendants of Targitaus, a son of the god of heaven and of the half-human, half-snakelike daughter of Dnieper, the river god. In some gnostic writings of the Hellenistic period there is the notion that the first human beings crawled on the ground like snakes. In New Guinea and the Admiralty Islands there is a legend that the first human beings were born of a serpent. Among the Australian Aborigines the moon is regarded as ancestor of the

tribe; his totem is a serpent. Many chieftains among the Paiwan (east coast of Taiwan) claim descent from the "hundred-step serpent." The Zulu (South Africa) look upon certain snakes as divinized ancestors who have the power to return to earth in this form. In Southwest Asia a serpent-princess is supposed to have been the founder of particular dynasties.

In Africa, Asia, and Oceania the snake is often associated with the soul. According to the beliefs of the Maa-sai (East Africa) the souls of chieftains and medicine men turn into snakes after death and live on in this form. The Melanesians identify their ancestors with this reptile, and it is frequently found as a totem, in New Britain and New Ireland, for example. In Chinese fairy tales the dead may reappear as serpents. In Europe, too, one finds the idea that the soul can leave the body in the form of a serpent, not only after death but even in dreams (cf. the saga of Guntram, the Frankish king). Various Slavic peoples believe that the souls of deceased ancestors dwell in snakes, which guard the homes of their human descendants.

Protector of the House and Bestower of Happiness. According to widespread popular belief, snakes should not be killed, because they protect the house and bring good fortune; if they are supplied with milk, they bring health and prosperity. In fairy tales the toad may replace the serpent in this role; both animals are accounted to be of chthonic origin and are numbered among the life-giving powers that contribute to the welfare of those who maintain contact with the earth and its forces. In the Alpine regions, for example, there is a familiar tale of a serpent with a golden crown; as long as the serpent is treated well, it brings happiness to the house and its inhabitants. Finns regard the ring snake as a sacred domestic animal and give it food; they believe that if it should be killed, the death of the family's best cow or even of the stockbreeder himself will follow. In Sweden a white snake is treated as a beneficent protector of the home and cared for with reverent awe. Among the ancient Prussians (a Baltic people), at a certain season of the year, food was set out for serpents living in the house; it was a bad omen if they did not take the food. In India even poisonous snakes were fed as protective spirits; there are areas even in modern times where every house has had a protective serpent (*vāstusarpa*). Among the Suk and Bari of East Africa, who live as nomadic shepherds, the serpent is called "child of God," fed with milk, and looked upon as a bringer of good fortune. Serpents, dragons, and toads are widely considered to be protectors and bearers of treasures and riches. In central Europe there are still place-names (e.g., Drachenfels; "dragon-rock") that allude to local sagas built around the idea of a Lindwurm

(from the Old Norse *linn-ormr*, "serpent-dragon") who protects a treasure; Fáfnir, who guarded the treasure of the Nibelungs, was such a dragon. In the cultural orbit of India the *nāgas* are the guardians and givers of the vital forces stored up in springs and wells and of the coral and pearls deposited in the sea. The Buddhist Jātaka tales tell of a Nāga prince who possesses a pearl that grants his every wish. The charitable Chinese dragon that brings good fortune is said to have the head of a horse or a camel and the body of a serpent, while his beard often contains a pearl. In the cults and customs of the Ivory Coast (West Africa) the snake is regarded as a bringer of wealth and fame; in Benin the python in particular is a symbol of happiness and prosperity. In Melanesia the snake plays the part of culture hero; in many sagas he gives human beings the edible plants, fire, and frequently simple tools like the shell knife and stone ax as well.

Wisdom and Power. The serpent knows all mysteries; if a person eats its flesh (or the heart of a dragon, as the Germanic hero Siegfried did), many things are revealed to him; in particular, he can understand the speech of the birds. In Greek myths if a serpent licks the ears of a human being, the human will understand the languages of animals (cf., e.g., the story of Melampus and the sons of Laocoön). The children of Hecuba, queen of Troy, were licked by a serpent and received the gift of prophecy. Snakes were associated with Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom, and in the Middle Ages with Prudentia, the personification of prudence or practical wisdom. Then there is the well-known saying of Jesus: "Be wise as serpents" (*Mt.* 10:16). The serpent represented on the croziers of Coptic and Byzantine bishops symbolizes the prudence with which the faithful are to be guided. The Aztec god Quetzalcoatl ("feathered serpent") was the founder of the body of priestly wisdom; high priests bore the title "Prince of Serpents." Animals that were superior to human beings in certain abilities became symbols of power: thus the prophet Isaiah (*Is.* 27:1) describes the great powers threatening the people of God as a leviathan (Babylon?) and a dragon (Egypt?). The representation of an asp known as the uraeus that the pharaohs wore on their foreheads was a symbol of their sovereignty; the uraeus was also worn by Horus, the royal god; the serpent on the brow of Re, the sun god, was said to annihilate all enemies. The horned serpent on the seals of scrolls from ancient Mesopotamia is probably a sign of divine power; it is sacred to the god Ningishzida, the guardian at the door of heaven. Among more primitive peoples, too, the serpent can be a symbol of power and sovereignty; thus it is part of the decoration on the festive garb of the Paiwan chieftains of Taiwan. Iconographically related to the serpent is the

dragon—it was the emperor's sign in China, and the Anglo-Saxons painted it on royal banners. The power inherent in the serpent was also thought to be apotropaic; thus the serpent protected temples (Egypt), tombs (classical antiquity), and the thresholds of homes (Sweden).

Representatives of Cosmic Powers. In classical antiquity the serpent Uroboros, which swallows its own tail, is able to embrace the entire universe. Various Indian paintings and sculptures show the dancing god Śiva inside a cosmic ring that is clearly recognizable as the body of a serpent with a head at each end. In Germanic mythology the Miðgarðsormr ("world serpent"), with which Þórr (Thor) does battle, is wound like a belt around the world. In some mythologies, the struggle between the storm god and a serpent symbolizes the antagonism between the uranian powers above and the chthonic powers below; this is true, for instance, of the battle between the Hittite storm god and Illuyanka. In the conflict between the two principles of being (between good and evil at the ethical level) the place of the divinity may be taken by an eagle. The enmity between the divine bird and the snake is a theme in the mythology and art of many peoples: it is found on seals from ancient Mesopotamia; in Homer's *Iliad*; in India, where the bird Garuḍa is known as "the serpent-slayer" (*nāgāntaka*); and in Christian contexts, where the eagle is a symbol of Christ and the serpent, dragon, and basilisk are demonic animals.

The serpent belongs not only to the water and the earth; it can also be associated with the heavens. In Melanesian, Finnic, and Aztec mythologies, snakes represent the lightning; among the Babylonians, in India, and in ancient Mexico the Milky Way was associated with a serpent. The motif of the rainbow as a snake is found in Oceania and tropical Africa; the Dogon of West Africa, for example, think of the rainbow as the serpent of the water god Nommo. Australian tribes regard the rainbow snake, under the name of Yulungul, as a creative divinity and bestower of culture. Above all, however, the serpent has a lunar significance; Mircea Eliade speaks of it as "an epiphany of the moon" (*Patterns in Comparative Religion*, New York, 1958, p. 165). Like the moon that is gradually diminished and then gradually renews itself, so the serpent sheds and renews its skin and becomes a symbol of death and resurrection. The Ngala tribe (central Kongo) believes that the moon at one time lived on earth as a python. Also to be interpreted in lunar terms is the horned serpent of the pre-Columbian Nazca culture (Peru); the horn is a widespread symbol of power. The double serpent—one with a head at each end—can simultaneously symbolize both moon and sun, as among the Kwakiutl tribe of Indians.

In addition to Quetzalcoatl, the serpent of the nocturnal sky, the Aztec believed in a turquoise serpent of the diurnal sky, which was associated with the solar god Huitzilopochtli. The Egyptian uraeus, like the serpent that is equated with Helios in Greek magical papyri, was certainly solar in character.

Death and the Underworld. Serpents frequently play an important role in religious conceptions about the origins of sin. A striking parallel to the story in the *Book of Genesis* of the fall of Adam and Eve is to be found in a myth of the Basari (northern Togo); here the serpent misleads the first human beings into eating certain fruits that until then only God (Unumbotte) had eaten. According to a story of the Dusun (northern Borneo), Kenharingen, the creator, said that those who shed their skins would not die; human beings paid no heed and are therefore snatched away by death, but snakes remain alive forever because they listened to God and shed their skins. After the Babylonian hero Gilgamesh at last found the plant of immortality, he was robbed of it by a serpent while he was bathing, thus forfeiting eternal life to the snake. Persian tradition tells of a plant called *haoma* that bestowed immortality; but Ahura Mazdā's adversary, Ahriman, created a serpent to harm the miraculous plant.

The figure of the serpent also stands for the threatening forces that bring death. In the Finnic concept of the next world, the traveler into the realm of the dead is threatened by an ever-vigilant serpent. The Norse Edda tells of a hall in the kingdom of the dead that has walls made of the bodies of serpents; poison drips from its roof. Etruscan iconography displays various demons of the underworld accompanied by serpents. Bronze Age statuettes found in Crete show a female figure with a serpent in each elevated hand and two serpents rearing up at her breasts; these statuettes are probably connected with the chthonic cult of the goddess of the earth and of the dead. The Erinyes (Furies) of Greek mythology are subterranean goddesses of vengeance; heads covered with writhing snakes, they pursue all evildoers. The Hindu goddess Kālī, the great "devourer" who destroys life, has as her attributes skulls and serpents. In Aztec lore the earth goddess Coatlicue, the "Lady with the Skirt of Serpents," is also the goddess of death; in Mictlen (the realm of the dead) poisonous snakes serve as food. The Egyptians believed the underworld to be inhabited by, among other things, fire-breathing serpents armed with knives; some sayings in the *Book of Going Forth by Day* are meant as protection against them (7.33–35). In Christianity the serpent is often associated with sin, death, and the Prince of Darkness who rules over the damned.

Life and Immortality. The serpent has possession of the plant of immortal life (*Epic of Gilgamesh*); in various fairy tales and in some Greek sagas (Glaucus, Typhon) snakes restore the dead to life by means of a plant known only to them. In Melanesian and South American traditions the snake gives human beings the knowledge of edible plants; in ancient Egypt, Renenutet, "mistress of the fertile land" (the goddess of agriculture), was worshiped in the form of a serpent. The serpent is closely associated with the fruit of life and the water of life; in Southwest Asia and in China it is considered to be the giver of rain. Among the Hopi Indians (Arizona) a feast of serpents is celebrated in August in order to obtain rain; during the dancing at this celebration the participants carry live rattlesnakes between their teeth. The (East) Indian *nāgas* are givers of fertility; sacrifices associated with the *nāgakal* (a cobra idol of stone) erected in Indian villages are supplications for the birth of children. Snakes have phallic significance in the most varied of cultures: classical antiquity, the ancient Near East, India, and Melanesia; some American Indian cultures employ the double symbol of the serpent (phallus) and the rhombus (vulva); according to an association made in ancient Mexico (Codex Borgia) the penis is controlled by a serpent-demon. The snake thrown into a cave in the worship of the Greek goddess Demeter also had a phallic significance: the snake was expected to promote the powers of growth present in the earth. Many peoples have believed that the snake obtained long life and even immortality by shedding its skin; as a result the serpent became an attribute of Shadrappa (ancient Syria) and Asklepios (Greece), who were gods of healing; the latter was taken over by the Romans as Aesculapius, and the staff of Aesculapius with snakes wound around it is still the symbol of the medical profession (the caduceus). In the Egyptian *Book of Going Forth by Day* transformation into a serpent will give new life to the dead person (chap. 87). The snake that in the mysteries of the Thracian-Phrygian god Sabazios was drawn across the bosom of the initiate, gave hope for the attainment of immortality. The bronze serpent that Moses displayed on a standard became a prefiguration of the Savior's death on the cross and of redemption (*Jn.* 3:14f.).

The Demonic and the Divine. Because of the ambivalence with which they are regarded, serpents may be associated either with devils or with gods. On cylinder seals from ancient Mesopotamia multiheaded serpents embody the forces hostile to the gods. Even as a small child, Apollo, the Greek god of light, killed the python of Delphi, which was persecuting his mother, Leto. In a similar manner the apocalyptic serpent threatens the

celestial virgin (*Rv.* 12:1-5). Among the more generally known demonic serpents are Apophis (Egypt), the Miðgarðsormr (Germany), Kulshedra (Albania), and the numerous *kaia* (Melanesia).

In the belief of the ancient Greeks the Agathos Daimon, frequently thought of as a winged serpent, played the role of a good spirit. As bringer of salvation and giver of life the serpent became a divine animal; it was associated with Anat, the goddess of war venerated at Ugarit (modern-day Shamra, Syria), and, in the form of a dragon, with Marduk, the principal Babylonian god. The figure depicted by worshipers of Mithra as having the head of a wolf and a body entwined by serpents is usually interpreted as representing Aion, the god of time. The cobra was sacred to Uto, the regional goddess of Lower Egypt. The Hindu snake goddess Manasā is invoked even today against snakebite. One of the terrifying divinities of Buddhism is Bhutadamara, who combats demons: his adornment consists of eight serpents. In the Kalderash gypsy tribe (France) there are still traces of a cult of serpents that reaches back to ancient India; thus in the spring the tribe celebrates the day of the snake or divine serpent. An explicit worship of snakes was practiced by the Lombards (sixth to eighth centuries in Italy) and by the Lithuanians; but in this context mention must be made of various sects of gnostics in late antiquity generally grouped together under the name of Ophites: they adored the godhead in the form of a serpent. The cult of snakes indigenous to West Africa (especially Dahomey) came to America with the slaves and acquired a new form in the magical and religious Voodoo of Haiti.

[See also Dragons.]

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MANFRED LURKER

Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

SNORRI STURLUSON (1179–1241), Iceland's greatest historian. His writings include the *Prose Edda* and the *Heimskringla*, which along with the *Poetic Edda* are the major primary sources for Germanic mythology and religion. Snorri was sent at a young age to Oddi to be fostered by Jón Loptsson, grandson of Saemund Sigfússon and of Magnus III of Norway. Jón Loptsson was the most powerful chieftain in Iceland at the time, and his farm was a center of learning without equal. Snorri received the best education possible; his power and stature increased, and he was elected law speaker in 1215. After one term (in 1218) he journeyed to Norway to visit its rulers, Earl Skúli and the young King Hákon. For several years Snorri traveled widely throughout both Norway and Sweden. He thwarted a scheme to force Iceland to submit to Norwegian rule and left Norway in great honor, promising to work for Norway's cause in Iceland. Snorri was reelected law speaker for three terms (1222–1231), and it was during this period that he found the time to produce his greatest writings. Ever a ruthless and opportunistic leader, Snorri was involved in many disputes, even with his own relatives, and in 1241 he was murdered by one of his enemies.

Upon his return from Norway, Snorri composed a poem in praise of Earl Skúli and King Hákon, the *Hátatál* (List of Verse Forms), which became the final part of a three-part handbook for skaldic poets now known as the *Prose Edda*. The *Hátatál* consisted of a list of the 108 possible verse forms for Old Norse skaldic poetry. By itself it would have been difficult for Snorri's contemporaries to understand, for there were many complicated metaphors with allusions to long forgotten mythological material. Snorri therefore went on to write a second part (the *Skáldskaparmál*) on poetic diction supplying the rules for the formation of kennings (compound metaphors) and *heiti* (poetical nouns). Many of the examples of kennings contain mythological information. Moreover, there is an extensive introduction

(the *Bragarædur*), according to which the god Ægir, during a visit to Valhöll, entertained his table companion Bragi with old tales of the gods, including important myths, such as the theft of Iðun's apples, the adventures of Þjazi, and the story of how Óðinn obtained the poetic mead.

Since much of this mythological material would have been unfamiliar to the readers of his time (who, like Snorri, were Christians in a country that two centuries earlier had accepted the Christian faith), he prefaced it with an introduction to Norse mythology, the *Gylfaginning*. In this section he presents Gylfi, a fictional Swedish king who, disguised as an old wanderer, travels to Ásgarðr to find out about the ancient pagan gods and meets Óðinn, also in disguise, who answers his questions. Óðinn describes the Norse mythological world from its beginning to its end in the Ragnarök (the destruction of the cosmos and its rebirth), noting important facts about the various gods, Valhöll, Yggdrasill (the cosmic tree), and more. As sources Snorri used Eddic and skaldic poetry and oral tradition.

Snorri then proceeded to compose the *Heimskringla* (Orb of the World), his monumental history of the Norwegian kings from their mythical origins through Magnús V Erlingsson (d. 1177). The first part, the *Ynglingasaga*, traces the origins of the kings back to their mythical ancestor Yngvifreyr, and before him to Njǫrðr and ultimately Óðinn. The purpose of the *Ynglingasaga* was to provide a meaningful connection between the traditional and Christian periods and to provide the Norwegian kings with an illustrious ancestry that confirmed their sacred right and ability to govern. As a source on Norse mythology the *Ynglingasaga* is the most important of the *Heimskringla* sagas, though the others contain mythological material as well.

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JOHN WEINSTOCK

SNOUCK HURGRONJE, CHRISTIAAN (1857–1936), Dutch Islamicist and colonial adviser. At the University of Leiden, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje studied theology and initially intended to become a minister.

His early interest in literary and historical criticism of the Bible, a field then still regarded as suspect by some conservative Christians, contributed to his decision in 1878 to renounce the ministry and pursue a scholarly career in Arabic and Islamic studies. In 1880 he defended a doctoral thesis on the origins of the traditional pilgrimage to Mecca. In August 1884 he traveled to Jidda, where he was invited by Meccan religious scholars and notables to visit Mecca. Although he dressed as a Muslim and adopted a Muslim name, 'Abd al-Ghaffār, Snouck Hurgronje did not conceal his identity as a non-Muslim from his hosts; he remained in Mecca from February to August 1884. In 1889 he published, with photographs, a detailed ethnographic account of contemporary Meccan social and intellectual life, translated as *Mecca in the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century* (1931). A chapter of this work is devoted to Mecca's Javanese colony.

Snouck Hurgronje's interests as a historian of religions were strongly informed by ethnography. For Snouck Hurgronje, both historical and contemporary religious beliefs and movements had to be understood in terms of the social and political contexts in which they occurred. After his return to Europe from Mecca, he continued to lecture and write on general themes in Islam and Islamic jurisprudence but he became increasingly interested in the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia). In 1889 he was sent to Batavia (present-day Djakarta), where he served as a colonial adviser while remaining an ethnographer and a religious scholar. In 1892 he was posted at Aceh, a region of Sumatra in frequent rebellion against Dutch rule since 1873. Living like a Muslim (though again not concealing his European identity) and reestablishing ties with Acehnese he had first met in Mecca, his comprehensive reporting on Islamic political and religious movements began to shape colonial policy. He recommended that the government co-opt the secular chieftains, while suppressing the Islamic leaders who were the instigators of the rebellion. His advice was informed by his view of the Islamic leadership as alien agitators intent upon imposing norms and values contrary to local customs. Snouck Hurgronje continued his role as Islamicist and colonial adviser to the Dutch government from his return to Leiden in 1906 until his retirement in 1927.

[See also *Acehnese Religion*.]

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DALE F. EICKELMAN

SOCIETY AND RELIGION. Relations between religion and society are fundamental to the nature of religion and, according to long-standing intellectual claims, are intrinsic to the nature of society. Indeed, societies are characterized by the values they embody, the individual and collective motivations they encourage, the incentives they inspire and sanction, and the ideals by which belief, attitude, and behavior are established and secured. Accordingly, religion can hardly be identified or defined except in terms of human social relations. Religion offers prescriptions for social order, individual behavior, and collective action. Thus, all religious traditions give expression to the relationship between what are acknowledged and understood to be the most compelling objectives of human life and day-to-day conduct. To a remarkable extent, the religions of the world can be distinguished from each other on the basis of their selective interpretations of this fundamental relationship and in terms of the attitudes toward society that they prescribe and honor. And yet, while the religious traditions of the world can be distinguished from each other on these grounds, they also share some common convictions about this fundamental relationship and what it entails.

Relations between Society and Various Religious Traditions. All religious traditions seek a measure of congruence between the ideals they espouse and the societal ordering of life in which such ideals are meant to be expressed. As a consequence, a society is known by its collective aspirations—aspirations to which religion attributes sanction. Similarly, all religious traditions have mechanisms to inspire their adherents toward objectives that their societies have not yet attained. The relationship between these ideals and the collective behavior that religion sanctions is always subject to correction and modification, given the more comprehensive sense of the world's well-being to which the teaching of the world's religions attest. All religious traditions provide some means by which individuals and communities can establish (or reestablish) their lives on a basis that is distinct from the social and cultural status quo. That is, all religious traditions sanction forms of withdrawal from the world or release from the social status quo. In so doing, they certify that religious ideals and the day-to-day ordering of common life are not fully congruent, but rather are characterized by conflict and tension. The effective resolution or mediation of

such conflicts requires deliberate spiritual and practical strategies.

Given the complex nature of their relationship to society, religious traditions often find it useful to invoke a distinction between sacred and secular, and to apply this distinction in establishing the status of society. While there is an inviolable tendency within religious consciousness to affirm that all of life is sacred, there is also the recognition that what is sacred is determined in relation to what is reckoned to be profane. Sacred and secular are dichotomous terms that can only be defined in relationship to each other. Thus, the intrinsic dynamism of each religious tradition issues from its comprehension of how all can be sacred when sacred is known and perceived only in contrast to the profane. The teachings of the religious traditions are drawn from knowledge and experience of how individual and collective human life ought to be ordered, and how human aspirations are to be accorded privilege, in light of the complexities of this fundamental relationship between the sacred and the profane. Consequently, the religious traditions offer tested formulas by which the boundaries and contours of the sacred can be discerned in relation to the boundaries and contours of the profane. But all of them seek to affirm that life itself is sacred, and that its societal forms and expressions can and must be infused by such perceptions and convictions.

Confucianism. Confucius (552?–479 BCE) traveled from state to state throughout China in order to awaken the social responsibility of the populace and to generate social and political reforms. Indeed, the teachings of Confucius are designed to create the moral context sufficient to encourage a harmonious family life, a state that is governed equitably, and a world with sufficient spiritual resourcefulness to allow its inhabitants to live in peace. In Confucius's eyes, individual character and a just social and political order are both consequences of moral cultivation. His emphasis upon the cultivation of individual moral character as well as a harmonious social order prompted his followers to point his teachings in two directions. The first, represented by the *Great Learning (Ta-hsüeh)*, from the fifth century BCE, emphasized the social implications of Confucian teaching. The second, represented by the *Doctrine of the Mean (Chung-yung)*, attributed to Tzu-ssu (483–402 BCE), Confucius's grandson, lays stress on the harmonization of emotion, temperament, and intelligence, as the means of achieving full realization of one's individual nature. The *Doctrine of the Mean* affirms that it is through the realization of individual natures that more comprehensive forms of social and political harmony can occur. Because Confucian teaching carried this twofold capacity, to provide individual moral incentive while pre-

scribing the bases for harmonious social and political order, it became the prevailing school of thought in China, and, in 136 BCE, was proclaimed official state doctrine. Through the centuries, Confucianism has exercised a fundamental formative role throughout Chinese social and cultural life, and particularly in the spheres of government, jurisprudence, education, music, and the ritual life of the people. While both Taoism and Buddhism have had enormous impact on Chinese religion and philosophy, the fundamental cohesiveness of traditional Chinese society can be attributed to the capacity of Confucian teaching to identify compatibilities between individual moral imperatives and the dictates of social order.

Islam. The Islamic religion offers a clear example of societal order that is prescribed by religious doctrine. Indeed, within regions where Islam dominates, it is just as appropriate to refer to Islamic states as to Islamic religion. The Islamic ideal is meant to be developed into community-states; the individual's relationship with God is interdependent with relationships among human beings in social settings. Thus, there are Islamic peoples, a Muslim empire, and indeed an Islamic civilization, all of which originated from the insights and teachings of the prophet Muḥammad in Arabia in the seventh century CE. Understanding that a Muslim is identified as one who "surrenders" to the will of God and who confesses "There is no god but God and Muḥammad is his prophet" establishes a strong basis for social and political cohesiveness. Islamic doctrine and Islamic law are conceived as aspects of the same will. The characteristic Islamic ethos blends the spiritual with the temporal, the public with the private, and individual religious aspiration with the affairs of the state. Because there can be no fundamental distinction between the religious and temporal spheres of life, Muslims understand Islamic states to have come into being in accordance with the divine will. Thus, from the beginning, the Muslim world has been populated by theocratic states. Indeed, much of the tension that exists within that world today derives from the power of modern educational and social reform and of increasing political democratization to upset the religious and social harmony that was explicit in traditional Islamic law.

Shintō. The indigenous culture and ethos of Japan, Shintō offers an example of interdependency between spiritual and temporal elements that are virtually impossible to distinguish. Having come to expression through the ancient folk tales, myths, and rites of the Japanese people, Shintō developed in close correspondence to the emerging and ongoing Japanese collective identity. Thus, Shintō came to describe those beliefs and practices that were distinctively and inherently

Japanese. It has no single founder, no authorized sacred scripture, and no set of prescribed doctrines. The myths to which it lays claim are in many respects similar to those that have been found among the peoples of Southeast Asia. Yet, the attitude to life that Shintō espouses is distinctively Japanese, and its influences are to be felt in myriad ways throughout Japanese social and cultural life. In its encounter with religious and cultural traditions whose origins lie elsewhere—Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, in particular—Shintō has displayed both its adaptive and resistive sides. Its presence among the people always has been associated with respect for ancestors that through the centuries has translated into respect for the emperor and the imperial line. This connotes a devotion to the power (*kami*) from which life flows, by which human conduct must be guided, and by means of which the people are united.

Hinduism. The religion (as well as civilization) of India presents a more complicated picture. Within Hindu civilization, religion functions much less in correspondence with national objectives, and much more as a way of life or mode of consciousness. The Hindu perception that human life consists of an endless series of births and rebirths, together with Hindu belief in *karman*—namely, that previous acts are factors that determine present and future circumstances—leads to a stratification of social classes as well as to a hierarchical ordering of religious values. Individuals are enjoined to perform the laws and duties (*dharma*) that are expected and required of the class, or caste, to which he or she belongs. Indeed, the distinctions between classes correspond to the fundamentally distinguishable estates of human beings. *Brahmāṇas* (brahmans), judged to be in the preeminent positions, are understood to be the guardians of the divine power. *Kṣatriyas*, the nobility, exist to protect the people. *Vaiśyas*, members of the third estate, are obliged to do the necessary work, that is, to tend farmland, to conduct trade, to care for cattle, and so on. The fourth estate, that of the *śūdras*, a kind of servant class, is supposed “to serve meekly.” Hindu teaching justifies social stratification insofar as it understands such stratification to be sanctioned by cosmic action. The social system is a necessary complement to the power of *karman*, and it is through *karman* that individuals can hope for an eventual release from the perpetual cycle of birth and rebirth. Thus, in Hindu understanding, there is a strong duality between spirit and matter. And while the existing social matrix is acknowledged and upheld, it sustains conditions that are deplorable. But such interpretation occurs within perceptions and convictions that affirm the world to be a single reality, and thus affirm religion and society to be complementary. [See also *Varna* and *Jāti*.]

Buddhism. Originating from a keen perception of the pervasiveness of suffering and spiritual ignorance in human life, Buddhism gives expression to the relationship between religion and society via the conviction that worldly life cannot ensure lasting or final happiness. Its founder, Siddhārtha Gautama (c. 563?–483? BCE), counseled his hearers and followers to resist a life of indulgence in sensual pleasure as well as a life of perpetual self-mortification. The “middle path” between these two extremes was designed to encourage true knowledge, tranquility, and enlightenment, pursued via a process that, as in Hinduism, works through a succession of lives toward an ultimate goal, *nirvāṇa*. This final goal is conceived as a transcendent state in which the individual is free from craving and sorrow and over which suffering has no effective control.

The deliberate character of spiritual formation, under Buddhism’s auspices, has required a strong monastic movement. The purpose of monastic life is to provide the context and spiritual nurture so that aspirants, guided by the dictates of the famous Eightfold Path, might progress toward *nirvāṇa*. Within the monastic order (*saṃgha*), life was to be lived simply; however, extreme ascetic practices were not condoned. Indeed, Buddhism can be described as a monastic religion, to be supported as well as followed by the laity. Thus, Buddhism has come to influence, but not to define, the societies within which it has become prevalent. In India, China, Japan, Tibet, Burma, Sri Lanka, and indeed, throughout Southeast and Southwest Asia, and even within the United States, it has been pliable and adaptive. It teaches a way of life that is exemplified by the monks, who are regarded as moral leaders, and is both respected and practiced by the laity. Buddhism specifically teaches that the response to suffering humanity should be active compassion, and the direct result of this has been the formation of social service ministries (i.e., hospitals, schools, orphanages, and other benevolent institutions). Compassion also dictates such individual virtues as generosity, morality, patience, vigor, concentration in meditation, and wisdom. But these virtues belong to a fundamental emphasis upon the primacy of individual consciousness; this is understood in stricter Theravāda Buddhism as communion with the Buddha and in Mahāyāna Buddhism as the vow of the human spirit to become a Buddha.

Taoism. Rooted in a response to the transition from feudalism toward a new social order in sixth-century BCE China, Taoism has had a formative influence on Chinese culture in all of its aspects. Associated with Lao-tzu, the reputed author of the *Tao-te ching*, Taoism teaches a practical way of life (the natural way) as well as an attitude that enables its adherents to dispose

themselves peacefully in the presence of the unity of the universe. It counsels harmony, simplicity, and peacefulness, which are expressed in artistic and cultural forms, such as landscape painting, tea drinking, and so on. Although it was never raised to official governmental status, as was Shintō in Japan, it has been the source of a collective attitude toward life in traditional Chinese society and was influential up to 1949, when the Communist government came to power.

Judaism. Within Judaism, complexities in the basic relationship of religion to society are mediated in a variety of ways. The Hebrew scriptures attest, for example, that creation (the world that was made by the one true God) is good and is intended for enjoyment. At the same time, the goodness and sanctity of life are interpreted in light of strong and abiding convictions regarding the special status and character of a people whose way of life is ordered according to precise and specific covenantal sanctions. In Jewish understanding, the covenant promise, "If you hear my words and obey my commands, I will be your god and you shall be my people" (*Ex.* 19:5), is not given to everyone. Thus, while Judaism affirms the propriety of all of life, it is particularly attentive to what has been properly consecrated and sanctified. Understanding the relation between God and his people to be delineated through the covenant, Judaism also places great emphasis upon the conditions—through laws and ritual practices—by which the covenant is honored and protected. The primacy of the covenant insures that those who are bound to a sovereign deity according to its dictates possess a collective identity. It also implies that this identity will distinguish them from all other peoples who are not so bound. Thus, the relationship between religion and society, in Jewish thought and understanding, must be depicted from two standpoints, that is, from outside and from within the covenantal relationship. In the more comprehensive sense, God established the pattern for harmonious existence between himself and all peoples when the world was created. And in establishing the covenant, God chose a people through which the redemption of that same world was to be carried out. From either vantage point, Judaism understands the world, and thus society, to be the environment in which divine activity occurs. From both vantage points, salvation involves the realization of the creator's purpose for his creation. Thus, Judaism affirms a basic compatibility between religious ideals and social reality, a compatibility that through the centuries has been invested in the idea of the nation of Israel, a nation of both religious and political circumscription.

Christianity. Beginning as a movement within Judaism, Christianity has inherited its predecessor's empha-

sis upon the primacy of the covenant as well as its singularly monotheistic understanding of the nature of deity. However, informed by the life of Jesus Christ and giving a triune formulation to its belief in the one true God, Christianity, even in its initial stages of development, made appeals not only to Jews but to all inhabitants of the Greco-Roman world. As a consequence, adherence to the covenant was reinterpreted in terms more spiritual and less juridical than otherwise prevails in Judaism.

Indeed, the Christian revision of the understanding of the covenant required the formulation of a new covenant, which would be the basis of a revised collective identity. This new covenant made it possible to conceive of Christianity in universal terms and to identify followers of Jesus Christ. Thus, basic convictions about the goodness of the created order as well as the need for redemption—convictions Christianity shares with Judaism—have to be applied and understood contextually. It is possible to apply such convictions to mean that there should be a Christian state and to cite the same convictions as providing a rationale for conceiving of Christians as "the salt of the earth," whose task it is to bring and/or discover the presence of God wherever they find themselves. And when these basic religious convictions are combined with insights derived in large part from Greek and Hellenistic influence, it is also possible to approach society both in transcendent and ideal terms, as in the Christian understanding of the kingdom of God.

Thus, it can be demonstrated that particular prescriptions regarding the relationships between religion and society are inherent in the basic and formative dispositions by which each of the religious traditions is motivated. Indeed, in every instance, one can anticipate the attitude that a religion will take toward society by knowing how that religion portrays the human condition, what value it places on human community, and how it delineates what is expected of the individual in light of its more comprehensive understanding of the cosmic order.

The Study of Society and Religion. Though the relationship between religion and society did not become an object of concentrated study in the West until the nineteenth century, the subject has formed the basis for perennial intellectual exposition from the time that questions arose concerning the ingredients of an ideal society, as, for example, in Plato's *Republic*. The way in which ethical and moral ideals contribute to effective social and community life are also explored in the writings of Aristotle (particularly in his *Nicomachean Ethics*), Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and other Epicureans and Stoics. The subject also appears in medieval Chris-

tian literature, wherein Greek contentions and categories of thought are utilized to lend expression to biblical affirmations. Syntheses were formed through a combination of Greek formulations of the relationships of permanence to change and of being to becoming with the Judeo-Christian understanding of the relationships between the creator and creation. Plato's question in *Timaeus*, "What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming and never is?" was answered in classical Christian theology in terms that described the relation between God and the world. Under such formulas, the world—and, by extension, society—was accorded a secondary, subordinate, and derivative reality in contrast to God, the seat of all permanence, or of "that which always is and has no becoming." And the theological task for the medieval writers, under dictates of the relationship between sacred and profane, was to affirm the intrinsic goodness and propriety of the subordinate reality in full recognition of the fact that its status could only be conceived in contrast to what was acknowledged to be primary.

The normative exposition of this relationship was offered by Augustine (354–430), in his *City of God*, in which the temporal order was conceived in the likeness of the eternal order and yet accorded an intrinsic positive status. Whereas Augustine utilized Platonic philosophical categories to spell out these interdependencies, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) employed an Aristotelian mode to affirm compatibilities between heavenly and earthly realms as well as between ecclesiastical and civil orders. At the time of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther (1483–1546) developed a doctrine of "two kingdoms," as, for example, in his *Christian Liberty*, so that both temporary and permanent obligations and services could be distinguished and rightly ordered. And there are many examples within Christian theological literature of attempts to create earthly or civil societies in close approximation to the heavenly or permanent ideal. John Calvin (1509–1564), the author of *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, wished this for his city of Geneva. The Cambridge Platform of 1648 outlines the plan of the Massachusetts Bay Puritans to order their community life on biblical principles, supported by both divine and natural law. All of these formulations conceived of the relationship of religion to society to be modeled according to the interdependencies between the ideal and the actual and sought to mediate the distance between such states by exploring the relationships between theory and practice.

Comte and Saint-Simon. The subject became an object of analytical (as distinct from theological) scholarly interest in the nineteenth century, with the birth of the science of sociology. Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the

acknowledged founder of sociology, built upon the influence of Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) in developing an evolutionary conception of the growth of intellectual consciousness. In Saint-Simon's view, human sensitivity had already passed through the religious stages of polytheism and monotheism, as well as through the philosophical stage of metaphysics, and had just embarked upon the era of positive science. Having come to this new stage, it was man's task to identify the conditions necessary to create an effective rapprochement between intellectuals and the society as a whole. Comte, sharing Saint-Simon's aspiration to improve social and political conditions, also approached theology as an antecedent and provisional mode of human intelligence that had been superseded by both philosophy and science. Each held that the theological mode identifies humankind's first way of coming to terms with experience. But as human knowledge became more exact and progressively more certain, all previous stages or forms of understanding became obsolete. [See the biography of Comte.]

Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim. Comte's views were highly respected within nineteenth and early twentieth-century French thought, specifically by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). Lévy-Bruhl, sharing the widespread enthusiasm for "the law of three stages," worked particularly to distinguish the mental reasoning processes of archaic (first stage) and more civilized (third stage) human beings. In his *How Natives Think* (1910) and *Primitive Mentality* (1922), which he described as "one and the same work in two volumes," he concentrated on the distinctive mental habits of primitive (or rudimentary) peoples in order to characterize religious consciousness. He contended that the mode of intelligence that is exercised among archaic human beings can be described as being mystical, prelogical, and pervaded by a sense of "affectational participation." To call it mystical is to recognize that it is "at all times oriented to occult forces." To call it prelogical is to describe it as being "indifferent to the laws of contradiction." "Affectational participation" is the phrase Lévy-Bruhl used to describe the way in which, in rudimentary apprehension, the data of experience tend to flow together and associate with each other in complex ways. His intention was to isolate fundamental differences between human beings of contemporary scientific disposition and those of a previous religious stage of intellectual development by comparing and contrasting the mental habits that lend form to knowledge in the two instances.

It is clear, however, that the same analytical strategy can be employed for alternative purposes. Instead of simply focusing on the coordinated mental habits of so-

called rudimentary peoples for purposes of sketching a possible primitive world of thought and experience, the scholar can decipher and describe the prevailing mental habits ("collective representations") wherever they occur. This, in brief, describes the analytical intentions of Durkheim, whose work illustrates a methodological shift from evolutionary to organic conceptions of the relationships between religion and society. Indeed, it was Durkheim who first defined religion as "something eminently social." His *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912) stands as a landmark in the development of both sociological theory and the academic study of religion. The study registers in both contexts because Durkheim's intention to identify "the religious nature of man" by seeking to explain "the most primitive and simple religion" was a part of his preoccupation with man's relation to society. He contended that "religious representations are collective representations." That is, they give expression to the manner in which intellectual life is formed and constituted. To be sure, knowledge is shaped by the intellect, which bestows order, offers pattern, lends arrangement, and seeks coherence. And yet order, pattern, arrangement, and coherence do not derive from an isolated intellect, but from intellects in social association. The collective ideal is always socially conceived and formulated. Thus religion becomes associated with the collective social vision, apart from which the social context cannot be understood. [See the biographies of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl.]

Weber. It was left to Max Weber (1864–1920) to break with the evolutionist model, and to place an analysis of the interdependencies between religion and society within a cross-cultural framework. Weber's primary intention was to understand how cultures are formed. Noting the self-evident compatibilities between Protestant-religious and capitalist-economic incentives in those nations and societies that have been influenced by the Reformation, Weber worked to identify the interrelationships between motivations and intentions, on the one hand, and acts and events, on the other, within whatever society came under his analytical scrutiny. He observed that religious ideas possess independent causal significance in all systems of social action or processes of social change. The interdependence of Protestant theology (motive) and capitalist economics (action) is Weber's chief example of the dynamics of social integration. But the same principles will apply to the place, status, and function of all religious traditions within their respective sociocultural environments. In general terms, religion, standing as ideology and as conceptual system, supplies motivation within a society. In more specific terms, the prevailing conception of deity

within a society influences individual and collective actions as well as the significance that is attributed to social relationships. For example, conception of deity in Hindu religion both affects and is in keeping with the socioeconomic situation of Indian culture. So, too, the way in which the cosmos is depicted in Hindu scriptures bears causal relevance to the socioeconomic theory of those peoples whose life has been influenced by Hindu religious principles. Similarly, there is sanction within the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation to make the world acceptable; this doctrine is implicit in the economic theory sanctioned in Judeo-Christian theology. In all of these instances, religion can be seen to lend constitutionality to the social order. [See also the biography of Weber.]

Weber's influence. The method Weber devised was intended to be used on a cross-cultural basis and, where possible, comparatively. He himself was eager to test his methods and theories on as many traditions as he had time and energy to study. Weber left the way clear for others to inquire into the social characteristics of individual religions, whether or not they wished to insert their findings into comparative cultural contexts.

Indeed, one would expect that significant sociocultural analyses of the major religious traditions would be inspired by Weber's pioneering work and would approach religion and society as formative cultural elements, to be described and defined in relation to one another. In this regard, the work of Gustave von Grunbaum, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, and Clifford Geertz on Islam should be cited. Notable, too, are the studies of William Theodore de Bary, James B. Pratt, and Charles Norton Eliot on the religions of India. Also significant are the more specialized analyses of Melford E. Spiro, Edward Conze, and Richard F. Gombrich on Buddhism; Oscar Lewis's *Life in a Mexican Village* (1963); Ch'ing-K'un Yang's *Religion in Chinese Society* (1961); Henri Frankfort's work on the religions of Egyptian antiquity; W. E. H. Stanner's portrayal of Aboriginal life in Australia; Vittorio Lanternari's *The Religions of the Oppressed* (1963), which analyzed religion functioning as protest movement; and Gerhard Lenski's *The Religious Factor* (1961), a comprehensive analysis of modern American socioreligious interaction.

Weber's interest in comparative cultural analysis was forwarded by Joachim Wach (1898–1955), a German-born scholar who taught at the University of Chicago from 1944 until his death. Wach is probably the first prominent historian of religion to approach the major religious traditions of the world as instances of organic coordination, for which the societal element is both formative and constitutive. It was Wach's conviction that religion could be studied properly only if ideational,

cultic, and social components were approached as interdependent. He contended that it is through the instrumentation of religion that such elements become integrated within a culture. The comparative history of culture, as Weber had recommended, is the context within which these integrative processes are best studied. [See the biography of Wach.]

Perhaps the most straightforward of recent attempts to approach the major religious traditions of the world as examples of organic coordination has been provided by Ninian Smart in his book *The Religious Experience of Mankind* (1969). Unlike Weber, however, Smart does not arrive at the religious traditions after engaging in complex theoretical analyses of the components of more comprehensive sociocultural ideological stances. Nor does he treat the religious as a testing ground for more extensive methodological or cultural issues. Instead, without flourish or methodological brocade, Smart contends that religions consist of strands of dimensions (John Henry Newman might have called them "notes") that are present in various degrees of emphasis in the religious traditions. Although Smart does not insist that the list be taken as exhaustive, there are six strands or dimensions: doctrine, mythology, ethics, ritual, social institutions, and religious experience. As noted, not all dimensions are present to the same degree in all religions. Indeed, not all of the dimensions are present in every religion. But some are present in all religions, and the way in which they are present and interact with society gives a religion its internal dynamism as well as its morphology. In *The Phenomenon of Religion* (London, 1973), Smart writes:

For instance, the shape of a particular myth may be in part determined by the exigencies of the kinship-system in the society in which it is recited. More sweepingly, the dominance of mother-goddesses in certain phases of religion might be at least partially ascribed to the emergence of agriculture. Conversely, some features of a society may be heavily influenced by religion itself, in which case the direction of the explanation runs the other way. (p. 44)

In Smart's view, such examples illustrate the "mutual dynamic," that is, the ongoing "dialectic in which a religion and its society help and shape one another." It is on this basis that Smart subsequently referred prominently to religion, in its social setting, as being "worldview," and the study of religion "worldview analysis" (see Smart, *Worldviews: Crosscultural Exploration of Human Beliefs*, New York, 1983).

Other contributions. The methods and insights of Durkheim and Weber were instrumental in establishing the dominant theoretical framework to identify and clarify relationships between religion and society. Yet,

along the way, there were numerous additional contributions that became accepted as belonging to the subject's permanent intellectual legacy. In 1864, for example, N. D. Fustel de Coulanges (1830–1889) published his seminal study, *The Ancient City*, which traced the impact of religious beliefs and customs upon the social institutions of classical Western civilization. At approximately the same time, Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) utilized a theory of evolution to describe the processes by which religious ideas develop in correspondence with the development of social institutions. In 1889, W. Robertson Smith, in his *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, portrayed Jewish worship and belief against the background of the customs and folkways of Semitic nomads. In 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) published his *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (translated as *Community and Society*, 1957), which traced the shift from a "communal, status-based concentric society of the Middle Ages to the more individualistic, impersonal and large-scale society of the democratic-industrial period." In so doing, Tönnies illustrated the intricate relations that religion and society have had in selected historical periods.

Focusing his Weberian sensitivities on the influence the Christian religion has had on Western culture, Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) identified two prominent forms of social organization, church and sect, in correspondence with two formative dispositional factors. In his *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1912), Troeltsch argued that the two forms of social organization have been dominant within Christianity because the religion has fostered two distinctive and not always congruent attitudes toward the world. Churches reflect an intention to accept the social order and lend credibility to its status; sects are motivated by the desire to disassociate from the societal status quo. Troeltsch's analyses, illustrating an application of Weberian inquiry to a specific religious tradition, also fostered linkages between sociological study and theological reflection. Bernhard Groethuysen, in his study of the development of the middle class (*Die Entstehung der bürgerlichen Welt- und Lebensanschauung in Frankreich*, 1927), illustrated that the bourgeois outlook developed in eighteenth-century France when the traditional dogma of the Roman Catholic church, removed from the formative environment of religious ritual and practice, had become "abstract." Gustav Mensching, who trained under Rudolf Otto at Marburg and became professor of the history of religions at Bonn, developed an approach that treated religions as instances of social coordination, motivated along the two distinctive dispositional lines of folk religion and universal religion (see his *Die Religion*, 1959).

The field of anthropology contributed several studies that are basic to an understanding of the relations between religion and society. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), for example, portrayed religion as belonging to the complex social machinery that enables human beings to live harmoniously and collectively. Paul Radin (1883–1959) investigated the beliefs and attitudes of primitive societies in light of his theory that religion has roots in fear and that the basis of fear is insecurity; Radin's intention was to isolate the psychological origins of religious sensitivity. Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), drawing much of his evidence from analyses of the collective behavior of the Trobriand Islanders, approached religion as one of the primary social institutions that is produced and shaped in response to the need for cultural survival. Durkheim's nephew Marcel Mauss (1872–1950) saw religion as belonging to that range of entities that deserved to be classified as "total social phenomena." Such analyses provided corroboration of the contention that religion and society could be approached, described, and defined in relation to one another. [See also the biographies of *Fustel de Coulanges*, *Malinowski*, *Mauss*, *Rudolf Otto*, *Radcliffe-Brown*, *Radin*, *W. Robertson Smith*, *Spencer*, *Tönnies*, and *Troeltsch*.]

Contemporary research. One direct line of succession from Weber to present-day sociology of religion is an extended commentary on social-action theory as modified, tempered, and extended in the work of Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929); John R. Commons (1862–1945); Robert M. MacIver (1882–1970); Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), who is important for his treatment of the influence of utopian ideas within selected societies; Alfred Marshall (1842–1924); Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923); and, perhaps most significantly, Talcott Parsons (1902–1979). Parsons is important not only because of his own contributions to the field—his translation of Weber's *Protestant Ethic* (1930) may have been the single most important event in bringing the work of the German sociologist to the attention of the English-speaking world—but, in addition, because of the remarkable influence he has had on other scholars who have become leaders in the field. Because of his translation of Weber's book, Parsons is associated with the legacy of Weber, but he must also be given credit for reviving interest in Durkheim's view and for making Durkheim into something more than an analyst of primitive societies. In exploring the congruences between Weber's and Durkheim's interests, Parsons was influential, too, in establishing associations between the German and French schools of social theory. By combining Durkheim's insight regarding the influence of social constraints with Weber's interest in discerning the way in which reli-

gious values are translated as social sanctions, Parsons was led to a new view of the structure of social action. He contended that the social milieu possesses a set of conditions that are beyond the control of each individual, but not outside the mastery of collective human agency. Interweaving Durkheim's and Weber's insights and working to give due respect to both scholars, Parsons offered this summary in *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937):

Durkheim called attention to the importance of the relation of symbolism as distinguished from that of intrinsic causality in cognitive patterns. . . . Weber integrated the various aspects of the role of non-empirical cognitive patterns in social action in terms of his theory of the significance of the problems of meaning and the corresponding cognitive structures, in a way which preclude, for analytical purposes, their being assimilated to the patterns of science. (p. 715)

Parsons worked to give due respect to both scholars.

Parsons was a nestor. His reworking and fusing of Weberian and Durkheimian themes was so comprehensive and detailed that he inspired a host of students to take up the same or related investigatory causes. Indeed, one of the most significant paths of intellectual influence within religious studies is that initiated by Talcott Parsons and his associates at Harvard. They insisted that social thought be pursued in a methodologically sophisticated cross-cultural and interdisciplinary manner.

The anthropologist Clifford Geertz, one of the most influential of Parsons's students, is known not only for his studies of Islamic religion and culture but also for his proposal that religion should be viewed as a "cultural system." In his highly regarded article "Religion as Cultural System," first published in *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, edited by Michael Banton (New York, 1966), Geertz defined religion in organic terms:

Religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

The role assigned to religion befits Geertz's conception of culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of meaning."

Similar combinations of interests are reflected in the work of Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger, who were influenced by Karl Mannheim, Robert Merton, continental philosophical phenomenology, and, in particular, the work of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959). Luckmann and Berger share concerns about the fate of the

individual within a "socially construed" context. In *The Invisible Religion* (New York, 1967), Luckmann identifies religion as "symbolic self-transcendence," and he sketches the process by which the human organism transcends its particularities by constructive objective, all-embracing, and morally binding universes of meaning. In describing the way in which this process is effected, Luckmann wrote of "the social construction of reality." For Berger, all religious propositions are "projections grounded in specific infrastructures," and religion itself is that "human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established." Without an awareness of the presence of the sacred in human consciousness, according to Berger, it would likely not have been possible "to conceive of a cosmos in the first place." Berger writes:

It can thus be said that religion has played a strategic part in the human enterprise of world-building. Religion implies the farthest reach of man's self-externalization, of his infusion of reality with his own meanings. Religion implies that human order is projected into the totality of being. Put differently, religion is the audacious attempt to conceive of the entire universe as being humanly significant.

(Berger, 1967, pp. 27–28)

Both Luckmann and Berger acknowledge that religion is present in institutions, that is, in readily identifiable religious organizations such as churches, synagogues, and temples. But they are unwilling to restrict the social reality of religion to these institutional forms. They observe that a sociology of religion that deals only with such organizations is a sociology of churches that may be concentrating upon already "frozen" forms of religion. In the larger sense, religion (Luckmann's "invisible religion") legitimates the fundamental values of a society by constructing symbolic universes of meaning. Berger understands the process of legitimation to require two important steps: first, "religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by locating them within a sacred and cosmic frame of reference" (Berger, 1967, p. 33); and, second, "religion . . . serves to maintain the reality of that socially constructed world within which men exist in their everyday lives" (*ibid.*, p. 42).

What Berger and Luckmann divined in theory, namely, the dynamics of the interdependence of religious patterns of meaning and the social construction of reality, Robert N. Bellah has disclosed as a certifiable American fact under the concept of *civil religion*. In so doing, Bellah discerns a systematic, organic form of religious understanding in the collective American consciousness that he believes has existed since the founding of the nation:

What we have, then, from the earliest years of the republic is a collection of beliefs, symbols and rituals with respect to sacred things and institutionalized in a collectivity. This religion—there seems no other word for it—while not antithetical to and indeed sharing much in common with Christianity, was neither sectarian nor in any specific sense Christian. At a time when the society was overwhelmingly Christian, it seems unlikely that this lack of Christian reference was meant to spare the feelings of the tiny non-Christian minority. Rather, the civil religion expressed what those who set the precedents felt was appropriate under the circumstances. It reflected their private as well as their public views. Nor was the civil religion simply "religion in general." . . . because of its specificity, the civil religion was saved from empty formalism and served as a genuine vehicle of national religious self-understanding. (Bellah, 1967, p. 9)

So far I have traced a line of inquiry, from Durkheim and Weber forward, that attests that religion gains concrete expression and possesses meaning within the context of social reality. This conviction can be interpreted as a refinement and extension of Weber's analyses of the interrelationships between motives and acts in the constitution of a culture. It belongs to Durkheim's more comprehensive observation that religious conceptions always reflect prescribed patterns of social organization. But how do scholars respond when the interrelationships are not clear or when expected correlations between motivation and action are in a state of disarray? Their recourse is to study the lack of correspondence as well as the dysfunctions that have become apparent. The term used to denote the ineffectiveness of religious meaning (because such meaning no longer corresponds with one's experience within the social reality) is *secularization*. Secularization means that some prior prevailing pattern of religious and ideological order is no longer functioning characteristically as a viable source of motivation or behavior. The work of more recent scholars, such as Bryan Wilson, Thomas F. O'Dea, Charles Y. Glock, Rodney Stark, Guy Swanson, and Harvey Cox, among others, is directed toward making sociological and religious sense of this pervasive development. As a consequence, scholarly analyses of the relation between religion and society that are appearing in the mid-1980s are focusing increasingly on the function and status of the sacred in a secular society. I refer specifically to two anthologies: Mary Douglas and Steven Tipton's *Religion and America: Spiritual Life in a Secular Age* (1982) and Phillip E. Hammond's *The Sacred in a Secular Society* (1985). The ingredients are the same as they were when Durkheim, Weber, and the others constructed the dominant paradigm. But there have been significant shifts, and necessary conceptual readjustments, in every chronicle that has attempted to cor-

relate analyses of the relationship between religion and society with a more extensive portrayal of the evolution or development of Western intellectual history.

Religion and Society in the Contemporary Era. Contemporary discussion of the relationship between religion and society is framed by widespread social and cultural change. Societies affected by complex processes of modernization are having difficulty deciding whether, under the new circumstances, traditional religion exercises benevolent or malevolent social influence.

In many quarters, the fundamental issue has to do with whether traditional religious aspirations are congruent or compatible with Marxist political theory and practice. [See *Marxism and the biography of Marx*.] In those areas of the world where Christianity has been the dominant religious tradition—and where, historically, it has been identified with the interests of colonial powers—there is a fascination with liberation theologies that sometimes advocate social and political revolution. [See *Political Theology and Revolution*.] Within these settings, the relations between religion and society are being shaped by the responses that the traditions are making to new formulations of faith that are tailored to facilitate transitional or revolutionary activity. To date, the dominant responses have been of two contrasting kinds. One of these kinds of responses condones (sometimes radical) change and appears to its enemies to be in league with the very secularizing forces that traditional religions oppose. The other, fundamentalist, response calls for a return to the purity of the tradition at its origins and has shown itself willing at times to adopt a militant, antirevolutionary stance. Within the United States, in particular, this conflict is implicit in the controversy surrounding the rise of a radical religious right. It has found expression, too, in court cases and legislative debate concerning abortion, prayer in schools, and the status of public religious observance. [See *Law and Religion*, *article on Religion and the Constitution of the United States*.]

Yet even in the present situation, perennial ingredients have been made explicit. In its social manifestations, religion still presents itself as the guardian of sensitivities concerning distinctions between the sacred and the profane. And in its religious dimensions, society continues to be known by the collective aspirations to which its sanctioned activity lends expression.

[See also *Sociology and Study of Religion*, *article on History of Study*.]

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WALTER H. CAPPS

SOCIETY OF FRIENDS. See Quakers.

SOCIETY OF JESUS. See Jesuits.

SOCINUS. See Sozzini, Fausto Pavolo.

SOCIOLOGY. [This entry consists of two articles. *Sociology and Religion* provides a historical survey of the relationship between the discipline of sociology and the scientific study of religion. *Sociology of Religion* focuses more precisely on sociological method and its antecedents in philosophical social thought insofar as they constitute a distinct approach to understanding religious phenomena.]

Sociology and Religion

The discipline of sociology has been closely associated with the study of religion ever since sociology emerged as a distinct field in the mid-nineteenth century; only psychology is similarly close. Indeed, Auguste Comte, the social philosopher who coined the word *sociology*, saw his new science equally as religion and as science. In his *Positive Philosophy* (1830–1842), and again in *Positive Polity* (1851–1854), Comte envisioned sociology (which he first named social physics) not only as the queen of the sciences but also as the scientific basis of the new religion of Positivism, which would gradually push all existing religions out of sight. There were some excellent thinkers of the nineteenth century—among them Harriet Martineau and Frederick Harrison in England—who took Comte's religion very seriously. But the real and enduring relationship between sociology and religion was established by those, including Comte, who saw religion as one of the vital constituents of the social bond and thus necessarily a matter for careful study by sociologists.

Development of the Discipline. A significant change in attitude toward religion took place from that

adopted by the eighteenth-century French *philosophes* to that represented by the nineteenth-century founders of sociology. The critical rationalists of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century had seen religion essentially as a mental or intellectual phenomenon, for the most part a tissue of superstitions, and therefore capable of eradication once the truth was told the people; but the sociologists from the beginning saw religion as a nearly inseparable aspect of social organization, a necessary window to understanding the past and present. Karl Marx, no lover of religion in any form, was not denigrating religion when, in a famous phrase, he declared it the "opium of the people." What he meant, as the context of his essay on Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* shows, is that in a world of human exploitation, religion is necessary to man; it is at once "the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress." Religion would not be banished, Marx stressed, until all of the social conditions of religion had been removed by revolution. Friedrich Engels, after Marx's death, went even further. He found many analogies between the infant socialism of his day and the infant Christianity of imperial Rome. Those who wished to understand the foundations of Christianity, Engels advised, needed only to look at "a local section of the International Workingmen's Association." He even advanced the idea that socialism, when it eventually drove out Christianity, would itself take on some of the attributes of religion. In this prophecy he has been proved largely right. As socialism became a mass movement in Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a prominent element was the apostasy of socialists from Judaism or Christianity and their turning to a surrogate. The longer socialism lasts in the Soviet Union, the more intense the reverence for Lenin and the more numerous the festivals and ceremonies in honor of great personages and events of the past.

Ludwig Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* (1841) must be seen (despite Marx's assault on it) as a profoundly sociological work in its dominant theme of religion as alienation and etherealization of powers belonging in man alone, and also in the structural character of his treatment of dogma, liturgy, and symbol. Too often the political purpose of Alexis de Tocqueville's classic *Democracy in America* (2 vols., 1835–1840) leads us to overlook the cultural and social content of the work, especially in the second volume. Religion fascinated Tocqueville, and along with analyses of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism based upon the social-status groups to be found in each, there are treatments of the patterns that spiritual fanaticism and of pantheism tend to take in democratic society. Frédéric Le Play's monumental work *The European Workers* (1855),

although directed primarily to family structures, contains a significant amount of insight into religion and the worker.

The attention these early sociologists gave religion in their studies of the social order was magnified in the works of the European sociologists at the end of the nineteenth century who are the true founders of contemporary sociological theory. Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Ernst Troeltsch all made the study of religion a crucial aspect of their systematic theories of society and of man's relation to society. We shall come back to these seminal theorists, for they are still very much a part of current sociology. For the moment suffice it to say that in the aggregate they subjected religion to precisely the same kind of study that went into their explorations of politics, morality, science, and other major phenomena of modern society. Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912), without question his greatest book, richly represents the application to religion of the modern sociological concepts of community, role, social interaction, and hierarchy. Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–1905) and, above all, his *Sociology of Religion* (1920–1921) demonstrated the functional role of Calvinist belief in the seventeenth-century rise of the Protestant work ethic and illuminated the interaction throughout history of major forms of religion and the prevailing currents of social hierarchy and of bureaucracy. In his *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Community and Society; 1887) Tönnies stressed religion as well as family as crucial elements of the "community" that he counterposed to "society," the former close and cohesive, the latter tending toward impersonality and anonymity. It was Troeltsch who, in his *Social Teachings of the Christian Church* (1912), made the fundamental distinction between "churches" and "sects" a fertile basis for insight into the effects of structural characteristics in religion upon matters of faith and dogma. Simmel, primarily interested in the social elements of capitalism and also of human personality and its intimate recesses, chose to make what he called "autonomous religious values" central elements of all forms of social interaction. Whether it is the tie between child and parent or that between citizen and nation, there is, Simmel declared, an ineradicable "religious key" to be found.

A kind of symbiotic relationship existed in the nineteenth century between sociology and religion. It should not be overlooked that in many areas religion, quite independently of currents in the social sciences, took on a strong social consciousness, manifest in the Social Catholic tradition in France and Germany and in the Social Gospel of some of the Protestant churches, especially in England and the United States. Interest in the study as

well as the possible relief of social problems—delinquency, family breakdown, alcoholism, and poverty—is first manifest in the United States, not in the colleges and universities, but in religious seminaries; the study was thought by seminary leaders to be vital to any clergyman's pastoral work. Many of the sociologists active in the early part of the twentieth century began their careers as clergymen or seminarians. It is not at all surprising that, during its first half-century, American sociology, lacking the kind of strong philosophical and historical influences that guided sociology in Europe, chose social problems as its primary subject matter. The American public may thus be forgiven for sometimes confusing sociology with socialism. From the beginning, the character of sociology in America was, and in some measure still is, more pragmatic, problem-oriented, and policy-directed than in Europe.

This close and reciprocal relationship between religion and sociology calls attention to another important aspect of their common history. Both areas of thought, sociology and the distinctively social cast of religion in the West, may be profitably seen as intellectual responses to the two great revolutions of modern times: the industrial and the democratic. Beginning in England and France in the eighteenth century, these massive disturbances of the social landscape spread in the nineteenth century to all of Europe and in the twentieth to the whole world. The growth and mechanization of the factory system, the mushrooming of villages into cities, the multiplication of population, the development of more egalitarian democracies and wider electorates—all of these, together with some of their by-products such as science and technology, the spirit of secularism, and an ever growing political bureaucracy, were bound to have profound impact upon the traditional social structure of Western nations. Everywhere the forces of political and economic modernism resulted in the fragmentation of ancient loyalties—of nation, community, kin, and religion. In sum, the rise and spread of sociology in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are part and parcel of the dual revolution that overcame first the West, then the world.

Sociological Antinomies. More than any other social science, sociology is the almost immediate intellectual result of the two revolutions. This fact is abundantly illustrated by the broad antinomies of the new discipline, which either encompass or loom over its more concrete concepts. In the sociological tradition five major antinomies arose in response to the great social changes of the past two centuries; each embodies a perspective that focuses upon a particular dialectic.

1. *Community versus Society* is the first of these antinomies, the opposition that Tönnies referred to as that between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*: the smaller,

more cohesive, communal, and durable social relationships contrasted to the larger, looser, and more impersonal relationships of the marketplace and to the equally large and impersonal ties inherent in the national state. From the beginning, sociologists tended to see conflict between the two types of relationship. This conflict increasingly is resolved in modern society by the triumph of the latter over the former, with consequent reduction in the necessary nurturing conditions of personality, morality, and social order.

2. *Authority versus Power* is the second antinomy. Authority is the natural accompaniment of any kind of organization, whether small and informal or large and impersonal. Authority inheres in the very roles of the members of such groups; in some degree it is natural to the very fabric of social life. Power, however, as the term is used by the pioneering sociologists, is characteristically perceived through its manifestations in the state and in large, corporate industry. Power tends to be more coercive than authority; more important, it is impersonal, rule-bound, office-centered, and expansive. In modern sociological writing, *bureaucracy*, whether in government, large industry, or profession, is most commonly made the focus of power, rather than authority. Here too an intrinsic conflict is perceived, and there is a wide conviction that in modern history the forces of bureaucratic power are winning out against traditional types of social and moral authority.

3. *Status versus Class*, the third antinomy, is a dichotomy emphasized in the work of Max Weber. But, like the other antinomies, it is found almost everywhere in sociology. Here traditional systems of hierarchy such as those spawned by Western feudalism, systems characterized by an almost universally perceived and accepted structuring of populations into upper, middle, and lower classes, are sharply distinguished from the diverse, variegated, and highly specialized statuses held by individuals in modern society as the result of the atomization of traditional classes under the blows of the two great revolutions. This antinomy, too, reflects a contrast between modern society and the whole social order devastated or made largely obsolete by industrialism and democracy.

4. *Sacred versus Secular*, the fourth antinomy, is where religion as the subject of sociological study most obviously comes to mind. From the sociological point of view, the large trends in modern history—impersonalization of social relationships, bureaucratization of authority, and the fragmentation of traditional classes—are accompanied by the secularization of society: the replacement of sacred values by others based upon utility, pragmatism, and hedonism.

5. *Membership versus Alienation* is the fifth and final member of my list of sociological antinomies. Through-

out sociology, especially among the pioneers from Comte to Durkheim, there is the clear sense that modern society reflects a widespread alienation of individuals from their accustomed memberships in family, community, religion, and social class. More than any other social science, sociology is responsible for the image of "the masses," of large aggregates of people wrenched from their traditional roles and made into a standardized, homogenized, and faceless multitude. For sociology, the very essence of alienation is the estrangement of individuals from community and other primary forms of association—estrangement even from self.

Central Concepts. With this historical background in mind, it is possible to understand more clearly the patterning of central concepts in contemporary sociology. We shall confine ourselves to those that have virtually universal acceptance by sociologists and that, taken together, constitute the theoretical structure of sociology today. All have been widely useful in understanding religion and the other major institutions of society. The concepts are primarily analytical, but they also take on significance as tools in social synthesis and the making of social policy. Although these concepts originated in the several great moral perspectives outlined above, their value to sociology and the other social sciences lies solely in their scientific utility in the study of human behavior.

Social interaction. All social structures are compounds of certain fundamental, universal patterns of social interaction. Social interaction among human beings differs from all other types of interaction in nature in that it is *symbolic*: that is, organized around signs and symbols that carry distinct meanings to those involved in the interaction. Animals interact; so do atoms and molecules; but symbolic interaction is limited to human beings. They alone fashion arbitrary symbols, reflected in language, thought, morality, religion, and other spheres—all of which constitute human culture, which has its own paths of evolution through time. Human thought is purposive, searching for meanings, responding to nature only through the acquired "filters" of values, norms, and meanings passed on from generation to generation. Our interactions are all influenced by the "pictures in our heads" (Walter Lippman), by our "definition of the situation" (W. I. Thomas). We never react to others or to the environment at large in a direct, unfiltered way. No matter who or what is before us, we perceive it as part of a larger context of meaning, one that we usually have experienced before. The really crucial episodes of symbolic interaction with other people take place during infancy and childhood. That is when, precisely through such interactions, the individual's self begins to take shape. The early American sociologist Charles H. Cooley referred to the self as "the

looking-glass self," meaning that the reflection of ourselves we see in the responses of others to us has a strong influence upon what kinds of selves—passive, aggressive, diffident, demonstrative, inward- or outward-turning—we are likely to be throughout our lives.

Social aggregates. When we look out on the world, we do not see masses of discrete individuals. We see social groups, associations, and organizations—or rather, we see individuals who are nearly inseparable from such aggregates. Man, as Aristotle wrote, is a social animal. What I have noted in the paragraph above about social interaction supports this claim. Interaction not only takes place in terms of meanings ascribed by the individuals concerned; it also tends to fix these meanings through symbols as elements of the culture that is transmitted through social mechanisms from one generation to the next. Social groups are composites of basic types of social interaction: cooperation, conflict, conformity, coercion, exchange, and so forth.

A great deal of contemporary sociological theory deals with analyses of social groups and organizations of all kinds and sizes. The reason for such analysis is not only the intrinsic interest of the structures themselves but the variable effects different types of groups have upon individual behavior. One of the most famous and by now deeply rooted typologies of social aggregates was referred to above: Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, or what Cooley called *primary* and *secondary groups*.

The sociological theory of groups, communities, and associations has been widely applied to religion in the literature of sociology. Émile Durkheim declared that religion originated in primitive man's absolute dependence upon his community and therefore his worship of it. Durkheim demonstrated through examples how the primitive worship of tribe and totem has become transmuted into many of the more ethereal symbols of the advanced and universal religions. Troeltsch and Simmel showed the close correlation between the size of a religious organization and the type of doctrine held: in small sects it is easier to insist upon a strict, undeviating dogma and code of conduct than in the larger, more cosmopolitan, and relatively impersonal churches. Every belief that is in any way tinged by religious passion suffers in strictness and purity as the number of its adherents grows. As Simmel pointed out, the history of socialism illustrates this as well as does that of Christianity.

Sociologists have recently given much attention to the *reference group*. This may be family, school class, church group, or neighborhood, or it may be a street gang or other manifestation of deviant or delinquent behavior. Whatever its nature, the group is by definition

the social entity—complete with values, symbols, and role models—to which one tends chiefly to refer in self-appraisals. One's assessments of one's own actual or potential bravery, cowardice, honesty, loyalty, team play, or betrayal are formed by observation and experience with one's dominant reference group. At any given time we may, especially in complex modern society, have not one or two but many reference groups of varying importance. But generally one group is supreme at any given time: in civil life it may be one's professional group; in war, however, it is likely to be composed of other, comparable, soldiers.

Social authority. The study of authority follows from the study of groups. No group, however small and informal, is without some degree of authority. It may proceed from the dominant personality in the group, from ready consensus, from cooperation necessary to the achievement of some end, or from mere custom and tradition. But no form of social life exists without authority, from the mother's domination of infant to the state's sovereignty over its citizens.

The most famous theorist of authority is Max Weber, who identifies three types: the *charismatic*, the *traditional*, and the *rational-bureaucratic*. The first is the kind of authority that emanates directly from the great individual, whether a Jesus in religion, a Caesar in warfare, or a Napoleon in war and government. Such authority is inseparable from that individual. Often, as in Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism, the charismatic authority of the founder becomes "routinized," as Weber put it, through disciples and followers. Words spoken by the founder become writ, tradition, dogma, and liturgy. Most traditional authority is the result of cumulation through the centuries of certain injunctions or admonitions or simple ways of doing things originally prescribed by some leader of charismatic power. The third great type of authority for Weber was bureaucracy—a rationalized, calculated, designed structure in which the office or function rather than the individual is crucial. Weber and his followers see a large part of history as involving the passage of authority from the charismatic to the traditional to, finally, especially in the modern Western world, the rational-bureaucratic. Weber saw educational, charitable, military, and political organizations, as well as churches, undergoing this development in time.

Some sociologists, such as Robert K. Merton, building on Weber's base, have studied the impacts upon personality of these types of authority, especially the traditional and the bureaucratic. When Weber, citing the poet Schiller, wrote of "the disenchantment of the world," he had in mind the relentless supplanting of the purely spontaneous and the traditional or customary by

the forces of bureaucracy in the modern world. A bureaucratization of the spirit as well as of organizations takes place; sociologists following Weber have brought insights into the sheer power of bureaucracy—power to bend men's wills, power to alter the very ends of an organization. Thus the church, the hospital, the university, or the army may grow so large that the organization becomes its own reason for being, where devotion to organizational processes may crowd out many of the original motivating goals.

The structure of authority has played an immense role in the histories of religions. The authority of Hinduism lies chiefly in the Indian caste system, and it was revolt against caste and its forms of punishments for infractions of caste inviolability that as much as anything inspired the Buddha's renunciation of Hinduism and his founding of a new religion flowing directly from his charismatic being. Struggles over the legitimacy of priestly and ecclesiastical authority have been the substance of a great deal of Christian history: Indeed, the Reformation was largely a challenge to the legitimacy of the authority wielded by the pope and the Curia Romana. It would be difficult to find any religion in which boundless authority is not attributed to some divine being or principle, but as to the mediation by men on earth of that authority, religious sects and churches, like political and economic organizations, differ vastly, ranging from the self-immured anchorite to an organization as huge and complex as the Roman Catholic church.

Social roles. "All the world's a stage," wrote Shakespeare, "and all the men and women merely players. / They have their exits and their entrances; / and one man in his time plays many parts." Natural man is a myth, although that fact has not prevented people through the ages from wondering what an individual would be were he totally isolated from all the social and cultural forces that shape our lives and assign us our varied roles. It is as true to say that human beings are roles as it is to say that all roles are human beings. We do not know people except in their near infinity of roles, but on the other hand any study of roles must be of individual persons.

Roles are, at bottom, ways of behavior, most of which have been handed down through the ages. There is no recognized role that is without norms from the social order to give it direction and meaning; nor can there be a social role that is not a part of some social union or interaction. Even Simeon Stylites occupied a role in the desert that, although physically isolated, was nevertheless part of a religious organization. Very strong in any role is the element of legitimacy. We will accept from individuals in their role capacities as police, physicians,

clergy, teachers, and parents obligations we might be loath to accept from others. We do not consider the most intimate examination of our bodies offensive or immoral if done by a physician, nor do we think the close observation of our minds disturbing if it is carried out by a priest or psychiatrist. Role, in short, confers legitimacy. Killing other human beings is widely deemed immoral, but most people do not hold the same act as immoral when done by a soldier in fulfillment of his legitimate role.

There is also a strong element of duty inherent in every recognized role. To occupy the role of mother or father, teacher or lawyer, cleric or police officer, or any other of the multitude of roles in society means to accept the various values and norms that define or identify these roles. When we find ourselves saying "It is my duty to" perform certain acts of social character, we are only acceding to the implicit demands inherent in every social role. To assume the role of parent is to assume certain duties and obligations, starting with the care and feeding of the infant. Roles are often reciprocal and complementary. Obviously there cannot be a teacher without a student, a physician without a patient. Our culture, drawn from the ages, is the source of the diverse prescriptions for what we think of as normal role-behavior. Illness may be physical in origin, but the actual *roles* of the sick—self-regard and regard by others—are cultural and vary from people to people, age to age.

We must not overlook the phenomenon of *role conflicts*. In simple societies these are few, but they are numerous in a society that is as filled with specializations and alternatives as modern Western society. Essentially the feminist revolution of the past century in the West has been a series of assaults upon previously unchallenged roles of women. Much social history is in essence the history of roles—their persistence, their alterations, their conflicts, and their erasure by negative forces.

Nor should we overlook the history of the *prestige* of given roles. Roles are statuses: any role can be evaluated by its rank in a social order's scale of values. Whenever we ask about anyone's status, we are asking about his position in a social hierarchy. When one is born to or achieves a given role in society, he also, willy-nilly, has the status of that role. A given role—for example, physician, businessman, scholar, or leather worker—can be of very high or low status, depending upon the social order or age in history. But despite the relativity and diversity of status rankings of roles, there are certain universal criteria of the kind of status of a given role—namely, gender, age, wealth, power, education, job, ethnicity, and kinship. Thus, in Western society, a middle-aged, economically or politically powerful, Caucasian, college-educated, professional man

of “good family” has historically been accorded high status.

Social classes are coalescences of people who have low, medium, or high “amounts” of the various kinds of status by which a society ranks its members. Karl Marx declared social class to be the dominant key to the understanding of history, and further believed that in due time the lower class—the proletariat or working class—would overthrow the upper class by revolution, thus inaugurating socialism and a classless society. For Marx, social class, whether low or high, was the crucial determinant of social behavior. But Max Weber, the principal architect of the contemporary sociological theory of status and stratification, realized that in modern, developed Western society, the single concept of class was inadequate to define the complexity of social life. He thus distinguished between power (chiefly political), economic level, and status—the last meaning the ranking an individual may receive in society by factors independent of power and wealth—for example, ancestry, family, breeding, schooling, mental acuity, talent, and so forth. Sociologists have come to realize that, in Western society, social classes are not the distinct, homogeneous entities they once were. The forces of modernization have fragmented social classes as they have kinship systems and certain religions. It is much more accurate today in the West to refer to *minorities* and *elites*, all of highly variable status, all dependent upon numerous spheres of values in our complex society. The number of elites is almost beyond count, and they are to be found in sports, theater, movies, television, and even crime as well as in politics, industry, professional groups, and universities. The large number of roles generated by liberal democracy, a highly technological society, and an increasingly secularized and relativist moral order carry with them the inevitable prestige-ranking that results in their being statuses, ascribed and achieved, as well as roles.

Deviance and change. From its beginnings in the nineteenth century, sociology has been closely concerned with the phenomena of deviance and change in human behavior. Few human beings live their lives in perfect accord with the rules and norms governing social interaction, social groups, social authorities, and social roles. Always there is at least an infinitesimal variance between role perfection, ideally defined, and actual role performance. When such variance becomes pronounced, we refer to it as deviant behavior, that is, behavior that violates the normative rules, codes, and stereotypes of a given social order. From a universal point of view, relativity is the very essence of moral behavior; behavior that would be regarded as deviant in a middle-class U.S. suburb might be acceptable in an

urban ghetto or in an utterly foreign culture. Headhunting would be regarded as deviant, to say the least, in America and most parts of the world, but it is far from being perceived as deviant in certain primitive cultures. The same holds for cannibalism and a host of other practices. What defines deviant behavior is the flouting or bypassing of rules and norms in a specific social order or system. Killing, robbing, arson, mutilation, and assault are almost universally regarded as deviant *within* the social order, but they are not so regarded when they are the acts of legitimate soldiers at war with external enemies.

Émile Durkheim is probably the preeminent pioneer in the study of social deviance, and his most basic principles continue to undergird its study and conceptualization. From Durkheim, especially his famous *Suicide* (1896), we have learned that deviance is at one and the same time abnormal and normal. Suicide, crime, desertion of family, arson, and the like are all abnormal in that they are recognized as violations of a given moral and social code and are punished or deplored accordingly. But, Durkheim continued, certain incidences of these acts of deviance are to be expected—are to be considered *sociologically* normal—when certain social, economic, and political conditions are present. Thus, sudden and high rates of urbanization, industrialization, and secularization in a population are almost certain to induce processes of community disorganization that in turn lead to erosions of social authority and of traditional social roles. Deviant behavior almost always increases in such circumstances. Durkheim concluded that the high rates of suicide he observed in the Western nations resulted from the alienation of people from traditional moral values and from the ties of close social cohesion—family, church, village, neighborhood, and so on.

When we consider change, we often find that it is the continuation and cumulation of deviant acts that will in time lead to changes in the social groups and roles by which deviant behavior is identified. One need think only of the changes that have occurred in the last century in the public definition of what is proper behavior in a “lady.” There is no need to list the behavior patterns now almost universally accepted as respectable in women that even a half century ago would have raised the eyebrows of the conventional. It suffices to say that in very large degree the change in the criteria of female respectability over many decades is the cumulative consequence of a multitude of at first minor, then major deviances from the norm.

Religion is, of course, a fertile field for the study of deviance in the strict sociological sense. Many of the mainline religions have undergone extraordinary

changes in creed and liturgy during the last century, and although we cannot ignore the calculated, planned nature of many of these changes, we are obliged to note the small but increasingly significant deviations of religious people from the strict codes of their forebears.

But not all social change is gradual, continuous, and cumulative. When we turn to the more notable historical changes in social systems and social organizations, we are forced to deal with the discontinuous—with the major conflict, the sporadic event, and the sudden, unforeseeable intrusion of an alien system. Nor can we overlook the immense force of charismatic human beings in religion, politics, science, or other social systems. Most change is slow and incremental, often so slow as to be more nearly persistence and fixity than change. But there are periods when changes are great, sudden, and explosive, inducing myriad consequences in thought and action in the population. Wars such as the two great ones of the twentieth century, spectacular revolutions such as the French and the Russian, spiritual awakenings such as that associated with John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council, major epidemics, rapid scientific and technological advance—these and other great interruptions of the normal have to be taken into consideration when we deal with social change.

There is one more preoccupation with change that has sociological as well as ethnological or anthropological aspects: *social evolution*. At the same time that anthropologists such as E. B. Tylor, Lewis Morgan, and James G. Frazer were constructing their patterns of social and cultural evolution, such sociologists as Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Lester Ward were engaged in almost identical pursuits. Inevitably religion figured large in social-evolutionary schemes. There was search for, and wide disagreement about, the natural origin of religion: some found it in psychic states such as animism, others in ritual acts like totemism, still others in awe of celestial bodies and terrestrial phenomena such as the changes of seasons. There was similarly universal interest among anthropologists and sociologists, and again wide disagreement, about the natural stages of development that religion has gone through from its origins to the development of the great world religions such as Christianity and Islam. For the most part, contemporary sociology has dismissed the kind of interest in social and religious evolution that was rife in the nineteenth century. Both unilinear and multilinear patterns of the supposed development of religion in the human race have come under wide attack as being more nearly philosophical and speculative than scientific. Unlike their forebears, today's sociologists do not foresee the demise of religion and its succession by the scien-

tific and secular. Religion, it is now generally believed by sociologists, answers certain psychosocial needs in human beings, and until or unless these needs become casualties of biological evolution of the human species, religion in one or another form will remain a persisting reality of human culture.

Sociological interest in religion is as great today as it ever has been during the past two centuries. Once the orientation toward universalist schemes of religious evolution faded, much more concrete, empirical, and scientific studies of religious behavior began to proliferate in all Western countries. Numerous sociological studies are to be found on such topics as the relation of religious thought and behavior to social class, to ethnicity, and to wealth and poverty; the systems of authority, stratification, and role formations in religion; religion and political ideology; and religion as a mainspring of social integration, but also of social change and revolution. These are but a few of the problems concerning religion that present-day sociologists consider significant. The general development and refinement of sociological methods of investigation—survey, case history, statistical, and mathematical, among others—have occurred as often in inquiries into religious behavior as in studies of other dimensions of human existence. There is no reason to suppose that the close relation between religion and sociology, now close to two centuries old, will dissolve soon.

[For related discussion, including detailed treatment of themes touched upon in this article, see *Bureaucracy; Evolutionism; Marxism; Study of Religion; Modernity; and Society and Religion*. See also the *biographies of Comte, Durkheim, Tönnies, Troeltsch, and Weber*.]

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illuminating in its uniting of classic and contemporary studies. On social class and social status, we should not overlook Karl Marx's works, commencing with *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* and reaching culmination in *Capital*. The writings of Max Weber, already cited, are eminently pertinent here for their criticism of Marx and their shaping of the contemporary theory of class and status. See also Thomas B. Bottomore's *Elites and Society* (New York, 1965), John Dollard's *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 3d ed. (Garden City, N.Y., 1957), Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), Peter I. Rose's *They and We*, 2d ed. (New York, 1974), and Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb's *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (New York, 1973) for diverse and sensitive insights into status and class.

On deviant behavior, Albert K. Cohen's *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe, Ill., 1955), Howard S. Becker's *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York, 1963), and Marshall B. Clinard's *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*, 4th ed. (New York, 1974), are all notable in the field. Ralph Ellison's novel *The Invisible Man* (New York, 1952) is a recognized masterpiece in the interpretation of individual alienation. David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* should be mentioned again in this context. *Contemporary Social Problems*, 4th ed., edited by Robert K. Merton and me (New York, 1976), is probably the most sweeping and comprehensive study of the various forms of deviance.

An excellent beginning in the sociology of social change is Wilbert E. Moore's *Social Change*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974). Cyril E. Black's *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, 1966) details the patterns of change found in developing countries, and Bryce F. Ryan's *Social and Cultural Change* (New York, 1969) presents a comparative picture of social change in Western and non-Western societies. For contrasting views on the relevance of social evolutionism to the study of change in time, see Talcott Parsons's *The Evolution of Societies*, edited by Toby Jackson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977), and my own *Social Change and History* (Oxford, 1969).

Following are a few of the more notable sociological studies of religion not mentioned above in the text. Joachim Wach's *Sociology of Religion* (1944; reprint, Chicago, 1962) and J. Milton Yinger's *The Scientific Study of Religion* (New York, 1970) are excellent presentations of the broad perspectives of the subject. Peter L. Berger's *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, N.Y., 1967) is distinctive in its command of both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the sociological study of religion. Close to it in importance, and giving greater scope to the methodologies involved, is Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark's *Religion and Society in Tension* (Chicago, 1965). Gerhard Lenski's *The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961) is valuable for the author's own inquiry and also for his wide coverage of other scholarly works. Books on religion as an integrative and stabilizing force are legion; Guenter Lewy, in *Religion and Revolution* (Oxford, 1974), emphasizes the immense role of religion as a force for social change since ancient times. Finally, the monumental work of Werner Stark, *The Sociology*

of Religion: A Study of Christendom, 5 vols. (New York, 1966–1972), must be recommended strongly.

ROBERT NISBET

Sociology of Religion

The systematic and objective study of the relations between religion and society existed long before Auguste Comte (1798–1857) coined the word *sociologie*. Xenophanes (c. 560–c. 478 BCE) was already dabbling in the discipline of sociology when he noted that the gods of the Ethiopians were black and had snub noses, while those of the Thracians had light blue eyes and red hair. Similarly, the Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406 CE), in the *Muqaddimah*, or introduction (1377), to his *Kitāb al-'ibar* (History of the World), displayed a keen understanding of the concept of social solidarity (*aṣabīyah*) in his analysis of the role of religion in the rise and fall of the kingdoms of North Africa. In modern times, classicists, historians of religion, and “secular” historians have undoubtedly written more, and probably better, studies of religion than have professional sociologists. The true strength of sociology as a discipline seems to lie in its more explicit use of models, theories, and, more recently, statistical methods, that collectively make for a coherent approach of broad, or even universal significance. In contrast to more idiographic modes of scholarship, the sociology of religion makes its mark by treating religion and society nomothetically, that is, by searching for their regularities as interrelated networks, or systems, of thought, feeling, and behavior.

The appearance of the sociological study of religion in modern times is closely related to the rise of capitalism, cultural pluralism, religious tolerance, and the liberal state. The discipline therefore cannot claim to be a “natural” way of looking at religion and society. On the contrary, it is a cultural artifact produced by unique historical developments in Western social thought that enabled, or compelled, researchers to distance themselves from the normative claims made by the religions and societies they studied. In effect, the sociology of religion is the product of one of its own seminal concerns, that is, the secularization of religious thought and institutions. In contrast to the sociology of religion, the related discipline of religious sociology has sought closer ties with theology and institutional religion, primarily with the Roman Catholic church in France and Belgium.

The history of the sociology of religion can be roughly divided into four periods: traditional social thought, skepticism and speculation, conservative and romantic reaction, and modern social theory.

Traditional Social Thought. The body of thought that was first transformed and secularized as modern sociology began to take shape can be called traditional social thought. Far from being a unified system of ideas, it included divergent and even contradictory elements: Platonic idealism, Aristotelian teleology, Stoic natural law, Augustinian social realism, and the various social theories of the medieval Schoolmen. What especially characterized traditional social thought was its synthesis of social and ethical analysis. Because society, like nature, was thought to have a goal or purpose, the “is” of social analysis was not separated from the “ought” of values in the era of traditional social thought. In Christian hands, the study of social institutions was ultimately subordinated to soteriological ends. Traditional social thought stressed the cosmological and divine provenience of all rightly established social values and institutions. Regarding man as a social and political creature, it taught the existence of an objectively real “common good” that could be known by “right reason” and realized by goodwill. As do other religions, Christianity defined this common good in terms of a transcendent order of things that included society and the universe alike. The mainstream of traditional social thought expressed the organic unity of society in the language of natural law. According to this theory, institutions could be philosophically justified or condemned—and not only legitimated mythologically—to the degree they reflected the law that God had given to nature itself.

Traditional social thought bequeathed to the sociology of religion some of its basic concepts: society, religion, obligation, and the basic regularity or lawfulness of existence. Transformed as a secular concept, its notion of natural law would become the foundation of the early natural and social sciences.

Skepticism and Speculation. The lawful order of society that theorists in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance sought was one that invited the spiritual perfection of the human race. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thinkers continued their search for order. But the order that now seemed to concern them was one that would explain the diversity of languages, mores, and religions in terms of some simple, natural uniformities. The role played by reason in all of this was magnified by some, including the rationalists, while it was minimized by others, especially the empiricists.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, traditional social thought came under intellectual attack and—after the publication of Richard Hooker’s *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* in 1600—was increasingly on the defensive. The challengers, who were no more

united than the defenders of tradition, included many Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers: political critics such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, satirists such as Bernard Mandeville, the Italian jurist Giovanni Battista Vico, and the *philosophes* (better called *sociologues* according to Crane Brinton) of the French and Scottish Enlightenments. The intellectual inspiration behind this criticism of traditional social thought was also quite diverse. It included Isaac Newton's mechanical philosophy, the anthropocentric epistemology of René Descartes, Francis Bacon's empiricism (and his attack on teleology), and various speculative systems of thought that aimed at putting both society and the economy on more "realistic" foundations, that is, less religious or moral ones. Equally important was the rise of the nation-state and the appearance of the commercial or middle classes, a new element in society that would take over the writing of social and economic theory from the clergy.

Attack on Natural Law. Speaking for the bourgeoisie and proclaiming the triumph of the commercial revolution, a number of seventeenth-century thinkers launched an attack on the traditional concept of natural law. Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, both Protestant laymen, showed that natural law could be divorced from God. Thomas Hobbes went much further and reduced natural law to "convenient Articles of Peace," that is, to a simple, utilitarian device. The "nature" that interested him was not a reflection of a divine order, but the psychobiological nature of insecure, "masterless men" living in a world no longer held together by traditional bonds of loyalty and deference. Even John Locke, who seemed to have boundless respect for Hooker's traditionalism, conceded that the law of nature was merely "a creature of the understanding." These philosophical efforts, which often were undertaken to sanctify property rights, secularized the idea of natural law and extended it from jurisprudence (where the Schoolmen had left it) to moral philosophy, which laid the foundation for the emerging social sciences.

Throughout the eighteenth century, writers of a secular or "enlightened" persuasion blamed religion and superstition for many of society's ills. Anticlericalism became a routine feature of nearly all social criticism. Convinced that religion had failed to curtail the endemic chaos of European life, a search was launched for new sources of social order. As a result, the traditional idea that society should be constructed according to the preordained blueprints of divine and natural law was replaced by the notion that society was, or could be, constructed by man's own "artifice" or "contrivance." A secular, social humanism thus came into being that, in turn, would beget most of the philosophical and socio-

logical theories of the modern world. In order to create a richer and safer society, thinkers such as Hobbes, Mandeville, d'Holbach, Helvétius, Spinoza, and Hume sought to harness or manipulate self-interest and other passions formerly repressed or held in check by traditional social thought.

One of the most important results of this speculation was the discovery of what today would be called social systems. What fascinated thinkers of this period was the possibility of developing impersonal networks of interaction that—without the intervention of religion, morality, or the state—would "naturally" generate order and prosperity. The idea of social systems owed much to literary irony and social satire. It was broached early in the eighteenth century by Bernard Mandeville, who fondly commented on the "publick Benefits" that result from the proper cultivation of "private Vices." Later in that century, Adam Ferguson developed the concept still further when he described institutions that are "the result of human activity, but not the execution of any human design." Adam Smith explained the idea in terms that would soon dominate Western social thought when he said that "systems in many respects resemble machines." As time went on, each of the "systems" developed by social thought—mechanical, organic, cybernetic, and, finally, semiotic—would be used, one after the other, in the sociological analysis of religion.

Unlike his more skeptical colleagues, Smith based his idea of economic and moral systems firmly on natural law and divine providence (i.e., his famous and influential "invisible hand"). Together with Locke's political philosophy, Smith's economics provided a groundwork for the unique synthesis of religious piety, political liberalism, and capitalism that would flourish in the Anglo-Saxon world through the twentieth century. The success of this cultural synthesis probably accounts for the fact that religious scholarship in the United Kingdom and North America has been less anticlerical and antireligious than the social thought of the continent.

Birth of sociology of religion. It was perhaps at this juncture, when "laical social science"—as twentieth-century economist Joseph A. Schumpeter terms it—began to apply the idea of natural law to social and economic phenomena, that the sociology of religion was born. While professing to take an empirical approach, most studies of religion during this period concentrated on the historical or the psychological origins of religious belief, raising questions that could be answered only by speculation. Generally, the effect was to reduce religion to a dependent variable of some more obvious reality such as climate, fear, ignorance, or ecclesiastical legerdemain. One of the most brilliant, but still speculative, essays in the early sociology (and social psychol-

ogy) of religion was written by Adam Smith himself in the *Wealth of Nations* (5.1.3). There the great economist, applying his notions of economic competition and psychological approbation to the problem of sectarian rivalry, produced one of the earliest theories of denominational pluralism.

Among the more valuable contributions made by the scholarship of this period to the sociology of religion was the analysis of religion's role in social control. Pioneers in this area included figures as diverse as Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Secondat), who studied the relation between religion and law, and Mandeville, who was interested in religion and social values. The most important contribution of the age of skepticism and speculation was probably its elaboration of the idea of secularization itself. For many eighteenth-century writers, the decline of religion was simply a corollary of the idea of progress. Most were convinced that as science and enlightenment advanced, religion and superstition would inevitably succumb to the forces of reason. Because changes in religion, social institutions, science, and technology were thought to be closely related, it seemed only natural that changes in one area would bring about automatic improvements in others. Furthermore, because of the alleged universality of the laws of development (denied only by J. G. Herder, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and a few others), the historical progress and secularization of one nation could be taken as a paradigm for the transformation of any other. These assumptions conspired to make the process of secularization appear to be as indubitable as the laws of nature itself.

The thinkers of the age of skepticism and speculation challenged some of the deepest convictions of traditional social thought. In place of the divine origin that tradition had assigned to law, morality, and institutions, these thinkers stressed society's conventional nature. Whereas tradition had given "right reason" the task of conforming society to its natural or sacred patterns, David Hume argued that "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions." The teleology of the common good taught by traditional thinkers was discarded as a "wild goose chase" (as Mandeville put it), and was finally replaced by utilitarian self-interest, Kantian individualism, and the faith that social and economic systems could operate "naturally"—that is, without direct governmental, religious, or moral support. Skeptical philosophers of the age therefore sought to undo the classical synthesis of the sacred and the social. Their various attempts to design an autonomous, secular morality seemed to leave religion with only a minor—or a negative—role to play in the affairs of humankind. For the first time, the office of the moralist was separated

from that of the *moraliste*, that is, the detached observer of social mores. The *moraliste's* disengagement from religious belief and commitment would later become a hallmark of the social-scientific approach to religion.

Conservative and Romantic Reaction. Speculation ultimately ran afoul of the empiricism of the age, especially when it resulted in futile discussions about the origin of religion, or about man's essential instincts in the "state of nature." The havoc caused by the industrial revolution and the French Revolution (and the Reign of Terror that followed in its wake) brought into question the Enlightenment's optimistic belief that man could make or improve his society simply through his own artifice or contrivance. The conservative and romantic reactions that ensued significantly altered attitudes toward society and religion alike.

Romantics bewailed the dehumanizing effects of the industrial revolution and the French Revolution on individuals and communities. They also taught that religion—which played a large role in their discussions of *Volksgeist* and *Volksseele* ("the spirit and soul of the nation or folk")—could no longer be arrogantly dismissed as a vulgar superstition of the past. Conservatives, on the other hand, insisted that society was not merely the artificial creation of individual contractors, but that, on the contrary, the individual was formed by society, and society by God. In effect, they had rediscovered the organic interrelations between community, religion, tradition, authority, and the individual. For conservative thinkers like Louis de Bonald (1754–1840) and François René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848), religion was no longer just a matter of dogma or faith; it was a social phenomenon. As monarchists and spokesmen for the aristocracy, they rejected the idea that self-interest, once it had been set free in the marketplace, would automatically produce social order. Bonald, along with Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861) and Justus Möser (1720–1794), attacked the abstract universalism of contemporary theories of natural law and the individualism implied by the eighteenth century's doctrine of natural rights. In their eyes, these teachings were the philosophical offspring of the political and industrial revolutions that had deformed European civilization.

Through their influence on Saint-Simon and Durkheim, the conservatives deeply influenced later discussions about religion and its role in the formation of institutions and individual life. Their work provided an inspiration for later sociologists who stressed the integrating or stabilizing function of religion. Their analysis of religion as a *corps intermediaire* standing between the individual and the state was a topic that would emerge again in the discussions of intermediate associations,

mediating structures, and guilds in the writings of sociologists from Durkheim to Peter L. Berger.

Modern Social Theory. The development of modern social theory has been characterized by a clearer understanding of the secular foundations of sociology, a determination to move research beyond mere speculation, a professionally cultivated tension between empathy and detachment in fieldwork, sophisticated efforts to relate religious studies to the models and theory-building of the social sciences in general, and ongoing debates over materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, positivism, evolutionism, and the hermeneutics of religious symbols. The anticlerical diatribes of the *philosophes* yielded to a more or less dispassionate analysis of the role of religion in the maintenance of social solidarity and in the promotion of social change.

Although modern social theory really begins in the eighteenth century with David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the Scottish Enlightenment, most sociologists today trace the founding of their discipline to Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and his onetime secretary, Auguste Comte (1798–1857). Sociology does indeed owe much to these two Frenchmen. In Auguste Comte's work, especially in his evolutionary schema purporting to trace history through its religious, metaphysical, and scientific stages, sociology discovered its own mythological charter. For both Marxist and liberal thinkers after Comte, the demise of religion would be taken as the prerequisite of progress and as an axiom of the social and natural sciences. Herbert Spencer dogmatically proclaimed that since moral injunctions were losing their sacred origins, a deliberate secularization of morals was imperative. From the beginning, the controversy over secularization was couched in extreme terms. Some—including Weber, Marx, and later Sorokin—argued that the decline of religion was inevitable. More recently, Talcott Parsons, Robert N. Bellah, Mary Douglas, Thomas Luckmann, and others have maintained that secularization is ultimately impossible. Arguing on empirical grounds, more cautious scholars have suggested that while religion may decline or disappear in specific areas of society, “the secularization process” is not necessarily universal, inevitable, or irreversible.

Contributions of Émile Durkheim. There have been only two truly great figures in the sociology of religion in the modern period, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Between them, they set the problems and parameters of the field, leaving the theoretical integration of their insights to others. Durkheim was influenced not only by Saint-Simon and Comte, but by W. Robertson Smith's writings on Semitic religion and by his own teacher, the classicist N. D. Fustel de Coulanges. Durkheim's pri-

mary contribution to the sociology of religion was his analysis of the role played by religion in the generation of the *conscience collective*, the collective moral conscience and consciousness of society. Although he shared the common assumption of his time that religion was bound to play an ever-smaller role in modern life, he focused not on the demise of religion but on its transformation. He called the religion of modern societies the “cult of the individual.”

Durkheim's analysis of this concept paved the way for modern sociology's interest in diffuse or parainstitutional forms of religiousness, for example, Thomas Luckmann's “invisible religion,” Talcott Parsons's “privatization of religion,” and Robert Bellah's “civil religion.” As a “theologian of civil religion,” as Bellah once called him, Durkheim was vitally interested in using sociology to heal the wounds of the acquisitive individualism he found in modern industrial society. While his moralism, his naive faith in altruism, and his interest in guilds seem rooted in the concerns of traditional social thought, the core of Durkheim's doctrine was thoroughly secular. Although he held that there are no false religions, divinity for him was never more than “society transfigured and symbolically expressed.” His analysis of religion rested on a basic confusion between the meaning or content of religious symbols (their sacrality) and one of the functions of religion (the unifying of society). This confusion caused him to underestimate the dysfunctional or disruptive capacity of religion, and to overemphasize its role in the generation of social solidarity.

The strengths and the weaknesses of Durkheim's sociology of religion were inherited by the functionalist school. As it developed in the hands of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronislaw Malinowski, and others, functionalism sought to interpret religion in terms of its contribution to the total social system, or to the psychobiological well-being and integration of the individual. Some functionalists speculated as freely about the psychosocial functions of religion (e.g., about its fear-reducing function) as did their skeptical predecessors in the eighteenth century. Although widely criticized for the tautological vacuousness of its implicit teleology, whereby religion is nearly reduced to its own consolidating function, functionalism continues to pervade the sociology of religion today as received wisdom, if not as explicit theory.

Influences of German scholarship. German scholarship in the history of religions (*Religionsgeschichte*) and the cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) evolved ways of conceptualizing religion that went far beyond the narrow, cognitive approach of Comte, Spencer, and E. B. Tylor. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) had

insisted that religion was grounded in feeling (*Gefühl*) rather than in the intellect. Consequently, religion must be more than a primitive attempt to “figure out” the world. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), working under the influence of Schleiermacher, pointed out the unique nature of religion and the need to understand it sympathetically, or from within (*Verstehen*), a point that would be developed in a significant way in the sociology of religion by Max Weber.

In 1917, Rudolf Otto, in his epochal book *The Idea of the Holy*, made a frontal attack on Protestant liberalism that, since Kant, tended to reduce the religious experience to ethics. Otto showed, quite to the contrary, that the essence of religion was the experience of standing before the holy in dread, awe, and fascination. The holy, far from being a way of “figuring out” the world, was a mysterious experience that both attracts and repels. Otto called it the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. These developments in German theology and religious studies paved the way for a much more sophisticated and sympathetic understanding of religion than was common in most parts of Europe at that time.

In Germany, the scholars who influenced the sociology of religion most decisively were Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) and Max Weber (1864–1920). Working in philosophical and theological traditions dominated by Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Fichte, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Albrecht Ritschl, Troeltsch emphasized the interaction of spiritual and material forces in religious history. He saw in the history of Christianity a continuous dialectic between movements and institutions that are willing to compromise with the world, and ones that refuse to do so. This became the basis for his typology of church (the compromising religious institution), sect (the rejectionist position), and mysticism (the religious outlook of individuals concerned more about the experience of religious ecstasy than about religious institutions per se).

This simple scheme, modified by the subsequent work of others on denominations, cults, and parainstitutional religions, became the basis for the taxonomy of religious affiliations in the West. Although he finally concluded that Protestantism had been more deeply affected by the modern world than vice versa, Troeltsch seemed to hold—with his friend Weber—that there was a significant relationship between ascetic Calvinism and the rise of capitalism. What primarily set apart the writings of these distinguished scholars was Troeltsch’s historicism and Weber’s ideal-typical, sociological approach to religion.

Contributions of Max Weber. While Troeltsch was deeply perplexed by the theological implications of his own historicism, Weber described himself as a “reli-

giously unmusical” individual primarily concerned about facing up to reality “like a man.” His methodological divorce of facts and values (i.e., “value-free social science”) seemed to be a secular transformation of the relationship between the Creator and the creation, which Weber described in his study of ancient Israel. Likewise, his emphasis on the “ethical personality” seems to have been deeply influenced by the disenchanting Calvinism of his own family. Both the existentialism of his political commitments and his social hermeneutics call to mind the voluntarism of the Calvinist tradition. In short, he was, in many ways, a religious thinker in spite of himself. In the sociology of religion he is known primarily for his thesis that ascetic Protestantism decisively influenced the rationalization of the world in general, and the rise of capitalism in particular.

While others before him had pointed out that modern capitalism developed primarily in the Protestant countries of northern Europe, Weber provided a sociopsychological explanation for the correlation. According to Weber, the Calvinist doctrine of predestination generated a deep anxiety among Protestants—English Puritans in particular—over their own salvation. Believing that wealth was a sign of their election, the Puritans turned to work “in their callings” as though their souls depended on it. In other words, the Puritans’ religious anxiety was the irrational goad behind their rationalization and disenchantment of the world. Believing that his thesis could be proven or confirmed by comparative research, Weber wrote a series of detailed studies on ancient Israel, India, and China. While his basic contentions have been severely criticized by historians, Weber’s thesis continues to be widely debated. Even now, it continues to inspire sociological and historical research. Mastery of the conceptual tools he fashioned is still part of apprenticeship in the sociology of religion (e.g., legitimation, theodicy, charisma, routinization, and so on).

Working as contemporaries, Durkheim and Weber made contributions to the sociology of religion that were as different as they were monumental. While Durkheim stressed the role of religion in the consolidation of society, Weber was interested primarily in the part it played in social change. For Durkheim, collective “effervescence” was the *fons et origo* of religious concepts and power; for Weber the concepts and power of religious systems originated in the charisma of individual founders and prophets. Durkheim believed that sociological analysis began with “social facts”; Weber held that the interpretation of social action ultimately rested on an understanding of the intentionality of individual actors. Durkheim sought to reunite sociology

and philosophy; Weber insisted on their separation. The divorce of the “is” and the “ought to be” that runs throughout Weber’s work on religion grew out of a conviction that there could be no philosophical justification of values. Beneath values he finds nothing but sheer will, prejudice and tradition. Later twentieth-century thinkers as diverse as Herbert Marcuse, on the left, and Leo Strauss, on the right, have sensed in Weber’s work a deeply entrenched nihilism. This nihilism seems to be rooted in his romantic conviction that the secularization and disenchantment of the world are the fate of Western civilization.

Contributions of Karl Marx. Although he is remembered for his pithy and often insightful remarks on religion, Karl Marx’s own contributions to the sociology of religion were negligible. His real impact on the discipline has been made indirectly through the diffusion of his theory of the interaction of the superstructure and infrastructure of society. Marx drew attention to the cultural and functional similarities between religion, law, politics, and ideology—all aspects of the superstructure. While insisting that superstructures are ultimately determined by the “relations of production” at work below, Marx did seem to recognize the relative autonomy of religious concepts, and their ability to function as independent variables. He sought to abolish religion by actualizing its eschatological hopes in this world with revolutionary praxis. Nevertheless, he held that the real secularizing force in modern society is not the revolutionary proletariat, but a bourgeoisie that had “drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor . . . in the icy waters of egotistical calculation.”

Since the Enlightenment, many thinkers have tried to develop a general “sociology of history,” that is, a nomothetic alternative to the historian’s idiographic approach to social change. Vico, Turgot, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Lord Kames (Henry Home), John Millar, Hegel, Herder, Tönnies, and many others sought to explain the complex transition from traditional society to enlightened civilization in terms of some basic dynamics or all-encompassing *Weltplan*.

Applied to religious studies, most of these schemes were highly conjectural. This was especially true of the evolutionary theories of nineteenth-century writers like Herbert Spencer, John Lubbock, and E. B. Tylor. Speculative as their ideas were, the evolutionists soon became enormously influential. Men like Durkheim, Weber, and Tönnies, who did not openly align themselves with evolutionism, nevertheless conceived developmental typologies that were clearly evolutionistic. Marx’s analysis of history was couched in terms of a “dialectical” process, a materialistic variation on Hegelianism that turned history itself into a set of unfolding internal relations.

A number of bourgeois theorists sought to discuss social change without falling prey to the determinism of the Marxists or the positivism of the historicists. Weber had an “approach-avoidance” reaction to the rationalization process that, for him, was the key to historical development. While Weber did not share the naive optimism of most nineteenth-century evolutionists, behind his complex, ideal-typical analysis of the rise of capitalism, one senses a kind of subtle, evolutionary movement at work. In a deliberate attempt to counter Tönnies’s treatment of modern society (*Gesellschaft*) as characterized by a weakening of social bonds, Durkheim insisted that the “organic solidarity” that holds modern society together is just as effective as the “mechanical solidarity” of the past. Applied to the study of religion, the nineteenth century’s preoccupation with conjectural schemes of development had the unfortunate effect of reducing all questions about religion to the question of its place in evolution or history.

Contributions of Talcott Parsons. In the twentieth century, Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) directed the attention of sociology to the place of religion in the general system of social action. In order to solve the “Hobbesian problem of social order,” Parsons devised a number of encompassing systems that combined the insights of Durkheim, Weber, Freud, the Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall, and the Harvard biochemist L. J. Henderson (a disciple of Vilfredo Pareto). Parsons granted to culture, and *a fortiori* to religion, a place of “cybernetic” sovereignty. From its exalted place in the system of action, religion could create values, shape norms, inform social roles, and provide overall guidance to the “systems” of society, personality, and behavior. Among his more important contributions to the sociology of religion and culture were his discussions of “value-generalization,” “denominational pluralism,” “the privatization of religion,” “liberalism,” “fundamentalism,” and the “instrumental activism” of the Neo-Calvinist tradition. In his later work, Parsons gave more attention to the structure of systems and less to “action” as such. Objective factors influencing action received more attention, and the subjectivity of the actor received less. Under his aegis, a revised form of evolutionism enjoyed a brief recrudescence in the social sciences. Although “neoevolutionism,” as it was called, sought to avoid the excesses and ethnocentrism of social Darwinism, its basic categories and dynamics were quite similar: adaptation, sociocultural differentiation, and integration. Out of this period of Parsons’s work came the widely read essay by his student, Robert N. Bellah, entitled “Religious Evolution.”

Because of the ascendancy of religion, ideas, and values in Parsons’s “pattern maintenance,” many criticized him as an idealist, or even as an ideological defender of

the status quo. Ironically, some criticized his later work for its "behaviorism" and "positivism." Whatever the case, toward the end of his life Parsons began to speculate more freely about the "ends of man," the "telic environment," and the "human condition." These interests prompted some to wonder whether, like Bellah, Parsons was trying to go beyond the social sciences, or whether he was about to turn into a theologian himself. For all of his scientific (or scientific) rigor, Parsons—like Durkheim and Bellah—was deeply concerned about the perennial issues of classical social thought.

Contemporary influences. The sociology of religion has received considerable stimulation from literary criticism (Kenneth Burke), contemporary studies in semiotics and hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur) and phenomenology (Alfred Schutz). Edmund Husserl's advice to go back "to the things themselves" has been broadly interpreted by some sociologists as a challenge to take the reported experience of informants more seriously. Thus, phenomenology seems to have inspired in some quarters a renewed interest in a qualitative, humanistic sociology. In religious studies, the term *phenomenology* has come to be applied quite diversely (1) to a nonconfessional, value-free approach to religion; (2) to cross-cultural, comparative studies; and (3) to a descriptive, nonexplanatory orientation toward the sacred that "brackets" both the ultimate reality "behind" it and all influences of this world on its manifestation in society. The phenomenological approach has often encouraged a secular orientation to the study of religion that, in turn, has facilitated the development of religious studies in nontheological circles. It has shown itself antithetical to a sociological orientation only when its "bracketing" puts the investigation of the secular and social influences on religion off-limits.

One of the sociologists responsible for introducing phenomenology into religious studies is Peter L. Berger. Berger's work has been influenced by the sociological phenomenology of Alfred Schutz and by the work of such figures as Durkheim, Weber, Marx, George Herbert Mead, and W. I. Thomas. Holding with other social scientists (such as Talcott Parsons, Robert N. Bellah, Clifford Geertz, Thomas Luckmann, and Arnold Gehlen) that humankind creates culture—and religion—in order to compensate for the limitations of its genetic patterns, Berger treats religious symbols as psychosocial projections generated by a process of objectification, reification, and internalization. Religion functions primarily as a "plausibility structure," legitimating human existence and providing a theodicy to explain its misery. In exceptional cases, such as biblical prophecy, religion may even serve to delegitimize social structures. While Berger's theory of religion rests upon a philosophical anthropology that may be more graphic than real, he

has managed to put together a theoretical vocabulary that many sociologists of religion find useful.

In American sociology, community studies conducted by William Lloyd Warner, Liston Pope, Robert and Helen Lynd, and others have taught us a great deal about the relationships between religion and society. Until the 1940s, the guiding lights of the sociology of religion in the United States were not Durkheim and Weber, but Herbert Spencer, Lester Frank Ward, William Graham Sumner, and W. Robertson Smith; the theory that these thinkers applied to religion was remote from a theological approach. While James H. Leuba in his book *The Belief in God and Immortality* (1916) found that only 19 percent of the "greater sociologists" believed in religion, most of the practitioners of the sociology of religion continued to be believers. Many of these scholars were liberal followers of the Social Gospel movement. Later on, when this movement came under attack by fundamentalism, neoorthodoxy, and the secular academic world, interest in the sociology of religion itself began to wane. (Significantly, this took place at about the same time "value-free" sociology was divesting itself of social work.) H. Richard Niebuhr's *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (1929) went nearly unnoticed by the major sociological journals. By the 1940s, the sociological study of religion in North America had largely passed into the hands of the newly formed Catholic Sociological Society. By the mid-1980s, the Association for the Sociology of Religion had absorbed the Catholic group in a wider, ecumenical organization. Another professional organization called the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion is associated with a more statistical, and sometimes with a more positivistic, approach to the subject.

Conclusions. By about 1920, the sociology and anthropology of religion had generated the concept of culture as it is known in modern social science. Because interest in this field has subsequently shifted from religion to culture itself, the study of religion currently plays a minor part in the sociological curriculum. Although religion made vital contributions to modern social theory (providing even Karl Marx with clues for the demythologizing of exchange value), religious data are now often used merely as illustrations of general theories. Students of the subject spend a great deal of their energy on correlational research ("religion-and- . . ."), that is, studying the interrelations between religion, social mobility, racial prejudice, voting patterns, divorce, family planning and so on. While these studies have greatly expanded our knowledge of the relations between society and religion, they have seldom contributed to the building of theories as such.

Sociologists of religion have "revisited" Troeltsch, Weber, and the other notable theorists, refining the

work of these writers into typologies that seldom have the vigor or the historical perspective of earlier formations. Another indication of the impoverishment of the field is the neglect of comparative, cross-cultural studies. By default, the sociology of religion has become an adjunct to the study of the Christian religion, and not only in the hands of the "Christian sociologists." Although the discipline came to its maturity in the richly comparative work of Durkheim, Weber, and others (who were perfectly at home in philosophy and the humanities in general), historicism, positivism, and the exigencies of academic careers have conspired to reduce comparative studies in the field to a cautious manipulation of easily quantified variables. Because of this lack of historical and comparative depth, few sociologists working on religion have been able to make contributions that are of interest to the rest of sociology or religious studies. The few sociologists who have made their mark in this field (e.g., Bellah, Berger, David A. Martin, and Bryan R. Wilson) have made abundant use of comparative and historical materials. While the study of religion owes much to the social sciences in general, currently anthropology—represented by the work of such writers as Clifford Geertz, Mary Douglas, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Victor Turner—seems to have had a greater impact than sociology itself.

In the modern period, a number of scholars have tried to rebuild the bridges traditional social thought had built between facts and values, namely, the religious engineering of Saint-Simon and Comte, the secular moralism of Durkheim, and various practical studies of the Christian sociologists in North America or the followers of *la sociologie religieuse* in France and Belgium. Nevertheless, because of the limited cultural significance of the sociology of religion today, only a few alienated theologians would say, with Marx, that the critique of society begins with the critique of religion.

In order to alleviate the cynicism that seemed to attend the analysis of religion in conventional sociology, Bellah has called for a more liberal suspension of disbelief ("symbolic realism"). This, in effect, would mark a return to Durkheim's idea that no religion is false. Unfortunately, symbolic realism seems to have led only to an uneasy and inauthentic reconciliation of the social sciences and religious faith. It is rather ironic that the prestige of the sociology of religion has never been higher among the theological disciplines than it is currently. Theologians, biblical scholars, and church historians are turning to a sociological approach to their fields, though sometimes without fully digesting it or realizing its theoretical costs.

Because its roots lie in such far-flung places as idealism, materialism, skepticism, literary satire, and ro-

mantic and conservative protest, the sociology of religion appears to be all things to all people. To put the best face on the fact, some methodologists refer to the discipline as a "multiparadigm" field that, unlike the natural sciences, does not advance by sequentially isolating and falsifying disjunctive paradigms. It does not confront its subject matter head-on with a proud phalanx of unified theory, but from all sides with scattered guerrilla bands armed only with piecemeal models and "polymethodic" tactics. Since the sociology of religion has failed to realize the nomothetic goals it once set for itself, some have legitimately wondered how it differs from the humanities and their idiographic approach.

Today, widespread criticism of the positivism of conventional social science, new interest in semiotics and the cybernetic control of shared cultural symbols, and ongoing investigations into the intentionality of the individual social actor may be paving the way for some interesting changes in the sociology of religion. These changes may bring the discipline into closer and more fruitful relations with the humanities and with the history of religions. The work of Parsons, Bellah, Berger, and others has generated a more sophisticated, less dogmatic attitude toward the theory of secularization itself. A growing number of researchers would probably agree with Saint-Simon that "religion cannot disappear; it can only be transformed."

[For discussion of related topics, see Anthropology, Ethnology, and Religion; Bureaucracy; Christian Social Movements; Civil Religion; Functionalism; Modernity; Political Theology; Politics and Religion; Psychology; Secularization; Society and Religion; Structuralism; and Study of Religion. See also the many biographies of thinkers and scholars whose work is discussed herein, especially Durkheim and Weber.]

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WINSTON DAVIS

SOCRATES (c. 470–399), Greek philosopher. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, was, according to Plato, a man of probity, leader of his deme, and esteemed friend of Lysimachus (*Laches* 180d). Socrates was born a decade following the naval victory of Salamis that lifted the Persian threat and opened to Athens the way to affluence, supremacy in the arts, and the democracy of the Periclean age. Aeschylus was writing plays when Socrates was a lad, and those of Sophocles and Euripides he doubtless witnessed as a youth. He was in his thirties when Phidias was at work on the Parthenon and Athanagoras was philosopher-in-residence to Pericles. In early manhood Socrates is said to have conversed publicly with the famed Sophists Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini, and in no instance is he represented either by Xenophon or Plato as unequal to the occasion.

By middle life Socrates' services at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, as soldier in the ranks, were legendary for imperturbable fortitude. By that time also, eccentricities as public gadfly, as *sophistēs*, as well as much "nonsense" about his preoccupations with "celestial matters" searched out from a basket suspended in "kindred air" suited to his "subtle spirit" were noto-

riously parodied by Aristophanes, a younger familiar of Socrates and comic poet, in his play *The Clouds* (423 BCE). This, while it presumed widespread gossip regarding Socrates, did nothing to dispel the fog. As somewhat ruthless caricature it doubtless amused the knowledgeable, who knew better, while it may have augmented suspicions of the uninformed (*Apology* 18–19).

Following the death of Pericles in 429, Socrates lived to see the weakening of the democracy with the prolonged attrition of the Peloponnesian War. Late in that period, as a senator and when his tribe held the presidency, Socrates refused to allow an illegal proposal fermenting in the Assembly to come to vote (*Apol.* 33b). With the collapse of the democracy and the takeover of the oligarchy, with the tyrannical rule of the Thirty, Critias, a leader of the reaction and former "student" of Socrates, sought to silence the latter's public commentary upon unlawful actions of the regime. Socrates ignored that order and yet another by the Thirty to join in the secret arrest of Leon of Salamis (*Apol.* 33d).

Four years following the restoration of the severely chastened and insecure democracy, one Anytus, of a reputable Athenian family, who was a leader of the resurgence and not unknown personally to Socrates, sought action against him. Anytus, along with Meletus and Lycon, a rhetorician, armed with a written indictment according to law, brought Socrates to trial. After a full hearing before the Heliastic Court of 501 jurors, Socrates was convicted of the charge by a small majority of thirty votes (*Apol.* 36a); and after his honest but daring counter to the motion of the prosecution, he was sentenced to death by the same small majority in 399. Although solicited to flee by friends of means, Socrates remained to accept the judgment of the lawful court for reasons stated in his defense and those supplied by Plato's *Crito*. The latter declares at one time the norm of Socrates' conception of the responsible self, his final principles of action, and the consequent ontological, as well as ethical, problem with which Plato was, for years, to wrestle:

Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. . . . Be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know there are few who believe or ever will believe this. (*Crito* 49c–d)

The indictment brought against Socrates, according to Plato's *Apology*, was as follows: "Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new and spiritual beings." The problem of the historical Socrates may be said to begin here, for Xenophon's version of the charge in the first line of the *Memorabilia* makes the

alleged impiety of Socrates primary and corruption of the youth secondary. This led A. E. Taylor to argue, with great learning, that the impiety of Socrates, tantamount to treason, was his intimate association with a Pythagorean brotherhood that regarded Socrates as the leader of its conventicle; but neither the conventicle hypothesis nor the treasonable nature of such a "foreign" importation is more than conjectural (*Varia Socratica*, vol. 1, Oxford, 1911). However, there is little doubt that Apollonarian Delphi and, probably, Orphic *muthos* figure in the religious perception of Socrates.

The facts seem to be that a small majority of the court, by thirty votes, judged Socrates guilty of the charges for reasons commensurate with their recollections of long-standing rumor. It was a time following hard upon fearful civil turmoil under the oligarchy, and in which, no doubt for many, and in one form or another, their own survival had been at stake. This had been attributable, on the face of it, to the machinations of an elite among whom not a few had, in days gone by, been known to give ear to Socrates—if with amusement, at least with curiosity. Others, like the tyrant Critias or, earlier, Alcibiades, were well remembered as sometime hearers of Socrates. The smoldering popular recollection of the latter could not have been more damaging; for Alcibiades, brilliant advocate and one of three generals of the disastrous campaign against Syracuse (415–414), had been, after the fleet's departure, condemned to death in his absence for arcane sacrilege in the case of the busts of the Hermae, mutilated prior to departure. Ordered home, he was darkly remembered as deserting to Sparta and supplying traitorous information that contributed, according to Thucydides, to the eventual annihilation of the Athenian forces. As preface to his defense, as reported by Plato, Socrates makes it clear that he knows he is indicted and may be convicted merely on grounds of association (*Apol.* 28a).

That public confusion prevailed as to who was this Socrates is perhaps plain enough. It was a question that haunted Plato most of his days, for quite different reasons, and yet it required the greater part of his dialogues to answer. The answers are as various as the *Euthyphro*, the exordium to Calicles in the *Gorgias*, the speech of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, and Socrates as "midwife" of the soul in the *Theaetetus*. Even in the *Philebus*, Plato does not stray far from the question, nor in book 10 of the *Laws*. Yet he is not so much probing for the doctrines of Socrates as for those presuppositions he deems essential to explain the stature of the man himself—the moral colossus. That stature was a *given*, made evident enough in the *Apology*—Socrates' public defense to which Plato (427?–347), a devoted hearer of Socrates and a supreme genius, was witness at age

twenty-seven. The measure of the man, as Plato knew him, is placed in the mouth of Phaedo following upon Socrates' serene and lethal draught of the hemlock: "Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man" (*Phaedo* 118).

In his dialogues Plato does not tire of exhibiting the incomparable acumen of his master in distinguishing truth from error as interlocutor of sundry opinions by way of his dialectical method of cross-examination with its attendant power of refutation (*elenchos*). Plato was aware that, in this, Socrates was in command of an unprecedented instrument of critical intelligence, threatening to anyone presuming orthodoxy (*orthē dōxa*; lit., "right opinion"). This was therefore vastly more than is implied in Aristotle's frugal observation that "Socrates devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was the first to seek of these a general definition" (*Metaphysics* 1078b.15f.). It was not given to Aristotle to understand the Socratic method, in great part because he could not concede, as did Plato, the Socratic *a priori* reach of the *psuchē* (soul). This, to the contrary, Plato sought to clarify, for he found in it the secret of the moral majesty of Socrates—the sublime enigma of the man.

Plato made venturesome advances in the *Phaedo*, as elsewhere, toward an understanding of Socrates' philosophy, but it was not until the completion of his masterpiece, the *Republic*, that he had drafted a coherent anthropology, epistemology, and ontology capacious enough to account for the responsible self of Socrates or for his fidelity to the vocation "the God" had laid upon him of which Socrates himself was, in Plato's account, the repeated witness at his trial. In the long march of the *Republic*, and in addition to a sociopolitical theory, Plato is able to vindicate the astounding confidence of Socrates—and as the kingpin of the theory—"that justice itself is the best thing for the soul in itself, whether it wear the ring of Gyges or not, or the helmet of Hades to boot" (*Rep.* 612b). In this, also, Plato found justification for his estimate of Socrates, that he was "the figure of a man 'equilibrated' and 'assimilated' to virtue's self perfectly, so far as it may be in word and deed" (*Rep.* 498e).

By general consent Plato's dialogues are the incomparable thesaurus for the quest of the historical Socrates. Socrates wrote nothing. Plato is quite aware of the reasons which he adopts for himself in his seventh *Epistle*. He knew that for Socrates, the unequaled pedagogue, the knowledge of wisdom is finally a personal discovery or it is of little worth for the betterment of human life in association, because wisdom (*phronēsis*) includes enactment. Accordingly, for Plato, in the

search for wisdom the truly primary datum was surely Socrates the philosopher at work. In this insight, we may suppose, is to be found the privileged hermeneutic for the quest, within the dialogues, of the historical Socrates. Appropriately, therefore, it is neither indicated nor necessary—as the older quests often supposed—that such dialogues as the *Phaedo* or the *Republic* be viewed comprehensively as aspiring exhibitions of the historical Socrates. A. K. Rogers properly notes that “we should expect to find Plato . . . combining Socratic doctrines with intellectual interests of his own” (*The Socratic Problem*, New Haven, 1933, p. 24).

Above all, in the dialogues we are to find Plato also on his way to a comprehensive understanding of that quality of life he esteemed in Socrates. It was known to him as to other contemporaries in its whimsical and uncensorious irony and inexhaustible humanity. Yet it was joined with a relentless logic of inquiry, and climactically in the serene fidelity of Socrates to a more divine summons he honored, not above the law, but above the opinions of the populace—high or low—and irrespective of their power to commend or to destroy. For Socrates it was true that “virtue comes to us by a divine dispensation, when it does come” (*Meno* 100b). In all of this, as Plato perceived, Socrates was the wholly liberated man. And in this he was an enigma as also he was awesome to many. So, however humane, Socrates could be feared, alike by tyrants and by democrats. He seemed dangerous in his immunity to all special pleading of whatever party. Thus, Plato does not miss the occasion to let us see that Anytus knew these things well (*Meno* 95b), as also Alcibiades (*Symp.* 216c).

If Socrates was to become, in a sense, the “patron saint” of Stoicism, so also he was to be, in a figure, the funnel and solvent through which the ancient Hellenic *ethos*, embracing both the religious and the scientific questing of the human spirit, was to find its complementary, if contrasting, twin issue in the Platonic and Aristotelian interpretations of Reality, and so, it appears, of the *philosophia perennis* of the Western world.

[See also the biography of Plato.]

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ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

SÖDERBLOM, NATHAN (1866–1931), Swedish churchman, theologian, Luther scholar, ecumenical pioneer, and historian of religions. Lars Olaf Johnathan Söderblom was born into a deeply religious family in Trönö, Hälsingland Province, Sweden. His father, a fervent evangelical preacher, was pastor of the Trönö parish and led his family in a life of devotion, study, discipline, and hard work. In 1883 young Nathan entered the university at Uppsala as a candidate in classical and Oriental languages but later changed to work for a degree in divinity. The theological faculty in Uppsala at the time was immovably conservative and literalist; it had been little touched by the German theology reigning on the European continent. Söderblom in consequence was disappointed with his divinity studies.

The outstanding events of the university years for him were the discovery of biblical criticism, his acquaintance with the theology of Albrecht Ritschl, and his participation in the Student Missionary Society. The new biblical criticism posed an acute crisis for Söderblom; while he enthusiastically welcomed its methods and insights, it threatened the conservative Swedish view of the Bible as a literal revelation. Söderblom resolved his difficulties through Ritschl's broad view of a dynamic revelation not confined to the literal words of the book. His attitudes in these matters earned him a reputation as a dangerous liberal, an accusation that would plague him all his life and that probably accounts for his failure to become a docent upon graduation. It was his participation in the Student Missionary Society and a consuming concern for Christian missions that first stimulated Söderblom's interest in non-Christian religious experience and laid the basis for his work as historian of religions.

In 1893 Söderblom was ordained and served for a time as chaplain in the Uppsala mental hospital, but in 1894 he accepted an appointment as pastor to the Swedish legation in Paris. In addition to pastoral duties, Söderblom cemented a close relationship with the Protestant Theological Faculty of the Sorbonne. Auguste Sabatier, A. and J. Réville, and Léon Marillier in particular exerted strong influence on his thinking, and he continued the study of Iranian languages that he had begun earlier. In 1899 he published in Paris *Les fra-vashis*, a short but erudite study of a type of spiritual beings in ancient Iranian religion; his Sorbonne doc-

toral dissertation, *La vie future d'après le Mazdéisme*, followed in 1901, establishing him among the leading Iranologists of Europe.

In 1901 Söderblom was invited to a professorship in Uppsala. The chair was in theology, but under Söderblom it became, practically speaking, one in the history of religions. The strong Swedish tradition in history of religions had its beginning with this appointment. Söderblom was a popular teacher who also rapidly became a decisive influence in the church as a leader of a general revival of religion and theology in Sweden. In 1912 he was appointed to the new chair of the history of religions in Leipzig which he held jointly with that of Uppsala. His most important contribution to the theory of the nature of religion, *Gudströms Uppkomst* (2d ed., Stockholm, 1914), and his books *The Nature of Revelation*, translated by Frederic C. Pamp (Oxford, 1933), and *Natürliche Theologie und allgemeine Religionsgeschichte* (Stockholm, 1913) belong to these years. The German connections also enabled him to carry out his work of reconciliation among Christians of the belligerent nations during World War I.

In 1914 the Swedish king chose Söderblom to replace J. A. Ekman as archbishop of Sweden. The first four years of his tenure coincided with World War I, and even while the fighting continued, Söderblom pleaded for a conference between Christians of the two sides. His interest in ecumenical matters had begun in his student days, and it continued through the Lambeth Conference of 1905 and the agreement between Anglicans and Swedish Lutherans concluded in 1922. The culmination for Söderblom was the great Stockholm conference of 1925 on life and work, of which he was a principal mover. His work among the combatants in World War I and his efforts toward Christian unity were the principal bases for the award of the Nobel Peace Prize that he received in 1930. The last of many honors bestowed on him was the Gifford lectureship for 1931–1932. He delivered the lectures for 1931, published as *The Living God* (1933; reprint, 1962), but he died before he could complete the series.

The central element in Söderblom's thought, as apparent in his work both as theologian and as historian of religions, was the concept of revelation. He held that revelation is dynamic, not confined to the words of the Bible but also to be seen in nature, history, and genius. Neither is it the exclusive possession of Christianity, for he believed there to be revelation wherever genuine religion is found. Nevertheless, he also held to the inherent religious superiority of Christianity over other traditions and believed that he could prove this superiority through purely disinterested and scientific study of the history of religions. His effort was thus to gain a concrete grasp of the world's religions in all their historical

diversity and richness but also to demonstrate the merits of Christianity as the climax of the revelation of the living God to human beings.

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CHARLES J. ADAMS

SOFER, MOSHEH (1762–1839), Jewish religious leader, known as the Ḥatam Sofer (Ḥasam Soyfer in Ashkenazic pronunciation) and as Moses Schreiber in governmental documents. Born in Frankfurt, Mosheh Sofer studied there under the chief rabbi, Pinḥas Horowitz, and under Natan Adler, a qabbalist known for his strict and unusual ritual practices. When in 1782 Adler became the rabbi of Boskowitz, Moravia (in modern Czechoslovakia), Sofer left with him. He married in Prossnitz, Moravia, in 1787 and later served as rabbi of Dresnitz, Moravia (1794–1798), and of Mattersdorf, Hungary (1798–1806). From 1806 until his death he was the chief rabbi of Pressburg (modern Bratislava, Czechoslovakia), then one of the chief cities of Hungary, where he established a large and influential *yeshivah* (Talmudic academy). After the death of his first wife he married the daughter of 'Aqiva' Eger, one of the leading Talmudists of the age. His descendants (all by his second marriage) include a number of important Talmudic scholars and Orthodox leaders.

The Ḥatam Sofer is generally viewed as the intellectual leader of the "Old Orthodox" opposition to Reform Judaism. One of the last great Talmudic scholars educated in Germany, he differed from later German Orthodoxy in that he opposed not only all ritual and liturgical innovations but also any changes in traditional education and style of life. Coining the slogan "The Torah forbids what is new," he vehemently fought the Mendelssohnian Enlightenment (*Haskalah*), the use of German in sermons, and even the slightest innovation in custom. He wished to retain Jewish national and cultural separateness and to strengthen the moral and coercive powers of the rabbinate and Jewish community to prevent innovation. He viewed the legal emancipation of the Jews as a poor substitute for messianic redemption and a return to Zion.

A charismatic and energetic leader, the Ḥatam Sofer aroused both intense admiration and violent opposi-

tion. His influence in western Hungary on Orthodoxy, especially non-Hasidic Orthodoxy, remained intense into the twentieth century; his example helped give Hungarian Orthodoxy its zealous, uncompromising imprint. Outside the Hungarian cultural area, his influence was felt mainly in the realm of traditional Talmudic and halakhic (religious-legal) scholarship. Though the Ḥatam Sofer published very little during his lifetime, the immense corpus of his posthumous works includes almost twelve hundred *responsa* (legal opinions), *novellae* on the Talmud, sermons, biblical and liturgical commentaries, and religious poetry.

[For further discussion of Sofer's influence on Hungarian Orthodoxy, see Orthodox Judaism.]

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STEVEN M. LOWENSTEIN

SOHM, RUDOLF (1841–1917), German Lutheran jurist and church historian. Rudolf Sohm was a member of the law faculties at Göttingen, Freiburg, Strassburg, and Leipzig universities and published in the fields of Roman and Germanic law and of canon law and church history. As a renowned jurist he entered into the controversy regarding the character of authority and organization in the primitive Christian community. In 1892 he published the first volume of his masterwork, *Kirchenrecht* (Canon Law); the second volume was published posthumously in 1923. Sohm was politically active and in 1896 he helped Friedrich Naumann found the National-Sozial Partei (not to be confused with the later Nazi party).

In *Kirchenrecht*, Sohm argued that the early church had no legal constitution. He claimed that "ecclesiastical law stands in contradiction to the nature of Ecclesia." Legal concepts, he believed, are completely inappropriate when considering the early church, which was informed by a power of a different order. This power he called "charisma" (from Gr., *charis*), which is "a gift of grace" imparted by the Holy Spirit. In Paul's view (*I Cor.* 12:4–28), the gifts of grace are manifest in the congregation as well as in apostles, prophets, and teachers. The congregation had the "gift" of acknowledging charismatic leaders; the community was not a democracy but rather a "pneumatocracy." In his interpretation

Sohm found that the community gave special status to the teacher whose charismatic gifts were exercised in conjunction with scripture and sacraments.

The development of a legal order within the church was a "fall" away from authenticity. This "fall" brought about the heresy, or apostasy, of Roman Catholicism and of bureaucratized Lutheranism. The fall away from the authentic church appeared in the development from the charismatic power of the individual Christian leader to the authority of the Christian official (in possession of legal and tenure rights), thence to a Christian corporation with legal and coercive control over individual salvation. This "fall" occurs because the unregenerate "natural man" is a "born Catholic" who seeks legal authenticity and a guarantee of salvation and who desires what is tangible and visible, providing pomp and circumstance that appeal to the senses. This "natural man" relies upon "small faith" bound to ecclesiastical law, that is, bound to the past. The true church is invisible and, as Martin Luther asserts, is oriented to the believers' life with God through Christ and the Holy Spirit, a regenerating power. Faith in the invisible church is a protection of the freedom of the gospel and against the absolutizing of the authority of the visible church.

Sohm has been severely criticized for having no concept of church order, for example, by his admirer Ernst Troeltsch in *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (1912). On the other hand, Emil Brunner was considered Sohm's disciple (see Brunner's *Missverständnis der Kirche*, 1951); Karl Barth spoke scornfully of Brunner as "only a follower of Sohm." Sohm's work has exercised a significant influence on biblical studies and on studies in ecclesiology and in the critique of tradition. Max Weber appropriated, generalized, and secularized Sohm's concept of charisma, thus almost entirely transforming it. [See Leadership.]

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JAMES LUTHER ADAMS

SŌKA GAKKAI (Value Creation Society) is a lay organization affiliated with the Japanese Buddhist priestly order Nichiren Shōshū (True School of Nichiren). Nichiren (1222–1282), a priest versed in the teachings of the Japanese Tendai sect, expounded the *Lotus Sutra*

(Skt., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*) as Gautama Buddha's final revelation of truth, and, because his own life experiences fulfilled Śākyamuni's predictions in the *Lotus Sutra* that the votary of the *sūtra* would undergo various persecutions, claimed to be Jōgyō, the *bodhisattva* heralded in the *sūtra*. Nichiren taught the invocation (*daimoku*) "Nam-Myōhō-*renge-kyō*" ("Homage to the *Lotus Sutra*"), which he inscribed on the sacred *maṇḍala* scroll, the Gohonzon, enshrined at Taisekiji, near Mount Fuji. The scroll is regarded by devotees as the embodiment of enlightenment and the essence of life. [See the *biography of Nichiren*.] Nichiren's disciple Nikkō founded Nichiren Shōshū, one of thirty-one Nichiren sects, and established the head temple, Taisekiji. [See the *biography of Nikkō*.] Nikkan (1665–1726), a chief priest at Taisekiji, systematized the sect's teachings based on Nikkō's declaration that Nichiren was the eternal Buddha, of whom Gautama (Śākyamuni) was only a precursor.

In 1930, Makiguchi Tsunesaburo (1871–1944), a teacher, published his work on what he termed "value-creating education" in accordance with the teachings of Nichiren, and founded an association, Sōka Kyoiku Sakkai (Value Creating Educational Society). During World War II he and his assistant, Toda Jōsei (1900–1958), were imprisoned and the society was persecuted and forced to disband. After Makiguchi died in prison, Toda came to realize that his task was to propagate his teacher's faith. He reestablished Sōka Gakkai, instilling in his followers a spirit of vigorous proselytism. This philosophy of evangelism, *shakubuku* (often translated as "break and subdue"), has been much criticized in journalistic accounts, but is espoused by followers as an act of compassion toward unbelievers that destroys false beliefs and confers upon them the blessings of Nichiren Buddhism. Conversions were numerous, and by 1958 the membership was 750,000 families.

The third president, Ikeda Daisaku, introduced a somewhat more circumspect application of *shakubuku*. Under his leadership membership by the mid-1980s had reached over ten million families in Japan and over a million elsewhere in the world. Ikeda, now president of Sōka Gakkai International and one of Japan's best-known public figures, is a prolific author and frequent traveler who is particularly devoted to the cause of world peace and who has engaged in extensive discussion on current issues with international political, academic, and cultural leaders.

Makiguchi stressed three cardinal values: benefit, beauty, and goodness (the satisfaction, respectively, of material, spiritual, and altruistic desires). The concept of benefit replaced the Kantian notion of truth, since the "true" was regarded as merely factual reality that in it-

self might not promote happiness, the supreme goal. Sōka Gakkai roots these ideas in adherence to Nichiren's teachings, and members realize these goals in the three practices: by chanting, morning and evening, the Daimoku and passages from the *Lotus Sutra* (an activity called *gongyō*) before a shrine containing a replica of the Gohonzon; by studying Nichiren's writings; and by teaching others.

Together with the Kaidan (place of instruction and dedication), the Gohonzon and the Daimoku constitute the "three great secret laws." The Gohonzon is held to contain the universal power of all Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, many of whose names are inscribed on it. The Daimoku is not a mantra or technique for meditation but the agency of enlightenment itself. Assiduous chanting of the invocation is held to bring wisdom, compassion, and energy; to be the source of happiness, health, and prosperity for individuals; and to cause inner reformation, the foundation of world peace and of salvation for all mankind. The phrase "Nam-Myōhō-*renge-kyō*" invokes the entire *Lotus Sutra*, encompassing it and all it contains. The two chapters of the *sūtra* are recited with the purpose of praising but simultaneously refuting Śākyamuni's Buddhism; they point to "Nam-Myōhō-*renge-kyō*" as the fundamental law that permeates the whole universe and makes Buddhahood available in this life. This is the "excellent medicine" referred to in the *sūtra* for people born during the last epoch of the Buddha's Dharma, the Latter Days of the Law (*mappō*). Thus, to encourage others to chant is a vital purpose of Sōka Gakkai. For Nichiren Shōshū and for Sōka Gakkai, the Kaidan is Taisekiji itself.

Nichiren Buddhism is the faith especially suited to *mappō*, the present epoch, during which the masses will experience human revolution. The doctrines of *karman* and the cycle of rebirths are acknowledged (without affirming self-identity or consciousness between past and present lives), but emphasis is on one's present life in this world. The three practices are believed to alter the accumulated effects of past causes, and are the cause of beneficial future effects. Sōka Gakkai proclaims a middle way that rejects extreme asceticism or materialism, collectivism or individualism. The goal is human revolution leading to *kōsen rufu*, worldwide proclamation on the basis of which will emerge world peace.

For members of Sōka Gakkai, salvation implies social, political, and cultural responsibility. The phrase "ōbutsu myōgō" ("the union of king and Buddha") used by the society may legitimize its involvement in the secular sphere, its work for world peace, human welfare, and enlarged cultural and educational opportunities, and its goal of reforming all human activities by intro-

ducing Buddhism into the sphere of everyday life as the basis for the creation of values.

The movement rapidly grew in its early years among the working classes, with conspicuous success, for instance, among coal miners in Hokkaido. Sōka Gakkai has also had a strong appeal for young people. Its vertical organization is from local cells to international structures, while horizontal divisions cater specifically to different age and sex categories. Small discussion groups (*zadankai*) are held to sustain members' commitment and facilitate conversion; mass festivals intensify solidarity within the movement; and pilgrimages to Taisekiji reinforce faith on an individual level. The movement runs several schools and a university in Japan, and sponsors many cultural events. In 1956 several successful candidates were sponsored for the Japanese parliament; since that time, Sōka Gakkai has promoted the Kōmeitō (Clean Government party), which, however, has remained independent of it. By the 1970s the Kōmeitō had become the third largest political party in Japan.

The relation of the lay leaders of Sōka Gakkai to the priests of Nichiren Shōshū has at times been uneasy: dissension has sometimes occurred, but disputes between the two groups in the late 1970s were resolved without serious schism. Sōka Gakkai provides the priests with income, buildings, and adherents, while the priests legitimize worship by members by providing authenticated replicas of the Gohonzon for household and local branch use.

[See also Nichirenshū and New Religions, *article on New Religions in Japan.*]

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BRYAN R. WILSON

SŌ KYŌNGDŌK, (1489–1546), a leading Neo-Confucian philosopher of Yi-dynasty Korea (1392–1910). In Korea he is best known by his honorific name, Hwadam. During the Yi dynasty, Neo-Confucianism supplanted Buddhism as Korea's main spiritual and intellectual tradition. Among the many Neo-Confucian thinkers in Korea during this five-hundred-year period, three are honored above all others: Hwadam, Yi Hwang (T'oegyē, 1501–1570), and Yi I (Yulgok, 1536–1584). These three philosophers are credited with bringing the Korean assimilation of the complex Neo-Confucian system of thought to complete maturity and with developing a characteristic Korean problematic.

Hwadam, the earliest of the three, is renowned as an original and seminal thinker. He came from a relatively poor gentry family and was largely self-educated. Although he was repeatedly offered posts in government, he never accepted, choosing instead to lead an impoverished life in the mountains or countryside, where he devoted himself entirely to study and teaching. There are many anecdotes concerning his inquisitiveness regarding natural phenomena, but his most serious work was devoted to fundamental metaphysical questions and to the complex system of the *Book of Changes* (Kor., *Yōkgyōng*; Chin., *I ching*).

Hwadam strongly proclaimed his independence of judgment and his originality; the small body of his writings that have come down to us, however, bear a marked resemblance to the monistic metaphysics of material force (Kor., *ki*; Chin., *ch'i*) developed by the early Chinese Neo-Confucian, Chang Tsai (1020–1077). Like Chang, he taught that material force was the sole component of all existence. In its ultimate, formless, pure condition, material force is without beginning or end; this he referred to as the Supreme Vacuity (Kor., *t'ae ho*; Chin., *t'ai hsiü*). By a process of condensation the distinct forms of the beings of the phenomenal world emerge from the Supreme Vacuity, and to it their stuff returns at death. Thus he argued that in the strict sense there is no death, only transformation.

Korean Neo-Confucianism is especially known for its exclusive adherence to the orthodox tradition of Chinese Neo-Confucianism derived from the thought of Chu Hsi (1130–1200). Hwadam lived at the end of Korea's fluid appropriation period. However, his thought is bold and deviant in a tradition that soon after became both more judicious and more authoritarian. Most later scholars followed the apparent dualism of the Chu Hsi school, but, among them, one school of thought tended to emphasize the role of material force; this school traces its immediate ancestry to Yi I (Yulgok), and ultimately to Hwadam. A distinctive characteristic of Korean Neo-Confucian thought is its thor-

ough exploration of the implications and tensions in Chu Hsi's dualism of principle (Kor., *i*; Chin., *li*) and material force. Hwadam's philosophy expressed a pure polar position that permanently established one of the extreme parameters of Korean Neo-Confucian thought. As such it became a constant reference point for later generations of thinkers.

[See also Confucianism in Korea.]

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MICHAEL C. KALTON

SOL INVICTUS. Worship of the sun god, Sol, was known in republican Rome, but it was of minor importance. In imperial Rome, however, in the third century CE (the last century of pagan Rome), the cult of the sun god became a major and, at times, dominant force in Roman religion. The cult of the Syrian sun god from Emesa, installed at Rome under the emperor Elagabalus (218–222), was short-lived, but in 274 the emperor Aurelian began a vigorous campaign of propaganda celebrating the sun god as the exclusive protector of Rome's imperial might. Under the epithets *oriens* ("the rising one"), *invictus* ("the invincible one"), and *comes Augusti* ("comrade of Augustus"), Sol was hailed as "the rising sun who dispels the forces of evil," as "invincible conqueror of Rome's enemies," and as the "companion and guardian deity of the emperor."

Numismatic iconography, our primary source for this propaganda campaign, portrayed Sol wearing the radiate crown and holding the globe, symbol of world rule, in his hand, while the vanquished enemy cowered at his feet. This campaign was continued with particular force by the emperors Probus (276–282) and Constantine (306–337). As late as 324, coins of Constantine celebrated Sol as the grantor of imperial power to the emperor. Only thereafter, in the last thirteen years of Constantine's reign, did references to Sol and to all other pagan divinities disappear from the coins.

A variety of influences contributed to the importance of Sol Invictus, the Invincible Sun, in imperial ideology of the third century CE. It was an age of religious syncretism and growing monotheism, when philosopher and common man alike increasingly viewed all divini-

ties as emanations of one supreme divine force. Sol was equated with Mithra, and as Sol Invictus Mithra was regarded as the most powerful and most immediate divine mediator between man and the invisible majesty of the supreme god. Thus Sol Invictus was the natural associate of the emperor, who ruled the earth as the vicegerent of the supreme god. The symbolism of the Pantheon built by the emperor Hadrian (117–138) had already intimately linked the emperor and Sol as the visible manifestations of the beneficent and omnipotent supreme god. The cult title *Invictus* was a natural outgrowth of this relationship. First attested for Sol in 158 CE, it was almost certainly borrowed by the god from the emperor's own panoply of titles.

The pervasive influence of imperial propaganda, together with the popularity of Mithraism in the third century, assured Sol Invictus an influence upon other divine formulations, Christian as well as pagan. A vault mosaic of the third century in the tomb of the Julii under Saint Peter's portrays Christ as Sol, rising in his chariot. The words of the Christmas Mass in the *Missale Gothicum* hail Christ as Sol Iustitiae ("sun of justice"), while the traditional date of Christmas, first attested in the fourth century, is hardly unrelated to the fact that 25 December was celebrated as the birthday of Sol Invictus Mithra.

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J. RUFUS FEARS

SOLOMON, or, in Hebrew, Shelomoh; son of David and third king of Israel and Judah (c. 960–920 BCE). During Solomon's reign the united kingdom reached its greatest extent and height of prosperity. The account of this reign, in *1 Kings* 1–11, is in its present form a collage of various historical and literary sources. Solomon's accession to the throne (*1 Kgs.* 1–2), portrayed as the result of palace intrigue and a struggle for power between two sons of David and their supporters, is part

of the so-called court history of David. The hand of the Deuteronomistic historian, the author of the larger history of the monarchy in *Kings*, may be seen in his treatment of the theophany in *1 Kings* 3:1–15 and its parallel in 9:1–9, in the account of the building of the Temple and its dedication (chapters 5–8), and in Solomon's failures and God's rejection of his rule over the northern state of Israel (*1 Kgs.* 11). This historian did make use of an earlier source, the "book of the deeds of Solomon" (*1 Kgs.* 11:41), which probably contained information on building activities and other royal undertakings gleaned from royal inscriptions. The basic history by the Deuteronomist was also embellished by later additions having to do with the greatness of Solomon's reign. The treatment of Solomon in *2 Chronicles* 1–9 depends upon *Kings*, with some omissions and additions. The sources cited by the Chronicler, however, namely books by the prophets Nathan, Ahijah, and Iddo, are most likely fictitious.

Solomon's greatest achievement, according to the historian of *Kings*, was his building of the Temple and palace in Jerusalem (*1 Kgs.* 5–8). Originally the Temple was built as a royal sanctuary, one of many temples throughout the realm, but through the centralization reform of King Josiah (*2 Kgs.* 22–23) it became the only legitimate cult place in the kingdom, and it is from this perspective that the Temple's significance is treated in *Kings*. [See *Biblical Temple*.] Solomon is also credited with the construction of major fortifications at Hazor, Megiddo, and Gezer for the consolidation of his realm, and this building activity seems to be confirmed by archaeology. The Bible also suggests that the state prospered greatly from various commercial ventures, a fact attested by a marked rise in the level of the material culture of the land as evidenced by archaeological finds. Nevertheless, one must be cautious in accepting all that is attributed to Solomon's reign, for it is unlikely that he had political control over the whole region from the Euphrates to the border of Egypt or that his court and military force were as large as *1 Kings* 5:1–8 (EV 4:21–28) states.

The biblical tradition celebrates Solomon's wisdom. The historian of *Kings* tells the story (*1 Kgs.* 3) of how Solomon experienced a dream theophany at Gibeon in which God granted him his request for wisdom in order to govern his people aright and, along with wisdom, gave him long life and prosperity. This gift of wisdom is then illustrated by a folk tale in which Solomon makes a successful judgment between two mothers who claim the same infant. This theme of Solomon's wisdom is greatly expanded by later additions, including the story of the queen of Sheba's visit and other remarks about Solomon's great wisdom and wealth (*1 Kgs.* 10).

The Deuteronomist regards the decline of Solomon's realm and the ultimate division of the kingdom as the result of Solomon's marriages to many foreign wives. While these may have been diplomatic marriages made as a matter of state, the historian viewed them as encouraging the importation of foreign deities into the kingdom, thereby compromising the exclusive worship of Yahveh. A more immediate cause of political unrest and division of the kingdom is attributed to Solomon's heavy taxation of the Israelites, from which no relief was given by his successor, Rehoboam, a condition that led to Israel's revolt (*1 Kgs.* 12). The Chronicler refrains from any criticism of Solomon's reign.

On the basis of the statement about Solomon's composition of many proverbs and songs (*1 Kgs.* 5:12 [EV 4:32]), later editors of the Bible attributed to Solomon much of the *Book of Proverbs* as well as the *Song of Songs*. It also led to the composition of works in Solomon's name. The author of *Ecclesiastes* calls himself "the son of David," thereby suggesting his identity with Solomon. Two later Jewish works using Solomon's name are the *Wisdom of Solomon*, written in Greek in Alexandria, and the *Psalms of Solomon*, probably written in Hebrew in Roman Palestine. An early Christian work ascribed to Solomon is the *Testament of Solomon*.

Both the New Testament and the Qur'ān (surah 21:78–81) make reference to Solomon's wisdom, but it is especially in Jewish *aggadah* (Ginzberg, 1956) that his wisdom and career receive the fullest amplification. Solomon is made an expert in many fields of science as well as in occult and hidden wisdom. Many additional stories are told in the *aggadah* to illustrate Solomon's ability to judge wisely. Special attention is given to the building of the Temple and to Solomon's throne, which later becomes a prize of war transmitted from one invading kingdom to another down to Roman times. The aggadic tradition also tells about a period of humiliation that Solomon endured for his sins against the Law. During this time he was an outcast, and an impostor reigned in his stead until he eventually regained the throne.

The Solomonic tradition embraces the whole wisdom tradition, both in its worldly aspect and in its piety, and embodies all the fantasies about the past glory of the united kingdom of Israel and Judah at the height of its power.

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JOHN VAN SETERS

SOLOMON ISLANDS RELIGIONS. Peoples of the Solomon Islands have been divided by convention into “Melanesian” (Guadalcanal, Malaita, Isabel, San Cristobal or Makira, Gela, New Georgia, Choiseul, Shortlands, Santa Cruz) and “Polynesian” (Rennell, Bellona, Tikopia, Anuta, Sikaiana, Ontong Java). The Melanesians of Bougainville and Buka, in the northern Solomons chain, are often included, although they are separated by a political border and by gulfs of language (since Papuan languages, as opposed to Oceanic Austronesian languages, are mainly spoken in the northern Solomons). Solomons religions can conveniently be classed as Melanesian and Polynesian, despite modern linguistic evidence showing close relationships between the Oceanic languages of the southeastern Solomons and those of eastern Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.

The Polynesian outliers in the Solomons have religions of the western Polynesian type, of which Raymond Firth, Richard E. Feinberg, Ian Hogbin, and Torben Monberg have given good descriptions. Firth's detailed studies of Tikopia ritual and belief provide some of the best evidence on traditional Polynesian religion. [See Tikopia Religion.]

The Melanesian religions of the Solomons were preeminently concerned with mediating relations with ancestral ghosts and nonhuman spirit beings, soliciting and manipulating their support, and deploying powers of magic for success in fighting, feasting, gardening, fishing, curing, and other pursuits. Through sacrifice of pigs and other offerings, through elaborate rituals, and through prayer, the living sought the support and potentiation without which human efforts alone could not succeed.

For most parts of the Solomons we have limited evidence on the pre-Christian past: Christianity took early hold on Gela, Isabel, the New Georgia group, Choiseul, the Shortlands, and most areas of Guadalcanal and San Cristobal. Douglas L. Oliver's important prewar study (published in 1955) of the Siuai of Bougainville gives good evidence on the religion of a Papuan-speaking people, and A. M. Hocart's early texts from Simbo (Ed-dystone) are useful in reconstructing a western Solomons religious system. Some modern ethnographers of

Malaita have worked in areas where the ancestral religions are still practiced. The more recent studies shed new light on old problems of Melanesian religion.

Ghosts, Gods, and Spirits. The pioneer student of Melanesian religions, R. H. Codrington, observed that Solomon Islanders and New Hebrideans worshiped two broad categories of invisible beings: ancestral ghosts and spirits that were never human. Whereas New Hebrides (Vanuatu) religions focused on spirits, according to Codrington, those of the Solomons focused on ghosts.

If we look at the western and northern Solomons as well as the southeastern islands that Codrington knew best, this generalization fades. In the New Georgia group and Choiseul, ancient beings, which Hocart (1922) and Harold Scheffler (1965) refer to as “gods,” were accorded a central place. These gods differed in their powers, nature, and mythic origins; they were often ranked hierarchically as more or less powerful, as intervening in different ways and degrees in human affairs, as having introduced different customs and skills. The *bangara* of Choiseul and the *tamasa* of Simbo are relatively well documented. From Papuan-speaking Bougainville, we have Oliver's account of the Siuai *kupuna* spirits, some of which affected the lives of all, while others affected only local descent groups.

In all parts of the Solomons, including the areas where higher spirit beings were believed to exercise the greatest powers, ancestral ghosts were thought to be ever-present participants in daily life, propitiated by and watching over their living kin. The *manuru* ghosts of Choiseul and the *tomate* of Simbo are counterparts of the *tindalo* of Gela and the *akalo* of Malaita.

Other classes of spirits, of forest and sea and sky, were recognized by Solomon Islanders. These spirits were of nonhuman origin. Some were malevolent, others merely capricious. Some were involved in human life; others were distant. Snakes, birds, sharks, and other animals were often seen as messengers from or manifestations of these spirits. Representations in folk art and in drawings collected by early ethnologists suggest that the spirits were often conceived as having (invisible) forms that combined animal and human features.

Shades, Souls, and Abodes of the Dead. Most Melanesians of the Solomons recognized two or more non-physical components of a human being. Commonly a distinction was made between “breath” and “shadow” (or “reflection”) as component souls. Souls of the dead were generally believed to go to an afterlife, a land of the dead where souls lived in villages and gardened and fished in an existence parallel to corporeal life. These abodes of the dead were usually associated with particular islands. Marapa in Marau Sound, Guadalcanal,

and Ramos Island, between Malaita and Isabel, were commonly thought by peoples in surrounding areas to be abodes of the dead. But whereas one soul component went off to the village of the dead, an ancestral shade, all-seeing though usually invisible, remained around the living.

Dream experiences were taken as the wanderings of one's shade among the shades of the dead and of the living: reports by those who recovered from coma were taken as experiential evidence on the fate of the dead (in Oceanic languages, the term *mate* commonly refers both to states of coma and to death). Communication with the dead, in the form of dreams, divination, omens, and prayer, infused daily life with religious significance.

Yet although Melanesians of the Solomons were deeply religious in the sense that they saw everywhere the signs of ghosts, deities, and spirits, their concerns were pragmatic rather than theological, focused on this world rather than on the invisible world lying behind it. Thus most Melanesian peoples of the Solomons had relatively undeveloped ideas, other than those expressed in myths of origin or of ancient times, about the nature of the spirit world and about how spirits intervened in human life. Ghosts, according to the Kwaio of Malaita, are "like the wind" in manifesting their effects in many places at once, and in going beyond the constraints of time, space, and agency that bind the living. But how these spirits do whatever it is they do is beyond human ken and even beyond human interest. The living are concerned not with explaining unseen forces but with using them to practical ends: with interpreting and manipulating the will of spirit beings, enlisting their support, and deploying their magical powers. Whether the ghosts or spirits have done their part can be discovered by divination, read in omens, or known retrospectively in the outcomes of human effort: success or failure in fighting, feasting, and other enterprises.

Mana. Retrospective pragmatism and relative unconcern with theological explanation and all-embracing cosmology are manifest in the ancient Oceanic concept of *mana*. Interpretations from Codrington's time onward have viewed *mana* as an invisible medium of supernaturally conferred power, manifest in sacred objects. Chiefs or warriors "had" *mana* by virtue of supernatural support; others gained "it" temporarily through sacrifice or magic. Thus C. E. Fox in his *The Threshold of the Pacific* (1924), writing of San Cristobal, likened *mana* (there *mena*) to a liquid in which weapons or sacred objects were immersed; E. S. Craighill Handy in his *Polynesian Religion* (1927) likened *mana* to electricity.

Contemporary ethnographic studies and reexamina-

tion of linguistic evidence suggest that *mana* as an invisible medium or substance or energy may be more a creation of European than of indigenous imagination. *Mana* in the Melanesian religions of the Solomons (and in the Polynesian religion of Tikopia) referred to a process, retrospectively interpreted, and to a state or quality manifest in results, rather than to an invisible spiritual medium of power.

Evidence that *mana* was conceived primarily as a process and quality, and not as a "substance," comes both from modern ethnographic accounts, especially my studies of the Kwaio of Malaita, and from linguistic evidence. In the Malaita languages and in Roviana in the western Solomons, *mana* when used as a noun is marked with a nominalizing affix that shows that it is an abstract verbal noun: "*mana*-ness" or "*mana*-ization." In all the Solomons languages where cognates of *mana* occur, we find the word used as a verb (the ghosts "*mana* for" or "*mana*-ize" the living) and as a verbal adjective (magic is *mana*, i.e., potent or effective), in addition to its uses as a noun. Comparative evidence suggests that these uses of *mana* as a verb are ancient and basic in Oceanic Austronesian languages. Although more evidence is needed, it at least seems clear that in the Melanesian religions of the Solomons, ideas about *mana* were not expressed in systematic theological interpretations, but were concerned with controlling and retrospectively interpreting the interventions of human beings in human life. Hogbin noted, of his research on *mana* (there *nanama*) on Guadalcanal, that "nobody knows how *nanama* works, and I gathered that the thought had never occurred to anyone before I made inquiries" ("*Mana*," *Oceania* 6, 1936, pp. 241-274).

In the light of this new evidence and some clear indications that ethnographers have mistranslated or misinterpreted usages of *mana* on the basis of anthropological orthodoxy, many older accounts of *mana* in the Solomons (and elsewhere in Oceania) must be bracketed with doubt. Even a native speaker of Bughotu was led by his training in anthropology to mistranslate the final line in a magical spell in his own language, "Make these words of mine *mana*," as "Give *mana* to my words." Doubts similar to my own have been expressed by Kim Jackson in the article "Head-Hunting in the Christianization of Bugotu 1861-1900" (*Journal of Pacific History* 10, 1975, pp. 65-78) regarding the common assumption that headhunters in the western Solomons were motivated by a desire to collect the *mana* supposedly inhering in the heads of their enemies. Jackson sees no evidence in the actual texts that the headhunters had such a conception of *mana* or drew the causal inferences European observers had supposed. Rodney Needham, in his article "Skulls and Causality" (*Man*,

n.s. 11, 1977, pp. 71–78), has expressed similar doubts about headhunting in Southeast Asia.

Social Structure and Religion. In tribal societies, we can discern close structural relationships between sociopolitical organization and the nature, scope, and powers of supernatural beings. My account of the religion of the Kwaio of Malaita (1982) illustrates the close fit between hierarchies of ancestors, the structure of descent groups, and rituals focused on ancestral shrines. For the western Solomons, Scheffler (1965) analyzes a similar close relationship between the propitiation of gods and spirits by descent group congregations and the social structure of the living.

Peoples of the mountainous interiors (like the Kwaio) generally had small, autonomous descent groups and relatively egalitarian social systems. Correspondingly, ritual was localized in small congregations; cosmologies and myths were relatively undeveloped. Peoples with maritime orientations tended to have more hierarchical sociopolitical systems (with hereditary chiefs in some areas), more centralized and elaborate ritual systems, and more fully elaborated cosmological beliefs and myths. Thus the Lau of the northern Malaita lagoons, with an elaborate cosmology positing a series of heavens and an extensive body of myths, contrast sharply with the Baegu of the nearby mountains, despite the cultural heritage they clearly share.

In none of these Melanesian societies of the Solomons were there full-time ritual specialists. The priests referred to in the literature served as ritual officiants on behalf of their groups. Succession to such duties was in some places hereditary; but in everyday respects, these officiants lived and worked as other men did.

Cults and Indigenous Churches in the Colonial Period. Cargo cults of classic Melanesian type apparently emerged in the Solomons only in parts of Bougainville and Buka, in the sphere of German and Australian influence. Thus the Lontis movement of southern Bougainville, in 1913–1914, and cargo movements in the 1930s show continuity through to the anticolonialist cultism of the Hahalis Welfare Society of Buka in the 1960s. More politically oriented movements with millenarian overtones (Keesing, 1978, 1982) have continued into the 1980s.

On Small Malaita an early syncretic religious cult was reported in 1896, and there is some evidence of a prophetic cult in north central Malaita somewhat earlier. In the 1920s syncretic movements that combined elements of traditional and Christian theology and ritual were reported from the same area; sporadic cult activity with anticolonial overtones continued in the 1930s. European reports of millenarian fantasy notwithstanding, the Maasina Rule movement, which took

shape in the aftermath of the Guadalcanal campaign of World War II, was solidly political—a challenge to colonial rule—although it had religious trappings.

Since the 1960s two strong indigenous movements have commanded widespread allegiance. On New Georgia a leader named Silas Eto, called the Holy Mama, created an indigenous religious movement combining elements of Methodism and folk belief and ritual. The movement has remained strong into the 1980s. On Guadalcanal, the Moro movement has institutionalized a synthesis of traditional custom, Christianity, and capitalism that has adapted successfully to political and economic changes.

[See also Cargo Cults.]

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ROGER M. KEESING

SOLOV'EV, VLADIMIR (1853–1900), Russian mystical philosopher. Born in Moscow, Solov'ev was educated at the University of Moscow and the Moscow

Theological Academy where, in 1873, his master's thesis, "The Crisis of Western Philosophy," earned him immediate repute. Solov'ev's lifelong concerns were to demonstrate rationally the truth of Christianity and to inspire an activist Christianity that would transform the world. His dedication to the philosophical goal of synthesizing religion, philosophy, science, and art in a comprehensive system that he called "all-unity" (*vse-edinstvo*) precluded his ever marrying. He is considered Russia's first systematic philosopher.

Solov'ev conceived of God as an all-inclusive being: that is, as absolute reality, which is progressively united with its creation through the interaction of the Logos and Sophia. The Logos is the word, reason, the active principle of creation. Sophia is the passive principle. More a symbol than a metaphysical concept, Sophia, whom Solov'ev experienced in three visions as a beautiful woman, also denotes, ambiguously, divine wisdom, the body of God, the universal church, the bride of Christ, and active love for the world and humanity. Although Solov'ev stated explicitly that his concept of Sophia was not intended to introduce a new god into the Trinity, he wrote poems to her that contain marked gnostic and erotic elements and in which she emerges almost as a female principle of divinity.

Solov'ev regarded the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus Christ as the central event in history and Jesus Christ as a "second Adam," a God-man, the prototype of the transfiguration of all humankind through love. His concept of God, not purely Christian, is somewhat pantheistic. His theology, moreover, was influenced by gnosticism, qabbalistic literature, writers such as Jakob Boehme, Paracelsus, and Franz Xaver von Baader, and by philosophical Idealism, as well as by the Slavophiles, Dostoevsky, and Nikolai Fedorov. Catholics regard him as a convert; Russian Orthodox writers argue that he remained in their faith.

Solov'ev's life and works are customarily divided into three periods. These periods are characterized by philosophical, theocratic, and ethical and apocalyptic concerns. In the first period, the 1870s, he opposed abstract philosophy, criticized Western empiricism and rationalism as inadequate for the discovery of truth, maintained the identity of being and knowing, and advocated mystical intuition and integral knowledge as the path to God.

In the second period, the 1880s, hoping to realize his ideal of a "free theocracy"—a Christian society united by internal and voluntary bonds—Solov'ev tried to reunite the Russian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches. Believing that it was Russia's mission to incarnate the ideal of theocracy, in 1881 he appealed to Alexander III to pardon the assassins of Alexander II,

the tsar's father. The tsar's refusal convinced Solov'ev that Russia was not yet a Christian state. He resigned his teaching post, declared Russian Orthodoxy to be dead, and turned to the pope to realize his ecumenical goal—a new church that would incorporate the spirituality of the East with the activism of the West and that would encompass all aspects of life, action, and thought, as well as faith. The pope did not accept Solov'ev's ideas on Sophia, nor his program for a theocratic union administered by tsar and pope. Solov'ev, for his part, could not accept Roman Catholic emphasis on obedience.

With the collapse of his theocratic hopes, Solov'ev, in his third period, turned his attention to the practical problems of building a Christian society. In *Justification of the Good* (1895; English translation, 1918) he criticized the "abstract moralism" of Tolstoi, the amorality of Nietzsche, and the "collective immoralism" implicit in nationalism and socialism. In *The Meaning of Love* (1892–1894; English translation, 1947) he argued that the purpose of sex was not procreation but the overcoming of egoism through love for the other.

In the last decade of his life, Solov'ev became preoccupied with the power of evil and had apocalyptic premonitions. His *Three Conversations concerning War, Progress, and the End of History*, also translated as *War and Christianity from the Christian Point of View* (1900; both English translations, 1915), is a discussion of the morality of militarism, power politics, and pacifism. Appended to it is "A Tale of Antichrist." The Antichrist, depicted by Solov'ev as a godless benefactor of humanity, is overcome by a revolt led by the Jews. Evil is, at last, vanquished and the churches reunited.

Solov'ev's influence was enormous. The saintliness of his personal life led Dostoevskii to model Aliosha in *The Brothers Karamazov* after him. His works were the fountainhead of the new spiritual, philosophical, and artistic currents of the Russian Silver Age (c. 1898–1917), and the Christian idealism and political liberalism of Sergei and Evgenii Trubetskoi, Pavel Novgorodtsev, and others stemmed in part from his thought and example. His sophiology helped shape the theology of Sergei Bulgakov and Pavel Florenskii, and it inspired the poetry and prose of the Russian Symbolists. Also important to Russian Symbolism was Solov'ev's view of art as a theurgy and of beauty as an incarnation of the divine. His apocalypticism and vision of pan-Mongolism (the rule of the "yellow" races over the "white") influenced Symbolist political thought, especially after 1904.

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BERNICE GLATZER ROSENTHAL

SOMA is the Sanskrit name of a god, a plant, and the juice squeezed from that plant. These referents serve individually and collectively as three of the most important elements of religious thought and practice in Vedic India.

In the earliest hymns of the *R̥gveda* (c. 1200 BCE) the term *soma* refers to a plant, the pressed juice of which the poets of ancient India depicted as an exhilarating and even rapturous drink, said to bring health and immortality to those who enjoyed its refreshment. Analysis of ritual texts and other cultural artifacts shows that *soma* was not a fermented or distilled liquid, so its transformative effects cannot be understood to be the results of alcohol inebriation. Vedic ritualists worshiped Soma as a god, whom they honored as a source of creative power, and found in their draughts of the *soma* extract, *soma-pavamāna*, the inspiration for the visionary images recorded in many of the Vedic sacred hymns. The entire *Sāmaveda*, a collection of ritual chants, is dedicated to Soma, and wondrous praises of Soma infuse the verses of the *R̥gveda* with lively depictions of kinetic ecstasy.

According to the *R̥gveda*, the *soma* plant's original home lay in the heavens, but a high-flying heroic eagle carried some of it to earth, where it took root high in the mountains. There it was gathered by the Vedic priests, who pressed the plant between stones in a wooden bowl, filtered the flowing extract through layers of wool, and sprinkled the liquid with clarified butter.

Historians have used the comprehensive term *soma ritual* to refer to a large number of solemn Vedic rites of varying complexity, some of which feature "sessions" (*sattras*) lasting twelve days or longer. The most important of these rites are the consecration of the king (*Rājasūya*), the horse sacrifice (*Aśvamedha*), the "drink of power" ritual (*Vājapeya*), and the various rites of passage based on the fire ritual, the *Agniṣṭoma*. During these rituals the priests poured the *soma* extract into the ritual fire, sending it via the smoke's pathway to the skies and thence to the gods, who heartily welcomed its effects. Invigorated and emboldened by the *soma*, the gods (most often Indra, a martial atmospheric deity) then found courage and strength to engage in cosmic battles against the powers of demons and other enemies of the Vedic community. After pleasing the gods with the gift of *soma*, the poet-priests often drank it themselves, typically with extraordinary results. Inspired by *soma*, for example, the "blind person sees [and] the crippled person walks forth" (*R̥gveda* 8.79.2). The ecstatic rapture experienced by those who drink of the *soma* is obvious: "I in my grandeur have surpassed the sky and this vast earth," one visionary exclaims. "I am great! Great! Flying to the skies! Have I not drunk the *soma*?" (*R̥gveda* 10.119.8, 12). "We have drunk the *soma* [and] have become immortal! We have gone to the light [and] have found the gods! What can hatred and the malice of a mortal do to us now?" proclaims another. "The splendid drops I have sipped have set me free" (*R̥gveda* 8.48.3, 5).

Recent research suggests that the *soma* extract was the clarified essence of the mushroom *Amanita muscaria* (fly agaric), although this conclusion has not met with universal acceptance. Evidence points to a Eurasian origin of the Vedic Indian practice of ritual ecstasy gained by drinking the psychedelic essence of such a plant. Linguistic data show that Uralic cultures knew of a hallucinogenic mushroom as early as 6000 BCE. Indo-European religious mythologies include such notions as the Avestan *haoma* (the term for a Zoroastrian ritual drink of immortality, to which the word *soma* is etymologically and mythologically directly related) and the Greek *ambrosia* and *nektar*. In addition, later Chinese myths include depictions of *ling-chih*, a mushroom of immortality. These mythic themes have led some historians to think that the isolation of a ritually significant plant was common along the routes of cultural exchange in the ancient world. Analysis of late Vedic religious texts suggests that around 1000 BCE the actual *soma* plant itself was replaced in the ritual with various substitutes. This suggests a historical development in which the original *soma* extract was no longer available to those Eastern Indo-European peoples who had moved in the

third and second millennia BCE from the steppes and forested mountains of Eurasia onto the plains and river valleys of Southwest and South Asia, and that the *soma* juice was no longer available to the Vedic ritual community. Post-Vedic religious communities stressed reliance on other means (such as meditation or devotion to a personal god) to gain the experience of immortality and rapture.

[See also *Haoma and Psychedelic Drugs*.]

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WILLIAM K. MAHONY

SONG SIYŎL (1607–1689), leader of the Noron faction and fierce exponent of the so-called orthodox school as expounded by Chinese and Korean followers of the Sung dynasty Neo-Confucian Chu Hsi (1130–1200). Born in an era of political change that witnessed the replacement of the Chinese Ming dynasty by the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty, Song's life was intimately interwoven with the political and intellectual turbulence that this change precipitated in Korea.

As a youth Song studied with the famous ritual scholar Kim Changsaeng (1548–1631) and his son Kim Chip (1574–1656). In 1633 he passed the preliminary examination, taking the first position, and subsequently began his official career. In 1635 he was appointed tutor to Prince Pongnim, who later became King Hyojong (r. 1649–1659). But the following year an event took place that immensely influenced a generation of Korean

scholars: the invasion of Korea by the Manchu ruler, Ch'ing T'ai-tung. Proclaiming loyalty to the Ming dynasty, the Korean court fled to a mountain castle. After a month of resistance, King Injo (r. 1623–1649) submitted to the Manchus, who took Crown Prince Sohyŏn (1612–1645) and Prince Pongnim hostage. As a demonstration of loyalty to the Ming, which symbolized the continuity of Confucian civilization to Korean scholars, Song retired from public life and spent the next dozen years as a private scholar, an action that seems to have earned him a reputation for integrity. When King Hyojong acceded to the throne in 1649 Song accepted a post in the Censorate, but he left involuntarily two years later. His eulogy for King Injo had used the Ming rather than the Ch'ing reign year. Informed of this by pro-Ch'ing officials, the Ch'ing court exerted pressure (typical of this tense period) in order to have him removed. Song returned to court in 1658 and served as Hyojong's close confidant, planning for an invasion of Ch'ing dynasty China that had the goal of installing a Chinese dynasty, and thus of restoring Confucian civilization there.

Upon Hyojong's death, a rites controversy erupted over how he should be mourned by his mother. Song led the Sŏin faction, which insisted that despite Hyojong's accession, he should be mourned in a fashion consonant with his familial position as a second son. This stance brought him into direct conflict with Yun Hyu, who insisted that Hyojong should be mourned according to his public status, irrespective of his familial position. The Sŏin position was adopted and the Sŏin faction dominated power during Hyŏnjong's (r. 1659–1674) reign. Song's official posts included Minister of the Right in 1671 and Minister of the Left in 1672.

The next king, Sukchong (r. 1674–1720), was a ruler determined to enhance monarchical power. He used factional politics to undermine bureaucratic power, starting with the removal of the Sŏin bureaucracy and the reversal of the decision in the rites controversy. Song Siyŏl, as the originator of the Sŏin position, was banished in 1675 and spent the next five years in exile in various places. With the return of the Sŏin to power in 1680 Song was restored to a position of honor, but he retired from public office in 1683 pleading old age. At about this time, the Sŏin bureaucracy split into the Noron and Soron factions. This rupture was attributed to Song's disagreement with Yun Chŭng (1629–1714), who emerged as the leader of the Soron. The dispute originated with Song's ambivalent evaluation of Yun Chŭng's father, Yun Sŏn'gŏ (1610–1669). Yun Sŏn'gŏ had fled to Kanghwa Island during the Manchu invasion. When the island fell to the Manchus he escaped rather than taking his life in defiance of the Manchus as

his wife had done. Song's eulogy of Yun Sŏn'gŏ contained a certain air of reservation concerning this event. At any rate, the rivalry between the Noron and the Soron factions became a dominant feature of Korean politics for many decades, with the Noron eventually emerging as victor.

If Song's political positions could be characterized by his loyalty to the Ming, his intellectual posture can be summarized by a rigid devotion to Chu Hsi orthodoxy. As a member of the Kiho school, whose philosophy was based on Yi Yulgok's philosophy of *ki* (Chin., *ch'i*; "material force"), Song's philosophical position differed from Chu Hsi's on several issues. Deeply disturbed by this, Song spent several decades attempting to demonstrate that Chu Hsi had been misrepresented by later redactors of his work. Beyond taking Chu Hsi as a source of inspiration for his personal behavior, Song believed that the best way to maintain Confucian civilization in Korea was to preserve Chu Hsi orthodoxy in as pristine a form as possible. Any challenge to Chu Hsi orthodoxy was seen as a threat to Confucian civilization, which, since the demise of the Ming dynasty in China, was in an extremely precarious state. This explained his disapproval of Yun Hyu, who questioned Chu Hsi's interpretations of the Four Books. He regarded Yun as a real threat to Confucian civilization and his desperate campaign to discredit him showed a certain defensive character. In 1689, his memorial objecting to the appointment of Sukchong's young son as heir apparent earned sufficient royal anger to result in his execution.

[See also Confucianism in Korea *and the biography of Yun Hyu.*]

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JAHYUN KIM HABOUSH

SOPHIA is a Greek word that means "wisdom." In the Greek translation of the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), the name *Sophia* is given as a translation of *Hokhmah* (also meaning "wisdom"), the name of a figure with feminine features. In the Greek version of the apocryphal book the *Wisdom of Solomon* (written in Al-

exandria at the beginning of the common era), Sophia is said to be the emanation of God's glory, the Holy Spirit, the immaculate mirror of his energy, nay, even the spouse of the Lord (Septuagint 8:3). In the Greek rendering of *Ben Sira*, or *Sirach*, she is depicted as a woman: to the wise man she is both a tender mother, who spoils him as if he were her favorite child, and his young mistress, who surprises him with unexpected wildness (15:2). In *Proverbs* (c. 300), Wisdom "standeth at the top of high places and cries at the gates" (8:2-3; what Oriental woman would thus expose herself?) to proclaim that the Lord had brought her forth (not "created") before he began the creation. After he had created the world, she stood before him as his daily delight (8:30). This image was inspired by the pagan belief, represented on many excavated objects, that a goddess (either the Egyptian Maat or a Canaanite figure) stands before the godhead to please and entertain him.

In *The Thunder, Whole Mind*, one of the writings found at Nag Hammadi in 1945 and written probably during the first pre-Christian century by an Alexandrian Jew, Sophia manifests herself through a series of impressive paradoxes: as both the wisdom of the Greeks and the *gnōsis* of the barbarians, as both the saint and the whore, as the "All-Mother."

The ideas that God is female or that he has a feminine spouse lie further back still. Recently, in the Israeli Negev and near Hebron, Hebrew inscriptions have been found dating back to the eighth century that speak about "the Lord and his Asherah" (Asherah, or Athirat, was a Canaanite goddess of love, war, and fertility). On one jar bearing such an inscription, YHWH seems to be represented by the Egyptian god Bes (possessing an enormous phallus) together with a feminine figure (Athirat?). In Elephantine (near Aswan, Egypt) the Jews venerated Anat Jahu, another Canaanite deity, possibly as the spouse of the Lord. *Hokhmah* (Sophia) is the positive offprint of this photographic negative, the great goddess of the pre-Greek and pre-Hebrew Mediterranean, who, variously called Anat, Athirat, or Astarte (comparable to the later Greek Aphrodite), was considered to be a sacred prostitute, as were her devotees, and was still venerated as *dea meretrix* (goddess/whore) during classical times in the Near East. [See *Hokhmah*; see also Hierodouleia.]

Gnosticism integrated this Jewish myth. Simon the Magician, a first-century Samaritan (i.e., heterodox Jew), taught that the spouse of the Lord, called Sophia or the Holy Spirit, was actually "the first Idea of God" and had descended in order to produce the angels and powers that created the world. These tyrannical powers then overwhelmed her and forced her reincarnation

again and again. (A contemporary version of this story is *She* by Rider Haggard.) At last she became one Helena, a prostitute in a brothel at Tyre (Phoenicia), whence Simon redeemed her. Here the cosmogonic Sophia of Hebrew lore has been combined with the Neo-Pythagorean concept of Helena as a symbol of the fallen and reascending heavenly soul.

In another gnostic text, the *Apocryphon of John* (Alexandria, first century), Sophia is the last of the spiritual entities to come into existence. She falls into the cosmos because of her wantonness, but there she fights against the demiurge in her struggle to make man spiritually conscious. The same theme is christianized by the greatest gnostic, Valentinus, according to whom Sophia desires to penetrate the mystery of ultimate being, then falls through hubris (*tolma*) but is saved by Christ.

In the modern *gnōsis*, initiated around 1600 by Jakob Boehme, a similar mythology has developed. In addition to Christ, the German pietists discern the feminine Sophia, a goddess (the Holy Spirit?) and bride to the wise man. To become like Adam before the birth of Eve from his side, man must unite with his inner Sophia and become androgynous. English representatives of this tradition were John Pordage (1607–1681) and Jane Leade (1623–1704). Franz von Baader (1764–1841), a Bohemian philosopher, regarded androgyny and Sophianology as the aim and purpose of marriage. At the time of the Holy Alliance, these ideas were exported to Russia, where they were accepted by the Freemasons and such brilliant Orthodox theologians as Vladimir Solov'ev and Sergei Bulgakov.

[See also Gnosticism.]

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GILLES QUISPÉL

SORCERY. See *Magic and Witchcraft*.

SORSKII, NIL (1433–1508), also known as Nilus of Sora; Russian hesychast and saint. Nil became a monk early in life and served his novitiate at the important northern monastery of Saint Cyril at Belye Ozero. After a journey to the monastic communities of Mount Athos and Constantinople, he returned to Belye Ozero with a commitment to hesychast spirituality. In the 1470s or 1480s Nil made his way to the deserted banks of the river Sora. His intention was to establish a mo-

nastic community that differed from the strict and complex pattern of life at his monastery of origin and was based, instead, on the pattern of the Athonite skete: loosely structured, sparsely populated, with silence at its core, and with no one superior.

In Nil's community the flexibility of the monastics' everyday arrangements corresponded to the flexibility with which their inner life was to be regulated. Hours of weekday prayer were left to the discretion of the individual, although all were cautioned against unrelied prayer beyond certain limits. The goal was that silence (Gr., *hesuchia*) by which communion with God would be fostered.

Nil wrote at some length about the temptations that impede prayer: avarice, anger, sadness, spiritual torpor, vanity, and pride. To counteract these, one must infuse the mind and heart with the awareness of God. To this end Nil commends the Jesus Prayer. With the constant use of such prayer the monk may even anticipate what the Greek fathers had described as *theōsis*—divinization, or union with God by grace. Regarding his own experience, Nil's retention of the first person singular in his (unattributed) quotation of Symeon the New Theologian suggests that, at the very least, it corresponds to his own aspirations. "As I sit in the midst of my cell," he wrote, "I see a light which is not of this world. Within me I see the maker of the world. I converse with him and love him. . . . God loves me, he has received me into his very being, and he hides me in his embrace" (Mariia S. Maikova, 1912, pp. 28–29).

Nil's intention was to provide authentic teaching, and for this purpose he borrowed from hesychast masters such as John Cassian, John Climacus, Isaac the Syrian, Gregory of Sinai, and Symeon the New Theologian. Nil, who knew Greek, was the first to communicate the essence of their teachings to the Russian reader.

Nil's integrity as editor and spiritual guide gained him a reputation throughout the land. In 1490 he was invited to Moscow to debate the question of the Judaizers, the followers of the contemporary Novgorod-Moscow heresy. He was certainly opposed to the persecution, still more the execution, of the heretics. Nil's followers were to be accused of sheltering, if not actually favoring, heretics in the years to follow.

But the most noteworthy appearance of Nil in public concerned the question of the secularization of monastic lands. At a council convened in 1503 by Ivan III (who favored secularization), Nil apparently rose to place before it an unexpected proposal: that monasteries should own no villages, and that monastics should live in deserted places and should gain their sustenance by the work of their own hands. The proposal was to be de-

feated, and Russian monasteries continued virtually unchecked as ever more prosperous landowners until the age of Catherine the Great (1729–1796). A prerequisite for Nil's type of spirituality was that monks should neither own property nor even yearn for it.

Nil's followers, the "Trans-Volgan" elders, peripheralized by the Possessor establishment of the succeeding age (for church and state alike were to follow in the footsteps of Ivan Sanin [Joseph of Volokolamsk] and to favor monastic ritualism as well as land ownership), were to live out their lives in obscurity. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Nil acquired a remarkable heir in Paisii Velichkovskii (1722–1794), who influenced, among others, the Russian elders of the Optino Hermitage and through them the Russian world beyond. The nineteenth century thus revived the reputation of Nil and confirmed, unobtrusively, his cult as saint.

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SERGEI HACKEL

SOTERIOLOGY. [This entry consists of two articles: An Overview attempts a morphology of doctrines of salvation as they are articulated in a variety of religious systems; Buddhist Soteriology surveys the principal avenues of liberation proposed by the tradition. For further discussion of Judeo-Christian views, see especially Atonement; Justification; and Grace. For related discussions, see Afterlife and Eschatology.]

An Overview

The term *soteriology* means "doctrine of salvation" or, more concretely, the "way of salvation," and derives from the Greek *sōtēria*, which in turn is built on *sōtēr*, or "savior." The term is usually used to refer to the salvation of individuals, but it can also relate to the salvation of a group. The implication of the idea is that

human beings are in some kind of unfortunate condition and may achieve an ultimately good state either by their own efforts or through the intervention of some divine power. Very commonly, there is belief in a savior God, that is, a God whose special concern is with the welfare of the human race. Examples of this idea are, in the ancient world, Isis, Mithra, and Christ; in the Far East, Amida Buddha in Japan and Kuan-yin in China; and Kṛṣṇa and Rāma in the Hindu tradition.

The notion that people need to be saved implies that a defective condition is normally prevalent, and the major religions have differing views as to the root of this problem. Thus many Indian systems ascribe our ultimate troubles to ignorance (*avidyā*). By contrast there is the Christian doctrine of original sin in which the human race is implicated through the primordial acts of Adam and Eve. Additionally, there are varying conceptions of how human life works: for instance, in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as in indigenous Chinese religion and in various others, life stretches essentially from birth or conception to death, and then the question arises about the status of postmortem existence, if any. But in the South Asian framework, the condition of living beings is *saṃsāra*, which implies a potentially endless round of rebirth or reincarnation from which one escapes only through ultimate liberation, or *mokṣa*. In Western monotheisms the question is often whether there is an afterlife; in the Indian tradition the afterlife is a given, and the question is whether one can get out of it.

The conception of salvation relates most clearly to the idea of some ultimate value or being, *nirvāṇa*, God, *brahman*, and so on. It may be thought of as an identity with such an ultimate state or being, or more frequently as a kind of communion with a personal Lord in a heavenly place, that is, "the place of God." Various means may be used to gain liberation or final communion. Where God is a personal object of worship typically salvation has to be effected by the deity, and this is where doctrines of grace and their analogues come in. Even here it is assumed in some way that the human being cooperates even if only by calling on the divine name for help. Where there is no such personal God, the individual must prepare himself, often through rigorous methods, in order to be in a position to gain eternal freedom. Consequently there are typically "self-help" and "other-help" kinds of religion. There are also different emphases as to whether salvation is something that ultimately occurs after death, for instance, by one's being transferred to a heavenly state, or is something attainable in this life. Thus in a number of Indian systems there is the ideal of the *jīvanmukta*, that is, one who has gained liberation (*mukti*) while still living (*jī-*

van). It is typical of “self-help” systems to postulate this kind of liberation, but even in “other-help” systems there is a prefiguring of final salvation, as indicated typically by the question asked by some Christians, Are you saved? (not, Will you be saved?).

The usual scheme of the major religions that take the idea of individual salvation seriously is to pose the question in terms of a finite series of alternatives: you either attain heaven or you don't. At death you are either simply destroyed, or you go to a state that is the opposite of salvation, namely damnation, in hell. There may also be an intermediate state, such as purgatory. In the Indian scheme of things, with the doctrine of reincarnation, many variations become possible. Usually (though not in the Dvaita school of Madhva) hells are in effect purgatories, for ultimately the individual rises out of them and resumes wandering through other regions and states of the cosmos. Again, the rewards for meritorious conduct in this life are varied, because there are many levels of superior social or ontological status. Thus, there is in some systems of belief, notably in Buddhism, a system of gradations of heavens, which correspond to differing levels of moral and spiritual attainment. Generally, though there may be places of punishment, the choice is between being liberated from rebirth or not being so liberated and carrying on. The choice in Western religions tends to be starker, so that the alternative to heaven is often seen as hopeless: “Abandon hope all ye who enter here” was written above the entrance to Dante's Hell.

In addition to the major religious traditions, there are secular ideologies that have analogues to religious doctrines of salvation. This is partly because some religions hold out hopes of a renewed blessed state that is community-oriented and located on this earth: the notion, for instance, of the millennium when humans will live in harmony and glory on the earth. [See Millenarianism.] Such a concept is easily secularized into utopian ideals considered as practical goals, such as the truly communist society in the Marxist picture, which is thought of as a social and economic system in which class contradictions and alienation have been overcome. What is lacking from the Marxist view, however, is a precise analogue of individual salvation that has been such a prominent idea in the religious systems. Hitler's thousand-year Reich was also modeled after millenarian expectations but was essentially tribal in orientation. Democratic capitalism has had a vaguer notion of progress without any clear idea of an ultimate state of human satisfaction. On the individual level, there is no real soteriology in scientific humanism, except that a person may find satisfaction retrospectively in thinking that he has done his duty in this life and has

made a contribution to the welfare of the human race. More analogous to religious ideas are those of existentialism: in Heidegger's thought the individual can live authentically in the face of, and conscious of, his own death and thus in a sense overcomes death from within a finite existence.

The concept of “living liberation” introduces us to a more general way of looking at soteriology, namely seeing it as concerned with the ultimate goal of the religious or spiritual life. In addition to the achievement of certain states, such as liberation from rebirth or life in heaven, there are central experiences, such as enlightenment and gnosis, that have ultimate significance. Sometimes it is the attainment of such experiences that gives people a sense of having attained living liberation. It is possible to have such experiences (e.g., Zen *satori*) without thinking that they guarantee anything about life after death. Such a soteriology is analogous to the secular existentialist type.

A religious act which has some relation to soteriology is that of healing. Indeed, the etymology of the word *salvation* suggests “making whole,” and there are indications of the close connection between physical and spiritual health in the New Testament (e.g., the emphasis on Jesus' healing miracles), and in many small-scale societies (e.g., in African classical religions, and in the new religious movements in Africa and elsewhere). Often disease is seen as arising from some deep alienation from society as a whole, or as the result of harmful religious practices (e.g., witchcraft). Healing is thus simultaneously the restoration of the individual's right relationship with the group.

The various dimensions of religion serve to illustrate differing means of salvation. Here it is perhaps a little misleading to use the word *means*, in that according to a number of religions, salvation arises from God's act rather than from human acts, and therefore there is no way of interpreting religion as itself an instrument causing salvation. Still we can look to a number of themes. Let us note first of all that the nature of the salvation envisaged will depend on the way the religious ultimate is viewed. In classical China the emphasis on both Heaven and the Tao as underlying cosmic and social harmony suggests that the elimination of disharmony is important; the Mahāyāna Buddhist emphasis on “emptiness” suggests the importance of a kind of intellectual vision, paralleling the Buddha's own enlightenment; theism of various kinds suggests the centrality of the right relationship to a personal creator, and so forth. Given the differing goals, what are the various means?

Beginning with the ritual dimension of religion, we may note that the right performance of ritual may be

central to soteriology. Thus the early Christian view of the sacrament of baptism implied that the neophyte, on entering the Christian community, dies like Christ and is resurrected with Christ. Provided there are no problems in the rest of the person's life, he is assured of ultimate salvation because of the ritual or sacramental union with Christ as victor over sin and death. This is repeated and reinforced by the eucharistic sacrament wherein Christ's eternal life is imparted to the faithful person in the bread and wine. There are similar motifs in the old mystery religions, for example the direct participation in the ritual reenactment of the myth of Persephone at Eleusis, and in the rites of Isis.

Ritual of a rather different sort is found in ancestral cults. Here the members of the deceased's family employ ritual means (e.g., proper feeding of the deceased, the right performance of funeral rites, etc.) to ensure that the departed are sent on their way serenely, or at least treated with propriety so that their afterlives are not scenes of misery and displacement.

The most important soteriological function of ritual is to open up lines of communication with the god. These allow those who participate in the rite to tap into the living substance of the divine and so to gain some kind of blessed or eternal life. Christian sacraments, for instance, allow the faithful to participate in Christ's resurrection. Such participation remains the main motif of Christian soteriology, although many other themes are also important. These include the ideas of Christ's victory over death and Satan, his expiatory sacrifice on behalf of humanity and in recognition of human sin, and his moral example [See Atonement.]

As well as the use of ritual means of gaining salvation, there is the importance of the mythic "score" that the ritual plays out. The Christian, for instance sees his own life as possibly reflecting the life of Christ, and more generally the life of Israel. Understanding the mythic narrative means sharing the power of the mythic dimension of the faith. This lends a special importance to scriptures and other works, both literary and oral, that expound the stories of religious founders, gods, and heroes. So the *ḥadīth* and the Qur'ān itself throw light on the life of the Prophet Muḥammad and become exemplars of the kind of actions and attitudes expected of the Muslim if he is to please God. But apart from making possible the imitation of great heroes, mythic narratives also provide assurance of the divine being's care and concern for those who worship him. The revelation to Muḥammad provides the matrix for Islamic life and so gives assurance that from within this life the faithful will gain salvation. Similarly the story of the people of Israel and of the Jewish people since biblical times gives the Jew a sense of his election by

God as part of an ongoing drama of history in which both God and the Jewish people will be vindicated. The *Bhagavadgītā* gives a special view of Viṣṇu's salvific power and assures his devotees of his desire to save those who turn to him in love and *bhakti*. The *Lotus Sutra* tells the story of the loving guardianship of Avalokiteśvara, who acts to save those Buddhists who turn to him (or her, in China) in faith and imitation.

Both ritual and the enactment or contemplation of myth help to nurture experience, and often it is a striking experience that gives people a sense of being saved. In Christianity, especially in the less sacramentally oriented forms of Protestantism, there is emphasis upon conversion-experiences, being "born again" and attaining an inner illumination concerning one's own salvation. In the Indian tradition there is much emphasis here also. In *jñāna*, or knowledge, one experiences an encounter with the ultimate, whether this be the discrimination (*viveka*) of the eternal from the noneternal in Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the attainment of the higher *dhyānas* in Buddhism, or the realization of the identity of *ātman* and *brahman* in Advaita. While the doctrine of a personal God will suggest the spontaneity of such a being "born again," however, the more contemplative forms of Indian and East Asian religion, from Ch'an and Neo-Confucianism to Theravāda Buddhism and Hindu yoga, stress the greater importance of technique (methods of meditation, breathing exercises, etc.).

The institutional dimension of religion can have a double relevance to soteriology. On the one hand, organizations may claim some kind of privilege or monopoly in relation to salvation. In the Christian tradition this view has received the familiar tag, "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*" ("There is no salvation outside the church"), which stems from exclusivist interpretations of the sacred myth (echoing Jesus' "I am the Way"). In Islam membership in the sacred community is vital. In Buddhism one "takes refuge" in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṃgha, the latter being the monastic community, with which the laity are closely connected. Such a doctrine of institutional exclusivity can be moderated by other doctrines, however, for instance the "baptism of desire" in Christianity, the initiation into the church in the wider sense of those non-Christians who, not having heard the gospel, yet lead a moral and holy life and so implicitly exhibit a "desire for Christ." One can compare this traditional idea with Karl Rahner's concept of the "anonymous Christian."

On the other hand, the conception of soteriology itself may be collective. Here the idea of God's saving work is applied primarily to the group as a whole—for instance, the people of Israel, who have a special destiny and a crucial role in the providential unfolding of history. In

Judaism and its offshoot, Christianity, millenarian and eschatological thinking is important, though it may take on a very provisional and concrete character, for example, the coming of the Messiah in traditional Judaism, leading to the restoration of Israel. In Shī'a Islam there is the analogous figure of the Mahdi and the whole eschatology of the Hidden Imam. While such mythic themes help to maintain the communitarian aspect of future hope, they do not always blend well with other aspects of soteriology, such as the concept of the resurrection of the body and of the immortality of the soul. Sometimes resurrection is seen as supplying the disembodied soul with a "body," a kind of personal clothing that is in heavenly terms to what the physical body is in earthly terms. At other times it is seen as something earthly. Likewise the communal aspect of faith can be pictured in heavenly terms as in the Christian doctrine of the communion of saints, which is a kind of transcendent continuation of the church on earth.

The ethical dimension of soteriology is sometimes underplayed insofar as it is by the grace of God rather than through ethical (or ritual) efforts that one is saved. Morality may thus have an oblique relationship to soteriology: the good person in the Calvinist tradition, for example, may show some symptoms of being saved, but his salvation is not because of his good works. Likewise in Pure Land Buddhism, especially in the teaching of Shinran, there is stress upon simple faith and calling on the name of Amida: if the virtuous person can be saved, how much more the sinner. By contrast religions of self-help give more importance to moral action as part of the means of gaining liberation or salvation. Thus virtue may at least be a precondition of study of the Ultimate, as in Advaita Vedanta or it may be integral to the Path, as in Buddhism.

Ethics may be combined with participation in the mythic career of one's exemplar. In general, the Mahāyāna Buddhist follows the path of the *bodhisattva*: he models his conduct on the self-sacrificial and compassionate life of the great Avalokiteśvara, or one of the other salvation-bringing *bodhisattvas*. It is not that following the path will bring salvation by itself, for it is rather by the transfer of merit from the limitless store of the *bodhisattva* that the otherwise unworthy person reaches ultimate liberation. But the mythic conception holds up an ethical and religious ideal that determines the follower's ethical perceptions. The path of the imitation of Christ in the Christian tradition has an analogous function. Similar motifs can be found elsewhere. In Hinduism, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and other avatars serve as alternative models of conduct. In Judaism, the reading of the Hebrew Bible provides the pious Jew with the

model of Abraham or one of the other great figures of the past. In Islam there is the imitation of the Prophet Muḥammad, and so on. In the Jewish case there is also a very close integration between ritual and ethical rules through the written and oral Torah. Such an integration stresses the importance of obedience to the will of God, though ultimately it is God's action that ensures the final welfare of the individual Jew.

The means of salvation may be closely tied to the figure of the spiritual leader. Thus, even in self-help religious traditions or subtraditions it may be important for the individual to receive guidance from a specialist. Meditation and yoga, for example, must be guided by a guru. In Buddhism the Buddha himself is important as the one who brings the knowledge of the Way to humans, while the Saṃgha provides the institutional framework for leading the holy life. In small-scale societies the figure of the shaman is often important in serving as the expert who provides healing and reenacts the death and resurrection of the person who has suffered evil. In ancient Greek religion there were mystagogues and leaders, such as Pythagoras and Plotinus, who served as authorities and exemplars for their followers. Such figures, whether shaman or mystic, serve as a bridge to the mythic idea of the savior God who helps humans by himself taking on human form. Thus we have in Zoroastrianism the theme of the future savior Saoshyant, the figure of Christ in the Christian tradition, the various mediating figures in the Hindu tradition, and the saving *bodhisattvas* of the Mahāyāna. Since such conceptions may be held to infringe on the purity of monotheism (some, of course, do not arise from a theistic background in any case) this savior-god concept cannot strictly speaking play a part in Judaism and Islam. As mediators of salvation such figures can be surrounded by other personages who have a role in helping human beings towards their ultimate welfare—for instance, the saints of the Christian tradition, above all the Virgin Mary in the Catholic and Orthodox traditions, and the lesser deities of the Hindu tradition.

In addition to the other dimensions of religion, the doctrinal too can play a role in liberation, given that a faith may stress the philosophical aspect, so that thinking about the world along certain lines may be conducive to a kind of knowledge that saves. Thus in Mahāyāna Buddhism the analysis of causation and the impermanence of things may be instrumental in attaining a new way of seeing the world that recognizes its existential "emptiness." There is a certain analogue in ancient Greek conceptions of philosophy as culminating in a sort of vision, as, for instance, in Plato. Likewise in Neo-Confucianism the investigation of things has a certain meditative role that yields vital, even salvific,

knowledge. Doctrine and philosophy have of course, other non-soteriological functions. They may, for instance, help define the community. But they are also ways of depicting reality as it is, and the vision thereof can thus be facilitated by practicing philosophical argumentation. Sometimes philosophy is used in a dialectical and critical way, to uproot entrenched concepts and to subvert habitual ways of looking at the world through the screen of language. In this way it can prepare for *satori* or other direct experiences of the "way things are." On the whole, Indian philosophy has stressed (admittedly in a rather theoretical way) the importance of this practice of philosophy for *mokṣa*, or liberation.

The belief in rebirth makes some difference to soteriology. It may involve a certain elitism. In Theravāda Buddhism or Jainism, for instance, there are only a few saints at any given time, but this does not preclude a much wider group from hoping for ultimate liberation in a future life. It also raises issues about identity, especially since the concept of the person in some systems is tied to the concept of rebirth. That is to say, if liberation is defined as ultimate escape from the round of reincarnation, then a kind of negative theology (or more strictly negative anthropology) is applied to the liberated "self." Thus in Buddhism various ways of speaking of the enlightened or liberated person after death are denied. Similarly, in Advaita, realization of oneness with *brahman* implies no more rebirth, since in that identity beyond final death there is no longer any individuality as we understand it in the empirical world. Even in Sāṃkhya-Yoga, where there is in theory a plurality of souls or *puruṣas* surviving in a state of isolated freedom, there is doubt as to whether we can speak of individuality in any meaningful sense. Moreover the ultimate state, which is one of absence of pain, does not seem to differ essentially from unconsciousness. By contrast the state of liberation according to Advaita is blissful, and such a positive evaluation of postmortem *nirvāṇa* is also made.

Where God is believed to govern the cosmos, rebirth becomes an expression of his will. So in Rāmānuja's theism, for instance, a person's destiny is worked out over many, many lives, but in accord with God's will. If he saves the individual it happens in one lifetime, but the fact that an individual has reached a state where he calls on God is itself a sign of previous deeds. Followers of Rāmānuja split over the question of whether salvation was solely by God's grace, or whether surrender (*prapatti*) was necessary. In the latter case, a measure of human effort was necessary for salvation. Although Rāmānuja did not fully work out his doctrine of grace, he seems to have inclined more to the former view. Later,

the dualist Madhva held to a doctrine akin to predestination, namely that God's sole task was to guide the cosmos in working out the results of the *karman* that already flowed from the inner nature of the individual.

Traditional cosmologies have assigned different "places" for salvation or damnation. Although heaven is conceived in theistic systems as the dwelling place of God (and vivid descriptions are given, such as in the *Book of Revelation* in the New Testament and in the Qur'ān), there are also heavens that are more fully devoted to the well-being and pleasure of the individual. Examples include the Buddhist and (to some extent) the Hindu heavens, which are attainable by the individual through rebirth but remain ultimately impermanent. The person goes thither as a reward for virtuous conduct, but however long he dwells, this is not final salvation. Some theistic forms of Hinduism postulate heavens that reflect the desires of the devotee in his longing for and adoration of God. A somewhat similar idea is found in Pure Land Buddhism. But such a heaven or paradise, though reflecting the joy of God's presence, may also incorporate many analogues to worldly pleasures. By contrast, hells reflect the deep pains of alienation from God and his love. Some systems postulate differing levels of salvation or heavenly existence in order to register the variety of possible human fates. The *Bhagavadgītā*, for instance, suggests that those who seek identity with *brahman* will attain it, but that it is a lower level than personal coexistence with Viṣṇu in Vaikuṅṭha Heaven.

Many religions conceive of release or salvation as the ultimate destiny of all humans (or of all living beings). In principle this is the case with Indian religious systems, with the exception of Madhva's dualism, which conceives of some souls as destined by their very nature for eternal punishment. But elsewhere in Buddhism and Hinduism hells are not everlasting places of punishment but in effect function as purgatories. A similar idea is found in Zoroastrianism, where the sins of the unsaved are finally burned away and all can rejoice in the victory of Ahura Mazdā. But Christianity and the other Western theisms conceive of eternal punishment as the fate of some (though some Christians have believed in an empty hell and the ultimate salvation of everyone). The emphasis on divine judgment suggests the radical differentiation of the saved from the sinners. Much recent Christian theology, however, has emphasized a psychological or existential interpretation of the old pictures of heaven and hell, and stresses the sense of alienation from God or closeness to him in the events and vicissitudes of this life. There has been a corresponding decline in belief in hell, partly through the fading of the retributive view of justice. Modern cos-

mology has also weakened older ways of thinking of a succession of heavens above and purgatories or hells below, or of a Pure Land or other paradise “to the West.” Hence there is greater emphasis upon salvation and its opposite as states of relationship to the Ultimate, or as states of mind. It has always been a characteristic of most Indian views of ultimate release, however, that such a condition is “beyond the heavens” and so not to be figured in a primarily spatial way (though there have also been disputes as to whether a soul is atomic or all-pervasive).

Finally it may be noted that some phases of traditions show a lack of interest in any radical notion of soteriology. Classical Confucianism has a picture of the ideal person or sage but not a doctrine of being saved from some pervasive evil or ignorance. In ancient Israel there was little concern with individual salvation until later on. Some modern secular worldviews such as scientific humanism do not possess the idea, and others such as Marxism do so only in an analogous sense. Classic small-scale religions, such as those in Africa, are typically more concerned with group welfare than with ultimate judgment about individuals. Nevertheless, the growth of modern individualism has highlighted the importance of thinking about how traditional patterns of soteriology might throw light on the symbols of judgment and ultimate meaning that remain vital in understanding the human condition.

[For further discussion, see Redemption; Mokṣa; and Enlightenment.]

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NINIAN SMART

Buddhist Soteriology

Traditionally, there have been two soteriological goals in Buddhism, either birth in heaven (*svarga*) or liberation (*mokṣa*). Both discussions also involve a consideration of enlightenment (*bodhi*). The literature dis-

tinguishes four soteriological paths: (1) ascetic practices, (2) the *prātimokṣa*, or monastic discipline, (3) the *bodhisattva* path, and (4) the Vajrayāna, or “diamond vehicle.”

Ascetic Practices. The ascetic practices are called *dhutaḡaṇa*, a term that apparently means “shaking off [*dhuta*] the [bad] strands [*ḡaṇa*].” Asceticism involves seclusion of the body, and therefore also restraint of speech. Such practices, usually listed as thirteen, go back to the Buddha’s time and were followed to some extent wherever Buddhism took root. They constituted a more rigorous path than the usual monastic regimen, and apparently also defined the nature of “retreats” by the monks. Ascetic practices were meant to purify the mind and make it serviceable (or agile) and fit for the “pure life” (*brahmacarya*). They are among the practices undertaken to overcome the power of the “realm of desire” (*kāmadhātu*), and thus to defeat the evil tempter Māra. Ascetic practitioners are categorized in one or more of thirteen types, as follows.

1. (*Prāpta-*) *piṇḡapātika* (“almsman satisfied with what happens to be received”): This refers to the monk’s obligation to eat in moderation.
2. *Sāvādāna-piṇḡapātika* (“almsman begging in regular rounds”): The almsman is proscribed from accepting invitations that upset the regular schedule.
3. *Ekāsanika* (“single-eater”): Having received alms of whatever type, however meager, the “single-eater” cannot then seek alms elsewhere.
4. *Khaluṡaścādbhaktika* (“after-food refuser”): Having been given excellent food in a certain house, the “after-food refuser” must never go there again.
5. *Traiḡivarika* (“three-robed man”): If the “three robed man” should obtain a fourth robe, he must give it away, seeing only trouble in keeping it.
6. *Nāmatika* (“wearer of wool”): Restricting himself to three robes, this type of ascetic wears only woolen material.
7. *Pāṡsukūlika* (“refuse-ragman”): The “refuse-ragman” pieces together his robe with throw-aways such as tailors’ clippings, cloth partially eaten by mice or singed by fire, and so forth.
8. *Āraṇyaka* (“dweller in a deserted place”): The ascetic must avoid noisy or heavily trafficked places.
9. *Vṛkṣamūlika* (“tree-base dweller”): The “tree-base dweller” must shun a roof over his head, refrain from creating a storage space, and avoid certain types of trees.
10. *Aṡyavakāśika* (“open-spacer”): one who avoids the roof, the tree, and places of storage is called an “open-spacer.”
11. *Śmāśanika* (“cremation-grounder”): In choosing a

cremation ground, this ascetic must avoid places of wailing and of constant smoke and fire.

12. *Naiṣadyika* ("sitting man"): The "sitting man" maintains the sitting posture in order to reduce the time he spends sleeping and thus to promote his ascension to various meditative levels.
13. *Yathāsaṃstarika* ("one who maintains his seat as it was arranged"): This type of ascetic has no interest in what other people lust after and is harmless to others.

Various exceptions are cited in the scripture. For example, the "sitting man" is allowed to get up if his teacher approaches; the "refuse-ragman" is allowed to keep clean cloth for bandaging a wound. Certain mandates are modified in local situations. In Tibet, for instance, the poet-saint Mi-la-ras-pa meditated for a long time in a cave. Elsewhere, there were ascetic practices that do not fit easily in the above list; mountain walking in China and Japan is a notable example. Overall, these practices are only mildly mortifying, hence the practitioner is able to avoid forms of mortification that the Buddha rejected in favor of the Middle Path.

The Monastic Prātimokṣa. The term *prātimokṣa* means "commencement" of "liberation" (*atimokṣa*), in short "liberation-onset," or commencement of virtuous natures. The Prātimokṣa is also the code of monastic discipline for monks and nuns. Thus, in contrast with ascetic practices, the monastic rules are understood to foster seclusion of the mind insofar as the monk is restrained by his Prātimokṣa vow (*saṃvara*). The Prātimokṣa constitutes commandments for the monks and nuns. As such, the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* is recited at the Uposatha, the monthly or bi-monthly meetings of the *saṃgha*, or congregation of monks. On these occasions, the monks sit face to face and confess their sins, hoping to expiate them in this manner.

The Prātimokṣa lists (in its Pali redaction) some 250 infractions, the gravest of which, the so-called "four defeats" (*pārājika*), mandate expulsion from the order and hence are not strictly susceptible to atonement through confession. The *pārājika* offenses are followed in gravity by thirteen *saṃghāvaśeṣas*, or sins requiring suspension and penance. The theory of abatement of sin by mutual facing became in the Mahāyāna period the rationale for imagining a deity or deities in front of the performer, with consequent "calming of the mind" (*śamatha*). If a monk is guilty of even minor infractions, his nonconfession of these in the appropriate circumstances is held to foretell failure in his meditations, and he is said to be "sitting on thorns." It is also said that if a monk tries to conceal his offence it is known first of all by the beneficent deities and then by those of his spiritual guides

who have the "dharma eye," by which one can see these natures in others. Thus, this theory that confession of infractions is necessary in order to attain *samādhi* is a remarkable teaching; it helps explain why the monastic life is a seclusion of mind, but not of body or of speech. [See also Vinaya.]

Explaining the *Instruction of Mind Training (Adhicitta-sīkṣā)*, the teacher Asaṅga (c. 375–430) writes: "Should he, having been without longing, have longing arise; having not blamed, being blamed; having been not sleepy, now sleepy; having been calm, [his mind] no longer fixed; having been without regret, now regretful; having been without lusts, now lusting—that one should become yoked in every way at all times, possessed of the right praxis" (*Ābhiprāyikārtha-gāthā* 40–41, in my *Buddhist Insight*, pp. 363–364).

Since the Buddhists believed in rebirth, they held that only after a series of such rebirths could one become liberated or attain enlightenment. The number of such rebirths was often believed to be seven. As Asaṅga writes in his *Śrāvakabhūmi*:

Whatever person who, through elimination of the three fetters (*saṃyojana*), to wit, of reifying view, of adherence to [improper] rules and usages, and of doubt, becomes a "stream-enterer," possessing a nature not liable to fall [to bad destinies], having the set goal of enlightenment, having only seven rebirths ahead of him, seven times spending time, transmigrating among gods and men; puts an end to suffering—that one is called the "person who has only seven rebirths ahead of him."

The *prātimokṣa* path, properly undertaken, culminates in the figure of the *arhat* ("worthy one"), who has attained liberation from all karmic causes and effects. In Northern Buddhism, the term *arhat* is reevaluated as *arihat* ("one who has destroyed the enemy"), where the enemy is twofold: the obscuration of defilement (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obscuration of equipoise (*samāpatti-āvaraṇa*). The *arhat* is thus held to establish both the "falling away" (*parihāṇi*, i.e., the possibility of regression) in the present life (*dṛṣṭadharmā*), as well as the "not falling away" (*aparihāṇi*, i.e., the possibility of this being the last life) in the present life.

The Bodhisattva Path. The *bodhisattva* path, which characterizes Mahāyāna Buddhism, conceives of the *bodhisattva* practitioner as progressing along an upward-oriented path comprising ten stages (*bhūmi*). The inauguration of this path is the *bodhisattva* vow, a pledge to forego one's own enlightenment until all beings have realized liberation. The theory of the "non-retrogressing *bodhisattva*" announced by the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, led to a formulation of the path in which *bodhisattvas* of the first seven stages are

subject to a spiritual retrogression, while the last three are deemed “irreversible.” To describe this division, the scriptures teach that the first seven stages represent the gradual elimination of the “hindrance of defilement” (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*) while the last three are the gradual elimination of the “hindrance of the knowable” (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*). This division shows that the first seven stages parallel the career of the *arhat*; the career of the *bodhisattva*, however, is held to be superior by virtue of his vow. Various “great *bodhisattvas*” are held to be on the last three stages. These include the *bodhisattvas* Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Maitreya, and Vajrapāṇi, who are represented by images, paintings, and sculpture, and who have cults devoted to them. [See also Celestial Buddhas and Bodhisattvas; Avalokiteśvara; Mañjuśrī; and Maitreya.]

The ten stages are usually associated with the ten “perfections” (*pāramitās*) and are as follows:

1. *Pramuditā* (“joyous”); associated with the “perfection of giving” (*dāna-pāramitā*).
2. *Vimalā* (“pure”); associated with the “perfection of morality” (*śīla-pāramitā*).
3. *Prabhākārī* (“luminous”); associated with the “perfection of forbearance” (*kṣānti-pāramitā*).
4. *Arciṣmatī* (“brilliant”); associated with the “perfections of striving” (*vīrya-pāramitā*).
5. *Sudurjayā* (“hard to conquer”); associated with the “perfection of meditation” (*dhyāna-pāramitā*).
6. *Abhimukhī* (“facing”); associated with the “perfection of insight” (*prajñā-pāramitā*).
7. *Dūraṅgamā* (“going far”); associated with the “perfection of skillful means” (*upāyakauśalya-pāramitā*).
8. *Acalā* (“immovable”); associated with the “perfection of aspiration” (*prañidhāna-pāramitā*).
9. *Sādhumatī* (“good mind”); associated with the “perfection of strength” (*bala-pāramitā*).
10. *Dharmameghā* (“cloud of doctrine”); associated with the “perfection of knowledge” (*jñāna-pāramitā*).

A *bodhisattva* on the tenth stage can be referred to as a Buddha, but not as a “complete Buddha” (*saṃbuddha*), for whom a Buddha stage, sometimes called the eleventh, is reserved.

The *bodhisattva* path emphasizes compassion (*karuṇā*) as the basis for that part of the *bodhisattva* vow that aims at the benefit of all sentient beings. For this purpose it includes mental exercises intended to promote this compassion. Two methods are preserved. The one known as “seven causes and effects” is attributed to the teacher Atiśa. [See the biography of Atiśa.] According to this method, perfected Buddhahood arises from the “thought of enlightenment” (*bodhicitta*); that thought,

from altruistic aspiration; that aspiration, from compassion; compassion from love; love from gratitude; gratitude from recollection of kindness; recollection of kindness from seeing everyone as one’s own mother. One starts with one’s own mother as the object of contemplation and eventually contemplates all sentient beings as “mother.” The other method derives from Śāntideva’s *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and involves changing places with another. [See the biography of Śāntideva.] Henceforth, the *bodhisattva*’s sense organs and organs of action will work only for the aim of others.

Vajrayāna. The Vajrayāna, or Diamond Vehicle, sometimes referred to as the *mantra* path, is intended to quicken the progress to enlightenment by employing the three avenues of body, speech, and mind through the use of gesture (*mudrā*), incantation (*mantra*), and intense concentration (*samādhi*), respectively. These avenues coordinate with the “three mysteries” (i.e., Body, Speech, and Mind) of the supermundane Buddha. The Tantras (esoteric texts and teachings) are transmitted from *guru* to disciple in a process requiring the disciple to look upon the *guru* as a Buddha. The Tantra that conveys the *mantra* path corresponds to the capacities of disciples. It is said that of the four Tantra classes, the Kriyā Tantras were revealed on behalf of candidates who delight more in external ritual than in inner *samādhi*; the Caryā Tantras were revealed for the candidates who delight in external ritual and inner *samādhi* equally; the Yoga Tantras are for those who delight more in inner *samādi* than in external ritual; and the Anuttarayoga Tantras were revealed on behalf of those who delight in inner *samādhi* completely.

The devotees of such cults usually have their *gurus* transmit to them permission to evoke a deity or deities. Often one of these deities is chosen as a tutelary deity (*iṣṭadevatā*), and the devotee daily serves this deity and expects this deity to give protection.

Various Buddhist Tantras have a theory about “defilement” (*kleśa*) that differs strikingly from the non-Tantric aim of eliminating it, as though defilement were something to extract. According to these Tantras, the three “poisons” (lust, hatred, and delusion) cannot really be extracted from man; they can only be detoxified. It is a kind of alchemy they teach. These “poisons” are to be turned against themselves, as though to short-circuit them. According to this theory, for man to be perfected nothing need be added or subtracted, only converted. The Tantras have of course been criticized, even condemned, for asserting that precisely what causes bondage is what causes release from bondage. But this doctrine was misunderstood as an endorsement of license to engage in practices that Buddhism has always condemned. It is true that the Tantric texts when

read literally sometimes appear to give such reproachable advice. In fact, Buddhism does not speak ill of the craving for enlightenment or for liberation; so it appears that what is wrong with craving is not craving itself but what it is aimed at, that is, craving that is badly aimed or perversely directed. Nevertheless, Buddhism uses different words to maintain the contrast between different types of craving. *Rāga* (lust) is reserved for bad craving; *praṇidhāna* (aspiration) for good craving. But while non-Tantric Buddhism speaks as though they are different cravings—the bad one and the good one—the Tantric outlook is that ultimately, they are the same craving. Indeed, even that so-called bad lust has the function of preserving the species and permitting the birth of *arhats*, *bodhisattvas*, and Tantric adepts (*mahāsiddhas*).

It should also be acknowledged about Tantric literature that some of the works included in this class differ as much from each other as does Tantric from non-Tantric Buddhism. Thus, works of the Caryā Tantra have much in common with a popular non-Tantric Mahāyāna text known as the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, which has a theory about the interrelatedness of each and every element of the world. These Tantras characteristically express the theory by maintaining that “body” also has “speech” and “mind”; that “speech” also has “body” and “mind”; that “mind” also has “body” and “speech.” Other kinds of Tantras, especially those of the Anuttarayoga class, have much in common with certain Brahmanic and Hindu notions, of the subtle body, for example, and so these Tantras speak of an “illusory body” that is made to enter something called the Clear Light, there to be purified and made into a kind of Diamond Body.

Probably it could be said of all the four kinds of paths distinguished above—the ascetic practices, the monastic *prātimokṣa*, the *bodhisattva* path, and the *mantra*, or “diamond vehicle”—that they agree that man should not aim at just re-becoming the heavenly man he was before the fall, but that they differ in what is to be dropped off, added, or converted, for the aim of becoming enlightened or liberated.

[For further discussion of the soteriologies outlined above, see Arhat; Bodhisattva Path; Mahāsiddhas; and Buddhism, Schools of, *articles on Hīnayāna Buddhism; Mahāyāna Buddhism; and Esoteric Buddhism.*]

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SOUL. [*Concepts of soul in various religious traditions are here presented in nine articles:*

- Concepts in Primitive Religions
- Ancient Near Eastern Concepts
- Greek and Hellenistic Concepts
- Indian Concepts
- Buddhist Concepts
- Chinese Concepts
- Jewish Concept
- Christian Concept
- Islamic Concepts

For discussion of beliefs about the soul's origins and its destiny, see Breath and Breathing and Afterlife. For questions about the relationship between soul (or mind) and body, see Human Body, article on Myths and Symbolism, and Artificial Intelligence.]

Concepts in Primitive Religions

Whereas in a Christian context the human soul is thought about and overvalued in relation to the body, in the traditional thinking of so-called archaic societies an immanent power, a vital principle, an individualized dynamism, is usually recognized to exist not only in man but in certain other material and biological beings as well. Whatever moves, whatever lives, is supposed to be the abode of one or many souls.

Here I shall essentially deal with what we conceive of as the spiritual principle of the human being, the prototype of the “beings-forces” of nature, and not with the more or less anthropomorphized spirits, gods, or genies, nor with powers that are supposed to have a mineral, an animal, or a vegetable as a continuous substratum.

The essence of the soul is power, to the extent that power, soul, and life become interchangeable categories. But with regard to traditional societies we can really speak neither of the uniqueness of the soul nor of homogenous and always precise concepts. The linguistic equivalents we use remain very approximate. Since the idea of the soul is rarely the object of metaphysical discussion in these societies, it is difficult to really know if what is designated by the aborigines as “spirit of the man,” or “spirit in the man,” corresponds to separate realities, to distinct functions of the same reality, or to inherent potentialities of a determined substance. Nevertheless, the fact that primitive man thinks of himself as unlimited with regard to his physical potentialities

shows that he examines himself in order to seize his hidden essence, which extends far beyond his body.

In the explanations relating to the subject, we observe a constant concern about concrete detail and the rejection of abstractions, which results in a correspondence between ontological pluralism and a plurality of phenomena; but nothing is represented as either purely material or purely spiritual. The quantitative character of the power of the soul is accentuated by this plurality of personal souls and by the identification of the degree of force that each individual disposes of in his relation to evil spirits, in his generative power, and in the influence he has on his fellow citizens, for example. Each of these individual powers tends to free itself and to exert itself in an independent way: for example, through the heart in courageous deeds of battle or through the mind in the wisdom of a palaver. The soul never appears as a pure essence but is identified through props and manifestations. Its power can vary from individual to individual, and even in the same individual in the course of his life.

Theoretical Elaborations. While most of the ethnologists of religion have been interested in problems relating to the soul, E. B. Tylor (*Primitive Culture*, 1871) and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (*L'âme primitive*, 1927) were among those who formulated the principal theories regarding this subject. In *The Golden Bough*, James Frazer remained close to Tylor's concepts. R. R. Marett, criticizing both Tylor and Frazer, coined the word *animatism* to describe the tendency of the mind to consider inanimate objects as living and endowed with feelings and a will of their own. [See Animism and Animatism.]

According to Tylor, who was one of the first to propose a theory of primitive religion, the evolution of religious systems had its origin in a primitive animism, defined as a belief in spiritual beings. The notion of the soul arose from the fusion of the idea of a life principle with a double, or an impalpable phantom that could separate itself from the body it resembled. Belief in a phantom double originated in the experience of the independent double of distant or deceased individuals appearing in nocturnal dreams and diurnal fantasies.

But studies in the history of religions have not validated Tylor's hypotheses. His sequential interpretation (belief in a double, attribution of a soul to animals and then to objects, ancestor and spirit cults, fetishism, idolatry, polytheism, monotheism) has been shown to be incorrect; the importance that he gave to dream-inspired revelations in the origin of myth and religion has been contested; and the historical evidence proves that monotheism appeared much earlier than Tylor thought.

According to Lévy-Bruhl, the primitive soul must be seen as participating in a unique principle. All beings function as the vehicles, and the diversely specified incarnations, of an anonymous and impersonal force that sociology has popularized under its Melanesian name, *mana*. [See Preanimism.] Participation in *mana*, which is at one and the same time substance, essence, force, and a unity of qualities, confers on things and beings a sacred and mysterious character that animates nature and maintains an interaction between all its parts. Belief in an essence common to certain beings and objects has been defined as totemism. But Lévy-Bruhl also viewed souls as variable and multiple powers, unequally located in the universe. Next to emanations-forces and powers of nature are placed the beings-forces, the personified souls, endowed both with intelligence and will.

It is, however, to be emphasized that both Lévy-Bruhl and Marett erred in concluding that the primitive conceives of everything in nature as being animated, even if he does believe that anything can serve as a prop for an animation under specific circumstances. The idea that all is soul is a theoretical construction. The idea that the individual soul does not exist and that it fuses either with the cosmos or with the group is also erroneous, because, on the one hand, the man's identification with the vegetable, animal, or divine world does not exclude the differentiation of powers and, on the other hand, among many African peoples (the Kikuyu of Kenya, for example), the collective soul (or family spirit) is entirely different from the soul of the individual.

The idea that primitive thought ignores any dualism separating the body and soul also lacks validation. Numerous examples show that there exists a quite noticeable distinction between the body element and the diversity of spiritual entities that we call "souls" for the sake of convenience, entities that may have the body as a prop or that, as the double of ego, constitute what Frazer called the "external soul."

Varieties of the Soul. Owing to a lack of better and more varied terms, I use the term *soul* here, in the singular, to refer to conceptions with greater differences than those existing between Shintō and Christianity; *soul* often designates, for a single living being, plural entities, distinguished by the autochthonous peoples themselves to account for what they judge to be independent spiritual forces. As beliefs can and do contradict each other from one ethnic group to another, it is hardly possible to imagine a typology that could be valid for a single continent or even for a large cultural area; consequently, it seems more appropriate to illus-

trate the diversity of souls—the complexity and ambiguity of these beliefs—with some examples.

The Fang of Gabon name seven types of souls: (1) *eba*, a vital principle located in the brain, which disappears after death; (2) *nlem*, the heart, the seat of conscience, which inspires the acts of men and also disappears at the time of death; (3) *edzii*, an individual name that retains a sort of individuality after death; (4) *ki* (or *ndem*) the sign of the individual and at the same time his force which perpetuates itself after disincarnation; (5) *ngzel*, the active principle of the soul as long as it is in the body; (6) *nsissim*, both shadow and soul; and (7) *khun*, the disincarnated spirit, which can appear as a ghost.

From this example, we can see that the soul is never conceived of as an amorphous substance; rather, it is represented through functional props (brain, heart), through images (shadow, ghost), through symbols (name, character sign), or by its activities. The differentiation of souls may also occur in relation to ethical or sexual criteria or their modalities of action.

The Mbua of the Rio Branco territory in Brazil (the São Paulo littoral) believe that there exists in each individual both a beneficial soul and a dangerous soul, which manifest themselves through communication, that is to say, through speech and an impulsive process comparable to telepathy. Moreover, there is a third type of soul called *ñeē*, which is the initial core of the personality and plays the part of the protective spirit. This soul stands guard while men sleep in the forest; but unlike the guardian angel, it is not a being distinct from man. If the three souls simultaneously abandon the body, the person dies. The Mossi of Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) believe that death comes from the disunion in the soul (*sigā*) of two invisible principles, one male (*hirma*) and the other female (*tule*).

Mircea Eliade has noted that the Aborigines of Australia recognize a distinction between two souls: the real ego, which preexists the individual and survives him, perhaps through reincarnation, as certain tribes believe; and the trickster-soul, which manifests itself in dreams, resists its definitive separation from the body, and may remain in the body of another person after the death of its owner. Men have to perform special rites to defend themselves against the trickster-soul.

This last example suggests what is to many theoreticians of primitive culture a fundamental distinction: that is, the distinction between soul-substance, which animates the body and which temporarily locates itself in the vital centers or in the products relating to its force (saliva, sweat, blood, sperm, tears), and the external soul, which is also plural and whose different aspects correspond to various particular functions. [See Blood; Tears; and Spittle and Spitting.]

Internal soul. Wilhelm Wundt called the potentialities of particular parts of the body (head, heart, liver, eye) “organic souls.” But if the soul is designated by the places where it shows its power, it is in the whole body that we find the substance of the soul.

Among the corporal expressions of vital dynamism, a privileged place is assigned to blood and to respiration. In one of the myths of the Iurak of Central Asia, the world perishes from a fire caused by the death of a sacred tree; as it tumbles down, the tree sheds its blood, which streams over the earth, changing itself into fire as it flows. Thus, the disanimation of the center of the world produces (as a consequence) the disanimation of all beings. Respiration is conceived of as both the sign of life and its principle. Such was the power of breath among the Celts that during the Battle of Druin Damghaire the druid Mog Ruith, using only his breath, transformed his enemies into rocks. [See Breath and Breathing.]

A vital spiritual force is also supposed to reside in sperm. Sexual relations are the symbol and the means of the continuity of the vital force in man. To say to an old African man that he does not have any more “force” is to tell him to his face that, on the one hand, he is impotent, and that, on the other, he is no longer capable of creation. Finally, it is to be noted that certain extraordinary potentialities of the body may be present as the result of its being possessed by a superior power.

External soul. This term designates the powers of the soul located outside the body. Frazer spoke at length about this in *The Golden Bough*. Discovering in himself potentialities that appear to him to be superior to those shown by his ordinary physical performance, man has a tendency to conceptualize this superiority more readily outside than inside his own body.

Thus, we call external soul what can leave the body during a dream or sometimes two or three years before physical death (Dogon, Serer, Kongo of Africa); what habitually lives in an animal double (totem), in a human double, in the shadow; what expresses itself through speech and rhythm in relation to the “non-me” (the soul of communication).

Thus, the indigenous peoples of the Bank’s Islands in Vanuatu fear that death will come to them if they see their reflection in the water of a cave. If the deceased does not have a shadow, he may be a shadow himself and may frighten the person who sees him as a ghost. An individual can attack another using a shadow acting as an intermediary. The Sotho of southern Africa believe that a crocodile can seize a passerby if it catches hold of his shadow at the surface of the water. But in this context the word *shadow* is used figuratively to designate some inner aspect that is *like* his shadow—

clearly individual and separable from him, but at the same time immaterial despite being represented by way of material substance. This is an example of the conceptual expressing itself through objects accessible to the senses.

The “double” (which is identified with the shadow in some cultures, distinguished from it in others) is a second self, mysteriously united to an individual. It can die with the individual, or it can be seized and consumed by a witch, which action, in turn, causes a mortal sickness in the victim (a general belief in West Africa). On the island of Mota in Melanesia, the term *tamaniu* refers to a kind of double, referring to any animal that is mystically connected to man. Men are forbidden to eat the *tamaniu*. Man and animal protect and influence each other in profound solidarity, but here the double does not have the exact same traits as the original.

The fact that some of man’s powers are represented by the hair and nails that continue to grow for a short time after death, and that they are symbolically transported and buried and become the objects around which family funerals are celebrated in the case of the death of a loved one in a foreign land or of an untransportable corpse (e.g., in Benin civilization), does not mean that a soul is held to live in the hair and the nails. Rather, they are viewed in very much the same way as the placenta, which, like them, is buried in most parts of Africa—which is to say, they are thought to be relics of life and power.

The souls of animals, like the souls of things (e.g., a statuette), may also enter into symbolic and participative relationship with the human soul, but an animal—for example, a bird that flies away, a fly that enters a person’s ear, a snake that kills—may also temporarily become the prop of a person’s external soul. Sorcerers and witches are supposed to possess, to varying degrees, this liberty to transport themselves, to live in a double, to metamorphose in order to reach the people on whom they wish to act. Sometimes, the double (e.g., the *aklama* of the Ewe of Togo) is thought of as a sort of tutelary spirit, an adviser on matters related to the luck of the individual, one that suggests a good deed or the way to avoid an accident.

Origin of the Soul. The soul can originate from an almighty spirit, from Mother Earth, or from special genies; it can also be obtained as a gift, by conquest, or by choice.

Among the Ewe of Togo—who use the terms *luvo* (the “substance of the soul”) and *gbogbo* (the “breath of life”)—the individual, before his incarnation, exists as a spirit, and together with the supreme creator Mawu-Lisa he chooses his own destiny. This choice is supposed to take place in the field called *borne*, the place of pre-

natal existence, a kind of reservoir of stagnant and infantile lives where the primordial mother, Bomeno, cuts clay from which to fashion the newborn, which she then sends into women’s wombs. The myths relating to the origin of each individual introduce the notions of initial choice of his life (*gbetsi*), of reproduction of a character type (*kpoli*), and of reincarnation of an ancestor (*dzoto*).

The Bambara of Mali believe that man possesses twin souls called *ni* and *dya*, which are given by the deity Faro. The *tere*, which represents character, conscience, and force, is given to man by the deity Pemba. Finally, it is from the deity Mouso Koroni Koundyé that each individual obtains his *waso*, a malignant force that lives in the foreskin or in the clitoris and disappears at the moment of circumcision or clitoridectomy.

Among some peoples the generation of the soul is not the action of a divinity external to man; rather it is through traditional methods that a soul can be obtained as a power. Thus, during their lifetime the Jivaroan people of Ecuador try to obtain a soul they call *arutam wakani*, which cannot be killed by physical violence, poisoning, or sympathetic magic. The search for this soul, which takes place around the age of six, involves a pilgrimage to a sacred waterfall, fasting, and the capture of a wandering soul during a vision of large animals in combat. The individual then feels an irrepresible desire to kill. The act of killing leads to the acquisition of the victims’ souls and thus confers cumulative supernatural power. Those who have an *arutam* soul and are killed by either natural or supernatural means can, at the moment of death, form a revengeful soul called *muisak*, which leaves the corpse through the mouth in order to kill the murderer. Each individual, regardless of sex, is supposed also to possess an ordinary soul (*nekas wakan*) that is relatively passive; this soul is represented by blood, and bleeding is even believed to be a hemorrhage of the soul. But the *nekas wakan* is only of secondary interest in relation to the *arutam wakani* and the *muisak*.

The Yoruba of Nigeria believe that force can be ingested and that this food possesses the quality of a soul. Thus the new king of Ife had to consume the heart of his predecessor, once that organ had been reduced to powder, in order to incorporate in himself the substance of royalty. [See Cannibalism.]

Destiny of the Soul. The migration of the soul is the extreme consequence of the freedom of movement attributed to spiritual entities. Indeed, most primitive peoples believe that a form of soul becomes detached from the body in dreams, but there are some who also hope to reach a stage of personal weightlessness through ecstasy.

Thus the Tupi-Guarani of Brazil believe that inces-

sant dancing associated with strict fasting will make them become so light that they will reach the "land of no evil" beyond the seas, where they will remain eternally young and be free from work and life's trials.

The majority of the so-called primitive societies believe that after death their ancestors live in another world that either parallels the world of the living or is similar to it. The voluntary burial of weapons and food in tombs can be traced as far back as the Mousterian epoch, to Neanderthal man, and during the Upper Paleolithic period the dead were usually covered with red ochre, a sign of life and perhaps resurrection. [See After-life.]

Many African peoples believe that an ancestor identified either by divination or by some distinguishing traits, although living in the country of spirits, can be reincarnated in a newborn child, and sometimes even in several newborns, especially twins.

When detached from the body after death, certain souls can disappear, and others can reach various worlds beyond. For example, one soul makes its way to the place where its ancestors live; another is transmitted as a vital force to its descendants, usually to its grandsons. The ghost remains as a double next to the corpse or appears to the living while they sleep.

Regarding forms of life after death, an example from the Dakota is illustrative. The sky god Skan attributes to each person at birth four types of souls. (1) *Nagi*, the spirit that controls the actions of human beings until their death, when it leaves the body to await Skan's judgment. If *nagi* is deserving, it joins the world of spirits (*wanagi tamakoce*); if not, it is condemned to wander endlessly. (2) *Niya*, the vital breath, which though immaterial, is visible whenever it wills. It gives vitality to the body, making it understand what is good and bad, and it helps the body to influence other men. The *niya* can leave the body of the human being, and if the *nagi* abandons the body at the same time, it means death. After death, the *niya* gives testimony on the role of the *nagi*, which helps in the judgment of the latter. (3) *Nagiya*, the shadow, the external double, responsible for supernatural actions. A man possessed by the *nagiya* of a bear, for example, will have the nature of a bear. The *nagiya* also allows communication between animals and humans. (4) *Sicun*, the guardian spirit. It is never visible and is sent forth by the *wakan kin* ("superior spirits") to make man react differently from animals. After death, it goes back to where it came from.

Almost everywhere, the voyage of the soul after death implies a gradual purification through a series of trials (e.g., crossing a stream, climbing to the sky by means of a rope). The ultimate destination is the land of the soul,

depicted as a celestial space or an underground place, a glade or a desert, or a place devoid of all tangible character. In the Solomon Islands, the beyond is said to be both a distant country and a nearby cave. The idea of the dead resting in the west where the sun sets, or underground, or in marshes does not contradict the idea of their close invisible presence.

That the individual continues to exist in a new condition does not mean that the soul is conceived of as being immortal. Life can have a circular and cyclical movement that death does not interrupt, provided that the correct rites relating to burial (cremation in the Solomon Islands), lamentation, prayer for the dead, and sacrificial offerings are carried out. [See Death.] Primitive peoples speak not of an eternal life but of a very long life, a kind of existence resembling the one the dead have had on earth. Behavior, good or bad, as well as the manner of death, largely determines the posthumous power. Among the Fon of Dahomey, the individual whose death was caused by lightning, drowning, or leprosy can never achieve ancestorhood, and among the Tongans of Polynesia only the nobles are totally immortal. Among other peoples, some ancestors can ascend to the heights of divinity.

Here, mutilation prevents the soul of a dead man from performing harmful acts (Bering Inuit); there, the noxious powers of a sorcerer's soul are destroyed through the burning of his body (Ganda of Uganda). While continuing his life in the other world, the dead man can be present elsewhere; as a specter or a ghost (Raketta of New Guinea) or in the form of an animal (lizard among the Samoans, python among the Kamba of East Africa). Although invisible, the souls of the dead can appear in dreams or to those specialists who know their desires and so can intercept their messages.

Summary. In the religions of primitive societies, the soul is not necessarily the particularized form of a general and undifferentiated supernatural force; it is neither the genie living in a material reality nor the unique prototype of the ego or of the person considered as a moral and judicial entity. Many societies believe in the existence of several souls in the same individual, each of them having a distinct function. Generally, greater importance is given to the power of animation (*anima*) than to the faculty of representation (*animus*). And the notion that some spiritual element of the person survives after death is quasi-general.

[See also Immortality.]

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Ancient Near Eastern Concepts

The soul can be defined most conveniently as that part (or those parts) of a person that persists after death. By this definition, the cultures of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt may be said to have believed in a soul. But in all other details of soul concepts, these two cultures differed.

Mesopotamia. Virtually no texts from the cultures of Sumeria, Akkadia, ancient Babylonia, and so forth, refer to the soul per se. All one can do in inquiring into the matter is to reason back from conceptions of the afterlife and the netherworld to the conception of the soul. If we know where and in what conditions a person persists after death we can infer (or, perhaps, invent) concepts appropriate to the soul, the persisting part.

To the ancient Mesopotamians an afterlife offered nothing good. Humans persisted for a period in conditions of unhappiness, discomfort, and despair. Various texts give similar descriptions of the place of the afterlife, thought usually to be beneath the world. It is a "house which none leave who have entered it. On the road from which there is no way back, to the house wherein the dwellers are bereft of light, where dust is their fare and clay their food. They are clothed like birds, with wings for garments, and see no light, residing in darkness" (*Akkadian Epic of Gilgamesh*, tablet 7.3.34–39, quoted in Pritchard, 1969, p. 87). The place is called here the "House of Dust" and is unusual in attributing feathers to the unlucky dead. Otherwise the account can be taken to stand for the basic concepts of the underworld. It is a place from which the dead wish to escape, yet it is a cardinal principle that none of the dead will ever leave. The central Mesopotamian myth of Gilgamesh, who seeks unsuccessfully for immortality, is indicative of the stress placed upon the impossibility of escape from the place of death. Even the great goddess Inanna/Ishtar, the queen of heaven, when she jour-

neyed to the underworld, was sequentially stripped of her insignia of royal rank until, naked, she became a corpse and was impaled upon a stake. She, by her divine nature immortal, escaped, as no human could.

The underworld is a place modeled generally upon this world, and gods and goddesses govern there much as the earthly deities do. But the pleasures of this world are wholly lacking: the dead hunger but dwell in darkness. In accordance with this dark view of afterlife, Mesopotamians were entirely pessimistic about death, finding it bereft of moral significance. In the underworld the great would be shorn of their power and the symbols of their power. The fact of their eminence on earth might be remembered (there is some indication that princes were still known as such in the underworld), but no one on earth could work politically, morally, or religiously for a pleasant condition below. Further, because human beings, by Mesopotamian definition, were not immortal, it is likely that the dead did not persist in the underworld forever but eventually faded away into nothingness.

The above conceptions allow us to define the soul for ancient Mesopotamians as the will and consciousness and individuality of persons that persist beyond the grave. Unfortunately, in their conception, the will was thereafter frustrated, the consciousness bereft of light and hope, and individuality doomed to, at best, disappear.

There are, however, indications that the central (or official) conceptions were not entirely and universally shared. The burial customs of ancient Mesopotamia varied from region to region and from time to time. Not infrequently, foodstuffs, drink, pottery, and other items were interred with the corpse. This might imply that the living could serve the dead and aid the dead in the underworld, but there is no reason to believe that this was thought seriously to be the case. No textual evidence exists to indicate that anything like continuing ancestor reverence on, say, the Chinese model, existed. That some in ancient Mesopotamia believed in ghosts might imply that the dead could escape from their unhappy existence in the underworld, but it is more likely that ghosts were persons who had not managed yet to enter the underworld and were, if such a thing can be imagined, more unhappy than the denizens there. There is probably no more reason to regard the grave furnishings of the common people and the belief in ghosts as significant for the Mesopotamian concept of the soul than it would be for similar beliefs and practices to be taken seriously in regard to Christian or Islamic beliefs about the soul.

There was a period of two or three generations about

the middle of the third millennium BCE, when the royalty of Ur were buried in tombs containing grave goods, including human servants, in sufficient quantity to justify the speculation that at this period the souls of royalty (at least) could achieve a condition of some comfort in the netherworld. But we cannot generalize from this aberrant period anything about Sumerian or ancient Mesopotamian beliefs generally. The ancient Mesopotamian concept of the soul can be summarized as those aspects of the personality that, regrettably, persist for a time after death in an afterlife without comfort, purpose, or hope.

Egypt. Although we may suspect that our sources of knowledge (primarily tomb inscriptions) bias our perspective, it nevertheless seems clear that the culture of ancient Egypt was persistently and substantially concerned with the fate of the soul after death. This concern led to conceptions of the soul that are of considerable complexity. If we take the definition of soul to be that part (or those parts) of a person that persists after death, the Egyptian concept of soul involved several major factors, any of which might be termed the soul. They might be thought of as the “*ka* soul,” the “*ba* soul,” the “*akh* soul,” and the “*ab* soul,” but the repetition of the English word “soul” could imply a conceptual unity that would distort Egyptian thought. Hence I shall here discuss the *ka*, the *ba*, the *akh*, and the *ab* using those terms.

The *ka*. The *ka* is most often termed “vital force” in scholarly commentaries. While this is an imprecise usage, *ka* is by no means a term used with precision by the Egyptians. The hieroglyphic symbol for *ka* is two arms pointing upward that are connected at the base by slightly curved lines probably meant to suggest pectoral muscles. If the *ka* symbol derives from a representation of upraised arms it can be said to imply religious reverence, and this also is implied from the fact that the *ka* symbol is frequently depicted as placed upon a standard in the fashion of symbols of deities. A significant difference of interpretation will result, however, if the *ka* symbol is presumed to derive from an Egyptian two-dimensional representation of outstretched arms rather than of upraised arms. The *ka* symbol has been understood, with good evidence derived from three dimensional statuary, as representing an embrace (as of a son by his father) and as such a symbolic transference of vitality. Our lack of certainty in defining even the shape of the *ka* symbol is indicative of our lack of certainty in defining the *ka* itself. It is probably the most important “soul” concept of the ancient Egyptians, but this very importance leads it to appear in many seemingly conflicting contexts.

In the *Memphite Theology*, the most important state-

ment of Egyptian philosophy known to us, it is written that at the time of creation

The mighty Great One is Ptah, who transmitted [*life* to all gods], as well as (to) their *ka*'s, through this heart, by which Horus became Ptah, and through this tongue, by which Thoth became Ptah. . . . Indeed, all the divine order really came into being through what the heart thought and the tongue commanded. Thus the *ka*-spirits were made and the *hemsut*-spirits were appointed, they who make all provisions and all nourishment, by this speech. . . . So the gods entered into their bodies of every (kind of) wood, of every (kind of) stone, of every (kind of) clay, or anything which might grow upon him, in which they had taken their form. So all the gods, as well as their *ka*'s gathered themselves to him, content and associated with the Lord of the Two Lands.

(quoted in Pritchard, 1969, pp. 4–5)

This text, as do many others, indicates that the individual (here, significantly, the individual gods) and his *ka* were thought of as two conjoined and associated beings; the *ka* was not simply an aspect of one single being. However, it would probably be incorrect to think of a *ka* as a double or a twin in the sense sometimes found in Manichaean writings, since the union of man (or god) and *ka* was intimate and the two could not be separated during life.

The *ka* of a person is his ability to do. It is the power of a god to do divine things, the power of a pharaoh to do divine things, and the power of a human being to do human things. If a god is thought to be resident in or symbolized by a statue (his body of wood, stone, or clay) it would be imperative to be sure that his *ka* also resided there.

The *kas* of the gods were of a different order than the *kas* of humans, but the gods were just as dependent upon them for their life as were humans. When Atum brought life to Shu and Tefnut, the first gods, he did so by sharing his *ka* with them by means of an embrace. It might be said that all *kas* derive ultimately from that of the creator god, that a father's *ka* is transmitted to his son and hence that all *kas* are in some mystical way united. But for the ancient Egyptians (the pharaoh excepted) a *ka* was a personal possession and it is doubtful that an individual thought of his *ka* as bringing him into union with other individuals.

The *ka* of the pharaoh was of a different order than the *ka* of all commoners as it was a *ka* that could exercise divine powers over the two lands or, in other words, be shared with the two lands. The central mythology of the Osiris/Horus cycle can be understood to focus on the problem of the pharaonic *ka*. Osiris (the former pharaoh) was the progenitor of Horus (the new pharaoh) and so the *ka* of the former reappears in the latter. Horus, however, must journey to the underworld

to bring a share of the *ka* back to Osiris so that Osiris can return to life and engender the vital force, *ka*, that provides life and growth to nature and agriculture. On the level of the pharaoh the divine economy of *ka* provides a mediating theme relating the Osiris/Horus mythology to the late Osiris pharaoh and the living Horus pharaoh. The *ka* of the pharaoh that is the *ka* of Osiris was for the ancient Egyptians the force that provided the means of sustenance for all other *kas*. Only the pharaoh's *ka* is commonly depicted in Egyptian art and inscriptions.

One received one's *ka* at birth and lived with it happily through life (or sadly, for one's *ka* might not be the best and might be unlucky). Its departure is the beginning of death. In the absence of one's *ka* one is a corpse. "The resting of the *ka*" is the period after death but before the rituals of final interment are completed. After interment one "goes to the *ka*" and thereafter is again alive, "master of one's *ka*." Egyptian mortuary ritual has, therefore, its happy side, for while one might be facing an uncertain future traversing dangerous depths and coaxing grim gatekeepers, one at least will not face the future alone; the *ka* will be there too and may accompany one even into the celestial ship of the sun.

The *ba*. In scholarly commentaries the *ba* is often called "soul" or "spirit," but it is unlikely that these terms are more appropriate for the *ba* than for the *ka*. The hieroglyphic representation of the *ba* is a human-headed bird that, not uncommonly, also has human arms and hands. The *ba* is the power of transformation, motion, animation of a person after death; it seems to have played little or no role in the Egyptian conception of a living person. The *ba* served to bind together the mummy and the *ka* of the deceased, provide the mobility the person needed to obtain food and drink and air, and enable the person to leave the tomb at will, travel through the underworld, and become manifest. A symbolic manifestation of a god, an especially potent amulet, or an especially significant text could be called the *ba* of that god. As such it would denote the god's presence in a particular realm. In addition to the *ka* of the god, which would be necessary to empower a sacred statue, one would need to arrange that the statue receive the *ba* of that same god so that the statue would be animated and able to receive and appreciate the offerings made to it. The *ba* of Re is the ram, the hawk is the *ba* of Horus, the crocodile is the *ba* of Sobek and so forth; these are the recognizable forms that those gods assume in communications with humans. A person wishing to assume the form of a hawk, spells tell us, must be endowed with the *ba* of Horus.

For a person recently deceased to resume human form, begin again to be able to consume food and drink,

move about from tomb to heavens to the solar ship, the *ba* was absolutely necessary. But it is, perhaps, erroneous to think of "the person" and "the *ba*" as two separate but related entities along the lines of "the person" and "the *ka*." The *ba* is rarely if ever mentioned in texts dealing with living persons, although the *ka* often is. It is probably not the case that a person when dead has a *ba*; rather, the person when dead is a *ba*. A living person, then, would be ego plus body plus *ka*; a dead person (when vitalized) would be *ba* plus mummy plus *ka*, the difference being that ego cannot separate from the body during life while the *ba* is able to move about separately from the mummy. The *ba* remains in some fashion dependent upon the mummy, as the extreme care taken in embalming by ancient Egyptians makes quite clear.

The *akh*. The *akh* is commonly translated by scholars as "spirit," or "transfigured spirit." The hieroglyphic character for *akh* is a crested ibis. The *akh* is the condition of a person after death when he may be described as glorious or shining. It carries the implication that he has joined the company of the happy deceased who cluster around the polestar and who therefore do not join in the daily round of the solar boat.

It is likely that the *akh* was a conception of the fate of the deceased that arose independently of that of the *ba* and *ka* and, in keeping with ancient Egypt's propensity to discuss reality by means of a multiplicity of approximations, was simply cojoined with them despite what appear to be conceptual contradictions. This should not be surprising, as we are concerned with a culture that lasted for millennia and was divided throughout that time into various competing centers of theological and necrological thinking and into various social classes. Egyptians seem to have been capable of seeing their dead both as participating in the solar cycles of nature and as transfigured and aloof from those cycles.

The *ab*. The *ab* is usually translated as "heart," although "conscience" might be a more appropriate rendering. The hieroglyphic character is a glyph of the human heart, an organ thought by the Egyptians to be the center of moral and ethical judgment.

Perhaps the most well known of all vignettes in the *Book of Going Forth by Day* is that of the judgment hall where Thoth and Anubis oversee the weighing of an *ab* in a giant scale. The *ab* is balanced against a feather, symbol of *maat*, which is the Egyptian term for cosmic and social order and justice. A crocodile monster stands by to devour those hearts that are too heavy. Osiris sits enthroned above the scene, and it may be that those whose hearts are sufficiently light may continue on toward union with him.

There exist, in relation to the judgment scene, texts

that are known as “negative confessions.” These are ritual claims of innocence in reference to a lengthy list of potential social and ritual misdeeds. These “negative confessions” seem to imply that whether or not there ever was a time when judgment after death in a Christian or Islamic sense was taken seriously, throughout much of ancient Egyptian history judgment was not very much more than another of many trials through which the newly deceased had to pass with the aid of magical knowledge and ritual assistance.

It is probably no more correct to identify the *ab* as a soul than it would be to identify the conscience as a soul. Nevertheless the *ab* does persist after death and so falls into the general definition of soul in use here.

Conclusion. The ancient Egyptian conception of the soul contrasts strikingly with that of the Mesopotamians. The Egyptians were convinced that they would exist after death and that this state of existence would quite possibly be pleasurable. If the *ka* be defined as soul, Egyptians made of it a central philosophical abstraction, such that the universe could be said to be sustained by soul and religion to be focused on the mediation of soul between the gods/pharaohs, Horus and Osiris.

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The Gods of the Egyptians, vol. 1 (Chicago, 1904), by E. A. Wallis Budge, contains translations of a wide variety of important texts, including lengthy and detailed accounts of the journey of the soul through the afterlife. A creative and impressive recent book on ancient Egypt is R. T. Rundle Clark’s *Myth and Symbol in Ancient Egypt* (London, 1959), wherein he sets forth a comprehensive and consistent theory of the meaning and development of Egyptian religion with frequent reference to various soul concepts, especially the *ka*. Henri Frankfort, a great Egyptologist, wrote both popular and technical books. The most accessible to those not knowledgeable about ancient Egypt is *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (New York, 1948); the more technical work most germane to discussion of the soul, particularly as it relates to the pharaoh, is *Kingship and the Gods* (1948; reprint, Chicago, 1978), where a full chapter is given over to consideration of the *ka*. Siegfried Morenz’s *Egyptian Religion*, translated by Ann E. Keep (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973), provides a lengthy, competent account of its subject and considers var-

ious soul concepts. On practices relating to the souls of the departed, a good recent work is that of C. Jouco Bleeker, *Egyptian Festivals* (Leiden, 1967), which includes a chapter on festivals of the dead.

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Greek and Hellenistic Concepts

The modern Western idea of the soul has both eschatological and psychological attributes, and the presence of the Greek word *psuchē*, or “soul,” in concepts such as psychiatry and psychology suggests that the Greeks viewed the soul in the modern way. Yet the absence of any psychological connotations in the earliest extant usages of *psuchē* shows that at least the early Greek concept of the soul was different from later beliefs. Taking this difference as my point of departure, I shall first trace the development of the conception of the soul of the living, then look at the conception of the soul of the dead, and, finally, analyze the fate of the soul according to Hellenistic religions.

Soul of the Living. The Greek conception of the soul in the Archaic age (800–500 BCE) might best be characterized as multiple. Following the widely accepted terminology developed by the Scandinavian Ernst Arman (1926, 1927), we can distinguish in the oldest literary texts—Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (commonly dated to the eighth and seventh century, respectively)—two types of soul. On the one hand, there is the free soul, or *psuchē*, an unencumbered soul representing the individual personality. This soul is inactive (and unmentioned) when the body is active; it is located in an unspecified part of the body. Its presence is the precondition for the continuation of life, but it has no connections with the physical or psychological aspects of the body. *Psuchē* manifests itself only during swoons or at death, when it leaves the body never to return again. On the other hand, there are a number of body-souls, which endow the body with life and consciousness. The most frequently occurring form of body-soul in Homer’s epics is *thumos*. It is this soul that both urges people on and is the seat of emotions. There is also *menos*, which is a more momentary impulse directed at specific activities. At one time, *menos* seems to have meant “mind, disposition,” as appears from related verbs and the fact that the Vedic *manas* has all the functions of the Homeric *thumos*. As is indicated by the related Sanskrit *dhūmah* and the Latin *fumus*, *thumos* probably once meant “smoke”; it later usurped most of the connotations of *menos*. A word emphasizing the intellect more than *thumos* and *menos* is *nous*, which is the mind or an act of mind, a thought or a

purpose. In addition, there are a number of organs, such as the heart and the lungs, which have both physical and psychological attributes.

In Homer, then, the soul of the living does not yet constitute a unity. The resemblance of this kind of belief in the soul to that of most "primitive" peoples strongly suggests that it belongs to a type of society in which the individual is not yet in need of a center of consciousness. Studies that relate the structural elements of Archaic Greek society to the emotional realities of that society, however, are sorely missing; in fact, studies of belief in the soul never seem to investigate this question.

In the course of the Archaic age, we hear of journeys of the soul—an important capability of the free soul that is not mentioned in Homer. Fascinating accounts tell of persons whose souls were reputed to wander away during a trance. It was told, for example, about one Hermotimos of Clazomenae, a city on the western coast of present-day Turkey, that his soul "wandering apart from the body, was absent for many years, and in different places foretold events such as great floods . . . while his stiff body was lying inert, and that the soul, after certain periods reentering the body as into a sheath, aroused it" (Apollonius, *Mirabilia* 3). Here we have a clear case of a person lying in trance whose soul is supposed to have left the body.

A similar case is reported of Aristeas of Proconnesus, an island in the Sea of Marmara. Herodotus (4.14) tells the following local legend. Aristeas entered a fuller's shop in Proconnesus and dropped dead. But, after the story of his death had spread, someone said that he had just met Aristeas outside the town. And when the relatives came to fetch the dead body from the fuller's shop, they did not find it. After six years Aristeas reappeared and composed a poem, the *Arimaspea*, in which he related a journey to the far North. A later account relates that the soul of Aristeas was seen flying from his mouth in the shape of a raven.

Aristeas's disappearance from the shop suggests that his "death" was in fact a deep trance during which his soul was believed to leave his body. The bilocation at the moment of his supposed death fits into a general pattern according to which bilocation always takes place when the free soul leaves the body—that is to say, during sleep, trance, or death. Aristeas's poem apparently used the first person to describe his journey to the Rhipaeon Mountains in the North, as do the Siberian shamans when recounting their adventures during trances. Those who knew Aristeas personally would have known that he experienced his adventures only in a trance; others who knew only his poem must have

concluded that he had experienced his adventures while awake. These and similar reports have been interpreted as manifestations of a shamanistic influence due to trade and colonization that had brought the Greeks in contact with the shamanistic culture of the Black Sea Scythians in the seventh century. Yet, the shamanistic parallels that have been adduced are either too general—ecstasy and the journey of the soul occur in too many places to be distinguishing traits—or cannot withstand close scrutiny. It seems more acceptable to claim these legends as valid testimonies for the existence of the free soul in Archaic Greece.

Toward the end of the Archaic age, two important developments took place. First, the gradual breakdown of the aristocratic hegemony in the later Archaic age had promoted a certain degree of individualization, and thus the idea of ending up in the unattractive and impersonal beyond that was the Homeric underworld became less and less acceptable. These changes promoted an "upgrading" of the *psuchē*, which in the middle of the fifth century even came to be called "immortal." The philosopher Pythagoras, who lived in the second half of the sixth century, introduced the speculative doctrine of metempsychosis—a doctrine probably influenced by Indo-Iranian sources. Initially, the concept of metempsychosis did not enter the mainstream of Classical Greek religion and remained restricted to marginal religious movements such as Pythagoreanism and Orphism. It was not above ridicule: a contemporary satirist relates that when Pythagoras saw a dog being beaten, he exclaimed: "Stop! Do not beat him. It is the *psuchē* of a dead friend. I recognized him when I heard his whine." However, the doctrine became very popular in post-Classical times.

The second development of the late Archaic age was the gradual incorporation by *psuchē* of *thumos*, which made the *psuchē* the center of consciousness. This transformation has not yet been satisfactorily explained, but it was most likely related to the growing differentiation of Greek society. Because of our limited sources, we can trace the course of this process only in Athens, whence, through the work of the tragedians of the second half of the fifth century, we acquire a detailed look at the changing nature of *psuchē*. Dramatic situations present persons, especially women, whose *psuchē* sighs or melts in despair, suffers pangs, or is "bitten" by misfortune—emotions never associated with *psuchē* in Homer. Characters even address their own *psuchē*, and a particular personality is referred to as, for example, a "mighty *psuchē*" or a "sweet *psuchē*." This development evidently reflects the growth of the private sphere in Athenian society, which promoted a more delicate sensibility.

ity and a greater capacity for tender feelings, such as we find more fully in the fourth century.

The culmination of the *psuchē* as the center of man's inner life was the necessary precondition for the Socratic view that a man's most important task was to take care of his *psuchē*. This view of the soul was taken up by Plato, throughout whose work concern about the *psuchē* remains axiomatic. As Friedrich Solmsen observes, "The *psyche* which he holds to be immortal and for whose fate after life reincarnation offered some meaningful answer, is now the central organ whose vibrations respond to the individual's sufferings and emotional experiences and whose decisions initiate his activities" (Solmsen, 1982, p. 474). Plato even goes so far as to include all intellectual functions in the *psuchē* as well.

Aristotle, on the other hand, almost completely discarded *psuchē*, but "care for the soul" and "cure of the soul" remained important topics for the philosophical schools of the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Cynics. Pursuing the concept of *psuchē* in these schools, however, belongs more to the area of the history of philosophy than to that of religion.

So far, we have been concerned only with *psuchē* as the soul of the living. However, in the second half of the sixth century, the philosopher Anaximenes seems to have used the term *pneuma*, the purely biological breath, to denote the soul of the cosmos in analogy to the soul of man (the testimony is debated, however). The Pythagoreans also believed in an "infinite breath" (*apeiron pneuma*) that was "breathed in" by the cosmos. And in the course of the fifth century, various passages appear in which *pneuma* is used where we would have expected *psuchē*. Yet *pneuma* never completely lost its biological connection and it did not replace *psuchē* in designating the eschatological soul. In Hellenistic times, *pneuma* figures notably in various philosophies, but it rises to religious prominence only among Hellenistic Jewry and in early Christianity.

Souls of the Dead and the Afterlife. The Greeks, like many other peoples, considered the soul of the dead to be a continuation of the free soul of the living. In the Homeric epic it is always *psuchē* that leaves for the underworld; the dead in the afterlife are indeed often called *psuchai*. The body-souls *thumos*, *menos*, and *nous* end their activity at the moment of death—their connection with the body is the cause of their disappearance. The *psuchē*, however, was not the only mode of existence after death; the deceased was also compared to a shadow or presented as an *eidōlon* ("image"), a word that stresses the fact that for the ancient Greeks the dead looked exactly like the living.

The physical actions of the souls of the dead were de-

scribed in two opposite ways. On the one hand, the Greeks believed that the dead souls moved and spoke like the living; the image of the deceased in the memory of the living play a major part in this activity. There is a corollary of this idea in the *Odyssey* (book 11) where Orion and Herakles are depicted as continuing their earthly activities. On the other hand, the souls of the dead are depicted as being unable to move or to speak properly: when the soul of Patroclus left Achilles, he disappeared squeaking (*Iliad* 23.101). The circumstance of death was also of some importance in the formation of ideas about the soul of the deceased. Homer (*Odyssey* 11.41) describes the warriors at the entrance to Hades still dressed in their bloody armor. Aeschylus (*Eumenides* 1.103) has the *eidōlon* of Clytemnestra display her death wounds, and Plato elaborately explains this idea, refining it in a way by adding that the soul also retains the scars of its former existence. On vases, the souls of the dead are even regularly shown with their wounds, sometimes still bandaged.

The idea of the soul of the dead in ancient Greece appears, then, to be influenced by the image of the deceased in the memory of the living, by the circumstances of death, and by the brute fact of the actual corpse. These ideas were never completely systematized and could occur in one and the same description. Just after his death, for example, Patroclus can be described as appearing to Achilles exactly as he was during his life. And as long as he has contact with Achilles he speaks like a normal mortal; only when the contact is over does he leave squeaking. With the passing of time the precise memories of a specific person fade away, and it is understandable that the more personal traits gradually recede behind a more general idea of the dead as the opposite of the living. In time, the individual soul becomes just a member of the countless number of "all souls." The souls move in "swarms" in the Homeric underworld and in the tragedies; the idea of the underworld found its way even into the famous description in book 6 of Vergil's *Aeneid*.

Earlier generations of scholars freely made inferences of belief in the soul from funeral rites. Nowadays we have become much more careful, but the evidence from Homer and other sources suggests that a proper funeral functioned as a rite of passage into afterlife for the dead. This seems to be reflected, for example, in the myth of Sisyphus, who instructed his wife not to perform the proper funeral rites after death so that he could persuade the queen of the underworld, Persephone, to let him return to the land of the living.

After a proper funeral the soul went to murky Hades, (the name is perhaps best translated as "house of invisibility"), which is ruled by the king of the same name

and his wife Persephone, the daughter of the goddess Demeter. The comfortless picture of Hades as "the land of no return" can hardly be separated from Babylonian and Semitic ideas as they appear in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament). The exact location of Hades remained vague; in the *Iliad* it was situated under the earth, in the *Odyssey* at the edge of the world. In the Homeric epics, the underworld was still reached by just crossing the river Acheron, but in the course of the Archaic age the transition between life and death became less "automatic" than in Homer. The new concern for the soul reflected itself now in the introduction of the ferryman Charon and the idea of guidance by the god Hermes Chthonios.

Not everyone, though, went to Hades. In the *Odyssey*, various heroes, such as Menelaus, went to the Elysian Fields. Others, such as Achilles, went to the so-called Isles of the Blessed, where the poet Hesiod, who lived somewhat later than Homer, also situated part of the "heroic" race, which included all the Homeric heroes. From the seventh century on, initiation into the mysteries of Eleusis becomes one of the means for the common man to share in the happiness the heroes enjoyed. As the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* (1.480ff.) says of those who have seen the secret rites: "Prosperous is that one of men upon earth who has seen them; but he who is uninitiated and has no share in the rites never has a portion of like happiness when he is dead and under the murky gloom." Any ethical requirements are still notably absent from this promise of the life eternal. At the end of the sixth century, however, clear indications of a more ethical view of the afterlife appeared, according to which the just were rewarded and the bad penalized, views especially connected with the Pythagorean and Orphic movements. These views also influenced ideas about the fate of Eleusinian initiates. However, despite the great interest in the afterlife that can be found in the literature connected with the mysteries, there is no specific mention of the soul or metempsychosis; the initiates apparently expected to arrive in the underworld in person.

On the whole, however, it must be stated that the ancient Greeks displayed only a limited interest in the life hereafter. It is in keeping with this limited interest that they did not worship their ancestors. The one festival that commemorated them had probably already ceased to be celebrated at the end of the Classical age. It is also part of this lack of interest in the afterlife that the Greeks of the Archaic and earlier Classical age rarely ever mentioned souls of the dead returning to the upperworld. Only the philosopher Plato, in the fourth century, mentions the existence of ghosts wandering around tombs and graveyards. It is true that during the

Athenian festival of the Anthesteria the *kēres* were believed to appear on earth, but it is unlikely that these were the souls of the dead as earlier generations of scholars, who were strongly influenced by animistic views of Greek religion, liked to believe.

Hellenistic Religions. Toward the end of the fifth century the idea developed that the body remained behind on earth but the soul disappeared into the air. The celestial eschatology became highly important in the dialogues of Plato, who introduced the idea that the soul, or at least its immortal part, returned to its original abode in the heavenly area. The large-scale loss of Hellenistic writings makes it difficult to trace the idea of the soul in detail. However, a late oracle of Apollo at Claros, which contains Hellenistic views, declares:

When someone asked Apollo whether the soul remained after death or was dissolved, he answered, "The soul, so long as it is subject to its bonds with the destructible body, while being immune to feelings, resembles the pains of that [the body]; but when it finds freedom after the mortal body dies, it is borne entire to the aether, being then forever ageless, and abides entirely untroubled; and this the First-born Divine Providence enjoined."

(translated in MacMullen, 1981, p. 13)

In various of his writings, the philosopher Plutarch (c. 40–120 CE) also described the flight of the soul to the heavens, in particular to the moon, which became increasingly popular as the final abode of the soul. These views, like metempsychosis, remained popular among philosophers and the educated classes, but it is virtually impossible to establish to what extent they were shared by the lower classes.

As regards the mystery religions, which consisted of a mixture of Greek and native elements, it seems highly unlikely that the cults of Isis, the Syrian Goddess (Dea Syria), and Cybele had any specific teachings about the fate of the soul; at least there are no such indications within the considerable evidence we have regarding these cults. Rather late sources relate that the mysteries of Dionysos and Sabazios were directed to the purification of the soul, but the information is not very specific. Even the so-called Orphic Hymns do not display the otherworldly interest we might expect from hymns carrying the name of Orpheus. Mithraism is the only cult about which anything more detailed is known, that being only that the soul was supposed to pass through the seven spheres of planets after death.

When the rhetorician Menander (third century CE) composed a small handbook on oratory for such customary occasions as birth, marriage, and funerals, he also included some directions on how to speak about the afterlife: "for it is not unsuitable," he notes, "on these topics also to philosophize." He refers to Elysium,

where Rhadamanthus, Menelaus, Achilles, and Memnon, reside. And perhaps, better, he [the deceased] now lives among the gods, traversing the heavens and looking down on life below. Perhaps even, he is reproaching those who mourn for him; for the soul is related to the divine, descends thence, but longs again to mount to its kind—as Helen, the Dioscuri, and Heracles, they say, belong to the gods' community.

(translated in MacMullen, 1984, p. 11)

The ambivalent view of the afterlife reflected in this passage is typical of Hellenistic religions. The gods of the Hellenistic period were generally thought of as gods effective in this life, just as the more traditional gods had been. Earlier generations of scholars have often considered the mystery cults competitors with Christianity in regard to the life hereafter, but it now appears more and more clear that the interest of most people in Hellenistic times rested firmly with this life. The inscriptions that have given us innumerable epitaphs display only a negligible interest in the soul or the life eternal. It was only with Christianity that there developed a new interest in the soul and the life hereafter, but its doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh always remained repugnant to the pagan world.

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onstrate the lack of interest in the afterlife in the Hellenistic religions.

JAN BREMMER

Indian Concepts

The many religious traditions of South Asia present such a variety of views regarding the psychological, metaphysical, and ethical nature of the human being and its relationship to the world that no single concept could adequately and consistently fit the English word *soul*. This may be due, in part, to the ambiguous connotations of the term itself. If by *soul* one denotes a dimension to human life that is distinguishable from corporeal existence and that to a large extent determines the nature of the human being, then one could rightly say that the various religions and philosophies of South Asia posit the existence of a soul (the most notable exception being the materialistic views of the Cārvāka and Lokāyata philosophies, which maintain that a person is nothing more than a conglomeration of physical matter). This is true even in the case of Buddhism, which, despite the fact that the doctrine of *anātman* ("no-soul") is one of the basic tenets of Buddhist teachings, still holds that the laws of *karman* apply to what is experienced as a self and that the moral aspect of one's being is subject to the cycles of rebirth. In general, South Asian religious anthropologies recognize an aspect to the human being (and, in some traditions, to all sentient beings) that either (1) survives the body's physical death and may be reborn in another form according to the actions performed in previous lives or (2) is uncreated and unchanging, does not experience the vicissitudes of mortal existence, and resides beyond the causal and normative realms.

One could not say, however, that the diverse religions and philosophies of the subcontinent that accept the notion of the self or the soul would maintain the same view regarding its ontological status or that they all hold the same values regarding its nature. Of course, this would be the case in any study in the history of complicated religious systems, but generalization is more dangerous in the case of the study of South Asian religions than it might be in others, because the teachings presented by some of those religions diametrically oppose those of other—even closely related—South Asian traditions. The monistic Advaita Vedānta argues that the soul (*ātman*) is the only reality, for example, while the equally monistic Mādhyamika school of Buddhism would hold that something is real precisely if it has *no* soul (*nairātmya*, *anātman*). Other religious traditions in South Asia similarly disagree on whether or

not the soul is substantive or ephemeral, individual or universal, temporal or eternal, personal or impersonal.

Perhaps the best way to avoid confusion regarding the various concepts of the soul in India and Sri Lanka would be to avoid the term *soul* altogether in favor of other and various—although probably just as ambiguous—translations of the different terms used by the traditions themselves. Such an abandonment having been made impossible by the very title of this article, however, one hopes that the confusion will be less puzzling by the end of this piece.

The following discussion summarizes Vedic, Vedantic, and Buddhist concepts of the soul. This tripartite classification is given for convenience rather than as a statement of rigid categorization. Yogic, Sāṃkhya, and theistic understandings of the soul will appear here and there throughout the following sections.

Vedic Concepts of the Soul. Vedic cremation hymns of the latter part of the second millennium BCE plead the fire not to burn the “unborn” (*ajobhāga*) or “undying” (*amartya*) parts of the deceased, for the ritualists held the position that a nonphysical dimension of the human being survives the death of the physical body and flies like a bird in a radiant body either to the *pitṛloka* (“world of the ancestors”), ruled by the Lord of the Dead, or to the *devaloka* (“world of the gods”), depending on the quality of the rituals the person performed while living on earth.

Thus, Vedic poets and visionaries recognized a difference between the corporeal body (*śarīra*, *kāya*, *deha*, etc.) and an immaterial spirit that might loosely be called the soul. The latter is generally understood in four ways, three of which (*jīva*, *manas*, *asu*) revolve around notions of what could be termed the individual soul while the fourth (*paramātman*, etc.) centers on the concept of a universal spirit. (1) *Jīva* (“living being”) is one’s biological and functional personality, that aspect of one’s being that distinguishes one individual from another and that suffers or enjoys existence in earthly as well as post-mortal life according to the acts one performs while alive in this world. (2) *Manas* (“mind”) is that subtle or immaterial structure of one’s being by which one knows that one is related in various ways to other divine and human beings. It is that incorporeal and cognizant dimension of the human being in which awareness resides and from which the sense of being alive derives. (3) *Asu* (the “breath of life”) is the vital force that brings life to inert matter, creates sentience, and which in general serves to animate the human being. In the latter part of the Vedic era, the concept of respiration (*prāṇa*, a form of *asu*) becomes one of the important images of ultimate reality.

Whether it is understood existentially and ethically (as one would infer from the connotations of *jīva*), or psychologically and epistemologically (*manas*), or ontologically (*asu/prāṇa*), the soul is said to exist independently of the physical body, which when deprived of its cognizing and animating spirit will become inert and lifeless (*śava*, *kuṇapa*, i.e., a “corpse”). This happens most obviously at the time of death, a moment the *Ṛgveda* sometimes describes as *asunīti* (“leading forth of *asu*”), that process by which one travels away from the physical body to the world of the ancestors or the gods and by which the soul returns to earth escorted by the celestial fire, Agni. This same disjunction may occur, in addition, during moments of unconsciousness, ecstasy, or dream sleep, states of being that in Vedic India were both feared and prized—feared because one did not want one’s spirit to get lost in the otherworld (thus the warning in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.14 and parallels not to wake a sleeping person too quickly because his life may not have time to return to his body), yet prized because these moments of disembodied existence allow one to gain knowledge of supermundane worlds and to bring that knowledge back to the waking or conscious state. The term *preta* (“one who has gone forth”) is sometimes used to describe such a departed or disembodied spirit, which lives in or travels to various regions of the cosmos once it has left the physical body.

The soul as *jīva*, *manas*, or *asu* is regarded as a unique dimension of a human being. However, later hymns of the *Ṛgveda* reflect the idea that each distinct living being finds its origin in a common, solitary, and universal spirit. Terms that imply this transpersonal notion of the soul vary from context to context. While a generic term would be (4) *paramātman*, which would connote the universal soul as opposed to the individual soul, verses from various Vedic songs and chants refer to this generative force, the source of all being, as Puruṣa (the primordial “person” of the universe), Viśvakarman (“maker of everything”), Prajāpati (“lord of [all] living things”), Vena (“the loving one”), Paramam Guhā (“greatest secret”), Skambha (“universal prop”), Jyeṣṭha Brahman (“the highest, or ultimate, reality”), or simply Tat (“it”). Throughout the pertinent verses runs the theme that this “soul” of the cosmos is a unified reality, the sole source of all existence, out of which all diversity comes and into which all things merge. Though this ultimate reality is the efficient source of all things in the physical world, it itself is subtle and unmanifest. It is *ucchiṣṭha brahman* (see *Atharvaveda* 11.7), the ultimate reality that still remains after all phenomenal, temporal, and spatial forms have been subtracted from the universe. Notions of this unified world soul that first ap-

pear in the later parts of the Vedic Saṃhitās find their most thorough exposition and analysis in the Upaniṣads and Vedantic commentaries.

Upaniṣadic and Vedantic Concepts. The seers of the early Vedic period generally understood the soul, the world, and the gods in realistic terms; all existed in an objective relationship. However, toward the end of the period in which the Vedic hymns were composed, certain poet-philosophers began to present more subjective ontologies. All the gods and all of nature were seen to be reflections of inner structures and processes. The *Atharvaveda*'s proclamation that "having made the mortal a home, the gods lived within a man" (11.8.18) and the *Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*'s assertion that "all the gods are within me" (1.14.2) typify an emergent Vedic metaphysical anthropology that subsumes earlier objective theologies and ritual notions and establishes the important principle of the subjective identity between macrocosm and microcosm.

The contemplative search for an understanding of the subjective structures of ultimate reality was of paramount concern to the forest dwellers who composed the Upaniṣads as well as to the thinkers who expounded on those works and whose teachings form the Vedānta (the "end of the Veda"). Seeking to know the nature of the self and its relationship to the world, these thinkers came to understand that behind or beyond all of the whirling flux of one's personal existence, deep within the living and dying physical body, exists an eternal, unchanging, intelligent, incorporeal, and joyful "self," and they saw that this essential reality is identical to the very ground being of the universe itself. "A person the size of a thumb lives in the middle of the body, like a flame without smoke," reads *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 2.1.13. "He is the lord of the past and of the future. He is the same today and [will be] the same tomorrow. This [soul], truly, is That."

The early and middle Upaniṣads (900–300 BCE) posit a distinction between material and spiritual existence, a cosmological or ontological stance that reflects the influence of early Sāṃkhya philosophies; the latter maintained that one's self is comprised of mutable physical matter (*prakṛti*), on the one hand, and immutable non-manifest spirit (*puruṣa*), on the other. As would be consistent with Sāṃkhya metaphysics and psychology, those elements of one's self that have any content or substance are, by nature, *prakṛti*, and therefore are not spiritual. Thus, the intellect (*buddhi*), the sense of self, or ego (*ahaṃkāra*; lit., "I-maker"), and the mind (*manas*) are constitutive of the world of matter and therefore cannot be considered to be dimensions of the soul.

Middle and especially later medieval Upaniṣads similarly show the influence of yogic philosophies and prac-

tices designed to "yoke" one's individual spiritual being with the unmanifest, unchanging, and eternal spirit and thus to attain autonomy (*kaivalya*) over the fluctuations and limitations of the physical world. While the early Upaniṣads often use the word *puruṣa* ("person") and the later Upaniṣads use such terms as *kṣetrajñā* ("knower, witness") to distinguish the world soul from the individual being (*pradhāna*, *jīva*, *sattva*, and so on), the most common terms generally used in Vedānta to signify the untransmigrating, eternal, and unified self are *ātman* and *brahman*. *Ātman* (which in the *R̥gveda* had meant, like *asu*, "breath") signifies the subtle, timeless, and deathless microcosmic self. *Brahman* (roughly, "expansive") refers to the equivalent intelligent and blissful essence of the macrocosm.

Said differently, *ātman* is the soul while *brahman* is the godhead. For many Vedantic thinkers the two are the same thing, a point made clear by such statements as the *Adhyātma Upaniṣad*'s assertion that "one is a liberated person who, through insight, sees no difference between his own *ātman* and *brahman*, and between *brahman* and the universe."

Upaniṣadic doctrine holds the position, therefore, that the souls of people, physical objects, otherworldly beings, and deities are all equal in that they are all *brahman*: "*Brahman* is [the gods] Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, and Indra; *brahman* is Yama [Lord of the Dead], the sun and the moon; *brahman* is the gods, spirits, and demons; men, women, and animals. . . . All of this, truly, is *brahman*" (*Nirālamba Upaniṣad* 6–20).

The composers of the Upaniṣads experienced *ātman* and *brahman* in cosmic, acosmic, monistic, and sectarian theological ways. Those who interpreted the self cosmically (*saguṇa*, "with qualities") depicted it as the subtle and stable essence of all that is, the foundation of the entire world. The sages of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, for example, put it thus: "This is my self [*ātman*] within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or a corn of barley, or a mustard seed, or a grain of millet, or the kernel within a grain of millet. This is my self within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the skies, greater than the heavens, greater than [all] the worlds" (3.14.3). They further proclaim that "all actions, all desires, all odors, all tastes, compassing [everything] . . . this is my soul [*ātman*] within the heart. This is *brahman*" (3.14.4). The soul, experienced cosmically, is everything that is real (see, e.g., *Kaṭh. Up.* 2.1.5–11).

Understood acosmically (*nirguṇa*, "without qualities"), *ātman* and *brahman* are the final reality that exists independently of all physical, personal, and causal terms. The acosmic soul is that imperishable and immutable reality that cannot be described or known rationally precisely because, like the notion of *ucchiṣṭa*

brahman, it is nonphenomenal. *Subāla Upaniṣad* (3.1) represents such an acosmic view when it describes the soul as “nonbeing, unborn, uncreated, nonexistent, not based on anything, silent, without solidity, formless, tasteless, odorless, [and] imperishable. A wise person therefore never sorrows, for he knows the soul [*ātman*] to be vast, independent, and without origin.” The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (3.9.26 and parallels) similarly expresses this acosmic view of the soul when it repeats the lesson that the self is “not this, not this.”

Interpreted theologically, the soul (here, *ātman*) is said to be the presence in the living being of a supreme deity, known generally as *Īś*, *Īśa*, or *Īśvara*, and more particularly as *Śiva*, *Viṣṇu*, or some other supreme deity according to the specific sectarian group. Such a position holds that the worship of a supreme god (or, as in the case with the Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads, the adoration of God’s *avatāras*) is, in fact, the worship of the *ātman*. The *Maitreya Upaniṣad* typifies a Śaiva-sectarian point of view when it states, “The body is said to be a temple. The self [*jīva*] within it is none other than *Śiva*. Having discarded all the residual effects of ignorance, one should worship him with [the words] ‘I am He’ ” (2.2). The *Ātmabhoda Upaniṣad* similarly represents a Vaiṣṇava position: “I [Nārāyaṇa, a name for *Viṣṇu*] am beyond all the differences in the universe, [beyond the distinction between] individual and God. I am supreme. I am not different from the personal soul [*pratyagātman*].” The *Īśa Upaniṣad* carries a similar message. Singing that “everything, whatever lives in this living world, is enveloped by the Lord” (1), the sage goes on to proclaim that “whoever that person [*puruṣa*] is, so also am I” (16).

Understood monistically, the universal soul (most often in this case *brahman* or *parabrahman*, “supreme *brahman*”) is said to encompass all cosmic and acosmic, personal and impersonal, immanent and transcendent concepts. While teachings supporting this notion of the soul appear throughout the Upaniṣads, typical representatives would include the statement in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* that “the One Self within all beings becomes varied in shape according to whatever [it lives in] and yet it lives outside [all of them]” (2.2.10); the *Īśa Upaniṣad*’s “It moves, and it moves not. It is far, and it is near. It is within all this, and it is outside all this” (5); and the *Maitreya Upaniṣad*’s “I am the self. I am also the not-self. I am *brahman*. . . . I am all of the worlds I am not the universe. I am the seer of everything. I am without eyes” (3.1ff.).

Medieval Vedantic philosophers did not entirely agree on the particulars of the identity between *ātman* and *brahman* (and equivalent terms). For the thinkers of the Advaita (“nondual”) Vedānta this identity was of

monistic character. The extent of *ātman* is the extent of *brahman*, a position argued most forcefully by Śaṅkara (eighth century CE) and his students. The Śrī Vaiṣṇava theologian Rāmānuja (eleventh century CE) and his followers taught a qualified nondualist, or panentheistic, doctrine known as Viśiṣṭādvaita (“identity within distinctions”) or *bhedābheda* (“difference and yet no difference”), a position that allowed for the greatness of the supreme soul beyond any cosmic or acosmic limitations. A third view, represented most articulately by Madhva (fourteenth century CE) and his school, argues in favor of *Dvaita Vedānta*, a dualistic ontology that keeps matter and spirit eternally separate.

Buddhist Concepts. Buddhist canonical and commentarial literatures from India and Sri Lanka use many of the same terms to connote the individual person as do the Upaniṣadic and Vedantic traditions, the most common being *ātman* (Pali, *attan*), *jīva*, and *sattva* (*satta*). Buddhist Abhidharma texts frequently employ the term *puḍgala* (*puggala*) to refer to that aspect of a living being that makes it distinct from other creatures and that in some way carries from one birth to another the moral residues of the previous life’s actions. Myths, legends, and pedagogical stories such as the Pali *Peta-vatthu* (Tales about the Spirits) similarly use such terms as *petta* (“one who has gone forth”) when telling of ancestors who now live in one of the many levels of the cosmos ranging from the hells to the heavens in accordance with their karmic residue. Such well-known works as the Theravādin *Milinda-pañha* employ such terms as *vedagu* to refer to a fully sentient being, and the Mahāyāna *Laiṅkavatāra Sūtra* speaks of *tathāgata-garbha* (“the womb [or abode] of suchness”) and *ālay-avijñāna* (the “store of consciousness”) when discussing the process of understanding, the nature of awareness, and the place where such awareness resides in the human being.

Buddhist texts in general, then, acknowledge the existence of a self as an entity that distinguishes one individual from another, that serves as the center of intellect, will, and moral agency, and that is understood to be the source of human perfection. This attitude toward the self dates to the earliest Buddhist textual traditions. Literatures of the Pali canon, for example, often use the adverb *paccattam* (or *pai-attam*), “separately, by oneself, in one’s own heart,” when referring to the existential and volitional dimension of one’s being. Pali collections of the Buddha’s reported teachings also use such compounds as *ajjhatta* (cf. Skt. *adhyātman*) to signify the inner self that is of great importance to Buddhist ethical reflection and personal religious practice. The *Dhammapada* describes a *bhikkhu* (roughly, “monk”) as one who is “in love with the inner self [*ajjhatarata*], one

who is content in solitude" (2.362), and the *Suttanipāta* similarly encourages the *bhikkhu* "not to let his mind go forth to external things, [but to remain] one with his mind turned to the inner self [*ajjattacintī*]" (2.14.168).

The Buddha's reported distrust of teachings not based in experience and, accordingly, his emphasis on the importance of "self-realization" (a loose translation of such phrases as *attā va seyyo*, "the self is the best") led his followers to stress his lesson that the self is the only source of truth. This emphasis is represented by the well-known admonition "*Attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā*" ("Remain making yourself your island [or support], making yourself your refuge, and not anyone else as your refuge"; see, e.g., *Dīgha Nikāya 2, Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* 35).

We must be careful, however, not to confuse this Buddhist notion of the moral, intellectual, and volitional aspect of the human being with an Upaniṣadic or Vedantic concept of the self or of a soul. Buddhist traditions as a whole distinguish a difference between what might be termed a functional self on one hand and an ontological soul on the other. At no time should these various terms signifying the autonomous self be understood to represent the notion of an undying, unchanging, and knowable soul. Nowhere in Buddhist canonical or semicanonical writings does the term *brahman* appear in the Upaniṣadic sense of the unified ground of being, and, certainly, in no Buddhist text does one find the teaching that *ātman* (and its equivalents) and *brahman* are identical or even related. For, with only a few quite vague exceptions, Buddhism in South Asia has maintained the position that what might be termed the ontological soul is nonsubstantial and illusory. In fact, Buddhism in general has maintained that to think that anybody or anything has an unchanging and permanent self or soul is a metaphysically incorrect or even perverted view (*viparyāsa*), for everything—everything—is always changing, and to cling to anything as if it were permanent is to misunderstand the nature of reality. To hold to a self is to hold to an artificial and ignorant construction. Reality is *nairātmya* or *anātman* (*anattā*), meaning "devoid of self."

Buddhist anthropologies, therefore, posit very different definitions of the person than do Upaniṣadic and Vedantic traditions. Although Buddhist teachings recognize various immaterial aspects to a person, these ephemeral dimensions are never understood to have independent ontological integrity, or "own-being" (*svabhāva*). *Ātman* is said to be dependent on a variety of transitory conditions, to be impermanent, and therefore to lack any reality of its own.

Buddhist analysis of the nature of the person centers on the realization that what appears to be an individual

is, in fact, an ever-changing combination of five constituent factors or building blocks (*skandha*; Pali, *khandha*): the physical body (*rūpa*), physical sensation (*vedanā*), sense perception (*sañjñā*, *saññā*), habitual tendencies (*saṃskāra*, *saṃkhārā*), and consciousness (*viññāna*, *viññāna*). These five aggregates fall together in various configurations to form what is experienced as a person, much in the same way that a chariot is built of various parts (see *Milindapañhā* 2.1.1). But just as the chariot as an entity disappears when its constituent elements are pulled apart, so does *ātman* disappear with the dissolution of the *skandhas*. The Theravāda philosopher Buddhaghosa (fifth century CE) uses the simile of the chariot to open his lesson in *Visuddhimagga* (The Path of Purification) regarding the soul (or lack thereof):

Just as the term "chariot" is nothing but an expression for an axle, wheels, a body, a pole, and other constituent parts combined in a particular manner, but when we analyze the various parts one by one we find that in the absolute sense there is no chariot. . . . In that same way, the terms "living being" and "soul" are nothing but expressions for the combination of the five *skandhas*, but when we analyze those aggregates of being one by one we find that in the absolute sense there is no "living being" or "soul" with which to form such assumptions as "I am" or "I." (18.28)

The five *skandhas* are themselves said to be comprised of effervescent elements (*dharma*s, *dhamma*s) which, like bubbles on the surface of a stream, form different shapes as they flow in and out of contact with each other. It is these different configurations that determine the nature of individuality, which would not exist without the *dharma*s.

Teachings regarding the ontological status of the *dharma*s varies from school to school, but never does the central notion of a soul appear. The Sarvāstivādins held that the *dharma*s are substantial and, being constitutive of space and time, exist eternally (*sarvāstivāda*, i.e., "the doctrine that everything exists"). Even while holding this eternalist view, however, the Sarvāstivādins remained true to the doctrine of *anātman*, for they maintained the position that the *dharma*s are independent of each other and as autonomous entities do not constitute a whole that is larger than the sum of the parts. The Sarvāstivādins teach that the *dharma*s do, however, interact with each other. This action (*karman*) follows the laws of cause and effect, thus bringing about the dynamic movements of time and space.

Some schools, notably the Pudgalavādins and other Abhidharmists, hold that a personal and moral aspect of one's being (*pudgala*, *puggala*; lit., "person") accumulates this *karman* and transmigrates from one birth to another according to the quality of the karmic residue. Even these schools, however, distinguish between

karman, “action,” and *kartr*, “actor.” No school holds the ontological validity of the latter, which is a fiction of an ignorant mind.

The Mādhyamika school maintained that even the *dharma*s are devoid of any untransmutable or eternal essence and are therefore also *nairātmya*. This means that all existence conditioned by the *dharma*s and *skandha*s—in other words, what from the everyday point of view is “reality”—is by its very nature impermanent and without substance. The implication is clear. What conditions existence has no essence, and since a human being is the aggregate combination of various impermanent conditions, then that being has no permanent essence. What we experience to be a person is not a thing but a process. There is no human being, there is only becoming. There is no static and eternal soul. Human life is *anātman*, like the constantly changing patterns of insubstantial bubbles on an insubstantial stream.

The Buddha himself is reported to have understood the anxiety that may arise when one ponders the possibility that one has no soul. According to tradition, he answered such fears by analyzing the source of the anxiety itself. One is afraid of non-being only when one thinks “I have no soul.” This torment ends when the realization arises that the “I” that fears such an annihilation is itself imaginary. The comprehension of the “fact of non-selfness” (*nairātmyāstika*) brings freedom from fear, doubt, insecurity, and pain. According to virtually all Buddhist traditions, this freedom from suffering is precisely what the Buddha hoped his followers would find.

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WILLIAM K. MAHONY

Buddhist Concepts

It is only slightly paradoxical to say that Buddhism has no concepts of the soul: its most fundamental doctrine teaches that no such thing exists and that the realization of this truth is enlightenment. In *The Buddha and His Teachings* (Colombo, 1957), G. P. Malalasekera, a Sinhala statesman and lay Buddhist, states this position forcefully:

In its denial of any real permanent Soul or Self, Buddhism stands alone. This teaching presents the utmost difficulty to many people and often provokes even violent antagonism towards the whole religion. Yet this doctrine of No-soul or Anatta, is the bedrock of Buddhism and all the other teachings of the Buddha are intimately connected with it. The Buddha is quite categorical in its exposition and would have no compromise. In a famous passage He declares, “Whether Buddhas arise in this world or not, it always remains a fact that the constituent parts of a being are lacking in a Soul,” the Pali word used for “Soul” being Atta. (pp. 33–34)

Of course, one must be careful about what exactly is being denied here. The closest direct equivalent to “soul” in Sanskrit or Pali is *jīva*, from the verbal root *jīv*, meaning “to live.” In Jainism, it denotes an individual, transmigrating, and eternal entity; and in the Vedānta school of Hinduism, the related term *jīvātman* denotes the individual (but not universal) form of the world soul, called *ātman* or *brahman*. In one context,

Buddhism uses this term to deny the existence of the soul. The questions whether such a *jīva* is identical to, or different from, the body are two of a list of “unanswerable questions”—unanswerable for the clear epistemological reason that since no *jīva* really exists, it cannot be identical to or different from anything. But in other contexts the word *jīva* and the closely related term *jīvita* are used uncontroversially to refer to animate life in contrast to inanimate objects or dead beings. One of the “constituent parts of a being,” as Malalasekara called them, is termed *jīvitendriya* (“life faculty”), which has both physical and mental forms; its presence in a collection of such constituents is essential for that collection to be alive, or loosely for that “being” to “exist.” What is denied by Buddhism is that any such collection contains or is equivalent to a permanent independent entity, whether individual or universal. The word standardly used in Buddhism to refer to such a (nonexistent) entity is *ātman*, or in Pali, *attan* (nominatives *ātmā* and *attā* respectively). In Indo-Aryan languages this (or related forms) often functions simply as the ordinary reflexive pronoun, used in the masculine singular for all numbers and genders. But since at least the time of the Upaniṣads it has also been used in religious and philosophical writing to refer to an eternal essence of man. By contrast, Buddhism is referred to as *anātmavāda* (“the teaching of not-self, or no-soul”). Other terms are used to refer to that whose ultimate reality Buddhism denies, but they can all, like *jīva* and *ātman*, also be used uncontroversially in other contexts. Examples are *pudgala* (*puggala*) or their synonyms *puruṣa* (*purisa*), usually translated “person,” and *sattva* (*satta*), “being.” (*Puruṣa* is the term for “soul” in the Sāṃkhya school of Hinduism.) If Buddhism denies, then, the existence of any ultimately real self, soul, person, or being, how does it account for the existence of human beings, their identity, continuity, and ultimate religious goal?

It is never denied that at the level of “conventional truth,” in the everyday transactional world, there are more or less stable persons, namable and humanly recognizable. At the level of “ultimate truth,” however, this unity and stability of personhood is seen to be merely a matter of appearances. Ultimately (or in some schools of Buddhism, in fact, only penultimately) there exist only collections of impersonal and impermanent elements (*dharmā*; Pali, *dhamma*) arranged into temporary configurations by the moral force of past deeds (*karman*) and by self-fulfilling but self-ruinous desire and selfishness (both cognitive and affective). There are different ways of analyzing the person in terms of these elements. One of the most ancient and frequent methods used is a list of five categories, aggregates, or con-

stituents of personality (*skandhas*; Pali, *khandhas*), which are body, or material form, and the four mental categories, namely feelings, perceptions (or ideas), mental formations (a heterogeneous class, most of which are volitional or dispositional), and consciousness. Common also is a list of twelve sense-bases (*āyatana*s), comprising the six senses (the usual five plus mind, always regarded as a sense in Buddhism) and their six corresponding subjects or fields. There are also eighteen elements (*dhātus*), which are the six senses, their objects, and the six resultant sense-consciousnesses. The various schools of Buddhism went on to produce many other lists, some involving quite large numbers, which develop and elaborate this basic idea. Whatever the list, the idea behind it is explained by this excerpt from the Pali commentary to a passage in the canon in which the Buddha speaks of “an ignorant person”:

[The Buddha] uses conventional language [here]. Buddhas have two types of speech, conventional and ultimate. Thus “being,” “man,” “person,” [the proper names] “Tissa,” “Naga” are used as conventional speech. “Categories,” “elements,” and “sense-bases” are used as ultimate speech. . . . The fully enlightened one, the best of speakers, declared two truths, the conventional and the ultimate; there is no third. Words [used by] mutual agreement are true because of worldly convention; words of ultimate meaning are true because of the existence of elements.

(*Sarathappakāsinī*, vol. 2, p. 77)

This analysis of personhood is nontemporal; personal continuity is accounted for by a theory of temporal atomism in which what appears to be a continuing and identical person or self is held to be in fact a series of discrete elements in an objectively given time sequence. Each discrete temporal particle in the succession of mental and physical elements is called a “moment” (*kṣaṇa*; Pali, *khaṇa*). Each of these moments is divided into phases or submoments, usually those of “arising,” “presence,” and “cessation.” There is a frequent and conscious parallel in the texts between the ordinary, “conventional” events of birth, life, and death and the “ultimate” phases of each moment. The Buddha is alleged to have said, “Ultimately, as the constituents of personality are born and grow old, moment by moment, so you, monk, are born, grow old and die.” Estimates of the length of these moments varied, some assuming a subliminal, even infinitesimal length, others seeing a moment as roughly the length of a perception or thought (and so resembling the notion of a sense-datum in Western philosophy). Whatever the postulated length, these moments are seen as discrete entities that are nevertheless held together in individual “streams” (a common Buddhist metaphor). This individuation is effected in two ways. First, it is effected by the simple

fact of the body. Mental moments are necessarily associated in any one human lifetime with a material body (though there are in Buddhist mythology some nonhuman, nonmaterial worlds), and the body is assumed to be necessarily numerically self-identical. Second, there are held to be certain kinds of conditioning relations (loosely, "causal laws") in the process of *karman*, which explain mental continuity both within one lifetime and over a series of rebirths. Among these conditioning relations are such things as contiguity between adjacent moments in a successive series and qualitative similarity between earlier and later parts of one "stream."

The two closely related problems of how karmic streams are held together and of how an act and its result are connected in one (and only one) series of rebirths, given the instantaneous arising and ceasing of momentary elements, led to a great deal of debate among Buddhist thinkers and to a great deal of new theory. One school, for example, thought that a special element, called possession or acquisition (*prāpti*), came into existence with each act in order to bind it to the stream in which it occurred, while another element, nonpossession or nonacquisition (*aprāpti*), served to keep away elements and acts not belonging to the stream. Two metaphorical terms were used by most schools to depict the process of act and retribution: *vāsanā* ("perfuming, trace") and *bīja* ("seed"). These traces or seeds were deposited in the mind by actions and remained there until their karmic result occurred. This process was called *vipāka* ("maturation, ripening"), and the result was *phala* ("fruit"); indeed, in Indian thought, *bīja* and *phala* commonly mean simply cause and effect. Sometimes particular kinds of mind, or forms of consciousness, were designated as the locus or vehicle of these traces or seeds. One school spoke of a subtle mind (*sūkṣma-citta*), another of a root-consciousness (*mūla-vijñāna*), in which the seeds of *karman* were stored. From these sorts of speculation arose a notion that was to have great importance in the Mahāyāna tradition: that of the store- or receptacle-consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*). Like all forms of consciousness, this was thought to be impermanent, momentary, and characterized as not-self, but it was also thought to be the place from which there arose not only the karmic results of past acts but also, in the more idealist versions, the (illusory) experience of an objective world. [See *Ālaya-vijñāna*.] Many opponents of this idea, both within and without the Buddhist fold, saw this idea as amounting to a soul-in-disguise. One tradition, which seems at one point to have been very widespread in India but for which scarcely any reliable sources remain (we know of it only, with one exception, through the distorting lens of others' refutations), was called the Pudgalavāda, the

Personalist school, since it actually used the taboo word *pudgala* to denote what continues through the process of rebirth.

In the Mahāyāna tradition, particularly in Tibet and China, another very important idea, which was often associated with the concept of the store-consciousness, was the *tathāgata-garbha* ("embryo of the Enlightened One"). This concept provided a solution not to the problem of connecting acts and their results but to that of how a conditioned, unenlightened phenomenon (or rather, a collection of phenomena) such as man could attain the unconditioned enlightenment of *nirvāṇa*. The embryo of the Enlightened One was said to exist, pure and untarnished, in all beings; the task was to discover it. Insofar as "soul" is taken to mean something like "that which is spiritually most valuable in human beings and which makes it possible for them to transcend their ordinary psychophysical conditions and attain the religiously ultimate goal," this may be called a Buddhist notion of the soul. Certainly, in some of the developments of the idea, particularly in China and Japan, where we read (in English) of the "Buddha mind" or "Buddha nature" inherent in all beings, we seem—although only at first sight—to have returned to the universal-essence view of *ātman* in the Upaniṣads, which the Buddha so trenchantly rejected. [See *Tathāgata-garbha and Nirvāṇa*.]

Many of these ideas are technical, even scholastic, details, in the elaboration of basic Buddhist doctrine. But how does Buddhism address the question of our self-consciousness, the linguistic and reflexive awareness of oneself that has led so many traditions of thought to see man as possessing a "soul" different from the rudimentary consciousness of animals? (In Western philosophy the classic exposition of this is by Descartes.) In the philosophical schools of Mahāyāna, the concept of *svasaṃvedanā* was developed; this may be translated "self-consciousness" or "reflexivity," but Buddhist thinkers held that it was not consciousness of a self, or *the* self but merely the capacity of consciousness to reflect *itself*. That is, the internal structure of consciousness is self-reflexive, but we cannot conclude from this that it reflects a real self or soul that exists outside the momentary arising and cessation of the mind. Another kind of account of this, which gives more of a sense of the dynamics of Buddhist thought and practice than do the details of scholasticism or the abstract arguments of philosophy, can be seen in the way in which Buddhism supposes that our sense of self develops—and disappears—in the progression from ordinary unenlightened man to enlightened saint. The teaching of no-soul takes effect in two major ways, as one loses gradually the "feters" that bind one to the wheel of rebirth.

First, on “entering the stream” bound for enlightenment, one of the fetters lost is *sakāyadṛṣṭi* (Pali, *sakkayaditṭhi*). Often translated as “personality belief,” literally it means “the view of a really existing body,” although “body” here does not denote simply the physical body but all the five constituents of personality seen as a group. “Personality belief” is the explicit view, or assumption, that what appears to be an individual person, the psychophysical conglomerate, represents or implies a real, permanent self or soul. It does not refer to the phenomenological or experiential sense of being a self, but to the use of this sense, however vaguely, as actual or potential evidence for a metaphysical theory. Losing this fetter thus constitutes a conscious allegiance to the Buddhist denial of self as a doctrine, without any immediate disappearance of the underlying subjective or “self-ish” pattern of experience.

Second, there is this underlying sense of self as the continuing subject of experience and agent of action, referred to in Buddhist thought by the term *asmimāna*, “the conceit ‘I am.’” This fetter, which is necessarily part of consciousness for the unenlightened, is an experiential datum or reaction pattern that is lost at the time of enlightenment; indeed, its loss is precisely what enlightenment is. The term is made up of two parts: *asmi* is the first-person singular of the verb to be, thus “I am”; *māna* comes from a verbal root meaning to think, but it regularly has the connotations of proud or conceited thought. For this reason the translation “the conceit ‘I am’” is useful, since not only can it point to the fact that the experiential datum of an “I” is taken in Buddhism to be a conception, something made up by a mental act, but also it suggests that this artificial mental construction is necessarily regarded with “conceited” pride and attachment. Thus not only is “the conceit ‘I am’” a cognitive fact, or aspect of consciousness (for the unenlightened); it is also a moral (or rather immoral) event. The idea that the experiential datum of an “I” is in fact the result of an act of utterance—an act performed automatically and unconsciously, but still an act because it is operative in the process of *karman*—is embodied in the term *ahaṅkāra*. This is most often explained, by Indian tradition as well as by Western scholarship, as I-making or I-construction—from *aham*, “I,” and *kāra* (from the verbal root *kr*), “making.” It can also, complementarily, be taken as “the utterance of ‘I.’” Along with *mamānkāra*, “the utterance of ‘mine,’” the term describes one of the seven underlying tendencies operative in unenlightened consciousness. Thus, the Buddhist view is that through the act of uttering “I” or “I am,” explicitly or implicitly, a self-positing and self-creating subjectivity is constructed, to which inevitably the person in whom it occurs is attached, and through

which all his forms of “selfishness” (conceptual and moral) arise.

Two stories in the ancient texts illustrate this attitude and show both the conceptual and the psychological relation between the ideas or utterances “I” and “I am” and the impersonal elements that are the “ultimate” constituents of the human person. A king, enticed by the mellifluous sound of a lute, asks his servant to bring him the sound. They bring the lute, but the king exclaims, “Away with the lute, I want the sound!” The servants explain, “This thing called a lute is made up of a great number of parts. . . . It makes a sound [the verb is *vadati*, literally, “speaks’] because it is composed of a number of parts—that is, the box, strings. . . .” The king then takes the lute, breaks it up into smaller and smaller pieces, and finally throws it away. The moral is drawn: “In this way, monks, a monk investigates the constituents of personality. . . . But for him there is no ‘I,’ ‘mine,’ or ‘I am.’”

The story of the elder Khemaka is similar. On hearing that he “does not consider there to be a self or anything belonging to a self” in the five constituents of personality, some other monks exclaim, “Is he not then an *arhat* [an enlightened saint]?” Khemaka hears of this but tells them that he is not an *arhat*, because “with regard to the five constituents, I have a sense of ‘I am,’ but I do not see ‘this is what I am!’” He explains by analogy with the scent of a flower: the smell is there, but it is impossible to say exactly from where it originates (whether from petals, colors, pollen or some other source). “Although, friends, a noble disciple has put away the five lower fetters (including personality belief), still there is a residue in the constituents of personality of the conceit of ‘I am,’ of the desire for ‘I am,’ of the underlying tendency to ‘I am,’ which is not finally destroyed.” If one practices the life of meditation to the full, he says, these things (and with them all the higher fetters) will eventually disappear. When this happens, *nirvāṇa* is attained, and the teaching of no-soul has served its purpose.

[See also Buddhist Philosophy; Nirvāṇa; Dharma, *article on Buddhist Dharma and Dharmas*; Karman, *article on Buddhist Concepts*; Pratītya-samutpāda; Sarvāstivāda; and Sautrāntika.]

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Translations of Buddhist texts directly relevant to this issue were mainly made into French in the first half of the century. These will be available in specialized libraries and remain by far the best source, since the translators provide many references to other texts and other useful information as well as giving direct access to the primary materials. Titles include Étienne Lamotte’s *Le traité de l’acte de Vasubandhu, Karma-*

siddhiprakaraṇa (Brussels, 1936); his translation of the Chinese text *Ta-chih-tu-lun*, traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna, as *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, 5 vols. (Louvain, 1944–1980), is a treasury of scholarship on almost every aspect of Buddhism. Louis de La Vallée Poussin translated the Chinese version of the most important work of Buddhist scholasticism, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, 6 vols. (1923–1931; Brussels, 1971). The last section of this work, a discussion of the concept of the person between an “orthodox” Buddhist and a member of the Personalist school, was translated from the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions by Theodore Stcherbatsky, as *The Soul Theory of the Buddhists* (1920; Vārāṇāsi, 1970). The Pali version of this debate is included in the *Kathāvattu*, translated by Shwe Zan Aung and Caroline Rhys Davids as *Points of Controversy* (London, 1915). Important texts of the Sanskrit and Tibetan traditions have been translated and discussed by Joe Wilson in *Chandrakīrti's Sevenfold Reasoning: Meditation on the Selflessness of Persons* (Dharamsala, 1980), and by Jeffrey Hopkins in *Meditation on Emptiness* (London, 1983).

Secondary sources include my *Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism* (London, 1982), which discusses the doctrine of *anattā* as presented in the Pali texts; David S. Ruegg's *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra* (Paris, 1969), which discusses the *tathāgata-garbha* theory, as presented in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts; and Paul Williams's *Mahāyāna Buddhism* (London, forthcoming), which treats these and other aspects of the Mahāyāna tradition in its entirety. Three older works, dated in some ways perhaps but still valuable, are Edward Conze's *Buddhist Thought in India* (1962; Ann Arbor, 1970), Arthur Berriedale Keith's *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon* (Oxford, 1923), and E. J. Thomas's *The History of Buddhist Thought*, 2d ed. (1951; New York, 1967). Buddhist notions of the soul, along with those from a number of different religious traditions, are discussed by the Christian theologian John Hick in *Death and Eternal Life* (London, 1976).

STEVEN COLLINS

Chinese Concepts

An early reference to the Chinese theory of the “soul” records an explanation on human life offered by a learned statesman in 535 BCE: the earthly aspect of the soul (*p'ō*) first comes into existence as the human life begins; after *p'ō* has been produced, the heavenly aspect of the soul (*hun*) emerges. As generally understood, *hun* is the spirit of a person's vital force that is expressed in consciousness and intelligence, and *p'ō* is the spirit of a person's physical nature that is expressed in bodily strength and movements. Both *hun* and *p'ō* require the nourishment of the essences of the vital forces of the cosmos to stay healthy. When a person dies a natural death, his or her *hun* gradually disperses in heaven, and the *p'ō*, perhaps in a similar manner, returns to earth. A violent death may cause the *hun* and *p'ō* to linger in the human world and perform evil and malicious acts.

Underlying this theory of the two souls is the *yin-yang* dichotomy, which is often associated with the *Book of Changes*, one of the most ancient and philosophically sophisticated wisdom books in human civilization. *Yin* and *yang* symbolize the two primordial forces of the cosmos. *Yin*, the receptive, consolidating, and conserving female element, and *yang*, the active, creative, and expanding male element, give rise to the multiplicity of things through their continuous and dynamic interactions. The relationship between *yin* and *yang* is competitive, complementary, and dialectic. Furthermore, there is always a *yang* element in the *yin* and a *yin* element in the *yang*; the *yang* element in the *yin* also contains *yin* and the *yin* element in the *yang* also contains *yang*. This infinite process of mutual penetration makes an exclusivistic dichotomy (such as a dichotomy between creator and creature, spirit and matter, mind and body, secular and sacred, consciousness and existence, or soul and flesh) inoperative as a conceptual apparatus in Chinese cosmological thinking.

A natural consequence of the nonexclusivistic *yin-yang* dichotomy is what may be referred to as the thesis of the “continuity of being.” F. W. Mote (1971) has characterized the uniqueness of the indigenous Chinese cosmological thinking as the lack of a creation myth. As Mote points out, the idea of a god who creates the cosmos *ex nihilo* is alien to the ancient Chinese mode of thought about the universe. Since there is no notion of God as a creator, let alone a notion of the “wholly other” that can never be comprehended by human rationality even though it is the ultimate reason of human existence, the Chinese take the world as given, as always in the process of becoming. This becoming process, known as the “great transformation” (*ta-hua*), makes every modality of being in the universe a dynamic change rather than a static structure. A piece of stone, a blade of grass, a horse, a human being, a spirit, and Heaven all form a continuum. They are all interconnected by the pervasive *ch'i* (vital force, material force) that penetrates every dimension of existence and functions as the constitutive element for each modality of being. [See *Ch'i*.]

Ch'i, which means both energy and matter, denotes, in classical Chinese medicine, the psychophysiological strength and power associated with blood and breath. Like the Greek idea of *pneuma*, or its more intriguing Platonic formulation of *psuchē*, *ch'i* is the air-breath that binds the world together. Indeed, its expansion (*yang*) and contraction (*yin*), two simple movements each containing infinite varieties of complexity, generate the multiplicity of the universe. This distinctively biological and specifically sexual interpretation makes the Chinese explanatory model significantly different

from any cosmology based on physics or mechanics. To the Chinese, the cosmos came into being not because of the willful act of an external creator or the initial push of a prime mover. Rather, it is through the continuous interaction of Heaven and Earth, or the mutual penetration of *yin* and *yang*, that the cosmos (*yu-chou*), an integration of time and space, emerged out of chaos, an undifferentiated wholeness. Implicit in the differentiating act of chaos itself are the two primary movements of *ch'i*—*yin* and *yang*. Since the cosmos is not fixed, there has been continuous creativity. Thus change and transformation are the defining characteristics of the cosmos, which is not a static structure but a dynamic process.

The "continuity of being" that exists because of the nature of *ch'i*, the cosmic energy that animates the whole universe from stone to Heaven, makes it impossible to imagine a clear separation between spirit and matter and, by implication, flesh and soul. Understandably, a form of animism and its corollary, panpsychism, are taken for granted by the Chinese. To the Chinese, there is *anima*, *mana*, *pneuma*, or *psuchē* in stones, trees, animals, human beings, spiritual beings, and Heaven. Precious stones, such as jade; rare trees, such as pines more than a thousand years old; unusual animals, such as the phoenix, the unicorn, and the dragon, are all, in a sense, spiritual beings. There is no matter devoid of spirituality. Human beings, spiritual beings, and Heaven are, in a sense, material. Totally disembodied spirit is also difficult to envision.

The *Problematik* of soul, in the Chinese context, must be approached by a cluster of key concepts centered around the idea of *ch'i* mentioned above. If we try to find the closest approximation of a functional equivalent of the notion of soul in Chinese, the word *ling* seems to work in some cases. After all, the modern Chinese translation of the English word *soul* is *ling-hun*, a compound made of *ling* and *hun*, earlier referred to as "the heavenly aspect of the soul." *Ling* is a spiritual force; the term especially refers to the inspirational content of a spiritual force. *Ling* is often joined with the word *shen*, which is commonly rendered as "spirit." In both classical and modern Chinese, the two words are, in most cases, interchangeable. Strictly speaking, however, *ling* is more localized and suggests a more specific content. *Shen* can be mysterious to the extent that its functioning in the world is totally beyond human comprehension, but the presence of *ling* is likely to be sensed and felt by those around. Soul, in the Chinese sense, can perhaps be understood as a refined vital force that mediates between the human world and the spiritual realm.

From the perspective of *ch'i*, the uniqueness of being

human lies in the fact that we are endowed with the finest of the vital forces in the cosmos. Human beings are therefore the embodiments of soul. One manifestation of the human soul is human sensitivity. Even though the idea that man is made in the image of God is not applicable to the Chinese perception of humanity, the Christian notion that humanity is a form of circumscribed divinity may find a sympathetic echo in the Chinese concept that human beings mediate and harmonize the myriad things between Heaven and Earth. In an anthropocosmic sense, human beings are guardians, indeed co-creators, of the universe. The reason why man forms a trinity with Heaven and Earth is that his soul enables him to bring himself into a spiritual accord with the creative transformation of the cosmos. Strictly speaking, man is not the measure of all things; if he should become so, it is because he has earned the right to speak and judge on behalf of Heaven and Earth. Man's ultimate concern, then, is to harmonize with nature and enter into a spiritual communion with the cosmos.

In the spiritual realm, the idea of soul is closely associated with two related concepts, *kuei* and *shen* (rendered by Wing-tsit Chan as positive and negative spiritual forces). *Shen*, commonly translated as "spirit" in modern Chinese, etymologically conveys the sense of expansion; *kuei*, on the other hand, means contraction. The soul that expands belongs to the *yang* force and is associated with heaven; the soul that contracts belongs to the *yin* force and is associated with earth. In popular religion, *shen* refers to gods that are good and *kuei* refers to demons (or ghosts) that are harmful. When the two words are joined together, they may simply refer to spiritual beings in general. In sacrifices, *kuei-shen* may refer to ancestors. The flexible use of these concepts suggests the complexity of the spiritual realm in Chinese religiosity. It should not prevent us from noticing an underlying pattern that is applicable to virtually all situations.

Obviously, the negative spirit (*kuei*) and positive spirit (*shen*) are manifestations of the two vital forces, *yin* and *yang*. It may not be farfetched to suggest that the negative spirit is the bodily soul (*p'ò*) and the positive spirit is the heavenly aspect of the soul (*hun*) in us. We as human beings, according to the thesis of the continuity of being, are integral parts of Heaven and Earth and the myriad things. The two souls that are in us are microcosms of the cosmic forces. We are thus intimately connected with nature on the one hand and heaven on the other. In actuality, a person is not an isolated individuality, but a center of relationships. It is not our own souls that constitute what we are. There are numerous souls, individual and communal, that

make humans active participants of the cosmic process. We, the living, are not separated (or indeed separable) from the dead, especially from our ancestors, those to whom we owe our lives. The biological nature of our existence is such that we do not exist as discrete temporal and spatial entities. Rather, we are part of the cosmic flow that makes us inevitably and fruitfully linked to an ever-expanding network of relationships. Human selfhood is not an isolated system; on the contrary, it is always open to the world beyond. The more we are capable of establishing a spiritual communion with other modalities of being, the more we are enriched as human beings.

Nevertheless, the power and potency of the human soul is determined by a variety of factors, especially political factors. For example, the soul of the emperor is the most exalted among the human souls; because of his high status he alone may offer sacrifices to Heaven and to the most sacred mountains and rivers. The soul of an ordinary person is such that he can only establish an intimate spiritual communion with his deceased parents and grandparents. However, this bureaucratic differentiation of the social functions of souls is not rigidly fixed. It is possible for people from the lowest echelons of society to cultivate themselves so that the quality of their souls can match the genuineness of Heaven, an accomplishment no worldly power, wealth, or reputation can approximate.

Before the introduction of Buddhism to China, both the Confucians and the Taoists had already developed indigenous traditions of immortality. For the Confucian, one achieves immortality by establishing one's moral excellence, by performing unusual meritorious political deeds or by writing books of enduring value. These three forms of immortality are deeply rooted in the historical consciousness of the Chinese, but they also point to a transcending dimension that makes morality, politics, and literature spiritual (or soulful) in the Confucian tradition. The individual soul achieves immortality through active participation in the collective communal soul of the moral, political, and literary heritage. Soul is not only inherent in natural objects; it is also present in cultural accomplishments.

In the Taoist tradition, immortality is attained through inner spiritual transformation. In a strict sense, what the Taoist advocates is not the immortality of the soul but longevity of the body. Yet the reason why the body can age gracefully (or elevate itself to a state of agelessness) is that it has become translucent like the soul without desires or thoughts.

The Indian notion of the transmigration of the soul that entered East Asia with the introduction of Buddhism has provoked heated debates in China since the

fourth century. Partly because of the Buddhist influence, the notions of *karman*, previous lives, hells, and journeys of souls are pervasive in Chinese folk religions. Fan Chen's essay "On the Mortality of the Soul," viewed in this perspective, may have been a successful Confucian refutation of the Buddhist belief in the separation of body and soul; but as a rationalist-utilitarian interpretation of the soul, its persuasive power was greatly undermined both by sophisticated Buddhists who denied the permanence of the phenomenal self and by lay people who were under the influence of Buddhist devotional schools.

Since there has been continuous interaction between the great traditions and folk traditions in China, the folk belief that souls are spiritual beings that float around the human world, on the one hand, and the naturalistic, organicist interpretation of souls as expressions of the vital force, on the other, are not conflicting perceptions of the same reality. In fact, there are enough points of convergence between them that they can well be understood as belonging to the same religious discourse. To the Chinese, souls are neither figments of the mind nor wishful thoughts of the heart. They have a right to exist, like stones, plants, and animals, in the creative transformation of the cosmos. The malevolent, negative souls can harm people, haunting the weak and upsetting the harmonious state of the human community. However, by and large, human beings benefit from the positive aspects of the soul, for through the "soul force" they are in touch with the dead and with the highest spiritual realm, Heaven.

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TU WEI-MING

Jewish Concept

Unlike the Egyptian and Akkadian terms that have been translated as "soul" (e.g., *ba*, *ka*, *khu*, *shimtu*, *shedu*, *ishtaru*), the most important Hebrew words for this concept (*nefesh*, *neshamah* or *nishmah*, and *ruah*) do not primarily refer to appearance, destiny, power, or supernatural influences, but to respiration—the inner, animating element of life. While the Hebrew Bible distinguishes between spirit and flesh, it does not accept the type of dualism of body and soul characteristic of Greek thought. Hebrew terms for the soul usually refer to an activity or characteristic of the body or to an entire living being. To "afflict the soul" means to practice physical self-denial (*Lv.* 16:29ff.).

Hebrew *nefesh*, usually translated as "soul," refers to the breath, as does the term *neshamah* (or *nishmah*), which became the most common word for the soul in postbiblical Hebrew. The verbs formed from the roots of these words (*nafash* and *nasham*) mean "to breathe." The two words are found together in *Genesis* 2:7, which narrates how the first human (*adam*) received the breath of life (*nishmat hayyim*) from God and became a living soul (*nefesh hayyah*). Another meaning of *nefesh* is "life," particularly animal life. Here the soul is a kind of material principle of vitality, which is separable from the inert substance (*basar*) of the body. *Neshamah*, on the other hand, sometimes refers particularly to conscious life or intelligence. *Nefesh* also may refer to mental states, in particular to strong emotions or physical cravings. At times *nefesh* refers to human capabilities, such as the capacity for eloquent speech.

The word *ruah*, which is often rendered as "spirit," refers to powers or actions outside the body and often has the meaning of "wind." *Ruah* is the mysterious vitality in the material body, which is considered a divine gift. *Ruah* sometimes denotes forces external to the body that operate in or through the body or the mental

faculties. These forces are states of exaltation and depression beyond normal experience that come and go "like the wind." (The clearest example of the various meanings of *ruah* in a single passage is *Ezekiel* 37:1–14, the vision of the valley of dry bones.)

According to the Hebrew Bible, a dead human being remains in possession of the soul upon entering She'ol, a shadowy place sometimes synonymous with the grave, where the vitality and energy associated with worldly life are drastically decreased. Since both the body and the soul enter She'ol, the later doctrine of the resurrection (as expressed in *Isaiah* 24–27 and *Daniel* 12) indicates a reentry into life in both aspects. The first definite appearance in Jewish thought of a doctrine of personal survival of death in a general resurrection of the dead comes in the literature associated with the Hasmonean Revolt (166–164 BCE), from which time it increases in importance to become a central dogma, later a part of the basic doctrine of Christianity.

The work in the Hebrew canon that expresses the idea of resurrection most explicitly is the *Book of Daniel*. The final chapter of this Hebrew-Aramaic text of the second century BCE expands some details of the divine judgment of the nations with a "secret" revelation wherein it is made known that at some future time many of the dead will wake to everlasting life, while some will wake only to eternal suffering. References to the concept of resurrection are also found in *Isaiah* 26, which modern scholars regard as part of a late addition to the book. It alludes to personal resurrection, which, it suggests, will be restricted to certain categories of the dead and to the shades or *refa'im*. The original nature of the *refa'im* in Canaanite mythology is the subject of continuing debate, but in biblical contexts they are usually understood as impotent ghosts.

The "dew of light" mentioned in *Isaiah* 26, as well as in the Pseudepigrapha (e.g., *1 Bar.* 29:7, 73:2; *1 Enoch* 60:7), suggests ideas of restored fertility, and is associated in the Jewish tradition with individual resurrections as well as a general resurrection. However, the passages in *Daniel* and *Isaiah* concerning the role of the soul in resurrection are ambiguous and have allowed for extensive and often contradictory speculation. The Sadducees, in the first century CE, followed a literal reading of the accepted scriptures and denied that the idea of a general resurrection was found there. But the Pharisees and their successors, the tannaim (first and second centuries CE) and the amoraim (third through fifth centuries CE) were convinced that the scriptures, properly understood in the light of an oral instruction passed down through Moses and the later prophets, were filled with hints and allusions concerning the world to come.

Rabbinic Views. A synopsis of concepts of the soul in rabbinic literature may give an overly uniform appearance to this material, which developed over many generations. Statements scattered through this vast literature may appear when cited in isolation to be pure speculation or assertions of dogma, but they often have a primarily polemic point in context. With explicit and implicit contradictions so abundant in the Talmud, no fully articulated system (or systems) can be found, but it is possible to summarize majority views and influential positions.

The close connection between soul and body characteristic of the biblical worldview is continued in the rabbinic literature. The Palestinian Talmud (J.T., *Kil.* 8.4, 31c) attributes the origin of different portions of the physical body to human parents, while the spirit, life, and soul are attributed to God. This admits a greater duality than is acknowledged in the Hebrew Bible, but the soul is regarded as the active element, and so is responsible for sin, while the body is only its vehicle. Such an attitude is contrary to Greek views known in Hellenistic Judaea whereby the body is seen as a trap that debases or hinders the soul. According to Kaufmann Kohler and Ephraim Urbach (see, respectively, *Jewish Theology* and *The Sages*.) this view of the body as the source of sin and impurity is not found in rabbinic Judaism. Urbach also concluded that neither the concept of the soul's immortality, separate from the body, nor the idea of its transmigration into other bodies, is rabbinic. The absence of early, authoritative pronouncements on such points allowed for widely variant speculations within later orthodox and heterodox thought. Talmudic Judaism, as Urbach indicates, found moral duality existing within the soul, which contains both good and evil impulses, the latter including the ambitious, self-centered, and envious impulses in human beings that must be controlled rather than extirpated. The Talmud presents the soul as a supernatural entity created and bestowed by God and joined to a terrestrial body (B.T., *Ber.* 60a). God takes back the soul at death, but later restores it to the dead body. Similar views of the soul are elaborated elsewhere in the Talmud and early *midrashim*, although not without opposing voices. Among these is the concept of the soul's preexistence, which, Urbach argues, appears in rabbinic sayings only after the third century CE. According to some, all human souls came into existence during creation as parts of the "wind of God," understood here as "spirit" (B.T., 'A.Z. 5a, *Yev.* 62a; *Gn. Rab.* 8.1, 24.4). Unborn souls abide in a *guf* ("a body"; commentators suggest "promptuary") among the treasures of the 'aravot, the seventh heaven, where also are found the souls of the righteous and the "dew of light" with which God

will resurrect the dead (B.T., *Ḥag.* 12b, *Yev.* 62a, *Shab.* 152b). The Messiah will come when the supply of souls in the *guf* is exhausted, or, according to others, when God has created those souls he has held in his intention from the beginning (B.T., 'A.Z. 5a, *Yev.* 62a, *Nid.* 136; *Gn. Rab.* 24.4; cf. also *Apocalypse of Ezra* 4:35).

According to one view, God compels the selected or newly created soul to enter the womb at the time of conception. Even after the soul has entered this world, it is not entirely forgetful of its origins and is not without divine care. It is accompanied by angels (B.T., *Ber.* 60b, end; B.T., *Shab.* 119a), and nightly, while the body sleeps, the soul ascends to heaven, from which it returns with renewed life for the body (*Gn. Rab.* 14.9; probably implied in B.T., *Ber.* 60a). On the Sabbath the body enjoys an "additional soul," which is sent forth by and returns to God, as Shim'on ben Laqish discovered by an ingenious rendering of the word *va-yinafash* in *Exodus* 31:17 (B.T., *Beits.* 16a, *Ta'an.* 27b).

Although the soul had protested at its embodiment and its birth into the world, it also protests at the death of the body. The soul hovers about the dead body for three days, hoping that life will return (*Tanḥuma'*, *Miqets* 4, *Pequdei* 3; cf. B.T., *Shab.* 152a). Ultimately the soul leaves the body and awaits the resurrection, when they will reunited and judged together (B.T., *San.* 91). Concerning the fate of the soul in the meantime, one view is that the souls of the righteous will remain with God, while the souls of the wicked wander in the air or are hurled from one end of the world to the other by angels (B.T., *Shab.* 152b).

Not everyone will be resurrected. The generation destroyed in the Flood, the men of Sodom (*San.* 10.3) who were punished by complete annihilation, and, with ironic appropriateness, those who denied the doctrine of resurrection will not return to life. Attempts have been made as well to relate doctrines of the soul or of the resurrection to Jewish concepts of religious duty and piety (e.g., B.T., *Ket.* 111b), a problem that was to be taken up at length by philosophers and mystics in later centuries.

Philosophical Views. Philosophical speculation in Judaism arose through the desire to reconcile the Jewish tradition with contemporary intellectual discourse. In medieval Jewish philosophy, the effort at reconciliation was directed at two rival forms of thought, Platonism and Aristotelianism, both of which were read under the influence of Neoplatonic commentaries and misattributed texts, such as the excerpts from Plotinus that circulated as the *Theology of Aristotle*. Isaac Husik noted (1916) that as a group, Jewish philosophers hesitated between (1) the Platonic view of the soul as a distinct entity that enters the body from a spiritual world and

acts by using the body as its instrument and (2) the Aristotelian view that, as far as the lower faculties such as sense, memory, and imagination are concerned, the soul is merely a form of the physical body and perishes with it. They found biblical references to support both views, although the latter provided a clearer division between the human and the divine.

Philo Judaeus (d. 45–50 CE) sought to reconcile Greek, predominantly Platonic and Stoic, philosophy with scripture, particularly the Pentateuch. He accomplished this through a device he borrowed from the Greeks, the allegorical method of interpretation, which the Stoics had used for the Homeric epics. Philo accepted most of the Greek distinction between body and soul, including the belief that the body and its desires were the cause of the pollution of the soul, the body being a prison from which the soul must escape. Man is related to the world of the senses through the body and the lower parts (or functions) of the soul, but through reason man is related to the suprasensual, or divine, realm, to which the higher portion of the soul seeks to be reunited. For Philo, the religious task is to bring about the union of the individual soul with the divine Logos, transcending both the material world and the limits of the rational soul.

In Philo's adaptation of Plato, there is a transcendent, preexistent, incorporeal Logos, a direct projection of the ideas in the mind of God, and there is also an immanent Logos, the totality of God's powers existing in the material world. The intelligible world of the transcendent Logos is the model for our world, in which all things, including individual souls, or minds, are reflections of the ideas, or images, as these are mediated through the immanent Logos. Directly below the immanent Logos in the descent from God are the rational, unbodied souls, which have the nature of living beings. Some of these were, or will be, incarnate in human bodies; others have not and never will be so embodied. These latter beings are ranked according to their inherent level of likeness to the divine. They are found in the heavens and in the air, and are known to the Greeks as *daimones*, that is (following the etymology in Plato's *Cratylus* 398b), "knowers," but in Hebrew they are called *mal'akhim*, "messengers," because they are God's messengers in his dealings with the created world. Translators of scripture have called them "angels," that is, "heralds."

The rational, human soul, a fragment of the Logos in human form, is capable of achieving a separate existence at a new level; the angels cannot. Without the support of God, however, the rational soul would perish by dissolving into its original, undifferentiated state. This is the fate of personal obliteration awaiting the

wicked. The souls of the righteous, the wise and virtuous, will be brought close to God in proportion to their merits. Not only can some reach the level of the highest angels beneath the immanent Logos, as did Elijah, but some can attain the level of the ideas of the intelligible world, as did Enoch. Moses, the most perfect man, who delivered the most perfect law by which souls are disciplined and improved, stands above all created species and genera, before God himself. Philo thus attempts to link the Platonic ascent of the soul to the Platonic ideas, using the biblical concepts of prophecy and election. No place is made for a resurrection of the body reunited with the soul. [See Ascension.]

Philosophical and systematic theological writings from Jewish sources appear again later in the ninth and tenth centuries in response to the philosophical schools of Islam. The work of Yitsḥaq Yisra'eli (c. 850–950) is largely Platonic in origin. Yisra'eli believed in the substantiality and immortality of the soul, of which he distinguished three kinds in every human being. The first is the rational soul, which receives wisdom, discriminates between good and evil, and is subject to punishment for wrongdoing. The second is the animal soul, which humans share with beasts. It consists of sense perception, and it controls motion, but has no connection with reality and can judge only from appearances. The third is the vegetative soul, which is responsible for nutrition, growth, and reproduction; it has no sense perception or capacity to move. These distinctions, with major and minor variations, were to become common in Jewish as well as in Muslim and Christian writings.

Yitsḥaq Yisra'eli's younger contemporary, Sa'adyah ben Yosef, or Sa'adyah Gaon (c. 882–942), summarized his ideas about the soul in the sixth treatise of his *Book of Beliefs and Opinions* (Arabic version, *Kitāb al-amānāt wa-al-Itiqādāt*, completed about 933; Hebrew paraphrases and full translation as *Sefer ha-emunot ve-hade'ot*). Sa'adyah follows the less widely accepted of the Talmudic and Midrashic views that the soul is formed with the completion of the body and that there is a continuous creation of souls. He accepts, however, the predetermined limit of the total number of souls. He defends the localization of the soul in the heart with a demonstration of synonymous uses of the words in biblical texts, as well as with ancient and medieval physiological theories locating consciousness in the heart. Like the celestial spheres, the soul is perfectly transparent, so that although it permeates the body through vessels leading from the heart, it is too fine to be seen. When the soul leaves the body it is stored up until the time of general retribution, when it is restored to its own body to face God's judgment. Because of their pure, celestial nature, the souls of the wise and just rise

to the heavenly spheres. The souls of the wicked, however, become turbid from the impurities of their earthly lives, and after death they drift aimlessly among the lower elements. When it first leaves the body, the soul is troubled by the thought of the disintegration of its former abode. The earthbound souls of the wicked are greatly distressed by this corruption, while pure souls are much less concerned by it and soon begin their ascent.

Sa'adyah used the resources of Arabic philosophical teachings to construct a rationalized exposition of some Talmudic views of the soul. The majority of his successors were content with more general resemblances, preferring to concentrate on the assurance of personal immortality and retribution when they discussed the soul. Shelomoh ibn Gabirol (c. 1021–1058), one of the great Jewish liturgical poets of medieval Spain, connected the soul with the nature of the universe. For Ibn Gabirol, a Neoplatonist, the individual human soul is part of the world soul and contains a higher faculty than that of the rational soul, which is that of immediate intellectual intuition. The soul contains all the forms of existence in its essence and can intuit these forms. Ibn Gabirol separates the soul from God through an intricate series of emanations, but to many his views seemed to attribute too much of the divine to the human soul.

Elaboration of the concept of soul in terms of Jewish thought was attempted by another Spanish poet-philosopher, Yehudah ha-Levi (c. 1058–1141), in his Arabic dialogue *Al-Khazari* (The Book of Argument and Proof in Defense of the Despised Faith). Ha-Levi argues that philosophy, which has been presented as an eclectic Neoplatonism, is not absolutely wrong in teaching men to seek communion with the divine by subduing the organic and emotional, or vegetative and animal, elements of the soul to the rational. He states that there is another faculty of the soul, the religious faculty, which is capable of grasping truths and experiences beyond the reach of reason alone, so that the immaterial substance of the higher faculties of the soul becomes indestructible and immortal by assimilating universal and eternal concepts. According to ha-Levi, rabbinic Judaism is uniquely able to foster this higher, religious faculty of the soul. By leading a temperate and moral life the soul attains immortality and closeness to God.

The Neoplatonic approach of Shelomoh ibn Gabirol was resumed in later decades by another Spanish poet, Mosheh ibn 'Ezra' (1070–1138), who was influenced, it is thought, by the Şūfīs. Ibn 'Ezra' believed in the preexistence of the individual soul and in the transmigration of souls until they gain sufficient wisdom to be reunited with their source in the world soul. Markedly Aristotelian, in contrast, is the work of Avraham ibn Daud (1100–1180), a Spanish historian and astronomer

who argued that the soul is the form of the body, that it can grasp universal ideas and discriminate between good and evil, and that it can survive the body. Ibn Daud criticized the idea of the preexistence of the soul as illogical, arguing that if a preexistent soul died with the body their union was without purpose, while if it survived the body their temporary union was also pointless.

In the twelfth century the dominant influence was not that of Ibn Daud, however, but of Moses Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204). In his major philosophical work, *The Guide of the Perplexed* (c. 1190), he bases his theory of the soul on Aristotelian thought as he understood it through the great Arabic commentaries of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and Al-Fārābī and on biblical texts interpreted by an elaborate theory of the meaning of scriptural language. For Maimonides, the complete soul, or *nefesh*, is coextensive with the physical body and is not separable from it. It has five functions, namely, (1) the nutritive, (2) the sensitive, which consists of the five senses, (3) the imaginative, (4) the appetitive, which manifests itself in desires and emotions, and (5) the rational. The rational function itself consists of (1) the reflective aspect, which acquires knowledge and makes ethical judgments, (2) the practical aspect, and (3) the theoretical aspect, which consists of knowledge of unchanging realities.

The rational faculty is twofold. The material intellect latent in all human beings can be developed into the acquired intellect by the proper use of the mind. The acquired intellect is a disposition of the soul and perishes with the body. The acquired intellect can realize correct general concepts about the world, and when these are realized the rational soul assimilates the corresponding thoughts of the Active Intellect, which is the emanation through which God governs the material world. In this manner elements of divinity enter into the acquired intellect. If the soul has been directed toward contemplation of the nature of God and the world, the acquired intellect is replaced by the actualized intellect, which consists of these general concepts received from the active intellect. When the body dies the lower faculties of the soul are destroyed, but the actualized intellect, being of divine origin, is reunited with God through the Active Intellect. Through rational contemplation, such souls are rewarded by immortality. The souls of those who indulged the senses and emotions will perish with their bodies. According to the *Treatise on Resurrection*, although Maimonides believed in resurrection, he considered it a temporary condition wherein the souls of the righteous remain before they depart from the physical world entirely.

The threat to traditional religious beliefs presented

by Maimonidean intellectualism was not met successfully until the late fourteenth century, in the *Or Adonai* (Light of the Lord) of Ḥasdai Crescas. Crescas attacked the theory of the soul as being a form coextensive with the physical body. He also rejected the assumption that reason is the characteristic feature of the human soul. He argued that the will and the emotions are basic parts of human nature and not merely bodily distractions to be discarded with the flesh, which survive the death of the body and play a part in determining the ultimate condition and fate of the soul. He contended that religious teaching and practice are correctly directed at shaping the will and the emotions, rather than the reason.

Qabbalistic Views. According to Qabbalah, man is a spiritual being whose body is merely an external wrapping. There are three essentially different parts of the soul in qabbalistic thought, designated by the Hebrew terms *nefesh*, *ruah*, and *neshamah*. The *nefesh* is the vital element and enters the body at birth; it dominates the physical and psychological aspects of the self. In contrast, the *ruah* and *neshamah* must be developed through spiritual discipline. The *ruah* comes into being when a person can overcome the body and its desires and it is thus associated with the ethical aspects of life. The *neshamah* is the highest part of the soul and is produced through study of the Torah and observation of the commandments. Torah study awakens the higher centers, through which the individual attains the capacity to apprehend God and the secrets of creation.

According to Gershom Scholem, Qabbalah took this division of the soul primarily from Jewish Neoplatonism and introduced theosophic and mythic elaborations. In Qabbalah the *neshamah* is that part of the soul that consists of the spark of the divine and is exclusively concerned with the knowledge of God. According to the fundamental text of thirteenth-century qabbalistic literature, the *Zohar*, each part of the soul originates in the world of the *sefirot* (the emanations of God). *Nefesh* originates in the *sefirah* Malkhut ("kingdom"), the lowest emanation, which corresponds to the Congregation of Israel. *Ruah* originates in Tiferet ("grandeur"), the central *sefirah*, also known as Raḥamim ("mercies"). *Neshamah* emerges from the third *sefirah*, Binah ("understanding"). The *sefirot* are assigned male and female aspects, and the soul has its origins in a union of these male and female archetypes and takes on masculine and feminine forms only in its emanations downward.

After the compilation of the *Zohar*, two additional parts of the soul were introduced, the *ḥayyah* and *yeḥidah* ("life" and "only one"; cf. *Psalms* 22:21). These were assigned higher levels than the *neshamah* and could be acquired only by spiritually evolved individu-

als. The soul of the Messiah, which was on the level of *yeḥidah*, had its source in the *sefirah* Keter ("crown"), the highest of the emanations.

According to Qabbalah, the *nefesh*, *ruah*, and *neshamah* have different destinies after death. The *nefesh* hovers over the body for a time; the *ruah* goes to a terrestrial realm assigned according to its virtue, and the *neshamah* returns to its home with the divine. Only the *nefesh* and *ruah* are subject to punishment.

In the thought of Isaac Luria (1534–1572) and his disciples, the doctrine of metempsychosis was incorporated into concepts of the nature and destiny of creation and the mission of the Jewish people. The task of *tiqqun*, that is, the restoration or reintegration into the divine pattern of existence of the flawed material universe, is entrusted to human souls, who seek out and redeem the scattered sparks of divinity in the world. Most souls are given repeated chances to achieve this task, thus constituting a kind of reincarnation, which earlier Jewish mystics had considered primarily a form of punishment or expiation for sins. In the Lurianic system, ritual commandments are important for achieving *tiqqun*, both for the individual soul and for the whole world.

[See also *Jewish Thought and Philosophy*, *article on Premodern Philosophy*, and *the biographies of the philosophers mentioned herein*.]

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JACK BEMPORAD

Christian Concept

The concept of the soul in Christian literature and tradition has a complex history. Moreover, Christian thought about its destiny is by no means uniform, nor is it always even clear.

Terminology. The New Testament word *psuchē* is rooted in the Hebrew *nefesh*, and in English both are generally translated "soul." In primitive Semitic thought *nefesh* (Arabic, *nafs*) is a fine, diminutive replica of the body. As such it can be contrasted with *ruah*, an onomatopoeic word that mimics the sound of breathing and is used to designate the spirit or principle of life that in such thought is seen in the breath, which stands in contrast to the flesh. The New Testament word *psuchē*, however, has complex overtones associated with the concept of life, sometimes also signifying what today would be called the self and often assuming a special connotation as the seat of the supernatural or eternal life, the life that cannot be destroyed by the malice of men as can the body, yet can be destroyed by God (*Mt.* 10:39). So valuable is the *psuchē* that not even

the whole of the material universe could compensate for its loss (*Mt.* 16:26, *Mk.* 8:36ff.).

When the *psuchē* is fully dedicated to God it acquires a special character (*1 Pt.* 1:22, 4:19), and in this dedication it can be anchored in God and be aware of possessing eternal life, assured of salvation from all that could alienate it from that inheritance (*Heb.* 6:19). Such is the "soul" or "self" that is under the care of Christ. Yet since the *psuchē* is spiritual, not material, it is not to be guarded as one guards an earthly mansion, nor to be placed like a precious heirloom in a safe deposit box, nor tended as one tends a delicate plant. On the contrary, Jesus urges his disciples to let go of it, abandoning it to God's care (*Mt.* 16:25, *Mk.* 8:35, *Lk.* 9:24, *Jn.* 12:25). Such is the paradox of self-giving, a concept that finds expression also in Hindu and Buddhist thought.

In the New Testament then, the *psuchē*, although fundamentally rooted in a Hebrew concept, encompasses so much of what we today understand as the "self" that it confronts us with many of the very complex problems to be found in modern discussions of selfhood. Yet the term carries also other connotations, as we shall see later. Furthermore, in its adjectival form, *psuchikos*, it can be used to designate the natural, biological life of man, as distinguished from the spiritual life, which is called *pneumatikos* (*1 Cor.* 2:14, 15:46; *Jude* 19). The dualistic distinction implied in this usage echoes one that is familiar to readers of gnostic literature. *Psuchē*, however, always refers to that dimension of man that is of eternal value and therefore contrasted with man's carnal embodiment.

In *Ezekiel* (13:17ff.) there is an echo of the primitivistic belief that the *nefesh* can slip out of the nostrils or another orifice during sleep (hence the old superstition against sleeping with one's mouth open) or, in the case of violent death, at the point of the assassin's sword. Ezekiel warns his hearers against women who sew frilly sleeves around their wrists, "the better to ensnare lives." This passage reflects both the old material concept of the *nefesh* and the ancient fear of witches, who made a profitable business out of nocturnal exploits in which they stole the *nefashot* of unwary sleepers, catching their souls like moths in handkerchiefs and then selling them to families with a member who, as we might say today, had "lost his mind." The Arabs entertained similar views about the vulnerability of the *nafs* to such evil agencies.

Soul and Spirit. The English words *soul* and *spirit* are attempts to represent the two sets of ideas found in the Bible: *soul* is continuous with the Hebrew *nefesh* and the Greek *psuchē*, while *spirit* is continuous with the Hebrew *ruah* and the Greek *pneuma*. The one set of

ideas, however, cannot be entirely dissociated from the other. For example, when we think of the ideas of wind, breath, or spirit, we would probably attach any one of them to *pneuma* rather than to *psuchē*; nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the word *psuchē* has an etymological connection with the verb *psuchēin* ("to breathe"), as does the Latin *animus* with *anemos*, the Greek word meaning "wind." So some study of the concept of spirit is not only relevant but necessary for any study of the Christian concept of the soul.

Ruah, which the New Testament writers translate as *pneuma* and which is traditionally rendered "spirit" in English, does not have the quasi-physical connotation that *nefesh* has. For although *ruah* is sometimes used to signify "wind" or "breath" (e.g., in *Job* 15:30), it is not accurately described as ambiguous in meaning since in Hebrew it refers simply to the principle of vital activity, however manifested. The Hebrews did not make the sharp distinction, to which our Western tradition has accustomed us, between the physical connotations of "wind" and the spiritual connotations of "spirit" or "mind." So the effects of *ruah* may be heard as one hears a hurricane, or seen as one might see breath on a mirror or the dancing of branches of trees on a windy day. Or it may be perceived in more complex ways, as we perceive the results of God's action in human events. Since the ancients saw in breathing the evidence of life and in its absence the lack of life, breath would seem an obvious locus for *ruah*. Nevertheless, they would so see it only as we see in the brain an obvious locus for mental activity, although not even the most positivistic of contemporary analytical philosophers would identify mental activity simply with the three pounds of pinkish-gray tissue we carry in our heads. *Ruah* is also the inner strength of a man or woman, which is weakened in times of despondency and is revived in times of exhilaration. Short-tempered people are short of *ruah* (*Ex.* 6:9). The *ruah* of God (Elohim) is uniquely powerful in its effects on man, affecting him in all sorts of ways, not all of them benevolent. Since the Hebrews had no special word for nature as did the Greeks (*phusis*), one word had to do service for all seemingly superhuman activity. God sends plagues and earthquakes as well as gentle rain and sunshine. The *ruah* of the Lord, however, is that of righteousness and love, of justice and mercy, inspiring the utterances of the prophets upon whom it falls.

Behind the New Testament use of *pneuma* lie these earlier uses of *ruah*. The spirit of God is given to Jesus in baptism (*Mt.* 3:13ff.) and from Jesus to the disciples. John the Baptist distinguishes the baptism he gives from the one Jesus is to give, which is to be by the Holy Spirit (*en pneumatī hagiō*) and by fire (*Mt.* 3:11). Here

John is represented as anticipating the experience of the disciples on the day of Pentecost, described in *Acts* 2 as the descent of the Spirit on the assembly as if in "tongues of fire." The extent to which the New Testament writers accounted the Holy Spirit of God a separate entity, as in the trinitarian doctrine developed in later Christian thought, is, to say the least, obscure and need not concern us here. *Pneuma*, however, is very frequently used, both in a somewhat pedestrian way (e.g., the disciples are afraid, thinking they are seeing a ghost, *Lk.* 24:37) and in more reverential senses having the full range of Hebrew meanings along with special meanings arising out of the pentecostal experience. Both Paul and John make notable use of the antinomy of flesh (*sarx*) and spirit (*pneuma*). What makes one righteous is circumcision not of the flesh but of the spirit (*Rom.* 2:29). Had not the psalmist noted that the Lord was less pleased by burnt offerings than by a humble and contrite heart (*Ps.* 51)? Christians do not walk according to the flesh but according to the spirit (*Rom.* 8:13).

Although Paul follows traditional usage in such matters, he also uses *pneuma* in several less expected ways, for example, as if he were alluding to the soul (*2 Cor.* 2:13) and as if referring to the mind as the seat of human consciousness (*1 Cor.* 7:34). He also writes as if mystically identifying the soul or conscious self of the Christian with the spiritual realm or dimension to which it has been introduced through Christ; he writes as if the Christian were so absorbed into Christ that everything he or she thought or said or did issued thence. Paul has a tendency to express his dominant sense of mystical union with Christ by coalescing all such distinctions as might lie between *psuchē* and *pneuma*, focusing upon what today would more readily be called a spiritual dimension of being, one in which the human participates in the divine.

John pointedly contrasts *sarx* ("flesh") with *pneuma* ("spirit"), as in *John* 3:5–8. Because God is a spirit, all dealings with him are in the spiritual, not the carnal, dimension (*Jn.* 4:24). The words of Jesus are the revelation of God, and as such they are to be recognized as spirit (*pneuma*) and life (*zōē*). Spirit is symbolized by the physical act of breathing: in *John* 20:22 Jesus breathes on the apostles as a symbol of his bestowal of the Holy Spirit (*pneuma hagian*). Alluding to the Holy Spirit, John uses the term *paraklētos*: the one who helps or pleads one's cause. This term had been used in classical Greek in much the same way as the Latin *advocatus* ("advocate," or the English *counsel*). As used by John, it seems to recall the notion of the spirit of truth as used in the Qumran literature in the sense of "helper," where the typically gnostic contrast between

the spirit of light and the spirit of darkness is also notable. Jesus, as God pitching his tent awhile in the carnal world of humankind, is he who can mediate between us, in our mixed, carnal-spiritual state, and God, who is pure spirit. In the light of such modes of conceptualizing, the distinction between soul and spirit tends to evanesce. The contrast is between the carnal realm and the spiritual realm. The characteristics of the spirit (coming “like the rushing of a mighty wind” and “blowing where it listeth”) become, then, descriptions of the way in which the spiritual dimension behaves; that is, it behaves otherwise than according to the “laws” of physics or biology.

To sum up: with the translation of *nefesh* as *psuchē* in the Greek version of the Bible (Septuagint), which the New Testament writers used, the ground is laid for the tendency toward the coalescence of the ideas suggested by the terms *psuchē* and *pneuma*. For both words focus on the traditional Semitic preoccupation with the idea of life. What matters to the spiritual man is not the life we measure in days or years (*bios*) but the spiritual energy, the inner life of a man, his *zōē*, which has the capacity to become everlasting. It is to this that the soul is to be resurrected, so that resurrection then entails an ongoing, everlasting state, which Christ has made possible even for us sinful men and women. Thus our struggle in this life is not so much against flesh (*sarx*) as “against the spiritual army of evil agencies” (*pros ta pneumatika tēs ponērias*; Eph. 6:12). By extension, then, the soul, as the higher part of man, becomes indistinguishable from the spiritual dimension of man’s being.

Still, one cannot easily overemphasize the fact that the New Testament Christians were heirs of a classical Hebrew view in which man does not *have* a body or *have* a soul; he *is* a soul-body unity. Flesh and spirit, however, are opposed as evil and good aspects of man. Recognition of this may have opened the way to a later accommodation to the Greek soul-body dualism. In Hebrew thought the soul was sometimes conceived as if it were a sort of liquid in the jar of the body, one that can be diminished and also replenished. In *Genesis 2:7* God breathed his Spirit into the very dust out of which he made man, and man then “became a living soul.” This imagery haunts Hebrew thought and the New Testament writers inherit the model it fostered.

Origin of the Soul. Within the development of Christian thought on the origin of the individual soul, three views have been maintained: (1) creationism, (2) traducianism, and (3) reincarnationism.

Creationism is the doctrine that God creates a new soul for each human being at conception. Upheld by Jerome, Hilary, and Peter Lombard, it was by far the most widely accepted view on the subject in the Middle

Ages. Thomas Aquinas insisted upon it (*Summa theologiae* 1.118), and in the Reformed tradition the Calvinists generally taught it. Its consequences for certain moral questions, notably that of abortion, are clear.

Traducianism is the theory that the soul is transmitted along with the body by the parents. Forms of this view were proposed by some of the Fathers (such as Gregory of Nyssa and, notably, Tertullian), but in the Middle Ages it found little if any favor. Lutherans, however, tended to accept it, and in the early nineteenth century a modified form of it was proposed within the Roman Catholic tradition by the founder of the Rosminians, Antonio Rosmini-Serbatì.

It is widely supposed that reincarnationism (a form of resurrection belief) is alien to Christian thought, but this supposition is not warranted by the evidence. The doctrine of the preexistence of the soul was certainly held by Origen and others in the tradition of Christian Platonism. Reincarnationism (not of course in its crude, primitivistic form, but in an ethical one, such as is found in Plato and in Indian philosophy) has a long and interesting, albeit partly underground, tradition in Christian thought and literature from early times down to the present day. Christian reincarnationists hold that the soul passes through many embodiments in the process of its development and spiritual growth and is judged accordingly, not on the basis of only one life of indeterminate duration. The soul, in this view, has a very long history, with origins antedating humanity itself.

Destiny of the Soul. Paul taught that since “the wages of sin is death” (*Rom.* 6:23), man has no more entitlement to immortality than has any other form of life. Thanks, however, to the power of Christ’s resurrection, every man and woman of the Christian way who truly believes in the power of Christ will rise with him (*Phil.* 3:21) in a body that will be like Christ’s “glorious” body (*tō sōmati tēs doxēs autou*). The resurrection of Christ makes us capable of personal resurrection, yet we can attain our own resurrection only insofar as we appropriate the power of Christ, which we can do through believing in its efficacy and accepting his divine gift of salvation from death and victory over the grave.

Indeed, although notions of immortality are inextricably woven into New Testament thought alongside the central resurrection theme, they are dependent on the latter in the thought of Paul and other New Testament writers. For all human beings, death has always been the supreme terror, the “final enemy” of man; now, Paul proclaims, it has been conquered, making possible the immortal life of the soul.

Yet we must not expect to find in the first century any clearly formulated universal doctrine of the afterlife.

The expectation of the end of the age and the imminent return of Christ (the Parousia) so governed the Christian outlook during that period as to discourage speculation about the nature of the soul or whatever it is in man that survives his physical body. Paul himself pointedly discouraged idle speculation on the precise nature of the resurrected body (*1 Cor.* 15:35–58). As, however, the hope of the Parousia gradually lost much of its urgency, the need for formulation of an answer to such questions pressed itself on theological minds. Since the biblical writers had left these questions so open, and since a variety of beliefs from throughout the Mediterranean world had consciously or otherwise affected those who were thinking seriously about such matters, different and sometimes incompatible views were brought together. Even before the Christian era the Jews had been entertaining beliefs about the afterlife that had not been in the general mold of their classical thought but had been picked up from foreign sources after the Exile (587/6 BCE). In the time of Jesus, for instance, some (such as the Pharisees) believed in a resurrection from the dead which others (for example, the Sadducees) repudiated.

In classical Hebrew thought the souls of the dead went to She'ol, the counterpart of the Hades of Greek mythology, a sort of nonworld, an underground place of darkness and dust so dreary that, as Homer remarked, one would rather be a poor beggar in the land of the living than a king in the land of the dead. Yet in later Hebrew thought *sophia* ("wisdom") is seen as delivering human beings from She'ol (*Prov.* 15:24). Unlike souls in the hell of later Christian theology, who have put themselves beyond God's benevolent power, those in She'ol could be the objects of God's care, for his power extends even there (*Dt.* 32:22, *Ps.* 139:8). In the New Testament, the concept of She'ol is sometimes replaced by that of death, for example in Paul's use of the Greek *thanatos* in *1 Corinthians* 15:55, quoting *Hosea* 13:14. However, in *Acts* 2:27, quoting *Psalms* 16:10, the term *haidēs* is retained.

In the rabbinical thought of the century before the advent of Christianity, *she'ol* came to mean a place exclusively for the wicked. The righteous go to *pardes* ("paradise," or, more strictly, "garden"), a late Hebrew term derived from the Greek *paradeisos*, the Septuagint translation for "Garden of Eden." *Pardes* was understood as a celestial restoration of the original, unfallen state of man. Sometimes, however, it represented an intermediate state between the death of the righteous and the final judgment—hence Jesus' promise to the penitent thief that they would meet that same day in "paradise" (a passage that would otherwise present grave interpretative difficulties), and other similar usages in the New Testament.

Along with such developments comes the notion of Gehenna as a pit of fire into which the wicked are to be thrown to be burned like trash. The symbolism of this transitional, intertestamental period is, however, by no means consistent; and the confusion is carried over into the New Testament, where both *haidēs* and *geenna* (*Mt.* 18:9 and *Mk.* 9:43) have been traditionally rendered "hell" in English, although they have different connotations in the Greek text. Hades, although it can function as a storehouse for the dead who await judgment (as in *Rv.* 20:13–14) and as a destructive power like death (as in *Mt.* 16:18), can also be (as in *Lk.* 16:23) a place of punishment indistinguishable from Gehenna.

The concept of Gehenna as a dumping ground for the incineration of the wicked originates with the "Valley of the son of Hinnom," the place on the boundary between Judah and Benjamin that in later Hebrew literature had an unsavory reputation as the site of a cultic shrine where human sacrifice was offered (*2 Kgs.* 23:10; *2 Chr.* 28:3, 33:6). When reference is made in *Isaiah* 66:24 to the place where the dead bodies of those who have rebelled against the Lord shall lie, this valley is the place being alluded to. In *2 Esdras* 7:6 Gehenna has become a furnace within sight of paradise. In Jewish apocalyptic literature it was often seen as a pit of unquenchable fire in which the wicked are destroyed, body and soul, a notion echoed in *Matthew* 10:28. The writer of *Revelation* calls this destination of the wicked "the second death" (21:8). In this Gehenna imagery lies the origin of the popular medieval concept of hell, in which, however, the soul, being indestructible, cannot be extinguished by the fire but is tormented everlastingly.

In early Christian thought, such a background for the concept of the soul and its destiny resulted in a confusion that no appeal to scripture could possibly clear, since the confusion was already embedded in the Bible itself. So we find that Tertullian, writing in his *De anima* (c. 210), assigns to the soul a sort of corporality. This tendency is to be found in other anti-gnostic writers of the period, including his contemporary Irenaeus. By contrast, Origen (c. 185–c. 254) and his influential Christian school at Alexandria taught that the soul preexisted in an incorporeal state and was imprisoned in a physical body as a result of its former waywardness. Origen probably also taught a form of reincarnationism. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 330–c. 395), Nemesius (who was bishop of Emesa toward the end of the fourth century), and the Greek theologian Maximos the Confessor (c. 580–662), all interpreted the biblical concepts of the soul along Platonic lines and in the general tradition of Origen and his school.

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas follows the doctrine of the soul presented in Aristotle's *Eudemus*, teaching that, while body and soul together constitute a

unity, the soul, as the “form” of the body, is an individual “spiritual substance” and as such is capable of leading a separate existence after the death of the body. This medieval doctrine of the soul, while largely determining the official teaching of the Roman Catholic church on the nature of the soul and its destiny, also indelibly imprinted itself on the theology of the Reformation. For the classical reformers, although contemporaneous with the great Renaissance movement in Europe, were thoroughly medieval in the mold of their theological thinking. The fact that Thomas described the essence of the pain of hell as the loss of the vision of God did little to mitigate the horror of hell in the popular mind.

In popular preaching during the Middle Ages and for centuries thereafter, hell was invariably depicted as a physical fire in which the souls of the damned, being somehow endowed with temporary bodies equipped to suffer physical pain, are eventually summoned on the Last Day to have their original bodies returned and enabled to suffer everlasting torture under the same conditions. The angels, however, according to Thomas, have no physical bodies; therefore Satan and the other denizens of hell must be equipped in some other way to undergo, as they certainly must, the punishment superabundantly due to them in the place of torment over which they reign. Nor could Dante’s obviously symbolic treatment and allegorical vision of hell in the *Commedia* have assuaged the horror of hell in the popular mind. After all, much of Dante’s genius lay in his ability to invest his great epic with an extraordinary realism that fixed itself on the minds of even those readers whose literary education had accustomed them to the allegorical methods so dear to the medieval mind.

Out of confusion in the concept of the soul, then, had sprung an increasing confusion in the Christian view of its destiny, making eschatology the least coherent aspect of the Christian theological tradition. For example, the soul has an independent existence and is sometimes envisioned, in Platonic fashion, as well rid of the burden of its physical encumbrance. Yet in the end the whole man, body and soul, must be restored in order to enjoy the fruits of Christ’s redemption. In the first century, on account of the imminent expectation of the Parousia, Christians could plausibly see the separation of soul from body as a very temporary state of affairs, as represented in the catacombs by such inscriptions as “Dormit in pace” (“He sleeps in peace”) and “Dormit in Christo” (“He sleeps in Christ”). As time went on, however, such a notion, although persisting to this day in pious epitaphs, could no longer serve as a theologically satisfactory account of what happens to the soul during a waiting period between death and the general resurrection of the dead. For it would suggest, if not entail,

the view that heaven and hell are uninhabited until that general resurrection shall occur. Such a view is not conformable to the standard vision of Christian piety on this subject—least of all where, as in Roman Catholic tradition, the saints are already in heaven (the Church Triumphant) interceding for and otherwise helping their fellow Christians in the Church Militant on earth. Moreover, both the words of Jesus to the penitent thief (*Lk.* 23:43) and the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (*Lk.* 16:19), with their implication of a paradisaical, Garden-of-Eden bliss, surely exclude the notion of a sleep till the Day of Judgment.

Furthermore, out of the doctrine of the intermediate state, which is at least foreshadowed in late Judaism and found in early Christian thought in a rudimentary form, was gradually developed the doctrine of purgatory. The concept of purgatory is of singular importance in the Christian doctrine of the life of the soul. Abused though the doctrine of purgatory was by legalistic distortions and ecclesiastical corruption in late medieval practice, purgatory has gradually come to be seen, through the influence of developments in English Tractarian thought in the nineteenth century, as a state not so much of punishment as of purification, refreshment, and growth. This theological development is adumbrated in some medieval Christian literature, notably the *Trattato (Dicchiarazione)* of Catherine of Genoa (1447–1510).

The souls in purgatory have generally been regarded as disembodied (or at least lacking our earthly embodiment), yet capable of the peculiar kind of pain that purgatory entails: a pain of waiting and longing. The duration of purgatory is indeterminate; but it is always assumed that some who enter it may be released comparatively soon and certainly that multitudes are to be released long before the Day of Judgment. What then happens to them on their release? Speculative theologians have made various proposals. According to Roman Catholic theology, each soul on its separation from the body is subjected to a “particular” judgment, as distinguished from the final or “general” judgment. In 1336, Pope Benedict XII, in his bull *Benedictus Deus*, specifically declared that souls, having been subjected to this particular judgment, are admitted at once to the beatific vision, which is heaven, or proceed at once to purgatory to be cleansed and readied for the heavenly state, or are consigned to hell. This teaching does not merely exclude explicitly the primitive Christian view represented by the *dormit in pace* type of epitaph; it makes nonsense of traditional Roman Catholic piety. For if purgatory be considered in any sense a state of punishment, hell a state of both torment and hopelessness, and heaven one of that joyful activity that comes with the full knowledge of God that is the reward of the

righteous, then the traditional prayer for the dead (“Requiescant in pace”; “May they rest in peace”) seems to express an inapposite wish for any of the three categories.

That ancient prayer echoes the primitive wish that the souls of the dead may not be inclined, because of their troubled state, to haunt the living but may instead pursue their business in peace and tranquillity and have no such harassing inclination. This primitive wish is, of course, transfigured in Catholic thought and sentiment, where it is illumined by the response “Et lux perpetua luceat eis” (“May perpetual light shine upon them”), expressing a loving concern for the progress of the souls of the dead and the belief that they are advancing toward the fulfillment of their destiny. Nevertheless, at the regular Roman Catholic burial service a beautiful prayer beckons the angels to come forth to meet the deceased and conduct him or her “into the heavenly city, Jerusalem.”

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The soul plays a central role in the various forms of Christian mysticism. The notion of the “fine point” of the soul, a cell remaining sensitive to God despite the fall and consequent corruption of mankind, is a common topic of such literature: for example, see *The Living Flame of Love* by John of the Cross. For the Salesian tradition, see Henri Bremond’s treatment in his *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France* (1915–1932), 2d ed. (Paris, 1967–1968), edited by René Taveneaux, especially vol. 7. Whether any form of reincarnationism is reconcilable to Christian faith is specifically considered in two books of mine: *Reincarnation in Christianity* (Wheaton, Ill., 1978) and *Reincarnation as a Christian Hope* (London, 1982).

GEDDES MACGREGOR

Islamic Concepts

Islamic concepts of the soul vary, ranging from the traditional (and most prevalent) to the mystical. They include doctrines formulated by individual schools of Islamic dialectical theology (*kalām*) and theories developed within Islamic philosophy (*falsafah*). It is possible to classify very broadly the different types of such concepts under four categories: traditional, theological, philosophical, and mystical (Şufi). Differences (as well as overlappings) abound, not only between these categories, but also within them. Nonetheless, the various Islamic concepts of the soul all seek or claim a Qur’anic base. Hence, the proper starting point of any discussion of such concepts is the Qur’ān. Before turning to the Qur’ān, however, a few preliminary remarks on the use of the Arabic terms *rūḥ* (“spirit”) and *nafs* (“soul”) are in order.

As in other languages, these terms relate to the ideas of breath and wind. In pre-Islamic Arabic poetry, *rūḥ* can mean “wind,” “breath,” or “that which one blows” (as when kindling a fire). In post-Qur’anic Arabic, the two terms are often used interchangeably when referring to the human soul, but distinctions between them are also maintained within certain conceptual schemes. In the Qur’ān, in addition to the grammatical reflexive use of *nafs* as “self,” the term is used to refer to the human soul, whereas *rūḥ* normally refers to the spirit that proceeds from God. In pre-Islamic Arabic poetry, these two terms do not have a religious or supernatural connotation. Thus *rūḥ* refers to the physical breath or wind, while *nafs* (when not used reflexively) refers to the blood, sometimes to the living body. This usage is consistent with the secular nature of this poetry, whose themes revolve around the poet’s mundane loves, sorrows, heroic exploits, and concept of tribal honor. The poetry is also noted for its vivid descriptions of nature—desert scenery and animal life, wild and domestic—that convey a sense of the splendor, power (sometimes harshness), and vitality of nature, but never anything that can be construed as either teleological or mystical. There are also affirmations in this poetry that, with death, everything ends, that there is nothing beyond the grave. A seeming exception to this consists of references to the *hāmāh*, a birdlike apparition resembling a small owl, which, according to pre-Islamic Arab belief, departs from the head of a slaughtered man, perches by his grave, and continues to shriek, “give me to drink,” until the death is avenged. The association of this belief with the tribal law of avenging the death of a kinsman is obvious.

Rūḥ and Nafs in the Qur’ān. As indicated earlier, *rūḥ* (“spirit”) in the Qur’ān refers normally to God’s spirit. The term appears in different contexts. It is the divine

creative breath: God creates man (Adam) from clay, animating him by blowing into the clay of his spirit (15:29; 32:9; 38:72). Again, God blew of his spirit into Mary, causing the conception of Jesus (21:91; 66:12). Spirit is sent by God as a messenger: it is *al-rūḥ al-amīn* ("the faithful spirit") that comes to Muḥammad's heart (26:193)—hence the Qur'anic commentators' identification of "the faithful spirit" with the angelic messenger Gabriel. Mary conceives when God sends his spirit to her in the form of a perfect man (19:17). Spirit is also *rūḥ al-qudūs* ("the holy spirit") which God sends to help Jesus (2:87, 2:253). Jesus himself is referred to as a spirit from God, but it is also made clear that this does not mean that he is the son of God (4:171).

Spirit relates also to the *amr* of God (16:2; 17:85; 40:15; 42:52), a term that can mean either "command" or "affair." Muslim scholars have disagreed on the interpretation of this term as well as on the referent of *rūḥ* ("spirit") in surah 17:85: "They ask thee [Muḥammad] about the spirit. Say: 'The spirit is of my Lord's *amr*; of knowledge ye have been given but little.'" Some have understood *amr* here as "affair," not "command," and *rūḥ* as referring to the human spirit. If this interpretation is correct, then the verse provides an exception to the normal Qur'anic use of the term *rūḥ*.

The term *nafs*, when not used in the grammatical reflexive sense of "self," refers to the human soul, not God's spirit. The human soul, however, relates to the divine spirit, since, as indicated earlier, God brings life to man by breathing into him of his spirit. The equivalence of life and soul in the Qur'ān, however, is not explicitly stated. Nor is there any explicit statement as to whether the soul is immaterial or material. The Qur'ān is primarily concerned with the moral and religious orientation of the human soul, with its conduct, and with the consequences of such conduct in terms of reward and punishment in the hereafter. This concern with the moral and religious disposition of the soul is reflected in the Qur'anic characterization of the soul as either *ammārah*, *lawwāmah*, or *muṭma'innah*. The *ammārah* (12:53) is the soul that by nature incites or commands what is evil. Qur'anic commentators have identified this with the carnal self. The *lawwāmah* (75:2) is the soul that constantly blames itself, interpreted by some commentators as upbraiding itself in the quest of goodness. The *muṭma'innah* (89:27) is the tranquil soul of the virtuous believer that will return to its lord.

With death, the soul leaves the body, to rejoin it on the Day of Judgment. Thereafter the righteous go to Paradise, the wicked dwell in Hell. Two questions in particular that relate to the resurrection were to occupy Islamic religious thinkers. The first is whether or not it is the remains of the same body that is resurrected. To this the Qur'ān gives no detailed answer, only an affir-

mation that God has the power to bring back to life what has been decayed: "Who will revive these bones when they are decayed? Say: 'He who created them the first time will revive them'" (36:78–79). The second is the question of what happens to the soul between the time of death and the day of resurrection. There are Qur'anic statements (8:49; 9:101; 32:21; 47:27) that suggest that wicked souls will be punished even before the resurrection and that the souls of martyrs will be in paradise: "Do not reckon that those killed in battle are dead; they are living with their Lord, provided for" (3:169). Such statements become a basis for traditional doctrines regarding the soul's fate in the interim between death and the final day of judgment.

Traditional Concepts. In Islam, the most prevalent concepts of the soul can perhaps best be termed "traditional." Their immediate inspiration is the Qur'ān, interpreted literally, and the *ḥadīth*, or "tradition." A chief source for our knowledge of the traditional concepts of the soul in Islam is *Kitāb al-rūḥ* (The Book of the Spirit), by the Damascene Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah (d. 1350), a celebrated Ḥanbalī theologian and juriconsult.

The term *rūḥ*, Ibn Qayyim maintains, is applicable in Arabic usage to both the spirit that comes from God and the human spirit. In the Qur'ān, however, it is used to refer to the spirit that comes from God. This spirit proceeds from the *amr* of God. The term *amr* in the Qur'ān, Ibn Qayyim insists, always means "command." Since the spirit proceeds from the command of God, it is a created being, although its creation antedates the creation of the human soul. The human body is created before the human soul. The latter, though created, is everlasting. Death means the separation of this soul from the body, to rejoin it permanently when the resurrection takes place. When the Qur'ān speaks of the soul that incites to evil, the soul that upbraids, and the tranquil soul, this does not mean that a human has three souls. These, Ibn Qayyim argues, are characteristics of one and the same human soul.

Ibn Qayyim gives a lengthy critique of the philosophical doctrine of an immaterial soul, incorporating in his criticism the arguments the theologian al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) had used in showing that Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna; d. 1037) had failed to demonstrate the immateriality of the human soul. Ibn Qayyim rejects the concept of an immaterial soul. An immaterial spirit or soul would be totally unrelated to what is spatial. What is unrelated to the spatial and the bodily cannot be spoken of as being in a body or outside it, or as traveling away from the body or returning to it. But this is the scriptural language expressing the activities of the soul. The human soul is hence material but "differs in quiddity [*al-māhiyyah*] from the sensible body, being a body that is

luminous, elevated, light, alive, and in motion. It penetrates the substance of the body organs, flowing therein in the way water flows in roses, oil in olives, and fire in charcoal" (*Kitāb al-rūḥ*, Hyderabad, 1963, p. 310). The body, in fact, is the mold (*qālib*) of the soul. Body and soul interact, helping to shape each other's individual characteristics. Thus, when death takes place, souls leaving their bodies have their individuality and are hence differentiated one from another.

During sleep, souls leave their bodies temporarily, sometimes communicating with other souls, whether of the living or of the dead. With death, the soul leaves the body but can very swiftly return to it. The souls of the virtuous can communicate with each other, the wicked souls being too preoccupied in their torments for this. For in the interim between death and the resurrection, most souls rejoin their bodies in the grave to be questioned by the two angels of death, Munkar and Nakīr. The wicked, unbelieving souls suffer punishment and torment in the grave, while the virtuous believers enjoy a measure of bliss. Ibn Qayyim equates the period of the grave with the *barzakh*, a Qur'anic term (23:100; 25:53; 55:20) that originally meant "hindrance" or "separation." The souls of prophets are in paradise, as are those of martyrs, although there are disagreements among traditional Muslims as to whether this applies to all martyrs. These disagreements, Ibn Qayyim maintains, are reconcilable once the legal conditions governing the fate of the soul are known. To cite but one of his examples, a martyr who dies before paying a debt is excluded from entry into paradise during this interim but does not suffer torment.

The prayers of the living over the souls of the dead are heard by the latter, who are helped by them. Ibn Qayyim devotes a long section of his book to this topic. The length of this chapter indicates the importance to Muslims of the visiting of graves and the offering of prayers over the dead, for these visits are very much part of traditional Muslim piety and a source of consolation to the bereaved.

Theological (Kalām) Concepts. Islam's dialectical theologians, the *mutakallimūn*, no less than the more traditional Muslims, sought to uphold a Qur'anic concept of the soul. They sought to uphold it, however, within scripturally rooted perspectives of the world that they formulated and rationally defended. Their concepts of the human soul were governed largely by two questions, one metaphysical, the other eschatological. The metaphysical question pertained to the ultimate constituents of the created world: Do these consist of indivisible atoms or of what is potentially infinitely divisible? The eschatological question arose out of their doctrine of bodily resurrection: if, in the ages between

the world's beginning and its end, dead human bodies decompose to become parts of other physical entities (organic or inorganic), how can there be a real resurrection, that is, a return to life of the actual individuals who once lived and died, and not the mere creation anew of replicas of them?

Regarding the metaphysical question, most of the *mutakallimūn* were atomists. Their concepts of the soul were for the most part materialist: they regarded it either as a body, or identified it with life, which they maintained is a transient quality, an accident, that occurs to a body. But there were disagreements among them, particularly among members of the "rationalist" Mu'tazilī school of *kalām*, which attained the height of its power and influence in the first part of the ninth century. Thus, one of its leading theologians, al-Nazzām (d. 845), rejected atomism. Moreover, he conceived of the soul (which he identified with life) as a subtle body that is diffused in all parts of the physical body. His concept of the soul is substantially the same as that of the traditional concept defended by Ibn Qayyim. Another exception of a different type was the view of the Mu'tazilī Mu'ammār (d. 835). He was an atomist and espoused a concept of the soul as an immaterial atom. Other theologians held the soul to be an atom, but not immaterial. But if it is a material atom, is life identical with it? If life is not identical with it, then could life be an accident that inheres in the single atom? The Mu'tazilah disagreed as to whether the accidents could inhere in the single atom or only in atoms that are interrelated, forming a body. They also disagreed as to whether spirit, soul, and life are identical. But the prevalent Mu'tazilī view was that the soul is material and that life, whether or not identical with soul, is a transient accident.

It is in terms of this prevalent view that the eschatological question mentioned earlier must be understood. If life is a transient accident and the dead body's atoms separate to combine differently forming other physical entities, where is the continuity that would guarantee the identity of the individual to be resurrected? Without this continuity, what appears to be the resurrected individual is only a similar being, a *mithl*. To resolve this difficulty, some of the Mu'tazilah resorted to the doctrine that nonexistence (*al'adam*) is "a thing" (*shay'*) or "an entity," "an essence" (*dhāt*), to which existence is a state that occurs. Thus a nonexistent entity *A* acquires existence for a span of time, loses it during another span, and regains it eternally at the resurrection, *A* remaining *A* throughout all these stages.

The doctrine that nonexistence is an entity, a thing, was rejected by the Ash'arī school of *kalām*. This school was founded by al-Ash'arī (d. 935), originally a Mu'tazilī

who rebelled against his school. (Ash'arism gradually gained ascendancy to become the dominant school of *kalām* in Islam.) But while the Ash'arīyah opposed fundamental Mu'tazilī doctrines, they were also atomists. Their atomism formed part of their occasionalist metaphysics according to which all events are the direct creation of God. Accidents are transient and do not endure for more than one moment of time and are hence constantly recreated. Life, the Ash'arīyah held, is a transient accident created and recreated while the individual lives. It is hence not difficult to see that the eschatological problem regarding the soul that the Mu'tazilah tried to solve persisted.

For an Ash'arī answer to this difficulty, I will turn to al-Ghazālī. His main arguments for the possibility of bodily resurrection are found in two works. The first is his criticism of the Islamic philosophers, particularly Ibn Sīnā, the *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). In this work he argues in great detail to show that Ibn Sīnā has failed to demonstrate his theory that the human soul is an immaterial, immortal substance. At the same time, he argues for the possibility of bodily resurrection in terms of a theory of an immaterial, immortal soul, maintaining that God at the resurrection creates for such a soul a new body. The second work, *Al-iqtisād fī al-l'tiqād* (Moderation in Belief), written shortly after the *Tahāfut*, gives a different explanation. Significantly, in this work al-Ghazālī repudiates the theory he advocated in the *Tahāfut*, maintaining that he had advanced it only for the sake of argument, to show that bodily resurrection is possible even if one adopts a doctrine of an immaterial soul. The true doctrine, he then continues, is the Ash'arī, namely that life is a transient accident constantly created and recreated in the living body. Resurrection is the return to life and existence of what was originally a first creation by God. God is able to recreate what he had previously created. A copy is simply a copy, never the recreation of what was actually a new creation. Al-Ghazālī does not discuss how one can differentiate between the resurrected, recreated original being, and the copy, the *mithl*, but the implication of his argument is that this is knowable to God, who is the creator of all things.

Al-Ghazālī follows substantially the line of reasoning of his predecessor and teacher, the Ash'arī al-Juwaynī (d. 1085). Unlike al-Juwaynī, however, al-Ghazālī does not discuss whether spirit or soul is the same as life. Al-Juwaynī is more explicit on this. Spirit is a body that pervades the physical body, animating it. Life, however, is a transient accident that inheres in spirit. With the exception of this distinction between life and spirit, al-Juwaynī's concept of the soul is in harmony with the traditional concept defended by Ibn Qayyim.

Philosophical Concepts. The theories of the soul formulated by Islam's philosophers, the *falāsifah* (sg., *faylasūf*), derive largely from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. But there are other influences—Greek medicine and Stoic thought, for example. An influential short Arabic treatise on the difference between spirit (*rūḥ*; Gr., *pneuma*), and soul (*nafs*; Gr., *psuchē*) by the Christian translator, Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (d. 912), is of interest, not only for its ideas, but also for its listing of the sources of these ideas—Plato (his *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*), Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Galen. Spirit, according to this treatise, is a subtle body. Its less refined form spreads in the body, from the heart through the veins, causing animation, breathing, and pulsation. The more refined spirit spreads from the brain through the nervous system to cause sensation and movement. Spirit, however, is only the proximate intermediary cause of these activities; its efficacy is caused by the soul, which is an immaterial, immortal substance. With death, spirit ceases, but not soul.

It was, however, in its Neoplatonic form that the doctrine of the soul's immateriality and immortality left its greatest impact on Islamic thought. This impact was not confined to philosophy proper but is discernible in the religious thought of various Islamic sectarian groups—the Ismā'īliyah, for example. The other most important source for the *falāsifah*'s concepts of the soul was Aristotle. The majority accepted Aristotle's definition of the soul as the entelechy of the body, his idea of its division into vegetative, sensitive, and rational and of the latter into theoretical and practical, and his description of the states of its various parts as these change from potentiality to actuality. Within the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic frameworks, however, there were differences in the *falāsifah*'s conceptions of the soul. An idea of these differences can be obtained by considering the conceptions offered by some representative philosophers.

Al-Kindī (d. c. 870), the first Islamic philosopher, for example, subscribes to the doctrine of the soul as an immaterial, immortal substance and at the same time defends the Qur'anic doctrine of bodily resurrection. His surviving treatises, however, do not include anything that shows the manner in which he synthesized these two doctrines. The physician-philosopher al-Rāzī (d. 926), on the other hand, offers a theory of the human soul inspired largely by Plato's *Timaeus*. Soul is one of the five eternal principles; the others are God, atomic (disorganized) matter, absolute space, and absolute time. At a moment in time, God imposes order on matter, rendering it receptive of soul. When soul unites with matter, it becomes individuated, forming the particular living creatures. Man alone among these crea-

tures is endowed with reason, an emanation from God. There is a lengthy but finite span of time, in which soul remains conjoined with matter and individuated. During this period there is transmigration of souls within animal and human life. The finite period ends when reason in men prevails. The individual souls then disengage from matter, returning to their original state of one soul. The initial state of the four other eternal principles resumes, continuing into the infinite future.

With al-Fārābī (d. 950) and Ibn Sīnā, we encounter two highly developed psychological theories. Both presupposed a Neoplatonic emanative scheme. The celestial world, for al-Fārābī, consists of a succession from God of dyads, intelligences, and bodily spheres; for Ibn Sīnā, it consists of a succession of triads, intelligences, souls, and bodily spheres. For both, the last successive celestial intelligence is the Active Intellect, after which our terrestrial world comes into existence. The entire process of successive emanations from God exists eternally.

According to al-Fārābī, the human rational soul is at first a potentiality in the material body. In some individuals, the objects of sensory perception, the material images, are transformed by the illuminary action of the Active Intellect into abstract concepts. These human souls that achieve abstract conceptual thought attain an immaterial status. (There are higher levels of conceptual thought, culminating with rare individuals, the philosopher-prophets, in the human soul's periodic union with the Active Intellect.) Only those souls that have attained an immaterial status are immortal. Good souls, those that have continued to live according to the dictates of reason, shunning the lower passions, live in eternal happiness, contemplating the celestial intelligences and God. Those rational souls that have betrayed their calling, surrendering to the lower passions, live in eternal misery, seeking contemplation of the celestial intelligences but unable to achieve it. The souls of the majority of mankind, however, never attain an immaterial status and, with death, cease to exist.

Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, insists on the individual immortality of all souls. The rational soul, an emanation from the Active Intellect, joins the human body and becomes individuated by it. It is an immaterial, individual substance that exists with the body but is not imprinted in it. Souls that have lived the rational life, controlling the lower passions and remaining untarnished by vice, are rewarded in the hereafter. They live in eternal bliss, contemplating the celestial beings and God. This applies to nonphilosophical virtuous souls that have lived in accordance with the divine law, for this law is an expression of philosophical truth in the language of imagery and symbol, which the nonphiloso-

pher can understand. Souls that have not lived the rational, virtuous life or have not adhered to the commands of the religious law are punished in the hereafter. They live eternally in torment, seeking contemplation of the celestial beings and God, but are unable to achieve this. The Qur'anic language describing the afterlife in physical terms is symbolic. Ibn Sīnā's theory of the soul culminates in mysticism. But this is intellectual mysticism. God, for Ibn Sīnā, is pure mind. The soul's journey to God includes the inundation of the souls of exceptional individuals with all of the intelligibles from the Active Intellect. This experience is intuitive, occurring all at once.

Ibn Rushd (Averroës; d. 1198) was the most Aristotelian of the *falāsifah*. In those writings addressed to the general Islamic reader, he affirms the doctrine of reward and punishment in the hereafter, insisting, however, that the scriptural language describing the hereafter should be understood on different levels, depending on one's intellectual capacity. His more technical psychological writings, notably his commentaries on Aristotle, leave no room for a doctrine of individual immortality. These writings, however, left a much greater impact on medieval and Renaissance Europe than they did on Islam. In the Islamic world, it was Ibn Sīnā's theory of the soul that had the greater influence on subsequent *falsafah* and religious thought.

Şūfī Concepts. In considering this very vast subject, it is well to differentiate between three of its aspects: (1) what Şūfīs conceived the human soul to be, (2) the soul's purification and the path of holiness it must follow as it seeks God, (3) the relation of the soul to God, particularly in its intimate experiencing of the divine. These aspects are related, but the third represents a central issue on which Şūfīs were divided and which caused controversy in the general history of Islamic religious thought.

According to some, the Şūfī (and Ash'arī theologian) al-Qushayrī (d. 1074) observes, the term "soul" refers to those of man's characteristics that are afflicted with illness and to his blameworthy actions. It is possible, he maintains, "that the soul is a subtle entity [*laṭīfah*] placed in this [bodily] mold [*qālib*], being the receptacle of ill dispositions, just as spirit [*al-rūḥ*] is placed in this mold, being the receptacle of praiseworthy dispositions" (*Al-risālah al-Qushayrīyah*, Cairo, 1966, vol. 1, p. 249). The earlier Şūfī al-Tirmidhī (fl. 894) also gives expression to the view that the soul is evil. Both, moreover, reflect traditional and *kalām* concepts of the soul as material.

Al-Ghazālī, on the other hand, often uses Avicennian language in his discussions of the soul. (This fact need not necessarily commit him to Avicennian ontology,

since he frequently suggests that Ibn Sinā's philosophical language can be interpreted in occasionalist, Ash'ari terms.) At the beginning of his *Mizān al-'Amal* (The Criterion for Action), al-Ghazālī also indicates that Ṣūfīs subscribe to the doctrine of the soul's immateriality as they reject the concept of physical reward and punishment in the hereafter. Thus, within Sufism there are differences in belief as to whether the soul is material or immaterial. There is less difference (and greater emphasis), however, on the subject of its purification and the ascetic devotional course it must pursue. (Differences between Ṣūfī orders here are largely a matter of ritual, not substance.)

It is, however, the relation of the human soul—the self, the “I”—to God that is at the heart of Sufism, and it was this issue that caused conflict. The mystical experience itself is both overwhelming and ineffable. Utterances attempting to convey it are symbolic, sometimes prone to overstatement, and hence prone to being misunderstood. Central to this issue is the interpretation of the mystical experience of *fanā'*, the “passing away” or “annihilation” of the self in the divine essence, the latter representing *baqā'*, “permanence.”

Ṣūfīs like al-Ghazālī interpreted *fanā'* as “closeness” (*qurb*) to God and thus helped to reconcile Sufism with the generally accepted tenets of Islam. The issue, however, remained a sensitive one, as reflected, for example, in the philosophical tale, *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān*, by the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185). Ḥayy, the story's hero, who grows up on an uninhabited tropical island, undergoes a process of self-education that culminates in the mystical experience. At first he falls into the error of thinking that his soul becomes one with the divine essence; he is delivered from this mistake through God's mercy as he realizes that such concepts as unity and plurality and union and disjunction are applicable only to bodies, not to immaterial selves that have experiential knowledge of God.

The relation of the soul to God in Ṣūfī thought takes on a highly metaphysical turn in the complex theosophy of the great mystic Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) and his followers, particularly 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jilī (d. 1408?). Ibn al-'Arabī is noted for his doctrine of the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*) wherein creation (*al-khalq*) is a mirroring of the Truth (*al-ḥaqq*), the Creator. Perfect souls are reflections of the perfection of the divine essence. The prophets are the archetypes of these perfect souls: each prophet is a word (*kalimah*) of God. The perfect soul is a microcosm of reality. The idea of man as a microcosm did not originate with Ibn al-'Arabī; it was utilized by the *falāsifah* and by al-Ghazālī. But with Ibn al-'Arabī and those who followed him it acquires a spiritual and metaphysical dimension all its own, repre-

senting a high point in the development of the concept of soul in the history of Islamic religious thought.

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SOUND. See *Music and Percussion and Noise*.

SOUTH AMERICAN INDIANS. [*This entry surveys the religious systems of indigenous peoples in several regions of South America. It consists of three articles:*

- Indians of the Andes
- Indians of the Tropical Forest
- Indians of the Gran Chaco

For discussion of indigenous religious traditions of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, see Mapuche Religion; Selk'nam Religion; and Tehuelche Religion. For coverage of the religious system of a native people of South America's northern littoral, see Warao Religion. For discussion of South American religions in a continental context, see South American Religions.]

Indians of the Andes

The Andean region is formed by the Andes mountain range, which extends the entire length of western South

America. This region can be divided into three geographically contrasting subareas: the highlands, the coast, and the eastern cordillera. In the highlands the intermontane valleys lie at altitudes of between three and four thousand meters. These valleys were the places in which the Chavín (tenth to first centuries BCE), Tiahuanaco-Huari (eighth to tenth centuries CE), and Inca (fifteenth century CE) cultures flourished. In the region along the Pacific coast, composed mostly of low-lying desert plains, life was concentrated out of necessity in the valleys formed by the rivers that drain from the highlands into the ocean. The coastal valleys in the Peruvian sector of the Andes region were the cradles of cultures such as the Moche (second to eighth centuries CE), the Paracas-Nazca (second to eighth centuries CE), and the Chimú (twelfth to fifteenth centuries CE), who devised colossal irrigation works that enabled them to bring extensive areas of desert under cultivation. The dramatic, abruptly changing topography of the eastern cordillera is covered by dense tropical vegetation. Peoples of the intermontane valleys entered this region and built the cities of Machu Picchu and Pajatén, and they terraced vast areas of the rugged, wooded hillsides to gain land for cultivation and to prevent erosion.

The sheltered agricultural cultures of the Andes have interrelated since ancient times. The areas where such cultures did not develop, although geographically "Andean," are not considered part of the Andean *cultural* region. The territory of the central Andes—basically equivalent to present-day Peru—became the center of the Andean cultural process. The northern Andes (parts of present-day Colombia and Ecuador) was the scene of the Quimbaya and Muisca (Chibcha) cultures and of the earlier Valdivia culture, which may have given the initial impulse to the entire high-Andean culture.

More than ten thousand years have passed since human beings first trod the Andes. The earliest settlers were hunters and Neolithic agriculturalists. By the third millennium BCE there appear incipient signs of complex cultures, such as that of Aldas on the northern coast of Peru, whose people built monumental temples. During the second and first millennia BCE, the appearance of Valdivia and Chavín represented the first flowering of developed culture, which set the foundation for the developments that eventually culminated in the Inca empire. By the time that Europeans arrived in the Americas, the Inca empire stretched for more than four thousand miles along the western part of South America, from southern Colombia in the north to Maule, in south central Chile, in the south. The empire passed into Spanish dominion in 1532, when Atahualpa, the thirteenth and last of the Inca sovereigns, was be-

headed. [See Atahualpa.] From then on, the breakdown of indigenous Andean cultural values is apparent.

Sources of Documentation. Study of Andean religion rests on two principle sources: the reports of early chroniclers and the archaeological documentation that presents a visual record of Andean civilizations. A number of chronicles exist that were written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Indians, mestizos, and Spaniards (who based their accounts on the reports of native informants). There are also other reports—files relating to the prosecution of cases of "witchcraft"—that remain scattered in archives, mostly unedited. The detailed reports composed by the "eradicators of idolatries" are of special value. For the most part, the chroniclers' accounts are interwoven with evident prejudices of diverse origin.

Even though the archaeological and iconographic evidence is scanty, it may be that the conclusions drawn from it are founded on a firmer basis than are those derived from chroniclers' reports. Naturally, study of iconography requires specific hermeneutic methods, especially when drawings are heavily loaded with symbols or are confusingly executed. Present-day Andean religious practices (especially in rural areas), which in many cases represent survivals of the pre-Conquest Andean religious world, represent a third source of documentation.

Subsistence and Religion. The peoples of the Andes are predisposed toward mysticism and ceremonial; even today, Andeans are steeped in an elaborate religious tradition. A significant part of their intense religiosity may be explained by ecological factors: no other agricultural society in the world has had to face a more hostile environment than that of the Andes region, with its vast areas of desert, its enormous wastes, and the heavy tropical vegetation that covers the mountains' rugged eastern flanks. All physical effort, all organization of human labor, and all technological solutions are insufficient to counter the environment, to whose ordinary harshness are added nature's frequent scourges, especially droughts. This endemic state of crisis could only be exorcised, it seems, through intense magico-religious practices; only through manipulation of supernatural powers have Andean peoples believed it possible to guarantee their existence.

The dramatic situation imposed by the environment perhaps explains why Andean religiosity appears to have been unencumbered by the moralizing of other religious traditions. Rules like "Thou shalt not steal" and "Thou shalt not commit adultery" were of course enforced, but theft and adultery were considered social offenses: it was the duty of the administrators of state law

to punish offenders. There was no concept of a future expiation. The relationship between religion and morality was closest in regard to behavior toward the deities; if their worship was not properly carried out, they were affronted, resulting in a series of calamities that could be checked through prayers, weeping, and sacrifices. The hostility of nature in the Andes led to a permanently febrile state of religiosity.

Gods of Sustenance. Andean deities jointly governed both individual and collective existence by providing sustenance. Soil fertility plays a significant role in Andean religion, as demonstrated by the profuse worship given to the deities that personified and controlled the forces of nature. The gods, though individualized, form a hieratic unit and share one focus: the economic state of the people. They are conceived in the image of nature, which simultaneously separates and conjoins the creative forces, masculine and feminine. Thus the first basic division appears in the opposition of Inti-Viracocha-Pachacámac and Quilla-Pachamama. Both of these deity-configurations are creative forces, but in accordance with the social order of the sexes, the supremacy of the former, masculine element is asserted. The powerful Illapa ("thunder, weather") is also integrated into the sphere of Inti-Viracocha-Pachacámac, but, above all his other functions, Illapa directly provides life-giving rain.

Viracocha. Glimpses of a culture hero on whom divine attributes have been superimposed can be seen in the figure of Viracocha, and therefore Pierre Duviols (1977) and María Rostworowski de Diez Canseco (1983) correctly deny him the character of a creator god. Because of these same divine attributes, however, Viracocha was thought by the sixteenth-century Spaniards to resemble the God of Christianity, although Christian-Andean syncretism preserved some aspects of Viracocha's indigenous origin. Thus, according to the stories told about him, Viracocha molded men in clay or sculpted them in stone. (They finally spring from the womb of Pachamama, "mother earth," which is sometimes represented as a cave.) On the other hand, stories about Viracocha also portray him as entering into confrontations with other divine beings and as engaged in other tasks ordinarily associated with culture heroes (for example, "teaching the created people"). Evidence of Viracocha's original character as a god of sustenance may be found in the prayer to him that was transcribed by the seventeenth-century chronicler Cristobal de Molina, in which Viracocha is presumed to be based "in thunder and tempests." Franklin Pease (1973) assigns to him outright solar and fertility attributes. [See also Viracocha.]

Pachacámac. The myth of Pachacámac ("animator of the world") links this Andean deity even more strongly than Viracocha with the creation of the first generation of human beings. This deity is characterized, above all, as bringing to mankind the food necessary for survival as a result of the entreaties of a primordial woman, Mother Earth. The provision of edible plants is shown in other myths: in one of these, Pachacámac disguises himself, taking the form of the sun (in some instances, the son, the brother, or even the father of Pachacámac, according to the chronicler Francisco Lopez de Gómara), who with his rays fertilizes the primordial woman, perhaps the incarnation of Pachamama. In another myth, Pachacámac kills what he has created, and this action may be interpreted as the institution of human sacrifice to nourish the food and fertility deities. When the victim is buried, his teeth sprout maize, his bones become manioc, and so on.

Inti. According to both the surviving mythic literature and the images discovered by archaeologists, the masculine creative force was incarnated in Inti, the sun. He offers heat and light, and his rays possess fertilizing powers, as is evident in the myth of Pachacámac. Mythic literature testifies to the Andeans' reliance on the power of the sun and to their anxiety that he may disappear, causing cataclysm and the destruction of mankind (an event that would be followed by the creation of a new generation of men). This anxiety explains the redoubled prayers and supplications during solar eclipses—rituals that ended with loud cries and lamentations (even domestic animals were whipped to make them howl!). Archaeological evidence of another form of magico-religious defense against this premonition of the tragic disappearance of the sun is found in stone altars called *intihuatanas*, a word revealingly translated as "the place where the sun is tied." Inti was also associated with fertility through water, as when the sun ceases to give light, yielding to clouds and rain (which would seem a contradiction were it not for the fact that the thunder and weather god Illapa was conjoined with the sun). In visual representations, particularly those at Chavín and Tiahuanaco, Inti appears with big teardrops that surely symbolize rain. Gold was the symbol *par excellence* of the sun, and the robes of head shamans were covered with oscillating metal disks that reflected the sun's rays and imitated its radiance. [See also Inti.]

Pachamama-Quilla. Pachamama ("mother earth") symbolized the feminine element of divinity for the Andeans. Pachamama is incarnated as the primordial mother of mythic literature, and she is personified as Quilla, the moon. In this connection she is symbolized by silver; with this metal many representations of

Pachamama were made, especially in the form of the half-moon (called *tumi*), which was one of the most important religious symbols of the Andes. The cult of Pachamama was, and still is, extensive (Mariscotti de Görlitz, 1978). Pachamama was held to be the producer of food, animals, and the first man. As primordial mother, she creates through the fertilizing action of the Sun, and she later becomes co-donor of food plants, especially maize.

The mythological literature tells of several female supernatural beings. These are likely regional versions of Pachamama. Among them are Chaupiñanca, the primordial mother of Huarochirí mythology; Illa, who appears in the mythic traditions of the Ecuadorian Andes; and Uрпиуáсhac, sister and wife of Pachacámac, who seems to be an expression of Cochamama, the marine form of Pachamama. To Cochamama is attributed the creation of fish and of seabirds such as the guanay, which latter act is in turn related to agricultural productivity because of the use of guano to fertilize crops.

Ancient documents show that Pachamama was individualized *ad infinitum* to guarantee the abundance of specific produce—maize, for example. Andean iconography offers representations of Pachamama incarnated in specific vegetable forms: multiple ears of maize, for instance, or groups of potatoes. In other instances these agricultural products metaphorically acquire human aspects, and they are also portrayed as being fertilized by a supernatural, anthropomorphic personage. Pachamama in her Cochamama aspect also appears to symbolize the presence of abundant water—essential for fertilizing the agricultural fields.

The symbolism of Pachamama has implications regarding the social status of women: as compared with the male element of divinity, Pachamama, the female, is clearly a passive and subaltern being. Her dependence on the male is established in the mythological literature. She uses her feminine attributes to win from the male gods favors, such as irrigation canals, that are beneficial to the collectivity. Pachamama also enshrines the modesty and passivity in sexual matters that characterizes the Andean woman to this day. The attitude of sexual modesty is to be seen in the many representations that appear to show versions of Pachamama, from the archaic terra-cotta figures of Valdivia to those of the late Chancay civilization of the central coast of Peru. In all these, sexual characteristics are not pronounced: the figures seem to represent almost asexual beings, and they remind one of the existence of non-Christian sexual taboos (see Kauffmann Doig, 1979a). Not only do these figures rarely stress sexual characteristics, but, curiously, they seldom portray pregnant women or women giving birth. Perhaps the anthropomorphic figures with

birdlike attributes that appear on the walls of Pajatén—which figures are shown in crouching positions with spread legs—are in fact female procreators (Kauffmann Doig, 1983, p. 531). Except for the cases of sexual representations from Vicus and, especially, in Moche art (both from the northern coast of Peru), images of women found throughout the Andean culture region seem to underscore that female sexuality was marked by modesty.

Pachamama still plays an important role in the deeply rooted peasant magic of today's Andean people. She is even venerated in Christian churches. In the Peruvian village of Huaylas, for example, Saramama (a version of Pachamama) is venerated in the form of two female saints who are joined in a single sculpture—like Siamese twins—to give visual representation to a pathetic fallacy: the symbolization of abundance that is identified in the double or multiple ears of grain that maize plants often generously produce.

Illapa. The deity Illapa (generally translated as “thunder,” “lightning,” or “weather”) occupies a preferential place in the Andean pantheon. Much of the mythological literature makes reference to Illapa, who takes on regional names and is expressed in varying forms: Yaro, Ñamoc, Libiac, Catequil, Pariacaca, Thunapa (possibly), and so on. To refer to these beings as if they were separate would be artificially to crowd the Andean pantheon by creating too great a number of distinct deities—a trap into which many interpreters, both early and recent, have fallen. Illapa may be seen as the incarnation of Inti, the sun, in Illapa's primary mythic form of a hawk or eagle (*indi* means “bird” in Quechua), a form to which were added human and feline attributes; thus Inti-Illapa may be said to be a true binomial in the Andean pantheon.

Associated with meteorological phenomena such as thunder, lightning, clouds, and rainbows, Illapa personifies rain, the element that fecundates the earth. As the direct source of sustenance—giving rains to the highlands and rivers and rich alluvial soils to the coastal valleys—Illapa is revered in a special and universal way. Yet he is also feared: for the crash of his thunder, for lightning that kills, for catastrophic hailstorms, severe floods, and even perhaps earthquakes. The worst of his scourges is drought. Proof of Illapa's prestige is the major temple to him (individualized as the ruler of atmospheric phenomena) that stood in Cuzco, the Inca capital; according to the plan of Cuzco drawn by Guamán Poma and the description written by Molina, Illapa's temple was rivalled only by the Coricancha, the temple of the sun.

After the Conquest, Andeans fused Illapa with images of James the Apostle, a syncretism perhaps suggested

by earlier Spanish traditions. In the realm of folklore, Illapa's cult may be said still to flourish in the veneration of hills and high mountains, which are the nesting places of the *huamani* (falcons) sacred to this deity. Also associated with Illapa are the *apus*, the spirits of the mountains, and the spirits of the lakes, which, if they are not worshiped, make the waves rise destructively, and which are offended if approached by someone not protected by the sacred coca leaf.

When he appears as an incarnation of, or as joined to, Inti, Illapa may be represented by a male feline with human and avian attributes. According to iconographic studies, Illapa's image as the "flying feline," or "tiger bird" (Kauffmann Doig, 1967; 1983, p. 225) is still current in the Andes, as witnessed in the oral documentation collected by Bernard Mishkin (1963) regarding Qoa, a god who is ruler of meteorological phenomena. Qoa still appears as a flying cat, his eyes throwing out lightning and his urine transformed into fertilizing rain. Pictorial representations of the "tiger bird," which have been made since the formative period, especially in Chavín and allied art (see below) have recently been related to Qoa by Johan Reinhard (1985, pp. 19–20).

Andean Iconography. Iconographic portrayal of supernatural beings is abundant and dates back more than three thousand years. In iconographic representations, supernatural beings are configured in complex ways; their hierarchal aspects are emphasized, and some achieve the status of gods. Supernatural beings other than gods are the figures represented in Sechín and in some Chavín art. Beings with the rank of gods are found in Chavín and related cultures—Vicús, Moche, Paracas-Nazca, Tiahuanaco, Huari, and others (especially Lambayeque).

Mythological literature indicates that those male beings who fertilize Mother Earth form the topmost division of the hierarchy of the Andean pantheon, which, again, is made up of deities of sustenance. One of the most obvious expressions of the Andean gods' character as providers is the anthropomorphic wooden figure of Huari style adorned with symbols referring to basic food products that was found in the temples of Pachacámac near Lima.

The image of a conspicuously superior being is found in the initial stages of high Andean civilization (especially in Chavín and related cultures). This image, typically a human form with feline and raptorial-bird attributes, is repeated in practically all the Andean cultures that succeeded Chavín, with variations of secondary importance. At Chavín, such hierarchal figures of the highest order appear on the Raimondi Stela; although lacking human elements, the figures on the Tello Obelisk and the Yauya Stela, both Chavín in style, may also be

considered as representations of the highest level of being, because of their monumental stature and fine execution. The central figure of the Door of the Sun at Tiahuanaco is an almost anthropomorphic representation of the highest-ranking god. Attributes of a culture hero are perhaps also incorporated here.

A frequently encountered image of what was perhaps the same god as the one described above (but represented in a clearer and more accessible form) is that of a hybrid being that also had a form somewhere between a feline and a bird of prey (a falcon?), represented naturalistically, in which elements of human anatomy are sometimes completely absent. This "winged feline" may be the most ancient and authentic representation known to us of an Andean god. The convoluted, baroque style of Chavín art is responsible for the fact the "winged feline" has sometimes been identified as a caiman and sometimes as a lobster, a shrimp, or even a spider. These animals, however, do not appear in relation to the divine sphere at any later stage of Andean culture.

Supernatural beings of the highest category are to be found in representations of the culture-heroes/gods Aiapaec and Naymlap and of the gods at Tiahuanaco and Paracas-Nazca. All are anthropomorphic beings that combine traits of both bird and feline; in this context they imply an evolutionary development of the older "winged feline" of Chavín. In the archetypal versions of Aiapaec, the figure bears wings (Kauffmann Doig, 1976; 1983, pp. 362, 624). At Paracas-Nazca, one figure seems to represent an evolution from a purely birdlike body into one that incorporates human elements (Kauffmann Doig, 1983, pp. 303, 325, 331–332). Feline and ornithomorphic ingredients are evident in the large figures at Tiahuanaco and Huari; from their eyes fall large tears in the form of birds, which, since Eugenio Yacovleff (1932) and even before, have been interpreted as symbolic of the fertilizing rainwater of Pachamama (Mamapacha).

Connubial gods in which the male element radiates fertilizing solar rays are found especially in the iconography derived from Huari and, more particularly, in the valleys of Huara, Pativilca, and Casma on the coast of Peru (Kauffmann Doig, 1979a, pp. 6, 60). The examples of Inca art that have survived have but scant votive content. But both the feline and the falcon continue to occupy their place of honor among iconographic elements, as may be seen in the "heraldic shield" of the Inca rulers drawn by Guaman Poma.

Forms of Worship. Through acts of worship, the sphere of the sacred could be manipulated to benefit mankind. The effectiveness of human intervention into the realm of the supernatural powers depended on the

intensity with which the rites were performed. In the Andean world, where natural factors put agricultural production and even existence itself to a constant test, worship assumed an extraordinary intensity and richness of form. The calamities that endangered personal and collective welfare were believed to have been caused by offenses to supernatural beings and especially to a lack of intensity in worship. Offerings to the gods of sustenance and to other supernatural beings related to them complemented the cultic display. Cruel sacrifices were necessary to worship's efficacy; in times of crisis they were performed lavishly and included human sacrifices.

The diversity of forms of worship in this region was due in part to the variety of forms of divine or magical conditions that these people perceived. These conditions were in general denoted by the term *huaca*, which can be translated as "holy." *Huaca* could refer to various unusual geographical features (including special stones, hills, lakes, etc.), heavenly bodies, atmospheric phenomena, mummies, amulets, idols, and even the Inca (i.e., the ruler) himself in his capacity as a living god.

The popular form of communication with *huaca* (i.e., the entire supernatural world) was effected through the *muchay* ("worship, reverence"). *Muchay* was performed by removing one's sandals, gesticulating, throwing kisses, murmuring supplications, bowing one's shoulders in humility, puffing out one's cheeks to blow in the direction of the object worshiped, and so on. Other forms of contact with supernatural beings were made through oracles, whose traditions go back to early forms of Andean cultures, like the Chavín. Oracles were represented in the form of idols located in sanctuaries such as the famous one of Pachacámac, near Lima; these oracles rendered predictions about important future events to shamans and priests.

To make an offering was an act of paying tribute. Offerings were made voluntarily, but they were also collected in the form of compulsory tribute, the administration of which was centralized in temples. A widespread, popular offering was *mullo*, a powder made of ground seashells, which by association was linked to fertility through water; another was coca (*Erythroxylon coca*) in the form of a masticated wad. Stone cairns in the high passes were places of worship; wads of coca would be thrown in a ritual act called *Togana*. The mummified dead were offered special jars containing grains, fruits, and liquids. Guinea pigs and llamas served as important sacrificial offerings.

Among sacrifices, that of young boys and girls was the most important; sometimes human sacrifice was performed by walling up a living female person. It appears

that among the Inca the sacrifice of boys and girls was received as a form of tribute, called the *capaccocha*, from the provinces. The person who was to serve as the *capaccocha* was delivered to the capital city of Cuzco in great pomp; after his death, his remains were returned to his homeland and mummified; the mummy acquired votive rank and was the object of supplications for health and agricultural welfare. Necropompa (Span., "death rite") was a special type of human sacrifice that consisted of immolations (voluntary or not) that were performed on the occasion of the death of an illustrious person (Araníbar, 1961). Decapitation of human sacrificial victims had been performed since ancient times: the Sechín stone sculpture of northern Peru depicting this practice is over three thousand years old. Head shrinking was rare and there is no evidence of cannibalism in the Andean region. (Though in the myths there are a number of supernatural beings, such as Carhuincho, Carhuallo, and Achké, who are anthropophagous.) Human sacrifice, performed to achieve greater agricultural fertility, drew its rationale from the principle that the Andeans believed governed nature: death engenders life.

The dead, mummified and revered, were expected to implore the supernatural powers for sustenance, soil fertility, abundant water, and the multiplication of domestic animals. Often bodies were buried in the cultivated fields in order to enrich them. As has recently been reported from Ayacucho, Peru, this practice survives in secret, isolated cases even to the present day: a mentally ill person is selected, intoxicated with liquor, thrown into a pit, and buried alive. Such "strengthening" rites were, according to sixteenth-century chroniclers, also practiced in laying the foundations of houses and bridges, and traces of these rites also have been recently reported from the central Andes.

Funeral rites included expressions of grief such as loud sobbing intermingled with chants in praise of the deceased; a practice that also survives in isolated areas of the Andes. The dead were mummified and taken to their tombs on stretchers. Peoples of the arid coast practiced earth burial, but in the highlands mummies were placed—singly or in groups—in *puccollos*, or *chullupas* (mausoleums that were built on almost inaccessible outcrops of rock). Individual or collective tombs were also hollowed out of extremely steep mountainsides. With few exceptions (e.g., among the Moche), bodies were buried in seated positions. Frequently the hands held the head, perhaps to simulate the fetal position. These "living" corpses were surrounded with food and drink, weapons, and other belongings meant to serve as provisions in the hereafter; some were bur-

ied with their mouths open, both to express the terror of sacrifice and to voice supplications to the gods for success in agriculture.

Religious festivals were celebrated continuously in the great plazas of Cuzco and at temples such as the Coricancha, the temple of the sun. Festivals dedicated to specific themes, especially in the context of food production, were held monthly with great pomp; the sovereign Inca presided, and guests were invited at his expense. Great quantities of *chicha* (maize beer) were consumed, drunk from ceremonial wooden vessels (*queros*).

Andeans have made pilgrimages since the remote times of Chavin, and one of the favorite *huacas*, or shrines, was the sanctuary of Pachacámac. "Natural" shrines such as those on the peaks of high mountains were also popular with pilgrims. The Collur Riti festival, a celebration that coincides with the Feast of Corpus Christi, follows ancient rites in which to this day people climb to heights of almost five thousand meters. Some of the pilgrims dress as "bear men," imitating the gestures of animals and speaking in animal-like voices; they act as intermediaries between other pilgrims and supernatural beings. Originally, the Collur Riti was dedicated to water, and even today pilgrims return to their homes with pieces of ice carved from the mountain glaciers, symbolizing the fertility imparted by water. In the past, pilgrims fasted for variable periods of time, abstaining from maize beer, *ají* (*Capsicum annuum*), and sexual intercourse.

Medicine and Magic. Shamans use maracas in their healing rites, a practice carried on into the present by Andean *curanderos* (Span., "healers"). The *curanderos* also use hallucinogenic substances to cause them to enter the trance state. The San Pedro cactus (*Trichocereus pabhanoi*) is a powerful hallucinogen used particularly on the Peruvian coast; it gives the *curandero* the ability to discover the cause of an illness. In the highlands the diagnosis is still made by rubbing the body of a sick person with a guinea pig or with substances such as maize powder. The cure was effected through the use of medicinal plants. Today, *curanderos* complement their ancient remedies with modern pharmaceutical products.

Divination was often performed under the influence of hallucinogens or coca. Several studies, among them those of Alana Cordy-Collins (1977) and Ralph Cané (1985) speculate that the intricate art of Chavin originated in hallucinogenic experiences.

Institutionalized worship gave rise to a rich range of folk magic. Thus, for example, there were magic love-stones (*guacanguí*). Small stone sculptures of domestic

animals, used to propitiate the spirits of abundance, are still produced. Ceramic figures representing vigorous bulls (*toritos de Pucará*) are still placed on rooftops, where they signify prosperity and fertility and offer magical protection of the home.

Messianism. Andean mysticism and ritual experienced a vigorous rejuvenescence some thirty years after the Spanish conquest in the form of the nativistic movement called Taqui Oncoy (see Duviols, 1977; Millones, 1964; Ossio, 1973; Curatola, 1977; Urbano, 1981). The aims of this sixteenth-century messianic movement were to drive the white invaders from the land and to reinstate the structures of the lost Inca past. The movement's power was based on the worship of *huacas*, the popular form of Andean religiosity after the Sun had lost its credibility with the defeat inflicted by the Christian God. By a kind of magic purification, Taqui Oncoy sought to free the land from European intrusion after it was no longer possible to do so by force of arms. The movement's adherents believed that, with intensified supplications and increased offerings, the *huacas* could become powerful enough to help reestablish the old order. This movement declined after ten years, but the hope of a return to the Inca past is still alive, although it is confined more and more to middle-class intellectual circles in Peru and Bolivia.

The messianic myth of Inkarrí (from Span., *Inca rey*, "Inca king") should also be mentioned here. Originally recorded by José María Arguedas (1956), the myth centers on a figure, Inkarrí, who is the son of the Sun and a "wild woman." According to Nathan Wachtel (1977), this archetypal "vision of a conquered people," although of native extraction, seems to be immersed in syncretism. The cult of Inkarrí lacks the action that characterized the Taqui Oncoy movement. Inkarrí is not an Andean god but rather a pale memory of the deified sovereign of ancient times, who after patient waiting will rise to life to vindicate the Andean world.

[For more information concerning Inkarrí, see Atahualpa. See also *Inca Religion and Quechua Religions, article on Andean Cultures.*]

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FEDERICO KAUFFMANN DOIG

Translated from Spanish by Mary Nickson

Indians of the Tropical Forest

The vast region of lowland South America, mostly drained by the Amazon and Orinoco river systems and mainly covered in tropical forest, presents at first glance an area of exceptional uniformity, but in fact it is comprised of a bewildering variety of microenvironments. The Indian societies that inhabit the region are likewise characterized by great variety masked by apparent uniformity. They have in common such features as the reliance for subsistence on shifting cultivation, hunting, fishing, and gathering, but at the same time they exhibit numerous minute variations. However, these differences are kaleidoscopic patterns put together from similar pieces. It is only because this is so that it is possible to make generalizations about the religions of lowland South America.

Today when one talks about the Indian societies of lowland South America one is referring to relatively small groups—a population of ten thousand is large, and most groups number only a few hundred—dwelling in tiny settlements away from the main waterways. In the past, things were different. Estimates of the pre-Conquest population vary between one and ten million, but whatever the actual number, it is certain that the population declined abruptly, perhaps by as much as 95 percent overall, beginning with the arrival of Europeans at the end of the fifteenth century. At that time, the coasts and main rivers, today virtually without an aboriginal population, were densely inhabited, and in contrast to modern Indian villages, there were large settlements of one thousand or more inhabitants. From this it is relatively safe to surmise that the Indians' social, political, and economic organizations were different from those observable today among extant groups. Despite the fact that the latter are in many cases the fugitive remnants of earlier groups, it is difficult to identify in them features that might be transformations of earlier, more complex forms of organization. However, in

one area of culture, that of religion, there is some discernible continuity with the past, for in early accounts by missionaries and travelers we find descriptions of ideas and practices that have their modern counterparts. For example, Pierre Barrère, writing of the Carib of the Guiana coast in 1743, describes religious beliefs and practices very similar to those observable among the modern Carib-speakers at the headwaters of the Guiana rivers.

The description of lowland South American religion that follows inevitably concentrates on what is there today. It is cast in rather general and abstract terms because it is an attempt to delineate the main themes. To compensate for this generality, ethnographic case studies are used by way of illustration; these should not be regarded as examples of some universal state of affairs.

Fundamental Religious Ideas. Although claims have been made for the existence of monotheistic beliefs within the region, there is no evidence that any group worships a single divine being. Where such claims do arise, the reference is, at best, to some otiose culture hero responsible for the creation of the universe or to some primordial power or essence that is the driving force behind the universe. For example, among the Tucanoan-speaking peoples of the northwest Amazon the Primal Sun, or Sun Father, was the creator of the universe; he was considered a primal creative force that is not the same as the sun seen in the sky today.

The question of a supreme deity vexed the early European writers. The missionary Joseph Gumilla, writing in the eighteenth century on the Indians of the Orinoco River, was unable to decide whether the term he took to mean "God" meant a first cause or referred to the earliest ancestors. Among the Carib-speaking Acawai of the Guyana-Venezuelan frontier, the existence of a supreme being is the result of Christian influence, although there appears to have been some traditional, abstract notion of "brightness" associated with the sun; the term for this idea means "light" and "life" and is the root of the word meaning "soul" or "spirit."

It is necessary to look elsewhere for Indian religion, and as a rough guide we may take E. B. Tylor's nineteenth-century definition of religion as animism, that is, the belief in spiritual beings. This concept needs some careful refining, and a first step in this task can be taken by considering the cosmology of the Indians. On this topic there is a remarkable degree of agreement among the various tribes. The universe has three layers: the sky, the earth, and a watery underworld. Each level may be further subdivided. [See *South American Religions, article on Mythic Themes.*] The three different layers are peopled by assorted beings, some of whom appear as recognizable denizens of the environment,

whereas others are monstrous and fantastic. Thus the underworld is inhabited by aquatic creatures who are exemplified by the largest of such animals, the anaconda or the caiman. The earth is inhabited not only by people but also by forest-dwelling creatures, in particular the jaguar. The sky is the realm of the birds, for which the king vulture or the harpy eagle is often taken to be representative. Although one may refer to these beings as identifiable zoological species, it is unwise to regard them as absolutely or necessarily of an animal nature. It is often difficult to distinguish between them and people, and myths and rituals that refer to the origin of the universe frequently do not make this distinction.

Most human beings are not normally in a position to visit the other layers of the cosmos, although they may obtain experience of them under specified conditions. In many societies, houses are held to be models of the universe—microcosms—in which it is possible, through ritual, to collapse the coordinates of space and time into a unity.

In addition to the three cosmological layers, the world is also constituted of two parts, one visible, the other invisible, although the latter is visible to people with special skills and may in fact reveal itself to any person at any time. It is mistaken to see this duality as involving two separate worlds, for the seen and the unseen are really two aspects of one intermingled world and are counterparts to each other. The unseen reality is often as important as or even more important than what is revealed to the eye. Indeed, everyday events, apparently random and chaotic, can only be fully understood by reference to the invisible. Thus, the Jivaroan Indians of Ecuador regard it as essential for everyone, sometimes even hunting dogs, to have experience of the other world, experience achieved in the case of the Jivaroan people by the use of hallucinogenic substances. Dreams are another avenue of access to the invisible realm.

Power, which for the Indian lies outside society and within the invisible world, is ambiguous—that is, it can be used for good or evil—and needs, like a strong electric current, to be handled with care. As we will see, it is the duty of the main religious practitioner of the area, the shaman, to harness this power for social ends.

The unseen world, or rather the invisible aspect of the world, is often referred to as the supernatural, but this word is best avoided because it implies that what is unseen is above or outside the ordinary operations of cause and effect. To the contrary, the unseen is the very essence of the causal chain.

Invisible Beings. All the layers of the universe are inhabited by invisible beings. In many cases, these are the

invisible counterparts of visible objects, both animate and inanimate. Some peoples consider virtually everything to have an invisible aspect, although only certain of these unseen objects are likely to be endowed with any great importance or to seriously impinge on human affairs. However, invisible beings are notorious for their unpredictability, so it is considered wise to take precautions. Their appearance, in visible form, to a human is thought to portend misfortune.

There are a great number of these invisible beings, and they take numerous forms. For example, the Samemá of the Brazilian-Venezuelan frontier region recognize eight different kinds of invisible beings, or *hekula*. These include *hekula* of animals, humans, plants, artifacts, mythical ancestors of animal species, mythical ancestors of human social groups, sky people, and evil spirits. All *hekula*, regardless of origin, are humanoid in appearance. Each society has its own way of classifying the inhabitants of the invisible world, but in each case the classification is likely to reflect the nature of the relationship between the invisible beings and human society.

Masters of animals. There is a widespread belief in "owners" or "masters" who govern the animals. The Tucano-Desána of the northwest Amazon believe that there are two such masters, one for animals of the forest and one for fish. The former lives in the rocky hills, the latter in the rocks that form the falls and rapids in the rivers. Here, in a larger-than-life, prototypical form, the animals and fish live in huge longhouses, like people. It is the master of the animals who lets out animals for Indians to hunt, but he does so only in return for human souls, which are used to replenish the supply of animals.

The master of animals may appear in a variety of guises, either as a normal animal or as a monstrous man or animal. As the latter, he is but one of a very large number of monstrous creatures with which all Indian groups populate the forest. These monsters are anthropomorphic and of abnormal size (either dwarfs or giants); they have other unfavorable characteristics, such as hairiness or blackness; and they tend to be cannibalistic. However, they are of so many different types and fulfill so many different functions that it is not possible to generalize easily about them. They sometimes appear to people, especially after dark in the forest. Some of them are definitely regarded as dangerous, others as little more than mischievous. These "bush spirits," as they are often referred to in the literature, are not to be confused with men who take on monstrous form in order to kill or bewitch other men, such as the *kanaima* of the Guyana region.

Ancestral spirits. In some societies the invisible beings most central to the continued existence and well-being of society are the ancestral spirits. Among the Tucano-Barasana of the northwest Amazon, the ancestral spirits are associated with the *He* instruments. These sacred flutes and trumpets form the local manifestation of a widely distributed cult popularly known as Yurupary. The term *He* does not refer just to these instruments but also means "ancestral" or "mythical," and conceptually it has much in common with the Dreaming of the Australian Aborigines. It is timeless, and although created long ago, *He* persists as an alternative aspect of reality. There are also *He* people and animals, the first ancestors (anacondas in the case of the Barasana). It is through ritual contact with the original creation and with *He*, its generative force, that society continues and reproduces itself. The names of living people are those of the first ancestors, which are passed on through alternate generations, a person taking the name of a dead grandparent. The soul is considered to be inherited in the same way. [See Yurupary.]

This recycling of soul-matter is another common theme in lowland South America, although by no means universal (it is mainly restricted to the Tropical Forest area). Throughout the lowlands the soul is considered to be another invisible entity, one that is crucial in the organization of everyday life. An individual is often regarded as having more than one soul and as having several different sorts of soul whose activities differ in this life and in the afterlife. Most people believe that the soul is detachable from the body and that during sleep or a trance it may leave the body and wander by itself. Many illnesses are attributed to soul-loss, often as a result of a soul being captured while wandering alone, and death is the result of the final detachment of the soul from the body.

The ghosts—that is, the souls of the dead—have many parts to play: they may be benevolent to the living, as among the Akwé-Xavante of central Brazil; they may be of no concern to the living, as among the Ge-speaking Suyá of the same area; or they may be menacing, as among the Waiwai of Guyana. The notion of reincarnation in the strict sense of the word does not seem to exist. It is not that an individual has a second life, but that the soul-matter energizes a new and different individual.

It is problematic whether the soul is seen as a discrete entity or whether the soul-matter is an undifferentiated substance from which no two successive individuals draw an identical soul. The latter is certainly the case with the Carib-speaking Trio Indians of Surinam, whose ideas on this matter involve something akin to a reser-

voir of soul-matter into which the soul of the dead man is poured back and from which the newborn child's is drawn. In some societies soul-matter is recycled directly; in others it passes through animals, and, as we have seen, a certain number of souls may get siphoned off as payment to a master of animals in return for game.

Religious Practitioners. The main religious practitioner throughout the region is the shaman. Shamans are usually but not always men. South American shamanism shares many characteristics with its Siberian prototype. It is often the one specialized role to be found in Indian societies, and although the actual functions vary from one society to another, shamans everywhere depend on similar basic skills: the ability to see the invisible aspect of the world, to communicate with it, and to travel to different cosmic layers while in a state of trance. The role of the shaman is that of cosmic mediator, and in this role he often acts as a transformer through whom the generative forces of the invisible world are transmitted to the everyday world for the benefit of its inhabitants. The shaman is assisted by spirit helpers, or familiars. To gain contact with the invisible world and to travel to the different cosmic levels, the shaman normally enters into a trance induced by a narcotic or hallucinogenic substance. In some societies it is expected that all adults will have firsthand experience of the invisible through the ingestion of such substances, and accordingly will have some shamanic competence. Among the Guaraní, for example, the men and women were divided into four hierarchically graded categories based on shamanic knowledge, with women allowed membership in all but the highest grade. However, even in situations such as this a class of "true shamans" is recognized, and shamans do not lose their preeminent role. It is the true shaman's task to guide the more or less skilled laymen through their experiences and to interpret these experiences for them, since unlike the shaman such people tend to have only a passive and not a manipulative relationship with the other world.

Shamanic apprenticeship. The skill of the shaman is achieved through a long and arduous apprenticeship. The call to become a shaman may come in a number of ways. It may arise from personal ambition; it may be spurred by inheritance of the apparatus of shamanism; it may occur if an individual suffers a severe illness, undergoes shamanic treatment, and wishes to help others who are sick; or it may result from a revelation through the visit of spirits, usually during sleep. In whatever way the call comes, the would-be shaman has to apprentice himself to a master—usually to a living sha-

man, but sometimes to the ghost of a dead shaman. The apprenticeship involves the accumulation of knowledge, usually in the form of songs and chants, and the acquisition of the apparatus of shamanism, of which the most widespread material representation is the rattle, usually made from a gourd with a bamboo handle and containing little pebbles representative of spirit helpers or spirit missiles with which to attack enemies. During this apprenticeship the neophyte must enter into a relationship with one or more spirits who will be his familiars. Another crucial skill that the apprentice has to learn is how to maintain control while operating under the influence of a trance-inducing substance. In this way the apprentice learns to see the invisible world, contact its inhabitants, and visit the different layers of the cosmos. The period of apprenticeship, which may last several years, also involves limitations, sometimes severe, on his everyday activities, including sexual abstinence, dietary prohibitions, and periods of seclusion in the forest.

In some groups the apprenticeship is formally brought to an end when the new shaman performs his first public séance under the eye of his master. Elsewhere there is no formal graduation; the new shaman begins to act as he gains confidence and is called upon to do so. However, the completion of the apprenticeship does not necessarily ensure that the individual will become a successful shaman. The quality of a shaman's performance and results is subject to continuous public scrutiny.

Shamanism and power. The ability to see, contact, and operate in the other world gives the shaman considerable power, and in some societies shamanic and ritual knowledge are the basis of political authority. However, the roles of spiritual and secular leader are not everywhere necessarily conjoined. When separate, their duties parallel each other: the secular leader defends his community from the dangers of the visible world, while the shaman wards off mystical attacks.

Given the ambiguity that characterizes the Indian concept of power, it is not surprising that a similar ambiguity characterizes those who hold power. It is occasionally suggested that there are two kinds of shaman—good and bad, or those who cure and those who kill. However, in most societies there is only one kind, whose power may be used for good or bad ends, depending on his relative position. A shaman in one's own community is considered good, while those in other, distant communities are considered bad and are held responsible for the misfortunes, illnesses, and deaths that result from mystical attacks. It is the home shaman's job to ward off such attacks and to mount counterattacks. The

possession of power, because it can be used for good or bad ends, brings with it occupational hazards. It is reported from the Tupian-speaking Mundurucú and Tapirapé of Brazil that in the face of severe misfortune blame is assigned to a powerful shaman who is then killed.

Even so, there are societies in which two different types of shaman are found. For example, among the Jivaroan people of Ecuador there are both curing and bewitching shamans, and while a pupil of the former may become either a curer or a bewitcher, a pupil of the latter can only be a bewitcher. The Boróro of central Brazil also recognize two types of shaman, but in their case the difference relates to the kind of spirits with which each one deals.

The shaman, in order to safeguard his power, normally has to submit to certain limitations on his behavior. These may be of a minor nature, such as avoiding menstruating women or observing dietary prohibitions, or they may be rather more far-reaching, such as maintaining total abstinence from marriage or sexual intercourse. A shaman is stricter about his behavior in the period leading up to a séance, since contact with the invisible world is always potentially dangerous. It is not known whether in the past shamans were paid for their services, although that is probably the case. Today, with the introduction of manufactured goods, shamans in some societies have become very wealthy. Among the Indians of lowland Ecuador, the shamans regularly engage in trade, exchanging their services for manufactured goods.

Shamanic tasks. The functions of the shaman are varied. He is best known as a curer, although in practice this is but one aspect of his general ability to contact the invisible world. This point can be understood only if it is appreciated that sickness is not seen solely as a physiological phenomenon but also as a social disorder, the cause of which lies in the invisible world and results from either human or spirit activity. The job of the shaman as medical practitioner is to cure both aspects of the sickness. Curing techniques may include blowing tobacco smoke over the patient, sucking out spirit weapons, or going into a trance to obtain the advice or help of familiars in fighting hostile spirits who have captured the patient's soul. Such séances often take place in the dark, either at night or in a specially constructed hide enclosure. Séances are usually public and dramatic performances in which the audience can hear, if not see, the shaman in communication with his spirit helpers. In some societies curing sessions may take place outside the house during daylight hours.

The shaman's other tasks include prophecy; control over the weather, especially storms (a close association

between shamans and thunder is common); the interpretation of omens and dreams; and maintenance of the supply of game animals. To fulfill the latter duty, the shaman either goes to negotiate with the master of animals for the release of game or is himself directly responsible for the supply. Powerful Tapirapé shamans secure game by visiting the home of wild pigs and having sexual intercourse with the sows. A further commonly reported duty of the shaman is the preparation of food, a mystical process parallel to the normal culinary techniques that render food edible.

Finally, there is the role of the shaman in major rituals, when a number of shamans may act together or be assisted by other ritual specialists. Among the Tucano-Barasana of the northwest Amazon, a group of such specialists, the dancer/chanters, perform a vital role complementary to that of the shaman: they represent the ancestors making their original creative journey. Christine Hugh-Jones, in *From the Milk River* (1979) notes that

shamans are of this world and yet able to mediate with the other, ancestral world, while dancer/chanters are actually part of the ancestral world when performing their role. Both are mediators with the ancestral world, but the shaman's transforming power is more concerned with the ever-present bearing of the ancestral world on the natural or physiological processes of this world, while the dancer/chanters are concerned with the developmental creation of society and cultural elements. (p. 62)

She goes on to make the point that these two kinds of specialists are also distinguished by the different aspects of space in which they operate: the shaman acts on a vertical axis across cosmological layers, while the dancer/chanters operate within horizontal space.

One can also compare the dancer/chanters of the northwest Amazon with certain other lower-order religious specialists found elsewhere. For example, the Carib-speaking Kalapalo of the upper Xingu River in central Brazil give recognition to the role of exceptionally learned men and women who know the ceremonial songs, can make the ceremonial gear, and know how a ritual should be performed. In the same society there are also members directly responsible for the sponsoring of certain ceremonies. [*For further discussion of the role of the shaman throughout South America, see Shamanism, article on South American Shamanism.*]

Prophets. Prophets also occur from time to time in some Indian societies. There is evidence that such figures existed in Indian societies prior to the arrival of Europeans. The great treks undertaken by the Tupi-speaking peoples across the continent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries appear to have been millennial in nature and led by prophets. In more recent times, the

appearance of prophets has been closely associated with the influence of Christian missionary teaching. A well-known and well-documented messianic cult led by prophets is Hallelujah, found among the Carib-speaking Acawai and Patamona of Guyana. Hallelujah is concerned with contact with the ultimate source of power, God; while incorporating something akin to Christian worship, it has clearly borrowed from the shamanistic tradition, which still flourishes as the means of communication with the spirit world.

Roles of nonspecialists. Although the focus in this section has been on religious specialists, it must not be supposed that ordinary men and women are ignorant of ritual knowledge. I have already noted that in many societies adults may have direct experience of the invisible aspect of the world. Even where this is not the case, virtually every man and woman will have some ritual knowledge, particularly of some of the ritual techniques for dealing with everyday needs, for these techniques form an integral part of the practical art of survival. It is frequently mentioned that in lowland South America an adult man and woman together command knowledge of and ability to perform all the activities of production and reproduction. However, this is true only if the ritual aspect is omitted from consideration, for few people have more than a scant knowledge of this.

A feature of rituals in many lowland South American societies is the apparent exclusion of women, girls, and uninitiated boys from ceremonies. This is often associated with the strict prohibition against such people seeing certain sacred instruments, such as the Yurupary trumpets or bull-roarers. In practice, the women, even when excluded, must still be regarded as at least passive participants who provide an audience for the males' show.

Myths and Ritual. Myths of lowland South America have received a great deal of attention in the last two decades as a result of Claude Lévi-Strauss's *magnum opus*, the four volumes of *Mythologiques* (translated as *Introduction to a Science of Mythology*, 1969–1981). Lévi-Strauss ranges far and wide—often without regard for social context—to reveal universal structures of the human mind. Despite numerous criticisms of these studies, some unfairly dismissive, there is no doubt that Lévi-Strauss's impact on the study of Indian myth has been profound and probably permanent. More recent authors have employed a modified form of his structuralism as an interpretative device with which to obtain a better understanding of the society under examination.

It is through myths that Indians make statements about the fundamental nature of the world in which they live. Myths are indeed a form of knowledge, but it

would be wrong to assume that they can be read as simple charters or explanations of social institutions, cultural practices, or natural phenomena. The relationships between myths, between myths and rites, and between rites are dialectical, and the contents of one myth may only be explicable by reference to certain other myths and even practices. At the same time myths, rites, and everyday activities all call on a common set of cultural categories. In other words, religious ideas and practices are embedded in social and cultural activities, and to separate either from the other is to lessen the chance of understanding both.

The ritual and myths of the area make abundant metaphorical use of the environment and its features. This use of cultural categories and natural objects to make abstract statements underlies the Indians' religious ideas. Given that the same major animals are distributed throughout lowland South America, it is not too surprising to find them recurring repeatedly in the myths of the area. Thus, the anaconda, caiman, jaguar, tapir, peccary, king vulture, harpy eagle, and many other animals, as well as the sun, moon, and constellations, figure regularly in the myths. [See Ethnoastronomy.] The specific choice of animals made by a society for this purpose depends on the particularities of wildlife distribution, while the meanings that certain animals hold for different groups vary with the ways in which these animals are juxtaposed and contrasted. Within these limits it would be difficult to argue that the choice of these characters and of their meanings is purely arbitrary. Variability is limited to some extent by the cosmological framework; if the anaconda is substituted for the caiman, for example, their common association with water and thus with the underworld remains unchanged. Likewise the behaviors and habits of creatures do not vary. The weird sounds of the howler monkey, the defecatory practices of the sloth, or the peculiar qualities of the tortoise are the same wherever these animals are found, and as such are appropriate for conveying, within a restricted range, a common set of meanings.

Myths record the differentiation that took place at the beginning of time. But this is not a once-and-for-all event, for mythic time is not historical time; it persists as another aspect of reality. Through ritual, which may involve the chanting of myths, contact is made with this other temporal dimension in which human beings, animals, and ancestors remain undifferentiated. This confounding of categories is a common feature of rituals, which attempt to transcend this mundane world and to draw on the generative forces outside it. Thus among the Carib-speaking Trio of Surinam the ritual festivals are periods in which mythical unity is achieved and the

empirical diversity and contradictions of everyday life are suppressed. It is through ritual that society is able both to register its continuity and to reproduce itself.

Another feature of ritual in lowland religions is that it produces a high degree of dependency. It has been noted that at an individual level no one has mastery of all the required ritual techniques and thus everyone has to depend on someone else. But this extends beyond individual requirements because many rituals, and not just the ritual aspect of technical activities, require the cooperation and participation of several people. Some rituals are preceded by collective hunting, and there are ceremonies in which crucial roles must be performed by outsiders. In functional terms, then, ritual can be seen as providing a counterweight to atomistic tendencies—that is, it forces individuals or groups who may dislike or suspect one another to interact for the benefit of society.

Practical Religion. Religion in lowland South American societies is not an institution that can be dealt with in isolation, since it is deeply embedded in other aspects of social, political, and economic life. This will have become apparent from earlier references to the ritual aspect of many everyday activities. Ritual acts are performed by individuals as a precaution against the unpredictable reactions of invisible beings. Some of these rituals involve the recital of a simple formula (rather like saying “God bless you” when someone sneezes) or the avoidance of a particular action (like not allowing a pot to boil over). More elaborate rituals are necessary under certain circumstances—for example, when food has to be treated by the shaman in order to be considered edible.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate the influence of practical religion is to look at the rituals that accompany the life cycle. Lowland South America is often regarded as the area in which the ritual phenomenon known as *couvade* (often wrongly described as “male childbed,” the imitation by fathers of the experience of childbirth) reaches its greatest development. These rites require the parents of a newborn child to observe prohibitions on their diet and activities until such time as the infant’s soul becomes properly secured to him. This may be expressed as a direct transfer of soul-matter from parents to child or, as in the case of the Ge-speaking Apinagé of central Brazil, it may be achieved through the increase of blood as the child grows naturally, which is considered to be directly responsible for the formation of the body and soul.

The creation of the individual as a combination of body and soul often has to be taken further in order to provide the person with a third entity, a social persona. This may be achieved through name-giving ceremonies,

of which the Ge-speaking peoples provide some of the most elaborate examples. Their name-giving ceremonies involve the public transmission of whole sets of names between people in specifically defined relationships. Ownership of a set of names bestows membership in certain social groupings, such as a moiety. Thus these rituals not only create social beings but at the same time ensure social continuity through the reproduction of social groupings. In the case of the Ge these rituals have a rather secular character compared with the male initiation rites of the Tucano peoples. While the same result is achieved—that is, boys are turned into full members of society and the lineage’s continuity is affirmed—the ritual more obviously involves contact with the invisible world, for the boys are born again not only as adults but also as direct descendants of mythical ancestors.

Multiple souls. Perhaps one of the best examples of the influence of ideas about souls and the other world on social life is provided by the Jivaroan people of eastern Ecuador. These Indians recognize the existence of three forms of soul. These are the “ordinary” soul; an “achieved” soul, of which an individual may possess up to two at any one time; and an “avenging” soul. Every living Jivaroan has an ordinary soul that is obtained at birth and lost at death. It is identified with the blood, and after death it goes through various transformations before finally taking on the form of mist.

The achieved soul is obtained through a vision that involves contact with the other world. Only a few women possess achieved souls, but it is regarded as essential for a man to obtain one by puberty or soon after if he is to survive. While a man is in possession of an achieved soul he is immune to death by certain causes, including violence and sorcery; if he has two, he is immune to death by any cause. The first soul is achieved through a vision quest in which the individual seeks out and touches a monstrous being. The presence of the soul greatly increases an individual’s feeling of power and induces in him a desire to kill. During raiding expeditions, on the evening before they attack, members of a war party have to declare publicly the nature of the vision, an act that causes the achieved soul to desert its owner. Although the loss of the soul would appear to make the Indian vulnerable, in practice its power lingers for a period after its departure, ebbing away slowly. In order to become eligible to obtain another achieved soul, an individual first has to kill; only after he has done this can he seek a new soul and thus render himself invulnerable. The rapid acquisition of the new soul locks in the remnants of the old soul, so that while no man may have more than two achieved souls at the same time, it is possible for him to accumulate power

from any number of souls. However, a soul that has been with the same person for a long time will begin to wander, exposing itself to capture, which renders the individual vulnerable. The achieved soul of the Jivaroan appears to have much in common with Western notions of prestige and reputation.

The third soul of the Jivaroan is the avenging soul. This soul comes into existence when a person who has at one point had an achieved soul is killed, and its function is to avenge the death of the individual. This it does by turning itself into a demon and causing the murderer, or a close relative of the murderer, to have an accident. The Jivaroan practice of shrinking heads is associated with the idea of the avenging soul. The soul is trapped inside the head by this means, and after its power is extracted from it by ritual, it is sent back to the locality of its owner.

This case has been considered in some detail because it illustrates particularly well the elaboration of beliefs about the soul and the way in which these beliefs are directly tied to certain forms of social behavior. It must not be assumed that a clear-cut relationship between social action and beliefs concerning invisible entities always exists; but such a relationship is not unusual, and is particularly common with regard to questions of causation, especially of such phenomena as misfortune, sickness, and death. This association explains why religious practitioners are also the main medical practitioners.

It is normal throughout the South American lowlands for death and sickness to be regarded as other than natural events. As I have noted, the Jivaroan Indians ascribe accidents to the malevolent actions of avenging souls. It is the same with many other types of misfortune: their occurrence is thought to result from the intervention of invisible entities—either acting on their own volition or motivated by humans—or from the direct actions of men. While certain rituals, as I have observed, function to break down the atomistic tendencies of lowland societies, their ideas about the causation of misfortune have exactly the opposite effect, generating mistrust and suspicion.

Funerary practices. Funerary practices in lowland South America range from simple burial to elaborate secondary rites involving endocannibalism and extended feasting. Common throughout the area is the tendency for mortuary practices to reflect the status of the deceased. Even where only simple interment occurs, the death of a village leader results in the abandonment of his settlement—an event unlikely to follow on the death of an individual of lower status. The corpse of a shaman may be treated differently from that of a layman; among the Carib-speaking Waiwai of Guyana the

layman was traditionally cremated, while shamans were buried. Among the Carib-speaking Kalapalo of the upper Xingu River there are two social ranks, chiefs and commoners, and their respective statuses are reflected in the ways in which their corpses are disposed of. Chiefs are buried in more elaborate graves, and their funerary rites consist of a series of ceremonies spread over a long period and involve participants from other villages.

Funerary rites are mainly concerned with the separation of the deceased from the living (and also the separation of one part of the body from another—for example, flesh from bone) and with the individual's incorporation among the dead. In addition, they often entail an inquest whose aim is to divine the identity of the person responsible for the death and to direct sorcery against him in revenge.

Ideas about the location of the afterlife or the village of the dead are hazy and, not surprisingly, even Indians from the same community provide rather different descriptions. However, one feature that ethnographers have frequently noted is that life hereafter is envisioned as a negation or reversal of certain aspects of life on earth (e.g., it is day in the afterworld while it is night on earth, and vice versa).

Syncretism. Few Indian systems of belief have escaped modification by the activities of Christian missionaries. The Spanish and Portuguese colonial powers employed representatives of the Roman Catholic church as their main agents for contact with and pacification of the Indians. However, as a result both of factionalism within the church and of antagonism between the church and colonists, it was rare that the influence of any one missionary order was long and sustained. An important exception to this was the Jesuit reductions of the Guaraní, which came to an end with the expulsion of the order in 1767 after nearly two centuries of contact.

In more recent times, various Protestant missions, in particular those of fundamentalist churches, have been active in lowland South America. The techniques and policies pursued by different missionary organizations, the conditions under which evangelization takes place, and the nature and degree of intactness of indigenous societies are all variables that prevent any simple statement about the effects of evangelization. Some missionary organizations have concentrated on trying to integrate the Indians into the national society by teaching them the national language and introducing a monetarized Western economy in place of the subsistence economy. The teaching of the Christian scriptures is not necessarily combined with attempts to eliminate traces of traditional beliefs and practices. The alternative ap-

proach is to teach entirely in the native language and to eliminate all practices that appear to fall foul of particular scriptural interpretations without making a purposeful effort to change the economic way of life. This policy is often associated with attempts to isolate the Indians from contact with the national society.

It is not at present clear why neighboring groups exposed to similar missionary attention have reacted in entirely different ways, one rejecting the teaching, the other accepting it. Under some conditions a form of syncretism has taken place, but elsewhere there has been little more than a smear of Christianity added on top of traditional beliefs. The study of lowland Indian syncretic religions is still an underresearched field. Some work has been done in this direction, in particular on the Hallelujah cult of the Carib-speaking Kapon and Pemón Indians, but a great deal remains to be done. Given the traditional association between religious and medical ideas in the lowlands, the syncretism of folk medicine and Western medical science is also a topic that falls within this general field and deserves further research.

[For detailed treatment of the religious systems of particular Tropical Forest peoples, see Ge Mythology and Quechua Religions, *article on Amazonian Cultures*.]

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The part of lowland South America for which we have the best ethnographic coverage of religion is the northwest, the region of the Tucano peoples. Outstanding in this respect are the complementary works of Christine Hugh-Jones, *From the Milk River: Spatial and Temporal Processes in Northwest Amazonia* (Cambridge, 1979), and Stephen Hugh-Jones, *The Palm and the Pleiades: Initiation and Cosmology in Northwest Amazonia* (Cambridge, 1979). From the same area, and providing slightly different perspectives, are Irving Goldman's *The Cubeo: Indians of the Northwest Amazon* (1963; reprint, Urbana, Ill., 1979) and Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff's two volumes, *Amazonian Cosmos: The Sexual and Religious Symbolism of the Tukano Indians* (Chicago, 1971) and *The Shaman and the Jaguar: A Study of Narcotic Drugs among the Indians of Colombia* (Philadelphia, 1975). All these books deal to some extent with the use of hallucinogens,

and this topic is taken further in a work edited by Michael J. Harner, *Hallucinogens and Shamanism* (Oxford, 1973).

Shamans and shamanism are subjects dealt with in most monographs, but two important works, both published too recently for their contents to be taken account of properly in the text of this article, are almost totally devoted to these topics. They are Jean-Pierre Chaumeil's *Voir, savoir, pouvoir: La chamanisme chez les Yagua du nord-est Péruvien* (Paris, 1983) and Jon Christopher Crocker's *Vital Souls: Bororo Cosmology, Natural Symbolism, and Shamanism* (Tucson, 1985). Audrey Butt Colson's "The Akawaio Shaman," in *Carib-Speaking Indians*, edited by Ellen B. Basso (Tucson, 1977), goes into detail on aspects of shamanic apprenticeship. Also valuable in this respect is Charles Wagley's *Welcome of Tears* (Oxford, 1977), which contains a highly readable account of the religious ideas and practices of the Tapirapé Indians of central Brazil. For a straightforward ethnographic description from another area, there is Niels Fock's *Waiwai: Religion and Society of an Amazonian Tribe* (Copenhagen, 1963).

On the subject of tobacco usage there is Johannes Wilbert's "Magico-Religious Use of Tobacco among South American Indians," in *Spirits, Shamans, and Stars*, edited by David L. Bowman and Ronald A. Schwarz (New York, 1979); this article can also be found in *Cannabis and Culture*, edited by Vera D. Rubin (The Hague, 1975). *Spirits, Shamans, and Stars* also contains a useful analysis by Kenneth I. Taylor of the relationships between spirits and human society among the Sanemá subgroup of the Yanoama. A more general and dramatized account of another Yanoama subgroup that touches upon many aspects of religious ideas and practices is Jacques Lizot's *Tales of the Yanoaman: Daily Life in the Venezuelan Forest* (Cambridge, 1985).

Michael J. Harner's *The Jivaro: People of the Sacred Waterfalls* (Garden City, N.Y., 1972) is the book from which the account in the text about Jivaroan ideas of the soul is adopted. A close examination of eschatological beliefs among the Ge-speaking Kraho of central Brazil is to be found in Manuel Carneiro da Cunha's *Os mortos e os outros* (São Paulo, 1978).

There is at the moment no general work on Indian ritual to match the work on myth done by Claude Lévi-Strauss in his four-volume *Mythologiques* (Paris, 1962–1971). Lévi-Strauss's masterwork has been translated into English as *Introduction to a Science of Mythology*; its four volumes are entitled *The Raw and the Cooked* (New York, 1969), *From Honey to Ashes* (New York, 1973), *The Origin of Table Manners* (New York, 1978), and *The Naked Man* (New York, 1981). Most ethnographic monographs contain some myths, but there are also volumes devoted solely to collections from particular tribes or areas. For example, Orlando Villas Boas and Claudio Villas Boas's *Xingu: The Indians, Their Myths* (New York, 1973) is recommended both for its readability and for the illustrations by Indians that it contains. The series "Latin American Studies," published by the Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, includes a volume (vol. 44) on the Ge, edited by Johannes Wilbert (Los Angeles, 1979), and another on the Boróro (vol. 57), edited by Johannes Wilbert and Karin Simoneau (Los Angeles, 1983).

On messianic movements there is H el ene Clastres's *La terre sans mal* (Paris, 1975), and, depicting the rise of a syncretic cult, Audrey J. Butt's "The Birth of a Religion," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 90 (1960): 66–106. The literature on the impact of evangelization on Indian religion is, so far, poorly developed.

PETER RIVI ERE

Indians of the Gran Chaco

The Gran Chaco (*chaco*, derived from Quechua, means "hunting land") is an arid alluvial plain in the lowlands of south-central South America. Approximately 725,000 square kilometers in area, it lies between the Andes in the west and the Paraguay and Paran a rivers in the east, and between the Mato Grosso to the north and the Pampas to the south. The scrub forests and grasslands of the Gran Chaco, though sparsely populated, were the home of numerous indigenous groups. In the main they were hunters, fishers, and gatherers, moving seasonally in search of food and practicing supplementary farming. Few still follow their traditional way of life.

The religion of the indigenous groups of the Gran Chaco can be understood through an examination of their mythic narratives, which contain their primary structures of meaning. These myths give an account of a primordial time in which an ontological modification was produced by the actions of various supernatural beings who shaped present-day cultural reality. This rupture may be caused by a lawgiver (who frequently has the appearance of a trickster), or it may be the result of infractions by ancestors or by the transformations of ancestors. Numerous supernatural beings with avowedly demonic characteristics monopolize the realm of fear and danger; their ambivalent intentions toward human beings are usually resolved through malevolent action that manifests itself in illness, culminating in the death of the individual. The general notion of power, such as the *la-ka- ayah* of the Mataco, or specific powers, such as the *uhopi e* of the Ayor e, are the structures that ontologically define the supernatural beings as well as people who have been consecrated by them.

The spectrum of supernatural beings encompasses everything from shamans and witches, in the cases of the Guiacur u or the Mataco, to the state of "amorous exaltation" known to the Pilag a. For an integral understanding of the peoples of the Chaco it is important to consider the contributions of these special personages and states of being, which contribute a unique cultural identity to each group's cosmology. In almost all the ethnic groups of the Gran Chaco the shaman occupies

the central role in religious tasks, sometimes defending and protecting, and, at other times, injuring. When engaged in healing practices, he can combine various techniques, such as singing, shaking rattles, blowing, and sucking, and can command the collaboration of familiar spirits who are generally powerful owing to their demonic nature. An important aspect of Gran Chaco religions is the idea that one or many souls are incarnated in an individual. Once the individual is dead, these souls, or spirits, enter a demonic state. Although they are directed to an established underworld, they continue to prey upon human communities.

The Zamuco Family. The two members of the Zamuco language group are the Ayor e and the Chamacoco of Paraguay, in the northeastern Chaco.

The Ayor e. The religion of the Ayor e (Ayoreo, Ayoreode) is expressed primarily in an extensive set of myths. All natural and cultural beings have their origins related in mythic tales, and in certain cases in various parallel myths. The morphology of the myths centers upon the metamorphosis of an ancestral figure into an entity of current reality. Each tale narrates events that occurred in primordial times and is accompanied by one or more songs, which may be used for therapeutic (*saude*) or preventive (*paragapidi*) purposes.

Despite the abundance of tales, it is possible to classify the Ayor e myths in different cycles as they relate to a particular supernatural being or theme:

1. *The cycle of ancestors.* Each tale in this cycle recounts events in the life of an ancestor (*nanibahai*). These generally end with the ancestor's violent transformation into an artifact, plant, animal, or some other entity of the cosmos, and with the establishment by the ancestor of cultural prescriptions (*puy ak*) governing the treatment of the new being and punishments for ignoring these prescriptions.
2. *The cycle of Dup ade.* A celestial supernatural being, Dup ade is associated with the sun; he causes the metamorphosis of the ancestors.
3. *The cycle of the Flood.* The tales of the Flood (*gedekesnas ori*) describe an offense inflicted on lightning by the *nanibahai*, their punishment in the form of a continual rain that inundated the world, and the survival of a few Ayor e, who became the first aquatic animals.
4. *The cycle of "water that washes away."* These tales describe a flood (*yotedidekesnas ori*) similar to that that appears in the preceding cycle, which was caused by Diesn a ("cricket"), the ruler of water.
5. *The cycle of the Asohsn a bird.* This bird (*Caprimulgidae spp*) is surrounded by numerous *puy ak*. The cen-

tral tale of this cycle relates the life of the female ancestor who created this bird. Asohsná is a supernatural being who established the annual ceremony that divides the year into two segments, one of which is characterized by an incalculable quantity of restrictions.

6. *The cycle of Asningái.* This cycle relates the courage of an ancestor named Asningái ("courage"), who threw himself onto the fire, transforming himself into an animal with certain morphological characteristics. It also established the meaning of slaughter, an important institution among the Ayoré, since an individual could rise to the status of chief (*asuté*) through contamination by spilled blood.

Illness is thought to be caused in almost all cases by the individual's violation of *puyák*. The cure is entrusted to the *igasiái*, those who have knowledge of *sáude*, whose power can undo the illness through the powerful word of the ancestors. The shaman, or *daihsnáí*, arrives at this state through an initiation that involves the ingestion of a strong dose of the juice of green mashed tobacco, which enables him to assume a special potency called *uhopié*. When an individual dies, the body (*ayói*) and mind (*aipiyé*) are destroyed; the soul (*oregaté*) moves to the underworld (*nahupié*).

The Chamacoco. The narrative of the Chamacoco, which recounts sacred events, is called "The Word of Ešnuwérta." This tale constitutes the secret mythology of those men who have undergone initiatory ordeals and contains the social and religious knowledge of the group. Ešnuwérta is the primordial mother. The myth is connected to the women of primordial times who were surprised by harmful supernatural beings (*axnábsero*). "The Word of Ešnuwérta" includes the actions of these *axnábsero*, characters to whom Chamacoco reality is subordinated. The physiognomy of these supernatural beings is similar to that of the Ayoré ancestors in that current reality originates from their transformations and their deaths. The distinctive characteristic of the *axnábsero* is their malignant power (*wozós*) over people.

The foundation of the social order is presented in this myth, since Ešnuwérta instituted the clans as well as the male initiation ceremonies in which the participants identify themselves with the principal deities of the myth.

The Chamacoco shaman (*konsáxa*) exercises a power appropriate to a specific region of the cosmos; for this reason there are shamans of the sky, of the water, and of the jungle. The shaman initiation begins with a vision of Ešnuwérta, who reveals the cosmos as well as the practices appropriate to the work of the shamans.

Another custom originating from Ešnuwérta is called *kaamták* and has to do with a ritual offering of food; it relates to the impurity of blood, among other themes.

The Tupi-Guaraní Family. The Tupi-Guaraní language family includes the Chiriguano of Bolivia and the Tapuí of Paraguay.

The Chiriguano. The tale of the mythical twins Yanderú Túmpa and Áña Túmpa is the most prevalent myth among the Chiriguano (Miá) and appears in conjunction with lunar mythology. The celestial supernatural being Yanderú Túmpa made the cosmos and bestowed its goods on the Chiriguano, at the same time instructing them in cultural practices. He conceived and made Áña Túmpa, who, because of envy, attempts to undermine all Yanderú Túmpa's works. Áña Túmpa received from his maker power (*imbapwére*), which he in turn gives to other beings (*áñas*) who aid him in his malignant activities. As a result the world has undergone a profound alteration. It is now the actions of the *áñas* that determine the condition of the Chiriguano world, and they have introduced calamities such as illness and death. The expression *túmpa* is difficult to comprehend, but it appears to designate a quality that transforms the various entities into "state beings." The terms *áña* and *túmpa* define the supernatural nature of these beings, that is to say, they emphasize that they are extraordinary.

The shaman and the sorcerer are both initiated by the acquisition of power from the *áñas*. The initiation itself is centered on the *áñas*. Due to their ambivalence, an initiate can become a shaman (*ipáye*) if their intent is benevolent; if their intent is malevolent, the initiate receives only malignant power that causes misfortune to the people and the community.

Tapuí and Guasurangwe. The religion of the Tapuí and the Guasurangwe, or Tapieté (an offshoot of the former), does not differ essentially from that of the Chiriguano; the same structures of meaning and the same supernatural beings may be observed.

Lengua-Mascoy Family. The Lengua-Mascoy language group of Paraguay includes the Angaité, Lengua, Kaskihá, and Sanapaná peoples.

The Angaité. The religious nature of the Angaité (Chananesmá) has undergone syncretism owing to their proximity to the Mascoy and Guaranian groups. Their mythology makes reference to three levels—the underworld, the terrestrial world, and the celestial world—all of which are inhabited by supernatural beings characterized by their ambivalent actions toward humans. The deity of the dead, Moksohanák, governs a legion of demonic beings, the *enzlép*, who pursue the sick, imprison them, and carry them to the "country of the dead," which is situated in the west. At night it is even

possible for them to overpower passersby. The *gabioamá* or *iliabiün* act as the spirit familiars of the shaman, and with him their role is ambivalent in a positive sense. For example, they are in charge of recapturing and restoring the souls of the sick.

According to Angaité myth, fire was obtained by a theft in which a bird was the intermediary; it was stolen from a forest demon, one of the *iek'amá*, who are anthropomorphic but have only one leg. Also anthropomorphic is the soul-shadow (*abiosná*), whose eyes are its distinguishing feature. The concept of corporal material as such does not exist, except for the *iek'amá* ("living cadaver" or "skeleton"), which is what remains after death.

During the initiation process, the shaman goes into the depths of the forest or to the banks of the river, where the familiar spirits (*pateaskóp* or *enzlép*) come to him in a dream. He communicates with the familiars through ecstatic dreams and songs. His therapeutic labors include sucking harmful agents from the bodies of the sick and applying vegetable concoctions whose efficacy resides in their "bad smell." There are shamans with purely malignant intentions, such as the *mamohót*, who are responsible for tragic deaths among members of the group. The benevolent shaman is responsible for discovering the identity of the bewitching shaman and for quartering and burning the body of the victim as a restorative vengeance. The Angaité do not have "lords" or "fathers" of the species; the figures closest to this theme are *Nekéñe* and *Nanticá*, male and female supernatural beings respectively, who are anthropomorphic and whose realm is the depths of the waters.

The Lengua. The anthropogenic myth of the Lengua (*Enlhít*, *Enslét*) attributes the formation of giant supernatural beings and the ancestors of the Lengua to Beetle, who utilized mud as primary material. After giving these beings a human form, he placed the bodies of the first *enlhíts* to dry on the bank of a lake, but he set them so close together that they stuck to one another. Once granted life, they could not defend themselves against the attacks of the powerful giants, and Beetle, as supreme deity, separated the two groups. Eventually the inability of the *enlhíts* to resist pursuit and mistreatment by the giants became so grave that Beetle took away the giants' bodies. The giants' souls gave birth to *kilikháma* who fought to regain control of the missing bodies, and it is for this reason that they torment present-day humans.

The important Lengua myths include the origin of plants and fire and the fall of the world. Ritual dramatizations of the myths are part of the celebrations for female puberty (*yanmána*), male puberty (*watnkya*), the spring and autumn equinoxes, the summer solstice,

war, the arrival of foreigners, marriage, and mourning.

Human reality consists of a "living soul" (*valhók*), whose dream existence is important. At death, a person is transported to *vangáuk*, which is a transitory state that leads to the *kilikháma* state. The *apyoxólhma*, or shaman, receives power (*siyavnáma*) through visions and apprenticeship to the song of the plants, whose ingestion, though lacking hallucinogenic properties, produces ritual death. Once he obtains *siyavnáma*, the shaman commands the *kilikháma*, who control numerous beings and realms of the universe. The territory of the dead (*pisisl*), situated toward the west, is the destination of the souls of the dead, although some remain close to the living.

The Kaskihá. The "masked celebration" of the *Kaskihá* is of particular interest. It is based on a myth that describes the origin of the festive attire following the quartering of the water deity *Iyenanik*. The practice of *kindáian*, which is a dance, is the only medium for invoking the power of such deities.

The Sanapaná. The rich mythic narrative of the *Sanapaná* focuses on the war between the heavenly world, inhabited by the ancestors (*inyakahpanamé*), and the terrestrial world, inhabited by the fox (*maalék*). The ancestors, who differ morphologically from present-day humanity, introduced the majority of cultural goods. Among the fundamental structures distinguished by the *Sanapaná* is the "dream," the soul's life in its wanderings separate from the body. Death is understood as theft of the soul by demonic forces, the souls of the dead that stalk during the night in forests and marshes. The demonic spirits are anthropomorphic. Some are malignant, including those whose mere appearance can cause immediate death. There are also benevolent spirits who are the familiars of shamans (*kiltongkamák*). The shaman's initiation involves fasting and other tests.

Mataco-Makká Family. The Mataco-Makká language family of the central Chaco includes the Mataco, Chulupí, Choroti, and Makká.

The Mataco. The religious universe of the Mataco (*Wichí*) centers on the notion of power (*la-ka-áyah*), which is the property of innumerable supernatural beings of demonic (*ahát*) or human (*wicht*) nature, personifications of such phenomena as the sun, moon, stars, and thunder. The Mataco recognize a dualism of body (*opisán*) and spirit (*o'nusék*) in humans. Death changes the *o'nusék* into a malevolent supernatural being.

The central character in Mataco mythic narrative (*pahlalis*), *Tokhwáh*, is the one who imposes cosmic and ontological order on the present-day world. The actions of this supernatural being, who has a demonic nature, are incorporated in his trickster aspect; nonetheless, he is perceived by the Mataco as a suffering and sad being.

In his lawgiving role he introduces economic practices and tools; humanizes the women who descend from the sky by eliminating their vaginal teeth; institutes marriage; and teaches the people how to get drunk, to fight, and to make war. He also introduces demonic spirits who cause illnesses (*aités*) and establishes the shamanic institution (*hayawú*) and death. The most important Mataco ceremony is carried out by the shamans, in both individual and communal form, with the objective of expelling illnesses according to Tokhwáh's teachings.

The shamanic initiation includes possession (*welán*) by a demonic spirit (*ahát*) and the consequent separation of the initiate's soul (*o'nusék*), which undertakes journeys to the different realms of the cosmos. When the initiation is complete, the shaman has achieved an ontological alteration in the state of his soul—he has been transformed into a demonic being. The smoking or inhalation of the dust of the sumac (*Anadenanthera macrocarpa*) is a frequent shamanic practice.

The Chulupí. The mythology of the Chulupí (Nivaklé, Aslusláy) comprises three narrative cycles on the deities who acted in primordial times, but who then distanced themselves from humanity and the earthly world. The Xitscittsamme cycle describes a supernatural being comparable to an almost forgotten *deus otiosus*. The cycle of the supernatural being Fitsók Exíts includes prescriptions for the rites of female initiation; myths recounting the origin of women, of the spots on the moon, and of honey, among other things; and the tale of the expulsion from the universe of the supernatural creator. The Kufiál cycle relates the cataclysmic events accompanying the fall of heaven and the subsequent actions of the demiurge Kufiál, to name a few of its themes.

A structure essential to the Chulupí religion is *sič'ee*, or ultimate power, which defines and dominates a vast group of beings and actions. In effect, *sič'ee* is the strange made powerful, which can manifest itself in unexpected guises—in human or animal form, by means of a sound or a movement like a whirlwind, or as master of the spirits of the forest. The *sič'ee* plays a significant role in the initiation of the shaman (*toyék*): he appears to the shaman in the guise of an old man, for example, who offers the shaman power and grants him the spirit familiars called *wat'akwáis*. By fasting, enduring solitude in the woods, and drinking potions made of various plants, the initiate achieves a revelatory experience rich in visions, many of which are terrifying. The Chulupí idea of animistic reality is extremely complicated and varied, given that the soul can appear in any number of manifestations.

The Choroti. The principle cycles of the Choroti are five in number. The cycle of Kixwét describes a supernatural being, of human appearance but gigantic,

whose role comprises the duplicity of both the demiurge and the trickster. The cycle of Ahóusa, the Hawk, the culture hero *par excellence*, recounts how he defeated the beings of primordial times, stealing and distributing fire and teaching humans the technique of fishing and the making of artifacts. The cycle of Woiki, the Fox, who partakes of the intrinsic nature of Kixwét and is a very important figure in indigenous cultures, contains myths describing his creation of various beings and modalities of the present-day world. The cycle of We'la, the Moon, relates the formation of the world. The cycle of Tsemataki alludes to a feminine figure characterized by her ill will toward men and her uncontrollable cannibalism.

The Choroti shaman (*atew*) receives power (*i-tóksi*) from the supernatural beings (*thlamó*), and the strength of his abilities depends on the number of familiars (*inxuélai*) he has.

The Makká. The Makká mythology can be classified as eclectic, as it demonstrates cultural contact with almost all the other indigenous groups of the Gran Chaco. The Makká cycle of the fox is similar to the narrative cycle surrounding the Mataco supernatural being Tokhwáh and demonstrates similar themes, such as the origin of women and the toothed vagina. The Makká hero Tippá, who possesses an immense penis, is somewhat reminiscent of Wéla, the Mataco moon deity.

In earlier times, power (*t'un*) was obtained by capturing a scalp, after which a complex ceremony was held in which the scalp was discarded but the soul (*le sinkál*) of the dead enemy was retained as a personal familiar, or spirit helper. This familiar would manifest itself during sleep by means of a song that even today is sung during drinking bouts. Ceremonies of drinking bouts among adults permit the regulation of power among people. The ceremony of female initiation is also important, as is true throughout most of the Gran Chaco.

The organization of the traditional religious universe was altered through the introduction of Christianity by General J. Belaieff, who brought the Makká from the interior of the Chaco to the outskirts of Asunción. The icon of Belaieff is now a central theme in Makká shamanism. Just as among the Mataco, the shaman (*wei-het'x*) is charged with controlling the demonic supernatural beings (*inwomét*).

Guiacurú-Caduveo Family. The Guiacurú-Caduveo language family of the Gran Chaco and Brazil includes the tribes known as the Pilagá, the Toba, the Caduveo, and the Mocoví.

The Pilagá. Certain mythic cycles may be distinguished in the Pilagá mythology. One cycle describes the celestial deity Dapiči, to whom is attributed the inversion of the cosmic planes and the transference of

some animals and plants to the sky. In the past, prayers were offered for his help in the most diverse activities. Another cycle describes Wayaykaláciyi, who introduced death, made the animals wild, and established hunting techniques, modifying the Edenic habits of an earlier time. Among the eminent supernatural beings is Nesóge, a cannibalistic woman who determines the practices of the witches (*konánagae*). Such characters and themes as the Star Woman and the origin of women appear in Pilagá myths.

Among the significant structures, the *payák* is the most important. This notion defines nonhuman nature, which is peculiar to supernatural beings, shamans (*pyogonák*), animals, plants, and some objects. Relations with the *payák* determine conditions in the indigenous world. Either people acquire *payáks* as familiars who aid them in their customary activities, or the *payáks* inflict suffering on them in the form of illness, the death of domestic animals, the destruction of farms, or a poor harvest of fruit from wild plants. Such concepts as the "master-dependent" (*logóti-lamasék*) and the "center-periphery" (*laiñt-lail*) allow the Pilagá to classify beings and entities according to a hierarchy of power.

The initiation of women takes place at the onset of menses. The young girl is locked in a corner of her hut and forced to fast rigorously. When males reach adolescence, they submit to scarification of their arms and legs by a shaman, and the young man is given the characteristics of the species of animal whose bone was used as a scarifier. Throughout entire lives, men continue to scarify themselves, especially when preparing for the hunt or going into battle.

The Toba. The principal themes of Toba (Kom) narrative are celestial cosmology and mythology, which appear in stories about Dapiči and the Pleiades; cataclysms; the origin of specific entities; stories of animals; stories of the trickster Wahayaka'lacigu, the lawgiver Ta'ankí, and Ašien, a supernatural being with a repulsive appearance; and encounters between Toba people and the supernatural being Nowét. The morphology of these characters, all of whom were powerful in the primordial times, fluctuates between the human and the animal.

For the Toba, the central structure of the cosmology is *nowét*, which appears in the forms of the masters of animals and of the spheres. Nowét, as a supernatural being, initiates the shamans (*pi'ogonák*) and grants them power that can be used equally to heal or to harm. Outside the shamanic sphere, all special skills—hunting, fishing, dancing, and so on—derive from power given by Nowét. Dreams are structures that have importance in the relations between man and Nowét. Shamanic power is established by the possession of spirit

familiars (*ltawá*), who help shamans cure serious illnesses, which are considered intentional and also material. Therapy combines singing, blowing, and sucking as methods of removing the harmful agent from the victim's body.

Some of the important ceremonies of the Toba are name giving, the initiation of young boys, the offering of prayers to Dapiči, matutinal prayers to the heavenly beings, and the supplications of the hunters to some supernatural being in a *nowét* state.

The Caduveo. Go-neno-hodi is the central deity of Caduveo mythology; he is maker of all people and of a great number of the cultural goods. His appearance is that of a Caduveo, and he is without evil intention. In his benevolence, he granted the Caduveo, in ancient times, an abundant supply of food, clothes, and utensils, as well as eternal life, but the intervention of Hawk, astute and malicious, made Go-neno-hodi modify the primordial order. Nibetád is a mythical hero identified with the Pleiades; he greeted the ancestors during the ceremony celebrating the annual reappearance of this cluster of stars and the maturation of the *algaroba* (mesquite).

The shamanic institution is actualized in two different individuals: the *nikyienígi* ("father"), who protects and benefits the community, and the *otxikanrígi*, the cause of all deaths, illnesses, and misfortunes in the group. Celebrations that are particularly worthy of note are the lunar ceremonies, the rites celebrating the birth of the chief's son, and the initiations of young men and women.

The Mocoví. Prominent in the scattered Mocoví material is the myth of an enormous tree that reached to the sky. By climbing its branches, one ascended to lakes and to a river. An angry old woman cut down the tree, extinguishing the valuable connection between heaven and earth.

Gdsapidolgaté, a benevolent supernatural being, presides over the world of the living. His activity contrasts with that of the witches. Healing practices among the Mocoví are the same as those of the other shamans of the Gran Chaco, with the addition of bloodletting. The Mocoví, like all the Guiacurú, believe in the honor of war and value dying in combat as much as killing. When they return from a battle they hang the heads of the vanquished on posts in the center of town and they sing and shout around them. The horse plays an important role in daily life and in the hereafter; when the owner of a horse dies, the horse is sacrificed and buried beside the owner to bear him to his final destination in the land of the dead.

Arawak Family. The extensive Arawak family of languages includes the Chané of Argentina. Fundamental

distinctions cannot be made between the corpus of Chané myths and that of the Chiriguano; similarities abound between them, particularly with respect to the figure of the shaman. There are two kinds of shamans: one with benevolent power (the *ipáye*) and another dedicated exclusively to malevolent actions that cause death (the *ipayepóci*). The *mbaidwá* ("knower, investigator") has dominion over the individual destinies of humans.

One of the most important aspects of Chané religion is the carnival of masks (also celebrated by the Chiriguano). Some of the masks are profane, representing animals and fantastic anthropomorphic characters. The sacred masks represent *Ñña*, and these are deadly playthings that cannot be sold to travelers. When the carnival is finished, the masks become dangerous and must be destroyed.

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There are only a few specific works that deal with particular groups; among those few are *Los indios Ayoreo del Chaco Boreal* by Marcelo Bórmida and myself (Buenos Aires, 1982). Branislava Susnik has also given attention to the Chulupí natives in *Chulupí: Esbozo gramatical analítico* (Asunción, 1968). Also worthy of mention are Miguel Chase-Sardi's *Cosmovisión mak'a* (Asunción, 1970) and *El concepto Nivaklé del Alma* (Lima, 1970). Bernardino de Nino wrote an *Ethnografía Chiriguano* (La Paz, 1912). In reference to the Caduveo culture, see Darcy Ribeiro's *Religião e mitologia Kadiuéu* (Rio de Janeiro, 1950). One can also consult Johannes Wilbert's *Folk Literature of the Mataco Indians* and *Folk Literature of the Toba Indians* (both, Los Angeles, 1982).

MARIO CALIFANO

Translated from Spanish by Tanya Feyen

The overview article presents a survey of the immensely variegated religious traditions of the South American continent. The article on Mythic Themes examines motifs prevalent among the continent's diverse mythological systems. The article on History of Study sketches the development of scholarly study of South American religious beliefs and practices from the time of the Spanish and Portuguese invasions to the present day.

An Overview

Since the Indians of South America do not conform culturally, there is no religious uniformity among them. Despite this inconsistency, an acceptable overview can be achieved by subdividing the continent's large, geographically distinct regions into the following cultural areas. (See also the accompanying map, which shows these areas as well as the Northern Littoral, whose peoples share much, culturally, with the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean region.)

1. *The Andes*. This mountain range stretches from present-day Colombia to Chile. The highland regions of Peru, lying between the Pacific coast region and the valleys that cut through the mountain range, were taken over in the distant past by highly advanced agrarian cultures. Among the most significant of these cultures was the Inca empire, which extended into the dawn of historical times. Direct descendants of earlier Andean cultures, the Quechua and Aymara peoples inhabit present-day Peru and Bolivia. [See South American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Andes, *and* Quechua Religions, *article on* Andean Cultures.]


2. *Amazon and Orinoco rivers*. These jungle- and savanna-covered regions were conquered by tropical farming cultures. From the standpoint of cultural history, this area also includes the mountainous sections of present-day Guyana; in early historical periods, the Amazon cultural area eventually spread to the Atlantic coast. As in the past, it is now inhabited by tribes belonging to a number of linguistic families, both small and large (Tupi, Carib, Arawak, Tucano, and Pano), and by a number of linguistically isolated tribes. Together they form cultural subareas that display religious specializations. [See South American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Tropical Forest.]

3. *Mountains of eastern Brazil*. This region is occupied by groups of the Ge linguistic family, who practice rudimentary farming methods; they settled in these hinterlands of the Atlantic coast region, joining indigenous hunting tribes. A few of these Ge groups have survived culturally up to the present time. [See Ge Mythology.]

4. *The Gran Chaco*. The bush and grass steppes of this area stretch from the Paraguay River west to the foothills of the Andes. The area was initially divided among

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- Mythic Themes
- History of Study



hunters, fishers, and gatherers, and these cultures came under diverse influences from neighboring agriculturists. A series of more or less acculturated groups of the Guiaicuru linguistic family (the Mataco and the Mascoy) may still be encountered at the present time. [See South American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Gran Chaco.]

5. *The Pampas and Patagonia.* Hunting groups wandered through these flatlands of the southern regions of South America. The extinct Pampa and Tehuelche Indians were among the peoples of this region. The Tierra del Fuego archipelago, near the Strait of Magellan, is also included within this territory. Although the inhabitants of these regions—the Selk'nam (Ona), Yahgan, and Alacaluf—are considered extinct, their culture and religion were well documented before they vanished. [See Tehuelche Religion and Selk'nam Religion.]

6. *Southern Andes.* This area, especially its middle and southernmost regions, is populated by the agrarian Araucanians of Chile, who have prospered up to the present time. Their success has been attributed to their development of a self-sufficient culture a few decades before the Spanish invasion in the early sixteenth century. This development was the result of the influence of highly advanced Peruvian cultures, as the Inca empire progressed to the Maule River in Chile. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Araucanians expanded eastward, but this part of the group, like its predecessors in the area, eventually became extinct. [See Mapuche Religion.]

Pronounced differences in religious phenomena appear within each of these cultural areas; these phenomena present certain discrepancies when seen together. The most outstanding contrast appears between the highly developed Andean religions, which are founded on priesthood and ruling cults, and the religious beliefs of the tribes in the eastern lowlands. Some typical examples of their forms and their respective beliefs should help to clarify their differences.

Deities, Culture Heroes, and Ancestors. The tradition of a creator as the prime mover and teacher of mankind is universal among the Indians of South America (Métraux, 1949). In the majority of cases, the mythical person most often represented is not directly involved in the daily activities of mortals and therefore does not enjoy particular veneration. There is no fundamental discrepancy between this disinterested deity and the omnipotent creator whose cultic worship is integrated into a religious system; similar characteristics are attributed to both figures. A god previously venerated may fade to the position of a mythical figure, just as a mythical character can achieve cultic significance.

Under certain conditions, a creator, a culture hero, or an ancestor may rise to the position of a deity or su-

preme being. Such a case occurred in the old cultures of Peru with the religious figure Viracocha. Perhaps originally a culture hero of the Quechua or some other Andean people, Viracocha eventually ascended to the ranks of the highest pantheon as a result of speculation on the part of the Inca priesthood. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Viracocha was represented in anthropomorphic sculptures that appeared in special Inca temples and was venerated through prayers and sacrificial offerings. Inti, the Inca sun god, is portrayed with a human face within a golden disk, and as the tribal god of the ruling Inca dynasty he was embodied in the Inca emperor. [See Inti and Viracocha.]

The establishment of an elaborate cult for an indigenous supreme being is a typical occurrence in highly advanced cultures, but such cults are seldom found in South America outside the Andes region. When they do appear elsewhere they are likely the result of the influence of these advanced civilizations on compatible cultural and geographical situations. A report by Karin Hissink and Albert Hahn (1961) on the cultures from the lowlands of Bolivia, near the Andes, points out that the Tacana Indians of the Beni River area maintain the belief in a supreme being known as Caquihuaca, who created the earth, human beings, animals, and plants. An old man with a white beard, Caquihuaca lives in a cave in a mountain that bears his name and that forms the center of the world. In temples he is represented by a small beeswax figure surrounded by a series of larger wooden statues that represent the lower gods, known as *edutzi*, who assist him. As the instructor of the priest-shamans, or *yanacona*, Caquihuaca assists them in the performance of their office, and as their master he is responsible for their religious vocation.

In addition to this, Deavoavai, the lord of the animals, also represents a creator, culture hero, and master of the dead. In his capacity as ruler of the game, Deavoavai is rooted in an earlier cultural-historical level—that of hunters, fishers, and gatherers. Such a deity is also found among other agricultural peoples, including peoples of the Amazon lowlands. Despite their reliance on an economic subsistence that has long since undergone the transition from a hunting to an agricultural base, these groups of the Amazon Basin maintain a religious emphasis that incorporates a dependence on a powerful being who controls the game, an aspect that will receive attention below. It is sufficient here to point out that within this region a relationship exists between the master of the hunted game and the supreme being, a concept first recognized by Adolf E. Jensen (1951).

Culture hero as supreme being. Konrad T. Preuss was convinced that Moma ("father") was the paramount, indeed, the only true god of the Witoto of the Putumayo area of the northwestern Amazon and that he was iden-

tified with the moon. According to creation legends among these people, Moma came into existence from the "word," that is, he was a product of magico-religious incantations and myths that are endowed with supernatural powers. He was also the personification of the "word," which he bestowed upon human beings, and the "word" was the doctrine that represented the driving force behind all religious ceremonies that Moma introduced. The original father created the earth and all things of the world from the archetype (*naino*), the "not-substance," of each individual entity. On the other hand, in a myth that explains the creation of the organic world, Moma extracts all the plants and animals from his own body. The blossoms of the food plants used by humans are evidence of his omnipotent presence, and when the trees of the earth no longer bear fruit they go to Moma in the underworld. In addition to being the Moon in the heavens, he resides below as master of the dead. He was the first being to experience the suffering of death, but in the fruits of the plants he is continually resurrected.

Among the Witóto, such a representation demonstrates intensely the character of a particular form of culture hero, that is, one who is at the same time a supreme entity. Jensen applied the term *dema deity* in describing such a culture hero among the Marind-anim of New Guinea (Jensen, 1951). The distinguishing characteristics of this deity are revealed in his slaying, which occurred in primal times, and the consequent growth of all food plants out of his body.

Waríkyana supreme being. A supreme god is also manifested among the Waríkyana (Arikena), a Carib-speaking tribe of the Brazilian Guianas. The highest deity in the religion of the Waríkyana is Pura (a name that, according to the Franciscan missionary Albert Kruse, means "God"). With his servant Mura, Pura stands on the zenith of heaven's mountains and observes all things that take place below (Kruse, 1955). At the command of Pura, the rain is sent from the sky. Pura and Mura are small men with red skin and are ageless and immortal. They appeared at the beginning of the world, together with water, the sky, and the earth. In early times Pura and Mura came down to earth and created humans and animals. Because mankind did not obey the ethical precepts of Pura, he retaliated by sending a great fire that was followed by a deluge. A segment of the human race survived this catastrophe, and the Waríkyana people believe that when the end of time comes, Pura will create another holocaust. It was therefore Pura to whom prayers were directed, and in his honor a celebration took place in which manioc cakes were offered to him.

Protasius Frikel, another Franciscan, completed Kruse's description, noting that the Waríkyana view the

supreme being as a reflection of the primal sun (Frickel, 1957). Pura continues to qualify as the superior god, and in addition he was also thought of as the world onto which the primal sun pours its blinding light. Pura also represents universal power, a belief that Frikel considers to be relatively recent among the Waríkyana.

In another instance, Pura is considered to be a "primordial man" or culture hero (*ibid.*). In any case, Pura resides in heaven and reigns over all elements. His companion and servant Mura is somehow connected with the moon and displays some features of a trickster. Such dual relationships as sun and moon, god and companion, culture hero and trickster—pairs that are often represented as twins—are encountered frequently in South American mythology. According to the Waríkyana, death is the beginning of the soul's journey to heaven, where it will be reincarnated—a journey that is modeled after the eternal cycle of the sun.

Yanoama and Mundurucú supreme beings. Kruse's work stimulated Josef Haekel to write an article about monotheistic tendencies among Carib-speakers and other Indian groups in the Guianas, as well as among those groups bordering the western areas of the Guianas (Haekel, 1958). According to Haekel's findings, reference to the name *Pura* in connection with a supreme being occurred in no other Carib-speaking tribe except the Waríkyana. To the west of their territory in the Guianas, however, the expression is used with only slight variation, even among different linguistic groups such as the isolated Yanoama (Yanonami) on the Venezuelan and Brazilian borders. According to the beliefs of some groups in Brazil, *Pore* is the name of a supreme being who descended to earth (Becher, 1974). Together with the moon, who is known as Perimbo, Pore established a dual relationship composed of both sexes—male and female—that was conceptually unified as a supreme entity who controls heaven, earth, and the underworld. As the most well-informed researcher of the Brazilian Yanoama, Hans Becher considers their mode of life to be strongly influenced by myths connected with the moon; the sun, on the other hand, is entirely unimportant. The awe in which these Indians hold Pore and Perimbo is so intense that they do not call on this supreme being directly. Instead, they employ the indirect services of intermediaries in the forms of plant and animal spirits (*hekura*) that reside on specific mountain ranges. Shamans identify with these spirits and when intoxicated with snuff come into contact with them.

There are strong similarities between the supreme being, Pura, of the Waríkyana and the figure of Karusakaibe, the "father of the Mundurucú" (an expression coined by Kruse, who was also a missionary among this central Tupi tribe). Karusakaibe once lived on earth

and created human souls, the sky, the stars, game animals, fish, and cultivated plants, together with all their respective guardian spirits, and he made the trees and plants fruitful. Karusakaibe is omniscient: he taught the Mundurucú how to hunt and farm, among other things. He is the lawgiver of the tribe and the originator of its dual social structure. Karusakaibe is immortal. Because he was treated badly at one time by the Mundurucú, he went off to the foggy regions of the heavens. He is also credited with having transformed himself into the bright sun of the dry season. When the end of the world comes, he will set the world and all mankind on fire. But until that time he will look after the well-being of his children, the Mundurucú, who direct their prayers and offerings to him when fishing and hunting and in times of sickness. Martin Gusinde (1960) is of the opinion that Karusakaibe was once a superior god among the Mundurucú. Later his status changed to that of a culture hero.

Tupi-Guaraní supreme beings. Resonances of a supreme being concept among the Tupi-Guaraní linguistic groups are mentioned by Alfred Métraux, who was the most important specialist in their religious systems (Métraux, 1949). Among these groups, the creator often has the characteristics of a transformer, and as a rule he is also the lawgiver and teacher of early mankind. After he fulfills these tasks, he journeys westward to the end of the world, where he rules over the shades of the dead.

Among the ancient Tupinamba of the Atlantic coast and the Guarayo of eastern Bolivia, traces were found of a cult devoted to the creator, Tamoi. In Métraux's opinion, the various culture heroes, including Monan and Maira-monan) were derived from a single mythical figure—the tribal grandfather, Tamoi. The occurrence of an eclipse of the sun or the moon is a signal that according to the beliefs of the Tupinamba relates directly to the end of the world, and the men must sing a hymn to Tamoi. These eschatological beliefs are characteristic of the Tupi-Guaraní and may be connected to the messianic movements of the Tupinamba at the beginning of the Portuguese colonization period. Such movements frequently led to mass migrations in search of the mythological land of Tamoi, a region perceived as a paradise where the inhabitants share immortality and eternal youth. A similar cult devoted to the worship of the great ancestor among the Guarayo was coupled with messianic movements at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In this case, Tamoi was considered the ruler of the celestial western kingdom of the dead as well as the dominant figure at burial rites and in beliefs about the afterlife.

The most revered god of the Guaraní-Apapocuvá ac-

ording to Curt Nimuendajú, the outstanding authority on this tribe at the beginning of the twentieth century, is the creator Nanderuvucu ("our great father"). Nanderuvucu has withdrawn to a remote region of eternal darkness that is illuminated solely by the light that radiates from his breast (Nimuendajú, 1914). He holds the means to destroy the world but retains the privilege of using this power for as long as he pleases. Because he is not concerned about the daily activities that occur on earth, no cultic practices are directed toward him. His wife Nandecy ("our mother") lives in the "land without evil," a paradise that at one time was believed to be in the east and then again in the west; this paradise also became the goal of various messianic movements of the Guaraní-Apapocuvá.

Ge solar and lunar gods. In the eastern Brazilian area, the majority of the northwestern and central Ge tribes (Apinagé, Canella, and Xerente) hold that the Sun and Moon are the only true gods. Both Sun and Moon are masculine. Though not related to each other, they are companions; the Sun, however, is predominant.

The supremacy of a solar god among the Apinagé led Jensen to the conclusion that here the mythical concept of a sun-man has a secondary identity, that is, he is also a supreme god (Jensen, 1951). To support this theory, Jensen directs attention to the fact that human beings alone have the privilege of addressing this deity as "my father." He finds additional support for this theory in the prayers that are offered to the solar god and in the role he plays in visions. An Apinagé chief spoke of an encounter he once had on a hunting expedition in which he met the sun-father in human form. The Apinagé consider the establishment of the dual organization of the tribe, as well as the placement of the two moieties within the circular settlement, to be the work of the Sun. A final supporting element observed by Nimuendajú (1939) is the Apinagé's consumption of round meat patties, which are eaten at feasts and are said to represent the sun.

At the beginning of the harvest season, a four-day dance festival is celebrated in honor of the Sun at which the dancers apply red paint to themselves in patterns representative of the sun. The Canella also publicly implore the heavenly gods, the Sun and the Moon, for rain, the safety of the game animals, the success of their harvest, and an abundance of wild fruit. In a similar manner, the Xerente call the sun "Our Creator" and pay the same devout tributes to the Sun-father as do the Apinagé. The Sun and the Moon themselves, however, never appear, but the Xerente receive instructions from these solar and lunar bodies through other celestial gods (the planets Venus, Mars, Jupiter) who are associated with the Sun and the Moon moieties. The most im-

portant ceremony of the Xerente is the Great Feast, at which a pole is erected so that the tribe members may climb to the top and pray to the Sun. At the end of the celebration, the master of ceremonies climbs this pole. Once at the top, he stretches his hand outward to the east and receives a message from a star within the constellation Orion, who acts as a celestial courier. In most cases, satisfaction is expressed and rain is assured.

The ceremonial pole as a link to the heavenly world is also believed to have been employed by the Botucudos, who were among the hunting tribes that once lived near the Atlantic Ocean but are now extinct. Their religion was apparently characterized by a belief in a supreme being in heaven, named White Head because of the image he created (the top of his head is white and his face is covered with red hair). He was also the chief of the heavenly spirits, who were known as *marets*. The *marets* spirits could be called to earth by the shaman, but in a form that is visible only to him; they also had to return to heaven in the same way. They took on the function of intermediaries between mortals and the supreme being when the shaman, through prayers and songs, turned to them in times of sickness or in an emergency. No one ever saw Father White Head face to face; although he was sympathetic toward mankind, he punished murderers and was responsible for sending rain storms.

Mother goddesses. As Métraux (1946) pointed out, the missionaries who searched for belief in a supreme being among the Indians of the Gran Chaco were not at all successful. The only mythical personality who comes close to the concept of a superior god, in Métraux's opinion, is Eschetewuarha ("mother of the universe"), the dominant deity among the Chamacoco, a Samuco group in the north Chaco region. She is the mother of numerous forest spirits as well as of the clouds. As the controller of all things, Eschetewuarha ensures that mankind receives water. In return for this favor, she expects her people to send songs to her nightly, and when such expectations are not fulfilled she punishes them. Herbert Baldus (1932), who provided in-depth information about Eschetewuarha, compares her with the universal mother of the Cágaba (Koghi), a Chibcha tribe in Colombia that had been influenced by more advanced cultures. This comparison facilitates postulating at least a phenomenological relationship between the two.

The obvious characteristics of a supreme god are apparently present in Kuma, the goddess of the Yaruro, who subsist on fishing, hunting, and gathering along the Capanaparo River, a tributary of the Orinoco in Venezuela. She is considered to be a moon goddess and consort of the sun god, who is unimportant. Kuma created the world with the help of two brothers, the Water Ser-

pent and the Jaguar, after whom the tribal moieties were named. Although she apparently created the first two human beings herself, her son, Hatschawa, became the educator and culture hero of mankind. Kuma dominates a paradise in the west in which gigantic counterparts for every plant and animal species exist. Shamans are capable of seeing the land of Kuma in dreams and visions and are able to send their souls there. As a reliable informant explained, "Everything originated from Kuma and everything that the Yaruro do has been arranged so by her; the other gods and cultural heroes act according to her laws" (Petrullo, 1939). Métraux drew attention to the typological affinities between Kuma and Gauteovan, the mother goddess of the Cágaba, who in turn is connected with Eschetewuarha of the Chamacoco (Métraux, 1949).

Supreme beings of Tierra del Fuego. Among the people living in the southern regions of the continent, a belief in a supreme being is common in hunting and fishing tribes, especially the Selk'nam (Ona) of Tierra del Fuego and the Yahgan and Alacaluf of the Tierra del Fuego archipelago. Despite many years of European influence in this area and the astonishing similarities of their beliefs to aspects of Christianity, Métraux believed that the religion of these three tribes remained substantially independent of Christianity (Métraux, 1949). Martin Gusinde, a member of the ethnological school of Wilhelm Schmidt, provided us with research information about these tribes shortly before their cultural extinction (Gusinde, 1931, 1937, 1974). The Selk'nam, the Yahgan (Yámana), and the Alacaluf (Halakwulip) maintain belief in a supreme being who is an invisible, omnipotent, and omniscient spirit living in heaven, beyond the stars. He has no physical body and is immortal; having neither wife nor children, he has no material desires. Among the Alacaluf, the creator god is named Xolas ("star"), and despite the great distance that separates him from the earth, he concerns himself with the daily life of human beings. Through his initiative a soul is allowed to enter the body of a newborn baby; it remains in the human being until death, at which time it returns to Xolas. The Alacaluf were obliged to abstain from any form of veneration of this perfect supreme being, since any attempt to influence his will would have been fruitless. For this reason, it is not known what formal prayers were addressed to Xolas nor whether cultic practices associated with him were performed.

Watauineiwa ("ancient one, eternal one") behaved quite differently, according to the beliefs of the Yahgan. He preferred to be addressed as "my father," and he was reputed to be the lord of the world and ruler over life and death. He was an astute observer of the actions of

humans and punished violations of the laws he had established in relation to morals and customs. Such rules were inculcated into the young (boys and girls concurrently) during initiation rituals, which formed the core of Yahgan religious life. In seeking contact with Watauineiwa, the individual Yahgan could draw upon numerous established prayers. A person would implore Watauineiwa, who was the controller of the game animals and of all food plants, to help him to secure his subsistence needs and would turn to Watauineiwa to ensure his continued health, to cure him of sickness, and to protect him from inclement weather and from drastic environmental changes. But Watauineiwa was also the target for harsh complaints in cases of ailments and misfortune, and in the event of death he was accused with the words "murderer in heaven."

The supreme god of the Yahgan maintained a closer contact with human beings than did Témaukel, the Selk'nam's supreme god. Témaukel ("the one above in heaven") was considered to be the originator and protector of mankind's moral and social laws, although he was otherwise uninterested in daily life on earth. Témaukel had existed from the beginning of time, but he entrusted Kenos, the first ancestor, with the final configuration of the world and the institution of social customs. In spite of the respect they accorded Témaukel, the Selk'nam prayed to him less frequently than did the Yahgan to their supreme god. Contrastingly, the Selk'nam meticulously observed the practice of throwing the first piece of meat from the evening meal out of their huts with the words "This is for him up there," an action that can be considered a form of sacrificial offering. The dead were also believed to travel to Témaukel.

Supreme beings of the Pampas, Patagonia, and the southern Andes. Although our knowledge of the religious practices and beliefs of the earlier inhabitants of the Pampas and Patagonia is sparse and relatively superficial, it is almost certain that the Tehuelche had a supreme being. Like Témaukel of the Selk'nam, the god of the Tehuelche was characterized by his lack of interest in worldly activities; he was also lord of the dead. This supreme being was, in general, sympathetic toward human beings, but there is no proof of a public cult devoted to him. Traditionally he was called Soy-chu. A benevolent supreme being of the same name was also found in the religious beliefs of the Pampa Indians, at least after the eighteenth century.

It would appear that the tribal religions of the southern areas of South America were, in general, marked by a belief in a supreme god. The Araucanians of the southern Andes, and in particular the Mapuche, have left behind traces of the concept of a superior god, as well as a devout veneration of him that survived well into the

eighteenth century. In most instances the supreme being is referred to as either Ngenechen ("lord of mankind") or Ngenemapun ("lord of the land"). Other, more feminine descriptions may reveal an androgynous character. Ngenechen is thought of as living in heaven or in the sun and is credited with being the creator of the world as well as the provider of life and of the fruits of the earth. Although he is responsible for the well-being of mankind, he is not associated with the moral laws. An individual would turn to Ngenechen in personal emergencies with prayers, the sacrifice of an animal, or an offering of the first fruits of the harvest. A public ritual known as the Ngillatun, which has survived up to the present time among the Araucanians, consists of offering the blood of a sacrificial animal to him. Two important objects employed at this feast are the *rewe*, a thick, step-notched pole, and a sacrificial altar, both of which are circled by the participants at the beginning of the ceremony. In addition to the master of ceremonies, the female shaman (*machi*) takes over some of the most vital functions at the Ngillatun. With a flat drum (*kultrun*), she climbs the ceremonial pole and upon reaching the top turns to Ngenechen, who is now symbolically nearer. Métraux (1949, p. 561) and John M. Cooper (1946, pp. 742–743) have both come to the conclusion that in this instance the older features of god among the Araucanians have been conceptually modified through the centuries to conform with the concepts of the conquering Western civilization.

Earlier Spanish chroniclers viewed the thunder god Pillán as the central, if not the supreme, being of the Araucanians. Ewald Böning, in a more recent account, pointed out convincingly that the Mapuche describe Pillán in general as a powerful, extraordinary, and tremendous apparition (Böning, 1974, p. 175). Pillán primarily represents an impersonal power, but he can also manifest himself in a personal form. The concept of impersonal power seldom occurs in the mentality of the South American Indians. The Nambikwára of the Mato Grosso, for example, believe in an abstract power, known as *nande*, that is present in certain things and that contains a magic poison or a real poison. Although any individual can, to a certain extent, achieve contact with *nande*, it is the shamans above all who can manipulate this power.

Nature Spirits, Hunting Rituals, and Vegetation Rites. In dealing with beliefs in a superior god, I have mentioned how the lord, or master, of the animals is one way in which the supreme being is conceptualized among South American tribes. Owing to the fact that hunting belongs to one of the oldest phases of human history, gods who are associated with this category of subsistence represent archaic beliefs. Not only do the

Indians of South America believe in a master of all animals but they frequently display a belief in supernatural protectors of the various animal species. Such nature spirits characteristically display strong individualistic tendencies and are often considered to be demons (Métraux, 1949). From the standpoint of cultural history, they are related to the lord of all beasts and have affinities with him that stem from the same hunting and fishing mentality.

Tupi master of the animals. The most important representation of a master of the animals in the tropical lowlands is the forest spirit Korupira, or Kaapora, of the ancient eastern Tupi and a few primitive isolates of the Tupi tribes, as well as of the *caboclo*, or mixed race, people of Brazil. A series of recorded myths and verbal descriptions have facilitated a reconstruction of this deity.

Although the use of two names creates the impression that Korupira and Kaapora are two separate mythical figures, they are so closely related as to be nearly indistinguishable. Korupira, the master of the animals, is the protecting spirit of the beasts as well as of the forest; he punishes those who maliciously destroy the game and rewards those who obey him or those on whom he takes pity. For a portion of tobacco, Korupira will lift the restrictions that he places on the killing of his animals. Encounters in recent times with a small isolated Tupi tribe, the Pauserna Guarasug'wä, who live in eastern Bolivia, have shown that the belief in Korupira/Kaapora has survived. Kaapora originated as a human being—that is, he was created from the soul of a Guarasu Indian. He is the lord of all animals of the forest and has put his mark somewhere on each of the wild animals, usually on its ear. A hunter must turn to him with a plea to release part of the game, but he is only allowed to kill as many as he will absolutely need for the moment. In thanksgiving for his success, the hunter will leave the skin, the feet, or the entrails of the slain animal behind when he leaves the forest: by doing so he begs forgiveness from the animal for having killed it. After such reconciliations, the soul of the animal returns home to Kaapora. Presumably this tribe, like others, believes either that the spiritual owner of the game will create an entirely new animal or that the soul of the animal itself is capable of reproducing a new material form from the remains the hunter leaves behind. (The preservation of the bones of game in the so-called bone ritual appears to be widely distributed throughout South America.)

Kurupi-vyra of the Guarasug'wä is a part-animal, part-human forest spirit, but not a lord of the animals. He is, however, a possible source of help for hunters in emergencies. At such times he will lend his miraculous

weapon, a hardwood wand that he himself uses to kill game, and in return he demands total obedience. Evidence of a master of the animals and a helping spirit is well documented in other regions of the South American subcontinent.

Mundurucú protective mother spirit. In the Amazon region, the idea of a lord of all animals is sometimes replaced by the belief in a lord or master of each individual animal species, and sometimes both concepts occur. Starting from the basic Tupi premise that every object in nature possesses a mother (*cy*), the Mundurucú, a Tupi-speaking group, recognize and venerate a maternal spirit of all game. She is the protector of the animal kingdom against mankind and maintains a mother-child relationship between herself and the beasts. Although she possesses a homogeneous character, she does not have a definite external form, nor does she exist as an independent personal goddess. The shaman alone knows and understands the methods for approaching her. In an ecstatic frenzy, he will feed her sweet manioc when she manifests herself in any one of her various forms (for example, as a specific type of land tortoise). The Mundurucú also attribute to each individual animal species a mother spirit that serves as a species protector.

Formerly the Mundurucú held a reconciliation ceremony at the beginning of the rainy season in honor of the guardian spirits of the game and fish. At the climax of this ceremony, two men sang songs devoted to the spirit of each animal in order to call on the spirit mothers. They performed this act while sitting in front of the skulls of numerous animals that had been taken in the hunts of the previous year. These skulls were arranged in parallel rows, according to species, in front of the men's house. Additionally, a bowl of manioc porridge was offered to the mothers of the animals to eat. When the shaman was convinced that the spirits had arrived, he blew tobacco smoke over the skulls and then, using a bamboo tube, proceeded to symbolically suck out arrowheads or bullets that had entered the spirits. Through this action the animals were pacified and the dancing could begin. Such dances, performed by the men, consisted of pantomimes of a herd of peccary, followed by representations of the tapir and other animals. This organized presentation by the Mundurucú was the most pregnant and illuminating of such ceremonies in the Amazon region.

Hunting dances. The concept of a lord, or master, of a particular species also plays an important role in the religious systems of the Carib-speaking tribes of the Guianas. This is exemplified by the frequent use of the term *father* or *grandfather* when speaking of a certain type of animal. The Taulipáng and the Arecuná of

the inland regions of the Guianas believe that each individual animal type has a father (*podole*), who is envisioned as either a real or a gigantic, legendary representative of that particular species, and who displays supernatural qualities. Two "animal fathers" are especially meaningful for their hunting ritual: the father of the peccary and the father of the fish. Both of these figures were originally human shamans who were transformed into spiritual beings and became incorporated into the opening dances of the Parischerá and the Tukui, the magical hunting dances of the Taulipáng. In the Parischerá, a long chain of participants, wearing palm-leaf costumes and representing a grunting peccary herd, dance to the booming of cane trumpets or clarinets. Performing the Parischerá ensures a plentiful supply of four-legged animals, just as the Tukui dance guarantees a sufficient supply of birds and fish. Starting with a dance performed by the neighboring Maquiritaré that is similar to the Parischerá of the Taulipáng, Meinhard Schuster classified the ritual hunting dances devoted to the peccary, including those of other Carib-speaking tribes of the Guianas; he concluded that a relationship existed between these and the peccary dances of the Mundurucú (Schuster, 1976).

Animal dances devoted to the attainment of game and fish are found among other tribes of the Amazon area and the Gran Chaco. Instead of focusing on the controlling master of the animals, however, they are often directed at the soul of the animal itself. Dances in which the animals, or their spiritual master, are depicted with masks made from bast fiber, straw, or wood frequently do not belong to hunting rituals as such. Instead, they are used in conjunction with rites of passage, especially initiation and mourning feasts. This applies to the animal-mask dances of the northwestern Amazon, the tribes of the upper Xingu River, and the northwestern Ge tribes of eastern Brazil.

The jaguar. The predatory jaguar occupies a special position in the religious practices of peoples inhabiting an extensive area of South America that stretches from the coast of Brazil to the central Andes. The religious life of these peoples is dominated by activities related to the jaguar. The tribute paid the jaguar takes a number of forms: in some cases, attempts are made to pacify or to ward off the spirits of captured jaguars; in others jaguars are ceremonially killed; in yet others, the jaguar is venerated as a god.

Among the ancient Tupinamba, the cadaver of a jaguar was ornamented and then mourned by the women. The people addressed the dead animal, explaining that it was his own fault that he had been captured and killed since the trap into which he had fallen had been intended for other game. He was implored not to take

revenge on human children. Among the western groups of the Boróro tribe of the Mato Grosso, who are included in the eastern Brazil cultural area, there is a dance of reconciliation performed for the slain jaguar. Such dances take place at night and consist of pantomimes of the jaguar acted by a hunter who wears a jaguar skin and is decorated with its claws and teeth. These Boróro groups believe that the soul of the jaguar will in this way be assimilated into the hunter. At the same time, the women mourn and cry emphatically to pacify the soul of the animal, which might otherwise take revenge by killing the hunter. The eastern groups of the Boróro tribe attach quite a different significance to their rites for the dead jaguar. Here the ceremonies are held in conjunction with the hunting rituals that accompany the death of an individual, and in this sense they belong to mourning rites.

Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, the Shipaya and Yuruna, Tupi-speaking tribes located on the middle Xingu River, knew of a cult dedicated to the creator of their tribe, who was known as Kumaphari. In the beginning Kumaphari had a human form, but in a state of anger he divorced himself from human beings and settled in the northern end of the world, where he became an invisible, cannibalistic jaguar. Through the shaman, who acted as a medium, the jaguar god occasionally demanded human flesh, whereupon a war party was organized for the purpose of acquiring a prisoner. The victim was shot with arrows and a portion of the body was consumed by the participants in the ritual; the remaining part was presented to Kumaphari, the jaguar god. The ceremonies practiced in this cult apparently maintained ritual cannibalistic elements found among the Tupinamba of the sixteenth century, although at that time the offering of a captured warrior to deity was not recorded.

An active jaguar cult was also known to the Mojo, an Arawakan tribe in eastern Bolivia. The killing of a jaguar, which automatically bestowed great prestige on the hunter, was accompanied by extensive rites. During the entire night, a dance was held around the slain animal. Finally the animal was butchered and eaten on the spot. The skull, paws, and various other parts were then placed within a temple of the jaguar god, and a sacrificial drink for the benefit of the hunter was presented by the jaguar shaman. The shaman was recruited from among those men who were distinguished for having escaped alive after being attacked by a jaguar. They alone could summon and console the jaguar spirit and could allegedly turn into jaguars, a transformation known to many other Indian tribes of the Amazon region. It is justifiable to view the jaguar god of the Mojo as a "lord of the jaguars" in the same sense that

the concept "master of the animals" is applied among hunting groups.

This feline predator also played a part in the religion of ancient Peru. Either a particular god possessed attributes of the jaguar, or the jaguar was an independent deity who served as the lord of the earthly jaguars and who appeared in the constellation Scorpius. [See also Jaguars.]

Protection from slain animals. Rituals established around various slain animals are especially obvious in eastern Brazil and Tierra del Fuego. Among the Boróro of eastern Brazil, the shaman enters a state of ecstasy after big game has been killed. In this condition he performs various activities related to the game—for example, breathing over the meat. He may also sample it before the rest of the members of the tribe partake of the meal. In this way he bestows a blessing that will protect against the revenge of the slain animal spirit (*bope*). When the Kaingán-Aweicoma (Xokleng) in the state of Santa Catarina in southern Brazil have killed a tapir, chopped greens, which are particularly favored by this animal, are spread over its head and body, which is supported upright. At the same time, the spirit of the animal is addressed with friendly words. It is asked to give a favorable report to the other animals of its kind, to report how well it was treated, and to persuade them that they too should let themselves be killed. Similarly, when a hunter of the Selk'nam of Tierra del Fuego removed the skin from a slain fox, he spoke apologetic phrases, such as "Dear fox, I am not evil-minded. I have respect and don't wish to harm you, but I am in need of your meat and your fur." By this means, the entire fox society was expected to be pacified after the loss of one of its members. The offering of such deceptions and fabrications to the slain animals is a typical archaic ritual that also finds expression among hunters in the Old World.

Plant fertility rites. I now turn to those religious rites that center around the theme of fertility, not only of planted crops but also of wild edible plants. The most impressive religious celebrations of the tribes in the lowlands of the Amazon are those held for the vegetation demons by the peoples in the northwestern section of this region. Such demons are usually, though incorrectly, identified with the worst of all demons among the ancient eastern Tupi, which demons (and their cults) are known as *yurupary* in the local vernacular (Métraux, 1949).

Among the Tucanoan and Arawakan groups of the upper Rio Negro and the basin of the Uaupés River, the *Yurupary* rites take place at the time when certain palm fruits particularly favored by the Indians are ripe. At the beginning of the festival, baskets of these fruits

are ceremonially escorted into the village by men blowing giant trumpets. These sacred instruments, which represent the voices of the vegetation demons, are hidden from the women and children, who must therefore remain within the huts at this time. During the first part of the ceremony, in which the men scourge one another with long rods, the women are also obligated to remain within their houses. After the secret part of the ritual has ended, however, the women may join the men in feasting and drinking, which continues for several days. The purpose of this feast is to thank the demons for a good harvest and to beg them to provide a rich yield in the coming season. In former times, the so-called *Yurupary* rites of the Arawakan groups, the *Tariana* and their neighbors, incorporated the use of two matted "mask suits" made from the hair of monkeys and women. These suits, worn by a pair of dancers, were also not allowed to be seen by the women.

The underlying meaning of the *Yurupary* rites involves the son of *Koai*, the tribal hero of the Arawakan groups. *Milomaki* of the *Yahuna* (a *Tucano* group), on the other hand, is a sun hero with an amazing talent for singing who was responsible for having created all edible fruits. He gave these gifts to mankind, although he himself was burned to death by men for having killed members of the tribe. From the ashes of his body sprang the palm tree that provides the wood for making the large trumpets used at the feasts. The trumpets allegedly have the same tones as his voice [See *Yurupary*.]

Sacred wind instruments. The reproduction of the voices of supernatural beings through the use of sacred wind instruments, including wooden flutes and trumpets made from rolled bark, is an element that is, or at least was, widespread over much of tropical South America. Their use is most often connected with the expansion of the Arawakan peoples from the north to the south. In the area north of the Amazon, these instruments are utilized in cultic activities devoted to vegetation deities, whereas south of the Amazon they are a central aspect of autonomous cults that have an esoteric character, but have little connection to fertility rituals. They appear in the Flute Dance feast of the Arawakan *Ipurina* of the *Purus* River as a representation of the ghostly *kamutsi*, who reside under water and are related not only to the sun but also to the animals. The *Paresi-Kabishi*, an Arawakan tribe in the western Mato Grosso, have a secret cult in which the snake demon *Nukaima* and his wife are represented by a huge trumpet and a smaller flute. The Alligator Jump dance of the old *Mojo* (an Arawakan group) is considered to be the equivalent of the snake cult of the *Paresi*. At the climax of this alligator cult feast, a procession is formed in which twelve men play nine-foot-long bark trumpets.

Women and children are not allowed to see the proceedings; were they to do so, they would allegedly risk being swallowed by an alligator. The cultural wave responsible for the use of sacred wind instruments in the reproduction of the voices of spiritual beings apparently dies out in the upper Xingu cultural area.

The flutes, which are taboo for women, are stored in special flute houses like those of the Arawakan Mehináku. They are associated with a mother spirit (*mama'e*) who has the form of a bird, the jacu (*Crax spp.*), and is represented by masked dancers during the ceremonies. Among the Camayura (a Tupi group), the Jacu feast was organized for the purpose of obtaining help from three manioc *mama'e* whose assistance was needed to guarantee success with a new manioc field.

Human and plant fertility. Among the Kaua (an Arawakan group) and the Cubeo (a Tucano group) in the northwestern Amazon region, fertility rites are obviously connected with a human generative power. At the end of the masked dances, in which the dancers represent animals, the participants unite to perform the Naädö (phallus dance). They hold artificial phalluses made of bast fiber in front of their bodies, and with coital gestures they mimic the scattering of semen over houses, fields, and forests.

Farther to the west, we encounter the primal father Moma of the Witóto, a superior god who has a strong influence on the fertility of all useful plants. Moma is responsible not only for the flourishing of the planted crops, including manioc and maize, but also for useful wild fruits. In his honor, the Okima, the festival of yuca (manioc) and of the ancestors, is performed. Those under the earth are invited to participate in the festival by their worldly descendants above, who stamp their feet or beat rhythmically on the ground with "stamping sticks" that are fitted with rattles. In the ball game festival known as Uike, the soul of Moma is believed to be present within the ball, which is bounced back and forth on the knees of the persons participating. Additionally, this ball symbolically represents the fruits that are brought to the feast, the idea being that the bouncing ball makes the same movements as the fruits in the branches of the trees.

Among the Jivaroan people in Ecuador, the cult of the earth mother Nunkwi is restricted to those cultivated plants whose soul is believed to be feminine—for example, manioc. The soul of the earth mother resides within a strangely shaped stone (*nantara*) that has the power to summon Nunkwi. The association between fertility of human females and the growth of plants considered to be feminine receives obvious expression through the rule that every woman who plants a manioc cutting must sit on a manioc tuber. The same theme

is expressed in the ritual for the first manioc cutting that is taken from a field whose yield is intended to be used at the Tobacco festival. The cutting is painted red, and the woman to be honored places it against her groin.

Even the *tsantsa*, the fist-sized shrunken head trophies of the Jivaroans, are connected with the fertility of the fields. The power that resides within these heads is expected to be transferred into the crops as the successful hunter, wearing the trophy around his neck, passes the fields. From the trophies the hunter also receives information concerning the fields, which he passes on to the women who tend them. [For further discussion of the beliefs and practices of the Jivaroan people of Ecuador, see Quechua Religions, article on Amazonian Cultures.] The Quechua and Aymara peoples of the central Andes region frequently call upon Pachamama, the goddess of the earth, who is essentially responsible for the fertility of plants and who is believed to live underground. In addition to being connected with many celebrations, she is also associated with many daily rituals. The cult devoted to her originated in pre-Hispanic times. [See Inca Religion.] It has survived to the present, a persistence that is undoubtedly related to Pachamama's identification with the Virgin Mary.

For the cultural areas of eastern Brazil, the Gran Chaco, the Pampas, and Patagonia (including Tierra del Fuego), information concerning gods or spirits related to the fertility of cultivated plants is partial, has little significance, or is completely lacking.

The Soul, the Dead, and Ancestors. Most of the Indian groups of South America believe that a human being has several souls, each residing in a different part of the body and responsible for numerous aspects of life. After death, each of these souls meets a different fate. One of the most interesting examples of this idea is found among the Guaraní-Apapocuvá (Nimuendajú, 1914). One soul, called the *ayvucue* ("breath"), comes from one of three possible dwelling places: from a deity in the zenith, who is the tribal hero; from "Our Mother" in the east; or from Tupan, the thunder god, in the west. In its place of origin the soul exists in a finished state, and at the moment of birth it enters the body of the individual. It is the shaman's task to determine which of the three places of origin each soul comes from. Soon after birth the breath soul is joined by another soul, the *acyigua* ("vigorous, strong"). The *acyigua* resides in the back of a person's neck and is considered to be an animal soul responsible for the temperament and impulses of that person, which correspond to the qualities of a particular animal. Immediately after death the two souls part company. The *ayvucue* of a small child goes to paradise, the "Land without Evil." The destination of

the *ayvucue* of adults is another afterworld that lies just before the entrance to paradise. The animal soul or *acyigua* transforms itself into a much-feared ghost, called *angéry*, that persecutes mankind and must therefore be fought.

Research on a number of Indian tribes indicates that meticulous preservation of the bones of the dead is a widespread practice. Such action, which is similar to the preservation of the bones of hunted game, can be traced to the belief that residual elements of the soul remain in the bones after death. The conceptualization of a "bone soul" has led to the ritual consumption of bone ash from dead family members. This form of endocannibalism is practiced at the present time by different groups of the Yanoama and appears to have been relatively widespread in western South America. Among the Yanoama, we find a perception of a soul that resides outside the body of a living individual, a concept seldom documented in South America. Such a soul most often dwells in an animal, but sometimes also in plants. This type of soul may reside, for example, in a harpy eagle if the soul is that of a man, or in an otter if it belongs to a woman. The predominant element of such a concept is that of an identical life pattern: when the respective animal dies, its human counterpart will also die, and vice versa. An animal soul, usually referred to as a "bush soul," represents the alter ego of a specific individual.

Some of the fundamental beliefs in an alter ego prevalent in South America stem from within the shamanic domain. The Araucanian female shaman (*machi*) possesses an alter ego in the form of an evergreen canelo tree (*Drimys winteri*) that she tends in the forest and whose fate is intimately linked to her own. If someone discovers this tree and destroys it, the *machi* invariably dies.

Honoring the dead was an essential component within the religions of old Peru, as exemplified by the care that mummies of the ancestors were given by priests (Métraux, 1949) and by the sacrificial victims brought to them. Mummies were also taken on procession at certain festivals.

One of the few cases of a developed cult of the dead in the tropical woodlands is exemplified by the ghost dance of the Shipaya of the lower Xingu, which is the most significant religious celebration of this Tupi tribe. The souls of the dead, which are well disposed toward mankind, express a desire to the shaman—through the words of the tribal chief—that the celebration known as the Feast for the Souls of the Dead should be held. It is believed that the souls of those long dead will take possession of the shaman, who is covered with a white cotton mantle; in this form, the soul can participate in the

dancing and drinking enjoyed by the living in the center of the village. When souls have borrowed the body of the shaman, his own soul lies idle in his hut. The ceremony continues for eight or more nights, during which other men who have also become the embodiment of dead souls appear in similar dance mantles.

An ancestor cult is also the focal point in the religion of the Cubeo who live in the northwest Amazon region. The soul of a dead person proceeds to the abode of the benevolent ancestors, which is located near the dwelling place of his sib, where all its dead are reunited. The ancestors are represented by large trumpets that are used not only at funeral rites but also at the initiation ceremonies for the boys of the tribe, who are whipped as these trumpets are played. The ancestors, represented by the trumpets once again, are also guardian spirits at sib gatherings. The sound they emit is believed to be a source of male strength when played during a men's bath in the river.

Among the Mundurucú in central Brazil, the large wind instruments are the embodiment of the sib ancestors when played at a particular men's feast. Like the trumpets of the Cubeo, they are not allowed to be seen by the women. At the end of the Mundurucú ceremony, a special drink made from manioc is poured into the instruments and is collected in a calabash bowl as it comes out the other end; it is then drunk by the participants. This ritual, which is looked upon as a form of spiritual communion with the ancestors, is intended as an act of reconciliation that will win their favor and help their descendants.

The combination of a memorial service for the recently dead and a commemorative ceremony for the legendary tribal ancestors can be seen in the Kwarup ritual of the Camayura, a Tupi group of the upper Xingu. The Kwarup (from *kuat*, "sun" and *yerup*, "my ancestor") centers around a number of posts, each about three feet high, outfitted and ornamented as human beings and carved from the sacred camiriva wood from which the creator, Mavutsine, allegedly fabricated the first Camayura. The chant given as people dance around these posts is the same one that Mavutsine sang as he created mankind. In the Kwarup ritual the ancestors return symbolically for the purpose of welcoming those who have recently died.

Death cults and ancestor worship also play an important role in the eastern Brazilian cultural area, particularly among the Boróro. This tribe makes a sharp distinction between nature spirits and spirits of the dead. The Boróro believe that the souls of their ancestors (*aroe*) hold a close relationship to mankind that influences and maintains its daily life. On certain social occasions, the spirits of the dead are ceremonially invoked

by special shamans to whom the spirits appear and whom they enlighten in dreams. As a result of this important attachment to the spirits, the funeral rites of the Boróro are highly developed and complex. After a ceremonial hunt, the successful hunter becomes the representative of the dead man at the funeral proper, which consists of a series of established rites. Among these is a dance in which the most interesting elements are large disk-shaped bundles of wood that represent the dead person. At the same time that the dance is being performed, the deceased person's bones, which have been buried for two weeks, are exhumed and painted red with *urucú*. Feathers associated with clan colors are glued to the bones. The specially decorated skull is then displayed to the mourners. After a period of safekeeping in the house of the deceased, the basket in which the bones have been placed is sunk in a deep section of the nearby river.

Among the Ge-speaking Canella (eastern Timbira), it is the medicine men who usually establish contact with the spirits of the dead, since they are omniscient. But even those members of the tribe who do not possess particular spiritual abilities seek advice from their ancestors in emergencies. In the first phase of the initiation ceremonies for young boys in which religion is emphasized, the initiates learn how to contact the dead. This knowledge is acquired in a race in which each person to be initiated carries a wooden block that is said to be the ghost of a dead ancestor. In the funeral rituals, the men carry much larger blocks in a similar race.

The cult of the dead is not only an impressive ritual but a basic foundation of the culture of the Kaingán, the southernmost Ge tribe. The objective that lies at the core of this ritual is the elimination of the ties that connect the living and the dead. This ritual insures that the souls of the deceased will finally arrive at the resting place in the underworld, located in the west.

A cult of the dead among the indigenous people in the southern regions of South America, including the Gran Chaco and the southern Andes, contains few authentic religious elements. At a funeral, the surviving family members sponsor a large feast in honor of the dead relative. The various ceremonies that take place during this feast—for example, eating and drinking bouts, lamenting, playing of music, feigned attacks, riding games, and speeches—are intended to drive from the village the dreaded spirits of the dead or the death demons, who are responsible for the death of the tribal member, to prevent them from causing more harm. Among the people in the Gran Chaco, an attempt is made to console the dead and to pacify them in their anger at having passed away. The mourning ceremonies, which begin immediately after a person dies, are

meant to serve this end. Often an invalid is set outside or buried before having actually died. Little has been recorded regarding beliefs about life of the soul after death among the peoples of the Gran Chaco.

Initiation Rites. Among the Indians of Tierra del Fuego there is no trace of a cult of the dead to be found in the funerary practices. In this region, socioreligious emphasis was placed on rites that are generally associated with the initiation of members of both sexes and particularly on those rituals connected with the acceptance of young males into men's organizations (the Kloketen of the Selk'nam and the Kina of the Yahgan). During these rites, a chain of men came out to frighten the women. The participating men wore conical masks made from bark or animal skin that covered their heads and faces. Their bodies were painted black, white, and pink in various patterns. Although they represented specific demons and spirits of the sea, forest, and animals, there was apparently no ghost of the dead among them.

The appearance of masks so far south is correctly attributed to the extensive influence of the Tropical Forest cultural areas. Between the Tropical Forest and Tierra del Fuego, there are no gaps in the appearance of masked dances in connection with initiation celebrations, as for example the Anapösö, or Forest Spirit feast, of the Chamacoco. In this region of the Gran Chaco, the performers representing the forest spirits were elaborately decorated with feathers. These spirits are believed to have been ruled by the dog demon Pohitschio, who was the consort of the great mother, Eschete-wuarha. Formerly the performers wore artistically intricate feather masks that were later replaced by sacks worn over the head with eyeholes cut in them. In either case, the women were not allowed to discover that these spirits were in reality men from their own tribe.

The Lengua of the Gran Chaco use a masked dance to represent symbolically the supernatural danger that threatens women at the onset of menstruation. In this dance, the single men, wearing rhea-feather belts and masks, approach the young women during a typical female puberty celebration. The young women believe them to be the bad spirits. They are eventually driven away by the adult women after they harass and threaten the young girls.

Conclusion. Because of the extreme variety of time periods from which information about these tribes is drawn, the only perspective that can be achieved in such an overview is of a diachronic nature. To close this survey of the various forms of religion, I shall briefly indicate phenomena that are particularly characteristic of the individual cultural areas.

The central Andes of pre-Columbian times is characterized by a belief in high gods and their respective

cults, by the worship of ancestors and of the dead, and by agrarian rites directed to a female earth deity. The peoples of the region of the Amazon and Orinoco rivers occasionally display signs of high-god worship (Witoto, Tupi-Guaraní). Along with the vegetation cults (north-western Amazon) that are typical of crop-cultivating peoples, there is a markedly large number of ceremonies and rites associated with deities of the hunt and of wild animals (including fish). The Ge of eastern Brazil exhibit clear signs of worship of astral deities—the Sun and Moon. The cults of the dead and of ancestors dominate much of their religious life. The Gran Chaco, by contrast, is noticeably lacking in religious ceremonies and rites in the narrow sense. First-fruit ceremonies related to hunting and fishing predominate; there are no agrarian rites. In the Pampas and Patagonia region a number of socioreligious rites are attested. The Selk'nam and Yahgan of Tierra del Fuego Archipelago believe in a high god, but there is little indication of cult worship. The regions of southern and central Andes share many aspects of religious life. The high-god cult (Ngenechen) is associated with a cultivation and fertility ritual. A highly developed form of shamanism is also prominent. Throughout South America outside the Andean region, the shaman remains the pillar of the religious life.

[See also Shamanism, article on South American Shamanism. For detailed treatment of some of the themes touched upon in this article, see Ethnoastronomy; Lord of the Animals; and Supreme Beings.]

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OTTO ZERRIES

Translated from German by John Maressa

Mythic Themes

South American mythology is a vast field whose pur-view extends linguistically and archaeologically beyond the continent proper to include the oral traditions of Panama and eastern Costa Rica as well as those of the autochthonous inhabitants of the West Indies. This article will consider myths from the point of view of religious studies and will emphasize the cosmologi-cal patterns and sacred symbolism in narratives from nonliterate South American societies of both ancient and modern times.

Since the early sixteenth century more than one thou-sand languages, representing a variety of linguistic stocks and many unrelated tongues, have been listed for

this area—a fact that suggests that South America was populated over a great number of centuries by successive migratory groups that trekked down from Siberia, North America, and Central America. One classification of South American languages attempts to reduce hundreds of mutually unintelligible tongues to only three groups: Macro-Chibchan, Andean-Equatorial, and Ge-Pano-Carib. This classification, however, is admittedly provisional and, in the case of the last two groups, very uncertain. These migrations began more than twenty thousand years ago. The majority of early South American archaeological sites date from between twelve and fourteen thousand years ago, but quartz tools found in Brazil in 1983 have been dated at about twenty-five thousand years before the present.

The higher civilizations of ancient South America occupied the Andean region and the Pacific coast from northern Colombia to central Chile. From the point of view of mythological studies the more or less “primitive” cultures are at least as important as the higher civilizations because the less developed societies usually possess abundant collections of sacred stories. The exceeding diversity of South American aboriginal peoples has precluded the formation of a common pantheon or mythico-religious system for the whole continent. Nevertheless, since many societies have been in contact at one time or another, more than a few myths are common to several tribes. Moreover, a large number of motifs are not only found in the mythologies of different South American groups but are also known to peoples of other continents, leaving room for speculation as to whether these motifs spread through diffusion or originated independently.

Myths of Origin. South American sacred stories about how the world originated do not, as a rule, conform to the pattern of creation out of nothing by the will of an omnipotent god. Rather, they commonly depict the coming into being and unfolding of a primordial spirit. In many cases little is said about the actual genesis of the world, but a detailed description of the structure of the universe is given. This description points out the universe’s tiered levels, the *axis mundi* (often in the shape of a cosmic tree), and the heavenly bodies (whose existence is mostly conceived as the product of the transformation of heroes, animals, or other creatures). Many myths deal with characteristics of the sky, and not a few with those of the underworld. There are also many stories about the origin of night. Even more abundant than myths of world creation are those about the destruction of the world, the recurrent agents of destruction being water or fire or both.

Creation of the world. The Piaroa, who live on the south bank of the Orinoco and speak a language of the

Sáliva-Piaroan family, believe that everything was created by the powers of imagination. In the beginning, they say, there was nothing at all. The first thing to appear was the sky, and then the air and the wind. With the wind, words of song were born. The words of song are the creative powers that produce thoughts and visions. Out of nothing they imagined and created Buoko, the first being, who developed in the words of song. Then Buoko imagined his sister Chejaru, and Chejaru was born. Because of this, mankind also has the power of imagination. The Piaroa say that thought is actually the only thing we have.

The Koghi, speakers of a Macro-Chibchan language who live in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, have a creation story that also underscores the spiritual nature both of the first beings and of the essence of the universe. According to this myth, creation took place in nine stages, from the bottom up. Each stage is both a cosmic level and a spiritual being called the Mother, who is sometimes accompanied by a Father or another spiritual being. The first level, which lies in darkness, is also the Sea; the second, the spiritual Tiger; the fifth, the first House of Spirit. Finally, the Fathers of the World find a huge tree and make a temple in the sky above the water. They call it the House of Spirit.

The Muisca (Chibcha) lived in the highlands of Colombia at the time of the arrival of the Spanish, and spoke a language of the Macro-Chibchan family. According to their creation myth, before there was anything in the world, it was night, and light was kept inside a great thing that, according to the Spanish chronicler who recorded the story, is the same that Europeans call God—an omnipotent, universal, ever-good lord and maker of all things. The great being began to dawn, showing the light that he had in himself, and he commenced, in that primordial light, to create. His first creations were some black birds that he commanded to go everywhere in the world blowing their breath from their beaks. That breath was luminous and transparent, and, the birds’ mission accomplished, the whole world remained clear and illumined as it is now.

Cosmic levels. In many South American myths, the universe is conceived as a series of layered planes—three or four in many cases, but sometimes more. The Mataco, whose language is a member of the Mataco-Mataguayo family and who live in the Gran Chaco between the Pilcomayo and Bermejo rivers, distinguish the levels of earth, sky, underworld, and (according to some) that of another earth farther down. Originally the sky had been joined to the earth, but the Owner of the Sky separated them. Afterward, a tree grew to connect the sky and the earth. People of the earth used to climb the tree and hunt in the sky, but an old man who had been

given a miserable portion of the game meat avenged himself by burning the tree. The hunters could not return; they became the Pleiades. The children of the hunters, who remained on earth, received from their mother, who was also stranded in the sky, a deerskin full of honey that she dropped from above. They grew up and became the ancestors of the present-day Mataco.

The Macuna of the Lower Pira-Parana River in the Vaupés region of Colombia, who speak a language of the Tucanoan family, think that the earth is the shape of a disk. A subterranean river is united with the earth by a whirlpool. The river is inhabited by monsters and bad spirits. Over the earth is a hot-water lake on which the sun sails from east to west in his boat every day. Over Sun Lake there is a house where the Lord of the Jaguars lives, a place that only shamans, in their flights to heaven, can reach. On top of the cosmos is a layer that covers all others like a lid. Nothing beyond it is known. The earth disk consists of several concentric zones, the innermost being the Macuna homeland. At the center, just below Sun Lake, stands a sacred mountain, which supports the firmament. No stone is taken from this mountain lest it fall, taking the sky with it. At a certain point on the earth's level is the House of the Dead. The outer zones are occupied by other Indian tribes, whites, and blacks.

Sky and underworld. The sky and the underworld are cosmic levels of special interest. They appear in myths influenced by the shamans' narratives of their ecstatic trips to the upper and lower worlds. The Marikitari, a Carib-speaking people living in the Upper Orinoco area, say that in the beginning the whole world was sky. There was no separation between heaven and earth. There was only light. In the sky dwelled good, wise people who never died; nor did they work: food was always available. In the highest sky was Wanadi, who is still there. He gave his light to the people and they were happy. One day he said that he wanted to make people on that part of the sky called "earth." He sent a spirit who made the first people and brought them knowledge, tobacco, the maraca, and the shaman's quartz power stones. Later, an evil spirit called Orosha introduced hunger, sickness, war, and death.

The sky and the cosmic tree. Some of the myths so far recounted show a close connection between the cosmic levels and the *axis mundi*, often represented by a gigantic tree. In the Mataco myth the danger of the sky falling down is clearly pointed out. The same motif appears in many other myths of tropical forest tribes. The Ge-speaking Kayapó of central Brazil say that in the east there was a gigantic tree called End of the Sky. It supported the heavens, which in those days were parallel to the earth. After several tries, a tapir succeeded

in gnawing the trunk until it broke. Then the sky drooped down at the edges, forming the celestial vault. At the place where the tree has its roots all kinds of strange beings live. When a group of people went to explore the east, they found it so frightening that they fled back home with no desire to return to the End of the Sky.

Sky, light, and darkness. Myths in which the sky, usually associated with light, is related to the origins of night are also common. The following story is told by the Cuiba, who live in the western plains of Colombia and speak a language of the Guahiboan family. In ancient times there was no night, only an endless daytime. People could not sleep. A woman who had gone out of her mind wanted to break the sky. Her husband, who was a shaman and had had a dream, warned her to be careful and not to damage the sky, which belonged to the locusts. But she paid no attention and hurled a stone that broke the sky, which was made of mud. Directly it became dark and the earth was invaded by locusts as big as iguanas. They ate the eyes of everybody except the shaman. Then the swallows, who are able to carry heavy loads, brought all the necessary mud and repaired the sky again.

Other stories about the origin of the night suggest that it was created because girls, or wives, would not grant their favors to their lovers, or husbands, since it was always daytime. A Tupi myth from central Brazil indicates that night was kept in a coconut that was opened against the formal prohibition to do so.

Sun, moon, and stars. The sun and moon play important roles in many South American myths. Their origins, like those of stars and constellations, are due in many cases to the transformation of humans at turning points or denouements in the mythical stories. Many versions of the widespread myth of the "twins and the jaguar" end with the heroes' ascending to the sky to become the sun and moon. This is perhaps the most ubiquitous myth of South America, found from Panama to the Gran Chaco and from the eastern coast of Brazil to the Amazonian forests of southern Peru, among dozens of tribes that speak mutually unintelligible languages. Different versions of this story diverge considerably, but the following summary contains a number of essential points common to a great number of stories known to widely scattered groups. A mysterious god or a civilizing hero impregnates a woman and then abandons her. While walking alone in the forest carrying twins in her womb, she is killed by one or more jaguars, but the jaguars' mother takes care of the babies and raises them. A bird or other animal tells the twins how their mother died. The twins determine to avenge their mother and prepare themselves to do so through several ordeals.

They finally kill all the jaguars except one, which escapes and becomes the ancestor of present-day jaguars. After some quarreling, the twins climb to the sky, where they can be seen as sun and moon. As an example of the differences between many versions of this story, it may be mentioned that in the rich Mashco account of this tale the twins do not appear; in this case the extraordinary boy Aimarinke kills the jaguars and then goes up to heaven and becomes Yuperax, the god of lightning.

The pre-Columbian Carib of northern South America, speakers of one or another language of the extensive Carib family, were skilled navigators of the Caribbean Sea and had a rich lore about stars and constellations, some of which has survived to the twentieth century. One of their stories tells about a newly married girl who was seduced by a man in the shape of a tapir who asked her to follow him eastward to the place where earth and sky meet. Serikoai, her husband, accidentally cut off his leg with an ax and, after being cured by his mother, set out in search of his wife. He finally found her in the company of Tapir, whom he shot, severing Tapir's head. He implored his wife to return, saying that if she refused he would follow her forever. She hurried on, chased by her lover's spirit and her husband. On arriving at the earth's steep edge, she threw herself into the deep blue sky. On a clear night, one can still watch her; she has been turned into the Pleiades, with Tapir's head (the star cluster Hyades, the star Aldebaran being Tapir's red eye) close behind, and Serikoai (Orion, with Rigel indicating the upper part of her husband's sound limb) in pursuit.

Myths of Destruction. Stories about the destruction of the world and mankind by a deluge—be it from excessive rain, or by high tides, or both—are fairly common in most regions of South America. Another type of myth of wholesale destruction is that of the world fire. In some cases these stories may recall actual catastrophes, but their significance seems to be symbolic of divine punishment for transgression of traditional taboos. Often, the destruction is believed to have occurred in the past; sometimes, however, the world fire is projected into the future.

The Deluge. The earliest recorded American myth of the deluge comes from the Taino, whom Columbus met on his first voyage of discovery. According to this version of the myth, a young man who wished to murder his father was banished and later killed by him. The old man kept his son's bones in a calabash where he and his wife could see them. One day they accidentally overturned the gourd and the bones turned into fish. Another day, as the man was out in the fields, four brothers, whose mother had died at their birth, took the

calabash and ate all the fish. Hearing that the father was returning, they hurried to hang the vessel back in place, but it fell to the ground and broke. The water from the calabash filled the whole earth and from it also came the fish in the sea. The theme of the Deluge as a consequence of killing forbidden fish is still present among the contemporary Mataco of Argentina and southern Bolivia. In the Andean countries, Deluge myths are generally associated with a magic mountain where mankind takes refuge. As the waters rise, the mountain also rises, thereby saving the lives of those who have reached the top. One of the best-known examples of this motif was recorded as early as the seventeenth century; its memory persists to this day among the speakers of dialects of the Araucanian language.

In the native traditions of the Huarochiri area of Peru that were collected from Quechua speakers early in the seventeenth century, the Deluge is caused by a god whose presence is not recognized by people who are reveling. Enraged, he advises a young woman who has tended him and won his friendship to take refuge on a high mountain nearby. Soon afterward, heavy rain carries the village away, leaving no one alive. Among the Kaueskar-speaking Alacaluf of southern Chile, who were once supposed to have preserved no mythology, an increasing collection of mythic tales has been gathered since the late 1970s. Among these stories is one about a devastating flood caused by the breaking of a taboo forbidding the killing of an otter. Only a young couple is saved, again by climbing a mountain.

The World Fire. The Carib-speaking Taulipáng of Venezuela connect the deluge with the world fire. They say that after the great flood, when everything had dried up, there was a great fire. All the game animals hid in an underground pit. Fire consumed everything: men, mountains, stones. That is why big chunks of coal are sometimes found in the earth. The Zapiteri, of the Mashco ethnic group of the southwestern Amazon, say that in the beginning of time it rained blood, but later the sun began to heat up and there was a great fire. The tribes of the Gran Chaco have a rich repertoire of myths about the world fire. One of these myths, from the Mataco, says that long ago the Mataco lived in great disorder. One day black clouds broke into lightning and rain began to fall. The drops were not water but fire, which spread everywhere. There were only a few survivors, among them Tokhuah the trickster, who went underground for the duration of the fire.

Many fragments have been collected of what is thought to have been a widely diffused myth of the destruction of the world by fire. According to the Tupi-speaking Apocacua Guarani, the World Fire was the

first of four cataclysms that annihilated almost all creatures, and it will be repeated when the creator removes from under the earth the crossed beams that hold it in place. Then the earth will catch fire, a long-lasting night will set in, and a blue tiger will devour mankind.

Such Ge-speaking tribes as the Apanyekra, Apinagé, Craho, and Ramkokamekra tell stories about the beginnings, when only two persons existed, Sun and Moon, both of them male. One day Sun obtained a beautiful plumed headdress that looked like fire. Because Moon also wanted one for himself, Sun got another and threw it to Moon, warning him not to let it touch the ground; but Moon was afraid to grab it and let it fall to earth, and it immediately started to burn, consuming all the sand and many animals.

Mythic Ancestors. Different South American myths place the origin of mankind at distinct levels of the universe and variously depict the human race as being born from minerals, plants, or animals. Women are sometimes assigned a separate origin. The Urus of Lake Titicaca, speakers of a language of the Uro-Chipaya family, relate that in the time of darkness the universal creator made the Chullpas, who were the first men. They were destroyed by a cataclysm when the Sun appeared, and their survivors became the ancestors of those who now call themselves Kotsuns ("people of the lake"), but are more commonly known by the name of Urus ("wild animals"), as they are called by their Aymara neighbors. The Carib-speaking Waiwai of Guyana say that before mankind existed there were on earth sky spirits, which now have the form of birds and which fly in the second heavenly layer. Some of them, however, have human form. Present-day mankind descends from the children of a woman who was one of these spirits and who, surprised while alone in the forest, was impregnated by a grasshopper-man.

The Quechua-speaking Inca of Peru had several myths of their origins that were recorded by Spanish chroniclers. According to one of these stories, the high god Viracocha created Alcaviza, a chieftain; and told him that after his (Viracocha's) departure the Inca noble would be born. Alcaviza resided at the place that would later become the main square of Cuzco, the capital of the Inca empire. Seven miles away, at a place called Pacaritambo ("lodge of dawn"), the earth opened to form a cave, from which the four Ayar brothers emerged, dressed in fine clothing and gold. Fearing the colossal strength of the one who had come out of the cave first, his brothers asked him to go back into the cave and fetch some golden objects that had been left behind. While he was inside, the others immured him there forever. Ayar Manco, who had come out last, took the prisoner's wife for himself. Another brother displayed big

wings, flew to the sky, and from high above told Ayar Manco that the sun had ordered that he should change his name to Manco Capac ("Manco the Magnificent") and take the winged man's wife for himself. Finally the winged man turned into a stone. In the company of his only remaining brother and their wives, Manco Capac walked to Cuzco, where Alcaviza recognized from their garments that they were indeed the children of the Sun and told them to settle at whatever place they liked best. Manco Capac, the first Inca ruler, chose the site where later the Coricancha, or court of the sun, would be built. His brother went away to settle another village.

High God. The belief in a high god conceived as omniscient and benevolent to man rather than as an omnipotent and perfect creator (which in some cases he also is) is documented in many South American myths. It was first reported by Fray Ramón Pané in the earliest ethnological study of American Indians. He wrote that the Taino of Haiti believed in the existence of an immortal being in the sky whom no one can see and who has a mother but no beginning. At the southernmost extreme of South America, the belief in the existence of a high god has been acknowledged among the tribes of Tierra del Fuego. The Tehuelche of Patagonia seem to have believed in a supreme being conceived as a good spirit who was also the lord of the dead. From the Araucanians (Mapuche) come testimonies of a belief, possibly autochthonous, in a supreme celestial being, Nguenechen. Very early reports say that the Tupí believed in a being they called Monan, and that they attributed to him the same perfections that Christians attribute to their God: he is eternal, and he created the heavens and the earth as well as the birds and animals.

The most famous of all South American high gods is the Andean deity Viracocha. Several etymologies have been proposed to explain the meaning of his name, among them "sea of grease" (as a rich source of life) and "lord of all created things." In any case the belief in a high creator god among the Andean peoples probably goes back to early prehistoric times. It has been suggested that Viracocha is none other than the same world creator and culture hero found in the mythology of many tribes from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Apparently, the ancient high god was obscured for a time by his conflation with the Inca sun god, but later the Inca were obliged to revert to the ancient high god of archaic mythologies in order to secure the support of their allies when Cuzco was threatened by other peoples. Another important Andean high god is Illapa, lord of rain, lightning, and thunder. As do some other Andean deities, Illapa hierophanically presents himself in trinitarian form comprising Illapa the Father, Illapa the Elder Son

(or Brother), and Illapa the Younger Son (or Brother). Illapa's name is related to the Quechua word *illa*, meaning both "protective spirit" and "light" or "lightning."

While Illapa is a god of the Andean highlands, Con and Pachacamac belong to the Peruvian coast. Con is said to have created the sky, the sun, the moon, the earth with all its animals, the Indians, and the fish by means of his thought and breath. After having made everything, he ascended into the sky. Con was followed later by a more powerful god called Pachacamac ("world maker," or "the god who gives orders").

Origins of Plants and Culture. The introduction of seeds for agriculture and the origins of certain staple plants and their fruits are recounted as etiological motifs in many South American myths. In Peru, several sacred personages of legendary times are credited with the creation of produce. According to an ancient story, the god Pachacamac transformed the sacrificed body of a divine being into the basic food plants of the Andean peoples.

In the traditions of the Ge-speaking Apinagé, Kayapó, Craho, and Xerenté, among the tribes of the Tropical Forest, as well as among the Mataco of the Gran Chaco, many fruits of the earth came from the heavens as gifts brought by Star Woman for her lover and his people. That is the way the Apinagé first came to know of sweet potatoes and yams and learned to plant maize and make maize cakes. The Kayapó obtained manioc, sweet potatoes, yams, and bananas through the good offices of Sky Woman, who was the daughter of Rain. Maize, however, was revealed by a little mouse who showed it to an old woman. Among the Waiwai it is said that an old woman allowed herself to be burned, and from her charred bones sprouted cassava plants of the type still in use today. In a Witóto myth an old woman who was ascending the sky in pursuit of a handsome youth fell down, transforming herself into the bitter yuca, while the young man became the sun.

In many tribal societies there are traditional stories teaching how artifacts and social institutions first came into being. Among the Ayoré of western Paraguay and eastern Bolivia, who speak a language of the Zamuco family, there is an origin myth (or sometimes several) for every single object, whether natural or man-made. According to the Ayoré, most things originated through the transformation of an ancestor. In many cases, however, cultural objects were in the beginning owned by the ancestor who, at a certain point, gave them to mankind.

Origins of Fire. Fire, the natural element required to transform the raw into the cooked, separates men from animals and establishes the basis of culture; as such, it

is the subject of many mythic stories which can be broadly divided into myths about the origin of fire and myths about the origin of the techniques for fire-making. Most stories of the former group recount how, in the times of the beginnings, men first obtained fire, either as a gift from a god or as an element stolen by a culture hero.

The greatest variety of myths about fire among South American societies probably occurs in the traditional oral literature of the Mataco. According to one of these stories, Raven was the owner of fire, and Toad, in an unsuccessful attempt to steal it, almost extinguished it. But Tokhuah, the trickster, did succeed in getting it, and, when chased away, waved his burning stick in all directions. The branches of all the species of trees that caught fire are now gathered to make drills for producing fire by friction. In another Mataco myth, Vulture, the guardian of fire, flapped his huge wings from time to time to fan the live coals. If someone attempted to take a burning piece of wood, however little, Vulture would flutter his wings with such force that the fire would flare up and the would-be thief would be burned to ashes. But according to the most widely reported version of the Mataco myth, the owner of the fire is Jaguar. In this story, Jaguar loses his fire to Rabbit, who puts live coals under his chin and runs away. Later Rabbit throws the embers in a meadow and the world begins to burn. People were thus able to obtain fire and to cook their meals, but Jaguar had to learn how to hunt and to eat his game raw. Then Tokhuah put the spirit of fire into the wood of the *sunchu* tree, which the Mataco use to make their fire-drills.

Origins of Death. Several types of myths about the origin of death have been noted among South American tribes. One of these may be called the "waxing and waning moon" type. The Ayoré of the Gran Chaco say that instead of following Moon, who waxes again after waning into nothing, their ancestor followed Tapir, who dies and never rises again.

The Warao of the Orinoco delta have several traditional stories representing different types of myth about the origins of death. One type concerns the "serpent and his cast off skin." It says that people lived happily on earth until one of them fell ill and died. He was buried, and the Master of the Palm-Leaf Fiber said that they should wail for their dead. The snakes immediately cried and shed their skins. That is why snakes do not die, but people do.

Another type of myth, and a very common one, attributes man's fate to his disobedience of a divine commandment. It is said that death and sickness came to the Warao as a punishment inflicted by the Master of Water Spirits because his daughter, who had married a

Warao, had been obliged to go into the menstruation hut when she had her menses, according to the customs of her husband's village but against her will, and she died. To castigate the Indians, the water spirits caused accidents, sickness, and death.

Yet another myth type, the "ill-timed answer," is found not only among the Warao but also in Guyana and elsewhere. Once, when the world was young and animals could talk, a chief announced that Death would pass by that night. The chief added that Death would call to them first, and that a good spirit would call afterward. If they answered the second call, people would never die, but if they answered the first call, all would surely die. The chief asked everybody to stay awake, but a young man went to sleep. Night came and all was quiet. About midnight they heard a voice that they did not answer, but the young man who was sleeping woke up and answered it. From that time, people began to die.

The "malevolent decision" motif and the "shouting at and scaring away the revenant" motif sometimes overlap, as in the Mataco myth according to which there was a time when everybody lived for five hundred years and died only of old age. Three days after death they would return to life again, rejuvenated. Nevertheless, when Tokhuah, the trickster, saw Moon, who was a handsome young man with an oversized member, beginning to shine again, Tokhuah was frightened, shouting "Go away!" and threatening Moon with a stick. Moon fled upward until he reached the sky. Tokhuah did the same to those who returned from the dead, and it is surmised that because of his actions the dead do not come back to life any more.

Another widely scattered motif is the "resurrection ritual that fails." The Selk'nam of Tierra del Fuego used to say that when their hero Kenos reached old age and seemed to die, he rose up again, and caused other men who died to come back to life by washing them. Subsequently, when he decided at one point not to rise again and went into the sky and became a star, he instructed Cenuke, a powerful sorcerer, to wash old people and make them young again. But Kwanip, another powerful sorcerer, ordained that no man should be raised from the sleep of age. He hurried up to the sky where he also became a star. Since then nobody comes back from the grave.

Relationship between Myth and Ritual. According to a well-known theory, myths recount rituals and rituals perform myths. Although this idea will hardly hold if applied to all myths and rituals, it is true that some myths relate the origins of certain rites. The southern Barasana, speakers of a Tucanoan language, tell a story of their culture hero Warimi, who in his childhood was

called Rijocamacu and who always succeeded in escaping when pursued by the daughters of the supernatural Meni. One day the youngest daughter of Meni caught Rijocamacu, who instantly turned into a little baby. The girl put him to her breast. Her father approved of what she was doing, and kindled some wax, blowing on the smoke in order to chase away the spirits of the dead so that they could not frighten the baby and make him cry. Since that time, when a woman gives birth, the chief blows on the household fire and only then are the people allowed into the house. In many tales, Meni is said to have been the first to do the things that the Barasana do now.

The close relationship between myth and ritual has been established in the case of the complex of sacred stories, holy performances, and tabooed musical instruments and other items that are associated with the name *Yurupary*, known to many tribes in the western Amazon region. The stories about Yurupary differ from one tribe to another. One of these stories, told among the Macuna, that Yurupary was an old jaguar-shaman whose female companion was Romi Kumu, another powerful being. Since he devoured many men, two ancestors decided to kill him, and they did. Afterward they burned his body; but his ashes produced a palm tree that shot quickly into the sky. The ancestors cut the palm to pieces and these became musical instruments: three male trumpets and one female flute that did not give out any sound until a hole was made to imitate the vagina of Romi Kumi. When the ancestors found Romi Kumi on an island, they stuck the flute between her legs, and that was the origin of menstruation. They gave the instruments to men, who at that time performed the agricultural work that is now performed by the women. In the Yurupary ceremonies, females are not allowed to see the instruments. [For further discussion, see Yurupary.]

Modern Myths. The myths mentioned above are ancient stories exhibiting the characteristics of South American cultures before contact with European civilization, but the creative forces of native imagination were not totally withered by the impact. Old myths were recast in new molds, making allowance for the presence of the whites and their ways. Hundreds of legends—that is, myths with some historical component—were coined in colonial times, and the process is still alive today in many areas where indigenous and foreign cultures meet. One such legend is the so-called myth of Inkarrí, which has been traced to several localities in the vicinity of Cuzco, but has also been found in other areas of Peru. Its gist is that the Spanish conqueror Pizarro imprisoned and beheaded Atahuallpa, the Inca king (Span., *Inca rey* = Inkarrí), but the head, which is

secretly kept somewhere, is not dead, and is growing a body, which when completed will shake off the chains and fetters that hold the Inca people in bondage. Eventually, Inkarrí will reestablish justice and bring back the ancient culture of the vanquished. [See Atahualpa.]

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History of Study

Systematic study of South American indigenous religions began with the arrival of the first Europeans. Almost immediately upon landing in the New World, scholars, priests, scribes, and soldiers began describing and assimilating the Indians’ peculiar and, to them,

outlandish practices for their Old World sponsors and public. The confrontation between these early explorer-chroniclers and their indigenous subjects established the basis of a religious opposition between Christian reformer and "heathen" Indian; and it is no exaggeration to say that these early accounts set the stage for all later scholarly and scientific studies of the continent's diverse religious traditions.

Such early accounts inevitably strike the modern-day reader as ethnocentric. The tone of these writings is understandable, however, since their purpose was not to describe religion, but to legitimate the events of a European conquest and to chronicle the details of European activity in the New World. To the degree that indigenous religion impinged on these events and these Europeans, religion was described and assigned importance; when it did not, it was treated as a symptom of the Indians' generally uncivilized nature. The practical importance of understanding and analyzing native religious belief first arose for the early writers through their encounters with the powerful Inca state of highland Peru. Chroniclers such as Juan de Betanzos (1551), Pedro Cieza de León (1553), and Cristóbal de Molina (1572), among others, provided vivid accounts of imperial religion and Inca state mythologies. Two concerns tempered their descriptions and choice of subject matter: the spectacle of Inca rituals, and the parallels they imagined to exist between their Christian millenarian and apostolic traditions and the natives' own beliefs in a "creator god" whose prophesized return coincided with—and thus facilitated—the initial Spanish conquests in Peru. Similar messianic beliefs among the Tupi-Guaraní of eastern Brazil attracted the attention of the explorers Hans von Staden (1557) and Antonie Knivet (1591). These writers provide fascinating accounts of Tupi religion as part of an argument intended to prove the presence of the Christian apostle Thomas in South America long before its sixteenth-century "discovery."

Other chronicles record the European reaction to religions of the Amazonian lowlands; these include, among others, the travel accounts of Claude d'Abbeville (1614), Jean de Léry (1578), and Gaspar de Carvajal, a priest who accompanied the first exploratory voyage up the Amazon river system in 1542. But if what the Europeans understood by "religion"—that is, hierarchies, priests, images, and processions—fit in well with what they found in the Andean state systems, it differed markedly from the less institutionalized religions of the Tropical Forest region. Accounts of lowland religions were accordingly couched in an exaggerated language stressing atrocity, paganism, and cannibalism. Such emphases had more to do with prevailing European

mythologies than with the actual religious beliefs of Tropical Forest peoples.

A second body of early writing about indigenous religions was motivated by more strictly theological interests. Debates were waged as to the humanity of the Indians, and as to whether Indians had souls and could therefore be converted to Christianity. When a papal decree finally stipulated that the Indians could (and therefore should) be converted, the study of religion began in earnest, for it was necessary to isolate and eradicate those aspects of the indigenous religions that stood in the way of conversion. Priests had to be instructed, catechisms written, and punishments devised for specific religious offenses. The ensuing campaigns to extirpate idolatries in Andean highland religions produced the first true studies of religion. Combining knowledge of Christian doctrine and missionary zeal with an increasing practical familiarity with indigenous life, theologians and priests such as José de Acosta (1590), José de Arriaga (1621), Cristóbal de Albornóz (c. 1600), and Francisco de Ávila (1608) set out to define in a rigorous and scholarly way the parameters of indigenous religion. A few indigenous and mestizo writers sought to vindicate their culture and religion from the attacks of these Catholic campaigners, in the process contributing greatly to the historical study of Andean religion. Among the most interesting of the indigenous chronicles are a 1,100-page letter to the king of Spain, written by Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala between 1584 and 1614; the chronicle of Juan de Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua (c. 1613); and the monumental history of the Incas (1609) by the half-Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. These inside accounts of Andean life and religion provide an altogether more sympathetic description of native beliefs and mythology than those written by the Spanish observers.

Taken as a whole, the early literature on Andean religion had two important consequences for ensuing scholarship of South American religion. On the one hand, it provided irreplaceable data about ritual, dances, offerings, sacrifices, beliefs, and gods now no longer in force—including, in the case of Guamán Poma's letter, a sequence of drawings depicting indigenous costume and ritual, and, in the chronicle of Francisco de Ávila, a complete mythology transcribed in the native language, Quechua. But these colonial writings also provided a powerful precedent for religious study thereafter. From the time of the extirpators on, religion was the salient element or institution by which indigenous peoples were judged in relation to their Christian or European conquerors. Religion, in short, became the principal index for defining the cultural and social differences separating two now adjacent populations. Such

religious criteria helped shape as well the unfortunate stereotypes applied to Amazonian peoples and cultures.

Nineteenth-Century Travel and Expeditionary Literature. The interval between the seventeenth-century campaigns against idolatry and the early nineteenth-century independence period was marked by an almost complete absence of religious studies. Interest in native religions was, however, revived somewhat by the foreign travelers, adventurers, natural historians, scientists, and commercial agents who came to explore the new South American republics. Whereas the earlier theologians had come to the study of religion because of its status as an immediate and entirely contemporary threat to their Catholic social order, by the nineteenth century these same “pagan” religions—and the cultural difference they defined—were studied as scientific indicators of their practitioners’ “less advanced” or “backward” status with respect to contemporary European cultural and historical achievements.

Such observations are a characteristic feature of the travel and scientific literature written during this period by Europeans and North Americans whose social views are influenced by the evolutionist thinking in vogue at that time. While none of these travelogues and natural histories concentrated specifically on the study or description of indigenous religion per se, reports on religious custom are scattered throughout many of them. Among the most important of these are the travel accounts of E. G. Squier (1877), Charles Wiener (1880), Friedrich Hassaurek (1867), and James Orton (1876) for the Andean highlands, and J. B. von Spix and Carl von Martius (1824), Henri Coudreau (1880–1900), Alcide d’Orbigny (1854), and General Couto de Magalhães (1876) for the Amazonian lowlands. Such descriptions were augmented, especially in the Amazon, by detailed and often highly informative accounts of “pagan” practices written by missionary ethnographers, such as José Cardus in Bolivia (1886) and W. H. Brett in British Guiana (1852).

This nineteenth-century literature did more than deprecate the extent of the natives’ religious, historical, and evolutionary development. It also tended to romanticize the Indians and their religions through exaggerated accounts of practices such as headhunting, cannibalism, blood sacrifice, and ritual drinking. In these “descriptions” of religion, emphasis is placed on the exotic, wild, and uncivilized aspects of the Indians’ religious practices—and on the narrator’s bravery and fortitude in searching them out. Such romanticizing and exoticizing, however, tended to occur unevenly. Thus, while religions of the Amazon Basin were subject to the most exotic and picturesque stereotypes of what a tropical primitive should be, the less remote Andean Indi-

ans were described primarily in terms of their degeneration from the glories of the lost Inca religion whose glamorous practices continued to fascinate the antiquarians and historical comparativists of Europe.

Early to Mid-Twentieth-Century Studies. The twentieth century ushered in new forms of scientific inquiry and scholarly ideals. Departing from the narrative, subjective styles of the chroniclers, travelers, and natural historians, modern writers sought to describe indigenous religion independently of any personal, cultural, or historical biases about it; subjectivity was to be subsumed to a new ideal of relativism and objectivity. These writers conform to two general yet interrelated disciplinary fields: (1) the anthropologists and historians of religion, who utilize a comparative and typological framework to examine the universal, phenomenological bases of religious belief, and (2) the area specialists, or Americanists, who are interested in defining the specificity and social cultural evolution of religions in the Americas.

The first group included such early scholars of lowland religions as Paul Ehrenreich (1905), Max Schmidt (1905), and Adolf E. Jensen (who was to later found the Frankfurt ethnographic school, home to such important recent scholars of South American religions as Otto Zerries and Karin Hissink). Their comparativist theories proved an impetus for the later field studies and Martin Gusinde in Tierra del Fuego (1931–1937), William Farabee (1915–1922) and Günter Tessmann (1928–1930) in the northwest Amazon, Konrad T. Preuss in both highland and lowland Colombia (1920–1930), and Theodor Koch-Grünberg in the Orinoco and in northwest Brazil (1900–1930). These field-workers wrote excellent overall descriptions of indigenous lowland religion, although their special concern was with art, mythology, and the analysis of animism and “high gods.”

Studies of highland religion during this turn-of-the-century period tended to focus almost exclusively on antiquities. The most important of these studies are the linguistic treatises of E. W. Middendorf (1890–1892) and J. J. von Tschudi (1891) and the archaeological surveys of Max Uhle and Alfons Stubel (1892). Both Incaic and contemporary Andean materials, however, were included in the broad surveys done by the scholars Adolf Bastian (1878–1889) and Gustav Brühl (1857–1887), who were interested in comparing the religions of North, South, and Central America so as to establish a theory of “cultural unity.”

The Americanists’ interdisciplinary studies of indigenous religion drew on the turn-of-the-century German studies and on at least three other sources as well. The first of these was the fieldwork during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s by European ethnologists such as Alfred Mé-

traux, Paul Rivet, and Herbert Baldus, as well as by American anthropologists from the Smithsonian Institution's Bureau of Ethnology. Beyond describing the general social organization, religion, ritual, and mythologies of the Indians, these men were interested in classifying the cultures and religions they found by tracing their interrelationships and linguistic affiliations. In their writings, therefore, a detailed account of religion is often subordinated to an overriding interest in linguistic data and material culture. Detailed studies of shamanism, for example, were produced by the Scandinavian ethnographers Rafael Karten, Henry Wassén, and Erland Nordenskiöld as part of a broader comparative examination of the material culture of South America. Of these early ethnographers, the German anthropologist Curt Nimuendajú stands out both for the extent of his fieldwork among the Ge, Boróro, Apinagé, Tucano, and Tupi tribes and for the degree to which his interests in describing these groups focused on their religious and ritual life. Other important sources on religious practices during this period are provided in the accounts of missionaries and priests, such as Bernadino de Nino in Bolivia (1912), Gaspar de Pinelli in Colombia (1924), and A. Colbacchini and C. Albisetti in Brazil (1907–1942).

A second group that influenced early Americanist approaches to religion was composed of ethnohistorians and archaeologists. Often hailed as the first true Americanists to work in the Southern Hemisphere, the archaeologists left a distinctive imprint on South American studies by the very nature of their specialty: the study of the pre-Spanish Andean past. Excavations, surveys, and analyses of previously unstudied sites in both coastal and highland Peru by Max Uhle and Adolph Bandelier were followed by the more detailed chronological studies of Alfred Kroeber, Junius Bird, Wendell Bennett, and John Rowe. Although the chronologies and site inventories constructed by these archaeologists did not focus on religion per se, the temple structures, burials, offerings, textiles, ceramics, and other ritual paraphernalia they unearthed provided new data on the importance of religion in pre-Columbian social organization and political evolution. Interpretation of this material was facilitated by the work of ethnohistorians such as Hermann Trimborn and Paul Kirchoff. Their historical investigations of both highland and lowland religions contributed immeasurably to an overall working definition of South American religious systems and their relation to systems of social stratification, state rule, and ethnicity.

A third and final group that helped shape Americanist studies was composed of South American folklorists, indigenists, and anthropologists. In attempting to resur-

rect indigenous culture and religion, *indigenista* writers of the 1930s and 1940s differed from the foreign ethnologists of these formative Americanist years. Their work was motivated largely by an explicit desire to record South American lifeways and religions before such practices—and the people who practiced them—disappeared completely. The emphasis of the *indigenista* studies on the vitality of living religious systems also served as an important counter to the archaeologists' initial influence on Americanist thinking. The prodigious group of national writers influenced by *indigenismo* has since compiled a vast archive of oral traditions, "customs," and ritual practices. Notable among these folklorists and anthropologists are Antonio Paredes Candia and Enrique Oblitas Poblete of Bolivia, Roberto Lehmann-Nitsche of Argentina, Gregorio Hernández de Alba of Colombia, and Jose-María Arguedas, Jorge Lira, and Oscar Nuñez del Prado of Peru. Unique among them was the Peruvian archaeologist-anthropologist Julio C. Tello. One of the most creative archaeologists working in Peru, Tello was also the only one interested in exploring the relation of the religious data he unearthed to modern-day Quechua beliefs and practices. His ethnographic publications of the 1920s are landmarks in the study of Andean religion, and his archaeological investigations of the 1930s and 1940s extended knowledge of the Andean religious mind into a comparative framework interrelating highland and lowland cosmologies and religions.

The major work to appear out of the formative period of Americanist studies is the seven-volume *Handbook of South American Indians* edited by Julian H. Steward, (1946–1959). Though somewhat outdated, the *Handbook's* articles, which cover aspects of prehistory, material culture, social organization, and ecology, still provide what is perhaps the most useful and accessible comparative source for beginning study of South American religions. Its interest for a history of religious studies, however, also lies in what it reveals about the biases informing Americanists' treatment of religion. These are (1) a preoccupation with relative historical or evolutionary classifications and the description of religious systems in terms of their similarity to, or degeneration from, a pre-Columbian standard, (2) a lowland-highland dichotomy informed by this evolutionary mode and according to which Tropical Forest religions are judged to be less "complex" than the pre-Hispanic prototypes formulated for the Andes, by archaeologists and ethnohistorians, and (3) the comparative framework used by these scholars, who were for the most part more interested in establishing cultural affinities and evolutionary links between different religious practices than in describing and analyzing the function and de-

tail of religion on a local level. The shortcomings of this dispersed and comparative focus are intimated by many of the *Handbook's* authors, who lament the inadequacy of their data on specific religious systems.

Functionalist and Functionalist-influenced Studies. The next group of scholars to address religious issues set out specifically to remedy this situation by studying indigenous religion in its social context. The manner in which local religious systems were treated was, however, once again tempered by the theoretical orientations of their observers. Thus the first group of anthropologists to follow the *Handbook's* lead during the 1950s and early 1960s was influenced by the functionalist school of British anthropology. According to this theory, society is an organic whole whose various parts may be analyzed or explained in terms of their integrative function in maintaining the stability or equilibrium of a local group. Religion was considered to be a more or less passive reflection of the organic unity of a total social system. Examples of this approach are the monographs of William Stein on the Peruvian Andes (1961), Allan Holmberg on the Siriono of Iwland Bolivia (1950), and Irving Goldman on the Cubeo of Brazil (1963). In several cases, more detailed monographs were written that focused specifically on the role of religion in indigenous social organization; these include works by Robert Murphy on the Brazilian Mundurucú, Segundo Bernal on the Paez of Colombia, David Maybury-Lewis on the Akwẽ-Xavante, and L. C. Faron on the Mapuche, or Araucanians, of coastal Chile. One variant of this functionalist approach brought out the role of religion as a signal means of achieving or maintaining balance between a society and the ecological system—jungle or mountain—upon which it depends. Prime examples of this approach are Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff's brilliant, Freudian-influenced treatments of mythology, shamanism, and cosmology among the Koghi Indians of Colombia's Sierra Nevada highlands and the Desána (Tucano) of the northwest Amazon. Other studies of shamanism, cosmology, and hallucinogens have been carried out by anthropologists Douglas Sharon in coastal Peru and Michael Harner in eastern Ecuador.

Structuralist Studies. During the 1960s and 1970s scholars began to question the passively reflective, or "superstructural," role to which much of functionalist anthropology had relegated religion, as well as the simplistic and ultimately evolutionist dichotomies between the Andean and Tropical Forest cultures. The major theoretical impetus for this new approach came from structuralism, which proposed to analyze the affinities connecting mythologies, ritual practices, and the societies in which they occurred by referring all to a per-

vative symbolic or cognitive structure based on dual oppositions and on diverse forms of hierarchical organization. The pioneering works of this tradition were Claude Lévi-Strauss's studies of social organization and mythology in the Amazon Basin and his four-volume *Mythologiques* (1964–1971), which presented a system for analyzing mythic narratives as isolated variants of an organizational logic whose standardized structure he invoked to explain the commonality of all North and South American modes of religious expression and social organization.

The structuralist approach has been particularly important for the study of religion. For the first time, a mode of thinking—evidenced by religion and mythology—was not only taken as the principal index of cultural identity, but was also seen to influence and even partly to determine the organization of other, more "material," spheres of social life. In its renewed focus on religion, structuralism has inspired myriad studies of lowland ritual and mythology, including those by Jean-Paul Dumont, Michel Perrin, Terence Turner, Jacques Lizot, Anthony Seeger, Stephen Hugh-Jones, and Christine Hugh-Jones. These structuralist studies of mythology and social organization were completed—and often preceded—by collections of mythologies and descriptions of cosmologies (or "worldviews") by ethnographers such as Johannes Wilbert, Marc de Civrieux, Darcy Ribiero, Roberto DaMatta, Egon Schaden, Neils Fock, and Gerald Weiss. Though departing from the structuralists' methodologies, these anthropologists shared with the structuralists an interest in studying religion as an expression of social organization, society-nature classifications, and broad cultural identities.

In the Andes, where mythologies and religion were judged to be less pristine and less divorced from the ravages of historical, social, and economic change, Lévi-Strauss's theories generated interest in the study of social continuity through examination of structural forms. These studies of underlying structural continuity were based on extensive fieldwork by anthropologists—including Billie Jean Isbell, Juan Ossio, Henrique Urbano, Gary Urton, John Earls, and Alejandro Ortíz Rescaniere—whose approach combines the methodologies of ethnography and ethnohistory. They have argued for the existence of a constant and culturally specific religious (as well as mythological and astronomical) structure by means of which indigenous groups have retained their cultural identity over time. Their studies of post-Conquest religious continuity drew upon ethnohistorical models of Andean social organization, in particular R. Tom Zuidema's complex structural model of Inca social relations and ritual geographies and María

Rostworowski de Diez Canseco's studies of pre-Hispanic coastal societies. Both of these ethnohistorians have emphasized the role of mythology, ritual, and religious ideology in the shaping of Andean economic and political history.

Structuralist methodology also motivated a new type of comparative study focusing on the similarities linking Andean and Amazonian religions. Again of importance here is Zuidema's structural model for Inca socioreligious organization, which drew upon the parallels between this elaborate highland state system and the equally complex, yet not state-formed, modes of ritual organization among the Ge and Boróro Indians of Brazil. D. W. Lathrap's all-encompassing archaeological model for the evolution of South American social organization utilized similar comparative techniques to establish a common heritage of lowland and highland cosmologies. By combining this comparative insight with the historical dynamics of archaeology and ethnohistory, and by assigning to religion a determinative role in the evolution of social systems, such models not only questioned, but in many ways actually reversed, the prevailing stereotypic dichotomy between "primitive" Amazon and "civilized" Andes.

Recent Views. The comparative and structuralist approaches of ethnographers and ethnohistorians have strengthened our appreciation of religion as an organizational feature permeating all aspects of indigenous South American social life. Indeed, it is this new insight, in conjunction with an increasing interest in the historical complexities of indigenous cultures, that characterizes recent study of South American religions. This recent work falls into roughly three groups, each distinguished by its approach to history and the relation of religion to historical changes in other spheres of indigenous social organization.

The first involves the investigation of religion as a mode of political or ethnic organization and resistance. In these studies, religion is seen as a conservative element of social organization that retains traditional tribal or ethnic identities in the face of often radical shifts in the economic and political environments of indigenous groups. Of particular interest here are studies of messianic movements as forms of religious conservatism coupled with situations of social resistance or even revolution. In the Andes such work has been stimulated largely by ethnohistorical studies of colonial messianisms by the Peruvian anthropologists Juan Ossio, Franklin Pease, and Luis Millones. Studies of lowland messianisms and messianic ideologies have been done by anthropologists William Crocker, Cezar L. Melatti, Stefano Varese, and Jonathan Hill, among others. Other studies have focused on the role of religion in the

consolidation of ethnic identities threatened by the encroachment of "modern" national societies. These include recent studies by Norman E. Whitten, Jr., in Amazonian Ecuador, the mythology collections of Orlando Villas Boas and Claudio Villas Boas in the Brazilian Xingu River area, and Miguel Chase-Sardi's studies of ethnicity and oral literatures in Paraguay.

At the opposite extreme to these studies of religious puritanism lie the studies of religious change. Although a concern with forms of religious syncretism—between, for example, Catholicism and indigenous cosmologies—has long been a central concern of anthropological treatments of religion, recent scholarship by anthropologist-ethnohistorians such as Henrique Urbano, Irene Silverblatt, Olivia Harris, Roger Rasnake, Inga Harman, and Tom Abercrombie has begun to unravel the dialectical processes involved in the historical formation of a religious ideology. In certain cases, they have even begun to question the historical origins of important aspects of religious practice long thought to be autochthonous. Of particular importance is the work of Pierre Duviols and Rolena Adorno, who have studied the cultural and literary influences informing those early accounts of religion upon which scholars depend for their reconstruction of pre-Columbian indigenous ritual and myth.

Yet another, and final, group of scholars has extended the historian's concern with the shifting social bases of religion to examine how indigenous modes of historical thought are reflected in and encoded by what we would consider "religious" practice and belief. Such scholars, including Xavier Albó, Joanne Rappaport, Catherine Allen, Gary Urton, and Michael Taussig, have examined how the construction of political movements, historical narratives, social hierarchies, and ideological classifications emerges from a constellation of daily activities and ritual gestures whose content is informed by religious belief. Their work points toward an eventual understanding of "religion" and "mythology" as active ideological processes through which indigenous people not only express a cultural view of historical causation, but also manipulate or control the representation and use of their own social histories and historical narratives for specific social and political ends.

[See also *Ge Mythology; Structuralism; and the biographies of Jensen and Preuss.*]

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DEBORAH A. POOLE

SOUTH ASIAN RELIGIONS. See Indian Religions; Himalayan Religions; and Sinhala Religion.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN RELIGIONS. [This entry surveys the religious diversity of the peoples and regions of Southeast Asia. It consists of three articles: Mainland Cultures; Insular Cultures; and Modern Movements in Insular Cultures.]

Mainland Cultures

Mainland Southeast Asia has been termed the "crossroad of religions," for in this region, today divided into the countries of Burma, Thailand, and Laos, Cambodia (Kampuchea), and Vietnam, a large diversity of autochthonous tribal religions are intermingled with Hinduism, Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity, as well as the modern secular faith of Marxist-Leninism. Beneath this diversity there are many religious practices and beliefs that have common roots in the prehistoric past of peoples of the region. This is not to say, as have some scholars, that the historic religions are merely a veneer and that those Southeast Asians who adhere to religions such as Buddhism have been, as Reginald LeMay said of the Northern Thai, animists from time immemorial. Although certain beliefs and practices can be seen as linking peoples of the present to ancient Southeast Asian religions, they have often been reformulated to make sense within worldviews shaped by historic religions. The processes of religious change have, moreover, intensified in the wake of radical shaking of traditional orders taking place throughout the twentieth century.

Mainland Southeast Asia is not only a region of religious diversity; it is also a veritable Babel. Insofar as historical linguistics permits us to reconstruct the past, it would appear that most of the earliest inhabitants of

the region spoke Austroasiatic languages ancestral to such modern-day descendants as Khmer and Mon. Many of the tribal peoples living in the highlands of central Vietnam and Laos, as well as a few groups found in northern Thailand and as far distant as Assam in India and Hainan Island belonging to China, speak Austroasiatic languages. Speakers of Austronesian languages, whose major modern-day representatives are the peoples of Indonesia, Malaysia, Micronesia, and Polynesia, as well as parts of Melanesia and Madagascar, were also present from prehistoric times in what is today southern Vietnam and the Malay Peninsula. Cham living in southern Vietnam and in Cambodia, as well as tribal peoples such as the Rhadé and Jarai in southern Vietnam, speak Austronesian languages. In the northern uplands of the region and in what is today northeastern India and southern China most peoples in prehistoric times appear to have spoken languages belonging to the Tibeto-Burman language family. The present-day Burmans and such tribal peoples as the Chin, Kachin, Lisu, Akha, and Lahu all speak Tibeto-Burman languages. Speakers of Tai (or Daic) languages seem to have originated in southern China and did not begin to settle in mainland Southeast Asia until much before the tenth century CE. Today, however, Thai (or Siamese), Lao, Northern Thai (or Yuan), and Shan—all speakers of Tai languages—constitute the major peoples of Thailand, Laos, and the Shan state of Burma, and Tai-speaking tribal peoples such as the Tho, Red Tai, Black Tai, and White Tai are found in northern Vietnam as well as northeastern Laos. Modern-day Vietnamese, which linguists assign to the distinctive Viet-Muong language family, is believed to have evolved from an Austroasiatic language that was transformed under the influence of Chinese. The distinctive Karennic languages spoken by peoples living on the eastern border of Burma and in parts of western Thailand are thought by linguists to be descendants of Tibeto-Burman stocks. Speakers of Miao-Yao languages, distantly connected to Tibeto-Burman and Sinitic language families, have migrated from southern China into mainland Southeast Asia only within the past century or so. Major migrations from China and India, spurred by the economic changes during the colonial period, also led to the introduction into the region of large numbers of speakers of Sinitic, Dravidian, and Indo-European languages.


Prehistoric Foundations. People have lived in mainland Southeast Asia for as long as there have been *Homo sapiens*, and there is evidence of *Homo erectus* and even earlier hominid forms in the region as well. Paleolithic hunting-and-gathering peoples must have constructed their religious understandings of the world out of images drawn from their experiences in their en-

vironments and from the workings of the human body. Beyond this, we can say little, for there is no mainland Southeast Asian equivalent of the cave paintings of Lascaux to provide insight into the world of Paleolithic man. It would, moreover, be quite illegitimate to project the religious beliefs of the Negritos of the Malay Peninsula, the last remaining significant groups of hunter-gatherers in the region, into the prehistoric past, for these beliefs have developed through as long a period as have other religions and have, moreover, been influenced by the religions of neighboring peoples. [See Negritos.]

The first significant evidence we have of religious beliefs and practices in mainland Southeast Asia comes from the period when humans in the region first began to live in settled agricultural communities. The domestication of rice, which may have taken place in mainland Southeast Asia before 4,000 BCE, led to the emergence of a powerful image that was to become incorporated in almost all of the religious traditions of the region. To this day, most Southeast Asians think of rice as having a spiritual as well as a material quality; rice, like man, has a vital essence and is typically associated with a feminine deity. The recognition of rice as fundamental to life among most peoples in mainland Southeast Asia has been intertwined in religious imagery with the nurturing attribute of a mother.

Neolithic burial sites, many only recently discovered, are proving to be sources of knowledge about prehistoric religions in Southeast Asia. The very existence of such sites suggests that those who took so much trouble to dispose of the physical remains of the dead must have had well-formed ideas about the afterlife and about the connection between the states of the dead and the living. In the mass burial sites of Ban Chiang and Non Nok Tha in northeastern Thailand, the graves contain many items, including pottery, tools, and metal jewelry. The items found in the graves may be interpreted, on the basis of ethnographic analogy, as constituting goods believed to be used by the dead in the afterlife. In communities in northeastern Thailand today, the dead are cremated in accord with Buddhist custom, but the practice of burning personal belongings of the deceased at the same time perpetuates a pre-Buddhist tradition.

In a Neolithic burial site in western Thailand, the grave of an old man was found to contain a perforated stone disk and an antler with the tines sawed off. Per Sørensen, the archaeologist who excavated the site, believes these items may represent the headdress of a shaman; if so, they would be the earliest evidence of shamanism in mainland Southeast Asia. Shamanism must have an ancient pedigree in the region because it is



Miao also known as Hmong. Yao also known as (lu) Mien. Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City (1975). Cambodia renamed Kampuchea (1976). People of Chinese and Indian descent concentrated in urban areas.

found among most tribal peoples. Among the most intriguing Neolithic burial sites are ones in central Laos where large stone jars were found containing cremated human remains. This discovery suggests either that cremation predates Indian influence in Southeast Asia or that the jars were used long after they had originally been constructed as depositories of remains by peoples who had adopted the Buddhist practice of cremation.

Sites mainly in northern Vietnam and southern China dating to the first millennium BCE contain bronze drums associated with assemblages termed Dong-Son after a site in northern Vietnam. Dong-Son-type drums were later distributed widely not only in mainland Southeast Asia but in the islands of the region as well, although manufacture of the drums apparently continued to be restricted to a rather small area in northern mainland Southeast Asia. In more recent times, drums have been used by tribal peoples such as the Karen in funerary rites, and some archaeologists believe that the drums were always associated with death customs. Boat designs found on some of the Neolithic drums have been interpreted as being symbols of the means whereby souls of the dead were conveyed to the afterworld. The soul-boat image is found in a number of Southeast Asian cultures today, and a prehistoric notion may have persisted also in transformed form in the Buddhist symbol of the boat that conveys the saved across the sea of *samsāra* to *nibbāna* (Skt., *nirvāṇa*). [See also *Drums and Boats*.]

The designs on the drums, including concentric circles, frogs, birds, snakes or dragons, human figures in headdresses, buildings, and in some southern Chinese drums miniature scenes of rituals, have been variously interpreted. Some understand these as indicating a type of shamanism in which the drum played a part; others have seen them as having totemic significance. It is quite probable that at least some drum designs encode a dualistic cosmology, symbolized in part by an opposition between birds and snakes/dragons. Of particular interest are the images of buildings on piles, which may probably be regarded as a type of ritual hall or perhaps a men's house, and which are clearly related both to those found in many tribal communities today and to the *dinh*, the communal ritual hall of the Vietnamese.

There was never a uniform Dongsonian culture in northern mainland Southeast Asia. Peoples of the region in late prehistoric times were often isolated from each other by the numerous ranges of hills and must have developed distinctive religious traditions. Even though drums were widely traded throughout the region, they were most certainly put to different ritual purposes by different peoples.

An older generation of scholars, best represented by

Robert Heine-Geldern, posited an underlying unity of prehistoric Southeast Asian religions that stemmed from the diffusion of a cultural complex from a single European source. While there were certainly contacts among peoples widely separated in Southeast Asia in prehistoric times, and while these contacts resulted in the diffusion of some practices and beliefs, most basic similarities must be understood to reflect the ordering of similar experiences (for example, those related to death, human fertility, cultivation of rice) that follow universal modes of human thought.

Drawing on later historical data as well as ethnographic analogy, Paul Mus, a distinguished student of Southeast Asian civilization argued that the autochthonous religions of protohistoric Southeast Asia coalesced around cults he termed "cadastral." Such cults were organized around images drawn from the local worlds of everyday experience. Spirits, such as the *nats* of various Tibeto-Burman peoples or the *phī* of the Tai, populated these worlds. [See *Nats*.] Humans were able to act in their worlds because they had "vital spirits," often conceived of as multiple, as with the Vietnamese *hon*, Khmer *pralu'n*, or Tai *khwan*. These vital spirits, which only in some cases constituted souls that gained immortal states after death, could leave the body for periods of time, but unless called back and secured—a practice widely seen among many peoples in Southeast Asia—the person would weaken and die.

These cadastral cults constituted the religions of agricultural peoples who had long since made rice their staple, although some cultivated it by swidden or slash-and-burn methods and others cultivated by irrigation. Rice also was believed to possess a vital spirit. Even today, peoples as diverse as the Chin in Burma, Lawa in northern Thailand, Lao in Laos, Jarai in southern Vietnam, and Khmer in Cambodia all perform rites after the harvest to call the spirit of the rice to ensure that it will provide essential nourishment when consumed. Some peoples also believe that other beings—especially the water buffalo used for plowing in wet-rice communities and elephants used for war and heavy labor—also have vital spirits.

The cosmologies of protohistoric Southeast Asian farmers, like those of primitive peoples throughout the world, were structured around fundamental oppositions. In Southeast Asia, the oscillation between the rainy rice-growing season and the dry fallow season found expression in such religious imagery. The fertility of the rainy season is widely associated with a female deity, the "rice mother," although a male image, that of the *nāga*, or dragon, and sometimes a crocodile, is also found in many traditions. [See *Nāgas and Yakṣas*.] In some cases—such as among the Cham, as attested by

seventh-century CE inscriptions—the female deity is a *nāgī*. The dry season finds expression in images of male creator gods associated with the sun. To this day, many peoples who have long been Buddhists still engage in rites that entail a dualistic conception of the cosmos. The Lao perform a rite toward the end of the dry season, heavy with sexual symbolism, at which they set off rockets to inform the gods that it is time to send the rains. At the end of the rainy season, when the rivers have flooded, another ceremony is held at which men compete in boat races. The boats, representing *nāgas*, serve to ensure that the earth as supreme *nāga* will accept the flood waters before they drown the rice. The concern with the power of the earth continues after the harvest when attention is turned to the Rice Mother, who is propitiated at the same time that the vital spirit of the rice is called.

The world in which protohistoric peoples lived was marked by uncertainty: crops might fail as a consequence of late rains or devastating floods; women might be barren, die in childbirth, or lose child after child; and both men and women might die young. Hence, people wished to influence the spirits and cosmic forces that controlled fertility and life. The fundamental method of gaining the favor of spiritual powers was through sacrifices. Human sacrifice was rare in mainland Southeast Asia, although the Wa of northern Burma and southern China even in recent times took heads to offer at New Year rites. Most peoples sacrificed domestic animals, with lesser rites requiring a chicken and more important rites, a pig or even a carabao. In tribal groups such as those in Burma and northeastern India, those men who organized large-scale sacrifices and the so-called feasts of merit associated with them acquired not only the esteem of their fellows but also a spiritual quality that was believed to persist even after their death. Such tribal chiefs are assumed to be similar to what O. W. Wolters calls “men of prowess,” who were the heads of protohistoric chiefdoms. What is noteworthy about the tribal chiefs, and presumably about the earlier men of the same type, is that because of the vagaries of life, their potency could never be firmly established. Attempts were made to fix this potency by making the remains of men of prowess objects of cultic attention, especially by those who succeeded them. Rough stone monuments associated with early Cham culture in southern Vietnam and upright stones found together with the prehistoric stone jars in Laos have been interpreted, by analogy with the practice by such modern tribal peoples as Chin of Burma and related groups in northeastern India, as monuments that perpetuated and localized the potency of men who had succeeded during their lifetimes in effecting a relationship between the society and the cosmos. Such monu-

ments were to lend themselves to reinterpretation in Hindu-Buddhist terms when Indian influences began to appear in Southeast Asia.

Historical Transformations. Prior to the adoption of Indian or Chinese models, there appears to have been no priesthood in any Southeast Asian society capable of enforcing an orthopraxy among peoples living over a wide area. As the ritual effectiveness of men of prowess waxed and waned, so did the relative power of the polities they headed, thus giving rise to a classic pattern of oscillation between “democratic” and “autocratic” communities found among tribal peoples such as the Kachin of Burma even in recent years. What made it possible for Southeast Asians to imagine themselves as parts of communities whose members, both living and dead, were not all known personally was the introduction of religious conceptions fixed in written texts.

Some evidence, especially from among tribal peoples in what is today southern China, suggests that writing was invented independently by Southeast Asian peoples. However, the historical fact is that the earliest written records are either in some form of Indian script or in Chinese logographs. With these borrowed writing systems came Indian and Chinese texts, rites rooted in the texts, and institutions to perform the rites and perpetuate the textual traditions.

Sinitic influences. Chinese influences appear first in conjunction with the Han conquest of what is now northern Vietnam. Between the first Han movement into the area, in 124 BCE, and 43 CE, when the Chinese suppressed a rebellion led by the legendary Trung sisters, Chinese influence appears to have lain rather lightly on the Vietnamese. From the first century CE, however, the Vietnamese came increasingly to see themselves as part of a Sinitic world, which they knew through the same texts as were used in China proper. This sense of belonging to a Chinese world remained even after the Vietnamese gained independence from China in the eleventh century.

The Chinese model was most significant for literati—the Confucian mandarin, Mahāyāna Buddhist monks, and even some Taoist priests—who derived their cultural understanding of the world from Chinese and Sino-Vietnamese texts. As none of these literati ever attained the role of a dominant priesthood in the villages, pre-Sinitic traditions, centered on a multitude of local spirits and deities, continued to be perpetuated by spirit mediums, soothsayers, and sorcerers (*thay*). Those Vietnamese who moved out of the Red River delta in the “push to the south” that began in the thirteenth century and continued into recent times came into contact with other traditions—those of the hinduized Cham and Khmer, the Buddhist Khmer, and local tribal peoples. In part because of significant non-Sinitic influences in

southern Vietnam, the impress of Chinese culture was somewhat less evident in the popular culture of that region than in that of northern Vietnam. Vietnamese in southern Vietnam have to the present often turned to non-Sinitic religious practitioners—montagnard sorcerers and Theravāda monks, for example—for help in confronting fundamental difficulties in their lives. Many of the religiously inspired peasant rebellions originating in southern Vietnam as well as some modern syncretic popular religions have drawn inspiration from non-Chinese sources. This said, Vietnamese religion in all parts of the country has assumed a distinctly Sinitic cast, being organized primarily around ancestor worship in the Chinese mode. Elsewhere in mainland Southeast Asia, only migrant Chinese and those tribal peoples such as the Hmong and Mien who have lived long in Chinese-dominated areas show similar concern with ancestor worship. [See also Vietnamese Religion and Ancestors, *article on Ancestor Worship*.]

Indian influences. In those areas of mainland Southeast Asia where Indian influences first appeared in the early centuries of the common era, individuals were rarely apotheosized for being apical ancestors in a line of descent. If, however, a man (but rarely a woman) succeeded in his lifetime in demonstrating through effective action in ritual and in warfare that he possessed some charismatic quality, this quality could continue to be influential after the individual's death by giving him a cosmic body to replace his worldly one. The earliest monuments of indianized civilization in Southeast Asia appeared in significant numbers between the fourth and eighth century CE. Particular examples are Śiva *linga* of the Cham in southern Vietnam, the Buddhist *semā* (Skt., *sīmā*) or boundary markers with scenes from the life of the Buddha or from the Jātakas in bas-relief found in Dvāravatī sites in northeastern Thailand, and the stupas at Beikthano and Śrīkṣetra in central Burma, Thaton in lower Burma, and Nakhon Pathom in central Thailand. These monuments can best be interpreted as having been put up to elevate a man of prowess to a divine form. Whereas an older generation of historians often associated early historical sites in mainland Southeast Asia with large kingdoms, most historians now accept that there were many petty kingdoms in the area whose power waxed and waned much as did that of the chiefdoms that preceded them. The proliferation of monuments, a pattern that climaxes in the classical civilizations of Angkor in Cambodia and Pagan in Burma, most likely represents a continuing effort by new kings, their families, and their rivals to establish their own claims to be identified with divine and cosmic power.

Influential mainland Southeast Asians who worked with Indian texts made minimal use of the Indian idea

that one's place within the world was fixed at birth by some cosmic plan. The caste system did not survive the voyage across the Bay of Bengal except in a very modified form, whereby kings claimed to be *kṣatriya*; even then a man of quite lowly origins could become a *kṣatriya* by successfully usurping the throne and clothing himself in sacralized regalia.

The process of indianization in Southeast Asia included identifying a power believed to be embodied in a local shrine with divine or cosmic powers known in Indian texts. This made possible the creation of larger polities, since peoples in very different parts of a realm saw themselves as part of the same cosmos and worshiped the same gods, often gods who were also equated with the rulers. The polity was a *maṇḍala*, the "circle of a king," a domain in which a particular ruler succeeded in being viewed as the link between the world and the cosmos. The kings who founded Angkor near the Great Lake in Cambodia in the ninth century were notably successful in establishing a cult of the *devarāja*, a god-king, whose *maṇḍala* included at its height all of present-day Cambodia, the Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam, and central and northeastern Thailand. The *devarāja* cult centered on the assimilation of the king to Śiva, as represented by a lingam. The capital was a place where, through erection of temples, dedicated not only to Śiva but also to Viṣṇu and other Hindu gods and to *bodhisattvas*, each king could ensure that his *maṇḍala* was a microcosm of the cosmos. While the Angkorean empire experienced a number of defeats by rulers of other *maṇḍalas*, it was not until the fifteenth century that it finally ended; by this time, the religious orientations of the populace had begun to change radically.

On the western side of mainland Southeast Asia, Burmese kings also succeeded in establishing a *maṇḍala*, that of Pagan, that between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries rivaled the splendor and power of Angkor. Although the Burmese kings promoted cults that usually equated them with the Buddha rather than with Hindu gods, the stupas and temples they built were like the Hindu and Mahāyāna temples at Angkor; they were both funerary monuments in which the kings became immortalized, albeit in this case in Buddhist terms, and re-creations of the sacred cosmos. In both Pagan and Angkor, Meru, the sacred mountain that lies at the center of the universe and is also an *axis mundi*, was represented in the temple or stupa erected by a king.

The *maṇḍala* organized around a shrine that served as an *axis mundi* became the model for villages as well as capitals. In nearly every village in Buddhist Southeast Asia, a stupa has been erected. Those who contribute to its construction believe they gain merit that will ensure a better rebirth and perhaps even rebirth at the time of the next Buddha, Metteyya (Skt., Maitreya). The

localized cults of the relics of the Buddha link Southeast Asians not only with early Indian Buddhism but also with the cosmographic practices of the rulers of the classical indianized states and beyond that with the cadastral cults of pre-indianized Southeast Asia. [See also *Stupa Worship*.]

The cult of the relics of the Buddha does not constitute the whole of Buddhism as practiced in Southeast Asia. Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, missionary monks established a Theravāda Buddhist orthodoxy among the majority of peoples, both rural and urban, living in what are today Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. In a sense, orthodox Buddhism made sense to Southeast Asians because of the pre-Buddhist idea that religious virtue is not a product solely of descent from particular ancestors but also a consequence of one's own religiously effective actions. In Buddhist terms, this idea was formulated so that people understood that although they were born with a certain karmic legacy of both merit and demerit they also continually acquire new merit and demerit from morally significant acts. [See also *Merit, article on Buddhist Concepts*.]

Those who became adherents of Theravāda Buddhism also retained pre-Buddhist beliefs in spirits and deities. These beliefs were given new significance in the context of a Buddhist worldview. Some of the supernatural beings were universalized and identified with Hindu deities also known to Buddhism. More significantly, spirits and deities were accorded a subordinate place within the Buddhist cosmic hierarchy generated by the law of *karman*. Beliefs in pre-Buddhist concepts of the vital spirit—the *leikpya* of the Burmese, the *khwan* of the Tai, the *pralu'n* of the Khmer—also remained and continued to be part of ritual. These beliefs were, however, reformulated to take into account the Buddhist teaching that the soul is not immortal and that “consciousness” (Pali, *viññāṇa*) links one life with the next.

The Theravāda revolution in mainland Southeast Asia did not lead to the demise of the *maṅḍala*; on the contrary, it led local lords to demonstrate their effectiveness by claiming to be righteous rulers and validating such claims by asserting their independence or even embarking on military ventures to extend their domains at the expense of other lords. Despite the political fragmentation of premodern Buddhist societies, all could conceive of being part of a common Buddhist world. Such a conception was expressed, for example, in the recognition of important pilgrimage shrines—ones containing relics of the Buddha—that lay in other domains. [See *Pilgrimage, article on Buddhist Pilgrimage in South and Southeast Asia*.]

The success of Theravāda Buddhism led to a much

sharper distinction between the religious traditions of the peoples of the western part of mainland Southeast Asia and those east of the Annamite cordillera. Not only were the Vietnamese becoming increasingly sinicized, but the Cham, who had once had an important indianized culture in southern Vietnam, turned from this tradition and embraced Islam, a religion that was becoming established among other Austronesian-speaking peoples in major societies of the Indonesian archipelago and on the Malay Peninsula.

Tribal peoples in Southeast Asia, mainly located in highland areas where they practiced swidden cultivation, did not remain totally isolated from the changes occurring in the lowlands. A myth among many tribal peoples in the northern part of the region tells of a “lost book” or “lost writing.” The Kachin version of the myth is typical. Ninggawn wa Magam, the deity from whom humans acquired culture, called all the different tribes of humans together. To each tribe he gave a book to help them in their lives. Shans and Burmans received books written on palm leaves; Chinese and foreigners (i.e., Westerners) received books on paper; and Kachin received a book of parchment. The Kachin, not truly understanding the significance of the book, ate it and have been without writing ever since. The myth reveals a sense on the part of tribal peoples of being culturally deprived relative to those who have writing.

When tribal peoples have turned to expand their horizons, they have tended to do so through acquiring access to the literature of their lowland neighbors. The Lawā, an Austroasiatic tribal people in Thailand, see themselves as Buddhists, like their Northern Thai neighbors, but unable to practice the religion in the hills where they have no monks to instruct them. When they move down from the hills, however, they quickly transform themselves into Northern Thai. Mien, who are found more in southern China than in Southeast Asia, long ago developed a tradition of craft literacy, with ritual specialists being able to read Taoist texts in Chinese. An interesting variant on the myth is found among some Karen in Burma, who were converted in significant numbers to Christianity beginning early in the nineteenth century. Their myth tells how the book will be returned to them by foreign brothers who are identified with the Western missionaries. Even among Karen, however, more have become Buddhist than have become Christian.

Missionization—not only by Christians but in recent years by Buddhists—and the spread of modern systems of compulsory education have rendered tribal religions increasingly peripheral. So, too, have improved health care and secular education undermined beliefs in spirits that were previously elements of the religions of

Southeast Asian Buddhists and Vietnamese. Moreover, as agriculture has been transformed by large-scale irrigation works and the introduction of new technology and new high-yield varieties of rice, peoples in the region have become less inclined to credit supernatural powers with the control over fertility. They may continue to perform traditional rites, but these are becoming more secular celebrations than sources of religious meaning. Nonetheless, even as the worlds of Southeast Asians are radically transformed by political-economic forces and cultural changes that have occurred over the past century and a half, there still remains among many the ancient idea of cultivating virtue through morally effective action.

[See also Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia*; Theravāda; Kingship, *article on Southeast Asian Kingship*; and Islam, *article on Islam in Southeast Asia*. For a discussion of the interrelation of popular and elite traditions in local Buddhist cultures, see Folk Religion, *article on Folk Buddhism*; for specific regional cultures, see Thai Religion; Burmese Religion; Lao Religion; and Khmer Religion. See also Megalithic Religions, *article on Historical Cultures*. For an overview of church-state relations in the Buddhist societies of the mainland, see Saṃgha, *article on Saṃgha and Society*.]

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Insular Cultures

The cultures of insular Southeast Asia are made up predominantly of peoples speaking Austronesian languages, and the traditional religions of the area, despite substantial diversity and extensive borrowing from other sources, retain significant features that reflect a common origin. Linguistic evidence indicates that the point of origin of the languages of present-day Austronesians was the island of Taiwan (Formosa) and possibly also the adjacent coastal region of southeastern China. The initial expansion of the Austronesians began in the third millennium BCE and proceeded, by stages, through the Philippines and the islands of Indonesia, then east to the islands of the Pacific, and eventually west as far as the island of Madagascar.

In the first stage of this expansion, migrating Austronesian groups possessed a basic cultural technology that included the domesticated dog and pig, a knowledge of the cultivation of rice, millet, and sugarcane, and a developing craftsmanship in pottery, weaving, and barkcloth making. At a later stage in the course of this continuing expansion, the Austronesians developed

further forms of cultivation involving breadfruit, bananas, taro, and yams and the use of a variety of fruit-bearing or starch-yielding palms. By this time they also possessed domesticated chickens and had developed sails for their canoes and some of the sailing techniques that were to carry them from island to island. By about 2500 BCE they had expanded through the southern Philippines and into Borneo and had begun to penetrate the islands of both eastern and western Indonesia.

Because this expansion involved a scattering of numerous small groups through thousands of islands over several millennia, it gave rise to considerable linguistic and cultural diversity. Earlier island populations were undoubtedly assimilated, although there is very little linguistic evidence on these peoples except for those in Melanesia.

Regional variation is indicated by the various linguistic subgroups of Austronesian that are currently recognized. Formosan languages are distinguished from Malayo-Polynesian languages within the Austronesian family and the Malayo-Polynesian languages are divided into (1) a western subgroup that includes the languages of the Philippines, Borneo, Madagascar, and western Indonesia as far as the island of Sumbawa, (2) a central subgroup that begins in eastern Sumbawa and comprises the languages of the Lesser Sundas and most of the Moluccas, and (3) an eastern subgroup that includes the languages of southern Halmahera and all of the languages of the Pacific.

In the course of migration, natural ecological variation as well as numerous outside influences led to the development, emphasis, or even abandonment of different elements of a general Neolithic culture. In the equatorial zones, for example, reliance on rice and millet gave way to a greater dependence on tubers and on fruit- and starch-gathering activities. As populations moved into the interior of the larger islands some sailing skills were abandoned, but a coastal or riverine orientation was generally maintained. During most of their protohistory, Austronesian populations lived in impermanent settlements and combined shifting cultivation with hunting and gathering. The development toward centralized states began on Java, on the coast of Sumatra, and in several other coastal areas that were open to trade and outside influences. Chief among these influences were religious ideas and inspiration that derived variously, at different periods, from Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity.

The earliest Hindu inscriptions found in insular Southeast Asia date from the fourth century CE; their location and composition, however, suggest a long period of prior regional contact with Indian religious ideas. By the fifth century, Hinduism is reliably re-



ported to have been established on Java, and by the sixth century, there is evidence of Buddhist influence on Sumatra and Java, with the port of Śrīvijaya developing into a major Buddhist center of learning in the seventh century. Javanese monuments dating from the eighth to the fourteenth centuries indicate a lively development and interrelation of Śaivaite, Vaiṣṇavite, and Buddhist traditions. By the thirteenth century, Islam had begun to spread through the islands and exert a major influence. By the fifteenth century, Catholicism had reached the region with the arrival of the Portuguese and Spanish, and by the sixteenth century, Protestantism had made its appearance with the Dutch and English. In addition, the popular traditions of Taoism and Confucianism were brought to the region by Chinese traders and settlers. Both individually and together these religions have had a profound effect in shaping religious practice in the region.

At present, 88 to 89 percent of the Indonesian population is classified as Muslim, although a significant portion of this population, particularly on Java, still adheres to traditional practices that are not considered orthodox. In the Philippines, approximately 84 percent of the population is Catholic; 3 percent is Protestant; and a further 5 percent are classified as Aglipayan, followers of an independent Philippine Christian church. Muslims constitute a small minority of approximately 5 percent in the Philippines, while Christians make up about 9 percent of the Indonesian population. In Indonesia, Bali forms a traditional Hindu-Buddhist enclave but there has occurred a recent resurgence of Hinduism on Java and elsewhere. Many members of the Chinese population of Indonesia are officially considered Buddhists, although some continue to practice forms of Taoism or Confucianism. A considerable portion are also Christian. Official statistics from Indonesia and the Philippines thus indicate only a small minority of the population in either country as official adherents of some form of traditional religion. In Sarawak and Sabah, adherents of tradition constitute a high percentage of the population of their local area, but in Malaysia as a whole they are a minority. In Brunei, similar groups form an even smaller minority.

National policies of the countries of the region affect the practice of traditional religions. Indonesia gives official recognition only to Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, with the result that in effect no traditional religion is regarded as a religion. In some areas a tacit tolerance of traditional practices has developed, but in general there is mounting pressure to assimilate to an officially recognized religion. On the basis of early cultural borrowings and some sim-

ilarity in forms of worship, various ethnic groups have gained recognition of their traditional religion as a Hindu sect. In the Philippines, missionary efforts by both Catholics and Protestants have been directed to conversion of the remaining adherents of tribal religions. In Sarawak and Sabah, there is pressure to convert to Islam as well as to Christianity. In all the countries of the region the adherents of traditional religions are minorities whose distinct ways of life are under pressure to change. Generally, they participate only at the margins of national life.

The tribal religions of the region vary according to the groups that continue to practice them. These groups include small, often isolated peoples whose economy is based primarily on hunting and gathering with limited cultivation. Examples of such groups are the Sakkudei of the island of Siberut off the coast of western Sumatra; various wandering bands of Kubu scattered in the interior forests of Sumatra; groups of a similar kind in Kalimantan who are referred to generically as Punan; as well as a variety of other small-scale societies on other islands—the Agta and other Aeta of Luzon, the Batak of Palawan, the Da'a or To Lare of Sulawesi (Celebes), or the Alifuru groups, such as the Huaulu and Nuauulu, of Ceram in eastern Indonesia. Many of these groups, with their simplified technology, no longer possess the range of economic pursuits attributed to the early Austronesians. Other adherents of traditional religions include the unconverted members of larger, economically and socially more complex populations: some Batak, particularly Karo, from north Sumatra; Ngaju communities in Kalimantan; various Toraja peoples in Sulawesi; as well as the Sumbanese, Savunese, and Timorese in eastern Indonesia. Sumba has the distinction of being the only island in Indonesia where a majority of the population profess to follow their traditional religion.

Some of these Indonesian populations have formally established religious associations to preserve their traditional practices and some have come to be identified as followers of Hindu-Dharma, a status that affords them official government recognition. This is one possibility available to members of the Toraja "Alukta," the Batak "Pelbegu," the Ngaju "Kaharingan," and the Bugis "Towani."

In the Philippines, a majority of the indigenous peoples in the mountains of northern Luzon (among them the Isneg, Ifugao, Bontok, Ibaloi, Kalinga, and Ilongot), in Mindoro (the Hanunoo, Buhid, and Alangan), and in the interior of Mindanao (the Subanun, Bukidnon, Tiruray, Manobo, Bagabo, and Mandaya) have retained their traditional religions despite increasing mis-

sionary efforts. In Sarawak, similar tribal peoples include the Iban, Kayan, Kenyah, and Kelabit; in Sabah, the Dusun, Murut, and Lun Dayeh; all of these tribal populations and other small groups as well have undergone conversion to Christianity in varying degrees.

Other adherents of traditional religion are more difficult to classify. Some form small enclaves, often consisting of no more than a few villages, whose traditional practices represent nonacceptance of the dominant religion of their region. Such groups would include the Badui (or Kanekes) of West Java, the Tengger of East Java, and the Waktu Tiga villagers of Lombok. All of these three groups maintain special priesthoods. Badui priests are confined to an inner territorial realm, whereas among the Tengger, there is one priest for each of twenty-eight villages. Both groups claim to preserve an "Agama Budha," which refers not to a form of Buddhism but to a pre-Islamic fusion of Indic and local practice. The Tengger priests, for example, follow an ancient Śaiva liturgy that is kept secret from the village population, who see their worship as an ancestral cult.

Many of the millenarian movements that have occurred in Indonesia and the Philippines can be seen as religious movements and the communities of members of these movements, such as the Kesepuhan in West Java, the Samin of Central Java, or the Rizalistas of Luzon, may also be considered as traditional religious adherents. In addition, many other individuals and groups carry on traditional rituals under nominal adherence to another formally recognized religion. On the island of Flores, for example, the people of Tana Wai Brama continue to maintain their traditional ceremonial cycle, even though they are formally classified as Catholics. The same is true for other populations, both Christian and Muslim, throughout the islands. Official statistics are therefore often misleading in assessing the extent of traditional religious adherence.

Studies of traditional religion, many of which have been written by missionaries or colonial administrators, document beliefs and practices that have since been either abandoned or modified through the process of conversion. Significant evidence on traditional religion is also derived from present practices and general conceptions that have been incorporated and retained in the major recognized religions in the course of their accommodation to the traditions of the region.

Chief among these basic conceptions and practices are the following: (1) the prevalence of complementary duality; (2) the belief in the immanence of life and in the interdependence of life and death; (3) the reliance on specific rituals to mark stages in the processes of life

and death; and (4) the celebration of spiritual differentiation. All of these notions may be regarded as part of a common Austronesian conceptual heritage.

The Prevalence of Complementary Duality. Forms of complementary dualism are singularly pervasive in the religions of the region. Such dualism figures prominently, for example, in a wide variety of myths of the origin of the cosmos that combine themes of reproduction and destruction. Among the Ngaju of Kalimantan (Borneo) creation begins when the mountain abodes of the two supreme deities clash repeatedly, bringing forth the upperworld and underworld and various of its parts; in the next phase of the creation, male and female hornbills of the two deities, perched on the tree of life, renew the struggle, destroying the tree but in the process creating the first man and woman. Among the Toraja of Sulawesi the universe originates from the marriage of heaven and earth: heaven lies upon the broad earth and, as they separate, the land is revealed and all their divine children, including the sun and moon, come forth. Among the Mambai of east Timor, a formless hermaphroditic being molds and shelters Mother Earth and Father Heaven; they separate and the pregnant Mother Earth bears the first mountain, known as the Great Father. Heaven descends upon Earth again and from their union are born the first trees and rocks and the first men and women. At each birth, the waters of the world increase, until Father Heaven eventually abandons Mother Earth, who is left to decompose and disintegrate.

Ideas of complementary duality are reflected in ideas about the principal divinity, who is often conceived of as a paired being (Mahatala/Jata among the Ngaju, Amawolo/Amarawi among the Sumbanese, or Nian Tana/Lero Wulan among the Ata Tana Ai); in ideas about categories of spirits, heroes, and other ancestral figures; in ideas about the division of sacred space: upperworld and underworld, upstream and downstream, mountainward and seaward, or inside and outside; and above all, in ideas about classes of persons and the order of participants in the performance of rituals.

Major celebrations based on this complementarity can become a form of ritual combat that reenacts the reproductive antagonisms of creation. To chose but one example, the Savunese of eastern Indonesia gather on the day preceding the night of a full moon to form male and female groups according to lineage affiliation; they position themselves at the upper and lower end of a sacred enclosure on the top of a particular hill. There they engage in ceremonial cockfighting that is timed to reach its crescendo precisely at noon. This high cosmological drama is based on a series of complementary opposi-

tions: the conjunction of male and female, the union of the upper and lower divisions of the cosmos, and the antagonism of spirits of the mountain and sea, all of which are timed to climax when the sun is at its zenith and the moon at its fullest.

A significant feature of the traditional religions of the region is the preservation of sacred knowledge through special forms of ritual language that are characterized by the pervasive use of parallelism. Parallelism is a form of dual phraseology and, in its most canonical form, results in a strict dyadic expression of all ritual statements. The following lines, excerpted from a traditional Rotinese mortuary chant, give an idea of the parallelism of such ritual poetry:

Delo Iuk has died
 So plant an areca nut at her foot
 And Soma Lopo has perished
 So plant a coconut at her head
 Let the coconut grow fruit for her head
 And let the areca nut grow flowerstalks for her feet.

This parallelism, which is a common feature of oral composition, resembles in form the parallelism that is to be found in the sacred literatures of other peoples of the world. (Both the *Psalms* and the *Popol Vuh* of the Quiche Maya provide good examples of such canonical parallelism.) Myths of the Batak, of the people of Nias, of the Ngaju, Kendayan, and Mualang Dayak, of the Toraja, and of a majority of the peoples of eastern Indonesia adhere to relatively strict forms of parallelism, whereas the myths of other traditional religious adherents follow freer forms of parallel compositions. In all cases, a form of duality is an essential part of the very process of composition.

Conceptions of complementary dualism continue to pervade even those societies that have adopted Hinduism, Islam, or Christianity. Balinese society is replete with dualism. The opposition between Barong and Rangda, which forms one of Bali's best-known dramatic temple performances, is a particularly striking example of complementary dualism. The Javanese *wayang*, or shadow theater, is similarly based on forms of dual opposition. Although the initial basis for many of the most important dramas was Indian, the Javanese have developed and extended these dramas to suit local conceptions. In the *Bhāratayuddha* (in the Javanese version of the Hindu epic *Mahābhārata*), the Pandawa heroes defeat and destroy their cousins, the Korawa. Yet according to the *Korawasrama*, an important Javanese text for which there exists no Sanskrit equivalent, the Korawa are resuscitated to continue their struggle with Pandawa for, as the text asserts: "How could the world be well ordered if the Korawa and Pandawa no longer ex-

isted? Are they not the content of the world?" [See also Drama, *article on Javanese Wayang*.]

Belief in the Immanence of Life. Virtually all of the traditional religions of the region are predicated on a belief in the immanence of life. In the literature this concept is often simplistically referred to as "animism." In traditional mythologies, creation did not occur *ex nihilo*: the cosmos was violently quickened into life and all that exists is thus part of a living cosmic whole. Life is evident everywhere in a multitude of forms whose manifestation can be complex, particularistic, but also transitory. There are many different classes of beings, including humans, whose origin may be identified in some mythological account but the system is inherently open and other classes of beings may be recognized whose origin is unknown, even though their manifestation is evident. In many of the traditional religions there is no single origin of humankind. Commonly, humans either descended from a heavenly sphere or emerged from earth or sea; yet, often, the origin of some categories of humans is left unexplained. The openness of these systems does not necessarily involve indifference so much as a recognition of the limitations of human knowledge.

Although there exists an ultimate ground of identity to all manifestations of life, the traditional view makes no assumption of identity or equality among particular manifestations. The result is a general acceptance of a plurality of beings and at the same time, especially in the mystic traditions elaborated in Java, a recognition of the oneness of the individual with the whole in the commonality of life.

The traditional religions differ markedly, however, in their classification of categories or classes of beings. Priests of the Ifugao, for example, are reported to be able to distinguish over fifteen hundred spirits or deities, who are divided into forty classes. By contrast, the Rotinese recognize two broad classes of spirits—those of the inside and those of the outside—and are only concerned with naming the spirits of the inside. The traditional religions also differ significantly in attitudes to the spirit world. For some, all spirits are potentially malevolent and must be placated; in others, benevolent spirits are called upon to intervene against troublesome spirits. In the majority, however, attitudes vary according to types of spirits. The result is a kind of spiritual empiricism in which various ritual procedures are employed as experiments to see what occurs. Often this is highly individualistic: what works for one person may not work for another. In general, all traditional religions aim to achieve some form of ritual balance that accords each category of life its appropriate due.

Although rarely accorded philosophical justification

except in the more consciously elaborate traditional religions, there exists the underlying assumption that, since all is part of a whole, any part can stand for the whole. Among the simplest but most common microcosmic representations of the macrocosm are rock and tree, whose union is variously interpreted as the primordial source of life and as the progenitorial conjunction of male and female. Other representations abound. Ceremonial space may be constructed to mirror the whole: villages, houses, or ships may be symbolically arranged on a macrocosmic basis, or particular objects, such as the *kayon* that is held up to begin and end a *wayang* performance, the four-cornered *raga-raga* rack that hangs suspended in a traditional Batak house, or merely a flag and flagpole, can be vested with all-embracing cosmic significance. Frequently, the human body itself may represent the whole of the cosmos. All such representations have a potency that is centered, ordered, and ultimately diffused outward.

A fundamental feature of the traditional religions is their recognition that life depends upon death, that creation derives from dissolution. This is the emphatic theme of most myths of creation and is repeated in origin tales and in much folklore. In widespread tales of the origin of the cultivation of rice, millet, or of various tubers, for example, the first sprouts or shoots of the new crop come from the body of some ancestral figure. Moreover, since life comes from death, the ancestral dead or specific deceased persons, whose lives were marked by notable attainments, are regarded as capable of bestowing life-giving potency. Thus the dead figure prominently in the religious activities of the living and the tombs of the dead are often sources of religious benefit. In some areas, as on Sumba, the tombs of the dead occupy the center of the village; elsewhere they form the focal point of pilgrimage.

The chief sacrificial animals in the traditional religions are the chicken, the dog, and the pig (although among those populations that keep them the water buffalo is by far the most important sacrificial animal). Sacrifice generally involves creative analogies on an ordered scale. The people of Nias, who perform spectacular pig sacrifices, describe themselves as "God's pigs." In the mortuary ceremonies of the Toraja, the sacrificial water buffalo is identified with the deceased but, in other contexts, can represent the entire descent group. Among the Rotinese, as among other peoples of Southeast Asia, the water buffalo can also be analogically identified with the whole of the cosmos and sacrifice can thus be conceived as a reenactment of creation.

The entrails of chickens and the livers of pigs frequently provide a means of divination within a sacrificial context. These forms of divination, as well as oth-

ers, such as the augury of birds or divination by spear, together with spirit possession form part of a complex revelatory process by which humans seek to interpret the wishes and intentions of the spirit powers.

Rituals of Life and Death. The rituals of the different traditional religions of the region invariably constitute part of a continuing process or cycle and are primarily concerned with the enhancement of life, either the life of particular persons or the life of large collectivities, including that of the cosmos as a totality. Life-cycle rituals mark the process of life and death. They may be seen to begin with marriage—the union of male and female—and proceed through specific stages. Prominent among these rituals are those that mark the seventh month of a woman's pregnancy, haircutting, tooth filing, circumcision (which may have had a pre-Islamic origin but has been given increased significance through the influence of Islam), the coming of adulthood through marriage, and the formation of an autonomous household, which in many societies centers on the celebration of the completion of a house. In numerous societies, tattooing is a physical marking of this process of development and special tattoos are used to identify individuals who can claim outstanding achievements. Often tattoos are regarded as a prerequisite for admission as well as individual identification in the world after death.

Death rituals are part of the same process as those of life and in general are celebrated throughout the region with great elaboration. Death rituals are also performed in stages commencing with burial and continuing sometimes for years. Such rituals are believed to chart, or even effect, the progress of the spirit of the deceased in its journey or elevation through the afterworld. Major celebrations often occur long after initial burial, when only the bones of the deceased remain. These bones, separated from the flesh, may either be reburied in a special sepulcher or reunited in a single tomb with the bones of other members of the descent group. Often the groups involved in performing these mortuary rituals complete and reverse the exchanges that began at the marriage ceremony of the parents of the deceased, thus ending one phase and beginning the next phase of a continuing cycle. On Bali, a Hindu cremation marks a comparable stage following a similar pattern, whereas in Java and elsewhere, despite an Islamic requirement of immediate burial, the spirits of the dead are given regular offerings and the tombs of former great rulers and leaders are prominent places of pilgrimage.

A feature of many of the rituals of life and death is their botanic idiom, which reflects a common Austronesian agricultural inheritance. The rituals describe a process of planting, growing, and ripening into old age; af-

ter the harvest comes the renewal of the cycle with the planting of new seed. Thus the rituals of the life cycle often parallel those of the agricultural cycle. Conceptually they are part of the same process.

Headhunting was once a prominent feature of the social life of many of the peoples of the region. Although this form of limited warfare was given various cultural interpretations, headhunting was frequently linked in rituals to the general cycle of death and renewal. In this sense, headhunting was a form of "harvest" in which particular individuals were able to achieve great renown.

The Celebration of Spiritual Differentiation. In the traditional religions of the region, there is no presumption of identity attached to any of the manifestations of life. Creation produced myriad forms of being and the processes of life that began in the past continue to the present. Generally, not even mankind is credited with a single origin or source of being. The result is an essential openness to life, a basic acceptance of life's many manifestations, and ultimately a celebration of spiritual differentiation.

The tendency in most traditional religions is to personalize whatever may be considered a manifestation of life. Included among such manifestations are the heavenly spheres—the sun, moon, and stars; the forces of nature—thunder, lightning, or great winds; points of geographical prominence—high mountain peaks, volcanic craters, waterfalls, caves, or old trees; places endowed with unusual significance as the result of past occurrences—sites of abandoned settlement, a former meeting place of some spirit, or the point of a past, powerful dream; and simpler iconic representations of life—ancient ancestral possessions, royal regalia, amulets, and other objects of specially conceived potency. Veneration for all such objects is accorded to the potency that the objects are considered to possess, but only as long as this potency is evident. Confrontation with any new source of unknown power requires a kind of ritual empiricism to discover precisely what is that power's appropriate due.

In social terms, these spiritual premises are conducive to notions of precedence and hierarchy. No society in the region is without some form of social differentiation. Even in the simplest of tribal societies the birth order of the children of the same parents becomes a means for such distinctions. In many societies—perhaps a majority of the societies of the region—forms and degrees of differentiation are endowed with considerable importance. The populations of many of these societies regard themselves as derived of different ancestral origins or even of different classes of creation. Thus, for example, the ranked class structures of the Ngaju of Kalimantan, of the Bugis of south Sulawesi, or of the

peoples of Sumba or Tanimbar in eastern Indonesia are all predicated on distinct creations.

Equally, the same spiritual premises may promote notions of achievement. A recurrent image of life involves the metaphor of the "journey of achievement." Myths recount the founding journeys of the ancestors, folk tales extol the attainments of heroic journeys, and dreams and séances can take the form of a spiritual journey. Furthermore, many societies encourage a period of journeying in early adulthood as a means of gaining knowledge, wealth, fame, and experience.

Literally and spiritually, individuals are distinguished by their journeys. Rank, prowess, and the attainment of wealth can be taken as evident signs of individual enhancement in a life's odyssey, and this enhancement may be celebrated through major rituals, both in life and after death. In many traditional religions, mortuary rituals and the feasting that generally accompanies them are the primary indicators of a person's social and spiritual position and are intended to translate this position into a similarly enhanced position in the afterlife. These rituals invariably invoke a journey, often described as the sailing of the ship of the dead, and by these rituals the living act to accord the deceased a proper spiritual position. (Often heaven or the underworld are considered to have many layers through which the soul of the dead wanders to find its proper abode.)

In return for the performance of the mortuary ritual, the deceased ancestor becomes capable of returning benefits to the living. In ancient Java, these ideas were given an Indic interpretation in the mortuary elevation of rulers to identification with Śiva or the Buddha. Similar ideas still underlie major temple rituals on Bali, megalithic tomb building among the Sumbanese, the spectacular mortuary ceremonies and cliff burial of the Sa'dan Toraja, or the simple, less obtrusive rituals of rock and tree elsewhere in the archipelago.

Today throughout insular Southeast Asia, the basic premises of traditional religions are under challenge from religions such as Islam and Christianity that preach transcendence in place of the immanence of life and assert spiritual equality rather than celebrate spiritual differentiation. These religions are also under challenge from modernizing national governments that insist upon bureaucratic homogeneity and positive rationalism. Yet despite present pressures, traditional ways of thinking and acting continue to show remarkable resilience and continuity with the past.

[Several of the peoples mentioned in this article are the subject of individual entries. See Balinese Religion; Batak Religion; Bornean Religions; Javanese Religion; Toraja Religion; and Bugis Religion. For a discussion of the impact of world religions on the region, and their cur-

rent practice there, see Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia, and Islam, article on Islam in Southeast Asia. For treatment of the religion of related island cultures, see Melanesian Religions, overview article. See also Megalithic Religions, article on Historical Cultures.]

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Modern Movements in Insular Cultures

Uprisings with religious content have occurred throughout insular Southeast Asian history, but religious movements show a distinctive focus. They are not anarchic protests but organized efforts, of national or

international scope, to achieve reforms or some other positive objective. Such movements are apparent especially since the beginning of this century. By limiting the discussion to such movements, we can at least begin to summarize a complicated fabric of history in which local processes are as varied as they are fascinating. For the sake of simplicity, it is convenient to group the myriad insular Southeast Asian religious movements under the three streams of religious tradition from which they draw, in part, their inspiration: Buddhism and Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. These are discussed with reference to the major island or peninsular areas of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Hindu-Buddhist Movements. The first important twentieth-century Hindu-Buddhist movement was Budi Utomo ("high endeavor") founded in 1908 by three students from the colonial Netherlands Indies medical school (STOVIA). The movement gained early adherents in other colonial technical schools, those for veterinarians and engineers, suggesting that the Western technical training was leaving the native students without any cultural or religious grounding, and that such grounding is what they sought in movements like Budi Utomo. Budi Utomo hoped to revitalize the deeply cherished Hindu-Buddhist-Javanist core of the Indonesian identity, so that a meaningful and respectable alternative could be found to the values offered by the West. Looking to India's Rabindranath Tagore and Mohandas Gandhi as inspirations in the revival of these traditions, Budi Utomo was controlled by the aristocracy and intelligentsia and never gained a broad popular following, although it had amassed some ten thousand members within a year of its founding. [See the biographies of Rabindranath Tagore and Mohandas Gandhi.]

Another movement, Taman Siswa ("garden of learning"), has a cultural grounding similar to that of Budi Utomo, but, unlike the earlier movement, it emphasized education. Taman Siswa was founded by Suwardi Surjaningrat, later known as Ki Hadjar Dewantara ("teacher of the gods").

Inspired by Tagore as well as such critics of Western education as Maria Montessori, Dewantara founded schools designed to restore lost traditions and identities by combining Western and Javanist-Hindu-Buddhist values. Taman Siswa schools taught the Javanese arts to encourage the child to express its inner identity, and they encouraged a family-like school community in which students and teachers were mutually involved as "brothers in learning." By 1940, Dewantara had succeeded in building some 250 schools throughout the islands, some of which survive today.

A third major Hindu-Buddhist movement is really many movements and cannot be reduced to any single

date of founding. These are known as *kebatinan*, from the Javanese word (of Arabic origin) *batin*, meaning "inner." Something in the range of one thousand different *kebatinan* sects now flourish, primarily on Java, most founded since the beginning of the twentieth century but rooted in practices and beliefs that go back to the beginnings of the Javanese Hindu-Buddhist civilizations in the eighth century CE.

The aim of Javanese *kebatinan* is to mute the crude feelings and perceptions of the material world in order to experience the underlying reality that is simultaneously god, self, and cosmos. The techniques are ascetic practice (abstinence from food, sleep, or sex), philosophical and psychological speculation, and meditation. Guidance in *kebatinan* meetings is provided by a teacher who is believed to possess charismatic and sacral qualities. The objective is not only to reach ultimate truth but also to balance and unify the self and, in this way, the wider society and world. Some *kebatinan* movements, such as Subud, have established branches in the West, while others, such as Sumarah, have attracted Westerners to Java; but, on the whole, *kebatinan* movements remain a quintessentially Javanese phenomenon.

While Budi Utomo, Taman Siswa, and *kebatinan* are primarily Javanese movements, Balinese Hinduism has been an important stimulus for a revival of Hindu traditions as an organized movement spreading through Java as well as Bali. Associated with this Neo-Hinduism is a Neo-Buddhism that claims as a root the only surviving folk-Buddhist population, the Tengger, who live near Mount Bromo on Java. The Indonesian Buddhist Association claims to have built ninety monasteries and acquired fifteen million adherents since 1965 (when, following the massacre of an estimated half-million so-called Communists, all Indonesians were required to declare some explicit religion or risk being branded atheistic and, therefore, Communist). These revivals, which hold massive celebrations at such revered monuments as Lara Janggrang and Borobudur, combine indigenous Bali-Java traditions with Hindu-Buddhism.

Muslim Movements. Where the Hindu-Buddhist movements of insular Southeast Asia have been confined primarily to Java and Bali, the Muslim movements have ranged more widely: throughout the three thousand miles of Indonesian islands and into Singapore, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. The stimulus for these movements was the opening in 1870 of the Suez Canal and associated increase in steamship travel, which encouraged great numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims, many of whom remained in the Near East for study, to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. By the beginning of the twentieth century, several Malay, Indonesian, Arab, and Indian citizens of insular Southeast

Asia had come under the influence of the proponent of Islamic modernism, Muḥammad Abduh of Cairo's al-Azhar center of learning. Returning to Singapore or other ports of embarkation and disembarkation to the Near East, these students founded schools, journals, and associations that spread through the islands and were known as the Kaum Muda ("new faction") of Southeast Asian Islam.

Pressing for a return to the fundamental truths of text and tradition, the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth*, while rejecting the authority of teachers, scholars, and the ornate speculations of medieval Islam, modernists extolled the method of *ijihād*: analysis of the original Arabic scriptures in order to read for oneself the word of God. Paradoxically, the return to scripture stimulated an advance to modernity, at least in certain respects. Folk practices that were not in the text were excised, while proper reading was held to demonstrate an Islamic basis for modern economics, science, medicine, and law. In what they themselves termed a "reformation" (*reformasi*), the devout Muslim could rediscover a pure identity and inspiration while equipping himself for the challenges of modernity.

Gaining impetus first in Singapore, where returning scholars founded such still-existing schools as Alsagoff, the Kaum Muda encountered resistance in Malaya but spread rapidly throughout the islands of Indonesia. Of the many Indonesian organizations standing for the Kaum Muda viewpoint, the most successful is the Muḥammadiyah, founded in 1912 by Kiai H. A. Dahlan, in the court city of Jogjakarta, Java. Muḥammadiyah worked not only to purify Islamic practice to accord with Qur'anic teaching but also in education and welfare, building a large system of schools as well as clinics, orphanages, and hospitals. Muḥammadiyah has been notable, too, in the strength of its women's movement, Aisjah. Having survived periods of turmoil and repression, Muḥammadiyah now boasts some six million members.

In reaction to Kaum Muda, the so-called Kaum Tua ("old faction") took steps to cement its cherished traditions, which the reformers threatened to sweep away. In Malaya, where Islam was identified with the state, the old could be buttressed simply by stiffening the established hierarchy of Islamic officialdom. In Indonesia, lacking such an establishment, reaction took the form of a counterreformation. In 1926, Indonesian traditionalists founded the Nahdatul Ulama ("union of Muslim teachers") to withstand the threat of reformism. Ruled by a dynasty centered around a famous religious school in East Java, Nahdatul Ulama has outstripped Muḥammadiyah in gaining support from the rural masses. While Nahdatul Ulama's membership is larger, its organization is looser, and this organization has not

equalled Muhammadiyah in educational and welfare activities.

Christian Movements. Although significant Christian populations are found in Indonesia—especially among the Batak, the Amboinese, the Toraja, and the Minahas—and among the Chinese throughout insular Southeast Asia, the only Christian nation is the Philippines. More than 80 percent of the Philippine population is Roman Catholic but an estimated 350 distinct Christian bodies exist there today, many of which could be termed “movements.” Most significant, perhaps, is the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI, or Philippine Independent Church). The foundations for this offshoot of the Roman Catholic church were laid during the Philippine revolt against Spain in 1896, but the IFI was officially founded in 1902 by Gregorio Aglipay, who became its first archbishop. When the Spanish were defeated, the Filipino priests of the IFI took over parishes held by the friars and achieved a membership of 1.5 million, or 25 percent of the Christian population. Highly nationalistic, the IFI has been known to raise the Philippine flag at the time of the consecration of the Host in the Mass.

At one time the IFI canonized José Rizal, the Filipino novelist and nationalist martyr, and other movements, too, deify Rizal as a Christ of the Malays. An example is Iglesia in Cristo, founded in 1914 by Feix Manalo and now a highly organized movement based on a special method of meditation. Another Rizalist group, Lapiang Malaya, attacked the city of Manila in 1967. Believing themselves immune to bullets, they provoked the police and military into violent reaction and thirty-three of them died. Such movements fuse Christian inspiration with nativism, nationalism, and millenarianism, often opposed to westernization, modernization, and oppression.

Religious Movements and Contemporary Society in Insular Southeast Asia. At different periods and in different places, these religious movements have contributed differently. Most of them, regardless of affiliation, were inspirational catalysts in giving rise to the striving for independence and modernity that led to the more directly political nationalist movements that began in the early twentieth century and culminated in the independence of these new nations soon after World War II. Since independence, their role has varied. In Indonesia, the Muslims have generally acted as an oppositional force complementing the government, while the Hindu-Buddhist streams have either fed into the Javanist-oriented national culture and government or provided personal fulfillment outside the governmental arena.

In Malaysia, the Muslims have identified more strongly with the government, while Hindu-Buddhism

has not claimed a place in the national political culture equal to that of Hindu-Buddhism in Indonesia. In the Philippines, Islam has been oppositional, entrenched in the south against Christian incursions identified with the national polity; Christianity has been identified more with governmental authority, although Christianity, too (exemplified by such movements as the Christians for National Liberation and church support of Corazon Aquino during her rise to power in 1986), has had an oppositional role. In Singapore, the Muslims have played an oppositional role in relation to the dominant government party, but in this highly modernized, formally pluralistic society, religious movements have not played a postwar role equal to that in the other insular Southeast Asian nations.

In all of these countries, religious movements were dominant sources of nationalism and creative ferment in the early twentieth century. Later, as the impetus toward independence was seized by more purely political movements, the religious movements became relatively less important. After independence was achieved, the regimes in these countries (especially the two largest, Indonesia and the Philippines) have tended to become authoritarian, while religious movements (such as the Muslim fundamentalists) have eclipsed the Communists and others as the locus of aspiration independent of the government. The beginning of the twenty-first century could parallel the beginning of the twentieth, in that the stage is set for religious movements to resume their earlier role as a reformative force independent of the central power.

[See also Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia*; Islam, *article on Islam in Southeast Asia*; and Christianity, *article on Christianity in Asia*.]

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SOUTHERN AFRICAN RELIGIONS. [*This entry includes two articles. The first, An Overview, introduces basic ideas and practices common to the traditional religions of the region. The second, Southern Bantu Religions, discusses the religions of the large Bantu-speaking population of southern Africa according to the symbolic contrast between heat and coolness that underlies much religious belief and practice.*]

An Overview

There is a basic similarity in religious practice, symbols, and ideas throughout southern Africa, from Uganda to the southern sea, from the east coast to Cameroon. This is the area in which Bantu languages are spoken, and there is a link, though no absolute coincidence, between language family and religious symbolism. Some of the religious symbols of Africa also occur in Europe: the divine king of the Ganda, the Bemba, the Nyakyusa, and the Zulu appeared in the Grove of Nemi in ancient Italy and in Stuart England; but there are many other symbols of more limited provenance, such as fire, symbol of lordship or authority, and blowing out water, or "spitting," a symbol of the confession of anger and the act of forgiveness and goodwill.

Religious belief in southern Africa can best be understood through its symbolism, for religion here is expressed more through drama and poetry than through dogma or theological speculation. The invisible is embodied in tangible symbols which are bent to human purposes. Hence attention must focus on the rituals celebrated.

Among any one people there are likely to be dominant symbols which recur in one ritual after another, and full understanding of them depends upon analysis of the whole ritual cycle. Examples of such symbols are the *mudyi* tree (with a milky latex), which among the Ndembu represents matriliney, motherhood, and womanhood, and the plantain and sweet banana—the

leaves, flowers, fruit, succoring stem—which among the Nyakyusa represent male and female respectively. These symbols are as obvious to a Nyakyusa as the skirt and trousers used to differentiate gender on washroom signs are to a European or an American.

The present tense is used for observations made during the twentieth century (with some references to earlier observers); but since rapid change is going on throughout Africa and since traditional African practice exists side by side with, and interacts with, modern Christian and Islamic practice, this article should be read in conjunction with others in the encyclopedia. What is described here is but a fragment of current religious practice in southern Africa: the symbolic systems and institutions I discuss indeed still exist widely but are not the sole beliefs or practice of whole populations.

Concepts of God. Throughout southern Africa there is an apprehension of God as a numinous being associated with light, brightness, and sheen. God may be represented by a high mountain glittering with snow, a tree symbolizing the mountain, or a sacred grove. There is a lively belief in the survival of the dead and in their power over the living, a power closely akin to that which living senior kinsmen have over their juniors. There is a belief in medicines—material substances which can be manipulated for good or ill, healing or murder, and which include poisons put in food as well as ointments which are rubbed on the body to make a hunter's aim true, a warrior "slippery," a candidate successful in examinations, or a choir or rugby team victorious in competition. Everywhere the power of evil is feared—a power thought to be incarnate in certain persons or familiars they control, which we call witchcraft. The notion of witchcraft involves the personification of anger, hate, jealousy, envy, lust, and greed—the negative feelings which men observe in themselves and in their neighbors. All these beliefs are general, but they appear in infinite variety, modified by kinship and political structure, by economy, and by poetic imagination, and they have changed through time.

How clearly God is distinguished from the first man, or from the founding heroes of a particular lineage, also varies with place and time. Among some peoples, at least, the distinction became clearer as outside contacts extended and the known world was no longer confined within a frame of kinship. Over many centuries Hebrew, Christian, and Islamic ideas of God, with their symbolism of monotheism and of God on high, have impinged on other ideas in Africa, notably the association of the dead with the earth; in some places a process of change may be traced over the past hundred years.

Throughout southern Africa God has been remote, ap-



This map shows approximate locations of ethnic groups mentioned in this and related articles. No selection of names for a map of this size could truly reflect the religious, ethnic, and linguistic complexity of the area. Moreover, scholars differ on the spellings and applications of names of various peoples.

proached only by exceptional priests or by the “elders.” The dead are regarded as alive, and it is the shades, or ancestors, the senior dead kin, who are the mediators between humanity and divinity, communicating human needs to the divine. Prayer or direct offerings to God himself rarely occur in traditional practice, but awe of God is constantly manifested, as fear of contamination, as a distancing of man from God, and avoidance of such emblems of sacred power as the thunderbolt, the tree struck by lightning, and the python in the grove. One does not speak readily of God, and one speaks of him not at all if he is near. Once, when I was at school in London, a fellow student (later a head of state in Africa) started in his seat when I was so rash as to discuss lightning on a day when the Lord was muttering overhead. Unusual fecundity, such as twin birth, is also of God and fearful, hence twins and their parents are isolated from the normal village community and, because of their divine connection, they function as “herds” to drive off storms.

Gabriel M. Setiloane, himself a Methodist minister, argues cogently in *The Image of God among the Sotho-Tswana* (Rotterdam, 1976) that the first missionary to the Tswana, Robert Moffat (the father-in-law of David Livingstone), misunderstood the Tswana language (into which he translated the New Testament) and hence the Tswana experience of God. But it is John V. Taylor who shows, in *The Primal Vision*, that in Africa God is both there and not there, that he is both sought and rejected. Bishop Taylor fastens upon the “significance of this ambivalence,” saying that humans have been aware of the numinous and their dependence upon it but have sought to separate themselves from it.

Shades. Among southern African peoples shades are of two categories: the dead senior kin (male and female) of each family or lineage and the founding heroes. Family shades are relevant only for their junior kin who celebrate “rituals of kinship”; founding heroes (male or female) have relevance for political units, that is, chiefdoms, groups of chiefdoms, or regions which honor a hero and his or her descendants in “communal rituals.” The ancestors of a ruling lineage, where one exists, commonly claim descent from the founding hero; or the hero may be thought of as a benefactor or prophet who left no descendants but who is celebrated in some grove or cave by a lineage or priests. The ancestors of a chief, it is believed, retain power over the country they once ruled, so in addition to rituals for founding heroes there may be a series of offerings to past chiefs.

Like God, the shades are associated with brightness, light, radiance, and whiteness. Among the Zulu and Xhosa a gray-leaved helichrysum, whose leaves and pale gold flowers both reflect light, is linked with the shades;

in Pondoland “the medicine of the home” is a small, yellow-flowered senecio which gleams in the veld. The beads offered to shades and worn by a diviner, novice, or pregnant bride are white, and when an animal is slaughtered and offered to the shades, the officiants wipe their hands in the chyme, a strong bleaching agent. But again, as with God, contact with the shades is seen to be somehow contaminating. A shade must be “pushed away a little”; it must be kept from continually “brooding” over humans as a hen broods over its chicks. The dead must be separated from the living and then “brought home,” that is, transformed.

Although they are numinous, the shades are held in far less awe than is God himself. To many Africans the shades are constantly about the homestead, evident in a tiny spiral of dust blowing across the yard or through the banana grove, or in the rustling of banana leaves; thought to be sheltering near the byre or in the shade of a tree, or sipping beer left overnight at the back of the great house. Their presence is so real in Pondoland that (into the twentieth century) a wife of the homestead carefully avoids the yard and the byre where men sit, even at night, lest the shades be there, and as she walks through a river associated with her husband’s clan she lets her skirts trail in the water, for to tuck up her skirts would insult his shades.

The living and the dead are so closely associated in southern Africa that it is common for a man’s heir (a brother, son, or sister’s son) and a woman’s heir (a sister, daughter, or brother’s daughter) to take the property, the name, the social position, and the responsibilities of the deceased. Hence one may be told that the holder of some office—a priest, chief, king, or senior kinsman—is “Mswati the third” (or tenth, as the case may be). A founding hero frequently has a living representative in this sense, a “divine king,” that is, a ruler or priest on whose health and virility the health and fertility of men, cattle, and land are thought to depend. Even into the twentieth century, a divine king who was ailing or feeble would be smothered—he must “die for the people”—and then be replaced.

Founding heroes typically are associated with a bed of reeds, from which the first man is said to have sprung; with a river source along the watershed between the Zambezi and Kongo rivers; with a pool in one of the rushing rivers of the south; with a hole in the ground (from which men and cattle emerged) on the dry edge of the Kalahari Desert; or with a grove of trees. Like family shades, heroes are of the earth and water, not of the sky. The place of celebration has moved as groups of kinsmen have moved, as chiefs have been installed and later buried, and as trees planted as boundary marks or on graves have spread into thickets.

Ritual Life. Communal rituals are of various sorts, including offerings to the founding heroes, their living representatives, and chiefly descendants. Such offerings are celebrated by the leading men of the region, chiefdom, or village. The common people know little of the details; they are aware only that a celebration has taken place.

But there is also a type of purification ritual that concerns everyone. Sometimes it is linked to a celebration of first fruits; at other times it is accompanied by a military review. At the break of the rains in tropical Africa, or at the summer solstice farther south, and in any general emergency such as plague or war, the people may be called upon to purify themselves, to sweep the homesteads, throw out the old ash from hearths, and rekindle new fire. Among at least some peoples everyone is expected to "speak out," that is, to confess anger and grudges held against neighbors and kin, or against fellow priests and leading men. It is a spring-cleaning of hearts and minds as well as homesteads.

In the Swazi kingdom today—as formerly in other Nguni kingdoms and chiefdoms on the southeastern coast of Africa—all the men of the country, and many women also, gather at the time of the summer solstice to celebrate the first fruits and strengthen their king, while regiments dance and demonstrate their loyalty. The Zulu form of this ritual was powerfully interpreted by Max Gluckman (1954) as a "ritual of rebellion," but it now seems that this early analysis was based on a mistranslation. According to Harriet Ngubane (1977), a Zulu anthropologist, the key phrase used in the ritual expresses a rejection of pollution: "What the king breaks to pieces and tramples upon is a gourd that symbolizes the evil of the past year." This exactly parallels rituals farther north for "cleansing the country" in which the population of entire regions "throw out the rubbish," especially ashes from all the hearths, and distribute newly kindled fire. The Ngonde (Malawi) chant: "Let us dance, let us fight that the homesteads may be peaceful. . . . Let us throw out the ashes that death may leave the homesteads and they be at peace." Close analysis shows that such rituals symbolically cast out the anger in people's hearts. The Taita of Kenya celebrate a similar rite of casting out anger, as Grace Harris (1978) has shown.

These cleansing rites speak repeatedly of ridding the people of "the dirt" of the past year. The similarity to ancient Hebrew rituals is obvious, although published reports from southern Africa make no mention of any symbolism having to do with driving out a scapegoat. Rather, the symbols which recur here are those of heat and coolness. Heat is associated with pollution, which in turn is closely associated with anger and sexual ac-

tivity; coolness is associated with rain, tranquility, and purification. These symbols are familiar to all Sotho-Tswana-speaking peoples and to others also.

Throughout southern Africa communal rituals have to do with rain, especially the dramatic "break of the rains," so eagerly awaited after the dry season. Local rituals celebrate seedtime and harvest; the firing of pasture to destroy unpalatable grass and bush which harbor tsetse flies; game drives or a fishing battue; murrain or plague; war and peace; the coronation of a chief and/or the handing over of power from one generation to the next. Details of such celebrations vary both with economy and with political structure. Regional rituals may involve the distribution of once-scarce goods, such as salt and iron tools, which in former times were brought to the shrine from beyond the boundaries of the political unit. The priests who brought the goods were sacred people: among the Nyakyusa these priests traveled in safety, announcing their status by drumbeat. Other rituals may be connected with the growth of chiefdoms. J. Matthew Schoffeleers has written about the spread of the Mbona cult with the development of Mang'anga chiefdoms in Malawi. [See Mbona.]

Kinship Rituals. Unless they concern a royal family, the rituals of kinship have no political overtones. They are celebrated on the great occasions of a person's life: at birth and death, at maturity and marriage. In southern Africa each family or lineage directs its celebrations to its own dead senior kinsmen, who are not sharply distinguished from living seniors. The living may indeed be referred to by the term for a shade as they grow old. In 1931 in Pondoland I heard the word *itongo* ("a shade") used in reference to an elderly father's living sister. Living as well as dead seniors are thought to bring sickness, sterility, and other misfortunes—even failure to secure a job or a residence pass—on insolent, quarrelsome, or neglectful juniors.

Family rituals vary with the economy, for the place of the shrine and the form of the offering depend upon the staple foods. Among a pastoral people the altar is the byre, the offering milk or a slaughtered animal. If the people cultivate, beer is added. Among banana-eating peoples the altar is set in a plantain grove, at the base of a succoring stem which represents the patri-lineage; among hunting peoples it may be a tree or branch on which are placed trophies of the chase. To the Lele, who live on the southern edge of the equatorial forest belt, the forest is holy and is associated with men; the grassland, where villages are built, has no prestige and is associated with women. Among other peoples the cleavage is between the open pastureland or bush (the veld) and the village; or, within the village itself, between the byre and its gateway—where prayer and offer-

ings are made and men gather—and the great hut occupied by the senior woman of the homestead. But everywhere the hearth and house, especially the doorway of the house, are sacred also, for among some peoples explicitly, and probably for all implicitly, the house represents the mother, the hearth stands for the marriage, and the doorway is the passage through which children are born. Taboos surrounding the hearth, the fire, and the whole reproductive process may be seen as an expression of the holiness of normal fertility and procreation, processes which are thought to be controlled by the shades.

Offerings to the shades consist of staple foods, especially choice foods such as a tender cut of beef eaten by the one on whose behalf prayer is made (the same cut from the right foreleg is used by peoples from Tanzania to the southern coast of Africa); a libation of fermented milk or beer; a sprinkling of flour or porridge; seeds of pulses, cucurbits, and grains. A strongly pastoral people will cling to the symbolism of slaughtering an animal—shedding blood—even when they live in a city. White goats may yet be seen grazing on the outskirts of the African quarters of Cape Town, or one may see them being led along a country road or wandering about on some modern farm where African laborers are employed. They are there to be used as offerings at times of birth or death, sickness or initiation, when meat from the butcher will not suffice; at such times informed authority turns a blind eye. The beer poured out may be made of sorghum, millet, bananas, bamboo, or even maize or cassava, which reached the coasts of Africa only in the sixteenth century and parts of the interior only in the nineteenth century.

Whatever the material used, the intention of the offering is the same: the shades are called to feast, and what is offered is a communion meal for living and dead kinsmen. If an ox has been slaughtered or much beer brewed, friends and neighbors will be asked to gather with the kinsmen, but they do not share in the sacred portions set aside for kin, who first eat and drink in a place set slightly apart from the main gathering. At an offering to the shades it is essential that kinsmen be present—the range of kin summoned depending upon the gravity of the occasion—and that they be loving and charitable to one another. Any quarrels must be admitted and resolved. I have heard the officiant at such a ritual urging all the kinsmen present to “drink up and speak out.” Sometimes a funeral feast, or a feast celebrating the return of a prodigal son to his father, may seem like a cursing match as one after another participant admits “anger in the heart,” a grudge against kinsmen. I have heard individual women complain that

they had not been received with due respect by a brother's wife when they visited and the brother's wife reply that her sister-in-law had been seen picking and stealing, taking green food from the garden as she passed through, and so forth. Unspoken anger, festering in the heart, is thought both to be the root of witchcraft and to invalidate an offering to the shades, for quarreling between kinsmen infuriates the shades.

When an offering is made, an officiant, usually the senior man of the lineage, or occasionally a dead father's sister or a grandmother of the homestead, addresses the shades, calling them by name, explaining why the offering has been made—that is, what is troubling the homestead—and requesting help. The calling of ancestors by name is in itself a form of praise, and the manner of speech is that used in the presence of a senior kinsman, or (as among the Nguni) that used to honor a chief. Prayer and praise are here barely distinguishable.

The occasions of family rituals are constant throughout the area: death and birth, especially abnormal birth such as that of twins; maturity, whether physically or socially defined; marriage; misfortune and serious illness; reconciliation after a quarrel; and the first fruits which the family celebrates after the national or regional ritual. Thanksgiving rituals also occur, particularly after escape from danger in war or hunting, or on the return home of a migrant laborer or a person released from imprisonment; and there are rituals invoking blessing for an important new tool such as a plough, but these are less general than the rituals of life crises. Everywhere the death rituals persist through time and are adapted to the new economy. In the south funeral parlors with facilities for keeping a corpse exist even in some country districts, and funerals are delayed until close kin, scattered at work centers, can gather. Sometimes the corpse of a town worker who has not visited the country for years is brought “home” to the country to be buried. Great numbers of people come to mourn, and, relative to the family's earnings, enormous sums are spent on traveling, funeral expenses, and food for guests. Many guests bring a contribution of money, but even so the family may be crippled financially. Whether a man has been buried in a Johannesburg township or a remote village, as of 1982 family status still depended on lavish expenditure just as it did among the Nya-kyusa in 1935, when a hundred cattle might be slaughtered on the death of a rich chief.

Although funerals have been adapted to the new economy, they include certain traditional rites, notably a washing and purification rite after the burial and a lifting of mourning after about a year. Among the Nguni peoples of the southeast coast a commemoration dinner

may replace the rite of "bringing home" the shade and implies an awareness of the continuing existence of the dead which is much greater than that experienced by many contemporary Europeans and Americans. Setiloane describes the vitality of such rites in Sotho-Tswana families of professing Christians.

All the kinship rituals, but especially funerals, are an affirmation of kinship and the unity of the extended family, and the efficacy of the ritual depends upon the presence, in love and charity, of a network of kin. Exactly who is involved varies both with the people—be they Ndembu, Bemba, Zulu, or Sotho—and with the occasion. The celebrations are a strong conservative force, for the health and well-being of the whole kinship group is thought to depend on "following the customs of the ancestors" in observing the ritual. This is evident even in a city.

Maturity rituals have many aspects; the extent to which any one aspect is stressed varies from one society to another. I have classed maturity rituals as religious, since they are explicitly concerned with fertility, which in turn is controlled by the shades; often they involve an offering and invocation to the shades, whose blessings are sought. Frequently, perhaps always, there is a symbolic death, a period of seclusion when the novice must observe taboos associated with the world of the dead, which is followed by a rebirth after which he or she returns to ordinary life. The rituals are viewed as a proper prelude to, if not a condition of, marriage and procreation. Rituals of maturity for boys often (but not invariably) involve circumcision: those for girls may or may not involve clitoridectomy or some lesser operation.

Circumcision is most often celebrated for a group, and those who have endured this rite together share a bond for life. The boys' group may become a unit in the army, and in areas where the political structure is based on age, its members may graduate together as elders holding legal and administrative office, and finally, as old men, share ritual functions. Where there are chiefs, a royal youth is sought to lead each circumcision group, and those circumcised with him become his closest followers. The circumcision school draws a youth out of the immediate network of kin and establishes links with scattered contemporaries and political authority, links sometimes expressed in an esoteric language known only to those initiated.

Girls' initiation, on the other hand, is most often an individual celebration at the first menstruation, and wider links with contemporaries or political authority are not treated as important. But among a few peoples, notably the Sotho-Tswana and the neighboring Venda

in precolonial times, girls' initiation was a group affair with political implications; a women's regiment was linked to a men's regiment, and, like its male counterpart, it might be called out for public service.

Maturity rituals are everywhere concerned with inculcating respect for authority: respect for seniors, shades, chiefs, and respect of a wife for her husband. A man must learn to keep secrets and never reveal the affairs of his chief or the secrets of the lodge. A woman likewise must learn to hold her tongue; she must not create conflict through gossip or reveal the affairs of her husband. Often there are taboo words and riddles with a set answer, knowledge of which are taken as proof of initiation. In *Chisungu* Audrey I. Richards (1956) admirably demonstrates the use of songs, mimes, designs, and models to inculcate in a Bemba girl the proper behavior of a wife. Always the rituals instruct the novice in the behavior required of an adult man or woman, and a transformation from childish behavior to responsible behavior is expected.

The rituals assert the authority of a senior generation over a junior: the initiated secure the young novice's submission through the pain of an operation, beating, scolding, and threats, or by playing upon the novice's fear of the unseen and longing to become an honored and fertile man or woman. The ritual creates a fraternity or sorority of those who have undergone the ordeal: those who have not undergone it are outsiders, but all who have endured are free to participate in the admonition of their juniors. A determination to use circumcision rites to bolster civil authority was made explicit in October 1981 when the Ciskei, later an "independent state" on the border of the Republic of South Africa, passed legislation empowering a chief to compel a young man to be circumcised, on the ground that "it is well known that circumcision causes irresponsible youths to behave in a responsible manner." This happened at a time when opposition by school boys and students to Ciskeian political authority was intense.

Why maturity rituals have survived among some peoples but not others, or for one sex but not the other, in fast-changing societies can only be demonstrated by analyzing historical events in particular areas. What is certain is that in some areas changes in practice have occurred since the eighteenth century, rites spreading or being abandoned; but there is also eyewitness evidence from survivors of wrecks on the southeastern coast of Africa which suggests minimal change in circumcision rites among Xhosa and Thembu peoples over three centuries.

Cults of Affliction, Spirit Possession, and Divination. Besides the cycle of rituals associated with families and

the birth, maturity, and death of individuals, and the cycle celebrated for a chiefdom or region, there is a cycle of rituals for those individuals "called" by their shades to become diviners, or for sufferers whose sickness has been relieved by what Victor Turner has called a "ritual of affliction." Cults or guilds are formed of those who have suffered a particular travail and been cured by a particular ritual. Their experience entitles them to participate in any celebration for a sufferer of the same category. Rituals for diviners who have been called (as opposed to herbalists who learn certain medicines) and rituals of affliction are much less widespread than those for birth, maturity, and death, or those for a chiefdom or region. They are not contained within the frame of kinship or locality and seem to have proliferated with trade and travel, but of that process not much is yet known. What is certain is that among some isolated peoples (such as the Nyakyusa) these rituals do not occur at all, and among peoples with a long tradition of distant trade, such as the Shona and Tsonga, possession is often interpreted as being the work of an outsider, not that of a family shade. This phenomenon has appeared recently among the Zulu, as Harriet Ngubane (1977) has shown, and, according to John Beattie (1969), it exists among the Nyoro of Uganda as well.

Diviners are thought to be in a peculiarly close relationship with their shades, who reveal themselves in dreams and trances. Communication with the shades is fostered by cleansing and purging, observance of taboos (including sexual abstinence), fasting, isolation in the bush, offerings to the shades, and dancing to clapping or drums. The emotion is often intense when, with an insistent beat of clapping provided by a packed crowd, a novice speaks of what she has seen in dreams. In Western society the closest analogue to the diviner in this respect is the medium, and among some peoples—notably the Shona of Zimbabwe—a state of trance undoubtedly occurs. Even though it may be a stranger spirit who possesses the medium, she remains in close contact with her family shades.

Most mediums deal with the domestic problems and health of clients who come to consult them. Occasionally, however, a medium may influence public events, as did Nongqause, the Xhosa girl who in 1856 urged all Xhosa on the eastern frontier of the Cape of Good Hope to kill their cattle and destroy their grain, prophesying that when they did so the dead would rise up and sweep the whites into the sea, or the Shona medium who in 1898 urged resistance against whites in what is now Zimbabwe. During the colonial period old prophecies of the coming of whites were repeatedly recorded, and these may be seen partly as a reconciliation of old and

new. To at least some Nyakyusa Christians, such prophecies were evidence of the reality—"the truth"—of ancient institutions, the prescience of past prophets. Had not the prophecy been fulfilled?

Witchcraft. In southern African belief, evil does not come from the shades, who are essentially good. They discipline erring descendants, sending sickness or sterility if they have been starved (for in a real sense the shades partake of the communion meal—that is, the beer and flesh—and are satisfied by it) or neglected, not informed of a marriage, or affronted by the quarrels of their juniors. But they are concerned about the welfare of their children and are held to be the source of blessing. Rather, evil comes from another source: witchcraft. It is thought to be embodied in a serpent—a "python in the belly" (Nyakyusa), a "snake of the women" (Pondo); or it takes the form of a baboon, or a fabulous hairy being with exaggerated sexual organs (Xhosa), and so forth. Such creatures are as real in imagination as was the pitchfork-wielding Devil to the medieval European, and like him they walk the earth seeking those whom they may devour. The witch familiars (and witchcraft generally) personify the evil recognized as existing in all humans, specifically, anger, hatred, jealousy, envy, lust, greed. Even sloth appears, in the belief that certain evil people have raised others from the dead to work their fields for them.

The form of witch belief varies with the social structure, as does the relationship of victim and accused, for the points of friction in a society vary with the form of residence and economic cooperation (i.e., who lives and works together), the occasions of competition, and the location of authority. Injury is thought to come from those with whom one has quarreled: a co-wife, mother-in-law, half sibling, fellow employee, rival claimant for inheritance, affine claiming marriage cattle, litigant in court against whom judgment has been given, or fellow priest. In some societies it is mostly women, poor men, and juniors who are accused; but in societies where egalitarian values are stressed the rich man is suspect, as is the successful grower of cash crops who is thought to have attracted the fertility of his neighbors' fields to his own. The one legitimately greater than the commoner (i.e., the chief) may covet the cattle of a wealthy stock owner, who is then accused of some wrongdoing—or so outsiders have thought.

Again and again during the colonial period, "witch-finding" movements arose when some prophet would call on his people to reject evil, to purge themselves of witchcraft and medicines used for sorcery. Over large regions people in fact complied, bringing out horns of medicines or other objects to throw publicly on a pyre and implicitly or explicitly admitting evil in themselves

and expressing goodwill to all. The *bamucapi* movement which swept through what are now Zambia, Malawi, and parts of Zimbabwe and Tanzania in 1934 was followed by a somewhat similar movement in much the same area (but with greatest influence in what is now Tanzania) between 1956 and 1964. Long before these movements arose, the Xhosa of the eastern Cape frontier had repeatedly been urged to purify themselves and reject witchcraft. In 1856 Nongqause, a sixteen-year-old medium, reported to the noted diviner Mhlakaza, her father's brother, that the shades had told her they would come to the rescue of their Xhosa descendants in their long war with whites over land on the eastern frontier, on condition that the living purify themselves and kill all their cattle. In the famine that ensued, twenty thousand people died. There is no evidence that such revivalist movements began in the colonial period: they may well have happened periodically before that, although certain characteristics of movements in colonial times, notably millennialism, were related to Christian missionary teaching.

People are known to confess to the practice of witchcraft, usually following an accusation and pressure to confess. One young mother in Pondoland explained to me that her baby had at first refused to nurse because she had had a witch-lover (who appeared in the form of a young man she named). The mother had then confessed, complying with the instructions of the midwives and giving her account precisely in terms of current beliefs; she was now being cleansed, and the baby was nursing all right. In some areas confessions have at times been extracted forcibly (through a poison ordeal or torture), since the recovery of the victim is held to depend upon the witch's confession and subsequent expression of goodwill toward the victim. [See also *Witchcraft*, *article on African Witchcraft*, and *Affliction*, *article on African Cults of Affliction*.]

Ritual, Order, and the Religious Experience. Analysis of ritual is important in any study of religion, for ritual enshrines the dogma and values of participants. There is always a gap between the values expressed and everyday practice, but ideals and ideas of ultimate reality are embodied in ritual action. In southern Africa there is constant emphasis on fertility—of human beings, stock, and fields; on health; on goodwill between kinsmen and neighbors; on amity among the ruling men of the region; on respect of juniors for seniors and the responsibility of seniors toward their dependents; on the continuation of life after death.

Order exists in the universe, and the natural and social orders are felt to be interrelated: as in *King Lear*, disharmony in the world of men is reflected both in the world of physical elements and in the tempest within a

man's mind—in madness. If the divine king breaks a taboo, drought or flood may follow; if the ritual for a widow or a nubile girl is neglected, she may become distraught. Right order is expressed in traditional custom, and in their essence, rituals—whether positive action or negative avoidance—express the sacredness both of physiological processes, that is, menstruation, coition, parturition, and death, and of the approved relationships of men and women, old and young, leaders and followers. Both family and communal rituals are occasions of emotion, and the celebrations themselves arouse emotion, as is obvious to any observer who listens to the drumbeat and watches the dancing. Rituals, then, channel emotion and teach the mourner, the adolescent, or the parent what it is proper to feel. Nyakyusa mourners were required to express the passion of grief and fear to the men "fighting death" in the war dance and to widows, mothers, and sisters weeping violently and smearing themselves with ash and mud; but the rituals reveal little of the actual experience of the individual.

Any understanding of religious experience must come primarily from what individuals report of their own lives. Firsthand accounts are meager, but we have evidence that an awareness of the numinous exists. The talk of priests hints at their fear of a grove in which a founding hero or chief has been buried; at a communion meal of living and dead kinsmen, there is a sense that the shades are present and that the participants find satisfaction in their company; people speak of the comfort felt in a moment of danger when a man or woman has called on the shade of a parent or grandparent and sensed its presence; the fear aroused by a nightmare may be interpreted as the attack of a witch. Dreams are indeed the most common experience of the unseen, and so real that in recording the experiences of southern Africans I often had to ask, "Were you asleep or awake when this happened?" Those closest to their shades, and hence most aware of the numinous, are the hereditary priests, or rainmakers, and diviners who have been "called" and who practice as mediums.

[See also *Bemba Religion*; *Central Bantu Religions*; *Interlacustrine Bantu Religions*; *Khoi and San Religion*; *Kongo Religion*; *Luba Religion*; *Ndembu Religion*; *Nyakyusa Religion*; *Shona Religion*; *Swazi Religion*; *Tswana Religion*; and *Zulu Religion*.]

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MONICA WILSON

Southern Bantu Religions

Patrilineal herdsmen and farmers belonging to the large Bantu linguistic group, which is widely spread over central and eastern Africa, moved into southern Africa in distinct waves. They appeared in the region as distinct cultural groups probably between 1000 and 1600 CE. The Sotho (Pedi, Matlala, et al.) and the related Tswana settled on the arid inland plateau where the San were hunting and the Khoi were raising livestock. The Nguni (Zulu, Swazi, and Xhosa) spread out along the southeastern coast. The Lovedu and Venda, two closely related peoples who became strongly amalgamated with the Sotho in the twentieth century, successively broke away from the Karanga in ancient Zimbabwe; the last Venda migration may have crossed the Limpopo River after 1600 CE, but their predecessors were probably among the first inhabitants of the north-eastern Transvaal. The Tsonga, or Thonga, migrated in the early nineteenth century into the Transvaal, where 2302 they ran into Sotho and Venda, but their lands still lie principally in Mozambique. In spite of these people's cultural diversity, their ceremonies as well as their conceptions of the world have sprung from the same fundamental cosmology, either through derivation from a common heritage or else from interactions.

A Thermodynamic Conception of the Individual and of the Universe. The opposition between hot and cold is fundamental to many different rites found among the southeastern Bantu-speaking peoples. J. D. Krige and Eileen Jensen Krige have shown the importance of this

opposition among the Lovedu. In effect, heat upsets equilibrium and causes dysphoria. To end severe drought, ward off the dangers associated with premature birth, and heal sickness, a cooling treatment is applied. This is also done after the birth of twins, for the whole country risks becoming dry.

The Venda also use this dialectic. Similarly, the Zulu make a sacrificer avoid warmth before undergoing an immolation to the ancestors, who are associated with water and sperm. The day before, he has to give up drinking beer, stop making love, and keep away from fire. Communication with the ancestors is possible only if all participants are cool—neither angry nor spiteful. According to the Tsonga, sick persons give off heat, as do menstruating or pregnant women and excited warriors who have just killed an enemy. The cosmic order is threatened by the birth of twins because the mother "has gone up to the sky" during pregnancy, a period of dangerous overheating inside her womb. The Pedi even recommend that pregnant women not go outside whenever it rains. The Tswana say that the hot blood of pregnant women counteracts rain medicine. Moreover, their rainmakers and chiefs must abstain from sexual intercourse throughout most of the rainy season.

The Tsonga liken the normally born baby to a pot that has not cracked when baked. The mother and child are secluded until the umbilical cord falls off. The father cannot approach his wife because she is considered to be too hot. If the baby is male, the father runs a special risk. A series of rites gradually separates the infant from the mother's burning body and integrates him into the father's sphere. The cooling process can be clearly observed during Tsonga funerals for infants. If death follows soon after birth, the body is put inside a cracked pot that is covered with a layer of ashes. If death occurs before the Boha Puri tribal integration, which allows the parents to resume sexual intercourse and is performed when the child reaches the age of one, the body is buried in a humid place. If the child dies after this rite, the funeral is conducted like that of an adult, and the corpse is buried in dry earth.

The same thermal code underlies rites of passage that, though differing in form, are basically similar. An example is the presentation to the moon. A cooling feminine principle, the moon is responsible for watching over the child's growth and is often likened to a paternal aunt. During the first new moon visible after birth, the Pedi place the baby on the ground for a few seconds, and water, symbolizing rain, is poured through the roof and onto the infant. Three months after birth, the Tsonga present the baby to the new moon, throwing a torch toward it. Once the torch goes out, the baby is separated from his or her mother and laid on a pile of

ashes. This example keenly reveals the transformational process that brings these rites within a single symbolic system: the Tsonga replace rain with an extinguished torch. Moreover, whenever twins, as “sons of the sky,” assist at funerals, their fontanelles are smeared with ashes because they are seen as burning, hence dangerous creatures.

The Python Cult. A major divinity known as the python spirit among southeastern Bantu-speaking peoples symbolizes the coolness that is responsible for individual, social, and cosmic equilibrium. He is undoubtedly part of the most archaic Bantu cultural substratum, and both the Swazi and Venda perform ceremonies in his honor. Among the Luba in Zaire, he has a celestial manifestation, that of the rainbow. The Zulu and Luba reverse his climatic functions. Nkongolo, the Luba python, is, like the Zulu one, associated with terrestrial waters. As the rainbow, however, he burns rain rather than bringing it. In contrast, the Zulu hold the python and rainbow to be two distinct spirits whose beneficial actions with regard to water are complementary. “Coolest of all animals” according to Axel-Ivar Berglund, Python licks the fat of the black sheep that rainmakers sacrifice to him. On the other hand, the rainbow princess, iNkosazana, is the virgin daughter of the lord of heaven (and of thunderbolts), whose changing moods are dreaded by men. She intercedes so that he regularly sends gentle, soaking rain. Her rays of light plunge into the waters. Virgin girls, disguised as warriors, offer her vegetables and beer on top of a mountain forbidden to men. The feminine rainbow cult stands opposite the masculine python rite of sacrifice. Only princes may kill this venerated animal provided that they not spill its blood. Its fat goes into medicines that specialized magicians use against thunderbolts.

The rainbow princess cult is found specifically among the Nguni. Traces of it are found among the Swazi, who inaugurate the annual Nwala ceremony during the southern summer solstice with a quest for the waters of the world. National priests lead two separate processions, one in search of river water and the other in search of seawater. Carried on a shield at the head of each procession is a ritual calabash, called “princess.” These two calabashes represent the rainbow princess. This extraordinarily complex ceremony, which principally regenerates the king’s mystical force, ends with a purifying bonfire that is supposed to be put out by rain.

Although the Swazi apparently have no python cult, Venda religion honors the python, and snake cults thrive among the Karanga. According to Venda cosmogony, the whole creation took place inside Python’s stomach. This primordial, aquatic demiurge vomited nine

creatures who roamed over the soggy earth, which was still in darkness. They became the sun, moon, and stars. Controlling fertility and rain, Python also presides over girls’ puberty rites. Killing a python during the rainy season is strictly forbidden. During the dry season, its carcass is thrown into water, although the head and tail are buried in the cattle fold in order to bring prosperity. People use its fat to protect themselves from burns and to prevent fires.

Most Bantu cosmogonies are fundamentally dualistic. Thus opposite Python is Raluvhumba, who has often been mistaken for a supreme being. His name evokes the eagle, *luvumba*. Raluvhumba’s voice is thunder, and during storms he is visible as a big flame. He controls the sun, which could burn the earth if it came too near. His complementarity with Python stands out in a royal ceremony that is no longer observed. After communicating with Raluvhumba in a sacred cave, the Venda king used to order his people to perform Python’s dance (*tshikona*) for two nights. Much like other, neighboring societies, the Venda believe that the universe’s equilibrium depends upon the joint action of two fundamental principles—water and fire, coolness and heat. Water and coolness have the advantage of having originated first; fire and heat are always menacing because they threaten life. Therefore, the Venda put out all fires when their king dies. The Lovedu do the same because the earth is “hot” whenever their queen (who is responsible for keeping the rain medicine—and keeping it cool) passes away.

These myths and rites parallel various fragmentary tales collected among the Karanga. The Korekore, a branch of the Karanga, worship Dzivaguru (“big pool”). This rain spirit lived on earth before he disappeared into a pool on a mountaintop. He was forced to vanish by the magic of a rival chief who coveted his wealth and put on red attire (the color of fire). Like the Venda Python, this vanquished spirit was the primordial ruler of the world. By going down into water, he brought darkness over the earth. His opponent had to use a new magical trick to bring the sun back. Dzivaguru said that he would accept only sheep as offerings—the same animal that the Zulu sacrifice to Python.

This tale is apparently a variation of a Hungwe myth, taken down by Leo Viktor Frobenius, that accounts for the origin of the mighty Zimbabwe kingdom, whose stone ruins are unique in the Bantu-speaking world. In olden times, a poverty-stricken people known as the Hungwe were dwelling on a mountain. They ate food raw because their chief, Madzivoa, had lost the fire that his daughters kept in a sealed horn containing oil. Hunters from the north, the Hungwe’s ancestors, came

into the land. They had fire and ritually smoked a pipe to sustain their magical force. Their chief gave fire to Madzivoa, married his daughter, and became the first "king" (*mambo*). Many people united around him, and even Madzivoa became his servant. The name of this fallen autochthonous chief derives from *dzivoa* ("lake" or "pool"), also found in the name Dzivaguru. These two similarly named figures met up with parallel fates at the hands of newcomers who seized their power and wealth.

The new mythical rulers of fire had to accommodate the demiurges associated with water, as told in another Karanga story collected by Frobenius. A snake spirit used to dwell in a lake on the Zimbabwe plain. The king's daughters are thought to copulate with this spirit to keep the sacred pool and rain from disappearing. The vaginas of these princesses, who enjoyed total sexual freedom, had to be continuously moist. Victims to be sacrificed for rainfall were chosen from among them. A second group of princesses had to stay chaste. They were associated with a ritual fire kept by the king's incestuous wife, Mwiza, who represents the morning star.

The Venda myth transposes these elements. Python lived with two wives. Only the first one knew his real nature and could visit him freely during daytime. The second could draw near him only at night when she was soaked. Driven by curiosity, she broke this rule and caught her husband smoking a pipe. Angrily, Python went down into a lake. To end the subsequent drought, the guilty wife had to sacrifice herself and join her husband in the water. The Venda primordial Python clearly brings to mind Zimbabwe's aquatic serpent, of whom Dzivaguru and Madzivoa are avatars.

These variant myths relate both the incompatibility of water and fire and their complementarity. The duality of the Karanga princesses with dry and moist vaginas expresses the southeastern Bantu dialectic of coolness and heat. The Venda myth about the python who secretly smoked a pipe recounts the same theme as the Hungwe one about a mysterious foreigner who drew force out of smoking and prevailed over Madzivoa, an aquatic spirit who used to keep fire in a horn. The sacrifice of the Venda Python's second wife obviously corresponds to the sacrifices demanded of the Karanga princesses. Karanga symbolism vividly distinguishes a primordial spirit associated with both terrestrial and rain waters from a ruler of fire who was his opponent or else became his ally through marriage. The Korekore see these two spirits as rivals but ultimately invoke Dzivaguru whenever there is no rain. However, this cosmogony has been obscured by the cults of possession dedicated to regional or particularistic gods. The ubiq-

uity of these cults, borrowed from the Shona, has distracted researchers from the still-present ancient gods. In fact, Dzivaguru is the only local spirit with no medium.

The Venda, however, have made an original transposition of the ancient dualism. Python, ruler of waters, and Raluvhumba, ruler of celestial fire, are ritually complementary. In Zimbabwe, neighboring Karanga worship Mwari, a supreme being who combines the attributes of both. This "possessor of heaven" is also called Dzivaguru. Mwari's representative, the python, is venerated as a spirit of the mountains, whereas a water snake keeps rivers and springs from going dry.

Cosmology and Sacred Kingship. James G. Frazer was the first to describe as "divine kingship" a political institution whose primary function is control over fertility and natural forces. I prefer to use the term "sacred kingship" because the particular chiefs who are essential to this institution are not actual gods. The Venda and Lovedu inherited the institution of sacred kingship from the Karanga while the Sotho and Tswana did not (sacred kingship is not apparently a feature of Sotho or Tswana culture despite the existence among them of some powerful military chieftaincies). The Swazi established a political and symbolic system remarkably similar to that of the Venda. Sacred kingship is widespread throughout Africa. Surprisingly constant characteristics are thus attributed to African, particularly Bantu-speaking, kings: they are uncommon beings; they take paramountcy through transgression (often incest); they are surrounded by prohibitions; and they are condemned to die early unless other victims make it possible for them to continue reigning.

The Swazi king, master of thunderbolts and of the sun, rules along with a queen mother associated with the moon and with lush vegetation. Together they control the rains. The king has the privilege of marrying his real or classificatory sisters. While young, he succeeds his father with the title "child," and when adult he takes full power by marrying the "queen of the right hand," with whom he commingles blood to become twins. But his real so-called twin is his mother. During the summer solstice, his force weakens, and the whole nation goes through a crisis. He then performs the Ncwala ceremony, which opens with the previously described quest for water. He is proclaimed "bull of the nation" after the sacrifice of an ill-treated black ox, which represents him. Following several events that alternately show his weakness and his force, he consumes the first fruits and is then disguised as the spirit of vegetation. [See Swazi Religion.]

According to the Venda founding myth, the first two

sovereigns were Sun and Moon, his twin sister as well as incestuous wife. Paradoxically, the Venda king rules with a paternal aunt (Makhadzi, a title also used to refer to the moon); an agnatic half sister takes the aunt's place during the next reign. His principal wife, often a real or classificatory sister, belongs to the royal family. The king, "light of the world," controls rain through both Python and Raluvhumba. Although no ritual marks the summer solstice, Makhadzi presides over the first-fruit ceremony.

Venda and Swazi symbolic configurations are related through transformations. In practice, the Venda put agnatic ties in place of the incestuous uterine (or twin) ties of their myth. The Swazi, on the contrary, maintain these mythical ties through a fiction. Mirrored by a queen who is the king's agnatic half sister, the Venda queen aunt obviously fills the same ritual position as the Swazi queen mother, who is a "twin" to her son. The queen of the right hand, who is both the king's wife and fictive twin, is a substitute for the queen mother. More meaningful parallels exist. The "twin body" of the Swazi kingdom expresses a great power of life; it is completed by the male *tinsila*, the sovereign's symbolic twins associated with his right and left hands. A similar pair in the Venda kingdom corresponds to the paternal uncle and agnatic half brother, respectively Makhadzi's and the queen sister's masculine doubles.

The Lovedu's mythic and historical traditions throw light upon this structural transformation of the ideal twin model. A very long time ago, Princess Dzugudini, the daughter of the king of Monomotapa, bore a son, Muhale, to her uterine brother. Their mother kept their secret, stole her husband's rain medicine, and gave it to her daughter, who fled southward with her young son. With some supporters, they reached the Lovedu land, where Muhale, who had brought fire along, founded a kingdom. The incestuous uterine couple are thus closely associated with the ritual couple formed by a son (keeper of fire) and mother (supplier of rain medicine). The Swazi have simply combined these two images to present the queen mother as her son's twin sister. Succession in the Lovedu royal house later came into the hands of women. The first queen was born out of incest between a king and his daughter. Even though the model for perpetuating sacred kingship through the union of a brother and his uterine sister (ideally between twins of the opposite sex) has shifted agnatically, the Lovedu did not adopt the Venda solution. Their rain queen reigns alone but reputedly has intercourse with a brother in order to bear an heiress.

Lovedu traditions have kept alive the incestuous marriage of sacred chiefs in the ancient Karanga civilization. The king of Monomotapa reigned with Mazarira,

his sister and wife. A later account (Frobenius) states that, in ancient Zimbabwe, Mazarira was the monarch's own mother. The heir apparent lived in incest with a sister who became his principal wife with the name Mwiza (in Monomotapa, Nabwiza). When enthroned along with her brother, she lit the new ritual fire for her keeping.

Unlike the Venda one, the Karanga founding myth does not mention a primordial monarchy of the Sun and Moon twins. Moon, the first king, emerged from the primeval waters. For two years he lived chastely with Morning Star, who brought him fire and bore vegetation before being taken back by Mwari, the supreme being. Moon received a second wife, Evening Star, who invited him to have sexual intercourse. She bore mankind and animals. Moon became "ruler" (*mambo*) over a large population. Two years later, Evening Star left him to go live with Snake, master of the rains. When Moon tried to take her back, Snake bit him. Moon pined away. Rain stopped falling. His children strangled him and buried him with Evening Star who had decided to die with him. After that the children chose a new king. This myth perfectly illustrates the cosmological function of sacred kingship, here under the sign of the moon. Having lost his power over nature, the weakened king was condemned to an early death. The rulers of Monomotapa were killed whenever they showed the least physical failing, whether sickness or impotence. The following ceremony clearly associated them with the moon. At the rising of the new moon, the king had to mock fight invisible enemies in the presence of the realm's dignitaries. According to several accounts, the sacred chiefs of the Karanga and related peoples were eliminated after reigning either two or four years. In the myth, this period corresponds to the Venusian cycle. Mwiza represents Venus, the morning star. Recall that Mwiza was surrounded by chaste, dry princesses. They greeted the first rising of the morning star. On the other hand, the second group of humid princesses, who had intercourse with the snake spirit of the waters, probably had to do with the evening star.

This cosmological system obviously differs from the Venda's, even though the Karanga origins of the Venda kingdom are beyond doubt. In charge of the rains, Karanga and Venda kings are related to aquatic snake spirits. In the Venda myth, both Venusian wives belonged to Python, but only the daytime one could be with her husband whenever he smoked (i.e., used fire). The morning/evening star opposition exists but is concealed. Moreover, the Venda sovereign was not lunar. The first king was none other than Sun, whom Python vomited out. Present-day rulers proclaim to be descended from Raluvhumba, who controls thunderbolts

and is symbolized by the eagle. The thunderbird's role in Karanga royal cosmogony needs to be better known. Thomas Huffman, an archaeologist, has suggested that Zimbabwe's famous stone birds represent successive rulers in the form of fish eagles. In old Zimbabwe, this brightly feathered bird was the mediator between humanity and Mwari, the celestial demiurge and congener of the Venda Raluvhumba. Recall that the Hungwe, whose name literally means "fish eagle," brought fire to the destitute folk ruled by the aquatic Madzivoa. The complementarity of the eagle and serpent restores the fundamental opposition between fire and water.

Two diverging traditions relate the origin of fire, the celestial symbol of sovereignty. The Venda king is apparently associated with the second. He went ahead of Raluvhumba when the latter appeared on earth as a big, thundering flame. The stick that the king uses to stir his porridge is called "the fire lighter."

Whereas the Karanga moon kings were killed after they reigned a short time (or whenever their physical forces failed, as in Monomotapa), the Venda kings enjoy long lives provided they do not have children after enthronement. They have to take a drug that inhibits their sexuality. Comparisons with central Africa lead to the conclusion that this practice aims at containing the king's dangerous, almost sorcerous, magical power. Among the Pende in Zaire, some sacred chiefs are forced to refrain from sexual intercourse after taking office. Lovedu ritual ascribes power over the rains to a secretly incestuous queen who had to commit suicide. It has its place in the same system of symbolic transformations, which goes back to a common ideology.

The Ritual Complex of Circumcision. Neither the Karanga nor the Shona practice circumcision. However, all accounts agree that this custom and its related initiation are a time-honored institution among the Sotho and Tswana, who have passed it on to the Lovedu, Venda, and Tsonga. Girls' puberty rites usually correspond to male circumcision. Girls undergo a pretended circumcision that amounts to slightly cutting the clitoris (Lovedu) or upper leg (Tswana) or to placing a knife between the legs (Pedi). The southern Sotho designate both feminine initiation and masculine circumcision with the same word (*lebello*). The Pedi, a northern Sotho people, make boys go through two successive rites (Bodika and Bogwera), but girls undergo a single collective rite (Byale). The Lovedu have adopted the latter; they call it Vyalu and correlate it with the second masculine initiation. Those peoples with Karanga origins initially held only individual rites (the Venda Khoba or Lovedu Khomba) at the first menstruation.

Among the Sotho circumcision enables young men to become warriors. Each new class of circumcised youths

forms a regiment in their chief's service. Although chiefs lack the attributes of sacred kings, the symbolism of Sotho initiation and of the Swazi kingdom are strikingly close. Major Pedi chiefs keep a tribal fire that neither women nor uncircumcised boys may approach. From it initiates take a brand to light the fire that will burn continuously in the center of their circular bush camp during the dry season. After being circumcised, they gather each morning around this fire, the "little lion," and stage a feigned attack. They "pierce the laws." The solar symbolism of the lion fire is indicated by its bed lying along an east-west axis. The sun symbolizes the adult Pedi man. The "spotted white hyena" represents the lunar feminine principle but also refers to a small conical tower forbidden to those undergoing initiation. Built at the camp's eastern entry with carefully polished stones grouted with cinders, it stands alongside a smaller structure, its child. At the end of initiation, the newly circumcised follow the "hyena's tracks," a trail of cinders inside the camp, from the western entry northward to the eastern one. This path depicts the moon's apparent movement eastward, opposite to the sun's. The discovery of the hyena monument by initiates brings together pairs of opposites: sun and moon, male and female. When the masculine ceremony ends, girls who have just had their first period begin collective initiation. They experience a pretend circumcision and are secluded for a month under the authority of the chief's principal wife.

The Matlala have made interesting changes in this ceremony. The fire bed, called "lion," also lies along an east-west axis. Initiates are awakened at dawn while the morning star is shining. Since looking at the sun is forbidden during the first phase of initiation, the boys turn their faces westward. During the second phase, they look eastward and expose the right half of their bodies to the fire's heat. During this "night of change," a stake is erected and its top decorated with ostrich feathers. Greeted as grandmother, this stake replicates the Pedi's lunar monument. Throughout their retreat, initiates pretend to attack the moon. The Matlala use obviously phallic metaphors to liken the waning moon to a female elephant that has to be "stabbed" and "made to fall." Pedi initiation songs also mention a mysterious elephant, an image that instructors take explicitly to mean the dangerous menstruating woman.

Just as the lion is in opposition to the elephant, so a solar fire along an east-west axis is in opposition to the moon. This Sotho symbolism can be compared to that surrounding the Swazi lion king, associated with the sun and fire, who rules along with an elephant queen mother, associated with the moon. During the Nwala ceremony, the weakened king runs after the summer

solstitial sun. He finally has sexual intercourse with the queen of the right hand, a notorious action comparable to the solar quest for virility by newly circumcised Sotho youth. During their retreat, Pedi initiates are as weak as the Swazi king during the Ncwala. They try in vain "to run past the sun." The king's successor is chosen from among his very young sons. This child king is the only Swazi male who, at adolescence, goes through a circumcision-like ceremony. Otherwise, the Nguni do not hold circumcision or related initiation ceremonies, although they might have in the past. The Swazi seemingly concentrate the symbolism of Sotho initiation within their royal institution. The Swazi king may never drink water, just as those undergoing Sotho initiation may not. At the end of initiation, the newly circumcised jump into water while their camp is set ablaze; the Ncwala ends as the Swazi king washes while a purifying bonfire is lit. Like this king, the Pedi who have completed initiation become lions and brave warriors. Just as Pedi initiation leads to the formation of new military regiments, so the Swazi military age grades actively participate in the Ncwala, under the sign of the moon. Throughout the Sotho region, circumcision camps fall under the chiefs' direct control. The Swazi Ncwala and Sotho puberty rites are variations of the same symbolic and sociological themes.

Similarities lie even closer. Recall how the lion fire in the Pedi initiatory camp is lit. The chief's principal wife has a function like that of the Swazi queen mother—to keep rain medicine. To be wedded, she appears at sunset as all fires are put out. The fire ignited in her dwelling is used to renew the tribal fire. The fire in the chief's keeping (which he gives to those undergoing initiation) and the rain medicine kept by his principal wife (who gives birth to his successor) are both complementary and opposite. The newly circumcised youth's solar/lunar quest for a woman is also a search for rain. Strictly kept apart from the opposite sex, initiates gather around the solar lion fire during the dry season. Ritual chants invite them to follow the elephant's (woman's) tracks "when it rains," for then this animal has "no more force" and can be killed easily. Such phrases mean that a man may approach a woman only after her menstrual period. The cycle of fertility is linked to the change of seasons; menstruation suspends sexual relations and, like the dry season, falls under the sign of fire.

The Tsonga and Venda use this cosmological code. They borrowed and also adapted the institution of circumcision camps from their Sotho neighbors. A feminine elephant fire replaces the masculine lion fire in initiation camps. How should this inversion be understood? For many southeastern Bantu-speaking peoples,

particularly the Swazi and Sotho, the masculine sun is complementary to the feminine moon (associated with rain and lush vegetation). But in general fire is feminine and terrestrial water masculine. Menstruation and pregnancy have to do with heat. The profound symbolic changes separating Sotho and non-Sotho circumcision rites come down to a fundamental alternative: should the ritual fire be given masculine and solar attributes or the hot properties of menstrual blood? The Sotho have made the first, the lion fire, their choice; the Tsonga and Venda have opted for the second, the elephant fire.

Moreover, the Tsonga do not put political authorities in charge of initiation. Unlike the Pedi, they entrust the ritual fire to the chief's principal wife, who keeps it burning in her dwelling in order to smoke medicine objects. Furthermore, the moon is dissociated from the sun; Moon's husband is Evening Star. For all these reasons, solar/lunar symbolism sinks into the background. Instead, all symbolism related to Tsonga circumcision is dominated by the opposition between masculine water and feminine fire, as shown by the ritual formulas taught during initiation.

Three animals successively figure in these formulas. Symbol of the circumcising knife that makes boys fit for reproduction, the crocodile "moves heavily across fords and in the rushes." The hippopotamus "opens the road for elephants toward the ford." The elephant "walks slowly on dry ground" where rain will fill her tracks. These metaphors strongly contrast the aquatic, masculine domain of the crocodile with the solid ground of the female elephant. Between these two lies the road opened up by the hippopotamus, which is associated with a virgin girl whom young boys rape. They thus open the way to the female elephant, the adult woman who becomes fertile only after menstruation, which supposedly stops with the start of the rainy season. The elephant fire is a sign of both feminine sterility and the dry season. Every day, initiates confront this fire and "stab" it with a phallic stick while they sing, "Elephant, stay calm!" Significantly, they may not drink any water during their retreat. When the camp is burned down at the end of initiation, they jump into a pool as they proclaim their virility. How to interpret this sequence? Circumcision, the necessary condition for procreative functioning, falls under the sign of masculine water. Separated from this element during seclusion, initiates are brought close to a feminine fire, which they cannot extinguish before the rainy season. The symbolic space around the elephant fire in the center of the initiation camp and the crocodile's watery place outside the camp are clearly delimited. The elephant fire corresponds to menstruation, dry earth, and feminine sterility; the

crocodile's watery realm to circumcision, terrestrial water, and masculine fertility.

By playing on these oppositions, the Tsonga merely adjusted Sotho symbolism to the thermodynamic code with which all their rites of passage comply. Recall that newborn Tsonga children, created inside burning wombs, undergo cooling rites and that the growth of boys is placed under the sign of the moon. Just before puberty, the ritual process is reversed, for sexuality is a new source of heat to be carefully controlled. Tsonga circumcision rites are an initiation into the mysteries of feminine fire. Circumcision definitively cuts the maternal bond and marks the beginning of a young man's search for a wife. Wives are normally taken from among pubescent girls who, excessively hot during their first menstruation, undergo a collective cooling rite, which is the reverse of the masculine ceremony. Every morning during their month-long retreat, they are led, with faces veiled, to a pool and dunked into water up to their necks. Back in the hut, they are not allowed to warm themselves near the fire. During Pedi initiation, girls are also dunked into a stream to take away heat caused by menstruation, but this occurs at sunset. The Tsonga and Venda both apply cooling treatments to lower girls' temperatures.

Solar symbolism remains a vital part of the Tsonga ceremony. Initiates leave for the place of circumcision at dawn while the morning star heralds the sun, which will pull them out of the "darkness" of childhood. In addition to putting a feminine elephant fire in place of the Pedi masculine lion fire, the Venda (and probably also the Tsonga) change its direction along a north-south axis. According to a widespread conception in southern Africa, the sun travels from its northern to its southern houses between dry and rainy seasons. Like the Pedi, the Tsonga hold initiation ceremonies during the dry season. As the southern summer solstice and the first rains draw near, the newly initiated may start "following the elephant's tracks"—fearlessly approaching women. The opposition between the elephant's dry ground and the crocodile's watery place is a sign of the changing seasons. Sexuality corresponds, as among the Pedi, to the cosmic order governed by the sun's course.

Thus the symbolic system of circumcision is based upon a kind of thermodynamics that characterizes all thought among the southeastern Bantu-speaking peoples. Moreover, circumcision resembles the *mu-kanda* complex of rituals that is diffused among such matrilineal Bantu-speaking peoples as the Ndembu and Chokwe in western central Africa. Consequently it brings to light a particularly interesting historical problem. Did the matrilineal societies in the region that is now comprised of Zambia, Angola, and northwest Zaire

maintain a very old Bantu cultural tradition that was lost by other groups (much like the patrilineal Sotho and their near neighbors did in southern Africa)? This hypothesis cannot be dismissed *a priori*. However many arguments support another interpretation (de Heusch, 1982). It seems more plausible that the southern Bantu-speaking zone should be considered as the center of diffusion of this institution to central Africa. This type of diffusion would have taken place in the land of the Lozi, or Rotse, where the Kololo conquerors (of Sotho origin) took power in 1836. They ruled until 1864 and set up circumcision camps there that were associated with the military formation of young men. Among the Ndembu these rites also make one a warrior. Everything leads one to believe that during the nineteenth century the circumcision camps inaugurated by the Sotho conquerors were gradually adopted by neighboring populations who added to the circumcision rituals their own practice of using masks. Naturally, in each case the model is transformed from one region to another, but this transformation always takes place within the logic of symbolic thought already at work in southern Africa.

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LUC DE HEUSCH

Translated from French by Noal Mellott

SOUTHERN SIBERIAN RELIGIONS. Southern Siberia is a region covered by a large wooded band, called taiga, that stretches from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean and is bordered by two treeless zones, the tundra to the north and the steppe to the south. The taiga evokes an entire procession of images: it is here where images of impenetrable immensity and absolute refuge mix with the intimacy of nature alone. The dense mass of huge dark trees is penetrated only by the great rivers (Ob, Yenisei, Lena, and tributaries) that roll their vast waters toward the Arctic Ocean, flooding their valleys in the summer and offering their frozen surfaces as bridges in the winter.

Throughout history the natural environment has prohibited any concentration of population; people continue to live in small scattered groups and to devote themselves to various kinds of hunting, fishing, and harvesting, which causes population shifts, varying in number and distance, throughout the year. These forest groups (from small isolated ethnic groups like the Ket—1,100 in 1979—to much larger groups) belong to one or the other of two great families of the Siberian peoples: Uralic to the west of the Yenisei River and Altaic to the east. Moreover, the majority of both groups live in the zones bordering the forest; these areas serve as pastoral land, while the forest is a hunting ground. Hence, one finds ethnic groups divided between taiga and tundra or between taiga and steppe. It must be noted, however,

that forest peoples of different families are more similar to each other than to steppe or tundra peoples of their own family; there are specific religious features associated with hunting life in the forest.


This distribution between taiga and tundra or taiga and steppe encourages a comparative approach, deliberately focusing on the specific religious implications of the forest, as opposed to the steppe and the tundra. However, in order to avoid the pitfall of ecological determinism, the form of societal organization and mode of thought must be considered with the natural environment (more precisely, the means of access to natural resources). This approach can also be hampered by the nature of the sources and facts themselves. The representations described in this article are those of the pre-Soviet period, that is, of the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Forest Peoples. The Uralic and Altaic families each may be divided into smaller units. The two Siberian branches of the former are the Ob-Ugrian and the Samoyed. The Ob-Ugrian people, essentially a forest-dwelling group, consists of the Khanty and the Mansi, known in the eleventh century as the Yugra to the Russians of Novgorod, who traded with them for skins and furs. After their entrance into the Russian empire in the seventeenth century they became known as the Ostiaks and Voguls, respectively. At the time of the 1979 census there were 21,000 Khanty and 7,600 Mansi (a minor increase from the 1926 figures of 17,800 and 5,700, respectively).

Because of their proximity to European Russia, the Khanty and Mansi were severely exposed to the impact of colonialism. Far worse than the burden of taxation, the appearance of new illnesses, and the exactions from civil servants were the appropriation of the best land, that bordering the rivers, by Russian peasants and the forced conversion to Orthodox Christianity; both actions provoked strong opposition. Nevertheless, rather than staging a revolt, which would be quickly crushed, some preferred submission and assimilation while others elected to escape into the depths of the forest. The traditional society of the Khanty and Mansi is organized in exogamic moieties—the "hare moiety" and the "bear moiety," each having descended through the male line from one clan, which eventually divided into many.


The Samoyed branch, settled primarily in the tundra, also has groups living in the forest: the Selkup, in particular, and a small group of the Nentsy. The Selkup (6,000 in 1926; 3,600 in 1979; called the Yenisei Ostiaks in the past when the Ket were included) were forced back from the Yenisei Valley to valleys situated farther west (Taz, Turukhan, and Yelogy) with the onset of Russian farming. Here too, each exogamic moiety—

SOUTHERN SIBERIA



This map shows approximate locations of ethnic groups mentioned in this and related articles. No selection of names for a map of this size could truly reflect the religious, ethnic and linguistic complexity of the area. Moreover, scholars differ on the spellings and applications of names of various peoples.

- Tundra
- Forest vegetation
- Grass vegetation
- Dry steppe and desert.



“eagle” and “nutcracker crow”—includes several patrilineal clans divided into various territorial units.

The other major group of forest people, the Altaic family, is divided into the Turkic, Mongol, and Manchu-Tunguz branches; these comprise the principal population of eastern Siberia. The Turkic branch (722,500 in Siberia in 1979), the most important of the three, is barely represented in the forest. However, certain ethnic groups, while primarily settled in the tundra (Yakuts) or steppe (eastern Tuva, Tofa, southern Shor), are found in the adjacent mountainous forest area as well.

On the other hand, the Toj-Tuva of the upper Yenisei River, the Tofa of the Sayan Mountains, and the Shor of the Altaic forest still practiced the traditional kinds of hunting in the nineteenth century. The Tuva and Tofa combine this with the raising, riding, and milking of deer. Each clan of the Shor has its own hunting ground; any infraction of the system entails vengeance. Each Shor hunter is entitled to hunt in the grounds of his wife's clan and must share his booty with her father.

The Mongol branch is represented in the forest by the Ekhirit-Bulagat Buriats who are native to the Cisbaikalian forests. These people were not influenced by the Mongolian empire. Although they did borrow animal breeding from their Mongolian cousins of the steppe in the sixteenth century, they have nonetheless retained an authentic hunting culture as well as the remaining visible traces of a social organization divided into exogamic moieties (Ekhirit and Bulagat), with each moiety further subdivided into several patrilineal clans.

Stemming from the Tunguz branch are the Eveny (12,000 in 1979), the various Tunguz groups along the Amur River, and the Evenki, the Tunguz of the taiga (28,000 in 1979 as compared to 38,804 in 1926). Contrary to the other Siberian peoples whose populations are concentrated in a particular region (albeit in scattered groups), they are scattered throughout all of eastern Siberia. Still identifiable in spite of a variety of lifestyles, the traditional Tunguz is a hunter, an unparalleled observer and indefatigable traveler who is also incessantly driven by his search for game. It was the Tunguz who were chosen as guides by all explorers of Siberia.

Hunting, Alliance, and the Horizontal Conception of the World. Considered in terms of the life he leads and the type of society in which he lives, the Siberian hunter's conceptions are based on a series of principles that create a structural analogy between the social, economic, and religious domains and that inform the mechanism of the interaction of these domains. Hunting is conceived of as an alliance in which the game is equivalent to the woman: the exchanging partners in each case are on the same plane, thus the world is thought of as horizontal.

Natural beings that supply sustenance are thought to be organized, like humans, into clans and linked to each other as well as to human clans through relations of alliance and vengeance. To be outside the clan is anomalous, and brings illness, death, and other trouble; everything possible is done to avoid such an anomaly. This conception applies primarily to game that is consumed but is in general not applied either to fish or to game hunted for fur, an occupation that is engaged in to meet external demand, thus making the game simple merchandise. Although fishing is a traditional practice and often supplies an important part of their subsistence, fish is still thought of simply as food, and rarely involves the same ritual treatment as game. (On the other hand, marine mammals on the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk are considered to be hunted and not fished; they are classified under the category of consumed game.) Nor is this concept applied to gathered products, which are not conceived of as beings and which depend on a woman's activity without symbolic value. Likewise, only game that is consumed forms the subject of sociologically pertinent collective practices (hunting, ritual of consumption) and popular discourse (myths, tales, stories).

Birds appear to be particularly rich in symbolic value, a value that derives primarily from their signaling function. Thus, birds of prey and birds living on carrion, which signal the presence of game, serve as evocations of hunting. Migrators, which signal the coming and going of the seasons, evoke the voyage to the supernatural world and the circulation of souls between the world of the living and that of the dead. [*See* Birds.]

Species-specific hunting and consumption restrictions are imposed upon each clan based on the mythical animal that is regarded as the clan's founder. This system has led many writers to speak of totemism, but the theory linked with this term is outdated today and even forgotten. Such a distribution of symbolic attributes—found in other places in the world—is to be understood as the clans' way of assuring networks of relationships among themselves and the necessary complementarity for general cohesion. However, the facts are insufficient to allow us to establish systematically the roots of the symbolic exploitation of one animal species or another, except those whose relationship can be assimilated to that of a hunter and a guide (e.g., the eagle or crow).

In the representations and the ritual treatment of the slain animal, the taking of game is reduced to a taking of meat. The bones are not destroyed but are disposed of (along with the head and other parts believed to contain the vital breath of life) in such a way that the animal will be reincarnated or that another animal of the same species will appear. Seemingly out of gratitude to the animal that came to offer its flesh, the hunter treats

it as a guest of honor and invites it to return. That he symbolically takes only meat and not the animal as such prevents the hunt from being likened to the murder of a member of another clan, which would unleash a chain of vengeance. It also happens that the death of the animal is recognized, but the responsibility for it is attributed to a stranger belonging to another tribe.

Just as there is a system of matrimonial alliance that legitimizes the individual's taking a wife, there is a system of economic (or one could say "food") alliance that justifies the hunter's taking of game. These two systems are often compared in detail in mythical discourse, as are their subjects and their protagonists: wife and game, the taker of wife and hunter, giver of wife and giver of game. As opposed to the others, the giver of game is an imaginary being, generally called the "spirit of the forest" and qualified as "rich." With this title and that of "owner of hunted species," he is indeed a "supernatural" power in the etymological sense of the word.

In societies divided into two exogamic moieties, the matrimonial system is one of restricted exchange, which is realized in the marriage of bilateral cross-cousins (children of both the mother's brother and the father's sister) and which amounts to an exchange of sisters. Whereas this system is sociologically simple and efficient considering the precarious conditions of life known to the Siberian hunters, it is nevertheless lacking in the constraints (debt of one side, claim from the other) necessary for its perpetuation: partners are released immediately through the simple act of exchange. However, the system is conceived of by people who bring it into operation as though it involves three stages or three partners, thereby preventing a person from perceiving himself as both giver and taker at the same time with respect to the same partner and delaying the obligation of exchange. Thus, the taker's and giver's positions toward the same partner alternate from one generation to the next. In this way the system becomes self-perpetuating within a patrilineal line: compensation for the wife taken by the father is a daughter of this same woman given by the son.

The hypothesis of the analogy of hunting with the matrimonial system leads both to the discovery of what compensation the hunter gives for the game he has taken and to an understanding of what are otherwise inexplicable practices: these come from the need for a third partner to create dynamics in the exchange system. The compensation for game taken is one of the same nature as the game itself—food—and is given by the hunter's wife to small tame animals (most of which belong to species that are neither hunted nor used: eagles, swans, cranes, nutcracker crows, foxes, etc.) as well as animal representations (furs, wooden figurines, etc.). The latter (Selkup, *khekhe*; Tuva, *eeren*; Buriat, *on-*

gon; Tunguz, *singken, sevek*), made at the time of marriage, are "fed" pieces of meat through their mouths, smeared with blood, and anointed with animal fat. In this way, the food taken from the animal world is symbolically returned. From the point of view of a tripartite system, these tame animals or animal representations occupy the taker position with respect to the hunter and the debtor position with respect to the forest spirit, the giver of game. If they are not fed, these spirits supposedly prevent the hunter from taking game and cause him and his family to fall ill and even die. [See Ongon.]

Built on an analogous model, these two systems—matrimonial and economic—also make use of mutual compensation. Frequently, the myths and tales attribute a loss in the realm of alliance (abduction of the hunter's wife or sister while he is away hunting) to excessive hunting. In the Evenk ritual called the Feast of the Bear, the taker of a wife becomes a supplier of game for his wife's brother. The numerous restrictions concerning the hunter's sexual activity before the hunt, on the one hand, and the wife's behavior (notably concerning menstrual blood) with respect to hunting weapons on the other, may also be interpreted in terms of maintaining a balance between hunting and alliance. Furthermore, in these two systems, the act of taking requires the observance of strict rules vis-à-vis the giver, such as the giving of specific offerings and demonstrating the qualities of taker. One will note that what is offered to the forest spirit (incense, tobacco, amusing stories) is intended to put him in a good mood and make him laugh, so that he will be easily persuaded to release the game: the catch involves some cunning.

Whereas these two systems and their interaction normally function autonomously, they are dependent both structurally and functionally upon the third system, shamanism, which is built on an analogous model. Based on the idea that the life of the body is subordinate to what is conveniently called the "soul" that dwells in it, this system ensures the exchange of souls between their supernatural dispensers and their natural human and animal supports. Upon death, the souls return to the spirits (which suggests the hypothesis of their reincarnation within the same clan). The artisan of this circulation is the shaman, who, it is believed, obtains the souls of game and people from their supernatural dispensers.

From the standpoint of the system, the shaman is homologous to both the wife-taker and the hunter, a fact that is often clearly demonstrated by the idea that he has a symbolic wife who is the daughter of either the forest spirit or water spirit (Selkup), or of the earth spirit Khosedam, as the Ket believe. The office of the shaman is generally transmitted through the patrilineal line, usually from grandfather to grandson; agnatic rel-

atives oversee the rites of investiture and control the position and the exercise of the shamanic function. Thus, among the Selkup, the death of every adult blood relative entails the destruction of the shaman's drum and its replacement by a larger one. In fact, the shaman's power increases as each soul of a deceased relative rejoins the spirit world. The very presence of the shaman in the midst of his group guarantees the existence of a relationship with the soul-giving spirits. This relationship can be reinforced by certain detailed roles, such as the Buriat shaman acting as godfather to newborns and the Tunguz shaman leading the souls of the dead to the otherworld. However, the shaman's active intervention is essential whenever there is a disturbance: scarcity of game; lack of descendants; or departure of a soul, which, by leaving the body vacant, renders it sick and soon dead. The shaman, who performs a divination procedure (throwing an object that falls on the "good" or "bad" side, answering his questions "yes" or "no"), then determines the cause of the disturbance. The two major causes considered are infractions of the rules governing the exchanges (excessive or insufficient hunting or alliances, inadequate amount of food given to tamed animals and figurines, violation of taboos concerning hunting, etc.) and the death of any animal or human surviving outside the framework of the clan and thus outside the system, which results in a wandering, unintegrated soul that is consequently harmful. Mediator *par excellence*, the shaman then negotiates a return to order with the spirits, tricking them somewhat, but also giving them offerings or a new cult (for example, by making a new figurine to be fed, zoomorphic in the event of a hunting infraction and anthropomorphic in the event of a deceased outsider to be reinstated). Thus, he symbolically secures the reappearance of game, the birth of children, the return of the soul to the ailing person's body, and so on.

The taking (or retaking) of these souls cannot be realized by the shaman without the aid of what is usually called his "auxiliary spirits," equivalent to such equally essential auxiliaries as the intermediary in the marriage and the beater or guide in the hunt. He sends these spirits to search for the soul that has strayed from the sick and to track down vengeful spirits, descended from the frustrated souls of those who died violent deaths, to keep them from doing harm. The Selkup rite involving the "dark tent" is held in total darkness in the presence of the shaman's kin and consists of the shaman's proving to them his ability to stir up his auxiliary spirits and summon their services. His power increases with their number and promptness in hastening to his call. Their remuneration is found in the type of offering given them (primarily food) and, for those descended from wandering souls, in their reinstatement.

In each system, the relationship between the taker and his auxiliary has the character of a personal contract, updatable and reversible, corresponding to an exchange of services. These services, which are not identical but complementary, are not organized into a hierarchy: thus, hunter and beater or guide have an equivalent status and an equal part regardless of the catch. This relationship between taker and auxiliary is based on the general principle of a dualist organization of the operating units from various levels, which finds expression in the very name of the Khanty-Mansi (bear, hare) or Selkup (eagle, crow) moieties (in the myths of origin, the moieties being descended either from two brothers-in-law or from two brothers, forming separate lines), in the custom of nomadic camping set up by two allied families, and so on. The Feast of the Bear, celebrated by most of these peoples, is still the totalizing ritual *par excellence*, despite some differences. There, the organization in moieties of the different units and the three systems of exchange come into play, a fact that illustrates the exceptional symbolic versatility of the bear. [See Bears.]

While the forest world is at once aerial and terrestrial and dominates symbolic space, the aquatic world also plays an important role. The souls of the dead descend along the course of the great rivers; boats or representations of boats appear in certain funerary or commemorative rites. Because of the orientation of the rivers, both the north and downstream water are associated with death. Symmetrically, upstream water and the south have a positive connotation. Birds that migrate from the south are offered ritual receptions upon arrival and invitations to return upon leaving, as if to materialize the rebirth of life (since it is believed that they bring the souls of newborns). The simultaneous presence of quadrupeds and birds does not really affect the uniqueness of the forest, represented by the omnipresent but indivisible element that is the tree. The declivity of the rivers there does not result in a separation of "upstream" from "downstream." "Up" and "down" are not superposed positions; rather, they are contiguous in the depth of the same horizontal plane, a plane in which forest and water are essential constituents conceived of, respectively, as giver of game and giver of fish. (The systems of alliance and contracts of assistance are outlined in figure 1.)

Cattle Breeding and the Vertical Conception of the World. The notion of superposed worlds—and correlatively of a vertical liaison between them—develops from the opposition of upstream/downstream, which is reinterpreted in terms of up/down and then divided into the oppositions of sky/earth and earth/lower (or subterranean) world. This is due to the combined influence of two factors: the adoption of animal breeding and incor-




FIGURE 1. *Systems of Alliance and Contracts of Assistance*

poration into a state organization, the Russian empire.

In that the adoption of animal breeding (or, with a subtle difference, agriculture) creates a patrimony to be handed down (herds, fields), ties of descent filiation develop and the systems of relationships tend to become vertical. Thus the alliance increasingly attempts to postpone reciprocity and begins to follow the model of a “generalized exchange” (according to which the clan from which one takes a wife is not the same as the clan to which one gives a sister). Instead of becoming segmented, the clans organize their lineages into a hierarchy. In the economic system, alimentary compensation is given to a “consecrated” or “tabooed” reindeer (or other domestic animal), fed along with its own herd but never utilized. Whereas the ritual treatment of the

bones of the game animal aimed at its reincarnation on earth, the sacrifice of the domestic animal (always slaughtered in a manner different than the hunted wild animal) is intended to increase the herds of spirits. The animal gradually becomes less a being and more a product; the proportion of zoomorphic representations decreases. This ideological change, only initiated with the animal breeding in the forest, expresses itself through the obviously production-oriented breeding found in the steppe (and, to a lesser degree, in the tundra). Associated with the hierarchical centralization, it lays the groundwork for the emergence of transcendental entities and is receptive to the adoption of a world religion with dogma and clergy, such as Russian Orthodoxy or Buddhism.

It is significant that the animal breeders living in the forest consider their own shamans as decadent and the shamans of their neighbors, who remained, for the most part, dependent on hunting, as powerful. Such is the case with the Nentsy toward the Entsy, the Entsy toward the Selkup and the Ket, and with all of them toward the Tunguz. This is because in the cattle breeders' ideology the giver is now conceived of in terms of the irreversible mode of filiation and therefore acquires the status of absolute superiority. He is no longer a partner with whom one negotiates, but a master on whom one is dependent. The shaman's capacity to act is therefore necessarily reduced in principle (since he is more dependent and has fewer opportunities to negotiate). As for the spirits, the pastoral ideology organizes them into a hierarchy, multiplies and localizes them (which leads to the notion of spirit-master of separate places), and also develops supporting myths and figures of the founders and creators over the ancestors.

The Russian empire instituted Peter the Great's idea of "only one God, only one Tsar." At the same time, the Orthodox church searched for (or created) indigenous equivalents compatible with its own concepts and refused all compromise with other beliefs. The traditional spirits were lowered to the rank of "devils and demons" and confined to the underworld. The promotion of heavenly bodies (sky, sun) to the rank of supreme being owes as much to the Christian attempt to support the idea of God as to the native effort to set up a rival against it and make more powerful their traditional view of the world (since a God is conceived of as "higher" than mere ancestors).

The case of the sun (Num, Nom) among the Uralic peoples is an example of this process. Its artificially constructed image as a supreme being is vague, fluctuating, and without ritual importance. In the myths of creation attributed to it the only constant element is its opposition to Nga, its (or his) son or brother-in-law, depending upon the case, an opposition that, rather than illustrating the Christian notion of a relationship between God and the devil, is indicative of a fundamental problem of kinship among the Uralic peoples concerning the opposition between older and younger people that is the framework of the creation myths. [See Num.] The same is true with the Tunguz concerning the *bugha* ("sky," derived from an earlier meaning, "moose"). Relationships with the spirits are reinterpreted. That which was nothing but a reaction by the spirits (beneficial or baleful) to the treatment received from man is radicalized into a moral opposition of good and evil. The shaman's "voyages" to the forest and aquatic worlds are replaced by an ascension into the sky or descent to the underworld. Nevertheless, the traditional

pragmatic sense remains: the icons of the saints, interpreted as the souls of the dead, are "fed" in the same way as traditional representations in order to ensure the proper continuation of domestic life.

[Many of the peoples mentioned herein are the subjects of independent entries. See Khanty and Mansi Religion; Yakut Religion; Samoyed Religion; and Tunguz Religion. See also Shamanism, article on Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanism.]

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ROBERTE HAMAYON

Translated from French by Sherri L. Granka

SOZZINI, FAUSTO PAVOLO (1539–1604), antitrinitarian theologian; known in Latin as Faustus Socinus. Sozzini was born in Siena on 5 December 1539. When his uncles fell under suspicion of heresy, and the Inquisition threatened the Sozzini family, Sozzini left Italy on 21 April 1561 for Lyons, France. After the death of his uncle Lelio Sozzini on 14 May 1562, Fausto acquired Lelio's manuscripts, which decisively turned his interests from literary studies to religious studies, specifically to doctrinal reform. His *Explicatio primae partis primi capituli Ioannis* (Explanation of the First Part of the First Chapter of John's Gospel), written in 1562 during his stay in Zurich and Basel, developed more fully Lelio's view of Christ as the person who revealed God's new creation by his teachings and his life.

Sozzini returned to Italy in 1563, where he served at the court of Cosimo I, duke of Florence (later grand duke of Tuscany). In 1574, after Cosimo's death, he returned to Switzerland and spent the following three years in Basel studying scripture and theology. In his greatest work, *De Jesu Christo Servatore* (On Jesus Christ, the Savior), completed in 1578, he attacked the doctrine that God requires satisfaction for human sins, argued that Christ is savior by his teachings and exemplary life, and emphasized the importance of faith, as trust in God and in Christ, as essential for salvation. In his response to Francesco Pucci (a widely traveled Italian humanist from Florence) in 1578, *De statu primi*

hominis ante lapsum (On the State of the First Man before the Fall), Sozzini argued that humanity is mortal by nature; immortality is a gift of God. He next traveled to Kolozsvár, Transylvania, to attempt to dissuade the Hungarian theologian Dávid Ferenc (Francis Dávid) from his opposition to prayer to Christ (a view known as nonadorantism—that is, a denial that either religious worship or prayers for aid should be addressed to Christ). When Dávid refused to change his stance, Sozzini went on to Cracow, Poland, in 1579.

Although he was not admitted as a full member of the Minor Reformed Church of Poland (the Polish Brethren) because he did not regard adult baptism as essential for church membership, Sozzini became the outstanding theologian of that church, uniting its various groups. He wrote numerous works defending the church against attacks on its antitrinitarian theological views and its pacifist social and political views. In *De Sacrae Scripturae auctoritate* (On the Authority of Holy Scripture), which was published under a pseudonym in 1580, Sozzini used rational and historical arguments to refute the skeptical views of those who doubted the divine authority of the Bible.

In 1586, Sozzini married Elżbieta Morsztyn, who died within a year. The Inquisition cut off his income from Italy, and university students tried to kill him as a heretic. In 1589 he moved from Cracow to Luclawice. His colloquies with his followers in 1601 and 1602 at Raków presented his mature views. Sozzini died at Luclawice on 3 March 1604.

Sozzini viewed Christ as unique, a man who is divine, not by nature, but by virtue of his office, for God instructed Christ, resurrected him, and gave him all power over the church in heaven and on earth. He opposed the nonadorantism of Dávid and others, insisting on prayer to Christ for guidance and for aid. He regarded scripture as God's revelation and denied that God can be known through a natural theology. He held that humankind is mortal by nature and that only the righteous will be resurrected. At death, sinners suffer eternal extinction.

Sozzini's theological analyses and arguments elicited intense controversies, which resulted in significant changes in the thought of some Protestant theologians, particularly on the doctrine of the atonement. The Polish Brethren modified and continued his biblical, rational theology in their famous *Racovian Catechism*.

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JOHN C. GODBEY

SPACE, SACRED. See Sacred Space.

SPARAGMOS. See Dismemberment.

SPEAKING IN TONGUES. See Glossolalia.

SPEECH, SACRED. See Language, *article on Sacred Language*.

SPEKTOR, YITSHAQ ELHANAN (1817–1896), Orthodox rabbi and foremost traditional Jewish legal authority during the last half of the nineteenth century. Born in Rosh, in the Grodno district of Russia, Spektor was raised in a highly traditional milieu and as a young boy mastered the study of Talmud under the tutelage of his father, Yisra'el Isser. After his arranged marriage at the age of thirteen, Spektor went to live with his in-laws in Volkovysk, where Binyamin Diskin instructed him in rabbinics and ordained him as a rabbi. Spektor occupied his first rabbinical post at the age of twenty and

served as rabbi in several Russian towns, including Nishvez and Novogradok, centers of traditional Talmudic scholarship. In 1864 Spektor became rabbi of Kovno, where he also headed the *kolel* (advanced rabbinic academy) until his death.

Spektor's piety, his absolute command of traditional rabbinic sources and methods, and his virtually unparalleled genius in rendering Jewish legal decisions made him the communal leader of Orthodox Jewry in Russia during his day. He participated in a host of charitable and civic affairs on behalf of Russian and world Jewry, arbitrated Jewish communal disputes throughout the world, and was a staunch supporter of Jewish colonization in Palestine. In addition, Spektor attempted to defend traditional Judaism against many of the onslaughts of modernity. He himself was unable to speak Russian and was an opponent of the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment); he forbade the translation of the Talmud into Russian and opposed the creation of modern rabbinical seminaries where secular subjects would be taught.

Spektor's first volume of *responsa* (Jewish legal decisions), *Be'er Yitshaq* (1858), was published when he was thirty-one years old, a relatively young age for such a work. Two other collections of *responsa*—*Nahal Yitshaq* (1872, 1884) and *'Ein Yitshaq* (1889, 1895)—further enhanced his stature. His decisions, marked by an astonishing ability to cite the whole range of rabbinic literature in arriving at a judgment, display a tendency toward leniency. They remain a valuable and authoritative source for contemporary Orthodox rabbis in dealing with Jewish legal issues. The largest Orthodox rabbinical school in the United States, the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary of Yeshiva University in New York, is named after him.

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