

# How to Play Dynamic Chess

**Valeri Beim** 

Seize the moment and take full advantage of your chances!







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Best regards!! Saludos!

Caissa Lovers

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First published in the UK by Gambit Publications Ltd 2004

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A copy of the British Library Cataloguing in Publication data is available from the British Library.

### ISBN 1 904600 15 8

### DISTRIBUTION:

Worldwide (except USA): Central Books Ltd, 99 Wallis Rd, London E9 5LN. Tel +44 (0)20 8986 4854 Fax +44 (0)20 8533 5821. E-mail: orders@Centralbooks.com USA: BHB International, Inc., 302 West North 2nd Street, Seneca, SC 29678, USA.

For all other enquiries (including a full list of all Gambit chess titles) please contact the publishers, Gambit Publications Ltd, P.O. Box 32640, London W14 0JN. E-mail: info@gambitbooks.com Or visit the GAMBIT web site at http://www.gambitbooks.com

Edited by Graham Burgess
Typeset by John Nunn
Cover image by Wolff Morrow
Printed in Great Britain by The Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wilts.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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# **Symbols**

```
check
+
         double check
++
#
         checkmate
11
         brilliant move
•
         good move
12
         interesting move
21
         dubious move
?
         bad move
??
         blunder
+-
         White is winning
         White is much better
±
±
         White is slightly better
         equal position
=
∓
         Black is slightly better
Ŧ
         Black is much better
         Black is winning
-+
         championship
Ch
         team championship
Cht
Wch
         world championship
Wcht
         world team championship
Ech
         European championship
Echt
         European team championship
ECC
         European Clubs Cup
Ct
         candidates event
IZ
         interzonal event
Z
         zonal event
OL
         olympiad
        junior event
jr
wom
        women's event
        rapidplay game
rpd
tt
         team tournament
        memorial event
mem
        game from simultaneous display
sim
corr.
        correspondence game
         the game ends in a win for White
1-0
1/2-1/2
        the game ends in a draw
0-1
        the game ends in a win for Black
        nth match game
(n)
(D)
         see next diagram
```

# Introduction

This book follows on from my previous work *Lessons in Chess Strategy*, in which the most important chapter, supplying the whole work with its central theme, was the one dealing with chess statics. Accordingly, in the present work it seems logical to concentrate on the other side of the coin: dynamics.

I will now repeat something I said in the previous book (I can't help it, for this is an essential point). The terms *statics* and *dynamics* express concepts that are extremely important in chess. They are frequently found in books, articles and annotations. There are definitions of these terms that are generally accepted. And yet I have not so far come across a lucid explanation of the substance that lies behind the definitions, of the way these concepts operate on the chessboard, of the dividing line between them (what it is, and where it must be drawn), and so forth.

Recently, in fact, these extremely important elements of chess have had some books devoted to them. Unfortunately, however, for an ordinary amateur – for someone we normally refer to as a club-player – these books are difficult to follow unaided, precisely because the complex concepts are not elucidated plainly and thoroughly. Such elucidation seems to me essential.

In general, I believe that neither authors nor trainers (and I belong to both those categories myself) should forget about the special importance of studying the simplest, most fundamental principles of the game, upon which, after all, everything else in chess is constructed. (I had already written these lines when I came across an utterance by Kasparov in his article on Petrosian: "Essentially, the basis for creative achievement in chess is supplied by truths which at first sight appear trivial." I was delighted to find such an authoritative confirmation of my view.)

To chess trainers, my message is this. Should your pupil lack a proper 'grasp' of some simple but important principle of the game, let's say centralization, then both you and he need to identify the problem by studying plenty of examples from his games. For someone who isn't a direct pupil of yours but merely a reader of your books, things are that much harder, for with no one to monitor his chess development, the defects in his play will accumulate.

That, by the way, is precisely the reason for rejecting one opinion which is very popular, indeed almost universal, among chess lovers in the West. According to them, a chess student can do without a trainer entirely (unlike in golf or tennis!), since there's always a computer that 'knows it all better than anyone', and you can buy a book too and on occasion have a look at it. But this view is mistaken. In the first place, a computer may be crammed full of information, but it can never tell what information – in what quantity, in what area, and so forth – is necessary for you personally. And secondly, neither a computer nor the best of books will be able to keep a constant watch on your progress as a chess-player, applying corrective measures as the need arises.

An authoritative and friendly view from someone at their side – this is the main thing that players expect from a good trainer, and it is one of the most indispensable conditions for their development. (This incidentally is a big topic and requires separate discussion.) From all that has been said, it isn't hard to see that for anyone working with chess novices or players trying to improve, the main requirement is a systematic approach and a grasp of the fact that we shouldn't on any account grudge the time spent on 'obvious things' – indeed we should make a detailed and extremely clear explanation of them!

To the students, the very same message can be given: don't try to 'skimp' on the time you devote to these matters. Time spent on the thoughtful study of 'commonplace truths' is always repaid in the form of time saved later and points scored in your games.

Now, a few words on the structure of this book and its content.

It will be entirely devoted to the place of dynamics in the game of chess. I aim to discuss the nature of dynamics, how they operate in the most varied situations, and, most importantly, how all this is to be utilized. To my 'regular' readers, I would point out that I have decided to depart somewhat from the usual structure. In particular, there will not be the 'exercises' which have become a regular feature of my books. On the other hand, the quantity of instructional material has been increased, and much of what might have been presented in the form of independent exercises will be found in the examples.

This is my fourth book, and the longer I work on searching for material, the more frequently I come across the problem of sub-standard annotations, whether in periodicals, books or databases. I have often found that these annotations miss the key moments of a game or fail to assess them correctly. I don't wish to point my finger at anyone in particular; indeed if anyone makes the same kind of reproach against my own writings, I am prepared to hear them out, provided of course that they show me exactly where the fault lies.

One other point seems to me of fundamental importance. As always when settling down to work on a new book, I am not content merely to retell things which are fairly common knowledge and which an intelligent and experienced reader can very well look for independently and find scattered in various other books and magazines.

Works composed on such lines, assembling material from various sources and drawing it all together, do have their use, which is sometimes very considerable. They can help the reader to attain a more complete grasp of one aspect of chess or another. However, when an author feels it is in his power to add something to what is generally known (he may simply be giving new information, but is often providing an original slant on some familiar aspects of the game), this can give an extra stimulus to his work and make it attractive to the readers. Up to now I have managed to present something 'novel' in each of my books. I intend to do so again this time. I realize of course that not all my disclosures are of equal significance, and that perhaps not all of them will withstand the passage of time. But I think that if some ideas come into your head now and again, they shouldn't be left on the back-burner but published in the expectation of constructive criticism.

The true value of these 'novelties' should emerge when other people – my readers – see them, ponder them and assess them. I am therefore very interested in receiving feedback. That is, I not only address myself to my readers but would also like to hear your opinions on this book as well as on all my previous (and perhaps future) ones. My e-mail address is: valeribeim@gmx.net

Valeri Beim Vienna, 2004

# 1 Dynamics


As I have said, and as the title indicates, there is such a thing as a dynamic component of chess, and the problems it raises are the subject of this book. To start with, therefore, let us look into what the very concept of 'dynamics' involves when applied to chess. How is it to be defined?

In the most general terms, the answer is that while statics concerns itself with things in a state of rest, dynamics concentrates on things in motion. However, a question still remains about the essence of dynamics in chess - and also of chess statics, since the two concepts are inseparable, like the two sides of a coin. Above all, why does the author raise these matters in a book intended for non-professionals? My view is that the terms and the concepts underlying them are exceptionally important; indeed I maintain that statics and dynamics are the very factors on which the whole edifice of chess is founded. Incidentally, I consider the word factors to be the correct one here; it is not so much a case of 'principles', or of 'phenomena' (like phenomena of nature). The static factors in chess are the elements of a position which don't change for a relatively long time, or change insignificantly and gradually; whereas dynamic factors are those elements which are in a rapid process of change.

Static elements (as was shown in Lessons in Chess Strategy) include the distribution of material, the presence on the board of a particular contingent of pieces – and, most importantly, the arrangement of the pawns, with everything that flows from it in terms of strong and weak squares, pawn weaknesses and so forth. Dynamics should above all be understood as the capacity of pieces and pawns to move around the board. That is the definition in its most general form; throughout the course of this book we shall be concerned to develop it. We will try to do so in as thorough and vivid a way as possible.

These definitions of dynamics and statics will be better grasped if we set out by examining them in comparison with each other. For

greater clarity, let us begin with some simple pawn endings, where there are no 'extraneous' features to obscure the picture.



Averbakh – Bebchuk Moscow 1964

In such situations, annotators are liable to write: "Black's positional assets are obvious." Black does indeed have assets, but the qualification positional is inappropriate here; we shall presently see why. What Black definitely does have is a static advantage, manifest in his outside passed b-pawn and the backwardness of the white pawn on the e-file. If it were his move, he would win easily with 50...\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}\$ of the static and this alters the situation completely. White wins by force, as in fact happened in the game:

# 50 e4 \$c6 51 e5! fxe5

He can't allow White to obtain a protected passed pawn. After 51...할d5 52 e6 할d6 53 할c4 할c6 54 할b4 b6 55 할c4, etc., White wins.

# 52 g5 hxg5


Black also loses with 52... 當d6 53 f6 當e6 54 fxg7 當f7 55 gxh6 b5, and now follows a manoeuvre that it's useful to know about: 56 當e4! b4 57 當d3!.

### 53 f6! 1-0

The white pawns have broken through.

White won by exploiting a *breakthrough*. The very word evokes resolute and forthright

motion. It means that in the initial position, White had trumps of the dynamic type. Black had advantages of a static nature, that is, the sort which would have counted if White's breakthrough had not been available - or if (as we said) it had been Black's move, and his king had therefore had time to stem the onrush of the white pawns. (All these hypotheses recall the saying, "If it hadn't been for the wolves, our goat would have reached Mecca.") In reality none of this was the case, and the dynamic advantages of the white position proved more weighty than the static advantages of the black one. (Or dynamics defeated statics, in the simplified wording which I shall use henceforth in similar cases. This will even apply when victory is not due to the objective preponderance of one factor, but to the more skilful exploitation of it.) It follows that in evaluating a position, we need to take both the dynamic and the static factors into account. Which one of them prevails will always depend on the concrete details. Now for another couple of examples.



Weinstein - Rohde
Lone Pine 1977

Black now had to make the fateful last move before the time-control. He failed to figure out the dynamic merits of his position, and lost as follows.

### 40...h4??

Instead he should have played 40...f4!, which would have led to an uncomplicated but striking win based on a breakthrough: 41 gxf4 gxf4 42 堂d4 e3 43 fxe3 (or 43 堂d3 f3! 44 gxf3 h4 45 堂e2 h3) 43...f3! 44 gxf3 h4.

In the game, the white king occupied the high ground, leaving Black unable to stir.


# 41 gxh4 gxh4 42 當d4 當e6

The outside passed pawn now decides the game.

# 43 a5 bxa5 44 bxa5 堂d6 45 a6 堂c6 46 堂e5 堂b6 47 堂xf5 堂xa6 48 堂xe4 1-0

In spite of Black's tragic failure, we can very well turn this episode to our own use, and draw a conclusion: exploiting a dynamic advantage requires resolute action without delay. This theme will, in fact, occupy us in earnest in the chapters that follow. Note also that once Black hesitated, White took over the dynamic advantage too – it consisted in the activation of his king. This enables us to state one more valuable conclusion: static or dynamic factors hardly ever exist on the chessboard in a pure form. Usually they are closely interwoven. We will elaborate this conclusion in due course.

Now, another example in which the dynamic resources of the position outweigh a significant static advantage:



Averbakh

In this exercise position from Yuri Averbakh's series of endgame manuals, Black has an immense static advantage in the shape of a protected passed pawn. In pawn endgames this is usually quite sufficient to win, other things being equal. Yet here, a dynamic motif — one that we already know about — comes into force:

### 1 c5! dxc5

If 1...bxc5, then 2 a5 c4 3 a6 bxa6 4 bxa6 c3 5 堂e2; or if 1...當f6, then 2 c6 bxc6 3 dxc6 d5 4 g5+ 堂xg5 (4...堂e6 5 g6) 5 a5, etc.

# 2 a5 bxa5 3 b6 cxb6 4 d6 \$6 5 g5+

And White wins.

All this is familiar, simple and clear, but now let us imagine a black pawn on a7 instead of b7.


It turns out that in that situation White has no breakthrough, and it is Black who wins. In other words, in the original position, Black's doubled pawns on the b-file were an important static defect. Then again, let's try a different experiment by giving the players a rook each. This time the doubled pawns prove to be a positive factor! From this it follows that in chess there are very few absolute truths. Almost everything in chess is relative, and the value of each individual element of a position depends purely on how it interacts with other factors.

We will now turn to some more complex examples of the interplay between statics and dynamics. Above all else, we need to know how to recognize situations in which one or other of these factors plays the more important role – though it must be said at the outset that this issue is almost inexhaustible.

# Keres – Botvinnik Leningrad/Moscow 1941

# 1 d4 公f6 2 c4 e6 3 公c3 桌b4 4 豐c2 d5 5 cxd5 exd5 6 桌g5 h6 7 桌h4

White also quite often plays 7 £xf6 here. **7...c5** (*D*)



### 8 0-0-0?

This game is of historical significance since it was played in the period of Botvinnik's approach to the world chess crown, and Keres was one of his most serious rivals. By that time, furthermore, Estonia had been incorporated into the Soviet Union, and it was clear that these two players were going to have many a crucial encounter on the national scene. Botvinnik evolved a plan for putting Keres under psychological pressure and making him dread the very


name of his rival! In this he eventually succeeded. Keres was almost incapable of fighting against Botvinnik, and started to rid himself of this curse only after the latter had become World Champion. The present game was the first one in which Botvinnik began to clamp down. Of course he was 'helped' in this by Keres himself, who failed to gear himself properly to the titanic clash of personalities – as we shall presently see.

White's last move is virtually the decisive mistake, though of course this is not easy to believe. It's too early in the game (you will say); the situation still appears too fluid for such an assertion to be made. Well, I have diligently searched for ways to improve White's play later on, and it proved extremely difficult. But there is also another interesting point. The position after queenside castling had occurred in another of Botvinnik's games, a year before the one we are looking at. On that occasion Botvinnik had lost. It is incredible that Keres should venture to play this same position against him. In those years Botyinnik was already widely acknowledged as a master of opening analysis and a man of iron character. There could be no doubt whatever that if he was prepared to repeat a variation with a shaky reputation in an important game, he would have some new weapon up his sleeve! It wouldn't even be so bad if the position were fairly quiet, but it isn't. With his last two moves White has opted for complex, incisive play, and Black has supported him in that intention. A sharp and complicated position has arisen, of the kind in which one error may prove fatal.

Today this position has been thoroughly investigated. It is well known that White must take the pawn instead of castling, and practice has shown that after 8 dxc5 g5 only two results are likely: a draw if Black is lucky, or a win for White. For instance in Kasparov-Short, London PCA Wch (9) 1993, the continuation was 9 皇 g3 ② e4 10 e3 營 a5 11 ② e2! 皇 f5 12 皇 e5 0-0 13 ② d4 皇 g6 14 ② b3 ② xc3 15 皇 xc3! 皇 xc2 16 ② xa5 皇 xc3+ 17 bxc3 b6 18 曾 d2! bxa5 19 曾 xc2 宣 c8 20 h4!, and White's advantage was virtually decisive.

In our game, events now begin to unfold swiftly and almost by force – but in order to understand them, we need to look deeply into this

position. The truth about it is not as simple as may appear at first sight. It looks as if White has created unpleasant pressure against the dpawn which Black consented to isolate with his last move. The black king's knight is awkwardly pinned. What does Black have in return for these problems that are essentially bound up with his pawn-structure, that is, problems of a static nature? At first sight this isn't very clear. It is no accident that Botvinnik lost this position the first time he happened to play it. At home, however, he succeeded in fathoming its secrets; it became clear that the chief defect of White's position is the situation of his king. At first you can't see a way to 'get at' it, but this is obviously what you must be searching for, and a fact which catches your eye is that Black is ready to open up the c-file where at the moment the white king is placed. After something like these deliberations, the correct plan of action came to light.



Botvinnik tells us that this position had arisen once before, but Black had played 10... 42e4? which completely contradicts the reasoning given above. The right move is:


### 10...cxd4!

This initiates the correct plan of action which Botvinnik had discovered at home and analysed in detail. Painstaking analysis was indeed necessary, since the plan involves some sharp pawn thrusts which seriously impair Black's own pawn-structure. If the attack against the king doesn't succeed, Black won't be able to cope with his weaknesses. In other words, we have here a situation where one player consciously accepts a major weakening of his position and stakes everything on one card – that of

dynamics and the initiative. But this policy has a realistic basis – the position of the white king.

### 11 營xd4 ②c6 12 營a4 (D)


The other plausible queen move doesn't rescue White from trouble either. The main variation is 12 營d3 兔e6 13 e3 (or 13 勺f3; on 13 營a3, Black has the decisive 13...兔f5! 14 e3 蚤c8 15 ੨e2 b5!), and now Black has an immensely powerful move: 13...營c8!, after which it turns out that White is in dire straits. For example, 14 營c3 (nor is there any salvation in 14 營c2 勺b4 15 營xc8+ ☒xc8+ 16 ᅌd2 ੨e4+) 14...d4! (15 exd4 ੨e4), and all the black pieces throw themselves on the enemy king position.



### 12...\$f5 13 e3

Botvinnik considers that this is where Keres missed his chance to resist more stubbornly. He recommends 13 f3 \$\subseteq\$b6 14 e4 dxe4 15 \$\subseteq\$b1. However, after 15...exf3+ 16 \$\subseteq\$a1 Black has the simple but overwhelming 16...\$\subseteq\$b4!, giving him an easily won position. White would seem to have done the best he could. And yet I definitely can't help feeling that some hidden defensive resource has yet to be unearthed. Try looking for it yourself!


# 13...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 (D)



# 14 **Qd3**

This loses quickly. Things turn out no better in the event of 14 2e5 0-0 15 2c3 2e4.

However, White *could* perhaps have played more strongly here. Botvinnik examines 14 ②e2 a6! (D), when there can follow:




a) 15 ②c3 b5 16 營xa6 b4, and now Botvinnik gives 17 ②b5, which is parried by 17...②d7—and the c3-knight perishes. On the other hand White does have the counter-stroke 17 e4!?, although after 17...bxc3 18 exf5 0-0 we reach a position where Black has very strong pressure. For instance, after 19 營a3 (which is not compulsory; 19 ②d3 looks more natural, but Black's initiative is still very powerful after 19...②b4 20 營b5 營e7) 19...②e4 20 f3, my 'electronic friend' indicates a convincing and attractive line: 20...營b6! 21 fxe4 營e3+ 22 含b1 ②b4! and Black wins. This explains why I said I couldn't think up any improvement for White.

b) After I had written this chapter, the second volume of Kasparov's My Great Predecessors appeared. While pursuing different aims from those of the present book, Kasparov examines some of the same games, including the one we are looking at now. I shall quote Kasparov's opinions where necessary. In this variation, he suggests a possible improvement on White's 16 公c3 豐e7 17 曾d2 (similarly 17 皇e5 公xa2+ 18 豐xa2 豐xe5 leaves White with no saving chances), Black has the very simple 17...0-0 (instead of the strange 17... 2c2?!) which gives him an easily won position. For example: 18 할e2 볼fe8! 19 h3 (defending against a bishop check; 19 罩d4 包c2 is also bad for White) 19... wc5, and there is no defence against the decisive break ...d4. So alas, this attempt at improvement also fails.

All this means that castling queenside was a serious mistake. But in order to prove it, Black had to assent to a drastic weakening of his own position. In other words he had to make static concessions in order to attain an advantage in the dynamic sphere.

In the game, it was all over quickly.



Black's late castling finally unites his pieces. Essentially we have here the sort of position that Black was dreaming of (in the most general sense, of course) when he exchanged bishop for knight on c3.

White ought to have resigned now, and the fact that he didn't immediately do so speaks for the state of deep shock in which the events of this game had put him. It's obvious that by winning it, Botvinnik gained much more than just one point.

19 罩d1

Or 19 罩f3 公d4.

19...b5 20 豐xb5 公d4 21 豐d3 公c2+ 22 含b1 公b4 0-1


And now, another classic instance of a conflict between static and dynamic factors.

# Smyslov - Euwe

The Hague/Moscow Wch 1948

1 e4 e5 2 包f3 包c6 3 兔b5 a6 4 兔a4 包f6 5 0-0 ②xe4 6 d4 b5 7 兔b3 d5 8 dxe5 兔e6 9 豐e2 ②c5 10 罩d1 ②xb3 11 axb3 豐c8 (D)

This version of the Open Defence to the Ruy Lopez is extremely rare today. At the time of



this game, however, it was highly topical, thanks to the encounter Keres-Reshevsky from the previous round of the same tournament. That game continued 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 h6 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\)h4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c5, and now Keres refrained from 14 c4!, which would have given him a strong initiative. He himself indicated a characteristic and important variation which could then have ensued: 14...dxc4 15 bxc4 2xc4 16 We4, and now if Black replies with the natural-seeming 16... 營e6? White wins by 17 罩xa6!, in view of 17... 罩xa6 18 豐xc6+. On the other hand after 16... \$\mathbb{\beta}\$b7 17 \$\overline{\Delta}\$bd2, Black can't remove his bishop from attack by 17.... de6? on account of 18 \(\mathbb{Z}\) ac1; White therefore obtains a distinct advantage. Instead, the game continued with 14 \( \Quad \)c3?, a general 'developing' move but one that is too nondescript for the present concrete situation. With 14...g5 15 盒g3 營b7! 16 公xd5 0-0-0! 17 公f6 g4 Black seized the initiative, created pressure on all parts of the board, and eventually won. It's important to understand the reason why White's 14th move, which looks natural and conforms to the principles of development, proved to be a serious lapse and landed him in the worse position. Prior to that moment, something out of the ordinary must have occurred to give a special slant to the play. What was it? For the answer, let us turn our attention to Black's 9th and 10th moves. With these two moves Black deliberately offended against the general principles of opening play by expending two tempi to exchange his knight, a piece already developed, for the white bishop. He thereby gained the advantage of the bishop-pair at the cost of falling behind in development. This was the moment, quite early on, when the game acquired a fairly fixed character. (For the moment I won't elaborate on this term in too much detail. Let's just say it means that certain features have arisen which are going to persist for a relatively long time and give the position a fairly concrete shape. In this way, the players' freedom to follow their preferences is restricted; they have to give serious attention to the demands of the position. Later, however, it will be very useful to examine this issue much more thoroughly.)

What, then, precisely, *is* the character of the position, and what does it demand of the players?

Both Black's advantages – the bishop-pair, and the slight deterioration in the white pawnstructure – are of a static nature. The sole price he has paid to attain them - his backwardness in development - is a very temporary phenomenon, as you can quite easily understand. It may disappear within the space of a move or two -White only needs to dither somewhere. Thus the position places demands on White first and foremost, and it is obvious what they are: to extract profit from his better development as quickly as possible. If he doesn't do this, his opponent will be left with all the trumps. We shall keep encountering such situations throughout this book; indeed you will meet them very often throughout your own chess career.

With his ill-fated 14th move Keres wasn't actually delaying, in the most straightforward sense of the word; the move did after all bring a new piece into play. He was, however, *missing the favourable moment* to strike at his opponent's position, and such an opportunity was never to recur. Reshevsky instantly took advantage of his opponent's error, boldly giving up a pawn with his 15th and 16th moves and completely taking over the initiative. Don't forget this episode. We shall come across similar ones time and again.

Now let's return to our principal game. Smyslov had studied the foregoing one. He assumed he would find opponents eager to repeat such a successful experiment, and was ready for them. The result was this:

### 12 c4!


By now the positional foundation of this move is comprehensible. The methods of play, as well as the concrete variations, will be very similar to the possibilities we looked at in the Keres-Reshevsky game.

### 12...dxc4

As Keres pointed out, the other capture is less good: after 12...bxc4 13 bxc4 ②b4 14 ②c3 dxc4 15 皇g5 ②d3 16 b3 皇b4 17 豐c2, White has a clear plus.

# 

This blow is something else that could have occurred in the earlier game.



14...De7?


Confronted with an unpleasant surprise in the opening, Euwe proves unequal to the situation. Certainly, his task was no easy one. Completely unexpectedly, he had to cope with a mass of sharp and hazardous variations in which blows from several quarters awaited him. Nor is this surprising, given the dangerous mobility that the white pieces have acquired.

One move that looks feasible, 14...\begin{aligned} b7?!, is prettily refuted after 15 ©c3 \( \bar{2}\)b8. In his notes to the game, the great Paul Keres judged this position to be perfectly acceptable for Black, but there is one important detail he missed. Today, an ordinary master would easily find the move that instantly overturns Keres's verdict: 16 e6!. At any rate, I have given the position to my students as an exercise on quite a few occasions, and nearly all of them suggested this thrust. It fits in with the present-day understanding of chess only too well. The value of the dynamic approach is taken for granted even by medium-ranking players (provided they have been well taught, of course!). Supplying analysis in support of White's breakthrough is another matter; it was done by Smyslov, who gave 16... এxe6 17 ②g5 ②d8 18 罩xd8+! 含xd8 19 ②xe6+ fxe6 20 營xe6 **2e7** 21 **2g5!** and wins.

Black's only acceptable reply to White's 14th move is 14... 4b4, whereupon White does best to play 15 \$25 - and again Black has a difficult

After going wrong here, Black is no longer able to save himself. This recalls the scenario in the Keres-Botvinnik game, doesn't it? And no wonder. In positions where the pieces are highly mobile, any mistake can be decisive.

15 2a3! (D)



This punch from the side is another thing we have seen before. In similar situations, similar devices – both strategic and tactical – often work. I shall never tire of repeating it: if you want to improve, study typical situations and typical methods of action.

### 15...c6


The whole point lies in the variation 15...\$b3
16 \$\mathbb{Z}d3! \$\subseteq 6 17 \$\overline{\infty}\xxb5\$, when Black can't play
17...\$f5? (the only move is 17...\$\mathbb{L}b8\$, to which
White replies 18 \$\overline{\infty}\xc3!\$ with a clear plus) in
view of the obvious 18 \$\overline{\infty}\xc7+\$. It's easy for us
to find this now, but the players of course had to
see it in the midst of a mass of other variations!

# 16 ②xc4 bxc4 17 豐xc4 豐b7

The pretty refutation of 17... e6 is 18 Zxa6!, and it's easy to see that White has a decisive plus. But then, a similar tactical stroke appeared before our eyes earlier!

# 18 e6 f6 19 罩d7 響b5 (D)

White has a huge plus, and Smyslov finds a simple and clear solution. In fact it proves the soundest route to victory. All these qualities were a constant distinguishing feature of the great master's play.



# 20 營xb5!

The queen was Black's only active piece. Exchanging such a piece is usually helpful.

# 20...cxb5 21 🖾d4 Ic8 22 Le3 🖾g6 23 Ixa6 🖾e5 24 Ib7 Le5 25 🖄f5 0-0

Now comes the concluding move of the game, which is neither a dramatic sacrifice nor a shattering knock-out blow. It's a simple 'quiet' move, but it caused Black to resign at once.

# 26 h3! 1-0

I enjoy drawing the attention of my students and readers to such 'modest', unobtrusive, but highly effective moves which are crucial for the subsequent events. In most cases it is these very moves that lay the essential grounds for victory. In the present position it is all very simple, and the point is revealed in the variation 26... 2 xe3 27 2e7+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$h8 28 2xc8. The white king's luft is decisive.

Now, we examine another impressive game that opens up various aspects of the theme which interests us.

# Stein - Petrosian

USSR Ch (Moscow) 1961

# 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 **2**b4 4 e5 c5 5 a3 **2**xc3+6 bxc3 ②e7 7 響g4 ②f5

Today this move is rarely seen. Theory concerns itself mainly with 7...cxd4 8 豐xg7 基g8 9 豐xh7 豐c7 or 7...0-0 8 &d3.

### 8 **拿d3 h5 9 豐f4 ②c6?!**

Evidently not best; nowadays, 9... **\*\*** 27 is played. Now Black runs into difficulties.


### 10 ②e2!

This is a good deal stronger than 10 ©f3. The knight heads for g3, where there will be plenty for it to do.

### 10...5)ce7

In the event of 10...c4 11 \(\hat{L}\)xf5 exf5 12 a4 (or first 12 h4!?, with a4 to follow), White's bishop is very good and Black has nothing with which to oppose it. The superiority of White's dark-squared bishop over its light-squared adversary is a theme which will play an important role throughout this game.

# 11 ②g3 (D)



# 11...**②g6?!**

This is a serious inaccuracy; Black has overlooked an important tactical refinement. But in any case his position isn't simple to play. Euwe gives the following variation which favours White: 11...c4 12 \$\overline{x}\$f5!? \$\overline{x}\$xf5 (12...exf5 13 \$\overline{y}\$g5! is also bad for Black) 13 \$\overline{x}\$xf5 exf5 14 a4, and again the bishop emerges to a3 – a theme that is important throughout the game. Black should have played 11...\$\overline{x}\$d7!? at once.

### 12 營d2 息d7

Petrosian might seem to have done the right thing in driving the white queen back from its active post and only then continuing his development. But as I said, there is something he has missed. Perhaps he should have played a preparatory 12... \$\mathbb{w}\$a5 or 12... \$\mathbb{w}\$c7.

### 13 \blue{2}b1!

This apparently simple attack is the way to exploit Black's error on move 11.

### 13...**⊈b**8

Black has to play this way and forfeit the right to castle queenside, which is extremely important in this situation. The natural 13... % c7 is met by the strong retort 14 % g5!, when it turns out that by moving his knight to g6 Black was seriously weakening f5. As a result he has to make major positional concessions; the main line goes 14...cxd4 15 \$\overline{a}\$xf5 exf5 16 cxd4 \$\overline{a}\$c3+

17 營d2! 營xd4 18 黨xb7! 營xe5+ (18...公xe5 is even worse; after 19 兔b2 公xd3+ 20 cxd3 營c5 21 0-0, Black can resign) 19 含d1, and Black is in deep trouble.


From this point on, Black's position steadily deteriorates, precisely because of his loss of the right to castle queenside.

# 14 0-0 c4

On 14...h4 15 ②xf5 exf5, White has the unpleasant reply 16 dxc5; for instance: 16...h3 17 g3  $ext{@c}$ 7 18 f4 with an indisputable plus.

# 15 &e2 ②xg3 (D)

A thematic situation that is already familiar to us arises after 15...h4 16 ②xf5 exf5 17 \$\oxedet\$6 18 a4!, and there is nothing to oppose the dark-squared bishop.



# 16 fxg3!

This capture goes against the generally accepted principle that pawns should take towards the centre, but here it is not only useful but practically forced. The point is that right from the very opening, White was assenting to some permanent pawn weaknesses in return for the bishop-pair and a space advantage in the centre. If these assets aren't brought into play somehow or other, the weaknesses will gradually make themselves felt. The only way White can utilize his trumps is by exerting pressure with his pieces. You may recall that this is precisely what dynamics is all about. Hence the capture with the f-pawn, which makes White's pawn-structure 'uglier' still, is essential to give his pieces new open lines. This is another of those games in which all White's chances depend on playing actively. He is going to stick firmly to this policy.

I would add that at no stage in this game do the pawns play an independent role. Despite this, they exert an immense influence on events by restricting or enhancing the scope for pieceplay by one side or the other.


#### 16...h4

Black would like to block the advance of the a-pawn, but 16... a4 is met by the highly unpleasant 17 h4!, after which the h5-pawn is doomed.

# 17 臭g4!?

A move with some thought behind it (see the further course of the game), but I would prefer an immediate 17 a4! hxg3 18 hxg3 &xa4 19 &a3 b5 20 \( \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \alpha & \delta & \de

# 17...hxg3 18 hxg3 (D)




### 18...**營e7?**

A strange decision, especially for such a profound positional player as Tigran Petrosian. Surely he couldn't have imagined that Stein would shrink from sacrificing a pawn! The indicated line was 18... 2a4!? 19 26 0-0 20 2e3. Although in Euwe's view White would still have a clear plus, such a turn of events is something that Black will soon only be able to dream about.

### 19 a4!

In this game, as we have said, the dynamic factors in the position are considerably more important than the static ones. That means that although static values are present, there is no way they can dominate the play just now; it is the difference in piece activity between the two sides that is all-important in shaping events. This explains why White lightly accepts all sorts of pawn weaknesses, and if he surrenders a pawn to bring his bishop out onto the key diagonal, this hardly even counts as a sacrifice! Black, for his part, is unfortunately in no position to utilize his superior pawn-structure.

# 



This position is the starting point for the most interesting variations in the game, even though many of them didn't actually occur.


### 24 營付1?!

To my knowledge, all other annotators without exception give this move an exclamation mark. The correct move is revealed at the end of the note to Black's 24th move.

### 24...罩h6?

None of the annotators append any sign to this move. Presumably they take the hopelessness of Black's position for granted, a view which they support with some analysis:

a) 24...a5 (D) and now:




a1) 25 置xf7? 置xf7 26 置xf7 含xf7 27 營f3+ 含e8 28 ②xe6 is supposed to win for White, but actually the result is the opposite after 28...②xe5! 29 營f4 (29 營e3 b4 30 cxb4 axb4 31 ②xb4 營b6 comes to the same thing) 29...b4 30 cxb4 axb4 31 ②xb4 (or 31 營xe5 bxa3 -+) 31...勞b6 and Black eventually wins.

a2) The correct winning line for White is 25 2xe6! fxe6 26 \(\mathbb{U}\)g4 \(\Delta\)e7 27 \(\mathbb{U}\)xg7 \(\mathbb{C}\)d7 28 \(\mathbb{E}\)f8 置xf8 29 置xf8 豐xf8 30 豐xf8 b4 31 cxb4 axb4 32 &c1.

b) 24... 豐g5 (a line not given by anyone else, but an important one) 25 全c1 豐d8 26 全h5!, with a decisive plus.

The important thing about this last variation is that it reveals the white bishop's sphere of responsibilities: the two diagonals a3-f8 and c1h6. This being so, isn't there a chance of the bishop becoming overburdened? I had a think about this, and devised a move that I am proud of. (Here I must add that I have made it a rule to analyse a position myself first, and only then to call upon the help of my 'electronic friend'. If I tried doing it the other way round, my own faculties of comprehension would sink almost to absolute zero. So I am proud to have solved this problem within 6 or 7 minutes. A computer would take a few seconds over it!) My move was not given by any of the previous annotators! Here it is:

c) 24...b4!(!!). The critical continuation here is 25 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}}}\) xb4, although taking with the pawn is conceivably better (in reply to 25 cxb4, Black's best move may be 25...\(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}}}}\) blocking the crucial diagonal). After 25...\(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}}}\) (D), there are two important variations:



c1) 26 鱼 3 豐h6 (a perfectly acceptable alternative is 26...豐e3!? 27 豐f3 豐xf3 28 gxf3 ②e7, with a roughly equal ending) 27 鱼h3 (a good reply to 27 罩f3 seems to be 27...②e7, and if 28 鱼c1?! then 28...豐h7!) 27...豐e3; and now in answer to the logical-seeming 28 豐a1 there is 28...冨xh3!, leading to various lines in which Black holds his own: 29 gxh3 (not 29 鱼c1? 豐xg3 30 豐xa4+ 曾f8 31 冨xf7+ 冨xf7 32 鱼a3+ 曾g8 33 豐e8+ 曾h7 34 豐xf7 豐h2+ 35 曾f2 ②f4 —+) 29...豐xg3+ 30 冨g2 (or 30

會h1 營xh3+ 31 單h2 營g4! =) 30... 營e3+ 31 單ff2 ②h4! 32 單xg7 魚xc2 =.

c2) 26 營e2 is of crucial importance for evaluating the events at move 24. However, after 26...營h6! 27 皇h3 ②f8! Black methodically succeeds in creating counterplay: 28 宣f4 ②g6 29 宣4f2 ②f8, and if White doesn't agree to a repetition, there can follow 30 皇a3 ②h7 31 宣f4 營g6! 32 宣h4 皇xc2, when the position is complicated and possibly better for Black. From this line we can see how high the price of a tempo is in the present situation.

However that may be, in all the above cases Black fights actively and not unsuccessfully in contrast to the actual game, where everything is over in a moment. And yet up until his 24th move White was playing logically and powerfully. If we try looking for an improvement at just that critical moment, then in keeping with the theory of 'candidate moves', 24 We2! will come into our heads. After what we have just seen, the point of this move is obvious: the e3square is now under control, and following 24...b4! (24... 營g5 25 皇c1 營d8 fails to 26 皇h5 食xc2 27 響xc2 罩xh5 28 罩xf7!, and wins) 25 兔xb4 豐g5 26 兔a3 豐h6 27 兔h3 豐h5 28 豐e1!? **Qc6** 29 豐a1, I judge the position to be clearly in White's favour.


In the game, the conclusion was:

### 25 皇c1! 單h7

On 25... 国h8, White wins by 26 兔h5! (much better than 26 兔xe6 fxe6 27 彎g4 ②xe5! 28 dxe5 彎b6 with good defensive chances) 26...b4 27 罩xf7.

# 26 & xe6! (D)

Here this move is correct! Against 26 \$\mathbb{L}\$h5, Black could play on with 26... \$\widetilde{\Pi}\$h8.



The final position deserves a diagram as a convincing example of how one side's forces acting in full cooperation are overwhelmingly superior to the scattered units of the opponent. Don't forget this.

Those who have read my books Chess Recipes from the Grandmaster's Kitchen and Lessons in Chess Strategy will have seen examples of Tigran Petrosian's positional solutions that are stupendous in their profundity. Yet all of them are concerned primarily with the static factors of the position. In this game, Petrosian went wrong more than once (on moves 18 and 24) in situations where it was essential to think in a 'dynamic' fashion – which would mean forgetting (though only temporarily!) about all the static elements, while focusing on the mobility of the pieces and their scope for concerted action.

Something else too will have been noticed by anyone who reads my books attentively. I like to illustrate a theme by giving examples in pairs, or occasionally in larger groups. This greatly helps to make a variety of ideas and methods stick in the memory. Here too, then, I submit another game featuring the same motif that is fresh in your mind.


# Anand - Shirov Frankfurt rpd 2000

As I have explained before in my writings, I feel that sometimes even the rapidplay games by top players are highly instructive, because "behind every move stands the chess-player's knowledge, gained by long hours of daily work, and his talent which enables him to find, sometimes in seconds, solutions that are inaccessible to other titled players without a long period of reflection." (see *Understanding the Leningrad Dutch*, pp. 101-2.)

### 1 e4 e6

Anand and Shirov have played a large number of games against each other, many of which opened with the French Defence.

2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 ②f6 4 e5 ②fd7 5 ②ce2 c5 6 c3 ②c6 7 f4 ∰b6 8 ②f3 &e7 9 a3 0-0 (D)




### 10 h4

Another method begins with 10 b4, but it isn't surprising that in a rapidplay game Anand chooses a more direct and aggressive plan of attack against the king. With limited thinking time, defending is always more difficult.

# 10...f6 11 \( \bar{2}\) h3 \( \bar{2}\) a5?

Anand judges this move to be a positional error, abandoning pressure against the central point d4, and I can only agree with him.

12 b4! cxb4 13 axb4 ②c4 14 ②g3 (D)



### 14...a5


# 15 &d3!

It seems strange to give such a natural move an exclamation mark, but I award it for consistency in pursuing plans which are nowhere near as simple and unproblematic as may appear at

first sight. The next few moves will confirm this.

# 15...f5 (D)

Confirmation is supplied by an important variation which Anand indicates. The attempt to relieve the tension in the centre with 15...fxe5 is refuted by 16 ②xh7+! ③xh7 17 ②g5+ ③xg5 (or 17.... ②g8 18 營h5 ②f6 19 營g6, and there is no defence against ②h5) 18 hxg5+ ⑤g8 19 營h5 and White wins.




# 16 2g5!

Everything that was said about White's previous move can also apply to this one – in fact even more so, as will presently become clear.

# 16...罩d8!

The most obvious reply here is 16...h6. Perhaps surprisingly, Anand doesn't even mention it in his notes to the game, although he must have considered it in his calculations. How does White continue? I had to look for the solution myself, and it proved to be far from simple, although the general direction that events must take is obvious. Thus, 17 &xc4! dxc4 18 營h5 ≜xb4 (the following line shows how other moves would be met: 18... **營**c6 19 **營**g6 hxg5 20 hxg5 豐xg2 21 豐h5!, and Black is helpless) 19 ②e2! 罩a6 20 彎g6 hxg5 21 hxg5, and now Black has no defence whatever against the queen returning to h5, etc. The chief difficulty here, and quite a considerable one, is that nearly all White's moves are without any direct threats. This makes calculation a good deal harder. If Black captures with the bishop instead, the continuation is 16... 2xg5 17 hxg5 Zd8 18 2xc4 dxc4, and now we see an idea familiar from Stein-Petrosian: 19 b5! 豐xb5 20 皇a3, with consequences that are also familiar.

# 




Now the tempting capture 18 hxg5 is met by 18... 18 19 2xc4 dxc4 20 b5 xb5 21 2a3 8e8, when Black has beaten off the first wave of his opponent's onslaught. The fact that Black managed to discover such a fine defensive idea, which relies entirely on accurate analysis, within limited thinking time, is the reason for the exclamation mark after his 16th move. But then White too has figured it all out! The exclamation mark for his next move will also now be comprehensible.

# 18 **營xg5!** 互f8

Not 18...②f8 which loses to 19 ②h5 罩d7 20 ②f6+

19 **②h5 罩f7 20 罩g3 g6** (D)




A characteristic situation has arisen, and an important one for the problems examined in this book. White is exerting pressure on his opponent's position with all his developed pieces, but at the moment he can't extract anything decisive from this pressure. In such situations it's always useful to find a way of bringing new forces into the game. It so happens that the solution is the same device that we have seen before:

# 

Black can't do anything to stop the bishop from occupying the crucial diagonal in the way that is so familiar to us. This invasion decides the outcome of the game.

23 **&a3** b6 24 **營h6 &b7** 25 **基**xg6+ hxg6 26 **營**xg6+ **�**h8 27 **營**xf7 **基**g8 (D)



White can now win by 28 ②f6 ②xf6 29 exf6! (note how a new fighting unit joins in the battle!) 29...豐e8 30 豐xe8 罩xe8 31 f7, but Anand has seen a more attractive and quicker method.

### 28 & f8! 1-0

If 28... 12xf8, then 29 12f6 leads to mate in a few moves.

The game turned out to be an excellent illustration of what I said at the beginning, about the value of games played to a fast time-limit. There is no doubt that many a strong grandmaster would have been glad to play the white side of a game like this in a tournament with the normal time-limit. (Some hope! Such things are not given to everyone.)

And now, another game by Leonid Stein in which statics are relegated to the background at a very early stage.

# Stein – Smyslov USSR Cht (Moscow) 1972


### 1 c4 分f6 2 公c3 e6 3 公f3 b6 4 e4 臭b7 5 豐e2

This move was played for the first time in this very game.

# 5... 2b4 6 e5 2g8 7 d4 d6

A more accurate line is considered to be 7... 2e7!? 8 2d2 0-0 9 0-0-0 d5!, as in Korchnoi-Karpov, Moscow Ct (3) 1974.

8 a3 \( \)\( \)xc3+ 9 bxc3 \( \)\( \)\( \)(D)



### 10 h4!

An excellent decision. In this way White seizes some space on the kingside, sets his sights on the dark squares where Black's lack of a bishop may tell, and prepares to bring his rook out via the h-file. A similar idea is familiar in the French Defence.

### 10... 2d7 11 h5 &xf3?

Alas, this move proves to be a serious error. I think it will be useful to look into its causes. In this situation Black's bishop obviously seems a very important piece. Nor is there any doubt that this kind of positional consideration was extremely obvious to Vasily Smyslov. If he nonetheless decided to part with his bishop, presenting the enemy queen with an ideal square on a key diagonal into the bargain – in other words, making huge positional concessions – then he must have thought there were the most serious of reasons for it.


As I see it, he will have felt that White had taken too many positional liberties by seizing space on the flank (with h4-h5) while his centre was under attack. In broad terms, the way to refute this kind of aggressive strategy was well-known as early as the 19th century: you should deliver a counter-blow in the centre. In White's position the obvious target for such a counter-attack is the e5-pawn — which the f3-knight is guarding. Thus the train of thought that led to Black's 11th move is elucidated.

But ... there are quite a few 'buts'! In the first place, given the high price that Black is paying to advance his cause, the question arises whether he has weighed up all the circumstances correctly. In particular, is White's centre really all that weak, and does Black really have such powerful means of attacking it? Secondly, with the action initiated by Black's 11th move, the

position suddenly becomes more tense, the opposing pieces come into direct contact, and, as always in such situations, numerous variations crop up, demanding exact analysis. The sharper the position, the more its evaluation depends on precision and depth of calculation. General considerations are not discarded, but temporarily (until the gunsmoke of tactical crossfire settles!) they recede into the background. Thus, in cases where one side opts for a sudden sharpening of the play, positional assessment tends to apply not so much to the initial situation as to the one reached at the end of a line of analysis. Accuracy of calculation is of course vitally important here. And it was in that department that Smyslov, as we shall see, made a mistake; that is, he miscalculated a very important variation.

All this means that for the moment, shelving any aggressive designs, he ought to have parried White's highly unpleasant threat of h6 by playing 11...h6 himself. White would evidently have replied 12 \( \mathbb{L}\)h3, covering his knight with the rook.

# 12 營xf3 dxe5 13 h6 (D)




### 13...gxh6?!

Black carries on with his plan, not yet realizing the flaw in his calculations. Objectively speaking, now was his last chance to avoid major trouble. He should have played 13...g6!?. Then after 14 dxe5 c6 15 \(\text{2g5}\) \(\text{\text{\text{W}}} c7\) White would have the advantage, but Black could put up a stubborn fight.

# 14 &xh6 exd4 15 &g7 罩g8 16 罩xh7 包f5

By now Black is in a bad way whatever he does. On 16...d3, White retains a clear plus with either 17 單d1 or 17 单xd3, since 17...里xg7? loses to 18 罩xg7 ②e5 19 響f6.

### 17 &xd4 c5 (D)



This is the position Smyslov had in mind when he started the whole operation in move 11. If the white bishop now had to move, Black would be in very good shape after 18 êe3 (or 18 êh8 含e7! 19 營h5 營e8) 18...包f6 19 營c6+含e7.


Unfortunately White proves to have something much stronger, so that the diagram position must be assessed as clearly advantageous for him. Here, then, is the move Black missed in his previous calculations:

### 18 g4! cxd4

Black also does badly with 18... ②d6 19 **Qg**7 ②f8 20 **Qxf8 Zxf8** 21 **Zd1! Zc8** 22 **遵f4!**.

# 19 gxf5 e5 (D)

As Stein himself pointed out, Black comes off even worse from 19...②e5 20 營e4 dxc3 21 墨a2! (only not 21 墨d1 c2! 22 墨xd8+?, as after 22...墨xd8 23 營xc2 ②f3+ 24 全e2 ②d4+ it is Black who wins). Taking Stein's variation further, we arrive at 21...f6 22 f4 exf5 23 營h1! ②f7 (or 23...②g6 24 墨e2+) 24 營b7! and wins.




20 当d5 互f8 21 cxd4 互c8 22 互d1

Perhaps 22 0-0-0! 豐e7 23 罩h3! is even stronger.

22... **營e7 23 身g2! 罩g8** (D)

At this point all variations confirm the overwhelming superiority of White's position. For example, 23... 豐xa3 24 c5! exd4 (24...bxc5 25 dxe5 is also bad for Black) 25 豐xd4 豐a5+ 26 區d2! 豐b5 27 c6 ②e5 28 f4, or 23...exd4+ 24 堂f1 豐c5 25 豐e4+ 當d8 26 區xd4.



# 

Black commits a gross blunder, evidently in a mutual time-scramble. We have seen how sharp and intense the struggle has become. An oversight like this is therefore excusable, and doesn't really spoil the impression that the game makes. Black's last chance lay in 24...exd4+25 全打 豐c5 26 兔d5 罩f8.

### 25 dxe5?

An outstanding tactician and a brilliant master of blitz chess, Stein himself now misses the elementary 25 \$\mathbb{\omega}a8+ \mathbb{\omega}d8 26 \mathbb{\omega}d5\$, when Black doesn't even get off with losing 'just' the exchange – as we see from 26...\mathbb{\omega}f6 27 \mathbb{\omega}xc4 \mathbb{\omega}xg2 28 \mathbb{\omega}c8+ \mathbb{\omega}c8 7 29 \mathbb{\omega}xd7+!. It seems that blitz chess and time-trouble are not the same thing!

# 

It now appears that White has everything accounted for. Black is helpless, as the following variations show: 27... 這cg4 28 豐c8+ 含e7 29 這xd7+ 含f6 30 這hxf7+; or 27... 這xg2+ 28 豐xg2! 豐xf5 29 豐g8+含e7 (29... 公f8 30 這d8+含xd8 31 豐xf8+含d7 32 這xf7+) 30 這xf7+.

# 28 豐xc6 罩xc6

Now a pretty tactical stroke decides the game: 29 \( \text{Lh8!} \) \( \text{Lcg6 30 fxg6 } \) \( \text{Lxh8 31 } \) \( \text{Lc6 } \) \( \text{Lg8 32 } \) \( \text{Lxd7+ } \) \( \text{Lc7 33 } \) \( \text{Lf5 fxg6 34 } \) \( \text{Ld7+ } \) \( \text{Ld7+ } \) \( \text{Ld6 35 } \) \( \text{Ld3 1-0} \)

This was an impressive game which reveals that remarkable player Leonid Stein in the most

attractive light. Why was a single error by Black enough to make his game go steadily downhill? The answer fits in perfectly with our topic. With his critical 11th move, as we have said already, Smyslov gave up his own active bishop and dramatically increased the activity of the enemy queen in order to land a counterblow against the white centre. To visualize the outcome that he must have had in mind, look again at the positions in the note to Black's 17th move. There White still retains some activity for his pieces, but it is not dangerous to Black, while the defects of the white pawn-structure are obvious and will remain fixed for the long term. In other words, we can formulate Black's plan by saying that he aimed to attain a static advantage while conceding a temporary dynamic ascendancy to his opponent in return. In the event, however, the dynamic ascendancy proved anything but temporary, and outweighed everything else. Similar misadventures are examined elsewhere in this book, and I also treated the issue quite seriously in Chapter 9 ('Static and Dynamic Features') of Lessons in Chess Strategy, when discussing the game Lautier-Anand. It just goes to show that the conflict between statics and dynamics is an eternal aspect of chess, and as long as the game exists, its two fundamental factors will clash with each other on the board.

To pursue the subject further, I will present one example from my own practice. It may seem rather vainglorious to put it here, in among games by the most illustrious masters, but to quote a line from a very good Soviet movie: "If a man gets the chance to boast, he'll do it, without bothering about the consequences!" Aside from that most important of reasons, there is another. The game in question is yet another fairly good example of how a player's dynamic advantage prevents the opponent from utilizing the obvious static merits of his position.

# Beim – Herzog Vienna 2003


# 1 ②f3 g6 2 e4 臭g7 3 d4 d6 4 ②c3 ②f6 5 皇e3 c6 6 營d2 營a5 7 h3 b5

This move does sometimes occur, but theory advises Black to refrain from it and play ... \( \tilde{\to}\) bd7, either at once or after castling, and then to carry out ... e5. Shirov, for example, played that way in 1995.

### 8 &d3 b4?!

Continuing on the same path, but it doesn't look a very promising one. Instead Black usually plays 8... \( \Delta \text{bd7 9 0-0 0-0.} \)

9 De2 & a6 10 0-0 & xd3 (D)



The first critical moment in the game has now arrived. White has to choose which way to take the bishop.

### 11 cxd3!?

I took with the pawn at once; the thinking time had been used before my previous move. (One of the useful things about annotating your own games is that you can talk about the reasons for a particular decision without having to make any conjectures. You can simply tell the reader what you were thinking about, and what variations you saw during the game.) In this case, I realized that I had to make a fundamental choice with far-reaching consequences. If White opts to continue quietly with 11 \mathbb{\m could go something like this: 11... 響b5 12 響xb5 cxb5 13 2 g3 2 bd7, with no particular advantage for White. "But then," I thought to myself, "Black hasn't played the opening as well as he could, and as a result (a) his queenside has been weakened, and (b) he's behind in development. So I want to get something more out of the position, and taking on d3 with the pawn promises to do that. Of course, the minus points are obvious. The white pawn-mass in the centre loses its flexibility, and its mobility. I might win the b4-pawn [by playing a3], but at what a cost -I'd be giving myself doubled isolated pawns on a half-open file (that is, a file that's open only for my opponent!), and I'd have to be careful


not to lose them both! On the other hand the play gets sharper, and what with my better development and more forces in the centre, I'll be able to seize the *initiative* — and then my opponent won't be able to get at my weaknesses." There will be a chapter on the initiative later!

In White's train of thought, then, a conflict is enacted between the static advantages which he is willing to concede to his opponent, and the dynamic advantages he is securing in return by force, exploiting the consequences of Black's opening play. And of course, when one side deliberately sets out to sharpen the struggle like this, the analysis of variations plays a more important role with every move.

# 11...0-0

If Black resolves to defend his b-pawn and plays 11... 數5 to that end, he is falling even further behind in development, and the situation could become dangerous for him: 12 e5! ②d5 (a thoroughly bad line is 12...dxe5 13 dxe5 ②d5 14 ②ed4 數b7 15 ②h6 0-0 16 ②f5 +—) 13 exd6 exd6 14 ②f4 ②xf4 15 徵xf4, and if now 15... 數d5, then after 16 a3 bxa3? (of course 16...0-0 is better, though 17 axb4 宣d8 18 宣fe1 數b3 19 數d2 still gives White a clear advantage) 17 ②c3, White has a virtually won position.

# 12 a3 **瞥b5** 13 axb4 **②**a6 (D)



This is the second critical moment for White. He has to attack the black queen, but there is more than one way to do so, and the correct one must be chosen. No general considerations can help here. The variations need to be worked out, and they go like this:

a) 14 基a5 營b7 15 b5 cxb5 16 基fa1 公c7 17 d5 a6 18 公ed4 e6, and perhaps the position even looks better for Black. What are the white

rooks doing all by themselves, stranded on the a-file?

b) 14 公c3?! 營b7 15 e5 is well answered by 15...公e8!, and again it isn't too clear how White is to continue.

Therefore, I chose:


14 e5! De8

Or:

- a) After 14... ②d7 15 ②c3 豐b7 16 exd6 exd6 17 ②f4, White's advantage is obvious.
- b) Similarly after 14...dxe5 15 dxe5 公d5 16 公c3 營b7 17 b5 公xe3 18 bxc6! 公xf1 19 cxb7 公xd2 20 bxa8營 區xa8 21 公xd2 公b4 22 d4, White has good winning chances.
- c) The consequences of 14...②d5 are the most difficult to follow: 15 ②c3 豐b6 16 b5!, and now after 16...②xe3 (16...②xc3 17 bxc3 cxb5 18 罩fb1 罩fc8 19 c4 b4 20 d5 豐b7 21 d4! gives White a substantial positional advantage with equal material) 17 fxe3! cxb5 18 ②d5 豐b7 19 e4! White has a very significant plus; this is shown by variations such as 19...dxe5 (after 19...e6 20 ②f6+ �b8 21 豐f4 dxe5 22 豐h4 h6 23 ②xe5, White has a dangerous attack) 20 豐a5, with an overwhelming position.

The move played seems the most accurate, despite its passivity. However, now that the black knight has decided on its position, White can make his own choice.


# 15 罩a5! 營b7 (D)



16 **罩a4** ②ec7

This is the quickest way for Black to unite his pieces. If instead he plays 16... ②ac7, attempting not only to develop them but to *coordinate* them (this theme will be examined in earnest in Chapter 2, 'Development'), then after 17 營c2 ②d5 18 单d2 White still has a clear plus.

# 17 耳fa1 耳fb8 (D)



It might seem that Black has got what he wants, that he will win his pawn back and obtain a good game. However, a key factor in the position now takes effect. Almost all the black pieces have crowded into a narrow sector at a distance from the centre and, especially, from the kingside, leaving the bishop all alone to take care of it — which naturally is insufficient. Understandably, therefore, White immediately strikes out in that direction.

### 18 \(\ell\_{14}!\) d5?

A mistake, after which Black's position is very difficult. But other variations also testify to White's significant plus:


- a) 18...dxe5 19 dxe5 ②xb4 (on 19...e6 20 e3, Black is hard-pressed to find moves) 20 e6! ②bd5 21 exf7+, and Black's king is in a dangerous position.
- b) The natural-seeming 18... £f8 leads to the most interesting and striking variations. White now initiates play on the kingside, and the black pieces can't get across in time; keep this situation in mind - we shall come across similar ones again. 19 \$\&\text{\$6}! \&\text{\$g7}\$ (that this move is essential can be seen from variations such as 19... ②xb4 20 &xf8 含xf8 21 營h6+) and now White has an attractive and convincing way to solve the problems of the position: 20 \(\mathbb{L}\xg7!\) \$\delta \text{xg7 21 exd6 exd6 22 d5! cxd5 (White also has an obvious plus after 22... 公xb4 23 營c3+ 會g8 24 dxc6 豐b6 25 ②ed4, or 22...c5 23 bxc5 ②xc5 24 \( \bar{2}\)h4 h5 25 b4 \( \bar{2}\)d7 26 \( \bar{2}\)ed4! \( \bar{2}\)xd5 27 基xh5! gxh5 28 ②f5+ winning) 23 ②ed4! ②xb4 (23... ₩b6 is met by a piece sacrifice which will be a recurring theme in all the other lines too: 24 ②f5+! gxf5 25 豐g5+ 當f8 26 豐f6 \$\delta\$e8 27 ②d4 \$\delta\$d7 28 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xa6 ②xa6 29 \$\delta\$xf7+

c) Black's best option is probably to take the pawn with 18... \( \text{D} \text{xb4} \). Then after 19 exd6 exd6 20 \( \text{2} \text{xd6} \( \text{D} \text{bd5} \) 21 \( \text{C} \text{c} \) \( \text{Z} \) d8 there would still be plenty of play ahead, notwithstanding White's undoubted plus.

Now an obvious thrust follows, designed to retain the key diagonal for the white bishop.

### 19 e6! f6?! (D)

After this, Black will be completely helpless. He had to take the pawn with 19...fxe6, keeping his bishop's diagonal open and making the ffile available to a rook. Even so, after 20 2c1! \$\overline{2}\$f8 21 \overline{2}\$b3 White would have a big advantage.



Now, exploiting the helpless position of the black pieces, White brings his last reserves into play, and the game quickly ends.

20 \( \text{\text{\text{0}}} \cdot! \) \( \text{\tint{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi}\texit{\texi{\

Black should have resigned now, but there followed:

25...①xe6 26 兔xb8 豐xb8 27 罩xa7 含f7 28 罩a8 豐e5 29 罩e1 豐f5 30 罩xe6 豐xe6 31 ②d4 豐d7

The last phantom of a hope was 31....皇h6 32 豐xh6 豐e1+ 33 堂h2 豐e5+, but even this


doesn't work: 34 f4 營xd4 35 營f8+ 含e6 36 營c8+ 含f7 37 營g8#.

### 32 公xb5 cxb5 33 營c1 營c6 34 罩b8 1-0

At this point it will be highly appropriate to look at a game with the opposite outcome: the player who has acquired static advantages succeeds in extinguishing his opponent's activity and exploiting his own gains.

# Lputian – Ivanchuk Elista OL 1998

1 d4 🗹 f6 2 c4 g6 3 🗸 c3 d5 4 🗹 f3 û g7 5 û f4 0-0 6 🗮 c1 dxc4 7 e4 û g4 8 û xc4 🗹 h5 9 û e3 û xf3 10 gxf3 e5 11 dxe5 û xe5 12 👑 xd8 🗒 xd8 (D)



### 13 b4?!

As Ivanchuk indicates, this is a novelty but not a very successful one. A line known to theory is 13 0-0 2d7 14 \( \begin{align\*} \text{2} \text{16} \) \( \begin{align\*} \text{2} \text{2} \) \( \begin{align\*} \text{2} \text{3} \) \( \begin{align\*} \text{2} \text{4} \) \( \

# 13...Øf4!

It's essential to seize this important blockading square; thus a much weaker choice would be 13... 2c6? 14 2d5.

### 14 Ød5?


White endeavours to repulse or exchange the strong enemy knight, but evidently goes about this in the wrong way. An improvement seems to be 14 0-0!? ②c6! (Ivanchuk's exclamation mark) 15 b5 (15 a3? is a good deal weaker: 15...②d4 16 单xd4 罩xd4 17 ②d5 c6, with a clear and lasting advantage to Black) 15...②d4 16 单xd4 罩xd4 17 ②d5, and although Black retains a plus, it is only slight.

# 14...**包g2+ 15 曾f1**

The whole point is that 15 堂e2 would be bad on account of 15...c6 16 ②e7+ (16 罩hg1 also doesn't work: 16...cxd5 17 童xd5 ②f4+ 18 童xf4 童xf4 19 童xb7 童xc1 20 罩xc1 ②d7 21 童xa8 罩xa8) 16...堂f8 17 童c5 ②f4+ 18 堂f1 (18 堂e3? 童d6 19 童xd6 ②g2+) 18...堂e8, and the white pieces are stuck fast. White probably made a miscalculation in one or other of the variations, leading to his weak 14th move.

# 15... 2xe3+ 16 fxe3 c6 17 f4 (D)

Ivanchuk gives the variation 17 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{O}}\$ 5 \$\oldsymbol{O}\$ 4 \$\oldsymbol{O}\$ 5 \$\oldsymbol{O}\$ 6 \$\oldsymbol{O}\$ 18 \$\oldsymbol{O}\$ 6 \$\oldsymbol{O}\$ 18 \$\oldsymbol{O}\$ 19 \$\olds



From here, the game enters a phase of sharp play. The point is that in order to maintain his advantage, which is based on his opponent's pawn weaknesses, Black is forced to engage in some sharp tactical skirmishes to extinguish the activity which White has in compensation.

### 17...cxd5!


### 18 \(\hat{\text}\) xd5 \(\phi\) c6

This is the essential follow-up to the decision taken last move. Black can't be at all interested

in 18... \( \bar{L} \) xd5 19 exd5 \( \bar{L} \) d6 20 \( \bar{L} \) c8+ or 18... \( \bar{L} \) b2 19 \( \bar{L} \) c2 \( \bar{L} \) a3 20 \( \bar{L} \) xb7.

# 19 fxe5 (D)

Necessary. In Ivanchuk's view, after 19 axc6 bxc6 20 fxe5 ad2 Black has a sizeable plus. Since all Black's subsequent play in the actual game will be based on breaking through to the opponent's second rank, it will be useful to take this variation further so that we can better understand the strength of this threat. Thus, 21 a3 (21 axc6 turns out thoroughly badly after 21...axa2 22 ag1 ad8 23 ad6 cs, and the black rooks will double on the second rank with decisive effect) 21...a5 22 h4 axb4 23 axb4 a4!?, and by now Black's big advantage is quite plain to see.




# 19...**②xb4**!

As before, Ivanchuk proceeds with extreme accuracy to stay on top. After 19... 2xe5?! 20 2 his advantage would be purely formal in character, and could hardly be developed any further. There is one thing I would like to repeat: realizing that he has the advantage and understanding that it rests purely on weaknesses in the white position, Ivanchuk isn't afraid of continuations in which his opponent maintains genuine counterplay. In this sense, the game we are looking at is by no means an exception - on the contrary, it rather represents the norm. Very often, in order to preserve an advantage of the static type, you have to go over to defence for a certain period, although as a rule this means active defence. From this moment on, the play features nothing but blows and immediate counter-blows, and becomes so spectacular that interesting and important positions could be diagrammed after literally every move.

20 息b3 (D) .

Ivanchuk points out that White has a choice of continuations here such as 20 e6? 公太5 21 exf7+ 曾xf7 22 exd5 罩xd5 23 罩c7+ 曾e6. Let us take this further: 24 罩xh7 罩d2 25 罩xb7 罩f8+ and Black wins.

There is another line that I like much better and which offers White the best chances of saving the game: 20 兔xb7!? 墨ab8 21 墨c7 墨d2 22 墨g1 ②a6!? (Black can preserve some advantage with 22...墨bd8 23 墨g2 墨d1+ 24 全e2 墨1d7!?, but it isn't clear how big it is) 23 墨c8+墨xc8 24 兔xc8 墨xa2 (24...②c5 allows the white king's rook, which takes no part in other variations, to come into play with 25 墨g2 — which can't be to Black's liking) 25 e6 全f8 26 墨g5! ②b4 27 墨b5 a5. Black has the advantage, but I think White has fair prospects of salvation. Lputian probably avoided this line because he missed something in the analysis.



# 

Again Black plays the best move, which like all the foregoing ones is based on a profound evaluation of positions arising from a variety of lines, as well as on exact calculation – which focuses not so much on his own actions and attacks as on counterstrokes to answer his opponent's blows; in my view, calculations of this sort are the most difficult aspect of chess analysis.

As Ivanchuk explains, 20... 2d3?! is much weaker: 21 \$\mathbb{Z}c7\$ \$\mathbb{Z}ac8\$ (or 21... 2\mathbb{X}xe5 22 \$\mathbb{Z}e2\$ \$\mathbb{Z}d7 23 \$\mathbb{Z}xd7 24 \$\mathbb{Z}c1\$, with strong counterplay for White) 22 \$\mathbb{Z}e7!\$ \$\mathbb{Z}c5 23 \$\mathbb{Z}e2\$ \$\mathbb{Z}xb3\$ 24 axb3, and at the end of it all, White proves to have everything in order.

### 21 罩c7 罩f8!

### 22 罩g1

Seeing that 22 \( \bar{\text{Zxb7}} \) \( \bar{\text{Zc8}} \) 23 \( \bar{\text{ce}} \) e1 \( \bar{\text{Zb2}} \) is no good, White strives to mobilize his reserves. This is just the kind of variation that Black needed to calculate.

### 22...5 a6!


White can only dream about 22... Exh2 23 Eg2!, when all his pieces are finally in play. In such situations, every tempo is worth its weight in gold. But the interesting thing is not so much this obvious variation as the fact that the sole correct move in this position, together with the analysis stemming from it, had to be foreseen by Black when he made his 19th move – a real tour de force!

### 23 @e1

Taking the pawn straight away leads to the following variation: 23 罩xb7 罩c8 24 兔xf7+ 含f8 25 含e1 罩xh2 26 含d1 ②c5 27 罩f1 ②xb7 28 兔e6+含e7 29 兔xc8 ②c5 30 罩f6 罩xa2, with a won position.

# 23...區b2! (D)

Only so. Ivanchuk gives 23... **Z**xh2? 24 **Z**xf7 **Z**xf7 25 **Z**f1, or 23... **Z**xa2? 24 **Z**xf7 **Z**a1+ 25 **e**e2 **Z**xg1 26 **Z**f1+!.



### 24 罩c3

White flinches and sounds the retreat, which, given his agglomeration of weaknesses, is tantamount to resignation. For better or worse, he had to keep on to the end in pursuit of his one remaining chance. Ivanchuk views the white position sceptically, as we see from the variation he gives: 24 \(\mathbb{Z}xb7!?\)\(\mathbb{Z}\colon 5!\) (my exclamation mark) 25 \(\mathbb{L}xf7+?\)\(\mathbb{L}xf7\) 26 \(\mathbb{L}xb2\)\(\mathbb{D}d3+\). But instead of losing a piece with his 25th move, can White try something else? On 25 \(\mathbb{L}xa7?\) Black wins with 25...\(\mathbb{D}d3+26\)\(\mathbb{D}d1\)\(\mathbb{L}c8\), but the natural move is 25 \(\mathbb{L}c7\). Then after

25...②xb3 26 axb3 罩xh2 27 罩xa7 罩b8 28 罩a3 罩b2 (much better than 28...罩c8?! 29 堂d1 罩cc2 30 罩f1 with counterplay) 29 罩f1 罩2xb3, we reach a highly unusual endgame in which White of course stands badly but is still quite capable of creating difficulties for his opponent.


Now, by contrast, Black has no need to exert himself.

### 24...b6!

The knight comes across to c5, and the white pawns are doomed.

### 25 e6?!

This is a blunder, but things are no easier for White after (for instance) 25 h4 2c5 26 2d5 2e8. He could already resign.



A mere 7 or 8 moves ago a fierce fight was raging on the board, but now it has emerged that White's activity was insufficient for his attack to succeed. It has been repulsed, leaving his position in utter ruins. A sad spectacle, but at the same time wholly typical of the frequent triumph of static advantages. And yet what a gripping struggle went before! As I wrote in an analogous context in Lessons in Chess Strategy: "This time statics defeated dynamics in a complex, sharp struggle. Once again this demonstrates that a player whose taste is for accumulating static assets ... always has to be prepared for the need to resist his opponent's aggression. This in turn requires excellent calculation of variations, faith in your own cause and in your abilities, and also ... a high level of technique for realizing an advantage." You will agree that all this is fully borne out by the game we have just been examining.

The end is of little interest:


# 29 할g2 할g7 30 볼c2 할f6 31 볼f2+ 할e7 32 볼c2 할d6 33 볼d2+ 할e5 34 호c2 볼f7 0-1

Now let us examine a somewhat surprising but nonetheless essential aspect of our theme: the psychological aspect.

It does sound surprising, but let's just think: the opposition between two such basic concepts as statics and dynamics often grows into a full-scale confrontation. Dynamics is all about piece activity (in the broadest sense). If one player achieves an 'explosion' in the mobility of his forces (for which he may be paying a positional or material price), then the quantity of plausible variations increases dramatically and differences in the ability to calculate them play an increasing role. If the player with the greater analytical powers holds an advantage in the dynamic sphere, his opponent will be in peril, even if objectively (taking all the parameters into account) his position is superior. He will be constantly exposed to the threat of unexpected blows. For this reason, a specialist in calculating variations will quite often be tempted to activate his forces even by objectively dubious means.

The outstanding master of this kind of play was the great Mikhail Tal. This aspect of his talent was defined with splendid precision by Botvinnik: "From the viewpoint of cybernetics and the technique of calculation, Mikhail Tal is an information-processing device that possesses both a larger memory and a higher reaction speed than other grandmasters. In cases where the pieces on the board are extremely mobile, this has a decisive significance. The young Tal had little interest in an objective evaluation of the position he was aiming for; he might not care if it was objectively worse, as long as his pieces were active..." I should add that chess ability structured on these lines was not given to Tal alone. (We are talking about structure, not level of talent!) At all times and at any level of chess, there are people with this kind of approach to the game.

We are going to examine a game that Tal played in this manner which in many respects leans heavily on psychology. To make it more comprehensible, however, let's first look at the following truly amazing extract from a different game:



Portisch – Tal Amsterdam IZ 1964

White is a rook up for just one pawn. Of course he has still to coordinate his forces and parry some threats, but at first sight this task doesn't look insuperable, given that his pieces are not strewn about in total disorder and his king is adequately defended. All the same, caution and the constant intensive analysis of variations are undoubtedly called for; the tension is increasing with every move, and time-trouble is approaching. In such conditions, the 'high reaction speed' of which Botvinnik spoke becomes all-important.


# 22 &e3!

For a long period Portisch plays excellently, taking the right decision at every move. Here, for instance, 22 ②ac2 can be met by 22...②c3 (better than 22...②h3 23 營d3 ②c3 24 e4) 23 e4! 營c4 24 營d2 ②xa2 25 ②b2 e5, giving a position where White is still not managing to organize his forces at all, while Black already has a second pawn to reduce his material deficit.

### 22...罩c3!

In such situations with an immense choice of possibilities, which in practice elude full calculation, Tal always played best. He was relying not only on the 'mechanistic' mental qualities listed above, but also on his powerful intuition, without which it is generally impossible to scale the summits in chess. When I analysed this position with a computer, it repeatedly happened that the 'electronic brain' didn't even mention the moves Tal selected – and these were always the moves containing the most 'poison', the most promising ones in the long term. You will soon see this for yourself.


# 23 ②dc2 響f5 (D)



# 24 g4!

This too is excellently played! After the natural 24 2d4 2g5!, White suddenly faces serious threats and needs to find a sequence of 'only' moves in order to win: 25 2xg7 2xg3 26 2h6! 2xe2++ (26... 3xh6 fails to 27 3d4!) 27 2h1! 2c6 28 2d4!. One of the problems for a player resisting an attack and trying to extinguish his opponent's activity is that one small mistake – even if, objectively, it doesn't let the win slip – will often allow the opponent to fan the smouldering embers and start his fire all over again. In these positions where your opponent hasn't quite exhausted all his resources, you need to exert yourself perhaps more than ever!

# **24...<u>we6 25 &d4** (D) Is it finally all over, then?</u>



### 25...h5!!

Not a bit of it! Tal hasn't enough pieces left, so he goes for mate with his pawns. This is just like him!


### 26 & xg7 hxg4 27 4 d4!

(leaving the knight alive and allowing a check on h2 is a terrifying prospect — we are all only human) 28...豐h3, Black draws. At first sight 27 e3 looks convincing, but it comes up against 27...互d3!! and now 28 豐xd3? gxf3 is quite horrific for White, while 28 豐e2 置d2 also looks unpleasant. After 28 ②d4 互xd1 29 ②xe6 互xe1+30 宣xe1 gxf3 31 宣f1 f2+ there is still, surprisingly, some lack of clarity in the position.

There would appear to be a forced win with 27 兔xc3 g3! 28 營d4 gxh2+ 29 含h1 ②g3+ 30 含xh2 營h3+ 31 含g1 營h1+ 32 含f2 營h2+ 33 含e3 ②f5+ 34 含d2 營h6+ 35 ②e3 ②xd4 36 兔xd4, but does everything here really click? It's such a long variation, with Black checking all the way! From a practical viewpoint, therefore, the decision Portisch takes is absolutely correct.

### 

# 29... je3+ 30 sh1 &c6 (D)



### 31 罩f1?

Up to here Portisch has played superbly and the win is within his grasp. After 31 ②c2! all variations end in victory, although there is a thorn in White's flesh that still needs to be extracted. Everything is simple in the case of 31...gxf3 32 ②xe3 fxe2+ 33 當g1 exd1營 34②xd1 or 31...營f4 32 ②xc3 gxf3 33 e4 f2 34 營d3. Nor does White have any particular problems with 31...營f2 32 ②d4 營h4 33 ②xc3 g3


34 e4 豐h3 35 罩g1. However, with 31... Ixc2 32 豐xc2 鱼b7! Black lays a mine which needs to be defused in quite a cunning way: 33 鱼d4! gxf3 (White has the same answer to 33... 豐xd4) 34 豐c8+!.

By now White's time-trouble must have been quite severe, so although it's easy to criticize Portisch, it wouldn't be so easy to step into his shoes.

### 

Most probably Tal was short of time too. At this point he could have tried 31...gxf3!? 32 exf3 全xg7 33 公c2 全xf3+ 34 營xf3 營xf3+ 35 星xf3, with a small but clear plus.

# 32 **營c1** gxf3 33 營xc6 營xe2 (D)



# 34 **国g1**

Necessary, as 34 罩xf3 罩xf3 35 单d4 罩f1+36 罩xf1 豐xf1+37 单g1 b5 is dangerous for White.

# 

Since 36 \( \mathbb{Z}\)xe7? \( \mathbb{Z}\)xa2 is unplayable, White repeats moves.

### 36...學e2

Here Black might have tried to play for a win with 36...營xb4!?, but time-trouble evidently prevailed.


### 37 罩de1 曾d2 1/2-1/2

A fantastic finish, and to my knowledge one of the most brilliant illustrations of the might of coordinated and mobile pieces, which is the essence of the concept of dynamism in chess.

A year later the same players faced each other in a world championship candidates match. This was their first encounter over the board since the one we have just seen, and there is no doubt whatever that that game will have left its imprint on the memories of both players. We shall detect echoes of it in the game we are going to examine now. A move like 25...h5!! is hard to forget!

# Tal - Portisch Bled Ct (2) 1965

1 e4 c6 2 ②c3 d5 3 ②f3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 皇g4 5 h3 皇xf3 6 豐xf3 ②d7 7 d4 ②gf6 8 皇d3 ②xe4 9 豐xe4 e6 10 0-0 皇e7 11 c3 ②f6 (D)



### 12 **營h4**

The opening phase is concluded. Objectively White has a slight edge after 12 We2!? 0-0 13 £44, as Tal indicates in his notes. He also explains, however, that in such a situation he doubted whether he could outplay Portisch, who was a distinguished master of positional chess. He therefore decided to rock the boat, even at the cost of a distinct positional risk. Memories of the previous game must surely have influenced this decision in no small way. Thus the psychology of the struggle between individualities has already entered into the proceedings.

# 12...公d5 13 營g4 皇f6 14 罩e1

With this move, the amazing events which follow are already prefigured, but White's decision is sensible anyway on objective grounds. Tal tells us that in reply to the logical-seeming 14 營e4, he didn't like 14...少e7!, with an equal game and a solid position for Black.

# 14... **曾b6!** 15 c4!?


A difficult move to evaluate. In sharp situations such as this the calculation of variations becomes paramount, and yet in the present case it cannot be exhaustive. I award an exclamation mark for the amount of analytical work that White has performed, as well as for sheer bravery. The question mark is to express doubt

about the objective correctness of the move. The weaknesses it creates in White's own position are substantial, so if it doesn't bring success by force, it may lead to defeat.

### 15... 2b4 16 罩xe6+

This sacrifice is the automatic consequence of the previous move.

16...fxe6 17 營xe6+ (D)




This position deserves the closest possible attention. Black has three possible moves. The first of these is the least interesting from a purely technical point of view: after 17... \\$\d8 18 營d6+ 含e8 19 營e6+, etc., the game ends in perpetual check - as Tal himself emphasizes. From the psychological standpoint, however, the move is much more interesting. After all, it was only a few moves ago that Tal deliberately rejected continuations in which his opponent would obtain a solid but not very active position and should therefore have been glad to draw. And yet now, Black doesn't even have to make any effort - he just needs to repeat moves! As Tal himself explains, he was hoping that Portisch, a player with a strictly classical approach to chess, would be seized by a desire to punish his opponent for flouting the classical principles.

We see that the dose of psychology in Tal's handling of this game (and many other games too) was very large. It is no accident that in his best years, some people seriously talked about him hypnotizing his opponents, and the like.

The refutation of the sacrifice, if there is one, must be sought in the variations beginning with 17... 2e7. Then after 18 ≥g5? ₩c7 19 ℤe1 ♠xd3 20 ≥xe7, Black wins with 20... ₩d7. However, Tal tells us he was intending something else: 18 ≥g6+!! (a typical 'resulting move'.

rectifying the faults of the immediate 18 全g5 see Chess Recipes from the Grandmaster's Kirchen) 18... 全d8 (forced, as after 18... hxg6? 19 全g5 曾c7 20 星e1, the point of the check on g6 is revealed: 20... 包d3 21 曾xg6+ wins for White; if instead 20... 星f8, one winning line is 21 曾xe7+ 曾xe7 22 星xe7+ 曾d8 23 星xg7+ 含c8 24 全e7 星f4 25 全xb4 星xd4 26 全c3) 19 全f5 曾xd4 (not 19... 曾c7? 20 全f4 曾c8 21 曾e4 +-) 20 全f4! 星e8 (D) and now:



a) If White wants, he can force a repetition with 21 鱼e5 營d2 (but not 21....鱼f6? 22 營xf6+gxf6 23 鱼xd4, and White wins without much trouble) 22 鱼f4 營d4 23 鱼e5.

b) Tal had in mind 21 置e1. There could follow 21....g6'?' (Tal's marking) 22 鱼e3 (it is still possible to repeat moves with 22 鱼e5 豐d2 23 鱼f4 豐d4 24 鱼e5) 22.... 豐d6 23 鱼xa7! 豐xe6 (this is the only move Tal examines; in actual fact Black can win at once with 23.... 鱼c7 24 c5 豐xe6 25 鱼b6+ 鱼b8 26 鱼xe6 鱼d8 -+) 24 鱼b6+ 鱼c8 (only not 24.... 鱼d7?? 25 鱼xe6+ 鱼d6 26 c5#) 25 鱼xe6+ 鱼b8 26 鱼d7 and in this position Tal stops, imagining it to be in his favour. Taking the analysis a couple of moves further, we can see that after 26... 包d3! 27 置e4 置f8 28 置xe7 置xa2 the advantage turns out to be on Black's side, and White has to worry about saving himself!

I am not raising my hand in criticism of Tal for these flaws in his analysis. When you discover resources like 18 \(\delta g6+!!\) and the line with mate in the middle of the board, you are eager to extract more than half a point from the position!

At the same time, I don't doubt for one moment that if the position after 20... Ze8 had actually arisen on the board, Tal would have seen

his way through all the consequences with supreme competence, and forced a draw. Such things have happened now and again in chess history, when a great master has been wrong in his analysis but precise in actual play. Capablanca is an example.

I would also add that Mikhail Tal's annotations are not taken from a newspaper or magazine, but from a book, which would not have been written and prepared for publication in just one day. With books, there is normally time for checking by the author, reviewers and editor.


For the reader, a useful conclusion from all that we have seen is expressed in a direct quotation from Lenin: "Follow your conviction, but keep testing it!" (So there was some point in teaching Marxism-Leninism to the author, both at school and at Odessa Polytechnic!)

In the game, Portisch chose:

### 17...\$f8

This too appears to be acceptable, although instead of the desired 'triumph of justice', it was to bring him nothing but problems.

18 **Qf4** (D)



### 18...罩d8!


To his misfortune, Portisch couldn't do anything to reduce the workload of analysis. At this point he had to choose between the move actually played (entailing the queen sacrifice which follows) and 18... 豐d8, which is much weaker. After 19 宣e1 鱼e7 20 鱼b1! it is Black to play with an extra rook, and yet acceptable moves are hard to find. For instance: 20... ②a6 21 宣e5 ②c7 22 宣f5+ �e8 23 豐f7+ �d7 24 □e5 g6 (or 24... 豐f8 25 □xe7+! 豐xe7 26 鱼f5+ �d8 27 鱼g5) 25 鱼g5 □e8 26 鱼f5+ gxf5 27 豐xf5+ ②e6 28 豐xe6+ �c7 29 鱼xe7 豐xd4 30 c5, and wins.

### 19 c5 (5)xd3 20 cxb6

After 20 总h6 豐xb2 (Tal considers this move natural, but another possibility is 20...豐c7 21 豐xf6+ 含g8 22 总xg7! 温e8! 23 总xh8 公f4; now the obligatory 24 d5 is met by 24...cxd5 25 温d1 公g6, with unclear consequences), a draw comes about by 21 豐xf6+ 含e8 22 豐e6+.

# 20...公xf4 21 豐g4 公d5 22 bxa7 含e7?! (D)

Tal suggests 22...g6!? as an improvement. The continuation might be something like 23 国e1 會g7 24 a8豐 區xa8 25 豐d7+ 會h6 26 豐xb7 區xa2 27 豐xc6 區d8 with unclear play, although White's chances look better.



### 23 b4!

Obvious, but strong. Since the black king hopes to hide on the queenside, White must open lines there. Supporting the a7-pawn can do no harm either.

# 23...罩a8?

Black's inaccuracy on his last move is followed by quite a serious error. It's a typical story! Earlier we examined the mechanism which produces such lapses.

Another line that looks dismal is 23... ②c7?! 24 罩e1+ 含f7 25 罩e4!, when there could follow 25... 罩d5 26 豐g3 罩d7 27 b5! cxb5 28 豐b3+. The only chance to continue the fight is 23...h5!?, trying to make White drive the black king to the queenside where it will find work to do. After 24 罩e1+ 含d6 25 豐g3+ 含d7 Black stands somewhat worse, but he can very well fight on.

### 24 **Ee1+ 含d6 25 b5 Exa7?**

This loses at once. 25... 量hd8 is better, but even so, White has good winning chances after 26 b6! 公xb6 27 營f4+ 全d7 28 量b1 公d5 29 罩xb7+.


### 26 罩e6+ 含c7 27 罩xf6 1-0

Now that we are generally acquainted with the subject of our study, the moment has finally come to bring on the player whose games will serve in many ways as the foundation for this book. That player is Garry Kasparov, and his selection for this role is not accidental but virtually obligatory. Very few others among the chief protagonists of chess history have demonstrated the essence and importance of the dynamic approach as convincingly as he has. In this respect only Morphy, Alekhine and Tal can be set beside him.

To begin with, let us look at one of his games against the player who, among all our contemporaries, is the most skilled in accumulating and exploiting static advantages.

# Kasparov - Anand Riga (Tal mem) 1995

1 e4 e5 2 🖄 f3 🖄 c6 3 & c4 & c5 4 b4 & xb4 5 c3 & e7 6 d4 🖄 a5 7 & e2 exd4 (D)



This is a rare variation of what is today a very rare opening.

### 8 營xd4!

By choosing this opening in the first place, Kasparov was making some long-term concessions (in the Evans Gambit White gives up a pawn 'for real', for a long stretch of time), and now he agrees to a significant worsening of his pawn-structure into the bargain. By playing this way, he stakes everything on developing the activity of his pieces, on exploiting the dynamic assets of his position. In the 19th century, in the games of Anderssen, Morphy and Zukertort, and later Chigorin, this kind of approach was the norm. Of course White would have liked to recapture with the pawn, but after 8 cxd4 266


(or 8...d5), Black would easily solve his opening problems.

### 8...Øf6

This looks completely obvious and indeed virtually the only move. However, the chess élite was so strongly influenced by the result of this game, and especially by the way the play went, that very soon afterwards 8...d6 came to the fore instead. Shirov-Timman, Biel 1995 continued 9 \$\mathbb{w}\$xg7 \$\overline{\overline{1}}\$6 10 \$\mathbb{w}\$g3 \$\mathbb{w}\$e7, and Black ought to have obtained an excellent position.

# 9 e5 ②c6 10 營h4!? (D)

This is not merely a good individual move (it is more accurate than 10 \(\begin{array}{c} \text{4} \\ \text{ because it doesn't allow the unpleasant retort 10...} \(\text{2}\) h5!?). It also initiates a plan of action which is deeply thought-out, based on exploiting dynamic advantages of the white position which have not so far been obvious. The plan involves some voluntary sacrifices of material.



# 10...公d5 11 營g3 g6

Black could sacrifice the exchange by 11...0-0 12 2 h6 g6 13 2 xf8 2 xf8, aiming to damp down White's activity, but unfortunately this is inadequate. In the resulting position White would have the advantage, quite apart from the fact that Kasparov gives 13 h4!? as a possibility.

### 12 0-0 Db6


Over the course of several moves starting from now, Black will have the option of castling but will reject it. White would always react along much the same lines. For example if instead 12...0-0, he has 13 \( \beta d \) \( \Delta b 6 14 \) c4!, after which Black has significant problems with his development. The same or a very similar scenario will occur in what follows.

### 13 c4!?

White plays a move from the variation we have just looked at. In Murray Chandler's opinion, a good alternative is 13 & h6!? d6 (13...d5!?) 14 \$25, which similarly makes development very difficult for Black. It's natural that Kasparov prefers the plan which he must have worked out at home. And there is one more very important general consideration, involving the theme of this whole book. Beginning with White's 8th move, the tension on the board has been constantly growing. From that moment until the end of the game, there are no more 'simple' moves. At each turn White brings a new unit into the battle: Black too strives to develop his forces - although White is making life very hard for him - and all these freshly deployed forces come into immediate conflict. Thus with each new move, more and more variations demand to be calculated, and what may be called the price of a move rises. In other words, the cost of going wrong increases from one move to the next; at this stage, any mistake may be fatal. All this of course applies to Black in particular, as he is constantly under attack.

### 13...d6(D)

After 13...0-0 14 \( \frac{1}{2} \)d1, the position is one we considered in the note to Black's 12th move.



#### 14 單 41!

A move that belongs to the familiar sequence. At first sight it looks simple, even obvious (but only after it has already been played and its consequences are known to us!). Am I right to give this move an exclamation mark? Yes! In the first place, it isn't the only possible move – some others also appear fairly interesting and logical – and yet (the second point) this one is the strongest, as the further course of the game will show. Thirdly, it entails a sacrifice of

material which will be compulsory for White in the immediate future, purely for the purpose of developing his initiative. Essentially, this move is the prelude to a positional sacrifice. So why not distinguish it? However, it would be more correct to say that the exclamation mark applies to White's plan as a whole.

### 14...**包d7**

If 14...0-0, then 15 c5 is unpleasant; interesting replies to 14...≜d7 are 15 c5!? and 15 Øc3!?.

### 15 &h6!

From his 11th move up to here, White has merely been bringing his forces into the fight. Now, however, the forces of both sides have partly been brought out and occupy fairly well-defined posts; the situation, with the possibilities and intentions of both players, has partly become *fixed*. (If you recall, we touched on the essence and meaning of this term in the notes to Smyslov-Euwe.) That means that the position imposes more and more specific demands on the players, progressively curtailing their freedom to 'choose according to their taste'. At this stage, simple developing moves are no longer adequate for White. In order to *retain* his initiative, he has to *increase it at all costs*.

The initiative is a theme to which a whole chapter will be devoted. Here I will just give a few variations to show that although White has played correctly and sensibly up to now, the logic of the position requires him to sacrifice material. After (let's say) 15 全f4 dxe5 16 ②xe5 ③cxe5! (I'm not as keen on 16....②h4 17 營e3 0-0 {17...④cxe5? fails to 18 查xd7! ③xd7 19 ②xe5 至e8 20 ②c3 +-} 18 ④xc6 bxc6 19 ②c3, when White maintains some initiative) 17 ②xe5 0-0 18 ②xc7 ②h4, Black is in good shape. For example: 19 ②xd8 ②xg3 20 hxg3 基xd8 21 ②c3 董f8!?, with approximate equality.

# 15...@cxe5

Anand exchanges a piece off in an attempt to reduce the enemy's attacking potential, and this looks logical. After 15...dxe5 16 ②c3, Black is already hard put to find any moves. 16... £f8 gives White a pleasant choice:


a) After 17 \$\mathrev{\mathrev

DYNAMICS 35

b) Kasparov gives 17 &g5! and shows that Black is in trouble: 17... &e7 (Black is also in a bad way after 17...f6 18 &e3 &g7 19 c5 0-0 20 &c4+ &h8 21 &h4!) 18 &d5 &xg5 19 &xg5 h6 20 &e6! fxe6 21 &xg6+ &f8 22 &h5, and White wins.

# 16 ②xe5 ②xe5 (D)

Black also has a difficult position after 16...dxe5 17 \( \text{2g7} \) \( \text{2g8} \) 18 \( \text{2xe5} \).



#### 17 Dc3!

So White is now two pawns down, and he carries on with his development as if nothing out of the ordinary has happened; he is convinced that his own activity and the cramped placing of his opponent's pieces are going to take effect. Of course, to play this way you need to have plenty of faith in yourself and in the strength of your position. White's policy is all the more noteworthy since he had the opportunity to win the exchange here with 17 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g7!?. However, the position after 17...\(\frac{1}{2}\)f6 18 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xh8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xh8 19 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d7!? (or 19...b6) turns out to be wholly unclear. That would be hasty, and trade in his dynamic pluses at too low a price!


#### 17...f6

Now, however, after 17... £e6 18 £g7 £f6 19 £xh8 £xh8 20 c5!, the position is clearly advantageous to White, as files are opened for his rooks. As it happens, the game opens up anyway.

#### 18 c5 (D)

#### 18...**Df**7

This is probably not best. All the same there is no point in criticizing Anand for his error. In this extremely complicated situation there were too many variations for him to calculate, too many sharp and dangerous positions to assess. Even after a better move, Black's troubles would



quite likely have persisted, as the following variations show. They are admittedly fairly provisional, and in no case exhaust the content of the position; they merely characterize the possible course of events:


- a) 18... êe6 19 cxd6 êxd6 (19... cxd6 can be met by 20 富ab1 b6 21 f4 ②f7 22 豐e3 ②xh6 23 豐xe6 豐c8 24 豐b3, and Black's defence is not easy) 20 ②e4 豐e7 21 f4 ②c6 22 ②xd6+ cxd6 23 富e1, and Black's problems are obvious.
- b) 18... 2d7 19 cxd6 2xd6 (on 19...cxd6, White has the amusing 20 2g7!? 2g8 21 2h6, and again the black position is not simple to play), and now 20 2h4! is unpleasant, taking aim at f6 and exerting powerful pressure.

In the game, however, White proceeds with a direct attack.

#### 19 cxd6! cxd6

With 19... \( \hat{\omega} xd6 \) Black would lose quickly: 20 \( \hat{\omega} b5 + c6 \) (or 20... \( \hat{\omega} d7 21 \) \( \hat{\omega} e1 + \hat{\omega} e7 22 \hat{\omega} g7 \) and wins) 21 \( \hat{\omega} f4 \) cxb5 22 \( \hat{\omega} xd6 \) \( \hat{\omega} xd6 \) 23 \( \hat{\omega} xd6 \), with an easy win for White.

#### 20 營e3 (D)




There simply is no other move, but then White doesn't need one! (Incidentally he had to foresee this position at move 18.)

#### 20...@xh6

Black's position is hopeless after 20...\(\hat{2}\)d7 21 \(\hat{2}\)g7 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g8 22 \(\hat{2}\)xf6.

#### 21 豐xh6 (D)



A most remarkable position. A number of White's attacking units have been exchanged. His rooks have yet to occupy open files, and it is Black to move. For all this, Black's game cannot be saved. The reason lies in the colossal difference in mobility and development between the two sides, and also in the weaknesses around the black king's position.

#### 21... 全f8 22 營e3+ 全f7

Is it perhaps here that we can detect the reason for Black's mistake on move 18. It emerges that 22...豐e7 is bad on account of 23 ②e4 ⑤f7 (23...豐e5 can be met by 24 冨ac1!? ②f5 25 ②b5+ ⑤d8 26 ②g5!! 豐xb5 27 ②f7+ ⑥d7 28 ②xh8 ②e6 29 營f3 with a winning position) 24 ②xd6+ ⑤g7, and now White has the decisive stroke 25 ②e8+! ⑤f7 26 ②c4+ ⑤xe8 27 ⑤b3, after which Black can't save himself, as you can quite easily verify.

Now White calmly brings up his forces for the decisive assault, and Black has nothing with which to oppose this. Such complete ascendancy of one side over the other goes by the name of *domination*.


#### 23 2 d5 \$e6

After 23.... 全d7, the manoeuvre 24 罩ab1! appears good, inducing the weakening 24...b6. There can follow 25 罩bc1! 罩c8 26 罩xc8 豐xc8 27 罩c1 豐e8 28 罩c7! with a winning advantage. for White

On 23...\$g7 24 \$c4 \$e6, Kasparov gives 25 \$b3! \$\mathbb{Z}\$e8 26 \$\angle f4\$ d5 27 \$\angle \text{xe6}\$ \$\mathbb{Z}\$xe6 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xe6 28 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xd5! +-.

#### 24 分f4 營e7

#### 25 罩e1! (D)



#### 1-0

Black resigned here, as there are no saving moves to be found:

- a) 25...\(\hat{2}\)d7 26 \(\hat{2}\)c4+ +-.
- b) 25...d5 26 \(\dagger f3 +--\).
- c) 25...\$h6 26 \$c4! +-.
- d) 25... **基e8** 26 ②xe6 **掌**xe6 27 **掌**xe6++-.
- e) The most stubborn move seems to be 25... 當d7, but even then, after 26 兔b5! 營xb5 27 營xe6+ 當g7 28 簋ab1, we reach a position where there is no sense whatever in playing on against Kasparov.

The final position explains very eloquently what a dynamic advantage is. All White's forces are already in the battle (except for the al-rook, but we have seen that even this piece is ready to join in at any moment), and acting in concert; they can quickly reach any part of the board where they are needed. Black's forces meanwhile are disunited; they have little mobility and can't get to the decisive areas of the battlefield. Hence White possesses a decisive advantage in the ability of his forces to travel the board in all directions - which fully corresponds to, and confirms, the definition we adopted right at the start of the chapter. I should add that all the elements of dynamics that are enumerated here will be examined in detail in the rest of the book.

I conclude this chapter with twin games by Kasparov which illustrate, in a more detailed way than we have so far seen, the *interweaving*  DYNAMICS 37

of the two opposing chess principles of statics and dynamics.


# Kasparov – Adams

Sarajevo 1999

1 e4 e5 2 ②f3 ②c6 3 d4 exd4 4 ②xd4 ②f6 5 ②xc6 bxc6 6 e5 빨e7 7 빨e2 ②d5 8 c4 ②b6 9 ②c3 빨e6 10 빨e4 Ձb4 11 Ձd2 Ձa6 12 b3 ②xc3 13 ②xc3 d5 14 빨h4!?

This was another Kasparov novelty. After this game it immediately became the standard way to handle the variation.

#### 14...dxc4 15 \( \) e2 \( \) d5 \( (D) \)



#### 16 &d4?!

This move, on the other hand, was some time later recognized as inferior, even though it brought Kasparov complete success in the present game.

#### 16...c5?!


This looks tempting, but we shall see that it isn't sufficient for equality. Instead, Black has a very convincing answer in 16... 豐f5!. Morozevich-Piket, Internet blitz 2000 then continued 17 0-0 公f4, but 17... 豐f4!? is stronger and gives Black the better chances. As to White's correct continuation on move 16, the next game will show us what it is.

#### 17 \(\prec{1}{2}\)xc5 \(\prec{1}{2}\)c3 \((D)\)

Not 17... 響xe5? 18 0-0 響f4 19 響h3! &c8 20 響f3! with a winning advantage for White.


You get the impression that Black has seized the initiative, but this is only apparent. He has too few forces in play to create any real threats. Don't forget this little episode or the verdict on it. The following chapter will be devoted entirely to these very problems.

#### 18 &xc4 豐xe5+ 19 &e3 ②e4!




Understandably, Adams doesn't want to leave his opponent with a unified queenside pawnchain (constituting a static advantage) after 19... 逸xc4 20 營xc4 0-0 21 0-0 ②d5, and in this he is right. Now, however, the 'hanging' position of his knight will lead to some unexpected difficulties. At first sight the problem doesn't look serious, but let us watch how events proceed from here.

20 0-0 &xc4 21 bxc4 0-0 22 \( \bar{2}\)fe1 \( \bar{2}\)fe8 (D)



The opening has culminated in this position almost by force. How should it be evaluated? The pawn-structure is symmetrical, with the isolated queenside pawns of both colours constituting a key factor. Who is usually able to profit from such mutual weaknesses? In the most general sense, the answer is simple and natural: the presence of weaknesses on both sides can be more effectively exploited by the side that is more active. This very formula points to the connection between static and dynamic elements of the position, and tells us clearly that these elements should always be considered as a whole. A practical conclusion follows. White's advantage consists of two elements: the insecure placing of the black knight (a temporary factor, under the heading of dynamics) and the potential superiority of bishop over knight in certain endgame situations (this is to some extent a long-term factor; it falls to some extent within statics). In order not to forfeit this advantage, White must act vigorously. A simple developing move like 23 \(\mathbb{Z}\) ad1 would not be energetic enough here; after 23...\(\mathbb{Z}\) a5!, the game would level out. Kasparov, who without any doubt had studied this position at home, plays with extreme precision:

## 23 f3! (D)



#### 23... 2d6?!

The knight would seem to have plenty of possible moves, but once you start analysing concretely, it all proves to be less simple:

- a) On 23...公c5?! 24 皇f2! 營d6 25 黨xe8+ 黨xe8, White has 26 營d4! winning a pawn.
- b) 23...②c3?! is met by 24 豐f2!, and if 24...豐a5? then 25 Qd2! wins.
- c) 23... ①f6?! is not good in view of 24 皇xa7 豐c3 25 皇d4, when 25... 豐xc4? fails to 26 皇xf6.
- d) The counter-stroke 23... 豐f6 also fails to equalize on account of 24 豐f4!? (Kasparov gives the even simpler 24 豐xf6 公xf6, and now not 25 罩ab1, when the strong reply 25... 公d7! limits White to a slight edge, but 25 皇f4! c6 26 罩xe8+ 罩xe8 27 罩b1 with a clear advantage) 24... 豐xf4 25 皇xf4 公d6 26 c5 公b7 27 罩ec1 c6 28 罩ab1 罩e7 29 罩c3, and Black has difficulty holding the position.

All Black's problems come from the causes set out in the foregoing notes, and show what a fine line separates comfort from trouble in positions where the pieces become very mobile – that is, where dynamic factors predominate.


e) In Kasparov's view Black's best reply is 23... 2c3!, against which he proposes 24 \$\displaystyle{c}\$f1!?

and I suggest 24 \(\mathbb{U}\)f2!?. In either case White has a small plus.

# 24 &f2! (D)

It's important not to let Black off with 24 ②xa7?! 

©c3, when White has nothing.



# 24...ッf5?


In tense situations every error can tell. According to Kasparov this move is wrong, but the position contains all kinds of dangers for Black, and finding the best reply is anything but simple. Kasparov gives 24...豐c3(?!) 25 c5 ± and 24...豐a5(?!) 25 c5 包b7 26 豐g5! ±. To me it seems that the strongest move is 24...豐b2!?, when there can follow 25 c5 包b5 26 豐a4 c6 27 豐a6 豐f6 28 氫xe8+ 氫xe8 29 氫f1 ②c3 30 豐xa7, when White's advantage is still not very great.

From this moment on, I don't see any point where Black's play could have been significantly improved.

#### 25 c5 2b5

Black's weaknesses make themselves felt in the variations 25...②b7? 26 豐a4! 置f8 27 豐c6, and 25...罩xe1+?! 26 罩xe1 ②e8 27 豐e7.

#### 26 **曾b4!** (D)



26...**營d3** 

It's hard to suggest anything better; for instance, 26...c6 27 a4 ②c7 28 豐b7 ②e6 29 豐xc6 罩ec8 30 豐d6 with a big advantage, or 26... 黨xe1+ 27 黨xe1 豐d3 28 a4 ②c3 29 豐b7 豐d8 30 黛g3! and Black is hard pressed.

## 27 \( \begin{array}{c} \text{ged1 a5} \end{array} \)

Not 27... e2? 28 a4, winning at once.

#### 28 營a4 營e2 29 冨e1 營d3?

This of course is an oversight which greatly speeds things up, but Black had major problems anyway. He would lose just as quickly with 29... 当b2? 30 星eb1 公c3 31 当xe8+. The only move enabling him to fight on was 29...公c3, when there could follow 30 当c6 (or 30 当d7) 30... 当b5 31 星xe8+ 星xe8 32 当xc7 公xa2 33 当b6!. White would then have a substantial plus, but there would still be some work for him to do.

#### 

Black resigned as 31... We2 loses to 32 Ze1.


Now we examine a second game that illustrates similar ideas, in the same opening line.

# Kasparov – Timman

Wiik aan Zee 2000

1 e4 e5 2 白f3 白c6 3 d4 exd4 4 白xd4 白f6 5 白xc6 bxc6 6 e5 豐e7 7 豐e2 白d5 8 c4 白b6 9 白c3 豐e6 10 豐e4 兔b4 11 兔d2 兔a6 12 b3 兔xc3 13 兔xc3 d5 14 豐h4 dxc4 15 兔e2 白d5 16 兔xc4! (D)

In the previous game Kasparov played 16 2d4, but it later emerged that Black had the powerful retort 16... #f5!. This gave rise to White's improvement, after which the game takes on rather a different character.




16...g5!?

With a shattered pawn-structure, wholesale exchanges of minor pieces are undesirable. Black therefore refrains from 16...2xc4 17 \( \text{\text{W}}\)xc3 18 \( \text{\text{W}}\)xc3, after which 18...f6 (or 18...0-0 19 0-0 f6) 19 0-0 0-0 20 \( \text{\text{Z}}\)ael would give White a definite plus. On the other hand, pawns don't go backwards, and the move Black plays is adding to his weaknesses. In return he hopes to create counterplay with his pieces. It's another case of dynamics versus statics, only this time without aggressive designs; Black is merely trying to hold on in an inferior position. This too is a highly typical case.

#### 17 **曾d4**

White could have won a pawn, but the presence of opposite-coloured bishops would have made it very hard to exploit his advantage, even with his opponent's broken pawn-structure. (This is a most suitable moment to emphasize that the well-known peculiarity of opposite-coloured bishops which neutralizes a material plus in the endgame is essentially their capacity to block the mobility of the opponent's extra pawns. That is, it belongs to the dynamic component of chess.)

After 17 全xd5 營xd5 18 營xg5, it's important for Black to play 18...互d8. Opposite-bishop endgames would then be in prospect. Kasparov understandably has a different continuation in mind.




Timman is trying to set up a blockade on the light squares, but he proves to have too many weaknesses.

# 19 營xe6+ ②xe6

White also has a clear plus in the event of 19...fxe6 20 g3 公d5 21 皇d2 h6 22 罩c1 含d7 23 罩c4!? 罩hf8 24 h4.

#### 20 0-0-0 **含e7** (D)



White now has to decide where to attack first.

#### 21 Zhe1!


The prospects on the queenside look much clearer, so the rook is transferred to the fourth rank where it will attain maximum mobility and will be best able to attack the opponent's weaknesses.

#### 21...罩hd8

For the side with pawn weaknesses, as a rule, it's useful to retain pieces on the board so as not to forfeit possibilities of counterplay. Perhaps Black should avoid exchanging rooks just now and transfer his knight to d5 by means of 21... 2f4!?. Then in the event of 22 e6 (if 22 g3, then 22... 2d5 23 2d4 hg8) 22... hd8 23 exf7+ \$xf7, the knight and the d8-rook would keep the white rooks at bay for the present.

#### 22 Xxd8 Xxd8 23 Xe4! Xd5

#### 24 \( \extrm{c} \)c2! \( (D) \)




Very typical of Kasparov. He always strives to have all his pieces in play, and this endeavour always rests on a powerful basis of analysis. It's perfectly possible that he already foresaw his 30th move at this point.

#### 24...c5!

The exclamation mark comes from Kasparov. In the event of 24... ②f4 25 g3 ②d3 26 f4 gxf4 27 gxf4 №e6 28 ℤa4, White has an incontestable plus.


25 \( \bar{2}\) \( \dd + 26 \( \dd \) \( \dd + 27 \) \( \dd \) \(



# **30 b4!** Now it's very difficult for Black.

#### 30....會e6? (D)

This question mark is also Kasparov's. Black is also badly off in other lines. After 30...\$c6 31 bxc5, he can't recapture the pawn: 31...\$xc5 32 \$\mathbb{Z}c4\$ is winning for White. A bid for active counterplay with 30...c4+ loses by force to 31 \$\mathbr{Z}xd4\$\$\$\mathbb{Z}e2\$ 32 \$\mathbb{Z}a7+\$\mathref{L}e6\$ 33 \$\mathbr{L}a6+\$\mathref{L}f5\$ 34 h3 h5 35 g4+ hxg4 36 hxg4+ \$\mathref{L}xg4\$ 37 \$\mathref{L}f6\$\$\mathref{L}xa2\$ 38 \$\mathref{L}xc4\$. Kasparov considers the best defence to be 30...cxb4 31 \$\mathref{L}xb4\$, when White 'only' has a significant plus and will still have to play accurately to exploit it.



# 31 **Za6**+

From this moment on, the play is completely forced.


#### 31...望f5

After 31... 堂d5, Black again loses the pawn endgame in which White secures an outside passed pawn: 32 罩a5 堂d6 33 罩xc5 罩xc5 34 bxc5+.

#### 32 b5 罩d5

Black goes in search of a miracle. If he tries 32... 這e1, White's winning line is 33 這c6! 這c1 34 b6 \$e5 35 b7 區b1 36 區xc5+ \$e46 37 區xg5 區xb7 and now a standard manoeuvre settles matters: 38 區g4! 區b2 39 區xd4+ \$e6 40 區e4+ \$e45 41 區e2. Black also loses after 32...c4+ 33 \$exc4 區e2 34 b6.

33 罩c6 c4+ 34 \$xc4 d3 (D)



This was the point of Black's 32nd move, but... (I advise you to put a bookmark in place now and try looking for the solution yourself!)


35 \$\ddot xd5 d2 36 g4+! 1-0

If 36...\$xg4, then 37 \( \bar{2}c4+.

# 2 Development

Simple and plain though its title may sound, I view this chapter as the most important one for presenting the theme of the book as a whole. Why this is so will become clear in due course. We shall start out from that 'elementary' principle, thoroughly familiar to everyone, which tells us about the importance of developing the pieces in the opening. You will very often see how even a fairly experienced and strong player 'forgets' about this principle in the heat of coping with specific problems of the position. Perhaps he figures that things which are common knowledge can sometimes be neglected by players of a high enough calibre. The punishment for this kind of aberration is sometimes very painful and usually comes about by 'dynamic' means - that is, at the hands of the opponent's mobile and aggressively deployed pieces, for these qualities fall entirely within the sphere of chess dynamics.

Let's look at a series of examples. The first of them, fittingly, is an extract from what has gone down in chess history as the 'Immortal Game'.



Anderssen – Kieseritzky London 1851


We will only look at the final part of it, as otherwise we would need to wander for ages through the labyrinths of innumerable annotations that have accumulated over the years. What is most instructive about this game, and at the same time fits perfectly into our own set of interests, is splendidly evident from the diagram. In spite of his huge material plus, Black is not in good shape, seeing that only two of his pieces have stepped out onto the battlefield against four white ones. But there is more to it than that. An extremely important question is not just how many units have come out, but where they have gone, and what they are doing there. In other words, quality of development is important as well as quantity. (However, I am running on ahead a little. For the present, let's just talk about the quantitative factor.) In the diagram, even Black's developed pieces are occupying strange positions far away from the urgent needs of their army (chief among which is the predicament of the black king). The white forces, by contrast, are deployed admirably. They are beautifully posted in the centre and cooperating excellently. (This last factor, which is highly important, is another one that we shall encounter later.)

Exploiting all the above-mentioned characteristics of the position, Adolf Anderssen – whom we may confidently call the first player in chess history to be a true master of the attack – concludes the game with a few energetic strokes:

#### 20 e5!! (D)

The logic underlying this move is simple. The g7-square beckons the white knight, and once the knight gets there, the queen will reach f7. This is all obvious, and so is the fact that in playing this way, White is keeping up the momentum of the attack. All the same, he has given up both his rooks, and plays a 'quiet' move! What's more, this was an 'off-hand' game in which Anderssen definitely can't have been calculating all possible variations. None-theless the great player's intuition didn't let him down. He understood that a united force, even if not a very large one, has a realistic chance of dealing with something that can very well be


likened to an array of military aircraft which haven't even taken off but are left standing around the airfield. One extremely important point, of course, is that in the sector where his king is placed, Black's position is full of 'holes' on the dark squares – a consequence of having his bishop on g1.



This position has been the object of numerous investigations which confirmed that even with Black to move and with such a gigantic material plus, he has no adequate defence. These analyses went on for years, and yet for the computer programs of our own day (assuming that you 'nudge' them in the right direction) the calculation of all the consequences is a matter of a few minutes. The main variations go:

- a) 20...f6 21 \( \times xg7 + \( \precent f7 22 \( \times xf6 \) and Black can't save himself from mate, as you can quite easily verify.
- c) The most stubborn defensive move is 20... \(\&\)a6, but even so, White wins by 21 \(\exists c7+!\) \(\delta d8 \) 22 \(\exists xa6!\) (the complete knight manoeuvre was indicated by Falkbeer), and now:
  - c1) 22...豐xa2 23 桌c7+ 含e8 24 包b4!.
- c2) 22... 豐c3 23 夏c7+ 豐xc7 24 ②xc7 含xc7 25 豐xa8 ②c6 (25... ②h6 26 ②d6 +--) 26 ②d6 ②xe5 27 ②e8+ 含b6 28 豐b8+ 含a5 29 豐xe5.
- c3) 22.... \$\(\delta\$6!\) (the most tenacious) 23 豐xa8 豐c3 24 豐xb8+ 豐c8 25 豐xc8+ \$\delta\$xc8 26 \$\delta\$f8! (D).

Now 26...h6 27 ②d6+ 當d8 28 ②xf7+ 當e8 29 ②xh8 當xf8 30 當f3 gives White a won endgame. This whole variation was discovered by Chigorin. Even if Anderssen saw 22.... 2b6, he definitely can't have envisaged 26 皇f8! — if only because he couldn't possibly have been



interested in an endgame after he had sacrificed so much, and so spectacularly. Fortunately, both for him and for all later generations of chessplayers, his opponent didn't set him this problem but allowed the game to finish in the most convincing and instructive way:


20...②a6 21 ②xg7+ \$\dd 8 22 \$\dd f6+! ②xf6 23 \$\dd e7# (1-0)\$

The magnificent final position of this wonderful game is also a concentrated graphic illustration of the theme of the present chapter. Don't forget it!

It is appropriate that the next example should be a game by Anderssen's great historic rival Paul Morphy, the genius who originated the dynamic approach to chess and was ahead of his time by several decades (if not a whole century).

> Morphy – Hampton London 1858

1 e4 e5 2 ②f3 ②c6 3 &c4 &c5 4 b4 &xb4 5 c3 &a5 6 d4 exd4 7 0-0 &b6 8 cxd4 d6 9 ②c3 (D)



9...4\(\featities f6?

In the present position, this obvious move proves to be an outright error. Such a verdict always tells us that the natural course of events has already been disrupted. (This doesn't, however, mean that a mistake has already been made. It just means that one side has initiated sharp play at an early stage. As this is an Evans Gambit, it must have been White who did so. Without overstepping the bounds of permissible risk, he is forcing his opponent as well as himself to operate in extreme conditions!) The theoretical continuations here are 9... 2g4 and 9... 2a5. The greatest-ever authority on this variation, and the greatest master at handling it (for both sides!), was Mikhail Chigorin. Morphy too had an excellent command of theory; assisted by his phenomenal memory, he was evidently the best openings connoisseur of his day. Accordingly he follows the strongest line here, which had been demonstrated only once before, in a game Périgal-Popert, London 1830.

#### 10 e5! dxe5

In Morphy-de Rivière, Paris 1858, Black tried to sidestep the 'theoretical dispute' by playing 10...d5, but was quickly crushed after 11 exf6 dxc4 12 fxg7 \( \mathbb{Z}g8 13 \) \( \mathbb{Z}e1+, etc. \)


#### 11 **≜a**3!

This is the whole point of the central breakthrough. Now Black can't castle, and White's better developed pieces proceed to a direct attack on the king.

#### 11...**gg4** (D)

In the original game already mentioned, there followed 11...②a5 12 罩e1! ②xc4 13 豐a4+ c6 14 豐xc4 兔e6 15 罩xe5 豐d7 16 罩xe6+! fxe6 17 ②e5 豐c8 18 罩e1 ②d5 19 ②xd5 cxd5 20 豐b5+ 含d8 21 ②f7+ 含c7 22 兔d6# (1-0). Two other continuations deserve consideration:

b) On 11... ②xd4 12 ②xe5 鱼e6 13 罩e1 c5 14 豐a4+ 曾f8 15 罩ad1 曾g8, the following forced variation looks good: 16 ②b5! 豐e8 17 ②xf7! 豐xf7 18 鱼xe6 ②xe6 19 ②d6 豐g6 (19... 豐d7 20 豐c4 ±) 20 罩xe6, with an undoubted plus for White.



12 營b3 &h5

Black also loses by force after 12... add 13 ②xe5 ②xe5 14 dxe5 ②h5 and now, to step up the pace of the offensive, White nonchalantly sacrifices the exchange for good measure with 15 Zad1!, formally losing material but in fact gaining a material plus in the limited part of the board where the decisive events are taking place, during the short interval which White needs in order to consummate his attack. In concrete terms, White is giving up a rook and capturing a bishop in return. Yet his rook's place is immediately taken by the other one, which until now has been out of the game. In other words, for a short space of time in the main battle area, everything will stay the same on White's side, whereas Black will have a bishop less. It is now a trifling matter for White to conduct his attack to a successful conclusion - if he doesn't, his opponent's formal preponderance will become a real one. We have come across the very same situation before, in Lessons in Chess Strategy (see Chapter 1, 'The Geometry of the Chessboard'), and that example too was from a game by Morphy. Actually, everything now unfolds more or less by force: 15...\(\hat{2}\)xd1 16 \(\beta\)xd1 \(\beta\)f5, and then comes the key move of the attack: 17 ②e4! 基f8 (17...公f4 18 公f6+) 18 曾b4 c5 19 曾b5+ and mates.

But as the game goes, Black also has no hope of salvation:

# 13 dxe5 ②g4 14 基ad1 豐c8 15 e6 f6 16 豐b5 奧g6 17 奧d5 1-0

I advise you to pay attention to the reason for Black's complete helplessness: all his minor pieces are out, and yet there isn't the slightest cooperation between them. By contrast, White's forces are working together splendidly.

The following game was played much later, when you would expect the lessons to have been learned from the great masters of the past.

# Spielmann – Chigorin


Nuremberg 1906

#### 1 e4 e5 2 & c4 Øf6 3 d3 Øc6 4 f4?!

Spielmann was himself an expert at punishing his opponents for neglecting their development, but his opening play here is strange – especially against Mikhail Chigorin, that brilliant master of dynamic chess (no matter how ageing and infirm at the time), and the direct successor to Anderssen and Morphy. White's undertaking, to put it mildly, is dubious. His third move, though it promises little, is playable, but his fourth merely weakens his own position and wastes time. With it he obtains a highly unfavourable form of King's Gambit, as Chigorin is quick to demonstrate:

#### 4...exf4 5 \(\hat{\omega}\)xf4?! (D)

A more accurate line seems to be 5 2c3 2b4 6 2xf4 d5 7 exd5 2xd5 8 2xd5 2xd5 2f3, with only a slight plus for Black. Now Chigorin immediately obtains the better prospects with a simple blow in the centre.




#### 5...d5 6 exd5 ②xd5 7 &d2?!

White doesn't want to part with his bishoppair, but the loss of time in an open position counts for more. After 7 2xd5 \widetilde{\text{w}}xd5 \& \overline{\text{Q}}f3, Black's advantage wouldn't be dangerous as yet.

#### 

Spielmann seems to have gone to pieces. Thanks to his neglect of development, White's prospects are indeed scarcely attractive, as the following variations show: 8 ②c3 ②xc3 9 ②xc3 0-0 10 圖h5 (10 ②e2 ②g4 is thoroughly bad for White; also after 10 圖f3 ②d4 11 ②xd4 圖xd4, Black's advantage can't be doubted) 10... 圖e7+11 ②e2 ②d4 12 ②xd4 ③xd4 13 0-0-0 g6, and to a modern player the advantages of Black's position are obvious. Yet by bringing his queen out into an exposed position at such an early stage, White commits one more offence against all the development rules, with lamentable results.



#### 8... 營e7+?!


In this game Black doesn't have to strain himself, but his actions are nonetheless instructive. Bringing the queen out early is rarely correct, but here it is justified by the urgent need to punish the opponent for his opening sins. The point is that in the present situation this has to be done by energetic means, by threats which hamper White's development - a theme that will closely concern us in Chapter 5 (Initiative). These considerations are all absolutely valid, but Black's way of applying them is wrong. Thus the exclamation mark is for assessing the position correctly and choosing the right overall course of action, while the question mark is for calculating the variations inaccurately. The move played is not really a mistake, but it would have been considerably better to insert an intermediate check provoking some useful weaknesses: 8... \wideharder \wideharder 4... \wideharder

weaknesses I mentioned are revealed in the variation 9 g3 豐e7+ 10 豐e2 ②d4 11 豐xe7+ ②xe7 12 兔b3 兔e6 13 ②e2 兔xb3 14 ②xd4 兔d5) 9...兔g4 10 豐g3 (10 豐e4+ 含f8 11 g3 豐f6+ is wholly bad for White) 10...豐xg3 11 hxg3 0-0-0 Black has a decisive plus.

#### 9 De2?

Now it is White's turn to miss a fortunate chance to make his opponent's task a good deal harder. The ending after 9 營e2 ②d4 10 營xe7+②xe7 11 ②b3 ②e6! 12 ②f3 ②xb3 13 ②xd4 ③d5 is none too appealing for White, but still playable. From now on, everything is simple.

9... ②d4 10 We4 ②xc2+ 11 &d1 ②de3+(D)



A gruesome spectacle. It's high time for White to resign.

12 \$\pmexc4 13 dxe4 \$\infty\$xa1 14 \$\pmexc4 d3 \$\pmexc4 e6\$
15 b4 \$\pmexc4 b6 16 \$\pmexc4 b2 0-0-0 17 \$\infty\$c1 \$\infty\$ac2 18
\$\pmexc2 \$\infty\$c4+ 19 \$\pmexc3 \$\pmexc4 d4+ 0-1\$

We have been examining some classical examples in chronological order. In those days, in fact, there were thousands of these games where one player offends against the principle of development and the other punishes him according to all the rules — with dramatic material sacrifices, the opening of lines, and final execution of the stranded king. You wouldn't think it would be hard to draw useful conclusions from such games and rigorously follow the very important lesson they teach — but alas! Human nature seems to be such that you need a taste of the knout on your own hide before you realize it hurts!

Consequently, such crushing defeats are not such a rarity even in our own enlightened age.

Today, of course, players no longer make such naïve and obvious mistakes as in the old days; when they forget to develop, it is out of some 'higher' considerations, in pursuit of certain concrete ends. Yet those considerations will not rescue you if the basic principles of chess are being flouted.

# Botvinnik - Portisch




Monte Carlo 1968

# 1 c4 e5 2 2 c3 2) f6 3 g3 d5 4 cxd5 2) xd5 5 2 g2 2 e6 6 2) f3 2) c6 7 0-0 2) b6 8 d3 2 e7 9 a3 a5?!

In his notes to the game Botvinnik was dubious about this move, after which Black already faces some minor difficulties. A good continuation is 9...0-0 10 b4 2 d 11 2 b2 2 xf3+ 12 xf3 c6, as occurred, for example, in M.Gurevich-Shirov, Sarajevo 2000.


10 **2e3 0-0 11 公a4** (D)



#### 11...@xa4?!

A second inaccuracy, the consequences of which will make themselves felt throughout the game. Botvinnik recommends 11...②d5!? 12 &c5 b6 13 &xe7 ②dxe7.

12 豐xa4 臭d5 13 罩fc1 罩e8 (D)




14 罩c2 身f8

Not 14...b5? 15 豐xb5 罩b8 16 豐a4. However, serious consideration should be given to 14... 2d6!? 15 豐b5 公e7.

# 15 罩ac1 ②b8? (D)

The crucial moment in the game; we will therefore examine it in detail. Black already has difficulty selecting his move. For instance, the line recommended by Botvinnik himself, 15...e4 16 dxe4 êxe4 17 區d2 營f6 18 食f4 區ac8, is open to doubt on account of the simple 19 êh3 êf5 20 êxf5 營xf5 21 營b3, with highly unpleasant pressure. Black may have nothing better than 15...êd6!?.



Some questions now arise:

- 1) What was the point of the move Black has just played?
  - 2) What are its drawbacks?
- 3) If it does have drawbacks, how are they to be exploited?

To answer the first two questions we need only look at the diagram, and we see that Black's main worry are the doubled white rooks on the c-file. Hence the whole point of the odd-looking knight retreat is to try to play ...c6, solving this problem once and for all. The drawbacks are also obvious. For one thing the c7-pawn is left open to attack, and secondly - just look at the position! - Black's pieces were developed a moment ago, and now suddenly all but one of them are on the back rank. This is precisely the kind of situation we talked about. Black is being guided by perfectly logical considerations while offending against one solitary principle, but one that is fundamental to chess - the principle of developing your forces.

Finally, can Black be punished for this transgression? And if so, how? The answer to the second part of the question comes readily to

mind: only by the capture on c7. As to the first part, the answer is more complex and can be discovered step by step. First, if we ponder the sense of the foregoing events, we can see that White has acted consistently and logically. As Tigran Petrosian would say in similar contexts, he hasn't done anything bad enough to deserve punishment. But if Black does place his pawn on c6, then both white rooks — and with them the entire sense of White's previous operations — will be 'dead'. Therefore:

- 1) White *must* take the c7-pawn, even without preliminary calculation! (Though this may sound over-categorical, the logic of chess is embodied in just this kind of reasoning.)
- 2) The variations are bound to 'come together' in White's favour. If at first sight it appears that they don't, you must search further and they will certainly work!


In the game, everything worked precisely and convincingly:

#### 16 \( \mathbb{Z}\)xc7! \( \mathbb{L}\)c6 17 \( \mathbb{Z}\)1xc6!

This capture too is fully justified by the above reasoning and almost obligatory, seeing that White must on no account slacken the pace of the attack and let Black organize a defence. That is what would happen if White captured the other way: 17 \$\mathbb{Z}7xc6?! \Deltaxc6 18 \Deltag5 \deltac7.

#### 17...bxc6(D)

Nothing would be substantially altered by 17... 公xc6 18 基xf7! 含xf7 (on 18... 全e7 19 營c4 含h8 20 營g4 全f6 21 公g5, White has a decisive plus) 19 營c4+ 含g6 20 營g4+ 含f7 21 公g5+ and wins (Botvinnik).




Here too, the same blow ensues:

#### 18 罩xf7! h6

Trying to complicate the issue with 18...e4!? is more interesting, but White still has a forced win, albeit not a simple one: 19 ②g5 h6 and now the decisive move is the magnificent 20 罩f5!! (which results from 'repairing' the variation 20 豐c4 豐d5). There can follow 20...hxg5 21 豐c4+ 全h8 22 罩xg5 g6 23 全d4+ 全g7 24 豐f7!, and wins.

# 19 **基b7** (D)




#### 19...**豐c8**

#### 20 **營c4+!**

The right square for the check!

#### 20...**∲h8** (D)

Or 20... \$\diphr 21 \dipsf 25+! hxg5 22 \$\dipse 4+ \$\dipsh 8 23 \$\dipsf 7\$ and wins.



#### 21 42h4!!

Botvinnik conducts the whole game in brilliant style, with extreme accuracy and energy.

# 21... **曾xb7**

Portisch allows the most attractive dénouement. Other tries also fail to save him: 21...\( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} 21...\( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} 24...\( \begin{align\*} 26...\( \begin{align\*} 2

22 **②**h3 **豐**xb7 23 **豐**xe6 +— or the more complicated 21...**豐**e6 22 **豐**e4 **�**g8 23 **②**g6 a4 24 **②**xh6! gxh6 25 **②**f4 +—.

# 22 ②g6+ \$\ddot\delta 7 23 \ddot\delta 6 24 ③xe5+ g6 25 \ddot\delta xg6+ \ddot\delta 7 26 \ddot\delta xh6+! 1-0

A beautiful finish to a superb game. Black's neglect of development received punishment in the best tradition.


And now another game in a similar vein.

# Karpov – Kasparov

Linares 1993

# 1 d4 公f6 2 c4 g6 3 公c3 全g7 4 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0 6 全e3 e5 7 公ge2 c6 8 營d2 公bd7 9 區d1 a6 10 dxe5?! (D)

Looking for ways to deflect Kasparov from his well-prepared and familiar course, Karpov embarks on a dubious undertaking which assists his opponent's development. After 10 d5 c5 the game would be unclear.



Now, however, in spite of the hopeless weakness of the d6-pawn (a weakness which is, however, typical of the King's Indian Defence), Black's chances will be superior. The dynamic merits of his position will outweigh its static defects. It's interesting that for all his vast experience of playing Kasparov, Karpov is conceding trumps to his opponent in precisely that field of chess where Kasparov's special strength lies: the field of active piece-play, and on King's Indian territory too, where he has a feel for the finest nuances. The course of the game will soon reveal the danger of this approach.

#### 10...**②**xe5!

Kasparov must surely have been prepared for this turn of events, if only as a result of knowing about Gavrikov-Barbero, Berne 1991. That game went 10...dxe5 11 c5 包e8 12 包c1 豐e7 13 包b3 會h8 14 兔c4 f5 15 0-0, leading to a typical King's Indian position in which White has a slight but enduring plus.


#### 11 b3

Karpov didn't go in for this variation in order to play 11 ②c1 ②e6 12 豐xd6 and then seek salvation in somewhat the worse ending after 12...豐xd6 13 冨xd6 ②xc4 14 ②e2 (not 14 f4? ②xf1 15 fxe5 ②g4 干; or 14 ②d4 ②xf1, and now 15 ③xe5 ③xg2 16 冨g1 ②e8 〒 or 15 冨xf1 ②c4! 16 冨xf6 冨fd8 干) 14...②xe2 15 ③xe2 ②c4.

#### 11...b5! 12 cxb5

The variation 12 營xd6?! 營xd6 13 基xd6 bxc4 favours Black.

#### 12...axb5 13 營xd6 ②fd7 14 f4 (D)



From Black's 10th move up to here, events have unfolded more or less by force – not in the mundane sense, of course, but according to the logic of the chess struggle on a very high level. When setting out on his opening operation, Karpov had most probably foreseen this situation and evaluated it in his own favour – underrating the dynamic power of the black position. These are the considerations I mentioned at the outset of the game. By exactly the same logic of the struggle, Kasparov's reply is completely obligatory. He can't on any account retreat.


#### 14...b4!

This gives rise to immense complications, in which the key factors will be the greatly superior mobility of Black's pieces and – in keeping with our theme – White's backwardness in development. In other words, Black will always have more forces to hand in the critical sector of the board, which is the most important thing about a development advantage.

#### 15 9 b1?

White's choice of moves here is wide and anything but simple. A mass of involved variations spring up, which can't be analysed exhaustively - and need not be, either. An essential skill in such cases is the correct evaluation of positions that arise after a relatively small number of compulsory moves. But even this may not be simple; even over quite a short range, calculation may be very difficult, and the sheer complexity of the ensuing positions may make them that much harder to assess. In these situations a player's intuition assumes an immense role - yet ultimately the ability to analyse remains the deciding factor. In this respect everything that was said about Mikhail Tal in the last chapter applies just as much to Kasparov; hence the particular complexity of Karpov's task here. There were variations like these to be calculated:

- a) 15 ②a4 罩xa4! and now:
- a1) 16 fxe5 Zxa2 17 Yxc6 Yh4+ 18 Qf2 Yg4, with a significant plus for Black.
- a2) 16 bxa4 ②c4 17 營d3 ②b2 18 營b3 ②xd1 19 營xd1 營a5, and again Black has clearly the better prospects.
- b) 15 fxe5 bxc3 (D), with these possibilities:




b1) 16 e6 fxe6 17 豐xe6+ \$\psi\$h8 18 \(\tilde{O}c1 (18 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d4? c2 19 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xg7+\$\psi\$xg7 -+) 18...\(\tilde{E}f6 19 豐g4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e7 and White's king is very unsafe; e.g., 20 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 c2 21 \(\tilde{E}d2 \(\tilde{O}c5 22 豐f3 \(\tilde{O}xe4 23 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf6.

- b2) 16 ②xc3 &xe5 17 ∰xc6 is a more complex option:
- b211) Events take a very interesting course after 18 g3 &xc3+ 19 &d2 &xd2+ 20 \( \frac{1}{2}xd2 \)

豐f6 21 豐xa8 ②e5 22 兔e2 ②f3+23 兔xf3 豐xf3 24 冨f1 豐e3+25 冨e2 豐xe2+26 蜍xe2 兔g4+.

b212) 18 皇f2 皇xc3+ 19 豐xc3 豐xe4+ 20 豐e3 豐b4+ 21 豐d2 (D), and now what? Put a bookmark in place, shut the book, and write down the solution for yourself.



b213) Kasparov suggests 18 \( \delta \)d2 with a wholly unclear position, putting paid to all the brilliance. Such a pity!


b22) In his view, Black's best course in this very complex situation would be 17... 全xc3+18 響xc3 響h4+19 當d2! 墨xa2+20 當c1 包f6 21 當b1 墨a8! with somewhat the better chances.

c) Another interesting move is 15 豐xb4!?, suggested by Knaak. The game may continue 15...c5! 16 兔xc5 勺xc5 17 豐xc5 勺d3+ 18 罩xd3 豐xd3 19 e5 罩d8 20 堂f2, and White retains chances of a successful defence, although Kasparov views this variation with scepticism.

#### 15... ②g4 16 臭d4

In his notes to the game Anand mentions 16 2g1 (which was analysed by the players in their post-mortem), and gives the following variations: 16... \(\maxa\) xa2 17 h3 (in Anand's view, 17 ₩xc6!? deserves attention), and now a gripping battle is joined: 17... h4+!! 18 g3 Exe2+! 19 堂xe2 豐xg3 20 罩d3 (a similar or identical situation would arise from 20 hxg4 2 f6!) 20... 2 a6 21 hxg4. Now Anand recommends 21...包f6! without giving any continuation. Let's try to fathom this situation ourselves. The truth is anything but obvious - the variations are more or less approximate (since there are so many possibilities), yet they do reveal the character of the position and confirm our definition of a development advantage: despite White's formal material plus, Black possesses the actual preponderance of forces on the parts of the board where the clash is taking place: 22 公d2 公d5! 23 公c4 公xf4+ 24 全d2 豐xg4 25 豐d7 豐g5 26 全e3 全xc4! 27 bxc4 罩a8 28 罩g1 豐h4 29 豐g4 豐h2+ and Black wins.

16...\(\hat{2}\)xd4 (D)




#### 17 **營xd4**

Speelman suggested 17 公xd4, to which our counter-suggestion is 17...公df6! (the consequences of this appear clearer than those of Anand's 17...互xa2) 18 營xc6 (Black has an overwhelming advantage after 18 營xd8 互xd8 19 e5 c5!; White also does badly with 18 公xc6 營xd6 19 互xd6 公xe4 20 公e7+ 全g7 21 互d4 公ef2 22 互g1 互e8), and now the queen sacrifice 18...互xa2!? 19 公e6 營xd1+ 20 全xd1 全xe6 gives Black a decisive plus.

# 17... 基xa2 18 h3 c5 19 營g1 (D)

Given White's hopeless passivity overall, an active sortie with the lone queen gives nothing: 19 營6 ②e3 20 罩d2 罩a1 and wins.



"I rest my case!" says Anand, by way of commenting on White's last move. I put it to you that the placing of White's pieces speaks for itself – it reveals in the most graphic manner

that no good comes of forgetting about development.

#### 19...இgf6 20 e5

#### 20...②e4 21 h4


Little is altered by inserting the moves 21 豐e3 兔b7, thus: 22 h4 豐e7 23 ②d2 (23 h5 g5! —+) 23...②xd2 24 罩xd2 罩xd2 25 豐xd2 f6, with a big advantage. If instead 22 ②d2, Kasparov gives 22...②xd2 23 罩xd2 罩xd2 24 豐xd2 ②b6! (his suggestion of 24...豐e7! is also strong) 25 豐xd8 罩xd8 26 ②c1 ②d5 27 ②d3 ②e3 with an overwhelming advantage. But now, fresh forces are able to storm into the game:

#### 21...c4! 22 ②c1

Black wins after 22 bxc4 豐a5 23 豐e3 b3+ 24 ②ec3 ②dc5. 22 豐e3 also fails, in view of 22...c3! 23 豐xe4 c2 24 單d2 (or 24 罩c1 ②c5) 24...cxb1豐+ 25 豐xb1 罩xd2 26 堂xd2 ②xe5+. 22...c3!?

The situation speaks for itself, but any position, even if completely won, demands good play all the way to the end. The classic chess masters, whose precepts we all try to follow, invariably recommended taking the clearest and safest path when realizing a big advantage. In the heat of battle, Kasparov sometimes neglects this wise advice. From the most general point of view he may be wrong, but then there is such a thing as subjective as well as objective truth. So for the moment we will refrain from any categorical judgement and just follow the course of events. As Anand points out, there was quite an uncomplicated and painless win here in the shape of 22... \$\square\$ 23 \$\square\$ d4 c3 24 \$\square\$ xe4 c2.

#### 23 ②xa2 (D)



23...c2

At this point Karpov was already in severe time-trouble. He now loses quickly.


#### 24 營d4?!

Neglecting the chance to play more stubbornly with 24 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{alig would have a speedy win indicated by Knaak: 豐e3 ②g4! 26 豐d3 cxb1豐 27 罩xb1 豐b6) 25... **Q**g4 26 **②**d2 **②**d3+. Kasparov, however (according to Anand!) had a different reply in mind, perhaps less strong but much more spectacular: 24...cxb1豐 25 Zxb1 公xe5 26 Zd1 and now the amazing 26... 2g4!!. However, in the variation 27 罩xd8!? 罩xd8 28 单e2 包d3+, he underestimated a typical computer-style move (indeed, what human being would have assessed it properly and believed in it?): 29 \displace d1!. and now, for example, after 29... ②xf4+30 &c2 罩d2+31 \$b1 ②xe2 32 \$b6 &f5 33 \$a1 ②d4 34 營b8+ 當g7 35 ②c1, my computer can see no win for Black. On the other hand, 27 \(\pm\$e2 would quickly be refuted by 27... 營a8! 28 fxe5 奠xe2 29 曾xe2 ②g3+.

#### 24...cxd1營+ 25 含xd1

On 25 營xd1, Black wins by 25...公g3 26 国h3 公xf1 27 含xf1 公c5! 28 營xd8 国xd8 29 国e3 国d1+30 国e1 鱼a6+ (Kasparov).

25...公dc5! 26 豐xd8 罩xd8+ 27 含c2 公f2 (D)



0 - 1

Here Karpov overstepped the time-limit. His position is lost, as we can see from the variation 28 單g1 单f5+ 29 曾b2 (or 29 曾c1 單d1+ 30 曾b2 罩xb1#) 29...②d1+ 30 曾a1 ②xb3#.

The game is very striking, instructive and convincing, but let's return to a theme that was touched on in the note to Black's 22nd move – the relation between the subjective and the objective.


Anand informs us that at this point Kasparov was intending to put the spectacular before the rational, and according to the classical canons he would have been wrong to do so. But this (as we said before) is to take the most general and strictly objective view of the matter. Man is an invariably subjective being, and the objective truth is sometimes outweighed by the subjective. I see this as a case in point. In selecting his move, Kasparov succeeded in unearthing some stunning ideas. If nothing else, look at the possibility of 26... g4!!. Can you imagine many players who would be capable of 'immersing' themselves so deeply in the position - or who would have any wish to, given that a clearer method was there?

Moreover, through the positive emotional stimulus that it gives you, doesn't this kind of decision sometimes serve to revitalize your powers? (In saying this, I must stress that Kasparov never overdoes these 'transgressions'. He would seem to engage in them from a form of inner necessity. We will come back to this.) After all, the gigantic amount of energy that Kasparov expends during play has to be replenished somehow or other! I suspect that in his case, the vital wellspring is his natural emotionality and his innate ability to convert it into energy. This would appear to be a gift possessed by very few.

Hence the conclusion, in its most general form: an ordinary player *should* follow the path bequeathed to us by the chess classics and tested by long years of experience. Individual deviations from this path can be of benefit only to a player who, in the first place, knows and thoroughly understands all the general principles – and who, in addition, completely knows his own mind when he violates them.

The following game opens up some different aspects of our central topic. Yet among its interesting themes we shall detect some problems which are psychologically akin to those of the Karpov-Kasparov game.

# Alekhine – Sterk Budapest 1921



# 6 包b5?

This is a sheer waste of time. Compare the position after White's 8th move with the possible variation 5... 2e7 6 2c2 c6. The position is just the same, only with the other side to play. A simple and good line is 6 c5 2e7 7 b4 with an advantage.


# 6... <u>\$e</u>7 7 **營c2 c6 8** ②c3 0-0 9 **\$d3 dxc4 10 \$xc4 c5!**

Even though this pawn has taken two moves to reach c5, it does good work there, which cannot be said of the white queen on c2. It's already White who is going to face some problems.

#### 11 dxc5

After 11 0-0 2b6 12 2d3 cxd4 13 exd4 2d7, White would have a more or less unfavourable form of an IQP position.

#### 11...\( \hat{2}xc5 12 0-0 b6 \( (D) \)



#### 13 e4


This advance leads to sharper play but at the same time weakens White's position. In other words, a typical clash between statics and dynamics arises. Positions of this sort were undoubtedly well known to Alekhine, because Rubinstein had played them willingly and with virtuosity, convincingly exposing weaknesses

such as those White has just accepted. But then, Alekhine realized that in this game he was not facing Rubinstein! Objectively speaking, a stronger line is 13 ②e4!? ②b7 14 ②xc5 ②xc5 15 b4 ②e4 16 Wc3, with equality and a most probable draw. Alekhine decided to take the risk, rightly supposing that in a sharp tactical struggle he would have the opportunity to outplay his opponent. Look at everything we said in similar contexts about Tal and Kasparov.

#### 13....**臭b7 14 臭g**5

Going into action with insufficient development rarely succeeds. Thus, 14 e5? is bad on account of 14...②g4! 15 ②g5 g6 16 ②xe6 營h4 17 ②f4 (17 h3? 營g3) 17...fxe6! 18 ②xe6+ ②g7 19 ②g3 營h5 20 ②xd7 邓xf2! —+; but a line I like better is 14 ②f4!?, when for instance there could follow 14...邓c8 15 邓ad1 ②b4 16 ②e5. As the game goes, Black gains the advantage with a few excellent moves.

14... **營c8!** 15 **營e2 身b4!** (D)




# 16 &d3!?

By now, a mere glance at Black's position gives you a sense of its merits. White has to proceed very accurately to maintain the tension of the struggle, and he discovers the best chance—which arises from analysing the variation 16 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c1? \) \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c5 \) 18 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c4! \) 19 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c4! \) 19 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c4! \) 19 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c4! \) 19 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c4! \) 19 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c4! \) 17 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) 17 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) 17 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) 18 \( \mathbb{\textsf} \alpha c3 \) would finish up \( en prise. \) Hence it is this rook that needs to go to c1. It could, of course, do so at once.

#### 16...\(\hat{\pm}\)xc3!

This natural move is also strongest. If only Black had succeeded in working out the consequences! Instead, after 16...公c5 17 皇xf6 gxf6 18 罩ac1 豐b8!?, Black's position is good but White too has everything in order.

#### 17 罩fc1! (D)



#### 17... ②xe4?


The opposing forces have no sooner started clashing directly than Black commits a decisive error! From this example (and a great many others), one very simple but extremely important conclusion can be drawn: sooner or later in every game, a certain stage is reached when the two sides' pieces come into contact, giving rise to variations which increase in number with every move. And if one player has the more promising position at the start of this sequence, it doesn't guarantee that he will still emerge with advantage from the tactical crossfire. The most important factor here is skill in calculating variations. It can probably be said that this very skill is the most valuable quality a chess-player can have. It follows that you shouldn't grudge the time spent on training your powers of calculation if you want to improve as a player.

To that end, you can perfectly well use any position from an annotated game in which there is something to be calculated. But at this point I will repeat my favourite entreaty: "Set up the position from the above diagram, put a bookmark in place, shut the book, and work things out for yourself." You can place a chess clock by the board, give yourself a certain amount of thinking time (for this position you shouldn't need more than 20-25 minutes), and work out the variations without moving the pieces. On the other hand you could also do without the clock; it's only really necessary for players with plenty of training behind them.

But now to the point – Black's correct choice is 17...②c5! 18 🖾xc3 ②xe4 19 ③xf6 ③xd3, after which the game continues on more or less forced lines with 20 👑e3 gxf6 21 b4 ②g6 22

bxc5 bxc5 23 \( \) xc5 \( \) a6. At this stage, following Alekhine, Kotov in his book writes: "24 h4 gives an attack for the pawn." If we make another couple of obvious moves – 24...\( \) fc8 25 h5 \( \) xc5 \( \) c5 \( \) c8 — we can easily see that the pawn and the attack are both missing. For anyone just starting to train their analytical powers, it should be enough to work through the first stage of this variation (up to move 19) and stop there. The more experienced must continue the analysis to the 23rd move.

# 18 &xe4 &xe4 19 ₩xe4 ②c5 (D) Now some real puzzles arise.



You don't need to look at the position for long to discover 20 營b1. Then after 20....全b4, White wins a piece and the game by either 21 国c4 a5 22 a3 營a6 23 營c2 b5 24 国h4 or 21 a3 營b7 22 b3!. It all happens quickly and simply. Instead, Alekhine chose:

#### 20 營e2?

Kotov gave this move an exclamation mark, but objectively it is much weaker than 20 豐b1, and lets slip nearly all White's advantage.


#### 20.... a5 21 罩ab1?!

This definitely does forfeit White's plus, part of which he could still have preserved by playing (once again) the most natural move: 21 a3 豐b7, and now 22 豐e3! (better than 22 b4?! 全xb4 23 axb4 分b3 with an unclear position). Then after 22...分a6 23 b4 全xb4 (Black could also take the pawn with the knight and retain his bishop) 24 axb4 公xb4 White would have the better chances, though there would be plenty of play left.

#### 21... **曾a6 22 罩c4** (D)

#### 22...@a4?

Black returns the favour! The preliminary move 22...h6! would considerably narrow down



White's attacking possibilities, as the following variations show:

- a) 23 **2**h4 **2**b7! 24 **2**f6 (24 b4 b5 25 **2**g4 **2**d8 26 **2**b2 f6 is in Black's favour) 24...**2**d6 25 **2**g4 with perpetual check.
- b) 23 鱼e3 罩ac8! 24 鱼xh6 (or 24 b4 ②e4 25 b5 豐b7; on 24 罩bc1, Black plays 24...②b7!?, when 25 鱼xh6? fails to 25...gxh6 26 罩g4+ 查h7! -+, while Black also has the better prospects after 25 ②d4 罩xc4 26 豐xc4 豐xc4 27 罩xc4 罩d8 28 查f1 罩d7) 24...②d7! 25 ②e5! 罩xc4 26 ③xc4 gxh6, and Black keeps the pawn with a sound position.
- c) An unclear situation results from 23 2xh6!? gxh6 24 b4 2xb4 25 2bxb4 2ad8.

#### 23 \( \hat{2} \) f6!


Of course, 23 b4? would fail to 23... 20c3. However, 23 bf1 would be perfectly good; once again White would be winning a piece by the simplest means. The text-move is very powerful and striking, but it is not only good in itself – this position proves extremely useful for our investigations. Why is that?

Observing the course of this battle, you might quite easily have forgotten that the present chapter is all about development. "What's this got to do with development problems, or players offending against the laws of development?" you may be asking. Of course it has nothing to do with them if we apply strictly formal standards. Both sides brought out their pieces in the normal way in the opening stage. However, let's recall what we said in the commentary on the Karpov-Kasparov game about the essence of a development advantage: in reality, such an advantage stems from the capability of one player's forces to form a substantial majority on that part of the board where the fate of the battle is being decided. If we look at the current position from this viewpoint, we can see at once that all Black's nominally developed pieces are bunched in quite an absurd fashion on the queenside, while on his kingside there are virtually no forces left. Doesn't this mean that in reality, though not formally, Black's pieces are undeveloped? Small wonder that in a few moves White works up a very strong attack against the black king which is left without support.

#### 23...耳fc8 (D)

Black no longer has any choice. After 23...h5 24 置g4! 豐xe2 25 置xg7+ 堂h8 26 ②g5, he is mated. Likewise after 23...h6 24 ②e5! g6 25 豐e3, mate is not far off. Black would lose in similar fashion with 23...②c5 24 ②e5! gxf6 25 置g4+ 堂h8 26 豐f3 f5 27 ②xf7+.

Even now, White's superior forces easily prevail.



#### 24 營e5! 罩c5


There is no salvation anywhere; for example, 24...豐xc4 25 豐g5 曾f8 26 豐xg7+ 含e8 27 豐g8+ 含d7 28 ②e5+ +- or 24...罩xc4 25 豐g5 罩g4 26 豐xg4 g6 27 豐xa4 +-.

#### 25 **曾g3!** (D)

At this point White has other tempting options, such as:

- b) 25 国xc5!? gxf6 26 豐g3+ 會h8 27 ②e5!! fxe5 (27...豐b7 28 国c7; 27...国f8 28 国c7 fxe5 29 豐xe5+ 會g8 30 国d1 +-) 28 豐xe5+ 會g8 29 豐g5+ 會f8 (29...會h8 30 豐f6+ 會g8 31 国g5+) 30 国c7.

Instead White simply pockets a piece, which seems to me on principle to be the most correct method. There's no point in picking a fight when the game is already over. Winning the game once is quite enough! The main thing is that the path to victory should be clear-cut and reliable. That is why I take such a sceptical view of the 'beauties' of this game.



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
This game won a brilliancy prize. What do you make of that?

At first I couldn't decide whether to include the whole of this game or just an extract from it, beginning with the position after Black's 22nd move. However, on reflection I realized that the interesting things about the game were not just the factors linking it to our topic, and not just the mutual errors either. Something equally instructive for the reader is the patchy quality of the annotations. It is very hard for the ordinary chess amateur to determine the quality of annotations by prominent players. Quite often they are miles away from accuracy. Sometimes you need to apply a little effort and do some work yourself to check the annotations and judgements that are being offered to you, even if you only do it in some particular places that have caught your interest. This not merely enables you to discern the truth, but it can also become an excellent means of improving your chess.

The next example *is* presented as a mere extract, even though the game is not only excellent in itself but also of considerable historical significance. The point is that if I gave the game in its entirety, we would need to delve into a

multitude of strategic refinements which would not suit our present purpose. Presenting a game like this *without* attending to the fine points would be absurd.

After a complex struggle in the opening and middlegame, the following position arose:



Botvinnik – Capablanca Rotterdam (AVRO) 1938

It looks unconventional and interesting. Black has an extra pawn and an overwhelming preponderance on the queenside, but since of course the king is the 'senior' piece, it's important to see what resources both players have on that part of the board where the kings are. Here we find that White's chances are far superior. In the first place the black king's shelter has been weakened, and secondly White has far more forces operating in this area. It is obvious why -Black's queen is involved on the opposite wing, and his knight in particular is stranded. White too would seem to have one piece out of play, namely his bishop - but that piece is stopping Black's counter-attack from breaking through via the queenside.

Botvinnik loses no time. He doesn't want to let his opponent bring his inactive units to the battleground, in other words finish developing. He goes into action without delay.

#### 26 罩e6!


And immediately Black is in trouble. As Botvinnik indicates, 26... 堂 7 loses by force to 27 罩xf6! 堂xf6 28 fxg6+ 堂xg6 (28... 堂 7 29 豐 f7+ 堂 d8 30 g7) 29 豐 f5+ 堂 g7 30 ② h5+ 堂 h6 31 h4! 罩g8 32 g4 豐 c6 33 ② a3! and mate. (This and many subsequent variations are from Botvinnik's notes to the game — I shall not acknowledge them individually.) Black therefore

has to take the rook, but this dramatically improves White's position.

# 26... 基xe6 27 fxe6 曾g7 28 曾f4 曾e8

# 29 幽e5 幽e7 (D)

Black's queen has re-entered the game. His knight could not do so in time: on 29... 2a5, the white bishop would get there first with 30 \(\docume{c}c1!\) \(\deltac6 31 \(\deltah6+, winning.



It now looks as if Black has managed to organize his defence; the knight will find time for the return journey, and it will be hard for White to find means of increasing the pressure. At this very moment, however, a bomb goes off:

#### 30 **皇a**3!!

This powerful, decisive stroke is perfectly in keeping with our theme. Cut off from the main action, the bishop sacrifices itself in order to deflect the principal black piece from that very same action and completely expose the black king. After this, White will have a decisive plus on the kingside.

#### 30...\₩xa3

On 30... 營e8, White wins with 31 營c7+ 営g8 32 兔e7 ②g4 33 營d7.


#### 31 @h5+! gxh5

# 32 幽g5+ 含f8 33 幽xf6+ 含g8 34 e7

As subsequent analysis showed, White can also win by 34 \$\mathbb{\text{#}}f7+ \mathbb{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$m}}}} h8}\$, when it is imperative to find the very subtle 35 g3!, enabling the king to hide. It is useful, indeed essential, to see such details afterwards — in home analysis. At the board, in a won position or a much superior one, it is enough to see a single but reliable way

forward. Winning the game once is quite sufficient.

34... 營c1+ 35 當f2 營c2+ 36 當g3 營d3+ 37 當h4 營e4+ 38 含xh5 (D)



White has to go in for a king march, but he has calculated everything.

#### 38... **營e2+**

Black also fails with 38... 豐g6+ 39 豐xg6+ hxg6+ 40 肇xg6, and for just the same reason—his knight is out of play. It is as good as undeveloped.

39 \$\dispha \text{\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tint{\text{\text{\text{\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tinit}}\text{\texi}}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\ti}}}}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\text{\

Of course, punishment for neglect of development tends to take the form of an attack on the king, so the scene of events is likely to be the centre and kingside. But then, it's also perfectly possible for the queenside to be the target for an offensive, and with a certain quantity of forces out of play it will be difficult to defend.


# Geller – Unzicker Saltsjöbaden IZ 1952

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 分f3 分f6 4 公c3 dxc4 5 e4 b5 6 e5 公d5 7 a4 e6 8 axb5 公xc3 9 bxc3 cxb5 10 公g5 急b7 11 營h5 g6 12 營g4 急e7 13 急e2 公d7 14 急f3 營c7?! (D)

This opening variation was in vogue in the 1950s, and in recent decades it has enjoyed some sporadic popularity. Black's last move, however, is considered inferior to 14... 8c8.

#### 15 6004

A more accurate line may be 15 0-0!? \( \hat{D}\)b6 16 \( \hat{D}\)e4 \( \hat{D}\)d5, and only now 17 \( \hat{L}\)g5 h6 18 \( \hat{L}\)xe7 \( \hat{L}\)xe7 19 \( \hat{D}\)d6 a6 20 \( \hat{L}\)e4, with a dangerous




initiative; this occurred in Panno-Maderna, Mar del Plata 1954.

#### 15...Øb6 16 &h6!?

Geller's explanation for this move is that he only wanted to place his bishop on g5 after the black knight had been transferred to d5, so that the white knight would no longer be under attack. At the same time the threat of 17 2g7 arises, and to defend against it, Black goes wrong with:

#### 16...**\mugage** g8? (D)

Black hopes to castle by hand, but it will cost time which in this situation is precious. The natural 16...②d5 looks much better; there could follow 17 兔g5 0-0 18 兔xe7 營xe7 19 ②d6!? (Geller gives 19 ②f6+ ②xf6 20 exf6 with initiative for White, but after the natural 20...營c7 there is no initiative or any other compensation either; that being so, the advantage would be with Black) 19...a6 20 h4, with good compensation for the pawn.



Now White manages to work up some extremely powerful pressure.

# 17 **g**g5!

It's obvious that with the gaping weaknesses on the dark squares in the black camp, it pays White to exchange off the enemy dark-squared bishop.


#### 17...\&xe4

Black in turn is obliged to exchange the extremely dangerous white knight. Some further forced play ensues.

# 

Here 18... **L**c8?! looks worse, since in the variation 19 **L**xe7 **W**xe7 20 0-0 **全**f8 21 **L**fb1 Black can't play 21... a6.

#### 19 &xd5 exd5 (D)



#### 20 &xe7!

On the face of it, this is just an exchange. Why, then, do I consider it worthy of an exclamation mark? White doesn't have to play this move as yet. However, in the first place, it pays him to keep his queen within range of f3 (we shall presently understand why). And secondly, it is from this position that White's calculation of the decisive action begins - he has already foreseen the events which are about to unfold. I earlier had occasion to speak of the important role which such 'modest', seemingly unremarkable moves play in deciding the fate of a game. They are often the ones that prepare the ground for the dramatic events which follow. They reveal a player's skill in fathoming the secrets of chess positions; his strength is determined in no small measure by his ability to make the right choice between a number of such 'inconspicuous' possibilities.


# 20... 響xe7 21 0-0 會f8

The king must be evacuated, and fast, so as to unite the other pieces.

#### 22 \( \bar{2}\) fb1 a6 (D)

#### 23 學f3!

In spite of Black's extra pawn, there is no doubt at all about White's advantage. But then,



this advantage is based solely on the black rook being out of play, and hence is of a temporary nature. If White dallies or fails to find the accurate course of action, his plus will evaporate. For instance after 23 基xb5?! axb5 24 基xa8+ 堂g7, White is left with only a slight edge, if that. (You will laugh when I tell you that in Ulko-Klichev, Moscow 1997, a draw was agreed in this very position.) White has no advantage at all in the variation 23 基xa6?! 基xa6 24 豐c8+ 堂g7 25 豐xa6 基b8 26 基xb5 基xb5 27 豐xb5 豐a3. Geller acts with precision and doesn't let the advantage slip.

# 23...**營e**6?

Unzicker hasn't sensed the danger. He had to play 23... \$ g7, although even so, Geller gives 24 豐xd5 罩gd8 25 豐e4 豐e6 26 f4! 豐d5 (26... 罩d5 27 罩xb5!) 27 豐xd5 罩xd5 28 罩a5 with a highly unpleasant position for Black.


#### 24 營f6!

This is basically the most natural move, and in a sense obvious. It fully satisfies a number of principles. First, White benefits from exchanging off the most active enemy piece, and secondly it is highly advantageous to split the opponent's forces and shut some of them out of the game. The one thing which comes as a slight surprise is that a queen exchange is being offered by the side that is a pawn down and striving to exploit the shaky position of the enemy king. However that may be, the move makes a powerful visual impression.

#### 24...₩c8

for good. Following all the rules of strategy, White breaks through on the part of the board that is inaccessible to the isolated enemy unit, and mounts an attack on the black king after all.

25 f4!



A glance at this position brings home the lesson that the pieces have to come into play as quickly as possible and must not allow themselves to be shut out of the game. Of course Black's cause is completely hopeless. He is playing with an exposed king and, in effect, a rook less.


# 27...b4 28 cxb4 豐xb4 29 罩xd5 豐b7 30 e6 1-0

Now for another extremely important aspect of our topic. Up to now, we have constantly encountered situations where punishment for backward development takes the form of an attack against the king. And yet it can't always be like that. In chess, the path of material gain – in other words, the technical path to victory – is also very natural and customary. So of course punishment for backward development may also be carried out in that way.

# Smyslov – Reshevsky The Hague/Moscow Wch 1948

# 1 e4 e5 2 ②f3 ②c6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4 d6 5 c3 ②e7 6 d4 &d7 7 &b3 h6 8 ②bd2 ②g6 (D) 9 ②c4!


As a result of Black's slow opening play, White has the chance to transfer his knight to a superb post in the centre. He takes the opportunity at once.



#### 9... 2e7 10 0-0 0-0

# 11 包e3 皇f6 12 包d5 罩e8?! (D)

Black pursues the correct plan for developing his forces, but commits a serious tactical error. It was virtually essential to exchange in the centre first: 12...exd4 13 ②xd4 国e8.



13 dxe5! &xe5

Of course Smyslov doesn't miss his chance. He was always an extremely dangerous tactician. Black's recapture with the bishop turns out to be forced, in view of the following variation indicated by Smyslov and expanded by Kasparov: 13... 2 gxe5 14 2 xe5 2 xe5 (14... 2 xe5 and 14... 2 xe5 are alternatives) 15 f4 2 f6 16 e5! (the point) 16... 2 e7 (16... dxe5? 17 2 xf6+ gxf6

18 營h5) 17 營h5 兔e6 18 兔e3! dxe5 19 罩ad1, when White works up some dangerous activity and Black has a hard time defending.


#### 14 @xe5 dxe5?!

I think this makes Black's position even worse. As the least of the evils, Kasparov suggests the knight recapture 14... 2gxe5 15 h3 (15 f4 2g4) 15...2e6 16 f4 2d7. I would add that here too White can continue advantageously with 17 \$\mathbb{e}\$f3. The trouble with taking with the pawn is that the black knights are left without any outposts — an extremely important matter for knights — while White's rook seizes the d-file and his queen settles on f3, a traditionally favourable square for it in the Ruy Lopez. Maybe Black's 14th move deserves a simple question mark.

#### 15 營f3 皇e6

Reshevsky has decided to exchange off the white knight, which is too strong. On 15...公a5 16 总c2 c6, Smyslov gives 17 公e3 总e6 18 公f5 營c7 19 營g4 全h7 20 h4! f6 21 h5 公f8 22 b3, with an obvious plus for White.

#### 16 星d1 &xd5 17 罩xd5 響e7 (D)



"That's funny," the attentive reader may say. "We're supposed to be talking about the problems of development, about how important it is and how you can get into trouble if you fall behind with it. But who's behind in development here? Speaking 'formally', you could say White was a bit behind. So why do the annotators come down firmly on his side?"


The answer is fairly clear: in chess there are plenty of other criteria that affect the strength of the opposing positions, and by those criteria White has already accumulated quite a few plus points. Wait a moment, though – the theme of development comes into it too! Let me just state

that White's apparent slight backwardness in development is purely superficial. His c1-bishop merely looks like an undeveloped piece. In actual fact it is already creating threats against the enemy kingside, since at any moment it is ready to support the concerted efforts of White's other pieces: the b3-bishop, the queen, and the rook that is constantly available to join them, all of which are casting glances at the black king. In this last sentence, I would call your attention in particular to the word concerted. We shall come across this term very often. And indeed, with his very next move, Smyslov finds a way of directly activating all the hitherto concealed factors.

#### 18 營f5! 分f8

Necessary, as White's last move created a number of threats. The obvious one was 19 Id7. A somewhat less obvious one was the attack against the g6-knight, as we see from the variation 18...Idad8? 19 全xh6! (but not 19 Ixd8 Ixd8 20 图xg6?? Id1+) 19...gxh6 20 Ixd8 Ixd8 21 图xg6+.

19 **호e3 ②e6** 20 **罩ad1 罩ed8** (D)




21 g3!

Neither Smyslov nor Kasparov gives this move an exclamation mark (they consider it too obvious), but I will! The point is that this is another of those 'unobtrusive' moves (which I have mentioned more than once already) that don't seem to do anything by themselves and yet create the indispensable conditions for the ensuing 'drastic' action – and are signs of chess mastery on a high level. Why does White need this move? It all has to do with the nature of the black position. Black appears safe enough – he has no obvious weaknesses. In other words his position looks quite acceptable from the static

point of view. But if we try looking for ways to create active play, we find that Black is in no shape for going into action of his own accord and must wait for his opponent to commence hostilities. Therefore since White doesn't need to worry about attacks from his opponent, he prepares to launch his own offensive in the most comfortable circumstances possible. The *luft* is useful since his rooks are on the point of abandoning the back rank; and the g-pawn is the best one to move, as it takes f4 away from the black knight.

# 



But why does *this* move get an exclamation mark? The threat of taking on h6 is easily parried. Are we to believe that for some reason the white queen is better placed on g4 than on f5? Just wait, and we shall soon see.

#### 23...\$h8

Significantly, going to f8 wouldn't improve Black's position much either. Smyslov gives the following variation, which is characteristic though only approximate: 23...全f8 24 全b6 全c7 25 豐f5 全e8 26 豐h7 全f6 27 豐h8+ 全g8 28 單d3.


#### 24 &b6!

This move is directly linked to White's previous manoeuvre, and limits Black's mobility still further.

#### 24...②b8 (D)

Smyslov gives a variation which well illustrates Black's difficulties. If Black makes the natural attempt to finish his development with 24... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \text{Ec8}, \text{White can pick up the weak d-pawn by 25 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{al

from b6, but here again White is in a position to force events.



The time has finally come when his opponent's mounting pressure has compelled Black to demobilize his forces temporarily – just for one move. White is presented with one moment when enemy pieces have departed from the battlefield. (The similarity with the Botvinnik-Portisch game which we examined before is astonishing. In that game the demobilization was even carried out by the same move: ... (2)c6-b8.) If White doesn't take immediate advantage, Black will get his defence together. But this was all probably foreseen by Smyslov (see the note to his 23rd move).

#### 25 \( \precent{\prece

For the sake of specific gains, White parts with one of the components of his positional advantage – his powerful light-squared bishop. Trading one type of advantage for another is a standard chess procedure. But apart from its specific purpose, the move complies with another important general principle: it pays to exchange the opponent's active (important) pieces. Right now Black only has two such pieces: the e6-knight and his queen, the latter being especially important. By exchanging the knight, White is able to get at the queen. Incidentally the strength of White's 23rd move is about to be revealed.

#### 25...fxe6


For one thing White's queen is not now under attack, and furthermore it can immediately deal the decisive blow:

#### 26 營h4!

With the queen exchange Black's d-pawn perishes, leading to the collapse of his whole position.

# 26...曾d7 (D)

Black would lose even more quickly with 26... 響xh4 27 gxh4. With the move played, he carries on the struggle.



27 豐d8+! 豐xd8 28 臭xd8 ②d7

Or 28... © c6 29 \( \extit{\hat{2}}\) b6, which is even worse.

#### 29 &c7 公c5 30 罩xd6!


The right way. This is much stronger than 30 2xd6 2d8 31 f4 (31 f3 b5!) 31...exf4 32 e5 2a4! with good counterplay.

#### 30...≌c8!

Reshevsky finds the only way to prolong resistance. White now has to demonstrate his technique to exploit his advantage, but for Smyslov that was never a problem.

31 **2b6 2a4** 32 **Exe6 2xb2** 33 **Exe5 2c4**The pawn can't be taken: 33...**Exc3** 34 **2d4 Ec2** 35 **Ee7**.


34 Ze6 🖾xb6 35 Zxb6 Zxc3 36 Zxb7 Zc2



An endgame has come about by force. At first sight it looks unclear. The white a-pawn is about to fall, and its opposite number will advance in an effort to compensate for White's material plus or exchange itself for one of the


white pawns – after which a draw will be very likely. Smyslov, however, demonstrates a precise and therefore highly instructive path to victory, based on a principle I examined in *Lessons in Chess Strategy*, in Chapter 5, 'The Space Advantage': he pushes his pawns to cramp his opponent as much as possible on the kingside, while taking constant care of the passed e-pawn, White's chief trump. Faced with this plan, Black proves defenceless. A very important factor is that the white rook is behind Black's passed pawn.

37 h4! \( \bar{2}\) xa2 38 \( \dig \)g2 a5 39 h5! a4 40 \( \bar{2}\)a7 \( \dig \)g8 41 g4! \( (D) \)



When the white king reaches g6, this pawn will be shielding it from checks on the g-file.

41...a3 42 \$\dag{9}g3 \$\overline{\pm}e2\$ 43 \$\dag{9}f3 \$\overline{\pm}a2\$ 44 \$\dag{9}e3\$ \$\dag{9}f8\$ 45 f3 \$\overline{\pm}a1\$ 46 \$\dag{9}f4\$ a2 47 e5! (D)



By pushing his passed pawn, White also protects his king from checks on f6.

# 47... 會g8 48 曾f5 罩f1

If 48...\$\delta\$h8, then 49 \delta\$g6 leads to mate; or if 48...\$\delta\$f8, then 49 f4 \delta\$g8 50 \delta\$g6.

49 \( \textbf{\textit{Z}}\) \( \textbf{\textit{Z}}\) \( \textbf{\textit{Z}}\) \( \textbf{\text{G}}\) \( \textbf{G}\) \( \text{G}\) \( \text{G}\)

We have seen that the problems connected with such a well-known and obvious principle as that of development are by no means as simple as is sometimes imagined. We have already unearthed some of its interesting aspects. Now let us try going into some of them in more detail. First we shall see whether the concept of development is itself such a simple and crude one, and whether it is covered by purely arithmetical calculations.

# Ehlvest - Kasparov

Linares 1991


# 1 e4 c5 2 ②f3 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ②xd4 a6 5 c4 ②f6 6 ②c3 豐c7 7 ゑd3

Kasparov has played the white side of this variation several times, on each occasion continuing with 7 a3 to keep the black bishop out of b4. In a game Kasparov-Kramnik, Moscow (2) 2001, Black replied 7...d6, and after 8 全3 b6 9 當c1 公bd7 10 盒e2 盒b7 11 f3 急e7 12 0-0 0-0 a typical hedgehog-type position arose. In Kasparov-Vallejo, Linares 2002, Black played 7...b6 instead, and after 8 盒e3 盒b7 9 f3 公c6 10 急e2 置b8 11 b4! 盒e7 12 0-0 0-0 13 罩c1 White obtained some advantage.

#### 7...**.**≜e7

Kasparov himself was sceptical about this move, and even gave it a question mark.

#### 8 f4 d6 9 營e2 ②c6 10 ②f3 (D)



Ehlvest prefers to deploy his forces in a manner that would be usual in an ordinary Sicilian with the white pawn on c2.

#### 10...�d7

Black goes against the principle of developing the pieces as quickly as possible – he makes a second move with a piece already developed, and aims to repeat this stunt again! His manoeuvre is nonetheless typical of this kind of position. How come? What are the peculiarities of the situation that permit such breaches of an important principle? We will discuss this in due course.

#### 11 a3?

This move looks superfluous at the present moment, but the plan of development underlying it appears even more faulty. White would also have no advantage after 11 0-0 \$\oldots 66 12 \$\oldots 25\$. A line that appeals to me is 11 \$\oldots 42!? \$\oldots 612 \oldots 613 \oldots 612 \oldots 613 \ol


#### 11...**£**f6

Again Black loses time with his development. However, this move is the natural follow-up to the previous one, and both are aimed at seizing the important d4-square which White has weakened. From this point of view, moving twice with pieces already developed is understandable; establishing control of important squares is another of the chief overall principles of chess. Let us take this reasoning a step further and try to draw some generalized conclusions (which for the time being will only be provisional, but we will later test them against examples). Well, then - what has Black gained from the manoeuvre with his last two moves? The answer is that the c6-knight and the f6bishop have obtained a possibility for concerted action to exploit the weakness of a strategically important object - a central square. There are two key components here, without which Black could not be justified in infringing such a fundamental rule as that of fast development. The object against which he directs his play has to be genuinely weak and of genuine strategic importance; and in addition, the attack (the seizure of control) has to be accomplished with forces capable of acting together, that is cooperating. This last concept - that of forces in cooperation - seems to me to be the key to this whole problem, and in what follows we shall try to investigate it further.

#### 12 **逸e3?!** (D)

Another dubious decision, but then it stems from White's previous move. At this stage, after 12 2d2 2d4 13 2xd4 2xd4 14 \( \) c1, the

position is even. In the game, things turn out worse.



Now Kasparov carries out a blockading operation which is standard though at first sight it looks risky:

#### 12... 2xc3+! 13 bxc3 e5! 14 f5

After 14 0-0 exf4 15 \(\hat{L}\)xf4 \(\hat{L}\)ce5, the black knights seize excellent outposts in the centre.

#### 14... Dcb8!

But this really is completely unexpected! To the reader of this book it will be all the more surprising since he has already seen two games (Botvinnik-Portisch and Smyslov-Reshevsky) in which this same move ... 2c6-b8 was severely punished. (I admit I deliberately placed this game just after Smyslov-Reshevsky to reinforce the effect and increase the reader's interest.) At this point the reasons given in the last note to justify such provocative play may appear inadequate, and we definitely need to go into the matter more closely.


What, then, is the knight on b8 after? The answer is, it wants to exchange its quarters on c6 for new ones on f6, while the other knight goes to c5 and the bishop goes via d7 to c6. Then the concerted efforts of this whole trio of pieces will be trained against the e4-pawn, which has been stopped dead by Black's last two moves. White will be tied down by this attack and deprived of any activity. Thus we have here an even more exemplary case of cooperating forces.

An important point is that the immediate 14...②c5 15 ②xc5 dxc5 would lead to complex, double-edged play after 16 0-0 and a subsequent knight march ②d2-f1-e3-d5. Also 16 f6 might prove unpleasant, bringing a number of white pieces into play. This explains Black's move-order.

All that may be true (you will say), but why was White able to exploit his opponent's obviously backward development in those other two games, and unable to do so now? Well, look at how White's forces are deployed - his forces, not just his pieces! That is, consider how the arrangement of his pawns and that of his pieces fit together. You will then see that he can only realistically hope to attack along the d-file. In fact this is what he could have tried in place of his next move. The game could have gone 15 &c2 ②f6 16 罩d1 ②bd7 17 營d3 含e7!?, and White probably has difficulty making up for his weaknesses by the activity of his pieces. Or, to use a terminology familiar to us: Black's static assets look more weighty than the dynamic assets of his opponent. The reason for all this is the inadequate coordination of the white forces. I think this example clearly shows how essential it is to ascertain how all a player's forces are cooperating.

Nonetheless that line seems to me more promising for White than the one he chooses in the game.

15 0-0?! \( \Delta c5 \) 16 \( \Delta c2 \( \Delta bd7 \) 17 \( \Delta fd1 \( \Delta f6 \) (D)




18 2 d2

Now that White has conceded a tempo, Black is ready to meet the attack on the d6-pawn with simple developing moves: 18 皇g5 皇d7 19 皇xf6 gxf6 20 營d2 皇c6 21 營xd6 營xd6 22 墨xd6 全e7, with the better chances.

# 18... **2d7** 19 **2g5 2c6** 20 **肾f3** 0-0-0 21 **2e1** h6 22 **2h4 2dg8** (*D*)

# 23 \$h1?

Exchanging on f6 is now an urgent matter. After 23 \( \) xf6!? gxf6 24 \( \) f1 the advantage would be with Black, but there would still be



plenty of play in the position. Ehlvest doesn't want to give up his bishop, but it soon turns out that the black knight can accomplish much more; the black g-pawn (together with its neighbour) will also prove to be an active fighting unit. This is probably where White commits the decisive error, which consists of a faulty positional assessment.

# 23... 4 fd7! 24 4 f1 g5 25 &f2

White keeps the game closed, but it makes little difference.


#### 25...h5 26 營d1

White would lose a pawn with 26 ②e3? g4 27 營e2 ②xe4.

#### 26...h4!

By pushing his pawns, Black seizes space and endeavours to open lines for his rooks.

# 27 曾b1 包f6 (D)




A convincing picture of the triumph of Black's strategy.

#### 28 &xc5

Ehlvest understandably doesn't want to go over to lifeless defence with 28 \( \frac{1}{2} \) d2. After the reply 28...g4, the outlook for White would be grim.

#### 28...dxc5 29 ②e3 豐a5 30 豐b2!? (D)

The active 30 ②d5 &xd5 31 cxd5 is met by 31... 響xc3 32 &d3 ②h5! 33 h3 g4, with a won position.



#### 30...h3 31 g3

The position after 31 ②d5 hxg2+ 32 ③xg2 ②xd5 33 cxd5 (33 exd5 ③c7 34 ⑤ab1 ⑥h4 -+) 33...②e8 holds no appeal for White, so he gives up a pawn in search of counter-chances. However, Black's only task now is to rearrange his forces to fit the new circumstances. That done, his material plus will be decisive.


31... ②xe4 32 ②xe4 ②xe4+ 33 當g1 置d8 34 ②g4 ②xf5 35 ②xe5 當c7! 36 當f2 ②e6 37 国ab1 国d6! 38 国b2 国hd8 39 国be2 f6! 40 ②g6 ②xc4 0-1

Let's look at one more famous game which contributes to our topic in an original manner.

# Alekhine – Wolf Bad Pistyan 1922

# 1 d4 d5 2 ②f3 c5 3 c4 cxd4?! 4 cxd5 ②f6 5 ②xd4 a6 (D)

This move seems based on a reasonable idea. It protects b5 against invasion by the white bishop. Theory, incidentally, shows that this approach (though not the move itself!) is well-founded. Thus, for example, a game Kasparov-Dlugy, Internet blitz 1998 continued 5...②xd5 6 e4 ②b4 7 ②e3 (7 營a4+ ②8c6 8 ②xc6 ②xc6 has also been seen; after 9 ②c3 e6 10 ②e3 ②b4 11 ②b5 ②d7 12 0-0 營a5 13 ဩac1 White had a plus in Illescas-Salmensuu, Elista OL 1998) 7...②8c6 8 ②b5, and after 8...②d7 9 ②xc6 ②xc6 10 ②xc6+ ②xc6 11 ②c3 e6 12 營b3 ②b4 13 0-0 0-0 14 ဩac1 營e7 15 a3 ②d6 16 ②b5 White obtained the advantage.



However, Black's slight delay in development inspires Alekhine to search for something, and he finds a remarkable solution.

#### 6 e4!?

The point of this unexpected move is to open lines for bringing out the white pieces and thus increase White's lead in development. True, the price to be paid is the isolation of the centre pawn (a static minus), but Alekhine has calculated that the activity of his pieces (a dynamic plus) will more than make up for this defect.

#### 6... ②xe4 7 營a4+!


This move is an essential part of White's design.

#### 7....d7

This seems the obvious reaction, but it may well be that 7...②d7, preserving a more natural arrangement of the black pieces, is no worse. I happen to have spent a fair amount of time looking for a way to retain White's advantage against that move, and all I could think of was 8 全2! g6 9 ②e6 fxe6 10 dxe6 ②ec5 11 營d4 ②f6 12 營xc5 ②xe6 13 0-0 with a slight edge for White.

#### 8 **學b3** (D)

Unfortunately 8 **營**c2 is no good on account of 8...**營**a5+.




#### 8...9)c5?

Right from the first few moves the game has proceeded on unconventional lines, which can be 'blamed' on White's energetic and original response to his opponent's dubious opening play. When one player acts unconventionally and yet within the reasonable bounds of positional sense, his opponent too must be ready (and able!) to think originally. The present game illustrates this excellently. Black's last move looks like a natural attempt to repel and defend simultaneously, but it turns out to be a mistake. The knight would be better off on d6. As is well known, knights generally like strongpoints (outpost squares) – but then on d6 the knight would be stopping the black major pieces from getting at the isolated pawn.

The fairly natural try 8... 響c7?! also turns out badly, as White quickly occupies the c-file: 9 全e3 g6 10 公c3! 公xc3 11 基c1! with an undoubted plus.

Black's best is a move 'against the rules', namely 8... 2c8!, which enables his pieces to re-establish their coordination. I exerted myself for quite a long time looking for White's best continuation here, until I came down in favour of 9 2e3 2d7 10 2e2 (10 2c3 isn't entirely clear; after 10... 2xc3 11 bxc3 2c5 12 2c4 e5 13 dxe6 2xe6 14 2d1 the initiative is with White, but the variation is not obligatory, and White does have queenside weaknesses) and now if 10... 2dc5, then 11 2c2 2xd5 12 2f3 e5 13 2c3 2d8 14 2xe4 exd4 15 0-0-0 gives White the better chances. I would like to hear other opinions of the position after 8... 2c8! In the game, White's advantage rapidly increases.

9 營e3! g6 (D)




10 公f3! 營c7?!

Black has lost the thread completely, and walks into a pin which will cost him dearly. He had to play 10...b6, although after 11 豐c3 罩g8 12 鱼e3 鱼g7 13 鱼d4 鱼xd4 14 豐xd4 White would still have a significant plus.

#### 11 營c3!

Eleven moves have been played, and four of White's last five have been made with his queen; his king's knight too has already made its third move! This is a gross offence against the principle of development. And yet White has an almost winning position. How do we account for this paradox? The explanation is that every one of White's moves has created some threat or other. This has been possible thanks to Black's cramped position, the almost total lack of coordination among his forces, and the constant 'hanging' position of his knight - in other words, thanks to Black's positional 'sins'. We should not forget that all White's minor pieces have been ready to come straight into play (with his rooks soon to follow). That means that White has had a lead in development all along. In such circumstances his opponent just needed to commit one inaccuracy - and in essence it would prove to be the decisive error. This is quite likely to happen in any position where one side's pieces are highly mobile. To sum up: White's offences in this game against one key principle (development) have been justified by pursuing another principle of no less importance - that of energetically working up an initiative. We shall study the latter closely in Chapter 5 (Initiative).

# 



#### 13 @bd2!

Alekhine points out that this is stronger than 13 b4 皇g7 14 公d4 豐a7. In fact after 15 公d2


a5 16 bxc5 bxc5 17 22b3 cxd4 18 2xd4 2xd4 19 2xd4 White would still have an obvious plus, but thanks to the exchange of a pair of knights his pressure would be reduced. The move played is therefore better.

# 13... 皇g7 14 皇d4 皇xd4 15 豐xd4 皇b5

It's hard for Black to find moves, yet it's imperative for him to develop. That explains this decision.

# 16 &xb5+ axb5 17 0-0 \( \bar{2}a4 18 b4 \bar{\text{\$\sec{d}}}\d8 19 \\ a3 \( \bar{2}\beta \d7 20 \) \( \bar{2}fe1 \\ \sec{\sec{d}}\d8 21 \) d6 \( \bar{2}\alpha \end{d} \( \end{d} \end{d} \) →


There is no improvement in 21...e6 22  $ext{@e}3$   $ext{@b}7$  23  $ext{@e}4$   $ext{@g}7$  24  $ext{@d}4$ , with an easy win.



#### 22 **罩xe6!**

This blow is obvious and wins in the simplest fashion.

22...fxe6 23 ②g5 營b8 24 ②xe6+ 含f7 25 ②g5+ 含f8 (D)



#### 26 營d5?!

White has reached a completely won position but relaxes a little too soon. His punishment takes the form of a dozen unnecessary moves and some extra effort, though admittedly not all that much. There was an immediate win with 26 dxe7+! \$\preceive{e}\)e8 27 \$\mathbb{Z}\)e1 \$\mathbb{Z}\)e2 \$\preceive{e}\)de4.

# 

Another inaccuracy. A simpler and quicker way was 30 營d4!? 查f7 (30... 營e8 31 星e1) 31 星e1 星a8 32 ②e4.

# 30... 基a7 31 基e1 營d6 32 e8分+!

Some unexpected difficulties had arisen, though not very big ones. White just had to pull himself together a little, and he found the simplest and safest solution. What is the important point here? It is just that he *did* have to exert himself and concentrate. Wouldn't it have been better to concentrate all the time and not drag the game out?

# 


Black could have prolonged his resistance a little with 34...全h6. The endgame after 35 營e3+營xe3 36 黨xe3 is an easy win for White, but he would still have had to work for an extra half-hour to an hour. Now it is all over.

35 h4! ፲xa3 36 쌜e8+ �g7 37 ፲e7+ �h6 38 쌜f8+ �h5 39 ፲e5+ �g4 40 ፲g5+ 1-0

The opening part of the following game appears even more astounding.

# Gelfand - Shirov Linares 1993

# 1 c4 e6 2 1 f3 d5 3 g3 c6 4 b3 (D)



#### 4...a5

So far, nothing exceptional has happened. Black's last move is a typical reaction to White's second fianchetto in situations of this type.

# 5 **身b2** a4


But although this move looks like the logical follow-up to the last one, it usually gets postponed 'until further notice'.

#### 6 **≜g2** a3

Of course this kind of play smacks of an amateur skittles game. "Keep on attacking things, and he may leave something en prise!" On the other hand, a serious basis for Black's actions can be discerned. In the first place, White hasn't been all that sparing with his own pawn moves, even though he has brought out three pieces more (3-0). Secondly – and more importantly – the position is of a fairly closed type, which means that the mobility of the developed pieces is as yet relatively small. The third point is that Black is taking a risk in order to seize some space, and if his opponent can't punish him for the risk, the space will make itself felt.

#### 7 &c3!? (D)

I have only found one other game that opened this way. On that occasion White sensibly retreated his bishop, obtaining a good position after 7 &c1 ②f6 8 0-0 &d6 9 d4 b6 10 營c2 營e7 11 ②c3 0-0 12 e4 (Salimaki-Tella, Vantaa 1993). Gelfand, however, is a combative, intrepid player. He doesn't believe that playing with pawns alone can be justified, and seeks a refutation of his opponent's undertaking.



# 7...b5

Though this move does look consistent, you can't help marvelling at it. When is Black going to get his pieces out?

#### 8 c5

This reply seems to be the only one by which White can fight for an advantage. After any other move, Black would make further territorial gains.


#### 8... 2 f6 9 b4 2 e4

Wonders never cease. No sooner has Black developed his first piece than he moves it again with the aim of exchanging it off! What would Dr Tarrasch say? And yet, Black could not play otherwise. He intends to exchange his opponent's important dark-squared bishop and thereby acquire an advantage of the long-term kind. In other words, he is accumulating static advantages. Now suppose that, instead of this second knight move, he had played 'by the rules', let's say by developing his bishop to e7. Then after 10 d3 White's advantage would be incontestable, and all Black's previous actions would turn out to have been pointless. From this we can draw a conclusion: once embarked on a risky course, a player has to be consistent and mustn't be afraid to go through with it to the end, however dangerous this may appear. Otherwise nothing will be left of his previous policy except all its drawbacks. We shall encounter this maxim again, more than once.

#### 10 0-0

White can't preserve his bishop from exchange. Thus, 10 总d4?! is bad in view of 10... Za4! (White's important weakness tells) 11 d3 Zxb4 12 dxe4 dxe4. After 10 总e5 公d7 11 0-0 (not 11 d3?? 公xf2! -+) 11... 公xe5 世c7 13 d4, the game is approximately equal.

#### 10...€\xc3 (D)




#### 11 ②xc3?

An astonishing mistake from Gelfand. The only thing that may explain it is some miscalculation or other. After the obligatory 11 dxc3, the continuation might be something like 11... 世d7 (or 11... 世c7) 12 世c1 世a7 13 世f4!? (of course White can pick up a pawn with 13 ②d4 ②e7 14 ②c2, but after 14...0-0 15 ②bxa3 e5 16 ②b1 the position seems to me to be unclear) 13... ②e7 (it doesn't pay to lash out with 13... f6?! 14 e4 e5, as after 15 世e3 ②e6 16 exd5! ②xd5 17 ②d4

White has a tangible initiative) 14 △bd2 0-0 15 e4, and the position looks better for White.

11...d4 12 ②e4 f5 (D)



Black still doesn't have a single piece developed, and yet strategically his position must be rated as far superior! This of course is a unique case, but we can still detect some marked similarities between this game and the last one (Alekhine-Wolf). In both games, one player deliberately offends against the fundamental principle of fast development, and attains complete success. For this to happen (as we said before), there need to be some other essential principles that are 'working' for him.


In the present case Black has been risking much more than White did in the previous example, as the positional basis for his actions is much less convincing. He could only hope that White wouldn't manage to get his pieces cooperating properly in a somewhat cramped and closed position. But Gelfand played resolutely and uncompromisingly, and should have obtained an advantage.

In both games, a single mistake – by no means a crude 'blunder' – was enough to spoil an acceptable position. This too is something we have seen before; when the play becomes sharp and tense, any mistake may prove fatal. If the element of tension in the previous game was obvious, in the present case it arises from the very awkward placing of the white knight in the centre (compare the black knight on c5 in Alekhine-Wolf). It might therefore seem natural for White to exchange this knight off, even at the cost of an important pawn, by 13 406+ 2xd6 14 cxd6; but alas, the variations after 14... \*\*Exd6 still serve to demonstrate Black's advantage. For instance: 15 e3 e5 16 \*\*Ec2 (if 16

exd4, then 16...e4 is strong) 16...包a6!? 17 包xd4 包xb4 18 包xf5 ②xc2! (the right way; 18...豐f8? looks tempting, but loses to 19 ②xc6+ 查f7 20 豐e4 ②xc6 21 豐d5+!) 19 ②xd6+ 查e7 20 ②xc8+ 国hxc8 21 国ab1 国a4, and Black has much the better ending. Of course, White cannot have had these variations in mind when making his 11th move; I am merely trying to establish the objective truth about this extraordinary game.

# 13 ②eg5 **Qe7** 14 h4 **Qf6** 15 **營b3** (D)

Shirov is negative about this move. In his view, the right line is 15 e3!? h6 16 公h3 dxe3 17 dxe3, when 17....全xa1 18 營xa1 gives White compensation. Therefore 17...營xd1!? is stronger; after 18 墨axd1 e5 Black is clearly better.



#### 


Black's achievements of the 'static' type are evident. You only have to look at the position. His superb dark-squared bishop has no opposite number; he has a space advantage in the centre and realistic chances of destroying the white queenside. He does need to be careful, though. The calm and 'natural' 15... at 7 would be met by 16 at 17 at 15... at 19. at

#### 16 **曾b1?!**

The queen exchange 16 營xd5 cxd5 17 罩abl ②c6 would leave Black with a significant plus. Shirov considers White's strongest reply to be 16 營c2! h6 17 ②h3 e5 18 d3 with counterchances. Now Black marches steadily forward while the white position contracts into a clump. Black's game is easy and carefree.

16...h6 17 ②h3 e5 18 e3 dxe3 19 dxe3 ℤa4! 20 ②d4 (D)


Or 20 国d1 營c4, attacking b4.



20... **\*\*\* d7 21 公c2 0-0 22 e4 f4! 23 \*\*\* b3+ \*\*\***

With the exchange of queens, White's last hope disappears. Essentially he could resign now.

24 豐xf7+ 萬xf7 25 萬fd1 f3 26 单f1 g5! 27 国d3 g4 28 曾h2 (D)



#### 28... 罩d7!

One final important touch. The d3-rook is a most important piece, the pride of White's position. The h3-knight is ill-fated, and even if it survives there will be little joy in its life. To this I should add that exchanging one pair of rooks is an extremely useful technical device, depriving the weaker side of an important source of counterplay; the point is that two rooks acting together can sometimes make up for any defects in your position. From the technical viewpoint, then, the rook exchange is much more accurate than 28...gxh3?! 29 &xh3, when the f3-pawn falls.

#### 29 罩ad1 罩xd3 30 罩xd3 桌e6 31 罩d6 含f7

This position (which is totally won for Black) illustrates another aspect of the development

question, which we have noticed before: pieces that haven't made a single move can sometimes be in play. Thus it is with the b8-knight. Being 'in play' isn't by any means necessarily the same thing as operating actively. Stopping the activities of enemy pieces is quite enough. The following events could only have occurred in extreme time-trouble.

# 32 &xb5 cxb5 33 \( \bar{2}\)b6 \( \Omega\)a6 34 c6 \( \alpha\)xa2 35 \( \alpha\)xb5 \( \alpha\)b1 36 \( \alpha\)b7 + \( \alpha\)e6 37 \( \Omega\)xa3 \( \alpha\)xa3 38 b5 \( \alpha\)xe4 39 \( \alpha\)a7 \( \gamma\)xa3 \( \alpha\)

At this point White's flag dropped; his torments were finally over.

We have now examined quite a few examples of the 'development' theme, and the time has come to take stock. Some of our conclusions were stated earlier; we will now try to draw them all together. The first conclusion is that development isn't entirely identical with what many of us may have heard and read about it at the start of our chess education. Granted, it is perfectly true and obvious that you shouldn't be slow to bring your pieces forward from the back rank, and it may be extremely useful to get ahead of your opponent in the number of fighting units brought out. However, this is not the whole story.

If we take it that the aim of development is to make your position as battle-worthy as possible, then the important thing (as many of our examples have shown) is not just the quantity of pieces brought out from their starting squares, but also the quality of their deployment. By quality, we should understand such factors as the ability of your forces to do their job, that is, how much work a piece or pawn is able to fulfil; the mobility of a fighting unit, its capacity to control the most important squares on the board; and its power to restrict the mobility of the opponent. A closely related notion is that of centralization: a centralized piece is capable, as a rule, of striking at a greater number of squares than a piece stranded on the edge of the board, which means its mobility is greater - and so on.

All this refers to units (pieces or pawns) viewed in isolation, but we mustn't forget that there is a further, more advanced criterion for assessing the deployment of forces: their degree of *cooperation* or *coordination*. This concept embraces all the above-mentioned capabilities

of individual units and the possibility of utilizing them together.

Much of what has just been said can be understood by a chess-player without recourse to formal rationalization. From his cumulative observation of how pieces combine together, in his own games and those of others, he has a feel for what is effective and what is not. Nonetheless the area of the unknown is likely to be greater than the area of his own concrete experience, which is why abstract knowledge – knowledge of the general principles of the game – is essential too. Among these principles, that of *coordination of the forces* occupies an especially important place, and in our next series of examples we shall concentrate on studying it.

As always, our study will be based on examples from games by the most distinguished masters. We shall start with a game from the 19th century.

## McConnell - Morphy

New Orleans 1850

## 1 e4 e5 2 Øf3 Øc6 3 &c4 &c5 4 b4 &xb4 5 c3 &a5 6 0-0

This reply is considered inaccurate. White's strongest is 6 d4!. Then after 6...exd4 7 0-0 Black has to play very precisely to avoid landing in trouble such as this: 7...②f6 8 鱼a3 鱼b6 9 營b3 d5 10 exd5 ②a5 11 罩e1+ 鱼e6 12 dxe6 ②xb3 13 exf7+ 쓸d7 14 鱼e6+ 全c6 15 ②e5+ 全b5 16 鱼c4+ 全a5 17 鱼b4+ 全a4 18 axb3# (1-0) Steinitz-Rock, London 1863.

#### 6... 2 f6 7 d4 0-0 8 dxe5

The other capture 8 ②xe5 has also been played. Then Alapin-Chigorin, Ostend 1905 continued 8...②xe4 9 營h5 ②xe5 10 營xe5 d5 11 ②xd5 ②xc3 12 ②c4 c5 13 dxc5 ဩe8 14 營h5 ②e6 15 ②xe6 氫xe6 16 ②xc3 ②xc3 17 ဩb1, with equality.


## 8...4)xe4 9 &a3

This doesn't work out well. The correct line is 9  $245 \le 5!$  10  $55 \le 5!$  11 f4 c6.

#### 9...d6 10 exd6?

The lesser evil would be 10 豐c2 包g5 11 ②xg5 豐xg5 12 exd6 cxd6 13 ②xd6 罩d8, with 'no more than' a clear positional plus for Black.

10... 公xd6 11 息b3 皇g4 12 h3 皇h5 13 豐d5 皇g6 14 包e5 公xe5 15 豐xa5 (D) This loses quickly. A more tenacious move is 15 wxe5, when after 15... b6 White is still in a bad way but can fight on.



Now the black pieces round on the lonely white king.

## 15... 曾g5 16 含h1 息e4 17 f3

White also loses with 17 里g1 豐h5 -+.

## 


Exchanging off a knight doesn't save White either: 19 &xd6 豐xh3+20 堂g1 豐g3+21 堂h1 cxd6 22 豐d5 墨ae8 23 豐xd6 豐h3+ 24 堂g1 ②xf3+ and wins.

Now one more black piece joins in the hunt for the white king:

#### 19...分f5! 20 罩ae1

Or 20 &xf8 營xh3+! 21 含g1 營g3+ 22 含h1 ②e3 23 寫f2 營xf2 24 寫g1 營h4#.

## 20... **營xh3+21 含g1** (D)




#### 21...罩fe8

There may have been an even simpler win in 21... **數**g3+ 22 **\$h1 數**h4+ 23 **\$g1 數**g5+, but it was very characteristic of Morphy to choose variations in which as many of his pieces as possible were working together — even in some cases where other, quicker solutions were

possible. Today the same approach is constantly adopted by Kasparov – we shall later see some examples. Both these players acquired exceptional powers, and doesn't this approach supply a reason for their strength? I think this understanding of the essence of chess was bestowed on both of them by nature.

## 22 宣f2 營g3+ 23 含f1 公d3 24 基xe8+ 基xe8 25 兔xf7+ 含h8 0-1

This game presents the 'coordination' theme in an entertaining way, but the play is too one-sided to do more than that. We will now try to go further into the subject by looking at some examples of concerted action by pieces in deceptively 'simple' positions. We shall thereby verify that the principle of coordination applies to all phases of the game.



Schlechter – Lasker Vienna Wch (1) 1910

Black's difficulties are obvious. Not only is he a pawn down but his king is cut off along the 6th rank, both his pawns are isolated, and he urgently needs to do something about White's threat of c4 followed by \$\Delta 64\$. His only real compensation for all this seems to be his passed a-pawn, but another big question is how strong his counterplay with this pawn will be.

All of a sudden, in disregard of all these considerations, Lasker played:

#### 54...≌e4!!

This looks both startling and incomprehensible. For a better understanding of the reasons behind it, let's look at some possible alternatives.

a) 54... 堂g7 is met by 55 c4 罩a3+ 56 堂f4 罩c3 57 c5 a4 58 堂xf5 罩xg3 59 罩c7+ 堂h6 60 堂e5 a3 61 罩a7 and wins.

b) On 54... Za1, Tartakower gives 55 Za6 a4 56 \$\frac{1}{2}64 Zf1 + 57 \$\frac{1}{2}g5 Zf3 58 Zxa4 Zxg3 + 59 \$\frac{1}{2}xf5. Let us take this further for the sake of clarity: 59... Zc3 60 Za7 + \$\frac{1}{2}f8 61 Za2, and White wins.

It isn't hard to see that the decisive role in these variations is played by the active white king, cooperating splendidly with the rook. Meanwhile its black counterpart is hardly influencing events at all. To alter this state of affairs radically, Black is prepared to part with a second pawn - his passed pawn, no less. What does he get in return? First of all he activates his rook and clears the path for the a-pawn, so the white rook will have to be diverted to attend to it. Secondly and most importantly, the black rook's line of action along the 4th rank will no longer be cut off if White plays c4. This is the most vital feature of the position, since the white king will not now be able to advance and act in concert with the rook. In other words, Black is giving up his last-but-one pawn in order to obstruct the coordination of White's pieces. More than that: by going after the a-pawn, the white rook will have to allow the black king into the game, and then the black pieces will begin to act in concert. On the other hand, two extra pawns are a lot of material, especially in an endgame. And yet in this example the material factor will be outweighed by the change in the relative strengths of the players' positions. Nor will this be at all accidental. On the contrary, it is a typical phenomenon, which we shall later come across repeatedly.

#### 55 罩c5

Instead of this, Marco recommended 55 c4, but after 55...a4 56 c5 \( \begin{array}{c} 2c4 57 \) \( \begin{array}{c} 2a6 \\ \begin{array}{c} 2c7 \end{array} \) 58 \( \begin{array}{c} 2a5 \\ \begin{array}{c} 2c5 \\ 2c4 \end{array} \) and 61 \( \begin{array}{c} 2c2 \\ 2c2 \\ 2c2 \\ 2c2 \\ 2c3 \\ 2c

## 55...會f6 56 基xa5 基c4


Schlechter now repeats moves to gain time on the clock.

## 57 **Za6+** \$\preceq\$e5 58 **Za5+** \$\preceq\$f6 59 **Za6+** \$\preceq\$e5 60 **Za5+** \$\preceq\$f6 61 **Za2** \$\preceq\$e5 (D)

The situation has been clarified, and it turns out that White has no plan for converting his advantage into a winning one. This is all because his king can't come into play without loss of material.

## 62 \( \bar{2} b2 \) \( \bar{2} c3 + 63 \) \( \bar{2} c3 + 64 \) \( \bar{2} c6! \)


Schlechter just set a fairly simple trap into which Lasker, of course, didn't fall: 64...f4? 65



■b3! Exc2 66 ■f3 +—. White therefore tries his last resource – he gives up the passed c-pawn to activate his pieces, but Black easily manages to keep them disunited and the game heads towards a draw.

## 65 \( \bar{L}\)b8 \( \bar{L}\)xc2 66 \( \bar{L}\)b6+ \( \bar{L}\)b7 67 h5 \( \bar{L}\)c4 68 h6+ \( \bar{L}\)b7 69 \( \bar{L}\)f6 \( \bar{L}\)a4 \( \bar{L}\)-\( \bar{L}\)

The following example, which is much more complicated, will now be easier to understand.



Geller – Smyslov Palma de Mallorca IZ 1970

At first sight White's advantage seems immense. He has an extra pawn and only one weakness (on c3) while his opponent has three weak pawns. On top of that, it is White's move. And yet the situation remains far from clear. There are some trumps for Black too, such as the well-known drawish tendency of rook endgames. I shall presently give variations to show that the weakness of White's c-pawn is of real importance. But the main thing, which the variations will also illustrate, is that the black king is ready to penetrate to the centre – to d6 or d5 –

at any moment, after which the king and rook will be cooperating excellently.

Some discussion of what the term cooperation entails will be highly appropriate here. In the present case, for instance, the black king and rook will not be uniting in the assault on a particular weakness. Instead, the idea will be something like this: the king will guard its domain against enemy invasion, and if Black should obtain a passed c-pawn it will be supported by the king when necessary; the rook meanwhile will attack the white pawns. In this way the two pieces will share the work between them; they will be working for a common cause, which is what cooperation means. Incidentally, for chess-players, this concept is perhaps even better expressed by the German word Zusammenspiel, which literally means 'playing together'. If I bring in this word from time to time, don't be surprised.

Now for some possible variations in which White goes after the black pawns. The 'candidate moves', as they are customarily called, are as follows:

- a) 46 \( \begin{align\*} \text{ \text{ \text{\text{ \text{\text{ \text{\text{ \text{ \text{\text{ \text{ \text{\text{ \text{ \tet
- c) 46 **Z**b6 **Z**a8 47 **Z**xb5 **Z**a3 48 **Z**b7+ **2**d6 49 **Z**xg7 **Z**xc3 50 **Z**g6+ **2**xd5 51 **Z**xh6 **Z**b3 52 **Z**h8 **Z**xb4 53 **Z**c8, again with a draw.


I don't claim that these variations exhaust the possibilities of the position, but they clearly show that if White plays at all inaccurately, his advantage vanishes.

## 46 **\$23!!**

This move is very hard to understand if you haven't looked at the above variations. Geller has seen that the main issue is whose king will occupy the centre and keep its opposite number out. The decisive factor will not be material but coordination of forces.

## 46... **Za8** 47 **\$f3 Za3** 48 **\$e4 Zxc3** 49 **Zg6 Zc2** 50 **Zxg7+ \$d6** 51 **Zg6+** (D)


This is the very position Geller had in mind when he took his decision on move 46. Even though Black has one very important endgame



trump – a protected passed pawn – the undoubted advantage is on White's side, and for one sole reason: the excellent cooperation between his king, rook and passed pawn. This outweighs everything else.

Better than 54 罩f6? 罩e2+55 當f3 罩d2.

54... **Z**e2+ 55 **\$d4 Z**xf2 56 **Z**g7+ **\$d6** 57 **Z**g6+ **\$d7** 58 g4! **Z**d2+ 59 **\$e5 Z**e2+ 60 **\$d4 Z**d2+ 61 **\$c5** c3 (D)



Geller now employs a device that is typical of rook endings. Pay attention to it – such things are very useful to know! In endgames generally – following Emanuel Lasker's wise advice – the main thing is to study methods of play rather than individual positions.

#### 62 \( \bar{2}\)d6+!


In fact 62 \( \mathbb{Z}g7+ \\ \mathbb{Z}e8 \) 63 \( \mathbb{Z}c7 \) is perfectly playable, but the text-move is even stronger.

#### 62...**∲**e7

This is more tenacious than 62...\$\documenter{\phi}\$c7 63 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xh6! c2 64 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c6+.

#### 63 **罩e6+! 含d7 64 罩e3! c2 65 罩c3** (D)

As the result of White's manoeuvre, his rook occupies its ideal post.




#### 65...罩h2

On 65... \( \bar{L} d3, \) White wins by 66 \( \bar{L} xc2 \) \( \bar{L} xh3 \) 67 \( \bar{L} a2 \) \( \bar{L} c3 + 68 \) \( \bar{L} xb5 \) \( \bar{L} d6 \) 69 \( \bar{L} a6 + \bar{L} xd5 \) 70 \( \bar{L} xh6 \).

#### 66 h4!

This is better than 66 \$\dispxb5 \dispde 67 \dispde c4 \$\bar{\textstyle xh3} 68 \$\bar{\textstyle xc2} \dispde \bar{\textstyle h4}, when White still wins but with unnecessary difficulty – which means more likelihood of going wrong.

66... Xxh4 67 Xxc2 Xxg4 68 Xh2 Xg6 69 \$xb5 \$d6 70 Xh5 (D)



## 70...**ġ**c7

Black finally managed to bring his king to the desired square d6, and now he has to abandon it. The reason is shown by the variations 70... \$\mathbb{Z}\$5 71 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xh6+ \$\mathbb{Z}\$xd5 72 \$\mathbb{Z}\$b6 and 70... \$\mathbb{Z}\$f6 71 \$\mathbb{Z}\$b6; in either case White has a theoretically won position. From now until the end of the game Black must abandon any idea of cooperation between his pieces.

71 \$c5 \$\overline{1}6 72 \$\overline{1}6 73 b5 \$\overline{1}6 74 \$\overline{1}6 75 \$\overline{1}6 76 b6+ \$\overline{1}6 77 \$\overline{1}6 74 \$\overline{1}6 76 b6+ \$\overline{1}6 77 \$\overline{1}6 74 \$\overline{1}6 76 b6+ \$\overline{1}6 77 \$\overline{1}6 76 \$\overli

There is no hope left for Black; for example, 79... 型d1+80 含e6 星e1+81 含f6. Therefore he resigned.


Geller conducted this endgame brilliantly. In particular, he conducted it ... in 'Smyslov style'! Against an opponent who had played many a superb rook ending, Geller played in much the same manner. I strongly advise you to improve your endgame technique by studying the games of Vasily Smyslov.

And now, another example of the importance of coordination. It looks relatively uncomplicated, but is convincing and attractive.

## Botvinnik – Robatsch Amsterdam (IBM) 1966

Not an effective line; 14...f5 is perfectly acceptable.

15 營a4 (D)



#### 15...f5

This move shouldn't be specially criticized, as there is no good alternative:

- a) On 15...a5 16 豐xc6 兔b7 17 豐xb6 兔a6 18 ②dxe4 兔xf1 19 罩xf1, White has an undoubted plus.
- b) White's chances are also better after 15...b5 16 營a5 皇f5 17 邕c1.
- c) Botvinnik suggested the continuation 15.... b7'!?' 16 ②dxe4! (my exclamation mark), and now 16...c5, which to me seems unconvincing after 17 f3. 16...b5 is also bad for Black: 17 豐b3 b4 18 ②c5 bxc3 19 豐xb7 豐xb7 翌xb7 20 ②xb7 星eb8 21 ②c5! 星xb2 22 星a1! 星ab8 23 ②a4 星c2 24 星ac1! (not 24 星fc1?! 星bb2!), with a big advantage.

Black's major inaccuracy had already occurred on move 14, which is why he has problems in all these variations.

#### 16 f3


This move is essential for White in such situations. Though his pawn-structure is weakened, all his pieces are activated, and the resulting dynamic benefits outweigh the static concessions.

## 16...exf3 17 @xf3 &b7?

This is simply bad, as it leads to the loss of two tempi and allows White to exert extremely powerful pressure. Instead 17... ad6 looks virtually obligatory.

## 18 ②e5 豐e6 19 豐c2 皇c8 (D)

After 19...g6 20 e4 fxe4 21 ②xe4 罩e7 22 豐c3! White works up a decisive attack; for example: 22... 還d8 23 d5! cxd5 24 ②f6+ 堂g7 25 ②c6, and wins.



## 20 e4


This pawn advance is also typical of such positions.

## 20... **營d6**

White undoubtedly also has a substantial plus after 20...fxe4 21 \( \mathbb{I} xe4.

## 21 **Zd1 ②e6** 22 **營b3!** fxe4 (D) 23 **Zf7!!**

Unexpected and immensely strong. Black was hoping for the 'obvious' 23 ②xe4 👑d5 24 👑xd5 cxd5, when after 25 ②d6 🖺d8 26 ②f5 🖺e8 White has the advantage but Black's defence is holding. After the move found by Botvinnik, Black is beyond salvation. What is the point of this move, and how do such continuations come into a player's head? Let's look at the position. Black's king is insufficiently protected by the pieces, given their bad state of development; its pawn-cover has also been noticeably weakened. The white queen and the




e5-knight are already aiming at the enemy king position, but their strength is inadequate by itself; they require support from other pieces. The question as to which other piece should join them first is very important, as we have already seen how crucial the time factor is in such sharp positions. To answer this question, we need to locate the most vulnerable points in the black camp, and we perceive that these are on the seventh rank – the pawns and squares next to the black king. Thus it occurs to us to place our rook on that rank, and quickly. After this, the calculation of variations follows (see below!), and the solution is found!

#### 23...a5


This loses at once, but as the following analysis shows, White wins in all variations anyway:

- a) 23... ②xd4 24 罩f8+ 含xf8 25 營f7#.
- b) 23... 2)g5 24 2)xe4! 2)xe4 25 2f8+ and mate next move.
- c) 23... **2**f8 24 **2**xf8+ **2**xf8 25 **2**xe4 **2**d5 26 **2**f3++-.
- d) White has the most trouble after 23...e3!? 24 ②e4 彎d5 25 彎xe3 罩f8 (more stubborn than 25...②xd4 26 ②f6+, an important line given by Botvinnik) 26 彎f3 (D) and now:



- d1) 26... \$b7? 27 豐f5! \$h8 28 包f6.
- d3) 26... 曾d8 27 宣f1! 曾xd4+ 28 宫h1 皇a6 29 曾h5!! (if 29 曾f5, then 29... 豐xe5! 30 豐xe5 宣xf7 31 豐xe6 皇xf1 32 ②d6 宣af8 33 ②xf7 宣xf7 34 豐e8+ 宣f8 35 豐xc6 h6) 29... 宣xf7 (or: 29... 皇xf1 30 ②f6+; 29... 豐xe4 30 宣xf8+ ②xf8 31 豐f7+; 29... h6 30 ②f6+) 30 豐xf7+ +-.

24 ②xe4 (D)



#### 1-0

Black resigned in anticipation of 24... 增d5 (24... ①xd4 25 罩f8+; or 24... 增d8 25 豐g3 罩f8 26 ②xc6) 25 罩xg7+! 含xg7 (25... ①xg7 26 ②f6+) 26 豐g3+ 含f8 27 罩f1+.


What we have just seen permits us to draw another useful intermediate conclusion. It often happens that one side has an obvious advantage but a decisive continuation cannot be seen, although you feel it ought to be there. The decision in such cases is almost always (perhaps always) brought about by fresh forces joining in the play. After that, it is sometimes even astonishing how easily the game is won.

Thus in the following well-known encounter, White refutes his opponent's opening errors by simply bringing new fighting units into the game one after another.

## Alekhine – Opočensky Paris 1925

## 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ②c3 ②f6 4 e3 &f5?! (D)


Theory considers this bishop development inadequate.



## 5 cxd5 ②xd5

The reason why Black's fourth move was bad, and why he retakes with the knight here, lies in the variation 5...cxd5 6 岁 3 岁 6? 7 ② xd5 岁 xb3 8 ② xf6+, winning a pawn. Black's move 6 is the standard response to White's queen sortie to b3, but in this case it doesn't work – which is Black's whole problem. Capablanca (in a game against Alekhine in 1924), and many others after him, retreated the bishop to c8 instead, which is naturally unappealing. In Yusupov-Förster, Schwäbisch Gmünd 2000, Black played 6... 對 67, but this also turned out badly after 7 ② b5 ② c6 8 ② f3 e6 9 ② e5 對 c7 10 對 a4 三 c8 11 對 xa7 ② d6 12 ② xc6 bxc6 13 對 xc7 三 xc7 14 ② e2.

## 6 &c4 e6 7 ②ge2 ②d7 8 e4 ②xc3 9 ②xc3 &g6 10 0-0 營h4? (D)



#### 11 d5!

This break is possible because Black's pointless queen move will eventually cost more than just one tempo.

## 11...exd5

Black does badly with 11... \( \) e5 12 dxe6 or 11... \( \) cxd5 12 \( \) b5.


## 12 g3 豐f6 13 exd5 臭c5

Black remembers about his development, but his position is already seriously compromised. Thus 13...②e5 is met by 14 dxc6, when after 14...bxc6 White has the surprising but logical and powerful stroke 15 ②d5! 營d6 (not 15...cxd5 16 ②b5+ ③e7 17 營xd5 ②d8 18 營b7+ ⑤e6 19 ③e1 and White wins) 16 ⑤f4 f6 17 營a4 with a big advantage. As the game goes, Black fares little better.

## 14 Ze1+ \$f8 15 \$f4 \$\infty\$b6 16 \$b3 h5

After 16... **Zd8** 17 **Zc1 Qd4** (17...cxd5 is strongly answered by 18 **Db5 Dc4** 19 **Dc7!**) 18 **2d2**, White has a large plus.

## 17 h4 \$g8 (D)



White has attained a significant plus, but as yet no decisive blow is to be found. This is not surprising, seeing that his queen and queen's rook have still to enter the fray. Alekhine therefore continues developing.

## 


This exchange greatly benefits White, as it deprives the black king of a defender and allows both white rooks to become much more active.

## 21...c5 22 營e2 g6 23 臭g5 營d6 24 營f3

White is playing very simply; he merely brings out his last undeveloped pieces and forces his opponent's pieces back. Yet his advantage has been increasing all the while, and is now decisive. The ease with which this has happened is explained by Black's battered and disorganized position.

## 24...**營f8** (D)

Black's position is also without hope after 24... \( \tilde{L} \) 17 \( \tilde{L} \) 25 \( \tilde{L} \) 26 \( \tilde{L} \) xa7.



#### 25 罩xd4!

This stroke is simple and obvious. It also wins the game at once. At the same time we should note how it obeys the principles of development and coordination; essentially it procures White an extra piece in the crucial area, for the crucial time-span. This is a theme we discussed in detail earlier.

## 25...cxd4 26 罩c6 堂h7 27 桌xf7 罩c8 28 罩xg6 1-0

The next game proceeds in a largely similar manner.

## Kasparov – Andersson Tilburg 1981

## 1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 e6 3 ②f3 b6 4 a3 &b7 5 ②c3 ②e4 6 ②xe4 &xe4 7 ②d2 &g6 8 g3 ②c6


Theorists are less than convinced by this move. In the last few years Black has mostly been playing 8... £e7. Then for instance after 9 £g2 d5 10 e4 dxe4 11 ②xe4 0-0 12 0-0 c6 13 £f4, White acquired a small plus in Stohl-Romanishin, Kaskady 2002.

#### 9 e3 a6?!

This is hard to explain. Ulf Andersson is a player in the classical mould, yet suddenly he sets out on a highly dubious operation which finally leaves him way behind in development. When you consider that on top of this he is facing Kasparov (who at that time was already

well known though still very young), his actions have an air of hara-kiri about them.

## 10 b4 b5?! 11 cxb5 axb5 12 \(\hat{\(\beta\)}\)b2 (D)



## 12... 2a7?!


For good measure the knight voluntarily leaves the centre for the edge of the board. Andersson is unrecognizable! A better line seems to be 12... \$\mathbb{L}\$ 8 13 \$\mathbb{L}\$ 17.

#### 13 h4!

Kasparov's actions are easy to understand. Black has been neglecting his own kingside, so White turns his attention to that part of the board. To begin with, he induces a first weakness there.

## 13...h6 (D)

The other defensive try is also dismal: 13...f6 14 h5 &f7 15 h6.



#### 14 d5!

After this, castling will be difficult for Black for some time. Meanwhile White will try to open up the central files against the black king.

#### 14...exd5


In the light of what has been said, 14...c6!? looks more logical, endeavouring to keep the position as closed as possible. For example: 15

## 15 **≜g2** c6

At this stage material is not the main thing. With every move the time factor plays an increasing role. Hence I feel that a better line is 15...②c8!? 16 &xd5 (16 0-0 ②b6) 16...c6 17 &g2 ②b6, when White's advantage wouldn't be so formidable. Now he works up a direct attack on the king.

## 

All Black's previous errors are now beginning to tell. Natural moves no longer work: 23... \( \) b6 24 \( \) d6+ \( \) xd6 25 \( \) xd6 \( \) 28 \( \) xe8 \( \) xe8 \( \) xe8 \( \) xf6+! and mates. In other words, in consequence of his backward development Black can no longer coordinate his forces. This demonstrates the link between development and coordination, which is a very important concept; it explains why I gave the heading 'Development' to a chapter in which the principle of coordination receives most attention.



After Black's last move, things still aren't any easier. The following blow – easy to predict, but attractive – is enough to make his position collapse. This isn't at all surprising. You only need to compare the white and black pieces in their capacity for concerted play. (*Zusammenspiel*, remember?) The fact that White's pieces have adequate open lines is further testimony to the cooperation between his pieces and his pawns. Without any doubt at all, Kasparov is one of the greatest-ever masters of the art of coordinating forces to maximum effect.

### 24 ②xf6! gxf6


## 25 營g6+ 含f8 26 &c1

We were presented with a similar picture in the game by the young Morphy which we examined at the start of our discussion of the coordination principle. White has an overwhelming advantage, and in such cases there will usually be more than one path to victory, so that choosing between them is a matter of taste. However, tastes differ in quality, and good taste springs from sound principles. Victory could also have been achieved by 26 <a href="mailto:lextra} lext <a href="mai

- 1) After his highly eccentric play, Black doesn't deserve to reach an ending. This applies all the more because Ulf Andersson is widely known as a passionate lover of endgames and would have offered lengthy and stubborn resistance.
- 2) The move played brings the white bishop into the game, when it had nothing to do on the long diagonal apart from the combinative line just mentioned.

## 26...d5 (D)

White wins easily in the event of 26... 響e8 27 ②xh6+ 罩xh6 28 響xh6+ 含f7 29 營h7+ 含f8 30 h6 豐f7 31 營f5 ②d6 (or 31... ②b6 32 罩d4 +-) 32 營f4, and the black rook can only watch the king's death agony.



## 27 国d4!

Here again Kasparov's choice of move fits in perfectly with our argument. This rook was not active enough. White could have gone ahead with a straightforward continuation utilizing the pieces that were already fully engaged: 27 ②xh6+ 置xh6 28 營xh6+ 登g8! 29 營g6+ 登h8! 30 置e6, and although White's advantage is not in doubt, he would still have some minor problems to solve. Yet once the rook is in the game, the rest all runs on oiled wheels. Kasparov, like Morphy before him, is endowed by nature with a feeling for coordination of the highest order.


## 

There was also an easy win with 28 兔xh6+ axh6 29 響xh6+ 含e8 30 響xf6, but the game continuation is more attractive and quicker. Observe that in this case too, the winning process is accelerated and made easier by bringing one more fighting unit to the sector where the clash of pieces is taking place.

## 28... 4 f7 29 &xh6+! \$\disperse e8 30 &g7 1-0

Black resigned since after 30... \$\mu\$g8 31 h6 he won't get away with losing less than a rook.

I shall often use the phrase 'coordination of forces', bearing in mind that the arrangement of pawns has a very significant influence on the scope of the pieces. It is not for nothing that pawn-structure is one of the most fundamental chess concepts. But that is a major theme in itself. It sometimes happens that the pawns themselves become fighting units that take a decisive part in the attack. This happened for instance in the following truly monumental game. Kasparov's notes to this game in his book about this match take up 20 pages! I shall merely give the finale of the game, but even that will demand more analysis than many a complete encounter. The variations are extremely vivid and fascinating.



Kasparov – Karpov London/Leningrad Wch (16) 1986

This position is from a very famous game. Despite the relatively small number of pieces left on the board, the situation is very sharp and complex. What strikes you is that each player has concentrated his forces in 'his own' sector of the board, and also that the white knight on a3 is condemned to perish. Since, however, White is a pawn up and his pieces are aiming at the enemy king – always an ominous sign – the position is virtually impossible to assess by its general features alone. Calculation of variations is bound to play a decisive role.

Kasparov played...


#### 33 學f4

...whereupon Karpov committed the decisive error:

#### 33... **營xa**3?


Kasparov gives a mass of complicated variations here, from which the first conclusion to be drawn is that the position hardly lends itself to exhaustive calculation in limited thinking time; intuition must play a major part too. Not that it can replace a constant and painstaking effort of analysis, of course; analysis will supply intuition with data, and intuition in turn will suggest a direction for the analysis to take.

a) Kasparov demonstrates that capturing the knight with the rook would also have lost. On 33... Zxa3?, White plays 34 Zf3! (D) with these consequences:




- a1) 34...f6? 35 **對d6+ \$e8** 36 **②**xf6+ and wins.
- a2) 34...f5 35 營d6+ 全e8 36 基e3+ 全d8 37 ②e5 全b5 38 ②c6+ 全xc6 39 dxc6 營b8 40 基e8+! +-.

- a4) 34... 含e7 35 豐xf7+ 含d6 36 豐e6+ 含c7 37 罩f7 含b5 38 包e5 d2 39 罩xd7+ 含xd7 40 豐xd7++-
- b) Kasparov considers Black's sole correct move to be 33...d2!, leading ultimately to equality but only by a most complex and contorted route. He supports this view with some long and intricate variations, in which both sides have plenty of scope for error. (Black has more of it than White, though. This allows us to conclude that the position after White's 33rd move is objectively equal but subjectively easier for White to play provided of course that he has adequate stocks of optimism and tactical prowess.) White continues with 34 4h6 (D), and now:




- b1) 34...豐f6? is decidedly poor: 35 豐xd2 豐d6 36 ②c2 ②f6 37 豐d4! ②h5? 38 ②f5! +-.
- b2) The same goes for 34... \$\displays 8 35 \$\bigwedge xf7+\$\displays 48 36 d6 d1\$\bigwedge 37 \$\bigwedge g8+\$\displays f8 38 \$\bigwedge xf8+\$\displays d7 39 \$\bigwedge e7+\$\displays 640 \$\bigwedge e7+\$\displays d5 41 d7 +-.
- b3) 34... \( \Delta = 5? \) is also bad: 35 \( \Delta x b 3 \) \( \Delta x b 3 \) \( \Delta x b 5 \) d1 \( \Delta 37 \) d6 +-. The position is characteristic of many variations in this game; Black's two queens lose to White's scanty but ideally coordinated forces.
- b4) After 34...266! (D), there is much more in the way of analysis.
- b41) 35 罩xb3 豐xb3 36 豐xf6 豐xd5 37 ②xf7 and now:
- b411) A small miracle occurs in the variation 37... 堂e8? 38 ②b1!! d1豐 39 ②c3!. One of the queens succumbs to a unique fork, and White is left with his extra pawns!
- b412) 37...d1豐 38 ②d6+ 查g8 39 豐xg6+ 查f8 40 豐f6+ 查g8 41 ②f5!. Again it looks as if



the two queens lose, but Black can draw by giving one of them up: 41... 響xf5! 42 響xf5 響d6+.

b42) 35 營d6+ 含e8! (35...含g7? loses to 36 包f5+ 含h7 37 營f8 包g4+ 38 區xg4 營e5+ 39 f4 區xh3+ 40 gxh3 營e2+ 41 區g2+—) 36 營c6+, and now not 36...包d7? 37 營xa6! d1營 (or 37...區xg3 38 營c8+ 含e7 39 包g8+ 含d6 40 營c6+ 含e5 41 包c4+) 38 營c8+ 含e7 39 包g8+ 含d6 40 〇c4+ 含xd5 41 包xb2+—, but 36...含f8! 37 營d6+ 含e8 38 營xa6 d1營 (at each turn Black has to find the only move; he would lose with 38...區xg3? 39 營c8+ 含e7 40 營c5+ (D).



The most dangerous moment in this variation arrives. Black's only move to survive is 40...當d7!!. Take note: apart from the fact that there are dangers lurking on all sides, this would have been the last move before the time-control. Is it conceivable that any mortal could go through all this without a mistake? (Black can't play either 40...當e8? 41 ②c4! 豐bd4 42 豐c8+ 當e7 43 豐c7+ ②d7 44 ②f5+! gxf5 45 豐d6+, or 40...當d8? 41 ②c4 豐bd4 42 ②xf7+ 當e8 43 ③cd6+ 當e7 44 ②f5++ 當xf7 45 豐e7+.) The analysis continues: 41 ②c4 豐ba1! 42 豐c6+ 當d8!, when White should take the draw by 43

豐d6+ 含c8 44 豐c6+ 含b8 45 豐d6+ 含a7 46、豐c5+, etc. Instead, the line given by Kasparov, 43 ②xf7+(?) 含e7 44 豐c5+ 含xf7 45 ②d6+ appears to lose to the surprising 45...含g8!! (Kasparov considered 45...含e7 46 ②f5++ 含d8 47 豐e7+ and 45...含g7 46 豐c7+ 含h8 47 ②f7+ 含g8!, which both lead to a draw) 46 豐c8+含h7 47 豐c7+ ②d7!, when nothing seems to work for White. However, as we said before, playing like this is much easier for White than for Black, who is walking through a minefield the whole time.

In the actual game everything ended more quickly and in a less spectacular manner, but there is still something very useful here for us to study.


## 34 **②h6 豐e7**

On 34...\$\delta 8 or 34...\$\delta 7, White wins by 35 \$\mathbb{Z} 63+ \$\delta 8 36 \$\alpha xf7+ \$\delta c8 37 \$\alpha d6+, while 34...\$\text{f6 loses to 35 \$\mathbb{Z} xg6.}\$

## 35 基xg6 營e5

Everything is simple after 35... \$\delta\$e8 36 d6, winning. After the text-move, however, White's queen is pinned and he is a piece down...

36 **黨g8+ 含e7** (D)



Now 37 265+? would lose to 37...\$66. It looks as if White's pieces aren't acting well enough together, while Black's on the contrary possess good coordination. Yet the intervention of a mere pawn abruptly alters the entire picture:

#### 37 d6+!

The truth now turns out to be the very opposite! White's small but united force has acquired amazing coordination, shattering the opponent's entire set-up. And this was achieved by bringing just one pawn to the aid of the attacking pieces!

That's why chess can be so difficult – there are often so many factors you have to take into account!

## 37...\$\dot\delta 6 38 \quad \text{E}\delta 6 39 \quad \text{Xxe5} + \tilde \text{Xxe5} 40 d7 \quad \text{E}\delta 8 41 \tilde \text{Xxf7} 1-0


"Coordination of forces doesn't come by itself, if you don't take measures..." This can be asserted with assurance, slightly adapting words by the famous Soviet poet Mayakovsky. You must work hard to achieve coordination against a strong opponent, since he is aiming for exactly the opposite outcome. We saw that in the last example and it recurs in those which follow.

## Yusupov – Kasparov Novgorod 1995

## 1 d4 Øf6 2 Øf3 g6 3 &g5 &g7 4 c3 c5 5 e3

Generally speaking the point of White's 4th move is to take the pawn at once with 5 dxc5!?. Then, for example, 5...包a6!? 6 營d4 包c7!? 7 包bd2 包e6 8 營c4 b6 9 cxb6 營xb6 occurred in Sorokin-Sakaev, St Petersburg 1993, leading to a complex position in which Black has compensation for the pawn.

## 5... 學b6 6 學b3 0-0 7 ②bd2 d6 (D)



#### 8 **營xb6**

The opposition of the queens is finally resolved. Black now has some minor weaknesses in his queenside pawn-structure, but it's hard for White to get at them. In return, the a-file is opened up for Black; this doesn't usually amount to much, though White does need to exercise some care.

## 8...axb6 9 2 c4 2 bd7 10 &e2


The moment has come for White to choose his plan. Yusupov opts for a kingside offensive.

Quite a good plan for seizing the b5-square was also possible: 10 鱼xf6!? 鱼xf6 11 色a3 d5 12 包b5, and now if 12... 互a5 13 a4 e5?, then 14 b4 wins a pawn.

#### 10...d5 11 Øce5 h6 12 &f4 c4

Since White has unambiguously disclosed his plan for kingside play, Black creates pressure on the opposite wing, where he has some basis for doing so.

## 13 h4!? b5 14 g4 ②b6 15 g5 hxg5 16 hxg5 ②e4 (D)



#### 17 ②d2 皇f5


This move is evidently necessary. White would have a clear advantage after 17...\(\int\)d6?! 18 \(\int\)g4! \(\beta\)d8 19 a3 \(\int\)a4 20 0-0-0.

## 18 **≜g**4

If 18 f3, then 18... 2xd2 or 18... 2d6 gives Black an excellent position.

## 18... ②a4 (D)

For 18... ≜xg4 19 ②xg4 ②a4 20 f3, see the next note.



#### 19 🖾 xe4

I don't think this move is best. It seems to me that a good idea for White is 19 f3!? ②xd2 20 堂xd2 এxg4 21 ②xg4; then after 21...⑤xb2 22

置hb1 ②d3 23 罩xb5 罩a7 24 罩xd5 罩fa8 25 a3 罩xa3 26 罩d8+罩xd8 27 罩xa3 e5 28 兔g3 b5 the game is about equal.

## 19...dxe4!

This is better than 19... 2xe4, after which 20 f3 followed by 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h2 would give White the advantage.

#### 20 &xf5

The immediate 20 \( \bar{2}\)b1 leads to a situation similar to the game, after 20...b4 21 cxb4 \( \bar{2}\)b6 22 a3 \( \bar{2}\)fc8.


## 20...gxf5 21 罩b1

21 0-0-0 also deserves attention, because in Kasparov's variation 21...②xc3 22 bxc3 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{al

## 21...b4!

Kasparov is in a resolute mood. By sacrificing a pawn he greatly increases the active scope of his pieces, especially his rooks which need open files. He considers that after 21... 42b6 22 a3 &xe5 (pay attention to this exchange – it will be an important factor in many variations; its point is that Black will have the chance to restrict the white bishop, which is hampered in any case by its own pawn-structure; meanwhile, the black knight will take up a dominating, impregnable position on d5) 23 2xe5 f6 24 gxf6 exf6 25 单f4 罩f7 26 堂e2 罩h7, the position would be equal. However, in assessing the consequences of his positional sacrifice, Kasparov had to be sure that the lines he was opening could be better utilized by Black than by White.

#### 22 cxb4 (D)



22...9\b6?!


At this point, in his own opinion, Kasparov goes wrong. He demonstrates that an immediate 22...c3? gives Black nothing: 23 b3! ②b2 24 a4 b5 25 a5 ②d3+ 26 ②xd3! exd3 27 罩d1 d2+ 28 堂e2, with a clear advantage for White. On the other hand 22...罩fc8!? is strong: 23 g6 ②xe5 24 gxf7+ 含xf7 25 ②xe5 c3 26 bxc3 ②xc3 27 罩b2 ②d5! with a small but stable plus for Black, whose pieces have greater scope than in the game continuation.

## 23 a3 互fc8 24 g6

Better than 24 Ic1 ②d5 25 曾d2 b5.

As I see it, 27 \( \frac{1}{2}h7+!? \) \( \frac{1}{2}e6 \) 28 \( \frac{1}{2}h6+ \) \( \frac{1}{2}h6 \) is a perfectly good option. If I saw such a real chance of drawing with Kasparov, I wouldn't be able to resist it. Still, there is nothing wrong with the game continuation either.

27...c3+ 28 含c2 cxb2+ 29 含xb2 罩c3 (D)



#### 30 \alpha a1

White has quite a wide choice. He must avoid 30 單h5? 單axa3 31 罩xf5+ \$\delta 6 32 \delta h5\$ \$\delta d7\$ followed by 33... 2xb4 -+. Another inaccurate line is 30 罩bc1?! 罩cxa3 31 b5 罩a2+ 32 \$\delta b3 \delta xf2 33 \delta h7+ \$\delta 6 34 \delta h6+ 2\delta f6 35 \delta c7 \delta a1 36 \delta xb7 \delta b1+! with advantage to Black. Yet as Kasparov shows, White has quite a simple draw with 30 \delta h7+!? \$\delta 6 31 \delta g1 \delta axa3 32 \delta g6+ \$\delta d7 33 \delta d6+ \delta 8 34 \delta xd5 \delta ab3+ 35 \$\delta a2 \delta a3+. Yusupov sidesteps this chance for the second time, and it would be interesting to know why. Was it deliberate, or an oversight?

#### 30...b5!


After 30... 2d3 31 2h7+ 2e6 32 2g1 2axa3 33 2g6+, the game would be drawn in the way we have seen already. Kasparov is going all-out to win.

#### 31 罩hc1

## 31... 基d3 32 基c5

This time if 32 \( \bar{2}\)d1?, Black wins by means of 32...\( \bar{2}\)axa3!.

## 32...②b6! (D)



#### 33 罩xb5?

Finally White commits a decisive error. As Kasparov demonstrates, he could have saved himself by 33 \$\displays 22! \$\oldots 4 34 a4! \$\oldots 42+ 35 \displays 53 \displays 23 \displays 24 \oldots 4 a4! \$\oldots 42+ 35 \displays 53 \displays 24 \displays 24 a4! \$\oldots 42+ 35 \displays 53 \displays 25 \


#### 33...②c4+ 34 **\$**c1

White loses at once with 34 堂c2? 罩axa3! or 34 堂b1? 罩d1+.

#### 34... **三g8** 35 **臭g3** (D)

Now, on the other hand, everything seems in order.

What can Black do? On 35...互c8? 36 互c5, White has a clear plus, while 35...互h8?! 36 堂c2 ②xa3+37 互xa3 互xa3 38 互xf5+ is also in his favour. The advantage is also on White's side after 35...互c3+?! 36 堂d1 互h8 37 互a2! 互h1+38 堂e2 互cc1 39 f3. In all these cases the black pieces, though much more active, are unable to breach the enemy defence. In such




situations, as we have said more than once before, you have to look for a chance to support your attacking pieces with extra reserves of some kind. Often a pawn will be enough. So it is here:

## 35...f4!! 36 罩f5+

We can now see that Black's pawn thrust has shattered the defensive coordination of White's forces. (Coordination is naturally essential in defence as well as attack. See, for example, Fischer-Larsen Denver Ct (1) 1971, which is one of my favourites; and also the fine game which follows below.)

If 36 全xf4, Black mates with 36... 基c3+. A more interesting try is 36 exf4, whereupon Kasparov gives 36... 基c3+! 37 全d1 (or 37 全b1 基h8 -+) 37... 基h8 38 基a2 (only move) 38... 基h1+39 全e2 基xg3! 40 基c2 基gg1! (much stronger than 40... 基e3+41 fxe3 基h2+42 全e1 基xc2 43 基c5, when Black has a technical task ahead of him) 41 基xc4 基d1 42 基f5+ 全e8 43 f3 基he1+44 全f2 e3+ and mates.

## 



38...**.**∳h5

Played in time-trouble. A simpler way is 38...술f7! 39 罩f4+ 술e8 40 罩f5 e5!.

## 39 \( \frac{1}{2}\)h4+ \( \frac{1}{2}\)g6 40 \( \frac{1}{2}\)g4+ \( \frac{1}{2}\)h4+ \( \frac{1}{2}\)g6 43 f5+ \( \frac{1}{2}\)g5 0-1

On 44  $\mathbb{Z}$ h2 (what else is there?), Black wins with 44... $\mathbb{Z}$ )d2+!.

The final position splendidly illustrates the total superiority of coordinated forces.

This was a high-class game. Kasparov's outstanding tactics, his energetic and bold actions, make a powerful impression. It is no accident that he succeeds more often than other players in pulling off such memorable strokes as 35...f4!! in this game, or conducting remarkable attacks like the one against Karpov that we examined before. It all has to do with his approach to chess, his constant focus on gaining dynamic advantages, his readiness for material or positional sacrifices (or both) in the interests of achieving maximum coordination.

And now, as promised, we come to coordination in defence. We already saw a brilliant illustration of this theme in the game Lputian-Ivanchuk in Chapter 1 (Dynamics). Here is another striking example.

## Fischer - Polugaevsky Palma de Mallorca IZ 1970

## 1 c4 ②f6 2 g3 c6 3 &g2 d5 4 ②f3 &f5 5 \bigspace b6 6 cxd5 \bigspace xb3 7 axb3 cxd5

In Polugaevsky's view, taking with the knight is more precise. After 7...②xd5!? 8 d3 ②b4 Black has everything in order.

### 8 5 c3 5 c6 9 d3 e6

## 10 0-0 **Qe7** (D)


But now, after...

#### 11 **£e3!**

...he had to start thinking. And yet he did so to very good effect. He probed deeply into the position and succeeded in finding a splendid forcing line of play, beginning with:

## 11...4\(\)g4!

That Polugaevsky's cogitations didn't begin too soon, we can see from the following




variation: the 'natural' 11...0-0 is met by 12 2d4! 2xd4 13 2xd4 a6 14 e4, and White works up some unpleasant pressure.

## 12 &f4 0-0 13 e4

According to Polugaevsky it was worth considering 13 \( \mathbb{I} \) fc1!?, but Fischer follows a course which looks highly attractive.

## 13...dxe4 14 dxe4 &g6 15 e5 (D)



#### 

White has to accept the challenge. After the alternative 16 \( \begin{align\*} \frac{1}{2} \text{c5} & 17 \( \begin{align\*} \text{cd} & 18 \text{ h3} \\ \text{ch} & 19 \text{ g4 f6!}, Black has fully adequate counterplay.} \end{align\*}

#### 16...&c2 17 \( \bar{\textsq} \] dc1!


The only way! 17 国d2 皇xb3 18 国d7 皇c5 19 ②e4 皇b6 20 h3 皇d5! turns out in Black's favour.

## 17... 2xb3 18 h3 g5!

This continuation is essential. On 18... 4 h6? 19 dd. White's advantage is obvious.

## 19 hxg4 gxf4 20 **(**D)

Now it is Fischer's turn to make a forced but powerful move, avoiding 20 gxf4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)fd8 with advantage to Black. It's interesting to follow how at every turn, the slightest inaccuracy can reverse the verdict on the position. This is quite typical of sharp situations.



Now again Black seems to be faced with awkward problems. The consequences of 20...2d5 21 2xd5 exd5 22 gxf4 2fd8 23 2b3 and 20...2d4 21 gxf4 look favourable to White. Instead there followed:

#### 20...f3!!

Black performs miracles. According to Polugaevsky, before making his 15th move he was already intending this superb and extremely effective counter-stroke. In this way – as one chess coach whom I know very well is fond of saying – he largely "uncoordinates his opponent's coordination". This is calculation on a high level! At every turn we can see how each player is striving to disrupt his opponent's coordination of forces and improve his own. The first mistake by either of them could gravely damage his cause.


#### 21 &xf3

Black also preserves equal chances after 21 ②xb3 fxg2 22 f4 f6 23 exf6 ②xf6 24 ③xg2 墨ad8.

## 21... (D) xe5 22 (D)

White too is obliged to play carefully. He does badly with 22 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}\$} \) \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}\$} \)

is better after 23 \(\hat{L}g2\) \(\Delta\d3!\), while 23 \(\beta\xa7\)? fails to 23...\(\hat{L}c5\) 24 \(\beta\a5\) \(\Delta\d3\) -+) 23...\(\Delta\xg4\), with advantage to Black.




#### 22... 2d5 23 9 xd5

The other try, 23 \( \Delta xd5 \) exd5 \( \Delta d\) \( \

## 23...exd5 24 \( \begin{aligned} \( \text{2c7} \) \( \text{2d8} \) 25 \( \begin{aligned} \text{Zxb7} \) \( \text{2b6} \)

It's clear by now that Black has held the position by his superlative defence. The draw is not far off.



29 罩d2

White can't improve his position any more; 29 堂g2? fails to 29...食xf2! 30 堂f3 ②e3, while 29 量d3 leads to repetition after 29...②e5 30 量d1 ②g4.

29...②f6 30 ②xf6 \$\psix\$xf6 31 \$\bar{\textbf{L}}\$d3 \$\psig\$g7 32 \$\psig\$g2 \$\bar{\textbf{L}}\$b8 33 \$\bar{\textbf{L}}\$d7 \$\bar{\textbf{L}}\$bd8 34 \$\partial c4\$ \$\bar{\textbf{L}}\$xd7 35 \$\bar{\textbf{L}}\$xd7 \$\partial g6\$ 36 g4 \$\bar{\textbf{L}}\$d8!


This draws in the simplest manner. In such cases it doesn't pay to dither.

An impressive tactical duel between two masters of calculation.

There is one more very important phenomenon to which I must draw attention. In the games of Tal, Kasparov, Shirov and very many others, the aim of coordinating the forces is pursued by methods that are sharp, quite often risky, and dynamic. (At this stage I don't think there is any need to dwell on this last term. I hope it is comprehensible to the reader by now.) And yet the great majority of other leading masters have an excellent command of, and a liking for, what we may call 'peaceful' means to achieve the same ends; in other words, rather than trust to extreme measures, they employ positional manoeuvring, technical devices and the like. The main thing is the attainment of coordination (we could also use a favourite word of Vasily Smyslov's - harmony). I will take the risk of stating that coordination constitutes the overriding principle in chess, to which all other principles are subordinate; to follow these general chess principles is always to pursue the ultimate aim of attaining coordination of the forces (or improving it when once attained).

Now let's look at some instances of what I have called 'peaceful' methods of achieving this end. I should like to begin with an example taken from Capablanca's Chess Fundamentals.

This excerpt, which isn't even very complex, made an overwhelming impression on me when I first saw it. To this day it appeals to me as a brilliant example of consistent logical thought in search of the solution to an original position. Capablanca is discussing the following extract:




Réti – Yates London 1922

## 26 營d7

Capablanca criticizes this move. He considers it a serious mistake, and claims that "White would have lost if Black had replied 26... \$\begin{aligned} 26... \$\begin{aligned} 5c7, \end{aligned}\$ driving the white queen off the h3-c8 diagonal. and then ... \( \bar{\pi} c6 \) threatening ... \( \bar{\pi} g6.'' \) Let's begin by testing the correctness of this claim. After 27 豐xb5 罩c6!, an attempt to bring the queen across to the defence fails miserably: 28 營e5? 單g6 29 豐h2 &a6 30 罩c1 罩xc1 31 罩xc1 &e2! 32 罩c8+ 會h7 33 罩c3 桌d6 34 豐h1 豐f5, and Black wins. Presumably Capablanca had something like this in mind, underestimating 28 2 f4!, which is White's best move. In reply, I haven't managed to find anything better for Black than 當h2 **皇a6** 32 營d5 營h4+ 33 當g1 營g4+ 34 當h2 營h4+, with repetition of moves. As we see, Capablanca's judgement was too categorical, but this isn't where the value of the extract lies.

The main thing comes later, when he writes: "In my personal opinion White could have parried all Black's threats by playing 26 罩d2." And further: "The move I am suggesting ... frees d1 for the bishop, which from this square would attack the queen on f3 and at the same time keep the d1-h5 diagonal in its sights. Moreover 26 罩d2 would maintain the threat of 營d7 in all its force. The latter move would be very strong if White managed to carry it out. Another point is that 26 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha \\ \ \ \end{aligned} \) liberates the e3-bishop, which otherwise couldn't move because of the reply ...e3 ... And once the dark-squared bishop obtains freedom to manoeuvre - let's say, to occupy f4 - this makes room for the g2-knight, which may go to e3 at a suitable moment. In this way, the white pieces will gradually reach their best positions. ... If all this could be achieved without loss of material, space and time, there would be no doubt as to who had the better game."

Let us first test Capablanca's assertions with a little analysis, and then discuss them. After 26 量位2 호c6 27 호d1 豐h3 28 호f4 罩d5 29 豐e3 豐xe3 30 호xe3 罩cd8 31 罩xd5 호xd5 32 b3 g5 (or 32...a4 33 包f4 호c6 34 호e2 g5 35 包h5 f5 36 罩c1 호e8 37 罩c7 with a slight advantage for White) 33 호e2 b4 34 호b6 罩b8 35 包e3 호e6 36 호d4 罩d8 37 罩d1 (D), the advantage is undoubtedly on White's side.



Of course this is another of those variations that are only very approximate, although it is based entirely on Capablanca's directives. Exploiting White's advantage will still be a very tricky problem, and yet what we have seen lends definite confirmation to the great player's words. And now, to the most important points.

First: the regrouping scheme that Capablanca describes is precisely the kind of plan for coordinating White's forces by 'peaceful' means (that is, without extreme expedients) of which I have spoken. Incidentally it is also one more example of effective coordination in defence. The last diagram splendidly illustrates White's achievements in this direction.

Secondly, Capablanca didn't give a single variation! The analysis he performed was purely logical in character. Capablanca's analysis derives its particular value from being lucid and comprehensible to anyone. Its simple and consequential presentation is very useful to those who wish to study a great master's process of thought. I will repeat that on my first acquaintance with it, and indeed afterwards, this extract made a tremendous impression on me, and I believe it taught me something – in particular, how to set about appraising a situation and looking for solutions by means of logical deduction. I hope it will be of benefit to you too.


In the game, Black failed to find the right move and lost as follows:

## 26... 基h5? 27 豐xe7 基c6

Anatoly Karpov, a player whose style is in many ways very similar to Capablanca's, succeeded in conducting the following game in a manner highly reminiscent of the above example.

## Karpov – Kasparov Moscow Wch (27) 1984/5

1 ②f3 d5 2 d4 ②f6 3 c4 e6 4 ②c3 兔e7 5 兔g5 h6 6 兔xf6 兔xf6 7e3 0-0 8 豐c2 c5 9 dxc5 dxc4 10 兔xc4 豐a5 11 0-0 兔xc3 12 豐xc3 豐xc3 13 bxc3 ②d7 14 c6 bxc6 15 罩ab1 ②b6 16 兔e2 c5 (D)



As you can quite easily see, White hasn't obtained very much out of the opening, and his advantage is of a slight and temporary nature. Black just has to play accurately over the course of the next few moves and prevent White's small lead in development from increasing. An important factor in the position is the c5-pawn, which considerably restricts the scope of some of White's pieces but at the same time represents a weakness. In addition the a7-pawn may very well become weak, but to get at it, White will have to place a rook on the a-file. Since the c5-pawn can't be attacked immediately either, White completes his development and prepares the conditions for a later assault on his opponent's weaknesses.

#### 17 罩fc1!


The correct way! After 17 \( \bar{2}\) fd1 \( \bar{2}\) b7 18 \( \bar{2}\) e5 \( \bar{2}\) fd8, the game would level out at once.

## 17....臭b7?!

A major inaccuracy, after which difficulties arise for Black. In later games Black profited from the lessons of this one, and invariably played 17...2d7! to keep the white rook away from b5. Every single game played in that way ended in a draw.

18 當f1 臭d5 (D)

Geller points out that White would also retain a slight advantage after the alternative 18....皇c6 19 ②e5 皇a4 20 皇b5 (20 皇a6!? also deserves consideration) 20...皇xb5+ 21 基xb5 基fc8 22 ②d3.



#### 19 罩b5! 公d7?

Not, of course, 19...\(\textit{\Quad}\)xa2? 20 c4 \(\textit{\Za}\)ad8 21 \(\textit{\Zb}\)2, but Black had to play 19...\(\textit{\Za}\)ac8! 20 \(\textit{\Za}\)a5 \(\textit{\Za}\)c7 21 c4 \(\textit{\Quad}\)a8. White would then have the advantage, but Black would be quite capable of holding on. Now White unexpectedly acquires a decisive plus:

#### 20 罩a5! 罩fb8 21 c4! 皇c6

White now carries out the final steps of his regrouping manoeuvre; his forces will attain ideal coordination. Black is already powerless to hinder this.


### 22 包e1! 罩b4 23 臭d1!

White prevents the exchange of his chief attacking unit, which would occur after 23 **②**d3? **□**a4.

#### 23...\bulletb b 7 24 f3!


A useful link in the plan. After 24 2d3 2e4 25 2xc5 2xc5 26 xc5 2b2, Black could hope for counterplay.

## 24...罩d8 25 **公**d3 g5 26 **息b3!** (D)



White has achieved the ideal deployment of his forces. The c5-pawn falls, and the game enters its technical phase. You will agree that Karpov's conduct of this phase is very impressive.

26...\$f8 27 2xc5 2xc5 28 2xc5 2d6 29 \$e2 \$e7 30 2d1 2xd1 31 \$xd1 \$xd6 32 2a5 f5!? 33 \$e2 h5 34 e4!? fxe4 35 fxe4 2xe4 36 2xg5 2f5 (D)



### 37 **含e**3?!

It is perhaps only here that White's play can be faulted. It's strange that such a brilliant master of the endgame as Karpov should miss the chance for an elementary but important device – the fixing of a weakness. Most likely he was short of time and therefore decided against altering the pawn-structure. After 37 h4! \(\frac{1}{2}\)g4+38 \(\frac{1}{2}\)each 3, as indicated by N.Popov, White would have little trouble in winning. Now there will be trouble for him! Kasparov defends magnificently and makes White's task a good deal more complicated.

## 37...h4! 38 \$\dd e5+ 39 \$\dd c3 \$\dd b1 40 a3 \$\dd e7\$ 41 \$\dd g4 h3!


Things would be simpler for White after 41... \$\square\$h7 42 h3!, with quite an easy win.

## 42 g3 **Ξe8** 43 **Ξg7! Ξf8** 44 **Ξxa7 Ξf2** 45 **�**b4 (D)

Look at the position that has been reached; it appears wholly unclear. If these events had not taken place after adjournment analysis, White's task would not have been at all easy.

#### 

Matters seem even more complicated after 45... 這b2 46 c5+ 當c6 47 當c4 意c2 48 區a6+ 當c7 49 意xc2 區xc2+ 50 當d5 區xh2 51 區a7+ 當b8 52 區h7 區h1. The only way to win here is 53 當e4! (after 53 g4 h2 54 當c6 e4 55 區h8+ 當a7 56 g5 e3, Black draws) 53...h2 54 當f3 區a1



55 \( \mathbb{Z}\) xa3+ 56 \( \mathbb{Z}\) g4 \( \mathbb{Z}\) c3 57 \( \mathbb{Z}\) e2 \( \mathbb{Z}\) xc5 58 \( \mathbb{Z}\) f5, a variation indicated by Geller. As a result of Karpov's lapse at move 37, all this effort might have been imposed on him – with all the consequent risk of letting the win slip!

## 46 c5+ \$\displayce c6 47 \displaya4+ \displayd5 48 \quad d7+ \displaye4

In answer to 48...堂e6, Popov gives the following variation: 49 c6 單b2+50 兔b3+ 罩xb3+51 堂xb3 兔e4 52 罩d8 兔xc6 53 罩h8 兔g2 54 a4 蛰f5 55 罩h4 and wins.

## 49 c6 \( \bar{L}b2 + 50 \\ \dagger a5 \( \bar{L}b8 \) 51 c7 \( \bar{L}c8 \) 52 \( \dagger b6 \) \( \dagger a5 \) 3 \( \alpha c6 \) h2 54 g4 \( \bar{L}h8 \) 55 \( \bar{L}d1 \)

Instead 55 \( \bar{\text{Z}}\)d8 \( \bar{\text{Z}}\)h6 would give White nothing.

#### 55...**\&a2**

On 55...2c2, White wins with 56  $\Xi$ h1! and 57  $\Xi$ xh2.


56 \( \mathbb{Z} e 1 + \overline{\psi} f 4 57 \) \( \mathbb{Z} e 4 + \overline{\psi} g 3 58 \) \( \mathbb{Z} x e 5 \overline{\psi} x g 4 \) \( 59 \) \( \mathbb{Z} e 2 1 - 0 \)

And now, another example of attaining coordination by 'peaceful' means – or 'almost' peaceful, as the winning side is played by Kasparov.

## Kasparov – Kharitonov USSR Ch (Moscow) 1988

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ②d2 c5 4 ②gf3 ②f6 5 exd5 exd5 6 兔b5+ 兔d7 7 兔xd7+ ②bxd7 8 0-0 兔e7 9 dxc5 ②xc5 10 ②d4 彎d7 11 彎f3 0-0 12 ②2b3 ②ce4 13 彎f5 罩fd8 14 罩e1 兔f8 15 c3 (D)

The opening variation has given White very little. To compensate for the weakness of his isolated pawn, Black has a spatial advantage and outposts in the centre. Now in the event of 15...2d6!, Kasparov considers the position equal. Instead Black played illogically:




## 15... **營xf5?**!

Now one white knight will leave d4 – where it wasn't much needed anyway, since one piece for this square is enough – and will settle on e3, where it will be attacking the weak pawn. In other words, the coordination of White's pieces noticeably improves. So you see – without any tactical mistakes, one ill-considered move can significantly strengthen the opponent's position!

## 16 ②xf5 g6 17 ②e3 罩e8 18 罩d1 ②c5?! (D)

This move too is not the most effective. An improvement is 18... add!?, and if 19 g4? (White should play 19 2c2 2c5 20 2g5 with a plus), then 19... h6!. Another possibility is 18... h5!?, though White would still retain some advantage with 19 f3 2c5 20 2f1.



19 g4

A stratagem typical of this kind of position. White seizes some space on the kingside and molests the knight which is defending the IQP. Black will now have to defend on two fronts, and this is not simple.

## 19...h6 20 h4 ②xb3 21 axb3 এc5 22 g5 hxg5 23 hxg5 ②e4

The variation 23... 2xe3 24 2xe3 2g4 25 2xa7 2e2 26 2d4 favours White.


## 24 2 g4!

A brilliant decision, typical of Kasparov. I'm convinced he didn't even look seriously at 24 axd5 ad8, after which the white pieces appear awkwardly placed while the black ones gain a good deal of activity. As always, Kasparov is striving for activity himself.

## 24...&b6?!

Another error. Black would also do badly with 24... 2e7 25 \(\beta\)xd5 \(\beta\)ad8 26 \(\beta\)e5!, but the correct line is 24...\(\beta\)ad8! 25 \(\beta\)g2 f5 26 gxf6 \(\beta\)f7. Then either 27 \(\beta\)a5!? or 27 \(\beta\)e3!? would retain a plus for White.


## 25 曾g2 (D)



## 25...曾g7?!

This loses quickly. A much more stubborn line is 25... 查f8!? 26 基xd5 基ad8, although after 27 基xd8 基xd8 28 章f4 基d5 29 包e3 毫xe3 (not 29... 基d2? 30 金f3! 包xf2 31 包c4 基c2 32 包xb6 axb6 33 毫e5) 30 毫xe3 a6 31 f4 White still has a significant plus.

## 26 鼻f4 罩ad8 27 f3 (D)



## 27...Øc5

By now White has a choice of continuations. One possibility is 28 &e5+ \( \mathbb{Z}\) xe5 (Black loses

by force with 28...\$f8 29 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h1 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d7 30 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f6! \$\frac{1}{2}\$xf6 31 gxf6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g8 32 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h4! \$\frac{1}{2}\$e2+ 33 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g3 g5 34 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c7+ 35 f4!) 29 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xe5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e6, and now after 30 c4! White has sufficient advantage to win, though he will still have some work to do. Kasparov once again takes a decision that is characteristic of him. Instead of a material advantage, he plays for a positional one, which is based on White's considerable superiority in the coordination of his forces. In this situation his choice is fully justified.


## 28 b4! **2**b3

White also wins without much trouble in the event of 28... ②e6 29 兔e5+ 全f8 30 ②f6! ②xg5 31 ②xe8 墨xe8 32 f4.

## 29 \( \bar{a}\) \( \bar{e}\) \( \bar{e}\) \( \bar{g}\) \( \bar{a}\) \(

There is no relief in 31...當f8 32 c5 ②xc5 33 bxc5 ②xc5, on account of 34 罩ad3 d4 35 ②e5 and wins

## 32 c5 **Qd8** 33 **Exa7 Eee**2 (D)




We have now reached the position for the sake of which this game was selected as a textbook example. The diagram demonstrates most convincingly the essence and supreme importance of Zusammenspiel - the concept of the coordination of forces. At first sight it looks as if Black has been more successful in this department. Has he not doubled his rooks on the seventh rank? Meanwhile on the white side, only the knight and bishop, which are much weaker than a pair of rooks, can boast of being coordinated. And yet, the position is completely won for White. How is this? The point is that in reality, the coordination of Black's pieces is extremely limited. The bishop is doing nothing, either on its own or grouped with any other pieces. The same can be said of the knight. As for the rooks on the seventh rank, they are

perfectly harmless in this situation for two reasons. First, the white king has escaped to the safety of the third rank; secondly and even more importantly, their action is severely restricted by the white bishop and knight. In view of all this, the coordination of Black's forces is a matter of mere outward appearance. White's situation is completely different, for *his* rooks in actual fact have excellent prospects. There is nothing to prevent them from breaking into the enemy camp and doubling on the seventh – with decisive effect. This indeed is what happened:

## 

What conclusion is to be drawn from what we saw in that game? The coordination of forces is the ability of pieces and pawns to perform concerted work. To do so, they don't always have to be aiming at one object or one part of the board. It's just as in real life – someone charges into the attack with a cry of hurrah, while someone else stands guard over objects in their own sector. Both are performing the common task of repulsing the enemy and invading his territory. Both roles are equally important, but I should add that you usually try to assign as few forces as possible to the guard duties, so that all the more can join in the attack. Lasker called this the economical defence principle.

In my previous book Lessons in Chess Strategy I gave one example I am very fond of:




Nimzowitsch – Capablanca New York 1927

In this position, Lasker's principle is illustrated perfectly. It only remains to be added that without his 'unimpressive and passive' bishop, Black's entire plan of attack could scarcely

have succeeded. This is what coordination of the pieces is all about.

Much the same watching and guarding function which the bishop performs in this last example is very often performed by pawns; ideally, they support the aggressive efforts of their own pieces and clear the path for them, while simultaneously restraining the activity of the opponent's forces. This kind of situation arises in Keres-Petrosian, USSR Ch (Moscow) 1950, which is also examined fairly thoroughly in Lessons in Chess Strategy.

Now, as something that logically flows from what has been said, let me state one more very important maxim. It quite often happens that in order to attain the ideal coordination of the forces – that is, the maximum effectiveness of their concerted work – one piece (or occasionally more than one) has to relinquish what looks like the most attractive post for it as a piece taken in isolation. It has to occupy a more modest position – which may even seem ungainly – to further the common cause. In Lessons in Chess Strategy, we saw a very convincing example on these lines. Here it the critical moment:



Karpov – F. Olafsson Amsterdam 1976

Look at this position for half a minute, and then 'off the cuff', without reflection, answer this question: which of White's pieces is occupying the strongest post? Isn't it the knight on d5? However, there followed:

#### 25 De2! a5 26 Ddc3!


In effect, the pride and joy on d5 has been transferred to e2. And yet, after...

26...罩f7 27 包b5

...Black's position collapsed (although White subsequently made a meal of realizing his advantage). Why, then, did the sudden worsening of the white knight's position lead to an improvement of White's game as a whole? Because the knight's departure from the crucial d-file increased the pressure of White's major pieces on that same file. Is any further evidence needed that the principle of coordination stands above all else in chess? If it is needed, here is one more vivid example:

**Botvinnik – Larsen** *Noordwijk 1965* 

1 c4 e6 2 ②c3 d5 3 d4 ②f6 4 cxd5 exd5 5 皇g5 c6 6 e3 皇e7 7 營c2 0-0 8 皇d3 ②bd7 9 ②ge2 h6?! 10 皇h4 冨e8 11 f3 c5 12 0-0 a6 13 冨ad1 b5 14 皇f2 (D)




This is a Queen's Gambit variation to which Botvinnik made a large contribution, working out the scheme of development which he employs in the present game and which is popular in our own day too; Kasparov has used it many times and with a great deal of success. White's basic idea is to try to seize the centre with his pawns and afterwards transfer the play to the kingside. Larsen's next move unties White's hands in the centre and makes it easier for him to carry out his plan. In return Black obtains counterplay on the queenside.

14...c4 15 单f5 ②b6 16 ②g3 单f8 17 a3 单b7 White has everything ready and now moves forward.

## 18 e4 g6 19 \( \text{\ti}}}}}}} \ext{\texi}\titt{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texit}\titt{\text{\texitiex{\text{\texit{\text{\text{\texit{\text{\tex

White is quite happy to give up a pawn to gain time in which to work up his initiative.

After 22...bxa3 23 f5! g5 24 bxa3 &xa3 25 f6 Black's affairs are in a dismal state.




What is White to do now though? Give up the exchange to save time, or move aside with his queen or rook? Botvinnik writes that in the case of an immediate 23 f5 2a4 24 4b1, he considered the position to be unclear after 24...25! 25 fxg6 xh3+. This means White has to move aside. But with which piece, and where to?

#### 23 罩a1!

This is quite incomprehensible! Why not to el? There the rook would be united with the rest of White's force. We must wait a little while for the answer.

#### 23... \( \hat{2}\) a4 (D)



#### 24 營61!

A startling decision about the future of White's strongest pieces, and the decision is not taken by just anyone, but by Botvinnik himself!


#### 24...f5

This move is essential to prevent White from playing f5. It was with just this in mind that White decided where to place his queen and rook.

#### 25 axb4!

With the rook having gone to a1, this move is understandable – but will White derive any benefit from the open file?

25...axb4 26 ②xf5! gxf5 27 息xf5 豐e7 (D)



It was to obtain this position that White made his astounding 23rd and 24th moves. It now unexpectedly turns out that all the white pieces can work in harmony.

## 28 🖄 g3!

White has given up a piece for only two pawns, but is in no hurry to force events. For the moment he is bringing up his forces. This proves possible thanks to the extremely awkward placing of Black's minor pieces — especially the knight on h7.

#### 28....皇d7


This leads to some forced play in which White will be on top. 28... 互eb8!? seems to be an improvement, after which it is hard to demonstrate any strictly forced variations. However, the following line may be cited as characteristic though by no means obligatory: 29 ②h5 \$\circ\$h8 30 \$\color{1}\$e1 \$\color{1}\$f7 31 g4 c3 32 e6 \$\color{1}\$c7 33 bxc3 \$\circ\$b5 34 \$\color{1}\$xa8 \$\color{1}\$xa9 \$\color{1}\$xb4 \$\color{1}\$xb4 \$\color{1}\$xb5 \$\co

As the game goes, it's remarkable how the white queen and the al-rook prove to be most effectively placed. We can only admire the profundity with which Botvinnik has fathomed the secrets of the position.

## 29 &xd7 公xd7 30 豐g6+ 豐g7 31 豐c6 罩xa1 32 罩xa1 豐f7 33 罩a7 (D)

## 33...@xe5?!


Of course this move is not good, but then a good one is difficult to find. Black would lose at once with 33... \$\mathbb{L}\eq 7? 34 \$\mathbb{L}\ext{x}d7\$. His only answer



would seem to be 33...心b8, but then Botvinnik gives 34 豐b6 心d7 and now 35 豐a5!, which is based on a logical deduction. The sense of this move becomes clear when we look at the line it improves upon: if 35 豐b5?, then 35...這e7, after which the most natural move 36 f5 allows the counter-stroke 36...心xe5! 37 這xe7 豐xe7 38 豐xd5+心f7. By contrast, after 35 豐a5 這e7 36 f5, the queen is defending the a7-square and White retains a substantial advantage.

The move played leads by force to an endgame in which the black passed pawns are easily blocked and White's only serious problem (presumably) was time-shortage.


34 dxe5 營e6 35 營xe6+ 基xe6 36 公f5 基c6 37 全f1 c3 38 bxc3 bxc3 39 全e3 全c5 40 全xc5 基xc5 41 基a1 公f8 (D)



#### 42 ge2!

White could have taken the pawn, but after 42 \( \times \) xh6+ \( \times \) h7 43 \( \times \) f5 \( \times \) e6 Black would obtain some counter-chances. They would still be insufficient, but that is not the point. For the moment the black h-pawn is not influencing the play, so it is more correct for White to attend to his chief problem – that of blockading the passed pawns. The win will then be guaranteed.

## 42... De6 43 g3 h5 44 \$\ddot d3 d4 45 Dd6! (D)



The knight transfers itself to the commanding square e4, and the game is over. Black could already resign.

### 45...罩c7 46 夕e4 \$h7 47 f5 夕d8

A decisive manoeuvre by White's knight now follows:

## 48 ②f6+! \$h6 49 ②d5 필b7 50 e6 ②c6 51 필a6 ②e5+ 52 \$xd4 1-0


The game makes a powerful impression. It must be said that in Botvinnik's play you could always observe a clear preference for dynamic rather than static values. Most of his work on the openings was based on exploiting concealed dynamic possibilities in a variety of positions (some of which, in fact, were already quite well known), as opposed to the static factors which were often plain enough to see. And a similar path has always been followed by the one pupil to whom Botvinnik devoted the most time and energy: Garry Kasparov.

## 3 King Moves for Attacking Purposes

After the foregoing heavyweight chapters it will not come amiss to strike a rather lighter note and discuss a topic that is much less wideranging and may even seem a little 'exotic' – though it too is fully in keeping with the subject of this book.

The king moves I shall be talking about are king moves made by the active, attacking side – which are something of a rarity. Before even beginning to study the 'Initiative' theme, we can firmly state that in sharp situations you are rarely justified in holding up active operations – so it will be all the more interesting and instructive to acquaint ourselves with some cases where this principle is called into question, even if only in appearance.

Let us go straight to practical examples.



Fischer – Gligorić Bled/Zagreb/Belgrade Ct 1959

It's more than 30 years now since Fischer's My 60 Memorable Games appeared in Russian. It made a tremendous impression on me; I came to know it almost by heart. I well remember how astonished I was by the following move and the note to it, even though according to present-day notions it is not at all complicated and even obvious.


## 21 **\$**b1

Fischer writes, "An important preparatory move. On the immediate 21 f5?!, 21...exf5 22

△d5 ≝xa2! gives Black good play." For the moment I refrain from commenting. This time we will try to collect a little more material and postpone conclusions until later.

What I remember for sure is my amazement at White's apparent loss of time in a doubleedged situation where every tempo can prove decisive. Well then, let us see if Fischer was right.

21... **曾b6 22 曾f3 罩c5** (D)



23 習は3!

Basically this is the only way to continue the attack, since as Fischer points out, the attractive-looking 23 f5?! is bad: 23...exf5 24 星xh5 (not 24 公d5? 幽d8 25 exf5 兔xf5 26 星xh5? 罩xc2!, when Black wins) 24...gxh5 25 公f4 星xc3! (the typical counter-attack in such situations) 26 bxc3 星xc3 27 豐xh5 星xb3+! 28 cxb3 豐e3 and White is in serious difficulties.

## 23...\$xc3


The only reasons for surrendering such a bishop are either immediate and substantial gains, or else sheer necessity. Fischer convincingly demonstrates that other continuations also turn out badly: on 23... 25c6 24 f5! exf5 25 2xh5! gxh5 26 exf5 White has an overwhelming position, while 23... 28c6 loses to 24 2a4. Finally, on 23... 2f8 White wins by 24 f5! exf5 25 2d5 2d5 2d6 (25... fxe4 loses to 26 2xe4 2f5 27 2xf5) 26 2xh5! gxh5 27 2f6+ 2g7 28 2h3.

#### 24 @xc3

In view of 24 bxc3? \$\ddots b5\$ White has to return the pawn, but this suits him perfectly well.

## 24... ②xf4 25 營f3 ②h5 (D)

As Fischer says, 25...e5 loses to 26 包e2!. To continue the variation: 26.... e6 27 包xf4 exf4 28 豐xf4 豐d8 29 豐h2!, and Black can resign.




#### 26 罩xh5!

This sacrifice is typical of the Dragon Variation, but it should also be obvious to us from our previous chapter. Now Black hasn't a single piece left near his totally exposed king.

## 26...gxh5 27 營xh5 总e8

Or 27...\$\documents f8 28 \documents h8 + \documents e7 29 \documents f6 + \documents e8 30 \documents h1 \documents b5 31 \documents xe6! and White wins.

#### 28 營h6! (D)



## 28... 基xc3 29 bxc3 基xc3

White's winning line in reply to 29... 豐e3 was indicated by Bronstein. After 30 罩h1 豐xc3 31 g6 豐g7 32 豐h2! Black has absolutely no defence even though he is a pawn up, it is his move, and White's none too numerous pieces are quite a distance from their target. For example, 32... 豐f6 33 g7! or 32... 豐e5 33 豐h7+ 全f8 34 罩g1! 豐g7 35 ②xe6!. How do we explain this

phenomenon? The answer is simple: White's forces are cooperating perfectly, while Black's are just strewn about.

In the game, the conclusion was similarly quick:

30 g6! fxg6 31 罩h1 營d4 32 營h7+ 1-0

## Kramnik - Leko


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The rare variation chosen by Leko is not very effective for Black, as the only two games with it in *Mega Database* demonstrate. Stein-Taimanov, USSR Ch (Erevan) 1962 went 11...②f6 12 fxe6 fxe6 13 ②h5+ ②xh5 14 營xh5+ g6 15 營g4 with advantage to White. Gaprindashvili-Hindle, Hastings 1964/5 saw instead 11...exf5 12 ②f4 營b6 13 a4 c4+ 14 �h1 ②f6 15 axb5 Zd8 16 營e1 ②b4 17 營g3, and White acquired a large plus. Also after 11...②d6 12 fxe6 fxe6 (12...②xh2+? turns out badly after 13 �h1 fxe6 14 ②xb5+ axb5 15 營h5+ g6 16 赟xh2) 13 ②h5+ g6 14 ②g4, White has the better chances.

## 12 豐e1 公f6


#### 13 fxe6 fxe6 (D)



We have here quite a familiar situation where one player is behind in development and his opponent needs to act energetically to profit from this in good time. A recipe for doing so is easy enough to formulate and even prove. Applying it effectively in an original concrete situation is much harder. For instance, what is the best thing for White to attack in this position? Your eyes are immediately drawn towards the knight on f6. It can easily be attacked, and you would very much like to clear the f-file for the white rook. But if you hit the knight at once, then after the forced variation 14 皇 5 皇 d6! 15 皇 x f6 g x f6 16 富 x f6 皇 x h2 + 17 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ h1 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ g3! 18 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x e6 + (the play is similar after 18 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f1 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ h4 19 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x e6 + \$\frac{1}{2}\$ d7 20 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f7 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ e5, and Black easily holds the position) 18... \$\frac{1}{2}\$ d7 19 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x g3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x g3 20 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ g4 h5 21 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ c7, a fairly typical position arises in which Black's two bishops compensate for the pawn minus. Kramnik therefore chooses a different, more promising way:

## 14 &f4! e5

15 **g**g5 **g**e7 (D)




Now that a new and quite significant weakness has appeared in the black position, the white side has become easier to play.

#### 16 a4! c4?!

Leko wants to avoid weakening his pawn-structure still more by 16...b4, whereupon Kramnik gives 17 兔xf6 兔xf6 18 公d5 兔xd5 19 exd5 豐d6 20 兔h5+!? g6 21 兔g4 with a solid plus for White, though the win would still be a long way off.

## 17 axb5 axb5 (D)

By not weakening his structure further with 16...b4, Black avoided worsening the static components of his position, but at a price: he spent a tempo on 16...c4 which didn't develop or defend anything, and thereby allowed his




opponent some dynamic advantages. The result, as we can see now, is that White has a choice of aggressive possibilities, but again the question arises: what exactly should he be attacking? The answer, in its most general form, is: his opponent's weaknesses. This means the f-file as before, and now the b5-pawn as well. The best thing would be to combine both these attacks. We may suppose that this is what prompted White's next move:

#### 18 \$h1! b4

Defending the b-pawn is essential but very difficult. Kramnik gives 18...豐b6 19 豐g3 0-0 20 豐xe5 with a large advantage for White, but Black's pawn move, though virtually obligatory, does nothing to help the defence of his kingside. Thus White's timely king move, depriving Black of a useful check in a whole range of variations, proves to be an important gain of tempo for the attack. From here, events unfold almost by force.

19 &xf6 &xf6 20 公d5 &xd5 21 exd5 營c5 22 &h5+! 含e7 (D)




Again White needs to locate the weakest link in his opponent's position. The relevant points are the squares a7, e6 and g7, as well as the whole of the f-file. Almost everything is being held by the black bishop. This piece is already under attack, and White just needs to create the optimum conditions for capturing it. Kramnik steers his queen in the required direction.

## 23 **曾g3!** g6

By now Black's game can hardly be saved. The alternatives are 23... 異a8 24 星ad1 營d6 25 星xf6! 營xf6 26 d6+ 含d8 27 營e3 and 23... 營b6 24 全e2 星hf8 25 全xc4 星d6 26 營d3 g6 27 營h3 with a decisive plus. Leko chooses a line which allows his opponent a sparkling (even though not very complicated) series of sacrifices:

## 24 罩xf6! 會xf6 25 罩f1+ 會g7 (D)



Now the coup de grâce:

26 兔xg6! hxg6 27 豐xe5+ 堂g8

Or 27... 含h6 28 罩f4 and mates.

28 營e6+ 含h7 29 罩f7+ 含h6 30 營h3+ 含g5 31 營g3+ 含h5 32 營e5+ 1-0

If 32...\$\\$\\$h6, then 33 \[ \frac{1}{2}\$f4; or if 32...\$\\$g5, then 33 \[ \frac{1}{2}\$e2+\$\\$\\$\\$g6 34 \[ \frac{1}{2}\$e6+\$\\$\\$\\$b5 35 \[ \frac{1}{2}\$g7.


We can detect a similar idea in the following game.

## Tal – Larsen Portorož IZ 1958

## 1 e4 c5 2 分f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 公xd4 公f6 5 公c3 a6 6 皇g5 公bd7 7 皇c4 豐a5 8 豐d2 e6 9 0-0 h6 10 皇h4 皇e7 11 罩ad1 公e5 12 皇b3 (D)

This game too opens with a comparatively rare variation. The move Tal plays here looks perfectly obvious, yet it was soon to be totally ousted by the bishop's retreat to e2. The reason for this was Tal's game against Korchnoi a year later, part of which we are shortly going to see.

12...g5




Clearly 12...0-0? 13 ②d5 豐d8 14 ②xe7+ is no good for Black. Larsen evidently didn't like 12...②g6 13 逸g3 0-0 14 f4 ②h5 15 f5 either. He therefore goes in for sharp play, trying to secure e5 as an outpost for his pieces.

## 13 &g3 &d7?!

This quiet developing move proves to be a significant loss of tempo in quite a sharp position. The aforementioned game Tal-Korchnoi, USSR Ch (Tbilisi) 1959 showed that Black has an improvement in 13...心h5! 14 鱼a4+ b5 15 鱼xe5 dxe5 16 心c6 豐c7 17 心xe7 全xe7 18 鱼b3 心f6 19 豐e3 鱼b7 20 a4 b4 21 心a2 a5 22 c3 鱼a6 23 罩fe1 bxc3 24 罩c1 罩ab8 25 罩xc3 豐b6, with an excellent game.

## 14 f4 gxf4 15 🚉 xf4 🖾 h5 (D)



#### 16 \( \mathbb{L} \) xe5!?

Tal is of course ready for a tactical fight, and therefore prefers this method to 16 全3 ②g4 17 ②f3 ②xe3 18 豐xe3 ②f6, when Black has a perfectly acceptable game.

#### 16...**当xe5**

The other recapture is bad: 16...dxe5 17 公f5 ②c5+ 18 含h1 0-0-0 19 公d6+ ②xd6 20 營xd6 with a clear plus for White.

#### 17 含h1!

This is played from motives which recall the analogous move in the previous game. An important factor in Black's defence would be the option of checking on c5, for instance in the variation 17 包f3 豐c5+ 18 堂h1 0-0-0 with wholly unclear play. So White won't be able to do without the king move in the course of the coming aggressive action. He therefore plays it at once, and will afterwards choose a continuation according to his opponent's reply.


## 17...**夕**f6

If Black plays an immediate 17...豐c5, the thematic breakthrough follows with 18 e5!. Then after 18...豐xe5 19 公f5! exf5 20 罩fe1 豐c5 21 豐e2 White has an obvious plus.

#### 18 **公f3** 營h5

The other queen move 18...豐c5 would probably lead to difficulties: 19 e5 dxe5 20 豐e2 (but not 20 ②e4 豐c7), and if 20...e4 then 21 ②xe4 ②xe4 22 豐xe4 ②c6 (White's advantage is obvious after 22...0-0-0 23 ②e5) 23 豐g4 (the position is unclear after 23 豐f4 置g8 24 豐xh6 豐f5) 23...②f6 (or 23...②d7 24 豐g7 0-0-0 25 豐xf7 and Black is in a bad way) and at this point White has the attractive solution 24 ②xe6! fxe6 25 ②h4!! with a decisive plus.

## 19 e5! dxe5 20 ②e4 (D)



## 20...0-0-0?

Up to here Larsen has avoided the worst, but now he commits the decisive error and loses at once. 20.... 2b5?! 21 公g3 豐g4 22 c4 星d8 23 豐f2 星xd1 24 星xd1 兔c6 25 公xe5 is clearly in White's favour, but some interesting play could result from 20...公xe4! 21 豐xd7+ 全f8 22 豐xb7 公g3+ 23 曾g1 and now 23...公xf1! (not 23...兔c5+? 24 星f2 and White wins) 24 豐xa8+ 含g7 25 豐a7 (25 豐e4 is met by 25...公xh2!; all Black's counterplay is based on this stroke)

25...e4 26 營xe7 ②xh2! (stronger than 26...②e3 27 墨d7 exf3 28 兔xe6, with a big advantage) 27 兔xe6! exf3 28 營xf7+ 營xf7 29 兔xf7 ⑤xf7 30 ⑤xh2. The resulting endgame is clearly better for White, but this was probably Black's best option.

## 21 ②g3 豐g4 22 ②xe5 豐h4 23 豐c3+ �b8 24 ②xd7+ 1-0


In the next game there is no genuine struggle, but White's method of realizing his advantage is quite instructive.

## Tal – Soloviev Riga 1955

## 1 d4 公f6 2 c4 g6 3 公c3 皇g7 4 e4 0-0 5 皇e3 d6 6 f3 e5 7 公ge2 c6 8 豐b3 公bd7 9 0-0-0 豐e7?! 10 含b1 罩e8?! 11 g4 a6

Black hasn't played the opening well. His 9th and 10th moves look especially odd. His last move is again too slow; 11...a5!? appears preferable.

### 12 ②g3 (D)



#### 12...分f8?


This is total positional capitulation. For good or ill, Black had to seek counter-chances. A way of doing so was 12...exd4 13 总xd4 公c5 14 營a3 公e6 (another possible plan, though a more passive one, begins with 14...公fd7) 15 总e3 公d7, and if White takes the pawn with 16 營xd6, Black has hopes of compensation after 16...營xd6 17 黨xd6 ②e5.

## 13 d5 26d7 14 h4 c5 15 2e2 2b8 16 2dg1 b5 17 h5 b4?

With this Black capitulates for good. Everything White can dream about in this sort of position is granted to him totally for free. Of

course White would still have a huge plus after 17...bxc4 18 營c2!?. The variation 17...公b6 18 cxb5 axb5 19 兔xb5 would also be clearly in his favour, but Black mustn't submit to his fate as meekly as he does! His sole consolation is that the game is now dragged out a little longer.


18 公a4 公b6 19 公xb6 基xb6 20 豐d3 基b7 21 豐d2 f6 (D)



## 22 hxg6 ②xg6

A ghastly move from the positional point of view, but at this stage it can scarcely count as an error, seeing that after 22...hxg6 the white rooks would have another open file at their disposal and the game could finish 23 \(\Delta d1!\) \(\Delta d7\) 24 \(\Delta f5!\) gxf5 \(\Delta f5!\) gxf5 \(\Delta f5!\) \(\Delta f8 27\) \(\Delta g4,\) with a quick win. There now follows a long sequence of moves which require no explanation.

23 分f5 兔xf5 24 gxf5 分f4 25 兔d1 \$\disph\$8 26 \$\disph\$12 h6 27 兔xf4 exf4 28 \$\mathbb{Z}\$16 \$\disph\$7 30 兔a4 \$\mathbb{Z}\$16 \$\disph\$17 \$\mathbb{Z}\$17 \$\disph\$17 \$\disph\$18 \$\dis




The verdict on the position is obvious. White only needs to find the most precise way to break through his opponent's defences. As this can't

be done with the forces already on the kingside, Tal next move brings up his bishop.

33 &d1! \( \bar{2} \) e8 34 \( \bar{2} \) e2 a5 35 \( \bar{2} \) f1 a4 36 \( \bar{2} \) h3 a3 37 b3 \( \bar{2} \) f7 38 \( \bar{2} \) g4 \( \bar{2} \) a7


If Black plays 38... 營e7, trying to bring his queen out onto the long diagonal, then 39 單h1 puts it back in its place.

39 **溴h5** 單d8 (D)



Now in order to remove the barrier from the h-file, White gives up his active rook for the passive enemy bishop, but the result – the activation of all White's other forces – is well worth it.

44 &g6+ &g8 (D)



It's only now that the hero of this chapter enters the scene – the attacking side makes a 'mysterious' king move. The mystery is soon dispelled, though.

45 堂c1! 罩d7 46 罩h1 堂f8 47 f4!

We now see that the king was removing itself from a possible check so that the pawns could advance. What isn't yet clear is how this advance can benefit White.

#### 47... Ic7 48 含d2 Id7 49 含d3 Ic7

Here is the answer. By playing e5, White will bring one more fighting unit into the attack on the enemy king, and this will be the deciding factor.

#### 50 **Ee1!**

This could have been played on move 48, but Black was of course completely helpless and the delay alters nothing.

## 

On 53...e4+ 54 \$\displays e3 \$\displays f8\$, White has 55 \$\displays h8+ \$\frac{1}{2}g8\$ 56 f6.


The next game contains a similar feature. In the course of preparing a massed onslaught against the enemy king, the attacker repeatedly has to trouble his *own* king.

## Alekhine - Yates Semmering 1926

## 1 c4 e5 2 ②c3 ②c6 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 d4 exd4 5 ②xd4 ②b4 6 ②g5 0-0 7 Ic1 Ie8 8 e3 d6

In this variation it's very important for Black to play ...h6, and he is well advised not to put it off. The present game clearly bears this out. In Smirin-Onishchuk, New York Open 1998, the continuation was 8...h6 9 皇h4 ②xd4 10 豐xd4 c5 11 豐d6 星e6 12 豐d1 豐a5 13 皇xf6 星xf6 14 a3 皇xc3+ 15 星xc3 d6 16 皇e2 皇d7 17 皇f3 星b8 18 0-0 b5 19 cxb5 ½-½-½.

## 



11...**∕**2g6?

Missing his last chance to play 11...h6, and if 12 \(\Delta\)h4, then 12...\(\Delta\)g6. After White's next move, the game assumes a settled shape; the pawn position will be fixed for an extremely long period and in a manner highly unfavourable to Black. Thus, a seemingly minor error sometimes has grave consequences.

#### 12 Db5!


Here is Black's punishment. It is simple but effective.

## 12... **Qd7** 13 **Qxf6** gxf6 14 **Qd3**

In a settled position, with features that are fixed for the long term, the subjective factor becomes less significant. That is, there is less scope for selecting a plan to suit your own taste; the demands of the position start to play an increasing role.


I mention all this because the plan chosen here by Alekhine does not seem to me to be especially suited to the character of the position. Black's obvious weakness is his kingside pawnstructure, but the question is what to attack the pawns on the f-file, or the one on h7. Alekhine, as we shall see, chooses the latter. I feel that attacking the f-pawns is more natural, and would therefore prefer either 14 \(\mathbb{L}\)f3!? (but not 14 c5 &xb5 15 &xb5 c6 16 &e2 d5) 14...\@c8 15 Ød4 Øe5 16 c5, when White has a clear plus and comfortable play; or else 14 ②d4!? 豐e7 (if 14...包e5, then 15 f4 - compare the game continuation) 15 營c2 罩ad8 16 c5, again with a highly attractive position. With the plan Alekhine adopts. White will face distinct difficulties. It will take time and energy to overcome them - but then, this will make for a large-scale, unconventional and in some ways instructive contest. Every cloud, as they say, has a silver lining.

14...會h8 15 公d4 黨g8 16 營h5 營f8 (D)




## 17 f4 罩e8 18 罩f3 罩g7 19 勾f5

The tempting bishop exchange doesn't work: 19 \(\delta f5?!\) c5!. Still, the white bishop will now be stronger than the black knight.



Two things have now become clear: (a) White can't break through to his chosen objective without pushing his own kingside pawns, and (b) as long as White doesn't undertake anything sharp, Black is forced to wait passively. These circumstances give rise to Alekhine's plan of transferring his king to the queenside and then launching a pawn attack on the other wing. In this case we are dealing not just with an individual king move that is useful for some reason or other, but with an entire king march!

24 曾f1 Id8 25 Id2 b6 26 曾d5 Igg8 27 曾f5 a5 28 曾e1 智e6 29 曾h5 (D)



29...豐e7


Here there are two more things I would like to call to your attention. The first is the fact that the white rook is chained to c3 for ages by the need to defend the e3-pawn. The second is a recommendation by Kotov. He advises Black not to wait, but to harass the enemy king by advancing his own pawns towards its new residence. However, if this advice is tested by analysis, we find that after (e.g.) 29...c6?! 30 堂d1 罩b8 31 堂c1 b5 (which is what Kotov gives), White obtains an overwhelming position by the simplest of means: 32 全f5! 豐e7 33 豐f3 c5 34 豐c6. Therefore we have to acknowledge that Yates was right to arrange his queenside and centre pawns in the most solid manner possible. His serious mistakes come later. For the moment, the play proceeds at a leisurely pace.

30 \$\d1 \textbf{\textit{Z}}g7 31 \$\dec{1} \times f8 32 \$\dec{1}{2}f5 \textbf{\textit{Z}}e8 33 g4 \$\times g6 34 a3 \$\dec{w}d8 35 \$\dec{1}{2}c2 \$\dec{w}c8 36 \$\dec{1}{2}b1 \$\times e7 37 h3 \$\times g6 38 \$\dec{w}h6 \$\dec{w}d8 39 \$\dec{1}{2}a2 \$\times e7 40 \$\dec{1}{2}a1 \$\dec{1}{2}a1 \$\dec{1}{2}a2 \$\dec{1}{2}a2

Not 40 豐xf6? 公d5 41 豐xd8 公xc3+.

White would like to bring more pawns into play and open up the h-file at the same time, but Black has organized an effective defence; after 46 h4 We6 47 h5? De7 48 Zxf6 Wxg4 White's queen turns out to be trapped and he has no good answer to the threat of ... Dg8. I would add that this variation is by no means accidental but results from the circumstances we discussed before. On the unopened h-file there isn't enough room for all White's major pieces, and in any case one of them is stuck on c3 – so that White has inadequate forces for mounting an attack. For these very reasons the plan beginning with 14 2d3 was in my view not the strongest.

46...fxg5 47 罩xg5 豐f8 48 罩h5 豐g8 (D)




49 \$a2!?

This move is easy to understand if you consider the uncomplicated variation 49 f5 2e5 50 f6 3e1 + 51 26 2e3 2e5 6.

#### 49...9f8

This looks like just another of those waiting moves that we are used to seeing in this game, but perhaps it should count as an inaccuracy, as the white queen now slips out of its corner into the open spaces, improving White's position. As an attempt to prevent this, the unexpectedly sharp 49...f6!? would be worth trying. There could follow 50 f5 包e5 51 營xf6 b5 52 營h4 b4 53 f6 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 54 \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 55 \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 54 \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 55 \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 54 \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 55 \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 54 \begin{aligned} quences. It must be said that moves causing such an abrupt change in the pace of the game are very difficult to find, especially for the defending side. It is even more difficult to resolve on playing them when facing a stronger opponent whose authority weighs on you psychologically.

50 \( \text{\text{\$\pi\$}} \)f6! \( \text{\$\pi\$} \)d7 51 \( \text{\$\text{\$\pi\$}} \)d4 f6 52 \( \text{\$\pi\$} \)f8 53 \( \text{\$\text{\$\pi\$}} \)f8 \( \text{\$\pi\$} \)ge7 54 \( \text{\$\pi\$} \)f5 \( (D) \)



#### 54...9c5?


Another very important moment. There is no doubt that 54... \$\begin{align\*} 27!\$ is stronger than the move played. Alekhine writes that he intended to reply 55 e4 (with a view to bringing his rook to g3 in some lines), but then Black has 55... \$\begin{align\*} 2ee7!\$, whereupon 56 \$\begin{align\*} f2 (which Alekhine indicates as part of his plan) comes up against the powerful retort 56... \$\begin{align\*} 2c5!\$. I can therefore see nothing better for White than 56 \$\begin{align\*} 2h4!? or 56 \$\begin{align\*} 2xd7!?\$, renouncing his ambitious attacking plans in favour of that prosaic play against weaknesses which he could have initiated much earlier.

#### 55 罩c2! 罩g7 56 罩g2!

As a result of Black's imprecise manoeuvring in a cramped and passive position, White has rid himself of both his liabilities (see above); all his pieces are now operating together against his opponent's weakened kingside. Similar transformations of a position occurred in our last chapter, and we studied their dire consequences for the weaker side.

#### 56...**罩ee7**

57 **三g4 a4 58 三h6! 三gf7 59 三gg6 公b3 60 豐c3** (D)




#### 60...d5

This loses quickly, but even after 60... Ze8 (which Alekhine gives as the only move to prolong Black's resistance) White would have two ways of winning:

- a) 61 e4!? (Alekhine's own recommendation, improving on 61 罩xf6 罩xf6 包罩xf6 豐g7 63 罩f7 豐xc3 64 罩xh7+ 鸷g8 65 bxc3 罩xe3) 61...豐e7 62 罩xf6 罩xf6 63 罩xf6 豐g7 64 罩f7, and White still has some work to do in this won endgame.
- b) A simpler way is 61 單h4 罩ee7 62 罩gh6 掌g8 (62...包c5 is also bad in view of 63 兔xh7 罩xh7 64 罩xf6) 63 營c2.

61 cxd5 罩e8 62 e4 營c5 (D)



And now at last, the ideal coordination of White's pieces makes itself felt:

Or 65...會h7 66 罩g4+.


66 營h8+ 含e7 67 罩e6+ 含d7 68 營xe8# (1-0)

Now another example, in which the analysis is positively replete with king moves! The game is a very famous one by the young Steinitz. Many of the variations are from Kasparov's My Great Predecessors.

## Steinitz - Mongredien

London 1862

1 e4 d5 2 exd5 👑xd5 3 🗟c3 👑d8 4 d4 e6 5 🖄 f3 🖄 f6 6 & d3 & e7 7 0-0 0-0 8 & e3 b6 9 🖄 e5 & b7 10 f4 🖄 bd7 11 👑 e2 🖄 d5? 12 🖄 xd5 exd5 13 🗸 f3 f5 14 🗸 h3 g6 15 g4 fxg4 (D)



Black's opening play has been poor, and with his last move Steinitz has launched a direct attack on the king. At this point he has the choice between the immediate rook sacrifice which actually occurs, and the simple recapture of the pawn. We shall first examine the consequences of the latter move. After 16 豐xg4 全f6 17 豐g2 皇c8, White plays the sacrifice which in this game is thematic: 18 墨xh7! 曾xh7 19 豐xg6+ 全h8 and in this position the obvious 20 全h1 follows, after which the rook joins in the attack, winning quickly. In the game, events take a very similar course, only with a somewhat greater number of possible variations.


#### 16 **基xh7!** ②xe5

If Black takes the rook at once, White's thematic king move is again indispensable: 16... \$\delta\$xh7 17 \$\delta\$xg4 \$\overline{\Omega}\$f6 (17... \$\overline{\Omega}\$xe5 18 fxe5 transposes to the game) 18 \$\delta\$xg6+ \$\delta\$h8 19 \$\delta\$h1 and wins. Other defensive tries don't help

either: 16...包f6 17 單h6, or 16...單f6 17 豐xg4! \$\disp\xn7 18 \disp\xg6+.

## 17 fxe5 \$\disp\xh7

18 **營xg4** (D)



## 18...**ℤg8**

A more stubborn defence is 18... e8 19 wh5+, and now:

a) 19... \$g7 20 \$\bigsymbol{\text{\text{bh}}}\$h6+ \$\bigsymbol{\text{\$g8}}\$ 21 \$\bigsymbol{\text{\$g\$}}\$xg6 \$\bigsymbol{\text{\$g\$}}\$f7 and again White's king move proves very useful: 22 \$\bigsymbol{\text{\$h\$}}\$1! \$\bigsymbol{\$g\$}\$f8 23 \$\bigsymbol{\text{\$b\$}}\$5 \$\bigsymbol{\$g\$}\$g7 24 \$\bigsymbol{\$g\$}\$g1 \$\bigsymbol{\$g\$}\$f8. At this point, according to Kasparov, the only winning move is 25 \$\bigsymbol{\$g\$}\$g3!!. (Actually, though, this shouldn't unduly surprise us. It's a case we are perfectly familiar with: one piece merely joins in a combined operation with other pieces, though this is not to deny the striking effect of the move.)

b) On 19...\$\delta g8 White wins with 20 \delta xg6 \boxed{\boxed} f7 21 \delta h1 \delta f8 22 \boxed{\boxed} g1 \delta g7 23 \delta h6!.


Black could try 18...宣f5 19 兔xf5 gxf5 20 豐xf5+ ��g7 (if 20...��h8 21 豐h5+ ��g8, then the decisive move of course is 22 ��h1) but here too the ever-recurring 21 ��h1 wins.

## 19 当h5+ 含g7 20 当h6+ 含f7 21 当h7+ 含e6 22 当h3+ 含f7 23 当f1+

By throwing in a pawn with 23 e6+! (followed by 23...堂e8 24 堂h6+! or 23...堂e8 24 營h7) White could have won more quickly than by bringing up his rook, but as long as something is thrown into the fight, it doesn't matter!

23... 全e8 24 響e6 置g7 25 皇g5 響d7 On 25... 皇c8, White wins with 26 響c6+!. 26 皇xg6+ 置xg6 27 響xg6+ 会d8 28 置f8+ 響e8 29 響xe8# (1-0)

And now, an extract from one of Kasparov's own games. The conclusion of this tremendous and hugely complicated game was analysed in our previous chapter. Here too, many of the variations are from Kasparov's book of the match.



Kasparov – Karpov London/Leningrad Wch (16) 1986


In general terms, the assessment of the situation isn't much different from the one we gave in the previous chapter. Black has an overwhelming plus on the queenside. The a3-knight appears doomed. On the other hand White has excellent prospects of an attack on the kingside. He has to act energetically and boldly, as in such situations tempi decide everything.

### 30 &xf8 &xf8 (D)

Taking with the rook is worse: 30... \( \bar{2}xf8?! \) 31 \( \bar{2}\)h6+, and now:

- a) On 31...\$h7?, Kasparov gives the attractive forced variation 32 ②xf7 \*\*\text{\text{w}}\text{xa3} 33 \*\*\text{\text{\text{e}}}\text{c1} + 34 \*\text{\text{ch}}\text{2} \*\text{mh1} +! 35 \*\text{sxh1} \text{\text{\text{ox}}\text{f2} + 36 \*\text{\text{g}}\text{1}} \text{\text{2xe4} = xf7} 38 \*\text{\text{Zxg6}!} \text{\text{\text{ox}}\text{c5}} 39 \*\text{\text{c2}}\text{2} \text{\text{b}}\text{7} 40 \*\text{\text{Zc6}} + \text{\text{d}}\text{d} 3 41 \*\text{Zxc4}, and wins.
- b) 31...含g7 32 ②f5+ 含h7 33 營e3, and if 33...gxf5? (better is 33...營c1+ 34 營xc1 ②xc1 35 ②d4, when White has the advantage but Black's position is still perfectly playable), then 34 ②xd3 cxd3 35 營g5 營f6 36 營h5+ 營h6 37 營xf5+ 含h8 38 營xd7 d2 39 營g4 国c8 40 含h2! and White wins.

#### 31 \$\document{\phi}\h2!




Despite the need to be energetic, White makes a move with his king; yet without this move the attack can't proceed, as is clear from the variation 31 ②h6? 豐c1+. Apart from that, the usefulness of this move will be seen in the subsequent play.

#### 31...罩b3!

For instance we see it here, where 31... wa3? is bad on account of 32 \( \overline{2} \) h6. The analysis goes:

a) 32... ②7e5 33 營f6 (D) and now:



- a1) 33... 響b2 34 罩xg6 會e8 and here the astonishing 35 罩g5!! gives White a decisive plus. A very important point is that Black can't take the bishop with check. Without check, the capture is no good (35... 響xb1 36 營d6 ②g6 37 罩xg6 fxg6 38 營e6+ 會d8 39 ②f7+ 會c7 40 營c6#), so Black has to play for simplification, and after 35... ②g4+ 36 ②xg4 營xf6 37 ②xf6+ 會e7 38 ②xd3 cxd3 39 ②e4 White wins the endgame.
- a2) Since 33...\(\beta\)xb1 also occurs without check, White wins by 34 \(\beta\)xg6.
- b) 32... 豐e7 33 罩xg6 鸷e8 and now White has the forced variation 34 兔xd3! 豐e5+ (or 34...cxd3 35 d6 豐e5+36 g3 fxg6 37 豐f7+ 鸷d8 38 豐g8+ and wins) 35 g3 fxg6 36 兔xg6+ �e7,

whereupon the decisive move is a pawn thrust that is well known to us from the previous chapter: 37 d6+!. The cooperation of Black's forces is finally destroyed and the game comes to an end. It's simply amazing how similar this situation is to the one that arose in the game.

#### 32 &xd3 cxd3

This gives the position in Chapter 2 (Development); its consequences are already familiar to us.

In the following dramatic and unconventional game, a voluntary king move serves as a prelude to aggressive operations. Later on, the king has to go on a march to avoid interfering with the concerted action of its own pieces.

# Spassky – Polugaevsky USSR Ch (Moscow) 1961

# 1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 e6 3 ②f3 b6 4 ②c3 **\$b7** 5 **\$g5 \$e7** 6 e3 ②e4 7 ②xe4 **\$xe4** 8 **\$f4** 0-0 9 **\$d3 \$b4+**

Giving up a tempo to stop White from castling. Another perfectly playable line is 9... g6 10 0-0 d6 11 & xg6 hxg6 12 e4 4d7, and Black subsequently equalized in Seirawan-Christiansen, USA Ch (Chandler) 1997.


#### 10 gf1

White chooses this square so that he can retake with the queen after 10...2xf3.

#### 

Spassky goes into action, but for now this amounts to no more than a bid for the initiative.

#### 12...f5(D)



Despite the criticism that has been levelled at it, this move looks logical and not at all bad. It is later that Black goes wrong.

#### 13 \text{\decision}e2!?

To continue with his fight for the initiative, White is prepared to take a definite risk. This is perfectly normal.


#### 13...d6

Another plan is also worth considering: 13...全d6!? 14 星ag1 ②c6, with an unclear position.

### 14 g4!? 🖾 d7

Of course, 14...fxg4? is bad on account of 15 ②g5 全xg5 16 hxg5 g6 17 豐e4 and wins. However, 14...豐d7!? looks quite good; after 15 罩ag1 ②c6 the chances are about even.

#### 15 \( \mathbb{Z}\) ag1 (D)



One annotator considers this position to be a good deal better for White. Is he right? What grounds are there for such a verdict? I don't think White has any real advantage. True, he has a spatial plus, but not a very significant one. He has a lead in development, but it is only slight. At present Black's light squares are a little weak, but White no longer has a light-squared bishop, and the rest of his pieces are as yet in no position to attack c6 or e6. It follows that these weaknesses are purely nominal and have no role to play. On the other hand White's king position is not safe enough, and although this isn't a tangible factor just now, it may begin to tell once the position opens up. From all this it is clear that White's position should be assessed as just a little more active, and Black's as sufficiently solid with realistic counterchances.

#### 15...fxg4

I have doubts about this move, and would prefer 15...豐e8!? 16 單h2 fxg4 17 罩xg4 ②f6 18 罩g1 ②h5.

#### 

It was worth thinking seriously about 16 2g5 2xg5 17 hxg5 2f5 18 2xg4 2f8 19 e4, with the better chances for White.


# 16...公f6 17 里g5!

The right square, not permitting 17...心h5!. 17... **\*\*\* d7 18 h5 ②e8 19 三g2 b5!?** 

Polugaevsky has regrouped his pieces quite effectively and now endeavours to counter-attack.

#### 20 c5! (D)

Spassky finds the only way to sustain the initiative. Black would be satisfied with the position after 20 cxb5 \( \mathbb{L}b8 \) 21 a4 a6.




#### 20...dxc5?

The first critical moment in the game has arrived. Black makes his only real mistake, but one that should have proved decisive. Such things are no rarity in sharp positions, as we have seen more than once. After 20... \cong c6!?, the right line for White is not at all simple to find. All I did manage to find was something fairly involved: 21 cxd6 &xd6, and now the surprising 22 d5! \widetilde{\pi} xd5 (the whole point is that 22...exd5? fails to 23 h6!, the thematic punch of this game; if then 23...g6, White wins 23 豐xd5 exd5 24 盒xd6 包xd6 25 罩c1, when White has splendid compensation for the pawn, though I think Black ought to hold the position without too much difficulty. Now the scene suddenly changes.

#### 21 h6! 罩f5 (D)

Other variations are no fun for Black either: 21...c4 22 豐xh7+! 堂xh7 23 hxg7+ 堂g8 24 gxf8豐+ 堂xf8 25 嶌h8+ 堂f7 26 包e5+ and White wins; or 21...g6 22 嶌xg6+ hxg6 23 豐xg6+ 堂h8 24 包e5 豐d5 (24...嶌f6 25 包f7+ 嶌xf7 26 豐xf7 +-) 25 嶌g1 +-.



#### 22 **ge5!**

Spassky was always very strong in attack. Here too he plays with precision. A much weaker line is 22 hxg7 分6 23 全5 豐d5, when the position is unclear.

#### 22...c4


On 22... \(\mathbb{e}\) c6 23 e4 \(\mathbb{E}\)f7, White wins by 24 \(\mathbb{L}\)xg7!.

# 23 營e4 營d5 24 營g4 c3 25 b3! b4

Seeking his chances. On 25... \$\bullet{\pi}\$f7, White has a simple win with 26 hxg7 \$\bullet\$f6 27 \$\bullet\$xf6 \$\bullet\$xf6 \$28\$\$\bullet\$xh7.

#### 26 e4 曾b5+ 27 會e3! (D)

There was a great chance for Black concealed in the variation 27 堂e1?? 豐d3! 28 皇xg7 皇g5!, when White must resign!




#### 27...罩f7 28 hxg7 勾f6

#### 29 **拿xf6 罩xf6 30 罩xh7!**

This blow crops up in nearly every variation of White's attack and is therefore obvious, but there was something else that required calculating:

This represents Black's last chance.



# 31 **\$**xf3


Not, of course, 31 豐xf3?? 皇g5+.

#### 

A remarkable 'thematic' line was pointed out by Moiseev: 32... 營位2+33 全65 全位6+34 全xe6 至e8+35 全位7 至e7+36 全位8. The white king is invulnerable, while the black one will quickly be mated. Working out all these marches with his king was what was so difficult about the operation Spassky undertook.

#### 33 曾g5 曾xh7

Now an extraordinary thing happened. After the obvious 34 &f6! 豐xd4+35 &f7 (D), the following dream position would have come about:



Spassky says he saw this variation, but some demon prompted him to play instead:

#### 34 \$h5??

What he missed, of course, was the following check:


# 34...營b5+!

In a state of shock (who wouldn't be?), he replied:

35 \$h4?

This move even throws away the forced draw that could have been achieved by 35 e5! 營e8+36 含h4 急e7+37 含h3 含g8 38 含h2! 營f7 39 營h3 營f4+40 含g1 (not 40 含h1 營h4 -+)40...營c1+, with perpetual check.

35....皇e7+ 36 當h3 豐g5! 37 豐xg5 皇xg5 38 置xg5 罩d8 (D)



Of course the endgame that has unexpectedly arisen must be evaluated in Black's favour thanks to the mighty passed pawn on c3, but for the moment he is tied down by the enemy pawn on g7. White should therefore hasten to bring his king into play; after 39 堂g3 堂g8! 40 罩c5 罩xd4 41 堂f4 罩d2 42 f3 罩xa2 Black still has the advantage, but White might preserve some drawing chances.

There was also another method: the paradoxical 39 g8豐+!? 墨xg8 40 墨c5 墨g1! (40...里g7? can be met by 41 a3!, while after 40...墨d8 41 墨c4 a5 42 堂g4 堂g6 43 堂f4 the chances are equal) 41 墨xc7+ 堂g6 42 堂h2 墨a1 43 堂g3 墨xa2 44 堂f4 a5. Again Black keeps a plus, but here too it seems that White can hope to save himself. Instead, emotionally shattered, Spassky played:

#### 39 f4?!

There followed:

39... \$\dagge g8! 40 \dagge c5 \dagge xd4 41 \dagge xc7 \dagge xe4 42 \$\dagge g4 (D)\$


White also loses after 42 \( \mathbb{Z}\)xa7 c2 43 \( \mathbb{Z}\)c7 \( \mathbb{Z}\)e3+ 44 \( \mathbb{Z}\)g4 \( \mathbb{Z}\)c3.

#### 42...e5!

It now turns out that Black has a forced win.

#### 43 a3

The whole point is that after 43 \( \frac{1}{2} \)f5 \( \frac{1}{2} \)xf4+ 44 \( \frac{1}{2} \)g6 \( \frac{1}{2} \)g4+ 45 \( \frac{1}{2} \)h6 Black wins with 45...e4! (here's a good exercise to practise your calculation; see if you can work out the rest by



yourself!) 46 罩c8+ 含f7 47 罩f8+ 含e6 48 g8營+ 罩xg8 49 罩xg8 e3! 50 罩e8+ 含d5 51 罩xe3 c2 52 罩e1 含d4 53 含g5 含c3 54 含f4 含d2 55 罩h1 c1營 56 罩xc1 含xc1.

# 43...<u>¤xf</u>4+ 44 \$\dig 5 a5 45 axb4 axb4 46 \$\dig 6 \$\dig 4+ 47 \$\dig 6\$

On 47 \$\overline{9}\$h6, Black wins with the familiar 47...e4!.

### 47...含h7! 48 g8營+

In the event of 48 \$\displayses \boxes \boxen \boxes \boxes \boxes \boxes \boxes \boxes \boxes \boxes \boxe

White also loses after 51 \$\dong{1}{2}g6 \$\dong{1}{2}f8.


#### 51...罩b1 0-1

"O woe, O woe!", as the unforgettable Isaak Boleslavsky would (no doubt rightly) have said.

It leaves an unpleasant taste when a brilliant attack is spoilt so lamentably. To make up for it, I want to present a real masterpiece of a game which made a tremendous impression on me when it was played. It did so not just because of its sheer magnificence but also because I was lucky enough to follow it move by move as it was relayed by telephone from Moscow to Odessa chess club. (In case anyone doesn't know, Efim Geller came from Odessa. Well. I too had the good fortune to be born in that wonderful city which I very much love, and to spend a large part of my life there.) The moves were shown, with a commentary, on a demonstration board in front of the chess fans assembled in the spacious hall, and I happened to be one of the assistants who brought the moves hot from the telephone to the commentator. To this day I remember the mouths gaping with amazement, the commentators' included! We shall duly examine the moments of the game when that happened.

# Geller – Smyslov Moscow Ct (4) 1965

1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 g6 3 ②c3 d5 4 cxd5 ②xd5 5 e4 ②xc3 6 bxc3 ②g7 7 ②c4 c5 8 ②e2 0-0 9 0-0 ②c6 10 ②e3 營c7 11 ③c1 ⑤d8 12 f4 e6 13 ⑤h1 (D)



#### 13...b6?

Smyslov did more than anyone else to develop this opening variation, but this time he mishandles it. As theory was later to show, the correct move here is the immediate 13...②a5; for example: 14 \(\hat{L}\)d3 f5 15 g4 b6 16 gxf5 exf5 17 \(\hat{L}\)g3 \(\hat{L}\)b7 with an excellent game for Black, as in Přibyl-Schmidt, Polanica Zdroj 1973.


#### 14 f5 Da5

On 14...exf5, Geller gives 15 皇g5 置f8 16 d5 ②a5 17 d6 營d7 18 皇d5 皇b7 19 exf5 with advantage to White.

# 15 &d3 exf5 16 exf5 &b7 17 \( \text{ \text{\$\su}} d2 \) \( \text{\$\text{\$\su}} e8 18 \) \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\su}}} g3 \) \( \text{\$\det{2}\$}}\$}d\$}}} d8}}}}}}} }} }} } } } } } }

As Geller points out, an attempt to reduce material by 19... 互xe3 20 豐xe3 cxd4 would lead to an obvious plus for White after 21 豐f4 dxc3 22 f6.

20 **Qh6 <b>Qh8** 21 **營f4 Zd7** (D)




#### 22 De4!

White loses no time in bringing his forces to the scene of the decisive battle – on the kingside. Geller was a wonderful master of the attack and a player with strong principles; that is, he always endeavoured to play according to the requirements of the position. In the present game, these qualities thoroughly make their mark.

#### 22...c4?!

The general remarks that can be made about this move are all simple and obvious. After releasing the tension in the centre, Black will be unable to work up any counterplay there. But then, just as obviously, Smyslov must have understood this. If a player of his calibre takes such a decision, he must have some reasons for it, and even if he turns out to be wrong it will be useful to follow his train of thought. Presumably Smyslov thought it would be useful to double rooks on the open e-file, but calculated the variation 22... Ide7 23 fxg6 hxg6 (23... 學xg6 24 ②f6+ 豐xf6 25 豐g4+) 24 ②d6 罩e1+ 25 made a move which offends against a wellknown general principle in order to coordinate the actions of his rooks. Geller gives 22... \cong c7 as more tenacious; he was intending to reply 23 国e1! &xe4 (not 23... 豐xf4? 24 ②f6+) 24 国xe4 罩xe4 25 營xe4, with an obvious plus. It was evidently to avoid this kind of thing that Smyslov conceded the centre.

#### 23 &c2 罩de7 (D)



#### 24 罩cf1!

This is where the spectators' jaws first dropped a little. White makes this move not out of any desire for outward show, but because after 24 fxg6 hxg6 he can't play 25 \( \frac{1}{2}\)d6?? on

account of 25... Le1+ and mate. On the other hand, allowing Black to seize the initiative would be fatal. Geller therefore continues to mobilize his pieces in the face of the enemy's fire. From this point on, the play proceeds almost on forced lines, and calculation of variations naturally comes to the fore.

#### 24...罩xe4


Black has to capture to prevent 42d6.

#### 25 fxg6! f6

Black has no choice. The white queen is immune, and 25... 豐xg6 26 豐xf7+ 豐xf7 27 罩xf7 is no good either.

But what now? Another jaw-dropping move ensued:

### 26 **曾g5!** (D)



# 26... **營d7**

Other replies don't improve Black's position: 26... 響c7 27 gxh7++ \$\precent{e}\$xh7 28 \$\precent{e}\$h5 \$\precent{e}\$g8 29 \$\precent{e}\$xe4 \$\precent{e}\$xe4 30 \$\precent{e}\$g6+ \$\precent{e}\$g7 31 \$\precent{e}\$xf6, or 26... \$\precent{e}\$e6 27 \$\precent{e}\$xe4 \$\precent{e}\$xe4 28 g7.

After the text-move, Geller naturally enough started looking at the capture on f6, but the analysis worked out like this: 27 \( \text{Zxf6} \) \( \text{Zxf6

#### 27 曾g1!!


It was when this move was passed to the commentator that I saw that experienced master's mouth gape in astonishment. As for me, my hands and feet were trembling from the feeling of the miracle which, starting from White's previous move, was taking place before our very eyes.

### 27....**皇g7**

It emerges that in spite of being presented with a breathing space, Black can't use it in any helpful way. On 27...豐e7 28 gxh7++ 含xh7, White wins with 29 豐h5 全g7 30 墨xf6! 含g8 31 罩f7.

# 28 罩xf6 罩g4 (D)

This time, with the king on g1, the variation 28... 全xf6 29 營xf6 hxg6 30 營xg6+ 含h8 31 全g5 置4e6 32 全f6+ 置xf6 would lead to a win for White after 33 置xf6!. He now wins in any case.



29 gxh7+ 含h8 30 息xg7+ 豐xg7 31 豐xg4! 1-0

An extremely attractive and powerful game by Geller. It's very hard to blame Smyslov for the decision he took on move 22, for in order to demonstrate his advantage and get in first with his attack, Geller had to perform a minor miracle on the chessboard. Contending with miracles, or even foreseeing them, is known to be difficult.

Furthermore I think that the move 27 \( \frac{1}{2} \)g1!! in this game would be sufficient by itself to justify the existence of this entire chapter. In fact, this chapter was prompted and inspired in the first place by this miraculous game.


Still, for the sake of justice I must add that in the position after Black's 26th move, White also had another way to win: 27 gxh7++ \$\delta\$xh7 28 \$\delta\$h5 \$\overline{2}\$8e6 29 \$\overline{2}\$f3 \$\delta\$e8 30 \$\delta\$f5+ \$\delta\$g6 31 \$\delta\$h3!. Yet this of course in no way detracts from either the strength or the beauty of Geller's conception. For the aesthetic element in chess is one of the most important strands in the centuries-long history of our beloved game.

Now the time has come to draw some conclusions from all that we have seen. They will not be very surprising. The king moves we have studied were made for various reasons and served various ends. Sometimes the purpose was simply to evade unpleasant checks, sometimes it was to make way for other pieces. Yet in the most general sense, all these moves were geared to improving the coordination of the active forces. Hence my main task in the present chapter was to confirm and demonstrate - even with this material of a fairly recondite kind the general applicability of that law we studied in Chapter 2 (Development), the law of coordination in chess. In this chapter too we saw that even when the attainment or improvement of coordination demands a major expenditure of tempo, it is still the supremely important factor.

# 4 Breakthrough

The subject of this chapter is a pleasant one to write about, as the material is dramatic and easy to take on board.

We acquainted ourselves with some simple examples of a breakthrough in Chapter 1 (Dynamics), and will now try to go further into the subject. To begin with, here is an example of a good opportunity that was missed.



Ståhlberg – Geller Zurich Ct 1953


Black has acquired an obvious advantage, but the position is of the blocked type, and another thing which proved even more important was that Black had two moves to make before the time-control. Geller was well known as an inveterate time-trouble addict, and there is no doubt at all that he must have been short of time again here. In such circumstances, especially when you have a secure plus, you find it very hard to decide on any radical measures, so it isn't easy to criticize Geller for missing his chance – his only one, as things turned out. We are more inclined to sympathize with him and try to draw some useful conclusions for ourselves.

For his next move, Black improved his position with:

**39... \*\*\* d3!** White replied: **40 \*\* c1** 

Exchanging would be bad; after 40 \(\bar{\text{w}}\)xd3 cxd3 41 \(\bar{\text{D}}\)d2, Black wins with a typical breakthrough, the thematic one for this game: 41...b4! 42 axb4 and now 42...\(\bar{\text{c}}\)xc3!.

Yet despite the presence of this resource in the foregoing variation, Geller's final move before the time-control throws away the chance to reach a won position in a similar manner. He could now have played 40...b4! (D).




The analysis goes as follows:

- a) 41 cxb4 營b3 42 營b1!?, and now a move straight out of our previous chapter: 42... 含h8! (avoiding 42... 營xb2? 43 总xe4! with chances of a successful defence), after which White can't save himself. That variation supplies the reason why I put this example at the start of this chapter, by way of a bridge between the two topics. However, White's other reply is more interesting:
- b) On 41 axb4, the breakthrough continues with 41...a3! 42 bxa3 (Black also has a winning position after 42 營a1 axb2 43 營xb2 營xc3 44 營b1, and now not 44...營b3? 45 总xe4!, but 44...營d3! 45 營a2 營d6!?) 42...營xc3, when neither of White's possibilities can rescue him:
- b1) 43 營d1 營b3 44 營h5 (44 營xb3 cxb3 45 公d2 b2 is also hopeless for White) 44...c3 45 总h3 (or 45 公g3 c2 46 公e2 營xa3 -+) 45...營d5 46 營e2 and again Black needs to make a prophylactic king move to win: 46...全h8! deprives White of any counter-chances involving checks

on f5 or e8. After 47 b5 豐b3, it's time for him to resign.

b2) 43 豐xc3 皇xc3 44 包g3 皇b2 45 包e2 皇d7! 46 皇f1. At this point Black's simplest winning method is the king move 46...皇g7!, leaving White in dire straits.

In the game, Black delayed by one move: 40...h5?(D)




And White managed to hold on, even though the position remains difficult:

# 41 **②g3** h4

Alas, the breakthrough no longer works: 41...b4 is met by 42 \(\delta f1\).

42 公h5 身f7 43 公xg7 曾xg7 44 身f1 豐d8 (D)




The position still looks dangerous for White, but he discovers a fine defensive resource:

After this superb move, there is no longer a win.

50... **曾g1** 51 **曾d7 \$g8** 52 **曾d8+ \$g7** 53 **智d4+ \$g6** 54 **智d6+** <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>- <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>

The following game extract will acquaint us with another typical variety of breakthrough.



Alekhine – H. Johner Zurich 1934

In this position there is no doubt about White's advantage, but how is he to convert it into a win? If he tries to create a passed pawn at once with 44 b4 2 d7 45 a4 2 e5 46 a5, then 46...bxa5 47 bxa5 g3 leads to unclear play. If he tries 44 & a4 to keep the knight away from e5, then after 44... ②h7! 45 b4 ②g5! 46 豐xg4 豐h6 Black again obtains counter-chances. If you think about the reasons why White's apparently logical plans lead to no clear result as yet, you quite easily perceive that although he has a pawn more, his pieces are not cooperating. These considerations lead on to the thought that if only the white bishop could get into play, a check with it on the a2-g8 diagonal would be devastating. From here it is a short step to discovering Alekhine's solution to the problem:

#### 44 e5!!

Spectacular and strong, but to us that is not even the main thing. What we should consider most important is that the breakthrough serves the purpose of coordinating the player's forces. This purpose will be present in all the examples we shall examine.


#### 44...dxe5?

Black loses his head and succumbs without a fight. I would add that a breakthrough always looks imposing, and this sometimes produces a psychological impact on the opponent. Black could have put up much stiffer resistance with 44...fxe5 45 f6 營xf6 46 營xg4+ 含f7. Then, for example, after 47 鱼4 含e7 48 營xf3 營g5 49 營g3, White has an undoubted plus – his bishop is now cooperating with his queen – but there would still be a fair amount of play ahead. Now the spectacle continues:

#### 45 d6! c5

White also wins after 45... 曾d7 46 曾xg4+ 含f7 47 dxc7 曾xc7 48 2d1. On the other hand in answer to 45...cxd6 one more pawn break takes place to clear the diagonal: 46 c5! 曾b7 (or 46... 2d7 47 c6 公c5 48 曾e8+ 含h7 49 曾g6+) 47 2b3+ d5 48 曾xg4+ 含f7 49 曾xf3, and again White wins.

# 46 **②e4 營d7 47 營h6!** (D)



#### 1-0

In the final position White has achieved all the aims of his breakthrough. We now see very clearly that the aim was by no means only to create a passed pawn but also to activate the pieces and bring them into cooperation. The latter function of a breakthrough is perhaps its principal one, and will be the object of our study throughout the present chapter.

It happens that the breakthrough theme occurs quite frequently in Geller's games. His aggressive, dynamic style may have been the reason.


# Geller – Taimanov USSR Ch (Leningrad) 1960

# 1 e4 c5 2 ②f3 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ②xd4 ②c6 5 ②b5 d6 6 &f4 ②e5?! (D)

This old move currently enjoys little popularity. Nowadays everyone plays 6...e5.

#### 7 c4

Apart from this solid continuation, Boleslavsky's suggestion of 7 🖄 1a3!? is interesting. Then after 7...a6 8 🚊 xe5 dxe5 9 👑 xd8+ 🗳 xd8 10 0-0-0+ 🕏 e7 11 🖄 d6 b5 12 c4 b4 13 🖄 c2, White acquired some advantage in Wahls-Teske, Bundesliga 1991/2.




# 7...a6 8 ②5c3 ②f6 9 &e2 &e7 10 0-0 0-0 11 ②d2 b6 12 &e3

The other retreat 12 \(\mathbb{L}\)g3 is also playable. 12...\(\mathbb{L}\)b7 13 f4 \(\infty\)g6

This position is fairly typical of the hedgehog set-up. In this system Black quite often has to make a decision about where to retreat his knight from e5. In this case 13... Ded7 would be quite acceptable and also more typical, but the point of the move played is that if the white bishop goes to f3, the knight can attack it from h4. However, this way Black is taking less good care of his b-pawn, so there follows:

# 14 營b3!? **公d7** 15 f5!? (D)



As always, Geller's play is energetic and uncompromising. Choosing Black's next move is a problem.


#### 15...\(\polenge\)g5!?

In my view, he solves it correctly. The other possibility is 15... ②ge5 16 fxe6 fxe6, but then White would carry out the breakthrough he was aiming for when he brought his queen out to b3: 17 c5!, and now the analysis goes:

a) 17...dxc5? 18 wxe6+ wh8 19 2c4! with a clear plus for White; for instance, 19... af6 20 ad1 we7 21 wxe7 axe7 22 af4!?.

- b) The other capture 17...②xc5?! also favours White: 18 &xc5 dxc5 19 營xe6+ ②f7 20 基xf7 基xf7 21 &c4 營d4+ 22 含h1 營f6 23 基f1 營xe6 24 &xe6 基af8 25 ②c4, and the b6-pawn is lost.
- c) 17...d5!? is Black's best reply. After 18 cxb6 2c5 19 2xc5 2xc5+20 2h1 an unclear position arises, but it should still no doubt be assessed as rather more promising for White.

16 皇xg5 豐xg5 17 fxg6 豐xd2 18 gxf7+ 豆xf7 19 豆xf7 含xf7 20 豆d1 豐e3+ 21 含h1 (D)



#### 21...豐c5!?

Once again I think Black makes the right choice. The alternative is 21...包f6, but then after 22 罩xd6 ②xe4 23 豐xb6! ②f2+ 24 含g1 ②h3+ 25 含f1 豐f4+ 26 含e1 ②xg2, either 27 罩d7+ or 27 豐d4 would leave White with a plus.

#### 22 **②a4 豐a5?** (D)

This time, however, Black's choice is wrong – a gross error, in fact. He should have evaluated the following replies:


- a) 22... 豐e5?! 23 公xb6 公xb6 24 豐xb6 호xe4 25 罩xd6 호xg2+ 26 含xg2 豐xe2+ 27 豐f2+ 豐xf2+ 28 含xf2 and the ending looks dangerous for Black.
- b) 22...豐c6! 23 &f3 b5 24 cxb5 豐xb5 25 豐a3 區c8 26 ②c3 豐c5 27 豐b3 &c6, and though Black's king position may not appear safe enough, the position is about equal.

We may say that Black's error lay in 'scattering' his pieces, disrupting their coordination (of his own accord!).

Now comes the breakthrough that is already familiar to us:

#### 23 c5!

Greatly enhancing the activity of White's pieces, and shattering the black position.



#### 23...**Ze8**


Other replies also work out in White's favour: 23...公xc5 24 罩f1+ \$\dispsis 8\$ (24...\$\dispsis 67\$ loses to 25 ②xc5 營xc5 26 營f3 \$\dispsis d7\$ 27 營f7+ \$\dispsis 62\$ e5!) 25 營f3 and wins. Or 23...d5 24 exd5 ②xd5 (the position after 24...exd5 25 \$\dispsis f3\$ is clearly better for White) 25 ②c4 ③xc4 26 ③xd7+! \$\dispsis 8\$ 27 營d1 ③b5 (or 27...②e2 28 營xe2 \$\dispsis xd7\$ 29 ②xb6+ +-) 28 \$\dispsis xg7 @xa4 29 份h5+ \$\dispsis d8\$ 30 營h4+ \$\dispsis c8\$ 31 營e4! and again White wins

#### 24 ②xb6 ②xb6

Black would lose at once with 24... ②xc5 25 豐f3+ 曾g8 26 罩f1.


#### 25 cxb6 \(\hat{\parallel}\) xe4 (D)

A situation has arisen with material equality but a terrible white passed pawn. On top of this, Black's king position is shaky. His bishop may be useful in attending to either of these problems. It therefore pays White to exchange it off.



#### 26 身f3! 身xf3 27 豐xf3+ 豐f5

28 基xd6 基c8 29 豐xf5+ exf5 30 h3 基b8 31 a4 씋e7 32 基c6 a5 (D)



The crowning breakthrough now takes place: 33 b4! axb4 34 a5 b3 35 \( \mathbb{Z} \)c3!

And to follow, a typical manoeuvre to stop and destroy the opponent's passed pawn. If White hadn't been in time-trouble, Black would surely have resigned now.


35...\$\d6 36 \bar{\textb3} \psic6 37 \bar{\textb4} e3! f4
Or 37...\$\psic5 38 \bar{\textb5} e5 + \psic6 39 \bar{\textb5} xf5.
38 \bar{\textb5} e7 \psic5 39 \bar{\textb5} a7 g5 40 b7 h5 41 a6 1-0

And now, yet another game by Efim Geller! Isn't this overdoing it? But what else can I do when he had so many fine 'breakthrough' games to his credit? And he was from my part of the world, too!

# Psakhis – Geller Erevan Z 1982

As a basis for the notes to this game, I have used the variations given by Kharitonov in *Mega Database*.

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ②c3 &e7 4 ②f3 ②f6 5 &g5 h6 6 &h4 0-0 7 e3 b6 8 &xf6 &xf6 9 cxd5 exd5 10 營d2 &e6 11 區d1 營e7! 12 g3 (D)



12...c5!?

This move improves on Black's play in T.Georgadze-Geller from the same tournament, which went 12... 2d7 13 2g2 2fd8 14 0-0 2ac8 15 2c1 c5, after which White's chances should be rated as slightly superior. But Geller's move demanded thorough pre-game analysis, as we shall soon see.


#### 13 dxc5?!

Psakhis overrates his position and underrates his opponent's home preparation. After 13 \(\(\frac{1}{2}\)g2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c6 14 0-0 cxd4 15 exd4, the chances are about equal.

#### 

#### 14 cxb6 (D)

The only consistent follow-up. In any case, 14 \( \text{\$\text{2}g2} \) bxc5 15 0-0 \( \text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exititt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exititt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exitit{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exitit{\$\exititt{\$\exititt{\$\exitititt{\$\exiti



Now comes a thrust which is obvious, but no less strong for that:

#### 14...d4! 15 \(\hat{\pm}\)g2!

The only way! This is the point of the plan initiated by White's 13th move, and he had evidently prepared it in advance. All other tries turn out badly, though not all the variations are simple:


- a) 15 ②xd4? fails to 15... £xd4 16 exd4 \$d5+.
  - b) 15 exd4? \(\hat{2}\)d5+ is also hopeless.
- c) 15 ②e2?! 豐b7 16 ②g2 ③d5 (only not 16...dxe3?? 17 豐xd8+ ③xd8 18 罩xd8+ ⑤h7 19 ②g5+), and after the obligatory 17 ②exd4 Black acquires a large plus by means of 17...②c6! 18 ②xc6 ②xc6 19 豐e2 罩xd1+ 20 豐xd1 罩d8 21 豐e2 豐xb6.
- d) The most striking variation is indicated by Geller: 15 ②e4? **Qd5** 16 ②xf6+ 豐xf6 17

豐xd4 豐xf3 18 b7 置d7! 19 豐a4 (White also loses with 19 bxa8豐 魚xa8, or 19 兔b5 豐xh1+20 含d2 豐xd1+21 含xd1 兔f3+) 19...豐xd1+! (given by Geller; 19...鱼xb7!? wins more prosaically) 20 豐xd1 兔xh1 21 f3 罩xd1+22 含e2 罩d2+23 含xd2 兔xf3.

#### 15...Øc6 16 Øxd4!?

The best decision. After 16 ②e4 dxe3 17 豐xe3 罩xd1+ 18 含xd1 axb6, Black is clearly better. He also has a plus in the event of 16 exd4 含b3+ 17 豐e3 含xd1 18 豐xe7 ②xe7.

## 16...②xd4 (D)




#### 17 exd4!

# 

It's hard to say for sure, but I like this move better than the more complicated and less clear variation 19 豐xd4 魚xd4 20 罩xd4 (20 魚xh3 魚xc3 干) 20...豐f6!? 21 罩f4 (21 罩d5 豐f3) 21...豐c6 22 罩g1 魚xg2+ 23 罩xg2 axb6 24 f3, with a slight advantage to Black.


# 19...曾b7! (D)



The similarity of themes between this and the previous game is astonishing. After treading sure-footed through a series of complex ordeals, Geller's opponents make a suicidal mistake at the decisive moment. We can see how hard it is to play against an opponent's unrelenting pressure, evading new difficulties with every move. A computer is much better at coping with such problems - it has nerves of steel! After the obligatory 20 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} & \begin{a might be worth trying 20... 基ad8 21 基xd4 2xg2+ 22 \(\beta\)xg2 \(\beta\)xd4, but White has an acceptable position even so) 21 2 xd1 2d8 22 we2! ≜xg2+ 23 \ xg2, we reach a position where Black has compensation for the pawn, but I doubt he has more. Now everything con-

# 20... 基xd1+ 21 公xd1 豐a6+ 22 曾g1

#### 22... 国d8 23 ②f2 &d4 24 響e1 (D)



#### 24... gxf2+! 0-1

cludes by force.

White resigned in view of 25 堂xf2 豐xb6+26 堂f1 皇c8!.


In the following game, in which the strategic themes overlap to some extent with those of the previous one, we shall look at a typical situation with hanging pawns in the centre.

> Korchnoi – Karpov Merano Wch (1) 1981

# 1 c4 e6 2 2c3 d5 3 d4 &e7 4 2f3 2f6 5 &g5 h6 6 &h4 0-0 7 e3 b6 8 \( \bar{a} \)c1 \( \&\)b7 9 \( \&\)e2

The bishop's development to d3 is also quite often seen.


9... 4 bd7 10 cxd5 exd5 11 0-0 c5 (D)



#### 12 dxc5?!

Theory doesn't approve of this decision. White decides on a specific type of position too early, and this helps his opponent to arrange his pieces in the best way possible. Today the generally accepted continuation is 12 營a4. This occurred for instance in Yusupov-Short, Linares 1992, which went 12...a6 13 dxc5 bxc5 14 董fd1 營b6 15 營b3 (a very important move in such situations; without queens, Black will find it much harder to utilize his assets; what those assets are, we shall later see in more detail) 15...董fd8 16 兔g3 冨ac8 17 ②e5 營xb3 18 axb3, and White obtained some advantage which he went on to exploit in a highly accurate manner.

12...bxc5 13 營c2 罩c8 14 罩fd1 營b6 (D)




A fairly typical position with hanging pawns has come about, and we must examine it in some detail. There are two conspicuous factors which greatly affect the possibilities open to the players. First, hanging pawns cannot – by definition – be defended by other pawns, and therefore require pieces to be deflected from other tasks in order to protect them. This means that in specific circumstances the hanging pawns may become a genuine weakness. Secondly,

these same pawns, standing side by side on the same rank, are keeping almost all the central squares under control as well as securing a distinct spatial advantage for their own army. Such are their defects and merits. It is therefore obvious that no generalized statements can be made as to whether hanging pawns should be considered strong or weak. Everything depends on the concrete situation, so let us look closely at the one we have before us. A spatial plus can be more effectively exploited when there are plenty of pieces on the board, whereas exchanges generally benefit the side that is cramped – so in this connection we can state with confidence that Black has an obvious point in his favour. Conversely, suffering from lack of space, White's possibilities for attacking the hanging pawns are severely limited. Such pawns are most effectively attacked by major pieces, but as long as they are defended by minor ones, this attack will rarely be successful. That is precisely the case we have here.

One conclusion is beyond doubt: when playing against hanging pawns, it is useful to aim for exchanges of minor pieces, and often queen exchanges too. Why queen exchanges? The very game we are looking at will supply the answer.

Now, to the game continuation. For the moment White is not in a position to set about exchanging pieces, and needs to pay attention to his opponent's active possibilities before anything else. This purpose could be served by a move that is thematic in such positions, the bishop retreat 15 \(\text{\(\etx{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\ind}\exi{\exi{\exi{\exi{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\ind}\exi{\exi{\exit{\(\text{\(\text{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi{\ind}\ind}\exi{\ind}\exi

15 **瞥b1?! 罩fd8 16 罩c2?! 鬯e6!** (D)




Black's last move is also highly characteristic of such positions. His queen is transferred to a strategically important square (see the variations that follow), while vacating b6 – which in this kind of situation is the rightful square for the knight. It now turns out that White has trouble even finding a playable move, let alone a coherent plan! Korchnoi could find nothing better than:

# 17 **g**3

The reason for this decision is that in answer to the planned 17 星cd2?, Black has a tactical ploy which again is typical: 17... ②e4! 18 ②xe4 dxe4 19 ②xe7 exf3, and now 20 ②xd8?! (the position is also highly unpleasant for White after 20 ②b5 ②e4! 21 豐c1 c4! 22 ②h4 ②d3) leads to a win for Black after 20...fxe2 21 罩xe2 (White also loses with 21 罩xd7 豐g4 22 罩1d5 ②xd5 23 罩xd5 豐b4!) 21... 罩xd8 22 罩ed2? 豐g4 23 f4 ②f8!.

The variation 17 h3 2d6! 18 2b5 2b8 19 b4 a6! also favours Black. White's best course may be to return his rook from c2 to c1 and then try to exchange some minor pieces. But that way of playing is not for Korchnoi! The following exchange of knight for bishop leaves Black with an enduring positional advantage.

17...②h5 18 罩cd2 ②xg3 19 hxg3 ②f6 20 豐c2 g6!? (D)




Typical of Karpov! White can't develop any real activity, so Black prepares the most congenial conditions for his own campaign of attack. White is deprived of the f5-square, while the black king will occupy a more comfortable and safer position.

#### 21 營a4 a6 22 臭d3

Korchnoi prepares a lengthy manoeuvre to bring his bishop to a2. This would indeed be the best place for it, but Black gets his blow in first

# 22...含g7 23 臭b1 營b6 24 a3? (D)

This move fits in with White's plan, but is already the decisive mistake. He should have given some attention to his own security with 24 262, as recommended by Botvinnik.




#### 24...d4!

This breakthrough has been maturing for some time. It is also highly characteristic of these hanging pawn positions. In fact the present game is full of typical situations and decisions, and is therefore extremely instructive.

#### 25 ②e2

White is obliged to play this ghastly move, after which his position is strategically quite hopeless. Some fairly simple variations show that he had no choice: 25 exd4 &c6! 26 營c4 (or 26 營c2 &xf3 27 gxf3 cxd4) 26... 全xf3, and now 27 gxf3 cxd4, or 27 dxc5 &xd1 28 cxb6 墨xc4 29 墨xd8 &xd8 30 公xd1 墨c1.

#### 25...dxe3 26 fxe3 (D)




This position can serve as a good illustration of the 'coordination of forces' theme.

### 26...c4!


Black shouldn't have any particular difficulties in realizing his advantage, but precise play is always called for. This move not only cuts off the white queen from the kingside where the decisive events will take place; it creates far more scope for Black's own pieces than for White's, so there should be no qualms at all about giving up the d4-square.

27 ②ed4 豐c7 28 ②h4 豐e5 29 曾h1 曾g8!



This simple little move, depriving White of a check on f5, essentially constitutes a dual attack and wins one of the white pawns. The game is already decided, but there was still some slight hope of time-trouble.

30 **公df3 豐xg3 31 罩xd8+ 盒xd8 32 豐b4** 




#### 32...\$e4!

Another move that is highly instructive although not complicated. Its purpose is to seize the commanding outpost on e4 for the knight. Black will then have a winning attack. The rest needs no explanation.

# **罩xd3 cxd3 40 豐xd3 豐d6 41 豐e4 豐d1+ 42** ②g1 豐d6 43 ②hf3 **罩b5 0-1**

The next example is also very good and will repay study.



**Botvinnik – Petrosian** *Moscow Wch (18) 1963* 

Despite the absence of queens, the position still contains plenty of fight. There are some strategic points in Black's favour, such as a smaller number of pawn-islands and a pawn-structure better suited to his remaining bishop. In return White has some spatial advantage, which promises rather more mobility to his pieces. With his next move Black concedes some further space in an attempt to profit from his assets and increase his activity. This brings the game to life.

#### 42...c5! 43 d5 ②e5 44 罩f1?

White wastes a very important tempo, which proves to be a major error now that Black's 42nd move has increased the tension in the position. It was essential to play 44 ②c4 ②xc4 45 bxc4 ②c6 46 ②e3 ②g6 47 罩b1 ②b4 48 ②f5+ ③xf5 49 exf5 罩de7, when a draw is the most likely outcome, though White will evidently still have to play with a certain accuracy.

#### 44...**≜**g6 45 **\$e1**

After 45 ②c4 ②xc4 46 bxc4 ②c8, Black wins the e4-pawn.

#### 45...分c8 46 罩df2 罩f7 47 含d2

Or 47  $\bigcirc$ f5+  $\bigcirc$ xf5 48  $\square$ xf5  $\bigcirc$ d6 49  $\bigcirc$ e3 and now Black acquires a substantial plus with 49...c4! 50 bxc4  $\square$ c8!.

#### 47...€)d6


Black's gains are obvious. His knights have seized important strongpoints in the centre.

48 Øf5+

The only move.

#### 48...\(\hat{L}\)xf5 49 exf5 (D)

David Bronstein suggested 49 \(\mathbb{Z}\text{xf5!}\)? as a way of trying to contain Black's pressure, but the answer is a move we have seen already: 49...c4!, breaking through and winning easily.



As it is, Black decides the game with this very same thrust:


#### 49...c4! 50 罩b1 b5!

A further blow, which has the same point: Black's excellently placed pieces break through into the enemy camp.

#### 51 b4

Other continuations are no better. After 51 axb5 公xb5 52 bxc4 (or 52 罩a1 c3+ 53 堂c1 公d4! 54 堂b1 罩b8 with an overwhelming plus) 52...公xc4+ 53 堂d3 公e5+ 54 堂d2 公a3, Black has a very strong initiative.

51...c3+! (D)




A cascade of breakthrough moves! The position is unblocked once and for all, and with the sacrifice of one pawn Black clears a road for all his pieces into White's position. This most effectively illustrates what a breakthrough is.

#### 52 \( \extrack{\phi} \) xc3

White can't defend successfully after 52 堂c1 axb4 either.

White also loses in other lines: 55 \( \bar{2} \) \( \text{S} \) \( \text{S} \) \( \text{S} \) \( \text{Z} \) \

55... ②dc4 56 **Za2** axb4 57 axb5 ②xb5 58 **Za6** ②c3+ 59 **\$c1** ②xd5 60 **2a4 Zec8** 61 ②e1 ②f4 (D)




0 - 1

In the final position you are struck by the superb coordination of the black pieces. Every breakthrough in the game had the purpose of achieving this.

As we have already seen repeatedly, the purpose of a breakthrough is to increase the mobility of your own forces and improve their cooperation. It isn't by any means necessary that the pawns making the break should be clashing with the opponent's pawns, as long as the main aim is achieved. The following game provides an example.

Ravinsky – Smyslov USSR Ch (Moscow) 1944

The game has opened with a quiet variation of the Catalan System. White has an advantage in space; Black has a pair of bishops and is very keen to carry out the ...c5 advance, to open up the game for their benefit.



#### 18 2a4?!


White decides to forestall his opponent's plan, but is neglecting the opportunity to increase his territorial gains. The indicated line was 18 e5!? ②d5 19 ②e4 罩ac8 20 ②fd2, followed by bringing a knight to d6.

#### 18... **国ac8** 19 b4

I don't think this is best either, and would prefer 19 它c5 豐c7 20 b4 b6 21 ②d3. The knight would then be very effectively placed, controlling the important squares c5, e5 and b4.

#### 19... 曾c7 20 曾b3

Here too 20  $\triangle$ c5!? was worth considering. **20...b6 21**  $\blacksquare$ c1 (D)



#### 21...c5!

So Black has, after all, achieved what is the thematic break in this opening variation.


#### 22 dxc5

In the event of the other pawn capture 22 bxc5, Black would have a slight edge after 22... d7!?.

#### 

Also after 24 罩c2 豐b6 25 e5 包d5 26 罩ec1 罩c7!, Black's chances should be rated as slightly better.

#### 24... **当b6 25 b5** (D)



In this position it must be said that the bishops are the key to the play. Although the remaining bishops are on opposite colours, any drawish consequences are a long way off. The prospects for Black's bishop should be rated as better than for White's. Compare the respective positions on the kingside – look at the a2-g8 and a7-g1 diagonals.

For White it is therefore imperative either to blockade the black c5-pawn or else to go into action himself as quickly as possible. He might very well succeed in something of the kind, if, for instance, the game went 25... \$\overline{\text{b}}\$ 5 26 \$\overline{\text{c}}\$ 6 28 \$\overline{\text{d}}\$ 3. What, then, is the strategic task for Black? It is absolutely essential for him to try to activate his own forces at once, and not wait for his opponent to act first. From all this, Black's next move inescapably follows. (I stress the word inescapably. It asserts that there is not even any need to analyse variations in detail. When the position demands it, you are in duty bound to be a hero!)

#### 25...c4!

Black opens lines for his queen, rook and bishop. At the same time the cooperation between the queen and bishop is significantly improved. On top of that, the knight joins their company! If White can't neutralize all these gains within a short time, it means at the very least that the pawn sacrifice is justified.

#### 26 h3?!

In consequence of Black's last move the number of possible variations has sharply increased, and White was faced with no simple choice. Smyslov gives the following analysis:


- a) 26 \(\hat{\pma}\)xc4 \(\bar{\pma}\)g4 and now:
- a1) 27 基f1 基d3! 28 单xd3 基xc1 29 包d4 (only move) 29...基c3 30 单e2 包xf2! 31 基xf2

②c5 and Black has an enduring initiative, based precisely on the difference in strength between the bishops.

- a2) 27 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \delta \cdot 2!? \delta \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \end{align\*} \delta \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot \delta \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot \delta \cdot 2 \cdo
- a3) 27 星e2 星d3! 28 兔xd3 (or 28 鸷g2 罩xa3) 28...星xc1+ 29 鸷g2 罩c3 30 e5 (White has a bad ending after 30 徵d1 徵xf2+! 31 罩xf2 ②e3+) 30...星xd3 31 徵xg4 徵xb5, with a slight but persistent advantage for Black.
- b) In Smyslov's view, White's best option is 26 罩xc4 包g4 27 罩e2! 罩xc4 28 豐xc4 兔c5 29 豐c2 豐xb5 30 e5 兔b6, when Black retains the initiative but White has every reason to count on a successful defence.

By declining the offered pawn, White allows Black to develop his initiative in complete comfort.

26...c3 (D)



### 27 學b3?


This move turns out to be the decisive mistake, though a barely noticeable one. Its implications strongly recall those of White's error on move 44 of the Botvinnik-Petrosian game. It looks natural but proves to be an extremely important loss of tempo in defence. The correct move is 27 \(\frac{1}{2}\text{g2}!\). Now Black's pressure becomes irresistible.

#### 

As Smyslov demonstrates, 28 **E**e2 loses to 28...**e**xf2+ 29 **E**xf2 **e**xe4 30 **e**c2 **e**e3! 31 **E**a1 **E**d2. White is also in a bad way after 28 **e**c2 **e**xa3.

But after the text-move Black also delivers a decisive blow:

28... 其d2! 29 罩xd2



On 29 ②xd2, Smyslov gives the pretty variation 29... ②xf2+30 ②g2 ②xe1 31 ②f3 豐e3! 32 冨e2 豐xe2+33 ②xe2 c2.

Against 35 公f3, Black wins with 35... 營d6! 36 a4 单f2!.

#### 35... 對xe4+ 36 當h2 對d4 37 罩g2 罩c1!

It was also perfectly possible to take the apawn, but that would be delaying things unnecessarily. As it is, Black has everything ready for the final assault. His forces are fully coordinated, his opponent's king is poorly defended, and in addition there are opposite-coloured bishops, which, as is well known, only reinforce the attack.

38 營e2 營a1 39 營xe3 **Zxf1 40 g4 Ze1 0-1** Since 41 **Ze2** is met by 41...**Zh1+ 42 含g3** 營f1 43 **Zg2 資**xb5.

In the next game, the same device is utilized in an even more convincing and attractive manner.

# Kasparov – Salov Barcelona (World Cup) 1989


1 ②f3 ②f6 2 c4 b6 3 ②c3 c5 4 e4 d6 5 d4 cxd4 6 ②xd4 &b7 (D)

#### 7 **營e2!?**

Kasparov steers the game into a little-known channel (but one that *he* knows!). The usual continuation is 7 f3.

#### 7...9\bd7

This is evidently not best. The standard method of development in such situations looks more accurate: 7...e6!? 8 g3 鱼e7 9 鱼g2 a6! 10 0-0 豐c7, as played with success, for instance,




in Ehlvest-Kudrin, New York 1991 and Serper-Kudrin, Chicago 1996.

# 8 g3 罩c8 9 兔g2 a6 10 0-0 豐c7?!

Another inaccuracy, after which quite a few problems arise for Black. Admittedly in Lautier-A.Sokolov, French Cht 1992, White also worked up dangerous pressure after 10...e6 11 \$\mathref{Le1} \Omega e5 12 f4 \Omega xc4 13 b3 \Omega a5 14 \Omega b2 \Omega c6 15 \Omega xc6 \omega xc6 16 \Omega d5.

#### 11 b3 e6 (D)



#### 12 Ød5!

This sacrifice, a typical one in such positions, had been prepared by Kasparov for the present game. Black doesn't manage to cope with the ensuing complexities.

#### 12...**學b8**


For better or worse, he should have accepted the sacrifice. After 12...exd5 13 exd5+, the options are as follows:

- a) 13...②e5 14 f4 豐c5 15 兔b2 ②fd7 16 fxe5 dxe5 17 �h1, with an overwhelming position for White.
- b) 13.... 全e7 14 ②f5! (but not 14 罩e1? 0-0!, when 15 豐xe7? loses to 15... 罩ce8) 14... ②e5 (14... 豐d8? allows the devastating 15 ②xd6+ 全f8 16 ②xb7 豐c7 17 身f4 豐xb7 18 d6) 15

②xg7+ \$\textrm{\$\Delta\$}\$d8 (White also has a dangerous initiative after 15...\$\textrm{\$\Delta\$}\$f8 16 \$\textrm{\$\Delta\$}\$h6 \$\textrm{\$\Delta\$}\$g8 17 \$\textrm{\$\Delta\$}\$f5) 16 \$\textrm{\$\Delta\$}\$f5, and White has more than enough compensation for the material. Therefore Black's strongest reply is:

c) 13...\$\dd.\$ Kasparov tells us he was intending to continue with 14 \$\ddots b2\$, and considers that White has only slightly the better prospects in that position.

# 13 罩d1! g6 14 臭g5! (D)



#### 


Now, however, taking the knight would be bad, as Kasparov indicates: 14...exd5 15 exd5+ \$\frac{1}{2}e7 16 \$\frac{1}{2}c6 \$\frac{1}{2}xc6 17 dxc6 \$\frac{1}{2}e5 18 f4 h6 19 fxe5 dxe5 20 \$\frac{1}{2}e3\$, with a winning position for White.

#### 15 &xf6 @xf6

The other recapture also leaves Black in a bad position: 15... 2xf6 16 2xf6+ 2xf6 17 e5! 2xg2 18 exf6 2h3 19 4e4!? h5 20 4h4.

#### 16 ②xb6 罩d8? (D)

After this, White has the opportunity for a breakthrough and concludes the game in a forcing and impressive manner. The sole acceptable defence is 16... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \align\* \begin{align



#### 17 e5! &xg2

On 17...dxe5 18 2c6 2xc6 19 2xc6+ 2e7 20 c5, White has an overwhelming position.


#### 18 exf6 & xf6 19 xe6!

This sacrifice is the point of the operation begun with White's 17th move. A different move-order would be faulty: 19 空xg2? 豐xb6 20 ②xe6 fxe6 21 豐xe6+ 兔e7 22 罩e1 豐b7+.

#### 19...fxe6

On 19... 2xa1 20 2xd8+ 2e5, White wins with what is the thematic move of many variations in this game: 21 c5!.

#### 20 營xe6+ &e7 (D)



#### 21 c5!!

Kasparov had already foreseen this striking and effective thrust before making his 17th move. The endgame after 21 罩e1 豐b7 22 豐xe7+豐xe7 23 罩xe7+ ඓxe7 24 \$\text{c}\$xg2 is also advantageous to White, but there would still be plenty of play ahead. Now there is no defence in any variation.


#### 21....\$b7

#### 22 **星e1 營c7** (D)

The merits of White's position are obvious, but how is he to continue the onslaught? If you recall the lessons of Chapter 2 (Development), you can find the next move – or at the very least you can understand the sense of it, and how it works.

#### 23 c6!

This pawn sacrifice enables White to bring another fighting unit into the game, namely his



queen's rook, which has played no part until now. In this way the outcome of the contest is immediately decided. A typical and convincing example of the power of a breakthrough.


#### 23...\&xc6

Black also loses with 23...\(\dot\)c8 24 \(\dd\)d5 \(\dd\)xe6 25 \(\dig\)xc7+.

# 24 Eac1 Ed7

The last chance to drag out his resistance, but even this is inadequate.

### 25 ②xd7 豐xd7 (D)



#### 26 **營c4!**

As always, Kasparov is energetic, precise, and elegant into the bargain. The continuation he finds is much stronger than 26 \( \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c

# 26...**£b**7

#### 27 豐c7! 罩f8 28 豐b8+ 曾f7 29 罩c7 1-0

A brilliant finale. Kasparov's play, elegant and powerful at the same time, makes an immensely strong impression.

Among today's generation, Vladimir Kramnik is the player whose games most often incorporate the breakthrough theme.

#### Kramnik - Beliavsky

Belgrade 1995

# 1 �f3 d5 2 g3 c6 3 ₤g2 ₤g4 4 0-0 �d7 5 d4 e6 6 �bd2 f5

Players make this move in order to avoid 6... ②gf6 7 Ze1 2e7 8 e4.

# 7 c4 &d6 8 当b3 罩b8 9 罩e1 勾h6


This had been played in Hug-Speelman, Altensteig 1994. Seeing that Black's move is refuted in the present game, Kramnik recommends 9... ②gf6 instead, although he still rates White's chances as better after 10 cxd5 cxd5 11 ②g5 豐e7 12 f3 急h5 13 e4.

#### 10 cxd5 cxd5 11 h3!

The indispensable prelude to the following action.

#### 11...**.食h5** (D)

After 11... £xf3 12 exf3, White's advantage is obvious.



Now comes an unexpected and very powerful stroke which is aimed at opening lines. From the positional viewpoint, the justification of this move is not hard to grasp. You need only give attention to Black's king which remains uncastled, the weakness of the e6-pawn, and the placing of White's queen on b3 and rook on e1, in order to understand how the idea of such a breakthrough comes into a player's head. The calculation of variations then follows, establishing how realistic the idea is and what sequence of moves is correct for implementing it.

#### 12 e4!! fxe4

After 12... \$\hat{\omega}\$xf3 13 \$\hat{\omega}\$xf3 fxe4 14 \$\hat{\omega}\$xe4 dxe4 15 \$\bar{\omega}\$xe6+ \$\bar{\omega}\$e7 (15... \$\hat{\omega}\$e7 16 \$\hat{\omega}\$xh6 exf3 17 \$\hat{\omega}\$xg7+—) 16 \$\bar{\omega}\$xe4, the position differs from the actual game only in a very insignificant detail. Instead, 12...dxe4 13 \$\hat{\omega}\$g5! \$\hat{\omega}\$f7 (13... \$\bar{\omega}\$xg5 14 \$\hat{\omega}\$xe4 \$\bar{\omega}\$e7 15 \$\hat{\omega}\$xd6++—) 14 \$\hat{\omega}\$dxe4 fxe4 transposes to the game continuation.


#### 13 ②g5!

Another superb stroke, after which Black is defenceless. If now 13... \(\begin{align\*}\begin{align\*}\text{w} & \text{g} & \text{5} & \text{14} \end{align\*}\text{xe4} \(\begin{align\*}\text{w} & \text{7} & \text{15} \\ \text{25} & \text{2} & \text{f6} & \text{(on 15...} \(\begin{align\*}\text{w} & \text{f8} & \text{there is an attractive and quick win with 16} \(\begin{align\*}\text{w} & \text{there is an attractive and quick win with 16} \(\begin{align\*}\text{w} & \text{f6} & \text{y} & \text{sch} & \text{w} & \text{with a won position. If } \\ \text{13...} \(\begin{align\*}\text{w} & \text{e7} & \text{then 14} & \text{2xe6}! & \text{and again Black has no defence in any of the variations:} \end{align\*}

- a) 14... 2)f6 15 & xe4! (this time it is pieces that carry out a breakthrough, sacrificing themselves to open lines for their colleagues that remain on the board; it follows that a breakthrough doesn't have to be a pawn break, although most often it is pawns that are sacrificed) 15...dxe4 16 2)xe4 2)xe4 17 Exe4 +-.
  - b) 14... 響xe6 15 罩xe4 +-.
- c) As the most complex line, Kramnik gives 14...全f7 15 ②xg7+! 含f8 16 ②xe4 含xg7 (or 16...dxe4 17 ②xh6 +-) 17 ②g5! 營f8 18 ②xh6+ 含xh6 19 營e3+ 含g7 20 營g5+ ②g6 21 ②xd6 and wins.

All these variations are made possible by the activity of White's pieces, which was dramatically increased by the breaks carried out on his 12th and subsequent moves.

#### 13...**&**f7 (D)



#### 14 🖾 dxe4! dxe4 15 🖾 xe6 🗟 xe6

Other replies also fail to save him. After 15... e7 16 Exe4, White has a winning attack. On 15... f6 16 Exe4 e7 17 ef4 Ed8 (17... c8 is very strongly answered by the

simple 18 豐xb7) 18 罩ae1, White also wins quickly.


#### 16 營xe6+ 營e7

Nor is there any hope for Black in 16... 2e7 17 2xh6 gxh6 18 2xe4.

#### 17 罩xe4 学d8

The ending after 17...豐xe6 18 罩xe6+ 兔e7 19 兔xh6 鸷f7 20 罩xe7+ 鸷xe7 21 兔xg7 is hopeless for Black, but that way at least the game could have been prolonged.

### 18 營d5 (D)



#### 1-0

Beliavsky resigned here to avoid further torment. His decision may have been a little premature but it was not unfounded, as the following variations show:

- a) 18...豐f8 19 罩e6 包f7 (or 19...皇e7 20 罩xe7! +-) 20 罩xd6!? 包xd6 (20...豐xd6 is no better in view of 21 豐xf7 豐e7 22 豐d5 +-) 21 皇f4 包f6 22 豐xd6+ 豐xd6 23 皇xd6 罩c8 24 皇xb7 罩c2 25 b3 +-.
- b) 18...\(\Omega\)f6 19 \(\maxe7\) \(\Omega\)xd5 20 \(\maxe4\)e6 \(\Omega\)f5 21 \(\maxeta\)xd5.

# Kramnik – Timman Belgrade 1995

# 1 公f3 公f6 2 c4 e6 3 公c3 d5 4 d4 公bd7 5 cxd5 exd5 6 兔g5 c6 7 e3 兔e7 8 兔d3 公h5 9 兔xe7 豐xe7 10 0-0 0-0 11 豐b1!?


Kramnik thought of this move over the board, as an improvement over the customary 11 \( \mathbb{\su} b1. \)
The point is that at the same time as supporting the b4-pawn, the queen will be increasing White's control of the e4-square.

#### 11...**包hf6**

Astonishing though it may seem, this natural move may be an inaccuracy. V.Milov-Borgo,

Bratto 2001 went 11...g6 12 b4 a6, and after 13 a4 ②b6 14 b5 axb5 15 axb5 罩xa1 16 豐xa1 c5 17 dxc5 豐xc5 18 罩c1 单g4 Black held the position.

### 12 b4 罩e8 (D)



#### 13 \( \bar{2} \) c1!


This refined positional move supports the knight in order to meet 13... 2e4 with 14 b5, when Black will not be able to reply ...c5.

# 13...a6 14 a4 g6

After 14... 2e4 15 2xe4 dxe4 16 2d2 f5 17 b5, Kramnik assesses the position as clearly favourable for White.

# 15 營b2!? a5?! (D)

Another move I have doubts about. Black is trying to solve his problems by playing with some of his pieces only, and gets into serious trouble. A more effective line seems to me to be 15... \$\infty\$18 16 b5 axb5 17 axb5 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xa1 18 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xa2 c5.



#### 16 bxa5!

Typical and strong – and much better than 16 b5 c5 (this too is a typical reaction in such situations), which gives White no more than an insignificant plus. At present the weakness of the a4-pawn counts for nothing.

#### 16...罩xa5 17 **公d2**

This move is an essential part of White's manoeuvre directed against a5.

# 17... ②g4!?


Timman looks for counterplay.

# 18 **公b3 曾d6 19 g3**

The rook can't be taken; after 19 ②xa5? 豐xh2+20 曾f1 罩xe3! it is Black who wins.

## 19...罩a7?! (D)

Withdrawing to a8 would be more precise, as the further course of events will confirm.



#### 20 e4!

This break is highly typical of the Queen's Gambit variation with which the game began, but it is not always good for White. It is only good when the resulting increase in the activity of White's pieces lasts for a fairly long time.

# 20...dxe4 21 公xe4 豐f8 22 罩e1 b6

Kramnik points out that after 22... ②df6 23 ②bc5 ②xe4 24 ②xe4 ②f6 25 圖b6! (see the note to Black's 19th move) 25... 置a8 26 ②f3 White maintains strong pressure all over the board. However, 22... ②gf6 was worth considering.

# 23 @bd2 &a6 24 &c2!

To understand the point of this bishop retreat, look at the a2-g8 diagonal and the f7-square in particular.


# 24...**¤**b7

By way of explaining this move, Kramnik gives the variation 24...c5 25 h3 ②gf6? (the alternative 25...②h6 is better but still leaves White with a large plus) 26 ②xf6+ ②xf6 27 👺xb6.

# 25 **息b3 ②gf6** 26 罩ac1! 罩c8 (D)

#### 27 ②xf6+!

White had the choice between this move and 27 ②g5!? ②d5 28 罩xc6 罩xc6 29 兔xd5 罩f6 30



♠xb7 ♠xb7, but then Black would have some hopes of counterplay. Kramnik opts for activity.

#### 27...4\xf6 28 d5!

This breakthrough and its consequences supply the grounds for Kramnik's 27th move.


#### 28... ②xd5 29 ②e4 罩d8?

In time-trouble, Timman fails to find the sole defence. Kramnik gives 29... ②b4 30 ②f6+ 含h8 31 ②d5+ f6 32 ②xb4 豐xb4 33 豐xf6+ 黨g7 34 黨c3 黨f8 35 豐xc6, after which White has an extra pawn and a positional advantage, but the game still continues — whereas now it is all over.

#### 30 罩xc6 營b4

Black also loses with 30... 響g7 31 響d2 罩bd7 32 &xd5.

31 ②f6+ \$\displaystyle{\phi}f8 32 ②xh7+ \$\displaystyle{\phi}g8 33 ②f6+ \$\displaystyle{\phi}f8 34 \quad \textbf{Ze4} (D)



#### 1-0

Once again the final position illustrates the results of a breakthrough. The activity of White's pieces and the degree of coordination attained by them are impressive.

# 5 Initiative

Every player has a notion of the initiative in chess, or rather a feeling for it.

Suppose, however, that you ask him to reply as precisely and comprehensibly as possible to the naïve question, "Just what *is* the initiative?" Will the answer be easy? Hardly, I believe.

And yet considerable use may be derived from defining things even when they appear the most self-evident. When some phenomenon, principle or rule is precisely and clearly formulated, it proves much easier to deal with it in everyday life, including chess life; and the circle of people capable of utilizing it is significantly widened. I shall therefore begin by trying to define the subject of this chapter, and then, as we go along, we will elaborate my formulations (I stress that they are mine!), test their validity in practice, and introduce corrections if need be. Well, then – possession of the initiative means being able to create threats faster than the opponent, and the aim of developing your initiative is ideally to use your threats to forestall the opponent's activities, defensive as well as aggressive. From this it follows that fighting for the initiative always means trying to be ahead in a race! Thus we can see already that the concept of the initiative is inextricably linked to that of time and speed.


The truth of all the assertions I have made will now be tested against examples. The first is a classic example of a player quickly seizing the initiative and energetically developing it.

# Alekhine – Fahrni Mannheim 1914

# 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 ②f6 4 ②g5 ②e7 5 e5 ②fd7 6 h4

The gambit variation starting with this move was still relatively little-known at the time of this game. White is intent on the rapid deployment of his forces.

6... ≜xg5 7 hxg5 ₩xg5 8 ②h3 ₩e7 9 ②f4




The basic position of the variation has arisen. Today it is considered perfectly acceptable for Black, who has a number of quite good continuations to choose from: 9...\(\infty\)c6, 9...g6, or even 9...c5 which can lead to complications such as 10 \(infty\)b5 cxd4 11 \(infty\)c7+ \(infty\)d8 12 \(infty\)xa8 \(infty\)b4+ 13 \(infty\)e2 \(infty\)xe5, with unclear play; this occurred in Frolov-Matveeva, Tomsk 1998. However, Alekhine's opponent fails to size up the situation and commits what is practically the decisive error – and it is only move nine! But then, we have seen similar things happen more than once in positions where the play has suddenly taken a sharp turn.

# 9...公f8? 10 營g4 f5 11 exf6 gxf6 Not 11...營xf6 12 公fxd5. 12 0-0-0 c6

An attempt to bring the black pieces into play more quickly, starting with 12... 2c6, would lead to a big advantage for White after 13 2e1 2d8 (13...e5 14 2h4 f5 15 2xe7+ 2xe7 16 2fxd5 2xd5 17 2xd5 gives White a won ending) and now either 14 2b5 or 14 2h5. What, then, do these variations tell us? They tell us that in this situation Black is compelled to fend off his opponent's threats and hence is already left with no time for other indispensable activities such as development and centralization. This goes to show that White possesses the initiative according to the definition we gave earlier. If he now keeps on stoking the fire, creating one threat after another (which was what

we understood by 'developing your initiative'), then the normal functioning of Black's chess organism will become impossible. Thus in the example we are looking at, the somewhat abstract formulations are beginning to assume concrete, tangible shape.

# 13 罩e1 含d8 (D)




I would repeat that for the player who has seized the initiative, it is very useful – indeed essential – to keep creating new threats to make the opponent's life as hard as possible. This demands inventiveness and quite often boldness too, because not infrequently the only way to sustain the initiative is by material sacrifices. All White's subsequent conduct of this game presents a paradigm of energetic and bold play with the initiative.

# 14 罩h6 e5

On 14... 2d7, White would play 15 2d3 or 15 4f 15 16 4g3.

#### 15 營h4 (D)




#### 15...Øbd7

Once again, an attempt by Black at active play would be refuted: 15... \( \bar{\textit{Z}} g8 \) 16 \( \bar{\textit{Z}} xf6 \( \bar{\textit{D}} bd7 \) 17 \( \bar{\textit{D}} xd5! \) cxd5 18 \( \bar{\textit{D}} xd5 \( \bar{\textit{D}} g6 \) 19 \( \bar{\textit{Z}} xg6! \) (19

②xe7 is also perfectly good; after 19...②xh4 20 ②xg8 ②xf6 21 ②xf6, the ending is won for White) 19...豐xh4 20 〖xg8+ with a winning position. We can see that in this variation too, our definition is fully confirmed: possessing the initiative means getting ahead of your opponent in the creation of threats.

#### 16 **Qd3 e4** (D)

Another possibility is 16... \$\begin{align\*}{0.65cm} \begin{align\*}{0.65cm} \begin{align\*}{



#### 17 曾g3!


In this situation White has quite a rich choice of possibilities. Such riches often contain a fair amount of danger, as you can easily be lured by something tempting but incorrect, or simply fail to figure out all the options; yet really strong players are generally equal to the task. How does Alekhine arrive at the right decision? We can probably guess: he wants to make ...f5 difficult for his opponent (on 17 f3 f5, this move would prove its value), and therefore hits on the idea of the move with his queen. Finding the right idea is half the battle, but it still needs to be implemented in such a way that the variations come together. We shall have reason to believe that Alekhine foresaw everything correctly.

#### 17...**營f7** (D)

The first point is that 17...f5, to fortify Black's central position, no longer works in view of 18 ②fxd5! cxd5 19 ②xd5 豐f7 20 豐h4+. The second point is that 17...豐d6, Black's other move to

INITIATIVE 133

release the pin against the queen, is also bad. White wins with 18 ②xe4! (Alekhine gives 18 ②xe4?!, but this is considerably weaker on account of 18...黨8!), and if now 18...營e7 (on 18...dxe4 19 黨xe4, Black has no way to prevent 20 營g7; here is the consequence of his failure to play 16...黨8), there follows 19 黨hh1! dxe4 20 黨xe4 營f7 21 黨he1, after which there is no stopping the decisive 22 黨e7.



#### 18 \( \hat{\hat{L}}\) xe4!


Here again, a bold piece sacrifice opens up lines for other pieces and greatly enhances the coordination of White's entire force. Apart from this, however, it was worth considering the more restrained 18 \(\textrm{\pmathbb{L}}e2!?\). It's quite easy to understand that Alekhine, possessing the initiative, didn't want to spend a single tempo on retreating. Even then, though, Black's position would have been difficult in view of his many weaknesses, his problems of development that are so hard to solve, and on top of it the dangerous situation of his king.

#### 18...dxe4 19 ②xe4 **国**g8

When pondering the bishop sacrifice, Alekhine would first have had to weigh up the consequences of 19... wa2!?. In reply White has the following line, which although perhaps not entirely forced, is highly plausible and significant: 20 公xf6 公xf6 21 wg7 wa1+22 sd2 wa5+23 c3 公6d7 and now 24 we7+(only not 24 wxh8? wg5, and Black wrests the initiative from his opponent; I presume there is no need to elucidate this term which is very important for our topic) 24... sc7 25 wd6+sb6 (25... sd8 loses at once to 26 le6!, thus: 26... le62 27 le64 se8 29 le64 se8 29 le65+, or 26... lexe6 27 lexe6+se8 28 lese5+!) 26 le65+, and although Black obtains three

pieces for the queen, the sheer impossibility of coordinating his forces makes his position hopeless. The game continuation brings no salvation either.

20 營a3! (D)



# 20...**營g**7

White also has an irresistible attack after 20...c5 21 ②d6 豐g7 22 豐e3!? cxd4 23 豐xd4. It should be observed that the player developing an initiative is always looking for either material gains or else the eventual transition to a direct attack – which means steering his stream of threats into a precisely defined channel.

21 ②d6 ②b6 22 ②e8! 豐f7 Or 22...②c4 23 豐c5 豐f7 24 ②d6. 23 豐d6+ 豐d7 24 豐xf6+ 1-0

The above game is a good illustration of how possession of the initiative grows into a direct attack – which still involves the consistent creation of threats, but ones that are directed to a more concrete end and are individually more dangerous.

Now, another example on the same lines:


Spassky – Evans Varna OL 1962

# 

Queenside castling in this variation was first employed in the present game. Its psychological impact on Evans seems to have been considerable, as his reaction is clearly wrong from the positional viewpoint. By exchanging pawns Black is merely giving himself a half-open file that he won't be able to use for a long time, while helping White to bring his bishop to an active post without any loss of tempo. In addition, White is relieved of worries about the further advance of the black b-pawn. Today the main line in this position is 8... \(\mathbb{\partial} a5\). Another move sometimes played is 8... \(\mathbb{\partial} e6\).

### 9 &xc4 0-0 (D)

There may have been some point in playing an immediate 9...d5 10 \&b3 dxe4 11 fxe4 \&g4 (a good answer to 11...\&\)g4 is 12 \&g5).




#### 10 h4

Of course.

# 10...d5?!

Now this manoeuvre comes too late; 10...h5!? was virtually forced.

#### 11 &b3 dxe4 (D)



#### 12 h5!


Spassky has decided that his position is strong enough for him to start a direct attack without being sidetracked by 'minor details', and he turns out to be quite right. Of course, this way of playing would have been impossible without Black's error on move 8. In essence, that error has left Black with a very bad version of the Dragon Sicilian. I did a special check and found that Larry Evans played the black side of

that opening quite a few times. We can only ask what he was doing landing himself in a position like this.

# 12...exf3

Basically nothing is altered by 12... ②xh5 13 ②h6 ②xh6 14 豐xh6 豐c7 15 ②ge2 exf3 16 gxf3, with a winning position.

# 13 hxg6 hxg6 (D)



#### 14 &h6!


Splendid! Just go straight ahead without losing a single tempo. The reply is forced, but afterwards all the files against the enemy king will be open for White. Attacking in such comfort is a dream come true!

#### 14...fxg2 15 \( \big| \)h4

This striking retort is merely the logical and even obligatory consequence of White's previous move.

# 15...**②**g4 (D)

Essential. Not 15...心h5? 16 罩xh5.



# 16 兔xg7 含xg7 17 豐xg2 分h6

This time Black does have alternatives, but they are scarcely appealing:

a) 17...包e3 is bad in view of 18 当h2 置h8 19 显xh8 当xh8 20 当e5+.


INITIATIVE 135

- b) After 17...f5 18 ②f3 罩h8 19 罩xh8 豐xh8 20 罩h1 豐e8, White wins attractively with 21 ②g5 \$\phi\$f6 22 \pmxg4! fxg4 23 ②ce4+, etc.

18 Øf3 Øf5

If 18... \( \bar{L} \) h8, then 19 \( \bar{L} \) dh1 +-.

19 罩h2 (D)



#### 19...**營d**6

In Chapter 2 (Development) we repeatedly witnessed similar scenes. An entire wing of the black position is standing idle, while the white pieces harmoniously proceed with the attack. No wonder the analysis bears out the hopelessness of Black's situation:

- b) 19...e6 20 国dh1 国g8 21 国h7+ 會f8 22 包e5 (22 包g5 and 22 包e4 also win) 22...国a7 (or 22...包g7 23 国f1; 22...国g7 23 国h8+国g8 24 国xg8+ 曾xg8 25 国h8+!) 23 包xg6+! 国xg6 24 豐xg6 fxg6 25 国h8+ 曾e7 26 国1h7+ 包g7 27 国xg7+曾f6 28 国xd8 国xd7 29 国xc8.

#### 20 De5! Dd7

# 21 ②e4 豐c7 22 罩dh1 罩g8

Or 22... 166 23 2xf7. It was already high time to resign.

23 **基h7+ 含f8 24 基xf7+ 含e8 25 營xg6** ②xe5 26 **基f8+! 1-0** 

The initiative is most easily acquired as a result of inaccuracies or outright errors by the opponent in the opening. But getting hold of it is not enough; the main thing is knowing how to handle it.


#### Tolush - Botvinnik

USSR Ch (Leningrad) 1939

# 1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 g6 3 ②c3 d5 4 &f4 &g7 5 e3 0-0 6 基c1 c5!? 7 dxc5 響a5

At that time Botvinnik was gaining successes with this whole variation and the present continuation in particular. Later he decided it was insufficient for equality, and introduced the more precise 7... 2e6! into practice.

8 cxd5 罩d8 (D)



#### 9 **營d2?!**


Tolush had thought up a new idea based on an interesting tactical resource, but unfortunately he hadn't thought it all through from the positional standpoint. Today White's best line is well known to be 9 ②c4! 豐xc5 10 ②b3 ②c6 11 ②f3. Then, for example, after 11...②a5 12 0-0 ②g4 13 e4 豐b4 14 ②c7! ②xf3 15 ③xa5 豐xa5 16 豐xf3, White gained the initiative in Lalić-J.Polgar, Erevan OL 1996.

#### 9...②xd5 10 &c7!?

This is the point of Tolush's conception. Not, of course, 10 ②xd5 豐xd2+ 11 堂xd2 簋xd5+ with a definite advantage to Black.

#### 10...**曾xc7** 11 **包xd5** (D)


Now after 11... **2**d1 包c6 (but not 12...e6? 13 包c7!) 13 **2**c1 **3**h8 14 包e2, there would be unclear play with White having an extra pawn. Botvinnik, however, has perceived the illogicality of White's actions. White has already fallen behind in development, his king is



stuck in the centre, and his queenside is obviously weak. At the same time the position is of a fairly open type. The conclusion is self-evident: Black must organize an attack on his opponent's position as quickly as he can, without shrinking from giving up material if required. In concrete terms, this reasoning led to Black's next move:

#### 11... **Zxd5!** 12 **營xd5 总e6**


#### 13 曾d2 公c6 (D)



#### 14 \( \bar{2}\)d1?

As we shall see on several more occasions, the initiative can affect the play not only objectively, but subjectively too. When faced with his opponent's initiative, a player gets worked up; by no means everyone is able to keep cool before the daunting spectacle of threats assailing him constantly and often from the most varied of quarters. It's only natural that in such conditions you make more frequent mistakes;

you tend to mistake imaginary threats for real ones, while underrating the genuine danger. In this position, for instance, White had to see his way through a fair number of unpleasant variations: 14 兔c4? 罩d8 15 豐c2 豐a5+ 16 全f1 罩d2 is hopeless for him, while after 14 兔d3?! 罩d8 15 豐e2 ②e5 16 兔b1 豐a5+ 17 全f1 罩d2 the game should again end in a quick win for Black.



- b) 14....全f5!? 15 a3 單d8 16 豐c1 豐a5 17 ②e2 兔xc3+18 豐xc3 豐a4 19 豐c1 ②e5, and although Black still retains some initiative, White can hope for a favourable outcome after, e.g., 20 ②d4 鱼d3 21 豐c3.
- c) Botvinnik tells us he was intending to play 14... \(\Delta\) b4!? 15 \(\Delta\) f3 \(\Delta\) d4 \(\Delta\) xa2, but after either 17 b3 e5 18 \(\Delta\) b5, or 17 \(\Delta\) c4 e5 18 \(\Delta\) a3, I don't see that Black can do anything serious.


Therefore, considering that in variation 'b' Black is seeking a solution by moving his bishop from e6 to f5, we must recall Botvinnik's recommendation on move 12 and conclude that that would indeed have been most accurate, whereas in the game White missed a saving chance.

# 

An attempt to leave the rook free to move is unrealistic. After 16 堂e2 豐b5+ 17 堂e1 豐b4+, etc., White can't save himself.

#### 16...罩d5! (D)

Compare this position with the situation before Black's crucial decision on move 11. This will help you to imagine how such decisions INITIATIVE 137



enter a player's head. All the black pieces without exception have now occupied ideal posts, while the only difference in White's position, apart from the disappearance of his knight, is that his queen and rook have changed places! A more successful illustration of the 'development' and 'initiative' themes would be difficult to devise. Small wonder that Black now wins in all variations.

#### 17 De2

White would lose more quickly with 17 公f3 罩xc5 18 瞥b1 兔xa2 19 瞥a1 公b4!.


#### 17... 基xc5 18 公c3 &xc3

As Botvinnik says, this is much more precise than 18... xc3?! 19 bxc3 &xc3 20 &d3 &xa2 21 &e2, when there is still plenty of play ahead.

# 19 bxc3 罩xc3 20 營b2 罩a3 21 營b5 營c3 22 營b2

White does even worse with 22 營d3 營c1+23 罩d1 營c5.


#### 22...ッc5 (D)



#### 23 **曾b1**

Black wins beautifully in the event of 23 豐xb7 豐c1+ 24 含e2 含c4+ 25 含f3 豐xd2 26 含xc4 ②e5+ 27 含g3 罩xe3+! 28 f3 ②xc4 29 豐c8+ 堂g7 30 豐xc4 罩e2, but then finding such variations against an exposed king is not difficult. Now Black carries out a different strike:


23... \( \) xa2! 24 \( \) xa2 \( \) \( \) a5+ 25 \( \) d2 \( \) a1 26 \( \) \( \) d3 \( \) xb1+ 27 \( \) xb1 \( (D) \)



27...∳e5

Botvinnik suggests that pushing his pawns at once and retaining the minor pieces would have been more precise; for instance, 27... 428 2a2 a5 29 h4 a4 30 h5 b5. However, considering that his win in the actual game is so easy and problem-free, it makes no difference to speak of.

28 堂e2 豐b5+ 29 黛d3 公xd3 30 罩xd3 a5 31 罩d1 (D)



31... **營c4!** 

To the attentive reader who is keen to improve, another quotation from Botvinnik is extremely useful: "'Technique' requires that the pawns shouldn't lose contact with each other."

#### 32 會f3 b5 33 基d7 b4 34 基a7

There is no variation in which White succeeds in uniting his rooks for effective concerted action; e.g., 34 基xe7 b3 35 基d8+ 含g7 36 基b8 a4 37 基a7 豐c6+ 38 含e2 豐c2+.

#### 34...a4 35 星d8+ 曾g7 36 星da8 a3 37 g3 豐b5! 0-1

White resigned in view of 38 罩a5 豐b7+39 含e2 b3.

In the following game too, the initial stage of seizing the initiative is greatly facilitated by the opponent's opening errors. The next phase, in which this initiative is developed further, is very interesting and instructive.

#### Stoltz - Botvinnik


Groningen 1946

# 1 e4 e6 2 ₩e2 c5 3 g3 ②c6 4 \( \mathrew{1}\mathrew{2}\

In Botvinnik's view, this is an inaccuracy. He recommends developing the white forces on the King's Indian pattern with 5 2 f 3 d 5 6 d 3 g 6 7 0-0 2 g 7 8 2 b d 2.

# 5...g6 6 d3 \( \partial g7 7 \( \partial e3?! \( (D) \)

This move proves to be a further inaccuracy, as it can't hinder Black's development while White is being sluggish about developing his own kingside. He should have brought his other knight out with 7 273 or 7 2h3.



#### 7...d5! 8 exd5


#### 8... ②d4! 9 豐d2

After 9 2xd4 cxd4 10 2e4 2xd5, Black is left with an obvious and lasting advantage.

# 9...exd5 10 ②ce2 (D)

#### 10...h6!

The result of White's inept handling of the opening stage is obvious. He is already behind in development and losing space. You might think this must be just the right time for Black



to go into action and increase his initiative further. Yet quite unexpectedly he makes a move with his h-pawn, which develops nothing and seems to serve no comprehensible purpose and this move is furnished with an exclamation mark! How is this to be squared with the principles of speed, activity and the like, which have been enunciated before? Here is how. With his last move White set up a threat of exchanging knights on d4. If he succeeded in this, Black's advantage would be greatly diminished, as, for example, in the variation 10... Def5 11 Dxd4 cxd4 12 &f4 0-0 13 De2. There is also too little promise for Black in 10... 2xe2 11 2xe2 2xb2 12 罩b1 臭g7 13 臭xc5. He mustn't allow his opponent to catch up, which would mean losing all or part of the initiative according to the definition given at the start of the chapter. That explains Black's very strong and important 10th move. Now answer this in all honesty: if the 'self-evident' concept of the initiative had not been given a clear-cut formulation, would it have been easy for me to explain the sense of this 'unobtrusive' pawn move (to use an expression I am very fond of), or for you to understand it?

# 11 **營c1**

Already it proves difficult for White to find good moves. After 11 c3 ②xe2 12 ③xe2 (not 12 ②xe2? d4 -+) 12...0-0 Black clearly has a significant plus, while 11 ②xd4? loses to 11...cxd4 12 ②f4 g5.

#### 11... 全f5 12 c3?!

Another inaccuracy. That makes three, and this one incurs the sign for a dubious move. It reminds me of a rule in the back-yard football matches of my childhood: "Three corners – penalty!" The eleven-metre kick, 'earned' as the result of his opponent's inaccuracies, is

INITIATIVE 139


carried out by Botvinnik in exemplary fashion in the further course of the game.

As White's best line, Botvinnik himself advises 12 ②xd4 cxd4 13 ②d2 罩c8 14 豐d1, although it must be said that even then, after 14...豐b6 15 罩b1 0-0 16 ②e2 罩c6 17 0-0 罩fc8, Black exerts unpleasant pressure. Anyway it was not easy for White to anticipate the following brilliant play by his opponent.

#### 12... ②xe2 13 ②xe2 d4!

Not allowing White even the small amount of freedom that he would have after 13...\(\hat{\omega}\)xd3 14 \(\hat{\omega}\)xc5.

# 14 **&d2 &xd3** 15 **&xb7** (D)



Black's gains are plain to see, but the game still needs to be won, and as yet this is not at all a simple matter. Botvinnik gives the important variation 15... \$\subseteq\$ b8 16 \$\otin 50 00 17 0-0 g5 18 \$\subseteq\$ e1 \$\otin g6 19 \$\otin g2 \$\otin e5\$. For the moment let's just make a note of this, and continue looking at the game.

#### 15...0-0!

Losing no time, Black offers the exchange. But it cannot be taken.

#### 16 \(\delta\)f3

This retreat is compulsory. White would lose at once with 16 逸xa8? 豐xa8 17 罩g1 罩e8, or 16 逸xh6? 逸xh6 17 豐xh6 ②f5! 18 豐d2 (18 豐f4 罩e8 also wins for Black) 18... 逸xe2. From these variations we can see that White's light-squared bishop is his most important defensive piece.


#### 16...g5!

Clearing a route for the knight to reach e5, from where it will start pursuing the bishop. After 16... \$\mathbb{L}\$e8 17 0-0 \$\overline{0}\$f5 18 \$\mathbb{L}\$e1, Black's advantage wouldn't be very great.

# 17 0-0 ②g6! 18 **E**e1

As before, the white bishop is more important than the enemy rook; after 18 皇xa8 豐xa8 19 星e1 ②e5, White is helpless.

### 18... ②e5 19 皇g2 (D)




Now let's compare this position with the variation in the note to White's 15th move. Everything is the same except that the rook hasn't left a8 and it is therefore Black to play. He now makes much more effective use of this move; the tempo he has gained for active operations decides the game quickly. This splendidly illustrates the importance of the time factor when developing an initiative.

# 19... 2a6! 20 營d1 公d3 21 營a4

#### 21... 營f6 22 f4 (D)

Here too 22 axa8 is unplayable: 22... 響xf2+23 ah1 ②xe1 24 響xa6 響f1+.



#### 22...**罩ae8**

White could very well resign already, but with Black in time-trouble, the game carries on.

23 & c6 ② xe1 24 & xe8 ② f3+ 25 \$\displays f2 ② xd2 26 & c6 & xe2 27 \$\displays xe2 dxc3 28 bxc3 \$\displays xc3 29\$

国d1 国d8 30 &e4 gxf4 31 gxf4 營h3 32 国g1 營h5+ 33 全e3 營h3+ 34 会e2 營xh2+ 35 国g2 營h5+ 36 会e3 營h3+ 37 会e2 營e6 0-1

In the following game, the danger of passive play is revealed in a most graphic manner. Handing over the initiative unconditionally, without even trying to fight for it, is a sure way of heading for defeat.

# Tarrasch – Alekhine Bad Pistyan 1922


#### 1 d4 Øf6 2 c4 e6 3 Øf3 c5 4 d5 b5

Black offers a pawn sacrifice, counting on the initiative in return. In the present game, this works ideally.

#### 5 dxe6

In this position the most usual move is 5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5, but acceptance of the sacrifice is also perfectly playable.

### 5...fxe6 6 cxb5 d5 (D)




#### 7 e3

Having accepted the pawn, White needs to fight boldly for the initiative rather than cling to the pawn with might and main. For instance, the game Ehlvest-Rogers, Tallinn 1985 continued 7 公c3!? (a cunning though risky move), and after the incautious 7...单b7?! (7...d4?! 8 公a4 leaves Black in trouble) White played 8 e4!, obeying a well-known rule: "The best way to refute a gambit is to accept it and then return the material at the right moment." After 8...dxe4 9 營xd8+ 含xd8 10 公e5! 含e8 11 全f4, White acquired a big advantage.

The other method of development with g3 also seems promising.

On 8.... \$\\_b\$7, the counter-stroke 9 e4!?, which we know about already, looks good. Then after 9...dxe4?! (9... \( \)bd7!? appears better, giving unclear play after 10 exd5 exd5 11 \( \)e2 0-0) 10 \( \)2g5 \( \)gd5 11 \( \)ec2 \( \)bd7 12 \( \)gxe4, White obtained the better position in Browne-Quinteros, Buenos Aires 1980.




#### 9 &e2?

From this moment on, White meekly consents to swim along with his opponent's plans, and his position deteriorates with every move. He had a good opportunity here to go over to the counter-attack with 9 e4!? ②xe4 (in O'Connell-Reynolds, Ireland 1988, White stood better after 9...d4 10 e5 dxc3 11 exd6 ②d5 12 ②e2 cxb2 13 ③xb2 \subseteq xd6 14 0-0 ②d7 15 \subseteq c1) 10 ②xe4 dxe4 11 ②g5, when Black has plenty of weaknesses while it isn't clear how he is to create active play.

# 

By now the prospects for both sides look fairly clear, and it must be said that White has no reason to be pleased with them. At present his extra pawn isn't playing the slightest role, whereas Black's mighty pawn-centre looks very dangerous; if it advances further, the consequences may be dire. Hence White was more or less obliged to try disrupting the natural progress of events, even if this appeared extremely risky. The method is very familiar to us: 14 e4, and then after 14...d4 (14... 2xe4? 15 2xe4 dxe4 16 公d2 e3 17 fxe3 当g5 18 &c4+ \$h8 19 e4 is obviously in White's favour) 15 \(\hat{2}c4+\) \$\d\ 16 \Q\d5 \Q\xd5 17 \&\xd5 \&\xd5 18 \exd5. Black has the promising sacrifice 18... Ixf3 (18...e4!? isn't bad either; after 19 ②d2 ②f6 Black has somewhat the better chances) 19 gxf3 豐g5+20 \$h1 營h5. White must then play INITIATIVE 141


21 \( \frac{1}{2} \) \( \frac{



# 14...e4 15 2 d2 De5 16 Dd1 Dfg4 17 2xg4

It goes against the grain for White to part with this bishop, but his position is so cramped that his pieces are positively treading on each other's toes. On 17 h3 2h6, this knight will soon come back into the game via the convenient square f5 (see below), while after 17 2f1 Wh4 White has to take on g4 anyway. It's amazing how quickly White has become totally helpless. In the subsequent play, Black won't encounter any serious resistance whatever.

#### 17...②xg4 18 ②f1 (D)



#### 18... 學g5!


It's completely obvious that Black is close to having a won game. All he has to do is bring up his reserves and slightly weaken the enemy king position. However, since 18... #f5?!, a useful move in many respects, would be favourably

answered by 19 f4, the queen move is played instead, covering the f5-square among other things.

#### 19 h3

White has to drive the knight back at once. After 19 a4 罩f5!? 20 a5 (on 20 罩e2 Black wins with 20...公xh2! 21 公xh2 兔xh2+ 22 兔xh2 營h4+ 23 兔g1 罩h5 -+, while 20 公g3 罩f7 21 公f1 罩df8 is also hopeless for White) 20...罩df8, it would be all over.

#### 19...②h6 20 \$\diph1 \@f5 21 \@h2 (D)




#### 21...d4!

A measure that we know about – a breakthrough. It occurs in ideal conditions for Black. In general it must be said that this game calls to mind a kind of training fight in which an experienced boxer reels off his entire stock of attacks and punches against a junior sparring partner.

#### 22 \( \mathbb{L} \) c1

White can't stem the avalanche: 22 exd4 cxd4 23 &c1 (or 23 基xe4 &xe4 24 營xe4 ②g3+! 25 fxg3 營xg3, mating) 23...e3 wins easily for Black.

22...d3 23 營c4+ 含h8 24 兔b2 (D)



24...@g3+!

Precision right to the end! This check is necessary, not for show or because of what would happen if White took the knight, but in order to keep White's queen out of touch with his other pieces. A different move-order would not achieve this, for after 24...2d5 25 2c3 2g3+ the knight can be taken: 26 fxg3 2xg3 27 2g4.

#### 25 **\$g1**


Now, of course, the same thing doesn't work. 25.... 全d5 26 營a4

At this stage 26 豐c3 is also unplayable.

# 26... 包e2+ 27 \$h1 罩f7 28 響a6 h5

Black isn't in a hurry. He marshals all his resources before commencing the decisive action.

29 b6 (D)



### 29... 2g3+!

Once again this knight check is useful to Black, as it quashes White's hopes of reducing the pressure in the variation 29...axb6 30 \( \mathbb{Z}xe2 \) dxe2 31 \( \mathbb{W}xe2. \)

# 30 \$\dip g1 axb6 31 \$\dip xb6 d2 32 \$\dip f1 \$\alpha xf1 33 \$\alpha xf1 \times e6!\$


The bishop has come across to sacrifice itself; against this, there is no defence.

34 堂h1 皇xh3! 35 gxh3 罩f3 36 公g3 h4 37 皇f6 營xf6 38 公xe4 罩xh3+ 0-1

When an opportunity to seize the initiative arises, it's very important not to miss it.

Bronstein – Szabo Zurich Ct 1953

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 c4 e6 3 🖄 c3 🏖 b4 4 🖄 f3 c5 5 e3 0-0 6 🕸 e2 d5 7 0-0 🖄 c6 8 cxd5 (D) 8...cxd4?!



This move is imprecise; in the ensuing play White immediately gains the better chances. Theory recommends 8...exd5.

#### 9 dxc6 dxc3

The pawns on c3 and c6 create tension in the position, and a lot now depends on whose move it is.

#### 10 **學b3**

The player to move needs to act resolutely in an effort to seize the initiative.

### 10...**營e**7?!


In Bronstein's opinion, 10... \$\widetharpoonup{\psi} 6!? is more precise.

Relying on some fine details of the position, White now succeeds in working up a noticeable initiative.

#### 11 De5! &d6

In the game Pachman-Zita, Marianske Lazne 1956, White obtained a clear advantage after 11... 公d5 12 全f3 全d6 13 公c4 bxc6 14 公xd6 豐xd6 15 bxc3.

12 ②c4 cxb2 13 &xb2 &c5 14 &f3 ②d5 15 ②e5 bxc6 (D)




With his enterprising pawn sacrifice for the initiative, White has made obvious progress over the last five moves, and now, according to

Bronstein, he could have acquired a distinct advantage by 16 ②xc6! 營d6 (16... 營c7? 17 호xd5 exd5 18 營c3 is wholly bad for Black; he would also lose after 16... 營g5? 17 h4! 營xh4 18 호xd5 exd5 19 營c3) 17 e4!. Alas, he played imprecisely:

#### 16 e4?!

And there followed:

16...公f6 17 罩fc1 &d7 18 豐c3 &b4 19 公xc6 &xc6 20 豐xc6 罩ad8 21 罩c4 罩d2 22 &c1 罩d7 23 &e3 &d6 24 豐a6 罩fd8 (D)




All that White has left is a very slight, more or less nominal advantage, seeing that Black has mobilized and deployed his pieces effectively. White's only hope of keeping up the fight lies in the black a7-pawn, but at present it is well shielded against attacks.

# 25 **基b1 ④e8** 26 g3 **§e5** 27 **\$g2** h6 28 **基cb4 \$h7**

At all events Black needs to be careful. He could lose by attempting to force exchanges with 28... 24? 29 2xd4 2xd4 30 2xd4 2xd4 31 2b7 2d7 32 e5! 2xb7 33 2xb7 2c5 34 2c6, even though in principle an exchange of dark-squared bishops is useful to him.

29 **基b7 公d6** 30 **基xd7 基xd7** 31 **&c5** (D)



#### 31...罩c7

Here Black commits his first almost imperceptible inaccuracy. According to Bronstein it was better to play 31...豐d8!? 32 罩d1 豐c7, and it's hard to see how White could breach this formation. But in what way is Black's move inaccurate, and what ideas can White have for improving his position here?

#### 32 **≜**a3


In Bronstein's view, 32 \undersama 3!? would have been even stronger.

# 32... 學d7 33 罩c1

Here is the answer to the first part of the question. Since the black rook is defending the only real weakness and the white one can't attack it, a rook exchange can only increase White's chances.

# 33... 基xc1 34 &xc1 &d4?! (D)

An obvious move – and evidently inaccurate! An improvement seems to be 34... 2b5 35



35 e5!

Unexpected, and very soundly based! White gives up a pawn to remove the black bishop from the crucial diagonal. Now at last his own bishops will have the opportunity to show their worth.

#### 35...\&xe5

Declining the offer with 35... 2f5!? seems better, but after 36 &c6 Wc7 37 f4 the white e5-pawn would be cramping the enemy position and the struggle would continue. Here it must be said that in chess you very rarely succeed in demonstrating an outright win even after mistakes by your opponent, but it's important to be able to strengthen your position and create the preconditions for his further errors.


# 36 **≜e3** ②c8

If 36... 15 37 2xa7 2d4, White has the strong rejoinder 38 \bigspace{10mu}b7!.

#### 37 a4

Now the point of White's pawn sacrifice is revealed. The black a-pawn is fixed on a vulnerable square, and by advancing his own pawn as far as he can, White hopes to turn this into a dangerous passed pawn sooner or later. The two bishops in this situation prove to be a tremendous force. Black's defence is not easy.

37... **2**b8 38 a5 **2**d6 39 **2**f4 f6 40 **2**d3+ **2**g8 41 a6 **2**h8 42 **2**b3 **2**e8 43 **2**h5 (D)



# 43... **營g8?**

The losing error. A much more stubborn line was 43... 幽c8 44 皇g4 f5 45 皇f3 皇c7, with chances of defence.

Now White strikes the decisive blow, showing what constitutes the power of the bishoppair in an open position.

# 44 &f7! 營xf7

Black also loses with 44...②xf7 45 營xb8 e5 (nothing is altered by 45...g5 46 營xg8+ 含xg8 47 息b8) 46 營xg8+ 含xg8 47 息e3 ②d6 48 含xa7 含f7 49 含c5 ②b5 50 兔b6.

# 45 豐xb8+ ②e8 46 豐b7 豐h5 47 h3 含h7 48 豐xa7 e5 49 含e3 e4 50 豐e7 1-0

The value of this game undoubtedly lies in White's pawn sacrifice on move 35 and his subsequent actions in developing his initiative.

In the following game, the play is based on similar strategic motifs.

Stein – Keres Moscow 1967

1 e4 e5 2 ②f3 ②c6 3 ②b5 a6 4 ②a4 ②f6 5 0-0 ②xe4 6 d4 b5 7 ②b3 d5 8 dxe5 ②e6 9 c3 ②c5


# 10 ②bd2 0-0 11 **호c2 f5 12 ②b3 <b>호b6 13 ②fd4** ②xd4 14 ②xd4 豐d7

Keres avoids a theoretical dispute over the once-fashionable variation 14.... xd4 15 cxd4 f4 16 f3 公g3! 17 hxg3 fxg3 18 營d3 全f5 19 營xf5 至xf5 20 全xf5 營h4 21 全h3 營xd4+ 22 全h1 營xe5 23 全d2 營xb2. Instead he chooses a rarer line, but one that allows White the advantage of the bishop-pair. Black therefore needs to be careful.

# 15 f3 分c5 16 含h1 分b7?!

This move looks unfortunate. All Black's favourable results in this extremely rare variation have involved 16... Zae8.

17 &e3 c5 18 ②xe6 豐xe6 (D)




#### 19 a4!!

The most interesting and important part of this game now begins. Instead of playing the obvious 19 f4, White gives up his e-pawn! In the endgame, a protected passed pawn often amounts to a decisive plus. The point, however, is that after 19... 2a5!? 20 b3 Zad8 the endgame would be a long way off, while Black would obtain realistic chances of advancing a passed pawn of his own and seizing the central squares. Furthermore a blocked type of position would arise, and this is unwelcome to bishops. Stein therefore strives to achieve the opposite to make the position as open as possible, so that his bishops can have their momentous say. In other words, both players are fighting for the initiative, which each of them hopes to develop in his own manner.

#### 19...(2) a5 (D)

White's ambitions are backed up by analysis; it appears that taking the pawn would be bad for Black. Dolmatov gives 19...豐xe5 20 宣e1 皇c7 21 皇g1 豐d6 22 axb5 axb5 23 罩xa8

置xa8 24 ≜xf5, with an obvious advantage for White.



#### 20 \( \extstyle f2!

Another subtle and deep move, based on the following considerations: (a) to avoid blocking the position, White must refrain from playing f4, and (b) since Black's main counter-chance consists in ... \(\int\)\(\text{2}\)\(\text{c4}\), White anticipates this by removing his bishop from attack.

# 20...\$h8

Of course, all general considerations need calculation to support them. Once again, the variations show that 20...豐xe5? fails: 21 axb5 axb5 22 b4 ②c4?! (even after the superior 22...②b7 23 罩xa8 罩xa8 24 罩e1 豐d6 25 兔xf5, White is clearly better) 23 罩xa8 罩xa8 24 bxc5 兔c7 25 兔g3 f4 26 兔xf4 and wins.


On the other hand 20... 2c4 is met by 21 b3 2xe5 22 axb5 axb5 23 2xf5! 2f7 24 2xa8 2xa8 25 2e1, again with the better chances for White. Still, this line was probably Black's best option in the circumstances. Keres prefers to keep the game closed. White is endeavouring to open it up. I repeat that a struggle for the initiative is going on, and the better chances in this struggle are on White's side.

#### 21 罩e1 罩a7 22 豐e2 b4?

This move proves to be the decisive mistake, after which Black's position falls apart. Instead 22...c4!? appears compulsory, though White would still have an undoubted plus after 23 单xb6 豐xb6 24 星ed1.

# 23 cxb4 cxb4 24 &xb6 豐xb6 25 罩ad1 豐c5 26 &d3! 豐b6 (D)


The position speaks for itself, but unfortunately it won't win itself! White needs to play well to the very end. Stein copes with the task splendidly.



#### 27 &b1!

Clearing a file for the major pieces. Now Black won't succeed in holding his weaknesses.

Black loses with either 30... 型xf5 31 營d8+ ②xd8 32 罩xd8+ or 30... ②e7 31 營c5.



#### 31 **營d6**

There was an easy win with 31 \( \mathbb{\text{w}} \text{xb5} \) axb5 32 \( \mathbb{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} \), but Stein has decided to keep on increasing his activity to the last. It's a matter of taste. The rest is simple and comprehensible.

31... 數 8 32 數 x 6 基 x 5 33 e 6 基 e 7 34 基 d 7 基 e 8 35 基 b 7 數 c 8 36 基 c 7 數 b 8 3 7 數 d 7 基 g 5 3 8 f 4 基 g 6 3 9 f 5 基 g 5 4 0 f 6 1 - 0


The next game reveals some interesting psychological details connected with the problems of fighting for the initiative.

Bisguier – Stein Stockholm IZ 1962


1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 c5 3 c4 cxd4 4 🖄 xd4 e6 5 e3 d5 6 🖄 c3 🖄 c6 7 & e2 & d6

An alternative is 7...\$c5.

8 0-0 0-0 9 b3 a6 10 &b2 公xd4 11 營xd4 營c7 12 營h4 (D)



Given the situation in the tournament, it was imperative for Stein to win this game. However, after the way the opening has gone, we can see that playing for the win is by no means simple. Playing this sort of position might have been to the taste of Akiba Rubinstein. The following exchange is necessary so as to keep the c-file temporarily obstructed while Black completes his development.



Although, in general terms, exchanges are unwelcome to Black, the trade of dark-squared bishops might have increased his chances. The most important enemy piece would have disappeared from the board, and Black could have hoped to exploit White's dark-square weaknesses.

# 20...罩d7!?


The right way; not 20... Zac8. It's absolutely essential for Black to introduce tension into the position. Almost certainly, he has already

seen the following positional and psychological trap.

#### 21 夕f3 罩ad8 22 罩cd2

Now on 22 ②e5 Id5, complications would set in, which would play into Black's hands. The move White makes looks logical. He plans to bring about mass-exchanges.

Black's next move looks unplayable, but... 22... 2b4! 23 2xf6 gxf6 24 \widetilde{w}xh6 f5 (D)




# 25 🗓 g5

#### 25...\(\hat{\omega}\)c3! (D)

One puzzle remains: what exactly has White overlooked? Perhaps he didn't see this last move, and was counting on 25...f6? 26 \$c4! 28 **營h7+ 含f8** 29 **營h8+** with mate to follow. However that may be, the abrupt change in the situation, with the sudden need to calculate a multitude of sharp lines, had knocked Bisguier off the rails. Thus, having lured his opponent into a trap with his 20th move, Black had first and foremost seized the psychological initiative. (It goes to show that there is such a thing!) But then Black also holds the initiative on the board, as White now needs to parry the threats and make a difficult choice between several variations.

#### 26 h4?

White fails to cope. Objectively there was a way to save himself, namely with 26 營h7+ 含f8 27 營h6+ 2g7 28 營h4!, and now if Black tries 28...營c5!?, a good answer is 29 營h5 (or 29 營g3 宣xd3 30 公h7+ 含g8 31 公f6+ 含f8 32



②h7+, which also leads to repetition) 29...豐b4 30 豐e2 e5 31 e4 兔h6 32 豐h5 兔xg5 33 豐h8+ 含e7 34 豐xe5+ 含f8 35 豐h8+ with perpetual check.

26... **營f6!** 

Now it's all over.

27 營h7+ 含f8 28 營h5 營h8

Other moves would also win: 28...\$\dot\perp 29 \@h7 \perp g6 -+ or 28...\perp g7 29 \@h7 + \dot\perp g8 -+.

29 公h7+ 曾g8 30 曾g5+ 曾g7 31 區c2 曾xg5 32 公xg5 區xd3 0-1

As we have just seen, the initiative in your opponent's hands is dangerous both objectively and subjectively. A computer doesn't mind whether you are threatening it or not. It has nerves of steel and takes a strictly objective view of everything. Human beings are different. They are endowed with emotions, and if they land in a situation where they are incessantly threatened (which, as we know, is what holding and developing the initiative is all about), they are quite capable of going to pieces, losing their composure and making what at first sight you would call the most incredible blunders. In the game we have just examined, we came across an example of this. We will now look at another one.


# Kožul – Kasparov Belgrade 1989

1 d4 公f6 2 c4 e6 3 公c3 息b4 4 營c2 0-0 5 息g5 h6 6 息h4 c5 7 dxc5 公a6 8 a3 息xc3+ 9 營xc3 公xc5 10 兔xf6 營xf6 11 營xf6 gxf6 12 b4 公a4 13 e3

Perhaps 13 g3!? is better.

13...b6 14 (D)

White has played the opening without the slightest pretensions to an advantage; his sole




aim has been to reach a simple and harmless position. Already, however, he has made some definite concessions. He is somewhat behind in development and is not even attempting to limit his opponent's scope. Furthermore the c-pawn, and with it the whole of the c-file, is liable to be a problem. Even though all this doesn't look dangerous as yet, and White's position is fairly sound, the fact remains that he has already handed his opponent the initiative, however slight it may be at present. In this connection I would like to say that when facing a stronger opponent, it is rather short-sighted to strive for safety above all else at the price of relieving him of any worries whatever. After all, if he is stronger, then once he feels secure he will harass you hard and persistently without risking anything.

# 14...&a6!?

Kasparov straight away fastens onto the weak white pawn. The moment when variations will need to be calculated is approaching fast.

15 ②d2 (D)


After 15 0-0-0 單fc8 16 罩xd7 এxc4 17 息xc4 罩xc4+ 18 曾d2 罩ac8, Black would retain some pressure.



15... gb7 16 gd3 Zac8 17 Zc1?!

This is already a significant though inconspicuous inaccuracy – perhaps even a downright error, after which White's problems are going to grow. A better move is 17 0-0, and then in the event of 17...②b2 18 êe2 d5 19 \$\mathbb{Z}\$fc1 \$\otin xc4 20 \$\otin xc4 \dxc4 21 \$\otin xc4! \$\mathbb{Z}\$fd8 22 \$\otin e2!\$ White would obtain completely equal chances.

17...d5 (D)



# 18 **\$e2?!**

Another unfortunate move. This kind of thing occurs very often. When faced with even minor difficulties, you only have to make one slight mistake, and you find that your problems have suddenly increased in number and complexity. With them, the likelihood of new errors, usually more serious ones, increases too. Such is the mechanism by which the initiative exerts its psychological pressure.

White's troubles are illustrated by these variations:


- a) 18 \( \begin{aligned} \text{acc4} \\ \text{dxc4} \end{acc4} \) (or 19 \( \begin{aligned} \text{xc4} \end{accc4} \) \( \begin{aligned} \text{bc} \) 19...\( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{fd8}, and by now Black's pressure is not easy to withstand. \end{acccc} \)
- b) 18 \(\(\Delta\cdot 2\) \(\Delta\cdot 2\) 19 c5 bxc5 20 \(\Delta\cdot 1\) \(\Delta\cdot 4\) 21 \(\Delta\cdot x\cdot 4\), and now Black has 21...cxb4! 22 \(\Delta\ddot d\)6 \(\Delta\cdot x\cdot 2\) \(\Delta\cdot x\cdot 2
- c) It seems to me that White's only acceptable try is 18 0-0. Then after 18... Ifd8 19 cxd5 Ixd5 20 2e4 Ixd2 21 2xb7 Ic3, he has the important resource 22 2f3, to create counterplay against the f7-pawn.

# 18...dxc4! 19 @xc4

# 19...罩fd8 20 罩hd1

White has plenty of problems. After, for instance, 20 f3 全a6 21 包b2 罩xd3! 22 包xd3 (not 22 罩xc8+ 罩d8+!) 22... 罩d8, he is in a bad way. If 20 b5, then 20...a6 is strong.

20... \( \hat{2}\) a6 (D)



#### 21 <sup>国</sup>d2

This move is a gross blunder, but there is still no need to attach any sign to it. The point is that White is lost in any case; e.g., 21 \( \tilde{D}b2 \) \( \tilde{L}xd3 + \)
22 \( \tilde{L}xd3 \) \( \tilde{L}c3 + -+, 21 \) e4 \( \tilde{L}xc4 \) 22 \( \tilde{L}xc4 \) \( \tilde{L}xc2 \) \( \tilde{L}xc2 \) \( \tilde{L}xc2 \) \( \tilde{L}xc2 \) \( \tilde{L}xc4 \) \( \tilde{L}xc2 \) \( \tilde

#### 21...b5 0-1

Of course, seizing the initiative is not always easy. Against a strong and well-prepared opponent, the initiative has to be fought for. The methods are already familiar to us: a constant focus on activity, and a readiness for material or positional sacrifices when necessary.


# Spassky – Tukmakov USSR Ch (Moscow) 1973

# 1 e4 c5 2 公f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 公xd4 公f6 5 公c3 a6 6 兔g5 e6 7 f4 公bd7 8 豐f3 豐c7 9 0-0-0 b5 10 兔d3 兔b7 11 罩he1 豐b6 12 公b3 b4 13 公a4

At one time this variation was quite popular. The knight move to a4 is the main line, although it leads to sharp play in which White has to be prepared to take radical measures. The retreat to b1 is also of interest.

# 13...營c7 14 公d4 &e7 15 營h3 (D) 15...公c5

After this move, which at first sight looks tempting, the play becomes a good deal sharper. In subsequent games, no one else played this



way; Black invariably castled queenside. Tukmakov's move may, however, be perfectly acceptable.

#### 16 9 xc5


White hasn't much choice, since in the event of 16 e5 ②xd3+ 17 🖾xd3 dxe5 18 fxe5 ②d5 19 ②xe7 ②xe7!? it is Black who has the advantage.

#### 16...dxc5

The variations after 16... wxc5 17 e5 dxe5 18 xe5 work out in White's favour:

- b) 18...豐c7 19 盒xf6 gxf6 20 罩xe6! 豐xf4+ (or 20...fxe6 21 ②xe6 豐a5 22 ②g7+ 當f8 23 豐h6 and White wins) 21 豐e3 with advantage.

17 ②xe6 fxe6 (D)



White has given up a piece for only one pawn, and now he makes a quiet move:

#### 18 Qc4!


Of course Spassky will have had to foresee and assess this turn of events when selecting the square for his knight on move 13. Now the black king is stuck in the centre for a long period, and White will have an enduring initiative – but it's hard to say how strong it will be, and what defensive resources there are in the black position. In chess such a state of affairs arises quite often; if a player steers clear of such unforced sacrifices through lack of confidence in the initiative, he is severely narrowing his chess horizon and depleting his arsenal.

# 18...罩d8?

Confronted with something unexpected (but then, what other variations *should* he have expected?), Black at once commits an error – perhaps even the decisive one! We have already analysed this kind of psychological reaction.

The most logical move seems to be 18... 2c8, trying to reduce White's attacking forces. Then on 19 2xe6, Black needs to study two possible replies:

- a) 19... 豐c6?! looks natural, but is met by the immensely strong 20 e5!! ②g8 (after 20... 호xe6 21 exf6 호xh3 22 置xe7+ \$\delta\$f8 23 fxg7+ \$\delta\$g8 24 gxh3 h6 25 gxh8 + \$\delta\$xh8 26 \$\delta\$h4 White has the advantage, though admittedly it's hard to say how big it is) 21 互d6! \$\delta\$xd6 (Black also does badly with 21... \$\delta\$b7 22 \$\delta\$h5+ g6 23 \$\delta\$xc8 \$\delta\$xc8 24 \$\delta\$xg6, or with 21... \$\delta\$c7 22 \$\delta\$f3 \$\delta\$b7 23 \$\delta\$d3), and now White wins by 22 exd6 \$\delta\$f8 23 \$\delta\$f5+.
- b) 19... $2 \times 6!$  is therefore much better. After 20  $\times \times 6$  (D), there are these options:




- b2) A line prompted by Fritz is also in White's favour: 20...c4?! 21 兔xf6!? gxf6 22 e5 fxe5 (22...b3 23 exf6 bxa2 24 耸d2!! 罩d8+ 25 耸e2 罩xd1 26 罩xd1 is clearly better for White; without an electronic friend, you can scarcely

b3) 20... If 8!?, and to me the consequences seem unclear.

19 營xe6 罩xd1+ 20 罩xd1 罩f8 21 兔xf6 Only not 21 e5? 兔c8.

21... 基xf6 22 豐g8+ 食f8 23 g3 (D)



# 23...**≜**c8

By now the position is easy to evaluate. White's advantage is obvious and Black's defence is very difficult. White holds an initiative which essentially will persist until the end of the game. All that is now required of him is to proceed accurately. As it happens, he has a whole range of threats at his disposal. Thus, on 23...g6, he would gain a decisive plus by 24 e5 \$\bigsim b6 25 \bigsim b3!, when Black has no good defence against the murderous check 26 \bigsim a4+.

#### 24 e5 \Bb6


Another of White's threats emerges from 24... \( \bar{L}\) \( \bar{L}\

#### 25 **營xh7?**

Alas, White does *not* show the necessary precision in exploiting his advantage. Tempted by the pawn, he comes close to letting the initiative slip, and the whole of his advantage with it. Here again the winning move is 25 罩d8+!, though this time it isn't so elementary: 25...\$\delta xd8 26 \boxed{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}xf8+\delta d7 27 \boxed{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}g7+\delta d8 28 \boved{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}xf8+\delta d7 29}}}\boxed{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}xf8+\delta d7 31 \boved{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}xf5+\delta d3 2}}}\boxed{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}xf5+\delta d3 3 \boved{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}g8+\delta d7 34 \boved{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{w}}}xf5+\delta d3 3 \boved{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}xf5} 33 \boved{\text{

# 25...**ge6**?

But Black lets his opponent get away with it! All he had to do was find the simple move 25... \( \delta g4! \) to bring disorder into the white ranks; after 26 🖺 d2 👑 c6 27 b3 👑 g6 28 👑 h4 & e7 29 👑 h8+ & f8 there would seem to be no way for White to improve his position. Thus by playing the right move, Black could very well have neutralized his opponent's initiative though not perhaps have seized it for himself. Now he stands virtually no chance.



#### 31 營e2! 營e6


It was essential to try 31...c4, so as to resuscitate his bishop and perhaps his rook too; though even then, Black's chances of salvation would be slim. Now they are non-existent.

32 h5 罩b7 33 豐e4 罩g7 34 hxg6 豐xg6 35 f5

# Kasparov – Short Amsterdam 1994

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 ②f6 4 e5 ②fd7 5 f4 c5 6 ②f3 ②c6 7 ②e3 cxd4 8 ②xd4 ②c5 9 營d2 0-0 10 0-0-0 a6 11 h4 ②xd4 12 ②xd4 b5 13 罩h3 b4 14 ②a4 ②xd4 15 營xd4 f6 (D)

Apparently, Black's last move was a novelty of Short's, but Kasparov came prepared for it!



#### 

Now the most interesting part of the game begins (especially for Short, to whom the following events, judging from the game score, must have come as a complete surprise). Immediately afterwards, the whole variation up to and including White's 19th move was incorporated into theory.

# 18 f5!


The point of White's whole manoeuvre, culminating in this striking sacrifice, is to break into Black's weakened queenside with his pieces. The pawn sacrifices itself to stop the black pieces from coming quickly into the game.

# 18...**營h6+**

Not 18... 響xf5? 19 罩f3 響g4 20 罩xf8+ 公xf8 21 公b6 and White wins.

#### 19 曾b1 罩xf5? (D)

In this position Black has only two candidate moves: the one he plays, and 19... ②f6. Today the latter has become the main line. For example, Wedberg-Brynell, Swedish Ch (Linköping) 2001 continued 20 ②b6 ②e4 21 營c7 宣f7 22 營d8+ 宣f8 23 營c7 宣f7 and, after declining to repeat moves with 24 營xe5, White eventually lost. Instead it would be worth considering 20 營xe5, but not Knaak's 'refutation' which continues: 20 fxe6'!' ②e4 21 營xd5 ③d2+ 22 墨xd2'!' (up to here the exclamation marks are his), and now after the elementary 22.... ②xe6! (Berg-Brynell, Örebro 2001) it is Black who wins.



#### 20 罩f3!

The positional sense of White's entire manoeuvre lies in this very continuation. Exchanging your opponent's most active piece is always a useful thing to do, and in the present case it basically decides the result of the game.

From the standpoint of the 'theory' of the initiative which I have put forward, the explanation is simple. If sustaining the initiative means preserving (or better still, increasing) the disparity in activity between our forces and those of our opponent, then the exchange of his most active unit increases this disparity in our favour. But there is another interesting point. If the computer is asked for its opinion of the diagram position, then in a flash it indicates the rook move to f3! But of course it doesn't do so from general considerations; its concrete aim is to remove the piece which is stopping White from striking at the d5-pawn.


#### 20... 基xf3

The other plausible reply 20... 響f6 loses by force: 21 置xf5 響xf5, and now a brilliant stroke clarifies everything: 22 ②b6!! ②xb6 23 ②d3! e4 (the main combinative motif is seen in the variation 23... ②c4 24 營d8+ 營f8 25 ②xh7+) 24 置f1 exd3 25 置xf5 exf5 26 營xb6 and wins.

# 21 gxf3 營f6

Ftačnik gives the variation 21... 全f7 22 全h3 a5!?, with the assessment 'slight advantage to White'. As a matter of fact, if we take this analysis further, we find that after 23 豐c7! 全f8 (or 23... 豐xh4 24 公b6 豐xh3 25 公xa8 豐xf3 26 宣c1 +-) 24 豐c6 宣b8 25 全xe6 空e7 26 全xd7 全xd7 27 豐xd5, White wins.

# 22 臭h3 當f7 (D)



White has achieved everything he was aiming for when he began the lengthy manoeuvre at move 16. Even Black's most active piece – his queen – is tied to the defence of a weakness. All White needs to do now is bring his rook into play and break up his opponent's centre. The logical way to attain both these ends appears to be...


#### 23 c4! dxc4

A strong answer to 23...d4 is 24 f4. Then after 24...exf4 (or 24...曾e7 25 fxe5 營xd6 26 exd6 e5 27 罩e1, with a big endgame advantage to White) 25 罩e1!, Black is in a bad way.

#### 24 Dc3!

Kasparov rightly declines to win material with 24 豐c6 罩b8 25 罩xd7+ 鱼xd7 26 豐xd7+ 查g6. That would mean exchanging White's rook, a piece with fine prospects, for two black pieces that were only half alive anyway; it would leave Black with genuine chances of resistance. Instead White continues in the typical 'Kasparov' manner that is very familiar to us from the foregoing chapters – he plays for the maximum coordination of his forces. This is guaranteed to demolish his opponent's defences.

# 24... **曾e7** (D)



It's hard to suggest anything else.

#### 25 豐c6 罩b8 26 ②e4 ②b6

In answer to 26... 當f8 (26... 營b4 27 魚xe6+ 當f8 is equivalent) 27 魚xe6 營b4, Kasparov gives 28 營d6+ 營xd6 29 ②xd6 當e7 30 ②xc8+ 當xe6 31 單d6+ 當f5 32 ②e7+ 當f4 33 單xd7 and wins.

On 26...包f8, the winning line indicated by Ftačnik is 27 包d6+ 全g8 28 ②xc8 營b4 29 營xe6+! 全h8 30 營xe5.


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White's pieces are now fully coordinated. Black's are not, but he is nonetheless preparing to create counterplay on the b-file. According to all the laws of development of the initiative, White gets there first:

#### 30 罩d6! c3

Black also loses after 30... ②a4 31 黨xe6 黨xb2+32 豐xb2.

# 31 &xe6+ &xe6 32 \( \) xe6 1-0




32... ②c4 33 豐xc3! ②a3+ 34 含c1 豐f8 35 豐xa3 is hopeless for Black.

# Kramnik – Malaniuk Moscow OL 1994

# 1 �f3 f5 2 g3 �f6 3 �g2 d6 4 d4 g6 5 0-0 �g7 6 c4 0-0 7 �c3 e8 8 d5 �a6 9 ਫb1 �d7 10 b4 c5 11 dxc6 �xc6 12 b3 �e4 13 �b2 �xc3?!

An inaccurate move-order, although that never even occurred to anyone until the present game. If Black wants to exchange on c3, he does better to play 13... 2xc3 14 2xc3 2xc3, when White has no intermediate check. Black can also refrain from exchanging, as in Lukacs-Beim, Budapest 1994, which went 13... 2c8 14 2xe4 2xe4 15 2xg7 2xg7 16 2bc1 2f6 with an acceptable game.

# 14 \( \) xc3 \( \) xc3 \( \) (D)




#### 15 c5+!?

In earlier games everyone recaptured on c3 at once, and as a rule Black managed to hold the position. As the further course of this game clearly proves, it would have been more sensible for Black to limit his opponent's options by paying careful attention to the move-order.

#### 15...e6

Black hasn't much choice; 15...d5?! would be downright senseless, but 15... \$\mathbb{T}7?! is also inferior, seeing that on 16 \$\mathbb{W}xc3\$ Black can't play 16...dxc5?? 17 b5, while after 16...\$\mathbb{W}xa2\$ 17 cxd6 exd6 18 \$\mathbb{Z}a1\$ \$\mathbb{T}7\$ 19 \$\mathbb{Q}g5\$ Kramnik considers that White has an obvious plus.

# 16 營xc3 dxc5 (D)



#### 17 b5

This of course is a very important moment in the game, and the annotators with one accord have cried 'intuitive sacrifice!' and given this move an exclamation mark. For my own part I have no wish to be stingy with the odd exclamation mark, especially for Vladimir Kramnik whom I greatly esteem. However, for the sake of objectivity and the interests of my readers, I am bound to say that at this point White had no choice. This incidentally is confirmed by Kramnik himself: "Of course White didn't play 15 c5+!? in order to think about how to defend his c-pawn after 17 bxc5 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{ \text{\$\sigma}} \\ \text{c8."} \end{aligned} \] In other words White was committing himself to the sacrifice of two pawns when he gave check on move 15, and this was done in full awareness that there was no forced continuation! His sole concern was to fight for the initiative.

This kind of sacrifice naturally requires boldness, faith in the correctness of your judgement, and an intuitive feel for the possibilities of your position. In this game we are going to acquaint ourselves with a form of initiative that is new to us: an initiative based not only on the difference in quantity between the developed forces, but also on a long-term complex of weaknesses in the enemy camp – in this case, dark-square weaknesses. Both these elements will play an important role, but while the first is


familiar to us already, the second will call for special attention. It isn't surprising that the presence of static defects can also be the cause of long-term passivity. If you succeed in creating persistent pressure against them, your opponent is forced onto the defensive whether he likes it or not.

#### 

As Kramnik indicates, the other method of attack doesn't work: 18 ②g5 &c6 19 墨xb7 &xb7 20 &xb7 豐e7!.

#### 18...**罩b8** (D)

Being greedy is no good at all: 18...\$xe2? 19 \$\mathbb{Z}xb7! \$\mathbb{L}xf1 20 \$\mathbb{L}g4\$ e5 21 \$\mathbb{L}d5+ \$\mathbb{L}b8\$ 22 \$\mathbb{L}xe5\$, with a quick mate.



#### 19 罩fe1!

Kramnik tells us that at this point he thought for ages trying to find a forced solution, but concluded that there wasn't one. For instance 19 豐a5?! ②xe2 20 宣fe1 b6 21 豐a3 ②b5 22 宣xb5? 豐xb5 23 ②f1 豐b4 or 19 g4?! ②xe2 20 宣fe1 ②xg4 21 宣xb7 宣xb7 22 ②xb7 ②c7 23 豐xc5 豐d8. White therefore needs to bring up his reserves. Note that the player with the initiative isn't always obliged to keep attacking directly. He just needs to keep the opponent constantly in his sights! When the enemy position is weighed down by weaknesses or other problems, there will be time to mobilize our reserves while of course giving due attention to the opponent's possibilities.


#### 19...b6

A characteristic variation is indicated by Kramnik: 19... ②c6?! 20 ②xc6 bxc6 21 豐a5 罩xb1 (White's advantage is also obvious after 21... ②b4 22 豐xc5 ②d5 23 罩xb8 豐xb8 24 豐xc6) 22 罩xb1 豐c8 23 e3, and Black's queenside pawns are doomed. It's worth pointing out

that the positions in this variation are reminiscent of the Catalan System, except that Black's kingside weaknesses make things a good deal worse for him.

#### 20 e4 ②c7 (D)

The standard 'Leningrad' continuation 20...f4 is unplayable here in view of 21 ②g4 e5 22 ②xe5, after which the knight returns to g4. Kramnik considers Black's best reply to be 20...②b4!. He gives a large number of variations, but I will confine myself to the main ones: 21 exf5 gxf5 22 a3 (if 22 營d2, then 22...營d8!) 22...②d5! 23 營d2! ②f6 24 營g5+ (or 24 Zbd1!?) 24...全h8 25 營h6 ②a4, and in this position White can play either 26 ⑤f3!? Zd8 27 Ze3, followed by doubling rooks on the e-file, or else 26 Zbc1 with the idea of bringing this rook to h4; on 26...營h5, White maintains the initiative with 27 營f4.



After the move in the game, Black's position is extremely passive.

#### 21 exf5 gxf5


Black loses his queen after 21...exf5 22 ②g4 fxg4 23 萬xe8 호xe8 24 豐e5 萬f7 25 호d5, while in the event of 21...萬xf5 22 호h3 萬h5 23 ②g4! ②d5 24 ②f6+ ②xf6 25 호xe6+! 常g7 26 호g4! White has a huge plus.

# 22 營e3! (D)

# 22...a6?!

The position looks clearer now than it was, shall we say, four moves ago; White's compensation for the two pawns is obvious. That Black has serious problems can be seen from the following:

- a) 22...豐h5 23 夏f3! f4 24 豐a3 followed by 豐xa7.




- d) In Kramnik's view the best continuation is 22... 2a4!?, so as not to allow a rook onto d1. In reply he suggests 23 \( \text{Lbc1}, \) aiming to transfer the rook to \( \text{H} a \) manoeuvre we have seen before. As alternatives, he gives 23 \( \text{H}!?, 23 \) \( \text{W}f4!? \) and even 23 \( \text{Lf}. \) In the game Black does worse, thanks to White's 24th move.

# 23 營g5+ 含h8

The next move is simple but important.

# 24 罩bd1 (D)




#### 24... 罩g8

# 25 **쌀f4!**

With this strong move White gains control of the squares c7 and a4. It turns out that Black can't cope with all the threats.

# 25...曾e7 (D)

On 25... \( \begin{aligned}
& \begin{aligned}
&



# 26 &c6!

We came across this blow in a previous variation. Here too it is decisive.


#### 26...Ig4

What you might call a despairing throw. The reason is simple: 26... 基 27 基 x d 8 基 x d 8 2 2 2 x b 5 a x b 5 29 ② c 6 營 d 7 30 ② x d 8 營 x d 8.

# 27 ②xg4 &xc6 28 罩d6!

This powerful move quashes Black's hopes of somehow holding on after 28 ②e5 &d5.

# 28... &e8 (D)



#### 29 5)h6?!


Short of time, Kramnik commits an inaccuracy. As he himself points out, the strongest line is 29 當dxe6! ②xe6 30 豐e5+! 豐g7 31 豐xb8 ②c7 32 罩xe8+ ②xe8 33 豐xe8+.

# 29...罩c8!

Now the struggle continues, though admittedly not for long.

# 30 基xb6 **当g7 31 基b7 点c6 32 基a7 公d5** (*D*) 33 **当e5!**

Discovered in time-trouble, this excellent move brings everything under control. Black's last hopes disappear.




# 33... 響xe5 34 ②f7+! 會g8 35 ②xe5 臭b5

Apparently, in its day Fritz3 suggested the sly trick 35... 2c3!?, hoping for 36 \( \) xa6 \( \) e2+37 \( \) xe2 \( \) bb5 38 \( \) xe6 \( \) xe2, when the c-pawn will still give White some bother. However, if you ask its descendant Fritz8 for its opinion, it answers in a trice with 36 a4! \( \) xa4 37 \( \) xa6 \( \) \( \) 2c2+38 \( \) xe2 \( \) bb5 39 \( \) aa2 +-.

# 

After this accurate move, any remaining hopes vanish for good: 41... 2a3 (or 41... 2a4 42 2b8!) 42 21xb5 2xb5 43 2xb5 c3 44 2b1.

It is not only in complex middlegame positions that the initiative plays an important role. It permeates all phases of the game. A player will frequently rely on a preponderance of activity – the factor from which the initiative grows – in order to realize a material advantage.




Smyslov – Timman Amsterdam (IBM) 1971

White has acquired an obvious positional plus. The only way Black can keep some hope of salvation is by creating active counterplay.

#### 40... \(\max\_a3!\)? 41 \(\exi(x)\) d3!

# 42 **a**xd3 **a**xb4 (D)



At the cost of a pawn, Black has noticeably increased his activity and set his opponent some awkward problems for the exploitation of the material advantage. Black's defence also rests on the important tactical refinement 43 \(\mathbb{L}\)b1 \(\overline{D}\)xd3!. Breaking down this defence by purely technical means would be very difficult, but tactics come to White's aid:

#### 43 &d6!!

This attractive stroke compels Black to start retreating from strategically important points.

#### 43 Ho5

Black has no choice. He can play neither 43...②xd3? 44 ②xa3 nor 43...②xd6? 44 ③b2+. After 43...②c3 44 ②c4, White retains the bishop-pair and aims to make the e5 advance.


# 44 &xe5+ 罩xe5 45 豐b2

Now the whole edifice of Black's defence, which was held together by his proud centralized bishop, has crumbled, and the retreat begins.

#### 45...f6

As Smyslov points out, in reply to 45...豐e7 White has the strong move 46 兔b5!. The following possible continuation is my own analysis: 46...壹g6 (the end would come at once after 46...豐c5? 47 罩d5! +-) 47 罩d7 豐c5 48 兔c4!? 罩e7 49 豐c3! 壹h7 50 罩d8 罩e5 51 罩f8! 豐xf8 52 豐xe5 壹g6 53 豐c7, and White wins.


# 46 罩b1 營d7 (D)



Now White marches relentlessly forward, consistently developing his initiative. He realizes his advantage, which is not so much a material one as a preponderance in activity.

# 47 **②c4! ②c6** 48 **②d5 ②e7** 49 **哟b8! 哟c8**White has a won position in the event of 49... **②**xd5 50 **③**b7 **哟**xb7 51 **哟**xb7 + **②**e7 52 f3.

# 50 營a7! 含g6 (D)



Of course, constant precise calculation is required on White's part, so as not to allow his opponent any counter-stroke or defensive resource. For a long time Smyslov handles this task superbly.

#### 51 罩b7! 營f8

Black can't play 51...豐c1+52 \$h2 豐f4+53 g3. Nor can the bishop be taken: 51... 公xd5 52 罩g7+ \$h5 53 豐f7+ \$h4 54 g3+ \$xh3 55 豐h5#.

# 52 罩b8 豐g7 53 豐a8 \$h7 54 \$c4?!

Here, however, Smyslov chooses an imprecise plan which could have led to a prolongation of the fight. There was an immediate win with 54 \(\hat{\omega}b3!\) f5 55 \(\beta f8\) \(\beta a5 56\) \(\beta e8.\)

# 54... 草c5 55 臭d3?!


Again 55 **Qb3** would have been very strong: 55...f5 56 **Zf8 Zc1+** 57 **2h2 We5+** 58 **g3**, and Black is defenceless.

# 55... 基e5 56 g3 h5 57 含f1 h4 58 g4 習f7?

This move loses out of hand. A much more tenacious line is 58... ②g6 59 总c4 堂h6, although even then, after 60 总d5 豐d7, White attacks the f6-pawn by 61 單b6, and defending it will be difficult.

# 59 草f8 豐g7 60 桌c4 1-0

Possession of the initiative plays a role even in positions that are far advanced into the endgame. We have examined plenty of examples already, in this book and others. Let's look at one more piece of play on the same lines, by a supreme endgame expert.



Smyslov – Konstantinopolsky Leningrad 1939


The winner here was a mere 18 years old, yet he displays endgame mastery of the highest class.

#### 26 含f2 b4! 27 罩c1!

We have here a rook ending, and the extra pawn by itself doesn't yet guarantee anything. If White were to take a second pawn, his opponent would obtain counterplay: 27 cxb4 \$\mathbb{Z} = 428\$ \$\mathbb{Z}

#### 27...\alpha ab8 28 c4!

Not content with refusing to pick up a second pawn last move, Smyslov actually gives his own extra pawn away. He is prepared to play an endgame with equal material, as long as he can take the initiative firmly into his own hands! Of course he isn't keen on a variation like 28 罩e3?! 罩xe3 29 塗xe3 bxc3 30 bxc3 罩b2 31 c4 塗f7 32 c5 dxc5 33 dxc5 塗e7.



In return for surrendering his extra material, White has obtained maximum activity for his pieces and created a strong passed pawn. The black forces meanwhile remain disunited.

#### 38 罩e4! g6


Black's pieces have little mobility: 38... \( \begin{align\*} \begi

#### 39 h4! f5 40 \( \begin{aligned} \text{ff h5 40 } \begin{aligned} \text{ff h5 41 } \begin{aligned} \text{d4 } \text{\$\decta\$c7 42 b3!} \end{aligned}

This move doesn't seem to tie in very well with what we have said about the constant need to create threats when you hold the initiative. In actual fact, the move is entirely appropriate. The point is that according to our definition, the task for the player with the initiative lies in constantly keeping ahead of his opponent. Accordingly, the prophylactic move that White has just made deprives Black of his one real possibility for attack; and in this way the difference in activity between the two sides is, at the very least, maintained.

#### 42...罩b8

# 43 含c4 罩e8 (D)




#### 44 \(\mathbb{I}\)d6

This is perhaps the one point where Smyslov's play can be called into question. There was evidently an even quicker win with 44 \$\displaystyle xb4 \quad \text{E} e2 45 \quad \text{E} d6 \quad \text{E} xg2 46 \quad \text{E} xa6. All the same, White is playing consistently to develop his initiative, and prefers to place his king more actively rather than win a pawn.

#### 44... 其e4+ 45 含d5 其xh4

# 46 \( \text{\texts} \text{xg6} \( \text{\texts} \text{g4 47} \( \text{\texts} \text{xa6} \( \text{\texts} \text{xg2 48} \( \text{\texts} \text{a7+} \) \( \text{\text{\$\delta}} \text{b8} \) 49 \( \text{\text{\$\delta}} \text{h7} \( \text{\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xitit{\$\xitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\xitit{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text



#### 50...罩c2

There is very little material left on the board, but White's win is not in doubt. In fact, didn't we see something very similar quite recently? Indeed; in Chapter 2 (Development) we examined an extract from Geller-Smyslov, Palma de Mallorca IZ 1970, in which White played in a

similar manner and was most probably influenced by the very game we are looking at now.

# 51 \$\displays c6! \$\displays a7 52 \$\displays b5! \$\overline{\over


From the last two examples it is quite easy to conclude that limiting the opponent's activity is also one of the elements of the mechanism which we call 'the initiative'. We have briefly touched on the reason; now let's consider it more closely. In the most general sense, the concept of the initiative means keeping ahead of your opponent. It follows that this concept embraces everything which increases, or at least maintains, the disparity between your own and your opponent's capacity for active play. So measures for reducing or wholly forestalling your opponent's activity are also a contribution to the initiative. Thus it is in the following game:

# ✓ Kasparov – Shirov Novgorod 1994

# 1 c4 e5 2 20c3 2b4 3 2d5 2e7 4 d4 d6 5 e4 c6 6 2xe7 2xe7 2xe7 5e2 f5

Even in appearance this move is dubious, as Kasparov precisely demonstrates. The natural 7... ②168 f3 d5 9 dxe5 ≝xe5 looks better, and was successfully employed by Black in Smirin-Stisis, Israeli Cht 1999.

# 8 dxe5 營xe5 9 exf5 ②f6 (D)



#### 10 營d4!

By this time we know very well how useful it is to exchange your opponent's best piece. This move is also based on another widely known principle, which states that the bishop-pair tends to be especially powerful in the ending.


# 

White has acquired an obvious advantage, based on the bishop-pair and the weakness of the d6-pawn, but exploiting it is not at all simple, seeing that Black is well developed and ready to create active counterplay at any moment. This is illustrated by a variation given by Ribli: 14 全x66 星8+ 15 全2 全d3 16 全f1 全xe2+ 17 分xe2 分a6.

# 14...d5 15 &d6!

White is still not ready to win a pawn, as Ribli again demonstrates: 15 cxd5 cxd5 16 2xd5 2xd5 17 2xd5 2e6 18 2d4 2c6 19 2a4 2xa2, with about equal chances. Kasparov therefore removes his bishop from its vulnerable position with tempo, while at the same time driving the black rook off the important f-file.

# 15... \( \bar{\pi} \) c8 \( (D) \)




Now there are no white pieces hanging, while the black ones aren't yet cooperating all that well. White therefore has time for a very useful move which deprives his opponent of control of the key e4-square. The same move simultaneously prepares an assault on that wing where White is stronger.

# 16 f3! \( \times \text{bd7} \) 17 g4! \( \times \text{e6} \) 18 g5 \( \times \text{e8} \) 19 cxd5!

A remarkable move! The bishop retreat 19 \( \frac{1}{2} \)g3 would leave White with no more than a slight but persistent advantage after 19... \( \frac{1}{2} \)b6 (or possibly 19...dxc4). Kasparov, as is well known, sets great store by the initiative, and endeavours to maintain and develop it as far as he can. Here too, then, he opts for a sharp variation to retain his initiative, without shrinking from effort or from complex calculation – which demands precision, as we shall soon see.


# 19...\(\exists xd5 \) 20 \(\exists g3 \) (D)



#### 

It can't have been easy for Shirov to renounce 20... 全xf3 and submit to this retreat, but analysis shows that the complications would work out in White's favour: 21 皇c4+ 會h8 (21... 皇d5 22 置xd5 cxd5 23 皇xd5+ 會h8 24 皇xb7 is wholly bad for Black) 22 置xd7 皇xh1 23 置f7 h6 (if 23...h5, then after 24 置f8+ 會h7 25 皇f7 h4 26 皇f4 g6 27 皇e6 ②d6 28 皇xc8 ②xc8 29 皇e5 ⑤b6 30 置f7+ White has a big advantage) 24 置f8+ 會h7 25 皇d3+ g6 26 皇e5 ②g7 (26... ②d6 27 置f6 ⑤f5 is the same thing) 27 置f6 ⑤f5 28 皇xf5 gxf5 29 置xh6+ 會g8 30 g6 會f8 31 皇f6 會e8 32 置h7, with an easily won position; e.g., 32... 皇d5 33 h4 f4 34 h5, etc.

21 &d3 &c5 22 &c2 \( \bar{L}\)d8 23 h4 \( \bar{L}\)f7 24 \( \bar{L}\)e4! \( (D) \)




Another strong and convincing move. Its rationale is already familiar to us. A useful black piece departs from the board, while the bad knight on e8 remains. This means that the disparity in activity is increased in White's favour. At the same time the f-file is opened up for the white rooks, which will soon find a use for it.

#### 24... 2xe4 25 fxe4 \$f8?!

An unfortunate move perhaps, but it's difficult to find a good one. In the event of 25...g6 26 2e5 27 27 2f6, White's advantage increases; but then I doubt if it can be stopped from increasing anyway.

26 罩df1! \$\pmu\$g8 27 h5 罩d7 28 罩f2 名d6 (D)




You only have to look at the position to notice White's gains. The time for a breakthrough has come.

# 29 g6! &e6

Capturing is impossible: 29...hxg6 30 hxg6 2xg6 31 2xd6 2xd6 32 2b3+; but Black is badly off in any case.

30 gxh7+ \$\displaysh8 31 h6! g6 32 \$\displaysh6 \displaysh2 \displaysh6 \displaysh2 4 (D)\$



The long diagonal is simply calling out for the dark-squared bishop. Therefore:

# 34 **Qe1! 曾xh7** 35 **国g3 包e5**

A rather more stubborn line was 35... \( \) 36 \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) able to hold out for long.

# 36 &c3 &c4 37 罩g7+! 1-0


Black loses a piece: 37... \( \mathbb{Z} \) xg7 38 hxg7+ \( \partial \) xg7 39 \( \mathbb{Z} \) f6 40 \( \mathbb{Z} \) f5+.

As we saw, White's swift offensive in the first part of the game procured him a lasting advantage in activity, although in the next phase the fight somewhat abated in intensity. But since we know that the initiative is defined as a disparity in the activity of the forces, it follows that sharp and rapidly changing conditions are by no means the only ones in which it may exist. In certain circumstances there can be fairly quiet methods of contending for the initiative and relatively placid means of developing it. We shall now see this illustrated.

# Karpov – Morović Las Palmas (1) 1994

# 1 c4 \$\angle\$ f6 2 \$\angle\$ f3 e6 3 d4 d5 4 e3 c5 5 \$\angle\$ c3 \$\angle\$ c6 6 cxd5 exd5 7 \$\angle\$ b5 \$\angle\$ d6 8 0-0 0-0 9 h3 cxd4 10 exd4 h6

Karpov is a connoisseur of this variation with a symmetrical pawn-structure. In *Lessons in Chess Strategy*, I examined the problems of playing this type of position in more detail, but the main conclusion is that the activity of the pieces plays a paramount role. Even a single extra tempo may prove important. In other words, the problems are the very ones we are studying in the present chapter. At this point, utilizing his extra tempo, White goes into action in the centre.



# 13 a3

For someone unacquainted with the play in such positions, this move will appear incomprehensible. Its point is that White's plans include lining up his queen and bishop on the b1-h7 diagonal. Hence he needs to take measures against a sortie by the black knight to b4.


#### 13...a6 14 &a4 b5 15 &b3!

A surprising move. White forces his opponent's bishop to leave the d7-square where it was under attack from the knight. Why? Because in this way Black is being forced to block the e-file, making the white knight's position on e5 more secure. Karpov indicates that after an immediate 15 兔c2 罩e8 16 兔f4, Black would obtain equal chances with 16... 當c7.

#### 15... £e6 16 £c2!

Now this is good. In any case White is simply obliged to act energetically, so as not to forfeit his small advantages. On 16 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ a5 17 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ c2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ c4, Black obtains his full share of the play.

# 16...豐b6 17 **Qe3 罩fd8** (D)



# 18 🖄 g4

Black was threatening to take on e5 and play ... d4. This has to be forestalled.

# 18... £xg4?!


Taking on g4 with the knight is better. After 18... 2xg4 19 hxg4 2e7 20 2d3 g6, Karpov suggests 21 f3! 2f6 22 2ad1, maintaining some initiative. It must be said that up until Black's 18th move, nothing in particular had occurred to enable White to count on more. It has just been an ordinary manoeuvring game with a minimal edge for White. It is only Black's last move that has increased his opponent's chances.

#### 19 hxg4 臭b8

Karpov considers this move to be another inaccuracy, and recommends 19... 2 e8!?. Then after 20 營d3 g6 21 总b3 White has an enduring plus, though not a very large one. Now his advantage is going to grow.

# 20 皇f5 罩c7 (D)

White controls a number of important points as well as the light-square diagonals, but this is



not yet sufficient. Black's position is still intact; it is essential to create some new weaknesses in it. White's next excellent manoeuvre pursues this aim.

#### 21 a4! b4

White has forced his opponent to weaken his queenside structure.


#### 22 a5!

Next he sacrifices a pawn to clear lines on that part of the board and make it possible to attack all Black's weaknesses. In this way White brings his own position to life, and his initiative becomes truly dangerous. It is these last two moves, together with the 15th and 16th, that give this game its special quality.

#### 22...\$\xa5

If Black declines to capture, Karpov gives 22... 曾b7 23 ②a4 象a7 24 ②c5 象xc5 25 dxc5 ②e7 26 象d4 ②xf5 27 gxf5, and in this position White's bishop guarantees him a lasting advantage.

# 23 **②a4 營d6 24 g3 罩a7** (D)




Now there is no time to be lost.

25 g5! hxg5 26 &xg5 ②c6 27 罩c1! ②a5

Alas, the knight can't join in the defence of the kingside: 27... 2e7?? 28 \(\delta\)f4.

**28 □c5 □c4 29 b3 □a3** (D) Not 29...**□**b6? 30 **□**f4 +-.



In a manner entirely characteristic of him, Karpov has thoroughly outplayed his opponent and now proceeds to an attack on the king.

# 30 曾g2! 星e7?

Black commits the decisive error. He had to play 30... 55, though even then White would have an undoubted plus after 31 \$\mathbb{Z}\$h1 g6 32 \$\ddot{2}\$d3!.

#### 31 Ih1 Ide8

Black has no good moves left; e.g., 31...g6 32 \$\oldsymbol{2}f4 +- \text{ or } 31...\$\oldsymbol{2}ee8 32 \$\oldsymbol{2}h4 \text{ g6 } 33 \$\oldsymbol{2}h1 +-. \text{ Now White finishes the game with a fairly simple but attractive combination:}

We know by now that the initiative can exist in the most varied guises. It isn't always a dramatic affair, calling for immediate, resolute and sacrificial deeds. Its effect may be of the long-term kind; the disparity in activity between the two sides, from which the initiative springs, may be dictated principally by a pawn-structure that is fixed for quite a long period.

According to the definition I gave in Lessons in Chess Strategy, the pawn-structure comes squarely under the heading of chess statics. However, who says that statics and dynamics have to exclude each other? Of course they do not! As the realm of chess is a unified whole, all its elements are interwoven and in a state of constant interaction.


Thus a long-term initiative is a possibility, and indeed we have encountered it before. We will now look at some more examples of it.

# Pillsbury – Showalter Nuremberg 1896

# 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ②c3 c6 4 ②f3 f5 5 Ձf4 Ձd6?!

Let's not judge Black's opening strategy too harshly from our present-day standpoint, but it's common knowledge that an exchange of dark-squared bishops in such situations is favourable to White. Hence 5.... 2e7 is more sensible.

6 e3 2f6 7 &d3 0-0 8 0-0 (D)



# 8...豐c7?

Another mistake, and this time a more serious one. If Black is consenting to a bishop exchange, it's clearly not in his interest that it should take place on f4. It therefore makes no sense to place himself in a pin, both on the diagonal and on the file. A better square for the queen is e7; for instance, 8... e7 9 \( \subseteq 10 \) \( \subseteq 2 \) \( \overline{2} \) e4, and if 11 c5, then 11... \( \overline{2} \) b8.

#### 9 g3 ②e4 10 罩c1 臭xf4?!

Another move that isn't good, but the idea behind it is even worse. Seeing that the queen needs to leave the c-file, it was better to do it at once with 10... \$\mathbb{\textit{#}e7}\$ 11 c5 \$\mathbb{\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex


#### 11 exf4 營b6?!

There's nothing for the queen to do on this square. Moving it to e7 was more natural and would also have defended the e-pawn.

#### 12 幽e2 夕d7

Again forgetting about the bishop, instead of playing 12... 2d7!?.

13 罩fd1 ②df6 14 ②e5 含h8 15 c5 營c7 16 f3 ②xc3 17 罩xc3 含d7 (D)



I had a reason for dwelling on Black's strategic errors, as they have resulted in this position which is so cheerless for him. The main thing about it is that its character cannot be altered for a long time to come. White's most important piece seems to be his proud knight on e5 – yet all of a sudden Pillsbury exchanges it for the enemy bishop, a sorry piece to all appearances.


#### 18 ②xd7!?

As they say, if an ordinary amateur did this, you could only shake your head condescendingly, but when Pillsbury does it, you surely do well to stop and think. You then realize that White is envisaging a pawn offensive on the queenside, leading quickly to the opening of files there for his major pieces. Since the black pawns as well as White's potential breakthrough points are located on light squares, White considered it useful to exchange off the defender of these weaknesses. Moreover Black's remaining knight will be weaker than the white bishop, which in the absence of an opposite number will be able to attack the black pawns unhindered. All this sounds rather surprising, but it does contain logic. Many people are likely to recall another very similar and famous exchange of a superb knight for an equally unimpressive bishop on d7. It occurred in Fischer-Petrosian, Buenos Aires Ct (7) 1971. Well I remember the sensation it created in the chess world. It's a pity Fischer didn't say anything about it himself, but once being acquainted with the Pillsbury game, I have hardly any doubt that Fischer will have recalled it when taking his famous decision.

#### 18...②xd7 19 b4 (D)

Not, of course, 19 營xe6?? Zae8 20 營d6 營c8, and the white queen is trapped.

# 19...**罩f**6




An important moment for assessing White's decision on move 18. It isn't hard to see that a lone black rook on g6 won't present any real danger to the white position. It therefore seems more logical to open the file with ...g5. First, however, Black needs to play 19... Zae8. Then after 20 b5 \( \bar{2}\)g8, White can strike a powerful blow with 21 \( \subseteq 33! \) g5 (White has a won position in the event of 21...a6 22 bxa6 b6 23 cxb6 豐xb6 24 豐f2) 22 嶌xa7 gxf4 (on 22...豐b8 23 bxc6! 營xa7 24 cxd7, White again has a decisive plus) 23 bxc6 營xc6 (23...fxg3 gives Black nothing after 24 cxd7 gxh2+ 25 \$\disphi\$h1 +-) 24 **逾b5 豐c8 25 逸xd7 豐xd7 26 豐e5+ 豐g7 27** 豐xf4 罩a8 28 罩xa8 罩xa8 29 罩e1, with a winning advantage. It's quite possible that Pillsbury saw something like this. He was perfectly capable of such things!

# 20 b5 罩g6 21 含f2 h5 22 h4

White of course blocks the position and Black is left without counterplay, though he still retains some hopes.

# 22...罩f8 (D)




#### 23 罩b3

23...cxb5 with 24 \( \bar{2}xa7\)? \( \Omega xc5 \) 25 \( dxc5\)? (25 \( \Delta c1\)? \( \Omega xd3+ \) 25...\( \Bar{2}xc5+ 26 \) \( \Bar{2}e3 \) d4.

#### 23...罩f7

After 23...b6!? 24 bxc6 豐xc6 25 兔b5 豐c7 26 兔xd7 豐xd7 27 cxb6 axb6 28 冨xb6 White has a large plus, but that might still have been better for Black than the game continuation.



#### 29 \$ e2

You can't afford to be careless in any situation. The 'obvious' 29 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \alpha \) as a would be bad on account of 29... \( \Delta \) xc5!.


# 29...公f8 30 罩b8 公g6 31 罩c8!

An important link in the attack.

# 31... Ic7 32 Ia8 Icf7

We now see that exchanging White's strong rook would be bad: 32... 宣f8 33 宣xf8 ②xf8 34 宣a3 宣b7 35 宣xa5 宣xb2 36 宣xa7. This was the point of White's 31st move.

# 33 罩a3 豐c7 34 罩a6 罩e7 (D)



#### 35 ₩a3

Another possible plan begins with 35 a4!?. The pawn then goes to a5, the white rooks capture on a7 and exchange themselves for the

black queen, and the white queen penetrates into the enemy camp via b6. An important point is that a knight sacrifice gives Black nothing: 35... 公xf4 36 罩6xa7 公h3+ 37 常g2 公f4+ 38 常f1, and White wins easily.


# 35...罩ff7 36 曾b3

Black was threatening 36... \$\mathbb{\text{\begin{align\*} b7.} \mathbb{\text{\text{\text{}}}} b7.

#### 36...5 xf4

This sacrifice is Black's last chance (otherwise White carries out the plan in the note to move 35), so he goes in for it, even though it isn't adequate to save him.

37 **基6xa7 豐xa7 38 基xa7 基xa7 39 gxf4 基fb7** (D)



#### 40 營e3?

Suddenly White stumbles, so to speak, on level ground, and commits an error which might have made the win much more difficult. Instead he could have won with 40 營c2 罩a3 (the outcome isn't altered by 40... 罩b4 41 營c3 罩aa4 42 含g3! 罩xd4 43 營e3) 41 營d2 罩ba7 42 營b2 罩xa2 43 營b6.

# 

It turns out that 41 \$\disp3?! is not good in view of 41... \$\disp\beta \disp\beta \din \disp\beta \disp\beta \disp\beta \disp\beta

# 41...互bb2 42 豐xf5+ g6?

Ah! This isn't the first time we've come across such an incident. No sooner does one player go wrong while trying to realize his advantage, than his opponent makes a mistake in return! A much better reply is 42...曾8 43 豐c8+ \$h7. Then after the forced variation 44 f5! 黨xe2+ 45 \$g3 黨ad2! 46 豐xc6 黨2+ 47 \$f4 黨xd4+ 48 \$e5 黨xh4 49 豐xd5 黨c2 50 f6, we reach a position which White can probably win – but I can't guarantee it for certain.

In the game, the end comes very simply. Perhaps the players were in a mutual time-scramble, but in that case what was the time-control? I'm afraid I just don't know.

43 營f7+ \$h6 44 f5 基xe2+ 45 \$g3 **Z**g2+ 46 \$f4 gxf5 47 營f6+ \$h7 48 營xc6 **Z**g6 49 營xd5 **Z**aa6 50 營d7+ **Z**g7 51 營xf5+ \$h6 52 d5 **Z**a4+ 53 \$e5 1-0

Now, another game containing a similar pattern of ideas. In the notes I shall draw on the judgements and recommendations of B.Macieja.

# Anand - Markowski

Bundesliga 2003/4

# 1 e4 c5 2 ②f3 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ②xd4 a6 5 &d3 &c5 6 ②b3 &e7 7 &e3 d6 8 ②1d2!?

In this variation it is very rare for White to develop the knight to this square.


8... 2f6 9 f4 b6 10 we2 2b7 11 0-0-0 wc7 12 g4 2fd7 13 wb1 2c6 14 c3 b5

Here 14... \$\alpha\$c5!? looks more logical.

#### 15 單bf1 e5?

A strange mistake for a player of such class. Now the white pawns can mount an attack unhindered, while the black pieces are deprived of the e5-square. Again, the recommended move 15... as would seem logical.

16 f5 h6 (D)



#### 17 ッf2!

An excellent move which serves many purposes. It takes control of the extremely important squares c5 and h4, after which Black's active possibilities are severely curtailed while White can advance on the kingside.

#### 17...罩c8?!

Now comes a blow which is quite simple, but no less strong for that.


#### 21 f6! gxf6

After this, a cluster of black pieces will be locked up inside their own camp. The general mobility of Black's position is sharply reduced; the difference in activity between his forces and White's increases drastically.

#### 22 a3!

And now this move strictly limits Black's possibilities on the other half of the board. Thus, with just two simple pawn moves Anand has reduced his opponent to a state of extreme passivity.

# 22... 2c5 23 2xc5 dxc5 (D)



# 24 g5! hxg5 25 hxg5 ②d4 26 gxf6 ዿf8 27 ₩g3 ℤh5 28 ዿxd4!!


In a strategic sense, this is the conclusive stroke. Anand's incredible mastery in handling the pawn-structure is something we have seen before. In almost any situation he possesses a striking ability to secure the pawn formation that suits him. In many cases the opponent won't start to realize what is happening until he is already in serious trouble. Then Anand's excellent technique and brilliant tactical prowess will easily enable him to finish the job.

In this case, after the straightforward exchange, which at first sight doesn't seem dangerous for Black, it turns out that 28...cxd4 is bad on account of 29 單b3 豐c7 30 兔e2! 罩h6 31 罩xb7! with an easy win. Another dismal prospect is 28...豐xd4 29 ②b3 豐d6 30 ②a5 豐c7 31 ②xb7 豐xb7 32 罩c2 兔d6 33 兔c4, and White's attack will quickly be decisive. There only remains:

#### 28...exd4

Now, however, the f8-bishop is permanently 'dead' and the black king won't find shelter anywhere. Black's position is passive and weak.

29 罩b3 豐c7 30 e5! 兔d5 31 兔c4 罩xe5 (D)




#### 32 **罩e1?**

But now, when the game is almost decided and White merely needs to display some precision and accuracy, he suddenly goes wrong. He could have won without any problems by 32 ②xd5! 置xd5 33 置e1+ 含d7, whereupon Macieja gives 34 豐g4+ 含c6 35 ②c4 置b8 36 置xb8 豐xb8 37 豐f3, and the black rook perishes.

# 32... \( \begin{aligned} 32... \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 22... \( \begin{aligned} 24... \\ 24

Yet Black returns the favour! After 33...fxe6!? White's advantage would only be slight.




#### 34 學d3?

Another unfortunate move. Instead, 34 響e1!? would keep the black queen away from the centre. Then after 34...響c6 35 公f3! 會d8 36 公e5, White would have a significant advantage as before.

34... 豐e5 35 皇xe6 豐xe6 36 ②c4 豐xf6 37 罩b6 (D)

37... **營h4?** 



So after all it's Markowski who makes the final mistake, and it costs him the game. Macieja suggests 37... \ 4! 38 \ 2+ \ 2d8 39 \ 2xa6 響f5+40 含a2 營d5, after which Black's saving chances are very good. However, there is one thing I would like to bring to your attention: White has still retained the initiative, even after two significant inaccuracies. The reason lies in the particular nature of this initiative – it has been based on long-term features of the position; that is, on White's static advantages. That is why, in a whole range of variations, White kept the upper hand with a deficit of one or sometimes two pawns. So it is here - White is a couple of pawns down, but the win is simple.

#### 38 營e2+ 含d8 39 營e5 營h3

He would also lose with 39... 豐e7 40 豐d5+ 豐d7 41 夕d6

40 公d6 豐e3 41 公xf7+ 空d7 42 豐d5+ 空e7 43 豐b7+ 1-0


This is fully adequate, though 43 ∅e5! is even more precise.

And now at last, a most important question which we have so far only alluded to: what happens if, for some reason or other, the player holding the initiative squanders some tempi that could have been used to develop it, or if he simply forgets about the need for resolute measures? Let's look at some examples which will give clear and convincing answers.

# Kotov – Botvinnik USSR Ch (Moscow) 1944

1 d4 ፟∅f6 2 ∅f3 b6 3 e3 c5 4 **2** d3 **2** b7 5 c4 e6 6 0-0 **2** e7 7 **2** c3 (*D*)

7...d5?!



A rare case of poor opening play by Botvinnik. White also comes off better from 7...0-0?! 8 d5!. A preliminary exchange on d4 is essential; after 7...cxd4 8 exd4, Botvinnik gives 8...d5 (by far the most usual moves today are 8...d6 and 8...0-0) 9 cxd5 \(\tilde{\text{D}}\xxd5, and if now 10 \(\tilde{\text{D}}\xeta5+, then 10...\(\tilde{\text{E}}\xeta6 \) seems a good reply.

#### 8 cxd5 exd5?!

This too is bad. A much better choice is 8... 2xd5 9 e4 2xc3.

#### 9 &b5+ 當f8

As Botvinnik says, "The decision Black takes is forced. At least after this a complex struggle will continue." To give him his due, it must be said that after making two mistakes in a row at a very early stage of the opening, he pulls himself together and carries on the fight with maximum self-possession under adverse conditions — as we shall see from what follows. Such things are not in everyone's power.

Other replies turn out clearly in White's favour: 9... 全6 10 營本! 全xb5 11 營xb5+ 營d7 (another grim prospect is 11... ②bd7 12 dxc5 a6 13 營c6 宣c8 14 營a4 bxc5 15 宣d1, Dizdar-Grosar, Bled 1994) 12 ②e5 營xb5 13 ②xb5 ②a6 14 宣d1 0-0 15 ②c6 with a big advantage, as in Petrosian-Keres, USSR Ch (Moscow) 1951; or 9... ②bd7 10 dxc5 bxc5 11 ②e5, and Black loses the d5-pawn.


# 10 b3 a6 11 **≜e2 ②**c6 12 **≜**b2 **≅**c8 13 **②**e5 **≜** d6 14 **②**xc6

14 f4? is a mistake due to 14...cxd4 15 ②xc6 (15 exd4? ②xd4) 15... ℤxc6.

14...\(\mathbb{Z}\)xc6 (D)

#### 15 **Af3**?!

Up to here White's play has been logical and strong. He has achieved a definite advantage. With the black king stranded in the centre and hindering the development of the kingside at



the same time, it would be logical for White to open the position. After 15 dxc5 bxc5 16 \(\frac{1}{2}\)f3, he would have excellent opportunities to realize his advantage. Exploiting White's omission, Black plays:

#### 15...c4!


After this, it won't be easy for White to open up the game.

# 16 g3

Not, of course, 16 ②xd5? ②xd5 17 ②xd5 ②xh2+, which would be in Black's favour.

#### 

As Botvinnik explains, this move is obligatory. He can't play 18...b5? 19 a4 b4 20 \( \triangle \triangle



Another critical moment in the game. In the course of the past few moves Black has noticeably improved his affairs, making use of White's error at move 15. White is on the verge of losing his advantage, which consists purely in his possession of the initiative. He now misses his second and final chance to profit from it.

#### 19 罩ac1?!

White has to play 19 e4!. If the game then opens up with 19...dxe4 20 公xe4 总xe4 21 总xe4 公xe4 22 營xe4, this definitely favours White – his opponent's development problems


at once begin to tell. It seems therefore that Black would have to sacrifice the exchange with 19... \*\*Exc3.\* After 20 \*\*Exc3 \*\*Exc3 21 \*\*Exc3 dxe4 22 \*\*Le2 White would be left with a minimal plus, but Black would still have cause to be thankful for White's slowness to act earlier in the game. From White's viewpoint, this would have been much better than what actually happens.

With his next move Botvinnik immediately stabilizes the position in the centre, and White's chances of a breakthrough disappear.

# 19... je6! 20 臭g2 h5!

"Since White is basically undertaking nothing in the way of active operations, Black is able to assume the initiative" – Botvinnik.

# 21 包e2 b5 22 包f4 豐e7 (D)



# 23 營d1?!

Sensing that his opponent has seized the initiative, White loses the thread. We have come across similar cases before. If your opponent holds the initiative, this makes a psychological impact, but when he has just wrested it from your own hands the effect is naturally all the stronger. White had to play 23 h4.


# 23...h4 24 營f3 曾g8

Preparing the following important invasion of the centre. Not at once 24... De4?? 25 2g6+.

# 25 볼fd1 ②e4 26 ②d3 (D)

Now let's compare this position with the one after Black's 18th move. On White's side, during these past eight moves, nothing has basically changed. His rooks have merely stationed themselves on c1 and d1, where neither of them is actually doing much. Black's gains are plain to see. All this results from White's mishandling of the initiative.

#### 26...基h6!




After this move, it can be said that "all Black's pieces are ideally placed for the decisive assault on the kingside" – Botvinnik.

# 27 We2 hxg3 28 fxg3

Not much is altered by 28 hxg3.

# 28... 当g5 29 & xe4 dxe4 30 分f4 (D)

White can no longer do anything active; 30 ②e5 would be thoroughly bad due to 30...基xc1 31 基xc1 f6 32 ②g4 基g6 33 ②f2 皇xg3 and Black wins.



#### 30...\&xf4!

This transaction is in Black's interest. An active white piece disappears from the board, while for Black a lethal diagonal is opened against the enemy king. Note the similarity between the idea of this move and that of White's exchange on move 28 in the previous game.

# 31 exf4 營d5 32 營g2

After 32 營e3 基xc1 33 基xc1 營xa2 34 營a3 營xa3 35 食xa3 a5, Black wins by advancing his pawns.

# 32... 国hc6 33 国xc4 国xc4 34 h3 b4!

Black's pawn-majority will help him deflect the white forces from the defence of their king.

#### 35 \$h2?!

This hastens defeat, but after 35 \( \bar{2} \)d2 a5 White couldn't have held out anyway.

# 35...e3! 36 營xd5 罩c2+ 37 堂g1 &xd5 0-1

Both the game we have just examined and the preceding one by Anand allow us to formulate one more conclusion that is important, although generally fairly obvious: the fight for the initiative can be conducted by the most varied of methods and can assume a multitude of forms. But once the initiative is in your hands, one strict rule applies: it is essential to sustain your initiative and endeavour to develop it. If you don't, it will pass to your opponent, and you will be in for a hard time.

The following encounter confirms this. The player with an active game goes astray, and the initiative is wrested from him by his opponent. The game is very well known, but that doesn't make it any less instructive or relevant to our subject. It is interesting as an example of both sides struggling for the initiative by methods that differ widely but are always intensive and resolute.

# Petrosian – Spassky Moscow Wch (10) 1966

# 1 ②f3 ②f6 2 g3 g6 3 c4 ℚg7 4 ℚg2 0-0 5 0-0 ②c6 6 ②c3 d6 7 d4 a6 8 d5 ②a5 9 ②d2 c5 10 ∰c2 e5 11 b3


Theory considers 11 a3 followed by 12 b4 to be strongest, but Petrosian always had his own perspective on the problems of the opening. The line he chooses looks unassuming; it's as if Black is being invited to play actively, which he can only do by advancing his kingside pawns. Then White will have an opportunity to play against the weaknesses Black will be creating. Such an approach was highly characteristic of Tigran Petrosian. Spassky accepts the challenge.

# 11... 🖒 g4 12 e4 f5 13 exf5 gxf5 (D) 14 🖒 d1!?

After the present game, no one played this way again. They generally brought the bishop out to b2.

# 14...b5 15 f3

White follows the line of action begun by his previous move. As we have said, his plans involve provoking his opponent into activity. I would like to point out to you that this doesn't at




all mean Petrosian is prepared to hand over the initiative submissively. It means that he wishes, so to speak, to be second on stage with his performance – to operate counter-aggressively, meeting his opponent's actions with counter-strokes. The conflict is coming to a head.

# 15...e4!?

On this particular day Spassky too was in a fighting mood and went straight ahead at the first opportunity. Mikhail Tal considered this decision to be too impulsive and suggested 15... h6, so as to muster Black's forces before proceeding with the attack. His opinion is supported by the way the game goes.

# 16 &b2 exf3 17 &xf3 (D)

17 ②xf3 would lose a pawn to 17... ≜xb2 18 ₩xb2 bxc4.




# 17... £xb2

Tal suggests 17... \(\tilde{\Delta}\)e5!? to keep the bishops on, with the same aim as before: to gather more pieces together. It must be said that behind Tal's recommendations lay his understanding of the frame of mind of both players. Among the numerous contemporary annotators of this game, he was the only one to state the opinion that Petrosian was actively striving for victory by

his own methods which were unlike anyone else's.

# 18 曾xb2 包e5 19 ge2 (D)




This position can hardly be assessed unequivocally. You are immediately struck by Black's spatial plus and his splendid knight on e5, yet his other knight is stuck on the edge of the board and there is no telling when it will come into play – though admittedly, by attacking the c4-pawn, it is hampering some of White's forces. On the other hand the black rook can easily be brought across from a8 to the kingside. White's chances are bound up with the weaknesses in his opponent's pawn-structure, but his communications – like Black's – are none too good. Mobilizing his queen's rook may become a problem.

#### 19...f4?!

#### 20 gxf4?! (D)

But now it is White's move that deserves the same sign, for after 20 星xf4 星xf4 21 gxf4 ②g6 he could obtain somewhat the better ending with a line indicated by Tal: 22 ②e4 ③xf4 23 ②e3 星a7 (White's chances are also slightly better after 23...豐e7 24 ②f3 ②d3 25 豐d2 ②e5 26 ②g2) 24 ②f6+ ②f7 25 星f1 豐xf6 26 酆xf6+ ③xf6 27 星xf4+. True, Black's saving chances would be considerable, and a draw looks the most likely result. Tal supposes that Petrosian was taking a conscious risk, setting a trap for his opponent and this way fighting for victory. Once again I would repeat that the struggle for

the initiative can sometimes assume highly unconventional forms. However that may be, there is no denying the fighting spirit of the players in this game.



#### 20...&h3?!

Spassky continues in the same vein in which he has conducted the entire game. He evidently thinks he is gaining an important tempo, when in fact he is losing one! After the natural 20... Ixf4 21 ②e3 当g5+ 22 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ Ixf1+ 23 ②exf1 Ia7 the position would be unclear, but it is perfectly possible that the chances would remain equal.

Now White seizes the initiative with an exchange sacrifice, which incidentally is forced:

#### 21 De3!

The positional rationale behind such a turnaround was examined in Chapter 2 (Development). The al-rook was temporarily out of play, but now it simply disappears from the board together with Black's active bishop. In other words, for a short period of time and on a restricted part of the board (the kingside), White acquires a preponderance of forces (he overtakes his opponent there). That is exactly what is meant by seizing the initiative or wresting it from the enemy.

#### 21...\(\hat{\omega}\)xf1?


I think this very move is Spassky's decisive mistake. Of course he has already committed a number of inaccuracies, but it seems to me that he could still have saved himself with 21...宣xf4. Then after 22 宣xf4 豐g5+ 23 宣g4 皇xg4 24 ②xg4 ②xg4 25 皇xg4 豐xg4+ 26 含h1 豐d4 (only move) 27 宣g1+ 含h8 28 豐xd4+ cxd4, we reach an endgame that has been assessed by various annotators as clearly favourable to White. Tal thought it was quite hopeless for Black, but he didn't give any variations. As a

matter of fact, I have failed to find anything concrete. For instance, 29 **国**g4 bxc4 30 bxc4 (or 30 ②xc4 ②xc4 31 bxc4 d3 32 \$\text{

# 22 基xf1 夕g6

The other retreat doesn't improve matters; after 22... ②d7 23 ②e4 豐e7 24 ②d3, the continuation could be something like this: 24...bxc4 25 \$\delta\$h1! \( \frac{1}{2}\$f7 26 ②f5 \( \frac{1}{2}\$xf5 27 \( \frac{1}{2}\$g1+ \$\delta\$f7 28 \( \frac{1}{2}\$g7+ \$\delta\$e8 29 \( \frac{1}{2}\$xe7+ \$\delta\$xe7 30 \( \frac{1}{2}\$g7+ \( \frac{1}{2}\$f7 31 \( \frac{1}{2}\$g5+ \( \delta\$f6 32 bxc4, with a winning position for White.

# 23 臭g4 (D)



#### 23...6)xf4?!

This hastens the end, but at least it lets us watch a spectacular finale. Black also loses with 23... 基xf4? 24 鱼e6+ 含f8 25 基xf4+ 公xf4 26 營h8+. The most stubborn defence is 23... 營f6, but even then, after 24 鱼e6+ 含h8 25 營xf6+ 基xf6 26 f5 包e5 27 包e4, White would have a technically won position. Now he concludes the game with a beautiful attack.

#### 

Or 25... \$\delta f8 26 \$\delta h8+ \$\delta e7 27 \$\delta xh7+ \$\delta e8 28 \$\delta g6+ \$\delta e7 29 \$\delta g5+.


# 26 ②e4 營h4

The variation 26... **基a7 27** 公f5 **豐**f8 28 **豐**f6 makes a striking effect.

# 27 ②xd6 (D)

#### 27... 学g5+

With White's king exposed and both his knights unsupported, it's easy to imagine that when Spassky foresaw this position some moves back, he must have thought that something



would 'turn up'. But analysis shows that he has nothing:

- b) 27... **二** aa7 28 ②ef5 **当** g4+ 29 **5** f2 **当** h4+ (or 29... **当** f4+ 30 **9** e1 +-) 30 **9** f1 **9** g4 (or 30... **当** h3+ 31 **9** e1) 31 **2** xf7+ **2** xf7, and now White plays the thematic 32 **当** h8+! **9** xh8 33 **2** xf7+ **9** g8 34 ②7h6+.


#### 28 常h1!

White can also win by 28 豐g2 豐xg2+29 \$\preceq\$xg2 \$\mathbb{Z}\$a7 30 \$\preceq\$g3 \$\preceq\$f8 31 \$\Delta\$xf7 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xf7 32 \$\preceq\$f4, but Petrosian was in a resolute mood.

#### 28...罩a7

Or 28... wxe3 29 &xf7+ &f8 30 wh8+, as in the note to Black's previous move.

# 29 $\hat{\mathbf{g}}$ xf7+ $\mathbf{\Xi}$ xf7 (D)



30 營h8+! 1-0

Finally I would like to show you a game which, although not free from errors, is full of fight and very interesting. It gives a good demonstration of an uncompromising struggle for the initiative between two players renowned for their pugnacity. As the game was part of an


elimination contest, they were both intent only on winning.

# Larsen - Korchnoi Leningrad IZ 1973

# 1 c4 e5 2 g3 c6 3 包f3 e4 4 包d4 d5 5 cxd5 豐xd5 6 包b3 包f6 7 皇g2 豐h5 8 h3 豐g6 9 包c3 包bd7

A line that looks even more appealing is 9... ②a6!? 10 營c2 ②b4 11 營b1 e3 12 營xg6 hxg6 13 營f1 exf2, as in Přibyl-Saidy, Dečin 1974, but the move played also gives Black a fully viable game.

# 10 營c2 e3 11 營xg6 exf2+ 12 含xf2 hxg6 13 d4 ②b6 14 e4 急e6 15 含f4 (D)



#### 15...**&**b4

An important moment in the game. Black has to make a decision. He seems to do badly with 15...0-0-0?! 16 d5! cxd5 17 Zac1, but 15...\(2\)h5!? is perfectly good. The text-move fixes the character of the game for quite a long time.

#### 16 E) 05

On 16 \( \text{ \text{ \text{ ac 1}}} \), Black can play 16...\( \text{ \text{ \text{ h5}}}\), catching the white bishop.


# 16...0-0-0

Taking the knight isn't good; after 16...\(\overline{2}\)xc5 17 dxc5 \(\overline{2}\)bd7 18 b4, White has the advantage. Instead Black carries on with the policy he started last move, and boldly accepts weaknesses in his own position. In return he obtains active play.

# 17 ②xe6 fxe6 (D)

#### 18 a3

Now it is White's turn to decide on his plan. He chooses to go in for active play, not wishing to surrender the initiative to his opponent. All




# 18... e7 19 Zad1

This time 19 ②e2 can be met by 19...②c4 with counterplay.

#### 19... **Zhf8 20 含e2 公c4!?** (D)

Well played! White could answer 20...②h5 with 21 ②f3 ②xf4+22 gxf4 〖xf4 (22...③d7 23 ②g4 comes to the same thing) 23 ③g4 ⑤d7, and now 24 〖hf1!. For the moment his advantage would be slight, but he would still hold the initiative, so that Black couldn't hope for more than a draw. Korchnoi wasn't interested in that.




#### 21 h4

It's hard to give a mark of disapproval to a move like this, but White is underrating his opponent's resources. The pawn sacrifice 21 b3!? Axa3 22 &e5, temporarily holding the black forces down, is interesting, and objectively White's best decision. Larsen, however, goes ahead optimistically, and comes up against a powerful counter-stroke:

# 21...**包h5**!

This now works; Black has seized the initiative. Observe how, in sharp positions, the situation is transformed from one move to the next.

# 22 臭h3 (D)



# 22...罩xf4!

Black's entire line of play is based on this move.

#### 23 & xe6+

The other capture leads to an undoubted plus for Black: 23 gxf4 ②xf4+ 24 常f3 ②xh3 25 罩xh3 ②xb2 26 罩d2 (or 26 罩g1 罩xd4 干) 26...②c4 27 罩d1 盒xa3.

# 23...\$c7 24 &xc4 @xg3+ 25 \$e3 \$\bar{2}\$df8 26 \$\bar{2}\$hg1?

A familiar scenario; one player has wrested the initiative from his opponent, and in dismay the latter fails to resist tenaciously. Of course 26 国h3?? loses to 26...国f3+ 27 含d2 ②xe4+. Instead 26 国h2!? ②xh4 27 含d3 is necessary, forestalling the events which ensued in the game.


# 26....皇xh4 27 曾d3 **基f2 28 基d2** (D) 28....皇g5!

After this strong move White can't avoid losing a second pawn and his position becomes critical, although there are still defensive chances.

# 29 罩xf2 罩xf2 30 包e2

This is better than 30 \( \textit{Lg8} \) \( \textit{Zd2} + \text{ (not } 30...b5 \)? 31 \( \text{Lxb5} + \text{cxb5} \) 32 \( \text{Zxg3} \) 31 \( \text{Lc4} \) \( \text{Lf4} \), and one of the pawns is lost.

30...≣f3+ 31 &c2 ②xe4 32 &d3 ≣e3 33 ②c3 ②g3! 34 d5



White has a difficult position after 34 \(\Delta\xxxxxxxxxxxx\) \(\Delta\text{f} 35 \) \(\Delta\text{d} 1 \) \(\Delta\text{f} 3.

# 34.... 全f6 35 ②d1 罩f3 36 dxc6 \$xc6

Possibly 36...bxc6!? 37 ≜xg6 ②e2 is better, to activate the knight.

37 \( \text{\xi}}\xi\text{\te}\text{\te}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\te}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\te}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}

The decisive blunder. Even now White could continue to defend with 43 \( \Delta d3 \) \( \Delta g5 + 44 \) \( \Delta c3 \) \( \Delta f6 45 \) \( \Delta d2, though Black would still preserve realistic winning chances.

# 43... £g5+ 0-1

White loses his knight.

I wish to conclude with a proposition that isn't easy to substantiate but seems to me to be interesting. The initiative, as we maintain, arises from a difference in activity between the two sides. Doesn't this bring to mind the physical phenomenon of an electric current generated by the potential difference between two points? Or the transfer of heat between two bodies at different temperatures? The initiative in chess can likewise be represented as a certain flow of activity directed from one side to the other. If the disparity in activity decreases or disappears, the initiative will be reduced or extinguished.

If that is so, doesn't this analogy serve as further indirect confirmation of the validity of the definition that was given at the start of this chapter?

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