John Cox

dealing with d4 deviations

fighting the Trompowsky, Torre, Blackmar-Diemer, London, Colle and other problem openings



EVERYMAN CHESS

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fighting the Trompowsky, Torre, Blackmar-Diemer, Stonewall, Colle and other problem openings

John Cox



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
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
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CONTENTS



| | Bibliography | 4 |
|----|----------------------------|-----|
| | Introduction | 6 |
| | | |
| 1 | The Trompowsky | 10 |
| 2 | The Pseudo-Trompowsky | 33 |
| 3 | The Torre Attack | 39 |
| 4 | The Hebden Torre | 54 |
| 5 | The London System | 59 |
| 6 | The Colle System | 79 |
| 7 | The Veresov | 101 |
| 8 | The Blackmar-Diemer Gambit | 111 |
| 9 | Anti-Benoni Lines | 118 |
| 10 | Rare Lines | 137 |
| | | |
| | Index of Variations | 143 |

BIBLIOGRAPHY



Few if any works cover the same ground as this book: usually only a chapter, if that, was relevant.

Winning with the Trompowsky, Peter Wells (Batsford 2003)

Outstanding white repertoire book; doesn't cover my proposed solution much.

The Trompowsky, Nigel Davies (Everyman 2005)

Only covers 3 e4 against 2...e6 really, and recommends the same solution I do. Better to be right than original, though.

Gambit Guide to the Torre Attack, Graham Burgess (Gambit 1999) Thorough and useful coverage.

The Ultimate Colle, Gary Lane (Batsford 2002)

A very one-sided look at the opening which omits all mention of 3...\$ f5 along with most of Black's other good moves, but actually covers the line I propose in the main Colle rather well.

The Slav, Graham Burgess (Gambit 2001)

Generally good coverage of one line I transpose into from the Colle; rather skates over the main try C12.

The Veresov, Nigel Davies (Everyman 2003)

Provocative and interesting work with good coverage of 3...c5.

Blackmar-Diemer Gambit, Gary Lane (Batsford 1995)

Not worth it for Black players since Black's best moves are by and large omitted.

Play 1 d4!, Richard Palliser (Batsford 2003)


Excellent white repertoire book; good on e3 Queen's Indian lines.

Annoying White d-pawn openings, Andrew Martin (Grandmaster Videos 1996) Breezy and inspirational rather than detailed coverage, as you'd expect from a video, but extremely good within that limitation.

Symmetrical English, Carsten Hansen (Gambit 2000) Thorough coverage on some of the lines in Chapter 9.

Eric Prie's subscription service on ChessPublishing.com is a really excellent source for all these irregular 1 d4 ideas. I also made use of ChessBase's Mega Database 2005. I would especially like to thank Richard Palliser for permission to use material from an unpublished series of articles he wrote for *CHESS*. If these ever get published they will be very much worth reading.

INTRODUCTION



I begged Everyman Chess to let me write this book. All my chess-playing life I have had a terrible record against these feeble variants, as I saw them. The final straw was being utterly slaughtered by Richard Pert in a London league match in the 4 e3 line in Chapter 9. I wanted the incentive to study them and give myself the opportunity to put this right. And for me, it's worked splendidly. I believe I have really learned something about these systems, and if I am able to pass on to the reader the confidence I have now gained myself, then the job will have been well done.

I hope this book is a sort of left-handed version of John Emms's popular *Play the Open Games with Black*. White has a succession of irritating, solid yet reputedly harmless openings after 1 d4, and just as the situation was with 1 e4 before John's book, it's very difficult to get the theory on them without buying a whole slew of specialist books on each one, often for the sake of one sub-variation in one chapter. With the aid of this book I hope the reader can put all these openings to bed with one purchase, and leave himself free to focus on the main defence he employs to d4.

I have assumed that Black is planning to play one of the Slav, Semi-Slav, Queen's Gambit Declined, Nimzo-, Bogo-, or Queen's Indians, or the Benoni through the 2...e6 move order. King's Indianers, Grünfelders and the like were well served by Joe Gallagher's *Beating the Anti-King's Indians*, and I've no intention of trying to compete with that. So I shan't be fianchettoing Black's king's bishop, but I've aimed to equip players of any of those defences with everything they need to combat White's various system openings and deviations before we get into the Nimzo or whatever proper.

The white systems which are covered are the Trompowsky Attack, the Queen's Bishop Attack, the Veresov, the Colle, the Colle-Zukertort, the Torre Attack, the London System, the Stonewall Attack, some quiet g3/e3 ways of avoiding the Benoni, the Blackmar-Diemer Gambit and some subsystems which don't even have names. You should be equipped to face any reasonable deviation by White from

whatever your main defence to 1 d4 may be.

I've given two set-ups against some of the more popular 'system' openings: the London, the Colle, and the Torre. Against the Trompowsky I think there is a stand-out choice for Black and I've simply gone for that, and pressure of space has also confined me to one system against the Veresov, although again I think it's a good 'un.

I think it's worth examining why I used to do so badly against these systems. Dealing with these openings successfully is a matter of psychological approach among other things – it's not by chance that every work from Black's point of view called them 'annoying' or some synonym. I set out what I now feel were my main failings in this area in the hope others might recognize some of theirs and be inspired to remedy them at less cost in points than I managed.

1) The most obvious point — I didn't actually have a repertoire at all against, say, the Colle. You just play chess, right? Develop the pieces and equalize.

I remember Grandmaster Vlatko Kovacevic playing the Colle against me back before databases. I had no idea this was his customary weapon of mass destruction, and I thought I must have sat down at the wrong board. A GM playing 3 e3??

With that attitude, it won't surprise you to learn I got torched on the kingside around about move 25. Only the fact that the game was played in a comparatively minor event has saved me from appearing in every Colle book since on the wrong end of a classic White crush. Time has mercifully obscured the details, but I know I went ...d5 and ...c5. Pretty soon a knight appeared on e5 and I didn't seem to be able to shift it. Shortly after that, either the h- or the g-pawn arrived on the premises. Then came \$\mathbb{L}\ext{e3}\$, \$\mathbb{W}\$h5, and the next thing I knew I was looking like something out of \$1001 Winning Chess Combinations. That wasn't the only such debacle, either; every time my opponent played one of these vile things I was behind on the clock as I worked on my conception of the wheel, and just as you'd expect some of my wheels came out square. Hopefully the remedy to this is obvious – you hold it in your hands.

2) I was bored by these openings: I didn't consider them interesting.

There is probably some objective sense in which these openings are not as interesting as the main lines. But to let that affect me was childish. I should have reflected on two things. One, winning any game is more interesting than losing any game. Two, in any chess position there are good moves and bad moves, and telling them apart is fundamentally what the game's about. If you find some types of position more interesting than others, that's a comment about you, not about the positions. I should have recognized that and if necessary taken a moment to refresh my gumption tank when 2 ②f3 hit the board (if you don't know what your gumption tank is I recommend Jonathan Rowson's Seven Deadly Sins).

3) Not only did I not consider them interesting, I didn't consider them dangerous.

Again, dumb. In the 1930s the top guys didn't know whether these openings or the Queen's Gambit were better. These were the 2700s of their day; they understood chess a lot better than I do, and if something wasn't obvious to them, it was arrogant of me to think it would be obvious to me if I just figured it out over the board. I could list easily a hundred 2550+ players who have succumbed to the openings in these books. These openings produce as red-blooded a struggle as any, and if you're not ready for it, you're starting at a big disadvantage.

4) A less obvious point, this: to combat these openings successfully requires a good knowledge of many structures. A good chess education, in fact.

In this book there are transpositions to the Semi-Tarrasch variation of the Queen's Gambit Declined (QGD), the e3 Queen's Indian, the £g5 Queen's Indian, the Queen's Gambit Accepted (QGA), the Symmetrical English, the Caro-Kann, the a3 Queen's Indian, the French, the Sicilian, the Slav, the Karpov Nimzo, and more. Not the most critical lines necessarily, but the same structures. And many of these openings are in fact black openings reversed. Transpositions are commoner than in other openings: getting the exact set-up you want can require a lot of thought in the early stages. Nothing much to be done about this except recognize the fact and welcome it, both in building a repertoire and at the board.

5) I didn't experience the adrenalin surge I got defending 'my' openings.

Playing your pet defence is like a football team playing at home. You're defending your ideas, your choice of set-up, to some extent what you believe in about chess. Meeting some random deployment of the white pieces isn't like that. To some extent, solving problem '1' solves this problem as well, but still it exists. Again recognizing it is halfway to solving it.

6) Lastly, I wasn't playing set-ups I was happy and had experience with.

I was 'playing in my opponent's garden' in fact. Both technically and psychologically, I was behind before I started. Again this to some extent disappears once you start to take these openings seriously, but still it's there. If someone has played the London System ever since 1952 (you know the type) then they have an advantage over you that isn't going to go away.

With some of these openings, there's nothing to be done about that last one. But with some of them, there is. If someone wants to play the London System, you have to recognize that the game's going to be pretty quiet for a long time. But with some other openings, you can do something about it. If someone plays the Blackmar-Diemer Gambit, it doesn't take Freud to work out they want to attack wildly while missing a pawn. The Tromp – well, they want an obscure struggle, probably with a strange pawn formation. The Veresov? They probably like the initiative in open posi-

tions. The Torre? Solid non-critical play in the opening leading to positional pressure. And so on. In building a repertoire, I think it pays to remember that these guys play this stuff all the time, and you don't. You need something fairly simple and thematic, you want to stay off the hot theory of the opening – good or bad, he will know it better than you – and most of all you want to stay out of your opponent's garden. If he's offering a pawn for wild play, try and trade his queen off and obtain a complex semi-ending. If he wants a solid game, mix it if you can. And so on. These aren't original ideas, but I've tried to express them in the repertoire that follows. Sometimes, like I say, it can't be done. But when it can, it should be.


That's all. I've learned a huge amount from writing this book. There are several grandmaster move order tricks in here which are tremendously useful, and several crystal GM performances which show exactly how it should be done against this or that opening. If I've managed to pass on half of what I learned, I don't think you'll regret the purchase.

Good luck in your games against these openings.

John Cox, London, October 2005

CHAPTER ONE

The Trompowsky




1 d4 �∫f6 2 Ձg5

Out of all the lines we're going to see in this book, probably the Tromp is the commonest, in the UK at least, and also one of the lines with most pretensions to being an opening which White can play at a high level and legitimately seek an edge.

I've already set out my general approach to dealing with these offbeat lines - stay out of his garden. Ask yourself what his choice of opening tells you about what your opponent wants, and do the opposite. Well, in my experience Trompers want one of two things. Either they want to rip your head off in a sharp game, or at the very least they want an unusual type of game, perhaps with an irregular pawn structure such as arises after doubling the pawns with 2xf6. And they, or some of them at any rate, know enough theory in the sharp lines as to make those a rather foolish choice for those of us who can't necessarily revise our repertoire before each game.

Fortunately, there is a solution to the Tromp that gives Black excellent play, is not terribly theoretical, and denies White what he wants, and sure enough it is this which has begun rather to puncture the Tromp's balloon after a recent upsurge in its popularity.

2...e6




The most natural move, really, certainly for Nimzo/Queen's Indian types. Black refuses to allow his pawn formation to be damaged and declines also to put his knight into e4 and allow White various f3/e4 ideas, or find himself

obliged to venture the likes of 3 https://dec.14.63.95. The true Tromp reply is 3 e4, and as Pete Wells famously said in his fine book, '...if 3 e4 ever ceases to be regarded as a viable approach then the Tromp will become just that little bit less scary.' However, there is a school of thought which holds that 3 e4 amounts to a sacrifice. White can also try 3 d2, or 3 e3 (3 df3 is the Torre Attack, Chapter 3), and by holding back his king's knight he creates some distinctive effects when compared to the normal Torre.

A: 3 e4 B: 3 e3 C: 3 ⁄2d2

A) 1 d4 **②**f6 2 **\$g5** e6 3 e4 h6

4 **拿xf6 營xf6**



White now has three possible approaches (5 ②f3 is again a position from the Torre Attack which is covered in Chapter 3).

A1: 5 ②c3 A2: 5 c3

White also sometimes plays 5 dd2, (he needs to cover f4 to get f2-f4 in and fight for some dark squares) but following our recommended line it makes no difference; White is hardly going to put his queen's knight anywhere but c3 with his queen on d2, and after 5...d6 White has no better move than 6 dc3 (or 6 f4 e5 7 dc3 c6).

A1)


1 d4 �f6 2 Ձg5 e6 3 e4 h6 4 Ձxf6 ≝xf6 5 ᡚc3 d6

5... ♠b4 is perhaps the main move, and indeed it is that which 5 ₩d2 seeks to avoid, but I am recommending the straightforward text.

6 **省d2**

White's usual move. 6 ②f3 is Chapter 3 again, while after 6 ②c4 Black can just carry on with the same plan as the text – 6...c6 7 ②f3 e5 8 ¥d2 ②g4 9 dxe5 dxe5 10 0-0-0 ②e7 was already better for him in M.Roland-E.Matsuura, Brasilia 2000.

6...c6




This is the move that gives this varia-

tion its shape. Black has many other moves – Karpov's popular 6...g5, for example. But the text is simple, easy to play, and strong. Black just wants to play ...e5, without allowing 2d5 (not that 6...e5 7 2d5 4d8 is fatal, but White gets to transfer his knight to the much more effective square e3 pretty much for free). 7 f4

This move usually has in mind White's next two moves. The main alternative is 7 0-0-0 e5, when the following illustrate Black's sensible approaches:

- a) 8 g3 exd4 9 營xd4 營xd4 10 黨xd4 ②d7 11 黛g2 0-0 12 ②ge2 0-0 13 含b1 ②c5 14 ②d1? f5 with an edge for Black, M.Ivanov-U.Kersten, Baunatal 2002.
- b) 8 dxe5 dxe5 9 🗹 f3 🗟 e7 10 🗟 c4 0-0 11 😩 b1 🖾 d7 again with an edge, C.Dunworth-R.Dive, London 1994.
- c) 8 夕f3 兔e7 9 h3 夕d7 10 �b1 0-0 11 豐e3 嶌e8 12 d5 兔d8 was equal in J.Hall-I.Glek, Germany 1997
- d) 8 d5 &e7? 9 dxc6 bxc6 10 \triangle d5 is a trap to avoid; instead 8... \triangle d7 is fine.

7...e5




8 dxe5

White might be better advised to try 8 Dge2 at this point, as advocated by Da-

vies. 8... \(\) e7 9 0-0-0 0-0 now would transpose into J.Trivino D.Suarez Pousa, Mondariz 1996, which continued 10 g3. Now 10... 2g4 11 2g2 exd4 12 \wxd4 \wxd4 13 \u222xd4 'produces an interesting endgame' (Davies). I doubt Black has much to fear there, but Black can also play more ambitiously as in the game with 10...b5 11 \$22, and now perhaps the clever 11... ad8!? (the game went 11...b4 12 2a4 Qa6 13 Zhe1 worked out well for White). The idea of this move is to allow ...c5 without losing material after dxe5, dxe5; \dds. After 11... Id8 a complicated game will follow, but Black certainly has his trumps with the c3-knight about to be driven out of play and White's king perhaps slightly shaky, for example 12 \(\bar{2}\) hf1 b4 13 \(\bar{2}\) a4 2a6 14 2f3 (14 fxe5 ¥e6, 14 Zf2 c5) 14.... \$\dot{a}\$ b5 15 **当**xb4 **2**a6 16 **当**b3 exd4 17 Xxd4 d5 with a very sharp game (Black's last two moves were aimed chiefly at preventing c4).


8...dxe5



9 f5

This manoeuvre has the support of Hodgson and Wells, two leading Tromp

9...**≜b4!**




People find aesthetic appeal in the oddest places: to me this is a beautiful positional move. In fact the position would make an excellent example for one of those Can you be a positional chess genius textbooks. Looking at the position, what White would like is to establish his bishop on the a2-g8 diagonal and play on the kingside. His Achilles heel is e4: if Black can put this under pressure if will restrict White's movements no end. Black's problems are that he has a bit less space, he has two pieces that want to be on d7, his queen isn't so brilliantly placed and he can't castle queenside at the moment because of the d-file. In the

long term what he would like to do is play ...b5 and perhaps ...c5 to gain space on the queenside and deny White's bishop the diagonal. The text move, with its plan of ...\(\infty\)d7, ...\(\infty\)e7, ...\(\infty\)f6, ...\(\infty\)d7 and ...0-0-0, promotes all of those objectives by freeing a good square for the queen, bringing the knight to a square where it presses on f6, arranging to block the d-file, and throwing in a awkward pin which restricts White's knight and queen. I believe Black is already better and that White needs to go back and start again if he wants to get anything out of this variation.

10 0-0-0 公d7 11 公f3 營e7!

This move, a vital link in the plan, belongs to the Icelandic GM Hannes Stefansson.



12 a3

In this variation's debut (M.Carlsen-H.Stefansson, Reykjavik 2004) the Norwegian wunderkind preferred 12 g4; the game continued thematically with 12... of 6 13 od 3 od 7 14 h3 (not 14 h4? oxg4, of course) 14...0-0-0 15 ob 1 ob 8 16 of he1 oc 8 17 a3 od 25, and faced by the prospect of Black carrying on strengthening with ... or


perhaps ...g5 or ... 2d7-c5, White lashed out with 18 b4 2a5 19 2a4. Black had a good many nice plans here; he chose 19...g6 20 2c3 gxf5 21 exf5 2he8. Perhaps this is only equal, but I'd sooner be Black, with his bishops, centre pawns and slightly safer king. Later Stefansson won a thematic ending with queen and two bishops against queen, bishop and knight and just the three queenside pawns each: Black lined up on the long diagonal, White was driven into passivity, his knight couldn't find a foothold, and in the end something dropped off.

The text makes no significant difference to the position.

12... & a5 13 曾b1 包f6 14 & d3

14 ②d5 &xd2 15 ②xe7 gives White nothing, as Davies says.


Keeping more options than 15...0-0-0: when White has weakened his queenside and made no progress on the kingside Black can also consider ...0-0.



and Black was much better in T.Thorhalsson-H.Stefansson, Reykjavik open 2004. In the game White was so desperate to change the course that he shortly went in for \(\mathbb{I}\)d5?!, after which only time trouble prevented Stefansson from racking up another victory with his plan.

A2)

1 d4 ②f6 2 âg5 e6 3 e4 h6 4 âxf6 ₩xf6 5 c3



Now White is much better placed to protect the dark squares in the centre, with his plan being \$\Dark2d3/\Delta\epsilon 2/f4\$. Rather than give this plan something to bite on with ...d6 and ...e5, I suggest a change of approach with


5...d5

"The refutation of 5 c3' – Prie.

6 e5

White has scored terribly after this and I agree with Davies that he would do well to consider 6 ②d2, not in the hope of advantage but to equalize. Usually after 6 ②d2 Black plays 6...c5. Now 7 dxc5 ②xc5 8 ②f3 0-0 9 exd5 exd5 10 ②e2? ■b6! (A.Summerscale-P.Marusenko, South Wales 2000) is good for Black, and 7 exd5 exd5 8 ②b5+ ②d7 9 ③xd7 ②xd7 10 ②e2 (10 ②f3 ③e6+ 11 ④e2 ③d6 is the problem) 0-0-0! was equal in

P.Wells-C.Ward, Southend 2002, so 7 Dgf3 is the most challenging. Now after 7...cxd4 Davies suggests 8 cxd4 dxe4 9 De5.



This doesn't look to me to achieve much after 9...\$\\delta\$b4, e.g. 10 \$\\delta\$a4+ \$\overline{\infty}c6\$ 11 \$\overline{\infty}xc6\$ (11 0-0-0 \$\overline{\infty}b8!\$) 11...\$\delta\$xd2+ 12 \$\delta\$xd2 \$\delta\$d7, or 10 \$\delta\$b5+ \$\delta\$d7 11 \$\overline{\infty}xd7\$ (11 \$\overline{\infty}cd8\$) 11...\$\delta\$xd2+ 12 \$\overline{\infty}xd2\$ \$\overline{\infty}xd7\$ 13 \$\delta\$xd7+ \$\delta\$xd7 14 \$\overline{\infty}b4\$ \$\overline{\infty}b4\$ \$\overline{\infty}b4\$. Another path for White is 8 exd5 exd5 9 \$\overline{\infty}xd4\$ \$\overline{\infty}c6\$ as in A.Bigg-D.King, British League 2003, but now the obvious continuation 10 \$\delta\$b5 is well met by 10...\$\delta\$e7 11 0-0 0-0, which seems very equal indeed.


If these variations understandably seem too dull for Black, another way to play is 5 c3 d6 6 2d3 g6 7 2e2 2g7 8 0-0 0-0 9 f4 We7, although this is not perhaps quite as solid.

6... yd8 7 分f3

In C.Ward-P.Marusenko, Port Erin 2000, White went for 7 包d2 c5 8 dxc5 axc5 9 包b3 ab6 10 包f3 包c6 11 息d3 ad7 12 響e2 響e7 13 0-0 with equality, although possibly this would have been more simply demonstrated by 13...0-0 than the game's double-edged 13...g5!?.


7 b4 a5 8 b5 a4, 7 a3 a5, and 7 f4 c5 8 a3 a5 9 2 f3 Wb6 have all been tried without showing anything good for White.

7...c5 8 dxc5



White hasn't often tried to hang onto d4: 8 a3 is still best met with 8...a5 in my view, while a continuation like 8 ♠e2 ♠c6 9 0-0 ∰b6 10 ∰b3 ∰xb3 11 axb3 cxd4 12 cxd4 ♠d7 is fine for Black.


8...\(\exists xc5 9 \exists d3



9...∳c6

There seems to be something of a consensus among Black players in this variation that castling on the kingside is too simple an approach altogether, but I don't see much wrong with 9...0-0: in

fact it seems quite promising and if this were a French Defence I'm sure it would be the first move Black would investigate. 10 0-0 f6 11 We2 2c6 12 exf6 Wxf6 (or 12 b4 - 12 2bd2? fxe5 13 2xe5 2xe5 14 Wxe5 Wb6! - 12...2b6 13 2bd2 fxe5 14 2xe5 2xe5 16 Wxe5 2c7 with an edge for Black) 13 2bd2 (13 c4 2d4!) 13...e5!




is a good illustration of how quickly routine play can leave White struggling: without the dark-squared bishop he just doesn't have the horses to hold onto e5.

In view of that I wonder if he shouldn't go 10 &c2, which at least prevents e5 from disappearing, since 10...f6 11 \daggeddd d3 forces 11...f5. However, after 10...f5 I don't think 11 exf6 罩xf6 12 just plays 12... 包c6 13 **肾**h7+ **含**f7; his next move is ...e5 and pretty soon White will be compelled to put his tail between his legs and retreat the queen to d3. That only leaves 11 0-0, but once he has ...f5 in Black has a comfortable French: a sample line might be 11... b6 (White's only plan is c3-c4: by provoking b2-b4 Black works against that) 12 b4 \$\frac{1}{2}e7 13 Øbd2 a5 14 a3 &d7 15 &d3 ₩c7 16 Ic1 Ifc8, when Black has succeeded in restraining c4 and stands nicely.

Black has another set-up in 9... \$\begin{align*} b6 10 \$\begin{align*} e2 2 c6 11 0-0 2 d7 12 b4 2 e7 13 \$\begin{align*} bd2 \begin{align*} \begin{align*} 2c8 14 a3 g5!?, which gave him a good position in J.Hodgson-J.Rowson, Southend 2001, after 15 2 b3 (15 h3 h5!?) 15...a5 16 \begin{align*} \begin{align*} adel a4!, when Hodgson's 17 2 a1 has been panned, but neither 17 2 d4 g4 18 2 d2 2 xd4 19 cxd4 \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} adel 2 2 2 4 18 2 d2 2 4 18 2 d2 g4 18 2 d

10 0-0 a6!?



Part of a plan aiming at d4. At the risk of repeating myself, 10...0-0 and a quick ...f6 was also fine, but I dare say Ward was aiming at a more strategically complex game.

11 ②bd2 Ձd7 12 ②b3 Ձb6 13 ₩e2 ₩b8

This was the point: even now 13...0-0 is also possible, but that what wasn't what Black played 10...a6 for.


14 ②bd4 ₩a7 15 ②xc6 bxc6 16 ②d2 a5 17 \$\text{\$\text{\$h}\$1 a4}

Maybe still 17...0-0 18 f4 f5 19 g4 g6 20 **₩**g2 **\$**h7 – Prie.

18 f4 g6 19 ²f3 h5

with an unclear position in P.Hutchin-


son-C.Ward, British Championship, Scarborough 2004.



B) 1 d4 4 f6 2 2g5 e6 3 e3

Clearly there are those – Peter Wells, for instance, who said that 'people who wanted to play like this could do so without the assistance of a book' – who consider this move a little feeble, but there are others who consider it simply the most accurate way to introduce the Torre Attack, and indeed a spectrum of opinion in between, so it's worth being ready for. And as a matter of fact both 3 e3 and 3 🖾 d2 score better in the databases than 3 e4.


3...h6



As with the Torre proper, it is best to find out what White is going to do with that bishop.

4 **臭h4**


4 2xf6 is possible, although really it only makes much sense in conjunction with 4... xf6 5 f4.



Many players believe strongly in this reversed Stonewall without the 'bad' bishop: I'm not so sure at all - that bishop can have an important role keeping the 'stone wall' standing, and actually I recommend that Black counterattack on the dark squares immediately with 5...g5!?. This hasn't been played so much, but a couple of GMs have ventured it, and anyone who thinks it's a crazy risk and Black should play some nice solid set-up instead should check out what happened to Matthias Wahls when he tried that in the game J.Hodgson-M.Wahls, Bundesliga 1998: 5...d6 6 4 f3 4 c6 7 4 bd2 \$ d7 8 c3 e5 9 fxe5 dxe5 10 &c4 0-0-0 11 0-0 We7 12 ₩e1 g6 13 d5 ②b8 14 e4 Ze8 15 ②h4 罩h7 16 含h1 營d8 17 營f2 息d6 18 b4 a6 19 萬ab1 **數**e7 20 a3 萬f8 21 **拿**d3 c5 22 ②c4 1-0.

After 5...g5 Black is going to castle

queenside, of course, and then ...g5 starts to look like a very sensible positional move, nibbling away at White's structure like a kind of mirror-image Botvinnik English.




White should avoid 6 g3 gxf4 7 exf4 c5, (K.Wesseln-K.Bischoff, NordWest Cup, Germany 1999), 6 De2 b6 7 Dc3 এb7 8 d2 兔b4 (L.Floresvillar Gonzalez-G.Hernandez, Mexico City 1991), and 6 fxg5 hxg5 7 ②c3 \$\oldsymbol{2}\$b4 8 \oldsymbol{\text{\text{\$\oldsymbol{a}}\$}}\text{d2 b6 9} 0-0-0 \$b7 (D.Brumen-T.Polak, Cvitanovic Memorial, Split 2003), all of which show Black's strategy beginning to look good. Probably his best is 6 42h3 when I propose 6...d5, followed by ... $\hat{2}$ d6, ... $\hat{2}$ d7, ... $\hat{2}$ c6, ...0-0-0 and the game continues – watch out for 7 \(\mathbb{Y}\)f3 threatening to win a pawn with fxg5. White could introduce this same sort of set-up more slowly with 5 c3 b6 6 2 d2 **2**b7 7 f4, but there's nothing wrong with 7...g5 even now.

4...c5

4...d5 is perfectly possible, of course, but White does still have 5 c4 up his sleeve, probably leading to an Orthodox Oueen's Gambit.

Now White has a choice:



B1: 5 c3 B2: 5 **②**f3

Most players who have started this way will continue with B1, leading to a Torre type of game. There are those, however, who prefer B2. This can also produce a Torre of course, but in B2 I consider the independent possibility of a pure £g5 Queen's Indian, which Black has to be ready for. In fact White has cut out what are usually considered Black's strongest replies to that by waiting until ...c5 is played before committing himself to c4.

B1)

1 d4 ፟∅f6 2 ዿg5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 ዿh4 c5 5 c3 b6 6 ፟∅d2


6 \(\mathbb{W} \)f3 d5 is nothing for Black to worry about.

6... ge7 7 agf3 gb7

Reaching a position pretty much from the main line of the Torre Attack, but by this move order White has avoided the cunning sequence we will see from Black in Chapter 3 in the much more common move order 1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 §g5.

White has tried no fewer than 13


moves after this, but the main ones are the following:



B11: 8 a4 B12: 8 h3 B13: 8 ≜g3 B14: 8 ≜d3

Out of these, by far the commonest is B14, although 8 \(\frac{1}{2}g^3\) is the regular choice of Miladinovic, the GM who specializes the most in this line, and we'll see why in B14.

B11) 1 d4 �f6 2 �g5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 �h4 c5 5 c3 b6 6 �d2 �e7 7 �gf3 �b7 8 a4



A move which has the air of being a bit of a luxury at this stage but nonetheless has some useful points: White wants to secure his knight's position at c4, and possibly play a4-a5 if the circumstances are right. A main strategic question in this line is which pawn White is going to use to recapture on d4, and with this move White declares that he will be using the e-pawn: he will hardly play cxd4 and leave b4 gaping.


8...0-0 9 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 cxd4

Black wants to see which way White recaptures before committing his queen's knight.

10 exd4

10 cxd4?! was played in E.Meduna-R.Dautov, Frankfurt (rapid) 1997, but after 10...②c6 11 0-0 ②b4 12 ③xf6 ④xf6 13 ④e4 d5 14 ⑤b1 White must have been regretting it already.

10...d6




This flexible set-up is how the pros normally handle the Torre. The move 10...d5 can hardly be too wrong, but the 2e5 leap gives White's whole position point – if Black captures with ... 2c6xe5, the h4-bishop can be exchanged and Black is left with the slightly weaker

piece on b7, the d2-knight can now come to f3, the bishop points at the kingside after a recapture on e5, and so on. Denied this easy way to play, White finds it harder to make a plan.

11 0-0 Øbd7

There's nothing wrong with ... 20c6, but the knight has more options here, and why block the bishop? The idea a4-a5 isn't anything to be afraid of: indeed one of Black's main goals in this position is to go ...b5-b4, and if anything the exchange makes that easier, while the opening of a file on the queenside ensures that White won't be doing anything against the king.



12 a5

Korchnoi deals with this rather neatly, and 12 \$\mathbb{Z}\$e1 would lead to a rather more popular position in which Black almost always plays 12...a6 (in fact sometimes it is Black who plays ...a7-a6 inducing a2-a4, perceiving that this favours him as it enables a knight to sit on d5 with a handy retreat to b4 in case of c3-c4) and a normal continuation would be 13 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c4 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c7 14 \$\mathbb{Z}\$e3 \$\mathbb{Z}\$fe8 15 \$\mathbb{Z}\$g3 (B.Chatalbashev-A.Drei, Montecatini Terme 2001), when Black should have contin-

ued with 15... \$\overline{2}\$f8 rather than 15... \$\overline{2}\$h5? 16 d5. To judge from his play in this game, though, Korchnoi doesn't believe that a4-a5 is a threat, and it looks as though he would have played 12... \$\overline{2}\$c7, which would actually be a novelty even today. One can see that Black doesn't necessarily want to spend a tempo and make a6 a target for the d3-bishop/e2-queen line-up unless he has to, so the text game is quite interesting.


12... **曾c7**

Not yet 12... **基**ab8 13 axb6 axb6 14 **基**a7 **豐**c7 15 **호**a6.

13 We2 国ab8 14 axb6

This can't give White anything. I suspect that the point of the great man's strategic idea was to meet 14 a6 \(\hat{\omega}\)a8 15 c4 with 15...b5 (now, before b2-b4 can cement White's bind). After 16 cxb5 \(\hat{\omega}\)b6 Black has ample compensation for the pawn, with White's weaknesses on b5 and d4 and the ineffective h4-bishop.


14...axb6 15 \(\bar{a} \) \(\bar{a} \) \(\bar{a} \)



with equality, I.Rogers-V.Korchnoi, Lucerne Olympiad 1982. White's queenside excursion has not helped his cause at all; on the contrary Black now has an easy game.

B12)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🚊 g5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 🚊 h4 c5 5 c3 b6 6 🖄 d2 🚊 e7 7 🖄 gf3 🚊 b7 8 h3



Also a little bit of a half-move; in fact apart from preventing ...g5-g4 I'm not too sure what it adds to White's game, but some pretty good players have thought it useful.


8...0-0

8...cxd4 9 cxd4 2e4, A.Miles-J.Parker, British League 2001, is another method.

9 **≜d3** cxd4

As before, Black wants to see which recapture White chooses before deciding on a set-up.

10 exd4



10 cxd4 is naturally possible, if a little dull. V.Hort-A.Karpov, Biel 1990 then went 10... ②c6 11 a3 (there seems to be consensus that 11 0-0 ②b4 is undesirable, although clearly it's nothing fatal) 11... ②h5 12 ③xe7 ※xe7 13 0-0 ⑤fc8 14 ⑥c1 ②a5! (14...d6 15 d5 instead might have given White a shade of a nibble), which was equal and very accurate from Black.


10...ളh5

A logical and ruthlessly efficient method: if h3 had any point presumably it was connected with \(\Delta g3\); notice how Karpov also played this move at the first convenient moment.

11 âxe7 ₩xe7 12 0-0 Øf4

Well timed, before White can go \(\mathbb{\textsup} \mathbb{\tex


13 ≜e4 ≜xe4 14 ②xe4 d5 15 ②g3 ♦\c6



This position was reached in the game D.Krumpacnik-K.Lerner, Oberwart 1998, when White succumbed to Black's minority attack, and again in M.Kujovic-Y.Pelletier, Charleville 2000, where White held on; no doubt the 'correct' assessment is equality, but one would probably choose to play Black here.

B13)


1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🚉 g5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 🗟 h4 c5 5 c3 b6 6 🖄 d2 🚊 e7 7 🖄 gf3 🗟 b7 8 🚉 g3



A pet of the Tromp/Torre expert Igor Miladinovic. White's idea is similar to the previous line but this time he's going to leave h2-h3 until he can actually be sure of hanging onto his bishop.

8...0-0 9 &d3 d6


When White holds onto his bishop, Black will almost always want to play this, so he waits one move more before committing himself to anything.



10 h3Before ... ②h5 comes. **10.... ≜a6**

Black loses a tempo like this, of course, but White's moves on the kingside haven't been terribly critical.

11 &xa6 公xa6 12 豐e2 豐c8 13 0-0 豐b7




Black surely has equality here, but Miladinovic has tried this position out three times. The first, I.Miladinovic-A.Beliavsky, Ohrid 2001, went 14 a4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)ac8 15 罩fe1 ②b8 16 e4 cxd4 17 ②xd4 罩fd8 with equality (our hero had to defend until move 127, but that didn't put him off and he was back for more). The next two went 14 e4 cxd4 15 2xd4 2c5 16 罩fe1 and now first 16...罩fd8 (I.Miladinovic-V.Bogdanovski, Balkan Cup, Thessaloniki 2001), when White got the better of it with an a4/b4/b5/20c6 manoeuvre and should have won, and in I.Miladinovic-L.Ortega, Porto San Giorgo 2003, the better 16... \square and later ... Ife8, the most usual hedgehog rook placement, which lent force to Black's ...d5 counter to Miladinovic's plan, and after which Black should have won.

B14)

1 d4 🗹 f6 2 🚉 g5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 🚊 h4

c5 5 c3 b6 6 公d2 ≗e7 7 公gf3 ≗b7 8 ≗d3




This looks natural, to be sure, and is White's most popular move by far, but it does allow Black to change the course of the game completely. Since line B141 is a little speculative, I'm also going to give the main line in B142.

B141: 8...g5!? B142: 8...cxd4

B141)

1 d4 �f6 2 皇g5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 皇h4 c5 5 c3 b6 6 �d2 皇e7 7 �gf3 皇b7 8 皇d3 g5!?



Opinions on this move vary widely,

from Tsesarsky on ChessBase who calls it the refutation of White's previous move, to the contempt of the silent majority who play 8...cxd4 here. However, Black doesn't seem to be worse after 8...g5, and most importantly it wrenches the play away from what White probably wants.


9 **≜**g3 g4

This is the idea: g2 is weak.

10 **②e**5

10 ②h4 🗓g8 is better for Black: although White does retain some tactical resources Black should be able to emerge the better after 11 h3 ②h5 or 11 dxc5 bxc5 12 ②c4 d5.

10...h5



11 f3


White has also tried 11 e4 and 11 0-0, which looks crazy but may even be best. After 11 e4 d6 Black has prospered after both of the following:

a) 12 ②ec4 cxd4 13 cxd4 d5 14 exd5 豐xd5 15 ②e5 ②bd7 (I don't see why not 15...豐xg2 now) 16 豐e2 (I.Miladinovic-T.Roussel Roozmon, Cap d'Agde 2003), when I think 16... \(\Delta\)xe5 17 dxe5 \(\Delta\)xg2 18 0-0-0 \(\Delta\)d5 might have made White wish he'd drawn by 16 \(\Delta\)e3 \(\Delta\)a5 17 \(\Delta\)ec4 \(\Delta\)d5 and so on.

b) 12 👑 a4+ &f8 13 ②ec4 cxd4 14 cxd4 h4 15 &f4 d5 16 exd5 ②xd5, when Black was better already in A.Sandrin-A.Karklins, Chicago 1989.

11 0-0's only outing went 11...d6 12 ②ec4 b5 13 ②a3 a6 14 ②h4 ②bd7 15 ②c2 c4 16 ②e2 ②d5 17 ③xe7 ⑤xe7 18 ②b4 ②xb4 19 cxb4 (J.Harmatosi-M.Orso, Tapolca 2000), when 19... ⑥g5 with the idea of ...g3 would have produced a most unclear struggle.

11...d6



12 **息b5**+

12 Dec4 b5 13 Da3 a6 doesn't seem much better either; 14 We2 h4 15 2f4 h3 16 e4 Dc6 favoured Black in J.Bourne-C.Ward, St Helier 1999, while 14 2h4 Dd5 and 14 0-0 h4 (15 2f4 e5!) are just as bad.


12 💆 a4+ 🕏 f8 13 ②ec4 h4 14 ② f4 was tried in the variation's first outing, A.Pomar-G.Forintos, Caorle 1972. Black might have tried 14...cxd4 15 cxd4 ②d5 now; in the game 14...a6 15 dxc5 b5 16 🖐 b3 also produced a ferocious and un-

clear struggle, but I don't like the way it lets White's knight back into the game.

12...∲f8 13 Ød3 a6 14 &a4 h4 15 ∳f2

After 15 \$\&\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$} f4 (V.Kovacevic-T.Roschina, Salona rapid 2002) I'm not so sure about 15...h3 16 g3!, which turned out rather well for White in the game; instead 15...cxd4 16 cxd4 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}} d5\$ removes the important bishop and could do with a try.

15...h3 16 e4




B142)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🚉 g5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 🕸 h4 c5 5 c3 b6 6 🖄 d2 🚉 e7 7 🖄 gf3 😩 b7 8 🚉 d3 cxd4

There's probably no concrete reason why Black shouldn't castle first, but Karpov always plays this way.

9 exd4




After 9 cxd4 Karpov's approach is 9... 2c6 10 a3 0-0 11 0-0 2c8 12 2e2 2h5 (his trademark method of easing the pressure in this line although ... 2d5, meeting 2g3 with ...f5, is also played) 13 2xe7 2xe7, when a rather typical continuation was 14 2fc1 2c7 (14...f5 is another way to handle this sort of position) 15 2a6 3b8 16 2xc7 xc7 17 2xb7 xb7 18 2c1 2f6 19 3d3 2c8 with equality, V.Salov-A.Karpov, blitz match, Alma-Ata 1995.

Again there seems to be a consensus that ... \(\tilde{\D}\)b4 is annoying enough to prevent, although I'm not sure this is true. W.Hug-K.Bischoff, Nuremberg (rapid) 1990, went 9...0-0 10 0-0 \(\tilde{\D}\)c6 11 \(\tilde{\D}\)c1 12 \(\tilde{\D}\)b4 12 \(\tilde{\D}\)b1 \(\tilde{\D}\)a6 13 \(\tilde{\D}\)c1 \(\tilde{\D}\)d3 14 \(\tilde{\D}\)xd3 \(

9...d6 10 0-0

White sometimes plays 10 \(\hat{\omega}\)xf6, which looks like a ridiculous move, but isn't quite. The object was well shown in




15 ②xf6+ ②xf6 16 營d3 g6 17 墨xe6!: Polugaevsky was too fly now to fall for 17...fxe6? 18 營xg6+ ②g7 19 營h7+ 營f7 20 ②g6+ 登f6 21 ②h5 when the queen and bishop destroy Black single-handed, but he still stood horribly.

White can also follow up the exchange with 11 We2 2047 12 0-0-0, when Black should follow Dautov in W.Arencibia-R.Dautov, Elista Olympiad 1998 with the careful 12...Wc7 13 26b1 26e7, intending to castle queenside in the event of some lunge like g4 or h4. Otherwise White is a little pushed for a useful move; the game's 14 c4 0-0 15 d5 20c5 16 dxe6 20xe6 17 26e8 already favoured Black.

10...**包bd7**

11 ②c4 0-0 12 &g3 Wc7 13 ②fd2 a6 14 \(\bar{A} = 1 \) \(\bar{A} = 6 \) 15 \(\bar{A} = 1 \) \(\bar{A} = 6 \) 15 \(\bar{A} = 1 \) \(\bar{A} = 6 \) \(\ba

17 a3 b5 18 ②e3 ₩b6 19 ₩c2 g6 20 åa2 åg7 21 dd3 ②h5 (it might seem surprising that White never found time for h2-h3, but perhaps he wasn't fussed about this exchange: the knight can be very effective on d5 once Black has ...b5 ≌cd1 1/2 - 1/222 was A.Miles-A.Yermolinsky, Hastings 1995/96. which illustrates Black's play pretty well. 11 **營e2**



11 \(\begin{aligned}
 & = 1 \) is also common, but we are really beyond the point where theory has any relevance, and rather than try and catalogue the moves played I prefer to follow a single thematic example.

11...a6

Black wants to go ...b5 to secure the d5-square and/or help in a minority attack.


12 a4

It is usual for White to do this and prevent ...b5, although Miles, for example, obviously saw no reason to.

12...0-0 13 罩fe1 罩fe8

Always the right square, discouraging any d4-d5 break or happening on the kingside, defending the e7 bishop, and sometimes making room for a retreat with ... \$\overline{\Delta} f8/\overline{\Delta} f8.

14 公c4 營c7 15 公fd2




White usually feels himself compelled to make this move, which does prevent ... 42h5 and ... 42df6 (quite often a useful idea) but doesn't contribute much positive to his position.

15...臭f8 16 臭g3 營c6 17 營f1

Black might have been thinking about 17...e5 after 17 ©e3, although this break is not common in these positions.

17...ളിh5




18 **≜e**4

White could have changed the structure with 18 2xd6 2xd6 19 2e4 2xh2+20 2xh2 2c7+, which is hard to judge.

18...d5 19 ዿf3 🛭 xg3 20 hxg3 營c7

21 9e3

The alternative method 21 De5 Dxe5 22 dxe5 doesn't offer anything: Black has good play on the queenside and White can't hold d4 nor do anything useful on the kingside – the a4 weakness will hurt him: if ever he has to defend it with b2-b3 then the c3-square will be terribly weak.




Black definitely stands better here: this pawn structure and piece configuration isn't always good for him by any means, especially if White can dominate e5 and make the b7 bishop look poor, but here Black has two advantages. First, the white knights are miles from e5 and his bishop badly needs rerouting, which will cost time; secondly, the a4 weakness means that Black can easily make things happen on the queenside, and White has no chance to make 'his' moves on the kingside.

22...b5 23 axb5 axb5 24 b4

Black's queen's bishop is always a problem in this set-up, and this move highlights the fact. Black's next move is one way to address that problem, but it doesn't work out. Instead Black needed to fight for the a-file with 24... Zeb8, which prepares ... Za4 without allowing Zxa4, bxa4; b5 in reply. Black can then deal with the manoeuvre Db3-c5 by ... Dxc5 and would have maintained a definite advantage.


24... ②b6?! 25 ②b3 ②c4 26 營e2




Both sides recognize that White will have to take the knight, and Black hopes then to rid himself of his poor c6bishop; all very well, but he has reckoned without the common positional theme that the queenside pawns then find themselves without their protector. 26...g6 27 2xc4 dxc4 28 2c5 2g7 29 **\(\) xa8** \(\) xa8 \(\) (29...\(\) xa8? 30 \(\) \(\) xe6) 30 基a1 全xf3 31 ₩xf3 ₩b8 32 ₩c6 ≅c8 33 ₩a6 e5 34 d5 ≅d8 35 ₩c6 Ic8 36 ₩a6 Id8 37 Id1 e4 38 d6 e3 39 fxe3 &xc3 40 營b7 (40 營c6!?) **食xb4?** (40...**豐**xb7 41 **公**xb7 **罩**d7 42 ②c5 罩d8 43 d7 曾f8 44 ②b7 曾e7 looks as though it holds) 41 豐xb8 基xb8 42 (V.Akobian-D.Sharavdori, ②a6 Burbank 2003).

B2)

1 d4 🗹 f6 2 🚉 g5 e6 3 e3 h6 4 🚊 h4 c5 5 🗹 f3 b6 6 🚊 d3




White could also commit himself now with 6 c4: as long as he's persuaded Black to play ...c5 he's avoided the lines with ...g5 or a simplifying ... 2e4 which are perhaps the main objections to the \$\oldsymbol{\text{g}}5\$ Queen's Indian. The advantage of that order is that White can avoid the unclear gambit in the text by playing \$\oldsymbol{\text{e}}e2\$, e.g. 6... \$\oldsymbol{\text{b}}7 7 \$\oldsymbol{\text{c}}c3\$ \$\oldsymbol{\text{e}}e7 8 \$\oldsymbol{\text{e}}e2\$.



This is a classical line of the Queen's Indian, and Black equalizes easily enough with 8...cxd4 9 2xd4 (9 2xd4 0-0 10 0-0 d5 is equal too, and so is 9 exd4 d5, but the bishop should not be on e2 in this isolated queen's pawn [IQP] structure) 9...0-0 10 0-0 2c6 11 2c1 (later Spassky tried 11 2db5 when

11...d5 is simplest) 11...\(\tilde{D}\)xd4 (11...\(\tilde{D}\)e5 also equalizes in a hedgehog-type game, L.Ortega-J.Horvath, Sochi 1987) 12 \(\tilde{W}\)xd4 \(\tilde{D}\)e4 (B.Spassky-P.Keres, 7th matchgame, Riga 1965).

6... \$b7 7 0-0 \$e7 8 c4 cxd4



9 exd4

9 2xd4 allows Black to equalize rather comfortably with either ... 2c6 and ...d5, or more combatively ...d6/2bd7 and a hedgehog sort of position with some of White's pieces in rather silly places. The text move, a particular fancy of the Belgian GM Luc Winants, amounts to a gambit.


9...0-0

9... \(\frac{1}{2}\) xf3 \(\frac{1}{2}\) c6 11 \(\frac{1}{2}\) h3 is the gambit I mentioned (11 \(\frac{1}{2}\) e3 loses material after 11... \(\frac{1}{2}\) g4 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xe7 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xe3 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xd8 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xf1 14 \(\frac{1}{2}\) c7 \([14 \) \(\frac{1}{2}\) h4 \(g5 \) 14... \(\frac{1}{2}\) b4 etc. \(- \) Finkel). White has surprising compensation after 11... \(\frac{1}{2}\) xd4 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\) c3 0-0 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\) ad1 \(\frac{1}{2}\) c8 14 \(\frac{1}{2}\) b1 \(\frac{1}{2}\) c6 15 \(\frac{1}{2}\) g3 \((L.Winants-K.Bischoff, Chalkidik) 2002). I'm sure White has no more than adequate compensation, but the text is easier.

10 0c3 0c6

A cunning move, waiting for the right

moment for ...d5. The immediate 10...d5 11 We2 is a reasonably good IQP position for White, and 11 2xf6 2xf6 12 cxd5 is promising too.




White's a little strapped for a good move somehow: Marin gives the lines 11 \$\\ \text{2}c2 \text{2}a6, 11 d5? exd5 12 cxd5 \text{2}xd5, and 11 a3 \text{2}h5 12 \text{2}xe7 \text{2}xe7 13 \text{2}e5 \text{2}f6 14 \text{2}g4 \text{2}xg4 15 \text{2}xg4, and I'll add on my own account 11 \text{2}b1 \text{2}a5, 11 \text{2}e2 \text{2}c8 with the idea of ...\text{2}b4, ...\text{2}xf3 and ...\text{2}xc4, and 11 \text{2}xf6 \text{2}xf6 12 \text{2}e4 (a common Torre theme and perhaps White's best).

11...d5

There is point in choosing this moment, although 11... \$\mathbb{L}{2}8\$ is also very solid. In principle White has a choice between two ways of meeting ...d5; allowing an IQP or playing \$\mathbb{L}\$xf6, \$\mathbb{L}\$xf6; \$\mathbb{L}\$xf6; \$\mathbb{L}\$xf6, exd5 with a type of position familiar from the Tartakower QGD, which can be surprisingly annoying for Black with his passive queen's bishop and the fixed structure favouring White's knights. Black's point in choosing this move order, though, is that the latter method cannot be applied now: 12 \$\mathref{L}\$xf6

②xf6 13 cxd5 ②xd4! (here is the difference) 14 ②xd4 ②xd4 15 dxe6 fxe6




(T.Gouret-M.Marin, Badalona 1994) is already promising for Black with his active pieces and pressure on f2. So White has to play with an IQP: 12 cxd5 2xd5 13 2xe7 2cxe7 is quite a comfortable specimen for Black, hence the text.

12 罩c1

12 a3 dxc4 13 2xc4 2h5 (I.Rogers-M.Petursson, Gausdal 1996) is also fine for Black.


12...dxc4 13 皇xc4 罩c8



White has now tried 14 &d3 \(\tilde{Q}\)b4 15 \(\tilde{Q}\)b1 \(\tilde{Q}\)fd5 (J.Plaskett-P.Zarnicki, Internet blitz 2004), 14 \(\tilde{Q}\)b3 \(\tilde{Q}\)a5 15 \(\tilde{Q}\)c2 \(\tilde{Q}\)xf3 16 \(\tilde{W}\)xf3 \(\tilde{W}\)xf3 \(\tilde{W}\)xf4 (A.Chernushevich-


C.Marcelin, French League 2003), and 14 & e2 Ød5 (V.Verdihanov-M.Brodsky, Nikolaev 1993), but in each of these cases Black has nothing to fear: White has not quite brought his pieces into play perfectly for an IQP position: he needed a rook on d1.

C) 1 d4 Øf6 2 &g5 e6 3 Ød2




There's not so much about this move in Tromp books, but actually it's a very important alternative to 3 e4. White either wants to slide into a 'Hebden Torre' or just to save on c2-c3. C1 is the former idea, C2 the latter.

3...h6 4 臭h4



4...c5


For an alternative I rather like the cheeky 4...\(\Omega\)c6: of course normally this is unthinkable in a Torre, but once White has committed his knight to d2 then first of all he now has to spend a tempo on e2-e3 or c2-c3, and secondly Black's plan of hitting at the centre with ...e5 becomes more appealing with no 2d5 in the offing. Evidence is scarce, but 5 e3 d6 6 c4 \$\hat{Q}\$d7 7 \$\hat{Q}\$gf3 g5 8 \$\hat{Q}\$g3 \$g7 9 \$d3 ₩e7 10 a3 \$\alpha\$h5 (C.Senk-V.Korchnoi, Hessen 1999), 5 c3 d6 6 e4 ②h5 10 \(\mathbb{Q}\)c4 \(\Omega\)xg3 11 hxg3 \(\mathbb{W}\)f6 (S.Dishman-J.Rowson, British League 2000, and 5 c3 g5 6 \(\hat{2}\)g3 \(\Delta\)h5 7 e4 2d7 11 ②e2 ₩e7 (V.Popov-A.Lugovoi, St Petersburg 1992) all seemed acceptable enough for Black.



After 4...c5 White has:

C1: 5 c3 C2: 5 e3

C1) 1 d4 🖄 f6 2 âg5 e6 3 🖄 d2 h6 4 âh4 c5 5 c3




With this move White announces that he may want e2-e4 in one go, but this move order does have an Achilles heel.

5...cxd4 6 cxd4 營b6 7 營c2

7 ☑gf3 ∰xb2 is an untried gambit, but the onus is on White.


7... 40c6 8 & xf6 gxf6 9 e3 d5 10 a3



This position was reached in G.Israel-O.Foisor, Bethune 1997. White's problem is that his knight really needs to be on c3 in this structure, which is particularly shown by 10 agf3 e5 11 ac1 ad7, which is fine for Black. With the text I suspect White meant to meet 10...e5 with 11 ac2, although if so I don't really understand why not 10 ac2 at once. Instead the game continued 10...ad7 11

②e2 罩c8 12 營b3 營c7 13 罩c1 拿d6 14 g3 營b8 with a complex and fairly equal position.


C2)
1 d4 ②f6 2 Ձg5 e6 3 ②d2 h6 4 Ձh4
c5 5 e3 cxd4 6 exd4 b6 7 ②gf3



White has a couple of ways of doubling the f-pawns: 7 \$\mathbb{\text{#}}f3 \otimes 2c6 8 \otimes xf6 gxf6 is one, and 7 \otimes e4 \otimes e7 8 \otimes xf6 gxf6 the other. Neither is too terrifying, but Black has to be a little careful: probably he should play ...d5 — the one break White must at all costs not be allowed is d4-d5 — and if convenient ...h5 is also a useful move. Alternatively, Black can simply start with ...\oxedexer e7 before ...b6.

White may also be tempted to set up a Stonewall with 7 c3 \$\tilde{L}\$e7 8 f4?!, but this is seldom effective before Black is committed to ...d5, and in A.Stefanova-N.Khurtsidze, Groningen 1999, White was already struggling after 8...\$\tilde{L}\$b7 9 \$\tilde{L}\$xf6 (9 \$\tilde{L}\$)gf3 \$\tilde{L}\$d5 is vexing) 9...\$\tilde{L}\$xf6 10 \$\tilde{L}\$gf3 \$\tilde{L}\$c7 11 g3 g5 12 fxg5 hxg5 13 g4, when I really don't know how White would have answered 13...\$\tilde{L}\$f4.

7…皇e7 8 皇d3 皇b7 9 0-0 0-0 10 ≌e1 d6




Pretty much as in former variations. Now White could of course play 11 c3 with a position very similar to B142 above, but the column illustrates another idea which wasn't mentioned above.

11 &xf6 &xf6 12 &e4


We saw 20e4 above in Kovacevic-Polugaevsky, but this is another follow-up to 2xf6. Now 12... 7 is one reply, but Bologan prefers a different way, appropriate where White doesn't have c2-c3 in.

12...d5 13 Ձd3 Ձa6 14 Ձxa6 ᡚxa6 15 c3 ᡚc7



Black is fine (A.Hauchard-V.Bologan, Belfort 1999), and in the game wasted no time in bringing his knight to d6, occupying the c-file, pushing ...b5-b4 and winning. I give the moves without comment since the whole thing flows like the Nile anyway, and it hardly needs any.

16 ②e5 ③b5 17 ②g4 ②e7 18 豐e2 ②d6 19 ②e3 罩e8 20 豐a6 豐d7 21 a4 罩ec8 22 豐d3 罩c7 23 罩ec1 罩ac8 24 含f1 罩c6 25 罩c2 豐b7 26 含e2 罩6c7 27 含d1 a6 28 g3 b5 29 axb5 axb5 30 含e2 b4 31 cxb4 罩xc2 32 ②xc2 ②f5 33 含d1 ②xb4 34 豐a6 罩b8 35 豐xb7 罩xb7 36 ②f1 ②e7 37含c1 ②g5+ 38 ③fe3 h5 39 罩a4 h4 40 含b1 ③xe3 41 fxe3 hxg3 42 hxg3 含h7 43 b4 含g6 44 含b2 含h5




45 \$b3 \$e7 46 \$\mathbb{Z}\$a1 \$\mathbb{Q}\$47 \$\mathbb{C}\$C3 g5 48 \$\mathbb{Z}\$g1 \$\mathbb{Q}\$d6 49 \$\mathbb{Q}\$d3 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xg3 50 e4 dxe4 51 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xe4 f5+ 52 \$\mathbb{Q}\$d3 \$\mathbb{Q}\$f3 53 \$\mathbb{Q}\$e3 \$\mathbb{Q}\$f2 54 \$\mathbb{Z}\$f1 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xb4 0-1.

Capablanca couldn't have done it better; an object lesson in how to play quietly but powerfully for a win against these rather dull white systems.

CHAPTER TWO

The Pseudo-Trompowsky



1 d4 d5 2 **≜**g5

The Pseudo-Tromp, once (and maybe still for all we know) a favourite of Julian Hodgson. The theoretical status of the move is best summed up by a comment of Mickey Adams: 'White is not worse after it', but it's worth having an idea what you're going to do: Anand, Kramnik twice, Shirov and Mikhail Gurevich have all lost in this line in recent years, so it's not a joke.


Black is under a little pressure since he can't move the e-pawn and can't develop his king's knight without some concession, be it doubled f-pawns, playing ...g6 at the risk of ending in a Grünfeld, or going ...\(\overline{D}\)d7 and blocking the queen's bishop. The line I recommend addresses these problems in a very natural way and has become the usual choice of grandmasters faced with this opening.

2...h6

A useful move: probably Black will be playing ... \$\oldsymbole f5\$ and this will create 'luft' for the bishop; ...g7-g5 may be a useful resource and the bishop may in some

lines be less well placed on h4 than g5.


3 **皇h4 c6**



Black prepares to go ... \$\mathbb{W}\$b6, gaining a tempo and unpinning the e-pawn. White has a great variety of moves here. The main moves are 4 \$\infty\$f3 and 4 e3, but others have their devotees:

- a) 4 c3 was well met in I.Miladinovic-G.Timoscenko, Leonardo di Bono 2000: 4.... f5 5 2 d2 2 d7 6 e3 2 gf6 7 f3?! (7 2 gf3 is more sensible, with complete equality) 7... b6 8 b4 e5! and Black was better already.
 - b) 4 c4, effectively meeting a Slav De-


fence to the Queen's Gambit with 3 \(\) g5?!, is more or less the sole intellectual property of the Russian Genrikh Chepukaitis. After 4...dxc4 his first try was 5 a4 \(\) b6 6 \(\) d2 e5 7 dxe5 \(\) b4 8 \(\) c3 \(\) e6, but a couple of very rapid losses to Rublevsky and Karjakin seem to have put him off (Black proceeds with a quick ...\(\) d7 and ...0-0-0) and his latest is 5 e4 b5 6 a4 a6 7 b3 cxb3 8 axb5 (G.Chepukaitis-M.Sebag, playchess.com 2003): in the unlikely event of this happening again I propose 8...\(\) f6,



when emerging from the opening in one piece is the very summit of White's ambitions.

- c) 4 a3, a sort of ...a6-Slav Attack, is best dealt with by 4... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{B}}6 5 \mathbb{\mathbb{E}}a2 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}f5 6 e3 e6 7 c4 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}e7 (this gain of tempo is one of the ideas of Black's set-up) 8 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}xe7 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}xe7 9 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}c3 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}d7 10 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}f3 0-0 11 c5 \mathbb{\mathbb{C}}c7 12 b4 a5 13 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}e2 axb4 14 axb4 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}xa2 15 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}xa2 \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}a8, when Black held the initiative in E.Prie-M.Gurevich, Aosta 2004.
- d) 4 ②c3 is rather like a Veresov, and usually leads to rather equal positions after something like 4...②f5 5 e3 ②d7 6 ②d3 ③xd3 7 cxd3 ⑤b6 8 ②ge2 e6 9 0-0 ②e7 10 ②xe7 ②xe7 11 ②a4 ⑥c7 12

₩c2 0-0 13 द्वfc1 e5 (A.Andres Gonzalez-P.Cramling, Vila Real 2001).




Here White has two main moves:

A: 4 ∕∆f3 B: 4 e3

Often enough these lead to the same thing: the former only really has independent significance if White intends a controversial gambit, which in line with my usual churlish policy I suggest you decline.

A) 1 d4 d5 2 皇g5 h6 3 皇h4 c6 4 包f3 豐b6 5 豐c1



5 b3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f5 6 e3 now is Line B, while 5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$bd2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f5 (5... \$\bar{\pi}{\pi}\$xb2 is possible of course but some good black players including Hodgson himself have declined to take up this challenge) leads to similar play, except that the d2-knight is not in the right place.

The gambit offered by the text was for a while a fearsome weapon in Hodgson's hands. It was thought to have been refuted in the games J.Hodgson-Mondariz 2000, M.Godena, I.Hodgson-L.Schandorff, Bundesliga 2001, but Miladinovic still goes in for it, and on the whole I'd recommend steering clear: it's one thing to let an opponent get away with offering a pawn if declining involves concessions, but all White's done is play Wc1, so there is really no reason not to carry on with Black's plan.

5...≜f5


5...g5 6 &g3 g4 7 </table-container>e5 $\mbox{$rac{1}{2}$}$ e5 $\mbox{$rac{1}{2}$}$ xd4 is the gambit line.

6 c4 e6 7 2c3

7 c5 ₩a5+ 8 ②c3 b6 is premature.

7...**≜e**7

Immediately, so as to allow ... d8 after c4-c5.




8 🚉 g3

8 2xe7 2xe7 is easy for Black: White's plan is to play c4-c5 and attack on the queenside and for that the bishop controlling b8 is essential.

8... 16 9 c5 ₩d8 10 e3 4bd7

Castling can wait – the text move is accurate because it threatens ... ②h5 (after 11 ♣e2 ②h5 12 ♣e5 Black can insist on the trade – or a draw – with 12... ②hf6).




11 h3 0-0

This is very solid, but Black can also consider 11...a5. By this means he prevents White from solidifying his queenside bind, and 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e2 0-0 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xe5 14 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xe5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d7 15 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g3 b6 would transpose into A.Barsov-J.Hector, Vikings GM, York 2000, in which White was forced to continue 16 cxb6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xb6 with a nice game for Black.


15 \(\mathbb{L}\)e2 can be met the same way: White figures he needs to play \(\mathbb{L}\)d3 to control b1 and give his b4-b5 plan some sting, and he intends to save a tempo by missing out \(\mathbb{L}\)e2.

15...**.**⊈f6




Black means to fight back with ...e5 rather than contesting the queenside. He's been quick enough that his counterplay comes in time, and Black had equal play in J.Hodgson-A.Naumann, Bundesliga 2003. Once ...e5 is achieved, by the way, Black should seldom release the tension with ...e4 in this line: he takes a long while to do anything on the kingside, and White is very quick on the other side.

B) 1 d4 d5 2 âg5 h6 3 âh4 c6 4 e3



The invariable choice of some heavyweight fans of this variation, for example Adams, Miles and Miladinovic. There are really two points behind the move: first, one can play 5 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}\)c1 next go without putting a pawn en prise; second, it has been discovered that 4...\(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}\)b6 5 b3/\(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}\)c1 e5, exploiting the trick 6 dxe5?? \(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}\)b4+, is not such a simple equalizer for Black as it appears.

4...≝b6




5 b3

5 **堂**c1 **\$**f5 is going to transpose to A: White hardly has a better move now than 6 **②**f3 (6 c4 e6 7 **②**c3 **\$**e7 is the same thing).

5... £f5 6 £d3

This almost always is White's plan after b2-b3, since Black's f5 bishop is surely more active than one on e2, and 6 c4 e6 7 ②c3 ②b4 is rather annoying. Of course he can also play pianissimo with 6 ②f3 e6 7 ②e2 ②e7 8 ③xe7 ②xe7 9 ②e5 c5 10 c3 ②bc6 11 ②d3 cxd4 12 cxd4 (R.Damaso-A.Frois, Portugal 1999). It's never too quiet to blunder, though, and I bet both sides spent a long time eyeing up 12...②xd4 13 exd4 ③xd3 15 0-0 ⑤b4 16 ⑥xd3 ⑥xa3 17 ⑥b5+ ⑤f8 18 ⑥xb7 before Black decided not to bother and the game ambled to a draw.

6...≜xd3 7 ∰xd3 e6 8 ∅f3 ∅d7 9 c4




9...**≜**e7

This, gaining a tempo as it does by the threat of exchange, has been the most popular move, but Karpov's 9... \$\overline{\Delta}e^7\$ might be even better: 10 0-0 \$\overline{\Delta}f5\$ 11 \$\overline{\Delta}bd2\$ \$\overline{\Delta}xh4\$ 12 \$\overline{\Delta}xh4\$ \$\overline{\Delta}e^7\$ seems to be about as good as White can do, and at least Black can hope that one day his bishop may be more effective than the knight.

10 **≜xe7 ②xe7** 11 0-0 0-0 12 **②c3**The tabiya of the variation.

12...**₩a6**



Black can play many moves here (arranging his rooks on either c8 and d8 or


e8 and d8 being the most popular) but the text has Kramnik's seal of approval. It forces White to move his queen before undertaking anything with the c-pawn, and frees the way for ...b7-b6, which may be useful either to challenge the c-pawn after c4-c5 or to support ...c6-c5.

13 **¤fd1**

Universally played, defending the queen and freeing the c-pawn.

13... \(\mathbb{I}\)fd8 14 \(\mathbb{I}\)ac1


In A.Morozevich-V.Kramnik, Astana 2001, White tried 14 Zab1; this I think is directed against Black's idea of ...dxc4 followed by ...c6-c5. However, it didn't go very well after 14...b6 (White's previous move might also have suggested that he was thinking about c4-c5) 15 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}f1 (I'm sure Morozevich had an idea with this move but what it was I don't understand at all; Hodgson used to play this way in conjunction with \(\begin{aligned} \Begin{aligned} \aligned \Begin{aligned} \Begin{ali can understand it as otherwise the queen is undefended, but not here). 15... \Bac8 16 Zd2 (was White's previous move somehow connected with a plan to use this rook on c2 or b2?) 16... 2f6 17 2e5 dxc4



18 ②xc4 (one would have thought White's formation called for 18 bxc4 c5 or indeed 18 wxc4: is White's queen really better than Black's?) 18...②ed5 19 ②xd5 cxd5 20 ②e5 wxf1+ 21 ③xf1 ②e4 was necessary: Tsesarsky assures us that a player of Morozevich's level should not lose such an endgame; against a player of Kramnik's level with quite such firm control of the c-file I'm not so sure, although anything is better than losing at once) 19...②xc3 20 ④xc3 c5 21 dxc5 b5! and Black won with the idea of ...②d2.

White has also tried 14 a4, when 14... ac8 15 a5 c5 was already comfortable in E.Rozentalis-A.Sulypa, Bad Wiessee 1999. I wonder if White might also consider 14 e4, when 14...dxe4 15 axe4 seems to leave White a little better (the knight on d7 is a little snookered, and perhaps White can think about d3/aad1 and the possibility of d4-d5), and 14...dxc4 15 bxc4 c5 16 d5 also seems to leave White slightly more active.


14... Zac8



With rather an equal position: White can now try the criminally dull 15 cxd5 or 15 c5 (when Black can play for ...e5 and/or a well-timed ...b6), while the slightly more ambitious 15 \$\mathbb{W}\$b1 b6 16 e4 (why White needed to move the queen from d3 before playing this is not clear to me; 15 e4!?) 16...\(\overline{D}\$f6 17 e5 \overline{D}\$d7 18 cxd5 cxd5 19 a4 possibly left a slight edge for White in V.Mikhalevski-B.Villamajor, Goodricke 2001, although Black drew comfortably enough.

CHAPTER THREE

The Torre Attack



1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 👲 g5 (and 1 d4 d5 2 🖄 f3 🖄 f6 3 և g5)


This is the Torre Attack proper. Unlike the versions which we saw in the Trompowsky chapter, White is willing to allow a direct counter which gains the two bishops and gives Black a rich game with counterchances. I'm not going to give an alternative for Black since if he wants to he can just play the same lines which I gave in the Tromp chapter. Instead I suggest that Black simply bags that bishop directly.

3...h6

The most uncompromising way. In fact I think avoiding this was probably the motive behind the development of what I have christened the Hebden Torre in the next chapter.

White now has a major choice:

A) 1 d4 ᡚf6 2 ᡚf3 e6 3 Ձg5 h6 4




This isn't the only move, of course, but White's compensation for having given up the bishops lies in having taken the centre, and this is by far the most critical. This position could have arisen from the Trompowsky after 1 d4 \$\overline{\Delta} 6 2\$ \$\overline{\Delta} 5 \overline{\Delta} 6 3\$ e4 h6 4 \$\overline{\Delta} x 6 \$\overline{\Delta} x 6 5\$ \$\overline{\Delta} 5 3\$, although usually it doesn't (Wells: 'I have rejected 5 \$\overline{\Delta} f 3\$ because I cannot conceive that the solution to White's problems lies in blocking the f-pawn').

White sometimes tries a slower set-up with 5 \Data bd2 d6 6 c3 \Data d7 7 a4 (or 7 g3

g6 8 \(\hat{L}g2 \) \(\hat{L}g7 \) 9 0-0 0-0 10 a4 a5 11 \(\hat{W}b3 \) e5 12 e4 \(\hat{L}b6 \), A.Kosten-M.Adams, London 1990) 7...g6 (not 7...g5?: a good rule is never to play this unless White has played e4) 8 a5 a6 9 g3 \(\hat{L}g7 \) 10 \(\hat{L}g2 \) \(\hat{W}e7 \) 11 0-0 0-0 12 \(\hat{W}c2 \) e5 13 e3 \(\hat{L}e8 \), which was reasonable for Black in A.Kachur-A.Kharitonov, Aktjubinsk 1985.

5...d6

Black could certainly also play 5...d5 when White probably doesn't have a lot better than 6 e5 d8 7 c3, which is line A2 in the Tromp chapter. His alternative try is 7 c4, when Burgess gives 7...dxc4 8 2xc4 2d7 9 2c3 2b6 10 2b3 2d7 11 0-0 2c6 12 2c1 2e7 13 d3 J.Hodgson-M.Lodhi, London 1987) as a clear advantage to White: this is not clear to me and I suggest 13...a5.




After 5...d6 White has a choice between set-ups based on 2c3 and those based on c3. In the latter move order can vary but I split them as follows:

I'm going to mention 6 e5 only to

dismiss it: Burgess claimed an edge after 6...dxe5 7 dxe5 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{e}7 8 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{c}}\text{c}3 \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{c}}\text{c}6 9 \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{b}5 \) but I don't see this at all, for example 9...\(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{d}7 10 \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{e}2 \) 0-0-0 11 0-0-0 a6 12 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{x}\text{6} \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{x}\text{6} 13 \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{x}\text{6} 13 \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{x}\text{6} 13 \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{d}7 \) 12 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{x}\text{c}6 \) \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{x}\text{c}6 \) 13 0-0-0 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{b}4 \) was similar, only worse, in K.Shirazi-L.Christiansen, US Championship 1984.

A1)

1 d4 �f6 2 �f3 e6 3 ₤g5 h6 4 ₤xf6 ∰xf6 5 e4 d6 6 �c3 �d7




Notwithstanding the failure of 6 e5, Black does well to clamp down on it now. White is aiming for quick development and Black needs to keep the centre closed and bide his time; in the long run he hopes the unopposed dark-squared bishop can play a decisive role, but before then he has to avoid getting mated.

7 **쌀d2**

By far White's main move, aiming for a quick 0-0-0, although he does have some alternatives:

a) 7 d5 e5 is nothing in particular for White.

b) 7 \(\mathbb{L}\)c4 can be met in much the same style as the text: E.Meduna-S.Kalinichev, Passau 1997, went 7... d8 8 0-0 (White is hardly going to go long after \$\oldsymbol{\pmathbb{L}}\$c4, so the play is slightly different, but Black can develop in the same way) 8... £e7 9 ₩e2 a6 10 a4 c5 (Black is well advised to get this in before castling: he looks a little undeveloped but White can't do anything about it, and White otherwise might take it into his head to play 2d1 and meet ...c5 with c3) 11 d5 e5 (usually the way to meet d4-d5 in this line: Black's king's bishop doesn't look so good after this in the short term, but, as in the King's Indian, its time will come) 12 2 dd 1 2 f6 13 2 d2 0-0,



when Black was fine; he went on with ...g6,⊉h5,⊉g5 and ...f5, and delivered mate.


c) 7 2d3 allows for either long or short castling still; Black can play 7...g5 with ...2g7 or 7...c6 with ...e5, or reply in the same style with 7... d8. In the latter case, most often White transposes now with 8 d2 and 9 0-0-0 anyway since if he wanted to play with 2d3 and 0-0 probably he would have played bd2 and c3. But if White does play 8

0-0 Black can go on in the same style with 8...a6 (8...c5 9 dxc5 公xc5 10 全b5 全d7 11 全xd7+ 營xd7 12 營d4 is a bit annoying) followed by ...c5: again White has an impressive lead in development but difficulty in engaging Black to make use of it.

7...\₩d8

I'm not sure it makes too much difference whether this or ...a6 is played first: Adams seems to prefer ...a6 first, Miles ... d8. I think the idea of 7... d8 first is to avoid 7...a6 8 a4, not that that's so terrifying. In general the queen retreat is necessary to avoid ...c5 being met by e4-e5, for example after 7...a6 8 0-0-0 c5 9 e5!.

8 0-0-0



As I say, this is almost always played.

8...a6


This exact sequence, popularized by Tony Miles, has been responsible for the status of White's once common set-up nose-diving in recent years. Black's plan is to play ...b5, b7 and ...c5, obtaining a Sicilian-type position in which White badly misses his bishop and Black has good prospects against White's king. White has tried a good many moves here

but has achieved a miserable score and has really not discovered a decent way to handle the position at all.

9 h4


This has been the most popular, but White has also tried the following:

a) 9 e5 introduces immediately one of the main strategic questions of the position: is Black to meet e4-e5 with ...d6-d5 or by ignoring it? It's not obvious that a move like 9...b5 is bad, but in practice Black has invariably played 9...d5. Now O.Annageldyev-I.Rogers, Istanbul 2000 went on 10 h4 b5 11 2e2 2b6!? (11...c5 was perhaps more normal and perfectly good) 12 2f4 2c4 13 2xc4 bxc4 14 2h5 4d7



b) 9 包e1 c5 10 dxc5 包xc5 11 包d3 豐c7 12 f4 臭e7 13 含b1 b5 14 g4 臭b7 15 \(\hat{\pmathbb{g}}g2\) was C.Marzolo-A.Kosten, Monte Carlo 1999, where Black had a nice Sicilian-type position.

c) 9 2d3 and 9 2b1 are not usually independent. In A.Stefanova-M.Gurevich, Antwerp 1997 White tried to miss out 2b1, but 9 2d3 2e7 10 h4 b5 11 g4 c5 was nice for Black again: Stefanova closed the centre by 12 d5 e5, but after 13 2dg1 c4 14 2f1 Black already had the initiative and a pleasant choice between the game's methodical 14... 2a5 15 g5 h5 16 2d8, and Gurevich's more flamboyant suggestion 14... b4 15 2b1 c3!? with strong compensation.



9...b5


The usual routine.

10 **⋭**b1

10 h3 2b7 11 f4 b4 12 2e2 c5 13 dxc5 2xc5 14 e5 was C.Crouch-M.Adams, London 1996, in which Black now closed the centre with 14...d5 and stood fine, although Palliser's 14...2d5 was very conceivable, while Fritz seems to think 14...2e4 is downright good for Black and I must say it seems to be right.


10 ②e2 c5 11 d5 e5 12 h5 c4 13 ②g3 ②c5 14 含b1 罩b8 15 ②h4 兔e7 15 ②hf5 兔g5 16 豐e1 was another centre-closing plan in A.Stefanova-A.Kolev, Madrid 1997, and as usual Black stood well with his dark-squared control on the kingside and chances on the queenside.

10…**.鱼b7**



11 **≜**d3


In I.Rogers-H.Stefansson, Iceland 2000, White played 11 d5 and Black eschewed the usual 11...e5 in favour of 11...\(\overline{D}\)b6!? Myself, I think I would have met that with 12 dxe6 fxe6 13 \(\overline{D}\)d3, but Rogers preferred 12 \(\overline{D}\)xb5+?!, which after entertaining complications basically turned out to lose (12...axb5 13 \(\overline{D}\)xb5+\(\overline{D}\)d7 14 dxe6 fxe6 15 \(\overline{D}\)e5 was the idea, but Rogers must have underestimated 15...c6!).



11...c5

This position was reached in the seminal game J.Hodgson-A.Miles, Kuala Lumpur 1992, which continued

12 dxc5 ②xc5 13 ≝e3 ≝c7 14 ②d4 0-0-0 15 f4 \$b8




A very natural series of moves which leave us in a position which might well have been some kind of Sicilian Defence. Now Spraggett showed how to meet the direct 16 f5 in N.Ristic-K.Spraggett, Metz 1997, with 16...b4 17 ②ce2 exf5 18 exf5 ②e7, when the f6-bishop more than compensated for the slight defects of Black's pawn structure. Gallagher suggested 16 h5 b4 17 ②ce2, when I rather suspect Black should be aiming for ...e5 rather than the 17...d5 18 e5 which Gallagher mentioned; perhaps by 17... 3c8 18 3c1 e5.

Hodgson thought ...b4 was worth preventing with 16 a3 h5 17 f5 全7 (if 17...exf5? now then 18 公d5, of course) 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 全2 全f6 20 單h3 罩c8, and now perhaps White had to change the course of the game with Gallagher's unclear proposal 21 公dxb5 axb5 22 公xb5 豐b6 23 罩xd6 罩c6 24 e5 全e7 25 罩xc6 全xc6 26 公d6 – in the game White

rejected this and went swiftly downhill once the bishop came to e5 and dominated the position. Mind you, Miles obviously wasn't afraid of this since 20... 28 isn't exactly the only move; for example 20... 27 comes into consideration.

A2) 1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 Ձg5 h6 4 Ձxf6 ∰xf6 5 e4 d6 6 Ձd3



White is not going to go for the sharp sort of game we saw in A1; instead he means to develop with c3 and \(\D\)bd2. This plan is more ambitious from the Tromp move order with \(\D\)f3 delayed so that f4 can be played, but here too it is a solid way to play and aim for a slight edge.

6...€)d7


Again this is Black's most flexible move.

7 0-0

7 Dbd2 might be a bit inaccurate since it lends force to Black's 7...g5!?. Now 8 c3 g4 9 Dg1 h5 seems to be necessary. White might well be best off here with 10 De2, just developing again and hoping to prove Black's advances to be

weaknesses, but practice has seen only 10 h3 h6 11 We2 a6 12 0-0-0 c5 13 dxc5 xc5 14 bb1 b5 15 c2 (A.Monteleone-L.Ortega, Rome 1991), when Black should have played 15....b7 with equality. Otherwise Black can set up the same way as the text: White's sixth to tenth moves can be played in any order without altering Black's set-up much except that Le1 should be met immediately with ...e5.


7...g6 8 ∅bd2 ⊈g7 9 c3 0-0 10 ≣e1 e5



The most natural position to reach in this line. White could also have arranged this position with his bishop on c4 instead of d3, after which Y.Seirawan-A.Karpov, Monaco (blindfold) 1994, continued 11 dxe5 dxe5 12 Wc2 a5 13 a3 a4 14 Off Oc5 15 Oe3 c6 16 Zad1, which looks as least okay for Black to me, though White won and Burgess assesses it as slightly better for White, so who am I to argue? White might also have tried an early a2-a4: in general Black is best to let this come to a5 and then meet it with ...a7-a6.


The chances after 10...e5 are rather level, although the continuation of

R.Ovetchkin-A.Lugovoi, Alma-Ata 1991 was notable for the future grandmaster's way of spicing the play up; after 11 ☑f1 ☑e8 12 ≝d2?! (12 ☑e3) he went in for 12...exd4 13 cxd4 c5.



This is still no more than equal, I dare say, but more interesting than the structure that arises after dxe5, dxe5.

B) 1 d4 �f6 2 �f3 e6 3 �g5 h6 4 �h4 d6



Another cunning little move from the Romanian stable; this one developed by Mihai Suba and Marin. Black still intends ...g5 and ...\(\overline{D}\)h5 in due course, but he doesn't want to go for the bishop at


once and allow the position after 4...g5 5 \$\times g3\$ \$\times h5\$ 6 c3 d6 7 e4 \$\times g7\$ 8 \$\times fd2\$ \$\times xg3\$ 9 hxg3, which Marin judges slightly better for White. It certainly isn't beyond dispute that that's true, but there's no harm in waiting for \$\times bd2\$ before going after the bishop. Black, incidentally, has scored 60% after the move 4...d6.

White has many moves now, although most of them are not independent.

B1: 5 h3 B2: 5 公c3 B3: 5 公bd2 B4: 5 e3

B1) 1 d4 �f6 2 �f3 e6 3 £g5 h6 4 £h4 d6 5 h3

Of course White can preserve the bishop like this, but he is basically just losing a tempo. Black found an interesting method of unbalancing the game in R.Bellin-V.Epishin, Gibraltar 2003, which continued...




and already Black was starting to take the initiative.

B2)

1 d4 �f6 2 �f3 e6 3 Ձg5 h6 4 Ձh4 d6 5 �c3

I don't see how this can be a good move, but various grandmasters have disagreed with me. 5...d5 is by no means stupid now, but

5...g5 6 âg3 4h5



is more thematic. Now both 7 e3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g7 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d2 \(\hat{2}\)xg3 9 hxg3 a6 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e2 \(\hat{2}\)d7 11 g4 d5 (usually desirable at some point in this line) 12 \(\hat{2}\)f3 \(\hat{2}\)f6 (S.Cicak-E.Agrest, Skara 2002), and 7 e4 \(\hat{2}\)d7 8 \(\hat{2}\)c4 a6 9 a4 \(\hat{2}\)e7 10 0-0 \(\hat{2}\)g7 11 \(\hat{2}\)e1 \(\hat{2}\)xg3 12 hxg3 0-0 13 \(\hat{2}\)h2 c6 14 \(\hat{2}\)g4 \(\hat{2}\)d8 15 \(\hat{2}\)b3 d5 (E.Torre-S.B.Hansen, Calvia 2004) illustrated typical black procedures and were equal.


B3)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 Ձg5 h6 4 Ձh4 d6 5 ⊘bd2

Commonest: 5 c3 2bd7! comes to the same thing – White hardly has a sensible move now other than 6 2bd2.

5...g5

Now 2fd2 is ruled out Black is happy to play this.



White must choose now between a set-up based on e2-e4 and one based on e2-e3.


B31: 7 e3 B32: 7 e4

B31)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 Ձg5 h6 4 Ձh4 d6 5 ②bd2 g5 6 Ձg3 ②h5 7 e3 Ձg7

Black's scheme of development is always the same in the early going.

8 c3 🖾 d7




This piece can also be developed on c6, but I have stuck to lines with ... 20d7. The motivation for this placement of the knight is twofold: it may be well placed

on f6, perhaps defending its colleague on h5 and enabling the useful delay of \(\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\) xg3; and the c-pawn is free for ...c5, working to free the unopposed g7-bishop on the long diagonal.

9 **皇d3**

White has tried many set-ups here:

- a) Certainly not wise is 9 h4 g4 10 h2 f5 11 ad3 0-0! (Black quite often goes short in this line: the king is hard to get at behind the g7-bishop), transposing to E.Karadeniz-Z.Izoria, Batumi 2002, in which White was overrun after ... e7 and ... e5 and deservedly collapsed on g3.
- b) 9 \(\)equiv e2 \(\)\delta\delta\delta\delta\text{6 10 0-0 \)\delta\delta\delta\text{7 can't have pleased Yasser Seirawan much in Y.Seirawan-J.Ehlvest, Skelleftea 1989, since his next moves were 11 e4 \(\)\delta\xg3 12 hxg3 0-0 and now 13 \(\)\delta\delta\delta\delta\delta\.
 - c) 9 🖄 g1




is not as foolish as it looks (White aims to ensure that he can get in g3-g4 to fix the h6-weakness) and was played in R.Appel-G.Kasparov, Internet (blitz) 1998, which continued 9...\(\int\text{2}\)xg3 10 hxg3 c5 (there's not much point my saying how Kasparov should have played, but bearing in mind the provenance of this game perhaps I may be forgiven for say-

ing that 'FWIW' 10... **豐**e7 looks arguably wiser to me) 11 ②e4 **豐**e7 12 dxc5 d5 13 ②d6+ **\$**f8, with rough equality.

d) Finally, White sometimes reaches for the a-pawn in the hope of dissuading Black from an eventual queenside fianchetto: 9 a4 We7 10 a5 a6 11 Wc2 f5 12 2c4 2df6 13 Wb3 was an attempt to take particular advantage of this in X.Lopez Sanchez-A.Cherniaev, Manresa 1997. Alex must have had his reasons for avoiding the natural 13...0-0 14 0-0 2d7 at this point, but I must say I'm not sure what they were. In any case Black is fine.

9...⊮e7



10 **e**2

10 a4 0-0 11 ②c4 f5 12 ②fd2 ②df6 13 f3 ②xg3 14 hxg3 c5 was all very natural-looking from White's angle in N.Sivan-Z.Izoria, New York 2002, but also already nice for Black.


10 **w**c2 is often played, when 10...a6 or 10...b6 are natural, but in K.Müller-M.Wahls, Dudweiler 1996, Black developed another way: 10...♠b6!? 11 0-0-0 ♠d7 12 e4 ♣c8, again with counterplay.

10...a6 11 **≜**c2

11 0-0-0 b5 gave Black an equal share

of the attacking prospects in A.Stefanova-Ki.Georgiev, Reckling-hausen 1996, especially after the improbable 12 ②b3 0-0 13 ②fd2 ③xg3 14 hxg3 c5 15 dxc5 ②xc5. White's best is probably 11 e4, but in that case he might as well have chosen Line B32.

11...b6




This was T.Nalbandian-V.Malaniuk, Yerevan Olympiad 1996, in which White now didn't find a plan, continuing 12 豐c4 ②xg3 13 hxg3 c5 14 豐d3 急b7 15 e4 墨c8, when Black was already comfortable.

B32)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 âg5 h6 4 âh4 d6 5 ②bd2 g5 6 âg3 ②h5 7 e4 âg7 8 c3 ②d7 9 âd3

Natural. As before White can also play other moves, for example 9 2c4, which tries to avoid the trouble caused in the text with ...f5-f4 by preparing to force the exchange on g3 by 2fd2. Black then continues with 9... F7 10 2fd2 2xg3 11 hxg3 and now Black is fine after either 11...c5 12 dxc5 2xc5 13 2e3 2d7, when White wisely tried to simplify with 14 a4 2c6 15 2b5 in I.Radziewicz-

M.Marin, MK Cafe Cup, Koszalın 1999, or 11...b6 12 ②e3 ②b7 13 ③d3 c5 14 d5 0-0-0 (S.Kovacevic-K.Spraggett, Andorra 1997).




9...0-0

Black has also done okay with 9...a6 and 9... e7 (e.g. 10 e2 a6 11 2b3 e5 12 2fd2 2xg3 13 hxg3 cxd4 14 2xd4, W.Hug-K.Hulak, Istanbul 2003 – equal and shortly drawn), but the text challenges White by immediately getting ready for ...f7-f5-f4.


10 **쌀b3**

10 We2 f5 11 e5 produces some interesting complications — Black can consider either 11...\(\infty\) b6 or 11...\(\text{g}\) 4 12 \(\infty\) h4 dxe5 13 \(\infty\) g6 exd4!?.




10...**∲**h8

Later Marin took against this natural move, and suggested 10...a6 11 0-0-0 b5, but his reason seems to have been wrong. 11 0-0-0 f5!?



Marin suggested this move after the game A.Miles-M.Marin, Andorra 1995 (in which 11...a6?! 12 \$\documentum{\pmathbb{\gamma}}{11...a6?!}\$ 12 \$\documentum{\pmathbb{\gamma}}{11...a6?!}\$ 13 \$\documentum{\pmathbb{\gamma}}{12...a6?!}\$ 14 \$\documentum{\pmathbb{\gamma}}{11...a6?!}\$ 15 \$\documentum{\pmathbb{\gamma}}{12...a6?!}\$ 16 \$\documentum{\pmathbb{\gamma}}{12...a6?!}\$ 17 \$\documentum{\pmathbb{\gamma}}{12...a6?!}\$ 19 \$\documentum{\quadba\gamma}{12...a6?!}\$ 19 \$\documentum{\quadba\gamma}{12...a6?!}\$ 19 \$\documentum{\quadba\gamma}{12...a6?!}\$ 19 \$\documentum{\quadba\gamma}{12...a6?!}\$ 19 \$\documentum{\quadba\gamma}{12...a6?!}\$ 10 \$\documentum{\quadba\gamma}{12.. ₩e8 14 ②g1 e5 15 h3 was good for White) but thought at first that it allowed 12 h4 g4 13 Øg5!?. In fact, however, this just seems bad - 13...hxg5 14 hxg5 豐xg5 15 exf5 exf5 16 罩h2 鼻h6 unpins the knight and ties down the queen's rook for long enough for Black to defend and apparently win fairly handily. Obviously that isn't the end of the question, but if White is reduced to 12 exf5 exf5 13 h3 then one would think Black must have a decent position, for example 13...2xg3 14 fxg3 c5!? would be sensible.


This can of course lead to Line B3, but here I show only two White ideas that don't.



5...∕abd7 6 c4

6 &d3 still hopes to meet ...g5/...\(2\)h5 by \(2\)fd2 forcing a premature exchange on g3, but now Black can play 6...g5 7 \(2\)g3 \(2\)h5 8 \(2\)fd2 \(2\)df6, still refusing to exchange, as in K.Sasikiran-P.Kiriakov, Internet (blitz) 2004, which went on 9 c4 \(2\)g7 10 \(2\)c3 a6 11 \(\)gc2 b6 12 0-0-0 \(2\)b7 13 d5!? Black could certainly consider accepting this pawn sacrifice, but instead 13...\(2\)xg3 14 hxg3 \(\)ge7 15 dxe6 fxe6 16 \(2\)g6+ \(2\)d8 d8 led to a most unclear struggle - Black's next few moves will include ...\(2\)c8c8-b8, and if White doesn't find some way to get to grips meantime he will probably end up worse.

6...g5 7 ≜g3 ົ2h5 8 亿3 ≜g7



9 &e2

This quiet plan, aiming to exchange the bishops with £f3 should Black fianchetto, seems the most logical to me. 9 $ext{@c2}$, aiming for queenside castling, was played in A.Korotylev-P.Maletin, Russia 2004. Black's bold 9...0-0 led to a complex game after 10 0-0-0 f5 11 £d3 $ext{@c7}$ 12 h4 g4 13 $ext{@cg1}$ c5 (always thematic: the g7-bishop is Black's main trump) 14 $ext{@cg2}$ $ext{@cx}$ 3 15 fxg3 and now the excellent 15... $ext{@castle base}$ However, Roiz's 9... $ext{@ccastle castle castle$


9...⊮e7

This seems better than 9...b6 in view of White's intentions.

10 ∕2d2 ∕2xg3 11 hxg3 c5

Maybe 11...e5!? here.

12 公b3 0-0 13 g4 公b6 14 0-0 f5 15 a4 a5 16 營d3 息d7 17 息f3 息c6




with equality, V.Sergeev-B.Chatalbashev, Balaton 2002. This was a difficult game where both sides had options on almost every move: if White wants to get something from the Torre in the original move order this might be a good place for him to look, in my opinion.

1 d4 分f6 2 分f3 d5 3 臭g5

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 d5 3 🎎 g5

Players who intend to defend any kind of Queen's Gambit Declined and start with ... 266 either to play a Nimzo if possible or merely in the hope White will play 263 early to avoid a Nimzo should certainly go for ...d5 as soon as 263 is played, for this order essentially prevents White from getting a 'proper' Torre. I won't beat around the bush here: after 1 d4 266 2 263 d5, the move 3 25 is ineffective.' (Burgess).

3...€\e4




Certainly! Unlike the Tromp, White no longer has the option to remove this beast with f2-f3. Moves that leave the g5-bishop to be taken have been amazingly popular now, but one has to draw the line somewhere, so:

B: 4 &f4

A)

1 d4 ∅f6 2 ∅f3 d5 3 ዿg5 ∅e4 4 ዿh4 c5




Taking advantage of the h4-bishop's absence.

5 e3

The most popular move but not the best: White has to start thinking about equality and either 5 c3 or 5 dxc5 is better. 5 c3 cxd4 6 cxd4 2c6 7 e3 b6 8 b3 xb3 (J.Simon-P.Acs, San Agustin 1998) or 7 2c3 b6 8 e3 (J.Costa-E.Dizdarevic, Biel 1989) and now 8...e5!, are both already a little better for Black.


5 dxc5 is the most reliable;



now J.Timman-A.Shırov, Wijk aan Zee 2001, went 5...②c6 6 e3 g6 7 ②bd2 ②xc5 8 ②b3 ②g7 9 c3 (9 ②xc5 ¥a5+10 c3 ¥xc5 11 ¥b3 0-0 was equal in A.Kharitonov-Y.Yakovich, Leeuwarden

1997) 9... De4 10 2d3 0-0 (Timman repeated this position later when 10... 2g4 11 0-0 b6 12 h3 2xf3 13 xf3 De5 14 e2 Dxd3 15 xd3 e6 was completely equal in J.Timman-L.Fressinet, Bundesliga 2001) 11 2xe4 (perhaps White shouldn't do this) 11...dxe4 12 xd8 xd8 13 Dfd4 De5! 14 2xe7 2e8 15 2a3 Dd3+ 16 e2 b6 17 f4 a5 18 Dc1 b5! 19 Dxb5 2a6 20 c4, when Black proved to have enough for his two pawns.

5...**₩b6**




6 ₩c1?

The most popular move, but really in view of the main column line White has to play something else. I'm sure both 6 ②bd2 ②xd2 7 豐xd2 豐xb2 8 罩d1 e6 9 **2**e2 c4 (M.Donk-P.Wells, Lost Boys Open, Antwerp 1997) and 6 ©c3 (a pet of the Chinese GM Ye Rongguang and therefore probably better than it looks) 6...2xc3 7 bxc3 **b**2 8 **b**1 **xc3**+ 9 ②d2 e6 10 &b5+ &d7 (M.S.Hansen-L.B.Hansen, Danish Championship 1995) objectively leave White a pawn down for more or less nothing, but the text just looks grim.

6...cxd4 7 exd4

7 2xd4 Wh6 8 2f3 g5 9 2g3 2xg3 10 fxg3, with a miserable position for White, is a typical twist.

7...g5!



Some surprisingly strong players have been willing to play White here - Jan Timman, for a start - and some surprisingly strong players haven't played this move, but after it White is extremely pressed even to emerge from the opening in one piece. 8 2g3 g4 wins a pawn for nothing; 8 ②xg5 \hbbare h6! 9 \hbbaref{h}6! 10 ②h3 ②xh3 11 👑xh6 ②xh6 12 gxh3 \$c1 was already virtually winning for Black in R.Phillips-J.Szabolcsi, Berlin 1996; and 8 2xg5 2xg5 leaves White a most unpleasant choice between 9 2xg5 2h6 and 9 ₩xg5 ₩xb2 10 ₩xd5 ₩c1+ (or 10... wxa1, I dare say, but why bother?) 11 \$\ding{\phi}e2 \Qc6 12 \$\ding{\psi}c4 \ding{\phi}g7, when clearly the opening has been a disaster for White.


C2)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 d5 3 ₤g5 ②e4 4 ₤f4

More sensible.


4...c5

Again the best.



5 e3


White can now play this without too much fear of losing horribly in the opening, which is nice. 5 c3 cxd4 6 cxd4 \(\frac{1}{2}\) c6 7 ②c3 e6 8 e3?! (8 罩c1 leaves Black only slightly better) 8...g5 9 2g3 h5 left White already struggling, if not actually lost, in A.Webster-Y.Yakovich, Hastings 1993, while 5 dxc5 20c6 6 c3 (6 e3 f6 7 c4 e5 8 êg3 êe6 was equal for Black at the very least in K.Hulak-G.Sosonko, Wijk aan 9 🖾 b3 🖾 e4 10 🙎 d3 e5! 11 🚉 xe4 dxe4 12 **劉**xd8+ **\$**xd8 13 **②**g5 **\$**e7 14 **\$**g3 f5 with advantage to Black showed the difference from 4 &h4 in S.Bartha-J.Pinter, Paris 1990.



5...₩b6 6 ₩c1 ②c6

Of course 6...cxd4 7 exd4 g5? 8 2xb8 is no longer good, but Black is still doing nicely.

7 c3 f6!?



7... £f5 among others is fine, but this unbalancing move of Alexander Graf's is the trickiest.


8 <u></u> **≜** e2

White is already faced with a difficult decision. 8 dxc5 wxc5 and ...e5 has to be a little better for Black. 8 2d3 g5 9 2g3 cxd4! (9...h5 10 dxc5) 10 2xd4 (10 exd4 h5 is the same story) 10...2c5 11 2c2 e5 12 2xc6 wxc6 is also pleasant for Black with his big centre. 8 2bd2 might be best, although clearly after 8...cxd4 9 exd4 e5 10 2e3 2xd2 11 wxd2 e4 12 2g1 2d6 Black has at least equalized.

8...g5 9 \(\hat{L}\)g3 h5 10 h3

After this White must be worse, but I'm not sure he had anything better.

10...**②xg3** 11 fxg3 **≜**f5 12 **②bd2** e6 13 dxc5 **≜**xc5 14 **②**d4




This was the game E.Kounalakis-A.Graf, Korinthos 2001, and now 14... 2xd4 15 exd4 2xd6 leaves Black with a stable advantage.

Conclusion

It seems to me that the Torre is downright bad against 2...d5. In its traditional 2...e6 3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 form the system shown here allows Black active and interesting play. Perhaps this accounts for the popularity of the Tromp move order and the growing interest in the white system shown in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Hebden Torre




1 d4 @f6 2 @f3 e6 3 c3

3 c3 is the Hebden Torre. Mark Hebden was by no means the first to play the move, but he and the late Tony Miles have been far and away the most devoted GM practitioners, so I'm going to name it after him. The move 3 c3 looks like a remarkably feeble effort, but actually White simply wants to avoid the system described against the conventional Torre in the previous chapter. When compared to the move order 3 ♠g5 c5 4 e3, White also hopes that he may be able to go e2-e4 in a single turn.

White may also intend with 3 c3 to play the London system with £f4, but in that case the move has no independent significance, so I have considered it only in connection with 4 £g5. Of course if Black wishes to defend the Torre with the ...d5, ...e6 variations, then he is not inconvenienced at all. To fit in with our Tromp repertoire, though, Black will probably want to aim for the position after 1 d4 £16 2 £13 e6 3 c3 b6 4 £g5 £b7 5 £16d2 £e7 6 e3 h6 7 £h4 c5,

which was discussed in Chapter 1. There are some move order issues on the way, though, and this chapter is devoted to the tricks White can employ to stop Black reaching his target position. It's worth pointing out that for a long time Mark Hebden would not allow this position, which in its own way is as good a tribute to the methods presented here both in the Tromp and Torre chapters as anything I might say.

3...b6 4 🚉 g5 🚊 b7




5 Øbd2

Renewing the threat of e2-e4. After c3

White is hardly going to develop this piece anywhere else, so other moves are merely less flexible.

5...**≜e**7

Really Black's immediate choices only involve the right moment to play ...h6. The immediate 5...h6 6 £xf6 £xf6 7 e4 g5 now is Mickey Adams' invariable choice, but I'm not sure I like this combination of ...g5 and an early ...b6, ...£b7. To me it makes more sense to wait for e2-e3 before playing ...h6, since if White does go in for £xf6 he usually wants to place his two pawns abreast at e4 and d4 as part of his compensation for giving up the two bishops.




Besides 6 e3 (C), there are two other moves White has played now with reasonable frequency:

A: 6 h4!? B: 6 營c2 C: 6 e3

A) 1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 c3 b6 4 ዿg5 ዿb7 5 ②bd2 ዿe7 6 h4!?

This is, or was, Mark Hebden's patent. It doesn't look as though it can really be a good move, but he did very well with it before he gave it up.




6...h6

A logical reply in my view.

7 &f4

Always Hebden's choice. After 7 \(\tilde{\tilde{\tilde{2}}} \) xf6 \(\tilde{\tilde{2}} \) xf6 \(\tilde{8} \) xf6 8 e4 Black has a variety of methods: the cool 8...0-0 9 \(\tilde{2} \) d3 \(\tilde{2} \) e7 10 \(\tilde{2} \) e2 c5 is one; another is 8...d5 9 e5 \(\tilde{2} \) e7 10 \(\tilde{2} \) d3 c5 11 h5 \(\tilde{2} \) c6 12 0-0 with a pretty decent French-type position for Black; he is probably wise to delay castling for the moment, but 12...c4 and 13...b5 is certainly a possibility.




7...c5

This is basically a London system in which Black has the extra (weakening?!)

...h6, while White has suddenly taken it into his head to play h4?!. This can't really be a good deal for White, which is no doubt why Hebden has given the line up (he now plays 6 e3).


8 e3 2c6



9 a3

White wants to meet ...cxd4 with cxd4 without being annoyed by ... ②b4; 9 ②d3 cxd4 10 exd4 0-0 11 0-0 d6 12 ¥e2 ≦e8 is a type of position familiar from the London system: Black will play ... ¥d7 and perhaps ...a6 and ...b5.

9...0-0 10 h5




10...**∮**d5

Black might very well have considered 10...cxd4 11 cxd4 d6 here. The constant

threat of ...e5 would have made it very hard for White to mass his forces for a kingside attack, and without that the pawn on h5 is merely an embarrassment. I think Black would stand better then.

11 **Qh2** f5 12 **Qc4 Q**f6 13 **Qf4 Ye8** 14 **Qe5 Qxe5** 15 dxe5 **Qd5** 16 **Yf3 Qc6** 17 **Yh3 Qxf4** 18 exf4



M.Hebden-R.Britton, British Rapidplay Championship, Bradford 2002. Here 18...d5 19 2e2 2b5 would have left Black with decidedly the better chances.

A2)

1 d4 夕f6 2 夕f3 e6 3 c3 b6 4 皇g5 身b7 5 夕bd2 皇e7 6 豐c2


Logical enough: White wants to take advantage of his move order to force through e2-e4.

6...h6 7 &h4

White doesn't seem ever to have tried 7 2xf6 2xf6 8 e4, though this looks sensible. Black might play 8...d5 again as in Line A; whether h4 or \$\mathbb{w}\$c2 is more useful in such a position is open to debate (at any rate if White's going to go e4-e5; one advantage of \$\mathbb{w}\$c2 might be to make exd5 an option).

7...c5

This looks the most logical to me, raising the spectre of an open c-file.




8 e4

This doesn't lead anywhere: White could try 8 dxc5 bxc5 9 e4 d5 10 exd5 exd5 11 &d3, although I don't think it's anything: Black can develop with ...0-0, ... \(\tilde{D}\) bd7, ... \(\tilde{A}\) e8, ... \(\tilde{B}\) b6 and ... \(\tilde{A}\) ad8.

8...cxd4 9 2xd4

This is hardly going to bring White an advantage, but 9 cxd4 g5 10 \(\&\)g3 \(\otimes\)c6 leaves the white queen a bit embarrassed, especially since ...g4 and ...\(\otimes\)xd4 is also in the air, for example 11 \(\otimes\)a4 a6, or 11 \(\otimes\)d1 g4.

9...0-0 10 Ձe2 ②c6 11 ②xc6 Ձxc6 12 0-0 ∰c7 13 f4 d6




This is completely equal – in fact I suspect most would take Black for choice. T.Parameswaran-A.Kunte, Goodricke Open, Calcutta 1997 was swiftly drawn after 14 \(\Delta 13 \) \(\Delta fe8 \) 15 f5 e5 16 \(\Delta ad1 \) \(\Delta d8 \) 17 \(\Delta fe1 \).

A3) 1 d4 외f6 2 외f3 e6 3 c3 b6 4 皇g5 皇b7 5 외bd2 皇e7 6 e3 h6 7 皇xf6

Obviously 7 2h4 c5 allows Black his objective. You would think that 2xf6 has little force with e4 in one go no longer available and with Black still having ...d5 available, but grandmasters do sometimes go in for the position after

7...≜xf6 8 ≜d3 c5 9 0-0 4\c6




White can try a few ideas here. 10 De4 De7 11 Dc2 d5 12 Dg3 0-0 13 De5 Dd6 was agreed drawn in J.Hodgson-J.Benjamin, San Francisco 1998: after 14 f4 a6 Black can meet any Dd3 with ...f5 and has no problems; he can create enough distraction on the queenside fast enough that a g4 hack isn't feasible. Most popular though is

10 營e2 營c7

11 2 a6 now was played in the gloriously-named game E.Limp-R.Disconzi

da Silva, Rio de Janeiro 2003, in which 11...\$\textcap{\textsuperscape{2}}\text{xa6}\$ 12 \$\textsuperscape{2}\text{xa6}\$ 0-0 13 \$\textsuperscape{2}\text{ac8}\$ 14 g3 \$\textsuperscape{2}\text{be}\$ 8 15 \$\textsuperscape{2}\text{fd1}\$ d5 16 a3 \$\text{gc7}\$ was already beginning to favour Black, who won a thematic game after meeting b4 with ...c4, then arranging ...e5; dxe5, \$\text{dxe5}\$ xe5!; \$\text{dxe5}\$, \$\text{dxe5}\$ xe5 when the d3-hole kept White's pieces passive and proved his downfall in the end. Burgess, however, approved White's play in A.Sygulski-Z.Ksieski, Polish Championship 1982, which went

11 罩ad1 0-0 12 臭b1 d5 13 罩fe1



when Burgess gives White the edge.


In both games from this position, however, Black has gratuitously fallen for the twist ...e5; e4!. This favours White since pawn captures on d4 lose material to exd5, and ...dxe4; ②xe4 embarrassingly hits f6. If Black instead continues sensibly with a move like 13... If d8 or even 13...a5, preparing to molest the White queen with ... 2a6, I don't believe he has any problems. Indeed to my mind it would be strange if White could hope for anything after giving up the bishop pair without getting more space in the centre to compensate him, and without managing a ②e5/f4 bunk-up either.

Conclusion

Given the recommended repertoire the Hebden Torre isn't significant. It avoids our specific anti-Torre lines but so does the Tromp move order. The variations shown here are not dangerous, as we can see from the fact that the man himself now accepts the transposition to the main line Torre positions from Chapter 1.

CHAPTER FIVE

The London System



1 d4 \$\angle\$f6 2 \$\angle\$f3 e6 3 \$\mathbb{2}\$f4 (and 1 d4 d5 2 \$\angle\$f3 \$\angle\$f6 3 \$\mathbb{2}\$f4)


It would be silly not to be honest — this is not the sharpest opening chess has to offer. White's system is immensely solid and I'm afraid Black just doesn't have a sound aggressive option. These openings do exist: the only reaction really is to hunker down, recall the Russian mantra that it is easier to win from an equal position than a bad one, and resolve to make like Capablanca if necessary. There are many ways for Black to play, but the main danger is not failing to equalize, but trying too hard.

Despite those wise words, though, I am providing two solutions: Line A is slightly more unbalancing; Line B is safer.

The London System also arises after 1 d4 d5 2 2 f3 2 f6 3 £f4, which is covered in Line C (although Black can also employ B from this position). Also dealt with in Line C is the sequence 1 d4 d5 2 £f4 which won the British Championship for Jonathan Rowson in 2004.

A: 1 d4 �16 2 �13 e6 3 £14 c5 B: 1 d4 �16 2 �13 e6 3 £14 d5 C: 1 d4 d5 2 �13 �16 3 £14 c5

A) 1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 Ձf4 c5




White will invariably now support the d-pawn; the choice is between:

A11: 4 c3 A12: 4 e3

A11)

1 d4 2f6 2 2f3 e6 3 2f4 c5 4 c3

cxd4 5 cxd4




5...b5!?

An interesting move recommended by *ECO* and by Andrew Martin. Black takes a little space on the queenside and ensures that he will have good squares for all his pieces.

It is also possible to play 5... \$\mathbb{\mod}\mathbb{\mtx\mod}\max\m Now 6 Wc1 d5 will probably lead to the variation of the Exchange Slav which runs 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 cxd5 cxd5 4 2 f3 2f6 5 2c3 2c6 6 2f4 e6, save that Black has played ... \$\mathbb{W}\$b6 (which on the whole is part of his plan of ... \(\hat{\pm} e^7\), ...\$\d7, ...0-0, ...\begin{align*} \begin{align*} \ White has played the ridiculous move ₩c1, which is just a loss of tempo. 6 ₩b3 is more usual, after which 6... ₩xb3 7 axb3 \$\overline{Q}\$c6 8 \$\overline{Q}\$c3 \$\overline{\pi}\$b4 is completely equal, and I suppose Black can point to the doubled b-pawns as offering him some prospect of obtaining a tiny edge, but one has to draw the line at some point.

6 e3 a6 7 **û**d3 **û**b7 8 **②**bd2 **②**c6 9 h3 **₩**b6 10 0-0 **û**e7


This is too natural a sequence to need much comment, and Black has equalized comfortably.



M.Knezevic-D.Velimirovic, Belgrade 1978 now went 11 2e5 2b4 12 2b1 d6 13 2d3 2c6 14 a3?! 0-0 15 2g5 2a5 16 2f4 g6: White's play has not been inspired but that's probably because White didn't have any inspiring options; in the game White now threw himself into an unsound kingside attack and lost rather miserably.

A12)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 ②f4 c5 4 e3 White's normal move.




4....皇e7

There are some quite tricky move order questions here:

a) 4... \(\frac{1}{2}\)c6 will probably lead to Line B.

- b) 4... \$\mathrew\$b6 is a main line move played by dozens of grandmasters over the years, but I'm not totally wild about Black's prospects after 5 \$\mathrew\$a3 (which no one ever plays), for example:
- b1) 5... ₩xb2 6 Øb5 Ød5 7 a3 is supposed to be bad for Black, and anyway White has an immediate draw with 7 Zb1
- b2) 5...d5 6 ②b5 ②a6 7 a4 also has a slightly dubious reputation (both these lines are normally reached after 5 ②c3).
- b3) 5...cxd4 6 🕏 b5 🕏 a6 7 exd4 is certainly possible but I don't care greatly for it.
- c) 4...b6 is an alternative (and more popular) move order to reach the same set-up as the column, but it seems to me that the move in the text is the most accurate. White has racked up a few wins after 4...b6 5 2c3 cxd4 6 2b5 2d5 (or 6...d6) 7 2xd4!,




and it is not clear to me at all how Black should meet this idea. The text, however, has no drawback that I can see. **5 h3**

Whether Black is actually threatening 5... 6h5 is a little unclear. More White players than not prefer to prevent it,

though. Two examples of White choosing not to do so are 5 c3 h5 6 kg3 hxg3 7 hxg3 d5 8 he5 hd7 9 hb5 d6 10 hxd7 kxd7 11 ha4 a6 12 kxd7+ hxd7 13 hxd7+ hxd7 when Black has anything that is going (J.Ratolistka-G.Tunik, Ceske Budejovice 1995), and 5 hd2 h5 6 kxb8 kxb8 xb8 7 dxc5 ha5 8 hd3 hxc5 9 0-0 (K.Volke-A.Kapengut, Kecskemet 1989), when Black now played the slightly obscure 9...g6, although 9...hf6 was also simple and good — White is going to miss his dark-squared bishop.

5 c4 does not force Black to choose between a £f4 QGD and a £f4 QID: 5...cxd4 6 exd4 d5 is neither (in the QGD with £f4 White does not allow Black to get in ...c5 and...cxd4 but meets ...c5 with dxc5) and is not particularly good for White, whose f4 bishop is not well placed for an IQP position.

5...0-0 6 **€**bd2




6...cxd4

There isn't really any significance to the move order around these parts. I have shown an early ...cxd4 in order to avoid the reply cxd4, although that is hardly fearsome. Black may also consider ... 2 a6 in some move orders, but I've chosen to assume he doesn't care to.

7 exd4 b6 8 单d3 单b7 9 0-0 d6 10 c3

So ineptly are White's pieces placed for an IQP that even with a tempo extra 10 c4 d5 is very acceptable for Black.

10... Dbd7 11 Ie1 Ie8



This is something of a tabiya: it seems to produce either a quick draw or a heavy manoeuvring struggle. The position is similar to one that arises from the Colle, save that White has played £f4 and h3.


12 a4

Commonest. Alternatively:

- a) 12 we2 a6 13 De4 (this never does much) 13...Dxe4 14 2xe4 2xe4 15 wxe4 Df6 16 dd3 b5 was A.Jakab-P.Horvath, Budapest 2004. Black's positive ideas in this line are either a minority attack with ...b5-b4 or to set his central pawns in motion with ...e5 and here he is reasonably placed for the former.
- b) 12 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}c2\)\(\tilde{D}f8\) 13 \(\tilde{D}c4\)\(\tilde{D}xe4\) 14 \(\tilde{D}xe4\)\(\tilde{D}xe4\) 15 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}xe4\)\(\delta 5\) 16 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}e3\)\(\tilde{D}g6\)\(17\)\(\tilde{D}g3\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe5\)\(\tilde{D}xe4\)\(\tilde{D}xe4\)\(\tilde{D}xe4\)\(\tilde{D}xe4\)\(\tilde{D}xe4\)\(\tilde{D}xe5


ing is a draw of course, but I would prefer to be Black.

c) Tigran Petrosian, as so often, had a unique plan in T.Petrosian-I.Csom, Vilnius 1978, with 12 \(\hat{2}g3\) a6 13 a4 \(\hat{2}f8\) (13...\(\hat{2}c7\) is also played) 14 \(\hat{2}c2\) h6 15 b4!?, but after 15...\(\hat{2}c6\)



he obviously didn't think much of it, since he played 16 b5 and offered a draw. 16 c4 is optically impressive but in fact doesn't achieve much after 16... ac8. If the queen moves then ... a5 is annoying (White needs the c4-square for his pieces in such a structure), while 17 a5 b5 leads nowhere special after either 18 c5 2d5 or 18 b3 bxc4 19 2xc4 d5.

12...a6




13 **②**f1

A tactical turn to avoid was illustrated by M.Petrovic-N.Bojkovic, Yugoslav Women's Championship 1993, which went 13 2h2 2h8 14 4b3 2c6 15 c4 d7 16 2c2 (a slightly random-looking collection of moves on White's part) and now 16...b5?! 17 axb5 axb5 18 d5! 4xa1 19 4xa1 exd5 20 cxb5 2xb5 21 2d4 saw Black struggling a bit to achieve a draw; better was to prepare ...b5 with 16...4c28 (so that ...2c4 should be possible at the end of this sequence).

13...臭f8 14 臭g5 營c7 15 公3d2

Exactly what David Bronstein had in mind with this move is not clear to me, but I am far from being able to say what he should have done instead.


15...h6 16 &h4 e5



showed Black's other plan in action in D.Bronstein-A.Vyzmanavin, Copenhagen 1991. Now 17 2e3 e4 18 2f1 d5 19 2b3 left a sharp and balanced position in which 19...2d6, forcing 2xf6, was a tempting alternative to the game's 19....4d6.

B) 1 d4 Øf6 2 Øf3 e6 3 £f4 d5 4 e3


c5



5 c3

Occasionally White plays 5 ②c3 when 5...a6 is the easiest, for example 6 ②c2 ②c6 7 0-0 ②c7 8 ဩc1 0-0 9 h3 b5 10 ③cf1 ②cb7 11 ②c5 ဩc8 12 a4 b4 and Black took over the initiative in C.Barlocco-M.Godena, Bratto 2004; White was a little more supine than needs be here, perhaps, but it is clear that the knight on c3 is just in the wrong place.

5...9c6



A natural, solid line: the invariable choice of a certain type of positional player. Black is going to oppose the f4-bishop with ... d6. After an exchange of

the dark-squared bishops his remaining bishop is a little less active than White's, but he has good control of the centre and assuming he can arrange ...e5 in he will be able to get his bishop active.

White has a few moves here:


B1)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 🕸 f4 d5 4 e3 c5 5 c3 🖄 c6 6 🖄 bd2

The commonest move.

6…≜d6


Black continues with the plan.



7 臭g3

This is the most popular move, although White has tried a host of alternatives.


- b) 7 2d3 2xf4 8 exf4 is not effective here (if White is going to allow the doubled f-pawns he wants to be able to play dxc5). 8...cxd4 9 2xd4 (9 cxd4 2b6 10 2b3 a5 leaves White without an adequate reply as ...a4; 2c5 2xd4 is threatened) 9...2xd4 10 cxd4 2b6 11 2b3 2d7 (11...a5 is now less effective as ...a4 is met by 2c5) is nice for Black, H.Wirthensohn-J.Schwalfenberg, Baden 2001.
- c) 7 2xd6 \widetilde xd6 seems to be thought a little compliant.



R.Schlindwein-J.Timman, Walldorf 1998 went on 8 \$\overline{\pi}\$b5 (this is quite a common move in this system, aimed against ...e5; 8 2d3 0-0 9 0-0 e5 10 dxc5 ₩xc5 11 e4 &g4 and 10 dxe5 ②xe5 11 ②xe5 \web xe5 12 \@f3 \web e7 are comfortable too) 8...0-0 9 0-0 &d7 10 &xc6 (this really is a little meek since Black's next move was surely going to be ...a6 anyway) 10... 2xc6 11 2e5 2d7 12 f4 f6 13 ②xd7 2xd7 and White found like many before him that the way to draw with a stronger player is not to make a series of exchanges into a slightly inferior position.

d) 7 De5 is really the crucial move, in the sense that it is the only one which

might cross Black's plans, but Black has the firepower to win control of e5.




7... 世c7 8 ②df3 (8 ②xc6 ②xf4 9 ②xa7 〖xa7 10 exf4 cxd4 11 cxd4 豐xf4 12 ②f3 0-0 is perhaps a touch better for Black — Ftacnik) 8... ②d7 9 ②xd7 ②xd7 10 ②xd6 豐xd6 11 ②b5 0-0 12 0-0 f6 13 c4 cxd4 14 ②xd4 〖fd8 was all a bit equal in P.Matovic-A.Kovacevic, Vrnjacka Banja 1999.

e) 7 \(\textstyle{\textstyle{2}}\)g5 can hardly be critical, although Black may find himself in a variation of the Torre he didn't necessarily want if he is later forced into ...\(\textstyle{2}\)e7. Play continues with 7...0-0 and now:

e1) 8 wc2 h6 9 h4 (8 wc2 was directed against 9...e5, when White intends to go 10 dxe5 2xe5 11 2xe5 xe5 12 f3 we7 13 0-0-0 and perhaps c4 next) 9...e7 10 2e2 b6 11 d1 2b7 12 2g3 d6 13 0-0 xg3 14 hxg3 we7 was fine for Black in D.Bronstein-R.Dzindzichashvili, USSR Championship, Leningrad 1971; Bronstein's next effort of 15 2e5 looks a little uncalled for to me; after 15...2xe5 16 dxe5 2d7 17 f4 f6 the weakened white kingside became exposed and the great man was very fortunate to survive.

e2) 8 &d3 h6 (this hasn't been played as far as I can see but I think it ought to be) 9 &h4 e5 (this plan fits in better with Black's play to date than ... &e7 in my opinion) 10 dxe5 &xe5 11 &xe5 &xe5 12 &f3 &c7 13 &c2 &e6 14 &d3 g6.



This position was reached in P.Harikrishna-E.Ghaem Maghami, Calcutta 2001 but without the moves ...h6; Ah4. In that position White has a few dangerous attacking ideas: besides Tsesarsky's 14 h4 Black can also lose quite quickly if he's not careful after 14 b5, e.g. 14...b6 15 44 d6 16 h4 e7 17 c5 5 5 8c8 18 24. In the game, though, 14 0-0 6 7 15 3 ad1 h6 16 4 6 7 was comfortable for Black and the same position might very well arise after 8...h6.


After that lengthy diversion, I return to $7 ext{ } extstyle g3$.

7...**豐e**7

White's system demands more respect than initially appears, and in my opinion this is the most accurate move. Commoner are both 7...2xg3 8 hxg3 \$\mathbb{\text{w}}\$d6 and 7...0-0, but in the former case I'm not keen on 9 \$\mathbb{\text{2}}\$b5 \$\mathbb{\text{2}}\$d7 10 \$\mathbb{\text{w}}\$c2 \$\mathbb{\text{2}}\$c8 11 g4 (K.Arkell-G.Timoscenko, Metz 2000), and in the latter on 8 \$\mathbb{\text{2}}\$b5 \$\mathbb{\text{w}}\$e7 9 \$\mathbb{\text{2}}\$xc6

bxc6 10 **a**4 cxd4 11 cxd4 **a**d7 12 **a**xd6 **a**7 wxd6 13 0-0 (J.Nogueiras-A.Kunte, Calvia Olympiad 2004).


8 🛭 e5



8 \$\delta\$5 now is smoothly met with 8...\$\delta\$d7 when 9 0-0 0-0 10 \$\delta\$a4 \$\delta\$xg3 11 hxg3 a6 12 \$\delta\$xc6 \$\delta\$xc6 13 \$\delta\$a3 \$\delta\$d7 is at least equal for Black (Z.Nikolic-I.Morovic Fernandez, Pancevo 1985), while 8 \$\delta\$d3 0-0 9 \$\delta\$e2 e5 9 dxe5 \$\delta\$xe5 \$\delta\$xe5 \$\delta\$xe5 \$\delta\$xe5 \$\delta\$xe5 \$\delta\$xe5 \$(M.M\delta]ler-V.Kupreichik, Goch 1999) also enables Black to achieve his positional goal and equalize.

8...0-0 9 **\$d3**

\$\\\\$b5\$ is pointless once \$\\\\$De5\$ has been played; 9...\$\\\\$d7\$ is equal.




9...9d7


Black can also opt for the immediate capture 9... 2xe5 10 dxe5 2d7 with a quite different style of game, but the text is thematic.

10 0-0

Much more common is 10 f4, when I prefer the temerarious 10...f6 to the usual 10...f5.



10 **当**h5 g6 and 10 **②**df3 f6, meanwhile, achieve little, while if White plays 10 **②**xc6 bxc6 11 **当**a4 Black can choose between the obscure and perhaps quite reasonable gambit 11...e5!?, and 11...**②**b7, when 12 **②**xd6 **当**xd6 13 **当**a3 **当**e7 14 **②**b3? **当**g5! is an important trick, so that after 14 0-0 Black has time for the move 14...**罩**fe8.




This forced sequence produced an interesting and unbalanced position in F.Bistric-M.Mchedlishvili, Bled Olympiad 2002.

B2) 1 d4 4\(f)6 2 4\(f)6 3 \) \(f)6 4 d5 4 e3 \) c5 5 c3 4\(f)6 6 \) \(f)6 d3

White's remaining moves are less accurate, and since the coverage of 6 Dbd2 tries to cover the main ideas in the opening I take other tries in less detail.

6...**≜**d6




7 🙎g3 0-0

In comparison to 6 ②bd2, White has simply deprived himself of the ②b5 option.

8 **②bd2** ₩e7


9 dxc5 axc5 10 e4



Note 'a' to White's 7th move in Line B1 was a similar idea but Black's ... e7 is not perfectly adapted for this structure change. White now obtained the advantage in J.Magem Badals-J.de la Villa Garcia, Spanish Championship 1990 after 10...dxe4 11 ②xe4 ②xe4 12 &xe4 e5 13 0-0 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}}\) 14 \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}\) 15 \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}\) a4, when Black saw no alternative to 15... xf3 16 âxf3 ac8, leaving White clearly better. It looks as though Black didn't play very well here, and perhaps he didn't, but it's not easy to improve upon his play. White already seems to have the edge at move 12, for example 12...\(\mathbb{I}\)d8 13 \(\mathbb{U}\)c2 h6 14 0-0 Qd7 15 罩fe1 with decidedly greater freedom of action for White.

The most natural idea is 10...e5. De la Villa must have had something fairly serious against this, as in such positions ...e5 is always the reply Black wants to make to e4 if he can. Indeed, 11 exd5 ②xd5 (11...e4? 12 0-0 is bad after 12...exf3 13 dxc6 fxg2 14 ၗe1 or 12...exd3 13 dxc6 bxc6 14 ၗe1 兔e6 15 ②e5) 12 ¥e2 ၗe8 13 0-0-0 (13 ೩xh7+ wins a pawn but gives Black too much play) 13...②f6 14 ၗhe1 gives White at least a slight advantage.

Another possibility is the rather cheeky 10... 20h5.




I don't see how White can take much advantage of this, for example 11 we2 2xg3 12 hxg3 h6 13 2b3 2b6 14 exd5 exd5 15 wxe7 is equal, while 14 0-0-0 2e8 15 g4 a5 produces an extremely sharp game with chances for both sides.

Finally, back at move nine Black might consider 9...\$\documen.2xg3 10 hxg3 e5. Then 11 e4 \documenxxc5 seems normal, and now 12 exd5 \documenxxd5 or 12 \documenxxdc 2d4 is nothing for White. Critical is 12 \document2b3 \documents
e7! 13 exd5 e4 with some perplexing complications. It seems to me that Black has quite reasonable play after 14 dxc6 exd3+ 15 \documents{eff} \documents{eff} \documents{eff}, while 14 0-0 \documents{eff} d8 15 dxc6 \documents{exd3} 16 cxb7 \documenxxdc xb7 17 \documents{eff} 2 \documents{eff} 2g4 is downright dangerous for White. But all of these ideas need tests: be warned

though that this is not an easy line for Black to counter off the cuff.

B3)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 🕸 f4 d5 4 e3 c5 5 c3 🖄 c6 6 🖄 e5



Committal, of course, but White knows how he wants to play and gets on with it.

The same recipe. Now 8 2d2 0-0 9 2df3 could have arisen after 9 2b5 in note 'd' to White's 7th move in Line B1, but 9...cxd4 10 exd4 2e4 followed by ...f6 is nice for Black. In Z.Pakleza-M.Krystoflan, Zakopane 2001, White instead tried 8 2df 9 2xd7 2xd7 10 2xd6 2xd6 11 2d2 0-0 12 0-0, which was also equal.

B4)


1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 🚉 f4 d5 4 e3 c5 5 c3 🖄 c6 6 h3

I would say this was a clueless move if it hadn't been played by Galkin. Black should go ahead as usual with

6...≜d6

White's best now is probably 7 dxc5 aiming to reach note 'a' to White's 7th

move in Line B1. In T.Reich-'Raluy2', playchess.com 2004 he instead tried



7 夕e5 0-0 8 夕d2 豐c7 9 夕df3

and now Black half-demonstrated why the missing tempo mattered with

9...②e4 10 **≜**e2


but then for some reason refrained from the obvious 10...cxd4 11 cxd4 f6 12 axc6 axf4 13 exf4 bxc6, which leaves White struggling.

Before making Line B your sole defence to the London, be warned about one move-order point. There are players who consider 3 £f4 a bit too daring, and prefer 3 c3. If Black is aiming for Line B, then he needs to play either 3...d5 or 3...c5. The trouble with 3...d5 is that 4 âg5 is a line of the Torre outside our repertoire. And 3...c5 4 \(\mathref{L}\)g5 also makes it a little more difficult for Black to achieve the Torre lines shown in Chapter 1, since once ...c5 has been played it is not so easy to find a moment for ...h6 when it cannot be met by £xf6 (e.g. line accounted slightly better for White). There is no solution to this. You either have to know which bishop move White

favours and bluff him, or else you need to be prepared to go 3 c3 b6 and adopt line A if White's next move is \$\hat{2}\$f4.


C)

1 d4 d5 2 ②f3 ②f6 3 ②f4 (or 1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 d5 3 ②f4)



As with most of these systems, the London is less fearsome if Black's queen's bishop is free to develop. In fact a very respectable method is to play 3... f5 right now and ask White what his point is. I'm going to suggest something a little more combative, though.


3...c5



'Hitting where it hurts' (Prie). If White wants to develop his f1-bishop he'll have

to play e2-e3 some time, and when he does the f4-bishop may be missed back home. Before going any further, a couple of move order points.

First, White may play 3 c3. Now 3...\$\overline{9}f5 4 \overline{9}f4 now is fine, but if you want to play either line B or C, then 3...c5 is mandatory (3...e6 4 \overline{9}g5 is a non-repertoire Torre again). After 3...c5, 4 \overline{9}g5 \overline{0}e4 takes us back to the QGD player's near-refutation of the Torre in Chapter 3. White, however, may try the interesting plan 3 c3 c5 4 dxc5,




a sort of reversed Slav. With the tempo 2c3/c6 missing it is not so easy to recover the pawn, but Black can reply 4...e6 5 b4 (the only critical move; 5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xc5 6 e3 0-0 7 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c6 8 0-0 h6 9 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e7 10 \$\frac{1}{2}\$bd2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e8 11 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e1 e5 12 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e6 is fine for Black, K.Valkesalmi-J.Plaskett, Jarvenpaa 1985, while 5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c6 6 b4 a5 7 b5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e7 8 \$\frac{1}{2}\$bd2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g6 9 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d7 10 e3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c8 was also okay in I.Almasi-Nguyen Anh Dung, Budapest 2000) 5...a5. White has tried a great many moves here, but the only two that really address the queenside issues are 6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$b3 and 6 e3.

a) After 6 Wb3 Black should not be in

a hurry with ...axb4: 6...b6 7 cxb6 wxb6 8 b5 (8 &e3 wb7 9 bxa5 &xa5 – D.Norwood-M.Wahls, Bundesliga 1993 – is no better: White has no prospect of holding both his split queenside pawns in the long term) 8...a4 9 wb2 dbd7 10 e3 &d6 11 &e2 0-0 12 0-0 (A.Stefanova-A.Graf, Recklinghausen 1998) and now either 12...e5 or 12...&b7 gives good compensation for the pawn.

b) 6 e3 axb4 7 cxb4 b6




8 \$\oldsymbol{\textit{b}}b5+\$ (sometimes 8 a4 bxc5 9 b5 \$\oldsymbol{\text{\textit{c}}}d6\$ is preferred, but in this Noteboomstyle continuation the presence of all the minor pieces favours the side with the centre, and Black's chances are at least equal here) 8...\$\oldsymbol{\text{c}}d7 9 \$\oldsymbol{\text{c}}xd7+ \oldsymbol{\text{c}}\text{Dbxd7} 10 a4 bxc5 11 b5 (if White simply gives back the pawn then Black has the edge with his better development and pressure against the a-pawn) 11...\$\oldsymbol{\text{c}}d6 12 \$\oldsymbol{\text{c}}b2 0-0 13 \$\oldsymbol{\text{Dbd2}}\text{\text{w}c7} and Black's chances are probably preferable (F.Christenson-Y.Yakovich, Bergen 2002).

Second, if one is playing 1 d4 d5 then White may try 2 £f4. It is not necessarily now possible to reach Line C, but Line B should be within reach. After 2... 16 f3 e3 e6 4 16 c5 5 c3 16 c6, or

some such sequence, we are back where we want to be. White hardly has better than this, but one move order wrinkle turned up in J.Rowson-S.Haslinger, Brıtish Championship 2004 (and other games): Black should not allow 1 d4 d5 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f4 e6 3 e3 c5 4 c3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c6 5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d6?! (5...\$\frac{1}{2}\$f6) 6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xd6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xd6 7 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g4. Black has to make some sort of concession now to defend the g-pawn; he may or may not be able to equalize anyway but it's better simply not to go there.

Returning to 3...c5.



Now 4 ©c3 a6 and 4 c4 cxd4 need not detain us, so White has three alternatives:

C1: 4 dxc5

C2: 4 e3 (the main move)


C3: 4 c3

C1)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 d5 3 🙎 f4 c5 4 dxc5

A sort of Queen's Gambit Accepted reversed with the extra move \$\frac{1}{2}\$f4. It turns out that this does not help White to hold on to the c5-pawn, and in the usual QGA structure the move is of little relevance.

4...e6



5 b4


Probably this is just a bad move, but if White allows ... \(\alpha\) xc5 then his choices are to play c2-c4 and play a \(\alpha\)f4 QGD a tempo down (since Black has not had to play... \(\alpha\)e7xc5), or to allow Black free development and slightly better command of the centre, e.g. 5 c3 \(\alpha\)c6 6 \(\Delta\)bd2 \(\alpha\)xc5 7 e3 0-0 8 \(\alpha\)d3 (8 \(\alpha\)e2 looks more sensible) 8...\(\mathbb{H}\)e8 9 \(\alpha\)g3 e5 10 e4 d4 11 \(\Delta\)b3 dxc3 12 bxc3 \(\alpha\)b6 13 0-0 \(\Delta\)h5 14 \(\alpha\)h4 \(\mathbb{H}\)d6, B.Soos-P.Wells, Koszeg 2000.

5...a5 6 c3 axb4

7 axb4


If 7 \(\hat{\omega}\)xb8 then the unexpected reply 7...b3! (A.Tobak-A.Sumets, Odessa 2000) is strong.

7...∮c6



Now in M.Orso-J.Gonzalev Garcia, Budapest 1998, White could find no better than 8 2c3 2xb4 9 2b5 2a6 10 2d6+ 2xd6 11 2xd6? (but 11 cxd6 0-0 brings no good either) 11...2xc5!. However, the b4-pawn is not to be defended: 8 3b6 is at least equal for Black; after 8 3d2, 8...b6 again or even speculation with 8...2e4 9 3b2 2xb4!? is possible, while 8 b5? 3a5+ is unthinkable.

C2) 1 d4 ∅f6 2 ∅f3 d5 3 ₤f4 c5 4 e3 ∅c6



Black could play 4...cxd4 5 exd4 ②c6 with a position from the Exchange Caro-Kann, and one at that where White

has played ②f3 a little earlier than devotees of that line think quite right.


After 4...2c6 White has two main moves:

C21: 5 ⊘c3 C22: 5 c3

Alternatively:

- a) 5 c4 cxd4 6 exd4 \(\existsq g4\) is a Panov-Botvinnik Caro where White has chosen an unlikely \(\existsq f4\) and Black is fine.
- b) 5 dxc5 e6 6 \(\tilde{Q}\)bd2 \(\tilde{x}\)xc5 is harmless as in Soos-Wells above.
- c) 5 &b5?! 營a5+ 6 公c3 ②e4 is an unsound gambit once beloved of the Czech GM Meduna; 7 0-0 ②xc3 8 &xc6+ bxc6 9 bxc3 (9 營d2? ②e2+ 10 營xe2 &a6 is an even more unsound gambit) 9...營xc3 10 ②e5 cxd4 11 exd4 &f5 12 基b1 f6 13 ②d3 營xd4 saw White already lost in E.Meduna-Y.Yakovich, Sochi 1986.
- d) 5 ②bd2 豐b6 is also bad, since 6 c3 豐xb2, 6 dxc5 豐xb2 and 6 豐c1 cxd4 all tend to leave White a pawn down.


C21)
1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 d5 3 ②f4 c5 4 e3
②c6 5 ②c3



A slightly wrong-looking set-up, but quite common. White at least prevents ... \$\widetharpoonup\$ b6.

5...<u></u>\$g4


5...₩b6?? 6 ②b5 of course.



6 **≜e2**


Most natural. 6 ♠b5 e6 7 h3 ♠xf3 8 ★xf3 cxd4 9 exd4 a6 10 ♠xc6+ bxc6 11 0-0 ♠e7 12 ♠a4 ₩a5 was equal in B.Kogan-V.Alterman, Tel Aviv (rapid) 1996, while 6 dxc5 e6 7 ♠e2 ♠xc5 8 h3 ♠h5 9 0-0 0-0 10 ♠e5 was so depressing that White couldn't think of anything better than a draw offer in J.Hodgson-K.Klundt, Kecskemet 1988.

6...e6 7 0-0 ≜e7



8 9 e5


Not forced, but it's not easy to see what White might play.



and Black had comfortable equality in T.Rakic-B.Abramovic, Kladovo 1991.

C22)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 d5 3 ₤f4 c5 4 e3 ②c6 5 c3 ₩b6




Many feel this move to be the Achilles heel of the whole London system. 5...e6 is Line B, of course.

6 ₩b3

By far the most popular move, although some of the others are probably no worse:


- b) 6 \(\mathbb{e}\)c1 \(\mathbb{e}\)f5 7 \(\mathbb{D}\)bd2 is also easy for Black, for example 7...\(\mathbb{E}\)c8 8 \(\mathbb{e}\)e2 cxd4 9 \(\mathbb{D}\)xd4 (the idea of Black's early ...\(\mathbb{E}\)c8 was that she would not need to use a tempo on ...\(\mathbb{h}\)6, as \(\mathbb{D}\)h4 at any point loses the d-pawn) 9...\(\mathbb{D}\)xd4 10 exd4 e6 11 a4 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d6 12 \(\mathbb{D}\)b5+ \(\mathbb{E}\)e7 13 \(\mathbb{L}\)xd6 \(\mathbb{W}\)xd6 14 \(\mathbb{D}\)f3 a6 15 \(\mathbb{L}\)e2 \(\mathbb{Q}\)g4 (A.Stefanova-S.Matveeva, Belgrade 1998).
 - c) After 6 ₩c2,



d) 6 2 a s is a bit of a problem since

6...豐xb2 7 ②b5 ②e4 8 ②g3 enables White to force a draw with 国b1-a1, as 8...②xc3 9 豐c1 is bad. 6...②f5?? 7 ②b5 国c8 8 ②c7 国xc7 9 dxc5 (a common trick) loses, so if Black intends to win then either 6...a6 or 6...c4 is called for.

6...c4



White has a choice here of two equally popular ways to approach the position:


C221)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 d5 3 拿f4 c5 4 e3 ②c6 5 c3 營b6 6 營b3 c4 7 營xb6 axb6 8 ③a3

The only decent move; many, many games have shown that if Black gets going on the queenside with ...b5-b4 White will always be on the defensive. For example, 8 a3 b5 9 \$\overline{D}\$e5 e6 10 b4 \$\overline{D}\$h5 11 \$\overline{D}\$xc6 \$\overline{D}\$xf4 12 exf4 bxc6 13 \$\overline{D}\$d2 f6 14 \$\overline{D}\$f3 \$\overline{D}\$d6 15 g3 0-0 was V.Kovacevic-Z.Ribli, Bugojno 1984, in which perhaps the leading exponent of these irregular d4 systems was already lost, or 8 \$\overline{D}\$bd2 b5 9 \$\overline{D}\$e2 b4 10 0-0 e6 11 \$\overline{D}\$e5 \$\overline{D}\$xe5 12 \$\overline{D}\$xe5 \$\overline{D}\$d7 13 e4?! \$\overline{D}\$xe5 14 dxe5 bxc3 15 bxc3


置a3, and the tide was already flowing Black's way in M.de Waal-P.Wells, Lost Boys Open, Antwerp 1997.

8…≜f5



There is no unanimity about White's best now:


- a) 9 包b5 is a shot in the dark; 9... a5 10 包c7+ 曾d7 11 皇e2 e6 12 0-0 皇d6 was already comfortable for Black in S.Sulyok-V.Vamos, Hungary 1995.
 - b) 9 \(\delta c7 \) also has no point:



9...e6 10 ②b5 罩a6 11 ②d6+ (this exchange is not to be feared) 11.. ②xd6 12 ②xd6 ②e4 13 ②f4 b5 14 ②d2 ②xd2 15 ③xd2 b4 16 cxb4 ②xb4 17 a3 ②c6 18 ②e2 ③d7 19 f3 罩b6 20 罩a2 left White grovelling in A.Borsuk-P.Cramling,

Women's Olympiad, Calvia 2004.

- c) 9 ②d2 e6 10 ②b5 \$\delta\$d7 11 \$\delta\$e2 \$\delta\$e7 12 0-0 \$\delta\$a5 13 a4 \$\delta\$ha8 14 \$\delta\$c7 \$\delta\$c8 15 ②b5 \$\delta\$c2 saw Black taking control in N.Monin-Y.Yakovich, St Petersburg 1994.
- d) 9 \(\hat{2}e2 \) is best met with 9...e6 10 \(\hat{2}b5 \) \(\hat{2}a5 \), when 11 \(\hat{2}c7+ \) is note 'a', 11 \(\hat{2}d6+ \hat{2}xd6 \) 12 \(\hat{2}xd6 \) \(\hat{2}d7 \) 13 \(\hat{2}e5 \) b5 14 \(\hat{2}h4 \) \(\hat{2}g6 \) 15 \(\hat{2}xg6 \) hxg6 was nice for Black in S.Witkowski-I.Farago, Lodz 1979, and 11 a4 \(\hat{2}d7 \) 12 \(\hat{2}d2 \) \(\hat{2}c2 \) 13 \(\hat{2}d1 \) \(\hat{2}xd1 \) 14 \(\hat{2}xd1 \) \(\hat{2}e7 \) (A.Barva-Z.Zambo, Cseppko 2001) was at least equal too.
- e) 9 ②h4 ②d7 10 ③e2 ②e4 11 ②b5 3a5 12 f3 was C.Dunworth-R.Tischbierek, Copenhagen 1990.




12... 1266 was about equal in the game, but I wonder if Black could have got away with 12... 12 kp5!? here. 13 fxe4 dxe4 14 b4 e5 15 2xc4 (15 2g3 g5 16 2xc4 gxh4 17 2xh4 2xb4) 15... 12xb4 16 cxb4 2xb4+ 17 2f2 exf4 is certainly far from clear, but Black has very active pieces and near material equality.

C222)


1 d4 2f6 2 2f3 d5 3 2f4 c5 4 e3

A popular position: 8...e6 and 8...h6 are both commoner, while Prie gives 8... d8 a '!', but I believe in securing that bishop before going any further.




9 <u>\$g</u>5

This must be the right move. White doesn't have enough control to get away with the likes of 9 \(\text{ }\)e2 \(\text{ }\)xf4 10 exf4 e6 11 0-0 \(\text{ }\)e7 12 \(\text{ }\)\text{ }\)bd2 \(\text{ }\)e7 13 g3 b5 14 \(\text{ }\)\text{ }\)e5 b4 (U.Scotti-I.Khenkin, Bratto 2003), or 9 \(\text{ }\)\text{ }\)h4 \(\text{ }\)xb1 10 \(\text{ }\)xb1 \(\text{ }\)\text{ }\)xf4 11 exf4 e6 12 \(\text{ }\)\text{ }\)\(\text{ }\)\(\text{ }\)\(\text{ }\)d6 13 g3 0-0 14 b3 cxb3 15 axb3 \(\text{ }\)\(\text{ }\)f6, while 9 \(\text{ }\)\(\text{ }\)e5 f6 10 \(\text{ }\)\(\text{ }\)g3 e5 is good for Black,



9...h6 10 ≜h4 g5 11 ≜g3 ≜g7 12 ②bd2 ②xg3 13 hxg3




13...0-0

Up to here both sides' moves have been too obvious to need comment, but besides this Rublevsky's 13...豐a5 is interesting. A.Semenyuk-S.Rublevsky, Tomsk 2001, then went 14 e4 dxe4 15 ②xc4 豐c7 16 ②fd2 0-0 with a sharp game (17 豐b1 單ad8 18 ②xe4 ②xd4 19 ②e3 ②xe4 20 豐xe4 f5 21 豐b1 and now 21...②f3+ would have won at once). However, the acid test is 14 b3 b5 15 a4; if Rublevsky intended 15...b4 16 bxc4 bxc3 17 ②b3 豐b4 18 cxd5 I don't think it quite works after 18...豐xb3 19 dxc6 when 罩a3 is threatened, or 18...②a5 19 ②b5+ 含d8 20 ②xa5 豐xa5 21 0-0.

14 **≜e2 營c7**


Ivanov had previously played 14... ac8 but had presumably concluded that he

can't stop b2-b3 anyway and that after that the rook is best on a8.



15 **≜**d1

15 0-0 b5 16 **Qd1 Qd3** is worse, and Black is reasonably prepared for 15 b3 b5 16 a4 a6 17 0-0 (17 **營**a3? b4) 17...罩fb8.




Black is better here, although perhaps 20...a5 would have been better than the game's 20...e5, which didn't really work out (D.Lopushnoy-V.Ivanov, Moscow 1996).

C3) 1 d4 Øf6 2 Øf3 d5 3 &f4 c5 4 c3

Not quite so timorous as it looks, or at least a psychological effort.

4... **省b6**

Slav Exchange devotees will have no trouble in playing 4...cxd4, of course, but the likelihood is that by selecting 4 c3 White wants to lure Black into 4... 2c6 5 dxc5. Black may well be doing fine here, but he doesn't have a simple way to regain the pawn: 5...e6 (5...a5 6 2a3!?) 6 b4 2e4 (6...a5 7 2d4!?) in A.Bagheri-E.Kengis, ADCF Masters, Abu Dhabi 2003, for example, led to ferocious complications in which Black was obliged to make a positional queen sacrifice; great fun but not what you need for an obscure corner of your repertoire like this.



5 ₩b3


Well-nigh invariable; both 5 b3 and putting the queen on the c-file involve positional concessions.

5...42c6 6 dxc5

Alternatively:

- a) 6 e3 c4 now is Line C2, of course.
- b) 6 wxb6 axb6 7 &c7 is well met by 7... £f5: 8 2bd2 cxd4 9 2xd4 2xd4 10 cxd4 \(\) &c8 gives Black ample play.

C2; White can instead try 8 ②b5 ¾a5 9 a4 ②f5 10 g4!? ②xg4 11 ②d2 (P.Blatny-M.Palac, Kecskemet 1991), when White threatens b4, but Black met this with 11...③d7 and went on to win, or 8 ②c7 ¾a6 9 e3 ②f5 10 ②h4 ②d7 11 ②xf5 ③xc7 12 ②g3 h5 13 ②e2 (G.Olarasu-L.Fressinet, Creon 1999),



in which Black's next was the typical stroke 13... \(\bar{\text{Z}}\) xa3!, followed by ...e6, ... \(\bar{\text{Z}}\) xa3, ... \(\bar{\text{Z}}\) a8-a5, ...b5-b4 and a further crushing advance on the queenside, a plan White found remarkably little to counter.

d) 6 ②bd2 c4 7 👑xb6 (7 👑c2 ②g4) axb6 would only have independent merit if White could come up with a plan avoiding e3; since 8 e4 misses the mark after 8...dxe4 9 ②g5 ②d5 10 ②g3 b5 11 ②dxe4? f5 12 ②d2 f4 13 ②h4 h6 winning a piece, it is not easy to see what

that could be.


6... ₩xc5

As Prie points out, this position is a Slav reversed (1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 2f3 2) f6 4 2c2 dxc4 5 2xc4 2f5), save that White has the extra move b3. This inconveniences him in two ways: first, it means that he cannot meet ... 2h5 with b3 winning the d-pawn; second, it means that b2-b4 is not practical.

7 e3 g6 8 🗹 bd2 👲 g7 9 h3

9 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)h5 illustrates Prie's point.

9...0-0 10 **≜e2 ②**d7!




White was ready with ②e5.

11 0-0 e5 12 ዿh2 ∅b6 13 a4 ዿd7 14 ዿb5 ፯fe8 15 a5 ∅c8 16 a6.

This was H.Ricart-E.Prie, Montpellier 1998: according to Prie both sides have played well since move 6, and now 16... 2b8 would have left Black a shade better if anything.

CHAPTER SIX

The Colle System



1 d4 2 f6 2 2 f3 e6 3 e3 (and 1 d4 d5 2 2 f3 2 f6 3 e3)

A nasty little transpositional move: if White is playing fair it introduces the Colle or Colle-Zukertort systems, but White's next move may also be c2-c4. Like many of these systems it is less fearsome if Black's second move was 2...d5.

Line A deals with the Colle, Line B with the Colle-Zukertort, and Line C gives an independent system for use if Black's c8-bishop is still free. The move orders are not easy, but I hope my suggestions in A and B are compatible. There is an unavoidable trade-off for Black in defending this system: either he allows White to play an e3 Queen's Indian if he so chooses, or he plays ...d5 fairly early, which is probably what White wants if he is playing a pure Colle. I have chosen the former of these evils: no problem for QID players but those who were still hoping to sneak into a Benoni will have to resign themselves to ıt.

A: 1 d4 **2** f6 2 **2** f3 e6 3 e3 (Pure Colle)

B: 1 d4 2 f6 2 2 f3 e6 3 e3 (with c4/b3)


C: 1 d4 d5 2 2f3 2f6 3 e3

A) 1 d4 Øf6 2 Øf3 e6 3 e3

In this section I deal only with the pure Colle, which is characterized by the moves \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3, \(\frac{1}{2}\)db2 and in particular c3. If the London System can be considered as a sort of Slav Attack, here we have the Semi-Slav Attack. The Colle is not well regarded by theory, but it is nonetheless a dangerous weapon in the hands of a certain type of player: an opponent against whom a draw would be a poor result even with Black, but is nonetheless fairly sprightly with the cheaper sort of tactic.

It is not particularly hard to equalize by carefully liquidating the centre, but if you want to unbalance the game, very usually the trade-off is that White has attacking chances and Black longer-term chances. It is no coincidence that any book on the Colle (which for some reason seems to attract White-to-play-and-win manuals) will begin with a few examples where White is permitted to launch some £xh7+ onslaught (if one were to give Black one tip on handling this opening, it would be to check this tactic before every move).

3...b6



4 **≜**d3

White could play c2-c4, which will transpose to Line B, but in fact he will almost always choose to play the text and keep his options open; even if he means to play c4 it cannot be prevented and he keeps Black guessing a little longer.

4....**2**b7 5 0-0 c5 6 **4**bd2


White has now to commit himself at least to some extent. 6 ©bd2 means that in all probability White wishes to stay within the Colle spirit.

6... e7 7 c3

And this is the moment at which White has finally to commit himself; this is a pure Colle as opposed to the Colle-Zukertort, which is B2 and is character-

ized by 7 b3 at this point.

7...Øc6



A system with a fair pedigree: the choice of Alekhine and Capablanca (and Colle, as it happens!) in their day and of Psakhis and Seirawan in ours. Black's immediate hope is that he has prevented e3-e4 by the threat of ...cxd4; cxd4 \(\Delta\)b4. White now has the choice of falling into this cunning positional trap, preparing e4 blatantly with a2-a3, changing the structure with dxc5, or developing in some other way.

Now White can play the following:

A1: 8 e4 A2: 8 a3


A3: 8 dxc5

A4: 8 營e2 and others

A1)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 🚊 d3 💄 b7 5 0-0 c5 6 🖄 bd2 💄 e7 7 c3 🖄 c6 8 e4

This move was long thought to be a mistake, but recently it has been played a bit and Black certainly needs to know what he is doing to combat it. In fact, any regular and prepared Colle player is likely to have an opinion about this position, so to some extent I am contradicting my principles by recommending this set-up.



8...cxd4 9 cxd4

Critical, of course. Colle himself used to play 9 ②xd4, as in the famous game Colle-Capablanca, Carlsbad 1929, in which it seemed to Colle 'that I did not make a weak move, but that my opponent made some very strong ones'. That went 9...0-0 10 ¥e2 ②e5 (10...d6 is fine also: to modern eyes it is evident that White's anti-Sicilian set-up is unlikely to be terribly effective) 11 ②c2 ¥c8 12 f4 ②a6 13 ¥d1 ②c6 14 ⑤f3 g6 (prophylaxis, but there was no threat and a move like 14...¥c7 or ...②b7 was also well possible) 15 ②2b3 ②xd4 16 ②xd4 ②b7 with equal chances.


9...②b4 10 ዿb1 ዿa6 11 볼e1 公d3 12 ዿxd3 ዿxd3 13 d5!

Nothing else poses any problems at all; in particular the positions after e5, 2d5 are comfortable for Black with White's king's bishop absent.

By Colle standards the position is now quite theoretical: Black's sequence was long thought to be the reason 8 e4 was bad, but 13 d5 casts a new light on the matter. Black's first task is to notice that 13...0-0? 14 d6 wins a piece, and his second to see that 13...exd5 14 exd5 2xd5 15 2f1! 2b4 16 a3 2xf1 17 axb4 2c4 18 4d4 favours White. 13...2c5 14 b4 2xb4 15 4b3 2xd2 16 2xd2 2a6 17 2a3 has also seen Black sustain a number of spankings, so his next move is an essential one.

13...⊮c8 14 **②e**5


I take this as the main line because Gary Lane gave it as such, although 14 d6 has also been popular and I think if White can get anything in this line it will not be in the main column. 14 d6 &d8 15 \(\tilde{\omega} \)e5 was G.Soppe-A.Giaccio, Buenos Aires 1991, and now Black should have played 15...\(\tilde{\omega} \)c2, for example 16 \(\tilde{\omega} \)e2 0-0 with an unclear position. Now 17 b3 \(\tilde{\omega} \)c3 18 \(\tilde{\omega} \)b2 \(\tilde{\omega} \)dc4 \(\tilde{\omega} \)dd4 20 \(\tilde{\omega} \)xc2 b5



is nowhere near as good as computers think it is. In fact it is striking how computers overestimate White's position in this line generally; perhaps they overrate the pawn at d6 and Black's short-term problem with the bishop stuck on d8. The whole battle tends to turn on

whether Black can solve this problem with either or both of ...b5 and ...\$b6, or ...f6 and ...fxe5. After 15 2d4 (L.Zaitseva-V.Gansvind, Moscow 1999) 15...0-0 was correct, holding back 16 ②2f3 a little longer. Now after 16 罩e3 **2**a6 17 **₩**a4 the positional pawn sacrifice 17...b5 18 ②xb5 豐c6 19 ②c3 罩c8 gives Black very reasonable compensation, while 16 \(\mathbb{Y}\)f3 \(\mathbb{2}\)a6 17 \(\overline{Q}\)2b3 \(\mathbb{Y}\)b7 18 单g5 罩c8 is similar to W.Arencibia-L.Psakhis, Terres Catalanes 1996. There White kept d6 in reserve with 14 2 d4 and following 14...0-0 15 Wb3 2a6 16 ②2f3 罩e8 (! - Psakhis, although 16...exd5 17 e5 ②e4 deserved attention, for example 18 \$\Q\$f5 \(\mathbb{L}\$c5 19 \(\mathbb{L}\$e3 \(\mathbb{L}\$e8 20 **營**xd5 **拿**b7 21 **營**d3 d5) 17 d6 **拿**d8 18 **g**g5 **b**7 19 **a**3 **a**c8 a draw was agreed.

14... &c2 15 響f3 0-0



Psakhis had proposed 15... \$\mathbb{\text}\circ\$ but the text is much better. White's problem is that 16 \$\overline{Q}\dc4 \&\text{2xe4} 17 \$\mathbb{\text{Zxe4}} \ext{exd5}\$ is bad, and so is 16 \$\overline{Q}\ec4 \ext{exd5}\$ 17 \ext{exd5}\$ \$\dext{2b4}\$. Yet he needs to move the d2-knight so as to develop, and when he does with

16 മb3


Black has

16...**.**⊈d6

when he has now overcome his development problems and stands better, E.Vancini-G.Sax, Bratto 2004.

A2)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 🙎 d3 \$\dagger{b}\$b7 5 0-0 c5 6 🖄 bd2 &e7 7 c3 \$\dagger{c}\$c6 8 a3




A popular move, preparing e4, although if you were to feel that such a slow and weakening move could hardly be good you would have some supporters.

8...d5

The most natural, although if Black wants a more obscure struggle he should certainly consider Black's play in V.Kovacevic-Y.Seirawan, Indonesia, which went 8...a5 9 e4 d5 10 e5 2 d7 11 = 2 a6 12 2xa6 (12 2c2!?) = xa6 13 = 2 a7, when Black had already equalized and went on to win a fine game.

9 /ne5

9 b4 doesn't do much: 9... **世**c7 10 **\$**b2 c4 11 **\$**c2 b5 12 **\$**e1 0-0 13 e4 a5 14 e5 **\$**dd7 was at least equal in C.Guimard-J.Sunye Neto, Porto Velho 1988. 9 dxc5




9...@xe5

Solid, although 9...0-0 10 f4 and now either 10...2e8 or 10...2d6 11 16 2e7 12 g4 2g6 (K.Pytel-V.Ikonnikov, Parthenay 1992) gives more complicated play with mutual chances.

10 dxe5 4 d7 11 f4

11 **\(\mathbb{@}**g4 \(\hat{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texit{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\

11…豐c7




From here G.Danner-L.Psakhis, Vienna 1995 went on 12 **2** c4 13 **2** c2 **2** c5 14 e4 dxe4 15 **2** xe4 **2** xe4 16 **2** xe4

②xe4 17 灣xe4 0-0, and G.Danner-V.Yemelin, Berlin 1995 equally tediously with 12 灣g4 g6 13 e4 c4 14 ②c2 ②c5 15 exd5 ③xd5 16 ②f3 h5 17 灣h3 灣b7 18 ③e3 ②e4 19 ②xe4 灣xe4 20 ②g5 ③xg5 21 ③xc5. Computers vigorously prefer 11...c4 12 ②c2 0-0; their intention being to save the queen for taking on d5 with after 13 e4 ②c5 14 exd5 灣xd5 or such. I don't think White can do anything at once on the kingside: 13 ③xh7+ ⑤xh7 14 灣h5+ ⑤g8 15 罩f3 f6 and 13 灣h5 f5 both seem to defend, and if so this might be worth a thought.

A3)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 🚊 d3 \$\darkline{\phi}\$b7 5 0-0 c5 6 4\darkline{\phi}\$bd2 \$\darkline{\phi}\$e7 7 c3 \$\darkline{\phi}\$c6 8 dxc5



A common idea in the Colle (as in the Semi-Slav), although a bit less common when Black can recapture with the b-pawn and get more influence in the centre. It's another way to arrange e3-e4 early by forestalling ...cxd4; cxd4 \(\Delta\)b4, but as with 8 a3 there's a concession involved too.


8...bxc5 9 e4 營c7

Not allowing e4-e5 just yet, while

keeping the choice between ...d6 and ...d5 a moment longer.

10 罩e1

10 **瞥**e2 d5 now is well timed, as in E.Colle-G.Thomas, Nice 1930. 11 e5 ②d7 12 罩e1 (or 12 兔b5) g5 is not good, so 11 exd5 ②xd5 (or 11...exd5 12 罩e1 0-0 13 ②f1 兔d6) 12 ②c4 ②f4 was equal in the game.



10...d6

Another equally good plan is 10...d5. Neither 11 exd5 exd5 12 h4 (or 12 f1 0-0 13 g5 h6 14 gh4 lab8 15 e3 gc8) 12...0-0 13 f5 le8 14 xe7+ nor 11 e5 d7 12 gb5 0-0 13 e2 is much to be feared, while 11 e2 0-0 12 e5 d7 13 df1 lae8 (another plan is ...c4, ...lab8, ...lfd8 and ...dc5) 14 gf4 c4 15 gc2 b6 16 lad1 f6 was about equal in A.Sydor-J.Smejkal, Sandomierz 1976.

11 分f1 0-0 12 營e2


White doesn't have a lot here, for example 12...包d7 13 总f4 罩fd8 14 罩ad1 a5 15 a4 ②ce5 was equal in A.Bulat-P.Nikolic, Yugoslav Championship 1984.

A4) 1 d4 Øf6 2 Øf3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 \(\ext{\hat{g}}\)d3

2b7 5 0-0 c5 6 **2**bd2 **2**e7 7 c3 **3**€ 6 8 **2**e2

White has tried a number of moves, as one can imagine:

- (a) 8 a4 doesn't look very relevant but was played by a great connoisseur: 8... © c7 9 © e2 0-0 10 ②g5!? h6 11 ②gf3 d6 12 ☐ e1 ☐ fe8 13 h3 ② f8 14 dxc5 bxc5 15 e4 was V.Kovacevic-I.Farago, Vinkovci 1993. Farago played 15... ☐ d7 and later recommended 15... ☐ ad8. It seems to me 15... d5 was worth thinking about too, but in any case it's fairly clear that White would be very happy to continue with a4-a2.
- (b) 8 b3 is a mixture of systems; 8... Ic8 9 兔b2 cxd4 10 exd4 0-0 11 Ie1 g6 12 Ic1 Ie8 13 ②e4 was equal in J.Fischer-F.Gheorghiu, Graz 1987.
 - (c) 8 De5 d6 9 Dxc6 2xc6 10 e4




was once a pet of the Yugoslav player Osmanagic. Black usually met this with 10...e5 but 10...0-0 seems more sensible to me: 11 **\(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\)2 \(\mathbb{e}**\)7 12 e5 dxe5 13 dxe5 **\(\mathbb{\mathbb{d}}\)**5 is fine for Black.

(d) 8 置e1 is another way of preparing e3-e4 since a6 no longer gains a tempo: 8... 它 7 9 a3 (necessary anyway since 9 e4 cxd4 10 cxd4 包b4 11 息b1

量c8 is annoying) 9...d5 10 b4 (now that ②e5 is too late, White is pushed for another idea) 10...0-0 11 ¥e2 e5 12 dxe5 ②xe5 13 ②xe5 ¥xe5 14 ②b2 was M.Glienke-S.Atalik, Berlin 2000, and now Black had several appealing options; besides the game's 14...②e4, 14...②d6 15 ②f3 ¥h5 was also plausible. 8...0-0

Logical: since White's last did nothing to prepare e4 (although 9 e4 cxd4 10 cxd4 20th 11 26th 1? 26th has been astonishingly popular) it is not yet necessary to take any steps against it.

9 **ℤe1**



White has the same sorts of ideas as before but Black can try plans without ... #c7:

a) 9 dxc5 bxc5 10 e4 d5 11 量e1 (11 e5 包d7 12 量e1 f6 13 exf6 量xf6 14 包g5 包f8 15 包df3 h6 16 包h3 e5 was another non-豐c7 plan in G.Gonzales-A.Vaisser, Las Palmas 1989) 11...豐c7 is Sydor-Smejkal above; another plan is 11...a5 12 e5 包e8 13 包f1 包c7 when in L.Winants-M.Suba, Ostend 1989 White decided to allow the exchange with 14 皇f4 皇a6 15 皇xa6 量xa6 16 量ad1 豐b8 17 c4 量b6 which was about equal, although many

might have preferred 13 or 14 \(\delta\)c2.

b) 9 a3 d5 is like A2; 10 b4 2 d7 11 e4!? dxe4 12 2 xe4 cxd4 13 cxd4 3 f6 14 2 b2 2 d5 was a different way to play in H.Kilicasian-E.Jobava, Istanbul 2003.


9... **營c7**

Still holding back e4.

10 dxc5

10...bxc5 11 e4 d5 12 e5 4 d7

This is Sydor-Smejkal above; another example was 13 🖾 f1 c4 14 🚨 b1 🖾 c5 15 🖾 g5?! h6 16 🖾 h3 f5 17 exf6 🖾 xf6,



when Black was already better in F.Hoffmeyer-J.Brueggemann, Germany 2002.

B)


1 d4 **2** f6 2 **2** f3 e6 3 e3 (with c4/b3)

I now move on to consider lines without c3 but with b3 and c4. These probably owe more to Rubinstein than anyone else, but are rather ahistorically called the Colle-Zukertort. Probably of

all the lines in this book, these are the ones you are most likely to see 2600 players essaying against each other, and hence I dare say they the most genuine tries for an opening advantage. In our day far and away its greatest exponent has been Yusupov.

The material in these 'system' openings is naturally recalcitrant to exact classification, but I have divided play into B1 (with an early c4, reserving the possibility of ②c3 and usually avoiding b2-b3) and B2 (with the 'pure' b2-b3 method).

B1) 1 d4 ∅f6 2 ∅f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 ⊈d3 ⊈b7 5 0-0 c5 6 c4



A cunning twist. This looks like a regular e3 Queen's Indian, and so it is, but Black has been deprived of the ...d5, ... d6 set-up which most people consider the strongest answer.


6...cxd4

This accepts the transposition to a variation of the e3 QID. Black has to be happy to play against an IQP, however. Instead 6...g6 is a well-respected move played by many grandmasters, but I just haven't been able to find a satisfactory

reply to the gambit 7 d5. Players determined to follow their own course might do worse then Klaus Bischoff's 6...cxd4 7 exd4 2xf3 8 \ xf3 2c6 9 d5 (9 2e3 2b4) 2e5 10 2e2 2xd3 11 2xd3: White probably holds some advantage here but there is no theory. Alternatively of course Black might have played ...2e7 at his fifth turn: he could then continue now with ...d5, another respectable defence to the e3 QID.

7...d5 8 2c3 2e7 is the same thing of course but gives White the option of 8 cxd5 2xd5 9 2e5, not that that's necessarily anything to be afraid of as long as Black is wiser than he was in B.Kurajica-R.Zelcic, Pula 1999, where a 2550 GM met 8 cxd5 2xd5 9 2e5 with the incautious 9...2e7? and was reduced to 10 2b5+ 2f8.

8 0c3 d5




9 cxd5

This is the most popular move and also the best, but White can also keep the tension either with 9 b3, in the Colle-Zukertort spirit, or 9 \hat{2}g5.


a) 9 \(\hat{2}\)g5 leads to a position similar to one that can arise from the Furman

Variation of the QGA. Black will have an extra tempo since White will play \(\tilde{\pm}\)d3xc4, but equally he will have his queenside pawns on a7/b6 rather than a6/b5. Against this the bishop will still be little exposed on c4. On balance these differences ought to favour Black. 9...0-0



10 We2 (the purest and best set-up in these IQP positions: if White chooses a less direct approach then ... Dc6 may become an option, e.g. 10 a3 dxc4 11 &xc4 ②h5 when Black is better; A.Kochiev-V.Eingorn, Minsk 1983) 10... 2bd7 11 罩ad1 罩e8 (a key move in these set-ups, discouraging d4-d5, permitting ... 包f8 and also possibly ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)xe7) 12 \(\mathbb{Z}\)fe1 dxc4 13 êxc4 a6 (many players have dropped an tion arose by a very different route in R.Sherbakov-Ki.Georgiev, Niksic 1996, when White continued with 14 2d3 b5 15 ②e5 罩c8 16 a3 ②xe5 17 dxe5 ②d5 18 ②xe7 ¥xe7 19 ②e4 ②f4 with approximate equality.


b) 9 b3 leads very naturally to a position which is fine for Black but which needs considerable care: 9...0-0 10 \$\overline{D}\$b2 \$\overline{D}\$c6 11 \$\overline{E}\$c8 12 \$\overline{E}\$c1 \$\overline{E}\$e8.



White could now continue with a move like ②e5 or ¥e2, in which case Black will no doubt play ... £18, ... g6, ... \(\hat{\pma}\)g7 (the usual plan in such positions) with about equal chances. 13 cxd5 2xd5 14 ②xd5 ₩xd5 (14...exd5 15 \$\hat{L}\$f5 gives White some pressure) 15 2e4 has occurred in many games, however, and Black has quite a few ways of losing: 15... **營**d7? 16 **罩**xc6 **호**xc6 17 **②**e5 **豐**b7 18 with a winning attack **&**xh7+ L.Portisch-N.De Firmian, Reggio Emilia 1989, was one, while 15... d6 16 d5 exd5 17 **對**xd5 (17...**公**a5?? 18 **基**xc8 **基**xc8 19 2xh7+ \$\dot\n xh7 20 \$\dot\n g5+\$ was more of the same in B.Kovacevic-J.Nikolac, Medulin 1997) 17... wxd5 18 2xd5 \$f8! 19 h4 f6! 20 h5 2a5 is the narrow path to equality, A.Yusupov-U.Andersson, Elista 1998.

In view of the rather tedious nature of this previous variation, one might want an alternative: very solid is 12... Db4 13 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ ft \$\tilde{Q}\$e4 14 a3 \$\tilde{Q}\$xc3 15 \$\tilde{Z}\$xc3 \$\tilde{Q}\$c6, which has occurred a few times: students of the game will recognize Keres-Smyslov, Zurich 1953 as the most prominent of these (16 \$\tilde{Q}\$e5 \$\tilde{Q}\$xe5 17 \$\tilde{Z}\$xe5 \$\tilde{Q}\$f6 18 \$\tilde{Z}\$h5!? g6 19 \$\tilde{Z}\$ch3 and now the cool and much-praised

19...dxc4! rather than the panicky 19...gxh5? 20 營xh5 罩e8 21 a4, winning). **9...** ②**xd5**




10 De5

A thrusting modern continuation, but again White has some alternatives:

- a) 10 a3 is a slightly irrelevant more giving a position which can arise from the a3 QID, although White normally avoids it. 10... 2d7 11 2d2 0-0 12 2e1 (12 2e4 256 13 2g3 2c5! was worse in W.Arencibia-R.Hübner, Capablanca Memorial, Havana 1998) 12... 2c8 13 2xd5 2xd5 14 2a6 2c6 15 2b5 2c8 16 2a6 and a draw in B.Gulko-A.Chernin, Volgodonsk 1981, was fairly typical: Black could go on if he wanted with 16... 2a8.
- b) 10 \$\(\textit{Lb5}\)+ \$\(\textit{Lc6}\) 611 \$\(\textit{Lc4}\) (for such a feeble continuation, 11 \$\textit{Wa4}\$ \$\textit{Wd7}\$ 12 \$\(\textit{Lxc6}\)\$ \$\(\textit{Lxc6}\)\$ \$\(\textit{Lxc6}\)\$ has been amazingly popular; for example 13 \$\(\textit{Lxc3}\)\$ \$\textit{Wxd5}\$ \$\textit{H4}\$ \$\(\textit{Le3}\)\$ 0-0 15 \$\textit{Lfc1}\$ \$\textit{L5}\$ 16 \$\textit{Wa6}\$ \$\(\textit{Lb4}\)\$ \$\(\textit{Lk}\)\$ \$\textit{Lsc3}\$ \$\(\textit{Lsc3}\)\$ \$\(\textit{L
 - c) 10 2xd5 2xd5 11 2e5 is more

- dangerous than it looks: 11...0-0 12 **\cong h**5 f5 13 **\cong e2!** \(\tilde \text{d}\)7 14 \(\tilde \cong \cong e8 15 \(\tilde \cong f6 16 \tilde \cong ac1 \cong g6 17 g3 \tilde fe8 18 \(\tilde \cong b4 \) left Black in deep trouble in J.Speelman-N.Short, Hastings 1983/84. I suspect the most pragmatic solution is to accept a slight disadvantage with 13...\(\tilde d6 \) and ...\(\tilde xe5 \), but also 12...g6 is possible. 13 \(\tilde xg6 \) and \(\tilde xg6 \) is a draw by perpetual, while 13 \(\tilde g4 \) \(\tilde f6 \) doesn't achieve anything very much (but not 13...\(\tilde d7 \) 14 \(\tilde h6 \) \(\tilde e8 15 \) \(\tilde b5 \)).
- d) 10 We2 isn't quite specific enough: 10...0-0 11 Ze1 Oc6 12 Od2 Of6 13 De3 Ob4 14 Db1 Ze8 15 a3 Obd5 16 Dd2 g6 was equal in A.Lombard-M.Tal, Skopje Olympiad 1972.
- e) $10 \stackrel{\checkmark}{=} e1$ is likely the best alternative. $10...\stackrel{\checkmark}{=} 0d7$



and now:

e1) 11 ②e4!?. is a move which had an impressive success in I.Sokolov-S.Kudrin, FIDE World Ch, Las Vegas 1999. White will transfer the knight to g3 and build up slowly. After 11...0-0 12 a3 I thought Black did better than Kudrin's 12...②5f6 in J.Nielsen-P.Stempin, Naestved 1988, with 12...②c8, when 13 ②cd2 (13 營e2 ②5f6 14 ②g3 ③e8 15 ②cf4 ②f8 16 ③ad1

②g6 didn't do any better in E.Gausel-E.Sidorenko, Bled Olympiad 2002) 13... ≝c7 14 ℤc1 ≝b8 15 ②e5 ℤxc1 16 ℚxc1 ⑤5f6 was equal.


e2) Instead 11 a3 0-0 12 &c2 \(\frac{1}{2} \)c8 13 \(\frac{1}{2} \)d3 g6 14 \(\frac{1}{2} \)h6 \(\frac{1}{2} \)e8 15 \(\frac{1}{2} \)e4 \(\frac{1}{2} \)5f6 was a more conventional approach in R.Djurhuus-D.King, Gausdal 1993, where White was forced to admit by 16 \(\frac{1}{2} \)c3 that Black had equality.

10...0-0 11 營h5

The feature of this particular position is that White can get his queen quickly to the kingside in this manner. He has a few other queen moves as well:

a) 11 \$\mathbb{\text{mf3}} \otimes \text{dd7} 12 \otimes \text{xd5} \otimes \text{xd5} 13\$\$ \$\mathbb{\text{mh3}}\$ f5 (this move frequently crops up in this variation: positionally it looks a bit of a shocker but the effect on the d3-bishop is sometimes worth the weakening of e6) 14 \$\otimes f4 \otimes \text{xe5} 15 \otimes \text{xe5} \otimes f6 16 \$\mathbb{\text{mg3}} \otimes \text{gc8} 17\$\$ \$\otimes \text{fe1} \otimes \text{xe5} 18 \$\otimes \text{xe5} \quad \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \text{Y}. Averbakh-P.Keres, USSR Championship 1961, illustrates the logic of ...f5 nicely; White is not better here at all.

A stronger try for White is 12 **營**h3 f5 13 **②**c4 (13 **②**f3 **③**c8 is fine) 13...**②**xe5 14 dxe5.




Black has to be careful here: after the

tempting 14... C7 White was better with 15 & xd5 exd5 16 3 d4 17 b5 d7 18 d6 in K.Volke-A.Goldberg, Bundesliga 1996. 16... 5 17 f4? d4 18 b5 d7 19 e6 was worse still in U.Bönsch-T.Tolnai, Budapest 1989. However, 14... s should be okay: after 15 xd5 exd5 16 d1 don't see how White can enforce a blockade on d4 (17 d3 fd8 18 e2 d4!?).

b) 11 ****g**4 can be respectably met with 11...f5, but similar to the main text is 11...①f6 12 ****g**3 (12 ****g**h4 is the text and 12 ****g**f4 ②c6 13 *****2d1 ②b4 14 *****2b1 ②bd5 was equal in F.Olafsson-G.Sosonko, Tilburg 1977). It's not at all clear that 12...****g**xd4 is bad, but simpler is 12...②c6 13 *****2d1 ②b4 14 *****2h6 ②e8 15 *****2c4 (15 *****2b5 *****2h4 16 ****g**34 f5 17 ****g**h5 ②c7 is fine) 15...*****2c8 16 *****2b3 ②bd5, when Black had equalized in E.Dizdarevic-D.Collas, Cannes 1995.

11...包f6



White is committed to a pawn sacrifice of one kind or another. After 12 Wh3 Black can get away with 12...Wxd4 since he is gaining a tempo on e5, although it's still close: 13 2g5 g6 14 Zfe1 2c6 15

②a6 ②xe5 16 ②xb7 ②d3 17 罩e3 ②xf2 is an important resource, while after 13 罩e1 ②c6 14 罩e4 彎d6 15 ②f4 ②b4 Black appears to be doing well (16 ②g6 彎d8 or 16 罩c4 罩fc8).


12...@e4

There are other moves but I think Black should accept the sacrifice.

13 **₩h3**

13 營f4 ②xc3 14 bxc3 ②d7 is fine for Black, but of course the caddish 13 營h5 ②f6 14 營h4 is a possibility. I'm afraid if White wants the draw in this position he can more or less force it, since 12...②bd7 13 ②g5 h6 14 ②xd7 赟xd7 15 ②xh6 gxh6 16 赟xh6 赟xd4 17 赟g5+ is also a draw. I can only suggest either 12 營h4 ②e4 13 營h5 g6, or 13 赟g4 f5: both of these are quite promising for White but at least play continues. Alternatively, playing 5...②e7 and meeting 6 c4 with 6...d5 is a more far-sighted option.

13... **營xd4**



14 **Qf4**


White can play for a small advantage with 14 ②xf7 ③xf7 15 ②xe4 ③xe4 16 ⑤g4, but he soon gave up trying to find it in E.Gausel-M.Womacka, Gausdal 2003, after 16...②c6 17 ⑤xe4 ⑥xe4 18 ②xe4

罩c8 19 &e3 ②b4 20 罩fc1 罩ff8 21 a4 ⑤c2 ½-½.

14...@f6 15 @e2

15 单g3 is cleverly met by 15... ②c6 (15...\$a6 16 \$\overline{Q}\$b5 \$\overline{Q}\$xb5 17 \$\overline{Q}\$xb5 \$\overline{W}\$xb2 18 堂c4 is very dangerous). 16 罩ad1 now looks like a good move but it isn't: 16... 🖸 xe5 17 👲 xh7+ 🗹 xh7 18 🗒 xd4 ②g5 19 Wh5 ②ef3+ 20 gxf3 ②xf3+ 21 \$\delta g2 \@\xd4+ is good for Black. Instead 16 夕b5 費xb2 17 夕d7 h6 18 夕xf8 罩xf8 (surely best) wins the exchange but dissipates White's initiative and allows Black enough compensation with the two pawns and the d5-square, while in P.Lukacs-E.Postny, Budapest 2000, 16 \$\delta\$h8 19 \delta\$xg4 \Q\xg4 20 \delta\$e4 \delta\$xe4 21 翼xe4 夕xe5 22 翼xe5 was also better for Black.

15...**₩a**4



16 **≜**g5

I doubt this is the best move, although other commentators have recommended it. 16 afe1 is a sensible move which hasn't been tried (16...g6!?), but practice has seen:


a) 16 b3 **\(\begin{array}{l}\) e8 17 \(\hat{\textit{L}}\)g5 (17 \(\begin{array}{l}\)gas (26) \(\hat{\textit{L}}\)e4 18 \(\hat{\textit{L}}\)f4 (A.Khalifman-E.Lobron,**

Groningen 1993), when 18... ②a6 is worth a thought, since 19 f3 ②f6 20 ②g4 h5! 21 ②xf6+ ②xf6 22 罩ad1 ②c5 is quite nice for Black

b) 16 Zac1 Qa6 17 Oc4 Zd8 18 Zfd1, when Black settled for equality in M.Matlak-G.Gajewski, Lubniewice 2002 with 18... Wxd1+19 Zxd1 Qxc4, although I don't know why he rejected the obvious 18... Qxc4 19 b3 Qxb3 20 axb3 We8 when I don't see White's compensation for two pawns. 18 Qc7 Zc8 19 Qe5 Obd7 20 b3 Wb4 21 a3 Wc5 22 b4 Wd5 23 Of4 Wb7 24 Qxf6 Oxf6 25 Oxe6 was a long semi-forced sequence in B.Chatalbashev-S.Kristjansson, European Teams Ch, Plovdiv 2003, which just about allowed White to obtain equality.

16...g6

Not 16... \$\begin{array}{l} \text{d8} & 17 & \text{\overline{O}} \text{c3} & followed by \$\text{\overline{Q}} \text{xf6} & and \$\begin{array}{l} \text{wh7+}, and certainly not \$16... \text{h6} & 17 & \text{\overline{Q}} \text{xh6} & followed by all sorts of unpleasantness.} \end{array}



After 16...g6, however, White is struggling for compensation. In A.Payen-D.Dumitrache, Avoine 2004, he could do no better than 17 ②f4 ②bd7 18 ②xg6? (but after 18 b3 👑d4 19 ②xd7 👑xd7 20 ဩad1 ②d5 White is just a pawn down)

18...②xe5 when Black won at once. White needs a new move 17: I can offer 17 ②c3 豐d4 18 單fe1 ②c6 19 ②a6 ②xe5 20 ②xb7 罩ad8 21 罩ad1 豐c5 22 豐h4 ②eg4, 17 罩ad1 豐a5, 17 罩fe1 ②c6 18 b3 豐a3 and 17 罩ae1 ②bd7 (17...②c6 18 b3 豐a3 19 ③xf6 and ②d7 is the idea of using the a-rook to go to e1) 18 ②c3 豐d4 19 ②b5 豐c5 20 ②xd7 ②xd7 21 ②e3 豐b4 22 ②c7 ②e5! (not 22...罩ac8 23 ②xe6!) as a few ideas that don't work, but that's as far as I go.


B2)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 🙎 d3 😩 b7 5 0-0 c5 6 b3

White can start with 6 \(\Delta \) bd2 as well of course, but it makes no difference.

6...cxd4

Black might just as well play this now: the bishop is hardly going anywhere but b2.




This position is almost bound to be reached one way or another, (although Black should wait for c2-c4 before playing ...d5; otherwise some ②e5/f2-f4 plan may well be strong) and now I split the material into:

B21: 10 ຝົc3 B22: 10 ຝົbd2

B21)

1 d4 2)f6 2 2)f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 2d3 2b7 5 0-0 c5 6 b3 cxd4 7 exd4 2e7 8 2b2 0-0 9 c4 d5 10 2)c6



11 **ℤc1**

11 We2 allows a similar caper to the text: 11...②b4 12 &b1 dxc4 13 bxc4 &xf3 14 Wxf3? (14 gxf3 is like the text only worse with the rook stuck on a1) 14...Wxd4 15 a3 ②a6 16 Wb7 (the only way to try and justify White's play) 16...&d6 and the game is over, T.Straeter-E.Van den Doel, Bundesliga 2002.


11 基e1 gives Black a choice between 11...dxc4 12 bxc4 基c8 13 基c1 基e8 with the usual sort of game, or 11...基c8, although White may then play the dull 12 cxd5 公xd5 13 公xd5 豐xd5 14 鱼e4 豐d6 15 d5 exd5 16 豐xd5 豐xd5 17 鱼xd5 鱼c5, G.Danner-P.Wells, Hungarian League 1997.

11...罩c8 12 營e2

12 \(\frac{1}{2} \) e1 was note 'b' to White's 9th move in Line B1, and as we saw there has the drawback of allowing Black to free himself with a well-timed ...\(\frac{1}{2} \) b4 sortie.

Another way of putting a stop to that is 12 a3, when a good example was R.Vaganian-M.Shereshevski, Minsk 1972, which went 12... \$\frac{1}{2}\text{e}8\$ 13 \$\frac{1}{2}\text{e}1\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ \$\frac{

12...∮b4



Of course Black doesn't have to go in for this, although it's quite promising. 12... 🗷 e8 13 🗷 fd1 👲 f8 is an alternative, when 14 h3 g6 15 🚊 b1? (15 👑 e3 is equal, but the queen is not well placed here) 15... 🚊 h6 winning material illustrates another common accident.


13 âb1 dxc4 14 bxc4 âxf3 15 gxf3

15 豐xf3 基xc4 16 d5 ②bxd5 17 基fd1 豐c8 was more or less winning for Black in A.Czebe-H.Koneru, Budapest 2001.

15....d6

15... 數xd4 allows a virtually forced draw with 16 ②e4 數d8 17 罩fd1 數c7 18 ②xf6 ②xf6 ②xf6 19 ②xf6 gxf6 20 數d2 數e7

21 **W**h6 f5 22 **Z**d7. Yakovich maintained that 19 **W**e4 here was much better for White but after 19...**Z**fd8 this seems anything but true.



After 15... 2d6 experience suggests that Black is very well placed:

a) 16 Sh1 Sh5 17 We4 was H.Gretarsson-O.Salmensuu, Reykjavik 2000, in which Black now went mad with the unclear 17...f5?!, but just 17...g6 was good, 18 Se2 Sf4! being the point Black presumably overlooked.


b) 16 ②e4 ②f4 17 a3?! ②xe4 18 fxe4 Wh4 19 f3 ②xc1 20 ③xc1 ②c6 21 ③h1 e5 left White lost in J.Gil Capape-G.Milos, World Junior Ch, Copenhagen 1982, while 17 ③cd1 ②xe4 18 fxe4 Wh4 19 f3 ④xc4 gives White at least some compensation after 20 ⑤f2; in I.Frog-V.Malakhov, Elista 1995, 20 a3? would have left White really struggling if Black had found 20...②c2.

B22)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 🗟 d3 âb7 5 0-0 c5 6 b3 cxd4 7 exd4 🚊 e7 8 âb2 0-0 9 c4 d5 10 🖄 bd2

On the whole this version attracts the great and good rather more; with the

knight on d2 both c4 and d4 have an extra defender which means that the ... \(\Delta \) b4/... \(\Delta \) xf3 ideas of the previous section are not going to work.




10...**②c6** 11 **≝e2**

Kramnik's choice. On the whole White's only decision over the next few moves is how to arrange the rooks: c1/e1, e1/d1 and c1/d1 all have their supporters. Also White has sometimes played a2-a3 before this point: often after 7... \(\) c6 in the sequence above White either judges it right to play a3 at once or else the sequence ... 2b4; 2e2 (move); a3 ②c6; ≜d3 occurs. An example of that position is L.M.Campos Gambuti-A.Chernin, Benidorm 1993: 11 a3 罩c8 12 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c7 (a slightly unusual plan but Chernin perhaps judges he has more time than usual: more regular is 12... Ze8 13 罩e1 桌f8 14 c5 a5 15 桌b5 勾d7 16 cxb6 equality, A.Yusupov-A.Chernin, Minsk 1987) 13 **營**e2 罩fd8 14 c5 a5 (usually the response to c5 in this set-up, preventing b4) 15 罩fe1 勾d7 16 cxb6 豐xb6 17 👑 e3 👲 a6 18 👲 b1 🖾 f8 19 🖾 e5 🖾 xe5 20 wxe5, and clearly things were going well for Black.

11...ℤe8

Kasparov doesn't see the point of a rook on c8 with the c-pawn so well defended.




12 罩ad1

Kramnik wants his rooks on d1 and e1. An excellent example of c1 and d1 was A.Ivanov-V.Korchnoi, Pasadena 1983: 12 罩ac1 罩c8 13 罩fd1 身f8 (there is a school of thought that holds that ...g6 first is more accurate in these positions, so that in the event of c5 bxc5; dxc5 occurring the bishop can come to the long diagonal in one move, but evidently Korchnoi doesn't agree) 14 h3 (quite often played, restraining ... 294, possibly enabling g4 and giving luft, although not obviously immediately necessary) 14...g6 15 We3 (defending d4 to allow De5 without being obliged to play (2xc6 after ...dxc4) at once 17...②xe5? 18 dxe5 ②d7 19 &e4. but now Black is ready for this) 18 2 df3 (more ambitious is 18 f4) 18... Dxe5 19 ②xe5 ¥e7 and Black had equalized: ...\Zed8 will be the next move.

With the rooks on c1 and e1 after 11 Lac1 Le8 12 Le8 White for no reason I can discern tends to play not 13 Le5 when Black played well in H.Dobosz-A.Kosten, Naestved, 1988: 13...dxc4 14 ②xc6 Zxc6 (14...②xc6 15 bxc4 Yd7 16 ②f3 Yb7 17 ②e5 ③xg2 18 d5 exd5 19 ③xg2 ⑥b4 is unclear) 15 bxc4 Zc7 16 ②f3 ⑥b4 17 Zf1 ②h5 18 c5 bxc5 19 ⑥b5. Kosten's 19...Zf8 now was fine, but he must have looked long and longingly at 19...c4!?.

12... \$\delta f8 13 \quad \text{fe1 g6 14 }\delta b1 \delta g7 15 \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\text{\$}\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\text{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\ext{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$}\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\deta}\$}\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\text{\$\$\exitt{\$\$\




This was Kramnik-Kasparov, Botvinnik Memorial (blitz), Moscow 2001, which is worth following a bit longer.

The two great men agree that Black's activity and e4 compensate for the crumpled pawns after 21 ②xf5 exf5 22 ¥f1 ②e4.

21...②d6 22 ②e3 ②f5 23 ②f1 ②e4 24 & xe4 dxe4

with a complex position which turned out in Black's favour in the game: a model display by Black.

Before leaving this last line; it is possible for White to be cunning and delay c4, e.g. 1 d4 2/16 2 2/1f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 2/2d3 2/2b7 5 0-0 c5 6 b3 cxd4 7 exd4 2/2e7 8 2/2b2 0-0 9 2/2bd2 2/2c6



10 a3 (pretty much necessary as 10 \(\bar{2} \)eta b4 is annoying). Black can now alter the play with 10...\(\bar{2} \)d5!?. White will surely play 11 \(\bar{2} \)eta f4 12 \(\bar{2} \)f1 and now Black can reasonably choose between the 12...\(\d5 \) 13 g3 \(\bar{2} \)g6 of D.Markosian-A.Goldin, Israel 2003, 12...\(\bar{5} \)5 13 b3 \(\bar{2} \)g6 14 c4 \(\bar{2} \)f6 of S.Polgar-L.B.Hansen, Vejstrup 1989 and 12...\(\bar{2} \)c8 8 13 g3 \(\bar{2} \)g6 14 h4 h6 15 h5 \(\bar{2} \)h8, A.Yusupov-N.Miezis, Ordix (rapid), Mainz 2002, all of which give interesting and untried play.


C)

We now look at lines beginning 1 d4 d5 2 2 f3 2 f6 3 e3. Nothing is now preventing Black from playing 3...e6, of course, but he is moving outside our repertoire in defending the ordinary Colle, and anyway it's a crime not to develop the c8-bishop now if it's possible, which it is. Black pretty much has to be prepared to play some variations of either the Slav or the QGA, and I've recommended allowing some of White's less frightening Slav lines.

1 d4 4 f6 2 f3 d5 3 e3 £f5

A littlé move order trick. I won't say it refutes the Colle in this version, but it's

certainly inconvenient enough that Colle books usually like to sweep it under the carpet. White has three approaches: he can change track and go for c2-c4 (the only way to try for anything); he can ignore Black and go for his Colle-Zukertort anyway, or he can just trade the bishop and pretend he's playing an ordinary Colle. So:




C1: 4 c4

C3: 4 &d3

C1)

1 d4 2f6 2 2f3 d5 3 e3 2f5 4 c4 c6



Colle books, if they tell you this line exists at all, normally give 4...e6, but the text simply transposes to a line of the Slav which has perhaps the solidest reputation in all of that solid opening. The immediate point is that 5 \$\mathbb{B}\$b3 \$\mathbb{B}\$b6 is nothing for White: 6 \$\mathbb{B}\$xb6 axb6 7 cxd5 \$\mathbb{D}\$xd5 8 \$\mathbb{D}\$c3 \$\mathbb{D}\$b4 and 6 cxd5 \$\mathbb{B}\$xb3 7 axb3 \$\mathbb{D}\$xd5 are both at least equal for Black. Instead White normally chooses between:


C11: 5 ዿd3 C12: 5 ፟\c3 C13: 5 cxd5

C11)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 d5 3 e3 Ձf5 4 c4 c6 5 Ձd3 Ձxd3 6 ∰xd3

If this line is too equal for you, then 5...e6 is an offbeat alternative. White's structure after an exchange on f5 and ...dxc4 is strangely ossified, and e4 is a fine square for Black.

6...e6 7 0-0 4bd7 8 4c3 &b4



To control e4. 8... 2 e7 is fine also.

9 &d2

White wants to recapture with the bishop. 9 a3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3 is fine for Black; after 10 bxc3 he should concentrate on c4, and

after 10 wxc3 developing and aiming for ...b5 is his most reliable.

9...a5

Deduct ten points for 9...0-0? 10 2xd5.

10 a3 Qe7


10...\(\exists xc3\) is fine too, but the text sets a trap which several 2600 players have missed, so why not?

11 b3

White has played many moves here: 11 e4 ②c5 is much like the text only equal, and 11...dxe4 12 ②xe4 ②xe4 13 ¥xe4 ②f6 14 ¥d3 a4 is fine too. 11 b4 0-0 12 bxa5 is also equal.

11...0-0 12 e4??

And here it is. 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\) fd1, for example, is equal.



12...9c5!

And Black wins, as in several games: 13 dxc5 dxe4 14 wxd8 Zfxd8 and Black regains the piece with a pawn as interest.


C12)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 d5 3 e3 🎎 f5 4 c4 c6 5 🖄 c3 e6 6 🖄 h4

6 **b**3 **b**6 still does nothing: in this structure White's problem is that 7 **b**2 xb6 axb6 8 cxd5 exd5 is very nice for Black,

since the a-pawn is exposed and if a3 then ...b5 followed by bringing a knight to c4 in the long term is worrying. Meanwhile 8 h4 c2 followed by ...h6 is also fine.

6....**臭e**4




Black can also play either 6... 2g4 or... 2g6.

7 f3

The main alternative is 7 \$\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{\math

7...≜g6 8 **∕**2xg6 hxg6




9 **肾b3**

After 9 g3 &d6 10 曾f2 切bd7 11 &d2

0-0 12 c5 2c7 13 f4 b6 Black was comfortable in Karpov-Shirov, Monaco (rapid) 2001, while after 9 2d3 Black can either contemplate the unclear adventure 9...dxc4 10 2xc4 2d6 11 f4 g5 or just develop with 9... 2bd7 10 f4 2e7 11 0-0, although I think he might now be well advised to play with 11...dxc4 12 2xc4 2b6 or some such, rather than the 11...0-0 12 f3 c7 13 b3 c5 of B.Chatalbashev-G.Timoscenko, Padova 1998: if White just takes the d-pawn now I don't see that Black has quite equalized.

9...⊌b6

9... as some supporters as well.



10 皇d2

10 c5 **\(\mathbb{y}\)**c7 11 **\(\mathbb{Q}\)**d2 **\(\mathbb{Q}\)**bd7 12 f4 **\(\mathbb{Q}\)**e7 was fine for Black in V.Milov-A.Hauchard, Istanbul Olympiad 2000.


10...@bd7 11 0-0-0

11 **數**xb6 axb6 12 0-0-0 **2**d6 13 h3 **2**h5 14 cxd5 exd5 15 **2**d3 0-0-0 16 **2**e2 **2**g3 was equal in S.Porat-A.Kharitonov, Chalkidiki 2003, while 11 **2**c2 **2**e7 12 0-0-0 0-0-0 13 **2**b1 **2**b8 with approximate equality would transpose to V.Tkachiev-A.Shirov, Corsica (rapid) 2003.

11... wxb3 12 axb3 âd6 13 h3 a6

Black has played a variety of other

moves, for example 13...\(\overline{Q}\)h5, 13...g5, 13...0-0 and 13...0-0-0, but the text has always done well.



14 **≜**d3

14 g4 0-0-0 15 单g2 单c7 16 量hf1 包b6 17 c5 包bd7 18 會c2 e5 19 b4 量he8 20 单e1 exd4 21 exd4 包f8 22 单f2 包e6 23 量fe1 g5, with a slight edge to Black, was another solid effort by Black in V.Cmilyte-P.Cramling, Women's European Championship (rapid) 2003, while Dautov's original idea with ...a6 was 14...量c8 15 曾b1 c5 16 cxd5 exd5 17 dxc5 单xc5 18 e4 (! — Dautov) 包e5 19 单c2 d4 20 单f4 包xf3 (with an edge for White — Dautov), although what he has against the natural 20...包c6 when Black seems to be doing fine I'm not sure.


14...0-0-0 15 &c2 &c7 16 e4 dxe4 17 fxe4 e5 18 d5 c5 19 2e2 2e8

with equality was a black model in J.Lautier-P.Cramling, Bundesliga 2003.

C13) 1 d4 Øf6 2 Øf3 d5 3 e3 &f5 4 c4 c6 5 cxd5

Mark Hebden has been using this a lot recently, which is always a recommendation, although it does seem that Black might now have the answer.


5...cxd5 6 **營b3 營c7**



7 **≜**d2

This is the idea: a sort of Slav Exchange Reversed. Nothing stops White playing 7 2c3 e6 8 2d2 2c6 9 2b5 2e7 (better than 9...2d6 as 10 2c1 0-0? loses to 2xc6 and 2b5, so Black has to stop for 10...2b8) 10 0-0 0-0 11 2fc1 2fc8 12 2e5 2g4 as in A.Yusupov-P.Nikolic, Belgrade 1991, but White has nothing here.


7...e6 8 &b5+



8...9\bd7

What White wants is the line 8... 20c6 9 0-0 20d6 10 20b4 with hopes of a technical edge on the queenside dark squares.

This is perfectly possible but the text is easier.




9 0-0

9 2c3 a6 10 2c1 is Hebden's latest try, but in M.Hebden-A.Ledger, British League 2005, Black equalized easily with 10... 4b6 11 4d8 12 2c2 2d6 13 0-0, when apart from the game's solid 13...h6, seeking the initiative with 13...b5 14 4d1 2c4 was also a possibility.

9...a6 10 &xd7+ 42xd7 11 42e5

Richard Palliser gave this an exclamation mark in *Play 1 d4!*, but I'm not convinced.



11...罩c8

Palliser doesn't mention 11...\(\exists c2\); both he and Houska must have had something

in mind but I confess I don't see what it

12 4 c3 **≜d6** 13 **ac**1


At this point Black rather rashly played 13...②c5 in R.Palliser-J.Houska, British League 2003. Instead 13...②xe5 14 dxe5 3 b8 was extremely equal.

C2)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 d5 3 e3 🚉 f5 4 🚉 e2

This can't be good. White plays one of Black's less accurate lines against the London System with colours reversed. Still, he has that extra tempo, and White can't be worse. An excellent example from Black's viewpoint was S.Kasparov-S.Vysochin, Kiev 2000, which went

4...c6 5 0-0 h6 6 b3 e6 7 Ձb2 ፭bd7 8 ፭bd2 Ձd6 9 ፭e5 0-0 10 ፭df3 ≝c7 11 c4 a5 12 ፭xd7 ፭xd7 13 a3 Ձg4




with at least equality for Black, whose moves are too natural really to require any comment. (The rest of this game is well worth playing through if you can find it.)

C3)

1 d4 4)f6 2 4)f3 d5 3 e3 1f5 4 2d3

This is a tamer version of Line C11, if

such a thing is possible. Obviously it is nothing to be alarmed by, but if you can't face it, a useful move order trick is 3...c6, when 4 c4 \(\extstyle f5 \) is C1, 4 \(\extstyle e2 \) \(\extstyle f5 \) is C2 and 4 \(\extstyle d3 \) can be met by 4...\(\extstyle g4.




4.... **xd3**

4...e6 is a perfectly reasonable alternative and is quite tempting.

5 **資xd3**


 in M.Annaberdiev-S.Erenburg, World Junior Ch, Goa 2002.



This position is also extremely equal, not to mention dull, although in N.Saleh-M.Al Sayed, Dubai 2003, White now enlivened it by falling for 15 \(\hat{L}g5?\) \(\hat{D}e5!\) and should really have lost.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Veresov




1 d4 4 f6 2 4 c3 d5 3 &g5

The Veresov Opening. This can arise either by the move order given or by 1 d4 d5 2 2c3 2f6 3 2g5: in the latter case Black has some options but I'm going to assume the same position arises.

White pays no heed to the ancient trope about blocking one's c-pawn in the d-pawn openings: we can assume that his plan involves playing e4, either at once after f2-f3 or \$\mathbb{u}\$d3, or after a more stately build-up with e2-e3. White can also start with 3 \$\mathbb{Q}\$f3, which perhaps leaves him rather better placed against 3...\$\mathbb{L}\$f5, when 4 \$\mathbb{L}\$g5 e6 allows Black a formation he can't quite get in the Veresov proper, and should make for a fairly easy life.

After 3 £g5 the first issue for Black is whether to take any notice of the 'threat' £xf6: the traditional main line is 3... 2bd7 but instead I'm recommending taking immediate action against White's e4 idea, and exploiting the blocking of the c3-square, with

3...c5



White doesn't have to play 4 £xf6 now, although that, followed either by 5 e4 or 5 e3, is the traditional move; he can be more temperate with 4 e3, or lash out incontinently with 4 e4. Two things he shouldn't do are 4 dxc5? d4 or 4 £153 £2e4, both of which are at least equal for Black.

A: 4 🕸 xf6

B: 4 e3


C: 4 e4?!

A)

1 d4 4 f6 2 4 c3 d5 3 1g5 c5 4

≜xf6 gxf6


Of course 4...exf6 is daft in conjunction with ...c5; White has a nice game with pressure on d5.



After 4...gxf6 White has a choice.

A1: 5 e4 A2: 5 e3 A3: 5 ∕∆f3


A1) 1 d4 �f6 2 �c3 d5 3 �g5 c5 4 �xf6 gxf6



5 e4

This tends to be what Veresov books concentrate on, although in truth I think the main question in this position is whether White can emerge from the opening at all.

5...dxe4



6 dxc5

6 d5 is also possible so long as White doesn't mind being a pawn down for nothing; M.Hebden-V.Milov, Port Erin 1995 continued 6...f5 7 營h5 (I wonder if the untried 7 f3!? might be better) 7.... 2g7 8 ②ge2 營b6 9 0-0-0 營h6+ and Black not surprisingly won, while C.Hoi-A.Ornstein, Malmö 1979 had the same result after 8 ②b5+ 含f8 9 ②h3 營d6 10 0-0 a6 11 ②e2 營g6 12 宣fd1 ②d7 13 營h4 ②f6 14 營f4 宣g8 15 g3 ②e5 (in fact every game after 6 d5 has had the same result, bar one draw).

6...f5


6... a5 is good too, but the text more or less obliges White to accept the worse endgame straight away.

7 Yxd8+

The alternatives are worse:

a) White was crushed in I.Miladinovic-S.Smagin, Montreal 2000 after 7 兔b5+ 兔d7 (always better than ... ②d7 as a means of blocking checks in these lines) 8 ②ge2 (8 兔xd7+ ②xd7 9 營d5 e6 10 營xb7 墓b8 11 營xa7 兔xc5 12 營a4 墓g8 –

b) 7 Wh5 is a usual sort of move.




Now I like 7... 2g7 8 2b5+ (8 2c4 2xc3+! 9 bxc3 e6 10 省h6 公d7 11 2b5 省a5 12 省f6 其f8 was winning for Black in Z.Mestrovic-J.Banas, Keszthely 1981) 8... 公c6 9 公ge2 0-0 (C.Perdomo-M.Narciso Dublan, Foment Martinenc 1996), when White started to collapse after 10 五d1 省a5 11 0-0 省b4. However, the more sensible 10 0-0 省a5 11 a3 省c7 would have transposed to the old (and model) game Z.Mestrovic-S.Gligoric, Hastings 1971, in which Black had the edge after 12 b4 2e6 13 二ad1 二ad8, when White could find nothing better than 14 2a4 a5 15 公b5 省e5.

c) 7 g4 seems to be strongly met by 7... \$\mathbb{\text{w}}\ a5\$, since 8 \$\mathbb{\text{w}}\ d4 \$\mathbb{\text{Lg8}}\ 9 b4? loses to 9... \$\mathbb{\text{c}}\ c6 10 \$\mathbb{\text{c}}\ b5 \$\mathbb{\text{w}}\ xb5 11 \$\mathbb{\text{c}}\ xb5 \$\mathbb{\text{c}}\ xd4\$ (Davies), while 9 \$\mathbb{\text{c}}\ b5+ (Palliser) also seems to leave Black comfortably better after 9... \$\mathbb{\text{d}}\ d7 10 b4 (or 10 \$\mathbb{\text{c}}\ xd7+ \$\mathbb{\text{c}}\ xd7 11 \$\mathbb{\text{d}}\ d1 0-0-0, but White's development is

looking alarmingly shabby here) 10... d8 11 \(\hat{2}\text{xd7} + \hat{2}\text{xd7} \) 12 \(\hat{2}\text{xd7} \) 2xd7 13 gxf5 \(\hat{2}\text{g7} \) 14 \(\hat{2}\text{ge2} \) a5. Meanwhile 8 \(\hat{2}\text{d5} \) \(\hat{2}\text{g7} \) 9 \(\hat{2}\text{b5} + \hat{2}\text{d7} \) 10 0-0-0? \(\hat{2}\text{xb5}! \) is also terrible for White.

d) 7 f3 \(\hat{2}\)g7 8 \(\bar{\text{w}}\)xd8+ transposes below; White doesn't have much choice since 8 fxe4? \(\hat{2}\)xc3+ and ...\(\bar{\text{w}}\)xd1+ is good for Black, and 8 \(\hat{2}\)ge2 \(\bar{\text{w}}\)a5 9 fxe4 \(\hat{2}\)c6 is already looking ominous.

7...**∲**xd8




8 0-0-0+

8 \(\begin{aligned}
 &\text{d}\) 1+ \(\beta\) d7 9 \(\beta\) c4 e6 was played in M.Vasilev-M.Krasenkow, Kavala 2001, with the same sort of position as the text: in the game White now lost it with 10 g4? fxg4 11 \(\beta\) xe4 \(\beta\)e7.

8...**≜**d7 9 g4

White has to tackle the pawns, and 9 f3 \(\textstyle g7 \) doesn't do any good – the trouble is that the threat of\(\textstyle xc3 \) compels some ugly move now; either 10 \(\textstyle ge2 \) exf3 11 gxf3 \(\textstyle a6 \) with an edge for Black (B.Heberla-G.Gajewski, Bartkowa 2002) or 10 \(\textstyle b5 \) (N.Van der Matt-H.Jonkman, Alphen aan der Rijn 1995), when 10...\(\textstyle g8 \) or 10...\(\textstyle a6 \) are both nice for Black.


Meanwhile 9 **2c**4 e6 10 g4 fxg4 11 ②xe4 **2e**7 (D.Floreen-L.Alburt, New York 1993), is similar to Vasilev-Krasenkow above, while 9 \$\&\text{b5}\$ \$\oting{\text{\text{C}}}\$c6 would transpose to T.Vogler-M.Krasenkow, Germany 2002, in which Black was again better after 10 f3 \$\oxed{\text{Lg}}\$8 11 g3 \$\oxed{\text{Lg}}\$7 (Black refuses as usual to develop White's men by ...exf3) 12 fxe4 \$\oxed{\text{Lx}}\$xc3 13 bxc3 fxe4 14 \$\oxed{\text{Lx}}\$xc6 bxc6 15 \$\oxed{\text{Ld4}}\$\oxed{\text{Lg5}}.



9....≜h6+

This was Ruslan Sherbakov's choice, but 9...fxg4 10 ②xe4 ③c7, planning to bring the bishop to c6, was also strong – ... ②xc5 may yet be a useful resource.

10 🕸 b1 💄 g7




11 **∕**∆ge2

11 gxf5 **Q**xc3 12 bxc3 **Q**e8 13 **Q**d4 **Q**xf5 14 **Q**d7 is winning for Black.

11...fxg4 12 ②xe4 ②c6

12...\$\dot\end{a}e8, aiming for...\$\dot\end{a}c6, was also good.

13 h3 ஓc7 14 ົົົົົົIf4 ≌ae8 15 ົົົົId5+ \$c8




and Black, with his sounder pawns and the two bishops, was better (S.Wielecki-R.Sherbakov, Polanica Zdroj 1998).

A2)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 c3 d5 3 🕸 g5 c5 4 \$\prec{1}{2}\$ xf6 gxf6 5 e3

A much more sensible proposition in my view; White plays as in a Chigorin reversed.

5...∕∆c6




The received wisdom of the ages holds

that this is a mistake because of White's reply, but practice has seen careless Whites mated rather regularly and even the more prudent getting nowhere in particular, and it's noticeable that some shrewd Veresov practitioners – Hort, for example – generally steer clear of this line.

6 \(\mathbb{\text{Wh5}}\)

Whether this is good or bad, it is certain that nothing else upsets Black's equilibrium much, for example 6 包f3 cxd4 7 exd4 皇g4 8 皇e2 e6 9 0-0 罩c8 10 罩e1 皇b4 11 營d2 0-0 12 罩ad1 含h8 13 營h6 罩g8, M.Levin-E.Lazarev, Ukraine 1954.

6...cxd4 7 exd4 e6



8 0-0-0 &d7


The most flexible. Black can also play 8... b4 at once, but the king's bishop may find other squares whereas the queen's bishop never will.

9 Øge2 Ձb4 10 h4

I take this as the main line because Rogozenko advertised its merits in *Secrets of Opening Surprises 2*.


The first game in this line was Pasman-Schneider, Beersheva 1980, which even today cannot be bettered as a 'gruesome warning' (Bellin) – 10 g4 We7 11 f4 0-0-0 12 \(\delta\)g2 (rarely a good idea in this set-up;

it asks for... 2a5-c4) 12... 2a5 13 \(\bar{2} \)d3



13...②c4 14 \$\delta\$b1 \$\delta\$b8 15 b3 ②a3+ 16 \$\delta\$b2 \$\delta\$c8 17 \$\delta\$e3 \$\delta\$b5 18 \$\delta\$e1 \$\delta\$c7 19 \$\delta\$h3 \$\delta\$a5 20 \$\delta\$c1 \$\delta\$c7 and White resigned, being too disgusted to wait for ...\$\delta\$hc8. White was also mated in O.Sagalchik-I.Krush, Seattle 2003 after 13...\$\delta\$b8 14 f5 \$\delta\$c8 15 \$\delta\$f1 \$\delta\$c4 16 \$\delta\$h6 \$\delta\$hf8 17 h4 \$\delta\$a8 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 \$\delta\$df3 \$\delta\$c7, although this position is still unclear and at least this time White managed to make some moves on the kingside.


10 f4 is most simply met by 10...f5 (Davies), e.g. 11 g4 fxg4 12 \widetilde{\pi}xg4 \widetilde{\pi}f6 with an equal position. 10 \widetilde{\pi}d3 needs a little care: 10...\widetilde{\pi}e7??



loses to 11 Ze3. Instead C.Weiss-

I.Farago, Austrian League 1999 went 10...②e7 11 單f3 ②g6 12 罩e3 盒c6 13 f4 盒xc3 14 罩xc3 f5 with a position which probably looks better for White than it is; Black continued with ...徵d6, ...0-0-0, ...當b8, ...②e7-g8-f6-e4,童e8 and ...f6, and won handily.

10... 響e7 11 罩h3 0-0-0 12 罩e3




This is White's idea.

12... ッf8

White is better here according to Rogozenko, but the game G.Mohr-I.Farago, Bled 2001, didn't show this.

13 g3 ⊈b8 14 ②f4 ②e7 15 ≜h3 ②c8 16 a3 ≜d6




Black has manoeuvred steadily, and a normal continuation like 17 ②ce2 ②b6

18 罩c3 豐g7 19 含b1 f5 20 臭g2 罩c8 is approximately equal. Instead White went in for

17 ②fxd5 exd5 18 Ձxd7 罩xd7 19 ②xd5 ∰d8 20 ∰f3

White must have had some resources here I can't see, because 20... 2c7 21 c4 b6, trying to hold on to his third pawn, looks well possible for Black to me. Instead there came

20... ge7 21 Øxe7 Øxe7 22 ₩xf6



and now

22... 公c6 23 營xd8+

led to an ending in which the players immediately agreed a draw, although as Palliser points out either side could still play for a win.


A3)

1 d4 Øf6 2 Øc3 d5 3 **2**g5 c5 4 **2**xf6 gxf6 5 Øf3

This is not a move to which Veresov theorists have given any attention, but Davies suggested a very interesting possibility after it.

5...@c6 6 e4!?


This is Davies' idea. 6 e3 transposes to Levin-Lazarev above, and the likes of 6 g3 don't make much impression either. Instead White follows John Watson's dictum that the player who has acquired the knight pair must immediately strive to destabilize the position.



6...dxe4

Not the only move. 6...cxd4 7 ②xd4 dxe4 8 ②xc6 bxc6 9 ¥xd8+ \$xd8 10 ②xe4 §f5 11 0-0-0+ \$c7 (Palliser) is probably about equal also. Even the surrealist 6...e5 might be possible, e.g. 7 dxe5 d4 8 ②d5 fxe5 followed by ...\$e6, ...\$g7 and ...0-0, or 7 dxc5 d4 8 ②d5 §xc5 9 c3 9 \$c4 \$e6 10 ②d2 ②b4!?) 9...\$e6 (10 \$b3 0-0; 10 b4 \$d6).

7 d5 exf3




8 dxc6

Davies' idea was 8...fxg2 9 ≜xg2 ¥b6

10 營行 置b8 11 0-0-0 魚h6+ 12 含b1 bxc6 13 ②a4 with an edge for White. The line 8... 營xd1+?! 9 罩xd1 魚h6 10 ②d5 0-0 11 cxb7 魚xb7 12 gxf3 含h8 13 鱼e2 罩ad8 gave Black an edge in K.Gasparian-D.Arutunian, Batumi 2003, but 11 gxf3 含h8 12 鱼e2 would have given White slightly the better of it.

8...**.**≜h6

Richard Palliser's move. Since 9 \(\hat{L}\) b5 0-0 is dangerous for him now, White has nothing better than



and now Black can continue the struggle in a two-edged semi-ending after 13...\$\displace b8 14 gxf3 \displace f5, or draw at once with 13...\$\displace c6.

R

1 d4 �f6 2 �c3 d5 3 ₤g5 c5 4 e3

White waits to see whether \hat{\mathbb{L}}\xf6 is a good idea.


4...∮)c6

Black is not troubled by the prospect of 5 \(\hat{L}\)xf6 gxf6, transposing to Line A2.

5 🖄 f3


White has some other moves:

a) In Sollers-Tukmakov, Malta 1980 the unfortunate White player wrote his name into Veresov theory with 5 dxc5?! e6 6 ②a4?? 響a5+7 c3 b5!,



but I think the poor fellow's suffered enough over the years, so I won't show you the remaining six moves.

- b) Speelman's 5 a3 is perhaps best met with 5...cxd4 6 exd4 £f5, when J.Lys-P.Pisk, Czech Championship 1992 went 7 £d3 2xd4 8 £xf5 2xf5 9 £xf6 gxf6 10 \text{\text{wxd5}} \text{\text{wxd5}} 11 2xd5 0-0-0 with at least equality for Black.
 - c) 5 &b5 was Korchnoi's choice:




5...a6 now is quite possible but also sensible is 5...e6 6 ②f3 ②e7, after which A.Kogan-S.Savchenko, Cappelle la Grande

1995 went on 7 0-0 0-0 8 dxc5 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$xc5 9 \$\wallet{\text{w}}\$e2 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$e7 10 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$fd1 a6 11 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$d3 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$d7! (a manoeuvre to note) 12 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$xe7 \$\widetilde{\text{w}}\$xe7 with equality.

5...**≜**g4

Very solid is 5...cxd4 6 exd4 \(\hat{2}\)g4, but the text allows for a little more interest.




6 dxc5

6 & xf6 gxf6 7 & e2 e6 8 0-0 f5 is fine for Black after either 9 dxc5 & xc5 10 dd (C.Hoi-J.Kristiansen, Naestved 1985), and now perhaps 10... g5 rather than the game's 10...h5!?, or 9 = cxd4 10 dxd4 & xe2 11 wxe2 & g7 (Y.Zilberman-D.Rotman, Rishon le Ziyyon 1993). Meanwhile 6 & e2 e6 is comfortable.

6...e6 7 h3

According to Davies, Hort said that 7 ②a4 was critical here, but if so I think he was wrong – after 7...②xf3 White suffers a sort of mini-Sollers disaster: 8 gxf3 ③a5+9 c3 b5 10 cxb6 axb6 11 ④b3 (11 b4 ②xb4!) 11...④xa4 12 ④xa4 ③xa4 13 ②b5 ③c4 with a plus for Black, and 9 ②c3 ③xc5 is also pretty unpleasant.


Other moves give nothing, e.g. 7 \$\oldsymbol{\infty} b5?! \oldsymbol{\infty} xc5 8 \oldsymbol{\infty} xf6 gxf6 9 \oldsymbol{\infty} bd4 \oldsymbol{\infty} xd4! \$10 \text{ exd4} \oldsymbol{\vec{w}} b6 \text{ with an edge, R.Eidelson-A,Bezgodov, Minsk 1996, or 7 \oldsymbol{\infty} e2



8...₩a5

I don't see a lot wrong with 8...\(\hat{2}\)xc5 either; both moves are about equal.


9 &xf6 gxf6



10 **臭b**5

10 ₩xf6 \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\be

10...f5 11 0-0 &xc5




C)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②c3 d5 3 ②g5 c5 4 e4?!
And why not?!

4...9xe4 5 9xe4 dxe4 6 d5

Objectively 6 dxc5 is probably more sensible, when Black's easiest method is 6... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}a5+7\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}d2\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}xd2+8\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{L}}xd2}\$ e5, with a good game after either 9 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}}e3\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}}e7\$ (M.Douven-Bu Xiangzhi, Budapest 1999) or 9 b4 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}}e6\$.

6....**對b**6



This move, first played it appears by Yuri Yakovich, seems to be best, aiming to prevent White from setting up with \$\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{W}}}\d2 and 0-0-0.\$ The two alternatives both allow White possibilities which have not yet been tried, 6...g6 7 c3!?, and 6...\Dd7 7 \$\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{W}}}\d2 g6 8 \$\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{W}}}\c3!?: it seems to me that both of these give White a better chance of equality than he deserves.


7 9e2

In S.Rocha-Y.Yakovich, San Antonio 1999, White submitted to 7 b3 but Black was soon on the verge of winning: 7...g6 8 d2 2g7 9 c1 2d7 10 2e2 2f6 11 2g3 0-0 12 2e2 d8 13 c4 e6 14 2xf6 2xf6 15 2xe4, although according to the database Black now played 15...exd5?! rather than 15...2d4, when White ought to have tried 16 2xf6+ wxf6 17 exd5 with chances to defend.

7...g6

Commentators are united in declaring that 7... **xb2 leaves White with inadequate compensation, and no doubt they're right, but the text is easier and doesn't let White have the sort of game he wants.

8 ≝b1 Ձg7 9 �c3 f5



Certainly! Black should at least force White to make it a real gambit if he wants to remove the cramping e4-pawn.

10 &e2 h6

Black could also consider ...②d7, ...a6 and ...豐d6, e.g. 10...②d7 11 0-0 a6 12 豐d2 豐d6 13 f3 (13 a4 ②e5) exf3 14 ②xf3 b5 15 ②f4 ②d4+ 16 含h1 ②e5 17 ②xe5 ②xe5 with a plus for Black.


11 &e3 4 d7 12 0-0

After 12 wd2 Black would have had to try the above-mentioned plan, which probably still retains some edge for him.

12...0-0

I still rather like 12...a6.


13 營d2 含h7 14 f3 exf3 15 息xf3 營a5



15... ②f6 is met by 16 b4, After 15... ¥a5 I'm not sure about this position for Black - White has managed to acquire compensation for his pawn. In G.Sagalchik-D.Ariel, US Championship, Seattle 2002 White now played 16 We2 and Black took the remarkable view to play 16... £xc3 17 bxc3 \subseteq xc3. White has many attacking possibilities after that, although of course the position is still rather unclear. Instead, according to both Davies and Finkel, after 16... 16 White can sacrifice a piece with 17 £f4!? allowing 17...g5. I must say I don't see this myself, but a quiet continuation like 17 &f2 still leaves White with a good deal of compensation for his pawn.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Blackmar-Diemer Gambit




The Blackmar-Diemer Gambit (or BDG) comes in two forms, although in either case White is aiming for the same position. The first is 1 d4 d5 2 e4 dxe4 3 2c3 2f6 4 f3, and the second is 1 d4 2f6 2 2c3 d5 3 e4 dxe4 4 f3.

The BDG is one of those things you have to be practical about. There's no doubt it is objectively weak, and that 4...exf3 is the best move. However, for some reason the BDG attracts the most fanatical followers of any opening, bar none. If you've ever felt that wounded tigresses can be a little overprotective of their cubs, hop over to one of the numerous BDG websites and venture the view that you've always wondered whether perhaps the gambit is unsound and that maybe the Catalan is a better bet for long-term pressure.

You aren't going to face it more than once or twice in a chess lifetime, you are – unlike your opponent – hardly likely to have more than a dim recollection of the theory, and sod's law dictates that this happy event will probably occur in the

third Saturday game of a weekender, when few of us are at our sharpest tactically. In these circumstances, if you run into some knife-wielding maniac with a glint in his eye and a yard of BDG workbooks on his shelf at home, then by all means take his pawn, but don't blame me if one slip sees you getting torched.

Witness the following debacle: 1 d4 \$\times\$ fo 2 \$\times\$ c3 d5 3 e4 dxe4 4 f3 exf3 5 \$\times\$ xf3 e6 6 \$\times\$ g5 \$\times\$ e7 7 \$\times\$ d3 \$\times\$ bd7 8 0-0 0-0 9 \$\times\$ e1 c5 10 \$\times\$ h4 g6



You can't say that Black's moves haven't been at least a little bit natural, but

unfortunately he is already lost: 11 ②e5 ③e8 12 ②xf7 營c7 13 ②xg6 hxg6 14 營h8+ 含f7 15 營h7+ 含f8 16 ②h6 mate (M.Houska-D.Moskovic, Smith & Williamson Young Masters, Witley 1999). The loser here had a rating of 2260, so evidently it's not quite as simple as all that.

No. We need something which will be simple to learn, will give Black a decent shot at the initiative, and above all will spoil White's fun. Call me cowardly, but I suggest that Black doesn't allow White's target position to arise at all. The exact evasive action I propose depends on the move order White chooses:

A: 1 d4 d5 2 e4

B: 1 d4 Øf6 2 Øc3 d5 3 e4

A)


1 d4 d5 2 e4 dxe4 3 40c3

This, by the way, is where the Diemer bit comes in. Blackmar used to play 3 f3 in the nineteenth century, but after 3...e5 (a move known since the 1890s at least) Black is already better, for example 4 dxe5 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\text{xd1} + 5 \(\mathbb{\text{e}}\text{xd1} \(\mathbb{\text{C}}\text{c6} 6 \(\mathbb{\text{e}}\text{f4} \(\mathbb{\text{Cge7}}\text{.}\)
The move 3 \(\mathbb{\text{C}}\text{c3}\text{ was Diemer's refinement, although he was by no means the first to propose it.

3...e5

This goes by the marvellous name of the Lemberger Counter-Gambit (although in fact Black isn't gambiting anything) but in spite of that it is perfectly sound.


White has tried many moves here, although 4 Wh5, the Sneiders Attack (the BDG abounds as no other opening with these tags) is the main hope for BDG fans.



A1: 4 ≝h5 A2: 4 ②ge2 A3: 4 ②xe4 A4: 4 Others

A1) 1 d4 d5 2 e4 dxe4 3 ②c3 e5 4 營h5 ②c6

4...exd4 is possible also, but as you know by now my churlish attitude is that BDG exponents should not be allowed to have even the modicum of fun provided by 5 &c4 \$\mathrew{e}\$e7 6 &g5 and so on.




5 dxe5

This is really the only sensible move: 5 d5? 🖄 f6 is terrible, and 5 🎍 b5 exd4 is

not much better after either 6 &xc6+bxc6 7 營e5+ &e6 8 ②xe4 營d5, or 7 ②xe4 營e7 8 營e2 &f5 9 f3 區b8. Here 6 ②xe4 &e6 is a little better, but Black is still basically a pawn up for nothing.

5... \$b4 6 \$d2



7... 2d4 8 ₩d1

The idea of White's two-step with the queen is to force Black to block the d4-square and thus avoid 7 👑d1 👑d4, when White is struggling for equality, for example 8 a3 âa5 9 âb5 âd7 10 👑e2 👑xe5 11 2xe4 0-0-0 or 9 2ge2 👑xe5 10 b4 âb6 11 âf4 👑g7.

8... g f5 9 g e3

This has the blessing of theory, such as it is, but actually I wonder whether White might not have more chances with 9 \(\begin{align*} \beg

bishop before tackling the d4-knight with ②ge2 and ②e3.


9...c5

This was suggested by Prie on ChessPublishing.com instead of the very drawish 9...\(\int\)c6, and it seems to give Black good chances to play for the advantage.

10 ** ②**ge2

10 a3 ⊈xc3+ 11 bxc3 ¥a5 is nice for Black.

10...**營a**5




Black has some nice tactical points in mind:

- b) 11 \(\hat{\omega}\) xd4 0-0-0! 12 a3 transposes to note 'a'.
- c) 11 ②xd4 0-0-0 forces White to give up the queen speculatively with 12 ②db5.

A2)

1 d4 d5 2 e4 dxe4 3 ②c3 e5 4 ②ge2 f5



With this move Black forces a semiending where he has good chances to play for the advantage. After 4...exd4 5 豐xd4 (not 5 ②xd4? 鱼b4 when White has nothing) 豐xd4 6 ②xd4 ②f6 7 鱼g5 鱼e7 8 0-0-0 0-0 9 鱼xf6 鱼xf6 10 ②xe4 White has a shade the better of a very drawish position.

5 dxe5 營xd1+ 6 含xd1

6 ②xd1 ②c6 is worse as the forced 7 \$\hat{2}\$f4 \$\hat{2}\$e6 leaves e5 horribly weak.


6...9c6

6...c6 is also possible, but I like the idea of luring the bishop to f4 with this move.

7 🖄 b5

7 \bigcirc d5 \bigcirc d8 achieves nothing, e.g. 8 \bigcirc g5+ \bigcirc ge7.

7...**ġ**d8 8 **ዿ**f4 a6 9 **⊘**bd4 **⊘**ge7




Black's idea is to proceed with ... 2xd4 and ... 2g6, and hope to prove that the e5-pawn is weak. This position has not been tested, but I think it offers reasonable prospects for Black.

A3)

1 d4 d5 2 e4 dxe4 3 40c3 e5 4 40xe4

White insists on being a pawn down, but this is even less promising than the gambit proper. Nonetheless, this move was the choice of the best player ever to play the BDG, the great Paul Keres. For some reason most of the high-rated games in the databases are in fact errors and arose from the Burn French, for example Sergei Tiviakov did not venture the BDG against Julian Hodgson in the Holland-England match at the Istanbul Olympiad in 2000, and Julian did not introduce the previously untested 4... 2d7?! in this position.

4... yxd4



5 **拿d3**


The miserable 5 \(\mathbb{\matha}\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\math

favour of 6...\$ f5, for example 7 \$\d3\$ \$\partial 3 \text{0} 48 0-0-0?! \$\partial 5 \text{b4!}.

5...公c6 6 公f3 營d5 7 營e2

7 ②c3 ②b4 8 ②d2 ③xc3 9 ③xc3 ③g4, or 7 0-0 ②g4 8 h3 ③h5 (Black should not give up this pin) 9 ②c3 豐a5 10 ②e4 ②d6; in either case Black will shortly consolidate with …②e7 and …f6.

7…皇g4 8 皇c4 營d7 9 皇e3 0-0-0 10 h3 皇h5 11 0-0



This was O.Lie-P.Lindblom, correspondence 1965, in which Black continued with 11...\$\omegad6 12 \boxed{\pma}ad1 and now fell for 12...\$\omega\gegre{2}\text{9e7}? 13 \omegac5! and lost ingloriously. Instead at this point it was time to be brave with 11...\$\text{f5}\$, after which 12 \omegac9\text{eg5}\$\omega=8 13 \omegad1 \omegad1 \omegac0 d5 is very good for Black, and the point is 12 \omegad1 \omegatad1 \omegaxf3! 13 gxf3 (13 \omegaxf3 xf3 fxe4, of course) when something like 13...\omegac7 14 \omegaxf3 xd8 + \omegaxf3 xd8 15 \omegac5 c3 \omegac6 c6 leaves Black with all the chances.

A4)

1 d4 d5 2 e4 dxe4 3 4 c3 e5 4 \(\darksquare{2} e3 \)

White can also try 4 d5, when Black can hold onto his pawn for the moment with 4...f5, for example 5 f3 \$\oldsymbol{2}\$b4 6 \$\oldsymbol{2}\$d2 (6 fxe4?? loses to 6...\bigwh4+, S.Samuel-


sson-J.Hector, Stockholm 1993) after which Black should focus on developing quickly and restraining White's queen's bishop rather than hanging on to his pawn, thus 6...c6 7 dxc6 ②xc6 8 &b5 &d7 9 a3 e3 10 &xe3 &xc3+ 11 bxc3 at 12 &d3 f4 followed by ...②f6 and ...0-0 with advantage rather than 6...②f6 7 fxe4 fxe4 8 &c4 0-0 9 a3, which is nothing like so clear.

4 dxe5 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\text{xd1} + \text{ is obviously feeble and after either 5 \(\mathbb{\text{x}}\text{xd1}\) \(\mathbb{\text{Q}}\text{c6 or 5}\) \(\mathbb{\text{Q}}\text{xd1}\) \(\mathbb{\text{Q}}\text{c6}\) (6 \(\mathbb{\text{Q}}\text{c3}\text{?}\) \(\mathbb{\text{D}}\text{b4}\!) Black is slightly better.

4...exd4 5 ₩xd4

5 &xd4 ②c6 6 &b5 &d7 is nice for Black, especially since 7 ②xe4 豐e7 pretty much wins for him, and 7 ②ge2 豐h4! is a good move.

5... wxd4 6 ≜xd4 5\c6 7 0-0-0




Or 7 2 b5 2 d7 with an edge for Black. After 7 0-0-0, 7... Ad4 was played in G.Baete-M.Dutreeuw, Antwerp 2000), but I think that Black ought to have preferred 7... 55. White is then struggling to recover his pawn at all, and if he does will surely concede Black the two bishops and a promising lead in development, for example 8 2 b5 2 ge7 9 2 e5 2 c8, or 9 2 ge2 0-0-0.

B)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 c3 d5 3 e4 🖄 xe4

This is the Hubsch Defence. It has a very sound positional base: Black's idea is that after

4 @xe4 dxe4



B1: 5 &c4 B2: 5 &e3 B3: 5 f3

B1)

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②c3 d5 3 e4 ②xe4 4 ②xe4 dxe4 5 &c4 ②c6

Even 5...e5 is not bad – 6 **\mathbb{\m**

₩xe5 ②c6 is fine for Black.

6 c3 e5 7 d5 he7 8 f3 exf3

I'm not quite so convinced by Eric Prie's 'refutation' of the BDG, 8... \$\sigma f5\$, which he advocated on his (excellent) site on ChessPublishing.com. After 9 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{o}}} \oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{o}} \oldsymbol{o} \


9 4 xf3 c6!

This is the key move.

10 **∮**0xe5

Worse is 10 d6 包f5 11 包xe5 豐h4+, and 10 0-0 包xd5 11 包xe5 兔e6 12 豐h5 豐c7 also leaves White no compensation.

10...公xd5 11 營e2 皇e7 12 皇e3 皇e6 13 0-0 0-0 14 罩ad1 營c7



These moves weren't forced, but they seem like a sensible way to develop, and really White doesn't have anything like enough for his pawn here.

B2)

1 d4 🖄f6 2 🖄c3 d5 3 e4 🖄xe4 4 🖄xe4 dxe4 5 âe3 âf5

White's last was directed against ...e5 ideas since he can now take on e5 and recapture on d1 with the rook, so Black changes course and defends the e-pawn.


6 g4

White could play many moves here, but I am following a game of one of the more dangerous US exponents of the gambit, and this thrust is normally considered necessary.

6...**å**g6 7 🖄e2

7 h4 fared no better in T.Stevens-L.Remlinger, Concord 1995 after 7...h5 8 g5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)f5 9 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e2 e6 10 c3 c6 11 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g4 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xe2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xe2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xe4 when Black was better; later he predictably managed to exchange his bishop for the knight and manoeuvre the knight to f5 with carnage following.

7...e6 8 h4 h6 9 分f4 臭h7




All very natural, and really I'm not sure what White is meant to do now. In C.Diebert-E.Kostur, Columbus 1987, 10 g5 &f5 11 ②h5 ②d7 12 gxh6 gxh6 13 ②g3 ¥f6 14 ¥d2 led to a position in which Black should have taken the bull by

the horns and played 14...0-0-0. No doubt he was afraid of something to do with \$\mathbb{w}\$a5, but 15 \$\mathbb{w}\$a5 \$\mathbb{c}\$b8 doesn't in fact achieve anything for White, and Black is considerably better with his extra pawn, the cramping one on e4, and decent development. I'm not convinced by 10 g5 but I don't see that, say 10 \$\mathbb{w}\$e2 c6 11 0-0-0 \$\mathbb{c}\$e7 is all that much better; Black is basically a pawn up with no particular problems.

B3)


1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 c3 d5 3 e4 🖄 xe4 4 🖄 xe4 dxe4 5 f3?! e5!



It was for the sake of this move that Black exchanged knights, or should have been. The struggle for equality is already over for White and he is searching for drawing chances, e.g. 6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e3 (Lane) 6...exd4 (and not Lane's absurd 6...exf3) 7 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd4 (or 7 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd4 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c6 when White is already looking at a gruelling struggle for a draw) 7...\(\frac{1}{2}\)c6 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd1 + 9 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd1 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b4 when White is virtually lost, or (probably best) the miserable 6 dxe5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd1 \(\frac{1}{2}\)f3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c6 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d8 may still offer White some chances to hold on. 6 d5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c5 is horrible, of course.

CHAPTER NINE

Anti-Benoni Lines



1 d4 Øf6 2 c4 e6 3 Øf3 c5


This chapter is intended for those like to play the Benoni but aren't man enough to allow the Taimanov Attack and other critical variations and instead seek to slide into the Benoni by the move order above, preferring to meet 3 2c3 with the Nimzo. If White doesn't want to let Black get away with this scheme then he has a couple of ways of refusing to play along with 4 d5: these break down really into defending the d-pawn with e2-e3 (A), or planning to recapture on d4 with a knight and probably to fianchetto the king's bishop (B and C).

A: 4 e3 B: 4 g3 C: 4 ②c3

A) 1 d4 Øf6 2 c4 e6 3 Øf3 c5 4 e3


An annoying move for many Benoni players to face. Not only does it lead to a much more technical game than 4 d5, but also it announces that White is not prepared to enter the deal which most Be-

noni/Nimzo players are looking for, whereby Black has both reasonable prospects for the initiative and the sounder structure. If Black plays the Caro-Kann, then his choice presents few difficulties: 4...cxd4 5 exd4 d5 is the Panov-Botvinnik Attack, in which White has already avoided the challenging 5 \(\tilde{D}\)c3/6 \(\tilde{D}\)g5 line. And 4...d5 5 cxd5 \(\tilde{D}\)xd5 is much the same. However, most Benoni players are not comfortable with the play against the isolated pawn which this involves, and to stay within the Benoni spirit is not easy since 4...g6 is not entirely satisfactory.



There is of course a line available which has always been regarded as fine for Black, and that is 4...d5 5 2 c 2 c 2 c 5 c xd5 e xd5. This form of Tarrasch with White's c1-bishop restricted by e2-e3 has been regarded theoretically as equal for many decades, and this is my recommendation, with the addition of a little twist at the beginning.

4...a6!?



This transpositional little move, originally introduced I think by Suba, is surprisingly unknown outside the grandmaster fraternity, but it has a phenomenal score in the databases (58% in Mega Database 2005) and I commend it to vou. It has two purposes. First, it prevents the slightly irritating line 4...d5 5 cxd5 exd5 6 **≜**b5+. Second, it makes it hard for White to maintain the tension in the centre (e.g. 4...d5 5 ②c3 ②c6 6 a3), for a reason we will see in Line A1. Meanwhile, it is a useful move either in a Benoni set-up if White does change his mind and go d4d5, or more likely in the isolated queen's pawn positions which now tend to arise. Black's next move is going to be ...d5, but by playing ... a6 first he is aiming to ensure that White has to isolate Black's d-pawn and give him the free play which comes with that.


In reply White's choice is limited; really for the reason shown in A21 he has to let Black have his isolated queen's pawn position if he wants to play for the advantage. The standard sequence is that in Line A22, but A1 is an attempt to improve on this.

A1: 5 a3 A2: 5 ∕∆c3

A1) 1 d4 �f6 2 c4 e6 3 �f3 c5 4 e3 a6 5 a3

The idea of this move is to follow up with dxc5 and b2-b4 and so obtain a more aggressive set-up than White's usual b3/\(\delta\)b2 development, at the cost of a tempo.

5...d5



6 dxc5

White can also play 6 cxd5 exd5, but he doesn't gain much from releasing the tension in this way. 6 2c3 is Line A21.

6...\(\preceq\)xc5 7 b4 \(\preceq\)e7

Black can also play 7... 2 a7, which is commoner and perhaps more natural,


keeping in touch with d4. But the text has it in mind to exploit directly the fact that White has not waited for Black's ... \(\Delta \)c6 before committing himself to his advances on the queenside.

8 <u>\$</u>b2

In D.Gurevich-N.Ioseliani, Mulhouse 1997, White played 8 cxd5 exd5 9 £e2 0-0 10 0-0, deferring the choice of square for his queen's knight. In the game Ioseliani had a different scheme, but the drawback of this move order for White if Black intends to play along the lines in the column is that 10...a5 11 b5 £e6 is now possible, when the occupation of c5 by a knight can be left to a more convenient moment.

8 &e2 is also possible, although the alarmingly equal equality of 8...dxc4 9 **xd8+ &xd8 10 &xc4 b5 may deter White; alternatively of course Black could play upon the lines in the column.

8...0-0 9 5 bd2 a5!




This is the point of Black's 7... £e7: White cannot prevent Black obtaining control of the c5-square for his pieces.

10 b5 4bd7 11 cxd5

If White doesn't play this now Black can recapture with a piece, for example I.Levitina-I.Chelushkina, Subotica 1991 went 11 &e2 ②c5 12 0-0, and now Black might well have continued with 12...b6 and ...&b7, intending to meet cxd5 with ...②xd5 reaching equality.

11...exd5 12 Ձe2 ②c5


Should White be bothered now to prevent Black's £ f5? Smyslov and Rashkovsky provide two different answers.



13 2 d4

In V.Smyslov-P.Cramling, Ladies vs. Veterans, Aruba 1992, the ex-world champion played 13 0-0, and Pia Cramling replied 13...\$f5 14 2d4 \$g6. The game was drawn but I am not sure about this manoeuvre at all. In my opinion the bishop is best on the e6-square in this system: if it is captured by a knight the reply ...fxe6 will prevent White making anything of the d-pawn. Indeed, it seems to me there is much to be said for the oafishly simple set-up ...\$\dot\ell_e6, ...\$\dot\ell_ac8, ... \$\mathbb{\beta}\$b6; alternatively Black could meet 13 0-0 much as Bauer plays in the main text. As usual in these IQP positions, White's b4-b5 is not a positional achievement for him (the same theme can be seen in QGD minority attack positions where


Black meets b5 with ...c6-c5).




13....皇d6

Black's main problem piece is his queen; this move clears e7 for it, which has the merit of fingering the a3-pawn (White does not terribly want to play a4 and leave this pawn under permanent observation by the c5-knight).

14 0-0 曾e7 15 约2f3 约fe4



A2) 1 d4 ∅f6 2 c4 e6 3 ∅f3 c5 4 e3 a6 5 ∅c3 d5



Now White has two main tries: the latter is by far the main move; the former line is included only to show a point of Black's system.

A21 6 a3 A22 6 cxd5

A21)


1 d4 ଦିf6 2 c4 e6 3 ଦିf3 c5 4 e3 a6 5 ଦିc3 d5 6 a3

White may be attempting to transpose to a symmetrical Semi-Tarrasch proper, after 6...②c6, or to some Semi-Tarrasch/Panov-Botvinnik hybrid after 6...cxd4 7 exd4 (in which he hopes to have avoided the main ...②b4 defences), or he may want to play dxc5 and b2-b4. But in any event his timing is off and Black can equalize immediately.

6...dxc4!

Lest you get the impression that what I am presenting here is some modern wrinkle, by the way, this useful transposition to a comfortable version of the Queen's Gambit Accepted was first

played in 1907. (6 2e2 or 6 dd3 can be met in the same way – the absence of a2-a3 makes little difference.)



7 **≜xc4**

7 dxc5 is as innocuous as it looked in B.Ivkov-M.Suba, Medina del Campo 1980, whose riotous further course was 7...豐xd1+ 8 含xd1 含xc5 9 含xc4 b5 10 含d3 含b7 11 含e2 分bd7 12 b4 含d6 13 含b2含e7 ½-½.


7...b5

This position could be reached in the main line of the Queen's Gambit Accepted if, after 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 \$\overline{D}\$f3 d6 4 e3 e6 5 \$\overline{L}\$xc4 c5, White were to essay the sequence 6 \$\overline{L}\$c3 a6 7 a3?!. Normally White doesn't do that, for the very good reason that \$\overline{L}\$c3 is inflexible and that a2-a3 contributes virtually nothing to his game, so this position usually arises from this side wind. Black has no difficulties here at all.

The alternative, equally popular, is 8 \(\text{\mathbb{Q}} d3 \(\text{\mathbb{Q}} b7 9 0-0 \) \(\text{\mathbb{Q}} bd7 \) (a position which can arise from an insipid line of the Meran) 10 \(\text{\mathbb{W}} e2 \), when Black has a number of good moves: modern players tend to play either 10...\(\text{\mathbb{Q}} d6 \) or 10...\(\text{\mathbb{W}} b8 \) as in

the QGA, intending to develop while dominating e5 and hoping to wring the tempo h2-h3 from White. However, this doesn't do much for the a8-rook, and I don't actually know that it's a great deal 11 罩d1 **岁**b6, when 12 a4?! c4 13 **\$**b1 b4 ₩c6 15 d5 exd5 16 (K.Opocensky-A.Rubinstein, Marienbad 1925) would not have worked out half so well for White if Black had now played 16... **幽**e6 or, earlier, 14... **幽**c7. Another option for White is 10 dxc5; A.Karpov-G.Kasparov, Reykjavik (blitz) 2004 continued 10 dxc5 &xc5 11 b4 &e7 12 &b2 0-0 13 \(\mathbb{e}\)e2 \(\mathbb{L}\)xf3 14 gxf3 \(\vartheta\)e5 with equality (15 &c2? \dd d2!).

11...&b7 9 0-0 5bd7



10 **營e2**

In J.Kraai-Y.Seirawan, Seattle 2002, White played for a draw with 10 d5 exd5 11 公xd5 兔e7 12 罩e1 公xd5 13 兔xd5 兔xd5 14 豐xd5 0-0 15 e4 公f6 16 豐f5 豐c8 and succeeded, although only after a lot of suffering.


10…**瞥b8**

Just as in the QGA, Black plays for the b8-h2 diagonal.

11 罩d1

11 e4 is also possible. 11...b4 now leads to dangerous complications; more sensible is 11...cxd4 12 2xd4 \$c5, when neither 13 4b3 \$b6 14 \$e3 \$xe3 15 ₩xe3 ₩a7 (S.Atalik-B.Lalic, Szeged 1997), nor 13 **2**e3 0-0 14 f3 **2**e5 15 罩fd1 豐a7 16 當f2 (S.Atalik-C.Horvath, Hungary 1992) promises White anything at all. More combative was 13 \(\doldoe{2}\)e3 0-0 14 国ad1 (Z.Kozul-I.Ibragimov, Graz 1994), when the idea is f2-f4. Perhaps the best reply is the computer's cunning prophylactic 14... Ze8: the idea is that 15 f4?! now loses material after 15... 2xe4 16 2xe4 ②xe4 17 ②xe6? ②xe3+ 18 ¥xe3 ②ef6, and with being denied this tactic White has difficulty going on with his plan and has probably simply chosen the wrong rook to put on d1.

11...âd6 12 h3 0-0 13 dxc5 🖄xc5 14 b4 🖄cd7 15 âb2



15....**⊈xf3**!?


Normal and equal was 15... 2e5, but the text is interesting too

16 豐xf3 臭h2+ 17 含h1 臭e5

when Black was at least equal in T.Wedberg-E.Agrest, Linkoping 2001 (0-1 in 41 moves – a model game for Black in this structure).

A22)

1 d4 �f6 2 c4 e6 3 �f3 c5 4 e3 a6 5 �c3 d5 6 cxd5 exd5



7 <u>ĝ</u>e2

White has many moves here, of course. For example:


a) 7 a3 can perfectly well be met with just 7...2c6, allowing White his 8 dxc5 2xc5 9 b4 2a7. That is fine for Black, but 7...c4 8 2e2 2d6 gives the game a more interesting shape: 7 2e2 c4, a Seirawan patent, is a feasible enough method, and here Black just about has an extra tempo, since to play for advantage against this plan White has to attack the pawn phalanx, and a2-a3 plays no part in that.

b) 7 dxc5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc5 8 a3 is another way of introducing this plan, but Black can continue with 8...0-0, when 9 b4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e7 is similar to Line A1 except that White's knight is on c3 and not d2, which is no great improvement. 9 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e6 10 0-0 \(\frac{1}{2}\)bd7 doesn't make much difference — White is hardly going to be able to refrain from b2-b4 for ever, and he is in danger of permitting Black to save a tempo by the reply ...\(\frac{1}{2}\)d6 and ...\(\frac{1}{2}\)e7. Alternatively Black can meet either method by simple

development, for example the black model 7 dxc5 &xc5 8 &e2 0-0 9 0-0 &c6 10 a3 &a7 11 b4 Ee8 12 &b2 &g4 13 Ec1 &d6 14 Ee1 Ead8 15 &a4 &e4 16 &d4 &d7 17 &xc6?? (17 &c5 is equal) &xf2! and Black is winning, L.Nikolaiczuk-P.Cramling, Dortmund 1986. In effect Black is a tempo ahead of the note to White's 10th move here.

7…∕∆c6 8 0-0 **≜**d6


This is the moment White has been waiting for to play dxc5, of course. If Black wants to win and is not afraid to go against most scientific opinion, he can consider 8...c4.



This idea is not considered quite comme il faut in the Tarrasch as a whole, but the circumstances here are as propitious as they will ever be – Black has snuck in the preparatory ...a6, White has developed his king's bishop to e2 rather than g2, menacing the d-pawn, and best of all White has played e2-e3 and thus cannot attack the pawn phalanx either with \$\omega\$g5 or (without sacrificing a tempo) with e4. Experience after 8...c4 is limited (the famous game Petrosian-Suetin, USSR Championship, Leningrad 1960, excepted). White really has to play either 9 \$\omega\$e5 (the most


popular, though perhaps not the best) or 9 b3.

- a) After 9 De5 the most effective reply seems to be 9...2d6. White has always met that with 10 f4 (an amusing trap is 10 24 2d7 11 Dxd7 2xd7 12 b3? 2b4 13 2b2 De4!; more sensible is 10 Dxc6 bxc6 11 b3 but it doesn't seem to give much after 11...cxb3 12 axb3 2e7 followed by ...0-0, ... 2e8, ...a5 and... 2a6), but now Black has a good move in 10... De7!. From this position N.Skalkotas-M.Knezevic, Balkaniad 1982 continued 11 e4 0-0 12 exd5 b5 13 2c6 2c7, when already White was the one struggling to equalize.
- b) Less common but perhaps more critical is 9 b3 \(\hat{2}\)b4 (9...b5 10 bxc4 bxc4 11 \(\hat{2}\)e5 \(\begin{array}{c} \text{C} & \text{T} & \text{C} & \



White went on to win after 14...9\ce7 15 e4 ②b6 16 罩b1 臭d6 17 罩xb6 臭xe5 18 罩b4 臭xd4 19 罩xc4 豐b6 20 e5 罩b8 食xb4 罩xb4 must surely be better for Black in the long run) 22 堂c6+ 曾f8 23 罩e1 &f6 24 &d5 &d7 25 罩ce4 罩e8 26 翼xe6 曾g8 30 翼xe7 翼xe7 31 兔xe7 竇a5 32 **≜**b4 **\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}**c7 1-0. A brilliant game, but the soundness of the entire project is deeply questionable and in particular I don't know what White can have meant to play after just 14... 12xe5. The line 15 鱼xd5 包g4 16 f4 罩b8 seems to leave Black a piece up without adequate compensation, and 15 dxe5 wxe5 also seems to leave White without much good to do (16 **\$b2**? c3; 16 **對**xc4 **\$d6** 17 **国**d1 ₩xb6 &b5+ 21 ₩xb5 axb5 22 &xa8, and 16 \mathbb{Z} d1 \mathbb{Z} xa1 - or 16... \mathbb{Z} c3 - 17 all seem to leave White struggling to a greater or lesser degree).


Another possibility after 9 b3 **②**b4 was 10 **②**d2 b5 11 **②**e5 (11 bxc4 dxc4!?) **豐**c⁷ 12 bxc4 bxc4 13 **②**f3 **②**xc3 14 **②**xc3 0-0.



This looks pretty equal to me as well,

but what this variation needs is less talk and more action. Perhaps more relevant than these shards of theory is the fact that the position after 8...c4 has occurred on sixteen occasions: White has won eight games and Black six, but there are only two draws.

After this long digression we return to the main line.




9 dxc5

White can also just develop and if he is going to do that then 9 b3 is the commonest, but it does allow Black a sequence which gives him quite easy equality: 9 b3 cxd4 10 ②xd4 ₩c7! (Black might as well help himself to this tempo) 11 Øf3 (of course 11 g3 blunders a piece to 11...\(\Omega\)xd4 since 12 \(\Wallet\)xd4 loses to 12... £e5; 11 f4 is not so stupid as it looks but is not how White wants to play) 11... **Q**e6 12 **Q**b2 0-0 13 **Q**c1 **Q**fd8 (or ... Zad8 and Zfe8) 14 g3 We7, when Black was fine after both 15 ②a4?! **\$h3** 16 罩e1 âb4 (M.Podgaets-V.Eingorn, Kharkov 1985) and the more sensible alternative 15 ₩d3 Zac8 16 Zfd1 h6 (I.Tsesarsky-M.Ulibin, Kursk 1987). A model for Black in this system is D.Allan-J.Benjamin, Szirak 1987: 13 g3 \(\frac{1}{2} \) fe8 14

Ic1 Iad8 15 ②g5 We7 16 ②xe6 Wxe6 17 急f3 兔e5 18 Ie1 Wf5 19 ②a4 h5 20 兔xe5 ②xe5 21 兔e2 h4 22 ②c3 ②fg4 23 兔xg4 ②xg4 24 Ic2 hxg3 25 hxg3 d4 26 exd4 Ixe1+27 Wxe1 Wxc2 0-1.

9...@xc5




10 b3

The natural 12 \(\hat{Q}\)b2 ignores the d4-square and allows the drawing attempt 12...d4 13 exd4 \(\hat{Q}\)xd4 14 \(\hat{Q}\)xd4 \(\hat{Q}\)xd4 \(\hat{Q}\)xd4 15 \(\hat{Q}\)f3 \(\hat{Q}\)b8 (or 15...a5 16 b5 \(\hat{Q}\)e6 [P.Kiria-kov-P.Cech, Copenhagen 2002] 17 \(\hat{Q}\)xb5 \(\hat{Q}\)xb5 \(\hat{Q}\)xc3 \(\hat{Q}\)xc3 \(\hat{Q}\)xb5 \(\hat{Q}\)xc3 21 \(\hat{Q}\)xc3 \(\hat{Q}\)xb5 with an edge for White), which has occurred in several games, most of them drawn shortly (16 \(\hat{Q}\)d2 \(\hat{Q}\)g4 17 \(\hat{Q}\)xg4 \(\hat{Q}\)xg4 18 \(\hat{Q}\)f6 \(\hat{Q}\)2-½ B.Gulko-J.Speelman, Oropesa del

Mar 1996, for example). However Black has a definite defensive task ahead of him here after something like 16 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} e1. \)

More interesting is 12... 2g4




and now:

- a) 13 b5 doesn't transpose to 12 b5 since after 13...axb5?! 14 ②xb5 ②b8 White has 15 ③xf6 ④xf6 16 ⑥xd5 with some advantage. Instead Black should play 13...②a5 with decent play after any of 14 ⑥a4 ②xf3 15 ③xf3 ②c4 (M.Petursson-M.Tal, Reykjavik 1986), 14 bxa6 bxa6 15 ②a4 ②e4 16 ②d4 ③xf3, J.Kjeldsen-M.Petursson(!), Aarhus 1993, or 14 bxa6 bxa6 15 ②a2 ②e4 16 ③c1 ⑤e8 17 ②b4 (or 17 ⑤c2 ②xf2) ④xf3 18 gxf3 ②xf2
- b) White's timing is less good with 13 ②a4 ②e4 14 〖c1 ¥d6! when ②c5 is prevented (R.Mascarinas-A.Vaisser, Switzerland 1990).
- c) 13 \(\begin{align*} \begin{align

17 \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*}

10...0-0 11 **息b2 息a7**




It will be necessary to move this piece again after \$\mathbb{L}c1\$ in any case, and White was vaguely threatening 12 \$\mathbb{D}a4 \mathbb{Q}a7\$ 13 \$\mathbb{Q}xf6\$. Black has some respectable alternatives, notably \$11...\$\mathbb{U}d6\$ followed by \$12...\$\mathbb{L}d8\$ (White can play to win a pawn by \$12 \$\mathbb{D}a4 \mathbb{Q}a7\$ 13 \$\mathbb{Q}xf6\$ \$\mathbb{U}xf6\$ 14 \$\mathbb{U}xd5\$ but Black has pretty reasonable compensation, for example \$14...\$\mathbb{Q}f5\$ 15 \$\mathbb{U}d2\$ b5 \$16 \$\mathbb{Q}c3\$ \$\mathbb{L}fd8\$ 17 \$\mathbb{U}b2\$ \$\mathbb{D}b4\$ was already a bit awkward for White in A.Deze-S.Gligoric, Novi Sad 1979).

12 \(\bar{z} \) = 8

Again there are other moves but this has performed best and looks the most natural to me.

13 🖾a4

White needs to attend to d4. 13 \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{fails to restrain 13...d4, when 14 exd4 (14 \) \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{dxc3 again} \end{aligned} \text{2xd4 15 } \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}



(P.Littlewood-J.Cox, Wellington 2005, an important trick) equalizes efficiently, e.g. 19 hxg4 包xg3 20 罩e1 包e4 21 罩ce2 包xf2 22 罩xf2 罩ad8.

Other moves like 13 dd or 13 dd also allow equality after 13...d4; alternatively Black can achieve a more complex game with a set-up based on ...de6, ...d6 and ...dad8, similar to positions which arise in the c3 Sicilian with colours reversed, although if this is what he wanted to do he should perhaps have tried 11...d6 earlier.

Another move which does restrain ...d4 is 13 \(\frac{1}{2} \) e1 (13...d4 14 exd4 \(\frac{1}{2} \) xd4 \(\frac{1}{2} \) xd4 \(\frac{1}{2} \) xd4 16 \(\frac{1}{2} \) f3 gives White a little pressure); perhaps Black should then revert to a ...\(\frac{1}{2} \) d6/...\(\frac{1}{2} \) e6 plan.

13...**∕**2e4


Always the reply to \bigcirc 24.

14 🖾 d4

The natural follow-up to 2a4, aiming

either for exchanges on d4 and a technical edge, or for ②xc6 bxc6 and occupation of the c5-square, one of White's major plans in these Tarrasch position-types, especially where Black's a-pawn has advanced to a6.

14…營g5



This move of Stuart Conquest's (O.Renet-S.Conquest, Clichy 2001) looks the most challenging at the moment, although 14...對d6 is much more popular, and another solid move is 14...並d7 15 ②xc6 ②xc6, when 16 ②d4 ②xd4 17 對d4 ③xa4 18 bxa4 (18 對xa4 對f6) 18...對a5 (P.Schlosser-P.Bachmayr, Austria 1996) is fairly equal, and 16 ②c3? (V.Kozlov-S.Dvoirys, Chigorin Memorial, St Petersburg 2000) 16...②xf2 17 黨xf2 ③xe3 is worse, White's difficulties being shown by 18 對f1 對g5! 19 區d1? d4 20

15 2xc6 bxc6 16 &d4


After 16 \(\) xc6?, 16...\(\) xf2 wins, for example 17 \(\) xf2 \(\) xe3 or 17 \(\) xf2 \(\) g4! (best and instructive; Black should not yet choose with which piece to capture on e3), after which Black has a crushing attack, for example 18 \(\) 2c2 \(\) xe3 – see how important it is that Black can still introduce the rook in this way.

16...**≜h**3

This tempo-gaining development of the bishop is the point of 14... \$\widetilde{\pi}g5\$.

17 拿f3 桌xd4 18 豐xd4 罩e6

White's position is already critical: in the game Renet went astray with 19 \(\begin{align*} \b




White must eliminate the e4-knight without losing his defensive bishop. Wells now gives the curious 19... \$\mathbb{L}\$g6 'with an attack' in Mega Database 2005, but unless my eyes deceive me 20 \$\mathbb{L}\$xe4 dxe4 21 \$\mathbb{L}\$xe4 defends rather handily. Instead Black should play 19... \$\mathbb{L}\$xc5 20 \$\mathbb{L}\$xc5, when 20... \$\mathbb{L}\$xg2? 21 h4 defends and wins, so Black can choose between 20...\$\mathbb{L}\$g6

B) 1 d4 ∅f6 2 c4 e6 3 ∅f3 c5 4 g3

Again White refuses to play the game: this position can also of course arise after 3 g3, when most Nimzo-Benoni players will react with 3...c5 4 ②f3, leading to the same position.

4...cxd4 5 ②xd4 &b4+




The obvious choice for Nimzo players; unfortunately by a quirk of the *ECO* opening classification system coverage of it tends to be divided between Nimzo books (6 ②c3), Symmetrical English (6 ②d2) and Catalan, if you're lucky (6 ②d2). The line 6 ②c3 is dubbed by Chris Ward the Kasparov variation of the Nimzo-Indian in his 2003 Everyman book on the subject. I know how some readers will hate to hear this, but since Black may well have this position in his repertoire already, and it was better cov-

ered in the aforementioned book than I could do it anyway, I don't propose to deal with it here.

B1: 6 **公**d2 B2: 6 **拿**d2

B1)
1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 e6 3 ②f3 c5 4 g3
cxd4 5 ②xd4 \$\ddot \ddot \ddot



A rare move, which probably deserves to be rarer, although some strong players have used it. White is not interested in allowing the doubled c-pawns but baulks at the simplification that 6 \(\hat{L}\)d2 entails.


6...₩b6

An efficient reply, used by Akopian. The point is that (unlike 6... 2c6) the reply 7 2c2 is impossible, since 7... 2c4 8 e3 2xd2+ 9 2xd2 2xb2 is good for Black. The line 7 24f3 2c4 8 e3 d5 9 a3 2xd2+ 10 2xd2 2xd2 11 2xd2 dxc4 also gives White no chance of the advantage, and nor does 7 e3 2c6 8 a3 2c7. The problem with this whole line for White is the possibility of being forced into the unaesthetic and time-wasting e2-e3.

7 a3 &c5

Introduced in D.Blagojevic-V.Akopian, Chalkidiki 2002, this move continues the theme of pressure on d4 and f2.

8 9 2b3 9 c6



9 9 xc5


9 e3 is possible too, although after 9... £e7 10 £g2 0-0 11 0-0 Black has reasonable prospects, for example 11... £d8 12 £d2 d5 13 cxd5 ②xd4 14 exd4 a5! 15 dxe6 £xe6 16 £xa5 £xa5 17 ②xa5 ¥xa5, with a difficult position to judge.

9... ₩xc5 10 e3

In the end White cannot resist this. 10 ②xc6? ③xc6 wins a pawn, but Ribli proposed 10 ②b5!? 0-0 11 ②e3 (11 ②d6 ②d4 12 ③e3 ③c6 13 ③g1 e5 14 ③xd4 ④xd6 15 ②c3 ⑤c7 leads to a similar type of game to the text) 11... ④xc4 12 ②d6 'with compensation'. White has some compensation to be sure, but after 12... ⑥d5 13 ⑥xd5 ②xd5 14 ②d2 ②f6 15 ②c3 ②e8 I prefer Black's chances of unravelling in the long run.

10...少xd4 11 徵xd4 徵c6

Black has equalized according to Ribli; his better development and the weaknesses on White's kingside compensate for the bishop pair. The Blagojevic-Akopian game continued




12 罩g1 d6 13 臭g2 營c7 14 b3 e5! 15 營d3 0-0 16 臭b2 罩d8!

after which White rashly continued with 17 \$\overline{\pmathbb{Q}}\$d2 and succumbed to Black's initiative after 17...\$\overline{\pmathbb{Q}}\$e6 18 \$\overline{\pmathbb{Z}}\$fc1 \$\overline{\pmathbb{W}}\$e7 19 \$\overline{\pmathbb{Q}}\$e1 d5. Instead Ribli suggests that 17 e4 was necessary, with equality, but I think most players would still prefer Black with his possible activity by ...a6 and ...b5: White has not yet solved the problem with his king.

B2)

1 d4 公f6 2 c4 e6 3 公f3 c5 4 g3 cxd4 5 公xd4 兔b4+ 6 兔d2 營b6



Beware: this move is sharper than it looks. Black is committing himself to


some tactical variations. White has a number of moves here:

B21)

Not the only move; 7... 2c6 is sound. **8 e3**

Since 8 &c3 e5 causes unpleasantness, White is committed to this sacrifice.

8... 2xd4 9 exd4 \wxd4



10 0-0

White has little choice but to invest a second pawn: 10 \$\mathbb{\text{b}}63\$ \$\mathbb{\text{e}}6+\$ 11 \$\mathbb{\text{e}}23\$ \$\mathbb{\text{g}}4\$ is nice for Black, so the only serious alternative is 10 \$\mathbb{\text{e}}2\$, when J.Garcia Padron- J Hernandez-Rodrigo, Barcelona 2002 continued 10... \$\mathbb{\text{w}}xb2\$ 11 0-0 0-0 12 \$\mathbb{\text{c}}3\$ \$\mathbb{\text{c}}6\$ 13 g4, and now I think the way to defend was to reclaim some dark squares with 13... \$\mathbb{\text{w}}a3\$ — White has some play for his pawns, of course, but I think Black is better.

10...**≝xc4**


10...Øc6 is also played, but 10...₩xb2 11 Øc3 is too dangerous.

11 5 a3

This is the commonest move, although 11 全c3 was played in N.Rashkovsky-S.Palatnik, Kirovabad 1973. 11...d5 12 ②a3 豐a6 13 冨e1 0-0 14 冨c1 ②c6 15 ②xf6 gxf6 16 豐g4+ �h8 17 豐h4 led to a draw; this is hard to improve upon for either side.

11... wd3 12 **身b4**

12 當e1 is possible, when it seems to me that more sensible than the 12...0-0 which has been played so far is 12...立c6, preventing 鱼b4; then White can choose between 13 當e3 豐f5, when I doubt he has adequate compensation for the two pawns, or 13 鱼f4 豐xd1 14 罩axd1 d5, when both 15 鱼xd5 ②xd5 16 罩xd5 f6 and 15 ②b5 0-0 16 ②c7 罩b8 17 ②b5 鱼d7 favour Black. Meanwhile 12 豐e1 was efficiently dealt with by 12...②c6 13 當d1 d5 14 鱼c3 豐f5 in B.Kohlweyer-J.Horvath, Leeuwarden 1993.



13...d5


It seems to me that 13... 2c6 might be worth a try here. 14 2b5 2xb4 15 2c7+ 2e7 16 2xa8 d5 is no good for White,

so presumably he proceeds 14 &d6, when 14...\$\delta\$d8 15 \$\overline{\infty}c4 \$\overline{\infty}e8\$ forces the exchange of the powerful dark-squared bishop. White still has a most unpleasant bind on d6, but I don't see that he has any way of breaking through, and Black can think about moves such as ...\$\delta\$5 and ...\$\delta\$5 to gain space, ...\$\delta\$e7, ...\$\delta\$d8 and ...\$\delta\$5, and perhaps one day ...\$\delta\$f6, ...\$\overline{\infty}e7\$ and ...\$\delta\$6. White has several turns while this happens, of course, but I don't know that he can make any real impact.

14 Øb5 Øc6 15 **åa**3

15 ②c7+ �d7 16 ②xa8 ②xb4 is still no good.

15...**ġd7 16 ᡚd6 ᡚd8**



22...@e7!

Essential: Vaganian had previously lost horribly after allowing the bishop to d6 in an earlier game.

23 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd6+


with a slight advantage to White, D.Yevseev-V.Yemelin, St Petersburg 2004.

B22)

1 d4 \$\angle\$16 2 c4 e6 3 \$\angle\$13 c5 4 g3 cxd4 5 \$\angle\$xd4 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$b4+ 6 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$d2 \$\overline{\overline{\omega}}\$b6 7 \$\oldsymbol{\omega}\$xb4 \$\overline{\omega}\$c3

Best; 8 ②d2 ∰xb2 9 ②b5 ②a6 is fine for Black.

8...9c6



By continuing to press on d4 Black prevents 9 \$\bigs\begin{array}{c} \text{b} 3 & (9...\dagger) \text{x} d4) which is a good reply to 8...0-0.


9 2 db5

More or less the only move. 9 全g2 0-0 10 0-0 豐xc4 is a feeble gambit which left White with virtually no compensation after 11 包b3 d5 12 罩c1 豐b4 13 e4 罩d8 in I.Hausner-L.Zsinka, Zamardi 1980.

9...0-0 10 e3 d5 11 a3 習a5 12 b4

12 c5 營d8 13 **Q**e2 營e7 14 ②d6 b6 ②xc8 罩fxc8 16 cxb6 axb6 is already a little better for Black, N.RashkovskyA.Schneider, Frunze 1983.

12... ₩d8 13 cxd5 exd5 14 \(\partial_g 2 \) \(\partial_g 4 \)



This is equal: Black's better development and control of c4 make up for the isolated d-pawn. After 15 d2 Black has the choice between Ulf Andersson's characteristically ruthless method of liquidating – 15... 6 16 0-0 fd8 17 d4 de4! with equality, M.Quinteros-U.Andersson, Buenos Aires 1978, Pinter's more combative 15... 6 (I.Hausner-J.Pinter, European Team Ch, Skara 1980), and the still more pragmatic ½-½ (M.Petursson-G.Sosonko, Reykjavik 1980).

B23)

1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 e6 3 ②f3 c5 4 g3 cxd4 5 ②xd4 &b4+ 6 &d2 ₩b6 7 e3

A hideous move according to Carsten Hansen, and you can see where he's coming from, although plenty of good players have used it.


7...**∕**2c6

Others are possible, but keeping up the uncomfortable pressure on d4 is thematic.

8 🙎 g2


White can also essay the unambitious 8

②xb4 ₩xb4+ 9 ₩d2, when perhaps 9...d5 is the most efficient of several ways. 8...0-0 9 0-0 □d8



Jan Timman's clever idea; again 9...d5 or 9... €e7 are possible, but the text will always be useful, keeps ...d5 in the air, and poses White the problem of how he's going to develop, since ②c3 leaves d4 en prise.

10 盒xb4 **₩**xb4



11 &xc6

The c4-pawn was attacked again; defending it is inconvenient, and 11 ②xc6 bxc6 12 ②xc6 ③b8 13 b3 ③a6 gives Black more than enough for his pawn, so White doesn't have much choice if he is still seeking the edge, although it may

already be time to play for equality with 11 \(\mathbb{\beta} d \) or 11 \(\mathbb{\beta} b \).


11...bxc6 12 ②xc6 豐xb2 13 ②xd8 豐xa1 14 豐d6

More or less forced to here. The move 14 by 3 might be more prudent now, but White is still following the critical path.

14...h6 15 🖺 a3

White plays this rather than 15 **瞥**e7 at once in order to commit Black's queen: 15 **豐**e7 **2**a6 16 **2**a3 **豐**c3! with and edge for Black is the point. 15 a3 **豐**a2 16 **2**d2 **2**a6! is no better.

15... ※ xa2 16




From here the game U.Adianto-J.Timman, Bali 2000 continued 16...\$\(\frac{1}{2}\)a6 17 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf7 (Black's point is that 17 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf7+ \(\frac{1}{2}\)h7 leaves White's pieces surprisingly poorly placed; the knight has to be extricated via f7 and the sooner White starts that process the better) 17...\$\(\frac{1}{2}\)f8 18 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d2 with equality according to Hansen, although this would still have to be shown after 19 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b5, perhaps.

Instead Hansen proposes 16... 2e4, and this does indeed seem quite promising for Black: after 17 2xf7 2b7 18 2e5, stronger than Hansen's 18... 2xf2 seems the simple and positional 18... 2g5

19 h4 2 f3+, which leaves Black clearly better

C)

1 d4 \$\angle\$16 2 c4 e6 3 \$\angle\$13 c5 4 \$\angle\$c3 cxd4 5 \$\angle\$xd4 \$\bar{2}\$b4



And now:

C1: 6 ≗d2

C2: 6 4 b5

Of course 6 g3 leads back to Chris Ward's book mentioned above.

C1)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 c4 e6 3 🖄 f3 c5 4 🖄 c3 cxd4 5 🖄 xd4 😩 b4 6 🚉 d2

A dull and passive move, frankly.

6...∮)c6

Again pressing d4 and hoping to force White into some concession in order to develop.

7 a3


The commonest: nothing makes much impression on Black here, for example 2c2 2c5 8 e3 d5 9 cxd5 exd5 10 2e2 0-0 11 0-0 a6, 7 2xc6?! dxc6 8 g3 e5 9 2g2 2e6, or 7 e3 0-0 8 2e2 d5 9 cxd5 exd5 10 2xc6 bxc6 11 0-0 2d6, all of which

have occurred in various games.

7... ge7 8 gg5

The least dull; there have been some corking games played from this position along the lines 8 e3 0-0 9 \(\ext{\omega} \)e2 d5 10 cxd5 exd5 11 0-0 \(\ext{\omega} \)xd4 12 exd4 \(\ext{\omega} \)f5 and so on (M.Novikov-M.Rusanov, St Petersburg 2000).

8...h6 9 &h4 0-0 10 e3



10...d5

ECO gives 10... 對 6 11 b4 a5 12 c5 對 d8 (Cu.Hansen-S.Kindermann, Dortmund 1988), and now 13 b5 公 xd4 14 exd4 d6, but since I don't understand why 14 對 xd4 isn't quite nice for White (14... 對 c7 15 ② e4 or 14... d6 15 cxd6 對 xd6 16 對 xd6 ② xd6 17 ② xf6 gxf6 18 g4) I'm giving the text. 10... b6 and ... ② b7 is also eminently possible.

11 罩c1 ②xd4 12 豐xd4 dxc4 13 豐xd8 罩xd8 14 ②xc4 ②d7 15 含e2 罩ac8 16 ②d3

with an equal position, V.Korchnor-Y.Dokhoian, Wijk aan Zee 1990.


C2)

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 c4 e6 3 🖄 f3 c5 4 🖄 c3 cxd4 5 🖄 xd4 և b4 6 🖄 b5

Another rather uninspiring move; the

best that can be said about it is that probably White can maintain equality with careful play. Some other rather poor moves are 6 ②c2? ②xc3+ 7 bxc3 營a5 with excellent prospects for Black, and 6 e3 ②e4, but 6 ②g5 is more challenging, when probably better than 6...②xc3+ is 6...②c6 7 ③c1 h6 8 ②h4 g5 9 ②g3 ②e4 10 ②b5 ②xg3 11 hxg3 a6 12 ②d6+ ③e7 13 ②xc8+ ③xc8 14 e3 d5 with a level position, B.Gelfand-A.Shirov, Monaco (blindfold) 1999.

6...d5




7 **£**f4

Or:

- a) Feeble is 7 a3? &xc3+ 8 &xc3 d4 9 2a4 0-0 10 b4 e5 11 &b2 &xc6 when Black is already better, (Xie Jun-U.Adianto, Beijing 1992).
- b) 7 cxd5 exd5 8 **2**g5 makes more sense, and now 8...()-0 9 e3 **2**c6 10 **2**e2 a6 11 **2**d4 **2**xc3+ 12 bxc3 **2**a5 13 f3 **2**xc3+ 14 **2**f2 **2**xd4 15 **2**xf6 gxf6 16 **2**c1 **2**b2 which is equal (L.Aronian-J.Gustafsson, Neckar 2002), and 9...a6 10 a3 axb5 11 axb4 **2**xa1 12 **2**xa1 **2**c6 13 **2**xb5 d4 14 exd4 **2**e8+ with compensation (B.Kogan-B.Gulko, USSR 1971) are both possible.

7...0-0 8 e3

8 ②c7 ②h5 is good for Black, although it is probably reassuring to be told about 9 ②xa8 ②xf4 10 ∰d4 e5! before the position arises rather than after.



is usually frowned on by theory because of 10 &d6 \(\) \(\


but 10 cxd5 exd5 11 e3 (11 亿c7? 包h5! again, of course) is more sensible, when perhaps 11...a6 12 包d6 豐a5 13 豐b3 (R.Debarnot-J.Rubinetti, Buenos Ares 1972) 13... 温d8 is Black's best.

8...a6 9 a3

9 ②c7 罩a7 10 cxd5 exd5 11 營b3 ②c6 is untried; 10 營b3? ②d6 favours Black.

9... âa5 10 ad6 ac6 11 axc8?!


Or 11 \(\hat{2}g3 \) \(\hat{2}xc3+ 12 \) bxc3 \(\hat{2}a5 13 \) \(\hat{2}b3 d4 \) with a plus for Black, L.Konings-A.Barsov, Dutch League 1996.



Black has a clear edge, R.Cifuentes Parada-M.Tal, Lucerne Olympiad 1982.


CHAPTER TEN

Rare Lines



In this final chapter I round up various other irregular tries for White. The first two sections deal with a couple of quite respectable sneaky transpositional attempts: Line A with Seirawan's 1 d4 266 2 c4 e6 3 2g5!?, Line B with 1 d4 66 2 2 f3 e6 3 g3. In C we look at attempts by White to establish a Stonewall formation, and finally D shows a couple of contrasting efforts with the g-pawn.

A) 1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 e6 3 ዿg5



A cunning move once favoured by

Yasser Seirawan. Of course QGD players can curl their lip and reply 3...d5, but White's idea is to inconvenience Nimzo players.

3...**臭b4**+

Actually unless the Benoni is simply an anathema to Black then 3...c5 is a good move: 4 d5 exd5 5 cxd5 d6 6 2c3 is the equivalent of meeting the Modern Benoni with 6 2g5, which is considered feeble because of 6...2e7 as Kramnik showed in M.Dlugy-V.Kramnik, Internet [blitz] 1999, with 7 2f3 0-0 8 d2 2e8 9 g3 2a6 10 2g2 2c7 11 0-0 b5 12 a3 h6 13 2f4 2b7 and Black has good play already. However, allowing...cxd4 hardly goes with c4 and 2g5 either, and 4 e3 b6 is downright embarrassing.

4 2 d2

This is the idea: 4 ②c3 is of course the Leningrad Variation of the Nimzo.


4...h6 5 **②**h4 c5 6 a3 **②**xd2+ 7 **◎**xd2 cxd4

I don't entirely trust 7...g5 8 **호**g3 **②**e4 9 **쌜**e3 **②**xg3 10 hxg3 **쌜**a5+ 11 **當**d1!? for Black, strange as that may seem.

8 4)f3

After 8 🖐 xd4 🖸 c6 9 🖐 c3, 9...e5 is a good move, for example 10 e3 g5 11 🚉 g3 🗗 e4 and ... 🖐 a5+.

8...@c6 9 @xd4 @e4



This equalizes simply; S.Ivanov-K.Aseev, St Petersburg 2000 now went 10 单xd8 如xd2 11 如xc6 dxc6 12 学xd2 学xd8 with a level endgame.


B)

1 d4 4 f6 2 4 f3 e6 3 g3

White has some other occasional tries here:

- a) 3 a3 invites an a3 Queens Indian after 3...b6 4 c4 or some kind of Symmetrical Semi-Tarrasch after 3...d5 4 e3. Black might perhaps play 3...g6 and ask White whether a2-a3 or ...e7-e6 is less useful in a King's Indian, but 3...c5 is also adequate. White's idea then is usually 4 dxc5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc5 5 b4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e7 6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b2 when I suggest 6...a5 7 b5 d5 with play similar to the lines in Chapter 9. The line 4 e3 d5 5 c4 a6 is also a transposition to that chapter.
- b) 3 b3 will almost certainly lead to the e3 Queen's Indian lines in the Colle-Zukertort section.
 - c) 3 ©c3 can be well met by 3...\$b4

 $(3...d5 \ 4 \ 2g5 \ 2bd7$ with a tame Veresov is also good).




For example, 4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d2 c5 5 a3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3 6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3 0-0 \(\frac{1}{2}\)-\(\frac{1}{2}\)(!) J.Ehlvest-A.Veingold, Finland 1997, or 4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 h6 5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf6 6 e4 with a position which could (but seldom does) arise from the Tromp. Black has many ideas now but I like 6...d5 7 e5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d8 8 a3 and now 8...\(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3+(8...\(\frac{1}{2}\)e7 worked out better for White in V.Akopian-R.Antonio, FIDE World Ch, Las Vegas 1999) 9 bxc3 c5 when Black can continue with ...\(\frac{1}{2}\)d7, ...\(\frac{1}{2}\)c6, ...\(\frac{1}{2}\)c6, ...\(\frac{1}{2}\)c7 with an acceptable French-type position.

d) Also seen is the self-block 3 \(\frac{1}{2} \) bd2, which is actually a tiny bit tricky for our repertoire since 3...c5 4 c3 (4 e3 b6 is back in our anti-Colle repertoire of course) 4...d5 allows a non-repertoire type of Colle, while (say) 4...b6 5 e4 probably favours White. One ruthless solution is 4...cxd4 5 cxd4 d5 with a quieter than usual Exchange Slav type of position.

With 3 g3 White's idea is usually to play a Catalan but without the dreadfully committal c2-c4, when Black might for example opt for a Bogo-Indian with ... £ b4+, or a Benoni/English after ... c5. Of course there's nothing wrong with

3...d5 to defend a Catalan, but if you'd rather avoid that I recommend:

3...b5



Another of those little twists known to GMs but not always exploited by amateurs. This extended fianchetto is very respectable (played over 1000 times with lots of GM games and a black score of 53%), and White really hasn't shown anything much against it; in fact Alterman declared that Black had already equalized.

4 <u>≗</u>g2

Alternatively:


a) 4 a4 b4 doesn't help much, for example 5 \(\frac{1}{2}g^2\) \(\frac{1}{2}b^7\) 6 0-0 (6 c4 can be met either with 6...c5 7 d5 exd5 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)h4 with a type of Benoni position, or 6...bxc3 7 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3 - 7 bxc3 c5 8 0-0 \(\frac{1}{2}e^7\) is equal also - 7...\(\frac{1}{2}\)a6 8 0-0 \(\frac{1}{2}e^7\) 9 \(\frac{1}{2}g^5\) 0-0 10 \(\frac{1}{2}c^1\) \(\frac{1}{2}b^3\) with equality as in H.Ardiansyah-U.Andersson, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1988) 6...c5 7 c3 cxd4 8 cxd4 \(\frac{1}{2}e^7\) 9 \(\frac{1}{2}b^3\) 6...c5 7 c3 cxd4 8 cxd4 \(\frac{1}{2}e^7\) 9 \(\frac{1}{2}b^3\)? \(\frac{1}{2}d^7\) 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd7 \(\frac{1}{2}xd^7\) \(\frac{1}{2}xd^7\) 14 f3 \(\frac{1}{2}f^6\) with a nice game for Black, R.Fyllingen-H.Stefansson, Nordic Net Club Cup 2000.

b) 4 c3 **2**b7 5 **b**b3 a6 6 a4 is ineffective since axb5 is not a threat: Black can

cheerfully continue 6...c5 and meet 7 axb5 with either with 7...c4 or 7...2d5 8 c4?

c) 4 d3 is sometimes played, e.g. 4...a6 5 a4 (or 5 e4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b7 6 e5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d5 7 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g2 c5 8 dxc5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc5 9 0-0 d6 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3 11 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3 0-0 with chances for both sides in J.Ehlvest-R.Hübner, European Club Cup, Germany 1991) 5..b4 6 e4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b7 7 e5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e4 (commoner and also very sound is 7...\(\frac{1}{2}\)d5) 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)bd2 d5 9 exd6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd2 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd6 11 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d7 12 0-0 \(\frac{1}{2}\)f6 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\)fe1 0-0 with equality in S.Djuric-M.Taimanov, Titograd 1984.

4...**≜**b7



5 🚉 g5


There seems to be consensus among GMs that White has to fight for e4 in this way. Otherwise Black's plan of ...\$\documenture{2}e7, ...\$\documenture{2}c5, ...\$\documenture{2}c6 and ...\$\documenture{2}c6 plan of example 5 0-0 c5 6 c3 \$\documenture{2}c6 a6 7 a4 b4 8 \$\documenture{2}c6 f4 \$\documenture{2}c8 9 dxc5 \$\documenture{2}xc5 10 \$\documenture{2}d6?! \$\documenture{2}c6 b6 11 \$\documenture{2}xc5 \$\documenture{2}xc5 12 cxb4 \$\documenture{2}xb4 with Black already comfortably better in M.Ornolfsson-J.Hjartarson, Icelandic Championship 1994.

5...**≜e**7

Onischuk's 5...d5 is a good alternative; this 'anti-positional' move is often useful

for Black in this system.

6 0-0 c5 7 c3 2a6 8 bd2 0-0




Something of a tabiya for the variation: White has tried a few moves now:

- a) 9 a3 \(\frac{1}{2} \) 8 10 \(\frac{1}{2} \) 11 cxd4 h6 12 \(\frac{1}{2} \) xf6 \(
- b) 9 \$\bigs\begin{align*} b) 1 \bigs\begin{align*} \text{End} \text{Colored} & \text{Colored} & \text{End} & \text{Colored} & \text{End} & \text{End
- c) 9 🖐 b3 🖺 b8 10 🖐 xb5 (10 🖺 ad1 cxd4 11 🖒 xd4 🚊 xg2 12 🚖 xg2 🖒 c5 is nothing either, M.Paunovic-L.Psakhis, Mondariz 1997) 10... 🚊 xf3 11 🖐 xa6 🚊 xg2 12 🚖 xg2 🖺 xb2 is a bit of a theoretical position for 3 g3 fans: 13 🖐 xa7 cxd4 14 cxd4 h6 15 🚉 xf6 🚊 xf6 gives White nothing, while 13 🖒 b3 🖐 a8+ 14 🚖 g1 cxd4 15 cxd4 👺 e4 (15... 🚊 c8!?) gave Black enough play in R.Cifuentes Parada-M.Marin, Mondariz 2002.

₩a5 16 ②fd2 cxd4 17 cxd4 ②b4 with good play for Black, J.Plachetka- M.Suba, Belgrade 1984.

e) 9 \$\mathbb{Z}\$e1 h6 10 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xf6 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xf6 11 e4 \$\mathbb{W}\$b6 12 a4 cxd4 13 e5 \$\mathbb{Q}\$e7 14 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xd4 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xg2 15 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xg2 b4 16 \$\mathbb{Q}\$e4 f5 17 exf6 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xf6 with active play for Black was more of the same in N.Pert-P.Wells, British Ch, Torquay 1998.

C) 1 d4 **⊘**f6 2 e3



This move may of course have no insignificance dependent whatsoever: White's next move might be \$\overline{\Omega}\$f3 taking us right back to Chapter 6. More often however he wants to play a Stonewall Attack with f4, but he doesn't fancy 2 f4 since that can really be met a bit too effectively with 2...d5, 3...\$45 and so on, and he wants to go 2d3 first so as to stop ... \$\documentum{1}{2}f5. Moreover this move does present a small move order dilemma: 2...d5 3 &d3 &g4 is a very effective way of disrupting White's plan, but then Black can't necessarily play what we'd like to play against the Colle proper. 2...g6 is another extremely effective move, since e3 is almost never a good idea against a King's Indian, but we said we weren't going to fianchetto either. So...

2...c5 3 c3

Stonewallites will usually play this: anything else makes it easy enough to slip into our anti-Colle methods.


3…e6 4 f4 b6 5 ∰f3 <u>\$</u>e7

Black waits for &d3.

6 **≜**d3

6 Øbd2 0-0 doesn't help: White has to lose the tempo

6...皇a6 7 0-0 0-0 8 皇xa6 公xa6 9 豐d3 豐c8



10 e4


I'm not wild about this: something like 10 心bd2 瞥b7 11 a4 罩ac8 12 f5!? (S.Sigfusson-H.Olafsson, Reykjavik (blindfold) 1997, is sounder.

10...cxd4 11 e5 4 d5 12 xd4 f5!?

Black has equalized and a move like 12...d6 or indeed 12...f6 would show this. After the text the critical 13 b4 was necessary to restrain the a6 knight, but in M.Babar-A.Zapata, Münsterland Open, Senden 2002, White lost at once with 13 c4? Dab4 14 We2 2c5 15 Ed1 Dc6 0-1.

D) 1 d4 4\(f6 2 g3 This is a move order with some point since it does rule out the solution shown in Line B. There is a flaw, however. An extended version with 2 g4 has an even more serious flaw. Of course 2...\(\tilde{Q}\)\times g4 is the best move, for example 3 e4 d6 4 \(\tilde{Q}\)\times 2 \(\tilde{Q}\)\times fo 5 \(\tilde{Q}\)\times 3 e5 6 d5 c6 7 \(\tilde{Q}\)g5 \(\tilde{Q}\)e7 when Black was already just winning in J.Calder-P.Zarnicki, Internet (blitz) 2004. For curmudgeons, however, 2...d5 3 g5 \(\tilde{Q}\)\times 4 f3 \(\tilde{Q}\)\do 6 5 \(\tilde{Q}\)\times 3 \(\tilde{Q}\)f5! (still preventing e4) also leaves Black a little better while denying White what he wants.

2...d5



This is the problem: Black wasn't committed to ...e6 and rather than a Catalan White is playing a sort of inept g3 system against the Slav. The game A.Roesch-L.Van Wely, Bundesliga 1998 demonstrated White's problems splendidly.

3 ᡚf3 c6 4 Ձg2 Ձf5 5 ᡚbd2 h6


Van Wely wants to keep the effective f5-bishop: 5 ②h4 ②e4 wasn't a threat, but perhaps 6 ②h4 was now.

6 0-0 e6 7 b3 4bd7 8 4b2 a5 9 a4

With the pawn on d3 and hence the possibility of c4 White's normal reply to this thrust would be a3, since ...a4; b4 is

not a problem with c4 still on the agenda. Here, however, White does not care for b4 and d4 together, hence a4, but now...

9...**∮**b4



Notice how Black delayed ... 2e7 to allow this. The position can also be thought of as a Réti with d4 instead of d3, but that is exactly the problem: without d3 White cannot shut the f5 bishop out, nor can he really aim for either e4 or c4, so Black is comfortable.

10 夕e5 0-0 11 夕xd7 徵xd7

This isn't helping, but White cannot find a plan.

12 c3


The annoying b4-bishop provokes this, but the b2-bishop isn't happy about it, and nor is the queenside pawn chain.

12...皇d6 13 罩e1 b5! 14 e4 dxe4 15 ②xe4 ②xe4 16 皇xe4 皇xe4 17 罩xe4 罩fd8

Black is already a little better: to get in

e2-e4 White had to play c3, but now he wishes he hadn't.

18 營c2 皇e7 19 冨ee1 營b7 20 axb5 cxb5 21 c4 皇f6 22 冨ed1 營b6 23 c5 營c6



and Black was in total control (the game concluded 24 **w**c3 b4 25 **w**c4 **a**d5 26 **w**e2 **a**a7 27 **a**a4 **d**d8 28 **a**da1 **a**ad7 29 **a**a5 **d**aa5 30 **a**a5 e5 31 **a**a6 **w**c8 32 c6 **a**7d6 33 dxe5 **a**xc6 34 **a**xc6 **w**xc6 35 h4 **a**d7 0-1).

A really classy example to finish the book with: Black knew exactly why White's move order is irregular and demonstrated; he knew what order his own developing moves should come in and why; he showed eloquently why forcing c2-c3 out of White was desirable and the result was the sort of Meister-gegen-Amateur positional crush which epitomises the sort of efficiency against these deviations which we're looking for.

INDEX OF VARIATIONS

The Trompowsky and Pseudo-Trompowsky

1 d4 🖄 f6

1...d5 2 \(\hat{Q}\)g5 h6 3 \(\hat{Q}\)h4 c6 4 e3 36 (4 \(\hat{Q}\)f3 34)

2 g5 e6 3 e3

3...h6 4 &h4 c5 5 c3

5 🖾 f3 *27*

5...b6 6 🖄d2 Ձe7 7 🖄gf3 Ձb7 8 Ձd3

8 a4 *19*; 8 h3 *21*; 8 **g**g3 *22*

8...cxd4 24

8...g5 23

The Torre Attack and Hebden Torre

1 d4 🖺 f6 2 🗐 f3 e6

2...d5 3 &g5 @e4 4 &h4 50 (4 &f4 52)

3 <u></u>\$g5

3 c3 b6 4 \(\hat{\pmag} g5 \(\hat{\pmab} b7 \) 5 \(\hat{\pma} bd2 \(\hat{\pmae} e7 \) 6 e3 \(57 \) (6 h4 \(55 \); 6 \(\hat{\pmae} c2 \(56 \))

3…h6 4 ≜h4

4...d6 5 🕭 bd2

5 h3 *45*; 5 ②c3 *46*; 5 e3 *49*

5...g5 6 âg3 4h5 7 e3 46

7 e4 48

The London System

1 d4 4 f6 2 1f3 e6

3 臭f4 d5

3...c5 4 e3 60 (4 c3 59)

4 e3 c5 5 c3 2c6 6 2bd2 64 (6 2d3 67; 6 h3 68; 6 2e5 68)

The Colle System

1 d4 4 f6 2 4 f3 e6

2...d5 3 e3 &f5 4 c4 (4 &e2 99; 4 &d3 99) 4...c6 5 cxd5 98 (5 &d3 96; 5 ©c3 96)

3 e3 b6 4 &d3 &b7 5 0-0 c5 6 4bd2

6 c4 86

6... **2e7 7 c3 2 c6 8 e4** 80 (8 a3 82; 8 dxc5 83; 8 **2 e 2** 84)

The Veresov

1 d4 Øf6 2 Øc3 d5 3 &g5 c5 4 &xf6

4 e3 107; 4 e4 109

4...gxf6 5 e4 102

5 e3 104; 5 🗹 f3 106

The Blackmar-Diemer Gambit

1 d4 d5

1...②f6 2 ②c3 d5 3 e4 ②xe4 4 ②xe4 dxe4 5 ②c4 116 (5 ②e3 117; 5 f3 117)

2 e4 dxe4 3 2c3 e5 4 \mathbb{e}h5 112 (4 2ge2 113; 4 2xe4 114; 4 \mathbb{e}e3 115)

Anti-Benoni Lines

1 d4 �f6 2 c4 e6 3 �f3 c5 4 g3

4 e3 a6 5 22c3 (5 a3 120) 5...d5 6 cxd5 124 (6 a3 122)

4 ②c3 cxd4 5 ②xd4 **2**b4 6 **2**d2 135 (6 ②db5 136)

4...cxd4 5 2xd4 2b4+ 6 2d2

6 ②d2 130

6...≝**b6 7 ≜**g**2** *132*

7 **Q**xb4 133; 7 e3 134

Rare lines

1 d4 🛭 f6 2 🖺 f3

2 c4 e6 3 **2** g5 138; 2 e3 141; 2 g3 142

2...e6 3 g3 139

dealing with d4 deviations

fighting the Trompowsky, Torre, Blackmar-Diemer, London, Colle and other problem openings

This book fills an enormous void in chess literature. There are a countless number of players who are very happy to defend the black side of the Queen's Gambit or play the Nimzo-Indian, Queen's Indian, Bogo-Indian or Benoni. However, more often than not they have been forced to muddle their way through a whole variety of annoying sidelines White has at his or her disposal, including the dreaded Trompowsky, the tricky Blackmar-Diemer Gambit and the tiresome Colle Variation. Now finally help is at hand! In this unique book John Cox reveals everything Black players need to know about all of White's offbeat tries, presenting Black with no-nonsense answers to every white option. Read this book and you will be fully armed to deal with anything that White can throw at you. In fact, you'll have all the White players running back to the main lines!

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