Joseph Campbell

Primitive Man as Metaphysician

Joseph Campbell (1904-1987) wrote this article for a collection of essays, Culture and History, *published in 1960 in memory of the pioneer anthropologist, Paul Radin (1883-1959). In it, he explores two of his favorite themes: the 'tender-minded' function of myth to provide metaphors that create a connection to the unknowable divine; and way in which 'tough-minded,' structured theologies misread their underlying myths. Campbell subsequently included it, in somewhat updated form, in his collection of essays,* The Flight of the Wild Gander, *originally published in 1969. It is presented here as it appeared in that work, with some minor formatting changes.*

PRIMITIVE MAN AS METAPHYSICIAN

> "The name of the song is called 'Haddocks' Eyes.'" "Oh, that's the name of the song, is it?" Alice said, trying to feel interested. "No, you don't understand," the Knight said, looking a little vexed. "That's what the name is called."
>
> —Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*

[1]
Tender- and Tough-Minded Thinking

"The metaphysical notions of man may be reduced to a few types which are of universal distribution"; so wrote Franz Boas in the first edition (1911) of *The Mind of Primitive Man*.[1] However, in the second edition of the same authoritative work, published a quarter of a century later (1938), this observation, as already remarked,[*] does not appear; for there had developed in American anthropology, meanwhile, a tendency to emphasize the differentiating, not the shared, traits of primitive societies; so that any mention of common features would simply have branded an author as out of touch with the fashions of his guild. By the early fifties, on the other hand, the tide again had turned, and in a formidable inventory of anthropological lore, prepared under the chairmanship of A. L. Kroeber and published *(1*953) as *Anthropology Today*,[2] there appeared a substantial article by Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture," as well as a number of references by the other recognized authorities to the need for comparative evaluations. No one at that time, however, brought forward again the idea developed by Paul Radin some thirty years before, when, in *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (1927), he offered a formula by which the two points of view successively represented by Boas might have been reconciled and brought together in a single general theory. His eminently sensible observation that among primitive as well as highly civilized peoples the two types of man are to be found that William James long ago characterized as the tough-minded and tender-minded[3] —and that the myths and symbols of all societies are interpreted in differing senses by these two—had apparently been forgotten

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[*] *Supra,* p. 45.

by the representatives of a science which, in the words of Boas himself, "does not deal with the exceptional man."[4]

"From the man of action's viewpoint," wrote Dr. Radin, describing the attitude of the tough-minded type, "a fact has no symbolic or static value. He predicates no unity beyond that of the certainty of continuous change and transformation. For him a double distortion is involved in investing the transitory and ceaselessly changing object with a symbolic, idealistic, or static significance." The thinker, on the other hand, the tender-minded type, "is impelled by his whole nature, by the innate orientation of his mind, to try to discover the reason why there is an effect, what is the nature of the relation between the ego and the world, and what part exactly the perceiving self plays therein. Like all philosophers, he is interested in the subject as such, the object as such, and the relations between them.... An original, moving, shapeless or undifferentiated world must be brought to rest and given stable form.... Philosophers have always given the same answer to this problem and predicated a unity behind these changing aspects and forms. Primitive philosophers *are* at one with their European and Asiatic brothers here."[5]

Now it appears to me that any science that takes into consideration only or even primarily the vulgar, tough-minded interpretation of symbols will inevitably be committed to a study largely of local differentiations, while, on the other hand, one addressed to the views of thinkers will find that the ultimate references of their cogitations are few and of universal distribution. Anthropologists, by and large (or, at least, those of the current American variety) are notoriously tough-minded. (There is a Haitian proverb, I am told: "When the anthropologist arrives, the gods depart!") They have tended to give reductive interpretations to the symbols of primitive thought and to find their references only in the particularities of the local scene. The following pages offer an alternative, an amplification and supplement, to that view.

[2]
The Image and Its Meaning

The first problem to be confronted by anyone wishing to deal with the metaphysical notions of mankind is that of distinguishing between symbols and their references—between what we may term the *vehicles* and their *tenor*. For instance, the three or four instances of "metaphysical notions" enumerated by Franz Boas in his chapter on "The Universality of Cultural Traits" are not metaphysical notions at all: they are simply images, symbols, or vehicles, which by a tough-minded individual might be interpreted physically, as references not to any metaphysical realization whatsoever but to remote facts, realms, or lands much like our own-whereas the term "metaphysical" refers to no place, no time, no thing, no fact, not even wonders of such stuff as dreams are made of. "Belief in a land of the souls of the deceased," for example,[6] "located in the west, and reached by crossing a river": this is not in itself a metaphysical notion, though it may be given a metaphysical reading. Nor can we call metaphysical "the idea of a multiplicity of worlds—one or more spanned over us, others

stretching under us, the central one the home of man; the upper or lower, the home of the gods and happy souls; the other, the home of the unhappy."[7]

Such images are not the final terms of our subject, if it is of metaphysics that we are treating. They have often served, indeed, as vehicles of metaphysical expression, and part of our problem, certainly, is to collect, compare, and classify them; but we miss our proper point if we rest with them as they stand. For an image may signify various things in various contexts and to various minds. Furthermore, where an image has disappeared, it need not follow that the tenor of its reference has disappeared: this may be lurking under another image entirely. Nor in cross-cultural comparisons can we safely assume that because the symbolic figures differ from culture to culture the tenors of their references must differ also.

Let us consider, therefore, a brief series of mythological images culled from a number of cultures, which may be discovered to be the vehicles of a single metaphysical tenor.

[3]
Imagery of the Manifold and Its "Cause"

Natalie Curtis, in *The Indians' Book*, published years ago (1907) a remarkable origin myth recounted to her by an aged Pima chief, Hovering Hawk:

> In the beginning there was only darkness—everywhere darkness and water. And the darkness gathered thick in places, crowding together and then separating, until at last out of one of the places where the darkness had crowded there came forth a man. This man wandered through the darkness until he began to think; then he knew himself and that he was a man; he knew that he was there for some purpose.
>
> He put his hand over his heart and drew forth a large stick. He used the stick to help him through the darkness, and when he was weary he rested upon it. Then lie made for himself little ants; he brought them from his body and put them on the stick. Everything that he made he drew from his own body even as he had drawn the stick from his heart. The stick was of grease-wood, and of the gum of the wood the ants made a round ball upon the stick.
>
> Then the man took the ball from the stick and put it down in the darkness tinder his foot, and as he stood upon the ball he rolled it under his foot and sang:
>
> I make the world, and lo!
> The world is finished.
> Thus I make the world, and lo!
> The world is finished.
>
> So he sang, calling himself the maker of the world. He sang slowly, and all the while the ball grew larger as he rolled it, till at the end of his song, behold, it was the world. Then he sang more quickly:
>
> Let it go, let it go,
> Let it go, start it forth!

> So the world was made, and now the man brought forth from himself a rock and divided it into little pieces. Of these he made stars, and put them in the sky to light the darkness. But the stars were not bright enough.
>
> So he made Tau-mik, the Milky Way. Yet Tau-mik was not bright enough. Then he made the moon. All these he made of rocks drawn forth from himself. But even the moon was not bright enough. So he began to wonder what next he could do. He could bring nothing from himself that could lighten the darkness.
>
> Then he thought. And from himself he made two large bowls, and he filled the one with water and covered it with the other. He sat and watched the bowls, and while he watched he wished that what he wanted to make in very truth would come to be. And it was even as he wished. For the water]it the bowl turned into the sun and shone out in rays through the cracks where the bowls joined.
>
> When the sun was made, the man lifted off the top bowl and took out the sun and threw it to the east. But the sun did not touch the ground; it stayed in the sky where he threw it and never moved. Then in the same way he threw the sun to the north and to the west and to the south. But each time it only stayed in the sky, motionless, for it never touched the ground. Then he threw it once more to the east, and this time it touched the ground and bounced and started upward. Since then the sun has never ceased to move. It goes around the world in a day, but every morning it must bounce anew in the east.[8]

It is impossible to read this story without thinking of the far-flung, Old World theme of the primordial giant out of whose body the universe proceeds, and who, until the end of time, remains within the forms of the universe as the "self of all."

"In the beginning, this universe was only the self, in a human form," we read in the Sanskrit B®hadåra£yaka Upanishad:

> He looked around and saw nothing, but himself. Then, at the beginning, he cried out, "I am he!" Whence came the name, I. That is why, even today, when a person is addressed, he first declares, "It is I," and then announces the other name that he goes by.
>
> He was afraid. That is why people are afraid to be alone. He thought, "But what am I afraid of? There is nothing but myself." Whereupon his fear was gone....
>
> He was unhappy. That is why people are not happy when they are alone. He wanted a mate. He became as big as a woman and man embracing. He divided this body, which was himself, in two parts. From that there came husband and wife.... Therefore this body [before one marries a wife] is like one of the halves of a split pea.... He united with her; and from that were born men.
>
> She considered: "How can he unite with me after producing me from himself? Well then, let me hide myself." She became a cow; but he became a bull and united with her: from that were born cattle. She became a mare, he a stallion; she a she-ass, he a he-ass and united with her; from that were born the one-hoofed animals.... She became a goat, he a buck; she an ewe, he a ram and united with her: from that were born goats and sheep. Thus did he project everything that exists in pairs, down to the ants.
>
> Then he knew: "Indeed, I am myself the creation, for I have projected this entire world." Whence he was called Creation....[9]

Sometimes, as here, the projection of the world is pictured in Brahminical mythology as

voluntary; sometimes, as the Kalika Puraå£a,[10] where the gods spring spontaneously from the yogic contemplation of the demiurge, Brahma, the creation is a succession of surprises even to the creator. In the Icelandic Eddas, it will be recalled, the cosmic hermaphrodite, Ymir, gives off Rime-Giants from his living hands and feet, but is attacked during a later age by the young gods, Wotan, Will, and We, to be cut up and transformed into the entire theater of the cosmos.[11] Comparably, in the celebrated Babylonian *Epic of Creation*, the young god Marduk kills, cuts up, and fashions the universe from the body of the primal chaos monster Tiamat. Ovid, in the first chapter of his *Metamorphoses,* states that a god, in the beginning, brought order out of chaos.[12] And we learn from the ancient Egyptian Memphite theogony that Egypt, the universe, and all the gods came forth from Ptah, "The Great One," "Him-with-the-lovely-face." [13]

In the Indian metaphysical system of the Vedanta, which purports to be a translation of the metaphorical imagery of Brahminical myths into abstract philosophical terms, the primordial entity out of which the universe proceeds is described as a fusion of Pure Consciousness (*brahman, vidyå*) and Ignorance (*måyå, avidyå*)where Ignorance (*måyå*) is compared to the female of the mythological pair, furnishing at once the womb and the substance of creation. By virtue of her obscuring power she occludes the Absolute Brahman, and by virtue of her projecting power she refracts the radiance of that Absolute in the forms of the world mirage, somewhat as a prism breaks the white light of the sun into the seven colors of the rainbow-for, as Goethe has phrased the same concept in his *Faust: "Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben."*[*]

In the fifteenth-century Vedåntasåra, this marriage of Ignorance and Consciousness, Illusion and Truth, Maya and Brahman, is described as at once the efficient and the material cause of all things. "Consciousness associated with Ignorance (and the latter possessed of the two powers) is both the efficient cause and the material cause of the universe…; just as the spider, when considered from the standpoint of its own self, is the efficient cause of the web, and, when looked upon from the standpoint of its own body, is also the material cause of the web."[14]

Translated into Kantian terms. Ignorance as here interpreted corresponds to the *a priori* forms of sensibility (time and space), which are the inmost and outmost boundaries and the preconditions of all empirical experience: these a priori forms occlude the metaphysical realm of absolute reality and project the universe of phenomenality. But what the "true being" of the ultimate reality, dissociated from our modes of experience, might be, we shall never know; for, as the "great Chinaman of Königsberg" phrases it: "*Was es für eine Bewandniss mit den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser Receptivität unserer Sinnlichkeit haben möge, bleibt uns gänzlich unbekannt.*"[†]

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[*] Faust, Part II, 1.1, last line. "We have our life in the colorful reflection."

[†] Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft, I.8.i.* "What might be said of the things in themselves, separated from all relationship to our senses, remains for us absolutely unknown."

Thus Hovering Hawk, the B®hadåra£yaka Upanishad, the Kalika Puråa, the Eddas, the Babylonian *Epic of Creation*, Ovid, the Memphite theogony, Vedantic philosophy, Kant, and Goethe, through varieties of metaphor, have stated and stated again a single thought—and what would appear to be an easy thought to state, namely: the One, by some sleight of hand or trick of the eye, has become the Manifold. Yet, instead of stating this thought directly, they have employed allegorical vehicles, now of pictorial, now of abstract character, and, curiously, though each of the vehicles succeeds in conveying at least a hint of the tenor of the message, none actually elucidates it—none really explains, or even directly represents, the mystery of the coming of the Manifold out of the One. And in this respect Kant's formulation is no more satisfactory than Hovering Hawk's.

But the problem, again regarded, is seen to be not susceptible of outright elucidation; for it is a problem of the relationship of a known term (the universe) to an unknowable (its so-called source): that is to say, it is, strictly speaking, a metaphysical, not an empirical problem. Whether such a problem be presented for contemplation in the picture language of the myth or in the abstract of philosophy, it can only be presented, never elucidated. And since it is thus finally ineffable, no single metaphor, no combination of metaphors, can exhaust its implications. The slightest change of standpoint, and the entire conception undergoes kaleidoscopic transformation, as do likewise the correlative vehicles of imagery and communication. The primordial One, for instance, may be represented as masculine (as in the case of Brahma), feminine (as in the World Mother), hermaphrodite (as in the cases of "I" and Ymir), anthropomorphic (as in most of the above-presented examples), theriomorphic (as in the Persian myth of the dismembered World Ox), botanomorphic (as in the Eddic image of the World Ash, Yggdrasil), simply ovoid (as in the stories of the World Egg), geometrical (as in the Tantric yantras), vocal (as in the cases of the Vedic sacred syllable OM and the Kabalistic Tetragrammaton), or absolutely transcendent (as in the cases of the Buddhistic Void and the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*). But even the notion of the Oneness of the primordial is finally only a metaphor—referring past itself to an inconceivable term beyond all such pairs of opposites as the One and the Manifold, masculinity and femininity, existence and nonexistence.

[4]
The "Cause" Understood as Absolutely Unknown

Kant supplies an extraordinarily simple formula for the proper reading of a metaphysical symbol.[15] What he offers is a four-term analogy (*a* is to *b* as *c* is to *x*), which points not to an incomplete resemblance of two things but to a complete resemblance of two relationships between quite dissimilar things ("*nicht etwa, eine unvollkommene Ähnlichkeit zweier Dinge, sondern eine vollkommene Ahnlichkeit zweier Verhältnisse zwischen ganz unähnlichen Dingen"):* not "*a* somewhat resembles *b,*" but "the relationship of *a* to *b* perfectly resembles that of *c* to *x,*" where *x* represents a quantity that is not only unknown but absolutely unknowable—which is to say, metaphysical.

Kant demonstrates this formula in two examples:

> I. As the promotion of the happiness of the children (*a*) is related to the parents' love (*b*), so is the welfare of the human race (*c*) to that unknown in God (*x*) which we call God's love.
>
> 2. The causality of the highest cause is precisely, in respect to the world, what human reason is in respect to the work of human art.

He then discusses the Implication of the second of these examples, as follows: "Herewith the nature of the highest cause itself remains unknown to me; I only compare its known effect (namely, the constitution of the universe) and the rationality of this effect with the known effects of human reason, and therefore I call that highest cause a Reason, without thereby attributing to it as its proper quality, either the thing that I understand by this term in the case of man, or any other thing with which I am familiar."

Mythological, theological, metaphysical analogies, in other words, do not point indirectly to an only partially understood knowable term, but directly to a *relationship between two terms*, the one empirical, the other metaphysical; the latter being, absolutely and forever and from every conceivable human standpoint, unknowable.

If this be so then we shall have misread the series presented in section 2 if we suppose that we have fully caught its tenor in the simple statement, "the One, by some sleight of hand, has become the Multiple." Such a statement furnishes, indeed, a terse summary of the vehicular aspect of the analogous metaphors but leaves unclarified their metaphysical tenor; that is to say, it summarizes only the first two terms of an implied four-term analogy, which would read, fully rendered, as follows: "As many (*a*) proceed from one *(b), so* does the universe (*c*) from God (*x*)." But the term *x*, it must be insisted, remains absolutely unknown and unknowable. Oneness can no more be a quality of this *x* than can Love or Reason. Hence, as Kant has declared, it is only by analogy that we speak of Love or Reason, Unity, or even Being, as of God.

X remaining unknown, then, the precise nature of its relationship to *c* must likewise remain unknown. Magic, simple fission, sexual procreation, violent dismemberment, refraction, effusion, and delusion are among the relationships suggested, not as proper to the mystery of creation itself, but as vehicles to carry the analogy. And there are no end of possible vehicular relationships; no end of possible *a* terms and related *b* terms; for instance: as Earth Maker *(b^1) is* related to the things drawn from his body (a^1) as All-father *(b^2)* is related to the creatures that he has begotten (a^2); as meditating Brahma (b^3) is related to the visions of his meditation (a^3); as occluded light *(b^4)* to Its refractions (a^4); as the spider (b^5) to its web (a^5); etc., etc., etc., ad infinitum (b^n: a^n); So is "God" (*x*) related to creation (*c*).

[5]
Theology as a Misreading of Mythology

Unless the myths can be understood—or felt—to be true in some such way as this, they lose their force, their magic, their charm for the tender-minded and become mere archaeological curiosities, fit only for some sort of reductive classification. And this, indeed, would appear to be the death that the heroes of the myths themselves most fear. Continually, they are pointing past and through their phenomenal to their universal, transcendental, aspect. "I and the Father are One," declares the Christ, for example (John 10:30). And Krishna, in the Bhagavad Gītå, shows that all the forms of the world are rooted in his metaphysical essence, just as that essence itself, reciprocally, is rooted in all things:

> Neither the hosts of gods, nor the great saints, know my origin, for in every way I am the source of all the gods and great saints. He who knows Me, birthless and beginningless, the great Lord of worlds—he, among mortals, is undeluded, he is freed from all sins.... I am the Self existing in the heart of all beings; I am the beginning, the middle, and also the end of all beings. Of the gods, I am Vishnu; of luminaries, the radiant sun;... of bodies of water, I am the ocean;... of measures, I am time; of beasts, I am the lord of beasts; of birds, I am the lord of birds;... of fishes, I am the shark; of streams, I am the Ganges;... I am the gambling of the fraudulent; I am the power of the powerful; I am victory, I am effort, I am the harmony of the harmonious;... of punishers, I am the scepter; of those who seek to conquer, I am the statesmanship; of things secret, I am silence, and the knowledge of the knowers am I....[16]

Comparably, Killer-of-Enemies, the hero of the Jicarilla Apache tribe of New Mexico, declares, when he is about to depart from the people:

> The earth is my body. The sky is my body. The seasons are my body. The water is my body too.... The world is just as big as my body. The world is as large as my word. And the world is as large as my prayers. The seasons are only as great as my body, my words, and my prayer. It is the same with the waters; my body, my words, my prayers are greater than the waters. Whoever believes me, whoever listens to what I say, will have long life. One who doesn't listen, who thinks in some evil way, will have a short life. Don't think I am just in the east, south, west, or north. The earth is my body. I am there. I am all over. Don't think I stay only under the earth or up in the sky, or only in the seasons, or on the other side of the waters. These are all my body. It is the truth that the underworld, the sky, the waters are all my body. I am all over. I have already given you that with which you have to make an offering to me. You have two kinds of pipe and you have the mountain tobacco.[17]

Or once again, in the words of Aeschylus:

> Zeus is air, Zeus is earth, Zeus is heaven;
> Zeus is all things, and whatsoever is higher than all things.[18]

"We should understand well," said an old Sioux medicine man, Black Elk, the Keeper of the Sacred Pipe of his tribe, "that all things are the works of the Great Spirit. We should know that He is within all things: the trees, the grasses, the rivers, the mountains, and all the four-legged animals, and the winged peoples; and even more important, we should understand

that He is also above all these things and peoples. When we do understand all this deeply in our hearts, then we will fear, and love, and know the Great Spirit, and then we will be and act and live as He intends." [19]

Wherever myths still are living symbols, the mythologies are teeming dream worlds of such images. But wherever systematizing theologians have appeared and gained the day (the tough-minded in the gardens of the tender) the figures have become petrified into propositions. Mythology is misread then as direct history or science, symbol becomes fact, metaphor dogma, and the quarrels of the sects arise, each mistaking its own symbolic signs for the ultimate reality—the local vehicle for its timeless, ineffable tenor.

"But he who is called Krishna," said the nineteenth-century Indian teacher, Ramakrishna, "is also called Shiva and bears the names ‡akti, Jesus, and Allah as well—the one Råma with a thousand names.... The substance is one under different names and everyone is seeking, the same substance; nothing but climate, temperament, and names vary."[20]

[6]
Esoteric and Exoteric Anthropology

And so now we have to ask whether mythology can have originated in the camps of the tough-minded and only later have become sublimated and sophisticated into metaphysical poetry by the broodings of the tender-minded; or whether its course of development must not have been in precisely the opposite direction, from the poetical imagery of the tender-minded to the clumsy misreadings of the ungifted many. Franz Boas appears to have been a champion of the former view. In his article already referred to, "The Ethnological Significance of Esoteric Doctrines," he wrote:

> It may be said that the exoteric doctrine is the more general ethnic phenomenon, the investigation of which is a necessary foundation for the study of the problems of esoteric teaching. It is, therefore, evident that we must not, in our study of Indian life, seek for the highest form of thought only, which is held by the priest, the chief, the leader. Interesting and attractive as this field of research may be, it is supplementary only to the study of the thoughts, emotional life, and ethical standards of the common people, whose interests center in other fields of thought and of whom the select class forms only a special type.[21]

Professor R. R. Marett, on the other hand, in his article "Mana," in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (fourteenth edition), appears to take the opposite view. "By the very virtue of his profession," he writes, "the medicine man or the divine king must hold himself apart from those who by status or by choice are *noa*, laymen. The latter may live in brutish contentment; but to the end they lack enlightenment, participating in the highest mysteries at best from without. Every member of a primitive society is in some degree versed in experience of the occult, though for the most part some better qualified person is present to help him through it."

Whether primary or secondary in temporal terms—that is to say, in terms of "Which came first?"—the tender-minded, esoteric view is clearly the one that has played the chief role in the significant shaping of traditions, since it is everywhere the priests and shamans who have maintained and developed the general inheritance of myths and symbols. Radin, I observe, like Boas, regarded the role of the intellectual as secondary in primitive societies.[22] He gave due recognition to the force of philosophical thought in the shaping of their cultural heritance, however; and since we cannot go back, even hypothetically, to the moment when a metaphysical insight first dawned in a human mind, to learn whether myths, rituals, and symbols had already given shape to the society in which the first genius lived who thought like a philosopher, perhaps Dr. Radin's balanced recognition of the dialogue of the two types in the continuance and development of primitive traditions is about as far as we can go. "How are we ever to trace properly the development of thought and, more specifically, that of our fundamental philosophical notions," he asks, "if we begin with false premises? If it can be shown that the thinkers among primitive peoples envisage life in philosophical terms, that human experience and the world around them have become subjects for reflection, that these ponderings and searchings have become embodied in literature and ritual, then obviously our customary treatment of cultural history, not to mention that of philosophical speculation, must be completely revised."[23]

For myself, I believe that we owe both the imagery and the poetical insights of myth to the genius of the tender-minded; to the tough-minded only their reduction to religion. As far as I know, in the myths themselves the origins of their symbols and cults have always been attributed to individual visionaries—dreamers, shamans, spiritual heroes, prophets, and divine incarnations. Hovering Hawk, for example, when asked how his people made their songs, replied: "We dreamed them. When a man would go away by himself-off into solitude then he would dream a song."[24]

In any case, the time has certainly come—as Paul Radin told us long ago—for the collectors and classifiers to regard the pretensions of their materials to a deep significance. From every corner of the globe they have gathered images, tales, and myths; yet the science of interpreting the materials can hardly be said to have broached even the first outposts of the psychology of Man's approach to and experience of the metaphysical; for up to now the interest of the scholars has been almost exclusively ethnological and historical. They have analyzed from many points of view what may be termed the stylistic variations of the vehicles. Yet, what such stylistic variations signify it will certainly be impossible to say until the tenors of clusters of analogous metaphors have been established and understood. For the bedrock of the science of folklore and myth is not in the wisps and strays of metaphor, but in the ideas to which the metaphors refer.

ENDNOTES

[1.] Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 156.

[2.] A. L. Kroeber (ed.), *Anthropology Today* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953)

[3.] William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1907), Lecture 1, "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy."

[4.] Franz Boas, Race, *Language and Culture* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940): "The Ethnological Significance of Esoteric Doctrines (1902), p. 314

[5.] Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (New York and London: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), pp. 747–52.

[6.] Boas, Race, Language and Culture, p. 156.

[7.] *Ibid*., p. 157.

[8.] Natalie Curtis, *The Indians' Book* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1907), pp. 315–16.

[9.] *B®hadåra£yaka Upanishad* I. iv. 1–5.

[10.] See also Heinrich Zimmer, *The King and the Corpse*, The Bollingen Series XI (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948; 2nd ed., with index, 1956), pp. 239ff.

[11.] *The Prose Edda*, Gylfaginning IV–VIII.

[12.] Ovid, *Metamorphoses* I, 21.

[13.] *Cf.* Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 25 and *passim;* see Index under "Ptah."

[14.] *Vedåntasåra*, 55–56.

[15.] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, paragraphs 57–58.

[16.] *Bhagavad G®tå*, chapter 10, abridged.

[17.] Morris Edward Opler, *Myths and Tales of the Jicarilla Apache Indians*, Memoirs of the American Folklore Society, XXXI (New York: G. E. Stechert and Co., 1938), pp. 133–34.

[18.] Aeschylus, *Heliades*, frag. 70.

[19.] Foreword to Joseph Epes Brown, *The Sacred Pipe: Black Elk's Account of the Seven Rites* of *the Oglala Sioux* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), p. xx

[20.] Sri Ramakrishna Centenary Committee, *The Cultural Heritage of India* (Mayavati, India: Advaita Ashrama, 1936), Vol. II, pp. 518–19.

[21.] Boas, *Race, Language and Culture*, pp. 314–15.

[22.] Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher*, pp. 211–12.

[23.] *lbid*., p. 386.

[24.] Curtis, *The Indians' Book*, p. 314.